Case Title: Commonwealth v. McGann

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12742

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-03-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12742 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  SKYE A. McGANN. 
 
 
 
Franklin.     November 7, 2019. - March 17, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Assault and Battery.  Assault and Battery by Means of a 
Dangerous Weapon.  Constitutional Law, Confrontation of 
witnesses, Fair trial.  Evidence, Hearsay, Spontaneous 
utterance, Medical record, Cross-examination.  Practice, 
Criminal, Hearsay, Confrontation of witnesses, Fair trial, 
Restitution.  Fair Trial.  Due Process of Law, Fair trial.  
Self-Defense.  Restitution. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Orange Division of 
the District Court Department on January 17, 2017. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to redact medical records was heard by 
Paul H. Smyth, J., and the case was tried before David S. Ross, 
J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Cara M. Cheyette for the defendant. 
 
Nicholas Shareef Atallah, Assistant District Attorney 
(Thomas H. Townsend, Assistant District Attorney, also present) 
for the Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  This is an appeal by the defendant, Skye A. 
McGann, from her convictions of assault and battery on a family 
or household member and assault by means of a dangerous weapon.  
We granted her application for direct appellate review.  Before 
trial, the victim, the defendant's then boyfriend, invoked his 
privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and therefore did not testify 
at trial.  The defendant argues on appeal that, for various 
reasons, her right to a fair trial was violated and that the 
judge improperly ordered the defendant to pay restitution to the 
victim's mother, who was a third party and nonvictim.  To 
determine whether the defendant received a fair trial, we 
address whether (1) the trial judge properly admitted the 
victim's statements he made over the telephone to his mother; 
(2) a judge who heard the defendant's pretrial motion to redact 
the victim's medical record (motion judge) properly admitted a 
statement contained in that record; (3) a line of questioning by 
the Commonwealth during cross-examination of the defendant was 
improper and, if so, whether it created a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice; and (4) the evidence presented by the 
Commonwealth was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to 
conclude that the defendant did not act in self-defense.  We 
hold that the defendant received a fair trial and that a trial 
judge may order a defendant to pay restitution to a third party 
3 
 
in certain circumstances.  We therefore affirm the defendant's 
convictions and the judge's restitution order. 
 
Background.  We recite the facts as the jury could have 
found them, reserving certain details for later discussion. 
 
1.  The incident.  The defendant and the victim lived 
together in an apartment (apartment).  At some time during the 
night of January 15, 2017, the defendant and the victim got into 
an argument.1  Around 11 P.M., the victim called his mother 
(first telephone call).  The victim's mother testified2 that the 
victim told her, "[The defendant] just punched me in both of my 
eyes.  I can barely see."  The victim's mother described the 
victim's tone of voice as "screaming and crying."  She testified 
that when she told the victim to call the police, he responded, 
"I'm gonna call the cops."3  The victim's mother called the 
police several times after speaking with her son. 
 
At some point after the first telephone call, the defendant 
left the apartment and drove to her father's house.  The 
                     
 
1 A neighbor testified at trial that she heard "banging," 
"slamming," and "yelling" around 11 P.M., coming from the 
apartment. 
 
 
2 As will be discussed in more detail infra, the judge 
accepted the victim's assertion of his privilege under the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and he therefore did 
not testify at trial. 
 
 
3 There is no evidence in the record to suggest that the 
victim called the police at any point during the incident at 
issue. 
4 
 
victim's mother testified that after the first telephone call, 
she called the defendant to address the victim's accusations.  
The victim's mother testified that when she told the defendant, 
"[The victim] told me you beat him up pretty bad and you stole 
his car," the defendant responded, "You should see what he did 
to me."  The defendant spent about an hour at her father's house 
and then returned to the apartment.  After the defendant 
returned to the apartment, the police arrived at the apartment, 
spoke to the victim, and left thereafter. 
 
At 1:30 A.M. on January 16, the victim again called his 
mother (second telephone call).  The victim's mother testified 
that during this telephone call, the victim was "screaming," 
"[h]e was crying," and his tone of voice was "hysterical."  She 
testified that the victim said to her, "She tried to kill me.  
She pulled out a knife."  A neighbor living in the apartment 
next to the victim and defendant testified that around 1:30 A.M. 
she heard4 the defendant state, "I'm going to kill you, and I 
want you dead," from the apartment.  Another neighbor testified 
that during the night she heard the defendant state, "I'm gonna 
F'ing kill you," from the apartment. 
                     
 
4 The neighbor testified that she could hear things from the 
apartment occupied by the victim and the defendant "very 
clear[ly]" and that she is able to recognize the defendant's 
voice. 
5 
 
 
As the victim concluded the second telephone call with his 
mother, the police arrived.  When Officer Corey Brown and 
Sergeant Randall Stange of the Athol police department arrived 
at the scene, they observed blood on the back of the victim's 
head.  Brown testified that he noticed blood around the victim's 
mouth and nose and bite marks on the victim's arm and shoulder, 
and that the victim's demeanor was "excited," his voice was 
"loud," and he was "very boisterous with his hands."  Both 
officers testified that they did not observe injuries or marks 
on the defendant.  The victim was transported to the hospital by 
ambulance. 
 
As detailed infra, the defendant testified at trial, 
raising the issue of self-defense. 
 
2.  Evidentiary holdings.  As relevant to the defendant's 
appeal, the judge accepted the victim's assertion of Fifth 
Amendment privilege, allowed the Commonwealth's motion to admit 
statements the victim made to his mother on the telephone as 
nontestimonial spontaneous utterances, and denied the 
defendant's motion to redact certain statements in the victim's 
medical records. 
 
3.  The restitution order.  After the verdicts, the 
prosecutor requested, inter alia, that the defendant pay 
6 
 
restitution.  At a later restitution hearing, the judge ordered 
the defendant to pay restitution to the victim's mother.5 
 
The defendant appealed from her convictions and from the 
restitution order, and we granted her application for direct 
appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Admissibility of the victim's statements 
to his mother.6  We first address whether the trial judge 
properly admitted the statements the victim made over the 
telephone to his mother.  The defendant argues that the victim's 
statements were testimonial because he knew or should have known 
that his statements were translating into police action.  She 
further argues that the judge should not have admitted the 
victim's statements to his mother as spontaneous utterances 
because the statements failed to bear sufficient indicia of 
reliability.  She encourages this court to "take this 
opportunity to revisit [Commonwealth v. King, 436 Mass. 252 
(2002),] and to empower and, indeed, require, that judges act as 
'engaged gatekeepers' to ensure that the presumptive reliability 
of spontaneous utterances offered without benefit of 
confrontation is not rebutted by other credible, reliable 
                     
 
5 The defendant satisfied the payment of restitution. 
 
 
6 In her brief, the defendant challenged the victim's 
invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege, but at oral 
argument, she stated that she was no longer asserting this as an 
independent argument. 
7 
 
evidence."7  The Commonwealth contends that the victim's 
statements to his mother were not testimonial because they were 
all made to resolve ongoing medical emergencies, and that "the 
limitations required by Commonwealth v. King did not violate the 
defendant's due process rights, as the court still evaluated the 
statements themselves for reliability."  For the reasons that 
follow, we hold that the judge properly admitted the statements 
the victim made to his mother as excited utterances. 
 
a.  Confrontation clause.  The first issue is whether the 
confrontation clause barred the victim's out-of-court statements 
to his mother from being admitted.  In a criminal case, to be 
admissible as a spontaneous utterance, the out-of-court 
statement made by a declarant who does not testify at trial must 
satisfy the confrontation clause and must be admissible pursuant 
to the rules of evidence.8  See Commonwealth v. Beatrice, 460 
                     
 
7 The defendant does not argue that the excited utterance 
exception be abandoned, "just that its application comport with 
due process." 
 
 
8 "A statement qualifies as a spontaneous utterance if 
'there is an occurrence or event "sufficiently startling to 
render inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of 
the observer"' and 'the declarant's statement was "a spontaneous 
reaction to the occurrence or event and not the [result] of 
reflective thought."'"  Commonwealth v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 
296, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 874 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Santiago, 437 Mass. 620, 623 (2002).  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 803(2) (2020).  The parties do not dispute that the victim's 
statements meet this test, and given the testimony of the 
victim's mother and Brown regarding the victim's demeanor, 
discussed infra, we agree. 
8 
 
Mass. 255, 258 (2011).  The confrontation clause bars the 
admission of testimonial hearsay by a declarant who does not 
appear at trial, unless the declarant is unavailable to testify 
as a matter of law and the defendant had an earlier opportunity 
to cross-examine him or her.  See id., citing Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004).  "Testimonial statements 
are those made with the primary purpose of 'creating an out-of-
court substitute for trial testimony'" (citation omitted).9  
Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 464 (2019).  "[T]he 
question is whether, in light of all the circumstances, viewed 
objectively, the 'primary purpose' of the conversation was to 
'creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.'"  
Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2180 (2015), quoting Michigan v. 
Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011).  "[W]hen the Commonwealth in a 
criminal case seeks to admit the excited utterance of a 
declarant who is not a witness at trial . . . , the judge should 
conduct a careful voir dire, evidentiary if needed, before 
admitting the excited utterance in evidence."  Commonwealth v. 
Hurley, 455 Mass. 53, 68 n.14 (2009).  "We accept the judge's 
findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but independently 
apply constitutional principles to the facts found."  
                     
 
9 In Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 464 n.18 
(2019), we clarified that the "appropriate method of analysis is 
the 'primary purpose' test." 
9 
 
Commonwealth v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 296, cert. denied, 562 
U.S. 874 (2010). 
 
The judge conducted a voir dire, before the trial, during 
which the victim's mother and a police officer who responded to 
the scene testified.  See Hurley, 455 Mass. at 68 n.14.  The 
victim's mother testified during the voir dire that at 
approximately 11 P.M. on January 15, the victim called her and 
said that the defendant punched him in both his eyes, that he 
could "barely see," and that the defendant stole his car.  The 
victim's mother further testified that during this telephone 
call, the victim was "very, very, very upset," and that he was 
"crying," "screaming," and "hysterical."  She said she told him 
to call the police and that he responded, "I will."  There is no 
evidence to suggest that the victim called the police, and the 
defendant does not argue that he did so. 
 
The victim called his mother a second time, again conveying 
the defendant's actions to his mother.  The victim's mother 
testified during voir dire that the victim called her around 
1:30 A.M. on January 16 and told her, "[The defendant] pulled 
out a knife.  She's tried to kill me."  She testified that 
during this second telephone call, the victim was "screaming," 
and his tone of voice was "hysterical" and "much worse" than the 
tone of his voice on the first telephone call.  The judge ruled 
that the statements were nontestimonial, explaining that they 
10 
 
"were not made for the purpose of aiding an investigation of 
prosecution of a crime.  That might have been so had he called 
the police, but he was calling his mother; it sounds as if in 
despair." 
 
The record before us demonstrates that a reasonable person 
in the victim's position would not have anticipated that his 
statements to his mother in the first telephone call would be 
used against the defendant in a prosecution.  See Commonwealth 
v. Smith, 460 Mass. 385, 394 (2011); Beatrice, 460 Mass. at 258-
259.  Although his mother urged him to call the police, there is 
no evidence that he did so, nor is there evidence that the 
victim's mother informed the victim that she was going to 
contact the police, or that she was attempting to gather 
information from the victim in order to communicate that 
information to the police.  See Smith, supra; Beatrice, supra. 
 
The statements the victim made to his mother during the 
second telephone call present us with an additional layer of 
information:  that after his first call to his mother and before 
his second call to his mother, the police responded to the 
apartment and spoke with the victim.  The defendant argues that 
the victim knew or should have known that his second telephone 
call to his mother would result in the police again responding 
to his apartment, and that it is immaterial that the police 
arrived on scene during the second telephone call in response to 
11 
 
a 911 call from a neighbor.10  However, as mentioned supra, there 
is no evidence in the record to suggest that, during the first 
call, the victim's mother told the victim that she was planning 
to contact the police.  The record reflects that on the second 
telephone call, the victim was "screaming" and "hysterical," and 
that when the police arrived as he finished the second telephone 
call, a police officer11 observed the victim to be "covered in 
blood," and "pretty frantic."  Therefore, the victim's state of 
being, combined with the record being void of an indication that 
he was aware his mother was doing anything other than just 
listening to his concerns regarding the defendant, leads us to 
hold that the statements in the second telephone call also were 
not testimonial.  See Beatrice, 460 Mass. at 258-259.  As such, 
the victim's statements to his mother were nontestimonial and 
the admission of the statements did not violate the 
confrontation clause.  See id. at 258. 
                     
 
10 The victim's mother testified during voir dire that she 
called the police multiple times between the first and second 
telephone calls with her son, to report that she had concerns 
about her son. 
 
 
11 Brown testified during the voir dire that when he arrived 
on scene at around 1:45 A.M. on January 16, the victim got out 
of the vehicle he was sitting in, was "covered in blood," and 
had blood coming from his nose and mouth area; that the blood 
was wet; and that the victim had bite marks on his arms and one 
bite mark on his shoulder.  Brown also testified that the victim 
"was pretty frantic," his tone of voice was "excited," and the 
volume of his voice "was pretty loud." 
12 
 
 
b.  Due process.  The second issue regarding the 
admissibility of the victim's statements to his mother is 
whether, as the defendant argues, her due process right to a 
fair trial was violated because the judge did not consider all 
the evidence in determining the admissibility of the victim's 
out-of-court statements to his mother.  While a judge has "broad 
discretion" to determine whether a statement meets the 
foundational criteria of the spontaneous utterance exception, 
Simon, 456 Mass. at 296, we held in King that the judge does not 
have discretion to exclude a spontaneous utterance that meets 
the foundational criteria "on the ground that, in light of other 
evidence, the statement no longer appears reliable."  King, 436 
Mass. at 256-257 (if judge had independent discretion to 
determine reliability of evidence in light of other evidence, 
this would "effectively require the judge to hear the entirety 
of the other proposed trial evidence and would have the judge 
usurp the fact finder's function").  Underlying our holding in 
King was the principle that spontaneous utterances are, by their 
very nature, considered reliable and that the reliability of a 
spontaneous utterance goes to its weight, not its admissibility.  
Id.  Although decided before Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, King does 
not conflict with Crawford's holding, or with our Commonwealth's 
subsequent case law.  As such, we decline the defendant's 
invitation to revisit King.  As the admission of the victim's 
13 
 
statements as spontaneous utterances complied with evidentiary 
standards, the admission of the victim's out-of-court statements 
did not violate the defendant's due process right to a fair 
trial. 
 
2.  Admissibility of the statement contained in the 
victim's medical record.  The next issue is whether the motion 
judge properly admitted the following statement contained in the 
victim's medical record:  "repeatedly beat him about the 
head/face and bit him several times in arms and also came after 
him with steak knife."12  The defendant contends that the 
statement in the victim's medical record in which he "describ[es 
the] defendant as the assailant on a charge involving only a 
threat of injury was inadmissible, testimonial hearsay."13  The 
Commonwealth argues that the judge properly admitted the 
statement as a statement related to the victim's medical history 
because it related to possible causes of the injuries for which 
he was receiving treatment.  We hold that the motion judge 
properly admitted the statement contained in the victim's 
medical record. 
                     
 
12 Information that may have named the defendant as the 
subject of this statement was redacted in the medical record. 
 
 
13 Before trial, the Commonwealth stated that the charge of 
assault and battery was never filed. 
14 
 
 
Certified medical records "may be admitted by the court, in 
its discretion, as evidence in the courts of the commonwealth so 
far as such records relate to the treatment and medical history 
of such cases . . . but nothing therein contained shall be 
admissible as evidence which has reference to the question of 
liability."  G. L. c. 233, § 79.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 803(6)(B) 
(2020).  "The statute has long been construed to permit the 
admission of a record that relates directly and primarily to the 
treatment and medical history of the patient, 'even though 
incidentally the facts recorded may have some bearing on the 
question of liability.'"  Commonwealth v. Torres, 479 Mass. 641, 
653 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Dube, 413 Mass. 570, 573 
(1992).  See Commonwealth v. Dargon, 457 Mass. 387, 395 (2010), 
quoting Commonwealth v. DiMonte, 427 Mass. 233, 242 (1998) ("We 
distinguish, however, 'a conclusory fact central to the jury's 
inquiry from physical observations from which inculpatory 
inferences flow'" [quotations omitted]). 
 
Here, the motion judge ruled that the statement was 
admissible, nontestimonial hearsay.  The victim's mother read 
the statement during her testimony at trial, and the prosecutor 
read the statement during closing argument. 
 
The first part of the statement, "repeatedly beat him about 
the head/face and bit him several times in arms," falls within 
the medical record exception because it relates to a potential 
15 
 
cause of the victim's "multiple bite marks," "bloodied 
appearance," and contusion.  See G. L. c. 233, § 79; Torres, 479 
Mass. at 653, quoting Dube, 413 Mass. at 573.  The second part 
of the statement, "came after him with steak knife," although a 
closer call than the first part of the statement, was also 
admissible.  Given that the victim's injuries included 
lacerations on his back, face, and finger, the second part of 
the statement in the medical record was a "fact-specific 
reference[] to the reported cause of [his] injuries [and was] 
part of [his] medical history and [was] relevant to treatment."  
DiMonte, 427 Mass. at 242.  Therefore, the motion judge properly 
admitted the statement contained in the victim's medical 
record.14 
 
3.  Prosecutor's cross-examination of the defendant.  We 
next examine whether a line of questioning by the prosecutor 
during cross-examination of the defendant was improper and, if 
so, whether it created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice.  The defendant argues that the prosecutor "asked a long 
series of 'improperly loaded question[s]'" on cross-examination 
of the defendant, and that the prosecutor did not have a good 
faith basis for the questions.  The Commonwealth agrees that the 
                     
 
14 Because statements properly admitted under the medical 
record exception are nontestimonial, we reject the defendant's 
confrontation clause argument.  See Commonwealth v. Irene, 462 
Mass. 600, 618, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 968 (2012). 
16 
 
questions were improper, but argues that no substantial risk of 
a miscarriage of justice occurred because the prosecutor did not 
refer to the line of inquiry during closing argument and there 
was substantial evidence to support the Commonwealth's case.  We 
conclude that the majority of the subject line of questioning 
was improper but that it did not create a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice. 
 
"A cross-examiner may ask a question that implies the truth 
of a proposition if she has a basis in fact for asking the 
question and is prepared to disclose that reason to the judge."  
Commonwealth v. Christian, 430 Mass. 552, 561 (2000), overruled 
on another ground by Commonwealth v. Paulding, 438 Mass. 1 
(2002).  "There must be a reasonable and good-faith basis for 
questions asked on cross-examination."  Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 611(b)(1) (2020).  Even when a prosecutor has a good faith 
basis for asking questions on cross-examination, the questioning 
should be curtailed in the face of a witness's consistent 
denials.  Christian, supra at 562. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Peck, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 34, 39 (2014), 
the Appeals Court stated that "the requirement noted in 
[Commonwealth v. White, 367 Mass. 280, 285 (1975)] (that the 
examiner must have a good faith basis and proper foundation for 
cross-examination) is simply another way of saying that the 
examiner must have a reasonable belief that the facts implied by 
17 
 
the questions could be established by admissible evidence."  The 
court in Peck went on to hold that although the prosecutor 
communicated to the judge that he had a report in which the 
defendant's boyfriend told the police and the insurance fraud 
bureau that the defendant had confessed to her involvement in 
insurance fraud, the prosecutor's cross-examination questions to 
the defendant about that conversation were improper.  See Peck, 
supra at 37-40.  The court held that the questioning was 
improper because the boyfriend was not present to testify and 
therefore "the prosecutor's questions had the effect of 
informing the jury of the contents of out-of-court statements 
allegedly made by the defendant that were not admissible" 
because (1) the boyfriend could have testified but did not and 
(2) on cross-examination the defendant denied making the 
statements.  See id. at 39-40.  The ruling in Peck, however, 
goes too far in limiting a prosecutor's cross-examination, as 
the cross-examiner need not be ready to offer admissible 
evidence in support of a question.  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 611(b)(1) & note, citing White, 367 Mass. at 284. 
 
The defendant in the present case did not object to the 
questioning, and we therefore review for a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Carroll, 439 Mass. 
547, 554 (2003).  This standard requires us to determine "if we 
have a serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have 
18 
 
been different had the error not been made."  Commonwealth v. 
Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002), S.C., 444 Mass. 72 (2005), 
quoting Commonwealth v. LeFave, 430 Mass. 169, 174 (1999).  In 
making this determination, "[w]e consider the strength of the 
Commonwealth's case, the nature of the error, the significance 
of the error in the context of the trial, and the possibility 
that the absence of an objection was the result of a reasonable 
tactical decision."  Azar, supra. 
 
During cross-examination of the defendant, the prosecutor 
asked the defendant a series of questions15 relating to her 
                     
 
15 The line of questioning at issue was as follows: 
 
Q.:  "And that wound was actually caused by the tip of the 
knife that you grabbed, correct?" 
 
A.:  "No." 
 
. . . 
 
Q.:  "Before you left -- you in fact had kicked [the 
victim] and hit him in the face before you took his car and 
left, correct?" 
 
A.:  "No." 
 
Q.:  "And then, when you returned and you -- the argument 
resumed, you yanked [the victim] out of bed, and you threw 
him up against that mirror, correct?" 
 
A.:  "No.  I never even --" 
 
Q.:  "And in fact --" 
 
A.:  "-- touched him." 
 
19 
 
grabbing the knife, kicking the victim, throwing him into a 
mirror, and breaking down a door; the defendant denied doing any 
of the actions about which the prosecutor questioned her.  
Although the Commonwealth agrees with the defendant that this 
questioning was improper, we must still decide the issue.  See 
Commonwealth v. Poirier, 458 Mass. 1014, 1015 (2010), quoting 
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 58 (1968) ("Confessions of 
error are, of course, entitled to and given great weight, but 
they do not 'relieve this Court of the performance of the 
judicial function'"); Commonwealth v. McClary, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 
678, 686 n.6 (1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 975 (1993). 
                     
Q.:  " -- he then ran into the bathroom with your phone 
after you threw him into the mirror, correct?" 
 
A.:  "No." 
 
Q.:  "And then --" 
 
A.:  "Are you trying to throw me off?" 
 
Q.:  "And then you broke down the door while he was in 
there with your phone, correct?" 
 
A.:  "Wait, what?" 
 
Q.:  "You broke down the door while he was in there with 
your phone, correct?" 
 
A.:  "No, I can't even break down a door." 
 
Q.:  "And then, when you grabbed the knife, he put his 
right arm up, didn't he?" 
 
A.:  "No." 
20 
 
 
The Commonwealth stated in its brief that the questions 
were based on the prosecutor's notes from a conversation he had 
with the victim and the victim's mother, which were provided to 
defense counsel before trial.  However, because the victim did 
not testify at trial, the victim's statements to the prosecutor 
during that conversation were not going to be admitted as 
evidence during the trial.  Because the prosecutor based his 
questions during this line of cross-examination on his 
conversation with the victim, he did have a good faith basis to 
ask the questions, even though he was not going to offer 
substantive evidence of the statements.  See White, 367 Mass. at 
284.  However, although the prosecutor had a good faith basis 
for asking the defendant the questions, he should have ceased 
the line of questioning in the face of the defendant's 
consistent denials.  See Christian, 430 Mass. at 562. 
 
The improper line of questioning did not create a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice because it was 
brief, the line of questioning did not receive substantial 
attention at trial, the prosecutor did not mention his questions 
or the defendant's answers in his closing argument, and the 
defendant answered each question with a denial.  See Azar, 435 
Mass. at 687.  Furthermore, although the defendant did not 
object to the questioning and the judge did not provide a 
contemporaneous curative instruction, the judge gave a general 
21 
 
curative instruction before the trial, explaining that "what a 
lawyer says is not evidence unless a witness agrees to it," and 
in his final instruction he explained that "[a] question by 
itself is not evidence, the evidence is the witness['s] answer 
taken in context."  See Commonwealth v. Imbert, 479 Mass. 575, 
587 (2018) (juries expected to follow judge's instructions).  
For the foregoing reasons, although the line of questions was 
improper, it did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage 
of justice.16  See Carroll, 439 Mass. at 554. 
 
4.  Defendant's self-defense claim.  The next issue is 
whether the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was 
sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the 
                     
 
16 In addition, the prosecutor's statements during his 
closing argument were not improper.  The prosecutor stated, 
"[Y]ou have to decide on the credibility of the witnesses you 
heard today.  And I argue to you, if there's one thing you know 
from this trial, you know whatever happened in that house didn't 
go down the way [the defendant] said it did.  Because her story 
is full of holes, it's full of unbelievable things.  It doesn't 
make any sense."  The defendant argues that the prosecutor 
"improperly invited the jury to resort to speculation."  While 
"[a] prosecutor may not misstate evidence or refer to facts not 
in evidence in a closing argument," Commonwealth v. Goddard, 476 
Mass. 443, 449 (2017), he or she "may properly attack the 
credibility of witnesses," Commonwealth v. Donovan, 422 Mass. 
349, 357 (1996).  Viewed in the context in which the prosecutor 
made his remarks, Commonwealth v. Valentin, 474 Mass. 301, 309 
(2016), he properly attacked the credibility of a witness, here 
the defendant, see Commonwealth v. Copeland, 481 Mass. 255, 264 
(2019) (not improper for prosecutor to state during closing 
argument that "one thing is for sure about whatever happened 
. . . , there's a lot of questions about it," and "[m]aybe 
something happened, maybe it didn't"). 
22 
 
defendant did not act in self-defense.  Where the defendant has 
sufficiently raised the issue of self-defense, the Commonwealth 
carries the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant did not act in self-defense.  Commonwealth v. King, 
460 Mass. 80, 83 (2011).  The defendant argues that "there was 
insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the 
elements of the charged crimes because the Commonwealth failed 
to present any evidence that [the defendant] did not act in 
self-defense" as "there was no competent evidence from which the 
jury could draw the necessary inferences" that she had not acted 
in self-defense.  The Commonwealth counters that the evidence 
was sufficient "to prove the [d]efendant hit and assaulted [the 
victim] without justification," and that the jury were free to 
discredit the defendant's self-defense claim.  Viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we 
hold that the jury could have found that the defendant did not 
act in self-defense on the assault and battery of a family 
member charge or on the assault by means of a dangerous weapon 
charge.  See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-678 
(1979). 
 
To satisfy its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant did not act in self-defense, the Commonwealth 
must establish that at least one of the following factors did 
not exist:  (1) the defendant had a reasonable concern for her 
23 
 
personal safety; (2) she used all reasonable means to avoid 
physical combat; and (3) "the degree of force used was 
reasonable in the circumstances, with proportionality being the 
touchstone for assessing reasonableness."  King, 460 Mass. at 
83, quoting Commonwealth v. Franchino, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 367, 
368-369 (2004).  Where deadly force is at issue, the defendant 
must have had an actual and reasonable belief of "imminent 
danger of death or serious bodily harm, from which [she] could 
save [herself] only by using deadly force" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Pike, 428 Mass. 393, 396 (1998). 
 
After the Commonwealth rested its case, the defendant 
testified in her defense and, in doing so, raised the issue of 
self-defense; the judge then instructed the jury on self-
defense.  The defendant testified that the victim held her down 
on the floor, took and broke her vaporizer, and "smashed into 
the mirror,"17 which caused glass shards from the mirror to fall 
on the defendant and the victim.  She testified that while the 
victim pinned her to the ground, she could not move anything 
other than her head, so she bit him and used her "head to hit 
his nose, or face, or face in general to get off of [her]," and 
that she was "pretty sure" this gave him a nosebleed.  She also 
testified that the victim "took [her] phone and smashed it 
                     
 
17 She testified on cross-examination that the mirror broke 
when the victim threw her vaporizer at it. 
24 
 
across the bathroom sink so [she] couldn't call anyone."  She 
further testified that she went into the bathroom and locked the 
door, that the victim forced his way in, and that she then left 
the bathroom and grabbed a knife from the kitchen, which the 
victim took from her. 
 
The defendant testified that she went to the hospital after 
being released from custody.  Her medical records from her visit 
to the hospital were admitted, and a photograph, which she 
testified was taken four days after the incident and which 
depicted a bruise on her head, above her eyebrow, also was 
admitted.  She testified that she received the bruise from the 
victim hitting her in the head with his arm and hand. 
 
The jury were free to reject the defendant's testimony and 
instead credit the evidence presented by the Commonwealth.  See 
Commonwealth v. Fluker, 377 Mass. 123, 128-129 (1979).  The 
Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence, which included the 
victim's injuries, his statements he made over the telephone to 
his mother, and the police officers' testimony that they did not 
observe any marks or other injuries on the defendant during her 
arrest, to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the 
defendant did not act in self-defense.  The jury here could have 
also credited the various statements made over the course of the 
incident, including the victim's statement, "She tried to kill 
me.  She pulled out a knife," and the neighbors' testimony that 
25 
 
the defendant stated, "I'm going to kill you, and I want you 
dead" and "I'm gonna F'ing kill you."  Given the evidence 
presented through the Commonwealth's witnesses, as well as the 
evidence of the victim's injuries, the Commonwealth presented 
sufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense.  See King, 
460 Mass. at 83. 
 
5.  Defendant's due process right to a fair trial.  
Moreover, contrary to the defendant's argument, the defendant 
received a fair trial.  The defendant argues that the "preserved 
and unpreserved errors combined to deny [her] a fair trial."  As 
discussed supra, the one error during the trial was the improper 
cross-examination, which although error, did not create a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
6.  Third-party restitution.  The final issue is whether a 
trial judge may order a defendant to pay restitution to a third 
party and, if so, whether the order in the present case 
satisfied the causation requirement.  The defendant argues that 
she "should be reimbursed the restitution she was ordered to pay 
to the complainant's mother, a nonvictim, for losses the mother 
voluntarily incurred."  She further argues that even if a trial 
judge may order a defendant to pay restitution to a third party, 
the order here was improper because the victim's mother's 
economic loss was not sufficiently connected to the defendant's 
26 
 
offense.  The Commonwealth counters that "courts are not limited 
to ordering restitution only to named victims, and as the 
expenses were related to the offense and reasonably foreseeable, 
the court's restitution order was proper."  We hold that the 
judge properly ordered the defendant to pay restitution to the 
victim's mother. 
 
The power of a judge to order restitution in a criminal 
case "derives from the judge's power to order conditions of 
probation under G. L. c. 276, §§ 87, 87A, and G. L. c. 279, 
§ 1."  Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 436 Mass. 829, 833 (2002).  Cf. 
G. L. c. 258B, §§ 1, 3 (o) (victim has right to seek 
restitution, and defining "victim" as "any natural person who 
suffers direct or threatened physical, emotional, or financial 
harm as the result of the commission or attempted commission of 
a crime").  A judge's power to order a defendant to pay 
restitution is "unquestionable" and "free of any [statutory] 
limitation on a judge's authority," and "afford[s] judges 
significant latitude in imposing such conditions" (quotations 
and citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Denehy, 466 Mass. 723, 
737 (2014).  See McIntyre, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Nawn, 
394 Mass. 1, 6 (1985) ("There is no question that restitution is 
an appropriate consideration in a criminal sentencing").  We 
review restitution orders for an abuse of discretion or an error 
of law.  See McIntyre, supra at 836. 
27 
 
 
In the present case, after a hearing on the issue of 
restitution, the judge ordered the defendant to pay $232.37 in 
restitution to the victim's mother.18  As the victim's mother 
testified at the restitution hearing, the $232.37 covered her 
payment for her son's two psychiatrist visits that took place 
after the incident, the removal of the staples from his head 
that were placed there in the hospital after the incident, and 
his prescription medicine connected to the present incident.  
The mother provided receipts, which were entered in evidence, 
documenting these expenses.  However, the differentiating factor 
from a more typical restitution order is that here the judge 
ordered the defendant to pay restitution to the victim's mother, 
rather than to the victim himself.  Although a third party (who 
is not also a victim of the crime, or a family member of a minor 
victim) may not have the "right" to seek restitution under G. L. 
c. 258B, § 3 (o), we hold that a judge has the power to order a 
defendant to pay restitution to such a third party.  See G. L. 
c. 258B, §§ 1, 3 (o); Denehy, 466 Mass. at 737 (judge has 
"significant latitude" to order restitution [citation omitted]).  
                     
 
18 The judge declined to include in the amount of 
restitution other expenses that the mother incurred.  The 
victim's mother testified that she incurred expenses for 
"supplies to try to fix the damage that happened the night of 
the attack" and a one hundred dollar payment she made toward the 
apartment's electric bill.  The judge ruled that the electric 
bill and hardware supplies were not related to the criminal 
offense. 
28 
 
While the defendant disputes the validity of a restitution order 
to a third party, given the circumstances of this case, with the 
defendant causing the victim to need medical care and the 
victim's mother paying for that care, it was within the judge's 
discretion to order restitution to the victim's mother because 
it was "primarily designed to meet . . . the goals of sentencing 
and of probation."  Commonwealth v. Power, 420 Mass. 410, 414 
(1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1042 (1996).  We note that third-
party restitution may not always be appropriate, but in the 
facts of the present case, where the mother paid for her son's 
medically related care, incurred as a direct result of the 
defendant's actions, the judge properly ordered it.  See 
McIntyre, 436 Mass. at 833 ("restitution best serves penal 
objectives when it bears a proper relationship to the crime of 
conviction, both in kind and proportion"). 
 
Moreover, the restitution order met the causation 
requirement in the present case.  See id. at 834-835, quoting 
Glaubius v. State, 688 So. 2d 913, 915 (Fla. 1997) (scope of 
restitution limited to "loss or damage [that] is causally 
connected to the offense and bears a significant relationship to 
the offense").  See also Denehy, 466 Mass. at 739 (test adopted 
in McIntyre "is a broad test that requires a holistic assessment 
of the facts surrounding the crime, not merely those facts 
establishing the elements of the crime").  Where the victim's 
29 
 
mother presented evidence of expenses she paid for the victim's 
medical care as a direct result of the defendant's actions, the 
expenses incurred were "causally connected to the offense and 
[bore] a significant relationship to the offense."  McIntyre, 
436 Mass. at 834-835, quoting Glaubius, 688 So. 2d at 915.  In 
addition, even though the victim was not a minor, it also was 
reasonably foreseeable that a mother would pay her twenty-four 
year old son's medical and medically related expenses.  For 
these reasons, the restitution order was proper.  See McIntyre, 
supra at 836. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
LOWY, J. (concurring).  I agree with the court that the 
defendant's convictions should be affirmed and that aspects of 
the prosecutor's cross-examination of the defendant were 
improper.  I also agree that the improper cross-examination did 
not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  I 
write separately to emphasize a point that was made in the 
court's opinion.  When impeaching a witness, interrogators need 
not be able to prove the contrary of a denial of their question 
with admissible evidence as a foundation for their inquiry.  In 
other words, we do not require that the party impeaching the 
witness have support for the question through otherwise 
admissible evidence.  See Commonwealth v. White, 367 Mass. 280, 
283-284 (1975) (judge did not err in permitting prosecutor to 
ask questions based on prosecutor's pretrial interview with 
witness even though prosecutor could only have introduced 
admissible evidence of that interview by withdrawing from case 
and becoming witness); Mass. G. Evid. § 611(b) & note (2020).  
Rather, counsel (or a pro se litigant) must have a reasonable 
and good faith basis to ask the question, and the question must 
be otherwise permissible.  See Commonwealth v. Johnston, 467 
Mass. 674, 699 (2014); Commonwealth v. Hart, 455 Mass. 230, 240 
(2009) (we prevent attorneys from "pursu[ing] a line of 
questioning" for which they have no "good faith basis to believe 
2 
 
that" the witness's answers will "prove the matters to which the 
line refers" [citation omitted]).