Case Title: Crawford v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation

Citation: 

Docket Number: 20160252

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 2017-04-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH
DAKOTA 2017 ND 103Ryan Dean
Crawford, Appellantv.Director, North Dakota Department of Transportation,
AppelleeNo. 20160252Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh
County, South Central Judicial District, the Honorable
John W. Grinsteiner, Judge.AFFIRMED.Opinion of the Court by VandeWalle, Chief Justice.Michael R. Hoffman, P.O. Box 1056, Bismarck, N.D.
58502-1056, for appellant.Andrew Moraghan,
Assistant Attorney General, 500 North Ninth Street, Bismarck, N.D. 58501-4509, for
appellee.Crawford v. North Dakota Dep't of
Transp.No. 20160252VandeWalle, Chief
Justice.[¶1] Ryan Crawford appealed from a district court
judgment affirming a Department of Transportation decision suspending his driving privileges
for two years. Crawford argues (1) the arresting officer did not have grounds to initially stop his
vehicle, and (2) the results of a warrantless blood test should not have been admitted into
evidence in the license suspension proceeding. We conclude the arresting officer had a
reasonable and articulable suspicion to initially stop Crawford's vehicle. We also conclude that
assuming Crawford's consent to the warrantless blood test was involuntary for purposes of this
appeal, the exclusionary rule does not require suppression of the results of the blood test in this
civil administrative license suspension proceeding under Beylund v. Levi, 2017 ND 30, 889 N.W.2d 907.
We affirm.I[¶2] According to the arresting
officer, he stopped a vehicle driven by Crawford for swerving over a centerline on a residential
street in Bismarck in January 2016, and ultimately arrested Crawford for driving under the
influence. After the officer read Crawford the implied consent advisory, Crawford submitted to a
warrantless blood test incident to the arrest, and the result of that test indicated a blood alcohol
concentration above the legal limit. Crawford requested an administrative hearing on the
Department's intended suspension of his license but did not testify at the hearing. After the
administrative hearing, the Department suspended Crawford's driving privileges for two years.
The district court affirmed the Department's decision.II[¶3] The Administrative Agencies Practice Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32, governs our
review of an administrative decision suspending or revoking a driver's license. E.g., Koehly v. Levi, 2016 ND 202, ¶ 15, 886 N.W.2d 689. Under N.D.C.C.
§ 28-32-49, we review an administrative appeal from a district court judgment in the same
manner as provided under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-46, which requires a district court to affirm
an agency order unless the order is not in accordance with the law, the order violates the
constitutional rights of the appellant, the provisions of N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32 have not been
complied with in the proceedings before the agency, the agency's rules or procedure have not
afforded the appellant a fair hearing, the agency's findings of fact are not supported by a
preponderance of the evidence, the agency's conclusions of law and order are not supported by its
findings of fact, or the agency's findings of fact do not sufficiently address the evidence presented
by the appellant. Koehly, at ¶ 15.[¶4]
In reviewing an agency's findings of fact, we do not make independent findings of fact or
substitute our judgment for that of the agency; rather, we determine only whether a reasoning
mind reasonably could have concluded the agency's findings were supported by the weight of the
evidence from the entire record. Power Fuels, Inc. v.
Elkin, 283 N.W.2d 214, 220 (N.D.
1979). We defer to the agency's opportunity to judge witnesses' credibility. Koehly, 2016 ND 202, ¶ 16, 886 N.W.2d 689. Once the facts are
established, their significance presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Bell v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 2012 ND 102, ¶ 20, 816 N.W.2d 786. We review
claimed violations of constitutional rights de novo. Martin v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 2009 ND 181,
¶ 5, 773 N.W.2d 190.III[¶5] Crawford argues the Department should
not have suspended his license because the arresting officer did not have a reasonable and
articulable suspicion to initially stop his vehicle. He claims a review of the officer's video of the
stop establishes Crawford "twice slightly moving left in his vehicle as he is driving, but it does
not show him hitting the center line even once." Crawford argues the hearing officer's finding of
fact that he hit the center dividing line is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. The
Department responds that based on the evidence presented at the administrative hearing, a
reasoning mind reasonably could have concluded the arresting officer observed Crawford's
vehicle swerve left over the centerline and the officer thus had a reasonable and articulable
suspicion to initially stop Crawford's vehicle for a traffic violation.[¶6] "'[T]raffic violations, even if considered common or minor, constitute
prohibited conduct and, therefore, provide officers with requisite suspicion for conducting
investigatory stops.'" State v. Fields,
2003 ND 81, ¶ 7, 662 N.W.2d 242
(quoting State v. Storbakken, 552 N.W.2d 78, 80-81 (N.D. 1996)). See
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (law enforcement officer's decision to
initially stop an automobile is reasonable when the officer has probable cause to believe a traffic
violation has occurred).[¶7] Although Crawford claims a video of
the traffic stop shows he did not cross or hit the center dividing line of the street even once, the
arresting officer testified at the administrative hearing that he observed Crawford's vehicle cross
the centerline of the street. Our review of the video of the traffic stop does not contradict the
arresting officer's testimony, and we do not reweigh that evidence or reassess the arresting
officer's credibility. A reasoning mind could reasonably conclude the police officer observed
Crawford's vehicle crossing the centerline, which supports the conclusion the officer had a
reasonable and articulable suspicion to initially stop Crawford's vehicle for a traffic violation.
See N.D.C.C. §§ 39-10-01.1 and 39-10-08(1) (subject to exceptions not
applicable here, failing to drive on right side of roadway is class B misdemeanor). We conclude
the hearing officer's determination is supported by a preponderance of the evidence and supports
the Department's decision.IV[¶8] Crawford
argues he did not voluntarily consent to the warrantless blood test incident to his arrest and his
driving privileges should be reinstated. He argues the implied consent advisory was a
misstatement of the law and his consent to the warrantless blood test incident to his arrest was
not knowingly, freely, and voluntarily given.[¶9] In Beylund, 2017 ND 30, ¶ 1, 889 N.W.2d 907, we recently assumed
two drivers' consent to warrantless blood tests incident to arrests was involuntary for purposes of
those appeals, and we concluded the exclusionary rule did not require suppression of the results
of the warrantless blood tests in civil administrative license suspension proceedings. We rejected
the drivers' reliance on the general provisions of N.D.C.C. §§ 28-32-24(3) and
28-32-46(2) to support their argument for exclusion of the blood test results. Beylund, at ¶¶ 24-26. We said those cases
involved the admissibility of blood test results, which the legislature has directed must be
received into evidence under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-07(5) when the sample was properly
obtained and the test fairly administered. Beylund, at ¶ 25. Under N.D.C.C. §
39-20-07(8), a certified copy of an analytical report of a blood analysis issued by the state crime
laboratory must be accepted as prima facie evidence of the results of a chemical analysis
performed under N.D.C.C. ch. 39-20 and satisfies the directives of N.D.C.C. §
39-20-07(5). In Beylund, at ¶ 25, we concluded the specific statutory
procedures for administrative license proceedings and the civil nature of those proceedings did
not require the exclusion of blood test results in the administrative proceedings.[¶10] Factual questions arise when a driver argues on appeal his or her consent
to a blood test was involuntary but did not testify at the administrative hearing. See  Hammeren v. N.D. State Highway Comm'r, 315 N.W.2d 679, 680-84 (N.D. 1982) (stating that
whether driver is confused is question of fact and refusing to adopt per se rule for confusion
where driver does not testify at administrative hearing and no evidence of confusion exists);
State v. Fields, 294 N.W.2d 404, 409-10 (N.D. 1980) (holding Miranda
warning applies to arrests for driving under the influence and discussing confusion that could
result in the context of Miranda warning and request to submit to blood test); Agnew v. Hjelle, 216 N.W.2d 291, 294-98 (N.D. 1974) (discussing claim for confusion
resulting from Miranda warning and request to submit to breathalyzer test in context of
whether driver knowingly refused to submit to test where driver did not testify at administrative
hearing). Nevertheless, under Beylund
and for purposes of this appeal, we assume Crawford's consent to the warrantless blood test was
involuntary, and we conclude the exclusionary rule and North Dakota law does not require the
suppression of his blood test results in this civil administrative license suspension proceeding.V[¶11] We affirm the judgment.[¶12] Gerald
W. VandeWalle, C.J.Carol Ronning KapsnerLisa Fair McEversJerod E.
TufteI concur in the result. Daniel J. Crothers