Case Title: State v. Burleson

Citation: 

Docket Number: S54377

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: June 1, 2007
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON, 
Plaintiff-Relator,
v. 
DAVID O. BURLESON,
Defendant, 
and 
JOHN  DOE
or JANE DOE
Adverse Party. 
(CC 060432571; SC S054377)
Original proceeding in mandamus.*
Argued and submitted May 7, 2007.
Paul L. Smith, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for Plaintiff-Relator.  With him on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
Marc D. Blackman, Ransom Blackman, Portland, argued the cause for Adverse
Party.  With him on the brief was Kendra M. Matthews.
Douglas E. Beloof, Margaret Garvin, Greg A. Rios, Kim Montagriff, Portland, 
and Erin K. Olson, Law Office of Erin Olson, PC, Portland, filed a joint brief on behalf
of amici curiae National Crime Victim Law Institute and Oregon Trial Lawyers
Association. 
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Balmer, Kistler, Walters, and
Linder, Justices.**
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
Peremptory writ to issue.
*On petition for writ of mandamus from an order of the Multnomah County
Circuit Court, Ronald E. Cinniger, Judge.
**Durham, J., did not participate in the decision of this case.
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
In this mandamus proceeding, we consider whether the trial court abused
its discretion in denying a motion to hold a grand jury witness (witness) in remedial
contempt for refusing to identify the victims of an alleged crime.  In denying the
contempt motion, the trial court also implicitly denied the state's motion to compel the
witness to identify the victims or to produce documents that would identify them.  We
conclude that the trial court correctly denied the contempt motion, but should have
granted the motion to compel production of full and unredacted medical records in the
possession of witness.  We therefore shall issue a peremptory writ of mandamus.
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
At the behest of the Multnomah County District Attorney, a grand jury
began an investigation of defendant, an anesthesiologist.  Defendant had acted as an
anesthesiologist for surgery performed by witness and his clinic.  The staff at the clinic
reported seeing defendant inappropriately touching two adult patients while they were
anesthetized. 
The clinic reported defendant's alleged behavior to the Board of Medical
Examiners (BME) and gave the BME redacted copies of the victims' medical records. 
Because the matter involved criminal conduct, the BME referred the matter to the district
attorney for prosecution.  The district attorney filed an information charging defendant
with two counts of sexual abuse.  Before submitting the matter to the grand jury, the
district attorney issued a subpoena duces tecum to witness for the victims' medical
records.  Witness gave the district attorney redacted copies of the medical records that did
not identify the victims.  The state filed a motion to compel, and witness opposed the
motion.
The trial court held a hearing at which witness's counsel summarized the
testimony that witness and his staff would offer.  The evidence indicated that both
victims were concerned about undergoing treatments.  Witness also believed, as their
treatment provider, that the victims would forgo necessary care if they learned what
defendant had done.
The trial court denied the motion to compel as premature.  The court
concluded that witness may appear before the grand jury and explain to the grand jury
why he had provided only redacted copies of the medical records to the district attorney. 
The grand jury then could decide whether to accept that explanation.  The court also
determined that the records should be kept confidential because of their relationship to
grand jury proceedings.
The state issued another subpoena duces tecum to witness.  Witness
appeared before the grand jury.  The grand jury directed witness to disclose the identities
of the victims and to produce unredacted records.  After witness refused, the grand jury 
requested that witness be held in contempt.  
The state then moved the trial court to impose a remedial sanction of 
contempt.  At that time, the state also renewed its motion to compel.  As to the merits of
the contempt motion, the trial court understood the underlying issue to be whether it
should issue an order requiring witness to provide the testimony and to produce the
evidence that the grand jury sought.  The state argued that the names of the victims were
necessary to the investigation because, at a minimum, the state needed to question those
victims about the effect of anesthesia on them and whether they had any recollection of
the events in question.  In addition, according to the state, such information was
necessary to determine what kind of crime defendant may have committed and how the
state would characterize and charge that crime.  See, e.g., ORS 163.427(1)(a)(C)
(whether victim was "physically helpless" may constitute element of crime of first-degree
sexual abuse).
The trial court issued a written order in which it made findings of fact,
indicating that the victims were being treated for conditions that would require additional
care.  The trial court found that disclosing to the victims the fact of the inappropriate
contact might cause them to forgo necessary medical care in the future.   
In its conclusions of law, the trial court determined that the information
sought -- the names of the victims -- was information that was both relevant and not
privileged, but the court further determined that such information "[was] not necessary to
the return of a valid indictment."  The trial court also opined that the information sought
"may be irrelevant to the resolution of criminal charges the grand jury may return against
[defendant] because he may seek to resolve those charges by agreement or stipulation, as
he did in the investigation by the Board of Medical Examiners."  The trial court then
concluded that, under ORS 136.617, even if the information was relevant and not
privileged, it did not have to order witness to testify if it found "that to do so would be
clearly contrary to the public interest." (1)  The trial court concluded that the facts
"demonstrate[d] that it would be clearly contrary to the public interest to require
[witness] to provide the identification information * * * being sought by the grand jury
because the immediate adverse consequences of doing so substantially outweigh the
grand jury's limited need for this information."  As a result, the trial court denied the
state's motion to hold witness in remedial contempt.  Implicitly, based on its analysis
under ORS 136.617, it also denied the motion to compel.
The state filed a petition in this court for an alternative or peremptory writ
of mandamus, seeking to compel the trial court to enforce the grand jury subpoena.  This
court issued an alternative writ, directing the trial court to vacate its order or, in the
alternative, show cause for not doing so within 14 days.  The trial court did not vacate its
order.  The parties then fully briefed this matter, and the court heard oral argument before
the matter was submitted for decision.
II. APPROPRIATENESS OF MANDAMUS REMEDY
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, Sexson v. Merten, 291 Or 441, 445,
631 P2d 1367 (1981), and may serve only to enforce a known, clear legal right, Ross v.
County Court of Marion, 147 Or 695, 700, 35 P2d 484 (1934).  This court, in its
discretion, may accept original jurisdiction in mandamus proceedings.  Or Const, Art VII
(Amended), § 2; ORS 34.120(2).  Ordinarily, the court will not issue a writ of mandamus
if there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law,  such as
an appeal.  See ORS 34.110 (providing standard).
Witness argues that the state has an adequate remedy by appeal, citing ORS
33.125(2).  That statute provides that a party against whom a judgment of contempt has
been imposed may challenge that sanction by appeal.  In fact, ORS 33.125(1) requires
that a trial court enter a judgment if it imposes a contempt sanction.  In this matter, the
trial court did not impose the state's requested remedial contempt sanction, much less
enter a judgment.  If the trial court refuses to impose remedial contempt sanctions,
requested before entry of judgment in a related proceeding, then the trial court must
include its ruling on contempt as part of the judgment in the underlying case.  ORS
33.125(3)(b).  Here, the underlying case is the criminal proceeding against defendant. 
See ORS 33.055(3) (motion to impose remedial sanctions "shall be filed in the
proceeding to which the contempt is related, if there is a related proceeding").  The state
thus could not appeal the trial court order at issue here until the trial court entered a final
judgment in defendant's criminal case.  Likewise, an order denying a motion to compel
grand jury testimony is not immediately appealable.  See State v. Threet, 294 Or 1, 7, 653
P2d 960 (1982) (motion to compel grand jury testimony under ORS 136.617 not
appealable as "special statutory proceeding").  As a result, the state faces irreparable
injury, because the absence of the names of the victims could undermine the
effectiveness of the investigation and prosecution.  We conclude that the state does not
have an adequate remedy by appeal.  Hence, it is appropriate for us to consider this
matter in mandamus.
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Mandamus 
Although a writ of mandamus "may require [a] court, corporation, board,
officer or person to exercise judgment, or proceed to the discharge of any functions, it
shall not control judicial discretion."  ORS 34.110.  In a mandamus proceeding, this court
may consider whether a trial court's actions are outside the permissible range of
discretionary choices open to the trial court.  State ex rel Keisling v. Norblad, 317 Or
615, 623, 860 P2d 241 (1993).  Within that framework, a claim of legal error underlying
a trial court's exercise of discretion may be raised in a mandamus proceeding.  Id.  
B. Contempt
The standard of review in matters of remedial contempt, when the sanction
does not include confinement, requires a review of the facts for clear and convincing 
evidence.  See ORS 33.055(11) (providing standard).   As a general rule, a contemnor
may not attack the underlying order or judgment that he or she violated in appealing a
judgment of contempt.  Barrett and Barrett, 320 Or 372, 380, 886 P2d 1 (1994). 
Ordinarily, the legal standard alleged to have been violated is a given, and the question
for decision is whether the facts support the conclusion that the alleged contemnor
willfully violated the judicial command.
IV.  ANALYSIS
A. Grand Jury
Although the role of the grand jury has developed over centuries and its
origins are somewhat obscure, see State v. Gortmaker, 295 Or 505, 510-12, 668 P2d 354
(1983) (discussing history of grand jury at common law), its function as an accusatory
body serves a crucial role in protecting individual liberties.  The grand jury serves as a
brake on the state's potential abuse of the accusatory process.  Without the grand jury,
presumably the prosecutor alone would decide which persons to accuse of major crimes,
without supervision or control by other branches of government.  Instead, the constitution
provides an institution in which a group of ordinary citizens must approve of the
initiation of the state power to accuse citizens of major crimes.  As often is the case with
important government activities, the constitution requires that two branches of
government must agree before moving forward with significant consequences that might
adversely affect citizens.  See Or Const, Art III, § 1 (separation of powers).  In this
instance, it is the executive branch, in its prosecutorial function, and the judicial branch,
in the form of the grand jury, that must agree before a criminal process may go forward. 
Although some scholars consider the grand jury to be almost entirely independent from
government, including the judicial branch, the Oregon Constitution indicates that the
grand jury function, at a minimum, is related to the judicial branch, because it is
mentioned within the judicial article.  See Or Const, Art VII (Amended), § 5 (listing
provisions regarding grand juries that legislature must enact).  Although the grand jury is
related to the judicial branch, it is not a court, and, as we explain below, that observation
has important implications for this case.
Several statutes define the role and proper activities of the grand jury and
its relationship to the prosecutor.  "A grand jury is a body of seven persons drawn from
the jurors in attendance upon the circuit court at a particular jury service term, having the
qualifications prescribed by ORS 10.030 and sworn to inquire of crimes committed or
triable within the county from which they are selected."  ORS 132.010.  "The district
attorney shall institute proceedings before magistrates for the arrest of persons charged
with or reasonably suspected of public offenses, when the district attorney has
information that any such offense has been committed, and attend upon and advise the
grand jury when required."  ORS 8.670.  
Although the grand jury is independent, the prosecutor ordinarily has an
active role in the grand jury process.  "The district attorney, when required by the grand
jury, must prepare indictments or presentments for it and attend its sittings to advise it in
relation to its duties or to examine witnesses in its presence."  ORS 132.340.  "The
district attorney may submit an indictment to the grand jury in any case when the district
attorney has good reason to believe that a crime has been committed which is triable
within the county."  ORS 132.330.  Despite the prosecutor's active advisory role,
however, the grand jury must make its own decisions.  "The grand jury shall retire into a
private room and may inquire into crimes committed or triable in the county and present
them to the court, either by presentment or indictment[.]"  ORS 132.310.  "The grand
jury may indict a person for a crime when it believes the person guilty thereof, whether
such person has been held to answer for such crime or not."  ORS 132.380.  In deciding
whether to issue an indictment, subject to some exceptions, "the grand jury shall receive
no other evidence than such as might be given on the trial of the person charged with the
crime in question."  ORS 132.320(1). 
B. Discovery and enforcement power
The grand jury is a powerful discovery tool in the hands of the prosecution. 
As part of a criminal investigation, witnesses may be summoned to the grand jury to
testify or produce documents and things.  "The district attorney may issue subpoenas
subscribed by the district attorney for witnesses within the state in support of the
prosecution or for such other witnesses as the grand jury directs to appear before the
grand jury upon an investigation pending before it."  ORS 136.563.
Although, as we observed, the grand jury works with the prosecutor, this
court has determined that the grand jury, not the prosecutor, is the actor that drives the
investigative process of the grand jury.  The grand jury must determine the questions that
must be answered and, in particular, those that demand additional inquiry after a witness
refuses to testify.  As this court has explained:
"The prosecutor has authority to subpena [sic] witnesses 'to appear
before the grand jury upon an investigation pending before it.'  ORS
136.563.  The inquisitorial power to compel testimony resides in the grand
jury, not in the district attorney.  It is his function to 'attend upon and advise
the grand jury when required.'  ORS 8.670, and, 'when required by the
grand jury, * * * to examine witnesses in its presence.'  ORS 132.340.  No
doubt in this capacity he also serves the grand jury in obtaining such aid
from the court as the grand jury may request.  But the qualifying phrase in
ORS 132.340, 'when required by the grand jury,' is not meaningless.  It
reflects the historic independence of the grand jury's role from that of the
prosecutor about which grand jurors should be clearly informed.  A grand
jury confronted by a witness who explains his reasons for not wishing to
answer a question may choose not to press the question.  In such a case, the
prosecutor could hardly ask the court on behalf of the grand jury to order
the witness to answer his question."
State ex rel Frohnmayer v. Sams, 293 Or 385, 388, 648 P2d 364 (1982).  It is for those
reasons that it would be inappropriate, in grand jury matters, to establish the procedure
that exists in civil litigation, in which a witness may object to producing documents in
advance of the scheduled date of production and force the party seeking evidence then to
seek a motion to compel.  See ORCP 55 B (so providing).  In grand jury matters, Sams
establishes that the decision to press for the production of evidence must come from the
grand jury after the witness has refused to cooperate fully.
The Court of Appeals has issued an opinion that offers an insightful
analysis of the procedures for seeking a contempt sanction.  Shortly after this court issued
its opinion in Sams, the Court of Appeals considered the proper sequence for refusals to
testify or offer evidence before the grand jury.  In State ex rel Grand Jury  v. Bernier, 64
Or App 378, 668 P2d 455 (1983), the state appealed from the dismissal of a motion for
an order to show cause why the defendant should not be held in contempt for refusing to
answer questions before a grand jury.  The trial court stated that "'one who claims a
privilege should not be required to gamble his liberty * * * without a prior impartial
adjudication of the validity of the claimed privilege following a demand for testimony
from the grand jury.'"  Id. at 381 (quoting from trial court order).  In other words, one
does not risk contempt merely by asserting an objection to produce evidence; instead, one
risks contempt for violating a court order to produce evidence.  As the Court of Appeals
reasoned: 
"[T]he validity of defendant's refusal should have been adjudicated before
contempt proceedings could begin.  We conclude that a witness before a
grand jury who declines to answer particular questions has not [refused to
answer as a witness] until there is an adjudication of the justification for the
refusal, a court order to answer the questions[,] and a subsequent refusal by
the witness."
Id. The Court of Appeals continued: 
"A witness who asserts a privilege or other similar ground for refusal
to answer should not be forced to guess whether his refusal is justified or
whether he is subject to contempt.  His refusal should be treated similarly to
an objection in trial in open court; until there is a ruling by the court on the
objection, the failure to respond is not contemptuous.  Grand jury witnesses
are not required to answer every question put to them.  'Refusal to answer
as a witness' implies that the refusal is unjustified, and whether the refusal
is legally unjustified is a determination to be made by the court, not by the
prosecutor or the grand jury."
Id. at 382 (emphasis in original).
The statutory definition of contempt generally establishes that there must be
a violation of a court order, rather than limited compliance with the terms of a subpoena,
for there to be a basis for a contempt sanction.  Under the general statutes governing
contempt, the definition of contempt of court requires that the alleged contemnor wilfully
engage in one of the following:
"(a) Misconduct in the presence of the court that interferes with a
court proceeding or with the administration of justice, or that impairs the
respect due the court.
"(b) Disobedience of, resistance to or obstruction of the court's
authority, process, orders or judgments.
"(c) Refusal as a witness to appear, be sworn or answer a question
contrary to an order of the court.
"(d) Refusal to produce a record, document or other object contrary
to an order of the court.
"(e) Violation of a statutory provision that specifically subjects the
person to the contempt power of the court."
ORS 33.015(2).  Most of the foregoing instances of contempt require a violation of a
court order or other form of judicial authority.  However, a grand jury subpoena or other
form of grand jury request issued in the name of the district attorney is not a court order,
nor does it represent some other form of judicial authority for purposes of ORS
33.015(2). 
The applicable statutes and Sams indicate that the proper procedure for
seeking a contempt sanction, based on a witness's refusal to answer a particular request in
a grand-jury subpoena, is as follows: (1) the prosecutor issues a subpoena to the witness
to appear before a grand jury; (2) the witness attends the grand jury, but fails to respond
fully to the subpoena, either by a partial refusal to testify or partial refusal to produce
documents; (3) the grand jury decides that it wants a fuller response and directs the
prosecutor to seek a motion to compel in the trial court; (4) if the evidence sought is
"such as might be given on the trial of the person charged with the crime in question,"
ORS 132.320(1), then the trial court must issue the order to compel, unless some
statutory exception applies.  Once the court has issued the order, if a witness fails to
comply, then it is an instance of contempt at that point, but not before.
C. Disposition of motions
At this point, we must bear in mind the procedural posture of this case. 
Before witness testified before grand jury, the state moved to compel production of the
unredacted records and the trial court denied the motion as premature.  After witness
appeared before the grand jury and testified, but refused to name the victims and produce
the unredacted documents, the state moved for contempt.  The parties stipulated to
incorporating all arguments and evidence presented at the prior hearing.  In addition, the
state renewed its motion to compel.  The trial court acknowledged that it was inquiring
into the merits of the motion to compel as well as the motion to hold witness in contempt,
and the trial court implicitly denied that motion based on its analysis of ORS 136.617. 
Although the trial court did not specifically indicate that it had ruled on the motion to
compel, it ruled on the contempt issue by declining to compel witness to produce the
unredacted records or reveal the victims' names.  As previously noted, the trial court
declined to compel further information from witness, concluding that to do so "would be
clearly contrary to the public interest."
The trial court was correct in denying the motion to hold witness in
contempt, because, as we have explained, witness did not violate a court order in refusing
to testify.  However, that was not the basis that the trial court gave for its ruling.
In refusing to hold witness in contempt, the trial court, in effect, analyzed
the merits of the motion to compel.  In determining the fundamental question whether
witness should provide the information that the grand jury requested, the trial court chose
to apply a statute, ORS 136.617, that applies only when a witness refuses to answer
questions before the grand jury because the witness fears self-incrimination.  If a witness
refuses to cooperate before a grand jury on the ground that the witness may be
incriminated by his or her testimony or production of documents, the legislature has
created special procedures for the state to seek the court's assistance in quickly
determining whether the witness must testify.  See ORS 136.617 (specifying procedures
that apply when "a witness refuses to testify or produce evidence of any kind on the
ground that the witness may be incriminated thereby" (emphasis added)); ORS 33.085
(establishing procedure in support of ORS 136.617).  When that is the case, "[t]he court
shall order the witness to testify regarding the subject matter under inquiry upon such
showing of reasonable cause or shall order the production of evidence upon a finding that
no privilege protects the evidence sought, unless the court finds that to do so would be
clearly contrary to the public interest." (2)  ORS 136.617.  Here, as noted, the trial court
purported to rely on ORS 136.617 in refusing to compel witness to testify and provide
evidence.
In relying on ORS 136.617, however, the trial court erred.  ORS 136.617,
by its own explicit limitations, had no application to this case.  See Threet, 294 Or at 7
(ORS 136.617 applies to only witness refusal to produce evidence based on self-incrimination).  In particular, witness did not assert his right to be free from the risk of
self-incrimination and cooperated with the grand jury except to the extent that he refused
to identify the victims or produce documents that would identify the victims. (3)
The trial court, while correctly denying the state's motion for contempt,
should have granted the state's motion to compel.  The trial court itself concluded that the
evidence sought was relevant and not privileged.  The grand jury is entitled to evidence
that "might be given on the trial of the person charged with the crime in question."  ORS
132.320(1).  As a matter of diligence, the prosecutor must identify victims and interview
them about facts likely to lead to the production of admissible evidence.  The identity of
victims of crime is the most basic kind of evidence given at trial.  Accordingly, we issue
a peremptory writ ordering the circuit court to grant the state's motion to compel
production of full and unredacted medical records. (4)
Peremptory writ to issue.
1. ORS 136.617 provides a procedure whereby a prosecuting attorney may move a
court to order witness testimony or production of evidence in certain circumstances. 
Among other things, it sets out the "contrary to the public interest" standard that the trial
court relied on below.
2. We note that testimony or evidence that is protected by the right against self-incrimination, but compelled under the procedures outlined in ORS 136.617, may not be
used against the witness in any criminal prosecution.  See ORS 136.619 (so stating).
3. ORCP 55 G, operating in conjunction with ORS 136.600,  also does not apply to
this proceeding.  That rule applies, by its terms, to instances in which a judge or justice
issued the subpoena, or when an action is pending before a court.  It does not purport to
address grand jury proceedings.
4. In a series of orders, the trial court sealed the contents of the court file, because the
information pertained to a grand jury investigation.  Grand jury proceedings are
conducted in secret.  See ORS 132.060 (oath of secrecy); ORS 132.090 (restricting access
to grand jury proceedings).  The Oregonian filed a motion in the trial court, seeking to
unseal the documents.  The trial court responded by unsealing a portion of the
documents.  After the state filed its mandamus petition in this court, this court ordered
that the materials filed in this court be treated in accordance with ORAP 3.07, which
governs the procedures for protecting confidential and sealed documents in appeals.  The
Oregonian then filed a motion in this court, seeking to intervene in these proceedings and
seeking access to the court documents filed in this court.  This court granted the motion
to intervene, but deferred the motion to unseal.  The information in this case falls within
the ambit of grand jury secrecy, subject to the supervision of the trial court.  In this
opinion, we have ruled on the mandamus petition before us and have decided to issue the
peremptory writ granting relief to the state and return this matter to the trial court.  In
light of the further proceedings necessary in the trial court, we refer The Oregonian's
motion to unseal the documents to the trial court.  See ORAP 3.07(5) ("The appellate
court may * * * remand the motion [to inspect material] to the trial court for a ruling.").