Case Title: In re Child of Amber L.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018 ME 91

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2018-07-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 91 
Docket: 
Pen-18-79 
Submitted 
On Briefs: June 27, 2018 
Decided: 
July 5, 2018 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILD OF AMBER L. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  Amber L. appeals from the judgment of the District Court 
(Bangor, Campbell, J.) that terminated her parental rights to her child pursuant 
to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a), (B)(2)(a), and (b)(i)-(ii) (2017).1  The mother 
contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s findings of 
parental unfitness.  She further challenges the court’s determination that 
termination of her parental rights is in the best interest of the child, arguing 
that because the kinship placement for the child provides sufficient stability, 
the court was required to order additional time for her to attempt to 
rehabilitate herself and reunify with the child.  We conclude that clear and 
convincing evidence supports the court’s finding that the mother is unfit as a 
                                         
1  The child’s father had his parental rights terminated after failing to appear at the termination 
hearing.  The father is not a party to this appeal. 
 
 
2 
parent and that the court acted within its discretion in determining that 
termination is in the child’s best interest.  We therefore affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  After a two-day hearing in early February of 2018, the court found 
that the mother is unwilling or unable (1) to protect the child from jeopardy 
and (2) to take responsibility for him and that both of these circumstances are 
unlikely to change in a time reasonably calculated to meet the needs of the child.  
See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii).  After carefully considering the record, 
the court ultimately determined that terminating the mother’s parental rights 
was in the child’s best interest.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).  To support 
its findings of parental unfitness and its best interest determination, the court 
made the following factual findings based upon clear and convincing evidence 
in the record: 
In this case, custody of [the child] was properly removed 
from the parents and granted to DHHS on October 21, 2016. 
 
. . . .  
 
. . . Mother clearly loves [the child] very much, and she has a 
bond with him.  Mother has also made progress in some areas, for 
which she deserves credit.  For example, mother has consistently 
engaged in supervised visits with [the child], and the visits have 
generally gone very well.  Mother also regularly attends [a clinic] 
for replacement therapy, and she has not used opiates. . . . 
Unfortunately, however, despite the progress mother has made in 
 
 
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some aspects of this case, many of the very serious jeopardy 
concerns remain. 
 
. . . .  
 
. . . Throughout the case, DHHS has attempted to assist 
mother with her substance abuse and mental health issues.  
Despite this, mother has continued to self-medicate with 
marijuana, and she has been very inconsistent in her mental health 
therapy.  Mother has also continued to make very impulsive and 
irresponsible decisions, and she continues to maintain contact with 
unsafe people. 
 
. . . Mother [has] long-standing problems with a cannabis use 
disorder, personality disorder . . . , and complex post-traumatic 
stress disorder. . . . Mother has [a] limited ability to self-correct and 
learn from the consequences of her behavior and acting out. 
According 
to 
[the 
court-ordered 
psychologist], 
without 
appropriate treatment, mother’s ability to safely parent as well as 
reunify with her children is guarded.  [The psychologist] believes 
that mother’s mental health diagnoses tend to be resistant to 
change and historically require long-term and committed 
involvement in treatment.  Mother’s prognosis is further guarded 
because of her tendency to self-medicate with marijuana. 
 
. . . . 
 
Although the [termination petition] had already been filed, 
mother did not follow through with her therapy [provider].  Rather 
than seeing her [therapist] twice a week, mother met with [her 
therapist twice between August and November of 2017]. . . .  
Although [her therapist] reports that mother has made progress 
since November 3rd, mother still does not regularly attend her 
appointments. . . . Mother has only attended her [dialectical 
behavioral therapy] groups three times, twice in December and 
once in January.  Mother attended individual therapy twice, once 
on December 11, 2017, and once on January 29, 2018. 
 
 
 
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Mother’s level of commitment is unacceptable.  [Her 
therapist] testified that mother still has a lot of work to do.  
According to [her therapist], mother’s [dialectical behavioral 
therapy] will take a year from November 3, 2017.  (This assumes 
that mother will be fully committed to her therapy, which, at this 
point, has not been the case.)  [Her therapist] believes that mother’s 
individual therapy will take longer. . . . 
 
The court is very concerned about mother’s continuing 
pattern of engaging in unsafe relationships with [the father of her 
other children] and her former fiancé. . . . Mother has had numerous 
and consistent police contacts resulting from family fights, 
threatening behavior, protection order violations, mental health 
crises, and other incidents involving [her former partners].  Rather 
than demonstrating stability through her behavior, mother has 
consistently been unstable in her relationships and behavior. 
 
. . . .  
 
. . . Mother clearly has a long-standing substance abuse 
problem.  She has continued to use marijuana throughout the time 
that this case has been pending.  This is not a situation where 
mother smokes occasionally to relieve anxiety.  According to [the 
psychologist in this case], this is a situation where mother abuses 
her methadone and marijuana to get intoxicated as a way of 
self-medicating. . . . 
 
. . . .  
 
. . . [The child] has special needs, and he requires a high level 
of care.  He needs a safe and stable home.  It is very important that 
he receive permanency as soon as possible.  Unfortunately, mother 
is unable to provide permanency for [the child]. 
 
 
 
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II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶3]  “We review the trial court’s factual findings that a parent is unfit and 
that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest for clear error 
and the ultimate decision to terminate parental rights for an abuse of 
discretion.”  In re Child of Kelcie L., 2018 ME 57, ¶ 3, --- A.3d ---. 
A. 
Parental Unfitness 
 
[¶4]  We will reverse a finding on parental unfitness “only if there is no 
competent evidence in the record to support it, if the fact-finder clearly 
misapprehends the meaning of the evidence, or if the finding is so contrary to 
the credible evidence that it does not represent the truth and right of the case.”  
In re Cameron B., 2017 ME 18, ¶ 10, 154 A.3d 1199 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶5]  The mother does not dispute the finding that at the time of the 
hearing, roughly fifteen months after the child was removed from her custody, 
she could not provide the child with permanency.  Instead, she asserts that the 
circumstances causing her parenting deficits are likely to change in a 
reasonable time.  “Although the [mother] contends that [she] made progress 
towards rehabilitation, the evidence was sufficient to support the court’s 
finding, by clear and convincing evidence, of at least one ground of [her] 
parental unfitness.”  In re Child of Kelcie L., 2018 ME 57, ¶ 5, --- A.3d ---.  
 
 
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Competent evidence in the record, particularly the testimony of the mental 
health professionals, fully supported the court’s findings that the mother’s 
parenting deficits pose jeopardy to the child and are not likely to be resolved 
absent intensive, long-term mental health treatment.  See id.; In re Mathew H., 
2017 ME 151, ¶ 5, 167 A.3d 561.  The court, as a result, did not clearly err by 
finding that mother’s circumstances are unlikely to change within a time 
reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.  
B. 
Best Interest of the Child 
 
[¶6]  Although the court granted the mother’s two motions to continue 
the termination hearing over objections by the State, the mother argues that 
the child protection statute’s prioritization of “family rehabilitation and 
reunification,” 22 M.R.S. § 4003(3) (2017), and the absence of record evidence 
suggesting that prolonging the kinship placement would harm the child, 
required the court to provide her with additional time to attempt to rehabilitate 
herself and reunify with the child, see 22 M.R.S. § 4055(2) (2017).  The mother 
further argues that the Department of Health and Human Services “overstates 
 
 
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the concept of permanency” in defending the court’s termination of her 
parental rights. 
 
[¶7]  Among the general purposes for the child protection statute, the 
Legislature has given priority to “family rehabilitation and reunification.”  
22 M.R.S. § 4003(3).  The Legislature, however, has qualified that general intent 
with the competing goal to “prevent needless delay” in achieving permanency 
for the child.  Id.  In the statutory provisions setting out the specific purposes of 
terminating parental rights, the Legislature has further emphasized its intent 
to “[e]liminate the need for children to wait unreasonable periods of time for 
their parents to correct the conditions which prevent their return to the family.”  
See 22 M.R.S. § 4050(2) (2017).  Although we have recognized that 
“[p]ermanency is a dynamic concept that must be fashioned from the actual 
circumstances and needs of the child,”  In re Child of Kelcie L., 2018 ME 57, ¶ 7, 
--- A.3d --- (quotation marks omitted), “[i]nstability is antithetical to 
permanence.”  In re Marcus S., 2007 ME 24, ¶ 11, 916 A.2d 225. 
 
[¶8]  The court’s best interest analysis relied on competent evidence of 
the “mother’s pattern of instability, her erratic behavior, and her continuing to 
maintain relationships with unsafe people,” as well as competent evidence of 
her “long-standing substance abuse problem” and “significant mental health 
 
 
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issues that will take an extended period of time to treat.”  Contrary to the 
mother’s contention, the court was not required to base its best interest 
determination on evidence of harm to the child resulting from additional time 
for the mother to further attempt rehabilitation and reunification with the 
child.  Pursuant to the Legislature’s mandate, the court deemed in this case that 
further delay of permanency is contrary to the child’s best interest, existing 
attachments, and physical and emotional needs.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(2); 
In re Cameron B., 2017 ME 18, ¶ 13, 154 A.3d 1199; In re Dakota K., 2016 ME 30, 
¶¶ 8-10, 133 A.3d 257.  The court’s findings are supported by competent 
evidence in the record; the court’s determination that termination of the 
mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest was well within the 
court’s discretion. 
 
The entry is: 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Erik T. Crocker, Esq., Farrell, Rosenblatt & Russell, Bangor, for appellant mother 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
Bangor District Court docket number PC-2016-80 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY