Case Title: Robertson v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 082009

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2016-03-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC13-443 
____________ 
 
 
JAMES ROBERTSON,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[March 17, 2016] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
James Robertson pleaded guilty to a charge of first-degree murder, waived 
the right to a jury recommendation on sentencing, and did not object to, contest, or 
rebut the State’s evidence and argument for a sentence of death.  The trial court 
adjudged Robertson guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death after 
concluding that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators.  We have jurisdiction 
of the direct appeal.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  
Appointed counsel brings this appeal on behalf of Robertson, who sought to 
dismiss this appeal or limit the advocacy of his appointed appellate counsel in 
accordance with his stated desire to be executed.  We did not allow Robertson to 
 
 
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dismiss his appeal based on our precedent but permitted him to file his own brief in 
support of his desire to be executed.  See Robertson v. State, 143 So. 3d 907 (Fla. 
2014).  
FACTS 
In connection with his plea of guilty to the charge of first-degree murder, 
Robertson submitted statements admitting that in December 2008, while an inmate 
at Charlotte Correctional Institution, he killed his cellmate, Frank Hart, by 
strangling him with a garrote he made by tying several socks together.  According 
to Robertson’s statement, there was no provocation or fight that led to the murder.  
Rather, Robertson planned the murder by waiting until Hart was asleep and the 
guards had made their rounds, when he knew he would have thirty minutes before 
the guards would return to the section.  Robertson also submitted an affidavit 
stating that he murdered his cellmate so that he would be charged with first-degree 
murder and sentenced to death.     
At the time of the murder, Robertson was forty-five years old and had been 
in prison for twenty-eight years, having first been convicted of a felony before his 
eighteenth birthday.  Subsequent convictions for offenses committed within the 
prison system resulted in additional sentences, and Robertson’s prospective release 
date at that time was 2038.  Based on a history of violence within the prison 
system, Robertson was being held under close management. 
 
 
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Initially, Robertson was charged with second-degree murder.  The State 
offered him a plea agreement of a life sentence in exchange for a guilty plea.  
Robertson rejected the offer, insisting that the charge should be first-degree murder 
because the killing was premeditated.  In 2011, his appointed attorney requested 
that Robertson be given a mental evaluation to determine his sanity at the time of 
the killing.  Two mental health experts, a psychiatrist and a psychologist, examined 
Robertson and concluded he did not meet the standard for insanity.   
In October 2011, while in the Charlotte County Jail where he was housed 
during times that his presence was needed in court hearings, Robertson attacked a 
county jail officer with a homemade weapon and was charged with attempted 
murder. 
In October 2012, the State indicted Robertson for first-degree murder.  The 
same two mental health professionals evaluated him again, this time for 
competence to stand trial.  Through counsel, Robertson advised the court that he 
intended to plead guilty.  The trial court set a date for Robertson to formally plead 
guilty in court.  Robertson and the State agreed to submit documents for the court 
to review before the plea hearing, including a sworn statement in which Robertson 
admitted his guilt and the transcript of his statement to police investigators.  
Robertson and the State also agreed that, upon acceptance of Robertson’s guilty 
plea, the court would proceed to the matter of sentencing.   
 
 
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At the hearing, various documents were admitted into evidence, including 
those previously submitted to the court.  The State introduced the Florida 
Department of Corrections’ homicide investigation report, the medical examiner’s 
autopsy report, Robertson’s affidavit and recorded statement, the reports on the 
mental health evaluations of Robertson’s sanity and competency, his prior criminal 
convictions, and his prison records.  The parties also submitted a statement of 
stipulated facts.  The court conducted a plea colloquy with Robertson to inquire 
into his knowledge and understanding of the charge, his legal rights, and the 
consequences of his plea.  On the basis of the documents submitted and the plea 
colloquy in open court, the court accepted Robertson’s plea of guilty and 
adjudicated him guilty of first-degree murder. 
Because Robertson waived his right to have a jury make a recommendation 
on sentencing, the trial court conducted the penalty proceeding without a jury.  In 
support of its argument that a sentence of death should be imposed, the State 
introduced into evidence all of the same documents, records, and reports as were 
submitted in the guilty plea portion of the hearing, as well as evidence that 
Robertson was serving a prison sentence at the time of the murder.  A Presentence 
Investigation Report (PSI) prepared by an officer of the Department of Corrections 
(DOC) was submitted to the court.  Based on Robertson’s instructions, defense 
counsel did not object to the documents introduced by the State.  On questioning 
 
 
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by defense counsel, Robertson testified that he had committed the murder 
intentionally and also acknowledged guilt of the subsequent attempted murder of 
the Charlotte County jail guard.  Based on Robertson’s waiver, defense counsel did 
not contest the State’s presentation with respect to aggravating circumstances.  The 
court announced on the record that Robertson had waived his right to a penalty- 
phase trial and to the presentation of mitigation evidence. 
The trial court found that the following aggravating circumstances had been 
established: (1) that the defendant had previously been convicted of a capital 
felony or a felony involving violence; (2) that the defendant was under a sentence 
of imprisonment for a previous felony conviction; (3) that the murder was 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (4) that the murder was committed in a 
cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without pretense of moral or legal 
justification.  The court ascribed moderate weight to the first two and great weight 
to the latter two circumstances. 
As for statutory mitigating circumstances, the court found only that the 
defendant was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance brought on by 
depression based on his being depressed about his future prospects as a prisoner 
and the severe restrictions of being held in close management, but gave it little 
weight.  Based on documents filed by the State, the court found the following 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances were shown to exist: (1) a history of 
 
 
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alcoholism and substance abuse disorders in Robertson’s family; (2) Robertson’s 
hyperactivity during childhood, a possible sign of an underlying disorder; (3) the 
poverty, substance abuse, and domestic violence to which Robertson was exposed 
in childhood; (4) Robertson’s use of several different types of drugs from an early 
age and his long criminal history, which resulted in long-term incarceration, 
depriving him of any opportunity for a normal life; and (5) Robertson’s attainment 
of a General Educational Development (GED) certificate in prison.  The trial court 
gave the nonstatutory mitigation little weight. 
The trial court found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the 
mitigating circumstances and that a sentence of death was not disproportionate.  
After the trial court sentenced Robertson to death, his appointed attorney filed a 
notice of appeal on his behalf. 
Robertson’s appointed appellate counsel, an assistant public defender, filed a 
motion to withdraw as counsel, bringing to this Court’s attention the fact that 
Robertson did not want counsel to pursue an appeal on his behalf and wished to 
waive his right to an appeal.  The Court denied the motion to withdraw in an order 
requiring “current counsel to continue to prosecute this appeal fully for the benefit 
of the Court in meeting its statutory and constitutional duties,” and allowing 
Robertson to “file a pro se supplemental brief setting forth his personal positions 
and interests with regard to the subject matter of the appeal.”  Robertson, 143 So. 
 
 
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3d at 910.  In his pro se supplemental brief, Robertson submits that the only issues 
the Court should address are (1) the sufficiency of the evidence and (2) the 
proportionality of the death sentence in light of death sentences upheld in other 
cases. 
ANALYSIS 
 
Robertson’s appointed attorney raises four claims on his behalf in this 
appeal: (1) the trial court erred in accepting Robertson’s waiver of the presentation 
of mitigating circumstances without appointing special counsel to investigate and 
present such evidence on his behalf; (2) the PSI considered by the trial court was 
insufficiently comprehensive to satisfy the applicable requirements; (3) the 
sentence of death was imposed through a defective procedure in which the judge 
prepared the sentencing order before the sentencing hearing; and (4) the trial court 
erred by considering a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance.  We will also 
address the issues of (5) whether Robertson’s guilty plea was knowing and 
voluntary and (6) whether the sentence of death is proportional. 
I. 
The standard by which we review a trial court’s acceptance of a death 
penalty defendant’s waiver of the right to present mitigating evidence is whether 
the court abused its discretion.  See Spann v. State, 857 So. 2d 845, 854 (Fla. 
2003).  Counsel argues that under the circumstances of this case, where 
 
 
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Robertson’s defense attorney acquiesced in his wish to waive the presentation of 
evidence of mitigating circumstances, the trial court should have appointed special 
counsel to investigate Robertson’s background and the circumstances of the 
offense in order to gather and present mitigating evidence to the court and that it 
was an abuse of discretion for the court not to do so.  He argues that without any 
advocacy in favor of a life sentence, the result is a sentence of death imposed by 
default, which is not permitted under this Court’s decisions in Hamblen v. State, 
527 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1988), and Koon v. Dugger, 619 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1993). 
In Hamblen, where we said that the “courts of this state can[not] administer 
the death penalty by default,” 527 So. 2d at 804, the defendant was allowed to 
discharge counsel and represent himself with standby counsel.  The defendant 
pleaded guilty and waived a jury sentencing proceeding.  At sentencing, the 
defendant did not challenge the State’s presentation and submitted no evidence 
himself.  Id. at 801-02.  On appeal from the sentence of death, it was argued on the 
defendant’s behalf that the trial court should have appointed special counsel to 
investigate and present mitigating evidence.  The Court found no error in the trial 
court’s handling of the case.  Id. at 804.  The defendant had been ruled competent, 
and “in the final analysis, all competent defendants have a right to control their 
own destinies.”  Id.  The Court noted that much of the material that one would 
expect to see presented in a case for mitigation was already before the court in the 
 
 
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psychiatric reports on the defendant’s competency and sanity.  There may have 
been additional material available that was not contained in those reports, the Court 
said, but even if special counsel had been appointed, “there [was] no power that 
could have compelled Hamblen to cooperate and divulge such information.”  Id.  
The Court held “that there was no error in not appointing counsel against 
Hamblen’s wishes to seek out and to present mitigating evidence and to argue 
against the death sentence.”  Id.  The trial judge, who provided “a thoughtful 
analysis of the facts,” had “adequately fulfilled that function on his own, thereby 
protecting society’s interests in seeing that the death penalty was not imposed 
improperly.”  Id.  “At the trial level . . . ‘defendants have a right to control their 
own destinies’ when facing the death penalty.”  Farr v. State, 656 So. 2d 448, 450 
(Fla. 1995) (quoting Hamblen, 527 So. 2d at 804). 
In Koon, the Court reaffirmed that a competent defendant may waive the 
presentation of mitigating evidence, but held that defense counsel must evaluate 
potential areas of mitigation that could be developed and discuss them with the 
defendant.  619 So. 2d at 250.  To minimize the possibility of a defendant waiving 
mitigation without a showing on the record that the waiver was a knowing one, the 
Court adopted the following prospective rule:  
When a defendant, against his counsel’s advice, refuses to permit the 
presentation of mitigating evidence in the penalty phase, counsel must 
inform the court on the record of the defendant’s decision.  Counsel 
must indicate whether, based on his investigation, he reasonably 
 
 
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believes there to be mitigating evidence that could be presented and 
what that evidence would be.  The court should then require the 
defendant to confirm on the record that his counsel has discussed 
these matters with him, and despite counsel’s recommendation, he 
wishes to waive presentation of penalty phase evidence. 
 
Id.   
 
In Chandler v. State, 702 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1997), the defendant waived the 
right to present mitigating evidence.  Defense counsel informed the trial court of 
the defendant’s decision and described the penalty phase witnesses he would have 
called on defendant’s behalf.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court 
had erred in accepting defendant’s waiver because defense counsel had failed to 
tell the court what the mitigating evidence would be, contrary to the requirements 
of Koon.  The Court found that the defendant’s argument was based on a 
“hypertechnical interpretation of what Koon requires in this situation.”  Id. at 199. 
Obviously, our primary reason for requiring this procedure was to 
ensure that a defendant understood the importance of presenting 
mitigating testimony, discussed these issues with counsel, and 
confirmed in open court that he or she wished to waive presentation of 
mitigating evidence.  Only then could the trial court, and this Court, 
be assured that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
waived this substantial and important right to show the jury why the 
death penalty should not be imposed in his or her particular case. 
 
Id.  Because the trial court conducted a colloquy with the defendant, confirming on 
the record that the defendant understood the importance of mitigation and that 
counsel had discussed mitigation with him, the Supreme Court found that the Koon 
procedure was fully satisfied. 
 
 
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The purpose of the Koon procedure is to make certain that the record reflects 
a defendant’s knowing waiver of the right to present mitigation.  See Mora v. State, 
814 So. 2d 322, 332-33 (Fla. 2002).  As this Court has held, “the end sought by the 
Koon decision” is satisfied when there are records and documents before the court 
pertaining to the circumstances of the offense and the defendant’s character and 
background.  Waterhouse v. State, 792 So. 2d 1176, 1184 (Fla. 2001).   
 
Appointed counsel’s claim on this point is based on the argument that since 
the trial court did not follow the Koon procedure, it was error to accept 
Robertson’s waiver of the presentation of mitigating evidence.  Defense counsel 
did not state that he had investigated mitigation, believed there was mitigating 
evidence that could be presented, or stated what the evidence would show.  Thus, 
appointed counsel argues that the trial court erred in not requiring counsel to 
indicate whether, based on his investigation, he reasonably believed mitigation 
evidence existed and what that evidence would be.    
However, based on the unique circumstances of this case, we reject this 
argument.  The court examined Robertson on the record to ensure that he wanted to 
waive mitigation and that he understood what he was waiving.  The waiver was 
knowing and voluntary and was, in fact, made at the defendant’s request.  The 
decisions discussed above, from before and after Koon, hold that a competent 
defendant has the right to “control his destiny,” meaning the defendant has the 
 
 
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power to control his defense.  Robertson clearly intended to, and did, waive the 
presentation of mitigation evidence. 
 
Further, while defense counsel failed to discuss the mitigation that exists in 
this case, the court had before it all the documents and background information 
from which mitigating evidence could have been derived had Robertson allowed 
such evidence to be presented, particularly as Robertson has spent most of his adult 
life in prison and was incarcerated as a juvenile before that.  As Robertson himself 
expressly stated, “everything about my family history, mental health, education, 
etc., is well documented and already part of the record.”  The trial court had before 
it the psychiatric and competency evaluations, the PSI, the DOC’s investigation 
report, the autopsy report, the statement of stipulated facts, Robertson’s recorded 
and transcribed statement to State investigators, and Robertson’s in-court 
testimony.  The PSI and the competency reports included information about 
Robertson’s mental health, family background, and school experience.  These 
materials provided a substantial amount of information about the circumstances of 
the offense, as well as Robertson’s character and background.  Whether to appoint 
special counsel was a matter within the court’s discretion.  See Sparre v. State, 164 
So. 3d 1183, 1198-99 (Fla. 2015).  Under the circumstances, it was not an abuse of 
discretion for the court not to appoint special counsel. 
 
 
 
 
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II. 
 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.710(b) provides that when a capital 
defendant chooses not to challenge the death penalty and refuses to present 
mitigation evidence, “the court shall refer the case to the Department of 
Corrections for the preparation of a presentence report.”  The rule requires the 
report to be “comprehensive” and include such matters as “previous mental health 
problems, (including hospitalizations), school records, and relevant family 
background.”  Appointed counsel for Robertson claims the presentence 
investigation performed in this case was not comprehensive and was inadequate to 
serve the purposes of the rule.  The trial court found the report sufficient and 
received it into evidence.  We review the trial court’s action for abuse of 
discretion.  See Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So. 2d 495, 524 (Fla. 2005).  
Our decision in Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2001), was the 
original impetus for the adoption of rule 3.710(b).  There the Court announced the 
policy, later expressed in the rule, requiring “the preparation of a PSI in every case 
where the defendant is not challenging the imposition of the death penalty and 
refuses to present mitigation.”  Id. at 363.  As later addressed in rule 3.710(b), we 
stated in Muhammad that the PSI should be “comprehensive” and “should include 
information such as previous mental health problems (including hospitalizations), 
school records, and relevant family background.”  Id.  The PSI prepared in this 
 
 
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case includes a section entitled “Education,” which states that Robertson left 
school after the eighth grade and obtained a GED in prison.  The report listed as a 
source “prior post and pre-sentence investigation and psychological reports and 
evaluations.”  There is also a section entitled “Family History,” which describes 
Robertson’s upbringing and family relationships.  Based on psychological reports 
reviewed by the investigator, “the defendant admitted to being hyper in the first, 
second, and third grades.”  In a section entitled “Physical and Mental Health,” the 
investigator reported that Robertson claimed to be in good mental health, but from 
time to time had been prescribed medication in the prison system for depression, 
anxiety, and insomnia, and had participated in group therapy. 
 
Appointed counsel for Robertson argues that the PSI did not meet the 
requirements of Muhammad because the investigator failed to examine 
Robertson’s school records directly and instead relied on information in previous 
DOC sentencing investigation reports conducted on Robertson.  However, by 
stating that a PSI should include information such as school records, Muhammad 
does not mandate that the PSI investigator obtain the defendant’s original school 
records.  Rather, school records are an example of the types of information a 
comprehensive PSI should include.  See Fitzpatrick, 900 So. 2d at 524 (holding 
trial court properly considered PSI that did not include military records because 
“[t]he substance of the PSI, not the form, is what is important”).  The PSI does not 
 
 
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lack comprehensiveness under Muhammad, and we cannot say that the trial judge 
abused her discretion in receiving it into evidence. 
 
Appointed counsel for Robertson also argues that it was improper for the 
PSI investigator to recommend that Robertson be sentenced to death.  In support of 
this claim, counsel cites the Committee Note accompanying the 2004 amendment 
to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.710.  As mentioned above, rule 3.710(b) 
was adopted to effectuate the prospective Muhammad PSI requirement.  See 
Amends. to Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro., 886 So. 2d 197, 199 (Fla. 2004).  The 
Committee Note states, “The Department of Corrections should not recommend a 
sentence.”1  Id. at 210. 
 
Section 921.231, Florida Statutes (2012), authorizes DOC to conduct 
presentence investigations and prepare reports upon referral from the circuit court 
in criminal cases under certain circumstances.  Section 921.231(1)(o) provides that 
the PSI should include “[a] recommendation as to disposition by the court” based 
on consideration of several factors.2  When a court refers a pending capital 
                                          
 
 
1.  The Committee Note is not binding legal authority supporting the 
argument that rule 3.710(b) prohibits a sentencing recommendation.  When the 
provision was adopted, this Court stated, “The committee notes and commentary 
are offered for explanation only and are not adopted as an official part of the 
rules.”  Id. at 200. 
 
2.  Section 921.231(1)(o) provides in relevant part as follows: 
The full report shall include: . . . 
 
 
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sentencing matter to DOC for a PSI under rule 3.710(b), the factors in section 
921.231(1)(o) do not apply.  By their plain language, these factors have no bearing 
on the decision of whether to sentence a defendant to death or life imprisonment.  
The corrections officer who prepared the report followed the outline of the statute, 
including the requirement of subsection (1)(o) calling for a recommended 
disposition.  However, the sentencing order shows that while the court relied upon 
the PSI for information about Robertson’s background, the officer’s 
recommendation of a death sentence did not influence the judge’s sentencing 
decision.  Under the circumstances, the inclusion of a sentencing recommendation 
in the report does not render the sentencing order invalid.     
III. 
 
Appointed counsel argues on Robertson’s behalf that the trial court violated 
his procedural rights by preparing the sentencing order before the sentencing 
                                          
 
 
(o)  A recommendation as to disposition by the court.  It shall 
be the duty of the department to make a written determination as to 
the reasons for its recommendation.  The department shall include an 
evaluation of the following factors: 
 
1.  The appropriateness or inappropriateness of community 
facilities, programs, or services for treatment or supervision. 
 
2.  The ability or inability of the department to provide an 
adequate level of supervision for the offender in the community and a 
statement of what constitutes an adequate level of supervision. 
 
3.  The existence of other treatment modalities which the 
offender could use but which do not exist at present in the community. 
 
 
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hearing.  He argues that this procedure was constitutionally defective and deprived 
him of due process of law with the result that the sentence of death cannot stand.  
We reject the claim that the procedure the trial court used was fatally flawed as a 
matter of law.  We apply an abuse of discretion standard and conclude that the trial 
court acted appropriately under the circumstances.   
 
Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993), requires that before the final 
determination of sentence, the judge must hold a hearing, the purposes of which 
are: (1) to give the parties and counsel an opportunity to be heard; (2) to give the 
parties an opportunity to present additional evidence; (3) to allow the parties to 
comment on or rebut information in a PSI or medical report; and (4) to provide the 
defendant the opportunity to address the court in person.  Id. at 691.  Normally, the 
Spencer hearing follows the penalty phase of the trial, which is usually conducted 
with a jury, and takes place after the court receives the jury’s recommendation.  
Following the Spencer hearing, the judge must recess the proceeding, consider the 
sentence, write the sentencing order, and then convene a separate hearing to 
impose the sentence and file the order.  Id. 
Here, jury sentencing had been waived.  The judge combined the evidentiary 
portion of the sentencing hearing, the Spencer hearing, and the imposition of the 
sentence into one proceeding, and the sentencing order was prepared in advance.  
The parties stipulated that the trial judge should consider all the important 
 
 
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documents in camera before the hearing.  In effect, this meant that to save time at 
the hearing, by agreement of the parties and the court, the trial judge previewed all 
the materials to be submitted at the hearing.  These included Robertson’s affidavit, 
in which he admitted guilt and waived a jury sentencing proceeding and all 
mitigating evidence, as well as a transcript of his interview with law enforcement 
investigators, in which he also admitted his guilt of premeditated murder.  The 
hearing itself included presentation of the following items of testimony and 
argument: (1) a colloquy to determine whether Robertson’s guilty plea was being 
entered knowingly and voluntarily; (2) the testimony of DOC’s investigating 
officer who submitted the PSI to the court; (3) Robertson’s testimony, in which he 
again admitted his guilt for the murder, as well as the separate charge of attempted 
murder of the county jail officer; (4) argument from the State in favor of a sentence 
of death; and (5) defense counsel’s statement to the court that Robertson did not 
contest the State’s evidence or argument and did not wish to present mitigating 
evidence, but reminding the court of its duty to consider any mitigating evidence 
that might appear in the record.  The purpose of the Spencer rule is “to ensure that 
trial judges take the time to consider all relevant circumstances and arrive at an 
informed decision uninfluenced by haste and initial impressions.”  Happ v. Moore, 
784 So. 2d 1091, 1103 n.12 (Fla. 2001).  Robertson was not deprived of the 
opportunity to present evidence or address the court before the imposition of 
 
 
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sentence.  Under these circumstances, we conclude that the judge’s preparation of 
the sentencing order before the hearing did not deny Robertson due process of law.   
IV. 
 
Appointed counsel argues on Robertson’s behalf that the trial judge erred by 
finding and considering a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance.  The sentencing 
order includes the following: 
Defendant has repeatedly expressed his wish to enter a plea of 
guilty to first degree murder, with the intention of receiving a sentence 
of death.  At first appearance on June 11, 2009, Defendant stated that 
the charge should be first degree murder rather than second degree 
murder, because it was premeditated.  Defendant stated in his October 
19, 2012 affidavit that he wanted to plead guilty to first degree murder 
and receive a death sentence.  He reiterated these statements to Dr. 
Silver according to Dr. Silver’s October 19, 2012 report, and to Dr. 
Schaerf in Dr. Schaerf’s report following his evaluation of Defendant 
on November 2, 2012.  The Pre-Sentence Investigation (PSI) report 
references a forensic evaluation of Defendant on October 19, 2011, 
where Defendant indicated he had been “thinking about how to go to 
death row” since 2008.  In his recorded statement taken on October 
19, 2012, Defendant indicated he had been thinking about how to get 
the death penalty since July 2008, and after murdering his cellmate, 
when he realized he was being charged with second degree murder, he 
wrote to five individuals in the State Attorney’s Office in 2009 
indicating the murder was premeditated and requesting the death 
penalty.  In the recorded statement, Defendant told the investigators 
that if he did not receive the death penalty, he would continue to kill 
until he received it.  Accordingly, the Court assigns great weight to 
the Defendant’s wishes and intent. 
 
 
 
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The claim is that these findings—and specifically the assignment of “great weight” 
to the defendant’s wishes—show that the trial judge considered Robertson’s wish 
to be sentenced to death as an aggravating circumstance.  
The only matters that may be considered in aggravation in a capital 
sentencing proceeding are the circumstances set forth in section 921.141(5), 
Florida Statutes.  See, e.g., Oyola v. State, 158 So. 3d 504, 509 (Fla. 2015); Zack v. 
State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1208 (Fla. 2005); Riley v. State, 366 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1978); 
Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1977).  Evidence in aggravation—that is, 
evidence that tends to weigh in favor of a death sentence—may not be introduced 
unless it relates to one of the aggravating circumstances set forth in section 
921.141(5).  See, e.g., Poole v. State, 997 So. 2d 382, 392 (Fla. 2008); Kormondy 
v. State, 703 So. 2d 454, 463 (Fla. 1997).  Nor may such evidence be considered 
by the sentencing judge.  See, e.g., Oyola, 158 So. 3d at 509; Perez v. State, 919 
So. 2d 347, 376 (Fla. 2005); Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 882, 885-86 (Fla. 1979).   
 
In the sentencing order, the judge found that Robertson wanted to be 
sentenced to death; that when charged with second-degree murder, he tried to get 
the State to charge him with first-degree murder; that he pleaded guilty and waived 
mitigation so that he would receive a death sentence; and that he had stated he 
would continue to try to kill people until he received a death sentence.  The trial 
judge then stated that she gave these facts great weight.  We do not agree with the 
 
 
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argument made on Robertson’s behalf that these findings reflect consideration of a 
nonstatutory aggravating circumstance.  The essential point of these findings was 
that Robertson killed his cellmate not because of a conflict with the cellmate but in 
order to achieve his goal of being sentenced to death.  This motivation for the 
murder, i.e., Robertson’s desire to be sentenced to death, was thus relevant to the 
aggravating circumstance that the capital felony “was committed in a cold, 
calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal 
justification,” § 921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (2008), a statutory aggravating 
circumstance which the judge found to exist.  It was therefore proper for the judge 
to discuss the evidence of his motive in the sentencing order.  As a result, we find 
no impropriety in the sentencing judge’s findings as to these facts, nor in her 
discussion of them in relation to the sentencing decision. 
V. 
In every initial death penalty appeal, whether the issue is raised or not, this 
Court reviews the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict of guilt.  
See, e.g., Pham v. State, 70 So. 3d 485, 501 (Fla. 2011); Davis v. State, 859 So. 2d 
465, 480 (Fla. 2003).  When a conviction is based on a guilty plea rather than the 
verdict of a trier of fact, the Court instead reviews the issue of whether the plea of 
guilty was knowingly and voluntarily entered.  See, e.g., Altersberger v. State, 103 
So. 3d 122, 128-29 (Fla. 2012); Barnes v. State, 29 So. 3d 1010, 1020 (Fla. 2010); 
 
 
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Winkles v. State, 894 So. 2d 842, 847 (Fla. 2005).  The record shows that the trial 
court conducted an extensive inquiry into Robertson’s knowledge and 
understanding of the charge against him, his legal rights, and the consequences of 
pleading guilty.  The record amply supports the conclusion that Robertson’s plea of 
guilty to the charge of first-degree murder was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 
VI. 
 
In every initial appeal from a judgment of first-degree murder for which a 
sentence of death has been imposed, this Court addresses the issue of the 
proportionality of the death sentence.  See, e.g., Altersberger, 103 So. 3d at 130; 
Bolin v. State, 869 So. 2d 1196, 1204 (Fla. 2004).  In this type of review, the Court 
compares the case to other cases to determine whether a death sentence is 
warranted in light of all the circumstances.  See, e.g., Davis, 859 So. 2d at 480; 
Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416-17 (Fla. 1998).  Having compared the facts of 
this case to those of cases with comparable circumstances and similar 
combinations of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, we find the sentence of 
death meets the standards of proportionality.  See, e.g., Eaglin v. State, 19 So. 3d 
935, 949-50 (Fla. 2009); Blackwelder v. State, 851 So. 2d 650, 651, 654 (Fla. 
2003); Cox v. State, 819 So. 2d 705, 723-24 (Fla. 2002). 
 
 
 
 
- 23 - 
CONCLUSION 
 
The conviction of first-degree murder and the sentence of death are 
affirmed. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Charlotte County,  
Christine Hissam Greider, Judge - Case No. 082009CF0008120001X 
 
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, Steven L. Bolotin, Assistant Public 
Defender, and Julius Joseph Aulisio, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial 
Circuit, Bartow, Florida; and James Robertson, pro se, Raiford, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Stephen D. Ake, 
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee