Case Title: State v. Mead

Citation: 362 N.C. 218

Docket Number: 383A07

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2008-03-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court
Slip Opinion
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES ALLEN MEAD
No. 383A07
FILED: 7 MARCH 2008
Sentencing--consecutive–failure to specify–imposition after comment by clerk of court
The trial court did not err in a second-degree rape and second-degree sexual
offense case by imposing consecutive sentences upon defendant after being advised by the
assistant clerk of superior court following defendant’s sentencing hearing that the trial court had
not specified that these sentences were to run consecutively, because: (1) it was the stated
intention of the trial judge that defendant’s sentences would run consecutively, as reflected in the
transcript of proceedings; (2) in light of the brutal nature of the crimes for which defendant was
convicted, imposing consecutive terms was well within the trial court’s discretion; (3) the
statutory provision relied upon by defendant, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1334(b), is not applicable to this
case when it cannot be inferred from the phrase “comment to the court on sentencing” any intent
of the General Assembly to prohibit routine communication between trial judges and clerks of
court during sentencing proceedings unless the clerk is first sworn as a witness; and (4) despite
defendant’s assertions to the contrary, there is no indication from the record that the discussion
which took place between the trial judge and the clerk of court in this case fell outside of the
usual administrative dialogue necessary for the fair and efficient conduct of court business.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the
decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 184 N.C.
App. ___, 646 S.E.2d 597 (2007), finding no prejudicial error in
part in judgments entered 8 March 2006 by Judge James L. Baker,
Jr. in Superior Court, Avery County, and dismissing defendant’s
appeal in part.  Heard in the Supreme Court 12 December 2007.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Philip A. Lehman,
Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
John Keating Wiles for defendant-appellant.
BRADY, Justice.
Defendant James Allen Mead was convicted by a jury of
second-degree rape and second-degree sexual offense, and a
divided panel of the Court of Appeals upheld these convictions. 
Defendant’s appeal as of right on the basis of the dissenting
opinion below presents a single issue for this Court to
determine:  Whether the trial court erred by imposing consecutive
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sentences upon defendant after being “advised” by the assistant
clerk of superior court following defendant’s sentencing hearing
that the trial court had not specified that these sentences were
to run consecutively.  We hold that this was not error and
thereby affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
BACKGROUND
I. State’s Evidence
On 7 March 2005, the Avery County Grand Jury returned
true bills of indictment charging defendant with second-degree
rape and two counts of second-degree sexual offense.  The State’s
evidence at trial tended to show the following:  That late on the
afternoon of 21 October 2004, the victim visited an unoccupied
cabin in Avery County which was for sale and which she was
interested in purchasing for her residence.  At about 6 p.m.,
defendant and his two sons arrived at the cabin in a van and
approached the victim.  Defendant informed her that he had an
ownership interest in the property, that there was a family
dispute over it, and that it was not for sale.  During this
discussion, defendant, his sons, and the victim were seated on
the front porch of the cabin drinking beer.
Approximately one hour later, defendant invited the
victim to his residence on an adjacent property in order to view
his horses and family pictures, and the victim accepted.  When
they arrived there, defendant continued to consume alcohol while
he showed the victim some family pictures and artifacts.  He then
instructed his sons to go outside and feed the horses.
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Once alone with the victim, defendant suddenly grabbed
her by the hair, punched her, and dragged her toward a nearby
bedroom.  The victim screamed, asked defendant to stop, and
attempted to flee through the front door, which had been
barricaded shut.  Defendant dragged her back into the bedroom,
where he punched her, tried to strangle and suffocate her, and
began removing her clothes.  The victim ran into the bathroom to
escape once more, but defendant again pulled her into the
bedroom.  He then bit her nipples and threatened to bite one of
them off unless she quit screaming.  He also clawed at her anus
and vagina with his hands, both internally and externally, and
penetrated her vagina with his penis, threatening that he would
kill her and dump her body in the woods if she was not quiet.
One of defendant’s sons entered the bedroom during the
struggle and told his father, “It is wrong what you are doing.” 
Defendant then stopped and released the victim, who quickly got
dressed and returned to her home, collapsing onto her bed in a
state of shock.  Later the next morning, the victim awoke in
considerable pain and in fear that defendant might discover where
she lived and murder her if she reported the crime, but she
decided to report the incident.  She drove to Spruce Pine
Community Hospital, where the emergency room staff treated and
evaluated her, completed a rape evidence kit, and photographed
her injuries.  A subsequent analysis conducted by the North
Carolina State Bureau of Investigation comparing the semen and
blood stains discovered on the victim and a blood sample later
taken from defendant showed a DNA match which indicated it was
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90.1 trillion times more likely that the semen on the victim came
from defendant than from any other unrelated individual in the
North Carolina Caucasian population.
II. Verdict, Sentence, and Appeal
On 8 March 2006, following defendant’s trial, the jury
returned its verdict finding defendant guilty of second-degree
rape and one count of second-degree sexual offense but not guilty
on the other count of second-degree sexual offense.
Also on 8 March 2006, the trial court held a brief
sentencing hearing, during which the prosecutor and defense
counsel both gave statements but no witnesses were called. 
Afterward, the court stated its intention to sentence defendant
within the presumptive range for the two convictions and stated
further, “I am going to impose a significant sentence against
you, which is what the law calls for.”  The court then pronounced
a sentence of 100 to 129 months imprisonment for the second-
degree rape conviction, with credit given for time already
served, and a sentence of 100 to 129 months imprisonment for the
second-degree sexual offense conviction, with no credit given for
time already served, “all of the prior credit having been awarded
in the first case.”  However, the court failed to specify whether
these sentences were to run consecutively.  See N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1340.15(a) (2007) (“Unless otherwise specified by the court, all
sentences of imprisonment run concurrently with any other
sentences of imprisonment.”).
After the trial court “complete[d] the matter” and
defendant was taken out of the courtroom, some discussion took
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1 The Court of Appeals unanimously dismissed a separate
assignment of error that is not before this Court.
place between the trial judge and the assistant clerk of superior
court which was not transcribed nor made a part of the record. 
Following this exchange, the trial judge then stated:  “Madame
Clerk, [defense counsel], that was a consecutive sentence.  I
want to make sure that was on the record with the defendant
present.  The clerk advised me that I did not say that was
consecutive, and that was my intention.”  Defendant was escorted
back into the courtroom, after which point the court stated that
defendant’s two sentences were to run consecutively, meaning
defendant’s sentence for second-degree sexual offense would not
begin until the expiration of his sentence for second-degree
rape.  Judgment was entered accordingly.
Defendant subsequently gave notice of appeal, and on 3
July 2007, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals found no
prejudicial error in his sentencing, although the dissenting
judge would have vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded the
case for the trial court to enter judgment imposing concurrent
sentences.1  Defendant now appeals to this Court as of right on
the basis of the dissent.
ANALYSIS
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by taking
into consideration a “comment to the court on sentencing” which
should have been barred by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1334(b).  This statute,
which governs the procedure for sentencing hearings, reads in
part:  “No person other than the defendant, his counsel, the
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prosecutor, and one making a presentence report may comment to
the court on sentencing unless called as a witness by the
defendant, the prosecutor, or the court.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1334(b)
(2007) (emphasis added).  Defendant argues that when the
assistant clerk of superior court, who was not sworn as a witness
at the hearing, “advised” the trial judge in regard to
defendant’s sentence, this amounted to a prohibited “comment to
the court on sentencing” and should not have served as the basis
for the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences.
We note at the outset that it was the stated intention
of the trial judge that defendant’s sentences would run
consecutively, as reflected in the transcript of proceedings. 
Defendant has not asserted otherwise.  Thus, there can be no
question that the sentences imposed against defendant comport
with the intention of the trial court, which had the statutory
authority and discretion to impose consecutive sentences against
defendant.  See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1354(a) (2007) (“When multiple
sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a person at the same
time . . .  the sentences may run either concurrently or
consecutively, as determined by the court.”); State v. LaPlanche,
349 N.C. 279, 284, 507 S.E.2d 34, 37 (1998) (“It is undisputed
that the trial court has express authority under N.C.G.S. §
15A-1354(a) to impose consecutive sentences.” (citation
omitted)).  Moreover, in light of the brutal nature of the crimes
for which defendant was convicted, imposing consecutive terms was
well within the trial court’s discretion.  See LaPlanche, 349
N.C. at 284, 507 S.E.2d at 37.
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Effectively then, defendant only challenges the means
by which the trial court effectuated its intent that the
sentences run consecutively.  However, we find that the statutory
provision relied upon by defendant, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1334(b), is
simply not applicable to the circumstances presented in this
case.  By its plain meaning, the language of the statute
encompasses all persons other than a defendant, defense counsel,
prosecutors, and those making a presentence report. 
Nevertheless, we cannot infer from the phrase “comment to the
court on sentencing” any intent of the General Assembly to
prohibit routine communication between trial judges and clerks of
court during sentencing proceedings unless the clerk is first
sworn as a witness.  To do so would erect an unnecessary barrier
between trial judges and the clerks, deputy clerks, and assistant
clerks of superior and district courts, who are entrusted with
making entries on the records of these courts and required to
ensure their accuracy and safekeeping.  See N.C.G.S. § 7A-109(a)
(2007); Gen. R. Pract. Super. & Dist. Cts. 17, 2008 Ann. R. N.C.
17.
Despite defendant’s assertions to the contrary, there
is no indication from the record that the discussion which took
place between the trial judge and the clerk of court in this case
fell outside of the usual administrative dialogue necessary for
the fair and efficient conduct of court business.  Defendant has
failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in sentencing
him to two consecutive sentences of imprisonment based upon his
convictions for second-degree rape and second-degree sexual
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offense.  Accordingly, that portion of the opinion of the Court
of Appeals finding no prejudicial error in defendant’s sentencing
is hereby affirmed.
AFFIRMED.