Case Title: People v. Martinez

Citation: 

Docket Number: S267138

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2023-08-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
MONICA MARIE MARTINEZ, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S267138 
 
Sixth Appellate District 
H046164 
 
Santa Clara County Superior Court 
C1518585 
 
 
August 24, 2023 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Groban, 
Jenkins, and Evans concurred. 
 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
S267138 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
Since 1941, a Department of Insurance regulation has 
prohibited bail bond agents from entering agreements with jail 
inmates to be notified when individuals have recently been 
arrested and thus may be in need of bail bond services.  (Cal. 
Code Regs., tit. 10, § 2076.)  The Court of Appeal in this case 
held the regulation facially invalid under the First Amendment.  
The court concluded that the regulation imposes burdens on the 
speech rights of bail bond agents that are not adequately 
justified by the state’s interests in deterring abusive bail 
solicitation practices.  
We now reverse.  In invalidating the regulation, the Court 
of Appeal failed to consider the full range of interests at stake 
when a commercial bail bond agent engages the services of a jail 
inmate to gain private access to information about prospective 
clients.  The state’s interests in stemming this practice are not 
solely — or even primarily — about the manner in which bail 
bond agents solicit clients.  The state’s interests instead mainly 
concern the effects of these arrangements on sound jail 
administration and fair competition in the bail bond industry.  
Without foreclosing the possibility of as-applied challenges in 
other cases, we conclude the Court of Appeal erred in holding 
the regulation unconstitutional on its face. 
 
 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
2 
I. 
A. 
When an individual is arrested and charged with a crime, 
bail may be set to help ensure the individual’s appearance in 
court while allowing the individual to be released from jail in 
the interim.  (See In re Humphrey (2021) 11 Cal.5th 135, 154 
(Humphrey).)1  To make bail, “an arrestee posts security — in 
the form of cash, property, or (more often) a commercial bail 
bond — which is forfeited if the arrestee later fails to appear in 
court.”  (Humphrey, at p. 142.)  
“The vast majority of defendants who are released on bail 
in California rely on commercial bail bonds to secure their 
release.”  (Pretrial Detention Reform Workgroup, Pretrial 
Detention Reform:  Recommendations to the Chief Justice (Oct. 
2017) p. 9  [as of August 24, 2023].)2  A commercial bail 
bond is a written agreement in which a licensed surety 
guarantees the defendant’s appearance in court and promises to 
pay the full bail amount if the defendant fails to appear.  (People 
v. Safety National Casualty Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 703, 709.)  
“Commercial bail bonds are underwritten and issued by licensed 
bail agents who act as the appointed representatives of licensed 
 
1  
In Humphrey, we held that it is unconstitutional to detain 
defendants before trial solely because they lack the financial 
resources to make bail and that accordingly, “courts must 
consider an arrestee’s ability to pay alongside the efficacy of less 
restrictive alternatives when setting bail.”  (Humphrey, supra, 
11 Cal.5th at p. 152.)   
2  
All Internet citations in this opinion are archived by year, 
docket 
number, 
and 
case 
name 
at 
. 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
3 
surety insurance companies.”  (Pretrial Detention Reform, 
p. 29.)  To obtain such a bond, the defendant (or someone acting 
on the defendant’s behalf) pays the bail bond agent a 
nonrefundable premium for the service of providing the bond.  
(Id. at p. 30 [noting that the premium is typically 10 percent of 
the bail amount].) 
Although the system of release on bail dates back 
centuries, the commercial bail bond industry is a relatively 
recent innovation, having first emerged in the latter part of the 
19th century.  (Baughman, The Bail Book:  A Comprehensive 
Look at Bail in America’s Criminal Justice System (2018) p. 164; 
see also, e.g., Holland v. Rosen (3d Cir. 2018) 895 F.3d 272, 293–
294 [citing additional sources].)  In California, the industry was 
unregulated for several decades, until reports revealed abusive 
practices that had become widespread among bail bond 
businesses across the state.  Reports indicated, for example, that 
bail bond agents commonly entered kickback schemes with 
police officers to gain information about potential clients; in 
return for notifying bail bond agents of criminal arrests, police 
officers would take a share of the bond premium once the agents 
had secured the prisoners’ release.  (See, e.g., Bail Broker 
Control Bill in Assembly, Oakland Tribune (Mar. 30, 1937) p. 5.)  
Other reports indicated that bail bond agents would agree to 
steer the prisoners to certain attorneys, who would, in turn, split 
legal fees with the agents and police officers involved in the 
schemes.  (See, e.g., Bail Brokers Are Rapped As Bill Wins Okeh, 
Sacramento Bee (Mar. 30, 1937) p. 13.) 
These revelations prompted calls for reform and increased 
oversight over the burgeoning commercial bail industry.  The 
Legislature responded by enacting the Bail Bond Regulatory Act 
of 1937, which established a framework for industry regulation.  
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
4 
(Stats. 1937, ch. 653, pp. 1797–1800; Stats. 1937, ch. 654, 
pp. 1800–1804; see McDonough v. Goodcell (1939) 13 Cal.2d 
741, 743.)  The Act requires every person engaged in the bail 
bond business to secure a license from the Insurance 
Commissioner.  (See Ins. Code, §§ 1800, 1802.)  The Act further 
vests the Insurance Commissioner with the authority to “make 
reasonable rules necessary, advisable, or convenient” for the 
regulation of bail licensees.  (Id., § 1812.)   
In 1941, following further investigations into the bail 
industry, the Insurance Commissioner promulgated a slate of 
regulations governing the conduct of bail licensees.  (Cal. Dept. 
of Insurance, Rules & Regulations Governing Bail Bond 
Transactions, Ruling No. 21 (Dec. 1, 1941) (Ruling No. 21).)  
Those regulations, many of which remain in force in 
substantially similar form today, prohibit bail licensees from, 
among other practices:  engaging unlicensed persons to solicit or 
negotiate bail on the licensed agent’s behalf (Cal. Code Regs., 
tit. 10, § 2068); entering bail agreements in advance of the 
commission of an offense or an arrest (id., § 2070); referring 
arrestees to defense attorneys (id., § 2071); soliciting bail in 
certain places, like jails and courthouses (id., § 2074); and 
charging rates or fees that differ from those that appear in rate 
schedules that licensees must file with the Department of 
Insurance (id., § 2082).  (See Ruling No. 21, supra, ¶¶ 19, 23, 27, 
35–36, 38.)  Another later-added regulation prohibits bail bond 
agents from directly soliciting arrestees unless the agent has 
received a bona fide request for bail services from the arrestee 
or other specified individuals acting on the arrestee’s behalf.  
(See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, § 2079.1; see id., § 2079.) 
The provision at issue in this case, California Code of 
Regulations, title 10, section 2076 (section 2076), was added as 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
5 
part of the initial 1941 slate of regulations.  (See Ruling No. 21, 
supra, ¶ 37.)  Section 2076, as presently in force, provides in full:  
“No bail licensee shall, for any purpose, directly or indirectly, 
enter into an arrangement of any kind or have any 
understanding with a law enforcement officer, newspaper 
employee, messenger service or any of its employees, a trusty in 
a jail, any other person incarcerated in a jail, or with any other 
persons, to inform or notify any licensee (except in direct answer 
to a question relating to the public records concerning a specific 
person named by the licensees in the request for information), 
directly or indirectly, of:  [¶]  (a) The existence of a criminal 
complaint;  [¶]  (b) The fact of an arrest; or  [¶]  (c) The fact that 
an arrest of any person is impending or contemplated;  [¶]  
(d) Any information pertaining to the matters set forth in (a) to 
(c) hereof or the persons involved therein.”3  Section 1814 of the 
Insurance Code makes the violation of a rule promulgated by 
the Insurance Commissioner, including section 2076, an offense 
chargeable either as a misdemeanor or a felony. 
B. 
In 2015, the Santa Clara County District Attorney 
charged defendant Monica Marie Martinez with seven felony 
counts of violating section 2076.4  The complaint alleged that on 
 
3  
The current regulation is essentially the same in 
substance as the version originally promulgated in 1941 (see 
Ruling No. 21, supra, ¶ 37), except that the original version did 
not include the public records exception, which was added in 
1977 (Cal. Reg. Notice Register 77, No. 38 (Sept. 17, 1977) 
p. 1741). 
4  
In various places in the record, Martinez is also referred 
to as Monica Milla or Monica Marie Milla.  To remain consistent 
with the charging documents and the Court of Appeal’s opinion, 
however, we will refer to her as Martinez. 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
6 
seven different dates in 2014, Martinez “enter[ed] into an 
agreement and ha[d] an understanding with a person 
incarcerated in jail, to inform and notify defendant, a bail 
licensee, of the fact of an arrest.”  Martinez demurred.  Among 
other things, she argued that section 2076 violates her right to 
freedom of speech under the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and article 2, section 2(a) of the California 
Constitution.  The trial court overruled the demurrer.  Martinez 
subsequently pleaded no contest to one of the counts in the 
complaint, and the prosecution agreed to dismiss the remaining 
six.  The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed 
Martinez on probation for three years.  The court also ordered 
that she serve four months in custody in the county jail, and it 
promised to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor if she 
successfully completed one year of probation.  (See Pen. Code, 
§ 17.) 
Martinez appealed her conviction after obtaining a 
certificate of probable cause.  (See Pen. Code, § 1237.5; Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(1).)  On appeal, a divided court 
agreed 
with 
Martinez 
that 
section 
2076 
is 
facially 
unconstitutional and reversed the conviction.  (People v. 
Martinez (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 280, 290 (Martinez).) 
At the outset, the Court of Appeal considered the 
applicable standard of constitutional scrutiny:  whether section 
2076 was subject to the strict scrutiny typically applicable to 
content-based speech regulations, as Martinez argued, or 
instead subject to the intermediate scrutiny applicable to 
commercial speech regulations, as the People argued.  The court 
agreed with Martinez that the regulation was content-based but 
ultimately did not decide whether strict scrutiny applied 
because, in the court’s view, the regulation failed even 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
7 
intermediate scrutiny.  (Martinez, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at 
pp. 303, 305–307, citing Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. 
Public Service Commission of New York (1980) 447 U.S. 557 
(Central Hudson).)  The court acknowledged that the People had 
identified substantial state interests underlying section 2076.  
The court cited, in particular, the state’s interests in deterring 
bail bond agents from engaging in forms of arrestee solicitation 
prohibited by other provisions of California law.  (Martinez, at 
pp. 307–311; see, e.g., Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, § 2079.1 
[prohibiting bail bond agents from directly soliciting arrestees 
who have not requested their services]; Pen. Code, § 160 
[prohibiting agents from employing inmates to solicit arrestees 
on the agents’ behalf].)  But in the court’s view, the People failed 
to adduce sufficient empirical or anecdotal evidence to show that 
section 2076 “directly and materially advance[d]” the state’s 
interests in deterring unlawful solicitation practices, as 
intermediate 
scrutiny 
under 
Central 
Hudson 
requires.  
(Martinez, at p. 312 & fn. 14.)5 
Justice 
Grover 
dissented. 
 
(Martinez, 
supra, 
59 
Cal.App.5th at p. 314 (dis. opn. of Grover, J.).)  In contrast to the 
majority, which focused on the state’s interest in deterring 
unlawful solicitation of arrestees, Justice Grover instead 
focused on the state’s “substantial interest[s]” in “prevent[ing] 
unfair competition among licensed bail agents” and in 
 
5  
Martinez also raised two other constitutional arguments:  
that section 2076 is unconstitutionally vague on its face and that 
it is unconstitutionally overbroad.  The Court of Appeal rejected 
the first (Martinez, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 297), and, in 
light of its conclusion that section 2076 was an invalid content-
based regulation, declined to address the second (Martinez, at 
pp. 290, 313).  Martinez has not pressed either of these 
arguments before this court, and we express no view on them. 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
8 
“maintaining professional and ethical standards.”  (Id. at p. 315 
(dis. opn. of Grover, J.).)  In Justice Grover’s view, section 2076 
directly advances those interests by “restricting bail licensees’ 
access to . . . insider information” permitting “the wholesale 
identification of people with imminent bail needs.”  (Martinez, 
at p. 315 (dis. opn. of Grover, J.).)  Justice Grover reasoned, “By 
restricting bail licensees’ access to that insider information, the 
regulation directly prevents unfair competition among licensed 
bail agents.  Restricting licensees’ access to wholesale 
identifying information also directly advances the state’s 
interest in protecting arrestees from intrusive conduct.  Further, 
the regulation is not unduly restrictive in light of the state’s 
interests, as it does not prohibit agreements to obtain public 
records regarding persons already known to and identified by a 
bail agent.”  (Ibid.)  “Seeing no constitutional impediment to 
enforcing California Code of Regulations, title 10, section 2076,” 
Justice Grover would have affirmed.6  (Martinez, at p. 316 (dis. 
opn. of Grover, J.).) 
We granted review to consider the issue.  
II. 
A. 
Our first task is to define the scope of our review.  By its 
terms, section 2076 prohibits notification arrangements 
involving a variety of different classes of informants with access 
to information about recent arrests, including law enforcement 
officers, newspaper employees, and others.  The charges in 
Martinez’s case, however, stem from just one type of 
arrangement, involving an informant who is a “person 
 
6  
Justice Grover also would have rejected Martinez’s 
vagueness and overbreadth challenges.  (See fn. 5, ante.) 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
9 
incarcerated in a jail.”  (§ 2076.)  Martinez’s argument does not 
focus specifically on such arrangements; her argument is that 
section 2076 is unconstitutional in all, or nearly all, its 
applications.  But the Attorney General asks us to focus more 
particularly on notification arrangements with incarcerated 
persons, which, in his view, call for a different analysis than 
notification arrangements with, for example, police officers or 
newspaper reporters.  The Attorney General accordingly urges 
us to treat Martinez’s challenge as a “partial facial challenge[], 
or class or category-based as-applied challenge[].”  (See Mathews 
v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 768 [employing a similar 
category-based facial analysis].)   
For present purposes, it does not matter whether we 
characterize Martinez’s challenge as a “partial” facial challenge 
or a “full” one.  Either way, the fact remains that Martinez seeks 
relief that extends “beyond [her] particular circumstances,” and 
she therefore must “satisfy our standards for a facial challenge 
to the extent of that reach.”  (Doe v. Reed (2010) 561 U.S. 186, 
194.)  To prevail on a facial challenge, litigants must show that 
the challenged rule creates constitutional problems in “at least 
‘ “the generality” ’ [citation] or ‘vast majority’ ” of cases.  (Today’s 
Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education 
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 218; cf. Reno v. Flores (1993) 507 U.S. 
292, 301 [noting that a facial challenge to a regulation is subject 
to the same standards as a facial challenge to a statute].)  Here, 
Martinez advances no theory on which she could establish the 
invalidity of section 2076 in the generality or vast majority of 
cases without also establishing the invalidity of section 2076 as 
applied to the class of arrangements involving incarcerated 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
10 
persons.7  Accordingly, regardless of whether we treat 
Martinez’s claim as a “partial” or “full” facial challenge, she 
must show that the regulation’s application to this class of 
arrangements is unconstitutional.  We therefore begin by 
analyzing whether section 2076 is valid as applied to the class 
of bail bond agents who, like Martinez, have entered prohibited 
notification arrangements with incarcerated persons; if it is, 
Martinez’s challenge to the regulation as a whole cannot prevail.  
B. 
Our next task is to define the nature of our review.  
Martinez brings a challenge under the First Amendment, which 
protects rights of expression, including the right to share 
information.  (Kleindienst v. Mandel (1972) 408 U.S. 753, 762 
[the First Amendment protects “ ‘the right to receive 
information and ideas’ ”]; Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. (2011) 564 
U.S. 552, 570 (Sorrell) [“the creation and dissemination of 
information are speech within the meaning of the First 
Amendment”].)   
Martinez contends section 2076 infringes this right by 
prohibiting bail licensees from receiving information about 
arrestees.  Martinez’s characterization of section 2076 is not 
quite accurate; the regulation does not, as she would have it, 
 
7 
This is because Martinez raises what we might call a 
“typical facial attack.”  (United States v. Stevens (2010) 559 U.S. 
460, 472.)  In the First Amendment context, courts have 
recognized another “ ‘type of facial challenge,’ whereby a law 
may be invalidated as overbroad if ‘a substantial number of its 
applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the 
statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’ ”  (Stevens, at p. 473.)  But 
as we have noted, Martinez does not press that sort of First 
Amendment overbreadth challenge in this court.  (See fn. 5, 
ante.) 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
11 
directly forbid any particular exchange of information.  Section 
2076 instead forbids “arrangement[s]” (or “understanding[s]”) 
between bail licensees and jail inmates (among others) to inform 
or notify the licensees about arrests, while expressly exempting 
information about particular arrestees that is sought or 
disclosed via public records requests.  (§ 2076.)  In other words, 
as the Court of Appeal correctly explained, the regulation 
forbids both formally binding contracts and less formal 
agreements to share arrest information.  (Martinez, supra, 59 
Cal.App.5th at pp. 298–299.)  The regulation does not prohibit a 
bail licensee from seeking or receiving such information, 
“provided the information is not being conveyed pursuant to a 
prohibited arrangement or understanding” with an incarcerated 
person or other prohibited informant.  (Id. at p. 306.)  All the 
same, at least for purposes of this case, the Attorney General 
does not dispute that the prohibition on notification 
arrangements “implicates the First Amendment-protected 
rights of commercial bail agents,” and we therefore assume 
without deciding that the regulation warrants scrutiny under 
the First Amendment.8   
The next question concerns the standard of scrutiny we 
should apply in evaluating the constitutionality of the 
regulation.  On this subject, Martinez and the Attorney General 
disagree sharply.  While Martinez argues that section 2076 
should be subject to strict scrutiny — the most exacting form of 
 
8  
The Attorney General has not argued, and we thus do not 
address, whether the speech-related burdens of section 2076’s 
prohibition on notification arrangements can be considered 
incidental to the state’s regulation of commercial activity.  (See 
Sorrell, supra, 564 U.S. at p. 567 [“[T]he First Amendment does 
not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or conduct from 
imposing incidental burdens on speech”].)  
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
12 
constitutional review — the Attorney General argues for a far 
less demanding standard appropriate to a regulation that 
applies to (1) commercial activity (2) in a jail setting.  
Collectively, the parties invoke essentially every possible 
standard of First Amendment review, ranging from the most 
demanding possible standard to the least.  We address the two 
extremes before we turn to the intermediate standard the Court 
of Appeal applied in the decision below. 
Emphasizing that this case concerns the class of 
prohibited arrangements involving incarcerated individuals, 
the Attorney General first argues that we should review section 
2076 under the standard for reviewing constitutional challenges 
to jail and prison regulations set out in Turner v. Safley (1987) 
482 U.S. 78.  This standard is highly deferential; under Turner, 
courts generally must uphold such regulations if they are 
“reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”  (Id. at 
p. 89.)  The Attorney General asserts that section 2076 is 
reasonably related to multiple legitimate interests in sound jail 
administration and safety.  For one thing, the Attorney General 
contends, 
the 
prohibited 
arrangements 
are 
typically 
compensated in cash or in kind, which allows inmates to profit 
from their incarceration by “steer[ing] business toward a 
particular bail bond firm.”9  The Attorney General argues that 
 
9  
Martinez is correct that the payment of compensation is 
not a necessary element of a section 2076 violation.  But the 
Attorney General notes, and common sense would also suggest, 
that a bail licensee’s “ ‘arrangement’ or ‘understanding’ ” with a 
jail inmate to obtain information about recent arrests will often 
involve some form of consideration from the bail licensee, 
whether monetary or in kind.  (See also Cal. Dept. of Insurance, 
Recommendations for California’s Bail System (Feb. 2018) p. 6 
[noting results of a multiyear investigation in Santa Clara 
 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
13 
such business arrangements with outside commercial entities 
“erode the deterrent and retributive value of incarceration” — 
at least for those jail inmates who are serving sentences 
following conviction for a crime.10  For this reason, courts have 
long upheld restrictions on commercial activity inside prisons.  
(See, e.g., French v. Butterworth (1st Cir. 1980) 614 F.2d 23, 24 
[“a prisoner has no recognized right to conduct a business while 
incarcerated”]; see also, e.g., King v. Federal Bureau of Prisons 
(7th Cir. 2005) 415 F.3d 634, 636 [citing cases]; Stroud v. Swope 
(9th Cir. 1951) 187 F.2d 850, 851 [prisoner had no constitutional 
right to conduct business concerning the publication of books he 
had authored].) 
More generally, the Attorney General argues that 
business arrangements between bail bond agents and jail 
insiders can threaten jail security by “promot[ing] inmate 
rivalries and even violence.”  The Attorney General cites a 2017 
investigation by the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s 
Office, which found that inmates involved in the prohibited 
arrangements would threaten or pressure other inmates to sign 
contracts with certain bail agents and would retaliate against 
inmates working for rival bail firms.  (See Lewis, Inside Santa 
 
County “uncovering schemes by bail agents to scoop business 
away from competitors by rewarding jail inmates with money 
added to their jail accounts for providing information about 
newly booked individuals in the jails”].) 
10  
Although pretrial detention arguably does not serve any 
retributive purpose, the Attorney General points out that jails 
in California also frequently house convicted inmates, who 
might be in a position to provide information about recently 
arrested pretrial detainees.  (See Pen. Code, § 4002, subd. (a) 
[authorizing jail to group together “persons . . . detained for trial 
[and] . . . persons convicted and under sentence” for certain 
purposes, including “supervised activities and . . . housing”].) 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
14 
Clara Jails, Predatory Bail Schemes Flourished for Years (Apr. 
10, 2017) KQED  
[as of August 24, 2023].)  The Attorney General also points to a 
2014 report by the New Jersey Commission of Investigation 
finding that aggressive competition among inmates retained by 
competing bail firms created dangerous conditions within New 
Jersey correctional facilities, particularly when the bail firms 
recruited rival prison gangs to drum up business.  (See State of 
N.J., Com. of Investigation, Inside Out:  Questionable and 
Abusive Practices in New Jersey’s Bail-Bond Industry (2014) 
pp. 12–13 
 [as of August 24, 2023].)  
Given these dangers, the Attorney General argues, we should 
defer under Turner to the Insurance Commissioner’s judgment 
that notification arrangements between jail inmates and bail 
bond agents should be prohibited.  
Although the Attorney General is undoubtedly correct 
that section 2076 implicates matters of jail administration and 
security insofar as it applies to arrangements between bail 
licensees and incarcerated persons, it is not clear whether 
Turner supplies the right lens for viewing the constitutionality 
of the regulation.  The rationale underlying the Turner test is 
based 
on 
the 
“considerable 
deference” 
owed 
“to 
the 
determinations of prison administrators who, in the interest of 
security, regulate the relations between prisoners and the 
outside world.”  (Thornburgh v. Abbott (1989) 490 U.S. 401, 408; 
id. at p. 407 [noting the “expertise of these officials” and 
emphasizing the need to “be[] sensitive to the delicate balance 
that [they] must strike between the order and security of the 
internal prison environment and the legitimate demands of 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
15 
those on the ‘outside’ who seek to enter that environment” in 
some way].)  Section 2076 was not, however, promulgated by a 
prison or jail administrator; it was promulgated by the 
Insurance Commissioner as part of a broader slate of bail 
industry regulations directed at licensed bail bond agents.  The 
regulations do not directly target the conduct of inmates in any 
of their applications.  (As we have noted, the regulation 
prohibits bail bond agents from entering a variety of 
arrangements with both incarcerated and nonincarcerated 
persons — only some of which could directly affect the internal 
environment of the jail.)  It is questionable whether we should 
afford Turner deference to a regulation with these features.11  In 
 
11  
The Attorney General cites cases from other jurisdictions 
indicating that Turner deference is not exclusively reserved for 
the judgments of jail and prison officials and applies, for 
instance, to statutory jail and prison regulations enacted by 
legislatures.  None of the Attorney General’s cases, however, 
involves circumstances comparable to this case, where the 
regulation in question was promulgated by a commercial 
regulator to govern the conduct of nonincarcerated commercial 
actors.  (Cf., e.g., Mass. Prisoners Ass’n v. Acting Governor 
(Mass. 2002) 761 N.E.2d 952, 955 [challenge to an executive 
order directing the state corrections department to prohibit 
political fundraising in state prisons, pursuant to a state 
statute]; Waterman v. Farmer (3d Cir. 1999) 183 F.3d 208, 211 
[challenge to a state statute prohibiting access to “ ‘[s]exually 
oriented material’ ” in a correctional facility for treatment of sex 
offenders, which the court construed in light of implementing 
regulations by the state corrections department]; Amatel v. Reno 
(D.C. Cir. 1998) 156 F.3d 192, 196, 202 [challenge to a federal 
statute banning use of Bureau of Prisons funds to distribute 
sexually explicit material to prisoners, which the court 
construed in light of implementing regulations by the Bureau of 
Prisons]; Matthews v. Morales (5th Cir. 1994) 23 F.3d 118, 119 
[challenge to a state statute barring convicted felons from 
changing their names].)   
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
16 
any event, for the reasons that follow, it is unnecessary for us to 
do so now in order to take adequate account of the range of 
governmental interests implicated by the application of section 
2076 to notification arrangements with persons incarcerated in 
a jail.12 
Venturing to the opposite pole from deferential Turner 
review, Martinez argues that section 2076 should be subject to 
strict scrutiny because it regulates speech on the basis of its 
content.  (See, e.g., Barr v. American Assn. of Political 
Consultants (2020) __ U.S. __, __ [140 S.Ct. 2335, 2346].)  Under 
high court precedent, restrictions on speech are considered 
content-based if they “target speech based on its communicative 
content” — that is, “if a law applies to particular speech because 
of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.”  (Reed 
v. Town of Gilbert (2015) 576 U.S. 155, 163; see City of Austin, 
Texas v. Reagan National Advertising of Austin, LLC (2022) 
__ U.S. __, __ [142 S.Ct. 1464, 1471].)  The parties do not dispute 
that section 2076 is content-based in this sense; to the extent 
 
12  
Martinez also argues that Turner is inapplicable because 
it governs only the constitutional claims of convicted inmates 
and not the claims of pretrial detainees.  Courts have not, 
however, generally distinguished between the two types of 
claims in applying the Turner test.  (See, e.g., Florence v. Board 
of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington (2012) 566 U.S. 
318, 330 [stating that the case, which involved searches of 
arrested persons held in jail pretrial, is “governed by the 
principles announced in Turner”]; Bull v. City and County of San 
Francisco (9th Cir. 2010) 595 F.3d 964, 974, fn. 10 (en banc) [“We 
have never distinguished between pretrial detainees and 
prisoners in applying the Turner test, but have identified the 
interests of correction facility officials responsible for pretrial 
detainees as being ‘penological’ in nature.”].)  In any event, we 
need not resolve that issue here; as explained below, we will 
assume without deciding that intermediate scrutiny applies. 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
17 
section 2076 burdens speech, it does so on the basis of the topic 
discussed — namely, information concerning arrestees.  As a 
general rule, the high court has held that noncommercial 
content-based restrictions “are presumptively unconstitutional 
and may be justified only if the government proves that they are 
narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”  (Reed, at 
p. 163.)  Courts engage in this demanding form of scrutiny “to 
ensure that communication has not been prohibited ‘merely 
because public officials disapprove the speaker’s views.’ ”  
(Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n (1980) 447 
U.S. 530, 536, quoting Niemotko v. Maryland (1951) 340 U.S. 
268, 282 (conc. opn. of Frankfurter, J.); see also Reed, at p. 174 
(conc. opn. of Alito, J.) [“Content-based laws merit th[e] 
protection [of strict scrutiny] because they present, albeit 
sometimes in a subtler form, the same dangers as laws that 
regulate speech based on viewpoint.  Limiting speech based on 
its ‘topic’ or ‘subject’ favors those who do not want to disturb the 
status quo.  Such regulations may interfere with democratic 
self-government and the search for truth.”].) 
There are, however, several exceptions to the general 
presumption 
that 
content-based 
restrictions 
are 
unconstitutional.  (See, e.g., Fallon, Sexual Harassment, Content 
Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog That Didn’t Bark 
(1994) Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 23; Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food & 
Commercial Workers Union Local 8 (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1083, 
1113–1114 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).)  Commercial speech 
constitutes one such exception.  As the high court has explained, 
“ ‘commercial speech [enjoys] a limited measure of protection, 
commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First 
Amendment values,’ and is subject to ‘modes of regulation that 
might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
18 
expression.’ ”  (Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox 
(1989) 492 U.S. 469, 477.)  Commercial speech restrictions — 
which 
not 
infrequently 
target 
speech 
based 
on 
its 
communicative content — are instead subject to “ ‘intermediate’ 
scrutiny . . . under the framework set forth in Central 
Hudson[, supra, 447 U.S. 557].”  (Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. 
(1995) 515 U.S. 618, 623.) 
The Attorney General argues that if the prohibition on 
notification arrangements is not subject to deferential review 
under Turner, the regulation aims at speech that is inextricably 
bound up with traditional regulation of commercial activity and 
thus at most should be subject to intermediate scrutiny, not 
strict scrutiny.  To the extent that section 2076 impinges on a 
protected speech right, we agree with the Attorney General that 
intermediate scrutiny is the more appropriate standard. 
The Attorney General’s argument in this regard relies 
heavily on cases addressing the contours of the commercial 
speech doctrine.  As the Court of Appeal in this case correctly 
observed, this case differs from many of those cases in that it 
does not involve restrictions on advertising or solicitation — at 
least, not directly.  (See Martinez, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at 
pp. 304–305; see also, e.g., Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Consumer 
Council (1976) 425 U.S. 748, 761–770 [prohibition on 
advertising prescription drug prices]; Central Hudson, supra, 
447 U.S. at pp. 563–566 [prohibition on promotional advertising 
by a utility]; Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly (2001) 533 U.S. 525, 
553–554 [restrictions on the sale, promotion, and labeling of 
tobacco products]; 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island (1996) 
517 U.S. 484, 501–504 [prohibition on advertising liquor 
prices].)   
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
19 
But while the commercial speech doctrine has most 
commonly been applied to such restrictions, the doctrine is not 
so limited.  “Although commercial speech is often described as 
‘speech proposing a commercial transaction’ [citation], the high 
court has also referred to commercial speech more broadly as 
‘expression related solely to the economic interests of the 
speaker and its audience’ (Central Hudson, supra, 447 U.S. at 
p. 561).”  (Beeman v. Anthem Prescription Management, LLC 
(2013) 58 Cal.4th 329, 352 (Beeman).)  Exploring the high court’s 
guidance, we held in Beeman that the commercial speech 
doctrine applied to a law requiring prescription drug claims 
processors to transmit a report on pharmacy fees to their clients.  
(Ibid.)  We explained that although the required report does not 
“ ‘propose[] a commercial transaction between the speaker . . . 
and its audience,’ ” that “does not necessarily mean the report is 
not commercial speech.”  (Ibid.)  We cited several factors in 
support of the conclusion that the statute was, in fact, a 
commercial speech regulation.  The statute, we explained, 
“operates in a commercial setting [and] prescribes a specific 
communication that a business entity must make to its clients”; 
the communication in question is “related to the economic 
interests of prescription drug claims processors and their 
clients”; and the communication is “ ‘ “ ‘linked inextricably’ ” ’ ” 
to commercial transactions within the government’s power to 
regulate “ ‘to prevent commercial harms.’ ”13  (Beeman, at p. 352, 
 
13  
Although we determined that the reports concerned only 
“ ‘commercial speech,’ ” we concluded that labeling them as such 
“does not dispositively determine” the applicable level of 
scrutiny.  (Beeman, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 353.)  We observed 
that the challenged law did not “impede the free flow of 
commercial information”; rather, the law enhanced the flow of 
 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
20 
quoting Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 955.)  Other 
courts have focused on similar factors to reach similar 
conclusions about laws operating outside the narrow context of 
marketing and advertising restrictions.  (See, e.g., Greater 
Philadelphia Chamber v. City of Phila. (3d Cir. 2020) 949 F.3d 
116, 136–137 [applying the commercial speech framework to a 
city ordinance prohibiting employers from inquiring into a 
prospective employee’s wage history in the process of setting or 
negotiating that employee’s wage]; see also Yim v. City of Seattle 
(9th Cir. 2023) 63 F.4th 783, 799–801 (conc. opn. of Wardlaw, J.) 
[concluding that a city ordinance prohibiting landlords from 
inquiring into the criminal history of current and prospective 
tenants regulates commercial speech]; id. at p. 809 (conc. & dis. 
opn. of Gould, J.) [agreeing that the regulated speech is 
commercial in nature].) 
A related line of cases has applied an intermediate level of 
scrutiny, akin to a commercial speech inquiry, to regulations 
restricting sales of customer data.  That line of cases begins with 
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders (1985) 472 U.S. 
749, 751 (Dun & Bradstreet), in which the high court considered 
the First Amendment interests at stake in a defamation action 
against a credit reporting agency that circulated a report 
containing false information about a business’s financial 
position.  (Dun & Bradstreet, at p. 751 (plur. opn. of Powell, J.).)  
 
commercial information by compelling disclosure of data that 
was relevant to the market participants.  (Id. at p. 354.)  
Because “the free speech interests implicated by compelled 
disclosure of ‘purely factual and uncontroversial information’ 
are ‘substantially weaker than those at stake when speech is 
actually suppressed,’ ” we held that rational basis review was 
appropriate under California’s free speech clause.  (Id. at 
p. 356.) 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
21 
The high court “recognized that not all speech is of equal First 
Amendment importance” and noted that “[i]t is speech on 
‘ “matters of public concern” ’ that is ‘at the heart of the First 
Amendment’s protection.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 758–759, quoting First 
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978) 435 U.S. 765, 776.)  
Evaluating the “ ‘content, form, and context’ ” of the credit 
report “ ‘as revealed by the whole record’ ” (Dun & Bradstreet, at 
p. 761), the high court concluded that the report contained 
speech on matters of purely private concern and therefore 
warranted reduced constitutional protection (id. at pp. 762–
763).  Specifically, the high court reasoned that the credit report 
“was speech solely in the individual interest of the speaker and 
its specific business audience”; that special protection for such 
credit reporting was not necessary to ensure that “ ‘debate on 
public issues [will] be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ ”; and 
that, like similarly profit-driven commercial speech, credit 
reporting was “unlikely to be deterred by incidental state 
regulation.”  (Id. at p. 762.)14   
Relying on Dun & Bradstreet, the D.C. Circuit has 
declined to apply strict scrutiny to regulations that prohibit the 
sale of certain consumer information for purposes of targeted 
marketing.  (Trans Union Corp. v. F.T.C. (D.C. Cir. 2001) 245 
F.3d 809, 818 (Trans Union I) [reasoning that marketing lists 
containing information about individual consumers and their 
credit performance warrant reduced constitutional protection]; 
 
14  
Two other Justices joined Justice Powell’s plurality 
opinion.  Chief Justice Burger and Justice White concurred in 
the judgment only, but both agreed with the plurality that the 
speech at issue did not concern matters of public importance and 
thus did not warrant special constitutional protection.  (See Dun 
& Bradstreet, supra, 472 U.S. at p. 764 (conc. opn. of Burger, 
C. J.); id. at p. 774 (conc. opn. of White, J.).) 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
22 
Trans Union LLC v. F.T.C. (D.C. Cir. 2002) 295 F.3d 42, 52–53 
(Trans Union II) [same, suggesting that the regulations 
burdened only commercial speech]; see also U.S. West, Inc. v. 
F.C.C. (10th Cir. 1999) 182 F.3d 1224, 1232–1233 [applying 
Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny to regulation limiting the 
ability of telecommunications carriers to share customer 
information]; National Cable & Telecoms. Ass’n v. F.C.C. (D.C. 
Cir. 2009) 555 F.3d 996, 1000–1001 [same, where all parties 
agreed that the regulated speech was commercial in nature].)   
All of these cases suggest that, to the extent a protected 
speech right is implicated here, intermediate rather than strict 
scrutiny is the more appropriate standard.  Like the regulations 
at issue in Trans Union I, Trans Union II, and related cases, 
section 2076 operates in a commercial setting:  It places limits 
on arrangements for the sharing of information about a class of 
consumers (here, inmate-consumers of bail services) with 
commercial actors seeking to profit from that information.  Such 
communications are directly and solely related to the economic 
interests of the agents:  Early access to information identifying 
potential clients enables the licensee to achieve a competitive 
advantage over other bail bond agents in soliciting business.  
And much as in Beeman, the communications at issue are 
“linked inextricably” to commercial bail bond transactions that 
are subject to extensive governmental regulation, including an 
extensive governmental licensing regime.  (Beeman, supra, 58 
Cal.4th at p. 352; see McDonough v. Goodcell, supra, 13 Cal.2d 
at p. 743.)  Assuming that section 2076 restricts the protected 
speech rights of bail bond agents, it is not the type of restriction 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
23 
that warrants the most exacting standard of constitutional 
review.15 
Martinez resists this conclusion.  She argues that 
regardless of the economic interests at stake, strict scrutiny is 
appropriate because section 2076 regulates the content of 
noncommercial speech concerning a matter of public concern, 
namely, the identity of persons the state has arrested.  There is 
no question that information about arrests is of great public 
concern.  But to regulate the specific type of notification 
arrangement at issue — between jail inmates and bail bond 
agents — is not to prevent the speech of those who want to speak 
out about arrests or other important criminal justice issues.  
Martinez contends that section 2076 “criminalizes the free 
communication about important public facts” by preventing not 
just bail licensees but also arrestees, those who seek bail 
services on their behalf, and the public from receiving 
information about who the state has arrested.  This is incorrect:  
The regulation is directed at the conduct of “bail licensee[s]” 
(§ 2076); it does not regulate the conduct of any other person.  
Moreover, section 2076 prohibits only the transmission of arrest 
information pursuant to a bail licensee’s “arrangement” or 
“understanding” with a jail insider.  Nothing in the regulation 
prohibits bail licensees from obtaining that information through 
other means available to the general public.  Indeed, the 
 
15  
This conclusion is consistent with Sorrell, supra, 564 U.S. 
552, in which the high court employed what it described as “a 
special 
commercial 
speech 
inquiry” 
to 
evaluate 
the 
constitutionality of a state law that restricted the sale, 
disclosure, and use, for marketing purposes, of pharmacy 
records that revealed the prescribing practices of individual 
doctors.  (Id. at p. 571; see id. at pp. 571–572, citing, inter alia, 
Central Hudson, supra, 447 U.S. 557.) 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
24 
California Public Records Act requires state and local law 
enforcement to publicly disclose information about recent 
arrests upon request (Gov. Code, § 6254, subd. (f)(1); County of 
Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 588, 595), 
and section 2076 explicitly permits the bail licensees to request 
the public records of specific inmates.  In short, section 2076 is 
much more limited than Martinez suggests:  It focuses on the 
transmission of information about arrestees to commercial 
actors, for a commercial purpose, pursuant to an “arrangement” 
or “understanding,” and not on the dissemination of arrestee 
information more generally. 
For these reasons, we reject Martinez’s arguments for 
strict scrutiny.  As previously noted, however, we need not 
definitively decide whether intermediate scrutiny or a lesser 
standard should apply.  We assume without deciding that 
intermediate scrutiny applies and, for the reasons below, hold 
that, considered on its face, section 2076 survives that 
heightened standard.  
III. 
The intermediate scrutiny inquiry under Central Hudson 
consists of a multipart test for evaluating whether a restriction 
on commercial speech unconstitutionally infringes freedom of 
speech.  At the threshold, we must determine whether the 
speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading.  (Central 
Hudson, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 566.)  Assuming that threshold is 
met, the state must show that the regulation is supported by a 
“substantial” governmental interest; that the regulation 
“directly advances the governmental interest asserted”; and 
that the regulation “is not more extensive than is necessary to 
serve that interest.”  (Ibid.) 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
25 
As a threshold matter, there is no dispute that section 
2076 regulates the transmission of expression that neither 
relates to unlawful activity nor is misleading.  Section 2076 
prohibits arrangements to share information about recent 
arrests, even when that information is accurate, and regardless 
of whether the arrangement is meant to facilitate unlawful 
conduct (for example, direct solicitation of inmates in violation 
of Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, § 2079.1).  Accordingly, the state bears 
the burden to demonstrate that the regulation is narrowly 
tailored to advance a substantial governmental interest. 
There is also no dispute that the government’s asserted 
interests in the regulation are substantial.  We agree.  First, the 
Attorney General contends that section 2076 advances the 
state’s interest in promoting “sound, secure jail administration.”  
We have little trouble concluding that this interest is 
substantial for purposes of Central Hudson; our cases have 
emphasized the importance of the state’s interests in 
“ ‘preserv[ing] 
internal 
order 
and 
discipline’ ” 
and 
“ ‘maintain[ing] institutional security’ ” in the jail and prison 
environment.  (In re Jenkins (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1167, 1175, 
quoting Bell v. Wolfish (1979) 441 U.S. 520, 547; see also People 
v. Dolezal (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 167, 174 [“orderly and 
efficient jail administration” is a substantial state interest].)  
Second, the Attorney General argues that section 2076 furthers 
the state’s interest in promoting “fair competition in the bail 
bond industry.”  We conclude that this interest is also 
substantial.  Long ago, we recognized that the “bail bond 
business is such a business as is subject to reasonable regulation 
under the police power of the state” and noted the Legislature’s 
determination that “abuses” in the industry required “that there 
be some public supervision” of the field.  (McDonough v. 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
26 
Goodcell, supra, 13 Cal.2d at p. 746.)  And in cases concerning 
other professionals, like lawyers and accountants, the high court 
has recognized that the state has compelling and important 
interests in licensing and regulating the practice of the 
professions and in maintaining standards of ethical conduct in 
those fields.  (Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., supra, 515 U.S. at 
p. 625; Edenfield v. Fane (1993) 507 U.S. 761, 770.)  Bail bond 
agents are licensed professionals who are “an integral part of 
the criminal justice system,” and we conclude that the state has 
a similarly substantial interest in establishing rules for fair 
competition in the industry and ensuring that bail bond agents 
operate in an “honest and professional manner.”  (Dolezal, at 
p. 174.)  
Martinez’s main contention is that section 2076 does not 
directly advance the interests asserted by the state.  The Court 
of Appeal agreed with her on this point.  Although the court 
briefly acknowledged the state’s argument that section 2076 
promotes fair competition and sound jail administration 
(Martinez, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 307–308), the court 
focused its analysis on a narrower state interest — “preventing 
unlawful, predatory solicitation of arrestees” (id. at p. 311).  The 
court “assume[d] that section 2076 might indirectly deter 
unlawful solicitation of arrestees,” but reasoned that “an 
indirect effect is not enough to survive judicial scrutiny.”  (Id. at 
p. 313.)  Because, in the court’s view, the state had not 
demonstrated that section 2076 “directly and materially 
advance[d] the state’s substantial interests,” the court 
concluded that the state had “failed to carry its burden.”  
(Martinez, at pp. 312, 313.)  
By focusing narrowly on whether section 2076 would 
prevent bail bond agents from engaging in unlawful solicitation, 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
27 
the Court of Appeal failed to account for the full range of 
governmental interests at stake.  California Code of 
Regulations, title 10, section 2076 is not merely an ancillary 
regulation designed to bolster the prohibitions on predatory 
solicitation practices found in California Code of Regulations, 
title 10, section 2079.1 (prohibiting direct solicitation of 
arrestees) and Penal Code section 160 (prohibiting the 
employment of unlicensed jail inmates to conduct direct 
solicitation).  Section 2076’s prohibition on notification 
arrangements with current inmates aims primarily at other 
purposes:  It is designed to serve the state’s interest in sound, 
secure jail administration and to prevent the sort of corruption 
and unfair competition in the bail bond industry more generally 
that prompted the creation of the current system of bail bond 
regulation.  (See Martinez, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 315 (dis. 
opn. of Grover, J.).) 
Under United States Supreme Court precedent, we may 
consult “history” and even “ ‘simple common sense’ ” to 
determine whether a speech regulation advances substantial 
government interests under Central Hudson.  (Florida Bar v. 
Went For It, Inc., supra, 515 U.S. at p. 628.)  The historical 
record, recent experience, and common sense all confirm that 
section 2076 directly and materially advances the interests the 
state has identified here.  By prohibiting arrangements with 
inmates that “facilitate the wholesale identification of people 
with imminent bail needs” (Martinez, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 315 (dis. opn. of Grover, J.)), section 2076 prevents bail bond 
businesses from developing insider information networks within 
jails and prisons that would give them an unfair “first mover” 
advantage in the bond services market.  As Martinez 
acknowledges, bail bond businesses would benefit from this first 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
28 
mover advantage even if they engaged in strictly lawful 
solicitation — for example, of an arrestee’s family members (see 
Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, §§ 2079, 2079.1), who are likely to be in 
a particularly vulnerable position and liable to engage the 
services of the first bail bond agent to reach out directly.  With 
section 2076 in place, bail bond businesses cannot compete 
based on the speed with which they can procure inside 
information about arrestees and reach those vulnerable 
consumers; instead, they must seek the arrest information from 
publicly available arrest reports or wait to receive a bona fide 
request for bail services from the arrestees, their families, or 
their designated representatives.  (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, 
§ 2079.1.)  As the Attorney General explains, section 2076 
thereby encourages more “legitimate forms of competition,” such 
as competition on “price, scope, and quality of services.” 
The history behind the Bail Bond Regulatory Act shows 
how these types of insider arrangements enabled certain firms 
to gain monopolistic control over bail in the regions where they 
operated.16  Before the Act’s passage, public attention focused, 
 
16  
In recounting the history behind the Act and describing 
more 
recent 
examples 
of 
the 
prohibited 
notification 
arrangements, the Attorney General’s briefs rely on materials 
such as newspaper and journal articles and government 
reports that are not formally part of the evidentiary record.  
Martinez has not objected to our consideration of those 
materials, and at oral argument, Martinez’s counsel expressly 
agreed that we can consider the materials as an aid to our 
interpretation of the law.  (See, e.g., Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery 
Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 776, fn. 5 [“In determining de novo 
what the law is, appellate courts routinely consider materials 
that were not introduced at the trial, including publications 
containing 
expressions 
of 
viewpoints 
and 
generalized 
statements about the state of the world.  These are considered 
 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
29 
in particular, on abuses by one of the first for-profit bail bond 
businesses in the United States, the McDonough Brothers Bail 
Bond Brokers.  (Barnes, “Fountainhead of Corruption”:  Peter P. 
McDonough, Boss of San Francisco’s Underworld (1979) 58 Cal. 
History 142, 151–152.)  The public learned that the McDonough 
Brothers had “monopolized the bail bond business in San 
Francisco” by developing a system for acquiring insider 
information about the bail needs of recent arrestees.  (Barnes, 
at p. 145.)  “Besides stationing functionaries of the firm at local, 
state, and federal courts, the McDonough organization created 
a remarkable network of informants” — including police officers 
who “provided daily lists of who had been arrested, the charges, 
and the bail set” — and even set up radios that connected the 
prisons and jails to the McDonough offices.  (Id. at p. 146.)  The 
firm reportedly used the information it acquired to quickly 
solicit business from recent arrestees and secure release orders 
from the city’s superior court judges.  (Ibid.)  A 1937 report 
following an investigation into citywide corruption — the 
“Atherton Report” — found that the McDonough Brothers had 
developed a “virtual ‘corner’ on the [b]ail bonds business” by 
“ ‘freez[ing] out’ ” its competition and noted that the firm had 
used the wealth, influence, and police connections that it had 
acquired through that business to expand into the city’s other 
vice trades, like prostitution, gambling, and bootlegging.  
(Report to the 1937 Grand Jury on Graft in the San Francisco 
 
not as a substitute for evidence but as an aid to the court’s work 
of interpreting, explaining and forming the law.”]; Kasler v. 
Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472, 482–483, 485–487 [relying on 
newspaper articles describing, among other things, the details 
of mass shootings and legislative negotiations in evaluating the 
state interests involved in a constitutional challenge to 
California’s assault weapons ban].)    
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
30 
Police Department, reprinted in S.F. Chronicle (Mar. 17, 1937) 
p. F2, col. 4; see also Barnes, at pp. 146–147.)  According to news 
reports of the time, bail bond businesses across the state 
engaged in similar abusive practices, recruiting police officers to 
notify them of recent arrests in exchange for a share of the bail 
premium and using that information to charge exorbitant bond 
fees from friends or relatives of the arrestees.  (See, e.g., Bail 
Bondsmen Facing Inquiry, L.A. Times (June 25, 1941) p. 23.)17  
These abusive practices, among others, led to the passage of the 
Bail Bond Regulatory Act and, later, to the Insurance 
Commissioner’s promulgation of regulations like section 2076 
that are still in force today.  (See, e.g., Bills to End M’Donough’s 
Rule Signed, S.F. Examiner (July 3, 1937) p. 1; MacDonald, 48 
Stringent Rules Set Up By Caminetti, S.F. Chronicle (Dec. 8, 
1941) p. 29.) 
Recent reports indicate that these practices continue to 
undermine fair competition in the industry, with deleterious 
effects on the internal jail and prison environment.  For 
example, the Court of Appeal took judicial notice of the 
Insurance Commissioner’s 2018 report titled Recommendations 
for California’s Bail System, which emphasized the need to 
improve oversight and regulation of the bail industry to protect 
vulnerable bail consumers.  (See Martinez, supra, 59 Cal. 
App.5th at p. 311, fn. 13.)  The report noted that recent 
investigations had uncovered “schemes by bail agents to scoop 
business away from competitors by rewarding jail inmates with 
money added to their jail accounts for providing information 
about newly booked individuals in the jails.”  (Cal. Dept. of 
 
17  
See also Bail Bondsmen Activities Probed, San Pedro 
News-Pilot (June 24, 1941) p. 2; Bail Broker Control Bill in 
Assembly, Oakland Tribune, supra, at p. 5. 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
31 
Insurance, Recommendations for California’s Bail System, 
supra, at p. 6.)  Those investigations found that the schemes 
undermined the security conditions within the jail because the 
inmates recruited to provide such information would frequently 
threaten or pressure other inmates to engage the services of 
certain bail bond firms and would retaliate against those 
working for rival businesses.  (See Lewis, Inside Santa Clara 
Jails, Predatory Bail Schemes Flourished for Years, supra, 
KQED.)  Other states have grappled with similar problems 
arising from similar notification arrangements.  (See, e.g., State 
of N.J., Com. of Investigation, Inside Out:  Questionable and 
Abusive Practices in New Jersey’s Bail-Bond Industry, supra, at 
pp. 12–13.)  By prohibiting such schemes, section 2076 directly 
serves the state’s substantial interests in avoiding such adverse 
consequences. 
Finally, we must consider whether section 2076 is “more 
extensive than is necessary to serve” those substantial 
governmental interests.  (Central Hudson, supra, 447 U.S. at 
p. 566.)  This step of the analysis requires that there be a “ ‘ “fit” 
between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to 
accomplish those ends,’ [citation] — a fit that is not necessarily 
perfect, but reasonable.”  (Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N.Y. 
v. Fox, supra, 492 U.S. at p. 480.)  Unlike strict scrutiny, 
intermediate scrutiny does not require the Legislature to choose 
the “least restrictive means,” so long as the means are “narrowly 
tailored to achieve the desired objective.”  (Ibid.; Florida Bar v. 
Went For It, Inc., supra, 515 U.S. at p. 632.) 
As applied to arrangements with jail inmates, section 
2076 is narrowly tailored because it prohibits only the very 
“arrangement[s]” or “understanding[s]” that have led to the 
unfair competitive practices and jail administration issues 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
32 
identified by the Attorney General.  As we have already 
explained (see pp. 10–11, ante), Martinez overstates the scope of 
section 2076 when she contends that the regulation prohibits 
bail licensees from receiving information about recent arrests.  
Instead, while the regulation does forbid both formal and less 
formal arrangements between licensed bail bond agents and 
inmates about the sharing of arrest information, bail licensees 
are free to obtain that information through public records 
requests or any other publicly available source.   
Moreover, Martinez is incorrect when she argues that 
other provisions — like California Code of Regulations, title 10, 
section 2079.1, which prohibits bail licensees from directly 
soliciting arrestees who have not requested their services, and 
Penal Code section 160, which prohibits bail licensees from 
employing inmates to solicit arrestees on the licensees’ behalf — 
suffice to address the governmental interests at stake.  In 
making this argument, Martinez repeats the error of the Court 
of Appeal, which failed to appreciate that California Code of 
Regulations, title 10, section 2076 addresses distinct harms to 
fair competition and secure jail administration that can arise 
from even lawful solicitation practices that capitalize on 
asymmetric access to information about new arrestees. 
In sum, our opinion today assumes without deciding that 
section 2076 burdens a protected speech right.  To the extent it 
does, we hold that intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny 
applies, and that section 2076 passes muster.  The Court of 
Appeal erred in concluding that the People had failed to make a 
sufficient showing that section 2076 directly advances the 
state’s interests.  The court’s analysis focused narrowly on the 
question whether the regulation would deter the unlawful 
solicitation of arrestees.  Its attention thus diverted, the court 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
33 
failed to consider other substantial interests at stake — 
interests that the regulation is, in fact, narrowly drawn to 
advance.  Martinez’s facial challenge to the regulation therefore 
fails.  
We emphasize that our conclusion is limited to the facial 
validity of the regulation.  A litigant mounting a facial challenge 
bears a formidable burden to demonstrate the regulation’s 
invalidity in “at least ‘ “the generality” ’ [citation] or ‘vast 
majority’ ” of cases.  (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles 
County Office of Education, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 218.)  This is 
an “exacting” standard (ibid.) — understandably so, because the 
consequence of facial invalidation is to undo the work of the 
political branches of government, without regard to the 
circumstances of the case at hand (Washington State Grange v. 
Washington State Republican Party (2008) 552 U.S. 442, 450–
451).  Our decision, however, does not foreclose future as-applied 
challenges to section 2076 — either to applications of the law to 
inmate arrangements that might, under the circumstances of a 
particular case, raise distinct constitutional concerns, or to 
arrangements with other groups of informants.  Although 
Martinez has not prevailed in her argument for invalidating 
section 2076 on its face, our holding today leaves open the 
possibility that other litigants may raise more particularized 
challenges. 
 
 
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
34 
IV. 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    KRUGER, J. 
 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Martinez 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 59 Cal.App.5th 280 
Review Granted (unpublished) 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S267138 
Date Filed:  August 24, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Santa Clara 
Judge:  Socrates Peter Manoukian 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Law Office of John Rorabaugh, John Mark Rorabaugh; and Lori A. 
Quick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Michael J. Mongan, 
State Solicitor General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Janill L. Richards, Principal Deputy State Solicitor General, 
Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Samuel T. Harbourt, 
Deputy State Solicitor General, René A. Chacón and Julia Y. Je, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
John Mark Rorabaugh 
Law Office of John Rorabaugh 
801 Parkcenter Drive, Suite 205 
Santa Ana, CA 92705 
(714) 617-9600 
 
Samuel T. Harbourt 
Deputy State Solicitor General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 
(415) 510-3919