Case Title: Application of Easton

Citation: 289 Or. 99, 610 P.2d 270

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1980-05-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
610 P.2d 270 (1980)
289 Or. 99
In the matter of the Application of Thomas D. EASTON, for Admission to Practice Law in the State of Oregon.
SC 25802.

Supreme Court of Oregon.
Argued and Submitted April 8, 1980.
Decided May 6, 1980.
Thomas Easton, applicant pro se, argued the cause and filed the briefs.
Marcus K. Ward, Eugene, argued the cause for the Oregon State Bar. With him on the brief was Richard E. Miller, Eugene.
Before DENECKE, C.J., and HOWELL, LENT, PETERSON and TANZER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Applicant seeks admission to the practice of law and the Oregon State Bar has filed objections thereto. A trial board conducted a hearing and recommended that the applicant be denied admission to the bar. A disciplinary review board also recommended denial.
This case comes under ORS 9.220, which requires:
The objections to admission are in the form of allegations of specific acts by applicant which purportedly demonstrate lack of good moral character. Although the statute places the burden upon the applicant, the Oregon State Bar went forward and proved the various events upon which it relies.
The allegations all arise from the tumultuous break-up in 1978 of applicant's nine-and-one-half-year marriage and the resulting dissolution proceedings. Applicant was then a 43-year-old third-year law student. There are several allegations regarding false accusations made against lawyers and judges directly and peripherally involved in the proceedings, but we do not dwell on these allegations because there are two fundamental allegations which are dispositive. The underlying facts of the dispositive allegations are generally not disputed, although much of the hearing was concerned with applicant's motivation.
*271 The first allegation is that the applicant took his three-and-one-half-year-old son to California in violation of an order awarding temporary custody to the mother. Over a period of time prior to taking the child, he researched the law and consulted others to determine in which states he would be able to obtain a custody order contrary to the custody order in Oregon. He expressed interest in the state of Montana where he felt he could find employment in the woods and not be discovered. He thereafter took the child and, three weeks later, he was apprehended in California. Upon return to Oregon, he was convicted of custodial interference in the first degree under ORS 163.257, a felony, and was held in contempt by the domestic relations court.
The second dispositive allegation is of perjury. During the course of the dissolution proceedings, the applicant disposed of property which was to be distributed to his wife. When questioned as a witness, he admitted that he had given the property to friends. When asked the identity of the friends, he declined to answer on the ground that he did not wish to reveal their identity and subject them to difficulties. Upon being ordered to answer, he stated that he did not remember the identity of the friends to whom he had given possession of the property. In fact, he did remember.
These incidents of custodial interference and perjury demonstrate a lack of good moral character as that term relates to fitness to practice law. They both arise from deliberate decisions to violate criminal law and to disobey orders of court. The applicant attempts to morally justify his conduct: his custodial interference, he asserts, was out of love for his son; his perjury was to protect his friends from harassment. His justification, however, is simply an admission that the applicant believes it morally correct to obey a higher personal ethic than to conform his behavior to the law and to orders of court. Applicant's belief directly undermines his ability to represent and advise clients, particularly in situations of stress and emotional conflict. Moreover, it is directly inconsistent with a lawyer's function as an officer of the court. We do not hold that every act of disobedience of law automatically disqualifies one for the practice of law. Some unlawful acts are not of a nature or magnitude which reflect adversely on character traits which are deemed essential to the practice of law. We conclude that a lack of good moral character under ORS 9.220(2) has been established.
Next, we address the subject of reformation. We recognized in In re Jolles, 235 Or. 262, 383 P.2d 388 (1963), that once an applicant has demonstrated a willingness to act in accordance with his personal convictions rather than with the law of the state, the next question is whether he has undergone a reformation of character between the time of such conduct and his application for admission to the bar. Here, we conclude that there has been no such reformation. Our conclusion is based upon the nature and circumstances of the offensive conduct and upon the applicant's attitude toward that conduct as expressed during this proceeding.
First, the conduct was that of a 43-year-old person, rather than a youngster in his formative years. We assume that the applicant, as a third-year law student, had been exposed to professional concepts of rule of law and legal ethics. We regard his conduct not as the isolated acts of a naive young person, but rather as the reaction of a generally unstable person faced with a stressful situation. By contrast, the conduct in In re Jolles reflected the applicant's intellectual conviction which was subject to reconsideration.
Moreover, applicant's conduct was deliberate rather than impulsive. The custodial interference was researched and planned over a period of time. The perjury occurred as a matter of conscious decision.
The most persuasive factor bearing on reformation is the applicant's lack of appreciation of the moral and legal implications of his conduct as reflected in his testimony before the trial board and in his argument before this court. Applicant has demonstrated *272 that he continues unchanged in the moral rationalization he made at the time. He testified, "I have grown. But I have not changed my character."
Regarding custodial coercion, applicant testified that he is familiar with Oregon cases in which custody has been changed, but indicates that he would nevertheless again, in a similar situation, resort to self-help rather than adjudication. For example, he testified:
In his pro se brief, applicant states:
It is patently clear that the applicant still has no understanding of the legal or moral implications of his extra-legal conduct.
At the hearing, the applicant's attitude toward possible repetition of his perjury was inconsistent. His testimony explaining why he would not again prevaricate in a similar situation lacks the ring of profound conviction:
Applicant still fails to understand the moral quality of his perjury. He testified:
Finally, in his argument to the trial board, the applicant contradicted his testimony and acknowledged that nothing has changed:
We are mindful of the evidence given by people whose opinions we respect that applicant is possessed of good moral character suitable for the practice of law. We are also mindful that applicant has many excellent qualities to commend him. We conclude nevertheless that the positive evidence is overcome by evidence of applicant's conduct as well as his testimony and professions during the course of this proceeding.
Application denied.