Case Title: Morris v. Staab

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Morris v. Staab1995 WY 90896 P.2d 773Case Number: 94-184Decided: 06/12/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

John 
N. MORRIS and Norma B. Morris, and Polo Ranch Company, a Wyoming 
Corporation,

 Appellants 
(Defendants),

v.

Leland STAAB and Barbara Staab, d/b/a Leba Oil 
Company,

 Appellees 
(Plaintiffs).

 

Appeal from 
District Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
J.

Henry F. Bailey, Jr. of 
Bailey, Pickering & Stock, Cheyenne, for appellants.

Rocklon L. Edmonds, 
Cheyenne, for 
appellees.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      This case 
involves a contractual dispute over the terms of an oil well lease. The trial 
court found the terms of the agreement ambiguous and decided in favor of 
appellees Leland and Barbara Staab (hereinafter Staabs). Appellants John N. 
Morris, Norma B. Morris, and Polo Ranch Company (hereinafter Morrises) appeal 
that judgment.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Morrises raise 
three issues:

1.         
Whether the district court erred in failing to grant [Morrises'] motion 
for summary judgment in the face of [Staabs'] deposition admissions that what 
they were suing for were normal daily operating costs.

2.         
Whether the [Staabs] failed to meet their burden of proof by failing to 
offer any evidence of maintenance expenses incurred by them. 

3.         
Whether the court erred in granting judgment in favor of [Staabs] given 
their admissions at trial that the expenses they were suing for were normal 
daily operating costs.

[¶4]      Staabs present 
two issues:

I.          
Whether or not the district court erred in denying the motion for summary 
judgment of the [Morrises].

II.          
Was there sufficient evidence presented at trial, when viewed in a light 
most favorable to [Staabs], to sustain the judgment of the trial 
court[?]

FACTS

[¶5]      The Morrises own 
three oil wells. In 1984, the Staabs approached the Morrises about leasing the 
wells; and, after negotiations, Morrises' counsel drafted a lease agreement. The 
agreement was executed May 18, 1984, and the Staabs then began operating the 
wells. On several occasions the Staabs requested that the Morrises pay expenses 
incurred after two of the wells began to produce oil; however, Morrises did not 
comply. Due to the Morrises' refusal to pay expenses, the Staabs abandoned the 
oil wells in 1987. The Staabs then filed a complaint asking to be reimbursed for 
half of the expenditures incurred after the wells were producing 
oil.

[¶6]      The Morrises 
filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court denied. At the bench 
trial, considerable confusion arose as to each party's obligations under the 
agreement. The dispute centered around the meaning of paragraphs 3, 5, and 6 of 
the agreement.

3. Lessee [Staabs] shall provide all labor, 
materials, supplies and equipment necessary to put each well in production in 
the following sequence, Polo Ranch 12-1, John Morris 1-12, Bell # 
1.

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

5. Normal daily operating costs shall be borne 
completely by Lessee [Staabs].

6. Maintenance costs other than those incurred in 
placing each well in production shall be shared on an equal basis by the parties 
hereto.

The Staabs expected to share 
expenses equally with the Morrises after the wells were producing oil. However, 
the distinction between "normal daily operating costs" and "maintenance costs 
other than those incurred in placing each well in production" could not be drawn 
by either the parties or expert testimony. In light of this ambiguity, the court 
construed the agreement against the drafting party, the Morrises. Specifically, 
the court determined that all costs which could be fairly categorized as 
production maintenance costs should be shared equally by the parties. The court 
relied on information from the Morrises as to the expenses involved. Morrises 
now appeal.

SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT

[¶7]      The Morrises 
appeal the denial of their summary judgment motion. Subsequent to denial of the 
motion, a trial was held on the merits. Very recently, we were confronted with 
this issue for the first time. In Cargill, Inc. v. Mountain Cement Co., 891 P.2d 57, 61 (Wyo. 1995), we stated:

Whether the denial of a motion for summary judgment 
may be reviewed on appeal, following a trial on the merits, is an issue of first 
impression to this court. Before granting summary judgment, a court must 
determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact in dispute and, 
if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Roemer Oil Co. v. Aztec Gas & Oil Corp., 886 P.2d 259, 262 (Wyo. 1994). This 
two-pronged analysis is inapplicable if a motion for summary judgment is denied 
and the case is heard on its merits. The first prong of summary judgment 
analysis is rendered moot when the trier of fact accepts a particular set of 
facts at trial.

When the "issue of material fact" prong of summary 
judgment analysis is removed, the only question that remains is whether the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The proper procedural 
mechanism for challenging an adverse judgment, following a trial on the merits, 
is a motion for judgment as a matter of law. We hold that it is improper to review the 
denial of a motion for summary judgment following a trial on the merits. 
Bigney v. Blanchard, 430 A.2d 839, 842-43 (Me. 1981). We will not consider 
Cargill's argument that it is entitled to summary 
judgment.

(Emphasis added.) Therefore, 
we will not consider the Morrises' argument that they were entitled to summary 
judgment. This part of the Morrises' appeal is dismissed.

SUFFICIENCY 
OF EVIDENCE

[¶8]      "We sustain a 
trial court's findings and judgment on questions of evidence unless they are 
clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of the evidence." Hillard v. 
Marshall, 888 P.2d 1255, 1260 (Wyo. 1995). In making such a determination, we 
examine the evidence in a light most favorable to the appellee, without 
considering evidence of the appellant which conflicts therewith. Samuel v. 
Zwerin, 868 P.2d 265, 267 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶9]      Morrises 
challenge the sufficiency of evidence to enforce the contract and require the 
Morrises to pay half of the production maintenance expenses. In construing an 
ambiguous contract provision, a court may look to extrinsic evidence to 
ascertain the meaning of the contract. Idaho Migrant Council, Inc. v. Warila, 
890 P.2d 39, 41 (Wyo. 1995). The court heard Mr. Staab's testimony that he 
believed the production maintenance costs were to be shared equally with the 
Morrises. Mr. Morris admitted in his own testimony that he was to share some 
expenses of the wells. The trial court heard sufficient evidence that some 
maintenance expenses were to be shared between the parties. When an agreement is 
ambiguous, the document must be construed against the drafter. Idaho Migrant 
Council, 890 P.2d  at 41; see also McNeiley v. Ayres Jewelry Co., 855 P.2d 1242, 
1244 (Wyo. 1993) and Brazelton v. Jackson Drug Co., Inc., 796 P.2d 808, 810 
(Wyo. 1990). Consequently, the trial court applied the Staabs' interpretation of 
maintenance costs. The Staabs presented evidence as to the expenses claimed; 
however, in reaching the judgment, the trial court relied upon the Morrises' 
breakdown of expenses. Accordingly, we hold sufficient evidence was presented at 
trial to support a judgment for the Staabs.

CONCLUSION

[¶10]   Summary judgment was properly 
denied, and the record reflects sufficient evidence to support the judgment. The 
judgment of the trial court is affirmed in all respects.