Case Title: State v. Young

Citation: 196 Kan. 63, 410 P.2d 256

Docket Number: 44,238

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1966-01-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
196 Kan. 63 (1966)
410 P.2d 256
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
LAWRENCE YOUNG, Appellant.
No. 44,238

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed January 22, 1966.
Robert B. Yohe, of Mission, argued the cause, and was on the brief for the appellant.
James P. Davis, Assistant County Attorney, argued the cause, and Robert C. Londerholm, Attorney General, and Leo J. Moroney, County Attorney, were with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
KAUL, J.:
The defendant Lawrence Young, an indigent, and Maurice Sims were charged on information, tried by a jury and convicted of the crime of robbery in the first degree. (K.S.A. 21-527) Defendant moved for a new trial and the motion was overruled. The trial court entered judgment and sentenced defendant to confinement in the Kansas State Penitentiary for a term of not less than ten years nor more than twenty-one years. Defendant appeals from the order overruling his motion for a new trial, the *64 judgment, sentence and order of commitment of the district court of Wyandotte county.
On May 26, 1964, a complaint was filed and a warrant issued charging the defendants with the commission of the crime of robbery in the first degree on May 25, 1964, in Wyandotte county. A preliminary examination was had on June 12, 1964. The examining magistrate made appropriate findings and orders binding the defendants over for trial in the district court of Wyandotte county. On June 22, 1964, the county attorney filed an information charging the defendants with the crime of robbery in the first degree.
On September 14, 1964, the district court pursuant to K.S.A. 62-1304 appointed Charles W. Thompson, a member of the Wyandotte county bar, as counsel for the defendant Lawrence Young. On September 15, 1964, the trial of defendant and codefendant Sims commenced and concluded during the afternoon of September 17, 1964, when the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to both defendants. The defendant Young is presently an inmate of the Kansas State Penitentiary at Lansing, Kansas.
For purposes of our consideration in this opinion the evidence may be summarized briefly. The defendants were charged and tried for the robbery of a Milgram Food Store, located at 1270 Merriam Lane, in Kansas City, Kansas. The evidence of the state was developed by the testimony of several employees of the store who were eye witnesses to the robbery and several officers of the Kansas City, Kansas, police force. About 7:40 on the morning of May 25, 1964, according to the testimony of the state's witnesses, Young and Sims accosted a store employee, McCain, as he was checking in a delivery man at the rear door of the store. Defendants told McCain that this was a hold up. After gaining admittance to the store Young and Sims took charge of the employees and deliverymen who were in the store at the time and directed them at gun point to place themselves in two piles in a crisscross manner in a store room in the rear of the store. Defendants were informed by the store manager that the safe could not be opened until nine o'clock and the defendants kept the store employees and deliverymen under gun point surveillance until that time. At nine o'clock the safe was opened by the store manager and a burglar alarm system was simultaneously set off. The Kansas City, Kansas, police department was notified immediately as well as the Kansas Highway Patrol. A member of the highway patrol *65 and thirty or forty members of the Kansas City, Kansas, police department were dispatched to the store. In the meantime the defendants saw the police officers arriving at the scene. According to the state's witnesses the defendant Young removed his coveralls and face mask and put on a white jacket and white apron which had the name of Milgram Food Store thereon and commenced to pose as an employee of the store. The defendant Young was apprehended as he walked out the rear door of the store. A .38 caliber revolver was found upon his person. After both of the defendants were in custody they were identified by the twelve or more witnesses who had been restrained by them. It appears from the record that defendant Young remained incarcerated in the county jail from the time of his arrest until after his trial and removal to the penitentiary.
On November 5, 1964, defendant Young filed an affidavit of poverty, motion to proceed in forma pauperis, motion for appointment of counsel and a motion for records. On November 12, 1964, the motions were granted by the district court of Wyandotte county and Robert B. Yohe, a member of the Wyandotte county bar, was appointed as counsel to conduct an appeal to this court on behalf of defendant Young.
Five specifications of error are assigned by defendant-appellant in this appeal. The first two assignments of error merit our consideration herein.
For his first point appellant contends the trial court erred in overruling his motion that an attorney other than Charles W. Thompson, who represented codefendant Sims, be appointed to represent appellant.
Secondly, appellant asserts the trial court erred when it overruled his motion for additional time in which to prepare his defense.
The facts and circumstances relative to these two points are developed in a pre-trial colloquy between appellant, court appointed counsel Thompson, county attorney Foster and the court. The colloquy took place before the court, outside the presence of the jury, the morning of the commencement of the trial. The record discloses the following:
"THE COURT: You are Mr. Young?
"THE COURT: He hasn't been your attorney all along?
"DEFENDANT YOUNG: No.
"THE COURT: Weren't you out on bond awhile?
"DEFENDANT YOUNG: No.
"THE COURT: You have been in jail all the time?
"DEFENDANT YOUNG: All the time.
"DEFENDANT YOUNG: Since May, yes, I have.
"THE COURT: That was in June?"
"DEFENDANT YOUNG: Yes, I believe so.
"DEFENDANT YOUNG: No, I haven't.
"THE COURT: What do you mean?
"THE COURT: The record reflects that Mr. Young.
"THE COURT: Very well, the record is clear."
It appears from the colloquy that the court was apparently under the misapprehension that Mr. Thompson had acted as appellant's attorney at the preliminary hearing. This is further indicated by a letter of the trial court to Mr. Thompson, dated September 5, 1964, advising Mr. Thompson that the case of State v. Sims and Young would be tried before a jury on September 15th at 9:30 a.m. The letter notwithstanding, we must conclude from the record that Mr. Thompson was not appointed as counsel for Young until the afternoon of September 14th. The above quoted colloquy also reveals that the first opportunity available to Young to consult with his counsel occurred during the pre-trial discussion in which "a few minutes before the jury gets here" was allotted defendant and his counsel to come up with a "concrete reason" for a postponement. The postponement being denied, those same "few minutes" constituted the time allotted to defendant and his counsel for trial preparation. The colloquy also reflects that Mr. Thompson was appointed over the objection of Young. It is also to be concluded from the statement of Mr. Thompson that there was a disagreement between counsel and client as to actions counsel had advised.
In view of the record before us the contentions of appellant must be considered within the applicable provisions of the constitution and statutes of Kansas.
Section 10 of the Bill of Rights of the Kansas Constitution, and subsequently the legislature and the courts of this state have carefully safeguarded the rights of accused citizens since the advent of statehood. Section 10 of the Bill of Rights provides:
From the time of the first territorial legislature in 1855 our code of criminal procedure has provided in substance that if a person about to be arraigned for a felony be without counsel it was the *69 duty of the court to assign counsel at his request. Both the legislature and this court have spoken on numerous occasions to further implement the constitutional mandate found in Article 10 of the Bill of Rights.
The present directive of the legislature is to be found in the provisions of 62-1304, supra. The provisions of the statute most pertinent to our discussion here are as follows:
We shall first consider the denial of defendant's request for counsel other than Mr. Thompson who was representing co-defendant Sims. This point seems to be of first impression in Kansas as there appears to be no reported case precisely in point with the facts and circumstances in the instant case. While the facts were dissimilar from those at hand this court clearly stated its attitude on the subject in the case of State v. Leigh, 178 Kan. 549, 289 P.2d 774:
The care required of an attorney in representing multiple clients was recently considered in the civil case of Stump v. Flint, 195 Kan. 2, 402 P.2d 794, wherein it was stated in syllabus § 6:
While there was no specific showing of a conflict of interest between defendant Young and codefendant Sims in the pre-trial colloquy, the testimony of Young at the trial indicates that the possibility of such a conflict should have been anticipated. Young testified that early in the morning of the robbery he was drinking coffee in a coffee shop at 26th and Troost where he met a person, George Evans, who held a "pretty hard grudge" as a result of a *70 gambling incident in California and that Evans was with another fellow named Harold and one named Wallace. Young testified that George Evans put a gun on him and took him to where his car was parked, the next block over from Troost. At this point, according to Young's testimony, Evans began to talk about this grudge and took $200.00 out of Young's billfold. Young further testified that Evans, together with Wallace and Harold, drove him in his car down around the vicinity of the Colgate Palmolive Peet factory. There they told Young to get out of his Buick car and to come on back to a late model white Pontiac car. The trunk of the Pontiac was opened and Young was put in the trunk of the Pontiac. Young testified:
"Q. Where at the Milgram Store?
"A. At the rear of the Milgram Store  rear door."
Young does not name codefendant Sims in his testimony as shown in the record, nor is the defense of Sims disclosed. However, the conclusion must be drawn from the testimony of Young, whether true or false, that a conflict of interest existed between the codefendants, the possibility of which should have been anticipated by court and counsel.
The Supreme Court of the United States considered the matter here involved in a similar situation in the case of Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 L. Ed. 680, 62 S.Ct., 457, the only factual difference being that Glasser, the complaining defendant, was forced to share his retained counsel, who was appointed by the court to represent a codefendant. Language of the court is applicable here.
In view of the objection of the accused and the remarks of his appointed counsel as reflected in the record, measured by the requirement of "full and fair representation" as set out in 62-1304, supra, we are constrained to hold that error was committed in denying defendant's request for counsel other than Mr. Thompson. The requirement of the statute to appoint counsel includes the proviso that counsel have no interest adverse to accused which would interfere with a fair presentation of his defense.
In considering the second assignment of error, i.e., the trial court's denial of defendant's request for a postponement, we are fully cognizant of the long established rule in this jurisdiction that continuances are within the discretion of the trial court. However, when the circumstances surrounding the request for postponement in this case are measured against the directives of 62-1304, supra, we are forced to conclude that discretion was abused in the trial court's denial. The performance of the duties prescribed for court appointed counsel in the statute is incompatible with the few minutes allotted for trial preparation as reflected by the record in this case. The right to counsel with full and fair representation as spelled out in 62-1304, supra, includes the right to have sufficient time to advise with counsel and to prepare a defense.
The duty of the court to appoint counsel, imposed by the statute, is not discharged by an assignment of counsel at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case.
In State v. Oldham, 178 Kan. 337, 285 P.2d 775, we stated:
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527, the United States Supreme Court said in syllabus § 4:
*72 From the facts and circumstances as disclosed by the record in this case, considered within the purview of 62-1304, supra, we must conclude that the discretion of the trial court was abused in denying defendant's requests for other counsel and for a continuance.
Other contentions of defendant have been considered and are found to be without merit, further discussion thereof is unnecessary in view of what has been stated.
The verdict of the jury and the judgment and sentence of the trial court are vacated and set aside and the cause is remanded to the district court. The appellant is ordered to be returned to Wyandotte county by the warden of the Kansas State Penitentiary, where appellant is now imprisoned, and delivered into the custody of the sheriff of Wyandotte county for further proceedings in harmony with this opinion.