Case Title: BOSWELL v. SCHULTZ

Citation: 

Docket Number: 104840

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2007-12-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
BOSWELL v. SCHULTZ  BOSWELL v. SCHULTZ 2007 OK 94 175 P.3d 390 Case Number: 104840 Decided: 12/04/2007 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA CODY HARRISON BOSWELL AND, CHERYL BOSWELL, Petitioners, v. KANDEE SCHULTZ, Respondent, and VICKI L. ROBERTSON, Judge of the District Court, real party in interest. APPLICATION TO ASSUME ORIGINAL JURISDICTION AND PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND WRIT OF PROHIBITION Honorable Vicki L. Robertson, Trial Judge ¶O The petitioners, Cody and Cheryl Boswell, filed a lawsuit against the respondent Kandee Schultz, seeking to recover damages for personal injuries sustained from an automobile accident. The respondent requested that the petitioners undergo medical examinations pursuant to ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ASSUMED; WRITS GRANTED. Howard Israel, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. for Petitioners. KAUGER, J: ¶1 The issue presented is whether a party to a lawsuit who is required to undergo a medical examination pursuant to FACTS ¶2 On July 28, 2006, the petitioners, Cody and Cheryl Boswell, filed a lawsuit against the respondent, Kandee Schultz, seeking to recover damages for personal injuries sustained from an automobile accident. As part of the pretrial discovery process, the respondent sought to have the petitioners undergo medical examinations by a doctor of respondent's choice pursuant to ¶3 The respondent chose Dr. Winzenread (doctor) to examine the petitioners. On May 24, 2007, the petitioner, Cody Boswell, showed up for his examination with his lawyer, who brought along a video camera. The attorney began videotaping as soon as he entered the doctor's office, but was asked to stop by the doctor's receptionist. Apparently the doctor's policy was not to allow videotaping because it was: 1) an invasion of the privacy of the other patients in the office; 2) annoying and distracting to the doctor; and 3) intrusive and an interferance with the doctor's examination. The petitioners refute the doctor's excuses, pointing out in the response to the motion to compel that the reason given at the time was that "unless the attorney who actually had - has the case scheduled and is paying for the exam - um- unless that attorney gives us permission or gives someone permission to videotape at the time, then it is not done." ¶4 Because the parties were unable to agree whether to allow the videotaping, the examination did not take place. The doctor also indicated that an examination of the other petitioner, Cheryl Boswell, would not take place either. On May 25, 2007, the respondent filed a Motion to Compel, requesting that the trial court order the petitioners submit to the examination because they had no legal basis to demand to videotape the examinations. The respondent also sought attorney's fees and costs incurred in filing the motion and cancelling the doctor's appointments. On July 5, 2007, the trial court granted the respondent's motion to compel. On July 11, 2007, the petitioners filed an application to assume original jurisdiction in this Court. ¶5 A PARTY TO A LAWSUIT WHO IS REQUIRED TO SUBMIT TO A MEDICAL EXAMINATION PURSUANT TO ¶6 The respondent argues that there is no legal basis to support the petitioners' demand to video the examination. The petitioners counter that: 1) 12 O.S. 2001 §32353 does not prohibit a person who is required to undergo a medical examination from videotaping the examination; and 2) the person being examined has a right to demand videotaping because it would have probative value and provide reliable proof if a doctor were biased and merely acting as a partisan for the opposing party. ¶7 In the nineteenth century, the United States Supreme Court in Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 , 11 S. Ct. 1000, 35 L. Ed. 734 (1891) expressed the common law view that court-ordered medical examinations were repugnant to a person's privacy and bodily integrity.4 However, over time and by at least the 1960's this view was no longer valid and this Court began to allow medical examinations of plaintiffs in personal injury suits recognizing that: 1) the object of all court litigation was, as far as possible, to arrive at the truth and administer justice; and 2) when persons appeal to the courts for justice, they are impliedly agreeing to make any disclosures which are necessary to be made in order that justice may be done.5 In other words, just as a plaintiff may be entitled to redress for an injury caused by a defendant, the defendant is entitled to verify the existence and extent of the injury. ¶8 Title 12 O.S. 2001 §32356 was apparently born out of this controversy, because it statutorily sets forth the procedures for obtaining through discovery physical and mental examinations of parties to a lawsuit. Subsections (A) and (B) govern when the party's physical condition is an element of that party's claim or defense,7 while subsection (C) governs when the party's physical condition is not an element of that party's claim or defense.8 When a party's physical condition is in controversy and is relied upon as an element of that party's claim or defense, as it is in the instant cause, an adverse party "may take" a physical examination of the party.9 A representative of the party to be examined is expressly authorized to be present at the examination.10 After the examination, a detailed written report of the examiner setting out the findings, results, diagnoses, and conclusions is required.11 ¶9 The Legislature, in §3235(B), authorized a party to request conditions for the medical examination and allowed the trial court to impose conditions regarding the examination, but did not specify precisely what "conditions" are to be allowed.12 In McCullough v. Mathews, 1995 OK 90, ¶¶1-2, 918 P.2d 25 , the Court assumed original jurisdiction to determine whether anything or anyone other than the party being examined and the physician doing the examining, should be allowed in the examination room. ¶10 McCullough, construing §3235(D), recognized that the statute expressly authorizes the person being examined to bring a third party representative to the examination; and that the statute was without restriction as to who could serve as a third party representative ---- an attorney or anyone else. Consequently, the Court held that an attorney was entitled to serve as a third party representative under the statute. ¶11 In McCollough, the trial court, as part of the conditions of the examination, had authorized that handwritten notes could be taken during the examination. We determined that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing handwritten notes to be taken, but we also recognized that an audio recording of the examination should be allowed. McCullough did not state the reason or purpose for allowing an audio recording; but in St. Clair v. Hatch, 2002 OK 101, ¶5, 62 P.3d 382 , we noted that when the party to be examined is relying upon a condition that is an element of that party's claim or defense, §3235 favors the rights of the party seeking the examination to fully investigate and prepare its case, to ascertain whether the plaintiff actually has the injuries which are alleged to have been caused by a defendant. ¶12 However, the purpose of the statute is twofold. The obvious counterpoint of allowing a "full investigation" would be to make certain that the injured party has an accurate and complete record of the proceeding, and to allow the party undergoing an examination to have reliable proof that the examiner is unbiased and not merely a shill for the opposing party. Allowing an electronic recording would expose the true facts and strike a balance to prevent either a false claim or a cursory exam. ¶13 Unless a contrary intent clearly appears, if a statute previously construed by courts of last resort is reenacted in the same or substantially the same terms, the Legislature is presumed to have been familiar with its construction, and to have adopted such construction as an integral part of the statute.13 After our ruling in McCollough, supra, the statute was recodified in 2001 without any changes. The Legislature did not override our construction of that statute and audio recording was approved as an authorized device allowed in the examination. A video recording would be a superior method of providing an impartial record of the physical examination. ¶14 The purpose of modern discovery practice and procedure is to promote the discovery of the true facts and circumstances of the controversy, rather than to aid in their concealment.14 In State ex rel. Remington Arms Co., Inc. v. Powers, 1976 OK 103, ¶4, 522 P.2d 1150,15 the Court recognized that rules and statutory enactments dealing with discovery are to be given liberal construction,16 stating: The purposes of the discovery statute are to facilitate and simplify identification of the issues by limiting the matters in controversy, avoid unnecessary testimony, promote justice, provide a more efficient and speedy disposition of cases, eliminate secrets and surprise, prevent the trial of a lawsuit from becoming a guessing game, and lead to fair and just settlements without the necessity of trial. Discovery statutes permit obtaining of evidence in the sole possession of one party which is unavailable to opposing counsel through the utilization of independent means. For these reasons, the rules dealing with discovery, production, and inspection are to be liberally construed. The intent of the Oklahoma discovery statutes is to attempt to provide procedures which promote accurate information in advance of trial concerning the actual facts and circumstances of a controversy, rather than to aid in its concealment. The utilization of discovery enables attorneys to better prepare and evaluate their cases. Ascertainment of truth and the ultimate disposition of lawsuit is better accomplished when parties are well educated through discovery as to their respective claims in advance of trial. Pretrial discovery procedures are intended to enhance truth-seeking process, and good faith compliance with such procedures is both desirable and necessary. (Citations omitted.) ¶15 Other courts have construed similar discovery statutes and addressed whether to allow the examination to be recorded. The federal counterpart to §3235, Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. (1991), is more restrictive than Oklahoma's statute17 in that it does not have a provision for the presence of a third party or representative of a party to attend the examination.18 Yet, federal courts have been divided on the issue of whether to allow the examination to be recorded.19 A few jurisdictions have rules or statutes which contain provisions similar to Oklahoma's statute,20 providing for the attendance of a third party such as the examinee's representative or attorney, or allowing for the recording of the examination by stenography, audio recording or video recording.21 In states where audio recording or stenography is expressly allowed, but videotaping has been omitted from the rule or statute, some courts have declined to allow videotaping because of its specific omission.22 ¶16 Nevertheless, despite the lack of explicit legislative authorization,23 many state courts have approved a variety of conditions such as the presence of counsel, a stenographic transcription of the examination, a tape-recording of the examination, and videotaping the examination.24 The Supreme Court of Indiana in Jacob v. Chaplin, 639 N.E.2d 1010 , 1013 (1994), in a personal injury case, explained the benefits of allow the examination to be recorded by electronic means. The court stated: The examination, by its nature, requires a verbal exchange between examiner and examinee. The purpose of the examination is to further the litigation process. An opinion arrived at by the examiner is intended to aid the trier of fact in making a damages assessment. Statements made by the examinee are intended to aid the examiner in arriving at a proper opinion, and, by necessity, are material to such trial issues as proximate cause. It is inherent that such an important meeting that both examiner and examinee be permitted to choose whether or not to make written notes of the verbal exchange. It follows from this conclusion that both should as well be permitted to chose whether or not, in lieu of the laborious process of making notes, to openly record the verbal exchange by electronic means. In permitting the examination ordered in this case to be recorded, the trial court properly exercised its discretion and recognized the justness of permitting recording to take place in an open manner, in the absence of some overriding reason to prohibit that recording. We fail to see any reason why electronic recording of the examination would in and of itself impede an examiner's ability to conduct a fair and complete examination. ¶17 The Supreme Court of Kentucky, in a unanimous opinion in Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Overstreet, 103 S.W.3d 31, 38 (2003), traces the history of allowing an external presence in an independent examination beginning with the Federal Rule, and Overstreet provides a thorough discussion of how different state courts have handled the issue. Overstreet allowed the videotaping of an independent examination upon a showing of good cause and recognized the adversarial purpose of such examinations, noting: By its very terms, CR 35.01 applies only when the mental or physical condition of the examinee is 'in controversy.' The examining party, almost by definition, moves for a CR 35.01 examination with the hope of furthering its litigation position. Thus, the examining physician will nearly always be hired with an adversarial mind-set. . . .[W]e recognized that expert witnesses are often compensated handsomely and it is widely believed that they may be expected to express opinions that favor the party who engaged them and who pays their fees. . . .[C]ertain expert witnesses derive a significant portion of their total income from testifying in litigation. . . . We would close our eyes to reality, . . .were we to pretend simply because CR 35.01 examinations should be conducted with only the health of the examinee in mind, that they always are so conducted. (Id.)(Citations omitted). ¶18 The Kentucky and Indiana Courts' reasoning regarding electronic recording is persuasive. The respondent has made no showing as to why electronic recording of the examination should be limited to audio recordings when a video recording is a superior method to providing an impartial record of the examination. A videographer has the ability to accurately record the physical aspects of the examination, and the use of technology is becoming more prevalent in the legal field. The examination is a discovery examination, not one in which a plaintiff is being treated.25 A defense-selected physician should not have the right to dictate all the terms under which a plaintiff's examination will be held. ¶19 Here, the doctor expressed concerns that videotaping would be an invasion of privacy of the other patients in the office, annoying and distracting, and intrusive and an interference with the doctor's examination. We agree that videotaping other patients would violate other patients' privacy rights. Furthermore, there may be circumstances where a videographer is annoying and distracting to the doctor or interfering with the examinations. None of these concerns are reasons to prohibit videotaping the examination altogether because they can all be readily addressed by an agreement between the parties or by order of the trial court when the time, place, manner, conditions and scope of the examination are set.26 Nor should we be concerned at this juncture about the possibility of a physician attempting to use a videotape at trial over the objection of the examinee because a waiver of the physician/patient privilege 27 does not bestow the physician with any rights. Accordingly, we hold that a party to a lawsuit who is required to submit to a medical examination pursuant to 12 O.S. 2001 §323528 is permitted to videotape the examination. Therefore, we assume original jurisdiction and grant the writ of prohibition and writ of mandamus. CONCLUSION ¶19 Our decision to allow an examinee to videotape a court-ordered independent examination was foreshadowed by our decision in McCullough v. Mathews, 1995 OK 90, ¶¶1-2, 918 P.2d 25 . In McCullough we recognized that the broad language of 12 O.S. 2001 §323529 allows the examinee to bring a third party representative to a court-ordered independent examination. We also determined that in addition to handwritten notes, audiotaping by the examinee, which was incorporated into the statute by the 2001 recodification of §3235,30 would be allowed as a "condition" of the examination. While audio recording is capable of providing proof that the examination did not involve a malingering patient or a cursory examination, we now hold that a video recording may be a superior method of providing an impartial record of the examination. Accordingly, a party to a lawsuit who is required to submit to a medical examination pursuant to 12 O.S. 2001 §323531 is permitted to videotape the examination. The writs of prohibition and mandamus are granted. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ASSUMED; WRITS GRANTED. EDMONDSON, V.C.J., OPALA, KAUGER, WATT, COLBERT, JJ., concur. WINCHESTER, C.J., HARGRAVE, TAYLOR, JJ., LAVENDER, S.J., dissent. FOOT