Case Title: State v. Travis

Citation: 2013 WI 38

Docket Number: 2011AP000685-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2013-05-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
2013 WI 38 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP685-CR     
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Lamont L. Travis, 
          Defendant-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
340 Wis. 2d 639, 813 N.W.2d 702 
(Ct. App. 2012 – Published) 
PDC No: 2012 WI App 46        
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 2, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 10, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
Wilbur Warren III 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., dissents. (Opinion filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J., did not participate.  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Christopher Wren, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.    
  
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Suzanne Hagopian, assistant state public defender, and oral 
argument by Suzanne Hagopian. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Anne Bensky, and Garvey 
McNeil 
& 
Associates, 
S.C., 
Madison, 
for 
the 
Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.  
 
 
2013 WI 38
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP685-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2009CF417) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Lamont L. Travis, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 2, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals that modified the 
judgment of conviction of the Circuit Court for Kenosha County, 
Wilbur W. Warren III, Judge, and remanded the matter to the 
circuit court for resentencing.1     
¶2 
The court of appeals ordered the circuit court to 
modify 
the 
judgment 
of 
conviction 
to 
list 
Wis. 
Stat. 
                                                 
1 State v. Travis, 2012 WI App 46, 340 Wis. 2d 639, 813 
N.W.2d 702. 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
2 
 
§ 948.02(1)(e) (2009-10),2 rather than § 948.02(1)(d),3 as the 
statute the defendant violated.  The prosecuting attorney, the 
defense counsel, the circuit court, and the defendant agreed at 
the hearing on the defendant's postconviction motion that it was 
error to charge the defendant with violating § 948.02(1)(d), and 
all agreed that the defendant should have been charged with 
violating § 948.02(1)(e).   
¶3 
The State attempted to change its position before the 
court of appeals and attempted to prove that the correct charge 
was a violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(d).  The court of 
appeals rejected the State's theory that the crime was a 
violation of § 948.02(1)(d).  State v. Travis, 2012 WI App 46, 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(1)(e) provides:  
Whoever has sexual contact with a person who has not 
attained the age of 13 years is guilty of a Class B 
felony. 
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-10 
version unless otherwise noted. 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(1)(d) provides: 
Whoever has sexual contact with a person who has not 
attained the age of 16 years by use or threat of force 
or violence is guilty of a Class B felony if the actor 
is at least 18 years of age when the sexual contact 
occurs. 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
3 
 
¶15 N.7, ¶19, 813 N.W.2d 702.  The State does not challenge this 
part of the court of appeals decision before this court.4     
¶4 
The court of appeals also remanded the case for 
resentencing, concluding that resentencing was required because 
a structural error occurred when the circuit court imposed the 
sentence relying on the penalty provision for a violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(d) instead of the penalty provision for a 
violation of § 948.02(e).       
                                                 
4 The State asserted a three-part argument in the court of 
appeals: (1) The defendant had pled guilty to a violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(d) that had a mandatory minimum penalty 
and therefore the circuit court had no inaccurate information 
about the penalty; (2) the alleged error in the penalty provides 
a basis for withdrawal of the plea or a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, not a basis for resentencing; and (3) the 
structural error doctrine does not apply to an inaccurate-
information-at-sentencing claim, citing State v. Tiepelman, 2006 
WI 66, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1, as adopting a harmless 
error analysis.   
The court of appeals rejected the State's position as 
follows:  
The State also requests that we assume that a 
videotape of a statement by the victim——which is not 
included in the appellate record——is proof that Travis 
attempted to have sexual contact "by use or threat of 
force or violence."  As the videotape is not in the 
record, and as defense counsel, the assistant district 
attorney, and the circuit court all agreed that Wis. 
Stat. § 948.02(1)(d) was not the crime Travis should 
have been charged with, we are again puzzled by the 
Attorney General's Office's argument.  We address this 
frivolous argument no further, and adopt the findings 
of the circuit court that the five-year mandatory 
minimum was erroneous and that inaccurate information 
was presented to the court. 
Travis, 340 Wis. 2d 639, ¶19. 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
4 
 
¶5 
The penalty provisions for Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(d) 
and for § 948.02(1)(e) are different.  Although both are Class B 
felonies and carry the same maximum penalty of 30 years' 
imprisonment,5 the difference is that § 948.02(1)(d) provides for 
a mandatory minimum period of confinement of five years;6 
§ 948.02(1)(e) 
requires 
no 
mandatory 
minimum 
period 
of 
confinement.  
¶6 
The defendant moved for resentencing on the ground 
that his sentence was based on the inaccurate information that 
he was subject to a mandatory minimum five-year period of 
confinement.  As the circuit court stated, the five-year 
mandatory minimum "was inaccurately referenced beginning in the 
                                                 
5 The maximum penalty for a conviction in the present case 
under both statutes is 30 years' imprisonment because the 
offense charged here is an attempt.  An attempt to commit first-
degree sexual assault in violation of § 948.02(1)(d) reduces 
each of the periods of imprisonment by half.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.32(1m)(b). 
"Penalties for felonies are as follows: . . . (b) For a 
Class B felony, imprisonment not to exceed 60 years," Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.50(3)(b), with a bifurcated sentence consisting of a 
maximum period of initial confinement of forty years, Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.01(2)(b), and a maximum period of extended supervision of 
twenty years, Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(d)1.  
6 "If a person is convicted of a violation of s. 948.02 
(1)(d) or 948.025 (1)(c), the court shall impose a bifurcated 
sentence under s. 973.01.  The term of confinement in prison 
portion of the bifurcated sentence shall be at least 5 years. 
Otherwise the penalties for the crime apply, subject to any 
applicable penalty enhancement."  Wis. Stat. § 939.616(2). 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
5 
 
pleadings and carried out through the plea, the sentencing and 
ultimately really pervaded the entire file in this case."7      
¶7 
Nonetheless, the circuit court denied the defendant's 
motion for resentencing, viewing the error as harmless.8      
¶8 
The court of appeals reversed the circuit court and 
remanded the case for resentencing, concluding that the error in 
sentencing, namely the mistake of law that a mandatory minimum 
period of confinement applies, constitutes structural error.  
The State focuses its objection on what it describes as the 
court of appeals'  "unprecedented and radical determination that 
reliance on inaccurate sentencing can qualify as structural 
error."             
¶9 
The question of law presented to this court is whether 
a circuit court's imposition of a sentence using inaccurate 
information that the defendant was subject to a mandatory 
minimum five-year period of confinement is structural error or 
subject to the application of harmless error analysis.9  If the 
latter, the question is whether the error in the present case 
was harmless. 
                                                 
7 The citation to the wrong statute carried through the 
entire proceeding, namely in the Warrant, the Information, the 
Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights, the plea colloquy, the Pre-
Sentence Investigation report, the sentencing hearing, and 
finally, the judgment of conviction. 
8 Judge Warren presided at all of the proceedings in the 
circuit 
court, 
including 
the 
hearing 
on 
the 
defendant's 
postconviction motion requesting resentencing. 
9 This court decides questions of law independently of the 
circuit court and court of appeals but benefits from their 
analyses.   
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
6 
 
¶10 We conclude that imposing a sentence under the 
erroneous belief that the defendant was subject to a five-year 
mandatory minimum period of confinement is an error subject to a 
harmless error analysis.  The error is not a structural error, 
as the court of appeals stated.  We further conclude that the 
error in the present case was not a harmless error.  We affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals, but on different grounds, 
and remand the matter for resentencing. 
I 
¶11 For purposes of this review, the facts of the offense 
and the procedural history are not in dispute.      
¶12 Lamont L. Travis, the defendant, was charged with one 
count of attempted first-degree sexual assault of a child in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(d).  The complaint and 
information erred in one very important respect: they charged a 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(d), but did not contain any 
allegations supporting the "use or threat of force or violence" 
element in § 948.02(1)(d).  
¶13 The defendant was convicted on his plea of guilty to a 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(d).  As described above, the 
court of appeals ordered the judgment of conviction to be 
amended in accordance with the agreement of the prosecuting 
attorney, defense counsel, the defendant, and the circuit court 
to 
list 
the 
correct 
crime, 
a 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.02(1)(e).   
¶14 The defendant has not sought, and does not now seek, 
to withdraw his guilty plea.  The defendant seeks resentencing. 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
7 
 
II 
¶15 We 
begin 
with 
two 
basic 
principles 
regarding 
sentencing:  
¶16 First, sentencing decisions are left to the sound 
discretion of the circuit court.  We review a sentencing 
decision to determine whether the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion.10  A discretionary sentencing decision 
will be sustained if it is based upon the facts in the record 
and relies on the appropriate and applicable law.11     
¶17 Second, and somewhat related to a proper exercise of 
discretion, a defendant has a constitutionally protected due 
process right to be sentenced upon accurate information.12  A 
defendant has a constitutional right to a fair sentencing 
process "in which the court goes through a rational procedure of 
                                                 
10 In State v. McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 182 N.W.2d 512 
(1971), the court explained that a sentencing court is to 
exercise its discretion on a rational and explainable basis.  
McCleary summarized the reasoning process of a sentencing court 
that facilitates appellate review of sentencing under the 
standard of erroneous exercise of discretion as follows: 
[T]he term [discretion] contemplates a process of 
reasoning.  This process must depend on facts that are 
of record or that are reasonably derived by inference 
from the record and a conclusion based on a logical 
rationale founded upon proper legal standards.  
Id. at 277, quoted with approval in State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 
42, ¶19, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197.  
11 State v. Spears, 227 Wis. 2d 495, 506, 596 N.W.2d 375 
(1999). 
12 Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶9. 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
8 
 
selecting a sentence based on relevant considerations and 
accurate information."13  When a circuit court relies on 
inaccurate information, we are dealing "not with a sentence 
imposed in the informed discretion of a trial judge, but with a 
sentence founded at least in part upon misinformation of 
constitutional magnitude."14  A criminal sentence based upon 
materially untrue information, whether caused by carelessness or 
design, is inconsistent with due process of law and cannot 
stand.15   
¶18 It is not the duration or severity of this sentence 
that renders it constitutionally invalid; it is the careless or 
designed 
pronouncement 
of 
sentence 
on 
a 
foundation 
so 
extensively and materially false, which the prisoner had no 
opportunity to correct by the services which counsel would 
provide, that renders the proceedings lacking in due process.16 
¶19 The 
defendant's 
postconviction 
motion 
seeking 
resentencing alleges that the defendant's due process rights 
were violated at sentencing because the circuit court imposed a 
                                                 
13 Id., ¶26, (quoting United States ex rel. Welch v. Lane, 
738 F.2d 863, 864-65 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
14 United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972). 
15 Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948).  See also 
Tucker, 404 U.S. at 447 (reinforcing the right to accuracy in 
sentencing).  
For the history of the evolution of this jurisprudence in 
Wisconsin, see Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶¶9-25. 
16 Townsend, 334 U.S. at 741, cited favorably in Tiepelman, 
291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶10. 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
9 
 
sentence based on inaccurate information that he was subject to 
a mandatory minimum five-year period of confinement when, in 
fact, there was no mandatory minimum penalty applicable to his 
offense.   
¶20 Whether a defendant has been denied due process is a 
constitutional issue which this court decides independently of 
the circuit court or court of appeals, benefiting from the 
analysis of these courts.17   
¶21 State v. Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 
N.W.2d 1, teaches that a defendant is entitled to resentencing 
if the defendant meets a two-pronged test:  (A) the defendant 
shows that the information at the original sentencing was 
inaccurate; and (B) the defendant shows that the court actually 
relied on the inaccurate information at sentencing.18   
¶22 Proving that information is inaccurate is a threshold 
question. 
 
A 
defendant 
"cannot 
show 
actual 
reliance 
on 
inaccurate information if the information is accurate."19  Once a 
defendant shows that the information is inaccurate, he or she 
must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the circuit 
court actually relied on the inaccurate information.20   
                                                 
17 Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶9. 
18 Id., ¶26 (citing State v. Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 419, 
576 N.W.2d 912 (1998)). 
19 State v. Harris, 2010 WI 79, ¶33 n.10, 326 Wis. 2d 685, 
786 N.W.2d 409 (relating to sentencing involving race or gender 
considerations). 
20 Id., ¶¶4, 34.   
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
10 
 
¶23 Once the defendant shows actual reliance on inaccurate 
information, the burden then shifts to the State to prove the 
error was harmless.21   
¶24 We now apply Tiepelman to the facts of the present 
case.   
III 
¶25 We examine the record (A) to identify the inaccurate 
information; and (B) to determine whether the sentencing court 
actually relied on the inaccurate information.  
A 
¶26 Addressing the first prong of the Tiepelman analysis, 
namely whether there was inaccurate information presented to the 
circuit court at sentencing, we note that the case comes before 
us from the court of appeals, which directed the circuit court 
to amend the judgment of conviction to reflect that the 
defendant pled guilty to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(e),22 which does 
not provide a mandatory minimum period of confinement.  The 
circuit court, however, had previously sentenced the defendant 
on the basis of a conviction under § 948.02(1)(d), which 
provides for a mandatory minimum period of confinement.  At 
sentencing, the circuit court repeatedly mistakenly stated that 
it was required to impose a five-year mandatory minimum period 
of 
confinement, 
although 
no 
such 
mandatory 
minimum 
was 
applicable.  The circuit court agreed with counsel for the State 
                                                 
21 Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶¶2, 9. 
22 Travis, 340 Wis. 2d 639, ¶4. 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
11 
 
and the defendant at the hearing on the postconviction motion 
that "there should not have been a mandatory minimum. . . . So 
that 
error . . . pervaded 
the 
entire 
file 
in 
this 
matter . . . ."    
¶27 We conclude, as did the circuit court, the court of 
appeals, the prosecuting attorney, the defense counsel, and the 
defendant 
that 
information 
relevant 
to 
the 
defendant's 
sentencing, namely a mandatory minimum period of confinement, 
was inaccurate and was presented to the circuit court at 
sentencing.  
B 
¶28 Addressing the second prong of the Tiepelman analysis, 
reliance on inaccurate information, this court, as the reviewing 
court, must examine the record to determine whether the circuit 
court "actually relied" on the inaccurate information at 
sentencing.  Whether the circuit court "actually relied" on the 
incorrect information at sentencing, according to the case law, 
turns on whether the circuit court gave "explicit attention" or 
"specific consideration" to the inaccurate information, so that 
the inaccurate information "formed part of the basis for the 
sentence."23  
¶29 A review of the record to determine whether there was 
actual 
reliance 
by 
the 
circuit 
court 
on 
the 
inaccurate 
information can be a difficult task.  Sentencing decisions 
                                                 
23 Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶14 (quoting United States ex 
rel. Welch v. Lane, 738 F.2d 863, 866 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
12 
 
depend on a wide array of factors, not all fully explained by 
the circuit court.  A circuit court might not have explicitly 
considered the inaccurate information on the record or the 
record may be ambiguous.24 
¶30 There are no "magic words" that the circuit court must 
use to enable a reviewing court to determine whether the circuit 
court gave "explicit attention" to inaccurate information.  If a 
circuit court expressly paid heed to the inaccurate information, 
it is easier for a reviewing court to ascertain the circuit 
court's reliance on that information in passing sentence.25   For 
a reviewing court to conclude there was actual reliance by the 
circuit court, a circuit court need not have stated, "Because of 
the 
existence 
of 
this 
[inaccurate 
information], 
you 
are 
sentenced to X years of imprisonment."  For a reviewing court to 
conclude there was actual reliance in the present case, the 
circuit court need not have specifically said, "Because of the 
existence of the mandatory minimum, you are sentenced to prison 
time equal to or greater than the mandatory minimum."   
¶31 In accordance with Tiepelman, we examine the record to 
determine whether the circuit court gave "explicit attention" or 
"specific consideration" to the inaccurate information so that 
the inaccurate information "formed part of the basis for the 
sentence." 
                                                 
24 United States ex rel. Welch v. Lane, 738 F.2d 863, 866 
(7th Cir. 1984). 
25 Id. at 866-67. 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
13 
 
¶32 In the present case, the circuit court's reference to 
the inaccurate penalty information was explicit and repetitive.  
At least four times during the sentencing hearing, the circuit 
court explained that a mandatory minimum period of confinement 
was applicable to the defendant.   
¶33 The circuit court opened the sentencing hearing by 
summarizing the charge and the penalty, explaining that a period 
of confinement of not less than five years applied to the 
defendant's conviction, to which the defendant's attorney 
replied, "Correct."  The circuit court then turned to the 
defendant and said "So there's a five-year minimum.  You 
understood that at the time your plea was given?"  To which the 
defendant responded, "Yes, your honor."  Here is the exchange:   
The Court:  Good afternoon.  The matter is here for 
sentencing.  The charge is attempted first-degree 
sexual assault of a child under the age of 12.  I 
would presume that the Class B that is reflected here 
would be the 30-year maximum term of confinement, 
bifurcated.  There's a term of confinement, the prison 
portion of the bifurcated sentence, of not less than 
five years. 
Defendant's Attorney:  Correct. 
The Court:  So there's a five-year minimum.  You 
understood that at the time your plea was given? 
The Defendant:  Yes, Your Honor. 
The Court:  So the Court's got an obligation here if a 
sentence 
is 
to 
be 
imposed 
other 
than 
straight 
probation that it has to be at least five years.  Do 
you understand that? 
The Defendant:  Yes, Your Honor. 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
14 
 
¶34 The circuit court explained that it had an obligation 
if it decided to impose a sentence, other than probation, to 
impose at least five years of confinement.  The defendant again 
responded that he understood.   
¶35 After this exchange with the defendant, the circuit 
court heard from the prosecuting attorney, the defendant's 
mother, the defendant, and defense counsel.  The prosecuting 
attorney recommended that the sentence include prison time but 
did not suggest the length of confinement or whether it should 
be concurrent or consecutive with a previously imposed sentence 
the defendant was serving.26  
¶36 The other speakers at the sentencing hearing addressed 
factors the circuit court might consider but did not express any 
view on the number of years to be spent in confinement.  Defense 
counsel 
recommended 
a 
prison 
sentence 
concurrent 
with 
a 
previously imposed sentence of confinement.  The presentence 
investigation report, which also referred to a five-year 
mandatory minimum period of confinement, recommended ten years 
of 
confinement 
and 
ten 
years 
of 
extended 
supervision, 
                                                 
26 Under the plea agreement, the State dismissed charges in 
two other cases and agreed to recommend a prison sentence but 
agreed not to specify the length or nature of the sentence.  The 
prosecuting attorney agreed to dismiss the Class H felony charge 
of failing to update his sex-offender registration information. 
The prosecuting attorney dismissed but read in charges of two 
Class A misdemeanors (obstructing an officer and resisting 
arrest).    
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
15 
 
consecutive to a previously imposed sentence of nine years of 
confinement and four years of extended supervision.27  
¶37 The circuit court discussed the defendant's criminal 
history and the seriousness of this offense before sentencing 
him to "a period of incarceration in the Wisconsin State Prison 
System of eight years of initial confinement followed by 10 
years of extended supervision."  This sentence was imposed 
consecutive to a previously imposed sentence of confinement the 
defendant was serving.  The sentence the circuit court imposed 
is well below the maximum penalty under either Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(1)(d) or § 948.02(1)(e). 
¶38 At the circuit court's hearing on the defendant's 
postconviction motion requesting resentencing, the circuit court 
declared that the inaccurate information was not pertinent to 
its sentencing decision.  Although conceding that the five-year 
mandatory 
minimum 
period of confinement was "inaccurately 
referenced" and "really pervaded the entire file in the case," 
the circuit court concluded it had no consequence on the 
sentence imposed and thus, any error was harmless.   
¶39 The circuit court explained at the postconviction 
hearing that its sentencing decision was "primarily based" on 
                                                 
27 The defendant's brief referred to information contained 
in the Pre-Sentence Investigation report (PSI).  No one objected 
to the defendant's brief on this ground.  This information in 
the PSI was not discussed on the record in the circuit court at 
the sentencing hearing or at the postconviction motion hearing.  
For a recent decision of the court on reference to a PSI in an 
appellate brief, see State Public Defender v. Court of Appeals, 
2013 WI 31, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.   
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
16 
 
the defendant's criminal record; that the sentence was based 
"not so much on the fact that there was a mandatory minimum;" 
and that "the existence or nonexistence of a mandatory minimum 
sentence [was] of no consequence. . . . [,] did not have any 
bearing on sentencing and was noted only to meet the statutory 
and case law requirements . . . ."   
¶40 The circuit court's comments on its sentencing at the 
hearing on the defendant's postconviction motion are set forth 
in full as follows:  
The Court:  Did the Court rely on the five-year 
minimum that was referenced, which I think all parties 
now recognize was inaccurately referenced beginning in 
the pleadings and carried out through the plea, the 
sentencing and ultimately really pervaded the entire 
file in this case.  One of the reasons why it's 
referenced is because failure to do so is grounds for 
a postconviction motion and perhaps reversible error.   
Had the Court not made reference to it, at least in 
directing the defendant's attention to it, in this 
case or in any case where a minimum is available to 
the State, defendants have in the past have, and I 
suppose Mr. Travis here would be no different in this 
situation, have a viable argument to say, "Well, the 
Judge gave me X number of years, but I didn't know 
that there was a mandatory minimum.  I never would 
have entered a plea to this case if I knew that there 
was a minimum, and no one ever told me there was a 
minimum."   
So the need to express what has been pled as a 
mandatory 
minimum, 
at 
least 
from 
a 
judicial 
perspective, 
is 
necessary 
to 
avoid 
potential 
reversible error and a valid claim for resentencing.  
The fact that it was mentioned, not only in the 
pleadings but especially by the Court at the time of 
sentencing, 
only 
goes 
to 
reinforce 
the 
Court's 
obligation to inform the defendant of what the Court 
believes 
is 
a 
valid 
sentencing 
consequence, 
a 
mandatory minimum. 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
17 
 
Did the court rely on that mandatory minimum?  And 
again, this ties in, I suppose, in some roundabout way 
with the prejudice argument here, but as far as the 
Court's perspective on this, in imposing an eight-year 
sentence, that sentence was primarily based, and the 
record should reflect this, not so much on the fact 
that there was a mandatory minimum perceived to be in 
place at the time but that there was, in fact, a 
substantial 
prior 
record 
involving, 
among 
other 
things, prior sexual assault-type offenses.  And in 
our system of progressive type of consequences for 
similar criminal behavior, the Court typically, and I 
think this case was no different, would certainly 
consider that prior conduct as a substantial factor 
when it considers what an appropriate sentence should 
be in the instant case. 
So from the Court's perspective, the existence or 
nonexistence of a mandatory minimum sentence is of no 
consequence to this Court in its determination of what 
an appropriate sentence were [sic].  Had that been the 
case, the Court, I'm sure, would have indicated to the 
defendant that, "Because of the mandatory minimum and 
the existence of it and the Court's belief, I am going 
to give you five years which is the mandatory minimum 
here because the law requires that," that certainly 
wasn't the case. As counsel points out and certainly 
the record reflects, this was an eight-year sentence 
of initial incarceration.   
And, I don't think it's reasonable to suppose, nor can 
this Court support in any way, that the five-year 
mandatory minimum, which was believed to be in effect, 
had any bearing whatsoever on the imposition of the 
eight years of initial confinement.  So that said, I 
believe the defense is correct in their position here 
that there should not have been a mandatory minimum.  
The defendant would not have been so informed had it 
not been pled and carried through as part of the plea 
proceeding, but the sentence would not have changed 
because of the existence or nonexistence of the 
mandatory minimum.   
So that error as it pervaded the entire file in this 
matter and the hearings that were held, that error I 
believe to be harmless because of the fact that it did 
not have any bearing on sentencing and was noted only 
to meet the statutory and case law requirements in 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
18 
 
informing 
the 
accused 
of 
what 
consequences 
are 
available, 
both 
maximum 
and 
minimum 
sentencing 
requirements. 
That said, I certainly accept the fact, [defense 
counsel], that the error existed in the recitation of 
that mandatory minimum, but I believe in the final 
analysis at sentencing that the error was harmless 
with 
respect 
to 
the 
entire 
proceeding 
and 
the 
sentencing so the motion for resentencing at this 
point would be denied for those reasons.  
¶41 Now that the facts of the present case are laid out, 
for guidance in determining whether the circuit court actually 
relied on the inaccurate information at sentencing the Tiepelman 
case is again instructive.    
¶42 In Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179, the circuit court read 
the defendant's Pre-Sentence Investigation (PSI) report as 
stating that the defendant had over 20 prior convictions at the 
time of the commission of the offense at issue, and referred to 
this "fact" on the record during sentencing.  The defendant's 
PSI, however, indicated that he had been charged with 20 
offenses before he committed the offense at issue, but it also 
indicated that only five of those offenses had resulted in 
convictions as of that date.  The circuit court misread the PSI 
and stated inaccurate information on the record at sentencing.28 
¶43 The Tiepelman court concluded, based on this one 
inaccurate statement by the circuit court, that Tiepelman had 
met his burden of showing that the circuit court actually relied 
                                                 
28 Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶6. 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
19 
 
on 
inaccurate 
information 
in 
reaching 
its 
decision 
on 
sentencing.29 
¶44 In the present case, the circuit court did not merely 
once mention the inaccurate information.  The circuit court 
referred to the mandatory minimum four times at the sentencing 
hearing and four times during the plea hearing, eight times in 
all.  The circuit court did not say at sentencing whether the 
five-year mandatory minimum period of confinement was or was not 
a factor in sentencing. 
¶45 In 
the 
present 
case, 
as 
in 
Tiepelman,30 
after 
sentencing, the sentencing court acknowledged the misinformation 
but denied the resentencing motion.     
¶46 The standard, as stated in Tiepelman, to determine 
whether the circuit court "actually relied" on the incorrect 
information at sentencing is based upon whether the circuit 
court gave "explicit attention" or "specific consideration" to 
it, so that the inaccurate information "formed part of the basis 
for the sentence."31  A circuit court's "explicit attention to 
the misinformation demonstrates [the circuit court's] reliance 
on that misinformation in passing sentence."32   
¶47 "[T]he 
fact 
that 
other 
information 
might 
have 
justified 
the 
sentence, 
independent 
of 
the 
inaccurate 
                                                 
29 Id., ¶¶4, 30.   
30 Id., ¶7. 
31 Id., ¶14 (quoting Welch, 738 F.2d at 866). 
32 Welch, 738 F.2d at 866-67. 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
20 
 
information, is irrelevant when the court has relied on 
inaccurate information as part of the basis of the sentence."33 
¶48 A reviewing court must independently review the record 
of the sentencing hearing to determine the existence of any 
actual reliance on inaccurate information.  A circuit court's 
after-the-fact assertion of non-reliance on allegedly inaccurate 
information is not dispositive of the issue of actual reliance.34   
¶49 We are satisfied, based upon a review of the record, 
that the circuit court gave "explicit attention" to the 
inaccurate 
penalty 
information 
and 
that 
this 
inaccurate 
information thus "formed part of the basis for the sentence."  
Thus we conclude that the defendant has met his two-pronged 
burden under Tiepelman.  The burden shifts to the State to prove 
that the error was, nonetheless, harmless. 
¶50 The Tiepelman court declined to address the harmless 
error issue because it had not been fully briefed or argued, and 
the parties agreed that it was appropriate to remand the case 
for resentencing.35  The court of appeals in the present case 
                                                 
33 Welch, 738 F.2d at 867, cited with approval in Tiepelman, 
291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶14. 
34 State v. Groth, 2002 WI App 299, ¶28, 258 Wis. 2d 889, 
655 N.W.2d 163 (other language withdrawn in Tiepelman, 291 
Wis. 2d 179, ¶¶2, 31).  Only when a case is overruled does it 
lose all of its precedential value.  See Blum v. 1st Auto & Cas. 
Ins. Co., 2010 WI 78, ¶56, 326 Wis. 2d 729, 786 N.W.2d 78; see 
also Harris, 326 Wis. 2d 685, ¶34 n.12 (discussing the effect of 
Tiepelman's withdrawal of language from prior opinions). 
35 Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶¶30-31. 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
21 
 
concluded that the error constituted structural error and no 
harmless error analysis was needed.36   
C 
¶51 This court must now determine whether the error in the 
present case is a structural error or whether a reviewing court 
must conduct a harmless error analysis.  Structural errors are 
per se prejudicial.37 
¶52 The defendant asserts that the court of appeals 
correctly concluded the error in the present case was structural 
error and that the decision of the court of appeals adheres to 
and does not dismantle Tiepelman.  According to the defendant, 
the court of appeals concluded that the circuit court's 
misunderstanding about the mandatory minimum penalty was "akin 
to a structural error for which prejudice is presumed" in the 
rare case, like the instant case, in which the error was 
pervasive.38  The defendant views the court of appeals decision 
in the present case as a very narrow holding limited to the 
unusual circumstances of the present case.  The defendant's 
position is that the court of appeals decision regarding 
structural error does not apply generally to all cases involving 
                                                 
36 Travis, 340 Wis. 2d 639, ¶¶21-24. 
37 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999); State v. 
Ford, 2007 WI 138, ¶¶42-43, 306 Wis. 2d 1, 742 N.W.2d 61; State 
v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶37, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189. 
38 The amicus curiae brief of the Wisconsin Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers argues that a harmless error analysis 
has no place when a defendant proves actual reliance upon 
erroneous information at sentencing. 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
22 
 
inaccurate information in sentencing or even to all cases 
involving sentencing with inaccurate information regarding a 
mandatory minimum penalty.   
¶53 The State acknowledges that error at sentencing can, 
in rare instances, qualify as structural error if the error 
concerns a defect already recognized as a structural error, such 
as denial of counsel at sentencing and delegation of a serious 
sentencing decision by a judicial officer to another.  The State 
asserts that no court other than the court of appeals in the 
present case has, to the State's knowledge, classified reliance 
on inaccurate information at sentencing as a structural error.  
¶54 Structural errors "seriously affect the fairness, 
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings and are 
so fundamental that they are considered per se prejudicial."39  A 
structural error is a "defect affecting the framework within 
which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the 
trial process itself."40  Structural errors "infect the entire 
trial process and necessarily render a trial fundamentally 
unfair."41   
¶55 Constitutional errors may be structural errors or may 
be subject to harmless error analysis.  Constitutional errors 
                                                 
39 Ford, 306 Wis. 2d 1, ¶42 (quoting State v. Shirley E., 
2006 WI 129, ¶62, 298 Wis. 2d 1, 724 N.W.2d 623). 
40 Id. (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 449 U.S. 279, 310 
(1991)). 
41 Id. (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 
(1999)). 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
23 
 
that are so intrinsically harmful to substantial rights that 
they 
"are 
not 
amenable 
to 
harmless 
error 
analysis" 
are 
classified as structural errors.42    
¶56 Although courts have often discussed the concept of 
structural error, structural errors have been found in a "very 
limited class of cases."43   
¶57 The structural error doctrine arose in the context of 
trial 
errors 
but 
is 
applicable 
to 
sentencing 
errors. 
A 
structural error at sentencing includes, for example, a biased 
tribunal.44  
¶58 The error at issue in the present case——the sentencing 
court's actual reliance on inaccurate information about a 
mandatory 
minimum 
period 
of 
confinement——simply 
does 
not 
resemble the limited number of cases in which an error has been 
categorized as a structural error.  
¶59 The court of appeals does not cite any case that 
supports its conclusion that a structural error requiring 
automatic reversal occurred in the present case.   
                                                 
42 Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶37.  
43 Ford, 306 Wis. 2d 1, ¶43 & n.4 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. 
at 8; Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶37)). 
44 State v. Goodson, 2009 WI App 107, 320 Wis. 2d 166, 771 
N.W.2d 385 (structural error when circuit court prejudges a 
sentence); State v. Gudgeon, 2006 WI App 143, ¶¶10, 31, 295 
Wis. 2d 189, 720 N.W.2d 114 ("When a tribunal predetermines how 
it will rule, the error is structural and poisons the entire 
proceeding."). 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
24 
 
¶60 The defendant cites three cases in support of his 
position on structural error:  State v. Shirley E., 2006 WI 129, 
298 Wis. 2d 1, 724 N.W.2d 623; State v. Goodson, 2009 WI App 
107, 320 Wis. 2d 166, 771 N.W.2d 385; and Sullivan v. Louisiana, 
508 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1993).  These cases are significantly 
different from the present case. 
¶61 In Shirley E., the court concluded that depriving a 
parent of the statutory right to counsel in a termination of 
parental rights proceeding constituted structural error.45  The 
deprivation of counsel during critical stages in criminal 
proceedings has long been considered structural error, for which 
automatic reversal is required.46  The Shirley E. court held that 
depriving 
a 
parent 
in 
a 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights 
proceeding of the statutory protection of counsel placed the 
fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings in doubt.47   
¶62 In Goodson, the sentencing court warned the defendant 
that if he violated the terms of extended supervision, the 
sentencing court would reconfine him to the maximum time 
available.  The defendant subsequently violated the terms of 
extended supervision and at the reconfinement hearing, the 
                                                 
45 State v. Shirley E., 2006 WI 129, ¶63, 298 Wis. 2d 1, 724 
N.W.2d 623.   
46 Shirley E., 298 Wis. 2d 1, ¶62 (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at 
8); Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶37; State v. Gordon, 2003 WI 69, 
¶35, 262 Wis. 2d 380, 663 N.W.2d 765). 
47 Shirley E., 298 Wis. 2d 1, ¶633.   
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
25 
 
circuit court followed through on the promise it had made.48  The 
court of appeals, guided by State v. Gudgeon, 2006 WI App 143, 
¶¶10, 31, 295 Wis. 2d 189, 720 N.W.2d 114, held that a tribunal 
that was not impartial constituted a structural error.  In 
Gudgeon, the court of appeals concluded that a "biased tribunal, 
like the lack of counsel, constitutes a 'structural error.'"49   
¶63 In Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court held that 
a jury instruction that deprives a defendant of the right to a 
jury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt qualifies as 
structural error.50  In Sullivan, the jury instructions provided 
a 
definition 
of 
"reasonable 
doubt" 
that 
was 
essentially 
identical to the one held unconstitutional in Cage v. Louisiana, 
498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam).51   
¶64 The present case is unlike Shirley E., Goodson, or 
Sullivan.  In the present case, the defendant was not deprived 
of counsel (Shirley E.), did not face a biased tribunal (Gudgeon 
                                                 
48 State v. Goodson, 2009 WI App 107, 320 Wis. 2d 166, 771 
N.W.2d 385. 
49 Gudgeon, 295 Wis. 2d 189, ¶10. 
50 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1993).   
51 Id. at 277. 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
26 
 
and Goodson), and was not deprived of his right to a jury 
verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (Sullivan).52 
¶65 On the basis of the case law governing structural 
error, we conclude that the error in the present case simply 
does not fit into the general description of a structural error 
and is unlike previously categorized structural errors.  We 
decline to extend the limited class of structural errors to the 
error in the present case, and thus we conclude that the present 
                                                 
52 The defendant relies on State v. Mason, 2004 WI App 176, 
276 Wis. 2d 434, 687 N.W.2d 526, and State v. Kleven, 2005 WI 
App 66, 280 Wis. 2d 468, 696 N.W.2d 226, for the proposition 
that the court of appeals has ordered resentencing with respect 
to inaccurate information in sentencing without engaging in a 
harmless 
error 
analysis. 
 
We 
conclude 
these 
cases 
are 
distinguishable. 
In Mason, the circuit court erroneously believed the 
penalty for the crime was maximum confinement of 40 years.  The 
correct maximum confinement was 37 years, 6 months.  The circuit 
court imposed 27 years of confinement.  The court of appeals 
ordered resentencing, noting the absence of "a viable harmless 
error argument from the State."  Mason, 276 Wis. 2d 434, ¶1. 
We read Mason to conclude not that the application of a 
harmless error analysis was not necessary, but rather that the 
State had failed to meet its burden to prove the error was 
harmless.  Mason, 276 Wis. 2d 434, ¶¶1, 24 n.4. 
In Kleven, the circuit court improperly calculated the 
maximum period of confinement for the defendant's base offense, 
without two penalty enhancers.  The court of appeals accepted 
the State's concession of error and ordered resentencing.  
We read Kleven to conclude that while a harmless error 
analysis would have been proper, the court of appeals did not 
apply it because the State did not argue the error was harmless 
and the State affirmatively requested a remand for resentencing.  
Kleven, 280 Wis. 2d 468, ¶28 n.8. 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
27 
 
case does not involve a structural error requiring automatic 
reversal.  
¶66 Having determined that the circuit court actually 
relied upon inaccurate information at sentencing and that the 
error is not subject to structural error analysis, we apply a 
harmless error analysis.  The burden is on the State to prove 
that the error is harmless.53 
IV 
¶67 Harmless error analysis in criminal cases has, for the 
most part, been developed and applied to the guilt phase and 
less frequently to the sentencing phase.  The State sets forth 
several formulations of the harmless error analysis and asserts 
that under any of the various formulations and alternative 
wordings of the harmless error analysis, the error in the 
present case is harmless.54 
                                                 
53 Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶9 (citing Lechner, 217 
Wis. 2d at 419). 
54 The State summarizes this court's approach to harmless 
error as follows: 
"Wisconsin's harmless error rule is codified in Wis. 
Stat. § 805.18 and is made applicable to criminal 
proceedings by Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1)."  State v. 
Sherman, 2008 WI App 57, ¶8, 310 Wis. 2d 248, 750 
N.W.2d 500 (citing State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶39, 
254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189) (footnote omitted).  
"[I]n order to conclude that an error 'did not 
contribute to the verdict' within the meaning of 
Chapman, a court must be able to conclude 'beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found 
the defendant guilty absent the error.'"  State v. 
Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶48 n.14, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 
N.W.2d 189 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 
1, 18 (1999)) (footnote added).  See also State v. 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
28 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Stuart, 2005 WI 47, ¶40 n.10, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 695 
N.W.2d 259 (various formulations of harmless-error 
test reflect "alternative wording," citing Neder, 527 
U.S. at 2-3; State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶29, 263 
Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485; Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 
¶48 n.14).  "The standard for evaluating harmless 
error is the same whether the error is constitutional, 
statutory, or otherwise."  Sherman, 310 Wis. 2d 248, 
¶8 (citing Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶40).  "The 
defendant has the initial burden of proving an error 
occurred, after which the State must prove the error 
was 
harmless." 
 
Id. 
 
(citing 
Tiepelman, 
291 
Wis. 2d 179, ¶3). 
The 
harmless 
error 
rule . . . is 
an 
injunction 
on 
the 
courts, 
which, 
if 
applicable, 
the 
courts 
are 
required 
to 
address regardless of whether the parties 
do.  See Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2) (specifying 
that no judgment shall be reversed unless 
the court determines, after examining the 
entire record, that the error complained of 
has affected the substantial rights of a 
party). 
Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶47 n.12.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.18 (harmless-error rule, made applicable to 
criminal 
proceedings 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 972.11(1)); 
Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶48 n.14 (harmless-error 
test); see also State v. Martin, 2012 WI 96, ¶¶42-46, 
343 Wis. 2d 278, 816 N.W.2d 270 (reviewing harmless-
error 
principles 
and 
factors); 
Stuart, 
279 
Wis. 2d 659, 
¶40 
n.10 
(various 
formulations 
of 
harmless-error test reflect "alternative wording").  
The harmless-error test applies to claims of [sic] 
that 
a 
sentencing 
court 
relied 
on 
inaccurate 
information when imposing the sentence.  Tiepelman, 
291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶31. 
The court summarized its approach to harmless error as 
follows in State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶¶28-29, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 
666 N.W.2d 485: 
In . . . ultimately concluding that any error was 
harmless, the court of appeals appeared to employ a 
sufficiency of the evidence standard:  "Because there 
was sufficient evidence, other than Michael's alleged 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
29 
 
¶68 The State proffers the harmless error test codified in 
Wis. Stat. § 805.18(1), which is made applicable to criminal 
proceedings by § 972.11(1).  Section 805.18(1) provides that 
"[t]he court shall, in every stage of an action, disregard any 
error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings which shall not 
affect the substantial rights of the adverse party."   
¶69 The Wisconsin statutory harmless error formulation is 
substantially similar to the one set forth in the Federal Rules 
                                                                                                                                                             
hearsay statement, to convict Patricia [Weed] beyond a 
reasonable doubt, we hold that any error in the 
admission 
of 
the 
Fuerbringers' 
testimony 
was 
harmless."  State v. Weed, No. 01-1476-CR, unpublished 
slip op., ¶5 (Wis. Ct. App. May 16, 2002).  To the 
extent 
that 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
relied 
on 
a 
sufficiency of the evidence standard, it was in error. 
To assess whether an error is harmless, we focus on 
the effect of the error on the jury's verdict.  
Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶44, 647 N.W.2d 189; see also 
State v. Carlson, 2003 WI 40, ¶87, 261 Wis. 2d 97, 661 
N.W.2d 51 (Sykes, J., dissenting).  This test is 
"'whether it appears "beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the error complained of did not contribute to the 
verdict obtained."'" Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶44, 647 
N.W.2d 189 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 15-16, 119 S. 
Ct. 1827 quoting in turn Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 
S. Ct. 824).  We have held that "in order to conclude 
that an error 'did not contribute to the verdict' 
within the meaning of Chapman, a court must be able to 
conclude 'beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational 
jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the 
error.'"  Id., ¶48 n.14 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 
18, 119 S. Ct. 1827).  In other words, if it is "clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would 
have convicted absent the error," then the error did 
not "'contribute to the verdict.'"  Neder, 527 U.S. at 
15, 18, 119 S. Ct. 1827 (citation omitted). 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
30 
 
of Criminal Procedure Rule 52(a).55  Therefore, federal case law 
interpreting Rule 52(a) also provides guidance on this issue.  
In a review of a sentencing proceeding, the United States 
Supreme Court cited Rule 52(a) in holding that "a remand [for 
resentencing] 
is 
appropriate 
unless 
the 
reviewing 
court 
concludes, on the record as a whole, that the error was 
harmless, i.e., that the error did not affect the [sentencing] 
court's selection of the sentence imposed."56    
¶70 The State submits that an error is harmless if the 
error did not contribute to the sentence,57 that is, if there is 
no reasonable probability that the error contributed to the 
outcome.58 
¶71 The State also offers that for an error to be 
harmless, the beneficiary of the error (here the State) must 
                                                 
55 Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:  
(a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity, 
or variance that does not affect substantial rights 
must be disregarded. 
56 Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992).  See 
also United States v. Burke, 425 F.3d 400, 417 (7th Cir. 2005) 
("An error is harmless only if it did not affect the district 
court's choice of sentence."). 
57 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).  
58 State v. Payette, 2008 WI App 106, ¶46, 313 Wis. 2d 39, 
756 N.W.2d 423; State v. Groth, 2002 WI App 299, ¶22, 258 
Wis. 2d 889, 
655 
N.W.2d 163 
(other 
language 
withdrawn 
in 
Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶¶ 2, 31).   
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
31 
 
prove that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the same 
result would have occurred absent the error.59 
¶72 The State argues that the error was harmless under any 
articulation of the harmless error analysis. 
¶73 The State can meet its burden to prove harmless error 
by demonstrating that the sentencing court would have imposed 
the same sentence absent the error.  The State therefore 
correctly relies on the transcript of the sentencing proceeding 
in making its argument, and correctly refrains from relying on 
the circuit court's assertions during the hearing on the 
defendant's postconviction motion or speculation about what a 
circuit court would do in the future upon resentencing.60   
                                                 
59 Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶49 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 
18).   
See Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶12 ("While not explicitly  
addressing the issue of harmless error, the [United States 
Supreme Court in Tucker] stated that 'the real question here 
is . . . whether the sentence in the 1953 federal case might 
have been different if the sentencing judge had known that at 
least two of the respondent's previous convictions had been 
unconstitutionally obtained.'"). 
See United States v. Paulus, 419 F.3d 693, 700 (7th Cir. 
2005) (when the district court indicates it would have arrived 
at the same sentence regardless of which methodology it used to 
calculate the sentence, any error is harmless).   
60 In State v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d 258, 262-63, 280, ¶¶2, 3, 
37, 558 N.W.2d 379 (1997), the State requested a remand to the 
circuit court for a hearing to determine whether the defendant 
would have received a different sentence if the prosecutor had 
kept his plea agreement promise to make no recommendation on the 
sentence.  The supreme court rejected the suggestion to remand 
for a hearing that "would necessarily involve speculation and 
calculation" by the circuit court.  Smith, 207 Wis. 2d at 280.  
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
32 
 
¶74 According to the State, the sentencing court focused 
on the defendant's extensive juvenile and criminal record and 
the few positive aspects of the defendant's life.  The State 
argues that although the circuit court referred to the mandatory 
minimum period of confinement, the sentencing court imposed the 
sentence only in light of the factors the circuit court 
emphasized at the sentencing proceeding.  The State urges that 
the error did not affect the circuit court's selection of the 
sentence; there is no reasonable probability that the error 
contributed to the sentence; and that it is clear beyond a 
                                                                                                                                                             
In United States ex rel. Welch v. Lane, 738 F.2d 863 (7th 
Cir. 1984), the prosecutor contended that the factual error in 
sentencing was harmless because the defendant would be given the 
same sentence upon resentencing.  The federal court of appeals 
responded that the prosecutor was merely speculating and that it 
would have to engage in the same speculation on the potential 
outcome.  The federal court of appeals explained: 
Once it is established that the [trial] court relied 
on 
erroneous 
information 
in 
passing 
sentence, 
reviewing courts cannot speculate as to whether the 
same 
result 
would 
again 
ensue 
with 
the 
error 
corrected. 
Id. at 868. 
The United States Supreme Court rejected a similar "what 
would a future court do" approach to harmless error.  In United 
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972), the prosecutor argued 
that in view of the other detrimental information the sentencing 
court possessed about the defendant at the time of sentencing, 
it was "highly unlikely" that a different sentence would be 
imposed in the future even if the two invalid prior convictions 
in the record were not considered.  The United States Supreme 
Court declared that resentencing was required because it simply 
could not be assumed that the sentencing court would again give 
the same sentence. 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
33 
 
reasonable doubt that the same sentence would have been imposed 
absent the error.   
¶75 We disagree with the State.   
¶76 The circuit court in the present case gave explicit 
attention to the inaccurate information, repeatedly reminding 
itself, the prosecuting attorney, the defendant, and defense 
counsel that the conviction subjected the defendant to a five-
year mandatory minimum period of confinement.   
¶77 We acknowledge the circuit court's conclusion at the 
postconviction motion hearing that the sentence it imposed would 
have been the same even if it had not been mistaken about the 
mandatory minimum.  We are not, however, bound by the circuit 
court's retrospective review of its sentencing decision that was 
made almost a year before.   
¶78 In determining whether the error in the present case 
was harmless, we give weight to the fact that the circuit court 
believed it was required by law to impose at least a five-year 
period of confinement.  The mandatory minimum penalty is, by 
statute, ordinarily the baseline for any confinement imposed.  
The inaccurate information regarding the mandatory minimum in 
the present case unnecessarily limited the sentencing court's 
discretion.  
¶79 If the circuit court did not take this five-year 
mandatory minimum penalty into consideration at all, it was 
arguably committing an error of law.  A sentencing court usurps 
the legislature's sentencing role if it refuses to impose a 
mandatory penalty.  Similarly, it usurps the legislature's 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
34 
 
sentencing role if it imposes a sentence believing there is a 
mandatory minimum when there is none.        
¶80 When the circuit court imposes a sentence with the 
misunderstanding that a mandatory minimum period of confinement 
applies, the framework for sentencing is thrown off, and the 
sentencing court cannot properly exercise its discretion based 
on 
correct 
facts 
and 
law. 
 
Furthermore, 
this 
kind 
of 
misunderstanding of the law violates the defendant's due process 
right to a "fair sentencing process" in which the sentencing 
"court goes through a rational procedure of selecting a sentence 
based on relevant considerations and accurate information."61 
¶81 We 
take 
another 
factor 
into 
consideration 
in 
determining harmless error in the present case.  With the 
enactment of truth in sentencing, "judges have an enhanced need 
for 
more 
complete 
information 
upfront, 
at 
the 
time 
of 
sentencing."62  This court has encouraged circuit courts to refer 
to information provided by others.63  Yet in the present case, 
inaccurate information infused the information the circuit court 
received at sentencing from a variety of sources.  When the 
statements provided to the circuit court at sentencing are based 
upon inaccurate information about a mandatory minimum period of 
                                                 
61 Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶10 (citing Townsend, 334 
U.S. at 741). 
62 State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶34, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 
N.W.2d 197. 
63 Id., ¶34. 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
35 
 
confinement, the circuit court does not have the benefit of 
recommendations or discussions based on accurate information.   
¶82 At sentencing in the present case, the circuit court 
heard from the prosecuting attorney, the defendant, defense 
counsel, and the defendant's mother.  All those who spoke at 
sentencing were under the mistaken impression that a five-year 
mandatory 
minimum 
period 
of 
confinement 
applied 
to 
the 
defendant's conviction.  The circuit court also received a Pre-
Sentence Investigation report (PSI) from the Department of 
Corrections.  The PSI was based on a five-year mandatory minimum 
period of confinement.   
¶83 A circuit court's exercise of discretion in sentencing 
may be significantly hindered when it has before it statements 
based on a universal mistake of law regarding a mandatory 
minimum period of confinement. 
¶84 We realize that the defendant was sentenced to eight 
years of confinement, which is more confinement than the five-
year mandatory minimum.  The fact that the sentence was greater 
than the mandatory minimum and within the permissible range is 
not determinative of harmless error in the present case.  It is 
not the actual sentence that determines the constitutionality of 
the sentencing procedure in the present case.  When the 
defendant raises a due process challenge to the sentence, this 
court must consider whether the sentence is based on a 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
36 
 
foundation of such materially inaccurate information that the 
proceedings are lacking in due process.64    
¶85 We conclude that the error about the mandatory minimum 
period of confinement permeated the entire sentencing procedure. 
¶86 The State has not met its burden of proving the error 
harmless.  The State has not demonstrated that the error did not 
affect the circuit court's selection of sentence; that there is 
no reasonable probability that the error contributed to the 
sentence; or that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
same sentence would have been imposed absent the error.65  
¶87 We conclude that imposing a sentence under the 
erroneous belief that the defendant was subject to a five-year 
mandatory minimum period of confinement is an error subject to a 
harmless error analysis.  The error is not a structural error, 
as the court of appeals stated.  We further conclude that the 
error in the present case was not a harmless error.  We affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals, but on different grounds, 
and remand the matter for resentencing.    
¶88 For the reasons set forth, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals.  The defendant's sentence must be vacated, 
and the case must be remanded for resentencing.   
                                                 
64 Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶10 (citing Townsend, 334 
U.S. at 741).  
65 United States v. Schlifer, 403 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 
2005) ("The government ultimately fails to meet its burden of 
demonstrating that, if the district court had known that the 
guidelines are advisory rather than mandatory, its choice of 
sentence would have been the same."). 
No. 
2011AP685-CR   
 
37 
 
¶89 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶90 Justice DAVID T. PROSSER did not participate. 
 
 
No.  2011AP685-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶91 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J. 
(dissenting).   I 
conclude that Lamont L. Travis was lawfully charged with an 
attempted violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(d);1 pled guilty to 
attempting to violate § 948.02(1)(d) and was convicted and 
sentenced for an attempted violation of § 948.02(1)(d), after 
being properly advised that the statute contained a minimum 
period of confinement in prison.  I also conclude that in order 
to resentence Travis, he must move to withdraw his plea of 
attempting to violate § 948.02(1)(d), and prevail on his motion 
before the circuit court.  Resentencing for a crime for which 
Travis was not charged or convicted does not vacate the crime of 
conviction.  Therefore, I would reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals and affirm the conviction and sentencing of the 
circuit court.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the 
majority opinion.2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶92 Travis was charged with an attempt to have sexual 
contact with a child under the age of 16, T.M.G., contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(d), which is a Class B felony.  On 
conviction, he faced a sentence of imprisonment not to exceed 30 
years.  Conviction of that charge, through the provisions of 
Wis. Stat. § 939.616(2), subjects a defendant to a bifurcated 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Although I agree with the majority opinion's conclusion 
that no structural error occurred, majority op., ¶65, that 
agreement does not change my ultimate conclusion that Travis' 
conviction and sentencing should be affirmed.  
No.  2011AP685-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
sentence under Wis. Stat. § 973.01, which includes confinement 
in prison for at least five years.   
¶93 The criminal complaint set out facts relevant to a 
showing of probable cause for the crime charged against Travis, 
who was T.M.G.'s uncle.  T.M.G. told the officer that she was 
sleeping on the floor in her grandmother's living room next to a 
mattress where Travis was sleeping.  She said she woke up around 
one o'clock in the morning and found her jeans unzipped with the 
defendant's hand in her pants and that she slapped his hand away 
before he touched her "private area."  She said that sometime 
later she awoke again to find him rubbing the side of her 
stomach.  She said she then got up and moved away from him to a 
couch and pretended to be asleep while he went to the bathroom.  
However, when Travis returned, he came to the couch and picked 
her up and carried her back to the mattress where he had been 
during the prior assault.  When that happened, she told Travis 
her head hurt and she went into her grandmother's room.  T.M.G. 
was ten years old at the time of the conduct alleged in the 
complaint.  
¶94 During the plea hearing, the circuit court went over 
some parts of the complaint, pointing out to Travis that there 
was a potential of 20 years initial confinement and a five year 
minimum period of confinement.  When asked if he understood both 
of those factors, i.e., the maximum and the minimum, Travis 
answered "Yes, I understand, Your Honor."  During the plea 
hearing, it was also pointed out that in exchange for his plea, 
two other pending charges would be dismissed:  08CF643, failing 
No.  2011AP685-CR.pdr 
 
3 
 
to register as a sex offender, and 08CM2317, obstructing or 
resisting arrest.  Travis acknowledged that he had committed the 
conduct underlying those two charges that were being dismissed 
but read-in.   
¶95 At sentencing, the court reminded Travis once again 
that the sentence to be imposed must include at least five years 
confinement.  The court asked Travis if he understood that, and 
again, Travis responded, "Yes, Your Honor."  The court then went 
through some of the details of the attempted sexual assault, 
pointing out that the child involved was only ten years old at 
the time.  The court, relying on the complaint and the Child 
Advocacy Center (CAC) interview,3 said: 
When she moved away and went into another room, the 
defendant brought her back into the living room area 
where they had both previously been laying and made 
additional efforts -- or made efforts to touch her at 
that point too.  She was able to demonstrate the way 
he moved his hand down from the top of her shorts to a 
location halfway between her waistband to her vagina.  
Later in an interview at the CAC, she did confirm that 
his hand did, in fact, reach her pubic area. 
¶96 The court also talked about Travis' prior record, 
which included at least eight prior convictions and three 
juvenile adjudications. 
¶97 The court said that the penalties for Travis' assault 
of T.M.G. could be more severe, except that the State chose to 
charge Travis with an attempt, rather than a completed sexual 
                                                 
3 The Child Advocacy Center (CAC) interview with T.M.G. is 
not in the record, but the parties agreed the circuit court 
could use it.  Aside from what is relayed in the circuit court's 
sentencing, I do not know what information it contains.  
No.  2011AP685-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
assault of a child, cutting the maximum penalty in half.  The 
court pointed out that Travis had "a couple of batteries" and 
threats to injure, as well as false imprisonment and second-
degree sexual assault convictions.   
¶98 The court explained that Travis' attempted assault of 
T.M.G. was a very serious offense and protection of the public 
was important.  The court said that the conviction required 
significant confinement, otherwise the sentence would depreciate 
the seriousness of the offense.  The court then sentenced Travis 
to eight years of initial confinement, followed by ten years of 
extended supervision.  The court ordered that the sentence be 
consecutive to the sentence that he was serving for a 2000 
sexual assault conviction.  The court also ordered that he have 
no further contact with T.M.G. 
¶99 Subsequently, Travis moved the court to conclude that 
he was sentenced based on inaccurate information because the 
crime that he was charged with was not that crime described or 
designated in the complaint, but rather, it was a violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(e), which does not include the use or 
threat of force or violence and has no minimum period of 
confinement.  For the first time at that hearing, the State, 
with a new district attorney appearing, said there was no 
allegation of the use or threat of force or violence.  The 
complaint was not reviewed, and the court seemed to proceed 
based on the assumption of the State and defense counsel. 
¶100 The court said that if there were an error in the 
factual allegations in the charge, it did not result in an 
No.  2011AP685-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
erroneous sentence because the court would have given the same 
sentence even if there had not been a mandatory minimum for the 
crime of conviction.  The court explained,  
So from the Court's perspective, the existence or 
nonexistence of a mandatory minimum sentence is of no 
consequence to this Court in its determination of what 
was an appropriate sentence [here].  Had that been the 
case, the Court, I'm sure, would have indicated to the 
defendant that, "Because of the mandatory minimum and 
the existence of it and the Court's belief, I am going 
to give you five years which is the mandatory minimum 
here 
because 
the 
law 
requires 
that," 
and 
that 
certainly wasn't the case.  . . .  And I don't think 
it's reasonable to suppose, nor can this Court support 
in any way, that the five-year mandatory minimum, 
which was believed to be in effect, had any bearing 
whatsoever on the imposition of the eight years of 
initial confinement. . . .  [T]he sentence would not 
have changed because of the existence or nonexistence 
of the mandatory minimum.  
¶101 The court of appeals reversed.  It ordered new 
sentencing based on a conviction for another attempted violation 
of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(e), without examining the facts set 
out in the complaint and without Travis moving to withdraw his 
plea.  The court of appeals did not discuss what conduct may 
encompass the use or threat of force or violence when a child is 
the victim and an adult is the perpetrator and whether 
reasonable inferences from the facts set forth in the complaint 
satisfied statutory requirements of § 948.02(1)(d).  The court 
of appeals also did not address whether the plea that resulted 
in Travis' conviction could be vacated without a motion to do so 
by Travis and a determination that manifest injustice would 
result if permission to withdraw the plea were not afforded.   
No.  2011AP685-CR.pdr 
 
6 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶102 Whether the facts alleged in a criminal complaint are 
sufficient to show probable cause that the crime stated in the 
complaint was committed is a question of law for our independent 
review.  State v. Robins, 2002 WI 65, ¶20, 253 Wis. 2d 298, 646 
N.W.2d 287.  Whether an adult who picks up a ten-year-old child 
who has moved away from the scene of an attempted sexual assault 
and carries her back to the place of that attempt is encompassed 
with "use or threat of force or violence" as set out in Wis. 
Stat. § 948.02(1)(d) is a question of statutory interpretation 
that requires our independent review; however, we benefit from 
the prior discussion of the court of appeals and the circuit 
court.  Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶14, 309 
Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581.     
B.  Sufficiency of the Complaint 
¶103 To 
determine 
whether 
a 
criminal 
complaint 
is 
sufficient, we examine the document to determine "whether there 
are facts or reasonable inferences [therefrom] set forth that 
are sufficient to allow a reasonable person to conclude that a 
crime was probably committed and that the defendant probably 
committed it."  State v. Reed, 2005 WI 53, ¶12, 280 Wis. 2d 68, 
695 N.W.2d 315.  The complaint is sufficient if it addressed 
five questions:  "(1) Who is charged?; (2) What is the person 
charged with?; (3) When and where did the alleged offense take 
place?; (4) Why is this particular person being charged?; and 
(5) Who says so? or how reliable is the informant?"  Id. 
No.  2011AP685-CR.pdr 
 
7 
 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The test is 
one of "minimal adequacy, not in a hypertechnical [evaluation] 
but in a common sense evaluation."  Evanow v. Seraphim, 40 
Wis. 2d 223, 226, 161 N.W.2d 369 (1968).   
¶104 Here, the complaint charges Travis with attempted 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(d), sexual contact with a 
person under 16 years of age, by the use or threat of force or 
violence.  The complaint states that the alleged attempted 
assaults took place on or about March 24, 2009 in Kenosha, 
Wisconsin.  It alleges that Travis repeatedly attempted to touch 
T.M.G.'s pubic area.  When T.M.G. moved away from Travis, he 
went to where she had moved and carried her back to the place of 
the prior attempted sexual assaults and again attempted to touch 
her pubic area.  T.M.G. was Travis' niece and ten years old at 
the time of the attempted sexual assaults.  The complaint was 
based on law enforcement reports and citizen informants.  
¶105 At neither the plea hearing nor at sentencing did 
Travis assert that the complaint was insufficient to support the 
charge that he attempted to sexually assault T.M.G. by the use 
or threat of force or violence.  However, he now assumes that 
the facts alleged in the complaint and the reasonable inferences 
therefrom are not sufficient to support an alleged use or threat 
of force or violence in the attempted sexual assaults of T.M.G.  
He does so with no analysis of the complaint.  With the 
exception of a brief comment at oral argument, the State seems 
to 
give 
little 
thought 
or 
push-back 
to 
his 
contention.  
Accordingly, I construe Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(d) to analyze 
No.  2011AP685-CR.pdr 
 
8 
 
whether 
there 
are 
sufficient 
factual 
allegations 
in 
the 
complaint to support this statutory requirement of conviction. 
C.  Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(1)(d) 
¶106 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(1)(d) provides:  "Whoever has 
sexual contact with a person who has not attained the age of 16 
years by use or threat of force or violence is guilty of a Class 
B felony if the actor is at least 18 years of age when the 
sexual contact occurs."  What conduct constitutes  "use or 
threat of force or violence" can vary depending on the 
circumstances under which the sexual assault occurs.   
¶107 The use or threat of force or violence is to be read 
in the disjunctive.  See State v. Baldwin, 101 Wis. 2d 441, 447-
54, 304 N.W.2d 742 (1981).  Conduct or words that attempt to 
compel submission of the victim to the acts of the perpetrator 
satisfy the standard of the "use or threat of force or 
violence."  See id. at 451.  As we said, "any conduct coming 
within that generalized force concept need not be further 
particularized."  See id.    
¶108 What conduct or words may constitute an attempt to 
compel the victim to submit will vary, depending on the 
circumstances of the assault.  Here, the age of the victim is a 
factor to be considered.  T.M.G. was only ten years old; Travis 
was 37 years old.  The relationship of the perpetrator to the 
victim is also a factor.  Travis was T.M.G.'s uncle, whom she 
regarded as a father figure, i.e., someone in a position of 
authority over her.  The relative physical strength of the 
perpetrator when compared with that of the victim is also a 
No.  2011AP685-CR.pdr 
 
9 
 
factor.  Here, T.M.G. slapped Travis' hand away and then moved 
from the place of the attempted sexual assaults.  Travis went to 
T.M.G.'s chosen location, picked her up and physically carried 
her back to his mattress where he attempted a further assault.4  
His relationship with T.M.G., as an authority figure, and his 
size when compared with ten-year-old T.M.G., permitted him to 
overwhelm her choice to move away from him to stop his attempts 
at sexual assault.  In picking her up and carrying her back to 
his mattress, Travis attempted to compel her submission to his 
desires.  Stated otherwise, picking up a young child involves 
the use of force by the adult to overwhelm the choice of the 
child to prevent access to her body by physically distancing her 
from the abuser.   
¶109 Accordingly, when all of the above factors are 
evaluated, 
the 
facts 
alleged 
in 
the 
complaint, 
and 
the 
reasonable inferences therefrom, are sufficient to support 
probable 
cause 
that 
Travis 
attempted 
to 
compel 
T.M.G.'s 
submission, thereby coming within the statutory phrase, "by use 
or threat of force or violence" of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(d). 
                                                 
4 That Travis attempted further sexual contact at that time 
is found in the discussion of the circuit court.  See ¶95.  It 
is not noted in the complaint, but must have been in the CAC 
interview that the court reviewed.  However, the CAC interview 
is not in the record.  I have assumed that Travis agrees with 
the circuit court's statements because if he did not, it was his 
burden to provide the CAC interview for our review.  See Lee v. 
LIRC, 202 Wis. 2d 558, 560 n.1, 550 N.W.2d 449 (Ct. App. 1996); 
Wis. Stat. § 809.15(1).  
No.  2011AP685-CR.pdr 
 
10 
 
D.  Plea Withdrawal 
¶110 There is no provision in the statutes nor logical 
rationale that supports the conclusion that the circuit court 
erred by sentencing on incorrect information when the court 
sentenced the defendant for the crime charged, to which he pled 
and of which he was convicted.  Here, the majority gets around 
this problem by saying Travis "pled guilty" to attempting to 
violate Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(e).5  However, the majority 
opinion's attempt to duck Travis' conviction for attempting to 
violate § 948.02(1)(d) by saying he pled to a different crime 
and then not referring to his actual conviction does not change 
the conviction.   
¶111 If Travis really believes he attempted to violate only 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(e) and therefore he was incorrectly 
sentenced, he must move to withdraw his plea and have the 
information 
charging 
him 
with 
an 
attempted 
violation 
of 
§ 948.02(1)(d) amended.   
¶112 Travis can withdraw his plea after sentencing only if 
permitting the judgment to remain would be a manifest injustice.  
See State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 473, 561 N.W.2d 707 
(1997).  Generally, if a plea is withdrawn, other charges that 
were dismissed at the plea will be reinstated.  See State v. 
Deilke, 2004 WI 104, ¶2, 274 Wis. 2d 595, 682 N.W.2d 945.   
¶113 Given the burdens that follow an attempt to withdraw a 
plea after sentencing, one can see why Travis has not moved to 
                                                 
5 Majority op., ¶26. 
No.  2011AP685-CR.pdr 
 
11 
 
withdraw his plea.6  However, the majority opinion is willing to 
create new law for Travis, a repeating felon with a record of 
sexual assaults, and to order the circuit court to sentence him 
for a crime of which he was not convicted.  I do not believe 
that the law supports the majority opinion's choice. 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶114 I conclude that Travis was lawfully charged with an 
attempted violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(d); pled guilty to 
attempting to violate § 948.02(1)(d) and was convicted and 
sentenced for an attempted violation of § 948.02(1)(d), after 
being properly advised that the statute contained a minimum 
period of confinement in prison.  I also conclude that in order 
to resentence Travis, he must move to withdraw his plea of 
attempting to violate § 948.02(1)(d) and prevail on his motion 
before the circuit court.  Resentencing for a crime for which 
Travis was not charged or convicted does not vacate the crime of 
conviction.  Therefore, I would reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals and affirm the conviction and sentencing of the 
circuit court.   
¶115 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority 
opinion.    
 
 
                                                 
6 Moving to withdraw his plea subsequent to sentencing will 
require examination of the complaint as I have done and may 
result in the reinstatement of two charges that were dismissed 
due to the plea.   
No.  2011AP685-CR.pdr 
 
 
 
1