Case Title: State v. Denney

Citation: 418 P.2d 468, 69 Wash. 2d 436

Docket Number: 

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1966-09-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
69 Wn.2d 436 (1966) 418 P.2d 468 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. DELBERT ELWOOD DENNEY, Appellant.[*] No. 38484. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department One. September 29, 1966. *437 Douglas A. Wilson, for appellant. Lincoln E. Shropshire, Wiley G. Hurst, and Walter B. Dauber, for respondent. LANGENBACH, J.[] The defendant was convicted of the crime of an attempt to obtain a narcotic drug by fraud, deceit, misrepresentation or subterfuge. He has appealed. Another man was likewise charged with the same offense. He pleaded guilty and testified for the state. The defendant did not testify. The appeal was perfected upon a short record. There was sufficient evidence to establish the following facts to the satisfaction of the jury which found him guilty. The codefendant testified he had known appellant for years. Prior to the time in question, he had procured narcotics from a drugstore in a like manner. He had telephoned the drugstore pretending to be a certain doctor and had received a prescription to get the desired drug. He had gone to the drugstore and obtained the narcotic. He had so informed appellant, who became interested in procuring narcotics. The accomplice agreed that he would attempt to get a further prescription for drugs in this same manner and would notify the appellant if successful. This was done and appellant was so informed. He was to go with the accomplice to the drugstore, where he would enter and ask for the prescription for the drug as "brother-in-law of Dick Reynolds." This was the name the accomplice said he had used in ordering the false prescription. They proceeded to the drugstore; appellant entered alone and made the necessary inquiry using this assumed name for identification purposes. The druggist refused to deliver the drug. The appellant left immediately and reported what had happened to the codefendant, who thereafter telephoned the drugstore about the matter. He was informed that the *438 druggist had telephoned the doctor who stated he had not made such a request of them for such a prescription. The two clerks who were in the drugstore at that time, as witnesses, stated the appellant resembled the person who had been in their store and had made the request for the execution of this prescription for the drug as such brother-in-law of Dick Reynolds. There was testimony that the drug sought was a narcotic and could be dispensed only upon the written prescription of a doctor. Appellant's main contention was that neither he nor his codefendant knew the drug sought was a Class A narcotic and banned under the narcotic statute. The accomplice knew that he had received another narcotic in this same manner a short time before. Both knew that some kind of a narcotic was being sought at the time and manner in question. Both knew it was sought under an assumed name and in a surreptitious method. When the drug was refused, appellant left the store at once and reported his failure to his codefendant. This would indicate scienter on his part. The first assignment of error was that there was no evidence or inference from evidence to establish the fact that appellant, in attempting to get the prescription, knew that it was for a narcotic drug banned by the Narcotic Drug Act, RCW 69.33. The evidence showed that appellant sought the prescription under an assumed name and when it was refused he immediately left the store. Had this been an innocent venture, certainly more would have been done to secure possession of the prescription and its content. The evidence further showed that these two men had discussed narcotics and their acquisition; they had considered this plan of procedure and had planned to carry it out jointly. Thus, they were participi criminis in this undertaking. [1] In support of this assignment, appellant cited State v. Christensen, 55 Wn.2d 490, 348 P.2d 408 (1960): "The rule is clear in this state that for a defendant to be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, two essential elements must be established, (1) criminal intent, and (2) some form of overt act. [Citing cases.]" That opinion, at 491, quoted *439 State v. Leach, 36 Wn.2d 641, 219 P.2d 972 (1950), as follows: Both of the elements, criminal intent and overt act, were present here; appellant knew they were engaged in some unlawful activity, in arranging to procure the narcotic in this manner under a false prescription. Also, he went into the drugstore with the avowed purpose of procuring the illicit drug under a fictitious name. Only the refusal of the druggist to deliver the drug prevented the completion of the crime. [2, 3] Appellant also assigned error against the entry of an order denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury, on the ground that there was no evidence or inference of evidence to justify the verdict. This contention is completely answered by the case of State v. Holbrook, 66 Wn.2d 278, 279, 401 P.2d 971 (1965): [4] Appellant further contended that substantial justice demanded that a conviction based upon uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice be set aside. The proof of guilt in this case rested primarily upon the testimony of an accomplice. He cited State v. Badda, 63 Wn.2d 176, 385 P.2d 859 (1963), in support of this proposition. But the court stated, p. 180: [5] Finally, the case of State v. Rosencrans, 24 Wn.2d 775, 778, 167 P.2d 170 (1946), held: There was sufficient evidence, if believed by the jury (as it was) to sustain the verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The judgment and sentence based upon the verdict of guilty must be and is hereby affirmed. ROSELLINI, C.J., HILL, HUNTER, and HALE, JJ., concur. [*] Reported in 418 P.2d 468. [] Judge Langenbach is serving as a judge pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38), state constitution.