Case Title: People v. Curiel

Citation: 

Docket Number: S272238

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2023-11-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
FREDDY ALFREDO CURIEL, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S272238 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division Three 
G058604 
 
Orange County Superior Court 
02CF2160 
 
 
November 27, 2023 
 
Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in 
which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and 
Evans concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
S272238 
 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
In 2006, a jury convicted Freddy Alfredo Curiel of first 
degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 and found true the 
gang-murder 
special 
circumstance 
allegation 
(§ 190.2, 
subd. (a)(22)) and the criminal street gang sentencing 
enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).  The jury also found true 
two firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)) and 
convicted Curiel of active participation in a criminal street gang 
(§ 186.22, subd. (a)).  The trial court sentenced Curiel to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, consecutive to 
an indeterminate term of 25 years to life in prison. 
Twelve years later, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 
No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), which 
narrowed or eliminated certain forms of accomplice liability for 
murder.  (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.)  Among other things, 
Senate Bill 1437 barred the use of the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine to obtain a murder conviction.  (People v. 
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 851 (Gentile).)  Senate Bill 1437 
also created “a procedure for convicted murderers who could not 
be convicted under the law as amended to retroactively seek 
relief.”  (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) 
 
1  
Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code 
unless otherwise specified. 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
2 
Curiel petitioned for relief and resentencing under this 
new procedure.  (Former § 1170.95, subd. (a); now § 1172.6, 
subd. (a).)  He alleged, among other things, that he had been 
convicted of first degree murder under the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine and could not currently be convicted of 
murder because of changes to the murder statutes enacted by 
Senate Bill 1437.  After appointing counsel and receiving 
briefing, the trial court denied Curiel’s petition for failure to 
state a prima facie case.  The court believed the jury’s finding 
that Curiel “inten[ded] to kill,” which was required for the gang-
murder special circumstance, refuted Curiel’s allegation that he 
could not be convicted of murder under current law and 
therefore precluded relief under Senate Bill 1437.  Curiel 
appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed.  It held that the 
jury’s intent to kill finding was insufficient, by itself, to establish 
that Curiel was liable for murder under current law.  For 
example, to be convicted as a direct aider and abettor, the 
prosecution would have to prove Curiel harbored a culpable 
mental state (mens rea) and he committed a culpable act (actus 
reus).  The Court of Appeal held the jury’s intent to kill finding 
did not demonstrate the latter as a matter of law. 
We granted review to consider the effect of the jury’s true 
finding on the gang-murder special circumstance, specifically its 
finding that Curiel intended to kill, on his ability to state a 
prima facie case for relief under Senate Bill 1437.  As a 
threshold matter, we conclude that the jury’s intent to kill 
finding was properly given preclusive effect in the resentencing 
proceedings below, i.e., Curiel was bound by the jury’s finding 
for purposes of assessing his petition.  The jury’s finding 
satisfied the traditional elements of the doctrine of issue 
preclusion, and Curiel has not established any applicable 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
3 
exception.  (See People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 715–716 
(Strong).)  The trial court was therefore correct to consider 
whether Curiel could state a prima facie case for relief 
notwithstanding the jury’s finding of intent to kill. 
The trial court erred, however, in denying Curiel’s petition 
at the prima facie stage based on this finding.  The jury’s finding 
of intent to kill does not, itself, conclusively establish that Curiel 
is ineligible for relief.  Curiel’s allegation that he could not 
currently be convicted of murder because of the changes in 
substantive law enacted by Senate Bill 1437 put at issue all the 
elements of murder under current law.  Murder liability as an 
aider and abettor requires both a sufficient mens rea and a 
sufficient actus reus.  A finding of intent to kill, viewed in 
isolation, establishes neither. 
But that conclusion does not end the prima facie inquiry.  
The jury necessarily made other findings, which bear on Curiel’s 
liability for murder.  We discuss those findings below and 
conclude that they too are insufficient to rebut Curiel’s 
allegation of nonliability and conclusively establish that he is 
ineligible for relief.  For example, the mens rea required of a 
direct aider and abettor includes knowledge of the perpetrator’s 
intent to commit an unlawful act constituting the offense and 
the intent to aid the perpetrator in its commission.  (People v. 
Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225 (Perez).)  The jury’s verdicts, 
viewed in light of the court’s jury instructions, do not show the 
jury necessarily made factual findings covering these elements.  
Thus, the trial court could not reject Curiel’s prima facie 
showing on this basis, and it should have proceeded to an 
evidentiary hearing on Curiel’s resentencing petition.  Because 
the Court of Appeal likewise found that the trial court erred, 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
4 
albeit on different grounds, we affirm its judgment, which 
reversed the trial court’s order denying relief.2 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Trial Evidence 
A group of friends, including Cesar Tejada, were 
socializing outside of Tejada’s apartment late one night in 
August 2002.  Two men, later identified as Curiel and Abraham 
Hernandez, walked past the group toward a convenience store.  
One person in Tejada’s group, Raul R., testified at trial that 
Curiel and Hernandez looked at the group “in a bad manner.”  
Curiel stipulated that he was a member of O.T.H., a criminal 
street gang, at the time.  A prosecution gang expert testified that 
Hernandez was an O.T.H. member as well. 
After 
visiting 
the 
convenience 
store, 
Curiel 
and 
Hernandez approached the group.  According to recorded 
statements that witness Lupe O. made to police, Hernandez 
confronted Tejada, asked him “where he was from,” and started 
shoving him.  Raul came to Tejada’s aid, but Curiel got mad and 
said, “this is my neighborhood.”  Lupe responded, “it’s not your 
neighborhood,” and Curiel became angrier.  He started 
screaming that it was “his neighborhood” and “OTH.”  
Hernandez and Tejada started pushing each other.  At some 
point, Tejada grabbed Hernandez’s shirt and shoved him over a 
shopping cart.  Hernandez got up, took out a gun, and shot 
Tejada.  Curiel and Hernandez ran away. 
 
2  
Although Curiel was convicted of first degree murder, 
neither party contends the degree of Curiel’s murder conviction 
should affect the showing necessary for Curiel to state a prima 
facie case or for the Attorney General to rebut it. 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
5 
At trial, Lupe claimed she did not remember the events 
leading up to the shooting.  She eventually agreed that 
Hernandez started an argument with Tejada, but Curiel tried to 
get them to calm down.  Lupe said she had known Curiel for a 
long time, Curiel did not have anything to do with the shooting, 
and “he didn’t want [the shooting] to happen.” 
Raul testified that he remembered Curiel arguing with the 
group of friends, telling Tejada “something about gangs or the 
barrio,” and asking Tejada where he was from.  Tejada 
responded, “I am from nowhere.”  Raul told Curiel and 
Hernandez to leave, and Curiel responded it was none of Raul’s 
business, that he should “[s]hut the fuck up” and “get the hell 
out of here.”  Lupe and Curiel argued and traded insults.  
Hernandez pulled out a gun and chased one of the other friends.  
The friend ran behind Tejada, and Hernandez shot Tejada in the 
chest at close range.  On cross-examination, Raul was 
confronted with earlier testimony where he stated that 
Hernandez, not Curiel, asked Tejada where he was from. 
Tejada suffered a single gunshot wound to his upper left 
chest.  Residue or “stippling” around the wound indicated that 
Tejada was shot from approximately 12 to 18 inches away.  The 
wound was fatal. 
The prosecution’s gang expert testified that he had been a 
police officer for 24 years and specialized in gang-related crimes.  
He had spoken to many gang members over the years about 
gang culture, the expectations of gang members, and concepts 
like “backup and payback and respect and loyalty” in a gang.  
The gang expert testified that gangs can be organized around a 
race or ethnicity and they can be “turf-oriented” or “non[-]turf-
oriented.”  In his experience, most Hispanic gangs were “turf-
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
6 
oriented,” meaning that they held a particular neighborhood or 
claimed a particular area.  The gang expert explained that 
asking “where are you from” is a serious challenge or “hit-up.”  
He said, “If it is in your particular gang neighborhood and you 
see somebody else there, you are trying to identify them to see 
what they are doing . . . .”  The gang expert testified that he had 
investigated fatal stabbings and shootings that resulted from 
statements like “where are you from.” 
The gang expert further testified about the importance of 
“respect” in gang culture, which in reality means “fear and 
intimidation.”  For example, “[t]he more violent an individual is, 
the more respect he has within the gang and the more fear that 
he produces in the community.”  If a community member tells a 
gang member to leave or says “you don’t live here,” the gang 
member will probably react violently.  The gang expert 
explained that a gang member is expected to provide “backup” 
for fellow gang members who commit crimes, and a member may 
be punished for not providing sufficient backup.  Guns are 
important in gang culture, and in the expert’s experience, “if 
there is a gun within a group, that it is expected that everybody 
knows if there is a gun and who has it.” 
The gang expert was familiar with the O.T.H. gang, which 
the parties stipulated was a criminal street gang.  The expert 
had reviewed police reports involving O.T.H., talked with other 
detectives about O.T.H., and spoken with O.T.H. members 
themselves.  The gang expert testified that O.T.H. is a “turf-
oriented” gang, and Tejada’s apartment was within the territory 
claimed by the gang.  In response to a hypothetical question 
based on the facts of this case, the expert testified that Curiel 
would have been expected to provide “backup” to Hernandez 
during the confrontation with Tejada.  Moreover, in the expert’s 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
7 
view, Tejada’s shooting was done for the benefit of or in 
association with a criminal street gang, and it promoted and 
assisted the criminal conduct of a gang.  The expert explained, 
“[T]hese two individuals doing the hit-up on that other 
individual are promoting their particular gang in trying to push 
him out of that area by challenging him.  You know, ‘where are 
you from?’ ”  The shooting “elevates their status because they 
were willing to work, do the work for the gang, promote the 
gang, and act in a violent manner against somebody who would 
disrespect that particular gang.”  Yelling the name of the gang 
during the shooting would “promote that particular gang so that 
the witnesses hear that and they know who is doing it.  They 
know what gang it is and who is responsible for that violent act.” 
On cross-examination, the gang expert acknowledged that 
gang members commit crimes that are not for the benefit of a 
gang, and it is “not uncommon” for them to do so.  Every shooting 
by a gang member is not necessarily gang related.  Moreover, 
gang members do not constantly commit crimes.  They live in a 
neighborhood, they have jobs and families, and they interact 
with non-gang members without incident. 
Curiel testified in his own defense.  He said he had only 
seen Hernandez twice before the night of the shooting.  
Hernandez arrived at the house where Curiel was hanging out, 
and about 10 minutes later Curiel said he was going to the 
convenience store.  Hernandez asked if he could come along.  On 
the way to the store, Curiel saw Tejada’s group of friends.  
Hernandez asked who they were, and Curiel said they lived in 
the neighborhood.  On the way back, Hernandez walked away 
from Curiel and toward the group.  Hernandez approached 
Tejada and said something that Curiel could not hear.  Curiel 
followed and started speaking with Lupe.  Curiel heard Tejada 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
8 
tell Hernandez “you are making the area hot” and “you can’t 
come around here.”  Raul told both Hernandez and Curiel to 
leave.  Curiel told Raul to calm down.  Tejada shoved 
Hernandez, 
who 
tripped 
over 
something 
behind 
him.  
Hernandez got back up and shot Tejada “real quick.”  Curiel was 
surprised; he did not know Hernandez was armed.  Curiel ran 
away. 
Curiel said that, after he and Hernandez were arrested 
and in custody, he told Hernandez he was mad and angry.  But 
Curiel did not “want to hold a grudge against him,” and they 
started writing back and forth.  In one letter, Curiel wrote, “You 
are a good dude with a lot of cora and a good head on your 
shoulders, but with too much damn [pride].”  In another, Curiel 
wished Hernandez a happy birthday:  “I know it is on the 27th, 
but it is all good.  I will be the first to congratulate you.”  In 
closing, Curiel wrote, “And keep your head up all day every day.  
Free like O.J.  Much respect, F. Curiel.” 
In a letter to another friend, Curiel talked about 
communicating in code and mentioned Lupe:  “Let me know 
when you write about Lupe, what she says, but just change her 
name to . . . Eva and I will know who you are talking about.”  
Later, Curiel reminded the friend, “Please do all the above for 
me” and “especially talk to Lupe aka Eva.”  Curiel signed the 
letter with his gang moniker and wrote “O.T.H.” 
Curiel testified, “I wanted [the friend] to go and talk to 
[Lupe] because I don’t know if she — if she understood what I 
was facing.  And considering what she told the police that day, 
I — I knew she was lying . . . .”  Curiel explained that he wanted 
to use the name “Eva” because he did not want the prosecutor to 
think he was threatening Lupe if the letter were intercepted.  
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
9 
Curiel denied threatening Lupe or directing anyone else to 
threaten her. 
Several months before Tejada was killed, Curiel went with 
an accomplice nicknamed “Troubles” to steal shoes from a 
business.  Curiel went inside, took some shoes, and ran away.  A 
security guard pursued Curiel, and his accomplice slashed at the 
guard with a knife.  The accomplice fled; Curiel was arrested.  
He pleaded guilty to theft and aiding and abetting an assault 
with a knife.  Curiel claimed he did not know the real name of 
his accomplice. 
B.  Closing Arguments and Jury Instructions 
In closing arguments, prior to the court’s jury instructions, 
the prosecutor contended that Curiel had instigated the 
confrontation with Tejada and his friends.  He said Curiel “did 
the hit-up and he was there for backup.”  The prosecutor 
maintained that Curiel directly aided and abetted Tejada’s 
murder and was also guilty under the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine.  He argued that Curiel acted with both 
express malice (intent to kill) and implied malice.  For the latter, 
the prosecutor said Curiel committed acts that were dangerous 
to human life, such as confronting Tejada and acting as backup 
for Hernandez, and he consciously disregarded the danger to 
life.  The prosecutor also specifically discussed the gang-murder 
special circumstance.  He explained, “To prove that this special 
circumstance is true, the People must prove that, one, the 
defendant intended to kill.  [¶]  Remember, we talked about for 
both special circumstance[s] you can find the defendant guilty 
of first degree murder.  That doesn’t automatically make the 
special circumstance true.  You have to also determine if I prove 
to you beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the intent to kill.” 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
10 
Defense counsel emphasized that Curiel was not the 
shooter.  He went on, “And it is really important that, you know, 
we are clear on what [the prosecutor] has to prove with the 
specific intents and all the mental states to go through.  And it 
is very complicated, because my client is not — you have to crawl 
into his head.  You have to try to figure out whether or not [the 
prosecutor] has proven those mental states beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  Among other things, defense counsel noted that Curiel 
had “to know that Hernandez . . . intended to commit a crime, 
okay?  And he has to know and has to be proven that my client 
knew Hernandez’s unlawful purpose.  And the fact that he is 
just simply present does not make him an aider and abettor.”  
Defense counsel accused Raul of lying when he said Curiel asked 
Tejada, “where are you from?”  Defense counsel said Raul had 
previously attributed this statement to Hernandez, but he had 
changed his testimony for Curiel’s trial.  Defense counsel also 
criticized the prosecution’s gang expert based on his lack of any 
academic qualifications and his “junk expertise.”  Defense 
counsel disagreed that “all the guys that they think are gang 
members . . . all behave the same way.”  He attacked as 
“nonsense” the idea that “[i]f one gang member has a gun, they 
all know he has a gun.” 
In its jury instructions, the court identified Hernandez as 
the alleged perpetrator of Tejada’s murder.  It continued, “A 
person is equally guilty of the crime whether he committed it 
personally or aided and abetted or conspired with a perpetrator 
who committed it.  Under some specific circumstances, if the 
evidence establishes aiding and abetting of one crime, a person 
may also be found guilty of other crimes that occurred during 
the commission of the first crime.” 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
11 
For the theory of direct aiding and abetting, the trial court 
instructed the jury as follows:  “To prove that the defendant is 
guilty of a crime based on aiding and abetting that crime, the 
People must prove that:  [1] the perpetrator committed the 
crime; [2] the defendant knew that the perpetrator intended to 
commit the crime; [3] before or during the commission of the 
crime, the defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in 
committing the crime; and [4] the defendant’s words or conduct 
did, in fact, aid and abet the perpetrator’s commission of the 
crime.  [¶]  Someone aids and abets a crime if he knows of the 
perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and he specifically intends to 
and does, in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage or instigate 
the perpetrator’s commission of that crime.” 
The trial court also instructed the jury on aiding and 
abetting based on the doctrine of natural and probable 
consequences:  “To prove that the defendant is guilty of murder 
under the theory of aiding and abetting [based on] natural and 
probable consequences, the People must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that [1] the defendant is guilty of disturbing 
the peace or of carrying a concealed firearm by a gang member; 
[2] during the commission of the crime of disturbing the peace 
or of the crime of carrying a concealed firearm by a gang member 
the crime of murder was committed; and [3] under all the 
circumstances a reasonable person in the defendant’s position 
would have known that the commission of murder was a natural 
and probable consequence of the commission of the crime of 
disturbing the peace or of the crime of carrying a concealed 
firearm by a gang member.” 
The court went on, “A natural and probable consequence 
is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen 
if nothing unusual intervenes.  In deciding whether a 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
12 
consequence is natural and probable, consider all the 
circumstances established by the evidence.  [¶]  If the murder 
was committed for a reason independent of the common plan to 
commit the crime of disturbing the peace or the crime of carrying 
a concealed firearm by a gang member, then the commission of 
murder was not a natural and probable consequence of the crime 
of disturbing the peace.  To decide whether a crime of murder 
was committed, please refer to the separate instructions that 
will be given to you on that crime.” 
The court also instructed the jury on the elements of 
disturbing the peace and carrying a concealed firearm by a gang 
member, as well as conspiracy liability for murder based on 
those crimes.  The jury was told, “A member of a conspiracy is 
also criminally responsible for any act of any member of the 
conspiracy if that act is done to further the conspiracy and that 
act is a natural and probable consequence of the common plan 
or design of the conspiracy.” 
For the gang-murder special circumstance allegation, the 
court instructed the jury as follows:  “To prove that this special 
circumstance is true, the People must prove that:  [1] the 
defendant intended to kill; [2] at the time of the killing the 
defendant was a member in a criminal street gang; and [3] the 
murder was carried out to further the activities of the criminal 
street gang.” 
Following deliberations, the jury convicted Curiel of first 
degree murder and found true the gang-murder special 
circumstance allegation and the criminal street gang sentencing 
enhancement, as described above.  The trial court sentenced 
Curiel to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, 
consecutive to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life in 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
13 
prison.  The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in an 
unpublished opinion.  (People v. Curiel (Feb. 21, 2008, G037359) 
[nonpub. opn.].) 
C.  Resentencing Proceedings and Appeal 
Following the enactment of Senate Bill 1437, Curiel 
petitioned the trial court for resentencing.  (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)  
He alleged that he had been convicted of first degree murder 
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine and could 
not currently be convicted of murder because of changes to the 
murder statutes enacted by Senate Bill 1437.  In response, 
among other arguments, the prosecution contended the jury’s 
true finding on the gang-murder special circumstance allegation 
rendered Curiel ineligible for relief.  In the prosecution’s view, 
because the gang-murder special circumstance included an 
element of intent to kill, the record of conviction established that 
Curiel acted with malice aforethought (specifically express 
malice) and thus he was not entitled to resentencing as a matter 
of law.  The trial court agreed and denied Curiel’s petition. 
Curiel appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed.  
(People v. Curiel (Nov. 4, 2021, G058604) [nonpub. opn.].)  The 
appellate court accepted the jury’s finding of intent to kill, but it 
concluded the finding was insufficient to show that Curiel was 
ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.  It explained, “to 
convict a defendant for first degree murder under the theory of 
direct aiding and abetting, the prosecution must prove more 
than just murderous intent.  In addition to proving the 
defendant harbored the intent to kill, the prosecution must also 
show the defendant actually ‘aided or encouraged the 
commission of the murder[.]’ ”  The court continued, “In this 
case, the jury’s true finding on the special circumstance 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
14 
allegation did not prove this crucial additional requirement.  
Rather, it only satisfied the intent requirement for aiding and 
abetting a murder. . . .  While the jury established Curiel had 
the mindset of a murderer, they did not prove he committed the 
necessary acts to subject him to murder liability under that 
theory of culpability.”  The court reversed the order denying 
Curiel’s petition and remanded the matter for an evidentiary 
hearing. 
The Attorney General petitioned for review, which we 
granted.  We now address whether and under what 
circumstances a jury’s finding of intent to kill renders a 
defendant who seeks relief under Senate Bill 1437 ineligible for 
resentencing as a matter of law. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Senate Bill 1437 
The Legislature enacted Senate Bill 1437 “to more 
equitably sentence offenders in accordance with their 
involvement in homicides.”  (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(b).)  The 
Legislature recognized, “It is a bedrock principle of the law and 
of equity that a person should be punished for his or her actions 
according to his or her own level of individual culpability.”  (Id., 
§ 1(d).)  With this purpose in mind, Senate Bill 1437 “amend[ed] 
the felony murder rule and the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that 
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual 
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major 
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless 
indifference to human life.”  (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f).)  
Outside of the felony-murder rule, “a conviction for murder 
requires that a person act with malice aforethought.  A person’s 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
15 
culpability for murder must be premised upon that person’s own 
actions and subjective mens rea.”  (Id., § 1(g).) 
Senate Bill 1437 altered the substantive law of murder in 
two areas.  First, with certain exceptions, it narrowed the 
application of the felony-murder rule by adding section 189, 
subdivision (e) to the Penal Code.  Under that provision, “A 
participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a 
[specified felony] in which a death occurs is liable for murder 
only if one of the following is proven:  [¶]  (1) The person was the 
actual killer.  [¶]  (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, 
with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, 
induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the 
commission of murder in the first degree.  [¶]  (3) The person 
was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with 
reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision 
(d) of Section 190.2.”  (§ 189, subd. (e).) 
Second, Senate Bill 1437 imposed a new requirement that, 
except in cases of felony murder, “a principal in a crime shall act 
with malice aforethought” to be convicted of murder.  (§ 188, 
subd. (a)(3).)  “Malice shall not be imputed to a person based 
solely on his or her participation in a crime.”  (Ibid.)  One effect 
of this requirement was to eliminate liability for murder as an 
aider and abettor under the natural and probable consequences 
doctrine.  (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 846.)  “[U]nder the 
natural and probable consequences doctrine, an accomplice is 
guilty not only of the offense he or she directly aided or abetted 
(i.e., the target offense), but also of any other offense committed 
by the direct perpetrator that was the ‘natural and probable 
consequence’ of the crime the accomplice aided and abetted (i.e., 
the nontarget offense).  [Citation.]  A nontarget offense is the 
natural and probable consequence of a target offense ‘if, judged 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
16 
objectively, the [nontarget] offense was reasonably foreseeable.’  
[Citation.]  The accomplice need not actually foresee the 
nontarget offense.  ‘Rather, liability “ ‘is measured by whether a 
reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have or 
should have known that the charged offense was a reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of the act aided and abetted.’ ” ’ ”  (Id. 
at pp. 843–844.)  Thus, under prior law, a defendant who aided 
and abetted an intended assault could be liable for murder, if 
the murder was the natural and probable consequence of the 
intended assault.  (Id. at p. 844.)  The defendant need not have 
intended the murder or even subjectively appreciated the 
natural and probable consequences of the intended crime.  (Id. 
at pp. 843–844.)  Senate Bill 1437 ended this form of liability for 
murder.  (Gentile, at p. 846.) 
Senate Bill 1437 also enacted former section 1170.95, 
which created a procedural mechanism “for those convicted of 
felony murder or murder under the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine to seek relief” where the two substantive 
changes described above affect a defendant’s conviction.  
(Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843.)  Curiel’s petition for 
resentencing was adjudicated under this former section.  Two 
years later, the Legislature amended the statute to expand the 
population of eligible offenders, codify certain aspects of our 
decision in Lewis, and clarify the procedure and burden of proof 
at the evidentiary hearing stage of proceedings.  (Stats. 2021, 
ch. 551, § 1.)  One year after that, former section 1170.95 was 
renumbered as section 1172.6 without substantive change.  
(Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)  Because these statutory changes do 
not affect our consideration of the issues raised in this appeal, 
we refer to the current statute throughout the rest of this 
opinion. 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
17 
Under section 1172.6, “A person convicted of felony 
murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences 
doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a 
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, 
attempted 
murder 
under 
the 
natural 
and 
probable 
consequences doctrine, or manslaughter may file a petition with 
the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s 
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction vacated 
and to be resentenced on any remaining counts . . . .”  (§ 1172.6, 
subd. (a).) 
“[T]he process begins with the filing of a petition 
containing a declaration that all requirements for eligibility are 
met ([§ 1172.6], subd. (b)(1)(A)), including that ‘[t]he petitioner 
could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder 
because of changes to [Penal Code] Section 188 or 189 made 
effective January 1, 2019,’ the effective date of Senate Bill 1437 
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3)).”  (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.)  
“When the trial court receives a petition containing the 
necessary declaration and other required information, the court 
must evaluate the petition ‘to determine whether the petitioner 
has made a prima facie case for relief.’  (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); 
[citation].)  If the petition and record in the case establish 
conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial 
court may dismiss the petition.  (See § 1172.6, subd. (c); 
[citation].)  If, instead, the defendant has made a prima facie 
showing of entitlement to relief, ‘the court shall issue an order 
to show cause.’  (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)”  (Strong, at p. 708.) 
“Within 60 days after the order to show cause has issued, 
the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate 
the murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction and 
to recall the sentence and resentence the petitioner on any 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
18 
remaining counts in the same manner as if the petitioner had 
not previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence, 
if any, is not greater than the initial sentence.”  (§ 1172.6, 
subd. (d)(1).)  “At the hearing to determine whether the 
petitioner is entitled to relief, the burden of proof shall be on the 
prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under 
California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 
made effective January 1, 2019.”  (Id., subd. (d)(3).) 
B.  Issue Preclusion 
As noted, the trial court denied Curiel’s petition at the 
prima facie stage based on the jury’s intent to kill finding.  The 
Court of Appeal disagreed that the intent to kill finding 
precluded relief, but it still treated the finding as conclusive on 
the issue of Curiel’s intent.  In this court, however, Curiel raises 
a more basic question:  Should the jury’s intent to kill finding be 
considered at all?  Curiel believes it should not.  He relies on 
general principles of issue preclusion to argue that the jury’s 
finding should not impact a court’s assessment of his 
resentencing petition, either because the traditional elements of 
issue preclusion have not been satisfied or, alternatively, 
because an equitable exception to preclusion should be applied.  
Curiel’s argument is unpersuasive. 
We recently examined the preclusive effect of a different 
jury finding in Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th 698.  There, we rejected 
the argument that section 1172.6 categorically prohibited the 
consideration of factual findings made by a jury in the 
defendant’s underlying trial.  (Strong, at p. 714.)  We reasoned 
that “the structure of the statute — which permits trial courts 
to consult the record of conviction to determine whether the 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
19 
defendant has made out a prima facie case of eligibility 
[citation], and which notably does not open resentencing to 
every previously convicted murder defendant — strongly 
suggests the Legislature contemplated that many, and perhaps 
most, such findings would be given effect on resentencing.  Had 
the Legislature intended to permit wholesale relitigation of 
findings supporting murder convictions in the context of 
section 1172.6 resentencing, we expect it would have said so 
more plainly.”  (Id. at p. 715.) 
Because the resentencing statute itself does not prohibit 
the consideration of jury findings — and in fact affirmatively 
contemplates it — we determined that general principles of 
issue preclusion informed our consideration of the effect of prior 
jury findings in a resentencing proceeding under section 1172.6.  
(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 715–716.)  Curiel therefore 
frames his argument in terms of issue preclusion, as does the 
Attorney General in response.  Without deciding whether this 
doctrine applies wholesale to criminal resentencing proceedings 
generally, or even section 1172.6 proceedings specifically, we 
continue to believe its contours are informative in this context 
and rely on them again here. 
“In general, whether a prior finding will be given 
conclusive effect in a later proceeding is governed by the 
doctrine of issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel.”  
(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 715.)  “The doctrine of collateral 
estoppel, or issue preclusion, is firmly embedded in both federal 
and California common law.  It is grounded on the premise that 
‘once an issue has been resolved in a prior proceeding, there is 
no further factfinding function to be performed.’  [Citation.]  
‘Collateral estoppel . . . has the dual purpose of protecting 
litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
20 
the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy 
by preventing needless litigation.’ ”  (Murray v. Alaska 
Airlines, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 860, 864, fn. omitted (Murray).) 
“As traditionally understood and applied, issue preclusion 
bars relitigation of issues earlier decided ‘only if several 
threshold requirements are fulfilled.  First, the issue sought to 
be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided 
in a former proceeding.  Second, this issue must have been 
actually litigated in the former proceeding.  Third, it must have 
been necessarily decided in the former proceeding.  Fourth, the 
decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the 
merits.  Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought 
must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former 
proceeding.’ ”  (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 716.)  “The party 
asserting collateral estoppel bears the burden of establishing 
these requirements.”  (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 
335, 341 (Lucido).) 
Curiel argues two of these requirements are missing:  
first, whether the intent to kill finding was actually litigated, 
and second, whether it was necessarily decided.  “An issue is 
actually litigated ‘[w]hen [it] is properly raised, by the pleadings 
or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is 
determined . . . .’ ”  (People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 484 
(Sims), quoting Rest.2d Judgments (1982) § 27, com. d, p. 255.)  
An issue is necessarily decided so long as it was not “ ‘entirely 
unnecessary’ to the judgment in the initial proceeding.”  (Lucido, 
supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 342.)  “In considering whether these 
criteria have been met, courts look carefully at the entire record 
from the prior proceeding, including the pleadings, the evidence, 
the jury instructions, and any special jury findings or verdicts.”  
(Hernandez v. City of Pomona (2009) 46 Cal.4th 501, 511.) 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
21 
The record here shows that Curiel’s intent to kill was 
actually litigated and necessarily decided.  The prosecution 
alleged the gang-murder special circumstance, which included 
an intent to kill element, and Curiel put all elements of the 
special circumstance at issue by pleading not guilty.  (See People 
v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th 346, 372.)  The court instructed the 
jury it could not find the special circumstance allegation true 
unless it determined Curiel “intended to kill.”  By finding the 
special circumstance allegation true, the jury necessarily found 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Curiel intended to kill.  
(See Rest.2d Judgments, supra, § 27, com. g, pp. 257–258 [“If 
several issues are litigated in an action, and a judgment cannot 
properly be rendered in favor of one party unless all of the issues 
are decided in his favor, and judgment is given for him, the 
judgment is conclusive with respect to all the issues”].) 
Curiel contends his intent to kill was not actually litigated 
because his counsel did not specifically address the special 
circumstance in closing argument.  But this element of issue 
preclusion requires only “ ‘the opportunity to litigate . . . not 
whether the litigant availed himself or herself of the 
opportunity.’ ”  (Murray, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 869; accord, 
Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 484 [a party’s “failure to present 
evidence at the hearing did not preclude the . . . issue from being 
‘submitted’ to and ‘determined’ ” by the trier of fact].)  Curiel 
cites 
Hardy 
v. 
America’s 
Best 
Home 
Loans 
(2014) 
232 Cal.App.4th 795, 806, for the proposition that the parties in 
the underlying action must have “ ‘disputed the issue’ ” for it to 
have been actually litigated.  But here, Curiel did dispute the 
issue by pleading not guilty, and the dispute was submitted to 
the jury for decision.  As the authority quoted by Hardy itself 
currently goes on to explain, “The rule that collateral estoppel 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
22 
applies only to those issues that were actually or fully litigated 
in the prior proceeding does not refer to the quality or quantity 
of argument or evidence addressed to an issue. . . .  Issue 
preclusion because of a prior adjudication results from the 
resolution of a question in issue, not from the litigation of 
specific arguments directed to the issue.”  (50 C.J.S. (2023) 
Judgments, § 1014, fns. omitted.)  The decision by Curiel’s 
counsel not to specifically address the special circumstance was 
a matter of trial strategy, which “would no more defeat the plea 
of collateral estoppel than the failure of a litigant to introduce 
relevant available evidence in any other situation.”  (Teitelbaum 
Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Insurance Co., Ltd. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 601, 
607.)3 
Separately, Curiel contends the issue of his intent to kill 
was not necessarily decided.  He points to the trial court’s jury 
instructions on conspiracy, which told the jury that a member of 
a conspiracy is “criminally responsible,” under certain 
circumstances, for the acts and statements of other members of 
the conspiracy.  (CALCRIM former Nos. 416, 417.)  But the 
instructions went on to explain the requirements for Curiel to 
 
3  
Curiel relies on People v. Gonzalez (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 
420, 433, which found no actual litigation under similar 
circumstances.  Gonzalez failed to appreciate that the 
dispositive question is a litigant’s opportunity to litigate, not the 
litigant’s actual conduct at trial.  (Murray, supra, 50 Cal.4th at 
p. 869.)  It was therefore incorrect to reject issue preclusion on 
this basis.  Gonzalez also reasoned that issue preclusion is 
unavailable where the resentencing statute does not specifically 
identify 
the 
relevant 
special 
circumstance 
finding 
as 
disqualifying.  (Gonzalez, at p. 434.)  This conclusion, too, is 
incorrect.  (See Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 714–715.)  We 
disapprove of People v. Gonzalez, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th 420 on 
these points. 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
23 
be liable for murder as a co-conspirator, not any special 
circumstance.  The special circumstance instructions separately 
required the jury to find that Curiel intended to kill, and the 
prosecutor explained this requirement to the jury in closing 
arguments.  He stated, “Remember, we talked about for both 
special circumstance[s] you can find the defendant guilty of first 
degree murder.  That doesn’t automatically make the special 
circumstance true.  You have to also determine if I prove to you 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the intent to kill.”  By 
finding the special circumstance allegation true, the jury 
necessarily decided that Curiel intended to kill. 
We therefore conclude the jury’s intent to kill finding 
meets the traditional threshold requirements for issue 
preclusion.  This conclusion is consistent with our observation 
in Strong that a relevant jury finding is generally preclusive in 
section 1172.6 proceedings, i.e., it “ordinarily establish[es] a 
defendant’s ineligibility for resentencing under Senate Bill 1437 
and thus preclude[s] the defendant from making a prima facie 
case for relief.”  (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 710.)  Indeed, it 
is difficult to foresee a situation in which a relevant jury finding, 
embodied in a final criminal judgment, would not meet the 
traditional elements of issue preclusion. 
However, this conclusion does not end our inquiry.  
“[W]hile these threshold requirements are necessary, they are 
not always sufficient:  ‘Even if the[] threshold requirements are 
satisfied, the doctrine will not be applied if such application 
would not serve its underlying fundamental principles’ of 
promoting efficiency while ensuring fairness to the parties.”  
(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 716.) 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
24 
In Strong, we applied “one well-settled equitable exception 
to the general rule” of issue preclusion, which “holds that 
preclusion does not apply when there has been a significant 
change in the law since the factual findings were rendered that 
warrants reexamination of the issue.”  (Strong, supra, 
13 Cal.5th at p. 716.)  “This exception ensures basic fairness by 
allowing for relitigation where ‘the change in the law [is] such 
that preclusion would result in a manifestly inequitable 
administration of the laws.’  [Citation.]  It also reflects a 
recognition that in the face of this sort of legal change, the 
equitable policies that underlie the doctrine of issue 
preclusion — ‘preservation of the integrity of the judicial 
system, promotion of judicial economy, and protection of 
litigants from harassment by vexatious litigation’ [citation] — 
are at an ebb.”  (Id. at p. 717.) 
The significant change in the law identified in Strong 
concerned the felony-murder special circumstance, specifically 
its requirement that an aider and abettor act “with reckless 
indifference to human life and as a major participant” in the 
underlying felony to be liable.  (§ 190.2, subd. (d); Strong, supra, 
13 Cal.5th at p. 703.)  These terms were “ ‘derive[d] verbatim’ 
from United States Supreme Court precedent concerning the 
permissible scope of capital punishment for felony murder.  
[Citation.]  But for the next quarter century, neither the United 
States Supreme Court nor California courts offered much 
guidance about the major participant or reckless indifference 
standards . . . .”  (Strong, at p. 705.)  After this court provided 
guidance in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. 
Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, we recognized that certain 
defendants may have been found liable for the special 
circumstance based on conduct that was later found insufficient.  
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
25 
(In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 676.)  We held that such 
defendants 
were 
entitled 
to 
relief 
in 
habeas 
corpus 
notwithstanding the finality of their convictions.  (Ibid.) 
Because a jury’s felony-murder special-circumstance 
finding made before Banks and Clark carries with it a 
significant risk that it does not reflect a determination under 
the correct legal standard, Strong held that those decisions 
“represent the sort of significant change that has traditionally 
been thought to warrant reexamination of an earlier-litigated 
issue.”  (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 717.)  “There are many 
petitioners with pre-Banks and Clark felony-murder special-
circumstance findings who nevertheless could not be convicted 
of murder today.”  (Ibid.)  It would therefore be inequitable to 
give preclusive effect to those findings in later resentencing 
proceedings under section 1172.6.  “For petitioners with pre-
Banks/Clark findings, no judge or jury has ever found the 
currently required degree of culpability for a first time.  
Allowing reexamination of the issue under these circumstances 
does not permit ‘a second bite of the apple’ because the changes 
in the law mean there is now ‘a different apple.’ ”  (Strong, at 
p. 718.) 
Curiel has not identified any similar change in the law 
that would justify a departure from the general rule of issue 
preclusion.  The intent to kill finding that was required at the 
time of Curiel’s trial was governed by the same standards that 
exist today.  There has been no intervening change in the law 
akin to Banks and Clark. 
Sidestepping the substantive law governing the finding 
itself, Curiel argues that other changes in the law, specifically 
those governing the admissibility of expert testimony, provide 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
26 
sufficient support for an equitable exception to issue preclusion.  
He attempts to link these changes to the jury’s finding of intent 
to kill by arguing that the jury would not have made the finding 
if the expert testimony at his trial had not been admitted.  It 
does not appear that this court or any lower California court has 
addressed whether a change in the law governing the 
admissibility of evidence is sufficient to invoke an equitable 
exception to issue preclusion.  However, even assuming that 
such a change could be sufficient under certain circumstances, 
Curiel has not justified the application of an equitable exception 
under the circumstances here.  He has not shown there has been 
a significant change in the law that would have resulted in a 
different factual finding under the law as it exists today.  
(See Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 716.) 
Curiel correctly points out that this court narrowed the 
permissible scope of expert testimony in People v. Sanchez 
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez).  Unlike lay witnesses, experts 
are allowed as a matter of necessity to testify to certain matters 
that would otherwise be excluded as hearsay:  “In addition to 
matters within their own personal knowledge, experts may 
relate information acquired through their training and 
experience, even though that information may have been 
derived from conversations with others, lectures, study of 
learned treatises, etc.”  (Id. at p. 675.)  “The hearsay rule has 
traditionally not barred an expert’s testimony regarding his 
general knowledge in his field of expertise.  ‘[T]he common law 
recognized that experts frequently acquired their knowledge 
from hearsay, and that “to reject a professional physician or 
mathematician because the fact or some facts to which he 
testifies are known to him only upon the authority of others 
would be to ignore the accepted methods of professional work 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
27 
and to insist on . . . impossible standards.”  Thus, the common 
law accepted that an expert’s general knowledge often came 
from inadmissible evidence.’ ”  (Id. at p. 676.) 
“By contrast, an expert has traditionally been precluded 
from relating case-specific facts about which the expert has no 
independent knowledge.  Case-specific facts are those relating 
to the particular events and participants alleged to have been 
involved in the case being tried.  Generally, parties try to 
establish the facts on which their theory of the case depends by 
calling witnesses with personal knowledge of those case-specific 
facts.  An expert may then testify about more generalized 
information to help jurors understand the significance of those 
case-specific facts.  An expert is also allowed to give an opinion 
about what those facts may mean.  The expert is generally not 
permitted, however, to supply case-specific facts about which he 
has no personal knowledge.”  (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at 
p. 676.) 
Sanchez explained, “At common law, the treatment of an 
expert’s testimony as to general background information and 
case-specific hearsay differed significantly.  However, the line 
between the two has now become blurred.”  (Sanchez, supra, 
63 Cal.4th at p. 678.)  Under the modern approach, “in support 
of his opinion, an expert is entitled to explain to the jury the 
‘matter’ upon which he relied, even if that matter would 
ordinarily be inadmissible.”  (Id. at p. 679; see Evid. Code, 
§§ 801, 802.)  “When that matter is hearsay, there is a question 
as to how much substantive detail may be given by the expert 
and how the jury may consider the evidence in evaluating the 
expert’s opinion.  It has long been the rule that an expert may 
not ‘ “under the guise of reasons [for an opinion] bring before the 
jury incompetent hearsay evidence.” ’ ”  (Sanchez, at p. 678.) 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
28 
Prior to Sanchez, courts sought to avoid this hearsay issue 
by instructing the jury that an expert’s testimony regarding the 
matters on which his or her opinion were based should be used 
only to evaluate the opinion and “ ‘should not be considered for 
their truth.’ ”  (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 679, quoting 
People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 919.)  Sanchez found this 
practice untenable with respect to case-specific facts.  “When an 
expert relies on hearsay to provide case-specific facts, considers 
the statements as true, and relates them to the jury as a reliable 
basis for the expert’s opinion, it cannot logically be asserted that 
the hearsay content is not offered for its truth.  In such a case, 
‘the validity of [the expert’s] opinion ultimately turn[s] on the 
truth’ [citation] of the hearsay statement.”  (Sanchez, at 
pp. 682–683.)  Thus, under Sanchez, “If an expert testifies to 
case-specific out-of-court statements to explain the bases for his 
opinion, those statements are necessarily considered by the jury 
for their truth, thus rendering them hearsay.  Like any other 
hearsay evidence, it must be properly admitted through an 
applicable hearsay exception.  Alternatively, the evidence can be 
admitted through an appropriate witness and the expert may 
assume its truth in a properly worded hypothetical question in 
the traditional manner.”  (Id. at p. 684, fn. omitted.)  A limiting 
instruction no longer provides justification for such case-specific 
hearsay testimony. 
Nonetheless, an “expert may still rely on hearsay in 
forming an opinion, and may tell the jury in general terms that 
he did so.  Because the jury must independently evaluate the 
probative value of an expert’s testimony, Evidence Code 
section 802 properly allows an expert to relate generally the 
kind and source of the ‘matter’ upon which his opinion rests.  . . .  
There is a distinction to be made between allowing an expert to 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
29 
describe the type or source of the matter relied upon as opposed 
to presenting, as fact, case-specific hearsay that does not 
otherwise fall under a statutory exception.”  (Sanchez, supra, 
63 Cal.4th at pp. 685–686.) 
Thus, although Sanchez narrowed the scope of permissible 
expert testimony, it did not impact the ability of an expert to 
rely on hearsay evidence to reach his or her opinions, relate 
those opinions to the jury, and explain in general terms their 
bases.  Nor did Sanchez foreclose the introduction of case-
specific evidence through other means.  Given this limited scope, 
we see no reasonable likelihood that the jury’s substantive 
finding in this case would have been different if Sanchez had 
been the law during Curiel’s trial.  The change in the law 
effected by Sanchez does not support Curiel’s claim that the 
finding should not be given preclusive effect.   
Resisting this conclusion, Curiel focuses on the specific 
circumstances of his trial and the testimony of the prosecution’s 
gang expert.  But even assuming it is proper to consider these 
circumstances, Curiel has not shown it would be inequitable to 
give preclusive effect to the jury’s intent to kill finding.  To begin, 
Curiel appears to misunderstand the import of Sanchez, and he 
fails to substantiate his assertion that large portions of the gang 
expert’s testimony would be inadmissible under current law.  He 
repeatedly attacks the expert’s opinion testimony as being 
“based on hearsay” or “founded in hearsay.”  But it is not 
improper under Sanchez for an expert to consider and rely on 
case-specific hearsay in forming his or her opinions.  (Sanchez, 
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 685.)  “The limitations that Sanchez 
placed on expert testimony concern case-specific information 
that an expert relates to a jury, not materials upon which the 
expert relies.”  (People v. Camacho (2022) 14 Cal.5th 77, 128.)  
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
30 
Curiel also cites the expert’s testimony about the characteristics 
of Curiel’s gang, O.T.H., and the culture of criminal street gangs 
in general.  But “general testimony about a gang’s behavior, 
history, territory, and general operations is usually admissible.  
[Citation.]  The same is true of the gang’s name, symbols, and 
colors.  All this background information can be admitted 
through an expert’s testimony, even if hearsay, if there is 
evidence that it is considered reliable and accurate by experts 
on the gang.”  (People v. Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th 818, 838.)  
Finally, to the extent Curiel identifies case-specific hearsay that 
was provided to the jury, he has not shown its inclusion justifies 
an equitable exception to issue preclusion.  For example, the 
expert identified and described a letter written by Hernandez as 
a basis for his opinion that Hernandez was an O.T.H. gang 
member.  But Hernandez was found to be an O.T.H. gang 
member following an earlier trial, where he was also found to 
have murdered Tejada specifically for the benefit of O.T.H.  The 
expert therefore had ample grounds for his opinion that 
Hernandez was an O.T.H. gang member.  His use of 
Hernandez’s letter as additional support, even if improper under 
Sanchez, does not bear strongly on the preclusive effect of the 
jury’s eventual verdict.  The expert’s opinion regarding 
Hernandez’s gang membership would have been presented to 
the jury regardless of the specific admissibility of the letter, and 
Hernandez’s gang membership was only one of many 
circumstances bearing on Curiel’s state of mind and intent to 
kill.  In sum, Curiel has not shown the jury would have reached 
a different conclusion regarding that intent if the expert’s 
testimony about the letter had not been admitted.  Put 
differently, the change in the law resulting from Sanchez would 
not have changed the outcome of Curiel’s trial on that issue.  It 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
31 
is not a change “that warrants reexamination” (Strong, supra, 
13 Cal.5th at p. 716) of the jury’s intent to kill finding, even 
considering the specific circumstances of his underlying trial.4 
Curiel also contends the intent to kill finding should not 
be given preclusive effect because he did not have an adequate 
incentive to litigate the issue at trial.  We have recognized the 
relevance of “the opportunity and incentive” of a party to present 
 
4  
The State Public Defender, as amicus curiae, cites Sargon 
Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 
55 Cal.4th 747 as another potential change in the law justifying 
an equitable exception to issue preclusion.  We disagree.  While 
Sargon emphasized the role of the trial court “as a gatekeeper 
to exclude speculative or irrelevant expert opinion” (id. at 
p. 770), neither the State Public Defender nor Curiel has shown 
Sargon meaningfully expanded Curiel’s ability to object to the 
gang expert’s testimony.  (See People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 
1169, 1213–1214 [challenges to reliability and foundation for 
expert testimony forfeited because they were available before 
Sargon]; see also People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 245, 
fn. 36, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Romero and 
Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1, 53, fn. 19.)  Moreover, even looking at 
the specific circumstances of Curiel’s trial, their criticism of the 
prosecution’s gang expert (primarily his reliance on his general 
training and experience) is unpersuasive.  For example, they 
have pointed to no evidence in the record that the expert was 
asked to provide more specificity regarding the bases for his 
opinions but could not do so. 
The State Public Defender also cites changes to the 
substantive definition of a criminal street gang.  (See § 186.22, 
subd. (g), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 4.)  Whether 
that change applies to the gang-murder special circumstance is 
currently under review by this court.  (See People v. Rojas (2022) 
80 Cal.App.5th 542, 554, review granted Oct. 19, 2022, 
S275835.)  But even assuming it applies to the definition of a 
criminal street gang in this context, it does not affect the 
substantive definition of intent to kill, so it has no bearing on 
the preclusive effect of the latter finding. 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
32 
its position in the prior action.  (Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at 
p. 481.)  Assuming without deciding that a lack of incentive to 
litigate could justify an equitable exception to issue preclusion 
in certain situations (see, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore 
(1979) 439 U.S. 322, 326), Curiel has not justified any such 
exception here. 
Curiel had more than adequate incentive to litigate his 
intent to kill because, under one theory pursued by the 
prosecution, it was an element of the crime of murder itself.  The 
jury was instructed that Curiel could be liable for murder as a 
direct perpetrator if he caused the victim’s death and harbored 
an intent to kill.  The prosecutor maintained in closing 
arguments that Curiel was liable under this theory because his 
actions — precipitating the confrontation and providing backup 
to Hernandez — were a substantial factor in causing the murder 
and because Curiel intended to kill.  Curiel therefore had an 
incentive to litigate the issue of his intent to kill regardless of 
the significance of the special circumstance. 
Moreover, the special circumstance finding would have 
collateral consequences in any future appeal or petition for writ 
of habeas corpus (e.g., by demonstrating the harmlessness of 
any trial error, see People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 
1148, 1165) and could impact a future request for pardon or 
commutation from the Governor.  We therefore disagree with 
Curiel that the significance of the special circumstance finding 
was “minimal” and it should not be given preclusive effect.5 
 
5  
Curiel suggests that contesting the intent to kill element 
would somehow have been inconsistent with his primary 
defense, which was that he was not guilty of murder because he 
 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
33 
Relatedly, Curiel argues that the enactment of Senate 
Bill 1437 itself was such a significant and unforeseeable change 
in the law that it would be inequitable to apply issue preclusion 
to jury findings in his underlying trial.  This argument is plainly 
foreclosed by our opinion in Strong:  “[T]he structure of the 
statute — which permits trial courts to consult the record of 
conviction to determine whether the defendant has made out a 
prima facie case of eligibility [citation], and which notably does 
not open resentencing to every previously convicted murder 
defendant — strongly suggests the Legislature contemplated 
that many, and perhaps most, such findings would be given 
effect on resentencing.”  (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 715; 
accord, Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971 [“ ‘if the record, 
including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting 
the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified 
in making a credibility determination adverse to the 
petitioner” ’ ”].)  Indeed, it was undisputed in Strong that jury 
findings made under the current governing substantive legal 
standard (i.e., post-Banks and Clark) would “ordinarily 
establish a defendant’s ineligibility for resentencing under 
Senate Bill 1437 and thus preclude the defendant from making 
 
did not (1) aid and abet the underlying felonies of disturbing the 
peace or carrying a concealed firearm by a gang member or 
(2) aid and abet the murder itself.  Even assuming any alleged 
inconsistency is relevant, Curiel is incorrect.  Neither of these 
underlying theories involved intent to kill, so Curiel could have 
argued both that he was not guilty of murder and that he did 
not intend to kill Tejada.  The tactical decision by Curiel’s 
counsel to focus on the former does not create an exception to 
the doctrine of issue preclusion.  (See Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at 
p. 484 [preclusion applied despite party’s failure to present 
evidence].) 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
34 
a prima facie case for relief.”  (Strong, at p. 710.)  Senate 
Bill 1437 does not itself support an equitable exception to issue 
preclusion.  To the contrary, issue preclusion will “ordinarily” 
apply in such proceedings.  (Strong, at p. 710.) 
C.  The Jury’s Intent to Kill Finding 
Although we conclude the jury’s intent to kill finding 
should be given preclusive effect, it remains to be determined 
what that effect should be, i.e., how a trial court should apply 
the intent to kill finding in resentencing proceedings under 
section 1172.6.  It is certainly relevant to the trial court’s 
consideration of a petitioner’s prima facie showing.  “The record 
of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie 
inquiry . . . , allowing the court to distinguish petitions with 
potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.”  (Lewis, 
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)  “Like the analogous prima facie 
inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, ‘ “the court takes 
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary 
assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled 
to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved.  If so, the 
court must issue an order to show cause.” ’  [Citation.]  ‘[A] court 
should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on 
credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary 
hearing.’  [Citation.]  ‘However, if the record, including the 
court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations 
made in the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a 
credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  
Consequently, “[i]f the petition and record in the case establish 
conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial 
court may dismiss the petition.”  (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at 
p. 708.) 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
35 
The Attorney General contends the intent to kill finding is 
not only relevant, but dispositive, based on section 1172.6, 
subdivision (a)(3).  That provision requires an otherwise-eligible 
petitioner to allege that he or she could not be convicted of the 
relevant homicide offense (here, murder) “because of changes to 
Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”  (§ 1172.6, 
subd. (a)(3).)  The Attorney General argues that the jury’s intent 
to kill finding precludes a petitioner from making that 
allegation.  We disagree.  For reasons we explain, an intent to 
kill finding does not itself conclusively establish that a 
petitioner is ineligible for relief. 
The Attorney General is correct that the allegation under 
section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3) is part of the prima facie 
showing a petitioner must make in order to proceed to an 
evidentiary hearing.  (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); Lewis, supra, 
11 Cal.5th at p. 962.)  While we have recognized this 
requirement, we have not previously explored its meaning.  
(Lewis, at p. 972, fn. 6 [“We are not asked to resolve what is 
substantively required under subdivision (a)(3)”].) 
Our standard of review in this context is well-settled:  “The 
proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review 
de novo.  [Citations.]  ‘ “ ‘ “As in any case involving statutory 
interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the 
Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.  
[Citation.]  We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving 
them a plain and commonsense meaning.” ’ ” ’  [Citation.]  
‘ “[W]e look to ‘the entire substance of the statute . . . in order to 
determine the scope and purpose of the provision . . . .  
[Citation.]’  [Citation.]  That is, we construe the words in 
question ‘ “in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious 
purpose of the statute . . . .”  [Citation.]’  [Citation.]  We must 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
36 
harmonize ‘the various parts of a statutory enactment . . . by 
considering the particular clause or section in the context of the 
statutory framework as a whole.’ ” ’ ”  (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 
at p. 961.) 
The 
“changes” 
described 
in 
section 1172.6, 
subdivision (a)(3) plainly refer to the substantive amendments 
to sections 188 and 189 that were enacted along with the 
resentencing provisions in Senate Bill 1437.  The amendments 
to section 189, concerning the felony-murder rule, are 
inapplicable here.  But the amendments to section 188, 
concerning malice, form the basis for Curiel’s resentencing 
petition.  As noted, Senate Bill 1437 amended section 188 to 
include the requirement that, except in cases of felony murder, 
“in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall 
act with malice aforethought.  Malice shall not be imputed to a 
person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”  
(§ 188, subd. (a)(3), added by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.) 
Because the amendment to section 188 specifically 
concerns malice, the Attorney General argues that the jury’s 
finding of intent to kill (i.e., express malice) conclusively refutes 
Curiel’s allegation that he could not currently be convicted of 
murder “because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective 
January 1, 2019.”  (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).)  The Attorney 
General relies on the legislative history of Senate Bill 1437, 
which reflects the Legislature’s concern with the perceived 
inequity of imposing murder liability on defendants who did not 
intend to kill.  (See, e.g., Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis 
of Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended 
May 25, 2018, pp. 4–5.)  He also cites the uncodified preamble to 
Senate Bill 1437, which explains, “It is necessary to amend the 
felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
37 
doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability 
is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not 
act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the 
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human 
life.”  (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f).) 
The Attorney General’s position is unpersuasive.  It reads 
section 188, subdivision (a)(3) in isolation, and it ignores the 
provision’s broader effect on murder liability in California.  That 
subdivision did not simply “add the element of malice 
aforethought” to existing theories of murder liability.  (Gentile, 
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 849.)  It eliminated the doctrine of 
natural and probable consequences in its entirety:  “By limiting 
murder liability to those principals who personally acted with 
malice aforethought, section 188(a)(3) eliminates what was the 
core feature of natural and probable consequences murder 
liability:  the absence of a requirement that the defendant 
personally possess malice aforethought.  As a result, the most 
natural reading of Senate Bill 1437’s operative language is that 
it eliminates natural and probable consequences liability for 
first and second degree murder.”  (Ibid.) 
Thus, after the enactment of Senate Bill 1437, a defendant 
cannot be convicted of murder based on the doctrine of natural 
and probable consequences, even with a showing of malice 
aforethought.  (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 849.)  It is an 
invalid theory.  Murder liability requires a different, valid 
theory, such as direct aiding and abetting.  (Id. at p. 850.)  And 
it requires a different, valid theory because of the changes to 
section 188 in Senate Bill 1437.  It was those changes that 
persuaded this court that the doctrine of natural and probable 
consequences could no longer support murder liability, with or 
without malice.  (Gentile, at p. 849.)  Consequently, a petitioner 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
38 
who alleges that he or she could not currently be convicted of a 
homicide offense “because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made 
effective January 1, 2019” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3)) puts at issue 
all elements of the offense under a valid theory. 
The Legislature’s focus on intent does not compel a 
different result.  As discussed, the amendments to section 188 
concerning malice had broader effects on the substantive law of 
murder than a narrow reading would suggest.  The Legislature 
sought to limit murder liability to established theories that 
incorporated the requisite intent; it did not intend to impose an 
intent requirement untethered from existing theories of 
liability.  (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 850–851.)  And it 
sought to provide the opportunity to petition for relief to 
defendants who were convicted under an invalid theory like the 
natural and probable consequences doctrine at issue here.  
(See § 1172.6, subd. (a)(1).)  
At the prima facie stage, a court must accept as true a 
petitioner’s allegation that he or she could not currently be 
convicted of a homicide offense because of changes to 
Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019, unless the 
allegation is refuted by the record.  (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 
p. 971.)  And this allegation is not refuted by the record unless 
the record conclusively establishes every element of the offense.  
If only one element of the offense is established by the record, 
the petitioner could still be correct that he or she could not 
currently be convicted of the relevant offense based on the 
absence of other elements. 
This general principle applies to a finding of intent to kill.  
It is only one element.  It does not by itself establish any valid 
theory of liability.  (See In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 587 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
39 
(Lopez).)  For example, “under direct aiding and abetting 
principles, an accomplice is guilty of an offense perpetrated by 
another [e.g., murder] if the accomplice aids the commission of 
that offense with ‘knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful 
intent and [with] an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful 
ends.’ ”  (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843.)  Similarly, to be 
liable for murder under a theory of implied malice, an aider and 
abettor must aid in the commission of a life-endangering act, 
with “ ‘knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the 
act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, 
knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting 
in conscious disregard for human life.’ ”  (People v. Reyes (2023) 
14 Cal.5th 981, 991 (Reyes), italics omitted.)  A finding of intent 
to kill does not, standing alone, cover all of the required 
elements.  It does not itself show that a petitioner like Curiel is 
liable for murder under any valid theory. 
D.  The Jury’s Other Findings 
While a finding of intent to kill does not, itself, suffice to 
refute 
a 
petitioner’s 
allegation 
under 
section 1172.6, 
subdivision (a)(3), a trial court does not end its prima facie 
inquiry there.  Other aspects of the record, such as additional 
jury findings, might be relevant to the remaining elements of 
the relevant homicide offense and conclusively refute a 
petitioner’s allegation that he or she could not be convicted of 
murder under current law.  “The record of conviction will 
necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under 
section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish petitions with 
potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.  This is 
consistent with the statute’s overall purpose:  to ensure that 
murder culpability is commensurate with a person’s actions, 
while also ensuring that clearly meritless petitions can be 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
40 
efficiently addressed as part of a single-step prima facie review 
process.”  (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)  “ ‘[I]f the record, 
including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting 
the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified 
in making a credibility determination adverse to the 
petitioner.” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  “In sum, the parties can, and should, use 
the record of conviction to aid the trial court in reliably assessing 
whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief . . . .”  
(Id. at p. 972.) 
For example, in Strong, we concluded that pre-Banks and 
Clark special circumstance findings did not have preclusive 
effect in resentencing proceedings under section 1172.6.  
(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 717–718.)  But suppose the jury 
in such a case made findings on all of the other elements 
supporting felony murder under section 189 as amended, 
including (1) the commission or attempted commission of a 
felony enumerated in that statute and (2) the death of a person 
during the commission or attempted commission of the 
enumerated felony.  In that case, if the jury additionally found 
intent to kill, it would “ordinarily be dispositive” because the 
jury’s findings would conclusively establish all of the elements 
of felony murder under current law.  (Strong, at p. 715; 
see § 189, subd. (e)(2).)  Considered together, the jury’s findings 
would completely refute a petitioner’s allegation that he or she 
could not currently be convicted of murder because of changes 
to sections 188 and 189. 
The Attorney General argues the same line of reasoning 
applies to this case.  Curiel was not prosecuted under a theory 
of felony murder, and the underlying offenses here (disturbing 
the peace and carrying a concealed firearm by a gang member) 
are not among those enumerated in section 189.  But, assuming 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
41 
the jury relied on the then-available doctrine of natural and 
probable consequences to convict Curiel of murder as an aider 
and abettor, it necessarily made certain factual findings in order 
to reach its verdict of guilt.  The Attorney General contends that 
those factual findings — combined with the jury’s finding of 
intent to kill — cover all of the elements of murder under the 
theory of direct aiding and abetting and therefore preclude relief 
under section 1172.6. 
As framed, this argument is analogous to one we 
considered recently in Lopez, supra, 14 Cal.5th 562.  There, a 
defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging his 
jury was improperly instructed on the natural and probable 
consequences theory of aiding and abetting first degree murder.  
(Id. at p. 578; see People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 158–159 
(Chiu).)  The Attorney General conceded the error but contended 
that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based in part 
on the jury’s factual findings, including its true finding on a 
gang-murder special circumstance.  (Lopez, at pp. 579, 585.)  
The Attorney General argued these findings encompassed all of 
the elements of first degree murder under a valid theory of direct 
aiding and abetting.  (Id. at p. 587.)  To assess the Attorney 
General’s contention, we examined the language of the court’s 
jury instructions and compared them to the elements of murder 
under a valid theory.  Following that examination, we concluded 
that “the relevant language evokes similar concepts” but “it does 
not cover all of the elements of direct aiding and abetting.”  
(Ibid.) 
Unlike Lopez, this matter is not governed by principles of 
harmless error.  But, similar to Lopez, we may look to the jury’s 
verdicts, and the factual findings they necessarily reflect, to 
determine whether the record of conviction refutes the factual 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
42 
allegations in Curiel’s petition.  (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 
p. 971.)  If the jury has made a factual finding, and it is issue 
preclusive under the principles described above, a court must 
give effect to that finding.  (See ibid.)  A court giving effect to 
such a finding does not engage in “ ‘factfinding involving the 
weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ”  (Id. at 
p. 972.)  It is simply “distinguish[ing] petitions with potential 
merit from those that are clearly meritless” based on findings 
already made by the jury.  (Id. at p. 971; see Strong, supra, 
13 Cal.5th at p. 710.)   
Although the framework evoked by the Attorney General 
is valid, we cannot agree with his ultimate conclusion.  For 
reasons we explain, the jury’s verdicts do not reflect all of the 
factual findings necessary to support a murder conviction under 
current law.  Thus, they do not refute Curiel’s allegation that he 
could not be convicted of murder under sections 188 and 189 as 
amended, and they do not establish conclusively that Curiel is 
ineligible for relief.6 
 
6  
In the harmless error context, “ ‘the reviewing court is not 
limited to a review of the verdict itself.’ ”  (Lopez, supra, 
14 Cal.5th at p. 588.)  The court “may look to ‘the entire cause, 
including the evidence.’ ”  (Id. at p. 592.)  “[T]his further 
harmlessness inquiry requires a reviewing court to ‘examine[] 
what the jury necessarily did find and ask[] whether it would be 
impossible, on the evidence, for the jury to find that without also 
finding the missing fact as well.’  [Citation.]  In other words, a 
reviewing court must be persuaded that, in light of the jury’s 
findings and the evidence at trial, any rational juror who made 
those findings would have made the additional findings 
necessary for a valid theory of liability, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, if the jury had been properly instructed.  [Citation.]  If 
the reviewing court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that 
 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
43 
As noted, “under the natural and probable consequences 
doctrine, an accomplice is guilty not only of the offense he or she 
directly aided or abetted (i.e., the target offense), but also of any 
other offense committed by the direct perpetrator that was the 
‘natural and probable consequence’ of the crime the accomplice 
aided and abetted (i.e., the nontarget offense).”  (Gentile, supra, 
10 Cal.5th at p. 843.)  The jury here was instructed on two 
underlying “target” offenses, disturbing the peace and carrying 
a concealed firearm by a gang member.  To convict Curiel of 
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, 
the jury was required to find that Curiel knew that the 
perpetrator (here, Hernandez) intended to commit the 
underlying crime; that Curiel intended to aid and abet the 
perpetrator in committing the crime; and that Curiel, by words 
or conduct, did, in fact, aid and abet the perpetrator’s 
commission of the crime.  In other words, Curiel must have 
known of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and specifically 
intended to and did, in fact, “aid, facilitate, promote, encourage 
or instigate the perpetrator’s commission of that crime.” 
Additionally, the jury was required to find that Hernandez 
committed murder during the commission of the crime of 
disturbing the peace or the crime of carrying a concealed firearm 
by a gang member, and that “under all the circumstances a 
 
any rational juror would have made the additional findings, 
based on the jury’s actual verdict and the evidence at trial, the 
error is harmless because the presentation of the invalid theory 
to the jury made no difference.  The error did not contribute to 
the verdict.”  (Id. at p. 589.)  Because neither party attempts to 
apply these principles here, we have no occasion in this matter 
to examine how, or even whether, these principles might apply 
in the context of a section 1172.6 resentencing petition. 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
44 
reasonable person in [Curiel’s] position would have known that 
the commission of murder was a natural and probable 
consequence of the commission of the crime of disturbing the 
peace or of the crime of carrying a concealed firearm by a gang 
member.”  The jury was told, “A natural and probable 
consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is 
likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes.” 
The scope of criminal liability is defined by statute:  “All 
persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether it be 
felony or misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the 
act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, 
or, not being present, have advised and encouraged its 
commission, . . . are principals in any crime so committed.”  
(§ 31.) 
In general, to establish liability for murder under the 
theory of direct aiding and abetting, “the prosecution must show 
that the defendant aided or encouraged the commission of the 
murder with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the 
perpetrator and with the intent or purpose of committing, 
encouraging, or facilitating its commission.”  (Chiu, supra, 
59 Cal.4th at p. 167.)  In addition, as noted, an aider and abettor 
may be liable for murder under a theory of implied malice where 
the aider and abettor aids in the commission of a life-
endangering act, with “ ‘knowledge that the perpetrator 
intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the 
commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to 
human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life.’ ”  
(Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991, italics omitted.)  “Thus, proof 
of aider and abettor liability requires proof in three distinct 
areas:  (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus — a crime 
committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
45 
mens rea” — which here includes knowledge that the direct 
perpetrator intends to commit the crime or life-endangering act, 
“and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus — conduct by the 
aider and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the 
crime.”  (Perez, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1225.)   
The jury found Curiel guilty of first degree murder and 
found true the gang-murder special circumstance, but it was not 
required to identify which theory it found persuasive.  Assuming 
the jury relied on the then-available natural and probable 
consequences doctrine to convict Curiel of murder, the Court of 
Appeal below found the jury’s factual findings insufficient under 
current law based on the absence of the last element of direct 
aiding and abetting, the aider and abettor’s actus reus.  The 
Attorney General responds that the jury must have found the 
requisite actus reus by Curiel based on his aiding one of the 
underlying target crimes (either disturbing the peace or 
carrying a concealed firearm by a gang member), of which 
murder was both an actual and a natural and probable 
consequence.  In the Attorney General’s view, based on the close 
causal relationship between the underlying crime and the 
murder, any act that aided or encouraged the underlying target 
crime must also as a factual matter have aided or encouraged 
the murder as well.  He contends, “The actus reus under each 
theory entails, at a minimum, 
encouragement of, or 
participation in, some activity that foreseeably results in a 
homicide . . . .”  For example, an aider and abettor who 
purchases a gun for a direct perpetrator could, by that act, be 
found to aid both the underlying offense of carrying a concealed 
firearm by a gang member and the offense of murder that 
results. 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
46 
However, in order to find this element satisfied at the 
prima facie stage of section 1172.6 proceedings, we must be 
confident the jury necessarily found the actus reus required for 
direct aiding and abetting murder.  That is, regardless of the 
facts, the jury must have made the required finding based on 
the instructions provided by the trial court.  Although in many 
factual scenarios the Attorney General may be correct that the 
same act would satisfy the actus reus of aiding and abetting the 
underlying target crime and aiding and abetting the murder 
that results, we are unsure that the same act must necessarily 
satisfy each as a matter of law.  Nonetheless, we need not decide 
whether the jury necessarily found the requisite actus reus 
because we conclude the jury did not necessarily find the 
requisite mens rea for direct aiding and abetting liability. 
We have generally described the requisite mens rea for 
direct aiding and abetting as “knowledge of the direct 
perpetrator’s unlawful intent and an intent to assist in 
achieving those unlawful ends.”  (Perez, supra, 35 Cal.4th at 
p. 1225.)  In other words, the aider and abettor must have 
“knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator” and “the 
intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating” the 
commission of the offense.  (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 167.)  
Alternatively, in the context of implied malice murder, the aider 
and abettor must know the perpetrator intends to commit a life-
endangering act, intend to aid the perpetrator in the commission 
of that act, know the act is dangerous to human life, and act in 
conscious disregard for human life.  (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 
p. 991.) 
Under the court’s instructions, the jury was not required 
to make these findings.  Because the jury was instructed on the 
natural and probable consequences doctrine, the jury was 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
47 
required to find only that Curiel knew that Hernandez intended 
to commit one of the underlying target offenses and that Curiel 
intended to aid him in that offense, not murder.  Nor was the 
jury required to find that the underlying target offenses, 
themselves, were dangerous to human life.  While the jury 
separately found Curiel intended to kill, such an intent standing 
alone is insufficient to establish the requisite mens rea for 
aiding and abetting murder.  The essence of aiding and abetting 
is involvement in the crime of another.  The aider and abettor 
must become “concerned” with the crime itself.  (§ 31.)  “[A] 
person ‘chooses to become a part of the criminal activity of 
another’ ” and “ ‘says in essence, “your acts are my acts.” ’ ”  
(People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1118 (McCoy).)  
Although intent to kill is certainly blameworthy, it is 
insufficient standing alone to render a person culpable for 
another’s acts.  The aider and abettor must know the direct 
perpetrator intends to commit the murder or life-endangering 
act and intend to aid the direct perpetrator in its commission.  It 
is this mental relationship to the perpetrator’s acts that confers 
liability on the aider and abettor.  (See Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th 
at p. 167; Perez, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1225; see also Reyes, 
supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 991–992.)  Indeed, even as it found the 
actus reus element lacking, the Court of Appeal below appears 
to have noted this shortcoming, explaining that the intent to kill 
finding “shed no light on whether Curiel actually encouraged or 
assisted the perpetrator in carrying out the murder.”  (Italics 
added.) 
The Attorney General relies heavily on McCoy in this 
context, but it does not support a contrary conclusion.  McCoy 
considered “whether an aider and abettor may be guilty of 
greater homicide-related offenses than those the actual 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
48 
perpetrator committed.”  (McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1114.)  
We determined that an aider and abettor could be liable for a 
greater offense, based on a more culpable mens rea.  “Aider and 
abettor liability is premised on the combined acts of all the 
principals, but on the aider and abettor’s own mens rea.  If the 
mens rea of the aider and abettor is more culpable than the 
actual perpetrator’s, the aider and abettor may be guilty of a 
more serious crime than the actual perpetrator.”  (Id. at 
p. 1120.) 
This recognition, however, did not entail dispensing with 
the traditional mens rea required for aiding and abetting 
murder.  We explained, “[W]hen a person, with the mental state 
necessary for an aider and abettor, helps or induces another to 
kill, that person’s guilt is determined by the combined acts of all 
the participants as well as that person’s own mens rea.  If that 
person’s mens rea is more culpable than another’s, that person’s 
guilt may be greater even if the other might be deemed the 
actual perpetrator.”  (McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1122, 
italics added.) 
McCoy discussed two examples, which figure prominently 
in the Attorney General’s argument.  First, we explained, “ ‘it is 
possible for a primary party negligently to kill another (and, 
thus, be guilty of involuntary manslaughter), while the 
secondary party is guilty of murder, because he encouraged the 
primary actor’s negligent conduct, with the intent that it result 
in the victim’s death.’ ”  (McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1119.)  
Second, we called to mind a well-known tragedy:  “[A]ssume 
someone, let us call him Iago, falsely tells another person, whom 
we will call Othello, that Othello’s wife, Desdemona, was having 
an affair, hoping that Othello would kill her in a fit of jealousy.  
Othello does so without Iago’s further involvement.  In that case, 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
49 
depending on the exact circumstances of the killing, Othello 
might be guilty of manslaughter, rather than murder, on a heat 
of passion theory.  Othello’s guilt of manslaughter, however, 
should not limit Iago’s guilt if his own culpability were greater.  
Iago should be liable for his own acts as well Othello’s, which he 
induced and encouraged.  But Iago’s criminal liability, as 
Othello’s, would be based on his own personal mens rea.  If, as 
our hypothetical suggests, Iago acted with malice, he would be 
guilty of murder even if Othello, who did the actual killing, was 
not.”  (Id. at pp. 1121–1122.) 
Critical to these examples is not only an intent to kill but 
knowledge and intent regarding the direct perpetrator’s 
homicidal or life-endangering acts.  The aider and abettor in the 
first example “ ‘encouraged the primary actor’s negligent 
conduct.’ ”  (McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1119.)  And Iago 
“induced and encouraged” Othello’s murderous rage.  (Id. at 
p. 1122.)  Indeed, in applying our holding, we recognized in 
McCoy that the jury found the aider and abettor had “acted with 
the necessary mental state of an aider and abettor” and “knew 
of [the direct perpetrator’s] unlawful purpose and intended to 
commit, encourage, or facilitate that purpose.”  (Id. at pp. 1122–
1123.)  The jury here was not required to make any similar 
findings encompassing Curiel’s knowledge and intent regarding 
Hernandez’s conduct. 
As noted, the jury here must have found, under the 
natural and probable consequences doctrine, that Curiel knew 
that Hernandez intended to commit one of the underlying target 
offenses and also intended to aid him in that offense.  The 
Attorney General argues this finding is sufficient because the 
underlying target offenses “foreseeably resulted in a homicide,” 
thus closing the loop on Curiel’s intent.  But, as the Attorney 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
50 
General elsewhere recognizes, McCoy requires the aider and 
abettor to actually foresee the homicidal or life-endangering 
consequences of the perpetrator’s actions in this context.  
(McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1118.)  An aider and abettor who 
knows and intends to aid the direct perpetrator in certain 
conduct, but does not subjectively appreciate that the conduct is 
dangerous to human life, is not liable for the murder that results 
because the aider and abettor has not sufficiently concerned 
himself with that murder.  This conclusion holds even if the 
aider and abettor separately intends to kill.  Intent to kill itself 
does not establish a sufficient mens rea regarding a murder or 
life-endangering conduct that the aider and abettor has no 
intent to aid or encourage — and that the aider and abettor does 
not even subjectively know will occur.  Indeed, a defendant could 
act with intent to kill but at the same time believe the actual 
perpetrator could never risk harm to another human being — 
and be genuinely surprised when the actual perpetrator 
commits a life-endangering act.7 
We have characterized this scenario — where a defendant 
is liable for murder under the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine, and acts with malice aforethought, but 
is not liable as a direct aider and abettor — as “quite narrow” 
and relevant only to a “very small set of cases.”  (Gentile, supra, 
10 Cal.5th at p. 850.)  But the question is not whether it is likely 
a defendant could have felt and acted in such a way, but whether 
the court’s jury instructions foreclose that possibility as a matter 
 
7  
We emphasize that our discussion of the requisite mental 
state applies to the direct aiding and abetting theory of murder.  
The mental state required for felony murder is materially 
different, and we do not consider it here.  (Cf. Strong, supra, 
13 Cal.5th at pp. 704–705.) 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
51 
of law.  Only in the latter scenario would a trial court be 
permitted to deny a defendant’s section 1172.6 petition at the 
prima facie stage.  (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)  In other 
words, only in that scenario would the record of conviction 
“establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief.”  
(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) 
Contrary to the Attorney General’s contention, this 
conclusion does not involve “litigat[ing] anew” any trial issues 
or allowing “a petitioner to challenge any aspect of the 
factfinding from the original trial that he or she wishes to 
revisit.”  We have already determined that the jury’s factual 
findings should be given preclusive effect.  The point here is to 
identify what those factual findings are and how they relate to 
the elements of murder under a valid theory. 
Finally, we note that our holding today does not 
necessarily apply to other cases where the jury found intent to 
kill, or even other cases where the jury found true the gang-
murder special circumstance.  The jury instructions in other 
cases might be materially different, and they might therefore 
have required different factual findings by the jury.  We hold 
only that under the jury instructions here, the findings the jury 
must have made are insufficient to conclusively establish that 
Curiel is liable for murder under current law.  The jury could 
have relied on the natural and probable consequences doctrine 
to convict Curiel of murder, and the findings required under that 
theory — even when combined with the finding of intent to kill 
required by the gang-murder special circumstance — do not 
encompass all of the elements of any theory of murder under 
current law.  These findings were therefore insufficient to rebut 
Curiel’s allegation that he could not be convicted of murder 
under current law, and the trial court erred by denying Curiel’s 
PEOPLE v. CURIEL 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
52 
petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage.  Although we 
do not consider the precise reasoning of the Court of Appeal, it 
was nonetheless correct to reverse the trial court’s order. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Curiel 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 11/4/21 – 4th 
Dist., Div. 3 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S272238 
Date Filed:  November 27, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Orange 
Judge:  Julian W. Bailey 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Nancy J. King, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, and 
Michelle May Peterson, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Mary K. McComb, State Public Defender, AJ Kutchins and Craig 
Buckser, Deputy State Public Defenders, for the Office of the State 
Public Defender as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland and Charles C. 
Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Michael Pulos, Seth M. 
Freidman, A. Natasha Cortina, Alan L. Amann and Lynne G. 
McGinnis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Michelle May Peterson 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 387  
Salem, MA 01970  
(978) 594-1925 
 
Lynne G. McGinnis 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 738-9217