Case Title: TOLLEFSON v. WYOMING STATE RETIREMENT BOARD

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-62

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-11-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
TOLLEFSON v. WYOMING STATE RETIREMENT BOARD2003 WY 15079 P.3d 518Case Number: 02-62Decided: 11/20/2003
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE RETIREMENT

BENEFITS 
OF:

 

ANN 
TOLLEFSON,

 

Appellant(Petitioner),

 

v.

 

WYOMING 
STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,

 

Appellee(Respondent).

 

 

W.R.A.P 
12.09 Certification from the District Court of Laramie 
County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Ann 
M. Rochelle of Shively, Taheri & Rochelle, P.C., Casper, Wyoming. 

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Wyoming Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney 
General.  Argument by Mr. 
Hubbard.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
In 
1998, Natrona County School District Number One (the School District) decided to 
implement a performance based salary system for certain employees.  These employees would receive a base 
salary and then potentially be eligible for additional incentive pay if they 
achieved certain performance goals.  
Ann Tollefson received several incentive payments under this 
program.  The Wyoming Retirement 
System determined that these incentive payments were not salary, but rather 
constituted "bonus" payments and thus excluded them from the calculation of 
Tollefson's retirement benefits upon her retirement.  Retirement benefits are calculated as a 
percentage of an employee's highest average salary for a certain number of 
years.  The higher the average 
salary, the higher the retirement benefits.  Thus, the decision of the Wyoming 
Retirement System to exclude the incentive payments lowered Tollefson's 
retirement benefit.  

 

[¶2]           
Tollefson 
appealed to the Wyoming Retirement Board (the Board), which upheld the decision 
of the Wyoming Retirement System.  
Tollefson then appealed to district court, which certified the appeal to 
us pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09.1  We reverse the decision of the Board and 
remand with instructions to include the incentive payments in the calculation of 
Tollefson's retirement benefits.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]           
The 
parties agree the two issues before this Court are:

 

1.  Did the Wyoming Retirement Board 
properly conclude that the Performance Salary Awards paid to Petitioner 
by Natrona County School District No. One do not constitute "salary" under Wyo. 
Stat. § 9-3-402(a)(xvi)?

 

2.  Did the Wyoming Retirement Board 
properly conclude that the Performance Salary Awards paid to Petitioner 
by Natrona County School District No. One constitute "bonuses" as excluded by 
the Board's rules and regulations?

 

 

 

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]           
This 
appeal is presented upon stipulated facts.2   The pertinent facts as stipulated 
are as follows:

 

1.  The Petitioner, Ann Tollefson, is a 
member of the Wyoming Retirement System and has been a member of the Wyoming 
Retirement System since August 26, 1963.

 

2.  Ann Tollefson retired on July 1, 2000, 
from Natrona County School District No. One with 394 total months of 
service.  The total months of 
service is not in dispute in this matter.  
Ms. Tollefson has been a teacher and an administrator during her career 
with the Wyoming public schools.

 

3.  During the last three years of her 
career, 1997 through 2000, Ms. Tollefson was the Executive Director of 
School-Community Relations and Resource Development with Natrona County School 
District No. One.  This is a 
"cabinet level" position.  

 

4.  In 1998, the Natrona County School 
District No. One Board of Trustees started a new compensation system called 
"performance pay" for cabinet level employees.  This new compensation system was the 
first such system for any employees in Natrona County School District No. 
One.  Similar systems have been 
established by Natrona County School District No. One for administrators other 
than cabinet level positions starting school year 1998-1999; teachers starting 
the school year 1999-2000; and classified employees to begin with school year 
1999-2000. . . .

 

5.  On May 30, 2000, Ann Tollefson filed an 
Application for Retirement with the Wyoming Retirement System.  The Application selected Option 1 
retirement, with an effective retirement date of July 1, 
2000.

* 
* * *

8. 
. . .  B.  In the calculation of Ann Tollefson's 
retirement benefit the Wyoming Retirement System did not include amounts that 
were refunded due to "unacceptable bonus" or "performance pay." . . 
.

 

* 
* * *

10.  By letter dated February 2, 2000, the 
Wyoming Retirement System notified the Natrona County Schools of the return of 
the contributions paid on bonus pay for Ann Tollefson. . . 
.

 

11.  By letter dated July 25, 2000, the 
Wyoming Retirement System notified the Natrona County Schools of the return of 
the contributions paid on "performance pay" for Ann Tollefson, as well as other 
employees. . . .

 

* 
* * *

25.  It is the position of the Wyoming 
Retirement System that the Performance Pay received by Ann Tollefson in this 
matter is a "bonus" and under the rule does not meet the definition of "cash 
remuneration."

 

26.  It is Ann Tollefson's position that 
"performance pay" received by Ann Tollefson is not a "bonus" under the 
applicable rule and meets the definition of "cash remuneration" in the statutes 
and the rules.

 

27.  The performance salary compensation 
system initiated by the Natrona County School District No. One Board of Trustees 
is an ongoing, permanent system established to compensate all 
employees.

 

28.  Not all employees who are eligible for 
"performance salary awards" receive them . . . .  The Performance Salary Awards granted by 
Natrona County School District No. One vary with the performance of the 
individual employee as evaluated by the assigned 
evaluators.

 

29.  Performance Salary Awards are an 
incentive to encourage employee performance in Natrona County School District 
No. One.

 

[¶5]           
Attached 
to the Stipulation of Facts and incorporated therein are several documents.  These documents help explain the 
compensation scheme implemented by the School District.  The performance salary compensation 
system, as explained by the School District and reflected in employee contracts, 
entails the establishment of a Performance Salary Range (PSR) for each 
employee.  The PSR essentially is a 
pay band.  Employees are assigned a 
Basic Salary (BS) from within the PSR.  
The BS is the fixed annual salary and is the least annual compensation an 
employee can expect to receive during the year.  In addition to the BS, the pay system 
provides for Performance Salary (PS).  
The PS is the difference between the BS and the top of the PSR.  The BS and the PS together represent the 
maximum amount that an employee can earn in an annual period.  

 

[¶6]           
As 
stated in Tollefson's employment contracts, the employee "may earn" a PS award 
not to exceed the difference between the employee's BS and the maximum of her 
PSR.  Employees are evaluated four 
times a year to provide feedback on their performances and the Superintendent 
and the Board Compensation Sub-committee determine the PS award as a part of the 
second and fourth evaluation.  As 
stated in the facts, the PS awards granted by the School District vary with the 
performance of the individual employee as evaluated by the assigned 
evaluators.  Not all employees 
receive PS awards after evaluation.  
The School District, however, established a salary budget equal to the 
top of each employee's PSR.  

 

[¶7]           
In 
its initial proposal, dated November 23, 1998, the School District explained the 
rationale for the performance pay system as follows:

 

In 
years past, salaries for the Superintendent and Cabinet-level employees were 
based on an annually determined percentage increase added to the existing salary 
of each employee.  It is the desire 
of the Board Chair and the Compensation Sub-Committee to dramatically change 
this previous compensation norm to one which emphasizes market standards, 
responsibility, and performance.  It 
is believed that the Pilot Performance-Based Compensation Plan . . . provides a 
rationale and structure for compensation which addresses this premise.  The two major goals of the proposed 
program are as follows:

            

1) 
to reward superior performance which produces improved opportunities and 
resources for students; and 

2) 
to provide an incentive for executive administrators to achieve the goals and 
objectives of the District as established by the Board of 
Trustees.

 

By 
awarding compensation using a performance-based system, executive administrators 
will have a greater incentive to perform their jobs, both individually and 
collaboratively, at the highest level possible. . . .

 

In 
the Natrona County School District, where the focus is on innovation, choice, 
opportunity, and improving achievement, this departure from traditional 
security-based pay systems which determine salaries based solely on longevity, 
is an appropriate method to address compensation.  The proposed program requires a deep 
level of trust and relationship between the Board and the executive staff.  It also promotes a continuous dialogue 
about the [sic] providing the best educational program possible for District 
students and rewarding those who commit to high expectations and high 
performance.

 

Attached 
to the Stipulation of Facts are annual "Work Plans" and semi-annual "Reports to 
Request Performance Salary."  The 
Reports specifically reference the Work Plans and indicate the status of each 
task identified in the respective work plan.  

 

[¶8]           
Tollefson 
received four PS installments prior to her retirement.  Tollefson paid contributions into the 
Wyoming Retirement System for both her BS and her PS.  The Wyoming Retirement System returned 
her contributions for her PS declaring that the PS was bonus pay and therefore 
unacceptable retirement salary.  
When Tollefson retired, the Wyoming Retirement System refused to 
calculate the PS into the final average salary from which it determined the 
amount of retirement due Tollefson, again claiming that the PS constituted bonus 
pay which is excluded from salary calculations for the purpose of determining 
retirement benefits.  Tollefson 
requested a hearing before the Board, which upheld the decision of the Wyoming 
Retirement System.  Tollefson 
appealed that decision to the district court, which certified the appeal to this 
Court.

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶9]           
On 
review of petitions for judicial review certified to this Court pursuant to 
W.R.A.P. 12.09, we invoke the same standard of review applicable to the district 
courts.   We review 
administrative decisions in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114 
(LexisNexis 2003):

 

(c) 
To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action.  In making the 
following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts 
of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

(i) 
Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

(ii) 
Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law;

(B) 
Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

(C) 
In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking 
statutory right;

(D) 
Without observance of procedure required by law; or

(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.

 

Because 
this case was submitted upon stipulated facts, we are only concerned with the 
Retirement Board's conclusions of law.  
We review an agency's conclusions of law de novo.  We affirm an agency's conclusions if the 
agency properly applied the correct rule of law to its findings of fact.  Texaco, Inc. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 845 P.2d 398, 399 (Wyo. 1993).  If, however, the agency applied the 
incorrect rule of law to its findings or if it improperly applied the correct 
rule of law to its findings, we correct the agency's errors.  Id.; see Elk Horn Ranch, Inc. 
v. Board of County Comm'rs, Crook County, 2002 WY 167, ¶¶7-8, 57 P.3d 1218, 
1222 (Wyo. 2002); DC Production Service v. Wyo. Dep't of Employment, 2002 
WY 142, ¶¶6-7, 54 P.3d 768, 771 (Wyo. 2002) (Appellant "contends that the legal 
conclusions based on the factual findings are not in accordance with law.  An agency's conclusion of law is 
entitled to no deference from this Court.  
We will affirm an agency's legal conclusion only if it is in accordance 
with the law.")  "When the 
determination before us is a mixed question of fact and law, we defer to an 
agency's findings of basic fact but correct misapplication of the law to those 
facts.  Aanenson v. State ex rel. 
Wyo. Workers' Compensation Div., 842 P.2d 1077, 1080 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting 
Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 802 P.2d 856, 860-61 
(Wyo. 1990))."  Antelope Valley 
Imp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 992 P.2d 563, 566 (Wyo. 
1999).

 

[¶10]      Likewise, 
to the extent this appeal involves mixed questions of law and 
fact:

 

When 
an agency's determinations contain elements of law and fact, we will not treat 
them as findings of fact.  We extend 
deference only to agency findings of "basic fact."  When reviewing a finding of "ultimate 
fact," we divide the factual and legal aspects of the finding to determine 
whether the correct rule of law has been properly applied to the facts.  If the correct rule of law has not been 
properly applied, we do not defer to the agency's finding but correct the 
agency's error in either stating or applying the law.

 

Union 
Pacific R.R. Co., 
802 P.2d  at 861.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶11]      Tollefson 
objects to the reduction in her retirement benefit caused by the exclusion of 
her PS awards from her salary by the Board.  The legal question to be resolved is 
whether the PS awards received by Tollefson constitute "salary" for purposes of 
computing Tollefson's retirement benefit.  

 

[¶12]      The 
Wyoming Retirement Act defines "salary" in pertinent part as "cash remuneration 
paid to a member in a calendar year."  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-3-402(a)(xvi) (LexisNexis 2003).  This Court defined "remuneration" in 
Mowry v. State ex rel. Wyoming Retirement Bd., 866 P.2d 729 (Wyo. 
1993):

 

Black's 
Law Dictionary defines remuneration as "[r]eward;  recompense;  salary;  compensation."  Black's Law Dictionary at 1165 (5th ed. 
1979).  Each of the terms used to 
define "remuneration" are also defined in Black's as referring to payments made 
in exchange for something equivalent, such as services rendered.  Id., at 1188, 1144, 1200, 256. 
Websters' Third New International Dictionary (1966) defines "remunerate" 
as:  "1:  to pay an equivalent for (as a service, 
loss or expense) 2:  to pay an 
equivalent to (a person) for service, loss or expense," and defines 
"remuneration" as "remunerating."   
Thus, the plain and ordinary meaning of remuneration clearly contemplates 
payments made in return for something equivalent.

 

Id. 
at 731.  In Mowry, this Court 
held that severance pay did not fall within the definition of salary because 
"definitions suggest that severance pay' is primarily gratuitous and, although 
it may be intended to partially alleviate the loss of employment, it is not an 
attempt to equally compensate the employee for services rendered, losses 
suffered, or expenses incurred."  
Id.

 

[¶13]      The 
Board has promulgated a rule defining "cash remuneration":

 

"Cash 
remuneration," as used in W.S. 9-3-402(a)(xvi) for the purposes of contributions 
to the system and the determination of an employee's "highest average salary," 
means the compensation paid for services rendered to a participating employer, 
and includes: contributions required by W.S. 9-3-412; any salary reduction or 
salary deferral amounts under federal Internal Revenue Code Sections 125, 
401(k), 403(b) or 457; any pay for administrative, sabbatical, annual, sick, 
vacation, or personal leave; any pay for compensatory time, provided that any 
such pay for compensatory time is made during the same calendar year in which 
the compensatory time is earned, and any retroactive compensation payments 
pursuant to court orders, arbitration awards, or litigation and grievance 
settlements.  "Cash remuneration" 
does not include: fringe benefits such as payments for unused sick, personal or 
vacation leave; housing allowances; transportation expenses; early retirement 
incentive pay; severance pay; bonuses; medical insurance; workers' compensation 
benefits; disability insurance premiums or benefits; payments received by a 
member in lieu of previously employer-provided fringe benefits under an 
agreement between the member and participating employer entered into within 
sixty months before retirement; any other payment which may reasonably be 
construed to be a fringe benefit; or any payment made during any three-year 
period of employment which is deemed to increase highest average salary for the 
primary purpose of increasing a retirement benefit.

 

Wyo. 
Retirement Bd., Rules, ch. 8 § 1(a) (1996).  According to this definition, any amount 
received as a  "bonus" is excluded 
from the calculation of retirement benefits.  "Bonus" is not defined by either statute 
or rule.  The rule does not 
specifically address incentive pay or merit pay.

 

[¶14]      The 
task before this Court is to construe the record evidence relating to 
Tollefson's employment to determine if PS awards are "payments made in return 
for something equivalent."  Our 
focus is on the intent of Tollefson and the School Board with regard to the 
compensation scheme.  Our appellate 
obligation is to interpret and construe contracts as a matter of law in order to 
shed light on the intention and understanding of the parties.  Amoco Production Company v. Stauffer 
Chemical, 612 P.2d 463, 465 (Wyo. 1980) ("Our basic purpose in construing or 
interpreting a contract is to determine the intention and understanding of the 
parties.")  Intention is determined 
from the words of the contract, if the language is clear and unambiguous, and we 
must consider the writing as a whole, taking into account the relationships 
between the various parts. Id.  
After reviewing the employment contract, the stipulated facts, and the 
other documents attached thereto, we conclude that PS is "salary" for retirement 
purposes.  PS is a contractually 
integrated component of an employee's compensation for services rendered.   

 

[¶15]      It 
is stipulated that the School District implemented a performance based 
compensation system and that this system is an ongoing, permanent system 
established to compensate all employees.  
As noted above, the School District explained the compensation system in 
its initial proposal.  The entire 
proposal speaks to changing the salary structure.  The School District wanted to depart 
"from traditional security-based pay systems which determine salaries based 
solely on longevity."  The School 
District wanted to create a compensation system that "emphasizes market 
standards, responsibility, and performance."  The proposal says nothing about 
gratuitous bonuses; it speaks only to performance pay based upon the quality and 
timeliness of completion of standard work tasks.  The proposal leaves no doubt that the 
School District intended its new compensation scheme to provide the method by 
which employees earn their complete salary based upon their 
performance.

 

[¶16]      The 
Performance Based Compensation Plan as described by the School District in its 
original proposal is reflected in the language of Tollefson's employment 
contracts.  The record contains two 
contracts of employment.  The first 
contract was for the 1998-1999 school year, but it was not executed until April 
1999 and was backdated to July 1, 1998.  
The second contract is for the 1999-2000 school year.  It was executed in December 1999.3  The language pertaining to salary is 
virtually identical in both contracts:

 

The 
Administrator's Performance Salary Range will be $55,000.00 (minimum) to 
$75,000.00 (maximum). The Administrator's Basic Salary will be $65,500.00. The 
Administrator may earn a Performance Salary Award not to exceed the difference 
between the Administrator's Basic Salary and the maximum of his/her Performance 
Range.

For 
any renewals of this contract as provided for in paragraph one herein, it is 
anticipated that the Administrator will be evaluated four times a year to 
provide feedback on his/her performance as scheduled below. 

 



Evaluation

Evaluator(s)

Evaluation 
      Period

Evaluation 
      Communicated

PS 
      Awarded

1

Superintendent

Jul-Sept

October 
      31

N/A

2

Supt./Bd.Com

Oct-Dec

January 
      31

January 
      31

3

Superintendent

Jan-Mar

April 
      15

N/A

4

Supt./Bd.Com

Apr-Jun

June 
      15

June 
      30

 

The 
Superintendent and Board Compensation Sub-Committee will determine the 
Administrative Performance Salary Award as a part of the second and fourth 
evaluations for any future contracts.  
The Performance Salary Award will be paid to the Administrator in 
accordance with the above schedule.

 

[¶17]      The 
language of the employment contract implements the performance salary system as 
outlined in the School District's initial proposal.  The employment contract provides for a 
base salary and a performance salary.  
As the contract notes, the employee's performance is evaluated four times 
a year.   The performance 
salary is awarded as a part of the second and fourth evaluations.  While perhaps it could have been written 
more distinctly, it is nevertheless clear from the language of the contract that 
the award of performance salary is directly tied to the individual performance 
of the employee.

 

[¶18]      Further, 
as the system is implemented, the performance of the employee is evaluated 
according to objectively defined criteria.  
The work plans in the record are very specifically individualized to 
Tollefson.  As the Board found in 
its order, "[t]he work plan shows the tasks assigned, the task leader, the start 
date, the end date, success criteria/measures and state/national standard, as 
well as the [School] Board Goal Priority."  
Each work plan consists of over thirty tasks that are specifically 
assigned to Tollefson.  Other tasks 
for which Tollefson has administrative oversight responsibility are also 
listed.  These work plans are the 
foundation for the award of performance pay.  Tollefson's requests for performance pay 
directly mirror the work plans.  The 
requests are comprised of the tasks listed in the work plans, the status of each 
task, and any comments with regards to the task's completion.  Thus, the awards of PS were expressly 
linked to Tollefson's services personally rendered and meet the definition of 
cash remuneration.

 

[¶19]      On 
appeal, the Board adamantly argues that this Court should not consider the work 
plans or the requests for performance pay because there is no direct evidentiary 
link between these documents and the award of performance pay.  Indeed, in its order, despite 
acknowledging the work plans and requests, the Board found that "[t]here is 
nothing to show that the remuneration was carefully tied to actual services 
rendered."  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Board viewed the evidence before it too narrowly.  While no direct evidence was presented 
expressly linking the work plans and requests for performance salary to the 
award of performance salary, the documentation in this case is closely 
related.  The relationship should 
not be ignored.

 

[¶20]      It 
is appropriate to draw reasonable inferences from evidence presented.  The School Board presented its initial 
compensation proposal on November 23, 1998.  The first work plan in the record is a 
work plan as revised on November 29, 1998, within a few days of the 
proposal.  The first request for 
performance pay is dated March 11, 1999.  
The first award of performance pay occurred in late March 1999.  The employment contract, retroactive to 
July 1998, was formally executed in early April 1999.  The language of the employment contract 
leaves no doubt as to the relationship between the employment contract and the 
other documentation.  The employment 
contracts contain "Recitals" that acknowledge that the parties successfully 
negotiated an agreement and are only now attempting to put it in writing because 
"the parties have conducted themselves pursuant to the mutually negotiated terms 
and conditions of this Contract of Employment to each party's 
satisfaction."  Thus, put in 
context, it is reasonable to infer that the work plans and the requests for 
performance salary relate to the award of PS as provided for in the contract of 
employment.  The Board erred in not 
examining these documents when determining the nature of the PS award.  The evidence considered as a whole 
establishes that PS is awarded in direct relation to the individual services 
performed by the employee.  

 

[¶21]      In 
the instant case, the Board held that PS is a bonus and not salary 
because:

 

The 
Performance Pay Awards are not guaranteed as part of the employee's employment 
contract.  The Performance Pay 
Awards are not contractually due if the goals are met.  The Performance Pay Award is determined 
by the Superintendent and the Board of Compensation Sub-Committee.  In addition, it is unlikely that the 
Performance Pay Award would be paid if goals are not met.  

 

(emphasis 
in original).  Essentially, the 
Board determined that PS is a gratuitous bonus because PS awards are 
discretionary, with no specific payment contractually guaranteed.  

 

[¶22]      We 
believe this views the issue too narrowly.  
Our definition of remuneration in Mowry only states that the 
payment must be directly related to the current employment efforts of the 
employee.  A payment is not 
disqualified simply because it is discretionary.  A payment also is not disqualified 
because it is offered as an incentive to an employee to achieve specific goals 
and objectives.  Certainly any 
purely gratuitous payment would be excluded from "salary."  Just as certainly, however, any payment 
that is a contractual "attempt to equally compensate the employee for services 
rendered" will fall within the definition of "salary."  

 

[¶23]      The 
fact that no specific payment is contractually guaranteed by itself is not 
decisive.  The focus is on the 
reason behind the discretionary payment.  
The School District introduced the incentive factor to improve personal 
productivity.  The discretionary 
factor is governed by objective goals for personal productivity.  Thus, PS is strictly tied to personal 
productivity.  It is quite 
consistent that some employees do not receive any PS.  They simply did not perform the tasks 
necessary to earn the extra compensation.  
Instead of supporting the Board's determination that PS is a bonus, the 
fact that some individual employees earn different amounts of PS, including no 
PS, actually supports the finding that PS is salary that has to be earned 
through individual effort.  

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶24]      
From 
the stipulated facts, the documents, and the practices they would necessarily 
dictate, it is clear that, as required by Mowry, there is a direct 
relationship linking the employee's own performance and the compensation to 
which that employee is entitled.  PS 
is an integral part of an employee's remuneration for services rendered.  The order of the Board is reversed and 
this case is remanded with specific instructions that the Wyoming Retirement 
System must include PS in its calculation of retirement benefits for Tollefson 
and all similarly situated employees.

       

     FOOTNOTES

       

1There seems to be some confusion as to whether the case was certified, or 
if only the questions were certified to this court.  A review of the order of the district 
court makes clear that the district court was certifying the entire case 
pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09.

 

2We 
note that Tollefson, on appeal, has included an affidavit explaining the 
correlation between the work plans, the requests for performance salary and the 
awarding of performance salary.  The 
Board has objected to the introduction of what it considers to be new evidence 
at the appellate stage.  There is 
record evidence that the affidavit was submitted to the Board.  However, the affidavit is not included 
in the administrative record, and the findings of fact in the final order 
suggest that the Board did not consider the affidavit in reaching its 
determination.  Therefore, this 
Court has not relied upon any information included in the affidavit in its 
review of this appeal.

 

  3We recognize 
that the dates on the second contract are not consistent.  In some paragraphs the effective date is 
given as July 1, 1999, while in other paragraphs the term of the contract is 
given as from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 1999.  We perceive this inaccuracy to be a 
scrivener's error and accept that the contract covers the time period from 1999 
to 2000.