Case Title: State v. Burnside

Citation: 2003-Ohio-5372

Docket Number: 20021440

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2003-10-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. BURNSIDE, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372.] 
Motor vehicles — Driving while intoxicated — Blood test used to determine 
alcohol content — State does not substantially comply with Ohio 
Adm.Code 3701-53-05 when it fails to use a solid anticoagulant in a blood 
test. 
(Nos. 2002-1440 and 2002-1524 — Submitted May 14, 2003 — Decided 
October 22, 2003.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Fairfield County, No. 
01CA60, 2002-Ohio-4344. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
The state does not substantially comply with Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-05 when it 
fails to use a solid anticoagulant in a blood test. 
__________________ 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶1} 
The issue presented in this case is whether the state substantially 
complies with the alcohol-testing regulations set forth in the Ohio Administrative 
Code when it fails to use a solid anticoagulant in a blood test. 
I 
{¶2} 
On July 28, 2001, Trooper Donald A. Ward arrested defendant-
appellee, Chadd A. Burnside, for driving under the influence of alcohol. In the 
early hours of that morning, Trooper Ward stopped Burnside’s vehicle for a 
speeding violation. During the stop, Trooper Ward observed that Burnside had 
glassy eyes and smelled of alcohol. Burnside admitted that he had consumed “a 
few” alcoholic beverages and consented to a standard field sobriety test. Upon the 
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completion of the field sobriety test, Trooper Ward arrested Burnside and charged 
him with driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of  R.C. 
4511.19(A)(1). 
{¶3} 
Trooper Ward transported Burnside to the State Highway Patrol 
Post, where he asked Burnside to submit to a chemical breath test. Burnside 
refused and requested a blood test. Trooper Ward then transported Burnside to the 
Fairfield Medical Center, where a phlebotomist drew a blood sample. After 
properly sealing the blood sample, Trooper Ward mailed the sample to the State 
Highway Patrol Laboratory in Columbus, Ohio. A criminalist at the laboratory 
tested the sample and determined that Burnside’s blood-alcohol content was 0.169 
grams per 100 milliliters. As a result, Trooper Ward additionally charged 
Burnside with operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood-alcohol level in 
violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(2). 
{¶4} 
On August 1, 2001, Burnside entered pleas of not guilty to charges 
of speeding, driving under the influence of alcohol, and driving with a prohibited 
level of alcohol.  Burnside thereafter filed a motion to suppress the blood-test 
results, asserting that the state had failed to substantially comply with the blood-
testing procedures in Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-05. At the suppression hearing, 
the state presented testimony from the arresting officer, the phlebotomist who 
drew the blood sample, and the criminalist who tested the blood sample. Burnside 
presented no evidence. During closing argument, Burnside asserted that the 
blood-test results should be suppressed because the state had failed to establish 
that it (1) used a nonvolatile antiseptic on his skin prior to collecting the blood 
sample and (2) drew the blood into a vacuum container with a solid anticoagulant. 
The trial court overruled Burnside’s motion to suppress, holding that the state had 
substantially complied with the blood-testing procedures in Ohio Adm.Code 
3701-53-05. 
January Term, 2003 
3 
{¶5} 
On December 4, 2001, Burnside entered a plea of no contest to 
operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited level of alcohol in violation of R.C. 
4511.19(A)(2). In exchange, the state dismissed the remaining charges. Burnside 
appealed his conviction to the Fifth District Court of Appeals, alleging that the 
trial court had erred in denying his motion to suppress the blood-test results. The 
court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court on the basis that the state 
failed to substantially comply with Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-05 and certified its 
judgment to be in conflict with that of the Seventh District Court of Appeals in 
State v. Zuzga (2001), 141 Ohio App.3d 696, 753 N.E.2d 229. 
{¶6} 
This cause is now before this court upon our determination that a 
conflict exists in case No. 2002-1524 and pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal in case No. 2002-1440. 
II 
{¶7} 
The court of appeals certified the following issue for our 
determination: “When there is no evidence that a solid anticoagulant is used in a 
blood test to determine alcohol content as required by O.A.C. 3701-53-05(C), dos 
[sic] the State still meet its burden of substantial compliance with Department of 
Health regulations?” Our analysis of the certified issue begins with the 
appropriate standard of review. 
A. Standard of Review 
{¶8} 
Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed 
question of law and fact.  When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court 
assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve 
factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses. State v. Mills (1992), 
62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 972. Consequently, an appellate court must 
accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, 
credible evidence. State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 1 OBR 57, 437 
N.E.2d 583. Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then 
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independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, 
whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. State v. McNamara (1997), 
124 Ohio App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539. We therefore consider whether the facts 
in the instant case demonstrate substantial compliance with the Department of 
Health regulations under a de novo standard of review. Resolution of this issue 
requires an examination of the blood-testing procedures in Ohio Adm.Code 3701-
53-05. 
B. The Blood-Testing Procedures in Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-05. 
{¶9} 
The General Assembly established the threshold criteria for the 
admissibility of alcohol-test results in prosecutions for driving under the influence 
and driving with a prohibited concentration of alcohol in R.C. 4511.19(D). That 
section, which governs the admissibility of alcohol-test results, provides that a 
defendant’s blood, breath, or urine “shall be analyzed in accordance with methods 
approved by the director of health by an individual possessing a valid permit 
issued by the director of health pursuant to section 3701.143 of the Revised 
Code.” R.C. 3701.143 requires the director of health to “determine, or cause to be 
determined, techniques or methods for chemically analyzing a person’s blood.” 
{¶10} In accordance with this statutory mandate, the Director of Health 
promulgated the following alcohol-testing regulations in Ohio Adm.Code 3701-
53-05: 
{¶11} “(A) All samples shall be collected in accordance with section 
4511.19, or section 1547.11 of the Revised Code, as applicable. 
{¶12} “(B) When collecting a blood sample, an aqueous solution of a 
non-volatile antiseptic shall be used on the skin. No alcohols shall be used as a 
skin antiseptic. 
{¶13} “(C) Blood shall be drawn with a sterile dry needle into a vacuum 
container with a solid anticoagulant, or according to the laboratory protocol as 
January Term, 2003 
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written in the laboratory procedure manual based on the type of specimen being 
tested. 
{¶14} “(D) The collection of a urine specimen must be witnessed to 
assure that the sample can be authenticated. Urine shall be deposited into a clean 
glass or plastic screw top container which shall be capped, or collected according 
to the laboratory protocol as written in the laboratory procedure manual. 
{¶15} “(E) Blood and urine containers shall be sealed in a manner such 
that tampering can be detected and have a label which contains at least the 
following information: 
{¶16} “(1) Name of suspect; 
{¶17} “(2) Date and time of collection; 
{¶18} “(3) Name or initials of person collecting the sample; and 
{¶19} “(4) Name or initials of person sealing the sample. 
{¶20} “(F) While not in transit or under examination, all blood and urine 
specimens shall be refrigerated.” (Emphasis added.) 
{¶21} The blood-testing procedure in Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-05 thus 
requires the state to (1) use an aqueous solution of a nonvolatile antiseptic on the 
skin, (2) use a sterile dry needle to draw blood into a vacuum container with a 
solid anticoagulant, (3) seal the blood container in accordance with the 
appropriate procedure, and (4) refrigerate the blood specimen when it is not in 
transit or under examination. The purpose of these regulations is to ensure the 
accuracy of the alcohol-test results. State v. Dickerson (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 64, 
65-66, 25 OBR 86, 495 N.E.2d 6. 
C. Judicial Interpretation of Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-05 
{¶22} We first addressed the application of the Department of Health 
regulations that govern alcohol testing in State v. Steele (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 
187, 6 O.O.3d 418, 370 N.E.2d 740. Steele involved the admissibility of a breath-
alcohol test administered by a police officer who failed to continuously observe a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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subject for the requisite 20-minute observation period prior to administering the 
test. We concluded that the failure to observe the subject for a “few seconds” 
while the officer exited and walked around his patrol car did not render the test 
results inadmissible. Steele thus established that rigid compliance with the 
alcohol-testing procedures in the Ohio Administrative Code is not a prerequisite 
to the admissibility of alcohol-test results. 
{¶23} Nearly a decade later, we again addressed whether the state had 
complied with the Department of Health regulations relating to alcohol testing in 
State v. Plummer (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 292, 22 OBR 461, 490 N.E.2d 902. In 
Plummer, we considered the consequences of the state’s failure to comply with a 
regulation that required it to refrigerate urine samples that were not in transit or 
under examination. Concluding that a three-to-four-hour interval without 
refrigeration did not render the test results inadmissible, we held that “[a]bsent a 
showing of prejudice to a defendant, the results of a urine-alcohol test 
administered in substantial compliance with Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-05 are 
admissible in a prosecution under R.C. 4511.19.” Id. at syllabus. 
{¶24} In the wake of Plummer, courts have applied a burden-shifting 
procedure to govern the admissibility of alcohol-test results. E.g., State v. Zuzga, 
141 Ohio App.3d at 698-699, 753 N.E.2d 229. The defendant must first challenge 
the validity of the alcohol test by way of a pretrial motion to suppress; failure to 
file such a motion “waives the requirement on the state to lay a foundation for the 
admissibility of the test results.” State v. French (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 446, 451, 
650 N.E.2d 887. After a defendant challenges the validity of test results in a 
pretrial motion, the state has the burden to show that the test was administered in 
substantial compliance with the regulations prescribed by the Director of Health. 
Once the state has satisfied this burden and created a presumption of 
admissibility, the burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut that presumption by 
demonstrating that he was prejudiced by anything less than strict compliance. 
January Term, 2003 
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State v. Brown (1996), 109 Ohio App.3d 629, 632, 672 N.E.2d 1050. Hence, 
evidence of prejudice is relevant only after the state demonstrates substantial 
compliance with the applicable regulation. 
{¶25} Against this backdrop, we turn to the instant case. 
III 
{¶26} The state does not dispute that it had the burden to establish 
compliance with Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-05, that this provision requires the use 
of a solid anticoagulant, and that it failed to establish the use of an anticoagulant. 
The state’s argument, rather, is that it need not use a solid anticoagulant to 
substantially comply with Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-05. We begin our analysis by 
examining the parameters of the “substantial compliance” standard. 
A 
{¶27} In determining the admissibility of alcohol-test results regulated by 
Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-05, we have observed that “there is leeway for 
substantial, though not literal, compliance with such regulations.” Plummer, 22 
Ohio St.3d at 294, 22 OBR 461, 490 N.E.2d 902. The state must therefore 
establish that it substantially complied with the alcohol-testing regulations to 
trigger the presumption of admissibility. Our conclusion that the state must 
establish substantial compliance rather than strict compliance, however, does not 
relieve the state of its burden to prove compliance with the alcohol-testing 
regulations, but rather defines what compliance is. 
{¶28} Although we have not had occasion to expound upon the 
substantial-compliance standard, appellate courts have developed two approaches 
to determine whether the state has substantially complied with Ohio Adm.Code 
3701-53-05. One approach is to consider whether the noncompliance rendered the 
test results unreliable. See, e.g., State v. Gray (1980), 4 Ohio App.3d 47, 50, 51, 4 
OBR 96, 446 N.E.2d 469. Under this approach, a court will conclude that the state 
has substantially complied with the Department of Health regulations if the 
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alleged deviation did not affect the reliability of the test results. Id. The other 
approach for determining substantial compliance is to consider whether the 
alleged deviation prejudiced the defendant. See, e.g., State v. Zuzga (2001), 141 
Ohio App.3d 696, 701, 753 N.E.2d 229. Under this approach, a court will 
conclude that the state has substantially complied with the Department of Health 
regulations so long as the alleged deviation did not cause an erroneously higher 
test result.  Id. 
{¶29} The import in denominating between these two approaches lies not 
in understanding the difference between them, but rather in recognizing the 
similarity: both require a judicial determination of what effect, if any, 
noncompliance had on the alcohol-test results. This determination, however, often 
requires judges to speculate why the Director of Health adopted a given 
regulation. One judge, charged with determining whether the failure to strictly 
comply with a regulation rendered alcohol-test results unreliable, deplored the 
fact that “most judges, myself included, do not know enough about chemistry, 
physics, or scientific testing so as to be able to know why the Department of 
Health adopted some of the required procedures. 
{¶30} “* * * 
{¶31} “* * * Thus, since I cannot know whether there was substantial 
compliance in this case, I am left with having to guess.” State v. Mitchell (Mar. 
31, 1995), 6th Dist. No. L-92-227, 1995 WL 136820 (Grey, J., dissenting). 
{¶32} This sentiment is not surprising when one considers the more 
fundamental problem with such a method of determining admissibility: a judicial 
determination that an alcohol test, although not administered in strict compliance 
with the alcohol-testing regulations, is reliable and therefore admissible may 
subvert the rule-making authority and the statutory mandate of the Director of 
Health. Indeed, the General Assembly instructed the Director of Health—and not 
the judiciary—to ensure the reliability of alcohol-test results by promulgating 
January Term, 2003 
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regulations precisely because the former possesses the scientific expertise that the 
latter does not. See R.C. 4511.19(D)(1). Notwithstanding this statutory mandate, 
however, courts have concluded that the state need not show strict compliance 
with the regulations prescribed by the Director of Health if a judge deems the test 
results reliable. The problem, of course, is that such an approach is inconsistent 
with R.C. 4511.19, which provides that compliance with the regulations, rather 
than a judicial determination as to reliability, is the criterion for admissibility. See 
Cincinnati v. Sand (1975), 43 Ohio St.2d 79, 72 O.O.2d 44, 330 N.E.2d 908. 
{¶33} This problem is particularly acute where, as here, the state has 
failed to proffer evidence that it complied with a particular regulation directly 
related to blood-alcohol testing. To state it succinctly: A court infringes upon the 
authority of the Director of Health when it holds that the state need not do that 
which the director has required. Such an infringement places the court in the 
position of the Director of Health for the precise purpose of second-guessing 
whether the regulation with which the state has not complied is necessary to 
ensure the reliability of the alcohol-test results. This approach further precipitates 
conflicting decisions from lower courts and impedes the public policy of 
achieving uniformity and stability in the law. Painter, Ohio Driving Under the 
Influence Law (2003), Section 9.3, 116. 
{¶34} Nevertheless, we are cognizant that if “we were to agree * * * that 
any deviation whatsoever from th[e] regulation rendered the results of a [test] 
inadmissible, we would be ignoring the fact that strict compliance is not always 
realistically or humanly possible.” Plummer, 22 Ohio St.3d at 294, 22 OBR 461, 
490 N.E.2d 902. Precisely for this reason, we concluded in Steele that rigid 
compliance with the Department of Health regulations is not necessary for test 
results to be admissible. Steele, 52 Ohio St.2d at 187, 6 O.O.3d 418, 370 N.E.2d 
740 (holding that the failure to observe a driver for a “few seconds” during the 
20-minute observation period did not render the test results inadmissible). To 
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avoid usurping a function that the General Assembly has assigned to the Director 
of Health, however, we must limit the substantial-compliance standard set forth in 
Plummer to excusing only errors that are clearly de minimis. Consistent with this 
limitation, we have characterized those errors that are excusable under the 
substantial-compliance standard as “minor procedural deviations.” State v. Homan 
(2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 421, 426, 732 N.E.2d 952. 
{¶35} With these principles in mind, we consider whether the state 
substantially complied with the alcohol-testing regulations in the instant case. 
B 
{¶36} The state asserts that it substantially complied with the alcohol-
testing regulations notwithstanding its failure to establish the use of a solid 
anticoagulant. We disagree. Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-05(C) declares in no 
uncertain terms that “[b]lood shall be drawn * * * into a vacuum container with a 
solid anticoagulant.” (Emphasis added.) This language does not advise the use of 
a solid anticoagulant when drawing a blood sample; it demands it.  Indeed, the 
state failed to produce any evidence that it complied with Ohio Adm.Code 3701-
53-05(C). As a result, we cannot conclude that such an error is de minimis and 
therefore permissible under the substantial-compliance standard. Given that the 
state failed to establish substantial compliance, its insistence that the defendant 
did not show prejudice is immaterial; rather, any evidence of prejudice would 
have been relevant only after the state demonstrated substantial compliance with 
the alcohol-testing regulations in Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-05(C). 
{¶37} Finally, we address the state’s argument that the alcohol-test 
results in the instant case should be admissible because the use of a solid 
anticoagulant was not necessary to ensure the reliability of the alcohol testing. 
This argument is properly directed not to us but to the Director of Health, whose 
charge it is to promulgate regulations that will ensure the reliability of alcohol-test 
results. To hold otherwise would be to speculate, with neither the requisite 
January Term, 2003 
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expertise nor the statutory authority, whether the failure to use a solid 
anticoagulant affected the reliability of the alcohol-test results in the instant case. 
{¶38} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
HILDEBRANDT, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, KLATT, LUNDBERG STRATTON and 
BROWN, JJ., concur. 
 
LEE H. HILDEBRANDT JR., J., of the First Appellate District, sitting for 
RESNICK, J. 
 
WILLIAM A. KLATT, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for COOK, J. 
 
SUSAN BROWN, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for O’CONNOR, 
J. 
__________________ 
Jason M. Griggs, Fairfield County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Terre Lynne Vandervoort, Lancaster Law Director, for appellant. 
Dagger, Johnston, Miller, Ogilvie & Hampson and Scott P. Wood, for 
appellee. 
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