Case Title: Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 7083 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11806

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-08-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11806 
 
JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 7083  vs.  SEX OFFENDER 
REGISTRY BOARD. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     March 5, 2015. - August 21, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification Act.  Constitutional Law, Sex offender.  Due 
Process of Law, Sex offender.  Practice, Civil, Sex 
offender. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
April 2, 2012. 
 
 
The case was heard by Paul E. Troy, J., on a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Ethan C. Stiles for the plaintiff. 
 
David L. Chenail for the defendant. 
 
Matthew J. Koes for John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board 
No. 3839, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  The plaintiff, John Doe, Sex Offender Registry 
Board No. 7083 (Doe), was serving a criminal sentence at the 
 
 
2 
Massachusetts Treatment Center (treatment center), and also had 
been civilly committed to the treatment center as a sexually 
dangerous person (SDP), when the defendant Sex Offender Registry 
Board (SORB) notified him in September, 2009, of its 
recommendation that he be classified as a level three sex 
offender, pursuant to the sex offender registration statute, 
G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q.1  Doe requested a hearing to challenge 
SORB's recommendation.  When that classification hearing took 
place, in February, 2012, Doe's earliest parole eligibility date 
was ten months away, and a trial on Doe's petition for discharge, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 9, had been scheduled for a date 
eighteen months away.2 
Because each date was not only distant in time, but also 
only a potential date on which he might have become eligible for 
release, rather than a known release date, Doe requested that the 
classification hearing be continued to a date after, or shortly 
before, trial on his petition for discharge.  In the alternative, 
Doe sought to have the classification proceeding left open after 
1 The sex offender registration statute, G. L. c. 6, 
§§ 178C-178Q, as enacted by St. 1996, c. 239, § 1, was rewritten 
in 1999.  See St. 1999, c. 74, § 2.  The 1999 version is at issue 
here. 
2 Thereafter, the trial on Doe's petition for discharge was 
rescheduled for a date one year later than originally scheduled.  
Doe's subsequent motion to dismiss the petition was allowed, and 
he remained confined at the Massachusetts Treatment Center 
(treatment center) when he filed this appeal. 
 
                     
 
 
3 
the hearing, so that his classification would not become final, 
and current evidence of his risk of reoffense would be available 
for the hearing officer to consider when his discharge was 
imminent.  The hearing examiner denied the requests and 
classified Doe as a level three sex offender.  Doe sought review 
in the Superior Court pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, §§ 7, and 14 (7), 
and G. L. c. 6, § 178M, arguing that his risk of reoffense was 
zero while he was confined at the treatment center, and that the 
denial of his request to continue or to leave open the 
classification hearing violated his right to due process.  A 
Superior Court judge affirmed the hearing examiner's decision, 
and Doe appealed.  A panel of the Appeals Court also affirmed, in 
an unpublished memorandum and order issued pursuant to its rule 
1:28.  Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 7083 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 86 Mass. App. Ct. 1113 (2014).  We granted Doe's 
application for further appellate review.3 
Doe argues that, by scheduling the classification hearing 
based on his earliest possible parole eligibility date, the 
information relied on by the hearing examiner in reaching a 
classification decision inevitably will have become stale, and 
therefore potentially unreliable, by the time he is released from 
confinement, even if the determination of his level of risk was 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by John Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Board No. 3839. 
 
                     
 
 
4 
based on appropriate factors when it was made.  Doe contends that 
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.37C(2) (2013), which permits a sex 
offender to seek reclassification three years after a final 
classification, does not address adequately his due process 
concerns.4 
SORB contends that the early classification was required 
here because there was a possibility that Doe could have been 
released prior to a trial on his petition for discharge.  SORB 
maintains that an individual who has been committed as an SDP may 
be released prior to the date of a trial on his or her petition 
for discharge pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 9, through one of two 
mechanisms.  First, the community access board (CAB) may file a 
petition for discharge under G. L. c. 123A, § 9, if it 
determines, in its annual review, that an individual committed as 
an SDP no longer is sexually dangerous.  Had the CAB determined 
at Doe's next annual review (which likely would have taken place 
a few months after the February, 2012, classification hearing) 
that Doe was no longer sexually dangerous, it could have filed 
its own petition for discharge, accompanied by a motion for an 
4 Doe cites a number of reasons in support of this 
contention.  He argues particularly that, under the regulations 
of the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB), while a petition for 
reclassification may be filed every three years, a decision to 
reclassify a registered sex offender requires that the offender 
has remained offense-free for more than five continuous years 
"since his or her release from incarceration."  See 803 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 1.37C(2)(d) (2013). 
 
                     
 
 
5 
expedited trial.5  Second, Doe could have filed a motion for an 
expedited trial on his petition for discharge if two qualified 
examiners opined, following their examination of Doe in 
conjunction with his petition, that he was no longer sexually 
dangerous.  See Matter of Johnstone, 453 Mass 544, 545, 553 
(2009).  SORB maintains that any error in a premature 
classification may be remedied by its reclassification 
procedures.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.37C(2). 
We conclude that the hearing examiner's 2009 recommendation 
that Doe be classified as a level three sex offender, based on 
evidence presented at a time when a trial on his petition for 
discharge under G. L. c. 123A, § 9, was at least eighteen months 
away, risked classifying Doe based on factors that would be stale 
at the time of his discharge, in violation of due process 
protections.  The hearing examiner's 2012 final classification of 
5 SORB argues that, based on the possibility of a finding by 
the community access board (CAB) that Doe was no longer sexually 
dangerous, 
 
"It was therefore conceivable that . . . within months 
after [SORB's] classification hearing, the CAB could find 
[Doe] no longer [a sexually dangerous person (SDP)] and on 
that basis, [Doe] could then have filed a motion seeking an 
expedited review by the qualified examiners and discharge 
trial. . . . In the event that the [c]ourt granted a motion 
for expedited review and trial, the offender could 
potentially have been released prior to the originally 
scheduled section 9 discharge trial.  Therefore, the 
initial trial date of August 2013 on [Doe's] section 9 
discharge petition was not necessarily dispositive as to 
[Doe's] earliest possible release from his SDP commitment." 
 
                     
 
 
6 
Doe as a level three sex offender embodies this result, and 
reflects an evaluation of Doe's risk that will be stale when Doe 
ultimately is discharged.  Nor are these procedural due process 
concerns adequately addressed by Doe's ability to request 
reclassification pursuant to 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.37C(1)-(9). 
We note first that a final classification as a level three 
sex offender would permit SORB to require Doe to register as such 
while he is committed to the treatment center, albeit that the 
final classification occurs long before even his potential 
release date.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178I (information about level 
three sex offenders "shall be made available"); 803 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 1.32(2) (2013) (SORB "may actively disseminate" 
information pertaining to level three sex offender, "in such 
time, place, manner or means, as it, in its sole discretion, 
deems reasonable and proper").  Thus, Doe's information and 
photograph would be actively and publicly disseminated on SORB's 
Web site, while he remains confined; the bell cannot thereafter 
be unrung by reclassification, and dissemination, which can 
result in a wide variety of harms, see Moe v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 467 Mass. 598, 604 (2014), cannot be revoked.  See 
Note, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 Hastings L.J. 257, 259 (2012) 
("information posted on the Internet is never truly forgotten"). 
Moreover, at a reclassification hearing, the regulations 
shift to Doe the burden of establishing that his risk of 
 
 
7 
reoffense and degree of dangerousness have been reduced, do not 
entitle him to appointed counsel if he is indigent, and provide 
that reclassification may not be requested for three years after 
the date of the final classification order.  See 803 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 1.37C(2).  In addition, most of the factors which SORB is 
to consider in determining whether a sex offender has 
demonstrated a reduced risk of reoffense contemplate that an 
offender already is living in the community.  See id. 
Accordingly, Doe's final classification as a level three sex 
offender must be vacated; the 2012 classification is only 
preliminary, and the evidentiary hearing held in February, 2012, 
must be left open.  At a reasonable time prior to his actual 
release date, Doe may request a continuation of the evidentiary 
hearing, at which he may submit new evidence relevant to a final 
classification determination,6 and SORB will bear the burden of 
establishing Doe's then-current risk of reoffense and degree of 
dangerousness.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178L; 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§§ 1.01, 1.10 (2013).  If Doe does not seek a continuation of the 
hearing at a reasonable time prior to his actual release date,7 
the findings from the initial hearing will become final, and SORB 
6 At that hearing, the Commonwealth also may introduce 
relevant new evidence. 
 
7 A next possible scheduled release date is to be 
distinguished from Doe's actual release date. 
 
                     
 
 
8 
may issue a final classification determination based on the 
preliminary classification. 
1.  Background.  a.  Governing offenses.  The hearing 
examiner found the following.  At the time of the February, 2012, 
classification hearing, Doe was forty-six years old.  He had been 
convicted of two separate sex offenses in 1987, and one sex 
offense in 2009.  In 1987, when he was twenty-one, Doe was 
convicted of indecent assault and battery on a nineteen year old 
female acquaintance of his girl friend and sentenced to a one-
year term of probation.  Later that year, while on probation for 
the first sexual assault, Doe broke into his former girl friend's 
house, raped her three times, and then stabbed her, and himself, 
with a knife.  He pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated 
rape, assault with intent to commit murder, assault and battery 
by means of a dangerous weapon, and breaking and entering in the 
nighttime; he was sentenced to concurrent terms of incarceration 
of from ten to twelve years for all but one of these convictions, 
and a term of probation on the other conviction.8 
In 2003, Doe met a twenty-two year old woman at a bus 
8 In 1990, Doe's motion to revise and revoke his sentences 
was allowed, and his sentences were modified to a single ten- to 
twelve-year term of incarceration, with commitment set to time 
served and the balance suspended for five years.  In April, 
1991, the suspension was revoked after Doe violated a term of 
his probation by having contact with his former girl friend (his 
second victim), and Doe was incarcerated until February, 1999. 
 
                     
 
 
9 
station in Fall River; after he missed his bus to Boston, she 
invited him to spend the night at her apartment, where her 
brother was also visiting.  The woman went to sleep alone in her 
bedroom and awoke to find that her pajamas had been removed and 
Doe was raping her.  Doe fled the apartment after the woman's 
screams alerted her brother.  The woman provided police a 
detailed description of her attacker, who was not identified at 
that time. 
In May, 2006, Doe was sentenced to a term of two and one-
half years of incarceration, with nineteen months to serve and 
the balance suspended, for failing to register as a sex offender.  
Shortly after he began serving this sentence, the State police 
crime laboratory conducted a search of a convicted offender 
database and matched a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sample from 
Doe to a sample taken during the investigation of the 2003 
assault.  The victim then identified Doe from a photographic 
array. 
In July, 2006, after receiving notice of the DNA match in 
the 2003 rape, the Commonwealth filed a petition pursuant to 
G. L. c. 123A, § 12, seeking Doe's civil commitment as an SDP.  A 
jury found Doe to be sexually dangerous, and in January, 2007, he 
was committed to the treatment center.  In October, 2009, Doe 
pleaded guilty to rape and was sentenced to a term of from five 
to eight years for the 2003 offense.  The earliest date on which 
 
 
10 
he would become eligible for parole from that sentence was in 
December, 2012.  In June, 2010, Doe filed in the Superior Court a 
petition for discharge, pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 9.  In June, 
2011, while that petition was pending, the CAB found during its 
annual review that Doe continued to be sexually dangerous. 
b.  Classification proceedings.  Meanwhile, SORB had 
proceeded with a determination of Doe's sex offender 
classification level.  In September, 2009, SORB concluded that 
Doe presented a high level of risk of reoffense, and recommended 
that he be classified as a level three sex offender.  Doe 
challenged this recommendation and requested a de novo hearing to 
determine his final classification.  See G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178L (1) (a).  The hearing ultimately was scheduled to be 
conducted in February, 2012.  At that time, trial in the Superior 
Court on Doe's petition for discharge had been scheduled for 
August, 2013, some eighteen months thereafter.  Doe requested 
that the hearing examiner either allow a continuance of the 
classification hearing until a date closer to the trial on Doe's 
petition, or that the classification proceeding be left open 
until immediately prior to his release, to allow for submission 
of then-current evidence of his risk of reoffense and his degree 
of dangerousness.  The hearing examiner denied this request.  The 
hearing took place as scheduled in February, 2012.  On March 16, 
2012, the hearing examiner issued a decision concluding that Doe 
 
 
11 
should be finally classified as a level three sex offender, and 
ordering Doe to register as such. 
2.  Statutory and regulatory framework.  The purpose of the 
sex offender registration statute is to protect "the vulnerable 
members of our communities from sexual offenders," St. 1999, 
c. 74, preamble, and from "the danger of recidivism posed by sex 
offenders."  St. 1999, c. 74, § 1.  Every person defined as a sex 
offender under G. L. c. 6, § 178C, is subject to a two-stage 
process of registration and classification.  See 803 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 1.38(3) (2013).  First, SORB prepares "a recommended 
registration determination and, if applicable, a classification 
of the sex offender as a Level 1, Level 2, or Level 3 Offender."  
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.06(1) (2013).  Second, if the offender 
objects to SORB's recommendation, the offender may request a de 
novo evidentiary hearing before a SORB hearing examiner to 
determine whether he or she must register, and, if so, at what 
level of risk.  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.38(4) (2013). 
In proceedings that result in a final classification of a 
sex offender's level of risk, the offender is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing and an individualized assessment of the 
proper classification level, to be represented by legal counsel, 
and to judicial review of an adverse result.  See G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178L; 803 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 1.01, 1.08, 1.10, 1.14, 1.26 
(2013).  SORB bears the burden of establishing the sex offender's 
 
 
12 
current level of dangerousness to the community, and the risk of 
reoffense.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178L; 803 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 1.01, 
1.10. 
The sex offender registration statute requires that SORB 
develop guidelines to determine a sex offender's level of 
dangerousness and risk of reoffense, and that an offender's 
recent behavior and current treatment be considered as factors 
relevant to this determination.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178K (1) (c), (h), (i), (j) (mandatory factors include "whether 
such sex offender is receiving counseling, therapy or treatment"; 
"the sex offender's participation in sex offender treatment and 
counseling while incarcerated or while on probation or parole and 
his response to such treatment or counseling"; "recent behavior, 
including behavior while incarcerated or while supervised on 
probation or parole"; and "recent threats against persons"). 
Consistent with this statutory imperative, SORB's 
regulations provide that a sex offender's current risk of 
reoffense and dangerousness to the community must be considered 
in arriving at a preliminary determination whether registration 
is required and in deciding a recommended classification level.  
See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.06(2)(d) (2013) (requiring 
registration only if offender "currently poses a danger"); 803 
Code Mass. Regs. § 1.06(3) (2013) (in determining whether 
offender "currently poses a danger," SORB shall review enumerated 
 
 
13 
criteria, as well as "other matters that demonstrate whether or 
not the offender poses a risk to reoffend").  Similarly, for a 
final classification determination, a sex offender's current 
circumstances must be considered.  See, e.g., 803 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 1.40(10), (11), (12), (19), (20) (2013) (hearing examiner 
must consider, among other factors, whether offender is 
"currently" supervised; "currently in sex-offender-specific 
treatment"; offender's "current home situation"; and "recent 
behavior" while incarcerated or on probation or parole).  SORB 
must demonstrate at the classification proceeding a "sound 
application of [the risk] factors to derive a true and accurate 
assessment of an offender's potential for reoffending."  Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 205614 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
466 Mass. 594, 605 (2013) (Doe No. 205614), quoting Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 136652 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 81 
Mass. App. Ct. 639, 656 (2012). 
A sex offender "has sufficient liberty and privacy interests 
constitutionally protected by art. 12 [of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights] that he is entitled to procedural due 
process before he may be required to register and before 
information may properly be publicly disclosed about him."  Doe 
v. Attorney Gen., 426 Mass. 136, 143-144 (1997).  As we said in 
Roe v. Attorney Gen., 434 Mass. 418, 427 (2001), quoting Mathews 
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976): 
 
 
14 
"Where there is an interference with a protected 
liberty interest, the court must consider 'the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, 
the Government's interest, including the function involved 
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail.'" 
 
In the context of sex offender classification, we examine the fit 
"between a classification and the policy that the classification 
serves."  See Doe v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 460 Mass. 342, 349 
(2011). 
To further the statutory purpose of protecting the public, 
while at the same time protecting a sex offender's due process 
rights, the sex offender registration statute establishes time 
frames within which certain actions must occur in connection with 
classification proceedings when a sex offender is incarcerated or 
civilly committed, and imposes deadlines for final classification 
of such offenders.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178E (a) (SORB "shall 
classify such a sex offender at least [ten] days before the 
offender's earliest possible release date"); G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178L (1) (a) ("Not less than [sixty] days prior to the release 
or parole of a sex offender from custody or incarceration, [SORB] 
shall notify the sex offender of his right to submit to [SORB] 
documentary evidence relative to his risk of reoffense and the 
degree of dangerousness posed to the public").  The registration 
statute contains no explicit requirement that SORB schedule a 
 
 
15 
classification hearing at a time near the anticipated date of a 
sex offender's release from custody. 
Our jurisprudence has acknowledged that the purpose of the 
registration statute is "promoted by allowing final 
classifications of sex offenders while they are incarcerated," 
and "before their release back into the community."  Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 1 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 79 
Mass. App. Ct. 683, 688 (2011), citing Doe, Sex Offender Registry 
Bd. No. 1211 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 447 Mass. 750, 759-760 
(2006). 
At the same time, our decisions recognize that the 
registration statute requires SORB to base its classification 
determinations on a sex offender's "current" risk to the 
community, in order to protect the offender's right to due 
process.  See, e.g., Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 8725 v. 
Sex Offender Registry Bd., 450 Mass. 780, 793 (2008) (sex 
offender entitled to hearing at which offender must have 
opportunity to demonstrate he or she is not "a current danger to 
vulnerable members of our communities"); Doe v. Attorney Gen., 
430 Mass. 155, 168 (1999) (individualized hearing must be 
conducted to determine whether sex offender "is a present threat" 
because of likelihood of reoffense); Doe, Sex Offender Registry 
Bd. No. 6904 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 82 Mass. App. Ct. 67, 
73-74 (2012) (Doe No. 6904), and cases cited ("Under the statute, 
 
 
16 
a sex offender is entitled to an individualized determination 
whether he is currently dangerous before registration and 
notification requirements may be imposed").  SORB's regulations 
themselves recognize that "the risk to reoffend and the degree of 
dangerousness posed by a sex offender may decrease over time."  
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.37C(1). 
3.  Application.  SORB contends that it is necessary to 
finally classify civilly committed sex offenders long before 
their actual release, to protect against the eventuality that the 
time prior to a trial on a petition for discharge by a sex 
offender might be shortened by a motion seeking an expedited 
trial, either by the CAB or by the petitioner, in two specific 
circumstances:  following the CAB's annual review, if it 
determines that a sex offender is no longer sexually dangerous, 
see G. L. c. 123A, §§ 6A, 9, or upon a finding by two qualified 
examiners who examined the offender in conjunction with a 
petition for discharge that the offender is no longer sexually 
dangerous.  See Johnstone, petitioner, 453 Mass. 544, 553 (2009).  
SORB maintains that any possible due process violation arising 
from a premature classification is ameliorated by the fact that 
its regulations permit a sex offender to seek reclassification 
after a three-year interval.  We are not persuaded. 
a.  Final classification date.  To promote both the 
statutory goals that a sex offender's final classification be 
 
 
17 
made before discharge, and that it be accurate and current, a 
final classification must be based on an evaluation of the 
offender's risk of reoffense at a time reasonably close to the 
actual date of discharge.  Reaching a final classification 
determination close to the actual date of discharge promotes 
accuracy of classification determinations, which advances both 
the interests of the community and of the sex offender.  For 
instance, a sex offender who has spent insufficient time in the 
treatment center, which was established to provide "treatment and 
rehabilitation of persons adjudicated as being sexually 
dangerous," G. L. c. 123A, § 2, may not have had the opportunity 
to fully avail himself or herself of specialized treatment 
programs, or to make progress in treatment, so as to reduce the 
risk of reoffense according to SORB's guidelines.  Similarly, a 
sex offender who has been committed to the treatment center for a 
lengthy period of time may have reached an age at which his or 
her risk of reoffense has been reduced.  See Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 151564 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 
612, 622-623 (2010).  Moreover, advances in scientific research 
on sex offender recidivism over the course of an offender's 
commitment could indicate that additional factors should be 
considered, or that factors thought to be relevant to a 
determination of risk are not as predictive as initially 
believed.  "Where, as here, scientific knowledge in a field is 
 
 
18 
rapidly evolving, . . . the applicable standards may require more 
frequent modification in order to reflect accurately the current 
state of knowledge" (citation omitted).  Id. at 623 n.6, citing 
Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 27 (1994).  See Doe No. 
205614, 466 Mass. at 608-609 (potential for "frustration of 
individualized risk assessment is particularly conspicuous where 
the growing scientific consensus suggests specific factors that 
have quantifiable effects on recidivism rates, such as age and 
gender"). 
A premature, and potentially unreliable or inaccurate, 
classification as a level three sex offender has severe 
consequences where classification has become final and, as a 
result, an offender is required to register at that risk level.  
Information about level three sex offenders is entered into a 
publicly accessible Internet database, see G. L. c. 6, § 178D, 
and "SORB and local police departments 'actively disseminate' 
information about level three offenders to individuals and 
organizations who are likely to encounter those offenders.  G. L. 
c. 6, § 178K (2) (c)."  Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 68549 
v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 470 Mass. 102, 104-105 (2014).  
Internet dissemination of sex offender information "exposes 
[offenders], through aggressive public notification of their 
crimes, to profound humiliation and community-wide ostracism."  
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 115 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 
 
19 
Sex offenders whose personal information is available on SORB's 
Web site "will suffer discrimination in employment and housing, 
and will otherwise suffer from the stigma of being identified as 
a sex offender, which sometimes means the additional risk of 
being harassed or assaulted."  Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
467 Mass. 598, 604 (2014).  "Classification and registration 
entail possible harm to a sex offender's earning capacity, damage 
to his reputation, and . . . 'the statutory branding of him as a 
public danger.'"  Poe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 
801, 813 (2010), quoting Doe v. Attorney Gen., 426 Mass. 136, 144 
(1997).  An inaccurate classification at a higher risk level not 
only does not serve to protect the public, it places a more 
onerous burden on law enforcement officials.  See G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178K (2) (c). 
Acknowledging similar concerns, the Appeals Court set aside 
a final classification order based on a classification hearing 
held four years before a sex offender's release, and remanded the 
matter for a "new final classification evidentiary hearing."  See 
Doe No. 6904, 82 Mass. App. Ct. at 78.  The sex offender in that 
case argued that a classification hearing held four years before 
his release from incarceration was unreasonable under the 
registration statute, and was prejudicial to him.  Asserting that 
"a hearing closer in time to his release was required so that the 
board could appropriately determine whether he had availed 
 
 
20 
himself of sex offender treatment while incarcerated and whether 
he posed a current risk to the public," the sex offender had 
moved to reschedule the hearing.  Id. at 76.  His motion was 
denied, and SORB proceeded to make a classification determination 
eight months prior to the sex offender's next scheduled parole 
hearing, at which parole was denied.  Id. at 77.  The Appeals 
Court concluded that, "where no administrative justification was 
provided, a procedure imposing a final classification 
approximately four years old at the time of the offender's 
release from incarceration and affording a reclassification no 
earlier than five years after his release, is inconsistent with 
the statutory purpose."9  Id. at 78. 
SORB argues that in the present case, unlike the 
incarcerated offender in Doe No. 6904, supra, Doe's commitment to 
the treatment center is open ended, and that this difference 
justifies conducting a classification hearing "as soon as 
practicable."  SORB contends that the due process protections 
extended to sex offenders during the classification process 
9 Under the reclassification procedure in effect at the 
time, see 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.37C(1) (2002), a sex offender 
was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in conjunction with a 
motion for reclassification.  See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. 
No. 6904 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 82 Mass. App. Ct. 67, 78 
n.3 (2012).  In 2013, SORB amended its reclassification 
procedure, such that a sex offender now is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on a motion for reclassification.  See 803 
Code Mass. Regs. § 1.37C(5) (2013). 
 
                     
 
 
21 
require that certain events take place within time limits that 
make it "impracticable" to classify a civilly committed offender 
at a time closer to a trial on a petition for discharge.10 
SORB notes also that, as discussed supra, the time prior to 
a trial on a petition for discharge might be shortened by a 
motion seeking an expedited trial, either by the CAB or by the 
petitioner, where a determination has been made, by the CAB or by 
two qualified examiners, that the sex offender is no longer 
sexually dangerous.  SORB does not argue that either a favorable 
review by the CAB or a favorable determination by two qualified 
examiners entitles a sex offender adjudicated to have been an SDP 
to immediate release without an order by a Superior Court judge.  
Nor does SORB offer any explanation why, if classification 
hearings were left open, there would be insufficient time in 
which to evaluate additional, current evidence concerning the 
level of risk of a sex offender who sought and was granted an 
expedited trial on a petition for discharge. 
SORB maintains that it was reasonable to seek final 
10 SORB cites, for example, regulations permitting a sex 
offender to submit, within thirty days after receipt of notice 
of a registration requirement, documentary evidence regarding 
the offender's risk to reoffend, 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§§ 1.04(1), (4), 1.05(1) (2013); that the offender has twenty 
days after notification of SORB's recommended classification 
within which to request a hearing, 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.07(2) (2013); and that the offender must receive notice of 
the scheduled date, time, and place of the hearing thirty days 
in advance.  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.09(1) (2013). 
 
                     
 
 
22 
classification of Doe ten months prior to his earliest parole 
eligibility date, because that was the earliest date on which Doe 
potentially could have been released.  SORB contends that holding 
a hearing at that time "adequately balanced [SORB's] statutory 
requirement to finally classify a sex offender prior to his 
release from incarceration with the offender's right to have an 
individualized hearing to determine his current risk."  SORB does 
not suggest that it was reasonably likely that Doe, who had been 
committed to the treatment center as an SDP, could in fact have 
been released into the community on the date on which he first 
became eligible for parole.11  Rather, SORB maintains that Doe's 
11 We note that, as with any other sex offender committed to 
the treatment center as an SDP, even if Doe had been released on 
parole or his sentence had expired, he could not have been 
discharged from the treatment center until a petition for 
discharge, pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 9, had been allowed.  
Notwithstanding its emphasis on Doe's parole eligibility date, 
SORB recognizes in its brief that Doe's parole eligibility date 
was his earliest possible release date only if he previously had 
been discharged from civil commitment as an SDP. 
 
A prior version of G. L. c. 123A, § 9, stated that "[a]ny 
person committed to the center for treatment and rehabilitation 
under [G. L. c. 123A, §§ 5, 6,] shall be eligible for parole," 
and required that such individuals be presented to the parole 
board at least once in the first year of commitment and at least 
every three years thereafter.  Commonwealth v. Travis, 372 Mass. 
238, 244 & n.3 (1977), quoting G. L. c. 123A, § 9.  See 
Thompson, petitioner, 394 Mass. 502, 503 n.1, 506-507 & n.5 
(1985); St. 1985, c. 752, § 1.  General Laws c. 123A, § 9, also 
allowed release on parole without a finding that an individual 
was no longer sexually dangerous.  See Thompson, petitioner, 
supra at 504 n.3, quoting Commonwealth v. Travis, supra at 247 
n.4.  Those provisions were eliminated when the statute was 
rewritten in 1993, see St. 1993, c. 489, § 7, and release 
                     
 
 
23 
procedural due process rights are protected adequately through 
the reclassification procedure, pursuant to which Doe may file a 
petition every three years seeking to obtain a lower 
classification level. 
We conclude that SORB's final classification of Doe was 
premature.  When SORB made its initial recommendation in 
September, 2009, that Doe be classified as a level three sex 
offender, he had been committed to the treatment center for 
approximately thirty-two months.  Approximately one month later, 
Doe pleaded guilty to the 2003 rape.  In his final classification 
determination, the hearing examiner noted that, although Doe had, 
during the preceding year, made progress in sex offender 
treatment, there were shortcomings in his response to treatment 
that remained to be addressed.  When Doe eventually is discharged 
from the treatment center, this classification, based on his 
circumstances in early 2012, will not reflect an evaluation of 
his then-current risk of reoffense and degree of dangerousness to 
the public.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1) (h) and 803 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 1.40(17) (2013) (defining current sex offender specific 
treatment as risk-reducing). 
Ensuring that a sex offender's final classification reflects 
a level of risk and dangerousness that is current at a time when 
without an adjudication that a person is no longer an SDP is no 
longer possible under the statute.  See G. L. c. 123A, § 6A. 
                                                                  
 
 
 
24 
the offender's release is imminent furthers both SORB's interest, 
and that of the public, in protecting vulnerable members of the 
community through reliable notification of an offender's risk of 
reoffense and degree of dangerousness, and better protects Doe's 
liberty interest in receiving a classification that reflects 
consideration of current, rather than stale, risk factors.  We 
turn to a consideration whether any harm from Doe's premature 
classification may be remedied through SORB's reclassification 
procedures. 
b.  Availability of reclassification.  We do not agree that 
the reclassification procedure available under 803 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 1.37C(1), (2), ameliorates the potential harm to a sex 
offender's protected liberty interests.  As stated, the 
regulations provide that a sex offender must wait three years 
after the date of a final classification before requesting 
reclassification.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.37C (2).  In 
addition, the factors SORB is to consider in determining whether 
reclassification is warranted, and the evidence that a sex 
offender must present to establish a reduced risk of reoffense, 
clearly contemplate that the offender must be living in the 
community.  See, e.g., 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.37C(2)(c) 
(stability of home and work situation, successful completion of 
probation, and substance free lifestyle in the community).  
Therefore, a sex offender such as Doe, who is committed to the 
 
 
25 
treatment center, likely would be unable to make such a showing.  
Moreover, the reclassification procedure as defined in the 
regulations imposes on the offender the burden of establishing 
that his or her level of risk has been reduced, see 803 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 1.10(1), and neither an indigent nor a juvenile 
offender has the right to appointed counsel in connection with a 
reclassification hearing.  Compare 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.37C(5)(d) with 803 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 1.08, 1.14. 
The registration statute, by contrast, requires SORB to bear 
the burden of proving that a classification reflects a sex 
offender's current risk to the community.  See Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 972 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 428 Mass. 90, 
98 (1998).  If, in order to update the results of a final 
classification hearing that was prematurely conducted, Doe's only 
recourse were to seek reclassification, SORB effectively would be 
relieved of its burden.  Procedural due process is not satisfied 
where the burden to establish his or her level of risk is, in 
effect, shifted to the offender.  Nor is the statutory purpose 
advanced where a sex offender confined to the treatment center 
must meet this burden by producing evidence of a reduction in 
risk based largely on factors which, practically, require SORB to 
evaluate his or her lifestyle in the community.  See Roe v. 
Attorney Gen., 434 Mass. 418, 427 (2001), quoting Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 
 
26 
c.  Remedy.  Because final classification of Doe will have 
been based on stale and not on current information on his risk of 
reoffense at the time he is actually released, and the 
reclassification proceeding does not adequately address 
procedural due process concerns, the final classification of Doe 
made in 2012 must be vacated, and Doe's classification as a level 
three sex offender must be deemed preliminary.  Doe is entitled 
to a continuation of the evidentiary hearing, conducted in 
accordance with 803 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 1.07-1.26 (2013), at a 
time reasonably close to his actual release date; at that 
hearing, both Doe and SORB may introduce new evidence relevant to 
a final classification determination. 
At any such hearing, in addition to the newly introduced 
evidence, the hearing examiner may consider all the evidence 
introduced in 2012, as well as the first hearing examiner's 
findings.  If Doe does not introduce additional evidence, SORB 
may issue a final classification decision when Doe's release is 
imminent.  If additional evidence is introduced at a continued 
evidentiary hearing that takes place at a time anticipated to be 
reasonably close to Doe's actual release date,12 but parole or a 
12 The Appeals Court panel's decision in this case reasoned 
that a classification hearing held within ten months of a sex 
offender's potential discharge date adequately ensures that the 
offender's classification reflects an evaluation of his or her 
current risk at the time of discharge.  See Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 7083 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 86 Mass. 
                     
 
 
27 
petition for discharge is denied, Doe may seek a further 
evidentiary hearing, at a reasonable time prior to a subsequent 
proceeding,13 and both parties may introduce in evidence at that 
hearing further information relative to Doe's then-current risk 
of reoffense.  Cf. Doe No. 6904, 82 Mass. App. Ct. at 78 n.4 
(suggesting offender may petition to reopen evidentiary hearing 
if significant period of time has elapsed between final 
classification and offender's scheduled release). 
We note that other cases have raised similar concerns about 
the potential for classification determinations based on stale 
factors, see, e.g., Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 3839 v. 
Sex Offender Registry Bd., 472 Mass.     (2015); Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 3974 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 457 
Mass. 53, 60-61 (2010); Doe No. 6904, supra at 75-76, and it 
appears likely that the issue will continue to arise in future 
cases.  SORB may wish to address these concerns through 
comprehensive amendment of its regulations in a manner that 
ensures its internal procedures meet constitutional due process 
requirements, with cognizance of the administrative burdens such 
App. Ct. 1113 (2014) (unpublished).  While that reasoning may be 
correct, so long as the offender actually is discharged within 
ten months of the classification hearing, we need not decide the 
issue. 
 
13 The minimum one-year period between such proceedings, see 
G. L. c. 123A, § 9, would render invalid a determination based 
only on prior, stale evidence. 
 
                                                                  
 
 
 
28 
amendments may engender.  See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 
972 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 428 Mass. 90, 100 (1998). 
4.  Conclusion.  Because the 2012 classification of Doe as a 
level three sex offender will not reflect an evaluation of his 
current level of risk at the time of his discharge from the 
treatment center, the decision finally classifying Doe as a level 
three offender is invalid, and the Superior Court judge's order 
affirming that determination is erroneous.  Both must be vacated. 
The 2012 classification will remain preliminary until a 
reasonable time prior to Doe's actual release date.  At that 
time, Doe is entitled to reopen the evidentiary hearing, and to 
introduce new evidence relevant to his then-current level of 
risk.  SORB will then bear the burden of establishing Doe's then-
current level of risk and dangerousness to the community.  See 
G. L. c. 6, § 178L; 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.01.  If Doe does not 
seek to reopen the hearing, the preliminary classification will 
become final.  The matter is remanded to the Superior Court for 
entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered.