Case Title: City of Oakland v. Desert Outdoor Adver.

Citation: 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 46

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2011-08-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
427 Nev, Advance Opinion 44d,

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

Appellant,

vs | FILED

CITY OF OAKLAND, | No. 63973

DESERT OUTDOOR ADVERTISING,
INC,
Respondent. |

 

Appeal from a district court order granting a niotion for NRCP
60(b) relief from a domesticated foreign judgment. Second Judicial
District Court, Washoe County; Steven R. Kosach, Judge.

Affirmed.
Porter Simon, PC, and Brian C. Hanley and Peter H. Cuttitta, Reno,
for Appellant.

Robison Belaustegui Sharp & Low and Frank C. Gilmore, Reno,
for Respondent.

 

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, CHERRY, J.:

This appeal involves an attempt by appellant City of Oakland
to enforce, in Nevada, a California civil judgment against respondent
Desert Outdoor Advertising, Inc. We consider whether the California
judgment is entitled to full faith and credit in Nevada, Recognizing that
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892), provides an exemption to the

WU A349

 
on ee

Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, such that
other states’ penal judgments are unenforceable in the State of Nevada,
we conclude that the California judgment in this case was penal in nature

and, as such, is not enforceable in Nevada. Accordingly, we affirm the

 

district court's decision in this matter.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2003, Desert Outdoor erected an outdoor billboard for
advertising purposes within Oakland, California, city limits. Upon
learning of the advertisement, Oakland sent a notice to abate to Desert
Outdoor, advising it that the billboard was in violation of Oakland's
municipal code. Specifically, the sign in question contained
advertisements for businesses that were not located on the property on
which the sign was erected, in violation of Oakland Municipal Code
section 14,04.270.! After two months had passed and Desert Outdoor had
taken no action, Oakland sent Desert Outdoor another notice to abate,
advising Desert Outdoor that it was in violation of Oakland Municipal
Code sections 14.04.270, 17.10.850,? and 17.70.050(B). The second notice

1Qakland Municipal Code section 14.04.270 provides, among other
things, that any billboard on a property that is adjacent to a freeway must
relate to a business that is located on that property.

 

2Oakland Municipal Code section 17.10.850 defines advertising
signs, in relevant part, as “[a] sign directing attention to, or otherwise
pertaining to, a commodity, service, business, or profession which is not,
sold, produced, conducted, or offered by any activity on the same lot.”

Oakland Municipal Code section 17.70.050(B) provides that special,
development, realty, civic, and business signs are to be permitted.

 

 
He

    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  

to abate also instructed Desert Outdoor to remove the billboard and its
supporting pole within the next month.

After Desert Outdoor failed to remove the sign, Oakland filed
suit against it in California for, among other things, unlawful business
practices, with the consent of the Alameda County District Attorney. See
Cal. Bus, & Prof. Code § 5466(b) (providing for civil actions brought by
government entities), The California district court ultimately found that
Desert Outdoor engaged in unlawful business practices through its
violation of the aforementioned Oakland Municipal Code sections. ‘Thus,
the California district court imposed civil statutory penalties upon Desert
Outdoor. On November 2, 2007, the California district court entered a
civil judgment in favor of Oakland pursuant to California Business and
Professions Code Section 5485.4 The judgment was for (1) $124,000 in

‘California Business and Professions Code section 5485 provides, in
relevant part, that

(b)If a display is placed or maintained
without a valid, unrevoked, and unexpired permit,
the following penalties s1

 

() If the advertising display is placed or
maintained in a location that conforms to the
provisions of this chapter, a penalty of one
hundred dollars ($100) shall be assessed.

(2)If the advertising display is placed or
maintained in a location that does not conform to
the provisions of this chapter or local ordinances,
and is not removed within thirty days of written
notice from the department or the city or the
county with land use jurisdiction over the property
upon which the advertising display is located, a
penalty of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) plus one

continued on next page

 
statutory civil penalties, which were calculated by adding the statutory
penalty of $10,000, plus $75 per day for 1,520 days of violation; (2)

 

$263,000 in disgorged profits; and (3) costs and attorney fees in the
amount of $92,353.75. Desert Outdoor appealed the judgment, and the
California Court of Appeal affirmed.

On February 28, 2008, Oakland filed its California judgment

 

in Nevada's Second Judicial District Court, seeking enforcement of the

continued

hundred dollars ($100) for each day the
advertising display is placed or maintained after
the department sends written notice shall be
assessed,

(© In addition to the penalties set forth in
subdivision (b), the gross revenues from the
unauthorized advertising display that are received
by, or owed to, the applicant and a person working
in concert with the applicant shall be disgorged.

(@ The department or a city or a county
within the location upon which the advertising is,
located may enforce the provisions of this section.

(©) Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, if an action results in the successful
enforcement of this section, the department may
request the court to award the department its
enforcement costs, including, but not limited to, its
reasonable attorneys’ fees for pursuing the action.

(It is the intent of the Legislature in
enacting this section to strengthen the ability of
local governments to enforce zoning ordinances
governing advertising displays.

added.)

 

 

 
0 000 

court of equity in the State of Maryland.” Id. at 663. ‘The circuit court of
Baltimore overruled the demurrer, and the Maryland Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the circuit court and dismissed the bill on the
grounds that “liability imposed by section 21 of the statute of New
York ... was intended as a punishment for doing any of the forbidden
acts, and was, therefore,
state of Maryland.” Id,
Huntington then sought a writ of error in the United States

a penalty which could not be enforced in the

 

Supreme Court, arguing that the Maryland court unconstitutionally
denied full faith and credit to the New York judgment, Id, at 665. After
determining that the question of whether full faith and credit was denied
to the New York judgment in Maryland was a federal question, the
Huntington Court stated that “in order to determine this question, it will
bbe necessary, in the first place, to consider the true scope and meaning of
the fundamental maxim of international law stated by Chief Justice
Marshall in the fewest possible words: ‘The courts of no country execute
the penal laws of another.” Id, at 666 (citing The Antelope, 23 US. 66,
123 (1825). ‘The Huntington court then determined that

[t]he question whether a statute of one state,
which in some aspects may be called penal, is
penal law, in the international sense, so that it
cannot be enforced in the courts of another state,
depends upon the question whether its purpose is
to punish an offense against the public justice of
the state, or to afford a private remedy to a person
injured by the wrongful act.

Id, at 673-74,

In analyzing whether the penal exception applies in this case,
we must first resolve whether the penal analysis and exception in
Huntington is dictum. Dictum is not controlling. Argentena Consol,

 

 
 

=

Mining Co. v. Jolley Urga, 125 Nev. 527, 536, 216 P.3d 779, 785 (2009);
Kaldi v. Farmers Ins, Exch., 117 Nev. 278, 282, 21 P.3d 16, 22 (2001). “A
statement in a case is dictum when it is ‘unnecess
the questions involved.” Argentena Consol, 125 Nev. at 536, 216 P.3d at

785 (quoting St, James Village, Inc, v, Cunningham, 125 Nev. 211, 216,
210 P.3d 190, 193 (2009).
‘We conclude that the statement in Huntington regarding the

 

 

wry to a determination of

penal exception does not constitute dictum because it was necessary to

 

dotermine the questions involved. While it has been indicated that this
analy: dictum, we disagree. See Enforcement by One State of Penal
Statutes of Another, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 172 n.1 (1912) (stating that the
penal exception discussion in Huntington was “dictum, since the case only
decided that a judgment on such a statute must be given full faith and
credit under the constitution’); Kersting v, Hardgrove, 48 A.2d 309, 310
(N.J. Cir, Ct. 1946) (stating that “courts of one sovereignty will not enforce

 

the penal laws of a foreign sovereignty” is “oft repeated dictum” that goes
back to Huntington and “the maxim of international law that ‘{tJhe courts
of no country execute the penal laws of another™ (quoting The Antelope,
28 U.S. 66, 123 (1825).

‘As stated by the United States District Court in the Eastern
District of Virginia, “the only issue before the Court in Hi was
the meaning of the terms ‘penal’ and ‘penalty’ in the context of the
international law doctrine that penal laws of one jurisdiction will not be
enforced in a foreign jurisdiction.” Fisher v. Virginia Electric and Power

 
ore

Co, 243 F. Supp. 2d 538, 643 (ED. Va. 2003).° ‘The Huntington Court
clearly stated that

 

iJn order to determine this question [of whether full
faith and credit was denied], it will be necessary, in the first place, to
consider the true scope and meaning of the fundamental maxim of
international law
another.” Huntington, 146 U.S, at 666 (quoting The Antelope, 23 U.S. at
123). The Huntington Court later concluded its decision on the fact that

“The courts of no country execute the penal laws of

 

the “statute under which that judgment was recovered was not, for the
reasons already stated at length, a penal law in the international sense.”
Id, at 686.

After Huntington was decided, the United States Supreme
Court impliedly questioned the penal exception in Milwaukee County v.
White Co,, 296 U.S. 268, 279 (1935), when it “intimate(d] no opinion
whether a suit upon a judgment for an obligation created by a penal law,

in the international sense, ...is within the jurisdiction of the federal

 

district courts” (citation omitted), However, the Court then reiterated that
“the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require that sister States
enforce a foreign penal judgment” for a second time in Nelson v. George,
399 U.S. 224, 229 (1970) (citing Huntington, 146 U.S. 657). The Court
noted that “until the obligation to extradite matures, the Full Faith and
Credit Clause does not require California to enforce the North Carolina

 

"The dissent misconstrues the court's statements in Fisher in an
attempt to bolster its position. When Fisher discusses “the Huntington
fallacy,” it is not disparaging the penal exception, as the dissent suggests,
but is referring to Huntington's discussion of the local action doctrine, a
real property trespass doctrine that is inapplicable in this case. Fisher,
243 F. Supp. 24 at 543-44.

 

10

 

 
os

 

penal judgment in any way.” Id. at 229 n.6; see also Philadelphia v,
Austin, 429 A.2d 568, 572 (NJ. 1981) (stating that “the United States
Supreme Court has continued to recognize the vitality of the penal
exception” (citing Nelson, 399 U.S, at 229)).6 Furthermore, numerous
courts have recognized the viability of Huntington's penal exception. See,
2.8. Schaefer v. H. B. Green Transportation Line, 252 F.2d 415, 418 (7th
Cir. 1956) (‘It is generally recognized that penalties fixed by state laws are
not [enforceable] in federal courts or even in other State courts.”); People
v.Laino, 87 P.3d 27, 34 (Cal. 2004) (recognizing Huntington's penal
exception and determining that “[i]f California need not give full faith and
credit to penal judgments of another state, then it is free to determine

under its own laws whether defendant's Arizona plea constitutes a

"The dissent points out that in Austin, the court enforced a sister
state judgment but fails to explain that the holding in Austin was limited
to a penalty for failure to pay taxes that the court recognized was not
intended to punish but was “a civil remedy to the City in its role as tax
collector.” 429 A.2d at 571. In concluding that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause requires enforcement of a sister state tax judgment, the court
determined that

it is not necessary to reject outright the penal

exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.

Indeed, that conclusion would be inappropriate

since the United States Supreme Court has

continued to recognize the vitality of the penal

exception. Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224, 229

(1970). In this decision, we distinguish between a

purely penal law and a tax law with penal

provisions.
Id, at 572. The court then left “the question of enforcement of an
extrastate civil judgment containing penalties for violation of laws other
than tax laws, such as parking ordinances,” unresolved. Id,

u

 
conviction for purposes of the three strikes law”); Wellman v. Mead, 107 A.
396, 898-400 (Vt. 1919) (recognizing that Huntington’s penal exception
applies to criminal laws and to penalties arising from municipal laws and
concluding that the law at issue was not penal). Accordingly, we conclude
that the Huntington penal analysis is not dictum,

Oakland further asserts that Huntington was effectively
superseded by the passage of time and UEFJA, as recognized by
Rosenstein, 103 Nev. at 573, 747 P.2d at 232, Oakland contends that
according to Rosenstein, the only dofenses to the UEPJA are not
applicable here because the defenses are limited to those “that a judgment
debtor can constitutionally raise under the full faith and credit clause and
which are directed to the validity of the foreign judgment.” Id.

We reject Oakland's argument because we conclide that
Huntington's penal exception is an exception to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause as it removes the judgment from the scope of the clause altogether.
Because the California judgment is not one entitled to full faith and credit,
it does not fall under Nevada's UEFJA. See NRS 17.340 (stating, in
relevant part, that “unless the context otherwise requires, ‘foreign
judgment’ means any judgment of a court of the United States or of any
other court which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state”
(emphasis added); see_also Farmers & Merchants Trust Company v,
Madeira, 68 Cal. Rptr. 184, 188 (Ct. App. 1968) (If the judgment is a
penal judgment it is not enforceable in this state under either the full faith

and credit clause of the United States Constitution or as a matter of
comity.”); SH. v, Adm’r of Golden Valley Health Ctr., 386 N.W.2d 805, 807
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (while not deciding the merits of the case,
recognizing that “{tJhe full faith and credit clause . . . does not require a

 

 
one

state to enforce the penal judgment of another state”); MGM Desert Inn,
Inc. v. Holz, 411 8.B.2d 399, 402 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (“One exception to

 

the full faith and credit rule is a penal judgment; a state need not enforce
the penal judgment of another state.” (quoting FMS_Management
Systems v. Thomas, 309 S.E.2d 697, 699-700 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983))); Russo
v. Dear, 105 8.W.8d 43, 46 (Tex. App. 2003) (recognizing that penal
judgments are not entitled to full faith and credit as they are among the
recognized exceptions to the full faith and credit requirements), Thus, not
all judgments are entitled to full faith and credit under Nevada's UEFJA,
as recognized by Rosenstein, and these exceptions include the applicable
penal exception in this case.’

Based on the foregoing discussion, we conclude that the
Huntington penal exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause is valid
and binding law. Because we conclude that penal laws are exempted from
the requirements of full faith and credit in Nevada, we next turn to the
determination of whether the California judgment in this case was penal

in nature.

‘While we have not discussed Huntington in the past, we disagree
with Oakland that this somehow renders the Huntington doctrine not
viable in Nevada. Huntington's penal exception has been repeatedly cited
to over the years, has never been overruled by the United States Supreme
Court, and has been enforced in other cases. See. e.g., Russo, 105 $.W.3d
at 46; Holz, 411 S.E.2d at 402; S.H.,, 386 N.W.2d at 807.

“The dissont begins its argument that the California judgment
should be enforced in Nevada by pointing out that gambling debts are
entitled to enforcement in sister states that prohibit gambling and
prohibit the enforcement of gambling debts. However, the dissent fails to
consider that it is illegal to cause a casino marker to be issued when the
individual has insufficient funds to pay back the marker. See NRS

continued on next page

13

 

 

 
ee

‘The California civil monetary judgment
Oakland contends that the civil judgment is remedial and not

penal because it resulted from Oakland's enforcement of its individual

 

rights under California's unfair competition laws and was brought to halt
‘a private harm against Oakland, We disagree and conclude that pursuant
to the language used in California Business and Professions Code section
5485, the

 

sessed statutory civil penalties were penal in nature.
Under the Huntington test,

[t]he question whether a statute of one state,
which in some aspects may be called penal, is a
penal law, in the international sense, so that it
cannot be enforced in the courts of another state,
depends upon the question whether its purpose is
to punish an offense against the public justice of
the state, or to afford a private remedy to a person
injured by the wrongful act.

146 U.S. at 673-74. “The test is not by what name the statute is called by
the legislature..., but whether it appears...to be in its essential
character and effect, a punishment of an offence against the public, or a
grant of a civil right to a private person.” Id. at 683.

‘Thus, here, the central question is whether the statute
provided civil penalties as a means to punish a violator for an offense
against the public or whether the statute created a private right of action

to compensate a private person or entity,

‘continued

205.0832; NRS 205.130. It is not illegal to erect and maintain billboards
in violation of zoning codes. Accordingly, these two situations are not
analogous.

 

7

 

 
We conclude that Oakland was not a private entity enforcing a
civil right. Instead, pursuant to California Business and Professions Code
section 17206, Oakland filed suit, with the permission of the Alameda

County District Attorney, seeking penalties for Desert Outdoor's violations

 

of Oakland zoning ordinances. Under these circumstances, it does not

appear that private parties could have sued Desert Outdoor pursuant to

 

California Business and Professions Code section 5466. However, each

 

principal, agent, or employee of Desert Outdoor is also guilty of a
misdemeanor for violating the billboard code sections, Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Code § 5464. Moreover, California Business and Professions Code section
5485(f) makes plain that the legislature’
penalties was “to strengthen the ability of local governments to enforce

 

intent in mandating such

 

zoning ordinances governing advertising displays.” As such, it is clear
that the statutes’ remedies do not address private harms but rather
address only public wrongs—in this case, the abatement of a public
nuisance—and were intended to deter conduct deemed wrongful under
California Iaw. While Oakland contends that it suffered damages, we
conclude that the purpose of the statute and resulting judgment was not to
“afford a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act,” but its
essential character and effect was to “to punish an offense against the
public justice of the state,” as evidenced by Oakland implementing suit.
Huntington, 146 USS. at 673-74.

Our conclusion that the judgment is unenforceable renders moot
the question of whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel bars Desert
Outdoor’s attempt to set aside the domesticated judgment under NRCP
60(6)(4). Accordingly, we will not discuss this contention further.

 

 
 

Accordingly, we conclude that this penal judgment cannot be
enforced in Nevada pursuant to Huntington, and we affirm the judgment
of the district court.19

We. concur:
>
Wifi

x

 

me

eNOS.

Gipkons

Parraguirre

WWe have carefully considered Oakland’s contention that the
question of whether Nevada will enforce a penal judgment is still
permissive in nature and that the judgment here should be enforced based
on public policy grounds, and we conclude that this contention is

unpersuasive.

 
one

PICKERING, J., with whom DOUGLAS, C.J., and HARDESTY, J., agree,
dissenting:

A Nevada judgment on a gambling debt is entitled to

enforcement in a

 

ter state, even though the sister state has statutes
that outlaw gambling and prohibit judicial enforcement of gambling debts.
MGM Desert Inn, Inc, v. Holz, 411 $.E.2d 399, 401.03 (N.C, Ct. App. 1991)
(citing the Full Faith and Credit Clause analysis in Fauntleroy v, Lum,
210 U.S. 230, 237 (1902), and the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act). I would extend the same reciprocal courtesy to the
California judgment presented here, True, the California judgment, while
civil, embodies a fine imposed to coerce compliance with an Oakland
outdoor advertising ordinance, after warnings and lesser remedies failed,
But the issue is not whether Nevada must allow Oakland to sue on its
ordinance originally in a Nevada court. We have here a California
judgment, fully enforceable under its laws for enforcing civil judgments,
presented to our Nevada courts for enforcement against a Nevada
defendant that departed California for Nevada after suffering judgment
there. This California judgment is as enforceable under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution! and the Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, NRS 17.330-.400, as the gambling
debt judgment in MGM Desert Inn. For these reasons, and as a matter of
comity, I respectfully dissent.

‘The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution
provides that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And
the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such
Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”
US. Const. art. IV, § 1.

 

 
‘The majority takes Huntington v, Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892),
as gospel. But Huntington's holding, as distinct from its dictum, is that a
Maryland court violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause and erred in not
enforcing a New York judgment based on a New York statute that made a
corporation's directors who violated the state's corporation laws
automatically liable for the entity’s debts. In so ruling, the Supreme Court
rejected the defendant's argument that the underlying claim was based on
“a penal law, in the international sense,” id. at 673, and thus did not
deserve full faith and credit. The “international sense” of the New York
judgment and law figured in Huntington, at least in part, because the
record showed a Canadian tribunal had enforced the same New York
judgment that Maryland had declined to enforce. Id. at 680-81 (noting
that a “Committee of the Privy Couneil of England, upon an appeal from
Canada, in an action brought by the present plaintiff [Huntington] against
Attrill in the province of Ontario upon the judgment to enforce which the
present suit was brought” had deemed the New York judgment
enforceable in Canada). The New York judgment received more full faith
and credit in Canada, in other words, than it did in Maryland, an anomaly
Huntington rectified.

Huntington does contain language, cited by the majority,
suggesting that the Full Faith and Credit Clause permits a state court to
refuse to enforce a sister state penal judgment on the same terms as it
might deny effect to a foreign-country penal judgment, and, drawing on
international law, Huntington deems “penal” a judgment based on a law
whose “purpose is to punish an offense against the public justice of the

State.” Id, at 673-74. However, unlike the majority, I view this language

as dictum, perhaps necessary to frame the arguments presented but not
necessary to the actual holding in Huntington. See Note, Enforcement by

 

 
oe

 

One State of Penal Statutes of Another, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 172 n.1 (1912)
(the penal exception discussion in Huntington is “dictum, since the case
only decided that a judgment on such a statute must be given full faith
and credit under the constitution”); Kersting v. Hardgrove, 48 A.2d 309,
310 (NJ. Cir, Ct, 1946) (stating that “courts of one sovereignty will not
enforce the penal laws of a foreign sovereignty” is “oft repeated dictum”
that goes back to Huntington and “the maxim of international law that
‘{t)he courts of no country execute the penal laws of another” (quoting The
Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 123 (1825))). And in a later decision, the Court cited
Huntington but reserved (or revived) the question whether a sister state
judgment for a monetary penalty is entitled to full faith and credit: “We
intimate no opinion whetherl, in] a suit upon a judgment for an obligation
created by a penal law, in the international sense, ... full faith and credit
must be given to such a judgment even though a suit for the penalty before
reduced to judgment could not be maintained outside of the state where
imposed.” Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 279 (1935).
Milwaukee County suggests considerable uncertainty as to the
scope and/or viability of Huntington's so-called penal exception, as applied
to a sister state money judgment, even where, as here, that judgment runs
in favor of a local governmental entity. Certainly, Huntington does not
compel the holding that a state must. under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, refuse to enforce a sister state's money judgment because that
judgment may be based on a law that is “penal... in the international
Commentators, too, recognize that Huntington is sketchy
authority, at best, on this point. As noted in the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws section 120, comment d (1971): “The Supreme Court of
the United States has never squarely decided whether a State may look

sense.

through the valid money judgment of a sister State and refuse to enforce

 
the judgment on the ground that it was based on a penal cause of action.”
It goes on to say that “[t]he privilege of refusing to enforce the sister State
judgment, if it exists at all, is a narrow one.” Id, (emphasis added); see
also Robert A. Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental
Claims, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 202 (1932) (“Essentially civil claims should
never be denied extrastate enforcement merely because the epithet penal
can be attached to them.”)

The law distinguishes between suits to enforce claims arising
under another state's laws and suits on final judgments rendered by a
sister state. States may not be obligated to entertain suits based on sister
state tax laws or laws that deeply offend local public policy. Milwaukee
County, 296 US. at 274-75; Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421-22 (1979).
Once the claim has been reduced to judgment, however, the Full Faith and
Credit Clause makes the judgment portable from state to state and
requires interstate enforcement of the civil judgment that results.
Milwaukee County, 296 U.S. at 275-76; Magnolia Petroleum Co, v. Hunt,
320 U.S. 430, 438 (1943) (while “there may be exceptional cases in which
the judgment of one state may not override the laws and policy of
another, ... [w]e are aware of no such exception in the ease of a money
judgment rendered in a civil suit or] of any considerations of local policy
or law which could rightly be deemed to impair the force and effect which
the full faith and credit clause and the Act of Congress require to be given
to such a judgment outside the state of its rendition”).

‘The case law the majority cites to show the vitality of the rule
it takes from Huntington offers little true support. In one case, Wellman
v. Mead, 107 A, 396, 398 (Vt. 1919), the Vermont Supreme Court
discussed the penal exception only to decide whether Vermont courts

would entertain a suit arising under Massachusetts law. ‘The majority's

 

 
reliance on this case confuses the distinction—drawn in Milwaukee
County and discussed above—between suits to adjudicate claims arising
under another state's laws and suits to enforce final judgments rendered
by a sister state. Milwaukee County, 296 U.S. at 275-76. Another case,
Fisher v. Virginia Electric and Power Co,, 243 F. Supp. 2d 538, 543-44
(ED. Va. 2003), is dictum about dictum. Fisher cites Huntington only to
inform a discussion on which law—state or federal—determines whether
an action is local or transitory in nature (and disparages “the Huntington
fallacy” as “broad discourse” involving a “rather obvious misapprehension”
of law modernly rejected as “dictum”).

Ina third case, Schaefer v. H.B, Green Transportation Line,
232 F.2d 415, 418 (7th Cir. 1956), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
discussed the penal exception in the context of whether an Illinois law
applied extraterritorially, not whether an Ilinois judgment would be
enforced extraterritorially. In that case, the plaintiff brought suit in the
federal district court of Ilinois seeking to enforce an Illinois corporate
statute against an lowa corporation for corporate conduct that occurred in
Iowa. Id, at 417. The court held that the statute could not be applied. Id,
at 418, But it is one thing to deny extraterritorial application of a state’s
statute, and quite another to deny enforcement of a sister state judgment
embodying a civil fine imposed for erecting and maintaining billboards in
the sister state's airspace and against its zoning laws. Indeed, the
majority's fourth case, Philadelphia v. Austin, 429 A.2d 568, 572 (NJ.
1981), makes this point—and does so in the context of a local
governmental entity's suit on a sister state money judgment for a fine.
‘Thus, in Austin, the New Jersey Supreme Court enforced a Pennsylvania
judgment in favor of the City of Philadelphia for a penalty incurred for not

complying with a Philadelphia wage tax ordinance, doing so both as a

 

 
matter of full faith and credit under Milwaukee County, id, at 571, and as
a matter of comity. Id, at 572-732

Differences between the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act and the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Act,
both of which have been adopted in Nevada, provide statutory support for
recognizing the California judgment in this case. In Overmyer v, Eliot
Realty, 371 N.Y.8.2d 246, 256 (Sup. Ct. 1975), a New York court observed
that the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, which governs
enforcement of sister state judgments, does not have a penal exception, id,
at 256, while its Uniform Recognition of Foreign-Country Money
Judgments Act, which governs enforcement of international judgments,
contains an exception to recognition when the foreign country judgment is
for “penalties or taxes.” Id, From this, the Overmyer court concluded
that, as a matter of comity, a sister state civil judgment embodying a fine
or penalty will be enforced, whereas a comparable foreign country
judgment will not.

*Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224, 229 (1970), and People v. Laino, 87
P.3d 27, 33-34 (Cal. 2004), cited by the majority, involve instances where
the penal exception actually applies, ie., in assessing a sister state
criminal conviction and its consequences under the host state’s criminal
laws. See Nelson, 399 U.S. at 229 n.6 (discussing the penal exception in
connection with a habeas petition challenging a North Carolina criminal
conviction/detainer claimed to affect a California parole determination);
Laino, 87 P.3d at 37-38 (discussing the effect of an Arizona judgment of
conviction on California's three-strikes law). Of note, even in this context,
Nevada can—though it is not constitutionally required to—recognize and
attach consequences to a sister state criminal conviction. See Donlan v,
State, 127 Nev. __, 249 P.3d 1231 (2011) (California judgment of
conviction required sex offender to register in Nevada, even though the
registration requirement had expired in California, where the conviction
originated).

 

 
Our statutes contain the same differences as those in
Overmyer. Nevada's version of the Uniform Recognition of Foreign-
Country Money Judgments Act includes a section on applicability, and
provides that a foreign-country judgment for a sum of money need not be
enforced if it is for a fine or other penalty, NRS 17.740(2)(b); see Unif.
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act § 1(2), 18 U.L.A. 44 (2002);
Unif, Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act § 3(b)(2), 13
U.LA. 12 (Supp. 2010). On the other hand, our Uniform Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Act, which outlines procedures for enforcement of
sister state judgments, lacks an applicability provision, much less a penal
exception. See NRS 17.330-.400. It requires only that the sister state
judgment be filed with the clerk of court. NRS 17.350. “A judgment so
filed has the same effect ... as a judgment of a district court of this state
and may be enforced or satisfied in a like manner” and is to be treated “in
the same manner as a judgment of the district court of this state.” NRS
17.350.

For these reasons, I would enforce the City of Oakland's
judgment, even though it may embody a fine. Such a judgment might not
be internationally enforceable, but it should be enforceable when rendered

by a sister state.

Pickering

We concur:

Dag , Od.
Douglas

Nas tok, J.

Hardesty