Case Title: Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Resnick

Citation: 2010-Ohio-6147

Docket Number: 20101188

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Resnick, 128 Ohio St.3d 56, 2010-Ohio-6147.] 
 
 
OHIO STATE BAR ASSOCIATION v. RESNICK. 
[Cite as Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Resnick, 128 Ohio St.3d 56, 2010-Ohio-6147.] 
Attorney misconduct — Convictions of possessing cocaine, resisting arrest, and 
disrupting public service — Indefinite suspension. 
(No. 2010-1188 — Submitted September 15, 2010 — Decided 
December 21, 2010.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No.  06-051. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Ramie Ann Resnick, a.k.a. Ramie Reisman Resnick 
of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0023382, was admitted to the 
practice of law in Ohio in 1984. 
{¶ 2} Respondent was convicted of possession of cocaine, a fifth-degree 
felony, in the Butler County Common Pleas Court on February 14, 2006, and 
placed on community-control sanctions.  As a result of that conviction, this court 
imposed an interim suspension of her law license, In re Resnick, 112 Ohio St.3d 
1432, 2007-Ohio-151, 860 N.E.2d 111, and relator, Ohio State Bar Association, 
charged her with violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
{¶ 3} On October 19, 2006, respondent was arrested again and was 
subsequently indicted in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court for multiple 
counts of violating R.C. 2909.04, disrupting public service, a felony of the fifth 
degree, and one count of R.C. 2921.33, resisting arrest, a misdemeanor of the 
second degree.  On June 27, 2007, she entered guilty pleas to resisting arrest and 
one count of disrupting public service, and in August 2007, she was sentenced to 
community-control sanctions. 
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{¶ 4} On November 21, 2007, relator filed an amended complaint with 
the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline setting forth two 
counts that detail the events in Butler County and Cuyahoga County.  A panel of 
the board began a formal hearing on the amended complaint in Cleveland on 
September 25, 2009.  That hearing included the testimony of respondent’s treating 
psychiatrist, Cathleen Cerny, M.D., but was continued by agreement of the parties 
in order to have respondent submit to an independent psychiatric examination by 
Arthur L. Rosenbaum, M.D.  On January 27, 2010, the panel received a report 
from Dr. Rosenbaum regarding his evaluation of respondent.  On April 8, 2010, 
the panel resumed its hearing and respondent testified. 
{¶ 5} The panel and board found that respondent had violated DR 1-
102(A)(3) (a lawyer shall not engage in illegal conduct involving moral 
turpitude), 1-102(A)(4) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 1-102(A)(6) (a lawyer shall 
not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice 
law) as charged in Count I, and DR 1-102(A)(6), as charged in Count II, and 
recommended that respondent be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law 
on conditions.  We adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct and the 
recommended sanction. 
Misconduct 
Count I — The Butler County Incident 
{¶ 6} On February 17, 2005, respondent traveled from Cleveland to 
Oxford, Ohio, for a court appearance.  Respondent traveled in her car, driven by a 
male companion, Daryl Taylor.  Respondent had previously represented Taylor in 
a criminal case, and it is undisputed that she knew that Taylor had previously 
been convicted of drug-related crimes. 
{¶ 7} While en route to the court, respondent’s vehicle ran out of gas.  A 
police officer took respondent to court while Taylor remained with the vehicle.  
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Taylor abandoned the car, and another officer had the car towed.  Before the car 
was towed, however, the officer conducted an inventory search.  During the 
search, police discovered a change purse in the glove compartment that contained 
a page of advertisements typically found in legal publications.  A small amount of 
cocaine was found inside the folded page of advertisements, as was a straw 
containing white residue.  Police also found a small amount of cocaine in a 
makeup bag behind the driver’s seat. 
{¶ 8} These facts formed the basis of the charge of cocaine possession in 
the Butler County Common Pleas Court.  Respondent was convicted of that 
offense. 
{¶ 9} Despite that conviction and her admitted occasional use of cocaine, 
respondent maintains that the cocaine found in her vehicle was not hers.  And at 
times during the hearing, she suggested that she is not guilty of the crime of 
possessing cocaine.  In her view, her error was simply that she had used poor 
judgment in having Taylor drive her. 
{¶ 10} In defense of her actions, respondent asserts that she was forced to 
have Taylor drive her to Oxford because she was under the influence of asthma 
medications and had been ordered by her physician not to drive, that she was 
unable to have the court hearing continued, and that Taylor was the only person 
she could find to drive her.  She concedes that having him drive her was 
“extremely ill advised” and that she had used “very poor judgment.”  And 
although she steadfastly denies that the cocaine belonged to her, she does admit 
that the makeup bag was hers. 
{¶ 11} As noted above, the board found that respondent’s misconduct 
related to the events in Butler County constituted violations of DR 1-102(A)(3), 
(4), and (6). 
Count II — The Cuyahoga County Incident 
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{¶ 12} On October 19, 2006, respondent called 9-1-1 to report that her car 
had been stolen.  Respondent avers that she became agitated because she did not 
think the police were responding appropriately to her report of the crime.  She 
testified that she did not have a good relationship with the police department at 
the time and that she had called the police at least three times that day pertaining 
to her stolen car.  Although the panel was not presented with any significant 
evidence of the other circumstances surrounding this event, it is undisputed that 
respondent was indicted subsequently for nine counts of disrupting public service 
in violation of R.C. 2909.04, a felony of the fifth degree, and resisting arrest in 
violation of R.C. 2921.33, a misdemeanor of the second degree. 
{¶ 13} During respondent’s appearance in court on the disrupting-public-
service and resisting-arrest charges, the judge was so concerned about 
respondent’s demeanor and erratic behavior that he ordered that she undergo a 
mental-competency evaluation.  She was held for approximately 60 days at 
Northcoast Behavioral Healthcare Center (“the treatment facility”) in Cleveland. 
{¶ 14} After respondent was found competent, she pleaded guilty in the 
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court to one count of disrupting public service 
and one count of resisting arrest. 
{¶ 15} Although there was much evidence submitted at the hearings 
regarding respondent’s mental health, we are still unsure whether she requires 
treatment.  Respondent was diagnosed with bipolar disorder during her 
hospitalization at the treatment facility.  But Dr. Cerny testified that she believes 
that respondent does not have bipolar disorder and that respondent’s behavior was 
caused by the use of illegal and/or prescription drugs. 
{¶ 16} Notably, there is no evidence (1) that respondent has experienced 
similar symptoms since her time at the treatment facility, (2) that she continues to 
use cocaine or other illegal drugs, or (3) that she misuses prescription drugs.  And 
Dr. Cerny testified that she does not expect respondent to have another manic 
January Term, 2010 
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episode unless she abuses drugs.  Dr. Cerny explained that she had not referred 
respondent for substance-abuse treatment because respondent denied using drugs 
after her discharge from the treatment facility and because Dr. Cerny saw no 
evidence of drug abuse by respondent.  And according to respondent, she has 
been evaluated for substance abuse in the past and been told that she did not have 
a substance-abuse problem. 
{¶ 17} The panel and board found that respondent’s misconduct in 
Cuyahoga County constituted a violation of DR 1-102(A)(6). 
Sanction 
{¶ 18} “When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in Section 10(B) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline (‘BCGD Proc.Reg.’).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d  
473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21.  Because each disciplinary case is 
unique, we are not limited to the factors specified in the rule but may take into 
account ‘all relevant factors’ in determining what sanction to impose.  BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B).”  Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Peskin, 125 Ohio St.3d 244, 2010-
Ohio-1811, 927 N.E.2d 598, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 19} The panel and board found as aggravating factors that respondent 
acted with a dishonest or selfish motive and that she had been convicted of 
multiple offenses.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b) and (d).  In mitigation, the 
panel and board found that respondent did not have a prior disciplinary record, 
that she exhibited a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, and that she had 
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been under an interim suspension since January 18, 2007, as a result of the felony 
conviction in Butler County.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (d), and (f). 
{¶ 20} Although relator sought respondent’s disbarment, the panel and 
board recommended that respondent be indefinitely suspended from the practice 
of law in Ohio and that her suspension be made retroactive to the date of her 
interim felony suspension, January 18, 2007.  The panel and board recommended 
further that should respondent “reapply to resume her law practice, [(1) she must] 
provide proof that she participated in a program of ‘intensive and long term 
therapy’ (as recommended by Dr. Rosenbaum in his evaluation) resulting in a 
report that [she] is mentally fit to resume the practice of law,” (2) she must show 
proof that she entered into a contract with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program 
(“OLAP”) “with respect to her chemical dependence and mental health and she 
must show compliance with that contract,” and (3) she must submit to a law-
practice monitor. 
{¶ 21} The recommendation by the panel and board was supported by the 
report of Dr. Rosenbaum, who, like Dr. Cerny, found no evidence that respondent 
is currently suffering from a mental disability.  However, Dr. Rosenbaum noted 
that respondent’s failure to keep her attorney-registration record up to date 
suggests that she might have some issues that would affect her fitness to manage a 
law practice.  Thus, although he found no evidence of current mental-health issues 
or substance abuse, he observed that “[o]nly in an intensive and long term 
therapy” could there be a determination of respondent’s mental health. 
{¶ 22} Although we are aware of the conflicting evidence of whether 
respondent has a substance-abuse problem or mental-health issues, the record 
establishes the need for ensuring that any such problems or issues are treated 
before she resumes the practice of law.  We recognize that respondent has been 
cooperative with the disciplinary process, but we are concerned that there are 
indications that she may not be fully compliant with treatment plans.  For 
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example, although she kept appointments with her treating physicians 
immediately after her discharge from the treatment facility, she later repeatedly 
missed scheduled appointments with Dr. Cerny.  Similarly, even though there is 
no evidence before us of current substance abuse, respondent did admit that she 
has used cocaine in the past, she was convicted of possession of cocaine, and her 
use or misuse of prescription drugs may have at least played a part in her inability 
to properly function when she faced charges in the Cuyahoga County courtroom.  
Thus, there is an obvious need to ensure that respondent does not have untreated 
substance-abuse and mental-health issues if and when she is reinstated to the 
practice of law.1  The primary purpose of disciplinary sanctions is not to punish 
the offender but to protect the public. Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio 
St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 33.  We impose the conditions in 
this case with that purpose in mind. 
{¶ 23} Relator sought disbarment of respondent.  Here, however, the 
evidence suggests strongly that respondent’s drug use led to the ethical breaches 
at issue.  In such cases, we tailor the sanctions imposed to assist in and monitor 
the attorney’s recovery. Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Lawson, 119 Ohio St.3d 58, 
2008-Ohio-3340, 891 N.E.2d 749, ¶ 73, citing Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. 
Washington, 109 Ohio St.3d 308, 2006-Ohio-2423, 847 N.E.2d 435, ¶ 9. 
{¶ 24} We therefore accept and agree with the recommendation of the 
board, to which no objection was filed.  The question of respondent’s ability to 
manage her affairs and the affairs of her clients is particularly salient here, given 
respondent’s admitted poor judgment and her expressed desire to return to her 
work as a sole practitioner in criminal law. 
                                                 
1.  Although the panel did not mention it in its report, respondent admitted to one of her mental-
health counselors that she had been convicted of driving while under the influence of alcohol in 
1997 and again in 1999.  
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{¶ 25} Accordingly, respondent is hereby suspended indefinitely from the 
practice of law in Ohio, and the suspension is retroactive to the date of her felony 
conviction, January 18, 2007.  Any petition for reinstatement must include (1) 
proof that respondent was evaluated by OLAP for chemical dependency and 
mental-health issues and that, if recommended by OLAP, she entered into a 
contract with OLAP and is in compliance with the contract and (2) a report from a 
qualified mental-health-care professional certifying that respondent is competent 
to resume the practice of law.  Also, if respondent is reinstated, she must submit 
to a law-practice monitor pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(9). 
Judgment accordingly. 
BROWN, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Eugene P. Whetzel and Carla J. Cannon, for relator. 
Gary H. Levine, for respondent. 
______________________