Case Title: Kiser v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 663, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Del. Supr. Ct. R. 25(a) (2007).
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
GEORGE KISER,
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No.  663, 2006
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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Court BelowBSuperior Court
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of the State of Delaware, in
v.  
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and for Kent County in Cr.
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ID No.  9709000684.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
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Plaintiff Below,
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Appellee.
Submitted: March 2, 2007
Decided:
May 9, 2007
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices.
O R D E R
This 9  day of May 2007, upon consideration of the appellant=s
th
opening brief and the appellee=s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court:
(1)
The appellant, George Kiser, has appealed the Superior Court=s
order of November 22, 2006, that summarily denied his second motion for
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (ARule
61").  The appellee, State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior
Court=s judgment on the basis that the appeal is without merit.   We agree
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and affirm.
Kiser v. State, 2000 WL 1626992 (Del. Supr).
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(2)
Kiser was indicted for selling crack cocaine to undercover
police officers during the summer of 1997.  At the conclusion of a two-day
jury trial in April 1999, Kiser was convicted of four counts of Delivery of
Cocaine and two counts of Conspiracy in the Second Degree.  The Superior
Court sentenced Kiser to sixty years of mandatory imprisonment followed
by four years of probation.  By order dated October 26, 2000, this Court
affirmed the conviction and sentence.2
(3)
At trial, Kiser=s defense counsel (Atrial counsel@) presented a
defense of mistaken identity.  The trial transcript reflects that trial counsel
cross-examined the prosecution=s sole witness, an undercover state police
detective, with photographs of Kiser and other males, several of whom were
Kiser=s relatives.  Trial counsel also presented several defense witnesses who
testified about Kiser=s appearance during the summer of 1997.
(4)
In April 2002, Kiser, with the assistance of new counsel, filed a
motion for postconviction relief.  Kiser alleged that he was deprived of the
effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to adequately
develop his mistaken identity defense.
(5)
The Superior Court referred the postconviction motion to a
Commissioner.  After  briefing, the Commissioner filed a report
3
State v. Kiser, 2002WL31236301 (Del. Super. Ct.).
3
Kiser v. State, 2003 WL 1572122 (Del. Supr.).
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recommending the dismissal of Kiser=s motion on the basis that Kiser had
not demonstrated prejudice arising from the alleged shortcomings of his
defense.  By order dated October 4, 2002, the Superior Court adopted the
Commissioner=s Report and Recommendation and dismissed Kiser=s
postconviction motion.   On appeal, this Court affirmed the Superior Court=s
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judgment.4
(6)
On November 20, 2006, Kiser filed a pro se motion for
postconviction relief.  Kiser again alleged ineffective assistance of counsel,
contending that trial counsel had failed to review crucial defense evidence
that  Kiser made available to him before trial, namely an additional
photograph of a
male relative and the testimony of Kiser=s mother.  By order dated
November 22, 2006, the Superior Court summarily dismissed Kiser=s motion
as untimely  
4
See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (2004) (providing in pertinent part that a
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motion for postconviction relief may not be filed more than three years after the judgment
of conviction is final).
See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2) (2007) (providing that any ground for relief
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that was not asserted in a prior postconviction proceeding is thereafter barred unless
consideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice).
See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3) (2007) (providing that any ground for relief
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that was not asserted is barred unless the movant demonstrates cause for relief from the
procedural default and prejudice as a result of the violation of the movant=s rights).
See Hamilton v. State, 2004 WL 1097703 (Del. Supr.) (citing Bailey v. State, 588
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A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991) (providing that the Superior Court must apply the procedural
requirements of Rule 61 before reaching the merits of the claims)).
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
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See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (2007) (providing in pertinent part that the
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procedural bars of Rule 61(i)(1), (2) and (3) shall not apply to a colorable claim that there
was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the
fundamental legality, reliability integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the
 (Rule 61(i)(1),  repetitive (Rule 61(i)(2),  and without prejudice (Rule
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61(i)(3).   This appeal followed.
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(7)
When considering a motion for postconviction relief under Rule
61, the Superior Court must apply the procedural requirements of the rule
before reaching the merits of the claims.   Likewise, on appeal this Court
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will not consider the merit of a postconviction claim unless the Superior
Court improperly applied the procedural requirements of Rule 61.9
(8)
Kiser has not demonstrated that the Superior Court misapplied
the procedural bars of Rule 61, and the record does not reflect a basis upon
which to apply an exception to those bars.    The Court also concludes that
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5
judgment of conviction).
See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4) (2007) (providing that any ground for relief
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that was formerly adjudicated is barred unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in
the interest of justice).
Collingwood v. State, 2000 WL 1177630 (Del. Supr.) (citing Skinner v. State, 607
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A.2d 1170, 1172 (1992) (quoting Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719, 721 (1990)).
Kiser has not demonstrated why his ineffective assistance of counsel claim
should be reconsidered in the interest of justice.   Under Rule 61(i)(4), a
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postconviction movant is not entitled to have a court reexamine a claim that
has been previously adjudicated Asimply because the claim is refined or
restated.@12
(9)
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is
without merit.  The issues on appeal are controlled by settled Delaware law,
and there was no abuse of discretion by the Superior Court.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger
Justice