Case Title: Bolden v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 011407

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2002-04-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
MICHAEL JEROME BOLDEN 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 011407 
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO 
 
 
 
April 19, 2002 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINA 
 
 
The question for decision in this drug case is whether the 
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of 
a motion to suppress evidence obtained in the search of a 
suitcase located in the trunk of a motor vehicle.  The question 
stems from a prosecution of Michael Jerome Bolden in the Circuit 
Court of Arlington County for the possession of more than five 
pounds of marijuana with the intent to distribute in violation 
of Code § 18.2-248.1.1
 
Following denial of the motion to suppress, the trial 
court, sitting without a jury, convicted Bolden of the 
possession charge and sentenced him to serve twelve years in the 
penitentiary, with nine years suspended.  In an unpublished 
opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.  We 
awarded Bolden this appeal.2
                     
 
1 Code § 18.2-248(A) makes it unlawful to possess a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute and Code § 18.2-
248.1(a)(3) provides a penalty of not less than five nor more 
than thirty years when the controlled substance consists of more 
than five pounds of marijuana.  
 
2 The defendant was also convicted of transporting marijuana 
into the Commonwealth with intent to distribute in violation of 
 
In his motion, Bolden sought to suppress "any and all 
evidence obtained directly or indirectly as the result of the 
illegal seizure of him and his effects on or about the 29th day 
of December 1999."  In a pretrial hearing on the motion, the 
evidence showed that, on the date alleged, Officer Garrett 
Daniel Polowy of the Arlington County Police Department, while 
on routine patrol in a marked police cruiser, observed the 
driver of a gold-colored automobile acting suspiciously.  He 
followed the car but lost sight of it briefly and then found it 
parked in front of an Oriental rug store located next door to an 
Econo Lodge hotel.  Polowy pulled into the hotel parking lot to 
keep the gold car under surveillance. 
 
While seated in his cruiser, Polowy observed a man, who 
turned out to be Bolden, walking toward the hotel from the 
vicinity of the gold car.  Bolden seemed to be "caught . . . off 
guard" when he saw Polowy, who was in uniform; Bolden paused for 
a moment, and then walked toward the hotel entrance.  Polowy 
left his cruiser, walked up to Bolden, and said, "Hi, how are 
you doing?"  Bolden "kind of nodded his head in response."  
Polowy asked Bolden why he was in the area and if he had seen 
the gold car or knew who had occupied it.  Bolden said he had 
                                                                  
Code § 18.2-248.01 but that conviction is not before the Court 
in this appeal. 
 
2
been a guest at the hotel, and he disclaimed any knowledge of 
the gold car.  The two then walked into the hotel together. 
 
Bolden took a seat in a chair directly in front of the 
doors of the small lobby.  Polowy asked the clerk at the front 
desk whether Bolden was a guest at the hotel, and she stated 
Bolden had been a guest but "had just checked out."  Polowy then 
radioed a fellow police officer, Corporal Dean Matthews, to come 
to the hotel.  While awaiting Matthews' arrival, Polowy and 
Bolden engaged in "small talk" about the gold car.  In the same 
period, a telephone call for Bolden came into the front desk.  
He left his seat, and the clerk handed him the cordless 
telephone.  He engaged in a conversation for 20 to 30 seconds 
and returned to his chair. 
 
Matthews arrived shortly, in uniform, and Polowy took him 
aside and briefed him on the situation.  Matthews then walked up 
to Bolden, who was still sitting in the chair, and began talking 
to him.  Bolden told Matthews he was "just . . . waiting for a 
cousin . . . to come and show him where to go because he was 
going to the cousin's house."  Matthews ultimately asked to see 
Bolden's identification, and Bolden produced a New Mexico 
driver's license.  When Bolden produced the license, he stood up 
and then took a step or two and leaned against a railing in the 
lobby while he and Matthews talked.  After the license "checked 
out," Matthews returned it to Bolden. 
 
3
 
In further questioning, Matthews asked Bolden about his 
relationship with the gold car, about when he got to the hotel, 
about where he was going, and about the cousin who was coming to 
pick him up.  Matthews then asked Bolden whether he would 
consent to be searched there in the lobby, and Bolden replied 
affirmatively.  Polowy searched Bolden, and "no contraband or 
anything illegal was found." 
 
A minute or two after Matthews arrived at the hotel, 
another uniformed officer, Jason Bryk, appeared, and he joined 
Polowy and Matthews in the hotel lobby.  All three officers were 
armed, but the weapons were never removed from their holsters 
during the encounter with Bolden. 
 
During Matthews' questioning of Bolden, another telephone 
call came into the hotel for Bolden.  Instead of handing the 
telephone to Bolden, the clerk handed it to Polowy, who said to 
the caller, "Hi, how are you doing?  How can I help you?"  The 
caller then hung up. 
 
After the questioning of Bolden had continued for some 15 
to 20 minutes, the hotel manager asked the officers to move out 
of the lobby, and Matthews asked Bolden to "step outside."  The 
officers "turned and walked, and [Bolden] came with [them]."  
Standing "just outside the front doors," Matthews continued 
questioning Bolden. 
 
4
 
Matthews asked Bolden where his luggage was, and Bolden 
said it was in his car, pointing to a vehicle located on the 
hotel parking lot.  The officers ran a record check on the car 
but apparently found nothing incriminating. 
 
Matthews looked inside the car, saw a green bag sitting on 
the rear seat, and asked Bolden if the bag was his.  Bolden 
responded affirmatively, and when Matthews asked him if there 
were any guns or drugs in the bag, Bolden replied "no."  
Matthews then asked Bolden for permission to search the bag, and 
Bolden "just took a deep breath and put his head straight down 
to the ground, [and] said nothing." 
 
Matthews next asked Bolden whether there was anything else 
in the car, and Bolden said there was a suitcase in the trunk.  
Matthews inquired whether there were "any guns, drugs, or 
anything like that in the suitcase," and Bolden said "no."  
Matthews then asked if he "could open the trunk."  Bolden 
responded by "pulling the keys" out of his pocket and opening 
the trunk.  When Matthews asked if he could take the suitcase 
out of the trunk and search it, Bolden stated "he would rather 
it stay in the trunk." 
 
Because there was a "drop-off" behind the car where it was 
sitting at the end of the parking lot, it was difficult to reach 
inside the trunk, and Bolden "volunteered to move the car ahead 
so that [the officers] could search the suitcase."  Bolden got 
 
5
in the car, started it with his key, and "pulled it up a little 
bit," but the move proved to be insufficient, and, at Matthews' 
request, Bolden "started the car back up [and] pulled it up a 
little bit further." 
 
Bolden testified that when he moved his car, one of the 
officers, at Matthews' direction, positioned his cruiser in 
front of Bolden's vehicle.  Bolden also testified that another 
officer had placed his cruiser at the exit to the parking lot. 
 
After Bolden moved his car, Matthews asked Bolden for 
permission to search the suitcase, and Bolden "just took a deep 
breath, and . . . put his head down."  Matthews then said that 
if Bolden had any contraband, he, Matthews, would prefer that 
Bolden just give it up, rather than requiring Matthews to 
conduct a search.  Again, Bolden "just put his head down," but 
finally told Matthews "[y]ou can look." 
 
After a brief discourse by Matthews about the importance of 
honesty and his preference for Bolden to give him what was in 
the suitcase, Bolden said, "Go ahead and look, man."  Matthews 
opened the suitcase and found a taped-up bundle of marijuana. 
The officers then arrested Bolden and advised him of his rights 
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  Bolden agreed to 
speak with Matthews and admitted the bundle contained fifty 
pounds of marijuana worth about $45,000.  All in all, the 
 
6
officers' encounter with Bolden consumed approximately 30 
minutes. 
 
In denying Bolden's motion to suppress, the trial court 
found that Bolden was "a mature, knowledgeable person" who 
"maintained a controlled demeanor and in [the] courtroom . . . 
showed that he has a strong presence about him and obvious 
intelligence."  The court further found that Bolden "thought 
about" whether to give the police permission to search, 
"implying that he knew he had a choice"; the "concept that he 
was stopped from going about his business is rebutted by the 
fact that he was where he wanted to be"; "he wanted to be at the 
Econo Lodge waiting for [his cousin] to come to him"; "very 
important is the fact that he elects to open the car . . . 
elects to move it . . . elects to facilitate access to the 
trunk"; he "makes the subtle distinction between you can't look 
at the suitcase outside of the [trunk]"; "[h]e knew what he was 
doing"; and he is "a reasonable person." 
 
On appeal, Bolden points out that Corporal Matthews 
admitted in his testimony that the police had no factual basis 
to suspect Bolden of any criminal activity.  Bolden says that, 
notwithstanding "this total lack of suspicion of any illegal 
conduct, the police engaged in a series of acts which would have 
led a reasonable individual to believe that [he or she was] not 
free to leave."  Hence, Bolden concludes, he was unlawfully 
 
7
seized prior to the time he consented to the search of his 
suitcase and, therefore, his consent was not voluntary. 
 
A claim by a defendant that he was seized within the 
contemplation of the Fourth Amendment "presents a mixed question 
of law and fact that is reviewed de novo on appeal."  McCain v. 
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 489, 545 S.E.2d 541, 545 (2001); see 
also Reittinger v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 232, 236, 532 S.E.2d 
25, 27 (2000).  In considering a claim of seizure, "the 
appellate court is required to give deference to the factual 
findings of the trial court and to determine independently 
whether, under the law, the manner in which the evidence was 
obtained satisfies constitutional requirements."  McCain, 261 
Va. at 490, 545 S.E.2d at 545.  And "[t]he burden is on the 
defendant to show that the denial of his suppression motion, 
when the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth, was reversible error."  Id.
 
"[A] person is 'seized' only when, by means of physical 
force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is 
restrained.  Only when such restraint is imposed is there any 
foundation whatever for invoking constitutional safeguards." 
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980).  Hence, 
"a person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances 
 
8
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have 
believed that he was not free to leave."  Id. at 554. 
 
The Supreme Court has provided examples of circumstances 
indicating the occurrence of a seizure.  These examples include 
"the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a 
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of 
the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating 
that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled."  
Id.
 
The Commonwealth argues that the encounter between the 
police officers and Bolden was entirely consensual.  "The police 
simply did not engage in a show of authority which would have 
caused a reasonable person to believe that he was not free to 
leave, refuse to answer questions, or refuse the officer's 
request to search the suitcase in the trunk."  The officers 
spoke to Bolden in a normal tone of voice throughout the 
encounter in an effort to secure his cooperation.  The officers' 
weapons remained holstered at all times.  Bolden readily acceded 
to Matthews' request for identification, and, furthermore, 
merely requesting identification does not constitute a seizure, 
McCain, 261 Va. at 491, 545 S.E.2d at 546.  Bolden also readily 
agreed to a search of his person.  The officers did not 
interfere with Bolden's purpose to remain in the lobby awaiting 
the arrival of his cousin, impede Bolden's ability to move about 
 
9
the lobby during questioning, or block the lobby doors to the 
outside. 
 
Continuing, the Commonwealth argues that when the parties 
went outside, the encounter remained consensual.  Bolden freely 
answered the officers' questions about the whereabouts of his 
car and his luggage and readily admitted the green bag on the 
rear seat was his.  When Bolden did not consent for Matthews to 
search the green bag, Matthews did not search it.  When Matthews 
asked whether there was anything else in the car, Bolden said 
there was a suitcase in the trunk.  When Matthews asked if he 
could open the trunk, Bolden took the key out of his pocket and 
opened the trunk, then voluntarily moved his car twice to 
facilitate Matthews' search of the suitcase.  Matthews gave 
Bolden the opportunity to be honest and give up any contraband 
that was in the suitcase in lieu of a search.  Matthews searched 
the suitcase only after Bolden had twice voiced his consent, and 
Matthews respected Bolden's wishes by searching the suitcase 
while it was inside the trunk rather than outside. 
 
We find the Commonwealth's argument interesting, but it is 
insufficient to overcome the effect of two incidents occurring 
in the encounter between the police officers and Bolden.  These 
two incidents are the police interception of the second 
telephone call for Bolden and the positioning of a police 
 
10
cruiser in front of Bolden's car when he moved it to facilitate 
Matthews' search of the suitcase. 
 
With respect to the intercepted telephone call, the 
Commonwealth argues that there is a reasonable inference the 
call came while Matthews was interviewing Bolden and that it "is 
entirely consistent with a consensual encounter for a second 
officer present to intervene, attempt to determine the identity 
of the caller in order to tell the citizen so he can judge 
whether he wants to take the call, or take a message for the 
citizen while he is engaged in a conversation with the police."  
But this argument misses the point.  The point is whether such 
an interception would cause a reasonable person to believe he or 
she is not free to leave the encounter. 
 
With respect to the positioning of the police cruiser in 
front of Bolden's car, the Commonwealth acknowledges on brief 
that Bolden testified "his vehicle was blocked in by police."3
"[B]ut," the Commonwealth continues, Bolden "admitted that no 
weapons were drawn."  Again, the Commonwealth misses the point.  
                     
 
3 While a trial judge is not bound to accept "unworthy, 
albeit uncontradicted, testimony of an accused," Chesson v. 
Commonwealth, 216 Va. 827, 832, 223 S.E.2d 923, 926-27 (1976), 
"a trier of fact may not arbitrarily or without justification 
discredit evidence which is uncontradicted and not inconsistent 
with other evidence in the case," id. at 832, 223 S.E.2d at 926.  
Here, Bolden's testimony concerning the blocking of his car was 
completely uncontradicted; he was not cross-examined on the 
point and not one of the three police officers involved denied 
 
11
Whether weapons were drawn or not is irrelevant to the question 
whether such blocking would cause a reasonable person to believe 
he or she is not free to leave the encounter. 
 
We need not decide in this case whether either the 
intercepted telephone call or the blocking of Bolden's car is 
sufficient alone to constitute a seizure within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.  Clearly, when these two incidents are 
combined, there is present such a "show of authority," 
Mendenhall, 544 U.S. at 553, as to make a reasonable person 
believe he or she is not free to leave the encounter, and an 
illegal seizure has occurred. 
 
Because Bolden suffered an illegal seizure, his consent to 
the search of his suitcase was tainted and ineffective to 
justify the search.  Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507-08 
(1983).  Hence, the evidence obtained from the suitcase should 
have been suppressed.  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals, vacate Bolden's conviction for 
possession of more than five pounds of marijuana, and remand the 
case to the Court of Appeals with direction to remand the matter 
to the trial court for further proceedings, if the Commonwealth 
be so advised. 
Reversed and remanded. 
                                                                  
the blocking.  Furthermore, Bolden's testimony was not 
inconsistent with other evidence in the case. 
 
12