Case Title: DEBRA LEA MILLER V JOHN THOMAS MILLER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 127767

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2005-12-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED DECEMBER 28, 2005 
DEBRA LEA MILLER, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 127767 
JOHN THOMAS MILLER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
PER CURIAM. 
This case presents the question whether the domestic 
relations arbitration act (DRAA)1 requires a formal hearing 
during arbitration comparable to that which occurs in 
traditional trial proceedings. 
We conclude that it does 
not. 
Also at issue is whether a court order to which the 
parties have stipulated in writing can satisfy the act’s 
requirement of a written agreement to arbitrate. 
We 
conclude that it can. 
Therefore, we reverse the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals, which ruled to the contrary on 
1 MCL 600.5070  
et seq. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
both issues, and we reinstate the arbitration award and the 
judgment of divorce. 
THE FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Plaintiff filed for divorce in January 2001. 
After 
failed settlement conferences in the circuit court, on 
December 4, 2001, both parties stipulated in writing to 
entry of an order sending all issues in the case to binding 
arbitration. 
The arbitrator put the parties in separate rooms 
during the arbitration proceedings.  He shuttled between 
them, gathering the necessary information and hearing the 
respective 
arguments. 
Both 
parties 
agreed 
to 
this 
procedure. 
At the end of the day, plaintiff asked the arbitrator 
for additional sessions. 
He denied the request, expressly 
noting in his written award that plaintiff had failed to 
raise anything new to justify further proceedings. 
When 
plaintiff made a second request, the arbitrator gave her 
three days to provide an outline of what she would present 
at the additional proceedings. 
She supplied, instead, 
voluminous material. 
Rather than schedule more hearings, 
the arbitrator reviewed plaintiff’s material, modified the 
award, and issued the final binding arbitration award. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff filed a motion in court to set aside the 
arbitration award on the basis that the arbitrator had 
failed to conduct a “hearing” as required by the DRAA. She 
also claimed that no arbitration agreement existed. 
The 
court rejected plaintiff’s claims and entered a judgment of 
divorce. 
In a split published decision, the Court of 
Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court and 
vacated the arbitration award.  It held that the DRAA 
required a formal hearing and that none occurred during the 
arbitration. 
Miller v Miller, 264 Mich App 497; 691 NW2d 
788 (2004). 
THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The two issues on appeal are matters of statutory 
interpretation that we review de novo.  People v Kimble, 
470 Mich 305, 308-309; 684 NW2d 669 (2004). 
When 
interpreting a statute, our goal is to give effect to the 
Legislature’s intent as determined from a review of the 
language of the statute. 
People v Koonce, 466 Mich 515, 
518; 648 NW2d 153 (2002). 
Defendant asks us to review the Court of Appeals 
decision not to enforce the arbitration award. 
We review 
such decisions de novo to determine whether the arbitrators 
exceeded their powers.  See Gordon Sel-Way, Inc v Spence 
Bros, Inc, 438 Mich 488, 496-497; 475 NW2d 704 (1991). 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arbitrators exceed their powers whenever they act beyond 
the material terms of the contract from which they draw 
their authority or in contravention of controlling law. 
DAIIE v Gavin, 416 Mich 407, 433-434; 331 NW2d 418 (1982). 
WHAT CONSTITUTES A HEARING UNDER THE DRAA 
MCL 600.5081 is the statutory provision that governs 
vacation and modification of arbitration awards under the 
DRAA. MCL 600.5081(2) provides: 
If a party applies under this section, the
court shall vacate an award under any of the
following circumstances: 
(a) The award was procured by corruption,
fraud, or other undue means. 
(b) There was evident partiality by an 
arbitrator appointed as a neutral, corruption of
an 
arbitrator, 
or 
misconduct 
prejudicing 
a 
party’s rights. 
(c) The arbitrator exceeded his or her 
powers. 
(d) The arbitrator refused to postpone the
hearing on a showing of sufficient cause, refused
to hear evidence material to the controversy, or
otherwise conducted the hearing to prejudice
substantially a party’s rights. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that the arbitrator 
violated 
MCL 
600.5081(2)(d). 
It 
reasoned 
that 
the 
informality of the hearing prejudiced plaintiff’s rights. 
The question is whether, in proceedings under the DRAA, the 
statute precludes hearings being conducted as the hearing 
was conducted in this case. 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals 
majority 
relied 
primarily 
on 
MCL 
600.5074(1), 
which 
provides: 
An arbitrator appointed under this chapter
shall hear and make an award on each issue 
submitted for arbitration under the arbitration 
agreement 
subject 
to 
the 
provisions 
of 
the 
agreement. [Emphasis added.] 
The DRAA does not define the term “hear” or “hearing.” 
Moreover, 
it 
sets 
no 
procedural 
requirements 
for 
arbitration. 
Rather, it specifically eschews them. 
For 
example, MCL 600.5077 requires, with certain exceptions, 
that the arbitrator not make an official record of most 
arbitration proceedings.2  This purposeful requirement of 
little or no record shows that the Legislature intended not 
to require specific procedures in arbitration proceedings. 
2 MCL 600.5077 provides: 
(1) Except as provided by this section,
court rule, or the arbitration agreement, a 
record shall not be made of an arbitration 
hearing under this chapter. 
If a record is not 
required, an arbitrator may make a record to be
used only by the arbitrator to aid in reaching
the decision. 
The parties may provide in the
arbitration agreement that a record be made of 
those portions of a hearing related to 1 or more
issues subject to arbitration. 
(2) A record shall be made of that portion
of 
a 
hearing 
that 
concerns 
child 
support,
custody, or parenting time in the same manner
required by the Michigan court rules for the
record of a witness’s testimony in a deposition. 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Without a record, reviewing courts cannot assess what 
procedures have been followed. 
The 
Legislature’s 
failure 
to 
provide 
specific 
arbitration procedures is consistent also with tradition. 
Historically, judicial review of arbitration awards is 
highly limited. 
Gavin, 416 Mich 433-434. 
This Court has 
characterized 
arbitration 
procedures 
as 
“informal 
and 
sometimes unorthodox . . . .” 
Id. at 429. 
Consequently, 
courts should not speculate why an arbitrator ruled in one 
particular manner. Id. 
Rather than employ the formality required in courts, 
parties in arbitration are able to shape the parameters and 
procedures of the proceeding. 
The DRAA requires that they 
first sign an agreement for binding arbitration delineating 
the 
powers 
and 
duties 
of 
the 
arbitrator. 
MCL 
600.5072(1)(e). 
The act also contemplates that the parties will 
discuss with the arbitrator the scope of the issues and how 
information 
necessary 
for 
their 
resolution 
will 
be 
produced. 
MCL 600.5076. 
The act contemplates that the 
parties will decide what is best for their case. 
Nowhere 
in the DRAA are procedural formalities imposed that 
restrict this freedom. 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
This Court has consistently held that arbitration is a 
matter of contract. “It is the agreement that dictates the 
authority of the arbitrators[.]”  Rowry v Univ of Michigan, 
441 Mich 1, 10; 490 NW2d 305 (1992). 
In this case, the 
Court of Appeals decision infringes on the parties’ 
recognized freedom to contract for binding arbitration. 
It restricts the parties’ freedom to decide how the 
arbitration 
hearing 
should 
be 
conducted.3
 
Plaintiff 
presents 
no 
convincing 
argument 
that 
the 
Legislature 
intended all DRAA hearings to approximate traditional court 
hearings. 
We know of none.4
 It is inappropriate for a 
court to read into a statute something that was not 
3 The language in US Const, art I, § 3, cl 6, stating 
that the Senate shall “try all Impeachments,” does not
constitute an “implied limitation on the method by which
the Senate might proceed in trying impeachments,” Nixon v 
United States, 506 US 224, 230; 113 S Ct 732; 122 L Ed 2d 1
(1993). 
Similarly, the language in MCL 600.5074(1),
stating that the arbitrator “shall hear and make an award 
on 
each 
issue 
submitted 
for 
arbitration,” 
does 
not 
constitute an implied limitation on the method by which the 
arbitrator might proceed in hearing the issues. 
(Emphasis
added.) 
4 Court of Appeals Judge Kirsten Frank Kelly correctly
noted in her dissent: 
“[A]lthough the majority refers to
the process [used in this arbitration] as mediation, the
process was still binding; binding mediation is equivalent
to arbitration and subject to the same judicial limitations
on review. 
Frain v Frain, 213 Mich App 509, 511-513; 540
NW2d 741 (1995).” Miller, 264 Mich App 517-518. 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
intended. 
AFSCME v Detroit, 468 Mich 388, 412; 662 NW2d 
695 (2003). 
Significantly, in this case, the parties specifically 
agreed to allow the arbitrator to conduct the hearing in 
two separate rooms. 
If the parties and the arbitrator 
thought that this was the best way to hold their hearing, 
they were at liberty to make that agreement. Because it is 
the agreement of the parties that dictates arbitration, the 
Court of Appeals should not have altered the agreement. 
Rowry, 441 Mich 10. 
THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE PARTIES’ WRITTEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT 
Plaintiff argued below that no written arbitration 
agreement existed in this case. 
Defendant disagreed. 
Although the Court of Appeals majority did not reach this 
issue directly, it listed as alternative grounds for 
possible 
relief 
that 
the 
stipulated 
order 
did 
not 
constitute a written arbitration agreement.  Miller, 264 
Mich App 507 n 12. We disagree. 
As we noted earlier, the DRAA requires a written 
arbitration agreement setting out the subject of the 
arbitration and the arbitrator’s powers. 
MCL 600.5071 and 
MCL 600.5072(1)(e). 
Here, the parties entered into a 
written agreement satisfying these requirements when they 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
stipulated to entry of the particularized order for binding 
arbitration that the court in due course entered. 
The order lists the issues for arbitration. 
It 
clearly delineates the arbitrator’s powers and duties. 
Accordingly, it is sufficient to satisfy the requirements 
of MCL 600.5071 and MCL 600.5072(1)(e).5 
Nothing in the DRAA mandates that there be an 
agreement separate from the stipulated order. 
This is 
consistent with the informal and sometimes unorthodox 
nature of arbitration. 
Gavin, 416 Mich 429. 
As long as 
the parties agree to some document that meets the minimal 
requirements of MCL 600.5071 and MCL 600.5072(1)(e), the 
agreement is sufficient. 
Therefore, we reverse the 
5 In addition, but not relevant here, the parties must
satisfy MCL 600.5072(1)(a) to (d), which provide: 
The court shall not order a party to 
participate in arbitration unless each party to
the domestic relations matter acknowledges, in
writing or on the record, that he or she has been
informed 
in 
plain 
language 
of 
all 
of 
the 
following: 
(a) Arbitration is voluntary. 
(b) Arbitration is binding and the right of
appeal is limited. 
(c) Arbitration is not recommended for cases 
involving domestic violence. 
(d) Arbitration may not be appropriate in
all cases. 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
decision of the Court of Appeals that reached the contrary 
conclusion. 
CONCLUSION 
We hold that the domestic relations arbitration act 
does not require that the formality of a hearing in 
arbitration proceedings approximate that of a hearing in 
court. 
Arbitration is by its nature informal. 
The 
appropriate structure for an arbitration hearing is best 
decided by the parties and the arbitrator. 
A procedure by 
which the arbitrator shuttles between the parties in 
separate rooms questioning and listening to them satisfies 
the act’s requirement of a hearing. 
We also hold that no written agreement beyond the 
order for binding arbitration is required (1) if the 
parties stipulate to entry of the order and the order meets 
the criteria of MCL 600.5071 and MCL 600.5072(1)(e), and 
(2) if the parties satisfy MCL 600.5072(1)(a) to (d) on the 
record. 
Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and reinstate the arbitration award and the 
judgment of divorce. 
Clifford W. Taylor
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
DEBRA LEA MILLER, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 127767 
JOHN THOMAS MILLER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring). 
I concur in the result reached by the majority for the 
reasons set forth in Renny v Port Huron Hosp, 427 Mich 415, 
437; 398 NW2d 327 (1986). 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
 
 
 
1