Case Title: Ashton v. Ashton

Citation: 733 P.2d 147

Docket Number: 

State: utah

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Date: 1987-02-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
733 P.2d 147 (1987) Woodruff ASHTON, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Wilford ASHTON and Virginia Ashton, Defendants and Appellants. No. 19129. Supreme Court of Utah. February 4, 1987. *148 Alan D. Boyack, St. George, for defendants and appellants. Phillip L. Foremaster, St. George, for plaintiff and respondent. HALL, Chief Justice: Plaintiff brought this quiet title action to settle a dispute over real property located in Hurricane, Utah. A trial was had in this case on February 1, 2, and 3, 1983, before an advisory jury. The case was submitted on special interrogatories which the jury returned in favor of plaintiff. The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law which generally conformed to the pleadings and incorporated the substance of the jury's answers to the special interrogatories. Those findings provided, in pertinent part: In accordance with these findings, the trial court entered judgment ordering defendants to convey the east one-half of the property, together with one water share, to plaintiff. When defendants failed to deed the property as ordered, the judgment was amended to reflect that plaintiff owned the east one-half of the property and one share of water. In their first point on appeal, defendants challenge the weight and sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's imposition of a constructive trust. Such claims require a two-step examination, first of the findings of fact and second of the conclusions of law. Review of findings of fact is controlled by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), which now provides, in pertinent part: Defendants' attack on the evidence essentially consists of two claims: First, defendants contend that no promise to reconvey the property was ever made. In support of this contention, defendants rely on their own trial testimony wherein they denied ever having promised to convey any of the subject property to plaintiff or ever having made any statements to this effect. In this regard, defendants also rely on the fact that plaintiff's attorney, the scrivener of the deed, had no independent recollection of the conveyance by Frank to defendants.[2] Second, defendants simply contend that there is no evidence that Frank required or solicited a promise from Wilford or detrimentally relied thereon as a condition of conveying the property. The Court begins its analysis with the trial court's findings of fact, not with an appellant's view of the way he or she believes the facts should have been found.[3] Defendants have not even begun to seriously discuss the trial court's findings that dispute their version of the facts. In Scharf v. BMG Corp.,[4] we explained the duty incumbent upon an appellant to mount a successful challenge to a trial court's findings of fact. An appellant must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings. Only then can we consider whether those findings are "clearly erroneous." Because defendants have failed to make such a showing, the trial court's findings will not be disturbed. We next turn to the lower court's conclusions of law. Conclusions of law are accorded no particular deference, but instead are reviewed simply for correctness.[5] The conclusions of law provided, in pertinent part: As previously noted, the trial judge subsequently modified this ruling when defendants refused to convey the property. Since we have not disturbed the trial court's findings of fact, our duty is merely to determine whether those findings justify the trial court's conclusion of law. A constructive trust is an equitable remedy which arises by operation of law to prevent unjust enrichment.[6] Accordingly, *151 parol evidence may be introduced to establish a constructive trust.[7] If the evidence is of a clear and convincing nature such that the remedy should be granted, the trial court may alter a deed which is regular in form and presumed to convey clear title.[8] Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 45 (1957) provides, in pertinent part: In Parks v. Zions First National Bank,[9] the Court construed section 44, Restatement (Second) of Trusts, as being applicable only to those cases arising out of express trusts or attempts to create express trusts.[10] The reasoning stated therein is without doubt applicable to section 45, and dictum in that opinion so states.[11] In Parks, we described an express trust as a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising as a result of a manifestation of intent to create it and subjecting the person in whom title is vested to equitable duties to deal with it for the benefit of others.[12] After reviewing the findings of fact, we do not hesitate to hold that an oral express trust existed in this case and that section 45 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts is therefore controlling. In Haws v. Jensen,[13] this Court applied section 45(1)(b) of the Restatement of Trusts to a fact situation analogous to the one before us.[14] In Haws, a mother deeded a home to her daughter. The deed was recorded, and the mother and daughter subsequently died. Thereafter, the property was distributed from the daughter's estate to the defendant, her husband, in fee simple. The plaintiffs initiated an action, claiming that the property had been distributed by the mother to the daughter in trust for the benefit of the plaintiffs. The defendant's demurrer to the complaint was overruled, and he was directed to convey the property to a newly appointed trustee.[15] This Court affirmed the decree based upon section 45(1)(b) of the Restatement of Trusts.[16] We now turn to the facts of this case. Finding No. 3 shows that Frank owned a tract of land and associated water shares, portions of which are the subject of this case. Findings No. 4, No. 5, and No. 6 clearly indicate that Wilford agreed to accept the water and tract of land and reconvey one-half thereof to plaintiff when plaintiff's marital problems were solved. Finding No. 9 indicates that a confidential relationship existed between Frank and Wilford. Findings No. 12 and No. 13 state that when plaintiff's marital problems were resolved, defendants refused to convey the east one-half of the property and a water share as was promised Frank, thereby breaching the confidential relationship between *152 Frank and defendants. Additionally, the record fails to disclose any evidence of a memorandum sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds. Accordingly, under section 45 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, it was proper to impose a constructive trust. Therefore, we uphold the trial court's conclusion of law to this effect. Defendants' second point is that the trial court erred by imposing a constructive trust upon Virginia Ashton's undivided one-half interest in the tract of land. The contention is that Virginia did nothing to justify the imposition of a constructive trust since she made no promise to Frank to reconvey the property. She claims, therefore, that the conveyance by Frank to defendants as joint tenants must be construed as a gift of one-half of the property by Frank to her. In Hawkins v. Perry,[17] the Court was presented with this same argument. In that case, Hawkins, a sixteen-year-old boy, gave his uncle, Mr. Perry, money to purchase a home in Perry's name with the understanding that when Hawkins reached the age of majority, Mr. Perry would reconvey the home to Hawkins. The title to the home was taken in the names of Mr. and Mrs. Perry. Thereafter, Mr. and Mrs. Perry were divorced, and Mrs. Perry was awarded the subject home.[18] Hawkins then sued Mrs. Perry and asked that a constructive trust be imposed on the home for his benefit.[19] Mrs. Perry defended on the ground that she was not a party to her husband's agreement and was therefore not bound by it. In upholding the constructive trust imposed by the court on the home as against Mrs. Perry, Justice Crockett, writing for the Court, stated: In Hawkins, the trial court expressly found that Mrs. Perry was not a bona fide purchaser.[21] Although no such finding exists in this case, the record is devoid of any evidence suggesting that Virginia paid any consideration for the subject property. Nor is there any evidence that Frank intended Virginia's interest to be any different in character from Wilford's interest. In any event, Virginia's interest could not have been obtained but for Wilford's actions. "Thus his acts in connection with the acquisition of the property are binding on her... ."[22] We hold that defendants' contention is therefore without merit. Defendants' next point is that the trial court erred by not allowing their expert witness to testify at trial. Because trial in this case was held in February 1983, Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (Repl. Vol. 9B, 1977 ed.) (superseded September 1, 1983) controlled this case. That rule provided in part: "A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or decision based thereon be reversed ... *153 unless (a) it appears of record that the proponent of the evidence ... made known the substance of the evidence."[23] At trial, defendants called Mr. Lowry Snow as a witness. Although plaintiff stipulated that the witness was a qualified and competent attorney and abstractor, the court sua sponte disallowed the witness's testimony. The proffer for the record was as follows: Since a proffer was made, we reach the merits of defendants' claim. First, it is a basic maxim of law that testimonial opinion on the state of the law is to be excluded.[24] The function of an expert is to relate an opinion of fact to the jury.[25] The opinion is either material in terms of the applicable law or it is not. The jurors must apply the opinion (if they give it credit) in terms of the court's instructions concerning the applicable law.[26] An attorney's opinion on the applicable law does not aid the jury, which is duty-bound to apply the law as stated by the court.[27] Second, Rule 1(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (Repl. Vol. 9B, 1977 ed.) (superseded September 1, 1983) defines "relevant evidence" as that which tends to prove or disprove the existence of a material fact.[28] Here there is absolutely no evidence that a conveyance was made by defendants after the property was deeded to them by Frank. Thus it would appear that the opinion had no relevance to this case. Finally, defendants' attorney stated that he was going to ask the witness "some hypothetical situations." Hypothetical questions must be based upon facts in evidence.[29] As stated, there were no facts in this case that a conveyance was made by defendants after they received the deed from Frank. The contention is therefore without merit. Defendants' final point is that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to explain to the jury defendants' absence on the final day of trial. The court told the jury: "I have been advised that Mr. Wilford Ashton is indisposed today. He and his wife will not be present, and I therefore excuse their presence."[30] The record reflects an objection and a motion for a mistrial, but nowhere sets forth the basis therefor. However, plaintiff's brief concedes that the motion was grounded on defendants' request that the court explain to the jury that Wilford had to be hospitalized for health reasons. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 61 (Repl. Vol. 9B, 1977 ed.) provides: We have construed this provision as placing upon an appellant the burden of showing not only that an error occurred, but that it was substantial and prejudicial in that the appellant was deprived in some manner of a full and fair consideration of the disputed issues by the jury.[31] Defendants in this case have failed to provide this Court with any basis for declaring that the trial court's instruction was an abuse of discretion or that they were denied a fair trial. Because defendants failed to meet their burden under Rule 61, their contention is without merit. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs to plaintiff. STEWART, HOWE, DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. [1] The emphasized portion of the rule was added by order of this Court on October 30, 1986, and became effective January 1, 1987. Cf. Utah R.Civ.P. 1(b) (Repl. Vol. 9B, 1977 ed.) (rules govern pending actions upon date they become effective). The change in the rule is in part attributable to the 1984 repeal and reenactment of article VIII of the Utah Constitution. Since July 1, 1985, article VIII has not made a distinction between equity cases and cases at law. See Utah Const. art. VIII, § 9 (1895, repealed 1985) ("The appeal shall be upon the record made in the court below and under such regulations as may be provided by law. In equity cases the appeal may be on questions of both law and fact; in cases at law the appeal shall be on questions of law alone."). [2] Defendants argue that plaintiff's attorney would not have drafted and witnessed a deed that was subject to an underlying promise to reconvey the subject property. [3] Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). [4] 700 P.2d 1068. [5] Id. at 1070. [6] See, e.g., In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111, 1114 (Utah 1982); Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708, 710, (Utah 1977); Hawkins v. Perry, 123 Utah 16, 23, 253 P.2d 372, 375 (1953); Haws v. Jensen, 116 Utah 212, 216, 209 P.2d 229, 231 (1949). [7] In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d at 1114; Carnesecca, 572 P.2d at 710; Haws, 116 Utah at 218, 209 P.2d at 232-33. [8] See In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d at 1114. [9] 673 P.2d 590 (Utah 1983). [10] Id. at 597 (quoting the Restatement of Restitution § 160 comment a (1937)). [11] Id. at 597-98. [12] Id. at 598. Accord Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 2 (1957). [13] 116 Utah 212, 209 P.2d 229. [14] 116 Utah 2d at 216-17, 209 P.2d at 231-32. Section 45(1)(b) in the first Restatement of Trusts is identical to that section in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts. [15] 116 Utah at 214-16, 209 P.2d at 231. [16] Id. at 216-17, 209 P.2d at 231-32. [17] 123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372. [18] Id. at 19-20, 253 P.2d at 373-74. [19] Id. at 20, 253 P.2d at 374. [20] Id. at 24-25, 253 P.2d at 376. [21] Id. [22] Id. at 21, 253 P.2d at 374. [23] The substance of this provision is presently located in Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (Repl. Vol. 9B, 1977 ed., Supp. 1986). [24] 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1952, at 103 (J. Chadbourn ed. 1978). [25] State v. Kelly, 118 N.J. Super. 38, 54, 285 A.2d 571, 580 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.), certification denied, 60 N.J. 350, 289 A.2d 795 (1972). [26] Id. [27] See id. [28] The substance of this provision is now found at Utah R.Evid. 401 (Repl.Vol. 9B, 1977 ed., Supp. 1986). [29] See Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 371, 482 P.2d 702, 705-06 (1971). [30] The jury was well aware that defendant Wilford Ashton was not a well man. When first called as a witness on behalf of defendants, defendants' attorney explained that defendant Wilford Ashton had undergone an operation on his throat for cancer and that therefore he had a difficult time in speaking. [31] Redevelopment Agency v. Mitsui Inv. Inc., 522 P.2d 1370, 1374 & n. 12 (Utah 1974).