Case Title: ALEXIS MAJORS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0157

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-04-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
ALEXIS MAJORS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 63Case Number: No. S-10-0157Decided: 04/13/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011

 
 

ALEXIS 
MAJORS,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Washakie County

The 
Honorable Robert E. Skar, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel; David E. 
Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Westling.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Justin A. 
Daraie, Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Daraie.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Ms. Majors was 
convicted after a jury trial of misdemeanor possession of marijuana and felony 
possession of ecstasy.  On appeal, 
she claims the district court erred when it denied her motion for a mistrial 
which was based upon the mid-trial discovery that the bailiff had been a member 
of the investigative team, admitted a recording of a drug transaction between a 
confidential informant and Ms. Majors' mother and denied her motion for 
sanctions based upon law enforcement's failure to collect as evidence a bottle 
which was shown in the prosecution photos.  
We conclude that the district court's rulings were appropriate except as 
to the recording.  The recording was 
inadmissible hearsay and the district court's erroneous admission of the 
recording was prejudicial with respect to the ecstasy charge.  Consequently, we reverse Ms. Majors' 
ecstasy possession conviction and affirm her marijuana possession 
conviction.   

            
 

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Ms. Majors 
presents the following issues on appeal:

 
 

I.              
Did 
the trial court err by allowing a sheriff's deputy who participated in the 
investigation of the case at bar to act as the court's bailiff and take charge 
of the jury and then further err by denying Ms. Major's motion for a mistrial, 
thereby denying her due process of law?

 
 

II.            
Did 
the trial court err by admitting a recording containing hearsay statements from 
a third party allegedly implicating Alexis Majors in the delivery of controlled 
substances despite the fact that those statements did not fall within any 
recognized exceptions to the prohibitions against admitting hearsay 
evidence?

 
 

III.           
Did 
the trial court err in refusing to grant Ms. Majors' motion for sanctions 
against the State of Wyoming for not preserving possible exculpatory evidence 
and not disclosing the exist[e]nce of the same? 

 
 
Although 
phrased differently, the State articulates the same 
issues.

 
 
 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Ms. Majors was a 
University of Wyoming student residing in Laramie, Wyoming at the time of the 
events at issue in this case.  On 
April 30, 2009, a confidential informant purchased marijuana from Ms. Majors' 
mother, Danelle Smith, in a controlled buy in Worland, Wyoming.  The transaction was audio recorded by 
the Washakie County Sheriff's Department.  
The confidential informant also asked Ms. Smith about obtaining some 
ecstasy.  Ms. Smith stated that she 
did not have any but that "Lex" could bring some next time she came back.    

 
 
[¶4]      The sheriff's 
department executed a no-knock search warrant on Ms. Smith's house on May 3, 
2009.  When the officers entered the 
house, Ms. Majors was sitting on the couch near a black bag.  The black bag held various drug related 
paraphernalia, including a glass bottle containing marijuana, a plastic 
"prescription" bottle containing ecstasy tablets and money used during the 
controlled buy from Ms. Smith on April 30th.  More controlled substances were located 
in other areas of the house, including Ms. Smith's bedroom.    

 
 
[¶5]      The State charged 
Ms. Majors with one count of unlawful possession with intent to deliver 
marijuana and one count of unlawful possession with intent to deliver ecstasy, 
both in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a) (LexisNexis 2009).1  The district court conducted a jury 
trial.  During the second day of 
trial, the district court discovered that a sheriff's deputy who had helped with 
the search of Ms. Smith's home was acting as the trial bailiff.  Ms. Majors moved for a mistrial, 
claiming a violation of her right to a fair trial.  The district court denied her mistrial 
motion, but appointed a different officer to act as bailiff for the remainder of 
the trial.  The district court also 
denied Ms. Majors' motion for sanctions based upon the State's failure to 
collect a pill bottle which was shown in the photographs of the contents of the 
black bag.  As part of its case in 
chief, the State was allowed to play, over defense objection, the audio 
recording of the controlled buy between Ms. Smith and the confidential 
informant.      
    

 
 
[¶6]      At the conclusion 
of the trial, the jury acquitted Ms. Majors of the delivery charges but 
convicted her of the lesser included charges of possession.  The marijuana possession charge was a 
misdemeanor, but the ecstasy possession charge was a felony.  Ms. Majors appealed.   

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
 
 

A.   Bailiff 
as Witness

 
 
[¶7]      Deputy Al Nelson 
was involved in the search of Ms. Smith's home as the K-9 (drug dog) 
handler.  He apparently was not 
initially listed as a witness for either the State or the defendant.  At the beginning of the trial, the 
district court appointed Deputy Nelson as the trial bailiff.  As part of his duties, he gathered the 
jury notebooks, conducted the jury back and forth between the courtroom and the 
jury room during breaks, etc.    

 
 
[¶8]      During the second 
day of trial, one of the other investigating officers mentioned that Deputy 
Nelson and his drug dog were involved in the search of Ms. Smith's 
residence.  The district court judge 
called the attorneys into chambers, but those proceedings were not 
reported.  Upon returning to the 
courtroom, the district court told the jury:

 
 
For 
the record, we took a break.  The 
Court became cognizant of the fact that . . . our Bailiff is the drug dog guy, 
okay.  So I need to replace the 
Bailiff for the remainder of the trial.

 
 
[¶9]      After another 
break, defense counsel moved for a mistrial because the bailiff participated in 
the search and was a potential witness.  
When asked if the defense intended to call Deputy Nelson as a witness, 
defense counsel stated that it may be necessary because the primary 
investigating officer could not testify as to whether the dog alerted on the 
black bag or Ms. Majors' other property.  
The district court denied the mistrial motion, stating that counsel 
should have known about Deputy Nelson's involvement from the police 
reports.  The judge stated that he 
would simply replace the bailiff.   

 
 
[¶10]   Defense counsel called Deputy 
Nelson as a witness.  He testified 
that he participated in the search of Ms. Smith's residence on May 3, 2009, 
stating he "deployed [his] K-9 for a K-9 sniff of that residence."  On direct examination, Deputy Nelson 
testified that the dog alerted to a bedroom dresser and the black bag.  He further stated that the dog did not 
alert to anything else in the residence, including any backpacks, suitcases or 
luggage, or to any of the vehicles at the residence.     

 
 
[¶11]   Ms. Majors claims the district 
court erred by denying her mistrial motion.  We review a district court's denial of a 
motion for a mistrial by applying the abuse of discretion standard.  Thomas v. State, 2006 WY 34, ¶ 
10, 131 P.3d 348, 352 (Wyo. 2006).  
A district court "abuses its discretion when it could not have reasonably 
concluded as it did."  Id., citing Gunnett v. State, 
2005 WY 8, ¶ 15, 104 P.3d 775, 779 (Wyo. 2005).  

 
 
[¶12]   Advancing her argument that the 
district court should have granted her motion for a mistrial, Ms. Majors cites 
to two primary casesTurner v. Louisiana, 
379 U.S. 466, 85 S. Ct. 546, 13 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1965) and Romo v. State, 500 P.2d 678 (Wyo. 
1972).  In Turner, the United States Supreme Court 
reversed the defendant's capital conviction, concluding he was denied the right 
to a fair trial by an impartial jury because the trial court placed two 
sheriff's deputies, who were also the key prosecution witnesses, in charge of 
the jury during the trial.  The 
deputies had freely mingled and conversed with the jury while the jury was 
sequestered during the trial.  Id. at 467-68, 85 S. Ct.  at 547.  The Supreme Court 
stated:

 
 
In 
the constitutional sense, trial by jury in a criminal case necessarily implies 
at the very least that the "evidence developed" against a defendant shall 
come from the witness stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial 
protection of the defendant's right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and 
of counsel. What happened in this case operated to subvert these basic 
guarantees of trial by jury. It is to be emphasized that the testimony of [the 
two deputies] was not confined to some uncontroverted or merely formal aspect of 
the case for the prosecution. On the contrary, the credibility which the jury 
attached to the testimony of these two key witnesses must inevitably have 
determined whether Wayne Turner was to be sent to his death. To be sure, their 
credibility was assailed by Turner's counsel through cross-examination in open 
court. But the potentialities of what went on outside the courtroom during the 
three days of the trial may well have made these courtroom proceedings little 
more than a hollow formality.

 
 
It 
is true that at the time they testified in open court [the deputies] told the 
trial judge that they had not talked to the jurors about the case itself. But 
there is nothing to show what the two deputies discussed in their conversations 
with the jurors thereafter.  And 
even if it could be assumed that the deputies never did discuss the case 
directly with any members of the jury, it would be blinking reality not to 
recognize the extreme prejudice inherent in this continual association 
throughout the trial between the jurors and these two key witnesses for the 
prosecution. We deal here not with a brief encounter, but with a continuous and 
intimate association throughout a three-day trial . . . . 

 
 
 
 

Id. 
at 
472-73, 85 S. Ct.  at 550 (footnotes and citations omitted).  See also, Gonzales v. Beto, 405 U.S. 1052, 92 S. Ct. 1503, 31 L. Ed. 2d 787 (1972) (reversing the defendant's conviction because 
a county sheriff, who was the prosecution's key witness, served as 
bailiff).  

 
 
[¶13]   In Romo, 500 P.2d  at 680-82, we reversed 
the defendant's conviction on a second degree murder charge because three jurors 
had lunch with two police officers, one of whom was a principal witness in the 
case.  Although the officers 
testified that they did not discuss the case with the jurors, we held the 
communication was improper and rebuttably presumed to be prejudicial.  We noted that reversal was required 
because "the witness who commingled with the jury was a police officer and also 
a principal witness for the prosecution, and therefore, a part of the 
prosecution team."  Id. at 682.  

 
 
[¶14]   Applying these principles to the 
case at bar, we conclude that it was 
improper for an officer who participated in the investigation to act as bailiff 
at the trial.  Although the district 
court placed the blame for allowing Deputy Nelson to be appointed as bailiff 
 on counsel, it was the judge's 
responsibility to make sure that such a situation did not occur.  Judges are required to supervise their 
staffs and make sure they follow the Code of Judicial Conduct.  Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 
2.12.  Rules 2.11(A)(1) and 2.12 of 
the Code of Judicial Conduct mandate disqualification of a judge, or any member 
of his staff, when "he has personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in 
the proceeding."  Because he had 
participated in the investigation, Deputy Nelson had personal knowledge of the 
facts in dispute and should have been disqualified from acting as bailiff in 
this case.  

 
 
[¶15]   Although we have concluded that the 
appointment of one of the investigating officers as bailiff was erroneous, in 
resolving whether the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion 
for a mistrial, we must determine whether it reasonably could have concluded 
that Ms. Majors was not denied her constitutional right to due process and a 
fair trial by an impartial jury.  In 
undertaking that analysis, we must consider the potential for prejudice.  See State v. Ford, 742 N.W.2d 61, 63 (Wis. 
2007) (stating that any error in allowing a witness to serve as bailiff must be 
shown to be prejudicial to mandate reversal).  

 
 
[¶16]   Unlike the officers in Turner and Romo, Deputy Nelson was not a principal 
witness in the case.  In fact, he 
apparently was not even initially listed as a possible witness by either 
side.  It was not until the primary 
investigating officer could not answer certain questions about the drug dog 
alerts that Deputy Nelson's testimony was determined to be necessary by the 
defense.  Moreover, Deputy Nelson's 
testimony was not particularly critical and was, in fact, helpful to the defense 
because he testified that the dog did not alert on any of Ms. Majors' other 
belongings (except the black bag, which the other officers had already 
discussed) or her car.     

 
 
[¶17]   The record does not contain any 
specific information about the nature of the communication between Deputy Nelson 
and the jury.  We do know that, 
according to the district court, Deputy Nelson performed the typical duties of a 
bailiff.  The judge 
explained:

 
 
            
I will note for the record that we have gone through one day of trial, 
we're into the second day of trial, and Mr. Nelson did  was present at the time 
of jury selection, he did take charge of the jury after his oath and after the 
jury was seated after the break following the selection of the jury.  Also that there is one, one break 
mid-morning and then following that break for the lunchtime, and Bailiff Nelson 
did make sure that the  he collected the jury notebooks and that sort of 
thing.

 
 
[¶18]   There is absolutely no evidence in 
the record that Deputy Nelson did anything as bailiff other than the routine, 
administrative matters he was charged with performing.  W.R.Cr.P. 24.1(a) makes the bailiff 
responsible for collecting jury notebooks, and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-201 
(LexisNexis 2009) states that the court will place the jury in the custody of 
the appropriate officer.  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-11-207 (LexisNexis 2009) provides specific directions to the bailiff 
about communicating with the jury:  
"The officer having [the jury] under his charge shall not allow any 
communication to be made to them nor make any himself except to ask them if they 
have agreed upon their verdict, unless by order of the court."  We assume, for the purposes of this 
case, that Deputy Nelson communicated with the jury to the extent permitted by 
law.  

 
 
[¶19]   In many respects, this case is like 
Ford, 742 N.W.2d 61.  In that case, the victim was working as 
a convenience store clerk when the defendant assaulted him.  At trial, the victim was asked who 
recommended that he contact the police after the assault and he "responded by 
pointing to the bailiff."  The 
defendant moved for a mistrial, arguing the bailiff could be an important 
defense witness.  The court denied 
the motion for a mistrial because there was no indication that the bailiff had 
any improper communication with the jury and he was not listed as a State 
witness.  The court did, however, 
appoint a different bailiff for the reminder of the trial.  Id. at 64.  

 
 
[¶20]   The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the 
defendant's motion for a mistrial.  
Id. at 72.  The court emphasized that the bailiff 
was not a witness in the case and there was no showing of close or improper 
contact between the jury and the bailiff.   Id. at 69-70.  While there is a distinction between Ford and the case at bar, in that Deputy 
Nelson did help investigate the crime and ended up testifying on a minor element 
of the case, we believe that the circumstances are sufficiently similar to 
justify applying Ford's rationale to 
the case at bar.    

 
 
[¶21]   We cannot say that Ms. Majors was 
prejudiced by the admittedly unorthodox procedures employed here.  Deputy Nelson was not a key witness and 
there is no indication of any improper contacts between him and jury.  Consequently, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion by denying Ms. Majors' motion for a 
mistrial.

 
 
 
 

B.   Audio 
Tape/Hearsay 

 
 
[¶22]   As described in the statement of 
facts, law enforcement audio recorded the April 30, 2009, drug transaction 
between Ms. Smith and the confidential informant.  At trial, the State moved for admission 
of the recording during the confidential informant's testimony.  Ms. Majors objected to the recording as 
hearsay, and the prosecution responded:  
"It's not hearsay, it's the actual conversation and it's the best 
evidence of the conversation."    

 
 
[¶23]   The district court allowed the 
recording to be played, although it indicated that it was only allowing counsel 
to "proceed with the identification" of it.  Later, the court officially admitted the 
recording into evidence.  The 
recording included conversations between law enforcement and the confidential 
informant and a conversation between the confidential informant and Ms. 
Smith.  The recording was very 
difficult to understand in places; consequently, the confidential informant was 
asked to explain various parts of the recording at trial.  She stated that Ms. Smith gave her two 
bags of marijuana and she then asked about obtaining some ecstasy.  We are unable to understand the 
recording, but the confidential informant was allowed to testify that Ms. Smith 
said that "Lex," who she identified as Ms. Majors, had a "whole bunch" of 
ecstasy.  Ms. Smith stated that she 
would tell "Lex" to bring some back with her.  Defense counsel objected to the 
confidential informant's interpretation of Ms. Smith's statements, but the 
district court allowed it.    

 
 
[¶24]   On appeal, Ms. Majors claims the 
district court erred by allowing the hearsay testimony contained in the 
recording to be admitted into evidence at trial.  The State asserts that the evidence was 
properly admitted because: 1) it was not hearsay; or 2) even if it was hearsay, 
it was admissible under the state of mind exception to the rule.2  The district court's decision as to the 
admissibility of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion.3  Szymanski v. State, 2007 WY 139, ¶ 15, 
166 P.3d 879, 883 (Wyo. 2007).  A 
district court abuses its discretion if it could not have reasonably concluded 
as it did.  "In this context, 
reasonably' means sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without being arbitrary or capricious.'"  Id.

 
 
[¶25]   Hearsay is not admissible except as 
specifically provided by court rule or statute. W.R.E. 802.  W.R.E. 801 defines hearsay as: 

 
 

(c) 
Hearsay.   "Hearsay" is a statement, other than 
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted.

 
 
The 
recorded statements at issue here were made outside of court and, therefore, 
qualify under the basic definition of hearsay.  W.R.E. 801(c).  

 
 
[¶26]   The State argues, however, that the 
statements were not hearsay because they were only elicited for the purpose of 
providing context to the later search and not for the truth of the matter 
asserted, i.e., that Ms. Majors had a "whole bunch" of ecstasy and would bring 
the drugs "back" with her.  In Schreibvogel v. State, 2010 WY 45, ¶ 28, 
228 P.3d 874, 884 (Wyo. 2010), we discussed statements that are admitted for a 
non-hearsay purpose:

 
 
If 
the testimony was elicited in an effort to provide context for the officer's 
investigation, rather than for the truth of the matter asserted, it is 
admissible for a limited purpose. Olson v. State, 698 P.2d 107, 114 
(Wyo.1985). In such a situation, a limiting instruction would be appropriate if 
requested by the defendant.  

 
 
[¶27]   The State's argument that the 
statements were not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted is belied by 
the prosecutor's closing argument.  
After replaying the recorded statement for the jury during closing 
argument, the prosecutor stated:

 
 
You 
don't have to believe [the confidential informant], but just listen to that tape 
and hear Ms. Smith say, "We're out, we are definitely out, Lex can get some of 
that, Lex has a lot of that."  
Listen to it.  You guys have 
to decide on that.  But that's the 
government's case.   

 
 
The 
prosecutor continued:

 
 
Did 
Miss Majors possess the drugs with the intent to deliver?  Did Miss Majors have anything at all to 
do with those?  First we go back to 
the tape, "we" this, and "we" that, "Lex has a lot of that, Lex can bring 
those.["]  . . . and [after a few 
days] lo and behold we come into the house and there's all the marijuana and 
here is all the Ecstasy, just as Mama promised.

 
 
There 
is simply no question that the prosecution intended to use Ms. Smith's 
statements to prove that Ms. Majors supplied her with illegal drugs.  The State clearly indicated that the 
recorded statement was substantive evidence of Ms. Major's possession of the 
controlled substances and her intent to deliver them.  Thus, the statements were hearsay and 
were not admissible unless they fell within an exception to the hearsay 
rule.

 
 
[¶28]   The State argues that the 
statements were admissible as evidence of Ms. Smith's present state of mind 
under W.R.E. 803(3):  

 
 
            
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the 
declarant is available as a witness:

. 
. . .

            
(3) Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition.   A statement of the declarant's 
then-existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as 
intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health) . . . 
.

   

The 
exception is generally used when a non-party declarant's (often the victim's) 
state of mind is relevant.  For 
example, in Humphrey v. State, 2008 
WY 67, ¶¶ 49-50, 185 P.3d 1236, 1250 (Wyo. 2008), we ruled that testimony about 
the victim's statement that he was angry with the defendant fell within the 
existing state of mind exception because the defendant's knowledge of the 
victim's state of mind may have affected the defendant's actions.  

 
 
[¶29]   The problem with the State's 
argument regarding the Rule 803(3) exception in the present case is the same as 
the problem with its argument that the evidence was not hearsaythe record 
clearly shows that the prosecution was not seeking admission of the evidence 
simply to show the declarant's (Ms. Smith's) state of mind; the State fully 
intended that the evidence be viewed by the jury as substantive evidence of Ms. 
Majors' delivery of illegal drugs.  
We, therefore, conclude that the evidence was hearsay, it was not 
admissible because it did not fall within any recognized exception and the 
district court erred by admitting it.  

 
 
[¶30]   However, our inquiry does not end 
there.  Reversal is required only if 
the error prejudiced the defendant.  
See Miller v. State, 2003 WY 55, ¶ 15, 67 P.3d 1191, 1195 (Wyo. 2003).  We 
must determine, therefore, whether the error affected any of Ms. Majors' 
substantial rights or whether the error was harmless.  W.R.A.P. 9.04; W.R.Cr.P. 52. 

 
 
The 
error is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might 
have been more favorable to the defendant if the error had never occurred.  To demonstrate harmful error, [the 
defendant] must prove prejudice under "circumstances which manifest inherent 
unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair 
play." 

 
 

Martin 
v. State, 2007 
WY 76, ¶ 21, 157 P.3d 923, 928 (Wyo. 2007) (citations 
omitted).

 
 
[¶31]   Ms. Majors was convicted of 
possession of marijuana and possession of ecstasy.  We cannot say that the error in 
admitting Ms. Smith's hearsay statements prejudiced Ms. Majors with regard to 
the marijuana charge because Ms. Smith's statements did not specifically relate 
the marijuana to Ms. Majors.  
Moreover, other trial evidence directly implicated Ms. Majors in the 
marijuana possession charge.  Her 
fingerprint was found on the glass container containing marijuana.  With that evidence in the record, we 
cannot say that the verdict on the marijuana charge might have been more 
favorable to her had the district court not erred by admitting Ms. Smith's 
hearsay statements.

 
 
[¶32]   The ecstasy conviction is another 
matter.  Ms. Majors' fingerprints 
were not found on the bottle containing the ecstasy tablets.  Besides Ms. Smith's inadmissible 
statements that "Lex" had a whole bunch of ecstasy and would bring some back 
with her, the only other evidence linking Ms. Majors to the ecstasy was the 
ecstasy pill bottle found in the bag next to her on the couch.  The bag contained items connected with 
both Ms. Majors (the marijuana bottle) and Ms. Smith (the controlled buy 
funds).  Other evidence admitted at 
trial demonstrated that illegal drugs were found throughout Ms. Smith's 
house.  In light of the entirety of 
the trial evidence, we conclude there is a reasonable probability the jury may 
have acquitted Ms. Majors on the ecstasy possession charge had the improper 
evidence not been admitted.  Under 
these circumstances, we conclude the circumstances manifest inherent unfairness 
and injustice.  Martin, ¶ 21, 157 P.3d  at 928.  We, therefore, reverse her conviction 
for possession of the ecstasy.  

 
 
  
 
 

C.   Sanctions/Spoliation 
of Evidence

 
 
[¶33]   On the second day of trial, Ms. 
Majors filed a motion for sanctions based upon the State's failure to provide 
the defense with access to a blue-green bottle shown in photos of the contents 
of the black bag.  She sought 
dismissal of the charges and/or suppression of all evidence connected with the 
black bag.  In a hearing held 
outside the jury's presence, Ms. Majors argued that she became aware of the 
bottle during the trial when reviewing the State's "blown up" color photographs 
showing the contents of the bag.  She stated that she had not been able to 
see it before because the copies of the photographs provided by the State prior 
to trial were small and in black and white.  She further stated it appeared from the 
photographs that there was something in the bottle.  The defense argued the bottle was 
potentially exculpatory because it could have had a label with someone else's 
name on it or contained another person's fingerprints.    

 
 
[¶34]   The prosecutor responded that the 
bottle was not collected during the search.  The chief investigating officer 
testified at the hearing and stated that he did not recall the blue pill 
bottle.  He stated, "[m]y focus was 
more on any kind of drug paraphernalia identification, anything that would 
relate to our case at the time."  He 
also stated that he did not "deliberately leave anything out."  The district court denied the motion for 
sanctions, stating the defense had not demonstrated that "there's clearly 
exculpatory evidence within the purse, the bottle, or otherwise."  The court stated, however, that it would 

 
 
allow 
fair comment on the contents of the photographs and the failure to collect or 
disclose the evidence contained within the purse, that this is not a complete 
inventory of what was in the purse, and fair comment would be that this was not 
completely done as an inventory.

 
 

[¶35]   Ms. Majors claims that the district 
court erred by denying her motion for sanctions against the State.  A district court generally has 
discretion in determining whether sanctions should be granted for an alleged 
violation of discovery responsibilities.  
State v. Naple, 2006 WY 125, ¶ 
8, 143 P.3d 358, 360-61 (Wyo. 2006).  
However, 
because Ms. Majors asserts her right to due process was violated when the State 
failed to collect or preserve the evidence, our review is de novo.  Grady v. State, 2008 WY 144, ¶ 29, 
197 P.3d 722, 732 (Wyo. 2008), citing Wilkening v. State, 2007 WY 187, ¶ 6, 
172 P.3d 385, 386 (Wyo. 2007).   

 
 
[¶36]   We discussed the State's obligation 
to preserve and disclose potentially exculpatory evidence in Grady.  
The victim's husband had found a letter in her jewelry box after her 
death.  The letter was reportedly 
written by the victim's former boyfriend ten to fifteen years before the victim 
was murdered.  The State Crime Lab 
examined the letter and determined it was not written by the defendant.  The State thereafter "misplaced" the 
letter and it could not be examined by the defendant.  Grady, ¶¶ 25-27, 197 P.3d  at 
730-31.  

 
 
[¶37]   Following the United States Supreme 
Court decisions in Arizona v. Youngblood, 
488 U.S. 51, 109 S. Ct. 333, 102 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1988) and California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 
104 S. Ct. 2528, 81 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1984), we rejected Grady's claim that the State violated his due 
process rights by failing to preserve the letter and provide it to him.  

 
 
In 
California v. Trombetta, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
Due Process Clause does not require law enforcement agencies to preserve breath 
samples in order to introduce the results of breath-analysis tests at trial. 
Trombetta, 467 U.S.  at 491, 104 S. Ct.  at 2535. In doing so, the Court 
noted the officers were acting in good faith and in accord with their normal 
practice. Id. at 488, 104 S. Ct.  at 2533. The Court concluded that 
whatever duty the Due Process Clause imposes on the government to preserve 
evidence, it is "limited to evidence that might be expected to play a 
significant role in the suspect's defense." Id. at 488, 104 S. Ct.  at 
2534. Under Trombetta, the government violates due process when it 
destroys evidence (1) whose exculpatory value is apparent before its destruction 
and (2) is "of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain 
comparable evidence by other reasonably available means." Id. at 489, 104 S. Ct.  at 2534.

 
 
In 
Arizona v. Youngblood, the Supreme Court extended Trombetta, 
holding that where the government fails to preserve "evidentiary material of 
which no more can be said than it could have been subjected to tests, the 
results of which might have exonerated the defendant," no due process violation 
occurs unless the defendant demonstrates the government acted in bad faith. 
Youngblood, 488 U.S.  at 57, 109 S. Ct.  at 337. To establish a due process 
violation under Youngblood based on the government's failure to preserve 
evidence, the defendant must show (1) the evidence was "potentially useful" and 
(2) the government acted in bad faith. Id. at 58, 109 S. Ct.  at 337. The 
inquiry into bad faith "must necessarily turn on the [government's] knowledge of 
the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed." 
Id. at 56 n. *, 109 S. Ct.  at 336 n. *.

    

Grady, 
¶¶ 
30-31, 197 P.3d  at 732.   

 
 
[¶38]   Using the Youngblood analysis, we must consider 
whether Ms. Majors made a showing that the blue bottle was potentially useful 
evidence and the State acted in bad faith by failing to preserve the 
bottle.  Ms. Majors suggests that 
the State's actions in failing to collect the bottle prevented her from showing 
that the evidence was potentially useful.   She argues, nevertheless, that the 
evidence would have been potentially useful if it contained evidence identifying 
it as belonging to Ms. Smith, such as fingerprints or a label.  Even if we accept that the bottle may 
have contained such evidence, we do not know how useful that would have been to 
Ms. Majors.  It was already 
established that there was money in the bag which had originally been given by 
the confidential informant to Ms. Smith during the controlled buy.  There was clearly a relationship between 
the items in the bag and both Ms. Smith and Ms. Majors.  Moreover, the damning evidence of Ms. 
Major's fingerprint on the marijuana bottle would not have been discounted 
regardless of the attributes of the blue bottle.

 
 
[¶39]   Ms. Majors' efforts to establish 
the second element of the Youngblood 
analysis are even more inadequate.  
There is absolutely no evidence that the officers had any idea of the 
exculpatory value of the bottle or had a nefarious intent when they failed to 
collect it.  In Youngblood, 488 U.S.  at 58, 109 S. Ct.  at 
337, the Supreme Court stated that 
the due process clause does not impose on the police "an undifferentiated and 
absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be of 
conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution."  The chief investigating officer 
testified that he could not really remember the bottle, but he would have 
collected it if he felt it had any significance.  There is simply no basis in the record 
to conclude that law enforcement acted in bad faith by failing to collect the 
bottle.

 
 
[¶40]   Moreover, we are unable to discern 
any prejudice as a result of the State's failure to collect the bottle.  The bottle was presumably still at the 
residence, which was in the possession of Ms. Smith and/or Ms. Majors.  Had Ms. Majors considered it crucial 
evidence, she could have collected it.  
In addition, the district court allowed the defense to question witnesses 
about the missing bottle and argue that the State failed to collect all 
potentially relevant evidence.  
Defense counsel took full advantage of that opportunity and it obviously 
did not sway the jury.  The district 
court did not err by concluding that the State did not violate Ms. Majors' due 
process rights or denying her motion for sanctions.  

     

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶41]   The district court properly denied 
Ms. Majors' mistrial motion which was based on the fact that the trial bailiff 
was part of the investigating team and a witness at trial.  There was no showing that Ms. Majors was 
denied a fair trial as a result of the bailiff's association with the 
prosecution team.  The district 
court erred by admitting the hearsay recording of the conversation between the 
confidential informant and Ms. Smith into evidence at trial.  That ruling was prejudicial with regard 
to the ecstasy possession charge and the conviction on that count is 
reversed.  Finally, Ms. Major's due 
process rights were not violated when the State failed to collect a blue bottle 
shown in photographs of the contents of the black bag; therefore, the district 
court properly denied her motion for sanctions against the State.   

            
 

[¶42]   Affirmed in part and reversed and 
remanded in part for further proceedings consistent with this decision.   

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1Section 35-7-1031(a) states in relevant part:  "Except as 
authorized by this act, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, 
or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled 
substance."

 
 

2The State also argues that Ms. Majors' right of confrontation under the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution was not violated because the 
statements were not "testimonial" under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004).   
Although Confrontation Clause and hearsay arguments overlap, we have 
recognized that they are distinct concepts.  Bush v. State, 2008 WY 108, ¶¶ 27-29, 
193 P.3d 203, 210 (Wyo. 2008).  Ms. 
Majors references Confrontation Clause principles, but the thrust of her 
argument is that the evidence was non-admissible hearsay.  We conclude the hearsay analysis is 
dispositive and, therefore, will not provide a separate Confrontation Clause 
analysis.  

     

3The State suggests that Ms. Majors' hearsay objection was not sufficient 
because she did not renew it when the recording was officially entered into 
evidence.  We will apply the abuse 
of discretion standard under these circumstances because the hearsay objection 
was clearly made and the district court's procedure in determining the 
admissibility of the evidence was somewhat unusual.  However, we note that the result would 
be the same under the plain error standard of review.