Case Title: In Re Estate of White

Citation: 307 N.E.2d 122, 56 Ill. 2d 265

Docket Number: 

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1974-01-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
56 Ill. 2d 265 (1974)
307 N.E.2d 122
In re ESTATE OF THOMAS WHITE, Deceased.  (Paul Edward Bishop, Exr., Appellee,
v.
Howard Bishop, Appellant.)
No. 45174.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
Opinion filed January 23, 1974.
*266 R.N. Gandy, of R.K. Peek and R.N. Gandy, of DuQuoin, for appellant.
Don Johnson, of Hohlt, House, DeMoss & Johnson, of Pinckneyville, and F. Mark Miller, of DuQuoin, for appellee.
Appellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court:
Paul Edward Bishop, executor of the last will and testament of Thomas White, deceased, filed a petition in the circuit court of Perry County to recover, as an asset of the estate, a certificate of deposit, or its proceeds, from Howard Bishop, respondent and nephew of the deceased.
The certificate of deposit in question was dated July 3, 1965, and on its face bore the legend "Thomas White or Howard Bishop, as joint tenants." It was in the sum of $7000 with interest at the rate of 4 per cent per annum.
An accompanying signature card purported to bear the signatures of Thomas White and Howard Bishop, but Bishop admitted that he had no knowledge of the $7000 until after his uncle's death, and that he did not sign the signature card nor did anyone sign for him. After White's death, respondent obtained possession of the certificate and the DuQuoin National Bank redeemed it by paying the proceeds thereof to Howard Bishop. Paul Edward Bishop, as executor, filed a petition to recover said funds. The circuit court entered judgment on January 27, 1970, in favor of the respondent, which found:
It is therefore Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed:
The petitioner appealed from this order and the order of the trial court entered April 2, 1970, denying his motion for rehearing. The appellate court reversed (In re Estate of White, 4 Ill. App.3d 505) and held that a valid joint tenancy was not created and we granted leave to appeal.
The issue in this case is whether a valid joint tenancy can be created in this certificate of deposit by the designation thereon by the issuing bank that it is in joint tenancy, where there is no other written agreement executed by one of the joint tenants.
In In re Estate of Baxter, 56 Ill. 2d 223, a case involving this identical issue, we stated:
*269 The introductory paragraph of section 2 of the Act in relation to Joint Rights and Obligations provides that except by will or other instrument in writing expressing an intention to create a joint tenancy in personal property with the right of survivorship, the right of survivorship as between joint tenants or owners of personal property is hereby abolished and all such joint tenancies shall be deemed tenancies in common; provided that the foregoing shall not be deemed to impair or affect the rights, privileges and immunities, as set forth in the provisos (a), (b) and (c).
In the case at bar, the certificate of deposit was an "other instrument in writing" which not only adequately expressed an intention to create a joint tenancy in personal property, but also did in fact create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship as between the joint tenants therein named. Thus, the certificate of deposit is not a deposit within the provisions of subsection (a) of section 2, but rather falls within the proviso (b) as "other evidences of indebtedness, or of interest" not requiring an agreement to be signed by all parties to create a joint tenancy, and also comes within the exception specified in the introductory paragraph of section 2.
In Frey v. Wubbena (1962), 26 Ill. 2d 62, at pages 67 and 68, the court stated:
And, at page 69, the court stated:
The certificate of deposit in question was issued in a fixed amount, $7,000, and it was not subject to daily change by either of the joint owners. Thus, this certificate was unlike the fluctuating res in an ordinary bank account, and any unstable atmosphere which, from a policy viewpoint, might call for the joint owners to contract, detailing their rights and obligations under the statute with *271 reference to an ordinary bank account, did not exist with reference to this certificate, which has all the essential elements of a promissory note. It contains an unconditional promise to pay a certain sum of money absolutely. It should be governed by the same rules as a promissory note with reference to the creation of joint tenancy rights therein. Such certificate is within the definition of a negotiable instrument set forth in the Uniform Commercial Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 26, pars. 3-104(1)(a)(b)(c)(d) and 2(a)(b)(c)(d)), which provides:
Section 4-104 of the Uniform Commercial Code is entitled "Definitions and Index of Definitions," and section 4-104(3) provides:
Section 3-104 is quoted above.
For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed and that of the appellate court is reversed.
Appellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed.
*272 MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
MR. JUSTICE KLUCZYNSKI, dissenting:
The issues presented and the majority holding are identical to those in the recent decision in In re Estate of Baxter, 56 Ill. 2d 223. My dissent in that case is applicable herein.