Case Title: In Interest of MKM

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-89-6

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-05-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
In Interest of MKM1990 WY 58792 P.2d 1369Case Number: C-89-6Decided: 05/31/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE INTEREST OF MKM, A 
MINOR CHILD. DF, 

APPELLANT 
(PETITIONER),

v.

MLM AND WS, 

APPELLEES (RESPONDENT). 

Appeal from the District 
Court, Laramie County, Edward L. Grant, J.

Stephen H. Kline 
and Kathryn A. Jenkins, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Ronald E. 
Triggs, Cheyenne, for appellee MLM.

Franklin Smith, 
Cheyenne, for appellee WS.

John Frentheway, 
Cheyenne, as Guardian Ad Litem.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Richard E. Dixon, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Wyoming Div. of Public 
Assistance & Social Services.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

URBIGKIT, Justice.

[¶1]      This case 
involves an extraordinarily bitter custody battle for MKM who was sexually 
abused by either her father or the man who became her mother's second husband. 
The district court adjudicated the controversy within child neglect and custody 
concepts and awarded custody to MKM's paternal grandmother in a best interests 
of the child discretional decision.

[¶2]      We affirm the 
district court's general award of present custody. However, in finding an award 
of permanent custody to the grandmother contrary to the statutes controlling 
this area of law, we modify the grant of custody to temporary legal custody and 
remand.

[¶3]      Mother, as 
appellant, questions whether the district court:

     A. * * * lack[ed] 
jurisdiction to award permanent custody of [MKM] to a third party by virtue of 
its failure to comply with the procedural requirements of the Juvenile Court 
Act?

     B. * * * violate[d] 
[mother's] fundamental rights by assuming jurisdiction under the Juvenile Court 
Act and awarding custody of [MKM] to a third party with no allegation, evidence 
or finding that [mother] neglected [MKM]?

    C. * * * deprive[d] [mother] 
of a fundamental right by awarding permanent custody of [MKM] to a third party, 
in effect terminating her parental rights, without a finding that she is 
unfit?

     D. * * * improperly 
award[ed] permanent custody of [MKM] to her paternal grandmother for the reasons 
that [grandmother] was not a party to the action and there was no evidence or 
finding that [mother] is unfit or neglected [MKM]?

Father, as 
appellee, with whom grandmother and MKM through her guardian ad litem join, 
questions whether the district court:

     A. * * * abuse[d] its 
discretion in awarding custody of [MKM] to [the grandmother]?

     B. * * * [had] before 
it substantial evidence upon which to base its decision to award custody of a 
minor to someone other than either of the natural parents?

     C. * * * [had] proper 
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties upon which to base its 
decision?

Finally, the 
Wyoming Division of Public Assistance & Social Services (DPASS) questions 
whether:

I. * * * the parties 
consent[ed] to a delay of more than 60 days between the filing of a petition and 
adjudication in juvenile court actions?

II. * * * the juvenile 
court [had] jurisdiction, to place custody of a child in third parties following 
an adjudication of neglect?

III. * * * [there is] 
error when a district court makes a child custody award pursuant to a divorce 
decree or modification thereof?

BACKGROUND

[¶4]      MKM's parents 
were married on May 20, 1983, MKM was born on August 23, 1983, and her parents 
divorced on December 21, 1984 in Laramie County, Wyoming. The divorce decree 
granted the father custody and the mother generous visitation 
rights.

[¶5]      On September 29, 
1986, the district attorney's office petitioned the Juvenile Court of Laramie 
County1 stating MKM was a neglected child, 
pursuant to W.S. 14-6-201(a)(xvi)(B) (1977), based on an allegation of her 
father's sexual abuse. Meanwhile, the child was placed in a foster home. An 
initial appearance and arraignment was held on October 10, 1986.2 While the father maintained his 
innocence, the result of this hearing was that temporary custody was awarded to 
the mother. The district court also ordered the mother not to cohabit with any 
person while the child was residing in her home.

[¶6]      Because custody 
provisions of a divorce decree remain open throughout the minority of the 
children involved, and the district court granting the divorce retains 
continuing jurisdiction to the custody aspect of the decree, Nicholaus v. 
Nicholaus, 756 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Wyo. 1988), the mother petitioned the district 
court on April 2, 1987 to award her continuing permanent custody of the child 
based on changed circumstances. At the same time, she moved that her petition be 
consolidated with the petition filed in juvenile court.

[¶7]      In June 1987, 
MKM's guardian ad litem moved for an order to show cause why mother should not 
be held in contempt for cohabiting with her boyfriend in violation of the 1986 
order granting her temporary custody. Mother responded with a number of motions, 
including one to remove the guardian ad litem. Mother and her boyfriend were 
married on July 24, 1987, from which a child was born in January 1988. Following 
a hearing held on August 6-7, 1987, the district court found the mother in 
contempt and denied her motion to remove the guardian ad litem.

[¶8]      Also at this 
hearing, the district court expressed concern about allowing the mother to 
continue temporary custody of MKM and asked counsel for suggestions on this 
matter. It was the result of that request that the possibility of MKM's paternal 
grandmother becoming custodian first surfaced. On May 17, 1988, the grandmother 
entered an appearance to move for the district court to grant present custody to 
her.

[¶9]      In January 1988, 
mother moved for relief from the 1986 order forbidding her to cohabit with any 
person while MKM was residing with her. She stated as her reason for relief that 
although she had not lived with her new husband since being found in contempt a 
few months earlier, they were now married and she had become pregnant. In 
February 1988, the district court, based on a stipulation of all parties 
involved, removed MKM from temporary custody of her mother and placed her in 
foster care. The district court allowed the mother and the father to visit their 
daughter under supervision, but the mother's second husband was ordered not to 
have any contact with the child.

[¶10]   While this custody battle was 
developing in the Wyoming juvenile and district courts, Colorado authorities 
instituted criminal proceedings for sexual abuse against the father. Although 
the record in this case does not provide an entirely clear picture of what 
happened in Colorado, we are able to ascertain that he was convicted of two 
counts of sexual assault on a minor and sentenced to two concurrent prison terms 
of six years. The father has stead-fastly maintained his innocence, claiming his 
conviction came as the result of an overzealous social worker and an "unlicensed 
psychologist." The Colorado court denied the father's motion for a new trial and 
his case is presently on appeal.

[¶11]   The new trial motion and appeal 
were apparently based on the finding of new evidence which came to light after 
the mother lost temporary custody of her daughter. While in foster care, MKM 
told her foster mother, social worker and therapist that her mother's second 
husband was the one who sexually assaulted her and that her mother had coerced 
her to lie about her father's alleged improper conduct. The young child also 
reported that her mother had burned her with a cigarette when she would not get 
off of a swing fast enough. The district court was now faced with contentions of 
abuse by all three adults - mother, father and mother's second husband. 
Following a pre-hearing conference in October 1988,3 the district court issued an order 
determining that MKM was a neglected child, although the specific perpetrator of 
any sexual assault could not be determined. Although recognizing the Colorado 
conviction, the district court noted the pending appeal and refused to 
dispositively assess guilt to the father.

[¶12]   A final custody disposition hearing 
came before the district court on August 8 and 15, 1989. Testimony came from 
numerous current and former social workers and therapists of MKM, MKM's foster 
mother, the mother, the father, the mother's second husband, the grandmother and 
the father's new wife who also had a child of their union. The testimony from 
the current social workers, the therapists and the foster mother indicated that 
the child may have been assaulted by her mother's second husband. The former 
social worker and therapist testified they believed it was the father who had 
abused the child. While everyone seemed reasonably certain MKM had been abused 
sexually, no one, except the victim or the wrongdoer, really knew who had been 
the perpetrator.

[¶13]   On August 29, 1989, the district 
court decided that the best placement for MKM would be with her paternal 
grandmother. The district court detailed its findings and conclusions and stated 
that "[t]he acrimony and apparent hatred between [father] and [mother], * * *, 
is extraordinary even by juvenile and divorce court standards." It went on to 
state:

     Most recently, * * *, 
there was persuasive and unrefuted evidence that [MKM] says that it was [her 
mother's second husband], not [her father], who sexually molested her; that she 
lied about it in court at the insistence of [her mother]; that she is tired and 
scared of the lying; frightened of [her mother's second husband]; and that he is 
the only one who ever "bad touched her." So there now stands against [the 
mother's second husband], the same if not stronger, evidence of having molested 
[MKM] than that which convicted her father * * * of that crime. According to 
testimony, the District Attorney's Office in Laramie County strongly considered 
filing criminal charges against [the mother's second husband], but did not do 
so. Mention must be made of [MKM]'s relationship with her grandmother, * * 
*.

     During much of her 
earliest years, and from time to time through this litigation, [MKM] has spent a 
great deal of time with [her grandmother]. There exists between them a very 
strong bond and affection. No one disputes [the grandmother]'s love for [MKM], 
her genuine interest in [MKM]'s welfare, or her ability to properly care for the 
child.

The district 
court manifested its awareness of the fundamental interest parents normally have 
in the custody of their children and that this interest may be overwhelmed only 
by the most compelling considerations of the child's best interests. It then 
listed four possibilities for placement of MKM - either of her parents, her 
grandmother or the Casey Family Program. Father was an unacceptable choice due 
to his criminal conviction, although the district court found him to be a caring 
and concerned father. Mother was an unacceptable choice due to her continuing 
relationship with her second husband who stood accused of molestation of the 
child. The Casey Family Program was eliminated because the district court saw it 
as a roadblock in front of MKM's need for familiarity and continuity in a home 
life. On the other hand, the district court determined the grandmother was able 
to offer the young child "a stable and predictable environment, that promises 
and delivers security, safety and love, in which she can accommodate a 
continuation and development of her relationship with both of her parents * * * 
with the minimum possible disruption." 

DISCUSSION

[¶14]   Mother centers her first issue 
around subject matter jurisdiction of the district court. Citing W.S. 14-6-224 
and 14-6-226 (July 1986 Replacement),4 she bases her contention on the 
district court's failure to hold an adjudicatory hearing within sixty days after 
the father's denial of the allegations concerning sexual abuse made in the 
petition at the October 10, 1986 arraignment. She argues the district court lost 
subject matter jurisdiction over the child as a result of that failure. We do 
not agree.

[¶15]   MKM remains subject to the 
jurisdiction of the court which granted the divorce between her parents. As 
noted earlier, the district court granting a divorce retains jurisdiction 
regarding custody. Nicholaus, 756 P.2d 1338. Mother recognized this jurisdiction 
through her petition to change custody, which she filed as an adjunct to the 
divorce proceeding while the juvenile court action was in progress. The district 
court, even though it was in essence the same court wearing different hats, 
recognized its civil jurisdiction derived from the initial divorce proceeding. 
Civil and juvenile jurisdiction was combined from the two parallel actions for 
the hearing. Although the district court demonstrated it was cognizant of this 
dual jurisdictional status, actual combination of the two actions was 
unnecessary. W.S. 14-6-203(h) (July 1986 Replacement) speaks somewhat to this 
situation by recognizing that a juvenile court action does not deprive the 
district court of its jurisdiction. In effect, the action in the juvenile court 
suspends, at least temporarily, the jurisdiction over the question of custody 
from the district court. State of Tenn. Dept. of Human Services v. Gouvitsa, 735 S.W.2d 452, 465 (Tenn. App. 1987) (citing Marmino v. Marmino, 34 Tenn. App. 352, 
238 S.W.2d 105 (1950)).

[¶16]   Subject matter jurisdiction is the 
power to hear and determine cases of the general class of which the proceeding 
belongs. In Interest of WM, 778 P.2d 1106, 1111 (Wyo. 1989). It either exists or 
it does not, and before proceeding to a disposition on the merits, a court 
should be satisfied it does have the requisite jurisdiction. Matter of Contempt 
Order Issued Against Anderson, 765 P.2d 933, 936 (Wyo. 1988). Subject matter 
jurisdiction here fits under the statutory scheme of the juvenile court act. 
W.S. 14-6-203(a)(i) (July 1986 Replacement).

[¶17]   Mother does not contest this 
principle; instead, she argues the district court lost its subject matter 
jurisdiction because it did not hold a hearing within the time frame suggested 
in W.S. 14-6-226(b) (July 1986 Replacement). As quoted above,5 W.S. 14-6-226(b) allows the 
district court, following denial of the allegations of the petition of neglect, 
to hold either a hearing immediately or schedule one within sixty days. Both of 
these choices are prefaced with the verb "may" instead of "shall" as other 
sentences in this section are constructed. Generally, the verb "may" when used 
in a statute makes that statute directory instead of mandatory. Mayor v. Board 
of Land Com'rs, 64 Wyo. 409, 192 P.2d 403, reh'g denied 195 P.2d 752 (Wyo. 
1948). While recognizing and without disturbing the public interests and rights 
exception to the rule of construction, Board of County Commissioners of the 
County of Fremont v. State ex rel. Miller, 369 P.2d 537 (Wyo. 1962), we find the 
verb "may" as expressed in this statute to be directory. A statute must be 
viewed in terms of its objective purpose. Halliburton Co. v. McAdams, Roux and 
Associates, Inc., 773 P.2d 153 (Wyo. 1989). The purpose of the entire juvenile 
court act is to protect the best interest of the children who come under its 
jurisdiction. See W.S. 14-6-229 (July 1986 Replacement). Statutes are not to be 
interpreted to produce absurd results. State v. Sodergren, 686 P.2d 521 (Wyo. 
1984). See P.F.M. v. District Court In and For Adams County, 184 Colo. 393, 520 P.2d 742 (1974). See also People in Interest of A.M., 786 P.2d 476 (Colo. App. 
1989) with an amazingly similar factual situation of father and boyfriend 
contended assault involving a family moving from Wyoming to 
Colorado.

Upon principle and 
authority a court or judge having jurisdiction to inquire into a question of 
such vital interest ought not to be hampered with a strict construction of 
statutes which would be the cause of much embarrassment, and often defeat the 
ends of justice.

Tytler v. 
Tytler, 15 Wyo. 319, 89 P. 1, 2 (1907). We cannot think of a result more absurd 
than to cause a vulnerable child to become unprotected while under the 
protective wing of our court system. Under W.S. 14-6-226(b) (July 1986 
Replacement), a juvenile court may either proceed immediately or hold a hearing 
within sixty days, but the statutes also preserve the discretion of the court to 
do neither if the best interests of the child are served at least until 
objection to the delayed hearing is asserted by a litigant. This is what we 
perceive happened here. The delay was necessary in order to develop certain 
facets of the case needed to allow the district court to make the proper 
placement.

[¶18]   Mother then premises her second and 
third issues upon the notion that her parental rights were violated through the 
custody award to the grandmother. Because the right of association with one's 
immediate family is a fundamental liberty right protected by the state and 
federal constitutions, Hall v. Hall, 708 P.2d 416, 421 (Wyo. 1985), she claims 
her fundamental rights were annulled. Resolving custody necessarily involves the 
clash of parental rights. Id. However, the mother had already given up custody 
through the divorce decree when this case came before the juvenile court. As we 
can find no appeal from the divorce action, we must assume her fundamental 
rights were properly respected in that proceeding when her right to custody was 
first adjudicated.

[¶19]   Mother mischaracterizes this action 
as a termination of parental rights case. The Wyoming statutes clarify the 
difference between a child neglect case and a parental termination case. The 
effect of terminating the parent-child relationship is that it

divests the parent and 
the child of all legal rights, privileges, duties and support obligations with 
respect to each other except the right of the child to inherent from the parent 
shall not be affected by the order.

W.S. 14-2-317 
(July 1986 Replacement). This did not occur. Instead, the grandmother was 
granted legal custody of MKM who was found to be a neglected child. Legal 
custody is defined as

a legal status created by 
court order which vests in a custodian the right to have physical custody of a 
minor, the right and duty to protect, train and discipline a minor, the duty to 
provide him with food, shelter, clothing, ordinary medical care, education and 
in an emergency, the right and duty to authorize surgery or other extraordinary 
medical care. The rights and duties of legal custody are subordinate to 
the rights and duties of the guardian of the person, and to residual parental 
rights and duties[.]

W.S. 
14-6-201(a)(xiv) (July 1986 Replacement) (emphasis added). Residual parental 
rights and duties are defined as

those rights and duties 
remaining with the parents after custody, guardianship of the person or both 
have been vested in another person, agency or institution. Residual parental 
rights and duties include but are not limited to the duty to support and provide 
necessities of life, the right to consent to adoption, the right to reasonable 
visitation unless restricted or prohibited by court order and the right to 
determine the minor's religious affiliation[.]

W.S. 
14-6-201(a)(xxi) (July 1986 Replacement). The juvenile court made no specific 
finding restricting visitation, which would have been within its jurisdiction to 
make. In Interest of K.B., 188 Ga. App. 199, 372 S.E.2d 476 (1988). Any other 
infringement of the mother's parental rights would have to be adjudicated 
through a termination of parental rights proceeding. W.S. 14-2-308 through 
14-2-319 (July 1986 Replacement). At present, her rights as a parent remain 
intact in residual character, subject to temporary custody in the grandmother, 
as a result of exercised judicial decision to achieve the status serving the 
best interest of the child which has constitutional preeminence. In Interest of 
J.L., 761 P.2d 985 (Wyo. 1988); TR v. Washakie County Dept. of Public Assistance 
and Social Services, 736 P.2d 712 (Wyo. 1987). See Fanning v. Fanning, 717 P.2d 346 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶20]   In support of her parental priority 
argument, mother directs us to the case of Douglas v. Sheffner, 79 Wyo. 172, 331 P.2d 840 (1958). She cites this case for the proposition that she should not be 
deprived of custody of her child unless it is clearly shown that she is so unfit 
a person as to endanger the child's welfare. Id. 331 P.2d  at 845. The 
proposition therein was based upon what has variously been called "the 
tender-years presumption" or "the maternal preference." While gender-based 
awards of custody might have been the law in 1958, they are not now. The 
legislature has eliminated such bias. W.S. 20-2-113(a) (1986 Cum.Supp.). See 
Fanning, 717 P.2d 346. Since W.S. 20-2-113(a) speaks to an entire subject of 
gender-based custody determinations, the legislature abrogated any contrary 
decisions of this court. L.U. Sheep Co. v. Bd. of County Com'rs of the County of 
Hot Springs, Wyoming, 790 P.2d 663 (Wyo. 1990); Matter of Voss' Adoption, 550 P.2d 481, 486 (Wyo. 1976); Snell v. Ruppert, 541 P.2d 1042, 1046 (Wyo. 
1975).

[¶21]   Mother's final issue requires us to 
consider the propriety of awarding custody of the child to the paternal 
grandmother. As found by the district court, there is no dispute about the 
neglected child status. W.S. 14-6-229 (July 1986 Replacement) controls the 
disposition of a case where a child is adjudged to be neglected. It states in 
part:

     (a) When a child is 
adjudged by the court to be neglected, * * *, the court shall enter its decree 
to that effect and make a disposition as provided in this section that places 
the child in the least restrictive environment consistent with what is best 
suited to the protection of the public safety and interest, the physical, mental 
and moral welfare of the child and in accord with the actual facilities 
presently available when the decree is entered.

     (b) If the child is 
found to be neglected the court may:

* * * * * *

     (iii) Transfer 
temporary legal custody to a relative or other suitable adult the court finds 
qualified to receive and care for the child, with or without supervision, 
subject to terms and conditions prescribed by the court[.]

Mother argues 
that the grandmother should be denied custody because she was not a "party" to 
this proceeding. She claims W.S. 14-6-201(a)(xviii) (July 1986 Replacement) 
excludes a grandparent as a party. However, that statute states "`[p]arties' 
include the child, his parents, guardian or custodian, the state of 
Wyoming and any other person made a party by an order to appear." (Emphasis 
added.) Cf. In Interest of WM, 778 P.2d 1106. This list of parties is 
illustrative and not exhaustive. Cf. Town of Pine Bluffs v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 79 Wyo. 262, 333 P.2d 700, 708 (1958).

[¶22]   Reading W.S. 14-6-201(a)(xviii) 
(July 1986 Replacement) in pari materia, e.g., Haddenham v. City of Laramie, 648 P.2d 551 (Wyo. 1982), with W.S. 14-6-229 (July 1986 Replacement), we hold that 
an interested relative of a neglected child may become a party in such an action 
through a motion as made by the grandmother here. In Interest of WM, 778 P.2d 1106 addresses this aspect of custody by a relative.

[¶23]   However, we do find one error with 
the disposition of this case. The order granting custody of MKM to the 
grandmother granted "permanent" custody. Since the statute allows only 
"temporary legal custody" to a relative, W.S. 14-6-229(b)(iii) (July 1986 
Replacement), this must be corrected. It is within the power of this court to 
modify the judgment. Slane v. Curtis, 41 Wyo. 402, 288 P. 12 (1930). We do so 
and remand the matter to the juvenile court to issue an order reflecting this 
modification. W.S. 14-6-231(b) and (c) (July 1986 Replacement) explain that an 
order of temporary custody remains in effect until terminated by the court upon 
a finding that its purpose has been achieved and the child's best interests have 
been served, or when the child reaches the age of eighteen or graduates from 
high school. Thus, the juvenile court will have continuing supervision over MKM 
until one of these three conditions have been achieved. For this child, the time 
has come to provide some stability. The order of the district court directed to 
achieve that goal is approved. In Interest of WM, 778 P.2d 1106; Matter of TR, 
777 P.2d 1106 (Wyo. 1989), Urbigkit, J., concurring in the result.

[¶24]   The decision of the district court 
is affirmed with modification.

MACY, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶25]   I concur in the result reached in 
this case; however, I want to briefly address an issue which the majority 
hurried past in its resolution of the case. I question whether a mother's 
parental rights are subject to disposition by the juvenile court when the 
petition contains no allegation charging her with neglect. When neglect is 
alleged against either or both of the parents, Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-226(a) through 
(c) (1977) contemplates a three-stage process: (1) Each parent is advised of the 
specific allegations set forth in the petition and given an opportunity to 
either admit or deny them; (2) if the allegations contained in the petition are 
denied, the court shall conduct an adjudicatory hearing to determine the truth 
of the allegations in the petition; and (3) after an adjudicatory hearing, the 
court shall either dismiss the petition (because the allegations have not been 
established) or enter its decree stating the jurisdictional facts upon which its 
finding of neglect is based.

[¶26]   Focusing on the present case, it 
seems to me that the above process has been compromised when an allegation that 
the father has "neglected" MKM is used to affect the mother's parental rights. A 
parent's rights, vis-a-vis the child, are not subject to the juvenile court's 
disposition, Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-229(a) (1977), absent an allegation and finding 
that the parent has committed an act of neglect. In this instance, the only 
allegation of neglect contained in the petition was directed at MKM's father. 
The mother was not put on notice that her conduct constituted neglect, and her 
opportunity under § 14-6-226(a) to deny the allegation was 
curtailed.

[¶27]   Because, as pointed out in the 
majority opinion, the mother participated in subsequent proceedings and was able 
to assert her parental rights, notwithstanding the absence of an allegation of 
neglect directed at her, I agree with the result reached by the 
majority.

 FOOTNOTES

1 W.S. 14-6-202(a) (July 
1986 Replacement) states:

Courts are established in 
each county of the state known as the "Juvenile Court of. . . . County, 
Wyoming." The district court judges of the state shall be the judges of the 
juvenile courts in the counties of their respective districts. Each juvenile 
court shall be a court of record with a seal and the judge, commissioner and 
clerk thereof have power to administer oaths and affirmations.

2 A transcript of this 
hearing is not included in the record.

3 A transcript of this 
hearing is also not included in the record.

4 W.S. 14-6-224 (July 1986 
Replacement) states in part:

(a) Unless a jury trial 
is demanded, hearings under this act shall be conducted by the court without a 
jury in an informal but orderly manner and separate from other proceedings not 
included in W.S. 14-6-203. The district attorney shall present evidence in 
support of the petition and otherwise represent the state.

W.S. 14-6-226 (July 1986 
Replacement) states in part:

(b) If the allegations of 
the petition are denied, the court may, with consent of the parties, proceed 
immediately to hear evidence on the petition or it may set a later time not to 
exceed sixty (60) days for an adjudicatory or a transfer hearing.

5 See n. 4. In a 1987 
amendment, Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 221, § 4 (1987), the permissive language found in 
a prior section of the juvenile code, W.S. 14-6-212(a), was changed from the 
permissive "may" to the mandatory "shall." Some legislative intent can be 
derived from analysis that the permissive term found in W.S. 14-6-226 was 
continued, although the section itself was otherwise amended by Wyo. Sess. Laws 
ch. 50 (1989). Stratman v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 760 P.2d 974, 986 (Wyo. 
1988).