Case Title: State ex rel. Maxwell v. Brice

Citation: 2021-Ohio-4333

Docket Number: 2021-0056

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2021-12-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Maxwell v. Brice, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-4333.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-4333 
THE STATE EX REL. MAXWELL v. THE VILLAGE OF BRICE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Maxwell v. Brice, Slip Opinion No.  
2021-Ohio-4333.] 
Prohibition—Ohio Revised Code vests exclusive jurisdiction over noncriminal 
traffic-law adjudications in the municipal courts—Evidence shows that 
village no longer conducts administrative hearings on traffic citations—
Writ of prohibition denied as moot. 
(No. 2021-0056—Submitted September 21, 2021—Decided December 14, 2021.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In this original action, relator, Alexander Maxwell, seeks a writ of 
prohibition to prevent respondent, the village of Brice (“the village”), from 
adjudicating an alleged traffic violation through an administrative hearing.  On 
April 14, 2021, we denied the village’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and 
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issued an alternative writ.  162 Ohio St.3d 1426, 2021-Ohio-1202, 166 N.E.3d 28.  
Maxwell has filed a motion to strike portions of the village’s merit brief and 
evidence and a motion for leave to submit supplemental evidence. 
{¶ 2} For the reasons set forth below, we deny Maxwell’s motion to strike, 
grant his motion for leave to submit supplemental evidence, and deny the writ of 
prohibition as moot. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
{¶ 3} In June 2020, this court held that the Ohio Revised Code vests 
exclusive jurisdiction over noncriminal traffic-law adjudications in the municipal 
courts.  State ex rel. Magsig v. Toledo, 160 Ohio St.3d 342, 2020-Ohio-3416, 156 
N.E.3d 899, ¶ 20.  We held that municipalities have no jurisdiction to conduct their 
own quasi-judicial adjudications of traffic violations.  Id. 
{¶ 4} On December 16, 2020, Maxwell received a “notice of violation” 
from the village for an alleged speeding offense.  Despite our ruling in Magsig, the 
notice informed Maxwell that he could contest the citation by requesting an 
administrative hearing.  Maxwell requested a hearing, which was scheduled for 
January 20, 2021. 
{¶ 5} On January 13, Maxwell contacted the village and spoke with a police 
officer.  Maxwell asked if the village intended to proceed with his hearing despite 
the Magsig decision and was informed that the village was aware of the decision 
but intended to continue conducting administrative hearings for traffic citations. 
{¶ 6} At Maxwell’s request, the hearing was rescheduled for February 17.  
But on January 15, the village’s clerk, Karen Deberry, wrote in a letter to Maxwell 
that the hearing was canceled due to a possible COVID-19 exposure.  Deberry 
informed Maxwell that the village was “unable to schedule [the] hearing in the time 
frame allowed by law.  Therefore [the] case has been dismissed.” 
{¶ 7} Maxwell claims that Deberry’s letter was not sent to his correct 
address.  And he alleges that “[a]s late as February 16, the third-party 
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administrators” for the village had told him that his hearing was still scheduled for 
February 17.  Maxwell requested a second continuance of the hearing but received 
no response to that request. 
{¶ 8} Deberry avers that she wrote to Maxwell again on February 4, 
informing him “that his rescheduled February 17, 2021 hearing was cancelled [and] 
that his civil violation had been dismissed.”  Maxwell contends that he did not 
receive that letter either. 
{¶ 9} The evidence in the record includes an affidavit from the village’s 
mayor, John Mathys.  In support of the village’s contention that this case is moot, 
Mathys attests: 
 
The Village of Brice is no longer holding administrative 
hearings under its Photo Speed Division/civil citation system.  And, 
the Village will not hold any administrative hearings, unless and 
until, the jurisdictional issue related to such hearings is determined 
on final appeal.  Until then, all requests for administrative hearings 
made under the Village of Brice Photo Speed Division/civil citation 
system will be directed to the Franklin County Municipal Court. 
 
II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A.  The motion to strike 
{¶ 10} After the village filed its merit brief, Maxwell filed a motion to strike 
portions of the brief and the village’s evidence.  Specifically, he objects to the 
affidavit of Deberry, the letter authored by Deberry that was submitted as an 
exhibit, and a statement in the village’s merit brief. 
{¶ 11} S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.06 requires that in original actions, “[s]worn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts of papers referred to in an affidavit shall be 
attached” to the affidavit.  In her affidavit, Deberry refers to the following 
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documents that are not attached thereto: (1) a letter from the village’s third-party 
administrator to Maxwell, dated January 4, 2021, notifying him of his January 20 
administrative-hearing date, (2) Maxwell’s written request to continue the January 
20 hearing, (3) a letter from the third-party administrator, dated January 15, 
notifying Maxwell of the rescheduled hearing date, (4) another letter from Deberry, 
dated February 4, informing Maxwell of the cancellation of his hearing, and (5) the 
village’s “administrative hearing docket.”  Maxwell asserts that the village’s 
omission of these documents violates S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.06 and that Deberry’s 
affidavit should therefore be stricken in its entirety. 
{¶ 12} The village admits the violations of S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.06 but disagrees 
with Maxwell’s requested remedy.  To be admissible, such affidavits must be based 
on the affiant’s personal knowledge.  S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.06; State ex rel. Lanham v. 
DeWine, 135 Ohio St.3d 191, 2013-Ohio-199, 985 N.E.2d 467, ¶ 15.  But according 
to the village, because Maxwell has not challenged Deberry’s personal knowledge 
of the events that she describes, there is no basis for striking her affidavit. 
{¶ 13} S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.06 sets forth the requirements for submitting and 
authenticating exhibits in original actions before this court; failure to abide by the 
rule will result in the exclusion of the proffered exhibits.  See State ex rel. Mun. 
Constr. Equip. Operators’ Labor Council v. Cleveland, 114 Ohio St.3d 183, 2007-
Ohio-3831, 870 N.E.2d 1174, ¶ 39, 41 (striking unauthenticated exhibits in an 
original action).  But Maxwell has not cited any authority for the proposition that 
the failure to attach an exhibit mentioned in an affidavit disqualifies the entire 
affidavit.  We therefore deny the motion to strike Deberry’s affidavit. 
{¶ 14} Next, Maxwell moves to strike the letter from Deberry informing 
him that his hearing was cancelled and his case dismissed because, in his view, the 
letter was not attached to or authenticated by Deberry’s affidavit.  But as Maxwell 
concedes, the same letter appears as an attachment to Deberry’s affidavit.  Maxwell 
contends that this makes the first copy of the letter in the record redundant, and he 
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asks that it be stricken on that basis.  But this court will not strike extraneous 
materials that are not subject to the rule.  State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Deters, 
148 Ohio St.3d 595, 2016-Ohio-8195, 71 N.E.3d 1076, ¶ 17 (declining to strike 
untimely filed materials because exhibits that do not assert any fact relevant to the 
case are not subject to the evidence-submission deadline).  Stated differently, 
striking the first copy of the letter would be a vain act because Maxwell has not 
challenged the admissibility of the second copy.  State ex rel. Peoples v. 
O’Shaughnessy, 165 Ohio St.3d 54, 2021-Ohio-1572, 175 N.E.3d 524, ¶ 11 (relief 
will not be granted to compel a vain act). 
{¶ 15} Finally, Maxwell moves for this court to strike a portion of the 
village’s merit brief that states, “In fact, the Village has suspended its use of the 
traffic law photo-monitoring device.”  Although the village’s mayor has attested 
that the village is no longer conducting administrative hearings, his affidavit does 
not assert that the village has discontinued its use of the monitoring equipment 
altogether.  We deny the motion because we are capable of disregarding statements 
that are not supported by the evidentiary record.  See State ex rel. Tam O’Shanter 
Co. v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections, 151 Ohio St.3d 134, 2017-Ohio-8167, 86 N.E.3d 
332, ¶ 11 (denying a motion to strike because this court is “capable of determining 
questions of relevance and assigning appropriate weight without striking evidence 
or arguments”). 
{¶ 16} For these reasons, we deny Maxwell’s motion to strike. 
B.  The merits of the prohibition claim 
{¶ 17} Three elements must be satisfied for a writ of prohibition to issue: 
(1) the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) the lack of authority for the 
exercise of that power, (3) and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of the law.  State ex rel. Elder v. Camplese, 144 Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-
3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 13. 
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{¶ 18} The village argues that this case is moot because it cancelled 
Maxwell’s administrative hearing and dismissed his case.  A case is moot when 
“ ‘without any fault of the defendant, an event occurs which renders it impossible 
for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of the plaintiff, to grant him any 
effectual relief whatever.’ ”  State ex rel. Eliza Jennings, Inc. v. Noble, 49 Ohio 
St.3d 71, 74, 551 N.E.2d 128 (1990), quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653, 16 
S.Ct. 132, 40 L.Ed. 293 (1895). 
{¶ 19} Maxwell argues that this case is not moot because, he asserts, the 
traffic charge against him remains pending.  Maxwell alleges that the village’s 
notice of dismissal was defective because it was sent to the wrong address and 
because the village’s clerk lacks the authority to dismiss the charges.  But this 
argument misses the point: the issue in this prohibition action is not whether a 
traffic citation remains pending against Maxwell but whether the village intends to 
adjudicate that citation through its own administrative hearing.  And there is no 
evidence in the record contradicting the village’s evidence that it has ceased 
conducting administrative hearings for traffic citations, including Maxwell’s. 
{¶ 20} Maxwell alternatively invokes the exception to mootness for cases 
presenting issues of public or great general interest that are capable of repetition yet 
evading review.  That exception applies, for example, when the relevant event or 
the injury to be prevented is of a brief duration.  See Adkins v. McFaul, 76 Ohio 
St.3d 350, 351, 667 N.E.2d 1171 (1996) (the question whether inmates serving 
sentences in county jails were entitled to good-time credit evaded review due to the 
“relatively brief sentences” involved for persons confined in county jails).  But 
instead of demonstrating that this case involves an issue capable of repetition yet 
evading review, Maxwell maintains his contention that his traffic case was not 
properly dismissed, arguing that his request to continue the February 17 hearing 
has never been ruled on and citing confusion between the village and its third-party 
administrator as to whether his hearing remained on the docket.  These facts do not 
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demonstrate that any issues involved in this case will evade review.  And as noted 
above, the administrative disposition of Maxwell’s traffic-citation case is not what 
renders this prohibition action moot. 
{¶ 21} Finally, Maxwell alleges that in order to evade this court’s review of 
the village’s procedures, the village has a practice of dismissing traffic citations 
when a defendant in one of those cases files a prohibition action against it.  In 
support of this contention, Maxwell cites State ex rel. Hatfield v. Brice, 161 Ohio 
St.3d 141, 2021-Ohio-120, 161 N.E.3d 709, claiming that in that case “the Village 
took a shockingly similar tactic of dismissing the case after Hatfield filed suit and 
then argued for mootness.”  According to the motion for judgment on the pleadings 
filed by the village in Hatfield, it dismissed the defendant’s traffic case at his 
request two days after he had filed his prohibition action but one day before the 
village had received service of the complaint.  State ex rel. Hatfield v. Brice, case 
No. 2020-1299 (Nov. 19, 2020).  In other words, it is unclear in Hatfield whether 
the village had notice of the prohibition action at the time that it dismissed the traffic 
citation, which allows for the possibility that the dismissal was for some other, 
legitimate reason.  Maxwell has not shown that the village has engaged in a pattern 
of deliberately dismissing traffic citations in response to prohibition actions. 
{¶ 22} Based on the testimony of the village’s mayor that the village no 
longer conducts administrative hearings on traffic citations, we deny the writ of 
prohibition as moot. 
C.  The motion for leave to submit supplemental evidence 
{¶ 23} On August 23, 2021, Maxwell filed a motion for leave to submit 
supplemental evidence purportedly showing that the village continued to schedule 
administrative hearings on traffic citations after the date on which it attested it had 
ceased to do so.  Maxwell’s supplemental evidence consists of two documents, 
exhibit Nos. 2 and 3.  Exhibit No. 2 is purportedly the village’s administrative-
hearing docket.  And exhibit No. 3 is the affidavit of Dana Ewing-Moore, who was 
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cited by the village for an alleged traffic violation in April 2021.  Maxwell states 
that he could not present this evidence sooner because he did not receive the 
documents in time to submit them under our rules and because the information was 
within the exclusive knowledge of the village. 
{¶ 24} The village has not opposed the motion.  We grant the motion, 
because doing so will not prejudice the village or delay our decision in this case.  
However, the admission of these exhibits does not change our determination that 
the case is moot.  To the contrary, the new evidence supports the conclusion that 
the village has ceased conducting administrative hearings on traffic citations and 
that the case is therefore moot. 
1.  Exhibit No. 2: the administrative docket 
{¶ 25} On May 4, 2021, the village’s mayor executed an affidavit in which 
he attested that the village “is no longer holding administrative hearings under its 
Photo Speed Division/civil citation system.”  Maxwell contends that the docket 
sheets show that the village continued to schedule administrative hearings on traffic 
citations into June 2021.  However, the docket sheets do not contradict the mayor’s 
testimony. 
{¶ 26} Exhibit No. 2 appears to be docket sheets from January 2020 to June 
2021.  And as Maxwell notes, the last two pages list hearings scheduled for June 
22, 2021.  However, unlike the other pages of the docket, there is no information 
on these pages showing the dispositions of the cases, which at least suggests that 
the village is no longer adjudicating them. 
{¶ 27} This conclusion is also supported by the rest of the exhibit.  The 
docket sheets indicate that the last time that the village imposed an administrative 
fine on a defendant was in January 2021.  Thereafter, in more than 50 cases, every 
defendant’s case was resolved with no financial sanction imposed, suggesting that 
the cases were dismissed. 
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{¶ 28} Maxwell suggests that even if the village did not conduct the June 
2021 hearings, it is significant that the village scheduled hearings for June in the 
first place.  He asks, “[W]hy would the Village create an administrative hearing 
docket for hearings that it did not intend to hold?”  Maxwell assumes that the June 
2021 docket sheet was created sometime after May 4, 2021 (the date of the mayor’s 
affidavit), but he has submitted no evidence supporting that assumption.  Until 
November 2020, the bottom right corner of each docket sheet showed the date on 
which it was created.  But starting with the December 9, 2020 docket sheet, that 
information no longer appears.  So, the docket sheet for the June 2021 hearings may 
have been generated before the village recognized that it had to discontinue the 
hearings. 
{¶ 29} Maxwell’s exhibit No. 2 does not prove his claim that the village 
continues to conduct administrative hearings on traffic citations.  Indeed, it supports 
the mayor’s testimony that the village has ceased doing so and that this prohibition 
action is moot. 
2.  Exhibit No. 3: the affidavit of Dana Ewing-Moore 
{¶ 30} In exhibit No. 3, Ewing-Moore attests that she received a citation 
from the village dated April 20, 2021, for an alleged violation on April 11.  She 
requested an administrative hearing and received a responsive letter from the 
village dated May 19, informing her that her hearing had not yet been scheduled 
and that she would be informed of the hearing date in the future.  She avers that she 
has not received any further communications from the village scheduling the 
hearing or dismissing her citation.  However, she states that on July 28, 2021, she 
spoke to a representative of the village’s third-party administrator, who informed 
her that her citation “is still active and awaiting a hearing date.” 
{¶ 31} Ewing-Moore’s affidavit fails to disprove the mootness of this 
prohibition action.  For one thing, Magsig does not declare traffic citations such as 
that involved here invalid; it holds only that the challenges must be heard by the 
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municipal court and that municipalities have no jurisdiction to conduct their own 
quasi-judicial proceedings.  160 Ohio St.3d 342, 2020-Ohio-3416, 156 N.E.3d 899, 
at ¶ 20.  So, Ewing-Moore is not entitled to have her traffic citation “dismissed.”  
The statement by the third-party administrator—that her citation is still “active and 
awaiting a hearing date”—may suggest poor communication between the village 
and its third-party administrator.  But it does not demonstrate that the village 
intends to ever proceed with her administrative hearing or anyone else’s. 
{¶ 32} Maxwell’s exhibit No. 3 does not show that the village continues to 
conduct administrative hearings on traffic citations. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 33} For these reasons, we deny Maxwell’s motion to strike and grant his 
motion for leave to submit supplemental evidence.  We hold that the prohibition 
claim is moot and therefore deny the writ. 
Writ denied. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, 
and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Alexander Maxwell, pro se. 
Isaac, Wiles & Burkholder, L.L.C., and Brian M. Zets, for respondent. 
_________________