Case Title: Commonwealth v. Javier

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11994

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-01-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-11994 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOEL JAVIER. 
 
 
 
Essex.     March 9, 2018. - January 28, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Budd, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Joint Enterprise.  Evidence, Joint venturer, Expert 
opinion, Qualification of expert witness, Videotape, 
Demonstration.  Witness, Expert.  Practice, Criminal, 
Presence of police witness at prosecutor's table, Capital 
case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 29, 2011. 
 
 
The case was tried before Mary K. Ames, J. 
 
 
 
Cathryn A. Neaves for the defendant. 
 
David F. O'Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  On January 10, 2009, Robert Gonzalez was shot 
and killed while he was sitting in his parked Dodge Caravan 
minivan on a side street in Lawrence.  In September 2013, the 
defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, as a 
 
 
2 
joint venturer, on a theory of deliberate premeditation in the 
shooting.1 
In this direct appeal, the defendant primarily challenges 
the sufficiency of the evidence that he was present at the 
scene, knowingly participated in the shooting, and had the 
mental state necessary to the offense.  He argues also that the 
trial judge abused her discretion in allowing the admission of 
opinion testimony by a cellular telephone company employee who 
was not an engineer, but who interpreted cell site location 
information (CSLI) gleaned from the defendant's and his friends' 
cellular telephones, because the witness was not qualified to 
render an expert opinion on certain topics.  In addition, the 
defendant challenges the judge's decision to allow the admission 
of a video recording comparing images from surveillance footage 
of the vehicle that dropped off the shooters and images of a 
Dodge Caravan that investigators had seized from the defendant's 
girl friend's mother and that the defendant and his girl friend 
                     
 
1 The Commonwealth also indicted four other individuals on 
charges of murder in the first degree for their alleged roles in 
the shooting.  One, Yoshio Stackerman, was convicted of murder 
in the second degree, and that conviction was affirmed by the 
Appeals Court.  See Commonwealth v. Stackerman, 91 Mass. App. 
Ct. 1108 (2017).  The Commonwealth dismissed the case against a 
second, Francis Wyatt, and a third, Thomas Castro, was acquitted 
of all charges.  A few weeks before the defendant's second 
trial, his girl friend, Cauris Gonzalez, was convicted of murder 
in the first degree; this court subsequently vacated the 
conviction on grounds of insufficient evidence.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 475 Mass. 396, 407 (2016). 
 
 
3 
often used.  Lastly, the defendant asserts that the presence of 
a key prosecution witness, a State trooper, at counsel table 
throughout the trial, until he testified as the Commonwealth's 
final witness, improperly vouched for the credibility of his 
testimony and requires a new trial.  The defendant also asks us 
to exercise our extraordinary power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
to order a new trial or to reduce the verdict to a lesser degree 
of guilt.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the conviction 
and decline to exercise our authority to grant relief under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
1.  Facts.  We recite the facts the jury could have found, 
viewing them in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
see Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), and 
reserving some details for later discussion. 
a.  Background.  The Commonwealth's theory at trial was 
that the defendant and his friends planned and carried out the 
shooting in retaliation for a fight in which the victim punched 
out the defendant's tooth.  The dispute between the victim and 
the defendant that led to the fight arose over an unpaid debt 
that the victim owed Cauris Gonzalez,2 the defendant's then girl 
friend, for a Honda Civic hatchback automobile that he had 
                     
2 Cauris Gonzalez and the victim, Robert Gonzalez, are not 
related.  Because they share a last name, for clarity, we refer 
to Cauris by her first name. 
 
 
4 
purchased from her in the summer of 2008.  By January of 2009, 
he had paid most of the cost of the vehicle, but still owed 
Cauris one hundred dollars.  Although the victim had not paid 
the full purchase price for the Honda Civic, by January 2009, he 
had sold it and had used the proceeds to purchase a Dodge 
Caravan minivan. 
b.  Evening before and day of the shooting.  At 
approximately 6 P.M. on January 9, 2009, Cauris telephoned the 
victim and asked him to pay her the remaining one hundred 
dollars for the Honda Civic she had sold him.  The victim said 
that he did not have the money.  Using his own cellular 
telephone, the defendant then called the victim and got into an 
argument with him when the defendant asked him to pay Cauris and 
the victim said that he was not going to give the defendant any 
money. 
Sometime between 7 or 8 P.M. that evening, the defendant 
and Cauris went to a party that was being hosted by several of 
the defendant's friends at their house on Essex Street.  At 
around 11 P.M., the defendant, Cauris, and the defendant's 
friend Yoshio Stackerman left to get some food at a nearby fast 
food restaurant.  They were expected to return to the party but 
did not; there was no evidence to establish where they went 
after leaving the house on Essex Street, until approximately 
2 A.M. on January 10, 2009. 
 
 
5 
At that point, the defendant and Cauris were waiting in the 
drive-through lane at the same fast food restaurant.  Cauris was 
driving her mother's Dodge Caravan minivan, and the defendant 
was standing next to the vehicle.  Stackerman was not with them.  
The victim and three friends drove past the restaurant, in the 
victim's Dodge Caravan.  When the victim saw the defendant and 
Cauris, he began yelling through the window of his vehicle, and 
the defendant began yelling back about the money the victim owed 
Cauris.  Immediately before the victim and his friends reached 
the restaurant, the victim, who seemed very angry, had been 
yelling at someone on his cellular telephone.  Call logs from 
the victim's and the defendant's cellular telephones showed 
three calls between those two numbers at approximately the same 
time, one at 2:12 A.M. and two at approximately 2:17 A.M. 
The victim and his friends got out of his Dodge Caravan; 
the friends stood near the vehicle, about twenty to thirty feet 
away, and the victim headed toward the defendant.  The defendant 
then pulled out a knife and "waved it around," but did not lunge 
toward anyone.  Both men were yelling and "screaming."  The 
defendant said, "Bitch ass nigger.  You gonna snuff me, bitch 
ass nigger?"  The victim, who was much larger and taller than 
the defendant, responded, "I don't want to hit you," then 
punched the defendant in the mouth, knocking out one of his 
teeth.  The defendant spit out his tooth and began spitting 
 
 
6 
blood toward the victim.  One of the victim's friends picked up 
the tooth and "started showing it like it was funny." 
The victim began to walk back toward his minivan, and the 
defendant followed, "screaming."  The defendant then threw his 
cellular telephone at the victim.  The telephone missed the 
victim, and broke when it hit the ground.  The defendant was 
still yelling at the victim when Cauris drove up in her mother's 
minivan and told the defendant to get in.  As the defendant was 
stepping into the minivan, he said to the victim, "Fuck you.  
It's not going to stay like this."  The defendant and Cauris 
drove off, leaving the broken cellular telephone on the ground.  
Each returned to their parents' houses, from where they spent 
the night talking to each other on the telephone.3 
At around noon that day, the defendant and Cauris went to a 
pharmacy to get medication for the defendant's mouth, which was 
swollen but no longer bleeding; Cauris was driving her mother's 
minivan.  In the early afternoon of January 10, 2009, the victim 
and three of his friends drove to the defendant's parents' 
house.  The defendant and Cauris returned from their trip to the 
pharmacy at approximately the same time.  Cauris got out of her 
minivan and walked up to the front door while the defendant 
drove away.  When the defendant's mother answered, she saw a man 
                     
 
3 The defendant's parents' house had a land line. 
 
 
7 
she did not know -- the victim -- standing across the street, 
near a minivan.  He told her that he had the defendant's tooth 
and would sell it to her for "a thousand bucks."  He then 
entered his minivan and drove away; the defendant, who had been 
watching from a distance, returned to the house.  Sometime 
between 3:30 and 4 P.M., the defendant and Cauris drove his 
mother to work in Cauris's mother's minivan.4 
The Commonwealth relied extensively on telephone records 
and CSLI as circumstantial evidence of the location of the 
defendant, Cauris, and the defendant's friends in the hours 
before the shooting, and to show that all five had participated 
in planning the shooting, then stopped calling each other during 
the fifteen minutes immediately prior to the shooting, which 
occurred shortly before 6 P.M.5 
Call records and testimony were also introduced concerning 
calls on the day of the shooting between Cauris and her 
brother's then girl friend, Ashley Calisto, who had had surgery 
                     
 
4 The defendant's mother testified that Cauris and the 
defendant drove her to work at some point between 3:30 and 
4 P.M., after she called Cauris to ask her for a ride; records 
from the cellular telephone service provider indicate that a 
call from the defendant's mother was placed to Cauris's 
telephone number during that time frame. 
 
5 The time of the shooting, at approximately 5:57 P.M., was 
determined based on the surveillance footage (which was four 
minutes and forty-two seconds off from the actual time, see 
note 6, infra) and a call to 911 at 5:59 P.M that was placed by 
one of the victim's friends. 
 
 
8 
approximately one week earlier.  Telephone records showed that 
Cauris's telephone number called Calisto's telephone number at 
1:40 P.M.; Cauris told police she had called to ask if she and 
the defendant could come by to visit Calisto that evening.  
Telephone records also indicated that Cauris's telephone called 
Calisto's telephone number again at approximately 5:45 P.M.  
Calisto testified to receiving a call from Cauris at around that 
time. 
Eight calls were made during the afternoon between the 
telephone numbers being used by the defendant and Cauris, 
Stackerman, Castro, and Wyatt; these telephone numbers also made 
calls to other numbers.  No calls were made from any of the four 
numbers between about 5:45 P.M. and 6:01 P.M.  Minutes after the 
shooting, at 6:01 P.M., Cauris's telephone called Castro's 
telephone number twice.  Also at 6:01 P.M., Castro called for a 
taxicab and asked to be picked up at a location approximately 
two blocks from the scene of the shooting, while Cauris's 
telephone called Calisto's telephone three times shortly after 
the shooting, between 6:02 and 6:06 P.M. 
Calisto testified that the defendant and Cauris arrived at 
her house at "6:15/6:10/6:20-ish."  Calisto had just had surgery 
and Cauris had spoken with Calisto earlier that day to plan a 
visit.  After about twenty minutes, Cauris left to pick up her 
mother at work, while the defendant stayed with Calisto.  Cauris 
 
 
9 
returned to Calisto's house at around 8 P.M.; Cauris and the 
defendant left together at around 9 P.M.  The Commonwealth 
argued that the calls to Calisto indicated that Cauris and the 
defendant had planned their visit specifically to create an 
alibi for the time of the shooting. 
c.  The shooting.  The shooting and the events immediately 
preceding it were video recorded by four surveillance cameras 
mounted on a private house in Lawrence.  Two of the cameras 
produced images that were dark but had relatively clear footage; 
two other cameras, which faced the area where the victim's 
vehicle was parked, produced images of very poor quality.  A 
composite from the four cameras, enhanced as far as possible, 
was created and played for the jury, then introduced as an 
exhibit. 
The surveillance footage shows the victim's Dodge Caravan 
minivan driving north on Hampton Street at approximately 
5:57 P.M.6 and parking on that street near an intersection, on 
the side of the street opposite the house.  It is not possible 
to determine from the surveillance footage who was driving; the 
position of the victim when he was found, and testimony at 
trial, established that the victim had been the driver.  There 
                     
6 All of the times stated are adjusted by subtracting four 
minutes and forty-two seconds from the time indicated on the 
surveillance footage, which was known to be that much in advance 
of the actual time. 
 
 
10 
were two passengers, also not visible in the video footage, one 
in the front passenger's seat and one in the rear seat.  After 
the minivan stopped, an individual got out on the passenger side 
and entered one of the buildings.7 
Another minivan came into view approximately twenty seconds 
later, driving along Haverhill Street.  It stopped and four 
people got out.  They walked across the street toward the 
victim's Dodge Caravan as the other vehicle drove away.  The 
vehicle turned right onto a side street, turned around, and 
returned to Haverhill Street, driving out of view of the cameras 
in the same direction that it had been heading. 
Two of the individuals who had crossed the street toward 
the victim's minivan walked behind and to the right of his 
vehicle, and two went to the left.  The video footage shows the 
victim's vehicle lurch forward and slide so that it was 
positioned diagonally across the road, while a pedestrian 
ducked.  The four individuals ran from the scene, heading away 
from Haverhill Street and out of sight of the surveillance 
cameras.  A person got out of the rear passenger's side of the 
victim's minivan and entered the front seat. 
The passenger called 911 at 5:59 P.M. and attempted to help 
the victim until emergency aid arrived.  Another call was made 
                     
 
7 Evidence was introduced concerning the identity of the 
passenger, but he did not testify at trial. 
 
 
11 
at close to the same time by a different individual.  The first 
officer on the scene arrived within minutes, because he had been 
only a few blocks away when the call went out.  The victim was 
conscious when the officer arrived, and he responded to the 
officer's question about what had happened by saying that he 
knew "who it was."  He then lost consciousness.  He was 
transported to a local hospital and was pronounced dead.  An 
autopsy showed that the victim has been shot twice in the back, 
and that one of the bullets had lodged in his spinal column and 
another had pierced his heart.  Either bullet would have been 
fatal within a short time. 
d.  Investigation.  Numerous spent cartridge casings were 
found near the victim's vehicle.  A ballistician examined them 
and determined that they had been shot from two different guns.  
There were six .45 caliber cartridge casings, near the rear of 
the victim's minivan, on the passenger's side; all had been 
fired from one semiautomatic weapon.  There also were six .357 
caliber cartridge casings, all of which had been fired from a 
single weapon, near the rear of the victim's minivan on the 
driver's side.8 
                     
 
8 An H & K USB compact semiautomatic pistol obtained from a 
friend of Stackerman on January 14, 2009, was identified to a 
reasonable degree of ballistic certainty as the .45 caliber 
firearm used in the shooting.  The friend did not testify, but 
his wife testified that Stackerman arrived at their house at 
some point between 6 and 9 P.M. on January 10, 2009, looking for 
 
 
12 
A few days after the shooting, when Lawrence police 
officers learned that the defendant had been involved in some 
kind of dispute with the victim, investigators went to the 
defendant's parents' house intending to interview him.  His 
father contacted the defendant by cellular telephone, and the 
defendant and Cauris came to the house within minutes of the 
call.9  As he walked into the house, the defendant asked the 
officers whether they were there because of "the fight."  The 
defendant and Cauris both agreed to go to the police station to 
speak with investigators.  The defendant went with his father 
and was interviewed by Lieutenant Norman Zuk and Detective 
Carlos Cuevas. 
The defendant waived his Miranda rights and agreed to the 
interview being recorded.  With the defendant's assent, officers 
also photographed the defendant's mouth and the area of the 
missing tooth.  The photograph and a video recording of the 
                     
her husband.  At trial, the wife indicated that she could not be 
more precise about the time frame, but on January 19, 2009, she 
told a police lieutenant that Stackerman had arrived after 7:30 
P.M. and that her husband had been at home with her between 5 
and 6 P.M.  She identified Stackerman and Wyatt as friends of 
her husband's. 
 
9 The defendant told police that he had been staying at 
Cauris's house, on his mother's suggestion, after she called him 
to say that there were people outside his house "looking" for 
him.  The defendant said that they believed he had had something 
to do with the shooting because of his earlier fight with the 
victim. 
 
 
13 
interview were introduced at trial.  The defendant described the 
incident at the fast food restaurant.  He told the officers that 
during an argument over the money the victim owed Cauris, his 
tooth had been knocked out with a pipe.  He said that the victim 
and his friends had taken his cellular telephone and that, in 
response, he had thrown a knife at the victim but had missed.  
He did not mention throwing his cellular telephone.  The 
defendant also told the officers that the victim had offered to 
sell his tooth to his mother, but he denied that he would have 
killed the victim over it.  The defendant insisted repeatedly 
that he did not care about the tooth being knocked out, because 
he "was going to buy another tooth anyways." 
The defendant denied killing the victim but said that he 
understood when the officers asked whether he knew why the fight 
would make him appear to be a primary suspect.  He said that he 
had been staying at Cauris's house on his mother's suggestion, 
because there had been people at his house looking for him; he 
had heard that some people believed he had had something to do 
with the shooting because of the fight.  When asked where he was 
between 5 and 8 P.M. on January 10, 2009, the defendant said 
that he had been at Calisto's house from 5 P.M. onwards.  The 
defendant reiterated a number of times that he had been at 
Calisto's parents' house with Cauris at the time of the 
shooting, as the officers reposed the question and suggested 
 
 
14 
that perhaps he had arrived later.  He was sure that he had 
arrived no later than 5 P.M, and that it could not have been 
around 6 P.M. 
The officers also asked several questions about who the 
defendant's friends were and who he would "hang out" with.  The 
defendant mentioned the names "P Rock" (Pedro), "T" ("Torture"), 
"D Money" (Danny), and Georgie, as well as a "Puerto Rican 
cli[que]" whose names he did not know but who tended to 
socialize in a particular alley that he sometimes visited.  The 
defendant did not mention Stackerman, Wyatt, or Castro, and 
initially denied knowing the name of the victim.  He said that 
he knew the name of a friend of the victim, "Diddy."  The 
defendant claimed at first not to recognize a telephone number 
that appeared in call records as having called his cellular 
telephone, and that was listed in T-Mobile records as registered 
under his name.  He then indicated that he remembered having 
acquired an additional telephone for Cauris's brother, Ricard.  
Later investigation determined that the cellular telephone was 
being used by Stackerman. 
On February 19, 2009, State police Trooper Joshua Ulrich 
recreated the path of the unknown vehicle seen in the home 
surveillance footage, by driving Cauris's mother's minivan, 
which had been seized from her mother's workplace.  He attempted 
to replicate the lighting conditions of January 10, 2009, and 
 
 
15 
drove according to the directions of another officer so that he 
could "copy the pattern that the suspect vehicle had executed."  
The footage of this "reenactment" was then combined with another 
video recording.  Images of Cauris's mother's minivan were 
overlaid on images from the unknown vehicle in the surveillance 
footage, so that two vehicles could be compared to each other. 
At the end of January 2009, the defendant's mother bought 
airplane tickets for the defendant and Cauris to travel to the 
Dominican Republic, so that he could have the missing tooth 
replaced with an implant.  The defendant told police during his 
interview that he had contacted his dentist in the United States 
and the dentist had told him an implant would cost approximately 
$3,000 because the defendant did not have insurance; in the 
Dominican Republic, the cost was approximately one hundred 
dollars.  The defendant remained in the Dominican Republic until 
September 2009, working on his family's farm, and then returned 
to Massachusetts. 
In June 2011, the defendant was indicted on a charge of 
murder in the first degree.  When the defendant learned that a 
warrant for his arrest had issued, he went to the Provincetown 
police headquarters on July 6, 2011, and turned himself in. 
e.  Trial proceedings.  The defendant's first trial, from 
June 10 through June 21, 2013, resulted in a mistrial when the 
jury were unable to reach a verdict.  A second trial, before a 
 
 
16 
different Superior Court judge, was conducted from August 22 to 
September 9, 2013.  The Commonwealth proceeded on a theory of 
deliberate premeditation by joint venture, and argued that the 
defendant had been a joint venturer with Cauris, Stackerman, 
Wyatt, and Castro.  The Commonwealth did not argue that the 
defendant had been one of the shooters. 
The Commonwealth relied extensively on cellular telephone 
records and CSLI data in its case-in-chief.  These records were 
the same as those that had been introduced at Cauris's trial a 
few weeks previously, and were explained by the same T-Mobile 
employee, Raymond MacDonald, who was a manager in the law 
enforcement relations group and a certified keeper of the 
records.  MacDonald testified over objection concerning CSLI 
data that was obtained from T-Mobile records for Cauris's 
cellular telephone number.  The defendant challenged MacDonald's 
qualifications to testify as an expert after MacDonald agreed 
that he was not an engineer, had not been specifically trained 
in cellular telephone technology, and was unable to conduct many 
of the tests that engineers would be able to do, such as 
determining the strength of a particular tower signal.  The 
objection was overruled. 
MacDonald then opined, over objection, that "[t]ypically, 
the phone is going to connect to a cell site that is the closest 
cell site," but also testified that a cellular telephone could 
 
 
17 
connect to a site that is farther away if, for example, the 
signal were stronger or the tower less busy, or there were 
obstacles such as hills or buildings in between.  He indicated 
that signal strength could vary based on a number of factors, 
including the amount of voice traffic, the proximity of other 
cellular towers, the time of year, weather, and obstructions 
such as hills and buildings.  Finally, MacDonald testified, 
again over objection, that he would not have expected a call 
made from Calisto's house to connect from the cellular tower 
that had transmitted two of the calls to Castro's telephone 
number from Cauris's number, within ten minutes after the 
shooting. 
Maps and charts introduced at trial, as well as MacDonald's 
testimony, showed that Cauris's parents' house was 1.5 miles 
from the scene of the shooting, and the defendant's parents' 
house was two miles from the scene.  Calisto's house was 
approximately four miles away.  MacDonald testified generally 
that the usual range of a cell tower in this area was roughly 
two miles (the range was smaller in crowded city neighborhoods 
than in rural areas), but many factors affected that distance.  
Because he did not have the technical knowledge or background, 
he did not know what factors would have affected the way that 
the cellular telephones attached to the specific cell towers in 
this case.  MacDonald's testimony, and the charts and maps he 
 
 
18 
used to explain the locations of the cell site towers, 
emphasized two T-Mobile towers that were closest to the scene of 
the shooting.  One was eight-tenths of a mile away, and one was 
four-tenths of a mile distant.  MacDonald testified that two 
calls to Castro from Cauris's cellular telephone, shortly after 
6 P.M., connected through the tower that is eight-tenths of one 
mile from the scene.10 
The Commonwealth also called Peter Smith, a civilian 
employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in its forensic 
audio, video, and image analysis unit, to testify concerning the 
surveillance video footage and a video presentation that Smith 
had created which superimposed images from Ulrich's 
"reenactment" on the surveillance footage.  The composite video 
presentation showed individual images of Cauris's mother's 
minivan, "fading back and forth" between images of the unknown 
vehicle from the same angles.  Smith testified that the 
recordings were not clear enough to distinguish any identifying 
characteristics (such as dents, scratches, rust spots, or 
stickers) or unique characteristics (such as vehicle 
identification numbers and license plate numbers) that might 
have helped to determine whether Cauris's mother's minivan was 
                     
 
10 Call logs showed that twenty-four other calls from 
Cauris's cellular telephone connected to the same tower that 
day, including at times when it was undisputed that Cauris was 
at her parents' house. 
 
 
19 
the vehicle in the surveillance video.  He noted, however, that 
the two vehicles shared "class" characteristics, such as size 
and shape of the windows, bumpers, and doors, the configuration 
of the taillights and headlights, and the location where the 
license plate would be attached.  As his final conclusion, Smith 
opined that he could not "exclude" the possibility that the 
vehicles depicted in the two video recordings were the same.11 
The defendant moved for required findings of not guilty at 
the close of the Commonwealth's case and again at the close of 
all the evidence.  Both motions were denied.  On September 9, 
2013, the jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first 
degree. 
2.  Discussion.  In this direct appeal, the defendant 
raises four claims.  First, he argues that the evidence was 
insufficient to allow a rational jury to conclude, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that he was guilty of murder in the first 
degree.  Second, he claims that the judge erred in allowing the 
admission of MacDonald's testimony regarding the CSLI.  Third, 
the defendant challenges the judge's decision to allow the 
introduction of Smith's video presentation, which compared still 
                     
11 Smith also testified that he did not perform an 
examination that would have narrowed the vehicle identification 
to a specific year or make and model.  He acknowledged that some 
minivans made in other years or by other manufacturers also 
share the same class characteristics. 
 
 
20 
photographs from the surveillance footage and Ulrich's 
"reenactment."  Fourth, the defendant contends that the judge 
should not have allowed Ulrich, who testified as the key 
summation witness for the Commonwealth, to sit at the 
prosecution table throughout the trial. 
a.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  To convict a defendant of 
murder in the first degree under a theory of deliberate 
premeditation, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant 
intentionally caused the death of the victim "after a period of 
reflection."  Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 46 (2018).  
See Commonwealth v. Chipman, 418 Mass. 262, 269 (1994).  "No 
particular period of reflection is required for deliberate 
premeditation to be found."  Id. at 269, and cases cited.  To 
convict a defendant as a joint venturer, the Commonwealth must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the "defendant knowingly 
participated in the commission of the crime . . . with the 
intent required to commit the crime."  Model Jury Instructions 
on Homicide 13 (2018).  See Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 
449, 468, 470 (Appendix) (2009). 
In determining whether the evidence was sufficient to 
sustain a conviction, we consider the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth.  Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677.  "A 
conviction may rest exclusively on circumstantial evidence, and, 
in evaluating that evidence, we draw all reasonable inferences 
 
 
21 
in favor of the Commonwealth."  Commonwealth v. Jones, 477 Mass. 
307, 316 (2017).  Inferences "need only be reasonable and 
possible and need not be necessary or inescapable."  
Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 
215 (2007) and 460 Mass. 12 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Longo, 402 Mass. 482, 487 (1988).  "A conviction may not, 
however, be based on conjecture or on inference piled upon 
inference."  Jones, supra. 
Considering the evidence in this light, and cognizant of 
the evidence, introduced at both this trial and Cauris's, that 
we subsequently determined was not sufficient to sustain 
Cauris's conviction of murder in the first degree as a joint 
venturer, see Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 475 Mass. 396, 412-413 
(2016), we conclude that, here, the evidence would have 
permitted a rational juror to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the defendant participated in the shooting and that he had 
the requisite mental state to sustain a conviction of murder in 
the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation. 
While the cellular telephone and CSLI evidence could not be 
relied upon as evidence of the defendant's precise location at 
any point on the day of the shooting, the telephone call logs 
were consistent with an inference that the defendant and his 
friends were in close contact throughout the afternoon, and then 
stopped calling each other for the fifteen minutes immediately 
 
 
22 
before the shooting, because they were together at the crime 
scene.  While not a necessary inference, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, it is a permissible 
inference that could, combined with other evidence that was 
introduced at the defendant's trial that was not introduced at 
Cauris's trial, create a network of facts sufficient to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
participated in the shooting and intended the result. 
The video surveillance evidence and the video presentation 
with the constructed overlays of the suspect vehicle and 
Cauris's mother's minivan did nothing to identify Cauris's 
mother's vehicle as the one that dropped off the four people 
near the victim's vehicle (also a Dodge Caravan minivan).  The 
Commonwealth's expert testified that he could see no identifying 
characteristics and that, in addition to other Dodge Caravans, 
there were minivans from other manufacturers or other years that 
shared the same "class characteristics" as did Cauris's mother's 
vehicle and the suspect vehicle.  He had not attempted to 
determine which other vehicles and makes those might be, or how 
many of them belonged to owners in Lawrence or nearby towns. 
Nonetheless, the evidence was not inconsistent with 
Cauris's mother's vehicle being used to drop off the four 
individuals, and tended to support the Commonwealth's case.  See 
Commonwealth v. Fayerweather, 406 Mass. 78, 83 (1989), quoting 
 
 
23 
Commonwealth v. Chretien, 383 Mass. 123, 136 (1981), and 
Commonwealth v. Copeland, 375 Mass. 438, 443 (1978) (evidence 
generally is relevant where it has "a 'rational tendency to 
prove an issue in the case,'" or makes "[a] desired inference 
more probable than it would be without [the]" evidence).  To be 
relevant, and admissible, evidence "need not establish directly 
the proposition sought; it must only provide a link in the chain 
of proof."  Commonwealth v. Gordon, 407 Mass. 340, 351 (1990), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Tobin, 392 Mass. 604, 613 (1984). 
Indeed, evidence may be relevant if it only "throw[s] light" on 
an issue.  See Commonwealth v. Palladino, 346 Mass. 720, 726 
(1964). 
In addition, and in contrast to the evidence at Cauris's 
trial, which was insufficient to establish her state of mind, 
here there was direct evidence of the defendant's state of mind 
shortly prior to and after the shooting, through his own words 
and actions.  The jury could have found the following.  First, 
the defendant had motive to kill the victim.  The victim had 
punched the defendant in the face, knocking out his tooth in 
front of both the defendant's and the victim's friends.  The 
victim had taunted the defendant by displaying the tooth to him, 
and then publicly tried to sell the tooth to the defendant's 
mother by yelling at her from across the street, while 
displaying the tooth and laughing. 
 
 
24 
Importantly, and unlike at Cauris's trial, there also was 
significant evidence that the defendant was angered by the 
victim's actions, and intended to act on that motive.  Before 
the physical altercation between the defendant and the victim at 
the fast food restaurant, they had been yelling and "screaming" 
at each other and the defendant had been "wav[ing]" a knife 
around, letting it be known that he had it, while yelling, 
"Bitch ass nigger.  You gonna snuff me, bitch ass nigger?"  
After the victim knocked out the defendant's tooth, the 
defendant swore at the victim, then followed him as the victim 
was heading back to his vehicle.  The defendant was stopped from 
continuing to pursue the victim by the intervention of Cauris, 
who drove up and repeatedly demanded that the defendant get into 
her vehicle.  As the defendant finally did so, he called out 
what the jury could have interpreted as another threat, yelling, 
"Fuck you, it's not going to stay like this."  When he was 
interviewed by police three days after the killing, the 
defendant did not say that he had thrown a cellular telephone, 
instead claiming that the victim had stolen it.  The defendant 
said that the victim had hit him in the face with a pipe and 
that he had responded by throwing a knife at the victim, 
intending to hit him, but had missed. 
Although the defendant's statement that "it's not going to 
stay like this" was introduced in evidence in Cauris's trial, 
 
 
25 
see Gonzalez, 475 Mass. at 399, it was not considered evidence 
of motive on her part.  "Rather than imputing this state of mind 
to the defendant, the threat put the killing into the context of 
a narrative that was comprehensible to the jury and was relevant 
to the purpose of the joint venture."  Commonwealth v. 
Fernandes, 427 Mass. 90, 95 (1998).  Here, by contrast, the jury 
could have inferred that the defendant intended to harm the 
victim, based on his threat to do so and on his statement to 
police that he had thrown a knife at the victim (potentially a 
deadly act), but had missed.  In addition, the defendant 
demonstrated hostility to the victim by throwing the cellular 
telephone at him and by chasing him through the fast food 
parking lot, a chase that was interrupted by Cauris.  From this, 
the jury could have inferred that the defendant's intent to harm 
the victim was carried out later that day.  See Commonwealth v. 
Henson, 394 Mass. 584, 591 (1985), and cases cited (evidence of 
"intent to kill may be inferred from the defendant's conduct"). 
While the defendant claims in this direct appeal that his 
statement does not rise to the level of a threat to kill, "[t]he 
assessment whether the defendant made a threat is not confined 
to a technical analysis of the precise words uttered.  Rather, 
the jury may consider the context in which the allegedly 
threatening statement was made and all of the surrounding 
circumstances."  Commonwealth v. Sholley, 432 Mass. 721, 725 
 
 
26 
(2000).  "Here, the context of the defendant's statement, along 
with his demeanor and tone of voice at the time the statement 
was made, would permit the jury to conclude that the statement 
was intended as a threat."  Id. at 725-726.  At the time of the 
statement, the defendant had been waving a knife in the air and 
had thrown his cellular telephone at the victim.  Viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, a 
reasonable jury could have concluded that the defendant's 
statement was a threat to kill, and could have inferred from 
that threat that the defendant intended to and did kill the 
victim. 
At Cauris's trial, the Commonwealth attempted to establish 
consciousness of guilt by two of her statements to police.  We 
noted both that consciousness of guilt is not sufficient to 
establish guilt, and that indications of a defendant's state of 
mind, coupled with other evidence, can be sufficient to 
establish guilt.  See Commonwealth v. Vick, 454 Mass. 418, 424 
(2009) ("While a conviction may not be based solely on evidence 
of consciousness of guilt, see Commonwealth v. Darnell D., 445 
Mass. 670, 674 [2005], indications of a defendant's state of 
mind, coupled with other evidence, can be sufficient to 
establish guilt.  See Commonwealth v. Doucette, 408 Mass. 454, 
461 [1990]").  We then concluded that the consciousness of guilt 
evidence in that case, in combination with the cellular 
 
 
27 
telephone records and the video recordings, did not suffice to 
meet the Commonwealth's burden.  Gonzalez, 475 Mass. at 412-413. 
Here, however, the evidence of consciousness of guilt was 
much stronger than at Cauris's trial, and could have contributed 
to the overall evidence of guilt.  See Commonwealth v. Salim, 
399 Mass. 227, 233 (1987) (evidence taken together may form 
proof of crime where any individual fact, taken alone, does 
not).  "[E]vidence of motive and consciousness of guilt is [not] 
sufficient to withstand [a] defendant's motion for [a] required 
finding of not guilty."  Commonwealth v. Mazza, 399 Mass. 395, 
398 (1987).  See Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 707, 713-716, 
cert. denied, 573 U.S. 937 (2014), S.C., 480 Mass. 231 (2018); 
Commonwealth v. Morris, 465 Mass. 733, 734-738 (2013).  Such 
evidence, however, in conjunction with other evidence, may 
suffice to support a conviction.  See Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 
442 Mass. 135, 140-141 (2004). 
The jury could have found that the defendant displayed 
consciousness of guilt by claiming, repeatedly during the 
interview, to have arrived at Calisto's house between 5 and 
6 P.M. instead of, as Calisto testified, at "6:15/6:10/6:20-
ish," and by at times insisting that he was at Calisto's house 
no later than 5 P.M., where Cauris had told police that they 
 
 
28 
arrived "around six."12  When he was asked for the names of his 
friends, the defendant provided police a number of names of 
people that his friends did not recognize, and police never 
located, and did not give police the names of Castro, Wyatt, or 
Stackerman.  Moreover, he denied knowing the victim's name even 
though he said he had spoken to the victim about the money that 
the victim owed Cauris, and claimed not to recognize the 
telephone number that was registered under the defendant's name 
that was being used by Stackerman.  After initially denying any 
knowledge of the number that call logs showed had telephoned him 
repeatedly, the defendant claimed to have remembered that he had 
taken out another subscription for someone named "Ricard," the 
name of Cauris's brother.  The Commonwealth also introduced 
evidence that the defendant and Cauris went to the Dominican 
Republic on January 29, 2009, to get his tooth fixed; he got it 
fixed for somewhere between $100 and $200, and stayed there 
working on his family's farm for eight months.13 
                     
 
12 The defendant was aware of the nature of the interview 
from the beginning.  When the defendant entered the room to 
speak with investigators at his parents' house, he immediately 
asked them whether they were there "about the fight." 
 
 
13 Cauris traveled with him but returned to the United 
States approximately one month later.  See Gonzalez, 475 Mass. 
at 404.  The Commonwealth argued that the jury could infer 
consciousness of guilt from the defendant's longer stay. 
 
 
29 
The judge properly instructed that intentionally false 
statements and flight may indicate feelings of guilt and, in 
turn, actual guilt, but that "there are numerous reasons why an 
innocent person might flee" and "guilty feelings are sometimes 
present in innocent people."  Additionally, she properly 
instructed that evidence of consciousness of guilt is not 
sufficient alone to sustain a conviction.  Neither evidence of 
consciousness of guilt nor consciousness of guilt as 
demonstrated by flight is sufficient to sustain a conviction.  
See Morris, 465 Mass. at 734-738 (neither evidence of 
consciousness of guilt nor consciousness of guilt as 
demonstrated by flight is sufficient to sustain conviction, but 
such evidence may be used, along with other evidence, to 
establish proof beyond reasonable doubt).  This portion of the 
evidence formed a proper part of the "mosaic of evidence" upon 
which the jury could have concluded that the Commonwealth met 
its burden of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
defendant had committed the crime.  See Salim, 399 Mass. at 233. 
Moreover, the jury heard direct evidence of verbal threats 
and attempted assaults by the defendant, approximately sixteen 
hours before the shooting, from which the jury could have 
inferred that the threat was, in fact, put into effect.14  See 
                     
 
14 Evidence was also introduced, including in the 
defendant's own statement, that, in the days after the shooting, 
 
 
30 
Commonwealth  v. Marrero, 459 Mass. 235, 248 (2011) (defendant's 
statement, "I'm going to kill you," was sufficient to 
demonstrate requisite intent to kill victim).  "These 
circumstances, no one of which alone would be enough to convict 
the defendant, combine to form a fabric of proof that was 
sufficient to warrant the jury's finding beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant" was guilty of murder in the first 
degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation as a joint 
venturer.  Commonwealth v. Rojas, 388 Mass. 626, 630 (1983). 
In addition to proving that the defendant knowingly 
participated in the commission of the crime, the Commonwealth 
must also prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant 
had the required mental state.  See Zanetti, 454 Mass. at 470 
(Appendix).  "Statements, not too remote in time, which indicate 
an intention to engage in particular conduct, are admissible to 
prove that the conduct was, in fact, put in effect."  
Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 381 Mass. 306, 310 (1980).  See Cook 
v. Moore, 11 Cush. 213, 217 (1853) ("The existence in the mind 
of a deliberate design to do a certain act, when once proved, 
may properly lead to the inference that the intent once harbored 
continued and was carried into effect by acts long subsequent to 
                     
he was staying at Cauris's house, on his mother's suggestion, 
because there were people outside his house, looking for him.  
The defendant thought that those people believed he had had some 
involvement in the shooting, based on the earlier fight. 
 
 
31 
the origin of the motive by which they were prompted").  It 
follows that "[a] declarant's threat to 'get' or kill someone is 
admissible to show that the declarant had a particular state of 
mind and that he carried out his intent."  Fernandes, 427 Mass. 
at 95. 
After reviewing the proceedings at Cauris's trial, we 
concluded that it would have required jurors improperly to 
infer, based on evidence that Cauris's minivan and cellular 
telephone were involved in the crime, that she was, too.  See 
Gonzalez, 475 Mass. at 412, 415-416.  Here, by contrast, there 
was sufficient other evidence to support the jury's conviction 
of the defendant of murder in the first degree as a joint 
venturer on a theory of deliberate premeditation.15  In 
combination with the evidence that also had been admitted at 
Cauris's trial, the entirety of the facts presented "form[s] a 
fabric of proof that was sufficient to warrant the jury's 
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant" was guilty 
of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate 
premeditation as a joint venturer.  Rojas, 388 Mass. at 630. 
                     
 
15 The jury reasonably could have inferred that Stackerman 
was tied to the shooting by an inference that he left one of the 
firearms with Medina, who then turned it over to police shortly 
thereafter.  The jury also could have inferred that Castro was 
tied to the scene by evidence that his cellular telephone was 
used to request a taxicab pick-up two blocks from the scene, 
within minutes after the shooting. 
 
 
32 
b.  CSLI testimony.  The defendant argues that MacDonald 
should not have been allowed to testify regarding how cell sites 
operate and how to locate a cellular telephone based on 
historical cell site information.  The defendant did not object 
to all of MacDonald's testimony, but did object to MacDonald's 
testimony as it related to such usage of CSLI. 
"A trial judge has wide discretion to qualify an expert 
witness and to decide whether the witness's testimony should be 
admitted."  Commonwealth v. Frangipane, 433 Mass. 527, 533 
(2001).  Such a decision "will be reversed only where it 
constitutes an abuse of discretion or other error of law."  Id.  
See L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014) ("a 
judge's discretionary decision constitutes an abuse of 
discretion where we conclude the judge made a clear error of 
judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision . . . 
such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives" [quotation and citation omitted]). 
In Gonzalez, 475 Mass. at 412 n.37, we observed that while 
MacDonald's testimony was generally admissible, "this is not 
without some doubt with respect to two of his opinions.  Those 
opinions -- that calls 'typically' are transmitted through the 
closest cellular site, and that a call from Calisto's address 
was unlikely to have been transmitted through cell site 4449 -- 
were objected to by the defendant and may well have required a 
 
 
33 
witness with greater technical expertise."  Because the CSLI was 
not able to place any of the participants at or near the scene 
of the shooting, and MacDonald did not contend otherwise, in 
reaching our decision as to the sufficiency of the evidence, we 
have relied on the call logs, which MacDonald was well-qualified 
to introduce, and have not relied on the CSLI evidence. 
We note that MacDonald properly qualified his testimony and 
explained that, even where a particular cellular telephone was 
most likely to connect to the nearest tower, there were many 
reasons why that might not happen.  Thus, the fact that he did 
not know or investigate the reasons why particular calls had 
connected to particular towers did not prejudice the defendant.  
MacDonald did not claim, improperly, that Cauris's telephone 
must have been near a particular tower when it connected to that 
tower, even though he opined he would not have expected it to 
have used a tower near the scene had the telephone been in the 
vicinity of Calisto's house.  Contrast United States v. Hill, 
818 F.3d 289, 299 (7th Cir. 2016) ("The admission of historical 
cell-site evidence that overpromises on the technique's 
precision -- or fails to account adequately for its potential 
flaws -- may well be an abuse of discretion").  There also was 
undisputed evidence, through the call logs and the CSLI records, 
as the defendant's counsel emphasized in cross-examination, that 
numerous other calls from Cauris's cellular telephone attached 
 
 
34 
to the cell tower at issue, near the crime scene, throughout the 
day, and at times when it was not disputed that she had been at 
her house.  Thus, we are confident that, while it might have 
been better practice to exclude evidence that was of little 
assistance to the jury and that possibly could have been 
confusing, the judge did not abuse her discretion in allowing 
MacDonald's testimony about certain aspects of the CSLI.  That 
portion of MacDonald's testimony concerning the reasons that 
cellular telephones connect to cell towers, and what he 
"expected" a particular telephone would be most likely to do 
here, would not have had any impact on the jury's verdict. 
c.  Video simulation.  The defendant challenges the 
admission of the video recording created by Smith that compared 
still images of the unknown vehicle from the surveillance videos 
and images of Cauris's mother's minivan taken during the 
simulation drive by Ulrich, as well as Smith's accompanying 
testimony.  The purpose of the video was to pair images of the 
two vehicles in similar lighting and from similar angles to 
determine whether Cauris's mother's minivan could be identified 
as the vehicle in the surveillance videos.  Smith concluded that 
he could "not exclude" the possibility that Cauris's mother's 
minivan was the vehicle in the surveillance images, but also 
that he could not determine that it was the same vehicle; the 
quality of the video was not good enough to discern identifying 
 
 
35 
or unique characteristics.  Cauris made a similar claim in her 
appeal, but, given our result in that case, we did not reach the 
issue.  See Gonzalez, 475 Mass. at 397.  The video was admitted 
at trial without objection, so we review for a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Lennon, 399 Mass. 443, 448 n.6 (1987). 
"A videotaped demonstration may be admitted in evidence 
provided it sufficiently resembles the actual event so as to be 
fair and informative" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Chipman, 418 Mass. at 270.  See Commonwealth v. Chukwuezi, 475 
Mass. 597, 603 (2016) ("In determining whether to admit a 
computer-generated simulation . . . , a trial judge must 
determine whether the simulation is relevant evidence; whether 
the simulation's conditions correspond to those of the original 
incident . . . ; and whether the evidence will confuse or 
mislead the jury" [citation omitted]).  "Whether the conditions 
were sufficiently similar to make the observation of any value 
in aiding the jury to pass upon the issue submitted to them was 
primarily for the trial court to determine as a matter of 
discretion."  Field v. Gowdy, 199 Mass. 568, 574 (1908). 
Ulrich testified to the process of filming the simulation 
video, including efforts to recreate lighting conditions.  Smith 
then explained how he paired still images of the vehicles from 
the surveillance video and the simulation video to compare 
 
 
36 
characteristics vehicle.  Smith opined that Cauris's mother's 
minivan was consistent with the unknown vehicle, but could not 
be identified as being the same vehicle.  This testimony was 
relevant to the jury's determination whether Cauris's mother's 
minivan was used to transport the individuals who shot the 
victim.  The judge did not abuse her discretion in allowing the 
introduction of the video presentation and Smith's testimony.  
While Smith's testimony and the video evidence did little to 
establish whether Cauris's mother's minivan was used during the 
commission of the crime, it did provide information from which 
the jury could have inferred that it was more likely that 
Cauris's mother's minivan had been involved in the shooting.  
See Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 851 (2011) 
("Evidence does not have to be conclusive of an issue to be 
admissible"; admissible evidence may simply make Commonwealth's 
contention more probable than it would be without that evidence 
[quotation and citation omitted]).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 401 
(2011) (relevant evidence "is evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more or less probable than it would 
be without the evidence"). 
d.  Presence of police witness at prosecutor's table.  The 
defendant contends that the judge should not have allowed Ulrich 
to sit at the prosecution table throughout the trial, when he 
 
 
37 
testified as an important witness for the Commonwealth and 
summed up essentially all of the Commonwealth's other evidence.  
The defendant did not object to the portion of the 
Commonwealth's motion exempting Ulrich from sequestration, but 
did object to the portion requesting that he sit at counsel's 
table.  Specifically, the defendant noted a concern "that this 
jury, which ultimately has to pass on what [Ulrich] says, can 
develop . . . a sense of him in the courtroom every day actively 
assisting, and it changes the dynamic of him as a traditional 
witness." 
"While we have cautioned the Commonwealth to be wary of 
deciding to have an essential witness sit at the counsel table, 
we also have determined the necessity of reserving the 
determination of the need for such a seating arrangement to the 
discretion of the judge."  Commonwealth v. Auguste, 414 Mass. 
51, 59-60 (1992), citing Commonwealth v. Perez, 405 Mass. 339, 
344 (1989).  See Perez, supra at 342 n.4.  In challenging such a 
seating arrangement, we have said that "[t]he defendant cannot 
rest upon a bare allegation that this police officer had a 
'cloak of credibility' which was accentuated by his presence at 
counsel table as a sufficient basis to overturn [the 
defendant's] convictions."  Id. at 343. 
The judge here concluded that Ulrich's assistance was 
essential to the management of the case.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
 
 
38 
Therrien, 359 Mass. 500, 508 (1971) (no error in exempting 
witness from sequestration where witness is essential to 
management of case).  The judge also attempted to combat any 
perceived "cloak of credibility" by asking potential jurors 
during voir dire whether they would credit the testimony of 
police witnesses more than the testimony of civilians simply 
because they were police officers.  In light of this, we cannot 
say that the judge abused her discretion in allowing Ulrich to 
be seated at the prosecution table. 
We emphasize, however, that the Commonwealth should proceed 
with caution in selecting a crucial witness to sit at counsel 
table and to help manage the case, prior to his testimony as the 
last of the Commonwealth's witnesses.  See Commonwealth v. 
Salcedo, 405 Mass. 346, 348 (1989), citing Perez, 405 Mass. at 
339 & n.4 (discussing "[the] general undesirability of having a 
key prosecution witness sit at counsel table").  Particularly 
where the lead prosecutor is assisted by a second chair, the 
Commonwealth should consider whether that attorney, or another 
member of the prosecution team who will not be a witness, could 
assist with case management. 
e.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant 
asks that we exercise our extraordinary power pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or to reduce the verdict to 
murder in the second degree.  After carefully reviewing the 
 
 
39 
record pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we 
decline to set aside the verdicts or to reduce the degree of 
guilt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.