Case Title: Juan Rivera v. State of Indiana

Citation: 

Docket Number: 57S03-0607-CR-273

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2006-07-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Daniel M. Grove  
 
 
 
 
 
Steve Carter 
Special Assistant to the Public Defender of Indiana 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justin F. Roebel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 57S03-0607-CR-273 
 
JUAN RIVERA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Noble Circuit Court, No. 57C01-0410-FB-000045 
The Honorable G. David Laur, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 57A03-0506-CR-307 
_________________________________ 
 
July 27, 2006 
 
Rucker, Justice. 
 
After selling approximately two pounds of methamphetamine to an undercover police 
officer for $1000, twenty-year-old Juan Rivera was arrested and ultimately charged with dealing 
 
in methamphetamine as a Class B felony.1  He pleaded guilty to the offense under terms of a plea 
agreement that provided in relevant part, “[t]en (10) years in the Indiana Department of 
Corrections, with the parties arguing as to how said sentence shall be served.”  App. to Br. of 
Appellant at 19.  After a hearing the trial court sentenced Rivera to ten years to be served at the 
Indiana Department of Correction with four years suspended to probation for a total executed 
term of six years.  Rivera appealed, contending that (1) the trial court took improper factors into 
consideration when determining how much of Rivera’s sentence should be executed and (2) his 
sentence should be revised pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) because it is inappropriate in 
light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.  Rivera requested that the 
court “remand this case with instructions to suspend more of the sentence than the four (4) years 
that was previously ordered to be suspended.”  Br. of Appellant at 8.  
 
The Court of Appeals addressed and ultimately rejected Rivera’s first claim.  As for 
Rivera’s second claim the court held, “By agreeing to the fixed term of ten years, Rivera 
impliedly agreed that such a sentence was appropriate.  This issue is waived.”  Rivera v. State, 
841 N.E.2d 1169, 1172 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).  In support the court cited Eaton v. State, 825 
N.E.2d 1287, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. not sought, for the proposition that “the defendant 
waived his right to challenge the appropriateness of his sentence by accepting a plea agreement 
in which he agreed to a sentencing range capped at less than the range authorized by statute.”  
Rivera, 841 N.E.2d at 1172.  Despite its waiver determination, the court nonetheless addressed 
the merits of Rivera’s argument and concluded that his sentence was appropriate in light of the 
nature of the offense and the character of the offender.  Although we now grant transfer, except 
as otherwise provided below we summarily affirm the Court of Appeals’ opinion.  
 
In a recent opinion we disagreed with the view expressed in several Court of Appeals 
opinions that defendants who enter into certain categories of plea agreements are either barred on 
appeal from challenging the appropriateness of their sentences under Indiana Appellate Rule 
                                                 
1 Contained in two separate packages, the precise combined weight of the drugs was determined to be 
970.8 grams.  Dealing in methamphetamine in an amount in excess of three grams is a Class A felony.  
See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(b).  The record is silent on the question of why Rivera was charged with a 
Class B felony offense.  
 
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7(B) or have acquiesced to their sentences and therefore cannot now complain.  We held instead 
that Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) 
 
articulates a standard of review designed as guidance for appellate 
courts. . . .  Of course a defendant must persuade the appellate 
court that his or her sentence has met this inappropriateness 
standard of review.  But to say that a defendant has acquiesced in 
his or her sentence or has implicitly agreed that the sentence is 
appropriate undermines in our view the scope of authority set forth 
in Article VII, Section 4 of the Indiana Constitution.  We thus 
disapprove of language in Gist, Mann, and their progeny providing 
otherwise.2   
 
Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 2073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).  That is not to say however that every 
sentence that is the product of a plea agreement is subject to Rule 7(B) review.  Only if the trial 
court is exercising discretion in imposing sentence may a defendant then contest on appeal the 
merits of that discretion on the grounds that the sentence is “inappropriate in light of the nature 
of the offense and character of the offender.”  Id. at 1078-80.  And whether a defendant pleads 
guilty under terms of an agreement that provides for an “open plea”3 or an agreement that 
provides for a sentencing cap or range, the trial court still must exercise discretion in determining 
the sentence it will impose.  See id. at 1078.  By contrast where a plea agreement calls for a 
specific term of years, “if the trial court accepts the parties’ agreement, it has no discretion to 
impose any thing other than the precise sentence upon which they agreed.”  Id. at 1078-79 n.4 
(citing Badger v. State, 637 N.E.2d 800, 802 (Ind. 1994) (“[I]f the court accepts the agreement, it 
becomes bound by the terms of the agreement.”); Blackburn v. State, 493 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Ind. 
1986) (“Although not a party to the agreement, once the court accepts a plea agreement, it is 
bound by the terms of that agreement.”)).  
 
 
In this case, the plea agreement is not “open” in the sense that sentencing is left 
completely to the trial court’s discretion.  Nor does the plea agreement contain a sentencing cap 
or sentencing range.  Nonetheless the plea agreement here still affords the trial court some 
                                                 
2 Eaton, supra, was among the opinions containing language of which we disapproved.  See Childress, 
848 N.E.2d at 1077 n.2.  
 
3 See Collins v. State, 817 N.E.2d 230, 231 (Ind. 2004) (“A plea agreement where the issue of sentencing 
is left to the trial court’s discretion is often referred to as an ‘open plea.’”).   
 
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amount of discretion in imposing sentence.  More precisely the trial court was left to decide 
“how said sentence shall be served.”  Stated somewhat differently, although the trial court was 
bound to impose a ten-year sentence, it retained the discretion to determine the amount of the 
sentence that would be suspended to probation.4  And precisely because the trial court retained 
discretion in determining the amount of the sentence that would be executed, Rivera did not 
waive his right to contest the merits of that discretion on grounds that the sentence is 
“inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.”  As 
indicated earlier in this opinion the Court of Appeals addressed the merits of Rivera’s claim.5  
We decline to address the claim further. 
 
 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.  
 
Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan and Boehm, JJ., concur. 
Dickson, J., concurs in result without separate opinion. 
 
                                                 
4 The trial court suspended four years of Rivera’s sentence to probation.  Because Rivera was not 
otherwise ineligible, the trial court had the discretion to suspend Rivera’s entire sentence.  See I.C. § 35-
50-2-2.   
 
5 On transfer, counsel for Rivera acknowledges that the Court of Appeals reviewed the merits of Rivera’s 
Rule 7(B) claim notwithstanding a finding of waiver.  He also acknowledges “[t]he propriety of the 
sentence is fact specific to the instant case and does not seem to be a novel question of law worthy of 
discretionary review by this Court.”  Pet. to Trans. at 7.  We appreciate counsel’s candor.   
 
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