Case Title: Ex parte Hattie Randall, an employee of the Mobile County Department of Human Resources. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Robert D. Hernandez and Mary L. Hernandez, as surviving parents of their infant son, Douglas Hernandez, deceased v. Department of Human Resources of the State of Alabama et al.)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1050203

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2007-04-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
04/27/07hattierandall
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
_________________________
1050203
_________________________
Ex parte Hattie Randall, an employee of the Mobile County
Department of Human Resources
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Robert D. Hernandez and Mary L. Hernandez, as
surviving parents of their infant son, Douglas Hernandez,
deceased 
v.
Department of Human Resources of the State of Alabama et
al.)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-04-2243)
BOLIN, Justice.
1050203
Randall states in her petition that the trial court has
1
dismissed the Department and the commissioner as defendants.
2
Hattie Randall, a social worker employed in Mobile County
by the Department of Human Resources ("the Department"),
petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the
Montgomery Circuit Court to vacate its order denying her
motion for a summary judgment based on State-agent immunity in
this wrongful-death action against her and to enter a summary
judgment in her favor based on that defense.  We grant the
petition.
Facts
Douglas Hernandez, the two-month-old son of Robert D. and
Mary L. Hernandez, died on August 30, 2002, while he was in
the care of Melinda Poplin, who was operating Tiny Tots Family
Day Care. Toxicology reports revealed the presence of several
over-the-counter cough and cold medications in Douglas's
blood, and his death was ultimately ruled a homicide.
Douglas's parents sued the Department, its commissioner, and
Hattie Randall, who at the time the parents filed the action
had been employed by the Department for 18 years.  The
1
Hernandezes alleged wrongful death and fraud and sought
1050203
3
injunctive relief. Randall moved for a summary judgment,
asserting as a defense State-agent immunity. After a hearing,
the trial court denied Randall's motion. Randall filed this
petition for the writ of mandamus. 
At the time of the events made the basis of this action,
Randall was serving as a day-care-licensing consultant for the
Department.  Randall's duties included visiting licensed and
prospective 
licensed 
group-day-care 
home 
providers 
to 
evaluate
the homes for purposes of licensing. At that time,  Poplin was
operating Tiny Tots Family Day Care out of her home and was
licensed to care for as many as 12 children ranging in ages
from infancy to 12 years old.  Poplin had been a licensed
group-day-care home operator since 1993.
Poplin had been notified by the Department in October
2001 that her license would soon expire and that she needed to
submit an application for renewal.  Poplin completed the
license-renewal application and submitted it to the Department
on February 13, 2002. Randall made an unannounced visit to the
Poplin home on April 9, 2002, to evaluate it for the purpose
1050203
Section 38-7-6(b), 
Ala. 
Code 
1975, 
provides, 
in 
pertinent
2
part:
"(b) The department 
shall 
reexamine 
every 
child-
care facility for renewal of license or approval,
including in that process, but not limited to, the
examination of the premises and records of the
facility and the persons responsible for the care of
children as the department considers necessary to
determine that minimum standards for licensing or
approval continue to be met ....  If the department
... is satisfied that the facility continues to meet
and maintain minimum standards which the department
prescribes and publishes, the department shall renew
the license or approval to operate the facility
...."    
The Department prescribes numerous regulations in its
3
"Minimum Standards for Family Day Care Homes" that a home-day-
care provider must comply with in order to obtain or maintain
licensing.  See § 38-7-7, Ala. Code 1975.  In order to ensure
proper compliance with the Department's minimum standards, a
licensing consultant is given an "Alabama Department of Human
Resources Child Care Home Licensing Evaluation" form to be
completed by the consultant during the home evaluations.  The
evaluation form lists the regulations that the home-day-care
provider must comply with. Located adjacent to each regulation
are three boxes that indicate "Compliance," "Non-compliance,"
and "Not Applicable."  The licensing consultant completes the
evaluation form by marking the appropriate box as it relates
to the regulation with the code letters "O," "S," "D," and
"X." "O" indicates that the licensing consultant observed
compliance or noncompliance with the regulation.  "S"
4
of determining whether to renew Poplin's license.   During the
2
evaluation, Randall reviewed certain records that Poplin was
required to maintain pursuant to the Department's minimum
standards.   Section F.3.g. of those standards require that
3
1050203
indicates that the licensee certified compliance or non-
compliance with the regulation.  "D" indicates that the
licensing consultant discussed compliance or noncompliance
with the regulation with the licensee.  "X" indicates that the
regulation was not applicable or was not reviewed with the
licensee.  Randall testified that the codes "O," "S," "D," and
"X" are "interchangeable" and that the decision to use an "O,"
"S," "D," or "X" in marking a box on the evaluation form is
left to the discretion of the licensing consultant.
5
the home-day-care provider maintain certain records relating
to the children in the provider's care, including (1) each
child's 
preadmission 
form, 
(2) 
written 
medication
authorizations, and (3) immunization certificates. The day-
care provider must maintain these records  two years after a
child leaves the day-care home.  Section E.2.d(1) of the
minimum standards provides as follows regarding the written
medication-authorization forms:
"No 
medication 
or 
medical 
procedures
(prescription 
or 
over-the-counter) 
shall 
be
administered without a written, signed authorization
form 
from 
the 
child's 
parent(s)/guardian(s).
Blanket authorization forms are prohibited.  The
authorization form shall include time(s) and date(s)
to be administered, dosage, storage instructions,
and 
specific 
directions for administering the
medication/medical procedure, such as give by mouth,
apply to skin, inhale, drops in eyes, etc.  An
authorization form shall be valid for no more than
seven (7) days, unless accompanied by a written
physician's statement."
1050203
6
(Emphasis in original.)             
The licensing consultant is provided with a "Children's
Records Checklist" to be completed when reviewing the records
of the day-care provider.  Randall determined that Poplin's
records were not in compliance with the minimum standards.
She indicated on the records checklist that Poplin had
immunization certificates for only 2 of the 12 children in her
care and that she had no preadmission forms for any of the
children.  Additionally, Poplin had no written medication-
authorization forms on file for the children.  However,
Randall indicated on the records checklist that the written
medication-authorization forms were not applicable to Poplin
under the minimum standards. Randall stated that a written
medication-authorization form is to be included in a child's
file only if the day-care provider has administered medication
to that child. Randall testified as follows regarding the
medication-authorization forms:
"Q. Why did you determine that [the medication-
authorization form] wasn't applicable?
"A.  Minimum standards states that two forms are
required for a child's checklist or to complete a
child's file, and that is the preadmission form and
the immunization certificate.
1050203
7
"Q.  Why would that form have a blank for
medical authorization on it?
"A.  If it was needed.
"Q.  Well, what would be a circumstance when it
would be needed when you were doing this evaluation?
"A.  If a child had been given medication, then
the form should be there.
"Q.  So was it your belief when you were doing
this record check that she had never given a child
medication?
"A.  She had no medical authorization forms.
"Q.  Yes, ma'am.  And so as an evaluation
person, did you believe that she had never given the
children medication?
"A.  When I do an evaluation, I check her files
and I check what [is] there.
"Q. Okay.
"A.  And if there are no forms, then she has not
given any medication because the form is not there.
"Q.  Okay.  And how long would she be –- if she
had given medication to children and she had filled
out those forms, how long would she have to keep
them?
"A.  A file is kept as long as a child is there.
"Q.  They don't have to keep a file any longer
than how long the child is there?
"A.  If the child has not been in the home in
over two years then they do not have to keep the
files.
1050203
8
"Q.  Okay.  So if the child leaves, then they've
got to keep the file for two years?
"A.  Yes, sir.
"....
"Q.  Did you look at any files on children other
than the ones that were actually there at the time?
"A.  No, sir.
"....
"Q.  When you found that the child –- the
children that were currently there had no record of
ever having a medical authorization for medication,
did that –- and with your experience of 18 years
with the department, did that trigger any thought
that, you know, maybe she's not keeping these
records?
"A.  No, sir.
"Q.  Did it lead you to believe, you know, I
might better look at these other children that used
to be here to see if she's ever given medication to
a child in her day care?
"A.  No, sir."  
Randall marked the "Compliance" box on a child-care home-
licensing evaluation form with a "D," indicating that Randall
had discussed with Poplin compliance with the Department's
standard requiring a written authorization form before she
could administer medication to a child in her care.  Randall
explained in her affidavit that she had discussed with Poplin
1050203
9
the requirement of administering medication only with written
parental authorization and that Poplin confirmed that she was
compliant with the policy. Further, Poplin had a written
operating policy for her home day care indicating that she
administered 
medication 
only 
with 
written 
parental
authorization.
Section E.2.d(2) of the Department's minimum standards
requires that any prescription or over-the-counter drug to be
administered to a child in day care be in its original
container 
and 
be 
labeled 
appropriately 
with 
specific
instructions for administering the drug and that a measuring
device be provided if the medication requires measuring.
Section E.2.d(3) requires that all medication in the home be
kept in a locked cabinet or other container. Section E.2.d(4)
requires that all medications be returned to the child's
parent or guardian when no longer needed.  
Randall marked the "Compliance" box on the child-care
home-licensing evaluation form with an "S," indicating that
Poplin had certified that she had a measuring device for
administering medications and that medications were returned
to parents or guardians when they were no longer needed.
1050203
10
Randall indicated that Poplin was in violation of the
requirement that all medications in the day-care home be kept
in a locked cabinet or container by marking the "Non-
compliance" box with a "D," indicating that she had discussed
with Poplin the violation of this standard. Randall testified
regarding her determinations as to the minimum standards as
follows:
"Q.  Okay.  You've got an S here under medicines
returned to child's parent when no longer needed,
and you've got an S there instead of a D?
"A.  Yes, sir.
"Q.  What did you do more than discuss that?
"....
"A. Ms. Poplin told me that she gave the
medicine back, and we discussed that that was the
procedure. 
 
We 
discussed 
that 
that 
was 
the
procedure.
"Q.  Did not that send up a red flag that there
were no medical authorizations if she told you that
she was sending medicine back with the parents when
they didn't need it any more?
"A.  Let me correct my statement.  We discussed
how –- what the procedure was if she received
medication, then the procedure was to give it back
to the parent.
"Q.  And again, my –-
"A.  And we discussed that.
1050203
11
"Q.  Okay.  And again my question –- there are
20 entries on this page under health all the way
down through care of infants.  There are 20 entries,
and you've got D for every one of them except you
certified in some method measuring device provided
and you certified in some method medicines returned
to child's parent when no longer needed.
"A.  Yes, sir.
"Q.  So that was certified to you that medicines
are returned to [a] child's parent when no longer
needed?
"A.  If she has to use medication, yes, she is
to return it to the parent.
"Q.  But she certified to you that she had been
returning it to the parent?
"A.  That's not what that says.
"Q.  Well, tell me why it has an S and
everything else on that page is a D except for the
measuring device?
"A.  That was what was used.  That was the –-
the code that was used for that particular.
"Q.  And I understand that's the code.  It's
obvious to me looking at it that that's the code
that was used.  But my question is you were the one
that used it; why did you use that in that
particular case instead of the D?
"A.  Because in discussing that, if I recall,
she said if medicine is ever used, she returned it
to the parent.
"Q.  Okay.  You couldn't find any evidence from
any of the records you reviewed that she'd ever
given medicine, though, could you?
1050203
12
"A.  According to the form, that was not
applicable.
"Q.  I understand, ma'am.  But you were the one
that filled out the form.  So I need you to tell me
what you found or didn't find, not what the form
says because you filled out the form.
"A.  Okay.  Had a form been there, then I would
have noted that there was one.
"Q.  Okay.  The medicines that you did see that
you discussed with her that they should be locked,
did you make any investigation to see if any of
those medicines were in the name of anybody other
than household members in that household?
"A.  No, sir.
"....
"Q.  Since there were no forms filled out
showing that parents had given authorization to give
any children medicine, did you think it might be
important to look at the medicines that were there
in the house to see if any of them were in some name
other than a household member and that they might
have been for a child?
"A.  I did not look to see who the medicine was
for.
"Q.  Okay.
"A.  There was medicine there, but I did not
look to see whose name was on it.
"Q.  And my question is did you think that might
be important to do?
"A.  We were not required to look.
1050203
13
"Q.  That was not your job; is that what you're
saying when you say not required?
"A.  No, that's not what I said.  We were not
required to look at each medicine bottle to verify
whose medicine it was because there was no form."
Section H.2. of the Department's minimum standards
requires that a group-day-care home have at least the
following caregivers: the licensee, an assistant caregiver,
and at least two substitutes.  Section H.3. provides that when
seven or more children are present in the day-care home, "at
least two (2) adult caregivers shall be present and
supervising the children.  This shall include the licensee and
the assistant caregiver.  If a substitute is used, either the
licensee or the assistant caregiver shall be present and
supervising the children."  Section H.6. requires that an
assistant caregiver receive at least 12 hours of training in
such areas as child development, health and safety, quality
child care and licensing, language development, and positive
discipline and guidance.  The substitutes are not required to
have any specialized training.
Dana Pope was Poplin's assistant caregiver.  Clifton
Poplin, Poplin's husband, and Margaret Hackney were listed as
Poplin's substitutes in the operating policy for the day-care
1050203
Nothing in the Department's minimum standards prevents
4
substitutes from being employed outside the group-day-care
home.
14
home.  Pope worked in the group-day-care home from 7:30 a.m.
to 5:30 p.m.  She was primarily responsible for caring for the
infants; Poplin cared primarily for the older children.  Pope
generally took a three-hour lunch break, which began at noon.
During the hours of Pope's lunch break Clifton would come home
from his outside employment to assist in the group-day-care
home.  Because Clifton was employed outside the group-day-care
home,  Randall required Poplin to provide a letter from
4
Clifton's employer stating that Clifton would be available to
assist in the day-care home when needed.  Although Randall
knew that Clifton would be used as a substitute, she testified
that she had no knowledge as to the extent to which Clifton
would be used as a substitute.  Nevertheless, Randall
testified that if Clifton substituted for the assistant
caregiver three hours a day five days a week, Poplin would not
be violating the Department's minimum standards regarding the
use of substitutes.  She stated that there was no regulation
regarding how often a substitute could be used by a licensee
1050203
15
so long as either the licensee or the assistant caregiver is
present while the substitute is being used.
Randall marked the "Compliance" boxes with a "D" on the
"Child Care Home Licensing Evaluation" form, indicating that
she had discussed with Poplin the requirements that at least
two adults be present and supervising the children when seven
or more children are present and that either the licensee or
assistant caregiver must be present when a substitute is being
used.  However, Randall found that Poplin was not compliant
with the requirement that certain records relating to the
assistant caregiver be kept.  She indicated that she discussed
Poplin's noncompliance with this requirement by marking the
"Non-Compliance" box with a "D."
Randall made a follow-up visit to Poplin's home on May
29, 2002.  Poplin had at this time corrected the majority of
the deficiencies found during the April 9, 2002, inspection
and had so verified to Randall. The correction of the
deficiencies was noted by Randall on the deficiency report.
Randall noted other deficiencies during the May 29, 2002,
visit relating to certain records of Hackney and Clifton that
Poplin was required to keep.  Randall again completed a
1050203
16
deficiency report.  Poplin corrected these deficiencies by
forwarding verification of these records to Randall, and
Randall subsequently noted that the deficiencies on the May
29, 2002, deficiency report had been corrected. Randall then
recommended to her supervisors that Poplin's home-day-care
license be renewed.  The Department renewed Poplin's home-day-
care license on July 26, 2002.
The evidence presented at the hearing on Randall's
summary-judgment motion revealed the following facts. Douglas
was born on June 17, 2002.  His parents, Robert and Mary
Hernandez, contacted the Department to inquire about licensed
home-day-care facilities and were provided a list. The parents
selected Poplin's day care, and Douglas began attending
Poplin's home day care on August 12, 2002.  On August 30,
2002, Robert took Douglas to Poplin's home day care and signed
him in at 7:06 a.m.  Douglas was sleeping and had recently
been fed when he arrived.  Douglas woke up approximately 20
minutes later.  As was the normal routine, Poplin and Pope
took the children outside for approximately 45 minutes to an
hour before lunch.  The children were then brought inside and
fed.
1050203
17
Poplin testified that Douglas was fussy and that she
administered some Tylenol brand acetaminophen to him after
lunch.  Poplin denies administering any other medication to
Douglas.  Douglas and the other infants were then put down for
their naps, and Pope left the day care to begin her lunch
break.  Poplin testified that at 2:30 p.m. she heard Douglas
cry out and she went into the nap room to check on him.  She
stated that she put Douglas's pacifier back in his mouth and
remained with him until he went back to sleep.  Poplin resumed
other activities in the home but testified that she could hear
Douglas and the  infants in the nap room.
Poplin returned to the nap room shortly after 3:00 p.m.
and saw that Douglas was blue and he was not breathing.
Poplin  called for Pope, who had just returned from her lunch
break, to telephone emergency 911.  As Pope telephoned 911,
Poplin began performing CPR on Douglas.  Douglas vomited
several times as Poplin was performing CPR on him.  The
emergency personnel arrived and transported Douglas to the
hospital, where he was pronounced dead at 3:50 p.m.
Dr. Leroy Riddick investigated Douglas's death for the
Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences.  An initial autopsy
1050203
18
report issued on August 31, 2002, indicated that the cause of
Douglas's death was "aspiration of a foreign material" and
that the manner of death was "undetermined."  Toxicology
results issued on December 20, 2002, revealed the presence of
dextromethorphan, 
chlorpheniramine, 
diphenhydramine, 
atropine,
and metoclopramide in Douglas's blood.  Dr. Riddick testified
that dextromethorphan is a cough suppressant and that
chlorpheniramine 
and 
diphenhydramine 
are 
common 
antihistamines
found in over-the-counter cold medications.  Atropine was used
during 
resuscitative 
measures 
at 
the 
hospital, 
and
metoclopramide is used to treat gastric reflux.
Dr. Riddick continued his investigation into Douglas's
death and consulted other experts.  On June 10, 2003, Dr.
Riddick amended his original finding as to the cause of death
to state the following:
"Further study of and reflection on this case
necessitates my putting 'Acute Drug Toxicity' as a
contributory cause of death and to indicate that, in
my opinion, the aspiration was due to the depression
of the central nervous system from the drug
toxicity.  Exactly when and how the infant received
the drugs are investigative matters, which remain
unclear to me.  Thus, the manner [of death] remains
undetermined."
1050203
19
Subsequently, Dr. Riddick performed additional tests on the
material Douglas had vomited onto the shirt that he was
wearing at the time of his death.  The tests revealed the
presence of the drug guaifenesin, a cough suppressant.  Based
on the results of these tests, Dr. Riddick, on September 9,
2003, changed his determination as to the manner of death to
state the following:
"The report of toxicological analysis of the
shirt worn by the subject is attached.  The presence
of the drugs in the stains on the shirt from gastric
contents and the high levels in the blood indicate
that the infant had received the drugs recently.
The manner of death is, therefore, changed to
Homicide."
Dr. Riddick testified as follows regarding his decision to
change the manner of Douglas's death to homicide:
"[T]he central question early on was when did this
child receive these drugs.  That was it.  That was
the reason –- I wasn't certain.  I knew the half-
life of the drugs was really shorter than if the
child had received the drugs prior to seven o'clock
in the morning.  This sort of clinched it.  That
sometime after seven o'clock in the morning, while
the child was at the day-care center, [the child]
received these drugs.  My definition of a homicide
is one or more people are responsible for another
person's death.  The child was not ill according to
the parents and the investigation, and the child was
not under a doctor's care, and these medications had
not been prescribed by a physician."
1050203
20
Dr. Riddick opined that the drugs in Douglas's system had been
administered to him after 7:00 a.m. on the date of his death.
He testified that if the drugs had been administered before
Douglas had arrived at the day care the toxicological tests
would not have disclosed the presence of the drugs in
Douglas's system because the drugs would have been absorbed
and metabolized.  Dr. Riddick further stated that if the drugs
had been administered before Douglas had arrived at the day
care he would have become nonresponsive or have had a central-
nervous-system depression upon his arrival at the day care.
Dr. Riddick testified that Douglas would have been in physical
distress during the process of aspirating and dying.  The
evidence further indicated that from the point Douglas
aspirated the liquid into his lungs to his death would have
been 15 to 20 minutes.
The Hernandezes filed a formal complaint with the
Department on September 3, 2002, alleging that Douglas had
been left unsupervised for a lengthy period at Poplin's day
care and that that had contributed to his death.  The
Department investigated the complaint on October 4, 2002, and
concluded that the complaint was "not indicated for inadequate
1050203
21
supervision."  Randall was not involved with the investigation
regarding the complaint. 
Subsequently, a second formal complaint alleging that
Poplin had administered medication to a child without parental
authorization was filed with the Department.  Randall returned
to the Poplin home day care on February 11, 2003, to
investigate the second complaint.  Poplin admitted that she
had administered Tylenol brand acetaminophen to Douglas
without a medical authorization from his parents.  Randall
found the complaint to be substantiated and completed a
licensing-complaint-investigation 
form. 
Randall 
again 
reviewed
with Poplin the Department's regulation against administering
medication to a child without written medical authorization
from the child's parents.  The Department instituted a
corrective plan, and Poplin agreed not to administer
medication 
to 
a 
child 
without 
having 
a 
medication-
authorization form on file.  Randall also noted additional
violations of the minimum standards during the February 11,
2003, visit.  She completed a deficiency form at that time.
Randall followed up with another visit to Poplin's day care on
1050203
22
February 27, 2003.  She confirmed that the violations noted on
February 11 had been corrected by Poplin. 
Ultimately, once the Department learned that Dr. Riddick
had reclassified the manner of Douglas's death as a homicide
caused by acute drug toxicity, it took action to suspend and
ultimately to revoke Poplin's home-day-care license.
The Hernandezes then filed their complaint, alleging
wrongful death and fraud and seeking certain injunctive
relief. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Randall
failed to perform her ministerial duty and acted either
negligently, willfully, illegally, or beyond her authority, or
under a mistaken interpretation of the law when she: (1)
failed to investigate Poplin's use of medication for children
at the day care and falsely reported that she had investigated
Poplin's use of medication; (2) failed to properly investigate
whether the children were supervised at all times; (3) made a
determination that supervising the children did not require
that someone visually and/or audibly supervise the children;
(4) failed to properly investigate Poplin's home day care at
the time Poplin's day-care license was renewed; and (5) failed
to advise and train Poplin to administer medication only after
1050203
23
she had received written authorization from the child's
parents. Regarding the fraud claim, the Hernandezes alleged
that Randall: (1) entered notations on the licensing report
that she knew or should have known were false; (2) falsely
documented the evaluation of the Poplin home day care to
indicate 
that 
Poplin 
was 
compliant 
in 
administering
medication; and (3) misrepresented the findings of her
licensing evaluation of Poplin's home day care, on which the
Hernandezes relied to their detriment.
Randall moved for a summary judgment, asserting State-
agent immunity as a defense. Following a hearing, the trial
court, on October 20, 2007, entered an order denying Randall's
summary-judgment motion and finding that a jury question was
presented as to "whether or not defendant Randall followed
proper departmental procedures regarding the evaluation forms
for the day care ...." This petition followed.
Standard of Review
This Court has stated:
"'While the general rule is that the denial of
a motion for summary judgment is not reviewable, the
exception is that the denial of a motion grounded on
a claim of immunity is reviewable by petition for
writ of mandamus.  Ex parte Purvis, 689 So. 2d 794
(Ala. 1996)....
1050203
24
"'Summary judgment is appropriate only when
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law."  Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ.
P., Young v. La Quinta Inns, Inc., 682 So. 2d 402
(Ala. 1996).  A court considering a motion for
summary judgment will view the record in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, Hurst v.
Alabama Power Co., 675 So. 2d 397 (Ala. 1996), Fuqua
v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 591 So. 2d 486 (Ala. 1991);
will accord the nonmoving party all reasonable
favorable inferences from the evidence, Fuqua,
supra, Aldridge v. Valley Steel Constr., Inc., 603
So. 2d 981 (Ala. 1992); and will resolve all
reasonable doubts against the moving party, Hurst,
supra, Ex parte Brislin, 719 So. 2d 185 (Ala. 1998).
"'An appellate court reviewing a ruling on a
motion for summary judgment will, de novo, apply
these same standards applicable in the trial court.
Fuqua, 
supra, 
Brislin, 
supra. 
Likewise, 
the
appellate court will consider only that factual
material available of record to the trial court for
its consideration in deciding the motion.  Dynasty
Corp. v. Alpha Resins Corp., 577 So. 2d 1278 (Ala.
1991), Boland v. Fort Rucker Nat'l Bank, 599 So. 2d
595 (Ala. 1992), Rowe v. Isbell, 599 So. 2d 35 (Ala.
1992).'"
Ex parte Turner, 840 So. 2d 132, 135 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Ex
parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912-13 (Ala. 2000)).  A writ of
mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only when the
petitioner demonstrates: "'(1) a clear legal right to the
order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked
1050203
25
jurisdiction of the court.'" Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d 541,
543 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So. 2d
1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001)).
Discussion
In Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000), this
Court restated the test for determining when a State employee
is entitled to State-agent immunity:
"A State agent shall be immune from civil
liability in his or her personal capacity when the
conduct made the basis of the claim against the
agent is based upon the agent's
"(1) formulating 
plans, 
policies, 
or 
designs; 
or
"(2) exercising his or her judgment in the
administration 
of 
a 
department 
or 
agency 
of
government, including, but not limited to, examples
such as:
"(a) 
making 
administrative
adjudications;
"(b) allocating resources;
"(c) negotiating contracts;
"(d) hiring, firing, transferring,
assigning, or supervising personnel; or
"(3) discharging duties imposed on a department
or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar
as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the
manner for performing the duties and the State agent
performs the duties in that manner; or
1050203
26
"(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of
the criminal laws of the State, including, but not
limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or
attempting to arrest persons; or
"(5) exercising judgment in the discharge of
duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in
releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons
of unsound mind, or educating students.
"Notwithstanding 
anything 
to 
the 
contrary 
in 
the
foregoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall
not be immune from civil liability in his or her
personal capacity
"(1) when the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws,
rules, or regulations of this State enacted or
promulgated for the purpose of regulating the
activities 
of 
a 
governmental 
agency 
require
otherwise; or
"(2) when the State agent acts willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his
or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation
of the law."
792 So. 2d at 405.  Although Cranman was a plurality decision,
the restatement of law as it pertains to State-agent immunity
set forth in Cranman was subsequently adopted by this Court's
decisions in Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911 (Ala. 2000), and Ex
parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173 (Ala. 2000).
Additionally, this Court has stated:
"This Court has established a 'burden-shifting'
process 
when 
a 
party 
raises 
the 
defense 
of
State-agent immunity.  Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So.
1050203
27
2d 1046, 1052 (Ala. 2003).  In order to claim
State-agent immunity, a State agent bears the burden
of demonstrating that the plaintiff's claims arise
from a function that would entitle the State agent
to immunity.  Giambrone, 874 So. 2d at 1052; Ex
parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 709 (Ala. 2002).  If the
State agent makes such a showing, the burden then
shifts to the plaintiff to show that the State agent
acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad
faith, or beyond his or her authority.  Giambrone,
874 So. 2d at 1052; Wood, 852 So. 2d at 709; Ex
parte Davis, 721 So. 2d 685, 689 (Ala. 1998).  'A
State agent acts beyond authority and is therefore
not immune when he or she "fail[s] to discharge
duties pursuant to detailed rules or regulations,
such as those stated on a checklist."'  Giambrone,
874 So. 2d at 1052 (quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So.
2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000))."
Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006).
Randall argues that in evaluating the Poplin home day
care for license renewal she complied with state law and with
departmental policy; therefore, she argues, she is entitled to
State-agent immunity as a matter of law.  The Hernandezes
argue that Randall is not entitled to State-agent immunity
because, they say, she acted fraudulently and under a mistaken
interpretation 
of 
the 
Department's 
policy, rules, and
regulations in evaluating the Poplin home day care for
purposes of renewing Poplin's license.
1050203
28
I.  Randall's Alleged Failure to Require Written Medication-
Authorization Forms
The Department's minimum standards require a home-day-
care operator to obtain a written medication authorization
from a child's parents before administering any medication to
that child.  The home-day-care operator is required by
Department regulation to keep a copy of the written
authorization in the child's records located at the day care
for up to two years after the child leaves the day care.  As
required by law and the Department's regulations, Randall
reviewed the records of the children in Poplin's care during
her evaluation of Poplin's day care on April 9, 2002.  Randall
discovered during the review of the children's records that
Poplin had no written medication-authorization forms on file.
Rather than indicate that Poplin was noncompliant in failing
to have any written medication-authorization forms, Randall
indicated on the records checklist that this requirement was
not applicable to Poplin.  Randall explained that a written
medication-authorization form was required to be in a child's
records only if Poplin had administered medication to that
child in the past.  Randall's explanation of requiring a
written medication-authorization form to be in a child's
1050203
29
records only if Poplin had administered medication to the
child is entirely consistent with the Department's policy
against "blanket" authorization forms found in section
E.2.d(1) of the Department's minimum standards.
Randall testified in her affidavit that she discussed
with Poplin the Department's regulation that medication be
administered to a child only after obtaining a written
medication-authorization form from the child's parents and
that Poplin assured her that she complied with that
regulation.  Randall indicated on the licensing-evaluation
form that she had discussed with Poplin that regulation.
Additionally, Randall confirmed that Poplin had a written
operating policy for her home day care, as required by the
Department, indicating that medication would be administered
to a child only with written authorization from the child's
parents. 
The Hernandezes point to the facts that it is unlikely
that Poplin had never had to administer medication to a child,
that Poplin certified to Randall that she had a measuring
device she used for administering medication, and that she
certified to Randall that she returned medication to the
1050203
30
parents when the medication was no longer needed, in support
of their argument that Randall should have known that Poplin
was administering medication to the children in her care
without first obtaining the written medication-authorization
forms from the children's parents.
Randall's fault with regard to the matters forming the
basis for this action is failing to probe more deeply to get
to the truth.  Of course, a reasonable person is not required
to accept an improbable explanation in absence of proof to the
contrary -- a reasonable person should reject such an
explanation.  The parents, when the evidence is viewed, as it
must be, in their favor, have assembled facts that could
reasonably support the conclusion that Randall was either
quite gullible or negligent or perhaps even reckless in
accepting Poplin's statements at face value and completing the
licensing-evaluation form based on those statements.  But no
evidence suggests that Randall was in collusion with Poplin or
that she had some impermissible motive "to look the other
way."  Randall's failure to detect that Poplin must have been
administering medication without proper documentation is
consistent only with negligent or wanton behavior.
1050203
31
This Court has previously held that poor judgment or
wanton misconduct, an aggravated form of negligence, does not
rise to the level of willfulness and maliciousness necessary
to put the State agent beyond the immunity recognized in
Cranman.  See Giambrone, 874 So. 2d at 1057 (holding that
State-agent immunity "is not abrogated for negligent and
wanton behavior; instead, immunity is withheld only upon a
showing that the State agent acted willfully, maliciously,
fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his or her authority").
The dissenting opinion appears to treat as exhaustive the
list illustrating the basis of immunity in Cranman.  This
Court in Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201, 206 (Ala.
2003), rejected that notion by acknowledging that the list in
Cranman was illustrative and not exhaustive.  ("On its face,
Cranman disclaims the rigidity, or exclusivity, attributed to
it by Howard.  In other words, Cranman states categories, but
does not purport to set forth an exhaustive list of activities
falling within each category.")  Cranman is only a
restatement; it is not a statute.  Additionally, category (2)
of Cranman refers to a State agent's "exercising his or her
judgment in the administration of a department or agency of
1050203
32
government, including, but not limited to, examples such as"
and there follow certain specific activities.  792 So. 2d at
405 (emphasis added).  Thus, Randall cannot be faulted for her
failure to identify in her petition an illustration that
applies neatly to her situation.  
Randall was charged by statute with duties necessary to
the administration of the Department.  Randall did not
erroneously report an objective fact, such as whether a
swimming pool was enclosed by a fence, as was the case in
Phillips v. Thomas, 555 So. 2d 81, 86 (Ala. 1989), in which
immunity was denied.  On the other hand, the ability to sift
through false information in a way that elicits the truth is
not on the same level of judgment in furtherance of a state
activity analogous to electing between potholes while
operating an automobile.  See  Town of Loxley v. Coleman, 720
So. 2d 907 (Ala. 1998) (holding that steering a police vehicle
around potholes does not involve the type of judgment to which
immunity applies).  A good case has been made that Randall
exercised poor judgment in the discharge of duties imposed
upon her by statute.  However, these circumstances are
insufficient to deprive her of State-agent immunity under
1050203
33
Cranman.  The dissent would deny immunity to a State agent who
would have clearly been entitled to immunity before this
Court's restatement of Cranman.    
The Hernandezes have failed to present substantial
evidence 
indicating 
that 
Randall 
acted 
willfully, 
maliciously,
fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond her authority, or under
a misinterpretation of the law in discharging her duties in
completing the Department's licensing-evaluation form as it
pertained to the Department's policy requiring day-care
operators to obtain written medication-authorization forms
before administering medication to children in their care.
Reynolds, supra.  Accordingly, we conclude that Randall is
entitled to State-agent immunity as to all claims asserted by
the Hernandezes arising out of the alleged failure to require
the written medication-authorization forms.  Cranman, supra.
II. Randall's Alleged Failure to Determine that the Children
At Poplin's Day Care Were Improperly Supervised
The Hernandezes contend that Poplin's day care was
continuously understaffed and that Randall failed to detect
this deficiency.  Because Poplin operated a home day care, the
Department's minimum standards required her to have, in
addition to herself, an assistant caregiver and at least two
1050203
34
substitutes on her staff.  Randall confirmed that Pope was
employed by Poplin as the assistant caregiver and that Clifton
Poplin and Margaret Hackney were on staff as substitutes.
Because Randall knew that Clifton was employed outside the
day-care home, she required Poplin to provide a confirmation
letter from Clifton's employer stating that Clifton would be
available to assist in the day care when he was needed.
Poplin's assistant caregiver and two substitutes were listed
on the operating policy of the home day care.  Accordingly,
Poplin's home day care was appropriately staffed. 
The Hernandezes further argue that had Randall done even
a cursory investigation by speaking with Pope or Clifton she
would have discovered that Pope was absent from the home day
care for three hours a day, and she would therefore have been
required 
to 
indicate 
Poplin's 
noncompliance 
with 
the
Department's staffing regulation on the deficiency report.
The Hernandezes argument assumes that Pope's absence from the
home day care for three hours per day violated a Department
regulation. Section H.3. of the Department's minimum standards
required only that Poplin and the assistant caregiver be
present and supervising the children when seven or more
1050203
35
children were present.  However, if Poplin chose to use a
substitute, then the Department's minimum standards required
that either Poplin or the assistant caregiver be present and
supervising 
the 
children with 
the substitute. Randall
testified that if Clifton was used as a substitute three hours
a day for five days a week, Poplin would not be in violation
of the Department's minimum standards regarding the use of
substitutes.  She further stated that there was no Department
regulation regarding how often a substitute could be used by
a licensee, so long as either the licensee or the assistant
caregiver was present with the substitute.  The Hernandezes
have presented no evidence to the contrary.
Additionally, 
the 
Hernandezes 
have 
presented 
no
Department regulation requiring Randall to confirm the work
schedules of employees at the day care.  All the licensing-
evaluation form requires Randall to do in regard to staffing
is to discuss with Poplin, to observe, or to certify that at
least two adults are present and supervising the children when
seven or more children are present and that either the
licensee or assistant caregiver be present if a substitute is
being used.  Randall complied with the licensing-evaluation
1050203
36
form by indicating that she had discussed that requirement
with Poplin.
We conclude that the Hernandezes have failed to present
substantial evidence creating a question of fact as to whether
Randall 
acted 
beyond 
her 
authority 
or 
under 
a
misinterpretation of the law in discharging her duties of
completing the Department's licensing-evaluation form as it
pertained to the staffing and supervision requirements of the
Department's minimum standards.  Reynolds, supra.  We further
conclude that Randall is entitled to State-agent immunity as
to all claims asserted by the Hernandezes arising out of the
alleged failure to properly supervise.  Cranman, supra.
III. Randall's Alleged Fraudulent Misrepresentations in
Completing the Licensing-Evaluation Form
  
The 
Hernandezes 
contend 
that 
Randall 
fraudulently
completed the licensing-evaluation form and made fraudulent
misrepresentations on the form about Poplin's compliance with
the Department's minimum standards.  In order to survive a
summary judgment on a fraud claim, a plaintiff must present
substantial evidence indicating that there was a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the defendant: (1) made a
misrepresentation; (2) of a material existing fact; (3) upon
1050203
37
which the plaintiff reasonably relied; (4) which proximately
caused injury or damage to the plaintiff.   Byrd v. Lamar, 846
So. 2d 334 (Ala. 2002). 
The Hernandezes specifically contend that "deficiencies
existed that were never listed nor corrected because Randall
did not perform the duties that she indicated on the
evaluation form [that] she had performed."  As discussed
above, this Court has concluded that the Hernandezes have
failed to present substantial evidence creating a question of
fact as to whether Randall acted beyond her authority or under
a misinterpretation of the law in discharging her duties when
she evaluated Poplin's home day care for the purpose of
renewing Poplin's license.  Further, the Hernandezes have
failed 
to 
present 
any 
evidence 
indicating 
that 
any
deficiencies existed in the day care that were not properly
identified 
by 
Randall 
and 
required 
to 
be 
corrected.
Accordingly, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Randall 
made 
no
misrepresentations 
in 
completing 
the 
licensing-evaluation 
form
that could have been relied on by the Hernandezes, and the
fraud claim therefore fails as a matter of law.
Conclusion
1050203
38
Randall is entitled to State-agent immunity as to the
claims asserted against her by the Hernandezes. Because she
has demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief sought, we
grant the petition and issue the writ of mandamus.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, and Parker, JJ., concur.
See, J., concurs specially.
Cobb, C.J., and Murdock, J., dissent.
1050203
39
SEE, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the main opinion.  
The main opinion concludes that Hattie Randall's conduct
in completing the licensing-evaluation forms used by the
Mobile County Department of Human Resources falls within the
protection of State-agent immunity, citing Ex parte Cranman,
792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000).  The respondents object, with good
reason, to the plausibility of some of the answers Randall
reported on the licensing-evaluation forms.  Justice Murdock
notes in his dissent that Randall's conduct does not readily
fit within any of the Cranman categories, but comes closest to
fitting into category (3), "discharging duties imposed on a
department or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar
as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the manner for
performing the duties and the State agent performs the duties
in that manner." Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405.  He states that,
"In general, these statutes and regulations left Randall with
significant discretion as to the manner in which she was to
examine and investigate the day care and then formulate and
record her findings and recommendations." ___ So. 2d. at ___.
1050203
I would argue against including the doctrine of sovereign
5
immunity in our State constitution.  If we can expect private
actors to live their lives and to carry out their business
40
If it is necessary to squeeze Randall's conduct into
category (3), I would note that we must be careful when
considering acts that are either ministerial or discretionary
in their fundamental nature that we do not so finely reduce
them into ministerial and discretionary components that we
effectively abolish State-agent immunity.  See Swan v. City of
Hueytown, 920 So. 2d 1075, 1081 ("Breaking discretionary
actions into increasingly minute ministerial components
circumvents the intention of Article I, § 14, Ala. Const.
1901." (footnote omitted)).  Every task can be minutely
disaggregated and inspected piece by piece, requiring the
State actor to defend each component action that does not
partake of the discretionary -– or, as here, the ministerial
–- nature of the Cranman category under which the general act
is immunized.  
It is our charge to determine the intent of the
Constitution and to apply it as intended.  We are charged to
do so whether we agree or disagree with the policy embodied in
it.   The Constitution of Alabama states "[t]hat the state of
5
1050203
within the limits of the laws of the State, I do not see why
we cannot expect the same of State actors.  The State is every
bit as capable of insuring itself as are private actors, and
the full cost of the acts of the State should be borne by
those who receive the benefit of the State action, not by
those who have the misfortune, as here, to be the victims of
the State actor's malfeasance.
41
Alabama shall never be made defendant in any court of law or
equity." Art. 1, § 14, Ala. Const. of 1901.  "The wall of
'governmental immunity' is almost invincible, made so by the
people through their Constitution as interpreted by this
Court." Hutchinson v. Board of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama, 288
Ala. 20, 24, 256 So. 2d 281, 284 (1971).  Moreover, "'[o]ne of
the purposes of immunity, absolute or qualified, is to spare
a defendant not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted
demands customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn
out lawsuit.'" Ryan v. Hayes, 831 So. 2d 21, 31 (Ala. 2002)
(quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)).
Therefore, I would recognize Randall's actions in completing
the Department licensing-evaluation forms as falling within
Cranman category (3), "discharging duties imposed on a
department or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar
as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the manner for
performing the duties and the State agent performs the duties
1050203
"(1) 
formulating 
plans, 
policies, 
or
6
designs; ...
"(2) exercising his or her judgment in the
administration 
of 
a 
department 
or 
agency 
of
government ...
"(3) discharging duties imposed on a department
or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar
as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the
manner for performing the duties and the State agent
performs the duties in that manner; ...
"(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of
the criminal laws of the State, including, but not
limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or
attempting to arrest persons; [and]
42
in that manner," notwithstanding that she was required to
exercise some discretion in how to fill out the forms, in how
deeply to dig for the information needed to complete the
forms, and in what answers to accept at face value or to
reject as too improbable.  It is not necessary, however, to
labor this point. 
The main opinion reminds us that it was the intention of
this Court, in Cranman, to "restate the rule governing State-
agent immunity."  792 So. 2d at 405.  Based on the prior
caselaw, Cranman enumerated five categories of conduct in
which a State agent is "immune from civil liability in his or
her personal capacity."   The main opinion relies on the
6
1050203
"(5) exercising judgment in the discharge of
duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in
releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons
of unsound mind, or educating students."
Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405.
I wrote in that dissent that I believed  the original per
7
curiam opinion in Cranman, which was subsequently withdrawn,
correctly restated the rule concerning State-agent immunity in
relevant part as follows:
"'[A] governmental agent is immune from civil
liability where the conduct made the basis of the
claim against the agent is based upon the agent's
formulation of plans, policies, or designs, or where
the agent otherwise makes decisions such as those
made in the context of the following activities:
"'(1) making administrative adjudications;
"'(2) allocating resources;
"'(3) negotiating contracts;
"'(4) hiring, firing, transferring, assigning,
or supervising personnel; 
"'(5) 
activities 
of 
law-enforcement 
or
correctional officers in arresting, attempting to
arrest, or releasing prisoners;
"'(6) 
all 
other 
instances 
where 
acts 
or
decisions, including those concerning the safety,
43
Cranman restatement to support its holding that Randall is
immune from suit.  Although I originally dissented in
Cranman,  I have since concurred. Ex parte Mobile County Dep't
7
1050203
health, 
well-being, 
fitness, 
competence,
development, or confinement of persons, cannot be
challenged without imposing a burden arising from
interference with a coequal branch of government
that exceeds the benefit of the challenging party's
right to a judicial remedy.'"
Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 415 (See, J., dissenting).  This
restatement of the doctrine of State-agent immunity, I
believe, reflects that Randall's behavior is covered by the
doctrine.
44
of Human Res., 815 So. 2d 527, 532 (See, J., concurring
specially) ("Although I disagreed with the discretionary-
immunity rule suggested by the plurality in Ex parte Cranman,
792 So. 2d 392, 413-17 (Ala. 2000) (See, J., dissenting
opinion), and subsequently adopted by this Court in Ex parte
Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, at 177-78 (Ala. 2000), it is now the
law of the State of Alabama.  I therefore concur.").  The main
opinion states 
that the 
Cranman categories 
are 
not exhaustive,
citing Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201, 206 (Ala.
2003) ("On its face, Cranman disclaims the rigidity, or
exclusivity, attributed to it by Howard.  In other words,
Cranman states categories, but does not purport to set forth
an exhaustive list of activities falling within each
category.").  Indeed, Cranman itself recognizes that it is not
1050203
We are without the power to change the law of sovereign
8
immunity that appears in the Constitution of Alabama, but are
bound by it.  Ala. Const. of 1901, Art. XVI, § 279 ("all
officers, executive and judicial, [are required to] take the
following oath or affirmation: 'I, __________, solemnly swear
... that I will support the Constitution of the United States,
and the Constitution of the State of Alabama ... and that I
will faithfully and honestly discharge the duties of the
office upon which I am about to enter....'").
45
intended to change the law, but to restate it. Cranman, 792
So. 2d at 405 ("We therefore restate the rule governing State-
agent immunity.").   I believe that the result in this case is
8
consistent with the Alabama caselaw interpreting the doctrine
of State-agent immunity. See, e.g., Ex parte Sawyer, 876 So.
2d 433 (Ala. 2003) (relying on Cranman to issue writ of
mandamus dismissing claims against the commissioner of the
Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation in her
individual capacity for failing to establish policies that
would have prevented an attack on a nursing-home resident by
a fellow nursing-home resident); Ex parte Blankenship, 806 So.
2d 1186 (Ala. 2000) (relying on Cranman to direct the trial
court to enter a summary judgment in favor of school principal
and band director as to claims against them in their
individual capacities in educating students).  Therefore, I
concur.  
1050203
46
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
Application of the Cranman Rule
The main opinion in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392,
404-05 (Ala. 2000), states as follows:  
"We cannot, in blind obedience to the doctrine
of stare decisis, continue to accept an expansive
application 
of 
caselaw 
characterizing 
as 
a
discretionary function conduct remote from the
execution of governmental policy; to do so would
perpetuate 
an 
erroneous 
construction 
of 
the
Constitution.  The time has come to face the
necessity of defining 'injury,' as that word is used
in § 13[, Ala. Const. 1901], in lawsuits against
State employees alleging torts committed in the line
of duty, in a manner that neither violates § 13 nor
prefers § 14[, Ala. Const. 1901,] or § 6.01 of the
Judicial Article over § 13.  We decline to label all
discretionary acts by an agent of the State, or all
acts by such an agent involving skill or judgment,
as 'immune' simply because the State has empowered
the agent to act.  Such an expansive view of the
power of the State to act with immunity for its
agents would be inconsistent with the rights secured
by § 13.
"We therefore restate the rule governing State-
agent immunity:
 
"A State agent shall be immune from civil
liability in his or her personal capacity when the
conduct made the basis of the claim against the
agent is based upon the agent's
  
"(1) formulating plans, policies, or designs;
...
  
"(2) exercising his or her judgment in the
administration of a department or agency of
1050203
47
government, including, but not limited to, examples
such as
"(a) 
making 
administrative
adjudications;
"(b) allocating resources;
"(c) negotiating contracts;
"(d) hiring, firing, transferring,
assigning, or supervising personnel; ...
  
"(3) discharging duties imposed on a department
or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar
as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the
manner for performing the duties and the State agent
performs the duties in that manner; ...
  
"(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of
the criminal laws of the State, including, but not
limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or
attempting to arrest persons; [and]
  
"(5) exercising judgment in the discharge of
duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in
releasing prisoners, 
counseling or releasing 
persons
of unsound mind, or educating students."
(Citations omitted.)  In Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173 (Ala.
2000), a majority of the Court adopted Cranman's statement of
the State-agent-immunity test.
Under the rule of State-agent immunity as formulated in
Cranman and adopted in Butts, Hattie Randall was entitled to
a summary judgment only if she demonstrated to the trial court
that her conduct fell within one of the above-quoted five
1050203
48
categories.  The main opinion criticizes this dissent for
"appear[ing] to treat as exhaustive the list illustrating the
basis of immunity in Cranman." __ So. 2d at __ (emphasis
added).  Given the language and structure of the rule of
immunity expressed in Cranman, I am uncertain what is meant by
the suggestion that "the list" in Cranman is not "exhaustive."
Admittedly, categories (2) and (4) each describe conduct of a
certain nature and then give their own nonexhaustive "list" of
examples.  These examples, however, are only examples of
conduct that falls within those respective categories.  The
other three categories contain no such list of examples.  My
point, however, is that to fall within one of the five
categories, a defendant's conduct must meet the description
provided by that category, and it is clear from the language
and structure used in Cranman  that the five categories
articulated constitute the entirety of the immunity rule.  See
also Butts, supra; note 17 and accompanying text, infra.  If
this Court is of the opinion that there is or should be some
additional catchall category for the discretionary execution
of governmental policy generally, it is incumbent upon us to
so state and to express the parameters of that category. 
1050203
49
Although Randall quotes the Cranman test in its entirety
in her brief to this Court, Randall does not expressly
identify the particular category into which she contends her
conduct falls.  She does not argue that she was "formulating
plans, policies, or designs" (category (1)); that she was
"exercising ... her judgment in the administration of a
department or agency of government" (category (2)); that she
was "exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal
laws" (category (4)); or that she was "exercising judgment" in
"releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons of
unsound 
mind, 
or 
educating 
students" 
(category 
(5)).
Presumably Randall makes no argument that her conduct falls
within one of these categories for the simple reason that the
plain language of these categories does not allow for any such
argument.  Randall was not making policy as contemplated by
category (1).  Unlike category (1), categories (2), (4), and
(5) contemplate the exercise of judgment or discretion in the
execution of certain laws or policies specifically identified
in those categories or the administration of a department or
agency.  Although Randall arguably was indeed "exercising
judgment" and discretion in the execution of governmental
1050203
As the petitioner in this mandamus proceeding, Randall
9
has the burden to demonstrate to this court a clear legal
right to relief.  See Ex parte Children's Hosp. of Alabama,
931 So. 2d 1, 8 (Ala. 2005).  As discussed in the text, infra,
the only Cranman category that her briefs to this Court
suggest is applicable in this case is category (3).  The main
opinion, however, makes note of the fact that category (2) of
Cranman "refers to a State agent's 'exercising his or her
judgment in the administration of a department or agency of
government, including, but not limited to, examples such as'
and there follow certain specific activities."  ___ So. 2d at
___ (quoting Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405 (emphasis in main
opinion).  I do not see how the fact that category (2)
includes a nonexhaustive list of examples of conduct that fall
within that category supports the conclusion in the main
opinion "Randall cannot be faulted for her failure to identify
in her petition an illustration that applies neatly to her
situation." ___ So. 2d at ___  Category (2), which involves
the administration of a department or agency, simply is not
applicable in this case.  Randall, as the petitioner,  makes
no effort to meet her burden by reference to category (2),
and, in any event, the wording of that category would not
support such an effort.
50
policy, she simply was not exercising judgment as to any of
those three Cranman categories, i.e.,  categories (2), (4),
and (5).9
Unable to fit her conduct in any other Cranman category,
and without specifically referring to category (3),  Randall
would apparently have this Court treat her conduct as falling
into that category, i.e., as the performance of duties in a
manner that is prescribed by statute, rule, or regulation.
Randall states in her petition to this Court that she "has
1050203
In this regard, Randall's position appears inconsistent
10
with that of the social worker for the Department of Human
Resources in Ex parte Trawick, [Ms. 1050749, Aug. 4, 2006] ___
So. 2d ___ (Ala. 2006).  In Trawick, this Court, among other
things, upheld a trial court's order denying a motion for a
summary judgment filed by a social worker for the Department
who allegedly failed to properly investigate a day-care
facility on the ground that "at no point [did the social
worker] actually argue that she was required by law to engage
in or to refrain from certain actions." ___ So. 2d at ___.
51
presented evidence of compliance with agency policies"
(petition at 11) and that she "established by her affidavit
and by attached documentation that her actions were in accord
with DHR [Department of Human Resources] policy and state
law."  (Petition at 12.)  According to Randall, "[t]he
[Hernandezes] 
have 
presented 
no 
evidence, 
much 
less
substantial 
evidence, that 
Randall 
failed 
to 
complete 
the form
according to DHR policy or failed to write down a code
required by DHR policy."  (Petition at 17.)  She also argues
that, "[a]t all times," she "acted within DHR policy as stated
by her supervisors, DHR written policy, and DHR legal
counsel."  (Petition at 18.)10
  
Randall was entitled to a summary judgment based on the
third category of Cranman, however, only if she showed the
trial court (1) that she was performing duties "imposed on"
1050203
52
the Department of Human Resources ("the Department") by a
"statute, rule, or regulation"; (2) that the "statute, rule,
or regulation prescribe[d] the manner for performing the
duties"; and (3) that there was no issue of material fact as
to whether she performed the prescribed duties in the
prescribed manner.  The trial court decided that Randall had
not made the required showing.  Randall  is entitled to the
issuance by this Court of an extraordinary  writ in the nature
of mandamus only if she has demonstrated to us a "clear legal
right to relief" from that decision, Ex parte Children's Hosp.
of Alabama, 931 So. 2d 1, 8 (Ala. 2005), or, in other words,
that there is "'"no reasonable basis for controversy about the
right to [such] relief."'"  Ex parte Vance, 900 So. 2d 394,
399 (Ala. 2004) (quoting other cases).  I conclude that she
has not done so.
The statutes and regulations governing the renewal of a
license to operate a "Family Day Care" impose upon the
Department a duty to inspect and investigate day-care
facilities to assess whether those facilities meet certain
minimum standards.  See Ala. Admin. Code (Department of Human
Resources), r. 660-5-27-.03(4), -.03(9)(d), and -.03(10); see
1050203
Given the specific language used for category (3)
11
immunity (including the absence of any qualifying "exercising
judgment" language found in categories (2), (4), and (5)),
category (3) does not apply to the exercise of discretion in
deciding how to perform a duty.
53
also Ala. Code 1975, §§ 38-7-6(b) and 38-7-11.  After
reviewing the materials before this Court and the pertinent
state statutes and day-care-licensing regulations issued by
the Department, see generally Ala. Code 1975, § 38-7-1 et seq.
and Ala. Admin. Code (Department of Human Resources),
r. 660-5-27-.01 et seq., I cannot conclude that the "statutes,
rules, and regulations" governing the Department's day-care-
licensing program fully "prescribed the manner" in which
Randall was required to perform her investigation of Poplin's
facility.  Instead, Randall was left with significant
discretion in how 
to 
conduct her investigation.   See 
Phillips
11
v. Thomas, 555 So. 2d 81, 86 (Ala. 1989) (recognizing that
under the above-described statutes, the investigation of a
day-care facility by a social worker employed by the
Department 
entails 
both 
discretionary 
and 
ministerial
components). 
Section 38-7-4, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in part: 
1050203
54
"Application for such license or approval to operate
a child-care facility shall be made to the
department in the manner and on forms prescribed by
it. 
 
The 
department, 
upon 
receiving 
such
application, shall examine the premises of the
child-care 
facility, 
including 
buildings, 
equipment,
furnishings 
and 
appliances 
thereof 
and 
shall
investigate the persons responsible for the care of
children therein.  If, upon such examination of the
facility 
and 
investigation 
of 
the 
persons
responsible for care of children, the department is
satisfied that the facility and the responsible
persons reasonably meet standards prescribed for the
type of child-care facility for which application is
made, the department shall issue a license or an
approval in the proper form, designating on said
license or approval the type of child-care facility
and, except for a child-placing agency, the number
of children to be served at any one time." 
(Emphasis added.)  As to a license-renewal reexamination, the
licensing statute provides:
"The department shall reexamine every child-care
facility for renewal of license or approval,
including in that process, but not limited to, the
examination of the premises and records of the
facility and the persons responsible for the care of
children as the department considers necessary to
determine that minimum standards for licensing or
approval continue to be met....  If the department
or the licensed child-placing agency, as the case
may be, is satisfied that the facility continues to
meet and maintain minimum standards which the
department prescribes and publishes, the department
shall renew the license or approval to operate the
facility or the licensed child-placing agency shall
renew its approval of a boarding home." 
1050203
The regulations also contain a detailed description of
12
the minimum standards the day-care facility must meet.  See
Ala. Admin. Code (Department of Human Resources), r. 660-5-27-
.04 through -.10 and r. 660-5-27-.13 through -.14. 
55
Ala. Code 1975, § 38-7-6(b) (emphasis added).  Section 38-7-11
provides that the Department's inspection 
"shall include, but not be limited to, premises,
services, personnel, program, accounts and records,
interviews with agents and employees of the child-
care facility being inspected and interviews with
any child or other person within the custody or
control 
of 
said 
child-care 
facility. 
 
Such
inspection shall be made at any reasonable time,
without prior notice, and as often as necessary to
enforce and administer the provisions of this
chapter. ...  If any such inspection ... discloses
any condition, deficiency, dereliction or abuse
which is, or could be, hazardous to the health, the
safety or the physical, moral or mental well-being
of the children in the care of the child-care
facility being inspected, the same shall at once be
brought to the attention of the department ...."
The regulations add that
"[i]f an inspection, evaluation, or investigation
indicates non-compliance with the minimum standards
(deficiency), a deficiency report shall be prepared
by the Department.  ...  In any visit to the home in
which deficiencies are observed or noted, the
licensing representative shall complete a 
deficiency
report, and discuss the deficiencies observed or
noted with the licensee or facility representative."
Ala. 
Admin. 
Code 
(Department 
of 
Human 
Resources),
r. 660-5-27-.11(3).   
12
1050203
I also note that, accepting for present purposes that the
"Minimum Standards" manual that was provided to Randall by the
Department and that Randall submitted with her petition
contains "rules" of the nature contemplated by category (3),
I see nothing in the manual that materially alters my view of
the degree of discretion held by Randall in performing her
investigative duties.
In his special concurrence, Justice See refers to
13
"Randall's conduct in completing the licensing-evaluation
forms issued by the Mobile County Department of Human
Resources." ___ So. 2d at ___.  The basis for my opinion in
this case, however, is that Randall as a fundamental matter
had responsibility for much more than merely the completion of
a checklist or an evaluation form.
56
In general, these statutes and regulations left Randall
with significant discretion as to the manner in which she was
to examine and investigate the day care and then formulate and
record her findings and recommendations.  First and foremost,
the above-quoted statutes and regulations did not limit
Randall's responsibilities merely to the completion of the
questionnaire at issue.  
13
Even if we focus solely upon the issue of the
questionnaire, and even if the general act of completing that
questionnaire was ministerial in the sense that Randall had no
discretion but to complete it, nothing in the statutes and
regulations required Randall merely to pose certain questions
to Poplin about her compliance with day-care-facility
1050203
57
requirements and then unquestioningly record and report
Poplin's responses.  Randall had discretion as to whether to
accept at face value what Poplin told her or, if she had
reason to question its credibility, to pursue such further
examination as Randall, in her discretion, might deem
warranted.  Nor did the rules and regulations limit Randall in
what other information she could elicit, or should view as
reliable, in completing her investigation generally, or in
completing specific forms.  The statutes and regulations did
not dictate to Randall under what circumstances she should or
should not extend her investigation, based on either her
observation 
of 
conditions at the 
facility 
or 
other 
information
she might, in her discretion, elicit from the operator of the
day-care facility, its other employees, or its clients.
Furthermore, the statutes and regulations do not
prescribe exactly how Randall should complete the aforesaid
investigative forms.  In fact, the form titled "Child Care
Home Licensing Evaluation" contains eight pages of boxes to be
checked, prefaced by the heading "Sections to be completed at
the discretion of the [Department] Licensing Representative."
(Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Randall 
herself 
testified 
by 
affidavit 
that
1050203
Justice See states that "we must be careful when
14
considering acts that are either ministerial or discretionary
in their fundamental nature that we do not so finely reduce
them into ministerial and discretionary components that we
effectively abolish State-agent immunity," __ So. 2d at __, a
sentiment with which I agree.  Justice See then states,
however, that we should be careful not to "disaggregate[] and
inspect[], piece by piece" every task in such a way as to
"require[] the State actor to defend each component action
that does not partake of the discretionary –- or, as here, the
ministerial –- nature of the Cranman category under which the
general act is immunized." __ So. 2d at __.  The emphasized
passage reflects an earlier suggestion in Justice See's
writing that Randall's conduct involved merely the completion
of evaluation forms.  See note 13, supra.  It presumes that
the "fundamental nature" of Randall's activity "here" is
"ministerial," and that we ought to be careful not to inspect
piece by piece those portions of it which do "not partake of
the ... ministerial."  My point, however, is that the
"fundamental nature" of the responsibility with which the
Department and Randall were charged –- the investigation and
licensing of the day-care facility –- is not ministerial, as
it would have to be to fall within Cranman's category (3).
Rather, 
this 
responsibility 
is 
"discretionary 
in 
its
fundamental nature."  As discussed, it involves much more than
just the mechanical "complet[ion] of the licensing-evaluation
forms."  Even the completion of the evaluation forms, upon
close examination, is seen to involve significant discretion.
58
certain "codes" on the form were interchangeable and that the
use of those codes was left to her discretion.14
In Phillips, this Court made clear that the duty of an
employee of the Department to investigate a day-care facility
partakes 
of 
both 
discretionary 
and 
nondiscretionary
activities.  That case involved the assertion of State-agent
1050203
59
immunity by Pittman, the director of the Department's Family
and Children's 
Services 
Division, and Thomas, a 
State 
employee
assigned to the Office of Daycare, presumably within that
division.  With respect to a claim against Pittman for
negligently training and supervising Thomas, this Court had
"little difficulty concluding that the exercise of such
function is, for the most part, discretionary in nature" and,
"to that extent, afford[ed] Pittman substantive immunity"
under 
the 
pre-Cranman 
"discretionary 
public 
function"
formulation of the immunity rule.  555 So. 2d at 85 (emphasis
added) (recognizing that Pittman's duty, in some respects,
"required constant decision making and judgment" but, "[a]t
the same time," included functions that could "be composed of
ministerial acts").
Moreover, the opinion in Phillips then proceeds to
analyze the statutes at issue here and to discuss Thomas's
claims of immunity for her direct role in inspecting a day-
care facility.  The opinion first quotes Ala. Code 1975,
§ 38-7-4, which I have quoted above.  Phillips then states:
"As concerns the inspection of day care facilities,
§ 38-7-11 provides, in part, as follows:
1050203
60
"'...  Such inspection shall include,
but not be limited to, premises, services,
personnel, program, accounts and records,
interviews with agents and employees of the
child-care facility being inspected and
interviews with any child or other person
within the custody or control of said
child-care 
facility. 
 
Such 
inspection 
shall
be made at any reasonable time, without
prior notice, and as often as necessary to
enforce and administer the provisions of
this chapter.  ... If any such inspection
of a licensed or approved child-care
facility 
discloses 
any 
condition,
deficiency, dereliction or abuse which is,
or could be, hazardous to the health, the
safety or the physical, moral or mental
well-being of the children in the care of
the child-care facility being inspected,
the same shall at once be brought to the
attention of the department, and the
department shall have the power to revoke
without notice the license or approval or
six-month 
permit 
of 
such 
child-care
facility.'  (Emphasis added.)
"Again, we recognize that these duties, although
affirmative in nature, do require a considerable
degree of discretion within department guidelines.
Cf., Grant[ v. Davis], 537 So. 2d 7, 10 (Ala. 1988).
Again, we also recognize that they can be composed
of ministerial components."
555 So. 2d at 85-86 (final emphasis added) (ultimately
concluding that Thomas could be personally liable for
negligently 
performing 
the 
"ministerial 
act" 
of 
completing 
the
1050203
Although it too is a pre-Cranman case, Grant v. Davis,
15
537 So. 2d 7 (Ala. 1988), cited in Phillips, also is
instructive.  While in one aspect Grant addressed a function
that "substantially part[ook] of planning level activities,"
537 So. 2d at 9, on a separate note the opinion addressed the
duty of workers employed by the Alabama Department of
Transportation ("ADOT") simply to inspect roadways for
defects.  Although manuals provided by ADOT required workers
to make frequent inspections, the Court noted:
"The duty to inspect the roads is an affirmative
duty but one that also involves a type of discretion
giving rise to qualified immunity.  In performing
that function, the defendants are involved in
determining the manner of carrying out these
inspections, i.e., determining the method and means.
Thus, they are carrying out the directives of the
guidelines that they must follow by determining how
the inspections are to be carried out.  While the
defendants have no discretion not to inspect, they
do have the discretion to determine the practical
method for inspecting each road."
537 So. 2d at 10 (some emphasis original; some emphasis
added).  Although the State agent in Grant was performing a
specific duty that was prescribed to him by law, the facts
that he had significant discretion in how to perform that duty
and that his alleged wrongdoing arose from the exercise of
that discretion entitled him to immunity under the pre-Cranman
formulation of discretionary public-function immunity.
61
questionnaire in that case when she wrongly reported that the
pool at the facility was enclosed by a fence).15
Poplin was required to maintain the following documents
for each child currently enrolled in her day care and for each
child who had been enrolled in the day care during the
1050203
62
preceding 
two 
years: 
 (a) 
preadmission 
forms, 
(b) 
immunization
certificates, and (c) medication-authorization forms.  See
Ala. 
Admin. 
Code 
(Department 
of 
Human 
Resources),
r. 660-5-27-.07(9)(g) and -.07(9)(h).  According to the
evaluation forms completed by Randall as to the 12 children
who were enrolled in Poplin's day care when Randall
investigated the facility, however, Poplin did not possess
preadmission forms for any of those 12 children.  Further,
Poplin was not in possession of the required immunization
certificates for 10 of those 12 children.  Notwithstanding
this 
record 
of 
noncompliance, 
Randall 
exercised 
her 
discretion
and chose to accept at face value Poplin's explanation for the
absence of any medication-authorization forms, namely, that
Poplin had not administered any medication to any of the
children then in her care.  Based on Randall's acceptance of
this representation at face value, she proceeded to report to
the Department that the requirement for maintenance of
medication-authorization 
forms 
was 
"not 
applicable" 
to 
Poplin.
Given the undisputed evidence of Poplin's failure to comply
with the Department's record-keeping requirements as to
preadmission forms and immunization certificates, however,
1050203
Even if we could construe the statutes and regulations
16
at issue as prescribing to Randall the manner in which she was
to perform all aspects of her investigation and the recording
63
Randall could have exercised her discretion so as to not
accept Poplin's explanation for the absence of medication-
authorization forms but to instead conduct further inquiries
and/or to note concerns in her report.
Further, Randall admitted that she did not review the
records of children who had been in Poplin's day-care facility
during the two years before her visit, but who were not
enrolled in the day care at the time Randall performed her
investigation.  As to this deficiency, Randall cannot have it
both ways.  If the duty to examine the "records of the
facility" under § 38-7-6, as part of the overall investigative
effort, was a particular task prescribed by statute, then
Randall's failure to perform it would not be protected by
category (3) immunity.  On the other hand, if Randall's
discretion in investigating the facility extended to the
decision whether to review those records, category (3)
immunity would not protect Randall if, in light of Poplin's
failure to comply with other record-keeping requirements,
Randall were found negligent for failing to review them.16
1050203
of information regarding the day care she was inspecting, it
still could not reasonably be suggested that those statutes
and 
regulations 
were 
intended 
to 
require 
Randall
unquestioningly to accept and rely upon representations of the
operator of a day-care facility that could not reasonably be
considered credible.   Compare Ex parte Trawick, [Ms. 1050749,
Aug. 4, 2006] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2006) (See, J., joined
by Smith, J., concurring in the rationale in part and
concurring in the result) ("[The defendant social worker]
cites no statute, rule, or regulation that put her under an
obligation to misrepresent facts to [the plaintiff-parent]
...."); see also Phillips, supra.
64
Based on the foregoing, I cannot conclude that Randall
has made a showing of a "clear right to relief" -- one as to
which there is "no reasonable basis for controversy."  In my
view, 
her 
responsibilities 
were 
fundamentally 
discretionary 
in
nature and therefore were not protected under the plain
language of the third Cranman category.  Under pre-Cranman
precedents, 
discretion was 
the 
very 
characteristic 
that led 
to
protection 
for 
the 
employee's 
conduct 
under 
the 
"discretionary
public function" formulation of the immunity rule.  Compare
Phillips, supra; Grant v. Davis, 537 So. 2d 7 (Ala. 1988); see
also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895D (1979) (providing,
in pertinent part, that "[a] public officer acting within the
general scope of his authority is not subject to tort
liability for an administrative act or omission if (a) he is
1050203
65
immune because he engaged in the exercise of a discretionary
function").  Under the Cranman formulation of the immunity
rule, it is that same characteristic –- discretion –- that
removes an employee's conduct from the only Cranman category
at issue here, category (3).
Despite the difficulty of "squeezing" Randall's conduct
into category (3) as articulated in Cranman, the main opinion
and Justice See's special concurrence take comfort in the
suggestions 
(1) 
that 
pre-Cranman 
decisional 
law 
would 
 
support
the result reached here and (2) that Cranman was merely a
"restatement" of that law.  I agree with the former
suggestion; I disagree with the latter.  In point of fact, if
this case were to be decided under the "discretionary public
function" analysis utilized in pre-Cranman cases, the result
would indeed be a finding of immunity.  See Phillips, supra.
If we remove from the calculus the dispute over whether the
conduct at issue is fundamentally discretionary in nature or
fundamentally ministerial, and we assume for the sake of
discussion a hypothetical set of facts in which the Department
and its employee are merely given the responsibility to
investigate a day-care facility in whatever manner they, in
1050203
66
their 
discretion, 
deem 
appropriate, 
the 
pre-Cranman
discretionary-public-function analysis clearly would extend
immunity to such conduct.  See Phillips, supra; Grant, supra.
For the reasons discussed above, however, category (3) in the
Cranman 
"restatement" 
clearly 
would 
not 
provide 
immunity 
under
such facts.  Nor does any other Cranman category.  Moreover,
the fact that the reformulation of the immunity rule in
Cranman was actually intended to alter preexisting decisional
law was expressed in Cranman itself.  After engaging in a
thorough discussion of preexisting caselaw, the main opinion
in Cranman explained its reformulation of the rule by stating
as follows:
"We cannot, in blind obedience to the doctrine
of stare decisis, continue to accept an expansive
application 
of 
caselaw 
characterizing 
as 
a
discretionary function conduct remote from the
execution of governmental policy; to do so would
perpetuate 
an 
erroneous 
construction 
of 
the
Constitution.  Ex parte Dan Tucker Auto Sales, Inc.,
718 So. 2d 33, 42 (Ala. 1998) (Lyons, J., concurring
specially) (citing Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v.
Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 454-55, 59 S. Ct. 325, 83
L. Ed. 272 (1939) (Black, J., dissenting)).  The
time has come to face the necessity of defining
'injury,' as that word is used in § 13[, Ala. Const.
1901], in lawsuits against State employees alleging
torts committed in the line of duty, in a manner
that neither violates § 13 nor prefers § 14[, Ala.
Const. 1901,] or § 6.01 of the Judicial Article over
§ 13. We decline to label all discretionary acts by
1050203
In Thompson, a prison warden and two correctional
17
officers were sued for allowing the escape of an inmate who
then broke into the plaintiff's home, assaulted her, and stole
her automobile; the plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive
damages.  Although these individual defendants did not fall
within any of the five categories of protected conduct
67
an agent of the State, or all acts by such an agent
involving skill or judgment, as 'immune' simply
because the State has empowered the agent to act.
Such an expansive view of the power of the State to
act 
with 
immunity 
for 
its 
agents 
would 
be
inconsistent with the rights secured by § 13."
792 So. 2d at 404-05 (emphasis added).  
Based on the foregoing, I cannot conclude that Randall's
petition for a writ of mandamus is due to be granted insofar
as that petition is based upon her claim of State-agent
immunity.
  
The Public-Duty Rule
In addition to her claim to State-agent immunity,
however, Randall argues in her brief to this Court that, as a
social worker engaged in licensing day-care facilities, she
had no legal duty to the plaintiffs.  Relying upon Alabama
Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 855 So. 2d 1016 (Ala.
2003), Randall argues that "[a]ny duty she owed was to the
public at large and, therefore, insufficient to support a
claim for negligence."17
1050203
articulated in Cranman and therefore were not entitled  to a
summary judgment on the ground of State-agent immunity, the
defendants also argued to the trial court that they owed no
duty to the plaintiff to protect her from the criminal acts of
a third person.  This Court agreed, holding that "state
correctional officers owe a general duty to the public, not a
duty to a specific person, to maintain custody of inmates."
855 So. 2d at 1025.  In so holding, this Court quoted with
approval from the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision in
Chivas v.  Koehler, 182 Mich. App. 467, 453 N.W.2d 264 (1990),
in which, among other things, the Michigan court explained
that
"'generally a police officer does not owe a duty to
any one individual.  A police officer's duty is
generally owed to the public and not to  a specific
individual. ...  Only where a special relationship
between the parties exists which the law recognizes
and defines as including a duty to conform to a
particular standard of conduct toward another will
a duty be recognized.'"
855 So. 2d at 1023 (emphasis omitted).
The Thompson Court also found persuasive a decision of
the South Carolina Court of Appeals referenced by Randall in
her petition, Washington v. Lexington County Jail, 337 S.C.
400, 405-06, 523 S.E.2d 204, 206-07 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999), in
which the South Carolina court explained
"'Under the public duty rule, public officials
are generally not held liable to individuals for
negligence in discharging public duties because the
duty is owed to the public at large and not to any
one individual.  "The public duty rule is a negative
defense which denies an element of the plaintiff's
cause of action–-the existence of a duty to the
individual plaintiff.  ..."
"'....
68
1050203
"'An exception to the public duty rule, however,
is recognized when a plaintiff can establish that
the defendant owed him an individual or special duty
of care.'"
855 So. 2d at 1024 (citations and emphasis omitted).
It may well be that the "public-duty rule" would
18
ultimately provide protection from liability in many of the
same cases as would the pre-Cranman "discretionary-public-
function" test.  Neither that question nor the proposition
that we somehow should utilize the public-duty rule as a basis
for reformulating or revising the rule of immunity is before
us, however. 
69
Even if there is merit to Randall's public-duty-rule
argument, this case is before us on a petition for a writ of
mandamus.  As the main opinion notes, the general rule is that
the denial of a motion for a summary judgment is not
reviewable by a petition for writ of mandamus, but this Court
has recognized an exception when the motion is grounded on a
claim of immunity.  ___ So. 2d at ___ (quoting Ex parte
Turner, 840 So. 2d 132, 135 (Ala. 2002)).  Randall does not
invoke the public-duty rule to urge upon us some reformulation
or other revision in the rule of immunity articulated in
Cranman.   
18
1050203
70
Instead, Randall invokes the public-duty rule merely for
the purpose of arguing that the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate
one of the elements of their negligence claim, i.e., that
Randall owed the plaintiffs a duty.  See, e.g., Martin v.
Arnold, 643 So. 2d 564, 567 (Ala. 1994).  Accordingly, I do
not believe Randall's public-duty-rule argument provides an
appropriate basis for granting her petition for a writ of
mandamus.  See, e.g., Ex parte Haralson, 853 So. 2d 928, 931
n.2 (Ala. 2003) (noting that, when a petition for a writ of
mandamus is based on a claim of immunity, this Court does not
address a petitioner's additional grounds for issuance of the
writ that are not related to the immunity claim when the
petitioner has an adequate remedy by way of appeal to assert
those additional grounds).
The Issue of Wantonness
In addition to the analysis by which the main opinion
concludes that Randall's conduct falls within one of the
categories of immunized conduct prescribed in Cranman, the
main opinion goes the further step of discussing one of the
two exceptions to immunity also articulated in Cranman, see
702 So. 2d at 405.  Specifically, the main opinion concludes
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71
that Randall's conduct would not fall within the exception
stated 
for 
acts 
committed 
"willfully, 
maliciously,
fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond [the State agent's]
authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law." Id.
This is so, according to the main opinion, because Randall's
conduct is "consistent only with negligent or wanton
behavior." __ So. 2d at __.  The main opinion refers to wanton
behavior as "an aggravated form of negligence" and cites this
Court's 2003 decision in Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046
(Ala. 2003), for the proposition that such behavior does not
deprive a State agent of immunity. 
 
Neither the parents' complaint nor their briefs to this
court assert wantonness as a ground for their wrongful-death
claim.  Nor has Randall discussed the issue of wantonness.
Moreover, given the definition of wantonness, see discussion
infra, it is not apparent that Randall's acts rise to that
level.  Nonetheless, because the main opinion addresses the
issue, I likewise will comment on it.
  
According to Sellers v. Thompson, 452 So. 2d 460, 462 n.3
(Ala. 1984),
"[i]n Deal v. Tannehill Furnace & Foundry Comm'n,
443 So. 2d 1213 (Ala. 1983), we expanded the scope
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72
of discretionary function immunity to include
allegations of wantonness on the part of State
officials sued in their individual capacities where
... there was no evidence of bad faith on the part
of the officials."
(Emphasis added.)  Neither Deal v. Tannehill Furnace & Foundry
Comm'n, 443 So. 2d 1213 (Ala. 1983), nor Sellers, however,
discusses by what authority this Court was compelled, or
should have been persuaded, to expand the scope of
discretionary-function immunity so as to exclude wantonness
claims.  Moreover, on its facts Deal appears to involve only
negligence on the part of the individual defendants.  There is
no suggestion in the facts that those defendants acted
wantonly, as that term has come to be understood, i.e.,
involving 
acts 
committed 
willfully 
with 
a 
conscious
realization that injury likely or probably will result.  See
discussion, infra.  Furthermore, the context in which Deal
uses the terms "wantonness" and "good faith," see 443 So. 2d
at  1215 and 1218, and Sellers uses the term "bad faith," see
452 So. 2d at 462 n.3, suggest that those cases were
attempting merely to distinguish between acts of mere
inadvertence, or negligence, on the one hand, and acts
committed in bad faith in the sense of a conscious disregard
1050203
73
for the safety of others.  Compare Stiebitz v. Mahoney, 144
Conn. 443, 448, 134 A.2d 71, 74 (1957) (noting that "the law
clothed [the State agent] with immunity from liability for his
official acts, performed in the use of a delegated discretion,
as long as they were done 'in good faith, in the exercise of
an honest judgment, and not in abuse of ... discretion, or
maliciously or wantonly.'  Wadsworth v. Town of Middletown, 94
Conn. 435, 439, 109 A. 246, 248 [(1920)]."  (emphasis added)).
This 
Court 
has 
recognized 
that 
wantonness 
is
qualitatively different from, and is more than an aggravated
form of, negligence.  Lynn Strickland Sales & Serv., Inc. v.
Aero-Lane Fabricators, Inc., 510 So. 2d 142, 145-46 (Ala.
1987).  "'Wantonness' has been defined by this Court as the
conscious doing of some act or the omission of some duty,
while knowing of the existing conditions and being conscious
that, from doing or omitting to do an act, injury will likely
or probably result."  Alfa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roush, 723 So. 2d
1250, 1256 (Ala. 1998) (emphasis added); see also Ala. Code
1975, § 6-11-20 (defining wantonness as "[c]onduct which is
carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the
rights or safety of others" (emphasis added)).  Given this
1050203
This conclusion arguably is bolstered by the use of the
19
term 
"willfully" 
in 
a 
list 
that 
includes 
acts 
done
"maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond authority,
and under mistaken interpretations of law."  792 So. 2d at
405.  Cf. Ex parte Emerald Mountain Expressway Bridge, L.L.C.,
856 So. 2d 834 (Ala. 2003) (discussing the principles of
context, noscitur a sociis, and ejusdem generis in relation to
statutory construction).
74
definition, I question whether wanton conduct is, and should
be treated for immunity purposes as, more akin to acts
committed 
"willfully, 
maliciously, 
fraudulently, 
in 
bad 
faith,
beyond 
his 
or 
her 
authority, 
or 
under 
a 
mistaken
interpretation of the law," than to mere negligence.  This
Court itself has grouped wantonness with both willfulness and
recklessness.  Indeed, given a proper understanding of the
concept of willfulness and its relation to the meaning of
wantonness, it may be that the Cranman exception for "willful"
actions should be construed as including "wanton" conduct.19
In Lynn Strickland, this Court explained:
"Wantonness is not merely a higher degree of
culpability 
than 
negligence. 
Negligence 
and
wantonness, plainly and simply, are qualitatively
different tort concepts of actionable culpability.
Implicit in wanton, willful, or reckless misconduct
is an acting, with knowledge of danger, or with
consciousness, that the doing or not doing of some
act will likely result in injury. ...  As the Court
stated in Smith v. Roland, 243 Ala. 400, 403, 10 So.
1050203
In Lynn Strickland, 510 So. 2d at 146, this Court
20
discussed other primary and secondary authorities explaining
the concept of wantonness in a way that implicates willful
conduct, including: Thompson v. White, 274 Ala. 413, 420, 149
So. 2d 797, 804 (1963) ("'[W]anton or willful misconduct
implies mental action; whereas that fact is absent in mere
negligence.'"  (emphasis added)); Coleman v. Hamilton Storage
75
2d 367, 369 (1942), quoting 5 Mayfield's Digest, p.
711, § 6:
"'"Gross negligence" is negligence, not
wantonness.  Before one can be convicted of
wantonness, the facts must show that he was
conscious of his conduct 
and conscious from
his knowledge of existing conditions that
injury would likely or probably result from
his conduct, [and] that with reckless
indifference 
to 
consequences, 
he
consciously and intentionally did some
wrongful act or omitted some known duty
which produced the injury.'
"Negligence is usually characterized as an
inattention, thoughtlessness, or heedlessness, a
lack 
of 
due 
care; 
whereas 
wantonness 
is
characterized as an act which cannot exist without
a purpose or design, a conscious or intentional
act."
510 So. 2d at 145(emphasis added).   Black's Law Dictionary
(5th ed. 1979), cited with approval in Lynn Strickland,
explained that "'[negligence] is characterized chiefly by
inadvertence, 
thoughtlessness, 
inattention 
and 
the 
like, 
while
"wantonness" 
or 
"recklessness" 
is 
characterized 
by
willfulness.'" 510 So. 2d at 146.     
20
1050203
Co., 235 Ala. 553, 559, 180 So. 553, 559 (1938) ("'The fact
that defendant's servant was not guilty of negligence would
not preclude a finding by the jury that he was guilty of
willful or wanton conduct.'" (emphasis in Lynn Strickland
omitted and emphasis added)); Prosser & Keeton on Torts 212
(5th ed. 1984) ("'["Willful," "wanton," and "reckless"
misconduct] have been grouped together as an aggravated form
of negligence, differing in quality rather than in degree from
ordinary lack of care.'" (emphasis added in Lynn Strickland));
Speiser, Krause, and Gans, 3 The American Law of Torts, § 10.1
at 358 (1986) ("'While such a tort [wanton misconduct] has
been labeled "willful negligence," "wanton and willful
negligence," "wanton and willful misconduct," and even "gross
negligence," it is most accurately designated as "wanton and
reckless misconduct." As the Wyoming court puts it:  While
"ordinary" and "gross" negligence differ in degree "ordinary"
negligence and "willful and wanton" misconduct differ in
kind.'").
76
It may be considered ironic that we would judicially
immunize wanton conduct by State officials while our
legislature has reaffirmed that wantonness is the very type of
conduct for which our civil law reserves the potentially heavy
sanction of punitive damages.  See Ala. Code 1975, § 6-11-20.
Moreover, in so doing, the legislature grouped wanton conduct
with, and considered it as meriting the same treatment as,
acts committed "maliciously" and "fraudulently."  Id.
Further, in several contexts our legislature has specifically
refused to extend qualified immunity as a defense to claims
alleging wanton conduct.  See Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-663
1050203
77
(volunteer medical professionals); Ala. Code 1975, § 10-11-3
(noncompensated 
officers 
of 
nonprofit 
corporations); 
Ala. 
Code
1975, § 11-89C-8(d) (individuals acting on behalf of certain
public corporations); Ala. Code 1975, § 25-4-113 (certain
persons 
associated 
with 
the 
Department 
of 
Industrial
Relations). 
In short, I have serious doubts about whether, in order
to protect executive discretion, it is necessary to protect
the conduct of State officials who, with knowledge that injury
or death likely or probably will result from their actions,
act with a conscious disregard for the safety of others.
Compare, 
e.g., 
Stiebitz, supra; Gilbert v. 
Richardson, 
264 Ga.
744, 752, 452 S.E.2d 476, 482 (1994) ("The doctrine of
official 
immunity, 
developed 
primarily 
in 
Georgia 
through 
case
law, provides that while a public officer or employee may be
personally liable for his negligent ministerial acts, he may
not be held liable for his discretionary acts unless such acts
are willful, wanton, or outside the scope of his authority."
(emphasis added)); Neal v. Donahue, 611 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Okla.
1980) ("Although officers and employees of governmental
agencies, including the State, are protected from tort
1050203
78
liability while performing discretionary functions, such
protection does not render such employees immune from
liability for willful and wanton negligence." (footnotes
omitted; 
emphasis 
added)); 
Bryant v. Duval 
County 
Hosp. 
Auth.,
459 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (construing a
Florida statute as not immunizing actions performed in bad
faith, with malice, or with willful and wanton disregard for
the safety of others); Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St. 3d 284,
288, 595 N.E.2d 862, 866 (1992) (to like effect).
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, I conclude that Randall has not
demonstrated a clear legal right to a reversal of the trial
court's decision denying her motion for a summary judgment.
I therefore respectfully dissent.
Cobb, C.J., concurs.