Case Title: In re M.S.A.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 332A20

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2021-04-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-52 
No. 332A20 
Filed 23 April 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF: M.S.A. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 6 
February 2020 by Judge Jimmy L. Myers in District Court, Davidson County. This 
matter was calendared in the Supreme Court on 19 March 2021, but determined on 
the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North 
Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
No brief filed for petitioner-appellee. 
 
Edward Eldred for respondent-appellant father. 
 
 
MORGAN, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Respondent-father appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his 
parental rights to his minor child, M.S.A. (Mary1). In his sole argument on appeal, 
respondent-father asserts that his voluntary lack of communication with Mary from 
the inception of the period of his incarceration in November 2012 through the 
December 2019 private termination of parental rights hearing could not serve as a 
basis for the trial court’s conclusion that grounds existed to terminate his parental 
rights due to abandonment under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) because the trial court did 
                                            
1 A pseudonym is used to protect the identity of the juvenile and for ease of reading. 
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not find, nor does the evidence support a finding, that respondent-father’s failure to 
contact Mary was willful. Because we conclude that clear, cogent, and convincing 
evidence is contained in the record to show that respondent-father admittedly ignored 
his ability to contact his daughter or her caretaker, we affirm the termination order. 
I. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
¶ 2 
 
This private termination action began on 12 December 2018 when petitioner, 
who is Mary’s maternal great, great aunt, filed a petition seeking to terminate the 
parental rights of both of Mary’s parents.2 On 1 March 2019, petitioner filed an 
amended petition alleging that Mary had resided with her continuously from October 
2010 until the filing of the petition, and that she had exercised sole legal and physical 
custody of Mary since June 2011. Petitioner claimed that she had provided for Mary’s 
financial, medical, emotional, and physical needs during this time of Mary’s 
habitation with petitioner, and that petitioner would continue to be able to do so. 
Petitioner further alleged that respondent-father was incarcerated at the time of the 
filing of the petition, that he had not visited with or seen Mary since 2011, and that 
he had not provided financial support nor sent any gifts or correspondence to Mary 
for at least five years. Petitioner filed her action in order to seek the termination of 
the parental rights of respondent-father on the basis of willful abandonment under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) (2019). Respondent-father filed an answer denying 
                                            
2 Mary’s mother is not a party to this appeal. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
petitioner’s material allegations. 
¶ 3 
 
The petition was heard during the 19 December 2019 session of District Court, 
Davidson County. Respondent-father did not contest petitioner’s allegations that he 
had previously demonstrated the ability to communicate with Mary’s mother and 
family members while incarcerated3, but offered testimony that he did not possess 
actual knowledge of the information that he needed to reach Mary or petitioner. On 
6 February 2020, the trial court entered an order terminating respondent-father’s 
parental rights, concluding that respondent-father had willfully abandoned Mary 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) and that termination of respondent-father’s 
parental rights was in Mary’s best interests. Respondent-father appeals the trial 
court’s order, asking this Court to decide “whether an incarcerated parent who has 
not had contact with his child for eight years and does not know how to contact his 
child may lose his parental rights on the ground of abandonment.” 
 
II. 
Analysis 
                                            
3 Respondent-father takes exception with the trial court’s finding that he was also in 
regular contact with his attorney, arguing that he had simply testified that he knew how to 
get in contact with his attorney while incarcerated. Such an admission would appear to be 
detrimental to respondent-father’s contention that the evidence in the record could not 
establish his ability to contact Mary or petitioner, as it appears that respondent-father knew 
how to contact a person who presumably possessed the wherewithal to obtain and relay the 
information to respondent-father which was necessary to contact Mary and petitioner. As 
explained below, however, this contested finding by the trial court is unnecessary to support 
the trial court’s ultimate conclusion and is therefore excluded by us from any consideration.  
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 4 
 
The North Carolina General Statutes set forth a two-step process for the 
termination of parental rights. After the filing of a petition for the termination of 
parental rights, a trial court conducts a hearing to adjudicate the existence or 
nonexistence of any grounds alleged in the petition as set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111. 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e) (2019). The petitioner carries the burden of proving by clear, 
cogent, and convincing evidence that grounds exist under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) to 
terminate a respondent-parent’s parental rights. In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 5–6, (2019). 
Upon an adjudication that at least one ground exists to terminate the parental rights 
of a respondent-parent, the trial court will then decide whether terminating the 
parental rights of the respondent-parent is in the child’s best interests. N.C.G.S. § 
7B-1110(a). 
¶ 5 
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) states, in pertinent part, that the court may 
terminate parental rights upon a finding that the parent has willfully abandoned the 
juvenile for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the 
petition. The only argument being voiced by respondent-father on this appeal 
concerns the trial court’s adjudication that respondent-father willfully abandoned 
Mary. He contends that the trial court’s findings of fact do not support its ultimate 
conclusion of law that he willfully abandoned Mary pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(7). 
¶ 6 
 
When reviewing the trial court’s adjudication of the existence of a ground to 
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terminate the parental rights of a respondent-parent, we examine whether the trial 
court’s findings of fact “are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and 
[whether] the findings support the conclusions of law.” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 
392 (2019) (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111 (1984)). Any factual findings 
of the trial court left unchallenged by an appellant are “deemed supported by 
competent evidence and are binding on appeal.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407, 
(2019). We review the trial court’s conclusions of law under a de novo standard. In re 
C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 19 (2019). 
¶ 7 
 
Section 7B-1111(a)(7) permits the trial court to terminate a parent’s rights 
when that “parent has willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six consecutive 
months immediately preceding the filing of the petition or motion.” Id. “Abandonment 
implies conduct on the part of the parent which manifests a willful determination to 
forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” In re B.C.B., 
374 N.C. 32, 35 (2020) (quoting In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 251 (1997)). We have held 
that abandonment is evident when a parent “withholds his presence, his love, his 
care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and wil[l]fully neglects to lend support 
and maintenance[.]” Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 501 (1962). “Although the trial 
court may consider a parent’s conduct outside the six-month window in evaluating a 
parent’s credibility and intentions, the ‘determinative’ period for adjudicating willful 
abandonment is the six consecutive months preceding the filing of the petition.” In re 
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N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 77 (2019) (quoting In re D.E.M., 257 N.C. App. 618, 619 (2018)). 
¶ 8 
 
Respondent-father does not challenge the trial court’s findings of fact which 
reflect that respondent-father “has never written letters,” has never “sent gifts or 
cards,” has never “provided financially” for Mary, and has never contacted petitioner 
“to inquire as to [Mary]’s well-being . . .” from the time of his incarceration in 
November 2012 until the filing of the amended termination petition on 1 March 2019. 
Nor does respondent-father dispute the trial court’s findings that respondent-father 
had neither “made an effort to ensure that he has a relationship with the minor child,” 
nor “reached out to [p]etitioner to inquire as to the minor child’s well-being since the 
minor child came into [p]etitioner’s custody.” Instead, respondent-father contends 
that the trial court’s remaining findings of fact do not establish the willfulness of the 
total nonperformance of his parental duties toward Mary, both during the relevant 
six-month period and in prior years. 
¶ 9 
 
In two respects, respondent-father contests the following portion of the trial 
court’s Finding of Fact 14, which he considers to be the linchpin of the trial court’s 
willfulness determination:  
While incarcerated, [r]espondent/father has always had 
the resources and ability to contact outside individuals, 
either through writing letters or by telephone. In fact, 
respondent/father stays in frequent contact with his family 
members and lawyers and has been in contact with 
respondent/mother. Respondent/father has never asked 
these individuals to assist him in getting in contact with 
Petitioner to inquire as to the minor child’s well-being, nor 
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has he asked for their help in maintaining a relationship 
with the minor child, despite having opportunities to do so. 
First, respondent-father argues that he was not in “frequent contact” with his lawyers 
and that he had not contacted Mary’s mother since 2012. Second, respondent-father 
contends that it is untrue that he never asked any family member for petitioner’s 
contact information, as he testified at the hearing that he asked petitioner’s sister for 
petitioner’s telephone number and “she wouldn’t give [respondent-father] that.” 
However, respondent-father concedes that Finding of Fact 14 is otherwise accurate 
to the extent that it shows that he “was in frequent contact with some of his family 
members and never asked those family members to help him contact [petitioner].” 
Respondent-father’s further admission that “he wrote [the mother] one letter in 2012 
and did not hear back from [the mother]” is susceptible to the reasonable 
interpretation reflected in the trial court’s finding that “[r]espondent-father ha[d] 
been in contact with respondent[-]mother.” Further, although respondent-father 
offered uncontested testimony that he asked petitioner’s sister for the telephone 
number of petitioner in 2012, nevertheless this evidence does not dilute the veracity 
of the portion of the trial court’s Finding of Fact 14 that respondent-father had “never 
asked these individuals to assist him in getting in contact with [p]etitioner to inquire 
as to the minor child’s well-being.” A thorough analysis of the application of the 
provisions of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) regarding the ground of abandonment to 
Finding of Fact 14 illustrates that respondent-father admits the validity of several of 
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the circumstances which the trial court determined in the finding and that 
respondent-father’s strongest example to support his interest in contacting 
petitioner—the request for her telephone number—occurred years outside of the 
determinative six-month statutory period. Respondent-father’s assertions are largely 
irrelevant to the gravamen of the ground of abandonment as to whether he 
manifested a “willful determination to forego all parental duties and relinquish all 
parental claims to the child.” In re B.C.B., 374 N.C. at 35. 
¶ 10 
 
This Court limits its “review to those challenged findings that are necessary to 
support the trial court’s determination that . . . parental rights should be 
terminated[.]” In re N.G., 374 N.C. 891, 900 (2020). Thus, even after disregarding the 
remaining segment of the trial court’s Finding of Fact 14 which is vigorously disputed 
by respondent-father that he “stays in frequent contact with his . . . lawyers,” the 
remainder of the trial court’s finding amply supports its conclusion that respondent-
father willfully abandoned Mary.  
¶ 11 
 
Respondent-father claims that, even though he “had the ability to contact 
people on the outside and that he did not ask those people to help contact [petitioner],” 
it does not follow that he willfully abandoned Mary. This assertion suggests that 
respondent-father is introducing his incarceration as a mechanism by which to 
absolve his parental duty toward Mary and to allow him therefore to refrain from 
undertaking the effort to pursue parental involvement with Mary through contact 
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with those persons with whom he communicated during his incarceration. We have 
previously rejected such representations which respondent-father appears to foment: 
Incarceration, standing alone, is neither a sword nor a 
shield in a termination of parental rights decision. 
Although a parent’s options for showing affection while   
incarcerated are greatly limited, a parent will not be 
excused from showing interest in the child’s welfare by 
whatever means available. 
In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. at 19–20 (quoting In re D.E.M., 257 N.C. App. 618, 621 (2018)) 
(extraneity omitted). 
¶ 12 
 
Here, it is undisputed that respondent-father, at a minimum, possessed the 
ability to seek Mary’s contact information from his relatives but declined to do so for 
a number of years. The trial court’s unchallenged findings reflect that respondent-
father did not utilize “whatever means available” to display his interest in Mary’s 
welfare during his incarceration. In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. at 19–20. Instead, 
respondent-father withheld his love, care, and filial affection from Mary, both in the 
statutorily relevant six-month period prior to the filing of the petition to terminate 
parental rights and in the years preceding that time span. See Pratt, 257 N.C. at 501. 
As this constitutes willful abandonment, the trial court did not err in adjudicating 
the existence of this ground pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) in terminating 
respondent-father’s parental rights. 
 
III. 
Conclusion 
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¶ 13 
 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly determined 
that the parental rights of respondent-father were subject to termination pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). Respondent-father does not challenge the trial court’s 
conclusion that termination of his parental rights was in Mary’s best interests. 
Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating respondent-father’s 
parental rights. 
AFFIRMED.