Case Title: Ex Parte JR

Citation: 896 So. 2d 416

Docket Number: 1021965

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
896 So. 2d 416 (2004)
Ex parte J.R.
(In re J.R.
v.
State Department of Human Resources).
1021965.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 4, 2004.
*417 Martha E. Williams, Cullman, for petitioner.
William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen.; Nathan A. Forrester and J. Coleman Campbell, deputy attys. gen.; and Lynn S. Merrill and Connie M. Carraway, asst. attys. gen., Department of Human Resources, for respondent.
HARWOOD, Justice.
The petitioner, J.R., sought a writ of certiorari from this Court to review the Court of Civil Appeals' no-opinion affirmance of the juvenile court's termination of her parental rights to her minor child, J.L.R. We granted the writ on November 3, 2003, to consider J.R.'s contentions (1) that Darrell R. and Lisa R., the child's paternal uncle and his wife, might represent a viable custodial alternative to the termination of her parental rights and (2) *418 that prejudicial error occurred in connection with the admission at trial of a report containing hearsay.
The record reveals that on March 7, 2002, the Cullman County Department of Human Resources ("DHR") petitioned the Juvenile Court of Cullman County for permanent custody of J.L.R., stating:
The Cullman County Juvenile Court heard the matter on August 23, 2002, and entered the order terminating J.R.'s parental rights on September 23, 2002; that order stated, in pertinent part:
J.R. and Darrell R. and Lisa R.[1] separately appealed to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals. In both appeals, the Court of Civil Appeals unanimously affirmed the decision of the juvenile court, without an opinion. J.R. v. Dep't of Human Res. (No. 2020042, June 13, 2003), 885 So. 2d 859 (Ala.Civ.App.2003)(table), and D.R. & L.R. v. Dep't of Human Res. (No. 2020068, June 13, 2003), 885 So. 2d 859 (Ala.Civ.App.2003). Darrell and Lisa did not petition this Court for certiorari review of the Court of Civil Appeals' decision. J.R. argues in her brief to this Court that (1) hearsay evidence in the form of a voluminous report marked as DHR Exhibit # 3 was improperly admitted into evidence in *420 the trial court, and (2) that her parental rights were terminated even though a viable family resource was available.
The record reveals that J. and J.R. had one child, J.L.R., a daughter, born to the marriage. J.R.'s daughter M.H. was also a member of the household unit, and the older of the two girls. In 1993, as a result of an automobile accident, J.R. became a quadriplegic. At the time of the accident, J.L.R. was a newborn and M.H. was approximately eight years old. As a result of that accident, M.H.'s responsibilities around the household increased dramatically and over time she became the primary caregiver for both J.R. and J.L.R. Her duties included feeding, washing, bathing, and clothing her half sister, and also taking care of household chores. The record indicates that by the time M.H. was 13 she was also responsible for driving the family's vehicle whenever that need arose.
In December 1998, the Cullman County DHR began an investigation into the household, based on a report that M.H. had become the primary caretaker in the household. The report indicated that M.H. had missed or been late to school approximately 29 times the previous school year because her household responsibilities prevented her from getting enough sleep. Also, it was alleged that J. had sexually abused M.H., beginning when she was nine years old, approximately three to four times a month. It was also alleged that the abuse sometimes took place in front of J.L.R. On December 4, 1998, J. admitted to sexually abusing M.H. and was charged with rape, sodomy, sexual abuse, and incest. That same day, J.L.R. and M.H. were placed in the temporary custody of DHR pending the outcome of a 72-hour hearing. J. subsequently pleaded guilty to three counts of sexual abuse in the first degree and was sentenced to three years in the state penitentiary. Because J. was to be incarcerated, the court returned J.L.R. and M.H. to J.R.'s custody on December 14, 1998.
The next day M.H. overdosed on Valium while at school. Methadone was also found in her possession. Testimony in the record reveals her reason for taking the Valium:
Shortly thereafter, DHR removed both children from the household, placing J.L.R. in foster care and M.H. with her father. J.L.R. was reunited with J.R. in January 1999. The reunification took place in the home of J.R.'s parents, who lived "across the road" and "up the hill" from J.R.'s house. Also living at that residence was J.R.'s mentally handicapped younger sister. J.R., J.L.R., and J.R.'s younger sister all shared one room while J.R. and J.L.R. lived with J.R.'s parents.
On May 6, 1999, DHR allowed J.R. and J.L.R. to return to J.R.'s house, but mandated that an adult, other than J.R., be present at all times. DHR subsequently received a report from J.L.R.'s school that she was coming to school unkempt and that her clothes were not clean. Shortly after receiving that report, DHR removed J.L.R. from J.R.'s custody and placed her back in foster care for the following reasons:
Because J.R.'s mother wanted to sleep in her own bed, she started leaving J.R. and J.L.R. alone and unattended at night.
On July 6, 1999, J.R. was evaluated by Patrick Dunne, a psychologist at Altamount Counseling Associates. In his report, which came into evidence as a part of the challenged DHR Exhibit # 3, he concluded that J.R. appeared to be incapable of placing her children's needs above her own. Specifically, he reported:
In September 1999, DHR conducted a home evaluation of the residence of J.R.'s parents to determine whether it was a suitable environment for J.L.R. The report of this home evaluation, entered into evidence also as a part of DHR Exhibit # 3, concluded that it was not, stating, in pertinent part:
(Emphasis added.) On April 3, 2000, J.R. was seen by Dr. Donald Garcia. According to a lengthy "consultation" report he authored, which came into evidence as a part of DHR Exhibit # 3, he was asked to perform a psychiatric evaluation of J.R. because of rectal and vaginal injuries she had sustained during "consensual sex" with a boyfriend. Dr. Garcia concluded in his report that J.R. was mentally and emotionally unable to make sound decisions, finding that "[t]he patient has a habit of minimizing her responsibility for problems, minimizing the poor choices she has made, and has not shown very much responsibility or good judgment in handling her injury and subsequent needs," and that "[t]he patient has demonstrated an inability to make sound judgments which has affected not only her own health but the health and welfare of her children."
Soon after Dr. Garcia's report, J.R.'s parents decided they could no longer take care of her needs and placed her in a nursing home. Meanwhile, beginning in 2000, Darrell and Lisa began expressing interest in being considered as a viable family resource. Darrell was in the United States Army and they were based in North Carolina at the time. The North Carolina counterpart to DHR approved them as a relative resource through the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children ("ICPC"). Later that year, however, Darrell was transferred to Alabama. He requested a home study be done on his residence, which, according to his testimony, was denied because "[DHR social worker Akridge] petitioned the Court that I not get to see [J.L.R.] again and that I couldn't get visitation at that time." Darrell contacted the Cullman County DHR again in March 2002, requesting he be allowed to visit J.L.R. and take her on a trip to Walt Disney World. DHR denied this request because, it says, there was a lack of substantial relationship between Darrell and J.L.R.
At the time of the August 2002 termination hearing, J.R. was in need of 24-hour care and admitted to the court that she was not physically able to care for herself or J.L.R.:
After the hearing, the court entered a final judgment terminating J.R.'s parental rights as to J.L.R.
The legal standards governing the process of the termination of parental rights are well settled.
J.V. v. State Dep't of Human Res., 656 So. 2d 1234, 1235 (Ala.Civ.App.1995) (citations omitted).
In Ex parte Brooks, 513 So. 2d 614 (Ala.1987),[2] this Court stated:
513 So. 2d  at 617. The legal principles noted in these authorities have resulted in a two-pronged test that has been implemented and followed by the Court of Civil Appeals in parental-rights-termination cases:
G.D.M. v. State, 655 So. 2d 1020, 1022 (Ala.Civ.App.1995). See also L.A.G. v. State Dep't of Human Res., 681 So. 2d 596 (Ala.Civ.App.1996); J.W. v. Mobile County Dep't of Human Res., 677 So. 2d 782 (Ala.Civ.App.1996).
J.R. concedes that the first prong of the test was met. It is the second prong  the determination that there was no viable alternative to the termination of her parental rights  that she argues has not been met.
This case presents an unusual situation. Although J.R.'s parental rights were terminated, she is not the one seeking to regain custody of J.L.R.; rather, she challenges the termination on the ground that Darrell and Lisa were a viable family resource and, therefore, that there were less drastic measures for the court to take than terminating her parental rights. *424 J.R., along with Darrell and Lisa, insisted in their briefs to the Court of Civil Appeals that "[d]uring the trial both the uncle and aunt and the maternal grandparents of the minor child presented themselves to the Court as ready[,] willing and able to take custody of [J.L.R.] ..."
Akridge testified that there were two main reasons DHR did not consider Darrell and Lisa a viable family resource. First, DHR was concerned with the amount of contact Darrell would have with his brother J., J.L.R.'s father, who had been convicted of sexually abusing J.L.R.'s half sister, M.H. When asked why Darrell and Lisa were no longer being considered a viable family resource, Akridge replied:
As noted above, this concern regarding Darrell's contact with his brother stemmed from Akridge's observation of J. and Darrell together outside the courthouse after the November 2001 custody hearing. However, Darrell testified as follows concerning the events of that day:
*425 Further, Akridge admitted that she merely observed Darrell and J. together once and that she had no knowledge of the reason of their interaction on that occasion.
Thus, Akridge's fears that there would be a relationship between Darrell and J., though heightened during the observation of the two together, could have been allayed after an investigation of the facts of Darrell's relationship with his brother. There is no indication, however, that DHR ever undertook such an investigation.
Akridge's second reason for rejecting Darrell and Lisa for custody consideration as a viable alternative less drastic than the termination of J.R.'s parental rights was based on the alleged lack of efforts by Darrell and Lisa to establish and maintain a relationship with J.L.R. Akridge testified:
However, Darrell testified as follows:
Further testimony from Darrell regarding his alleged failure to maintain a relationship with [J.L.R.] included the following:
In fact, Akridge admitted the following:
The only inference to be drawn from this evidence is that Darrell and Lisa had offered themselves as a custodial resource for J.L.R., but DHR, by Akridge's admission, did not fully investigate their potential as a viable family resource before deciding that they did not qualify as a viable resource.
Darrell has been employed with the United States Army for almost 17 years; his current rank is staff sergeant. When questioned about his home life, Darrell stated the following:
"DHR  not the prospective custodian  has the burden of initiating investigations, and it is DHR's burden to prove the unsuitability of one who seeks to be considered as the custodian of a dependent child." D.S.S. v. Clay County Dep't of Human Res., 755 So. 2d 584, 591 (Ala.Civ.App.1999).
The record clearly indicates that Darrell and Lisa expressed an interest in being considered as a relative resource and pursued that interest through two levels of court proceedings. DHR presented no evidence that clearly indicated why Darrell and Lisa were "unsuitable" as an alternative family resource, a decision far less drastic than terminating J.R.'s parental rights. Accordingly, the order of termination was erroneous on that account, and the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals affirming that order is reversed and this cause is remanded for the Court of Civil Appeals to remand it to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Because we are remanding the cause for further proceedings, we also address briefly the hearsay issue. As recently confirmed in Y.M. v. Jefferson County Department of Human Resources, 890 So. 2d 114 (Ala.2004), a parental-rights-termination hearing is an adjudicatory proceeding at which hearsay evidence is inadmissible.
Y.M., 890 So. 2d  at 117-118 (footnote omitted).
In the parental-termination proceeding underlying the appeal in L.A.C. v. State Department of Human Resources, 890 So. 2d 1026 (Ala.Civ.App.2003), referenced in Y.M., the trial judge allowed a DHR social worker to vouch for a report contained in the DHR file that had been prepared by an employee of the Children's *429 Hospital intervention program. The mother whose parental rights DHR was seeking to terminate objected to the admission of the report on the ground that the report was hearsay, arguing that the proper foundational witnesses were the personnel of the Children's Hospital intervention program responsible for the report.
L.A.C., 890 So. 2d  at 1034.
Ex parte Frith, 526 So. 2d 880 (Ala.1987), is indeed apposite authority, establishing that the recipient and custodian of a letter received by a psychiatric social worker in the regular course of her business could not testify that the letter was made in the regular course of her business because the letter was authored by a third party, a staff psychiatrist at Bryce Hospital, who was not associated with the recipient's business in any way.
Akridge's predicate testimony was as follows:
In light of the holdings of Y.M. and L.A.C., supra, the trial court should consider in connection with the further proceedings to be conducted on remand in this case whether Akridge's testimony was sufficient to lay the proper predicate under Rule 803(6) for admission of all of the reports contained in DHR Exhibit # 3.
*430 For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.
[1]  Darrell is J.'s brother, and he and his wife Lisa assert that they represent a viable family resource. They participated in the proceedings in the juvenile court, where they were represented by counsel.
[2]  Ex parte Brooks has been overruled to the extent it held that a parent must prove a child is "dependent" before seeking to terminate the rights of the other parent. Ex parte Beasley, 564 So. 2d 950 (Ala.1990).
[3]  J. was living with his parents at this time.