Case Title: Matter of Greene

Citation: 701 A.2d 1061

Docket Number: 

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 1997-10-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
701 A.2d 1061 (1997)
In the Matter of a Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware: Andrew A. GREENE, Jr., Respondent.
No. 80, 1997.

Supreme Court of Delaware.
Submitted: September 23, 1997.
Decided: October 23, 1997.
Donald E. Pease, Widener University School of Law, Wilmington, for Respondent.
David Curtis Glebe, Chief Counsel, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Wilmington, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel.
Before VEASEY, C.J., WALSH and HOLLAND, JJ.
PER CURIAM:
In this proceeding, the Court reviews a report of the Board on Professional Responsibility ("Board") directed to a petition for discipline filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel ("ODC") against the Respondent, Andrew A. Greene, Jr. ("Greene"), a member of the Delaware Bar. The Board concluded, after a hearing, that Greene had committed various violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including the misappropriation of clients' funds, and recommended disbarment. Although Greene essentially admits the underlying conduct, he contends that the sanction of disbarment is unduly severe given his significant effort at rehabilitation. While we recognize the presence of significant mitigating factors here and the excellent presentation to the Court by Respondent's counsel, we agree with the Board's findings and the recommendation of disbarment.
Greene was charged with seven violations of the Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct ("DLRPC") for: (1) lack of competence in violation of Rule 1.1; (2) lack of diligence in violation of Rule 1.3; (3) commingling of property in violation of Rule 1.15(a); (4) failure to deliver property in violation of Rule 1.15(b); (5) failure to deliver and maintain books and records in violation of Rule 1.15(d); (6) engaging in criminal conduct in violation of Rule 8.4(b); and (7) engaging in dishonest conduct in violation of Rule 8.4(c).
Greene filed an answer admitting to six counts of the factual allegations, except the *1062 charge that he failed to remit certain funds, in the form of services fees, to a title insurance company.
The Board's findings of fact, in pertinent part, may be summarized as follows:
In our review of reports of the Board on Professional Responsibility in lawyer disciplinary matters, we consider the Board's factual finding under a substantial evidence standard. Matter of Lewis, Del. Supr., 528 A.2d 1192, 1193 (1987). The Board's conclusions of law, including its recommendation of sanctions, are subject to de novo review. Matter of Berl, Del.Supr., 540 A.2d 410, 413 (1988).
Greene does not dispute the essential findings of the Board to the effect that: (i) he misappropriated clients' funds in the amount of $47,000; (ii) he concealed the defalcations by failing to record documents and satisfy liens; and (iii) he failed to maintain his financial records as required by disciplinary standards. His principal dispute with the Board's report is that its recommended sanction fails to recognize the mitigating effect of Greene's addiction and his efforts at rehabilitation. Greene also complains that the Board seemed to have adopted a sanction rationale that presumes that cases of lawyer dishonesty in Delaware automatically warrant disbarment.
We have carefully and independently reviewed the evidence in this record concerning Greene's addiction and rehabilitative efforts and the extent they may mitigate his conduct. The evidence offered by Greene at the hearing before the Board concerning the basis for, and the prospects of recovery from, his drug addiction was forceful and sympathetic. Greene's addiction is longstanding and has played a significant part in his disciplinary history. We agree with the Board, however, that his addiction only provides an explanation for and does not excuse his conduct. Matter of Clyne, Del.Supr., 581 A.2d 1118 (1990). Presumably, Greene's plea of guilty to a charge of intentional criminal theft would neither have been tendered, nor accepted, if his conduct was not the product of the requisite mental state. See 11 Del.C. § 251(a) ("No person may be found guilty of a criminal offense without proof of the state of mind required by the law defining the offense...."). Because Greene has not moved to withdraw his plea of guilty, or suggested it was entered without understanding its consequences, we are entitled to assume, for disciplinary purposes, that his conduct was intentional.
To the extent Greene offers his drug addiction history as mitigation, we are willing to recognize his significant effort at rehabilitation. *1064 At the same time, we note that his longstanding addiction led him to previous disciplinary problems, including acts of dishonesty, for which he received lenient treatment in the form of a private admonition. Both the Board and this Court have offered Greene the opportunity to maintain his professional status, but the result has been further harm to the public.
Greene's argument that the Board adopted a per se rule calling for disbarment in all cases of misappropriation of client's funds is not supportable. The Board's function in the area of sanctions is one of recommendation. This Court bears the ultimate responsibility for the imposition of sanctions. As the Board noted, this Court has not adopted a per se rule but has attempted to adopt a policy that is consistent with, and protective of, the public interest whenever a lawyer has converted public funds. That policy, as set forth in Matter of Dorsey, Del.Supr., 683 A.2d 1046, 1048 (1996), bears repeating:
683 A.2d  at 1049.
Based on our evaluation of the aggravating and mitigating factors affecting Greene's conduct, we are satisfied that disbarment is required in order to protect the public and to serve as a continued determent to the legal profession.
The recommendation of the Board is accepted and IT IS ORDERED that Andrew A. Greene, Jr. be disbarred from membership in the Delaware Bar and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys entitled to practice before the Courts of this State.