Case Title: ANTONIO CRAIG V OAKWOOD HOSPITAL

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2004-07-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice  
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED JULY 23, 2004  
ANTONIO CRAIG, by his next
friend, KIMBERLY CRAIG, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
Nos. 121405 
121407-09 
OAKWOOD HOSPITAL, HENRY FORD
HOSPITAL, doing business as HENRY FORD
HEALTH SYSTEM, ASSOCIATED
PHYSICIANS, P.C., and ELIAS
G. GENNAOUI, M.D., 
121419 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
AJIT KITTUR, M.D., 
Defendant. 
________________________________ 
YOUNG, J. 
Plaintiff, now an adult, suffers from cerebral palsy, 
mental retardation, and a number of other neurological and 
physical ailments. 
He argues, through his mother as next 
friend, that these conditions are the proximate results of 
defendants’ negligence in treating his mother during her 
labor leading to his delivery. 
Specifically, plaintiff 
1  
 
 
 
 
 
                     
maintains that defendants administered an excessive amount 
of a contraction-inducing medication to his mother and were 
unable to detect signs of fetal distress because they 
failed to make appropriate use of fetal monitoring devices. 
The trial court denied defendants’ request to hold a Davis-
Frye hearing on expert testimony that purported to draw a 
causal connection between these breaches of the standard of 
care and plaintiff’s present neurological and physiological 
condition. 
Following a five week trial, the jury returned a 
verdict in plaintiff=s favor. 
The trial court thereafter 
determined that defendant Henry Ford Health System was 
liable as a successor corporation to defendant Associated 
Physicians, P.C. 
The trial court denied the defendants= 
motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a 
new trial. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of 
liability, but ordered remittitur on lost wage earning 
capacity.1
 We reverse and remand the matter for entry of 
judgment in defendants= favor. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This appeal arises out of the events surrounding 
plaintiff’s birth on July 16, 1980. 
Plaintiff’s mother, 
1 249 Mich App 534; 643 NW2d 580 (2002). 
2  
 
 
   
 
 
                     
Kimberly Craig, received prenatal care from defendant 
Associated Physicians, P.C. Associated Physicians employed 
four obstetricians, including defendants Dr. Elias Gennaoui 
and Dr. Ajit Kittur.2  Ms. Craig met with each obstetrician 
at some point before plaintiff’s birth, but was primarily 
attended to by Dr. Gennaoui during plaintiff’s delivery. 
Ms. Craig’s amniotic and chorionic membranes ruptured 
at approximately 5:30 A.M. on July 16, 1980, and she was 
admitted to defendant Oakwood Hospital within a half hour. 
The resident doctor on call at the time noted that 
plaintiff’s fetal heart tones were within a normal range. 
Dr. Kittur, who was the attending physician on staff when 
Ms. Craig was admitted, requested that Ms. Craig be given 
an intravenous (IV) “keep open” line to maintain hydration 
and 
to 
establish 
a 
channel 
for 
the 
intravenous 
administration of medication, should the need arise. 
Nurses applied an external fetal-uterine monitor to Ms. 
Craig at approximately 9:30 A.M., at which time she still 
had not experienced contractions. 
At 10:00, Ms. Craig 
began to receive 1000 cc of a 5% Ringer’s lactate solution 
through the “keep open” IV line. 
Dr. Gennaoui, who had taken over for Dr. Kittur 
2 Dr. Kittur is not a party to this appeal because the 
jury determined that he was not negligent. 
3  
 
 
 
 
                     
sometime after Ms. Craig was admitted, met with Ms. Craig 
at approximately 11:00 A.M. He was concerned that Ms. Craig 
and her child had been exposed to infection since her 
membranes burst earlier that morning,3 and concluded that 
Ms. Craig should be given ten units of Pitocin4 in order to 
induce labor.5  From 11:30 A.M. to 6:00 P.M., Ms. Craig was 
given doses of Pitocin in increasing amounts. 
One of the central issues at trial was the precise 
amount of Pitocin administered to Ms. Craig and whether, as 
plaintiff argued, she had mistakenly received a double 
dosage. 
Plaintiff’s 
standard 
of 
care 
expert, 
Paul 
Gatewood, M.D., testified that Ms. Craig’s medical records 
reveal that she was inadvertently given two doses of 
Pitocin. 
The first was administered shortly after 11:00 
a.m. upon Dr. Gennaoui’s order. 
Nurse Quinlan wrote a 
check on Dr. Gennaoui’s order for Pitocin to indicate, 
according to Dr. Gatewood, that she had performed Dr. 
Gennaoui’s request and had administered Pitocin through the 
3 Dr. Gennaoui testified that amniotic fluid, which was
discharged 
when 
plaintiff’s 
amniotic 
and 
chorionic 
membranes burst, protected the fetus from infection. 
4 “Pitocin” is a brand name for synthetic oxytocin. 
5 Plaintiff contends that records from a fetal uterine 
monitor show that Ms. Craig was, in fact, experiencing
contractions before Dr. Gennaoui’s decision to administer 
Pitocin. 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
5% Ringer’s lactate solution. 
Dr. Gatewood noted, however, that another nurse, Tyra, 
had 
written 
in 
Ms. 
Craig’s 
records 
that 
she 
had 
administered Pitocin through D5W,6 a solution other than the 
5% Ringer’s lactate Ms. Craig was already receiving 
intravenously. 
Thus, 
according 
to 
Dr. 
Gatewood’s 
testimony, Dr. Gennaoui had given a single order for 
Pitocin that had been filled twice—once by Nurse Quinlan 
through the 5% Ringer’s lactate solution, and once by Nurse 
Tyra through the D5W solution. 
Also contested at trial was whether Ms. Craig’s labor 
presented any complications. 
Medical records compiled 
after 
plaintiff’s 
birth 
show 
that 
Ms. 
Craig 
began 
experiencing contractions of “moderate” strength after 
receiving 
Pitocin 
and 
that 
“moderate” 
contractions 
continued until plaintiff’s delivery. 
Plaintiff contends, however, that the records from a 
fetal uterine monitor tell a different story. 
These 
records, according to Dr. Gatewood, show that plaintiff 
experienced recurrent decelerations of his heart rate, or 
bradycardia, after Ms. Craig began to receive Pitocin. Dr. 
Gatewood explained at trial that the decelerations occurred 
6 Dr. Gatewood described this solution as a mix of 
dextrose and water. 
5  
 
 
 
   
 
 
                     
 
because the Pitocin administered to Ms. Craig caused 
contractions 
of 
excessive 
intensity 
and 
duration. 
Plaintiff’s umbilical cord became compressed because of 
these contractions, thereby decreasing the amount of blood 
flowing to plaintiff. 
The result was the pattern of 
decelerations in heart rate shown by the fetal uterine 
monitor and a decrease in the amount of oxygen flowing to 
plaintiff’s brain, or “hypoxia” in medical parlance. 
Plaintiff was born shortly before 7:00 P.M. that day. 
His Apgar scores, 8 and 9 (on a one to ten scale), were 
well within the typical range,7 indicating that plaintiff 
appeared to be a normal, healthy baby. 
Plaintiff also 
contests this Apgar assessment, maintaining that a picture 
of plaintiff taken shortly after his birth depicts an 
infant 
who 
had 
recently 
suffered 
head 
trauma. 
Specifically, plaintiff points to a “large ridge” across 
his forehead as evidence of “facial or brow molding,” and 
argues that the photograph clearly reveals bruising and 
7 An Apgar score represents an evaluation of a newborn
infant=s physical condition immediately after birth. An
infant is evaluated at one and five minutes after birth on 
five criteria: heart rate, respiratory effort, muscle tone,
skin color, and response to stimuli. 
Each criterion is 
assigned a value between zero and two, with a score of ten
indicating the best condition. Attorney=s Dictionary of
Medicine Illustrated, vol 1, p A-475. 
6  
 
 
 
 
                     
 
 
edema,8 both sure signs of trauma. 
In addition, plaintiff 
contends that the postdelivery picture shows him “gazing” 
to the right while holding his left hand in a cortical 
position and that these “are indicative of acute brain 
injury.” 
Two days after his birth, plaintiff was examined by 
pediatrician Dr. Carolyn Johnson, who concluded that 
plaintiff seemed to be healthy and displayed normal 
cognitive functions. Plaintiff received a vastly different 
diagnosis approximately one year later. 
On June 6, 1981, 
Ms. Craig had plaintiff examined by Dr. Michael Nigro, a 
pediatric neurologist, after noticing that plaintiff began 
to seem developmentally slow after his third month. 
Dr. 
Nigro 
diagnosed 
plaintiff 
with 
nonprogressive 
encephalopathy9 with global developmental delay and mild 
spasticity. 
He concluded at the time and maintained 
throughout this trial that the etiology or cause of 
plaintiff’s condition was unclear.10 
8 An “edema” is an “effusion of serious fluid into the 
interstices of cells in tissue spaces or into body
cavities.” 
Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary
(2d ed, 2001). 
9 “Encephalopathy” is a general term for any disease of
the brain. 
Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary
(2d ed, 2001). 
10 Dr. Nigro gave a slightly different diagnosis later, 
7  
 
 
 
   
                     
 
Plaintiff initiated the present lawsuit in 1994 
through his mother, Kimberly Craig, as next friend. 
He 
alleged that Drs. Gennaoui and Kittur committed medical 
malpractice in failing to monitor plaintiff’s heartbeat 
with an internal uterine catheter until 2:30 P.M. on July 
16, 1980. 
Further, he alleged that Dr. Gennaoui and his 
colleagues negligently administered Pitocin to Ms. Craig 
despite the fact that she presented physical symptoms 
indicating that Pitocin was unnecessary and potentially 
harmful. 
As a result, plaintiff alleged, plaintiff 
sustained brain damage either through hypoxia or through 
the pounding of plaintiff’s head against his mother’s 
“pelvic rim” before birth. 
Plaintiff also named Associated Physicians, P.C., the 
employer of Drs. Kittur and Gennaoui, under a theory of 
vicarious liability. 
In addition, plaintiff named Oakwood 
Hospital, where plaintiff was delivered, and named Henry 
on October 30, 1981, when he opined that plaintiff had
chronic, nonspecific encephalopathy with retardation or 
psychomotor delay, cerebral palsy, and epilepsy. 
When 
plaintiff was in his early teens, Dr. Nigro diagnosed him
with profound encephalopathy, spastic quadriplegia, mental
retardation, and aphasia. 
“Aphasia” is “the loss of a
previously held ability to speak or understand spoken or
written language, due to injury of the brain.” 
Random 
House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed, 2001). 
8  
 
 
   
 
 
                     
Ford Hospital under a successor liability theory.11 
On January 21, 1997, defendant asked the Court to 
exclude the testimony of Dr. Ronald Gabriel, plaintiff’s 
proposed causation expert, or, in the alternative, to 
conduct a Davis-Frye hearing.12  This motion was denied. 
Henry Ford filed a successful motion to sever. 
However, the trial court found after conducting a bench 
trial that Henry Ford was liable to plaintiff as a 
successor to Associated Physicians, P.C. 
After the jury found in plaintiff’s favor, the court 
entered judgment of $21 million, reflecting the present 
value of the $36 million awarded by the jury. 
The trial 
court 
denied 
defendants’ 
motion 
for 
judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. 
On February 1, 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
jury verdict in plaintiff’s favor, but ordered remittitur 
because of the jury’s overestimation of plaintiff’s lost 
11 Henry Ford had purchased the administrative portion
of Associated Physicians Medical Center, Inc., a business
corporation created from the professional corporation that
had employed defendants Dr. Gennaoui and Dr. Kittur at the
time of the alleged malpractice. The relationships between
the corporate entities are discussed in greater detail
below. 
12 See People v Davis, 343 Mich 348; 72 NW2d 269
(1955); Frye v United States, 54 App DC 46; 293 F 1013
(1923). 
9  
 
 
 
 
                     
 
 
   
wage earning capacity.13  The panel also affirmed the trial 
court’s conclusion that Henry Ford was liable to plaintiff 
as a successor corporation. 
We granted defendants’ applications for leave to 
appeal on September 12, 2003, limiting the parties to the 
following issues: “(1) Whether the witnesses' testimony was 
based on facts not in evidence and whether the trial court 
erred in permitting the testimony of plaintiff's expert 
witnesses; (2) Whether the trial court erred in finding 
defendant Henry Ford Hospital liable on a successor 
liability theory.”14  We denied plaintiff’s application for 
leave to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude 
evidence for an abuse of discretion.15  A court necessarily 
abuses its discretion when it “admits evidence that is 
inadmissible as a matter of law.”16  However, any error in 
the admission or exclusion of evidence will not warrant 
appellate relief “unless refusal to take this action 
13 249 Mich App 534, 544.  
14 469 Mich 880 (2003) (citations omitted).  
15 People v Katt, 468 Mich 272, 278; 662 NW2d 12 
(2003). 
16 Id. 
10  
 
 
       
  
 
   
 
                     
 
 
 
     
 
 
appears . . . inconsistent with substantial justice,”17 or 
affects “a substantial right of the [opposing] party.”18 
We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or 
deny a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.19 
In conducting this review de novo, we “’review the evidence 
and all legitimate inferences in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party.’”20  Only when “the evidence viewed 
in this light fails to establish a claim as a matter of 
law” 
is 
the 
moving 
party 
entitled 
to 
judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV).21 
The doctrine of successor liability is “’derived from 
equitable principles.’”22
 Its application is therefore 
subject to review de novo.23 
17 MCR 2.613(A).  
18 MRE 103(a).  
19 Sniecinski v Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 469 Mich 124, 
131; 666 NW2d 186 (2003). 
20 Id., quoting Wilkinson v Lee, 463 Mich 388, 391; 617
NW2d 305 (2000). 
21 Id. 
22 Stevens v McLouth Steel Products Corp, 433 Mich 365,
376; 446 NW2d 95 (1989), quoting Musikiwamba v ESSI, Inc,
760 F2d 740, 750 (CA 7, 1985). 
23 Stachnik v Winkel, 394 Mich 375, 383; 230 NW2d 529
(1975). 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
                     
 
III. IMPROPER ADMISSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 
We turn, first, to the trial court’s erroneous 
conclusion that defendant Oakwood Hospital was not entitled 
to a Davis-Frye hearing before the admission of Dr. Ronald 
Gabriel’s expert testimony. 
Defendant contends that the 
trial court erred when it denied its motion to exclude the 
expert opinion testimony of Dr. Gabriel or, in the 
alternative, to hold a Davis-Frye hearing. We agree. 
A. 
MRE 702 AND DAVIS-FRYE ANALYSIS 
Expert testimony is admitted pursuant to MRE 702, 
which provided, at the pertinent times: 
If the court determines that recognized
scientific, 
technical, 
or 
other 
specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, 
skill, 
experience, 
training, 
or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise . . . . 
In construing this rule of evidence, we must apply “’the 
legal 
principles 
that 
govern 
the 
construction 
and 
application of statutes.’”24
 When the language of an 
evidentiary rule is unambiguous, we apply the plain meaning 
of the text “’without further judicial construction or 
24 CAM Constr v Lake Edgewood Condo Ass’n, 465 Mich
549, 
554; 
640 
NW2d 
256 
(2002), 
quoting 
Grievance 
Administrator v Underwood, 462 Mich 188, 193; 612 NW2d 116
(2000). 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
 
   
 
 
 
   
interpretation.’”25 
The plain language of MRE 702 establishes three broad 
preconditions to the admission of expert testimony.26 First, 
the proposed expert witness must be “qualified” to render 
the proposed testimony.27
 Generally, the expert may be 
qualified by virtue of “knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education.”28  In a medical malpractice action 
such as this one, the court’s assessment of an expert’s 
“qualifications” are now guided by MCL 600.2169(2): 
In determining the qualifications of an 
expert witness in an action alleging medical 
malpractice, the court shall, at a minimum,
evaluate all of the following: 
(a) 
The 
educational 
and 
professional
training of the expert witness. 
(b) The area of specialization of the expert
witness. 
(c) The length of time the expert witness 
has been engaged in the active clinical practice
or instruction of the health profession or the 
specialty. 
(d) The relevancy of the expert witness’s
testimony. 
Second, the proposed testimony must “assist the trier 
25 Id. 
26 People v Beckley, 434 Mich 691, 710-711; 456 NW2d
391 (1990) (opinion of BRICKLEY, J.).   
27 MRE 702. 
28 Id. 
13  
 
 
 
                     
 
 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact 
in issue . . . .”29
 In other words, the expert opinion 
testimony “must serve to give the trier of fact a better 
understanding of the evidence or assist in determining a 
fact in issue.”30 
Finally, under MRE 702 as it read when this matter was 
tried, expert testimony must have been based on a 
“recognized” form of “scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge.”31
 The Court of Appeals properly 
construed this language in Nelson v American Sterilizer Co 
(On Remand): 
The word “recognized” connotes a general
acknowledgement 
of 
the 
existence, 
validity,
authority, or genuineness of a fact, claim or
concept. 
The adjective “scientific” connotes a
grounding in the principles, procedures, and 
29 MRE 702. 
30 Beckley, supra at 711 (opinion of BRICKLEY, J.).   
31  MRE 702. 
This rule was amended effective January
1, 2004, and now provides: 
If the court determines that scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise if (1) the testimony is based on 
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is
the product of reliable principles and methods,
and (3) the witness has applied the principles 
and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
 
 
methods 
of 
science. 
Finally, 
the 
word 
“knowledge” connotes more than subjective belief
or unsupported speculation. 
The word applies to
any body of known facts or to any body of ideas
inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on
good grounds.[32] 
Continuing 
along 
these 
lines, 
the 
word 
“technical” 
signifies grounding in a specialized field of knowledge, or 
a particular “art, science, or the like.”33
 Similarly, 
“specialized” suggests a foundation in a specific field of 
study or expertise.34 
When this case was tried, the admission of expert 
testimony 
was 
subject 
not 
only 
to 
the 
threshold 
requirements 
of 
MRE 
702, 
but 
also 
to 
the 
standard 
articulated in People v Davis,35 now generally known in 
Michigan as the Davis-Frye test.36  In Davis, we held that 
expert opinion based on novel scientific techniques is 
admissible only if the underlying methodology is generally 
32 223 Mich App 485, 491; 566 NW2d 671 (1997)
(citations and quotation marks omitted). 
33 Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed,
2001). 
34 Id. 
35 343 Mich 348; 72 NW2d 269 (1955). 
36 See Frye v United States, 54 App DC 46; 293 F 1013
(1923). 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
 
 
 
 
accepted within the scientific community.37
 Thus, in 
determining 
whether 
the 
proposed 
expert 
opinion 
was 
grounded in a “recognized” field of scientific, technical, 
or other specialized knowledge as was required by MRE 702, 
a trial court was obligated to ensure that the expert 
opinion was based on accurate and generally accepted 
methodologies.38
 The proponent of expert testimony bears 
the burden of proving general acceptance under this 
standard.39 
B. 
THE  
TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO PERFORM ITS 
GATEKEEPING ROLE UNDER MRE 702 
In this case, defendant Oakwood Hospital moved in 
limine to exclude the testimony of Dr. Ronald Gabriel on 
the basis that Dr. Gabriel’s theory of how plaintiff 
sustained brain damage was not generally accepted within 
the medical community, as required by Davis-Frye. 
Dr. 
Gabriel’s etiological theory, as summarized by defendant in 
arguing its motion, was that “hyperstimulat[ion]” of the 
uterus caused the head of the fetus (plaintiff) to pound 
37  Davis, supra at 370. 
38 Id. at 372. 
See also People v Young, 418 Mich 1,
24; 340 NW2d 805 (1983) (“The Davis-Frye standard is the 
means by which the court can determine that the novel
evidence 
offered 
for 
admission 
here 
enjoys 
such 
recognition.”). 
39 People v Young (After Remand), 425 Mich 470, 475;
391 NW2d 270 (1986). 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
against his mother’s pelvic anatomy, thereby producing 
permanent 
brain 
damage. 
This 
theory, 
according 
to 
defendant, was novel enough to be excluded and, at best, 
was admissible only once it passed through the crucible of 
Davis-Frye analysis. 
In response to this motion, plaintiff’s attorney 
produced several articles and authorities that were meant 
to demonstrate a link between the use of Pitocin and the 
type of injury sustained by plaintiff. 
But while some of 
these articles described a correlation between the use of 
Pitocin and generalized brain injury, none of these 
authorities supported the theory of causation actually put 
forth by Dr. Gabriel. 
That is, none supported a causal 
connection between Pitocin and brain injury incurred 
through repeated pounding of the fetal head against 
maternal anatomy. 
However, the court did not rely on authorities 
proffered by plaintiff in denying defendant’s motion for a 
Davis-Frye hearing. 
Instead of consulting plaintiff’s 
proffered scientific and medical literature, the court 
erroneously assigned the burden of proof under Davis-Frye 
to defendant—the party opposing the admission of Dr. 
Gabriel’s 
testimony—and 
held 
that 
defendant 
was 
not 
entitled to a hearing because it failed to prove that Dr. 
17  
 
 
 
   
                     
 
 
Gabriel’s theory lacked “general acceptance.”40 
When the MRE 702 principles described above are 
properly applied, it is evident that the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a Davis-
Frye hearing. 
This abuse of discretion was predicated on 
two fundamental legal errors. 
First, the trial court erred in concluding that it had 
no 
obligation 
to 
review 
plaintiff’s 
proposed 
expert 
testimony unless defendant introduced evidence that the 
expert testimony was “novel.” 
Under MRE 702, the trial 
court had an independent obligation to review all expert 
40 Indeed, the trial court was explicit in this regard: 
[Allocating the burden of proof to the 
proponent of novel scientific testimony] would
mean that everybody can come in here and allege
that whatever everybody’s expert is saying is not
supported by scientific data, and I would have to
hold a Davis-Frye hearing in every single case
where any expert had to testify. 
And that’s not 
the standard. 
You have to submit some evidence 
to me that I need a Davis-Frye hearing, other
than you just saying it. 
The dissent makes the same error. 
See post at 2-4. 
But compare Young (After Remand), supra at 475 (allocating
the burden of proof under Davis-Frye to the proponent of
novel scientific evidence). 
The position advocated by the trial court and the
dissent 
is 
not 
only 
at 
odds 
with 
our 
Davis-Frye
jurisprudence, but it also defies logic. The trial court’s 
rule would require the party opposing expert testimony to
prove a negative—that the expert’s opinion is not generally
accepted. 
This 
is 
an 
unreasonable 
and 
thoroughly
impractical allocation of the burden of proof. 
18  
 
 
                     
opinion testimony in order to ensure that the opinion 
testimony satisfied the three Beckley preconditions noted 
above—that it was rendered by a “qualified expert,” that 
the testimony would “assist the trier of fact,” and, under 
the rules of evidence in effect during this trial, that the 
opinion testimony was rooted in “recognized” scientific or 
technical 
principles. 
These 
obligations 
applied 
irrespective of the type of expert opinion testimony 
offered by the parties.41  While a party may waive any claim 
of error by failing to call this gatekeeping obligation to 
the court’s attention, the court must evaluate expert 
testimony under MRE 702 once that issue is raised. 
Second, the trial court erred in concluding that there 
was no justification for a Davis-Frye hearing. 
At issue 
was Dr. Gabriel’s opinion that Pitocin administered to Ms. 
Craig produced contractions of excessive duration and 
force, that these contractions caused plaintiff’s head to 
be repeatedly ground against Ms. Craig’s pelvic anatomy, 
and that the resulting head trauma caused plaintiff’s 
cerebral palsy. 
This causal sequence, defendant argued, 
has “never been described in medical literature” and was at 
odds with the testimony of plaintiff’s other expert 
41 See MRE 702. 
19  
 
 
 
                     
 
witnesses. 
Plaintiff failed to introduce a single authority that 
truly supported Dr. Gabriel’s theory in response to 
defendant’s motion. Instead, plaintiff repeatedly stressed 
that medical literature amply supported the proposition 
that 
Pitocin 
could 
cause 
brain 
damage—a 
proposition 
defendant did not contest—and supplied the court with 
literature to that effect. 
But this literature had little 
to do with Dr. Gabriel’s causal theory and therefore did 
not counter the proposition that his expert opinion was 
based on novel science. 
Therefore, 
a 
Davis-Frye 
hearing 
was 
more 
than 
justified in light of the information before the trial 
court when it ruled on defendant’s motion in limine. 
The 
proponent of expert opinion testimony bears the burden of 
proving that the contested opinion is based on generally 
accepted methodology.42
 Because there was no evidence to 
indicate that Dr. Gabriel’s theory was anything but novel, 
the trial court was required to conduct the Davis-Frye 
inquiry requested by defendant. 
Had 
the 
trial 
court 
conducted 
the 
assessment 
requirement by MRE 702, it might well have determined that 
42 Young (After Remand), supra at 475. 
20  
 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Gabriel’s theory was not “recognized” as required by 
our rules of evidence. 
Indeed, the evidence plaintiff 
offered in support of Dr. Gabriel should have provided 
sufficient notice to the trial court that his theory lacked 
general acceptance in the medical community. 
For one 
thing, Dr. Gabriel was unable to cite a single study 
supporting his traumatic injury theory during a voir dire 
conducted at trial. 
The only authorities he offered for 
the proposition that excessive amounts of Pitocin may cause 
cerebral palsy through the traumatic mechanism he described 
at trial were studies he cited in which Pitocin caused 
cerebral palsy in animals when given in excessive amounts. 
These studies did not involve the “bumping and grinding” 
mechanism on which Dr. Gabriel’s expert testimony relied. 
In fact, Dr. Gabriel expressly distinguished the mechanism 
to which he attributed plaintiff’s injuries from those at 
work in the animal studies. 
It would appear, then, that 
there was little evidence that Dr. Gabriel’s theory was 
“recognized,” 
much 
less 
generally 
accepted, 
within 
pediatric neurology. 
Second, had the court conducted the MRE 702 inquiry 
requested by defendant, it might have discovered that Dr. 
Gabriel’s theory lacked evidentiary support. 
Dr. Gabriel 
was unable to identify the specific part of Ms. Craig’s 
21  
 
 
 
 
anatomy with which, according to his theory, plaintiff’s 
head repeatedly collided during labor. Indeed, Dr. Gabriel 
pointedly refused to identify this anatomical structure on 
a chart, contending that such testimony was beyond his 
expertise. 
This failure to root his causal theory in 
anything but his own hypothetical depiction of female 
anatomy indicates that Dr. Gabriel’s testimony may have 
been too speculative under MRE 702 to assist the trier of 
fact. 
Finally, a Davis-Frye/MRE 702 hearing should have 
alerted the court to the error described in part IV. At no 
point did Dr. Gabriel opine that the traumatic and vascular 
mechanisms he described could cause cerebral palsy, or that 
those mechanisms might produce the asymmetrical development 
shown in plaintiff’s MRI. 
Thus, Dr. Gabriel’s testimony 
supported plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim only if the 
jury was permitted to assume, without supporting evidence, 
that a causal connection existed between these elements. 
As shown in part IV, this is not a permissible inference. 
Consequently, the court again had reason to conclude that 
Dr. Gabriel’s testimony could not have “assist[ed] the 
trier of fact” given the yawning gap between Dr. Gabriel’s 
testimony and the conclusions plaintiff hoped the jury 
would draw from it. 
22  
 
 
 
 
 
                     
Although the trial court clearly erred in declining to 
review Dr. Gabriel’s testimony before its admission, we 
need not determine whether reversal on this basis alone is 
warranted under the “substantial justice” standard of our 
court rules.43  For the reasons stated below, remand for a 
Davis-Frye hearing is unnecessary given plaintiff’s failure 
to 
establish 
the 
causation 
element 
of 
his 
medical 
malpractice claim. 
IV. JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
Even if plaintiff were able to show upon remand that 
Dr. Gabriel’s testimony was properly admitted, defendants 
would nevertheless be entitled to JNOV. 
The record reveals 
that the proofs submitted by plaintiff do not support the 
verdict rendered by the jury because of plaintiff’s failure 
to establish that defendants’ breach of the applicable 
standard of care proximately caused his cerebral palsy. We 
therefore 
reverse 
and 
remand 
for 
entry 
of 
judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. 
A.  STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW BACKGROUND 
In order to establish a cause of action for medical 
malpractice, a plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) 
the appropriate standard of care governing the defendant’s 
43 MCR 2.613(A). 
23  
 
 
 
     
 
                     
 
 
conduct at the time of the purported negligence, (2) that 
the defendant breached that standard of care, (3) that the 
plaintiff was injured, and (4) that the plaintiff’s 
injuries were the proximate result of the defendant’s 
breach of the applicable standard of care.44  These common­
law elements have been codified in MCL 600.2912a, which 
requires a plaintiff alleging medical malpractice to show 
that 
[t]he defendant, if a specialist, failed to 
provide the recognized standard of practice or
care within that specialty as reasonably applied
in light of the facilities available in the 
community 
or 
other 
facilities 
reasonably
available under the circumstances, and as a 
proximate result of defendant failing to provide
that standard, the plaintiff suffered an injury. 
Furthermore, the plaintiff in a medical malpractice case 
must establish the proximate causation prong of his prima 
facie case by a preponderance of the evidence.45 
“Proximate cause” is a legal term of art that 
incorporates both cause in fact and legal (or “proximate”) 
cause.46
 We defined these elements in Skinner v Square D 
44 Weymers v Khera, 454 Mich 639, 655; 563 NW2d 647
(1997). 
45 See MCL 600.2912a(2) (stating that “the plaintiff
has the burden of proving that he or she suffered an injury
that more probably than not was proximately caused by the
negligence of the defendant or defendants”). 
46 Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 162-163; 516 
24  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
                     
 
 
   
 
 
Co: 
The cause in fact element generally requires
showing that “but for” the defendant’s actions,
the plaintiff’s injury would not have occurred.
On the other hand, legal cause or “proximate
cause” 
normally 
involves 
examining 
the 
foreseeability of consequences, and whether a 
defendant should be held legally responsible for
such consequences.[47] 
As a matter of logic, a court must find that the 
defendant’s 
negligence 
was 
a 
cause 
in 
fact 
of 
the 
plaintiff’s 
injuries 
before 
it 
can 
hold 
that 
the 
defendant’s negligence was the proximate or legal cause of 
those injuries.48 
Generally, an act or omission is a cause in fact of an 
injury only if the injury could not have occurred without 
(or “but for”) that act or omission.49
 While a plaintiff 
need not prove that an act or omission was the sole 
catalyst for his injuries, he must introduce evidence 
permitting the jury to conclude that the act or omission 
was a cause.50 
It is important to bear in mind that a plaintiff 
NW2d 475 (1994). 
47 Id. at 163 (citations omitted). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. See also Prosser, Torts (4th ed, 1971), p 239. 
50 Jordan v Whiting Corp, 396 Mich 145, 151; 240 NW2d
468 (1976). 
25  
 
 
 
                     
 
 
 
 
 
cannot satisfy this burden by showing only that the 
defendant may have caused his injuries. 
Our case law 
requires more than a mere possibility or a plausible 
explanation.51
 Rather, a plaintiff establishes that the 
defendant’s conduct was a cause in fact of his injuries 
only if he “set[s] forth specific facts that would support 
a reasonable inference of a logical sequence of cause and 
effect.”52  A valid theory of causation, therefore, must be 
based on facts in evidence.53
 And while “'[t]he evidence 
need not negate all other possible causes,’” this Court has 
consistently required that the evidence “’exclude other 
reasonable hypotheses with a fair amount of certainty.’”54 
In Skinner, for example, we held that the plaintiff 
failed to show that the defendant’s negligence caused the 
decedent’s electrocution. 
Skinner was a product liability 
action in which the plaintiff claimed that the decedent was 
killed because an electrical switch manufactured by the 
defendant had malfunctioned.55  The plaintiff’s decedent had 
51 Skinner, supra at 172-173. 
52 Id. at 174. 
53 Id. at 166. 
54 Id. at 166, quoting with approval 57A Am Jur 2d,
Negligence, § 461, p 422. 
55 Skinner, supra at 157. 
26  
 
 
   
                     
 
   
 
   
 
     
 
  
 
   
built a tumbling machine that was used to wash metal parts, 
and had used the defendant’s switch to turn the machine on 
and off.56  Wires from the defendant’s switch were attached 
to the tumbling machine with alligator clips.57  Immediately 
before his death, the plaintiff’s decedent was found with 
both alligator clips in his hands while electricity coursed 
through his body.58 
In order to find that a flaw in the defendant’s 
product was a cause in fact of that electrocution, the jury 
would have had to conclude, in effect, that the decedent 
had disconnected the alligator clips and that the machine 
had 
somehow 
been 
activated 
again, 
despite 
being 
disconnected from its power source.59
 Not only was this 
scenario implausible, but there was no evidence to rule out 
the possibility that the decedent had been electrocuted 
because he had mistakenly touched wires he knew to be live. 
There was no evidence to support the plaintiff’s theory of 
causation.60
 Consequently, we concluded that the trial 
court had properly granted summary disposition to the 
56 Id.  
57 Id.  
58 Id.  
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
27  
 
 
 
 
   
                     
 
 
 
   
 
defendant. 
Mulholland v DEC Int’l,61 provides a useful factual 
counterpoint to Skinner. 
In Mulholland, the plaintiffs’ 
herd of milking cows contracted mastitis, a bacterial 
infection of the udder, after the plaintiffs began to use a 
milking system built by the defendants.62
 Key expert 
testimony was provided by Sidney Beale, an expert in 
agriculture and dairy science. 
Mr. Beale had observed a 
milking at the plaintiffs’ farm and deduced that the 
mastitis was related to the improper configuration of the 
milking 
system.63
 
He 
suggested 
that 
the 
plaintiffs 
implement certain changes, and, indeed, once these were put 
into practice, the plaintiffs noticed “a decrease in 
mastitis and an increase in milk production in the herd.”64 
We held, on the basis of this expert testimony, that 
the trial court improperly granted a directed verdict to 
the defendant.65  Because Mr. Beale’s testimony was based on 
his direct observation of the milking machinery, its use on 
the 
plaintiffs’ 
herd, 
and 
teat 
inflammation 
in 
the 
61 432 Mich 395; 443 NW2d 340 (1989). 
62 Id. at 399. 
63 Id. at 400. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 398. 
28  
 
 
   
 
 
                     
 
 
       
plaintiff’s herd following milking, a jury could have 
reasonably concluded, on the basis of this testimony, that 
the milking machinery caused mastitis.66  While Mr. Beale’s 
testimony did not rule out every other potential cause of 
mastitis, this fact merely related to the credibility of 
his testimony; his opinion was nevertheless admissible and 
sufficient to support a finding of causation.67 
B.  PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH CAUSATION 
The statutory and common-law background provided above 
makes it clear that a plaintiff’s prima facie case of 
medical malpractice must draw a causal connection between 
the defendant’s breach of the applicable standard of care 
and the plaintiff’s injuries. 
In this case, the evidence 
adduced at trial cannot support the jury’s verdict because 
plaintiff has failed to make the necessary causal links. 
Even if plaintiff had shown that defendants breached the 
standard of care, the jury had no basis in the record to 
connect 
this 
breach 
to 
the 
cerebral 
palsy, 
mental 
retardation, and other injuries now presented by plaintiff. 
At trial, plaintiff attempted to connect defendants’ 
purported violations of the applicable standard of care to 
66 Id. at 413.  
67 Id.  
29  
 
 
 
plaintiff’s injuries through the expert testimony of Drs. 
Paul Gatewood and Ronald Gabriel. 
Dr. Gatewood testified 
principally as a standard of care witness, interpreting the 
medical records of plaintiff and Ms. Craig, and opining 
that defendants breached the applicable standard of care by 
administering excessive amounts of Pitocin and by failing 
to use an internal uterine pressure catheter. Dr. Gatewood 
also testified that records from fetal and uterine monitors 
indicated that Ms. Craig experienced excessive and severe 
contractions, and that these reduced the flow of oxygenated 
blood to plaintiff both by compressing the umbilical cord 
and 
by 
reducing 
the 
periods 
of 
oxygenation 
between 
contractions. 
Dr. Gatewood testified that, as a result, 
plaintiff 
suffered 
from 
hypoxia 
and 
correlated 
decelerations in his heart rate. 
While Dr. Gatewood’s testimony connected defendants’ 
alleged breach of the standard of care to physiological 
symptoms displayed by plaintiff before his birth, he 
specifically declined to connect these prebirth conditions 
to the particular injuries for which plaintiff sought 
compensation. 
Indeed, Dr. Gatewood denied he had the 
requisite 
expertise 
to 
make 
the 
causal 
linkage 
and 
expressly refused to testify to a causal relationship 
between plaintiff’s neurological diseases and his prenatal 
30  
 
 
   
 
                     
care. 
He insisted instead that “what happened to the 
baby’s brain” was “[within] the purview of a neurologist.”68 
Plaintiff contended that the link between defendants’ 
negligence and plaintiff’s injuries was to be supplied 
instead by the expert testimony of Dr. Ronald Gabriel. Dr. 
Gabriel opined that plaintiff’s injuries were attributable 
to two mechanisms that affected plaintiff’s brain before 
delivery; he referred to these mechanisms as “traumatic” 
and “vascular.” 
According to Dr. Gabriel’s testimony, 
plaintiff sustained “traumatic” injuries when excessive 
uterine contractions induced by Pitocin caused plaintiff’s 
head to be “pounded or grinded [sic] into [his mother’s] 
pelvic rim” during her labor. 
Because of this pounding, 
68 This is a critical fact; the dissent’s analysis
suffers for paying insufficient heed to Dr. Gatewood’s
disclaimer of expertise regarding the etiology of cerebral
palsy. See post at 11-12. 
Indeed, the dissent seems to conflate the testimony of
plaintiff’s two principal experts by concluding that Dr. 
Gabriel’s “bumping and grinding” theory of causation was 
somehow supported by Dr. Gatewood’s testimony about the
dangers of excessive doses of Pitocin. 
In reality, there
was a fundamental gap between the theories proffered by
these experts. 
Dr. Gabriel testified that excessive doses 
of Pitocin caused plaintiff’s head to be ground against his
mother’s pelvic anatomy and that this grinding, in turn,
led to hypoxia. 
Dr. Gabriel did not testify that an
excessive dosage of Pitocin alone—that is, without head
compression injuries sustained from repeated contact with
maternal anatomy—could have caused plaintiff’s cerebral 
palsy. 
31  
 
 
 
 
 
plaintiff’s brain sustained compression injuries, which 
resulted 
in 
elevated 
venous 
“pressures” 
and 
impeded 
“arter[ial] blood flow.” 
Dr. Gabriel analogized this 
“venous component” to the distribution of water through a 
lawn sprinkler system, explaining that increased pressure 
in certain areas of the brain reduced the flow of 
oxygenated blood to outlying, “watershed” regions of the 
brain just as “the last sprinkler who [sic] gets the 
pressure is the least able to provide water for that area 
of the lawn.” 
The crux of Dr. Gabriel’s theory, then, was 
that plaintiff suffered traumatic head injury during labor 
and was detrimentally affected by that trauma and the 
accompanying vascular effects. 
Even if we accept Dr. Gabriel’s testimony in full, a 
fatal flaw remains in plaintiff’s prima facie case: Dr. 
Gabriel never testified that the injuries stemming from 
this pounding and its accompanying vascular effects could 
cause cerebral palsy, mental retardation, or any of the 
other conditions now presented by plaintiff. 
Dr. Gabriel began his testimony by explaining that an 
MRI image showed that plaintiff’s brain tissue had developed 
asymmetrically. 
He 
failed, 
however, 
to 
trace 
this 
asymmetric development either back to the traumatic and 
vascular mechanisms he described or forward to the specific 
32  
 
 
 
   
 
                     
 
neurological conditions presently displayed by plaintiff. 
Thus, how exactly the mechanisms he described led to 
cerebral palsy (as opposed to any other neurological 
impairment) and how they were connected to the asymmetric 
brain development depicted in plaintiff’s MRI was never 
explained.69 
It 
is 
axiomatic 
in 
logic 
and 
in 
science 
that 
correlation is not causation.70  This adage counsels that it 
is error to infer that A causes B from the mere fact that A 
and B occur together. 
Given the absence of testimony on 
causation supplied by Dr. Gabriel, the jury could have 
found for plaintiff only if it indulged in this logical 
error—concluding, in effect, that evidence that plaintiff 
may have sustained a head injury, combined with evidence 
that plaintiff now has cerebral palsy, leads to the 
conclusion that the conduct that caused plaintiff’s head 
69 Compare 1st of America Bank, Mid-Michigan v United
States, 752 F Supp 764, 765 (ED Mich, 1990) (finding that
the negligence of Air Force physicians proximately caused a
child’s 
cerebral 
palsy 
where 
the 
plaintiff 
and 
the 
defendant presented extensive testimony on the etiology of
cerebral palsy); Bradford v McGee, 534 So 2d 1076 (Ala,
1988) (holding that the plaintiffs presented evidence 
sufficient for the jury to determine that the defendant’s
negligence proximately caused their son’s cerebral palsy);
Dick v Lewis, 506 F Supp 799 (D ND, 1980). 
70 United States v O’Hagan, 521 US 642, 691 n 7; 117 S
Ct 2199; 138 L Ed 2d 724 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). 
33  
 
 
   
                     
 
injury also caused his cerebral palsy. 
Such indulgence is prohibited by our jurisprudence on 
causation. 
We have long required the plaintiff to show 
“that ‘but for’ the defendant’s actions, the plaintiff’s 
injury would not have occurred.”71
 Where the connection 
between 
the 
defendant’s 
negligent 
conduct 
and 
the 
plaintiff’s injuries is entirely speculative, the plaintiff 
cannot establish a prima facie case of negligence.72 
Here, 
any 
causal 
connection 
between 
plaintiff’s 
cerebral palsy and the events described by Dr. Gabriel had 
to be supplied ex nihilo by the jury. Therefore, the trial 
court erred as a matter of law in denying defendants’ 
motion for JNOV. 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and remand for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
V. SUCCESSOR LIABLITY 
Although we have established that plaintiff has failed 
to state a valid claim of medical malpractice, we must also 
correct an erroneous legal conclusion in the published 
opinion of the Court of Appeals. 
The panel held that Henry Ford Health Care Corporation 
71 Skinner, supra at 163 (emphasis added).  
72 See id. at 174.  
34  
 
 
 
 
 
   
                     
(Henry Ford)73 was liable as a corporate successor to 
Associated Physicians, P.C. 
To the contrary, we conclude 
that 
the 
trial 
court 
erroneously 
imposed 
successor 
liability on Henry Ford. 
At the time of the alleged malpractice in 1980, 
defendant Drs. Kittur and Gennaoui were employees of 
Associated 
Physicians, 
P.C., 
which 
was 
a 
medical 
professional corporation organized under the Professional 
Service Corporation Act.74 
Six 
years 
after 
plaintiff’s 
birth, 
Associated 
Physicians, P.C., began to consider the possibility that 
Henry 
Ford 
might 
take 
over 
its 
administrative 
and 
bookkeeping services. 
While Henry Ford was interested in 
pursuing this arrangement with Associated Physicians, the 
latter’s 
corporate 
form 
posed 
an 
obstacle. 
As 
a 
professional 
corporation, 
Associated 
Physicians, 
P.C., 
could neither legally merge with nor sell its shares to 
Henry Ford, given that Henry Ford=s shareholders were not 
physicians.75 
73 Henry Ford Health Care Corporation became Henry Ford
Heath System in 1989. For the sake of clarity, we refer to
both as “Henry Ford.” 
74 MCL 450.221 et seq. 
75 See generally Professional Services Corporation Act,
MCL 450.221 et seq. 
The shares of a professional 
35  
 
 
 
                     
Consequently, Associated Physicians, P.C., split into 
two entities. 
Its administrative portion was incorporated 
Associated Physicians Medical Center, Inc., a business 
corporation in which nonphysicians could legally share 
ownership and control. 
Its medical practice, however, 
became APMC, P.C., a new professional corporation. 
Henry Ford purchased all the shares of Associated 
Physicans Medical Center, Inc., in accordance with the 
Business Corporation Act.76  Henry Ford thereby became the 
parent corporation of Associated Physicians Medical Center, 
Inc. 
As the parties intended before the sale, APMC, P.C., 
entered into an agreement with Associated Physicians 
Medical Center, Inc., in which the latter controlled 
corporation may not be 
sold or transferred except to an individual who
is 
eligible 
to 
be 
a 
shareholder 
of 
the 
corporation or to the personal representative or
estate of a deceased or legally incompetent 
shareholder or to a trust or split interest 
trust, in which the trustee and the current 
income beneficiary are both licensed persons in a
professional corporation. [MCL 450.230.] 
An 
individual 
may 
not 
become 
a 
shareholder 
in 
a 
professional services corporation unless he or she is a
“licensed person.” 
MCL 450.224. 
A “licensed person” is
“an individual who is duly licensed or otherwise legally
authorized to practice a professional service by a court,
department, board, commission, an agency of this state or
another jurisdiction, or any corporation all of whose 
shareholders are licensed persons.” MCL 450.222(a). 
76 MCL 450.1101 et seq. 
36  
 
 
 
   
                     
billing, record keeping, and other administrative aspects 
of the medical practice. 
This arrangement ended in 1993, 
when APMC, P.C., dissolved before the initiation of the 
present lawsuit. 
Henry Ford argued that, because it assumed the 
ownership of only the administrative portion of Associated 
Physicians, 
P.C. 
(which 
was 
vicariously 
liable 
to 
plaintiff), 
the 
equitable 
concerns 
that 
justify 
the 
imposition of successor liability are not present in this 
case. 
The trial court severed the issue of Henry Ford’s 
successor liability. 
After a one-hour bench trial, the 
trial court held that Henry Ford was liable as a successor 
corporation to Associated Physicians, Inc. 
The Court of 
Appeals agreed. 
Both courts relied in part on the factors 
listed in Turner v Bituminous Cas Co77 as supporting the 
imposition of successor liability.78 
77 397 Mich 406, 430; 244 NW2d 873 (1976).
78 See Turner, 397 Mich 430: 
(1) There was basic continuity of the 
enterprise of the seller corporation, including,
apparently, a retention of key personnel, assets,
general 
business 
operations, 
and 
even 
the 
[corporate] name. 
(2) The seller corporation ceased ordinary
business operations, liquidated, and dissolved 
soon after distribution of consideration received 
from the buying corporation. 
37  
 
 
 
                     
 
 
   
We recently described the scope of successor liability 
in Foster v Cone-Blanchard Machine Co.79  There, we observed 
the “traditional rule” that successor liability requires an 
examination of “the nature of the transaction between 
predecessor and successor corporations.”80
 In a merger in 
which stock is exchanged as consideration, the successor 
corporation 
“generally 
assumes 
all 
its 
predecessor’s 
liabilities.”81
 When the successor purchases assets for 
cash, however, the successor corporation assumes its 
predecessor’s liabilities only 
(1) 
where 
there 
is 
an 
express 
or 
implied
assumption 
of 
liability; 
(2) 
where 
the 
transaction 
amounts 
to 
a 
consolidation 
or 
merger;[82] 
(3) 
where 
the 
transaction 
was 
fraudulent; (4) where some of the elements of a
purchase in good faith were lacking, or where the
transfer 
was 
without 
consideration 
and 
the 
(3) The purchasing corporation assumed those
liabilities 
and 
obligations 
of 
the 
seller 
ordinarily necessary for the continuation of the
normal 
business 
operations 
of 
the 
seller 
corporation. 
(4) The purchasing corporation held itself
out to the world as the effective continuation of 
the seller corporation. 
79 460 Mich 696; 597 NW2d 506 (1999). 
80 Id. at 702. 
81 Id. 
82 See Turner, supra at 419-420 (“It is the law in
Michigan that if two corporations merge, the obligations of
each 
become 
the 
obligations 
of 
the 
resulting
corporation.”). 
38  
 
 
 
  
                     
 
 
 
creditors of the transferor were not provided
for; or (5) where the transferee corporation was
a mere continuation or reincarnation of the old 
corporation.[83] 
Plaintiff has not alleged that the sale of Associated 
Physicians Medical Center, Inc., was fraudulent, in bad 
faith, or lacking in consideration. 
Likewise, plaintiff 
has adduced no evidence that Henry Ford expressly or 
impliedly assumed the liabilities of Associated Physicians 
Medical Center, Inc. 
Our inquiry therefore must focus on 
whether (1) the transaction was a consolidation or merger 
(either de jure or de facto), and (2) whether Henry Ford is 
a “mere continuation”84 of Associated Physicians. 
Plaintiff’s claim fails on both accounts. 
First, 
plaintiff does not allege that a de jure merger took place, 
and he has not demonstrated that a de facto merger 
occurred. 
A de facto merger exists when each of the 
following requirements is met: 
(1) 
There 
is 
a 
continuation 
of 
the 
enterprise of the seller corporation, so that
there is a continuity of management, personnel,
physical location, assets, and general business
operations. 
(2) There is a continuity of shareholders
which results from the purchasing corporation 
paying for the acquired assets with shares of its
own stock, this stock ultimately coming to be 
83 Id. at 702 (citations omitted).  
84 Id.  
39  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
                     
 
 
 
held 
by 
the 
shareholders 
of 
the 
seller 
corporation so that they become a constituent
part of the purchasing corporation. 
(3) 
The 
seller 
corporation 
ceases 
its 
ordinary business operations, liquidates, and 
dissolves as soon as legally and practically
possible. 
(4) The purchasing corporation assumes those
liabilities 
and 
obligations 
of 
the 
seller 
ordinarily 
necessary 
for 
the 
uninterrupted
continuation of normal business operations of the
seller corporation. [85] 
This transaction is not a de facto merger simply because 
Henry Ford, the purchasing corporation, paid in cash rather 
than stock. 
Thus, there is no “continuity of shareholders 
which results from the purchasing corporation paying for 
the acquired assets with shares of its own stock. . . .”86 
We also conclude that Henry Ford is not a “mere 
continuation” of Associated Physicians Medical Center, Inc. 
As the history recited above shows, Associated Physicians 
split into two entities immediately before Henry Ford’s 
purchase of Associated Physicians Medical Center, Inc. The 
professional 
corporation—Associated 
Physicians’ 
medical 
practice—became APMC, Inc. 
Henry Ford was therefore able 
to purchase only the administrative aspects of the former 
85 Turner, supra at 420 (citations, quotation marks,
and emphasis deleted), quoting Shannon v Samuel Langston
Co, 379 F Supp 797, 801 (WD Mich, 1974). 
86 Id. 
40  
 
 
 
 
  
                     
 
 
 
 
professional corporation. The core functions of the entity 
that originally became vicariously liable to plaintiff were 
carried on exclusively by APMC, Inc., a professional 
corporation, rather than the business corporation purchased 
by Henry Ford. 
Having analyzed the “nature of the 
transaction,”87 we can only conclude that the only company 
even 
arguably 
liable 
as 
a 
successor 
to 
Associated 
Physicians, P.C., is that which continued its medical 
practice—namely, APMC, Inc. 
Moreover, we have never applied successor liability in 
the medical malpractice context. 
Plaintiff has adduced no 
reason why we should do so in this case. Not only are the 
Turner/Foster 
requirements 
not 
met 
here 
but, 
more 
important, the policies that justify the imposition of 
successor liability are noticeably inapplicable here. 
We 
stated in Foster that 
[t]he thrust of the decision in Turner was to 
provide a remedy to an injured plaintiff in those
cases in which the first corporation “legally
and/or practically becomes defunct.” . . . 
The 
underlying 
rationale 
for 
the 
Turner 
Court's 
decision to disregard traditional corporate law
principles was to provide a source of recovery
for injured plaintiffs.[88] 
87 Foster, supra at 702. 
88 Foster, supra at 705-706. 
41  
 
 
 
  
 
 
Here, plaintiff has already sought and obtained a judgment 
from Drs. Gennaoui and Kittur, from Associated Physicians, 
P.C., and from Oakwood Hospital. 
Because plaintiff 
obtained a judgment against other sources, there was no 
need to impose successor liability on Henry Ford, even if 
the Turner/Foster factors had justified such liability. 
The trial court erred in imposing successor liability on 
Henry Ford and the Court of Appeals erroneously affirmed 
this ruling. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude that the trial court erred when it refused 
to grant defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict. Plaintiff failed to present any evidence from 
which the fact-finder could reasonably conclude that any 
breach of the applicable standard of care by defendants 
proximately caused his cerebral palsy, mental retardation, 
and other neurological conditions. 
In addition, the trial 
court improperly denied defendant Oakwood Hospital’s motion 
to 
compel 
an 
evidentiary 
hearing 
regarding 
the 
qualifications and theories propounded by one of the 
plaintiff=s expert witnesses. 
Finally, the trial court 
erred in concluding that Henry Ford Health Care Corporation 
was a corporate successor to the professional medical 
42  
 
 
corporation that employed Dr. Gennaoui. For those reasons, 
we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand 
the matter for entry of judgment in defendants= favor. 
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Clifford W. Taylor
Stephen J. Markman 
43  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
ANTONIO CRAIG, by his next
friend, KIMBERLY CRAIG, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
Nos. 121405 
121407-121409 
121419 
OAKWOOD HOSPITAL, HENRY FORD
HOSPITAL, doing business as
HENRY FORD HEALTH SYSTEM,
ASSOCIATED PHYSICIANS, P.C.,
and ELIAS G. GENNAOUI, M.D., 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
AJIT KITTUR, M.D., 
Defendant. 
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring). 
I concur with the majority in this case. 
I write 
separately, however, because I do not agree with some of 
the rationale regarding successor liability articulated by 
the majority in part V. 
Therefore, as it pertains to 
successor liability, I concur in the result only. 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
                     
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
ANTONIO CRAIG by his next
friend, Kimberly Craig, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
Nos. 121405 
121407-121409 
OAKWOOD HOSPITAL, HENRY FORD 
121419 
HOSPITAL, doing business as
HENRY FORD HEALTH SYSTEM,
ASSOCIATED PHYSICIANS, P.C.,
and ELIAS G. GENNAOUI, M.D., 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
AJIT KITTUR, M.D., 
Defendant. 
KELLY, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
I dissent from the majority's decision that the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying a Davis-Frye1 
hearing. I also disagree that there was insufficient 
evidence of causation. 
I agree with the conclusion that 
Henry Ford Hospital is not liable under the theory of 
successor 
liability. 
Therefore, 
with 
respect 
to 
the 
1 People v Davis, 343 Mich 348; 72 NW2d 269 (1955), and
Frye v United States, 54 App DC 46; 293 F 1013 (1923). 
 
 
 
defendants other than Henry Ford Hospital, I would affirm 
the rulings of both lower courts for plaintiff. 
The Davis-Frye Hearing 
Defendant Oakwood Hospital failed to present any 
substantiation for its motion asserting that the testimony 
of plaintiff's causation expert, Dr. Ronald Gabriel, was 
inadmissible 
because 
it 
was 
not 
recognized 
in 
the 
scientific community. 
Rule 2.119(A)(1)(b) of the Michigan 
Court Rules requires that a motion state with particularity 
the grounds and authority on which it is based. 
All that 
defendant stated was a conclusory and overbroad statement 
that 
[t]he 
testimony 
and 
opinions 
regarding
plaintiff's condition and the causes for it that
were offered by Dr. Ronald Gabriel in deposition
are groundless in the extreme and, by his own
admission, without support or even mention in
modern medical literature. 
To this statement, defendant attached several pages of 
Dr. Gabriel's deposition testimony. 
After reviewing them, 
I find that Dr. Gabriel's only relevant admission is that 
few recent studies regarding fetal head compression exist 
because it occurs rarely. 
The reason it occurs rarely is 
that fetal heart monitors and other medical technology help 
detect the conditions associated with it so that head 
compression is averted. 
2  
 
 
 
A lack of recent studies does not necessarily indicate 
that a scientific theory has been abandoned or has fallen 
into disrepute. It may indicate that the theory has become 
generally accepted. For instance, although there are no 
recent scientific studies showing the shape of the earth, 
the statement, "The earth is round," would be accepted in 
the scientific community. 
In its response to defendant's motion, plaintiff cited 
the Physician's Desk Reference and quoted a textbook 
describing the effects of labor on a fetus. Defendant 
offered nothing in response. Had it set forth specific 
grounds and authority to support the motion, a Davis-Frye 
hearing would have been appropriate. 
Under the majority's relaxed standard articulated 
today, whenever in the future a party claims that a theory 
is "groundless in the extreme," it appears that party will 
be entitled to a Davis-Frye hearing. This effectively 
removes from the trial court the discretion to decide 
whether a hearing is needed, making it automatic. Criminal 
defendants questioning proffered testimony regarding the 
psychological effect their actions had on a child victim 
could receive a Davis-Frye hearing on the bald assertion 
that the testimony is unacceptable in the scientific 
community. 
3  
 
 
 
                     
Defendant's written motion was vague. 
Attached to it 
was some of Dr. Gabriel's deposition testimony in which he 
stated that a compression injury occurred and that it 
resulted from the administration of excessive Pitocin. The 
court heard oral argument on the motion. 
In focusing on 
the expert testimony that it believed was inadmissible, 
defendant 
referred 
to 
Dr. 
Gabriel's 
testimony 
that 
plaintiff had experienced a traumatic head injury during 
childbirth. 
It asked for a hearing at which it might 
present an expert to testify that there is no scientific 
support for this theory. Defendant did not have an expert 
nor did it provide an affidavit signed by an expert 
indicating that Dr. Gabriel's theory is not recognized in 
the scientific community. 
In denying the motion, the judge noted: 
The problem with your [defendant's] motion
is you don't have any Affidavits. You don't have
any evidence in there that -- I mean, that there
should be a Davis Frye Hearing. I mean, it's just
you as an attorney saying that . . . .[granting a
hearing 
without 
any 
support 
for 
defendant's 
argument] would mean that everybody can come in
here and allege that whatever everybody's expert
is saying is not supported by scientific data, 
and I would have to hold a Davis Frye Hearing in
every single case where any expert had to 
testify. And that's not the standard. You have to
submit some evidence to me that I need a Davis 
Frye Hearing, other than you just saying it.[2] 
2 As did the judge in this case, others have noted the 
4  
 
 
 
                     
   
The judge indicated a willingness to revisit the motion 
should defendant provide support for its contention: "[Y]ou 
can submit anything additional. I will take a look at it. 
But that's my ruling today." 
Defendant never renewed the 
motion. 
difference between the burden of persuasion, which is on
the proponent of the evidence, and the initial burden of
production. "Because of judicial economy and the 'liberal
thrust' of the rules pertaining to experts, it seems 
reasonable to place the initial burden of production on the
opponent for purposes of [a] hearing." Gentry v Magnum, 195
W Va 512, 522; 466 SE2d 171 (1995). Appellate decisions in
the area offer "little guidance on how trial courts should
procedurally accomplish their gatekeeping responsibilities
without frustrating" the policy of liberal admissibility of
expert evidence. Alberts v Wickes Lumber Co, 1995 US Dist
LEXIS 5893 (ND Ill, 1995). 
Commentators have also addressed the problem. They
have noted that allocating the initial burden of production
to 
the 
opponent 
of 
the 
evidence 
"furthers 
the 
[]
gatekeeping 
objective 
without 
hampering 
the 
'liberal 
thrust' of the [rules of evidence]." Accordingly, the 
opponent's burden is merely to go forward with evidence
showing that the plaintiff's expert proof is inadmissible.
"Plaintiff bears the burden of showing by a preponderance
of the evidence that the expert's opinion is admissible."
Berger, Procedural paradigms for applying the Daubert test,
78 Minn L Rev 1345, 1365-1366 (1994). See, also, Brown,
Procedural issues under Daubert, 36 Hous L Rev 1133, 1140­
1141 (1999). While these decisions and articles deal with
the newer Daubert test, the inquiry about who bears the
burden of production is not affected. 
See Daubert v 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 US 579; 113 S Ct
2786; 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993). The change occasioned by the
adoption of the Daubert test relates only to what the
proponent must show to prove admissibility once the 
determination is made that a hearing is warranted. 
5  
 
 
The Michigan Rules of Evidence grant considerable 
deference to a trial judge in ruling on motions. 
With 
regard to preliminary questions, MRE 104(a) provides that 
questions regarding the qualification of a person to be a 
witness and the admissibility of evidence "shall be 
determined 
by 
the 
court 
. 
. 
. 
. 
In 
making 
its 
determination, it is not bound by the Rules of Evidence 
except those with respect to privileges." 
Contrary to the 
majority's assertions and in accordance with this rule, the 
trial court was not bound by MRE 702, which governs the 
testimony of expert witnesses, when it ruled on defendant's 
motion. 
It is without question that, once a defendant shows 
that a genuine issue exists with regard to a theory's 
acceptance, 
the 
theory's 
proponent 
must 
prove 
its 
acceptance in the medical community. 
But before that, the 
party raising the issue must present more than a conclusory 
allegation that an issue exists. 
Defendant failed to make the necessary showing in this 
case. 
It never provided support for counsel's proposition 
that 
Dr. 
Gabriel's 
traumatic 
injury 
theory 
lacked 
recognition in the scientific community. 
Even given the 
opportunity to provide support to the court, defendant was 
either unwilling or unable to do so. 
Hence, the trial 
6  
 
 
 
court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to hold 
a Davis-Frye hearing. 
The Evidence of Causation 
Defendants assert that plaintiff failed to present 
sufficient evidence that his damages were caused by 
defendants' medical malpractice to allow the case to go to 
the jury. In presenting its evidence of a prima facie case, 
a plaintiff must show causation but need not use any 
particular formulation of words. 
In this case, plaintiff's expert did not say "Antonio 
Craig's cerebral palsy was caused by hypoxia resulting from 
defendants' breaches of the standard of care." 
Although 
desirable, such precision is simply not mandated. 
"[T]he 
plaintiff's evidence is sufficient if it 'establishes a 
logical sequence of cause and effect, notwithstanding the 
existence of other plausible theories . . . ." Skinner v 
Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 159-160; 516 NW2d 475 (1994), 
quoting Mulholland v DEC Int'l Corp, 432 Mich 395, 415; 443 
NW2d 340 (1989). 
The trial court ruled found that plaintiff presented 
sufficient evidence. 
After the jury found for plaintiff, 
defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
The motion was denied, and on appeal defendants challenge 
that ruling. They question the sufficiency of the evidence 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
only with respect to the element of causation. 
The standard for reviewing a decision on a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict is deferential to the 
nonmoving party: 
If reasonable jurors could disagree, neither
the trial court nor this Court has the authority
to substitute its judgment for that of the jury.
[Matras v Amoco Oil Co, 424 Mich 675, 682; 385
NW2d 586 (1986).] 
The trial court found: 
Dr. Donn testified that Pitocin can cause 
both trauma and hypoxia. Dr. Gatewood testified
that 
Pitocin 
can 
cause 
compression, 
and 
compression can cause head injury. Dr. Dombrowski
testified that Pitocin can cause trauma and 
hypoxia. 
Dr. 
Gabriel 
testified 
that 
Antonio 
suffered 
a 
brain 
injury 
during 
labor 
and 
delivery, based on the character of the labor and
delivery, based on the fetal monitoring, based on
the positioning of the head, based on the MRI
findings, it was caused by the use of Pitocin. He
testified that there was compression of the head
in the pelvic ridge. There was elevation of the
venous pressure and loss of blood flow and the
loss of oxygen and fusing the brain. 
Testimony was also presented that an excessive dose of 
Pitocin causes cerebral palsy in animals. The majority 
notes that animal experiments are the only authority that 
plaintiff offered showing a correlation between excessive 
amounts of Pitocin and cerebral palsy. 
The implication is 
that animal studies are insufficient evidence upon which to 
base medical expert testimony. That is incorrect. 
Dr. Gabriel's authority was sufficient for a jury 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
reasonably to infer that the same effects occur in humans. 
Dr. Gabriel also testified that the animal studies were the 
types "upon which the American Medical Establishment 
formulated their warnings on the use of oxytoxic drugs." 
These warnings appear in medical reference materials 
discussing the effects of Pitocin. 
Defendants did not 
refute these statements. 
Dr. Gabriel testified that he believed that excessive 
Pitocin caused plaintiff's condition. He testified that the 
drug affected plaintiff in two ways. 
It produced both a 
vascular effect and a traumatic effect. 
At trial, Dr. 
Gabriel used the terms "pounding and grinding" to explain 
the traumatic component of the injury. He testified: 
In part, what happened to Antonio I think is
more complicated because I think there is a 
traumatic 
component 
as 
well 
as 
a 
vascular 
component. Those studies showed the vascular 
component, that is to say the reduced blood flow. 
Antonio also suffered from the trauma of the 
head being pounded or grinded [sic] into the
pelvic rim with successive uterine contractions
which were of a high pressure and which resulted
in marked decelerations. So I think it's a 
combination of vascular and trauma. 
Dr. Gabriel testified that what happened to Antonio Craig 
would not have happened without the administration of 
Pitocin. 
The majority focused attention on Dr. Gabriel's 
9  
 
 
   
                     
"pounding and grinding" theory as if it were the only 
theory that plaintiff presented. 
It was not. 
Dr. Gabriel 
testified that there were two different contributors to 
plaintiff's injuries. He claimed that plaintiff suffered 
from both a decreased blood flow and from a traumatic 
compression injury.3 
In 
addition 
to 
Dr. 
Gabriel, 
Dr. 
Paul 
Gatewood 
testified for plaintiff regarding the standard of care. He 
stated that an excessive dosage of Pitocin was given to 
plaintiff's mother. In his expert opinion, this was a 
deviation from the standard of care. Dr. Gatewood also 
explained that the administration of excessive Pitocin was 
3 The majority maintains that "Dr. Gabriel did not
testify that an excessive dosage of Pitocin alone . . . 
could have caused plaintiff's cerebral palsy." Ante at 31 
n 68 (emphasis in original). Yet, the majority begins its 
causation discussion by noting that "[e]ven if plaintiff
were able to show upon remand that Dr. Gabriel's testimony
was properly admitted, defendants would nevertheless be
entitled to JNOV." Ante at 23. Thus, for purposes of its
causation discussion, the majority assumes both theories
were admissible. Were this not the case, the proper outcome
should be a remand for a Davis-Frye hearing, not an 
appellate ruling that the defendants were entitled to JNOV.
The testimony of Dr. Gabriel indicates that excessive 
Pitocin 
causes 
reduced 
blood 
flow 
("the 
vascular 
component"). The studies showed a link between this 
vascular component and cerebral palsy. There was sufficient
evidence of causation, regardless of the majority's reading
of the record. 
10  
 
 
  
                     
the proximate cause of Antonio's injuries.4 
After Dr. Gatewood established a breach of duty, Dr. 
Gabriel testified that excessive Pitocin causes fetal brain 
damage and cerebral palsy in animals. In Dr. Gabriel’s 
opinion, the excessive Pitocin caused the fetal brain 
damage that led to Antonio’s cerebral palsy.5 In all, there 
was sufficient evidence to establish the element of 
causation. The jury was entitled to decide the case on the 
evidence presented. 
Conclusion 
The failure to hold a Davis-Frye hearing was not an 
abuse of discretion under the facts of this case. Defendant 
Oakwood had an obligation to provide support for the claim 
that Dr. Gabriel's traumatic injury theory was not accepted 
within the scientific community. 
Moreover, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to 
establish the element of causation. 
Both Dr. Gabriel and 
4 
When 
plaintiff's 
counsel 
asked 
whether 
these 
deviations "were the proximate causes of the reduced 
oxygen, reduced blood flow to the fet[us] here Antonio
Craig," the doctor answered "[T]hese deviations are a 
result in the hypoxic episodes . . . all of these factors
contributed to the development and prolongation of the
interim hypoxia that this baby's brain suffered." 
5 When asked whether Antonio’s cerebral palsy was
related to the administering of Pitocin, the doctor 
testified that “without Pitocin this would not have 
happened.” 
11  
 
 
 
Dr. Gatewood testified effectively that an excessive dosage 
of Pitocin gave rise to the conditions that caused the 
baby's injuries. 
Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the Court of 
Appeals on all issues except that Henry Ford Hospital is 
liable under a theory of successor liability. In that 
regard, I agree with the majority's conclusion that the 
Court of Appeals was incorrect. 
With that exception, the 
decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed. 
Marilyn Kelly 
12