Case Title: Carter v. State

Citation: 501 N.E.2d 439

Docket Number: 784S296

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1986-12-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
501 N.E.2d 439 (1986)
Charles CARTER, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 784S296.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
December 22, 1986.
*440 Stephen J. Manich, Merrillville, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Lisa M. Paunicka, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
DeBRULER, Justice.
This is a direct appeal from a conviction of dealing in cocaine, a class B felony, I.C. § 35-48-4-1 and I.C. § 35-48-2-6. A jury tried the case. Appellant received a seventeen year sentence.
Appellant raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in conducting the trial in his absence without first obtaining an express waiver of his right to be present at trial; and (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence several statements made by Lindsey Carter.
The facts from the record which support the determination of guilt are as follows. On September 22, 1981, Officer Paul Vido, Officer David Mora, and a confidential informant drove to the residence of Lindsey Carter in order to purchase drugs. Officer Vido questioned Lindsey Carter about the availability of cocaine. Subsequently, the Officers, the informant, and Lindsey Carter drove to the residence of appellant. Thereafter, appellant, who was Lindsey Carter's brother, sold Officer Vido two grams of cocaine for one hundred and eighty dollars. A laboratory toxicologist confirmed that the purchased substance was cocaine. On October 13, 1981, the State charged appellant with the instant offense.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it conducted the trial in his absence without first obtaining an express waiver of his right to be present at trial.
Martin v. State (1984), Ind., 457 N.E.2d 1085, 1086.
Here, the record reveals that the appellant was personally advised of the trial date. He did not notify the trial court nor provide it with an explanation of his absence. Consequently, he knowingly and *441 voluntarily waived his right to be present at trial.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence several out-of-court statements made by Lindsey Carter. Appellant's trial counsel objected to the statements on the grounds that they consisted of hearsay.
Hearsay evidence has been defined as follows:
Connell v. State (1984), Ind., 470 N.E.2d 701, 705-706; See also Harvey v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 473, 269 N.E.2d 759. The challenged statements are set forth here:
The statements "he didn't have any" and "he knew that his brother had some cocaine" are hearsay because their obvious purpose is to prove the truth of the matter contained therein, namely that appellant had cocaine. However, the admission of these statements is harmless error. The admission of improper evidence which tends only to disclose a fact which is clearly proved by other legitimate evidence is harmless error. See Harvey v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 473, 269 N.E.2d 759; Adams v. State (1946), 224 Ind. 472, 477, 69 N.E.2d 21, 23. Here the cocaine is in evidence and there is direct testimony of the fact that appellant had it and sold it to the Officer by witnesses having first hand knowledge of the events.
The statement "he would have to check with his brother, Charles Carter, to see if it was available" is also hearsay; however, it falls under the state of mind *442 exception because it is introduced to show Lindsey Carter's intention to do a future act, namely to telephone appellant.
Mutual Life Ins. v. Hillman (1892), 145 U.S. 285, 12 S. Ct. 909, 36 L. Ed. 706. Here, Lindsey Carter's statement gives content to his act of telephoning appellant. Consequently, the intention to be proved is important only as qualifying the act of telephoning. Since the statement's connection with the act of telephoning was shown through the testimony of Officer Mora, it was admissible into evidence.
The conviction is affirmed.
GIVAN, C.J., and PIVARNIK, SHEPARD and DICKSON, JJ., concur.