Case Title: Matter of Injury to Loveday

Citation: 

Docket Number: 85-84

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Matter of Injury to Loveday1985 WY 202711 P.2d 396Case Number: 85-84Decided: 12/17/1985IN THE MATTER OF THE INJURY TO JOHNY LOVEDAY, AN EMPLOYEE OF EXETER DRILLING. 

JOHNY LOVEDAY, APPELLANT (CLAIMANT), 

v. 

WYOMING STATE TREASURER, EX REL. WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION, APPELLEE (OBJECTOR).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
INJURY TO JOHNY LOVEDAY, AN EMPLOYEE OF EXETER DRILLING. 

JOHNY LOVEDAY, APPELLANT 
(CLAIMANT), 

v. 

WYOMING STATE TREASURER, EX REL. 
WYOMING 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION, APPELLEE (OBJECTOR).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Terrence L. 
O'Brien, J.

 
 
Mark L. Hughes 
of Hughes & Dumbrill, Sundance, for 
appellant (claimant).

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Terry J. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), for appellee 
(objector).

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE,* ROONEY,** BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

* ROSE, J., retired from 
the court November 1, 1985.

** ROONEY, J., retired from 
the court November 30, 1985.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The appellant, John 
Loveday, applied to the district court for modification of a worker's 
compensation award he had received following an oil rig accident. Neither the 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division nor Exeter Drilling, the appellant's 
employer, contested the application for modification. The district court, 
nevertheless, held a hearing and denied the application.

[¶2.]     Appellant raises two 
issues on appeal and the appellee, the State of Wyoming, agrees that they are controlling. The 
two issues we must decide are:

(1) whether the district 
court could lawfully conduct a hearing and deny the application for modification 
in the absence of it being contested by the State or by the employer; 
and

(2) assuming that the 
district court's action was lawful, whether its denial is supported by the 
evidence.

[¶3.]     We 
affirm.

FACTS

[¶4.]     On August 27, 1981, 
appellant suffered a severe back injury while working on an oil rig for his 
employer, Exeter Drilling. A period of disability and medical treatment ensued 
during which appellant filed for and received worker's compensation benefits. 
Eventually, appellant applied for a permanent partial disability rating of 65% 
of the man as a whole; and the court granted the application based on 
appellant's educational level, age, and chances for reemployment in jobs 
requiring physical labor. Appellant received his permanent partial disability 
award in two lump sums totaling $30,000.

[¶5.]     Appellant continued to 
suffer severe back pain from his work-related injury and subsequently underwent 
surgery to remove Harrington rods that had been implanted in his back. Although 
the rods were successfully removed, appellant suffered a heart attack within a 
day after the surgery. Appellant's heart condition and continued back problems 
made it impossible for him to perform physical labor in the oil industry. More 
sedentary work was precluded by appellant's age, educational background and 
continued pain in his back and legs. He therefore requested that the district 
court modify his permanent disability rating from 65% to 
100%.

[¶6.]     The district court set 
the matter for a contested hearing and sent notices to appellant, the Worker's 
Compensation Division, and the employer. Neither the Worker's Compensation 
Division nor the employer appeared at the hearing to contest the application for 
modification. Appellant, his lawyer, and appellant's back surgeon, Dr. Baker, 
appeared and participated in the hearing. It was clear from Dr. Baker's 
undisputed testimony that appellant was 100% disabled, but it was not clear that 
the heart attack which increased the disability was caused by the surgery. 
During the taking of testimony, the court interrupted direct examination and 
asked Dr. Baker exactly when the heart attack occurred. Dr. Baker said that the 
heart symptoms had appeared almost immediately after surgery, meaning that 
afternoon or the next day. Dr. Baker's only other reference to causation 
occurred when he was asked about the level of appellant's disability. Dr. Baker 
stated:

"[A]t the time of his 
initial evaluation for disability, I thought that it was 65% related to the back 
only. Unfortunately, this was complicated by a - a complication at the time of 
surgery or shortly thereafter, while still in the hospital, with a heart attack, 
which, again, left him with some degree of limitation."

Then, in 
response to a straightforward question about the cause of the heart attack, Dr. 
Baker answered:

"Well, I guess one would 
have to say that the injury to his heart did occur at the time of surgery under 
an anesthetic. I only can say that because he - there were no complaints of this 
before and he did have trouble afterwards that I would have to voice my opinion 
on that reasoning."

This response 
concluded Dr. Baker's testimony.

[¶7.]     At the close of the 
hearing, the district court denied appellant's application for a higher 
permanent disability rating. The court held that it could not view the case as 
"strictly a default matter"; that "the employee has an obligation to show his 
entitlement to benefits under the existing statutes"; that the court based its 
finding upon the evidence presented at the hearing; and, finally, that there had 
not been "sufficient credible evidence - medical or otherwise - to establish a 
causal link between the back surgery and the heart attack." Without that link, 
the appellant had not satisfied his burden of proving that there had been an 
"increase * * * of incapacity due to solely to the injury" as required by § 
27-12-606, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement), the statute which allows 
modification of an award.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
AUTHORITY TO HOLD AN UNCONTESTED HEARING

[¶8.]     This is not the first 
time we have reviewed a trial court's decision to deny a worker's uncontested 
application for modification. Recently, we affirmed such a denial on grounds 
that the worker did not carry her burden of proving an increase in incapacity 
due solely to her original injury. Matter 
of Abas, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1153 (1985). In Abas, both parties assumed that the 
district court had authority to hold a hearing and deny a modification though 
neither the employer nor the Worker's Compensation Division contested the 
application by the employee. In this case, however, appellant makes no such 
assumption but instead brings squarely before us the issue of the district 
court's authority to hear and deny an application that is not contested. 
Appellant argues that the Wyoming statutes do not authorize district 
courts to hold hearings or deny modification applications when neither the 
employer nor the Worker's Compensation Division contests the 
application.

[¶9.]     It is true that there 
is no specific statute providing for a modification hearing when the application 
is uncontested. The elaborate hearing procedures set forth in §§ 27-12-602 
through 27-12-605, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement), are designed for contested 
cases. Also, there is no statute which explicitly empowers the district court to 
deny uncontested applications for modification. Nevertheless, we believe that §§ 
27-12-606 and 27-12-607, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement), implicitly permit 
the district court to hold hearings and deny those applications.1

[¶10.]  Section 27-12-607 provides in 
part:

"Every award within the 
meaning of this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804] is a judicial determination 
of the rights of the employer, the employee and the disposition of money within 
the various accounts provided under this act as to all matters 
involved."

This statute 
puts an application for modification on a much different footing than an initial 
claim. When a claimant applies for a modification, he is seeking to alter an 
award which was established by a final judicial determination. As we stated 
recently in Hunteman v. Ward Transport, 
Inc., Wyo., 706 P.2d 1126, 1129 (1985), "[a worker's compensation award] is 
subject to the concept of finality, and the burden of establishing the ground to 
reopen is upon the claimant." See also House v. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation 
Division, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1162 (1985); Matter of Abas, supra, 701 P.2d 1153; Conn v. Ed Wederski Construction 
Company, Wyo., 668 P.2d 649 (1983). Although Hunteman was a contested case, we see no 
reason why the same principle of finality does not apply to an uncontested case. 
Section 27-12-607 does not distinguish between contested and uncontested 
modifications. In either case, the underlying awards to be modified are 
"award[s] within the meaning of this act" and thus subject to finality under § 
27-12-607.

[¶11.]  The finality principle of § 27-12-607 is 
not absolute. The legislature has attempted, through § 27-12-606, W.S. 1977 
(June 1983 Replacement), to "balance the concept of finality as applied to 
worker's compensation awards with the need to assure that injured workmen 
receive the full amount of any benefits to which they are entitled under the 
law." Conn v. Ed Wederski Construction 
Company, supra, 668 P.2d  at 653. Section 27-12-606 was not intended to 
provide an easy means for the workman to obtain a modification. On the contrary, 
it provides quite limited grounds for modification. Conn, supra. It provides in 
part:

"Where an award of 
compensation has been made in favor of * * * an employee for any benefits under 
this act * * *, an application may be made to the clerk of district court * * * 
for * * * modification of the amount of the award on the ground of increase * * 
* of incapacity due solely to the injury, or upon grounds of mistake or 
fraud."

[¶12.]  Besides providing limited grounds for 
modification, § 27-12-606 places the burden of proving those grounds upon the 
workman. In Hunteman v. Ward Transport, 
Inc., supra, 706 P.2d  at 1129, we stated: 

"[T]he burden of 
establishing the ground to reopen is upon the claimant. * * * The same burden 
must pertain to establishing an increase of incapacity due solely to the claimed 
injury. This burden is no different from the usual burden of proof cast upon the 
injured workman in worker's compensation matters. * * * The difference with 
respect to § 27-12-606 is that the workman must meet the burden in order to have 
the claim reopened. If he succeeds in persuading the district court to reopen 
the claim, then he quite likely will have met his burden of proof to establish 
entitlement to additional awards, although that might not be true in all 
instances. Even though the claim were reopened, additional testimony at a 
hearing on the merits might persuade the trial court not to grant the additional 
award." (Citations omitted.)

The burden of 
proof we referred to in Hunteman is 
the same burden of proof that prevails in a majority of the jurisdictions. 3 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 81.33(c) at 15-554.77 (1983). The party 
seeking modification must prove that the grounds for modification exist by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Matter of 
Jones, Wyo., 702 P.2d 1299 (1985), citing 
Consolidated Freightways v. Drake, 
Wyo., 678 P.2d 874 (1984).

[¶13.]  There is nothing in § 27-12-606 or our 
cases interpreting that statute which distinguishes between contested and 
uncontested cases. We agree, however, with Professor Larson that "[w]hatever the 
degree of proof required, it is clear that the party with the burden of proof 
cannot prevail without putting on any evidence, even if the other party fails to 
appear." 3 Larson, supra, § 81.33(c) at 15-554.77.

[¶14.]  It is worth noting that appellant did not 
suffer from any surprise as to what he had to establish at the hearing or the 
burden of proof he carried. Appellant's attorney elicited testimony on the two 
key elements of the application, the extent of the increased disability and the 
cause of that increase. On the critical causation issue he asked Dr. Baker 
pointblank, "[D]o you have an opinion as to whether or not the arrhythmia - 
problems with his heart - were due to the surgery that he had to remove the 
Harrington rods?"

"Well, I guess one would 
have to say that the injury to his heart did occur at the time of surgery under 
an anesthetic. I only can say that because he - there were no complaints of this 
before and he did have trouble afterwards that I would have to voice my opinion 
on that reasoning."

The witness did 
not state that the heart attack was due solely to the injury, but merely that it 
occurred shortly after surgery. The court held that to be 
insufficient.

[¶15.]  In closing argument, appellant's attorney 
claimed that the evidence established the grounds for modification set forth in 
§ 27-12-606. It was never argued that appellant had satisfied his burden of 
proof because the case was uncontested. Instead, counsel treated the absence of 
the State and the employer merely as showing that his evidence was not disputed. 
The fact that appellant's proof ultimately failed does not persuade us that the 
procedure in this case was anything but fair.

[¶16.]  In summary, we hold that a district court 
may deny an uncontested application for modification after a hearing if the 
claimant is unable to show by a preponderance of the evidence that his claim 
satisfies the requirements of the modification statute, to wit, § 27-12-606. The 
burden of proof created by § 27-12-606, the finality principle of § 27-12-607, 
and our recent decision in Hunteman, 
supra, support our holding.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
DECISION

[¶17.]  Having decided that the court may hold a 
hearing and deny an uncontested modification, we must now determine whether the 
district court properly denied appellant's application in this case. We have 
developed a standard of review in contested worker's compensation cases that 
applies also to an uncontested hearing upon an application for modification. We 
presume that the findings of fact made by the trial court are correct, and we 
will not disturb such findings unless inconsistent with the evidence, clearly 
erroneous, or contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Matter of Abas, supra, 701 P.2d  at 1156; 
Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. 
Drake, supra, 678 P.2d  at 878. In order to reverse the district court's 
judgment in this case, we would have to find that the great weight of the 
evidence showed a causal connection between appellant's heart attack and back 
surgery.

[¶18.]  Before we can measure the evidence 
against our standard of review, we must decide what materials and testimony were 
actually before the trial court for its consideration. In his brief, appellant 
assumes that all the contents of the court file were "evidence" that the court 
should have weighed. We disagree. In Matter of Jones, supra, 702 P.2d  at 
1301, we held that material in the court's worker's compensation file is not 
evidence before the court until properly offered and admitted. See also Black Watch Farms v. Baldwin, Wyo., 474 P.2d 297, 299 
(1970). Common sense supports this rule. The worker's compensation file is often 
voluminous, containing many routine claims, bills, reports, and letters that are 
totally irrelevant to issues presented and disputed at the hearings. Although Matter of Jones and Black Watch Farms v. Baldwin, supra, 
involved the admission of evidence in contested cases, the rationale behind 
those holdings applies equally to cases that are uncontested. It is the parties' 
duty to offer and introduce into evidence relevant materials so that they are 
properly in the case and may be considered by the court.

[¶19.]  The court file contained additional 
expert opinion linking appellant's back surgery to his heart attack, but this 
material was never formally introduced into evidence at the hearing. In a letter 
filed with the clerk of court, Dr. Baker had stated:

"However, during Mr. 
Loveday's postoperative hospitalization course, he developed problems with his 
heart which ultimately were diagnosed as a myocardial infarction. This, 
unfortunately, was related to the surgery as performed and is considered a 
postoperative complication."

Dr. Hiser, one 
of appellant's cardiologists, observed in a letter to the Worker's Compensation 
Division:

"At this point in time, I 
would have to say that if an infarct did occur, it was an end result of having 
been required to have back surgery and the back surgery was necessary secondary 
to his injury."

[¶20.]  Appellant knew that he had to introduce 
evidence linking the heart attack and the surgery. That is why he called Dr. 
Baker to testify. When Dr. Baker's testimony proved to be insufficient, 
appellant could have introduced Dr. Hiser's letter. That letter, not having been 
offered or received into evidence at the hearing, cannot be considered on 
appeal. Carter Oil Company v. 
Pacific-Wyoming Oil Company, 37 Wyo. 448, 263 P. 960 
(1928).

[¶21.]  The only evidence admitted at the hearing 
consisted of the testimony of Dr. Baker and the appellant. Appellant testified 
that he had no heart problems prior to his back surgery, had never been treated 
for heart problems, had never had high blood pressure, and had never taken any 
heart medicine. A trial court may, in a proper case, give considerable weight to 
nonmedical testimony. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division v. 
Colvin, Wyo., 
681 P.2d 269, 271 (1984). We can well understand, however, why the court did not 
hold that appellant's testimony satisfied his burden of proof on causation in 
this case. Even if the trial judge felt that appellant's testimony was truthful, 
that testimony did little to show that the heart attack was due solely to the 
surgery.

[¶22.]  There is no doubt that Dr. Baker's 
testimony was critical to the appellant's case. But even though he was asked 
directly to link the back surgery and the heart attack, he never did so. He 
stated:

"I guess one would have 
to say that the injury to his heart did occur at the time of surgery under an 
anesthetic. I only can say that because he - there were no complaints of this 
before and he did have trouble afterwards that I would have to voice my opinion 
on that reasoning."

We cannot say 
that this equivocal testimony satisfied the appellant's burden of proving that 
his increase in incapacity caused by the heart attack was due solely to the 
surgery. Nor can we say that Dr. Baker's earlier passing reference to the heart 
attack as a complication of surgery added much to the appellant's case. Were we 
deciding this case at the trial level, we might decide it differently. But, the 
trial court was in a better position to judge the tone of Dr. Baker's answers 
and the weight to be given his testimony than are we. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Division v. Colvin, supra, 681 P.2d  at 
271.

[¶23.]  In conclusion, the district court 
properly held a hearing at which appellant was required to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that his increase in incapacity was due solely to 
his original injury. Appellant presented some relevant evidence on this key 
point but not enough to convince us that the district court's denial was 
contrary to the great weight of the evidence.

[¶24.]  Affirmed.

1 In his brief, appellant 
argues that § 27-12-601(a), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement), allows the 
district court clerk to pay a claim where there is no dispute and the claim 
appears free of collusion. Appellant ignores the fact that the statute also 
permits the clerk to order "denial of compensation in accordance with the facts 
he ascertained and the terms of this act." Moreover, we do not think that this 
section even applies to modification cases. This section begins with the clause, 
"If an injury or death resulting from injury is reported to the clerk of the 
district court of the county in which the injury occurred, in accordance with 
the provisions of this act * * *." This section is aimed at the clerk's duty to 
docket and approve or deny an initial claim, not a modification. We need not 
interpret this confusing statute which appears to have been thoughtlessly 
extracted from its statutory predecessor in 1975. Compare § 27-113, W.S. 1957 
(1967 Replacement), with § 27-12-601(a), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement). See 
Bauer v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, Wyo., 695 P.2d 1048, 1050 
n. 2 (1985), for an example of the problems this section has 
caused.

Appellant also 
argues that part of § 27-12-607 disposes of this case. It 
states:

"If no written objection 
to the payment of the claim is filed within ten (10) days from the date of 
verified receipt of the notice to the employer or his qualified agent, it is 
conclusively presumed that the employer consents to the claim and the claim 
shall be submitted to the clerk of district court for 
approval."

We do not 
believe, as appellant does, that this sentence requires that the clerk 
automatically approve uncontested claims. It merely takes the employer out of 
the case and forces the clerk to move the proceeding forward. How that 
uncontested proceeding is to move forward is the real issue in this 
case.

ROSE, Justice, Retired, 
dissenting.

[¶25.]  Given the age-old rule that the Worker's 
Compensation law is to be interpreted favorably to the worker whenever possible 
- and given the facts as recited in the majority opinion - it is 
incomprehensible to me that this court should find that the worker's heart 
attack was not a result of surgery and his original 
accident.