Case Title: State v. Gondor

Citation: 2006-Ohio-6679

Docket Number: 20050329 and 20050336

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-12-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. GONDOR, APPELLANT. 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. RESH, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679.] 
Postconviction relief — Standard of review — Trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding ineffective assistance of counsel. 
(Nos. 2005-0329 and 2005-0336 — Submitted January 25, 2006 — Decided 
December 26, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Portage County, 
No. 2002-P-0073, 2004-Ohio-7219. 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Portage County, 
No. 2002-P-0074, 2004-Ohio-7220. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} The question presented in these two cases, consolidated sua sponte, 
is whether the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review when it 
reviewed de novo the trial court’s judgment granting the appellants’ petitions for 
postconviction relief.  We hold that the court of appeals should have applied an 
abuse-of-discretion standard rather than a de novo standard in reviewing the trial 
court’s decisions on the two postconviction petitions.  We therefore reverse the 
judgments of the court of appeals.  Because we also hold that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion when it granted postconviction relief and ordered new 
trials for the two appellants, we remand these cases to the trial court for retrial. 
Factual Background 
{¶ 2} These cases arise from the August 14, 1988 murder of Connie 
Nardi.  She was beaten and then strangled to death; her body was dumped in a 
pond, where it was discovered the following day.  Troy Busta, Robert Gondor, 
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and Randy Resh were charged with Nardi’s murder.  In 1989, Busta pleaded 
guilty; in 1990, Resh and Gondor were convicted of Nardi’s murder in separate 
trials. 
{¶ 3} With some variations, the state presented the same evidence at 
both Resh’s and Gondor’s trials.  Busta was the prosecution’s key witness at both 
proceedings.  He testified to the following events.  Around 5:30 p.m., on Sunday, 
August 14, 1988, Busta went to Ed’s Upper Deck, a bar in Mantua.  While at the 
bar, he met and danced with Nardi.  About 30 to 45 minutes later, Resh and 
Gondor arrived at the bar.  At around 7:00 p.m., Busta took Nardi on a motorcycle 
ride to cool off.  They traveled to a washed-out bridge that formerly crossed the 
Cuyahoga River on Allyn Road.  After about 45 minutes, they returned to the bar. 
{¶ 4} After returning to the Upper Deck, Busta talked with Resh about 
Nardi.  Busta falsely bragged that he had had sex with Nardi.  Resh asked Busta to 
persuade Nardi to return to the washed-out bridge area and have sex with him.  
Busta agreed, and the two planned for Busta to buy some beer and take Nardi 
back to the washed-out bridge.  Resh and Gondor were to arrive 15 to 20 minutes 
later. 
{¶ 5} Later that evening, Busta bought a “split six” pack of beer – three 
Coronas and three Pabsts.  Busta and Nardi then left the Upper Deck on Busta’s 
motorcycle and returned to the washed-out bridge.  Busta’s stated departure time 
from the Upper Deck differed at the two trials.  At Resh’s trial, Busta testified that 
he and Nardi had left the Upper Deck between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m.  At Gondor’s 
trial, Busta testified that they had left between 9:00 and 9:30 p.m.  At both trials, 
Busta testified that Resh and Gondor arrived at the bridge in Gondor’s white 
pickup truck 15 to 20 minutes after Busta and Nardi. 
{¶ 6} Resh and Gondor joined Busta and Nardi near the bridge.  After a 
short conversation, Resh asked Nardi to have sex with the three of them.  Nardi 
refused, and Resh became angry.  Resh grabbed Nardi and told Gondor and Busta 
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to hold her hands and feet.  Resh sat on Nardi’s stomach while she struggled to 
free herself.  Gondor took off Nardi’s shorts and underwear.  Nardi freed a leg 
and kicked Gondor.  Resh responded by striking Nardi several times on her head 
and then strangled her. 
{¶ 7} According to Busta, Resh and Gondor put Nardi’s body in the back 
of Gondor’s truck on top of a pile of two-by-four pieces of wood.  Gondor and 
Resh drove the truck, and Busta followed on his motorcycle, to a parking area 
near a pond.  Gondor and Resh then dumped Nardi’s body into the pond.  Busta 
left Resh and Gondor, and he later discarded Nardi’s purse in a ditch and disposed 
of the beer cans and bottles near the intersection of Abbot and Allyn Roads. 
{¶ 8} At around 11:00 or 11:15 p.m. that evening, Busta returned to the 
Upper Deck and met Resh and Gondor, who had already arrived.  They remained 
until the bar closed.  After leaving the bar, they noticed blood on some of the 
wood in the back of Gondor’s truck.  The three of them started tossing the wood 
into the parking lot of the bar across the street.  Gondor and Resh then followed 
Busta to his residence.  However, Gondor and Resh did not stop at Busta’s house.  
Other testimony established that Resh and Gondor returned to Resh’s trailer and 
at 12:42 a.m. on August 15, 1988, ordered a pizza from Domino’s. 
{¶ 9} During the trials of Resh and Gondor, the state relied on blood 
evidence and false-alibi evidence.  Investigators had examined suspected 
bloodstains found on the black plastic bed liner of Gondor’s truck because Busta 
had claimed that Nardi’s bloodstains were left on wood in the back of the truck.  
Dale Laux, a criminalist with the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and 
Investigation (“BCI”), testified that the stains were human bloodstains.  However, 
Laux could not determine the blood type because of the age and small size of the 
samples.  During cross-examination at Gondor’s trial, Laux testified that the 
stains were also sent for testing to the Serological Research Institute (“SERI”).  
Laux testified that SERI tests to type the stains were unsuccessful. 
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{¶ 10} The state also presented testimony that Resh and Gondor had 
attempted to establish an alibi for Nardi’s murder before they had been identified 
as suspects.  At both trials, the owner of Domino’s Pizza testified that Gondor had 
contacted him on Monday, August 15, 1988, to make sure that his name was 
added to a receipt for the pizza that had been ordered by Resh the night before.  
Brenda Holcomb, another Domino’s employee, testified that both Resh and 
Gondor went into Domino’s on Tuesday, August 16, 1988, to verify their early 
Monday morning order because they were being investigated for a murder. 
{¶ 11} Resh and Gondor denied any involvement in Nardi’s murders.  
During his trial, Resh testified that upon arriving at the Upper Deck, he saw Nardi 
dancing on the bar.  Resh claimed that he saw Busta and Nardi leave the bar 
together and return about 30 to 45 minutes later.  Around 9:00 p.m., Resh saw 
Busta and Nardi leave again.  According to Resh, around 10:00 p.m., he and 
Gondor left the Upper Deck and went to the Village Tavern.  They stayed there 
for about an hour and then returned to the Upper Deck.  Resh noticed that Busta 
had also returned to the Upper Deck and was sitting alone at the bar.  Resh 
testified that he left the bar when it closed and that he, Gondor, and Busta threw 
some pieces of wood from the bed of Gondor’s truck into the parking lot across 
the street.  However, Resh denied seeing any blood on the wood.  Afterwards, 
according to Resh, he and Gondor drove to Resh’s trailer and ordered the pizza. 
{¶ 12} At his trial, Gondor testified that upon arriving at the Upper Deck, 
he sat with Resh, who told him about a woman who had been dancing on the bar 
and had left with Busta.  Sometime later, Busta and Nardi returned.  Around 
10:00 p.m., according to Gondor, he and Resh left the Upper Deck and went to 
the Village Tavern.  They remained there for 30 to 40 minutes and then went back 
to the Upper Deck.  After they returned, Gondor noticed that Busta came back to 
the Upper Deck.  When the Upper Deck closed at midnight, Gondor stated that 
he, Resh, and Busta went out to the parking lot and threw pieces of wood from the 
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bed of his truck across the street.  Gondor denied seeing any blood on the wood.  
Afterwards, Gondor followed Resh to Resh’s trailer, and they ordered the pizza. 
{¶ 13} During the defense case at Gondor’s trial, the bartender at the 
Village Tavern testified that Resh and Gondor were at the Village Tavern for 
about 30 minutes between 9:45 and 10:45 p.m. on August 14.  Resh’s defense 
team presented similar evidence at his trial. 
{¶ 14} Resh was convicted of murder and attempted rape.  He was 
sentenced to five to 15 years for attempted rape and 15 years to life for murder, 
the sentences to be served consecutively.  Gondor was convicted of involuntary 
manslaughter, kidnapping, and obstructing justice.  He was sentenced to ten to 25 
years for both involuntary manslaughter and kidnapping, and 18 months for 
obstructing justice, all sentences to run consecutively. 
Procedural History 
{¶ 15} The court of appeals separately affirmed Resh’s and Gondor’s 
convictions.  State v. Resh (Dec. 11, 1992), Portage App. No. 90-P-2256, 1992 
WL 366992; State v. Gondor (Dec. 11, 1992), Portage App. No. 90-P-2260, 1992 
WL 366988.  On May 5, 1993, this court declined to review Resh’s discretionary 
appeal.  State v. Resh (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 1473, 611 N.E.2d 835.  On July 21, 
1993, this court likewise declined to review Gondor’s discretionary appeal.  State 
v. Gondor (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 1408, 615 N.E.2d 1043. 
{¶ 16} On September 20, 1996, Resh and Gondor filed separate petitions 
for postconviction relief.  Both alleged that the state had withheld exculpatory 
material and that they had received ineffective assistance of counsel.  On October 
10, 1996, the trial court denied both petitions without issuing findings of fact or 
conclusions of law.  On November 12, 1996, Resh and Gondor appealed and also 
filed with the trial court motions to reconsider, as well as amended petitions for 
postconviction relief and attached evidentiary materials. 
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{¶ 17} On January 7, 1997, the court of appeals remanded both cases to 
the trial court with instructions to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law.  
On January 30, 1997, the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law 
in both cases and dismissed Resh’s and Gondor’s amended petitions.  The court of 
appeals reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on Gondor’s petition 
for postconviction relief.  State v. Gondor (Dec. 19, 1997), Portage App. Nos. 96-
P-0261 and 97-P-0017, 1997 WL 799575.  On December 22, 1997, the court of 
appeals also reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on Resh’s petition 
for postconviction relief.  State v. Resh (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 694, 706, 707 
N.E.2d 531. 
{¶ 18} On March 30, 1999, Busta filed a motion to intervene in both 
Resh’s and Gondor’s postconviction proceedings and a motion to disqualify 
counsel for Resh and Gondor.  Busta’s motion to disqualify petitioners’ counsel 
was based on his interest in protecting certain privileged attorney-client matters 
that might be disclosed in connection with Resh’s and Gondor’s cases.  The trial 
court denied Busta’s motion, and further postconviction proceedings were stayed 
pending Busta’s appeal.  The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s decision 
denying Busta’s motion to intervene and remanded the matter to the trial court.  
State v. Resh (June 29, 2001), Portage App. No. 99-P-0035, 2001 WL 735788; 
State v. Gondor (June 29, 2001), Portage App. No. 99-P-0034, 2001 WL 735781. 
Postconviction Evidentiary Hearing 
{¶ 19} On May 8, 2002, the trial court began an eight-day joint 
evidentiary hearing.  During the postconviction hearing, James Draper, Resh’s 
trial counsel, testified that he began representing Resh in April 1990.  Draper was 
in the process of trying a case in federal court at the time he represented Resh.  
Draper said that he had moved for continuances in the federal case and Resh’s 
case, but that both motions were denied. 
January Term, 2006 
7 
{¶ 20} Draper testified that the prosecutor informed him that discovery in 
Resh’s case would be conducted though an open-file procedure.  Draper admitted 
reviewing the prosecutor’s file.  However, Draper explained that he did not 
review each page of the prosecutor’s “voluminous files” due to his trial schedule 
and because he relied on “the things that were pointed out to [him] that went to 
the theory of the State’s case.” 
{¶ 21} Gary Levine, Gondor’s trial counsel, testified that he began 
representing Gondor before Gondor’s April 5, 1990 indictment.  Prosecutors 
notified Levine “[e]arly on” that discovery would be conducted through an open-
file procedure.  Nevertheless, Levine testified that he expected a formal response 
to his discovery requests pursuant to Crim.R. 16.  Levine also testified that he 
personally viewed the prosecutor’s file at the Portage County Prosecutor’s Office 
and was never refused an appointment to do so. 
{¶ 22} During the postconviction hearing, Resh and Gondor presented 
evidence from the prosecutor’s file that was favorable to the defense but that was 
never introduced at their trials.  First, Resh and Gondor presented a July 6, 1990 
report from Brian Wraxall, Chief Forensic Serologist at the Serological Research 
Institute.  Wraxall’s affidavit, dated November 12, 1996, and Wraxall’s April 30, 
2001 deposition were also introduced.  Wraxall’s July 6, 1990 report set forth the 
test results of the suspected bloodstains found on Gondor’s bed liner.  He wrote 
that gamma markers and kappa markers “are found in blood serum as well as 
other body fluids” and that they “are very stable in dried bloodstains.”  However, 
Wraxall reported that his tests detected no gamma markers or kappa markers in 
the samples submitted.  He further reported that DNA “is found in nucleated cells, 
e.g. white blood cells, spermatozoa, salivary, vaginal and tissue epithelial cells,” 
but that he detected no DNA in the stains submitted.  In his November 12, 1996 
affidavit, Wraxall stated, “The body fluid that best fits [the test results] is 
perspiration.”  Wraxall testified at his deposition that he did not remember, and 
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his telephone logs do not show, whether he was contacted by either Resh’s or 
Gondor’s counsel before the two trials. 
{¶ 23} Second, Resh and Gondor presented evidence challenging the 
prosecution’s theory that they attempted to establish an alibi before they were 
considered suspects.  Resh and Gondor introduced a March 6, 1990 statement of 
Rick Hollibaugh, a Domino’s employee, which established that Hollibaugh and 
Brenda Holcomb had worked together on the evening that Resh and Gondor 
returned to confirm their order.  Domino’s work records from Monday, August 
15, 1988, through Sunday, August 21, 1988, were also introduced.  They showed 
that Holcomb and Hollibaugh first worked together again on Friday, August 19, 
1988.  This date was after the police had contacted both Resh and Gondor about 
the Nardi homicide. 
{¶ 24} Holcomb’s grand jury testimony and her testimony at the 
postconviction hearing indicated that it was raining when Resh and Gondor 
returned to confirm their order.  Resh and Gondor presented a climatological 
report from the Akron-Canton Airport for August 1988, which showed 
thunderstorms on August 5, 15, 18, 19, 25, and 28.  Resh and Gondor claimed that 
this report, in conjunction with Hollibaugh’s testimony and the work records, 
showed that Friday, August 19, 1988, was the only date when they could have 
returned to Domino’s.  By that date, the police had identified Resh and Gondor as 
suspects, and their efforts to establish their whereabouts on the night of the 
murder would not have been as incriminating as trial testimony that Resh and 
Gondor had tried to establish an alibi just hours after the crime. 
{¶ 25} During the postconviction hearing, the April 26, 1999 testimony of 
former Domino’s owner Timothy Hayes was presented.  Hayes testified that he 
thought that Gondor had phoned him about his pizza receipt on Monday, August 
15, 1988, because Hayes did not have to search for the Sunday receipts and “it 
would have been right there.”  Hayes testified that his testimony about the 
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Monday date was based on the logic of what happened and not on his memory of 
when the phone call was actually made. 
{¶ 26} Third, Resh and Gondor presented evidence about Busta’s 
credibility that was not presented at their trials.  The petitioners introduced a 
transcript of a September 14, 1988 interview between Busta, his lawyers, and his 
investigator that took place before Busta’s trial.  Busta stated during that 1988 
interview that Lieutenant David Easthon, the police investigator, had told him that 
Busta’s assistance was needed to implicate Resh and Gondor in Nardi’s murder.  
During the interview, Busta denied seeing anyone strike Nardi.  Busta also said 
that he did not know why Gondor and Resh were throwing wood from Gondor’s 
truck, but he indicated that it was “good wood.” 
{¶ 27} As the interview progressed, Busta’s attorneys asked him whether 
he would be willing to set up Resh and Gondor for Lieutenant Easthon.  Busta 
replied, “I’d do anything I have to do to get myself out of this.  I ain’t sitting in no 
chair for somebody else.  I’m not going to sit in jail for somebody else.”  Busta 
also said, “I’m not going down for it.  If I do when I do get out, I’m going to find 
out who did it.  * * *  If they did do it 100%, I’m going to prove it some way.  I 
don’t know how.”  Busta also asked, “Has anything been checked on her husband 
or * * * anything like that?  Would he have anything to do with this?”   
{¶ 28} During postconviction proceedings, Resh and Gondor also 
presented a police report dated September 11, 1988, concerning an attempt by 
Busta’s mother, Kay Busta, to smuggle a knife into jail to her son.  Charges 
against his mother were dropped as part of the plea agreement with Busta.  
Neither Resh’s nor Gondor’s counsel used this incident during their cross-
examination of Busta at the defendants’ trials. 
{¶ 29} Finally, Resh and Gondor presented postconviction evidence that 
was not used during their trials, showing that others may have been involved in 
Nardi’s homicide.  First, Donna Sabarese provided police with a statement about 
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an encounter that she had with three men in the general vicinity of Nardi’s body.  
Early Monday, August 15, 1988, Sabarese was delivering newspapers when she 
was approached by three men in their twenties who told her that they had been 
fishing and that “a girl was missing * * * [and she] was a friend of theirs.”  
Sabarese said that the men appeared agitated, and she told them to stay away from 
her.  Sabarese thought they were carrying pipes because she heard a “tinny” sound 
when one of them dropped something on the pavement.  A month later, during a 
search of the area of the encounter, the police found a metal strut and a broom 
handle. 
{¶ 30} Second, Resh and Gondor presented a police report containing 
statements from Pauline and Fred Green.  The Greens lived on the corner of Allyn 
and Abbot Roads.  The Greens said that around 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. on August 14, 
1988, they saw a man and a woman on a motorcycle, a man on a dirt bike, and a 
man on another motorcycle down by the river.  Around 11:30 p.m. that evening, 
Pauline saw two people on a motorcycle that she believed was the same 
motorcycle she had seen earlier, and they threw something into the weeds near her 
home.  The next day, she retrieved two full cans and one empty can of Pabst beer, 
and one full bottle and one empty bottle of Corona beer. 
{¶ 31} Third, Resh and Gondor presented the transcript of a September 
20, 1988 telephone interview conducted by Lieutenant Easthon with Ed Douglas, 
the owner of the Upper Deck bar.  Douglas reported during that telephone 
interview that he received information that Busta and Nardi had gone to a party 
the night of August 14, 1988, where two other men, Eddie Price and Bennett 
Nelson, were present.  Easthon replied, “Well we haven’t spoken to these two 
guys.  Yeah, we’re beyond that.  We’re in more critical stages now.” 
{¶ 32} Fourth, Resh and Gondor presented a statement that Mr. and Mrs. 
Thomas provided to the police on October 18, 1988.  They resided on the first 
piece of property north of the alleged location of the homicide.  The Thomases 
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reported that on Sunday, August 14, 1988, they never saw Busta on his 
motorcycle and never saw a white pickup truck. 
{¶ 33} During the postconviction hearing, James Draper, Resh’s trial 
attorney, testified that before Resh’s trial, he did not see or receive Wraxall’s 
report, the Domino’s work records, the Hollibaugh interview, or Holcomb’s grand 
jury testimony.  Additionally, Draper did not see or receive the transcript of 
Busta’s interview with his attorneys and did not remember receiving the police 
report about Busta’s mother.  According to Draper, he also did not see or receive 
the police investigative reports containing Donna Sabarese’s statements, 
Douglas’s telephone interview, or the Green and Thomas statements. 
{¶ 34} Gary Levine, Gondor’s trial attorney, testified at the postconviction 
hearing that before Gondor’s trial, he did not see or receive the transcript of 
Busta’s interview with his attorneys or the police report concerning Busta’s 
mother.  Further, Levine did not see or receive police investigative reports relating 
to Sabarese’s statements, Douglas’s telephone interview, or the Green and 
Thomas statements.  Levine also did not see or receive Domino’s work records or 
Holcomb’s grand jury testimony, and he did not recall seeing Hollibaugh’s 
interview. 
{¶ 35} Levine testified that he first learned about Wraxall’s report during 
his cross-examination of Dale Laux.  Levine stated at the postconviction hearing 
that he was “astounded” at trial when Laux testified that another laboratory had 
conducted testing on the stains.  Although Laux discussed the results of those tests 
during further cross-examination, Levine explained at the postconviction hearing 
that he did not see or receive a copy of Wraxall’s report before the end of 
Gondor’s trial. 
{¶ 36} Both Draper and Levine testified at the postconviction hearing that 
all of these reports would have assisted the defense in refuting Busta’s testimony 
at trial and could have helped to suggest to the juries that other individuals might 
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have murdered Nardi.  Draper and Levine also testified that there would have 
been no reasonable strategic reason for them to fail to use such reports, and they 
believe that they would have rendered ineffective assistance to their clients had 
they known about the evidence and failed to present it. 
{¶ 37} Ron Craig, an investigator with the Portage County Prosecutor’s 
Office, testified that he was responsible for gathering and organizing all the 
evidence pertaining to the Nardi homicide at the time of the investigation and the 
trials.  Craig testified that the prosecutor’s office had an open-file discovery 
policy.  According to Craig, Draper and Levine were informed that the open-file 
discovery applied to discovery in the Resh and Gondor cases, which meant that 
the defense was going to receive everything the prosecutor’s office had in its files.  
Craig testified at the postconviction hearing that Draper and Levine came to the 
prosecutor’s office on several occasions to review the prosecutor’s master file 
before the trials. 
{¶ 38} Craig organized the evidence in the Resh and Gondor cases into a 
master file before the trials.  He also prepared notebook binders containing all the 
information from the master file.  Craig testified that Draper and Levine were 
each provided a copy of these notebooks before trial.  As the cases progressed, 
Draper and Levine were also provided with supplemental evidence that was not 
included in the original notebooks. 
{¶ 39} During postconviction proceedings, Craig remembered much of 
the evidence that he had included in the master file and the notebooks.  Craig 
testified that Wraxall’s July 6, 1990 report, Holcomb’s grand jury testimony, 
Domino’s work records, and the climatological data report from the Akron-
Canton Airport for August 1988 were made part of the master file and were 
included in the notebooks.  He also testified that the police report containing the 
Greens’ statements, the Douglas telephone interview, and the police report 
relating to Busta’s mother were in the master file and the notebooks.  Craig also 
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recalled that the transcript of Busta’s interview with his attorneys was 
supplementary evidence that was driven by Ted Hornyak, an investigator, to 
Draper’s Cleveland office.  According to Craig, the transcript of Busta’s interview 
was also provided to Levine before Gondor’s trial. 
{¶ 40} David Norris, the Portage County Prosecutor at the time of the 
trials, testified that he had informed Draper and Levine that open-file discovery 
would be in effect for the Resh and Gondor cases.  Norris testified that “open-file 
discovery” meant, “Our files were open for review, for copying.  Our files, our 
preparation, our work product, other than some of our handwritten notes, but 
other than that, just pretty much * * * everything else” was accessible.  According 
to Norris, both defense attorneys were also provided with trial notebooks that 
contained the “[p]olice reports, witness statements, scientific reports, scientific lab 
work, Grand Jury testimony, [and] just pretty much anything” needed before trial. 
{¶ 41} Norris testified that Wraxall’s July 6, 1990 report was received by 
the prosecutor’s office shortly before Resh’s trial.  Norris remembered providing 
Draper with the report during jury selection.  Norris also testified that he 
personally provided Levine with a copy of Wraxall’s report before Gondor’s trial. 
{¶ 42} On June 14, 2002, after the postconviction hearing had concluded, 
the trial court denied Resh’s and Gondor’s Brady claim, finding that the 
prosecution did not withhold material, exculpatory evidence. See Brady v. 
Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215.  However, the trial 
court found that both Resh and Gondor had received ineffective assistance of 
counsel because their attorneys had failed to properly examine the prosecutor’s 
file and present evidence in it to the trial juries.  The trial court concluded that 
“had such evidence been disclosed to the juries that decided these cases, there is a 
reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been 
different.”  The trial court therefore vacated Resh’s and Gondor’s convictions and 
ordered new trials. 
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{¶ 43} On appeal, the court of appeals conducted a de novo review of the 
trial court’s postconviction findings of fact and conclusions of law. State v. Resh, 
Portage App. No. 2002-P-0074, 2004-Ohio-7220, ¶ 23; State v. Gondor, Portage 
App. No. 2002-P-0073, 2004-Ohio-7219, ¶ 25.  The court of appeals reversed, 
holding that neither Resh nor Gondor had received ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Resh, 2004-Ohio-7220, ¶ 121; Gondor, 2004-Ohio-7219, ¶ 115. 
{¶ 44} The cause is now before this court upon the acceptance of 
discretionary appeals filed by both Gondor and Resh. 
Standard of Review 
{¶ 45} In proposition of law II, Gondor argues that the Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh District erred when it reviewed de novo the trial court’s 
postconviction findings.  Gondor argues that the court of appeals should have 
reviewed the trial court’s findings under an abuse-of-discretion standard.  We 
agree. 
{¶ 46} The appellate court wrote, “It is important to note the standard of 
review we apply in determining this appeal, i.e., we review the trial court’s 
judgment granting [the defendant’s] petition for post conviction relief de novo. 
State v. Braden, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-954, 2003-Ohio-2949, ¶ 13.” Gondor, 2004-
Ohio-7219, ¶ 25; Resh, 2004-Ohio-7220, ¶ 23.  However, Braden does not stand 
for the proposition that all appeals from postconviction relief hearings are to be 
reviewed de novo.  Braden merely states – as an aside – that the standard of 
appellate review for postconviction proceedings brought pursuant to R.C. 
2953.08, which involves sentencing matters, is de novo.  Braden added that for 
postconviction relief brought pursuant to R.C. 2953.21, the standard of review is 
different: 
{¶ 47} “[I]n the interest of providing finality to judgments of conviction, 
courts construe the post-conviction relief allowed under R.C. 2953.21(A)(1) 
narrowly.  See State v. Steffen (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 399, 410, 639 N.E.2d 67.  
January Term, 2006 
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Further, when a trial court rules on a petition for post-conviction relief after a 
hearing, an appellate court will give deference to the trial court's findings of fact.” 
Braden, 2003-Ohio-2949, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 48} Braden’s statements regarding the standard of review in 
postconviction claims brought pursuant to R.C. 2953.21 are correct.  A 
postconviction claim is not an ordinary appeal: “A postconviction proceeding is 
not an appeal of a criminal conviction, but, rather, a collateral civil attack on the 
judgment.” Steffen, 70 Ohio St.3d at 410, 639 N.E.2d 67. 
{¶ 49} Further, the Eleventh District Court of Appeals has itself applied 
an abuse-of-discretion standard of review in a postconviction case where the 
defendant alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.  In State v. Pierce (Dec. 22, 
2000), Lake App. No. 98-L-232, 2000 WL 1876592, *5, the court held that “[a]s a 
postconviction relief proceeding is a collateral civil attack on a judgment, the 
judgment of the trial court is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.”  
The court concluded in Pierce that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding that there was a lack of credible evidence establishing that the defendant’s 
trial counsel’s performance had been deficient. Id. at *8. 
{¶ 50} We also find persuasive the ruling of the court in State v. Mitchell 
(1988), 53 Ohio App.3d 117, 119, 559 N.E.2d 1370, in which the court held in a 
postconviction case involving a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that 
“[a]bsent a showing of abuse of discretion, a reviewing court will not overrule the 
trial court’s finding on a petition for post-conviction relief which is supported by 
competent and credible evidence.”  See, also, State v. Mullins (June 25, 1996), 
Franklin App. No. 96APA01-32, 1996 WL 362073, *3. 
{¶ 51} In postconviction cases, a trial court has a gatekeeping role as to 
whether a defendant will even receive a hearing.  In State v. Calhoun (1999), 86 
Ohio St.3d 279, 714 N.E.2d 905, paragraph two of the syllabus, this court held 
that a trial court could dismiss a petition for postconviction relief without a 
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hearing “where the petition, the supporting affidavits, the documentary evidence, 
the files, and the records do not demonstrate that petitioner set forth sufficient 
operative facts to establish substantive grounds for relief.”  This court reversed 
the judgment of the appellate court in Calhoun, holding that “the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in dismissing the credibility of [the] affidavits,” which 
served as the basis for his petition.  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 286, 714 N.E.2d 
905. 
{¶ 52} We thus determined in Calhoun that the trial court’s gatekeeping 
function in the postconviction relief process is entitled to deference, including the 
court’s decision regarding the sufficiency of the facts set forth by the petitioner 
and the credibility of the affidavits submitted.  We established in Calhoun that a 
court reviewing the trial court’s decision in regard to its gatekeeping function 
should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard.  The consistent approach is to grant 
that same level of deference to the trial court in regard to its posthearing decision. 
{¶ 53} Upon direct appeal, appellate courts generally review ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims on a de novo basis, simply because the issue 
originates at the appellate level; no trial court has held forth on the issue.  
Appellate courts review the trial record and are left to judge from the bare record 
whether the assistance was effective. 
{¶ 54} On postconviction petitions, however, the trial judge holds a 
hearing and receives testimony on the very issue of ineffective assistance.  The 
trial judge can delve into the motivation or reasoning of trial counsel through trial 
counsel’s testimony.  The court can hear the testimony of witnesses that were 
never called to testify at the original trial, and can determine the worth of their 
testimony as well as the witnesses’ credibility.  The trial judge can ask what the 
counsel knew, when he knew it, and whether a mistake was not strategic, but was 
instead careless.  As here, in a postconviction hearing, a judge can hear testimony 
about what evidence was made available to trial counsel and when it was made 
January Term, 2006 
17 
available.  A trial court in a postconviction proceeding thus plays a unique role in 
the consideration of ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  It is the only court 
that actually hears testimony on that issue. 
{¶ 55} In many cases, the judge presiding over the postconviction hearing 
will be the same judge that presided over the underlying trial and stands in an 
especially strong position to determine the significance of a trial counsel’s errors 
in the original trial.  The state contends that the de novo standard of review was 
appropriate here because a visiting judge had presided over the evidentiary 
hearing.  The state argues that the hearing court possessed only second-hand 
knowledge of the original trial from reading the trial transcripts and stood in no 
better a position than a court of review in assessing the credibility of the 
witnesses.  We reject this argument.  Such a rule, if adopted, would require an 
appellate court to apply two different standards of review, depending upon the 
trial judge’s prior experience in the case.  Moreover, a visiting judge at a 
postconviction hearing is in a totally different position from the appellate judges.  
The postconviction judge sees and hears the live postconviction witnesses, and he 
or she is therefore in a much better position to weigh their credibility than are the 
appellate judges. 
{¶ 56} A de novo review by appellate courts would relegate the 
postconviction trial court to a mere testimony-gathering apparatus.  Nothing in 
R.C. 2953.21 indicates that that should be the case.  Further, a clean slate on 
appeal would encourage every petitioner to seek another day in court, which 
would not benefit the overall administration of justice in Ohio: 
{¶ 57} “[C]ases of postconviction relief pose difficult problems for courts, 
petitioners, defense counsel and prosecuting attorneys alike.  Cases long 
considered to be fully adjudicated are reopened, although memories may be dim 
and proof difficult. The courts justifiably fear frivolous and interminable appeals 
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from prisoners who have their freedom to gain and comparatively little to lose.” 
State v. Milanovich (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 46, 51, 71 O.O.2d 26, 325 N.E.2d 540. 
{¶ 58} We thus conclude that proposition of law II has merit.  The court 
of appeals erred by using a de novo standard of review in reversing the trial 
court’s findings.  We hold that a trial court’s decision granting or denying a 
postconviction petition filed pursuant to R.C. 2953.21 should be upheld absent an 
abuse of discretion; a reviewing court should not overrule the trial court’s finding 
on a petition for postconviction relief that is supported by competent and credible 
evidence. 
Trial Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
{¶ 59} In his propositions of law I and III, Gondor argues that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion when it held that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  In his sole proposition of law, Resh makes a similar 
argument. 
{¶ 60} As stated above, a trial court’s decision regarding a postconviction 
petition filed pursuant to R.C. 2953.21 will be upheld absent an abuse of 
discretion when the trial court’s finding is supported by competent and credible 
evidence.  “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ connotes more than an error of law or 
of judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or 
unconscionable.”  State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 16 O.O.3d 169, 
404 N.E.2d 144; State v. Keenan (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 137, 689 N.E.2d 929. 
{¶ 61} The trial court employed the correct legal standard in resolving the 
defendants’ ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  In evaluating claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, a two-step process is used.  “First, the defendant 
must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.  This requires showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  Second, the defendant must 
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  This requires 
January Term, 2006 
19 
showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial * * *.”  Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
80 L.Ed.2d 674; State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, 
paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 62} On the issue of counsel’s ineffectiveness, the petitioner has the 
burden of proof because in Ohio, a properly licensed attorney is presumed 
competent.  Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d at 289, 714 N.E.2d 905, citing Vaughn v. 
Maxwell (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 299, 31 O.O.2d 567, 209 N.E.2d 164.  In order to 
overcome this presumption, the petitioner must submit sufficient operative facts 
or evidentiary documents that demonstrate that the petitioner was prejudiced by 
the ineffective assistance.  State v. Davis (1999), 133 Ohio App.3d 511, 516, 728 
N.E.2d 1111.  To demonstrate prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. 
{¶ 63} Here, the trial court found that the assistance of Draper and Levine 
was ineffective because they both failed to use evidence available to them at the 
1990 trials.  The trial court concluded: 
{¶ 64} “[H]ad such evidence been disclosed to the juries that decided 
these cases, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings 
would have been different.  Certainly the juries should have been given this 
evidence for their consideration for their verdicts to be worthy of confidence.  
Without the benefit of such evidence this Court finds that the verdicts are not 
worthy of confidence. 
{¶ 65} “It is therefore determined that the Petitioners herein were denied 
their Constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel at their trials.” 
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{¶ 66} In finding that Draper and Levine were ineffective, the trial court 
examined four categories of evidence that neither counsel had used during the 
trials.  First, the trial court stated that counsel were ineffective because they had 
failed to utilize the Domino’s records and the climatological reports.  The trial 
court found that this evidence was “clearly exculpatory” because it showed that 
Brenda Holcomb was wrong in testifying that Gondor and Resh had contacted 
Domino’s on Tuesday, August 16, before they became suspects in Nardi’s 
murder. 
{¶ 67} Second, the trial court found that Draper and Levine were 
ineffective because they had failed to utilize the SERI report to cast doubt on 
Laux’s testimony that bloodstains were found on the bed liner of Gondor’s truck.  
In reaching this conclusion, the trial court noted, “This report was not used at 
either trial, although the testimony established that both defense counsel, by 
phone call from Ron Craig * * * and in person by David Norris, * * * were 
notified of its existence.”  Although the trial court incorrectly wrote that the 1990 
SERI report “stated that the stains were ‘most likely perspiration,’ ” the report did 
present findings that were inconsistent with blood.  Further, when Brian Wraxall 
was asked to interpret his 1990 report, he wrote in his 1996 affidavit that “[t]he 
body fluid that best fits this scenario is perspiration.  In summary, the 
interpretation of this evidence should be approached with extensive caution.”  The 
court correctly found that the SERI report would have cast doubt on Laux’s 
testimony. 
{¶ 68} Third, the trial court found that Draper and Levine were ineffective 
because they failed to use several statements showing that other people might 
have been involved in the murder.  This evidence included Sabarese’s statements, 
Douglas’s phone interview, Pauline and Fred Green’s statements, and the 
Thomases’ statements. 
January Term, 2006 
21 
{¶ 69} Fourth, the trial court found that both counsel were ineffective 
because they had failed to use the police report showing that Busta’s mother had 
tried to smuggle a knife into the jail where Busta was confined.  This report was 
completed shortly before Busta implicated Resh and Gondor.  Thus, the trial court 
found that the defense attorneys could have used this report to show that Busta’s 
statements implicating Gondor and Resh were motivated by his concern that his 
mother might be prosecuted for smuggling contraband into the jail. 
{¶ 70} Finally, the trial court found that Draper and Levine were 
ineffective because they had failed to use the transcript of Busta’s pretrial 
interview with his lawyers and defense investigator.  This interview revealed that 
Busta said that he was uncertain about the facts of Nardi’s murder and that 
pressure that was being exerted on him prior to his own trial.  In emphasizing the 
importance of this information, the trial court pointed out, “Draper testified that, 
in his opinion, it ‘would have changed the outcome of the trial.’ ”   
{¶ 71} In an 11-page opinion prepared after the postconviction hearing, 
the trial court set forth the appropriate legal standards and addressed Resh’s and 
Gondor’s claims.  Having reviewed the petition and supporting documentation, 
the trial court concluded that Resh and Gondor had received ineffective assistance 
of counsel at their trials in 1990. 
{¶ 72} The trial court properly considered the cumulative effect of trial 
counsels’ errors.  Strickland directs us to look at the “totality of the evidence 
before the judge or jury,” keeping in mind that “[s]ome errors will have had a 
pervasive effect on the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the 
entire evidentiary picture * * *.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
80 L.Ed.2d 674.  We therefore consider these errors in the aggregate.  State v. 
DeMarco (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 191, 196, 31 OBR 390, 509 N.E.2d 1256.  See, 
also, Moore v. Johnson (C.A.5, 1999), 194 F.3d 586, 619 (court should examine 
cumulative effect of errors committed during both trial and sentencing); Stouffer 
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v. Reynolds (C.A.10, 1999), 168 F.3d 1155, 1163-1164 (“Taken alone, no one 
instance establishes deficient representation.  However, cumulatively, each failure 
underscores a fundamental lack of formulation and direction in presenting a 
coherent defense”). 
{¶ 73} Gondor’s first and third propositions of law and Resh’s proposition 
of law have merit.  The trial court properly weighed the credibility of the 
evidence, properly found that the defendants had set forth sufficient operative 
facts to obtain postconviction relief, and properly issued sufficient findings of fact 
and conclusions of law.  Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion when it found that Resh and Gondor received ineffective 
assistance of counsel, vacated the convictions and sentences, and ordered new 
trials.  Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Disposition 
{¶ 74} In case No. 2005-0329 (Robert Gondor) and case No. 2005-0336 
(Randy Resh), the judgments of the Portage County Court of Appeals are 
reversed.  Gondor and Resh are remanded to the trial court for retrial. 
Judgments accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL 
and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecuting Attorney, and Pamela J. 
Holder, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee in case Nos. 2005-0329 and 
2005-0336. 
 
Steven L. Bradley and David F. Hanson, for appellant in case No. 2005-
0329. 
 
James D. Owen and Samuel Porter, for appellant in case No. 2005-0336. 
______________________