Case Title: Coprich v. Jones

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC-2023-0675, SC-2023-0923

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2024-06-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: June 21, 2024 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0675 
_________________________ 
 
Earnest Coprich  
 
v.  
 
Bessie Elizabeth Jones 
 
 
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court 
(CV-21-900720) 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Earnest Coprich appeals from the Montgomery Circuit Court's 
March 10, 2023, order entered after a bench trial concerning whether a 
deed for Coprich's residence that Coprich had executed in favor of Bessie 
SC-2023-0675 
2 
 
Elizabeth Jones should be set aside on account of fraud, undue influence, 
or Coprich's alleged incompetence. The circuit court declined to set aside 
the deed. We transfer the appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals. 
I. Facts 
 
 Coprich and Jones have known each other for about 50 years. On 
May 21, 2019, Jones drove Coprich to attorney Dan Taliaferro's office 
where Coprich signed a warranty deed drafted by Taliaferro that 
transferred ownership of Coprich's residence, which was located on East 
Elizabeth Lane in Montgomery ("the Elizabeth Lane property"), to Jones. 
Jones testified at trial that Coprich had sold her the Elizabeth Lane 
property for $10,000 and that she had agreed to make monthly payments 
over time to complete the transaction. In contrast, Coprich testified that 
the sale price for the Elizabeth Lane property was $15,000, not $10,000. 
He also stated that Jones was supposed to pay him $500 a month and 
that there would be an $85 late fee for payments that were not made on 
time. 
 
After Jones moved into the Elizabeth Lane property, she began 
making several improvements to the property because it was in "bad 
shape." Those improvements included clearing the yard of overgrown 
SC-2023-0675 
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bushes, fixing up the inside of the house, purchasing a septic tank, adding 
a front porch, and adding an additional room to the house. Coprich was 
aware of those improvements.  
 
On July 6, 2021, Coprich commenced an action against Jones by 
filing a complaint in the circuit court in which he sought to have the court 
set aside the May 21, 2019, deed. In his complaint, Coprich alleged that 
he owned the Elizabeth Lane property; that Jones "has occupied the 
house located on the property … and rented a portion of the real property 
for use as a mobile home lot without [Coprich's] permission"; and that, 
when Jones was asked to remove herself and the mobile home from the 
property, she claimed ownership of the property based on the May 21, 
2019, deed. Coprich alleged that, at the time he signed the deed, he "had 
a mental disability and was incompetent to execute" the deed.1 Coprich 
further asserted that he "was coerced and defrauded by [Jones] into 
executing" the deed. 
 
On July 28, 2021, Jones filed an answer to the complaint in which 
she denied Coprich's substantive allegations, asserted that she had 
 
1The deed was notarized by Taliaferro. 
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4 
 
purchased the Elizabeth Lane property in May 2019, and asserted that 
she had continuously occupied the property since that time. 
 
On November 22, 2022, a bench trial was held before Circuit Judge 
Greg Griffin in which testimony was heard from Jones, Coprich, 
Taliaferro, and Coprich's sister, Cheryl Dixon. Coprich contended at trial 
that either he had not been competent to transfer the Elizabeth Lane 
property to Jones or that Jones had taken advantage of Coprich to obtain 
the property at a bargain price. In the course of presenting his case, 
Coprich introduced documentation from the Montgomery County 
Revenue Commissioner's Office that indicated that, for tax purposes, the 
Elizabeth Lane property had been valued at $30,200 in 2019.  
 
On March 10, 2023, Judge Griffin entered a "Final Order" in which 
he ruled in Jones's favor. Specifically, Judge Griffin concluded that 
Coprich had "failed to present sufficient evidence from which this Court 
could find him incompetent and incapable of executing the deed at issue 
in this case," that Coprich's actions after the transaction and his 
testimony at trial indicated that Coprich was aware that the transaction 
was a sale of the Elizabeth Lane property, and that Coprich had "failed 
SC-2023-0675 
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to present clear and convincing evidence of fraud or misrepresentation on 
the part of [Jones] to coerce [Coprich] into signing the deed."  
 
On April 6, 2023, Coprich filed a "Motion to Vacate" Judge Griffin's 
March 10, 2023, order pursuant to Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P. In an order 
entered on April 11, 2023, Judge Griffin summarily denied Coprich's 
postjudgment motion. 
 
On May 9, 2023, Coprich appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. 
However, on September 18, 2023, the Court of Civil Appeals transferred 
the appeal to this Court for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 
II. Analysis 
 
Neither party raises the issue whether the proper jurisdiction for 
this appeal lies with the Court of Civil Appeals rather than with this 
Court, but "'jurisdictional matters are of such magnitude that we take 
notice of them at any time and do so even ex mero motu.' Nunn v. Baker, 
518 So. 2d 711, 712 (Ala. 1987)." Thomas v. Merritt, 167 So. 3d 283, 289 
(Ala. 2013).  
 
The Alabama Constitution provides that "[t]he supreme court shall 
be the highest court of the state" and that "[t]he supreme court shall have 
such appellate jurisdiction as may be provided by law."  Art. VI, § 140(a) 
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and (c), Ala. Const. 2022. The Alabama Constitution further provides 
that "[t]he court of civil appeals … shall exercise appellate jurisdiction 
under such terms and conditions as shall be provided by law and by rules 
of the supreme court." Art. VI, § 141(b), Ala. Const. 2022. Section 12-3-
10, Ala. Code 1975, provides for the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the 
Court of Civil Appeals: 
 
"The Court of Civil Appeals shall have exclusive 
appellate jurisdiction of all civil cases where the amount 
involved, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed 
$50,000, all appeals from administrative agencies other than 
the Alabama Public Service Commission, all appeals in 
workers' compensation cases, all appeals in domestic relations 
cases, including annulment, divorce, adoption, and child 
custody cases and all extraordinary writs arising from appeals 
in said cases. Where there is a recovery in the court below of 
any amount other than costs, the amount of such recovery 
shall be deemed to be the amount involved; otherwise, the 
amount claimed shall be deemed to be the amount involved; 
except, that in actions of detinue the alternate value of the 
property as found by the court or jury shall be deemed to be 
the amount involved." 
 
 
Coprich's complaint stated the following with respect to his 
requested relief: 
 
"9. [Coprich] requests the Warranty Deed … to be set 
aside and awarding him any damages that he may be entitled 
to receive. 
 
SC-2023-0675 
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"10. WHEREFORE, premises considered, [Coprich] 
requests the Warranty Deed … be set aside, and he is granted 
any other relief appropriate in this matter." 
 
Thus, Coprich clearly requested a form of equitable relief: setting aside 
the May 21, 2019, deed that transferred ownership of the Elizabeth Lane 
property from Coprich to Jones. Coprich also vaguely requested an award 
of damages. At the conclusion of the trial, Coprich's counsel stated that 
Coprich was "entitled to have the deed set aside and he regain possession 
of the [Elizabeth Lane] property and that any funds that [Jones] paid to 
him be deemed basically rent." 
 
Last year, in McCullough v. Windyke Country Club, Inc., [Ms. SC-
2023-0408, Aug. 11, 2023] __ So. 3d __ (Ala. 2023), the Court of Civil 
Appeals transferred an appeal to this Court in a case in which the 
Limestone Circuit Court had granted a party's motion to enforce a 
settlement agreement and had entered a judgment in the amount of 
$500. This Court explained that jurisdiction over that appeal belonged 
with the Court of Civil Appeals: 
 
"The underlying action is a 'civil case' and there was a 
'recovery' in the circuit court below of an 'amount': 
McCullough was awarded a judgment in the amount of $500. 
That recovery is thus 'deemed to be the amount involved.' 
Because 'the amount involved ... does not exceed $50,000,' the 
Court of Civil Appeals has 'exclusive appellate jurisdiction.' 
SC-2023-0675 
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The fact that the circuit court in its judgment also enforced a 
settlement agreement, which relief prior caselaw has deemed 
'injunctive in nature,' Kappa Sigma Fraternity v. Price-
Williams, 40 So. 3d 683, 690 (Ala. 2009), does not alter the 
analysis: the judgment provided a $500 recovery, thus 
establishing an 'amount involved' not exceeding $50,000. 
Therefore, we transfer this case to the Court of Civil Appeals." 
 
__ So. 3d at __ (emphasis added). Thus, in McCullough, we concluded that 
the fact that equitable relief in the form of an injunction had been 
requested and granted did not deprive the Court of Civil Appeals of 
jurisdiction over the appeal. 
 
The present case could be viewed as being distinguishable from 
McCullough because Coprich neither recovered any damages nor even 
claimed a specific amount of damages in his complaint. But the fact that 
Coprich did not specify the amount of damages requested is not an 
impediment to concluding that "the amount involved" in this case is less 
than $50,000. In Kirk v. Griffin, 667 So. 2d 1378 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995), 
the Court of Civil Appeals explained: 
"We note that, effective January 1, 1995, which was after this 
appeal was filed, the jurisdictional limit of this court was 
raised to $50,000.[2] Prior to January 1, 1995, this court had 
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of all civil cases where the 
amount involved did not exceed $10,000. § 12-3-10, Ala. Code 
 
2See Ala. Acts 1993, Act No. 93-346, § 5. 
 
SC-2023-0675 
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1975. 'Where there is a recovery in the court below of any 
amount other than costs, the amount of such recovery shall be 
deemed to be the amount involved; otherwise, the amount 
claimed shall be deemed to be the amount involved....' Id. We 
note that on the notice of appeal form, Kirk specifically elected 
to appeal to this court and intentionally chose to indicate 'no 
designated amount,' rather than indicating his claim to be in 
excess of $10,000. While it is impossible to determine with any 
certainty the exact amount involved in this controversy, 
viewing the totality of the language employed by Kirk in his 
claim and appeal, it appears that the amount involved is less 
than $10,000, and that appellate jurisdiction in this court is 
proper." 
 
Id. at 1380. See, e.g., Ex parte Greene Cnty. Comm'n, 317 So. 3d 1005, 
1006-07 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020) (noting that "[t]he plaintiffs did not demand 
specified amounts of damages in their claims, but the nature of those 
claims indicate that the amount in controversy in their action exceeds the 
$50,000 monetary jurisdictional limit of this court"); Ex parte Texas Loss 
Control Sys., LLC, 164 So. 3d 602, 605 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (explaining 
that, "[w]hen no judgment has been entered, this court and the supreme 
court determine 'the amount involved' by reference to the claims in the 
complaint" but that, because the plaintiff "did not specify the amount of 
damages," the court examined the nature of the claims and determined 
that, "[u]ndoubtedly, the amount in controversy exceeds the $50,000 
jurisdictional limit of this court"). Likewise, in this case, Coprich did not 
SC-2023-0675 
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specify in his complaint or in his notice of appeal an amount of damages 
sought; Coprich filed his notice of appeal with the Court of Civil Appeals; 
the testimony at trial indicated that the alleged sale price for the 
Elizabeth Lane property was either $10,000 or $15,000; and evidence 
admitted at trial indicated that, at the time of the alleged sale, the 
Elizabeth Lane property was worth, at most, $30,200. Thus, "the amount 
involved" in this appeal is less than $50,000. 
 
However, we have been informed that the Court of Civil Appeals 
transferred the present appeal to this Court, and that our Clerk's Office 
accepted the appeal, based on an understanding that Coprich was solely 
seeking equitable relief, i.e., seeking only to set aside the May 21, 2019, 
deed.3 Moreover, it is undeniable that the Court of Civil Appeals has 
transferred many appeals to this Court that this Court has accepted on 
the basis that only equitable relief had been requested in the plaintiff's 
 
3As we already have observed, Coprich's request for damages in his 
complaint was, at best, vague; in closing arguments, Coprich's counsel 
did not contend that Coprich was entitled to damages; Coprich's notice of 
appeal does not indicate that he is seeking a damages recovery; and on 
appeal Coprich does not mention seeking damages in any way. 
 
SC-2023-0675 
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complaint.4 For example, in Wells v. Wells, 49 So. 3d 216 (Ala. Civ. App. 
2010) ("Wells I"), the Etowah Circuit Court concluded that a mother who 
had executed a deed conveying her house to one of her sons lacked the 
mental capacity to do so, and the trial court therefore set the deed aside 
as requested by the plaintiff, who was the administrator of the mother's 
estate. See Wells I, 49 So. 3d at 220-21. The Court of Civil Appeals 
transferred the appeal to this Court "for lack of appellate jurisdiction," 
and this Court transferred the appeal back to the Court of Civil Appeals 
"pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala. Code 1975," thus indicating that this Court 
believed that it had jurisdiction of the appeal.5 49 So. 3d at 221. The 
Court of Civil Appeals remanded the case to the trial court to "consider 
the remaining evidence of record to determine whether or not that 
evidence support[ed] a finding that the mother, at the time she executed 
 
4In this regard, it is worth noting that, on the standard "Notice of 
Appeal" form, one of the listed categories for jurisdiction in the Supreme 
Court of Alabama is "Equitable relief, except for domestic relations." See 
Ala. R. App. P., Appendix 1, Form 1. 
 
5Section 12-2-7(6), Ala. Code 1975, permits this Court to "transfer 
to the Court of Civil Appeals … any civil case appealed to the Supreme 
Court and within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court" as long 
as the case does not fall within certain exceptional types of cases provided 
in the statute. (Emphasis added.) 
 
SC-2023-0675 
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the September 2007 deed, was experiencing a lucid interval such that she 
was competent to execute the September 2007 deed." Id. at 224. The trial 
court again determined that the mother had not been competent to 
execute the deed, and it therefore set aside the deed. On appeal to the 
Court of Civil Appeals, that court once again "transferred the appeal to 
the supreme court for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The supreme court 
transferred the appeal back to [the Court of Civil Appeals] pursuant to § 
12-2-7(6), Ala. Code 1975." Wells v. Wells, 69 So. 3d 192, 195 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 2011) ("Wells II"). Thus, in Wells II, both the Court of Civil Appeals 
and this Court again implicitly concluded that this Court, rather than 
the Court of Civil Appeals, had jurisdiction of the appeal because the 
plaintiff had solely sought equitable relief. 
 
Despite this Court's past treatment of such appeals, we now 
conclude that in cases in which the only requested relief is equitable and 
"the amount involved" appears to be less than $50,000, the Court of Civil 
Appeals has "exclusive appellate jurisdiction." Explaining why that is so 
requires examining the history of the Court of Civil Appeals.  
 
Before the inception of the Court of Civil Appeals and the Court of 
Criminal Appeals, Alabama had a single Court of Appeals. The Court of 
SC-2023-0675 
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Appeals was established by the Legislature in 1911 by General Act No. 
121. Section 2 of that Act provided: 
 
"Sec. 2. Said court, except as to actions involving the 
title to or possession of lands and except as herein otherwise 
provided, shall have final appellate jurisdiction, co-extensive 
with the State of all suits at law where the amount involved, 
exclusive of interests and costs does not exceed the sum of one 
thousand dollars, of all misdemeanors, including the violation 
of town and city ordinances, bastardy, habeas corpus and all 
felonies, where the punishment has been fixed at twenty 
years or under. Where there is a recovery in the court below 
of any amount other than costs, the amount of such recovery 
shall be deemed to be the amount involved, otherwise the 
amount claimed shall be deemed to be the amount involved, 
except that in actions of detinue the alternative value of the 
property as found by the court or jury shall be deemed to be 
the amount involved. …" 
 
Ala. Gen. Acts 1911, Act No. 121, § 2 (emphasis added).  
 
For the purpose of understanding the history of the Court of Civil 
Appeals, what is worth noting in the language of § 2 of Act No. 121 is that 
the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction of appeals in "actions involving 
the title to or possession of lands" and that the Court of Appeals had "final 
appellate jurisdiction" as to appeals in "suits at law where the amount 
involved" did not exceed $1,000.  
 
The term "suits at law" had a specialized meaning because, at that 
time, Alabama's court system had circuit courts that entertained "suits 
SC-2023-0675 
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at law" and chancery courts that entertained "suits at equity."6 See, 
generally, Barbour v. Poncelor, 203 Ala. 386, 393, 83 So. 130, 137 (1919) 
("In this state the distinction between the jurisdiction of the courts of law 
and the courts of equity has been maintained."). An action "at law" was 
one seeking damages for relief. See, e.g., Jenelle Mims Marsh, Alabama 
Law of Damages § 1:1 (6th ed. 2012) ("The law of damages is often, from 
a practical viewpoint, the very essence of most actions at law."). Actions 
in equity entailed some form of specific enforcement. See, e.g., Dylan 
Reeves, Tilley's Alabama Equity § 1:3 (6th ed. 2023) ("[E]quitable 
remedies generally seek to enjoin or compel conduct or to reform or 
rescind contracts, deeds, and other instruments."). See, generally, 
Iantosca v. Benistar Admin. Servs., Inc., 843 F. Supp. 2d 148, 153 (D. 
Mass. 2012) ("Traditionally, legal remedies involve money damages 
whereas equitable remedies are 'typically coercive, and are enforceable 
directly on the person or thing to which they are directed.'" (quoting 
International Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Chromas Tech. Canada, Inc., 356 F.3d 
731, 736 (7th Cir. 2004))); 1A C.J.S. Actions § 158 (2016) ("An action at 
 
6"'Chancery' and 'equity' are commonly used interchangeably and 
synonymously." Dylan Reeves, Tilley's Alabama Equity § 1:1 (6th ed. 
2023). 
SC-2023-0675 
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law generally involves a claim for money damages, while an equitable 
claim seeks a form of specific relief, as by an order directing a person to 
do or not to do a specific act, involving the coercive power of the court, 
including injunctions or specific performance." (footnotes omitted)). 
 
In a 1915 act that became effective in 1917, the Legislature 
abolished chancery courts, ordered the establishment of circuit courts in 
every county in the State, and conferred "the jurisdiction and powers of 
the chancery court … on the circuit court." Ala. Gen. Acts 1915, Act No. 
217, para. 2. The circuit courts were required to "try and determine every 
cause, or proceeding in equity in the same manner, by the same rules and 
principles as the same cause would be tried if in the chancery court." Id. 
Thus, even though chancery courts had been abolished, circuit courts 
maintained a "law side" and an "equity side" of the court. See § 6486, Ala. 
Code 1923 (providing for when a "bill in equity" should be transferred to 
"the law side of [the] court"). Accordingly, a procedural division between 
law and equity remained in the Alabama court system.  
 
In the 1940 Alabama Code, the Legislature continued the existence 
of the Court of Appeals and repeated nearly verbatim the jurisdiction 
that that court originally possessed, i.e., that the Court of Appeals, 
SC-2023-0675 
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"except as to actions involving title to or possession of lands, … shall have 
final appellate jurisdiction of all suits at law where the amount involved, 
exclusive of interests and costs[,] does not exceed the sum of one thousand 
dollars …." Title 13, § 86, Ala. Code 1940 (emphasis added). The 
maintenance of that procedural division between law and equity is why 
the Court of Appeals declared during that period that "[t]his court of 
course has no chancery jurisdiction." Taylor v. Shoemaker, 34 Ala. App. 
168, 171, 38 So. 2d 895, 898 (1948). The Alabama Supreme Court agreed 
with the Court of Appeals' understanding of its jurisdiction. See State ex 
rel. Patterson v. O'Dell, 270 Ala. 1, 6, 117 So. 2d 157, 162 (1959) (stating 
that "[t]he Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction in cases 
involving injunctions"). 
 
However, the late 1960s brought a movement to reform the 
Alabama judicial system. See, generally, Tony A. Freyer & Paul M. 
Pruitt, Jr., Reaction and Reform: Transforming the Judiciary Under 
Alabama's Constitution, 1901-1975, 53 Ala. L. Rev. 77, 106-26 (2001). 
Part of that movement included the abolition of the Court of Appeals, 
which was replaced by the Court of Civil Appeals and the Court of 
Criminal Appeals. In 1969, the Legislature approved Act No. 987, which 
SC-2023-0675 
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created both of the current intermediate appellate courts, provided for 
the jurisdiction of each of those courts, and provided for the transfer of 
cases between those courts and the Alabama Supreme Court. With 
respect to the jurisdiction of the Court of Civil Appeals, Act No. 987 
provided: 
 
"Section 3. The Court of Civil Appeals shall have 
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of all suits at law where the 
amount involved, exclusive of interests and costs, does not 
exceed ten thousand dollars, all appeals from administrative 
agencies other than the Alabama Public Service Commission, 
all appeals in workmen's compensation cases, all appeals in 
domestic relations cases, including annulment, divorce, 
adoption and child custody cases, and all extraordinary writs 
arising from appeals in said cases. Where there is a recovery 
in the court below of any amount other than costs, the amount 
of such recovery shall be deemed to be the amount involved, 
otherwise the amount claimed shall be deemed to be the 
amount involved, except that in actions of detinue the 
alternative value of the property as found by the court or jury 
shall be deemed to be the amount involved." 
 
Ala. Acts 1969, Act No. 987, § 3 (emphasis added). Thus, when it created 
the Court of Civil Appeals, the Legislature increased the jurisdictional 
"amount involved" to $10,000, and it eliminated the exclusion of "actions 
involving title to or possession of lands," but the Court of Civil Appeals, 
like its predecessor the Court of Appeals, had jurisdiction in "suits at 
law," but not in appeals coming from the equity side of the circuit courts.  
SC-2023-0675 
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However, in 1971, the Legislature approved Act No. 1311, which 
empowered the Alabama Supreme Court to adopt general rules 
governing pleading, practice, and procedure in civil actions in all courts 
in Alabama. Specifically, Act No. 1311 provided: 
 
"Section 1. For the purpose of simplifying practice and 
procedure in all civil actions in all Courts in Alabama, and 
securing the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of 
every action upon its merits, the Supreme Court shall have 
the power from time to time to adopt by general rules the 
forms of process, writs, pleadings, motions, practice and 
procedure in all civil actions in all Courts in Alabama; 
provided, however, that such rules shall not abridge, 
enlarge or modify the substantive right of any party. 
 
 
"Section 2. In adopting the said general rules, the 
Supreme Court shall have the power to provide for one form 
of civil action and procedure for the trial of cases both at law 
and in equity; provided, however, that equitable rights as 
at common law and declared by the Supreme Court of 
Alabama shall be preserved to the parties inviolate; 
provided, further, that the right of trial by jury as at 
common law and declared by the Seventh Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States and by Section 11 of the 
Constitution of Alabama shall be preserved to the parties 
inviolate." 
 
Ala. Acts 1971, Act No. 1311, §§ 1-2 (bold typeface in original; other 
emphasis added).7 
 
7In December 1973, Amendment 328 to the Alabama Constitution 
of 1901 was approved. The "new judicial article," as it was called, 
"'place[d] the mandatory function on the Supreme Court to make the 
SC-2023-0675 
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Pursuant to Act No. 1311, in July 1973 the Alabama Supreme Court 
adopted the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. Pertinent here is Rule 2, 
Ala. R. Civ. P., which states: "There shall be one form of action to be 
known as [a] 'civil action.'" The Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption 
of Rule 2 explained: 
"This rule does not affect the various remedies which 
have heretofore been available. Instead, the merger of law and 
equity and the abolition of the forms of action supply one 
uniform procedure by which a litigant may present his claim 
in an orderly manner to a court empowered to give him 
whatever relief is appropriate and just; it is for the court to 
decide, 
in 
accordance 
with 
unchanged 
principles 
of 
substantive law, what form of relief meets this test on the 
particular facts proved." 
 
 See, e.g., Ex parte Reynolds, 436 So. 2d 873, 874-75 (Ala. 1983) ("Rule 2, 
[Ala. R. Civ. P.], provided for the merger of law and equity. … That 
merger was accomplished so that litigants could present related legal and 
equitable claims in an orderly manner."); Du Boise v. Brewer, 349 So. 2d 
1086, 1087 (Ala. 1977) ("[I]t should be remembered that the procedural 
 
operating rules for the judicial system, subject to only specific restraints 
and checks.'" Schoenvogel v. Venator Grp. Retail, Inc., 895 So. 2d 225, 
231 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Morgan Cnty. Comm'n v. Powell, 292 Ala. 300, 
326, 293 So. 2d 830, 854 (1974) (Heflin, C.J., dissenting)). See Art. VI, § 
150, Ala. Const. 2022 ("The supreme court shall make and promulgate 
rules governing the administration of all courts and rules governing 
practice and procedure in all courts …."). 
SC-2023-0675 
20 
 
differences between law and equity have been abolished and there is only 
one form of action, known as a 'civil action,' in which all claims between 
the parties should be litigated."); Citizens Bank & Sav. Co. v. Wolfe Sales 
Co., 394 So. 2d 941, 943 (Ala. 1981) (plurality opinion) ("The Alabama 
Rules of Civil Procedure abolishing common law forms of action and 
replacing them with one form of action did not abolish substantive 
remedies …."). In other words, with the adoption of Rule 2, Ala. R. Civ. 
P., the procedural distinctions between law and equity were abolished, 
but the substantive legal differences between those remedies were 
preserved. As Act No. 1311 and the Committee Comments to Rule 2 
indicated, the merger of law and equity occurred in order to simplify legal 
procedure and to increase the likelihood that civil disputes would be 
decided on the merits rather than upon legal technicalities.8  
 
8The Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure, which the Legislature 
empowered the Alabama Supreme Court to promulgate in September 
1971, were adopted in June 1973 and became effective on December 1, 
1975. Those rules similarly declared that they "shall be construed so as 
to assure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
appellate proceeding on its merits." Rule 1, Ala. R. App. P. See Ala. Acts 
1971, Act No. 964, § 1. See, generally, J.H. Alsbrooks & J.H. Ritch, The 
Alabama Appellate Process -- Part II, 6 Cumb. L. Rev. 63, 63-64 (1975). 
 
SC-2023-0675 
21 
 
 
In apparent recognition of the adoption of the Alabama Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the procedural changes brought about by the merger 
of law and equity, on September 16, 1975, Chief Justice of the Alabama 
Supreme Court Howell Heflin and Presiding Judge of the Alabama Court 
of Civil Appeals L. Charles Wright entered into an agreement on behalf 
of those courts that was ordered entered into the minutes of the Alabama 
Supreme Court and that sought "to clarify jurisdictional questions 
between the two courts." In part, that agreement stated: "(3) Appeals 
which contain both legal and equitable relief and the amount in 
controversy does not exceed $10,000 shall come within the jurisdiction of 
the Court of Civil Appeals."9 
 
During this same period of reform, the Legislature ordered the 
revision, digesting, and codification of all the statutes of the State of 
Alabama into The Code of Alabama 1975 ("the Code"). See Ala. Acts 1977, 
Act No. 20, § 1. That process included the Legislature's authorizing a joint 
committee of the members of the House of Representatives and the 
 
9The September 16, 1975, agreement's understanding with respect 
to which appellate court has jurisdiction of appeals that involve both legal 
and equitable relief is confirmed by our decision in McCullough. 
 
SC-2023-0675 
22 
 
Senate to make revisions, corrections, and amendments to the Code 
before its final adoption. See Ala. Acts 1976, Act No. 510. One of the 
"substantive and major changes" made by the joint committee was to § 
12-3-10, in which "'civil cases' [was] substituted for 'suits at law.'" Code 
of Alabama 1975 Legislative Manuscript, Appendix I. Summary of 
Changes in Codified Sections, p. A.148. On February 15, 1977, the 
Legislature approved the adoption of the Code. See Ala. Acts 1977, Act 
No. 20. "The 1975 Code became effective on October 31, 1977, pursuant 
to a proclamation of the Governor of October 1, 1977, based on Act No. 20 
(1977 Regular Session)." Ex parte Stewart, 730 So. 2d 1246, 1249 (Ala. 
1999).  
 
The reason for that "major change[]" in language from "all suits at 
law" to "all civil cases" is clear from our foregoing discussion concerning 
the adoption of Rule 2 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure: the 
change in language reflected the fact that law and equity had been 
merged with respect to legal procedure in order to simplify the litigation 
process for the parties involved. The significance of the change in 
language from "all suits at law" to "all civil cases" is equally clear from 
our foregoing discussion concerning the legal distinctions between "suits 
SC-2023-0675 
23 
 
at law" and "suits in equity": "all civil cases" encompasses both types of 
cases. Indeed, the significance of describing a case as a "civil action" 
rather than as either a "suit at law" or as a "suit in equity" was recognized 
long ago by this Court: 
"The jurisdiction in the present Constitution is 'in all civil 
causes.' So it was under the former constitutions. The term 
comprehends every cause which is not criminal. All causes, 
whether in equity or at law, had but two grand classifications, 
civil and criminal. The latter comprehends only violations of 
the criminal law, -- causes at the common law, in which the 
crown, or with us the State, complains of violated law and 
broken peace, in which all individual right and interest are 
lost, and merged in the greater right and interest of the 
sovereign. Civil causes had parties, individual suitors, whose 
rights and wrongs were the matter of controversy. They 
embraced every action at law and every suit in equity, 
whether it sprung from contract or from tort; whether the 
form of action for the injury was ex contractu or ex delicto." 
 
Taylor v. Woods, 52 Ala. 474, 478-79 (1875) (emphasis added). In short, 
with the adoption of the Code, the jurisdiction of the Court of Civil 
Appeals was altered in § 12-3-10 to include "all civil cases" -- both in law 
and in equity -- that had an "amount involved" of up to $10,000.10 
 
10In 1993, the Legislature promulgated another significant change 
to § 12-3-10 when it raised the jurisdictional "amount involved" for appeal 
of a civil action to the Court of Civil Appeals from $10,000 to $50,000 -- a 
change that became effective on January 1, 1995. See Ala. Acts 1993, Act 
No. 93-346, § 5. 
 
SC-2023-0675 
24 
 
 
Nonetheless, despite the procedural merger of law and equity 
brought about by Rule 2 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure in 1973, 
the Alabama courts' first attempt to recognize the effect of that merger 
through the September 16, 1975, agreement between the Supreme Court 
and the Court of Civil Appeals, and the substantive change in the 
language of § 12-3-10 that was adopted in 1977, some appeals that were 
filed in the Court of Civil Appeals that involved both legal and equitable 
relief continued to be transferred to, and were accepted by, the Alabama 
Supreme Court. Moreover, essentially all appeals filed in the Court of 
Civil Appeals that involved solely equitable relief -- and that did not fall 
within the Court of Civil Appeals' specialized jurisdiction for appeals 
from 
administrative 
agencies 
or 
in 
cases 
involving 
workers' 
compensation or domestic relations -- continued to be transferred to, and 
were accepted by, the Alabama Supreme Court.11 
 
11Even practitioners who are considered experts in civil procedure 
have not fully recognized the shift in the jurisdiction of the Court of Civil 
Appeals brought about by the alteration of the language in § 12-3-10. See 
Champ Lyons, Jr., Appellate Practice Pointers for Alabama Lawyers in 
Civil Cases, 44 Alabama Lawyer 6, 6 (1983) (stating that "the Supreme 
Court hears all appeals in claims solely for equitable relief, regardless of 
the amount in controversy. Where legal and equitable claims are mixed 
in the same action, the equitable claims are disregarded for purposes of 
determining jurisdiction."). 
SC-2023-0675 
25 
 
 
The present case is a testament to the enduring confusion 
concerning the jurisdiction of appeals that seek equitable relief, which we 
seek to clarify through this opinion. Coprich filed his appeal with the 
Court of Civil Appeals, but the appeal was transferred to, and accepted 
by, this Court because Coprich had sought equitable relief in his 
complaint: Coprich asked the circuit court to set aside the May 21, 2019, 
deed that he had signed and that had granted ownership of the Elizabeth 
Lane property to Jones. Coprich's action is clearly a "civil case" within 
the meaning of § 12-3-10. Moreover, the "amount involved" in the case 
clearly does not exceed the jurisdictional threshold of $50,000 provided 
in § 12-3-10. Therefore, we transfer the appeal to the Court of Civil 
Appeals. 
 
APPEAL TRANSFERRED. 
 
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, Stewart, 
Mitchell, and Cook, JJ., concur.