Case Title: Juergensen v. Isern Drilling Co.

Citation: 197 Kan. 804, 421 P.2d 11

Docket Number: 44,675

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1966-12-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
197 Kan. 804 (1966)
421 P.2d 11
ANDREW P. JUERGENSEN, Appellant,
v.
ISERN DRILLING COMPANY and EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellees.
No. 44,675

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 10, 1966.
M. John Carpenter, of Great Bend, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellant.
H. Lee Turner, of Great Bend, argued the cause, and J. Eugene Balloun and James L. Berglund, both of Great Bend, were with him on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court affirming an order of the Workmen's Compensation Director denying an award of compensation.
The facts are not in dispute.
The claimant, now the appellant, was on the payroll of the respondent, the Isern Drilling Company, at a monthly salary of $375. The respondent is an oil drilling company and as such is required to carry workmen's compensation coverage. During the winter the claimant worked as a roustabout on the oil drilling sites. This work consisted of heavy manual labor, but during the summer and fall he was directed by his employer to take care of the lawns of Mr. *805 Milton Isern, the owner of the company, Mr. Isern's son, his son-in-law and his mother.
On November 6, 1963, at about 10 o'clock A.M., while operating a power lawn mower, mowing the lawn of Milton Isern, he experienced a choking feeling and a pain in the upper part of his chest. He got a drink of water, rested awhile, and the pain disappeared. He then continued with his work. A short time later he had a similar pain but it was more severe so he quit work and drove to see his doctor who hospitalized him.
The claimant was in the hospital for thirty days; went home for thirty days; was back in the hospital for another thirty days, and finally resumed the same type of work that he had been doing prior to his hospitalization.
It was the opinion of the family physician, who did not claim to be a specialist in internal medicine, that the work claimant was doing precipitated the heart attack. Three physicians who were specialists in cardiology were of the opinion that there was no causal relationship between the work the claimant was doing and his heart attack. The examiner concluded:
Based on the above findings an award of compensation was denied. On an application for review by the Director of Workmen's Compensation the examiner's conclusions were affirmed.
The claimant appealed to the district court where a memorandum decision was entered which reads in part:
The claimant has appealed to this court making two basic contentions, i.e., (1) the trial court erred in concluding that the claimant was engaged in an agricultural pursuit at the time of his alleged accidental injury, and (2) the trial court erred in not concluding that claimant was engaged in employment covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act at the time of the injury.
Although the specific question is perhaps immaterial we are forced to agree with the appellant that he was not engaged in an agricultural pursuit at the time of the alleged accidental injury.
The undisputed facts are that the employment of the appellant during the summer and fall consisted of taking care of the lawns of the owner of the company, his son, his son-in-law and his mother, and that he was mowing the lawn of the owner of the company when he experienced his physical difficulty.
It is from the above facts that the trial court concluded that the appellant sustained his injury while doing gardening work and that gardening is agricultural work.
"Agricultural pursuits," as used in K.S.A. 44-505 and declared to be nonhazardous and exempt from the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, anticipates engagement in an enterprise conducted for profit. Appellant's work at the time of his physical difficulty consisted of that of a yardman who took care of the yards at four private residences. A yardman for urban residences cannot be classified as employed in an agricultural pursuit.
However, it would appear to be immaterial to the determination of the controversy whether the appellant was employed in an agricultural pursuit which is specifically exempt from the provisions of *807 the act, or some other nonhazardous employment such as gardening or yard work which is not covered by the act. The latter is just as free from the Workmen's Compensation Act as the former. Neither can come within the provisions of the act unless there is an election to be so covered.
Although the district court suggested generally that it was adopting the findings of the Examiner it later limited its findings to the single issue of whether appellant was engaged in employment covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Our consideration is therefore limited to the single issue.
K.S.A. 44-505 designates the employment to which the act shall apply. It reads in part:
..............
This section also makes provisions for employers carrying on a nonhazardous work, trade or business to elect to come within the act. Oil and gas drilling is brought within the act by the definition of mine. (K.S.A. 44-508 [c].)
To come within the operation of the Workmen's Compensation Act a workman must be employed in one of the various classes of enterprises named in the statute or there must have been an election by the employer to do so.
It is clear that the well drilling operations of the respondent were covered by the act. It is equally clear that employment for gardening or yard work was not, and there had been no election to bring such employment within the act.
We have stated:
It would appear that the appellant worked about half the year in the oil fields and about half the year as a yardman. This nature of employment had continued for six years. The work was not interchangeable. He was either employed at one job or the other for the full period. The yard work had no connection with the drilling operations.
The appellant contends that because he was employed by the respondent drilling company and paid by it, he was covered under the act as a drilling company employee. We cannot agree. An employer may have various trades or businesses, some of which are within the act and others which are not. (Shrout v. Lewis, 147 Kan. 592, 77 P.2d 973; Davis v. Julian, 152 Kan. 749, 107 P.2d 745; Thorp v. Victory Cab Co., 172 Kan. 384, 240 P.2d 128.)
We stated in Shrout v. Lewis, 147 Kan. 592, 595, 77 P.2d 973:
The fact that an employer is engaged in a hazardous enterprise does not subject the nonhazardous business or employment to the statute. The right of one employed both as an exempt worker and in an occupation covered by the compensation act to compensation for an injury depends on the nature of the duties he was performing at the time he was injured. One employed in nonhazardous work and also in a covered employment is not entitled to compensation when injured in the course of the nonhazardous work.
We do not have under consideration a situation where an employee was temporarily taken from his usual employment to mow *809 a yard. Neither do we have two types of employment which are incidental or casually related to each other. We have two unrelated employments continuing separately for six month periods.
Campos v. Garden City Co., 166 Kan. 352, 355, 356, 201 P.2d 1017 is the controlling case in Kansas on this question. Although one of the employments under consideration was agricultural, the same rule must apply to other pursuits not covered by the act. We there stated:
..............
We are forced to conclude that during the summer and fall the appellant was engaged in yard work or gardening for residential lawns and was so engaged at the time he suffered physical difficulty. Such employment was nonhazardous and not covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The judgment is affirmed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.