Case Title: Bogertman v. Attorney General

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12063

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12063  
 
 
 
 
TIMOTHY BOGERTMAN & others1  vs.  ATTORNEY GENERAL & another.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 2, 2016. - June 28, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, 
JJ. 
 
 
Initiative.  Constitutional Law, Initiative petition.  Attorney 
General.  Gaming. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on December 7, 2015. 
 
 
The case was reported by Cordy, J. 
 
 
 
Matthew S. Cameron for the plaintiffs. 
 
Elizabeth N. Dewar, Assistant State Solicitor, for the 
defendants. 
 
Jeffrey S. King & Hayley Trahan-Liptak, for Eugene McCain, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  In this appeal, we decide whether the Attorney 
General properly certified an initiative petition that seeks to 
                     
 
1 Matthew Cameron, Joseph Catricala, Meagan Catricala, Brian 
Gannon, Jesse Kollins, Gail Miller, Celeste Myers, Sandra Nijar, 
and John Ribeiro. 
 
 
2 Secretary of the Commonwealth. 
2 
 
amend G. L. c. 23K to authorize the Gaming Commission 
(commission) to award one additional license for a slot machine 
parlor.  Article 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts 
Constitution, which governs the process for presenting proposed 
laws directly to Massachusetts voters through popular 
initiatives, sets forth certain standards for initiative 
petitions.  In this case, the plaintiffs contend that the 
petition violates two of art. 48's restrictions, which prohibit 
initiative petitions that are (1) limited to local matters, or 
(2) substantially the same as those presented at either of the 
two preceding biennial State elections.  See art. 48, The 
Initiative, II, §§ 2, 3, of the Amendments to the Massachusetts 
Constitution, as amended by art. 74 of the Amendments.  We 
conclude that the petition complies with these provisions and 
was therefore properly certified by the Attorney General. 
 
Background.  In 2011, the Legislature enacted the Expanded 
Gaming Act, St. 2011, c. 194, which established the commission 
and a highly structured process for introducing, licensing, and 
regulating casino and slots gambling in the Commonwealth under a 
new statute, G. L. c. 23K.  See Abdow v. Attorney Gen., 468 
Mass. 478, 480-483 (2014) (describing Expanded Gaming Act).  
Chapter 23K authorizes the commission to award up to three 
"category 1" licenses for gaming establishments "with table 
games and slot machines" (i.e., casinos) in certain specified 
3 
 
regions of the Commonwealth, and no more than one "category 2" 
license for a gaming establishment "with no table games and not 
more than 1,250 slot machines" (i.e., a slots parlor).  See 
G. L. c. 23K, § 2 (defining category 1 and 2 licenses); G. L. 
c. 23K, § 19 (a) (specifying number and regional locations of 
category 1 licenses); G. L. c. 23K, § 20 (a) (specifying number 
of category 2 licenses).  Chapter 23K also requires the 
commission to request applications for category 2 slots parlor 
licenses before requesting applications for category 1 casino 
licenses.  See G. L. c. 23K, § 8 (a). 
 
On August 5, 2015, the proponent, Eugene McCain,3 filed an 
initiative petition for "An Act relative to expanded gaming," 
(petition 15-34 or petition), pursuant to art. 48.4  This 
petition seeks to amend G. L. c. 23K in two ways.  First, the 
petition would amend G. L. c. 23K, § 20, by adding a new 
subsection (g) that would authorize, but not require, the 
commission to award one additional category 2 slots parlor 
license to a qualified applicant, but only for a location that 
meets the following qualifications: 
"The proposed location of the gaming establishment shall be 
at least 4 acres large, and shall be adjacent to, and 
within 1500 feet of, a race track, including the track, 
                     
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Eugene 
McCain. 
 
 
4 The full text of petition 15-34 is set out in the 
Appendix. 
4 
 
grounds, paddocks, barns, auditorium, amphitheatre and/or 
bleachers, if any, where a horse racing meeting may 
physically be held, which race track shall have hosted a 
horse racing meeting, provided that said location is not 
separated from said race track by a highway or railway." 
 
Second, the petition would eliminate the timing requirement in 
G. L. c. 23K, § 8, so that the commission may solicit 
applications for a category 2 slots parlor license concurrently 
with or after the solicitation of applications for category 1 
casino licenses.5 
 
In a letter to the Secretary of the Commonwealth 
(Secretary) dated September 2, 2015, the Attorney General 
certified that 
"this measure is in proper form for submission to the 
people; that the measure is not, either affirmatively or 
negatively, substantially the same as any measure which has 
been qualified for submission or submitted to the people at 
either of the two preceding biennial state elections; and 
that it contains only subjects that are related or are 
mutually dependent and which are not excluded from the 
initiative process pursuant to Article 48, the Initiative, 
Part 2, Section 2." 
 
 
On December 7, 2015, the plaintiffs, ten registered voters 
and residents of Suffolk County, commenced an action against the 
Attorney General and the Secretary in the county court, seeking 
                     
 
5 Specifically, the proposed amendment would delete the 
first sentence from G. L. c. 23K, § 8 (a), which currently 
states:  "The commission shall issue a request for applications 
for category 1 and category 2 licenses; provided, however, that 
the commission shall first issue a request for applications for 
the category 2 licenses."  The amendment would replace the 
deleted language with a new sentence that simply states, "The 
commission shall issue a request for applications for category 1 
and category 2 licenses." 
5 
 
relief in the nature of certiorari and mandamus under G. L. 
c. 249, §§ 4 and 5, and requesting declaratory relief under 
G. L. c. 231A.  The plaintiffs allege in their complaint that 
the petition concerns an excluded local matter in violation of 
art. 48, because it would "restrict the newly-available license 
to gaming establishment proposals in the immediate vicinity of 
Suffolk Downs, a thoroughbred horse racing track which spans two 
municipalities (Boston and Revere) in Suffolk County."  In 
connection with that allegation, the plaintiffs submitted a 
September 12, 2015, Boston Globe article reporting that McCain, 
"the man who is driving the campaign" for the initiative 
petition, had an agreement to buy a mobile-home property near 
Suffolk Downs in Revere.  According to the article, McCain 
raised with Revere officials the prospect of putting slot 
machines at the site, although the city did not support the 
proposal.  The plaintiffs also allege that the petition violated 
art. 48's prohibition on presenting "substantially the same" 
measure as had been proposed within the two preceding biennial 
State elections, because in the November, 2014, election the 
voters had considered ballot question 3, entitled "Expanding 
Prohibitions on Gaming." 
 
On February 25, 2016, a single justice of the county court 
reserved and reported the case for determination by this court. 
6 
 
 
Discussion.  Article 48 of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution establishes the process and standards 
for enactment of a law by "popular initiative, which is the 
power of a specified number of voters to submit constitutional 
amendments and laws to the people for approval or rejection."  
Art. 48, I.  Article 48 requires that, before the proponents of 
an initiative petition can start the process of soliciting 
signatures from additional voters, submitting the petition to 
the Legislature for possible action, and placing it on the 
ballot, they must submit the petition by a certain date to the 
Attorney General for review.  Art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 3, 
as amended by art. 74.  The Attorney General must then decide 
whether to 
"certify that the measure and the title thereof are in 
proper form for submission to the people, and that the 
measure is not, either affirmatively or negatively, 
substantially the same as any measure which has been 
qualified for submission or submitted to the people at 
either of the two preceding biennial state elections, and 
that it contains only subjects not excluded from the 
popular initiative and which are related or which are 
mutually dependent." 
 
Id.  If the Attorney General certifies that the initiative 
petition meets these criteria, and the proponents submit the 
required number of additional signatures of qualified voters to 
the Secretary by a certain date, the Secretary will then 
transmit the initiative petition to the House of Representatives 
for consideration.  See id. § 4; art. 48, The Initiative, V, 
7 
 
§ 1, as amended by art. 81 of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution; Lincoln v. Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, 326 Mass. 313, 317-318 (1950).  If the Legislature 
fails to enact the proposed law by a certain date,6 and the 
proponents succeed in obtaining and timely submitting the 
required number of further additional signatures, then the 
Secretary will submit the initiative petition to the voters at 
the next State election.  Art. 48, The Initiative, V, § 1, as 
amended by art. 81. 
 
Thus, the Attorney General acts as the gatekeeper for the 
initiative process, ensuring that a proposed petition meets 
certain constitutional requirements before it can be submitted 
to the Legislature and the voters.  The Attorney General's 
review does not involve, however, an "inquiry into [the] 
substance" of a proposed measure; she is to be "not the censor, 
but the aid and interpreter of the people's will," allowing "the 
people [to] speak freely," with "as little restraint as 
possible."  Nigro v. Attorney Gen., 402 Mass. 438, 446-447 
(1988), quoting 2 Debates in the Massachusetts Constitutional 
Convention 1917-1918, at 728 (1918) (Constitutional Debates).  
                     
 
6 The legislative process is somewhat different for 
constitutional amendments proposed in an initiative petition.  
See art. 48, The Initiative, IV, §§ 1-5, of the Amendments to 
the Massachusetts Constitution, as amended by art. 81 of the 
Amendments. 
8 
 
See Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 
403 Mass. 203, 211 (1988) (Yankee II).     
 
We have long held that "the certificate of the Attorney 
General" concerning an initiative petition "is open to inquiry 
as to its conformity to the Constitution in appropriate 
proceedings."  Horton v. Attorney Gen., 269 Mass. 503, 508 
(1929).  We review the Attorney General's certification of an 
initiative petition de novo, Abdow, 468 Mass. at 487, 
"consider[ing] anew what facts are implicit in the language of 
the petition or are subject to judicial notice, but . . .  
defer[ring] to the Attorney General's reasonable determinations 
concerning facts subject to [her] official notice,"7 Associated 
Indus. of Mass. v. Attorney Gen., 418 Mass. 279, 286 (1994).  In 
undertaking our review, we also bear in mind "the firmly 
established principle that art. 48 is to be construed to support 
the people's prerogative to initiate and adopt laws."  Abdow, 
supra, at 487, quoting Carney v. Attorney Gen., 451 Mass. 803, 
814 (2008) (Carney II).  We do not weigh the wisdom of the 
policies underlying a proposed measure, but only whether the 
petition conforms to the constitutional requirements of art. 48.  
See Buckley v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 371 Mass. 195, 
202-203 (1976). 
                     
 
7 See part 1.c, infra, for further discussion of official 
notice. 
9 
 
 
1.  Local matters exclusion.  Article 48 provides that 
"[n]o measure . . . the operation of which is restricted to a 
particular town, city or other political division or to 
particular districts or localities of the commonwealth . . . 
shall be proposed by an initiative petition."  Art. 48, The 
Initiative, II, § 2.  The plaintiffs contend that petition 15-34 
violates this "local matters" exclusion because the petition is 
so narrowly drawn that only one existing site in the 
Commonwealth could meet its specifications while also being 
legally eligible for a new slots parlor license.  Our review of 
the Attorney General's certification of the petition is informed 
by the general principle favoring certification of proposed 
initiatives:  "unless it is reasonably clear that a proposal 
contains an excluded matter, neither the Attorney General nor 
this court on review should prevent the proposal from appearing 
on the ballot" (emphasis added).  Associated Indus. of Mass., 
418 Mass. at 287. 
 
a.  Purpose and scope.  We begin by reviewing the purpose 
and scope of the local matters exclusion in art. 48.  "The 
purpose of the local matters exclusion is to ensure that only 
matters of Statewide concern are put before the voters in an 
initiative petition," because "[m]atters of purely local or 
regional concern are not appropriately decided by all 
Massachusetts voters."  Abdow, 468 Mass. at 496, citing Carney 
10 
 
II, 451 Mass. at 811.  See Thompson v. Attorney Gen., 413 Mass. 
21, 23 (1992); Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n v. Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 209, 224 (1981).  As stated by a member 
of the committee on initiative and referendum that proposed art. 
48 during the Massachusetts constitutional convention of 1917-
1918: 
"Under the heading 'Excluded Matters', . . . the intention 
was to exclude purely local matters, matters that were not 
State wide matters.  A matter relating to a city or town 
should be dealt with by the Legislature or by that city or 
town, or by the Legislature referred to that city or town.  
It is clear that a matter referring to a particular city is 
not a matter of State wide interest that should be dealt 
with by the State wide initiative and referendum." 
 
Constitutional Debates, supra at 693 (comments of Joseph Walker 
of Brookline).8  In discussing the language of the local matters 
exclusion, Walker distinguished between "[l]aws that relate to a 
particular district or locality" and those that relate "to the 
Commonwealth as a whole."  Id.  As these comments suggest, the 
local matters exclusion serves to prevent the entire 
Massachusetts electorate from deciding issues involving 
particular municipalities or other political subdivisions that 
                     
 
8 "It is permissible to examine the debates of the 
Constitutional Convention for the purpose of ascertaining the 
views presented to the Convention and the understanding of its 
members, although the plain meaning of the words used in the 
Amendment cannot be thereby controlled."  Yont v. Secretary of 
the Commonwealth, 275 Mass. 365, 369 (1931).  See Buckley v. 
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 371 Mass. 195, 198-199 (1976). 
11 
 
do not concern them and that are more properly decided by the 
government or voters of those localities, or by the Legislature. 
 
Our previous decisions concerning the local matters 
exclusion have distinguished between two types of petitions.  
Where "the restriction to a particular town, city or other 
political subdivision or to particular districts or localities 
[is] specified in the law itself in terms which expressly or by 
fair implication are geographically descriptive of territorial 
divisions of the Commonwealth," the petition is barred by the 
local matters exclusion.  Mount Washington v. Cook, 288 Mass. 
67, 74 (1934), cited with approval in Abdow, 468 Mass. at 497; 
Carney II, 451 Mass. at 811; Ash v. Attorney Gen., 418 Mass. 
344, 348 (1994); and Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n, 384 Mass. at 
224.  For example, this court has advised the Legislature on 
many occasions that proposed laws were not proper subjects for 
an initiative or a referendum9 where they explicitly targeted 
particular counties, regions, or municipalities.  See, e.g., 
Opinion of the Justices, 334 Mass. 721, 724, 733, 743-744 (1956) 
(bill creating Massachusetts Port Authority to take over, 
                     
 
9 Article 48 contains a local matters exclusion for 
referendum petitions that is nearly identical to the exclusion 
for initiative petitions.  See art. 48, The Referendum, III, 
§ 2.  We therefore consider decisions applying the local matters 
exclusion to referendum petitions in deciding how to apply the 
local matters exclusion to initiative petitions.  See 
Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 
384 Mass. 209, 223 (1981). 
12 
 
finance, and operate Sumner tunnel in Boston, State-owned 
airports in East Boston and Bedford, Mystic River Bridge, and 
other port properties in Boston not subject to referendum due to 
local matters exclusion); Opinion of the Justices, 303 Mass. 
615, 618, 626 (1939) (bill for establishment of representative 
districts in counties that did not apply to Dukes and Nantucket 
Counties, and that operated differently in Suffolk County, not 
subject to referendum due to local matters exclusion); Opinion 
of the Justices, 294 Mass. 607, 608, 609 (1936) (initiative 
proposal requiring taxicab stands only in cities improper due to 
local matters exclusion); Opinion of the Justices, 261 Mass. 
523, 541, 554 (1927) (bill concerning Boston Elevated Railway 
Company not subject to referendum due to local matters 
exclusion, where assessment of costs and operation of bill were 
restricted to cities and towns where the railway operated).  See 
also Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n, supra at 223 (discussing 
application of local matters exclusion in these opinions). 
 
Where the proposed laws concerned Statewide issues and, on 
their face, applied Statewide, we have held that initiative 
petitions were not barred by the local matters exclusion even 
though, in practice, the laws might affect some localities 
significantly more than others.  See Abdow, 468 Mass. at 497-498 
(petition to prohibit various forms of gaming not barred by 
local matters exclusion, because it involved matter of Statewide 
13 
 
concern and applied Statewide, even though economic impact of 
Statewide ban would be greatest in existing or prospective host 
communities); Carney II, 451 Mass. at 810-813 (petition to 
eliminate parimutuel dog racing not barred by local matters 
exclusion, because it involved matter of Statewide concern and 
applied Statewide, even though opponents alleged it took "'dead 
aim' at the only two localities where dog racing . . . exist[ed] 
or [was] likely to exist in the foreseeable future"); Ash, 418 
Mass. at 347-349 (petition to ban rent control not barred by 
local matters exclusion, because it applied Statewide and 
involved issue of Statewide concern, even though rent control 
was only in effect in small number of municipalities); 
Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n, 384 Mass. at 224-225 (Proposition 
2½ not barred by local matters exclusion because it addressed 
matter of Statewide concern and applied in all areas of the 
Commonwealth, even though it had different consequences in 
various municipalities). 
 
b.  Application in this case.  Applying these principles to 
petition 15-34, we note, first, that it falls within a subject 
matter area -- gaming -- that is regulated by the State, not by 
municipalities or other political subdivisions, and is plainly 
an issue of Statewide concern.10  See Abdow, 468 Mass. at 497 
                     
 
10 The plaintiffs concede in their brief that "the general 
question of an additional gaming license might . . . be a 
14 
 
(proposal to prohibit casinos, slot machines, all games 
conducted under G. L. c. 23K, and parimutuel wagering was 
"plainly a matter of Statewide . . . concern"); Carney II, 451 
Mass. at 806, 812-813 (proposal to eliminate parimutuel dog 
racing involved issue of Statewide concern, since it was 
regulated at State level); Commonwealth v. Wolbarst, 319 Mass. 
291, 294-296 (1946) (discussing Commonwealth's "long established 
policy of dealing with gambling on a State wide basis").  
Wherever the second slots parlor license might be awarded, its 
economic "impact would be Statewide."  See Abdow, supra at 498.  
The construction workers who would build such a slots parlor, 
the employees who would operate it, and the visitors who would 
play the slots would not be limited to those residing in the 
host community, and the tax revenues anticipated from its 
operation would benefit State coffers.  See id.  The adverse 
consequences of slots parlor gambling claimed by gambling 
opponents, "including an increase in those suffering the 
psychological, social, and economic effects of 'gambling 
disorder,' . . . and higher crime rates, if they were to occur," 
would also not be limited to the host community.  Id.  These 
factors support submission of the petition to the entire 
Massachusetts electorate. 
                                                                  
suitable subject for a statewide ballot question in and of 
itself." 
15 
 
 
We further observe that, on its face, there is nothing in 
the language of the proposed law that explicitly refers, or 
restricts its operation, to any "particular town, city or other 
political division or to particular districts or localities of 
the commonwealth."  Art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 2.  To be 
sure, it contains a set of relatively narrow specifications:  
the location of the new slots parlor must be at least four acres 
large; it must be within 1,500 feet of a race track where a 
horse race may be physically held and in fact has been held; and 
it cannot be separated from the race track by a highway or 
railway.  But on their face, these requirements do not refer to 
any particular geographical location, and the plaintiffs have 
not demonstrated why a developer could not create a new 
entertainment complex that meets these specifications at any one 
of many possible locations across the Commonwealth where horse 
races have been held or could be conducted, and then proceed to 
apply for the new slots parlor license. 
 
We thus consider whether, even if the proposed law is not 
expressly limited to a particular locality, it contains terms 
that "by fair implication are geographically descriptive of 
territorial divisions of the Commonwealth," and thereby 
improperly restrict its application to local matters.  Mount 
Washington, 288 Mass. at 74.  The plaintiffs urge us to take 
judicial notice that the petition's "proponent Eugene McCain has 
16 
 
a property interest in land which . . . is the only site in the 
Commonwealth which meets these carefully-drafted specifications 
while also being legally eligible for a new license application" 
(footnote omitted).  These asserted facts are not appropriate 
for judicial notice, and, even if they were, they would not 
suffice to show that the proposed law is limited to local 
matters. 
 
We may take judicial notice of facts of common knowledge 
that are indisputably true.  See Provencal v. Commonwealth 
Health Ins. Connector Auth., 456 Mass. 506, 515 n.16 (2010), 
citing Nantucket v. Beinecke, 379 Mass. 345, 352 (1979).  See 
also Mass. G. Evid. § 201(b) (2016) ("The court may judicially 
notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because 
it [1] is generally known within the trial court's territorial 
jurisdiction or [2] can be accurately and readily determined 
from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned"). 
 
Here, it is certainly not a matter of common knowledge that 
McCain has an interest in a property that meets the 
specifications in the proposed law, still less that it is the 
only property in the Commonwealth that could meet those 
specifications while also being eligible for the proposed slots 
parlor license.  Nor have the plaintiffs brought to our 
attention unimpeachable records that would unquestionably 
establish these alleged facts.  Although the plaintiffs have 
17 
 
proffered a newspaper article in support of their claims, the 
article does not definitively state all of these allegations 
and, in any event, we must disregard it as hearsay.11  See Costa 
v. Fall River Hous. Auth., 453 Mass. 614, 628 (2009). 
 
Nor can we say that all of the plaintiffs' allegations are 
indisputably true.  See Provencal, 456 Mass. at 515 n.16.  The 
record indicates that there is a dispute over how many locations 
with existing race tracks nearby might be eligible for a slots 
parlor license under the specifications in the proposed law.  As 
the plaintiffs stipulated, "[t]he proponent and opponents of 
petition 15-34, in their various memoranda on certification to 
the Attorney General, debated which, and how many, currently-
existing race tracks in the Commonwealth could meet the specific 
site requirements set forth in the proposed law."  A memorandum 
submitted by counsel for the proponent asserts that the proposed 
siting criteria would "apply to at least [ten] municipalities 
containing horse race tracks scattered throughout the 
Commonwealth, which have already hosted horse racing meetings."  
An opposition memorandum disputes that assertion, but presents 
                     
 
11 The article states that "[t]he language of the ballot 
petition . . . seemed tailor-written for Suffolk Downs," and 
that McCain "has an agreement to buy the mobile-home property 
down the parkway from Suffolk Downs."  But it does not 
unequivocally state that the property meets the specifications 
in the proposed law or that it is the only property in the 
Commonwealth that would be eligible for the proposed slots 
parlor license. 
18 
 
specific arguments challenging only two of the potential sites 
listed.  Even the plaintiffs acknowledge in their brief that 
there are "three presently identifiable sites in the 
Commonwealth" -- Brockton Fairgrounds, Plainridge Park, and 
Suffolk Downs -- near which the proposed slots parlor might be 
located.  The plaintiffs argue that the Brockton Fairgrounds and 
Plainridge Park locations would not be eligible for the proposed 
slots license, leaving Suffolk Downs as the only possible 
choice, but those arguments are open to question.  The 
plaintiffs ask us to take notice that the city of Brockton has 
entered into an agreement under which the city has pledged to 
work with Mass Gaming & Entertainment, LLC, to support that 
entity's application for a category 1 casino license at the 
Brockton Fairgrounds.  But it appears that application was 
rejected by the commission on April 28, 2016.12  The plaintiffs 
also assert that Plainridge Park is already the holder of a 
category 2 license and therefore would not be eligible for a 
second license under G. L. c. 23K, § 23 (d).  But the 
proponent's memorandum argues that Plainville, the town where 
Plainridge Park is located, would not be excluded as a location 
                     
 
12 See Gaming Commission, Transcript, Public Meeting no. 
188, vol. 3, at 121-122 (Apr. 28, 2016), http://massgaming.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/Transcript-4-28-16-REGION-C-UPDATE.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9QGF-PVCD]. 
19 
 
by this provision; only the actual license holder or its 
affiliates would be barred from seeking a second license. 
 
Even if we were to accept as true all of the plaintiffs' 
allegations that the petition's specifications would limit the 
slots parlor license to a single site among existing race 
tracks, i.e., Suffolk Downs, that still would not render the 
petition improper under the local matters exclusion because 
nothing would prohibit a developer from building a new race 
track in the Commonwealth, holding a horse race there (subject 
to licensing),13 and then seeking to license an adjacent slots 
parlor that fits within the terms of the proposed law.  Although 
we acknowledge that there might be considerable practical 
economic obstacles to such an undertaking, "[t]hat the present 
economic realities of the industry might make this prospect 
unlikely to materialize is irrelevant" (emphasis in original).  
Carney II, 451 Mass. at 812.  The initiative petition does not 
run afoul of the local matters exclusion where the second slots 
parlor license it proposes could potentially be awarded to a 
site in many localities, even if it were most likely that it 
would be awarded to a site near Suffolk Downs.  See id. at 810-
812 (rejecting argument that proposed law outlawing dog racing 
                     
 
13 The plaintiffs have not directed us to any limitation on 
the number of horse racing licenses available in the 
Commonwealth; nor are we aware of any.  See G. L. c. 128A, § 2, 
as amended through St. 2011, c. 194, § 38. 
20 
 
should be excluded from initiative process because there were 
only two localities where dog racing currently existed or was 
likely to exist in foreseeable future). 
 
The plaintiffs also contend that the initiative is improper 
because it automatically excludes all cities and towns that lack 
sufficient developable acreage to meet the size requirements of 
the proposed law.  We do not find this argument persuasive.  The 
four-acre size requirement is not prohibitively large, amounting 
to only 0.00625 square miles, and cities and towns that are 
fully developed might still choose to redevelop a parcel.  And 
even assuming that the four-acre requirement might favor some 
cities or towns over others, the local matters exclusion "does 
not require that a proposed statute have uniform, Statewide 
application" (emphasis added).  Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n, 
384 Mass. at 224. 
 
It may well be true that this petition was motivated by one 
person's desire to profit from the Commonwealth's developing 
gaming industry, based on his ownership interest in a particular 
property; the interests that propel both proponents and 
opponents of initiative petitions may often involve self-
interest rather than the public interest.  But our focus in 
deciding whether an initiative petition reaches the voters must 
be on the actual law proposed by the petition, not on the 
motives that may lie behind it; the voters may consider those 
21 
 
motives in deciding how they vote on the petition.  Because the 
language of the proposed law would permit the additional slots 
parlor to be located at many potential sites in the 
Commonwealth, it is not reasonably clear that the petition 
contains terms that "by fair implication are geographically 
descriptive of territorial divisions of the Commonwealth."  
Mount Washington, 288 Mass. at 74.  The petition, if approved by 
the voters of Massachusetts, would not require that the 
additional slots parlor license be awarded only to an applicant 
located near Suffolk Downs. 
 
c.  Factual examination by Attorney General.  The 
plaintiffs also contend that the Attorney General failed to 
conduct an adequate factual inquiry concerning the petition's 
alleged inclusion of excluded local matters.  We have previously 
held, however, that "the Attorney General is not to become 
involved with holding extensive hearings to determine the full 
factual impact of a petition."  Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. 
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 402 Mass. 750, 758 (1988) (Yankee 
I).  Rather, "the factual examination required of the Attorney 
General is limited to matters implicit in the language of the 
petition and to matters of which the Attorney General may 
properly take official notice."  Yankee II, 403 Mass. at 205.  
"Official notice includes matters subject to judicial notice, as 
well as additional items of which an agency official may take 
22 
 
notice due to the agency's established familiarity with and 
expertise regarding a particular subject area."  Id., quoting 
Yankee I, supra at 759 n.7.  Such facts, we have said, can be 
"quickly determined," so that the Attorney General's 
"determinations w[ill] not involve undue delay which might 
frustrate the initiative process."  Yankee I, supra at 759. 
 
In this case, the Attorney General has stipulated that she 
did not take official notice of how many race tracks currently 
existing in the Commonwealth would meet the requirements set 
forth in the proposed law.  But she was not obligated to do so 
where the facts alleged by the plaintiffs are not appropriate 
for judicial notice.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 201(b).  Nor have the 
plaintiffs demonstrated that there were any additional matters 
that the Attorney General should have officially noticed based 
on her office's established familiarity and expertise.  In light 
of the deference due the Attorney General's reasonable 
determinations concerning facts subject to her official notice, 
see Associated Indus. of Mass., 418 Mass. at 286, we conclude 
that the Attorney General was not required to undertake further 
factual investigation. 
 
2.  Exclusion of "substantially the same" matters.  Article 
48 also requires the Attorney General to certify that "the 
measure is not, either affirmatively or negatively, 
substantially the same as any measure which has been qualified 
23 
 
for submission or submitted to the people at either of the two 
preceding biennial state elections."  See art. 48, The 
Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by art. 74.  This provision 
appears to have been intended especially to prevent "the 
constant forcing of . . . questions which have been rejected."  
Constitutional Debates, supra at 673.  But it also prohibits 
hasty efforts to repeal laws previously enacted by initiative.  
See Opinion of the Justices, 422 Mass. 1212, 1225 (1996) (art. 
48 "prohibit[s] initiative proposals relating to measures the 
substance of which were enacted in either of the two prior 
State-wide elections"). 
    The plaintiffs contend that the Attorney General improperly 
certified the petition because it is "substantially the same" as 
question 3 on the 2014 ballot, which sought to prohibit casinos, 
slots parlors, and wagering on simulcast greyhound races.  To 
address this issue, we must construe the meaning of the phrase 
"substantially the same," which we have not previously 
interpreted in this context.14 
 
We have previously interpreted "substantially," in other 
contexts, as meaning "really or essentially."  See Bennett v. 
                     
 
14 In Opinion of the Justices, 422 Mass. 1212, 1224 (1996), 
the justices considered an initiative petition that would have 
revised a term limits law that had just been enacted through the 
initiative process.  They concluded that the new petition was 
substantially the same as the previously enacted initiative 
petition but did not specifically analyze or construe the phrase 
"substantially the same."  See id. at 1224-1225. 
24 
 
Newell, 266 Mass. 127, 131 (1929), citing Commonwealth v. 
Wentworth, 118 Mass. 441, 442 (1875).  See also Hollinger Inc. 
v. Hollinger Int'l, Inc., 858 A.2d 342, 377 (Del. Ch. 2004) 
("Substantially conveys the same meaning as 'considerably' and 
'essentially' because it means 'to a great extent or degree' and 
communicates that it is very nearly the same thing . . ." 
[footnote omitted]).  We have also said that where two matters 
are "substantially the same," there is "no substantive 
difference between" them.  Haran v. Board of Registration in 
Med., 398 Mass. 571, 574-575 (1986). 
 
We also note that an earlier version of the "substantially 
the same" provision of art. 48, as presented at the 
constitutional convention, required the Attorney General to 
certify that "the measure petitioned for is not, either in form 
or in essential substance, either affirmatively or negatively, 
the same as any measure which has been submitted to the people" 
(emphasis added).  Constitutional Debates, supra at 675-676.  
The committee on form and phraseology subsequently revised this 
provision and adopted the language that currently appears in 
art. 48, requiring the Attorney General to certify that the 
measure "is not, either affirmatively or negatively, 
substantially the same as any measure which has been qualified 
for submission or submitted to the people."  Id. at 953.  In so 
doing, the committee commented that "[n]o change has been made 
25 
 
in the document that affects its meaning one way or the other."  
Id. at 959. 
 
Accordingly, we interpret the phrase "substantially the 
same" in art. 48 to mean "essentially the same," or "with little 
or no substantive difference."  Thus, a measure would be 
"affirmatively or negatively, substantially the same" as a 
previous measure where it affirms or negates essentially the 
same provisions, with little or no substantive difference. 
 
With that standard in mind, we now compare question 3 and 
petition 15-34.  The law proposed in question 3, which was 
rejected by the voters in the November, 2014, election, 
contained two elements.  First, it would have revised the 
definition of "illegal gaming" under G. L. c. 4, § 7, Tenth, to 
prohibit casinos, slots parlors, and parimutuel wagering on 
simulcast greyhound races.  Second, it would have added a new 
§ 72 to G. L. c. 23K, prohibiting any "illegal gaming" as 
redefined in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Tenth, and barring the commission 
from accepting or approving any application to conduct "illegal 
gaming."  Thus, it would have effectively nullified all of the 
other provisions of G. L. c. 23K.  See Abdow, 468 Mass. at 483-
484 (describing initiative petition that resulted in question 
3).  By contrast, petition 15-34 merely seeks to make one 
incremental change in the licensing scheme for slots parlors by 
authorizing the commission to award a second license. 
26 
 
 
We conclude that these two measures are not substantially 
the same, either affirmatively or negatively.  Question 3 asked 
whether the voters wanted to prohibit casinos, slots parlors, 
and wagering on simulcast greyhound races.  Petition 15-34 asks 
whether the voters want to permit the licensing of a second 
slots parlor adjacent to a horse racing track. 
 
Nor is there any actual overlap in the specific legal 
provisions of the two proposed measures.  Question 3 would have 
amended G. L. c. 4, § 7, Tenth, and added a new § 72 to G. L. 
c. 23K.  Petition 15-34 would amend G. L. c. 23K, §§ 8 and 20.  
Therefore, petition 15-34 does "not propose (or seek to repeal 
or change) a law that has been voted on in either of the last 
two State-wide elections."  Opinion of the Justices, 422 Mass. 
at 1224.  The two measures overlap only insofar as, at the 
highest level of generality, they both concern slots parlors.  
We do not think that is enough to establish that question 3 and 
petition 15-34 are substantially the same, where they are 
otherwise so different in scope and subject matter.  We 
therefore conclude that the Attorney General correctly certified 
that petition 15-34 is not, either affirmatively or negatively, 
substantially the same as any measure that has been qualified 
for submission or submitted to the people at either of the two 
preceding biennial State elections. 
27 
 
 
Conclusion.  Having determined that the Attorney General 
properly certified petition 15-34 pursuant to art. 48, The 
Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by art. 74, we remand the case 
to the county court for entry of a declaratory judgment to that 
effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
Appendix. 
 
An Act Relative To Expanded Gaming 
 
 
Be it enacted by the People, and by their authority: 
 
 
SECTION 1.  Subsection (a) of Section 8 of Chapter 23K of 
the General Laws, as appearing in the 2012 Official Edition is 
hereby amended by striking out the first sentence and inserting 
in place thereof the following sentence:-  The commission shall 
issue a request for applications for category 1 and category 2 
licenses. 
 
 
SECTION 2.  Section 20 of said Chapter 23K of the General 
Laws, as so appearing, is hereby amended by adding the following 
subsection:- 
 
(g)  Notwithstanding any general or special law, rule, or 
regulation to the contrary, the commission may issue 1 
additional category 2 license; provided, however, that the 
additional category 2 license shall only be issued to 
applicants who are qualified under the criteria set forth 
in this chapter as determined by the commission and that 
the additional category 2 license meet the following 
additional qualification: 
 
(1)  The proposed location of the gaming establishment 
shall be at least 4 acres large, and shall be adjacent to, 
and within 1500 feet of, a race track, including the track, 
grounds, paddocks, barns, auditorium, amphitheatre and/or 
bleachers, if any, where a horse racing meeting may 
physically be held, which race track shall have hosted a 
horse racing meeting, provided that said location is not 
separated from said race track by a highway or railway.