Case Title: Ex Parte Clements

Citation: 447 So. 2d 695

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1984-02-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
447 So. 2d 695 (1984)
Ex parte Billy Edward CLEMENTS.
(Re Billy Edward CLEMENTS, alias v. STATE).
83-34.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 24, 1984.
Myron K. Allenstein, Gadsden, for petitioner.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Patricia E. Guthrie, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
BEATTY, Justice.
The petitioner was indicted for the offense of robbery in the first degree. Prior to his trial, he offered to stipulate to the introduction into evidence of a polygraph examination. The State refused to stipulate. Following a trial, the defendant was convicted and sentenced. He appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeals which affirmed without opinion. 438 So. 2d 769. Petitioner appropriately utilized Rule 39(k), Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure (A.R.A.P.), to supply to that court an additional statement of facts. His application for a rehearing was denied. 443 So. 2d 66. This Court granted a writ of certiorari to resolve two questions posed by the petitioner: (1) Whether the trial court, in the admission of certain evidence discussed below, erred to reversal in violating the business reports exception of the rule against hearsay; and (2) Whether the decision of the State to refuse to stipulate to the admission of the proffered polygraph examination constituted reversible error.
The facts furnished under Rule 39(k), and verified by the transcript of the evidence, *696 disclose the following exchanges during the examination of one Angela Golden, cashier of the service station allegedly robbed. That examination was being conducted to determine the amount of money missing after the robbery:
This testimony clearly established that the witness had no personal knowledge of the amount of the service station's loss. Resort was had, therefore, to the fact that the witness had seen store records which disclosed that loss, and thus her testimony as to what those records contained was admitted, over objection, without production of the records themselves.
In Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 254.01(3) (3d ed. 1977), the pertinent rule on admitting the contents of business records is succinctly stated:
See also Rule 44, A.R.Civ.P. In this instance, there was a complete absence of any attempt to qualify the record alluded to by the witness under this rule of evidence.
Apparently recognizing this dilemma, the State argues that the procedure utilized was proper under the theory of "present recollection revived." This position overlooks the fact that (1) no memorandum or record was used here to refresh the witness's errant memory, and (2) the witness here testified not to an independent knowledge of the fact but to the contents of a record not in evidence. Cf. Gibson v. State, 347 So. 2d 576 (Ala.Cr.App.1977).
Having recognized the error in the admission of the testimony pertaining to the amount of money taken, however, we have concluded that this error was not prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused. Mikell v. State, 242 Ala. 298, 5 So. 2d 825 (1942). The indictment charged the defendant with taking $1,322.40. The evidence disclosed that the petitioner obtained $4.00 from the complaining witness and two bags containing money. In a robbery conviction, the amount of money stolen is not an essential element of the charge. Code of 1975, § 13A-8-40, et seq. Hence, the theft of money having been proved under the circumstances proscribed by statute, no prejudice has resulted to the petitioner on account of the procedure used by the prosecutor to prove the amount charged in the indictment.
On the second issue, the petitioner finds support in a federal circuit court decision, McMorris v. Israel, 643 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1981). There, the prosecution's case rested solely upon the testimony of the victim to identify the defendant, who denied any involvement in the crime. The victim had identified the defendant "upon a short observation in the dark while being knocked to the ground." The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the defendant's offer to stipulate to the admission of his polygraph examination could not have been summarily refused by the prosecution. That court looked favorably upon the Wisconsin court's recognition of polygraph results in State v. Stanislawski, 62 Wis.2d 730, 216 N.W.2d 8 (1974), holding that they were admissible by stipulation under certain guidelines. At bottom, the favorable position of the Wisconsin court upon the admission of polygraph examinations stems from the premise adopted by that court that "[s]cientific developments seem to *698 have made the polygraph more reliable." McMorris, 643 F.2d  at 462.
Criticizing the unrestricted veto enjoyed by a prosecutor which would prevent the use of the polygraph test, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated, at 464:
And finally, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals cogently observed that its decision "is closely linked to the peculiarities of the Wisconsin stipulation rule," which is unlike a "consent" rule whose effect is to simply allow the parties to waive the benefit of an evidentiary rule barring polygraph evidence.
In contradistinction, the results of polygraph examinations are, in general, inadmissible in Alabama. Stewart v. State, 398 So. 2d 369 (Ala.Cr.App.1981). They are admissible, however, upon stipulation of the parties, subject to certain conditions which relate to the accused's knowledge of his rights thereunder and the trial court's discretion relating to the conduct of the test itself. See Wynn v. State, 423 So. 2d 294, 299-300 (Ala.Cr.App.1982). Nothing in that case, however, nor in any other Alabama case to which we have been cited, requires the prosecutor's consent to an offer of the accused to stipulate to the admission of the results of the accused's polygraph examination. As yet, Alabama has not adopted the premise of Wisconsin that such tests have achieved such a degree of reliability and scientific recognition "that their unconditional rejection is no longer appropriate." McMorris, 643 F.2d  at 465.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES and SHORES, JJ., concur.