Case Title: Commonwealth v. Dossantos

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11790

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11790 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DOUGLAS DOSSANTOS. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     March 2, 2015. - July 1, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Domestic Violence Record Keeping System. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Framingham Division 
of the District Court Department on August 25, 2014. 
 
 
A question of law was reported to the Appeals Court by 
Douglas W. Stoddart, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Alexandra H. Deal for the defendant. 
 
Melissa Weisgold Johnsen, Assistant District Attorney 
(Laura G. Montes, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  In this case, we consider a report of a 
District Court judge pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 34, as 
2 
 
amended, 442 Mass. 1501 (2004),1 concerning G. L. c. 276, § 56A 
(§ 56A), a statute enacted in 2014 as one component of a 
comprehensive package of legislation entitled, "An Act relative 
to domestic violence."  See St. 2014, c. 260, § 30.  Section 
§ 56A requires that in every case in which a person is arrested 
and charged with a crime against the person or property, if the 
Commonwealth alleges that domestic abuse occurred "immediately 
prior to or in conjunction with" the charged crime, the 
Commonwealth is to file a written statement that it does so 
allege, the judge is to make a written ruling that the 
Commonwealth does so allege, and the Commonwealth's written 
statement is then to be entered into the Statewide domestic 
violence record keeping system (DVRS).  For the reasons we 
discuss hereafter, we interpret § 56A to mean that before a 
judge makes a "written ruling that abuse is alleged in 
connection with the charged offense," the judge must inquire 
into and be satisfied that there is an adequate factual basis 
                     
 
1 Rule 34 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
as amended, 442 Mass. 1501 (2004), provides: 
 
 
"If, prior to trial, or, with the consent of the 
defendant, after conviction of the defendant, a question of 
law arises which the trial judge determines is so important 
or doubtful as to require the decision of the Appeals 
Court, the judge may report the case so far as necessary to 
present the question of law arising therein.  If the case 
is reported prior to trial, the case shall be continued for 
trial to await the decision of the Appeals Court." 
 
3 
 
for the allegations of abuse made by the Commonwealth.  In light 
of our construction of the statute's terms, we do not reach the 
constitutional claims raised by the judge's report and the 
defendant. 
 
Background.  Framingham police officers arrested the 
defendant, Douglas Dossantos, on August 24, 2014.  According to 
the police report, the defendant, who was trying to retrieve 
personal belongings from his wife's house, attempted to enter 
the house by pushing an air conditioning unit in through a 
window.  When the defendant's wife saw the defendant at the 
window, she let him inside the house; as the defendant entered, 
he pushed her aside, causing her to lose her balance but causing 
no physical injury.  A criminal complaint issued from the 
Framingham Division of the District Court Department charging 
the defendant with one count of assault and battery on a family 
or household member in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13M (a).2 
 
Upon arraignment, a District Court judge released the 
defendant on conditions.3  Prior to the defendant's release, the 
                     
 
2 General Laws c. 265, § 13M (a), provides:  "Whoever 
commits an assault or assault and battery on a family or 
household member shall be punished" by a fine, imprisonment, or 
both. 
 
 
3 The conditions included requirements that the defendant 
stay thirty yards away from his wife and her residence; he 
communicate with his wife only by telephone, electronic mail, or 
text messaging; and he undergo an evaluation by a health care 
professional who was to file a written opinion with the court 
4 
 
Commonwealth submitted a preliminary written statement pursuant 
to § 56A, alleging that domestic abuse occurred immediately 
prior to or in conjunction with the defendant's charged offense.  
The judge declined to make a "written ruling that [domestic] 
abuse is alleged in connection with the charged offense," see 
§ 56A, but instead reported the case to the Appeals Court 
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 34.  In his report, the judge 
opined that § 56A in part violated the defendant's 
constitutional guarantee of due process, and suggested that the 
statute may violate the separation of powers guarantee of art. 
30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights by interfering 
with the judicial function.  The case was entered in the Appeals 
Court, and we granted the defendant's application for direct 
appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  Section 56A, the text of which is quoted in 
the margin,4 provides that before a judge releases, discharges, 
                                                                  
regarding the defendant's "anger issues."  One day after 
imposing these conditions, the judge terminated the stay-away 
and no-contact conditions of the defendant's release upon a 
motion filed by the defendant's wife requesting termination of 
these conditions so that she and the defendant could attend 
marital counselling together. 
 
 
4 General Laws c. 276, § 56A (§ 56A), provides: 
 
 
"Before a judge of the superior court, district court 
or Boston municipal court releases, discharges or admits to 
bail any person arrested and charged with a crime against 
the person or property of another, the judicial officer 
shall inquire of the commonwealth as to whether abuse, as 
5 
 
or admits to bail a person charged with any crime "against the 
person or property of another," the judge must ask the 
prosecutor whether the Commonwealth alleges that domestic abuse 
"occurred immediately prior to or in conjunction with the crime 
for which the person was arrested and charged."  If the 
                                                                  
defined in [G. L. c. 209A, § 1], is alleged to have 
occurred immediately prior to or in conjunction with the 
crime for which the person was arrested and charged.  The 
commonwealth shall file a preliminary written statement if 
it is alleged that abuse has so occurred.  The judicial 
officer shall make a written ruling that abuse is alleged 
in connection with the charged offense.  Such preliminary 
written statement shall be maintained within the statewide 
domestic violence record keeping system [(DVRS)].  Such 
preliminary written statement shall not be considered 
criminal offender record information or public records and 
shall not be open for public inspection.  Such preliminary 
written statement shall not be admissible in any 
investigation or proceeding before a grand jury or court of 
the commonwealth related to the crime for which the person 
was brought before the court. 
 
 
"If the defendant has been found not guilty by the 
court or jury, or a no bill has been returned by the grand 
jury or a finding of no probable cause has been made by the 
court, the court shall remove the preliminary written 
statement from the statewide [DVRS]; provided however, that 
a dismissal shall not be eligible for removal from the 
statewide [DVRS]. 
 
 
"Nothing in this section shall be construed as 
modifying or limiting the presumption of innocence." 
 
The word "abuse," appearing in the first paragraph of § 56A, is 
defined in G. L. c. 209A, § 1, as "the occurrence of one or more 
of the following acts between family or household members:  (a) 
attempting to cause or causing physical harm; (b) placing 
another in fear of imminent serious physical harm; (c) causing 
another to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by force, 
threat or duress." 
 
6 
 
Commonwealth alleges that domestic abuse occurred, the 
prosecutor must file a "preliminary written statement," and the 
judge must then "make a written ruling that abuse is alleged in 
connection with the charged offense."  Id.  This preliminary 
written statement is to be maintained in the DVRS, but it is not 
considered a public record or criminal offender record 
information, and is not available for public inspection.  Id. 
 
Section 56A also provides that if the crime that triggered 
the Commonwealth's preliminary written statement of abuse is 
ultimately disposed of by (1) a finding of not guilty, (2) a "no 
bill" returned by the grand jury, or (3) a finding of no 
probable cause by the court, the preliminary written statement 
is to be removed from the DVRS.  In the event of a dismissal of 
the charge, however, the statement of abuse is not "eligible for 
removal" from the DVRS.  Id. 
The DVRS is a registry of sorts, established by the 
commissioner of probation pursuant to a statutory directive 
originally enacted in 1992, and includes, among others, records 
of the issuance of and any violations of criminal or civil 
restraining or protective orders.  St. 1992, c. 188, § 7.5  See 
                     
 
5 The relevant part of St. 1992, c. 188, § 7, provides as 
follows: 
 
 
"The commissioner of probation is hereby authorized 
and directed to develop and implement a statewide [DVRS] 
. . . .  Said [DVRS] shall include a computerized record of 
7 
 
Vaccaro v. Vaccaro, 425 Mass. 153, 155 (1997).  Records in the 
DVRS are available only to law enforcement and "judges 
considering petitions or complaints" for restraining and 
protective orders.  See St. 1992, c. 188, § 7. 
 
Consistent with the reporting judge's view, the defendant 
contends that § 56A requires a judge automatically to affirm the 
Commonwealth's allegation of domestic abuse and cause the 
allegation to be recorded in the DVRS, and that this requirement 
for judicial rubber stamping of the prosecutor's abuse 
allegation violates his right to due process.  Also consistent 
with the reporting judge, the defendant further asserts that 
this mandate of § 56A contravenes art. 30 by dictating that the 
executive branch usurp the fact-finding authority of the 
judiciary.  We consider the defendant's arguments in turn. 
 
1.  Due process.  The defendant, citing Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), contends that § 56A offends 
                                                                  
the issuance of or violations of any protective orders or 
restraining orders issued pursuant to [G. L. c. 208, §§ 18, 
34B; G. L. c. 209, § 32], civil restraining orders or 
protective orders issued pursuant to [G. L. c. 209A] or any 
violations of [G. L. c. 209A], or [G. L. c. 209C, §§ 15, 
20].  Further, said computerized [DVRS] shall include the 
information contained in the court activity record 
information system maintained by the office of said 
commissioner.  The information contained in said [DVRS] 
shall be made available to judges considering petitions or 
complaints pursuant to [G. L. c. 208, §§ 18, 34B; G. L. 
c. 209, § 32; G. L. c. 209A; and G. L. c. 209C, §§ 15, 20].  
Further, the information contained in said [DVRS] shall be 
made available to law enforcement agencies." 
8 
 
due process because, as he construes the statute, a judge must 
simply affirm the Commonwealth's allegation of domestic abuse in 
writing without making any independent determination whether the 
allegation has any validity, and must then cause the allegation 
of abuse to be entered into the DVRS -- with the consequence, he 
argues, that thereafter the defendant is labeled as an "abuser" 
in the "eyes of the State," and his "rights in a host of arenas 
in which the [DVRS] plays a role" are compromised.  In the 
defendant's view, due process requirements demand that the judge 
play a meaningful role in assessing the substance of the 
Commonwealth's allegation of domestic abuse.  The thrust of the 
Commonwealth's response is that a judge, in making a "ruling" 
under § 56A that the Commonwealth alleges that domestic abuse 
occurred in connection with the charged offense, is performing 
purely a record-keeping function that does not implicate a 
liberty interest or indeed any protectable interest of a 
defendant, and therefore does not raise any due process 
concerns. 
 
We disagree with the Commonwealth that § 56A is simply a 
record-keeping mechanism that has no consequences for the 
defendant.  As the defendant notes, there are various legal 
proceedings in which a judge may rely on the Commonwealth's 
written statement of abuse allegation, entered into the DVRS 
pursuant to § 56A.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 208, § 34D (judge 
9 
 
considering request for restraining order or order for spouse to 
vacate marital home must search DVRS to determine whether 
defendant has history of domestic abuse).6  However, we need not 
reach the claim that § 56A violates constitutional due process 
guarantees because we interpret the statute's language to 
require, in a case in which § 56A comes into play, that before 
making the statutorily-mandated "ruling," the judge must conduct 
a preliminary inquiry to determine that the Commonwealth's 
allegation of domestic abuse has sufficient factual support to 
warrant its entry into the DVRS for reference and use in later 
proceedings.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Disler, 451 Mass. 216, 228 
(2008), quoting Staman v. Assessors of Chatham, 351 Mass. 479, 
487 (1966) ("Doubts as to a statute's constitutionality 'should 
be avoided if reasonable principles of interpretation permit 
doing so'"). 
 
The judge's report focuses on the first four sentences of 
§ 56A: 
"[1] Before a judge . . . releases, discharges or admits to 
bail any person arrested and charged with a crime against 
the person or property of another, the judicial officer 
shall inquire of the commonwealth as to whether abuse . . . 
is alleged to have occurred immediately prior to or in 
conjunction with the crime for which the person was 
arrested and charged.  [2] The commonwealth shall file a 
preliminary written statement if it is alleged that abuse 
has so occurred.  [3] The judicial officer shall make a 
                     
 
6 See also G. L. c. 209, § 32; G. L. c. 209A, § 7; G. L. 
c. 209C, § 15. 
 
10 
 
written ruling that abuse is alleged in connection with the 
charged offense.  [4] Such preliminary written statement 
shall be maintained within the [DVRS]."7 
 
In seeking to interpret these sentences, we follow the familiar 
rule that a statute is to be construed "so that effect is given 
to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or 
superfluous" (quotations and citation omitted).  Wolfe v. 
Gormally, 440 Mass. 699, 704 (2004).  If the third sentence of 
the statute means only that, where the Commonwealth answers 
"yes" to the judge's question whether abuse is alleged to have 
occurred in connection with the charged offense and the 
Commonwealth files a written statement so stating, the judge is 
then required by the statute to "rule" that abuse is alleged to 
have occurred, the third sentence, in terms of substance, would 
indeed be superfluous.  That is, the second sentence directs the 
Commonwealth, where it alleges that abuse occurred in connection 
with the charged crime, to file a "preliminary written 
statement" so stating, and the fourth sentence directs that the 
Commonwealth's "preliminary written statement" be maintained 
within the DVRS.  A written "ruling" by the judge acknowledging 
                     
7 Although the statute makes reference to a "judge" as well 
as a "judicial officer," we interpret both terms to refer to a 
judge, and in this opinion use only the term "judge" for ease of 
reference.  Furthermore, we read the phrase "in connection with 
the charged offense" in the third sentence of § 56A as 
legislative shorthand that functions as the equivalent of the 
phrase, "immediately prior to or in conjunction with the crime 
for which the person was arrested and charged" that appears in 
the statute's first sentence. 
11 
 
that, just as its preliminary written statement states, the 
Commonwealth alleges abuse has occurred is essentially a formal 
gesture that adds nothing material to the equation. 
Moreover, interpreting § 56A as giving the judge simply the 
ministerial role of confirming that the Commonwealth states it 
has alleged abuse would strip the word or term "ruling" of its 
typical significance.  "Ruling," when used in connection with a 
court or judge, generally connotes an act involving judgment, 
and signifies more than the act of signing a preliminary written 
statement prepared by a prosecutor.  See Black's Law Dictionary 
1533 (10th ed. 2014), quoting R.E. Keeton, Judging 67-68 (1990) 
(defining "ruling" as "outcome of a court's decision either on 
some point of law or on the case as a whole," and noting that 
"in common usage 'legal ruling' [or simply 'ruling'] is a term 
ordinarily used to signify the outcome of applying a legal test 
when that outcome is one of relatively narrow impact").  Cf., 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Spagnolo, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 516, 517 
(1984) (discussing standard of review of ruling on motion to 
suppress, and implying judge's "ruling" involves exercise of 
judgment). 
To give meaning to the reference to the judge's "ruling" -- 
and more particularly the statute's phrase, "a written ruling 
that abuse is alleged in connection with the charged offense" in 
the third sentence of § 56A -- it is appropriate to interpret 
12 
 
the sentence to incorporate a requirement that the judge be 
satisfied that there is an adequate factual basis underlying the 
Commonwealth's allegation of abuse before making the ruling.  
Determining whether there is an adequate factual basis does not 
mean that the judge must determine that there is probable cause 
to believe that abuse occurred in connection with the charged 
offense.  As is made plain by the second paragraph of § 56A, 
which requires the removal of an abuse allegation that is being 
maintained on the DVRS if "a finding of no probable cause has 
been made by the court," the Legislature clearly knew how to 
reference a probable cause standard, and chose not to do so in 
defining the judge's role in connection with the initial 
placement of an abuse allegation statement in the DVRS.  See, 
e.g., Nguyen v. William Joiner Ctr. for the Study of War & 
Social Consequences, 450 Mass. 291, 301 (2007) ("Because the 
Legislature knew how to reference employees specifically when it 
wanted to, its use of the words 'any person' in [the provision 
of the statute at issue] cannot reasonably be construed to 
include prospective employees"). 
Rather, the judge must undertake an inquiry sufficient to 
determine that the alleged facts supporting the Commonwealth's 
proffered allegation of abuse, if deemed credible by a fact 
finder, would be sufficient to warrant or justify a finding of 
"abuse," as the term is defined in G. L. c. 209A, § 1.  More 
13 
 
specifically, the judge must review information concerning the 
abuse allegation proffered by the Commonwealth -- which is 
likely to consist of a police report, but might include other 
material -- and then decide whether this information, assuming 
its credibility, would support a finding of "abuse."8  To 
accomplish this task, the judge is not required to take evidence 
or hold a separate hearing; presumably, the inquiry we describe 
here will be undertaken at the time of arraignment in 
conjunction with the judge's bail determination, as § 56A 
clearly appears to contemplate.  See § 56A, first par.  In 
addition, although § 56A requires the judge's "ruling that abuse 
is alleged in connection with the charged offense" to be in 
writing, the judge's determination of an adequate factual basis 
for the Commonwealth's allegation of abuse need not take the 
form of separate written findings.  It must be clear from the 
record, however, that the judge did determine that a sufficient 
factual basis supporting the Commonwealth's allegation of abuse 
exists. 
2.  Separation of powers.  Our conclusion that § 56A 
requires a judge to make an independent determination that the 
                     
8 It bears emphasis that the judge's task under § 56A is not 
to make a finding whether the allegation of abuse proffered by 
the Commonwealth is credible, but to assume the credibility of 
supporting alleged facts; the sole issue is the sufficiency of 
the presumed-credible facts to show abuse as statutorily 
defined. 
14 
 
case record provides an adequate factual basis to support an 
allegation of domestic abuse obviates the need to consider the 
argument -- made explicitly by the defendant and implicitly in 
the judge's report -- that § 56A violates art. 30 by permitting 
the executive branch to usurp and thereby interfere with the 
judiciary's "core" function of fact finding. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  We respond to the judge's report as 
follows:  G. L. c. 276, §  56A, first par., requires that before 
making "a written ruling that abuse is alleged in connection 
with the charged offense," a judge must first inquire into and 
be satisfied that there is an adequate factual basis for the 
Commonwealth's allegation of abuse.  In view of this response, 
we decline to consider the constitutional questions contained in 
the report. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.