Case Title: The Florida Bar v. Domenic Leonard Grosso

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2000-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
  
____________
No. SC94099
____________
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,
vs.
DOMENIC LEONARD GROSSO,
Respondent.
[June 1, 2000]
CORRECTED OPINION
PER CURIAM.
We have for review the complaint of The Florida Bar and the referee’s report
regarding alleged ethical breaches by attorney Domenic Leonard Grosso.  We have
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  The referee has recommended a fifteen-
day suspension.  The Florida Bar seeks review, requesting a ninety-one day
suspension.  For the reasons stated herein, we order a ninety-day suspension
followed by a one-year probationary period.
FACTS
On October 13, 1998, the Bar filed a complaint against respondent, alleging
-2-
misconduct as to respondent’s duties as guardian of property he agreed to keep in
his possession during the time that his client, Michael Cusick, was on criminal
probation.  Respondent had represented Cusick in a dissolution of marriage case
during the course of which Cusick was charged with domestic abuse.  Cusick
entered a no-contest plea to this charge and was placed on probation for one year. 
As a condition of probation, Cusick was required to give up possession of his
firearms collection during the period of his probation.  The court and the assistant
state attorney approved respondent’s taking possession of Cusick’s weapons and
retaining custody of them until the end of Cusick’s probation.  Respondent took
possession of thirty-one firearms on October 8, 1996, to be held in trust for Cusick. 
A letter memorializing the agreement along with a list of the firearms was sent to the
judge in Cusick’s case.  Respondent placed the firearms in his garage, where some
of them rusted and pitted.
Cusick’s probation ended October 7, 1997, at which time he demanded that
respondent return his firearms.  Respondent, by letter dated October 7, 1997, stated
that he required a letter from the probation department confirming that the probation
was terminated.  Cusick produced such a letter.  On October 15, 1997, respondent
returned to Cusick twenty-nine of the thirty-one firearms that were entrusted to
respondent, as evidenced by an inventory and receipt.  By letter dated October 16,
1The referee’s report makes no further reference to the second allegedly missing firearm, a
.45 caliber pistol.  The record reflects that during the February 25 hearing, respondent examined
Cusick, and Cusick answered affirmatively when respondent asked him if he been reimbursed for the
missing .45-caliber pistol.  Transcript of Proceedings at 29-30.
-3-
1997, respondent acknowledged that two of the firearms were missing and one was
likely still kept in his garage.  Cusick made repeated calls to respondent, who wrote
to Cusick in a letter dated October 30, 1997:  “I don’t want to be bothered with you
any more, Michael . . . .  So I will get them to you, Michael, okay?  Don’t call me.  I
will call you.”  On November 5, Cusick wrote to respondent again requesting the
firearms.  On November 6, respondent replied:  “When I find them, I find them . . . . 
I’ll give them to you when I can.”
One of the twenty-nine weapons returned to Cusick was a 9 mm carbine,
which was missing a bolt handle.  Despite repeated demands, respondent failed to
repair the bolt handle for the 9 mm carbine and return the two missing firearms,
which were a .45-caliber carbine and a .45-caliber pistol.  Cusick represented that
the missing carbine was an irreplaceable collector’s item.1
Respondent testified under oath at his disciplinary hearing before the referee
that he did have the .45 carbine at home in a cardboard box.  At the conclusion of
the hearing, the referee announced that he would recommend a finding of not guilty,
conditioned upon the return to Cusick of the missing firearm within fifteen days
-4-
from the date of the final hearing.  Respondent made no effort to contact Cusick
within the fifteen-day period, which ended March 12, 1999.  On March 18,
respondent was tardy in arriving at a hearing, at which he then asserted that he had
found a similar weapon but that it was not in a box, as Cusick said his rifle was. 
In a letter dated April 7, 1999, and copied to the referee, respondent told
Cusick that he had searched for the .45 carbine and could not find it.  On August 7,
1998, respondent sent a letter to Cusick and enclosed a check for $280.54 made out
to Cusick for what respondent considered to be restitution for the lost .45 carbine
handgun.  The referee considered his copy of said letter to be an ex parte
communication and noted that it directly contradicted respondent’s testimony in the
original hearing, in which he stated that he had located the missing carbine, a
position respondent still maintained at the March 18 hearing.
REFEREE’S REPORT
As to guilt, the referee found that respondent had failed to properly safeguard
his client’s property and had failed to promptly return all items held in trust for his
client.  The referee recommended that respondent be found guilty of violating the
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar:  rule 4-1.15(a) (a lawyer shall hold in
trust funds and property of client; property shall be appropriately safeguarded); and
rule 4-1.15(b) (a lawyer shall promptly deliver to client any funds or property client
-5-
is entitled to receive).
As to discipline, the referee recommended that respondent be subject to
discipline in the form of a suspension for fifteen days.  In making this
recommendation, the referee found as an aggravating factor that respondent had a
prior record of the following disciplinary actions:  (1) admonishment, May 6, 1994,
for violation of rules 4-1.2(a) (comply with client directions); 4-1.3 (diligent
representation); 4-1.5(a) (excessive fee); (2) admonishment, June 21, 1994, for
violation of rule 4-1.3 (diligent representation); (3) ten-day suspension for a failure
to respond to a Florida Bar investigative inquiry, Florida Bar v. Grosso, 647 So. 2d
840 (Fla. 1994); and (4) public reprimand for violations of rules 4-1.1 (competent
representation); 4-1.3 (diligent representation); 4-1.4(a) (informing a client), Florida
Bar v. Grosso, No. 83,989 (Fla. June 22, 1995).  The referee also found as an
aggravating factor that respondent testified falsely under oath that he had found
Cusick’s .45 mm carbine, when in fact he had not, and found this to be “as
egregious, if not more so, than the violations . . . for which respondent has been
found guilty.”  The referee noted that respondent had a “cavalier or lackadaisical”
attitude during the disciplinary proceedings.  As a mitigating factor, the referee
found that respondent attempted to make restitution.
The referee found suspension to be the appropriate sanction under this
-6-
Court’s holdings in Florida Bar v. Weiss, 586 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1991) (six-month
suspension for negligent misuse of client funds), and Florida Bar v. McClure, 575
So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1991) (three-year suspension for negligent misuse of client funds). 
The referee noted that the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and the
Rules Regulating The Florida Bar make no distinction between client funds and
client property in providing discipline for misconduct relating to client “property” or
“funds and property.”  The referee noted that in Florida Bar v. MacMillan, 600 So.
2d 457 (Fla. 1992), the respondent was suspended for two years for violations
including respondent’s inability to return items of jewelry entrusted to him.  The
Florida Bar seeks review of the referee’s report.
ANALYSIS
As to guilt, respondent in this Court states the “position” that he was not
actually representing Cusick at the time he agreed to take possession of the firearms. 
However, neither respondent nor the Bar contests the referee’s determination of
guilt.  Therefore, we approve the referee’s findings of fact and recommendation as
to respondent’s guilt because they are supported by competent, substantial evidence.
As to the disciplinary recommendation, we disagree with the referee’s
recommendation of a fifteen-day suspension and reject the Bar’s assertion that a
ninety-one day suspension, with required proof of rehabilitation, is appropriate here. 
-7-
See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Pipkins, 708 So. 2d 953, 955 (Fla. 1998).  The Bar argues
that a fifteen-day suspension is inconsistent with the referee’s own findings and
cases cited in the referee’s report.  The Bar notes that this Court imposed a six-
month suspension in Weiss for an attorney’s negligent handling of client funds, a
three-year suspension in McClure for negligent misuse of client funds, and a two-
year suspension in MacMillan for, inter alia, negligent handling of client property.
We find the cases cited by the Bar to be distinguishable in that Weiss
concerns commingling of client funds and McClure concerns negligent withholding
of funds from an estate.  In MacMillan, the respondent was found guilty of three of
five counts of misconduct relating to respondent’s duties as guardian of property
that a minor received from an estate.  See 600 So. 2d at 458.  In one of these counts,
the referee found that respondent violated rules 5-1.1 (trust accounts) and 4-1.15(a)
(safeguarding of property held in trust) for failing to deliver jewelry entrusted to him
as guardian.  Id. at 458-59.  However, respondent also was found guilty of
intentional misappropriation of funds and intentional failure to disclose fund
transfers in the guardian’s report.  Id. at 459.  Thus, the cumulative misconduct was
more serious in MacMillan and warranted the two-year suspension we imposed.
Here, there is no allegation of intentional misappropriation of property by
respondent.  The record reflects that respondent was negligent to the point of
-8-
incompetence in failing to return his client’s property after repeated requests.  We
find that more egregious misconduct occurred in violating trust and safekeeping
agreements in Weiss, McClure, and MacMillan than in the one instance found by
the referee in this case.  Moreover, we consider the fact that Grosso did make
restitution.
Florida Standard for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 4.12 states that suspension
is appropriate when a lawyer knows or should know that he is dealing improperly
with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.  However, we
find that the referee’s disciplinary recommendation that Grosso be given a fifteen-
day suspension is inappropriate in view of respondent’s rule violations, substantial
past record of disciplinary actions, equivocal statements as to whether he had the
.45 mm carbine in his possession, and our case law.
In reviewing a referee’s recommendation of discipline, this Court’s review is
broader than that afforded to findings of fact because it is this Court’s ultimate
responsibility to order an appropriate punishment.  Florida Bar v. Anderson, 538 So.
2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989).  We order a ninety-day suspension to be followed by a
one-year period of probation.  See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Schultz, 712 So. 2d 386,
388, 389 (Fla. 1998); Florida Bar v. Mitchell, 645 So. 2d 414, 415 (Fla. 1994).
We strongly caution respondent that he must avoid the practices in which he
-9-
has engaged that have resulted in Bar discipline.  Our protection of the public
interest requires increasing recommended discipline if there are further violations of
the disciplinary rules.  We also caution members of the Bar that our Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar dictate that the same consequences will result from
incompetent or dishonest trust guardianship of all kinds of property as from similar
conduct in cases concerning money.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, respondent is suspended from the practice of law for ninety
days, to be followed by a one-year probationary period.  The suspension shall be
effective thirty days from the filing of this opinion so that respondent can close out
his practice and protect the interests of existing clients.  If respondent notifies this
Court in writing that he is no longer practicing and does not need the thirty days to
protect existing clients, this Court will enter an order making the suspension
effective immediately.  Respondent shall accept no new business from the date this
opinion is filed until the suspension is completed.  Judgment is entered for The
Florida Bar, 650 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399, for recovery of
costs from Domenic Leonard Grosso in the amount of $998.95, for which sum let
execution issue.
It is so ordered.
-10-
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION.
Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and John A. Boggs, Staff Counsel,
Tallahassee, Florida, and David M. Barnovitz, Bar Counsel, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
       for Complainant
Domenic L. Grosso, pro se, Boca Raton, Florida,
       for Respondent