Case Title: P. v. Martinez

Citation: 47 Cal. 4th 399

Docket Number: S064574

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2009-08-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 8/13/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S064574 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
  
MICHAEL MATTHEW MARTINEZ, 
) 
 
) 
Alameda County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. H15696 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Defendant Michael Matthew Martinez appeals from the judgment of death 
imposed by the Alameda County Superior Court following his conviction of the 
first degree murder of Lisa White (Pen. Code, § 187)1 and the premeditated, 
attempted murder of Tara R.  (§§ 187, 664, subds. (a), (f).)  In connection with the 
murder charge, the jury found true the allegation that defendant personally used 
deadly weapons, specifically a hammer and a knife.  (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).)  In 
connection with the attempted murder charge, the jury found true the allegation 
that defendant inflicted great bodily injury.  (§ 12022.7.)  The jury found true a 
special circumstance allegation that the murder occurred while defendant was 
engaged in the commission, or attempted commission of, or flight after the 
performance of a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 years, in violation of 
section 288.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(E).)  After the penalty phase of the trial, the 
                                              
1  
Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 
2 
jury returned a verdict of death and the trial court imposed a sentence of death, 
also imposing a sentence of life imprisonment for the attempted murder, two one-
year terms of imprisonment for the weapons enhancements, and a three-year term 
for the great-bodily-injury enhancement.  Defendant‟s appeal is automatic.  
(§ 1239, subd. (b).) 
We affirm the judgment in its entirety for the reasons set forth below. 
I. 
FACTS 
A. Guilt Phase Evidence 
1. Prosecution evidence 
The murder victim, Lisa White, resided in Hayward with her daughter 
Amanda O., then two years of age.  White‟s other daughter, Tara R., was 10 years 
of age at the time of the charged offenses.  According to Tara‟s grandmother, 
Tara, after having been sexually abused by Amanda‟s father, was removed from 
her mother‟s home by the local child protective services agency and was placed 
for a period of approximately two years in a residential facility for psychiatric 
treatment.  Tara visited her mother and her sister from time to time on weekends 
and for holidays.   
White occasionally employed Lisa Gamaza as a babysitter.  According to 
Gamaza‟s testimony, White chastised Gamaza for permitting her boyfriend, 
defendant, to visit while Gamaza tended Tara and Amanda.  White explained to 
Gamaza that Amanda‟s father had sodomized and orally copulated Tara, and that 
Tara was in residential treatment as a result of that abuse.  Gamaza also testified 
that defendant had drawn a picture for Tara on one occasion, depicting a cross 
dripping with blood, surrounded by flowers.  Defendant ordinarily carried a buck 
knife on his hip.  Gamaza mentioned that White and defendant had engaged in 
3 
methamphetamine sales with one another.  Gamaza‟s relationship with defendant 
ended in May 1989.   
The charged offenses occurred in the early morning hours of December 22, 
1990, when Tara was at her mother‟s residence for her Christmas visit.  According 
to the testimony of defendant‟s acquaintance, Ron Casuga, defendant spent the 
preceding evening of December 21 at defendant‟s residence with Casuga and 
Casuga‟s girlfriend, Shonette Leite.  The group drank beer and smoked marijuana.  
According to Casuga, they moved to a bar, where they were joined by Jennifer 
Hartz.  At approximately 11:00 p.m., the party returned to defendant‟s residence 
and consumed more beer and marijuana.  Casuga testified that defendant departed 
with his neighbor, James Dyer, at approximately midnight.  Casuga and the other 
members of the group departed from defendant‟s residence at approximately 
3:00 a.m.  Casuga testified he left defendant a note explaining that because 
defendant had not returned, the rest of the group had departed.  
Dyer testified that late in the evening of December 21, 1989, defendant 
requested a ride to a nearby residence, which Dyer identified at trial as White‟s 
home.  According to Dyer, defendant entered the residence, then emerged to direct 
Dyer not to wait for him, because he would use the occupant‟s vehicle to return 
home.   
Tara testified that in the early morning hours of December 22, 1990, she 
was sleeping in her mother‟s room with her younger sister, Amanda, when she felt 
someone lift her up and carry her to her own room.  She discovered that she had 
been transported by defendant, with whom she was acquainted.  Tara testified that 
he ordered her to remove her clothing, then raped and sodomized her and forced 
her to orally copulate him.  Defendant informed Tara he would kill her and her 
mother if she told anyone what he had done.  Tara testified further that defendant 
struck her on the head and arm with a hammer.  She lost consciousness, then 
4 
awoke to hear her mother slam the door of her automobile and approach the 
residence.  Defendant ran out of Tara‟s room.  Tara observed him hiding behind 
the front door.  Tara testified that when her mother entered the residence, Tara 
screamed a warning and that defendant then struck White on the head repeatedly 
with a hammer.  After White fell to the floor, defendant went to the kitchen and 
retrieved a knife.  He stabbed White in the neck.  Tara testified that she ran to a 
neighbor‟s residence, pursued by defendant. 
Tara‟s testimony was marked by hostility to defense counsel, impulsive 
outbursts, and her refusal to answer questions until ordered to do so by the court.  
Her testimony contained some inaccuracies, such as her assertion she had 
encountered defendant in her mother‟s residence, confronted him, and disarmed 
him two days prior to the commission of the crimes — when Tara actually was in 
her group home in Sacramento.  In closing argument, the prosecutor 
acknowledged that Tara‟s testimony was inaccurate in some relatively 
unimportant respects and reflected her psychiatric problems.  The prosecutor 
pointed out, however, that her testimony was consistent in all significant respects 
with statements she made to police officers and medical examiners immediately 
following the crimes. 
Prosecution witness John Feeny confirmed that in the early morning hours 
of December 22, 1990, Tara appeared at his residence, which adjoined White‟s, 
and tapped on his front door.  He testified that she was clothed only in sweatpants, 
was bleeding from the face and chest, and wept uncontrollably.  At first Tara 
informed him that her mother had dropped her off in downtown Hayward and a 
man had beaten her.  Feeny was skeptical because he had observed White leave 
her home some 25 to 30 minutes prior to Tara‟s arrival.  Feeny had spoken to 
White, who had explained she was going to buy cigarettes.  He had assumed there 
5 
was another adult present at White‟s residence to care for Tara and Amanda 
during her absence. 
Feeny testified that shortly after he heard White‟s vehicle return, he heard 
loud banging, as if someone were affixing a nail to a wall to hang a picture.  
Approximately 10 minutes later, Tara arrived at his doorstep.   
Feeny testified that when he contacted a police department emergency 
dispatcher, Tara became distraught and stated that she had been beaten and raped 
by her mother‟s friend Mike, that Mike had killed her mother by hitting her on the 
head with a hammer, and that her mother‟s bloody body was lying on the floor of 
her home.  A tape-recording of the 911 call was played for the jury and confirmed 
Feeny‟s account of Tara‟s statements to the police dispatcher.  Feeny‟s testimony 
also was confirmed by that of his stepdaughter, Kimberly Hoskins, who was 
present when Tara arrived at Feeny‟s residence. 
Casuga, who testified concerning defendant‟s movements on December 21, 
1990, also stated that when he visited defendant on the morning of December 22, 
defendant informed him he had injured someone and thus had blood on his 
clothing.  According to Casuga, defendant instructed him to say defendant had 
been with Casuga all night if anyone should ask. 
Prosecution witness Linda Pedersen testified that defendant contacted her 
by telephone at approximately 3:00 a.m. on December 22, 1990.  Pedersen resided 
near White‟s residence.  Defendant informed her that he was stranded at a gas 
station located some six blocks from Pedersen‟s home, and he pleaded with her to 
pick him up in her automobile.  She was persuaded by his tone of desperation and 
drove to the gas station.  Following defendant‟s instructions, she parked at the side 
of the station.  Defendant emerged from a bathroom, jumped into her vehicle, and 
ordered her to drive away.  Pedersen noticed a red stain on defendant‟s jeans and 
testified that he refused to explain his circumstances.  Pedersen drove to her 
6 
residence, where defendant used the telephone, and then drove defendant to his 
own apartment. 
Prosecution witness Dyer testified that in the early morning hours of 
December 22, 1990, approximately three or four hours after he had driven 
defendant to White‟s residence, defendant knocked at his door and requested a 
ride to a grocery store.  Dyer testified that defendant appeared nervous, and that he 
slumped in his seat as Dyer drove.  Defendant informed Dyer he had a headache 
and needed to sleep.  Dyer purchased a soporific for him, and then drove 
defendant back to defendant‟s residence. 
Pediatric emergency physician William Hawk testified that when Tara 
arrived at Children‟s Hospital & Research Center Oakland (Children‟s Hospital) in 
the early morning hours of December 22, 1990, both bones in her left forearm 
were broken and she had suffered a laceration to her scalp that almost penetrated 
to her skull.  Her face, chest, and legs were bruised, and her lips were swollen and 
lacerated.  In Hawk‟s opinion, her head wound could have been inflicted by the 
claw of a hammer.  
Hawk testified that during his medical examination, Tara stated that 
“Michael M.” had threatened her and raped her.  She also identified her attacker as 
Michael Martinez and described him as a Hispanic male who was approximately 
25 years of age.  Hawk testified that Tara informed him defendant had placed his 
finger and his penis inside her vagina.  Although she initially reported that there 
had been no anal contact, subsequently she informed Hawk that defendant had 
placed his penis inside her rectum.  Tara also informed Hawk that she had been 
attacked with a hammer.  Hawk testified that his medical examination of Tara 
revealed trauma in the vicinity of the anus, denoting anal penetration, but there 
was no trauma to the vagina.  
7 
Alameda County Deputy Sheriff Claudette Center testified that on 
December 22, 1990, she responded to Feeny‟s residence, where she observed Tara 
bleeding profusely from a large head wound.  Screaming and weeping, Tara 
repeatedly declared, “she‟s dead, I saw her fall down dead, he killed her, he fucked 
me, he hit me — I have to go back.” 
Center testified that her inspection of the crime scene at White‟s residence 
revealed a pool of blood on the mattress in Tara‟s bedroom, blood spattered on the 
walls of the bedroom, and drops of blood on the floor leading to the corner of the 
room.  White‟s body was on the floor in a doorway between the kitchen and the 
living room of the residence.  Her skull and face had been beaten in, and she was 
impaled to the floor with a knife through her neck.  Her body was warm, and 
steam rose from the surrounding pools of blood.  The front door was spattered 
with blood. 
After inspecting the crime scene, Center followed Tara to Children‟s 
Hospital in Oakland.  Center had past experience as a social worker treating 
sexually abused children.  She testified that at the hospital, Tara gave her an 
anguished account of her experiences that night.  She testified that Tara informed 
her that defendant had carried her from her mother‟s bed to her own bed and, 
using graphic terms, Tara declared that defendant had raped her, sodomized her, 
and forced her to orally copulate him.  Tara added that defendant warned her not 
to say anything about what he had done.  He left the room and returned, then 
attacked her with a hammer and used “the sharp part” to strike her head.  Center 
testified Tara informed her she heard her mother return, heard yelling, and after 
Tara left her bed, witnessed defendant strike her mother on the head multiple 
times.  Tara stated she fled from the house, and then returned briefly with the 
objective of saving her younger sister, Amanda.  She fled when she heard noises 
inside the residence, and climbed over the fence to reach Feeny‟s residence.  
8 
Center testified that Tara displayed extreme emotional turmoil throughout the 
interview.   
Alameda County Deputy Sheriff Dale Toussaint testified that he conducted 
two tape-recorded interviews of Tara, one on the morning of December 22, 1990, 
and one on the afternoon of the same date.  The recordings were played for the 
jury.  The transcript of the recorded statements reflects that Tara was sleepy, a 
condition the officer attributed to medication.  Tara‟s statements were rambling, 
and it is difficult to determine whether she was offering a chronological account or 
merely blurting out each event as it occurred to her.  The interview was terminated 
and recommenced after several hours in order to accommodate Tara‟s need for 
rest.  At one point in her statements, Tara informed Toussaint that defendant was 
present in the residence before Tara went to bed on the night of the crimes, but 
subsequently she stated she was unaware of his presence until he woke her.  She 
stated that while she slept, “mommy left and then he watched us, and then he put 
me in my room and started fucking me.”  She added that defendant removed her 
pants and underpants but not her shirt, and raped her and forced her to orally 
copulate him; that at some point while assaulting her, he retrieved a knife; that he 
left her room and returned with a hammer, with which he struck her; that she heard 
her mother enter the residence and heard banging; and that she heard defendant 
stab her mother and then ran to Feeny‟s residence.  She would not acknowledge 
that she witnessed defendant‟s attack on her mother.  She repeatedly sought to 
terminate the second interview.  
Prosecution witness Sharon Smith, an Alameda County Sheriff‟s Office 
criminalist, testified that rectal, vaginal, and oral swabs taken from Tara on 
December 22, 1990, tested negative for semen.  Semen was present, however, on 
the exterior and interior of Tara‟s underpants, which had been removed and 
examined when Tara arrived at the hospital.  The underpants also bore blood and 
9 
possible fecal stains.  A sweatshirt removed from Tara‟s bedroom bore stains of 
semen and either fecal material or saliva on the lower front portion of the shirt.  
Tara‟s trousers bore bloodstains, but no evidence of semen was discovered on 
them.  Conventional testing for genetic markers indicated that defendant could not 
be excluded as the source of the semen stains on the underpants, although the 
result may have been influenced by the admixture of Tara‟s body fluids.  Smith 
also testified that jeans seized from defendant‟s apartment bore bloodstains that 
were consistent with White‟s blood but not with Tara‟s or defendant‟s blood.  
Blood collected from the hammer discovered near White‟s body matched White‟s 
blood, but not defendant‟s or Tara‟s.   
Samples from defendant‟s jeans and Tara‟s sweatshirt were submitted for 
DNA testing.  The stains from defendant‟s jeans matched White‟s DNA profile in 
four of six chromosomal tests; the remaining two tests were inconclusive.  The 
blood found on the hammer did not come from defendant‟s body.  The DNA of the 
semen sample taken from the sweatshirt matched defendant‟s DNA profile in five 
of six chromosomal tests; the sixth was inconclusive.  The frequency with which 
defendant‟s genetic profile would appear in the population was 1 out of 250 
million persons belonging to the southwestern United States Hispanic population, 
1 out of 760 million persons belonging to the Black population, 1 out of 890 
million persons belonging to the White population, and 1 out of 480 million 
persons belonging to the southeastern Hispanic population. 
White‟s body was examined for evidence of sperm but none was found.  
The cause of her death was acute trauma to the head, and her injuries were 
consistent with hammer blows.  She also had been stabbed twice in the neck.  
When her body was discovered on the floor of her home, a knife had penetrated 
her neck and the floor beneath her.  The handle of the hammer that was recovered 
near her body was split. 
10 
Prosecution witnesses Pedersen and Casuga testified they were present in 
defendant‟s residence on the evening of December 22, 1990, along with two other 
persons, when the police arrived and knocked on the door.  Both witnesses 
testified that the officers announced several times that they had an arrest warrant.  
According to the witnesses, defendant directed all those present to remain silent, 
and then proceeded up the stairs to the second story.  The police broke down the 
door and ejected Pedersen and the other occupants of the room. 
Sergeant John Reasoner of the Alameda County Sheriff‟s Office testified 
that he and his partner went to defendant‟s residence on the evening of December 
22, 1990, to serve an arrest warrant.  Upon their arrival, they heard voices coming 
from inside the apartment.  The officers identified themselves several times, then 
effected a forced entry.  Reasoner testified that the arresting officers conducted a 
search for defendant, and that when they announced they would release a police 
dog and began to ascend the stairs to the second story, defendant surrendered and 
was placed under arrest. 
2. Defense evidence 
Defendant testified in his own defense.  He admitted that he killed White, 
but denied assaulting Tara or, indeed, even having seen her or having had any 
contact with her on the evening of White‟s death. 
Defendant testified he had sold controlled substances to friends for 
approximately 10 years prior to committing the charged offenses.  He testified that 
on December 21, 1990, he had been under the influence of methamphetamine and 
unable to sleep for six days.  He described further heavy use of this drug at various 
points during that day.  He felt “amped” or “unreal.”  
Defendant testified that he consumed alcohol and smoked marijuana in his 
apartment with Casuga and Leite.  The party, joined by Hartz, proceeded to a bar.  
11 
Defendant consumed two strong alcoholic drinks and ingested methamphetamine.  
The group returned to defendant‟s residence, where defendant drank two beers and 
ingested additional methamphetamine.  Because White telephoned to say she 
wished to purchase methamphetamine, defendant secured a ride to her residence 
from Dyer.  Before he reached White‟s residence, he visited Pedersen and ingested 
methamphetamine.  At White‟s residence, defendant requested the use of White‟s 
automobile.  Although they failed to agree on a price for his use of her vehicle, 
defendant returned to Dyer‟s vehicle to say he would not need a ride.  Defendant 
gave Dyer some methamphetamine, and Dyer departed. 
Defendant testified that he and White injected methamphetamine in Tara‟s 
empty, darkened bedroom.  According to him, he and White had sexual 
intercourse on Tara‟s bed.  Defendant testified he ejaculated on the bed.  He 
claimed that he and White argued concerning his use of her vehicle.  She 
demanded a gram of methamphetamine in exchange for his using the vehicle and 
departed to buy cigarettes, returning after five or 10 minutes.  When she returned, 
the argument continued concerning trading methamphetamine for defendant‟s use 
of the vehicle.  After White hit him in the chest, he pushed her.  She then swung at 
defendant with a hammer.  He became angry and struck her in the face.  When she 
fell to the ground, he retrieved the hammer and used it to beat White‟s face and 
head.  Defendant testified that the next thing he remembered was Pedersen 
arriving to give him a ride to her residence, and then to his own apartment.  He did 
not realize he had killed White.  He testified he did not observe Tara or interact 
with her that evening. 
Defendant further testified that when the police arrived at his residence on 
December 22, 1990, they knocked on the door but failed to identify themselves.  
According to defendant, because the officers did not respond when he questioned 
them, he mounted the stairs to reach an upstairs window that could afford a view 
12 
of the front door.  He denied requesting that the other persons present remain 
silent. 
The defense presented the testimony of John Schlim, an expert on the 
subject of methamphetamine use.  He testified concerning the generally 
deleterious effects of habitual methamphetamine use on the body, including 
sleeplessness, and on behavior, noting an increased incidence of sudden bursts of 
paranoia, hostility, and aggression.  He also testified that tests of blood and urine 
samples extracted from White‟s body indicated a high level of methamphetamine 
intoxication at the time of her death.  In Schlim‟s opinion, the tests demonstrated 
White had ingested a large dose of methamphetamine approximately 10 to 14 
hours prior to her death. 
B. Penalty Phase Evidence 
1. Prosecution evidence 
The prosecution introduced evidence implicating defendant in the 
uncharged murder of another woman, Christine Parks, whose body was discovered 
on October 29, 1989, in an alleyway next to an athletic field.  The victim‟s dress 
had been pulled up above her waist.  The entire body was smeared with blood and 
dirt and bore evidence of multiple blunt force traumas.  In addition, there were 22 
stab wounds, including multiple injuries to the face, neck, chest, arms, and hands.  
All had been inflicted while the victim was alive.  Tire tread marks were evident in 
the dirt next to the body.  Death was caused by the stab wounds and the blunt force 
injury.  The latter was consistent with the victim‟s having been run over by an 
automobile.  An autopsy disclosed that the victim had injested multiple controlled 
substances. 
In connection with this earlier incident, prosecution witness Denise Alden 
testified that defendant had borrowed an automobile from her.  Early one morning 
13 
in the autumn of 1989, defendant returned the vehicle in a badly damaged 
condition.  Defendant‟s finger was lacerated, and his clothing bore bloodstains.  
The front end and one side of the vehicle had been damaged.  The exterior had 
been cleaned but there were puddles of blood on the front passenger seat and on 
the floor.   
Alden testified that defendant informed her he had witnessed a beating and 
had given aid to the victim, a man.  She testified that according to defendant, the 
victim‟s assailants then attacked defendant.  Defendant told her he had driven 
away, dropping off the victim at the latter‟s request.  Alden testified that she 
witnessed defendant washing blood from a knife. 
Alden further testified that she and defendant cleaned the interior of the 
vehicle at a carwash facility.  The victim‟s handbag subsequently was discovered 
in a dumpster near the facility.  
Alden‟s stepfather, Chester O‟Steen, testified that when defendant returned 
Alden‟s vehicle in damaged condition, O‟Steen directed defendant to show him 
the location where the purported attack had occurred and the vehicle had been 
damaged.  Defendant did so, but there was no broken glass or evidence of paint or 
blood at that location to corroborate defendant‟s story. 
Prosecution witness Gamaza testified that prior to defendant‟s commission 
of the presently charged offenses, defendant informed her he had killed a man by 
running him over with an automobile belonging to his then-girlfriend, Denise 
Alden.  According to Gamaza‟s testimony, defendant explained he was delivering 
controlled substances when the man approached him and attacked him, cutting 
defendant‟s finger.  Defendant bragged that he had run over the individual several 
times to make certain that he was dead. 
14 
Prosecution witness Erik Eastman testified that in 1996, when he and 
defendant were prisoners at Santa Rita Jail, defendant struck him twice without 
provocation.   
White‟s mother, Sondra Filson, testified concerning the impact of White‟s 
death on her.  She also described the traumatic effect of the crimes on Tara and 
Tara‟s sister, Amanda. 
2. Defense evidence 
Defendant‟s half brother, Steve Martinez, testified regarding the harsh 
treatment received by defendant at the hands of their mother when they were 
children.  He recounted episodes of physical abuse inflicted on defendant by his 
mother.  Defendant‟s half brother and his sister, Jessica Marie Hutchinson, 
testified that defendant‟s mother always blamed defendant for a brain aneurysm 
that substantially disabled defendant‟s father when defendant was 14 years of age.  
According to these witnesses, defendant‟s mother believed an incident in which 
defendant accidentally struck his father‟s head while closing a garage door was the 
cause of the aneurysm that occurred months later. 
II.  
DISCUSSION 
A. Marsden Inquiry   
Defendant contends the trial court erred (1) in failing to conduct a Marsden 
hearing (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118); (2) in discussing complaints 
concerning defense counsel‟s representation with counsel in defendant‟s absence; 
and (3) in failing to intervene to ensure that defense counsel responded adequately 
to complaints concerning his legal representation of defendant.  Defendant claims 
these errors violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due process of 
15 
law and a fair trial, to reliable guilt and penalty determinations, and to be 
personally present at all critical stages of the proceedings.  We are not persuaded. 
1. Factual background 
When a complaint was filed on December 26, 1990, the Alameda County 
Public Defender was appointed to represent defendant.  Counsel from that office 
represented defendant during his 1991 preliminary hearing and subsequently filed 
a motion to suppress evidence.  On February 1, 1994, prior to the hearing on the 
motion to suppress, the office declared a conflict of interest and attorney Lincoln 
Mintz was appointed.  Jury selection commenced on March 18, 1997, and the jury 
was sworn on May 5, 1997. 
Defendant‟s sister, Jessica Hutchinson, wrote four letters to the Superior 
Court of Alameda County during March, April, and May of 1995, approximately 
two years prior to the commencement of the trial.  These letters complained that 
Mintz had failed to communicate adequately with defendant subsequent to the 
attorney‟s initial interview with his client. 
The first letter, dated March 28, 1995, addressed to the court administrator, 
asserted that Hutchinson was writing “on behalf of [her] brother,” and stated, “we 
are requesting” that the defendant be transported to court for the next trial-setting 
hearing, then scheduled for April 4, 1995.  The letter acknowledged that, 
ordinarily, such requests are made by counsel, but explained that defendant had 
been unable to communicate in person or by telephone with his attorney for a full 
year despite defendant‟s efforts to arrange a visit.  The letter referred to denial of 
the “right to an adequate defense” and concluded:  “[Defendant] is asking for what 
he is entitled to and what Mr. Mintz was appointed to give him — a defense.  He 
is asking for a candid, face-to-face discussion with his attorney.  Mr. Mintz has 
excellent recommendations and appears to be supremely qualified and well-
16 
respected.  However, we are all extremely frustrated with this situation and the 
lack of interest displayed by Mr. Mintz.  We ask that all this be taken into 
consideration when deciding this basic request to appear in court.” 
The second letter was dated April 4, 1995, and, like the remaining two 
letters, was addressed to the Honorable William McGuiness.  The letter repeated 
the earlier letter‟s description of defendant‟s unsuccessful efforts to contact Mintz 
personally or by telephone.  It requested defendant‟s presence at the next trial-
setting hearing and added that “[a]n acknowledgement and recognition of this 
problem and/or any other helpful information, conveyed to my brother, would be 
greatly appreciated.”   
The third letter was dated April 26, 1995, and stated Hutchinson was 
communicating “regarding her brother.”  The letter noted that no response to the 
previous letter had been received, but stated the expectation that any response 
from the court would be made “to [defendant] personally.”  The letter again 
asserted defendant had experienced “numerous difficulties” communicating with 
Mintz.  It continued:  “I do not believe [defendant] wants to change his attorney 
further delaying the proceedings.  However, you must understand his intense 
frustration and ours as we have no legal advisor or access to the system at this 
current time.  Not everyone enjoys the privileges of O.J. Simpson, but, regardless, 
[defendant] is entitled to legal representation.  If Mr. Mintz is not willing or able 
to give this to him, it is the very least his obligation to let [defendant] know about 
it.  We respectfully ask you to intervene, in an appropriate manner, and facilitate 
some communication between Mr. Mintz and [defendant].  [¶]  I apologize for this 
ordeal which should involve you.  However, we are not sure of where to turn 
either and can not see any reason for what seems to be a continual neglect of 
[defendant].”  
17 
The fourth letter was dated May 10, 1995, and again was characterized as a 
communication “regarding” defendant.  Defendant‟s sister requested “some kind 
of acknowledgement” from the court.  It noted that “to my knowledge, Mr. Mintz 
has still not consulted with [defendant] at all about his case,” and asserted that 
“[defendant] would simply like to meet and consult with Mr. Mintz prior to going 
to trial.  If it takes judicial intervention to do so, then that is what he is asking.”  
On June 1, 1995, Judge McGuiness conducted a trial-setting proceeding.  
Defense counsel waived defendant‟s right to be present at the hearing.  The clerk 
of the court noted in the record that the “[c]ourt further notes receiving 
correspondence from Jessica [Hutchinson].  [Counsel] receives copies of said 
correspondence and states he has ongoing contact with client and will contact 
family [with] future dates.” 
The reporter‟s transcript of the hearing reflects the following interchange. 
“The Court:  I would note parenthetically, for the record, the court received 
communications on May [10] and April 26 from a Jessica [Hutchinson], directed 
to the court.  [¶]  I have shared that correspondence, providing a copy with respect 
to those letters to Mr. Mintz.  [¶]  Mr. Mintz, did you want to state anything on the 
record with regard to that?   
“[Defense counsel]:  Just briefly.  [¶]  [Defendant] and I are in 
communication, your honor, contrary to what concerned members of his family 
have said.  [¶]  The Court, [defendant] and I have discussed the defense in this 
case.  And what I will do is, previous to the July 13th [trial-setting] date, I will 
take up the matter of these with [defendant] and his family, and see that the court 
receives a communication, and close up the matter.”   
Defendant asserts that there was no further discussion of the matter on the 
record. 
18 
2. Discussion 
Defendant contends the letters sent by his sister imposed a duty upon the 
court to order that he be transported to the court for a hearing at which the court 
could inquire into the adequacy of the legal representation provided to defendant 
by Mintz.  Defendant places primary reliance upon this court‟s decision in 
People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).  In that case, the defendant 
complained in general terms that his appointed counsel was not providing 
adequate representation, and the court inferred that he wished to discharge counsel 
and substitute another appointed attorney.  The court conducted a hearing, but 
erred by refusing to permit defendant to list particular instances in which he felt 
his counsel had performed inadequately.  (Id. at p. 124.) 
In Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, we explained that although an indigent 
defendant possesses a right under the Sixth Amendment to the assistance of court-
appointed counsel, he or she does not have an unlimited right to require the trial 
court to discharge appointed counsel and appoint substitute counsel.  (Marsden, at 
p. 123.)  The decision whether to substitute counsel at the defendant‟s request rests 
within the trial court‟s discretion; when ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged 
by the defendant, the court should grant a request to substitute counsel if there is 
“ „ “a sufficient showing . . . that the right to the assistance of counsel would be 
substantially impaired . . . in case the request is not granted . . . .” ‟ ”  (Ibid.)   
In Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, we pointed out that a trial court cannot 
discharge its duty without hearing the reasons for the defendant‟s belief that his or 
her attorney has not afforded adequate representation.  (Id. at pp. 123-124.)  We 
observed that “ „the critical factual inquiry ordinarily relates to matters outside the 
trial record‟ ” (id. at p. 123), and concluded that denial of a motion to substitute 
counsel based upon the court‟s observations in the courtroom — without affording 
the defendant an opportunity to offer argument or evidence in support of his or her 
19 
complaint — “ „is lacking in all the attributes of a judicial determination.‟ ”  (Id. at 
p. 124.)   
We also rejected the position taken by the trial court in the Marsden case — 
that it was prohibited from advising the defendant how to present his request to 
substitute counsel.  We pointed out that, on the contrary, we had commended 
courts that aided unrepresented persons “ „as to the presentation of evidence, the 
rules of substantive law, and legal procedure.‟ ”  (Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at 
p. 126.)  Even as to defendants who are represented, we concluded it is within the 
court‟s authority to assist a defendant who is “groping for the proper manner in 
which to demonstrate the alleged lack of competence of his attorney . . . .”  (Ibid.) 
a. Absence of request to substitute counsel 
As a threshold matter, defendant‟s claim fails because a review of the 
record reveals that defendant did not complain concerning counsel, nor did he 
request substitution of counsel.  Although a formal motion is not required, the trial 
court‟s duty to conduct an inquiry into the reasons the defendant believes his or 
her attorney is incompetent arises only when the defendant (or in some instances 
counsel) provides “ „at least some clear indication‟ ” that the defendant wishes to 
substitute counsel.  (People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 920; see People v. 
Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 97; People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 157.)  
Because defendant made no assertion whatsoever regarding dissatisfaction with 
counsel, the trial court‟s duty under Marsden was not triggered.  
Moreover, contrary to defendant‟s contention, even if we were to view the 
letters sent by defendant‟s sister as emanating from defendant, those letters do not 
contain a “clear indication” from the defendant that he desired substitution of 
counsel on the ground of counsel‟s deficiencies.  In fact, as noted above, one of 
the letters states that “Mr. Mintz has excellent recommendations and appears to be 
20 
supremely qualified and well-respected.”  The letters do not even imply a request 
to substitute counsel.  Rather, they complain of lack of communication between 
defendant and his counsel, and request the court‟s intervention to improve 
attorney-client communication.  In the absence of a request to discharge appointed 
counsel, however, differences of opinion between a defendant and his or her 
appointed counsel regarding the conduct of the defense do not impose a duty upon 
the court to conduct a Marsden hearing.  (People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 
281.) 
b. Invocation of defendant’s rights under Marsden by a third 
party 
In addition, the circumstance that the letters were sent by a third party 
renders them an insufficient basis for imposing a duty upon the court to conduct a 
Marsden hearing.  This is so because our decision in Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 
118, was intended to afford protection to the defendant‟s right to counsel as 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and the constitutional right to counsel is 
personal to the defendant and ordinarily cannot be asserted vicariously.  (People v. 
Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 343-344; see also People v. Tena (2007) 156 
Cal.App.4th 598, 613 [describing the personal nature of the right to present a 
defense, and to counsel].)2 
                                              
2  
We observe that persons who are not parties to litigation ordinarily cannot 
be heard in the litigation.  In civil litigation a nonparty who has not formally 
intervened ordinarily cannot make a motion (Difani v. Riverside County Oil Co. 
(1927) 201 Cal. 210, 214; Marshank v. Superior Court (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 
602, 605; see generally 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Proceedings 
Without Trial, § 4, p. 430.)  The same generally is true in criminal cases.  As we 
explained in Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442:  “Except as specifically 
provided by law, a private citizen has no personal legal interest in the outcome of 
an individual criminal proceeding against another person.”  (Id., at p. 451, italics 
added; see also 4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Introduction 
(footnote continued on next page) 
21 
It would be inappropriate to recognize a third party‟s authority to require 
the court to conduct a Marsden inquiry, because the defendant‟s right to mount a 
defense in the manner that he or she, under the direction of defense counsel, deems 
best requires that counsel‟s independence from third party influence be protected.  
The court must exercise circumspection in taking actions that may interfere with 
an existing attorney-client relationship, and must remain “on [its] guard neither to 
infringe upon the defendant‟s right to counsel of his choice, nor to compromise the 
independence of the bar.”  (Smith v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 559 
[“The value in issue . . . is „the state‟s duty to refrain from unreasonable 
interference with the individual‟s desire to defend himself in whatever manner he 
deems best, using every legitimate resource at his command‟ ”]; see Cannon v. 
Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1975) 14 Cal.3d 678, 697; see also People 
v. Jones (2004) 33 Cal.4th 234, 244; Ingraham v. Justice Court (1968) 69 Cal.2d 
832, 840.)  We would risk encouraging interference with the attorney-client 
relationship were we to hold that a trial court must conduct a Marsden hearing 
when a third party complains concerning the representation received by a 
defendant.3   
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
to Criminal Procedure, § 21, pp. 30-32); but see Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, amended 
by initiative, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2008) [commonly known as Prop. 9, affording 
certain rights to victims of crimes]; §§ 679.026, 1191.1-1191.2, 3041.5, 3043-
3044 [also affording certain rights to victims of crime in some instances].) 
3  
Defendant‟s claim that his sister acted as his agent does not assist his 
position.  Even lawyers may not appear on behalf of persons who are represented 
by other attorneys.  (1A Cal.Jur.3d  (2006 ed.) Actions, § 130, p. 179; see also 
Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 2-100(A); 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Attorneys, 
§ 422, p. 536.)  Indeed, with limited exceptions — including the one developed in 
our Marsden decision — the client himself or herself must be heard in court 
through his or her counsel.  (People v. Masterson (1994) 8 Cal.4th 965, 969; 1 
(footnote continued on next page) 
22 
Practical considerations support the conclusion we reach.  A third party 
does not owe a duty of loyalty to the defendant, whereas a party‟s attorney owes 
the highest fiduciary duty to his or her client.  (1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, 
Attorneys, § 90, pp. 125-127; id., § 101, p. 138.)  The intervention of a person who 
is not under such a duty could impair the defendant‟s interests, especially because 
third parties may have motives that are inimical to the defense position.  And 
when the nonparty is not a lawyer, even a well-intentioned person adversely could 
impact the defendant‟s position because of ignorance of the law.  (See J.W. v. 
Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 958, 969.)  In addition, because 
communication between attorney and client is confidential and privileged, third 
parties are unlikely to have complete information concerning the attorney-client 
relationship.  Accordingly, third parties ordinarily lack a reliable basis upon which 
to allege ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Finally, there is no necessity to impose a duty upon the court to entertain 
Marsden motions made by third parties, because even incarcerated defendants can 
speak for themselves in various ways.  There is no indication on the present record 
that defendant was unable to communicate with the court except through his sister.  
Defendant, like his sister, could have mailed a letter to the court.  He also could 
have complained concerning the representation afforded to him at the first 
opportunity when he ultimately did appear in court.   
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Attorneys, § 239, p. 312; id., § 243, p. 316; see also 
People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 376, superseded by statute on other 
grounds as recognized in Verdin v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1096, 1106-
1107.)  In light of this circumstance, it would be anomalous to conclude that 
applications made by a stranger to the litigation nonetheless must be considered 
and acted upon by the court.   
23 
For all these reasons, we perceive no cause to deviate from principles 
recognizing the personal nature of the right to counsel and protecting the attorney-
client relationship from third-party interference.  We decline to impose upon the 
court a duty to conduct a hearing or respond to criticism of appointed counsel that 
has been levied by a nonparty.   
c. Asserted obligation to intervene on the court’s own motion 
Defendant contends that trial courts are under an obligation to protect the 
defendant‟s right to effective assistance of counsel through inquiry initiated in the 
first instance by the court, once the court knows or should know that the adequacy 
of counsel‟s representation is in question.  Defendant claims the court, at the least, 
should have “acknowledged” his sister‟s letters, permitted defendant to appear 
before the court, and “follow[ed] up on Mr. Mintz‟s promise to furnish the court 
with a „communication‟ to „close up the matter.‟ ”  To the extent defendant claims 
the court is under an obligation to conduct a Marsden inquiry on its own motion, 
we are not persuaded.  On the contrary, as suggested by the many decisions of this 
court requiring some indication from the defendant (or defense counsel) (see 
People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1194) that the defendant wishes to 
substitute counsel (People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 96; People v. Dickey, 
supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 920-921), we agree with the decisions of the Courts of 
Appeal holding specifically that the trial court is not required to conduct a 
Marsden hearing on its own motion.  (People v. Lara (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 139, 
150; People v. Leonard (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 776, 787; People v. Gay (1990) 
221 Cal.App.3d 1065, 1070; see also People v. Monteil (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 
906.)   
To the extent defendant‟s claim is based upon an asserted general duty on 
the part of the trial court to supervise appointed counsel, any obligation that may 
24 
rest upon the court to uphold a proper standard of representation by appointed 
counsel (see McMann v. Richardson (1970) 397 U.S. 759, 771; People v. 
McKenzie (1983) 34 Cal.3d 616, 630, disapproved on another point in People v. 
Crayton, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 364-365) is circumscribed and must be 
understood in light of the countervailing duty of the court to respect the 
inviolability of the attorney-client relationship and to permit the defendant to 
present his or her defense in the manner deemed appropriate by counsel in 
consultation with the defendant.  (See Smith v. Superior Court, supra, 68 Cal.2d at 
pp. 559-561; see also People v. Jones, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 242-244.)  Thus, 
the trial court‟s authority to discharge an appointed attorney for misconduct or 
incompetence on its own motion is limited.  (See People v. Jones, supra, 33 
Cal.4th at p. 243, citing Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, supra, 
14 Cal.3d at p. 697.)   
In any event, whatever may be the obligation of a court to initiate a hearing 
when the defendant complains to the court concerning appointed counsel‟s 
performance, or when the court, in person, has observed an attorney‟s apparent 
disregard for his or her client‟s interests, no such obligation falls upon a court 
simply because a third party has suggested that appointed counsel — long before 
the commencement of trial — has neglected a client who is equally capable of 
lodging such a complaint.4 
                                              
4  
Defendant suggests that if the court was not inclined to assist defendant in 
formulating a Marsden motion, it should have appointed independent advisory 
counsel to represent him “on the issue of whether he was receiving the effective 
assistance of counsel . . . .”  We have rejected the same claim in a prior decision.  
(People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1024-1025.)   
 
Defendant also relies upon a federal decision declaring that “to compel one 
charged with [a] grievous crime to undergo a trial with the assistance of an 
attorney with whom he has become embroiled in irreconcilable conflict is to 
(footnote continued on next page) 
25 
We also acknowledge that the trial court does bear a duty of inquiry on its 
own motion when it knows or should know of a potential conflict of interest 
between a defendant and his or her counsel.  Specifically, “[w]hen a court 
„ “knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists,” ‟ it should 
inquire into the conflict even in the absence of objection by the defendant or his or 
her counsel.”  (People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 75, disapproved on 
another point in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22; see also 
People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 176, disapproved on another point in 
People v. Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 421, fn. 22.)  Nonetheless, “the duty to 
inquire is not triggered merely because of „a vague, unspecified possibility of 
conflict.‟ ”  (People v. Cornwell, at p. 75 [noting that not every instance of an 
attorney‟s representation of multiple defendants charged with the same crime 
gives rise to a duty of inquiry].)  But, as with defendant‟s doubtful assertion that 
the court has a general obligation to supervise counsel to ensure adequate 
representation, even assuming some such limited duty under certain 
circumstances, the cited decisions fall far short of suggesting a duty to initiate a 
hearing whenever the court receives any indication, even one made by a third 
party, that appointed counsel has failed to communicate adequately with the 
defendant — a complaint that, by itself, ordinarily is not a sufficient basis to 
require a court to grant even the defendant’s own request to substitute counsel.  
(See People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1192.) 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
deprive him of the effective assistance of any counsel whatsoever.”  (Brown v. 
Craven (9th Cir. 1970) 424 F.2d 1166, 1170.)  Because the defendant in that case 
had complained concerning his attorney and requested substitute counsel on four 
occasions, ultimately refusing entirely to cooperate at trial, that case is clearly 
distinguishable. 
26 
Defendant asserts that the special need for reliability existing in capital 
trials requires courts to conduct an inquiry or take some further action to ensure 
diligent and competent assistance of appointed counsel under circumstances such 
as occurred in the present case.  Indeed, as defendant contends, high court 
decisions state as a general proposition that the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution prescribe heightened reliability for 
proceedings in capital cases.  (See Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862, 874-879; 
Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625, 637-638.)  Defendant offers no authority, 
however, supporting the view that this general rule requires trial courts to 
intervene in the attorney-client relationship on the basis of complaints concerning 
attorney-client communication brought by third parties.5 
                                              
5  
Defendant seeks to bolster his claim by pointing to counsel‟s conduct 
throughout the trial, but the trial court‟s actions ordinarily must be reviewed on the 
basis of the evidence before it at the time it made its decision concerning such a 
complaint.  (See People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1070, disapproved on 
other grounds in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1.)  The decisions 
of the trial court cannot be reviewed on the basis of the subsequent conduct of 
counsel.  Defendant‟s claim that the court should have “followed up on” his 
sister‟s complaints ignores the circumstance that the court was not under an 
obligation to respond to complaints made by third parties.  In addition, defendant‟s 
reference to his attorney‟s conduct of the trial principally is offered in support of 
his claim that any error on the part of the court in failing to conduct a hearing on 
the basis of his sister‟s letters was prejudicial, but we have concluded there was no 
error, obviating the need to inquire into prejudice.  Finally, although we have 
taken judicial notice of certain records of professional discipline imposed on 
Mintz, including disbarment subsequent to the trial in the present case (see Evid. 
Code, § 452), these records are not relevant to defendant‟s claim.  (See People v. 
Hill, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 755 [“a court may not go outside the record of 
the immediate prosecution and base the disposition of [the] defendant‟s [Marsden 
motion] upon observations of the attorney on other occasions”].)  There is no 
indication that the court was aware of misconduct by Mintz toward his other 
clients.  
27 
 
d.  Asserted error in conducting hearing in defendant’s absence 
Defendant contends his rights to counsel and to be present at critical stages 
of the proceedings were violated when the trial court conducted the trial-setting 
hearing on June 1, 1995, and discussed defendant‟s sister‟s letters with counsel, 
but failed to order that defendant be brought to court for the hearing.  He contends 
that his attorney failed to represent him at the hearing, leaving him “totally without 
representation at a crucial hearing.” 
Indeed, trial courts ordinarily should not enter into a discussion of a 
defendant‟s Marsden motion with defense counsel when the defendant is absent.  
(People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744, 755; 5 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. 
Criminal Law, supra, Criminal Trial, § 222, p. 347; see also People v. Perry 
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 302, 313 [“We do not dispute that a defendant may be entitled 
to be present at a conference called to consider whether to remove his counsel for 
conflict of interest or any other reason, because the removal of counsel will affect 
the defendant‟s representation at trial, and is a matter on which the defendant‟s 
views should be heard”].)  Defendant‟s trial-setting hearing, however, did not 
constitute a hearing on a Marsden motion, and the court did not consider at the 
trial-setting hearing whether to substitute counsel. 
With respect to defendant‟s claim that he had a right to be present at the 
trial-setting hearing, “[u]nder the Sixth Amendment‟s confrontation clause, a 
criminal defendant does not have a right to be personally present at a particular 
proceeding unless his appearance is necessary to prevent „interference with [his] 
opportunity for effective cross-examination.‟  [Citations.]  [¶]  Similarly, under the 
Fourteenth Amendment‟s due process clause, a criminal defendant does not have a 
right to be personally present at a particular proceeding unless he finds himself at a 
„stage . . . that is critical to [the] outcome‟ and „his presence would contribute to 
28 
the fairness of the procedure.‟  [Citation.]”  (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 
690, 741-742.) 
We need not discuss the boundaries of defendant‟s right to be present at 
pretrial hearings, or whether defendant effectively waived his presence at the trial-
setting hearing, however, because any error in failing to secure his presence was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (See Rushen v. Spain (1983) 464 U.S. 114, 
117-118, fn. 2; see also Campbell v. Rice (9th Cir. 2005) 408 F.3d 1166, 1172-
1173; People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 419; People v. Ayala (2000) 24 
Cal.4th 243, 268-269; People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1357; People v. 
Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 403.)  As noted, the court did not conduct a 
Marsden hearing or reach any decision at the trial-setting hearing of June 1, 1995; 
the court did not interpose any obstacle to defendant‟s expressing dissatisfaction 
with Mintz by letter or at a later hearing actually attended by defendant;6 and the 
proceedings of which defendant complains occurred approximately two years 
prior to the commencement of the trial, leaving him multiple subsequent 
opportunities to express — for himself — any reservations he entertained 
concerning his defense counsel. 
B. Exclusion of Prospective Jurors for Cause   
Defendant contends the trial court improperly sustained the prosecutor‟s 
challenges for cause against two prospective jurors, in violation of his state and 
federal constitutional rights to due process of law, a fair and impartial jury, and a 
reliable penalty verdict.  (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., 
art. I, §§ 7, 15, 16 & 17.)  He contends these two prospective jurors did not 
                                              
6  
As defendant acknowledges, he was personally present at a pretrial hearing 
conducted on August 9, 1996, and at subsequent hearings and at all portions of the 
trial, which commenced in March 1997. 
29 
express views concerning capital punishment that warranted their exclusion from 
the jury, that the trial court employed an incorrect standard in making its ruling, 
and that the court displayed bias against prospective jurors who had reservations 
concerning the death penalty.7  As we shall explain, we conclude the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion and did not apply an incorrect standard or display bias. 
 
1. 
Governing principles 
The state and federal Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right 
to a trial by an impartial jury.  (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 
(Witt); People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 778.)  Decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court and of this court make it clear that a prospective juror‟s 
personal views concerning the death penalty do not necessarily afford a basis for 
excusing the juror for bias.  As the high court observed, because “ „[a] man who 
opposes the death penalty, no less than one who favors it, can make the 
discretionary judgment entrusted to him by the State,‟ ” it follows that “ „a 
sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it 
was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general 
objections to the death penalty.‟ ”  (Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 6.) 
Rather, when a juror is challenged for cause because of his or her views 
concerning capital punishment, the trial court must apply the following standard:  
“ „[T]o achieve the constitutional imperative of impartiality, the law permits a 
prospective juror to be challenged for cause only if his or her views in favor of or 
against capital punishment “would „prevent or substantially impair the 
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with instructions and the juror‟s 
                                              
7  
Defendant claims that error in this regard would require reversal not only of 
the penalty phase judgment but also of the guilt phase judgment.  This claim lacks 
merit.  (People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 966.) 
30 
oath.‟ ”  (People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 741, quoting Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 
at p. 424.) 
As we have explained in many decisions, “ „ “[t]here is no requirement that 
a prospective juror‟s bias against the death penalty be proven with unmistakable 
clarity.  [Citations.]  Rather, it is sufficient that the trial judge is left with the 
definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and 
impartially apply the law in the case before the juror.” ‟ ”  (People v. Abilez (2007) 
41 Cal.4th 472, 497-498.)  
The trial court‟s determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  (People 
v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 497-498.)  Reviewing courts defer to the trial 
court on the essentially factual question of the prospective juror‟s true state of 
mind.  (People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 483.)  Indeed, “the [trial court‟s] 
finding may be upheld even in the absence of clear statements from the juror that 
he or she is impaired because „many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough 
questions to reach the point where their bias has been made “unmistakably clear”; 
these veniremen may not know how they will react when faced with imposing the 
death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true 
feelings.‟  [Citation.]  Thus, when there is ambiguity in the prospective juror‟s 
statements, „the trial court, aided as it undoubtedly [is] by its assessment of [the 
venireman‟s] demeanor, [is] entitled to resolve it in favor of the State.‟ ”  (Uttecht 
v. Brown, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 7.)  In sum, even when “ „[t]he precise wording of 
the question asked of [the venireman], and the answer he gave, do not by 
themselves compel the conclusion that he could not under any circumstance 
recommend the death penalty,‟ the need to defer to the trial court remains because 
so much may turn on a potential juror‟s demeanor.”  (Id. at p. 8.) 
The deference owed to the trial court‟s determination bears emphasis.  As 
explained in a recent decision by the United States Supreme Court, “[d]eference to 
31 
the trial court is appropriate because it is in a position to assess the demeanor of 
the venire, and of the individuals who compose it, a factor of critical importance in 
assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.”  (Uttecht v. Brown, 
supra, 551 U.S. at p. 9.)  The trial court‟s determination whether a prospective 
juror entertains disqualifying bias “ „is based upon determinations of demeanor 
and credibility that are peculiarly within a trial judge‟s province.‟ ”  (Id. at p. 7.)   
Our own decisions are in accord:  “[A]ppellate courts recognize that a trial 
judge who observes and speaks with a prospective juror and hears that person‟s 
responses (noting, among other things, the person‟s tone of voice, apparent level 
of confidence, and demeanor) gleans valuable information that simply does not 
appear on the record.”  (People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 451.) 
Jurors commonly supply conflicting or equivocal responses to questions 
directed at their potential bias or incapacity to serve.  When such conflicting or 
equivocal answers are given, the trial court, through its observation of the juror‟s 
demeanor as well as through its evaluation of the juror‟s verbal responses, is best 
suited to reach a conclusion regarding the juror‟s actual state of mind (People v. 
Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 890), and its determination “ „ “as to [the juror‟s] 
true state of mind is binding on an appellate court.” ‟ ”  (People v. Boyette (2002) 
29 Cal.4th 381, 416, italics added.)  The trial court‟s resolution of conflicts on the 
question of juror bias is binding on the reviewing court if supported by substantial 
evidence.  (People v. Hamilton, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 890.) 
In applying these precepts, however, we must keep in mind that a 
prospective juror who is firmly opposed to the death penalty is not disqualified 
from serving on a capital jury.  “[N]ot all who oppose the death penalty are subject 
to removal for cause in capital cases; those who firmly believe that the death 
penalty is unjust may nevertheless serve as jurors in capital cases so long as they 
state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in 
32 
deference to the rule of law.”  (Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 176; see 
People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 446.)  As this court has stated, “a 
prospective juror‟s personal conscientious objection to the death penalty is not a 
sufficient basis for excluding that person from jury service in a capital case . . . .  
„ . . . The real question is whether the juror‟s attitude will “ „prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his 
instructions and his oath.‟ ” . . . A juror whose personal opposition toward the 
death penalty may predispose him to assign greater than average weight to the 
mitigating factors presented at the penalty phase may not be excluded, unless that 
predilection would actually preclude him from engaging in the weighing process 
and returning a capital verdict.‟ ”   (People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 446, 
italics omitted; see People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 699.) 
2. Discussion 
a. Prospective Juror B.S. 
In her questionnaire, Prospective Juror B.S. stated she was “strongly 
against” the death penalty, but she also checked a box indicating she did not “hold 
any religious, moral feelings or philosophical principles that would affect [her] 
ability to vote for the death penalty in this case.”  She repeated that she was 
“strongly against” the death penalty and would vote against a ballot measure 
authorizing capital punishment, explaining that she believed such punishment 
“serves no useful purpose; makes killers out of us.”  At the same time, she added 
that she could “see some circumstances where society would have to put an end to 
someone‟s life.”  
During voir dire, the court explained to Prospective Juror B.S. that it would 
determine whether prospective jurors would “truly have an open mind to both 
penalty choices,” permitting them to “realistically and practically, not as a matter 
33 
of theory, . . . seriously consider imposing either . . .  the death penalty or life in 
prison without possibility of parole.”  The court inquired:  “What‟s your . . . 
bottom line judgment here on yourself?  You have some very strong views you 
expressed in your questionnaire.  Do you think as a practical realistic matter both 
of these penalty alternatives are really available to you?” 
B.S. responded:  “I have some very strong views against the death penalty.  
And I feel I could listen to the evidence and make a determination based on the 
evidence.  It‟s not something that I would look forward to doing, but I feel I could 
do it.”   
When the trial court noted that Prospective Juror B.S. “generally opposed 
the death penalty,” she corrected the court, stating, “I would change that to 
strongly” in lieu of “generally.”  The court referred to her stated view that capital 
punishment serves no useful purpose and “makes everyone a killer,” but that there 
might be circumstances in which “society would have to put an end to someone‟s 
life.”  The court commented:  “Now bear in mind the decision the jury would be 
asked to make here is not a decision by society, it‟s a decision that you personally 
would have to make.  So my question [is] do you  . . . realistically and practically 
feel that you could ever vote for the death penalty, you yourself personally vote 
for the death penalty?”  B.S. responded:  “I think I probably could if the evidence 
warranted it.  I would not do so lightly.  And I would be more inclined not to.” 
As defendant points out, in spite of her philosophical views Prospective 
Juror B.S. did assert on several occasions that she could impose a sentence of 
death.  When the prosecutor asked whether there was a realistic possibility she 
could “vote to end [defendant‟s] life,” B.S. responded that “I‟d [say] that I could 
do it if I had to do it.”  Her explanation introduced some ambiguity into her 
response, however:  “Even though I am philosophically opposed to the death — 
I‟m strongly opposed to the death penalty —I also have thought long and hard 
34 
about this during these last weeks and I would rather have me on a jury than 
somebody who has no opinion or somebody who is vociferously for the death 
penalty.”   
When the prosecutor inquired as to which circumstances might lead her to 
vote for the death penalty despite her belief the penalty “makes killers out of us,” 
she referred to “particularly heinous” crimes, to recidivists, “or if it seemed like 
this is the kind of person he was before this time as well, I‟m just kind of talking 
off the top of my head, I don‟t know.  I really have to . . . hear the evidence, hear 
the facts . . . .” 
The prosecutor commented that some persons might be unable to impose 
the death penalty for crimes such as those charged against defendant, that is for a 
murder in the course of a child molestation.  The prosecutor continued:  “Just 
knowing yourself . . . and the fact that you feel that the death penalty serves no 
purpose other than making killers out of us all,  . . . is it realistic that you would 
vote for the death penalty in this case that we have here?”   
B.S. responded:  “It is not realistic that I would, but it is realistic that I can, 
that I could.  I‟m sorry, I‟m a writer.”  
When the prosecutor asked her to elaborate, she responded:  “Well, I don‟t 
think I can say more about it than I already have.  I take this seriously.  There is a 
possibility that I could vote for the death penalty.  I would have to have all the 
evidence, all the facts, and it would have to be something that would push me 
beyond the way I normally feel about the death penalty.  But . . . that could 
happen.” 
The prosecutor pursued the point made by the prospective juror that she 
could vote in favor of the death penalty only if something “pushed her beyond” 
her established views, asking whether she meant that although it was possible that 
certain evidence could cause her to vote for the death penalty, it was not “realistic” 
35 
that she would.  B.S. parried this question with the comment that she believed the 
prosecutor was “trying to get [her] to say that [she] would never vote for the death 
penalty.”  The prosecutor explained that a person who automatically would reject 
the death penalty would not afford the People a fair trial.  He asked:  “[I]s this an 
appropriate case for you as far as the nature of this case [and] the imposition of the 
death penalty . . . given what you have written in your questionnaire?”  
B.S. responded:  “I think I can hear the evidence and I think I can make a 
good decision according to the law.  I am not looking to be on this jury.  I don‟t 
especially want to, but if I am chosen for the jury I think I would make a good 
decision.” 
The prosecutor challenged Prospective Juror B.S. for cause.  In the 
prosecutor‟s view, B.S. had “engage[d] in verbal gymnastics,” was evasive, and 
lacked candor.  By contrast, defense counsel opposed the challenge and argued 
that a juror who is strongly opposed to the death penalty and would be disinclined 
to reach a verdict of death nonetheless may serve on a jury if his or her ability to 
follow the law is not impaired. 
In making its determination, the trial court commented that B.S. held the 
strongest views opposing the death penalty of any of the prospective jurors who 
had been questioned, and that “no one ha[s] articulated with such a precise and 
devastating impact the depth of her feeling against capital punishment wherein she 
brands anyone who would impose capital punishment a killer.”  Referring to the 
prosecutor‟s question whether it was realistic to suppose B.S. would vote for a 
sentence of death, the court commented that her initial statement in response to the 
prosecutor — that “[i]t is not realistic that I would” impose a sentence of death — 
rendered the second part of her answer — “it is realistic that I . . . could” — 
“essentially irrelevant. . . .  I think what she’s telling me in the context of all the 
statements she‟s made here, especially in the statement in the questionnaire . . . is 
36 
that she would never vote for the death penalty under any circumstances.”  (Italics 
added.)  The court expressed “a definite impression that she would be unable to 
fulfill and impartially apply the law,” and “a definite impression based on her 
questionnaire and based on what she said here in court that her views are such that 
[they] would prevent or substantial[ly] impair her performance [of her] duties in 
accordance with . . . instructions [and] . . . her oath. . . .” 
The trial court‟s impression of the prospective juror‟s true state of mind is 
entitled to deference under the circumstances apparent in the present case.  This 
court has considered the extensive transcript documenting the voir dire of B.S.  
The trial court “supervised a diligent and thoughtful voir dire” (Uttecht v. Brown, 
supra, 555 U.S. at p. 20), taking pains to state and apply the correct standard and 
to explain the overall impression it received from the entire voir dire of B.S.  As 
required by our decisions, the court “engage[d] in a conscientious attempt to 
determine [this] prospective juror‟s views regarding capital punishment . . . .”  
(People v. Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 779.)  Although the juror declared a 
theoretical possibility that she could vote for the penalty of death, the court 
legitimately could infer from the strength of the juror‟s views, her verbal fencing 
with the prosecutor, and her equivocal statements, that she was substantially 
impaired in her ability to perform her duties as a juror. 
Defendant claims that deference to the trial court is unwarranted because, in 
his view, the prospective juror did not equivocate on any significant point during 
her voir dire.  We disagree.  She equivocated when the trial court inquired whether 
she “realistically and practically” believed she could “personally vote for the death 
penalty,” to which she replied, “I think I probably could if the evidence warranted 
it.”  (Italics added.)  It appeared she proposed to hold to her views unless 
something “push[ed] [her] beyond the way [she] normally [felt] about the death 
penalty.”  Finally, when the prosecutor legitimately inquired whether it was 
37 
realistic to suppose she would vote in favor of the penalty of death for a murder 
committed in connection with a child molestation (see People v. Hill (1992) 3 
Cal.4th 959, 1003, disapproved on another point in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 
25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13; People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 917-
918), her response — that it was “not realistic that I would, but it is realistic that I 
can, that I could” impose the death penalty (italics added) — appeared to the court 
in the context of the questioning to be “verbal gymnastics,” as the prosecutor 
alleged, rather than an exercise in grammar, as defendant claims.  (See People v. 
DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 21 [noting the significance of a prospective juror‟s 
avoidance of the prosecutor‟s questions].)  The trial court explained that the 
response persuaded it that B.S.‟s actual state of mind was such that there was no 
realistic possibility she ever would vote in favor of a penalty of death.  (The court 
evidently paid attention to the demeanor of prospective jurors throughout the voir 
dire, stating later in the proceedings that “I‟m very sensitive to . . . such things as 
body language, unspoken pauses . . . .”  [See p. 56; see also pp. 53, 55, post].)  The 
court‟s determination concerning the prospective juror‟s true state of mind is 
entitled to deference. 
Defendant objects to the trial court‟s reliance upon the strength of the 
prospective juror‟s opposition to the death penalty.  As defendant urges, jurors 
who are firmly opposed to the death penalty are qualified to serve if they “state 
clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference 
to the rule of law.”  (Lockhart v. McCree, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 176; see also 
People v. Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 785-786).)  Prospective Juror B.S. did 
not make such a statement, however.  Indeed, she said on five occasions that she 
was “strongly” or “very strongly” opposed to the death penalty, and confirmed 
that she believed “philosophically” that capital punishment “serves no useful 
purpose” and “makes killers out of us.”  In the absence of a clear indication that 
38 
she was willing to set aside those views and apply the law, the trial court 
legitimately took into account her insistent, repeated, and forcefully worded 
references to her strong opposition to the death penalty when it considered the 
equivocal nature of some of her responses.  (See People v. Hamilton, supra, 45 
Cal.4th at p. 891 [trial court referred to the excused juror as “a man of pretty 
strong convictions” who did not wish to appear closed minded but who would, in 
actuality, always vote against the penalty of death]; People v. Avila (2007) 38 
Cal.4th 491, 531 [referring to jurors‟ having disclosed views against the death 
penalty “so strong as to disqualify them for duty on a death penalty case”]; see 
also United States v. Fell (2d Cir. 2008) 531 F.3d 197, 213.)  
Defendant also points to statements made by the prospective juror 
indicating she was not opposed to imposition of the death penalty in every case, 
contending these established her qualification to serve.  The court legitimately 
could view these statements, however, as in tension with her view that a vote in 
favor of the penalty of death would serve no purpose and would render the 
prospective juror a killer.  (See People v. DePriest, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 21-22; 
see also People v. Salcido (2007) 44 Cal.4th 93, 133.)  When a prospective juror 
has made statements that tend to support the trial court‟s conclusion that the juror 
is not qualified, “[t]he fact that [the juror] also gave statements that might have 
warranted keeping [her] as [a juror] does not change [the] conclusion” that 
substantial evidence supports the trial court‟s ruling.  (People v. Thornton (2007) 
41 Cal.4th 391, 414.)   
The trial court was justified in concluding that the prospective juror‟s 
responses, rather than suggesting she could set aside her own personal views, 
constituted merely a grudging acknowledgment that those views might include 
some narrow exception — or at least an abstract possibility she would consider the 
statutory penalty of death.  But the mere theoretical possibility that a prospective 
39 
juror might be able to reach a verdict of death in some case does not necessarily 
render the dismissal of the juror an abuse of discretion.  (People v. Wharton (1991) 
53 Cal.3d 522, 588-589; see also People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 80.)  
Excusal for cause is not limited to a juror who “ „zealously opposes or supports the 
death penalty in every case.‟ ”  (People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 282.)   
Defendant, objecting that the trial court employed an incorrect standard, 
asserts the court failed to understand that a person who is opposed to the death 
penalty nevertheless may be qualified to serve.  Defendant contends the 
prospective juror‟s responses merely demonstrated she had a high threshold for 
imposing the death penalty — a circumstance we acknowledge does not 
necessarily mean the juror is substantially impaired within the meaning of Witt, 
supra, 469 U.S. 412.  (People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 447; People v. 
Kaurish, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 699.) 
We are not persuaded.  The court did not limit its inquiry to whether B.S. 
was opposed to the death penalty.  Rather, the court correctly enunciated the Witt 
standard and inquired of B.S. and other prospective jurors whether there was a 
realistic, practical possibility the juror could consider either penalty option — a 
formulation we have concluded satisfies the standard set forth by the high court in 
Witt.  (People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 954; see also People v. Lancaster, 
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 80.)   
Defendant counters that the trial court must have employed an erroneous 
standard, because it believed B.S.‟s views concerning capital punishment were 
“far stronger, far more compelling than any of the answers that the Supreme Court 
reviewed and upheld as constituting a valid challenge for cause” in People v. Hill, 
supra, 3 Cal.4th 959, whereas the jurors in that case stated they “probably” could 
not or “didn‟t think” they could, or “would feel uneasy about” imposing the death 
penalty.  By contrast, defendant points out, B.S. affirmed that there was a 
40 
possibility she could vote for the maximum penalty.  Unlike B.S. in the present 
case, however, the prospective jurors in the Hill case did not stress their strong 
opposition to the death penalty and did not state that the death penalty serves no 
purpose and “makes killers out of us” all — a view that cast doubt upon B.S.‟s 
claim she could vote to impose the penalty of death in an appropriate case. 
In sum, in the circumstances of the present case it is appropriate to defer to 
the trial court, which conducted a careful voir dire and was able to observe the 
prospective juror‟s demeanor.  Substantial evidence supports the trial court‟s 
conclusion that Prospective Juror B.S. held views that would render her unable 
“ „realistically and honestly‟ ” to give the prosecution “ „a fair hearing and a fair 
opportunity to at least persuade [her] to [vote for] the death penalty.‟ ”  (People v. 
Hamilton, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 891; see also People v. DePriest, supra, 42 
Cal.4th at p. 22 [jurors properly excused who would experience “extreme 
difficulty imposing capital punishment, even in an appropriate case,” and whose 
responses and demeanor produced a “ „definite impression that [their] views on the 
death penalty would substantially impair the performance of [their] duties‟ ”].)   
b. Prospective Juror E.H.  
In her response to the juror questionnaire, when asked to describe her 
general feelings regarding the death penalty, Prospective Juror E.H. wrote:  “I 
used to be strictly against it — particularly because it was applied to poor or 
minority persons more so than others.  Now — I might be able to vote for the 
death penalty — if a crime was really, really awful.”  She added that her views had 
moved from “strongly against” to “moderately against” capital punishment, “based 
on hearing of awful crimes and repeat offenders.”  Her questionnaire also noted 
that she would vote against a ballot measure authorizing the penalty of death, 
because “it‟s applied more often to minority and poor” defendants.  She 
41 
nonetheless checked the box on the questionnaire indicating that she did not “hold 
any religious, moral feelings or philosophical principle that would affect [her] 
ability to vote for the death penalty in this case.” 
During voir dire, the trial court inquired whether, in light of her views, both 
the punishment of death and the punishment of life in prison without the 
possibility of parole “are realistically available to you?”  E.H. responded in the 
affirmative, explaining:  “I just mean because there are the two choices, I‟m more 
inclined to go for life [in prison] without [the possibility of parole], instead of the 
death penalty, but there could be situations where I could vote for the death 
penalty.” 
The court inquired whether in “the situations that you are contemplating, 
are they the kind of thing that you would call realistic and practical possibilities, or 
do you think they fall into the category of something that is theoretically available 
but not really realistic, practical, common sense.”  E.H. responded:  “No I think 
they‟re realistic for a . . . crime or crimes that were — had such aggravating, is 
that the word, circumstances.” 
Under questioning by the prosecutor, E.H. acknowledged that she was 
philosophically opposed to the death penalty and that if the choice were hers, the 
state would not authorize capital punishment.  
The prosecutor asked in what circumstances E.H. envisioned being able to 
impose a sentence of death, and she responded: “I guess it would be . . . if there 
were lots of people killed . . . I guess if you can‟t take into account someone‟s 
previous history, so I guess you‟re just looking at the current case, so I guess it 
would be just how awful . . . the current situation was.” 
The prosecutor stated:  “The nature of the case that we have here does not 
fit what you‟ve described.  So I ask . . . is this one that raises its level . . . to really, 
really awful, where you could consider imposing the death penalty?”  E.H. 
42 
responded that “[i]t might.”  She agreed when the prosecutor added, “you‟ve told 
me that you haven‟t thought too much about it because it‟s unpleasant to you.”  
When asked whether she could impose the ultimate penalty, she replied:  “I‟d have 
to . . . hear the case.  I didn‟t want to think about it in the abstract.”  
The prosecutor explained that “in order for the punishment of the death 
penalty being realistic for a — juror, they have to actually be capable of voting to 
end another person‟s life.  And if they can‟t do that, if they couldn‟t bring 
themselves to do that because they couldn‟t live with themselves, or for any 
number of reasons, then the reality is that the death penalty isn‟t an option for 
them because they couldn‟t actually vote for it, no matter what [t]he evidence was.  
[¶]  So I ask . . . knowing yourself and given your philosophical base, and that you 
oppose the death penalty and don‟t think we should have death penalty on the 
books, do you really believe that you could actually vote to end the life of another 
person?”   
E.H. responded:  “Depending on the facts of the case, that‟s a possibility 
that I could.”  The prosecutor inquired what facts she was referring to, and E.H. 
responded:  “It just seems strange to discuss this because we‟re discussing the end 
of the case, and we haven‟t even . . . heard the evidence.” 
The prosecutor explained that just as the law provides that the jury in a 
capital case should not be composed of persons who automatically would vote in 
favor of death for all murders, the law also provides that the jury should not be 
composed of persons who never could vote for the death penalty because 
“realistically, the option of the death penalty doesn‟t exist for them.  [¶]  But if we 
don‟t ask these questions, we can‟t get to those people to confront the issue as to 
whether this is something that they could actually do.”   
The prosecutor noted E.H.‟s emotional state, asking:  “Now, does that upset 
you?  I get a sense that this is very, very uncomfortable for you, and you know, 
43 
it[‟s] very . . . irritating.”  E.H. confirmed that the prosecutor‟s observation 
concerning her emotional state was correct.     
The prosecutor remarked further on the prospective juror‟s apparent unease 
during voir dire:  “And the idea of being in the situation of being asked, could I 
actually vote to kill another human being, given the fact that you don‟t think we 
should have a death penalty, sort of makes the situation even more 
uncomfortable?”  E.H. answered in the affirmative.  The prosecutor inquired 
whether “realistically, is this an appropriate case for you . . . given your attitudes 
and your feelings about the death penalty?”   
E.H. responded that she “probably” did not agree “with the philosophy that 
people that are opposed to the death penalty . . . should be excluded from the case.  
But I think, besides that, that given the case, that I would consider the case, and 
there is a possibility I could vote for the death penalty in certain cases.”  She 
confirmed that she had “strong feelings” against the rule that a person who could 
never impose the death penalty should be excluded from a capital jury.   
The prosecutor asked whether E.H. believed that capital punishment is 
“applied more often to minorities and the poor,” and she confirmed she held that 
belief, and that it applied to persons of Hispanic background such as defendant.  
She nevertheless averred that she could vote to impose the death penalty on a 
member of a minority group, explaining that “each case is different, [and] . . . if 
the facts warranted it, I could vote for the death penalty.” 
The prosecutor pursued the topic of the influence of the juror‟s views on 
her performance of her duties in the present case, stating:  “When you say it is 
possible, I mean you‟re an educated woman, the court didn‟t haphazardly choose 
the words, a realistic possibility.  Given your attitude against, your opposition to 
the death penalty, that we shouldn‟t have it on the books, your attitude that people 
who oppose the death penalty shouldn‟t be excluded from death-penalty juries, 
44 
your long-held position that minorities and the poor are more frequently recipients 
of the death penalty than other folks, is it truly realistic now that you would ever 
actually vote to impose the death penalty, honestly?” 
E.H. responded:  “Well, it‟s a small percentage, but it‟s in the realm of 
possibility.”  The prosecutor replied:  “We‟re not talking about remote 
possibilities.  We‟re talking about practical application.  [¶]  Can you sit there and 
honestly tell me, ma‟am, that you would vote to end his life realistically?”  E.H. 
answered:  “It sounds like you and I define realistically differently.”  
After the prosecutor moved to challenge E.H. for cause, the court posed 
additional questions, and E.H. explained her view that persons who never would 
vote for a sentence of death should be permitted to serve on capital juries.  She 
stated:  “I think the full range of possibilities should be allowed, particularly if — 
when you get to the penalty phase, it isn‟t automatic that it‟s the death penalty, 
that there are two choices, that you should have the full range of the community‟s 
input.” 
The court then inquired whether, if a prospective juror informed the court 
he or she never could impose the death penalty, the juror should be permitted to 
serve on the jury, and she responded that if she were a legislator, that would be her 
position. 
The court pointed out that the result of such a position would be that the 
jury never would be able to impose a sentence of death.  E.H. responded that 
perhaps the juror who was a death penalty opponent would “get changed or 
swayed by the actual situation.” 
The court continued:  “I‟m certainly not trying to argue with you, nor am I 
trying to put words in your mouth or tilt this out of context, but it‟s that kind of 
response . . . sounds like there might be an agenda here, an agenda to achieve 
some social or political end.  And I‟m concerned about that.  If I‟m wrong, please 
45 
tell me.  And I may very well be wrong.”  (Italics added.)  E.H. declared that the 
court was in error, adding, “I‟m just trying to be as candid about where I am, and 
I‟m not coming with a hidden agenda, and I have thought about things, and 
realistically, if I had to put a number on it, it would be like, say 10 percent 
possibility I could vote for the death penalty.” 
In ruling upon the prosecutor‟s challenge, the trial court expressed its 
concern that Prospective Juror E.H. had “an agenda,” also referring to E.H.‟s 
belief that persons who never would impose the death penalty should be permitted 
to serve as jurors in capital cases.  E.H.‟s opinion on this point emerged in the 
questioning during which E.H., evidently through her demeanor, displayed signs 
that she was “upset” and “irritated.”  The court added:  “Although agenda is too 
strong a word for [E.H.].  I don‟t believe she is lying here.  I don‟t believe she 
came into court to thwart the process.  But I am very concerned with any [juror] 
who will state in an unequivocal way that she . . . disapprove[s] of a law that 
would allow the court to excuse someone who is emphatically opposed to the 
death penalty in all circumstances and wouldn‟t vote for it, no matter what the 
evidence showed at a penalty trial,” pointing out that such a juror inevitably would 
prevent the imposition of the death penalty.  According to the court, E.H.‟s view 
that such a law concerning jury selection is improper — when combined with 
other circumstances that the court acknowledged separately would not be grounds 
for challenge, such as her “moderate” opposition to the death penalty and her view 
it was imposed more frequently on minorities and the poor — gave the court the 
“definite impression that she would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply 
the law.”   
Reviewing the cold record with the appropriate level of deference, we 
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.  Again, this court has 
reviewed the full transcript of the extensive voir dire of E.H., and is impressed 
46 
with the court‟s care and thoughtfulness.  The court stated the correct standard and 
acknowledged that persons who are opposed to the death penalty may not be 
excused for that reason alone.  In addition, the court evidently was sensitive to the 
demeanor of the jurors.  (See pp. 53, 55, 56, post.)  The record reflects that E.H. 
displayed visible emotion when challenged concerning her ability to consider 
imposing the death penalty, as well as when she learned that the law permitted the 
exclusion of prospective jurors who were unalterably opposed to the death penalty.  
She characterized herself as strongly opposed to the latter rule.  Although the court 
rejected the notion that E.H. had committed perjury during voir dire, she evidently 
gave the court the impression that, even if she did not have a precise “agenda,” her 
attitude toward the process of imposing punishment was far from open minded.  
Like Prospective Juror B.S., E.H. acknowledged there was merely a small 
possibility she ever could vote in favor of a verdict of death.  Moreover, as with 
B.S., the record supports the inference that E.H. was resistant to the prosecutor‟s 
efforts to probe her willingness to return such a verdict.  Also, like B.S., E.H. did 
not suggest she could put aside her own views concerning the death penalty and 
participate in the trial purely on the basis of the law under which she was 
instructed.  Rather than deferring to existing law, the prospective juror offered 
merely a small possibility that her own scruples would permit her to reach a 
verdict of death for an especially heinous crime.  The court could infer she would 
be unable to afford the prosecution “ „a fair hearing and a fair opportunity to at 
least persuade [her] to [vote for] the death penalty.‟ ”  (People v. Hamilton, supra, 
45 Cal.4th at p. 891.) 
Defendant seizes upon the court‟s reference to E.H.‟s opposition to the 
death penalty, relying upon the rule that we have acknowledged above that firm 
opposition to the death penalty does not disqualify jurors who clearly state a 
47 
willingness to “set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law.”  
(Lockhart v. McCree, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 176.)   
Examining the voir dire of Prospective Juror E.H. as a whole, and applying 
the appropriate deferential standard, we conclude that this juror was not excused 
simply because of her opposition to the death penalty.  The trial court in the 
present case referred to a number of circumstances it believed combined to 
disqualify her, including her views on the composition of capital juries and on the 
application of the death penalty to members of ethnic minorities.  As noted, E.H. 
also displayed visible emotion during the prosecutor‟s questioning, a circumstance 
that supports the trial court‟s evaluation of her demeanor.  She agreed with the 
prosecutor‟s characterization of her as upset, uncomfortable, and irritated by 
questioning on a topic considered significant by the trial court, namely the juror‟s 
view that persons unalterably opposed to the death penalty should be permitted to 
serve on capital juries.  The trial court was concerned that Prospective Juror E.H. 
had, if not exactly “an agenda,” at least a combination of views that would, despite 
the potential juror‟s evident good faith, substantially impair her ability to abide by 
her oath as a juror.  In distinguishing the present case from those in which a trial 
court has excused a potential juror simply because of the individual‟s opposition to 
the death penalty, we also observe that it is significant the trial court stated it 
understood that a juror who is opposed to the death penalty cannot properly be 
excused for cause for this reason alone. 
The United States Supreme Court has counseled reviewing courts to afford 
considerable deference to the trial court‟s impressions concerning the ability of a 
prospective juror to serve on a capital case.  (Uttecht v. Brown, supra, 551 U.S. at 
pp. 7-9.)  As the high court commented in Uttecht, the trial court is in the best 
position to view the juror‟s demeanor and to give weight to the juror‟s body 
language, demeanor, and attitude.  We defer to the trial court‟s superior ability to 
48 
assess the prospective juror‟s demeanor and, in view of all the circumstances, 
conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court‟s conclusion that this 
prospective juror‟s views would prevent or substantially impair her ability to 
perform her duties according to the law.  
Accordingly, we reject defendant‟s claim that the trial court improperly 
excused Prospective Jurors B.S. and E.H. for cause. 
3. Asserted unfairness in the application of the Witt standard 
Defendant contends the trial court applied a stricter standard to prospective 
jurors who disfavored the death penalty than the court applied to prospective 
jurors who favored that penalty.  Defendant describes the trial court‟s asserted 
standard as follows:  “For pro-death jurors, the standard was: a pro-death juror is 
qualified if he or she makes a commitment to listen to mitigating evidence and 
consider life [in prison] without parole as a possible sentence, regardless of the 
strength of his or her general feelings about the need to impose the death penalty. 
. . .  For pro-life jurors, the standard was that a pro-life juror is disqualified if he or 
she not only makes a commitment to listen to the evidence and consider a death 
verdict as a realistic possibility, but also has general philosophical views which the 
trial judge views as not too strong.” 
Defendant also claims the trial court displayed a bias in favor of 
prospective jurors who supported the death penalty, using its “power to question 
prospective jurors disparately to ask favorable, rehabilitating questions to pro-
death jurors and hostile, disqualifying questions to pro-life jurors.”  Defendant 
summarizes:  “The point here is not that it was in any way improper for the trial 
judge to attempt to rehabilitate pro-death jurors.  The point is that the judge took 
no similar steps to rehabilitate pro-life jurors.  [Indeed] [t]he court‟s brief 
questioning of [B.S.] was framed to elicit disqualifying answers.”   
49 
Defendant claims that the actions of the trial court violated his federal 
constitutional guarantees of due process of law, trial before an impartial jury, and 
equal protection of the laws.  He contends that the trial court‟s asserted bias should 
cause this court to withdraw any deference otherwise owed to the trial court‟s 
conclusions concerning the challenges to Prospective Jurors B.S. and E.H. 8 
Defendant‟s argument rests upon the record of the voir dire of three 
persons, two of whom ultimately did not serve as jurors, and one of whom served 
only as an alternate but was not called upon to deliberate.  Defendant places 
principal reliance upon the examination of Prospective Juror D.F., as to whom the 
court denied a defense challenge for cause.  Defendant claims D.F. was less 
qualified to serve than either B.S. or E.H.  
In questioning D.F., as in its questioning of B.S. and E.H., the court 
attempted to ascertain whether both punishment options were realistic and 
                                              
8  
Respondent contends defendant‟s claim that the trial court employed 
different standards for the two types of jurors and exhibited bias in its questioning 
is forfeited because it was not raised below.  Although we previously have 
determined that a claim that the trial court committed misconduct during its voir 
dire examination — for instance, by assertedly posing questions implying the 
court believed the defendant to be guilty — is forfeited if not raised at trial 
(People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 635; see also People v. Heard, supra, 31 
Cal.4th at p. 958, fn. 8; People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 487), the issue in 
the present case appears to be somewhat different.  Defendant claims that the 
responses of the other jurors, along with the court‟s asserted lack of 
evenhandedness, demonstrate that the court erred in applying the Witt standard to 
B.S. and E.H.  We reached the merits of similar claims in People v. Thornton, 
supra, 41 Cal.4th 391.  In addition, during an examination discussed post, at pages 
55-56, defense counsel did compare his own belief that the prospective juror had a 
pro-death “agenda” with earlier questioning that, he noted, had been regarded by 
the trial court as having disclosed an anti-death-penalty agenda on the part of 
another prospective juror, and in response the trial court considered whether it had 
been evenhanded.  (See pp. 56-57, post.) 
50 
practical possibilities in the mind of the juror — as opposed to being foreclosed by 
personal views.  The court stated:  “It‟s not enough that they might both be 
theoretically available or hypothetically available, we‟re interested to know if they 
are both in realistic practical terms available to choose from . . . depending entirely 
on what the evidence showed that juror and how that juror evaluated that 
evidence.”  
Prospective Juror D.F. responded that both punishment options were open 
to him.  Although he “leaned” toward the death penalty, he also referred to the 
need to hear all the evidence and agreed that the lesser punishment would be a 
practical possibility for him.  He was cautious concerning his ability to reach a 
decision to impose the death penalty, stating: “It would be very definitely a very 
big decision, a very tough decision, but I think if I heard enough facts that sounded 
something very severe, I think I could do it.”  The prosecutor identified the 
charges in the present case and described the process of lethal injection, asking 
whether D.F. actually could supply the 12th vote to impose a sentence of death 
upon defendant.  D.F. responded:  “To be honest I don‟t really know unless the 
time came, but I would think if I truly thought, you know, that these criteria were 
met, I think I could.  But yeah, to be honest until that time happens I don‟t know.” 
D.F. added, “I could reasonably vote for the death penalty, I could 
reasonably vote for life without parole, even though I have a leaning.”  The 
prosecutor asked whether D.F. fell into the automatic-vote-for-death category or 
the leaning-toward-death category.  D.F. stated: “I would think I would wait until I 
hear all the evidence before I truly made up my mind one way or the other.  I may 
be leaning but yeah, I would still want to hear all the evidence.”  On a scale of one 
to 10, D.F. explained he was an “eight-and-a half” in support of the death penalty.   
Defendant suggests D.F.‟s further responses under defense questioning also 
disclosed he was less qualified to serve than B.S. or E.H., and defendant asserts 
51 
that the court‟s failure to excuse D.F. supports defendant‟s claim the court applied 
a different standard to the two categories of prospective jurors.  D.F. agreed that it 
was possible he could vote for life imprisonment, stating, “I would definitely be 
leaning towards death, but possibly.”  He continued:  “Probably if I had to really 
think more in depth about what possibility would lead me to vote for life in prison 
without the possibility of parole, I probably couldn‟t come up with any examples.  
It probably would have to be something really fairly substantial which I can‟t even 
think of to lean towards the other sentence.”  He added:  “It‟s really tough without 
knowing everything else but just from that sound alone I don‟t think I could.  I 
would definitely lean towards [the] death penalty.”  Defense counsel pursued the 
point:  “Well, lean towards is not close my mind, right?”  D.F. responded:  “Yeah, 
well to say yeah, I would vote for the death penalty in those circumstances without 
knowing anything else about the case.”   
D.F. agreed with defense counsel that “there‟s no information to which [he] 
would foreclose [himself],” but when defense counsel inquired whether if the 
charges were proven, a verdict of death would be a foregone conclusion, D.F. 
responded:  “From the sound of it now, from just the little I know, I would 
undoubtedly be leaning that way, yeah.  It would be a foregone conclusion.  I can‟t 
think of anything that would change my mind to think that would not be the right 
punishment.”   
D.F. further acknowledged that in his response to the questionnaire, he 
stated the penalty should be based upon the nature of the crime, not the evidence 
in mitigation.  Defense counsel inquired:  “So no matter how much good we 
showed you about someone who did murder and murder in the course of child 
molest, you would always vote for the death penalty?”  D.F. responded:  “Yeah, I 
would agree with that.  I would think I would think in these terms without — it 
52 
wouldn‟t matter what this other stuff was about; what you are saying I think, yes, I 
would vote for the death penalty.” 
The court thereafter posed supplemental questions, and defense counsel 
subsequently conceded that if the court relied upon D.F.‟s response to these 
supplemental questions, there would not be a basis for a challenge for cause.  On 
appeal, however, defendant claims the court purposefully rehabilitated D.F., but 
refrained from similar rehabilitative questioning of Prospective Jurors B.S. and 
E.H., thereby assertedly demonstrating bias in its decision to excuse the latter 
prospective jurors. 
In its supplemental questions, the court explained the meaning of mitigating 
and aggravating evidence and other matters peculiar to the penalty phase.  The 
court inquired of D.F. whether he believed that if the defendant was guilty of 
murder and murder in connection with a child molestation, “there is no mitigating 
circumstance — which would be defined as not constituting a justification or 
excuse for the crime in question, but which could be considered as an extenuating 
circumstance in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty — there is no 
such mitigating evidence that would be sufficient for you to . . . vote for anything 
but the death penalty?”  D.F. responded:  “Not that I can think of.  It‟s really tough 
without hearing it, but hearing these crimes, yeah, I would answer I can‟t think of 
anything else and I can‟t imagine not voting for the death penalty.” 
The court responded that it recognized it was difficult to decide the matter 
in the abstract.  But, the court asked, assuming there was some evidence in 
mitigation, “would you still be receptive to listening to that evidence?  And when I 
say listen to it having as a possibility, something more than just theory, but a 
practical possibility that it might sway, it might convince you that . . . you might 
still evaluate the case as one where . . . life in prison is appropriate?”  D.F. 
responded:  “Possibly, but . . . I have a real hard time because I don‟t know what it 
53 
can be, yeah, but if there was something out there that definitely could, there was 
some sort of extenuating circumstance I would definitely be willing to listen to it.”  
The court inquired whether D.F. not only could listen, “but there is a part of your 
mental process reserved for choosing either penalty option or do you think the 
listening is simply a formality, but that your mind could not be swayed?”  D.F. 
responded:  “No, if those mitigating circumstances were there, something 
substantive like how I could change my mind, yeah, then I could be swayed.”   
Defense counsel moved to excuse D.F. for cause, although he offered a 
concession that D.F.‟s answers to the court‟s supplemental questions made it “real 
clear to me that those questions of the court undermine my challenge for cause.  
And that my challenge for cause is appropriate only if your honor is willing to 
draw the inference that this juror was being more revealing of his true state of 
mind when he said he „can‟t imagine not voting for the death penalty‟ [than] in his 
direct response to the court‟s question.”   
The court denied the challenge, stating:  “I‟m couching my ruling not only 
on the discussion I had earlier which I will incorporate, but I did ask him 
supplementary questions and, you know, I think the supplemental questions that I 
asked have indicate[d] that while he may be leaning towards the death penalty 
based on hypothetical questions being asked in this case by [the prosecutor], I 
don‟t believe he has foreclosed the possibility and I judge him from looking at his 
demeanor and listening to the way in which he answers questions.  In watching 
him I don‟t believe he has foreclosed a realistic and practical possibility that he 
could impose either punishment.”  (Italics added.)  The court explained further that 
lay persons naturally cannot imagine the nature of mitigating evidence, and the 
court posited this was why D.F. stated he could not imagine voting for any 
sentence other than death.  The court observed that it “will excuse if it has a 
definite impression that the juror‟s views prevent or substantially impair the 
54 
performance of his duties in according with the instructions of his oath . . . and 
that involves a lot of subjective decisions . . . on the part of the trial judge.”  
On appeal, defendant also refers to the questioning of Prospective 
Juror 16.9  The court overruled the defense challenge for cause as to this 
prospective juror, who ultimately served as an alternate but was not called upon to 
deliberate.  
In her questionnaire, Prospective Juror 16 indicated support for capital 
punishment, a belief that capital punishment serves as a deterrent, and an 
assumption that a person found guilty of murder deserves the penalty of death. 
During voir dire, the court inquired whether she believed that only the 
death penalty would be appropriate for the crime of murder.  The prospective juror 
responded:  “Not necessarily.  I‟ve been thinking a lot after filling this out.  It 
would all depend on, you know, my impression [of] whatever we heard as a juror.  
The — I‟m an honest and truthful person, and I think that if I felt that that was 
what the person deserved, then that‟s the way I would vote, but if there was any 
doubt, then I wouldn‟t.”  The court asked whether, even if she found defendant 
guilty of murder and found the special circumstance true, “are you saying that 
there would still be a reasonable, realistic possibility that, despite what you‟ve said 
here and what you feel, you could vote for life in prison?”  The prospective juror 
answered:  “As you said, you have to balance it out and — whatever the 
information is, then you would have to balance it truthfully or honestly and decide 
if you felt that what the circumstances were warranted it or not.  It could go either 
way.”  
                                              
9  
Some of the prospective jurors evidently were addressed by name, whereas 
some were addressed by number. 
55 
The court responded that its initial impression of the prospective juror was 
that she would not be able to consider any penalty but death if the murder and 
special circumstance were proven, and the court suggested: “I thought maybe that 
might be your frame of mind.”  The prospective juror responded:  “Not 
necessarily,” again confirming that both penalties were a realistic and practical 
possible choice for her. 
In response to the prosecution‟s questions, Prospective Juror 16 stated it 
would be difficult and emotional for her to make a decision to impose the death 
penalty, but she believed she could reach such a decision.  She acknowledged she 
had strong feelings concerning crimes against children, but stated she would be 
capable of listening and making up her own mind concerning penalty, and would 
“not necessarily” vote for death.  She rated herself as a 7 out of 10 in terms of her 
support for capital punishment.   
When the defense inquired whether she always would vote for the death 
penalty in cases involving child molestation, she responded:  “I find that hard to 
say, just to say yes.  Then you‟re saying, you know, that I‟ve made up my mind.”  
She repeated that she could vote for either penalty, depending upon the evidence.  
Defense counsel inquired whether she believed prison constituted an adequate 
penalty, and she equivocated, characterizing some prisons as resembling “Club 
Med.”  Again, she informed counsel that she found it difficult to predict her vote 
when she was unaware of the circumstances of the case, and never had 
participated in a capital trial.  She reminded counsel that jurors are instructed to 
approach the evidence with an open mind, but that he was asking her to admit “it 
is in cement that I would vote for the death penalty.  And I say I don‟t know.”  She 
stated she would give defendant a fair hearing.  
Defense counsel moved to excuse the juror, referring to her manner and to 
defense counsel‟s belief that she “had an agenda.”  Counsel stated:  “It just looks 
56 
that way to me as firmly as it looked that other people have had an agenda for the 
defense.” 
The court acknowledged that demeanor was important to its determination, 
and invited defense counsel to explain aspects of the prospective juror‟s demeanor 
that suggested an “agenda.”  Defense counsel responded that the prospective 
juror‟s answer referring to some prisons as resembling “Club Med” indicated a 
view that prison did not constitute severe punishment, and counsel also referred to 
“the various relatively lengthy pauses that she had at one point or another.”  
Defense counsel expressed disbelief in the juror‟s claim that she had softened her 
views since the time she completed the juror questionnaire.   
The court observed that it had been “sensitive to jurors who might be 
perceived to have an agenda,” adding it did not believe Prospective Juror 16 
“wants to get on this jury to achieve some goal.”  The court stated its view that the 
prospective juror‟s answers to the written questionnaire reflected a person who 
“has, for practical purposes, excluded one of the two penalty options.”  At the 
same time, the court credited the juror‟s claim that she had thought more deeply 
concerning capital punishment after completing the questionnaire.  The court 
noted its view that the juror‟s pauses during questioning arose from the 
forcefulness of the defense questioning, and commented it did not believe the 
prospective juror was lying. 
The court also observed that it had reflected upon whether it was “being 
consistent with myself in this analysis, and I think I am.” The court added:  “I‟m 
very sensitive to . . . such things as body language, unspoken pauses . . . .  But I 
don‟t see those things in her spoken words or unspoken communications as 
indicating she can‟t serve.”  The court denied the defense challenge. 
The court subsequently set aside its decision denying the defense challenge, 
expressing the concern that it should not have compared Prospective Juror 16 to 
57 
other prospective jurors, and also noting that at one point the court had interjected 
an unfounded criticism of defense counsel (for suggesting the court had directed 
the juror to change her views). 
When the court reconsidered the challenge (ultimately overruling it again), 
it stated that the juror‟s questionnaire in isolation would disqualify her, but that her 
answers to the court‟s and counsel‟s questions reflected she had thought deeply 
about the matter after completing the questionnaire.  The court added that it 
believed her “post-questionnaire conversion” was sincere and genuine.  The court 
noted that it had “looked at her demeanor, . . . watched and listened to the pauses, 
and tried to see whether or not they reflected . . . intent to deceive . . . us or 
deceive herself.  [¶]  I didn‟t read it that way.  I really did not.”  As noted, the court 
then again overruled the defense challenge for cause as to this juror, allowing her 
to serve (as an alternate). 
Defendant also refers briefly to the court‟s questioning of Prospective Juror 
A.S., who supported the death penalty “for an offense as capital as taking a life 
unless there are extenuating circumstances.”  In response to the court‟s questions 
concerning his willingness to consider both penalties, the prospective juror 
responded he could consider both penalties, but had “a tough time understanding” 
the purpose of life imprisonment for someone who is judged so dangerous he can 
never return to society.  “Maybe that‟s a narrow-minded thought, but . . . what 
would be the evidence that would support life [in prison] without possibility of 
parole, but yet wouldn‟t support the death penalty?  I guess I‟m a little confused 
where the line would be drawn.”   
The court expressed “serious concerns” that A.S. might not be able to 
return any verdict but death for murder with special circumstances.  A.S. 
responded that he supported death for murder with special circumstances as an 
abstract matter, but “I haven‟t heard everything there is to hear.”  As the court had 
58 
done with other jurors, it acknowledged the difficulty of predicting a decision on 
the basis of speculation, but asked for the juror‟s best judgment, inquiring:  “Given 
the fact that you may have leanings towards the death penalty, do you believe that 
it is still a realistic and practical possibility that there could be extenuating 
evidence, for example presented [at] a penalty phase trial that could nevertheless 
convince you that in this particular case life in prison is the appropriate choice?”  
The prospective juror conceded it was possible for him to change his mind.   
We have considered the questions posed by the court to Prospective Jurors 
D.F., 16, and A.S., but reject defendant‟s claim that the court‟s inquiry exhibits 
bias or the application of inconsistent standards with respect to Prospective Jurors 
B.S. and E.H.  Decisions concerning the qualifications of prospective jurors to 
serve rest within the “ „wide discretion‟ ” of the trial court, and the manner of the 
court‟s conduct of voir dire is “ „seldom disturbed on appeal.‟ ”  (People v. 
Thornton, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 420.)  Moreover, the record does not establish 
that the court applied different standards to the prospective jurors identified by 
defendant, depending upon their attitude toward the death penalty.   
The court inquired of each prospective juror whether there was a practical, 
realistic possibility that he or she could vote in favor of either penalty verdict.  
Moreover, we are not persuaded that Prospective Jurors B.S. and E.H. were so 
demonstrably more open minded concerning penalty than Prospective Jurors D.F., 
16, or A.S. that the court must have employed different standards or been 
motivated by bias in ruling on the challenges to each juror.  Rather, unlike B.S. 
and E.H., whose answers supplied a substantial basis for concluding that they 
never would vote for the penalty of death, or in any case would not afford the 
prosecution a fair hearing and opportunity to persuade them to vote for the penalty 
of death, “the death-favorable jurors of whom defendant complains clearly 
indicated their ability to consider circumstances in mitigation, to withhold 
59 
judgment upon the question of penalty until the evidence was before them, and 
seriously to entertain the option of imposing a sentence of life [in prison] without 
possibility of parole.”  (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 989.)  
Additionally, the court‟s statements indicated it was particularly “sensitive” to and 
observant of the demeanor of prospective jurors in reaching its conclusion 
regarding eligibility for jury service in a capital case, and nothing in the court‟s 
conduct of voir dire indicates we should withhold deference to its ability to 
evaluate and rely upon the jurors‟ demeanor in making its rulings in this matter. 
As for the court‟s asserted efforts to “rehabilitate” Prospective Jurors D.F., 
16, and A.S., and the claim these efforts disclosed bias on the part of the court, we 
ordinarily defer to the court‟s determination that a prospective juror‟s answers 
require clarification.  Although the prospective jurors challenged by the defense 
and identified on appeal initially may have appeared unable to be fair to defendant, 
after questioning the court legitimately was satisfied that they were eligible to 
serve.  As in People v. Thornton, supra, 41 Cal.4th 391, “it is evident that the 
court found it necessary to ask the prospective juror[s] questions to reach a 
decision about [them], and doing so worked no unfairness to defendant.”  (Id. at 
p. 422.)  And as we commented in that decision, “[w]e see nothing improper in the 
court‟s explaining the law to the prospective juror, nor in its failing to engage in a 
similar dialogue with other prospective jurors whose voir dire did not give rise to 
the same concerns . . . .”  (Ibid.)  
Although trial courts “ „should be evenhanded in their questions to 
prospective jurors during the “death-qualification” portion of the voir dire,‟ ” on 
appeal “[a] reviewing court should not require a trial court‟s questioning of each 
prospective juror in the Witherspoon-Witt context ( . . . Witherspoon v. Illinois 
(1968) 391 U.S. 510) to be similar in each case in which the court has questions, 
lest the court feel compelled to conduct a needlessly broad voir dire, receiving 
60 
answers to questions it does not need to ask.”  (People v. Thornton, supra, 41 
Cal.4th at p. 425.) 
We observe finally that defendant supplied three examples of asserted 
rehabilitation of persons who generally supported the death penalty, and compared 
these examples with the voir dire of two persons who were opposed to the death 
penalty.  The examination of such a small number of prospective jurors constitutes 
an extremely limited sample of the trial court‟s overall performance, thereby 
diminishing the probative value of the examples proffered by defendant to support 
the inference he would have us draw.  More than 150 prospective jurors were 
examined concerning their views related to the death penalty, during 15 court days 
of voir dire.  When considered in this context, and for the reasons explained 
above, the examples supplied by defendant fail to establish that the court applied 
incorrect or inconsistent standards or followed a practice exhibiting bias against 
prospective jurors who opposed the death penalty.  
C. Asserted Instructional Error at the Guilt Phase  
1. CALJIC No. 2.21.2 
Defendant claims the trial court‟s instruction based upon CALJIC No. 
2.21.2, concerning the jury‟s consideration of the testimony of a willfully 
untruthful witness, violated his constitutional right to due process of law.  He 
contends the instruction served to shift the burden of proof to defendant and 
rendered the verdict unreliable.10   
                                              
10 
The trial court delivered the following instruction based upon CALJIC No. 
2.21.2:  “A witness, who is willfully false in one material part of his or her 
testimony, is to be distrusted in others.  You may reject the whole testimony of a 
witness who willfully has testified falsely as to a material point, unless, from all 
the evidence, you believe the probability of truth favors his or her testimony in 
other particulars.”  The court already had cautioned the jury that “[d]iscrepancies 
(footnote continued on next page) 
61 
Defendant complains specifically of language authorizing the jury “to reject 
the whole testimony” of defendant himself if the jury found he willfully testified 
falsely on a material point, “unless, from all the evidence, you believe the 
probability of truth favors his or her testimony in other particulars.”  According to 
defendant, this language permitted the jury to reject all of defendant‟s testimony, 
even if that testimony raised a reasonable doubt as to some element of the charged 
offenses, unless the instruction improperly imposed the burden on defendant of 
proving that the “probability of truth favors his or her testimony in other 
particulars.”   
We have rejected substantially identical attacks upon CALJIC No. 2.21.2 
on many occasions, and decline to reconsider our conclusion.  (People v. Crew 
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 848; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 428-429; 
People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 94-95.)  “ „The qualification attacked by 
defendant as shifting the burden of proof . . . is merely a statement of the 
obvious — that the jury should refrain from rejecting the whole of a witness‟s 
testimony if it believes that the probability of truth favors any part of it.  [¶]  “Thus 
[the instruction] does nothing more than explain to a jury one of the tests they may 
use in resolving a credibility dispute.” ‟ . . . When [the instruction] is considered in 
context with CALJIC Nos. 1.01 (consider instructions as a whole) and 2.90 
(burden of proof), „the jury was adequately told to apply CALJIC No. 2.21.2 “only 
as part of the process of determining whether the prosecution had met its 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
in a witness‟ testimony or between his or her testimony and that of others, if there 
were any, do not necessarily mean that the witness should be discredited,” and that 
“[w]hether a discrepancy pertains to a fact of importance or only to a trivial detail 
should be considered in weighing its significance.”  (See CALJIC No. 2.21.1.)   
62 
fundamental burden of proving [defendant‟s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” ‟ ”  
(People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 428-429.) 
Defendant contends the burden-shifting effect he detects in the pattern 
instruction was exacerbated in the present case by the prosecutor‟s closing 
argument.  In our view, however, that argument does not provide a basis for 
distinguishing the present case from the cases cited above.   
The prosecutor discussed various aspects of the evidence presented by the 
prosecution that cast doubt upon defendant‟s testimony that he killed White during 
an altercation but had no contact with Tara.  The prosecutor carefully reviewed 
each element of defendant‟s testimony and suggested that defendant willfully 
fabricated numerous aspects of that testimony to rebut the inculpatory evidence 
presented by the prosecution.  The prosecutor directed the jury to consider the 
instruction concerning untruthful witnesses.  He paraphrased CALJIC No. 2.21.2, 
stating:  “A witness willfully false in one material part of his testimony is to be 
distrusted in others.  You may reject the whole testimony . . . if [he] willfully 
testified falsely as to a material fact.  Reject everything he said.  Unless from all 
the evidence you believe the probability of the truth favors his testimony in other 
particulars.”  
The prosecutor continued:  “In other words, you can reject all his testimony 
if he testified falsely as to a material fact, and you‟re to distrust everything else he 
has to say.  And the only time you can accept anything he has to say as true after 
you have caught him in a lie on a material issue, is if all the other evidence, not his 
testimony, but all the other evidence goes to show the probability that what he said 
is true.  And you don‟t have that here because all the other evidence points in the 
opposite direction, of complete falsehood and lies by him.”  (Italics added.)  The 
prosecutor then specifically acknowledged the People‟s burden of proof:  “What 
has to be established by the evidence, what I have to do is to prove beyond a 
63 
reasonable doubt that these crimes have been committed and that he did it.  And 
you‟ve heard for the last two hours . . . that that evidence proves beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he did it and that he committed these crimes.”  
Defendant contends it is reasonably probable this argument misled the jury 
into shifting the burden of proof.  We disagree.  It is highly unlikely that the 
prosecutor‟s argument persuaded the jury to ignore defendant‟s entire testimony, 
because much of that testimony was inculpatory and supported the case against 
defendant for the murder of White.  (See People v. Beardslee, supra, 53 Cal.3d at 
pp. 94-95.)  Moreover, the jury was directed to follow the instructions on the law 
as given to it by the court, and to disregard any contrary statements by counsel.  
The instruction given to the jury “at no point require[d] the jury to reject any 
testimony; it simply state[d] circumstances under which it may do so.”  (Id. at p. 
95.)  
2. Consciousness of guilt instructions 
Defendant contends that the court committed error by delivering pattern 
instructions permitting the jury to infer consciousness of guilt from defendant‟s 
attempt to persuade a witness to provide false evidence, or from evidence of his 
flight from the crime scene.  (See CALJIC Nos. 2.04, 2.52.)11  He argues that in 
                                              
11  
The court delivered the following instruction based upon CALJIC No. 2.04:  
“If you find that the defendant attempted to or did persuade a witness to provide 
false evidence, such conduct may be considered by you as a circumstance tending 
to show a consciousness of guilt.  However, such conduct is not sufficient by itself 
to prove guilt, and its weight and significance, if any, are matters for your 
determination.”  The court also delivered the following instruction based upon 
CALJIC No. 2.52:  “The flight of a person immediately after the commission of a 
crime, or after he is accused of a crime, is not sufficient in itself to establish his 
guilt; but is a fact which, if proved, may be considered by you in the light of all 
other proved facts in deciding the question of his guilt or innocence.  The weight 
to which such circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine.”  
64 
cases in which a defendant has admitted his identity as the perpetrator of a crime, 
the instructions “invite the jury to use evidence whose only rational use is to 
determine the identity of a perpetrator for an irrational purpose — as evidence that 
other elements of the crime[ had] been established.” 
We have rejected this argument in prior decisions, and defendant proffers 
no persuasive basis for reconsideration.  (See People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 1082, 1159-1160, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin, 
supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 421, fn. 22, and cases cited; People v. Jackson (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 1164, 1224.)  Contrary to defendant‟s claims, the instructions do not 
suggest that evidence of a defendant‟s consciousness of guilt serves to support an 
inference of the existence of a particular mental state or degree of culpability.  
(People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1224.)  “[W]e have repeatedly rejected 
the argument that instructions on consciousness of guilt, including instructions 
regarding the defendant‟s flight following the crime, permit the jury to draw 
impermissible inferences about the defendant‟s mental state, or are otherwise 
inappropriate where mental state, not identity, is the principal disputed issue.”  
(People v. Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1160.) 
D. Appellate Counsel’s Access to Tara’s Juvenile Dependency Case 
File   
Prior to the preliminary hearing and almost six years prior to the trial, the 
defense requested to inspect Tara‟s juvenile dependency case file.  The request 
was granted in part.  On appeal, defendant‟s counsel sought full access to the 
undisclosed portions of the confidential juvenile file, both through his briefing and 
through a separate request for an order granting him access.  Appellate counsel 
asserted in his request and in his opening brief that denying him unrestricted 
access to the file would violate defendant‟s rights to fundamental fairness, due 
process of law, confrontation, and a reliable penalty determination within the 
65 
meaning of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution.  Defendant contends that, should we deny appellate counsel 
further access to the juvenile file, this court must review the file to determine 
whether the trial court erred in failing to afford the defense access to material 
information contained therein.  
As we shall explain, defendant is not entitled to inspect the undisclosed 
portion of Tara‟s juvenile file.  We have reviewed the undisclosed portion of the 
file and conclude it did not contain material evidence.  
1. Background 
At the time of the charged crimes, Tara was under the supervision of the 
juvenile court as a result of sexual abuse by several men.  In 1991, prior to the 
preliminary hearing, the defense moved in the juvenile court to inspect her file on 
the theory that Tara‟s credibility would constitute a critical issue at trial.  The 
motion sought access to materials that indicated “some level of mental 
instability, . . . prior sexual knowledge due to a previous unrelated molest[ation], 
. . . or a proclivity for telling falsehoods . . . .” 
After reviewing the entire file at a hearing conducted on May 31, 1991, the 
juvenile court ordered that certain portions of the file be disclosed to the defense, 
because they indicated that Tara had been sexually abused in the past and also 
were pertinent to the issue of Tara‟s credibility.  The juvenile court denied the 
request with respect to the remainder of the file.  The disclosed material 
principally consisted of psychological assessments of Tara that had been 
performed at various times between November 1988 and February 1989.  In 
addition, the court ordered the disclosure of recommendations prepared for a 1989 
66 
detention hearing in the juvenile court and a jurisdictional report dated January 24, 
1991.12  
The defense filed another motion in the municipal court for inspection of 
additional records concerning Tara that were subpoenaed from Stanford 
Children‟s Hospital.  Tara had undergone residential psychiatric treatment at the 
hospital in 1988 and again in 1989, prior to the charged offenses, and had 
undergone further residential psychiatric treatment in 1991 following the charged 
offenses.  The municipal court conducted a hearing, after which it concluded that 
the complete records documenting all three periods of psychiatric treatment at 
Stanford Children‟s Hospital were to be disclosed to the defense but to be 
maintained in the court‟s file under seal.   
                                              
12  
Specifically, the court directed disclosure of a jurisdictional report dated 
January 24, 1991; a confidential psychological evaluation prepared by the New 
Haven Unified School District dated February 14, 1989; a psychological 
assessment report dated January 17, 1989, on the letterhead of Alameda County 
Health Care Services; a psychological evaluation dated November 11, 1988, on 
the letterhead of Lucile Packard Children‟s Hospital at Stanford (Stanford 
Children‟s Hospital); a report, on the letterhead of Stanford Children‟s Hospital, 
having an admission date of November 3, 1988, and a discharge date of November 
28, 1988; and a document entitled “Recommendation for Order of Detention” in 
Tara‟s case, undated, with a handwritten notation concerning a six-month review 
with the date of December 20, 1989.  The documents that the juvenile court 
declined to disclose to the defense were not listed.  During record-correction 
proceedings, the superior court ordered that the juvenile court file be delivered 
under seal to this court.  The file as originally sent to us, however, did not contain 
the material that was ordered disclosed.  After diligent efforts by our clerk‟s office 
and the clerk‟s office of the Alameda County Superior Court, the disclosed portion 
of the juvenile file was discovered in storage and subsequently was delivered to 
this court, rendering the juvenile file complete.   
67 
On September 15, 2004, this court denied defendant‟s request for an order 
providing appellate counsel with access to the undisclosed portion of Tara‟s 
confidential juvenile court file.  
2. Discussion 
Our order denying appellate counsel‟s request for access to the undisclosed 
portion of the sealed file cited Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987) 480 U.S. 39, 59-61, 
in support.  In that case, the defendant was charged with committing sexual 
offenses against his daughter, and sought to examine confidential records 
concerning her, compiled by the state child protective services agency in 
connection with the alleged abuse.  He claimed the file “might contain the names 
of favorable witnesses, as well as other, unspecified exculpatory evidence.”  (Id. at 
p. 44.)  The United States Supreme Court determined that the trial court had erred 
by denying the request without inspecting the file.  The high court reasoned that 
the principle of due process of law requires the government to disclose evidence in 
its possession that is both “favorable to the accused and material to guilt or 
punishment.”  (Id. at p. 57.)  Because pertinent state statutes provided certain 
exceptions to the general rule of confidentiality for the records at issue, including 
one applicable when a court of competent jurisdiction orders their disclosure, there 
was no absolute bar to disclosure.  “In the absence of any apparent state policy to 
the contrary, we therefore have no reason to believe that relevant information 
would not be disclosed when a court of competent jurisdiction determines that the 
information is „material‟ to the defense of the accused.”  (Id. at p. 58.)   
The high court concluded the defendant was “entitled to have the 
[confidential] file reviewed by the trial court to determine whether it contains 
information that probably would have changed the outcome of his trial.”  
(Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 58, italics added.)  The court 
68 
emphasized that defense counsel was not entitled to review the entire file to search 
for evidence that might have some utility in preparing his case.  Using language 
that is particularly relevant here, the court stated:  “A defendant‟s right to discover 
exculpatory evidence does not include the unsupervised authority to search 
through the Commonwealth‟s files.  [Citations.]  Although the eye of an advocate 
may be helpful to a defendant in ferreting out information, [citation], this Court 
has never held — even in the absence of a statute restricting disclosure — that a 
defendant alone may make the determination as to the materiality of the 
information.  Settled practice is to the contrary. . . .  Defense counsel has no 
constitutional right to conduct his own search of the State‟s files to argue 
relevance.  [Citation.]”  (Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. at pp. 59-60, fn. 
omitted.) 
The juvenile court in the present case followed the rule established in the 
Ritchie decision and, pursuant to its authority under Welfare and Institutions Code 
section 827, reviewed the entire file to determine whether it contained material 
evidence.  As noted, several documents from the juvenile court file were disclosed 
to the defense. 
Defendant contends that Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. 39, is 
inapposite, because it concerned the accused‟s right to pretrial discovery, whereas 
defendant‟s claim in the present case is that appellate counsel must be afforded 
access to the complete juvenile file for the purpose of determining whether it 
contains any information that might be helpful to the defense on appeal.   
As has been demonstrated, however, even at trial the defense is not entitled 
to review confidential documents to determine which are material for its purposes; 
rather, as occurred in the present case, it is the trial court‟s duty to review the 
documents and to determine which, if any, are material and should be disclosed.  
We perceive no reason that the defense should have a broader right of access to 
69 
privileged material on appeal, particularly when we consider that the defense 
request concedes that the juvenile and municipal courts ordered disclosure of 
substantial sensitive and embarrassing material from the file and that, on appeal, 
appellate counsel offers mere speculation that the file might disclose something 
that could be the basis for a claim on appeal.   
Appellate counsel contends that Tara has a diminished interest in 
maintaining the confidentiality of the juvenile file because the passage of time has 
rendered the contents stale.  Appellate counsel further contends that because so 
much information of a highly personal nature was disclosed by the orders of the 
trial court and the juvenile court, “it is highly doubtful” that disclosure of the 
remainder of the file‟s contents “would reveal anything more intrusive than the 
material already disclosed.”  Finally, counsel asserts that because Tara is no longer 
a minor or within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, one of the rationales for 
maintaining the confidentiality of the juvenile court file — to avoid interference 
with the rehabilitative purposes of juvenile court proceedings — is absent.  These 
arguments fail to afford appropriate deference to the statutory policy of 
maintaining the confidentiality of juvenile case files, and to Tara‟s interest in 
avoiding public revelation of additional painful and embarrassing circumstances in 
her early life. 
In sum, contrary to defendant‟s claim that he is entitled to inspect the entire 
file, “[p]arties who challenge on appeal trial court orders withholding information 
as privileged or otherwise nondiscoverable „must do the best they can with the 
information they have, and the appellate court will fill the gap by objectively 
reviewing the whole record.‟ ”  (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 493; see 
also People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 606.) 
This court‟s function is to review the confidential records that the juvenile 
court declined to disclose, in order to determine whether they were material and 
70 
should have been disclosed.  (See People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 493.)  
“Although courts have used different terminologies to define „materiality,‟ a 
majority of [the United States Supreme] Court has agreed, „[e]vidence is material 
only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to 
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A “reasonable 
probability” is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.‟ ”  
(Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 57, quoting United States v. Bagley 
(1985) 473 U.S. 667, 682.)  We also consider the effect of nondisclosure on the 
investigations conducted by counsel and on their trial strategy.  (People v. 
Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1132.)  
We have reviewed the entire confidential juvenile court and superior court 
files, and have concluded that the undisclosed information was not material to the 
defense.13  In addition, having reviewed the confidential file, we conclude the 
contents do not support any claim that further disclosure is required to protect 
defendant‟s right to a fair appeal.  (See People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 
595.) 
                                              
13  
Defendant does not explain his reliance upon the right of confrontation 
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.  The plurality opinion in 
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. 39, interpreted the right of confrontation 
as a trial right.  (Id. at pp. 52-54.)  The defendant has no right to confront 
witnesses against him during an appeal.  To the extent defendant claims error 
under the confrontation clause on the basis of the juvenile court‟s refusal to order 
pretrial disclosure of the entire file, we have rejected claims that the Sixth 
Amendment right of confrontation extends to requiring the granting of pretrial 
discovery motions.  (People v. Hammon (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117, 1128 [“we 
decline to extend the defendant‟s Sixth Amendment right[] of confrontation . . . to 
authorize pretrial disclosure of privileged information”].)  Even if the Sixth 
Amendment right of confrontation applied to the discovery request made in the 
trial court, our review of the entire file establishes that the trial court‟s order did 
not deprive defendant of any material evidence.   
71 
E. Challenges to California’s Death Penalty Scheme 
Defendant contends California‟s death penalty statute, as interpreted by this 
court and applied at defendant‟s trial, violates federal constitutional provisions in 
various respects.  These claims have been rejected in many prior decisions of this 
court, and defendant offers no persuasive grounds for reconsideration. 
The California death penalty statute is not impermissibly broad within the 
meaning of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution, whether the statute is considered on its face or as applied.  
(People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1141; People v. Snow (2003) 30 
Cal.4th 43, 125-126.) 
Section 190.3, factor (a) does not permit arbitrary or capricious imposition 
of a sentence of death in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, whether considered on its face or 
as applied.  (Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975-977; People v. 
Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 648.) 
Nothing in the federal Constitution requires a penalty phase jury to reach 
unanimity on the presence of aggravating factors or to agree unanimously that 
aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors.  (People v. Williams, supra, 43 
Cal.4th at pp. 648-649; People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 730.)  Except 
for prior-violent-crimes evidence and prior felony convictions under section 190.3, 
factors (b) and (c), the court is not required to instruct on any burden of proof, 
whether for finding aggravating factors, for determining that aggravating factors 
outweigh mitigating factors, or for reaching the conclusion that death is the 
appropriate penalty.  (People v. Cruz  (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 681.)  In addition, 
the United States Supreme Court decisions in Cunningham v. California (2007) 
549 U.S. 270, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, and Apprendi v. New Jersey 
(2000) 530 U.S. 466 do not compel a different result.  (People v. Williams, supra, 
72 
43 Cal.4th at p. 649.)  Rather, “ „[u]nlike the guilt determination, “the sentencing 
function is inherently moral and normative, not factual” [citation] and, hence, not 
susceptible to a burden-of-proof quantification.‟ ”  (People v. Manriquez (2005) 
37 Cal.4th 547, 589.)   
The federal Constitution does not require the jury to make penalty phase 
findings, written or otherwise.  (People v. Williams, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 648-
649.) 
The absence of intercase proportionality review does not violate state or 
federal constitutional principles.  (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 156-
157; see also People v. Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 681; People v. Harris (2008) 
43 Cal.4th 1269, 1323 [questioning the defendant‟s assertion that this court has 
“categorically forbidden such review”].) 
The use of unadjudicated criminal activity as a circumstance in aggravation 
does not violate the guarantee of due process of law or render a judgment of death 
unreliable, and the jury is not constitutionally required to agree unanimously that 
the prior violent criminal activity has been proven.  (People v. Morrison, supra, 34 
Cal.4th at p. 729.) 
As we have held, “[u]se in the sentencing factors of such adjectives as 
„extreme‟ (factors (d), (g)) and „substantial‟ (factor (g)) does not act as a barrier to 
the consideration of mitigating evidence in violation of the federal Constitution.”  
(People v. Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 729-730.) 
It is not required by the federal Constitution that the jury be instructed that 
certain factors may be considered solely in mitigation.  (People v. Morrison, 
supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 730.)  The statute and the instruction based upon the statute 
directing the jury to consider “whether or not” mitigating facts are present, are 
consistent with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  (People v. Morrison, at 
p. 730.) 
73 
The California death penalty scheme does not violate the guarantee of equal 
protection of the laws by virtue of its failure to afford various procedural 
safeguards to capital defendants that are applicable in noncapital trials.  (People v. 
Mungia, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1142; People v. Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 681.) 
We have rejected the contention that the California death penalty scheme 
violates international law.  (People v. Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 689; People v. 
Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 403.) 
III.   
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed in its entirety. 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY MORENO, J. 
 
I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it affirms the guilt verdict and 
special circumstance finding.  I dissent with respect to the penalty verdict.  In my 
view, Prospective Juror E.H. was improperly excused for cause because of the trial 
court‟s determination that E.H. was unable to realistically impose the death 
penalty.  Notwithstanding the deference appellate courts owe to a trial court‟s 
determination of such matters, I conclude the trial court erred.  Although E.H. 
professed to be against the death penalty, she was also unequivocal in her 
willingness to impose that penalty in some circumstances, and to do so in a way 
that was consistent with California death penalty law, and that therefore she was 
able and willing to perform her duties as a juror in a capital case.  Moreover, the 
trial court explicitly stated that it did not doubt her credibility.  I therefore 
conclude that the trial court erred in determining she would be substantially 
impaired in performing her duty as a juror.  Such error requires reversal of the 
death penalty verdict. 
I. 
I begin with review of pertinent case law.  In Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 
391 U.S. 510 (Witherspoon), the United States Supreme Court considered a capital 
jury selection regime governed by a statute that permitted a challenge for cause 
whenever a prospective juror was opposed to capital punishment or expressed 
“conscientious scruples” against such punishment.  (Id. at p. 512.)  In the case 
2 
before the court, almost half the veniremen had been excused because of qualms 
about capital punishment.  (Id. at p. 513.)  The Witherspoon court concluded that 
such a regime would deny a capital defendant the Sixth Amendment right to an 
impartial jury, because a jury in which all persons with reservations about the 
death penalty were excluded would be a panel “uncommonly willing to condemn a 
man to die.”  (Witherspoon, at p. 521.)  Instead, the court held that jurors may be 
excluded for cause if they make it “unmistakably clear (1) that they would 
automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to 
any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them, or (2) 
that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an 
impartial decision as to the defendant‟s guilt.”  (Id. at pp. 522-523, fn. 21, italics in 
original.) 
In Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412 (Witt), the court, while 
reaffirming that the Sixth Amendment is violated by categorically excluding from 
capital juries those opposed to the death penalty, criticized the Witherspoon 
court‟s formulation of the proper standard for challenging prospective jurors.  In 
that case, notwithstanding a prospective juror‟s admission that she believed her 
personal objections to the death penalty would interfere with her ability to sit as a 
juror and to determine both defendant‟s guilt and innocence, the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeal had concluded that the juror‟s expression had not met the 
Witherspoon standard of unequivocally stating that she would never vote for the 
death penalty, and reversed the death judgment.  The Supreme Court reversed.  
The court noted that the jury in Witherspoon was given unfettered discretion to 
impose the death penalty, whereas jurors after Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 
153 had their discretion limited and directed by certain statutory criteria.  
Therefore, the fact that a prospective juror would not “automatically” vote against 
death was insufficient to protect the state‟s interest in having jurors who would 
3 
comply with its statutory capital sentencing scheme.  (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at 
pp. 420-423.)  Instead, the court permitted removal for cause when the juror‟s 
views would “ „prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a 
juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.‟ ”  (Id. at p. 424.) 
The Witt court further elaborated that “in addition to dispensing with 
Witherspoon‟s reference to „automatic‟ decisionmaking, this standard likewise 
does not require that a juror‟s bias be proved with „unmistakable clarity.‟  This is 
because determinations of juror bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer 
sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism.  What common sense 
should have realized experience has proved:  many veniremen simply cannot be 
asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made 
„unmistakably clear‟; these veniremen may not know how they will react when 
faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may 
wish to hide their true feelings.  Despite this lack of clarity in the printed record, 
however, there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite 
impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially 
apply the law.”  (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at pp. 424-426, fn. omitted.)  The Witt court 
also emphasized that, as in other situations involving juror bias, a capital juror‟s 
bias based on opposition to the death penalty “involves credibility findings whose 
basis cannot be easily discerned from an appellate record, “and therefore requires 
considerable deference to the trial court‟s determination.  (Id. at p. 429.)  The 
question on review “is not whether a reviewing court might disagree with the trial 
court‟s findings, but whether those findings are fairly supported by the record.”  
(Id. at p. 434.) 
 
In California, our capital statutory scheme requires that penalty phase jurors 
weigh various aggravating and mitigating factors in order to determine whether 
death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole is the proper sentence.  
4 
Although jurors are statutorily directed to consider such aggravating and 
mitigating factors, their evaluation of those factors is by its very nature subjective: 
“ „Each juror is free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value he deems 
appropriate to each and all of the various factors he is permitted to consider. . . .‟ ”  
(People v. Boyde (1988) 46 Cal.3d, 212, 253.)   For this reason, the standard and 
burden of proof requirements for determining guilt in criminal proceedings are 
neither required nor appropriate at the penalty phase of a capital trial.  “ „Unlike 
the guilt determination, “the sentencing function is inherently moral and 
normative, not factual” [citation] and, hence, not susceptible to a burden-of-proof 
quantification.‟ ”  (People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1216.)  
Accordingly, it is understood that jurors will bring their values, beliefs, and 
opinions into the jury room when determining the proper penalty.  As we 
explained in People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 699 (Kaurish):  “A 
prospective juror personally opposed to the death penalty may nonetheless be 
capable of following his oath and the law.  A juror whose personal opposition 
toward the death penalty may predispose him to assign greater than average 
weight to the mitigating factors presented at the penalty phase may not be 
excluded, unless that predilection would actually preclude him from engaging in 
the weighing process and returning a capital verdict.” 
As we elaborated in People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 447 
(Stewart): “Kaurish, supra, 52 Cal.3d 648, recognizes that a prospective juror may 
not be excluded for cause simply because his or her conscientious views relating 
to the death penalty would lead the juror to impose a higher threshold before 
concluding that the death penalty is appropriate or because such views would 
make it very difficult for the juror ever to impose the death penalty.  Because the 
California death penalty sentencing process contemplates that jurors will take into 
account their own values in determining whether aggravating factors outweigh 
5 
mitigating factors such that the death penalty is warranted, the circumstance that a 
juror‟s conscientious opinions or beliefs concerning the death penalty would make 
it very difficult for the juror ever to impose the death penalty is not equivalent to a 
determination that such beliefs will „substantially impair the performance of his 
[or her] duties as a juror‟ under Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412. . . .  A juror might find 
it very difficult to vote to impose the death penalty, and yet such a juror‟s 
performance still would not be substantially impaired under Witt, unless he or she 
were unwilling or unable to follow the trial court‟s instructions by weighing the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the case and determining whether 
death is the appropriate penalty under the law.”  (First italics added.) 
Thus, although we require jurors to set aside their values and biases when 
determining guilt, and to objectively apply the law as described to them in the jury 
instructions to the evidence presented, at the penalty phase of a capital trial 
something quite different is expected.  Values, far from being set aside, are the 
very basis for the juror‟s decision, albeit guided by certain statutory markers.  
Accordingly, if we can imagine a hypothetical system in which jurors serve on 
multiple capital juries, and their voting records can be discovered, juror A, who 
voted 5 times for life imprisonment without parole and 5 times for death, would 
not necessarily be a more objective or conscientious juror than juror B, who served 
on the same 10 juries but voted for death 9 times out of 10, or juror C, who voted 
for life imprisonment without parole 9 out of 10 times.  Although juror B may be 
strongly predisposed to vote for the death penalty, and juror C against, each would 
be following his or her oath as long as he or she followed the statutory directive to 
choose a penalty by weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances, even 
6 
though their attitudes toward the death penalty would cause them to differ from 
each other, and from juror A, as to the weights given.1 
There are two types of challenges that prosecution and defense counsel may 
exercise to remove prospective jurors, challenges for cause (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 227) and peremptory challenges (id., § 231), and in a capital case, each side has 
20 peremptory challenges (ibid.).  In practice, peremptory challenges often are 
used to remove prospective jurors in whom bias is perceived, but where that bias 
does not rise to the level of a challenge for cause.  (See People v. Wheeler (1978) 
22 Cal.3d 258, 278-279.) 
Therefore, in a capital case, when a prosecutor is faced with a prospective 
juror who expresses opposition to the death penalty, he or she may pursue two 
routes to removing that person.  First, if it can be gleaned from voir dire that such 
opposition would essentially prevent the prospective juror from voting for the 
death penalty, or from following the statutory scheme governing capital cases, he 
or she may be removed for cause.  If, on the other hand, it appears from voir dire 
that the prospective juror can set aside categorical opposition to the death penalty, 
can engage in the weighing process and under some realistic circumstances 
impose the death penalty, but the person‟s opposition to the death penalty makes it 
                                              
1  
I note that the problem of how to deal with prospective jurors in capital 
cases who oppose the death penalty may well be a large and growing one.  Polls 
show that about one-third of those surveyed in this state oppose the death penalty, 
up from only 14 percent in 1989.  (See Field Research Corp., The Field Poll, 
Release #2183 (Mar. 3, 2006) 1-2, 6 (The Field Poll) [poll conducted February 12-
26, 2006, showed 63 percent favored and 32 percent opposed the death penalty in 
California].)  The exclusion of one out of three potential jurors because the 
attitudes toward the death penalty might predispose them to vote for life 
imprisonment without parole would indeed result in a jury panel “uncommonly 
willing to condemn a man to die” in violation of the defendant‟s Sixth 
Amendment rights.  (Witherspoon, supra, 391 U.S. at p. 521.) 
7 
less likely that he or she will impose that penalty, the prosecution may exercise a 
peremptory challenge to remove the juror.  Although the determination is not 
necessarily easy, a trial court must not confuse the two types of jurors, and if it 
appears from the record that the trial court excused for cause a juror who was able 
to engage in the weighing process and impose the death penalty, even though that 
juror‟s opposition to capital punishment would “make it very difficult for the juror 
ever to impose the death penalty . . .” (Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 447), an 
appellate court must find error. 
On the other hand if a prospective juror equivocates during voir dire on the 
question of whether she can fulfill her oath in a capital case, the trial court‟s 
determination that she should be removed for cause is binding on appellate courts.  
(See People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 696.)  This is because in evaluating 
whether equivocal answers indicate substantial impairment, the trial court takes 
into account the credibility and demeanor of the prospective juror, which appellate 
courts cannot do.  (See id. at p. 697.) 
II. 
Turning to the present case, as the majority recounts: “In her response to 
the juror questionnaire, when asked to describe her general feelings regarding the 
death penalty, Prospective Juror E.H. wrote:  „I used to be strictly against it — 
particularly because it was applied to poor or minority persons more so than 
others.  Now — I might be able to vote for the death penalty — if a crime was 
really, really awful.‟  She added that her views had moved from „strongly against‟ 
to „moderately against‟ capital punishment, „based on hearing of awful crimes and 
repeat offenders.‟  Her questionnaire also noted that she would vote against a 
ballot measure authorizing the penalty of death, because „it‟s applied more often to 
minority and poor‟ defendants.  She nonetheless checked the box on the 
questionnaire indicating that she did not „hold any religious, moral feelings or 
8 
philosophical principle that would affect [her] ability to vote for the death penalty 
in this case.‟ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 40-41.) 
In response to her initial questioning by the trial court, she candidly 
admitted that she was more inclined to vote for life without parole instead of 
death.  She nonetheless affirmed that she could vote for death, that such a vote was 
not merely a remote possibility but a realistic one “for a crime or crimes that . . . 
had such aggravating . . . circumstances.” 
In response to questioning by the prosecution, E.H. affirmed that she could 
vote in favor of the death penalty, for example, in situations in which a lot of 
people were killed, or in which torture was involved.  She never indicated that 
these were the sole sets of circumstances that would warrant her vote in favor of 
the death penalty.  When the prosecutor pointed out that neither was involved in 
the present case, and that the special circumstance at issue was a murder connected 
with lewd and lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14, she indicated that she 
“might” be able to impose the death penalty, and that she would have to hear the 
facts of the case.  In the course of the prosecutor‟s voir dire, E.H. stated her 
disagreement with the rule that people opposed to the death penalty who state that 
there was no realistic possibility of them imposing the death penalty should be 
excluded from juries, although she reiterated that she did not fall into that 
category.  She also affirmed that, notwithstanding her view that minorities are 
disproportionately subject to the death penalty, she could impose the death penalty 
on a member of minority group because “each case is different. . . .  [I]f the facts 
warrant it, I could vote for the death penalty.”  Pressed by the prosecution about 
whether her possibility of imposing the death penalty was realistic, she stated: “It 
sounds like you and I define realistically differently.”  In the course of their 
colloquy, in the prosecutor‟s attempt to probe whether imposition of the death 
penalty was a realistic possibility for her, he stated that “I get a sense that this is 
9 
very, very uncomfortable for you, and, you know it‟s very — it‟s irritating.  Am I 
right?”  E.H. agreed that he was. 
Defense counsel declined to question E.H., and the trial court conducted 
further voir dire.  The court stated its particular concern with her position that 
people categorically opposed to imposing the death penalty should not be 
excluded from juries, and that if that were the case, there would be no death 
penalty verdicts.  E.H. affirmed that if she were a legislator, that would be her 
position, and that such a rule would not necessarily result in no death penalty 
verdicts because “perhaps that person, with that belief, might get changed or 
swayed by the actual situation.”  The trial court expressed concern that her 
response sounded like “there may be an agenda here.  An agenda to achieve some 
social or political end.”  E.H. denied having any “hidden agenda” and stated that 
“realistically, if I had to put a number on it, it would be like, say, 10 percent 
possibility I could vote for the death penalty.” 
After hearing from the prosecution and defense counsel, the latter of whom 
argued vigorously that E.H. should not be excused for cause, the trial court ruled 
in favor of the prosecution.  The court stated that it was a “close and troubling 
call.”  It noted again E.H.‟s moderate opposition to the death penalty and her view 
that minorities are disproportionately given the death penalty and stated that it was 
“troubled, to a degree, by all these things,” but acknowledged that they were not, 
by themselves, reasons to excuse a juror.  The court then stated: “I don‟t believe 
she is lying here.  I don‟t believe she came into court with the intent to thwart the 
process.  But I am very concerned with any [juror] who will state in [the] 
unequivocal way that she did in response to one of my questions, I disagree and 
disapprove of the law that would allow the court to excuse someone who is 
emphatically opposed to the death penalty in all circumstances and wouldn‟t vote 
10 
for it, no matter what the evidence showed at a penalty trial.  And she did state 
that. 
“Now, I made it clear that I did not believe that it was her — and I don‟t 
and it‟s clear from her questionnaire and her questions here that that isn‟t 
necessarily her.  But if that is her view, for someone who does fall into that 
position, that is a criteri[on] that I need to evaluate[.  I]n terms of whether or not it 
is a realistic and practical possibility that she would ever, under any 
circumstances, impose the death penalty.  In other words, it‟s a factor for the court 
to determine in deciding whether or not I have a definite impression that she 
would be unable to perform her oath. 
“Adding all these things together, I have the definite impression that she 
could not do this, that she could not perform her duty, in accordance with her oath.  
And by adding all these things together, I am adding together all the various things 
that we‟ve ascribed to her, the fact that she equates this defendant with a class that 
she believes are disproportionately the target of capital punishment and the various 
other things that she‟s expressed here.  All things considered, I thought about this 
as carefully as I can.  I am left with the definite impression that she would be 
unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. 
“I do not believe she is perjuring herself here.  I do not believe she is lying 
to us.  I believe she is honestly expressing her views, as best she can. 
“But that‟s my ruling.  And I will excuse her.” 
Although no one can fault the trial court for what was obviously a 
conscientious and earnest effort to grapple with this difficult question, the record 
does not support the determination that E.H. was unable to fulfill her oath.  In 
arriving at this conclusion I first consider the trial court‟s negative findings.  The 
court concluded that E.H. was not lying, and did not have a hidden agenda.  Thus, 
although reviewing courts will generally defer to trial courts on matters of 
11 
credibility, here the trial court made clear it found that E.H.‟s statements were 
credible. 
If that is the case, then E.H. was not lying when she said that she could 
impose the death penalty in some cases, if the circumstances were truly 
aggravating.  Indeed, the trial court expressly concluded that E.H. was not among 
the class of persons who could never vote for the death penalty.  Nor did E.H. take 
the position that only certain of the statutory special circumstances were worthy of 
the death penalty.  She did not rule out the possibility that she could impose the 
death penalty in the present case in which the special circumstance was that the 
murder was committed in connection with the commission of lewd acts on a child 
under the age of 14. 
The trial court found significant E.H.‟s view that those categorically 
opposed to imposing the death penalty should be allowed on juries.  But her view 
on this matter was largely irrelevant to the question of whether she could follow 
her oath.  She merely stated that, if she were a legislator, she would support that 
rule.  She never stated that she would be unable to serve on a jury that would 
exclude such strong opponents of the death penalty.  The question of who should 
be allowed to serve on a capital jury is a complex one that has bedeviled lawyers, 
courts and scholars alike.  While E.H.‟s views on this question were perhaps not 
fully formed, and she might have altered them with further discussion, she was 
not, in her view, advocating a method of jury selection that would result in no 
death verdicts.  She believed that some people who professed to be categorically 
against the imposition of the death penalty might change their mind when asked to 
serve on a jury sitting in judgment of an aggravated murder — in other words that 
some of those jurors might undergo the transformation that she herself had 
experienced of modifying her opposition to the death penalty when faced with the 
facts of a very aggravated murder.  To be sure, if her rule was adopted, fewer 
12 
death penalty verdicts would result.  But her opinion on who should qualify for a 
capital jury would have bearing on her fitness to serve on a capital jury herself 
only if it reflected some kind of hidden agenda to qualify for a capital jury in order 
to vote against the death penalty.  As discussed, the trial court explicitly rejected 
the notion that E.H. had such a hidden agenda.   Indeed, a person with such an 
agenda would tend to hide or understate his or her true feelings about the death 
penalty whereas E.H. was, in the trial court‟s words, “honestly expressing her 
views.” 
Nor did her view that minority jurors are disproportionately subject to the 
death penalty disqualify her.  That view does have a basis in fact and is widely 
shared.2  As long as this view will not prevent a juror from imposing the death 
penalty on a minority defendant, it cannot be a basis for disqualifying a juror for 
cause.  Here, E.H. specifically stated that she could impose the death penalty on a 
minority defendant if the facts warranted it, and the record indicates the trial court 
believed her statement. 
In sum, there is nothing in the record, nor anything in the trial court‟s 
remarks, to suggest that E.H. would have subverted a proper determination of guilt 
                                              
2  
Although the case for the race of the defendant, as an independent factor, 
affecting the charging and sentencing practices of prosecutors and juries in capital 
cases is inconclusive (see Liptak, New Look at Death Sentences and Race, N.Y. 
Times (Apr. 29, 2008) p. A10), there is no question that African-Americans in 
particular make up a much larger proportion of the death row population than of 
the general population.  (NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 
Death Row U.S.A. (Winter 2009) 35 [42 percent of those on death row are 
African-American, as opposed to approximately 12 percent of the general 
population].)  The February 2006 Field Poll on the subject reports that 40 percent 
of those surveyed agree with the statement “racial discrimination is a big factor in 
deciding who gets the death penalty with whites not as likely as blacks, Latinos, 
and other minorities,” with 51 percent disagreeing and 9 percent having no 
opinion.  (The Field Poll, supra, at p. 5.) 
13 
or special circumstances.  At most, the record supports the conclusion that E.H.‟s 
moderate opposition to the death penalty would “make it very difficult for [her] 
ever to impose the death penalty . . . .”  (Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 447.)  But 
as we have held, that difficulty is not to be equated with substantial impairment of 
a juror‟s duties.  (Ibid.)  Indeed, Juror D.F., who was not excused for cause, had a 
strong predilection in favor of the death penalty.  Although the prosecution may 
well have found a peremptory challenge of E.H. appropriate, there is nothing in 
the record, particularly in light of the trial court finding in favor of E.H.‟s 
credibility, to indicate a substantial impairment that would support a challenge for 
cause.  Whether the trial court misapprehended the distinction that we made 
explicit in Stewart between substantial impairment of a juror‟s performance of the 
prescribed duties and a juror‟s great difficulty in imposing the death penalty, 
and/or because the court was distracted by the irrelevancy of E.H.‟s position 
regarding who should serve on a capital jury, or for some other reason, the trial 
court erred in granting the prosecutor‟s challenge of E.H. for cause. 
The majority comes to the contrary conclusion, relying on several 
considerations.  The majority makes much of the fact that E.H. “displayed visible 
emotion when challenged concerning her ability to consider imposing the death 
penalty, as well as when she learned that the law permitted exclusion of 
prospective jurors who were unalterably opposed to the death penalty.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 46.)  But neither E.H.‟s irritation with the prosecutor‟s line of 
somewhat repetitious questioning, nor her expression of emotion when articulating 
and defending her positions in an intimidating setting, pointed to her inability or 
unwillingness to follow her oath.  Indeed, if voir dire produces tension between 
prospective jurors and prosecutors, or otherwise exposes temperamental unfitness, 
it is a peremptory challenge rather than a challenge for cause that is appropriately 
exercised.  As the United States Supreme Court stated in Swain v. Alabama (1965) 
14 
380 U.S. 202, 219-220 (overruled on other grounds in Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 
476 U.S. 79):  “[T]he very availability of peremptories allows counsel to ascertain 
the possibility of bias through probing questions on the voir dire and facilitates the 
exercise of challenges for cause by removing the fear of incurring a juror‟s 
hostility through examination and challenge for cause.”  Furthermore, the trial 
court in its extensive statement of reasons for granting the challenge for cause did 
not rely on E.H.‟s emotional response during voir dire. 
The majority also states: “E.H. did not suggest she could put aside her own 
views concerning the death penalty and participate in the trial purely on the basis 
of the law under which she was instructed.  Rather than deferring to existing law, 
the prospective juror offered merely a small possibility that her own scruples 
would permit her to reach a verdict of death for an especially heinous crime.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 46.)  I respectfully disagree with the majority‟s 
characterization of E.H.‟s responses during voir dire.  Although E.H. did not 
employ the legal jargon that belongs to penalty phase jurisprudence, she did 
evince an understanding of her role as a juror that is perfectly consistent with our 
death penalty law.  She affirmed that she could realistically impose the death 
penalty “for a crime or crimes that . . . had such aggravating . . . circumstances,” 
and that she had relaxed her previous strong opposition to the death penalty due to 
“awful crimes and repeat offenders.”  Thus, although she was not explicitly asked 
about weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances, she avowed that she 
could and would impose the death penalty for certain murders when there were 
aggravating circumstances involving either the crime or the criminal record of the 
defendant.  Nor, as discussed above, did she unduly restrict what types of 
aggravating circumstances could lead her to vote for the death penalty — she 
mentioned torture murder and multiple murder as examples but she did not rule 
out murder in the course of committing lewd and lascivious acts on a minor as also 
15 
worthy of the death penalty if aggravating circumstances were present.  She 
appeared to be describing, albeit in layman‟s terms, precisely the kind of weighing 
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances that penalty phase juries are required 
to perform.   
The majority compares E.H. to Prospective Juror B.S., who was also 
excused for cause and also espoused anti-death-penalty views.  I believe a 
comparison between the two jurors is useful but again, I draw a different 
conclusion.  B.S. indicated on her questionnaire that she was strongly opposed to 
the death penalty and stated that the death penalty “serves no useful purpose” and 
“makes killers out of us.”  (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 32.)  When asked by the 
prosecutor if it is realistic that she would ever vote for the death penalty, she 
responded that “it is not realistic that I would” but “it is realistic that I . . . could,” 
a response the trial court characterized as “verbal gymnastics.”  The trial court 
reasonably concluded that a person with such strong views against the death 
penalty would not follow her oath, notwithstanding the lip service she gave to her 
ability to impose it.  E.H., in contrast, was consistent in explaining that her 
opposition to the death penalty had moderated and that she could impose the death 
penalty in some cases of murder with aggravating circumstances.  She never 
expressed the kind of grave moral reservations stated by B.S. — the death penalty 
makes killers out of us — nor engaged in B.S.‟s type of verbal evasion, both of 
which taken together justifiably led to B.S.‟s removal for cause.  She made clear 
that her general opposition, based in large part on her view that minorities and the 
poor are disproportionately subject to the death penalty, would not preclude her 
from imposing that penalty on a particular minority defendant when warranted by 
the facts. 
I agree with the majority that E.H. was not disqualified simply because she 
was opposed to the death penalty.  Rather, the trial court appeared to disqualify her 
16 
because of the views she held — that minorities and the poor are punished 
disproportionately, that people categorically impose the death penalty should serve 
on juries — and the court‟s belief that such views would make it difficult for her 
to impose the death penalty.  But as discussed above, that difficulty does not 
constitute a substantial impairment of her ability to perform her duty as a juror, 
and there was no indication of substantial impairment, particularly in light of the 
trial court‟s credibility findings in favor of E.H.  I see nothing in the record, nor in 
the trial court‟s reasons for granting the prosecution‟s motion, that would call into 
question her ability to engage in the weighing process required by the death 
penalty statute and, in appropriate cases, vote to impose the death penalty. 
The commission of Witt error by wrongfully excusing a prospective juror in 
a capital case requires automatic reversal of the death judgment, but does not 
disturb the guilt and special circumstance verdicts.  (People v. Heard (2003) 31 
Cal.4th 946, 966.)  Accordingly, I would reverse the capital sentence and remand 
for a new penalty phase trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Martinez 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S064574 
Date Filed: August 13, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Alameda 
Judge: Jeffrey W. Horner 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Paul J. Spiegelman, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Bruce Ortega and Jill M. Thayer, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Paul J. Spiegelman 
P. O. Box 22575 
San Diego, CA  92192-2575 
(858) 452-7121 
 
Jill M. Thayer 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5954