Case Title: County of Milwaukee v. Lawrence C. Williams

Citation: 2007 WI 69

Docket Number: 2005AP002686

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
2007 WI 69 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
County of Milwaukee, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Lawrence C. Williams, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
County of Milwaukee, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Russell L. Hegney, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2006 WI App 153 
Reported at:  295 Wis. 2d 389, 720 N.W.2d 177 
(Ct. App. 2006-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 12, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
 
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 6, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit Court   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel L. Konkol   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BUTLER, JR., J., joins the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by Peter C. Carstensen & William Rosales and University of 
Wisconsin Law School, Madison, and Douglas P. Dehler and 
Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller & Shah, LLC, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Peter C. Carstensen. 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief by Thomas 
J. McAdams, assistant district attorney and E. Michael McCann, 
district attorney, Milwaukee, and William J. Domina, Milwaukee 
County 
Corporation 
Counsel 
and 
Timothy 
R. 
Karaskiewicz, 
 
 
2 
principal assistant corporation counsel, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Timothy R. Karaskiewicz. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Gwendolyn J. Cooley, 
assistant attorney general with whom on the brief was J.B. Van 
Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
2007 WI 69
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos.  2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687  
(L.C. Nos. 2005FO107 & 2005FO110) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
County of Milwaukee, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Lawrence C. Williams, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 12, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
County of Milwaukee, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Russell L. Hegney, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
2 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioners, Lawrence C. 
Williams and Russell L. Hegney, seek review of a published court 
of appeals decision that affirmed judgments of conviction. The 
defendants were found guilty of picking up passengers in their 
taxis at General Mitchell International Airport ("Airport") 
without an Airport permit, in violation Milwaukee County 
Ordinance 4.05.1 They assert that Ordinance 4.05 is invalid on 
several 
grounds: 
(1) 
that 
Ordinance 
4.05 
conflicts 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 114.14;2 (2) that Ordinance 4.05 conflicts with 
Wis. Stat. §§ 133.01, 349.24, and 194.02; and (3) that the 
restrictions on prearranged taxi service in Ordinance 4.05 are 
unconstitutional 
because 
they 
impermissibly 
interfere 
with 
interstate commerce.  
¶2 
We determine that Ordinance 4.05, which prohibits 
taxis without Airport permits from making prearranged pickups, 
conflicts with the requirement under § 114.14 that the public 
have equal access to airport services, and to that extent is 
invalid and unenforceable. However, we determine that Ordinance 
4.05 does not conflict with Wis. Stat. §§ 133.01, 349.24, and 
194.02. Because our decision rests on statutory grounds, we do 
not 
reach 
the 
question 
of 
whether 
the 
restrictions 
on 
                                                 
1 See County of Milwaukee v. Williams, County of Milwaukee 
v. Hegney, 2006 WI App 153, 295 Wis. 2d 389, 720 N.W.2d 177 
(affirming judgments of the circuit court for Milwaukee County, 
Daniel L. Konkol, Judge). The court of appeals granted a motion 
by Williams and Hegney to consolidate their cases for appeal.  
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-
06 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
3 
 
prearranged 
taxi 
service 
in 
Ordinance 
4.05 
impermissibly 
interfere with interstate commerce.  
¶3 
Fundamentally, this case is about whether part of a 
county ordinance conflicts with a state statute passed by the 
legislature. Ultimately, it is about whether that part of the 
Ordinance arbitrarily excludes members of the public from equal 
and uniform use of the Airport. 
¶4 
This case, however, is not about requiring the Airport 
to return to an "open" taxi system where there was no limitation 
on taxis conducting business at the Airport.  The record 
demonstrates 
the 
need 
for 
Milwaukee 
County 
to 
regulate 
commercial ground transportation at the Airport.  It recognizes 
how Milwaukee County has made great strides in reducing 
congestion, increasing efficiency, and enhancing safety at the 
Airport. 
¶5 
The error here is not remedied by a return to the open 
system. Rather, it is remedied by the elimination of an 
arbitrary exclusion. Accordingly, we reverse the court of 
appeals, and remand with instructions to vacate the judgments of 
conviction.  
I 
¶6 
The factual record is limited in this case. It is 
based on a stipulation of facts agreed to by the parties 
together with affidavits incorporated into the stipulation. 
¶7 
Until the late 1980s, General Mitchell International 
Airport had an "open" taxi system that did not limit taxis from 
conducting business at the Airport.  The open system led to a 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
4 
 
number of problems. Taxis had to wait up to five hours for 
customers, and because of the long wait they sometimes would 
refuse "short-haul" fares. The Airport's limited space led to a 
chaotic taxi staging area, with taxi traffic that spilled onto 
the Airport's roadway. This created a safety problem for the 
Airport's non-taxi traffic. The congestion and chaos from taxis 
jockeying for position led to fights between taxi drivers. 
¶8 
In addition to problems created by too many taxis 
vying for fares, the open system created problems of too few 
taxis at off-peak times. Passengers seeking curbside taxi 
pickups endured long waits for rides.  
¶9 
In 
the 
late 
1980s, 
Milwaukee 
County 
("County") 
addressed these problems by adopting Ordinance 4.05, which 
regulates commercial ground transportation at the Airport. The 
Ordinance requires that taxis picking up passengers at the 
Airport have a permit from the Airport in addition to the city, 
town, or village license required under Wis. Stat. § 349.24. 
Milw. County Ord. 4.05(3)(b)(5), 4.05(3)(b)(1). Under Ordinance 
4.05, the number of permits issued for taxis to do business is 
capped at 50, though the Airport Director is authorized to 
request 
additional 
taxis 
to 
meet 
immediate 
demand 
under 
extraordinary circumstances (for example, large conventions or 
inclement weather). Milw. County Ord. 4.05(3)(b)(3)(a). Under an 
exception to the permit rule, taxis are not required to have 
permits in order to drop off passengers at the Airport. Milw. 
County Ord. 4.05(3)(b)(5).  
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
5 
 
¶10 Limousines are not subject to permit requirements, but 
are allowed to take customers only on a prearranged (or in the 
words of the Ordinance, "prereserved") basis. Milw. County Ord. 
4.05(6). Under the Ordinance, the limousines have a designated 
area to meet their prearranged passengers.3 Non-permitted taxis 
are prohibited from using that designated area and are excluded 
from being at the Airport to meet prearranged passengers. 
¶11 Since the adoption of Ordinance 4.05, the problems of 
the open system have abated. The time that taxis must wait for 
fares has decreased, and the time that passengers must wait for 
curbside taxi service has decreased. The cap on taxi permits has 
reduced the congestion problems, and taxis no longer spill into 
the Airport roadway to create a hazard for other Airport 
traffic. The limited number of taxis also allows Airport staff 
to inspect periodically the taxis servicing the Airport, which 
has resulted in taxis that are better maintained and cleaner 
than under the open system.  
¶12 Taxis provide service using two distinct methods. The 
first is curbside service, which is on-demand service where 
                                                 
3 The Ordinance defines "luxury limousine" as: 
[A] for-hire ground transportation vehicle, regularly 
engaged in the business of carrying passengers for 
hire, having a maximum seating capacity of six (6) 
persons, unless the size of the group dictates a 
larger vehicle, behind the driver and which is a top 
of the line American or foreign production or custom 
automobile 
designated 
by 
its 
manufacturer 
as 
a 
limousine and which has custom nonproduction features. 
Milw. County Ord. 4.05(6)(a)(2).  
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
6 
 
passengers get taxis without having made a prior agreement to 
meet the taxi. The second is "prearranged" or "prereserved" 
service. It involves a prior agreement to pick up a passenger at 
a particular time and place. In the case of prearranged airport 
service, a reservation typically is made prior to the traveler's 
departure. The requirement that taxis have an Airport permit to 
"do business" at the Airport encompasses both curbside and 
prearranged pickup services.4 
¶13 Williams and Hegney were taxi drivers for Quality Cab 
Company, which is based in Fond du Lac. Quality Cab has 
relationships with individuals and businesses in the Fond du Lac 
area that request Quality Cab provide transportation to and from 
the Airport. As of January 2005, Quality Cab did not have a 
valid Airport permit, and thus Williams and Hegney did not 
possess valid permits pursuant to Ordinance 4.05(3)(b)(5).  
¶14 On different dates in January 2005, Williams and 
Hegney traveled to the Airport to pick up passengers who had 
made prior arrangements for pickups by Quality Cab. After 
ignoring warnings that they could not accept departing taxi 
                                                 
4 The petitioners appear to assert that Ordinance 4.05 
creates an "absolute" ban on taxis providing prearranged 
service. There is nothing in the record that supports this 
claim, and they do not cite a provision in the Ordinance (or 
elsewhere) that sets forth such a prohibition. In fact, the 
Ordinance 
explicitly 
contemplates 
prearranged 
service 
by 
permitted taxis: "Where prereserved (reservation) business is 
engaged in, driver shall check in with the ground transportation 
coordinator and provide the name(s), flight number(s) and 
arrival time(s) for the reserved passenger(s)." Milw. County 
Ord. 4.05(3)(f)(7). 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
7 
 
fares from the Airport, Williams and Hegney were issued 
citations for violating Ordinance 4.05(3)(b)(5). 
¶15 The petitioners did not dispute that they lacked the 
appropriate permits under Ordinance 4.05. Rather, they moved the 
circuit court to dismiss the citations, arguing that the 
Ordinance 
is 
invalid 
because 
it 
conflicts 
with 
Wis. Stat. §§ 349.24, 194.02, and 133.01. After the circuit 
court denied the motion, Williams and Hegney stipulated to facts 
and received fines of $250. The court of appeals affirmed, 
holding that Wis. Stat. § 114.14 provides Milwaukee County the 
authority 
to 
regulate 
taxis 
at 
the 
Airport, 
that 
Wis. Stat. §§ 349.24, 194.02, and 133.01 are consistent with 
Ordinance 4.05, and that Ordinance 4.05 was therefore valid.  
II 
¶16 In this case we address Milwaukee County's ability to 
enact an ordinance that prohibits taxis without Airport permits 
from making prearranged pickups of customers, where the same 
ordinance allows limousines without permits to make such 
pickups.5 
¶17  We examine whether Milwaukee County Ordinance 4.05 is 
in part invalid and unenforceable because it conflicts with a 
                                                 
5 The petitioners do not argue that this case is about the 
County's ability to enact an ordinance that prohibits taxis 
without Airport permits from making prearranged pickups where 
that ordinance allows taxis with Airport permits to make such 
pickups. As noted above in footnote 4, they appear to assert 
without citation or support in the record that all taxis are 
prohibited from providing prearranged service at the Airport. 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
8 
 
state 
statute. 
Resolution 
of 
this 
inquiry 
involves 
the 
interpretation of the Ordinance and the statute. Each presents a 
question of law which we review independently.  State ex rel. 
Teunas v. County of Kenosha, 142 Wis. 2d 498, 504, 418 N.W.2d 
833 (1988); Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. Hegerty, 2005 WI 28, ¶11, 
279 Wis. 2d 150, 693 N.W.2d 738. 
III 
¶18 At oral argument, the petitioners aptly described the 
case as follows. 
This case is about the validity of an absolute ban on 
my clients' providing prereserved service to arriving 
travelers at Milwaukee Airport just because they drive 
taxis rather than limousines . . . . In other words, 
if they drove a limousine, they could have met their 
passengers and taken them back to Fond du Lac. The 
basic question in this case is why does the Ordinance 
impose this restraint on taxi drivers and taxi 
companies? . . .  
No one disputes the authority of Milwaukee County to 
regulate traffic and other aspects of the Airport. 
Petitioners do challenge the County's claim that it 
has unfettered discretion to impose any regulation it 
sees fit, regardless of the public interest. 
¶19 The 
petitioners contend that the restriction is 
problematic in two respects. First, they argue that it is not 
within the County's authority to treat them (taxis without 
Airport permits) differently from limousines (which are not 
required to have Airport permits) with respect to providing 
prearranged service at the Airport. Second, they argue that it 
is not within the County's authority to require taxis to have 
one of a limited number of Airport permits in order to do 
business at the Airport. 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
9 
 
¶20 The authority for counties to regulate the operation 
of 
airports 
derives 
from 
chapter 
114. 
Specifically, 
Wis. Stat. § 114.14(1) provides that the "governing body of 
a . . . county may adopt regulations, and establish fees or 
charges for the use of [its] airport."6 While the petitioners 
correctly note that chapter 114 does not explicitly provide for 
the regulation of traffic or ground transportation, it has long 
been recognized that under that chapter, counties may regulate 
airport ground transportation.  
¶21 In Milwaukee County v. Town of Lake, for example, the 
court examined contracts between airlines and General Mitchell 
Field 
which 
allowed 
the 
airlines 
to 
provide 
ground 
transportation between the air field and Milwaukee. 259 Wis. 
                                                 
6 Wis. Stat. § 114.14(1) states: 
The governing body of a city, village, town or county 
which has established an airport or landing field, or 
landing and take-off strip, and acquired, leased or 
set 
apart 
real 
property 
for 
such 
purpose 
may 
construct, improve, equip, maintain and operate the 
same, or may vest jurisdiction for the construction, 
improvement, 
equipment, 
maintenance 
and 
operation 
thereof in any suitable officer, board or body of such 
city, village, town or county. The expenses of such 
construction, improvement, equipment, maintenance and 
operation shall be a city, village, town or county 
charge as the case may be. The governing body of a 
city, village, town or county may adopt regulations, 
and establish fees or charges for the use of such 
airport or landing field, or may authorize an officer, 
board or body of such village, city, town or county 
having jurisdiction to adopt such regulations and 
establish such fees or charges, subject however to the 
approval of such governing body before they shall take 
effect. 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
10 
 
208, 48 N.W.2d 1 (1951). The Town of Lake, adjacent to the 
airport, passed an ordinance prohibiting taxis not licensed by 
the Town from operating within its limits, and began ticketing 
taxis without such a license as they passed through the Town. 
Id. 
at 
227. 
This 
court 
determined 
that 
the 
ordinance 
impermissibly interfered with Milwaukee County's authority to 
regulate the air field. It affirmed the circuit court's 
determination that under chapter 114, as the owner of General 
Mitchell Field, Milwaukee County "has the exclusive right to 
manage said field, including the right to regulate the ground 
transportation to be furnished to airline passengers arriving at 
and departing from General Mitchell Field."  Id. at 231.  
¶22 Further, the Town of Lake court determined that, 
beyond having the authority to regulate the air field, the 
county must regulate the field to assure the field's efficient 
and safe operation:  
The county . . . was bound to regulate the matters 
affecting the use of the field so as to produce 
efficiency and good order and to prevent confusion 
which necessarily would arise at an airfield where 
hundreds of thousands of passengers are annually 
passing through the gates, and which if left without 
regulation 
would 
hobble 
operations 
and 
seriously 
interfere with the safety and comfort of the traveling 
public. 
Id. See also Courtesy Cab Co. v. Johnson, 10 Wis. 2d 426, 431-
32, 434, 103 N.W.2d 17 (1960).  
¶23 The petitioners argue, however, that the ability of 
the County to regulate commercial ground transportation at the 
Airport is limited by Wis. Stat. § 114.14(3)(b)1.  It provides 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
11 
 
that "[t]he public may in no case be deprived of equal and 
uniform use of the airport."  Citing to this court's decision in 
Wussow v. Gaida, 251 Wis. 328, 29 N.W.2d 42 (1947), they assert 
that 
the 
"equal 
and 
uniform 
use" 
requirement 
under 
§ 114.14(3)(b)1 applies to commercial entities as well as to 
non-commercial entities.  They contend that prohibiting taxis 
without Airport permits from making prearranged pickups at the 
Airport deprives the public of equal and uniform use of the 
Airport. Thus, because Ordinance 4.05 has such a prohibition, it 
conflicts with state law, and therefore is invalid. 
¶24 While § 114.14 allows counties to regulate commercial 
ground transportation at airports, a county may not promulgate 
regulations that are inconsistent with state legislation.  A 
county "has only such powers as are expressly conferred upon it 
or necessarily implied from the powers expressly given or from 
the nature of the grant of power."  Teunas, 142 Wis. 2d  at 504 
(quoting Town of Vernon v. Waukesha County, 102 Wis. 2d 686, 
689, 307 N.W.2d 227 (1981)). "As a creature of the legislature, 
a county must exercise its powers within the scope of authority 
that the State confers upon it." Mommsen v. Schueller, 228 
Wis. 2d 627, 634-35, 599 N.W.2d 21 (Ct. App. 1999)(citation 
omitted). Where a county promulgates an ordinance that conflicts 
with its statutory authority, it is an invalid exercise of 
authority. 
Teunas, 
142 
Wis. 2d at 
515-16. 
Where 
a 
local 
governmental body enacts an ordinance pursuant to express 
statutory authority, "all presumptions are in favor of its 
validity, and any person attacking it must make the fact of its 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
12 
 
invalidity clearly appear." State ex rel. B'nai B'rith Found. v. 
Walworth County Bd. of Adjustment, 59 Wis. 2d 296, 307, 208 
N.W.2d 113 (1973) (quoting Newman v. Pagels, 212 Wis. 475, 479, 
250 N.W. 430 (1933)). 
¶25 In determining whether Ordinance 4.05 conflicts with 
the statute, and is therefore not within the County's authority, 
we examine both the language of the Ordinance and the relevant 
provisions of the statute. Ordinance 4.05(3)(b) sets forth the 
requirement that taxis must have an Airport permit in order to 
conduct business at the Airport: 
4.05(3)(b) License, permits, fees. 
 . . . . 
(3)(a) On and after September 1, 1990, taxicab owner 
permits will be issued only to those owners who whose 
vehicles(s) have been permitted during the period 
October 1, 1989, through July 5, 1990. Taxicab owner 
permits must be renewed and remain in full force and 
effect on a continuous basis . . . . In the event an 
owner does not renew the taxicab owner permit prior to 
the annual dates prescribed herein below, that owner 
shall forfeit his/her privilege to operate at the 
airport. . . . 
(5) Any person who is not in possession of the 
necessary permits required under this section and who 
operates a taxicab at General Mitchell International 
Airport in such a manner as to constitute doing 
business, or who attempts to do business thereon 
shall, without limitation because of enumeration, be 
deemed to be in violation of chapter 4 of the 
Code. . . . 7 
                                                 
7 A taxi that drops off passengers at the Airport is not 
doing business under the meaning of 4.05(3):  
A taxicab 
driver entering upon General Mitchell 
International 
Airport 
for 
the 
sole 
purpose 
of 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
13 
 
At the same time, however, Ordinance 4.05 does allow limousines 
without 
Airport 
permits 
to 
conduct 
business 
transporting 
passengers from the Airport on a prearranged basis. Milw. County 
Ord. 4.05(6)(a)(2).8  
¶26 Milwaukee County Ordinance 4.08(2)(b) sets forth the 
penalties for violating section 4.05(3)(b): 
(b)   Commercial ground transportation violations.  
Persons 
violating 
section 
4.05 
of 
this 
chapter . . . shall, upon conviction of the violation, 
forfeit to the county a sum not less than one hundred 
dollars ($100.00) nor more than five hundred dollars 
($500.00) as the court in its discretion shall 
determine, together with the costs of the action to 
collect such forfeiture, and upon default of payment 
thereof, such persons shall be imprisoned in the 
county jail or the house of correction in the county 
for a period of not less than five (5) days nor more 
than ninety (90) days in the discretion of the court.  
¶27 Section 114.14(3) provides in relevant part: 
(3)(a) Except as provided in par. (b), in carrying out 
its duties the airport commission may do any of the 
following: 
 . . . . 
(b) 
The 
exercise 
of 
authority 
by 
the 
airport 
commission under par. (a) shall be subject to all of 
the following conditions: 
                                                                                                                                                             
discharging a taxicab patron at said airport shall not 
be deemed to be doing business thereon if, after 
discharging said passenger, he/she shall immediately 
leave the airport premises. 
Milw. County Ord. 4.05(3)(b)(5).  
8 "[L]imousines must operate on a pre-reserved (reservation) 
basis only . . . ." Milw. County Ord. 4.05(6)(a)(2). 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
14 
 
1. The public may in no case be deprived of equal and 
uniform use of the airport. 
¶28 In Wussow, this court examined § 114.14(3) and focused 
on the provision that the public may not be "deprived of equal 
and uniform use of the airport." Wussow leased the Shawano 
Municipal Airport from the Shawano County airport committee. 
Under the lease, Wussow was to operate the airport and receive 
the income from concessions and rentals. 251 Wis. at 329-30. 
Gaida operated a business adjacent to the airport that sold 
aircraft, gave flying instruction, and provided a taxi service. 
He had used the airport for two years prior to Wussow's lease, 
and continued to use the airport after the lease had been 
executed. Id. at 330.  
¶29 Wussow sought to enjoin Gaida's use of the airport on 
the grounds that giving flying lessons and providing taxi 
services impinged on Wussow's rights under the contract and 
caused him to lose profits. Id. at 330-31. The circuit court 
granted the injunction. On review, this court determined that 
the lease did not provide Wussow with the right to exclusive 
commercial use of the airport because § 114.14(3) prohibits 
depriving the public of equal and uniform use of airports: 
The lease itself does not attempt to give [Wussow] the 
right to arbitrarily exclude members of the public 
from the use of the airport, as indeed it could not, 
for sec. 114.14(3), Stats., clearly precludes the 
granting of such a right. That section provides that 
although contracts may be made with private parties 
for the operation of municipal airports, they may in 
no case deprive the public of equal and uniform use of 
the airports. 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
15 
 
Id. at 331 (emphasis added).9 
¶30 Further, the Wussow court declined to adopt the 
argument that § 114.14(3) requires equal and uniform use only 
for private use. Rather, it determined that "no distinction 
between private or personal and commercial use can be read into 
the clear words of the statute." Id. Wussow makes clear that 
under § 114.14(3)(b)1, arbitrarily excluding members of the 
public (whether private or commercial) from the use of the 
Airport will constitute depriving the public of equal and 
uniform use of airports.  
¶31 We recognize that in regulating an airport there may 
be many instances of unequal or non-uniform treatment.  Such 
unequal or non-uniform treatment does not by itself constitute 
"depriving" members of the public of equal and uniform use under 
the statute.  Rather, according to Wussow, it is the arbitrary 
exclusion, which is to say exclusion without a reasonable 
justification, that "deprive[s] the public of equal and uniform 
use" of an airport under § 114.14(3)(b)1. Thus, in order to 
determine whether Ordinance 4.05 conflicts with § 114.14(3)(b)1, 
we must examine whether the exclusion is arbitrary, or whether 
there exists a reasonable justification for the unequal and non-
                                                 
9 The wording of Wis. Stat. § 114.14(3) was amended by 1999 
Wis. Act 83, §§ 187-188.  The changes do not affect the meaning 
of the statute for the purposes of the analysis here, and the 
language requiring that "[t]he public may in no case be deprived 
of equal and uniform use of the airport" was unchanged. 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
16 
 
uniform use of the Airport pertaining to the pre-reserved 
pickup.10 
¶32 In determining whether Ordinance 4.05 conflicts with 
§ 114.14, we are limited by a sparse record.  Nonetheless, the 
record before us indicates that under the open taxi system, 
                                                 
10 The 
County 
argues 
that 
the 
express 
language 
of 
§ 114.14(3) subjects only the exercise of authority by the 
airport commission to the condition that the public may not be 
deprived of equal and uniform use.  Because Ordinance 4.05 is an 
exercise of the County's authority, rather than an exercise of 
an airport commission's authority, the County contends that the 
requirement that the public not be deprived of equal and uniform 
use is not applicable.  This is incorrect. 
Section 114.14(2)(a) provides that the "governing body of a 
city, village, town or county which has established an airport 
may 
vest 
jurisdiction 
for 
the 
construction, 
improvement, 
equipment, maintenance and operation of the airport in an 
airport commission. . . ." Once such a governing body has vested 
jurisdiction for the operation of an airport in an airport 
commission, "[t]he commission shall have complete and exclusive 
control and management over the airport for which it has been 
appointed." Wis. Stat. § 114.14(2)(e).  Thus, the legislature 
intended that counties and other municipalities could establish 
commissions with complete control over airports, and that such 
commissions could not exercise control so as to deprive the 
public of equal and uniform use of those airports.  
Here, the County has vested authority in an airport 
commission to operate the airport with "complete and exclusive" 
control.  At the same time, however, it has promulgated a rule 
which arbitrarily deprives the public of equal and uniform 
airport use.  The promulgation of such a rule allows the County 
to circumvent the statutory protection of the public's equal and 
uniform 
use 
of 
the 
Airport 
afforded 
by 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 114.14(3)(b)1.  Further, the County's authority to regulate 
the Airport is limited to the power conferred by the statute. 
Mommsen v. Schueller, 228 Wis. 2d 627, 634-35, 599 N.W.2d 21 
(Ct. App. 1999)(citations omitted).  Nothing in § 114.14 can be 
read to confer or imply authority for the County to exercise its 
power arbitrarily, so as to deprive members of the public of 
equal and uniform use of airports. 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
17 
 
there were problems of congestion, long waits for both taxis and 
customers, taxis refusing to provide short rides, traffic 
hazards, and fights among taxi drivers.  
¶33 The record also indicates that under Ordinance 4.05, 
these problems have abated and that the taxis servicing the 
Airport are better maintained.  The effect of the Ordinance on 
the problems that attended the open system is explained in an 
affidavit by the Airport Director, which was incorporated by 
reference into the stipulation of facts.11 
¶34 The affidavit provides that the cap on the number of 
Airport taxi permits has decreased the wait time for both taxis 
and passengers:  
4. Since the adoption of Mil. County Ord. 4.05, the 
number of permits issued to taxicabs has been capped 
at 50.  Consequently, the wait time for fares has 
decreased to two to three hours and passenger wait 
time for a taxi has decreased to one to two minutes. 
Under the previous system, wait times were longer and 
passengers were less certain because there were often 
fewer cabs during off-peak hours and cabs often 
refused fares.  The new system ensures enough business 
for the taxis so that they receive fares within a 
reasonable amount of time and gives them the incentive 
to return immediately to the airport, even during off-
peak hours. 
¶35 Further, the affidavit asserts that the cap on Airport 
taxi permits allows for greater inspection of taxis, relieves 
traffic congestion, and reduces traffic hazards. 
                                                 
11 There is nothing in the stipulated facts that would 
counter the County's claim that the Ordinance has resolved the 
problems of the open system.  The affidavits submitted by the 
petitioners address only the way that Quality Cab conducts its 
business and ways in which Ordinance 4.05 is anticompetitive. 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
18 
 
5. . . . The limited number of cabs makes it possible 
for the staff to inspect periodically the permitted 
taxis. . . .  
6. Capping the number of taxis at 50 has also reduced 
congestion problems.  The staging area in front of the 
terminal can only accommodate four taxis, and there is 
not enough room for taxis to double park.  Under the 
"open" system, taxis would frequently clog the staging 
area by double parking, and fights between taxi 
drivers would break out due to the congestion and 
aggression caused by drivers cutting in line and 
jockeying for position.  The limited space would also 
cause taxis to spill over into the roadway and create 
a hazard for passenger traffic.  Under the current 
system the problems relating to overflow and double 
parking have been greatly reduced. . . .  
¶36 Moreover, the affidavit contends that allowing taxis 
without Airport permits would add to congestion problems, but at 
the same time would not aid in providing reliable and efficient 
transportation for most of the Airport's customers. 
7. There are good reasons for granting permits only to 
cabs that will base themselves at the Airport to 
provide a constant supply of cab services for arriving 
passengers.  For example, since a Fond du Lac cab 
would not transport a customer who wanted to travel 
from the Airport to another location within the City 
of Milwaukee, the Fond du Lac cab would have less 
incentive to wait in the staging area for a fare.  
That would mean that the Fond du Lac cab would add to 
the congestion when it did appear but could not be 
relied upon to provide a steady supply of services to 
arriving passengers. 
¶37 The County argues that these are precisely the kinds 
of benefits that justify regulation under § 114.14 and Town of 
Lake. By decreasing wait times, assuring adequate business, 
minimizing 
traffic 
hazards, and allowing inspections, the 
regulations ensure "good order," "efficiency," "prevent[ion of] 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
19 
 
confusion," and the "safety and comfort of the traveling 
public."  Town of Lake, 259 Wis. at 231.  
¶38 We agree that the record supports the County's 
argument that some regulation of taxi traffic comports with 
§ 114.14.  However, the Airport Director's affidavit does not 
proffer any sort of justification for prohibiting taxis without 
Airport permits from providing prearranged service, despite 
limousines being able to provide such service.  Rather, the 
proffered justifications reflect reasons for limiting only taxis 
that provide curbside service.12  
¶39 Taxis picking up prearranged fares need not wait in 
line with taxis offering curbside pickups, thereby contributing 
to congestion.  Similarly, if taxis meeting prearranged fares 
are not in line with the curbside taxis, they would not 
contribute to taxi traffic spilling onto the Airport's roadway. 
Because prearranged taxi service must by definition have been 
arranged ahead of time, there is no reason to suspect that the 
wait time for customers would increase if non-permitted taxis 
could retrieve prearranged fares from the Airport.  Finally, 
were some passengers to use taxis for prearranged service, it 
would not affect the ability of the Airport to inspect its 
permitted taxis regularly to assure that they are well-
maintained. 
                                                 
12 The 
dissent 
asserts 
that 
the 
majority 
is 
forcing 
Milwaukee County to return to an open system.  Dissent, ¶83. 
This assertion is incorrect and should not be allowed to cause 
confusion. 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
20 
 
¶40 Thus, 
the 
County's 
proffered 
justifications 
for 
Ordinance 4.05 relate only to the Ordinance's restrictions on 
taxis' ability to provide curbside service, and provide no 
justification 
for 
precluding 
taxis 
without 
permits 
from 
providing prearranged service.  However, under the Ordinance 
only limousines may provide prearranged service without Airport 
permits.  
¶41 Similar to Wussow, a commercial enterprise has been 
arbitrarily excluded from using an airport, depriving it of 
equal and uniform use under § 114.14(3)(b)1. 251 Wis. at 331. 
More importantly, the Ordinance arbitrarily limits the options 
of the general public——the people who need to make the 
transportation arrangements.  They do not have the option of 
choosing a taxi without a permit for prearranged pick-ups from 
the airport.13 
                                                 
13 Milwaukee County Ordinance 4.05(5)(a) also provides that 
"out-of-county shuttle services" may operate on a prearranged 
basis from the Airport:  
"Out-of-county" shuttle service, under this subsection 
shall mean a company, partnership or person which 
operates on a prereserved basis from General Mitchell 
International 
Airport 
to 
destinations 
beyond 
the 
county limits. 
The vehicle(s) which make up "out-of-county" shuttle 
service(s) shall be van(s) regularly engaged in the 
business of carrying passengers for hire, having a 
maximum seating capacity of twenty-two (22) persons 
behind the driver, with heating and air conditioning 
and be in good operating condition. 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
21 
 
¶42 The County contends that passengers wanting pre-
arranged taxi service from the petitioners may take a shuttle to 
an off-Airport location and meet the taxi for a prearranged ride 
there, and that the petitioners could offer prearranged service 
by providing limousine services.  These arguments miss the mark. 
The issue is whether prohibiting taxis without permits from 
making prearranged pickups, and depriving the public from 
meeting prearranged taxis at the Airport, is justified in the 
first instance.  The possibility that the petitioners could 
expand their business to include a limousine service or meet 
passengers at other locations does not provide a justification 
for prohibiting taxis without Airport permits from providing 
prearranged pickups.  
¶43 The County also asserts, based on an affidavit, that 
it "does not limit the number of limousine operators due to a 
                                                                                                                                                             
Milw. County Ord. 4.05(5)(a). The record does not provide 
details about such services.  It is unclear from the record 
whether such service operates in Fond du Lac.  However, the 
possibility of prearranged van services does not affect the 
analysis here, for it does not provide a reason for excluding 
taxis 
without 
Airport 
permits 
from 
providing 
prearranged 
services. 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
22 
 
federal law applicable to interstate limousine transports."14 
However, the question in this case is whether the limitation on 
taxis without Airport permits providing prearranged pickups is 
justified by the benefits outlined in the County's affidavits, 
not whether the County has the power to restrict the number of 
limousines providing services at the Airport.  The County has 
provided nothing in the record to support the claim that 
allowing taxis without permits to make prearranged pickups would 
                                                 
14 Neither the affidavit nor the briefs cite to a statute or 
case law on this point.  The County may be referring to 
Executive Town & Country Servs., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 789 
F.2d 1523, 1525-26 (11th Cir. 1986).  In that case, the Eleventh 
Circuit determined that while taxis generally do not operate in 
the stream of interstate commerce, a limousine service that 
received the vast majority of its business from an international 
airport, received many of its incoming calls on 800 number 
lines, and served multi-national corporate clients was within 
the stream of interstate commerce.  Id. at 1525-26.  See also 
Charter Limousine, Inc. v. Dade County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 
678 F.2d 586 (Former 5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Yellow Cab 
Co., 332 U.S. 218, 231-32 (1947). 
The dissent posits that the County is instead referring to 
49 U.S.C. § 14501(d).  This seems unlikely because that statute 
clearly states that it does not limit airports from providing 
preferential 
access 
to 
providers 
of 
pre-arranged 
ground 
transportation services: 
(3) Matters not covered.  Nothing in this subsection 
shall be construed— 
 . . .  
(B) as prohibiting or restricting an airport, train, 
or bus terminal operator from contracting to provide 
preferential access or facilities to one or more 
providers 
of 
pre-arranged 
ground 
transportation 
service . . . . 
49 U.S.C. § 14501(d)(3) (2006).  
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
23 
 
create the problems associated with the open system, even though 
prearranged service by limousines does not cause such problems. 
¶44 As the Wussow court noted, such arbitrary exclusions 
conflict with the rule under § 114.14(3)(b)1 that "[t]he public 
may in no case be deprived of equal and uniform use of the 
airport."  We therefore determine that precluding taxis without 
Airport permits from providing prearranged services conflicts 
with § 114.14(3)(b)1 and is an invalid exercise of the County's 
authority.  To that extent, Ordinance 4.05 is invalid and 
therefore unenforceable. 
IV 
¶45 We consider next Williams and Hegney's arguments that 
by requiring taxis to have one of a limited number of permits in 
order to do business at the Airport, Ordinance 4.05 conflicts 
with Wis. Stat. §§ 133.01, 349.24, and 194.02.  
¶46 The essence of their argument under § 133.01 is that 
every single Wisconsin statute that affects economic competition 
must be interpreted through the lens of § 133.01.  They argue 
that the section "establish[es] a clear public policy governing 
all regulatory agencies in this state that requires maximizing 
economic 
competition, 
including 
commercial 
ground 
transportation, subject only to those limits necessary to 
achieve the legislature's goals."  They contend that the 
decision in Cedarhurst Air Charter, Inc. v. Waukesha County, 110 
F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. Wis. 2000), and this court's decision in 
American Med. Transp. of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Curtis-Universal, 
Inc., 154 Wis. 2d 135, 452 N.W.2d 575 (1990), warrant a broad 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
24 
 
application of § 133.01.  Thus, they argue, any regulation must 
"employ 
the 
least 
anticompetitive 
means 
to 
achieve 
any 
legislatively mandated goal." 
¶47 The petitioners' view is supported by neither the 
language of § 133.01 nor the cases cited.  Further, the 
petitioners' 
view 
would 
subject 
the 
enforcement 
of 
any 
regulation affecting competition to litigation regarding the 
regulation's effect on competition.  We therefore decline to 
adopt it here. 
¶48 Chapter 133 of the Wisconsin Code is titled "Trusts 
and Monopolies."  The first section of the chapter, § 133.01, is 
captioned "Legislative Intent" and states: 
The intent of this chapter is to safeguard the public 
against the creation or perpetuation of monopolies and 
to foster and encourage competition by prohibiting 
unfair and discriminatory business practices which 
destroy or hamper competition.  It is the intent of 
the legislature that this chapter be interpreted in a 
manner which gives the most liberal construction to 
achieve the aim of competition.  It is the intent of 
the legislature to make competition the fundamental 
economic policy of this state and, to that end, state 
regulatory agencies shall regard the public interest 
as requiring the preservation and promotion of the 
maximum level of competition in any regulated industry 
consistent 
with the other public interest goals 
established by the legislature. 
(Emphasis 
added). 
The 
section 
expressly 
describes 
the 
legislature's intent as applying to this chapter (that is, 
chapter 133), and nowhere states that it is the intent of the 
section that the entire Wisconsin Code be interpreted in light 
of § 133.01.  Rather, the section applies in circumstances in 
which parties assert violations of antitrust law. 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
25 
 
¶49 The petitioners' contention that case law supports the 
view that § 133.01 should be used to interpret all state actions 
regulating competition is incorrect.  The case law cited by the 
petitioners supports the view that § 133.01 applies when a party 
brings a cause of action in antitrust.  American Medical 
Transport involved a complaint filed by three private ambulance 
companies alleging that the City of Milwaukee and four other 
private ambulance companies had violated § 133.03 of the state 
antitrust law. 154 Wis. 2d at 138.  The complaint concerned a 
system 
that 
gave 
the 
four 
defendant 
companies 
primary 
responsibility for the city's ambulance service and relegated 
the plaintiff companies to providing backup service.  Id. at 
139.  
¶50 The circuit court granted the defendants' motions to 
dismiss on the ground that the city was authorized to implement 
such a system under home-rule authority pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.11(5).  Id. at 141.  This court relied upon § 133.01 in 
considering whether § 62.11(5) did in fact authorize such 
"anticompetitive, monopolistic regulation."  Id. at 151.  It 
determined that under § 133.01, "we should not lightly reach the 
conclusion that monopoly or restraint of trade is authorized by 
extraneous statutes that do not quite clearly indicate that 
intent." Id. at 151-52.  Thus, it allowed the plaintiffs' 
antitrust suit to move forward.15 
                                                 
15 Wis. Stat. § 133.03 no longer applies "to ambulance 
service contracted for under ss. 59.54(1), 60.565, 61.64 and 
62.133."  Wis. Stat. § 133.03(4). 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
26 
 
¶51 In Cedarhurst, the plaintiff claimed that Waukesha 
County had conspired with the operator of Waukesha County 
Airport to monopolize the market for aircraft fuel, in violation 
of federal antitrust laws, specifically 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2. 110 
F. Supp. 2d at 892-93.  The county moved to dismiss, asserting 
that the claims were barred by state action immunity.  Id. 
(citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)).  Specifically, 
the county stated that it was immune on the ground that § 114.14 
gave it wide authority to engage in anticompetitive conduct. In 
its consideration of whether the legislature intended that 
§ 114.14 authorize the county's conduct, the court recognized 
that § 133.01 requires that courts liberally interpret statutes 
to promote competition.  Id. at 895.  The court determined that 
§ 114.14 did not provide the "'clear articulation of a state 
policy to authorize anticompetitive conduct' needed to support 
[the county's] defense of state action immunity." Id. at 895 
(quoting City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 
365, 372 (1991)). 
¶52 Both 
American 
Medical 
Transport 
and 
Cedarhurst 
involved causes of action under antitrust law. In each case, 
§ 133.01 was used as an interpretive tool in determining whether 
a statute had authorized the regulation that formed the basis of 
the 
antitrust 
action. 
 
In 
contrast 
to 
American 
Medical 
Transport, in which plaintiffs alleged violations of § 133.03, 
and 
in 
contrast 
to 
Cedarhurst, 
where 
plaintiffs 
alleged 
violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act, Williams and Hegney's 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
27 
 
only assertion of a violation of antitrust laws comes from its 
invocation of § 133.01.16 
¶53 The petitioners concede that their view of § 133.01 
does not give rise to an independent cause of action.  However, 
that 
assertion 
belies 
the 
potential 
sweep 
of 
their 
interpretation of § 133.01.  In the petitioners' view, because 
there is some less restrictive alternative to the Ordinance 
consistent with the goals of the statutes that authorize the 
Ordinance, the Ordinance conflicts with the statutes as a matter 
of law. 
¶54 As the Attorney General notes in an amicus brief, 
every form of economic regulation restrains trade to some 
degree.  However, the petitioners' theory would allow as a 
defense to any enforcement action of any such regulation the 
claim that there is a less restrictive alternative consistent 
with the statute authorizing the regulation.  Thus, even if 
§ 133.01 does not give rise to a cause of action in its own 
right, the petitioners' theory has the potential to precipitate 
litigation across every area of economic regulation in the 
state.  In their view, any time a party is cited for a violation 
of a regulation, that party could assert that the regulation is 
unenforceable because there is a less restrictive alternative 
consistent with the goals of the statute authorizing the 
Ordinance. 
                                                 
16 We note, too, that § 133.01 expressly applies to "state 
regulatory agencies."  We decline to address whether Milwaukee 
County is a state regulatory agency under § 133.01. 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
28 
 
¶55 The Supreme Court noted in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of 
Maryland that "if an adverse effect on competition were, in and 
of itself, enough to render a state statute invalid, the States' 
power to engage in economic regulation would be effectively 
destroyed."  437 U.S. 117, 133 (1978).  As a corollary, we could 
add that if a regulation's adverse effect on competition allowed 
an 
affirmative 
defense 
that 
less 
restrictive 
means 
were 
available, this state's power to engage in economic regulation 
would be hobbled.  We therefore determine that Ordinance 4.05 
does not conflict with § 133.01.  
¶56 The 
petitioners' 
argument 
that 
Ordinance 
4.05 
conflicts with Wis. Stat. § 349.24 is also unavailing. Under 
that section, city councils and village and town boards may 
regulate 
and 
license 
taxis 
and 
drivers. 
 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 349.24(1).17  Further, taxis and drivers licensed by any city, 
                                                 
17 Wis. Stat. § 349.24 provides in relevant part: 
Authority to license taxicab operators and taxicabs. 
(1) The council of any city and every village or town 
board may: 
(a) Regulate and license chauffeurs and operators of 
taxicabs used for hire; 
(b) Regulate and license the taxicab business by 
licensing each taxicab used for hire; 
(c) Prohibit any person from operating any motor 
vehicle for taxicab purposes upon the highways of the 
city, village or town unless the person is licensed as 
a chauffeur and operator and unless the taxicab 
business is licensed by the licensing of each taxicab; 
(d) Revoke any license mentioned in this section when 
in its judgment the public safety so requires. 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
29 
 
village or town may not be required to procure such a license 
"in any other municipality for the purpose of carrying taxi 
passengers 
for 
hire 
from 
one 
municipality 
to 
another." 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 349.24(2). 
The 
petitioners 
argue 
that 
the 
requirement under Ordinance 4.05(3)(b)(3) that taxis doing 
business at the Airport have an Airport permit conflicts with 
§ 349.24(2), and is therefore unenforceable. 
¶57 The petitioners' view is contrary to the very words of 
the statute.  As the court of appeals here explained, § 349.24 
makes no mention of counties or airports. 295 Wis. 2d 389, ¶21. 
Further, Wis. Stat. § 349.01 provides that words used in chapter 
349 are used in the same sense as those words are defined in 
Wis. Stat. § 340.01. 
Section 
340.01(36m) 
states 
that 
"'[m]unicipality' means city, village or town."  Neither the 
county nor the Airport is a municipality under this definition. 
Thus, 
the 
restrictions 
in 
§ 349.24(2) 
that 
prevent 
"municipalities" from requiring licenses from taxis and drivers 
with licenses from other municipalities do not pertain to the 
permits required under Ordinance 4.05, for neither the County 
nor the Airport is a municipality in the relevant sense. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2) Any person licensed by any city, village or town 
as a chauffeur and operator shall not be required to 
procure either a chauffeur's and operator's license or 
a taxicab license in any other municipality for the 
purpose of carrying taxicab passengers for hire from 
one municipality to another, but this exception does 
not permit the chauffeur or operator to operate a 
taxicab wholly within the limits of any municipality 
in which the chauffeur or operator is not licensed.  
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
30 
 
¶58 We also agree with the court of appeals that the 
purpose of § 349.24 is to allow taxis and drivers to convey 
passengers through cities, towns, and villages without having to 
obtain a license in each one. 295 Wis. 2d 389, ¶21.  In 
contrast, the permit requirement of Ordinance 4.05(3)(b)(3) is 
to promote efficient and safe ground transportation at the 
Airport.  Regulations promoting this goal are within the 
County's purview under § 114.14(1) and Town of Lake. 259 Wis. at 
231.  Thus, we determine that § 349.24 does not conflict with 
Ordinance 4.05.  
¶59 The petitioners' final statutory argument is based on 
§ 194.02.  That section states:  
It is the intent of the legislature to remove the 
economic 
regulations 
which 
limit 
motor 
carrier 
operations in the state.  The legislature intends to 
let the market promote competitive and efficient 
transportation services, while maintaining the safety 
regulations necessary to protect the welfare of the 
traveling and shipping public.  It is the intent of 
the legislature that this chapter be interpreted in a 
manner which gives the most liberal construction to 
achieve the aim of a safe, competitive transportation 
industry. 
The petitioners maintain that the statement of intent to promote 
"competitive and efficient transportation services" in § 194.02 
extends to the regulation of taxis.  They argue that the 
language 
of 
§ 194.02 
requires 
that 
regulation 
of 
any 
transportation services be "the minimum necessary to achieve the 
other goals the legislature has adopted."  Because Ordinance 
4.05 is not the minimum regulation necessary to achieve other 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
31 
 
legislative goals, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance is 
unenforceable on the ground that it contradicts § 194.02. 
¶60 Their argument, however, is belied by the express 
scope of chapter 194.  The very first subsection of the chapter, 
§ 194.01(1), specifically excludes taxis from the definition of 
"common motor carrier."  It states: 
"Common motor carrier" means any person who holds 
himself or herself out to the public as willing to 
undertake for hire to transport passengers by motor 
vehicle between fixed end points or over a regular 
route upon the public highways or property over 
regular or irregular routes upon the public highways. 
The transportation of passengers in taxicab service 
 . . . shall not be construed as being that of a 
common motor carrier. 
(Emphasis added.)  The other two types of vehicles covered by 
the section ("contract motor carrier" and "private motor 
carrier") do not include taxis, for both are defined as 
transporting property rather than passengers.18 
¶61 The petitioners argue that § 194.02's statement of 
intent "to let the market promote competitive and efficient 
transportation services" is not specific to motor carriers, and 
therefore applies to regulations regarding taxis.  However, that 
statement follows a sentence specifically stating that the 
intent of the legislature is to remove regulations "which limit 
motor carrier operations" (emphasis added).  Thus, one sentence 
in a statement of legislative intent refers to "transportation 
services," while the rest of the chapter expressly excludes 
                                                 
18 Wis. Stat. §§ 194.01(2), (11).  
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
32 
 
taxis from its scope.  This is simply not a sufficient 
foundation to conclude that any regulation of taxis must be the 
least restrictive to competition consistent with legislative 
goals, as the petitioners claim.  We therefore determine that 
the Ordinance does not conflict with § 194.02. 
¶62 Accordingly, we conclude that the requirement under 
Ordinance 4.05 that taxis have one of a limited number of 
permits in order to do business at the Airport does not conflict 
with Wis. Stat. §§ 133.01, 349.24, or 194.02. Section 133.01 
does not give rise to an independent cause of action, § 349.24 
does not apply to counties or airports, and taxis are explicitly 
excluded from the scope of chapter 194. 
¶63 Finally, the petitioners assert that the restriction 
on 
prearranged 
taxi 
service 
in 
Ordinance 
4.05 
is 
an 
unconstitutional 
interference 
with 
interstate 
commerce.  
However, it is fundamental that a court should not reach a 
constitutional 
question 
unless 
it 
is 
essential 
to 
the 
determination of the case before it.  Kollasch v. Adamany, 104 
Wis. 2d 552, 561, 313 N.W.2d 47 (1981).  Because we determine 
that by prohibiting taxis without Airport permits from accepting 
prearranged fares,  Ordinance 4.05 conflicts with § 114.14 and 
to that extent is invalid and unenforceable, we do not reach the 
constitutional question. 
V 
¶64 In sum, we determine that Ordinance 4.05, which 
prohibits taxis without Airport permits from making prearranged 
pickups, conflicts with the requirement under § 114.14 that the 
No. 
2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687   
 
33 
 
public have equal access to airport services, and to that extent 
is invalid and unenforceable. However, we determine that 
Ordinance 4.05 does not conflict with Wis. Stat. §§ 133.01, 
349.24, and 194.02.  Because our decision rests on statutory 
grounds, 
we 
do 
not 
reach 
the 
question 
of 
whether 
the 
restrictions on prearranged taxi service in Ordinance 4.05 
impermissibly interfere with interstate commerce.  Accordingly, 
we reverse the court of appeals, and remand the cause to the 
circuit court with instructions to vacate the judgments of 
conviction. 
By the Court.—the decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687.dtp 
 
 
1 
 
 
¶65 DAVID 
T. 
PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  This case 
interprets 
Milwaukee 
County's 
power 
to 
regulate 
ground 
transportation 
at 
General 
Mitchell 
International 
Airport.  
Although I might seek changes to Milwaukee County's Ordinance 
4.05 if I were a member of the Milwaukee County Board, this 
court should not force changes to the ordinance unless there is 
very clear proof that the ordinance is invalid.  Because I am 
not persuaded that the petitioners have satisfied their burden 
to establish invalidity, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶66 The Wisconsin Legislature has given local governments 
broad powers to "construct, improve, equip, maintain and 
operate" an airport.  Wis. Stat. § 114.14(1).  "The governing 
body of a city, village, town or county may adopt regulations, 
and establish fees or charges for the use of such airport."  Id. 
¶67 Pursuant to the authority granted to Milwaukee County 
by this statute, the County Board adopted Milwaukee County 
Ordinance 4.05.  The ordinance provides in part: 
(1) Purpose. The purpose and intent of this 
section 
is 
to 
regulate 
all 
commercial 
ground 
transportation 
including 
prereserved 
(reservation) 
service, by the issuance of permit(s) to both those 
owning or operating a commercial ground transportation 
service 
and 
those 
driving 
commercial 
ground 
transportation 
vehicles 
at 
General 
Mitchell 
International 
Airport. 
 
Prereserved 
(reservation) 
service means ground transportation that is contracted 
for prior to the actual time passengers are picked up. 
. . . .  
(3) Taxicabs. 
No.  2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687.dtp 
 
 
2 
 
(a) Definition. "Taxicab" under this section is 
a motor vehicle regularly engaged in the business of 
carrying passengers for hire, with heating and air 
conditioning, be in good operating condition, metered, 
and not operated on an affixed route. 
(b) License, permits, fees. 
(1) An owner or operator of a taxicab shall 
not do business or attempt to do business on 
General Mitchell International Airport unless 
such owner or operator has been licensed as owner 
or operator of a taxicab business by any city, 
village or town consistent with Wis. Stats. § 
349.24, and unless such license remains in full 
force and effect. 
. . . .  
(3)(a) On and after September 1, 1990, taxicab 
owner permits will be issued only to those owners 
whose vehicle(s) have been permitted during the period 
October 1, 1989, through July 5, 1990.  Taxicab owner 
permits must be renewed and remain in full force and 
effect on a continuous basis, in accordance with 
subparagraph (b) below.  In the event an owner does 
not renew the taxicab owner permit prior to the annual 
dates 
prescribed herein below, that owner shall 
forfeit his/her privilege to operate at the airport.  
At such time that the total number of taxicab permits 
issued decreases below fifty (50), additional permits, 
to maintain the total issued at fifty (50), will be 
issued to those taxicab owners who are on the waiting 
list.  Permits will be issued based upon date of 
request on the waiting list.  In the event of 
extraordinary circumstances, i.e. large conventions, 
inclement 
weather or inability of the permitted 
taxicab fleet to meet immediate passenger demand, the 
airport director or his/her designated representative 
is authorized to request temporary taxicab service 
from 
local 
providers 
in 
order 
to 
meet 
such 
extraordinary demand.  Additional taxicabs will follow 
all policies, rules and regulations pertaining to the 
operation 
of 
taxicabs 
at 
General 
Mitchell 
International Airport. 
. . . .  
No.  2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687.dtp 
 
 
3 
 
(5) Any person who is not in possession of the 
necessary permits required under this section and who 
operates a taxicab at General Mitchell International 
Airport in such a manner as to constitute doing 
business, or who attempts to do business thereon 
shall, without limitation because of enumeration, be 
deemed to be in violation of chapter 4 of the Code.  A 
taxicab 
driver 
entering 
upon 
General 
Mitchell 
International 
Airport 
for 
the 
sole 
purpose 
of 
discharging a taxicab patron at said airport shall not 
be deemed to be doing business thereon if, after 
discharging said passenger, he/she shall immediately 
leave the airport premises. 
Milwaukee County, WI, Code of General Ordinances, ch. 4 (2006) 
(emphasis added). 
¶68 Persons challenging this ordinance have a heavy 
burden. 
 
The 
police 
power 
of 
the 
state, 
exercised 
by 
municipalities under the authority of the legislature, extends 
to the public safety, health, morals, and general welfare.  
Highway 100 Auto Wreckers, Inc. v. City of West Allis, 6 
Wis. 2d 637, 643, 96 N.W.2d 85 (1959), rehearing denied, 6 
Wis. 2d 637, 97 N.W.2d 423 (1959).  The police power embraces 
regulations designed to promote the public convenience or 
general 
prosperity. 
 
Courtesy 
Cab 
Co. 
v. 
Johnson, 
10 
Wis. 2d 426, 432, 103 N.W.2d 17 (1960).  "This court has often 
recognized the principle that the court will not interfere with 
the exercise of police power by a municipality unless the 
illegality of the exercise is clear."  Highway 100 Auto 
Wreckers, 6 Wis. 2d at 643.  "If there are any reasons which can 
fairly have weight, the reasons for a given ordinance are for 
the legislative body and not for the courts."  Courtesy Cab, 10 
Wis. 2d at 432.   
No.  2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687.dtp 
 
 
4 
 
¶69 The county "does not have the burden of proving the 
validity of its ordinance . . . .  Rather, [a challenger] has 
the burden of showing its invalidity."  State ex rel. B'nai 
B'rith 
Found. 
v. 
Walworth 
County 
Bd. 
of 
Adjustment, 
59 
Wis. 2d 296, 307, 208 N.W.2d 113 (1973).  "[W]here a municipal 
body enacts regulations pursuant to authority expressly granted, 
all presumptions are in favor of its validity, and any person 
attacking it must make the fact of its invalidity clearly 
appear."  State ex rel. Newman v. Pagels, 212 Wis. 475, 250 N.W. 
430 (1933). 
¶70 The majority opinion carefully explains the history 
and purpose of the County ordinance.  See majority op., ¶¶7, 8, 
9, 11, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, and 37.  This is summarized well in 
the following sentences: 
Since 
the 
adoption 
of 
Ordinance 
4.05, 
the 
problems of the open system have abated.  The time 
that taxis must wait for fares has decreased, and the 
time that passengers must wait for curbside taxi 
service has decreased.  The cap on taxi permits has 
reduced the congestion problems, and taxis no longer 
spill into the Airport roadway to create a hazard for 
other Airport traffic. 
Id., ¶11. 
¶71 Surprisingly, the majority invalidates the ordinance 
in part in spite of this success. 
II 
¶72 To support their attack on Ordinance 4.05, petitioners 
point to Wis. Stat. § 114.14(3)(b)1.: "(b) The exercise of 
authority by the airport commission under par. (a) shall be 
subject to all of the following conditions: 1. The public may in 
No.  2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687.dtp 
 
 
5 
 
no case be deprived of equal and uniform use of the airport."  
(Emphasis added.)  They contend that Ordinance 4.05(3)(b)(5), 
prohibiting the operation of a taxicab at General Mitchell 
International Airport without a permit, violates the statutory 
rule on "equal and uniform use of the airport" if the taxicab 
merely picks up passengers on a "prearranged" or "prereserved" 
basis.  They argue that it is not within the County's authority 
to 
treat 
taxis 
without 
permits 
differently 
from 
luxury 
limousines (which are not required to have airport permits) with 
respect to providing prearranged service at the Airport.  See 
majority op., ¶19.   
¶73 They also argue that it is not within the County's 
authority to require taxis to have one of a limited number (50) 
of Airport permits to do business at the Airport.  Id.  
According 
to 
petitioners, 
"[f]orbidding 
the 
provision 
of 
[prereserved] service [by taxis without permits] serves only to 
protect the favored 50 Milwaukee taxis and the providers of more 
expensive prereserved services from competition." 
¶74 Before responding to these arguments, it is helpful to 
understand the history of the language at issue.  The present 
sentence, "The public may in no case be deprived of equal and 
uniform use of the airport," Wis. Stat. § 114.14(3)(b)1., first 
appeared in our statutes in slightly different form in 1943.  
See § 15, ch. 269, Laws of 1943.  Newly created § 114.14(3) gave 
airport commissions certain powers, including the power to 
"contract with private parties for the operation of the airport, 
including all necessary arrangements for the improvement and 
No.  2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687.dtp 
 
 
6 
 
equipment and successful operation thereof.  Provided, that in 
no case shall the public be deprived of equal and uniform use of 
the airport."  Wis. Stat. § 114.14(3) (1943). 
¶75 Legislative Reference Bureau drafting records for 1943 
S.B. 123, the source of Chapter 269, do not explain this 
proviso.  Although the drafting records are incomplete, they 
show that the bill went through significant drafting changes 
before introduction.  At some point, the bill drafter appears to 
have 
borrowed 
language 
from 
the 
Uniform 
Airports 
Act, 
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws in 1935.   
¶76 For instance, Section 5 of the Uniform Airports Act 
reads in part: 
 
Section 5. Authority to Equip, Improve, Establish 
Fees and Charges and Lease.——Counties, municipalities, 
or other political subdivisions of this state which 
have established or may hereafter establish airports 
or landing fields, or which acquire, lease, or set 
apart real property for such purpose or purposes, are 
hereby authorized: 
 
(a) to construct, equip, improve, maintain, and 
operate the same, or to vest authority for the 
construction, equipment, improvement, maintenance, and 
operation thereof, in an officer, board or body of 
such political subdivision. . . .  
 
. . . .  
 
(c) to lease for a term not exceeding [  ] years 
such airports or landing fields to private parties for 
operation, or to lease or assign for a term not 
exceeding [  ] years to private parties for operation 
space, area, improvements, and equipment on such 
airports or landing fields, provided in each case that 
in so doing the public is not deprived of its 
rightful, equal and uniform use thereof. 
No.  2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687.dtp 
 
 
7 
 
Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws and Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Annual Conference, 
Uniform Airports Act 216-17 (1935) (emphasis added).1  The 
underscored 
words 
were 
substantially 
incorporated 
into 
Wis. Stat. § 114.14(3) (1943). 
 
¶77 Admittedly, the language of our statute is somewhat 
broader than the language of the uniform law.  This helps to 
explain the comment in Wussow v. Gaida, 251 Wis. 328, 331, 29 
N.W.2d 42 (1947), that "no distinction between private or 
personal and commercial use can be read into the clear words of 
the statute."  Yet, the Wussow decision——which is vital to 
petitioners' argument——was influenced by more than the language 
of the statute.  Both the statute and Wussow were influenced by 
contemporary practices. 
¶78 In a 1941 article, John M. Hunter, Jr., an attorney 
for the Civil Aeronautics Administration of the United States 
Department of Commerce, wrote: 
 
The principal legal developments of interest in 
the field of airport operation during the last year 
[1940] were with regard to the leasing of municipal 
airports or airport facilities to private persons and 
the grant by cities of airport operating privileges.  
These developments included the adoption of several 
city resolutions authorizing airport leases and grants 
of privileges and concessions . . . . 
 
In addition to these developments, there have 
been three cases in which informal complaint has been 
made to the Civil Aeronautics Authority of violation 
of the exclusive right provision of Section 303 of the 
                                                 
1 See also Ga. Code Ann. § 6-3-25(3) (1995); S.C. Code Ann. 
§ 55-9-190(3) (1992); Utah Code Ann. § 72-10-207(1)(c) (2001). 
No.  2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687.dtp 
 
 
8 
 
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, which reads: "There 
shall be no exclusive right for the use of any landing 
area or air navigation facility upon which Federal 
funds have been expended."  In all of these cases the 
complaint was that the city in question had granted a 
private 
operator 
an 
exclusive 
right 
to 
conduct 
commercial flying activities at the municipal airport, 
including operation of a flying school and a charter 
flying service. 
John M. Hunter, Jr., Airport Legal Developments of Interest to 
Municipalities——1940, The Journal of Air Law and Commerce 153 
(Vol. XII, 1941) (citation omitted). 
 
¶79 Hunter's article was prescient, for it anticipated the 
very facts of the Wussow case.  Wussow entered into a lease to 
operate the Shawano Municipal Airport and to "have sole charge 
of said airport."  Wussow, 251 Wis. at 329-30.  Gaida, who owned 
an aircraft sales company on adjacent land and had regularly 
used the airport for landing and taking off, continued to use 
the airport to give "flying instructions and taxi service" 
(likely meaning air charter service).  Id. at 330.  Wussow 
sought an injunction to bar such use, claiming that Gaida was 
forceably taking Wussow's rights under the contract and causing 
him "great loss in profits and earnings."  Id.  This court 
reversed the circuit court and denied the injunction.  It cited 
the procedural posture of the case as well as the language of 
the statute, then added: "The final answer to the immediate 
question must be arrived at in the light of this determination 
that [Wussow's] right to equitable relief does not exist.  We do 
not decide whether a cause of action at law may exist."  Id. at 
331 (emphasis added). 
No.  2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687.dtp 
 
 
9 
 
¶80 Thus, close examination of the Wussow case suggests 
that petitioners may be reading too much into it.  A 1958 
opinion of the Wisconsin Attorney General presents a more 
balanced discussion of the law on airport contracts.  The 
Attorney General concluded in summary: 
 
Where the county is the owner and operator of an 
airport it can lawfully lease space in its terminal 
building to a car rental agency upon the condition 
that it will not lease space to any other car rental 
agency, but it is doubtful whether it can lawfully 
exclude other rental agencies from soliciting business 
in the airport or terminal unless such regulation can 
be shown to be necessary for the convenience of the 
flying public or the efficiency of the operation of 
the airport. 
47 Op. Att'y Gen. 29 (1958). 
 
¶81 An annotation at 40 A.L.R.2d 1060 (1955) ("Validity, 
construction, and operation of airport operator's grant of 
exclusive or discriminatory privilege or concession") cites 
several cases upholding exclusive ground transportation service 
contracts at public airports.  Thus, it is difficult to believe 
that the Wisconsin Legislature intended to hamstring the 
operation of Wisconsin airports by prohibiting the reasonable 
regulation of competition. 
 
¶82 This 
background 
has 
a 
direct 
relationship 
to 
petitioners' argument that a 50-permit limit on taxicabs at the 
Airport 
violates 
Wis. Stat. § 114.14(3)(b)1. 
 
If 
Milwaukee 
County may not limit the number of taxicab permits at its 
Airport, it is hard to see how it can limit the number of other 
service providers and vendors by regulation or contract. 
No.  2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687.dtp 
 
 
10 
 
¶83 Clearly, Quality Cab, which employs Williams and 
Hegney, is not the only taxicab company in the region that may 
wish to conduct a prereserved pick up and return business if an 
Airport permit is not required.  Hence, the majority opinion 
appears to be forcing Milwaukee County to return to an open 
system.  This would be a substitution of judicial policy for 
county regulation. 
¶84 Milwaukee County Ordinance 4.05 is a comprehensive, 
detailed ordinance.  It governs taxicabs (subsection 3), in-
county shuttle service (subsection 4), out-of-county shuttle 
service (subsection 
5), luxury limousines (subsection 6), 
courtesy cars (subsection 7), and buses (subsection 8), as well 
as car and truck rentals (subsection 9).  The ordinance 
addresses prereserved service for taxicabs (4.05(3)(f)(7)), out-
of-county shuttle service (4.05(5)(a)), and luxury limousines 
(4.05(6)(a)(2)). 
¶85 The kind of prereserved taxicab service, without 
permit, 
contemplated 
by 
the 
majority 
will 
be 
in 
direct 
competition against (1) taxicabs with permits; (2) in-county 
shuttle service under negotiated contract and permit; and (3) 
out-of-county shuttle services that have paid for permits.  
Traffic congestion, fairness to permit holders, reliable service 
to the public, and revenue to the County all factor into the 
present regulatory scheme. 
¶86 Unaccountably, the majority opinion faults the County 
for not anticipating and countering every argument the majority 
adduces in favor of open competition for prereserved taxicab 
No.  2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687.dtp 
 
 
11 
 
service.  See, e.g., majority op., ¶39.  After all, the County 
does not have the burden of proving the validity of its 
ordinance.  The majority's assumption that there will be no 
longer wait time if non-permitted taxis are able to retrieve 
prearranged fares at the Airport is, frankly, unrealistic.  
Passengers get out of their taxicabs when the cabs arrive at the 
Airport.  Passengers get into their taxicabs after their planes 
arrive at the Airport and after they have picked up any luggage.  
No extra wait time?  Even the residents of Lake Wobegon would 
smile at the suggestion that planes are never late and luggage 
is never delayed or lost at General Mitchell International 
Airport. 
¶87 As for arbitrary discrimination, petitioners make much 
of the fact that luxury limousines are not required to have 
permits.  This distinction appears to be based upon federal law, 
which prohibits local governments from requiring a license or 
fee for certain motor vehicles providing prearranged ground 
transportation service.  See 49 U.S.C. § 14501(d).2  Complying 
with federal law is not being arbitrary. 
                                                 
2 49 U.S.C. § 14501(d) (1955), reads as follows: 
 
(d) Pre-arranged ground transportation.—— 
 
(1) In 
general.——No 
State 
or 
political 
subdivision thereof and no interstate agency, or other 
political agency of 2 or more States shall enact or 
enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard or other 
provision having the force and effect of law requiring 
a license or fee on account of the fact that a motor 
vehicle 
is 
providing 
pre-arranged 
ground 
transportation service if the motor carrier providing 
such service—— 
No.  2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687.dtp 
 
 
12 
 
¶88 Milwaukee County Ordinance 4.05(3) is defensible as 
applied in these citations.  Because the majority holds 
otherwise, I respectfully dissent. 
¶89 I am authorized to state that Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER, 
JR., joins this opinion. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
(A) meets 
all 
applicable 
registration 
requirements under chapter 139 for the interstate 
transportation of passengers; 
 
 
(B) meets 
all 
applicable 
vehicle 
and 
intrastate passenger licensing requirements of the 
State or States in which the motor carrier is 
domiciled or registered to do business; and 
 
 
(C) is providing such service pursuant to a 
contract for—— 
 
 
(i) transportation by the motor carrier 
from one State, including intermediate stops, to a 
destination in another State; or 
 
 
(ii) transportation by the motor carrier 
from 
one 
State, including intermediate stops in 
another State, to a destination in the original State. 
No.  2005AP2686 & 2005AP2687.dtp 
 
 
 
 
1