Case Title: Gonzales v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers'Compensation Div

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-12-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Gonzales v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers'Compensation Div1999 WY 163992 P.2d 560Case Number: 98-289Decided: 12/08/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF:

MARGIE MARIE GONZALES, 
Appellant (Employee-Petitioner),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING, ex 
rel., WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee 
(Objector-Respondent).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Fremont County, Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, 
Judge.

Robert A. 
Nicholas, Riverton, Wyoming, representing 
Appellant.

Gay Woodhouse, 
Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. 
Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Bernard P. Haggerty, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General, representing Appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and HILL, JJ.

Golden, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Margie Marie 
Gonzales (Gonzales) appeals from the district court order awarding attorney's 
fees of $2,200.00, which was considerably less than the $4,205.25 requested by 
her attorney. The district court's order did not explain how it arrived at the 
attorney's fee award. The district court also declined to rule on a motion for 
reconsideration requesting the court to set forth the specific reasons for the 
denial of the fees in accordance with UNC Teton Exploration Drilling v. Peyton, 
774 P.2d 584 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶2]      We have held that 
the district court must include some explanation of its attorney's fees awards 
to allow for appellate review. UNC Teton, 774 P.2d  at 594-95. The district 
court's failure to explain its award, as required by law, was an error of law. 
Therefore, we reverse and remand for a determination of an appropriate 
attorney's fee award pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-615 and 1-14-126(b) 
(LEXIS 1999), which shall concisely explain the district court's action on the 
fee application.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Gonzales submits 
the following statement of the issues in the form of 
arguments:

1. The district 
court erred when it refused to provide a concise and clear explanation for 
denying attorney's fees.

2. Based upon 
the undisputed evidence presented, the attorney's fees submitted were reasonable 
and the district court erred as a matter of law when it denied a portion of 
those attorney's fees submitted pursuant to W.S. § 
27-14-615.

The Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Division presents its statement of the 
issues:

The district 
court denied half of the Employee's requested attorney fees, but its order 
contained no findings of fact or conclusions of law.

1. Which version 
of the Act applies?

B. Should the 
Court remand for findings and conclusions?

3. Should the 
Court remand to require a hearing?

D. Should the 
Court award the full amount of fees requested, without a 
remand?

FACTS

[¶4]      This case has 
been before us previously for resolution of Gonzales' claim for worker's 
compensation benefits in Gonzales v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers § Comp. Div., 
970 P.2d 865 (Wyo. 1998). Gonzales injured her back at work in 1993 and received 
worker's compensation benefits for that injury. Id. at 867. However, the 
Workers' Compensation Division (Division) denied her claims for medical benefits 
and permanent partial impairment benefits for her thoracic back condition, and 
the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) affirmed the Division's denial of 
benefits. Id. at 868-69. Gonzales appealed to the district court, which affirmed 
the hearing examiner's decision. Id. at 869. When Gonzales filed the motion and 
supporting affidavit for payment of attorney's fees of $4,205.25 and costs of 
$143.72, the Division objected to the amount of attorney's fees in excess of 
$4,000.00 as unreasonable.

[¶5]      Gonzales' 
attorney did not request a hearing, and the district court subsequently issued 
its order awarding $2,200.00 in attorney's fees, which provided, in pertinent 
part:

This matter 
having come before the Court upon the application of Nicholas Law Office, LLC 
for attorney's fees; the Court, being fully advised in the premises, finds that 
attorney's fees and costs should be approved in the following 
amounts:

$ 2200.00 
Attorney's Fees $ 143.72 Costs

* * * 
*

The order did 
not include any factual findings, reasoning, or explanation for reducing the 
requested award from $4,205.25 to $2,200.00. Gonzales' attorney filed a motion 
for reconsideration, asking the court to provide specific findings of fact and 
conclusions of law for review on appeal. He also submitted an affidavit 
explaining why his fees are reasonable, using the factors set out in UNC Teton 
Exploration Drilling v. Peyton, 774 P.2d 584 (Wyo. 1989). When the district 
court failed to rule on the motion for reconsideration, he filed a notice of 
appeal with this Court.

DISCUSSION

[¶6]      The district 
court has "considerable discretion in awarding attorney's fees" under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-615 (LEXIS 1999).1 Hemme v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers 
§ Comp. Div., 914 P.2d 824, 827 (1996).

Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so Harbitrarily or 
capriciously.

Watt v. Watt, 
971 P.2d 608, 613 (Wyo. 1999)."Sound exercise of discretion effectuates the rule 
of law, not the will of the judge." Id. (citing Vanasse v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 
996 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Federal Enterprises v. Frank Allbritten Motors, 16 F.R.D. 109, 112 (W.D.Mo. 1954)). "Discretion necessarily represents a choice on 
the part of the trial judge, but that choice is rarely unfettered." 
Id.

The relevant 
language in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-615 (LEXIS 1999) 
provides:

The district 
court may appoint an attorney to represent the employee during proceedings in 
the district court and appeal to the supreme court. The district court may allow 
the attorney a reasonable fee for his services at the conclusion of the 
proceedings in district court. . . . An award of attorney's fees shall be for a 
reasonable number of hours and shall not exceed the benefits at issue in the 
appeal.

[¶7]      Although the 
statute affords the district court considerable discretion in determining 
whether to allow a fee and the reasonableness of the fee and the number of hours 
worked, that discretion is not unfettered. W.R.C.P. 54, concerning judgments, 
provides for attorney's fees when allowed by law:

(d)(2) 
Attorney's Fees.

(A) When allowed 
by law, claims for attorney's fees and related nontaxable expenses shall be made 
by motion. . . .

(B) Unless 
otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, the motion must be filed 
and served no later than 14 days after entry of judgment; must specify the 
judgment and the statute, rule, or other grounds entitling the moving party to 
the award; and must state the amount or provide a fair estimate of the amount 
sought. . . .

(C) On request 
of a party or class member, the court shall afford an opportunity for adversary 
submissions with respect to the motion in accordance with Rule 43(e). . . . The 
court shall find the facts and state its conclusions of law as provided in Rule 
52(a), and a judgment shall be set forth in a separate document as provided in 
Rule 58.

W.R.C.P. 54(d) 
(emphasis added). There is no dispute that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-615 allows 
for an award of attorney's fees or that Gonzales' attorney did not file a proper 
motion for his fees. The Division objected to those fees, and the district court 
issued a judgment awarding considerably less than Gonzales requested. However, 
the district court's judgment did not "find the facts and state its conclusions 
of law." We have said many times that the use of "shall" is considered mandatory 
language requiring that the directive be obeyed. Russell v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 944 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Wyo. 1997). The 
district court's order did not contain any findings of fact or conclusions of 
law and, therefore, the order awarding attorney's fees did not comply with the 
applicable rule. This constitutes an error of law. Although the court has 
considerable discretion in awarding attorney's fees, it "does not enjoy any 
discretion with respect to an error of law." Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 
(Wyo. 1998). Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to the district 
court to reconsider the attorney's fees award and issue an order containing 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.

[¶8]      In Cargile v. 
State ex rel. Wyo. Workers § Comp. Div., 965 P.2d 666 (Wyo. 1998), we suggested 
the following to a hearing examiner upon remand:

In resolving the 
issue with respect to attorney fees, the hearing examiner, upon remand, may find 
it desirable to refer to the factors outlined in Wyo. Stat. § 1-14-126(b) 
(1997). That statute provides:

(b) In civil 
actions for which an award of attorney's fees is authorized, the court in its 
discretion may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party without 
requiring expert testimony. In exercising its discretion the court may consider 
the following factors:

(i) The time and 
labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the 
skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(ii) The 
likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment precluded other 
employment by the lawyer;

(iii) The fee 
customarily charged in the locality for similar legal 
services;

(iv) The amount 
involved and the results obtained;

(v) The time 
limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

(vi) The nature 
and length of the professional relationship with the 
client;

(vii) The 
experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the 
services; and

(viii) Whether 
the fee is fixed or contingent.

Id. at 668-69. 
This statute relates to the discretion of the district court in awarding fees 
and encompasses a policy of the State of Wyoming. Id. at 669. We will assume 
that, on remand, the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law 
will appropriately reflect consideration of these factors justifying the 
attorney's fees awarded. See id.

[¶9]      The Division 
suggests our remand should limit the district court to proceeding without a 
hearing. We decline to impinge on the district court's discretion to conduct a 
hearing if it determines one is necessary for resolution of the issue before 
it.

CONCLUSION

[¶10]   We reverse and remand to the 
district court for reconsideration of its attorney's fee award, which shall 
include appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law to support that 
award.

Footnotes

1 The 
applicable version of the statute is the current version, which was amended in 
1995. The Division suggests that an issue is presented concerning the correct 
version of the statute to apply in this case. That suggestion is based on the 
Division's incorrect reading of Manning v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. 
Div., 938 P.2d 870 (Wyo. 1997). The Division contends Manning held that the 
version of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-615 in effect at the time of the injury 
governs an attorney's fee award, even though the 1995 amendment to the statute 
expressly provided: "This act applies to all hearings and appeals on or after 
the effective date of this act regardless of the date of injury." 1995 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws Ch. 193, § 2.

Manning interpreted and applied Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-601 and - 602, 
relating to the appointment of attorneys for contested case hearings. Id. at 
873-74. We ordered the district court to "reconsider the award of attorney fees 
incurred in the appeal to the district court pursuant to W.S. 27-14-615 (Supp. 
1996)." Id. at 874. Although the date used for citing the statute was not part 
of the analysis or holding, we note that the date used is 1996, the version in 
effect after the amendment, not the version in effect at the time of the injury. 
Id. at 874. Nothing in Manning even implies a holding that the version in effect 
at the time of the injury applied.