Case Title: Robinson Co. v. Beck

Citation: 74 So. 2d 915

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1954-10-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
74 So. 2d 915 (1954)
ROBINSON CO., Inc.
v.
M. L. BECK.
5 Div. 589.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
October 7, 1954.
*916 A. B. Robertson, Jr., Clayton, for appellant.
J. A. Walker, Jacob Walker, Jr., Walker & Walker, Opelika, H. W. Nixon, Auburn, for appellee.
MERRILL, Justice.
The appellee sued appellant for damages in deceit. The appellant made no appearance or answer and when the cause came on to be heard the appellee withdrew his demand for jury trial, Title 7, § 260, as amended, Code of 1940, and the court after hearing the evidence rendered a default judgment against the appellant on November 12, 1953. On December 9, 1953, the appellant, appearing specially for the sole purpose of filing the motion, filed a motion to set aside the judgment by default. The motion was not presented to the judge until December 18th, at which time he continued it and set the hearing for January 15, 1954. Although the motion was not called to the court's attention until after thirty days from the date of the judgment, the so-called "30 day rule," as provided for in § 119, Title 13, Code of 1940, applies in this case, because we judicially know that Judge Hooten did not reside in Lee County on the date of trial and he as trial judge did not lose power over his order until the expiration of sixty days, the motion having been filed in the clerk's office within thirty days. The motion and this appeal cannot be treated as a proceeding under the four months statute because the requirements of §§ 279 and 280, Title 7, Code of 1940, are not met and appellant does not contend that the appeal was so taken. The grounds for the motion were:
The motion was heard and testimony of witnesses was taken ore tenus before Judge Hooten. The motion was overruled and defendant appealed, not from the default judgment, but from the order overruling the motion to set aside the judgment by default.
The one assignment of error reads: "The court erred in overruling the appellant's motion to set aside the judgment by default." Appellee insists that the appeal should be dismissed because the order overruling the motion to set aside the default judgment is not appealable, and that is the main question to be determined by this court.
It is settled that where it appears on the face of the record that the judgment or decree is void, it is the duty of the court upon application thereto by the party having rights or interests immediately involved, to vacate such judgment or decree at any time subsequent to its rendition; and this court has repeatedly recognized the right and propriety of appeal, whether the order to vacate be granted or refused. Sweeney v. Tritsch, 151 Ala. 242, 44 So. 184; Griffin v. Proctor, 244 Ala. 537, 14 So. 2d 116.
In the case of Ford v. Ford, 218 Ala. 15, 117 So. 462, 463, where within thirty days from the rendition of a decree of divorce the appellant filed her motion to vacate the decree on the ground that personal service of summons was not had upon the date shown by the return, but at a later date, and that the decree thereon was prematurely entered, the court said:
In Griffin v. Proctor, supra, the court said [244 Ala. 537, 14 So.2d 119]:
Was the judgment in the instant case void? The complaint states a cause of action. The sheriff's return is as follows:
Thus the record affirmatively shows prima facie that service was had and it is sufficient to authorize judgment by default, Title 7, § 188, Code of 1940; and the testimony before the trial court supports the default judgment. Therefore, on the face of the record the judgment was not void.
We return to the main question, whether the order on the motion is appealable. In Colley v. Spivey, 127 Ala. 109, 28 So. 574, where the lower court had overruled the motion to set aside the default judgment, we find:
In Ex parte Gay, 213 Ala. 5, 104 So. 898, 899, the court said, all the Justices concurring:
In Pinkston v. Bagley, 256 Ala. 366, 54 So. 2d 561, we said:
The question as to the proper remedy to review the action of the lower court in granting or overruling a motion to set aside judgments by default or nil dicit was carefully reviewed in Ex parte State ex rel. Atlas Auto Finance Co., 251 Ala. 665, 38 So. 2d 560, 561, where the court said:
In the case of Trognitz v. Touart, 219 Ala. 404, 122 So. 620, 621, it was said:
See 14 Ala.Dig., Mandamus.
The appellant filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the alternative on June 25, 1954. But this case was submitted to this court on April 13, 1954, and thus the petition for mandamus comes too late. It should have been submitted upon the submission of the cause and it cannot be considered. Cornelius v. Moore, 208 Ala. 237, 94 So. 57; Preddy v. Herren Sales Co., 215 Ala. 216, 110 So. 131; Ex parte State ex rel. Denson, 248 Ala. 161, 26 So. 2d 563. Neither has there been "spread a motion on the docket, before the case was submitted, asking for a mandamus," as mentioned in Brady v. Brady, 144 Ala. 414, 39 So. 237, 239.
For other cases where the question of service of process on the defendant was involved and mandamus was considered by our courts see Ex parte Smith, 258 Ala. 319, 62 So. 2d 792; Ex parte Haisten, 227 Ala. 183, 149 So. 213; Ex parte Crumpton, 21 Ala.App. 446, 109 So. 184.
In its reply brief filed May 24, 1954, appellant states that this appeal was taken under § 572, Title 7, Code of 1940. With reference to that contention, with which we do not agree, we merely cite the case of Taylor v. Jones, 202 Ala. 18, 79 So. 356, 357. There the court was petitioned to set aside and annul an order on the ground that the proceeding in circuit court was void on its face and of no effect. "The circuit court entertained, but denied, his petition, and taxed him with the costs, and from the judgment or order to such effect petitioner presents this appeal." The court said:
It follows that the appeal must be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
All the Justices concur.