Case Title: Engel v. Univ. of Toledo Coll. of Medicine

Citation: 2011-Ohio-3375

Docket Number: 20091735

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-07-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Engel v. Univ. of Toledo College of Medicine, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-3375.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-3375 
ENGEL, APPELLEE, v. UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO COLLEGE OF MEDICINE, 
APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Engel v. Univ. of Toledo College of Medicine,  
Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-3375.] 
Sovereign immunity — R.C. 9.86 — Immunity of state employees — Physicians — 
Physician who was volunteer clinical faculty member for state medical 
college was not entitled to immunity as state employee — Physician had 
no contractual relationship with state, practiced medicine in private 
practice only, college exercised no control over physician’s practice of 
medicine, and was not paid — R.C. 109.36 — Physician was not serving 
in elected or appointed office or position with state. 
(No. 2009-1735 — Submitted February 1, 2011 — Decided July 13, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 09AP-53, 
184 Ohio App.3d 669, 2009-Ohio-3957. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, University of Toledo College of Medicine (“College of 
Medicine”), appeals the lower court’s decision that Dr. Marek Skoskiewicz is 
entitled to personal immunity in the medical-malpractice suit filed against him 
because he is an officer or employee of the state.  For the reasons that follow, we 
conclude that Dr. Skoskiewicz is not an officer or employee of the state. 
I.  Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} Dr. Marek Skoskiewicz practices general surgery at Henry County 
Hospital in Napoleon, Ohio.  Henry County Hospital is a private organization and 
is not affiliated with the College of Medicine or any other state-sponsored 
institution.  Dr. Skoskiewicz has been a volunteer clinical faculty member of the 
College of Medicine since 1995.  The University of Toledo is a state university.  
R.C. 3345.011. 
{¶ 3} In January 2005, while a third-year medical student from the 
College of Medicine was observing, Dr. Skoskiewicz performed two vasectomy 
surgeries on appellee, Larry Engel Jr., on separate days.  Both of these procedures 
occurred at Henry County Hospital.  Allegedly due to negligence during the first 
and second surgeries, a third surgery, to remove Engel’s necrotic right testicle, 
was performed. 
{¶ 4} In May 2006, Engel filed a medical-malpractice suit against Dr. 
Skoskiewicz in the Henry County Court of Common Pleas.  Dr. Skoskiewicz 
asserted that he was entitled to personal immunity pursuant to R.C. 9.86 because, 
at the time of the surgeries, he was acting in his capacity as a volunteer clinical 
instructor of the College of Medicine and was therefore an officer or employee of 
the state.  Accordingly, Engel filed an action against the College of Medicine in 
the Court of Claims, which possesses exclusive jurisdiction over personal-
immunity claims.  R.C. 2743.02(F).  In his complaint, Engel reasserted his 
January Term, 2011 
3 
 
malpractice allegations and sought a determination as to whether Dr. Skoskiewicz 
was entitled to personal immunity as a state employee.  The court of common 
pleas stayed Engel’s malpractice suit pending resolution of the personal-immunity 
issue. 
{¶ 5} The Court of Claims concluded that Dr. Skoskiewicz had 
“performed the operations as a state employee” and that, therefore, he was entitled 
to personal immunity.  Engel v. Univ. of Toledo College of Medicine, Ct. of Cl. 
No. 2008-03572, 2008-Ohio-7058, ¶ 23. The Tenth District Court of Appeals 
affirmed, based on its conclusion that Dr. Skoskiewicz “satisfies the definition of 
‘officer or employee’ in R.C. 109.36(A)(1)(a).”  Engel v. Univ. of Toledo College 
of Medicine, 184 Ohio App.3d 669, 2009-Ohio-3957, 922 N.E.2d 244, ¶ 16.  This 
court accepted Engel’s discretionary appeal.  124 Ohio St. 3d 1479, 2010-Ohio-
354, 921 N.E.2d 249. 
II.  Analysis 
{¶ 6} R.C. 9.86 states, “Except for civil actions that arise out of the 
operation of a motor vehicle and civil actions in which the state is the plaintiff, no 
officer or employee shall be liable in any civil action that arises under the law of 
this state for damage or injury caused in the performance of his duties, unless the 
officer’s or employee’s actions were manifestly outside the scope of his 
employment or official responsibilities, or unless the officer or employee acted 
with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.”  In 
Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 111 Ohio St.3d 541, 2006-Ohio-6208, 857 
N.E.2d 573, ¶ 14, this court stated that determining whether a person is entitled to 
R.C. 9.86 immunity requires a two-part analysis, the first part of which is to 
determine whether the person claiming immunity is a state officer or employee.  
Id.  If the person claiming immunity is a state officer or employee, the second part 
of the analysis is to determine whether that person was acting within the scope of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
employment when the cause of action arose.  Id.  Because we conclude that Dr. 
Skoskiewicz was not a state officer or employee when the cause of action arose, 
we need not address the second part. 
A.  Is Dr. Skoskiewicz a state employee? 
{¶ 7} R.C. 109.36(A)(1)(a) through (d) defines who is a state officer or 
employee for purposes of R.C. 9.86.  R.C. 9.85(A); Theobald at ¶ 14.  Only 
subsection (a) is relevant here; it provides that a state officer or employee is “[a] 
person who, at the time a cause of action against the person arises, is serving in an 
elected or appointed office or position with the state or is employed by the state.” 
{¶ 8} This court has rarely had the opportunity to examine subsection (a) 
of R.C. 109.36.  In State ex rel. Sanquily v. Lucas Cty. Court of Common Pleas 
(1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 78, 573 N.E.2d 606, we did little more than acknowledge 
the obvious: that a doctor employed as a resident physician working for the 
Medical College of Ohio, a state institution, was a state employee.  We did not use 
a specific test or look at a list of criteria to determine whether the doctor in that 
case was a state officer or employee, as it was obvious that he was a state 
employee. 
{¶ 9} Although Theobald involved a similar medical-malpractice suit 
filed against several doctors, the case is of little help here.  The issue of whether 
the doctors were state employees was not before the court because it had not been 
appealed.  Id. at ¶ 14.  The ultimate issue in Theobald was whether the doctors 
were acting within the scope of employment when the alleged negligence 
occurred, which is not relevant here.  Id. 
{¶ 10} The College of Medicine suggests that certain factors be 
considered when determining whether a person is a state employee.  Although we 
do not adopt a formal test, we find the proposed factors to be helpful.  We 
January Term, 2011 
5 
 
emphasize that other factors may be considered and stress that in most 
circumstances a person’s status as a state employee is factually indisputable. 
1.  Contractual relationship between state and alleged employee 
{¶ 11} The College of Medicine argues that Dr. Skoskiewicz was not a 
state employee because he did not have a contractual relationship with the College 
of Medicine.  The only possible evidence that such a contractual relationship did 
exist are two letters from the College of Medicine, one from 1995 and one from 
2005, confirming Dr. Skoskiewicz’s status as a volunteer clinical instructor.  But 
the letters do not show that Dr. Skoskiewicz was hired, appointed, or credentialed 
by the College of Medicine.  Indeed, the parties stipulated that Dr. Skoskiewicz 
practiced general surgery at Henry County Hospital, which is not affiliated with or 
a part of any state university and is not an instrumentality of the state of Ohio.  We 
conclude that there was no contract of employment, written or oral, between the 
College of Medicine and Dr. Skoskiewicz. 
2.  State control over actions of purported employee 
{¶ 12} The College of Medicine argues that Dr. Skoskiewicz was not a 
state employee because the College of Medicine did not exercise control over Dr. 
Skoskiewicz’s medical practice.  This argument is based on “the logical principle 
that where the state lacks the ability to control a physician’s actions it makes no 
sense to extend immunity to him.”  See Walton v. State Dept. of Health, 162 Ohio 
App.3d 65, 2005-Ohio-3375, 832 N.E.2d 790, ¶ 19 (citing state’s lack of control 
over plaintiff as basis for holding that plaintiff was not state employee).  At all 
times relevant to this case, Dr. Skoskiewicz was treating a private patient at a 
private hospital. 
{¶ 13} For its holding that Dr. Skoskiewicz was serving in an appointed 
position with the state, the court of appeals relied on the 2005 letter from the 
College of Medicine to Dr. Skoskiewicz confirming his “appointment” to the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
volunteer faculty.  That letter states, “As a condition of appointment, you will be 
subject to the [Medical College of Ohio] Faculty Rules and Regulations, and 
Medical College of Ohio policies and procedures, including those governing 
research.  Use of your Medical College of Ohio title or academic affiliation on 
professional publications, such as professional journal articles, requires the prior 
approval and is at the discretion of the department chair.”  But this language, 
without more, does not demonstrate that the College of Medicine exercised, or 
intended to exercise, such control over Dr. Skoskiewicz’s practice of medicine as 
to justify a holding that the doctor was at any time a state employee.  Whether the 
rules, regulations, policies, and procedures cited in the first sentence above would 
control the way Dr. Skoskiewicz practiced medicine is a matter of pure 
speculation.  The import of the second sentence seems to be to ensure that the 
College of Medicine’s name is not used to lend gravitas to published materials 
without its prior approval, which hardly shows the kind of control that would 
support a holding of employment.  We conclude that the College of Medicine did 
not control Dr. Skoskiewicz. 
3.  Payment by state for services of alleged employee 
{¶ 14} Finally, the College of Medicine argues that Dr. Skoskiewicz was 
not a state employee because he was not paid by the state for his services.  The 
parties stipulated that “[a]t no time relevant to this case was Dr. Skoskiewicz a 
member of the regular faculty of the [College of Medicine].  At all times relevant 
to this case, regular faculty members of the [College of Medicine] were paid 
academic salaries directly from [the college].  Dr. Skoskiewicz did not receive any 
such salary.” 
{¶ 15} That the College of Medicine did not directly pay Dr. Skoskiewicz 
does not necessarily mean that he is not a state employee.  For example, in 
Potavin v. Univ. Med. Ctr. (Apr. 19, 2001), 10th Dist. No. 00AP-715, 2001 WL 
January Term, 2011 
7 
 
392492, the court of appeals concluded that a state entity, the University of 
Cincinnati Medical Center, and a private entity, the Foundation for Obstetrics and 
Gynecology, “functioned as one entity”  because the foundation “could not exist if 
not for its relationship” with the medical center.  Id. at *5.  Based on that finding, 
the court concluded that a doctor who volunteered for the state entity but who was 
paid by the foundation was a state employee.  Id.  But here no such symbiotic 
relationship exists.  The College of Medicine did not pay Dr. Skoskiewicz, and the 
Henry County Hospital, which is not connected with the college, did. 
{¶ 16} Based on the record before us, we conclude that there was no 
contract of employment between the College of Medicine and Dr. Skoskiewicz, 
that the College of Medicine did not exercise control over Dr. Skoskiewicz’s 
medical practice, and that the College of Medicine did not pay Dr. Skoskiewicz.  
Based on these conclusions, we conclude that Dr. Skoskiewicz was not an 
employee of the College of Medicine. 
B.  Does Dr. Skoskiewicz hold a state office or position? 
{¶ 17} We must also determine whether Dr. Skoskiewicz was “serving in 
an elected or appointed office or position with the state” within the meaning of 
R.C. 109.36(A)(1)(a).  Based on the record and briefs, there is no suggestion that 
Dr. Skoskiewicz was holding an elected office or position, so we need not address 
that issue, which leaves us to consider only whether Dr. Skoskiewicz holds an 
“appointed office or position with the state.” 
{¶ 18} To be sure, the letters that Dr. Skoskiewicz received from the 
College of Medicine stated that the College of Medicine had approved his 
“appointment” to the volunteer faculty at the rank of clinical assistant professor.  
As support for the proposition that Dr. Skoskiewicz had been appointed to an R.C. 
109.36 “office or position,” however, these letters are a slender reed.  We refuse 
to read so much into the letters’ use of the word “appointment” because, to us, the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
more significant words in R.C. 109.36(A)(1)(a) are “office and position with the 
state.” 
{¶ 19} Dr. Skoskiewicz does not occupy a position or office with the state.  
In State ex rel. Newman v. Skinner (1934), 128 Ohio St. 325, 191 N.E.2d 127, this 
court was required to determine whether a person employed by the state as a 
librarian was also a state officer.  We stated that “[a] public officer, as 
distinguished from an employee, must possess some sovereign functions of 
government to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public either of an 
executive, legislative, or judicial character.  * * * ‘[T]he chief and most decisive 
characteristic of a public office is determined by the quality of the duties with 
which the appointee is invested, and by the fact that such duties are conferred 
upon the appointee by law.’ ”  Id. at 327, quoting State ex rel. Landis v. Butler 
Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1917), 95 Ohio St. 157, 159, 115 N.E. 919.  Clearly, Dr. 
Skoskiewicz possessed no “sovereign” function of an executive, legislative, or 
judicial character.  And his duties were not of a level consonant with those of a 
public office.  The appointment did not entitle Dr. Skoskiewicz to office space, 
staff, or authority at the College of Medicine; did not enable him to lecture or 
teach a class at the College of Medicine; did not allow him to conduct university-
sponsored research, although he was allowed to collaborate with College of 
Medicine researchers; did not allow him to practice at the university clinic; and 
did not entitle him to payment from the College of Medicine.  In truth, based on 
the record before us, the appointment did not enable Dr. Skoskiewicz to do 
anything except, as stipulated, allow students to “rotate through Dr. Skoskiewicz’s 
practice as a part of one-month clerkships.”  Furthermore, the appointment did not 
impose any duties upon Dr. Skoskiewicz.  To the extent that complying with the 
College of Medicine’s policy guidelines is a duty, the duty was not conferred by 
law. 
January Term, 2011 
9 
 
{¶ 20} Dr. Skoskiewicz and the many other volunteer clinical faculty in 
Ohio provide an important service.  But that service, however commendable, does 
not transform the volunteers behind it into an arm of the state.  Based on the 
record before us, we conclude that Dr. Skoskiewicz did not hold an appointed 
office or position with the state. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 21} We conclude that Dr. Skoskiewicz is not a state employee and that 
he does not hold an appointed office or position with the state.  Accordingly, he is 
not entitled to personal immunity pursuant to R.C. 9.86.  We reverse the judgment 
of the court of appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, 
CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Law Office of John B. Fisher, L.L.C., and John B. Fisher, for appellee. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor 
General, Brandon J. Lester, Deputy Solicitor, and Anne Berry Strait, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellant. 
Kitch, Drutchas, Wagner, Valitutti & Sherbrook, Susan Healy Zitterman, 
and John S. Wasung, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Dr. Marek Skoskiewicz. 
Giorgianni Law, L.L.C., and Paul Giorgianni; Amer Cunningham Co., 
L.P.A., and Thomas R. Houlihan; and Elk & Elk Co., Ltd., and Peter D. Traska, 
urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Association for Justice. 
______________________