Case Title: Noel v. Proud

Citation: 189 Kan. 6, 367 P.2d 61

Docket Number: 42,352

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1961-12-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
189 Kan. 6 (1961)
367 P.2d 61
MARVIN D. NOEL, Appellee,
v.
G.O. PROUD, Appellant.
No. 42,352

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 9, 1961.
John J. Alder, of Kansas City, argued the cause, and H.S. Roberts, also of Kansas City, was with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Stanley L. Lind, of Kansas City, and Vincent L. Bogart, of Wichita, argued the cause and were on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SCHROEDER, J.:
This is an action against a physician by a patient wherein breach of an express warranty is alleged as the basis for the recovery of damages. Appeal has been duly perfected by the defendant physician from an order of the trial court overruling a demurrer to the amended petition.
The question presented is whether the petition states a good cause of action sounding in contract or one in tort for malpractice. The statute of limitations would bar the latter but not the former.
The petition was filed January 30, 1960, in the district court of Wyandotte County, Kansas. After giving the plaintiff's residence as Sedgwick County and the defendant's residence as Johnson County, the amended petition alleges that the defendant is a duly licensed physician and surgeon under the laws of the State of Kansas *7 and engaged in the practice of his profession at the University of Kansas Medical Center in Kansas City, Kansas. It then alleges:
The demurrer lodged against the amended petition charges that it (a) does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; (b) shows on its face that the cause is barred by the statute of limitations; and (c) contains a confusion of theories.
It is readily apparent from the foregoing allegations of the amended petition that no allegations of negligence have been made concerning the conduct of the appellant physician. Negligence is an essential element of malpractice, and for a patient to allege a cause of action on the theory of malpractice he must allege a causal connection between the negligent act of the physician and his injury. (Natanson v. Kline, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670.) Therefore, the appellee has not stated a cause of action on the theory of malpractice.
We fail to see any confusion of theories set forth in the petition. The cause of action is based on a breach of an express warranty made by the appellant for a consideration and upon which the appellee relied. The appellant contends, however, that irrespective of any express warranties made by a physician to a patient the only cause of action predicated thereon must sound in tort and allege malpractice.
As early as 1870 the Kansas court recognized the general rule that a physician may contract specially for a particular result. In Erastus Tefft v. Hardin H. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46, the law was stated as follows:
It is generally recognized that a physician or surgeon may bind himself by express contract to perform a cure or obtain specific results by treatment or an operation. (41 Am. Jur., Physicians and Surgeons, § 105, p. 220; 70 C.J.S., Physicians and Surgeons, § 37, p. 942; 27 A.L.R. 1235, and supporting cases cited in these works.) *9 In Colvin v. Smith [1949], 92 N.Y.S.2d 794, 276 App. Div. 9, a physician and surgeon was unsuccessful in his attempt to remove a cataract from the plaintiff's eye. An action based on the alleged breach of a special contract for the removal of the cataract followed. The court said in the opinion:
A decision by the New York Court of Appeals to the same effect is Robins v. Finestone [1955], 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330.
In his brief the appellant relies upon Travis v. Bishoff, 143 Kan. 283, 54 P.2d 955; Graham v. Updegraph, 144 Kan. 45, 58 P.2d 475; Coulter v. Sharp, 145 Kan. 28, 64 P.2d 564; Foster v. Kopp, 151 Kan. 650, 100 P.2d 660; Becker v. Floersch, 153 Kan. 374, 110 P.2d 752; and Maddox v. Neptune, 175 Kan. 465, 264 P.2d 1073, and contends they "spell out the following mandate: (a) Substance prevails over form, (b) if the allegations reveal a surgeon performs an operation and damage results to the patient, the cause of action, if any, against the surgeon is `for injury to the rights of another' and (c) is governed as to the statute of limitations by Section G.S. 1949, 60-306 3rd (for actions arising in tort), (d) even if the action was in form for breach of a contract, and (e) whether through breach of contract or tort, the claim for damages from such physician is governed by the limitations for malpractice in view of its ex delicto (fault) source."
In each of the foregoing cases cited by the appellant recovery of damages was sought upon allegations of negligence which are characteristic of malpractice  acts tortious in nature.
Once the relationship of physician and patient is established by contract, either express or implied, there are implied in law certain warranties and obligations by reason of such relationship. As a result rules concerning the liability of physicians in malpractice *10 cases have become established. These rules have been frequently stated and many of them are collected in James v. Grigsby, 114 Kan. 627, 220 Pac. 267, where the cases are accumulated. Without further discussion or elaboration on such rules, the reader is referred to pages 631 and 632 in the James case. (See, also, Goheen v. Graber, 181 Kan. 107, 309 P.2d 636.)
To assist in showing the distinction between forms of action which are characteristically in malpractice and those sounding in contract, we shall again resort to a New York case for illuminating language. In discussing the form of action in malpractice, whether fraud, deceit, concealment or contract, the New York Supreme Court in Calebrese v. Bickley [1955], 143 N.Y.S.2d 846, 208 Misc. 407, affirmed as modified 150 N.Y.S.2d 542, said:
For Kansas malpractice cases on concealment see, McCoy v. Wesley Hospital & Nurse Training School, 188 Kan. 325, 362 P.2d 841; and Graham v. Updegraph, supra.
The improper performance by a physician or surgeon of the duties imposed upon him by reason of the professional services *11 undertaken, whether under a contractual relationship with the patient arising out of either an express or implied contract of employment or the obligation imposed by law under a consensual relationship, whereby the patient is injured in body and health for which he seeks damages, is malpractice. It has thus been said an action for damages for malpractice is one in tort, even though there was a contract, or implied contract of employment. (Cassity v. Brady, 182 Kan. 381, 321 P.2d 171.) And it is this situation  attempts to assert what is in substance a cause of action in malpractice as a cause of action in contract to avoid the two-year statute of limitations  to which the above Kansas decisions cited by the appellant were directed and apply. (In Maddox v. Neptune, supra, it was an attempt by the physician on demurrer to assert assault and battery alleged in the petition to invoke the one-year statute of limitations.) But these cases have no application to a cause of action based upon a special contract between a physician and his patient, or upon an express warranty by a physician for which there was consideration given by his patient, as here.
In Becker v. Floersch, supra, the petition alleged the defendant said he was an X-ray specialist and that he could guarantee to cure the tumorous growth that ailed the patient in ten X-ray treatments at $10 each, or for $75 in all. But these allegations were not asserted as a special contract in which the physician guaranteed to cure the patient. Concealment and continued treatment by the physician free of charge after the injury were asserted by the patient as grounds for avoiding the two-year statute of limitations.
We think the legal effect of the express warranty here alleged in the amended petition  "while the operations might not have any beneficial effect the plaintiff's hearing would not be worsened as a result of the operations"  is equivalent to a special contract for a particular result. (See, Frank v. Maliniak [1931], 249 N.Y.S. 514, 232 App. Div. 278.)
By his amended petition the appellee seeks recovery of payments made for the appellant's services, transportation expenses, and other doctor bills (Colvin v. Smith, supra; and Robins v. Finestone, supra), among other damages which need not be treated on demurrer to the pleading under attack. (See, McCoy v. Wesley Hospital & Nurse Training School, supra; Hawkins v. McGee [1929], 84 N.H. 114, 146 At. 641; McQuaid v. Michou [1932], 85 *12 N.H. 299, 157 At. 881; and Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199.)
The amended petition herein discloses upon its face the cause of action was not commenced within two years after it accrued, but that it was commenced within three years. G.S. 1949, 60-306, provides in pertinent part:
..............
The appellant contends the limitation of the action is not determined by the form of the action, but by its object, and since the action stems from bodily injury to the appellee it is barred by the two-year limitation period. (See, Annotation in 157 A.L.R. 763, 766.) Here again it is asserted the fault source lies in tort. This is in substance a continuation of the argument heretofore made by the appellant which has already been answered.
A case squarely in point has been decided by the Oklahoma Supreme Court which has a statute of limitations identical to the Kansas statute. It was held in Seanor v. Browne [1932], 154 Okla. 222, 7 P.2d 627, 151 A.L.R. 1031, where the plaintiff pleads a special oral contract that the defendant physicians agreed to cure the injury of the plaintiff for a reasonable fee and compensation, and further pleads a failure of the defendant to perfect said cure and pleads the amount paid the defendant for such service, the special contract thus pleaded is governed by the three-year statute of limitations.
Another authority to the same effect is Robins v. Finestone, supra. (See, McCoy v. Wesley Hospital & Nurse Training School.)
Analogy is to be found in our Kansas food poisoning cases where actions are permitted on an implied warranty and controlled by the three-year statute of limitations on the theory of contract, although the action stems from personal injury caused by eating food which is unfit for human consumption. The measure of damages in these cases is not confined to the price paid for the unwholesome or unfit food, but properly consists of all damages that were foreseen or could reasonably have been foreseen as likely to result from the *13 particular sale of the food in question. (Challis v. Hartloff, supra, and authorities cited therein.)
In conclusion we hold the amended petition states a cause of action sounding in contract and is controlled by the three-year statute of limitations. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
PRICE, J., dissenting:
Here the physician is alleged to have told the patient 
It then is alleged that as a direct result of the operations the patient's hearing was worsened.
In my opinion  looking through form to substance  such allegations amount to nothing more than that the physician either did not know what he was talking about or else was guilty of giving bad medical advice  when he made such statement  and therefore was guilty of negligence amounting to malpractice. Despite the allegations as to "agreements, promises and warranties," it seems to me  looking at this matter from a practical and realistic standpoint  that the real contention in this case is that the patient was the victim of "bad medical advice"  thus rendering the physician guilty of malpractice  in which event the two-year statute of limitations would apply.
I therefore believe the demurrer to the amended petition should have been sustained.
PARKER, C.J., joins in the foregoing dissent.