Case Title: Judgment Vacated; Case Dismissed; Appeal Dismissed. Alabama Department of Public Safety and Mike Coppage, as director of the Alabama Department of Public Safety v. Greg Ogles

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1061539

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2009-01-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:01/16/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1061539
____________________
Alabama Department of Public Safety and Mike Coppage, as
director of the Alabama Department of Public Safety 
v.
Greg Ogles
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court 
(CV-05-1751)
BOLIN, Justice.
The issue in this case is whether the court in which the
underlying action was filed, the Jefferson Circuit Court, had
1061539
While this litigation was pending, Coppage retired and
1
Christopher Murphy was appointed as the director of the
Department.  Upon his appointment, Murphy was automatically
substituted for Coppage as a party in this action pursuant to
Rule 25(d), Ala. R. Civ. P. 
2
subject-matter jurisdiction over the original complaint. We
conclude that it did not. 
Facts and Procedural History
On February 25, 2005, Greg Ogles filed a class action in
the Jefferson Circuit Court claiming that members of the
purported class had been overcharged for duplicate or renewed
driver's licenses by the Alabama Department of Public Safety
("the Department").  The complaint sought declaratory and
injunctive relief and a refund of the alleged overpayments.
The Department, which was listed on the complaint as the only
defendant, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, claiming,
among other things, sovereign immunity and asserting that
venue in Jefferson County was improper.  In opposition to the
Department's motion to dismiss, Ogles amended his complaint to
name Mike Coppage, in his official capacity as director of the
Department, as a defendant.   On May 4, 2005, the Jefferson
1
Circuit Court denied the Department's motion to dismiss but
apparently agreed with the Department that venue in Jefferson
1061539
3
County was improper.  On July 8, 2005, the case was
transferred to the Montgomery Circuit Court.  On December 14,
2005, the Department and the director filed a motion asking
the Montgomery Circuit Court to reconsider the Jefferson
Circuit Court's order denying the motion to dismiss, again
asserting sovereign immunity as a basis for dismissal.  On May
11, 2005, the Montgomery Circuit Court entered an order
reserving its ruling on the Department's assertion of
sovereign immunity.  The court allowed Ogles to proceed with
discovery on his individual claims (as opposed to any
discovery related to the class action), limited to the issue
whether the Department was charging more than is statutorily
allowed for the issuance of duplicate or renewed driver's
licenses.      
On August 18, 2006, the Department and its director filed
a motion for a summary judgment that, among other things,
involved the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  On August 31,
2006, Ogles filed a motion in opposition to the Department and
the director's summary-judgment motion, along with a motion
for a summary judgment on his individual claims.  On June 12,
2007, the Montgomery Circuit Court entered an order denying
1061539
4
the Department and the director's motion for a summary
judgment and entering a summary judgment in favor of Ogles,
finding that Ogles had been overcharged for his duplicate
driver's license.  The court stated that the class allegations
remained pending.  The court made the summary judgment for
Ogle on his individual claims final pursuant to Rule 54(b),
Ala. R. Civ. P. On July 19, 2007, the Department and its
director appealed, raising the following issues for appellate
review:  
"I.  Whether the trial court erred in finding
that Greg Ogles was overcharged $1.36 for a driver's
license by the Alabama Department of Public Safety.
"II.  Whether under Article I, § 14 of the
Constitution of Alabama of 1901, Greg Ogles is
precluded in this action from recovering from the
Alabama Department of Public Safety an alleged $1.36
overcharge for a driver's license." 
While the appeal was pending, the Montgomery Circuit
Court purported to consolidate this case with a class action
pending in that court against the Department and its director
that involved the same issue, and the court allowed the
parties in the consolidated cases to proceed with class-
related discovery.
Discussion
1061539
5
In Ex parte Alabama Department of Transportation, 978 So.
2d 17 (Ala. 2007)("Good Hope"), Good Hope Contracting Company
("the company") sued the Alabama Department of Transportation
("ALDOT"), seeking declaratory relief, damages for breach of
contract, and a writ of mandamus directing ALDOT to pay for
roadway-construction projects the company had allegedly
completed for ALDOT.  ALDOT filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that ALDOT, as a State agency, is
entitled to sovereign immunity under § 14, Ala. Const. 1901.
The trial court did not rule on the motion.  Subsequently,
ALDOT petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus.  In
response to the petition, the company asked this Court to
direct the trial judge "to allow [the company] to amend its
complaint to add the proper party."  978 So. 2d at 25.  
In regard to suing a State agency, this Court in Good
Hope stated:   
"This Court has long held that '"'the circuit
court is without jurisdiction to entertain a suit
against the State because of Sec. 14 of the
Constitution.'"' Larkins v. Department of Mental
Health & Mental Retardation, 806 So. 2d 358, 364
(Ala. 2001) (quoting Alabama State Docks Terminal
Ry. v. Lyles, 797 So. 2d 432, 435 (Ala. 2001),
quoting in turn Aland v. Graham, 287 Ala. 226, 229,
250 So. 2d 677, 678 (1971)).  '[A]n action contrary
to the State's immunity is an action over which the
1061539
6
courts 
of 
this 
State 
lack 
subject-matter
jurisdiction.' 
".... 
"This Court has repeatedly held that § 14, Ala.
Const. 1901, 'affords the State and its agencies an
"absolute" immunity from suit in any court.'  Haley
v. Barbour County, 885 So. 2d 783, 788 (Ala. 2004);
see also Ex parte Mobile County Dep't of Human Res.,
815 So. 2d 527, 530 (Ala. 2001) ('Pursuant to § 14,
Ala. Const. of 1901, the State of Alabama and its
agencies have absolute immunity from suit in any
court.'); Ex parte Tuscaloosa County, 796 So. 2d
1100, 1103 (Ala. 2000) ('Under Ala. Const. of 1901,
§ 14, the State of Alabama has absolute immunity
from lawsuits. This absolute immunity extends to
arms or agencies of the state....').  This absolute
immunity from suit also bars suits for relief by way
of mandamus or injunction.  Ex parte Troy Univ., 961
So. 2d 105, 110 (Ala. 2006)." 
Good Hope, 978 So. 2d at 21-22.
This Court in Good Hope also refused to allow the company
to amend its complaint to add the proper party, stating: 
"ALDOT argued in its motion to dismiss that, as a
State agency, it was not the proper party to be
sued, and it pointed out that [the company] had
failed to name any State official as a party.
ALDOT's supplemental submission and brief in support
of motion to dismiss, tab 3 at 8. 
 
"Further, in Ex parte Blankenship, 893 So. 2d
303, 306-07 (Ala. 2004), this Court held that, if a
trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, it
has no power to take any action other than to
dismiss the complaint.  A trial court lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction if the defendant is immune under
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  Larkins, 806
1061539
7
So. 2d at 364 ('"Article I, § 14, of the Alabama
Constitution of 1901 thus removes subject-matter
jurisdiction from the courts when an action is
determined to be one against the State."' (quoting
[Alabama State Docks Terminal Ry. v.] Lyles, 797 So.
2d [432] at 435 [(Ala. 2001)])).  Thus, this Court
cannot order the trial court to allow [the company]
to amend its complaint because the trial court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction."
Good Hope, 978 So. 2d at 26.  
In Ex parte Alabama Department of Transportation, 990 So.
2d  366 (Ala. 2008)("Jones Brothers"), Jones Brothers, Inc.,
entered into a contract with ALDOT to construct a bridge.
Jones Brothers subcontracted certain work to an electrical and
lighting company.  ALDOT eventually rejected some of the work
performed by Jones Brothers and its subcontractor.  Jones
Brothers, the subcontractor, and the subcontractor's insurer
then sued ALDOT, alleging, among other things, breach of
contract.  ALDOT moved to dismiss the action based on the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, and it cited to Good Hope,
supra.  The trial court denied the motion and purported to
order the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to name proper
parties.  ALDOT petitioned this Court for mandamus relief.
This Court held that because ALDOT was the only named
defendant and no State official had been named by the
1061539
8
plaintiffs, the action was due to be dismissed on the basis
that § 14 deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to
entertain the action against ALDOT.  
This 
Court 
subsequently 
issued 
Ex 
parte 
Alabama
Department of Transportation, [Ms. 1070721, June 13, 2008] ___
So. 2d     (Ala. 2008)("Russell Petroleum"), in which we held
that ALDOT had absolute immunity from suit and, therefore,
that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to
entertain an amendment to the original complaint.  Russell
Petroleum sued ALDOT seeking compensation for ALDOT's alleged
"inverse condemnation" of Russell Petroleum's property.  ALDOT
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action
was barred by Ala. Const. 1901, § 14 ("the State shall never
be made a defendant in any court of law or equity").
Subsequently, Russell Petroleum filed a motion seeking to
"substitute (or add)" the director of ALDOT as a defendant.
Russell Petroleum also filed an amended complaint that
included the director in the style of the complaint and that
sought declaratory relief along with money damages to
compensate 
Russell 
Petroleum 
for 
the 
alleged 
inverse
condemnation.  ALDOT and its director filed a motion to
1061539
9
dismiss, relying on Good Hope and arguing that the trial court
did not have jurisdiction over them because the amended
complaint was a nullity and arguing further that the trial
court had no alternative but to dismiss the action.  ALDOT and
its director argued that the original complaint, which named
only ALDOT, failed to invoke the subject-matter jurisdiction
of the trial court because ALDOT was absolutely immune from
suit, and that the amended complaint, which purported to amend
a complaint that was void ab initio, was a nullity and,
therefore, that no jurisdiction attached as a result of the
amendment.  The trial court denied the motion, and ALDOT
petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus.  Relying on Good
Hope, supra, and Jones Brothers, supra, this  Court held that
the 
trial 
court 
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction 
to
entertain an amendment to the original complaint, which was
filed solely against ALDOT, because the trial court never had
subject-matter jurisdiction.  We granted the petition and
ordered that the action be dismissed.
In Alabama Department of Corrections v. Montgomery County
Commission, [Ms. 1051455, Dec. 12, 2008]     So. 2d     (Ala.
2008)("Montgomery County Commission"), the Montgomery County
1061539
10
Commission sued the Department of Corrections ("the DOC"),
alleging that the DOC was responsible for paying for the
medical treatment of an inmate who had been confined at the
Montgomery County detention facility.  The DOC filed an answer
denying the material allegations in the complaint.  The
Commission filed a motion for a summary judgment, which the
trial court denied.  Subsequently, the Commission filed an
amended 
complaint 
in 
which 
it 
purported 
to 
add 
the
commissioner of the DOC as a defendant in his official
capacity, seeking to require the commissioner to perform his
legal duty and to reimburse the Commission for its payments
for the inmate's medical care.  The DOC and the Commission
each moved for a summary judgment.  The trial court granted
the Commission's summary-judgment motion and entered a
judgment in its favor.  The DOC and the commissioner appealed.
This Court issued an opinion in Montgomery County
Commission on June 27, 2008, affirming in part, reversing in
part, and dismissing the appeal in part, and, when no
application for rehearing was filed, we issued a certificate
of judgment.  However, we then recalled the certificate of
judgment and placed the case on rehearing ex mero motu.  In so
1061539
11
doing, we directed the parties to address the issue whether
the Montgomery Circuit Court had subject-matter jurisdiction
to allow the amendment of the complaint to add the
commissioner of the DOC as a defendant.  In our opinion on
rehearing ex mero motu, issued on December 12, 2008, we held
that Russell Petroleum and Good Hope controlled and that
because the DOC is a State agency and had absolute immunity
from suit, the original complaint, which named only a party
that was absolutely immune from liability, failed to trigger
the subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court.  We
further held that because the original complaint was a
nullity, the purported amendment of that complaint was also a
nullity.  In its response to our request for arguments from
the parties, the Commission attempted to distinguish Good Hope
by arguing that Good Hope  also included a breach-of-contract
claim, while the Commission was asking us to construe a
statute, which is one of the exceptions to the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.  This Court noted that although some prior
caselaw had used language indicating that a State agency can
be a defendant under the exceptions to the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, careless language is never a justification
1061539
12
for 
ignoring 
the 
clearly 
expressed 
mandate 
of 
the
Constitution.  It is well established that the State and its
agencies have absolute immunity from suit under § 14, not
simply immunity from certain claims.  The exceptions to the
doctrine of sovereign immunity are relevant only as they
relate to claims against State officials in their official
capacities, not as they relate to the State agency or the
State itself.      So. 2d at    .  
In the present case, the original class-action complaint
filed on February 25, 2005, listed the Department as the sole
defendant.  The Department and its director argue that the
Jefferson Circuit Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
over the original complaint, that it consequently could not
entertain the amended complaint naming as a defendant Coppage
in his official capacity as the director, and, therefore, that
the appeal should be dismissed.    
Ogles argues that the exceptions to the State's absolute
immunity are not limited to officers of a State agency and
that a State agency can be a defendant to a legal action.  In
support of his position, Ogles cites State Board of Education
v. McClain, 810 So. 2d 763 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000).  However,
1061539
13
this Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment in Ex
parte Board of Education, 810 So. 2d 773 (Ala. 2001), in which
this Court held that the State Board of Education was immune
from suit under § 14.  Moreover, this Court recently held that
only State officers named in their official capacity –- and
not State agencies -- may be defendants in declaratory-
judgment actions.  Alabama Dep't of Transp. v. Harbert Int'l,
Inc., 990 So. 2d 831 (Ala. 2008); see also Montgomery County
Commission.  
We agree with the Department that because the original
complaint named as a defendant solely the Department the
Jefferson Circuit Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.
On the authority of Good Hope, Jones Brothers, Russell
Petroleum, and Montgomery County Commission, we conclude that
the Jefferson Circuit Court thus lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction to entertain the amendment to the complaint and
to transfer the case to the Montgomery Circuit Court.
Additionally, we note that the Montgomery Circuit Court
likewise lacked jurisdiction over the case, including the
jurisdiction to consolidate the case with any other pending
action.  "Where 'the trial court ha[s] no subject-matter
1061539
14
jurisdiction, [it has] no alternative but to dismiss the
action.'"  Gulf Beach Hotel, Inc. v. State ex rel. Whetstone,
935 So. 2d 1177, 1182 (Ala. 2006) (quoting State v. Property
at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025, 1029 (Ala. 1999)).
The judgment appealed from is vacated, and the action is
ordered dismissed.  Moreover, a void judgment will not support
an appeal.  Faith Props., LLC v. First Commercial Bank, 988
So. 2d 485, 492 (Ala. 2008).  Therefore, the appeal is
likewise dismissed.
JUDGMENT VACATED; CASE DISMISSED; APPEAL DISMISSED.
See, Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, and Parker, JJ.,
concur.  
Cobb, C.J., and Murdock, J., dissent.
1061539
15
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
For the reasons explained in my special writings in Cadle
Co. v. Shabani, [Ms. 1070116, Sept. 5, 2008] ___ So. 2d ___,
___ (Ala. 2008) (Murdock, J., dissenting), and Ex parte
Alabama Dep't of Transp., [Ms. 1070721, Oct. 24, 2008] ___
So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2008)(Murdock, J., dissenting), I
respectfully dissent.  See also Alabama Dep't of Corr. v.
Montgomery County Comm'n, [Ms. 1051455, Dec. 12, 2008] ___
So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2008) (Murdock, J., dissenting).
Cobb, C.J., concurs.