Case Title: Lawrence v. Regent Realty Group, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88237

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 88237-Agenda 11-January 2001.
AURELIA LAWRENCE, Appellee, v. REGENT REALTY 
 								GROUP, INC., et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed July 26, 2001.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the
court:
	Aurelia Lawrence (Lawrence) brought an action in the circuit
court of Cook County to recover damages from her landlord,
Regent Realty Group (Regent), for failure to make annual interest
payments on her security deposit as required by section
5-12-080(c) of Chicago's Residential Landlord and Tenant
Ordinance (RLTO) (Chicago Municipal Code §5-12-080(c)
(amended November 6, 1991)). The matter was tried before the
court, sitting without a jury, which entered judgment in favor of
Regent. The court denied Lawrence's claim for double damages as
authorized by the section 5-12-080(f) of the RLTO (Chicago
Municipal Code §5-12-080(f) (amended November 6, 1991)) and
refused to entertain her claim for costs and attorney fees (see
Chicago Municipal Code §5-12-180 (amended November 6,
1991)), but ordered Regent to refund to Lawrence the amount of
her security deposit with accrued interest.
	Lawrence moved for a new trial or reconsideration. When that
motion was denied, she appealed. The appellate court reversed and
remanded. It held that Lawrence was entitled to judgment for
double the amount of her deposit plus interest, as specified by the
Chicago Municipal Code. It further held that Lawrence should be
given a hearing on her fee petition and that she was entitled to an
award of her reasonable attorney fees. 307 Ill. App. 3d 155, 160-61. We granted Regent's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d
R. 315) and subsequently allowed the Chicago Association of
Realtors and the Illinois Association of Realtors to file amicus
curiae briefs in support of Regent. We also allowed the Illinois
Consumer Justice Council, Inc., and the Legal Assistance
Foundation of Chicago to file amicus curiae briefs in support of
Lawrence. 155 Ill. 2d R. 346. For the reasons that follow, we now
affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
	The facts, which come to us through a bystanders report, are
straightforward. Lawrence rented an apartment in a building
managed by Regent. The apartment was located in the City of
Chicago in a building containing more than six residential
dwelling units and was subject to the provisions of the RLTO.
Lawrence lived there from October 1, 1990, to November 1, 1996.
During the term of her occupancy, she received and executed a
series of leases. Pursuant to the provisions of those leases,
Lawrence paid Regent security deposits, including deposits to
cover damage by pets. The security deposits, including the pet
deposits, were each held for a period in excess of six months.
	During Lawrence's first year in the apartment, Regent paid
her interest on the total amount of her security deposit, including
the amount designated as a pet deposit. In subsequent years,
however, it only paid her interest on the basic security deposit. No
interest was paid on the portion of the security deposit designated
as the pet deposit. The specifics of each lease follow.
	During the first year, which commenced October 1, 1990, and
ended September 30, 1991, Lawrence paid Regent a basic security
deposit of $435, which was equivalent to one month's rent. She
also paid Regent an additional $100 as her pet deposit.
	The next year, October 1, 1991, through September 30, 1992,
Regent increased Lawrence's monthly rent to $455. Regent carried
over her $435 basic security deposit and $100 pet deposit. At the
same time, it credited Lawrence for $26.75. That sum represented
interest earned on the full amount of the $535 security deposit held
by Regent during the previous year, calculated at an annual rate of
5%, the amount fixed by law. Regent did not pay this money
directly to Lawrence. Instead, it held it as an additional security
deposit. Including the interest credit, Lawrence's total security
deposit for 1991-92 was $561.75.
	In 1992-93, Regent increased Lawrence's monthly rent to
$460. It carried over her prior security deposit of $561.75. It also
credited Lawrence for an additional $23.09 in interest, which it
applied to increase Lawrence's total security deposit to $584.84.
The $23.09 was computed by applying the statutory interest rate
of 5% to $461.75 of Lawrence's security deposit. For purposes of
determining the interest due, Lawrence's $100 pet deposit was not
included.
	By letter dated December 30, 1992, Lawrence advised Regent
that the $100 had not been included in its interest calculation.
Lawrence asked that any corrections or explanations regarding the
interest calculation be in writing. Regent did not respond. Instead,
it continued to exclude that portion of the security deposit
attributable to the pet deposit when computing the interest it owed.
	During the 1993-94 lease term, Regent increased Lawrence's
monthly rent to $465. The $584.84 security deposit was carried
over. In addition, Regent credited Lawrence for $24.24 in interest.
As in 1992-93, that credit was computed by multiplying the 5%
interest rate by the amount of the security deposit less the $100
attributable to the pet deposit. Regent retained this credit and
added it to Lawrence's security deposit, increasing the amount of
the deposit to $609.08.
	For 1994-95, Lawrence's monthly rent was raised to $475.
The $609.08 security deposit was carried over, and Regent
credited Lawrence for $25.45 in interest, representing 5% of
$509.08, the amount of the prior security deposit excluding the
$100 pet deposit. That credit was retained by Regent and added to
Lawrence's security deposit, increasing the amount of the deposit
to $634.53.
	Finally, in 1995-96, Lawrence paid rent of $495 per month.
The $634.53 security deposit was carried over, and Regent
credited Lawrence for $26.73 in interest, representing 5% of
$534.53, the amount of the prior security deposit excluding the
$100 pet deposit. As before, that credit was retained by Regent and
added to Lawrence's security deposit, increasing the amount of the
deposit to $661.26.
	The 1995-96 lease was the final agreement between the
parties. Under the lease, Lawrence's tenancy was month to month.
She terminated her tenancy effective November 1, 1996. Shortly
before moving out, she initiated these proceedings in the circuit
court of Cook County. As indicated above, Lawrence premised her
complaint on Chicago's Residential Landlord and Tenant
Ordinance (RLTO). Section 5-12-080 of that ordinance provides:
			"(c) A landlord who holds a security deposit or prepaid
rent pursuant to this section, after the effective date of this
chapter shall pay interest to the tenant accruing from the
beginning date of the rental term specified in the rental
agreement at the rate [of five percent per year]. The
landlord shall, within 30 days after the end of each
12-month rental period, pay to the tenant any interest, by
cash or credit to be applied to the rent due.
* * *
			(f) If the landlord or landlord's agent fails to comply
with any provision of Section 5-12-080(a)-(e), the tenant
shall be awarded damages in an amount equal to two
times the security deposit plus interest at [five percent].
This subsection does not preclude the tenant from
recovering other damages to which he may be entitled
under this chapter." Chicago Municipal Code
§§5-12-080(c), (f) (amended November 6, 1991).
	In addition, section 5-12-180 of the ordinance states:
			"Except in cases of forcible entry and detainer actions,
the prevailing plaintiff in any action arising out of a
landlord's or tenant's application of the rights or remedies
made available in this ordinance shall be entitled to all
court costs and reasonable attorney's fees ***." Chicago
Municipal Code §5-12-180 (amended November 6,
1991).
	 In her complaint, Lawrence alleged that the $100 pet deposit
was part of the security deposit paid to Regent and that Regent had
failed to pay interest on the pet deposit in violation of the
ordinance. Based on that violation, Lawrence sought damages, as
authorized by the ordinance, in an amount equal to two times the
amount of the security deposit, including the pet deposit, plus
interest. She also sought the costs of the action and reasonable
attorney fees.
	At trial, there was no dispute that the apartment leased by
Lawrence was subject to the provisions of the RLTO, nor was
there any dispute that Regent stopped paying Lawrence interest on
the pet deposit portion of her security deposit after the first year of
her tenancy. The company's defense was that it did not regard the
pet deposit as a security deposit within the meaning of the RLTO's
interest requirements and that any violation of the law on its part
was unintentional.
	In support of its defense, Regent presented the testimony of
Jay Strauss, who was the only witness to testify at trial on behalf
of the company. Strauss was Regent's chairman and was
personally responsible for keeping track of Lawrence's security
deposit and calculating the interest Regent was obligated to pay on
that deposit. Although Lawrence's $100 pet deposit was
specifically included in each lease under the section designated for
the security deposit, Strauss claimed that he did not pay interest on
that amount for the years 1991 through 1995 because he viewed
the pet deposit as a pet "fee" or "charge" and not as a security
deposit. Strauss did not explain how he reached that conclusion,
nor did he account for why he had credited Lawrence for interest
earned on her pet deposit in 1990.
	 The circuit court rejected Strauss' characterization of the pet
deposit, concluding that it did constitute a security deposit for
purposes of Chicago's Residential Landlord and Tenant
Ordinance. The court nevertheless ruled that Regent's failure to
pay interest on the pet deposit was not sufficient to trigger relief
under the ordinance. The circuit court accepted Regent's
contention that the right to collect double the amount of the
security deposit plus interest under the ordinance applied only
where the landlord's failure to pay was willful. The court did not
believe that condition had been met here. It characterized Regent's
failure to pay the full amount of interest due as nothing more than
an error of judgment. Accordingly, it entered judgement for
Regent, dismissed Lawrence's complaint and denied her request
to submit a petition for attorney fees. At the same time, however,
it ordered the company to refund Lawrence's security deposit and
the interest on that deposit, including the interest attributable to the
pet deposit. 	Lawrence moved for a new trial or, in the alternative,
for reconsideration of the judgment. When that motion was
denied, Lawrence appealed. The appellate court rejected the circuit
court's interpretation of the RLTO, holding that a showing of
willfulness is not required to subject a landlord to the remedies
provided under the ordinance. As noted above, the appellate court
therefore reversed and remanded with directions to vacate the
judgment in favor of Regent, to enter judgment for Lawrence for
double the amount of the deposit plus interest, and to conduct a
hearing on Lawrence's petition for attorney fees. 307 Ill. App. 3d
at 160-61.
	We granted Regent's petition for leave to appeal, and the
matter is before us for review. The sole issue presented for our
consideration is whether the trial court was correct in concluding
that the RLTO requires a landlord's violation of the interest
payment provisions to have been willful before the tenant is
entitled to recover the damages, attorney fees and costs provided
by the ordinance. Because that determination turns on the
construction and legal effect of the RLTO, our review is de novo.
See Plambeck v. Greystone Management & Columbia National
Trust Co., 281 Ill. App. 3d 260, 266 (1996).
	The terms of the pertinent provisions of the RLTO have been
set forth above. As we have indicated, the trial court in this case
specifically found that the pet deposit given by Lawrence to
Regent constituted a security deposit within the meaning of section
5-12-080(c) and that Regent had failed to pay Lawrence any
interest on that deposit after the first year of the lease. The trial
court's findings are undisputed. Under the clear and unambiguous
terms of section 5-12-080(f) of the RLTO, Lawrence was
therefore entitled to an award of "damages in an amount equal to
two times the security deposit plus interest at [five percent]."
	Regent cannot deny that it was fully aware of the law. Under
the express provisions of the RLTO, it was required to attach to
the lease agreements a copy of a summary of the law, including a
summary of the provisions governing the payment of interest.
Chicago Municipal Code §5-12-170 (amended November 6,
1991). That Regent's violation of the ordinance's interest
requirements may have been the product of poor judgment, as the
trial court believed, is of no consequence. Nothing in section
5-12-080(f) requires proof that the landlord's actions were
knowing or willful. A landlord's duty to comply with the statute
is absolute. If a landlord requires a security deposit, the landlord
is required to pay the tenant interest on that deposit. If he fails to
do so, he is liable to the tenant for the damages specified in the
ordinance. There are no exceptions. Where a statute is clear and
unambiguous, as this one is, the court should not look to extrinsic
aids for construction. Board of Education of Rockford School
District No. 205 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board,
165 Ill. 2d 80, 87 (1995). The statute must be enforced as written,
and a court may not depart from its plain language by reading into
it exceptions, limitations, or conditions not expressed by the
legislature. People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 29 (2000).
	Regent argues that a willfulness requirement is necessary to
avoid unjust results. That contention is untenable. The purpose of
the law is to help protect the rights of tenants with respect to their
security deposits, including the right to receive interest. In most
cases, the amount of interest landlords owe for security deposits is
small, too small to warrant litigation against a landlord who
refuses to abide by the law. Without the prospect of liability for
significant additional damages, landlords would therefore have
little incentive to meet their statutory obligations. They could
withhold the interest payments with impunity. And many do. A
study cited by plaintiff and presented to the circuit court showed
that failure of landlords to pay interest on security deposits is a
pervasive problem in the City of Chicago.
	The city council has elected to address this problem by
imposing an absolute duty on landlords to pay the interest they
owe and conferring on tenants the right to recover double the
amount of their security deposits when that duty is breached.
While one may personally disagree with the wisdom of this
choice, it is not this court's function to second-guess the city
council's judgment in such matters. As our decisions have made
clear, responsibility for the wisdom or justice of legislation rests
with the legislature. Under our system of government, courts may
not rewrite statutes to make them consistent with their own ideas
of orderliness and public policy. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d  at 29.
	The body of law concerned with the implication of mental
states in criminal cases does not support a contrary result.
Absolute liability and the implication of mental states in criminal
cases have been specifically addressed by the General Assembly.
See 720 ILCS 5/4-3(b), 4-9 (West 1998); People v. Anderson, 148 Ill. 2d 15, 23-24 (1992). The matter before us, however, is not a
criminal case. We deal here with a municipal ordinance. In
contrast to matters arising under the Unified Code of Corrections,
neither the General Assembly nor the Chicago city council have
promulgated rules allowing implication of mental states for
ordinance violations where no mental state has been expressly
provided.
	That willfulness is not required to recover double damages
under section 5-12-080(f) of the RLTO is further supported by a
comparison between that ordinance and this state's Security
Deposit Interest Act (765 ILCS 715/0.01 et seq. (West 1998)). In
contrast to section 5-12-080(f), the Security Deposit Interest Act
imposes statutory penalties for a lessor's failure or refusal to pay
interest on security deposits as required by the Act only where
such failure or refusal is willful. 765 ILCS 715/2 (West 1998). The
willfulness requirement is specifically set forth in the Act, which
predates the RLTO. The Chicago city council was presumably
aware of that statute when it enacted the ordinance at issue here,
but chose not to include the statute's willfulness requirement in its
own version of the law. There is no valid basis for regarding that
omission as anything but informed and deliberate. Narrowing the
ordinance to situations where the landlord acted willfully would,
in fact, run directly counter the city council's command that the
ordinance "shall be liberally construed *** to promote its purposes
and policies." Chicago Municipal Code §5-12-010 (amended
November 6, 1991).
	Szpila v. Burke, 279 Ill. App. 3d 964 (1996), cited by Regent,
was properly distinguished by the appellate court. To the extent it
might be construed as supporting the circuit court's judgment in
the case before us, it is hereby overruled.
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is affirmed.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
	There are two issues that must be resolved in this case. The
first issue is whether the Chicago Residential Landlords and
Tenants Ordinance (the Ordinance) (Chicago Municipal Code
§5-12-010 et seq. (amended November 6, 1991)) is a remedial
ordinance or a penal ordinance. The second issue is what, if any,
scienter must be shown in an action under the Ordinance. The
appellate court found that the Ordinance is remedial and,
consequently, a showing of willfulness is not required to subject
a landlord to the penalties provided in the Ordinance. 307 Ill. App.
3d 155, 156. The majority affirms. It imposes absolute liability
upon landlords for violations of the Ordinance, even though it
recognizes that, under the terms of the Ordinance, landlords are
subject to "significant additional damages." Slip op. at 7. In a case
involving a one-year lease and interest of 5% per annum, the
"significant additional damages" amount to 40 times the actual
damages suffered by the tenant, together with interest, court costs,
and attorney fees.
	It is exactly because landlords are subject to significant
penalties for violations of the Ordinance that I cannot join the
majority opinion. I believe that the Ordinance, while remedial in
purpose, is also penal. Furthermore, because the provisions of the
Ordinance at issue in this appeal are penal, I believe this court may
not impose absolute liability upon Regent absent either a clear
indication that the legislature intended to impose absolute liability,
or an important public policy favoring absolute liability. Instead,
I would require that Regent have acted with knowledge, as
opposed to either intent or recklessness, to be subject to liability
for the violations of the Ordinance.
	I do not believe that the Chicago city council intended to
punish landlords for inadvertent mistakes and violations of the
Ordinance. I do not believe that the Chicago city council intended
to force smaller landlords out of business by imposing "significant
additional damages" upon these landlords. As expressly stated in
section 5-12-010 of the Ordinance, the Chicago city council
intended to "establish the rights and obligations of the landlord
and the tenant in the rental of dwelling units, and to encourage the
landlord and the tenant to maintain and improve the quality of
housing." To impose "significant additional damages" upon
landlords without a requirement of scienter is to effectively
decrease the number of dwelling units that are available for rental
in the City of Chicago. The decision of this court does not further
the policies of the Ordinance. Accordingly, I dissent.

ANALYSIS
A. Nature of Ordinance
	The first issue that must be addressed in this case is whether
the Ordinance is remedial or penal. If a statute is penal in nature,
this court will not impose absolute liability absent either a clear
indication that the legislature intended to impose absolute liability
or an important public policy favoring absolute liability. See
People v. Gean, 143 Ill. 2d 281, 287 (1991). Instead, this court
will impose a scienter requirement, whether that be intent,
knowledge or recklessness. See People v. Anderson, 148 Ill. 2d 15,
23 (1992).
	Both the circuit court and the appellate court addressed this
issue. The majority, however, does not feel constrained to do so.
In the absence of any discussion in the majority opinion, I outline
my thoughts on the nature of the Ordinance, and the intention of
the Chicago city council in enacting the Ordinance.
	As noted in the bystanders' report, the circuit court found that
Regent's "mistake of judgment" in characterizing the pet deposit
as a "fee" or "charge" and not as a "security deposit"did not rise
to the level of willfulness, as discussed in Szpila, which would
support an award of twice the amount of the security deposit.
	In Szpila, the tenant entered into a one-year lease from May
1, 1989, to May 1, 1990, and paid $975 as a security deposit. At
the expiration of the lease term, the parties orally agreed to renew
the lease. The building owners deposited rent money they received
into the same account in which they held the tenant's security
deposit. The tenant vacated the premises on September 30, 1993.
The owners claimed that the tenant had admitted breaking a key
off in a lock and had requested that the owners deduct the cost of
the repair from the security deposit. By October 11, 1993, the
owners refunded the tenant $926 of his security deposit. They had
deducted $49 from the deposit for the repair, but failed to send the
tenant a receipt for the repair. Further, at no time during the
tenancy did the owners pay the tenant interest on his security
deposit or provide him with a summary of the Ordinance.
	In a complaint against the owners, the tenant alleged that the
owners had violated: section 5-12-080(a) of the Ordinance, which
requires that a landlord keep a tenant's security deposit in a
different account from that used for rent collected; section
5-12-080(c) of the Ordinance, which required a landlord to pay
his tenant 5% interest on a security deposit; section 5-12-080(d)
of the Ordinance, which requires that a landlord provide the tenant
with a receipt for all repair costs deducted from the security
deposit; and section 5-12-170 of the Ordinance, which requires
that a landlord provide the tenant with a summary of the
Ordinance. The tenant claimed a separate violation of section
5-12-080(c) of the Ordinance for each year that the owners failed
to pay interest on the security deposit. For each violation of section
5-12-080, the tenant requested two times the security deposit as
a penalty under the Ordinance. The tenant also requested the
yearly interest payments on the security deposit, and $100 as a
penalty under section 5-12-170. In all, the tenant requested
$12,044 for the owners' failure to pay him a total of $195 in
interest over a four-year period, for the owners' failure to provide
him with a summary of the Ordinance, for the owners' failure to
send him a receipt for the repair of the lock and for the owners'
failure to keep the security deposit in a separate account.
	The trial court awarded the tenant the $100 penalty for the
owners' failure to give the tenant a summary of the Ordinance,
attorney fees and court costs. The trial court also awarded the
tenant twice the amount of the security deposit for one of the
violations of section 5-12-080. However, the trial court
determined that the tenant was not entitled to separate penalties for
each violation of section 5-12-080. The appellate court affirmed.
Initially, the appellate court noted that section 5-12-080 of the
Ordinance does not contain a "willfulness" requirement. The
appellate court also noted the rule of statutory construction that
when necessary to effectuate the intent of the legislature a court
may alter, supply or modify words and obvious mistakes. The
appellate court then stated:
			"We judge, therefore, that to avoid the absurd and
unjust result urged upon us by the [tenant], the city
council intended that violations under the ordinance, in
order to be subject to the penalty provisions, must have
been willful. At the very least, the [tenant] should have
made some requests for the summary, the receipt and the
interest payments. ***
			For these reasons, the trial judge's holding that the
[tenant] was not entitled to separate penalties is affirmed.
We note parenthetically, although the [owners] do not
cross-appeal, that under our holding the [tenant] should
not have received a payment of a sum double the amount
of the security deposit under any count." Szpila v. Burke,
279 Ill. App. 3d 964, 972-73 (1996).
	In Szpila, the appellate court did not refer to the Ordinance as
being remedial or penal. However, noting the court's reference to
willfulness, other panels of the appellate court have stated that
Szpila found the Ordinance to be penal. See Namur v. Habitat Co.,
294 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 1011 (1998); 307 Ill. App. 3d at 156 ("a
willfulness requirement can only stand if the ordinance is penal").
	In Namur, the court held that sections 5-12-080(f) and
5-12-170 of the Ordinance are penal. Initially, the court observed
that:
			"A statute is penal if it imposes automatic liability for
a violation of its terms and if the amount of liability is
predetermined by the statute and imposed without actual
damages suffered by the plaintiff. [Citation.] A statute is
remedial where it imposes liability only for actual
damages resulting from a violation." Namur, 294 Ill. App.
3d at 1010-11.
The court stated that sections 5-12-080(f) and 5-12-170 of the
Ordinance are penal because they specify either the amount of
damages that can be awarded for violations or the formula by
which the amount of damages is to be calculated. Namur, 294 Ill.
App. 3d at 1011. The court also recognized that some portions of
the Ordinance are remedial because they permit recovery of actual
damages. Namur, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 1011.
	Other panels of the appellate court have distinguished Szpila,
or simply refused to follow its reasoning. Thus, in Friedman v.
Krupp Corp., 282 Ill. App. 3d 436 (1996), a panel of the appellate
court found that the Ordinance is remedial, not penal. The court
looked to the statement of purpose contained in section 5-12-010
of the Ordinance to support its finding that the Ordinance is
remedial:
			"It is the purpose of this chapter and the policy of the
city, in order to protect and promote the public health,
safety and welfare of its citizens, to establish the rights
and obligations of the landlord and the tenant in the rental
of dwelling units, and to encourage the landlord and the
tenant to maintain and improve the quality of housing."
Chicago Municipal Code §5-12-010 (amended
November 6, 1991).
The court employed a rule of liberal construction to give effect to
the Ordinance's stated purpose. Friedman, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 443.
	Likewise, in the case at bar, the appellate court stated that the
clear intent of the Ordinance is to protect tenants and hold
landlords to a high standard of conduct when entrusted with a
tenant's money. 307 Ill. App. 3d at 159. The court reasoned:
			"The primary role of statutory construction is to give
effect to the legislative purpose, and an inquiry into the
legislative intent must begin with the language of the
statute. [Citation.] One clear purpose of the ordinance is
to protect tenants. This purpose is rooted in the public
policy that recognizes that tenants are in a
disadvantageous position with respect to landlords.
Viewing section 5-12-080(f) as penal, with respect to the
single-count violation, would defeat its remedial
purpose." 307 Ill. App. 3d at 160.
See also Plambeck v. Greystone Management & Columbia
National Trust Co., 281 Ill. App. 3d 260 (1996) (directing that the
trial court award the tenant damages in an amount equal to two
times the security deposit plus interest for the landlord's failure to
keep two small increases in the security deposit in a separate
account from that used for rent monies, and that the trial court
award the tenant an identical sum for the landlord's failure to pay
interest on the security deposit).
	In Friedman, and in the case at bar, the appellate court
focused on the statement of purpose to find the Ordinance
remedial. I am no less conscious of the purpose of the Ordinance.
I am also aware that certain sections of the Ordinance provide
damages which are remedial in nature. See Chicago Municipal
Code §5-12-060 (landlord's remedies for improper denial of
access to premises); §5-12-110 (tenant's remedies for landlord's
failure to maintain premises); §5-12-120 (landlord's remedies for
early termination of rental agreement); §5-12-130 (landlord's
remedies for tenant's failure to pay rent and failure to maintain
premises). However, I cannot agree that the Ordinance is purely
remedial.
	A remedial statute contemplates recovery of direct damages
sustained by reason of the omission or failure of which complaint
is made. Compensation for injuries inflicted, not punishment, is
the ground of recovery. Odin Coal Co. v. Denman, 185 Ill. 413,
417-18 (1900). By contrast, as we explained in Bell v. Farwell,
176 Ill. 489 (1898):
		" ' "A penal statute is one which imposes a forfeiture or
penalty for transgressing its provisions or for doing a
thing prohibited." It is the effect-not the form-of the
statute that is to be considered, and when its object is
clearly to inflict a punishment on a party for violating
it,-i.e., doing what is prohibited or failing to do what is
commanded to be done,-it is penal in its character.' "
Bell, 176 Ill.  at 496, quoting Diversey v. Smith, 103 Ill. 378, 390 (1882).
See also Hoffmann v. Clark, 69 Ill. 2d 402, 429 (1977).
	A review of the Ordinance shows that it must be construed as
both remedial and penal. For example, section 5-12-080, at issue
in this case, provides that the tenant shall be awarded damages in
an amount equal to two times the security deposit plus interest.
Section 5-12-150 prohibits retaliatory conduct by the landlord and
provides that the tenant shall recover an amount equal to not more
than two months' rent or twice the damages sustained by him,
whichever is greater, and reasonable attorney fees. Section
5-12-160 prohibits an interruption of the tenant's occupancy and
provides that a tenant shall recover an amount equal to not more
than two months' rent or twice the actual damages sustained by
him, whichever is greater. In addition, section 5-12-160 provides
that the Chicago police department shall investigate and determine
whether a violation of the section has occurred. Any person found
guilty of violating the section shall be fined not less then $200 or
more than $500, and each day that such violation shall occur or
continue shall constitute a separate and distinct offense for which
a fine shall be imposed. These damage provisions give a tenant an
incentive to enforce the Ordinance. Concurrently, the provisions
serve to discourage future violations of the Ordinance by
landlords. I, therefore, conclude that the Ordinance is both
remedial and penal.
	That a statute may be both remedial and penal is well
supported in our jurisprudence. See Harris v. Manor Healthcare
Corp., 111 Ill. 2d 350, 361 (1986) ("Although we believe that
section 3-602 [of the Nursing Home Care Reform Act of 1979]
was enacted primarily to encourage private enforcement of the Act
and to compensate residents for violations of their rights, we agree
that the section also must be construed as being punitive"); Acme
Fireworks Corp. v. Bibb, 6 Ill. 2d 112 (1955); Cedar Park
Cemetery Ass'n v. Cooper, 408 Ill. 79 (1951); Howlett v. Doglio,
402 Ill. 311, 318 (1949) ("Although the Dram Shop Act is penal
in character and should be strictly construed, [citations] the
legislation is, at the same time, remedial and should be so
construed as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy");
Bell, 176 Ill.  at 496, quoting Diversey, 103 Ill.  at 390 (" ' "A penal
law may also be remedial, and a statute may be remedial in one
part and penal in another" ' "). See also 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes
§§13, 292 (1974); 3 N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory
Construction §60.04 (5th ed.1992).
	I believe that a balanced approach, which recognizes that
certain portions of the Ordinance are remedial and certain portions
are penal, furthers the goal of the Ordinance to promote the public
health, safety and welfare of the citizens of Chicago by
establishing the rights and obligations of the landlord and the
tenant in the rental of dwelling units, and encouraging the landlord
and the tenant to maintain and improve the quality of housing.
	The majority rejects such a balanced approach. Instead, the
majority states "the purpose of the law is to help protect the rights
of tenants with respect to their security deposits, including the
right to receive interest." Slip op. at 7. The majority nowhere
acknowledges the Chicago city council's intention to establish the
rights of landlords, and to protect both landlords and tenants in
order to promote the goal of quality housing. In my view, the
majority's approach to the Ordinance is unbalanced, serving as it
does the interests of only one of the two constituencies the
Chicago city council intended to protect.

B. Scienter Requirement
	The second issue that must be addressed is the scienter
requirement for a violation of the Ordinance. Turning to section
5-12-080 of the Ordinance, I note that it provides the tenant shall
be awarded damages in an amount equal to two times the security
deposit, together with interest, court costs and attorney fees for a
violation of the section. Thus, section 5-12-080 is penal in nature.
	As noted in the bystanders' report, the circuit court concluded
that a finding of willfulness was required in order for Lawrence to
recover damages pursuant to section 5-12-080. In this appeal,
Lawrence maintains that the circuit court erred in holding that a
finding of willfulness was required in order for Lawrence to
recover damages pursuant to section 5-12-080 of the Ordinance.
Pointing to the lack of express language describing a mental state,
Lawrence explains that the Chicago city council intended to
impose strict and certain liability for violations of section
5-12-080. Lawrence concludes that a finding of willfulness, or
any other scienter requirement, is not necessary for recovery under
section 5-12-080. The majority agrees.
	In considering whether a statute imposes absolute liability for
certain conduct, the fact that the statute does not contain express
language calling for a mental state does not, of itself, lead to a
conclusion that no mental state is required. People v. Farmer, 165 Ill. 2d 194, 202-03 (1995); People v. Whitlow, 89 Ill. 2d 322, 332
(1982); People v. Nunn, 77 Ill. 2d 243, 250 (1979). This court
looks, instead, to sources beyond the statutory language to
ascertain the intent of the legislature and determine whether the
conclusion that the statute imposes absolute liability is warranted.
Farmer, 165 Ill. 2d at 205-06; People v. Sevilla, 132 Ill. 2d 113,
118-19 (1989). This court has heretofore recognized that the
penalty for a violation of a statute is an important factor in
determining whether the legislature intended to impose absolute
liability. Gean, 143 Ill. 2d  at 287; Sevilla, 132 Ill. 2d  at 122.
Where the penalty for a violation of a statute is great, it is less
likely that the legislature intended to create an absolute liability
offense. Farmer, 165 Ill. 2d  at 206; People v. Valley Steel
Products Co., 71 Ill. 2d 408, 425 (1978). Absent either a clear
indication that the legislature intended to impose absolute liability,
or an important public policy favoring absolute liability, this court
has generally not been willing to interpret a statute as imposing
absolute liability. See Gean, 143 Ill. 2d  at 286 (and cases cited
therein).
	As Lawrence notes, section 5-12-080 does not contain a
mental state element. Moreover, the balance of the Ordinance,
does not contain a clear indication that the Chicago city council
intended to impose absolute liability for violations of the section.(1)
The penalty imposed under section 5-12-080 (twice the amount of
the security deposit plus interest, court costs, and attorney fees)
can be substantial. And, with respect to a landlord's failure to pay
interest on the security deposit, as well as the landlord's failure to
segregate the security deposit from other assets, the damages
recovered by the tenant will be totally disproportionate to the loss
he suffers. Given the lack of clear legislative intent and the
implications to the landlord for failure to pay interest on the
security deposit, I am of the opinion that the Chicago city council
did not intend to impose absolute liability for violations of section
5-12-080.
	The majority disagrees. It finds that the Ordinance is "clear
and unambiguous." From there, it concludes that the Ordinance
must be enforced as written, without resort to extrinsic aids for
construction. See slip op. at 7. The majority fails to recognize,
however, that in considering whether a statute imposes absolute
liability for certain conduct, the fact that the statute does not
contain express language calling for a mental state does not, of
itself, lead to a conclusion that no mental state is required. By
limiting its analysis to the "clear and unambiguous" language of
the Ordinance, the majority fails to determine the actual intent of
the Chicago city council in enacting the Ordinance.(2)
	When a statute neither prescribes a particular mental state nor
creates an absolute liability offense, either intent, knowledge or
recklessness applies. Anderson, 148 Ill. 2d  at 23; Gean, 143 Ill. 2d 
at 288. In determining the appropriate mental state, this court
looks to other provisions in the statute, or to the language of any
parallel statute. Sevilla, 132 Ill. 2d  at 123-24.
	Three other provisions of the Ordinance are instructive.
Section 5-12-150 provides that a landlord may not knowingly
terminate a tenancy or refuse to renew a lease because the tenant
has complained of code violations, sought assistance to remedy a
code violation or requested that the landlord make repairs to the
premises. A tenant shall recover an amount equal to two months'
rent or twice the damages sustained by him, whichever is greater,
for a violation of this provision. Section 5-12-160 provides that
it is unlawful for any landlord knowingly to oust or dispossess or
threaten or attempt to oust or dispossess a tenant from a dwelling
unit without authority of law. A tenant shall recover an amount
equal to two months' rent or twice the damages sustained by him,
whichever is greater, for a violation of this provision. Lastly,
section 5-12-110 provides that if a person's failure to deliver
possession of a dwelling unit is willful, an aggrieved person may
recover from the person withholding possession an amount not
more than two months' rent or twice the actual damages sustained,
whichever is greater. All three provisions thus require that the
landlord have acted with knowledge in committing the particular
infraction. See 720 ILCS 5/4-5 (West 1998) (conduct performed
knowingly or with knowledge is performed willfully, within the
meaning of a statute using the term "wilfully," unless the statute
clearly requires another meaning).
	I also find instructive the language of the Security Deposit
Interest Act (765 ILCS 715/1 et seq. (West 1998)). Section 1 of the
Security Deposit Interest Act provides that, with respect to
buildings or complexes containing at least 25 units, a landlord who
receives a security deposit from a tenant shall pay interest to the
tenant if the landlord holds the deposit for more than six months.
765 ILCS 715/1 (West 1998). A landlord who willfully fails or
refuses to pay the interest required by the act shall, upon a finding
by a circuit court that the landlord has willfully failed or refused
to pay, be liable for an amount equal to the amount of the security
deposit together with court costs and reasonable attorney fees. 765
ILCS 715/2 (West 1998); see also Gittleman v. Create, Inc., 189
Ill. App. 3d 199 (1989) (finding a violation of the Security Deposit
Interest Act where the landlord was fully aware of its legal
obligation to pay interest on the security deposits but attempted to
circumvent the statute by claiming, contrary to a lease provision
setting the rent at $300, that the gross rent was actually $301.25;
that the tenant paid only $300 per month; and that $1.25 was
credited each month to the tenant's account as interest on the
security deposit).
	Many of our sister states have adopted legislation regulating
payment of interest on security deposits and the return of the
security deposits. The enactments fall into four categories: (1)
those imposing absolute liability for any retention of the security
deposits in violation of the statute; (2) those prohibiting
unreasonable retention of the security deposits, that is a retention
without reasonable justification or basis as determined by a fact
finder; (3) those prohibiting wrongful and willful retention of the
security deposits; and (4) those prohibiting bad-faith retention of
the security deposits. See Annot., 63 A.L.R.4th 901 (1988). Within
the enactments proscribing wrongful and willful retention, certain
statutes have been interpreted as requiring only deliberate or
intentional conduct (see Martinez v. Steinbaum, 623 P.2d 49
(Colo. 1981)), while others have been interpreted as requiring bad-faith retention (see Karantza v. Salamone, 435 A.2d 1384 (Me.
1981)) or an arbitrary and unjustified withholding (see Calix v.
Whitson, 306 So. 2d 62 (La. App. 1974)).
	My review of the other portions of the Ordinance, the Security
Deposit Interest Act, and parallel enactments in our sister states
convinces me that knowledge, as opposed to either intent or
recklessness, is the appropriate mental state for a violation of
section 5-12-080 of the Ordinance. Knowledge generally refers to
an awareness of the existence of the facts which make an
individual's conduct unlawful. See Sevilla, 132 Ill. 2d  at 125. In
arriving at this conclusion, I am keenly aware that the Ordinance
is both penal and remedial. I believe that a requirement that the
landlord have acted intentionally or with bad faith is not in
keeping with the remedial purpose of the Ordinance. Such a
holding would set too high a bar to recovery under section
5-12-080 of the Ordinance. On the other hand, I believe that
knowledge is required for a violation of the section. Such a
requirement furthers the remedial purpose of the Ordinance while
appropriately restricting the penal consequences of the section by
excluding violations which are merely inadvertent.
	The majority rejects my conclusion. The majority states that:
"The body of law concerned with the implication of mental states
in criminal cases does not support a contrary result." Slip op. at 7.
Further, the Chicago city council has not "promulgated rules
allowing implication of mental states for ordinance violations
where no mental state has been expressly provided." Slip op. at 8. 
Thus, the majority concludes that the law regarding scienter does
not apply to a municipal ordinance.
	The majority's reasoning is based on the premise that the title
of a statute is more important than its substance, a premise this
court has heretofore rejected. See Bell, 176 Ill.  at 496 ("It is the
effect-not the form-of the statute that is to be considered, and
when its object is clearly to inflict a punishment on a party for
violating it,-i.e., doing what is prohibited or failing to do what is
commanded to be done,-it is penal in its character"). What matters
that the Ordinance is a municipal ordinance if the relevant
provisions are penal in nature? If the provisions are intended to
impose "significant" penalties upon a landlord, and, if the
Ordinance does not contain a clear indication that the Chicago city
council intended to impose absolute liability for violations of the
Ordinance, this court must impose a scienter requirement.
	I note that in People v. O'Brien, No. 90390 (July 26, 2001),
a case filed concurrently with the case at bar, this court rejects the
narrow approach to the application of scienter the majority here
advances. Instead, in O'Brien, this court recognizes that the
scienter requirement of section 4-9 of the Criminal Code of 1961
(720 ILCS 5/4-9 (West 1998)): "applies to all criminal penalty
provisions, including those outside the Criminal Code of 1961."
O'Brien, slip op. at 3. Thus, the O'Brien court applies "[t]he body
of law concerned with the implication of mental states in criminal
cases" (slip op. at 7 (supra)) in determining whether section 3-707
of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3-707 (West 1998))
creates an absolute liability offense.
	The O'Brien court recognizes that the substance of a statute
and the nature of the penalties imposed by the statute are to be
taken into account in determining whether the legislative body
intended to create an absolute liability statute.

CONCLUSION
	Today, the majority imposes absolute liability upon a landlord
for a violation of the Ordinance. The majority does so because it
believes that "failure of landlords to pay interest on security
deposits is a pervasive problem in the City of Chicago." Slip op.
at 7. This belief rests largely upon a 1995 study that Lawrence
cited to the circuit court. I agree that certain landlords are lax in
the payment of interest on their tenants' security deposits, and
should be held accountable under the Ordinance. I cannot agree,
however, that a study performed several years after the Ordinance
was adopted is instructive on the intent of the Chicago city council
in enacting the Ordinance.
	Further, I cannot agree that punishing landlords for
inadvertent infractions of the Ordinance best serves the interests
of tenants and the City of Chicago in quality housing. The
penalties imposed by the Ordinance are substantial. They apply to
landlords who own large buildings as well as the landlord whose
building contains only six apartments. If the penalties accumulate
over the length of a long-term lease, or are multiplied by a number
of tenants, they may devastate the smaller landlord. I do not
believe that the Chicago city council intended to force smaller
landlords out of business. Instead, I believe that the Chicago city
council intended to punish landlords only for knowing violations
of the Ordinance. Where a landlord inadvertently violates the
Ordinance, for example by entering the wrong number on a
calculator, the landlord should not be liable for "significant
additional damages." Accordingly, I dissent.
	JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this dissent.
	 
	 
1.      1There are no records of Chicago city council proceedings regarding
the Ordinance. Thus, this court does not have a source of "legislative
history" from which it could infer the intent of the Chicago city council. 

2.      2Although the majority states that it is not relying on "extrinsic aids
for construction," the majority cites to a 1995 study for the proposition
that "failure of landlords to pay interest on security deposits is a
pervasive problem in the City of Chicago." See slip op. at 7. The
majority also looks to the Security Deposit Interest Act (765 ILCS
715/0.01 et seq. (West 1998)) as an aid in construing the Ordinance. See
slip op. at 8 ("The Chicago city council was presumably aware of that
statute when it enacted the ordinance at issue here, but chose not to
include the statute's willfulness requirement in its own version of the
law").