Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V RUSSELL DOUGLAS TOMBS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 1, 2005 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 125483 
RUSSELL DOUGLAS TOMBS, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
KELLY, J.  
This 
case 
requires 
us 
to 
consider 
whether 
MCL 
750.145c(3), which prohibits the distribution or promotion 
of child sexually abusive material, requires that the 
distribution or promotion be performed with criminal 
intent. 
If criminal intent is an element of the offense, 
we must determine also whether the prosecutor presented 
sufficient evidence to prove that defendant possessed it. 
We 
agree 
with 
the 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
that 
MCL 
750.145c(3) requires that an accused be shown to have had 
criminal intent to distribute or promote. 
We also agree 
that the evidence presented to the trial court was 
 
 
 
 
 
insufficient to prove that intent. 
Therefore, we affirm 
the decision of the Court of Appeals that reversed 
defendant’s conviction for distributing and promoting child 
sexually abusive material. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Defendant was a field technician for Comcast OnLine, 
an organization that sells cable Internet access to 
business and residential customers. 
Field technicians 
install Internet cable service and perform troubleshooting 
when a customer encounters difficulty in accessing the 
Internet. 
Comcast furnished defendant with a company van and a 
laptop computer for employment-related use. 
Before the 
laptop 
was 
issued 
to 
defendant, 
the 
hard 
drive was 
reformatted so that it contained only company-sanctioned 
software programs. 
On August 9, 2000, a Wednesday, defendant quit his 
employment with Comcast. 
He told Christopher Williams, 
another 
Comcast 
employee, 
that 
he 
would 
return 
the 
company's equipment and van on the weekend. 
Williams 
initially told defendant that this would be acceptable, but 
called defendant a second time and advised him that the 
equipment had to be returned that day. 
2  
 
 
 
Williams 
retrieved 
the 
items 
from 
defendant 
approximately an hour after the telephone conversation. He 
returned the laptop to Comcast’s office and began to 
reformat it. 
Although it was not required in the 
formatting, he ran a search for JPG files, files containing 
pictures, "[j]ust to see what was on it." He found several 
and opened one. 
It contained adult pornography. 
Williams 
looked further and came across a picture of a partially 
naked young girl. 
Because of his discovery, Williams gave the computer 
to Carl Radcliff, a data support technician for Comcast. 
Radcliff also ran a search for JPG files. 
He eventually 
found "a series of child pornography." 
Radcliff indicated 
that the pornographic material was not in a readily 
available location, but was "buried inside of what's known 
as a user profile." 
The laptop was later turned over to the police. 
Detective Edward Stack of the St. Clair Shores Police 
Department testified that he and another detective found 
images of child pornography on it. 
Sergeant Joseph Duke, 
the supervisor of the Computer Crimes Unit of the Oakland 
County Sheriff's Department, counted over five hundred 
images on the computer that he believed qualified "as 
either child sexually abusive material or child erotica." 
3  
 
 
                                                 
Sergeant Duke believed that the photographs had been 
downloaded from the Internet. 
He indicated that the files 
had been difficult for him to find because they were buried 
in subfolders seven directory levels down. 
He testified 
that "[a]s an investigator and as an examiner, it’s kind of 
a red flag when I have to go down through 7 directory 
levels to get to evidence." 
When asked why this raises a 
red flag, Sergeant Duke said it indicates that the data are 
being hidden. 
Because of the discovery of child pornography, and 
because there were two minor children living in defendant's 
home, David Joseph, a children's protective services worker 
with the Family Independence Agency,1 interviewed defendant. 
Joseph testified that defendant told him that, when a 
Comcast employee leaves employment, new programs are 
installed in that employee’s computer. Defendant indicated 
that he did not think anybody would go through the files he 
had created there. 
He presumed that the hard drive would 
simply be wiped clean before installation of new software. 
Defendant admitted to Joseph that he had obtained the 
photographs "from the Internet and from sharing with 
others." 
Joseph also said that it was his impression from 
1 Family Independence Agency is now the Department of
Human Services. 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
talking with defendant that defendant had taken part in an 
Internet club that exchanged child pornography. 
A jury convicted defendant of (1) distributing or 
promoting child sexually abusive material, MCL 750.145c(3); 
(2) possessing the material, MCL 750.145c(4); and (3) using 
the Internet or a computer to communicate with people for 
the purpose of possessing the material, MCL 750.145d.2  In a 
published 
opinion, 
the 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
reversed 
defendant's conviction for distributing or promoting child 
sexually 
abusive 
material 
under 
MCL 
750.145c(3) 
and 
affirmed his other convictions. 260 Mich App 201; 679 NW2d 
77 (2003). 
The prosecutor appeals the reversal to this 
Court. 470 Mich 889 (2004). 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
Issues of statutory interpretation, like questions of 
law, are reviewed de novo. 
People v Koonce, 466 Mich 515, 
518; 648 NW2d 153 (2002). 
In interpreting a statute, our 
goal is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's 
intent. 
People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 330; 603 NW2d 250 
(1999). 
Where the language of the statute is unambiguous, 
2 On appeal to us, defendant did not challenge his
convictions 
under 
MCL 
750.145c(4) 
or 
MCL 
750.145d. 
Therefore, this Court takes no position on whether the
facts are sufficient to support convictions under those
provisions. 
5  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
the Court presumes that the Legislature intended the 
meaning expressed. Id. 
Accordingly, to determine whether a statute imposes 
strict liability or requires proof of a guilty mind, the 
Court first searches for an explicit expression of intent 
in the statute itself. 
See People v Quinn, 440 Mich 178, 
185; 487 NW2d 194 (1992). 
Normally, criminal intent is an element of a crime. 
People v Rice, 161 Mich 657, 664; 126 NW2d 981 (1910). 
Statutes that create strict liability for all their 
elements are not favored. 
Quinn, 440 Mich at 187. 
Hence, 
we tend to find that the Legislature wanted criminal intent 
to be an element of a criminal offense, even if it was left 
unstated. 
III. CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN ELEMENT OF MCL 750.145C(3) 
The 
statutory 
provision 
under 
consideration, 
MCL 
750.145c(3), reads in relevant part: 
A person who distributes or promotes, or
finances the distribution or promotion of, or
receives for the purpose of distributing or 
promoting, or conspires, attempts, or prepares to
distribute, receive, finance, or promote any
child sexually abusive material or child sexually
abusive 
activity 
is 
guilty 
of 
a 
felony,
punishable by imprisonment for not more than 7
years, or a fine of not more than $50,000.00, or
both, if that person knows, has reason to know,
or should reasonably be expected to know that the
child is a child or that the child sexually
abusive material includes a child or that the 
depiction constituting the child sexually abusive 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
material appears to include a child, or that
person has not taken reasonable precautions to
determine the age of the child. This subsection
does not apply to the persons described in 
section 7 of 1984 PA 343, MCL 752.367. 
The question presented is whether, to be convicted under 
the statute, a defendant must possess the criminal intent 
to distribute or promote child pornography. 
Considering solely the statute’s words, it is apparent 
that criminal intent, mens rea, is not explicitly required. 
The only specific knowledge requirement is that the 
defendant knew that the sexually abusive material included 
or appeared to include a child. 
IV. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the 
issue whether a criminal intent element should be read into 
a statute where it does not appear. Morissette v United 
States, 342 US 246; 72 S Ct 240; 96 L Ed 288 (1952). 
In 
Morissette, the defendant took spent shell casings from a 
government bombing range and sold them for salvage. The 
defendant was convicted of converting government property 
despite evidence suggesting that he had no criminal intent 
to steal anything and thought the property abandoned. 
The 
trial court instructed the jury that a lack of criminal 
intent was not a defense to the charge. Id. at 247-249. 
In reviewing the case, the Morissette Court began with 
the proposition that criminal offenses that do not require
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a criminal intent are disfavored. 
Liability without 
criminal intent will not be found in the absence of an 
express or implied indication of congressional intent to 
dispense with the criminal intent element. Id. at 250-263. 
Morissette stated: 
The contention that an injury can amount to
a crime only when inflicted by intention is no
provincial or transient notion. 
It is as 
universal and persistent in mature systems of law
as belief in freedom of the human will and a 
consequent 
ability 
and 
duty 
of 
the 
normal 
individual to choose between good and evil. 
A 
relation 
between 
some 
mental 
element 
and 
punishment for a harmful act is almost as 
instinctive as the child's familiar exculpatory
"But I didn't mean to," and has afforded the
rational 
basis 
for 
a 
tardy 
and 
unfinished 
substitution of deterrence and reformation in 
place 
of 
retaliation 
and 
vengeance 
as 
the 
motivation for public prosecution. 
Unqualified
acceptance of this doctrine by English common law
in the Eighteenth Century was indicated by
Blackstone's 
sweeping 
statement 
that 
to 
constitute any crime there must first be a 
"vicious will." 
Common-law commentators of the 
Nineteenth Century early pronounced the same 
principle . . . . 
Crime, as a compound concept, generally 
constituted only from concurrence of an evil­
meaning 
mind 
with 
an 
evil-doing 
hand, 
was 
congenial to an intense individualism and took
deep and early root in American soil. 
As the 
states codified the common law of crimes, even if
their enactments were silent on the subject,
their courts assumed that the omission did not 
signify disapproval of the principle but merely
recognized that intent was so inherent in the
idea of the offense that it required no statutory
affirmation. 
Courts, with little hesitation or
division, found an implication of the requirement
as to offenses that were taken over from the 
common law. 
The unanimity with which they have 
8 
 
 
 
 
adhered to the central thought that wrongdoing
must be conscious to be criminal is emphasized by
the variety, disparity and confusion of their
definitions of the requisite but elusive mental
element. 
However, 
courts 
of 
various 
jurisdictions, and for the purposes of different
offenses, have 
devised working formulae, if not
scientific ones, for the instruction of juries
around 
such 
terms 
as 
"felonious 
intent,"
"criminal intent," "malice aforethought," "guilty
knowledge," "fraudulent intent," "wilfulness,"
"scienter," to denote guilty knowledge, or "mens 
rea," to signify an evil purpose or mental 
culpability. 
By use or combination of these
various tokens, they have sought to protect those
who were not blameworthy in mind from conviction
of infamous common-law crimes. [Id. at 250-252.] 
The Court then considered the history and purpose of the 
federal statute at issue and determined that there was no 
indication that Congress wanted criminal intent eliminated 
from the offense. Id at 265-269. 
The 
Morissette 
Court 
noted 
the 
longstanding 
presumption that all crimes require criminal intent. 
It 
held that Congress’s failure to include 
a criminal intent 
element did not signal a desire to preclude the need to 
prove criminal intent. Rather, the omission of any mention 
of criminal intent was not to be construed as eliminating 
the element from the crime. Id. at 272-273. 
Since the Morissette decision, the United States 
Supreme Court has reiterated that offenses not requiring 
criminal intent are disfavored. 
The Court will infer the 
presence of the element unless a statute contains an 
9  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
express or implied indication that the legislative body 
wanted to dispense with it. 
Moreover, the Court has 
expressly held that the presumption in favor of a criminal 
intent or mens rea requirement applies to each element of a 
statutory crime. 
In Staples v United States,3 the Court interpreted a 
federal statute that makes it a crime to possess an 
unregistered weapon capable of automatic firing. The Court 
noted that silence with respect to criminal intent does 
not, by itself, “necessarily suggest that Congress intended 
to dispense with a conventional mens rea element, which 
would require that the defendant know the facts that make 
his conduct illegal.” Staples, 511 US at 605. 
The Court observed that the existence of mens rea “‘is 
the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles 
of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.’” 
Id., quoting 
United States v United States Gypsum Co, 438 US 422, 436; 
98 S Ct 2864; 57 L Ed 2d 854 (1978). It held that silence 
did not suggest that Congress intended to eliminate a mens 
rea requirement from the National Firearms Act. 
Staples 
said: 
On the contrary, we must construe the 
statute in light of the background rules of the 
3 511 US 600; 114 S Ct 1793; 128 L Ed 2d 608 (1994). 
10  
 
 
   
   
 
                                                 
common law, in which the requirement of some mens 
rea for a crime is firmly embedded. . . . 
There can be no doubt that this established 
concept has influenced our interpretation of 
criminal statutes. 
Indeed, we have noted that
the common-law rule requiring mens rea has been 
“followed in regard to statutory crimes even 
where the statutory definition did not in terms
include it.” 
Relying on the strength of the
traditional rule, we have stated that offenses
that 
require 
no 
mens 
rea 
generally 
are 
disfavored, 
and 
have 
suggested 
that 
some 
indication of congressional intent, express or
implied, is required to dispense with mens rea as 
an element of a crime. 
[Staples, 511 US at 605­
606 (citations omitted).] 
In United States v X-Citement Video, Inc,4 the United 
States Supreme Court applied the mens rea rule to a federal 
statute prohibiting child pornography. The statute made it 
illegal to “knowingly transport[] or ship[]” or “knowingly 
receive[] or distribute[]” any visual depiction involving 
the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 
18 USC 2252. 
The Court was required to determine whether 
the term “knowingly” as used in the section also modified 
the phrase “use of a minor.” 
The Court undertook to 
determine whether the defendant must knowingly transport 
the material and must know that it depicted a minor engaged 
in sexually explicit conduct. 
The X-Citement Video Court presumed that mens rea must 
be shown to obtain a conviction, there being no clear 
4 513 US 64; 115 S Ct 464; 130 L Ed 2d 372 (1994). 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
congressional intent that strict liability should be 
imposed. 
It held that Congress must have intended that an 
accused 
transported 
the 
material 
knowingly 
and 
had 
knowledge of its nature to be guilty of the crime. 
X-
Citement Video, 513 US at 78. 
The Court noted that this 
reading was necessary because "some form of scienter is to 
be implied in a criminal statute even if not expressed" and 
because "a statute is to be construed where fairly possible 
so as to avoid substantial constitutional questions.” 
Id. 
at 69. 
V. APPLICATION OF PRECEDENT TO RESOLVE THE CRIMINAL INTENT QUESTION 
We apply this Supreme Court precedent to the case 
before us. 
No mens rea with respect to distribution or 
promotion is explicitly required in MCL 750.145c(3). 
Absent some clear indication that the Legislature intended 
to dispense with the requirement, we presume that silence 
suggests the Legislature’s intent not to eliminate mens rea 
in MCL 750.145c(3). 
The 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
correctly 
reached 
this 
conclusion. 
The most applicable dictionary definition of 
"distribute" implies putting items in the hands of others 
as a knowing and intentional act.5 Likewise, the terms 
5 “Distribute: 
to divide and give out in shares;
allot. To pass out or deliver: to distribute pamphlets.”
(continued…)
12 
 
 
 
    
                                                 
 
"promote" and "finance," and the phrase "receives for the 
purpose of distributing or promoting" contemplate knowing, 
intentional conduct on the part of the accused. 
The use of these active verbs supports the presumption 
that the Legislature intended that the prosecution prove 
that an accused performed the prohibited act with criminal 
intent. 
If we held otherwise, not only would it be 
illogical, we would create a questionable scheme of 
punishment: One who, with criminal intent, possessed child 
sexually abusive material would be subject to a lesser 
punishment than someone who, without criminal intent, 
passed along such material to others.6 
The Court of Appeals holding that the prosecution must 
prove criminal intent to distribute or promote fully 
implements the goal of the legislative scheme. It also 
(…continued)
The Random House College Dictionary (2001) "[T]o give out
or deliver especially to members of a group ." 
Merriam-Webster 
OnLine 
Dictionary
 
(accessed 
April 
15, 
2005). 
"[T]o
divide (something) among several or many people, or to
spread or scatter (something) over an area." 
Cambridge 
Dictionary 
of 
American 
English 
(Online 
version)
 (accessed April 15, 
2005). 
6 The maximum penalty for violating MCL 750.145c(3),
distributing or promoting child sexually abusive material,
is seven years in prison and a fine of $50,000. 
The 
maximum penalty for possessing child sexually abusive 
material, MCL 750.145c(4), is four years in prison and a
$10,000 
fine. 
When 
defendant 
was 
convicted, 
MCL 
750.145c(4) provided for imprisonment of one year. 
13  
  
 
 
  
  
                                                 
avoids substantial constitutional questions. 
The fact, 
standing alone, that the Legislature did not affix the term 
"knowingly" to the distribution or promotion element does 
not mean that the Legislature intended a strict liability 
standard. 
As the United States Supreme Court explained in X-
Citement Video,7 if there were no mens rea element 
respecting the distribution of the material, the statute 
could punish otherwise innocent conduct. 
For instance, a 
person might accidentally attach the wrong file to an e­
mail sent to another. 
The person might intend to send an 
innocent photograph, but accidentally send a pornographic 
photograph of a child instead. 
Also, the person might not 
intend that the recipient recognize or even see the 
material that he transferred. 
If the statute contained no mens rea element, a person 
lacking 
any 
criminal 
intent 
could 
be 
convicted 
and 
sentenced to seven years in prison and a fine of $50,000. 
Or, as in the present case, he could be found criminally 
liable for returning a laptop owned by his employer, 
intending only that the offending material be destroyed.8 
7 513 US at 69. 
8 The dissent claims that evidence of intent is found 
in the fact that defendant returned the laptop containing
(continued…)
14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
If 
this 
were 
the 
law, 
Comcast 
employees 
who 
transferred defendant’s JPG computer files among themselves 
and ultimately to the police, knowing what was in them, 
would 
have 
violated 
MCL 
750.145c(3). 
It 
would 
be 
immaterial that they had no criminal intent. 
Such a 
reading of the statute would frustrate its purpose.9 
For all of the reasons given, we conclude that the 
Legislature intended that criminal intent to distribute be 
an element of MCL 750.145c(3). 
(…continued)
the offending material. 
There is evidence that defendant 
intended to distribute the laptop to Comcast, but there is
no evidence of a criminal intent on his part to distribute
child sexually abusive material. In fact, all the evidence
points to the contrary conclusion, that defendant did not
distribute the material with a criminal intent. 
He 
returned the laptop to his former employer as required and
with the expectation that his former employer would not
search for and find the child sexually abusive material.
This is further supported by the fact that the material was
hidden in subfolders seven directory levels down. 
9 The dissent insists that these Comcast employees
could be convicted under our reading of MCL 750.145c(3),
post at 5 n 6. It appears to miss the distinction between
intent to commit an act, such as returning another's 
personal property, and intent to commit a crime, a "guilty
mind.” 
The Comcast employees intended to report a 
suspected 
crime. 
They 
did 
not 
intend 
to 
illegally
distribute child sexually abusive material. 
The dissent states that, in other statutes, the 
Legislature has taken steps to prevent the prosecution of
people who lack criminal intent. 
But it fails to show how 
those statutes are relevant to the issue before us, which
is whether MCL 750.145c(3) includes criminal intent as an
element. 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI. THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR 
DISTRIBUTING CHILD SEXUALLY ABUSIVE MATERIAL 
The next question is whether the prosecution proved 
that defendant had the criminal intent to distribute or 
promote child sexually abusive material. 
Due process 
requires proof of intent beyond a reasonable doubt. People 
v Petrella, 424 Mich 221, 268; 380 NW2d 11 (1985). 
When 
determining if sufficient evidence was presented to sustain 
a conviction, a court must view the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the prosecution. It must determine 
whether any rational trier of fact could have found that 
the essential elements of the crime were proven as 
required. 
People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 
(1992). 
A. RETURN OF THE LAPTOP TO COMCAST 
Although defendant intended to distribute the laptop 
containing child sexually abusive material to his former 
employer, no evidence suggests that he distributed the 
material with a criminal intent. 
There was no evidence 
that defendant made anyone at Comcast aware, or attempted 
to make anyone aware, of the presence of the material. 
To 
the contrary, there is evidence that defendant neither 
intended nor expected anyone at Comcast to discover or view 
the material. 
16  
 
 
 
Comcast witnesses acknowledged that the computer hard 
drive could be erased and reformatted without any of its 
files being reviewed. 
Mr. Williams admitted that this was 
the practice at Comcast and that defendant himself may have 
previously performed such erasures on returned computers. 
Williams admitted that he looked through defendant’s 
files because "I just wanted to see what was on there," not 
because it was necessary. 
Williams further testified that 
he did not tell defendant when he arranged to pick up the 
computer that he intended to look at any of his files. 
Another witness testified that the practice at Comcast was 
simply to wipe the hard drives of all information and 
reformat them. 
From the testimony, one could reasonably conclude that 
defendant anticipated that no one at Comcast would review 
his files. 
His statement to FIA investigators was that he 
thought the entire hard drive would be merely erased and 
reformatted. Viewed most favorably to the prosecution, the 
record contains nothing from which to reasonably infer that 
defendant intentionally left the material on the laptop for 
Comcast's employees to discover. 
The dissent questions the relevancy of the fact that 
defendant did not intend anybody to discover or view the 
material. As explained above, defendant could be convicted 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
of distributing child sexually abusive material only if he 
distributed 
the 
material 
with 
a 
criminal 
intent. 
Obviously, if defendant distributed the material not 
intending anybody to discover or view it, he did not 
distribute it with a criminal intent. 
Defendant returned the computer, as he was required to 
do, to individuals who possibly knew how to find the 
information. This does not change the fact that defendant 
concealed the images. Nor does it change the fact that, on 
the basis of past company practice, defendant legitimately 
believed that those individuals would not search the 
computer for picture files. That someone had the ability 
and 
desire 
to 
search 
for 
the 
material 
defendant 
purposefully concealed does not affect the analysis of 
defendant's state of mind. The actions of a third party 
could not create a criminal intent in the mind of 
defendant. 
In addition to defendant’s statement to the FIA, 
substantiation for the inference that there was no mens rea 
is found in the testimony of prosecution witness Radcliffe. 
He said that the photos were buried deep in a user profile, 
not in a readily available location. Likewise, Sergeant 
Duke testified that, in his opinion, the location, seven 
18  
 
 
 
 
directory levels down, indicated that defendant intended to 
keep the material secret. 
Hence, insufficient evidence existed from which the 
jury could draw an inference beyond a reasonable doubt 
that, when returning the laptop, defendant distributed 
child sexually abusive material with criminal intent. 
We 
avoid the dissent’s error of conflating the criminal intent 
to distribute child sexually abusive material with the 
simple intent to return the laptop. 
B. DEFENDANT’S INTERNET ACTIVITY 
The prosecutor made the alternative argument that 
defendant distributed child sexually abusive material over 
the Internet. 
However, the jury acquitted him of that 
crime. It specifically found that defendant did not use a 
computer or the Internet to communicate with another person 
to distribute or promote child sexually abusive material. 
MCL 750.145d. It found him guilty only of using a computer 
or the Internet to communicate with another person in order 
to possess child sexually abusive material. Id. 
We apply the same reasoning regarding this argument as 
did the Court of Appeals: 
Given the prosecutor's theory that defendant
distributed child sexually abusive material by
returning to Comcast the computer containing such
material and the jury's verdict of acquittal on
the charge of using a computer to distribute or
promote 
such 
material, 
we 
conclude 
that 
19  
 
 
 
 
 
defendant's conviction solely rests upon the 
theory primarily advanced by the prosecution at
trial: that defendant distributed child sexually
abusive material by returning to Comcast a 
computer 
that 
contained 
such 
material. 
Accordingly, our review of the sufficiency of the
evidence is limited to the theory that resulted
in defendant's conviction. 
[260 Mich App at
208.] [Emphasis added.] 
In his concurrence, Chief Justice Taylor concludes 
that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict 
defendant of distributing child sexually abusive material. 
The basis for the conviction could have been that he shared 
such material with others on the Internet. The concurrence 
acknowledges that the jury specifically acquitted defendant 
of using a computer to distribute such material, but it 
observes that jury verdicts need not be consistent. 
We reason that, although inconsistent jury verdicts 
may be legally permissible, it does not follow that we 
should find verdicts inconsistent when it is possible to 
find them consistent. 
See Lagalo v Allied Corp, 457 Mich 
278, 282; 577 NW2d 462 (1998) (“‘[i]f there is an 
interpretation of the evidence that provides a logical 
explanation for the findings of the jury, the verdict is 
not inconsistent.’”) (Citation omitted.) 
There 
is 
no 
disagreement 
that, 
here, 
the 
jury 
specifically acquitted defendant of using a computer to 
distribute 
child 
sexually 
abusive 
material, 
and 
it 
20  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
convicted him of distributing such material. It could have 
found him guilty of distributing the material in one of two 
ways: 
(a) finding that he shared the material with others 
on the Internet, or (b) finding that he distributed it by 
returning the computer to Comcast. 
The former would be 
inconsistent with the jury's verdict concerning the “use of 
a computer to distribute child sexually abusive material” 
charge; the latter would not be. 
Because we presume that 
the verdicts are consistent, we conclude that the jury 
convicted 
defendant 
of 
distributing 
the 
material 
by 
returning the computer to Comcast.10 
VII. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A  
CONVICTION FOR PROMOTING CHILD SEXUALLY ABUSIVE MATERIAL  
It is without dispute that defendant possessed child 
sexually abusive material that he had obtained over the 
Internet. 
The prosecution contends that possessing the 
material is the legal equivalent of promoting it for 
purposes of MCL 750.145c(3). 
MCL 750.145c(3) reads: 
10 The concurring justice mistakes defense of our
analysis for a criticism of his unanimity argument. Rather 
than criticize the argument, we simply find that there is
no reason to consider the unanimity issue. 
The jury
specifically acquitted defendant of using a computer or the
Internet to distribute child sexually abusive material.
This conclusive determination precludes reliance on the
rationale that the conviction for distribution was based on 
defendant’s Internet activity. We need go no further. 
21  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
A person who distributes or promotes, or
finances the distribution or promotion of, or
receives for the purpose of distributing or 
promoting, or conspires, attempts, or prepares to
distribute, receive, finance, or promote any
child sexually abusive material or child sexually
abusive 
activity 
is 
guilty 
of 
a 
felony,
punishable by imprisonment for not more than 7
years, or a fine of not more than $50,000.00, or
both . . . . [Emphasis added.] 
MCL 750.145c(4) reads: 
A person who knowingly possesses any child
sexually abusive material is guilty of a felony
punishable by imprisonment for not more than 4
years or a fine of not more than $10,000.00, or
both,[11] if that person knows, has reason to know,
or should reasonably be expected to know the
child is a child or that the child sexually
abusive material includes a child or that the 
depiction constituting the child sexually abusive
material appears to include a child, or that
person has not taken reasonable precautions to
determine the age of the child. 
[Emphasis
added.] 
Possession 
is 
not 
the 
same 
as 
promotion. 
The 
prosecutor blurs the two, asserting that by obtaining the 
material from the Internet, defendant promoted it. 
To 
accept that argument, this Court would have to ignore the 
express 
language 
of 
the 
Legislature 
that 
created 
a 
graduated scheme of offenses and punishments regarding 
child sexually abusive material. 
11 MCL 740.145c(4) was amended after defendant's trial.
Formerly, a violation of this provision was punishable as a
misdemeanor. 
22  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The Legislature expressly separated the crimes of 
production 
of 
child 
sexually 
abusive 
material,12 
distribution or promotion of the material, and simple 
possession. 
It would not have made the distinction had it 
intended to equate mere possession with promotion. 
If the Legislature had wanted end-users of the 
material to be guilty of promoting such material merely 
because they possess it, MCL 750.145c(4) would have 
included promotion. 
Alternatively, the Legislature would 
have 
equated 
possession 
with 
both 
distribution 
and 
promotion in MCL 750.145c(3) instead of creating a separate 
provision for possession in § 145c(4). 
The statute on its 
face makes the mere possession of child sexually abusive 
material a different and less severe offense than either 
distribution or promotion of the material. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
We hold that, to convict a defendant of distribution 
or promotion under MCL 750.145c(3), the prosecution must 
prove that (1) the defendant distributed or promoted child 
sexually abusive material, (2) the defendant knew the 
material to be child sexually abusive material at the time 
of distribution or promotion, and (3) the defendant 
distributed or promoted the material with criminal intent. 
12 MCL 750.145c(2). 
23  
 
 
 
 
Also, we hold that the mere obtaining and possessing of 
child sexually abusive material using the Internet does not 
constitute a violation of MCL 750.145c(3). 
There was insufficient evidence in this case for a 
jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant 
distributed or promoted child sexually abusive material 
with criminal intent. 
Therefore, we affirm the Court of 
Appeals 
decision 
reversing 
defendant’s 
conviction 
of 
distribution or promotion under MCL 750.145c(3). 
Marilyn Kelly
Michael F. Cavanagh
Stephen J. Markman 
24  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 125483 
RUSSELL DOUGLAS TOMBS, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
TAYLOR, C.J. (concurring). 
I concur in the result of Justice Kelly’s opinion and 
with her analysis in all but part VI(B). 
I write 
separately to explain my own reasons for reaching the 
conclusion that defendant’s conviction for “distributing or 
promoting” child sexually abusive material was properly 
reversed by the Court of Appeals. 
I agree with Justice 
Kelly 
regarding 
the 
intent 
required 
to 
establish 
a 
violation of this statute. 
In addition, I believe such an 
intent is required because without it, otherwise innocent 
conduct could be criminalized. As a general rule there can 
be no crime without a criminal intent.1 
People v Roby, 52 
1 Strict liability crimes present a very limited 
exception to this rule, but I do not believe this crime is
in that category. 
 
 
Mich 577, 579; 18 NW 365 (1884) (Cooley, C.J.). The United 
States Supreme Court has spoken extensively on this, 
holding that when a criminal statute is totally silent 
about state of mind (as is often the case), courts 
nonetheless assume that Congress intended to require some 
kind of guilty knowledge with respect to certain elements 
of the crime. 
See Liparota v United States, 471 US 419, 
426; 105 S Ct 2084; 85 L Ed 2d 434 (1985) (courts should 
not read criminal statutes as 
requiring no mens rea); 
Morissette v United States, 342 US 246, 255-256, 263; 72 S 
Ct 240; 96 L Ed 288 (1952). 
Under Justice Corrigan’s interpretation, the only 
element requiring criminal intent is that the material is 
child pornography, because this is the element that 
criminalizes otherwise innocent conduct. However, a person 
may be aware of the existence of such material without 
taking the criminal step of distributing it or promoting 
it. 
Such a person would be engaging only in innocent 
conduct until the element of distributing or promoting is 
met. 
What Justice Corrigan seems to be arguing here is 
that defendant possessed the material, and then went one 
step further and handed the computer to Comcast employees, 
and thus he had not engaged in only innocent conduct before 
distributing. 
However, possession is not an element of 
2  
 
 
 
distributing or promoting, and we must look at the elements 
of the charged crime, not the facts of the case before us, 
in determining the required intent. The Court of Appeals 
correctly applied this law in its analysis, finding that 
defendant did not “distribute” the material when he 
returned the computer to Comcast because he did not 
“intend[] for anyone to see or receive child sexually 
abusive material.” 
260 Mich App 201, 217; 679 NW2d 77 
(2003). 
Thus, I agree with Justice Kelly’s conclusion that 
there was insufficient evidence to prove defendant had this 
intent when he returned the computer to Comcast. 
Ante at 
20. 
I also agree with her analysis and conclusion that 
there was insufficient evidence supporting the prosecutor’s 
second theory, i.e., that defendant promoted child sexually 
abusive material by merely acquiring or possessing it. 
Justice Kelly properly concludes that acquisition or 
possession of the material is not legally equivalent to 
promoting it for the purposes of MCL 750.145c(3). 
Ante at 
22. 
Finally, while I agree with her conclusion that 
defendant’s conviction for distributing or promoting child 
sexually 
abusive 
material 
is 
not 
supported 
by 
the 
prosecutor’s third theory—that defendant committed the 
3  
 
 
                                                 
crime by uploading or sharing child sexually abusive 
material through the Internet—I do not find her analysis of 
this issue persuasive. 
Although the jury found defendant 
not guilty of using a computer or the Internet to 
distribute or promote child sexually abusive material, the 
elements of the more general distribution crime are also 
satisfied by defendant’s alleged acts of sharing the 
material, and this is sufficient to convict. 
When a 
defendant is convicted under a multicount indictment, we 
must consider whether the elements of each charge have been 
met. 
People v Vaughn, 409 Mich 463, 465; 295 NW2d 354 
(1980). 
Each count is regarded as if it were a separate 
indictment, and jury verdicts rendered on the several 
counts need not be consistent. Id. 
In contrast to Justice Kelly’s analysis, I believe the 
evidence supporting this theory is sufficient (but barely) 
when the evidence presented at trial, and the reasonable 
inferences taken from it, is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution.2
 See People v Tanner, 469 
Mich 437, 444 n 6; 671 NW2d 728 (2003). 
2 At trial, Mr. David Joseph, the children’s protective
services 
worker, 
testified 
that 
defendant 
admitted 
“sharing” child pornography through the Internet. 
When 
pressed as to what defendant meant by “sharing,” Mr. Joseph
(continued…) 
4  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
However, the fact is that the prosecutor presented to 
the jury distinct factual situations, each of which could 
have been seen by individual jurors as satisfying the actus 
reus of the single charge.3  This is permissible, but only 
if the jurors are instructed that they all must unanimously 
agree that defendant committed at least one of the criminal 
acts. 
That 
unanimity 
requirement, 
not 
having 
been 
presented to the jury, is fatal to this conviction. 
The 
Michigan Constitution requires the jury’s verdict to be 
unanimous to comply with minimal due process. 
Const 1963, 
art 1, § 14; see People v Cooks, 446 Mich 503, 510-511; 521 
NW2d 275 (1994); Schad v Arizona, 501 US 624, 649-652; 111 
S Ct 2491; 115 L Ed 2d 555 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
Unanimity is not a difficulty if there is a single charged 
criminal act that could have been committed in various 
ways. In such a case, jurors need not agree on the mode of 
commission. 
Thus, submitting a charge of murder in which 
the defendant either killed with premeditation or committed 
the murder during the course of a felony does not violate 
(…continued) 
first admitted he was not an expert, then stated that his 
“impression” was that defendant was part of a club. He did  
not testify that defendant “stated” he was part of a club.  
3 That is, although defendant was charged only once,
the alleged acts could have resulted in three separate
charges. 
5  
 
 
 
 
due process because the jury still determines what crime 
was committed as a result of the single, unlawful act. 
Likewise, “when a statute lists alternative means of 
committing an offense, which means in and of themselves do 
not 
constitute 
separate 
and 
distinct 
offenses, 
jury 
unanimity is not required with regard to the alternate 
theories.” 
People v Gadomski, 232 Mich App 24, 31; 592 
NW2d 75 (1998). 
For example, in Gadomski, an instruction 
on unanimity was not necessary when the jury was required 
to find that the defendant engaged in a specific act of 
sexual penetration alleged by the prosecution and that this 
act was accompanied by one of three alternative aggravating 
circumstances: (1) that the act occurred during the 
commission of a home invasion, see MCL 750.520b(1)(c); (2) 
that it involved aiding and abetting and force or coercion, 
see MCL 750.520b(1)(d)(ii); or (3) that it caused personal 
injury to the victim and involved force or coercion, MCL 
750.520b(1)(f). 
Id. at 29-31. 
But if discrete, specific 
acts were committed, each of which is claimed to satisfy 
all the elements of the charged crime, the trial court is 
required to instruct the jury that it must unanimously 
agree on the same specific act. Cooks, supra at 530. 
Here, at least two of the alleged criminal acts 
required materially different evidence. 
The act of 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
returning the computer to Comcast involved a separate and 
different set of facts from those concerning defendant’s 
alleged 
involvement 
in 
facilitating 
the 
exchange 
of 
Internet child pornography. 
To have a valid conviction, 
the jurors had to be instructed that they all had to agree 
on the incident in which all elements of the crime had been 
established. 
This was not done, and this deprived 
defendant 
of 
due 
process.4 
Schad, 
supra 
at 
650. 
Complicating this, however, is the fact that the error was 
unpreserved because defendant did not request such an 
instruction and did not object to the instructions as 
given. 
MCL 768.29 provides that “[t]he failure of the court 
to instruct on any point of law shall not be ground for 
4 The lead opinion in responding to this position
misunderstands it. My position is that all the jurors must
agree on the same incident that establishes the crime. You 
cannot, to use this case as the example, have some jurors
using the facts of one incident (the return of the 
computer) and others using another incident (the alleged 
distribution of pornography over the Internet) to establish
a crime of distribution. 
To prevent this, an instruction
telling the jurors that they must agree on not only the
bottom line but also on which incident establishes the 
crime was necessary. This was not done here and thus error 
requiring reversal occurred. My argument is not predicated
on the consistency of the several verdicts themselves.
Indeed, the verdicts could be consistent and the unanimity
requirement still be violated. Nothing in the lead opinion
responds to this simple point. 
7  
 
 
setting aside the verdict of the jury unless such an 
instruction is requested by the accused,” but this statute 
can only control if enforcing it would not run afoul of the 
Constitution. 
In an effort to make such incompatibilities 
of statutes and the Constitution as infrequent as possible, 
a canon of construction has developed that constrains us to 
construe the statute at issue, if possible, in a manner 
that does not conflict with the Constitution. 
People v 
Bricker, 389 Mich 524, 528; 208 NW2d 172 (1973). 
People v 
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-765; 597 NW2d 130 (1999), has 
outlined our approach to these cases and holds that with 
unpreserved, constitutional error, such as we have here, 
the defendant, to secure a reversal, must show that three 
requirements are met: “1) error must have occurred, 2) the 
error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain 
error affected substantial rights.” Id. at 763. 
The error here meets all these elements. 
The jury 
could 
have 
convicted, 
and 
most 
likely 
did 
convict, 
defendant on the basis of his act of turning in the 
computer. 
Alternatively, it could have convicted on the 
theory 
the 
prosecutor 
presented 
that 
acquiring 
and 
possessing the material equates with “promotion.” Finally, 
it could have convicted him on the basis of a single piece 
of testimony from which one may infer that defendant 
8  
 
 
 
distributed the material by uploading it and sending it to 
others through the Internet. 
While two of these three 
theories were impermissible as a matter of law (having no 
proof of criminal intent) and the third was permissible, as 
I have discussed, there is simply no showing, nor can there 
be, that the jurors all agreed on the same incident as the 
one in which all elements of the crime were shown. This is 
a violation of the unanimity requirement. 
Moreover, it is 
impossible to say that, had the jury been properly 
instructed, 
the 
outcome 
would 
be 
the 
same. 
This 
constitutes 
plain 
error 
that 
affected 
defendant’s 
substantial rights and the conviction must be reversed. 
For the reasons I have stated, I agree with Justice 
Kelly’s result of affirming the Court of Appeals reversal 
of defendant’s conviction for distributing or promoting 
child sexually abusive material and I agree with her 
analysis in all but part VI(B). 
Clifford W. Taylor 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 125483 
RUSSELL DOUGLAS TOMBS, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
CORRIGAN, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I agree with the majority that the distribution or 
promotion of child sexually abusive material must be an 
intentional act. I respectfully dissent, however, from the 
majority’s 
application 
of 
intentionality. 
Under 
the 
majority view, the intentionality of defendant’s act is 
negated because he allegedly and erroneously believed that 
Comcast’s computer technicians would not “discover or view” 
the child sexually abusive material. 
The majority’s 
erroneous analysis adds a heightened intent element that is 
not constitutionally required and is not found in the plain 
language of the statute. 
I believe that the prosecution presented sufficient 
evidence that defendant distributed child sexually abusive 
material. 
Defendant distributed child sexually abusive 
material when he deliberately returned the company-owned 
 
 
 
 
computer to his employer, with full knowledge that the 
computer contained images that he knew to be child sexually 
abusive material. Accordingly, I would reverse the decision 
of 
the 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
and 
reinstate 
defendant’s 
conviction of distributing child sexually abusive material, 
MCL 750.145c(3). 
While the majority properly imputes an intent to the 
distribution or promotion element contained in the statute, 
it is undisputed that defendant intentionally distributed 
the computer to his employer with the knowledge that the 
computer 
contained 
child 
sexually 
abusive 
material. 
Testimony adduced at trial reveals that, on the day 
defendant resigned his employment with Comcast, defendant 
was informed that he would have to return the company 
automobile and computer the same day. His supervisor, 
Christopher Williams, testified that he waited “45 minutes 
to an hour” before proceeding to defendant’s residence. 
While 
en 
route 
to 
defendant’s 
residence, 
defendant 
telephoned Williams and told Williams that “everything was 
ready.” The evidence revealed that, although given less 
time than requested, defendant voluntarily returned the 
computer to Comcast. 
Moreover, the testimony of David Joseph revealed that 
defendant was aware that the prurient material was on the 
2  
 
 
 
                                                 
computer at the time the computer was returned. Joseph 
testified that defendant was not concerned that the 
material would be discovered on the Comcast computer 
because defendant “didn’t feel as though there would be 
anybody that would go through those individual files” 
because defendant believed that “the hard drive would sort 
of just be wiped out.” Defendant further stated to Joseph 
that he “didn’t get the opportunity” to “expunge the 
material that he knew was offensive.”1 The evidence adduced 
clearly establishes that defendant deliberately returned 
the computer to Comcast, knowing that it contained child 
sexually abusive material. Because the statute requires no 
more, this should end the inquiry. 
The 
lead 
opinion 
casts 
the 
issue 
as 
whether 
defendant’s distribution of child sexually abusive material 
must be an intentional act; however, the opinion ignores 
the uncontroverted evidence that the distribution was in 
fact an intentional act. Instead, the opinion concludes 
1  While defendant maintained to Joseph that he did not
have the “opportunity” to “expunge” the child pornography,
the testimony in the record indicates otherwise. The 
testimony of Sgt. Joseph Duke revealed that a “wiping
program” was installed on the hard drive of defendant’s
computer. Duke further testified that it would have taken
less than fifteen minutes to completely eradicate the child
pornography files from the computer. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
that defendant did not intentionally distribute the child 
sexually 
abusive 
material 
because 
“defendant 
neither 
intended nor expected anyone at Comcast to discover or view 
the material.” Ante at 18. 
The lead opinion requires a heightened mens rea 
element that is not supported in the language of the 
statute and that is not constitutionally required. The 
opinion cites Morissette v United States,2 Staples v United 
States,3 and United States v X-Citement Video, Inc,4 in 
support of the claim that this additional element is 
required. 
However, 
those 
cases 
do 
not 
hold 
that 
a 
defendant’s criminal intent is dependent on the particular 
response or reaction of a third party. In each case, the 
Supreme Court held that the prosecution was required to 
prove a defendant possessed criminal intent,5 either with 
regard to the nature of the volitional act (Morissette) or 
with regard to the nature of the prohibited goods (Staples 
2  342 US 246; 72 S Ct 240; 96 L Ed 288 (1952). 
3  511 US 600; 114 S Ct 1793; 128 L Ed 2d 608 (1994). 
4  513 US 64; 115 S Ct 464; 130 L Ed 2d 372 (1994). 
5
 “Criminal intent” is defined as “[t]he intent to
commit a crime . . . .” Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed). In
this case, defendant intended to commit a crime, as defined
by our Legislature: he knowingly delivered a computer that
he knew to contain child pornography. The only intent
defendant lacked in this case was the intent to get caught. 
4  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
and X-Citement). In Morissette, for example, the Court 
required the prosecution to prove that the defendant had 
the intent to steal shell casings. In this case, the 
prosecution must prove that defendant had the general 
intent to distribute child pornography. See People v 
Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 405; 614 NW2d 78 (2000) (requiring 
“'the intent to do the physical act'” for a general intent 
crime) (citation omitted). The lead opinion transforms 
defendant’s admittedly volitional act into a nonvolitional 
act on the basis of what defendant expected his employer to 
do. 
Under the lead opinion, it is not enough that 
defendant intentionally distribute the computer, nor is it 
enough that defendant be aware of the presence of child 
pornography on the computer at the time of distribution. 
Rather, 
the 
opinion 
requires 
proof 
that 
defendant 
specifically intended a particular action or response on 
the part of the recipient.6 
6 Those on the lead opinion believe that this specific
intent is required, else “[a]ll the Comcast employees” who
handled the computer files could be convicted of violating
the statute, despite having “no criminal intent.” Ante at 
15. However, even under the standard articulated in the
lead opinion, all the witnesses could still be convicted of 
violating the statute. Each one of the Comcast employees
intentionally distributed the computer to his superior,
(continued…) 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
It is unclear why the lead opinion requires that a 
defendant specifically intend his or her recipient to 
“discover or view” the prurient material in order to 
“distribute” the material. The plain meaning of the word 
“distribute” does not support such a requirement. The 
dictionary definition of “distribute” is: "1. to divide and 
give out in shares; allot. 2. to spread throughout a space 
or over an area; scatter. 3. to pass out or deliver: to 
distribute pamphlets. 4. to sell (merchandise) in a 
specified area." Random House Webster's College Dictionary 
(2d ed, 1997). Likewise, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed) 
defines “distribute” as “[t]o deal or divide out in 
proportion or in shares.” 
As the Court of Appeals 
(…continued) 
knowing that the computer contained child pornography, and 
intending for the recipient to “discover or view” the 
material.  
Although not directly applicable here, the Legislature
has already taken steps to prevent the prosecution of
people deemed to have no criminal intent. For example, MCL
752.367 contains several exemptions to MCL 750.145c(3). MCL
750.145c has been amended by 2002 PA 629 and 2004 PA 478.
The most recent amendments of MCL 750.145c provide both
civil and criminal immunity from a charge of possession to
computer technicians acting within the scope of their 
employment. MCL 750.145c(4)(a) and (9). The Legislature has
also taken steps to provide criminal immunity to police
officers acting within the scope of their employment. MCL
750.145c(4)(b). 
It 
is 
within 
the 
purview 
of 
the 
Legislature, not the judiciary, to extend this immunity to
the distribution of child pornography. 
6  
  
 
 
 
correctly 
stated, 
the 
most 
applicable 
definition 
of 
“distribute” is to “pass out or deliver.” Nothing in either 
the lay dictionary or the legal dictionary gives any 
indication that “distribution” requires the recipient to 
view or appreciate the prurient nature of the material 
intentionally distributed. 
Moreover, 
the 
lead 
opinion 
makes 
no 
effort 
to 
rationalize why defendant’s erroneous belief that no one at 
Comcast would “discover or view” the child pornography 
converts defendant’s volitional act into a nonvolitional 
act. 
Likewise, the opinion fails to explain why 
defendant’s criminal intent to distribute turns on how he 
believed Comcast would respond after the intentionally 
distributed material was received. While the lead opinion 
relies heavily on the claim that “the practice” at Comcast 
was to reformat the hard drive of the computer without 
reviewing any of the files, the testimony of Christopher 
Williams indicated that this practice was only done “on 
some of” the company computers. Williams testified that he 
inspected the contents of the computer “to see what it 
needed” before being “issued to another technician.” Cliff 
Radcliff testified that the process of completely erasing 
the contents of the hard drive was “lengthy,” and that 
“just cleaning out the unneeded files” shortened the 
7  
 
 
 
                                                 
cleaning process. The record does not reveal any company 
“policy” requiring the automatic erasure of computer hard 
drives without inspection. Indeed, even if such a “policy” 
did exist, the lead opinion fails to explain why defendant 
enjoyed 
any 
type 
of 
expectation 
interest 
in 
the 
continuation of this so-called “practice.”7  That defendant 
believed that the material would not be discovered in the 
computer does not alter the fact that he knew that his 
employer would in fact receive the material. 
Thus, the 
prosecutor presented sufficient evidence for a conviction 
under MCL 750.145c(3). 
Apart from the sufficiency of the evidence, Chief 
Justice Taylor raises in his concurrence for the first time 
in these proceedings the requirement of unanimity in a 
conviction. 
Under 
this 
constitutional 
requirement, 
individual jurors must rely on the same actus reus, despite 
the presence of alternative acts, when they convict a 
defendant. 
See People v Cooks, 446 Mich 503, 510-511; 521 
7 The lead opinion also notes that defendant had “no
expectation” that defendant’s employer would “search for
and find” the child pornography. Yet this ignores the
uncontroverted evidence that defendant knowingly delivered
the company computer to computer technicians, who would
have no difficulty locating the images “in subfolders seven
directory levels down.” Indeed, one officer located the
materials without difficulty, despite his inexperience with
computer investigations. 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
NW2d 275 (1994). Here, the Chief Justice’s concern is that 
the jury heard evidence regarding two different “acts” that 
might have met the statute and might have resulted in 
defendant’s conviction: 
(1) defendant’s return of the 
computer to his employer and (2) defendant’s participation 
in an Internet club that traded in child sexually abusive 
material. 
While it may be possible that the jury could have 
failed to reach unanimity here, the issue has not been 
raised 
by 
defendant 
and 
is 
not 
before 
our 
Court. 
Additionally, as Chief Justice Taylor notes, this issue is 
unpreserved. 
Defendant neither requested a unanimity 
instruction nor objected to the instructions given. 
An unpreserved constitutional error comes within the 
standard of review articulated in People v Carines, 460 
Mich 750, 763-765; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). 
As the Chief 
Justice noted when he listed the requirements for showing 
that a plain error occurred that affected a substantial 
right, the defendant bears the evidentiary burden. Id. at 
763 (recognizing that the burden of persuasion for a 
showing of prejudice was on the defendant). 
However, 
defendant has not established entitlement to relief under 
Carines because, at a minimum, defendant did not identify 
or argue the issue. 
Moreover, prejudice requires showing 
9  
 
 
 
 
that the error affected the outcome. 
This differs from 
showing the possibility that the jury improperly failed to 
meet the unanimity requirement and requires a showing that 
the error did affect the outcome. 
Here, the jury was instructed to consider only acts 
occurring on August 9, 2000, the day that defendant 
relinquished his employment. The social worker’s testimony 
did not link defendant’s admission that he participated in 
an Internet club to any particular date. 
Also, the jury 
was instructed to consider only the evidence presented, and 
that the arguments made by the attorneys were not evidence. 
Thus, I believe that the Chief Justice has established, at 
best, the possibility of error; however, it has not been 
shown that claimed error affected the outcome of the case. 
More fundamentally, defendant must make this showing rather 
than rely on the Chief Justice to make it on an issue not 
preserved below and not argued before this Court. 
In conclusion, the prosecutor presented sufficient 
evidence to convict defendant of distribution of child 
sexually abusive material under MCL 750.145c(3). 
While I 
agree that an intent requirement is properly imputed to the 
“distributes or promotes” element of the statute, the 
prosecution put forward sufficient evidence to sustain 
defendant’s conviction. Defendant intentionally delivered 
10  
 
 
 
 
the computer to his employer, knowing that the computer 
contained child sexually abusive material at the time of 
its return. The majority errs in imputing a heightened 
requirement 
that 
defendant 
intend 
his 
recipient 
to 
“discover or view” the material. Because this requirement 
is neither constitutionally nor statutorily required, I 
dissent from its adoption. I would reverse the decision of 
the Court of Appeals and reinstate defendant’s conviction. 
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
11