Case Title: Summerfield v. OLCC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2020-08-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 31	
August 28, 2020	
763
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF OREGON
Gene SUMMERFIELD,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
OREGON LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION,
Respondent on Review.
(CC CV12100185) (CA A157108) (SC S066377)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 19, 2019.
Michael E. Rose, Portland, argued the cause and filed the 
briefs for petitioner on review.
Colm Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued 
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. Also 
on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and 
Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Caitlin Mitchell, Johnson Johnson Lucas & Middleton 
PC, Eugene, filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial 
Lawyers Association.
Before Walters, Chief Justice, and Balmer, Nakamoto, 
Flynn, Duncan, and Nelson, Justices, and Kistler, Senior 
Judge, Justice pro tempore.**
DUNCAN, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of 
the trial court are affirmed.
______________
	
**  Appeal from Clackamas County Circuit Court, Katherine Weber, Judge. 
294 Or App 415, 431 P3d 424 (2018).
	
**  Garrett, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
764	
Summerfield v. OLCC
Case Summary: Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging, among other things, that 
defendant, his former employer, violated statutes that (1) required defendant 
to reemploy him after a work injury, ORS 659A.046, (2) prohibited defendant 
from retaliating against him for opposing or reporting racial discrimination or 
harassment, ORS 659A.030(1)(f), and (3) prohibited defendant from retaliating 
against him for “whistleblowing,” that is, making a good faith report of what he 
believed was a violation of law, ORS 659A.199. The trial court granted defen-
dant’s motion for a directed verdict on plaintiff’s reemployment claim, declined 
to read an instructing defining “adverse employment action” in connection with 
plaintiff’s retaliation claim, and declined to award him equitable relief on his 
whistleblowing claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: (1) The trial court 
did not err in granting defendant a directed verdict on plaintiff’s reemployment 
claim because a plaintiff claiming a violation of ORS 659A.046 must prove that 
there was an available and suitable position in which the plaintiff could have 
been reemployed and, in this case, plaintiff conceded that he had failed to do so; 
(2) the trial court erred in failing to give plaintiff’s requested jury instruction 
defining “adverse employment action” for purposes of a retaliation claim under 
ORS 659A.030(1)(f) but the error was harmless; and (3) the trial court did not err 
in declining to award plaintiff equitable relief under the circumstances.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court 
are affirmed.
Cite as 366 Or 763 (2020)	
765
	
DUNCAN, J.
	
Plaintiff brought this civil action against defendant, 
his former employer, raising multiple claims of unlawful 
employment actions. A jury rejected all but one of plaintiff’s 
claims. On the single claim on which the jury found for plain-
tiff, it did not award him any damages. Consequently, the 
trial court entered a judgment in defendant’s favor. Plaintiff 
appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Summerfield 
v. OLCC, 294 Or App 415, 431 P3d 424 (2018). For the rea-
sons explained below, we also affirm.
I.  PROCEDURAL AND HISTORICAL FACTS
	
We begin with an overview of the procedural and 
historical facts. Additional facts that are relevant to the 
issues on review are set out in the discussion section below, 
where we address each of the issues separately.
	
Plaintiff, Gene Summerfield, worked for defendant, 
Oregon Liquor Control Commission (OLCC), in its ware-
house. In his complaint in this civil action, plaintiff alleged 
that he and other African-Americans had been subjected to 
racial discrimination and racial harassment at the ware-
house. Plaintiff also alleged that he had repeatedly told 
defendant about the discrimination and harassment, but 
defendant had failed to take effective corrective action. 
Instead, according to plaintiff, defendant had passed him 
over for promotions and had promoted persons who had dis-
criminated against him. Plaintiff further alleged that, after 
he filed a racial discrimination complaint against defendant 
with the Bureau of Labor and Industries (BOLI), he found a 
noose in his work area. Plaintiff reported the noose and left 
work. He filed a worker’s compensation claim for acute stress, 
and the claim was accepted. Plaintiff received medical treat-
ment for his acute stress, and his medical provider eventu-
ally released him to return to work at a site other than the 
OLCC warehouse. Plaintiff requested reemployment, but—
according to plaintiff’s complaint in this action—defendant 
failed to reemploy him in an available and suitable position; 
instead, defendant initiated an investigation into allega-
tions that plaintiff had engaged in workplace misconduct 
four years earlier. After the investigation, which plaintiff 
766	
Summerfield v. OLCC
alleged was biased against him and incomplete, defendant 
terminated plaintiff’s employment.
	
Based on those allegations, plaintiff made several 
claims for relief, four of which are relevant on review. Those 
four claims were brought pursuant to ORS 659A.885(1), 
which provides that “[a]ny person claiming to be aggrieved” 
by certain unlawful employment practices “may file a civil 
action in circuit court.” ORS 659A.885(1) further provides 
that, “[i]n any action under this subsection, the court may 
order injunctive relief or any other equitable relief that may 
be appropriate, including but not limited to reinstatement 
or the hiring of employees with or without back pay.”
	
Plaintiff’s first claim, an employment discrimina-
tion claim, alleged that defendant “discriminated against 
Plaintiff in the terms and conditions of his employment, 
which constitutes racial discrimination” and “created a 
hostile work environment.” Plaintiff’s second claim, which 
he entitled “retaliation,” alleged that defendant “discrimi-
nated against Plaintiff for opposing unlawful employment 
practices.” His third claim, which he entitled “whistle-
blowing,” alleged that defendant “discriminated and retal-
iated against Plaintiff in the terms and conditions of his 
employment due to his complaints of racial harassment, 
discrimination, and retaliation.” A fourth claim, which he 
entitled “failure to reemploy,” alleged that defendant “failed 
to reemploy Plaintiff in an available and suitable position 
after his repeated requests.”1
	
Plaintiff alleged that, as a consequence of defen-
dant’s conduct, he “suffered lost wages” and “emotional dis-
tress and upset” and related harms. He sought economic 
damages, noneconomic damages, reinstatement, and injunc-
tive relief, as well as “any and all other relief as [the trial 
court] may deem proper.”
	
The case proceeded to a jury trial, during which 
the parties presented competing versions of events, which 
they previewed in their opening statements. In his opening 
	
1  Plaintiff also brought a claim for “race discrimination,” alleging a violation 
of 42 USC section 1981, and a claim for “race intimidation,” alleging a violation 
of ORS 30.198. The trial court granted defendant summary judgment on both of 
those claims and they are not at issue on review.
Cite as 366 Or 763 (2020)	
767
statement, plaintiff told the jury that he would prove: A 
group of his co-workers created a hostile work environ-
ment. He reported their misconduct to defendant’s manag-
ers. Although the managers took some actions in response 
to the complaints, their actions were inadequate and inef-
fective. In order to work in a position other than the ware-
house, plaintiff sought promotions, but did not receive any. 
Frustrated with defendant’s failure to respond to his com-
plaints about the discrimination and harassment, plaintiff 
filed a complaint with BOLI, which was dismissed because 
it was untimely. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff found a noose 
in his work area. He made an immediate report to manage-
ment and then left work. Later, he reported the incident to 
the police.
	
Plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim for 
acute stress. The claim was accepted, and plaintiff received 
treatment. 
Plaintiff’s 
treatment 
provider 
eventually 
released plaintiff to return to work, and plaintiff requested 
reemployment.
	
After learning that plaintiff had filed this action, 
one of his co-workers, Staten, told defendant’s managers 
that, four years earlier, plaintiff had sold him prescrip-
tion drugs and had loaned him money, charging 50 percent 
interest. The managers investigated those claims. While 
the investigation was pending, defendant duty-stationed 
plaintiff at home. Based on the results of the investigation, 
defendant terminated plaintiff for misconduct.
	
In contrast to plaintiff’s version of events, defen-
dant explained in its opening statement that it had thor-
oughly investigated plaintiff’s allegations of discrimina-
tion and harassment by his coworkers and had responded 
appropriately. Regarding plaintiff’s report about the noose, 
defendant stated that a manager had determined that the 
noose was made of twine, which was used throughout the 
warehouse. The manager had conducted several interviews 
but had been unable to determine who put the noose where 
plaintiff saw it, how long it had been there, and whether 
it had been put there for plaintiff to discover. The police, 
who investigated the incident based on plaintiff’s report, 
also were unable to make those determinations. Regarding 
768	
Summerfield v. OLCC
Staten’s allegation that plaintiff had sold him prescription 
drugs, defendant explained that, when Staten reported 
the conduct, it investigated and determined that plaintiff 
in fact had sold the drugs to Staten, which was a violation 
of OLCC’s policy regarding appropriate workplace behav-
ior. Based on that and other conduct, defendant terminated 
plaintiff’s employment.
	
Plaintiff presented his case-in-chief, after which 
defendant moved for a directed verdict on plaintiff’s “fail-
ure to reemploy” claim. That claim was based on ORS 
659A.046(1), which provides:
	
“A worker who has sustained a compensable injury 
and is disabled from performing the duties of the work-
er’s former regular employment shall, upon demand, be 
reemployed by the worker’s employer at employment which 
is available and suitable.”
In support of its motion, defendant argued that plaintiff 
was required to present, but had failed to present, evidence 
that defendant had available and suitable employment for 
plaintiff at the relevant time. In response, plaintiff conceded 
that he had not presented any such evidence but contended 
that he was not required to do so. The trial court accepted 
defendant’s argument and granted defendant’s motion for a 
directed verdict.
	
After the presentation of evidence, the trial court 
instructed the jury on the law governing plaintiff’s remain-
ing claims, viz., his claims for employment discrimination, 
retaliation, and whistleblowing. Regarding the retaliation 
claim, the trial court instructed the jury that plaintiff had 
to prove that (1) plaintiff had opposed or reported racial dis-
crimination or harassment in the workplace, (2) defendant 
had subjected him to “an adverse employment action,” and 
(3) defendant had subjected him to the adverse employment 
action because of plaintiff’s opposition to, or report of, racial 
discrimination or harassment in the workplace. Both parties 
submitted instructions that defined “adverse employment 
action.” The trial court declined to give any of the proffered 
definitions, stating that it did not think that an instruction 
defining “adverse employment action” was necessary.
Cite as 366 Or 763 (2020)	
769
	
The trial court provided the jury with a verdict 
form. “Part I” of the form posed questions to the jury about 
each claim that was being submitted to it. “Part II” of asked, 
“What damages, if any, should plaintiff be awarded?” and 
included blank spaces for the jury to insert numbers for eco-
nomic and noneconomic damages.
	
The jury rejected plaintiff’s first claim; on the ver-
dict form, it answered the questions about that claim in the 
negative, finding that defendant had not “intentionally dis-
criminate[d] against plaintiff because of his race” and had 
not “subject[ed] plaintiff to a racially hostile work environ-
ment by his co-workers.” The jury also rejected plaintiff’s 
retaliation claim, finding that defendant had not “retali-
ate[d] against [plaintiff] for opposing or reporting racial dis-
crimination or racial harassment.”
	
But the jury accepted plaintiff’s whistleblowing 
claim, finding that defendant had “take[n] adverse enforce-
ment [sic] action against plaintiff because he in good faith 
reported information that he believed was a violation of a 
law, rule or other regulation.” The jury was not asked to 
identify, and did not identify, the specific adverse action 
(or actions) that defendant had taken against plaintiff. 
Although the jury accepted plaintiff’s whistleblowing claim, 
it declined to award him any monetary damages. On the 
verdict form, in the blanks for economic and noneconomic 
damages, the jury inserted “0.”
	
The trial court read the completed verdict form 
aloud in court. Neither party objected to the verdict, and 
the jury was released. Plaintiff then made an oral request 
for equitable relief, asking the trial court to order defendant 
to reinstate him as an employee. The trial court denied the 
request. Approximately two weeks later, plaintiff filed a 
motion for compensatory and equitable relief. After a hear-
ing, the trial court took the matter under advisement and 
later issued a letter opinion, simply stating that the motion 
was denied.
	
Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed. Summerfield, 294 Or App at 415. Plaintiff peti-
tioned this court for review, which we allowed to address 
770	
Summerfield v. OLCC
three issues, specifically, whether the trial court erred in 
(1) granting defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on 
plaintiff’s reemployment claim, (2) declining to give plain-
tiff’s requested jury instruction defining “adverse employ-
ment action” for the purposes of his retaliation claim, and 
(3) denying defendant’s request for equitable relief on his 
whistleblowing claim. We address those issues in turn.
II.  DISCUSSION
A.  Reemployment Claim—Elements of a Prima Facie Case
	
We begin with the issue relating to plaintiff’s 
reemployment claim. ORS 659A.046(1), set out below, 366 Or 
at 772-73 imposes a duty on employers to reemploy workers 
who have suffered compensable work injuries. In addition, 
ORS 659A.052(1)(c) provides that, if an injured worker was 
employed by a state agency, like defendant, the worker has 
a right to be reemployed at another state agency.2 In this 
case, plaintiff alleged that defendant violated its duty under 
ORS 659A.046(1) because it had “failed to reemploy plain-
tiff in an available and suitable position after his repeated 
requests.”
	
At trial, plaintiff contended that, under ORS 
659A.052(1)(c), defendant had to find him other employ-
ment with the state once it was established that he could 
not return to work at OLCC. Plaintiff also presented evi-
dence that OLCC’s own policy on returning injured workers 
to work provides that OLCC “is committed to returning its 
employees who have compensable, work related injuries or 
illnesses to available and suitable work,” and that it will 
take specific steps to do so, including “entering the employ-
ee’s name on the statewide Injured Workers List, if suitable 
work at [OLCC] is not available.” After plaintiff requested 
reemployment, defendant offered him a position doing 
maintenance work at OLCC, which plaintiff declined. Then, 
	
2  ORS 659A.052(1)(c) provides:
“[I]f all permanent restrictions of an injured worker are known and * 
* 
* 
[t]he injured worker was employed at the time of injury by any agency of the 
executive or administrative department of the government of this state, the 
injured worker shall have the right to reinstatement or reemployment at any 
available and suitable position in another agency of the executive or admin-
istrative department.”
Cite as 366 Or 763 (2020)	
771
when defendant initiated its investigation into Staten’s alle-
gations, defendant duty-stationed plaintiff at home. It did 
not place him in another position at OLCC, and it did not 
enter his name on the Injured Workers List.
	
After plaintiff’s case-in-chief, defendant moved for 
a directed verdict on plaintiff’s reemployment claim, argu-
ing that plaintiff had failed to present any evidence that 
there had been available and suitable employment for him 
at either OLCC or another state agency during the relevant 
time period. Specifically, defendant argued that there was 
“zero evidence that there were any such openings.”
	
Plaintiff acknowledged that “there’s no evidence of 
such openings.” But he argued that he was not required to 
produce such evidence. He asserted that he had presented 
evidence that OLCC had failed to take steps to reemploy 
him as required by its own policy, and he argued that that 
evidence was sufficient.
	
After reviewing the text of ORS 659A.046(1), the 
trial court told plaintiff that it appeared that he had to 
prove that, after he was released to work and had requested 
reemployment, defendant had an available and suitable 
position for him. Plaintiff countered that the absence of 
available and suitable employment was a defense. The trial 
court disagreed, concluding that the existence of available 
and suitable employment is an element of a reemployment 
claim. Because it was undisputed that plaintiff had pre-
sented “zero evidence” that there had been available and 
suitable employment, the trial court granted defendant’s 
motion for a directed verdict.
	
On review, plaintiff renews the argument he made 
below. Therefore, the issue before this court is whether a 
plaintiff who brings a reemployment claim for a violation 
of ORS 659A.046 must prove not only that the defendant 
failed to reemploy the plaintiff, but also that there was an 
available and suitable position in which he could have been 
reemployed.
	
A plaintiff bears the burden of proving the elements 
of his or her claim. Lindland v. United Business Investments, 
298 Or 318, 322-23, 693 P2d 20 (1984). Whether a fact is an 
772	
Summerfield v. OLCC
element of a claim depends on the substantive law defin-
ing the claim. Id. at 323 (quoting OEC 305 Commentary 
(1981)). Therefore, to determine what facts are elements of 
a reemployment claim, it is necessary to look to the statute 
that authorizes the claim, ORS 659A.885, and the statute 
that defines the duty to reemploy, ORS 659A.046.
	
ORS 659A.885 authorizes a person to bring a civil 
action if the person is aggrieved by certain unlawful employ-
ment practices, including violations of ORS 659A.046. It 
provides, in pertinent part:
	
“(1)  Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlaw-
ful practice specified in subsection (2) of this section may 
file a civil action in circuit court. * 
* 
*
	
“(2)  An action may be brought under subsection (1) of 
this section alleging a violation of:
	
“(a)  * 
* 
* [ORS] 659A.046.”
(Emphasis added.) Thus, when a plaintiff brings a civil 
action pursuant to ORS 659A.855, the plaintiff is alleging 
that the defendant violated a statutory duty. “[T]o prove a 
claim for statutory liability, the plaintiff must establish,” 
among other things, that “a statute imposed a duty on the 
defendant” and “the defendant violated the duty.” Deckard 
v. Bunch, 358 Or 754, 759-60, 370 P3d 478 (2016). Here, 
plaintiff alleged that defendant violated its duty to reemploy 
under ORS 659A.046.
	
ORS 659A.046 requires an employer, in certain cir-
cumstances, to reemploy an injured employee. Of particu-
lar relevance here, subsection (1) establishes an employer’s 
reemployment duty and subsection (3) identifies when that 
duty terminates:
	
“(1)  A worker who has sustained a compensable injury 
and is disabled from performing the duties of the work-
er’s former regular employment shall, upon demand, be 
reemployed by the worker’s employer at employment which 
is available and suitable.
	
“* 
* 
* 
* 
*
	
“(3)  Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, the 
right to reemployment under this section terminates when 
whichever of the following events first occurs:
Cite as 366 Or 763 (2020)	
773
	
“(a)  The worker cannot return to reemployment at any 
position with the employer either by determination of the 
attending physician or a nurse practitioner authorized to 
provide compensable medical services  under ORS 656.245 
or upon appeal of that determination, by determination of 
a medical arbiter or panel of medical arbiters pursuant to 
ORS chapter 656.
	
“(b)  The worker is eligible and participates in voca-
tional assistance under ORS 656.340.
	
“(c)  The worker accepts suitable employment with 
another employer after becoming medically stationary.
	
“(d)  The worker refuses a bona fide offer from the 
employer of light duty or modified employment that is suit-
able prior to becoming medically stationary.
	
“(e)  Seven days elapse from the date that the worker 
is notified by the insurer or self-insured employer by certi-
fied mail that the worker’s attending physician or a nurse 
practitioner authorized to provide compensable medical 
services under ORS 656.245 has released the worker for 
reemployment unless the worker requests reemployment 
within that time period.
	
“(f)  Three years elapse from the date of injury.”
By its terms, ORS 659A.046(1) requires an employer to 
reemploy an injured employee “at employment which is 
available and suitable.” As such, it creates a limited duty 
on an employer. An employer is not required to reemploy an 
employee in any position; instead, an employer is required 
to reemploy an employee in an available and suitable posi-
tion. The existence of available and suitable employment is 
a core component of the duty to reemploy defined by ORS 
659A.046(1). It is not a limitation on, or an exception to, that 
duty.
	
The whole of ORS 659A.046(1) supports that con-
clusion. It identifies the circumstances that give rise to an 
employer’s duty to reemploy an injured worker. Consequently, 
a plaintiff making a reemployment claim must prove that 
 
(1) he sustained a compensable injury, (2) he was disabled 
from performing the duties of his former regular employ-
ment, (3) he demanded reemployment, and, after the 
demand, (4) there was an available and suitable position for 
774	
Summerfield v. OLCC
him, and (5) the employer failed to reemploy him. Each of 
those facts is a “necessary ingredient” of any claim that an 
employer violated its duty to reemploy an injured worker. 
See State v. Vasquez-Rubio, 323 Or 275, 278-79, 917 P2d 494 
(1996) (quoting State v. Tamler & Polly, 19 Or 528, 530, 25 P 
71 (1890), for the proposition that the state, as the plaintiff 
in a criminal case, must plead and prove facts set out in 
the statute defining an offense that are “necessary ingredi-
ent[s]” of the offense, but not facts that are “mere matter[s] 
of excuse or defense”) Thus, the text of ORS 659A.046(1) 
shows that the existence of available and suitable employ-
ment is part of the basic definition of the duty to reemploy; 
as such, it is a fact that the plaintiff must prove to establish 
a violation of that duty.3
	
ORS 659A.046(3) provides contextual support for 
that conclusion. As set out above, ORS 659A.046(3) lists 
	
3  Others have reached the same conclusion and, although their decisions are 
not binding on this court, they support our view that the text of ORS 659A.046(1) 
establishes that the existence of available and suitable employment is an element 
of a reemployment claim. The United States District Court for the District of 
Oregon has held:
	
“In order to state a prima facie case of failure to reemploy under ORS 
§ 659A.046, an employee must show that (1) the employee suffered a com-
pensable on-the-job injury, (2) the employee was disabled from performing 
the duties of her former position, (3) the employee made a timely demand for 
reemployment, (4) at the time of that demand a suitable position was available, 
and (5) the employer failed to reemploy the employee in the available suitable 
position.”
Davis v. Tri-Cty. Metro. Transp. Dist. of Or., 45 F Supp 3d 1222, 1243 (D Or 2014) 
(emphasis added).
	
Likewise, the Oregon Uniform Civil Jury Instructions require a plaintiff 
making a reemployment claim based on ORS 659A.046 to prove that the defen-
dant had available and suitable employment for the plaintiff. Uniform Civil Jury 
Instruction 58.03 provides:
	
“The plaintiff claims that the defendant failed to reemploy [him / her] to 
an available and suitable position.
	
“To recover, the plaintiff must prove all of the following:
	
“* 
* 
* 
* 
*
	
“(3)  The plaintiff made a timely demand for reemployment;
	
“(4)  A position was available at the time of the demand;
	
“(5)  That position was suitable; and 
	
“(6)  The defendant failed to reemploy the plaintiff in the available and 
suitable position.”
(Emphases added.)
Cite as 366 Or 763 (2020)	
775
circumstances in which an employer’s duty to reemploy 
an employee terminates. The fact that the legislature set 
those circumstances out separately from the circumstances 
that give rise to the duty to reemploy indicates that, if the 
legislature had intended to create an exception to the duty 
to reemploy or a defense for failing to perform that duty, it 
would have done so in a separate section or used language 
indicating that it was creating an exception or a defense. 
But it did not. Nothing in the text of ORS 659A.046 indi-
cates that a plaintiff can make a prima facie case that the 
defendant failed to reemploy the plaintiff in violation of ORS 
659A.046(1) without presenting evidence that there had 
been an available and suitable position in which the defen-
dant could have reemployed the plaintiff.
	
In arguing that the trial court in this case erred 
by granting defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on his 
reemployment claim, plaintiff asserts that an employee does 
not bear the “burden” of finding a position in which he can 
be reemployed. Specifically, he asserts that an employee 
seeking reemployment has “no burden * 
* 
* to do anything 
other than make the appropriate demand for reemployment 
and then to follow the instructions of the employer. There is 
no obligation placed on the injured worker to find his own 
suitable job.” In support of that proposition, plaintiff cites 
Robinson v. School District No. 1, 92 Or App 627, 759 P2d 
1116 (1988). In that case, the Court of Appeals stated that 
the reemployment statute “unambiguously requires that, on 
demand of an injured employee, the employer must offer the 
employee a suitable job when it becomes available.” Id. at 
630.4 Plaintiff also cites an administrative rule, OAR 839-
006-0135(6), which states, “At the time of the injured work-
er’s demand for reemployment, a suitable position may not 
be available. When this occurs, the injured worker must fol-
low the employer’s reporting policy until the employer offers 
the injured worker an available, suitable position.” Relying 
on those sources, plaintiff argues, “There is a burden placed 
on the employer to be aware of the availability of suitable 
reemployment so that the employer can offer the suitable 
	
4  Robinson construed former ORS 659.420(1) (1985), renumbered as ORS 
659A.046(1) (2001). The text of the two sections does not differ in any way that is 
material to our analysis.
776	
Summerfield v. OLCC
job to the employee when it becomes available.” Relatedly, 
he argues, “[T]he only burden on the employee is to wait 
patiently; there is no affirmative duty placed on an employee 
to find his own job with the employer.”
	
Those propositions are correct, but inapposite 
in this case. As defendant argues, “Plaintiff mistakes an 
employer’s obligation to identify suitable work in response 
to an injured worker’s demand with his obligation at trial to 
prove his statutory claim under ORS 659A.046.” Although 
an employer has a duty to reemploy an injured worker in 
some circumstances, when a worker brings a civil action 
alleging that his employer violated that duty, the worker 
bears the burden of proving that the circumstances that 
give rise to the duty existed. As discussed above, the exis-
tence of available and suitable employment is an element of 
a reemployment claim, and, consequently, a plaintiff bears 
the burden of production and persuasion on it. OEC 305 (“A 
party has the burden of persuasion as to each fact the exis-
tence or nonexistence of which the law declares essential to 
the claim for relief or defense the party is asserting.”); OEC 
307(2) (“The burden of producing evidence as to a particular 
issue is initially on the party with the burden of persuasion 
as to that issue.”).
	
Plaintiff also argues that, because an employer will 
know what positions it has, it should bear the burden of prov-
ing that it did not have any available and suitable positions. 
But the fact that a defendant may have superior access to 
evidence is not a sufficient basis to transfer the burden of 
producing evidence from the plaintiff to the defendant. See 2 
McCormick on Evidence, § 337 (8th ed 2020) (“Very often one 
must plead and prove matters as to which his adversary has 
superior access to the proof. Nearly all the required allega-
tions of the plaintiff in actions for tort or breach of contract 
relating to the defendant’s acts or omissions describe mat-
ters peculiarly in the defendant’s knowledge.”).5
	
5  As a practical matter, an employee filing a reemployment claim will be 
able to obtain evidence regarding available positions through discovery, includ-
ing requests for production of documents disclosing job openings and depo-
sitions of those responsible for posting and filling openings. An employee may 
also be able to rely on his own knowledge of the employer’s staffing needs and 
 
practices.
Cite as 366 Or 763 (2020)	
777
	
In sum, the existence of available and suitable 
employment is an element of a plaintiff’s reemployment 
claim. Therefore, a plaintiff bears the burden of production 
and persuasion with respect to that fact.
	
In this case, plaintiff conceded that he presented 
“zero” evidence of that fact.6 When there is no evidence from 
which a reasonable trier of fact could find facts sufficient 
to establish an element of the party’s claim, the opposing 
party is entitled to a directed verdict on the claim. Brown 
v. J. C. Penney Co., 297 Or 695, 705, 688 P2d 811 (1984). 
Consequently, the trial court did not err in granting defen-
dant’s motion for a directed verdict on plaintiff’s reemploy-
ment claim.
B.  Retaliation Claim—Jury Instruction
	
The second issue that we allowed review to consider 
is whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on 
plaintiff’s retaliation claim. That claim was based on ORS 
659A.030(1)(f), which provides that it is an unlawful employ-
ment practice
“[f]or any person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discrim-
inate against any other person because that other person 
has opposed any unlawful practice, or because that other 
person has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any 
proceeding under this chapter or has attempted to do so.”
	
At trial, the parties agreed to an instruction on the 
elements of plaintiff’s retaliation claim, and the trial court 
gave that agreed-upon instruction, which stated:
	
“Retaliation, elements and burden of proof: The plain-
tiff seeks damages against the defendant for retaliation. 
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the follow-
ing elements by a preponderance of the evidence.
	
“One, the plaintiff engaged in or was engaging in an 
activity protected under law; that is, opposing or reporting 
racial discrimination and/or harassment in the workplace.
	
“Two, the employer subjected the plaintiff to an adverse 
employment action. And, three, the plaintiff was subjected 
	
6  Plaintiff did not argue that the evidence he presented was sufficient to sup-
port a reasonable inference that there was an available and suitable position 
available for him at either OLCC or another state agency at the relevant time.
778	
Summerfield v. OLCC
to the adverse employment action because of his opposition 
to or report of—or reports of racial discrimination and/or 
harassment in the workplace.”
(Emphases added.) Plaintiff also requested the following 
instruction defining “adverse employment action”:
	
“An action is an adverse employment action if a reasonable 
employee would have found the action materially adverse, 
which means it might have dissuaded a reasonable worker 
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”
(Emphases added.) The trial court declined to give plain-
tiff’s requested instruction. Instead, it opted not to define 
“adverse employment action.”7
	
The trial court provided the jury a verdict form 
that set out questions about each of plaintiff’s claims. The 
question regarding plaintiff’s retaliation claim asked, “Did 
defendant retaliate against plaintiff for opposing or report-
ing racial discrimination or racial harassment?” The jury 
answered, “No.”
	
Generally, a “party is entitled to a jury instruction 
on its theory of the case if the requested instruction cor-
rectly states the law, is based on the operative pleadings, 
and is supported by the evidence.” Ossanna v. Nike, Inc., 
365 Or 196, 212-13, 445 P3d 281 (2019) (citing Hernandez v. 
Barbo Machinery Co., 327 Or 99, 106, 957 P2d 147 (1998)). 
In this case, there is no dispute that plaintiff’s requested 
instruction was based on the pleadings and was supported 
by the evidence. The only dispute is whether it is a correct 
statement of law.
	
Plaintiff’s requested instruction is based on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. 
White, 548 US 53, 126 S Ct 2405, 165 L Ed 2d 345 (2006), 
which concerned a retaliation claim under 42 USC section 
2000e-3(a), the antiretaliation provision of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. In Burlington, the Court held that 
a plaintiff alleging a retaliation claim under Title VII “must 
show that a reasonable employee would have found the 
	
7  As mentioned, 366 Or at 768, the trial court also declined to give an instruc-
tion defendant requested defining “adverse employment action.”
Cite as 366 Or 763 (2020)	
779
challenged action materially adverse, which in this context 
means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from 
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” 548 US at 
68 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
	
In PSU Association of University Professors v. 
PSU, 352 Or 697, 291 P3d 658 (2012), when determining 
what a plaintiff must prove to establish a retaliation claim 
under ORS 659A.030(1)(f), this court repeatedly referred 
to Burlington, noting that that case provided useful con-
text for ORS 659A.030(1)(f), given that the purposes of ORS 
659A.030(1)(f) and the antiretaliation provision in Title VII 
are similar. Id. at 711-13. At one point, the court quoted 
Burlington’s rule: that to establish that an employee was 
subjected to an adverse employment action for the purposes 
of Title VII, the employee “must show that ‘a reasonable 
employee would have found the challenged action materi-
ally adverse,’ meaning that the challenged action ‘well might 
have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or sup-
porting a charge of discrimination.’ 
” PSU Association, 352 
Or at 722 (quoting Burlington, 548 US at 68) (first empha-
sis in PSU Association, second emphasis added). However, 
at another point, the court paraphrased the Burlington 
holding, stating that the Supreme Court had held that the 
antiretaliation provision of Title VII applied to all employer 
actions that “reasonably would deter a victim of discrimi-
nation from pursuing the remedial mechanisms available 
under Title VII.” PSU Association, 352 Or at 712 (empha-
sis added). Thus, in PSU Association, this court quoted 
Burlington as holding that an adverse employment action is 
one that “well might have dissuaded” a reasonable worker 
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination, but 
later described the case as defining an adverse employment 
action as one that “would reasonably deter” a victim of dis-
crimination from taking such action. Finally, this court held 
that ORS 659A.030(1)(f) “restricts an employer from engag-
ing in retaliatory activity that reasonably would impede 
or deter employees from pursuing their rights under [ORS 
chapter 659A].” 352 Or at 713 (emphasis added).
	
Defendant argues that, despite extensively quot-
ing and paraphrasing Burlington, this court established a 
780	
Summerfield v. OLCC
higher standard for an adverse employment action for the 
purposes of ORS 659A.030(1)(f) in PSU Association than 
the Supreme Court established for the purposes of Title 
VII in Burlington. Defendant notes that, in Burlington, the 
Supreme Court referred to actions that “well might have 
dissuaded” a victim from pursuing a remedy, but in PSU 
Association this court stated the rule in terms of actions 
“that reasonably would impede or deter.” In defendant’s 
view, the former “indicates that there is a possibility that 
something will happen, and the latter indicates that there 
is a probability that something will happen.” Based on that 
premise, defendant argues that plaintiff’s requested instruc-
tion in this case, which was based on Burlington, does not 
accurately reflect Oregon law under PSU Association.
	
We disagree with defendant’s reading of PSU 
Association. In PSU Association, this court used the phrases 
“well might” and “reasonably would” interchangeably, which 
indicates that it intended the phrases to express the same 
standard. Had the court intended the phrase “reasonably 
would” to establish a higher standard than “well might,” it 
would not have used “reasonably would” in describing the 
purportedly lower standard in Burlington. Additionally, it 
held that ORS 659A.030(1)(f) prohibits retaliatory actions 
that “reasonably would” deter an employee from pursu-
ing his or her statutory rights, the same phrase it used to 
describe the holding in Burlington. The fact that it used 
“reasonably would” to describe both the Burlington stan-
dard and the ORS 659A.030(1)(f) standard indicates that 
it did not announce a different standard. See McLaughlin v. 
Wilson, 365 Or 535, 551, 449 P3d 492 (2019) (explaining that 
PSU Association “noted the similarity of our standard to the 
standard in Burlington”).8
	
Consequently, defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s 
requested instruction regarding the meaning of “adverse 
employment action” is incorrect is unavailing. In PSU 
Association, this court adopted the Burlington standard 
for establishing such an action, and plaintiff’s requested 
	
8  That conclusion is also consistent with how the Court of Appeals has inter-
preted PSU Association. See Meyer v. Oregon Lottery, 292 Or App 647, 679, 426 
P3d 89 (2018) (citing PSU Association as “adopting the Burlington ‘materially 
adverse’ standard” for claims made under ORS 659A.030(1)(f)).
Cite as 366 Or 763 (2020)	
781
instruction is consistent with that standard.9 Because the 
instruction was a correct statement of the law, was based on 
the pleadings, and was supported by the evidence, the trial 
court erred in declining to give it.10
	
That conclusion leads us to defendant’s alternative 
argument: that the failure to give the instruction was harm-
less. See ORS 19.415(2) (“No judgment shall be reversed or 
modified except for error substantially affecting the rights 
of a party.”); see also Or Const, Art VII (Amended), § 3. An 
error in failing to give a requested instruction “is harmless 
if there is little likelihood that the error affected the verdict.” 
Ossanna, 365 Or at 219 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Conversely, an error in failing to give an instruction is prej-
udicial if it “probably created an erroneous impression of the 
law in the minds of the jury and if that erroneous impres-
sion may have affected the outcome of the case.” Id. (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). When determining whether 
an instructional error is harmless, this court considers the 
instructions “as a whole” and “in the context of the evidence 
at trial and the parties’ theories of the case with respect to 
the various charges, claims, and defenses at issue.” Purdy v. 
Deere and Company, 355 Or 204, 227-28, 324 P3d 455 (2014) 
(internal citation omitted).
	
In this case, defendant argues that the failure to 
give plaintiff’s requested instruction defining “adverse 
employment action” was harmless given the parties’ theo-
ries regarding the retaliation claim. Plaintiff’s theory was 
that defendant, his employer, took actions against him at 
work because he opposed and reported racial discrimina-
tion and racial harassment. In closing argument, he told the 
jury that they had heard evidence about “a lot of adverse 
	
90  Under Burlington, an action is adverse if it “well might have dissuaded a 
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination” and 
plaintiff’s instruction stated that an action is adverse if it “might have dissuaded 
a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” We 
acknowledge that the Burlington definition begins with “well might have,” as 
opposed to “might have,” but we do not view the use of the word “well” as requir-
ing a probability, as defendant argues.
	
10  Plaintiff also requested an alternative instruction defining “adverse 
employment action,” using similar language taken from Burlington. In light of 
our conclusion that the trial court erred in declining to give the instruction dis-
cussed above, we do not address plaintiff’s alternative instruction. 
782	
Summerfield v. OLCC
employment actions,” including “failure to promote,” “failure 
to train,” and “other slights in the workplace.” Defendant 
did not dispute that those actions would constitute “adverse 
employment actions.” Instead, defendant disputed that 
it took those actions because plaintiff had opposed and 
reported racial discrimination and racial harassment. For 
example, defendant did not dispute that it failed to promote 
plaintiff, but it argued that it did so because “a more quali-
fied individual was hired” for that job. Similarly, defendant 
did not dispute that it terminated plaintiff, but it argued 
that it “terminated [plaintiff’s] employment for violating its 
policies and procedures.” Thus, the parties’ disagreement 
was not about whether the actions were adverse to plaintiff; 
rather, it was about why defendant took them.
	
As the trial court instructed the jury, to establish 
his retaliation claim, plaintiff had to prove three elements: 
(1) he engaged in an activity protected by law, that is, he 
opposed or reported racial discrimination or racial harass-
ment, (2) defendant subjected him to an adverse employ-
ment action, and (3) defendant subjected him to the adverse 
employment action because of plaintiff’s opposition to or 
report of racial discrimination or racial harassment. Given 
that defendant did not dispute the second element, it does 
not appear that the trial court’s failure to define “adverse 
employment action” could have affected the jury’s verdict on 
the claim.
	
Plaintiff suggests that, regardless of the fact that 
defendant did not dispute that an adverse employment action 
had been taken, the jury might have misunderstood what 
constitutes an “adverse employment action.” He points out 
that the trial court used the phrase in connection with both 
his retaliation claim, which was based on ORS 659A.030(1)(f), 
 
and his whistleblowing claim, which was based on ORS 
659A.199. The retaliation statute and the whistleblowing 
statute cover different categories of conduct, as plaintiff 
notes. As just discussed, the retaliation statute covers con-
duct that “well might * 
* 
* dissuade[ 
] a reasonable worker 
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” 
PSU Association, 352 Or at 722 (quoting Burlington, 548 US 
at 68). But the whistleblowing statute covers only a subset 
Cite as 366 Or 763 (2020)	
783
of that conduct; specifically, it covers conduct that relates to 
the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” ORS 
659A.199(1). Plaintiff contends that, given the way the trial 
court instructed the jury, the jury might have erroneously 
concluded that, to prevail on his retaliation claim, plaintiff 
had to prove that defendant took adverse actions against 
him relating to the “terms, conditions, or privileges of [his] 
employment” when, in fact, he had to prove only that defen-
dant took actions that “might well have dissuaded a reason-
able person” from opposing or reporting racial discrimina-
tion or racial harassment.
	
We understand plaintiff’s contention and agree that 
trial courts should be clear about the differences between 
the elements of a retaliation claim under ORS 659A.030(1)(f) 
 
and a whistleblowing claim under ORS 659A.199. But we 
cannot conclude that the trial court’s jury instructions in 
this case were prejudicial. Even assuming that the jury 
could have understood “adverse employment action” to cover 
only actions relating to the terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, plaintiff has not identified any adverse 
actions by defendant that he relied on to support his retal-
iation claim that would fall outside that category. Indeed, 
at trial, plaintiff did not differentiate between the actions 
by defendant that he was relying on to support his retalia-
tion claim and the actions he was relying on to support his 
whistleblowing claim. He generally treated the two claims 
as one and the same. He argued that he engaged in pro-
tected activities and defendant responded by taking retal-
iatory actions, and he relied on the same protected activi-
ties and retaliatory actions for both claims. Thus, plaintiff’s 
position throughout the proceedings was that the retalia-
tory actions he identified were sufficient to prove both his 
retaliation claim (which covered a broader category of retal-
iatory actions) and his whistleblowing claim (which covered 
a narrower category of retaliatory actions).
	
Moreover, the jury found for plaintiff on the whistle-
blowing claim, which means that the jury found that defen-
dant had taken an action against plaintiff that fell within 
the narrower category of retaliatory actions covered by the 
whistleblowing statute. Considering the identity between 
784	
Summerfield v. OLCC
the protected activities that plaintiff relied on as the basis 
for both his whistleblowing claim and his retaliation claim, 
the jury necessarily found that defendant had taken an 
adverse action against him that fell within the broader cate-
gory of conduct covered by the retaliation statute. Given that 
the jury actually found that defendant had taken an adverse 
employment action against plaintiff, we conclude that the 
trial court’s failure to define that phrase was harmless.
C.  Whistleblowing Claim—Entitlement to Equitable Relief
	
The third and final issue in this case is whether the 
trial court erred in denying plaintiff equitable relief on his 
whistleblower claim. As recounted above, plaintiff brought 
that claim pursuant to ORS 659A.885(1), which authorizes 
civil actions for violations of certain antidiscrimination stat-
utes, including ORS 659A.199(1), which provides:
	
“It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer 
to discharge, demote, suspend or in any manner discrimi-
nate or retaliate against an employee with regard to pro-
motion, compensation or other terms, conditions or privi-
leges of employment for the reason that the employee has in 
good faith reported information that the employee believes 
is evidence of a violation of a state or federal law, rule or 
regulation.”
	
Throughout the proceedings, plaintiff had identified 
several actions that he contended defendant took in retalia-
tion against him for whistleblowing. Those actions included 
subjecting plaintiff to “slights in the workplace,” giving 
plaintiff undesirable work assignments, failing to train and 
promote plaintiff, investigating plaintiff for workplace mis-
conduct, duty-stationing plaintiff at home, and ultimately 
terminating plaintiff’s employment. But the verdict form 
did not specify what action or actions the jury had found 
that defendant took in retaliation against plaintiff. Thus, 
it is unclear whether the jury found that defendant retal-
iated against plaintiff for whistleblowing by, for example, 
giving him undesirable work assignments or by terminating 
 
him.
	
As mentioned, although the jury found that defen-
dant had retaliated against plaintiff for whistleblowing, it 
did not award plaintiff any monetary damages. After the 
Cite as 366 Or 763 (2020)	
785
jury’s verdict was received and the jury was dismissed, 
plaintiff made an oral motion for equitable relief in form of 
reinstatement, which the trial court denied.
	
Weeks later, plaintiff filed a motion seeking com-
pensatory damages and equitable relief. As compensatory 
damages, he sought lost wages and counseling costs. As 
equitable relief, he sought front pay, which is an equitable 
remedy that a court can award when reinstatement is not 
possible. Noting that the trial court had denied his request 
for reinstatement, plaintiff requested two years of front pay. 
Also as equitable relief, plaintiff requested injunctions; spe-
cifically, he asked the trial court to enjoin defendant from 
“engaging in further illegal practices” and to order defen-
dant “[to] take appropriate steps to ensure such conduct 
does not occur again, including any post-termination retali-
ation against plaintiff.”
	
Defendant filed a response to plaintiff’s motion, 
arguing against each type of relief plaintiff had requested. 
Defendant asserted that awarding plaintiff compensatory 
damages on a theory that defendant caused plaintiff finan-
cial losses would be inconsistent with the jury’s verdict. 
Regarding front pay, defendant asserted that plaintiff was 
essentially seeking reconsideration of the trial court’s ear-
lier denial of reinstatement and that front pay was beyond 
the scope of the pleadings.11 Finally, regarding plaintiff’s 
request for injunctive relief, defendant asserted that plain-
tiff’s request was “moot” because plaintiff was no longer 
employed by defendant; that there “was no legal basis for 
an injunction or order that essentially tells a party to ‘follow 
the law’ 
”; and that plaintiff had neither alleged nor estab-
lished that defendant would retaliate against him in the 
future, so any injunction would be based on speculation.
	
Plaintiff filed a reply. He asserted that the trial court 
could award front pay in lieu of reinstatement. Regarding his 
request for injunctive relief, plaintiff acknowledged that an 
injunction is appropriate only if a threatened injury is “ 
‘of a 
real and substantial character.’ 
” (Quoting Wilson v. Parent, 
	
11  During the trial, plaintiff moved to amend his complaint to allege front 
pay and the trial court denied that motion.
786	
Summerfield v. OLCC
228 Or 354, 370, 365 P2d 72 (1961).) “ 
‘[I]t must appear that 
the danger is probable or threatened.’ 
” (Quoting McCombs v. 
McClelland, 223 Or 475, 485, 354 P2d 311 (1960).) Plaintiff 
asserted that there was a risk that defendant would “offer 
potential employers negative references for plaintiff.” Based 
on that assertion, plaintiff suggested that the trial court 
could issue an order “specifying that no negative job refer-
ences are to be given when prospective employers call,” “an 
order * 
* 
* not to interfere with plaintiff’s potential future 
employment with the State,” and “an order * 
* 
* requiring 
mandatory training for OLCC employees about whistle-
blower retaliation.”
	
The trial court held a hearing on plaintiff’s motion, 
after which it took the matter under advisement. It subse-
quently issued a letter opinion denying the motion.
	
On review, the issue is whether the trial court 
erred in denying plaintiff equitable relief. Plaintiff asserts 
that, because the jury found that defendant had retaliated 
against him for whistleblowing but did not award him any 
damages, the trial court was required to award him equita-
ble relief.
	
When, as here, a plaintiff has brought an action 
pursuant to ORS 659A.885(1), a trial court “may order 
injunctive relief and any other equitable relief that may be 
appropriate, including but not limited to reinstatement or 
the hiring of employees with or without backpay.” (Emphasis 
added.) Thus, a trial court has discretion regarding whether 
to order equitable relief, even if the relief is appropriate. 
Consequently, we review a trial court’s decision regarding 
whether to order equitable relief for an abuse of discretion. 
The party challenging a trial court’s exercise of discretion 
bears the burden of proving that the trial court abused its 
discretion.12
	
In this case, plaintiff’s argument regarding his 
entitlement to equitable relief is limited and categorical. 
	
12  To be clear, the issue is not whether the trial court could have ordered 
equitable relief; rather, it is whether the trial court abused its discretion in not 
awarding such relief. That is, the issue is whether, given plaintiff’s requests, the 
evidence, and the parties’ arguments, the trial court had no choice but to order 
equitable relief.
Cite as 366 Or 763 (2020)	
787
Plaintiff asserts “[w]hen a plaintiff seeks both monetary 
damages and equitable relief under ORS [chapter] 659A, 
and the jury returns a verdict in plaintiff’s favor but awards 
no monetary relief, plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief.” 
Plaintiff bases his argument on a general statement in 
Ballinger v. Klamath Pacific Corp., 135 Or App 438, 898 P2d 
232 (1995).
	
In Ballinger, the trial court concluded that the 
plaintiffs had established that the defendants had engaged 
in sex discrimination, but the trial court did not grant the 
plaintiffs any relief because, in its view, the plaintiffs had 
not made reasonable efforts to resolve the problem. The 
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court had 
erred, as a matter of law, “when it imposed a ‘reasonable 
effort’ requirement and barred recovery of lost wages on 
that basis.” Id. at 450; id. at 451 n 10 (“We remand in this 
case because [the trial] court erred, as a matter of law, when 
it treated ‘reasonable effort’ as if it were a prerequisite to 
an award[.]” (Emphasis in original.)). In doing so, the Court 
of Appeals stated that “[p]laintiffs either establish discrim-
ination or they do not. Here, they did. Once discrimination 
is established, plaintiffs are entitled to relief * 
* 
*.” Id. at 448 
(emphasis added).
	
Based on the italicized statement, plaintiff asserts 
that a trial court “does not have discretion to deny relief 
once [an] unlawful practice has been established.” That 
argument is unavailing. First and obviously, Ballinger is 
not binding on this court. Second and more importantly, as 
explained below, Ballinger did not involve the same issue as 
this case; it did not involve whether a trial court could, as an 
exercise of its discretion, deny equitable relief.
	
Given the issue in Ballinger and the Court of 
Appeals’ explanation of its reasoning, Ballinger cannot be 
read as establishing the categorial rule for which plaintiff 
cites it. Thus, Ballinger does not support plaintiff’s claim of 
error and, because plaintiff has not developed an argument 
based on any other authority, plaintiff has failed to estab-
lish that the trial court abused its discretion in denying him 
equitable relief.
788	
Summerfield v. OLCC
	
That conclusion does not end our analysis, however, 
because amicus curiae, Oregon Trial Lawyers Association 
(OTLA), has proffered an argument in support of plain-
tiff’s claim based on other authorities. Relying on federal 
cases involving Title VII, which also includes a provision 
authorizing civil actions for violations of antidiscrimination 
statutes, OTLA argues that the trial court erred in denying 
plaintiff either of two types of equitable relief. Specifically, 
OTLA argues that “the trial court abused its discretion 
* 
* 
* by denying plaintiff either reinstatement or front pay.” 
OTLA points out that ORS 659A.885 was based on a similar 
provision in Title VII and, as this court stated in Holien v. 
Sears, Roebuck and Co., 298 Or 76, 99, 689 P2d 1292 (1984), 
was intended to provide “parallel” remedies to that federal 
provision. Therefore, OTLA argues, federal cases interpret-
ing the federal provision are instructive when interpreting 
ORS 659.885. According to OTLA, federal cases establish 
two general rules relevant here. First, OTLA asserts, they 
establish that “where the fact-finder finds illegal conduct 
resulting in wage-loss, plaintiffs are generally entitled to 
back pay.” (Citing Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 US 
405, 421, 95 S Ct 2362, 45 L Ed 2d 280 (1975); EEOC v. Joint 
Apprenticeship Comm’n., 186 F3d 110, 122 (2d Cir 1999); 
EEOC v. Massey Yardley Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 117 F3d 
1244, 1251 (11th Cir 1997); Pegues v. Mississippi State Emp’t 
Serv., 899 F2d 1449, 1457 (5th Cir 1990).) Second, OTLA 
asserts, they establish that “a plaintiff will generally be 
entitled to front pay when he or she has been unlawfully 
terminated by where reinstatement is not a viable option.” 
(Citing Bogan v. MTD Consumer Grp. Inc., 919 F3d 332, 
336-37 (5th Cir 2019); Weaver v. Casa Gallardo, Inc., 922 
F2d 1515, 1528 (1lth Cir 1991).) Thus, OTLA’s argument is 
that, when a plaintiff establishes that a defendant violated 
an antidiscrimination statute and the violation resulted in 
wage loss or termination, the defendant is generally enti-
tled to equitable relief in the form or back pay, reinstate-
ment, or front pay (or some combination of those forms of 
 
relief).
	
Defendant does not dispute that ORS 659A.885 was 
based on Title VII and that federal cases can be instructive, 
and we do not hold otherwise. But, even assuming arguendo 
Cite as 366 Or 763 (2020)	
789
that the general rules OTLA draws from the federal cases 
also apply to ORS 659A.885, those rules do not establish 
that the trial court erred in this case. As is apparent from 
the rules themselves (as articulated by OTLA), the rules 
apply to certain types of violations: those that result in wage 
loss or termination. Indeed, all the cases cited by OTLA in 
support of the rules involved those types of violations. Joint 
Apprenticeship Comm’n., 186 F3d at 122 (2d Cir 1999) (“An 
applicant denied employment in violation of Title VII is ordi-
narily entitled to an award of back pay from the date of the 
discriminatory action to the date of judgment.”); Massey 
Yardley Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 117 F3d at 1251 (stating 
that once liability for constructive discharge is established, 
a plaintiff is presumptively entitled to back pay from the 
date of discharge until the date of judgment); Pegues, 899 
F2d at 1458 (upholding an award of back pay for plaintiffs 
who were denied job opportunities in violation of Title VII); 
Bogan, 919 F3d at 339-40 (reversing trial court’s denial of 
reinstatement of plaintiff who had been unlawfully termi-
nated because trial court had relied on improper factors); 
Weaver, 922 F2d at 1529-30 (affirming back pay award for 
plaintiff who had been passed over for promotions and ter-
minated in violation of Title VII).
	
The difficulty with OTLA’s argument in this case 
is that it is not clear what type of violation the jury found; 
specifically, it is not clear whether the jury found that defen-
dant had retaliated against plaintiff in a way that resulted 
in wage loss or termination. As mentioned, plaintiff argued 
that defendant had retaliated against him in several ways. 
Not all those actions resulted in wage loss or termination. 
The jury could have found, for example, that defendant 
retaliated against plaintiff through “slights in the work-
place” or undesirable job assignments, in which case back-
pay, reinstatement, or front pay would not be appropriate. 
Given the way the case was litigated and the lack of speci-
ficity of the jury’s verdict, the general rules OTLA proffers 
do not establish that the trial court abused its discretion in 
this case. Nothing in those rules or the cases from which 
OTLA derives them supports the conclusion that the trial 
court was required to either reinstate plaintiff or award him 
front pay, as OTLA argues.
790	
Summerfield v. OLCC
	
In sum, neither plaintiff’s argument nor OTLA’s 
argument establish that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in denying plaintiff equitable relief. Plaintiff’s categori-
cal argument that a trial court must always order equitable 
relief in circumstances like this is unsupported, and OTLA’s 
argument that equitable relief is required for certain types of 
violations does not account for the fact that, in this case, it is 
not clear that the jury found any of those types of violations. 
Therefore, we conclude that plaintiff, either on his own or as 
aided by OTLA, has not carried his burden of proving that 
the trial court’s denial of equitable relief requires reversal.
III.  CONCLUSION
	
In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not 
err in granting defendant a directed verdict on plaintiff’s 
reemployment claim; plaintiff bore the burden of proving 
that defendant had available and suitable employment for 
him and plaintiff conceded that he had not done so. We also 
conclude that, although the trial court erred in failing to 
instruct the jury on the meaning of “adverse employment 
action” for the purposes of plaintiff’s retaliation claim, the 
error was harmless because there was no dispute that the 
actions plaintiff relied on to support his retaliation claim 
were adverse employment actions and the jury actually 
found that defendant had committed an adverse employ-
ment action. Finally, we conclude that plaintiff has not 
established that, under the circumstances of this case, the 
trial court abused its discretion in declining to award plain-
tiff equitable relief.
	
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judg-
ment of the trial court are affirmed.