Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF REINSTATEMENT OF PACENZA

Citation: 

Docket Number: SCBD-5432

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2009-02-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF REINSTATEMENT OF PACENZA  IN THE MATTER OF REINSTATEMENT OF PACENZA 2009 OK 9 204 P.3d 58 Case Number: SCBD-5432 Decided: 02/10/2009 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA IN THE MATTER OF REINSTATEMENT OF: FRANKLIN J. PACENZA, TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION AND TO THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. Petition for Reinstatement ¶0 Following a suspension of two years and one day, the petitioner, Franklin J. Pacenza (Pacenza/attorney), sought reinstatement to the respondent, Oklahoma Bar Association (Bar Association). The suspension arose from the attorney's dishonest, fraudulent, deceitful, and misleading actions in a real estate transaction resulting in significant economic harm, embarrassment to the legal profession and to this Court, and an undermining of public confidence in the Bar Association and its members. The Bar Association opposed reinstatement. Although the trial panel of the Professional Responsibility Tribunal found that Pacenza had not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law during his suspension and had offered credible evidence of his competency and learning of the law, it determined that the attorney did not present evidence sufficient to demonstrate his good moral character in that he lacked true remorse for his actions leading to suspension and did not acknowledge the adverse effect his actions had upon the public and his clients. The trial panel recommended that reinstatement be denied and that costs be assessed. Upon de novo review, we determine that reinstatement should be denied and impose $2,714.63 in costs. PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT IS DENIED; PETITIONER IS ORDERED TO PAY COSTS. Franklin J. Pacenza, Cleveland, Oklahoma, Pro se. Mark A. Davidson, Assistant General Counsel, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Complainant. PER CURIAM ¶1 On June 13, 2006, we suspended the attorney for two years and one day for his dishonest, fraudulent, deceitful, and misleading actions in a real estate transaction resulting in significant economic harm, embarrassment to the legal profession and to this Court, and an undermining of public confidence in the Bar Association and its members. We deemed the extended suspension appropriate based on Pacenza's disciplinary history, discipline administered in similar cases, and the attorney's unwillingness to acknowledge his wrongdoing. ¶2 Upon a de novo review, FACTS RELEVANT TO REINSTATEMENT PROCEEDINGS ¶3 Pacenza was admitted to the practice of law on October 7, 1976. Before the incident resulting in his suspension for two years and a day, he was disciplined on two occasions. The attorney was privately reprimanded by this Court in October of 1987 for engaging in conduct involving misrepresentations and deceit arising from his collusion in removing a client's child from the lawful custody of the minor's father and transporting the mother and child from Texas to Oklahoma. On February 24, 1989, the Professional Responsibility Commission administered a private reprimand for misrepresentations he made to a social worker at the Oklahoma Department of Human Services that he had filed suit on behalf of an individual and expected to settle the suit within six months. No lawsuit had been filed and the attorney was aware that there was no settlement forthcoming. ¶4 The transaction leading to his suspension occurred in 1999 when the Richards executed a contract for deed to purchase real property from the attorney. At that time, Pacenza did not disclose: the existence of $300,00.00 in IRS tax liens against the property; title problems existing as a result of an incomplete foreclosure action; or that the couple could only expect a merchantable title upon the payment of cash in hand to the attorney. For a period of approximately nine months, Pacenza represented to the Richards and to attorneys hired to assist them that he was working on clearing title to the property. During this period, the attorney did nothing to remedy the title problems. ¶5 Once the Richards sought independent legal advice, Pacenza attempted to force the couple into a settlement of $55,000.00. The attorney advised the couple's lawyer that if they did not take his offer, he would obtain a divorce to protect his assets. The settlement offer was refused; and Pacenza followed through with his threats, divorcing his wife in order to preserve assets of his estate. ¶6 On July 28, 2008, Pacenza filed for reinstatement pursuant to Rule 11, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 O.S. 2001, Ch. 1, App. 1-A. The hearing on reinstatement was held before the trial panel on October 14, 2008. The trial panel issued its report on November 12, 2008 determining that Pacenza had not met the burden of proof for reinstatement and recommending that reinstatement be denied and costs be imposed. On the same day, the Bar Association filed an application for the assessment of costs in the amount of $2,714.63. The order setting a briefing schedule issued on November 13, 2008. On December 9th and 15th, respectively, Pacenza and the Bar Association filed waivers of their rights to file briefs in the cause. JURISDICTION, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND BURDEN OF PROOF ¶7 It is this Court's nondelegable, constitutional responsibility to regulate both the practice and the ethics, licensure, and discipline of the practitioners of the law. The duty is vested solely in this department of government. ¶8 A suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years and one day is tantamount to disbarment in that the suspended lawyer must follow the same procedures for readmittance as would a disbarred counterpart. ¶9 Rule 11.5, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 O.S. 2001, Ch. 1, App. 1-A requires the trial panel to make specific findings regarding whether: 1) the petitioner possesses the good moral character which would entitle him to be admitted to the Bar Association; 2) the petitioner has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law during the period of suspension; and 3) the petitioner possesses the competency and learning in the law required for admission to the practice of law in the State of Oklahoma. In addition, this Court considers the following eight factors in making a reinstatement decision: 1) the applicant's present moral fitness; 2) demonstrated consciousness of the conduct's wrongfulness and the disrepute it has brought upon the legal profession; 3) the extent of rehabilitation; 4) the original misconduct's seriousness; 5) conduct after resignation; 6) time elapsed since the resignation; 7) the applicant's character, maturity, and experience when suspended; and 8) present legal competence. ¶10 a. The attorney has not demonstrated the clear and convincing evidence necessary for his readmittance to the practice of law in Oklahoma. ¶11 Pacenza did not submit a brief arguing his position, but we assume that the attorney would assert that he has met all requirements for reinstatement; or, he would not have sought such by the filing of a petition and participation in reinstatement proceedings. The trial panel found that Pacenza had not submitted credible evidence of his good moral character or that, if readmitted, he would conform his conduct to the high standards expected of members of the legal profession in Oklahoma. Specifically, it determined that the attorney was not truly remorseful for his actions and did not understand their gravity nor did he acknowledge the effect of his actions on the public and his clients. Nevertheless, the trial panel did believe that Pacenza had met the burden of proof on the issue of his learning and competence in the law. Both the trial panel and the Bar Association recommend that we deny reinstatement and impose costs of the proceeding. We agree with these recommendations. However, unlike the trial panel, we are not persuaded that Pacenza met the burden of proof as it relates to his competency to practice law. Our lack of confidence in the attorney's legal abilities arises from his failure to strictly comply with the rules governing suspension and reinstatement proceedings. ¶12 1) Pacenza failed to demonstrate true remorse for the damage he caused his clients and to recognize that they have not been fully reimbursed economically. ¶13 Both the Richards appeared to testify against readmitting the attorney to the practice of law. Their general purpose in doing so was an attempt to keep the same harm Pacenza inflicted upon them from happening to anyone else.18 The first time that the attorney contacted the Richards to express his regrets for the treatment they suffered at his hands was the day of the reinstatement hearing. Although those apologies appear on the record, the candor of the attorney's statements do not comport with the tone of questioning he utilized with the couple. In cross examination, Pacenza was far more interested in attempting to show that the couple had not been injured to the extent they claimed, approximately $75,000.00,19 than he was to demonstrate that he had done anything to ease their losses.20 Although the attorney testified that not a day had gone by since his suspension that he did not feel remorse for the pain he had caused the Richards and the disrepute he brought on the profession, when asked how he would characterize his punishment, Pacenza testified that the discipline imposed for his involvement with the Richards was "excessive" and "harsh."21 ¶14 In his opening statement, Pacenza expressed that he had done everything in his power to make the injured parties whole. ¶15 Making full restitution to a lawyer's victims will neither preclude discipline nor insure reinstatement. ¶16 2) Evidence of Pacenza's good work in his church and in his community is insufficient to overcome testimony from former colleagues and a judicial officer questioning both his legal abilities and his integrity. ¶17 During the reinstatement hearing, the attorney called four individuals. Two of these individuals were not listed as witnesses but were allowed to make narrative statements. Only one of the four witnesses was a lawyer familiar with Pacenza's legal practice. He testified that the attorney had given him excellent assistance in research of a complicated medical malpractice case during his suspension. He also stated that Pacenza was considered a very ethical and decent person in the community. The two individuals allowed to make narrative statements were adamant that Pacenza is a good man who does extensive work in his church, ministers to shut-ins in the local rest homes, and is a solid contributor to the well being of the community as a whole. Also included in the record are eight letters from members of the legal and church community which strongly urge reinstatement. ¶18 The President of the Pawnee County Bar Association, Patrick Pickerill (Pickerill), testified that he began receiving telephone calls and letters from other attorneys in his community opposing Pacenza's reinstatement even before he read the notice of the filing of the petition in the Bar Journal. Recognizing that he has had personal differences with Pacenza in the past, ¶19 Another lawyer testified that he became involved in a cause in which Pacenza had been the attorney of record in a guardianship and adoption case in which the father's parental rights had been terminated and an adoption had been allowed, all without notice to the father. ¶20 Pacenza listed several judges as potential witnesses. Most of those listed were ambivalent about the reinstatement either stating that they did not have a lot of contact with the attorney when practicing or that they simply had no knowledge of his having engaged in the unauthorized practice of law during his suspension. Nevertheless, the Bar Association's investigator spoke to one judge who stated that he did not support reinstatement because he did not believe the attorney to be trustworthy. ¶21 The District Attorney of Pawhuska County stated that he did not believe Pacenza could be trusted and that he hoped he would not be reinstated. ¶22 The statements from the attorney's witnesses are insufficient to demonstrate clear and convincing evidence ¶23 3) The attorney's failure to strictly comply with the rules governing suspension and reinstatement proceedings militates against a finding of knowledge of the law and competency in its practice. ¶24 Pacenza filed for reinstatement pursuant to Rule 11, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 O.S. 2001, Ch. 1, App. 1-A. However, his petition did not conform strictly to the requirements of the rule. Rule 11.1, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 O.S. Supp. 2002, Ch. 1, App. 1-A requires that affidavits be attached to the petition showing all the applicant's activities and places of residence since suspension along with an affidavit of the applicant and of all court clerks in counties in which the applicant resided establishing that there has been no unauthorized practice of law during the suspension. ¶25 The three documents attached to the application did not conform with the statutory requirements for affidavits. In one instance, the document denominated as an affidavit was not signed. None of the three supposed affidavits indicated they were signed before an individual authorized to administer oaths nor did they contain a statement indicating they were being signed under penalty of perjury. ¶26 A witness list was attached to the application denominating twenty-seven individuals. When the investigator for the Bar Association made inquiries of these individuals, only nine responded. In addition, it became clear that Pacenza had not contacted all the individuals nor advised them that he would be calling them as witnesses. ¶27 Rule 9.1, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 O.S. 2001, Ch. 1, App. 1-A ¶28 Because he had no pending causes in any court, Pacenza did not file any formal withdrawals after he was notified of his suspension. When asked for evidence that he had contacted all his clients as required upon suspension, the attorney was able to present only twenty-five return receipts although he had a client list of thirty-five individuals. ¶29 Every lawyer is charged with the observance of the rules of professional conduct. CONCLUSION ¶30 We agree with the trial panel that there is no evidence to indicate that the attorney engaged in the unauthorized practice of law during his suspension. However, although there is testimony in support of Pacenza, the transcript of proceedings before the trial panel makes it clear that the attorney has not demonstrated true remorse for the damage he caused and that he continues to fail to recognize that his clients have not been made whole financially. In addition, we are presented with testimony from the clients harmed by the attorney's actions leading to discipline, by the practicing bar, and by one judicial officer questioning his legal abilities and his integrity. Finally, we are faced with evidence that Pacenza did not strictly comply with the rules governing either his suspension or his reinstatement. ¶31 In making a reinstatement decision, this Court must disregard feelings of sympathy, PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT IS DENIED; PETITIONER IS ORDERED TO PAY COSTS. EDMONDSON, C.J., TAYLOR, V.C.J., HARGRAVE, OPALA, KAUGER, WATT, WINCHESTER, COLBERT, JJ. - concur REIF, J. - recused FOOT