Case Title: Miller v. House of Boom Kentucky, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018-SC-000625-CL

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 2019-06-13T00:00:00Z

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RENDERED: JUNE 13, 2019 TO BE PUBLISHED 2018-SC-000625-CL IN RE: KATHY MILLER, AS NEXT FRIEND OF HER MINOR CHILD, E.M. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT V. WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY LOUISVILLE DIVISION CASE NO. 3:16-CV-332-CRS HOUSE OF BOOM KENTUCKY, LLC OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE VANMETER CERTIFYING THE LAW By o r de r e nt e r e d Fe br uar y 14, 2019, t his Co ur t gr ant e d t he Unit e d St at e s Dist r ic t Co ur t , We st e r n Dist r ic t o f Ke nt uc ky’s r e que st f o r c e r t if ic at io n o f law o n t he f o llo wing issue : Is a pr e -injur y liabilit y waive r signe d by a par e nt o n be half o f a mino r c hild e nf o r c e able unde r Ke nt uc ky law? Af t e r c ar e f ul c o nside r at io n, we ho ld t hat suc h a waive r is une nf o r c e able unde r t he spe c if ic f ac t s o f t his c ase . I. Factual and Procedural Background. Ho use o f Bo o m, LLC (“Ho use o f Bo o m”) is a f o r -pr o f it t r ampo line par k lo c at e d in Lo uisville , Ke nt uc ky. The par k is a c o lle c t io n o f t r ampo line and ac r o bat ic st unt at t r ac t io ns. On August 6, 2015, Kat hy Mille r pur c hase d t ic ke t s f o r he r 11-ye ar -o ld daught e r , E.M., and he r daught e r ’s f r ie nds t o go play at Ho use o f Bo o m. Be f o r e pur c hasing t he t ic ke t s, Ho use o f Bo o m r e quir e d t he pur c hase r t o c he c k a bo x indic at ing t hat t he pur c hase r had r e ad t he waive r o f liabilit y. The waive r r e ads: (1) RELEASE OF LIABILITY: De spit e all kno wn and unkno wn r isks inc luding b[u]t no t limit e [d] t o se r io us bo dily injur y, pe r mane nt disabilit y, par alysis and lo ss o f lif e , I, o n be half o f myse lf , and/o r o n be half o f my spo use , mino r c hild(r e n)/war d(s) he r e by e xpr e ssly and vo lunt ar ily r e mise , r e le ase , ac quit , sat isf y and f o r e ve r disc har ge and agr e e no t t o sue HOUSE OF BOOM, inc luding it s supplie r s, de signe r s, inst alle r s, manuf ac t ur e r s o f any t r ampo line e quipme nt , f o am pit mat e r ial, o r suc h o t he r mat e r ial and e quipme nt in HOUSE OF BOOM’S f ac ilit y (all he r e inaf t e r r e f e r r e d t o as “EQUIPMENT SUPPLIERS”) and agr e e t o ho ld said par t ie s har mle ss o f and f r o m any and all manne r o f ac t io ns o r o missio n(s), c ause s o f ac t io n, suit s, sums o f mo ne y, c o nt r o ve r sie s, damage s, judgme nt s, e xe c ut io ns, c laims and de mands what so e ve r , in law o r in e quit y, inc luding, but no [t ] limit e d t o , any and all c laim[s] whic h alle ge ne glige nt ac t s and/o r o missio ns c o mmit t e d by HOUSE OF BOOM o r any EQUIPMENT SUPPLIERS, whe t he r t he ac t io n ar ise s o ut o f any damage , lo ss, pe r so nal injur y , o r de at h t o me o r my spo use , mino r c hild(r e n)/war d(s), while par t ic ipat ing in o r as a r e sult o f par t ic ipat ing in any o f t he ACTIVITIES in o r abo ut t he pr e mise s. This Re le ase o f Liabilit y, is e f f e c t ive and valid r e gar dle ss o f whe t he r t he damage , lo ss o r de at h is a r e sult o f any ac t o r o missio n o n t he par t o f HOUSE OF BOOM and/o r any EQUIPMENT SUPPLIERS. The agr e e me nt go e s o n t o st at e : 1. By signing t his do c ume nt , I unde r st and t hat I may be f o und by a c o ur t o f law t o have f o r e ve r waive d my and my spo use and / o r c hild(r e n)/war d(s) r ight t o maint ain any ac t io n against HOUSE OF BOOM o n t he basis o f any c laim f r o m whic h I have r e le ase d HOUSE OF BOOM and any r e le ase d par t y he r e in and t hat I have assume d all r isk o f damage , lo ss, pe r so nal injur y, o r de at h t o myse lf , my spo use and/o r my mino r c hild(r e n)/war ds(s) and agr e e d t o inde mnif y and ho ld har mle ss HOUSE OF BOOM and all EQUIPMENT SUPPLIERS f r o m and against any and all 2 lo sse s, liabilit ie s, c laims, o bligat io ns, c o st s, damage s and/o r e xpe nse s what so e ve r paid, inc ur r e d and/o r suf f e r e d by HOUSE OF BOOM and all EQUIPMENT SUPPLIERS as a r e sult o f t he par t ic ipat io n in ACTIVITIES in o r abo ut t he f ac ilit y by myse lf , my spo use and/o r c hild(r e n)/war d(s) and/o r c laims asse r t e d by myse lf , my spo use and/o r c hild(r e n)/war d(s) against HOUSE OF BOOM and all EQUIPMENT SUPPLIERS r e lat e d t o suc h par t ic ipat io n in ACTIVITIES. I have had a r e aso nable and suf f ic ie nt o ppo r t unit y t o r e ad and unde r st and t his e nt ir e do c ume nt and c o nsult wit h le gal c o unse l, o r have vo lunt ar ily waive d my r ight t o do so . I kno wingly and vo lunt ar ily agr e e t o be bo und by all t e r ms and c o ndit io ns se t f o r t h he r e in. The abo ve waive r inc lude s language t hat , if e nf o r c e able , wo uld r e le ase all c laims by (1) t he individual who c he c ke d t he bo x, (2) he r spo use , (3) he r mino r c hild, o r (4) he r war d against Ho use o f Bo o m. Onc e Mille r c he c ke d t he bo x, E.M. par t ic ipat e d in ac t ivit ie s at Ho use o f Bo o m. She was injur e d whe n ano t he r gir l jumpe d o f f a t hr e e -f o o t le dge and lande d o n E.M’s ankle , c ausing it t o br e ak. Mille r , as ne xt f r ie nd o f he r daught e r , sue d Ho use o f Bo o m f o r t he injur y. Ho use o f Bo o m, r e lying o n Mille r ’s le gal po we r t o waive t he r ight s o f he r daught e r via t he r e le ase , mo ve d f o r summar y judgme nt . The We st e r n Dist r ic t o f Ke nt uc ky c o nc lude d t hat Ho use o f Bo o m’s mo t io n f o r summar y judgme nt invo lve d a no ve l issue o f st at e law and r e que st e d Ce r t if ic at io n f r o m t his Co ur t whic h we gr ant e d. Bo t h par t ie s have br ie f e d t he issue and t he mat t e r is no w r ipe f o r Ce r t if ic at io n. II. Analysis. The que st io n be f o r e t his Co ur t is whe t he r a par e nt has t he aut ho r it y t o sign a pr e -injur y e xc ulpat o r y agr e e me nt o n be half o f he r c hild, t hus t e r minat ing t he c hild’s po t e nt ial r ight t o c o mpe nsat io n f o r an injur y o c c ur r ing while par t ic ipat ing in ac t ivit ie s spo nso r e d by a f o r -pr o f it c o mpany. Alt ho ugh 3 an issue o f f ir st impr e ssio n in t he Co mmo nwe alt h, t he e nf o r c e abilit y o f a pr e ­ injur y waive r signe d by a par e nt o n be half o f a c hild has be e n he avily lit igat e d in a mult it ude o f jur isdic t io ns. Ho use o f Bo o m c at e go r ize s t he se de c isio ns in as t ho se t hat e nf o r c e d t he waive r and t ho se t hat did no t , but t he de c isio ns o f t ho se jur isdic t io ns mo r e ac c ur at e ly f all int o f o ur dist inc t c at e go r ie s: (1) jur isdic t io ns t hat have e nf o r c e d a waive r be t we e n a par e nt and a f o r -pr o f it e nt it y;1 (2) jur isdic t io ns t hat have e nf o r c e d waive r s be t we e n a par e nt and a no n-pr o f it e nt it y;2 (3) jur isdic t io ns t hat have de c lar e d a waive r be t we e n a par e nt and a f o r -pr o f it e nt it y une nf o r c e able ;3 and (4) jur isdic t io ns t hat have 1 Mainland's highe st c o ur t is t he o nly judic ial bo dy t o e nf o r c e t he se waive r s whe n o ne o f t he par t ie s is a f o r -pr o f it e nt it y. Ho we ve r , Mar yland’s c o ur t r ule s allo w par e nt s t o “make de c isio ns t o t e r minat e t o r t c laims ” wit ho ut “judic ial int e r f e r e nc e .” BJ’s Wholesale Club Inc. v. Rosen, 80 A.3d 345, 356-57 (Md. 2013) (c it ing Md. Co de Ann. § 6-205). Ke nt uc ky do e s no t have a similar pr o visio n in o ur c o ur t r ule s, st at ut e s, o r judic ial de c isio ns. 2 See Kelly u. United States, 809 F. Supp.2d 429, 437 (E.D. N.C. 2011) (waive r e nf o r c e able as it allo we d plaint if f t o “par t ic ipat e in a sc ho o l-spo nso r e d e nr ic hme nt pr o gr am t hat was e xt r ac ur r ic ular and vo lunt ar y[]”); Hohe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 274 Cal. Rpt r . 647, 649-50 (Cal. Ct . App. 1990) (upho lding a pr e -injury r e le ase e xe c ut e d by a f at he r o n be half o f his mino r c hild whic h waive d c laims r e sult ing f r o m an injur y dur ing a sc ho o l spo nso r e d ac t ivit y); Sharon v. City of Newton, 769 N.E.2d 738, 747 (Mass. 2002) (upho lding a public sc ho o l e xt r ac ur r ic ular spo r t s ac t ivit ie s waive r signe d by a par e nt o n be half o f a mino r ); Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ohio 1998) (ho lding t hat public po lic y suppo r t ing limit ing liabilit y o f vo lunt e e r c o ac he s and lando wne r s who o pe n t he ir land t o t he public “just if ie d] giving par e nt s aut ho r it y t o e nt e r int o [pr e -injur y liabilit y waive r s] o n be half o f t he ir mino r c hildr e n[]”). 3 See In re Complaint of Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 403 F. Supp.2d 1168, 1172-73 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (whe r e “a r e le ase o f liabilit y is signe d o n be half o f a mino r c hild f o r an ac t ivit y r un by a f o r -pr o f it busine ss, o ut side o f a sc ho o l o r c o mmunit y se t t ing, t he r e le ase is t ypic ally une nf o r c e able against t he mino r []”); Simmons v. Parkette Nat'l Gymnastic Training Ctr., 670 F. Supp. 140, 144 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (invalidat ing a pr e -injur y r e le ase waive r signe d by a par e nt in adhe r e nc e wit h t he “c o mmo n law r ule t hat mino r s, wit h c e r t ain e xc e pt io ns, may disaf f ir m t he ir c o nt r ac t s [base d o n] t he public po lic y c o nc e r n t hat mino r s sho uld no t be bo und by mist ake s r e sult ing f r o m t he ir immat ur it y o r t he o ve r be ar anc e o f unsc r upulo us adult s[]”); Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co., 48 P.3d 1229, 1237 (Co lo . 2002) (“[T]o allo w a par e nt t o r e le ase a 4 de c lar e d a waive r be t we e n a par e nt and a no n-pr o f it e nt it y une nf o r c e able .4 Ho use o f Bo o m is a f o r -pr o f it t r ampo line par k, and e le ve n o ut o f t we lve jur isdic t io ns t hat have analyze d similar waive r s be t we e n par e nt s and f o r -pr o f it c hild’s po ssible f ut ur e c laims f o r injur y c ause d by ne glige nc e may as a pr ac t ic al mat t e r le ave t he mino r in an unac c e pt ably pr e c ar io us po sit io n wit h no r e c o ur se , no par e nt al suppo r t , and no me t ho d t o suppo r t himse lf o r c ar e f o r his injur y[]”), superseded by statute, Co lo . Re v. St at . § 13-22-107(3)); Kirton v. Fields, 997 So .2d 349, 358 (Fla. 2008) (invalidat ing agr e e me nt be t we e n par e nt and f o r -pr o f it ATV par k, but limit ing t he ho lding t o “injur ie s r e sult ing f r o m par t ic ipat io n in a c o mme r c ial ac t ivit y[]”); Meyer v. Naperville Manner, Inc., 634 N.E.2d 411, 414 (Ill. 1994) (invalidat ing waive r be t we e n par e nt and f o r -pr o f it ho r se r iding st able ); Woodman ex. rel Woodman v. Kera LLC, 785 N.W.2d 1, 16 (Mic h. 2010) (ho lding, in a c ase against a f o r -pr o f it inf lat able play ar e a, t hat st at e c o mmo n law indic at e d t hat e nf o r c e me nt o f a waive r signe d by par e nt was “c o nt r ar y t o t he e st ablishe d public po lic y o f t his st at e ” and t hat t he le gislat ur e is be t t e r e quippe d f o r suc h a c hange in t he c o mmo n law); Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 901 A.2d 381, 386 (N.J. 2006) (“t he public po lic y o f Ne w Je r se y pr o hibit s a par e nt o f a mino r c hild f r o m r e le asing a mino r c hild’s po t e nt ial t o r t c laims ar ising o ut o f t he use o f a c o mme r c ial r e c r e at io nal f ac ilit y[]”); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mallison, 354 P.2d 800, 802 (Or . 1960) (invalidat ing an inde mnit y pr o visio n in a se t t le me nt agr e e me nt —af t e r se t t le me nt t he c hild sust aine d f ur t he r injur y—in par t be c ause a par e nt ’s dut y t o ac t “f o r t he be ne f it o f his c hild [is] no t f ully disc har ge d whe r e t he par e nt e nt e r s int o a bar gain whic h give s r ise t o c o nf lic t ing int e r e st s[]”); Blackwell v. Sky High Sports Nashville Operations, LLC, 523 S.W.3d 624, 651 (Te nn. Ct . App. 2017) (in ho lding a par e nt -signe d waive r une nf o r c e able , t he c o ur t he ld t hat Te nne sse e had no public po lic y suppo r t ing t he “de sir e t o shie ld t he o pe r at o r s o f f o r - pr o f it t r ampo line par ks f r o m liabilit y[]”); Munoz v. IUaz Inc., 863 S.W.2d 207, 210 (Te x. App. 1993) (“in light o f t his st at e ’s lo ng-st anding po lic y t o pr o t e c t mino r c hildr e n, t he language , ‘de c isio ns o f subst ant ial le gal signif ic anc e ’ in se c t io n 12.04(7) o f t he Family Co de c anno t be int e r pr e t e d as e mpo we r ing t he par e nt s t o waive t he r ight s o f a mino r c hild t o sue f o r pe r so nal injur ie s[]”); Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062, 1066 (Ut ah 2001) (c o nc luding t hat “a par e nt do e s no t have t he aut ho r it y t o r e le ase a c hild’s c laims before an injur y”); Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 11-12 (Wash. 1992) (“Sinc e a par e nt ge ne r ally may no t r e le ase a c hild’s c ause o f ac t io n af t e r injur y, it make s lit t le , if any, se nse t o c o nc lude a par e nt has t he aut ho r it y t o r e le ase a c hild’s c ause o f ac t io n pr io r t o an injur y[]”). 4 See Fedor v. Mauwehu Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 143 A.2d 466, 468-69 (Co nn. 1958) (invalidat ing a waive r signe d by a c hild’s par e nt s allo wing t he c hild t o at t e nd Bo y Sc o ut c amp); Galloway v. State, 790 N.W.2d 252, 259 (Io wa 2010) (invalidat ing a pr e -injur y r e le ase waive r signe d by a par e nt o n be half o f a c hild at t e nding a sc ho o l spo nso r e d f ie ld t r ip be c ause o f Io wa’s “st r o ng public po lic y f avo r ing t he pr o t e c t io n o f c hildr e n’s le gal r ight s ”). 5 e nt it ie s have adhe r e d t o t he c o mmo n law and he ld suc h waive r s t o be une nf o r c e able .5 Pr e -injur y r e le ase waive r s ar e no t pe r se invalid in t he Co mmo nwe alt h but ar e ge ne r ally “disf avo r e d and ar e st r ic t ly c o nst r ue d against t he par t ie s r e lying o n t he m.” Hargis v. Baize, 168 S.W.3d 36, 47 (Ky. 2005) (c it at io n o mit t e d). We analyze t he se agr e e me nt s f o r vio lat io ns o f public po lic y. See Cobb v. Gulf Refining Co., 284 Ky. 523, 528, 145 S.W.2d 96, 99 (1940) (c it ing Restatement of Contracts § 575). The r e le vant public po lic y he r e is whe t he r a par e nt has t he aut ho r it y t o e nt e r int o an e xc ulpat o r y agr e e me nt o n t he ir c hild’s be half , ne gat ing any o ppo r t unit y f o r a t o r t c laim—a c hild’s pr o pe r t y r ight —if Ho use o f Bo o m’s ne glige nc e c ause s injur y t o t he c hild. The ge ne r al c o mmo n law r ule in Ke nt uc ky is t hat “par e nt s ha[ve ] no r ight t o c o mpr o mise o r se t t le ” t he ir c hild’s c ause o f ac t io n as t hat “r ight e xist f s] in t he c hild alo ne ,” and par e nt s have no r ight t o e nt e r int o c o nt r ac t s o n be half o f t he ir c hildr e n abse nt spe c ial c ir c umst anc e s. Meyer’s Adm’r v. Zoll, 119 Ky. 480, 486, 84 S.W. 543, 544 (1905); see also Wilson v. Wilson, 251 Ky. 522, 525, 65 S.W.2d 694, 695 (1933) (“[W]hile t he mo t he r might e nt e r int o a c o nt r ac t r e gar ding he r r ight s, she c o uld no t c o nt r ac t away t he r ight s o f he r unbo r n c hild[]”);GGNSC Stanford, LLC v. Rowe, 388 S.W.3d 117, 123 (Ky. App. 2012) (“In light o f t he limit e d aut ho r it y gr ant e d t o c ust o dians by KRS6 405.020 and 5 While a slight majo r it y o f jur isdic t io ns suppo r t e nf o r c e abilit y in t he c o nt e xt o f a no n-pr o f it r e c r e at io nal ac t ivit y, no n-pr o f it s and vo lunt e e r yo ut h spo r t s r aise dif f e r e nt public po lic y c o nc e r ns whic h we ne e d no t addr e ss in t his o pinio n t o day. 6 Ke nt uc ky Re vise d St at ut e s. 6 KRS 387.280, we c anno t c o nc lude t he y ar e pe r mit t e d t o c o nt r ac t ually bind t he ir war ds wit ho ut f o r mal appo int me nt as guar dians[)”). Thus, we must de t e r mine whe t he r Ke nt uc ky public po lic y suppo r t s a c hange in t he c o mmo n law t hat wo uld pr o t e c t f o r -pr o f it e nt it ie s f r o m liabilit y by e nf o r c ing pr e -injur y liabilit y waive r s signe d by par e nt s o n be half o f t he ir c hildr e n. Fir st , KRS 405.020 pr o vide s t hat “[t ]he f at he r and mo t he r shall have t he jo int c ust o dy, nur t ur e , and e duc at io n o f t he ir c hildr e n who ar e unde r t he age o f e ight e e n (18).” Ho we ve r , t his gr ant o f c ust o dy and a par e nt ’s r ight t o r aise t he ir c hild, c ho o se t he c hild’s e duc at io nal pat h, and make he alt hc ar e de c isio ns o n a c hild’s be half has ne ve r abr o gat e d t he t r adit io nal c o mmo n law vie w t hat par e nt s have no aut ho r it y t o e nt e r int o c o nt r ac t s o n be half o f t he ir c hild whe n de aling wit h a c hild’s pr o pe r t y r ight s, pr io r t o be ing appo int e d guar dian by a dist r ic t c o ur t . Scott v. Montgomery Traders Bank & Trust Co., 956 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Ky. 1997). In Scott, t he par e nt at issue at t e mpt e d t o se t t le he r c hild’s t o r t c laim and f und a t r ust wit h t he se t t le me nt f unds wit ho ut be ing appo int e d guar dian by a dist r ic t c o ur t . Id. This Co ur t he ld t hat [i]t is fundamental legal knowledge in t his st at e t hat Dist r ic t Co ur t has e xc lusive jur isdic t io n "... f o r t he appo int me nt and r e mo val o f guar dians . . . and f o r t he manage me nt and se t t le me nt o f t he ir ac c o unt s ” and t hat a pe r so n must be appo int e d as guar dian by t he Co ur t in o r de r t o le gally r e c e ive se t t le me nt s in e xc e ss o f $10,000.00. Id. (quo t ing KRS 387.020(1), KRS 387.125(b)) (e mphasis adde d). Addit io nally, o ur pr e c e de nt dic t at e s t hat e ve n whe n ac t ing as ne xt f r ie nd, a mino r ’s par e nt has no r ight t o c o mpr o mise o r se t t le a mino r ’s c laim wit ho ut c o ur t appr o val o r 7 c o lle c t t he pr o c e e ds o f a mino r ’s c laim.7 Metzger Bros. v. Watson’s Guardian, 251 Ky. 446, 450, 65 S.W.2d 460, 462 (1933). Thus, f inding no inhe r e nt r ight o n t he par t o f a par e nt t o c o nt r ac t o n be half o f t he ir c hild, t he r e maining que st io n is whe t he r public po lic y de mands e nf o r c e me nt o f t he se c o nt r ac t s wit hin t he Co mmo nwe alt h. Ho use o f Bo o m’s init ial public po lic y ar gume nt is t hat a par e nt ’s f undame nt al libe r t y int e r e st “in t he c ar e and c ust o dy o f t he ir c hildr e n” suppo r t s e nf o r c ing a f o r -pr o f it e nt it y’s pr e -injur y liabilit y waive r signe d by a par e nt o n be half o f a mino r c hild. Morgan v. Getter, 441 S.W.3d 94, 112 (Ky. 2014) (c it ing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct . 2054, 2060, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000) (“The libe r t y int e r e st ... o f par e nt s in t he c ar e , c ust o dy, and c o nt r o l o f t he ir c hildr e n—is pe r haps t he o lde st o f t he f undame nt al libe r t y int e r e st s r e c o gnize d by t his Co ur t []”). Alt ho ugh t his Co ur t r e c o gnize s a par e nt ’s f undame nt al libe r t y int e r e st in t he r e ar ing o f o ne ’s c hild, t his r ight is no t abso lut e , and t he Co mmo nwe alt h may st e p in as parens patraie8 t o pr o t e c t t he be st int e r e st s o f t he c hild. See Hojnowski, 901 A.2d at 390 (“t he que st io n 7 The le gislat ur e has so ught f it t o slight ly c hange t his po r t io n o f t he c o mmo n law and has aut ho r ize d par e nt s t o receive f unds le ss t han $10,000, but t ho se se t t le me nt s must be appr o ve d by a c o ur t be f o r e t he f unds may be paid t o a par e nt in c ust o dy o f a c hild. KRS 387.280. Thus, a par e nt , base d me r e ly o n c ust o dy, st ill maint ains no r ight t o ne go t iat e a se t t le me nt o n be half o f t he ir c hild. 8 See Parens Patriae, Blac k’s Law Dic t io nar y (10t h. e d 2014) (“The st at e r e gar de d as a so ve r e ign; t he st at e in it s c apac it y as pr o vide r o f pr o t e c t io n t o t ho se unable t o c ar e f o r t he mse lve s”); see also KRS 600.010(2)(a) (t he Co mmo nwe alt h sho uld “dir e c t it s e f f o r t s t o pr o mo t ing pr o t e c t io n o f c hildr e n”); Giuliani v. Guiler, 951 S.W.2d 318, 319 (Ky. 1997) (r e le vant public po lic y e xist e d t o suppo r t t he e nlar ge me nt o f c hildr e n’s le gal r ight s unde r t he c o mmo n law de r ive d f r o m KRS 600.010(2)(a)’s dir e c t ive t o pr o t e c t c hildr e n). 8 whe t he r a par e nt may r e le ase a mino r ’s f ut ur e t o r t c laims implic at e s wide r public po lic y c o nc e r ns and t he parens patriae dut y t o pr o t e c t t he be st int e r e st s o f c hildr e n[]”); see also Cooper, 48 P.3d at 1235 n. 11 (par e nt al r e le ase o f c hild’s r ight t o sue f o r ne glige nc e is “no t o f t he same c har ac t e r and qualit y as t ho se r ight s r e c o gnize d as implic at ing par e nt s ’ f undame nt al libe r t y int e r e st in t he ‘c ar e , c ust o dy and c o nt r o l’ o f t he ir c hildr e n[]”). Ho use o f Bo o m ar gue s t hat t he parens patriae do c t r ine “is dif f ic ult t o de f e nd in a po st -Troxel wo r ld.” Ho we ve r , if Troxel is r e ad t o gr ant par e nt s t he de c isio n t o e nt e r int o pr e -injur y liabilit y waive r s, t he n, lo gic ally, o ur c o ur t -appo int e d guar dian st at ut e s and st at ut e s r e st r ic t ing a par e nt ’s abilit y t o se t t le c laims po st -injur y wo uld also inf r inge upo n a par e nt ’s f undame nt al libe r t y int e r e st . As lit igat io n r e st r ic t io ns upo n par e nt s have r e maine d a vit al pie c e o f o ur Co mmo nwe alt h’s c ivil pr ac t ic e and pr o c e dur e , we do no t r e c o gnize a par e nt ’s f undame nt al libe r t y int e r e st t o quash t he ir c hild’s po t e nt ial t o r t c laim. Ho use o f Bo o m ne xt ar gue s t hat public po lic y c o nc e r ns sur r o unding po st -injur y se t t le me nt s be t we e n par e nt s and de f e ndant s ar e no t pr e se nt whe n a par e nt is signing a pr e -injur y r e le ase waive r (signing in t he pr e se nt c ase be ing c he c king a bo x o n an Ipho ne ), and t he r e f o r e , t he st at e o nly ne e ds t o st e p in t o pr o t e c t t he c hild po st -injur y, no t pr e -injur y. Fir st , we no t e t hat sinc e Meyer’s Adm’r and Metzger Bros., t his Co ur t and t he le gislat ur e have pr o t e c t e d mino r ’s r ight s t o c ivil c laims. See KRS 387.280. Inde e d, “c hildr e n de se r ve as muc h pr o t e c t io n f r o m t he impr o vide nt c o mpr o mise o f t he ir r ight s be f o r e an injur y o c c ur s [as o ur c o mmo n law and st at ut o r y sc he me s] af f o r d[] t he m af t e r t he 9 injur y.” Hojnowski, 901 A.2d at 387. As summar ize d in Hawkins, 37 P.3d at 1066, [w]e se e lit t le r e aso n t o base t he validit y o f a par e nt ’s c o nt r ac t ual r e le ase o f a mino r ’s c laim o n t he t iming o f an injur y. Inde e d, t he law ge ne r ally t r e at s pr e injury r e le ase s o r inde mnit y pr o visio ns wit h gr e at e r suspic io n t han po st injur y r e le ase s. See Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Ut ah 1983). An e xc ulpat o r y c lause t hat r e lie ve s a par t y f r o m f ut ur e liabilit y may r e mo ve an impo r t ant inc e nt ive t o ac t wit h r e aso nable c ar e . The se c lause s ar e also r o ut ine ly impo se d in a unilat e r al manne r wit ho ut any ge nuine bar gaining o r o ppo r t unit y t o pay a f e e f o r insur anc e . The par t y de manding adhe r e nc e t o an e xc ulpat o r y c lause simply e vade s t he ne c e ssit y o f liabilit y c o ve r age and t he n shif t s t he f ull bur de n o f r isk o f har m t o t he o t he r par t y. Co mpr o mise o f an e xist ing c laim, ho we ve r , r e lat e s t o ne glige nc e t hat has alr e ady t ake n plac e and is subje c t t o me asur able damage s. Suc h r e le ase s invo lve ac t ual ne go t iat io ns c o nc e r ning asc e r t aine d r ight s and liabilit ie s. Thus, if anyt hing, t he po lic ie s r e lat ing t o r e st r ic t io ns o n a par e nt ’s r ight t o c o mpr o mise an e xist ing c laim apply wit h e ve n gr e at e r f o r c e in t he pr e injur y, e xc ulpat o r y c lause sc e nar io . The public po lic y r e aso ns f o r pr o t e c t ing a c hild’s c ivil c laim pr e -injur y ar e no le ss pr e se nt t han t he y ar e po st -injur y, and we ar e unpe r suade d by Ho use o f Bo o m’s ar gume nt s t o t he c o nt r ar y. Last ly, Ho use o f Bo o m ar gue s t hat e nf o r c ing a waive r signe d by a par e nt o n be half o f a c hild t o e nt e r a f o r -pr o f it t r ampo line par k f ur t he r s t he public po lic y o f e nc o ur aging af f o r dable r e c r e at io nal ac t ivit ie s. In making t his ar gume nt , Ho use o f Bo o m r e lie s o n t he de c isio ns o f st at e s t hat have e nf o r c e d t he se waive r s be t we e n a par e nt and a no n-c o mme r c ial e nt it y. Gr ant e d, t his Co mmo nwe alt h has similar public po lic y t o t he se jur isdic t io ns t o “e nc o ur age who le so me r e c r e at io n f o r bo ys and gir ls ” and t o limit liabilit y f o r t ho se vo lunt e e r ing, in a var ie t y o f ways, t o inc r e ase r e c r e at io nal and c o mmunit y 10 ac t ivit ie s ac r o ss t he Co mmo nwe alt h. Wilson v. Graves Cty. Bd. Of Educ., 307 Ky. 203, 206, 210 S.W.2d 350, 351 (1948); see also KRS 162.055 (gr ant ing limit e d immunit y t o sc ho o l dist r ic t s f o r allo wing t he public t o use sc ho o l gr o unds f o r “r e c r e at io n, spo r t , ac ade mic , lit e r ar y, ar t ist ic , o r c o mmunit y use s”); KRS 411.190(2) (“[t ]he pur po se o f t his se c t io n is t o e nc o ur age o wne r s o f land t o make land and wat e r ar e as available t o t he public f o r r e c r e at io nal pur po se s by limit ing t he ir liabilit y t o war d pe r so ns e nt e r ing t he r e o n f o r suc h pur po se s[]”). Ho we ve r , t he same public po lic y implic at io ns t hat apply whe n de aling wit h t he vo lunt ar y o pe ning o f pr ivat e pr o pe r t y o r a sc ho o l dist r ic t ’s limit e d immunit y allo wing c o mmunit y use o f sc ho o l pr o pe r t y do no t apply whe n de aling wit h a c o mme r c ial e nt it y. A c o mme r c ial e nt it y has t he abilit y t o pur c hase insur anc e and spr e ad t he c o st be t we e n it s c ust o me r s. It also has t he abilit y t o t r ain it s e mplo ye e s and inspe c t t he busine ss f o r unsaf e c o ndit io ns. A c hild has no similar abilit y t o pr o t e c t himse lf f r o m t he ne glige nc e o f o t he r s wit hin t he c o nf ine s o f a c o mme r c ial e st ablishme nt . “If pr e -injur y r e le ase s we r e pe r mit t e d f o r c o mme r c ial e st ablishme nt s, t he inc e nt ive t o t ake r e aso nable pr e c aut io ns t o pr o t e c t t he saf e t y o f mino r c hildr e n wo uld be r e mo ve d.” Kirton, 997 So .2d at 358. Ac c o r dingly, no public po lic y e xist s t o suppo r t Ho use o f Bo o m’s 11 af f o r dable r e c r e at io nal ac t ivit ie s ar gume nt in t he c o nt e xt o f a c o mme r c ial ac t ivit y.9 III. Conclusion. Unde r t he c o mmo n law o f t his Co mmo nwe alt h, abse nt spe c ial c ir c umst anc e s, a par e nt has no aut ho r it y t o e nt e r int o c o nt r ac t s o n a c hild’s be half . Base d upo n o ur e xt e nsive r e se ar c h and r e vie w o f t he r e le vant po lic y in t his Co mmo nwe alt h and t he nat io n as a who le , we f ind no r e le vant public po lic y t o just if y abr o gat ing t he c o mmo n law t o e nf o r c e an e xc ulpat o r y agr e e me nt be t we e n a f o r -pr o f it e nt it y and a par e nt o n be half o f he r mino r c hild.10 Simply put , t he st at ut e s o f t he Ge ne r al Asse mbly and de c isio ns o f t his Co ur t r e f le c t no public po lic y shie lding t he o pe r at o r s o f f o r -pr o f it t r ampo line par ks f r o m liabilit y. All sit t ing. All c o nc ur . 9 As pr e vio usly no t e d, t he que st io n o f whe t he r public po lic y e xist s t o r e quir e e nf o r c e me nt o f par e nt -signe d, pr e -injur y waive r s in a no n-c o mme r c ial c o nt e xt is no t be f o r e t his Co ur t t o day, and t hus we make no de t e r minat io n o n t he issue . 10 Ho use o f Bo o m r e t ains t he abilit y t o ur ge c hange in t he c o mmo n law by pe t it io ning t he Ge ne r al Asse mbly t o e nac t a st at ut e t hat suppo r t s a par e nt ’s abilit y t o waive t he ir c hild’s le gal r ight s. See Alaska St at . § 09.65.292 (2004) (“a par e nt may, o n be half o f t he par e nt ’s c hild, r e le ase o r waive t he c hild’s pr o spe c t ive c laim f o r ne glige nc e against t he pr o vide r o f a spo r t s o r r e c r e at io nal ac t ivit y in whic h t he c hild par t ic ipat e s t o t he e xt e nt t hat t he ac t ivit ie s t o whic h t he waive r applie s ar e c le ar ly and c o nspic uo usly se t o ut in t he wr it t e n waive r and t o t he e xt e nt t he waive r is o t he r wise valid. The r e le ase o r waive r must be in wr it ing and shall be signe d by t he c hild’s par e nt []); Co lo . Re v. St at . § 13-22-107(3) (2003) (“A par e nt o f a c hild may, o n be half o f t he c hild, r e le ase o r waive t he c hild’s pr o spe c t ive c laim f o r ne glige nc e []”). 12 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Gr o ve r Simpso n Co x Gr o ve r S. Co x Law Of f ic e Vane ssa Lynn Ar mst r o ng U.S. Dist r ic t Co ur t COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Ant ho ny M. Pe r nic e Re minge r Co ., LPA COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE KENTUCKY JUSTICE ASSOCIATION: Ke vin Cr o sby Bur ke Jamie Kr ist in Ne al Bur ke Ne al PLLC 13