Case Title: Thompson v. State

Citation: 371 Md. 473

Docket Number: 5/02

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2002-11-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Terry Hugh Thompson v. State of Maryland, 
No. 5 September Term 2002
[Criminal Law:   Amendment to a Charging Document, Maryland Rule 4-204. Held: When
the State amends an otherwise sufficient Indictment during trial by substituting correct
statutory citations for otherwise erroneous citations, such an amendment is not prejudicial
because it does not change the character of the offense charged.]
[Criminal Law: Duty to Deliberate Jury Instructions. Held: When “duty to deliberate” jury
instructions are modified by the trial judge to include language of a “final test,” these
additional terms are a deviation in substance from appropriate instruction language.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 5
September Term, 2002
TERRY HUGH THOMPSON
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Bell, C.J. and Cathell, J., concur in the
result and in Part II.A of the opinion
Filed:   November 4, 2002
1
It was determined after the search that the substances found in the three baggies were
30.5 grams, 15.69 grams, and 1.72 grams, respectively, of marijuana.
2
Analysis showed that the pipe contained marijuana residue.
Having been convicted of possession of marijuana, possession with intent to distribute
marijuana, and possession of controlled paraphernalia, Terry Hugh Thompson (“Thompson”)
asks us to consider whether the trial judge erred when he permitted a mid-trial amendment
to the indictment altering statutory references in the body and at the end of the count charging
Thompson with possession of controlled paraphernalia.  Thompson also alleges that the trial
judge erred by adding inappropriate language in the jury instruction regarding the “duty to
deliberate.”  We conclude that, because the amendment to the indictment was not a “change
in the character of the offense charged,” no prejudice befell Thompson.  We also find that
the language used by the trial judge, instead of the “duty to deliberate” instruction, was
erroneous and prejudicial to Thompson; therefore, we reverse the Court of Special Appeals
and remand for a new trial. 
I. Background
On April 27, 2000, Detective Joseph New and other officers of the Montgomery
County Police Department executed a search warrant for 2101 Forest Glen Road, Silver
Spring, Maryland.  During the search, the officers recovered a black bag containing
numerous glassine baggies and a digital scale on the night stand of Thompson’s bedroom.
In addition, three bags of marijuana,1 cash totaling $190.00, a pack of rolling papers, a box
of Philly Blunt cigars, sandwich bags, and a pipe2 were also recovered in the same room.
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Thompson was arrested and interviewed after receiving his Miranda warnings.
During that interview, Thompson admitted that the marijuana belonged to him for his own
personal use, although he sometimes sold some to his friends.  
Thompson was indicted on charges of possession with intent to distribute a controlled
dangerous substance in violation of Maryland Code Art. 27, Section 286(a)(1) (1957, 1996
Repl. Vol.), possession of controlled paraphernalia in violation of Maryland Code Art. 27,
Section 287A (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), and possession of a controlled dangerous substance
in violation of Maryland Code Art. 27, Section 287(a) (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.).
The Second Count, possession of controlled paraphernalia, contained the following
language:
The Grand Jurors of the State of Maryland, for the body of
Montgomery County, upon their oaths and affirmations, present
that TERRY HUGH THOMPSON, on or about April 27,
2000, in Montgomery County, Maryland unlawfully did possess
controlled paraphernalia in sufficient quantity to and under
circumstances which reasonably indicate an intention to use
such items for the illegal distribution and dispensing of a
controlled dangerous substance, to wit: a digital scale, glassine
baggies, Philly blunt cigars, rolling papers, and a wooden pipe,
in violation of Article 27, Section 287A of the Annotated Code
of Maryland, contrary to the form of the Act of Assembly in
such case made and provided, and against the peace,
government and dignity of the State.  (Possession of Controlled
Paraphernalia, Article 27, Section 287A)
Thompson’s trial in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County began on December
5, 2000.  On the final day of trial, the State moved to amend the Second Count by striking
the statutory references to Maryland Code, Art. 27, Section 287A and adding, in their stead,
3
The State submitted a written request that the court use MPJI-Cr 2:01 to instruct the
jury.
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references to Article 27, Section 287(d)(2).  In  unsuccessfully objecting to this amendment,
Thompson iterated that it would alter the punishment he could face from a fine to a potential
of a one-year incarceration for this count.
At the close of arguments, the trial judge indicated he was going to instruct the jury
with what he called the “attitude of jurors” instruction.  Thompson objected to the court’s
proposed instruction and indicated his preference for the “duty to deliberate” Maryland
Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction, (MPJI-Cr) 2:01.3 
Thompson’s attorney excepted to the instruction, and Thompson was convicted on all
three counts.  The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, affirmed the lower
court’s decision  regarding both issues.  The court held that the amendment of the statutory
reference to the indictment was only a change of form, not substance, and that the jury
instruction given, as a whole, was not coercive and did not encourage any jurors to relinquish
their beliefs solely to reach a verdict.  
Thompson filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which we granted, Thompson v.
State, 368 Md. 526, 796 A.2d 695 (2002), to address two separate issues:
A. 
Did the trial court err in failing to give the Maryland Criminal Pattern
Jury Instruction regarding the jury’s duty to deliberate, and giving its
own modified version of the instruction instead?  
B.
Does an amendment to a charging document, which changes the statute
under which a defendant has been charged from Article 27, Section
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287A to Article 27, Section 287(d)(2), thereby increasing the maximum
penalty the defendant may face, constitute a “change in the character of
the offense charged”?
II.  Discussion
A.
Jury Instruction. 
The first issue posed by our grant of certiorari is whether the trial judge erred in
instructing the jury with what he called the “attitude of jurors” instruction rather than the
“duty to deliberate” Maryland Pattern Jury Instruction 2:01.   We answer that question in the
affirmative.  
Rule 4-325 of the Maryland Rules defines the timing of jury instructions and the
content of those instructions.  The Rule states that, “[t]he court may, and at the request of any
party shall, instruct the jury as to the applicable law and the extent to which the instructions
are binding.”  Maryland Rule 4-325(c) (2000).  As we have often stated, the purpose of
instructing a jury is “to aid the jury in clearly understanding the case, to provide guidance for
the jury’s deliberations, and to help the jury arrive at a correct verdict.” Chambers v. State,
337 Md. 44, 48, 650 A.2d 727, 729 (1994); General v. State, 367 Md. 475, 485, 789 A.2d
102, 108 (2002). An important aspect of this guidance is providing a description of the
process by which the jury is supposed to deliberate.  See, Kelly v. State, 270 Md. 139, 142,
310 A.2d 538, 540-41 (1973).  
In the present case, the trial judge instructed the jury on the process of deliberation as
follows:
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The attitude and conduct of jurors at the outset of their
deliberations are matters of considerable importance.  It is rarely
productive or good for a juror upon entering the jury room to
make an emphatic expression of his or her opinion on the case
or to announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict.  
Your verdict should only be arrived at after careful and
thoughtful deliberation.  And it may be helpful to listen to
consult with each other and to discuss the evidence and the
deductions to be drawn therefrom freely and fairly in a sincere
effort to arrive at a just verdict.  This, however, does not mean
that any juror is required to yield an honest conviction after such
consultation or deliberation.
Remember that you are not partisans or advocates but rather
jurors.  The final test of the quality of your service will lie in the
verdict which you return to the Court, not in the opinions any of
you may hold as you retire.  
Have in mind that you will make a definite contribution to
efficient judicial administration if you arrive at a just and proper
verdict in this case.  To this end, the Court reminds you that in
your deliberations in the jury room there can be no triumph
except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth.  
Your verdict must represent the considered judgment of each
juror and must be unanimous.  In other words, all 12 of you
must agree.
Thompson asserts that the process of deliberation should have been described as that
given in the Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction (MPJI-Cr) 2:01 as he requested
during trial.  MPJI-Cr 2:01, entitled “Jury’s Duty to Deliberate,” is as follows:
The verdict must be the considered judgment of each of you.  In
order to reach a verdict, all of you must agree.  Your verdict
must be unanimous.  
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You must consult with one another and deliberate with a view
to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to
your individual judgment.  Each of you must decide the case for
yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of the
evidence with your fellow jurors.  
During deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own
views.  You should change your opinion if convinced you are
wrong, but do not surrender your honest belief as to the weight
or effect of the evidence only because of the opinions of your
fellow jurors for the mere purpose of reaching a verdict.
Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction (MPJI-Cr) 2:01.  
We first addressed the appropriate language to be used in a criminal case to instruct
a jury on its duty to deliberate prior to its adjournment to consider the fate of a defendant in
Kelly, 270 Md. at 140, 310 A.2d at 539-40.  In that case, we were asked to reverse a
conviction for manslaughter and remand for a new trial because the following language was
used by the trial court in the instruction given to the jury before it retired: 
May I say to you when you retire to consider this case it may
well be that there will be a difference of opinion between you.
If that is so, that is not something to be concerned about because
obviously when there are three days of testimony it’s not
unlikely that there may be some difference.  What I ask you to
do is for each of you to consult with each other, to consider the
testimony as it has been given.  In those instances where you
cannot conscientiously agree with the majority, then you should
maintain your own position.  On the other hand you should not
out of stubbornness refuse to alter your position, whether it is
for innocence or guilt merely because you are not willing to
listen to the arguments of the other jurors.  There must be some
give and take between you.  There must be some understanding
between you and it is up to you to determine for yourselves
whether or not you can conscientiously agree as to what the
4
The ABA Standards is now in its third edition, Standard 15-5.4 ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice: Discovery and Trial by Jury, Third Edition, American Bar Association,
1996.  The current form reflects some stylistic changes and a change in the numbering used,
but, otherwise, there is no change in substance.  
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verdict should be in this case.  It makes no difference whether
you originally start out in the minority or majority.  In every case
you are the final arbiters of your own conscience and you must
decide whether or not you can agree to reach a verdict in this
case.  
Id. at 144-45, 310 A.2d at 542.
In affirming the conviction, we announced our adoption of the American Bar
Association Criminal Justice Standards, Standard 5.4, Standards Relating to Trial by Jury,
Approved Draft, 1968, American Bar Association, 1968 (“ABA Standards”) as the criteria
to be used in measuring the appropriateness of “duty to deliberate” jury instructions.  The text
of the ABA Standards was:4 
Length of deliberations; deadlocked jury.
(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may give an
instruction which informs the jury: (i) that in order to return a
verdict, each juror must agree thereto; (ii) that jurors have a duty
to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to
reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to
individual judgment; (iii) that each juror must decide the case
for himself, but only after an impartial consideration of the
evidence with his fellow jurors; (iv) that in the course of
deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to reexamine his own
views and change his opinion if convinced it is erroneous; and
(v) that no juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the
weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of
his fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
-8-
(b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to
agree, the court may require the jury to continue their
deliberations and may give or repeat an instruction as provided
in subsection (a).  The court shall not require or threaten to
require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time
or for unreasonable intervals.
(c) The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon a
verdict if it appears that there is no reasonable probability of
agreement. 
Standard 5.4, Standards Relating to Trial by Jury, Approved Draft, 1968, American Bar
Association, 1968.  In Kelly, we determined that the jury instructions given by the trial court
comported with these ABA Standards and held, therefore, that a reversal of the underlying
conviction was not warranted.  Kelly, 270 Md. at 140-45, 310 A.2d at 540-42.  
The guidance we provided in Kelly, however, went beyond our examination of the
specific jury instructions utilized in the underlying case.  In addition to adopting the ABA
Standards, we also gave approval to a specific instruction that, we held, was always proper
to use before a jury begins to deliberate.  That instruction states:
The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each
juror.  In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that each juror
agree thereto.  Your verdict must be unanimous. 
 
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to
deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do
so without violence to individual judgment.  Each of you must
decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial
consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors.  In the
course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your
own views and change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous.
5
“Allen charge” is derived from an instruction sanctioned by the Supreme Court and
given to a deadlocked jury.  Allen v. United States 164 U.S. 492, 17 S. Ct. 154, 41 L. Ed. 528
(1896). Such a charge encourages jurors to reach a verdict by stressing deference of the
minority jurors to the views of the majority.  We used the term “Allen-type charge” to
distinguish jury instructions that utilized language modifications to the specific instruction
given in Allen v. United States.  Kelly, 270 Md. at 140 n.1, 310 A.2d. at 539 n.1.
-9-
But do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or
effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow
jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
You are not partisans. You are judges – judges of the facts. [In
criminal cases substitute the following: Since this is a criminal
case, you are judges – judges of both the law and the facts.]
Your sole interest is to ascertain the truth from the evidence in
the case.
Id. at 143-44, 310 A.2d at 541 (quoting Instruction 8.11 of Jury Instructions and Forms for
Federal Criminal Cases, 27 F.R.D. 39, 97-98 (D.C. 1961)).  We referred to this instruction
as an “Allen-type”5instruction because of its modified language and recognized that judges
may “personalize” jury instructions, especially prior to the beginning of deliberations as long
as they “reasonably adhere[] to the [ABA] Standards.”  Id.  at 144, 310 A.2d at 542. 
In Burnette v. State, 280 Md. 88, 371 A.2d. 663 (1977), we were asked to consider
whether an Allen charge should be given when the jury is deadlocked.  In response, we
disavowed its use because we determined that the language was coercive and, as such, an
impermissible interference with the province of the jury.  Id. at 100, 371 A.2d. at 669.
Subsequently, in Goodmuth v. State, 302 Md. 613, 490 A.2d 682 (1985), we noted that the
guidance given in Burnette was applicable to pre-deliberation instructions as well as to those
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given to deadlocked juries.  Id. at 622, 490 A.2d at 686.
In Burnette we objected to language suggesting that the minority members of a jury
should be deferential to the views of the majority.  Burnette, 280 Md. at 100, 371 A.2d at
669.  Specifically, we considered whether the following language offended the ABA
Standards:  “[i]f your views are contrary to those of the vast majority you should consider
whether your views, which make no impression on the minds of so many equally intelligent
jurors, are correct.” Id.  We also voiced concern over language used in Burnette in which one
part of a sentence instructed jurors to reach a verdict based on their own convictions, while
the next part of the same sentence told jurors to give “proper regard and deference to the
opinions of others.”  Id. at 100, 371 A.2d. at 669.  The instruction, according to our analysis,
gave only “passing attention to the important principle that honest judgment, and not mere
acquiescence, should be at [the] basis of a juror’s decision.  Id.  We stated also that “the
instruction might tend to unduly strengthen the majority’s convictions, perhaps making the
majority less willing to seriously engage in further deliberations.” Id.   As such, we found
that the instruction in Burnette was essentially a traditional Allen charge; it was not a
personalized version of our recommended instruction nor did it “closely adhere” to the ABA
Standards.  Id. at 99-100, 371 A.2d at 668.  We emphasized that, “deviations in substance
will not meet with our approval.”  Id. at 101, 371 A.2d at 669.  
In Goodmuth, we explored whether  traditional Allen language could be appropriately
used to instruct a jury prior to deliberation. 302 Md. at 614, 490 A.2d. at 682.  We
6
In Graham we used the language of “modified Allen charge.” Graham, 325 Md. at
409, 601 A.2d. at 136.
7
See supra note 4 explaining that the ABA Standards have undergone stylistic and
numeric changes since their inception in 1968.  The reference in Graham is to the then-
current edition of the ABA Standards. 
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emphasized that the analysis in Burnette was not limited to instructions given to deadlocked
juries but also to jurors prior to the beginning of deliberations.  Id. at 622, 490 A.2d at 686.
We found that Allen instructions given before deliberations are just as coercive and “may
well impact upon the minority.”  Id. at 622-23, 490 A.2d at 687.
The ABA Standards for “duty to deliberate” jury instructions approved in Kelly,  and
affirmed in Burnette and Goodmuth, have been incorporated into the “Duty to Deliberate”
Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 2:01 as we noted in Graham v. State, 325 Md.
398, 409 n.4, 601 A.2d 131, 136 n.4 (1992).6   We explicitly expressed approval of MPJI-Cr-
2:01, which we noted “closely follows the language of Standard 15-4.4 (formerly Standard
5.4) of the Standards for Criminal Justice (1978, 1986 Supp.).”7  Id.    
Although some portions of the jury instruction given by the trial judge in the present
case in what he called the “attitude of the jurors” instruction give some deference to the ABA
Standards and  reflect some of the nuances of the Maryland Pattern Jury Instruction 2:01,
there are substantial deviations between the instruction given in this case and the ABA
Standards, as well as MPJI-CR 2:01.  Specifically, the following portions of the instruction
given by the trial court do not meet the criteria of the ABA Standards:   
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The attitude and conduct of jurors at the outset of their
deliberations are matters of considerable importance.  It is rarely
productive or good for a juror upon entering the jury room to
make an emphatic expression of his or her opinion on the case
or to announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict.  
Remember that you are not partisans or advocates but rather
jurors.  The final test of the quality of your service will lie in the
verdict which you return to the Court, not in the opinions any of
you may hold as you retire.  
Have in mind that you will make a definite contribution to
efficient judicial administration if you arrive at a just and proper
verdict in this case.  To this end, the Court reminds you that in
your deliberations in the jury room there can be no triumph
except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth.  
The language of this instruction does not “reasonably adhere to” the ABA Standards.  This
is especially true of the language that suggests “the final test of the quality of your service
will lie in the verdict which you return to the Court, not in the opinions any of you may hold
as you retire.”  This concept of a “final test” implies that there is a standard of service to
which a juror should aspire, one that requires a verdict to be reached rather than one that
requires consideration of individual conviction and whether individual conviction
thoughtfully can be reconciled with collective judgment.   Because a verdict cannot be
reached without unanimity, the “final test” language logically implies that a “good” juror
acquiesces in a verdict rather than adheres to his or her own judgment.  Such language is a
deviation in substance from MPJI-Cr 2:01 and the ABA Standards, which recognize that
jurors should not surrender honest convictions in order to return a verdict.
8
Since the time of these decisions, North Carolina and California have changed their
“duty to deliberate” instructions.  The North Carolina General Assembly enacted a
statute,G.S.15A-1235, based on the ABA Standards, effective July 1, 1978, to provide
guidelines for “duty to deliberate”jury instructions.  See State v. Alston, 294 N.C. 577, 597,
243 S.E.2d 354, 367 (1978).  California has adopted standards for “duty to deliberate” jury
instruction in People v. Gainer, 19 Cal.3d 835, 852, 566 P.2d 997, 1006 (1977) declaring a
rule of criminal procedure that it is error “to give an instruction which either (1) encourages
jurors to consider the numerical division or preponderance of opinion on the jury . . .; or (2)
states or implies that if the jury fails to agree the case will necessarily be retried.” 
The language of a “final test”used in State v. Tope, 86 Idaho 462, 468, 387 P.2d 888,
892 (1963), was part of a charge given to a deadlocked jury and such Allen charges were
disavowed in State v. Flint, 114 Idaho 806, 812, 761 P.2d 1158, 1164 (1988). 
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The State points to other jurisdictions such as North Carolina, Idaho, and California
that have made use of the language of a “final test” in which the “quality of service will lie
in the verdict you return.”   State v. Bryant, 282 N.C. 92, 99-100, 191 S.E.2d 745, 750-51
(1972) cert. denied, 410 U.S. 958, 35 L. Ed. 2d 691, 93 S. Ct. 1432  (1973); State v. Tope,
86 Idaho 462, 468, 387 P.2d 888, 892 (1963); People v. Moraga, 244 Cal. App. 2d 565, 53
Cal. Rptr. 563 (1966).  At the time of those decisions, however, these jurisdictions had not
adopted the ABA Standards as we have done to provide guidance concerning appropriate
language for “duty to deliberate” jury instructions.8  As such, those cases are inapposite to
the present case. 
The Court of Special Appeals found that the instruction given by the trial judge
comported with MPJI-Cr 2:01.  We differ from that court because we find the “final test”
language used in the duty to deliberate instruction to be a deviation in substance from the
pattern jury instruction and the ABA Standards.  Such language is suggestive of the primacy
9
Rule 4-204 is derived from Maryland Code, Art. 52, Section 22 (1957), which allowed
the amendment of a criminal information “provided, however, that such amendment [did] not
change the character of the offense or crime with which the accused [was] charged.”  There
were additional modifications in the intervening years involving “form vs. substance”
language and “character of the offense” language as well as numbering changes.  Finally, in
1984, Rule 4-204 was issued in its present form.  Consequently, depending upon the
language of the Rule in effect at the time, this Court has conducted either a “character of the
offense” analysis or a “matter of substance” analysis to determine if amendments not
otherwise consented to have been permissible.   Johnson v. State, 358 Md. 384, 387-88 &
n.1, 749 A.2d 769, 770-71 & n.1 (2000).
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of collective judgment over individual principle and honest conviction.  We, therefore,
reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals with instructions to reverse the
judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial.  
B.
Amendment to the Indictment. 
Although this case will be remanded for a new trial, the issue of the amendment to the
Indictment must be addressed because of its potential double jeopardy implication regarding
the affected count were we to find petitioner’s argument had merit.  We, therefore, shall
address the second issue raised, that of whether a mid-trial amendment to the Indictment
changing the statutory reference was properly received.  
Maryland Rule 4-204 permits an amendment to a charging document under certain
circumstances.  Rule 4-204 provides that: “[o]n motion of a party or on its own initiative, the
court at any time before verdict may permit a charging document to be amended except that
if the amendment changes the character of the offense charged, the consent of the parties is
required.” Md. Rule 4-204 (2000). 9   Thompson did not consent to the amendment.  Rather,
10
A defendant must have adequate notice of the character of the offense charged against
him because “every man hath a right to be informed of the accusation against him; to have
a copy of the Indictment, or charge, in due time (if required) to prepare for his defence.” MD.
CONST.  Decl. of Rights, Art. 21.  “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
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he objected based on his assertion that the amendment specifically changed the penalty from
a flat fine to one with a possibility of one-year incarceration.  We, therefore, must determine
whether the amendment of the Second Count during trial “changed the character of that
offense.”  
Initially, the Second Count of the Indictment stated, in pertinent part, the following:
COUNT TW O: Possession of Controlled Paraphernalia
. . . that TERRY HUGH THOMPSON, on or about April 27,
2000, in Montgomery County, Maryland unlawfully did possess
controlled paraphernalia in sufficient quantity to and under
circumstances which reasonably indicate an intention to use
such items for the illegal distribution and dispensing of a
controlled dangerous substance, to wit: a digital scale, glassine
baggies, Philly blunt cigars, rolling papers, and a wooden pipe,
in violation of Article 27, Section 287A of the Annotated Code
of Maryland . . . .   (Possession of Controlled Paraphernalia,
Article 27, Section 287A)  
On the final day of trial, the State moved to amend this count by substituting the statutory
citations.  The State sought to change the citation from Article 27, Section 287A to Article
27, Section 287(d)(2).  Section 287A bears a possible maximum fine of $500.00 while the
possible penalty for a violation of Section 287(d)(2) is a one-year prison term.
As we have stated, the purpose of an indictment is to provide notice to the accused of
the charge against him and to guard against the possibility of unfair surprise during trial.10
right to . . . be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation . . . .”  U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. 
11
Maryland Rule 4-202(a) is derived from former Rule 711 a and former M.D.R. 711(a).
Rule 4-202, approved by this Court in 1984, modified previously used language regarding
the criteria for a sufficient charging document henceforth requiring that an indictment be
stated with “reasonable particularity.” 
12
See also Laque v. State, 207 Md. 242, 249, 113 A.2d 893, 895-96 (1955) (discussing
a warrant that incorrectly cited a section of a zoning ordinance; the warrant was found to be
sufficient because the incorrect citation did not otherwise mislead the accused and an
amendment to the warrant of a substitution for  the correct section reference could have been
made at any time before the final judgment.) 
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Johnson, 358 Md. at 392, 749 A.2d at 773.  Adequate notice is given when a charging
document contains both a characterization of the crime and the particular act alleged to have
been committed.  Ayre v. State, 291 Md. 155, 163, 433 A.2d 1150, 1155 (1980).  Our
guidance in Ayre is based on former Maryland Rule 711 a, now Rule 4-202(a),11 requiring
a charging document to contain a “definite statement of the essential facts of the offense with
which the defendant is charged.”
With respect to the role of the statutory citation in this scheme, we note that Maryland
Rule 4-202(a) also states that, “[t]he statute or other authority for each count shall be cited
at the end of the count, but error in or omission of the citation of authority is not grounds for
dismissal of the charging document or for reversal of a conviction.”  In Ayre we iterated that
“[the statutory] reference exists as a matter of convenience to the parties and the court, and
thus possesses no substance of its own.”12  Ayre, at168 n.9, 433 A.2d at 1158 n.9.  The
“character of the offense” is determined by what is stated in the body of an indictment, not
13
In Busch v. State, 289 Md. 669, 678, 426 A.2d 954, 959 (1981), we found that the
caption listed as “Resisting Arrest” above a charging document did not serve to characterize
the offense when the body of the document contained the alleged act of the accused as
“resist[ing] and hinder[ing] a police officer in the lawful execution of his duties.” See also
State v. Carter, 200 Md. 255, 262, 89 A.2d 586, 589 (1952).
14
Maryland Code, Art. 27, Sections 287, 287A (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) were repealed
effective October 1, 2002.  Article 27, Section 287 was superseded by Maryland Code
Section 5-620 of the Criminal Law Article (2002).  Article 27, Section 287A was superseded
by Maryland Code, Section 5-619 of the Criminal Law Article (2002) with the exception of
Section 287A (a) which was superseded by Section 5-101(o).  All became effective October
1, 2002. 
-17-
the statutory reference or caption.13   Busch v. State, 289 Md. 669, 678, 426 A.2d 954, 959
(1981).  
The “character of the offense charged” is really the gravamen of Thompson’s
challenge, so we proceed to explore the language of the Second Count as compared to
Sections 287A and 287(d)(2).   Below is the language of these three texts at issue - the initial
Indictment, Article 27, Section 287A and Article 27, Section 287:14 
Initial Indictm ent  - 
Count 2
Possession of Controlled
Paraphernalia  
. . . T E R R Y  
H U G H
THOMPSON, on or about
April  
27, 
2 000, 
i n
Montgom ery 
C ounty,
Maryland, unlawfully did
p o s s e s s  
c o n t r o l l e d
paraphernalia in sufficient
quantity 
to 
and 
under
Language of Article 27, 
§ 287A
287A  Drug Paraphernalia 
(a) Definition - As used in
this section, the term “drug
paraphernalia” means all
equipment, products, and
materials of any kind which
are used, intended for use, .
. . in . . . introducing into
t h e 
hum an 
b ody 
a
controlled 
dangerous
substance . . . .  It includes
Language of Article 27, 
§ 287(d)(2)
Unlawful 
possession 
or
distribution of controlled
paraphernalia . . . 
(d) To possess or distribute
controlled 
paraphernalia,
which shall mean:
(2) 
Gelatin 
capsules,
glassine envelopes or any
other container suitable for
the packaging of individual
-18-
circumstanc e s 
whic h
reasonably 
indicate 
an
intention to use such items
for the illegal distribution
and 
dispensing 
of 
a
controlled 
dangerous
substance, to wit: a digital
scale, 
glassine 
baggies,
Philly blunt cigars, rolling
papers, and a wooden pipe,
in violation of Article 27,
Section 
287A 
of 
the
A n n o t a t e d 
C o d e  
o f
Maryland, contrary to the
form 
of 
the 
Act 
of
Assembly in such case
made and provided, and
a g a i n s t  
t h e  
p e a c e ,
government and dignity of
the State.
but is not limited to: (5)
scales . . . (9) capsules,
balloons, envelopes and
other 
containers 
used,
intended 
for 
use, 
or
designed 
for 
use 
in
packaging small quantities
of controlled dangerous
substances; (10) Containers
and other objects used . . .
in storing or concealing
controlled 
dangerous
s u b s t a n c e s ;  
( 1 1 )
Hypoderm ic 
syringes,
needles and other objects
used . . . in parenterally
i n j e c t i n g 
c o n t r o l l e d
dangerous substances into
the 
human 
body; 
(12)
Objects used, intended for
use . . . in introducing
marijuana . . . into the
human body, such as: (i)
metal, 
wooden, 
acrylic,
glass, stone, plastic, or
ceramic pipes . . . 
(c) Use of possession with
intent to use. – It is
unlawful for any person to
use, or to possess with
intent 
to 
use, 
d rug
paraphernalia 
to 
plant,
propagate, cultivate, grow,
harvest, 
manufa cture,
c o m p o u n d ,  
c o n v e r t ,
produce, process, prepare,
test, analyze, pack, repack,
store, 
contain, 
conceal,
inject, ingest, inhale, or
otherwise introduce into the
quantities 
of 
controlled
dangerous substances in
sufficient quantity to and
under circumstances which
reasonably 
indicate 
an
intention to use any such
item 
for 
the 
illegal
manufacture, distribution,
or dispensing of any such
controlled 
dangerous
substance.  Evidence of
such circumstances shall
include but not be limited to
close proximity to any such
controlled paraphernalia to
a n y  
a d u l t e ra n t s  
o r
equipment commonly used
in the illegal manufacture
a n d  
d i s t r i b u ti o n  
o f
controlled 
dangerous
substances, such as but not
limited to any of the
following: scales, sieves,
strainers, measuring spoons,
staples and staplers, or
procaine 
hydrochloride,
mannitol, lactose, quinine,
or any controlled dangerous
substance . . . .
-19-
human body a controlled
dangerous substance . . . .
The language of the Indictment reflects the language of Section 287(d)(2) at first
glance. A more studied exploration supports this conclusion.  The Second Count utilizes
exact phrases from Section 287(d)(2) to indicate a charge against Thompson for possession
of paraphernalia with the intent to distribute marijuana.  The term “controlled paraphernalia”
is used throughout the charging document.  This terminology is included and defined
exclusively in Section 287(d)(2) above.  The following boldfaced language within the
unamended Indictment indicates phraseology that is taken directly from the text of Section
287(d)(2):  
Possession of Controlled Paraphernalia  
. . . TERRY HUGH THOMPSON, on or about April 27, 2000,
in Montgomery County, Maryland, unlawfully did possess
controlled paraphernalia in sufficient quantity to and under
circumstances which reasonably indicate an intention to use
such items for the illegal distribution and dispensing of a
controlled dangerous substance, to wit: a digital scale,
glassine baggies, Philly blunt cigars, rolling papers, and a
wooden pipe, in violation of Article 27, Section 287A of the
Annotated Code of Maryland, contrary to the form of the Act of
Assembly in such case made and provided, and against the
peace, government and dignity of the State.  (Possession of
Controlled Paraphernalia, Article 27, Section 287A)
In addition, Section 287(d)(2)’s category of  “glassine envelopes or any other
container suitable for the packaging of individual quantities of controlled dangerous
substances for the illegal . . . distribution” could include items listed on the Indictment -
15
In Gray, the caption, “Concealed Weapon,” headed a warrant that did not use the
statutory language of the basic description of the offense, i.e., the carrying of a weapon
“openly with the intent and purpose of injury to any person in any unlawful manner,” but
rather, specified how the accused carried the weapons i.e., “concealed upon and about his
person.”  Gray, 216 Md. at 416, 140 A.2d at 646.  Because we found that the initial warrant
as a whole, including the caption, adequately notified the accused of the charge against him,
though in nontechnical terms, the amendment to that warrant did not change the character of
the offense charged.  Id.
-20-
Philly Blunt cigars, rolling papers, and glassine baggies.  
The next focus of our analysis must be whether the body of the Second Count was
sufficient to charge any crime, because in Gray v. State,  216 Md. 410, 416, 140 A.2d 643,
646 (1958), we found that an insufficiency in the language of a charge could give rise to a
circumstance in which a statutory reference supplied a necessary element of the
characterization of an offense charged.  There, we found that a caption, ordinarily amendable
without altering the character of an offense, became a necessary part of the charging
document because it served to clarify an otherwise insufficiently described charge.15  Id.   In
the present case, however, we find that the Indictment is sufficient without the statutory
citation in that it provides notice to Thompson that he is being charged with possession of
controlled paraphernalia with intent to distribute in violation of Section 287(d)(2).
Thompson also argues that the language of the Indictment is a combination of the
wording of both Section 287A and Section 287(d)(2), and, thus, the statutory reference is a
necessary indicator of which section is charged.  An examination of both Sections 287A and
287(d)(2) shows that possession of the paraphernalia listed in the Second Count, specifically
16
Our decision in Campbell v. State, 325 Md. 488, 601 A.2d 667 (1992), holds that
pipes adapted for administering controlled dangerous substances under circumstances which
indicate an intention to use them for such purposes are not controlled paraphernalia under
Article 27, Section 287(d).  Id. at 508-09, 601 A.2d at 677; see also Kraft v. State, 18 Md.
App.169, 172, 305 A.2d 489, 491 (1973) (finding that possession of a pipe of the type used
for marijuana smoking does not come under the umbrella of Article 27, Section 287(d)). 
17
The distinctions between these two sections is the focus of a 1981 Opinion by the
Maryland Attorney General’s Office issued in response to a practitioner’s question about
whether Section 287A repealed Section 287(d)(2).  66 Op. Atty. Gen. Md. 125 (1981).   This
opinion highlights the textual differences in these two sections.  In addition, the legislative
history shows that Section 287 first became part of Maryland’s criminal statutes in 1935 and
later was broadened by additions in 1970 and 1971.  Section 287A was enacted as emergency
legislation in 1980 in an apparent attempt to stem the tide of a fairly new phenomenon in
many communities - the open display, marketing, and sale of drug paraphernalia to the public
for personal use.  There is nothing in the legislative history to indicate any intention that the
addition to Maryland’s drug statutes of Section 287A was meant as a replacement for any
preexisting statutes such as Section 287(d)(2).  Section 287A does not expressly nor
impliedly repeal Section 287(d)(2).
-21-
the scale, glassine baggies, Philly Blunt cigars, and rolling papers, conceivably could fit
either section.16  This commonality, however, does not create any ambiguity regarding which
statute had been charged.17   It is the intent with which one possesses such paraphernalia that
determines which section is charged.  The gravamen of Section 287(d)(2) is possession of
controlled paraphernalia with the intention of distributing or dispensing.  Code, Art. 27,
Section 287(d)(2).  The caption used for Section 287(d), distribution of controlled
paraphernalia, reinforces this statute’s clear purpose.  
In contrast, the gravamen of  Section 287A is specifically that of possessing a drug
paraphernalia with the intention to use it in ingesting, inhaling or otherwise introducing a
controlled dangerous substance into the human body.  Code, Art. 27, Section 287A.  The
18
In Johnson, the court acknowledged the relevant differences in the two charges at
issues in that case.  Johnson, 358 Md. at 391, 749 A.2d. at 772-73.  A violation involving
marijuana under Article 27, Sections 286(a)(1) and 287(a) has a maximum penalty of five
years imprisonment and a $15,000.00 fine compared with a maximum penalty of twenty
years incarceration and a $25,000.00 fine for a violation involving a narcotic such as cocaine.
Id. In addition, the enhanced penalties for second offenders do not apply for marijuana
convictions but apply for previous cocaine convictions. Id. Under Section 287, the penalty
for marijuana violation is a maximum of one year incarceration and/or a $1,000.00 fine
compared with a possibility of four years imprisonment and/or a $25,000.00 fine for cocaine.
Id.
-22-
possession for personal use is clearly indicated by the statute’s language.  
In the Second Count of the Indictment, the language of the alleged act and character
of the charge is extrapolated directly from Section 287(d)(2) - “possess controlled
paraphernalia in sufficient quantity to and under circumstances which reasonably indicate an
intention to use such items for the illegal distribution and dispensing of a controlled
dangerous substance.”  Therefore, the “character of the offense charged” was clearly that of
Section 287(d)(2).   
This situation differs from that in Johnson, in which the State sought to substitute the
word “cocaine” for the word “marijuana” in a charging document.  Johnson, 358 Md. at 387,
749 A.2d at 770.  Such an amendment would have altered what the basic offense was and
triggered a more severe penalty for a charge involving cocaine rather than marijuana.18 Id.
at 391, 749 A.2d. at 772-73.  In this case, the amendment of the statutory citation does not
alter the character of the offense; the Indictment sufficiently charges a violation of Section
287(d)(2).  It is not the statutory reference that triggers the possible penalty but, rather, the
-23-
character of the offense alleged.  Therefore,  no prejudicial error occurred in the trial court’s
allowance of the amendment at the first trial. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED
TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS
TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY
COUNTY AND TO REMAND THE CASE TO
THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL
CONSISTENT 
WITH 
THIS 
OPINION;
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE COURT
OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY
MONTGOMERY COUNTY.
Chief Judge Bell and Judge Cathell concur in the result and in Part II.A of the opinion.