Case Title: State v. Terry

Citation: 

Docket Number: S42818

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2001-12-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  December 28, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
	Respondent,
	v.
KARL ANTHONY TERRY,
	Appellant.
(CC 94-1337; SC S42818)

	On automatic and direct review of the judgment of conviction
and sentences of death imposed by the Clackamas County Circuit
Court.
	Raymond Bagley, Judge.
	Argued and submitted September 6, 2001.
	Eric Johansen, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause for appellant.  With him on the briefs were David. E.
Groom, State Public Defender, and Ingrid MacFarlane, Deputy
Public Defender.
	Robert E. Rocklin, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for respondent.  With him on the brief were Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General,
and Kathleen Cegla and Doug M. Petrina, Assistant Attorneys
General.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.*
	DE MUNIZ, J.
	The judgment of conviction and sentences of death are
affirmed.
	*Balmer, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
		DE MUNIZ, J.
		This case is before us on automatic review of
defendant's convictions for two counts of aggravated murder and
sentences of death.  See State v. Lotches, 331 Or 455, 457 n 1,
17 P3d 1045 (2000) (explaining that judgment of conviction and
sentence of death now subject to automatic and direct review in
this court under ORS 138.012(1)).  Defendant challenges the pre-trial, guilt, and penalty phases of his trial in 22 assignments
of error.  For the reasons set out below, we reject each of
defendant's assignments of error and affirm the convictions for
aggravated murder and sentences of death
I.  FACTS

		Because the jury found defendant guilty of the crimes
charged, we view the evidence presented at trial in the light
most favorable to the state.  State v. Thompson, 328 Or 248, 250,
971 P2d 879 (1999).
		On August 6, 1994, Jeffrey Brown (Jeff) invited
defendant to celebrate the birthday of Jeff's brother Dale Brown
(Dale).  Defendant and Jeff had spent a lot of time together. 
According to defendant's writings, they belonged to an
organization that defendant called the "Order of the Black Dove." 
The creed of the Order of the Black Dove, as reflected in
defendant's journals, celebrated violence and other anti-social
behavior.
		Defendant accepted the invitation and met Jeff and Dale
at approximately 2:30 or 3:00 p.m. that day.  The three of them
drank beer together and, eventually, decided to go camping on the
Willamette River.  The brothers collected their gear, and Jeff
brought a samurai or ninja knife that he owned.  The group
obtained cash from an ATM machine and purchased a six-pack of
beer.  At the river, they drank more beer and argued about where
to camp.  Witnesses recalled seeing defendant with Jeff and Dale
at the river before 9:00 p.m., and also recalled that defendant
was wearing a black leather jacket.  Defendant was seen alone at
the river at about 9:15 p.m. 
		The next day, Bennie Garry and his two sons went
fishing at the Jefferson Milwaukee boat landing.  The younger son
tired of fishing and decided to play elsewhere.  A few minutes
later, he returned and reported that there was a dead man nearby. 
The older son investigated and returned to tell his father that
the man had a hole in his neck.  Garry then found two bodies, one
that appeared to be sleeping on the ground and one that was in a
sleeping bag.  He notified police.  The police concluded that the
victims had been killed where they were found.  Although the
police surveyed the area, they did not find a weapon.  The
victims were identified as Jeff and Dale.
		Jeff had lived in an apartment above a restaurant where
he worked.  The owner of the restaurant let the police into the
apartment, where they made a brief, preliminary search.  The
owner noticed that Jeff's keys were on the counter and that the
deadbolt, usually locked, was unlocked.  After notifying the
parents and obtaining permission, the police searched Jeff's
apartment more thoroughly and discovered defendant's black
motorcycle jacket inside a backpack.  A witness had seen
defendant leaving Jeff's apartment on the night of the murders at
about 9:30 p.m.  Defendant was not wearing a jacket at that time. 
		On August 8, 1994, the police again went to Jeff's
apartment.  While searching the apartment, Detective Corson
noticed that the telephone had a redial function.  He pressed the
button.  The person who answered the call identified himself as
"Karl," i.e., defendant.  Defendant acknowledged that he was a
friend of Jeff's.  Corson asked if he could speak with defendant
in person at his apartment in Portland.  Defendant agreed. 
		When Corson arrived at defendant's apartment, defendant
gave him a paper sack containing a knife, saying that he was
aware that the police were looking for knives.  According to
defendant, the knife had belonged to Jeff.  Defendant also handed
Corson a written statement, and agreed to go to a Portland police
station to give an interview.  At the interview, Corson advised
defendant of his Miranda rights and recorded defendant's oral
statement.  In that statement, defendant indicated that he had
left Dale and Jeff at the river at about 8:00 p.m.  He denied
that he had fought with them.  Corson and Detective Kidd then
took defendant home but, on the way, stopped for some cigarettes. 
At his apartment, defendant invited the police inside and
permitted them to look around.  The officers explained to
defendant that they had no right to look inside his apartment
without a warrant and that anything incriminating that they might
find could be used against him.  Defendant was cooperative and
signed a consent-to-search form.  The police searched the
apartment but did not seize anything. 
		On August 9, 1994, Kidd telephoned defendant and
obtained defendant's consent to take a polygraph examination.  
The next day, when Kidd arrived at defendant's apartment,
defendant refused to submit to the polygraph examination and
walked away, stating that he had given the police all the
information that he had. 
		On August 19, 1994, the police obtained a search
warrant for defendant's apartment.  Four officers -- Corson,
Kidd, Trooper Nguyen, and Sergeant McCrum -- went to defendant's
apartment to execute the warrant.  The officers talked to
defendant through the front door.  When that discussion was
unavailing, the police forced the door open.  Once the police
were inside, defendant sat calmly at a table and watched the
officers.  Corson informed defendant that he was not under arrest
and that he was free to leave while the officers conducted the
search.  Despite that invitation, defendant remained in the
apartment and even assisted the officers in their search. 
		The police seized various items from the apartment and
obtained defendant's consent to take a polygraph test and to have
his blood drawn.  The police took defendant to the hospital to
obtain a blood sample and then returned him to his apartment.
		On August 22, 1994, Corson and Nguyen transported
defendant to the location of the polygraph examination.  Before
the examination, the examiner, Detective Bryant, advised
defendant of his Miranda rights.  After the examination, Bryant
informed defendant that his answers were deceptive.  Defendant
indicated that he wanted to talk to Corson and the others about
his test.  During the ensuing conversation with the officers,
McCrum referred to inconsistencies in defendant's statements. 
Defendant became agitated and responded, "How about if I let you
talk to my attorney?  I want to go home."  McCrum responded,
"That's fine."  Defendant then sat down and asked McCrum
questions about the investigation, and stated, "How do you expect
me to remember everybody that was outside there that day?  I was
drunk."  McCrum answered defendant's questions, and defendant
calmed down. 
		Defendant then went outside with the officers to smoke
a cigarette.  Once outside, he discussed with the officers
whether he would have interfered in a fight between Dale and
Jeff.  He then began to ramble about having blackouts.  He also
asked about what the DNA analysis of the blood on his jacket
might reveal.  He was told that, according to preliminary tests,
the blood might be Dale's, but that further testing would be
undertaken.  Defendant responded, "I just want to go home.  Maybe
you guys should talk to my attorney."  McCrum replied, "Okay. 
Fine."  They began to walk toward the police vehicle.  On the way
to the vehicle, defendant asked more questions of the officers
and speculated about why a person might black out.  Defendant
asked more questions about the blood on the jacket.  After the
officers answered his questions, defendant declared, "I want to
go home."  About 7:00 p.m., the officers drove him home.
		When they arrived at defendant's apartment, defendant
stated, "I'm fucked either way.  No matter what I tell you, the
D.A. is going [to] put me in prison, that's for sure."  Corson
told defendant that the district attorney would review the
information that the police provided to him.  Defendant inquired
whether the police would appoint him an attorney.  Corson said he
could not appoint an attorney for defendant, and explained that,
if defendant wanted an attorney, he should say so, and then asked
whether defendant wanted the officer not to ask any further
questions without an attorney present.  Corson elaborated that,
"If you want to have an attorney, you need to tell me and I will
not have any contact or conversation with you."  Defendant
replied that he knew his rights and asked for Corson's business
card.  Defendant took the card and said that he might call Corson
later that night.  He then said that he definitely would call
Corson the next day.  The officers left.
		About a half-hour later, Corson suggested that Nguyen
call defendant at his apartment.  Nguyen called defendant and
asked how he was doing.  Nguyen intimated that he knew that
defendant wanted to talk to them, but was having difficulty doing
so.  Defendant indicated that he was worried about going to jail
and no longer receiving his social security checks.  Nguyen
explained that the police gather information and give that
information to the district attorney to make a charging decision. 
Defendant agreed to speak with the police again that evening. 
		Corson and Nguyen arrived at defendant's residence and
defendant spoke to them in an unmarked patrol car.  After being
advised of his rights, and after acknowledging that he was
speaking voluntarily, he told the police his version of the
events that led to the killings.  According to defendant, Dale
and Jeff started fighting, Dale killed Jeff, and defendant 
killed Dale in Jeff's defense.  Defendant agreed to help the
police search for the murder weapon at the scene.  Corson wanted
to advise defendant of his constitutional rights again, but
defendant refused, stating that he did not want a lawyer and that
he knew what his rights were.  Defendant recited his rights to
the officers.  He described to them how and where he had disposed
of a sword.  They then drove to the crime scene and engaged in a
fruitless search for the sword.  Defendant identified the area in
which the sword should be located.  It was getting late in the
evening, and defendant indicated that he would help the police
again the next day.  Defendant said that he was hungry, so an
officer took him to buy some food and then took him home. 
		The next day, Corson and Nguyen arrived at the front
door of defendant's apartment and found a note fixed to the door
stating that defendant did not wish to cooperate further.  Later
that day, the police arrested defendant.  The police also found a
samurai sword near the location that defendant had identified.  
DNA testing of blood on the sword indicated that the blood
belonged to Dale and Jeff.  Defendant's black leather jacket also
had Dale's and Jeff's blood on it. 
		In October 1994, while in detention in the Clackamas
County Jail, defendant told a fellow prisoner that Jeff had
wanted out of the Order of the Black Dove.  Defendant also told
the prisoner that the only way out was death, and that he had
killed Jeff with a "big knife." 
		Defendant was tried and convicted of the murders of
Dale and Jeff, and sentenced to death.  This automatic review
followed.  ORS 138.012(1).
II.  ADMISSIBILITY OF DEFENDANT'S
STATEMENTS TO POLICE

	Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
permitting defendant's statements to be admitted into evidence. 
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress his statements to the
police, in which he claimed that he had killed Dale in Jeff's
defense, citing Article I, sections 9, (1) 11, (2) and 12, (3) of the
Oregon Constitution, and the Fourth, (4) Fifth, (5) Sixth, (6) and
Fourteenth Amendments (7) to the United States Constitution. 
Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion,
concluding
	"that in each of the interviews defendant was not in
custody.  To the extent his comments regarding an
attorney could be construed to be an exercise of his
right to counsel, it was waived by his continuing the
conversations with police."
		On appeal, defendant argues that his statements were
involuntary and that the trial court should have suppressed them
because his mental health had been fragile, the police had made
an express or implied promise of leniency, and police questioning
had been persistent and involved the "false friend" investigation
technique.  In addition, defendant argues that the trial court
should have suppressed his statements because he "equivocally
invoked" his right to counsel, and the police had not clarified
his intent.  Although defendant identifies a number of statements
that he made, he challenges only the substance of the interview
that took place on August 22, 1994, during which he confessed to
killing Dale in Jeff's defense.
A.	Alleged Involuntariness of Statements
		In reviewing the voluntariness of defendant's
statements, this court is bound by the trial court's findings of
historical fact if the evidence supports them.  Ball v. Gladden,
250 Or 485, 487, 443 P2d 621 (1968).  We are not bound by the
trial court's ultimate holding as to voluntariness, however, and
we assess anew whether the facts are sufficient to meet
constitutional standards.  State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 135, 806
P2d 92 (1991).
		Defendant has failed to identify any evidence in the
record that provides a basis for a conclusion that the police
made an offer of leniency to defendant or employed some other
fraudulent tactic to obtain defendant's statement.  He offers
instances of contact with the police that do not indicate any
misconduct on their part or anything that would have encompassed
some form of deception.  He argues that the police obtained a
statement from him "by leading [him] to believe that they cared
about him and were interested in his well-being," and that his
statement "was derived through the implied representation of
leniency that one would expect of a friend."  Defendant thus
attempts to construe courtesy and civility as some form of
deceit.  The police did not mislead defendant and, indeed,
defendant understood that the police had thought that he was the
prime suspect.  He acknowledged that fact, for example, when he
told the police that "the D.A. is going to put me in prison,
that's for sure."  Similarly, defendant's reference in his
argument to his "mental health" is not sufficiently developed to
conclude that his state of mind made his statement involuntary.
B.	Right to Counsel
		Although a trial court's findings of historical fact
are binding on this court if the evidence supports them, we
review legal conclusions regarding the invocation of the right to
counsel for legal error.  State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 572-73,
789 P2d 1352 (1990).  Defendant's references to his right to
counsel during questioning are not a basis for reversal for two
reasons.  
		First, defendant was not in custody when he mused that
the police perhaps should talk to his attorney.  The invocation
of the right to counsel under Article I, section 12, of the
Oregon Constitution, requires police questioning to cease only
when a defendant is in custody, i.e., not free to leave. 
However, when a person gives an interview, even at a police
station, of his own free will, and is "free to answer questions,
or not to answer, or simply to end the meeting," that person is
not in custody.  State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 8, 791 P2d 836 (1990). 
Similarly, under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, a person is in custody only if his or her freedom
has been "significantly restrained"; voluntary participation in a
police interview at the police station generally does not
constitute a significant restraint.  Id. (citing Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 US 298, 309, 105 S Ct 1285, 84 L Ed 2d 222 (1985) and
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 US 492, 495, 97 S Ct 711, 50 L Ed 2d 714
(1977).  Here, defendant referred to an attorney on four
occasions.  However, in each instance, which we set out below, he
was free to leave, and he chose not to.
		1.  After the polygraph examination, when defendant had
indicated that he wanted to talk to the officers about the test,
defendant made an ambiguous statement about "How about if I let
you talk to my attorney" and expressed a desire to "go home."  An
officer responded, "That's fine."  At that point, defendant sat
back down in his chair.  
		2.  Defendant went outside to smoke a cigarette.  He
talked to the officers about the testing of the blood on his
jacket.  Defendant stated, "I just want to go home.  Maybe you
guys should talk to my attorney," to which an officer responded,
"Okay," and began walking toward the police vehicle to leave. 
Defendant then persisted in asking more questions of the
officers.  After the officers responded to his questions,
defendant stated again that he wanted to go home, and the
officers took him home.  
		3. When they arrived at his residence, defendant asked
whether the police would provide him with an attorney.  Corson
told defendant that, if he wanted an attorney, he should say so. 
Corson asked defendant whether he wanted an attorney.  Defendant
replied that he knew his rights; he then accepted a business card
from Corson and discussed when they would speak again.
		4. Defendant agreed to speak with the officers again. 
When Corson attempted to advise defendant of his rights,
defendant stated that "he didn't want a lawyer and he knew what
his rights were."  He acknowledged that his statement that he had
killed Dale was voluntary.  
		In each of those four instances, defendant was free to
leave, yet he remained.  We conclude that defendant was not in
custody when he mentioned the subject of counsel.
		Second, each time that defendant mentioned counsel, he
rejected the idea in favor of cooperating with the police and
engaging in further conversation about the investigation, thereby
waiving any protection from interrogation.  See State v. Meade,
327 Or 335, 341, 963 P3d 656 (1998) (suspect who has made
equivocal request for counsel thereafter may waive right to have
counsel present during that or later interrogation).  In each
instance noted above, defendant appeared to have weighed his
options of remaining silent versus cooperating with the police
and decided that he wanted to cooperate, or at least engage in
dialogue.  At times, defendant refused to cooperate, thereby
demonstrating that he was aware of his rights.  In fact, he was
so aware of his rights that he could recite them.
		We conclude that defendant's constitutional right to
counsel under the Oregon Constitution and the United States
Constitution was not violated, and that his statements properly
were admitted at trial.
III.  REFERENCE TO POLYGRAPH AT TRIAL

		Defendant maintains that the court erred in denying his
motions to dismiss and for a mistrial because a witness made a
passing reference to the fact that defendant had taken a
polygraph test.  Trooper Nguyen testified at trial that he had
been present when defendant was interviewed at the police station
on August 22, 1994, and that he had accompanied Corson when they
drove defendant home.  Specifically, Nguyen testified on direct
examination:
		"Q: [Prosecutor] And after you got back to the
police station at about 7:40, did you place a telephone
call to the defendant?
		"A: [Nguyen] That's correct, I did.
		"Q: Before doing that, did you discuss that with
Detective Corson?
		"A: Yes, I did.
		"Q: What did you -- what was the conversation you
had with [defendant] on that occasion?
		"* * * * *
		"A: On that day what I did was I placed a
telephone call to [defendant] and spoke to him in
general conversation at first.  And then [defendant]
initiated conversation with me further.
		"Q: What did you tell him about why you called
when you first called him?
		"A: Oh.  I stated to [defendant] that I called
because I wanted to see how he was doing because I knew
that the polygraph examination that he took and the
interviews  --"
Defense counsel cut off the witness, stating that he had a matter
for the court.  Outside the jury's presence, defense counsel
stated that, "[i]t was our understanding, Your Honor, that all
witnesses had been cautioned not to get into the issue of
polygraphs taken, polygraphs not taken."  The prosecutor
apologized that he had forgotten to caution Nguyen about
referring to any polygraph and did not know that Nguyen was going
to mention one.  Defendant moved for a mistrial or,
alternatively, for a curative instruction.  The trial court
observed that Nguyen's answer was not responsive to the question
asked and that no one in the room had expected the answer that
followed.   The court adjourned for the day before making a
decision.  
		The next day, defendant moved to dismiss the case or,
alternatively, for a mistrial, and argued that a curative
instruction was insufficient because implicit in Nguyen's
statement was an inference that defendant had failed the
polygraph examination.  The trial court denied those motions and
opined that a curative instruction would be adequate:
		"[W]hen words are said in a courtroom, they ring
in our ears and I don't know what they ring to the
juror's ears.  I think it was stated in a context that
didn't indicate a result.  That, at best, an
instruction that is neutral along the line prepared by
the State that 'disregard the last response' won't
bring that response back to their attention.  And I
assume the jurors follow the instructions that judges
give them, that they disregard that evidence." 
Consistent with the foregoing observations, the trial court
instructed the jury as follows:
		"Yesterday there was an answer given by the
witness on the stand, Mr. Nguyen, that wasn't
responsive to the question asked.  That testimony is
stricken.  You will disregard it." 
		This court reviews a trial court's decision to deny a
mistrial motion for abuse of discretion.  State v. Larson, 325 Or
15, 22, 933 2d 958 (1997).  We recognize that "[t]he trial judge
is in the best position to assess the impact of the complained-of
incident and to select the means (if any) necessary to correct
any problem resulting from it."  State v. Wright, 323 Or 8, 12,
913 P2d 321 (1996).  With respect to the polygraph, this court
has held that evidence of the results of a polygraph examination
is inherently prejudicial.  See State v. Lyon, 304 Or 221,
233-34, 744 P2d 231 (1987) (polygraph evidence not admissible by
stipulation); State v. Brown, 297 Or 404, 445, 687 P2d 751 (1984)
(polygraph evidence inadmissible over proper objection); State v.
Middleton, 295 Or 485, 492, 668 P2d 371 (1983) (polygraph
evidence "inherently prejudicial"). 
		Despite the general inadmissibility of polygraph
evidence, law enforcement agencies often use polygraph tests in
the course of investigation and, despite vigilant efforts,
reference to them occasionally finds its way into courtroom
testimony.  This court has held that it is not an abuse of
discretion to refuse a motion for a mistrial based on a passing
reference to a polygraph examination when that reference did not
disclose the results of that examination.  For example, in State
v. Farrar, 309 Or 132, 786 P2d 161 (1990), defense counsel asked
a state witness whether he had reviewed his statement with the
police or a prosecutor, to which he replied, "[w]e went over
roughly the same questions that were asked during the lie
detector test and during tapings they took at [the] police
station."  Id. at 162.  The defendant moved for a mistrial, which
the trial court rejected.  This court affirmed, reasoning that
"[t]he reference did not warrant a mistrial because it was
isolated and made only in passing, the results of the test were
not disclosed, and the state never argued that the test had any
significance to the witness's credibility or to any other issue
in the case."  Id. at 164.  Likewise, in State v. Eby, 296 Or 63,
673 P2d 522 (1983), this court affirmed a lower court's decision
to deny a mistrial motion based on a witness's brief reference to
a polygraph examination, because "reference to the word
'polygraph,' without more, was so indefinite as to render any
prejudicial effect speculative at best."  Id. at 77-78.
		In this instance, the trial court found that the
witness's testimony referring to the polygraph examination was
inadvertent and did not imply the results of the examination. 
The court was uncertain whether the jury might have understood
the reference to it at all.  Although Nguyen's telephone call to
defendant possibly could have indicated a sign of concern on
Nguyen's part that defendant had failed the test, the call also
could have suggested that defendant's performance in the test had
been favorable, because defendant had been released and Nguyen
was calling him at home.  Hence, Nguyen's testimony was ambiguous
as to whether defendant's polygraph results were favorable or
unfavorable to defendant.
		In such circumstances, a curative instruction is
sufficient to neutralize the possibility of prejudice to the
defendant.  "Jurors are assumed to have followed their
instructions, absent an overwhelming probability that they would
be unable to do so."  Smith, 310 Or at 26.  The instruction did
not mention the critical testimony and informed the jurors to
disregard as unresponsive what Nguyen had mentioned.  
		We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying
defendant's motions to dismiss and for a mistrial, in light of
the curative instruction given.
IV.  PENALTY PHASE ISSUES

A.	Admissibility of Victim-Impact Evidence
		Defendant argues that the trial court erred in
admitting victim-impact evidence in the form of a statement that
the victims' mother had read to the jury during the penalty
phase.  At the outset of the proceedings, the law did not provide
specifically for the admission of victim-impact evidence during
the penalty phase of an aggravated murder trial.  See ORS 163.150
(1993) (outlining penalty-phase procedures prior to allowance of
victim-impact evidence consideration by Oregon juries).  Thus,
the trial court granted defendant's motion to limit victim-impact
evidence and ordered the state to notify defendant of any victim-impact evidence that it intended to present.  Defendant's motion
did not raise any federal or state issues regarding prohibitions
on ex post facto laws.
		Effective July 7, 1995, the legislature amended ORS
163.150(1)(a) to permit a jury to consider, during the penalty
phase, "victim impact evidence relating to the personal
characteristics of the victim or the impact of the crime on the
victim's family[.]"  State v. Hayward, 327 Or 397, 412, 963 P2d
667 (1998).  As a result of the legislature's enactment of the
new statute, the trial court reversed its prior ruling and
decided to permit the state to offer victim impact evidence.
		In accordance with that ruling, the state offered a
written statement from the victims' mother that the defense had
reviewed.  The victims' mother read the following statement to
the jury:
		"Jeffrey Ray Brown, 23 and a half years, Dale
Archie Brown, 22 years, I had the privilege of being
their mother.
		"Jeffrey was my first born, my obedient child. 
After all, he was told to get off the table before he
fell and broke something in our nursery, so he did fall
off the table and [break] his arm.
		"Dale was my baby.  My loving child.  He would be
outside playing, suddenly stop, come running inside to
say, 'Mommy, I love you,' and run back outside to
continue to play.
		"They will never marry, have children, grow old. 
They will walk with God forever.  They made that choice
as young children.  I will miss seeing them grow, but
this I know, I will be with them in God's good time.
		"Jeffrey Ray Brown, 23 and a half years, Dale
Archie Brown, 22 years, I had the privilege of being
their mother.
		"This past year at family gatherings as I listened
to my sister-in-law talking about their daughters-in-law, grandchildren, and even a great grandchild, I
delighted in hearing the stories and I hope they will
always continue.  And yet at the same time I was
greatly saddened as I will never enjoy the pleasure of
a daughter-in-law.  I will never enjoy the pleasure of
a grandchild and I will never enjoy the pleasure of a
great grandchild.  Mr. Terry, you took those
opportunities from me when you murdered my sons,
Jeffrey and Dale.
		"During this past year, as my brothers and I
rallied around my mother to lend her emotional and
physical support in dealing with her first year as a
widow, I was pleased and proud of our willing ability
to do so, and yet at the same time I was greatly
saddened as I realized that when either my husband or I
reached that stage in life, we will be truly alone, no
children to lift us up as my brothers and I lifted my
mother.  Mr. Terry you have taken that from us when you
murdered our sons, Jeffrey and Dale." 
		Afterwards, defendant renewed his objection to the
victim impact testimony:
		"I believe that earlier in the case that there was
a motion regarding victim impact.  I am certainly aware
of the recent statute.  We'll stand on our previous
objections over the impact."
The trial court then overruled the objection in light of the 
amended statute.
		On appeal, defendant maintains that the victim impact
evidence at trial violated the ex post facto prohibitions set out
in Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution, (8) and
Article I, section 10, of the United States Constitution. (9)  The
ex post facto clause of the Oregon Constitution, for example,
forbids the retroactive application of certain types of criminal
statutes.  See generally State v. Fugate, 332 Or 195, 211, 26 P3d
802 (2001) (discussing doctrine).
		In this instance, however, defendant failed to preserve
the issue for review, because he made no objection in the trial
court that referred to either the federal or state ex post facto
doctrine. (10)  Ordinarily, this court will not consider any matter
assigned as error unless it was preserved in the lower court. 
ORAP 5.45(4)(a); see State v. Montez, 324 Or 343, 356, 927 P2d 64
(1996) (claim of error not preserved when defendant failed to
object to testimony on grounds asserted on appeal).  Indeed,
defendant admits that "[i]t does not appear on the record * * *
that defendant specifically asserted that application of the 1995
version of ORS 163.150 violated the ex post facto provisions of
the Oregon and U.S. Constitutions."  Defendant suggests, without
citing a basis in the record, that the issue may have been raised
"off the record."  This court, however, will not look outside the
record to find objections.  
		We also reject defendant's alternative argument that
his more generalized objections preserved the issue for review,
when those objections did not include a citation or other
reference either to Article I, section 21, of the Oregon
Constitution, or to Article I, section 10, of the United States
Constitution, or otherwise suggest that applying the new statute
somehow was constitutionally impermissible.  Defendant failed to
preserve the ex post facto issue.  See State v. Hitz, 307 Or 183,
188, 766 P2d 373 (1988) (stressing justifications for raising
issues before trial court).
		Defendant next requests that this court review his ex
post facto arguments as error apparent on the face of the record. 
"Even if a party fails to preserve a claim of error, appellate
courts nonetheless possess discretion to consider it if it is
plain error, also known as error 'apparent on the face of the
record.'"  State v. Reyes-Camarena, 330 Or 431, 435-36, 7 P3d 522
(2000).  The elements of "error apparent on the face of the
record" are that:  "(1) the error is one of law; (2) the point of
law is obvious, i.e., is not reasonably in dispute; and (3) the
error is not one respecting which the court must go outside the
record or select among competing inferences."  Lotches, 331 Or at
472. (11)  The first and third elements are present here, because
the issue is whether the mother's testimony should have been
admitted into evidence.  Thus, the only issue is whether the
error was "obvious," assuming that admitting the evidence in
question was error at all.  At the time of trial in this matter,
and even now, the purported error is not obvious.  Ex post facto
claims frequently require an intricate constitutional analysis. 
See, e.g., Fugate, 332 Or at 211, (engaging in ex post facto
analysis).  
		When the victims' mother testified in October 1995, no
case from this court or the Court of Appeals had determined
whether the retroactive application of a statute permitting
victim-impact evidence at trial would violate either Article I,
section 21, of the Oregon Constitution, or Article I, section 10,
of the United States Constitution.  The first such case was not
decided until four years later.  See State v. Metz, 162 Or App
448, 461, 986 P2d 714 (1999) (1995 revision to ORS 163.150
fundamentally changed what evidence may be relevant to the issue
before the jury and thus violated the ex post facto provision of
Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution).  Deciding
whether an error even occurred would require this court to engage
in the same kind of extensive analysis that the Court of Appeals
undertook in Metz.  As a result, we conclude that the alleged
error is not obvious.
		Defendant failed to preserve his ex post facto argument
for purposes of appeal, and we decline to address that argument
as error apparent on the face of the record.
B.	Alleged Error in Jury Instructions
		Defendant argues that the trial court erred by
instructing the jury that it could consider any aspect of
defendant's life in answering the penalty-phase questions. 
Quoting the pertinent jury instruction in full illustrates the
alleged error:
		"The first question asked by the law as to Count I
is, was the conduct of the defendant that caused the
death of Jeffrey Brown committed deliberately and with
the reasonable expectation that the death of Jeffrey
Brown would result.
		"The first question asked by the law as to Count
II is, was the conduct of the defendant that caused the
death of Dale Archie Brown committed deliberately and
with the reasonable expectation that the death of Dale
Archie Brown would result.
		"The word deliberately means that state of mind
that examines and considers whether a contemplated act
should or should not be done.  Deliberation is present
if the thinking is being done in such a cool mental
state under such circumstances and for such a period of
time as to permit a careful weighing of the proposed
decision.  The law, however, does not prescribe a
particular period of time as necessary to constitute
deliberation.
		"The second question asked by the law in each
count is, is there a probability, meaning is it more
likely than not, that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society.
		"The third question asked by the law in each count
is, shall a death sentence be imposed.
		"The burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
does not apply to the third question.  As to this
question, neither side bears any burden of proof.  You
must answer this question no if there is any aspect of
the defendant's character or background or any
circumstance of the events that one or more of the
jurors believes justifies a sentence less than death.
		"You may consider any aspect of the defendant's
life in your determination of the answers to these
questions.  And in answering these questions, you are
to consider any mitigating circumstances received in
evidence including but not limited to the defendant's
age and the extent and severity of the defendant's
prior criminal conduct. 
		"Mitigating circumstances include those
circumstances that do not justify or excuse the events,
but that in your sole [judgment] may be considered as
extenuating or reducing the degree of culpability and
the appropriate punishment.  The defendant need not
establish the existence of a mitigating circumstance
beyond a reasonable doubt.  If you reasonably believe
that a mitigating circumstance exists, then you may
consider it as established.
		"If you unanimously answer all three of the
[preceding] questions yes, the law requires that the
penalty should be death.  You may answer any of the
first three questions in any order.  * * *."
(Emphasis added.)  The questions presented to the jury followed
those set out in the then-current version of ORS 163.150(1)(b)
(1995). (12)
		Defendant admits that he failed to object at trial to
the sentence in the jury instructions that he now challenges.  
Accordingly, defendant requests that this court review the
alleged error as an error of law apparent on the face of the
record.  As noted above, this court, in its discretion, may
review such alleged errors if the error is a legal error
discernable in the record, and the point of law is not reasonably
in dispute.
		Defendant makes no argument that the purported error is
an obvious one.  Indeed, the error is not obvious because Oregon
appellate courts have not ruled on the inclusion of that
particular sentence in penalty-phase jury instructions.  In fact,
in conjunction with a slightly different suggested formulation of
the four questions set out in ORS 163.150(b) (1993), this court
previously had approved in substance an instruction that stated:
		"You may consider any aspect of defendant's life
in your determination on the fourth question [here, the
third question] and any aspect of defendant's life that
may be relevant in your determination of the first
three questions."
Farrar, 309 Or at 177. (13)  There is little, if any, substantive
difference between the two instructions.  Defendant has not
demonstrated that the error, if it existed at all, is obvious.
		Defendant failed to preserve his argument that the jury
was improperly instructed, and we decline to address the argument
as error apparent on the face of the record.
C.	Allegedly Defective Indictment
		Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in
sentencing him to death.  He maintains that, because the penalty
phase instruction must include an element of "deliberation" to
make him death eligible, the indictment that charged him had to
specify that he had acted deliberately.  He bases that argument
on this court's decision in State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 623 P2d
630 (1981), and on a relatively recent United States Supreme
Court case, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US 466, 120 S Ct 2348,
147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000).
		The indictment in this case stated:
		"The above-named defendant is accused by the Grand
Jury of the County of Clackamas, State of Oregon, by
this indictment of the crimes of AGGRAVATED MURDER (TWO
COUNTS) committed as follows:
"COUNT I (ORS 163.095)
		"The said defendant on or about the 7th day of
August 1994, in the County of Clackamas, State of
Oregon, did unlawfully and intentionally cause the
death of another human being, to-wit: Jeffrey Ray Brown
by stabbing him, the said defendant having unlawfully
and intentionally, in the course of the same criminal
episode caused the death of an additional human being,
to-wit: Dale Archie Brown by stabbing him * * *.
"COUNT II (ORS 163.095)
		"The said defendant on or about the 7th day of
August 1994, in the County of Clackamas, State of
Oregon, did unlawfully and intentionally cause the
death of another human being, to-wit: Dale Archie Brown
by stabbing him, the said defendant having unlawfully
and intentionally, in the course of the same criminal
episode caused the death of an additional human being,
to-wit: Jeffrey Ray Brown by stabbing him * * *."
		Defendant thus was charged with aggravated murder under
ORS 163.095(d) (1993), which required that the murder be
committed intentionally and that there be more than one murder
victim during the same criminal episode.  See ORS 131.505(4)
(1993) (defining "criminal episode").
		During the penalty phase, the jury was asked to
determine "whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the
death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the
reasonable expectation that death of the deceased or another
would result."  See ORS 163.150(1)(b)(A) (1993) (setting out
first question that must be asked in penalty phase).  As noted,
defendant contends that, under Quinn and Apprendi,
"deliberateness" is an element that had to be set out in the
indictment.
		Defendant admits that he "did not object in the trial
court to his sentence on the grounds asserted here."  However,
defendant argues that the state's failure to plead "deliberation"
in the indictment deprived the trial court of subject matter
jurisdiction and that lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be
raised at any stage of the proceedings.  See Ailes v. Portland
Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 383, 823 P2d 956 (1991) (lack of
subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, including
on appeal).   Defendant also argues that this court should review
the matter as "error apparent on the face of the record."
		Even assuming that defendant were correct that
deliberateness is an element of the crime that must be pled in
the indictment -- a claim that we consider and reject for the
reasons explained below -- such a defect would not have deprived
the court of subject matter jurisdiction.  
		Subject matter jurisdiction defines the scope of
proceedings that may be heard by a particular court of law and is
conferred by statute or the constitution. (14)  See Charles E.
Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Procedure, §11 at 95 (13th ed 1989)
("A criminal court has jurisdiction, i.e., the power to determine
whether an accused is guilty of a particular crime and, if so, to
impose a punishment therefor, if it has jurisdiction of the
subject matter and of the person of the accused."); see also
State v. Webb, 324 Or 380, 393, 927 P2d 79 (1996) (holding that
legislature granted two separate kinds of jurisdiction to
district courts, i.e., same criminal jurisdiction as justice
court and concurrent jurisdiction with circuit courts of
misdemeanors for which punishment may not exceed $3,000 fine). 
Under the Oregon Constitution, circuit courts have subject matter
jurisdiction over all actions unless a statute or rule of law
divests them of jurisdiction.  See Or Const, Art VII (Amended), §
2 (not changing jurisdictional scheme set out in original Article
VII); Or Const, Art VII (Original), § 9 (all jurisdiction not
vested by law in another court shall be vested in circuit
courts).  In particular, the Oregon Constitution states that,
once a person has been indicted by a grand jury, that person can
be charged "in a circuit court with the commission of any crime
punishable as a felony."  Or Const, Art VII (Amended), § 5(3). 
The trial court therefore had subject matter jurisdiction to try
defendant for the crime of aggravated murder, even if the
indictment arguable was defective. (15)
		Defendant claims that, even if his jurisdictional
challenge is not well taken, this court should address the merits
of the issue as an "error apparent on the face of the record." 
As noted, for this court to do so, the alleged error must be
"obvious, i.e., not reasonably in dispute."  Lotches, 331 Or at
472.  An analysis of Quinn and Apprendi, in appropriate context,
demonstrates that, not only is the alleged error not obvious, in
fact, there was no error.
		In Quinn, this court stated that the new death penalty
statute enacted by initiative in 1978 and at issue in that case
	"restore[d] deliberation as an additional element of
murder for which a greater penalty, death, may be
imposed much as it was under the pre-1971 statutory
scheme.  Although it is in the form of an enhanced
penalty statute, an effect of the new statute is to
indirectly reestablish a crime of deliberate first
degree murder punishable by death."
290 Or at 403 (footnote omitted).
		Thus, under the statutory scheme at issue in Quinn,
"deliberation" served to enhance the penalty for intentional
murder from life imprisonment to death, and indirectly created a
separate crime of deliberate murder.  Following this court's
decision in Quinn, the legislature enacted statutes creating the
crime of aggravated murder.  Separate crimes of murder and
aggravated murder are now defined statutorily.  Because defendant
was charged under a different statutory scheme from the one at
issue in Quinn, that case does not support defendant's argument.
		In fact, in State v. Wagner, 305 Or 115, 172, 752 P2d
1136 (1988), vacated and remanded on other grounds 492 US 914,
109 S Ct 3235, 106 L Ed 2d 583 (1989), this court rejected an
argument much like the one defendant makes here.  In Wagner, the
court described the aggravated-murder statutes and accompanying
pleading requirements as follows:
	"The offense with which this defendant is charged is
aggravated murder as defined in ORS 163.095(2)(a)(E)
[murder of a witness], * * *.  The ultimate facts that
make up that offense are clearly alleged in the
indictment.  To be guilty of aggravated murder one does
not need to act 'deliberately.'  If one is guilty of
aggravated murder but the jury does not unanimously
find that the perpetrator acted deliberately, the
guilty one is not sentenced to death but is yet guilty
of aggravated murder.  There is no requirement of
pleading an indictment that requires the indictment to
set forth possible penalties that the law may fix for
guilt on a particular charge."
305 Or at 172 (emphasis added); see State v. Moen, 309 Or 45, 53,
786 P2d 111 (1990) (Wagner "holds only that the three [penalty-phase] questions need not be alleged" in the indictment).
		Furthermore, the Oregon Constitution now provides that:
	"[T]he penalty for aggravated murder as defined by law
shall be death upon unanimous affirmative jury findings
as provided by law and otherwise shall be life
imprisonment with minimum sentence as provided by law." 
Or Const, Art I, § 40. 
		Defendant's reliance on Apprendi also is misplaced.  
Apprendi involved a defendant who fired several shots into the
house of an African-American family.  The indictment did not
charge any "hate crime" sentencing enhancement under New Jersey
law.  The defendant pleaded guilty to several counts set out in
the indictment, including second-degree possession of a firearm
for an unlawful purpose.  In the penalty phase, however, the
sentence corresponding to that count was enhanced as a hate crime
beyond the statutory maximum for the underlying crime of second-degree unlawful firearm possession.  The United States Supreme
Court held that, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, any fact that increases the penalty beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Apprendi, 530 US at 476,
120 S Ct at 2362-63.  Under Apprendi, in the absence of a jury
trial to determine the enhanced sentence, the defendant would
have had to plead guilty to an indictment that contained the
factual findings necessary to support the sentence enhancement. 
In this case, however, and unlike Apprendi, the prescribed
maximum statutory penalty for the crime of aggravated murder is
death and, moreover, the jury, not the trial court, decided that
defendant acted deliberately.
		In summary, under the current aggravated murder scheme,
a sentence of death is not a "penalty enhancement."  Rather, a
sentence of death is one of the penalties, as is life
imprisonment, that may be imposed for the commission of the crime
of aggravated murder.  Because a sentence of death is not an
enhancement under the aggravated murder scheme, the state is not
required to allege in the indictment that the murder was
committed deliberately. 
V.  CONCLUSION

		We have considered defendant's other assignments of
error and every argument made in support of those assignments. 
Based on our review, we conclude that no error occurred as
claimed in any of the assignments of error, including the ones
not discussed in this opinion.
		The judgment of conviction and sentences of death are
affirmed.



1. 	Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides:  
		"No law shall violate the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized."

2. 	Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides, in part:  
		"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right * * * to be heard by himself and
counsel[.]"

3. 	Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides, in part:  
		"No person shall be * * * compelled in any
criminal prosecution to testify against himself."

4. 	The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:  
		"The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrant shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized."

5. 	The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in part:  
		"No person * * * shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]"

6. 	The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in part: 
		"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right * * * to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence."

7. 	Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution provides, in part:  
	"No State shall * * * deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]"

8. 	Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides, in part:  
		"No ex post facto law * * * shall ever be
passed[.]"

9. 	Article I, section 10, of the United States
Constitution, provides, in part:  
		"No State shall * * * pass any * * * ex post facto
Law * * *."

10. 	Defendant's prior objections to the victim-impact
evidence were tendered before the legislature changed the law.  

11. 	Once those elements have been satisfied, an appellate
court must exercise discretion whether to review the purported
error.  In deciding whether to review an error of law apparent on
the face of the record, an appellate court may consider:  the
competing interests of the parties; the nature of the case; the
gravity of the error; the ends of justice in the particular case;
how the error came to the court's attention; and whether the
policies behind the general rule requiring preservation of error
have been served in the case in another way, i.e., whether the
trial court, in some manner, was presented with both sides of the
issue and given an opportunity to correct any error.  Ailes v.
Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 382 n 6, 823 P2d 956 (1991).

12. 	ORS 163.150(1)(b) (1995) provided:
		"Upon the conclusion of the presentation of the
evidence, the court shall submit the following issues
to the jury:
		"(A) Whether the conduct of the defendant that
caused the death of the deceased was committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that
death of the deceased or another would result;
		"(B) Whether there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society;
		"(C) If raised by the evidence, whether the
conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was
unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by
the deceased; and
		"(D) Whether the defendant should receive a death
sentence."
		In this case, the jury did not consider subsection (C),
regarding provocation, so that subsection (D), ordinarily the
"Fourth Question," became in this case the "Third Question."
13. 	The court in Farrar suggested that the four questions
that ORS 163.150(b) requires could be asked in the following
manner:
		"1. Was the conduct of the defendant that caused
the death of the deceased committed deliberately and
with the reasonable expectation that death of the
deceased or another would result?  
		"2. Is there a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing threat to society?  In
determining this issue, you shall consider any
mitigating circumstances offered in evidence,
including, but not limited to, the defendant's age, the
extent and severity of the defendant's prior criminal
conduct and the extent of the mental and emotional
pressure under which the defendant was acting at the
time the offense was committed.  
		"(If raised by the evidence) 3. Was the conduct of
the defendant in killing the deceased unreasonable in
response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased?  
		"4. Should defendant receive a death sentence?  
You should answer this question 'no' if you find that
there is any aspect of defendant's character or
background, or any circumstances of the offense, that
you believe would justify a sentence less than death."
Farrar, 309 Or at 177.

14.   Subject matter jurisdiction differs from personal
jurisdiction, which governs the assertion over the person of the
accused.  See ORS 131.205-235 (1993) (defining principles of
personal jurisdiction in criminal matters).

15. 	An indictment, if it is defective, may be reviewed for
error rather than for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  See,
e.g., State v. Trueax, 315 Or 396, 845 P2d 1291 (1993)
(discrepancy between caption of indictment charging sodomy in
third degree, required remand for entry of conviction for sodomy
in third degree, not new trial); State v. Woodson, 315 Or 314,
845 P2d 203 (1993) (amendment of indictment to allege attempted
rape rather than rape was not error).