Case Title: Village of Slinger v. Polk Properties, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017AP002244

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2021-04-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
2021 WI 29 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP2244 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Village of Slinger, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Polk Properties, LLC and Donald J. Thoma, 
          Defendants-Third-Party  
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Russell Brandt, Rick Gundrum, Jeff Behrend, Lee  
Fredericks, John Dukelow, Richard Kohl, Dean 
Otte, Jessi Balcom and ABC Insurance Company, 
          Third-Party Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 388 Wis. 2d 475,934 N.W. 2d 475 
(2019 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 1, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 10, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Washington   
 
JUDGE: 
Sandy A. Williams   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, 
and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  ZIEGLER, J., filed a concurring 
opinion. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
HAGEDORN, J., did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendants-third-party-plaintiffs-appellants-
petitioners, there were briefs filed by Colleen W. Jones, Terry 
J. Booth, and Rogahn Jones LLC, Waukesha. There was an oral 
argument by Terry J. Booth. 
 
 
 
2 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by H. 
Stanley Riffle and Municipal Law & Litigation Group, S.C., 
Waukesha. There was an oral argument by H. Stanley Riffle. 
 
 
2021 WI 29 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP2244 
(L.C. No. 
2011CV1224) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Village of Slinger, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Polk Properties, LLC and Donald J. Thoma, 
 
          Defendants-Third-Party  
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Russell Brandt, Rick Gundrum, Jeff Behrend, Lee  
Fredericks, John Dukelow, Richard Kohl, Dean 
Otte, Jessi Balcom and ABC Insurance Company, 
 
          Third-Party Defendants. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 1, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, 
and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. ZIEGLER, J., filed a concurring 
opinion. 
 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J., did not participate. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded to the circuit court. 
 
No. 
2017AP2244   
 
2 
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   Polk Properties, LLC and 
its sole member, Donald J. Thoma (collectively, "Polk"1), seek 
review of the court of appeals decision, which affirmed the 
circuit court's order requiring Polk to pay forfeitures for 
zoning violations, damages for the Village of Slinger's lost 
property tax revenue, and attorney's fees.2  Whether these 
forfeitures, damages, and fees can be sustained depends upon 
whether Polk abandoned the legal nonconforming use of the 
property after its zoning classification was changed from 
agricultural to residential.  Applying Wisconsin's two-part test 
for abandonment of a nonconforming use set forth in State ex 
rel. Schaetz v. Manders and State ex rel. Morehouse v. Hunt,3 we 
conclude that Polk did not abandon the lawful nonconforming use 
because it continued to use the property in the same manner in 
which it had been used before the zoning change.  It is 
undisputed that the farmer who farmed the land before Polk 
acquired it continued to cut and remove vegetation on the 
property after Polk purchased it and after the rezoning.  
Because the agricultural use continued without cessation, Polk 
                                                 
1 We refer to Polk Properties and Thoma collectively as 
"Polk" except when necessary to refer to them separately. 
2 The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment granted 
by the Honorable Sandy A. Williams, Washington County Circuit 
Court.  See Village of Slinger v. Polk Props., LLC, No. 
2017AP2244, unpublished slip op., (Wis. Ct. App. July 10, 2019). 
3 State ex rel. Schaetz v. Manders, 206 Wis. 121, 238 N.W. 
835 (1931); State ex rel. Morehouse v. Hunt, 235 Wis. 358, 291 
N.W. 745 (1940). 
No. 
2017AP2244   
 
3 
 
remained 
in 
compliance 
with 
the 
applicable 
zoning 
code 
provisions and Polk's use of the property constituted a lawful 
nonconforming 
use 
for 
which 
it 
cannot 
be 
penalized.  
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
vacate the circuit court's order imposing forfeitures, its 
monetary judgment for real estate taxes, its order authorizing 
special assessments, special charges, and fees to be levied 
against Polk, and its order enjoining Polk from using the 
property for agricultural purposes.  We remand to the circuit 
court for further proceedings consistent with this decision. 
I   
¶2 
This case arises out of a long-term legal conflict 
between the Village of Slinger and Polk, including an earlier 
appearance in this court.  See Thoma v. Village of Slinger, 2018 
WI 45, 381 Wis. 2d 311, 912 N.W.2d 56.4  We recite only the 
background necessary in order to resolve the legal issue 
presented. 
¶3 
Polk's property comprises 82 acres of rural land 
located in the Village of Slinger, which the Melius family 
                                                 
4 Thoma v. Village of Slinger, 2018 WI 45, 381 Wis. 2d 311, 
912 
N.W.2d 56, 
involved 
the 
consolidation 
of 
two 
cases, 
resulting in a decision of this court that Polk had failed to 
present enough evidence to the Village of Slinger Board of 
Review sufficient to overturn the 2014 tax assessment, which had 
been based on a change in the classification of the property 
from "agricultural use" to "residential use."  Id., ¶¶2, 7.   
No. 
2017AP2244   
 
4 
 
operated as a farm before Polk purchased the parcel in 2004.5  
Polk worked with the Village of Slinger on his proposed plan to 
convert the farmland to a residential subdivision known as 
Pleasant Farm Estates, which would consist of three phases of 
development over the course of several years.  In February 2007, 
the Village of Slinger approved Polk's planned residential 
subdivision development.  Installation of the infrastructure for 
the development began in June 2007 and was completed in August 
2008.  Two of the lots in phase one of the project were sold and 
residential homes were constructed on those lots.  Sales of 
additional lots stalled, however, due to the 2008 economic 
recession and the collapse of the real estate market. 
¶4 
Throughout the entire development project, Ronald 
Melius continued to farm the property by cutting and removing 
                                                 
5 The date of purchase is unclear from the record.  There 
are references to Polk having purchased the Melius farm in 2004 
or 2005.  The court of appeals said "Polk purchased the property 
in 2006 in order to develop the farmland into a residential 
subdivision."  Village of Slinger v. Polk Props., LLC, No. 
2017AP2244, unpublished slip op., ¶2 (Wis. Ct. App. July 10, 
2019).  On November 16, 2005, Polk petitioned the Village of 
Slinger to rezone the property from an A-1 Agricultural zone to 
an R-2 Residential zone, and the Village granted the request on 
December 19, 2005.  The exact date of Polk's purchase of the 
Melius farm is immaterial to our resolution of the legal issue 
presented. 
No. 
2017AP2244   
 
5 
 
vegetation from the land.6  This continuous farming formed the 
basis for the Village of Slinger's lawsuit against Polk, in 
which the Village of Slinger sought an injunction from the 
circuit court ordering Polk to stop the agricultural use of the 
property.  Melius' continued farming of the property is the 
particular conduct that led the circuit court to conclude Polk 
violated the residential zoning ordinance as well as the circuit 
court's order, for which that court found Polk in contempt.  
After many motions and multiple hearings, the circuit court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the Village of Slinger and 
ordered Polk to pay the Village of Slinger "daily forfeitures" 
because it "used or permitted use of the subject property for 
agricultural purposes continuously from before October 7, 2009, 
through August 21, 2017."  Ultimately, the circuit court ordered 
Polk Properties, LLC to pay to the Village of Slinger $28,760, 
representing daily zoning violation forfeitures, as well as 
$48,953.26 in additional real estate taxes covering tax years 
2009 to 2013.  The circuit court additionally ordered Thoma to 
                                                 
6 A precise definition of "farming" is not required for us 
to resolve the legal issue presented.  Polk contends that 
Melius' farming consisted of cutting and removing the grasses 
that were growing on the property.  The Village of Slinger 
contends that the "cutting and removing" constituted improper 
agricultural use of the property in violation of the residential 
zoning code.  No one disputes that the property was being used 
for such farming continuously——both before Polk purchased the 
property and after the property's zoning classification was 
changed from agricultural to residential.  It is therefore not 
necessary for this court to specifically define "farming," or 
"agricultural use" in the context of zoning classification 
versus "agricultural use" for tax assessment purposes. 
No. 
2017AP2244   
 
6 
 
pay to the Village of Slinger $28,760, representing daily zoning 
violation forfeitures as well as $12,017 for additional real 
estate taxes covering tax years 2009 to 2013. 
¶5 
Polk appealed the circuit court's orders and the court 
of appeals affirmed.  Relying on an opinion from the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court, Duffy v. Milder, 896 A.2d 27 (R.I. 2006), 
the court of appeals decided that Polk had abandoned its legal 
nonconforming use.  Village of Slinger v. Polk Props., LLC, No. 
2017AP2244, unpublished slip op., ¶20 (Wis. Ct. App. July 10, 
2019) (citing Duffy, 896 A.2d at 38-39).  Polk petitioned this 
court for review, which we granted. 
II   
¶6 
We review the grant of summary judgment against Polk 
de novo.  CED Props., LLC v. City of Oshkosh, 2018 WI 24, ¶17, 
380 Wis. 2d 399, 909 N.W.2d 136 ("We independently review a 
grant of summary judgment using the same methodology of the 
circuit court and the court of appeals." (quoted source 
omitted)).  Resolution of this dispute requires us to interpret 
and apply the Village of Slinger's ordinances, an issue of law 
we review de novo.  Town of Rhine v. Bizzell, 2008 WI 76, ¶13, 
311 
Wis. 2d 1, 
751 
N.W.2d 780 
("The 
interpretation 
and 
application of an ordinance to an undisputed set of facts is a 
question of law, which this court decides de novo.") (quoted 
source omitted). 
III   
¶7 
The issue in this case is whether Polk abandoned the 
nonconforming 
use 
of 
its 
property 
after 
the 
zoning 
No. 
2017AP2244   
 
7 
 
classification was changed from agricultural to residential use.  
Polk maintains that the cutting and removing of the vegetation 
on the property was not abandoned after purchase, but in fact 
occurred continuously as part of the maintenance of the 
property.  The Village of Slinger agrees that the farming 
occurred continuously, but argues that specific actions Polk 
took to convert the property into a residential subdivision 
constituted abandonment.  Specifically, the Village of Slinger 
pinpoints Polk's request for the zoning change, the Subdivision 
Development 
Agreement 
for 
Pleasant 
Farm 
Estates 
("the 
Development 
Agreement"), 
which 
limited 
the 
property 
to 
residential use,7 and the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions 
and Restrictions of Pleasant Farm Estates ("the Declaration") 
with residential restrictions executed and recorded by Polk.8   
                                                 
7 It is undisputed that the Development Agreement was 
entered into to develop the property into a residential 
subdivision.  A specific residential limitation does not exist 
in the portion of the 2007 Development Agreement in the record.  
The 
2008 
Amended 
Development 
Agreement, 
however, 
does 
specifically state that Polk's subdivision "was zoned for only 
single-family use." 
8 Article V of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and 
Restrictions of Pleasant Farm Estates ("the Declaration") 
executed and recorded by Polk states, in relevant part, that 
"[e]ach Lot shall be occupied and used only for single family 
residential purposes and for no other purpose.  No business, 
commercial or individual activity (except as allowed under 
applicable zoning codes) shall be conducted on any lot . . . ."  
However, Article X of the Declaration reserves the right of Polk 
Properties, LLC to "use the Outlots, and any unsold Lots in any 
manner as may facilitate the sale of Lots including, but not 
limited to, maintaining a sales and/or rental office or offices, 
models and signs and/or showing the Lots." 
No. 
2017AP2244   
 
8 
 
¶8 
The court of appeals agreed that these specific acts 
by Polk constituted legal abandonment regardless of any farming 
still taking place on the property.  Rather than relying on 
Wisconsin law, however, the court of appeals rested its 
determination on a single foreign case at odds with our own 
jurisprudence. 
 
Wisconsin 
law 
requires 
two 
elements 
for 
abandonment of a legal nonconforming use:  (1) actual cessation 
of the nonconforming use and (2) an intent to abandon the 
nonconforming use.  See Schaetz, 206 Wis. at 124; Morehouse, 235 
Wis. at 369-70.  Although Polk's specific acts may signify an 
intent to abandon the nonconforming use, the undisputed fact 
that Polk continued farming on the property confirms there was 
no actual cessation of the nonconforming use.  Wisconsin's two-
pronged abandonment test requires satisfaction of both factors; 
accordingly, the court of appeals erred in concluding Polk 
abandoned the nonconforming use, and we reverse its decision.9 
                                                 
9 Relying on State ex rel. Peterson v. Burt, 42 Wis. 2d 284, 
166 N.W.2d 207 (1969), Justice Annette Ziegler's concurrence 
recasts this case as a statutory claim neither party raised nor 
asked us to resolve.  In Peterson, "[t]he sole issue presented" 
was "as follows: Does sec. 28.05(3)(f) 1, Madison General 
Ordinances, providing for relinquishment of nonconforming use if 
such use is discontinued for a continuous period of one year, 
eliminate the necessity of proving intent to abandon?"  In this 
case, there is no dispute that Polk continued the nonconforming 
agricultural use of the property, which prompted the Village of 
Slinger to (successfully) seek an injunction against Polk in 
order to stop its agricultural use and for which the Village of 
Slinger received an award of forfeitures and damages.  Not 
surprisingly, neither party in this case asked the court to 
apply the 12-month time period for discontinuance set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7) and in Village of Slinger Zoning Ordinance 
§ 8.01 because both parties agree that Polk continued its 
agricultural activity on the property, rendering the statutory 
No. 
2017AP2244   
 
9 
 
¶9 
Generally, when the zoning restrictions applicable to 
a property are changed, property owners may continue to use 
their property in a manner that was allowed under the prior 
zoning ordinance.  See Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(h) (2017-18).10  
Although prohibited under the newly applicable zoning ordinance, 
the existing use becomes a lawful nonconforming use.  "Land use 
qualifies as 'nonconforming' if there is an active and actual 
use of the land and buildings which existed prior to the 
commencement of the zoning ordinance and which has continued in 
the same or a related use until the present."  Waukesha Cnty. v. 
                                                                                                                                                             
timeframe irrelevant. 
The crux of the Village of Slinger's argument rested on its 
contention that Polk's nonconforming use was not legal.  Unlike 
Peterson, in this case Slinger argued, and the court of appeals 
agreed, that Polk abandoned its unlawful agricultural use not by 
discontinuing 
it, 
but 
by 
seeking 
the 
zoning 
change 
to 
residential; entering a Developer's Agreement to convert the 
property to residential; and recording a Declaration restricting 
the property to residential use only.  Village of Slinger v. 
Polk Props., LLC, No. 2017AP2244, unpublished slip op., ¶¶20-22 
(Wis. Ct. App. July 10, 2019).  This court was asked to 
determine whether such actions constitute abandonment of the 
nonconforming 
use, 
notwithstanding 
its 
uninterrupted 
continuance.  Justice Ziegler erroneously contends the two-part 
test for abandonment of a nonconforming use was "abrogated" 80 
years ago.  Concurrence, ¶29.  To the contrary, both Schaetz and 
Morehouse, which set forth the test, remain good law and have 
not been "abrogated," "set aside," or "abandoned."  Because 
farming undisputedly occurred continuously on Polk's property 
before, during, and after the rezoning, the 12-month time period 
for discontinuance set forth in Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7) and in 
Village of Slinger Zoning Ordinance § 8.01 is simply irrelevant 
to the analysis.  Justice Ziegler's concurrence answers a 
question the parties did not pose. 
10 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2017AP2244   
 
10 
 
Seitz, 140 Wis. 2d 111, 115, 409 N.W.2d 403 (Ct. App. 1987) 
(citation omitted).  Section 62.23(7)(h) provides:   
Nonconforming uses.  The continued lawful use of a 
building, premises, structure, or fixture existing at 
the time of the adoption or amendment of a zoning 
ordinance may not be prohibited although the use does 
not conform with the provisions of the ordinance.  The 
nonconforming use may not be extended . . . . 
(Emphasis added.)  The Village of Slinger's Zoning Ordinance 
adopts this general rule.  Ordinance § 8.01 provides: 
The lawful nonconforming use of a structure, land or 
water, existing at the time of the adoption or 
amendment of this ordinance may be continued, although 
the use does not conform with the provisions of this 
ordinance, however; A. Only that portion of the land 
or water in actual use may be so continued and the 
structure 
may 
not 
be 
extended, 
enlarged, 
reconstructed, substituted, moved, or structurally 
altered except when required to do so by law or order 
or so as to comply with the provisions of this 
ordinance. 
(Emphasis added.)  If the property owner abandons the lawful 
nonconforming use after the property's zoning classification has 
changed, then the property may be used only in a manner 
consistent with its current zoning classification.  Similarly, 
if 
the 
property 
owner 
changes 
or 
enlarges 
the 
prior 
nonconforming use, he is thereafter bound by the current zoning 
restrictions.  Waukesha Cnty. v. Pewaukee Marina, Inc., 187 
Wis. 2d 18, 24, 522 N.W.2d 536 (Ct. App. 1994); Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.23(7)(h) ("If the nonconforming use is discontinued for a 
period of 12 months, any future use of the building, premises, 
structure, or fixture shall conform to the ordinance."). 
No. 
2017AP2244   
 
11 
 
¶10 As set forth by this court almost a century ago, 
Wisconsin applies a two-part test to determine whether a 
property owner has abandoned the prior use:  (1) actual 
cessation of the nonconforming use, which requires more than 
just a "mere suspension" of the use; and (2) an intent to 
abandon the nonconforming use.  See Schaetz, 206 Wis. at 124; 
Morehouse, 235 Wis. at 373.  In State ex rel. Schaetz v. 
Manders, 206 Wis. 121, 238 N.W. 835 (1931), this court held 
that, in the context of new zoning ordinances, "abandonment" of 
a nonconforming use requires the owner to "voluntar[ily], 
affirmative[ly], 
[and] 
complete[ly] 
act" 
to 
cease 
the 
nonconforming use.  206 Wis. at 124. 
¶11 In Schaetz, a dairy farm went into receivership 
following a downturn in the economy and stopped conducting dairy 
manufacturing on the premises.  Id. at 122.  Around this time, 
the City of Green Bay passed a local ordinance prohibiting the 
use of this land for dairy purposes, with the exception of legal 
nonconforming uses.  Id. at 123.  Following the enactment of 
this ordinance, a local buyer acquired the property and 
attempted to restart dairy manufacturing on the land.  Id. at 
122-23.  The Schaetz court held that the plaintiff could return 
to using the property as a dairy, despite the local ordinance, 
because 
the 
former 
owner 
only 
temporarily 
suspended 
the 
nonconforming use and never fully ceased operating a dairy.  Id. 
at 124.  As the court explained, "mere suspension" of a 
nonconforming use does not constitute abandonment.  See id. 
No. 
2017AP2244   
 
12 
 
¶12 In State ex rel. Morehouse v. Hunt, 235 Wis. 358, 291 
N.W. 745 (1940), this court reiterated its holding in Schaetz.  
Specifically, the Morehouse court stated that "mere cessation of 
a non-conforming use under the terms of a zoning ordinance does 
not destroy the right to continue it or prevent resumption of 
it."  Id. at 369-70.  The first element of abandonment is clear:  
in order to abandon a nonconforming use, the property owner must 
actually cease engaging in the nonconforming use, and a "mere 
suspension" of that use does not signify abandonment.  The 
Morehouse 
court 
also 
established 
a 
second 
element 
of 
abandonment:  the property owner must actually intend to abandon 
the nonconforming use. 
¶13 In Morehouse, a property owner used his home as a 
fraternity 
house 
and 
continued 
to 
do 
so 
as 
a 
lawful 
nonconforming use after a zoning ordinance prohibited it.  Id. 
at 361.  After the owner sold the property, the new owner began 
renting rooms on the property for residential purposes——in 
compliance with the zoning ordinance.  Id. at 362.  This was the 
only commercially viable use for the property at the time.  
Because demand for leasing the property as a fraternity house 
collapsed during the Great Depression, "there was no present 
prospect of sale for use as a fraternity house, and no 
opportunity or prospect of opportunity to lease it for that 
purpose."  Id. at 363-64.  However, the owner "constantly 
contemplated eventual disposition to a fraternity if opportunity 
offered."  Id. at 364. 
No. 
2017AP2244   
 
13 
 
¶14 When the owner eventually received an offer to 
purchase from a college fraternity, it was conditioned on 
procurement of permission for this particular use under the 
zoning ordinance.  Id.  The issue before the Board of Zoning 
Appeals and eventually the Morehouse court was whether or not 
the owner had abandoned the nonconforming use when he leased the 
property to a family for one year.  Id. at 370.  The Morehouse 
court upheld the Board's and the lower court's conclusion that 
the owner "did not intend to abandon the right of use of 
. . . [the] fraternity house" and that the "use of it for a 
residence was intended to be only temporary until opportunity 
should arise to sell it for that purpose [as a fraternity 
house]."  Id. at 367 (emphasis added).  Because the owner never 
intended to abandon using the property as a fraternity house, he 
was entitled to engage in the nonconforming use despite a zoning 
ordinance prohibiting that use.  Id. at 370.11 
¶15 Instead of simply applying Wisconsin law, the court of 
appeals relied entirely on the Duffy v. Milder case from Rhode 
                                                 
11 This two-factor analysis——an actual cessation of the 
nonconforming use coupled with an intent to do so——prevails in 
jurisdictions around the country.  The Indiana Supreme Court has 
held that "[a]bandonment requires the concurrence of an intent 
to abandon and a voluntary act or failure to act signifying 
abandonment."  Stuckman v. Kosciusko Cnty. Bd. of Zoning 
Appeals, 506 N.E.2d 1079, 1082 (Ind. 1987).  Likewise, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court held that "abandonment" requires 
"'the concurrence of two factors:  (1) the intent to abandon and 
(2) voluntary conduct, whether affirmative or negative, which 
carries the implication of abandonment.'"  Derby Ref. Co. v. 
City of Chelsea, 555 N.E.2d 534, 538 (Mass. 1990) (quoted source 
omitted). 
No. 
2017AP2244   
 
14 
 
Island.  896 A.2d 27 (R.I. 2006).  In that case, the property 
was originally a horse farm before being sold to developers, the 
Malms, who intended to convert it into residential condominiums.  
Id. at 29-30.  The Malms petitioned the town to rezone the 
property from farming to residential.  Id. at 29.  Their 
rezoning request was granted, but the town required an easement 
area over a 2.7 acre portion of the land, to remain in 
conservation and for recreational use by the condominium owners.  
Id.  After the condominium project was completed, the Malms sold 
a single-family residence to the Milders, who were given 
assurances they could "keep horses" on the property.  Id. at 30.  
The Malms secured a zoning certificate, which stated "the 
keeping of horses on this lot is currently considered a lawfully 
nonconforming and permitted use and shall be allowed to continue 
until such time as an overt action for discontinuation is 
conducted by the property owner."  Id.  Thereafter, the Milders 
asked the town for "permission to install an internal grazing 
management system as well as a riding area, but the Town Council 
unanimously denied their request."  Id. at 30-31.  Despite this 
denial, the Milders "grazed approximately sixteen animals, 
including llamas, alpacas, goats, and horses" and "erected 
internal fences across the open space easement area."  Id. at 
31.  The Milders' actions led to complaints from neighbors as 
well as the condominium association, which sought a court order 
to enjoin the Milders from using horses on the property and from 
interfering with others' "access to the open space easement 
area."  Id. at 32.  The neighbors also alleged that "the 
No. 
2017AP2244   
 
15 
 
Milders' conduct violated the express language of the open space 
easement" and "constituted a nuisance."  Id. at 31-32. 
¶16 Although the Rhode Island Supreme Court recognized 
that the Malms were entitled to use the property as a horse farm 
when they purchased it, that court concluded that "the Malms 
abandoned this privilege when they chose to develop their 
property."  Id. at 38.  Applying the applicable ordinance 
language defining abandonment of a non-conforming use as "either 
an owners' (or legal tenant if applicable) overt act or a 
failure to act which demonstrates that there is neither a claim 
nor any interest in continuing the nonconforming use" the court 
concluded that a successful "petition to rezone a lot to which a 
nonconforming use is attached is clearly such an overt act."  
Id.  The Duffy court explained that "[t]his overt act manifested 
their intent to abandon the use of their property as a horse 
farm."  Id. at 39.  As a result, the Duffy court decided that 
the Milders "did not acquire any nonconforming use to keep 
horses on the property because any such rights had been 
extinguished before the property was conveyed to them."  Id. 
¶17 Although Duffy also involved a zoning change requested 
by a property owner to develop a former farm into a condominium 
project, the governing ordinance in Duffy differs substantially 
from the Village of Slinger's nonconforming use ordinance, as 
well as Wisconsin law.  While an intent to abandon may suffice 
to establish abandonment under Rhode Island law (or at least 
under the ordinances of the Town of East Greenwich), Wisconsin 
No. 
2017AP2244   
 
16 
 
law requires something more:  the actual cessation of the 
nonconforming use, rendering Duffy unpersuasive and inapposite. 
¶18 There is no dispute that the farming on Polk's 
property was a lawful use of the property under the agricultural 
zoning in place before the property was rezoned to residential 
use.  To determine whether that legal nonconforming use was 
abandoned by Polk, rendering any farming of the property in 
violation of the zoning ordinance, requires the application of 
Wisconsin's two-part abandonment test.  We therefore consider 
whether there was an actual cessation of the farming activity on 
Polk's property, and if so, whether Polk demonstrated an intent 
to abandon farming on the property. 
¶19 In order to establish a zoning violation, the property 
owner must have actually stopped the nonconforming use of the 
property.  See Schaetz, 206 Wis. at 124 (the owner must 
voluntarily, 
affirmatively, 
and 
completely 
stop 
the 
nonconforming use).  In this case, complete cessation never 
happened, at least until the circuit court imposed sanctions 
against Polk following the hearing on September 5, 2017.  No one 
disputes that Melius continuously farmed the property before the 
rezoning, during the entire time Polk attempted to develop this 
property, and after the rezoning (until September 2017).  The 
Village of Slinger has repeatedly complained about Polk's 
ongoing agricultural use of the property, taking successive 
legal steps in an attempt to force Polk to stop all farming 
activities on the property. 
No. 
2017AP2244   
 
17 
 
¶20 The Village of Slinger concedes that Polk did not 
actually stop farming, but contends that complete cessation of 
farming activity was not required to satisfy the cessation 
element of the abandonment test.  The Village of Slinger 
believes that Polk abandoned the nonconforming use because Polk 
sought and obtained the rezoning, entered into the Development 
Agreement restricting the property to residential use, and 
recorded the Declaration, which explicitly stated that Polk 
"intends to develop a subdivision for residences."  The Village 
of 
Slinger 
further 
argues 
that 
installing 
residential 
infrastructure and building a couple of homes on the property 
constituted a cessation of agricultural use even if farming 
continued on the remaining parts of the property.  We disagree.  
While each of these actions may evidence Polk's intent to stop 
farming the property, none of them establish actual cessation of 
farming. 
¶21 Requesting a zoning change from agricultural to 
residential in order to convert farmland into a residential 
subdivision undoubtedly demonstrates the property owner's intent 
to stop farming the property.  Entering into the Development 
Agreement and recording the Declaration for a residential 
subdivision also expressed Polk's intent to stop farming the 
property.  Further, installing roads and infrastructure for 
utilities, and platting the prior farmland into individual lots 
to be sold to people who want to build their individual 
residences upon them, all manifest an intent to stop farming the 
property.  The record irrefutably conveys Polk's intent to 
No. 
2017AP2244   
 
18 
 
convert the land from agricultural use into a residential 
subdivision.  These acts, however, do not equate to actual 
cessation of the lawful nonconforming use. 
¶22 For nearly a century, Wisconsin has required actual 
cessation of a legal nonconforming use together with an intent 
to stop it as prerequisites to abandonment.  We have even 
rejected a "mere suspension" of the nonconforming use in 
considering whether the actual cessation element had been met.  
See Schaetz, 206 Wis. at 124.  The law requires actual cessation 
in order to conclude that a property owner has abandoned the 
legal nonconforming use.  The record in this case overwhelmingly 
demonstrates that Polk did not actually stop farming this 
property, 
despite 
the 
Village 
of 
Slinger's 
repeated 
and 
persistent attempts to end this use. 
¶23 The Village of Slinger suggests that cessation of 
farming on part of the property constitutes legal cessation of 
that use on the entire property.  A portion of Polk's property 
is no longer being farmed because homes have been constructed on 
the few lots that were sold, and farming has in fact ceased on 
the land that now consists of roadways.  The Village of Slinger 
points to this partial cessation as proof that Polk "modified, 
extended 
and 
enlarged" 
its 
use, 
thereby 
satisfying 
the 
abandonment test.  The Village of Slinger relies on Waukesha 
County v. Pewaukee Marina, Inc., 187 Wis. 2d 18, 23-24, 522 
N.W.2d 536 (Ct. App. 1994) to support its argument.  Pewaukee 
Marina, however, is inapposite.  That case involved a change and 
expansion of the nonconforming use.  The Pewaukee Marina 
No. 
2017AP2244   
 
19 
 
property had been used "as a lake resort providing cottage 
rentals, boat livery, fuel and bait and minor motor repair" 
before a zoning change converted the property to "residential 
and rendering [the property owner's] use nonconforming."  Seitz, 
140 Wis. 2d at 114.  The business continued to operate as a 
marina because zoning law protected the original nonconforming 
use.  Id.  Seven years later, the marina changed and enlarged 
the nonconforming use when it "added a retail store and a place 
for lounging and entertainment" and began selling "boats, boat 
lifts and piers."  Pewaukee Marina, 187 Wis. 2d at 20.  A jury 
found these activities to be a change in the nonconforming use 
and therefore in violation of the zoning ordinance.  Id. at 27. 
¶24 In contrast, the changes on the Polk property did not 
alter or expand the nonconforming use of farming; instead, the 
changes 
initiated 
the 
development 
of 
the 
property 
into 
residential conforming use.  The sale of lots, building of 
homes, and installation of roads and infrastructure actually 
reduced the nonconforming farming use on the property rather 
than enlarging it.  The Village of Slinger has not presented nor 
have we located any case suggesting that merely reducing the 
nonconforming 
use 
constitutes 
actual 
cessation. 
 
To 
the 
contrary, courts in other jurisdictions have rejected the 
argument that decreasing the nonconforming use is tantamount to 
abandonment.  See Feldman v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of City of 
Pittsburgh, 492 A.2d 468, 470 (Pa. 1985) ("The mere fact that 
Appellant proposes to reduce the space on the property devoted 
to the nonconforming use and add to it a conforming use does not 
No. 
2017AP2244   
 
20 
 
constitute an abandonment."); Ernst v. Johnson Cnty., 522 
N.W.2d 599, 603 (Iowa 1994) ("A decrease in business does not 
amount to a per se abandonment of a nonconforming use.  
Discontinuance of one or more, but not all operations of the 
quarry did not amount to a voluntary discontinuance of the 
use.") (citation omitted); Rhine v. City of Portland, 852 P.2d 
874, 877 n.1 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) ("[A] nonconforming use can 
exist or continue at some level that is less than an exhaustive 
use of the affected property, as long as the ongoing use is of 
the same nature as and within the scope of the original one or 
of any altered or expanded use that has been lawfully 
allowed."). 
¶25 Reducing the nonconforming farming use progresses the 
property into compliance with the residential zoning ordinance.  
It would be illogical to hold that reducing the nonconforming 
use somehow enlarges or expands the nonconforming use.  If 
farming occurred on the property before rezoning, it may 
continue as a legal nonconforming use until the property owner 
actually 
abandons 
that 
use 
by 
terminating 
the 
farming 
altogether. 
¶26 This property comprises 82 acres of farmland that Polk 
intends to convert to a 100-lot residential subdivision.  At the 
time the circuit court granted summary judgment to the Village 
of Slinger in 2012, only one lot had been sold for this purpose.  
Because Melius continued to engage in the same cutting and 
removal of vegetation that he carried out on this land before 
the 
zoning 
classification 
changed 
from 
agricultural 
to 
No. 
2017AP2244   
 
21 
 
residential, the agricultural activity has continued "in the 
same 
or 
related 
use" 
and 
the 
farming 
remains 
a 
legal 
nonconforming use of the property.  See City of Lake Geneva v. 
Smuda, 
75 
Wis. 2d 532, 
536-37, 
249 
N.W.2d 783 
(1977).  
Residential use on some parts of the property does not negate 
the continued farming on other portions of the land.  When 
farming continues on part of the property, there has not been 
complete 
cessation 
of 
this 
nonconforming 
use. 
 
Partial 
conforming use does not trump Wisconsin's two-factor test for 
abandonment 
of 
nonconforming 
use. 
 
Determining 
whether 
abandonment occurred depends upon application of the two-factor 
test, not whether some use of the property conforms to the 
current zoning classification.12 
IV   
¶27 We conclude that Polk did not abandon the lawful 
nonconforming use of the property because farming occurred 
continuously on the property before, during, and after the 
rezoning.  Polk never ceased cutting and removing vegetation on 
the property.  Because this nonconforming use continued without 
cessation, Polk's use of the property constituted a lawful 
nonconforming 
use 
for 
which 
it 
cannot 
be 
penalized.  
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
                                                 
12 Because we conclude that Polk never abandoned the 
nonconforming use, it is not necessary for us to address any of 
the additional arguments raised.  We decide cases on the 
narrowest possible grounds.  See Water Well Sols. Serv. Grp., 
Inc. v. Consol. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 54, ¶33 n.18, 369 Wis. 2d 607, 
881 N.W.2d 285. 
No. 
2017AP2244   
 
22 
 
vacate the circuit court's order imposing forfeitures, its 
monetary judgment for real estate taxes, its order authorizing 
special assessments, special charges, and fees to be levied 
against Polk, and its order enjoining Polk from using the 
property for agricultural purposes.  We remand to the circuit 
court for further proceedings consistent with this decision. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
¶28 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J., did not participate. 
 
No.  2017AP2244.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶29 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  While I 
agree with the majority's conclusion that Polk did not abandon 
its nonconforming use of the property, I write separately 
because the majority could be read to be unnecessarily breathing 
life back into a doctrine that the legislature abrogated over 80 
years ago.  As I explain below, the voluntary abandonment 
doctrine is inapplicable in cases where the parties rely upon a 
nonconforming 
use 
statute 
or 
ordinance 
with 
a 
definite 
legislative time limit.  When the relied upon statute or 
ordinance contains a definite time limit, the court must 
determine whether the property owner actually ceased the 
nonconforming use and discontinued that use for a period of more 
than the time limit.  Because Polk did not discontinue its 
nonconforming, agricultural use of the property for more than 
the statutorily definite limit of 12 months, Polk did not lose 
its right to the nonconforming use.  As a result, I do not join 
the majority opinion and instead respectfully concur.   
 
I.  ANALYSIS  
A.  Nonconforming Uses Generally 
¶30 Municipalities that seek to adopt zoning and land use 
schemes do so pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7) and its 
subsections.  Town of Rhine v. Bizzell, 2008 WI 76, ¶16, 311 
Wis. 2d 1, 751 N.W.2d 780.  As part of a comprehensive zoning 
and land use scheme, "[a] municipality is generally divided into 
different districts, such as residential, commercial, and 
industrial."  Id., ¶17 (footnote omitted).  However, if a 
No.  2017AP2244.akz 
 
2 
 
municipality adopts a new zoning and land use scheme, there may 
be properties that, at the time the new scheme is adopted, are 
being used for a purpose different than what the new scheme 
allows or permits——known as nonconforming uses.  Waukesha Cnty. 
v. Seitz, 140 Wis. 2d 111, 114-15, 409 N.W.2d 403 (Ct. App. 
1987) ("A nonconforming use is a use of land for a purpose not 
permitted in the district in which the land is situated.").  
"Land use qualifies as 'nonconforming' if there is an active and 
actual use of the land and buildings which existed prior to the 
commencement of the zoning ordinance and which has continued in 
the same or a related use until the present."  Id. 
¶31 Just 
as 
zoning 
is 
a 
creature 
of 
statutes 
and 
ordinances, nonconforming use is also based in the language of 
statutes and ordinances.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(h); 
Village of Slinger Zoning Ord. Ch. XXXI, §§ 8.01, 8.02 (1999) 
(hereinafter Slinger Zoning Ordinance)1; Bartkus v. Albers, 189 
Wis. 539, 208 N.W. 260 (1926) (analyzing a city of Kenosha 
nonconforming use ordinance); State ex rel. Schaetz v. Manders, 
206 Wis. 121, 238 N.W. 835 (1931) (analyzing a city of Green Bay 
nonconforming ordinance); State ex rel. Morehouse v. Hunt, 235 
Wis. 358, 291 N.W. 745 (1940) (analyzing a city of Madison 
nonconforming use ordinance enacted pursuant to statute).  
                                                 
1 The Village of Slinger amended its zoning ordinances on 
March 20, 2017.  The current version of the zoning ordinance 
cited in this case is found in the Village of Slinger's Code at 
Part III, Art. VIII, § 550-75 "Existing Legal Conforming Uses," 
found at https://ecode360.com/31143081; the current language is 
substantially the same as that used in 1999. 
No.  2017AP2244.akz 
 
3 
 
Accordingly, we must interpret the plain language of both the 
statute and ordinance before we apply it to this case.   
¶32 Statutory interpretation "begins with the language of 
the statute."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(internal quotations omitted).  If its meaning is plain, then 
our inquiry ends.  Id.  We give statutory language "its common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning."  Id.  However, "[w]here a 
statute has been authoritatively interpreted by this court, the 
party challenging that interpretation must establish that our 
prior interpretation was 'objectively wrong.'"  Waupaca Cnty. v. 
K.E.K., 2021 WI 9, ¶17, 395 Wis. 2d 460, 954 N.W.2d 366 (quoting 
State v. Breitzman, 2017 WI 100, ¶5 n.4, 378 Wis. 2d 431, 904 
N.W.2d 93).  
¶33 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.23(7)(h) is the current iteration 
of the nonconforming use statute.  It provides: 
The continued lawful use of a building, premises, 
structure, or fixture existing at the time of the 
adoption or amendment of a zoning ordinance may not be 
prohibited although the use does not conform with the 
provisions 
of 
the 
ordinance. . . . If 
the 
nonconforming use is discontinued for a period of 12 
months, any future use of the building, premises, 
structure, or fixture shall conform to the ordinance.  
The Village of Slinger adopted an ordinance with nearly 
identical language: 
The lawful nonconforming use of a structure, land or 
water, existing at the time of the adoption or 
amendment of this ordinance may be continued, although 
the use does not conform with the provisions of this 
ordinance . . . . 
No.  2017AP2244.akz 
 
4 
 
If 
such 
nonconforming 
use 
is 
discontinued 
or 
terminated for a period of twelve (12) months, any 
future use of the structure, land, or water shall 
conform to the provisions of this ordinance.   
Slinger Zoning Ordinance.2  It is undisputed that Polk was 
engaged in agricultural use prior to the Village of Slinger 
rezoning Polk's property from an A-1 Agricultural zone to an R-2 
Residential zone.  As such, Polk possessed a legal nonconforming 
use at the time of the rezoning.3  Consequently, the question 
remaining 
in 
this 
case 
is 
whether 
Polk 
abandoned 
this 
nonconforming use.  
B.  Abandoning a Nonconforming Use 
                                                 
2 The majority criticizes my concurrence for relying on the 
language of the statute, asserting that I am "recast[ing] this 
case as a statutory claim neither party raised nor asked us to 
resolve."  Majority op., ¶8 n.9.  However, the majority then 
points to both Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(h) and the Slinger Zoning 
Ordinance as the legal bases by which a nonconforming use may 
exist.  Id., ¶9.  The majority implicitly acknowledges that the 
legislature 
is 
the 
one 
who 
establishes 
the 
bases 
for 
abandonment, not this court.  Id. (listing the statutorily 
prescribed 
methods 
by 
which 
a 
landowner 
may 
abandon 
a 
nonconforming use).  Thus, I am not "recast[ing] this case as a 
statutory claim"; I am interpreting the statutory bases for 
abandonment, as we must.   
3 The majority characterizes this assertion as ignoring the 
question presented in this case, namely whether Polk abandoned 
its nonconforming agricultural use.  Majority op., ¶8 n.9.  To 
the contrary, I am acknowledging the historical record that at 
the time of the zoning change, Polk engaged in a nonconforming 
agricultural use——a fact that the majority itself recognizes.  
Id., ¶18 ("There is no dispute that the farming on Polk's 
property was a lawful use of the property under the agricultural 
zoning in place before the property was rezoned to residential 
use.").  With this historical record in mind, I then turn to the 
exact same question that the majority does: whether Polk 
abandoned its nonconforming use.  Id., ¶18.  
No.  2017AP2244.akz 
 
5 
 
¶34 Even 
if 
a 
property 
owner 
possesses 
a 
lawful 
nonconforming use, the property owner can lose that the right to 
that use if it is abandoned.  As the majority correctly 
summarizes, "[i]f the property owner abandons the lawful 
nonconforming use after the property's zoning classification has 
changed, then the property may be used only in a manner 
consistent with its current zoning classification."  Majority 
op., ¶9.  While the majority and I agree that a nonconforming 
use may be abandoned, we disagree which is the proper test to 
determine whether a property owner has abandoned a nonconforming 
use.  The majority reinvigorates the two-part, intent-based 
abandonment test that this court created nearly a century ago.  
Id., ¶10.  However, not long after we set forth this two-part 
test, the legislature set aside the test in favor of an 
objective, time-based test.  As such, I would use the language 
and test the legislature enacted instead of the judicially-
created two-part abandonment test.   
¶35 In reaching this conclusion, it is important to note 
the historical development of the two-part abandonment doctrine 
upon which the majority relies.  In 1931, we originally adopted 
the two-part test for abandonment, which required intent to 
abandon and actual cessation of use.  See Schaetz, 206 Wis. at 
124.  In Schaetz, we analyzed an ordinance, which provided:   
The lawful use of land existing at the time of 
the adoption of this ordinance may be conducted, 
although such use does not conform to the provisions 
hereof, but if such nonconforming use is discontinued, 
any future use of said premises shall be in conformity 
with the provisions of this ordinance. 
No.  2017AP2244.akz 
 
6 
 
Id. at 123.  In that case, the owner of a nonconforming dairy 
temporarily ceased operations with the intention of finding a 
buyer to resume the nonconforming use.  Id. at 123-24.  We 
applied the two-part abandonment test because it interpreted 
"[t]he word 'discontinuance' as it is used in the ordinance [a]s 
synonymous with abandonment."  Id. at 124.  We held that the 
owner did not "discontinue" the nonconforming use because the 
owner did not satisfy the intent prong of the test.  Id.   
¶36 We echoed this two-part abandonment test in a later 
case, finding that cessation of a nonconforming use "as a mere 
temporary matter and with intent that the nonconforming use be 
resumed 
when 
opportunity 
therefor 
should 
arise, 
did 
not 
constitute a 'discontinuance' of the nonconforming use[.]"  
Morehouse, 235 Wis. at 370. 
¶37 However, 
the 
legislature 
later 
abandoned 
this 
approach.  Shortly after the Morehouse decision, the legislature 
changed the statutory language regarding discontinuance to its 
current form:  "[i]f such nonconforming use is discontinued for 
a period of 12 months, any future use of the building and 
premises shall conform to the ordinance."  § 5, ch. 203, Laws of 
1941; accord Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(h).  After the enactment of 
this statute, we interpreted the phrase "discontinued for a 
period of 12 months" in the context of a municipal ordinance: 
We construe these words to mean termination or 
cessation of the nonconforming use for the twelve 
months' period.  The doctrine of voluntary abandonment 
as applied in [Schaetz and Morehouse] is not to be 
extended and applied to substituted nonconforming uses 
in a county zoning ordinance limiting discontinuance 
of such nonconforming uses to a definite time limit. 
No.  2017AP2244.akz 
 
7 
 
State ex rel. Brill v. Mortenson, 6 Wis. 2d 325, 331c, 96 
N.W.2d 603 (1959).4 
¶38 We 
later 
clarified 
the 
effect 
of 
the 
12-month 
discontinuance rule.  State ex rel. Peterson v. Burt, 42 
Wis. 2d 284, 166 N.W.2d 207 (1969).  We held that Brill 
"supports the proposition that the subjective test of voluntary 
abandonment is to be rejected in the face of a definite 
legislative time limit."  Id. at 288.  Moreover, we specifically 
addressed the impact Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(h) had on the Schaetz 
and Morehouse decisions.  Id. at 290.  We held that the 
enactment of the 12-month definite time period in § 62.23(7)(h) 
"renders inapplicable the doctrine of 'voluntary abandonment' as 
contained in the [Schaetz] and Morehouse [c]ases."  Id.5   
¶39 As 
this 
history 
demonstrates, 
the 
doctrine 
of 
voluntary abandonment is inapplicable to cases where either the 
                                                 
4 The original question presented in Brill was whether 
Schaetz and Morehouse apply when a nonconforming use ends and a 
different nonconforming use later begins.  State ex rel. Brill 
v. Mortenson, 6 Wis. 2d 325, 328-29, 94 N.W.2d 691 (1959).  We 
held that Schaetz and Morehouse were inapplicable because the 
landowner did not intend to resume the same nonconforming use.  
Id. at 329-30.  On rehearing, we addressed whether intent to 
abandon a nonconforming use should be considered in light of the 
ordinance containing the 12-month discontinuance restriction.  
Brill, 6 Wis. 2d at 331c.  It was in this rehearing that we 
interpreted the phrase "discontinued for a period of twelve 
months."  Id. 
5 This reflects the view expressed in Morehouse's dissenting 
opinion:  "The question is not one of intention to abandon a 
nonconforming use, but whether the acts of the owner have 
brought 
him 
within 
the 
provisions 
of 
the 
ordinance 
[or 
statute]."  State ex rel. Morehouse v. Hunt, 235 Wis. 358, 375, 
291 N.W. 745 (1940) (Wickhem, J., dissenting). 
No.  2017AP2244.akz 
 
8 
 
statute or municipal ordinance contains a definite time limit.6  
In the case at bar, both the statute and municipal ordinance 
contain the language "discontinued for a period of 12 months."  
Consequently, we must decide whether this language constitutes a 
definite time limit to render the voluntary abandonment doctrine 
inapplicable.  This court answered this question when it 
interpreted identical 12-month period language.  Compare Brill, 
6 Wis. 2d at 331c ("discontinued for a period of [12] months"); 
Peterson, 42 Wis. 2d at 287 ("discontinued for a period of 12 
months") with Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(h) ("discontinued for a 
period of 12 months"); Slinger Zoning Ordinance ("discontinued 
or terminated for a period of [12] months").  In both of the 
previous cases, we concluded that the voluntary abandonment 
doctrine does not apply.  See Brill, 6 Wis. 2d at 331c; 
Peterson, 42 Wis. 2d at 290.  This is an authoritative 
construction that we must continue to follow.  See K.E.K., 395 
Wis. 2d 460, ¶17.   
¶40 Accordingly, when a nonconforming use statute or 
ordinance refer to a definite time period, we do not apply the 
voluntary abandonment test from Schaetz and Morehouse.  Instead, 
we must determine whether the property owner actually ceased use 
                                                 
6 Instead of addressing the historical changes to the words 
of the statute or our own case law, the majority rejects this 
conclusion without any analysis.  Majority op., ¶8 n.9.  The 
majority fails to wrestle with this historical change to the 
words of the statute and our case law saying that those changes 
have meaning.  See Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, 
¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 ("By analyzing the changes 
the legislature has made over the course of several years, we 
may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.").  
No.  2017AP2244.akz 
 
9 
 
for the definite time period.  Consequently, regardless of the 
property owner's actions, including seeking the zoning change, 
or agreeing to convert the property to a conforming use, the 
property owner can abandon its nonconforming use only when the 
property owner ceases the nonconforming use for the statutorily 
defined time period.7 
C.  Application 
¶41 Applying the proper test here, it is clear that Polk 
never ceased agricultural use of the property for a 12-month 
period.  As I described above, both the statute and the 
ordinance have a 12-month definite time period.  See supra, ¶33.  
Accordingly, to have lost the right to use the property for 
agricultural purposes, Polk must have ceased using the property 
for agricultural purposes for a period of 12 months.   
¶42 Polk never ceased its agricultural use for a period of 
12 months.  Indeed, Polk never ceased its agricultural use for a 
                                                 
7 Contrary to the majority's assertions, State ex rel. 
Peterson v. Burt, 42 Wis. 2d 284, 166 N.W.2d 207 (1969), goes to 
the heart of Slinger's arguments.  See majority op., ¶8 n.9.  
Slinger argues that Polk's actions of "seeking the zoning change 
to residential; entering a Developer's Agreement to convert the 
property to residential; and recording a Declaration restricting 
the property to residential use only" constitute abandonment of 
the nonconforming use.  See id., ¶8 n.9.  Under Peterson, these 
actions are irrelevant because these actions are not actual 
cessation of use and go to intent.  The only inquiry that 
matters under the statute, ordinance, and our case law is 
whether Polk ceased its agricultural use for the statutorily 
defined period of 12 months.  
No.  2017AP2244.akz 
 
10 
 
single day.  As the majority noted, "complete cessation never 
happened."  Majority op., ¶19.8  
¶43 As such, I conclude that Polk did not abandon its 
nonconforming use and may continue its agricultural use of the 
property.   
 
II.  CONCLUSION 
¶44 While I agree with the majority that Polk did not 
abandon its nonconforming use, I would make clear that the 
voluntary abandonment doctrine is inapplicable here.  I would 
rely on the objective test that the legislature set forth in the 
statute——whether the property owner actually ceased use for the 
legislatively definite time limit.  Because Polk never ceased 
its agricultural use of the property for even a day, let alone 
the 12-month time limit, I conclude that Polk did not abandon 
its nonconforming, agricultural use.  As a result, I do not join 
the majority opinion and instead respectfully concur.   
¶45 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
                                                 
8 The majority critiques my concurrence for addressing the 
statute and ordinance because "both parties agree that Polk 
continued its agricultural activity on the property, rendering 
the statutory timeframe irrelevant."  Majority op., ¶8 n.9.  To 
the contrary, this proves my point.  The statutory period is the 
only relevant inquiry, and the facts of the case show that Polk 
never ceased its use for the statutorily defined 12-month 
period.  As the statute and our case law demand, the majority 
should have stopped its inquiry after its conclusion that 
"complete cessation never happened."  Id., ¶19.  
No.  2017AP2244.akz 
 
 
 
1