Case Title: Collins v. Goeman General Tire

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84-3

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1984-06-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Collins v. Goeman General Tire1984 WY 61682 P.2d 332Case Number: 84-3Decided: 06/18/1984LEO COLLINS, APPELLANT (EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT), 

v. 

GOEMAN GENERAL TIRE, APPELLEE (EMPLOYER-DEFENDANT).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
LEO COLLINS, APPELLANT 
(EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT), 

v. 

GOEMAN GENERAL TIRE, 
APPELLEE (EMPLOYER-DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty, R.M. Forrister, 
J.

 
 
David A. Drell, 
Casper, for appellant. 

Thomas F. Reese 
of Brown, Drew, Apostolos, Massey & Sullivan, Casper, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN, and CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal is from an 
order denying benefits under the Worker's Compensation Act. The court held that 
appellant's present medical problems were not related to the injury suffered in 
a work-related accident. We will affirm.

[¶2.]     Appellant was employed 
by appellee Goeman General Tire. On June 30, 1981, he was changing a tire on a 
semitrailer. A truck backed into the trailer, knocking it off the jack and 
causing the trailer to roll across his left foot injuring his ankle. He was 
immediately seen by doctors who informed him that his left foot was badly 
sprained. These bills were paid without protest from the employer. Appellant 
returned to work the day after the accident and continued working at Goeman 
General Tire until he left their employment approximately two months after the 
accident. He next consulted Dr. Bailey concerning this injury in February 1982, 
although this visit was primarily for a back injury. Nothing was done at that 
time. In April of 1982, he consulted Dr. Nastasi about the back injury and 
mentioned that his ankle was swollen. In July of 1982, Doctor Behrens had 
three-way view x-rays taken of the ankle and told appellant that there was no 
instability in the ankle and that his symptoms were minimal. He was given a 
brace for his ankle. Claims were presented for medical and temporary disability 
in April of 1983 and objected to by appellee. In July of 1983 appellant again 
consulted Dr. Nastasi about his ankle because of swelling and pain. Dr. Nastasi 
had x-rays taken of the ankle under stress which revealed loose bone chips. At a 
hearing held on September 12, 1983, the district court denied benefits to 
appellant.

[¶3.]     The only question 
presented for review is:

Whether there was 
substantial evidence to support the finding by the examining physician that 
causation did not exist.

[¶4.]     Appellants in worker's 
compensation cases have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence 
each element of their claim.1 Consolidated Freightways v. Drake, Wyo., 
678 P.2d 874 (1984); Randell v. Wyoming 
State Treasurer, ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Comp. Div., Wyo., 671 P.2d 303 
(1983). Findings of facts which are supported by substantial evidence will not 
be disturbed on appeal. Randell v. 
Wyoming State Treasurer, ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Comp. Div., supra; Williams v. Northern Development Co., 
Wyo., 425 P.2d 594 (1967). Where an appeal is based entirely upon the trial court's alleged 
erroneous determinations of facts, it is only necessary for the supreme court to 
search the record to ascertain if substantial evidence supports the trial 
court's conclusions and judgment, even though these findings are made upon 
conflicting testimony. Plummer v. 
Gladstone Hotel, 78 Wyo. 427, 328 P.2d 1118 
(1958).

[¶5.]     Dr. Anthony Nastasi 
testified that x-rays of the ankle taken in July 1983 revealed loose chips which 
had fragmented from the bone of the ankle. He initially stated that this type of 
injury was consistent with a semitrailer falling on an ankle if that had been 
the only injury which had occurred. However, when the doctor was asked if this 
injury was consistent with an employee going back to work and continuing 
employment without difficulty for several weeks, he stated: 

"A. I would say that 
that's odd. I mean if he injured it that badly to cause chip fractures in his 
ankle, I would suspect that the ankle would have been, you know, swollen, 
painful, difficult to bare [sic] weight. Yeah, history like that would make me 
suspect."

He also 
stated:

"The point that bothers 
me here is that the fact after sustaining an injury like this, this gentleman 
was able to go back to work."

At the time of 
this deposition, the parties were unsure of the dates when appellant had seen 
doctors. However, when the doctor was asked:

"Q. If that medical 
history is different than what you've related to us at that time, and if it 
actually turned out to be that he did not 
see a doctor for almost eight months, would your opinion change?" (Emphasis 
added.)

he 
stated:

"A. I think it would. 
Eight months is too long to walk around on an ankle with loose bodies without 
anything surfacing as far as symptomatology goes. Here again, you know, I have, 
`Did this man have in fact problems with the ankle?' I did not specifically 
question him about that. Did he have problems with that ankle? Did he go back to 
work in spite of the fact the ankle was bothering him? Does anyone 
know?"

This kind of 
testimony was found by the trial judge not sufficient to satisfy appellant's 
burden of proof. Appellant continued working and did not see a doctor about his 
ankle injury from the time of the accident until eight months later. No 
instability was found in July 1982, and the three-view x-rays taken did not 
disclose bone chips. There was substantial evidence to support the trial court's 
finding that the injury occurring on June 30, 1981, was not a proximate cause of 
appellant's present medical bills.

[¶6.]     The trial court's 
decision, therefore, is affirmed.

1 Section 27-12-603(a), 
W.S. 1977, provides in part:

"(a) The burden of proof 
in contested cases involving injuries which occur over a substantial period of 
time is on the employee to make proper proof of his claim by a preponderance of 
the evidence, and to also prove by competent medical authority that his claim 
arose out of and in the course of his employment, by showing by a preponderance 
of evidence that: "(i) There is a direct causal connection between the condition 
or circumstances under which the work is performed and the 
injury."