Case Title: Bjugan v. Bjugan

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-11-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Bjugan v. Bjugan1985 WY 196710 P.2d 213Case Number: 84-83Decided: 11/27/1985CHERYL BJUGAN, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

RICHARD C. BJUGAN, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
CHERYL BJUGAN, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

RICHARD C. BJUGAN, 
APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Paul T. Liamos, Jr., 
J.

 
 
Martin J. 
McClain, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Bert T. 
Ahlstrom, Jr., (argued), and Kay Snider Coffman, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, Justice.*

* This case was originally 
assigned to Chief Justice Thomas on September 14, 1984 for the rendering of a 
proffered majority opinion. No such opinion being forthcoming, it was reassigned 
to Justice Cardine on July 30, 1985. Justice Cardine distributed a proffered 
opinion to the court on September 5, 1985.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
a judgment entered pursuant to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act 
(URESA) modifying a child support order previously entered in another 
jurisdiction. We reverse.

[¶2.]     Appellant raises the 
following issues:

"1. Whether in an URESA 
action brought pursuant to § 20-4-101 et seq., W.S. 1977, the responding court 
may modify a support order previously entered in another action or 
proceeding.

"2. If modification is 
permissible, whether the responding court complied with the dictates of 
procedural due process in ordering a modification of an Iowa support 
decree."

[¶3.]     Appellee restates the 
issues as:

"1. Whether in a URESA 
action brought pursuant to § 20-4-101 et seq., W.S. 1977, the responding state 
can modify a support order previously entered in another 
jurisdiction.

2. Whether the district 
court had jurisdiction over the plaintiff to modify the 
decree."

[¶4.]     Cheryl and Richard 
Bjugan were married in Rochester, Minnesota, in December 1966. They had four 
children. On January 12, 1982, after a separation of six months, Cheryl and 
Richard were divorced in Cerro Gordo 
County, Iowa. The 
divorce decree ordered Richard to pay $200 per month per child for child 
support. Richard subsequently moved to Cheyenne, Wyoming, and fell behind in his child support 
payments.

[¶5.]     On May 20, 1983, the 
district court of Laramie 
County, Wyoming, 
received URESA papers from the Cerro Gordo County District Court. The papers 
contained a request for registration of the Iowa divorce decree and enforcement of the 
$800 per month child support obligation and alleged arrearages of $2,267.98. 
Pursuant to the request, the Iowa divorce decree was registered and an 
Order to Appear and Show Cause was served on Richard on June 8, 1983. A hearing 
was held before the Wyoming district court on June 22, 1983. On 
September 27, 1983, judgment was entered against Richard.

[¶6.]     The court found that 
Richard had been delinquent in his child support payments in the amount of 
$2,267.98. However, the court also found that Richard was financially unable to 
pay child support of $800 per month as ordered by the Iowa court. The court, 
therefore, modified the Iowa court's judgment, ordering Richard to pay 
$100 per month toward the arrearage in addition to a monthly child support 
payment of $500. Upon payment in full of the arrearage, the monthly payments 
were to be increased to $600, still $200 less than that which was required by 
the Iowa 
divorce decree.

[¶7.]     Meanwhile, back in 
Iowa, Cheryl had obtained judgment against 
Richard for $3,967.98, the amount of arrearage accumulated under the Iowa divorce decree. On 
November 17, 1983, Cheryl filed a foreign judgment action in Laramie County 
District Court seeking enforcement of the Iowa judgment. Garnishment proceedings began 
on January 10, 1984, and on January 16, 1984, Richard's wages were garnished. 
Richard filed a motion to dissolve the attachment and to stay the garnishment, 
stating that he was in full compliance with the Wyoming court's support order, that he had no notice of 
the Iowa 
proceedings, and that he was not served and did not appear in those 
proceedings.

[¶8.]     On February 27, 1984, 
the trial court entered an Order and Decree of Modification (URESA), finding 
that it had modified the Iowa court's support determination in the URESA action 
in 1983; that Richard had no obligation to pay support or arrearages other than 
what had been ordered in that action; that Richard was, at the time of filing 
the foreign judgment and garnishment, in full compliance with the Wyoming 
court's URESA order; that the appellant's actions in pursuing a foreign judgment 
after Wyoming had assumed jurisdiction pursuant to the URESA action were 
improper; and

"[t]hat the Judgment And 
Order of this Court * * * is supreme so long as the Defendant is within the 
jurisdiction of this Court and is in compliance therewith, and that any other 
ruling would defeat the purpose of the URESA statutes."

The court thus 
reaffirmed its prior URESA judgment, quashed the pending garnishment action and 
any further attempts to enforce the foreign judgment, and expressly held that 
"the Decree of the Iowa Court is modified, accordingly and as set forth 
herein."

[¶9.]     Claiming that the 
Wyoming court lacked jurisdiction to modify the 
Iowa support 
decree, Cheryl Bjugan appealed. Her claim is based in part on § 20-4-130, W.S. 
1977, which provides:

"A responding court shall 
not stay the proceeding or refuse a hearing under this act [§§ 20-4-101 through 
20-4-138] because of any pending or prior action or proceeding for divorce, 
separation, annulment, dissolution, habeas corpus, adoption or custody in this 
or any other state. The court shall hold a hearing and may issue a support order 
pendente lite. In aid thereof it may require the obligor to give a bond for the 
prompt prosecution of the pending proceeding. If the other action or proceeding 
is concluded before the hearing in the instant proceeding and the judgment 
therein provides for the support demanded in the complaint being heard, the court shall conform its support order to 
the amount allowed in the other action or proceeding. Thereafter the court 
shall not stay enforcement of its support order because of the retention of 
jurisdiction for enforcement purposes by the court in the other action or 
proceeding." (Emphasis added.)

Section 
20-4-130, seems to us to concern the effect of fairly contemporaneous 
proceedings in different states upon the URESA action in the responding state 
(Wyoming). 
Thus, it is provided that the URESA action shall not be stayed because of the 
other proceeding, that a support order may be entered pendente lite, and that if 
the other proceeding is concluded before the URESA action, the support award 
shall be conformed to the amount in the other proceeding. Where the proceedings 
are not contemporaneous and a period of time has passed between a support order 
and commencement of the URESA action sufficient that a change in circumstances 
might necessitate modification, it is only reasonable that there be provision 
therefor.

[¶10.]  We have said many times that in 
determining the intent and purpose of a statute every clause must be given 
effect. State ex rel. Albany County Weed 
and Pest Control District v. Board of County Commissioners of County of 
Albany, Wyo., 592 P.2d 1154 (1979); Basin Electric Power Coop. v. State Board of 
Control, Wyo., 578 P.2d 557 (1978). Consideration by this court of a 
legislative enactment should not be confined to a narrow reading of one 
particular section. State ex rel. 
AlbanyCounty Weed and Pest Control District v. Board of 
CountyCommissioners of AlbanyCounty, supra. All portions of an act 
must be read in pari materia. Haddenham 
v. City of Laramie, 
Wyo., 648 P.2d 551 
(1982).

[¶11.]  In light of these well established 
principles, appellant's argument cannot be sustained. It is based on a narrow 
reading of only one section of Wyoming's URESA and fails to consider other 
relevant provisions or the purpose of the act as a whole.

[¶12.]  Among the provisions that must be 
considered is § 20-4-131, W.S. 1977, which provides in 
part:

"A support order made by 
a court of this state pursuant to this act [§§ 20-4-101 to 20-4-138] does not 
nullify and is not nullified by a support order made by a court of this state 
pursuant to any other law or by a support order made by a court of any other 
state pursuant to a substantially similar act or any other law, regardless of 
priority of issuance, unless otherwise 
specifically provided by the court." (Emphasis added.)

[¶13.]  Jurisdictions having similar provisions 
have held that under this section a support order issued by a responding court 
under URESA will have no effect on a prior decree absent a specific provision. 
Matter of Custody of Gulick, Nev., 676 P.2d 801 (1984); Nomer v. Kossman, 100 
Idaho 898, 606 P.2d 1002 (1980). We agree. However, the first order issued by the Wyoming court 
in this case provided

"[t]hat the Court shall 
not modify the Iowa Decree for support at this time, other than as is set forth herein." 
(Emphasis added.)

[¶14.]  This provision demonstrates clearly the 
court's intent to modify the Iowa decree to the extent provided. We find the 
language sufficient to meet the requirements of § 
20-4-131.

[¶15.]  Appellant's argument also ignores § 
20-4-136(a), W.S. 1977, which provides:

"Upon registration, the 
registered foreign support order shall be treated in the same manner as a 
support order issued by a court of this state. It has the same effect and is 
subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating 
or staying as a support order of this state and may be enforced and satisfied in 
like manner."

[¶16.]  The action in this case was commenced in 
Wyoming as a URESA registration proceeding as authorized by § 20-4-134(a), W.S. 
1977. The statement signed by Cheryl Bjugan was entitled "Statement for 
Registration of Foreign Support Order." The letter from the Cerro Gordo County 
Attorney asked the Wyoming court to register the Iowa divorce decree. The 
documents sent complied with the requirements of § 20-4-135(a), W.S. 1977. 
Therefore, pursuant to § 20-4-136(a), the Wyoming court was entitled to treat 
the Iowa decree as if it had been issued by a court of this state and to apply 
applicable Wyoming law in issuing a new order. The general rule in Wyoming is 
that a provision for future support can be modified from time to time in light 
of changing circumstances. Salmeri v. 
Salmeri, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1244 (1976). Under § 20-4-136(a) and Salmeri, we hold that the Wyoming court 
could properly issue its order modifying the support provisions of the foreign 
order.

[¶17.]  Our holding is unaffected by subsections 
(b) and (c) of § 20-4-136 which provide:

"(b) The obligor has 
twenty (20) days after the mailing of notice of the registration in which to 
petition the court to vacate the registration or for other relief. If he does 
not so petition the registered support order is confirmed.

"(c) At the hearing to 
enforce the registered support order the obligor may present only matters that 
would be available to him as defenses in an action to enforce a foreign money 
judgment. If the obligor shows to the court that an appeal from the order is 
pending or will be taken or that a stay of execution has been granted the court 
shall stay enforcement of the order until the appeal is concluded, the time for 
appeal has expired, or the order is vacated, upon satisfactory proof that the 
obligor has furnished security for payment of the support ordered as required by 
the rendering state. If the obligor shows to the court any ground upon which 
enforcement of a support order of this state may be stayed, the court shall stay 
enforcement of the order for an appropriate period if the obligor furnishes the 
same security for payment of the support ordered that is required for a support 
order of this state."

Although these 
subsections could be construed to mean that the obligor must file a special 
petition within the time specified or forever lose his opportunity to seek 
modification, we cannot accept that construction. That modification is one form 
of relief which may be sought by petition under subsection (b) does not mean 
that modification may not be sought by other means at a later date. As 
demonstrated above, subsection (a) clearly and expressly provides that a 
registered foreign support order is to be treated in the same manner as a 
support order issued by a Wyoming court. Support orders issued in Wyoming are 
subject to modification, Salmeri v. Salmeri, supra; a priori foreign support 
orders registered in Wyoming are subject to modification.

[¶18.]  In reaching this result, we are not 
alone. In Monson v. Monson, 85 Wis.2d 
794, 271 N.W.2d 137 (1978), as in this case, the obligor did not petition the 
court within twenty days. Nevertheless, under a provision identical to § 
20-4-136, the court held that an obligor may request modification of a support 
order at any time after it has been registered and that it is immaterial that 
the request for modification is not made within twenty days. Id. at 
138.

[¶19.]  Other courts have said that in enforcing 
a foreign support order:

"[D]ue process requires 
that a court consider any questions of modification raised by either party which 
could have been presented to the courts of the state where the decree was 
originally entered." Alig v. Alig, 
220 Va. 80, 255 S.E.2d 494, 497 (1979).

For these 
reasons, we will not hold that the failure to petition for modification within 
twenty days forecloses the obligor from seeking 
modification.

[¶20.]  We are left with the task of reconciling 
the conflicting provisions of Wyoming's URESA. On the one hand, as illustrated 
above, §§ 20-4-131 and 20-4-136 provide for circumstances under which prior 
foreign decrees may be modified by a Wyoming court. On the other hand, § 
20-4-130, the provision upon which appellant relies, seems to provide, and some 
states have so held, that the responding court must conform its order to the 
amount allowed in any prior or pending action.

[¶21.]  We have said that, when statutory 
language is unclear or ambiguous,

"the court must look to 
the mischief the statute was intended to cure, the historical setting 
surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state, the conclusions of 
law, and other prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances, making use of 
the accepted rules of construction to ascertain a legislative intent that is 
reasonable and consistent." State ex rel. 
Motor Vehicle Division v. Holtz, Wyo., 674 P.2d 732, 736 
(1983).

[¶22.]  The purpose of the Wyoming URESA is "to 
improve and extend by reciprocal legislation the enforcement of duties of 
support." Section 20-4-101, W.S. 1977. The mischief the Act was intended to cure 
was the nonpayment of child support. More specifically, the URESA was intended 
to provide an inexpensive, simplified and effective means of enforcing the duty 
of support owed by the obligor in one state to the obligee in another state. Clarkston v. Bridge, 273 Or. 68, 539 P.2d 1094, 81 A.L.R.3d 1166 (1975). It is well recognized that the function of 
the responding court is not only to determine whether a duty of support exists, 
but to establish an effective means of enforcing that duty. Vigil v. Vigil, 30 Colo. App. 452, 494 P.2d 609 (1972); State ex rel. Dewyea v. 
Knapp, Mont., 674 P.2d 1104 (1984). The power to enforce a child support 
order necessarily includes the power to modify the order. In re Marriage of Straeck, 156 Cal. App. 3d 617, 203 Cal. Rptr. 69, 71 (1984). It would be inconsistent to give a 
responding court the authority to enforce support duties while denying it the 
authority to enter a reasonable and effective order capable of enforcement. In 
many instances, an exspouse's failure to pay is due to his or her inability to 
pay. Modification of the original decree may under these circumstances 
constitute the only realistic means of obtaining compliance. If the obligor 
simply cannot pay the sum originally ordered, little is accomplished by 
demanding immediate payment of the full amount. Modification provides some 
assurance that the obligee will receive something as opposed to nothing. As we 
have noted, the amount of support to be given in the future must be subject to 
modification in light of changing circumstances. Salmeri v. Salmeri, supra. For these 
reasons, we hold that the URESA confers authority on a responding court to 
modify a foreign support order.

[¶23.]  As further support for our holding, we 
note § 20-4-137, W.S. 1977, which provides:

"This act [§§ 20-4-101 to 
20-4-138] shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make 
uniform the law of those states which enact it."

[¶24.]  A review of cases from other 
jurisdictions demonstrates that our holding is consistent with the majority 
view. Annot., 31 A.L.R.4th 347 (1984). To hold that modification is not 
permissible under our URESA would, therefore, defy the legislative directive 
contained in § 20-4-137. That provision requires this court to construe our 
URESA in a manner that is consistent with the construction given it by other 
courts. It is our duty to seek uniformity in the application of the 
URESA.

[¶25.]  The Act is not a model of statutory 
draftsmanship. Its provisions are unclear and conflicting and are, therefore, 
susceptible to differing interpretations. Complete uniformity may not be 
possible. However, keeping in mind the directive of § 20-4-137 and having 
reviewed the history and purpose of the URESA, the intent of the legislature and 
the language of the Act itself, we find that the trial court had jurisdiction to 
modify the foreign support order. Having authority to modify does not mean that 
the court will modify. It may enforce the Iowa decree as originally entered if 
dictated by the circumstances, or some sympathetic judge may modify so that the 
burden of required payments are realistically attainable and the wife will 
receive something rather than nothing.

[¶26.]  We turn now to the question of whether 
the trial court's authority to modify extends only to future support payments or 
to past-due payments as well. It is true that once arrearages become vested with 
the attributes of a judgment, they cannot be modified. Salmeri v. Salmeri, supra. However, 
until they are established by a formal order or decree of the court as past due 
and owing, a final judgment does not exist and such payments may be modified in 
the same manner as future support payments. 

[¶27.]  While often cited for the proposition 
that arrearages cannot be modified, Salmeri v. Salmeri, supra, is 
distinguishable. Salmeri involved two 
separate foreign judgments. The first was a judgment nisi issued by the New 
Jersey court dissolving the marriage of the parties and ordering payment of 
support. We found that judgment subject to modification by the Wyoming court. 
The second was a final judgment of the New Jersey court declaring a definite and 
fixed sum of money due and owing for past-due payments under the original 
judgment. We found that the second judgment had the same force and effect as any 
other money judgment, that it constituted a lien upon the property of the 
defendant permitting execution and that it was not subject to the discretion of 
the court. We said that where a court has issued a final judgment that payments 
are past due and owing, the judgment may not be modified to allow payment over a 
period of time or be subjected to qualifications that do not pertain to other 
types of final money judgments. We noted further that statutes authorizing the 
court to alter a support decree should not be construed as permitting judicial 
interference with or modification of what has become a final money judgment. 
Finally, we noted that the fact that a final judgment for a fixed sum of money 
grows out of a divorce action does not authorize the courts to extend the time 
for payment or otherwise modify payments.

[¶28.]  In the present case, we are asked to 
determine only whether the trial court had jurisdiction to modify the order of 
support contained in the original divorce decree. There was no subsequent 
judgment by the Iowa court declaring support payments past due and owing. 
Therefore, under Salmeri v. Salmeri, 
supra, there was no final money judgment, and the Wyoming court had jurisdiction 
to modify payment of the arrearages.

[¶29.]  Having concluded that the URESA confers 
authority upon a responding court to modify a prior decree, we must consider 
whether in this case the court's order did in fact modify the Iowa decree. 
Appellee contends the Wyoming court's order did not constitute a modification; 
that by using the Iowa decree to determine the amount of arrearage, the judge in 
fact conformed his order to the original decree. We find appellee's argument 
unpersuasive. To say that the order changed the amount to be paid each month but 
did not modify the original decree is nonsensical. Modification means to change, 
enlarge, or reduce; to modify is to change or alter in a quantitative sense. 
Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). We simply cannot accept the argument that 
an order reducing monthly payments from $800 to $600 and providing for payment 
of arrearages in monthly installments is not a modification. In our view any 
change in the amount, manner or method of payment constitutes a modification. If 
an order does not conform to the original decree, it is a 
modification.

[¶30.]  While holding that the trial court had 
jurisdiction to modify the foreign support order under the URESA, we cannot 
uphold the modification under the circumstances presented here. The Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits any taking of property 
without due process of law. Notice and an opportunity to defend are 
unquestionably incident to due process. Tanner v. Tanner, Wyo., 482 P.2d 443 
(1971). In proceedings for modification of a divorce decree the general rule is 
that an opportunity to be heard is required. Tanner v. Tanner, supra. Other courts 
have extended application of that rule to URESA cases and have held that unless 
the URESA petitioner has prior notice of a modification proceeding and an 
opportunity to protect his or her interests therein, the order cannot be 
modified. Rondy v. Rondy, 13 Ohio 
App.3d 19, 468 N.E.2d 81 (1983).

[¶31.]  In the present case, appellant brought a 
URESA action for the single purpose of obtaining payment of past due support. 
When the hearing began she did not know that the court would go beyond 
enforcement of the Iowa judgment and undertake modification of it. She received 
no notice that a modification was contemplated. There was no petition to modify 
and there were no pleadings. Appellant had no way of knowing that her right to 
support in the future would be modified at the hearing. The prosecuting attorney 
appeared on her behalf solely to determine if the proper defendant was before 
the court and to seek enforcement of past due support payments. Under these 
circumstances, the trial court's modification cannot be upheld. Where the 
responding court on its own initiative or upon motion of a party determines that 
modification is proper, notice and an opportunity to present evidence must be 
given to the obligee.

[¶32.]  For the reasons stated, we hold that 
although a responding court has the authority under the URESA to modify a prior 
support order, the modification in this case violated appellant's due process 
rights and, therefore, cannot be upheld.

[¶33.]  Reversed and remanded for future 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

THOMAS, 
C.J., 
filed a specially concurring opinion.

BROWN, 
J., 
filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which ROONEY, J., 
joined.

THOMAS, Chief Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶34.]  I concur in the result which is reached 
by the majority opinion in this case. I am not, however, satisfied that this is 
the case in which to treat with the problem of whether child support obligations 
which have not been paid are subject to modification as are future child support 
payments. Because we hold that the modification was not accomplished by the 
trial court in this case on the ground that no notice was furnished to the 
obligee, I am convinced we should await a case in which we find that a 
modification was accomplished by a district court order before we treat with the 
propriety of modifying child support payments that are in 
arrears.

[¶35.]  I would construe the provisions of § 
20-4-136, W.S. 1977, in a different fashion than does the majority of the court. 
I would hold that the thrust of these statutory provisions is to give to the 
original Iowa decree, registered and confirmed as a foreign support order, 
substantially the same effect that this court afforded the New Jersey judgment 
for a fixed sum of money in Salmeri v. 
Salmeri, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1244 (1976). The statutory language of § 
20-4-136(c), W.S. 1977, is: "At the hearing to enforce the registered support 
order the obligor may present only matters that would be available to him as 
defenses in an action to enforce a foreign money judgment." In Salmeri v. Salmeri, supra, at 554 P.2d 1248, this court said:

"If, then, we are to give 
full faith and credit to that judgment we must hold that it is not subject to 
attack in this state except on grounds that would permit attack upon any other money judgment, such as want 
of jurisdiction in the court entering the judgment or lack of service so as to 
vest jurisdiction over the defendant." (Emphasis added.)

The effect of 
both our statute and our precedent is to foreclose the modification of the 
unpaid child support obligation in an instance such as 
this.

[¶36.]  Lastly, it seems to me that we need to 
further consider the effect of the filing of the later Iowa judgment which 
reduced the arrearage of child support payments to a money judgment of 
$3,967.98. We, in effect, have set aside the judgment of the District Court of 
the First Judicial District which purported to modify the Iowa support decree, 
and upon which the district judge relied in concluding that the filing of the 
foreign money judgment was of no efficacy because it was contrary to his order. 
Since the modification order has been set aside, it would be my judgment that 
now the Iowa judgment for $3,967.98 must be recognized in Wyoming, in accordance 
with Salmeri v. Salmeri, supra, and 
that the holding of that precedent is sound to the effect that whatever it may 
do with respect to future child support the Wyoming court is without authority 
after this reversal to modify that Iowa money judgment.

BROWN, 
J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which ROONEY, J., 
joins.

[¶37.]  I agree with the result reached by the 
majority opinion for the reasons stated. But I cannot agree with the rule of law 
set forth in the majority opinion which states:

"* * * [U]ntil they 
[arrearages] are established by a formal order or decree of the court as past 
due and owing, a final judgment does not exist and such payments may be modified 
in the same manner as future support payments."

[¶38.]  Such a rule encourages a person to 
default in his support payments whilst avoiding process of the court that 
originally ordered support. He later surfaces at a fortuitous time in a more 
favorable jurisdiction, with a large arrearage, and may be able to convince a 
sympathetic judge to forgive his dereliction. In Salmeri v. Salmeri, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1244 
(1976), we held that a judgment for arrearages was not subject to modification, 
and a divorce decree could only be modified as to future alimony and support 
payments.

[¶39.]  The majority's distinction that an 
obligation to pay arrearages must be reduced to a formal judgment before a court 
lacks authority to modify it seems untenable. The proposition remains that one 
seeking exoneration from arrearages in support payments may find a sympathetic 
judge elsewhere who is willing to grant him absolution from his 
sins.