Case Title: Commonwealth v. Alvarez

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12396

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-08-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12396 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ANGEL LUIS ALVAREZ. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     January 8, 2018. - August 22, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Rape.  Indecent Assault and Battery.  Evidence, Expert opinion.  
Witness, Expert.  Practice, Criminal, Argument by 
prosecutor, Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 22, 2014. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Daniel M. Wrenn, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
David Rassoul Rangaviz, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, for the defendant. 
 
Nathaniel R. Beaudoin, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  A Superior Court jury found the defendant, 
Angel Alvarez, guilty on indictments charging three counts of 
rape of a child and one count of indecent assault and battery 
2 
 
upon a child.  The defendant presents three claims of error on 
appeal:  first, that the prosecutor misstated important evidence 
in closing argument; second, that the judge erred by admitting 
expert testimony from the treating physician of the victim; and 
third, that the judge's instructions unfairly limited the jury's 
consideration of a defense based on the inadequacy of the police 
investigation, known as a Bowden defense.  See Commonwealth v. 
Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-486 (1980).  We conclude that the 
prosecutor's closing argument was prejudicial error, where she 
told the jury of critical corroborative evidence that was not 
presented at trial.  We therefore vacate the defendant's 
convictions and remand the case to the Superior Court for a new 
trial.  We address the defendant's other two claims of error 
because they are likely to recur at a new trial.  We conclude 
that the judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the 
expert opinion of the treating physician where it could not 
reasonably be understood by the jury as implicitly vouching for 
the complainant's credibility.  We also conclude that the judge 
did not unfairly limit the jury's consideration of the Bowden 
defense by instructing the jury to decide the case based solely 
on the evidence. 
3 
 
 
Background.  The strength of the Commonwealth's evidence in 
this case rested on the credibility of Camila,1 a twelve year old 
girl who recounted acts of sexual abuse by the defendant that 
had allegedly occurred on various occasions when she was between 
the ages of six and nine.  The defendant is Camila's godfather, 
and is married to Camila's aunt; Camila thinks of the defendant 
as her uncle and refers to him as "tio." 
 
When Camila was six years old, the defendant and several 
relatives were at her house for a party.  The defendant asked 
her to come with him to pick up her cousin to bring back to the 
party.  Camila refused because she was having fun.  The 
defendant "begg[ed]" Camila's mother for Camila to accompany him 
and her mother agreed.  The defendant drove to his house and 
told Camila he needed something from inside.  Camila wanted to 
stay in the vehicle, but the defendant insisted that she come 
inside the house.  As the defendant looked for something, Camila 
sat on an air mattress in one of the bedrooms.  The defendant 
walked in and took off his pants and underwear.  He pulled down 
Camila's skirt and underwear.  He laid down on the bed and "put 
[Camila] on top of him" and "his penis touched [her] vagina."  
The sexual assault lasted approximately one minute; the 
defendant then went to the bathroom.  Camila testified that her 
vagina felt "sticky," "wet, and disgusting." 
                     
 
1 We use a pseudonym for the child. 
4 
 
 
The defendant and Camila left the house and drove to pick 
up her cousin.  On the way, Camila told the defendant that her 
vagina was hurting.  The defendant was "surprised" and asked 
"why it was hurting."  She said that she did not know why she 
was in pain.  The defendant told her to not tell her mother.  
After picking up Camila's cousin the defendant drove back to 
Camila's house. 
 
Camila testified that, once she was home, she felt "wet and 
sticky and gross," and asked her mother if she could shower.  
She ultimately did not shower again because she had showered 
approximately one hour before leaving the house; instead, she 
played with her cousins. 
 
The defendant worked as a taxicab driver and would 
sometimes pick up Camila from school in a taxicab.  On four to 
six occasions, when Camila was six or seven years old, the 
defendant drove her to a fast food restaurant and parked the 
taxicab behind the restaurant.  There, he would place his hand 
under Camila's pants and underwear and into her vagina. 
 
When Camila was six or seven years old, she was in a 
hallway in the defendant's apartment, waiting for him to drive 
her home for a family event.  Camila's aunt was in another room 
getting ready.  The defendant walked into the hallway, pulled 
down his pants and underwear, and put his penis in Camila's 
5 
 
mouth.  The defendant told her to "suck it and do it."  After 
approximately one minute, Camila pushed the defendant away. 
 
When Camila was approximately eight years old, the 
defendant on two separate occasions stood behind her in the same 
hallway and rubbed his penis on her buttocks.  On another 
occasion, when she and the defendant's niece were both sleeping 
at his house on different couches in the same room, the 
defendant put his hand under Camila's blanket and inside her 
vagina.  Camila woke up, said "[o]w," and pushed him away. 
 
Every time Camila slept at the defendant's house, he tried 
to assault her.  She would respond by pushing and kicking him, 
and the defendant would remain quiet and walk out of the room. 
 
When Camila was nine years old, soon after the assault on 
the couch, she was home, celebrating New Year's Eve with the 
defendant's niece.  The defendant's niece wanted Camila to sleep 
at the defendant's house, but Camila did not want to.  The 
defendant "kept begging" Camila's mother to allow Camila to 
sleep over until she acquiesced.  Once at the defendant's house, 
Camila said she was hungry and asked the defendant for food.  
After the defendant told her he had no food and no money for 
food, Camila said, "I just want to go home, I want to go home."  
The defendant "screamed" at her, "Just go home, then, go home."  
The defendant's niece drove Camila to a fast food restaurant and 
then drove her home. 
6 
 
 
Approximately two weeks later, Camila was talking with her 
mother and one of her sisters.  Someone mentioned the defendant, 
and Camila started crying.  After her mother and sister asked 
why she was crying, Camila disclosed that the defendant had 
assaulted her multiple times. 
 
Soon after disclosing that the defendant had been 
assaulting her, Camila was examined by Dr. Heather C. Forkey, a 
pediatrician who specialized in caring for children who have 
been victims of abuse.  Dr. Forkey testified at trial that 
Camila did not exhibit or report any of the common behavioral 
symptoms of abuse -- including nightmares, bed-wetting, 
difficulty in school, and running away from home.  She also 
testified that Camila's genital examination was "normal" for a 
nine year old girl, and that there were no signs of genital 
injury.  When the prosecutor asked Dr. Forkey to offer an expert 
opinion as to whether "it is or is not common to find physical 
injuries during the genital exam of someone that has been 
sexually abused," the defendant objected.  Dr. Forkey answered, 
"It's very uncommon," before the judge sustained the objection 
on the grounds that the question "stray[ed] too close to the 
credibility component of the case."  Mistakenly believing that 
Dr. Forkey had not answered the question, the judge denied the 
defendant's motion to strike any response to the question.  At 
the conclusion of her direct testimony, without objection, Dr. 
7 
 
Forkey testified that "[t]he absence of physical trauma is not 
inconsistent with abuse." 
 
When the defendant was interviewed by the police about 
these allegations, he admitted that he had spent time with 
Camila "almost every day," that she would "always hang out" with 
him and "always call" him, but he insisted that he had never 
touched her in a sexual manner.  When asked by the police if 
Camila had ever "come on" to him, he stated that she never had, 
and he denied having "any feelings like that towards her."  He 
declared, "I [have] always been good to this family; I [have] 
never hurt [them]."  When asked why Camila would say that he 
abused her if it were not true, he answered, "I don't know."  
When the interrogating police officer falsely told the defendant 
that she knew that he had kept photographs of young girls on his 
cellular telephone, thinking that this "bluff" would cause the 
defendant to confess, he adamantly denied ever having taken such 
photographs or keeping any on his cellular telephone.  There was 
no evidence at trial that the defendant possessed any child 
pornography or photographs of children, and no evidence of bad 
acts towards any other child. 
 
The defendant appealed his convictions, and we granted his 
application for direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  As noted, 
Camila testified that, when she was six years old, after the 
8 
 
first alleged sexual abuse incident with the defendant, she 
"felt wet and disgusting" because of a "sticky" substance around 
her vagina.  She also testified that, when she was nine years 
old and told her mother and sister about her sexual abuse, she 
spoke of this aspect of the incident and said:  "I told them how 
I felt gross and wet; that's why I wanted to take the shower."  
This was the only sexual incident in which there was any 
indication that the defendant had ejaculated, so corroboration 
from a source other than Camila that she felt "wet and sticky" 
would strongly corroborate her testimony regarding that 
incident.  The prosecutor recognized the importance of this 
corroborative evidence by telling the jury during her opening 
statement that Camila would testify that, after she returned 
home and told her mother that she needed to "take a tub or a 
shower," "[h]er mom said, 'Why?  You just took one before you 
left, a few hours ago.'"  However, when Camila testified, she 
testified only that she had asked her mother whether she could 
take a shower, but that she did not shower because she had taken 
one an hour before she had left home.  She was not asked what 
her mother said in response to her desire to take a shower, and 
did not testify as to any statement made by her mother regarding 
that incident. 
 
When Camila's mother testified, the prosecutor did not ask 
about this incident; the mother said nothing about Camila asking 
9 
 
to "take a tub or a shower," or her saying she felt "wet," 
"disgusting," or "sticky" when she came home.  On cross-
examination, defense counsel asked Camila's mother to read the 
police report reflecting what she had told the detective after 
Camila's first complaint regarding this particular incident, and 
the following dialogue ensued: 
Q.:  "And . . . you told the detective about the first 
incident that [Camila] told you about?" 
 
A.:  "Yes." 
 
Q.:  "And that's when [the defendant] was at your house, 
and was supposed to go pick up some other cousins?" 
 
A.:  "Yes." 
 
Q.:  "And you told the detective that he asked if he could 
take [Camila]?" 
 
A.:  "Yes." 
 
Q.:  "And she asked you, 'Mommy, can I go with tio to pick 
up the kids'?" 
 
A.:  "Yes." 
 
Q.:  "And you said 'Yes; go ahead'?" 
 
A.:  "Yes." 
 
Q.:  "And when she got home that day, she didn't tell you 
that [the defendant had] hurt her?" 
 
A.:  "No." 
 
Q.:  "She didn't tell you that she didn't want to see him 
[anymore]?" 
 
A.:  "No." 
 
10 
 
Q.:  "And she wanted to play with the other kids that were 
around?" 
 
A.:  "No, because there wasn't anybody." 
 
Q.:  "There were no kids around when she came home that 
first day?" 
 
A.:  "There weren't children." 
 
Q.:  "Who was around?" 
 
A.:  "Us -- the same people as always.  He went to go pick 
up the girls, but I never saw the girls." 
 
 
Consequently, there was no testimony elicited at trial, 
either from Camila or her mother, regarding what the mother had 
said when Camila returned home from that incident, and no 
corroboration by the mother that Camila wanted to clean herself 
when she returned home that day.  However, during closing 
argument, the prosecutor, in answer to defense counsel's 
argument that the case rested solely on the words of Camila, 
said: 
"the Commonwealth submits that's not true.  You have some 
corroboration  . . . of [Camila's] word in other forms.  
You have her mom saying  . . . she told you how that first 
time she came home and asked to take a bath, because she 
felt disgusting?  Mom told you, 'She did come home one day 
and ask to take a bath, and I thought it was weird, because 
she had taken a bath that morning.'  That's corroboration." 
 
 
Defense counsel objected at the end of the prosecutor's 
closing argument, informing the judge that there was no evidence 
that the mother provided any corroboration of Camila's testimony 
that she told her mother she needed to bathe.  Neither the 
11 
 
prosecutor nor the judge recalled whether the mother had offered 
this testimony, and defense counsel herself said that she might 
have been mistaken about it.  The judge refused to give any 
curative instruction.  Instead, the judge told the jury during 
his instructions that they are "the sole and exclusive judges of 
the facts," and that "opening statements and the closing 
arguments of the lawyers are not a substitute for the evidence," 
but are simply intended to assist the jury in understanding the 
evidence. 
 
Under our case law, "[w]hile prosecutors are entitled to 
argue 'forcefully for the defendant's conviction,' closing 
arguments must be limited to facts in evidence and the fair 
inferences that may be drawn from those facts."  Commonwealth v. 
Rutherford, 476 Mass. 639, 643 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 350 (1998).  See Commonwealth v. Silva-
Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 807 (2009).  Where, as here, the 
prosecutor argued facts in closing argument that find no support 
in the evidence at trial and where that error is preserved by a 
timely objection, the error is nonprejudicial only if we are 
"sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very 
slight effect."  Commonwealth v. Hrabak, 440 Mass. 650, 656 
(2004), quoting Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 
(1994).  "Where it cannot be said with assurance that the 
improper closing argument could not have influenced the jury to 
12 
 
convict, the judgment of conviction cannot be preserved."  
Commonwealth v. Beaudry, 445 Mass. 577, 586 (2005), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Kelly, 417 Mass. 266, 272 (1994).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Mountry, 463 Mass. 80, 92 (2012). 
 
We consider four factors in determining whether an error 
made during closing argument is prejudicial:  "(1) whether the 
defendant seasonably objected; (2) whether the error was limited 
to collateral issues or went to the heart of the case; (3) what 
specific or general instructions the judge gave the jury which 
may have mitigated the mistake; and (4) whether the error, in 
the circumstances, possibly made a difference in the jury's 
conclusions."  Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 807, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Perez, 444 Mass. 143, 151 (2005).  Here, the 
defendant objected in a timely manner to the factually incorrect 
statement in the prosecutor's closing argument.  The error went 
to the "heart of the case," that is, the credibility of Camila.  
See Commonwealth v. Pearce, 427 Mass. 642, 645 (1998) (victim's 
credibility went to heart of case where Commonwealth's evidence 
"consisted primarily of the victim's testimony and four fresh 
complaint witnesses").  And the judge gave only the most general 
instructions to mitigate the mistake. In these circumstances, we 
13 
 
cannot say with assurance that this error could not have 
influenced the jury's verdict.2 
 
The judge instructed the jury before closing arguments that 
a "closing statement is not itself evidence, nor is it a 
substitute for the evidence.  The evidence in this case is 
closed."  But we cannot be confident that the jury recognized 
that the prosecutor erred and that the mother never gave this 
testimony, where (1) the prosecutor quoted the mother's question 
to Camila about Camila's need to bathe in her opening statement 
on the first day of trial; (2) the prosecutor quoted the mother 
again about how "weird" it was that Camila wanted to take a bath 
after having just taken a bath earlier that morning in her 
                     
 
2 In Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 808 
(2009), as here, "[t]he only instruction the judge gave that may 
have mitigated the error was her reminder to the jury in her 
final instructions that 'the closing arguments of the lawyers 
are not a substitute for the evidence.  They are only intended 
to assist you in understanding the evidence and the respective 
contentions of the parties.'"  We noted in that case, "The judge 
did not focus on any statement in the prosecutor's closing 
argument when she provided this guidance, so the jury were not 
warned to be careful in comparing their memory of [the 
witness's] testimony with the attorneys' characterization of 
it."  Id. 
 
 
In Commonwealth v. Beaudry, 445 Mass. 577, 585 (2005), the 
judge told the jury in her final instructions not to speculate 
about matters not in evidence and to confine their deliberations 
to the evidence.  She also informed them that closing arguments 
are not evidence, and that the jury "should rely on their memory 
of the evidence if their memory [was] different from that of an 
attorney."  Id.  We characterized these remarks as "standard 
fare" and concluded that they did not address the closing 
argument error.  Id. 
14 
 
closing argument on the second day of trial; (3) neither the 
judge nor the prosecutor could recall whether the mother had 
given this testimony even after defense counsel told them it was 
never in evidence; (4) defense counsel did not have any 
opportunity to tell the jury that there was no such evidence 
because she had already given her closing argument; and (5) 
nothing the judge told the jury meaningfully cautioned them to 
be wary in considering the prosecutor's closing argument.  And 
if the jury were under the false impression that Camila's mother 
had testified that she thought it "weird" that Camila wanted to 
take a bath, we cannot say with assurance that this could not 
have influenced their verdict.  The prosecutor thought this 
supposed corroboration to be so important that she mentioned it 
both in her opening statement and in her closing argument, and 
discussed it first when she spoke about the corroboration of 
Camila's testimony.  And it would have been powerful 
corroboration of Camila's testimony, had it actually been in 
evidence, because it would have corroborated that Camila 
immediately after the incident said she felt "wet" and "sticky" 
after the defendant ejaculated on her. 
 
In fact, apart from the first complaint evidence, which 
itself simply reported what Camila had said to her mother when 
she revealed the sexual abuse, the prosecutor's imagined 
testimony of the mother that Camila said she wanted to bathe or 
15 
 
shower and that the mother thought this "weird" because Camila 
had recently bathed, was the only significant corroboration of 
Camila's testimony.  The other claimed corroboration that the 
prosecutor spoke of in her closing argument amounted to almost 
nothing. 
 
The prosecutor argued three other sources of supposed 
corroboration.  First, she argued that Camila's statement to her 
mother that she no longer wanted the defendant to pick her up 
from school was corroborative of her allegations of his sexual 
abuse.  But the evidence at trial, offered by both Camila and 
her mother, was that the defendant worked as a taxicab driver 
during that time period and often would not drive Camila home 
from school until after he had finished his work day, which 
sometimes did not end until 10 P.M.  Camila's testimony at trial 
was that she asked her mother to pick her up from school because 
"[the defendant] takes a long time to bring me back home." 
 
Second, the prosecutor argued that it was corroborative 
that Camila wanted to come home from the defendant's home in the 
middle of the night on New Year's Eve.  But the evidence at 
trial was that Camila's mother had rented a hall on New Year's 
Eve day to enable her entire family to get together, including 
the defendant, his sister, and his two nieces who were visiting 
from New York.  Camila testified that the defendant wanted her 
to come to his home to spend time with his nieces, so she went 
16 
 
to his home with a friend and the friend's cousin at 
approximately 12:30 A.M.  As earlier noted, when she arrived, 
they were hungry, but the defendant said that he had no money 
and no food.  Camila said that she wanted to go home, and the 
defendant "screamed" at her, "Just go home, then, go home."  
Camila told her mother that she wanted to come home and, after 
the defendant's niece took Camila to eat at a fast food 
restaurant, her cousin drove her home around 1:30 A.M.  There 
was no evidence that the defendant touched her that night, or 
attempted to.  Under these circumstances, it is hardly 
surprising or noteworthy that a nine year old child, especially 
one who testified that she gets homesick and prefers to stay at 
home with her mother, would want to go home. 
 
Third, the prosecutor argued in closing, "You have [the 
defendant] himself telling you, 'She came to my house for sleep-
overs.  I picked her up at school.  We played all these games.' 
That's all corroboration."  But all those facts are equally 
corroborative of a healthy relationship between a child and her 
godfather, whom she considers her uncle; accordingly, they lend 
no credence to Camila's testimony regarding sexual abuse. 
 
We have found prejudicial error in comparable cases, 
despite the seriousness of the alleged crime.  In Commonwealth 
v. Loguidice, 420 Mass. 453, 453-454 (1995), the defendant was 
charged, and subsequently convicted of, two counts of forcible 
17 
 
rape of a four year old child.  The prosecutor argued during 
closing that the child victim had observed the defendant 
masturbate and ejaculate, and that the persons who lived in the 
apartment near where the incidents allegedly occurred were at 
church on the morning of the day of the incidents; but there was 
no evidence in support of either assertion.  Id. at 454-455.  We 
noted that where "an objection is made to a prosecutor's error, 
the judge summarily rejects the challenge, and thus there is no 
curative jury instruction, an appellate court should proceed 
with caution in considering whether it is likely that an error 
made no difference in the jury's result."  Id. at 456.  In 
reversing the judgments, we concluded: 
"This was a close case for the jury.  Success for the 
Commonwealth depended completely on the credibility of the 
child.  In such an instance, errors in a prosecutor's 
closing argument describing a circumstance that made the 
defendant's commission of the crimes more plausible (the 
[neighbors'] absence) and putting the defendant in an 
unfavorable light (masturbation in front of the child) 
should not be viewed collectively as unlikely to have 
affected the jury's verdicts." 
 
Id. at 457. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Beaudry, 445 Mass. at  580, 586, we 
reversed the defendant's convictions of rape of a child where 
the prosecutor, despite the absence of expert testimony, 
declared during closing argument that a nine year old child 
would not have known about the specific types of sexual acts 
alleged unless she had experienced them.  We determined that 
18 
 
where, despite a timely objection, the judge did not cure the 
improprieties "by appropriate and timely" instructions, and 
where "[t]he verdicts rested solely on the jury's believing [the 
alleged victim]" because "[t]here was no physical evidence or 
testimony from eyewitnesses to the abuse," id. at 585, "[w]e are 
unable to say that we are assured that the improper remark had 
little or no effect on the jury's deliberations."  Id. at 586. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 806-807, 
the prosecutor argued in closing that an eyewitness had seen the 
defendant at the approximate location where the shooting 
occurred when, in fact, the eyewitness testified that she had 
seen the defendant there roughly ten to fifteen minutes before 
the shooting and had not seen him there at the time of the 
shooting.  Where this witness's testimony was presented to 
corroborate the "photospread" identification of the defendant as 
the shooter by other eyewitnesses, and where the prosecutor, by 
mischaracterizing this part of her testimony, "transformed into 
inculpatory testimony the exculpatory part of [the witness's] 
testimony," we concluded that "[w]e cannot say with assurance 
that the closing argument errors, considered together in the 
totality of the circumstances, could not have influenced the 
jury to convict."  Id. at 788, 808.  See also Commonwealth v. 
Misquina, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 204, 205-208 (2012) (reversing 
indecent assault and battery conviction for prejudicial error 
19 
 
where prosecutor argued in closing that victim had recounted 
same description of crime to four persons, but where there was 
evidence of her telling only one person). 
 
For the reasons stated, we conclude that, where the 
convictions in this case rested solely on the credibility of a 
young child, and where the prosecutor, in both her opening 
statement and closing argument, told the jury about key 
corroborative testimony of the mother that the prosecutor did 
not attempt to elicit during trial and that was not otherwise in 
evidence, and where a timely objection by defense counsel did 
not yield an effective curative instruction, we must reverse the 
convictions and remand the case for a new trial because we 
cannot say with assurance that the prosecutor's improper closing 
argument could not have influenced the jury to convict.3,4 
                     
 
3 Because of the likelihood of a retrial, we address the 
defendant's two other claims of impropriety in the prosecutor's 
closing argument which, because they were not preserved at trial 
by an objection, we review to determine whether they created a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth 
v. Horne, 476 Mass. 222, 225-226 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Zimmerman, 441 Mass. 146, 150 (2004) ("Where . . . the objection 
was not preserved, we review the defendant's claim to 'determine 
whether any error . . . created a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice").  First, the defendant contends that 
the prosecutor in her closing argument, when speaking about 
Camila wanting to go home on New Year's Eve, improperly asked 
the rhetorical question, "Should we bring in more witnesses to 
tell you the same thing?"  The defendant correctly contends that 
this statement improperly suggests that other witnesses would 
have corroborated Camila's testimony on this point had they 
testified.  See Commonwealth v. Dirgo, 474 Mass. 1012, 1017 
(2016) (improper for prosecutor to imply "that there were more 
20 
 
                                                                  
witnesses that were not brought before the jury that would have 
corroborated the first complaint testimony").  But where the 
defendant did not object to the prosecutor's use of this 
rhetorical question and where there was no testimony that the 
defendant sexually touched Camila on New Year's Eve, we conclude 
that this impropriety did not create a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice. 
 
 
Second, the defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly 
compared the evidence in this case to the evidence in other 
child sexual abuse cases when she stated during her closing 
argument, "In this case, as in a lot of these cases, the only 
evidence you have in front of you is testimony."  But where the 
defendant did not object to the prosecutor's statement, we 
conclude that this comment regarding the nature of the evidence 
presented in "a lot of" other child sexual abuse cases, although 
best omitted, did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage 
of justice. 
 
 
4 The dissent unfairly mischaracterizes the court's opinion 
in various ways that warrant rebuttal.  First, the dissent 
attempts to paint the opinion as giving less weight to the 
credibility of the testimony of alleged victims of sexual 
assaults than the testimony of alleged victims of other crimes.  
It does not.  If the allegation here was theft, rather than 
sexual assault, and if the weight of the evidence rested solely 
on the testimony of a child regarding events that happened when 
the child was between the ages of six and nine, our analysis 
would be precisely the same.  We reject the notion that the 
testimony of alleged sexual assault victims is less credible 
than the testimony of the alleged victims of other crimes, and 
recognize that notion as the product of stereotypical 
misperceptions, prejudice, and bias.  See generally Commonwealth 
v. Asenjo, 477 Mass. 599, 603 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. 
King, 445 Mass. 217, 239-241 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1216 
(2006) ("the underlying purpose of first complaint evidence is 
still 'to counterbalance or address inaccurate assumptions 
regarding stereotypes about delayed reporting of a sexual 
assault or about sexual assault victims in general'"); 
Commonwealth v. Arana, 453 Mass. 214, 228 (2009) (recognizing 
importance "that a complainant (who, as here, may be still a 
child) has her credibility fairly judged on the specific facts 
of the case rather than unfairly by misguided stereotypical 
thinking"). 
 
21 
 
                                                                  
 
Second, the dissent, in stating that "courts have dismissed 
the value of sexual assault victim testimony" with "ease," 
insinuates that the opinion here has done just that.  Post at    
.  It does not; we do not in any way dismiss the value of 
Camila's testimony.  The testimony of Camila plainly was 
sufficient as a matter of law to support the defendant's 
convictions and, if the prosecutor had not told the jury in 
opening statement and closing argument of key corroborating 
testimony of Camila's mother that was not in evidence, the 
convictions would have been affirmed.  But where a conviction 
rests solely on the credibility of a single witness, a 
reasonable jury must believe that witness's testimony beyond a 
reasonable doubt with respect to the required elements of a 
crime to find a defendant guilty of that crime.  The issue on 
appeal is not whether we credit Camila's testimony, but whether 
we are "sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had 
but very slight effect" in the jury's evaluation of whether they 
believed that testimony beyond a reasonable doubt.  See 
Commonwealth v. Hrabak, 440 Mass. 650, 656 (2004), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994).  By 
concluding that we are not sure that the error did not influence 
the jury in its deliberations, we in no way "dismiss" the value 
of Camila's testimony. 
 
 
Third, the dissent contends that, by noting that Dr. 
Heather Forkey testified that Camila did not exhibit or report 
any of the common behavioral symptoms of abuse, including 
nightmares, bed-wetting, difficulty in school, and running away 
from home, and that her genital examination was "normal" for a 
nine year old girl, the court's opinion "creates a de facto 
corroboration requirement, necessitating a child without 
physical symptoms or eyewitnesses . . . to display enough 
emotional trauma to be credible."  Post at    .  It does not.  
The uncorroborated testimony of a child is sufficient to support 
a conviction of sexual assault, but a competent prosecutor knows 
that the credibility of such testimony is stronger with 
corroboration than without it, and will offer corroborative 
evidence where it exists. 
 
 
Finally, the dissent contends that, by vacating the 
conviction and remanding for a new trial, the court "does a 
disservice to all future victims whose interests are represented 
by imperfect prosecutors."  Post at    .  The prosecutor here 
was not merely "imperfect" -- she twice told the jury that there 
was important corroboration from the mother that was not in 
evidence, and we are not sure that this error did not influence 
22 
 
 
2.  Expert testimony of treating physician.  The defendant 
invites us to hold that "[n]o individual should ever be 
permitted to testify in his or her capacity as both a treating 
doctor and an expert on the subject of child sexual abuse," 
because such testimony inevitably has the effect on a jury of 
improperly bolstering the victim's credibility.  He therefore 
claims that the judge committed reversible error by not striking 
Dr. Forkey's trial testimony that it is "very uncommon" to find 
physical injury on the genitals of victims of sexual abuse, and 
by admitting in evidence her opinion that "[t]he absence of 
physical trauma is not inconsistent with abuse."  Where this 
issue is likely to recur at a retrial of this case, we address 
the defendant's claim of error.  See Commonwealth v. Tanso, 411 
Mass. 640, 651, cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1221 (1992). 
 
Expert opinion testimony is appropriate and admissible 
where an expert's "specialized knowledge would be helpful to the 
jury."  Commonwealth v. Holley, 476 Mass. 114, 125 (2016), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 844 (2011).  
See Mass. G. Evid. § 702(a) (2018).  "Under this principle, we 
have held that testimony on the general behavioral 
characteristics of sexually abused children may properly be the 
subject of expert testimony because behavioral and emotional 
                                                                  
the jury in their deliberations.  It does not disserve future 
victims for this court to order a new trial where we find 
prejudicial error.  Due process requires nothing less. 
23 
 
characteristics common to these victims are 'beyond the jury's 
common knowledge and may aid them in reaching a decision."  
Commonwealth v. Federico, 425 Mass. 844, 847-848 (1997), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Colin C., 419 Mass. 54, 60 (1994).  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Day, 409 Mass. 719, 724 (1991) (expert testimony 
concerning "battered child syndrome" admissible because 
condition is not matter of common knowledge); Commonwealth v. 
Mamay, 407 Mass. 412, 421 (1990) (expert testimony regarding 
rape trauma syndrome admissible because syndrome is "beyond the 
jury's common knowledge"). 
 
Such expert testimony "must, however, be confined to a 
description of the general or typical characteristics shared by 
child victims of sexual abuse."  Federico, 425 Mass. at 848.  An 
expert witness on sexually abused children "may not 'directly 
opine on whether the victim was in fact subject to sexual 
abuse,' or directly refer or compare the behavior of the 
complainant to general behavioral characteristics of sexually 
abused children."  Commonwealth v. Quinn, 469 Mass. 641, 647 
(2014), quoting Federico, supra at 849.  See Commonwealth v. 
Trowbridge, 419 Mass. 750, 759 (1995) ("[a]lthough expert 
testimony on the general behavioral characteristics of sexually 
abused children is permissible, an expert may not refer or 
compare the child to those general characteristics").  
"Consequently, an expert may not opine that the child's behavior 
24 
 
or experience is consistent with the typical behavior or 
experience of sexually abused children."  Quinn, supra.  "Even 
where an expert does not directly compare the behavior of the 
complainant to that typical of sexually abused children, the 
expert's testimony may be inadmissible where a reasonable jury 
would think the expert was implicitly vouching for the 
credibility of the complainant."  Id., and cases cited. 
 
"The risk of improper comparisons between any general 
behavioral characteristics of sexually abused children and a 
particular complaining child witness is most acute when the 
expert witness has examined or treated the child.  Testimony on 
the general characteristics of sexually abused children by such 
experts has been disallowed."  Federico, supra, and cases cited.  
We have often warned of the danger of implicit vouching for the 
credibility of the complainant where a treating physician or 
psychologist in a child sexual abuse case testifies as an expert 
witness, see Quinn, 469 Mass. at 647-648, and cases cited, and 
at times have concluded that the implicit vouching arising from 
such testimony was prejudicial error.  See id. at 650.  See also 
Colin C., 419 Mass. at 60-61 (judge committed reversible error 
by allowing child's treating physician to give opinion testimony 
that child had been sexually abused); Commonwealth v. 
Brouillard, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 448, 451 (1996), overruled on 
another ground by Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 217 (2005), 
25 
 
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1216 (2006) (reversal required where 
child complainants' treating therapist "juxtaposed discussion of 
general syndromes with specific descriptions of and opinions 
about the complainants").  But we have not yet imposed the 
blanket prohibition proposed by the defendant that would bar a 
treating physician from offering any expert opinion in all child 
sexual abuse cases.  We decline to do so here, given the nature 
of the opinion offered by the treating physician. 
 
If, for example, Dr. Forkey had testified that, as a 
treating physician, she had observed Camila display various 
emotional, psychological, or behavioral characteristics, and 
then offered an expert opinion about the emotional, 
psychological, or behavioral characteristics of child victims of 
sexual abuse, we would likely conclude, given the acute risk of 
implicit vouching, that it was an abuse of discretion for a 
judge to have permitted such opinion testimony.  See Quinn, 469 
Mass. at 643, 644-646, 650 (expert opinion testimony was 
improper vouching for victim's credibility where licensed 
clinical social worker testified about victim's particular 
emotional problems and subsequently opined about similar or 
typical behavioral characteristics of child sexual abuse 
victims).  And if, for example, Dr. Forkey had observed genital 
injuries during her examination of Camila, and then offered an 
expert opinion that Camila's genital injuries are consistent 
26 
 
with sexual abuse, we also would have likely concluded that the 
risk of implicit vouching was too great to permit the treating 
physician to offer such an opinion.  See Trowbridge, 419 Mass. 
at 760 (treating physician's testimony came "impermissibly 
close" to endorsing child's credibility when she "testified that 
the symptoms and physical condition of the child were consistent 
with the type of nonviolent sexual abuse that the child alleged 
in this case").  But where, as here, the treating physician 
offered the expert opinion that it is "very uncommon" to find 
physical injury on the genitals of victims of sexual abuse and 
that "[t]he absence of physical trauma is not inconsistent with 
abuse," and where the prosecutor made clear in eliciting these 
opinions that her questions were not focused on the complainant, 
but were "general questions about a patient that would come in 
and see you, another child," we conclude that the risk of 
implicit vouching is so small that the judge did not abuse his 
discretion by not striking these opinions.5 
 
We have recognized on prior occasions that a medical expert 
may be able to assist the jury by informing them that the 
absence of evidence of physical injury "does not necessarily 
                     
 
5 We recognize that the judge did not strike Dr. Forkey's 
testimony that it is "very uncommon" to find physical injury on 
the genitals of victims of sexual abuse after sustaining an 
objection to this question only because he did not hear the 
answer.  But, where the answer was not struck, we treat it as if 
the judge had denied the motion to strike after having heard the 
answer, and review for an abuse of discretion. 
27 
 
lead to the medical conclusion that the child was not abused," 
Federico, 425 Mass. at 851, because "[t]he jury may be under the 
mistaken understanding that certain types of sexual abuse always 
or nearly always causes physical injury or scarring in the 
victim."  Id. at 851 n.13.  Where such opinion testimony is 
admissible and where its probative value is to negate the 
inaccurate inference that a child who was sexually abused would 
have sustained some genital injury, we do not require the 
Commonwealth to call a nontreating physician expert to offer 
such an opinion.  See Commonwealth v. Quincy Q., 434 Mass. 859, 
871-872 (2001) (judge did not abuse discretion in admitting  
testimony of treating pediatrician that child's examination was 
"completely normal" and that "majority of girls examined for 
possible sexual abuse have 'normal' findings [i.e., no 
recognizable traces of physical contact]").  As in Quincy Q., 
Dr. Forkey's "testimony 'did no more than give the jury 
information concerning the medical interpretation of an absence 
of any physical evidence of penetration; namely, such a finding 
does not exclude that sexual abuse occurred.'"  Id. at 872, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Colon, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 289, 293 
(2000).  Such testimony does not implicitly comment on the 
complainant's truthfulness; it says nothing more than that no 
inference can be drawn from the absence of genital injury.  
28 
 
Therefore, we conclude that the judge did not abuse his 
discretion in not striking Dr. Forkey's opinion testimony. 
 
3.  Jury instructions.  A detective who investigated 
Camila's allegations against the defendant interviewed Camila, 
the defendant, Camila's mother, and Camila's sister, who was 
present when Camila first disclosed that she had been assaulted.  
The defendant contends that the detective's investigation was 
inadequate and, during his cross-examination of the detective at 
trial, he focused on the purported deficiencies in her 
investigation.6  The defendant contends that the judge unfairly 
limited the jury's consideration of his Bowden defense by 
instructing the jury to decide the case based solely on the 
evidence.  Because this issue may arise again at a retrial, we 
address it now.  See Tanso, 411 Mass. at 651. 
 
We permit a defendant to elicit evidence of the purported 
inadequacy of the police investigation because "the inference 
that may be drawn from an inadequate police investigation is 
that the evidence at trial may be inadequate or unreliable 
because the police failed to conduct the scientific tests or to 
                     
 
6 During cross-examination, the defendant questioned the 
detective about the lapse in time between Camila's first 
complaint and her interviews of the defendant and Camila's 
mother.  The defendant also questioned her decision not to take 
a written statement from one of Camila's sisters, and not to 
speak with Camila's other sister.  The detective did not 
recognize the name of Camila's father or attempt to speak to her 
young cousins and friends who were present during some of the 
gatherings in question. 
29 
 
pursue leads that a reasonable police investigation would have 
conducted or investigated, and these tests or investigation 
reasonably may have led to significant evidence of the 
defendant's guilt or innocence."  Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 
801.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 1107(a) (2018) (evidence of 
inadequate police investigation may be admissible).  "A jury may 
find a reasonable doubt if they conclude that the investigation 
was careless, incomplete, or so focused on the defendant that it 
ignored leads that may have suggested other culprits."  Silva-
Santiago, supra.  See Commonwealth v. Phinney, 446 Mass. 155, 
165 (2006), S.C., 448 Mass. 621 (2007) ("Defendants have the 
right to base their defense on the failure of police adequately 
to investigate a murder in order to raise the issue of 
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt"); Commonwealth v. 
Bowden, 379 Mass. at 486 ("[t]he fact that certain tests were 
not conducted or certain police procedures not followed could 
raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt in the 
minds of the jurors"). 
 
We have long held that defense counsel in closing argument 
is entitled to argue that the jury should find the defendant not 
guilty because of the inadequacy of a police investigation.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 463 Mass. 581, 597-598 
(2012).  Here, in closing argument, defense counsel 
30 
 
characterized the police investigation as "offensive" and asked 
two rhetorical questions: 
"A person is charged with one of the most horrible things 
you can possibly be accused of, and no one in the family is 
interviewed, spoken to?  If we're supposed to trust the 
police to get to the bottom of something and to be just as 
concerned with confirming that nothing happened, and maybe 
clearing someone, wouldn't you hope they would speak to a 
couple [of] witnesses?" 
 
 
The judge declined the defendant's request for a Bowden 
instruction.  The defendant does not challenge the judge's 
declination, recognizing that it is within the discretion of the 
judge whether to provide the jury with a Bowden instruction that 
explains to the jury the inferences they may draw if they were 
to find the investigation inadequate.  See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Durand, 475 Mass. 657, 674 (2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 
259 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Lao, 460 Mass. 12, 23 (2011) 
("a judge is not required to instruct on the claimed inadequacy 
of a police investigation.  'Bowden simply holds that a judge 
may not remove the issue from the jury's consideration'"); 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 Mass. 678, 687 (2003) (declining 
to give Bowden instruction not error "because the giving of such 
an instruction is never required").  See also Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 1107(b) (2018) (giving of Bowden instruction is 
discretionary). 
 
Instead, the defendant claims that the judge erred in 
giving the jury the following facially proper instruction 
31 
 
because, in the context of the evidence in this case, the 
instruction unfairly limited the jury's full consideration of 
the Bowden evidence and, effectively, negated the defendant's 
Bowden argument: 
"You are not to decide this case based on what you may have 
read or heard outside of this courtroom.  You are not to 
engage in any guesswork about any unanswered questions that 
remain in your mind.  You should not consider anything I 
have said or done during the trial, in ruling on 
objections, or in comments to the attorneys, or in 
questions to witnesses, or in setting forth the law in 
these instructions, as any indication of my opinion as to 
how you should decide the case.  In short, you are to 
confine your deliberations to the evidence and nothing but 
the evidence." 
"You are to decide what the facts are solely from the 
evidence admitted in this case, and not from suspicion or 
conjecture.  The evidence consists of the testimony of 
witnesses as you recall it, any documents or other things 
that were received into evidence as exhibits.  You will 
have all of the exhibits with you in the jury room.  You 
alone will decide the weight -- that is, the value -- that 
they deserve to receive in helping you make your ultimate 
judgment about whether the Commonwealth has proved its 
case" (emphases added by defendant). 
 
We recognize that, in some circumstances, a facially proper 
jury instruction that the jury should decide the case based on 
the evidence rather than guesswork or conjecture may reasonably 
be understood by the jury to negate or undercut a defendant's 
proper Bowden argument, such as where the judge interrupts 
defense counsel's Bowden argument to give the instruction, or 
where the judge furnishes this instruction in response to a 
question from the jury about a Bowden issue.  See, e.g., 
32 
 
Commonwealth v. Gilmore, 399 Mass. 741, 746 (1987) ("The judge 
twice interrupted defense counsel's closing argument to instruct 
the jury that they were to consider only 'the evidence 
introduced in fact in this case.'  Not only did the judge 
prevent defense counsel from pursuing a permissible line of 
argument, but he . . . in effect instructed the jury to 
disregard defense counsel's immediately preceding argument"); 
Commonwealth v. Remedor, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 694, 700 (2001) 
("[t]he judge's response to the jury's question, refusing to 
answer the question concerning admissibility and instructing the 
jury to confine their consideration to the evidence that was 
presented, in context could only have been understood by the 
jury as a ruling that the police officers' failure to record the 
transaction or to photograph the taxicab driver or to record his 
license and taxicab numbers, were not an appropriate ground upon 
which to build a defense and were not to be considered by them." 
 
Here, however, defense counsel proceeded through her 
closing argument uninterrupted, and the judge's instructions 
were not issued in response to any specific questions from the 
jury.  Rather, this instruction constituted a small part of the 
judge's final jury instructions that were given after the 
attorneys had presented their respective closing arguments.  In 
light of the context in which these instructions were given, 
there is nothing to suggest that these instructions "may have 
33 
 
been construed by the jury as requiring them to reject the 
[Bowden defense] suggested by defense counsel."  Commonwealth v. 
Smith, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 827, 832 (2000).  Where a judge, in his 
or her final jury instructions, tells the jury to decide the 
case based solely on the evidence rather than on guesswork or 
conjecture, it is unlikely that the jury will hear that 
instruction as a derogatory comment on the defendant's Bowden 
argument.  Moreover, the permissible inference from "police 
failure to take certain investigatory steps, as it relates to 
the reliability of the Commonwealth's case," rests on evidence 
actually presented regarding the inadequacy of the police 
investigation, and "is not intended to permit jurors to 
speculate about the results of investigative steps not taken."  
Commonwealth v. Tolan, 453 Mass. 634, 652 (2009).  On retrial, 
however, if the judge decides not to give a Bowden instruction 
as part of the final jury instructions, it would be prudent to 
omit from the instructions the sentence, "You are not to engage 
in any guesswork about any unanswered questions that remain in 
your mind," to avoid the risk that the jury may interpret this 
sentence as undercutting the defendant's Bowden argument. 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated above, we vacate the 
defendant's convictions and remand the case to the Superior 
Court for a new trial. 
So ordered. 
 
LOWY, J. (concurring, with whom Lenk and Budd, JJ., join).  
I agree with the court that the prosecutor's closing argument 
constituted prejudicial error, requiring reversal of the 
defendant's conviction.  I do so not because this is a sexual 
assault case, nor because the conviction rests on the testimony 
of a young child.  I do so because jurors crave corroboration, 
and the prosecutor's closing argument included powerful 
statements corroborating the child's testimony that were not 
offered in evidence at trial.  Specifically, the prosecutor 
inaccurately argued that the victim's mother had testified that, 
upon returning from spending time with the defendant, the victim 
told her mother that she felt "disgusting" and wanted to take a 
bath.  Although it appears that the mother would have so 
testified had she been asked, the prosecutor did not elicit this 
testimony on direct examination.  I cannot say with assurance 
that this remark in the prosecutor's closing, referencing a 
statement not admitted in evidence, could not have influenced 
the jury's verdict. 
 
I write separately because I agree with many of the 
concerns raised by Justice Cypher in her dissent.  I believe 
that, unfortunately, little has changed since we noted in 
Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass 217, 238-239 (2005), cert. 
denied, 546 U.S. 1216 (2006) that: 
2 
 
"Some jurors may continue to harbor prejudicial 
misperceptions about the nature of rape and rape 
allegations, including that complainants who wear 
revealing clothing, consume drugs or alcohol, or have 
unorthodox or promiscuous lifestyles cannot be 'real' 
victims of rape; that forced sex by a spouse or a past 
partner does not constitute 'real' rape; and that 
false accusations of sexual assault are more frequent 
than those of other violent crimes." 
 
 
The dissent's clarion call cautioning trial and appellate 
courts to evaluate the testimony of sexual assault victims no 
more critically than victims or witnesses of other crimes is 
well taken.  The mistreatment of victims of sexual assault is 
still present in many aspects of our society today.  It is 
imperative that nothing in our decision today be interpreted as 
endorsing antiquated notions of what makes an alleged victim of 
rape credible. 
 
Our society's normative values concerning sexual 
relationships have evolved and are varied and complex.  All too 
often, victims of sexual assault are forced to endure further 
trauma in their pursuit of justice.  This trauma goes beyond 
having to testify about the crime committed.  A victim of sexual 
assault is often scrutinized in a manner that is far more 
pervasive than victims of almost any other crime.  For the 
victim of a robbery, their privileged medical or psychiatric 
records are not usually subject to scrutiny; their previous 
personal relationships, conduct, and the most intimate details 
of their life are not often topics of cross-examination.  
3 
 
However, this is the reality for many victims of sexual assault; 
they are treated with more distrust than victims of other 
crimes.  The dissent's emphasis on some of the troubling aspects 
of sexual assault prosecutions -- a lingering and unacceptable 
vestige of our society's history of gender inequality –- raises 
concerns that we must not ignore and that should be kept firmly 
in mind. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J. (dissenting, with whom Kafker, J., joins).  This 
case involves a prosecutorial error, preserved by objection, and 
calls upon the court to determine that error's impact.  When 
assessing such an error's effect, the court frequently evaluates 
the strength of the Commonwealth's case, absent the error, to 
determine whether "the error did not influence the jury, or had 
but very slight effect."  Commonwealth v. Hrabak, 440 Mass. 650, 
656 (2004), quoting Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 
(1994).  In cases such as this, where the victim of the alleged 
crime testifies, the court naturally evaluates her testimony 
when considering whether the Commonwealth's case was 
independently strong enough without the prosecutor's mistake.  I 
disagree with the court about the importance of the undisputed, 
consistent, and clear testimony of a survivor of sexual assault 
and would conclude that a prosecutorial error, even if 
preserved, does not necessarily erase the merits of a strong 
case.  Because a long line of cases arguably evaluates the 
testimony of survivors of sexual assault more critically than 
testimony of victims and witnesses of other kinds of crimes, 
which does a disservice to all future victims whose interests 
are represented by imperfect prosecutors,1 I dissent. 
                     
 
1 The court disputes this characterization of the 
prosecutor's performance, alleging that "she twice told the jury 
that there was important corroboration from the mother that was 
not in evidence."  Ante at note 4.  A close reading of the 
2 
 
 
 
Perhaps the ease with which courts have dismissed the value 
of sexual assault victim testimony has its roots in Sir Matthew 
Hale's Seventeenth Century adage, describing rape as "an 
accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder 
to be defended by the party accused, tho ever so innocent."  See 
Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement, 
Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus 
Sexual Assault, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 945, 948 (2004).  See id. at 949 
("Many jurisdictions responded to Hale's admonition by requiring 
courts to issue instructions cautioning juries to regard the 
complainant's testimony in rape cases with particular 
suspicion").  Hale's admonishment accompanied the "hue and cry" 
requirement, mandating that courts credit a victim's complaint 
only if made immediately following an assault.  Torrey, When 
Will We Be Believed?  Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in 
Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1013, 1041 (1991).  
Hale's words of caution about the testimony of rape complainants 
were imported into the American legal system.  Anderson, supra 
at 960.  Every American jurisdiction previously required 
                                                                  
record shows that the prosecutor's error occurred only once, 
during the disputed closing argument.  The court 
mischaracterizes the prosecutor's opening statement.  There, the 
prosecutor mentioned Camila's desire to take a bath after the 
first assault, during a section in which she previewed Camila's 
testimony, not any evidence to be offered by Camila's mother.  
Camila testified in accordance with the prosecutor's opening 
statement. 
3 
 
 
evidence that the victim promptly reported the assault before 
permitting a prosecution to proceed or upholding a conviction.  
DuBois, A Matter of Time:  Evidence of a Victim's Prompt 
Complaint in New York, 53 Brook. L. Rev. 1087 n.2 (1988).  See 
Commonwealth v. Izzo, 359 Mass. 39, 44 (1971) , quoting Glover 
v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 57 (1937) (Commonwealth has "duty" to 
demonstrate victim expeditiously reported sexual assault because 
"where a female witness testifies as to a rape or similar 
assault upon her the mere absence of evidence of an earlier 
complaint discredits her.  A legitimate argument against her 
credibility may be made solely on the basis of the absence of 
evidence of such a complaint"). 
 
Massachusetts has since departed from some of those 
troubling requirements of sexual assault prosecutions, see 
Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 217, 242 (2005), cert. denied, 
546 U.S. 1216 (2006),2 but remnants of these philosophies clearly 
survive.  When evaluating the Commonwealth's evidence in the 
face of an error in cases without sexual assault charges, our 
jurisprudence frequently credits testimony of witnesses and 
victims.  See Commonwealth v. Stevens, 379 Mass. 772, 774 (1980) 
(case against defendant for armed assault with intent to murder 
                     
 
2 We preserve the opportunity for the Commonwealth to 
introduce first complaint evidence "consistent with our focus on 
the evidence pertaining to the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the complainant's initial report of the alleged 
crime."  King, 445 Mass. at 242. 
4 
 
 
and armed robbery, based on testimony of victim, was "strong"); 
Commonwealth v. Walker, 421 Mass. 90, 98-99 (1995) (affirming 
robbery conviction despite multiple improper comments by judge 
and prosecutor because Commonwealth made "strong" case where 
only evidence was victim's testimony).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Barbosa, 463 Mass. 116, 118 (2012) (based in eyewitness 
testimony, case against defendant for murder in first degree and 
multiple firearms offenses was strong, despite all identifying 
witnesses being impeached with prior inconsistent statements and 
judge erroneously admitting hearsay to corroborate testimony of 
Commonwealth's witness); Commonwealth v. Rollins, 441 Mass. 114, 
118-119 (2004) (case against defendant for operating motor 
vehicle while intoxicated, where Commonwealth introduced only 
testimony of police officer witnesses, was strong).  Yet when 
performing the same analysis in cases of sexual assault, the 
testimony of victims appears to be given comparably less weight.  
See Commonwealth v. Beaudry, 445 Mass. 577, 585 (2005) (closing 
argument error in child rape case was prejudicial where victim 
was only witness to abuse); Hrabak, 440 Mass. at 656 
(Commonwealth's case was not strong enough to withstand error 
where six year old anal rape victim's testimony was only 
evidence); Commonwealth v. Scheffer, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 398, 401 
(1997) (reversing conviction for rape of child where error 
"might loom less large in a case where there was anatomical or 
5 
 
 
percipient witness evidence [from other than the purported 
victim] that made the government case of sexual abuse 
overwhelming"); Commonwealth v. LaCaprucia, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 
496, 502 (1996), S.C., 429 Mass. 440 (1999) (case against 
defendant in child sexual assault case was not strong where 
there was limited physical evidence, so victims' statements were 
central to Commonwealth's case).  Cf. Commonwealth v. White, 475 
Mass. 724, 740 (2016) (recognizing that corroboration 
requirement in G. L. c. 277, § 63, "sets a high bar for 
prosecuting sexual offenses against children that are alleged to 
have occurred many years before").  See Raitt, Judging 
Children's Credibility -- Cracks in the Culture of Disbelief, or 
Business as Usual?, 13 New. Crim. L. Rev. 735, 737 (2010) 
("Concern over children's reliability as witnesses dates back 
centuries, and this concern is compounded when the child is a 
complainant of a sexual offense").  The court's conclusion is 
tinged with this legacy. 
 
I would eschew the entrenched habits of excess suspicion of 
rape victims and affirm this conviction.3  When properly 
evaluating the value of the victim's testimony, it is clear the 
error was not prejudicial.  "[T]he prosecutor's improper 
statement warrants reversal only if it prejudiced the defendant 
                     
 
3 Of course, we do not presume a person is guilty based on a 
mere untested accusation. 
6 
 
 
in light of the prosecutor's entire argument, the trial 
testimony, and the judge's instructions to the jury."  
Commonwealth v. Burgos, 462 Mass. 53, 72, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 
1072 (2012).  Within that context, we also consider "the 
persistence or flagrancy of the remarks."  Commonwealth v. 
Clary, 388 Mass. 583, 590–591 (1983), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Dougan, 377 Mass. 303, 312 (1979).  Approximately seven 
transcribed pages into closing argument, the Commonwealth sought 
to remind the jury of testimony of some sources of corroboration 
of the details surrounding the allegations of assault.  At that 
time, the prosecutor told the jury that Camila's mother had 
remembered Camila coming home from being out with the defendant 
and wanting to take a bath.  Although Camila had testified to 
this, the prosecutor had failed to elicit this testimony from 
Camila's mother. 
 
This error, properly considered in its context, "did not 
influence the jury, or had but very slight effect."  Hrabak, 440 
Mass. at 656, quoting Flebotte, 417 Mass. at 353.  This error 
was far from the persistent or flagrant comments that 
necessitate upending a jury verdict.  Camila's testimony was 
strong evidence against the defendant and should be treated as 
such.  She described, in detail, each incident of abuse.4  Her 
                     
 
4 The defendant's cross-examination focused on the happy 
relationship Camila had with her family, including the 
7 
 
 
testimony alone was enough evidence to merit a conviction.  The 
jury listened to all of her testimony, just as they listened to 
the judge's repeated and clear instructions about argument not 
being evidence.5  "[W]e must and do recognize that closing 
                                                                  
defendant, and Camila's parents' gentle style of discipline.  
Defense counsel contended in closing argument that if the 
defendant were abusing Camila, her family would have noticed, 
and she would have felt safe coming forward because her parents 
did not hit her or often shout at her.  Although Camila did not 
disclose immediately, she did, in fact, disclose the abuse to 
her family. 
 
 
5 During jury empanelment, the judge told the jury that they 
would be deciding the case solely on the evidence and that 
evidence consisted of witness testimony, exhibits, and factual 
stipulations alone.  After jury empanelment, the judge reminded 
the jury that they would decide the case "exclusively on the 
evidence."  At the beginning of trial, the judge told the jury 
that statements from the attorneys are not evidence.  Prior to 
closing argument the judge instructed the jury that a "closing 
statement is not itself evidence, nor is it a substitute for the 
evidence.  The evidence in this case is closed." 
 
 
After closing argument, the defendant requested that the 
judge immediately remind the jurors that their memory of the 
evidence controls.  The judge declined because that instruction 
was "adequately covered in the [jury] charge as a whole."  The 
judge then immediately instructed the jury, beginning the charge 
by reminding the jury that they are "the sole and exclusive 
judges of the facts."  While elaborating on how the jury may 
find facts, the judge reminded the jury that "opening statements 
and the closing arguments of the lawyers are not a substitute 
for the evidence." 
 
 
Although the judge issued that instruction further from the 
prosecutor's closing argument than the defendant wished 
(approximately five transcribed pages separate the defendant's 
request and the judge's reminder that closing arguments are not 
evidence), its content satisfied the defendant's request.  "In 
light of the judge's repeated instructions that the closing 
arguments do not constitute evidence, any damage to the 
defendant was sufficiently repaired."  Commonwealth v. 
8 
 
 
argument is identified as argument, the jury understand[] that, 
instructions from the judge inform the jury that closing 
argument is not evidence, and instructions may mitigate any 
prejudice in the final argument."  Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 
Mass. 514, 517 (1987).  See Commonwealth v. Hammond, 477 Mass. 
499, 507-508 (2017) (affirming convictions of raping three 
children, despite prosecutor's two improper statements in 
closing argument, where judge gave curative instructions when 
charging jury). 
 
Moreover, the prosecutor's erroneous statement was an 
insignificant portion of her closing argument, occupying a mere 
five lines out of approximately nine transcribed pages.  Compare 
Clary, 388 Mass. at 593 (reversing where "a fact not proved 
directly or by fair inference . . . was used as a focal point in 
the prosecutor's argument"), with Commonwealth v. Wood, 469 
Mass. 266, 286 (2014) ("[W]e cannot say that the error, taken in 
context, made a difference in the jury's conclusion.  It was a 
single statement made in the course of a lengthy closing 
argument").  The prosecutor discussed other evidence from 
Camila's mother's testimony corroborating that the defendant 
                                                                  
O'Connell, 432 Mass. 657, 659 n.3 (2000).  See Commonwealth v. 
Dagley, 442 Mass. 713, 725 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 930 
(2005) ("That the judge's final instruction did not include any 
express correction of the prosecutor's mischaracterization does 
not mean that the instruction was inadequate to cure any 
confusion caused by that mischaracterization"). 
9 
 
 
would pick up Camila from school, but that she wanted that to 
stop, and that she came home in the middle of the night on New 
Year's Eve.6  The prosecutor also reminded the jury that the 
defendant himself told police that Camila would sleep at his 
house and he would pick her up from school, further verifying 
the contextual details of Camila's testimony.  Compare 
Commonwealth v. Gomes, 443 Mass. 502, 510 (2005) ("improper 
subject of argument" was "isolated" "slip of the tongue" and did 
not require reversal), with Beaudry, 445 Mass. at 585-586 
(prosecutor's comment that child victim was credible because her 
sexual knowledge was inappropriate for her age and must have 
been result of defendant's abuse was unsupported by record and 
could have influenced jury's decision about all allegations).  
The court's focus on Camila not displaying the behavioral 
characteristics of a "normal" child who has suffered abuse 
creates a de facto corroboration requirement, necessitating a 
                     
 
6 The court dismisses the value of the testimony 
corroborating the context of Camila's allegations because such 
behavior is "hardly surprising or noteworthy" for a child of 
Camila's age.  Ante at    .  Considered in isolation, any fact 
about a child's behavior can seem insufficient to support 
allegations of abuse, especially where such evaluations include 
the court taking judicial notice of what is normal for a child 
of a certain age.  Even the recognized signs of abuse, which the 
court notes are absent, such as nightmares, bed-wetting, 
difficulty in school, or running away from home, can be 
interpreted in isolation to have innocent explanations.  Ante at    
.  When considered in the full context of allegations of sexual 
abuse, however, behavior that can be otherwise typical for some 
children can inform our understanding of a particular child 
victim's testimony. 
10 
 
 
child without physical symptoms or eyewitnesses (as already 
discussed, each is uncommon in child sexual assault cases) to 
display enough emotional trauma to be credible.  Beyond the 
obvious issues with demanding a certain type of behavior from 
victims of these crimes, this requires a child to walk a 
tightrope of being behaviorally symptomatic enough to be 
believed, but not too emotional so as to be deemed unreliable.  
See Commonwealth v. Quinn, 469 Mass. 641, 650 (2014) (vacating 
child rape conviction where "Commonwealth's case rested almost 
entirely on the credibility of the emotionally troubled 
victim").  See also Raitt, supra at 737 ("The concerns affecting 
children that cloud [child rape cases] and evidence are very 
similar to the suspicion expressed toward all victims of sexual 
assault, which is made explicit through expectations that the 
'righteous' victim will be of impeccable character, make the 
complaint promptly, exhibit tangible injuries, and provide a 
full and unswerving account").  Even if the court's devaluation 
of other sources of corroboration is accurate, this nonetheless 
does nothing to minimize the strength of Camila's testimony as 
the core of the Commonwealth's case.  The Commonwealth presented 
a case that was sturdy without the addition of the prosecutor's 
inaccurate closing argument. 
 
This case hews closely to a common pattern of child sexual 
assault cases, where the assailant preys on the child in 
11 
 
 
secluded, controlled environments, leaving no other eyewitnesses 
to the actual acts of abuse.  See Buller, Fighting Rape Culture 
with Noncorroboration Instructions, 53 Tulsa L. Rev. 1, 5 (2017) 
(large majority of sexual assault cases have no third-party 
eyewitnesses); Walsh, Jones, Cross, & Lippert, Prosecuting Child 
Sexual Abuse:  The Importance of Evidence Type, 56 Crime & 
Delinquency 436, 438 (2010) ("[c]hild sexual abuse is distinct 
from other types of crimes because multiple forms of convincing 
evidence are often lacking").  See also Beaudry, 445 Mass. at 
585 (noting, in case without physical evidence or eyewitnesses, 
"[a]s is often true in cases involving sexual abuse, the trial 
was a battle of the credibility of the witnesses").  Where no 
physical evidence is available,7 it is the victim's testimony 
alone that stands as direct evidence of the assault.8  Camila's 
                     
 
7 See T.J. Buller, Fighting Rape Culture with 
Noncorroboration Instructions, 53 Tulsa L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (2017) 
(evidence of physical injury from sexual assault is uncommon and 
"the odds of finding any physical trauma decreases dramatically 
following the first twenty-four hours after an attack"). 
 
 
8 The persistent lack of physical evidence and regular 
disbelief of victims necessitates that prior bad acts be 
admissible in cases of rape and sexual assault.  See Fed. R. 
Evid. 413 & 414; Larsen, Sexual Violence is Unique:  Why 
Evidence of Other Crimes Should be Admissible in Sexual Assault 
and Child Molestation Cases, 29 Hamline L. Rev. 177, 207-208 
(2006) ("perceived lack of credibility demands a rule that 
attempts to equalize the rights of the victim with the rights of 
the accused.  The credibility problem becomes particularly 
important given that many victims will refrain from reporting 
the crime since they are perceived as unbelievable").  Such a 
change would be an important, but not radical, change in our 
12 
 
 
testimony, as the only percipient witness to these crimes, 
deserves no less value than the testimony of any other victim in 
a case not involving sexual assault. 
 
Given the entirety of the evidence and the minor role the 
prosecutor's misstatement played in closing argument, I conclude 
that the error could not have influenced the jury's decision.  I 
dissent. 
                                                                  
current case law.  See e.g., Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass. 
214, 225-226 (1986) (affirming rape conviction where two people 
testified that defendant sexually assaulted them in 
circumstances similar to victim's allegations because prior acts 
were probative of defendant's common pattern of conduct and 
probative value outweighed prejudice to defendant); Commonwealth 
v. King, 387 Mass. 464, 469, 470 (1982) (affirming conviction of 
rape of child where Commonwealth introduced evidence of 
defendant's uncharged rape of child other than victim because 
evidence showed common pattern or course of conduct toward two 
children and was "sufficiently related in time and location to 
be logically probative"); Commonwealth v. Lanning, 32 Mass. App. 
Ct. 279, 283 (1992) (affirming convictions of indecent assault 
and battery on child and rape of child where children other than 
victims testified about defendant's prior acts, because "the 
evidence corroborated the victims' testimony and showed a common 
scheme and pattern of behavior").