Case Title: State v. Lucero

Citation: 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 7

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2011-03-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
127 Nev., Advance Opinion 7
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

‘THE STATE OF NEVADA, No. 54375

Appellant, FIL ED

ARTHUR LOUIS LUCERO, |

Respondent. WAR 17 2011

  
  

Appeal from an order denying the State’s motion to correct an
illegal sentence. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Connie
J, Steinheimer, Judge.

Affirmed.
Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Richard A.
Gammick, District Attorney, and Gary H. Hatlestad, Chief Deputy District

Attorney, Washoe County,
for Appellant.

Jennifer L. Lunt, Alternate Public Defender, and Mary Pat Barry, Deputy

Alternate Public Defender, Washoe County,
for Respondent.

BEFORE DOUGLAS, C.J., PICKERING and HARDESTY, JJ.
OPINION
By the Court, HARDESTY, J.
A conviction for level-three trafficking in a controlled

substance results in a mandatory minimum prison term of 10 years
pursuant to NRS 453.3385(9), unless the defendant renders substantial

MW 08/03

 
nn

assistance to law enforcement pursuant to NRS 453.3405(2). Under the
substantial-assistance exception, the district court has discretion to reduce
or suspend the mandatory minimum sentence if it determines that the
defendant rendered substantial assistance. In this appeal, we consider
whether the district court has the authority to reduce the 10-year
minimum sentence prescribed by NRS 453.8385 when revoking probation
pursuant to NRS 176A.630 for a defendant who previously received a

suspended sentence because he rendered substantial assistance. We

  

conclude that the phrase “minimum term of imprisonment prescribed by
the applicable penal statute” in NRS 176A.630, which limits the extent to

which a district court can reduce the term of imprisonment upon

revocation of probation, is ambiguous when applied to NRS 453.3385 in

 

general rules of statutory construction do not resolve that ambiguity, we

apply the rule of lenity and conclude that the district court had the

authority to reduce the defendant's sentence after it revoked his probation.
FACTS:

In 2007, the State charged respondent Arthur Lucero with one
count of level-three trafficking in a controlled substance, in violation of
RS 453.3385(3), and in January 2008, he pleaded guilty to that charge.
‘The district court sentenced Lucero to life in prison with eligibility for
parole after 10 years, but the court suspended his sentence, placing him on
probation for up to 60 months pursuant to NRS 453.3405(2) because he
provided “substantial assistance” to law enforcement.

 

 
Several months later, Lucero violated the terms of his
probation. After a hearing pursuant to Anaya v. State, 96 Nev. 119, 606
P.24 156 (1980),! the district court revoked his probation. Lucero’s counsel
requested a lesser sentence than the sentence originally imposed by the

district court because of the prior finding of substantial assistance. After

 

revoking his probation, the district court reduced Lucero’s original
sentence to 180 months with eligibility for parole after 24 months.
‘The State then filed a motion to correct the new

 

ntence,

which it asserted was an illegal sentence. The State argued that allowing

 

parole eligibility in less than 10 years violated the statutorily prescribed
minimum sentence found in NRS 453.3385(3). It also argued that NRS
453.3405(2), which allows a sentence reduction for “substantial
assistance,” is limited to original sentences imposed by the district court,
not subsequent probation revocation proceedings. Permitting such a
sentence reduction at the time probation is being revoked, the State
argued, would allow district courts to resentence probation violators on
lesser charges than those of their original convictions. Lucero countered
that the applicable sentencing statute contains an exception to the
minimum sentencing requirements for defendants who provided
substantial assistance to the State. Thus, he argued, the controlling
sentencing statute at the time of probation revocation authorized the
district court to reduce sentences below the statutory 10-year minimum.

*An Anaya hearing ensures that the probationer's due process rights
are protected during probation revocation proceedings by giving the
probationer an opportunity to “confront and question witnesses giving
information against him.” Anaya v, State, 96 Nev. 119, 123, 606 P.2d 166,
158 (1980).

 

 
Be

‘The district court ultimately found that it had authority to
reduce Lucero’s sentence at the time of probation revocation pursuant to
NRS 453.3405(2), and it denied the State's motion to correct the sentence.
‘The State now appeals.

DISCUSSION

NRS 453.3385 prescribes the mandatory prison sentence for
trafficking in certain controlled substances unl
453.3405(2), the defendant has “rendered substantial assistance in the

under NRS

 

investigation or prosecution of any offense.” In such event, the district
court has discretion to “reduce or suspend” the mandatory prison sentence
imposed for a drug trafficking violation. NRS 453.3405(2). ‘The State and
Lucero agree that the substantial-assistance provision applied at the time
Lucero was originally sentenced, giving the district court the discretion to
deviate from the mandatory minimum by reducing or suspending his
sentence. In its original sentence, the district court chose not to reduce
the statutorily mandated minimum sentence for a level-three trafficking
offense of 10 years, but instead imposed the minimum sentence and
suspended it for 60 months.

When a defendant's probation is revoked, NRS 176A.630(5)
precludes the court from sentencing him or her to prison for a term “less
than the minimum term of imprisonment prescribed by the applicable
penal statute.” In this appeal, we must determine whether the “minimum
term of imprisonment” after revocation of Lucero’s level-three trafficking
sentence includes consideration of substantial assistance rendered under
NRS 453.3405(2). Applying the rule of lenity, we conclude that the district
court can consider substantial assistance rendered by a defendant in

setting the minimum term of imprisonment after probation revocation.

 

 
Standard of reviow and statutory interpretation

Challenges to a district court's discretionary modification of a
sentence after a probation revocation hearing are reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Kirkpatrick v. State, 122 Nev. 846, 848, 187 P.3d 1193, 1194
(2006). However, we review questions of statutory interpretation de novo,
State v. Catanio, 120 Nev. 1030, 1038, 102 P.3d 688, 590 (2004). Whether

the substantial-assistance provision of NRS 453.3405(2) applies after the

 

Aistrict court revokes probation is a matter of statutory interpretation.
When interpreting a statute, legislative intent “is the
controlling factor.” Robert E. v, Justice Court, 99 Nev. 443, 445, 664 P.2d
957, 959 (1983). The starting point for determining legislative intent is
the statute's plain meaning; when a statute “is clear on its face, a court
can not go beyond the statute in determining legislative intent.” Td. see
also Catanio, 120 Nev. at 1033, 102 P.8d at 590 (“We must attribute the
plain meaning to a statute that is not ambiguous”), But when “the
statutory language lends itself to two or more reasonable interpretations,”
the statute is ambiguous, and we may then look beyond the statute in
determining legislative intent. Catanio, 120 Nev. at 1033, 102 P.3d at
590. To interpret an ambiguous statute, we look to the legislative history
and construe the statute in a manner that is consistent with reason and
public policy. Great Basin Water Network v. State Engr, 126 Nev.
__. 234 P.3d 912, 918 (2010); see also Moore v. State, 122 Nev. 27, 32, 126
P.3d 508, 511 (2006) (looking to legislative history to determine legislative
intent behind ambiguous statute); Robert E., 99 Nev. at 445-48, 664 P.2d
at 959-61 (looking to legislative history, reason, and public policy to
determine legislative intent behind ambiguous statute). With these rules,
of statutory construction in mind, we turn first to the statutory language
to determine whether NRS 176A.630(5) is plain or ambiguous. In doing

 

 
cn, Be

80, we must examine its language in conjunction with that of NRS
463.3385 and 453.3405(2) when a district court revokes the probation of a
drug trafficker who provided substantial assistance.

um term of imprisonment” referred to in NRS 176A.63065) is
ambiguous

Pursuant to NRS 176A.630(6), a district court may modify a
defendant's sentence after it revokes probation, but “{tJhe court shall not
make the term of imprisonment less than the minimum term of
imprisonment prescribed by the applicable penal statute.” The applicable
penal statute for Lucero's trafficking offense is NRS 453.3385. NRS
453.3385 provides the statutory minimum penalty, unless otherwise
authorized by “the provisions of NRS 453.011 to 453.552, inclusive.” NRS
453.3405(2) grants the district court the authority to “reduce or suspend
the sentence of any person convicted of violating any of the provisions of
NRS 453.3385, 453.839 or 453.3395 if the court finds that the convicted
person rendered substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution
of any offense.”

‘The State and Lucero agree on appeal, as they stipulated in
the district court, that Lucero provided substantial assistance and was
eligible for a reduced or suspended sentence pursuant to NRS 453.3405(2)
when the district court originally sentenced him. Accordingly, the district
court sentenced Lucero to life with parole eligibility after a minimum of 10
years, and chose to suspend his sentence, placing him on probation for up
to 60 months.

‘The State contends that after probation is revoked pursuant to
NRS 176A.630(5), the “minimum term of imprisonment prescribed by the
applicable penal statute’ does not include the substantial-assistance

provision in NRS 459.3405(2) for two reasons. First, it argues that the

 

 
“applicable penal statute” to which NRS 176A.630(5) refers is NRS
453.3386(3). This subsection provides the mandatory minimum sentence
of 10 years for a level-three trafficking offense but does not refer to the
substantial-assistance provision. Second, the State argues that the “or”
spend” in NRS 453.3405(2) (emph:
the district court one opportunity to impose a lenient sentence on a

between “reduce or

   

\dded) gives

defendant who renders substantial aj

 

wnce to the investigation or
prosecution of other crimes, Thus, according to the State's interpretation,
NRS 453.3405(2) gave the district court authority to initially reduce
Lucero’s mandatory minimum sentence, but the district court chose to
suspend his sentence instead. Because the district court elected to
suspend, rather than reduce, Lucero’s sentence, the State argues that the
court cannot later choose to reduce that sentence below the statutory
minimum upon revocation of probation.

Lucero, on the other hand, argues that the statutorily
prescribed minimum sentence after revocation of probation includes all of
‘the statutory provisions that determine the original sentence. NRS
176A.630(6) refers to the “minimum term of imprisonment prescribed by
the applicable penal statute” for sentencing after a probation revocation,
and the applicable statute is NRS 453.3385 in its entirety, which allows
for statutory reductions in sentences for substantial assistance pursuant
to NRS 453.3405). Based on Lucero’s argument, when the district court
revokes a defendant's probation, it has two options: it can reinstate the
original sentence, see, e.g. McNallen v, State, 91 Nev. 592, 592, 540 P.2d
121, 121 (1975), or “{mlodify the original sentence imposed by reducing the
term of imprisonment and cause the modified sentence to be executed [s0

long as] the term of imprisonment [is not] less than the minimum term of

 

 
imprisonment prescribed by the applicable penal statute.” NRS
176A.630(6).

We conclude that both interpretations of the phrase
“minimum term of imprisonment” in NRS 176A.630(6) are reasonable.
Upon probation revocation, NRS 176A.630(6) refers to NRS 453.3385.
NRS 453,3385's sentencing provisions include NRS 453.3405(2), but it is
unclear whether NRS 176A.630(5) contemplates that NRS 453.3405(2)
applies only at the original sentencing or whether it applies any time a
defendant is resentenced thereafter,

Because we determine that both the State's and Lucero’s

interpretations of NRS 176A.630(5) are equally plausible, we conclude

 

that the statute is ambiguous, We therefore must look beyond the
statutory language to interpret an ambiguous statute by evaluating the
legislative history and looking to reason and publie policy.
Statutory interpretation

The legislative history of NRS 176A.630(5) does not address
whether the Legislature intended the applicable minimum sentence after
probation revocation to include relief statutes such as NRS 453.3405(2).
‘The Legislature added the language found in subsection 5 of NRS

2We reject the State's suggestion that the applicable penal statute
refers only to subsection 3 of NRS 453.3385. Absent language in NRS
1 76A.630(5) to the contrary, NRS 453.3385 must be read as a whole. See
Haney v, State, 124 Nev. 408, 411-12, 185 P.3d 350, 353 (2008) (“When
interpreting a statute, this court will give the statute its plain meaning
and will examine the statute as a whole without rendering . .. a provision

nugatory.”).

 

 

 
176A.630 in 1995 through Assembly Bill 317.7 1995 Nev. Stat., ch. 444, §
22, at 1956-57. Discussions regarding NRS 176A.630(6)'s statutory
language focused on whether the district court would have discretion to
reduce a sentence below the statutory minimum after revoking probation.
‘See Hearing on A.B. 317 Bofore the Assembly Judiciary Comm., 68th Leg.
(Nev., April 17, 1995). ‘The legislative record indicates that the district

 

court would not be able to reduce a sentence below the statutory minimum

after revoking probation. Id, However, there is no indication as to

 

whether the Legislature intended for the mandatory minimum sentence to
include or exclude other provisions that are part of the applicable
sentencing statute, such as NRS 453.3405(2).

‘The legislative history regarding NRS 453.3405(2), the
substantial-assistance provision, is equally unhelpful. It appears that the
Legislature enacted that statute to assist law enforcement in
apprehending high-level drug traffickers by providing leniency to lower-
level offenders who disclose helpful information.* Hearing on S.B. 7

sThis language was part of NRS 176.221 until 1997, when the
Legislature created NRS Chapter 176A, Nevada's probation and
suspension-of-sentence statutes. NRS 176.221 became NRS 176A.630.

4When the Legislature first enacted NRS 453.3405 in 1983, see 1983
Nev. Stat., ch. 111, § 5, at 288, Senator William Raggio stated that its
purpose was “to increase the penalties so that they are so great that there
will be an impetus, or incentive, to the convicted individual to furnish
information to enable law enforcement to reach the higher ups who are
involved in the wholesaling of large amounts—heavy trafficking—of
drugs.” Hearing on S.B. 7 Before the Assembly Judiciary Comm., 62d Leg.
(Nev., March 10, 1983). In effect, this rewards a defendant for cooperating
with an ongoing investigation. Testimony on the bill focused extensively
continued on next page.

 

 

 
Before the Assembly Judiciary Comm., 62d Leg. (Nev., March 10, 1983);
see Parrish v. State, 116 Nev. 982, 988, 12 P.Sd 958, 956 (2000)
('{Substantial-assistance] statutes are obviously intended to provide an
incentive to drug-trafficking offenders to cooperate with law enforcement
in the investigation of other drug traffickers.”). But that purpose is not
indicative of the Legislature's intent regarding whether that provision is
part of the mandatory minimum sentencing statute after the district court
revokes probation.

In Robert E,, 99 Nev. at 447-48, 664 P.2d at 960-61, we
determined that, in the absence of applicable legislative history, specific
public policy grounds supported one interpretation of an ambiguous
statute over another, However, the parties have not argued, and there
does not appear to be any reason or public policy independent of that
expressed in the legislative history, regarding the role of the substantial-
assistance provision in sentencing drug traffickers after probation
revocation.

Thus, the legislative history and the reason and public policy
behind these statutes shed no light on whether the Legislature intended
for the district court to have the discretion to consider NRS 453.3405(2)'s
substantial-assistance provision after it revokes probation on an original
sentence that already took into account the substantial-assistance

provision. We therefore must turn elsewhere to resolve the ambiguity.

» continued

on the statute's effectiveness as a tool for law enforcement to gather
information about higher-level drug traffickers. Id,

 

 
Rule of lenity

‘The “rule of lenity {is a rule of construction that] demands that
ambiguities in criminal statutes be liberally interpreted in the accused's
favor,” Moore, 122 Nev. at 32, 126 P.Sd at 511, and it “applies not only to
interpretations of the substantive ambit of criminal prohibitions, but also
to the penalties they impose,” Bifulco v, United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387
(1980). Because ambiguity is the cornerstone of the rule of lenity, the rule
only applies when other statutory interpretation methods, including the
plain language, legislative history, reason, and public policy, have failed to
resolve a penal statute's ambiguity. Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. __, _,
180 S. Ct, 2499, 2508-09 (2010); Bifuleo, 447 U.S. at 387; see also Moore,
122 Nev. at 32, 126 P.3d at 511, That is the case here,

Applying the rule of lenity, we conclude that the phrase

 

“minimum term of imprisonment prescribed by the applicable penal
statute” in NRS 176A.630(6) requires us to read NRS 458.3385 as a whole,
which includes the substantial-assistance provision in NRS 453.3405(2).
‘The rule of lenity requires a liberal interpretation in favor of Lucero, and
thus, the applicable statute setting forth Lucero's mandatory minimum
sentence after the district court revoked probation includes the
substantial-assistance provision in NRS 453.3405(2). ‘Thus, we conclude
that the district court had the discretion to “reduce” Lucero’s sentence
below the statutory minimum of 10 years provided in NRS 453.3385 upon
revoking his probation.

 

 
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order.

Per leet, J

Hardesty

Tconeur:

 

Tconcur in the result only: