Case Title: James Raulerson V. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
  
CORRECTED OPINION
____________
Nos. SC91611, SC92066, SC92143,
SC92235, SC93114, SC92750,
SC92808, SC92809, SC93274,
SC93334, SC93335, SC93822
____________
JAMES RAULERSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
                                                                             
HECTOR LUCIO,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
                                                                             
-2-
RICKEY PAUL MURRAY,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
                                                                             
ALBERT MICHAEL GLOSTER,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
                                                                             
MICHAEL KEIRN,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
                                                                             
-3-
ROBERT LEE HAWKINS, Jr.
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
                                                                             
JACK ALTON BEEBE,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
                                                                             
TIMOTHY LEWIS GAILLARD,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
                                                                             
-4-
RICHARD E. AUSTIN,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
                                                                             
KEITH JEROME HARVEY,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
                                                                             
JORGE CASTRO,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
                                                                             
-5-
RENIEL SANTIAGO,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
                                                                             
[July 13, 2000]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s decision in
Raulerson v. State, 699 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); the First District Court of
Appeal’s decision in State v. Gloster, 703 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); and
the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision in State v. Keirn, 720 So. 2d 1085
(Fla. 4th DCA 1998), in which the district courts expressly declared that section
322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1995), is constitutional.  Further, we have for review
Murray v. State, 701 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Lucio v. State, 701 So. 2d
127 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Austin v. State, 709 So. 2d 1389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998);
Castro v. State, 710 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Harvey v. State, 710 So. 2d
760 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Gaillard v. State, 707 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998);
Beebe v. State, 706 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Hawkins v. State, 748 So. 2d
1037 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); and State v. Santiago, 713 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 4th DCA
1 We previously granted a motion to consolidate Raulerson, Lucio, and Murray, for all purposes,
and, on our own motion, we consolidated those three cases with Gloster and Keirn for the purposes of oral
argument.  We now consolidate all cases listed in the caption of this opinion for disposition herein.
2 In Pirtle v. State, 700 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), the Third District adopted the position
of the Fifth District in Raulerson, while the Second District in State v. Crossno, 713 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1998), joined the view espoused by the Fourth District in Keirn.  Neither Pirtle nor Crossno are
before us for review, however.
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1998), which cited as controlling authority either Raulerson, Gloster, or Keirn.  We
have jurisdiction.  See Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.; see also Jollie v. State, 405
So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 1981).  On our own motion, we now consolidate all of these
cases for disposition in this opinion.1  As more fully explained below, we agree
with Florida’s District Courts of Appeal2 that section 322.34(1) is constitutional.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1995, the Legislature amended section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.
1994), to provide, in pertinent part, that a person who drives a motor vehicle upon
Florida’s highways while his or her driver’s license or driving privilege is canceled,
suspended or revoked (hereinafter “DWLCSR offense”) is, upon a third
conviction, guilty of a third-degree felony.  See Ch. 95-278, § 1, at 2594, Laws of
Fla.  Previously, a second or subsequent conviction for a DWLCSR offense was a
first-degree misdemeanor.  See § 322.34(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1994).  As a result of
3 The Legislature has amended section 322.34 several times since 1995, and as a result of those
changes, subsection (1) of the 1995 version of the statute is now located in subsection (2) of the statute.
Compare § 322.34(1), Fla. Stat. (1995), with § 322.34(2), Fla. Stat. (1999).  Unlike subsection (1) of
the 1995 statute, subsection (2) of the current statute contains an express knowledge requirement.  See
§ 322.34(2), Fla. Stat. (1999).  For purposes of the constitutional issues before us here, however, the
current version of the statute is substantively identical to the 1995 version.
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the 1995 amendment, section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1995)3, sets forth in full:
(1) Any person whose driver’s license or driving privilege has
been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except
persons defined in s. 322.264, and who drives any motor vehicle upon
the highways of this state while such license or privilege is canceled,
suspended, or revoked, upon:
(a) A first conviction is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree,
punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(b) A second conviction is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree,
punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(c) A third or subsequent conviction is guilty of a felony of the third
degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
In each of the cases before us today, the State charged the defendant with at
least one felony DWLCSR offense pursuant to section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes
(1995).  Each defendant challenged the constitutionality of section 322.34(1),
primarily arguing that the statute constitutes an improper delegation of legislative
power to the judiciary.  See Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const. (“The powers of the state
government shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches.  No
person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of
the other branches unless expressly provided herein.”).  More specifically, the
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defendants asserted that because a trial court may, pursuant to section 948.01,
Florida Statutes (1995), withhold an adjudication of guilt with regard to a
DWLCSR offense, the trial court therefore has the authority to determine whether a
third or subsequent DWLCSR offense constitutes a misdemeanor or a felony.  As
the Legislature has the sole authority and responsibility to define the degree of
substantive criminal offenses, the defendants asserted, the authority of the trial
court to withhold adjudication with regard to a DWLCSR offense
unconstitutionally infringes upon the Legislature’s exclusive authority.
The linchpin of the defendant’s primary constitutional challenge to section
322.34(1) is the assumption that no “conviction” results in a DWLCSR case when
a trial court withholds adjudication.  The defendants in the cases before us asserted
their primary constitutional argument with varying degrees of success in the
respective trial courts, and appeals were taken in those cases to the various District
Courts of Appeal.  In Raulerson, Gloster, and Keirn, the Fifth District, First
District, and Fourth District, respectively, discussed and analyzed whether section
322.34(1) is unconstitutional.  Each of those district courts, along with the Third
District in Pirtle v. State, 700 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (adopting Raulerson
analysis), and the Second District in State v. Crossno, 713 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1998) (adopting Keirn analysis), determined that section 322.34(1) is
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constitutional, but the courts did so on different grounds.  We now briefly
summarize the analysis employed by the district courts in Raulerson, Gloster, and
Keirn.
A. RAULERSON
In Raulerson, the Fifth District found that the dispositive issue in the case
was whether “a defendant’s violation of section 322.34(1) constitutes a conviction
when the sentencing court decides to withhold an adjudication of guilt instead of
entering a judgment against the defendant.”  699 So. 2d at 340.  In analyzing that
issue, the court primarily considered this Court’s decision in State v. Gazda, 257
So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1971), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(2), both
of which include withheld adjudications within the meaning of “conviction.”  See
Raulerson, 699 So. 2d at 340.  After considering Gazda, rule 3.701(d)(2), and
several other authorities, the Fifth District affirmed the trial court’s rejection of
Raulerson’s constitutional challenge to section 322.34(1), reasoning that:
A common sense reading of the instant statute indicates that the
legislature intended the term “conviction” to mean a determination of a
defendant’s guilt by way of plea or verdict.  There appears to be no
requirement that there be an adjudication.  The obvious legislative
intent of section 322.34 is to increase the penalty for repeat violations
of the statute.  The legislative goal is accomplished by application of
the Gazda definition of conviction.  Accordingly, we conclude that the
statute is constitutional.
4 In Raulerson, Judge Harris concurred with Chief Judge Griffin and Judge Antoon in the majority
opinion.  However, Judge Harris also authored a specially concurring opinion.  See 699 So. 2d at 340-42
(Harris, J., concurring and concurring specially).  In that opinion, Judge Harris discussed this Court’s
decision in Wooten v. State, 332 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1976), which, similar to the cases before us, involved a
criminal statute (the DUI statute) providing for progressively more severe sentences for subsequent like
offenses.
-10-
Raulerson, 699 So. 2d at 340.4
B. GLOSTER
In Gloster, the defendant heavily relied upon the decision in State v.
Santiago, 4 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 220, 221 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. Aug. 2, 1996),
reversed, 713 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), wherein the circuit court held
section 322.34(1) to be unconstitutional.  See Gloster, 703 So. 2d at 1175.  In
Santiago, the circuit court reasoned:
Because [section 322.34(1)(c)] requires an adjudication of guilt for the
conduct to be punishable as a felony, and because § 948.01, Fla. Stat.,
allows this Court to withhold adjudication of guilt, this Court has the
unbridled discretion to make the Defendant's conduct a felony or a
misdemeanor by simply exercising its discretion regarding the
withholding of adjudication of guilt.  The Legislature has the sole
authority and responsibility to make the criminal laws, including
classifying transgressions of the criminal law as either a felony or a
misdemeanor.  It is an unconstitutional delegation of the legislative
power to grant to this Court the power to make the Defendant’s
conduct punishable as a felony or a misdemeanor by this Court
exercising its discretion to withhold adjudication of guilt.
4 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 221.  The First District found the circuit court’s
reasoning in Santiago to be flawed because it assumed that “by withholding
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adjudication in a case where a defendant is charged with a violation of section
322.34(1)(c), the result will be that the defendant’s conduct will be treated as a
misdemeanor, rather than a felony.”  Gloster, 703 So. 2d at 1175.  The First District
analyzed section 948.01(2), Florida Statutes, which authorizes a court to withhold
an adjudication of guilt, and noted that a withhold of adjudication is permitted only
if the defendant is placed on probation.  See Gloster, 703 So. 2d at 1176 (citing
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.670).  Based on the interaction between a
withhold of adjudication and placement of the defendant on probation, the First
District concluded:
Pursuant to this statutory scheme, a defendant who has adjudication of
guilt withheld and successfully completes the term of probation
imposed “is not a convicted person.”  Thomas v. State, 356 So. 2d
846, 847 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 361 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1978). 
However, if probation is revoked, the defendant must be adjudicated
guilty of the charged offense. § 948.06(1), Fla. Stat. (1995).
Applying the foregoing statutory scheme to the issue at hand, it
becomes apparent that there are two possible alternatives when one
charged with a violation of section 322.34(1)(c) has adjudication of
guilt withheld and is placed on probation--either the term of probation
will be successfully completed, in which event the defendant will not
have been convicted at all; or probation will be revoked, in which case
the defendant must be adjudicated guilty of a violation of section
322.34(1)(c), and sentenced accordingly.  Treating the charge as a
misdemeanor (as Santiago suggests) is simply not an available
alternative.  Thus, it is clear that section 322.34(1)(c) does not have the
effect ascribed to it in Santiago, and by the trial court below; and,
therefore, does not involve an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power to the judiciary.  See Raulerson v. State, 699 So.2d 339 (Fla.
-12-
5th DCA 1997) (rejecting, on somewhat different grounds, the
contention that section 322.34(1)(c) involves an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power to trial courts).
Gloster, 703 So. 2d at 1176.
C. KEIRN
In Keirn, the Fourth District rejected the circuit court’s ruling in Santiago and
upheld the constitutionality of section 322.34(1).  See Keirn, 720 So. 2d at 1086. 
The Fourth District stated that “[o]ne flaw in Santiago’s reasoning is its assumption
that the term ‘conviction’ as used in section 322.34 requires an adjudication of the
defendant’s guilt.”  Id.  The court noted that while an adjudication of guilty is
generally required for there to be a “conviction,” that term as used in Florida law is
a “chameleon-like term which draws meaning from its statutory context.”  Id.  After
thoroughly analyzing the interaction of section 322.34(1) with other related statutes,
as well as the relevant legislative history surrounding section 322.34(1), the Fourth
District held that “a conviction under section 322.34 occurs after final disposition
of a case, as a result of a trial or plea, without regard to the court’s decision on
adjudication of a defendant, unless the disposition is made pursuant to section
318.14(1), Florida Statutes (1995).”  Id. at 1086.  The Keirn court acknowledged
the Fifth District’s decision in Raulerson, but it did not join in the Raulerson
analysis.  Finally, the Fourth District stated that “[b]ecause our decision turns on
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the definition of a ‘conviction,’ we do not address the other aspects of the
constitutional argument.  Cf. Gloster, 703 So. 2d 1174.” Keirn, 720 So. 2d at 1091.
II. ANALYSIS
After carefully reviewing the decisions of the District Courts of Appeal
upholding the constitutionality of section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1995), we join
in the same conclusion.  In so doing, we agree in large measure with the Fourth
District’s thorough analysis in Keirn because, in our view, the Legislature clearly
intended that the term “conviction” as used in section 322.34(1) include both
adjudications and withheld adjudications in DWLCSR cases, unless the disposition
is made pursuant to section 318.14(10), Florida Statutes (1995).
As stated above, section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1995), prescribes a
progressive scheme of DWLCSR offenses for persons who drive “any motor
vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license or privilege is canceled,
suspended, or revoked.”  The statute specifically provides that, upon a third
“conviction,” a person guilty of a DWLCSR offense is guilty of a third-degree
felony.  See id.  Section 322.01(10), Florida Statutes (1995), defines “conviction”
as follows:
“Conviction” means a conviction of an offense relating to the
operation of motor vehicles on highways which is a violation of this
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chapter or any other such law of this state or any other state, including
an admission or determination of a noncriminal traffic infraction
pursuant to s. 318.14, or a judicial disposition of an offense
committed under any federal law substantially conforming to the
aforesaid state statutory provisions.
From the plain language of section 322.01(10), it is unclear whether or not
the Legislature intended for the term “conviction” to encompass withheld
adjudications.  In Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992), we stated that
“[o]ne of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we
give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless words are defined in
the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature.”  As the Fourth District
recognized in Keirn, however, the term “conviction” as used in Florida law has
been a “chameleon-like” term that has drawn its meaning from the particular
statutory context in which the term is used.  See 720 So. 2d at 1086.  Accordingly,
we must consider how section 322.34 interrelates with other statutory provisions,
as well as the legislative history surrounding the statute, to ascertain the
Legislature’s intent.  See, e.g., Streeter v. Sullivan, 509 So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla. 1987)
(“Were these provisions even slightly ambiguous, an examination of legislative
history and statutory construction principles would be necessary.”).
In considering section 322.34(1) in light of both other related provisions and
the relevant legislative history, we, as did the Second District Court of Appeal in
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Crosso, see 713 So. 2d at 1093, join the view espoused by the Fourth District
Court in Keirn.  Accordingly, we now set forth the relevant portion of the Keirn
court’s thorough analysis of the relationship between section322.34(1) and other
similar statutes and rules, and the legislative history surrounding the statute:
To properly determine the meaning of the term “conviction” in
section 322.34, it is necessary to read that section in conjunction with
other provisions of Chapter 322 and Chapter 318, Florida Statutes,
entitled “Disposition of Traffic Infractions.”  Sections in each chapter
cross-reference the other.  The Chapters have been amended in the
same session laws.  Viewed together, Chapters 318 and 322 comprise
the legislative scheme for regulating  the privilege to drive a motor
vehicle in Florida.
Section 322.263, Florida Statutes (1995), expressly declares the
legislative intent underlying all of Chapter 322:
It is declared to be the legislative intent to:
(1) Provide maximum safety for all persons who
travel or otherwise use the public highways of the state.
(2) Deny the privilege of operating motor vehicles
on public highways to persons who, by their conduct and
record, have demonstrated their indifference for the safety
and welfare of others and their disrespect for the laws of
the state and the orders of the state courts and
administrative agencies.
(3) Discourage repetition of criminal action by
individuals against the peace and dignity of the state . . .
and impose increased and added deprivation of the
privilege of operating motor vehicles upon habitual
offenders who have been convicted repeatedly of
violations of traffic laws.
For section 322.34 suspensions, the legislature has specified
both the type of suspension entitled to leniency and the procedure for
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obtaining a special disposition of a charge.
In 1985, the legislature added subsection 10(a) to section
318.14.  Ch. 85-250, § 2, at 1668, Laws of Fla. Even though section
318.14 was entitled “Noncriminal traffic infractions; exception;
procedures,” section 318.14(10) established a procedure for handling
certain criminal violations.2
[NOTE 2:]  That the legislature intended to include these
criminal violations in the section is evidenced by the
description of the amendment in the title to the bill---
“providing for withholding of adjudication of guilt in
certain traffic infractions and offenses.”  Ch. 85-250,
Laws of Fla.
One of these criminal charges was “operating a motor vehicle with a
license which has been suspended for failure to appear, failure to pay
civil penalty, or failure to attend a driver improvement course.” §
318.14(10)(a) 1, Fla. Stat. (1995).  Under section 318.14(10)(a), any
person cited for such a suspension may,
in lieu of payment of fine or court appearance, elect to
enter a plea of nolo contendere and provide proof of
compliance to the clerk of the court. . . .  In such case,
adjudication shall be withheld; however, no election shall
be made under this subsection if such person has made
an election under this subsection in the 12 months
preceding election hereunder.  No person may make more
than three elections under this subsection.
By enacting this section, the legislature recognized that leniency
was appropriate for certain types of license suspensions.  Subsection
(10) allows a person to reinstate his or her driver's license with the
clerk prior to the court appearance date indicated on the citation or
notice to appear.  Traffic Rule 6.360(b) authorizes the clerk to allow a
person up to 60 additional days to reinstate the license.  If a defendant
still needs additional time to comply with section 318.14(10), a judge
or traffic hearing officer may extend the time for compliance.  Fla. R.
5 The staff analysis explaining the change made to the definition of conviction states, “The word
‘conviction’ is revised to provide that when adjudication is withheld for certain traffic infractions and
offenses, such action shall not be deemed a conviction.”  See Fla. S. Comm. Com., CS for SB 528 (1990)
Staff Analysis 1-2 (final June 7, 1990) (on file with comm.).  Further, the staff analysis provided that the
effect of the proposed amendment was “to provide that drivers who choose to attend a driver training
course . . . not have points applied to their driver’s license.”  Id.
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Traf. Ct. 6.360(b); 6.040(a).
In 1990, the legislature moved away from the “adjudication”
concept in defining a chapter 322 conviction, to make that definition
coincide with those cases reserved for special treatment under section
318.14(10). Ch. 90-230, Laws of Fla. § 3, at 1722.  Prior to the 1990
amendment, a “conviction” was defined as,
an adjudication of guilt; a determination in a court of
original jurisdiction or an administrative proceeding that a
person has violated, or failed to comply with, the law;  a
forfeiture of bail or collateral deposited to secure the
person’s appearance in court, unless such forfeiture is
vacated; a plea of guilty or nolo contend[e]re accepted by
a court;  the payment of a fine, penalty, or court costs,
regardless of whether such fine, penalty, or cost is
rebated, suspended, or probated; a ruling which
withholds adjudication; or a violation of a condition of
release.
§ 322.01(10), Fla. Stat. (1989) (emphasis supplied).  Significantly,
since this section defined “a ruling which withholds adjudication” as a
conviction, a withhold of adjudication in a suspension case under
section 318.14(10) would still have counted as a conviction for the
purpose of Chapter 322.[5]
The legislature remedied this anomaly in 1990 by eliminating the
1989 version of section 322.01(10), redefining a conviction under that
section, and adding a section addressing the relationship between a
withhold of adjudication and a conviction.  Ch. 90-230, Laws of Fla.
§§ 2, 3, at 1722.  These amendments were to operate “retroactively to
July 1, 1989,” prior to the effective date of the 1989 version of section
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322.01(10).  Id.; see ch. 89-282, Laws of Fla. § 3, at 1664.  The 1990
amendment defined “conviction” without reference to an adjudication,
reflecting a legislative intent to remove that concept from the Chapter
322 “conviction” equation.  The amendment adopted the current form
of the statute, which states,
“Conviction” means a conviction of an offense relating to
the operation of motor vehicles on highways which is a
violation of this chapter or any other such law of this
state or any other state, including an admission or
determination of a noncriminal traffic infraction pursuant
to s. 318.14, or a judicial disposition of an offense
committed under any federal law substantially conforming
to the aforesaid state statutory provisions.
§ 322.01(10), Fla. Stat. (1995); ch. 90-230, § 3, at 1722, Laws of Fla.
The focus of this definition is whether an offense was
committed and not on the judicial decision of whether to impose or
withhold adjudication.  For example, the definition includes a “judicial
disposition” of federal offenses, language signifying the closing of a
case without regard to the adjudication of guilt.  Similarly, for a traffic
infraction, the definition refers not to an adjudication, but to an
“admission or determination,” words that precisely echo the language
of section 318.14.  From issuance of the citation through conviction,
section 318.14 sets out the procedure for handling a traffic infraction
without any mention of an adjudication of guilt.3
[NOTE 3]: Section 318.14(4) provides that a person
charged with an infraction may pay the civil penalty by
mail or in person within 30 days of receiving the citation. 
If the person does so, “he or she shall be deemed to have
admitted the infraction and to have waived his or her right
to a hearing on the issue of commission of the
infraction.”  Id. (emphasis supplied).  If the person
requests a hearing, the presiding judge or hearing officer
shall “make a determination as to whether an infraction
has been committed.” § 318.14(5), Fla. Stat. (1995)
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(emphasis supplied).  A “determination” under the statute
goes only to the occurrence of the infraction; it has
nothing to do with an adjudication of guilt.  A
“determination” may occur as the result of a final hearing
or plea.  A “determination” that an infraction has been
committed may arise from a no contest plea.  See Vinson
v. State, 345 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1977); Stewart v. State, 586
So. 2d 449 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).  When a report of “a
determination or admission of an infraction is received by
the department, it shall proceed to enter the proper
number of points on the licensee’s driving record in
accordance with s. 322.27.”  § 318.14(8), Fla. Stat.
(1995) (emphasis supplied).  Section 322.27(3), Florida
Statutes (1995), provides for a point system for
“convictions of violations of motor vehicle laws.”
In the same 1990 statute that changed section 322.01(10)’s
definition of conviction, the legislature added section 318.14(11),
which provides: 
If adjudication is withheld for any person charged or cited
under this section, such action shall not be deemed a
conviction.
Ch. 90-230, § 2, at 1722, Laws of Fla.  It is significant that the
legislature included section 318.14(11) in the same session law that
redefined a conviction.  If a withhold of adjudication on a criminal
charge generally did not constitute a conviction, then subsection (11)
would have been unnecessary.
The adoption of subsection (11) evidences the legislative intent
that all dispositions of driving under suspension charges amount to
convictions under section 322.01(10), unless adjudication has been
withheld pursuant to the procedures of section 318.14(10), for the
three types of license suspensions enumerated in that section.  This
interpretation is consistent with the stated legislative intent found at
section 322.263.  The legislature has placed a  ceiling on both the
frequency and the number of times a person may avoid the full
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sanction of a license suspension—one time every twelve months and
three elections in a lifetime.  A disposition outside of the section
318.14(10) procedure, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld
or imposed, is a “conviction” within the meaning of section
322.01(10), which can be used to habitualize under section
322.264(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1995), or for aggravation under
section 322.34.
The Rules of Traffic Procedure mirror section 318.14(11).  Rule
6.560 states that elections under “section 318.14(9) or (10) . . . when
adjudication is withheld, shall not constitute convictions.”  Rule 6.291
governs “procedures on withheld adjudication in driving while license
suspended.”  Rule 6.291(d) provides:
(d) Convictions. Elections under section 318.14(10),
Florida Statutes, when adjudication is withheld, shall not
constitute convictions as that term is used in chapter 322,
Florida Statutes.
Rule 6.291(d) and the last sentence of Rule 6.560 explicitly tie the
absence of a Chapter 322 conviction in suspension cases to the
withholding of adjudication under section 318.14(10) procedures, and
not to a withhold of adjudication in any other situation.4
[NOTE 4]: This is in contrast to the treatment accorded
traffic infractions by the Florida Rules of Traffic
Procedure.  Rule 6.560 indicates that an "admission or
determination that a defendant has committed a traffic
infraction shall constitute a conviction as that term is used
in Chapter 322 . . . unless adjudication is withheld by an
official in those cases in which withholding of
adjudication is not otherwise prohibited by statute or rule
of procedure.”  (Emphasis supplied).  The italicized
portion of the Rule was added in 1984.  In re Florida
Rules of Practice and Procedure for Traffic Courts, 458
So. 2d 1112, 1115 (Fla. 1984).  Section 318.14(9) was
adopted in 1985.  Ch. 85-250, § 2, at 1688, Laws of Fla. 
Rule 6.560 was later amended to add a specific reference
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to section 318.14(9).  Rule 6.560 contracts the Chapter
322 definition of an infraction conviction, by eliminating
those infractions for which there was a “determination”
under section 318.14(5), but for which adjudication has
been withheld.  For criminal violations, there is no rule of
traffic procedure similar in effect to Rule 6.560.
Outside of section 318.14, a judge is authorized to withhold
adjudication in criminal cases if he or she places a defendant on
probation.  See Waite v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 681 So. 2d 901 n. 1
(Fla. 4th DCA 1996); State v. Gloster, 703 So. 2d 1174, 1175 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1997); §§ 948.01(2); 921.187(1)(a)3; Fla. Stat. (1997); Fla. R.
Crim. P. 3.670.  These types of dispositions fall outside of Chapter
322’s definition of a conviction.
Given this construction of the term “conviction,” the concern
noted by the trial judge does not exist.  Even if the judge in this case
were to withhold adjudication on the driving while license suspended
charge after a plea or verdict, such a disposition would still amount to
a third “conviction” under section 322.34(1)(c), because it is a
disposition outside of section 318.14(10).
Keirn, 720 So. 2d at 1088-90.
As aptly explained by the Fourth District in Keirn, it is clear that the
Legislature intended that a “conviction” for the purposes of section 322.34(1),
Florida Statutes (1995), include both adjudicated DWLCSR offenses and
DWLCSR offenses in which adjudication is withheld.  Construing the term
“conviction” in such a manner is consistent with both the Legislature’s expressed
intent in chapter 322, Florida Statutes, and the legislative history surrounding
section 322.34(1).  Accordingly, we reject each petitioners’ separation of powers
6 We decline to address the ancillary arguments raised by the petitioners in Keirn, Castro, Beebe,
Gaillard, and Hawkins.
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challenge to section 322.34(1),6 and approve the result reached by the district
courts in each of the decisions under review.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Twelve Cases Consolidated:
SC91611
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Statutory Validity
 Fifth District - Case No. 5D97-710 
(Marion County)
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Kenneth Witts, Assistant Public Defender,
Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida; and Glen P. Gifford, Assistant
Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Mary G. Jolley, Assistant Attorney
General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Respondent
SC92066
-23-
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
 Fifth District - Case No. 5D97-168 
(Marion County)
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and James R. Wulchak, Chief, Appellate Division,
Assistant Public Defender, and Kenneth Witts, Assistant Public Defender, Seventh
Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida; and Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public
Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Mary G. Jolley and Kristen L.
Davenport, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Respondent
SC92143
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
 Fifth District - Case No. 5D97-707 
(Marion County)
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Brynn Newton, Assistant Public Defender,
Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida; and Glen P. Gifford, Assistant
Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Mary G. Jolley, Assistant Attorney
-24-
General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Respondent
SC92235
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Statutory Validity
 First District - Case No.1D96-4559
(Escambia County)
Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee,
Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Tallahassee, Bureau
Chief Criminal Appeal, and Mark C. Menser, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee,
Florida; and Mary G. Jolley, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Respondent
SC93114
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Statutory Validity
Fourth District - Case No.4D96-4001
(Broward County)
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Karen E. Ehrlich, Assistant Public
Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida,
-25-
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Celia A. Terenzio, Bureau Chief and
Rochelle L. Kirdy, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida; and Mary
G. Jolley, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Respondent
SC92750
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
First District - Case No. 1D97-2500 
(Escambia County)
Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee,
Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Tallahassee Bureau
Chief, Criminal Appeals, and J. Ray Poole, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee,
Florida,
for Respondent
SC92808
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
First District - Case No.1D97-2121
-26-
(Escambia County)
Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee,
Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Tallahassee Bureau
Chief, Criminal Appeals, and J. Ray Poole, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee,
Florida,
for Respondent
SC92809
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
 First District - Case No.1D97-2120
(Escambia County)
Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee,
Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Tallahassee Bureau
Chief, Criminal Appeals, and J. Ray Poole, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee,
Florida,
for Respondent
SC93274
-27-
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
 First District - Case No.1D97-2731
(Columbia County)
Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee,
Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Tallahassee Bureau
Chief, Criminal Appeals, and J. Ray Poole, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee,
Florida,
for Respondent
SC93334
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Statutory Validity
First District - Case No.1D97-1963
(Escambia County)
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Kathleen Stover, Assistant Public Defender,
Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Tallahassee Bureau
Chief, Criminal Appeals, and J. Ray Poole and L. Michael Billmeier, Assistant 
Attorneys General, Tallahassee, Florida,
-28-
for Respondent
SC93335
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Statutory Validity
First District - Case No.1D97-287
(Columbia County)
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Kathleen Stover, Assistant Public Defender,
Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Tallahassee Bureau
Chief, Criminal Appeals, and J. Ray Poole and L. Michael Billmeier, Assistant
Attorneys General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent
SC93822
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Statutory Validity
Fourth District - Case No.4D96-2818
(Broward County)
 
H. Dohn Williams, Jr., Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
-29-
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Celia A. Terenzio, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Bureau Chief, and Joseph A. Tringali, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm
Beach, Florida,
for Respondent