Case Title: Edwards v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13073

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-10-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13073 
 
SAUNDRA R. EDWARDS  vs.  COMMONWEALTH & another.1 
 
 
 
Essex.     May 5, 2021. - October 12, 2021. 
 
Present:  Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Commonwealth, Claim against.  Governor.  Public Employment, 
Termination.  Employment, Termination, Retaliation.  
Statute, Construction.  Constitutional Law, Separation of 
powers.  Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Interlocutory 
appeal. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
December 31, 2014. 
 
Following review by this court, 477 Mass. 254 (2017), the 
case was heard by Salim Rodriguez Tabit, J., on a motion for 
summary judgment. 
 
A proceeding for interlocutory review was heard in the 
Appeals Court by Joseph M. Ditkoff, J.  The Supreme Judicial 
Court granted an application for direct appellate review. 
 
 
Terence P. McCourt, Special Assistant Attorney General, for 
the Commonwealth. 
Gail M. McKenna for the plaintiff. 
 
 
 
1 Deval Patrick.  Patrick's motion to dismiss was allowed, 
and he is no longer a party to the case. 
2 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In September 2014, Governor Deval Patrick 
dismissed the plaintiff from her position as chair of the Sex 
Offender Registry Board (SORB), to which he had appointed her 
some seven years earlier.  In statements to the media, Patrick 
said that he had fired the plaintiff because she had interfered 
in a sex offender classification proceeding and had attempted 
inappropriately to influence the hearing examiner.  The case 
involved a question whether a California statute was a "like 
offense" to a crime in Massachusetts; the petitioner in the 
proceeding was Patrick's brother-in-law.  The plaintiff 
subsequently filed a complaint against Patrick for defamation 
and against the Commonwealth for wrongful termination under 
G. L. c. 149, § 185, the Massachusetts whistleblower act.  We 
ordered the claims against Patrick dismissed on the ground that 
the plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts to show that 
Patrick's statements to the media were made with actual malice, 
see Edwards v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 254, 255 (2017), and a 
Superior Court judge subsequently denied the Commonwealth's 
motion for summary judgment on the remaining whistleblower 
claim.  At issue here is the Commonwealth's interlocutory appeal 
from that decision.  We conclude that the whistleblower act is 
applicable in these circumstances and that there was no error in 
the judge's decision to deny the Commonwealth's motion for 
3 
 
summary judgment, as genuine issues of material fact remain in 
dispute. 
 
1.  Background.  We recite the relevant facts from the 
summary judgment record, reserving certain details for later 
discussion.  See Edwards, 477 Mass. at 255-259.  We view the 
"pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," 
Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 410 Mass. 805, 808 
(1991), in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
here, the plaintiff, see Chambers v. RDI Logistics, Inc., 476 
Mass. 95, 99 (2016). 
a.  Plaintiff's work with SORB.  SORB is an administrative 
agency within the Executive Office of Public Safety and Security 
(EOPSS); it is responsible for classifying and maintaining a 
centralized registry of sex offenders under the Massachusetts 
sex offender registration act, G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q 
(registration act).  SORB is led by a chair who "shall be 
appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the governor . . . 
[to] be the executive and administrative head" of the agency.  
G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1), second par.  The plaintiff served in 
this role from November of 2007 to September of 2014, after 
having worked for over thirteen years as an assistant district 
attorney in Plymouth County. 
4 
 
Before she was hired at SORB, the plaintiff interviewed 
with EOPSS's Secretary (Secretary) and Undersecretary of 
Criminal Justice (Undersecretary); she was not interviewed by 
Patrick, and was never introduced to him.  Her appointment 
letter, dated October 4, 2007, was printed on letterhead from 
the Commonwealth and was signed by Patrick as Governor.  During 
her time at SORB, the plaintiff understood her supervisor to be 
the Undersecretary, with whom she was in contact on at least a 
weekly basis.  The plaintiff received positive annual personnel 
reviews, which were completed by the Undersecretary. 
b.  Sigh/Paglia matter.  In 1993, Bernard Sigh pleaded 
guilty in California to the crime of spousal rape, see Cal. 
Penal Code § 262.  He admitted that he had "accomplished an act 
of sexual intercourse with [his] wife against her will by means 
of force."  After serving a term of incarceration, Sigh moved to 
Massachusetts, but he did not register as a sex offender.  
Generally, any person who has been convicted of a sex offense in 
another State that is a "like offense" to a sex offense that 
requires registration under Massachusetts law must register with 
SORB if the individual moves to the Commonwealth.  See G. L. 
c. 6, § 178C (sex offense includes "like violation of the laws 
of another [S]tate"); G. L. c. 6, § 178E (g) (registration by 
sex offender is required within two days of moving to 
Massachusetts).  See, e.g., Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 
5 
 
151564 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 612, 615–616 
(2010) (Maine sex offense was "like violation" because elements 
were "the same or nearly the same as an offense requiring 
registration in Massachusetts"). 
After Sigh's offense and failure to register became a 
public issue during Patrick's 2006 gubernatorial campaign, SORB 
undertook an investigation of Sigh's case.  SORB made a 
preliminary recommendation that Sigh be required to register as 
a low-risk, level one sex offender.  At that time, such a 
classification did not mandate public disclosure.  Sigh 
requested a hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 6, § 178L (1) (a), and 
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.04(3) to challenge the preliminary 
classification; he also filed a motion seeking relief from the 
requirement that he register.  SORB's general counsel, Daniel 
Less, asked the parties to brief the issue whether the 
conviction of "spousal rape" in California was a "like offense" 
to rape in Massachusetts, and also asked the Attorney General 
for an opinion on that question.2  SORB's acting director wanted 
to wait to hold a hearing on Sigh's motion until the Attorney 
General had responded. 
 
 
2 The Appeals Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Becker, 71 
Mass. App. Ct. 81, 87, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 933 (2008), 
holding that a "like offense" is one that "comports with the 
essence of the Massachusetts crime," had not been issued when 
Paglia conducted the Sigh hearing in 2007. 
6 
 
An assistant general counsel at SORB (who had been told 
that Sigh was Patrick's brother-in-law) thought that no hearing 
was necessary because the offense of rape carries a lifetime 
registration requirement in Massachusetts, and the level one 
classification order should issue, as no better outcome for Sigh 
would be possible.  He therefore filed a motion for a required 
finding that Sigh be classified as a level one sex offender.  
Hearing examiner Attilio Paglia denied that motion and began a 
three-day hearing on Sigh's motion for classification that same 
day, August 1, 2017.  Paglia had arranged to take the Sigh 
matter from the hearing officer to whom it originally had been 
assigned.  At the end of the hearing, Paglia made an oral ruling 
that the crime of spousal rape in California was not equivalent 
to rape in Massachusetts, but rather to indecent assault and 
battery, and that Sigh was relieved of the obligation to 
register as a sex offender.3  For an oral ruling to be made at a 
SORB hearing was rare; Paglia testified that he could recall two 
out of approximately 250 cases he had decided where he made an 
oral ruling rather than take the matter under advisement at the 
end of the hearing.  On September 14, 2007, Paglia internally 
 
3 Because indecent assault and battery, unlike rape, is not 
classified as a sexually violent offense under G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178C, the obligation to register is not for life, and may be 
terminated after twenty years pursuant to G. L. c. 6, § 178G. 
7 
 
submitted his initial written decision absolving Sigh from the 
requirement of registration. 
The plaintiff began her service as chair of SORB several 
months later, in November of 2007.  During her first days in the 
position, Paglia himself informed her about a particular matter 
she later learned was the Sigh matter; he told her that he felt 
others at SORB were upset by the way it had been handled and 
were calling and sending him e-mail messages about it, and that 
he was unsure how to handle the decision where others at SORB 
did not agree with the outcome he had reached.  When the 
plaintiff met with senior SORB staff several days later, they 
explained their view of the situation to her and told her of 
their frustration with the decision and their belief that it was 
incorrect.  The plaintiff reviewed the decision and the 
recordings of the hearing and determined that Paglia's 
conclusion that Sigh had not committed an offense that was 
equivalent to the crime of rape in Massachusetts was erroneous; 
the plaintiff also believed based on those recordings that the 
level one determination was incorrect and Sigh's risk of 
reoffense was higher.  The plaintiff and senior staff at SORB 
and EOPSS accordingly decided to wait for the opinion by the 
Attorney General before allowing a written decision to be 
released, and delayed issuance of Paglia's written decision.  
They also contemplated issuing a one-line decision stating 
8 
 
simply that, after a hearing, Sigh's motion to be relieved of 
the obligation to register was allowed. 
In May of 2008, the plaintiff again met with Paglia.  She 
explained the elements of rape under Massachusetts law and 
emphasized that "rape is rape" regardless of the relationship of 
the parties involved;4 she did not, however, tell Paglia 
specifically what to do with the decision in the Sigh matter, 
and she explicitly declined to answer when he asked her what she 
wanted him to do, instead directing him to seek advice from 
another SORB employee if he needed help with the legal analysis.  
Paglia later told her that he had based his decision on a 
Superior Court decision he found compelling, and on his belief 
that the conclusion that the Sigh matter involved a violent 
offense was "not fair."  Shortly thereafter, and following 
further consultation by the plaintiff with her superiors at 
EOPSS, SORB issued the Sigh decision as Paglia originally had 
drafted it. 
The plaintiff then implemented a staff-wide training on the 
elements of every offense over which SORB had jurisdiction, with 
instruction by a former assistant district attorney, and 
informed Paglia that he would need to have remedial training on 
 
 
4 In Commonwealth v. Chretien, 383 Mass. 123, 130 (1981), 
this court held that the common-law spousal exclusion to the 
crime of rape had been abolished by the 1974 revisions to the 
Commonwealth's rape statute. 
9 
 
these elements.  The plaintiff also promulgated a regulation 
permitting board-level review of decisions by individual hearing 
examiners.  Prior to that, individual hearing examiners 
generally could issue decisions without further review within 
SORB, and SORB staff doubted they had any authority to prevent 
issuance of a decision by an individual examiner; although a 
respondent could appeal from a decision of a hearing examiner to 
the Superior Court, SORB had no such right of appeal.  In 
December of 2008, Paglia resigned from SORB and then filed a 
complaint in the Superior Court against SORB, the plaintiff, and 
a number of others under the whistleblower act.  The complaint 
alleged that the plaintiff's actions constituted retaliation 
against Paglia for his actions in connection with the Sigh 
matter.  In July of 2014, Paglia and the Commonwealth reached a 
settlement agreement. 
c.  Plaintiff's dismissal from SORB.  On September 15, 
2014, more than six years after the decision issued in the Sigh 
case, and approximately two months after the settlement of 
Paglia's lawsuit, the plaintiff was invited to a meeting 
scheduled for the following morning with members of Patrick's 
staff, at his office.5  At that meeting, the plaintiff was told 
 
5 Neither the Undersecretary, the Secretary, nor Patrick was 
present at this meeting, which was conducted by Kendra Foley, 
Patrick's director of boards and commissions. 
10 
 
that she served "at the Governor's pleasure," that she had done 
nothing wrong, and that Patrick had decided to replace her as 
chair of SORB, effective immediately; she was instructed not to 
attend a regular meeting she had scheduled at the State House 
for later that day.  Patrick had not consulted with the 
Secretary or the Undersecretary prior to deciding to replace the 
plaintiff.  The Undersecretary, Sandra McCroom, who had been the 
plaintiff's supervisor, was surprised by the decision when she 
had learned of it several days before the meeting with the 
plaintiff.  As the meeting was taking place, McCroom had been 
sent to the offices of SORB to announce to agency staff that the 
plaintiff was being replaced. 
Later that same day, the plaintiff asked McCroom if she 
could resign from her position as SORB chair, in order to avoid 
the stigma of being dismissed from such a high-profile public 
office.  After McCroom consulted with her own supervisors, she 
told the plaintiff that she would be allowed to resign if she 
did so effective that day.  On September 17, 2014, the plaintiff 
submitted a letter dated September 16, 2014, addressed to 
Patrick as Governor, stating that she was resigning "[i]n 
anticipation of the appointment of a new Chairperson" of SORB.  
EOPPS acknowledged her resignation in writing on September 18, 
2014. 
11 
 
In a statement to the media on September 22, 2014, Patrick 
explained his decision to appoint a new chair of SORB as 
follows: 
"I think we put out the statement saying that I lost 
confidence and that's what it is about.  They've had 
several cases where the SJC has reversed them and most 
recently I think at the end of last year they were 
criticized for not updating their regulations which is and 
I know it's a tough job but it is something they need to 
do.  We have gotten a number of reports about the work 
environment not being very positive, not being very 
conducive to the kind of productivity we need out of them 
and then I'd say maybe the straw, the final straw was the 
settlement of a lawsuit which happened about not quite a 
year ago now that involved some inappropriate at least, 
maybe unlawful pressuring by the Chair and Executive 
Director of a hearing officer to change the outcome of a 
case.  The hearing officer didn't ultimately do that.  It 
turns out that that case is the case that arose out of my 
brother-in-law's experience way back at the beginning of 
the first campaign when the Republican party sorry to say, 
aided by the Herald nearly destroyed their lives.  So it 
was time." 
 
On January 2, 2015, Patrick also discussed the plaintiff's 
dismissal with the media.  As the motion judge quoted in his 
findings of fact, Patrick said, 
"You know, people do things like this when they've been, 
sometimes when they've been called out, and, you know, it's 
part of the business.  The fact is that she influenced 
inappropriately, or attempted to influence inappropriately, 
a hearing officer, and that's a matter of record.  That 
hearing did involve my brother-in-law, that is true.  We've 
never made a secret of that, but it's still inappropriate, 
and that's the reason why I asked for her resignation.  We 
can't have officials inappropriately interfering with the 
independence of hearing officers.  It undermines the whole 
process whether it involves someone I know or not." 
 
12 
 
d.  Prior proceedings.  In December of 2014, the plaintiff 
filed a complaint in the Superior Court against Patrick for 
defamation and against the Commonwealth for wrongful termination 
under the whistleblower act.  As to the latter claim, the 
plaintiff alleged that she had been dismissed because of her 
objection to Paglia's ruling that spousal rape was not 
equivalent to rape.  After the claims against Patrick were 
dismissed, see Edwards, 477 Mass. at 255, the Commonwealth filed 
a motion for summary judgment on the remaining whistleblower act 
claim; that motion was denied by a Superior Court judge.  A 
single justice of the Appeals Court subsequently allowed the 
Commonwealth's request for leave to pursue an interlocutory 
appeal from the denial under G. L. c. 231, § 118.  The single 
justice noted that "most of the issues raised in the summary 
judgment motion are legal in nature and go to important 
questions about the contours of the Governor's appointment 
authority."  We then allowed the Commonwealth's petition for 
direct appellate review. 
2.  Discussion.  We review a motion for summary judgment de 
novo.  Psychemedics Corp. v. Boston, 486 Mass. 724, 731 (2021).  
See Mass. R. Civ. P. 56, 365 Mass. 824 (1974).  "Summary 
judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party," in this case the 
Commonwealth, "is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  
13 
 
Green Mountain Ins. Co. v. Wakelin, 484 Mass. 222, 226 (2020), 
quoting Boazova v. Safety Ins. Co., 462 Mass. 346, 350 (2012). 
Here we first must consider whether, as a matter of 
statutory interpretation and constitutional principles, the 
whistleblower act may be invoked by the chair of SORB when she 
is dismissed by the Governor.  Having concluded that it may be, 
we then turn to consider whether the plaintiff has raised at 
least a genuine issue of material fact for all of the required 
elements of a claim under the act.  We conclude that she has. 
a.  The whistleblower act.  The whistleblower act was 
enacted in 1994, see St. 1993, c. 471.  The act prohibits an 
"employer" from "tak[ing] any retaliatory action against an 
employee" because the employee has engaged in certain protected 
activities.6  G. L. c. 149, § 185 (b).  These activities include 
"[o]bject[ing] to, or refus[ing] to participate in any activity, 
policy or practice which the employee reasonably believes is in 
violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant 
to law, or which the employee reasonably believes poses a risk 
 
6 We separately have recognized common-law protection for 
"whistleblowers" as part of the public policy exception to the 
rule allowing at-will employees to be dismissed for any or no 
reason.  See GTE Prods. Corp. v. Stewart, 421 Mass. 22, 26 
(1995).  The plaintiff does not raise any argument based on this 
public policy exception. 
 
14 
 
to public health, safety or the environment."7  G. L. c. 149, 
§ 185 (b) (3).  The act defines "employer" to mean only "the 
[C]ommonwealth, and its agencies or political subdivisions, 
including, but not limited to, cities, towns, counties and 
regional school districts, or any authority, commission, board 
or instrumentality thereof."8  G. L. c. 149, § 185 (a) (2).  An 
"employee" is defined as "any individual who performs services 
for and under the control and direction of an employer for wages 
or other remuneration."  G. L. c. 149, § 185 (a) (1). 
The act provides a variety of remedies for a violation:  
common-law tort remedies, temporary restraining orders or 
injunctions, reinstatement of the employee to the same or an 
equivalent position, reinstatement of benefits and seniority 
rights, treble reimbursement for lost compensation, and payment 
of reasonable costs and attorney's fees.  G. L. c. 149, 
§ 185 (d). 
 
7 Also protected are disclosing, or threatening to disclose, 
such an activity, policy, or practice to a supervisor or to a 
public body, and providing information or testimony to a public 
body conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry.  G. L. 
c. 149, § 185 (b) (1)-(2). 
 
8 The act was amended effective June 24, 2021.  See 
St. 2021, c. 8, §§ 75, 76.  The changes modify the definition of 
"employer" throughout the act to include "public utility 
employers," a change not relevant to the issues here.  All 
citations in this decision refer to the language effective at 
the times of the events at issue, as amended in 1997.  See St. 
1997, c. 19, § 90. 
15 
 
 
b.  Applicability of the act.  The Commonwealth argues 
that, as a matter of law, the whistleblower act does not apply 
to a situation in which the chair of SORB is dismissed by the 
Governor.  Although the Commonwealth challenged in its brief the 
plaintiff's status as an employee of the Commonwealth, it 
conceded at oral argument that, for purposes of the 
whistleblower act, she was employed by the Commonwealth in her 
position as chair of SORB.9  The Commonwealth argues, however, 
that the Governor was not acting as the agent of the 
Commonwealth when he dismissed the plaintiff, and that his 
actions thus were not attributable to the Commonwealth as the 
plaintiff's employer.  The Commonwealth also contends that the 
 
9 In its brief, the Commonwealth argued that the plaintiff's 
employer for purposes of the whistleblower act was not the 
Commonwealth, but, rather, the Undersecretary or possibly the 
Secretary, because the plaintiff worked under their supervision.  
That position is unsupported by the statutory language, which 
defines an "employer" as "the [C]ommonwealth, and its agencies 
or political subdivisions," and not specific individuals within 
those entities.  See G. L. c. 149, § 185 (a) (2).  Indeed, the 
whistleblower act has been interpreted to preclude bringing a 
claim against an individual supervisor.  See, e.g., Welch v. 
Ciampa, 542 F.3d 927, 943 n.7 (1st Cir. 2008) ("The 
Whistleblower statute permits only an 'employer' [as defined in 
the statute] to be sued, not individual supervisors" [citation 
omitted]).  Similarly, in other employment contexts, we have 
avoided restricting the status of an "employer" to immediate 
superiors who exercise control over an employee.  See, e.g., 
McNamara v. Honeyman, 406 Mass. 43, 48 (1989) (doctor was 
"public employee" because he was employed by public medical 
school); College-Town, Div. of Interco, Inc. v. Massachusetts 
Comm'n Against Discrimination, 400 Mass. 156, 166-167 (1987) 
(corporation was liable for sexual harassment of subordinates 
committed by its supervisors). 
16 
 
registration act and the whistleblower act are in conflict with 
respect to the Governor's appointment of the SORB chair, and 
that the registration act should prevail.  In addition, the 
Commonwealth argues that the application of the whistleblower 
act in these circumstances violates the constitutional principle 
of the separation of powers by intruding on the Governor's 
executive role. 
 
i.  Attribution of Governor's actions to the Commonwealth.  
We think it clear that the Governor was acting for and on behalf 
of the Commonwealth when he brought about the departure of the 
plaintiff from SORB.  As a general matter, the Commonwealth, 
formed by the people of Massachusetts, can act only through 
specific individuals.  See art. 5 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights ("All power residing originally in the 
people, and being derived from them, the several magistrates and 
officers of government . . . are their substitutes and 
agents . . ."); T. Hobbes, Leviathan, pt. II, c. 23 (1651) ("A 
Publique Minister, is he, that by the Soveraign . . . is 
employed in any affaires, with Authority to represent in that 
employment, the Person of the Common-wealth").  Just as 
"authority to manage the business affairs of a corporation is 
primarily vested in its board of directors," Kelly v. Citizens 
Fin. Co. of Lowell, 306 Mass. 531, 532 (1940), the Massachusetts 
Constitution makes the Governor the "supreme executive 
17 
 
magistrate," who, along with the Governor's Council, is charged 
with "ordering and directing the affairs of the [C]ommonwealth," 
Part II, c. 2, § 1, arts. 1, 4, of the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth. 
 
In appointing and removing the SORB chair, moreover, the 
Governor was not acting in a private, individual capacity; 
rather, he was exercising a power conferred on his office by the 
Legislature in the registration act.  Given that the plaintiff 
was employed by the Commonwealth, it also would be nonsensical 
to view the single person empowered to hire and fire the 
plaintiff as acting independently of the Commonwealth.  On this 
view, the Commonwealth would lack basic control over its own 
employee, an absurd result.  See Bellalta v. Zoning Bd. of 
Appeals of Brookline, 481 Mass. 372, 378 (2019) ("Ultimately, we 
must 'avoid any construction of statutory language which leads 
to an absurd result,' or that otherwise would frustrate the 
Legislature's intent" [citation omitted]).  We therefore discern 
no merit in the Commonwealth's argument that the Governor acted 
as "an independent principal . . . in exercising his appointment 
and removal power." 
 
ii.  Statutory conflicts.  The Commonwealth argues that the 
ban in the whistleblower act on a public employer dismissing an 
employee for engaging in a protected activity, see G. L. c. 149, 
§ 185 (b), is in conflict with the provision of the registration 
18 
 
act that the chair of SORB "shall be appointed by and serve at 
the pleasure of the governor,"  G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1).  In 
support of its view that the whistleblower act must yield to the 
registration act, the Commonwealth notes that the registration 
act was adopted two years after the whistleblower act, and deals 
with a more specific subject matter.  We do not agree. 
 
"In the absence of explicit legislative commands to the 
contrary, we construe statutes to harmonize and not to undercut 
each other."  Ryan v. Mary Ann Morse Healthcare Corp., 483 Mass. 
612, 620 (2019), quoting School Comm. of Newton v. Newton Sch. 
Custodians Ass'n, Local 454, SEIU, 438 Mass. 739, 751 (2003).  
In other words, we avoid doing precisely what the Commonwealth 
here urges us to do, namely, "mechanically [to] apply[] the 
concept that the more 'recent' or more 'specific' statute 
(whichever one that is) trumps the other."  Commonwealth v. 
Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 725 (2005).  Rather, we attempt to ensure 
that "the policies underlying both may be honored."  Id.  In 
this case, a reconciliation of the two provisions is readily 
achieved. 
The phrase "at the pleasure of" is "commonly understood to 
refer to employment at will."  Clough v. Mayor & Council of 
Hurlock, 445 Md. 364, 373 (2015).  The provision of the 
registration act stating that the SORB chair serves "at the 
pleasure of" the Governor means that the chair of SORB 
19 
 
essentially is analogous to an at-will employee of the Governor.  
See Regan v. Commissioner of Ins., 343 Mass. 202, 206 (1961) 
("In a removal at pleasure no cause need be given . . ." 
[citation omitted]); Bailen v. Assessors of Chelsea, 241 Mass. 
411, 414 (1922) (where "a public officer is appointed during 
pleasure, or where the power of removal is discretionary, the 
power may be exercised without notice or hearing").  Generally, 
"employment at will can be terminated for any reason or for no 
reason."  Harrison v. NetCentric Corp., 433 Mass. 465, 478 
(2001).  See King v. Driscoll, 418 Mass. 576, 583 (1994), S.C., 
424 Mass. 1 (1996).  At-will employment for public officials is 
in contrast with the situation where a subordinate officer can 
be dismissed only "for cause."  See Levy v. Acting Governor, 436 
Mass. 736, 749 (2002) (Governor could not dismiss members of 
Turnpike Authority, independent corporate body, based on "honest 
dispute over policy"); McSweeney v. Town Manager of Lexington, 
379 Mass. 794, 798 (1980) ("for cause" standard in town manager 
act allowed town manager to exercise discretion to remove 
untenured officials). 
 
Even for at-will employees, however, certain limitations 
exist on an employer's ability to terminate their employment.  
Employers, for example, may not terminate an at-will employee 
"for a reason that violates a clearly established public 
policy," which includes termination for refusal to disobey the 
20 
 
law.  Upton v. JWP Businessland, 425 Mass. 756, 757 (1997), and 
cases cited.  See DeRose v. Putnam Mgt. Co., 398 Mass. 205, 209 
(1986).  In some circumstances, these limits have been codified 
by the Legislature.  Thus, firing at-will employees out of 
discriminatory animus is prohibited by G. L. c. 151B, § 4, the 
antidiscrimination statute.  See Jackson v. Action for Boston 
Community Dev., Inc., 403 Mass. 8, 9 (1988) (listing exceptions 
to at-will employment rule). 
 
The situation is much the same with respect to the manner 
in which the SORB chair may be removed.  The policies underlying 
the registration act may be honored by reading it to give the 
Governor broad discretion in hiring and firing the chair, with 
the proviso that the chair may not be removed for an illegal 
reason, for instance because of discriminatory animus or because 
of an activity protected by the whistleblower act.  See Bowditch 
v. Banuelos, 1 Gray 220, 231–232 (1854) (power to appoint new 
trustee "at pleasure" is not "an arbitrary power," but "by 
necessary implication" is limited to appointment of person 
legally capable of executing trust). 
 
We recognize that an appointee serving at the Governor's 
pleasure in a policy-making role seeking a remedy of 
"reinstate[ment] . . . to the same position held before the 
retaliatory action," as provided under G. L. c. 149, § 185 (d), 
in some circumstances could create a conflict of the sort that 
21 
 
the Commonwealth posits here.  See Cieri v. Commissioner of 
Ins., 343 Mass. 181, 185 (1961) (veterans' tenure act did not 
allow plaintiff to sue for reinstatement as insurance 
commissioner's representative on board of appeal for motor 
vehicle liability policies and bonds).  The Governor must be 
able to "enlist aid from appropriate officials within the 
executive branch in connection with performing the duties 
conferred" on him or her.  See Teamsters Local Union No. 404 v. 
Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 434 Mass. 651, 656 (2001).  The 
question, however, is not before us, as the plaintiff has not 
sought reinstatement.  Moreover, G. L. c. 149, § 185 (d), also 
provides for reinstatement "to an equivalent position," as well 
as for other remedies.  See Peterson v. Commissioner of Revenue, 
444 Mass. 128, 138 (2005) (noting preference in favor of 
severability should part of statute prove to be invalid). 
 
iii.  Separation of powers.  The Commonwealth maintains 
that the application of the whistleblower act in this situation 
violates the constitutional principle of the separation of 
powers by intruding on the functions reserved to the executive.  
Article 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provides: 
"In the government of this [C]ommonwealth, the legislative 
department shall never exercise the executive and judicial 
powers, or either of them:  the executive shall never 
exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of 
them:  the judicial shall never exercise the legislative 
and executive powers, or either of them:  to the end it may 
be a government of laws and not of men." 
22 
 
 
The Massachusetts Constitution thus is "more explicit than the 
Federal Constitution in calling for the separation of the powers 
of the three branches of government, and we have insisted on 
scrupulous observance of its limitations."  New Bedford 
Standard-Times Publ. Co. v. Clerk of the Third Dist. Court of 
Bristol, 377 Mass. 404, 410 (1979).  Nonetheless, "an absolute 
division of the three general types of functions is neither 
possible nor always desirable," Opinion of the Justices, 365 
Mass. 639, 641 (1974), and art. 30 "does not require three 
'watertight compartments' within the government," Commonwealth 
v. Gonsalves, 432 Mass. 613, 619 (2000), quoting Opinion of the 
Justices, 372 Mass. 883, 892 (1977). 
In considering a constitutional challenge to a statute, we 
have a duty, "[w]here fairly possible," to construe the 
statutory language "so as to avoid not only the conclusion that 
it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score."  
Commonwealth v. Kelly, 484 Mass. 53, 62 (2020), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 459 Mass. 209, 214 (2011).  
See Demetropolos v. Commonwealth, 342 Mass. 658, 660 (1961) 
("where a statute may be construed as either constitutional or 
unconstitutional, a construction will be adopted which avoids an 
unconstitutional interpretation").  Bearing this duty in mind, 
we conclude that the limitation in the whistleblower act on the 
23 
 
Governor's power to remove the chair of SORB does not violate 
the constitutional principle of the separation of powers. 
 
The Legislature created the position of the chair of the 
SORB, using its constitutional authority, and provided that the 
chair "shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the 
governor."  G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1).  See Part II, c. 1, § 1, 
art. 4, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth.  At the same 
time, as the Massachusetts Constitution authorizes it to do, the 
Legislature has placed certain general constraints on the manner 
in which all public employees, including the SORB chair, may be 
removed.  See id. (Legislature has "full power and authority" to 
make "all manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, laws, 
statutes, and ordinances, directions and instructions . . . for 
the good and welfare of this [C]ommonwealth, and for the 
government and ordering thereof").  This it has done in the 
whistleblower act, just as in the antidiscrimination statute, 
G. L. c. 151B, and the State ethics statute, G. L. c. 268A. 
The plaintiff argues that her termination was in response 
to her objection to an activity, policy, or practice that she 
believed to be in "violation of a law."  See G. L. c. 149, 
§ 185 (b) (3).  We therefore need not address the second prong 
of the retaliatory action provision, which protects an 
employee's objection to an activity, policy, or practice that he 
or she reasonably believes poses "a risk to public health, 
24 
 
safety or the environment," id., although we recognize that, in 
many routine policy disagreements, any given position might be 
characterized as creating "a risk to public health, safety or 
the environment," cf. Chambers v. Department of the Interior, 
515 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (any "policy decision 
related to the allocation or distribution of law enforcement 
funding . . . could potentially be said to create a risk to 
public safety"). 
 
c.  Whether genuine issues of material fact remain in 
dispute.  Given that, as a matter of law, the whistleblower act 
applies to a person serving in the plaintiff's position who has 
been dismissed by the Governor, we turn to consider whether the 
plaintiff has demonstrated sufficient disputes of material fact 
to survive the Commonwealth's motion for summary judgment.  "A 
court must deny a motion for summary judgment if, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
there exist genuine issues of material fact . . ." (citation 
omitted).  Maxwell v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc., 460 Mass. 91, 
97 (2011).  See Godbout v. Cousens, 396 Mass. 254, 257, 261 
(1985) (nonmoving party has burden to show genuine issues of 
material fact in dispute so as to preclude moving party from 
meeting "the initial burden under rule 56 [c] of showing that 
there was no dispute as to a material fact"). 
25 
 
 
The elements of a whistleblower claim under G. L. c. 149, 
§ 185, are that (1) the plaintiff-employee engaged in an 
activity protected by the act; (2) the protected activity was 
the cause of an adverse employment action, such that the 
employment action was retaliatory; and (3) the retaliatory 
action caused the plaintiff damages.  See Cristo v. Worcester 
County Sheriff's Office, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 372, 376 (2020); 
Trychon v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 90 Mass. App. Ct. 
250, 255 (2016); Welch v. Ciampa, 542 F.3d 927, 943 (1st Cir. 
2008); Taylor v. Freetown, 479 F. Supp. 2d 227, 241 (D. Mass. 
2007).  See also Newberne v. Department of Crime Control & Pub. 
Safety, 359 N.C. 782, 788-789 (2005) (identifying "essential 
elements of comparable whistleblower provisions in various 
[S]tate and [F]ederal statutes"). 
 
i.  Protected activity.  The Commonwealth argues that the 
plaintiff did not engage in an activity protected by the 
whistleblower act because she did not "[o]bject[] to, or 
refuse[] to participate in any activity, policy or practice 
which [she] reasonably believe[d was] in violation of a law."  
See G. L. c. 149, § 185 (b) (3).  The Commonwealth maintains 
that the plaintiff did not "object" within the meaning of the 
whistleblower act because she did not complain about Paglia's 
decision to any superior, but only responded to it using her 
ordinary authority over SORB.  We disagree.  The act does not 
26 
 
specify how or to whom an objection must be expressed in order 
to be considered a protected activity under its terms; in any 
event, it also covers a "refus[al] to participate."  
Furthermore, the act enumerates separate protected activities 
concerning "[d]isclos[ure] . . . to a supervisor or to a public 
body," and "[p]rovid[ing] information to . . . any public body 
conducting an investigation, hearing or inquiry."  G. L. c. 149, 
§ 185 (b) (1), (2).  This language suggests that "objecting" to 
a policy need not necessarily involve such steps.  See Wolfe v. 
Gormally, 440 Mass. 699, 704 (2004) (constructions making part 
of statute superfluous are to be avoided).  On this record, 
viewed, as we must, in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, see Maxwell, 460 Mass. at 97, a fact finder could 
conclude that the plaintiff communicated her belief that 
Paglia's decision was legally erroneous to senior SORB staff, 
attempted to delay the issuance of the decision, and took steps 
to prevent such mistakes being made in the future. 
The Commonwealth also contends that the plaintiff did not 
object to an "activity, policy or practice" because her 
intervention related solely to a single isolated decision by 
Paglia.  We discern no reason why even a single event could not 
constitute an "activity" for purposes of the act.  See Quazi v. 
Barnstable County, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 780, 784 (2007) (employee's 
objection to superior's request that employee falsely credit 
27 
 
overdue account was protected by whistleblower act).  
Furthermore, the plaintiff has provided some evidence that 
Paglia's decision could have had precedential value for future 
SORB classification decisions, and that senior SORB staff were 
concerned about this eventuality.  Among other things, the 
plaintiff points to a series of electronic mail messages in 
which a SORB attorney expressed concern that litigants were 
"sharing decisions," and that the Paglia ruling would "provide 
counter and conflicting authority" on the issue of like 
offenses.  The plaintiff also points to the delay in issuing 
Paglia's decision, and the discussions among senior SORB staff 
about the possibility of releasing a very brief written decision 
simply affirming the determination at the hearing that Sigh was 
exempt from registration, without offering any specific 
analysis.  A trier of fact thus could find that the plaintiff's 
objection to Paglia's decision was an objection to a "policy" 
within the meaning of the act.  In addition, whether the 
plaintiff reasonably believed that Paglia's decision was illegal 
"is a genuine issue of material fact to be resolved by the trier 
of fact."  See Mailloux v. Littleton, 473 F. Supp. 2d 177, 185 
(D. Mass. 2007). 
 
ii.  Retaliatory action.  The whistleblower act defines a 
"retaliatory action" as "the discharge, suspension or demotion 
of an employee, or other adverse employment action taken against 
28 
 
an employee in the terms and conditions of employment."  G. L. 
c. 149, § 185 (a) (5).  The Commonwealth argues that no such 
action took place because the plaintiff voluntarily resigned 
from her position.  This argument is unavailing. 
 
There are abundant indications in the record that the 
plaintiff was fired and that her letter of resignation was 
merely an attempt to save face professionally after the 
termination had happened.  Before the letter was submitted, 
according to several depositions, the plaintiff had been told 
that she was relieved of her position effective immediately and 
that her supervisor had been sent to convey the news to SORB 
staff.  She also was told that her replacement had been 
selected, but the person's name could not be revealed because 
the individual's background was in the process of being vetted.  
She additionally was told that, although there had been no 
wrongdoing, Patrick was choosing to "go in another direction."  
Tellingly, Patrick later publicly characterized the plaintiff's 
departure as involuntary; he commented to news media that her 
actions had been "inappropriate" and that he had "asked for her 
resignation." 
 
The facts of this case are clearly distinguishable from 
those in the other cases involving voluntary resignations upon 
which the Commonwealth relies.  Viewed in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, this was not a case where a mere 
29 
 
"threat of discharge or discipline" meant that she was 
confronted with a "difficult choice" about whether to resign.  
See Spencer v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 479 Mass. 210, 215, 222 
(2018) (no cause of action for plaintiff-employee because 
"termination of his service" in civil service law did not cover 
voluntary resignation); Monahan v. Romney, 625 F.3d 42, 47 (1st 
Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 976 (2011) (no deprivation of 
property interest protected by due process where plaintiff was 
offered "choice between resignation and termination" and "could 
have requested more time or demanded to speak to the Governor to 
argue against" dismissal). 
Furthermore, the plaintiffs' claims in those cases did not 
involve the whistleblower act.  Under the act, an involuntary 
dismissal is not required to state a claim; the definition of 
"retaliatory action" includes the broad category "other adverse 
employment action."  See G. L. c. 149, § 185 (a) (5).  Even if 
the plaintiff had been offered a genuine choice between 
resignation and involuntary termination, that would not 
necessarily foreclose a showing that she had suffered an 
"adverse employment action."  See Yee v. Massachusetts State 
Police, 481 Mass. 290, 296 (2019) ("adverse employment action" 
for purposes of antidiscrimination statute includes "effects on 
working terms, conditions, or privileges" that "have materially 
disadvantaged an employee" [citation omitted]). 
30 
 
 
iii.  Causation.  The whistleblower act prohibits "tak[ing] 
any retaliatory action against an employee because the employee" 
engages in a protected activity (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 149, 
§ 185 (b).  We consistently have construed similar language in 
the antidiscrimination statute, G. L. c. 151B, § 4, to require a 
plaintiff to show that a discriminatory animus was a 
"determinative" or "but for" cause of an adverse employment 
action, even if it was not "the only cause."  Lipchitz v. 
Raytheon Co., 434 Mass. 493, 504–505, 506 n.19 (2001).  See Psy-
Ed Corp. v. Klein, 459 Mass. 697, 707 (2011) (under 
antidiscrimination statute, "employer's desire to retaliate 
against the employee must be shown to be a determinative factor 
in its decision to take adverse action"); Smith v. Winter Place 
LLC, 447 Mass. 363, 364 n.4 (2006) (claim for retaliation may 
succeed where underlying claim for discrimination would fail, 
"so long as the [employee] can prove that he [or she] reasonably 
and in good faith believed the [employer] was engaged in 
wrongful discrimination," and that employer's "desire to 
retaliate against" employee was determinative factor in decision 
to terminate employment [quotation and citation omitted]).  See, 
e.g., Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 432 
Mass. 107, 121 (2000), quoting Tate v. Department of Mental 
Health, 419 Mass. 356, 364 (1995) (plaintiff must prove that 
31 
 
employer's desire to retaliate against employee was "a 
determinative factor" in its decision to terminate employment). 
 
In interpreting the whistleblower act, some decisions of 
the Appeals Court have applied this standard of "determinative 
cause."  See, e.g., Orfaly v. Office of Community Corrections, 
83 Mass. App. Ct. 1120 (2013) (describing "determinative" cause 
in whistleblower claims as "the decisive factor, the crucial 
factor, the deciding factor, the conclusive factor").  At the 
same time, other Appeals Court decisions, and numerous decisions 
by Federal District Court judges, deciding claims under the 
Massachusetts whistleblower act, have inquired whether the 
protected activity "played a substantial or motivating part in 
the retaliatory action," based upon the Federal standard used in 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions.  See, e.g., Cristo, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 376, quoting Trychon, 90 Mass. App. Ct. at 255.  See also Mt. 
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 
286–287 (1977). 
 
The Appeals Court has discussed these inconsistent 
standards in some detail, albeit in circumstances where there 
was no need to resolve the issue: 
"In analyzing § 185 claims, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit applies the causation 
standard utilized in retaliation and discrimination cases 
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  See [Mt. Healthy City Sch. 
Dist. Bd. of Educ., 429 U.S. at 286–287]; Pierce v. Cotuit 
Fire Dist., 741 F.3d 295, 301–302, 303 (1st Cir. 2014).  
See also Harris v. Trustees of State Colleges, 405 Mass. 
32 
 
515, 522–523 (1989).  Here, the motion judge applied the 
determinative cause standard.  See [Lipchitz, 434 Mass. at 
504–506]. Where the issue is not raised, we have no 
occasion to address the conflict in this appeal." 
 
Trychon, 90 Mass. App. Ct. at 255 n.10.  See, e.g., Pierce, 741 
F.3d at 303.  We clarify here that the determinative cause 
standard applicable in employment discrimination cases should be 
used in claims for retaliation brought under the whistleblower 
act. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that there is no evidence that 
Patrick was aware of the Sigh/Paglia matter; that the six-year 
gap between the issuance of Paglia's decision and the 
plaintiff's dismissal was too great to infer a connection 
between the two; and that Patrick had unrelated, proper reasons 
for dismissing the plaintiff. 
 
Contrary to the Commonwealth's implication, the 
whistleblower act does not contain any requirement that the 
retaliating party be aware of the protected activity at the time 
that the activity occurred, so long as the employer knew of the 
protected activity before undertaking the retaliatory action.  
The record before us, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, indicates that Patrick was aware of her response to 
Paglia's decision in Sigh's case.  According to Patrick's 
deposition and his statements to news media, he learned of the 
plaintiff's involvement in the matter in late 2013, when 
33 
 
Paglia's lawsuit against the Commonwealth was about to be 
settled, and he fired the plaintiff in September 2014, shortly 
after the settlement was made in July of 2014, more than six 
years after the underlying events. 
 
When "adverse action is taken against a satisfactorily 
performing employee in the immediate aftermath of the employer's 
becoming aware of the employee's protected activity, an 
inference of causation is permissible."  Mole v. University of 
Mass., 442 Mass. 582, 592 (2004).  Moreover, the record suggests 
more than mere temporal proximity of the discovery of the 
activity to the alleged retaliation; Patrick explained in his 
statements to news media that the Sigh/Paglia matter, which 
involved his brother-in-law, was "the final straw" in his 
concerns about the environment at SORB, and "the reason why [he] 
asked for [the plaintiff's] resignation." 
In his statements to the media, Patrick also did reference 
several other, potentially nonretaliatory, reasons for 
dismissing the plaintiff from her position as chair of SORB.  
Although a "determinative cause" of an adverse employment 
decision is a "but for" cause, it need not be "the only cause."  
See Lipchitz, 434 Mass. at 506 n.19.  Whether, but for the 
protected activity, Patrick would have dismissed the plaintiff 
is a genuine question of material fact that must be resolved by 
a fact finder.  See Flesner, 410 Mass. at 809 ("In cases where 
34 
 
motive, intent, or other state of mind questions are at issue, 
summary judgment is often inappropriate"). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion for 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  summary judgment affirmed.