Case Title: Gaines v. Doby

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-05-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Gaines v. Doby1989 WY 93773 P.2d 442Case Number: 88-283Decided: 05/02/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
PHYLLIS VIRGINIA (DOBY) 
GAINES, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

 
 
v.

 
 
HERBERT KENNETH DOBY, 
APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
J.

 
 
Robert B. Carroll, 
Cheyenne, for appellant.

 
 
Herbert K. Doby, pro se.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

MACY, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant Phyllis 
(Doby) Gaines appeals from an order of the district court which modified a 
divorce decree with respect to child visitation and certain aspects of child 
support and in which neither party was found in contempt. The modification and 
contempt proceedings were held before a court commissioner who took evidence, 
made findings, and submitted a recommended order to the district 
court.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
reverse.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant describes the 
issues as follows:

 
 
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT 
ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW, OR ABUSE ITS DISCRETION, IN ASSIGNING POST DECREE 
CROSS-MOTIONS TO MODIFY THE DIVORCE DECREE AND CROSS-MOTIONS TO HOLD THE PARTIES 
IN CONTEMPT TO THE COURT COMMISSIONER FOR A TRIAL ON THE 
ISSUES?

 
 
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT 
ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW, OR ABUSE ITS DISCRETION, BY APPROVING THE COURT 
COMMISSIONER'S INJUNCTION ENJOINING THE APPELLANT FROM ALLOWING THE MINOR CHILD 
OR ANY OTHER PERSON TO CALL ANY PERSON, EXCEPT HER NATURAL FATHER, "DADDY", 
"FATHER", "PAPA", "DAD", "POP", OR ANY OTHER TERM THAT INDICATES THE PARENTAL 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FATHER AND CHILD?

 
 
III. DID THE TRIAL COURT 
ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW, OR ABUSE ITS DISCRETION, BY APPROVING THE COURT 
COMMISSIONER'S ORDER REDEFINING VISITATION, ALLOWING APPELLEE TO VOLUNTARILY 
REDUCE HIS CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION AND REFUSING TO ENFORCE THE MEDICAL PAYMENT 
TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY THE PARTIES?

 
 
In her reply brief, 
appellant articulates as a narrower issue:

 
 
WAS THE DISTRICT COURT 
PRESENTED ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT TO INDEPENDENTLY REVIEW THE PROCEEDINGS 
BEFORE THE COURT COMMISSIONER AND MAKE AN INDEPENDENT DECISION IN MODIFYING THE 
DIVORCE DECREE?

 
 
As in our recent decision 
in the case of Foster v. Foster, 768 P.2d 1038 (Wyo. 1989), the dispositive 
issue here, as more precisely identified and argued by appellant in her reply 
brief, is whether the district court's review of the court commissioner's 
findings and recommendations complied with constitutional and statutory 
requirements.

 
 

[¶4.]     Appellant (the wife) 
and appellee Herbert Doby (the husband) were divorced on January 20, 1987. The 
divorce decree incorporated the terms of an agreement entered into by the 
parties regarding property settlement and the custody and support of the minor 
child of the parties. On June 22, 1988, the husband filed a combined motion to 
find the wife in contempt and to modify the decree. In this motion the husband 
alleged that the wife had not allowed him liberal visitation as provided for in 
the decree and requested that the decree be modified to specify visitation 
rights and to more clearly specify a sum certain in monthly child 
support.

 
 

[¶5.]     On July 6, 1988, the 
wife filed a response and a cross-motion to find the husband in contempt and to 
modify the decree. The wife alleged, as the basis for her contempt motion, that 
the husband had failed to disclose his true income during the negotiations 
leading to the settlement agreement. The wife sought increased child support in 
accordance with her reading of the decree, which was drafted to allow a 
fluctuating support obligation determined as a percentage of the husband's 
income, and she also requested that the medical and dental insurance coverage 
provision of the settlement agreement be enforced in accordance with her 
interpretation of that provision.

 
 

[¶6.]     The matter was referred 
to the court commissioner who conducted a hearing on August 9, 1988. The court 
commissioner heard testimony from both parties and from their respective new 
spouses. At the conclusion of the testimony, the court commissioner orally 
announced his findings and directed counsel for the husband to prepare an order, 
encompassing such findings and recommendations, to be submitted to the district 
court for approval. The wife filed objections to the proposed order, apparently 
before the order was approved by the court commissioner. Thereafter the court 
commissioner entered into the record a document designated "FINDINGS AND REPORT 
OF COURT COMMISSIONER," which indicated that his findings were set forth in the 
proposed form of order submitted to the district court. The order was approved 
by the district court as submitted except that, in response to the objections, 
the district court changed a provision requiring the costs of visitation to be 
shared equally by the parties. The district court, in a handwritten insertion, 
altered this provision to provide that the wife would pay only $100 per year 
toward such costs.

 
 

[¶7.]     The order encompassing 
the court commissioner's findings and recommendations, as approved by the 
district court, significantly expanded the husband's visitation rights and 
established a very specific visitation schedule. The order additionally provided 
that neither party was found in contempt; that there was no change in 
circumstances warranting a change in monthly child support; that the wife's 
remarriage was a change in circumstances such that the husband should not be 
required to pay any of the wife's medical insurance or expenses; that as long as 
the wife's employment provided health insurance she was required to carry such 
insurance for the benefit of the child - the cost of such insurance to otherwise 
be divided equally between the parties; and that the wife was not to allow or 
encourage the child to call anyone but the husband "daddy." The order was 
amended on September 22, 1988, to incorporate the previously inserted change 
regarding costs of visitation and to include Memorial Day as one of the holidays 
on which the husband was entitled to visitation in alternating years. This 
appeal was taken from the amended order.

 
 

[¶8.]     Subsequent to these 
proceedings, this Court decided Foster, 768 P.2d 1038, which also arose in 
LaramieCounty district court and 
which addressed a similar challenge to a divorce decree modification proceeding 
referred to a court commissioner. The analysis in Foster is equally applicable 
to the instant case, and it will be repeated here only in abbreviated form. In 
Foster we considered the constitutional1 and statutory2 provisions for court commissioners 
and synthesized the applicable provisions in this manner:

 
 
Thus, under the Wyoming 
Constitution, court commissioners may perform "such other duties * * * as shall 
be prescribed by law." The legislature has determined that those duties include 
taking evidence, making findings, and reporting the same to the district court, 
which in turn is required to review all proceedings had before court 
commissioners.

 
 

Id. at 
1041.

 
 

[¶9.]     In Foster, the court 
commissioner found a substantial change in circumstances warranting an increase 
in child support. That portion of the hearing in which the court commissioner 
summarized his findings was transcribed and submitted to the district court 
along with a prepared order. We noted, however, that these findings made no 
mention of the evidentiary basis relied upon but rather simply consisted of a 
series of conclusions without evidentiary support. Id. at 1041. We further 
observed that there was no indication that the district court conducted any 
review beyond reading and signing the order. Id. at 1041. In reversing the district court 
in Foster, we said: 

 
 
[W]e hold that, pursuant 
to Wyo. Const. art. 5, § 14 and Wyo. Stat. § 5-3-307 (1977), an assignment to a 
court commissioner to take evidence and make findings in a child support 
modification proceeding is not improper, but the district court must be apprised 
of the evidence received and relied upon by the court commissioner in making his 
findings, and the district court must independently review the evidence and 
findings in making its decision, with such review being indicated on the 
record.

 
 

Id. at 
1042.

 
 

[¶10.]  The procedure utilized in the instant 
case suffers from the same infirmities as those in Foster. Here, no part of the 
proceedings before the court commissioner was transcribed for review by the 
district court.3 As in Foster, the order and amended 
order modifying the divorce decree contain only the conclusions of the court 
commissioner. By virtue of the wife's filed objections to the modification order 
the district court undoubtedly gained some insight into the factual contentions 
of the parties, but these filed objections did not provide an adequate 
evidentiary basis upon which the district court could review the findings of the 
court commissioner. In Foster, we stated:

 
 
Section 5-3-307(a)(v) 
provides that, when the court commissioner takes evidence and makes findings, he 
is to report the same to the district court. We read that section as requiring 
the court commissioner to prepare a report of some substance which at least 
summarizes the evidence presented and indicates the basis upon which he has made 
his findings of fact. * * * In addition, in order to insure an informed 
decision, the record should clearly indicate that the district court has 
independently reviewed the evidence and findings and reached its decision 
accordingly.

 
 

Id. at 1042. See also K.C. 
v. State, 771 P.2d 774 (1989). As we did in Foster, we conclude in the instant 
case that the district court afforded unwarranted deference to the 
determinations by the court commissioner and expanded the role of the court 
commissioner beyond that envisioned by constitution and statute. As a result we 
must reverse.4

 
 

[¶11.]  Our decision herein is not on the merits 
of the case, and it may be that, upon further review, the district court will 
reach a similar result. In the interest of judicial economy, however, we will 
briefly address two of the specific contentions raised by the wife which 
undoubtedly will be considered upon remand.

 
 

[¶12.]  The wife asserts that the district court 
erred by approving the court commissioner's "injunction" prohibiting the wife 
from encouraging or allowing the child to refer to anyone except the husband as 
"daddy" or any other such term. We are not persuaded by the wife's argument that 
the court commissioner issued the "injunction." The order was signed by the 
district court and not by the court commissioner but, as discussed, the district 
court did not adequately review the proceedings had before the court 
commissioner which established the foundation for the 
order.

 
 

[¶13.]  Of greater consequence is the wife's 
contention that such an order is unenforceable, potentially abusive, and overly 
broad. We agree. Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-113(a) (1977) provides in part that, upon the 
petition of either of the parents, the district court "may revise the decree 
concerning the care, custody, visitation and maintenance of the children as the 
circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the children require[]." The 
paramount consideration in such situation is the best interests of the children. 
Ayling v. Ayling, 661 P.2d 1054, 1056 (Wyo. 
1983); Bereman v. Bereman, 645 P.2d 1155, 1160 (Wyo. 1982). Decisions in matters of care, 
custody, and control of the children are within the sound discretion of the 
district court. Manners v. Manners, 706 P.2d 671, 674 (Wyo. 1985); Bereman, 645 P.2d  at 1160.

 
 

[¶14.]  To the extent that the district court's 
order is in the nature of an injunction, it is, in addition to being 
ill-advised, clearly unenforceable. In Devine v. Devine, 20 N.J. Super. 522, 90 A.2d 126 (1952), the plaintiff wife sought an injunction against her 
mother-in-law to enjoin any acts (slanderous statements, et cetera) by the 
mother-in-law designed to alienate the affections of the husband. The court 
denied relief, refusing to censor communications between mother and son by means 
of an injunction. The court stated, in language appropriate to the instant 
case:

 
 
Just how the court could 
enforce such an order, were an injunction granted, is not clear and the 
enforcement of such an injunction would appear to present insurmountable 
difficulties. Communications between a mother and son would ordinarily be 
private and confidential and not open to inspection or 
examination.

 
 
Equity has always 
regarded the problem of enforcing its judgment or decree as an important factor 
in determining whether injunctive relief is appropriate.

 
 

Id. 90 A.2d  at 129. See also 
42 Am.Jur.2d, Injunctions § 37 (1969).

 
 

[¶15.]  Further, the "daddy" provision does 
contain the seeds of potential abuse. We question just how the mother would or 
should regulate the manner in which the child addresses the male father figure 
residing in the home. The order as written raises the specter of a contempt 
citation issuing against the custodial parent for failing to punish the child 
for expressing what may be a natural manifestation of the child's 
feelings.

 
 

[¶16.]  On the other hand, we are sensitive to 
the natural father's concern that the mother and stepfather may be deliberately 
or inadvertently confusing the child as to the identity of the natural father or 
attempting to alienate the child's affections for him. This is a difficult area 
of family relationships which is not particularly well suited to court 
regulation or supervision. We believe, however, that it would be within the 
district court's discretion to direct the wife to respect and assist in the 
maintenance of a proper relationship between the child and the natural father. 
See Henson v. Henson, 384 P.2d 721 (Wyo. 1963). The failure to honor such an 
admonition could conceivably provide the basis for a further modification of the 
decree.

 
 

[¶17.]  Finally, we note the wife's argument 
that, even if the court commissioner had authority to take evidence in the 
modification proceeding, he was not empowered to hear the cross-motions for 
contempt. To this contention we would point out that the district court has 
continuing jurisdiction to modify or enforce provisions of a divorce decree 
regarding support, custody, and visitation. Section 20-2-113(a); Graham v. 
Fenno, 734 P.2d 983, 985 (Wyo. 1987). Contempt proceedings to enforce 
the provisions of the decree are part of this continuing jurisdiction. 
Id. at 985; Erb v. Erb, 573 P.2d 849 
(Wyo. 1978). 
We see no reason why the court commissioner cannot take evidence, make findings, 
and report the same to the district court in a contempt proceeding to the same 
extent as it may in a modification proceeding.

 
 

[¶18.]  Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 See Wyo. Const. art. 5, § 
14.

 
 

2 See Wyo. Stat. §§ 5-3-301 to -312 
(1977) and particularly §§ 5-3-307 and 5-3-310.

 
 

3 A complete transcript of the 
hearing was prepared and submitted as part of the record on 
appeal.

 
 

4 The wife's reply brief was filed 
after our decision in Foster. Attached to this brief is a copy of the procedures 
for hearings before court commissioners as revised by the LaramieCounty district court in response to our 
decision in Foster. It would appear that the problems occurring in Foster and in 
the instant case have been remedied and should not 
reoccur.