Case Title: Commonwealth v. Trotto

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11930

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-06-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11930 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MATTEO TROTTO. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     December 2, 2020. - June 24, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Kidnapping.  Joint Enterprise.  
Evidence, Joint venturer, Hearsay, Testimony before grand 
jury, State of mind, Relevancy and materiality, Death 
certificate.  Practice, Criminal, Hearsay, Confrontation of 
witnesses, Cross-examination by prosecutor, Instructions to 
jury, Capital case.  Constitutional Law, Confrontation of 
witnesses. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 20, 2012. 
 
 
The case was tried before Richard T. Tucker, J. 
 
 
 
Robert F. Shaw, Jr., for the defendant. 
 
Ellyn H. Lazar, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In May of 2014, the defendant was convicted of 
murder in the first degree on a theory of joint venture felony-
murder, with aggravated kidnapping as the predicate felony, in 
connection with the disappearance of Kevin Harkins in Worcester 
2 
 
in February of 1994.  As the Commonwealth now concedes, the 
conviction of murder in the first degree was invalid, because at 
the time of the offense, the felony of aggravated kidnapping did 
not exist, so the defendant could have been found guilty only of 
felony-murder in the second degree.  The defendant challenges in 
this direct appeal the sufficiency of the evidence of murder in 
the second degree.  He also raises issues related to the 
substantive use of grand jury testimony after a finding that a 
witness was feigning loss of memory, certain inadmissible 
hearsay statements, and improper Bowden evidence.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-486 (1980).  In 
addition, the defendant asserts a number of other errors at 
trial, including improper cross-examination by the prosecutor 
and incorrect jury instructions.   
 
Having carefully examined the record, we affirm the 
conviction of felony-murder, and decline to exercise our 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict or to 
order a new trial.  Nonetheless, due to the issue with the 
predicate felony of aggravated kidnapping, we vacate the 
conviction of murder in the first degree and remand the matter 
to the Superior Court for entry of a verdict of guilty of murder 
in the second degree and for resentencing. 
 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts the jury could have 
found, viewing them in the light most favorable to the 
3 
 
Commonwealth and reserving certain details for later discussion.  
Commonwealth v. Salazar, 481 Mass. 105, 107 (2018). 
 
a.  The incident.  In February of 1994, the victim was 
working at a pub in Worcester and living in an apartment above 
it.  He was a frequent user of cocaine and would obtain cocaine 
from the defendant.  The defendant was close friends with John 
Fredette and Elias Samia; they referred to each other as 
"brothers."   
 
On the evening of February 15, 1994, the victim was a 
patron at the pub.  At around 10:30 P.M., a dark sedan driven by 
Fredette pulled up across the street from the pub.  The 
defendant got out of the vehicle, entered the pub, and gestured 
to the victim to come outside.  The victim did so, leaving 
behind a half-finished bottle of beer, a package of cigarettes, 
keys, and a jacket.  The victim and the defendant crossed the 
street to the sedan.  The victim started to get into the rear 
passenger's side seat, but the defendant opened the front 
passenger door; the victim got into the front seat, followed by 
the defendant, and the sedan drove off.  A fourth individual was 
sitting in the rear seat.   
 
About three and one-half hours later, at around 2 A.M. on 
February 16, 1994, now-retired Millbury police Chief Mark Moore, 
then a patrol officer, observed a dark Chevrolet Impala 
traveling northbound through Millbury on Route 146, from the 
4 
 
direction of Rhode Island, at ten miles per hour above the speed 
limit; the location where Moore first saw the sedan is about 
three miles south of Worcester and approximately thirty-six 
miles from Providence, Rhode Island.  After following the 
vehicle for a short distance, Moore decided to execute a traffic 
stop.  The vehicle was a 1985 Chevrolet Impala that was 
registered to Samia.  When Moore made the stop, Samia was 
driving, and Fredette was in the front passenger seat; the 
defendant was not in the vehicle.  After Moore asked Samia for 
his driver's license and the vehicle's registration, Samia 
provided his license but said that he did not have the 
registration with him because he recently had had the Impala 
repainted and had given the registration to his insurance 
company.   
 
When Moore requested consent to search the vehicle, Samia 
did not give a clear answer.  Moore went around to the 
passenger's side, asked Fredette to get out, and entered the 
vehicle himself to look at the inspection sticker on the 
windshield from the interior; he discovered that the sticker did 
not match the license plate.  While inside the vehicle, Moore 
smelled marijuana.  Consequently, he searched the entire 
vehicle, as well as Fredette and Samia.  The search of the 
vehicle produced a small film canister containing marijuana 
residue.  Moore then observed what he believed to be blood on 
5 
 
the front passenger seat, the floor in front of that seat, the 
driver's side door, and Fredette's clothing.  Fredette told a 
second police officer, who had joined Moore at the scene, that 
he had been punched in the face during a bar fight; there were 
no apparent injuries on Fredette's face.  Moore did not search 
the glove compartment or the trunk, because Samia stated that he 
did not have a key to open them.  Eventually, Moore allowed 
Samia and Fredette to continue on their way in the Impala, 
without issuing a traffic citation for speeding or for the 
invalid inspection sticker.  The entire stop lasted 
approximately fifty minutes. 
 
A few hours later, at around 5:30 A.M. on February 16, 
1994, James Whalen, a mechanic, received a call from the owner 
of the automobile sales, salvage, and repair shop in Charlton 
where he worked, asking him to report to work early.  Whalen 
knew Samia and the defendant and had worked on their vehicles in 
the past.  Whalen remembered working on a 1985 Chevrolet Impala 
belonging to Samia, which originally had been painted blue, but 
later was painted black.  When Whalen reached his workplace, a 
black Chevrolet Impala was parked outside the shop.  Shortly 
thereafter, the defendant arrived and told Whalen that Whalen 
had to help in getting rid of the Impala, and to "keep [his] 
mouth shut" or his "family would never be safe."   
6 
 
 
Whalen began dismantling the Impala, placing the interior 
parts in a Dumpster behind the shop.  Larger pieces were taken 
to a private garage to be cut up with a torch.  Whalen and some 
of his coworkers then discarded the pieces in various places, 
including a wooded area and a Dumpster behind a different shop.  
One passenger door was thrown into a pond behind that shop.1  
That same day, the license plate for a 1985 Chevrolet Impala 
belonging to Samia was returned to the registry of motor 
vehicles.   
 
b.  Investigation.  In March of 2002, Anthony Carlo, an 
acquaintance of the defendant, made a statement to Worcester 
police asserting that he had talked to the defendant about the 
victim's disappearance.  In 2006 and again in 2012, Carlo was 
called to testify before a grand jury about what he had heard.  
Testifying under a grant of immunity at the defendant's trial, 
Carlo said that he no longer remembered anything about the 
matters.  The prosecutor thereafter was allowed to introduce 
substantively Carlo's testimony before the second grand jury.  
Carlo had testified before that grand jury that the defendant 
told Carlo that the defendant, Fredette, and Samia had picked up 
 
1 In 2005, a dive team from the Worcester fire department 
recovered the passenger's side door of an automobile from the 
pond.  The door was identified as being consistent with that of 
a 1985 Chevrolet Impala that originally had been painted blue 
and was repainted in black.   
 
7 
 
the victim at the pub; while they were in the vehicle, a gun the 
defendant had been holding accidentally discharged, killing the 
victim and spreading blood everywhere; the three men dumped the 
victim's body at a location Carlo was not told; and the vehicle 
subsequently was destroyed. 
 
c.  Trial.  At trial, multiple witnesses, including the 
victim's sister and the mother of his daughter, testified that 
they had not seen or heard from the victim after February 15, 
1994.  A State police research analyst explained that searches 
of certain public records databases had not revealed any 
indication of the victim being active after February 1994.  The 
Commonwealth also introduced a "delayed return of death" 
certificate that had been issued in 2012; the certificate 
declared the victim to be dead as of February 15, 2001. 
 
The Commonwealth's theory of the case was that the victim 
had not cooperated in a scheme organized by the defendant to 
procure false testimony to help Fredette, who had been arrested 
in a "sting" operation in September 1993 and charged with drug 
trafficking and related offenses.  John Mayotte, the victim's 
roommate, testified that on February 11, 1994, the defendant and 
Fredette visited the victim's home.2  Mayotte overheard their 
 
 
2 Robert Beahn, who also lived above the pub, testified that 
the defendant and Fredette had visited the victim on February 
11, 1994. 
8 
 
conversation and saw the victim being given a large bag of 
cocaine.  The defendant wanted the victim to appear at 
Fredette's trial and "say that he was the informant, and that he 
had lied."  Apparently as a result of a weekend of heavy use of 
cocaine, however, the victim ultimately did not appear in court 
to testify.   
 
Several witnesses offered testimony about the victim's 
statements to the effect that, as a result of having flubbed the 
scheme to present false testimony, he now feared the defendant.  
The victim told John Mayotte, for instance, that the defendant 
and Fredette were going to "come after him."  Dawn Mayotte, John 
Mayotte's sister, who previously had dated the defendant, 
testified that the victim confided in her that he was supposed 
to "go to court and say that he had done something that he did 
not do and take the blame so that [Fredette] did not go to jail" 
and that if he did not do so the defendant "was going to kill 
him."  The Commonwealth argued that these statements, introduced 
as evidence of the victim's state of mind, showed that the 
victim would not voluntarily have entered a vehicle with the 
defendant, and thus in fact had been kidnapped at that point. 
 
The jury were played an audio-video recording of an 
interview with the defendant in July 2006, conducted by Captain 
Steven Sargent of the Worcester police department, in which the 
9 
 
defendant disavowed any involvement in or knowledge about the 
killing.  The defendant himself did not testify.   
 
The jury were instructed on murder in the first degree on 
theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-murder; they 
convicted the defendant of felony-murder.  Samia and Fredette 
were tried separately; both also were convicted.  See 
Commonwealth v. Fredette, 480 Mass. 75 (2018); Commonwealth vs. 
Samia, Mass. Super. Ct., No. 1285CR00178 (Worcester County 
Nov. 3, 2014).3 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant maintains that his 
conviction must be vacated and judgment must enter in his favor 
because the life felony which is the basis for the conviction of 
felony-murder in the first degree did not exist at the time of 
the offense, and the conviction cannot be reduced to a lesser 
degree of guilt because the evidence was insufficient to support 
a conviction of nonaggravated kidnapping.  The defendant also 
challenges certain hearsay statements by the victim; the 
substantive introduction of grand jury testimony; the 
sufficiency of the evidence that a Massachusetts court had 
jurisdiction over the offense; purportedly improper questioning 
 
 
3 Elias Samia commenced his direct appeal in this court, and 
then filed a motion for a new trial in this court, which was 
transferred to the Superior Court for decision; any appeal 
therefrom was ordered to be consolidated with his briefs on 
direct appeal, if any are filed.  That motion is pending in the 
Superior Court.  See Commonwealth vs. Samia, No. SJC-12023. 
10 
 
by the prosecutor; the introduction of a delayed return of death 
certification; and the introduction of testimony by a State 
police analyst concerning databases in which someone else had 
collected data.  The defendant also asks this court to exercise 
its authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to grant a new trial. 
 
a.  Conviction of felony-murder on the basis of a predicate 
felony that did not exist at the time of the offense.  The 
defendant contends that his conviction of murder in the first 
degree cannot stand because it is based on the felony of 
aggravated kidnapping, an offense which the Commonwealth 
concedes did not exist at the time of the victim's death.  The 
offense of aggravated kidnapping, G. L. c. 265, § 26, is 
kidnapping "while armed with a dangerous weapon and inflict[ing] 
serious bodily injury thereby."  The offense was enacted in 
1998, see G. L. c. 265, § 26, third par., inserted by St. 1998, 
c. 180, § 63, and did not exist in 1994.  See Fredette, 480 
Mass. at 87.  A conviction of murder in the first degree, based 
on a crime that did not exist when the victim was killed, would 
amount to an unconstitutional ex post facto application of the 
current law.  Id. at 87-88.   
 
The offense of kidnapping, which did exist in 1994, is a 
lesser included offense of aggravated kidnapping.  See 
Commonwealth v. Pearson, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 720, 721 n.1 (2015).  
By convicting the defendant of felony-murder with a predicate 
11 
 
felony of aggravated kidnapping, the jury necessarily concluded 
that the defendant had kidnapped the victim.  Under the language 
of G. L. c. 265, § 26, both today and as it stood in 1994, a 
conviction of kidnapping (without the intent to extort money) 
provides for a sentence of imprisonment "for not more than ten 
years."  Because kidnapping is not a felony punishable by a term 
of incarceration of up to life in prison, it can support a 
conviction of felony-murder only in the second degree.  See 
G. L. c. 265, § 1 (killing during commission of felony that is 
"punishable with death or imprisonment for life" is murder in 
first degree); Commonwealth v. Burton, 450 Mass. 55, 57 (2007).  
At a minimum, therefore, the defendant's conviction must be 
reduced to felony-murder in the second degree. 
 
b.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The defendant also 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 
conviction of felony-murder in the second degree.  As the crime 
here was committed before this court's decision in Commonwealth 
v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805 (2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 
(2018), significantly restricting those situations in which a 
defendant can be convicted of felony-murder, see id. at 826-836 
(Gants, C.J., concurring), we rely upon the previous, long-
standing standard, see Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 
503 n.12 (1982).  Under our pre-Brown standard, "[a] conviction 
of felony-murder in the second degree requires the jury to find 
12 
 
that (1) the defendant committed or attempted to commit a felony 
with a maximum sentence of less than imprisonment for life, 
(2) a killing occurred during the commission or attempted 
commission of that felony, and (3) the felony was inherently 
dangerous or the defendant acted with conscious disregard for 
the risk to human life."  Commonwealth v. Bell, 460 Mass. 294, 
308 (2011), S.C., 473 Mass. 131 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
2467 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Christian, 430 Mass. 552, 
558 (2000), overruled on another ground by Commonwealth v. 
Paulding, 438 Mass. 1 (2002). 
 
The defendant asserts that the evidence here was 
insufficient to establish that a kidnapping occurred, the 
kidnapping was committed with conscious disregard for human 
life, and the kidnapping was sufficiently connected to the 
killing.  In addition, the defendant argues that there was 
insufficient evidence to prove that the killing occurred within 
Massachusetts.  
 
We analyze the legal sufficiency of the evidence under the 
familiar Latimore standard, that is, whether, "after viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979).  
"[C]ircumstantial evidence and inferences drawn therefrom may be 
13 
 
sufficient," so long as the inferences that must be drawn are 
"reasonable and possible"; they need not be "necessary or 
inescapable."  Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 478 Mass. 725, 739 
(2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Linton, 456 Mass. 534, 544 
(2010).  A conviction, however, "may not rest on the piling of 
inference upon inference or on conjecture and speculation."  
Commonwealth v. Bin, 480 Mass. 665, 674 (2018), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 
215 and 460 Mass. 12 (2011). 
 
i.  Kidnapping.  To prove nonaggravated kidnapping, the 
Commonwealth must show that the defendant, "without lawful 
authority, forcibly or secretly confine[d] or imprison[ed] 
another person within this [C]ommonwealth against [the person's] 
will."  G. L. c. 265, § 26.  Viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence here would have 
allowed the jury to find that the defendant forcibly confined 
the victim in the Impala outside the pub, against the victim's 
will, albeit with constructive rather than actual force.   
 
The jury could have found that because the victim left 
behind his unfinished beer and a number of personal possessions, 
such as his keys, cigarettes, and a jacket (on a cold night in 
the middle of February), the victim intended to return quickly, 
and not to depart in a vehicle.  The jury also could have 
concluded based on the victim's statements that he feared the 
14 
 
defendant and Fredette, and that the victim would not 
voluntarily have entered a motor vehicle with the two of them.  
Four witnesses testified to statements the victim had made to 
them concerning his fear of what the defendant would do because 
he had not participated in the scheme to testify falsely at the 
defendant's brother's trial.  Several witnesses recalled the 
victim explaining that he was afraid the defendant would "come 
after" him or "kill" him for his failure to participate.  
Another recalled a conversation in which the victim recounted 
the defendant's threats to kill his brother's codefendant, and 
the codefendant's entire family, because the defendant viewed 
that individual as responsible for what happened to his brother.  
See part 2.c.iii, infra.  The evidence of the victim's fear 
could have allowed the jury to infer the exercise of 
"constructive force," that is, "threatening words or gestures" 
by the defendant that "operate[d] on the mind" of the victim so 
as to induce him to enter the vehicle.  See Commonwealth v. 
Caracciola, 409 Mass. 648, 652 (1991) (evidence of constructive 
force was sufficient to support convictions of robbery and rape 
as crimes of violence).  See also Commonwealth v. Boyd, 73 Mass. 
App. Ct. 190, 193 (2008) ("display of potential force" was 
sufficient to prove kidnapping).   
 
ii.  Conscious disregard of the risk to life.  Under our 
felony-murder doctrine as it stood at the time of the 
15 
 
defendant's trial, a homicide committed during the commission of 
a felony that was not punishable by death or imprisonment for 
life was felony-murder in the second degree only if the 
predicate felony either was inherently dangerous or was 
committed in circumstances that demonstrated a "conscious 
disregard of the risk to human life" on the part of the 
defendant.  Burton, 450 Mass. at 57, quoting Matchett, 386 Mass. 
at 506.  See Commonwealth v. Scott, 428 Mass. 362, 364 (1998). 
 
Here, the jury would have been warranted in finding that 
the manner in which the kidnapping occurred showed a conscious 
disregard for the risk to human life, even if the evidence did 
not compel that conclusion.  See Commonwealth v. Plunkett, 422 
Mass. 634, 639 (1996).  Although Moore testified that he found 
no gun in the Impala, according to Carlo, the defendant said 
that there had been one, which "went off accidentally while he 
was holding it," killing the victim.  There also was testimony 
that Samia carried a gun "most of the time."  From this, the 
jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant either 
was armed himself or at least knew that one of his coventurers, 
sitting in the vehicle in which he was confining the victim, was 
armed.  This would be sufficient to establish that the 
kidnapping involved a conscious disregard of the risk to human 
life.  See Commonwealth v. Benitez, 464 Mass. 686, 689–690 
(2013) (joint venture armed robbery requires only one 
16 
 
participant to be armed); Commonwealth v. Fickett, 403 Mass. 
194, 196–197 (1988) (sufficient for joint venture armed robbery 
that defendant knew coventurer had gun); Commonwealth v. Watson, 
388 Mass. 536, 544 (1983), S.C., 393 Mass. 297 (1984) (use of 
gun tends to indicate that felony "inherently involved a 
conscious disregard of risk to human life").  
 
iii.  Connection of the kidnapping to the homicide.  "For 
purposes of felony-murder, the homicide and the predicate felony 
'need only to have occurred as part of one continuous 
transaction,'" a requirement that is met when the offenses "took 
place at substantially the same time and place."  Commonwealth 
v. Morin, 478 Mass. 415, 422 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Ortiz, 408 Mass. 463, 466 (1990).  The evidence before the jury 
suggested that the victim died sometime before 2 A.M. on 
February 16, 1994.  If the jury concluded that the defendant 
intentionally participated in the underlying felony, the 
kidnapping, he became "liable for a death that 'followed 
naturally and probably from the carrying out of the joint 
enterprise,'" even if there was no initial plan to kill.  Bin, 
480 Mass. at 674, quoting Morin, supra at 421.   
 
iv.  Territorial jurisdiction.  The defendant argues that 
the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the offense charged was committed by the 
defendant in Massachusetts, or even that the victim was killed 
17 
 
in Massachusetts.  He contends that the only evidence of 
location introduced at trial involved the victim leaving the pub 
and getting into the Impala, which was driven away.  The stop of 
Samia's vehicle on Route 146 approximately four hours later did 
not involve the defendant, who was not in the vehicle.  Based on 
its northward direction of travel, however, the officer who 
conducted the stop suspected that the vehicle was coming from 
Rhode Island, approximately seventeen miles away, and requested 
a "be on the lookout for" alert in Rhode Island.  This 
suspicion, based on no actual evidence of ties to other States, 
is the entire underpinning of the defendant's jurisdictional 
claims. 
 
"It is elementary that it must be shown that jurisdiction 
lodged in the courts of Massachusetts before the defendant can 
be found guilty of the offence charged."  Commonwealth v. Hall, 
485 Mass. 145, 153 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Combs, 480 
Mass. 55, 60 (2018).  See Commonwealth v. Fleming, 360 Mass. 
404, 406 (1971).  "The general rule, accepted as 'axiomatic' by 
the courts in this country, is that a State may not prosecute an 
individual for a crime committed outside its boundaries."  
Vasquez, petitioner, 428 Mass. 842, 848 (1999).  Thus, where 
"there is a genuine factual dispute about whether a crime was 
committed in Massachusetts, 'that issue is to be submitted to 
the jury in the form of an instruction.'"  Hall, supra, quoting 
18 
 
Combs, supra at 61.  "Where territorial jurisdiction is a 
triable issue, the Commonwealth's burden of proof is the same as 
it is for the substantive elements of the crime(s) charged, that 
being proof beyond a reasonable doubt."  Hall, supra, quoting 
Combs, supra.  "Merely because the defendant raised the issue of 
jurisdiction does not automatically entitle him [or her] to have 
the issue submitted to the jury."  Commonwealth v. Adelson, 40 
Mass. App. Ct. 585, 589 (1996).  "[N]o jurisdictional 
instruction is required where the evidence makes it neither 
reasonable nor possible to assume that the victim was not killed 
or injured in Massachusetts."  Hall, supra, citing Combs, supra.  
See Commonwealth v. Jaynes, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 301, 308-310 
(2002). 
 
Here, the defendant points out, the judge instructed the 
jury on the need to find that the kidnapping took place in 
Massachusetts, as required under the statute, but gave no 
comparable instruction with respect to a determination where the 
killing took place.  Nonetheless, we discern no error.  Nothing 
in the record remotely suggested that the crime happened outside 
Massachusetts.  The victim, the defendant, and his coventurers 
lived and worked in Massachusetts and had known each other since 
childhood.  According to testimony from multiple witnesses, the 
defendant and his coventurers were well known in the pub where 
the victim left his belongings.  The detailed testimony about 
19 
 
the dismantling and disbursement of the Impala by one of the 
defendant's acquaintances suggested a pattern of scattering 
objects to be dumped in woods near the airport in Worcester, in 
local ponds, and in Dumpsters behind local businesses; indeed, 
Whalen described the locations he thought were best and 
explained a prior scattering where the same woods had been used.  
Nothing in the evidence suggests that the defendant and his 
coventurers decided to drive almost an hour south across State 
lines with either a prisoner or a body in their vehicle, and 
then return north again.  Given the lack of any events in or any 
affirmative connection to Rhode Island, it was a "reasonable and 
possible" inference for the jury to make that the crime occurred 
within Massachusetts.  See Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 366 Mass. 
18, 29-30 (1974).  See also Jaynes, 55 Mass. App. Ct. at 308–309 
(no jurisdictional instruction was required where 
"circumstantial evidence pointed to Massachusetts as the site of 
the murder," even though body was discovered in Maine).  
 
c.  Evidentiary issues.  The defendant raises a number of 
issues with the judge's evidentiary rulings.  The defendant 
challenges the introduction of evidence from the traffic stop in 
Millbury, Carlo's grand jury testimony and statements to police, 
certain hearsay statements relating to the victim's state of 
mind, the delayed return of the death certificate, and the 
testimony of a police research analyst about database searches.  
20 
 
 
i.  Statements made during the traffic stop.  The defendant 
argues that statements Samia and Fredette made to Moore and 
another Millbury police officer, Sergeant Webb, during the 
traffic stop at approximately 2 A.M. on February 16, 1994, 
should not have been admitted.4  Because the defendant objected 
to the admission of Moore's testimony, we review for prejudicial 
error.  See Commonwealth v. Murungu, 450 Mass. 441, 448 (2008).  
The statements were introduced, over the defendant's objection, 
under the joint venture exception to the hearsay rule.  This 
exception "derives from an analogy between a criminal venture 
and a lawful partnership," Commonwealth v. Bright, 463 Mass. 
421, 426 (2012), such that "the statement of each joint venturer 
is equivalent to a statement by the defendant," Commonwealth v. 
Stewart, 454 Mass. 527, 535 (2009).  To introduce such 
statements, the Commonwealth must show by a preponderance of the 
 
 
4 The jury also heard a recording from a "turret tape," 
consisting of condensed portions of conversations between Moore, 
Webb, and the dispatcher during the traffic stop.  The defendant 
challenges the introduction of this evidence on appeal, arguing 
that it was an out-of-court statement offered for its truth.  As 
he did not object at trial, we review for a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 296 (2002).  Even if the tape should 
not have been introduced, there was no substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice.  The recorded statements were largely 
cumulative of testimony by Moore; in addition, although they may 
have learned that Samia had been speeding, the jury heard that 
both Samia and Fredette were duly licensed and had no 
outstanding arrest warrants and that one was licensed to carry 
mace. 
21 
 
evidence "that a joint venture existed between the declarant and 
the defendant, and that the statement was made in furtherance of 
the joint venture, while the joint venture was ongoing."  
Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 460 (2019).  A 
determination that a joint venture existed is reviewed for abuse 
of discretion.  Commonwealth v. Winquist, 474 Mass. 517, 521 
(2016). 
 
At trial, the judge allowed the prosecutor to introduce 
statements by Fredette and Samia after the Commonwealth 
established that the Impala in which they were stopped was the 
same vehicle, belonging to Samia, that the defendant ordered 
destroyed a few hours later.  The jury heard sufficient evidence 
from which they could have found that a criminal joint venture 
had existed between Samia, Fredette, and the defendant when the 
victim got into Samia's Impala, and that the venture was still 
underway at the time of the traffic stop.   
 
The defendant's role in the kidnapping prior to the stop, 
and in the destruction of the vehicle after the stop, provided 
sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found that a 
joint venture existed.  At that point, the participants' 
interests remained "closely bound together" and had not been 
replaced by motives of individual self-preservation.  See 
Wardsworth, 482 Mass. at 460, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Mavredakis, 430 Mass. 848, 863 (2000).  "It is of no consequence 
22 
 
that the defendant was not present [when] the contested 
statements were made."  Bright, 463 Mass. at 437.   
 
The jury also could have found that the statements to Moore 
and Webb by Samia and Fredette during the traffic stop were in 
furtherance of the joint venture because they were designed to 
keep the police from discovering that a crime had been 
committed.  Statements made in an attempt "to avoid detection 
and detention" are admissible against all joint venturers.  
Mavredakis, 430 Mass. at 863, quoting Commonwealth v. Colon–
Cruz, 408 Mass. 533, 545 (1990) (statements made by coventurers 
to police were allowed to be introduced at trial).  See 
Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 39 (2017) (threats to third 
party by defendant's coventurer were admissible as efforts to 
conceal crime).  Therefore, there was no abuse of discretion in 
allowing the introduction of Moore's testimony about the 
statements by Samia and Fredette during the traffic stop. 
 
The defendant also argues that his rights under the 
confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights were violated because Fredette and Samia did not 
testify at his trial.  "The confrontation clause bars the 
admission of testimonial hearsay by a declarant who does not 
appear at trial, unless the declarant is unavailable to testify 
as a matter of law and the defendant had an earlier opportunity 
23 
 
to cross-examine him or her."  Commonwealth v. McGann, 484 Mass. 
312, 316 (2020).  Statements of joint venturers, however, 
generally are not testimonial and thus are not barred.5  See 
Winquist, 474 Mass. at 521 n.6; Commonwealth v. Carriere, 470 
Mass. 1, 9 (2014).  See also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36, 56 (2004) ("Most of the hearsay exceptions covered 
statements that by their nature were not testimonial -- for 
example, . . . statements in furtherance of a conspiracy").  
Although Fredette and Samia did make certain statements to Moore 
and Webb, at that time neither officer was aware of, or 
investigating, the victim's death.  While Moore found marijuana, 
a container of Mace, an inspection sticker that did not match 
the vehicle, and apparent blood on the floors, doors, and other 
areas, he ultimately allowed Samia and Fredette to leave in 
their vehicle, and without a traffic citation.  The questions 
concerning what appeared to be a routine traffic stop were quite 
different from the type of "formal station-house interrogation" 
designed to establish facts relevant to a particular offense and 
to persuade, overbear, or bring pressure to a suspect's decision 
 
 
5 In Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 464–465 
(2019), we held that statements made to police by a defendant's 
coventurer were testimonial.  There, however, the joint venture 
already had concluded.  Had the joint venture been ongoing, the 
statements might have "avoid[ed] scrutiny under the Sixth 
Amendment by virtue of having been made by a coventurer."  Id. 
at 465 n.19.  See Commonwealth v. Brown, 474 Mass. 576, 588 
(2016).   
24 
 
not to speak.  See Commonwealth v. Middlemiss, 465 Mass. 627, 
636 (2013), quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 366 
(2011).  The defendant's confrontation rights were not violated. 
 
ii.  Carlo's statements.  The defendant challenges the 
substantive use of Carlo's grand jury testimony, and the 
testimony about Carlo's statements from Sargent.  The latter was 
introduced as part of the Commonwealth's response to a Bowden 
defense.6  Since both Carlo's and Sargent's testimony were 
objected to at trial, we review for prejudicial error, i.e., an 
error that had more than a "very slight effect" on the jury 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Lester, 486 Mass. 239, 247 
(2020).   
 
A.  Substantive use of grand jury testimony.  In March of 
2002, Carlo gave a statement to Worcester police in which he 
claimed that the defendant had talked to him about the 
circumstances of the victim's disappearance.  In 2006, Officer 
Timothy O'Connor of the Worcester police department contacted 
 
 
6 A Bowden defense is an argument that the police failed 
adequately to investigate a crime, so as to raise a reasonable 
doubt with respect the defendant's guilt.  Commonwealth v. 
Colon, 482 Mass. 162, 186 (2019).  See Commonwealth v. Bowden, 
379 Mass. 472, 486 (1980).  The prosecution may respond to such 
a defense by introducing evidence that otherwise would be 
inadmissible hearsay, on the ground that the statements are not 
being offered for the truth of the matter, but rather to 
establish the adequacy of the police investigation.  See Colon, 
supra at 186-187.   
 
25 
 
Carlo to discuss the statement he made in 2002.  Carlo 
ultimately appeared twice before a grand jury, first in 2006 and 
then in 2012.  In the 2006 proceeding, he exercised his right to 
remain silent, but in 2012 he answered questions to some degree 
affirming what he said in 2002.   
 
When Carlo was first called to the stand at trial, he 
claimed not to remember any conversations he had had with the 
defendant about the victim.  He said that he suffered from 
memory loss as a result of health problems.  The prosecutor 
immediately impeached Carlo using his 2012 grand jury testimony, 
allowing the jury to hear its key points, including that a gun 
had gone off in the Impala and that the victim's body had been 
dumped.  See G. L. c. 233, § 23; Mass. G. Evid. § 607 (2021) 
(party may impeach its own witness).  
 
Thereafter, the judge conducted a voir dire at which 
O'Connor testified to his conversation with Carlo in 2006.  
O'Connor said that Carlo told him at that time that he did not 
wish to cooperate any further with the police because his 
earlier statement, while true, had been made in the belief that 
it would keep him from going to jail on an unrelated drug 
charge -- a plan that went unrealized.  Carlo told O'Connor, 
"I'm not getting involved anymore, and if they try to call me to 
testify, I'm going to get amnesia."  In a follow-up telephone 
call with O'Connor, Carlo similarly told him:  "I'm done 
26 
 
talking, and if you make me come in, I will make a better 
witness for the defense than for the prosecution." 
 
After the voir dire, the judge ruled that the Commonwealth 
could introduce the grand jury testimony substantively, and the 
Commonwealth did so when Carlo again took the stand.  Carlo's 
grand jury testimony provided the Commonwealth's only direct 
evidence relating to the victim's death by gunshot in the 
vehicle and the fate of his body; there was no other evidence 
that the defendant, who was not present for the traffic stop, 
was in the vehicle when the victim was killed.  
 
We allow the probative use of a prior statement by a 
witness who testifies at trial when the prior statement is 
inconsistent with the witness's in-court testimony, was made 
under oath (including before a grand jury), was not coerced, and 
was "more than mere confirmations or denials of statements made  
by the interrogator."  See Commonwealth v. DePina, 476 Mass. 
614, 621 (2017), citing Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 466 Mass. 
742, 756, cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1125 (2014).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 75 (1984); Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 801(d)(1).  A prior statement is inconsistent with testimony 
in the court room when the witness on the stand claims not to 
remember the underlying matter and the judge determines that 
this lack of memory is feigned.  See DePina, supra at 614; 
Commonwealth v. Sineiro, 432 Mass. 735, 742 (2000).  A judge's 
27 
 
determination on these issues "is conclusive as long as it is 
supported by the evidence."  Maldonado, supra, quoting Sineiro, 
supra at 742 n.6.   
 
Here, the judge made the required findings, which were 
supported by the evidence, notably by Carlo's statement that he 
would "get amnesia."  The judge was not required to credit 
Carlo's claim that he was coerced at the 2012 proceeding, see 
DePina, 476 Mass. at 622, nor does our own review of the 
transcripts lead us to disagree.  The judge also allowed the 
Commonwealth to use the substance of statements from the grand 
jury testimony that were in Carlo's own words, as opposed to 
other responses that were mere affirmative answers to leading 
questions.  Although the Commonwealth did, over the defense's 
objection, read a few exchanges from the grand jury transcript 
in which Carlo merely agreed to leading questions, the questions 
were comprised of quotations from Carlo's 2002 statement.  In 
other words, the prosecutor at the grand jury was leading Carlo 
to adopt his own earlier statements, rather than encouraging him 
to assent to the prosecutor's version of events.  We discern no 
error in the substantive use of the grand jury testimony.  
 
B.  Sargent's testimony.  The Commonwealth initially called 
Sargent to testify about his 2006 interview with the defendant; 
on cross-examination, defense counsel asked him about lost 
identification photographs.  After the defendant had solicited 
28 
 
this Bowden evidence, on redirect examination, the prosecutor 
elicited testimony from Sargent about Carlo's 2002 statement.  
The judge allowed Sargent's testimony to be introduced in 
response to the defendant's Bowden defense.  Sargent largely 
reiterated information that the jury already had heard from 
Carlo.  Sargent did present at least one new point, namely that 
Carlo had claimed to have heard from the defendant that when 
Moore executed the traffic stop in Millbury, Fredette "threw the 
key in the air vent" because Samia and Fredette both "thought 
they were going to get arrested, and they didn't get arrested, 
and how lucky they were that they didn't get arrested."  Sargent 
also testified to Carlo's 2006 conversation with O'Connor, 
including Carlo's statement that he would "get amnesia" if he 
were called to testify at trial. 
 
The theory of the defense was that the police investigation 
had been inadequate, in particular with respect to two witnesses 
(both dead by the time of trial) who might have given police 
alternative accounts of the victim's departure from the pub, had 
police followed up investigating their statements near in time 
to when they were made.  In addition, in closing, defense 
counsel asked, "Has the police department thoroughly 
investigated this?  I suggest to you they did not. . . .  They 
got holes in their case.  They never investigated it.  They 
never followed through.  Ladies and gentlemen, that is not proof 
29 
 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  That is not good police work.  That 
is not a thorough investigation."  In his final charge, the 
judge instructed that the jurors could consider omissions in the 
investigation as factors tending to create reasonable doubt.   
 
A "Bowden defense is clearly a two-edged sword:  the more 
wide-ranging the defendant's attack on the police investigation, 
the broader the Commonwealth's response may be."  Commonwealth 
v. Avila, 454 Mass. 744, 754–755 (2009).  We have stressed "the 
need to use caution in assessing the scope of a rebuttal," 
because even a broad Bowden defense should "not mean that the 
case becomes devoid of evidentiary constraint."  Id. at 756 
n.12.  Here, the fact that the police had been in possession of 
Carlo's statement in 2002 was admissible to explain why they 
focused their investigation exclusively on the defendant and his 
associates rather than pursuing alternative theories.  At the 
same time, the testimony elicited from Sargent exceeded the 
bounds of what was permissible to establish the adequacy of the 
police investigation; it allowed the jury to hear at least one 
possibly relevant new fact (the key thrown in the vent), as well 
as Carlo's statement to O'Connor that he would "get amnesia," 
which could have affected the jury's assessment of Carlo's 
credibility.  
 
The introduction of Sargent's testimony therefore was 
error, but the judge was not asked to, nor did he sua sponte, 
30 
 
provide a limiting instruction, either contemporaneously or in 
his final charge, that might have helped to mitigate the error 
by explaining to the jury that they could not consider Sargent's 
testimony for the truth of what he said.  Cf. Avila, 454 Mass. 
at 755-756 (in response to Bowden defense, judge "repeatedly 
instructed the jury that the investigators' testimony . . . was 
presented to enable the jury to evaluate the police").  We 
nonetheless are "confident that, if the error had not been made, 
the jury verdict would have been the same."  See Commonwealth v. 
Lodge, 431 Mass. 461, 468 (2000) (improper response to Bowden 
defense was not prejudicial); Commonwealth v. Raymond, 424 Mass. 
382, 388 (1997), S.C., 450 Mass. 729 (2008) (jury's 
consideration of improperly admitted hearsay did not create 
substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice).  Almost all 
the information Sargent conveyed was cumulative; the new detail 
about the key in the vent was helpful to the Commonwealth's case 
in chief, but not critical.  Inasmuch as all of Sargent's 
testimony avowedly was based on statements by Carlo, who had 
testified immediately before Sergeant, the jury were well 
positioned to evaluate its ultimate reliability. 
 
iii.  Introduction of the victim's statements.  The 
defendant challenges the introduction of testimony by four 
witnesses concerning statements made by the victim.  The 
statements were introduced to show the victim's state of mind, 
31 
 
namely that he feared the defendant, such that the victim would 
not have entered the vehicle with him outside the pub on the 
night of February 15 of his own free will (and thus was 
kidnapped).  The defense objected to all these statements. 
 
First, Robert Beahn, who was one of Fredette's customers 
and was arrested along with Fredette in the September 1993 drug 
trafficking sting, testified that the victim later told him that 
the defendant blamed Beahn for what happened to Fredette, and 
that the defendant planned to kill Beahn and then "take care of 
[his] family."  Second, John Mayotte testified that the victim 
told him on two occasions that he was "scared" and "afraid" that 
the defendant and Fredette would "come after him" for failing to 
participate in the false testimony scheme.  Third, Dawn Mayotte 
testified that the victim confided in her that he was supposed 
to "go to court and say that he had done something that he did 
not do and take the blame so that [the defendant's] brother did 
not go to jail" and that "otherwise [the defendant] was going to 
kill him."  Finally, Daniel Kachadoorian, the manager of the 
pub, testified that he had heard from the victim a different 
version of the scheme to help Fredette, according to which the 
defendant wanted the victim to pay a $50,000 bribe to a police 
officer with whom the victim was friendly, so that the officer 
would change his testimony. 
32 
 
 
Evidence of a victim's state of mind is admissible where 
that state of mind is relevant to an essential element of the 
crime charged.  See Commonwealth v. Cheremond, 461 Mass. 397, 
408–409 (2012) (evidence of murder victim's state of mind was 
admissible to prove absence of consent as element of rape); 
Mass. G. Evid. § 803(3)(B)(i) ("Statements of a person as to his 
or her present friendliness, hostility, intent, knowledge, fear, 
or other mental condition are admissible to prove such mental 
condition").  See also Gilbert, 366 Mass. at 27.  We also have 
emphasized that "a judge must exercise discretion and balance 
the probative value of such evidence against the prejudicial 
impact it may have on the defendant's case."7  Commonwealth v. 
Magraw, 426 Mass. 589, 595 (1998).  If admitted, the evidence 
"may only be used to prove [the victim's] state of mind, and not 
to prove the truth of what was stated or that a defendant 
harbored certain thoughts or acted in a certain way."  Id. at 
 
 
7 In Commonwealth v. Magraw, 426 Mass. 589, 593–594, 600 
(1998), we required that a defendant "open the door" to such 
evidence, for instance "by claiming that the death was a suicide 
or a result of self-defense, that the victim would voluntarily 
meet with or go someplace with the defendant, or that the 
defendant was on friendly terms with the victim."  See 
Commonwealth v. Keown, 478 Mass. 232, 246 (2017), cert. denied, 
138 S. Ct. 1038 (2018) (defendant's argument that victim tried 
to commit suicide opened door to introduction of victim's 
statements and Internet browsing history).  This analysis, 
however, is not necessary where the evidence of the victim's 
state of mind goes to an essential element of a crime that the 
Commonwealth must prove.  See Commonwealth v. Cheremond, 461 
Mass. 397, 408 n.3 (2012). 
33 
 
594-595.  See Commonwealth v. Qualls, 425 Mass. 163, 169 (1997), 
S.C., 440 Mass. 576 (2003) ("A murder victim's statement that he 
feared the defendant . . . sheds no light on whether the 
defendant had a motive to kill him . . ."). 
 
Here, the Commonwealth had the burden of proving that the 
defendant had confined the victim "against his will," G. L. 
c. 265, § 26, in order to establish kidnapping as the predicate 
offense for felony-murder.  All the challenged hearsay 
statements by the victim were directly or indirectly relevant to 
the voluntariness of his entry into the Impala with the 
defendant, and thus relevant to an essential element of the 
crime of kidnapping.   
 
To the extent that the statements suggested that the 
defendant was the kind of person who would kill or "come after" 
people, the victim's statements also were highly prejudicial to 
the defendant.  Beahn's testimony, for instance, indeed was 
relevant to the defendant's state of mind in so far as it 
suggested that the victim knew the defendant was a person who 
would kill.  The jury also could have considered the statements 
not merely as evidence for the victim's state of mind, but also 
as corroborating the false testimony scheme that the prosecutor 
presented as explaining the defendant's motive to kill the 
victim.   
34 
 
 
Immediately after the testimony by Beahn and John Mayotte, 
the judge gave a limiting instruction to the effect that the 
hearsay statements could be considered only with respect to the 
victim's state of mind in entering Samia's vehicle outside the 
pub, and whether this entry was voluntary, and not for the 
defendant's character or propensity to commit violence.  The 
judge repeated a condensed version of this instruction after 
Dawn Mayotte's testimony, and gave no instruction after 
Kachadoorian's.  In his final charge, the judge also instructed 
on the proper use of statements attributed to the victim that 
"may have included references to alleged drug dealing or other 
bad acts" by the defendant. 
 
It is incumbent on judges to "weigh the probative value of 
the evidence and the risk of unfair prejudice, and [to] 
determine whether the balance favors admission."  Commonwealth 
v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 479 n.15 (2010).  The question here 
is a close one.  The testimony elicited went beyond what was 
necessary to show that the victim feared the defendant, and the 
limiting instructions could have been more forceful.  On the 
other hand, we ordinarily presume that such instructions are 
understood by the jury and "render[] any potentially prejudicial 
evidence harmless."  See Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 
251 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 Mass. 710, 718 
(2000).  Given what the Commonwealth was required to prove to 
35 
 
establish the crime of kidnapping, we cannot say that the 
judge's decision to allow introduction of the testimony, 
mitigated by limiting instructions, was an abuse of discretion. 
 
iv.  Delayed return of death certificate.  The defendant 
argues that his confrontation rights were violated by the 
introduction of a "Delayed Return of Death" certificate for the 
victim.  The document in question is a certified copy, signed by 
the Worcester city clerk, of a certificate signed by the same 
clerk.  Both the certificate and the copy are dated February 15, 
2012; in the blank space to be filled in under "Name and Address 
of Certifying Physician or Medical Examiner" is a reference to a 
docket of the Worcester Division of the Probate and Family Court 
Department with a date of February 29, 2008.  Under "Date of 
Death," the certificate states, "as of February 15, 2001."  The 
record does not disclose anything about the circumstances of the 
certificate being issued or the probate proceeding that it 
references. 
 
The Commonwealth offered the certificate under G. L. c. 46, 
§ 19, which provides, in pertinent part, that a "record of the 
town clerk relative to a birth, marriage or death shall be prima 
facie evidence of the facts recorded."  The key question here, 
however, is whether the underlying certificate was "testimonial" 
in nature so as to implicate the defendant's rights to 
confrontation under the Sixth Amendment and art. 12.  
36 
 
 
"[T]he touchstone of the confrontation clause analysis is 
whether the primary purpose of a declarant's out-of-court 
statement is . . . to 'prove past events potentially relevant to 
later criminal prosecution.'"  Middlemiss, 465 Mass. at 634, 
quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. at 366.  Accordingly, "public records 
are generally admissible absent confrontation," as they are 
created for routine administrative reasons and "not for the 
purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial."  
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009).  
Although death certificates are routinely produced for all 
deaths under G. L. c. 46, § 9, we have held that a death 
certificate stating the cause of death to be a gunshot wound to 
the head was testimonial.  Commonwealth v. Carr, 464 Mass. 855, 
875-876 (2013).  We reasoned that "[i]n circumstances where a 
victim has undoubtedly died an unnatural death, a medical 
examiner who makes a statement regarding the cause of a victim's 
death could reasonably anticipate that such statement would 
likely be used in a criminal trial."  Id. at 876.  
 
The certificate challenged here is different from the one 
at issue in Carr, in that it contains no information about the 
specific circumstances of the victim's death.  Death 
certificates with the cause of death redacted have been held to 
be admissible in murder trials in the Commonwealth.  See 
Commonwealth v. Almonte, 465 Mass. 224, 242 (2013).  
37 
 
Nonetheless, the certificate offered in this instance must be 
treated as testimonial.  The document signed by the clerk was a 
"solemn declaration" that "did not simply attest to the 
existence and authenticity of records," but rather made "a 
factual representation" that the defendant was dead.  See 
Commonwealth v. Parenteau, 460 Mass. 1, 8 (2011) (certificate 
from registry of motor vehicles attesting that notice of 
revocation of license suspension had been mailed to defendant 
was testimonial).  Even assuming that the Probate and Family 
Court docket on which the clerk relied was not testimonial, the 
clerk clearly interpreted a Probate and Family Court judge's 
findings in order to create a new piece of evidence.  See 
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 322–323 (confrontation clause is 
implicated where clerk goes beyond merely "authenticat[ing] or 
provid[ing] a copy of an otherwise admissible record" to offer 
"interpretation of what the record contains or shows" or 
otherwise to "create a record for the sole purpose of providing 
evidence against a defendant" [citation omitted]).   
 
Moreover, the fact that the original and the copy were 
issued on the same date strongly suggests that the certificate 
was deliberately created "for use at the defendant's trial as 
prima facie evidence [of] an essential element of the charged 
crime that the Commonwealth was required to prove."  See 
Parenteau, 460 Mass. at 8 (noting that certificate was issued by 
38 
 
registrar after criminal complaint issued).  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Zeininger, 459 Mass. 775, 788, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 967 (2011) 
(certificate that breathalyzer machine was functioning normally 
was not testimonial because technician conducting test had no 
"particular prosecutorial use in mind" [citation omitted]). 
 
Where, as here, a defendant objects to evidence that was 
admitted in violation of his or her constitutional rights, we 
review "to determine whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt" (citation omitted).  Wardsworth, 482 Mass. at 458.  We 
conclude that the introduction of the certificate was harmless 
error.  The certificate stated simply that the victim was dead 
"as of February 15, 2001," seven years after the date of his 
disappearance, and included no other information that 
corroborated the Commonwealth's case or implicated the defendant 
specifically.  Although the victim's body has never been found, 
the circumstantial evidence of his death at trial was strong.  
Friends and relatives testified uniformly that they had not seen 
or heard from the victim after February 15, 1994, and the 
victim's name appeared in no public databases.  Taken together, 
a "sudden disappearance," bloodstains, and "a suspect's apparent 
attempts . . . to conceal the victim's disappearance, or 
evidence of the crime," are circumstantial evidence of an 
unlawful killing.  State v. Edwards, 278 Neb. 55, 67–68 (2009).  
See Commonwealth v. Nadworny, 396 Mass. 342, 354 (1985), cert. 
39 
 
denied, 477 U.S. 904 (1986).  The Commonwealth thus did not (and 
did not need to) rely on the certificate; to the contrary, the 
prosecutor concluded his closing argument by practically 
disavowing it, stating that "it's not a piece of paper that 
shows you that Kevin Harkins was killed that night.  It is all 
the other evidence." 
 
The defendant also protests on appeal that the certificate 
was not provided to the defense in advance of trial.  The 
disclosure of the document was required by our broad automatic 
discovery provisions for criminal trials.  Mass. R. Crim. P. 
14 (a) (1) (A) (vii), as amended, 444 Mass. 1501 (2005) 
(mandatory discovery for the defendant of "all intended 
exhibits").  See Commonwealth v. Frith, 458 Mass. 434, 439-440 
(2010).  Defense counsel claimed at trial that he had "never 
been given a copy," but did not request a continuance.  Treating 
the objection as preserved, for the same reasons given above we 
conclude that there was no prejudice to the defendant. 
 
v.  Research analyst testimony.  The defendant raises 
similar challenges, based on the confrontation clause, with 
respect to the testimony of the State police research analyst.  
The analyst testified that her agency was contacted by police to 
obtain information about the victim.  She then described the 
results of searches using two databases that contain nationwide 
records from cellular telephone subscriptions, utilities, and 
40 
 
credit reports; in a database of people who had formed 
corporations in Massachusetts; and in a nationwide insurance 
claims database.  The analyst testified that none of the 
searches revealed any activity by the victim after 1994, and 
that in one instance the search results listed the defendant as 
deceased.  No documentary evidence of the search results was 
proffered. 
 
The analyst's testimony was at best ambiguous as to whether 
she personally had performed the searches in question.  She 
stated initially, "I ran public records databases" for the 
police, but when questioned as to whether she had searched a 
particular database, she responded, "Someone in my agency did."  
Even if the analyst had performed all the searches herself, 
however, her statements nonetheless would be inadmissible 
hearsay.  Information from a database stored on a computer is 
hearsay inasmuch as the database "merely store[s] or maintain[s] 
the statements and assertions of a human being" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Royal, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 168, 171-172 
(2016) (officer's testimony about results of computer search for 
status of defendant's driver's license was hearsay).  In 
Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 478 Mass. 369, 376-378 (2017), we thus 
determined that testimony by a State police trooper about the 
results of a search in a national deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
database was inadmissible, because no one responsible for 
41 
 
creating the database testified and was subject to cross-
examination.  See Commonwealth v. Tassone, 468 Mass. 391, 399-
400 (2014) (Massachusetts common law affords defendants 
"meaningful opportunity" to cross-examine prosecution expert 
about reliability of underlying facts or data).   
 
Here, the prosecutor made no effort to establish that the 
research analyst, who did not testify as an expert, had personal 
knowledge of how the databases that she consulted were created 
and maintained.  Apparently conceding that the analyst's 
statements were hearsay, the prosecutor argued successfully at 
trial that the evidence of the database searches was admissible 
as a response to a Bowden argument.  The Commonwealth renews 
this argument on appeal, pointing to assertions in trial 
counsel's opening statement to the effect that the Commonwealth 
had "not proven a death."  We disagree with this argument.  
General claims that the prosecution has not proved all of the 
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt are not the same 
as claims "that certain tests were not conducted or certain 
police procedures not followed."  Bowden, 379 Mass. at 486.  For 
a defendant to rely on the presumption of innocence should not 
render the trial "devoid of evidentiary constraint."  Avila, 454 
Mass. at 756 n.12.  Because the analyst's statements were not 
relevant to any real Bowden defense, they were inadmissible 
hearsay.   
42 
 
 
The hearsay in the analyst's testimony, however, 
additionally was testimonial, thus implicating the defendant's 
constitutional rights under the confrontation clause.  Searches 
undertaken by law enforcement employees in response to police 
requests obviously have a primary purpose of "prov[ing] past 
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution" 
(citation omitted).  Middlemiss, 465 Mass. at 634.  To permit 
the resulting testimonial statements "to enter into evidence 
through the in-court testimony of a second person" violates the 
confrontation clause.  Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 
658 (2011).  See Sullivan, 478 Mass. at 377-378 (testimony about 
DNA database match was testimonial hearsay "without proper 
foundation to establish personal knowledge"). 
 
Although the admission of the analyst's testimony was 
constitutional error, as with the introduction of the delayed 
return of death certificate, we conclude that it was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  There was significant other evidence 
of the victim's death.  Moreover, the jury were unlikely to have 
found the analyst's testimony very persuasive; defense counsel 
effectively brought out on cross-examination that the searches 
the analyst described would have been unlikely to uncover 
activity by the victim if he were alive under an assumed 
identity. 
43 
 
 
d.  Other issues.  i.  Prosecutor's cross-examination of 
several witnesses.  The defendant objects to questions the 
prosecutor posed during cross-examination of two defense 
witnesses, Robert Couture and Thomas Daly, both Worcester police 
detectives who had been involved in 1998 in an investigation 
into the disappearance of the victim.  The defendant called 
these witnesses to show that they had taken statements from 
other witnesses who gave alternative accounts of the victim's 
departure from the pub in 1994, and that there was no follow up 
on these statements.  On cross-examination, the prosecutor 
sought to emphasize that Couture and Daly had no memory of the 
investigation, which they had not been directing; did not have 
any information as to the credibility of the witnesses; and were 
not in a position to explain why some leads had been followed 
and others not.  The defendant points, for instance, to a series 
of questions that the prosecutor put to Couture: 
Q.:  "And you don't know if [the witness] was on crack 
cocaine at the time?" 
 
A.:  "I have no idea." 
 
Q.:  "You don't know if he was really in the bar at that 
time?" 
 
A.:  "No, I don't." 
 
Q.:  "You don't know if he was [the defendant's] best 
friend?" 
 
A.:  "No, I don't." 
 
44 
 
Q.:  "You don't know if he hated [the victim]?" 
 
A.:  "No, I don't." 
 
Q.:  "You don't know if he was buying a brand new car from 
John Fredette?" 
 
A.:  "No, I don't." 
 
Q.:  "You don't know if he was getting a million dollars 
from Elias Samia?" 
 
A.:  "No, I don't." 
 
Q.:  "You don't know what motive he would have had to say 
anything?" 
 
A.:  "No, I don't." 
 
The prosecutor asked Couture a similar series of questions 
concerning a different witness. 
 
A prosecutor may not "communicate impressions by innuendo 
through questions which are answered in the negative," nor may a 
prosecutor cross-examine a witness "in bad faith or without 
foundation."  Commonwealth v. Fordham, 417 Mass. 10, 20–21 
(1994), quoting Commonwealth v. White, 367 Mass. 280, 284, 285 
(1975).  Here, the prosecutor's questions could be viewed as 
improperly suggesting that there was some factual basis for 
thinking that the witnesses were biased, or that the defendant 
and his coventurers had bribed them to give false statements.  
Because trial counsel did not object, however, we review for a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 296 (2002).  The tone 
45 
 
of the prosecutor's questions appears to have been facetious and 
unlikely to suggest to the jury that the prosecutor expected 
them to believe what he was saying.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Wynter, 
55 Mass. App. Ct. 337, 339 (2002) (improper to use leading 
questions on cross-examination of defendant as main vehicle to 
present prosecution's theory of motive).  Taking the cross-
examination as a whole, the prosecutor's strategy clearly was to 
undermine the value of Couture's and Daly's testimony about the 
investigation.  The judge properly instructed the jury both 
contemporaneously after Couture's testimony and in his final 
charge that questions by counsel are not evidence.  We conclude 
that there was no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice created by the questions.   
 
ii.  Jury instructions.  The defendant maintains that the 
judge erred in instructing the jury that to convict the 
defendant of felony-murder in the second degree they were 
required to find that the "underlying felony was inherently 
dangerous or the defendant acted with a conscious disregard for 
the risk to human life."  The first alternative should not have 
been included, as the question whether a felony is inherently 
dangerous is a question of law for the judge, not the jury.  See 
Commonwealth v. Pfeiffer, 482 Mass. 110, 131, cert. denied, 140 
S. Ct. 498 (2019); Scott, 428 Mass. at 364. 
46 
 
 
Defense counsel did not object to this error at trial.  As 
the challenged instructions related to an offense other than 
murder in the first degree, we review for a substantial risk of 
a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Bolling, 462 
Mass. 440, 452 (2012).  We conclude that there was no such risk.  
To begin, the jury convicted the defendant of murder in the 
first degree with the predicate felony of aggravated kidnapping, 
indicating that they were convinced that the defendant committed 
the kidnapping "while armed with a dangerous weapon and 
inflict[ed] serious bodily injury thereby upon" the victim.  See 
G. L. c. 265, § 26.  Had they proceeded to consider the offense 
of felony-murder in the second degree, the jury presumably would 
have found that the kidnapping involved a conscious disregard of 
the risk to human life. 
 
The defendant also argues that the judge erred in omitting 
the words "with intent . . . to cause him to be secretly 
confined or imprisoned . . . against his will," set out in G. L. 
c. 265, § 26, in instructing the jury and, more generally, by 
not instructing them on any intent requirement for the 
kidnapping conviction.  There was no error.  Where kidnapping is 
charged under the first clause of § 26, proof of specific intent 
is not required.  Commonwealth v. Traylor, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 
239, 243 n.7 (1997).  See Commonwealth v. Ford, 424 Mass. 709, 
711 (1997) (no proof of specific intent is required for general 
47 
 
intent crimes).  The statutory language requiring an intent to 
confine or imprison applies only to the third clause of § 26 
("forcibly seizes and confines or inveigles or kidnaps another 
person"), which covers cases where the victim has been seized 
with force, but not actually confined, or was confined, but not 
forcibly or secretly.  Commonwealth v. Ware, 375 Mass. 118, 120 
(1978). 
 
e.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant argues 
that we should exercise our power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
order a new trial.  In particular, he contends that his due 
process rights were violated by the Commonwealth's reliance on 
inconsistent theories about the death of the victim at his trial 
and at the trials of Samia and Fredette.   
 
Although differing evidence was admissible at the different 
trials with respect to what precisely transpired in Samia's 
vehicle, the Commonwealth's basic theory remained the same:  the 
defendant led the victim out of the pub and into the car, where 
the victim later died of a gunshot wound.  In his closing 
argument at the defendant's trial, the prosecutor focused on the 
defendant's purportedly central involvement in the kidnapping 
and did not claim that the defendant actually fired the gun that 
killed the victim.  The Commonwealth, of course, was not 
required to prove who among the defendant and his coventurers 
was the shooter in order to convict the defendant on a theory of 
48 
 
joint venture felony-murder.  Therefore, to the extent that 
there was any inconsistency as to who fired the fatal shot, this 
"did not go to the core of the Commonwealth's case, and 
therefore no due process violation occurred."  Commonwealth v. 
Housen, 458 Mass. 702, 709 (2011). 
 
A thorough review of the record reveals no other issues 
that would merit the exercise of our broad authority under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, beyond those raised by the defendant on appeal.  
We are reluctant to view the cumulative effect of trial errors 
identified by the defendant as more prejudicial than the errors 
taken individually, where these had minimal if any effect.  
Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 482 Mass. 538, 560 (2019).  The interests 
of justice thus are best served by reducing the degree of guilt 
to murder in the second degree, as we are required to do, for 
the reasons discussed supra. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The conviction of murder in the first 
degree is vacated and set aside, and the matter is remanded to 
the Superior Court for entry of a judgment of guilty of murder 
in the second degree, and for resentencing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.