Case Title: Day v. Davidson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-12-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Day v. Davidson1997 WY 160951 P.2d 378Case Number: 96-266Decided: 12/24/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming
 

CLEMENTINE DAY and ANTOINE DAY,  

Appellants (Plaintiffs), 

 

v. 

 

KEITH DAVIDSON,  

Appellee (Defendant).

 

Appeal 
from The District Court of Fremont County

The 
Honorable D. Terry Rogers, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants: 

Robert W. 
Horn and Vonde M. Smith of Robert W. Horn, P.C., 
Jackson.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

Patrick J. 
Murphy of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., 
Casper.

 

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

THOMAS, Justice. 

[¶1]      The question in 
this case is the effect to be given a judgment, based on vicarious liability and 
entered against an employer, following an offer of judgment and acceptance of 
that offer, in a subsequent action brought against the negligent employee. After 
accepting an offer of judgment made by Pamida, Inc. (Pamida), which was entered 
and satisfied, Clementine Day and Antoine Day (Days) brought this action against 
Keith Davidson (Davidson). The judgment against Pamida was based upon vicarious 
liability flowing from Davidson's negligent conduct. The trial court ruled that 
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel served as effective bars 
to the claims of the Days against Davidson, and it granted a summary judgment in 
favor of Davidson. We hold that res judicata and collateral estoppel are 
inapposite. We hold, however, that the consent judgment is to be treated the 
same as a judgment on the merits for purposes of applying the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) of JUDGMENTS §§ 50 and 51 (1982). We agree with the disposition of the 
trial court, albeit on a different ground, and the Order Granting Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is affirmed.

[¶2]      In the Brief of 
Appellant, filed by the Days, the issues are defined as 
follows:

I. Does a Judgment pursuant to an Offer of Judgment 
against an entity liable for a loss (Pamida) terminate a claim that the injured 
parties (Days) may have against another person who may also be liable (Davidson) 
although the Offer of Judgment does not clearly specify that it releases all 
liable parties?

II. Does Judgment against one of several persons 
liable for the same loss does [sic] have a preclusive effect against the 
remaining liable parties?

III. Where Judgment is entered pursuant to an Offer 
of Judgment, do the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel and judicial 
estoppel operate as a bar to a subsequent suit against a different tortfeasor 
arising out of the same set of facts?

In the Brief of Appellee, 
presented on behalf of Davidson, the issues are defined as 
follows:

I. Where the injured plaintiffs have received full 
payment (satisfaction) of a Judgment against an employer for personal injuries 
sustained in an accident, are those plaintiffs barred from further recovery 
against that employer's employee for the same injuries arising out of the same 
accident?

II. Did the district court properly rule that the 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel barred the plaintiffs from any 
recovery in this second lawsuit?

[¶3]      There is no 
dispute among these parties as to the operative facts. Clementine Day was 
shopping at the Pamida store in Lander on May 14, 1992. She was waiting in a 
checkout line when a bookcase, that had been placed on top of an adjacent 
counter, fell on her causing injuries to her back and neck. Davidson was the 
Pamida employee who had placed the bookcase on the adjacent customer service 
counter. The Days sued Pamida on a theory of negligence on November 18, 1993. 
The Days alleged:

At all times material hereto, the maintenance of the 
building, as well as the stacking of the shelves was the responsibility of 
employees of Pamida, Inc. acting with the scope and capacity of their 
employment.

[¶4]      In the course of 
that litigation, Pamida presented an Offer of Judgment which 
stated:

COMES NOW defendant Pamida, Inc., through counsel, 
and pursuant to Rule 68 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure hereby offers to 
allow judgment to be entered against it and in favor of both plaintiffs (jointly 
but not severally), for the total sum of SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND 
ONE DOLLARS ($75,501.00), together with costs accrued to 
date.

Subsequently the Days filed 
an Acceptance of Offer of Judgment, which provided:

COME NOW the plaintiffs, by and through counsel, and 
pursuant to Rule 68 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby gives notice 
of acceptance and hereby accepts the "Offer of Judgment" dated August 18, 1994 
and made on behalf of defendant Pamida, Inc. Said "Offer of Judgment" is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A".

The trial court then entered 
a Judgment in that case, in this language:

The defendant in the above-captioned case having 
filed and served an "Offer of Judgment" dated August 18, 1994, said offer of 
judgment being in the amount of "SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND ONE 
DOLLARS ($75,501.00), together with costs accrued to date", said offer of 
judgment being more fully incorporated herein by this reference; and the 
plaintiffs having accepted such judgment, pursuant to Rule 68 W.R.C.P.; and the 
plaintiffs having filed "Plaintiffs' Certificate of Costs" dated August 31, 
1994, and the Court being otherwise advised in the 
premises,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
plaintiffs Clementine Day and Antoine Day, jointly and severally recover of and 
from the defendant Pamida, Inc. the sum of $75,501.00 together with costs in 
this action of $768.10 and interest as provided by law.

[¶5]      Some six months 
later, the Days filed their Complaint in this case, naming Davidson as a 
defendant and asserting the same facts as had been relied upon in the action 
against Pamida. The Complaint alleged that Davidson was negligent in placing the 
bookcase on the customer service counter and that it fell on Day causing the 
same injuries. Davidson filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Summary 
Judgment, relying upon res judicata, collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel. 
The district court did not rely upon judicial estoppel, but it granted summary 
judgment based upon res judicata and collateral estoppel. Day appeals from the 
Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

[¶6]      The parties 
vigorously debate the application of our precedent addressing res judicata, 
collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel. Our conclusion, however, is that an 
employer and an employee are not in privity for the purpose of applying the 
rules of res judicata or collateral estoppel with respect to tort liability. As 
we have frequently done, we turn to the RESTATEMENTS OF THE LAW to address a 
novel question in our jurisdiction. E.g., Bigley v. Craven, 769 P.2d 892 (Wyo. 
1989); Toltec Watershed Imp. Dist. v. Johnston, 717 P.2d 808 (Wyo. 1986); 
Cervelli v. Graves, 661 P.2d 1032 (Wyo. 1983); Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167 
(Wyo. 1981); Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123 (Wyo. 1978); Meredith 
GMC, Inc. v. Garner, 78 Wyo. 396, 328 P.2d 371 (Wyo. 1958), and cases cited in 
those opinions.

[¶7]      In their brief, 
Days point to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 49, "A judgment against 
one person liable for a loss does not terminate a claim that the injured party 
may have against another person who may be liable therefore." Davidson prefers 
the application of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 50 and 51. Those 
sections provide:

§ 50. Discharge of Judgment Against One of Several 
Co-Obligors

When a judgment has been rendered against one of 
several persons each of whom is liable for a loss claimed in the action on which 
the judgment is based:

(1) A satisfaction or release of the judgment, or 
covenant not to execute upon it, or other agreement terminating in whole or in 
part the judgment debtor's obligation, does not discharge the liability of any 
of the other persons liable for the loss, except:

(a) To the extent that the agreement may so provide; 
and

(b) To the extent required by the law of 
suretyship.

(2) Any consideration received by the judgment 
creditor in payment of the judgment debtor's obligation discharges, to the 
extent of the amount of value received, the liability to the judgment creditor 
of all other persons liable for the loss.

§ 51. Persons Having a Relationship in 
Which One Is Vicariously Responsible for the Conduct of the 
Other

If two persons have a relationship such that one of 
them is vicariously responsible for the conduct of the other, and an action is 
brought by the injured person against one of them, the judgment in the action 
has the following preclusive effects against the injured person in a subsequent 
action against the other.

(1) A judgment against the injured person that bars 
him from reasserting his claim against the defendant in the first action 
extinguishes any claim he has against the other person responsible for the 
conduct unless:

(a) The claim asserted in the second action is based 
upon grounds that could not have been asserted against the defendant in the 
first action; or

(b) The judgment in the first action was based on a 
defense that was personal to the defendant in the first 
action.

(2) A judgment in favor of the injured person is 
conclusive upon him as to the amount of his damages, 
unless:

(a) There were limitations on the competence of the 
forum in the first action preventing him from obtaining the full measure of his 
damages, as stated in § 26(1)(c), or he exercised the option stated in § 
26(1)(e) to divide his claim; or

(b) Different rules govern the measure of damages in 
the two actions.

(3) If the action is brought against the primary 
obligor and judgment is against the injured person, it extinguishes the claim 
against the person vicariously responsible if under applicable law the latter is 
an indemnitor whose liability arises only when the primary obligor is found 
liable to the injured person.

(4) A judgment by consent for or 
against the injured person does not extinguish his claim against the person not 
sued in the first action except:

(a) In the circumstances stated in Subsection (3); 
and

(b) To the extent stated in § 
50.

[¶8]      In this instance, 
we are disposed to follow the rules articulated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS with the exception of the application of that rule set forth in 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 51(4):

(4) A judgment by consent for or against the injured 
person does not extinguish his claim against the person not sued in the first 
action except:

(a) In the circumstances stated in Subsection (3); 
and

(b) To the extent stated in § 
50.

It is clear that this 
provision in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS is premised upon the 
application of the contract theory of consent judgments. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. e. On this score, we prefer the view that even 
though a judgment is taken pursuant to the consent of the defendant, the 
judgment is to be treated the same as any other judgment, such as one entered 
after an adjudication on the merits.

[¶9]      Conflicting 
policy justifications exist for adoption of the contract theory with respect to 
consent judgments and what we denominate the "judgment" theory. We are 
persuaded, however, that a judgment, even though entered pursuant to an 
agreement of the parties, has all the authority of any other judgment. American 
Colloid Co. v. Hodel, 701 F. Supp. 1537 (D.Wyo. 1988). "A consent decree 
[judgment] * * * is an agreement that the parties desire and expect will be 
reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial decree that is subject to the 
rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees." Rufo v. Inmates of 
Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378, 112 S. Ct. 748, 757, 116 L. Ed. 2d 867, 883 
(1992), followed by, Satsky v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1468 
(10th Cir. 1993). Consequently, the effects of that judgment should not be any 
different. We specifically acknowledge that if pursuant to Rule 68 of the 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, known at the time of the operative facts in 
this case as an offer of judgment, the parties achieve an offer and acceptance 
which is filed with the court for the purpose of entry of judgment, those 
parties can, if the court is willing, address and agree upon the effect to be 
given to the judgment that is entered. If, as in this instance, that does not 
occur, then we hold the judgment must be treated as a judgment on the 
merits.

[¶10]   With respect to a judgment on the 
merits entered against an employer who is liable only because of vicarious 
liability, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 51 
provides:

(2) A judgment in favor of the injured person is 
conclusive upon him as to the amount of his damages, 
unless:

(a) There were limitations on the competence of the 
forum in the first action preventing him from obtaining the full measure of his 
damages, as stated in § 26(1)(e) to divide his claim; 
or

(b) Different rules govern the measure of damages in 
the two actions.

Neither of these exceptions 
is applicable in this instance. We turn then to the application of RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 50 which provides:

When a judgment has been rendered against one of 
several persons each of whom is liable for a loss claimed in the action on which 
the judgment is based: * * * 

(2) Any consideration received by the judgment 
creditor in payment of the judgment debtor's obligation discharges, to the 
extent of the amount of value received, the liability to the judgment creditor 
of all other persons liable for the loss.

The 
application of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS to an instance such as this 
resembles judicial estoppel although the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS does 
not rely upon that doctrine.

[¶11]   When read together, the pertinent 
provisions of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 50 and 51 in this instance 
provide the amount of damages obtained by the Days in the suit against Pamida, 
Inc. is the limit on the damages that may be claimed against Davidson, and 
Davidson is to be credited with that amount as to any judgment entered against 
him. Since it is apparent that in applying this rule the Days could recover no 
additional monies from Davidson, we agree with the decision of the district 
court to enter summary judgment in favor of Davidson.

[¶12]   The Order Granting Defendant's 
Motion For Summary Judgment is affirmed.