Case Title: Ryan Scott v. Savers Property and Casualty Insurance Company

Citation: 2003 WI 60

Docket Number: 2001AP002953

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 60 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-2953 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Ryan Scott, Kathy Scott, and Patrick Scott,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Savers Property and Casualty Insurance Company, 
and Stevens Point Area Public School District,  
 
Defendants-Respondents, 
Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company,  
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  257 Wis. 2d 621, 650 N.W.2d 560 
(Ct. App. 2002-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 19, 2003 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 4, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Portage   
 
JUDGE: 
James M. Mason   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BABLITCH and CROOKS, JJ., join concurrence. 
BABLITCH, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
CROOKS, J., joins concurrence. 
SYKES, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: BRADLEY, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by Russell T. Golla and Anderson, O'Brien, Bertz, Skrenes & 
Golla, Stevens Point, and oral argument by Russell T. Golla. 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief by Cari L. 
Westerhof and Ruder, Ware & Michler, LLSC, Wausau, and oral 
argument by Cari Lynn Westerhof. 
 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Michael Riley and 
Atterbury, Riley & Kammer, S.C., Madison, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
2003 WI 60 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-2953  
(L.C. No. 
00 CV 286) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Ryan Scott, Kathy Scott, and Patrick  
Scott,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Savers Property and Casualty Insurance  
Company, and Stevens Point Area Public  
School District,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 19, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.  This is a 
review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 
affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court for Portage County, 
James Mason, Judge.  The circuit court dismissed the amended 
                                                 
1 Scott v. Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 01-2953, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 18, 2002). 
No. 
01-2953   
 
2 
 
complaint of Ryan Scott and his parents, Kathy and Patrick 
Scott, against the Stevens Point Area Public School District and 
its insurer, Savers Property and Casualty Insurance Company.  
The circuit court concluded that the negligence claim in the 
amended complaint was barred under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) (2001-
02)2, Wisconsin's governmental immunity statute, and that the 
allegations of breach of contract and promissory estoppel failed 
to state claims upon which relief could be granted.    
¶2 
Ryan Scott and his parents, Kathy and Patrick Scott 
(the plaintiffs), allege that Dave Johnson, a guidance counselor 
at Stevens Point Area Senior High School (SPASH) in the Stevens 
Point Area Public School District, provided them with inaccurate 
information 
about 
National 
Collegiate 
Athletic 
Association 
(NCAA) student athlete scholarship eligibility requirements, and 
as a result, Ryan Scott lost a hockey scholarship to the 
University of Alaska.  The plaintiffs brought suit against 
Stevens Point Area Public School District and its insurer, 
Savers Property and Casualty Insurance Company (the District), 
seeking damages for the loss of the scholarship and other 
expenses incurred.  The amended complaint sets forth three 
claims 
for 
relief: 
negligence, 
breach 
of 
contract, 
and 
promissory estoppel.  The District responded by filing a motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted. 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2000-2001 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
01-2953   
 
3 
 
¶3 
To determine whether the plaintiffs' amended complaint 
against the District should be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted, we must answer three 
questions:  First, does the negligent provision of counseling 
services, as alleged in the amended complaint, fall under either 
the ministerial duty or professional discretion exception to 
Wisconsin's 
governmental 
immunity 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), so that the plaintiffs state a claim 
against the District?  Second, was an enforceable contract 
created between the District and the plaintiffs when, according 
to the amended complaint, guidance counselor Johnson agreed to 
assist Ryan Scott in selecting classes approved by the NCAA, so 
that the plaintiffs have a claim for breach of contract?  Third, 
does the plaintiffs' amended complaint allege grounds for 
equitable relief based upon the doctrine of promissory estoppel?  
¶4 
We answer each question in the negative and affirm the 
court of appeals' decision that the amended complaint should be 
dismissed.  We conclude that none of the allegations in the 
plaintiffs' amended complaint support a claim for relief under 
either the ministerial act or professional discretion exception 
to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  We conclude that no contract exists 
to support a breach of contract claim in the present case 
because 
any 
alleged 
promise 
by 
the 
District 
to 
provide 
counseling services was a promise to perform a preexisting legal 
obligation.  We also conclude that the promissory estoppel claim 
fails.  Permitting the plaintiffs to obtain damages from an 
immune public official through the back door opened by a claim 
No. 
01-2953   
 
4 
 
of promissory estoppel contravenes the government immunity 
policy of this State set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) and 
consequently would not serve the ends of justice.  
I 
¶5 
A motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a 
claim tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint.3  All facts 
pleaded and all reasonable inferences from those facts are 
admitted as true, but only for the purpose of testing the legal 
sufficiency of a claim, not for trial.4  A complaint will be 
dismissed only if it appears certain that no relief can be 
granted under any set of facts that the plaintiffs might prove 
in support of their allegations.5 
¶6 
Whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief 
may be granted is a question of law that is determined by this 
court independent of the circuit court and court of appeals, but 
with the benefit of the analyses of these courts.  We test the 
sufficiency of the plaintiffs' amended complaint by first 
setting forth the facts asserted in the complaint and then 
analyzing each of the legal theories upon which the plaintiffs 
rest their claims for relief.6 
                                                 
3 See Wis. Stat. § 802.06(2)(f); Evans v. Cameron, 121 
Wis. 2d 421, 426, 360 N.W.2d 25 (1985). 
4 Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County, 96 Wis. 2d 663, 669, 292 
N.W.2d 816 (1980). 
5 Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 103 Wis. 2d 56, 
82, 307 N.W.2d 256 (1981).   
6 Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 512, 405 N.W.2d 303 
(1987). 
No. 
01-2953   
 
5 
 
II 
¶7 
The 
plaintiffs' 
amended 
complaint 
alleges 
the 
following facts.  Ryan Scott attended Stevens Point Area Senior 
High School (SPASH), which is part of the Stevens Point Area 
Public School District.  SPASH offered guidance counseling 
services as required by Wis. Stat. § 121.02(1)(e) and Wis. 
Admin. Code § PI 8.01(e) (Oct., 2001).7  These services were 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 121.02(1) reads:  "Except as provided in 
s. 118.40(2r)(d), each school board shall: . . . (e) Provide 
guidance and counseling services." 
Wisconsin Admin. Code § PI 8.01(e) (Oct., 2001) reads:  
Each school district board shall provide a program of 
guidance and counseling services for all pupils, which 
meets all of the following requirements: 
1. The school district shall maintain a school board 
approved plan for the provision of a program of 
guidance and counseling services. 
2. The program shall be developmentally based and 
available to every pupil in every grade of the school 
district. 
3. The program shall be: 
a. Systematically planned by licensed school 
counselors in collaboration with other licensed 
pupil 
services 
staff, 
teachers, 
parents 
and 
community health and human service professionals. 
b. Provided by licensed school counselors in 
collaboration with other licensed pupil services 
staff, teachers, parents and community health and 
human service professionals. 
4. 
The 
program 
shall 
provide 
developmentally 
appropriate education, vocational, career, personal 
and social information to assist pupils in problem 
solving and in making decisions. 
No. 
01-2953   
 
6 
 
explained in the school's "Educational Planner," a publication 
offered to students.8  Dave Johnson was employed by the District 
as a guidance counselor at SPASH and met the state's licensing 
requirements.  Johnson was Ryan Scott's assigned guidance 
counselor. 
¶8 
During Ryan Scott's junior year of high school, he and 
his parents met with Johnson.  The plaintiffs explained that 
Ryan Scott was trying to receive a hockey scholarship to an NCAA 
Division I school.  The plaintiffs knew that the NCAA required 
students to take courses in certain core subjects in order to be 
eligible for a student athlete scholarship.  The plaintiffs told 
Johnson that they wanted to make sure Ryan Scott fulfilled the 
core requirements and needed help in selecting the appropriate 
courses.  Johnson agreed to assist them. 
¶9 
In Ryan Scott's senior year of high school, he and his 
mother met with Johnson to discuss which classes Ryan Scott 
should take.  They asked Johnson specifically whether "Broadcast 
Communication" was a course approved by the NCAA as fulfilling a 
core English requirement.  This information was available to 
                                                                                                                                                             
5. The program shall include pupil appraisal, post-
secondary 
planning, 
referral, 
research 
and 
pupil 
follow-up activities.   
8 The relevant section of the Educational Planner reads: 
"[The 
Student 
Services/Counseling 
Office] 
offer[s] 
course 
advising, reference books and college catalogs, computer search 
programs, career counseling, scholarship and financial aid 
information, 
opportunities 
to 
talk 
with 
university 
and 
vocational-technical 
college 
representatives, 
and 
years 
of 
experience and expertise."  SPASH Educational Planner at 5. 
No. 
01-2953   
 
7 
 
Johnson.  SPASH had sent its curriculum to the NCAA Initial 
Eligibility Clearinghouse and received a Form 48-H indicating 
those courses offered by SPASH that met the NCAA approved core 
course requirements and those that did not.  Johnson had access 
to 48-H forms covering several years, and each of them 
explicitly states that "Broadcast Communication" is not an 
approved course.  Johnson, however, erroneously advised Ryan 
Scott and his mother that "Broadcast Communication" was an 
approved course.  Ryan Scott enrolled in and completed the 
"Broadcast Communication" course. 
¶10 After graduating from SPASH, Ryan Scott played junior 
hockey in Iowa and was offered a full four-year scholarship to 
the University of Alaska, an NCAA Division I school.  The 
plaintiffs accepted the scholarship offer.  The scholarship was 
contingent upon receipt of an initial eligibility certification 
from the NCAA.  After receipt of Ryan Scott's final transcripts 
from SPASH, the NCAA determined that Ryan Scott was not eligible 
for a Division I student athlete scholarship solely because 
"Broadcast Communication" was not an approved core course in 
English.  The University of Alaska rescinded its scholarship. 
¶11 The plaintiffs sued the District, seeking recovery in 
the amount of the rescinded scholarship plus the out-of-pocket 
expenses they incurred for Ryan Scott's college education, and 
the District filed a motion to dismiss. 
¶12 The circuit court granted the District's motion to 
dismiss the amended complaint, concluding that the plaintiffs' 
case was governed by Kierstyn v. Racine Unified School District, 
No. 
01-2953   
 
8 
 
228 Wis. 2d 81, 596 N.W.2d 417 (1999).  In Kierstyn, the court 
held that a school district benefits specialist who provided 
erroneous advice was immune from liability.  The circuit court 
held that the immunity rationale of Kierstyn applied to the 
plaintiffs' promissory estoppel claim.   
¶13 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
circuit court dismissing the plaintiffs' suit.  The court of 
appeals held that the District was immune from suit under 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), pursuant to Kierstyn.  Moreover, the 
court of appeals concluded that the alleged contract failed for 
lack of consideration and that equitable relief under the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel was not appropriate because the 
District did not make a promise that reasonably induced 
reliance, and because injustice would not be avoided or remedied 
by granting judgment to the plaintiffs.  
III  
¶14 We begin our analysis of the amended complaint with 
the plaintiffs' claim for damages on the ground of negligence.  
The parties agree that the amended complaint properly states all 
the elements of a negligence claim.  The dispute focuses on 
whether the District is immune from liability for negligence 
under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), Wisconsin's government immunity 
statute.   
¶15 The statute provides political subdivisions and public 
officials with immunity for acts done in the exercise of 
legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial, 
or 
quasi-judicial 
functions.  Section 893.80(4) reads as follows: 
No. 
01-2953   
 
9 
 
No suit may be brought against any volunteer fire 
company 
organized 
under 
ch. 
213, 
political 
corporation, governmental subdivision or any agency 
thereof for the intentional torts of its officers, 
officials, agents or employees nor may any suit be 
brought 
against 
such 
corporation, 
subdivision 
or 
agency or volunteer fire company or against its 
officers, officials, agents or employees for acts done 
in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions.  
¶16 Decisions of this court have concluded that quasi-
judicial or quasi-legislative activities are activities that 
involve the exercise of "discretion."9  Further decisions of this 
court have recognized limitations to governmental immunity where 
the activities performed are (1) ministerial duties imposed by 
law, (2) duties to address a known danger, (3) actions involving 
professional discretion, and (4) actions that are malicious, 
willful, and intentional.10   
¶17 The plaintiffs argue that the amended complaint in the 
present case was improperly dismissed because rendering guidance 
counseling and advice to students falls within the ministerial 
duty exception and the professional discretion exception to 
immunity.  According to the plaintiffs, Johnson was not required 
to exercise any discretion or judgment in accurately conveying 
                                                 
9 Kierstyn v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 228 Wis. 2d 81, 596 
N.W.2d 417 (1999).       
10 Lodl v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 71, ¶24, 253 
Wis. 2d 323, 646 N.W.2d 314; Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 90.  
These concepts are generally applicable to both state and 
municipal officers and the tests for immunity are similar.  
Kimps v. Hill, 200 Wis. 2d 1, 10 n.6, 546 N.W.2d 151 (1996) 
(citing Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County, 96 Wis. 2d 663, 682 n.19, 
683 n.20, 292 N.W.2d 816 (1980)). 
No. 
01-2953   
 
10 
 
the 
unambiguous 
information 
contained 
in 
Form 
48-H 
that 
"Broadcast Communication" was not an NCAA-approved course.  The 
information Johnson disseminated was, the plaintiffs argue, 
capable of being easily and readily verified.  Furthermore, the 
plaintiffs assert that Johnson, as a licensed and certified 
school counselor, exercised "professional" discretion and is 
therefore exempt from immunity. 
¶18 We conclude, as did both the circuit court and court 
of appeals, that the present case does not fall within either 
the ministerial duty exception or the professional discretion 
exception to immunity and that therefore the District is immune 
from liability under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).   
¶19 The facts in the case at hand and the plaintiffs' 
claim are legally indistinguishable from the facts and claim set 
forth in our four-year-old Kierstyn decision, in which the 
ministerial duty and professional discretion exceptions were 
explained. 
 
In 
Kierstyn, 
the 
court 
ruled 
against 
the 
complainant, who suffered financial harm when he relied on the 
erroneous advice of a benefits counselor employed by a school 
district.  Because we conclude that Kierstyn governs the outcome 
of the present case, we shall examine the facts and holding of 
Kierstyn.  
¶20 Judith Kierstyn was an employee of the Racine Unified 
School District.  She became ill and had to take a medical leave 
of absence.  She received benefits both as a union employee of 
the school district and as a municipal employee with the 
Wisconsin Retirement System (WRS), and when she ceased working, 
No. 
01-2953   
 
11 
 
Ms. Kierstyn and her husband met with a health benefit 
specialist employed by the school district in order to determine 
the disability benefits.  The health benefit specialist was an 
employee of the school district and authorized to give employees 
information about their union benefits; he was not, on the other 
hand, an agent of WRS able to give authoritative advice on WRS 
benefits, though he was equipped with the resources to provide 
information on WRS benefits.   
¶21 At 
this 
meeting, 
the 
health 
benefit 
specialist 
erroneously informed the Kierstyns that Ms. Kierstyn could not 
apply for WRS benefits until she had depleted all of her 
available sick leave, despite the fact that Wis. Stat. § 40.63 
clearly and unambiguously stated otherwise.  Relying on this 
misinformation, the Kierstyns did not apply for disability 
benefits.  Ms. Kierstyn died before depleting her available sick 
leave and therefore never applied for her disability benefits.  
Her death rendered her ineligible for the disability benefits.   
¶22 Mr. Kierstyn sued the benefit specialist and the 
school district for damages for negligence, and the school 
district defended on the ground that the health benefit 
specialist exercised a discretionary function so that the 
District was immune under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).   
¶23 Mr. Kierstyn contended that the benefits counselor's 
actions fell within the ministerial duty exception to liability, 
because the correct advice that the specialist should have 
provided 
was 
clearly 
and 
unambiguously 
available 
to 
the 
No. 
01-2953   
 
12 
 
specialist and did not require the specialist to exercise any 
discretion to provide it.  This court rejected his claim.   
¶24 The 
Kierstyn 
court 
explained 
that 
a 
duty 
is 
ministerial in nature when its performance is demanded by a 
specific legal obligation that leaves no room for judgment or 
discretion.  The court reasoned that the health benefit 
specialist in Kierstyn did not perform a ministerial duty.  He 
was not legally obligated to provide WRS benefit information; 
his conduct was not due to any duty that was "absolute, certain 
and imperative" or any law that "impose[d], prescribe[d] and 
define[d] the time, mode and occasion for [the conduct's] 
performance."11     
¶25 Moreover, the court rejected Mr. Kierstyn's chief 
argument that once the benefit specialist took the discretionary 
action of providing WRS information, he had a ministerial duty 
to provide the information that was unambiguously contained in 
the statute.12  Mr. Kierstyn acknowledged that when an officer 
applies a statute to a given set of facts, the interpretation is 
quasi-judicial and has the hallmarks of discretion.  Yet Mr. 
Kierstyn 
argued 
that 
the 
unambiguous 
statute 
created 
a 
ministerial duty once the officer acted.  Thus Mr. Kierstyn's 
argument that a ministerial duty was involved focused on the 
clear statutory statement of the information the benefit 
specialist erroneously furnished.  The Kierstyn court concluded 
                                                 
11 Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 91.     
12 Id. at 92. 
No. 
01-2953   
 
13 
 
that the statute's clarity regarding the information to be 
provided does not render the duty ministerial.  
¶26 Unlike the health benefit specialist in Kierstyn, 
Johnson provided guidance and counseling services to students 
that SPASH was required to provide.13  The question remains, 
however, 
whether 
Johnson 
was 
performing 
ministerial 
or 
discretionary duties when he gave advice about NCAA-approved 
courses to Ryan Scott.   
¶27 A duty is regarded as ministerial when it has been 
"positively imposed by law, and its performance required at a 
time and in a manner, or upon conditions which are specifically 
designated, the duty to perform under the conditions specified 
not being dependent upon the officer's judgment or discretion."14  
Recently, in Lodl v. Progressive Northern Insurance Co., 2002 WI 
71, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 646 N.W.2d 314, this court repeated the 
narrow definition of ministerial duties first set out in Lister 
v. Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 301, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976).  
The court wrote: 
A public officer's duty is ministerial only when it is 
absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely the 
performance of a specific task when the law imposes, 
prescribes, and defines the time, mode and occasion 
                                                 
13 See Wis. Stat. § 121.02(1)(e); Wis. Admin. Code § PI 
8.01(2)(e) (Oct., 2001). 
14 Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶26 (quoting Meyer v. Carman, 271 
Wis. 329, 332, 73 N.W.2d 514 (1955) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. 
Filer, 145 So. 204 (Fla. 1933))). 
No. 
01-2953   
 
14 
 
for its performance with such certainty that nothing 
remains for judgment or discretion.15  
¶28 As 
a 
result 
of 
the 
Lister/Lodl 
definition 
of 
"ministerial," many governmental actions, even those done under 
a legal obligation, qualify as discretionary because they 
implicate some discretion.16  The court of appeals concluded, in 
accordance with this definition, that the provision of guidance 
services is inherently discretionary because the statute and 
regulation do not impose, prescribe, and define the time, mode, 
and occasion for its performance.  Neither the statute nor the 
regulation creates a duty that is "absolute, certain and 
imperative" with respect to counseling or providing information 
about NCAA requirements.  The court of appeals wrote as follows: 
The 
counselor's 
general 
obligation 
to 
provide 
counseling services did not dictate precisely what 
advice or information should be given to each student.  
Rather, the counselor was required to apply the 
requirements of various institutions to each student's 
                                                 
15 Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶25 (quoting Lister v. Bd. of 
Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 301, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976)). 
16 Justice Prosser, dissenting in Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C. 
v. Town of Shelby, 2000 WI 56, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693, 
noted that as early as 1867 the Court observed that "[i]t is 
sometimes difficult to draw the exact line of distinction 
between ministerial and discretionary or judicial authority.  
The same officer may act sometimes in one capacity, and 
sometimes in the other."  Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C., 235 
Wis. 2d 409, ¶129 (quoting Druecker v. Salomon, 21 Wis. 621, 637 
(1867)).  Also see the McQuillin text on Municipal Corporations 
cited by Justice Prosser in Willow Creek, 235 Wis. 2d 409, ¶136, 
stating 
that 
"the 
difference 
between 
'discretionary' 
and 
'ministerial' is artificial." 
No. 
01-2953   
 
15 
 
situation.  This interpretive process was inherently 
discretionary in nature.17 
¶29 We agree with the court of appeals, given our 
definition of "ministerial."  Moreover, like the clear and 
unambiguous benefits statute in Kierstyn, the existence of Form 
48-H clearly and unambiguously detailing approved and unapproved 
NCAA courses does not transform Johnson's counseling obligations 
into a ministerial act.  His failure to provide correct advice 
in the face of clear and unambiguous information goes to his 
negligence, not the nature of his duty.  In the end, the 
plaintiffs' argument is not that the NCAA Form 48-H imposes a 
ministerial duty on Johnson, only that its clarity renders 
Johnson's conduct that much more negligent.  The analysis of 
immunity 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), 
however, 
assumes 
negligence.18  We conclude that Johnson's actions, like those of 
the health benefit specialist in Kierstyn, do not fall within 
the definition of ministerial conduct. 
¶30 The plaintiffs' second argument is that any discretion 
exercised by Johnson was professional in nature and therefore 
falls within the third exception to governmental immunity.  This 
argument was also raised in Kierstyn and rejected by this court.  
                                                 
17 Scott 
v. 
Savers 
Prop. 
& 
Cas. 
Co., 
No. 
01-2953, 
unpublished slip op., ¶10 (Wis. Ct. App. July 18, 2002). 
18 Kierstyn, 
228 
Wis. 2d at 
94; 
see 
also 
Lodl, 
253 
Wis. 2d 323, ¶17 ("The immunity defense assumes negligence, 
focusing instead on whether the municipal action or inaction 
upon which liability is premised is entitled to immunity under 
the statute, and if so, whether one of the judicially-created 
exceptions to immunity applies."). 
No. 
01-2953   
 
16 
 
As the court in Kierstyn explained, the professional discretion 
exception to governmental immunity has been limited to the 
medical setting.19   
¶31 The professional discretion exception to governmental 
immunity originated in Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County, 96 Wis.2d 
663, 292 N.W.2d 816 (1980), in which the court held a county 
medical examiner liable for negligence committed in the course 
of performing an autopsy.  This court in Scarpaci concluded that 
the decisions made during the autopsy constituted "medical" 
discretion, not "governmental" discretion, and therefore the 
medical examiner was not protected from liability.20  The 
exception has been applied in only two other cases, both 
involving public officials performing acts in the medical 
context,21 and in Stann v. Waukesha County, 161 Wis. 2d 808, 818, 
468 N.W.2d 775 (Ct. App. 1991), the court of appeals limited the 
exception to the medical context.  In Kierstyn and in Kimps v. 
Hill, the court refused to revisit the Stann rule.22   
¶32 The court concluded in Kierstyn that "even if we were 
to read Scarpaci as erasing immunity for acts of professional 
discretion, this expansion would be of no avail to [Mr.] 
                                                 
19 Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 97-98. 
20 Scarpaci, 96 Wis. 2d at 686. 
21 See Protic v. Castle Co., 132 Wis. 2d 364, 369-70, 392 
N.W.2d 119 (Ct. App. 1986); Gordon v. Milwaukee County, 125 
Wis. 2d 62, 67-68, 370 N.W.2d 803 (Ct. App. 1985). 
22 See Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 98; Kimps v. Hill, 200 
Wis. 2d 1, 19-20, 546 N.W.2d 151 (1996). 
No. 
01-2953   
 
17 
 
Kierstyn."23  Including a health benefits specialist within the 
professional discretion exception would mean that many persons 
would fall within the professional discretion exception and that 
the exception "would swallow the rule."24  Similarly, we conclude 
that 
the 
professional 
discretion 
exception 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) does not apply to a guidance counselor. 
¶33 In addition to their arguments that Johnson's actions 
fall within one of the exceptions to immunity, the plaintiffs 
urge this court to reexamine its cases and the balance this 
court has struck between the need of municipal public officers 
to perform their functions freely and the right of an aggrieved 
party to seek redress for injuries.  The plaintiffs urge the 
court to return to the holding in Holytz v. City of Milwaukee 
that immunity is the exception, not the rule,25 to abandon the 
rule equating the concepts of "quasi-judicial" and "quasi-
legislative" in § 893.80(4) with discretionary duties, and to 
reexamine the multitude of exceptions and interpretations the 
court has encrusted on Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).    
¶34 The 
plaintiffs 
argue 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), 
codifying this court's decision in Holytz, originally intended 
to provide municipal government immunity only for a narrow slice 
of 
conduct 
involving 
"legislative 
or 
judicial 
or 
quasi-
                                                 
23 Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 99. 
24 Id. at 98. 
25 Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 40, 115 
N.W.2d 618 (1962). 
No. 
01-2953   
 
18 
 
legislative or quasi-judicial functions."  According to the 
plaintiffs, this court mistakenly broadened the grant of 
municipal immunity in Lifer v. Raymond, 80 Wis. 2d 503, 259 
N.W.2d 537 (1977), when it affixed to the doctrine of municipal 
officer 
immunity 
the 
ministerial/discretionary 
distinction 
applicable to state government immunity.  The result of this 
erroneous mixing of doctrines, asserts the plaintiffs, is that 
students like Ryan Scott remain powerless and remediless in the 
face of clearly negligent actions committed by schools and other 
municipal actors.   
¶35 This court has had many opportunities to apply 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), and we have struggled to define the 
proper 
scope 
of 
governmental 
immunity, 
considering 
the 
underlying policy goals.26  The doctrine of governmental immunity 
represents "a balance between the need of public officers to 
perform their functions freely [and] the right of an aggrieved 
                                                 
26 The 
court 
has 
set 
forth 
the 
following 
policy 
considerations supporting governmental immunity:   
(1) The danger of influencing public officers in the 
performance of their functions by the threat of 
lawsuit; (2) The deterrent effect which the threat of 
personal liability might have on those who are 
considering entering public service; (3) The drain on 
valuable 
time 
caused 
by 
such 
actions; 
(4) 
The 
unfairness 
of 
subjecting 
officials 
to 
personal 
liability for the acts of their subordinates; and 
(5)The feeling that the ballot and removal procedures 
are 
more 
appropriate 
methods 
of 
dealing 
with 
misconduct in public office.   
Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 89-90 (quoting Lister v. Bd. of 
Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 299-300, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976)). 
No. 
01-2953   
 
19 
 
party to seek redress."27  The doctrine reflects concern for 
"protection 
of 
the 
public 
purse 
against 
legal 
action 
and . . . the restraint of public officials through political 
rather than judicial means."28 
¶36 Governmental immunity was developed "to protect public 
officers from being unduly hampered or intimidated in the 
discretion of their functions by threat of lawsuit or personal 
liability."29  Guidance counselors are important figures in our 
educational 
system. 
They 
are 
regularly 
required 
to 
make 
discretionary decisions and judgment calls in performing their 
functions, and the future progress and success of students rests 
on the ability of the guidance counselors to make those 
decisions.  Immunity allows guidance counselors to perform their 
duties free from the hindrance of threats of litigation or 
liability.   
¶37 The plaintiffs correctly point out that Ryan Scott has 
suffered greatly, and he has no avenue for redress.  The outcome 
of this case is harsh, and the harshness of our holding is 
especially palpable because the negligence is so clear.  Yet the 
doctrine of governmental immunity plays a significant role in 
our legal system.  Imposing liability in the present case would 
                                                 
27 Id.  at 89 (quoting Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 300).  
28 Id. at 89-90 (quoting Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 299).  
29 Scarpaci, 96 Wis. 2d at 682 (citing Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 
299). 
No. 
01-2953   
 
20 
 
therefore not serve the policy underlying the doctrine of 
immunity. 
¶38 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the 
District 
is 
immune 
from 
liability 
for 
negligence 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4). 
IV 
¶39 We turn next to the plaintiffs' contract-based claims.  
The plaintiffs allege contract claims to avoid the application 
of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), the government immunity statute. 
¶40 The plaintiffs allege two contract claims as grounds 
for relief.  The first claim is that a contract to provide 
counseling 
services 
exists 
between 
the 
District 
and 
the 
plaintiffs and that the District breached the contract when it 
gave incorrect information to Ryan Scott about the "Broadcast 
Communication" course.  The second claim is that, if no contract 
exists, the plaintiffs are entitled to equitable relief under 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel because the District should 
have expected its promise to provide counseling services to 
induce the plaintiffs to act in reliance on that promise, which 
they did to their detriment.  
¶41 We agree with the court of appeals that neither 
contract-based theory states a claim upon which relief may be 
granted. 
A 
¶42 The plaintiffs argue that a contract was formed when 
they accepted the District's offer to provide them with guidance 
counseling services, including a specific offer to counsel Ryan 
No. 
01-2953   
 
21 
 
Scott about NCAA-approved core courses necessary for Division I 
student athlete scholarship eligibility.  The plaintiffs view 
the contract with the District as a unilateral contract.  
According to the plaintiffs, the District made the offer to 
provide counseling and the plaintiffs accepted the offer by 
their performance, that is, by their utilizing the counseling 
services. 
 
This 
contract 
was 
then 
breached, 
argue 
the 
plaintiffs, when Johnson counseled Ryan Scott to take the 
unapproved "Broadcast Communication" course. 
¶43 The District responds that no enforceable contract was 
created or breached in the present case.  According to the 
District, the alleged contract fails for insufficiency of 
consideration——the promise to provide counseling services is not 
sufficient consideration because it is a promise to perform an 
act that the District is already statutorily and legally 
obligated to perform.  The court of appeals agreed with the 
District, concluding that because the District was legally 
obligated 
to 
provide 
guidance 
counseling 
services 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 121.02(e) (Oct., 2001), there was no bargained-for 
exchange of promises between the parties.30   
 
¶44 We agree with the District and the court of appeals 
that no contract existed between the District and the plaintiffs 
in the present case.  The district is required by statute and 
administrative 
regulation 
to 
provide 
guidance 
counseling 
                                                 
30 Scott v. Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 01-2953, 
unpublished slip op., ¶5 (Wis. Ct. App. July 18, 2002).  
No. 
01-2953   
 
22 
 
services.  Thus the District and its agent, Johnson, had a legal 
duty to the plaintiffs to do what they allegedly promised to do.  
Under Wis. Stat. § 121.02(1)(e) 
and 
Wis. Admin. Code 
§ PI 
8.01(e), the District and Johnson could not have refrained from 
providing 
counseling services.  Consequently, 
neither the 
District nor Johnson could have participated in any bargained-
for exchange for counseling services with the plaintiffs.31      
¶45 The general rule is that the performance of a legal 
duty, or the promise to perform a legal duty, is not sufficient 
consideration to create a contract.32  Here, Johnson's and the 
                                                 
31 Holcomb v. United States, 622 F.2d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 
1980) (holding that taxpayer's promise to make monthly tax 
payments in response to government's promise to apply bankruptcy 
proceeds in particular manner was not sufficient consideration 
to 
create 
contract 
because 
taxpayer 
was 
already 
legally 
obligated to pay taxes). 
The plaintiffs contend that it is inconsistent to conclude 
that no contract was formed in this case because the promise 
made to the plaintiffs to provide counseling was a preexisting 
legal obligation and that the duty to provide counseling is 
discretionary, 
not 
ministerial.  
The 
plaintiffs' argument 
confuses two concepts.  The fact that a public official has a 
legal duty to perform a specific act does not mean that 
performance of that act is made without judgment or discretion. 
32 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 73, 76 (1981).   
The preexisting legal duty rule is the subject of debate 
and, according to some commentators, is in the process of decay 
and disintegration.  See 2 Corbin on Contracts, § 7.5 at 351 
(1996); John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of 
Contracts, § 4-9 at 204 (3d ed. 1987); E. Allan Farnsworth, 
Farnsworth on Contracts, §§ 4.21, 4.22 at 501-07 (1998).    
No. 
01-2953   
 
23 
 
District's performance was induced not by the plaintiffs but by 
the laws of the state.  The plaintiffs had a right to have 
Johnson perform his job, but no contract was created between the 
plaintiffs and the District or Johnson.  The Williston contract 
text explains the rule as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                             
The erosion of the rule, however, appears to be taking 
place in the commercial contract context where the preexisting 
duty rule historically stood in the way of two parties seeking 
to modify an unperformed duty that already existed under a valid 
contract.  2 Joseph M. Perillo & Helen Hadjiyannakis Bender, 
Corbin on Contracts, § 7.5 at 351 (1996); E. Allan Farnsworth, 
Farnsworth on Contracts, §§ 4.21, 4.22 at 501-07 (1998).  
A preexisting contractual duty is distinguishable from a 
duty imposed by statute on public officials and public employees 
because of the public policy considerations involved.  A public 
official's contracting with a member of the public to perform 
that which he or she is already legally required to do suggests 
either that the official has threatened to withhold performance 
of the duty already owed or is obtaining an inappropriate 
private benefit.  Thus, while the plaintiffs' claim fails under 
established principles of contract law, it may also be true, as 
some commentators suggest, that it is unwise as a matter of 
public policy to recognize the creation of a contractual 
relationship every time a public employee is asked to perform a 
service required by law.  See Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 73 cmt. b (1981); Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts, 
§ 7.41 at 657 (1992).  See also Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. 
Dep't of State, 444 N.W.2d 786, 789 n.4 (Mich. 1989). 
The plaintiffs ask this court to adopt the rule that a 
promise made to a person entitled to the performance of an 
existing legal obligation may be enforced against the promisor.  
The plaintiffs cite specifically to the rule announced in 
American 
Jurisprudence 
(Second) 
Contracts 
§ 164 
(2002), 
addressing past consideration.  Because the rule of past 
consideration addresses situations in which parties seek to 
modify an unperformed duty that already existed under a valid 
contract and does not apply to situations in which a public 
official's or public employee's legal duty arises under statute—
—that is, without the formation of a contract——it is inapposite 
here.   
No. 
01-2953   
 
24 
 
If a promisee is already bound by official duty to 
render a service, it is no detriment to him and no 
benefit to the promisor beyond that what the law 
requires the promise to suffer or to give, for him to 
do or agree to do the service on request.  Though the 
previous legal duty does not necessarily run to the 
promisor under the later agreement, it does run to the 
public of which the promisor is one member.  As such, 
he has a right, though it may not be one enforceable 
at law, to the performance in question, and therefore, 
no contract can be based upon such consideration.33 
¶46 The plaintiffs argue that focusing only on the 
provision 
of 
counseling 
services 
generally 
ignores 
the 
additional promise made by Johnson to specifically aid the 
plaintiffs with the selection of NCAA-approved courses.  The 
plaintiffs are attempting to assert that Johnson offered, 
promised, or agreed to perform services in addition to those 
required by law.  We conclude that Johnson made no such 
agreement.   
                                                 
33 3 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts, § 7:41 at 653-
57 (4th ed. 1992). 
The plaintiffs fail to cite any case in support of their 
argument that a public school district is bound by contract to 
perform governmental services required by law.  The plaintiffs' 
reliance on Sain v. Cedar Rapids Community School District, 626 
N.W.2d 115 (Iowa 2001), to support any of its claims is 
misplaced.  Although the facts in Sain are remarkably similar to 
those in the present case, the Iowa Supreme Court's reasoning in 
Sain does not support either the plaintiffs' contract or 
negligence claim.  The Iowa supreme court did not rely on 
contract doctrines to hold the school district liable.  The Iowa 
supreme 
court 
permitted 
a 
tort 
claim 
of 
negligent 
misrepresentation against the school district to proceed in Sain 
under Iowa law, but specifically observed that "some states have 
enacted statutes giving schools and teachers immunity from any 
liability."  Sain, 626 N.W.2d at 127.  As we have previously 
held, Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) is just such a statute. 
No. 
01-2953   
 
25 
 
¶47 The District is required to develop a counseling 
program that provides education information to assist pupils in 
problem solving and in making decisions.34  The program "shall" 
include "post-secondary planning."35  Johnson's promise to advise 
Ryan Scott in selecting NCAA-approved courses thus falls 
squarely within the District's obligation to assist with post-
secondary planning and is part and parcel of the legal duty 
already owed to the plaintiffs.36  In this case the services 
provided to the plaintiffs were not in addition to or materially 
different 
from 
the 
District's 
performance 
of 
its 
legal 
obligation to provide guidance counseling.   
 
¶48 We conclude that the plaintiffs' breach of contract 
claim fails.  The District and Johnson had a legal duty to 
provide the counseling services requested by the plaintiffs.  
The plaintiffs did 
not 
convert this 
legal 
duty into a 
contractual duty by requesting or using Johnson's service.   
 
B 
                                                 
34 Wis. Admin. Code § PI 8.01(e)(4) (Oct., 2001). 
35 Wis. Admin. Code § PI 8.01(e)(5) (Oct., 2001). 
36 The plaintiffs also urge this court to follow other 
jurisdictions 
that 
have 
recognized 
that 
a 
contractual 
relationship exists between a school and a student under certain 
circumstances.  They cite Hendricks v. Clemson University, 529 
S.E.2d 293 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000), Ross v. Creighton University, 
957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992), and Wickstrom v. North Idaho 
College, 725 P.2d 155 (Idaho 1986).  All of the cases are 
distinguishable, however.  They all involve post-secondary 
schools, none of which was statutorily required to offer the 
services that formed the basis of the contract. 
No. 
01-2953   
 
26 
 
¶49 The plaintiffs next argue that if their breach of 
contract claim fails, then the doctrine of promissory estoppel 
requires judicial enforcement of Johnson's promise.  The 
plaintiffs argue that Johnson and Ryan Scott had a special 
relationship and Ryan Scott relied on Johnson's statement that 
"Broadcast Communication" was an NCAA-approved course to his 
detriment.   
¶50 The District responds that promissory estoppel is not 
appropriate 
because 
the 
plaintiffs 
relied 
on 
Johnson's 
representation that the course was NCAA-approved, not on 
Johnson's promise to provide guidance counseling and aid with 
course selection.  
¶51 In order to state a claim on which equitable relief 
under the doctrine of promissory estoppel may be granted, the 
plaintiffs' complaint must be read to allege the three elements 
of promissory estoppel.  The elements are: 
1. The promise is one which the promissor should 
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a 
definite and substantial character on the part of the 
promissee; 
2. The promise induced such action or forbearance; and 
3. Injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the 
promise.37 
The first two elements are typically questions of fact, while 
the third element requires a court to make a "policy decision."38 
                                                 
37 Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 698, 133 
N.W.2d 267 (1965).   
38 Id. at 698.   
No. 
01-2953   
 
27 
 
 
¶52 We conclude that considerations of policy undermine 
any claim for relief under the doctrine of promissory estoppel 
in the present case.  Undoubtedly, Ryan Scott has suffered a 
great injustice.  He lost a full scholarship to the University 
of Alaska and the opportunity to play on an NCAA Division I 
hockey team based upon the negligent acts of Johnson and the 
District.  However, when making a policy decision under the 
third 
element 
of 
the 
promissory 
estoppel 
test——that 
is, 
determining whether an injustice can be avoided by enforcing the 
promise——a court "must remember all of its powers, derived from 
equity, law merchant, and other sources, as well as the common 
law.  Its decree should be molded accordingly."39   
¶53 Molding a decision upon consideration of all sources 
of law under the third element of promissory estoppel also 
includes 
consideration 
of 
the 
statutory 
restriction 
on 
governmental 
liability. 
 
Governmental 
immunity 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) applies only to claims based in tort, not 
to claims in contract.40  Promissory estoppel, however, rests on 
a theory separate from contract;41 a claim for promissory 
                                                 
39 Id. at 702. 
40 See Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C. v. Town of Shelby, 2000 WI 
56, ¶¶33, 35, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693 (suits must be 
based in tort to garner the protection of immunity consistent 
with the statute); Energy Complexes, Inc. v. Eau Claire County, 
152 Wis. 2d 453, 464-65, 449 N.W.2d 35 (1989) (statute does not 
grant immunity from breach of contract claims). 
41 See Ferraro v. Koelsch, 124 Wis. 2d 154, 368 N.W.2d 666 
(1985); Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 
N.W.2d 587 (1967). 
No. 
01-2953   
 
28 
 
estoppel only arises when there is no contract.  "One branch of 
promissory 
estoppel's 
family 
tree 
lies 
in 
tort"42 
and 
"[o]bligations and remedies based on reliance are not peculiar 
to the law of contracts."43  A single set of facts may give rise 
to actions both in contract and in tort, thus making it 
difficult to always draw a clear distinction between the two 
actions.44 
                                                 
42 3 Corbin on Contracts § 8.11 at 55 (1996) ("Arguably, 
promissory estoppel can be asserted as an independent tort 
theory of detrimental reliance."); E. Alan Farnsworth, The Past 
of Promise:  An Historical Introduction to Contract, 69 Colum. 
L. Rev. 576, 594 (1969). 
43 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 cmt. a. 
44 See, e.g., Brooks v. Hayes, 133 Wis. 2d 228, 235, 246, 
395 N.W.2d 167 (1986) (failure to exercise common law duty to 
perform contracts with care and skill is a tort as well as a 
breach of contract); Matusik v. Dorn, 756 P.2d 346, 347-48 
(Ariz. App. 1988) (defective construction can give rise to 
claims for breach of implied warranty and common law duty of 
care). 
In Bicknese v. Sutula, 2003 WI 31, 260 Wis. 2d 713, 660 
N.W.2d 289, this court apparently treated a claim of promissory 
estoppel as a tort-based claim to which Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) 
applies.  See Bicknese, 260 Wis. 2d 713, ¶13 n.2 (declining to 
address whether promissory estoppel should be treated the same 
as a contract with respect to public officer immunity "[s]ince 
neither party petitioned this court for a determination" of that 
issue).  In the present case, unlike in Bicknese, the plaintiffs 
treat promissory estoppel as a contract-based claim. 
The plaintiff in Bicknese prevailed despite the fact that 
the court treated her promissory estoppel claim as a tort and  
applied § 893.80(4) because the Bicknese court concluded that 
the 
ministerial 
exception 
to 
governmental 
immunity 
was 
applicable.  This exception, as was discussed previously, does 
not apply in the present case. 
No. 
01-2953   
 
29 
 
¶54 In the present 
case, the 
plaintiffs' 
promissory 
estoppel claim is based on the same allegations as the 
plaintiffs' negligence claim.  We have just held that the grant 
of government immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) extends to 
the plaintiffs' negligence claims against the District and 
Johnson.  
¶55 Permitting the plaintiffs to obtain damages from an 
immune public official through the back door opened by a claim 
of promissory estoppel contravenes the government immunity 
policy of this State set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) and 
consequently would not serve the ends of justice.  The circuit 
court correctly concluded that "the immunity rational [sic] of 
Kierstyn nevertheless applies [to the plaintiffs'] promissory 
estoppel premise just as it does to [the plaintiffs'] negligence 
claim.  The facts giving rise to the claim are the same in 
either cause of action.  Promissory estoppel could've been pled 
in Kierstyn."45 
V 
¶56 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's judgment 
dismissing the plaintiffs' amended complaint for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
                                                 
45 Scott v. ABC Ins. Co., Case No. 00-CV-286, Decision and 
Order on Motion to Dismiss at 2 (Aug. 27, 2001) (see Appendix of 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners at 8).  
No. 
01-2953   
 
30 
 
¶57 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., did not participate. 
 
 
No.  01-2953.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶58 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (concurring).  
As I recognized in writing for the majority, this court has had 
many opportunities to apply Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), and we have 
struggled to define the proper scope of governmental immunity.46  
One need only review a handful of this court's recent decisions 
on the limits of governmental immunity to appreciate the 
jurisprudential 
chaos 
surrounding 
the 
phrase 
"legislative, 
quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions" in 
§ 893.80(4).47 
¶59 If this court is ready to revisit the limits of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), as Justice Prosser's dissent and Justice 
Bablitch's concurrence suggest, then it should set this case for 
re-briefing and re-argument in the fall and invite amicus curiae 
participation from affected actors, such as the State of 
Wisconsin, the League of Wisconsin Municipalities, the Wisconsin 
Counties Association, the Wisconsin Insurance Alliance, and 
others.  The impact of construing governmental immunity anew 
will have a far-reaching impact, and this court should only 
undertake such a task with the benefit of full information. 
                                                 
46 Majority op., ¶34. 
47 See, 
e.g., 
Bicknese 
v. 
Sutula, 
2003 
WI 
31, 
260 
Wis. 2d 713, 660 N.W.2d 289; Kierstyn v. Racine Unified Sch. 
Dist., 
228 
Wis. 2d 81, 
596 
N.W.2d 417 
(1999); 
Lodl 
v. 
Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 71, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 646 
N.W.2d 314. 
No.  01-2953.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶60 I am authorized to state that Justices WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH and N. PATRICK CROOKS join this opinion.  
 
 
No.  01-2953.WAB 
 
1 
 
¶61 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   (concurring).  Although my 
sentiments are with the dissent, I concur only because I feel 
compelled by stare decisis to do so. 
¶62 Although the majority's result is consistent with past 
cases, it is also an unjust result.  This court should revisit 
these past cases for the reasons so well stated in the dissent 
of Justice Prosser.  A doctrine of governmental immunity that 
has caused such injustice and inequity, in this case and others, 
cannot, and I predict, will not, stand much longer.  See, e.g., 
Kierstyn v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 228 Wis. 2d 81, 596 
N.W.2d 417 (1999); Willow Creek Ranch v. Town of Shelby, 2000 WI 
56, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693.  Unfortunately, because 
this court will not now revisit the past, Scott suffers.   
¶63 Here, Scott did nothing wrong.  In fact, he did 
everything right.  Scott sought out the appropriate individual 
to assist him in choosing courses to fulfill the requirements 
for his NCAA scholarship.  Scott relied on the advice of his 
high school guidance counselor, the school official who was 
privy to the information Scott requested; regrettably, it was to 
his detriment.  The law should not allow such an injustice.  
Although the majority denies Scott any relief, I believe he 
should have a legal remedy.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
¶64 I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK 
CROOKS joins this concurrence.     
 
 
No.  01-2953.dss 
 
1 
 
¶65 DIANE S. SYKES, J.   (concurring).  I write separately 
to state my disagreement with the majority's characterization of 
promissory estoppel.  The majority opinion appears to suggest 
that in some circumstances, promissory estoppel may be a tort 
remedy.  Majority op., ¶53.  This is incorrect. 
¶66  Promissory estoppel is an equitable contract remedy 
that enforces a promise, in the absence of proof of the elements 
of a contract, where there has been substantial reliance on the 
promise, but only to the extent that justice requires.  Hoffman 
v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 698, 133 N.W.2d 267 
(1965).  In recognizing the promissory estoppel cause of action 
nearly 40 years ago in Hoffman, this court was defining a new 
contract remedy, not creating a new tort.  Bicknese v. Sutula, 
2003 WI 31, ¶62, 260 Wis. 2d 713, 660 N.W.2d 289 (Sykes, J., 
dissenting).48 
 ¶67  It is certainly true, as the majority states, that "a 
claim for promissory estoppel only arises when there is no 
contract," but the majority subtly overstates the matter when it 
also asserts that promissory estoppel "rests on a theory 
separate from contract."  Majority op., ¶53.  A promissory 
estoppel claim is not the equivalent of a breach of contract 
claim, in its elements or its measure of damages.  Hoffman, 26 
                                                 
 
48  See also Mackenzie v. Miller Brewing Co., 2001 WI 23, 
¶25, 241 Wis. 2d 700, 623 N.W.2d 739 ("A cause of action for 
promissory estoppel in the employment context, like a contract 
cause of action based on an employee handbook, is in accordance 
with Wisconsin contract law."); Ahnapee & W. Ry. Co. v. 
Challoner, 34 Wis. 2d 134, 145, 148 N.W.2d 646 (1967)("[T]he 
basis of promissory estoppel is akin to the contractual basis 
for reformation."). 
  
No.  01-2953.dss 
 
2 
 
Wis. 2d at 699-701.  But that hardly means that promissory 
estoppel falls outside the law of contracts and can be 
considered a tort cause of action. 
¶68  On this point, the majority cites Ferraro v. Koelsch, 
124 Wis. 2d 154, 368 N.W.2d 666 (1985), and Forrer v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967).  Majority 
op., ¶53 n.41.  Both of these were contract cases, however, and 
neither supports the notion that promissory estoppel might be a 
tort.  In Ferraro, this court found an express contract between 
the parties based upon an employee handbook.  Ferraro, 124 Wis. 
2d at 157-158.  Ferraro simply describes the distinctions 
between promissory estoppel and breach of contract theories, and 
notes that in Forrer the plaintiff pleaded promissory estoppel.  
Ferraro, 124 Wis. 2d at 167-68. 
¶69  That promissory estoppel is different from breach of 
contract does not operate to remove promissory estoppel from the 
realm of contract law into the realm of tort law.  A plaintiff 
may proceed in tort under the separate and distinct theories of 
strict products liability and negligence, but these are both 
still tort claims, despite their distinctions.  Similarly, a 
plaintiff may proceed in contract under the separate and 
distinct theories of breach of contract and promissory estoppel.  
Both are contract claims.  If proof of the contract fails, the 
promise may still be enforced (although not to the extent of 
full breach of contract damages) if the elements of promissory 
estoppel are proven. 
No.  01-2953.dss 
 
3 
 
¶70  The majority also asserts that "'[o]ne branch of 
promissory estoppel's family tree lies in tort'" and that 
"'[a]rguably, 
promissory 
estoppel 
can 
be 
asserted 
as 
an 
independent tort theory of detrimental reliance.'"  Majority 
op., ¶53 n.42.  The source of these statements is the treatise 
Corbin on Contracts.  Id.  There is no support in Wisconsin law 
for Corbin's colorful genealogical assertion or an "arguable" 
independent promissory estoppel tort. 
¶71  Tort law does contain remedies that, like promissory 
estoppel, protect reliance interests.49  Tort and contract 
remedies, however, have distinct purposes, elements, and types 
of recoverable damages.  See Mackenzie v. Miller Brewing Co., 
2001 WI 23, ¶¶27-28, 241 Wis. 2d 700, 723-25, 623 N.W.2d 739; 
Digicorp v. Ameritech, 2003 WI 54, ¶75, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___ (Sykes, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part)(citing Wausau Tile, Inc. v. County Concrete Corp., 226 
Wis. 2d 235, 247, 593 N.W.2d 445 (1999)).  "Tort law 'rests on 
obligations imposed by law.' . . . In contrast, contract law 'is 
based on obligations imposed by bargain,'. . . Essentially, 
contract law is based upon the principles of free will and 
consent, whereas tort law is based upon the principles of risk-
sharing and social duties."  Mackenzie, 241 Wis. 2d 700, ¶¶27-28 
                                                 
 
49 
See 
Wis 
JI——Civil 
2400-03 
for 
the 
elements 
of 
misrepresentation.      
  
No.  01-2953.dss 
 
4 
 
(internal citations omitted).  We should respect and enforce 
these distinctions, not blur them.50 
¶72  The majority asserts that "[a] single set of facts may 
give rise to actions both in contract and in tort, thus making 
it difficult to always draw a clear distinction between the two 
actions."  Majority op., ¶53.  That a single set of facts may in 
certain circumstances support both a contract claim and a tort 
claim does not mean that a single cause of action, promissory 
estoppel, is both a tort and a contract remedy. 
¶73  Here, the plaintiffs brought three claims for relief, 
one in tort (negligence) and two in contract (breach of contract 
and promissory estoppel).  The majority states that "[i]n the 
present case . . . the plaintiffs treat promissory estoppel as a 
contract-based claim."  Majority op., ¶53 n.44.  I object to any 
suggestion that promissory estoppel can be either a tort or a 
contract remedy depending upon how any particular plaintiff 
might treat it.  Bicknese, 2003 WI 31, ¶74 (Sykes, J., 
dissenting). 
                                                 
50 I suppose we could say that "one branch of the family 
tree" of strict products liability lies in contract law (i.e., 
breach of implied warranty), but that would not transform a 
strict products liability claim, derived from section 402A of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, into a contract action.  The 
adoption of section 402A stemmed in part from dissatisfaction 
with privity of contract requirements in breach of implied 
warranty actions, Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 
N.W.2d 55 (1967), but that does not suggest that strict products 
liability is a contract remedy.  That both tort and contract law 
recognize reliance-based causes of action does not suggest that 
a promissory estoppel claim under Hoffman is a tort remedy.     
No.  01-2953.dss 
 
5 
 
¶74 Although 
I 
disagree 
with 
the 
majority's 
characterization of promissory estoppel,51 I agree that the 
plaintiffs have failed to state a promissory estoppel claim.  
There was no promise, either by the district or Johnson, upon 
which to base a promissory estoppel claim.  This is an action 
for negligent performance of counseling services by a public 
high school guidance counselor, and, as such, is barred by 
public officer immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  The 
contract 
and 
promissory 
estoppel 
claims 
are 
factually 
insufficient to survive the motion to dismiss. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
51  The majority correctly notes that public officer 
immunity does not apply to contract claims.  Majority op., ¶53 
n.40 (citing Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C. v. Town of Shelby, 2000 
WI 56, ¶¶33, 35, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693, and Energy 
Complexes, Inc. v. Eau Claire County, 152 Wis. 2d 453, 464-65, 
449 N.W.2d 35 (1989)). 
  
No.  01-2953.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶75 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  Four decades 
have passed since this court issued its landmark decision in 
Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 
(1962).  Many have now forgotten the zeal with which a unanimous 
court attacked and belittled the doctrine of governmental 
immunity, quoting judicial and legal writers to the effect that 
governmental immunity was "ancient and fallacious," "archaic," 
"mistaken and unjust," "unsupported by any valid reason," 
"unjust, inequitable, and patently unfair," and an "absurdity."  
Id. at 33-35. 
¶76 In a bold stroke, the court disavowed its past 
decisions and abrogated the principle of governmental immunity.  
It declared that "so far as governmental responsibility for 
torts is concerned, the rule is liability——the exception is 
immunity."  Id. at 39.   
¶77 The court stopped short of imposing "liability on a 
government body in the exercise of its legislative or judicial 
or quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions."  Id. at 40 
(citing Hargrove v. Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 
1957)).  It recognized that government should not be liable for 
all harms to which it is connected, including honest errors in 
the exercise of discretion. 
¶78 The Wisconsin legislature did not back away from 
reform.  It promptly enacted a progressive tort claims act which 
followed the suggestions in the Holytz opinion.  See ch. 198, 
Laws of 1963.  The legislature specifically adopted the court's 
articulated exception to tort liability, which is now set out in 
No.  01-2953.dtp 
 
2 
 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  This statute provides that "No suit may 
be 
brought 
against 
any . . . [political] 
corporation, 
[governmental] 
subdivision 
or 
agency 
[thereof] . . . or 
volunteer fire company or against its officers, officials, 
agents 
or 
employees 
for 
acts 
done 
in 
the 
exercise 
of 
legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial 
functions."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶79 In logic, a government agency seeking to rely on this 
statute as a defense against the negligence of its employee 
should be required to establish that the employee's negligence 
occurred in the exercise of some legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial, or quasi-judicial function.  Yet, this is not the 
focus 
of 
our 
current 
jurisprudence. 
 
Instead, 
when 
the 
government claims immunity for negligence from an alleged 
"discretionary" act, an injured party is forced to try to 
shoehorn the negligent employee's conduct into one of the four 
narrow exceptions to governmental immunity, such as "ministerial 
duty," that have been grafted onto § 893.80(4).  Willow Creek 
Ranch v. Town of Shelby, 2000 WI 56, ¶26, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 
N.W.2d 693; 
Kierstyn 
v. 
Racine 
Unified 
Sch. 
Dist., 
228 
Wis. 2d 81, 90-97, 596 N.W.2d 417 (1999).  In effect, this 
methodology has made the rule become immunity——the exception, 
liability. 
¶80 The legislature is not responsible for the reenactment 
of governmental immunity.  This court is responsible for several 
decades of backsliding that has produced today's opinion.   
No.  01-2953.dtp 
 
3 
 
¶81 The majority opinion faithfully describes the salient 
facts of this case.  Majority op., ¶¶8-9.  The Stevens Point 
Area Senior High School submitted its curriculum to the NCAA 
Initial-Eligibility Clearinghouse and received back four reports 
listing, 
individually, 
both 
the 
approved 
and 
disapproved 
courses.  These reports were dated April 4, 1996, January 30, 
1997, July 31, 1997, and April 21, 1998.  All four reports list 
BROADCAST COMMUNICATION as the first course under the heading 
NOT ACCEPTABLE. 
¶82 In determining today that a school counselor is immune 
from 
liability 
for 
advising 
a 
student 
that 
BROADCAST 
COMMUNICATION is an acceptable NCAA-approved course when the 
counselor had access to a two-page, clearly organized NCAA 
document listing BROADCAST COMMUNICATION as NOT ACCEPTABLE, this 
court has come virtually full circle on governmental immunity.  
The result is profoundly wrong and unjust.  It is also contrary 
to 
legislative 
intent. 
 
For 
the 
reasons 
indicated, 
I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
 
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1