Case Title: People v. Strain

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88007

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-11-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 88007-Agenda 32-May 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 								TERRANCE STRAIN, Appellee.
Opinion filed November 16, 2000.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	A jury convicted defendant, Terrance Strain, of two counts of
first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1992)) in
connection with the death of Geary Dow. Subsequently, the trial
court sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of 45 years
for each count of first degree murder. The appellate court reversed
defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial because it
found that the trial court committed error in refusing to ask the
jury venire two questions submitted by defendant. 306 Ill. App. 3d
328. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill.
2d R. 315(a)), and now affirm.
BACKGROUND
	On February 12, 1996, Dow was killed as he stood outside a
home on the 120th block of Perry Avenue in Chicago. Dow had
gone to the home, along with Terry Bosley, to perform some
electrical work. He was shot as he and Bosley waited next to a van
for the daughter of the homeowner to give them a ride home.
	A few days after the shooting, defendant learned that the
police wanted to question him about a homicide. On February 20,
1996, police officer Jerry paged defendant. Defendant responded
to the page and suggested a meeting at a gas station in Riverdale.
Defendant had acted as a confidential informant for Officer Jerry
since 1995. When the police car arrived at the gas station,
defendant flagged the car down and got in the car. Officer Jerry
took defendant to the police station, where he was placed under
arrest.
	The State claimed that defendant gave an oral statement while
under arrest. Defendant denied making any statement. After a
hearing on a motion to suppress, the trial court decided to allow
the State to introduce the alleged statement into evidence at trial.
The statement contained numerous references to gangs.
	The State then moved to allow proof of other crimes at trial.
In its motion, the State alleged that members of the Gangster
Disciples shot defendant in the leg because defendant was a
member of the Black Disciples. In retaliation, defendant attempted
to shoot Darryl Burnett, a member of the Gangster Disciples, near
the intersection of 120th Street and Perry Avenue. The State
argued that defendant's action in killing Geary Dow was yet
another attempt to retaliate against the Gangster Disciples. The
trial court granted the State's motion, ruling that the evidence of
other crimes was admissible to show defendant's state of mind,
intent and motive, and relevant to identification.
	The trial court recognized that evidence of gang affiliation
was to play a part in defendant's trial. Prior to the start of voir
dire, the trial judge indicated to the attorneys that he would advise
prospective members of the jury there would be evidence of gang
involvement at trial. The trial judge noted that he would ask the
prospective jurors questions relating to:
		"The allegation they or any close member of their family
or close friend had any involvement with a gang, could be
membership, affiliation, could be a victimization and so
the parties then would be fully aware of anything like
that."
The trial judge also indicated that, pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 431 (177 Ill. 2d R. 431), he would allow supplemental
questioning of the prospective jurors, upon the court's approval of
the questions.
	The trial judge conducted voir dire of the first panel of the
venire, consisting of 20 prospective jurors. The trial judge asked
each prospective juror whether the juror, any member of the
juror's family or a close friend of the juror had ever been involved
in a gang. The trial judge also asked each prospective juror
whether the juror could be fair to both sides. Defense counsel then
requested that the trial judge ask each prospective juror whether
the juror would find defendant less believable if the juror learned
that defendant belonged to a gang. This colloquy followed:
			"THE COURT: Whom am I supposed to ask that [to]?
			MR. STRALKA: Everybody, I know you mentioned
you would ask about gangs but the question is have you
had any contact with gangs.
			THE COURT: Why wasn't this submitted prior to me
doing the jury questioning?
			MR. STRALKA: I thought you said when you asked
about gangs, you would get into it.
			THE COURT: I gave specifically what question I
would ask and typically the question I have asked.
			MR. STRALKA: This is my request for a supplemental
question.
			THE COURT: That's not supplemental. This is new, a
new, separately new question which would require the
Court [to] go back and ask each individual juror a
question that could have been submitted previously on
that.
			MR. STRALKA: If the Court would allow me to ask it,
I'll ask it.
			THE COURT: It's not supplemental.
			MR. STRALKA: It's supplemental to the issue of
gangs.
			THE COURT: To the issue but not the question. I
indicated the question to you previously, and you at that
point even though it was tardy and not in writing, I would
have allowed you to submit this at this time and I would
have asked this in tandem with the question if it was
submitted but it's not submitted, it's not supplemental,
it's different.
			Next is if you learned the defendant is and was a
member of a gang would it make it more likely than not
that he's guilty of a gang shooting.
			You see that's the reason why you can't add these at the
11th hour like this, because obviously-.
			MR. STRALKA: I'm asking that either the Court or I
be allowed to ask this as a question, follow up question on
the issue of gangs.
			THE COURT: Nobody has indicated that they have
been involved in a gang at all, none has answered that yet.
And again this is the kind of question that the State is
entitled to respond to and object to and to be heard on and
bring authority on and not be ambushed by it at the 11th
hour.
			MR. STRALKA: The issue here is how does it affect
the juror? They could answer to this Court that they have
had no knowledge, no contact with gangs as all, but one
juror has indicated. But the question would be do you
have an opinion of gangs, would that opinion of gangs if
you learned the defendant is in a gang would that affect
your ability to be fair. That's what these questions go to
and probe. A fairness question.
			THE COURT: Then why didn't you submit them
earlier? Now as a matter of trial strategy you're springing
them on the Court and on your adversary.
			MR. STRALKA: The rules suggest that supplemental
questions be submitted after the Court asks questions.
			THE COURT: These are not supplemental, these are
brand new questions that the Court is entitled to notice
and to make a fair intelligent ruling on as the opposition
is entitled to very notice and make a credible and well
researched objection on it. This is, both these will not be
allowed."
	The trial judge recalled the first venire panel and asked one
prospective juror supplemental questions regarding the
circumstances surrounding the murder of a relative. The trial judge
also asked the prospective juror, as well as three other members of
the panel, supplemental questions regarding the districts to which
their police officer relatives and acquaintances were assigned. The
trial judge then continued voir dire with the examination of a
second venire panel. As with the members of the first venire panel,
the trial court asked each prospective juror whether the
venireperson, any member of the venireperson's family or a close
friend of the venireperson had ever been involved in a gang. The
trial judge also asked each prospective juror whether he or she
could be fair to both sides. Although defense counsel renewed his
request to have the prospective jurors questioned regarding gang
bias, the trial judge refused to do so.
	Defendant's trial proceeded with the presentation of the
State's opening statement. In its statement, the State explained to
the jury that defendant held a grudge against the Gangster
Disciples because defendant believed that members of the
Gangster Disciples had shot him in the leg on January 29, 1996.
The State then recounted defendant's attempts to extract revenge
from the Gangster Disciples, culminating in the murder of Dow.
The State concluded that Dow was an innocent victim, killed
because he "walk[ed] straight into a collision course [with
defendant's] wrath. He walked into a bullet fired by [defendant, a]
member of the Black Disciple street gang [, at] people who this
defendant thought were G.Ds., Gangster Disciples, rival gang
members."
	At trial, the State introduced defendant's alleged oral
statement into evidence, and presented the testimony of several
police officers and members of the Gangster Disciples, to support
its theory that defendant shot and killed Dow in an attempt, gone
awry, to extract revenge from the Gangster Disciples. The opinion
of the appellate court contains a thorough exposition of this
evidence, including a summary of defendant's alleged oral
statement, and his testimony denying that he made the statement.
See 306 Ill. App. 3d 328. We need not repeat the facts here.
However, for purposes of this appeal, we note two matters of
crucial importance: (1) gang information permeated the testimony
of almost every witness at trial; and (2) the outcome of the trial
turned upon the credibility of defendant, various police officers,
and members of the Gangster Disciples.
DISCUSSION
	As indicated above, the appellate court found that the trial
court committed error in refusing the questions submitted by
defendant, probing for gang bias. Initially, the State maintains that
defendant waived objection to the voir dire because defendant
submitted the questions in an untimely manner. The State notes
that defendant had an opportunity to submit questions to the trial
court prior to voir dire but failed to do so. We reject the State's
contention. Instead, we agree with defendant that the questions he
submitted on the subject of gang bias were supplemental
questions, which he could not have known the need for or, indeed,
could not have formulated until the trial court posed the initial
question on gang involvement.
	The trial judge indicated to the attorneys at bar that he would
question the prospective jurors on the subject of gangs, and gave
examples of areas, such as affiliation and victimization, that would
be covered in questioning. The trial judge noted that "the parties
then would be fully aware of anything like that." However, the
trial judge posed only one question to the prospective jurors,
inquiring regarding each prospective juror's involvement in a
gang.
	Once the trial judge concluded his examination of the first
venire panel, he conferred with the attorneys regarding
supplemental questions. Defense counsel then submitted the
questions on gang bias. Defense counsel argued forcefully that the
trial judge's question regarding gang involvement would not
reveal biases against gang members. A juror might well answer a
question regarding gang involvement in the negative, while
harboring an opinion of gang members that would affect his ability
to weigh the evidence fairly and impartially. Realistically, the
conference was defense counsel's first opportunity to submit the
questions at issue. Even more importantly, it was not until the trial
judge posed the question regarding gang involvement that defense
counsel became aware of the scope of the court's examination and
perceived the deficiencies in the questioning. In general a party
does not waive an issue if raised at the first opportunity. See
People v. Janes, 168 Ill. 2d 382, 387 (1995); People v. Karas, 81
Ill. App. 3d 990, 996 (1980); People v. Knutson, 17 Ill. App. 2d
251, 259 (1958).
	We note that the trial judge recalled the first venire panel and
asked members of the panel supplemental questions relating to
other matters. It would have taken little additional time for the trial
judge to ask the prospective jurors the supplemental questions on
gang bias.
	Next, the State maintains that defendant was not entitled to
question the venire regarding gang bias and, thus, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing the questions submitted by
defendant. Again, we disagree.
	Section 13 of article I of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, §13) guarantees an accused the "right of trial by jury
as heretofore enjoyed." This court has previously construed these
words to mean the right of a trial by jury as it existed under the
common law, that is "the right to have the facts in controversy
determined, under the direction and superintendence of a judge, by
the unanimous verdict of twelve impartial jurors who possess the
qualifications and are selected in the manner prescribed by law."
People v. Lobb, 17 Ill. 2d 287, 298 (1959) (interpreting
predecessor provision in 1870 Constitution). Section 13
complements the right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury
afforded to an accused pursuant to section 8 of article I of the
Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8).
	Consistent with constitutional safeguards, this court has the
inherent power to make rules governing the practice in the circuit
courts, including the regulation of jury trials in criminal cases.
Lobb, 17 Ill. 2d  at 299. Accordingly, this court has adopted Rule
431, regulating voir dire examination of prospective jurors. The
rule provides in part:
			"The court shall conduct voir dire examination of
prospective jurors by putting to them questions it thinks
appropriate, touching upon their qualifications to serve as
jurors in the case at trial. The court may permit the parties
to submit additional questions to it for further inquiry if it
thinks they are appropriate and shall permit the parties to
supplement the examination by such direct inquiry as the
court deems proper for a reasonable period of time
depending upon the length of examination by the court,
the complexity of the case, and the nature of the charges.
Questions shall not directly or indirectly concern matters
of law or instructions." 177 Ill. 2d R. 431.
Thus, the trial court is given the primary responsibility of
conducting the voir dire examination, and the extent and scope of
the examination rests within its discretion. People v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467, 484 (1998); People v. Williams, 164 Ill. 2d 1, 16
(1994); Lobb, 17 Ill. 2d  at 300. However, the trial court must
exercise its discretion in a manner consistent with the purpose of
voir dire. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d  at 484; People v. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d 1,
30 (1995). As the court observed in People v. Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d 483, 495-96 (1993), "[t]he purpose of voir dire is to ascertain
sufficient information about prospective jurors' beliefs and
opinions so as to allow removal of those members of the venire
whose minds are so closed by bias and prejudice that they cannot
apply the law as instructed in accordance with their oath." See also
Hope, 168 Ill. 2d  at 30; People v. Howard, 147 Ill. 2d 103, 133
(1991). The jurors must harbor no bias or prejudice which would
prevent them from returning a verdict according to the law and
evidence. Lobb, 17 Ill. 2d  at 300. Thus, "a failure to permit
pertinent inquiries to enable a party to ascertain whether the minds
of the jurors are free from bias or prejudice which would constitute
a basis of challenge for cause, or which would enable him to
exercise his right of peremptory challenge intelligently, may
constitute reversible error." Lobb, 17 Ill. 2d  at 300; see also People
v. Porter, 111 Ill. 2d 386, 401 (1986).
	This court has previously recognized that street gangs are
regarded with considerable disfavor by other segments of our
society. People v. Gonzalez, 142 Ill. 2d 481, 489 (1991).
Moreover, this court has acknowledged, as has our appellate court,
that, particularly in metropolitan areas, there may be strong
prejudice against street gangs. People v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414,
458 (1992); People v. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d 40, 58 (1990); People v.
Pogue, 312 Ill. App. 3d 719, 727 (1999); People v. Jimenez, 284
Ill. App. 3d 908, 912 (1996); People v. Martin, 271 Ill. App. 3d
346, 355 (1995). Accordingly, this court has held that evidence
indicating a defendant is a member of a gang or is involved in
gang-related activity is admissible only where there is sufficient
proof that membership or activity in the gang is related to the
crime charged. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d  at 458; Smith, 141 Ill. 2d  at
58. The same concerns regarding the prejudicial effect of gang
evidence dictate our holding that, when testimony regarding gang
membership and gang-related activity is to be an integral part of
the defendant's trial, the defendant must be afforded an
opportunity to question the prospective jurors, either directly or
through questions submitted to the trial court, concerning gang
bias. See Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d  at 485 (discussing the circumstances
and fairness concerns involved in Jimenez, 284 Ill. App. 3d 908,
a case where the defendant was convicted of murdering a man who
opposed the defendant's gang activities); see also People v.
Murawski, 2 Ill. 2d 143, 147 (1954) (trial court should have
permitted voir dire inquiry on the subject of abortion since
abortion is "a particularly fertile field for preconceived notions and
prejudices").
	In the case at bar, gang-related testimony was pervasive.
Indeed, the first words of the State in closing argument referred to
gangs:
			" 'Let's get strapped. The GD's are coming.' With
words to that effect, this defendant, Terrance Strain, set in
motion the chain of events of February 12, 1996."
The State continued closing argument with numerous references
to gangs:
			"And you remember the background, the gang
evidence, the things that happened even before we get to
February 12. Let's talk about that for a minute. What do
we now know? We now know that this whole thing is
over gang nonsense. The gang crap that controls our
streets these days. That is what this whole thing is about.
And we now know that this guy is a life long member of
the BD's [Black Disciple's]. We know he was a BD on
February 12. He was a BD on February 6. He was a BD
on February 9. And he was a BD on January 29. And for
ten years prior to that, no matter what he wants you to
believe about being citizen of the year and resurrected.
			What else do we know? We know that there's
territories. That these gangs are very, very well-organized
in the City of Chicago. And they are particularly well-organized in the Roseland community.
			How do we know that? We know that from every single
source of evidence that you heard in this courtroom. We
know that from the defendant himself. We know that from
Dave Jarmusz. We know that from all the police officers,
and we know that from James Burnet[t] and Darryl
Burnet[t] who are also also experts in the field of gang
crimes.
			And you heard about the different boundaries that exist
with the gangs in the 120th and Perry area. And you know
now what they knew then. What all of the gang knew.
That Lafayette was controlled by Terrance Strain's gang.
This area is the Land of Strain, the Land of the BD's. And
this area is controlled by the GD's the gang that James
Burnet[t] is a governor in.
			And you also know that there was a rivalry going on.
That there had been shootings back and forth over a
period of at least a year. And you know that from every
single source except for this guy [defendant], who wants
you to believe there was no rivalry or he didn't know
about it.
* * *
			[Defendant is] going to get revenge. This is what gangs
do for a living, they get revenge. They spend all their time
out there. They don't work. They don't go to school. They
don't serve the community. They spend all their time
plotting revenge and retaliation. You get shot, you got to
shoot somebody. It's respect. It's your stature in the gang.
You don't let it go by. ***
* * *
			Well, this is [defendant's] favorite method of escape
from there. This is how he always gets away. When you
limp through that lot, where do you end up? You end up
on Lafayette in the Land of Strain. That is where you end
up. In BD Land where he is safe. That is what he does. He
comes sneaking in. He creeps in. He does the creeping on
February 6, the creeping he likes so much. Sneaks into
this territory, shoots at Darryl and Jerome, and then leaves
and goes back to his own territory."
	Throughout its opening statement and closing argument, the
State reminded the jurors of the importance of gang testimony at
trial. The jury heard testimony from numerous police officers
assigned to gang units, police detectives and gang members, all
contending that a gang war was in effect between the Gangster
Disciples and the Black Disciples; that Perry Avenue was the
dividing line between the two gangs; and that defendant, intent on
obtaining revenge against the Gangster Disciples, made forays into
Perry Avenue in his capacity as a police informant, who gave
information leading to the arrest of members of the Gangster
Disciples, and as the shooter with the limp and the automatic
weapon, who, eventually, shot Dow. Given this list of witnesses,
the importance of gang testimony at trial, and the prejudice which
may attach to such testimony, the trial court should have
questioned the prospective jurors to determine whether they
harbored any gang bias or prejudice.
	In its opening brief on appeal, the State remarks: "Naturally,
prospective jurors may find street gangs objectionable based upon
their criminal conduct. A bias against street gangs is not morally
reprehensible." However, the State maintains that the trial court's
questions sufficiently probed the venire members' potential to be
biased against defendant. We disagree. As the appellate court
commented: "the procedure employed to test juror impartiality in
the case at bar would not have revealed prejudice against gang
members since the prospective jurors were asked only whether
they or any member of their families had ever had any
involvement with street gangs." 306 Ill. App. 3d at 336. A
prospective juror may have had no direct or indirect involvement
with gangs, yet be biased against gang members or hold a negative
opinion on the subject of gangs. Moreover, as the appellate court
observed, "[a] question should not depend upon the prospective
juror to volunteer information that does not fall within the
question's scope." 306 Ill. App. 3d at 336.
	 The State notes that gang evidence was admitted at trial to
show defendant's motive in killing Dow. The State argues that,
since the prosecution is not required to prove motive in order to
sustain a conviction for murder, the resolution of the trial did not
rest on the jury's acceptance of the gang motive. This argument is
unavailing. The State chose to place the gang testimony before the
jurors, and to stress its importance from the first words in opening
statement through closing argument. We cannot conclude that the
jurors chose to ignore this evidence.
	Next, the State maintains that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing the questions at issue because the questions
were directed to the evidence to be presented at trial. The State
argues the questions were an attempt to pre-educate the jury with
respect to evidence that defendant had quit the street gang. In our
view, the proffered questions would not have informed the jury
that defendant was no longer a member of a gang. Rather,
defendant sought to expose juror predisposition toward, and bias
against, gangs.
	Lastly, the State notes the trial court instructed the jurors that
evidence defendant had been involved in an offense and conduct
other than that charged in the indictment was to be considered only
with respect to the issue of defendant's identification, intent, and
motive, and to show the absence of mistake. Given the clause in
Rule 431 that "[q]uestions shall not directly or indirectly concern
maters of law or instructions," the State maintains that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the questions
submitted by defendant because the questions were the subject of
the trial court's limiting instruction. Again, we must disagree. The
limiting instruction the trial court gave the jury pertained to
defendant's involvement in an offense and conduct other than that
charged in the indictment, that is, the alleged attempt by defendant
to shoot Darryl Burnett on February 6, 1996. The instruction does
not cover the area of gang bias or prejudice. Thus, we conclude
that the questions submitted by defendant did not directly or
indirectly concern the trial court's instruction.
CONCLUSION
	The trial court was required to conduct voir dire in a manner
to assure the selection of an impartial panel of jurors, free from
bias and prejudice. Because of the trial court's refusal to probe for
gang bias, defendant was denied an informed and intelligent basis
on which to assert challenges for cause or to exercise peremptory
challenges. We note that considerations of double jeopardy do not
apply (People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289, 309-10 (1979)).
Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court
reversing defendant's conviction and remanding for a new trial.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting:
	Unlike the majority, I believe that the trial judge in the present
case adequately questioned the members of the defendant's venire
about their views regarding street gangs. At the outset of jury
selection, the trial judge told the venire that evidence of gang
membership would be introduced at trial. During the course of
voir dire, the judge asked each prospective juror whether the
person, a family member, or close friend had had any involvement
with street gangs. Prospective jurors who answered affirmatively
were questioned further about the matter and were asked whether
that would affect their ability to be fair and impartial. No
additional inquiry was necessary, and the trial judge did not abuse
his discretion in refusing to ask the supplemental questions posed
by defense counsel. As Justice Heiple points out in his dissent,
juror attitudes toward street gangs do not fall within the subject
areas-racial prejudice, and views on the death penalty-for which
the United States Supreme Court has required a more
particularized inquiry about possible bias. Moreover, this court has
held that prospective jurors should not generally be questioned
about the evidence to be introduced at trial. See People v. Buss,
187 Ill. 2d 144, 179-80 (1999); People v. Howard, 147 Ill. 2d 103,
135-36 (1991). I believe that the inquiry made by the trial judge in
the case at bar was sufficient to ensure the selection of an impartial
jury. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
	JUSTICE HEIPLE, also dissenting:
	The evidence at trial in this case showed that Geary Dow was
killed when defendant, a member of the Black Disciples street
gang, shot Dow repeatedly in attempted retaliation for a prior
shooting by a rival gang. In affirming the appellate court's reversal
of defendant's conviction, the majority here rules that the trial
judge erred when he refused defendant's request to ask potential
jurors two questions defendant had submitted regarding gangs. 
	The Illinois Constitution requires jurors to be impartial. Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, §8. To this end, potential jurors are typically
asked whether they have any relationship with or sympathy toward
certain people, such as law enforcement officers or convicted
criminals, which may affect the jurors' ability to be impartial.
Because the evidence in this case indicated that the shooting was
gang-related, the trial judge asked all potential jurors if they had
any involvement with or exposure to gangs. Those who answered
in the affirmative were questioned further as to the details of their
involvement and whether they could nevertheless be impartial. For
example, when one potential juror indicated that his brother had
been attacked by gang members in high school, the judge asked,
"If you learn during the course of the case the defendant is or was
a member of a gang, would you hold that against him since your
brother was beaten up by gang members?" The venire member
responded in the negative.
	Unsatisfied with the extent of the questioning, defendant
requested that the judge also ask all potential jurors two additional
questions:
			"1. If you learned the defendant is a member of a gang,
would this make him less believable?
			2. If you learned the defendant is and was a member of
a gang would it make it more likely than not that he's
guilty of a gang shooting?"
These two requested questions were not allowed by the trial judge.
He ruled correctly. The jurors' reaction to gangs and gang
membership had previously been adequately addressed.
	This court has consistently held that potential jurors may not
be asked about their anticipated responses to specific items of
evidence. People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 179-80 (1999). Allowing
an attorney to survey the reaction of potential jurors to specific
items of evidence facilitates the seating of a partial rather than an
impartial jury.
	Furthermore, the majority's per se rule sets a troubling
precedent. As a result of today's decision, other litigants will now
demand that jurors be questioned about an endless list of potential
biases and asked to explain their reactions. Under the majority's
revolutionary rule, a defendant becomes entitled to question
potential jurors on a particular subject merely by showing that (1)
evidence concerning the subject will play a major role in the trial;
and (2) "segments of our society" regard the subject with
"considerable disfavor." Slip op. at 8.
	While this court is entirely free to interpret the Illinois
Constitution and United States Constitution differently, the United
States Supreme Court has wisely read the federal document to
require particularized questioning concerning bias in only two
subject areas: (1) racial bias; and (2) attitudes toward the death
penalty in capital cases. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 35 L. Ed. 2d 46, 93 S. Ct. 848 (1973); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, 88 S. Ct. 1770 (1968). Unlike these
well-settled areas, questions concerning a potential juror's
attitudes toward gangs are unnecessary and may even be
counterproductive. Although unacknowledged by the majority, the
primary decision upon which the appellate court in the instant case
relied has now been overturned by the en banc United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Gardner v. Barnett, 199 F.3d 915 (7th Cir. 1999). In reversing the decision of a three-judge
panel which had required gang bias questioning similar to that
sought in the instant case, the en banc court wrote:
		"The subject matter of gangs and the unlawful activities
their members engage in is delicate and long inquiries can
be more detrimental to a fair trial than serve to expose an
unwarranted prejudice. Not only does it invite a trip
through a mine field it can actually serve to educate some
persons whose understanding of gangs is limited, and
create prejudice where none existed before." Gardner,
199 F.3d  at 921.
	Finally, the nature and extent of venire questioning on such
issues is decidedly best left to the discretion of the trial court. The
judge in this case did an admirable job of balancing the need for
inquiry into jurors' own exposure to gangs against the need to
prevent corruption of the jury by premature exposure to evidence.
The trial judge should be affirmed and the conviction and sentence
reinstated.
	For the reasons given, I respectfully dissent.
	JUSTICE BILANDIC joins in this dissent.