Case Title: The People v. Eric Bailey

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 97  
The People &c., 
            Respondent, 
        v. 
Eric Bailey, 
            Appellant.
John D. Kircher, for appellant.
Olivia Sohmer, for respondent.
JONES, J.:
The question before the Court is whether the evidence
was legally sufficient to convict defendant of criminal
possession of a forged instrument in the first degree.  We hold
that it was not. 
          
Due to reports of increased thefts in Midtown
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Manhattan, a plainclothes team of officers including Police
Officer Murphy and Sergeant Fressle, were on the look-out for
pickpockets.  Defendant Eric Bailey caught their attention.  The
team observed him enter and leave eight fast food restaurants in
the 34th Street area.  In the various restaurants he entered,
defendant walked around the dining area, looked around, but never
looked at the menu or made a purchase.  In one restaurant, he was
observed attempting to take the purse of a female customer by
sticking his hand through a partition which separated his seat
from this customer.  Apparently sensing his hand near her purse,
the woman moved the purse and put it on her lap.  Defendant was
later observed in another restaurant where he sat, back-to-back,
with another woman customer.  In this encounter, the team
observed him extend his arms around his chair in an attempt to
reach her handbag.  Later, they noticed that her coat pocket had
been turned inside out.  Following these observations, defendant
was placed under arrest. At the precinct, defendant was searched
by Sergeant Fressle and three counterfeit ten dollar bills were
recovered from his pocket.  When Sergeant Fressle recovered the
bills he handed them to Officer Murphy who remarked that the
bills were counterfeit.  Defendant overheard the remark and
reportedly said, “you got me for the counterfeit money, but I
didn’t have my hand near the purse.”  Defendant moved prior to
trial to suppress the statement.  Although defendant had not
received Miranda warnings, the trial court denied the motion to
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No. 97
1 Penal Law 170.15 provides in relevant part that:
“A person is guilty of forgery in the first degree
when, with intent to defraud, deceive or injure
another, he falsely makes, completes or alters a
written instrument which is or purports to be, or which
is calculated to become or to represent if completed:
1. Part of an issue of money . . .”
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suppress his statement on the ground that it was voluntary and
not the result of interrogation or police conduct reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response.  The court found that
the police officer’s remark to his fellow officer was “merely a
interjection of the briefest sort occurring during arrest
processing after Fressle found the ten-dollar bills during the
search." 
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two
counts of attempted grand larceny and possession of a forged
instrument in the first degree.  Defendant moved to set aside the
verdict on the forgery count, arguing that the evidence was
insufficient to prove that he had the culpable mental state
necessary to commit the crime.  Under Penal Law § 170.30,
"[a] person is guilty of criminal possession
of a forged instrument in the first degree
when, with knowledge that it is forged and
with intent to defraud, deceive or injure
another, he utters or possesses any forged
instrument of a kind specified in section
170.15."1
In support of the motion, defendant argues that the evidence was 
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insufficient to prove his "intent to deceive, defraud, or injure
another."  
In opposition, the People argue that defendant's
statement was proof of his knowledge that the bills were
counterfeit and consequently evidence of his criminal intent.  In
finding the evidence legally sufficient, the trial court
dismissed the motion and concluded “why would Bailey already
embarked upon a brazen effort to commit theft, carry currency in
his pocket that he knew to be bogus unless his plan was to pass
it off to unsuspecting storekeeper, news vendor, or fast food
worker?”
The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction
on all three counts.  Relying on (People v Danielson 9 NY3d 342
[2007]), the court rejected defendant’s challenges to the
sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting the “intent"
element of Penal Law § 170.30 of his forged instrument
conviction.  The court reasoned that the totality of the
evidence, including defendant’s statement to the police evincing
a consciousness of guilt, and the lack of any reason for the
defendant to be carrying counterfeit bills in a shopping district
other than to pass them, supported the inference that he
possessed the bills with the requisite intent.  A judge of this
court granted defendant leave to appeal and we now modify by
dismissing the possession of a forged instrument count.
"A verdict is legally sufficient when, viewing the
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facts in a light most favorable to the People, there is a valid
line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a
rational jury could have found the elements of the crime proved
beyond a reasonable doubt" (Danielson, 9 NY3d at 349 [internal
citations and quotations omitted]).  A sufficiency inquiry
requires a court "to marshal the competent facts most favorable
to the People and determine whether, as a matter of law, a jury
could logically conclude that the People sustained their burden
of proof" (id. at 349).  In viewing the facts in this case we
hold that the proof was legally insufficient as to intent.   
The People argue that it was reasonable for the jury to
infer defendant's intent to defraud, deceive or injure another
with counterfeit bills because of his knowledge that he possessed
counterfeit bills and his attempt to steal property in a
commercial district.  The People rely on People v Bracey (41 NY2d
296 [1977]) and People v Dallas (46 AD3d 489 [1st Dept. 2007])
for support.  However, the People’s reliance on these cases is
misplaced.  
In Bracey, two defendants, after exiting a car which
had its license plate removed, entered a store armed with a gun
concealed in a bag.  They made a token purchase in the store and
looked around.  Once they left the store, they split up and
exchanged the bag with the gun.  One defendant drove the car
around the block and parked it down the street from the store. 
The second defendant entered the store with the gun drawn.  In
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determining that defendants were properly convicted at their jury
trial, this Court noted:
“Under all the circumstances the jury could
well find that the defendants, who acted
together throughout, had reconnoitered the
store and returned to rob it.  In fact the
only thing that could have made this
intention plainer was an actual demand for
money”
(Bracey, 41 NY2d at 302).  In Dallas, the defendant possessed 12
forged documents including multiple documents in the name of one
individual which he admitted that he intended to sell to other
persons.   
Clearly, Bracey and Dallas are distinguishable from the
case at bar.  In those cases, the criminal intent is specific to
the very crime they committed.  Here, the only reasonable
inference to be drawn by the jury is that defendant's conduct was
common to larceny, a crime completely unrelated to possession of
a forged instrument. 
There is no dispute that defendant's inculpatory
statement proved that he knew the bills were counterfeit. 
However, knowledge alone is not sufficient to hold defendant
criminally liable for possessing a forged instrument.  Knowledge
and intent are two separate elements that must each be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt by the People.  Simply put, drawing the
inference of defendant's intent from his knowledge that the bills
were counterfeit improperly shifts the burden to prove intent
from the People to the defendant.  Stated another way, by ruling
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that the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant’s
conviction of possession of a forged instrument, the lower courts
have effectively stripped the element of intent from the statute
and criminalized knowing possession.   
In addition, we reject the People’s argument that the
requisite intent for possessing a forged instrument can be drawn
from defendant’s presence in a shopping district, his possession
of counterfeit bills, and his larcenous intent.  Both the trial
court and the Appellate Division questioned why the defendant was
in a shopping area with the bills.  They concluded defendant
lacked a reason, other than to pass them.  However, the intent to
commit a crime must be specific to the crime charged (see e.g.,
People v Morales, 130 AD2d 366 [1st Dept 1987] [where proof of
the intent to injure a victim, which is sufficient to establish
assault, may not be relied upon to establish the culpability
requirements of robbery]). 
Furthermore, when the Legislature intends for there to
be a presumption or inference of intent by mere possession, it so
specifies in the statute.  In Penal Law § 170.27, which relates
to forged credit and debit cards, the statute provides that a
person who possesses two or more such cards is “presumed to
possess the same with knowledge that they are forged and with the
intent to defraud, deceive or injure another.”  Similar statutory
presumptions of intent are found in other penal law statutes (see
e.g., Penal Law §158.00 [2] [a] [relates to welfare fraud -- “A
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No. 97
2 In fact, it can be argued that the evidence proves the
lack of intent to pass counterfeit bills.  The police observed
defendant for at least one and a half hours, in which he never
made a purchase, looked at a menu, stood in line nor did he
approach a counter.  If anything, we can infer that his sole
intent was to steal real currency from unsuspecting customers. 
The evidence provided by the People only gives rise to suspicion
and conjecture that defendant intended to pass or utter the
counterfeit bills (see People v Lewis, 275 NY 33 [1937]).
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person who possesses five or more public benefit cards in a name
or names other than his or her own is presumed to possess the
same with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another”]; Penal
Law § 235.10 [2] [relates to promotion of obscene articles –- “A
person who possesses six or more identical or similar obscene
articles is presumed to possess them with intent to promote the
same”]).  Unlike these statutes, there is no statutory
presumption regarding counterfeit bills.  The Legislature could
have easily created such a presumption.  Instead, it required the
People to prove not only that defendant knew the bills were
counterfeit but that he intended to use them to defraud, deceive
or injure another.2
Defendant's remaining argument regarding the admission
of the statement lacks merit.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be modified by dismissing the count of the indictment charging
criminal possession of a forged instrument in the first degree
and remitting to Supreme Court for re-sentencing and, as so
modified, affirmed. 
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People v Bailey
No. 97 
PIGOTT, J.(dissenting in part) :
Although the majority has set forth the proper standard
of review to be applied in this case, I nevertheless respectfully
dissent because I believe both the trial court and the Appellate
Division correctly applied that standard and reached the correct
decision.
In my view, the majority's analysis is clouded by the
fact that defendant was charged with the two purse snatching
misdemeanors in addition to felony possession of a forged
instrument.  The majority seems to conclude that because
defendant was up to a different larcenous escapade at the time of
his arrest, the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the
forgery is weakened or lacking.  I disagree.  Indeed, had the
People elected not to pursue the two attempted purse snatching
charges, the intent element of the possession of a forged
instrument charge becomes clear.
The People were required to prove that defendant
knowingly possessed the counterfeit bills with the "intent to
defraud, deceive or injure another" (Penal Law § 170.30).  As the
majority notes, the defendant's intent must be specific to the
crime (see maj. opn. at 7), but the specific intent required for
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possession of a forged instrument is a state of mind that may be
inferred from defendant's actions and the surrounding
circumstances (see e.g. People v Barnes, 50 NY2d 375, 381
[1980]).  The intent to defraud or deceive need not be targeted
to any specific person; a general intent to defraud suffices (see
People v Dallas, 46 AD3d 489, 491 [1st Dept 2007]).  Nor does the
statute require the People to prove that defendant attempted to
use the counterfeit bills.  They need only show that defendant
possessed the counterfeit bills with the requisite mental state.
Here, the relevant evidence shows that defendant was
going from one fast food restaurant to another in a busy shopping
district.  He was carrying the counterfeit bills in his pants
pocket - where one would ordinarily carry spending money.  All
the while, he was engaging in larcenous behavior.  Upon his
arrest, he admitted "you got me for the counterfeit money", and
then stated "but I didn't have my hand near the purse."  The
majority, as well as the defendant, concede that this statement
proves that defendant knew the bills were counterfeit.  But it
does more - it shows that defendant had a guilty mind with
respect to his possession of the bills.  Under these
circumstances, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that
there was no other logical explanation for defendant's possession
of the bills, except to pass them when the opportunity arose.  
Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the People, I believe the evidence was legally
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sufficient to permit the charge to be submitted to the jury and I
would therefore affirm the order of the Appellate Division.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order modified by dismissing the count of the indictment charging
criminal possession of a forged instrument in the first degree
and remitting to Supreme Court, New York County, for resentencing
and, as so modified, affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Jones.  Chief
Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo and Read concur.
Judge Pigott dissents in part and votes to affirm in an opinion
in which Judge Smith concurs.
Decided June 11, 2009