Case Title: Booth v. North Dakota

Citation: 

Docket Number: 20160200

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 2017-04-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH
DAKOTA 2017 ND 97Jimmy Booth,
Jr., Petitioner and Appellantv.State of North Dakota, Respondent and
AppelleeNo. 20160200Appeal from the District Court of Williams
County, Northwest Judicial District, the Honorable Paul W.
Jacobson, Judge.AFFIRMED.Opinion of the Court by Tufte, Justice.Samuel A. Gereszek, P.O. Box 4, East Grand Forks,
Minn. 56721-0004, for petitioner and appellant.Nathan
K. Madden, Assistant State's Attorney, P.O. Box 2047, Williston, N.D. 58802, for
respondent and appellee.Booth v. StateNo. 20160200Tufte, Justice.[¶1] Jimmy Booth, Jr., appeals from a judgment denying his application for
postconviction relief based on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm because
Booth failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the allegedly deficient performance of his
counsel.I[¶2] Booth pled guilty to
manufacturing a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug
paraphernalia, and four counts of endangerment of a child. Booth, accompanied by his attorney,
agreed with the factual basis presented for the plea. The district court accepted the plea
agreement and sentenced Booth to ten years of incarceration on each count to be served
concurrently, with credit for time served. Booth timely moved for reduction of his sentence. The
court denied the motion.[¶3] Booth then moved to correct an
illegal sentence under N.D.R.Crim.P. 35(a)(1),
arguing his sentence was illegal because the State gave him only a one-day notice of its intention
to seek habitual offender sentence enhancement under N.D.C.C.
§ 12.1-32-09. The district court denied the motion and this Court affirmed in
State v. Booth, 2015 ND 59, 861 N.W.2d 160. This Court concluded "the one-day notice was reasonable" and "Booth did not suffer
prejudice resulting from the State's one-day notice of intent to seek the habitual offender sentence
enhancement." Id. at ¶ 6. Booth's voluntary guilty plea
waived any challenge to such procedural defects. Id. at ¶ 8.[¶4] Booth then filed a pro se application for postconviction relief under N.D.C.C. ch. 29-32.1, claiming he
received ineffective assistance of counsel leading up to his guilty plea. Booth alleged his attorney
failed to: 1) determine whether the evidence seized during a search "was properly received into
custody (chain of custody) in a timely and legal manner"; 2) conduct an investigation to
determine whether (a) he was unconstitutionally detained, (b) he was informed of his
Miranda rights, (c) the State Laboratory had tested the evidence, (d) the evidence
belonged to someone else, and (e) his DNA or fingerprints were found on the evidence; 3)
conduct a "complete investigation of all relevant facts" before advising him to plead guilty; 4)
promptly comply with his requests for information as required by N.D.R. Prof. Conduct 1.4; and 5) represent him
competently under the North
Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct. Booth claimed he was prejudiced because he "would
have more thoughtfully considered trying the case before a jury," and he "would not have plead
guilty, but for the advice of Counsel." The district court appointed counsel for Booth, who filed a
supplement to the petition, additionally claiming: 1) the court had failed to follow N.D.R.Crim.P. 11 procedures because Booth was
not informed of his right to counsel when he entered the guilty plea; and 2) Booth's guilty plea
was not knowingly and voluntarily entered.[¶5] The district court
held an evidentiary hearing where it heard testimony from Booth and his attorney in the
underlying criminal matter. Booth raised other issues at the hearing and testified he would not
have pled guilty if his attorney had competently advised him. Booth's attorney explained his
handling of the case and testified Booth wanted to plead guilty and "had more desire to dispose
of his case th[a]n most clients do." The court denied Booth's application for postconviction relief,
concluding the claims of noncompliance with N.D.R.Crim.P. 11 and his allegedly involuntary
guilty plea could have been raised in the proceedings leading to Booth, 2015 ND 59, 861 N.W.2d 160, and were
therefore barred by N.D.C.C.
§ 29-32.1-12(2)(a) as a misuse of process. The court rejected the remainder of
Booth's claims because he presented no evidence of a "reasonably probable different outcome"
and had therefore failed to establish prejudice resulted from his trial counsel's alleged errors.II[¶6] On appeal, Booth does not challenge the
district court's rulings on the issues barred by misuse of process, but argues the court erred in
denying his application for postconviction relief because he established ineffective assistance of
counsel.[¶7] The framework for evaluating ineffective assistance
of counsel claims under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and N.D. Const.
art. I, § 12, is well-established:In order to prevail on a
post-conviction relief application based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must
(1) "show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness"
and (2) "show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task.
An ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and
raise issues not presented at trial or in pretrial proceedings, and so the Strickland
standard must be applied with scrupulous care, lest intrusive post-trial inquiry threaten the
integrity of the very adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve. Even under de
novo review, the standard for judging counsel's representation is a most deferential
one. . . . It is all too tempting to second-guess counsel's assistance after
conviction or adverse sentence.Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 739-40
(2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The two-part Strickland test "applies
to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel." Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). "Thus, a defendant must demonstrate both deficient
representation by counsel and prejudice caused by the deficient representation." Woehlhoff v. State, 487 N.W.2d 16, 17 (N.D. 1992). Bahtiraj v. State, 2013 ND 240, ¶ 9, 840 N.W.2d 605. Whether a
defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact fully
reviewable on appeal. See, e.g., Osier v.
State, 2014 ND 41, ¶ 10, 843 N.W.2d 277.[¶8] "Courts need not address both prongs of the
Strickland test, and if a court can resolve the case by addressing only one prong it is
encouraged to do so." Osier, 2014 ND
41, ¶ 11, 843 N.W.2d 277;
see also Broadwell v. State,
2014 ND 6, ¶ 7, 841 N.W.2d 750. "If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient
prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed." Garcia v. State, 2004 ND 81, ¶ 5, 678 N.W.2d 568 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697); see also Greywind v. State, 2004 ND 213, ¶ 15, 689 N.W.2d 390.[¶9] "The second prong of the Strickland test is
satisfied in the context of a guilty plea if the defendant shows 'there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going
to trial.'" Lindsey v. State, 2014 ND 174,
¶ 19, 852 N.W.2d 383 (quoting
Ernst v. State, 2004 ND 152, ¶ 10, 683 N.W.2d 891). To
establish prejudice under Strickland in a plea bargain situation, the petitioner must
allege facts that, if proven, would support a conclusion that rejection of the plea bargain would
have been rational because valid defenses existed, a suppression motion could have undermined
the prosecution's case, or there was a realistic potential for a lower sentence. See Bahtiraj, 2013 ND 240, ¶ 16, 840 N.W.2d 605. No court is
satisfied with a defendant's subjective, self-serving statement that, with competent advice, he
would have insisted on going to trial. Id. (citing 3 Wayne LaFave et al.,
Criminal Procedure § 11.10(d) (3rd ed. 2007)).[¶10] At the change of plea hearing, the attorneys explained the terms of the plea
agreement to the district court. Booth acknowledged his understanding of the terms. After the
court accepted Booth's guilty plea and the factual basis for the four charges, Booth addressed the
court. He asked the court to sentence him to the Teen Challenge program, which was not part of
the agreement. Asked if he wanted the court to accept the proposed agreement, Booth said
"Yeah." The court then explained that it would simply accept or reject the agreement as presented
and went on to say that it would not sentence Booth to Teen Challenge even if it were sentencing
without regard to a plea agreement. The court accepted the agreement as presented. Regardless of
what advice Booth may have received from counsel, he cannot establish that his desire to attend
Teen Challenge might reasonably have led him to plead not guilty and proceed to trial. The court
had already indicated he would not be sentenced to Teen Challenge if sentenced after trial.
Accordingly, the district court correctly determined that Booth presented no evidence that would
support a finding of prejudice on his claim that he was not properly advised regarding how the
plea agreement might affect his desire to be sentenced to the Teen Challenge
program.[¶11] The district court found Booth presented no
evidence of a probable different outcome at the change of plea hearing if he had received the
State Laboratory results before pleading guilty, or if his attorney had challenged the chain of
custody of the evidence. The court found that Booth's attorney received the discovery materials
that were available at the time of the change of plea hearing and Booth presented no evidence
showing a probable different result had a formal demand for discovery under N.D.R.Crim.P. 16 been made. Regarding Booth's
claim of lack of discussions with his attorney, the court found Booth presented no evidence that
his attorney "did not discuss the materials then available with him, and that there would be
any reasonable probable different outcome." The court rejected Booth's claim that his attorney
should have hired investigators or other persons because he presented no "evidence showing
what these persons [would] have been able to provide information about, and no evidence
showing any reasonably probable different outcome had such personnel . . .
been hired."[¶12] In its decision, the district court used the
ambiguous phrase "reasonably probable different outcome" in finding no prejudice under the
second prong of the Strickland test. At a change of plea hearing, the two possible
outcomes are entry of a not guilty plea followed by a trial and entry of a guilty plea followed by
sentencing. In Thompson v. State, 2016
ND 101, ¶ 7, 879 N.W.2d 93, the
defendant argued he was entitled to postconviction relief because he received ineffective
assistance of counsel when he pled guilty. In rejecting the defendant's claim, the district court
found the defendant "failed to show a reasonable probability a jury would not have returned a
guilty verdict had [he] not pled guilty prior to trial." Id. at ¶ 12. Because that is the wrong
standard for analyzing ineffectiveness claims in a guilty plea context, we reversed and remanded
for the court to "make findings regarding whether a reasonable probability exists that, but for the
alleged errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial." Id. at ¶ 13. Here, the district court did
not commit the same error we reversed in Thompson. In context, the district court's use of
"different outcome" refers to the outcome of the plea hearing and we are satisfied that the court
below applied the correct standard for Strickland prong two. Where the district court
uses an ambiguous expression of the standard we examine the record carefully to ensure the law
was properly applied. Everett v. State,
2015 ND 149, ¶ 10, 864 N.W.2d 450 (affirming denial of ineffective assistance claim following guilty plea where district
court stated the standard as "showing the probability of a different outcome"). We recognize that
at one point in its decision the district court referred to the lack of evidence of "any reasonably
probable different outcome even if he had taken the matter to trial." However, as discussed
above, the issue was a limitation on the court's sentencing authority that would apply either after
a guilty plea or a trial. Thus we interpret this reference to trial as referring to whether any advice
about what the court may include in its sentence as having no bearing on whether Booth would
be reasonably likely to have made a different decision as to his guilty plea. The district court
found that Booth failed to establish a likelihood that he would have insisted on going to trial. The
district court's decision could have provided greater clarity in expressing that a reasonable
probability of a different outcome means a substantial likelihood that Booth would have rejected
the plea bargain and gone to trial. Id. at
¶ 9-10. We are satisfied that the
court applied the correct standard in this case.[¶13] The district
court's determination that Booth failed to establish prejudice resulting from his counsel's
allegedly deficient performance is supported by the evidence in the record. When asked about a
reasonably probable different outcome during the hearing, Booth
testified:A. If they would have done everything right I wouldn't be in this
courtroom right now. I would be free on the streets, and one less felony. That's for sure.Q.
And why is that an objectively reasonable outcome? Why is that reasonably probable?A.
Why is it probable?Q. Exactly.A. It's not probable. It's fact.. . . .A.
. . . a motion for discovery, a motion to suppress, a motion to see these lab
tests. It all would have been different. I would have never been found guilty of
this. Booth has offered nothing but subjective speculation and self-serving
statements that he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
See Bahtiraj, 2013 ND 240, ¶ 16, 840 N.W.2d 605. Moreover,
this Court previously determined that Booth's guilty plea was voluntary. See Booth, 2015 ND 59, ¶¶ 7-8, 861 N.W.2d 160. We
have held that a defendant who pleads "guilty knowingly and voluntarily . . .
cannot show in what manner actual prejudice resulted from his trial counsel's failure to
investigate more thoroughly or to move to suppress specific evidence." Damron v. State, 2003 ND 102, ¶ 18, 663 N.W.2d 650; see
also Greywind, 2004 ND 213, ¶¶ 15-1 6, 689 N.W.2d 390.[¶14] Booth argues the district court's analysis was flawed
because the court "picked the claims piece by piece to illustrate the Appellant's failure to satisfy
each claim," rather than consider "the totality of the circumstances." However, the mere number
of alleged errors is not in itself the measure for relief, and where asserted errors are not errors or,
if they were error, they were not unfairly prejudicial, the cumulative effect of those alleged errors
generally does not require reversal unless the errors are intertwined and interrelated. See
State v. Parisien, 2005 ND 152, ¶ 22, 703 N.W.2d 306; State v. Ebach, 1999 ND 5, ¶ 16, 589 N.W.2d 566; State v. Sievers, 543 N.W.2d 491, 498 (N.D. 1996). While courts have recognized
that numerous nonprejudicial attorney deficiencies may in some circumstances cumulatively
cause prejudice, see, e.g., People v. Kipp, 956 P.2d 1169, 1190 (Cal. 1998);
Cirincione v. State, 705 A.2d 96, 113 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998), that is not the case
here. Booth voluntarily pled guilty, and the court determined Booth failed to establish prejudice
from any of his attorney's alleged deficiencies. Having considered the totality of the
circumstances, we conclude Booth's claims neither singly nor cumulatively establish
prejudice.[¶15] We do not consider the arguments first raised
during oral argument in this case because they were not raised in the district court or in Booth's
appellate brief. See State v.
Mackey, 2011 ND 203, ¶ 17, 805 N.W.2d 98. We conclude
Booth failed to show that he was prejudiced by his attorney's alleged deficiencies and, therefore,
he failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court did not err in dismissing
Booth's application for postconviction relief.III[¶16] The judgment is affirmed.[¶17]  Jerod E. TufteDaniel J. CrothersLisa Fair
McEversCarol Ronning KapsnerGerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.