Case Title: Smiley First, LLC v. Dep't of Transportation

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13300

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2023-05-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13300 
 
SMILEY FIRST, LLC  vs.  DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 4, 2022. – May 23, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Easement.  Eminent Domain, Extent of taking.  Real Property, 
Easement.  Railroad. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
January 24, 2020. 
 
The case was heard by Paul D. Wilson, J., on motions for 
summary judgment. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Paul L. Feldman (Shawn M. McCormack also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
Kendra Kinscherf, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendant. 
Ben Robbins & Daniel B. Winslow, for New England Legal 
Foundation, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
Deborah J. La Fetra, of California, Sam Spiegelman, of 
Washington, & Jonathan M. Houghton, for Pacific Legal 
Foundation, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
GEORGES, J.  In this case, we consider whether an easement 
taken by eminent domain in 2018 (2018 easement) by the 
defendant, the Department of Transportation (MassDOT), exceeded 
the scope of an easement taken in 1991 (1991 easement) by 
MassDOT's predecessor in interest, the Department of Public 
Works (DPW), with respect to certain land in the South Boston 
section of Boston (burdened land) that presently is owned by the 
plaintiff, Smiley First, LLC (Smiley). 
 
DPW's 1991 order of taking (1991 taking) created an 
easement over the burdened land for purposes of "the relocation 
of the facilities of the Consolidated Rail Corporation 
[(Conrail)]," which were going to be displaced by construction 
of a haul road for the Central Artery/Tunnel Project, also known 
as the "Big Dig."1  In 2017, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority (MBTA) announced plans to construct a test track and a 
6,000 square foot building for newly purchased subway cars (Red 
Line test track project) on the portion of Smiley's land 
burdened by the 1991 easement.  MassDOT then recorded the 2018 
confirmatory order of taking (2018 taking), which provides that 
it is to confirm and, "to the extent necessary to establish such 
 
 
1 The Central Artery/Tunnel Project rerouted the Central 
Artery, a portion of Interstate Route 93 that ran through the 
city of Boston on an elevated highway, to an underground tunnel.  
DPW and Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority operated 
together on the Big Dig project.  MassDOT is the lawful 
successor to DPW in accordance with G. L. c. 6C. 
3 
rights, acquire[]" an easement "for railroad purposes" that 
include the Red Line test track project. 
 
Based on its contention that the 2018 taking merely 
confirmed rights that it already held under the 1991 taking, 
MassDOT refused to pay Smiley any compensation for the 2018 
taking, and this litigation ensued.  On the parties' cross 
motions for partial summary judgment, a Superior Court judge 
determined, in reliance on his understanding that easements 
taken by eminent domain are not subject to the ordinary rules of 
interpretation of easements, that the 1991 easement was a grant 
to use the entire area of the easement for "any 'railroad 
purpose,'" including the Red Line test track project, and, 
accordingly, that Smiley was due no compensation as a result of 
the 2018 taking. 
 
We hold that, while the intent of the parties is not to be 
considered when an easement is taken by eminent domain, the 
ordinary rules of interpretation for easements otherwise apply.  
Thus, the "scope of the condemnor's use of the easement will be 
limited to the extent reasonably necessary for the purpose 
served by the taking, so that the landowner's right to use the 
easement area is as great as possible while remaining reasonably 
consistent with the purpose of the taking."  General Hosp. Corp. 
v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 423 Mass. 759, 764 (1996).  
Applying this principle here, we conclude that the 1991 easement 
4 
was more limited in scope than the 2018 easement and, in 
particular, did not encompass a use such as the Red Line test 
track project.  Therefore, the summary judgment in favor of 
MassDOT must be reversed, and the matter remanded to the 
Superior Court for a determination of the appropriate 
compensation due Smiley.2 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the undisputed facts set 
forth in the motion judge's decision on the parties' cross 
motions for partial summary judgment, supplemented by other 
uncontroverted facts in the summary judgment record.  See 
Williams v. Board of Appeals of Norwell, 490 Mass. 684, 685 
(2022). 
 
a.  Smiley's property.  In 2015, Smiley acquired an 18,088 
square foot parcel of land at the intersection of B Street and 
Cypher Street in South Boston.  Approximately 12,510 square feet 
of that property comprise the burdened land at issue here, which 
is contained within one of the parcels, parcel 60-E-RR-1, 
subject to the 1991 taking. 
 
b.  1991 taking.  In 1991, DPW laid out a limited access 
State highway, known as the South Boston Haul Road (haul road), 
to support construction of the extension of Interstate Route 90 
to the proposed third harbor tunnel, as part of the Central 
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs by the New England Legal 
Foundation and the Pacific Legal Foundation. 
5 
Artery/Tunnel Project.  Construction of the haul road was a 
massive enterprise that affected over 1 million square feet of 
land spread across twenty-eight parcels owned by multiple 
different owners. 
 
To acquire property for the haul road, the 1991 taking took 
in fee simple approximately 400,000 square feet of land occupied 
by Conrail, which is not at issue in this appeal.  Because this 
action displaced Conrail's rail operations, the order also 
established easements on several neighboring parcels, including 
over 12,510 square feet of parcel 60-E-RR-1, so that Conrail 
could relocate its railroad operations there.  Specifically, the 
order provides: 
"In connection with the laying out of the State highway 
hereinbefore described, it is necessary to relocate 
portions of railroad rights of way and land is hereby 
acquired for said relocation as follows: 
 
"Easements are hereby taken in parcels 60-E-RR-1, 60-E-RR-
5, and 60-E-RR-6, shown on the plan hereinafter referred 
to, for the relocation of facilities of the Consolidated 
Rail Corporation, including all trees and structures 
located thereon . . . . 
 
"Said easements (i) shall be used for railroad purposes 
only, (ii) shall not be used for the storage of any 
hazardous materials, hazardous wastes or hazardous 
substances other than in connection with the extension of 
Interstate Route 90 or the reconstruction of Interstate 
Route 93, and (iii) shall be subject to the rights of the 
owner of the underlying fee as hereinafter provided. . . . 
 
"Said railroad easements are acquired in limited vertical 
dimension only, said area being limited to a height of 
[twenty feet, six inches] above the top of the rails to be 
placed thereon.  Included in the easements, however, is the 
6 
unlimited right to utilize the air rights above [twenty 
feet, six inches] for twelve (12) years following the date 
of recording of this taking.  Thereafter, the use of said 
easements shall be subject to the rights of the owner of 
the air rights so reserved to use the area subject to the 
easements as reasonably may be required, subject to the 
approval of the party or parties having the benefit of the 
easements, for access to and to support the uses of the air 
rights." 
 
This order by its terms defined the 1991 easement, and, pursuant 
to it, Conrail subsequently relocated its main line to a single 
track that crosses land, now part of Smiley's property, that is 
burdened by the 1991 easement. 
 
c.  2018 taking.  Through a series of transactions, MassDOT 
ultimately acquired the 1991 easement.3  MassDOT subsequently 
sponsored the MBTA's Red Line test track project and authorized 
the MBTA to use MassDOT's land and rights in land for the 
project.  MassDOT and the MBTA also publicly declared that the 
entirety of the burdened land on Smiley's property was subject 
to the MBTA's exclusive use for any railroad purpose, including 
the Red Line test track project. 
 
After Smiley filed a complaint in the Land Court 
challenging MassDOT's authority to use the burdened land for the 
 
 
3 In 1997, the Commonwealth conveyed the 1991 easement to 
Conrail.  On June 1, 1999, Conrail sold its Boston rail assets 
to New York Central Lines LLC, which subsequently merged into 
CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX).  Through a release deed dated 
June 11, 2010, CSX conveyed to MassDOT its right, title, and 
interest in the 1991 easement, subject to a retained easement 
for CSX's continued freight service. 
7 
Red Line test track project, MassDOT recorded the 2018 taking.  
That order purported to "confirm and, to the extent necessary to 
establish such rights, acquire[] an easement for railroad 
purposes as . . . set forth in the 1991 [t]aking and/or in this 
instrument," including testing and storage of rapid transit rail 
vehicles and reasonably related uses such as access, parking, 
and utility needs.  "For the further avoidance of doubt," the 
order explicitly declared that these uses included the Red Line 
test track project. 
 
d.  Prior proceedings.  Following dismissal of its initial 
suit without prejudice,4 in 2020, Smiley filed a new complaint 
against MassDOT in the Superior Court, seeking declaratory and 
equitable relief pursuant to G. L. c. 231A, § 1, with respect to 
the parties' respective rights under the 1991 easement as of 
January 11, 2018 (the day before the 2018 taking), and damages 
pursuant to G. L. c. 79, for the taking by MassDOT on January 
12, 2018. 
 
 
4 A Land Court judge dismissed Smiley's quiet title claims, 
but not the declaratory judgment claims, which, by agreement of 
the parties, were transferred to the Superior Court.  A Superior 
Court judge dismissed those claims without prejudice, ruling 
that the remaining declaratory judgment claims had to be 
combined in a single action with a claim for land damages.  
Smiley then filed his current complaint in the Superior Court in 
January 2020; the resulting judgment is what is now before us on 
appeal. 
8 
 
Following a nonevidentiary hearing on the parties' cross 
motions for partial summary judgment, a Superior Court judge 
denied Smiley's motion, allowed MassDOT's cross motion, and 
dismissed Smiley's claim for compensation under G. L. c. 79.  
The judge agreed with MassDOT that the 1991 "easement, by its 
terms, may be used for any 'railroad purposes,' which includes 
the construction of a test track and building to test newly-
purchased subway cars."  Smiley filed an appeal with the Appeals 
Court, and we transferred the case to this court on our own 
motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  "We review a 
decision on a motion for summary judgment de novo and, thus, 
accord no deference to the decision of the motion judge" 
(quotation omitted).  Williams, 490 Mass. at 689-690, quoting 
Tracer Lane II Realty, LLC v. Waltham, 489 Mass. 775, 778 
(2022).  "The allowance of a motion for summary judgment 'is 
appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact 
in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.'"  Williams, supra at 689, quoting Barron 
Chiropractic & Rehabilitation, P.C. v. Norfolk & Dedham Group, 
469 Mass. 800, 804 (2014).  Where both parties have moved for 
summary judgment, "the evidence is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom judgment" has been entered.  
9 
Green Mountains Ins. Co. v. Wakelin, 484 Mass. 222, 226 (2020), 
quoting Boazova v. Safety Ins. Co., 462 Mass. 346, 350 (2012). 
 
b.  Principles governing easements taken by eminent domain.  
"The meaning and scope of an instrument of taking, so far as it 
affects private rights in property, is a question of law."  
General Hosp. Corp., 423 Mass. at 764, citing Flagg v. Concord, 
222 Mass. 569, 572 (1916). 
 
We begin by reviewing the principles governing our general 
construction of easements.  "An affirmative easement 'creates a 
nonpossessory right to enter and use land in the possession of 
another and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the 
uses authorized by the easement.'"  Patterson v. Paul, 448 Mass. 
658, 663 (2007), quoting Restatement (Third) of Property:  
Servitudes § 1.2(1) (2000).  "Restrictions on land 'are 
disfavored,' . . . and doubts concerning the rights of use of an 
easement 'are to be resolved in favor of freedom of land from 
servitude'" (citation omitted).  Martin v. Simmons Props., LLC, 
467 Mass. 1, 9 (2014).  "[T]he servient owner retains the use of 
his [or her] land for all purposes except such as are 
inconsistent with the right granted to the dominant owner" or 
acquired by that owner.  Merry v. Priest, 276 Mass. 592, 600 
(1931). 
 
The motion judge concluded that "[t]hese principles . . . 
do not assist Smiley," and Smiley's reliance on them was 
10 
misplaced, because they derive from cases that concern 
"transfers or prescriptive rights involving private parties" 
(emphasis added), Mugar v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 28 
Mass. App. Ct. 443, 445 (1990).  The conclusion that easements 
taken by eminent domain are not to be construed in favor of 
freedom of the land from servitude was error. 
 
As MassDOT points out, an easement taken by eminent domain 
must be construed in light of the language of the order of 
taking and the "circumstances surrounding the taking."  General 
Hosp. Corp., 423 Mass. at 764.  This approach differs in one 
respect from negotiated easements, as the intents of the owner 
and the government entity taking the easement are not relevant.  
See Mugar, 28 Mass. App. Ct. at 445 (intent of parties is 
irrelevant in construing easement taken by eminent domain 
because "[t]he taking of private property for a public purpose 
may be accomplished without the consent of the owner," and "the 
intent of the governmental body is largely beyond the scope of 
judicial scrutiny").  Thus, "principles of interpretation 
designed to give effect to the express or implied intent of 
parties contracting for or acquiring an interest in land . . . 
are, in general, inapplicable to eminent domain proceedings."  
Taylor v. Martha's Vineyard Land Bank Comm'n, 475 Mass. 682, 690 
n.17 (2016), quoting Bateman v. Board of Appeals of Georgetown, 
56 Mass. App. Ct. 236, 239 (2002). 
11 
 
But that does not mean that an easement taken by eminent 
domain is insulated from application of the ordinary rules of 
construction otherwise applicable to the interpretation of 
easements.  Apart from consideration of the parties' intent, 
which is inapplicable to takings by eminent domain, we 
consistently have applied the same rules of construction to 
easements taken by eminent domain as are applicable to privately 
granted easements.  Most significantly with respect to the 
issues here, whether an easement has been established by eminent 
domain or granted privately, "as a general rule, doubts as to 
the extent of a restriction in an easement 'should be resolved 
in favor of freedom of land from servitude.'"  General Hosp. 
Corp., 423 Mass. at 765, quoting Hemenway v. Bartevian, 321 
Mass. 226, 229 (1947).  As with an easement that was privately 
granted, 
"[t]he scope of the condemnor's use of the easement will be 
limited to the extent reasonably necessary for the purpose 
served by the taking, so that the landowner's right to use 
the easement area is as great as possible while remaining 
reasonably consistent with the purpose of the taking. . . .  
If the condemnor takes an easement, the owner retains title 
to the land in fee and has the right to make any use of it 
that does not interfere with the public use." 
 
General Hosp. Corp., supra at 764-765.  See Agostini v. North 
Adams Gaslight Co., 265 Mass. 70, 73 (1928) ("In a taking by 
eminent domain only such rights are acquired as are reasonably 
necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the taking is 
12 
made, unless the Legislature authorizes the acquiring of greater 
rights"). 
 
With these principles in mind, we turn to consider the 
easements at issue in this case. 
 
c.  Scope of 1991 easement.  In determining the scope of 
the 1991 easement, we begin with the language of the 1991 
taking, which expresses the purpose for which the easement was 
taken and the circumstances of the taking.  The 1991 order 
clearly states that the purpose was to facilitate "the laying 
out of the State highway" for the Central Artery/Tunnel Project 
by "relocat[ing] portions of railroad rights of way," and, more 
specifically, "relocat[ing] . . . the facilities of [Conrail]."  
Accordingly, by its plain language, the scope of the easement is 
limited to the extent reasonably necessary to relocate Conrail's 
facilities.  See General Hosp. Corp., 423 Mass. at 764 
(questions about extent of eminent domain takings "should be 
resolved in favor of freedom of the land from the servitude"). 
 
MassDOT correctly points out that the 1991 license 
agreement between the Commonwealth and Conrail permitted the 
1991 easement to be used by Conrail for ancillary activities 
that constituted "railroad purposes": 
"(i) for the construction and maintenance of the temporary 
rail yard; (ii) for materials handling and processing; and 
(iii) for use by Conrail, its authorized customers, agents 
and assigns for railroad purposes (freight or passenger), 
including the loading and unloading of rail cars or 
13 
containers, the classifying and assembling of trains, the 
temporary storage of operating rolling stock or for such 
other railroad purposes related to the transportation of 
freight and commodities by rail." 
 
But this license could not unilaterally expand the scope of the 
permissible use of the burdened land beyond what was stated in 
the 1991 taking.  Moreover, consistent with the purpose stated 
in the 1991 taking, the license agreement similarly recites that 
the Commonwealth is entering into the license agreement "to 
partially replace and restore the [c]urrent [Conrail] Rail 
Facilities and Conrail Land affected or eliminated by the Haul 
Road."  Thus, the Commonwealth's licensing of these activities 
was still governed by the over-all purpose set out in the 1991 
taking –- enabling Conrail to relocate the facilities being 
displaced by the haul road. 
 
It is also important to recognize that the 1991 easement 
for the relocation of Conrail's facilities was limited in space 
and time by the air rights reserved to the fee holder.  As 
defined in the 1991 taking, the easement included a vertical 
dimension of twenty feet and six inches "above the top of the 
rails to be placed" on the property, "subject to the rights of 
the owner of the air rights" above that height after a certain 
period of time.  For the first twelve years after the recording 
of the taking, Conrail, as the beneficiary of the easement, also 
enjoyed "the unlimited right to utilize the air rights above" 
14 
twenty feet and six inches.  "Thereafter, the use of said 
easements shall be subject to the rights of the owner of the air 
rights so reserved . . . for access to and to support the uses 
of the air rights."  Notably, the twelve-year period coincided 
with the time frame in which Conrail was to complete the 
relocation of its track and other facilities, and for the haul 
road to be constructed.  Otherwise put, the fee holder had to 
wait twelve years before developing its air rights, so as to 
allow Conrail time to relocate its operations, in accordance 
with the purpose of the taking.  Once Conrail accomplished that 
purpose by relocating a single track to the property, the scope 
of the easement established thereunder was fixed and limited to 
the right of way occupied by Conrail's track and the vertical 
dimension above it.5 
 
 
5 As we discuss further infra, the operation of the air 
rights provision in the 1991 easement was analogous to the well-
established doctrine of practical location. 
 
"Where a right of way, or other easement, is granted by 
deed without fixed and defined limits, the practical 
location and use of such way or easement by the grantee 
under [the] deed, acquiesced in by the grantor at the time 
of the grant and for a long time subsequent thereto, 
operate as an assignment of the right, and are deemed to be 
that which was intended to be conveyed by the deed, and are 
the same, in legal effect, as if it had been fully 
described by the terms of the grant." 
 
Bannon v. Angier, 2 Allen 128, 129 (1861).  See Naumkeag Steam 
Cotton Co. v. American Glue Co., 244 Mass. 506, 508 (1923) 
("When the exact location of the easement is not precisely 
defined but has been exercised in a certain place, the grantee 
15 
 
Our interpretation of the extent of the 1991 easement is 
supported by one of our rulings in General Hosp. Corp.  In that 
case, Massachusetts General Hospital had acquired property that 
was subject to an easement taken by DPW for the purpose of 
constructing an elevated highway ramp.  General Hosp. Corp., 423 
Mass. at 759-760.  The hospital and the MBTA then disputed the 
scope of this easement in the hospital's suit seeking damages 
for the MBTA's subsequent eminent domain takings of hospital 
property.  Id.  Specifically, the MBTA contended that the 
hospital had no right to access its property across location 
lines shown on the highway ramp layout.  Id. at 763-764. 
 
We concluded, however, that, as the fee owner, the hospital 
had the right to access its property across these location 
lines, given that DPW had only taken an easement on the 
property, not a fee; the easement had been taken for "highway 
purposes"; and "[t]he height of the ramp where it crosse[d] [the 
 
has not the right afterwards to change the location to some 
other part of the land"); Chandler v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct 
Corp., 125 Mass. 544, 550 (1878) (easement to lay pipes and keep 
and support them forever did not include right to change 
location of pipes once they had been laid).  See also 
Restatement (Third) of Property:  Servitudes § 4.8 comment c 
("When improvements are constructed or installed on the servient 
estate for the enjoyment of a servitude without objection from 
the servient owner, the parties have given a practical 
construction to the instrument or agreement that created the 
servitude.  Even if the instrument specifies a different 
location, the location is fixed by the placement of the 
improvements unless the language or circumstances lead to the 
conclusion that the initial location is temporary"). 
16 
property] was adequate to permit the owner of the underlying fee 
to use the area under the ramp without interfering with the 
limited access highway."  Id. at 764-765.  Once DPW had 
constructed the highway ramp, the hospital was free to access 
and use the remaining land for parking, as long as the parking 
did not interfere with the highway.  See id. at 765-766.  
Similarly, here, under the 1991 taking, the fee holder of what 
is now Smiley's land was entitled to access to the burdened 
land, so long as that access did not interfere with the 
operations of the railroad track built by Conrail. 
 
d.  Scope of 2018 taking.  The 2018 taking provides that 
the easement for "railroad purposes" "permits [MassDOT] and its 
lawful successors and assigns to use the Remainder Railroad 
Easement Area for all lawful railroad purposes within the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts."  The 2018 taking further 
specifies that such uses shall include "(a) the use of the 
Remainder Railroad Easement Area[6] by railroads powered by any 
source, for purposes including, but not limited to, the 
deployment, testing, calibration, and storage of rapid transit 
rail vehicles; and (b) uses reasonably related to such railroad 
 
 
6 The 2018 taking defines the "Remainder Railroad Easement 
Area" as "an easement for railroad purposes as described and 
more particularly set forth in the 1991 [t]aking and/or in this 
instrument over the parcel of land comprised of portions of the 
Easement Parcel as more particularly shown on the plan of land 
hereinafter described." 
17 
purposes such as access, parking and utility needs in connection 
therewith." 
 
We conclude that the scope of the 2018 easement exceeds the 
scope of the 1991 taking and that the motion judge erred in 
determining otherwise.  The judge misconstrued the extent of the 
1991 easement in large part because, in his view, certain 
ordinary rules of construction of easements were inapplicable to 
an easement taken by eminent domain.  As stated, however, other 
than the exclusion of any consideration of the parties' intent, 
we consistently have applied the ordinary rules of 
interpretation of easements to easements taken by eminent 
domain, see General Hosp. Corp., 423 Mass. at 764-765, and 
MassDOT has not proffered any reason for us to revisit that 
view. 
 
Here, whereas the purpose of the 1991 taking was to 
relocate railroad rights of way and Conrail's facilities, the 
2018 taking provides, "[f]or the avoidance of doubt," that it 
encompasses the 1991 purpose, but that it also includes "all 
lawful railroad purposes within the Commonwealth."  
Specifically, the 2018 taking states that it encompasses, 
"without limitation," testing, calibration, and storage of any 
type of railroad vehicle, and the associated uses such as 
parking that are necessary to those primary uses. 
18 
 
The Red Line test track project, which falls within this 
language, is a new and different project from the original 
relocation of Conrail's railroad track and facilities.  It 
involves an additional 6,000 square foot building, a different 
type of railroad car, and a considerably larger portion of the 
burdened land than did the single track originally constructed 
by Conrail pursuant to the 1991 easement.  Indeed, the 2018 
taking permits the easement holder to use the "Remainder 
Railroad Easement Area" -- i.e., the entirety of the burdened 
land, not just the right of way taken up by the relocated 
Conrail track -– for "all lawful railroad purposes within the 
Commonwealth."  Thus, the easement holder now may engage in any 
"railroad purposes," anytime and anywhere on the burdened land.  
Consequently, the 2018 easement makes it virtually impossible 
for the fee holder to build anywhere else on the burdened land, 
because the owner of the fee can never know whether or when the 
easement holder might seek to exercise its rights on that part 
of the burdened land. 
 
MassDOT raises a number of arguments as to why the 1991 
easement is just as sweeping in extent as the 2018 easement.  
These arguments are unpersuasive.  If the purpose of the 1991 
easement was to relocate Conrail's right of way and facilities 
to support construction of the haul road, and if the location of 
the easement became fixed once Conrail completed that process, 
19 
then clearly the 1991 easement did not authorize the very 
different and larger Red Line test track project nearly thirty 
years later.  In particular, MassDOT contends that the provision 
in the 1991 taking that the easement "shall be used for railroad 
purposes only" broadly authorizes use of the 1991 easement for 
any railroad purpose in the future, including the Red Line test 
track project.  That provision, however, is plainly a 
restriction on the use of the 1991 easement; it prohibits 
Conrail or a successor from using the easement for something 
other than railroad purposes.  As such, it remains subordinate 
to the over-all governing purpose of the 1991 easement, namely, 
the relocation of Conrail's right of way and facilities to 
support construction of the haul road.  The provision does not 
supersede that overarching governing purpose so as to expand the 
scope of the easement to include any future railroad purpose. 
 
As discussed, an easement taken by eminent domain must be 
construed in light of the "circumstances surrounding the 
taking."  General Hosp. Corp., 423 Mass. at 764.  In that case, 
for example, DPW had granted the Massachusetts Transit Authority 
(MTA) (the predecessor of the MBTA) the right to maintain its 
existing transit lines running through a DPW highway layout.  
Id. at 761.  The right to maintain included the right to 
"construct, reconstruct, maintain, repair, and operate [the] 
structures."  Id.  Because the MTA's only structures within the 
20 
layout at that time were elevated tracks, no reasonable 
interpretation of the language of the easement granted the MTA 
the right to build an underground parking garage.  Similarly, 
here, the phrase "for railroad purposes only" in the 1991 taking 
should not be viewed out of context as authorizing the Red Line 
test track project nearly thirty years later, when clearly the 
purpose of the 1991 taking was to facilitate the relocation of 
Conrail's facilities. 
 
e.  Use of like kind.  MassDOT further argues, relying on 
Leroy v. Worcester St. Ry., 287 Mass. 1, 10-15 (1934), that the 
use of the easement for a test track and a building to hold new 
subway cars was permissible under the 1991 taking because the 
new use did not differ in kind from the original railroad use 
set forth in the 1991 taking.  In Leroy, the court held that an 
easement that had been taken for operation of a steam railway 
properly could be used for a motor bus, applying the principle 
that an easement taken for one public purpose may be used for a 
"public use of a like kind."  Leroy, supra at 13.  In either 
event, the court reasoned, "the essential purpose was to . . . 
transport members of the public."  Id. at 12. 
 
The Red Line test track project, however, is not a public 
use of a like kind.  The 1991 easement provided Conrail the 
right to relocate its operations, which proved to be a single 
track.  In contrast, the Red Line test track project involves 
21 
not only a test track, but also a large new building, parking, 
and another track. 
 
f.  Doctrine of practical location.  MassDOT also contends 
that because the 1991 easement covered the entirety of the 
12,510 square foot area set forth in the 1991 taking, the use of 
the entire burdened area for the Red Line test track was 
permissible.  We disagree. 
 
The 1991 taking states at the outset of the relevant 
passage that "[e]asements are hereby taken in [three] parcels[, 
including] 60-E-RR-1, . . . for the relocation of the facilities 
of [Conrail]."  Contrary to MassDOT's contention, this language 
does not "clearly and unambiguously" establish that those 
easements were intended to cover the entirety of each parcel.  
Rather, the language merely refers to an easement in some 
portion of each enumerated parcel. 
 
Under the 1991 easement, Conrail was free to relocate its 
operations wherever it chose within the scope of the easement on 
each parcel.  Once it did so, however, the location of the 
easement became fixed, see Leroy, 287 Mass. at 14; Naumkeag 
Steam Cotton Co. v. American Glue Co., 244 Mass. 506, 508 
(1923), and the fee owner was free to develop the remainder of 
the parcel and the air rights, see General Hosp. Corp., 423 
Mass. at 764.  MassDOT's contention that possession of the 
easement continued to give the easement holder complete control 
22 
to construct additional facilities anywhere on the burdened land 
is inconsistent with the fundamental principles limiting the 
dominant estate to the extent reasonably necessary for the 
purpose of the taking, and protecting the right of the fee 
holder to use the easement area to as great an extent as 
possible, see id., as well as with the doctrine of practical 
location, see Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co., supra; Bannon v. 
Angier, 2 Allen 128, 129 (1861). 
 
For this reason, we reject, as inapplicable, MassDOT's 
argument that it would have been illegal under Federal law for 
Conrail to "abandon" its rights over the rest of the burdened 
land.  Conrail never possessed a right to occupy the entire 
parcel of burdened land in perpetuity.  Conrail only possessed a 
right to place its tracks and facilities in the place of its 
choosing on the burdened land.7 
 
We also conclude that the Appeals Court's decision in 
Mugar, which MassDOT cites and upon which the motion judge 
substantially relied, is distinguishable from the present case.  
Mugar involved an action for compensation where the MBTA had 
taken an easement for an "undefined right of access" from 
 
 
7 MassDOT also cites Mahan v. Rockport, 287 Mass. 34, 37 
(1934), for the proposition that rights are not lost by using 
less than the entire area taken, but that case involved a public 
way, which "once duly laid out continues to be such until 
legally discontinued," and "may be discontinued by vote of the 
town and not otherwise." 
23 
surrounding city streets to a parcel containing a subway vent 
shaft near the center of the plaintiffs' parking lot.  Mugar, 28 
Mass. App. Ct. at 443-444.  Because this access easement gave 
the MBTA unlimited rights of passage from the city streets, it 
necessarily prevented the plaintiffs from building anywhere in 
the parking lot.  See id. at 444.  By contrast, here the 1991 
taking included language that limited the scope of the easement 
to the relocation of Conrail's facilities and explicitly allowed 
the fee holder to develop the air rights on the burdened land 
after a twelve-year period. 
 
We are mindful that, in exercising the power of eminent 
domain in 1991, DPW had the power to choose how it wished to 
articulate the scope of the easement.  If it had intended to 
establish a perpetual right to occupy all of the burdened 
property, then it could have done so unequivocally, but it did 
not.  When the scope and extent of a taking is unclear, we must 
adopt the narrower interpretation of its language, in favor of 
freedom of the land from servitude, as long as it is otherwise 
consistent with applicable legal principles.  See General Hosp. 
Corp., 423 Mass. at 764. 
 
g.  Just compensation.  Because the scope of the 2018 
easement exceeded the scope of the 1991 easement, it represented 
an additional taking.  Accordingly, Smiley's claim for damages 
24 
under G. L. c. 79 should not have been dismissed, and, on 
remand, Smiley is entitled to pursue its claim for damages. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The summary judgment is reversed.  The 
matter is remanded to the Superior Court for entry of a 
declaratory judgment in favor of Smiley that the 2018 easement 
exceeded the scope of the 1991 easement and, in particular, did 
not encompass a use such as the Red Line test track project, and 
for further proceedings on the compensation Smiley is due 
pursuant to G. L. c. 79, § 14, as a result of the 2018 taking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.