Case Title: Lamar Central Outdoor, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of Milwaukee

Citation: 2005 WI 117

Docket Number: 2001AP003105

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2005-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
2005 WI 117 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2001AP3105 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Lamar Central Outdoor, Inc., d/b/a Lamar  
Advertising of Milwaukee,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of 
Milwaukee,  
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 12, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 6, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
David A. Hansher   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Grant F. Langley, Stuart S. Mukamal, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Stuart S. Mukamal. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by Michael 
A.I. Whitcomb and Michael A.I. Whitcomb S.C., Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Michael A.I. Whitcomb. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Catherine A. La Fleur 
and Halling & Cayo, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of the Outdoor 
Advertising Association of Wisconsin. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Claire Silverman, 
Madison, on behalf of the League of Wisconsin Municipalities. 
 
 
2005 WI 117 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2001AP3105  
(L.C. No. 
01 CV 3484) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Lamar Central Outdoor, Inc., d/b/a Lamar  
Advertising of Milwaukee,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of  
Milwaukee,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, Lamar Central 
Outdoor, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, No. 2001AP3105, 
unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. June 17, 2003).  In a summary 
disposition, the court of appeals held that the Board of Zoning 
Appeals of the City of Milwaukee (the Board) failed to 
reasonably exercise its discretion when it denied Lamar Central 
Outdoor, Inc.'s (Lamar's) application for a dimensional area 
variance to raise the height of a billboard.  The Board sought 
review in this court, and we now affirm because the Board did 
2001AP3105 
2 
 
not proceed on the correct theory of law and because it failed 
to adequately express the reasoning on which it based its 
decision. 
¶2 
The Board considered Lamar's application on March 22, 
2001.  Since then, this court has issued three major decisions1 
relating to the law of zoning variances.  In light of the 
revised standards we announced in those cases, and through no 
fault of its own, the Board did not proceed on the correct 
theory of law. 
¶3 
We also conclude that the record does not show that 
the 
Board 
reasonably 
exercised 
its 
discretion. 
 
We 
are 
sympathetic to the Board's concern, echoed in the amicus brief 
of the League of Wisconsin Municipalities, that many board 
members are not lawyers and cannot be expected to produce a 
finely 
tuned 
piece 
of 
legal 
reasoning 
in 
each 
case.  
Nevertheless, this Board like other boards must provide enough 
reasoning to allow a court to meaningfully review its decision.  
This reasoning need not be embodied in a written decision as 
long as it is reflected in a transcript of the proceedings. 
¶4 
Therefore, we remand the cause to the circuit court 
for entry of an order directing the Board to reconsider and, if 
necessary, rehear and decide this matter in conformance with the 
new standards governing area variances.  On remand, the Board 
                                                 
1State v. Waushara County Bd. of Adjustment, 2004 WI 56, 271 
Wis. 2d 547, 
679 
N.W.2d 514; 
State 
ex 
rel. 
Ziervogel 
v. 
Washington 
County 
Bd. 
of 
Adjustment, 
2004 
WI 
23, 
269 
Wis. 2d 549, 676 N.W.2d 401; State v. Outagamie County Bd. of 
Adjustment, 2001 WI 78, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 628 N.W.2d 376.  
2001AP3105 
3 
 
must apply the appropriate legal standards and adequately 
express the reasons for its decision on the record.   
I. FACTS 
¶5 
Lamar leases property adjacent to Interstate Highway 
43 (I-43) in Milwaukee for the purpose of maintaining an 
"outdoor advertising structure."2  The structure is currently 34 
feet high and is intended to be visible to northbound and 
southbound traffic on I-43.  At some point in the past, the 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation (WDOT) planted trees 
between the structure and I-43 to serve as a noise barrier.  The 
trees have since grown tall enough to partially obstruct the 
structure as viewed from I-43. 
¶6 
At first, Lamar attempted to resolve the problem by 
asking WDOT to trim the trees.3  Unable to convince the WDOT to 
act, Lamar elected to try to raise the structure above the 
treetops.  Lamar calculated that to be visible above the trees, 
the height of the structure had to increase 20 feet, to a total 
of 54 feet high.  As the Milwaukee Code of Ordinances limits the 
maximum height of such structures to 40 feet, Lamar needed an 
area variance in order to lawfully increase the structure's 
height beyond the maximum height permitted by the zoning code.  
Lamar therefore requested an area variance from the Department 
                                                 
2 The property is located at 1632 North 12th Street in 
Milwaukee. 
3 At the Board's hearing, Lamar asserted that the WDOT had 
insisted upon using its own tree-trimming schedule.  Although it 
planned on trimming the trees eventually, it would not do so at 
Lamar's request. 
2001AP3105 
4 
 
of City Development (DCD).  DCD denied that request.4  On 
February 7, 2001, Lamar appealed DCD's denial by filing an 
application with the Board requesting a dimensional variance to 
increase the height of the structure to 54 feet. 
¶7 
The Board's hearing on Lamar's application took place 
on 
March 
22, 
2001. 
 
At 
the 
hearing, 
the 
Board 
gave 
representatives 
from 
several 
City 
of 
Milwaukee 
(City) 
departments the opportunity to comment on Lamar's application.  
The DCD 
had 
the 
first 
opportunity 
to comment, and its 
representative stated: 
[W]e do oppose the variance request to raise this 
above the 40 foot height limit.  We do not see that 
spirit and intent have been made.  It just adds, you 
know, the ordinance is designed to keep the signs at 
a——a 
height. 
 
We 
do 
not 
see 
any 
exceptional 
circumstances here that merit that.   
 
¶8 
The Department of Neighborhood Services and Department 
of Public Works also had the opportunity to comment, but did 
not.  The Secretary of the Board noted that the local alderman 
had no opposition to the application.5 
 
¶9 
Lamar's representatives attempted to convince the 
Board to grant the variance.  First, they presented the Board 
with several photographs of the property, showing the structure 
                                                 
4 Lamar also requested a special use permit pursuant to 
Milwaukee Code 295-513-16 because its structure is located 
within 300 feet of a multi-family residential district.  The DCD 
granted that permit, and although it was briefly discussed 
before the Board, it is not at issue here. 
5 Alderman Willie L. Hines wrote a letter urging the Board 
to approve the variance. 
2001AP3105 
5 
 
both before and after it became obscured by the trees.  Next, 
Lamar presented the Board with several maps of the area 
surrounding the sign.  One of the maps showed nearby locations 
at which the Board had approved variances for signs up to 100 
feet high. 
 
¶10 After Lamar's presentation, the Board discussed the 
application.  As the Board's discussion is critical to our 
holding, we reproduce substantial portions of its debate: 
BOARD MEMBER WINKLER: My comment to the board is that 
I think this is a perfect case that illustrates a 
hardship.  This has been a convincing presentation to 
me.  I think the original intent or the idea 
of . . . a 
hardship 
was 
to 
relieve 
a 
landowner 
from . . . the diminished use of the property because 
of the configuration of the property.  Now, here we 
have a little variance on that.  It's . . . the 
location of the property that's become isolated.  It's 
not the shape of the property itself, although I think 
the 
way 
in 
which 
to 
read . . . the 
variance 
requirement . . . of 
a 
hardship 
as 
it 
currently 
applies to this property.  We are faced with a very 
strong case of a hardship.  That would be my comment. 
CHAIRMAN ZETLEY: Further comments, questions? 
BOARD MEMBER SZYMANSKI: I guess I'm not really in 
agreement with you on that one, Scotty.  The applicant 
is citing some existing signage that we should use as 
a precedent to allow this advertising to be increased 
in height[ ].  Existing signage, I would hope, would 
further be diminished.  Again, I'm not a sign 
aficionado.  I would agree with . . . Mr. Richardson's 
comments 
that 
the 
spirit 
and 
intent 
has 
not 
been . . . met.  And I think the hardship also has not 
been met, because it is intended to wind up generating 
some 
additional 
revenue 
for 
this 
facility . . . I'm . . . not of the——on the same side 
of the coin as you are, Scotty. 
. . . .  
2001AP3105 
6 
 
BOARD MEMBER WINKLER: I just think with the nature of 
the signs . . . .  Signs always have two purposes.  
One to generate revenue, and one to make itself known, 
make itself visible.  I don't know what else you can 
do with a sign.  And so if you can't go to surrounding 
signs as examples and then, also, illustrate as they 
have 
historically, 
how 
the 
property 
has 
become 
isolated and tree covered through no fault of their 
own.  It's not self-imposed.  And economics are always 
going to be . . . an element of the presentation for a 
hardship in sign cases. 
CHAIRMAN ZETLEY: But then, if that's the case, then it 
can't be met according to the standard. 
BOARD MEMBER WINKLER: Well, I—— 
CHAIRMAN ZETLEY: You're arguing that, and that's——If 
they can't have revenue on the sign, that's a revenue 
issue.  That's not——That doesn't meet the height——
hardship 
criteria. 
 
Specifically, 
in 
the . . . criteria it says it can't be based solely on 
economic criteria. 
BOARD MEMBER WINKLER: Well, then it's not.  Then 
in . . . my opinion it is not based solely on economic 
criteria.  It's based upon visibility criteria.  And 
the visibility because of the isolation of the 
property and the way the highways have all been set up 
to criss-cross and——and basically hem this place in, 
that, together with the——the DOT construction or the 
planting of trees convinces me we've got a hardship. 
. . . .  
BOARD MEMBER WINKLER: I'm voting in favor.  I'm going 
to make a motion having found that all the criteria 
have been met for a variance and special use, based 
upon a technical review conducted by the departments, 
the testimony received today by the board, this 
exhibit, which I think will——I would offer to be 
Exhibit 1, marked and received, that was given to us 
by the applicant, and the testimony received today by 
the board, I move to grant this variance to run with 
the land.   
2001AP3105 
7 
 
 
¶11 The Board then voted on the application.  The 
controlling statute requires a supermajority vote to grant such 
variances,6 so that four of the five Board members had to vote 
"yes" in order to grant the variance.  One Board member 
(Szymanski) voted no; three voted yes.  Chairman Zetley waited 
until the others had voted, then spoke: 
I will vote against the variance for the increased 
height restriction.  I believe that the criteria for 
hardship has not been met.  I believe the exceptional 
circumstances have not been met.  I believe that this 
is an economic issue.  I agree with Henry, and I 
believe that the——there [are] other purposes for this 
land.  It hasn't been shown that there isn't another 
purpose for this land.  I also believe that there is——
It hasn't 
been shown, 
preservation and 
property 
rights, and third, it's——it's back to the same 
argument, but it's a third objection by the Chair in 
that just making the signs bigger and bigger isn't 
something that this Chair is in favor of, but that's 
just my third position on it.  It's based that the 
criteria haven't been met. 
 
¶12 Chairman 
Zetley's 
"no" 
vote 
denied 
Lamar 
the 
supermajority it needed, so that the Board denied Lamar's appeal 
for the area variance.  Five days later, the Board issued its 
written decision, in which the Board concluded that Lamar's 
application was "not consistent with" the Milwaukee Code of 
Ordinances.  The Board then recited the provisions of the 
ordinance.  Accordingly, "[o]n the basis of the Findings, 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)9. (2001-02) provides that 
"The concurring vote of 4 members of the board shall be 
necessary to reverse any order, requirement, decision or 
determination 
of 
any . . . administrative 
official." 
 
All 
subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 edition unless otherwise noted. 
2001AP3105 
8 
 
Conclusions, and the record herein," the Board denied the 
variance. 
 
¶13 Lamar exercised its statutory right to certiorari 
review in the circuit court.7  On September 19, 2001, the court 
affirmed the Board's decision because "It was reasonable for the 
board to conclude a height variance for a billboard was an 
economic issue.  The fact that the board might have reached a 
different conclusion does not make the conclusion it did reach 
either arbitrary or capricious." 
 
¶14 Lamar appealed, and the court of appeals summarily 
reversed.  Lamar, unpublished order at 1.  The court concluded 
that the Board's "perfunctory recitation" of the criteria in the 
Milwaukee Code did not constitute a reasonable exercise of 
discretion.  Id. at 1-2.  On the contrary, the court of appeals 
believed the Board did not exercise its discretion at all.  Id. 
at 2.  The court of appeals remanded the case to the circuit 
court to "direct [the Board] to vacate its order, apply the 
criteria to the facts, and provide an explicitly reasoned 
decision on Lamar's application."  Id. at 2, 4.  The Board 
sought review in this court. 
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶15 The legislature has granted the zoning power to cities8 
and other local governments, but has conditioned that power with 
                                                 
7 See Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)10. 
8 See Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(a) (City council may exercise 
the zoning power "[f]or the purpose of promoting health, safety, 
morals or the general welfare of the community."). 
2001AP3105 
9 
 
certain safeguards.  Among these safeguards for cities is a 
board of zoning appeals, which must be created by any city 
exercising the zoning power.  Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)1. ("The 
council . . . shall by ordinance provide for the appointment of 
a board of appeals . . . .").  The board consists of five 
members appointed by the mayor.  Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)2.  The 
purpose of a board is to hear appeals from any person 
"aggrieved" by a zoning decision of a municipal administrative 
official.  Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)4.  In order for a board to 
overturn the municipal official's decision, a supermajority 
vote——four 
of 
the 
five 
members——is 
required.  
Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)9. 
 
"The 
grounds 
of 
every 
such 
determination shall be stated."  Id.   
 
¶16 This case is before us on certiorari review, and we 
therefore accord a presumption of "correctness and validity" to 
the Board's decision.  State ex rel. Ziervogel v. Washington 
County Bd. of Adjustment, 2004 WI 23, ¶13, 269 Wis. 2d 549, 676 
N.W.2d 401.  Our review is limited to: (1) whether the Board 
kept within its jurisdiction; (2) whether it proceeded on a 
correct theory of law; (3) whether its action was arbitrary, 
oppressive, or unreasonable and represented its will and not its 
judgment; and (4) whether the Board might reasonably make the 
order or determination in question based on the evidence.  Id., 
¶14.  We conclude that the Board's action does not satisfy the 
second and third prongs of this test. 
 
 
2001AP3105 
10 
 
III. CORRECT THEORY OF LAW 
 
¶17 The Board took up this matter in March 2001.  At the 
time, the controlling law was our decision in State v. Kenosha 
County Board of Adjustment, 218 Wis. 2d 396, 577 N.W.2d 813 
(1998).  In Kenosha County, the court held that the proper 
standard for evaluating a request for an area variance9 was 
whether the landowner would be left with "no reasonable use of 
the property without a variance."  Id. at 413.  In other words, 
if the landowner had a "feasible use" without the variance, the 
application should be denied.  Id. 
 
¶18 An examination of the transcript shows that at least 
one of the Board members attempted to apply the Kenosha County 
"no reasonable use" test.  Chairman Craig Zetley, explaining his 
decision to cast the vote ultimately responsible for denying 
Lamar's application, remarked that "there [are] other purposes 
for this land.  It hasn't been shown that there isn't another 
purpose for this land." 
 
¶19 Lamar filed its certiorari brief with the circuit 
court on June 12, 2001.  On June 29, 2001, this court reached a 
divided 
decision 
in 
State 
v. 
Outagamie 
County 
Board 
of 
Adjustment, 2001 WI 78, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 628 N.W.2d 376.  In 
Outagamie 
County, 
the 
court 
split 
over 
whether 
the 
"no 
reasonable use" standard should be "overruled (three justices), 
                                                 
9 In State v. Kenosha County Board of Adjustment, the 
parties disputed whether the same test should apply to use 
variances and area variances, and the court ultimately did not 
decide "whether there is a difference between the two types of 
variances."  218 Wis. 2d 396, 412 n.10, 577 N.W.2d 813 (1998). 
2001AP3105 
11 
 
maintained but not applied to defeat the area variance in [that] 
case (two justices in concurrence) or maintained and applied to 
defeat the variance (two justices in dissent)."  Ziervogel, 269 
Wis. 2d 549, ¶3 (citing Outagamie County, 244 Wis. 2d 613, ¶5).  
In its brief to the circuit court, filed July 12, 2001, the 
Board cited the newly released Outagamie County decision. 
¶20 While this case wended its way through the appellate 
process, this court decided two more cases directly relevant to 
the Board's decision.  In Ziervogel, released March 19, 2004, a 
more united court determined that the "no reasonable use" test 
was "unworkable and unfair" when used to evaluate applications 
for area variances.  Ziervogel, 269 Wis. 2d 549, ¶¶4-5.  The 
court revitalized a standard first announced in Snyder v. 
Waukesha County Zoning Board of Adjustment, 74 Wis. 2d 468, 247 
N.W.2d 98 (1976).  Under the Snyder standard,  
when considering an area variance, the question of 
whether 
unnecessary 
hardship . . . exists 
is 
best 
explained as whether compliance with the strict letter 
of 
the 
restrictions 
governing 
area, 
set 
backs, 
frontage, height, bulk or density would unreasonably 
prevent the owner from using the property for a 
permitted purpose or would render conformity with such 
restrictions unnecessarily burdensome.   
Ziervogel, 269 Wis. 2d 549, ¶7 (quoting Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 
475) (internal citations omitted).   
¶21 The court added that in making its determination, a 
board must consider the purpose of the zoning restriction, its 
effect on the property, and the effect a variance would have on 
the neighborhood and the larger public interest.  Id., ¶7.  We 
2001AP3105 
12 
 
remanded the Ziervogel case because "whether [the Snyder] 
standard is met in this case will depend upon the board of 
adjustment's consideration of the [newly announced test]."  Id., 
¶42. 
¶22 Two months later, we released State v. Waushara County 
Board 
of 
Adjustment, 
2004 
WI 
56, 
271 
Wis. 2d 547, 
679 
N.W.2d 514.  In Waushara County, we reiterated the abrogation of 
the "no reasonable use" test for evaluating area variances.  The 
party seeking a variance in that case asserted that the 
Wisconsin law on variances was "in a state of confusion" due to 
the interplay among Snyder, Kenosha County, and Outagamie 
County.  Id., ¶¶16-18.  The court candidly acknowledged: "It is 
evident that there is some confusion over how to interpret and 
apply our decisions in Snyder, Kenosha County, and Outagamie 
County."  Id., ¶23.  We stated in Waushara County that our 
purpose was to "give boards of adjustment and Wisconsin courts 
sufficient guidance as to how to resolve these types of cases in 
the future."  Id.  The court admitted that "it appears that the 
no reasonable use standard has been applied, since [Kenosha 
County], in a very restrictive manner."  Id., ¶32.  In light of 
the new standards it announced, the court remanded the case for 
renewed consideration of the facts.  Id., ¶35.   
¶23 As did the Washington County Board of Adjustment in 
Ziervogel10 and the Waushara County Board of Adjustment in 
                                                 
10 The application was considered on October 22, 2001.  
Ziervogel, 269 Wis. 2d 549, ¶11. 
2001AP3105 
13 
 
Waushara County,11 the Board in the instant case evaluated 
Lamar's application in 2001 under the Kenosha County "no 
reasonable use" rule.  At that time, the state of the law was 
uncertain.  The very purpose of the Waushara County decision was 
to give boards of adjustment guidance in resolving area variance 
applications.  We see no reason why, like those other two 
boards, this Board should not have the opportunity to reevaluate 
the facts under the principles we laid out in Ziervogel, 
Waushara County, and Outagamie County. 
¶24 The Board's failure to proceed on the correct theory 
of law independently justifies a remand.  However, counsel for 
the Board at oral argument emphasized that such a decision would 
not answer the critical question before the court involving 
whether the Board must deliver an "explicitly reasoned written 
decision," nor would it provide guidance to other boards of 
zoning appeal around the state.  We agree that clarification of 
the court of appeals' decision is required, and accordingly, we 
proceed to discuss the adequacy of the Board's reasoning. 
IV. ADEQUACY OF THE BOARD'S REASONING 
¶25 Certainly, a court's review of a zoning board's 
decision is deferential; the court "must accord a presumption of 
correctness and validity to a board of adjustment's decision."  
Ziervogel, 269 Wis. 2d 549, ¶13.  The court should not disturb a 
                                                 
11 The application was considered "in 2001."  Waushara 
County, 271 Wis. 2d 547, ¶6. 
2001AP3105 
14 
 
board's findings if any reasonable view of the evidence supports 
them.  Waushara County, 271 Wis. 2d 547, ¶13.   
¶26 For certiorari review to be meaningful, however, a 
board must give the reviewing court something to review.  State 
v. Trudeau, 139 Wis. 2d 91, 110, 408 N.W.2d 337 (1987); see also 
3 Yokley Zoning Law and Practice § 18-9 at 18-62 (MacGregor rev. 
2002) (hereinafter Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice) ("The record 
made before a board of adjustment is essential to an enlightened 
determination of its action by a governing body or by a court on 
review"); 3 Rathkopf The Law of Zoning and Planning § 62:47 at 
62-133 (4th ed. (Ziegler rev.) 1975, supp. 2004) ("[T]he most 
common reason for a remand is that the findings of fact upon 
which the determination should be based are either entirely 
absent or are so inadequate that the determination cannot 
adequately be reviewed.").  "The majority view is now that 
boards are generally required to make findings of fact and state 
reasons for their decisions."  Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice 
§ 20-16 at 20-68.  In this case, the court of appeals 
characterized the Board's order as exhibiting an "absence of 
discretion."  Lamar, unpublished order at 2.  This amounts to a 
violation of the third prong of certiorari review. 
¶27 The controlling statute is pithy, providing only that 
"The grounds of every such determination shall be stated."  
Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)9.  The term "grounds" is not defined in 
the statute.  Accordingly, we look to the common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning of the word.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
2001AP3105 
15 
 
N.W.2d 110.  A "ground" in the legal sense is defined as "The 
reason or point that something (as a legal claim or argument) 
relies on for validity."  Black's Law Dictionary 710 (7th ed. 
1999).  The Board stated in conclusory fashion that Lamar's 
application was denied because it did not meet various statutory 
criteria.  We believe that Lamar had the right to know not only 
the statutory criteria under which the Board rejected its claim, 
but also the reasons ("grounds") why the Board decided that the 
facts did not fit the statutory criteria.   
¶28 Such 
an 
approach 
is 
consistent 
with 
historical 
interpretations of Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)9.  In 1960 the 
League of Wisconsin Municipalities published Zoning Boards of 
Appeal: A Manual on Their Powers and Duties with Suggested Rules 
of Procedure.12  The League intended to provide guidance for 
Wisconsin's boards of zoning appeal.  In discussing the required 
form of a board's decision, the League stated: 
The 
decision 
of 
the 
board . . . must 
contain . . . reasons for the action taken . . . .  It 
is not sufficient for the board to give its reasons in 
the words of the statute such as, "The variance is 
granted because owing to special conditions, a literal 
enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will 
result 
in 
practical 
difficulty 
or 
unnecessary 
hardship."  The exact nature of the hardship or 
difficulty found by the board should be stated. 
                                                 
12 On 
file 
at 
Wisconsin 
State 
Law 
Library, 
Madison, 
Wisconsin. 
2001AP3105 
16 
 
Id. at 10 (citing Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)9.13 (emphasis added). 
¶29 Requiring the Board to provide reasons for its 
determination 
is 
also 
consistent 
with 
common 
sense 
and 
traditional notions of due process.  Accord Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970) ("[Due process] principles require 
that a recipient have timely and adequate notice detailing the 
reasons for a proposed [benefit] termination."). 
¶30 The Board, and the League of Wisconsin Municipalities 
as amicus, argue that we proceed down a slippery slope if we 
affirm the court of appeals' conclusion that the Board's 
discussion was inadequate.  They argue that under the court of 
appeals' decision, boards of zoning appeals must produce an 
"explicitly reasoned written decision."  They note that we here 
consider the decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals for the 
City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin's largest community.  In smaller 
communities, they observe, the boards may have less experience 
with governing legal standards, may not produce written opinions 
at all, and frequently have members who are neither attorneys 
nor are counseled by attorneys and cannot be expected to produce 
the type of finely-tuned legal reasoning expected from a court.  
¶31 We understand and are sympathetic to the League's 
concerns.  We realize that most board members are not attorneys 
and recognize that many boards in this state operate without 
                                                 
13 In the 1959 version of the Wisconsin Statutes, which were 
in effect at the time the League penned these words, the 
phrasing of Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)9. was identical to today's 
version.  The statute has not changed.  
2001AP3105 
17 
 
issuing written opinions.  We do not expect boards of zoning 
appeal to produce judicial opinions.  We agree, in fact, that a 
written decision is not required as long as a board's reasoning 
is clear from the transcript of its proceedings.14 
¶32 Nonetheless, this court cannot and should not relax 
its standards of reasoning to the point where the standards are 
nonexistent.  A board may not simply grant or deny an 
application with conclusory statements that the application does 
or does not satisfy the statutory criteria.  Accord League of 
Wisconsin Municipalities, Zoning Boards of Appeal at 10.  
Rather, we expect a board to express, on the record, its 
reasoning why an application does or does not meet the statutory 
                                                 
14 The League's position regarding the necessity of a 
written decision has apparently changed over the years.  Almost 
50 years ago, the League plainly stated: "The decision of the 
board must be reduced to writing and must contain written 
reasons for the action taken . . . .  The final disposition of 
an appeal or application shall be in the form of a written 
resolution or order."  League of Wisconsin Municipalities, 
Zoning Boards of Appeal: A Manual on Their Powers and Duties 
with Suggested Rules of Procedure 10, 45 (1960) (on file at 
Wisconsin State Law Library, Madison, Wisconsin). 
At oral argument, the Board's counsel repeatedly asserted 
that under the court of appeals' decision, boards are required 
to provide an "explicitly reasoned written decision."  Closer 
review of the court of appeals' opinion reveals that it never 
used the word "written."  Opposing counsel also conceded that 
the Board's decision need not be reduced to writing.  Neither 
does the controlling statute impose such a requirement; it 
provides only that "The grounds of [the Board's] determination 
shall be stated."  Finally, we are unable to locate any 
Wisconsin case law requiring a written decision.  As neither 
party asks us to impose such a requirement on the Board, we 
decline to do so.   
2001AP3105 
18 
 
criteria.  Without such statement of reasoning, it is impossible 
for the circuit court to meaningfully review a board's decision, 
and the value of certiorari review becomes worthless.  See 
Trudeau, 139 Wis. 2d at 110. 
¶33 Finally, we address the Board's argument that it is 
"particularly troublesome and impractical" for a board to issue 
an "explicitly reasoned decision" because under the statute, the 
decision may effectively be controlled by a minority of the 
board.  We disagree.  Even when a board's decision is dictated 
by a minority, these controlling members of the board ought to 
be able to articulate why an applicant has not satisfied its 
burden of proof on unnecessary hardship or why the facts of 
record cannot be reconciled with some requirement of the 
ordinance or statute. 
¶34 In its written order, the Board simply stated that 
Lamar's application did not meet the ordinance criteria, then 
recited the criteria.  The court of appeals correctly perceived 
the problem with this approach.  The Board may not rest on a 
declaration that an application does not meet certain ordinance 
criteria; the Board must explain why the application does not 
meet the criteria.  In this case, the Board's written order did 
not do so.   
¶35 That, however, is not the end of the inquiry because, 
as noted above, a written determination is not always necessary.  
2001AP3105 
19 
 
We also review the transcript of the proceedings before the 
Board.15 
¶36 Member 
Szymanksi 
disagreed 
with 
Member 
Winkler's 
assessment that "We are faced with a very strong case of 
hardship."  He also disagreed that non-conforming existing 
signage could be cited as precedent.  He said he "hoped" 
existing signage "would be further diminished" because "I'm not 
a sign aficionado."  He added that "the spirit and intent [of 
the ordinance] has not been met . . . [and] the hardship also 
has not been met, because it is intended to wind up generating 
some additional revenue for this facility . . . ." 
¶37 Member Szymanski's remarks that he hoped existing 
signage would be diminished and that he is not a "sign 
aficionado," however heartfelt, are not relevant to a board's 
determination on a request for a variance.  They might be 
characterized as expressions of his will and not his judgment.  
His 
other 
remarks 
were 
conclusory 
statements 
that 
the 
application did not meet the ordinance criteria.  Member 
Szymanski did not explain why the application and supporting 
facts did not meet the criteria.  His objection to the sign's 
revenue generation was not only a restatement of criteria in the 
Milwaukee 
ordinances 
(see 
Milwaukee 
Code 
§ 295-95-2-b-3-5 
(alleged hardship cannot be based solely on economic grounds)), 
                                                 
15 As we have noted, see supra n.14, we do not believe that 
the Board must provide a written decision.  Accordingly, we 
proceed to consider the transcript of the proceedings before the 
Board. 
2001AP3105 
20 
 
but also a near per se rejection of any variance for a 
commercial sign.   
¶38 Chairman Zetley's comments were also insufficient to 
justify a finding that the Board reasonably exercised its 
discretion.  Chairman Zetley stated that he had three reasons 
for voting to deny the application.  First, he believed "the 
exceptional circumstances have not been met.  I believe that 
this is an economic issue."  As we have noted, that reasoning is 
insufficient because it is circular.  It merely restated the 
grounds laid out in the ordinance.  Second, Zetley stated "there 
[are] other purposes for this land.  It hasn't been shown that 
there isn't another purpose for this land."  As we have 
described, this is a restatement of the now-abrogated "no 
reasonable use" test.  Chairman Zetley's second reason is 
invalid.  Third, Zetley stated, "making the signs bigger and 
bigger isn't something that this Chair is in favor of."  Again, 
a member's personal feelings about signs are irrelevant to the 
Board's determination of whether the statutory criteria have 
been met. 
¶39 We conclude that the Board did not satisfactorily 
express its reasons for denying Lamar's application.  Our remand 
will allow the Board to reconsider the facts in the wake of 
Ziervogel and Waushara County.  We caution that we believe the 
Board——with or without attorneys——can do a far better job of 
expressing its reasoning on the record.  The Board must allow 
for meaningful certiorari review by stating the "grounds" for 
2001AP3105 
21 
 
its decision——the reasons that Lamar's application does or does 
not fit the statutory criteria.  
V. CONCLUSION 
¶40 We remand this cause to the circuit court with 
instructions to remand it to the Board.  On remand, the Board 
should reconsider and, if necessary, rehear and decide this 
matter in conformance with the new legal standards governing 
area variances.  The Board must also adequately express its 
reasons for approving or denying Lamar's application under the 
appropriate legal standards.  This reasoning need not be 
embodied in a written decision as long as it is reflected in a 
transcript of the proceedings.  We express no opinion on whether 
Lamar's application should be granted under Ziervogel and 
Waushara County.  The Board is the body best suited to make such 
factual determinations, and we remand this cause to allow it to 
do so. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2001AP3105.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶41 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
majority opinion is careful to explain that "[a] board may not 
simply grant or deny an application with conclusory statements 
that the application does or does not satisfy the statutory 
criteria."  Majority op., ¶32.  I agree with the rule advanced 
by the majority opinion.   
¶42 The majority opinion analyzes each of the dissenters' 
rationales and leaves an important question unanswered:  When 
there is no adequate written opinion, does one board member's 
explanation of his or her reasoning for granting or denying an 
application speak for a member who is silent, offering no 
reasoning, offers conflicting reasoning, or offers invalid or 
unclear reasoning?    
¶43 A written opinion that adequately expresses reasoning 
in which the requisite number of board members joins is, without 
question, the reasoning of the Board.  When there is no adequate 
written opinion and the court looks at the transcript of the 
proceedings, majority op., ¶3, the court no longer looks at the 
rationale of the board as an entity but rather looks at the 
rationales of individuals who comprise the board. 
¶44 The majority opinion has left uncertain whether each 
member's reasoning must be analyzed when there is no written 
opinion of the board.   
¶45 Here, only one of the three proponents of the 
variance, Board Member Winkler, expressed any reasoning prior to 
casting his vote.  A second proponent, Board Member Cameron, 
No.  2001AP3105.ssa 
 
2 
 
asked, "What was the alderman's [position] on this?"  Board 
Member Jackson seconded Board Member Winkler's motion to grant 
the variance, without more.   
¶46 The majority opinion has left uncertain the procedure 
each member of a board must follow to ensure that the Board as a 
whole has provided adequate reasoning for granting or denying an 
application when the Board does not offer a written opinion.   
¶47 For the foregoing reasons, I write separately. 
 
 
No.  2001AP3105.ssa 
 
 
 
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