Case Title: Complaint of Rook

Citation: 276 Or. 695, 556 P.2d 1351

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1976-11-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
556 P.2d 1351 (1976)
276 Or. 695
In re COMPLAINT As to the Conduct OF Roger ROOK, Accused.

Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.
Argued and Submitted September 7, 1976.
Decided November 18, 1976.
Duane Vergeer, Portland, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Vergeer, Samuels, Roehr & Sweek, and Rudy R. Lachenmeier, Portland.
Don Marmaduke, Portland, argued the cause for the Oregon State Bar. With him on the brief was Steven A. Lowenstein, Portland.
W. Michael Gillette, Solicitor Gen., Salem, filed a brief amicus curiae on behalf of Attorneys for Oregon District Attorneys Association. With him on the brief were Bruce A. Bottini, John C. Bradley, *1352 David L. Hattrick, Stephen F. Peifer, Michael D. Schrunk and Judy D. Snyder, Multnomah County Deputy Dist. Attys., Portland.
John Henry Hingson, III, Oregon City, filed a brief amicus curiae on behalf of National Association of Criminal Defense lawyers.
Roy Dwyer, Eugene, filed a brief amicus curiae on behalf of Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.
Before DENECKE, C.J., and McALLISTER, O'CONNELL, TONGUE, HOWELL and BRYSON, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Roger Rook, the District Attorney of Clackamas County, is accused of unethical conduct in refusing to plea bargain with 15 criminal defendants on the same basis as previously offered to another criminal defendant as long as they were represented by either of their two attorneys.
The complaint of the Oregon State Bar charges that this conduct by the accused was improper and unethical in that: (1) Such conduct was "prejudicial to the administration of justice," in violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the Oregon State Bar; (2) Such conduct "serve[d] merely to harass or maliciously injure another," in violation of DR 7-102(A)(1) of that Code; (3) Such conduct "deprived defendants in criminal cases of their right to the assistance of counsel of their own choice, as guaranteed to them by the 6th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution," and (4) By such conduct the accused "encouraged the continuance of criminal actions or proceedings from motives of passion or interest," in wilful violation of ORS 9.460(7).
These charges were denied by the accused, who also contended: (1) That "none of the disciplinary rules cited by the Bar were intended to apply to the facts of this case"; (2) That "the Bar's authority to discipline a prosecutor should be narrowly circumscribed"; (3) That "the burden of proof is on the Bar to show by clear and convincing evidence that the Accused acted unethically, and proof of mere negligence is not enough"; (4) That "there exists no right to a particular counsel"; (5) That "if the right to a particular counsel exists, it was either not infringed, waived, or justifiably denied under the circumstances"; and (6) That "all of the Bar's alleged charges are unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case."
A Trial Board of the Oregon State Bar, after a three-day hearing, found the accused guilty of all four charges. A majority of the members of that board recommended that the accused be suspended from the practice of law for six months. A third member recommended suspension for two years. After a review of the record by the Disciplinary Review Board of the Oregon State Bar, two of its members "agree[d] that the accused committed an unethical act, but * * * disagree[d] with the recommended punishment" and recommended that the accused be reprimanded for such conduct. One member of that board, by a separate and dissenting opinion, recommended that the proceeding should be dismissed. The accused has filed a petition in this court to reject the opinion, conclusions and recommendations of that board and to adopt the dissenting opinion.
The facts giving rise to the complaint, as stated in the decision of the Trial Board, are not seriously controverted by counsel, except to complain of some omissions. That statement of facts is as follows:
Based upon the evidence offered to it, the Trial Board made the following Findings of Fact:
Based upon these Findings of Fact, and in response to the first charge by the Oregon State Bar, the Trial Board concluded that:
We fully recognize, as contended by the accused and as a general proposition, that in order to discharge the duties of his office it is of importance that a prosecuting attorney be able to act "with independence and without fear of consequences."[2] As recognized by the accused, however, "that is not to say that a prosecutor is not answerable for unethical conduct." Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States recently said that:
We also recognize, as contended by the accused, that disciplinary proceedings against an elected public official who is also an attorney must be supported by "clear and convincing evidence." After a review of the record in this case, however, we agree with the Trial Board in its conclusion that there was clear and convincing evidence in support of its findings, as well as its conclusion that the conduct of the accused was "prejudicial to the administration of justice," within the intended meaning of DR 1-102(A)(5).
In agreeing with that conclusion we need not decide whether, as contended by the accused, a district attorney is under no mandatory duty to engage in plea bargaining with any defendant in any criminal case. Neither need we decide whether, as also contended by the accused, the defendant in a criminal case has no constitutional right to be represented by any particular attorney or whether, in such an event, any such constitutional right was either waived or was not violated in this case or that any "interference" with any such right was "justified" under the facts of this case.
In Oregon the standards and requirements for plea bargaining are set forth by *1356 statute. ORS 135.405 provides, among other things, as follows:
To approve of the conduct of the accused in this case would be to approve of a practice under which a prosecuting attorney could decide for himself, in cases involving more than one criminal defendant, which criminal defense attorneys he would deal with and which criminal defense attorneys he would refuse to deal with. He could enforce such a practice by the simple expedient of offering a plea bargain to one defendant and refusing to offer the same plea bargain to other "similarly situated defendants" represented by other attorneys unless they discharged such attorneys. For a defendant represented by such an attorney to refuse to discharge him would subject that defendant not only to a trial, but to the hazard of the imposition of the maximum penalty in the event of conviction.
Such a practice would not only violate the clear requirements of ORS 135.405(4), but would have other consequences which would be clearly "prejudicial" to the administration of criminal justice. Aside from the fact that such a practice would lend itself to possible corruption, we believe it to be so obvious as to require no further demonstration that the very integrity of the administration of criminal justice would be opened to question by such a practice.
There is no charge of corruption in this case. Indeed, the Trial Board found that the conduct of the accused "arose out of overzealousness" rather than "from any motive of personal gain or profit." Nevertheless, the Trial Board found that the accused was motivated in such conduct not only by frustration, but also by "animosity and a desire to punish." After a review of the record, we agree with these findings by the Trial Board, as well as its conclusion that the conduct of accused was "prejudicial to the administration of [criminal] justice," in violation of DR 1-102(A)(5).[3]
The Trial Board also concluded, in response to the second charge by the Oregon State Bar, that the conduct of the accused "served only to harass or maliciously injure another," in violation of DR 7-102(A)(1).[4]
In addition to denying this charge, the accused contends that DR 7-102(A)(1) was not intended to apply in such a case, but was "intended to deal with prosecuting cases merely to harass or injure defendants." It is clear, however, from the terms of that rule that it not only provides that a *1357 lawyer shall not "file a suit" to harass or injure the defendant in that suit, but also provides that a lawyer shall not "assert a position" or "take other action" when he knows or when it is obvious that such "action" would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure "another."
In addition to its finding that "the Accused was motivated in said conduct by frustration, animosity and a desire to punish," the Trial Board found that "the motivation of the Accused's action had nothing to do with the merits of the case but was to punish the fifteen defendants or Messrs. Ringle and Thom or the Elks' or all of them by harassing the attorneys involved."[5] After a review of the record we agree with these findings by the Trial Board, as well as with its conclusion that the conduct by the accused "falls within the plain language and intent" of DR 7-102(A)(1).[6]
As for the contention by the accused that the terms of DR 1-102(1) and (5) are unconstitutionally vague, we believe that as standards of professional conduct they are sufficiently definite for the purpose of a professional disciplinary proceeding. See Board of Medical Examiners v. Mintz, 233 Or. 441, 448, 378 P.2d 945 (1963). We have previously held that such a proceeding is not a criminal proceeding and that the technicalities of criminal law, which are properly invoked to safeguard the liberty of citizens, are not necessarily relevant in the investigation of unethical conduct by an attorney. See In re Gronnert, 242 Or. 233, 236, 391 P.2d 772 (1965). See also In re Lenske, 269 Or. 146, 158, 523 P.2d 1262 (1974). This is particularly true where, as in this case, no First Amendment freedoms have been violated. Cf. State v. Nelson, 210 Kan. 637, 504 P.2d 211 (1972).
As previouly stated, the Trial Board (one member dissenting) recommended that the accused be suspended for a period of six months. The Review Board (one member dissenting) agreed with the findings by the Trial Board that the accused was guilty of the charges against him, but concluded that his conduct was not so serious as to justify suspension and recommended that he be publicly reprimanded for his misconduct.
Although recommending a more severe penalty, the Trial Board made the following Findings of Fact, with which we agree:
We also think it fair to consider the fact that, to our knowledge, this is the first reported decision not only in Oregon, but in any other jurisdiction in the United States, involving a charge of misconduct against a prosecuting attorney in refusing to plea bargain with a criminal defendant.
Under all of the circumstances of this case, we agree with the recommendation by the majority of the Disciplinary Review Board of the Oregon State Bar that the appropriate penalty to be imposed upon the accused in this case be a public reprimand for his misconduct. This opinon shall serve as such a public reprimand.
[1]  DR 1-102 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that

"(A) A lawyer shall not:
"* * *
"(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."
[2]  Lundblade v. Doyle, 376 F. Supp. 57, 60 (N.D.Ill. 1974). See also Newman v. United States, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 263, 382 F.2d 479, 481 (1967).
[3]  In view of our disposition of this charge we need not consider the separate charge by the Oregon State Bar that the conduct of the accused deprived defendants of the right to counsel. We agree with the Trial Board in its holding that this charge did not give rise to a "separate ethical breach."
[4]  DR 7-102 provides that:

"(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another."
[5]  The Trial Board also found that:

"* * * By his own testimony, he intended to deprive Mr. Thom of his employment in the case because of suspicions of criminal connections. In effect, the Accused set out upon something of a `witch hunt' for Mr. Thom, and on extremely flimsy evidence, * * *."
[6]  In view of the disposition of this charge we need not consider the fourth and final charge against the accused, that by his conduct he encouraged the continuance of criminal proceedings from motives of passion or intent. We agree with the Trial Board that it does not "give rise to an independent breach."