Case Title: OLR v. Wendy Alison Nora

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2013AP000653-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2018-03-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2018 WI 23 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP653-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Wendy Alison Nora, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Wendy Alison Nora, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST NORA 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 30, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
 
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 7, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs and an oral 
argument by Wendy Alison Nora and Access Legal Services, 
Minneapolis, Minnesota.   
 
For the complainant-respondent, there was a brief and an 
oral argument by Paul W. Schwarzenbart on behalf of the Office 
of Lawyer Regulation, Madison. 
 
 
 
 
2018 WI 23
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2013AP653-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Wendy Alison Nora, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Wendy Alison Nora, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 30, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Wendy Alison Nora appeals from 
the report of the referee, Attorney Lisa C. Goldman, who found 
that Attorney Nora had committed four violations of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys and recommended that Attorney 
No. 
2013AP653-D   
 
2 
 
Nora's license to practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for one 
year.1 
¶2 
Having heard oral argument and having fully reviewed 
this matter, we conclude that the referee's factual findings are 
not clearly erroneous and that those findings support the legal 
conclusion that Attorney Nora committed the four counts of 
professional 
misconduct 
alleged 
in 
the 
Office 
of 
Lawyer 
Regulation's (OLR) amended complaint.  We further determine that 
the serious nature of Attorney Nora's misconduct and her 
continued refusal to acknowledge her improper use of the 
judicial system requires a one-year suspension of her license to 
practice law in this state. 
¶3 
Attorney Nora was admitted to the practice of law in 
this state in June 1975.  She was also licensed to practice law 
in the state of Minnesota in 1985.  She currently practices law 
under the name Access Legal Services in Minneapolis, Minnesota.   
¶4 
Attorney Nora has been the subject of professional 
discipline in this state on one prior occasion.  In 1993 this 
court suspended Attorney Nora's license to practice law in 
                                                 
1 The referee also recommended that the court order Attorney 
Nora to pay certain defense costs incurred by two law firms who 
were sued by Attorney Nora and that the court require Attorney 
Nora to pay the full costs of this disciplinary proceeding.  Due 
to the fact that Attorney Nora currently has a bankruptcy 
proceeding pending and in order to avoid any possible conflict 
with the automatic stay arising from that bankruptcy proceeding, 
we have previously held the issues of restitution and costs in 
this proceeding in abeyance.  Consequently, we will not address 
those issues in this decision. 
No. 
2013AP653-D   
 
3 
 
Wisconsin for 30 days, as discipline reciprocal to that imposed 
by the Supreme Court of Minnesota.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Nora, 173 Wis. 2d 660, 495 N.W.2d 99 (1993) 
(Nora I).2 
¶5 
The allegations of misconduct in this case arise out 
of a foreclosure action in the Dane County circuit court against 
a residential property owned by Attorney Nora (the foreclosure 
action) and three subsequent civil actions filed by Attorney 
Nora against the circuit court judge and opposing counsel 
involved in the foreclosure action.  An understanding of some of 
the procedural history of the foreclosure action, as found by 
the referee or which is undisputed, is necessary to understand 
the misconduct findings against Attorney Nora. 
                                                 
2 Attorney Nora's license to practice law in Minnesota was 
indefinitely 
suspended 
with 
the 
ability 
to 
petition 
for 
reinstatement after 30 days.  The misconduct that resulted in 
that suspension involved making misrepresentations concerning 
the 
reopening 
and 
capitalization 
of 
a 
bank, 
failing 
to 
adequately investigate the person who was to provide capital to 
the bank, improperly authorizing the issuance of cashier checks 
by the bank, bringing a frivolous claim against a bank, 
transferring assets of her Minnesota law partnership in an 
attempt to insulate those assets from collection, bringing 
litigation primarily as a delay tactic, and asserting a legal 
theory not justified by existing law.  Nora I, 173 Wis. 2d at 
660-61; see also In re Disciplinary Action Against Nora, 450 
N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1990).  While her Wisconsin license was 
reinstated in May 1993 after the 30-day suspension had expired, 
she did not successfully petition to have her Minnesota license 
reinstated until January 2007.   
No. 
2013AP653-D   
 
4 
 
¶6 
On March 3, 2009, the law firm of Gray and Associates, 
S.C. (the Gray firm) filed a foreclosure action3 against Attorney 
Nora's residential property on behalf of Residential Funding 
Corporation (RFC), which was a related entity of GMAC Mortgage 
Group LLC.  Shortly after the initiation of the foreclosure 
action, the law firm of Bass & Moglowsky, S.C. (the Bass firm) 
also appeared as co-counsel on behalf of RFC.  Judge Juan B. 
Colas was assigned to preside over the foreclosure action.   
¶7 
In July 2009, after Attorney Nora had filed a number 
of motions and an answer to the complaint, Attorney David 
Potteiger of the Bass firm filed a motion for summary judgment 
on the issue of the foreclosure of the mortgage by RFC.   
¶8 
In August 2009 there were discussions between Attorney 
Nora and RFC/GMAC regarding the execution of a possible 
Foreclosure Repayment Agreement (the Agreement) that RFC/GMAC 
had offered to Attorney Nora.  The following facts were found by 
the referee based on Attorney Nora's admission of the facts 
alleged 
in 
the 
OLR's 
amended 
complaint, 
either 
through 
admissions in Attorney Nora's answer to the amended complaint or 
through an oral admission during argument on OLR's motion for 
summary judgment.   
¶9 
On August 23, 2009, Attorney Nora executed a copy of 
the Agreement, but she had modified a number of material terms.  
Specifically, she had written into the Agreement that she 
                                                 
3 Residential Funding Co. LLC v. Nora, Dane County Case No. 
09-CV-1096. 
No. 
2013AP653-D   
 
5 
 
reserved the right to challenge the amount that remained due on 
the note and that she also reserved the right to assert 
counterclaims against RFC/GMAC.    
¶10 After consulting with his client, on August 25, 2009, 
Attorney Potteiger "informed [Attorney] Nora in writing that the 
reservation of her counterclaims found in [Attorney] Nora's 
Foreclosure Repayment Agreement counteroffer was rejected" and 
that "no settlement offer existed."4  Specifically, Attorney 
Potteiger explained in an affidavit that he had sent an email to 
Attorney Nora at 4:20 p.m. on August 25, 2009, advising her of 
his client's rejection of her counteroffer.  At the time that 
the referee held a hearing on the OLR's summary judgment motion, 
Attorney Nora did not claim that she had failed to receive 
Attorney Potteiger's August 25, 2009 email.   
¶11 At approximately 9:44 a.m. on August 26, 2009, 
Attorney Nora sent a letter and a copy of the Agreement to Judge 
Colas via facsimile transmission.  Her letter said that as a 
result of the Agreement, proceedings in the foreclosure action 
"are stayed."  Even if the Agreement was not then in effect, 
Attorney Nora's letter implied that an agreement was imminent, 
which still required the foreclosure action to be stayed.  The 
referee found that this was a knowing misrepresentation, as 
Attorney 
Nora 
knew 
when 
she 
sent 
the 
letter 
that 
her 
                                                 
4 In her answer, Attorney Nora specifically admitted the 
truth of these statements, which were found in paragraph 22 of 
the OLR's Amended Complaint. 
No. 
2013AP653-D   
 
6 
 
counteroffer had been rejected and the offer of an Agreement had 
been withdrawn by RFC.   
¶12 On September 21, 2009, Judge Colas denied Attorney 
Nora's request to schedule oral argument on RFC's summary 
judgment motion, but extended the time for her to file a 
response until October 1, 2009.  Rather than file a summary 
judgment response, however, three days before that response was 
due Attorney Nora filed a personal bankruptcy petition, which 
stayed the foreclosure action. 
¶13 The bankruptcy stay was lifted on December 18, 2009, 
which meant that the remaining few days to file a response to 
the summary judgment motion in the foreclosure action resumed 
running.  Attorney Nora, however, did not file a response to 
RFC's summary judgment motion.  On January 6, 2010, Attorney 
Potteiger notified Judge Colas in writing (with a copy to 
Attorney Nora) that the bankruptcy stay had been lifted.  
Attorney Potteiger sent a subsequent letter to Judge Colas 
indicating that, in light of the lifting of the stay and 
Attorney Nora's failure to file a response, the court could 
consider the summary judgment motion as being unopposed.  
Between January 14-22, 2010, Attorney Nora filed a number of 
motions and what she labeled as a "verified response" to the 
summary judgment motion.  On February 9, 2010, Judge Colas 
granted RFC's motion for summary judgment allowing foreclosure 
of Attorney Nora's residential property.  He struck Attorney 
Nora's "verified response" both because it was untimely and 
because it was a "mixture of argument, motions, and allegations 
No. 
2013AP653-D   
 
7 
 
of fact" rather than a brief with properly developed arguments 
and supporting affidavits.  Attorney Nora did not appeal the 
grant of summary judgment of foreclosure.   
¶14 On February 22, 2010, after the grant of summary 
judgment, Attorney Nora filed a request in the foreclosure 
action 
seeking 
accommodations 
on 
account 
of 
an 
alleged 
disability.5  She subsequently requested Judge Colas to appoint a 
guardian ad litem (GAL) for her.  On March 29, 2010, Judge Colas 
denied Attorney Nora's request for reconsideration of his order 
granting summary judgment of foreclosure to RFC and her request 
for the appointment of a GAL.  His order noted that all 
essential legal work in the case had concluded prior to Attorney 
Nora's request for an accommodation or the appointment of a GAL, 
that she had failed to present evidence meeting the standard for 
the appointment of a GAL, and that she had offered no legal 
authority for applying her accommodation and GAL requests 
retroactively to allow her to relitigate the summary judgment 
motion.  Judge Colas denied a subsequent motion by Attorney Nora 
in which she sought reconsideration of the denial of her request 
for a GAL and sought the recusal of Judge Colas.   
                                                 
5 The referee noted that Attorney Nora testified in this 
proceeding that she had sought assistance with accommodation 
issues from the clerk of circuit court in January 2010 because 
of medical issues, but the clerk's office advised her that she 
needed to request additional time to respond to pleadings and 
motions from Judge Colas.  She did not do so until after he had 
granted summary judgment against her.   
No. 
2013AP653-D   
 
8 
 
¶15 On November 15, 2010, almost eight months after Judge 
Colas had granted summary judgment against Attorney Nora, she 
sued him personally in the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Wisconsin (the Western District Court), 
alleging that he had violated the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA), as revised.  Her claim essentially was that Judge 
Colas had violated her federal statutory rights to disability  
accommodations due to an alleged back injury by not granting her 
extensions of time to respond to RFC's filings in the 
foreclosure action.  As part of her request for relief, she 
asked the federal court to remove Judge Colas from the 
foreclosure action and to vacate the summary judgment order of 
foreclosure.  Within a week of filing the federal complaint 
against Judge Colas, she filed a motion in the state foreclosure 
action to disqualify Judge Colas from continuing to preside on 
the ground that he was now an adverse party to Attorney Nora in 
a lawsuit.  Attorney Nora ultimately dismissed the federal 
action in March 2011.   
¶16 The referee found that there had been no good faith 
basis for Attorney Nora's federal ADA claim against Judge Colas.  
Attorney Nora alleged that in the state foreclosure action, he 
had denied her disability accommodations, but the referee found 
that she had not asked Judge Colas for disability accommodations 
prior to his grant of summary judgment nor had she properly 
responded to RFC's summary judgment motion despite having months 
to do so.  Moreover, although Attorney Nora claimed that she had 
initiated the federal action in order to obtain disability 
No. 
2013AP653-D   
 
9 
 
accommodations in the foreclosure action, the referee stated 
that Attorney Nora admitted that she was no longer experiencing 
a disability at the time she filed the federal action, as 
evidenced 
by 
the 
fact 
that 
she 
never 
sought 
disability 
accommodations in the federal action.  The referee found that 
Attorney Nora's federal action against Judge Colas, especially 
her request that the federal court remove him from the 
foreclosure action and void the grant of summary judgment, had 
not been brought for a legitimate purpose, but rather to harass 
Judge Colas and to obstruct the foreclosure of her property.   
¶17 On November 29, 2010, the day before the scheduled 
sheriff's sale of her Madison property and two weeks after she 
had initiated her federal lawsuit against Judge Colas, Attorney 
Nora sent an email to Attorney Potteiger, the Bass firm, another 
lawyer, and the Gray firm, threatening to sue them in federal 
court if they did not cancel the sheriff's sale.  She filed a 
federal complaint in the Western District Court the same day 
alleging, among other things, that the opposing attorneys had 
violated 
the 
federal 
Racketeer 
Influenced 
and 
Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO), by, among other things, creating a 
fraudulent assignment of her mortgage and note to RFC and 
bringing the foreclosure action based on those fraudulent 
assignments.6  In her prayer for relief, Attorney Nora asked the 
                                                 
6 This action against her former opposing counsel in the 
Western District Court will be referenced in this opinion as 
"the RICO district court action" to distinguish it from the 
action against Judge Colas and a similar action filed in a 
federal bankruptcy court, which is discussed below. 
No. 
2013AP653-D   
 
10 
 
federal court essentially to void the state court foreclosure 
judgment and to award her title to her home free and clear of 
any lien by RFC and GMAC.  She also sought an injunction against 
the sheriff's sale and what the referee characterized as 
"exorbitant" compensatory and punitive damages.   
¶18 Some of the defendant attorneys and law firms were 
forced to hire counsel to defend against Attorney Nora's 
complaint.  On September 30, 2012, the Western District Court 
granted the defendants' motions to dismiss, holding that 
Attorney Nora's claims were barred by both the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine7 and claim preclusion.  Attorney Nora appealed, and the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.   
¶19 The referee in this disciplinary case found that, 
based on Attorney Nora's 40 years of experience as an attorney 
and her comments during the summary judgment hearing, she 
understood the Rooker-Feldman doctrine before she filed any of 
her federal court actions.  The referee further found that 
Attorney Nora did not have a good faith basis for filing the 
RICO district court action against the defendants in the Western 
                                                 
7 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which is based on the concept 
that only the United States Supreme Court may review state court 
judgments applying federal law, broadly prohibits federal courts 
from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over claims that 
seek relief that is tantamount to vacating a state court 
judgment.  United States v. Alkaramla, 872 F.3d 532, 534 (7th 
Cir. 2017); Mains v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.3d 669, 675 (7th Cir. 
2017); see also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 
(1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 
U.S. 462 (1983). 
No. 
2013AP653-D   
 
11 
 
District Court and that she had filed that action in order to 
harass them for taking away her Madison residence.   
¶20 On March 18, 2013, nearly six months after the Western 
District Court had ruled that her claims against her former 
opposing counsel could not be brought in federal court, Attorney 
Nora filed an adversarial proceeding against many of the same 
defendants in a bankruptcy proceeding in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the 
Southern District Bankruptcy Court).8  The referee found that the 
allegations in Attorney Nora's complaints in the RICO district 
court action and the Southern District adversarial proceeding 
were almost identical, that Attorney Nora knew that the 
adversarial 
proceeding 
was 
barred 
by 
the 
Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine, and that she had initiated the adversarial proceeding 
to harass her former opposing counsel and to reverse the state 
court foreclosure judgment.   
¶21 After nearly eight months, Attorney Nora dismissed her 
Southern District adversarial proceeding as part of a settlement 
with the defendant attorneys and law firms.  The referee found 
that the defendant attorneys spent a considerable amount of time 
                                                 
8 This adversarial proceeding will be referenced in this 
opinion as "the Southern District adversarial proceeding." 
No. 
2013AP653-D   
 
12 
 
and money defending both the RICO district court action and the 
Southern District adversarial proceeding.9   
¶22 On the basis of these factual findings, either as 
admitted by Attorney Nora or as found by the referee after an 
evidentiary hearing, the referee concluded that the OLR had 
proven all four counts of misconduct alleged in its amended 
complaint by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence.  
Specifically, the referee determined with respect to Count 2 
that Attorney Nora's August 26, 2009, facsimile transmission to 
Judge Colas alleging that her execution of a modified version of 
the Agreement stayed the foreclosure action constituted a false 
statement of material fact made to a tribunal, in violation of 
SCR 20:3.3(a)(1).  On Count 1, the referee concluded that in 
bringing the federal lawsuit against Judge Colas, Attorney Nora 
had knowingly advanced a claim that was unwarranted under 
existing law (or a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification, or reversal of the law) and had filed a suit when 
she knew that the action would serve merely to harass or 
maliciously injure another, in violation of SCR 20:3.1(a).  With 
respect to Counts 3 and 4, the referee also concluded that 
Attorney Nora's two federal complaints against her former 
                                                 
9 For example, the referee determined that the Gray firm had 
spent over $25,000 hiring a separate law firm to defend against 
just the RICO district court action.  Further, the Bass firm's 
malpractice insurance premiums rose as a result of Attorney 
Nora's allegations in the RICO district court action and the 
Southern District adversarial proceeding.   
No. 
2013AP653-D   
 
13 
 
opposing 
counsel 
had 
likewise 
constituted 
violations 
of 
SCR 20:3.1(a). 
¶23 Citing the factors that this court has set forth for 
analyzing the appropriate level of discipline,10 the referee 
recommended that the court suspend Attorney Nora's license to 
practice law in this state for a period of one year.  The 
referee acknowledged that other attorneys have committed more 
numerous violations, but stated that Attorney Nora's "violations 
involving an aggressive strategy to harm others warrant a 
suspension necessitating a petition for reinstatement so some 
investigation into her ability to conform her litigation tactics 
to appropriate boundaries occurs."  The referee compared 
Attorney Nora's misconduct to the filing and maintaining of a 
frivolous lawsuit that resulted in this court imposing a six-
month suspension.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Widule, 2003 WI 34, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.  Unlike 
Attorney Widule, however, Attorney Nora had a prior disciplinary 
suspension for misconduct (dishonesty and improper litigation 
tactics) 
that 
the 
referee 
concluded 
was 
similar 
to 
the 
misconduct at issue in the present proceeding.  Consequently, 
                                                 
10 Those factors include:  "(1) the seriousness, nature and 
extent of the misconduct; (2) the level of discipline needed to 
protect the public, the courts, and the legal system from 
repetition of the attorney's misconduct; (3) the need to impress 
upon the attorney the seriousness of the misconduct; and (4) the 
need 
to 
deter 
other 
attorneys 
from 
committing 
similar 
misconduct."  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carroll, 
2001 WI 130, ¶40, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 636 N.W.2d 718. 
No. 
2013AP653-D   
 
14 
 
the referee believed that a more severe level of discipline was 
warranted for Attorney Nora.   
¶24 When we review a referee's report, we will affirm a 
referee's findings of fact unless they are found to be clearly 
erroneous, but we review the referee's conclusions of law on a 
de novo basis.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 
2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  We determine 
the appropriate level of discipline to impose given the 
particular facts of each case, independent of the referee's 
recommendation, but benefiting from it.  Widule, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 
¶44. 
¶25 Nearly all of Attorney Nora's arguments on appeal11 
focus on challenges to the procedures that the OLR and the 
referee followed, both prior to and during this disciplinary 
case.  The only real challenge to the substance of the referee's 
report is found at the very end of Attorney Nora's opening 
brief, where she asserts that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the referee's conclusions of misconduct on Count 1 
(Judge Colas lawsuit), Count 3 (RICO district court action), and 
                                                 
11 In multiple places in her briefs, Attorney Nora purports 
to incorporate by reference arguments from prior filings.  This 
is improper in appellate briefs, which are limited to a 
specified number of words or pages by rule.  See, e.g., State v. 
Armstead, 220 Wis. 2d 626, 642 n.6, 583 N.W.2d 444 (Ct. App. 
1998); State v. Flynn, 190 Wis. 2d 31, 58, 527 N.W.2d 343 (Ct. 
App. 1994); see also Michael S. Heffernan, Appellate Practice 
and Procedure in Wisconsin § 11.14 (7th Ed. 2017). 
 
No. 
2013AP653-D   
 
15 
 
Count 4 (Southern District adversarial proceeding).  Before 
turning to her various procedural arguments, we will analyze the 
referee's conclusions of violations on all four counts, as that 
impacts some of Attorney Nora's procedural arguments. 
¶26 First, we address Count 2.  We agree with the referee 
that summary judgment on this count was appropriate.  Attorney 
Nora admitted all of the allegations in the OLR's amended 
complaint, either in her answer or during argument on the OLR's 
summary judgment motion.  Specifically, she admitted that (1) 
she had changed a material term in the offer by writing in a 
reservation of her claims against the lender and (2) on the day 
before she faxed her letter to Judge Colas, Attorney Potteiger 
"informed 
[her] 
in 
writing 
that 
the 
reservation 
of 
her 
counterclaims found in [Attorney] Nora's Foreclosure Repayment 
Agreement counteroffer was rejected."  Attorney Potteiger's 
informing her of that fact necessarily included that she had 
received his writing (i.e., his email).  Attorney Nora's claim 
after summary judgment on Count 2 that she had not received his 
email is therefore unavailing.  Her admissions demonstrate that 
her letter to Judge Colas contained a knowingly false statement.   
¶27 Further, 
Attorney 
Nora's 
receipt 
of 
Attorney 
Potteiger's August 25, 2009 email is unnecessary to uphold the 
violation of SCR 20:3.3(a)(1).  Like all law students, Attorney 
Nora knew that making material revisions to a contract offer and 
then signing the revised contract offer does not constitute an 
acceptance of the offer, but rather creates a counteroffer that 
the other party must affirmatively accept before there is an 
No. 
2013AP653-D   
 
16 
 
agreement.  See, e.g., Schwartz v. Handorf, 7 Wis. 2d 228, 236, 
96 N.W.2d 366 (1959); Fricano v. Bank of America NA, 2016 WI App 
11, ¶29, 366 Wis. 2d 748, 875 N.W.2d 143 (". . . an acceptance 
that varies the terms of the offer constitutes a rejection and a 
counteroffer").  She therefore knew at the time of her facsimile 
transmission to Judge Colas, even without regard to whether she 
had received Attorney Potteiger's reply email, that she had no 
binding contract.  The assertion in her letter that the 
foreclosure 
action 
was 
therefore 
stayed 
because 
of 
the 
Foreclosure Repayment Agreement was a false statement of fact 
that Attorney Nora knew to be false.  Accordingly, we accept the 
referee's conclusion of a violation of SCR 20:3.3(a)(1). 
¶28 With respect to Attorney Nora's federal action against 
Judge Colas, the referee found that Attorney Nora had not had a 
legitimate purpose for filing the complaint and that she had 
done so in order to harass Judge Colas and obstruct the 
foreclosure action.  Attorney Nora attacks these findings only 
by 
making 
a 
general 
allegation 
that 
the 
evidence 
was 
insufficient to support a violation and by asserting that Judge 
Colas was not protected by judicial immunity because her request 
for retroactive extensions of time due to an alleged disability 
were administrative matters.  She does not specifically allege 
that the referee's findings are clearly erroneous.   
¶29 Attorney Nora's assertion about a lack of judicial 
immunity, however, is irrelevant.  The referee did not find that 
her federal action against Judge Colas was without merit because 
he was immune from suit.  The referee found that Attorney Nora 
No. 
2013AP653-D   
 
17 
 
claimed she brought the suit because she wanted to obtain 
disability 
accommodations, 
but 
she 
did 
not 
seek 
such 
accommodations from Judge Colas before he granted summary 
judgment against her and she no longer needed accommodations 
when she initiated the federal action.  Moreover, the referee 
found that Attorney Nora brought the federal claim against Judge 
Colas not to gain disability accommodations, but as a way to 
force him off the foreclosure action and to undo his prior 
summary judgment ruling, which was included in her prayer for 
relief in the federal action.  Given the facts as found by the 
referee, we agree that Attorney Nora's federal action against 
Judge 
Colas, 
at 
least 
to 
the 
extent 
it 
sought 
his 
disqualification and the vacation of the summary judgment in the 
state foreclosure action, was unwarranted under existing law and 
was clearly pursued in an attempt to harass or maliciously 
injure another, in violation of SCR 20:3.1(a). 
¶30 Attorney Nora also alleges that there was insufficient 
evidence to support Counts 3 and 4 regarding her RICO actions 
against her former opposing counsel.  She asserts that attorneys 
who actively participate in conspiracies that violate RICO are 
liable for damages to an injured party.  As in her complaint 
against Judge Colas, however, her complaints against her 
opposing counsel were not simply seeking an award of damages, 
but 
were 
attempts 
to 
attack 
the 
foreclosure 
judgment 
collaterally.  According to the referee, Attorney Nora initially 
tried in this proceeding to present certain arguments as to why 
her RICO complaints had been brought in good faith under 
No. 
2013AP653-D   
 
18 
 
existing law, but she then abandoned those arguments when she 
filed her post-hearing brief.  The referee concluded that 
Attorney Nora lacked credibility in her claims, that she 
understood 
the 
Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine 
based 
on 
her 
own 
assertions of experience with it, that she filed the federal 
RICO actions for the ulterior purpose of undoing or avoiding the 
state foreclosure judgment despite her knowledge that the 
doctrine prohibits subsequent federal actions from overturning 
prior state court judgments, and that she pursued the federal 
RICO actions to harass her former opponents.  Tellingly, 
Attorney Nora does not dispute in her briefs that her federal 
RICO actions were intended to undo or avoid the foreclosure 
judgment or that she knew the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevented 
the 
federal 
courts 
from 
invalidating 
that 
judgment.  
Accordingly, we agree with the referee that, based on the 
referee's findings, there is sufficient evidence to conclude 
that Attorney Nora violated SCR 20:3.1(a) by pursuing the two 
RICO actions against her former opposing counsel, as alleged in 
Counts 3 and 4. 
¶31 We now turn to Attorney Nora's arguments challenging 
the process by which the OLR conducted its investigation and 
charging decision.  She initially argues that this disciplinary 
proceeding violated her rights to free speech and to petition 
the government under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, § 4 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
because the OLR intended to punish her on behalf of her 
litigation opponents.  We reject her claims.  First, she offers 
No. 
2013AP653-D   
 
19 
 
absolutely no evidence to support her bare claim that the OLR 
intended to punish her.  Second, Attorney Nora fails to 
recognize that there is no First Amendment right to violate 
ethical rules in litigation that prohibit attorneys from making 
false statements to tribunals and from using court proceedings 
to harass or maliciously injure presiding judges or opposing 
counsel.  See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985) ("The States 
and the Federal Government are free to prevent the dissemination 
of commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or misleading."); 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) ("But 
there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact."); 
McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 
436 (1988) ("Neither paid nor appointed counsel may deliberately 
mislead the court with respect to either the facts or the law, 
or consume the time and the energies of the court or the 
opposing party by advancing frivolous arguments."); Florida Bar 
v. Sayler, 721 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1998) ("The First Amendment 
does not protect those who make harassing or threatening remarks 
about the judiciary or opposing counsel."). 
¶32 Attorney Nora also asserts that she was deprived of 
due process and equal protection12 during the investigation 
                                                 
12 Although Attorney Nora mentions equal protection in her 
brief, she does not develop any legal argument based on equal 
protection.  Accordingly, we do not consider that issue.  
Parsons v. Associated Banc-Corp., 2017 WI 37, ¶39 n.8, 374 
Wis. 2d 513, 893 N.W.2d 212. 
No. 
2013AP653-D   
 
20 
 
conducted by the OLR.  Specifically, she alleges that the OLR 
violated her due process rights by improperly using and re-
disclosing her medical information to the Preliminary Review 
Panel (PRP).  We need not decide the merits of her claims in the 
context of this disciplinary proceeding.   We conclude that this 
situation is similar to a claim of error at a preliminary 
hearing in a criminal case, which we have refused to decide when 
there has been a proper subsequent trial.  State v. Webb, 160 
Wis. 2d 622, 628, 467 N.W.2d 108 (1991) ("We do not decide the 
question of whether there was error at the preliminary hearing 
in this case, because we hold that a conviction resulting from a 
fair and errorless trial in effect cures any error at the 
preliminary hearing.").  Similarly, to the extent that Attorney 
Nora is alleging an error or impropriety in the investigation 
phase, we conclude that the subsequent holding of a proper 
disciplinary hearing cured any arguable error.13  
¶33 Attorney Nora also alleges that her due process rights 
were violated in the charging decision.  Specifically, she 
points to the fact that Attorney Edward A. Hannan, who was the 
                                                 
13 In any event, we question how Attorney Nora's allegations 
would foreclose this court from considering whether she can be 
disciplined for violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
for Attorneys.  First, the OLR did not offer any of the medical 
information in this disciplinary case.  Thus, no violation is 
based on any of the medical information.  Further, the referee 
found that the records, which had been submitted to a federal 
district court, were not confidential and had not been treated 
as confidential by the federal district court, a fact which 
Attorney Nora admitted at the disciplinary hearing.  
No. 
2013AP653-D   
 
21 
 
chair of the Preliminary Review Committee (PRC), had a conflict 
of interest because he was representing parties who were adverse 
to Attorney Nora in a civil action pending in the Waukesha 
County circuit court (Bank of America, N.A. v. Brown, Waukesha 
County Case No. 2011CV3333).14   
¶34 Attorney Nora is not entitled to any relief regarding 
this allegation.  Initially, we note that this argument was 
raised for the first time on appeal, and we generally do not 
address the merits of untimely issues, especially where raising 
the issue could have allowed the parties or the tribunal to take 
action to eliminate the ground for the objection.  Terpstra v. 
                                                 
14 Attorney Nora has filed a request for the court to take 
judicial notice of five documents, but it is clear from her 
request that she is really asking the court to take judicial 
notice of two adjudicative facts from those documents:  (1) that 
Attorney Hannan served as the chair of the PRC during the 2012-
13 fiscal year when the cause-to-proceed determination regarding 
the counts of misconduct alleged in this case was made, and (2) 
that during the same time period Attorney Hannan represented 
parties who were adverse to Attorney Nora in the Waukesha County 
circuit court action.  We take judicial notice of these two 
adjudicative facts as they are "capable of accurate and ready 
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned."  Wis. Stat. § 902.01(2)(b).  We do 
not take judicial notice of all of the contents of the five 
documents because not all of those contents meet this criteria.  
With respect to the fifth identified document, Attorney Nora's 
petition for an interlocutory appeal in this disciplinary 
proceeding, there is no need for us to take judicial notice as 
that document is before us as a filing in this disciplinary 
action.  
No. 
2013AP653-D   
 
22 
 
Soiltest, Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 585, 593, 218 N.W.2d 129 (1974).  We 
decline to do so here.15   
¶35 Attorney Nora also claims that this disciplinary 
proceeding must be invalidated in its entirety because the 
referee, Attorney Lisa C. Goldman, was biased against her.  As 
examples of this alleged bias, Attorney Nora points to various 
decisions and rulings by Referee Goldman that were adverse to, 
and even critical of, Attorney Nora's requests or positions.  
Mere adverse rulings or critical statements based on a judicial 
officer's consideration of a litigant's arguments or evidence 
and 
the 
officer's 
experience 
with 
a 
litigant 
during 
a 
proceeding, however, are usually not sufficient to demonstrate 
bias on behalf of the presiding judicial official.  See, e.g., 
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) ("First, 
judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for 
a bias or partiality motion. . . . Second, opinions formed by 
the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring 
in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior 
                                                 
15 Even if we were to consider the claim, Attorney Nora has 
not demonstrated that her due process rights were violated.  The 
cause-to-proceed determination in a disciplinary investigation 
is made by a Preliminary Review Panel, which is only a subset of 
the PRC.  Although Attorney Hannan was the chair of the PRC, 
Attorney Nora does not allege that he was a member of the panel 
that actually reviewed her case.  Indeed, at oral argument, 
counsel for the OLR advised the court that he was not a member 
of that panel, and Attorney Nora did not dispute that fact.  
Thus, Attorney Nora cannot show that the cause-to-proceed 
determination in this matter was tainted by a panel member who 
had a conflict of interest. 
No. 
2013AP653-D   
 
23 
 
proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality 
motion 
unless 
they 
display 
a 
deep-seated 
favoritism 
or 
antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.  Thus, 
judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical 
or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or 
their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality 
challenge.").  We also disagree with Attorney Nora's claim that 
Referee Goldman demonstrated bias by becoming an advocate for 
the OLR rather than a neutral and detached magistrate.  The 
record does not support this assertion.     
¶36 Attorney Nora also alleges that Referee Goldman 
demonstrated bias by comparing Attorney Nora's continuing 
practice of law to a criminal who keeps committing crimes after 
charges have already been filed.  This claim, however, is not 
accurate because it takes the referee's statement out of 
context.  The referee never called Attorney Nora a criminal or 
compared her to a criminal.  It is clear from the context of the 
referee's statement, which was made in the course of denying the 
OLR's motion for leave to file an amended complaint to add new, 
unrelated counts, that the referee believed such an amendment at 
that point in the case would interfere with the efficient 
resolution of this ongoing proceeding.  The referee was simply 
reasoning by analogy to the question of amending criminal 
complaints to add new alleged crimes.  Her point was that when 
there can be a new criminal charge based on conduct that 
occurred after the initial criminal complaint has been filed, 
courts usually require prosecutors to initiate a second criminal 
No. 
2013AP653-D   
 
24 
 
proceeding rather than delaying a pending criminal case through 
an amendment of that complaint.  The referee's comments about 
this procedural issue evince no animus toward Attorney Nora.   
¶37 Finally, 
Attorney 
Nora 
claims 
that 
the 
referee 
admitted her bias because in her decision denying Attorney 
Nora's second motion for disqualification, the referee stated 
that she had "not acted impartially."  This argument borders on 
the frivolous, as it is clear from the surrounding text that the 
inclusion of the word "not" was an unintended, typographical 
error.  The referee unambiguously rejected Attorney Nora's 
claims that she was biased.  There is no legal basis for this 
court to find otherwise. 
¶38 In the end, we find no basis in the record to overturn 
Referee Goldman's subjective determination that she could be 
fair in her duties or to conclude that Referee Goldman was 
objectively biased. 
¶39 We have considered the rest of Attorney Nora's 
arguments alleging prosecutorial misconduct by the OLR and 
erroneous procedures by the referee.  We conclude that they are 
without 
legal 
merit, 
although 
we 
will 
not 
address 
them 
specifically in this opinion.   
¶40 We turn now to the issue of the appropriate sanction 
for the four counts of misconduct that we have found.  We agree 
with the referee's analysis of Attorney Nora's misconduct in 
comparison to the misconduct that resulted in a six-month 
suspension for Attorney Widule.  Unlike Attorney Widule, 
Attorney Nora has been disciplined previously for misconduct, 
No. 
2013AP653-D   
 
25 
 
some of which was similar in nature.  Moreover, her misconduct 
in this case is aggravated by the fact that it was not an 
isolated occurrence, but rather was a pattern of multiple 
instances of misconduct that stretched over a substantial period 
of time.  In addition, her misconduct was not based on her 
failure to do something, but on her affirmative and aggressive 
attempts to use the judicial system to obstruct the foreclosure 
of her property and to harass those she apparently deemed 
responsible for the loss of that property.  She has offered no 
basis for this court to conclude that she recognizes her 
misconduct or that she would change her tactics in similar 
circumstances in the future.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
misconduct at issue here requires a more severe level of 
discipline than we imposed on Attorney Widule.  We determine 
that a one-year suspension of Attorney Nora's license to 
practice law in Wisconsin is necessary and appropriate under 
these circumstances. 
¶41 Finally, it seems apparent that Attorney Nora believes 
that she must personally fight abuses or improprieties in the 
real estate lending industry.  A lawyer's fight for any cause, 
however noble one might think it to be, must be conducted within 
the ethical rules that govern the lawyer's conduct.  Attorney 
Nora must demonstrate that she understands this principle and 
can conform her conduct to the applicable ethical rules before 
she may return to the practice of law in this state. 
No. 
2013AP653-D   
 
26 
 
¶42 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Wendy Alison Nora to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of one year, 
effective April 30, 2018. 
¶43 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the issues of restitution 
and the assessment of costs shall continue to be held in 
abeyance for resolution at a subsequent time after the automatic 
stay arising from Attorney Nora's bankruptcy proceeding has been 
lifted. 
¶44 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Wendy Alison Nora shall 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
¶45 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement from the 
suspension imposed herein.