Case Title: UBS Financial Services, Inc. v. Aliberti

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12662

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-10-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12662 
 
UBS FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.  vs.  DONNA M. ALIBERTI. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 1, 2019. - October 22, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Individual Retirement Account.  Trust, Interest of beneficiary.  
Fiduciary.  Contract, Third party beneficiary.  Consumer 
Protection Act, Standing, Trade or commerce, Unfair or 
deceptive act. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
August 4, 2015. 
 
 
Counterclaims were heard by Karen F. Green, J., on a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Carmen A. Frattaroli for the defendant. 
 
John K. Wells for the plaintiff. 
 
Glenn Kaplan, Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney 
General, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
David Goldberg & Susan Light, of New York, Robert T. Smith 
& Mary C. Fleming, of the District of Columbia, Christian 
Kemnitz, of Illinois, & William C. Pericak, for Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  On appeal from an order granting judgment on the 
pleadings, we are called upon to consider the legal relationship 
between the commercial custodian of three nondiscretionary 
individual retirement accounts (IRAs) and a named beneficiary of 
those accounts upon the death of the original account holder.  
Quasi familial conflict following the death of the IRAs' 
original account holder sparked a lengthy account beneficiary 
dispute between the plaintiff in counterclaim, Donna M. 
Aliberti, as a named IRA beneficiary, and the defendant in 
counterclaim, UBS Financial Services, Inc. (UBS), as IRA 
custodian.  Allegedly fueled by a combination of bureaucratic 
indifference or incompetence and hypersensitivity to risk 
exposure, the feud festered for more than one and one-half years 
before resulting in legal action, commenced by UBS filing a 
complaint for interpleader. 
In counterclaim to UBS's interpleader complaint, Aliberti 
asserted claims of breach of contract; breach of fiduciary duty; 
violation of the consumer protection statute, G. L. c. 93A, § 9 
(c. 93A); and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  A 
Superior Court judge allowed UBS's motion for judgment on the 
pleadings as to all claims, but the Appeals Court reversed on 
all counts but intentional infliction of emotional distress.  
See UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Aliberti, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 180, 
192-193 (2018).  More specifically, the Appeals Court concluded 
3 
 
 
 
that the pleadings stated facially plausible claims that 
(1) Aliberti was an intended third-party beneficiary of 
contracts governing the IRAs with standing to sue for 
contractual breach, (2) UBS committed a breach of fiduciary 
duties owed to Aliberti, because IRAs are "trusts" under Federal 
tax law, and (3) the challenged conduct by UBS occurred in a 
business context and violated c. 93A.1  We granted UBS's 
application for further appellate review. 
 
On review, we conclude that there is no plausible claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty, but the facts alleged do state a claim 
that UBS's conduct violated c. 93A.  More specifically, we hold 
that the custodian of a nondiscretionary IRA does not owe a 
fiduciary duty to a named beneficiary of that IRA, where no 
special agreement or circumstances elevate their relationship 
above the consumer sphere, which the record here does not 
support.  We also hold that the interactions between the 
commercial custodian of a nondiscretionary IRA and a named 
beneficiary of that IRA occur in a business context within the 
meaning of c. 93A, and that the injurious conduct of UBS alleged 
                     
 
1 The Appeals Court reversed the judgment on the pleadings 
entered by the Superior Court as to those counts of the amended 
counterclaim asserting claims for breach of contract.  See UBS 
Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Aliberti, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 180, 192-193 
(2018).  UBS did not seek further appellate review of the breach 
of contract issue, and it is not before us.  Those counts were 
remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings 
consistent with the Appeals Court's order. 
4 
 
 
 
here plausibly constitutes a c. 93A violation.  We therefore 
affirm the Superior Court judge's decision as to the breach of 
fiduciary duty claim and reverse the decision as to the 
violation of c. 93A.2 
Background.  1.  IRA background.  This dispute arises from 
within that sector of the consumer financial services industry 
devoted to the sale, maintenance, and postmortem transfer of 
IRAs.  IRAs are a widely used type of tax-advantaged account 
that provides incentives for individuals to accumulate 
retirement savings.  See Clark v. Rameker, 573 U.S. 122, 124-
125, 128 (2014); Investment Company Institute, Investment 
Company Fact Book 172 (59th ed. 2019), https://www.ici.org/pdf 
/2019_factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/TX83-JFYP].3  Congress first 
enacted the legal framework for IRAs in 1974, to make tax-
deferred savings available to workers without access to an 
employer-sponsored retirement plan.  Congressional Research 
Service, Traditional and Roth Individual Retirement Accounts 
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association in support 
of UBS with respect to the fiduciary duty question, and the 
amicus letter submitted by the Attorney General respecting 
G. L. c. 93A, § 9. 
 
 
3 According to the Investment Company Institute, about one-
third of households in the United States owned an IRA at year-
end 2018, with the assets in those IRAs accounting for thirty-
three percent of all retirement assets in the United States (or 
approximately $8.8 trillion).  Investment Company Institute, 
supra at 172-173. 
5 
 
 
 
(IRAs):  A Primer 1 (updated May 11, 2018).  While IRAs were 
designed to function primarily as tax-advantaged savings 
vehicles for the account holder's own future use and benefit, 
they have since become an important estate planning vehicle, as 
significant balances may remain upon an account holder's death.  
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) contemplates that a typical 
account holder will establish an IRA "to provide [both] for his 
or her retirement and for the support of his or her 
beneficiaries."  IRS Form 5305-A (model traditional IRA 
custodial account agreement). 
Although the income tax treatment of IRA assets is complex 
and dictated by Federal law, nearly all other legal aspects of 
these accounts are governed by State statutory and common law, 
and the contractual terms of account agreements as dictated by 
private financial institutions to consumers.  See Sterk & 
Leslie, Accidental Inheritance:  Retirement Accounts and the 
Hidden Law of Succession, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 165, 174-175 (2014) 
(Sterk & Leslie).4  The procedure for transferring ownership of 
                     
 
4 Unlike "qualified" retirement plans sponsored by 
employers, IRAs (and those who market and sell them to 
consumers) are not subject to the strict accountability 
requirements of tit. I of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA), including fiduciary standards for plan 
advisors (29 U.S.C. § 1104), stringent disclosure requirements 
(29 U.S.C. § 1021), automatic surviving spouse benefits (29 
U.S.C. § 1055[a][2]), and the private right of action granted to 
beneficiaries for breach of fiduciary duty and other claims (29 
U.S.C. § 1132[a][1]).  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(a), 1051(6) 
6 
 
 
 
the IRA upon an account holder's death is among the legal 
aspects of an IRA dictated by State law.  IRAs are a type of 
"nonprobate" asset, meaning that upon the death of the owner, 
title passes in accordance with a contractual beneficiary 
designation rather than under the provisions of a will.  See 
G. L. c. 190B, § 6-101 (contract for nonprobate transfer on 
death not testamentary, meaning valid without will's 
formalities); G. L. c. 167D, § 15 (IRA beneficiary designations 
take effect according to contractual terms, "notwithstanding any 
purported testamentary disposition allowed by statute, by 
operation of law or otherwise to the contrary"). 
In Massachusetts, as in most other jurisdictions, State law 
does not provide regulations or guidelines standardizing or 
otherwise governing the form or content of IRA beneficiary 
designations, the procedure for amending them, or the default 
provisions in the event no beneficiary is designated.  Sterk & 
Leslie, supra, at 175.  Financial intermediaries each use their 
own "standard form instruments with fill-in-the-blank 
beneficiary designations," Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution 
and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1108, 
                     
(exempting IRAs from coverage under title I of ERISA).  Whereas 
ERISA frequently preempts State law actions with respect to 
qualified retirement plans, litigation concerning IRAs typically 
involves State law.  See, e.g., Joint Committee on Taxation, 
Present Law and Analysis Relating to Individual Retirement 
Arrangements 19 (June 24, 2008). 
7 
 
 
 
1109 (1986), and typically, the contractual "framework keeps 
administrative costs down by limiting the inquiry required of 
the account custodian at the time of the accountholder's death."  
Sterk & Leslie, supra at 177. 
The contractual change in account ownership appears 
typically to occur "immediately and automatically" at the moment 
of the original account holder's death, yet it is not typical 
practice for a beneficiary to "be able to walk in to the IRA 
provider's office, present his identification, and get a check 
for the entire balance payable to himself."  N.B. Choate, Life 
and Death Planning for Retirement Benefits 259 (8th ed. 2019).  
Rather, many IRA custodians will not accept instructions from a 
beneficiary-cum-owner until appropriate documents have been 
signed (typically a new account agreement) and, where 
applicable, the account has been "retitled" as an inherited IRA 
to formalize the change in ownership.  Id. 
2.  Factual background.  We present the pertinent facts 
from the pleadings and exhibits that were before the motion 
judge, in the light most favorable to Aliberti.  In 2008, 
Patrick Kenney opened three IRAs with UBS.  The UBS financial 
advisor who assisted Patrick Kenney in establishing the IRAs, 
Margaret Kenney, was also his one-time sister-in-law.5  At the 
                     
 
5 We refer to Patrick Kenney and Margaret Kenney by their 
full names to avoid confusion. 
8 
 
 
 
time he established the IRAs, Patrick Kenney was involved in a 
long-term romantic but nonmarital relationship with Aliberti.  
When Patrick Kenney filled out the initial account paperwork, he 
designated Aliberti as the sole primary beneficiary of each IRA.6 
In establishing the IRAs, Patrick Kenney signed the "UBS 
Client Relationship Agreement" (CRA), which named Aliberti as 
sole primary beneficiary below the statement, "At your death, 
your IRA will be transferred to the beneficiary or beneficiaries 
whose name(s) are printed below," followed by the advisory, "You 
may change your beneficiary designation at any time by notifying 
UBS in writing of the change in a form acceptable to UBS."  The 
CRA also incorporated terms and conditions of the "UBS IRA 
Custodial Agreement" (custodial agreement) and "IRA Disclosure 
Statement," two other documents allegedly included in the set of 
initial account paperwork mailed to Patrick Kenney for review 
and signature. 
In November 2013, Patrick Kenney completed two UBS "IRA 
Beneficiary Designation Update Forms" (update forms) in 
connection with two of the IRAs, one with an approximate balance 
of $18,000 and the other with an approximate balance of $31,000 
                     
 
6 Patrick Kenney was a resident of Billerica from the time 
he established the IRAs until his death.  UBS is a Delaware 
corporation that conducts business in several Massachusetts 
locations (among others), including in Hyannis, where Margaret 
Kenney was based.  Aliberti lived in Massachusetts throughout 
the period of time relevant to this case. 
9 
 
 
 
(collectively, smaller IRAs).  Kenney completed the two update 
forms in an identical manner, writing in the names of four 
individuals with the notation "25%" next to each.  Those 
individuals are Aliberti, Aliberti's son, Patrick Kenney's 
niece, and a friend of Patrick Kenney named Craig Gillespie. 
Patrick Kenney completed each of the forms improperly, writing 
Gillespie's name on the line designated for a "primary 
beneficiary" and each of the three other names on a line 
designated for a "contingent beneficiary." 
UBS received the two update forms from Patrick Kenney, but 
declined to process them because they were not properly 
completed.  Margaret Kenney arranged for new beneficiary update 
forms for each IRA to be sent to Patrick Kenney for completion.  
UBS never received any request from Patrick Kenney to update the 
beneficiary designation with respect to the third IRA, valued at 
approximately $276,000 (larger IRA), and no additional forms 
were ever received with respect to the smaller IRAs.  Patrick 
Kenney died unexpectedly on December 2, 2013. 
Approximately two weeks following Patrick Kenney's death, 
Aliberti contacted Margaret Kenney about the three IRAs.  That 
evening, Margaret Kenney sent Aliberti a series of text 
messages, beginning with a request for her address, but followed 
by attacks on Aliberti's character, including references to her 
as "a whore" and "the . . . worst piece of filth I have ever 
10 
 
 
 
encountered," and ultimately an accusation that Aliberti had 
failed to notice errors on Patrick Kenney's death certificate on 
account of being "too busy ransacking" and "so eager to grab the 
money."  Two days later, Margaret Kenney sent Aliberti another 
text message stating, "Documents mailed to you today please sign 
and return ASAP for distribution." 
Near the end of December 2013, UBS received a letter from 
Gillespie's attorney, stating the attorney's understanding that 
Patrick Kenney had "changed the named beneficiaries on two of 
the IRA accounts and that he was in the process of changing 
beneficiaries with regard to the third IRA account at the time 
of his passing."  The letter also stated that Gillespie intended 
"to have a court of law resolve the issue of whether or not he 
is a named beneficiary of the third IRA account" and asked UBS 
not to make any distributions therefrom.7  The letter from 
Gillespie's counsel resulted in UBS's classification of the 
larger IRA as "disputed" in accordance with internal policy, 
which meant that UBS would take no action with regard to the 
                     
 
7 The letter also contended that Massachusetts law "deems a 
change of beneficiary to have occurred before the completion of 
a change of beneficiary form in the event that the decedent has 
expressed an intent to change beneficiaries, has conveyed that 
intent to the financial services provider and has substantially 
completed the change of beneficiary process."  Even if this 
argument gave UBS pause, the theory could not apply to the 
larger IRA without the existence of an update form completed and 
signed by Patrick Kenney in connection with that account.  No 
such form was ever produced. 
11 
 
 
 
larger IRA unless one of the following occurred:  (1) receipt of 
a court order with instructions; (2) Gillespie's withdrawal of 
any claim to the funds; or (3) the expiration of all applicable 
statutes of limitations, eliminating any related risk for UBS. 
During the second week of January 2014, Aliberti telephoned 
the UBS client relations department to complain about the text 
messages received from Margaret Kenney.  During the call, she 
stated her belief that she was the sole beneficiary of all three 
IRAs, and the UBS "Client Relations Telephone Log Sheet" 
generated in connection with that call references the account 
numbers of all three IRAs.  Aliberti had no further 
communication with UBS until February 4, 2014, when she received 
an unsigned letter from UBS's "Early Dispute Resolution Group," 
stating that a case manager had been assigned to her complaint 
and would respond after review.  On February 19, 2014, Aliberti 
sent completed beneficiary processing forms for all three IRAs, 
a copy of Patrick Kenney's death certificate, and a copy of her 
driver's license to UBS. 
Five days later, Aliberti telephoned UBS's client relations 
department to complain a second time, having received a package 
of new account paperwork indicating that Margaret Kenney 
remained in control of the IRAs.  Aliberti again complained 
about Margaret Kenney's previous unprofessional text messages 
and demanded assignment of a new UBS financial advisor to 
12 
 
 
 
administer the IRAs.  Near the end of March 2014, UBS removed 
Margaret Kenney from oversight of all three IRAs, and Aliberti 
received another form letter from UBS stating that the IRAs had 
"been updated for Management access only" and that the UBS 
client relations department would respond to Aliberti's concerns 
"as soon as possible."  Shortly thereafter, within five months 
of Patrick Kenney's death, UBS liquidated each of the smaller 
IRAs, in each instance making four equal distributions of funds 
to each of Aliberti, Aliberti's son, Gillespie, and Patrick 
Kenney's niece.8  Neither Aliberti nor her son attempted to 
return funds to UBS. 
After receiving these distributions from the smaller IRAs, 
Aliberti retained counsel to communicate with UBS on her behalf.  
In early May 2014, Aliberti made a written request, through 
counsel, seeking information relating to the IRAs of which 
Aliberti was a named beneficiary, UBS's treatment of Aliberti's 
complaints, and details of any dispute as to Aliberti's 
beneficial interest in one or more of the IRAs.9  This request 
                     
 
8 Although Aliberti pleaded that distributions were made 
"without notice," the record suggests that she opened a new 
account at UBS expressly for the purpose of accepting them. 
 
 
9 The letter from Aliberti's counsel acknowledges an 
"understanding that [UBS] has indicated that there is a dispute 
as to [Aliberti]'s beneficial interest in one of more Individual 
Retirement Accounts held by [Patrick Kenney]" but does not 
elaborate as to how that indication was made. 
13 
 
 
 
was sent by certified mail to the UBS personnel who had 
previously assured her, first in early February and subsequently 
in late March, that a response to her concerns would be 
forthcoming.  Although Aliberti's request expressly proposed 
delivery of materials within seven days, UBS failed to respond.  
Aliberti ultimately resorted to service of a keeper of the 
records deposition subpoena on UBS.  UBS replied, "albeit 
late."10 
On August 29, 2014, nearly nine months following Patrick 
Kenney's death, Aliberti, through counsel, sent a second letter 
to the same UBS personnel.  This letter contained a written 
demand for immediate distribution of the date-of-death balance 
of the larger IRA, with appropriate interest and dividends, to 
Aliberti; a statement of intent to sue failing delivery of those 
funds within ten business days; and a reservation of Aliberti's 
rights to contest the distributions made from proceeds of the 
smaller IRAs.  Although UBS failed to respond or deliver 
payment, Aliberti did not file suit. 
On April 2, 2015, Aliberti's counsel deposed Margaret 
Kenney, who, among other things, admitted to sending Aliberti 
the text messages that caused Aliberti to complain to UBS's 
                     
 
10 The record contains no further details with respect to 
the timing or substance of either the subpoena or UBS's response 
thereto. 
14 
 
 
 
client relations department.  On May 18, 2015, Aliberti's 
counsel sent UBS a c. 93A demand letter, enclosing the Margaret 
Kenney deposition transcript and exhibits.  The allegations 
stated in the c. 93A demand letter included the following:  UBS 
knowingly and willfully failed to provide Aliberti with 
information to which she was entitled as the beneficiary of an 
account or accounts held by UBS; UBS serially ignored Aliberti's 
attempts to communicate for the purpose of requesting 
information about and distribution of amounts to which 
beneficiary status entitled her; UBS compelled Aliberti to 
obtain counsel and issue a subpoena in order to obtain that 
information; UBS distributed proceeds of the smaller IRAs 
without first addressing Aliberti's stated belief that she was 
rightfully the sole designated beneficiary thereof; and UBS 
refused to distribute the substantial proceeds of the larger IRA 
to her "without lawful excuse or basis." 
UBS responded to Aliberti's c. 93A demand letter in writing 
on June 15, 2015, denying the legal merit of Aliberti's stated 
claims.  Further correspondence between the parties in early and 
mid-July yielded no resolution.  On August 4, 2015, UBS filed a 
complaint for interpleader in the Superior Court pursuant to 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 22, 365 Mass. 767 (1974), asking the court to 
determine ownership of the larger IRA and joining Aliberti and 
Gillespie as defendants.  Litigation ensued, but by March 10, 
15 
 
 
 
2016, all parties stipulated to partial dismissal of those 
claims by and against Gillespie, resulting in Gillespie's waiver 
of any claim to ownership of the proceeds of the larger IRA. 
 
Even after Gillespie, through stipulation, withdrew any 
claim to the proceeds of the larger IRA, UBS still delayed 
distribution.  On June 9, 2016, UBS and Aliberti entered into a 
limited stipulation and release whereby UBS would distribute all 
proceeds of the larger IRA to Aliberti "promptly and without 
delay" in return for her releasing them from liability regarding 
any claim for disbursement of the funds in the larger IRA.  The 
stipulation expressly acknowledged Aliberti's right to pursue 
her claims against UBS as stated in her amended counterclaim, 
including breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and 
violation of c. 93A.  By June 16, 2016, when Aliberti filed a 
motion to amend her counterclaims against UBS and sought to join 
Margaret Kenney as a cross defendant,11 UBS still had not made 
any distribution from the larger IRA. 
 
UBS distributed the larger IRA proceeds to Aliberti on 
July 1, 2016, approximately two and one-half years following 
Patrick Kenney's death.  Aliberti continued pursuit of her 
counterclaims against UBS, and after several months of further 
litigation, UBS filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as 
                     
 
11 The Superior Court judge ultimately denied the motion to 
join Margaret Kenney as a party to the suit. 
16 
 
 
 
to those claims.  The Superior Court judge granted the motion, 
dismissing each of Aliberti's claims.  Aliberti appealed.  The 
Appeals Court reversed in part, finding Aliberti's claims of 
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of 
c. 93A to be well pleaded.  UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 94 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 192-193.  We granted further appellate review to consider 
whether the factual allegations as pleaded support plausible 
claims for relief as to breach of fiduciary duty and violation 
of c. 93A. 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  "We review de novo a 
judge's order allowing a motion for judgment on the pleadings 
under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (c), 365 Mass. 754 (1974)."  Champa v. 
Weston Pub. Sch., 473 Mass. 86, 90 (2015), quoting Merriam v. 
Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 464 Mass. 721, 726 (2013).  We 
accept the truth of all well-pleaded facts alleged by, and "draw 
every reasonable inference in favor" of, the nonmoving party, 
Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011), 
to determine whether there are "factual 'allegations plausibly 
suggesting (not merely consistent with)' an entitlement to 
relief."  Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 
(2008), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 
(2007).  See Jaroz v. Palmer, 436 Mass. 526, 530 (2002) 
(defendant's "motion under rule 12 [c] is akin to a motion [to 
17 
 
 
 
dismiss] under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 [b] [6]," 365 Mass. 754 
[1974]). 
 
2.  Breach of fiduciary duty.  Aliberti contends that UBS 
committed a breach of fiduciary duties owed to her as the 
designated beneficiary of all three nondiscretionary custodial 
IRAs at issue here.  To establish a claim of breach of fiduciary 
duty under Massachusetts law, "there must be a [fiduciary] duty 
owed to the plaintiff by the defendant and injury to the 
plaintiff proximately caused by the [defendant's] breach 
[thereof].12  Estate of Moulton v. Puopolo, 467 Mass. 478, 492 
                     
 
12 We conduct the fiduciary duty analysis in accordance with 
Massachusetts law, as the parties are in agreement that it 
should apply.  The CRA and the incorporated custodial agreement 
are both governed by New York law.  However, the choice-of-law 
provisions therein relate only to the interpretation and 
enforcement of the CRA and the custodial agreement, and the 
parties' contractual disputes are not before us.  Further, "only 
actual conflicts between the laws of different jurisdictions 
must be resolved," Kaufman v. Richmond, 442 Mass. 1010, 1012 
(2004), and we discern no relevant difference between the 
fiduciary duty law of New York and Massachusetts.  See, e.g., 
Rut v. Young Adult Inst., Inc., 74 A.D.3d 776, 777 (2010) 
(elements for fiduciary duty claim under New York law).  Thus, 
application of either State's law would yield the same result 
here.  Cf. Terra Nova Ins. Co. v. Fray-Witzer, 449 Mass. 406, 
411-412 (2007) (applying New Jersey law where parties "agree 
that there is no relevant difference between New Jersey and 
Massachusetts law and have both employed New Jersey law in their 
arguments"). 
 
 
In any event, under the particular circumstances of this 
case the Massachusetts choice-of-law rules indicate that 
Massachusetts law should apply to our fiduciary duty analysis.  
See Bushkin Assocs., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 393 Mass. 622, 631 
(1985) (Massachusetts follows "a functional choice-of-law 
approach that responds to the interests of the parties, the 
18 
 
 
 
(2014).  See Baker v. Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, 
91 Mass. App. Ct. 835, 842 (2017).  "A fiduciary relationship is 
one founded on the trust and confidence reposed by one party in 
the integrity and fidelity of another."  Estate of Moulton, 
supra. 
Fiduciary duties may arise in two ways:  (a) as a matter of 
law, where parties to the subject relationship are cast in 
archetypal roles, "such as trustee and [beneficiary], guardian 
and ward, attorney and client,"  Smith v. Smith, 222 Mass. 102, 
106 (1915); or (b) as "determined by the facts established," 
Warsofsky v. Sherman, 326 Mass. 290, 293 (1950), upon "evidence 
indicating that one person is in fact dependent on another's 
judgment in business affairs or property matters."  Markell v. 
Sidney B. Pfeifer Found., Inc., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 412, 444 
(1978), abrogated on another ground by Cleary v. Cleary, 427 
Mass. 286, 292 (1998), citing Hawes v. Lackey, 207 Mass. 424, 
431-432 (1911).  Because the amended complaint does not 
                     
States involved, and the interstate system as a whole").  "The 
Massachusetts functional approach is explicitly guided by the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) 
[(Restatement)]."  Clarendon Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Arbella Mut. Ins. 
Co., 60 Mass. App. Ct. 492, 496 (2004) (Lenk, J.).  Section 145 
of the Restatement states that "[t]he rights and liabilities of 
the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by 
the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, 
has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the 
parties" as determined by factors laid out in § 6 of the 
Restatement. 
19 
 
 
 
adequately plead facts to support the existence of a fiduciary 
duty under either theory, the Superior Court judge properly 
granted UBS's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the 
counts claiming breach of fiduciary duty. 
a.  No fiduciary relationship exists by operation of law.  
The relationship between the custodian of a nondiscretionary IRA 
and a named beneficiary of the IRA is not among those 
traditional "familiar and well[-]recognized" relationships 
giving rise to fiduciary duties as a matter of law.13  Warsofsky, 
326 Mass. at 292.  See 1 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity 
Jurisprudence as Administered in England and America §§ 308-327 
(1836) (discussing fiduciary standards governing certain 
relationships, including attorney and client, guardian and ward, 
principal and agent, and trustee and beneficiary).  More 
specifically, the record does not support an allegation that UBS 
and Aliberti are bound by the fiduciary ties of trustee and 
beneficiary, because no "trust" exists under State law or is 
required by Federal law. 
The IRAs were not "trusts" under State law, because a 
settlor's expressed intent to create a trust is a prerequisite 
                     
 
13 A securities account is "nondiscretionary" where "the 
customer makes the investment decisions and the stockbroker 
merely receives and executes a customer's orders."  Patsos v. 
First Albany Corp., 433 Mass. 323, 333 (2001).  A 
nondiscretionary IRA is one maintained by a custodian or trustee 
without investment discretion. 
20 
 
 
 
to the creation of a Massachusetts trust.  See G. L. c. 203E, 
§ 402 (2).  And there is nothing in the record to suggest that 
Patrick Kenney intended to create a trust relationship between 
UBS and Aliberti either in 2008, when he first signed the CRA, 
or in 2013, when he completed the update forms.  See, e.g., 
Tucker v. Soy Capital Bank & Trust Co., 2012 IL App (1st) 
103303, ¶ 34 (2012) (no explicit language creating trust in 
governing contract). 
Federal law does not alter this analysis.14  Although the 
terms "trust" and "trustee" permeate the section of the United 
States Code governing IRAs, 26 U.S.C. § 408 (I.R.C. § 408), and 
the corresponding Department of the Treasury regulations, 26 
C.F.R. §§ 1.408-1 et seq., the Federal law does not itself 
define "trust," nor does it require an IRA to be a "trust" as 
that term may be defined under applicable State law.15  An IRA 
                     
 
14 IRAs are created and governed by Section 408 of the 
United States Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 408 (I.R.C. 
§ 408), which "establish[es] a framework whereby individuals may 
obtain favorable tax treatment of amounts set aside for 
retirement in certain circumstances."  Sirna vs. Prudential 
Sec., Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., Nos. 95 Civ. 8422, 95 Civ. 9016, 96 
Civ. 4534 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1997).  It provides "no implied 
cause of action against allegedly errant IRA fiduciaries."  
Grund v. Delaware Charter Guarantee & Trust Co., 788 F. Supp. 2d 
226, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), quoting Sirna, supra. 
 
 
15 The Internal Revenue Code defines an IRA as "a trust 
created or organized in the United States for the exclusive 
benefit of an individual or his beneficiaries, but only if the 
written governing instrument creating the trust meets . . . 
[certain] requirements."  26 U.S.C. § 408.  Notably, the 
21 
 
 
 
may take the form of either a trust account or a "custodial 
account."  See 26 U.S.C. § 408(a), (h); 26 C.F.R. § 1.408–2(a).  
Where an IRA is created as a custodial account, such as the IRAs 
at issue here, it is subject to all the same requirements as an 
IRA structured as a trust account, "except for the fact that it 
is not a trust" (emphasis added).16  26 U.S.C. § 408(h).  See 26 
C.F.R. § 1.408-2(d).  Unlike fiduciary duties, most of the 
obligations imposed on the IRA custodian by Federal law are not 
to the benefit of the account holder or beneficiary, but rather 
to assist the IRS in preventing the tax incentives intended to 
encourage individual retirement savings from giving rise to tax 
fraud and abuse.17 
b.  The facts do not otherwise support creation of 
fiduciary duties.  "The circumstances which may create a 
                     
definition is constrained to uses "[f]or purposes of this 
section" (i.e., for tax purposes).  Id. 
 
 
16 Along with other requirements, the type of organizations 
that may hold and administer IRA assets is limited to either a 
bank "or such other person who demonstrates to the satisfaction 
of the Secretary [of the Treasury] that" the IRA will be 
administered in accordance with required law.  26 U.S.C. 
§ 408(a)(2).  UBS is this latter type of "nonbank" custodian. 
 
 
17 An IRA custodian's various reporting obligations (viz. 
valuing account assets and accounting for contributions and 
distributions) ultimately provide the IRS with a means of 
verifying income tax deductions reported by the individual 
account holder or beneficiary, and allow the account to maintain 
its tax-favored status.  Joint Committee on Taxation, supra at 
20.  See 26 C.F.R. § 1.408–5 (detailing certain reporting 
requirements). 
22 
 
 
 
fiduciary relationship are so varied and so difficult to foresee 
that it is unwise for courts to attempt to make comprehensive 
definitions."  Cann v. Barry, 293 Mass. 313, 316 (1936).  As 
such, fiduciary duties may arise wherever "faith, confidence, 
and trust" is reposed by one party "in another's judgment and 
advice."  Doe v. Harbor Sch., Inc., 446 Mass. 245, 252 (2006).  
See Cann, supra at 316-317, quoting Tate v. Williamson, L. R. 2 
Ch. App. 55, 61 (1886) (fiduciary duty arises "[w]herever two 
persons stand in such a relation that, while it continues, 
confidence is necessarily reposed by one, and the influence 
which naturally grows out of that confidence is possessed by the 
other"). 
The amended counterclaim does not allege that Aliberti ever 
"reposed trust and confidence" in UBS's judgment or advice.  
Although Aliberti had to rely on UBS's cooperation in order to 
realize her ownership interest in the IRAs, this functional 
absence of choice did not yield a relationship of "higher" trust 
or entitle Aliberti to special treatment.  Although there was a 
disparity in the parties' positions due to UBS having possession 
of the IRA assets and unilaterally dictating the terms upon 
which Aliberti could access them, this particular brand of power 
imbalance is not uncommon in our modern consumer marketplace and 
does not, in and of itself, create a fiduciary duty.  There is 
nothing in the record to suggest that the relationship between 
23 
 
 
 
Aliberti and UBS was anything more than a retail consumer 
relationship governed by contract. 
IRA custodianship is a recognized line of business in the 
consumer financial services sector, providing a fairly customary 
bundle of contracted-for services.18  One of those services is 
transfer of ownership of the IRA or distribution of the proceeds 
of its assets to the designated beneficiaries upon the initial 
account holder's death.  Historically, the grave and solemn 
responsibility of distributing a person's assets after death has 
been assigned to a fiduciary, such as an executor or trustee, 
who "is held to something stricter than the morals of the market 
place," Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928), and must 
account to the probate court.  But the nonprobate transfer of 
IRA assets is typically contracted for at arms' length, and 
performed in the ordinary course of business with no more or 
less gravity or solemnity than other customer instructions.  The 
nonprobate asset transfer that Patrick Kenney contracted for 
here is no exception. 
The contracts governing the IRAs here do not include 
language establishing a relationship of higher trust or 
                     
 
18 See, e.g., United States Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, Comptroller's Handbook:  Retirement Plan Products and 
Services 4 (Feb. 2014) ("Typical custody services include 
settlement, safekeeping, determining the market value of the 
assets held, and reporting customers' transactions"). 
24 
 
 
 
confidence, either between the custodian and the account holder 
or between the custodian and the designated beneficiary.  
Because Aliberti is a designated beneficiary of each IRA, she is 
an intended third-party beneficiary of the contracts between 
Patrick Kenney and UBS.  UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 94 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 187.  These agreements, without which Aliberti and UBS 
would have no connection, impose a contractual duty on UBS to 
transfer the IRA proceeds in accordance with Patrick Kenney's 
instructions, but the contract contains no express or implicit 
assumption of any fiduciary responsibility.  In fact, the 
custodial agreement expressly disclaims any fiduciary 
obligations. 
Whereas there is neither "any common-law fiduciary 
obligation, nor any special relationship of trust, confidence, 
or reliance," the amended counterclaim fails to state a claim 
for breach of fiduciary duty under Massachusetts law.  Locator 
Servs. Group, Ltd. v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 443 Mass. 837, 
855 (2005). 
3.  Violation of G. L. c. 93A.  The facts pleaded in the 
amended counterclaim support the claim that Aliberti became the 
rightful owner of the IRAs upon Patrick Kenney's death, and that 
UBS's conduct unfairly impeded her exercise of property rights 
25 
 
 
 
in violation of c. 93A.19  See G. L. c. 93A, § 9.  The enactment 
of c. 93A's consumer remedy provision "created new substantive 
rights," Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 366 Mass. 234, 244 n.8 (1974), 
which now extend to any individual injured by the "unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices" of a business operating in the 
consumer marketplace.  G. L. c. 93A §§ 2, 9.  The law seeks "to 
improve the commercial relationship between consumers and 
business persons and to encourage more equitable behavior in the 
marketplace" by "impos[ing] liability on persons seeking to 
profit from unfair practices."  Herman v. Admit One Ticket 
Agency LLC, 454 Mass. 611, 615 (2006), quoting Poznik v. 
Massachusetts Med. Professional Ins. Ass'n, 417 Mass. 48, 53 
(1994).  To establish entitlement to c. 93A relief, the amended 
counterclaim must plead sufficient facts to demonstrate 
"first, that [UBS] has committed an unfair or 
deceptive act or practice; second, that the unfair or 
deceptive act or practice occurred 'in the conduct of 
any trade or commerce;' third, that [Aliberti] 
suffered an injury; and fourth, that [UBS]'s unfair or 
deceptive conduct was a cause of the injury." 
 
Rafferty v Merck & Co., 479 Mass. 141, 161 (2018).  We conclude 
that it does. 
a.  The amended counterclaim establishes that Aliberti is a 
proper plaintiff.  That the connection between UBS and Aliberti 
                     
 
19 Although the CRA and custodial agreement include New York 
choice-of-law provisions, UBS has not challenged the application 
of Massachusetts consumer protection law in this case. 
26 
 
 
 
arises from UBS's service contract with another account holder 
(Patrick Kenney) does not render Aliberti an improper plaintiff 
to assert the c. 93A claim against UBS.  We have long held that 
"[p]arties need not be in privity for their actions to come 
within the reach of c. 93A."  Kattar v. Demoulas, 433 Mass. 1, 
14-15 (2000).  See Ciardi v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd., 436 
Mass. 53, 60 (2002) (no privity required because c. 93A "allows 
any person who has been injured by trade or commerce indirectly 
affecting the people of this Commonwealth to bring a cause of 
action" [emphasis in original]).  We recently held that to 
assert a claim under c. 93A, "[i]t suffices that the plaintiff 
used the product, even if it was sold to another, and was 
injured as a result" (emphasis in original).  Rafferty, 479 
Mass. at 161.  Aliberti's standing to assert the c. 93A claim is 
adequately supported here by the allegations that UBS's botched 
performance of the IRA transfer services promised to Patrick 
Kenney caused financial injury to Aliberti.20 
                     
 
20 Although no party addressed the issue of injury in the 
briefs, the amended counterclaim alleges that UBS's unfair 
conduct "[c]ompell[ed]" Aliberti "to retain legal counsel and 
incur substantial expenses."  Based upon the facts alleged in 
the amended counterclaim, any legal fees and costs Aliberti 
incurred in attempted communication with UBS about the larger 
IRA and associated dispute are distinct from those later 
incurred in connection with the c. 93A claim, and may be treated 
as actual damages.  See Siegel v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 64 
Mass. App. Ct. 698, 703 (2005). 
27 
 
 
 
b.  Trade or commerce.  Under c. 93A, the "trade or 
commerce" requirement is met when the defendant was operating in 
"a business context" at the time of its allegedly unfair or 
deceptive activity.  Feeney v. Dell Inc., 454 Mass. 192, 212 
(2009).  This is a fact-specific, multifactor inquiry, requiring 
"consideration of the nature of the transaction, the character 
of the parties and their activities, and whether the transaction 
was motivated by business or personal reasons" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Id.  See Klairmont v. Gainsboro Restaurant, 
Inc., 465 Mass. 165, 176 (2013) (facts permitted fair inference 
that "defendants had a profit-seeking motive in constructing and 
maintaining the hazardous [structural feature that led to 
decedent's injury] in the context of their commercial 
enterprise"). 
That UBS provides custodial IRA services to consumers in 
the ordinary course of its business, for profit, and under 
standard form contracts it drafts and presents to prospective 
customers for signature is fairly inferred from the record, and 
at least partially conceded.21  Cf. Quinton v. Gavin, 64 Mass. 
                     
 
21 Although many of the technical requirements of an IRA are 
dictated by the IRS, IRAs are not subject to the much more 
stringent controls imposed by ERISA.  See note 4, supra.  This 
means that the terms governing these accounts are left to State 
law (which typically does not apply to retirement plans within 
the ERISA sphere, due to preemption).  Because there is a dearth 
of State law specifically regulating the nonprobate transfer of 
IRAs, however, the account transfer terms (including default 
28 
 
 
 
App. Ct. 792, 799 (2005) (trustee subject to c. 93A liability 
where services were provided "to members of the public in the 
ordinary course of business" and not for private purpose).  In 
the standard CRA form (as it appeared in 2008), UBS promises the 
consumer account holder that the "IRA will be transferred" to a 
designated beneficiary or beneficiaries at the account holder's 
death.  This promise is a critical practical element of the IRA 
custodian's contracted-for performance, considering that a large 
balance may remain at the account holder's death, or that an 
account holder's management of the IRA may have been guided by a 
wider estate-planning strategy to maximize the assets 
transferred outside of probate.  Sterk & Leslie, supra at 175-
176.  UBS need not charge a specific fee for this postmortem 
asset delivery service for its performance to occur "in a 
business context," because that service is part of a bundle of 
contracted-for services that UBS performs as IRA custodian in 
exchange for periodic fees. 
The pleadings here contain sufficient factual allegations 
to establish that the interactions between UBS, as IRA 
                     
beneficiary provisions and the applicable procedure for changing 
a named beneficiary) are ultimately left to the discretion and 
internal policies of the private financial institutions who sell 
IRAs to consumers.  Although these contract terms may have a 
significant effect on whether a decedent's donative intent is 
actually realized, consumers typically do not shop around to 
compare the fine print, so consumer preferences are unlikely to 
affect market forces.  See Sterk & Leslie, supra at 223. 
29 
 
 
 
custodian, and Aliberti, as the designated beneficiary of the 
IRAs following Patrick Kenney's death, occurred in a business 
context within the meaning of c. 93A.  Furthermore, given the 
consumer context in which the nonprobate transfer function of 
IRAs occurs, and the public importance of that functionality, we 
expressly hold that the interactions between an IRA custodian 
and a named beneficiary of the IRA, following the initial 
account holder's death, typically occur in a business context 
within the meaning of c. 93A. 
c.  Unfair or deceptive practices.  "Chapter 93A does not 
define what constitutes an 'unfair or deceptive act or 
practice.'"  Kattar, 433 Mass. at 13.  Instead, we have held 
that "unfair or deceptive conduct is best discerned 'from the 
circumstances of each case.'"  Id. at 14, quoting DeCotis, 366 
Mass. at 242.  See Duclersaint v. Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 427 
Mass. 809, 814 (1998) (unfairness of act or practice "is 
determined from all the circumstances").  We look to "(1) 
whether the practice . . . is within at least the penumbra of 
some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of 
unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or 
unscrupulous; [and] (3) whether it causes substantial injury to 
consumers (or competitors or other businessmen)."  PMP Assocs., 
Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 366 Mass. 593, 596 (1975).  
Further, in "evaluat[ing] the equities between the parties," 
30 
 
 
 
what the parties, respectively, "knew or should have known may 
be relevant in determining unfairness."  Swanson v. Bankers Life 
Co., 389 Mass. 345, 349 (1983). 
Viewed in the light most favorable to Aliberti, there is 
ample support in the facts alleged that the manner in which UBS 
conducted itself with respect to Aliberti was "unfair" within 
the meaning of c. 93A.  The amended counterclaim alleges that 
UBS "(1) denied Aliberti the funds to which she was entitled; 
(2) for multiple years; (3) without good reason; (4) until she 
was forced to take legal action and incur unnecessary costs and 
fees."  UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 94 Mass. App. Ct. at 191.  To 
this litany may be added UBS employee Margaret Kenney's admitted 
dispatch of abusive text messages in response to Aliberti's 
inquiry about receipt of IRA distributions; UBS's alleged 
failure to supervise the IRAs' administration following Patrick 
Kenney's death (including by not removing Margaret Kenney as the 
UBS financial advisor until Aliberti had complained twice); and 
UBS's decision to file an allegedly unjustified interpleader 
complaint following more than one and one-half years of delay 
and in light of the foregoing. 
The pleadings suggest that there never has been any 
legitimate question whether Aliberti was the legally designated 
sole beneficiary of the larger IRA.  The CRA reflects that from 
the time Patrick Kenney opened the larger IRA in 2008, Aliberti 
31 
 
 
 
was designated as its sole beneficiary upon Patrick Kenney's 
death.  UBS admits that it never received any form or other 
writing from Patrick Kenney with instructions to update the 
beneficiary designation on the larger IRA.22  The CRA and 
incorporated custodial agreement clearly specify that, to be 
effective, any instruction from Patrick Kenney to change the IRA 
beneficiary designation not only was required to be in writing 
sent to UBS, but also was required to be in a form acceptable to 
and accepted by UBS, in its sole discretion. 
Nevertheless, as reflected in correspondence from UBS's 
counsel attached to the amended counterclaim, UBS designated the 
larger IRA "disputed" immediately upon receipt of Gillespie's 
letter, and the assets remained frozen for nearly two and one-
                     
 
22 Even in the light most favorable to Aliberti, the 
allegations do not support a c. 93A claim as to distributions 
from the smaller IRAs.  Patrick Kenney at least attempted to 
provide instructions regarding change of IRA beneficiary to UBS 
by completing and returning the update forms in connection with 
each of the smaller IRAs; there was no duty to inform Aliberti.  
Despite its earlier request for written clarification, several 
months after Patrick Kenney died, UBS appears to have reached a 
reasonable good faith conclusion as to Kenney's intended 
beneficiaries, and made distributions accordingly.  Whether this 
violated the relevant contracts is a question for the fact 
finder, but does not itself implicate c. 93A.  See Massachusetts 
Employers Ins. Exch. v. Propac-Mass, Inc., 420 Mass. 39, 43 
(1995), citing Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 
85, 100-101 (1979) ("a breach of contract alone does not amount 
to an unfair act or practice under G. L. c. 93A, § 2").  Cf. 
Anton v. Merrill Lynch, 36 S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) 
(rejecting challenges to IRA beneficiary redesignation based 
upon IRA provider's purported failure to comply with its own 
rules). 
32 
 
 
 
half years.  Contrary to the interpretation advanced by 
Gillespie's counsel in that letter, see note 7, supra, 
Massachusetts courts enforce the statutory directive of G. L. 
c. 167D, § 15, that nonprobate transfers shall be made in 
accordance with their own contractual terms, even when faced 
with a subsequent will provision to the contrary: 
"the Legislature appears to have determined that the policy 
giving effect to testamentary intent should yield to the 
policy of giving prompt and final effect to the beneficiary 
designations in retirement plans." 
 
Fitzpatrick v. Small, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 704, 707 (1991) 
(applying earlier version of statute).23 
It is fair to infer that UBS drafted the contract 
provisions that required a writing from Patrick Kenney in a form 
meeting UBS approval for a valid change to occur and entitling 
UBS to "conclusively rely upon" instructions received from its 
                     
 
23 Incidentally, given the New York choice-of-law provisions 
in the CRA and custodial agreement, UBS reasonably may have 
expected that New York (rather than Massachusetts) law would 
apply to any beneficiary designation challenge.  New York law 
also plainly requires that any change of beneficiary designation 
with respect to nonprobate assets be made in writing and signed 
by the account holder, and further that it be made in accordance 
with the rules imposed by the asset's administrator.  N.Y. Est. 
Powers & Trusts Law § 13-3.2(e) (McKinney) ("designation of a 
beneficiary or payee to receive payment upon death of the person 
making the designation . . . must be made in writing and signed 
by the person making the designation" and "made in accordance 
with the rules prescribed" to govern relevant assets).  New York 
law also provides that the beneficiary's ownership rights shall 
not be "impaired or defeated by any statute or rule of law 
governing the transfer of property by will, gift or intestacy."  
N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 13-3.2(a) (McKinney). 
33 
 
 
 
client.  The parties agree that Gillespie never produced any 
evidence that Patrick Kenney changed (or even attempted to 
change) the beneficiary designation in accordance with that 
provision, and never brought suit.  Still, the pleadings reflect 
that immediately upon designating the larger IRA "disputed" in 
late December 2013, UBS decided that its hands were tied due to 
heightened risk exposure:  it would take no action regarding the 
larger IRA unless it received a court order or withdrawal of 
Gillespie's claim, or until all applicable statutes of 
limitation had expired. 
Aliberti has alleged that she was not even notified of any 
dispute with respect to the larger IRA until nearly three and 
one-half months after UBS received Gillespie's letter.  Once the 
existence of a dispute was known to Aliberti, UBS allegedly 
ignored her requests for additional information about that 
dispute, even when those requests were made in writing through 
legal counsel retained for that purpose.  In the amended 
counterclaim, she further contends that only service of a 
subpoena succeeded in eliciting any response from UBS.  The 
perceived unfairness of UBS's policy of inaction with respect to 
the "disputed" larger IRA was thus exacerbated by its allegedly 
willful failures to communicate with Aliberti, which required 
her to retain counsel in order to determine the particulars of 
34 
 
 
 
the dispute preventing her from exercising ownership rights to 
the larger IRA. 
The pleadings support that UBS decided it was time to seek 
the comfort of a court order and file an interpleader complaint 
in the Superior Court, under the following undisputed 
circumstances: approximately one year and eight months after 
Patrick Kenney's death, the larger IRA remained frozen; Aliberti 
remained the only designated beneficiary; and Gillespie had 
neither produced evidence to substantiate his claim nor filed 
suit.  The purpose of interpleader "is to sort out the amounts 
and priorities of competing claims to a fund."  National Lumber 
Co. v. Canton Inst. for Savings, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 186, 188 
(2002).  UBS's delaying of distribution for more than one and 
one-half years before filing an interpleader complaint is 
alleged to have been commercially unreasonable and "unfair" for 
purposes of c. 93A. 
That claim is facially plausible given the supporting 
allegations of (1) no legitimate competing claim to ownership of 
the larger IRA in the absence of a writing acceptable to UBS, 
cf. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the U.S. v. Porter-Englehart, 
867 F.2d 79, 89 (1st Cir. 1989) (interpleader inappropriate 
where no "potentially conflicting claim" to funds at issue 
exists); and (2) the effective refusal of UBS, during the period 
between Patrick Kenney's death and its filing of the 
35 
 
 
 
interpleader complaint, to communicate with Aliberti about 
assets that its own records and policies indicated belonged to 
her -- until she hired counsel and served a subpoena.  See 
Brewster Wallcovering Co. v. Blue Mt. Wallcoverings, Inc., 68 
Mass. App. Ct. 582, 606 (2007) (facts exacerbating unfairness 
included, inter alia, that "[defendant company's] officers and 
personnel . . . often took weeks to respond to [plaintiff 
customer's] inquiries, and sometimes stopped communicating at 
all, with no adequate or even plausible explanations for their 
lacks of responsiveness"). 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated, we affirm the Superior 
Court judge's order allowing UBS's motion for judgment on the 
pleadings with respect to Aliberti's breach of fiduciary duty 
claim and reverse the order as it relates to Aliberti's claim 
under G. L. c. 93A.  Accordingly, we remand to the Superior 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.