Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Elvis C. Banks

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2020-06-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
2020 WI 51 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2002AP1871-D 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Elvis C. Banks, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Elvis C. Banks, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY BANKS REINSTATEMENT PROCEEDINGS 
Reported at 329 Wis. 2d 39,787 N.W.2d 809 
PDC No:2010 WI 105 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 3, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
KELLY, J. dissents, joined by REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
 
 
2020 WI 51
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2002AP1871-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Elvis C. Banks, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Elvis C. Banks, 
 
          Respondent. 
FILED 
 
JUN 3, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY reinstatement proceeding.   Reinstatement granted, 
with conditions.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review a report filed by Referee John 
B. Murphy, recommending that the court reinstate, with conditions, 
Elvis C. Banks' license to practice law in Wisconsin.  After 
careful review of the matter, we agree that Attorney Banks' license 
should be reinstated and that conditions should be placed upon his 
practice of law.  We also conclude that Attorney Banks should be 
required to pay the full costs of this reinstatement proceeding, 
which are $4,205.80 as of September 18, 2019.  
No.  2002AP1871-D 
 
 
2 
¶2 
Attorney Banks was admitted to the practice of law in 
Wisconsin in September 1997.  This court revoked his license to 
practice law in this state on July 16, 2003.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Banks, 2003 WI 115, 265 Wis. 2d 45, 665 
N.W.2d 827.  In that disciplinary proceeding, Attorney Banks pled 
no contest to 42 separate counts of professional misconduct arising 
out of 20 separate representations.  The counts included eight 
violations 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation; 11 violations for failure to follow client 
trust account rules; ten violations for failing to provide 
competent representation; eight violations for failing to act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; and 
one violation for knowingly disobeying an obligation under the 
rules of a tribunal.  In addition to pleading no contest to the 42 
counts mentioned above, Attorney Banks also filed a petition for 
consensual license revocation, in which he admitted that he could 
not defend against 17 additional counts of misconduct in another 
seven client matters.  Because we revoked his license on the basis 
of the 42 counts in the then-pending disciplinary proceeding, we 
deemed it unnecessary to rule on the additional misconduct 
disclosed in the petition for consensual license revocation.   
¶3 
Attorney Banks filed a petition for reinstatement of his 
license to practice law in May of 2009.  This court denied the 
petition for reinstatement, agreeing with the referee that 
Attorney Banks had failed to satisfy the requirements for 
reinstatement.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Banks, 2010 
WI 105, 329 Wis. 2d 39, 787 N.W.2d 809.   
No.  2002AP1871-D 
 
 
3 
¶4 
On June 29, 2018, Attorney Banks filed a second 
reinstatement petition.  After an investigation, the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation (OLR) filed a response on March 25, 2019, stating 
that it opposed Attorney Banks' reinstatement due to various 
concerns, including his failure to pay $11,430.04 in costs owed in 
connection with his 2003 disciplinary case and his first attempt 
at reinstatement, and his failure to pay $900 in restitution to 
the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection, which had made 
a payment in that amount arising from his misconduct.   
¶5 
The referee then held a public hearing on the 
reinstatement petition, at which only Attorney Banks testified.   
¶6 
The parties filed post-hearing memoranda.  As will be 
explained in more detail below, the OLR stated in its post-hearing 
memorandum that, based upon consideration of the complete record 
and in light of a post-hearing commitment by Attorney Banks to pay 
the OLR $300 per month toward his outstanding costs obligation, 
the OLR no longer opposed Attorney Banks' reinstatement. 
¶7 
On September 6, 2019, the referee filed a report 
recommending that this court conditionally grant Attorney Banks' 
reinstatement petition.   Among other things, the referee found 
that, since his revocation, Attorney Banks has "applied himself 
diligently to getting his life back on track"——efforts that are 
"impressive" and "give insight into the strength of [his] 
character."  The referee found that Attorney Banks currently works 
as a school teacher and a security guard.  The referee found that 
Attorney Banks has remained current with his continuing legal 
No.  2002AP1871-D 
 
 
4 
education requirements.1  The referee found that, if reinstated, 
Attorney Banks does not intend to practice law in Wisconsin, but 
rather plans to use his Wisconsin law license to help him become 
licensed to practice law in Tennessee or Mississippi.  The referee 
found that Attorney Banks has committed to pay the OLR $300 per 
month toward his outstanding costs obligations.  Ultimately, the 
referee wrote that he "concur[red] with the OLR recommendation 
that [Attorney] Banks' license to practice law in Wisconsin should 
be reinstated."  The referee proposed that the court impose the 
following two conditions on Attorney Banks' reinstatement:  (1) 
that he fully comply with his costs payment agreement with the 
OLR; and (2) that he annually provide the OLR with a summary of 
his finances.   
¶8 
Neither party appeals from the referee's recommendation, 
so the court considers this matter pursuant to SCR 22.33(3).2 
¶9 
In our review, we accept a referee's findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  We review a referee's legal 
conclusions, including whether the attorney has satisfied the 
criteria for reinstatement, on a de novo basis.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Jennings, 2011 WI 45, ¶39, 334 
                                                 
1 We note that the Board of Bar Examiners filed a memorandum 
on April 9, 2020, confirming that Attorney Banks is currently in 
compliance with the court's continuing legal education and ethics 
and professional responsibility requirements. 
 
2 SCR 22.33(3) provides:  "If no appeal is timely filed, the 
supreme 
court 
shall 
review 
the 
referee's 
report, 
order 
reinstatement, with or without conditions, deny reinstatement, or 
order the parties to file briefs in the matter."  
No.  2002AP1871-D 
 
 
5 
Wis. 2d 335, 801 N.W.2d 304; In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Gral, 2010 WI 14, ¶22, 323 Wis. 2d 280, 779 N.W.2d 168. 
¶10 Supreme Court Rule 22.29(4) provides that a petition for 
reinstatement must show all of the following: 
(a) The petitioner desires to have the petitioner's license 
reinstated. 
(b) The petitioner has not practiced law during the period of 
suspension or revocation. 
(c) The petitioner has complied fully with the terms of the 
order of suspension or revocation and will continue to comply with 
them until the petitioner's license is reinstated. 
(d) The petitioner has maintained competence and learning in 
the law by attendance at identified educational activities. 
(e) The petitioner's conduct since the suspension or 
revocation has been exemplary and above reproach. 
(f) The petitioner has a proper understanding of and attitude 
toward the standards that are imposed upon members of the bar and 
will act in conformity with the standards. 
(g) The petitioner can safely be recommended to the legal 
profession, the courts and the public as a person fit to be 
consulted by others and to represent them and otherwise act in 
matters of trust and confidence and in general to aid in the 
administration of justice as a member of the bar and as an officer 
of the courts. 
No.  2002AP1871-D 
 
 
6 
(h) The petitioner has fully complied with the requirements 
set forth in SCR 22.26.3 
                                                 
 
3 SCR 22.26 provides:   
 
(1) On or before the effective date of license 
suspension or revocation, an attorney whose license is 
suspended or revoked shall do all of the following:  
(a) Notify by certified mail all clients being 
represented in pending matters of the suspension or 
revocation and of the attorney's consequent inability to 
act as an attorney following the effective date of the 
suspension or revocation.  
(b) Advise the clients to seek legal advice of their 
choice elsewhere.  
(c) Promptly provide written notification to the 
court or administrative agency and the attorney for each 
party 
in 
a 
matter 
pending 
before 
a 
court 
or 
administrative agency of the suspension or revocation 
and of the attorney's consequent inability to act as an 
attorney following the effective date of the suspension 
or revocation. The notice shall identify the successor 
attorney of the attorney's client or, if there is none 
at the time notice is given, shall state the client's 
place of residence.  
(d) Within the first 15 days after the effective 
date of suspension or revocation, make all arrangements 
for the temporary or permanent closing or winding up of 
the attorney's practice. The attorney may assist in 
having others take over clients' work in progress.  
(e) Within 25 days after the effective date of 
suspension or revocation, file with the director an 
affidavit showing all of the following: 
                                     (continued) 
 
 
(i) Full compliance with the provisions of the 
suspension or revocation order and with the rules and 
No.  2002AP1871-D 
 
 
7 
(j) The petitioner's proposed use of the license if 
reinstated. 
(k) A full description of all of the petitioner's business 
activities during the period of suspension or revocation. 
¶11 Supreme Court Rule 22.29(4m) requires the petitioner to 
show that he or she has made restitution to or settled all claims 
of persons injured or harmed by the petitioner's misconduct, 
including reimbursement to the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client 
                                                 
procedures regarding the closing of the attorney's 
practice.  
(ii) A list of all jurisdictions, including state, 
federal and administrative bodies, before which the 
attorney is admitted to practice.  
(iii) A list of clients in all pending matters and 
a list of all matters pending before any court or 
administrative agency, together with the case number of 
each matter.  
(f) Maintain records of the various steps taken 
under this rule in order that, in any subsequent 
proceeding instituted by or against the attorney, proof 
of compliance with the rule and with the suspension or 
revocation order is available.  
(2) An attorney whose license to practice law is 
suspended or revoked or who is suspended from the 
practice of law may not engage in this state in the 
practice of law or in any law work activity customarily 
done by law students, law clerks, or other paralegal 
personnel, except that the attorney may engage in law 
related work in this state for a commercial employer 
itself not engaged in the practice of law.  
(3) Proof of compliance with this rule is a 
condition precedent to reinstatement of the attorney's 
license to practice law. 
No.  2002AP1871-D 
 
 
8 
Protection for all payments made from that fund, or explained the 
failure or inability to do so.   
¶12 Supreme Court Rule 22.31(1)(c) provides that an attorney 
seeking reinstatement has the burden of demonstrating all of the 
above requirements by clear, satisfactory, and convincing 
evidence.  Supreme Court Rule 22.31(1) also provides that an 
attorney seeking reinstatement must show by clear, satisfactory, 
and convincing evidence that he or she has the moral character to 
practice law; that his or her resumption of the practice of law 
will not be detrimental to the administration of justice or 
subversive to the public interest; and that he or she has complied 
with SCR 22.26 and the terms of the underlying disciplinary order.  
See SCR 22.31(1)(a), (b), and (d). 
¶13 Our review of this matter is complicated by the fact 
that the referee did not make specific findings or conclusions 
with respect to 
a number of the criteria required for 
reinstatement.  Instead, the referee primarily focused on what he 
viewed as the most significant challenge facing Attorney Banks' 
reinstatement petition:  his failure to pay $11,430.04 in costs 
owed in connection with his 2003 disciplinary case and his first 
attempt at reinstatement.   
¶14 To be sure, Attorney Banks' outstanding costs obligation 
was an important factor for the referee to consider.  Outstanding 
costs obligations must be addressed in reinstatement proceedings, 
see SCR 22.29(4)(c) and 22.31(1)(d), and their existence bears on 
many of the reinstatement criteria.  But as our above discussion 
of SCR 22.29(4), (4m), and 22.31(1) shows, there are many other 
No.  2002AP1871-D 
 
 
9 
factors that must be taken into account, and the referee's report 
suffers for having failed to explicitly and thoroughly do so.  
¶15 Although the referee's report is lacking in this 
respect, we opt not to remand this matter to the referee for 
additional findings and conclusions, for two reasons.  First, 
further proceedings before the referee would generate additional 
costs for Attorney Banks——who, the record shows, already has 
considerable financial obligations——and would serve to delay the 
disposition of this matter further.  Second, in its post-hearing 
memorandum filed with the referee, the OLR agreed that Attorney 
Banks has satisfied all requirements for reinstatement, and the 
referee 
endorsed 
this 
agreement 
between 
the 
parties.  
Specifically, the OLR wrote: 
To gain reinstatement, [Attorney] Banks must prove by 
clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that: (a) 
he has the moral character to practice law; (b) his 
resumption of the practice of law will not be detrimental 
to the administration of justice or subversive of the 
public interest; (c) his representations in the 
reinstatement petition, including the representations 
required by SCR 22.29(4)(a)-(k), (4m), and (5), are 
substantiated; and (d) he has complied fully with the 
terms of the revocation order and with the requirements 
of SCR 22.26.  Based upon the complete record, on balance 
it appears that [Attorney] Banks made an adequate 
showing as to (a)-(c) and, in light of his post-
reinstatement 
hearing 
renewed 
costs 
repayment 
arrangement with OLR, is in substantial compliance with 
(d), as well.  Accordingly, OLR does not oppose 
reinstatement.  (citations and footnote omitted).   
As noted, the referee wrote in his report that he "concur[s] with 
the OLR recommendation that [Attorney] Banks' license to practice 
law in Wisconsin should be reinstated."   
No.  2002AP1871-D 
 
 
10 
¶16 Although it would have been far better practice for the 
referee to have made specific findings and conclusions regarding 
each of the reinstatement requirements, informed by the parties' 
agreement that they have been met, the lack of such explicit 
findings and conclusions does not require that we remand this 
matter to the referee.  The parties and the referee concur that 
Attorney Banks has satisfactorily shown that he has met the 
reinstatement criteria delineated above.  Although we are not bound 
by this consensus, see In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Ruppelt, 2017 WI 80, ¶¶30, 34, 377 Wis. 2d 441, 898 N.W.2d 473, we 
agree with its correctness, based on our independent review of the 
record and the particular circumstances of this case.  
¶17 Therefore, we hold that Attorney Banks is entitled to 
reinstatement of his license to practice law in Wisconsin.  In 
order to ensure that Attorney Banks remains in compliance with the 
terms of his previous disciplinary and reinstatement proceedings 
and with the requirements of SCR 22.26, and in order to ensure his 
past misconduct is not repeated, we deem it appropriate to impose 
the following conditions on the reinstatement of his license to 
practice law in Wisconsin: 
 Attorney Banks shall continue to comply with his costs 
payments to the OLR until such time as his costs obligation 
is fully satisfied. 
 Within 30 days of the date of his reinstatement, Attorney 
Banks shall confer with appropriate representatives of the 
OLR to discuss and reach a plan for repayment of the $900 
No.  2002AP1871-D 
 
 
11 
in restitution owed to the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for 
Client Protection.  
 Attorney Banks shall annually file with the OLR a financial 
statement in a form acceptable to the OLR, along with 
copies of his state and federal tax returns, until such 
time as he has satisfied all costs and restitution 
obligations referenced above. 
¶18 Finally, with respect to the costs of this reinstatement 
proceeding, it is our general practice to assess the full costs of 
the 
proceeding 
against 
the 
petitioning 
attorney. 
 
See 
SCR 22.24(1m).  The OLR's statement of costs indicates that the 
costs of this proceeding, as of September 18, 2019, were $4,205.80.  
Attorney Banks has not filed an objection to the OLR's statement 
of costs, and we find no basis to depart from our general policy 
in this matter.  Accordingly, we impose the full costs of the 
reinstatement proceeding on Attorney Banks.  As is standard 
procedure, Attorney Banks may contact the OLR to request a payment 
plan that will enable him to pay the full costs of this proceeding 
in a matter consistent with his financial ability. 
¶19 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Elvis C. Banks to 
practice law in Wisconsin is reinstated, effective the date of 
this order, subject to compliance with the conditions set forth in 
this order.  Absent such compliance, and absent a showing to this 
court of his inability to comply with this order, the license of 
Elvis C. Banks to practice law in Wisconsin shall be suspended 
until further order of the court. 
No.  2002AP1871-D 
 
 
12 
¶20 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of 
this order, Elvis C. Banks shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are $4,205.80 as of 
September 18, 2019, or enter into a payment agreement plan with 
the Office of Lawyer Regulation for the full payment of costs over 
a period of time.   
 
 
 
No.  2002AP1871-D.dk 
 
1 
 
¶21 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (dissenting).  I respectfully, and 
reluctantly, dissent.  Our rules say that an attorney seeking 
reinstatement must prove, inter alia, that: 
 He "has a proper understanding of and attitude toward 
the standards that are imposed upon members of the 
bar and will act in conformity with the standards." 
(SCR 22.29(4)(f)); 
 He "can safely be recommended to the legal profession, 
the courts and the public as a person fit to be 
consulted by others and to represent them and 
otherwise act in matters of trust and confidence and 
in general to aid in the administration of justice as 
a member of the bar and as an officer of the courts." 
(SCR 22.29(4)(g)); 
 He "has the moral character to practice law in 
Wisconsin." (SCR 22.31(1)(a)); and 
 His "resumption of the practice of law will not be 
detrimental to the administration of justice or 
subversive 
of 
the 
public 
interest."  
(SCR 22.31(1)(b)). 
Mr. Banks must establish these criteria with "clear, satisfactory, 
and convincing evidence" (SCR 22.31(1)) at a reinstatement hearing 
before a court-appointed referee.  SCR 22.30.  I dissent because 
we have no way of knowing whether Mr. Banks meets those 
prerequisites; I do so reluctantly because I am privy to no 
information suggesting he does not. 
¶22 I am in this uncomfortable place primarily because of 
the deficiencies of the referee's report.  The referee's role in 
the reinstatement process is crucial.  His responsibility is not 
just to resolve disputed facts; he actually creates the factual 
record we use in determining whether the petitioner has satisfied 
the prerequisites for reinstatement.  SCR 22.32(1) ("[T]he referee 
No.  2002AP1871-D.dk 
 
2 
 
shall file in the supreme court a report setting forth findings 
and a recommendation on the petition for reinstatement.").  We are 
not the finders of fact——we simply review the referee's findings 
for clear error.  See Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mutschler, 
2019 WI 92, ¶9, 388 Wis. 2d 486, 933 N.W.2d 99 ("On review, we 
accept a referee's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous.")  We then determine for ourselves whether those facts 
warrant reinstatement of the petitioner's license to practice law 
(although 
we 
benefit 
from 
the 
referee's 
analysis 
and 
recommendation).  Id. ("We review a referee's legal conclusions, 
including whether the attorney has satisfied the criteria for 
reinstatement, on a de novo basis."); Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Mandelman, 2018 WI 56, ¶24, 381 Wis. 2d 628, 912 
N.W.2d 395 reconsideration denied sub nom. Office of Lawyer 
Regulation v. Mandelman, 2018 WI 100, 384 Wis. 2d 771, 920 
N.W.2d 928 
("We 
benefit 
from 
the 
referee's 
findings 
and 
conclusions . . . .").  This responsibility "require[s] us to 
undertake a comprehensive assessment of the lawyer . . . .").  Id. 
¶23 The report in this case, however, prevents us from 
performing that comprehensive assessment.  The referee made not a 
single finding relevant to the criteria quoted above, a deficiency 
readily acknowledged by the court's opinion.  Majority op., ¶13 
("[T]he referee did not make specific findings or conclusions with 
respect to a number of the criteria required for reinstatement.").  
How, then, are we supposed to know whether Mr. Banks properly 
understands his responsibilities as an attorney?  Or whether we 
can safely recommend him to our fellow Wisconsinites as a person 
No.  2002AP1871-D.dk 
 
3 
 
fit to practice law?  What are we to consult in determining whether 
he has the moral character we expect of those we license?  If asked 
to justify our decision today, on what would we rely for our 
confidence that his practice will not subvert the public interest? 
¶24 The court's solution is to take on the role of the 
referee and perform an independent assessment of the record.  
Majority op., ¶16.  Nothing in our rules prevents this course of 
action, and indeed it may be pragmatically preferable to remanding 
the matter to the referee for additional attention.  I would accept 
that unorthodox procedure if the record didn't mirror the report's 
lack of facts supporting the criteria I identified above. 
¶25 Take, for example, Mr. Banks' obligation to prove he 
"has a proper understanding of and attitude toward the standards 
that are imposed upon members of the bar and will act in conformity 
with the standards." SCR 22.29(4)(f).  His petition alleges, in 
conclusory fashion, that he has satisfied this condition.  The 
Office of Lawyer Regulation ("OLR"), however, was not convinced.  
Its response says "Banks has not met his burden regarding this 
requirement given his continued lack of appreciation for what he 
did wrong and his statements suggesting that he continues to 
believe that the events leading to his revocation were not within 
his control."  The OLR proceeded to document three specific ways 
in which Mr. Banks failed this standard.  At the ensuing hearing, 
no one addressed this issue.  Mr. Banks' written closing statement 
obliquely touched on it by expressing his appreciation for the 
role of the rule of law in reducing racial discrimination, and by 
asserting he has "always had a proper understanding and attitude 
No.  2002AP1871-D.dk 
 
4 
 
toward the standards that are imposed upon members of the bar."  
Notwithstanding its original position, the OLR's closing statement 
says that, "[b]ased upon the complete record, on balance it appears 
that Banks made an adequate showing as to" his compliance with 
SCR 22.29(4)(f).  If he did, indeed, make an adequate showing, 
it's not reflected anywhere in the record.  All we have to go on 
is the OLR's unsubstantiated assurance. 
¶26 The same is true with respect to his duty to prove he:  
can safely be recommended to the legal profession, the 
courts and the public as a person fit to be consulted by 
others and to represent them and otherwise act in matters 
of trust and confidence and in general to aid in the 
administration of justice as a member of the bar and as 
an officer of the courts.  
SCR 22.29(4)(g).  As with the previous criterion, his petition 
summarily asserts he satisfies this condition.  The OLR contests 
this assertion, just as it did above, and substantiates its 
concerns with specific examples of his lack of fitness.  No one 
addressed this issue at the hearing either.  Nonetheless, the OLR's 
post hearing submission asserts Mr. Banks' fitness.  The OLR does 
not say what changed between its response to the petition and its 
closing statement.  So when the court concludes that Mr. Banks is 
fit to practice law, it is relying on nothing more than the OLR's 
unexplained change of opinion. 
¶27 The record is similarly lacking with respect to Mr. 
Banks' obligation to prove he "has the moral character to practice 
law in Wisconsin." SCR 22.31(1)(a).  After reviewing Mr. Banks' 
petition and supporting material, the OLR opined that he "faces a 
high burden to prove that he has the moral character to practice 
No.  2002AP1871-D.dk 
 
5 
 
law in Wisconsin . . . ."  This suggests that, at least at the 
beginning of the hearing, Mr. Banks' materials had failed to 
convince the OLR that he has the requisite character.  But after 
the hearing, at which no one spoke of this issue, the OLR changed 
its position, saying Mr. Banks "had made an adequate showing" of 
a moral character sufficient to practice law in Wisconsin.  The 
OLR doesn't say what informed this belief or why it changed its 
position.  Nor does anything in the record shed light on the 
switch.  Nor does it give us the information necessary to 
independently 
conclude 
the 
OLR's 
original 
reticence 
was 
unjustified. 
¶28 Finally, it seems everyone has simply ignored the 
requirement that Mr. Banks prove his "resumption of the practice 
of law will not be detrimental to the administration of justice or 
subversive of the public interest."  SCR 22.31(1)(b).  The OLR's 
questionnaire asks for a statement of facts showing that Mr. Banks 
satisfied this requirement.  His response simply says "see 
addendum."  The addendum comprises nothing but a collection of 
financial documents.  No one addressed this issue in the hearing, 
and the OLR's closing statement simply asserts he has satisfied 
the criterion.  So once again, an independent review of the record 
discloses that we have nothing upon which to base our conclusion 
except the OLR's unsubstantiated assertion. 
¶29 I do not doubt the OLR genuinely believes that Mr. Banks 
has satisfied the prerequisites to reinstatement of his law 
license.  Nor do I have information affirmatively suggesting Mr. 
Banks should not be reinstated.  But we don't reinstate attorneys 
No.  2002AP1871-D.dk 
 
6 
 
based on the OLR's beliefs or the absence of negative information 
in the record.  We require proof——by clear, satisfactory, and 
convincing evidence——that the petitioner has affirmatively met the 
conditions for reinstatement.  Instead of proof, however, we have 
a referee's report that does not address the criteria discussed 
above, a lack of testimony or other evidence from Mr. Banks to 
prove their satisfaction, and the OLR's failure to explain why it 
believes we need not inquire any further into the rationale for 
his reinstatement.  And that means, with respect to the criteria 
I identified above, we have no facts at all with which to inform 
our judgment.  So although we have the authority to act as the 
fact finder in reinstatement petitions, I haven't found facts in 
this record to support the reinstatement criteria I discussed.  
For these reasons, I would remand the petition to the referee for 
further fact-finding.  Therefore, I respectfully (and reluctantly) 
dissent. 
¶30 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
No.  2002AP1871-D.dk 
 
1