Case Title: Bank of Hawaii v. Shinn.

Citation: 120 Haw. 1

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2008-12-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER’

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'E

 

---00e--

 

BANK OF HAWAII,
Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellee :

oats

MICHAEL L. SHINN,
Petitioner /Defendant-Appellant

 

816 wy 62302

 

and

BAYS, DEAVER, HIATT, KAWACHIKA & LEZAK,
a Hawai'i partnership, Defendant-Appellee

and

DONALD T EOVINO? KAHALA VENTURES, a Hawai'i
general partnership; FIRST HAWAIIAN BANK; DONALD 8.
WILSON, as Trustee of the Jerry T. Lynn Charitable
Remainder Trust; BéT ENTERPRISES, a California
corporation: RICHARD WALLACE and PATRICIA DAVISON
WALLACE, as Trustees of the Muldoon & Associates
Money Purchase Plan and Trust; UNIVERSAL SECURITIES

CO., LTD., a Japan corporation; LOREN H. COOK;

DARCY H. COOK; J. ROGER ALLEN; CATHREINE G.

ALLEN; JOHN DOBS 1-50; JANE DOES 1-50; DOE

PARTNERSHIPS 1-507 DOE CORPORATIONS 1-50; DOE

ENTITIES 1-50; and DOE GOVERNMENTAL UNITS 1-50,
Defendants

 

No. 27832

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CIV, No. 93-1151)

Decenber 29, 2008

C.J-, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.7
CONCURRING SEPARATELY,

MOON,
JOINS

WITH LEVINSON,’ J.,
AND DISSENTING, WITH WHOM NAKAYAMA, J.,
 

'FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER:

LON OF THE OBA,

 

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Michael L. Shinn
(Petitioner) seeks review of the judgment of the Intermediate
Court of Appeals (ICA), filed on March 30, 2008, pursuant to its
published opinion filed on February 29, 2008,1 affirming the March
7, 2006 Order of the first circuit court (the court)? denying
Petitioner's Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 60(b)
(2008) motion (1) to set aside the court's December 18, 2003 order
granting the motion of Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee Bank of
Hawaii (Respondent) to extend a deficiency judgment against
Petitioner entered on December 21, 1993, and (2) to expunge the
court's December 21, 1993 joint and several judgment against
Petitioner. See Bank of Hawaii v, Shinn, 118 Hawai'i 132, 138,
185 P.3d 880, 886 (App. 2008).

We hold (1) that Hawai's Revised Statutes (HRS) § 657-5

(supp. 2007)? controls over HRCP Rule 5(a) (2008),' and therefore,

 

 

‘The opinion was authored by Associate Judge Daniel R. Foley and
Joined by Chief Juage Mark Recktenwald and Associate Judge Craig He Nskanura.

+ the Honorable Karen 4. Slondin presided.

 

+ URS $ 657-5 provides as follows

   

Unless an extension te granted, every judgnent and
decree of any court of the State shall be presumed to be
Paid and discharged at the expiration of ten years after the
Judgment or decree was rendered. No action shall be
commenced after the expiration of ten years from the date a
judgnent or decree waa rendered or extended. No extensicr
Of 2 judgnent or decree shall be granted unless the
extension is sought within ten years of the dave the
Original judgment or decree wae rendered. A court shall not
extend any judgeant or decree beyond twenty years from the

 

Gate of the original judgment or decree, No’ extension shall
‘be cranted without notice and the filing of a nonohearing
Continue

 
 

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notice of a proposed extension of a judgment pursuant to HRS §
657-5 must be provided to the judgment debtor prior to the
granting of the extension, even if the debtor is in default and is
not required under HRCP Rule S(a) to be served with pleadings; and
(2) although the failure to provide notice under ERS § 657-7
(1993) to a party in default is error, such error was harmless
under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the December
18, 2003 order granting extension of judgment was not void under

HRCP Rule 60(b) (4).? The error was harmless in this case because

>. veontinue

(Emphasis added.)

+ Hace Rute 5/8) governs the “Service and Filing of Pleadings and
Other Papers” and provides as follow:

 

(a) Service: when required. Every order required by
its ters to be served, every pleading subsequent to the
OFiginal complaint uniess the court otherwise orders because
Of nunerous defendants, every paper relating to discovery
Fequired to be

Otherwise orders, every written motion
may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance,
denand, ‘brief or senovandun of lau, offer of Judgment, Bill’
of costs, designation of record on appeal, and similar paper
Shall. be' serves upon each of the parties, but no service
heed be nade on partic: in default for failure to copear,

 
   

‘Shall Se served upon then in The manner
Brovided for service of summons in Rule 4.

(Italics in original.) (Exphasis added.)

+ -HRCE Rule 60(b) provides:

(®) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly

discovered evidences fraud, ete. Qa nation and anon auch’
Hemms as are lust. the Court nay relieve a carty ora.

iy mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in tine to move for a new trial unger sule
‘continue
 

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Petitioner had never appeared in the action to defend himself, he

 

had an opportunity to be heard at the Rule 60(b) hearing, he
offered no defense on the merits to the original judgment or the
extension, and thus failed to demonstrate any prejudice.
‘Therefore, the ICA’s judgment is affirmed, albeit on different
grounds.
I

In 1990, Petitioner and his business associates formed
Kahala Ventures, a Hawai'i partnership. On June 25, 1990, Kahala
Ventures borrowed $1,500,000 from Respondent to develop property
located in Kahala (property). The lending agreement required the
loan to be repaid in full by January 1, 1993. n March 22 of that
same year, Respondent filed its complaint for foreclosure and
deficiency after Petitioner and his partners failed to make the

payments. On April 1, 1993, the complaint and summons were served

 

 

continse
5915); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic

sntation, OF other misconduct of an
old; (S) the Judgment
OF discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it ts based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
Judgment. should nave prospective application; or (6) any
Other reason justifying relief from che operation of the
Judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable
Eine, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one
year after the judgeent, order, or proceeding was enteres or
Haken. A motion under this subdivision. (b) does not affect,
the finality of a sedgment of suspend ita operation. “This
Fule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an
Indepensent action to relieve a party frome juagnent,
order, oF proceeding, or to set aside a judgnent for fraud
Upon the court. Writs of coram nobis, ‘coram vobis, audita
Guerela, and bills of review and Bills in the nature of @
Bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shell be by motion es
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.

 
  

 

 

   

(Italics in original.) (Emphases added.)
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on Petitioner at his home. Respondent moved for summary judgment
fon the foreclosure later that month, Notice of the sunmary
judgment motion and hearing were sent to Petitioner at the same
address by U.S. mail. Petitioner filed no answer to the complaint
and never appeared in court, resulting in @ default judgment
against him, entered by the clerk of the court on May 6, 1993.

on June 23, 1993, the court granted Respondent’s sunmary
judgment motion. The Foreclosure Decree determined that
$1,565,426.17 was due on the loan as of April 23, 1993, with per
diem interest of $471.93 thereafter. By August of 1993,
Respondent had sold the mortgaged property for $1,208,218.87.

on December 16, 1993, Respondent served the Affidavit of
Michael C. Webb, requesting entry of a deficiency judgment against
Petitioner and others in the amount of $467,120, on Petitioner by
U.S mail to the same residence in Kahala. On December 21, 1993,
Respondent obtained a deficiency judgment against Petitioner and
others, which was served on Petitioner, also via U.S. mail, to his
Hawai'i address.

on August 9, 2000, Respondent filed a release of the
judgment as to Petitioner's partner, Defendant Donald Eovino, due
to his receipt of a discharge in bankruptcy.

On December 10, 2003, Respondent filed a motion to

extend the deficiency judgment for an additional ten years, and to

 

+ HRC Role 55{a) (2008) states that [when a party against whom a

tee ie sought hay failed to plead or otherwise.
foles and chat fact ie made £0 appear by affidavit
OF otherwise, the clerk shall enter the party's default.”

      

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Set aside an “order of dismissal,” which had been entered on June
28, 2002, for inactivity. The motion to extend was not served on
Petitioner. Eight days later, the court held a hearing on the
motion and entered an order extending the judgment for ten years
and setting aside the order of dismissal to the extent that it
dismissed claims and parties that were already subject to judgment
or otherwise previously dismissed.

Because Respondent did not notify Petitioner of ite
motion to extend, he did not learn of the extension until 2005.
On January 17, 2006, Petitioner filed a HRCP Rule 60(b) motion
seeking to void the trial court’s 2003 grant of extension, and to
expunge the extended deficiency judgment, which was recorded at
the Bureau of Conveyances. Petitioner argued that HRS § 657-5
requires notice to the judgment debtor of any motion to extend a
judgment, and that Petitioner had an absolute right to notice of
the motion to extend.

‘The court heard argument on Petitioner's motion on
February 7, 2006. At the hearing, Respondent “emphasized that
[Petitioner] had never contested the default or appealed the
underlying [jJudgment . . . [and] . . . raised no defenses on the
merits to the original [jJudgment or its extension.” Respondent
also offered the testimony of its Vice President of Commercial
Collections, David Bowman, by way of a declaration stating that
Respondent had been informed on various occasions that Petitioner

had moved back and forth between Colorado and Florida, to show
 

“FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

that Respondent was unaware of Petitioner's exact address.
Petitioner's arguments focused on the legislative intent in HRS
§ 657-5 that notice must be provided, on his belief that

Respondent actually knew of his exact whereabouts at the time of

 

the extension and that Respondent's assertions to the contrary
were hearsay. On March 7, 2006, without announcing any findings
of fact or conclusions of law, the court entered an order denying
Petitioner's motion to set aside the extension of judgment.

on March 22, 2006, Petitioner filed his notice of
appeal. On February 29, 2008, the ICA affirmed the court's
March 7, 2006 order denying Petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion. the
ICA determined, based on an in pari materia reading of HRS § 657-5
and HRCP Rules 5(a) and $5(b) (2) (2008),” that Respondent was not
required to provide notice to Petitioner prior to entry of the
extension of judgment because the notice requirement does not
apply to parties who fail to appear and are defaulted. hinn, 118
Hawai'i at 136-37, 185 P.3d at 884-85, Therefore, the ICA
concluded that the court had properly denied Petitioner's Rule
60(b) motion to set aside the extension of judgment. Petitioner
filed his Application for Weit of Certiorari (Application) on June
18, 2008. This court accepted certiorari and oral argument on the

merits was heard on October 16, 2008.

> See infea note 11,
‘SPOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

TT.

Petitioner lists the following pertinent questions in

his Application:*

1
$575 siaturory procedural cahts, ib) his falrticle (11,
(s]ection 5, State [clonseiturional procedural rights, and
{(e)"his Fifth and Fourteenth Anendnent. United Stat

(Clonstitutional procedural rights shan che lower courtial

 

Roney iudaneat against hin, rendering that extension
Sefective and null and void?’

20° “ag the Ich correct in concluding that construing
HRS {81 650-5 in pari material (ic) with HBCP (mules! Sand
‘pen a previsusiy defaulted party, notwithstanding that

notice Fequirement in HRS 657-5, because an extension on
Judgment request is supposedly not s new or additions) claim?

 

(Bmphases added. )*

 

+ petitioner posits a third question as follows: "Is the

2006 amending of HRS (5) €36-3 intended to be retroactive?” HRS
‘rents s judgment creditor an automatic lien on any
the judgment debtor. Petitioner argues that the lien on res
after ten years. Arguably, it is unclear whether Respondent’ s\ judgnent. lien
on real property continues with the extension. At the time Respondent filed
Eo extend its judgment, HRS § 626-3 allowed the Lien to extend for ten years
Hes'§ 636-3 (Supp. 2005). In 2006, the statute was amended to allow judgment
Liens to be extended for the Life of the Judgment. HRS § 636-3. (Supp. 2006)
However, neither Respondent nor Petitioner have pointed to any real property
within fawes'l that cen be attached. The facts of this cage do not raise the
Tien issue, Therefore, che issue 19 not ripe as it is “not yet appropriate
for adjudication.” _

4, APT Howard 274, 207, 177 Po3d

 

  

      

 

 

 

ST (2008) {ertation
oaietea

+ Respondent contends that Petitioner's Application does not comply
with HRS § 602-59(b) (Supp. 2007], which sets out the requirenents for the
Contents of an application for certiorari, because (1) *(Petitioner] fails to
State wether he is seeking relief from alleged errore of law or fact”) and
(2) “(Peeitioner) fails to describe how any auch error waa grave... and
2. . of sufficient magnituae to dictate further sppeal.”" However,
Petitioner's argunents are sufficiently clear as to whether he is seeking
relief from errors of law or fact, as he specifically points out under waich
statutory and constitutional provisions he is seeking relief. Furthermore,
Because Petitioner alleges errors in violation of state statutory lav as well
as the state and federal constitutions, we think this rises to the level of
Sigrave) error . . - of sufficient magnitude to dictate further appeal.”
Therefore, Petitioner’ s Application meets the requirements of ARS § £02-59(b)

 

 
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Hr.
a
Petitioner's first argument” is that the trial court
should not have granted Respondent’s motion to extend the
underlying judgment because he did not receive notice of the

motion as required by HRS § 657-5. See HRS § 657-5 ("No extension

 

shall be granted without notice and the filing of a non-hearing

motion or a h

 

ring motion to extend the life of the judgment or
decree.”). Petitioner argues “that the plain meaning of [the]

statute is... cl

 

x and unambiguous,” and therefore should
control.

Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that the
confluence of HRCP Rules 5(a) and 5$(b) (2) create an exception to
the notice requirement in HRS § 657-5. See HRCP Rule 5(a)
(stating that “no service need be made on parties in default for
failure to appear”); HRCP Rule $5(b) (2) ("If the party against
whom judgment by default is sought has appeared in the action, the
party . . . shall be served with written notice of the application
for judgment at least 3 days prior to the hearing on such

application.”).% According to Respondent, HRS § 657-5 and HRCP

 

petitioner also argues that (1) “[t]he filing of a BRCP 60(b)
[motion was the correct method for sesking affirmative relief below.”
Respondent does not contest this assertion

1B HRCP Rule Rule $5(b) (2) An ite entirety reads a follows:

By the Court. In all other cases the party entitled to

fa judgaent by default shall apply to the court therefory but

ho jucgment by default shall be entered against an infant oF

Incompetent person unless represented in the action by a
‘continue,

 
 

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5

 

fe reconcilable and therefore both

 

ould be given effect.
Respondent argues that when HRS § 657-5 and HRCP Rule 5 are read
An nari materia, or construed with reference to one another, the
notice requirement in the statute does not apply to parties who
are in default. The ICA agreed with Respondent, thereby
concluding:

in the instant case, we have no difficulty harmonizing the
gpelicable provisions of HRC? Rule[] 5. 1 and dae “o7-
Be Alt obs 1¢ principle that service and notice are
generally required, but Rule(] 5... secognizers} thevweli~
$aifled exception to that principie applying to parting Ur
fait to appear and axe defaulted. Consequestiy, we hed reat
the notice requirement contained in ins $ €51-% dese cue
apply to defaulted parties who have act Sphere

 

 

 

128 Hawai'i at 137, 185 P.3d at 885. Therefore, according to
Respondent’s argument and the ICA, because default was entered

against Petitioner, and he never appeared in the action, the

 

continue
guardian, or other such representative who has appeared

fberein, ‘and upon whom service may be made under Rare a7.
Seeearea Ratu ote aman eau ach lan a
Scarier oP absentia ata be dese sdaneat at Teast
Zgi Belen to che hearing oo such application. TPoTn

Fder fo enable the court to enter judgmert orto cecrs ie
{Rte effect, it ss necessary to take an account or te
Getermine the anount of damages or to establish the truth of
any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of eng
gies matter, the court may conduct such neariggs on cide
guch references as it deems necessary and proses acd oko
accord 4 right of trial by jury to the parties when aetoy
Fequired by any statute,

 

 

Listlics in original-) (Emphasis added.) Both Respondent and the ICA cite to

i 20 Mow, App. 411, 876 F.2d 1342 (1980)> Zor the propeniciee
nose eee aaa {b) (2) Feauizes that notice of an application Fee seitacne
TepisSUeSE°Ad posinet a party'in default whe haw appenred inthe sesso
SIELSGME Lon EBSE rule does not reguize notice to a perty in defesie ier hae
Ecole, $5 ABET,” the sction.* “aie wawaid at i3¢, 185 P50 ot Sb cling
Eogia, 10 Haw. App. at Als, 76 P.20 at D340).

 

 

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exception to the notice requirement in Rule 5(a) is applicable and
Petitioner was not entitled to notice under HRS § 657-5.

In support of its argument that HRCP Rule 5 “does not
require that a defaulted party who hae failed to appear in the
action receive notice," Respondent cites to the ICA’s decision in
Boaia. In Poaia, the trial court had entered default judgment
after the defendant failed to file an answering brief or appear
before the court to contest clains arising out of an automobile
accident. 10 Haw. App. at 413, 876 P.2d at 1344. The defendant
subsequently asked the court to set aside an award of damages
because she had not received notice of the proof hearing. Id. at
418, 876 P.2d at 1346.

‘The ICA held that notice was not required because HRCP
Rule 5(a) stated that no pleadings subsequent to the original
complaint need be served in cases where default judgment has been
entered. Id. (citing ERCP Rule S(a)). Additionally, as described
in note 11 supra, the ICA construed the notice requirement in HRCP
Rule $5(b) (2) for parties who have appeared in the action, as by
implication meaning that notice is not required for parties who
have not appeared. Id. at 419, 876 P.2d at 1346. However, Bogia
is distinguishable from the present case because HRS $ 675-5 was
not in issue, and in Bogia no other relevant statute was raised
that potentially conflicted with the application of HRCP Rule
5(a). Here, however, HRS § 657-5 directly conflicts with HRCP

Rule 5(a).

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Petitioners argument that the HRS and HRCP provisions

should be harmonized where possible finds some support in case
law. In Chock v, Government Employers Insurance Co., 103 Hawai's
263, 81 P.3d 1178 (2003), this court reconciled a potential
conflict between HRS § 431:10-242 (1993) and HRCP Rule 54(d)
(2000). HRS 431:10-242 gives prevailing insureds the right to
seek reimbursement for court costs, but is silent as to whether
prevailing insurers could seek reimbursement, whereas HRCP

Rule 54(d) gave any prevailing party the right to seek costs. Id.
Because the statute was silent on the matter of reimbursement for
insurers, the insured argued that it should be interpreted as a
negative reimbursement right for insurers, Id. at 268, 81 P.3d at
1183. This court disagreed, construing HRCP Rule 54(d) as merely
overlapping with HRS § 431:10-242. Id, at 268, 81 P.3d at lied.
It was concluded that “where the statutes simply overlap in their
application, effect will be given to both if possible, as repeal
by implication is disfavored.” Id, (citing Richardson v. City &
County of Honolulu, 76 Hawai'i 46, 55, 868 P.2d 1193, 1202 (1994))
(emphasis omitted). Unlike the reimbursement statute at issue in
Chock, HRS § 657-5, which applies to Petitioner's case, is not
silent as to notice. The statute unequivocally states that [no

‘extension shall be granted without notice[.]” HRS § 657-5.

 

 

% Re § 431:10-262 provides that “(wIhere an insurer has contested
Ace Liabiuity snder a policy sna is ordered by the courts to pay benefits
‘under the policy, the policyholder... shall be awarded reasonable
attorney's fees ang the costs of suit, in addition to the benefits onder the
policy.” but is silent as to Whether the insurer could be awarded fees. No
Gmenduente were made to HRS § 4s1'10-Z42 after its enactment in 1967. That
Statute is now in the 2005 replacenent volume.

 

 

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Respondent further urgea this court to adopt the view of
the Oregon Supreme Court in Shepard 4 Morse Lumber Co. v, Clawson,
486 P.2d 542 (Or, 1971), that notice is not required for the
extension of judgment. However, Shepard is inapposite to the
present case, The relevant Oregon statute addressing judgment
extensions did not set forth any requirement that the judgment
debtor be notified of the extension. Id. at 544." The Oregon
Supreme Court declined to imply such a requirement into the
statute. Id. By contrast, HRS § 657-5 clearly sets forth a
notice requirement for the filing of an extension of judgment.
8.

In ke Doe Children, 94 Hawai'i 485, 17 P.34 217 (2001),
addressed this issue in the context of conflicting HRS and Hawai"
Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) provisions for filing appeals.
In Doe Children, the statute required parties to file a motion for
reconsideration within twenty days of final judgment before filing
an appeal. Id, at 486, 17 P.3d at 218 (citing HRS § 571-54
(1993)). However, HRAP Rule 4 required parties to file an appeal

within 30 days of the original judgment. Id, (citing HRAP Rule

 

© oregon Revised Statutes § 18,360 (repeated in 2003) stated «i
follows:

nenever, after the entry of judgnent, a period of 10 years
Shall elapse, the Judgeent ana the lién shall expire.
However, before the expiration of 10 years the circuit court
Invwhich such judgeent war docketed, on motion, may renew
‘auch judgment and cause a new entry of the sane to be nade
{nthe judgment docket, after which entry the lien of th
judgment shall continue for another 10 years unlei
Satisfied, and after which entry

Such Judgnent for another 10 years.

13

 

 

   

      
 

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4(a) (2). ‘The parents, who had been denied custody of their

child, filed a motion for reconsideration and appealed within

 

thirty days of denial of that motion, but more than thirty days
after the original judgment. Id, at 485-86, 17 P.3d at 217-18.
Recognizing that there was a conflict between the filing
requirements in the statute and the rule, this court analyzed the
judiciary’s rule-making powers in determining whether the statute
or the rule controlled. Id. at 486-87, 17 P.3d at 218-19. This
court looked to the reasoning in In re Doe, which stated as
follows:

Article VI, section 7 of the Mawai's Constitution
provides that “the supreme court shall have power to
Bromulgate rules and regulations in all civil and
Erininal cases for ali courts relating to proces:

which shall have the

 

 

practice, procedures and app
Eorce and effect of Law.” owever, pursuant to HRS
5 602-11 (1985), “such rules shall oot abridge,

‘for the jariediction of any.of the courts,
hor affect any statute of Limitation.”

Id. at 487, 17 P.3d at 219 (quoting in xe Doe, 77 Hawai'i (109,]
113, 683 P.2d (30,] 34 [(1994)]} (brackets omitted) (emphasis
added). In In re Doe, because the statute allowed for a longer
period within which to file an appeal under the circunstances of
the case than the rule, the court determined that the rule
improperly “infringe[d} on an aggrieved party's right to appeal by
curtailing the time in which to file a timely notice of appeal.”
In. ze Doe, 77 Hawai'i at 113, 883 P.2d at 34, Based on the same
reasoning, this court in Dos Children concluded that “the statute,
and not the rule, is controlling.” 94 Hawai'i at 486, 17 P.3d at

218.

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Th the present case, this court is similarly faced with
a conflict between a statute anda rule. To reiterate, HRS § 657
5 requires that “[nlo extension shall be granted without notice.”
‘The notice requirement in HRS § 657-5 is manifest. See, e.a., Doe
Children, 94 Hawai'i at 486-87, 17 P.3d at 218-19 (By the plain
language of the statute, a party desiring to appeal from an order
entered in a proceeding governed by HRS § 571-54 is required to
file a motion for reconsideration{,]” and, therefore, “we cannot
construe HRAP Rule 4(a) (3) in such a way as to modify the
requisite deadline for filing a[] HRS § 571-54 motion for

reconsideration and the subsequent notice of appeal.”). As noted,

 

HRCP Rule 5(a) states that “no service need be made on parties in
default for failure to appear(.]” (Emphasis added.)

However, the notice requirement in HRS § 657-5 does not
allow for any exceptions, even for parties in default. Because
HRS § 657-5 contains an unambiguous notice requirement, HRCP
Rule S(a) is in direct conflict with the statute. As we reasoned
in Doe Children, the judiciary may not promulgate rules that
abridge the rights of any litigant, in this case, the right to
notice as provided HRS § 657-5. Therefore, “the statute, and not
the rule, is controlling.” Doe Children, 94 Hawai'i at 486, 17
P.3d at 218.

Hence, the plain language of HRS § 657-5 requires notice
to judgment debtors before an “extension shall be granted” and

u

 

es no room for the modification of that right by the civil

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fules of procedure. See HRS § 657-5. Allowing a party, through
reliance on HRCP Rule 5(a), to avoid giving notice to a party in
default prior to extension of a judgment would eviscerate the
legislature’s unmistakable mandate in HRS § 657-5 that “[nJo
extension shall be granted without notice.” As such, we hold that
the statute's notice requirement is controlling and that
Respondent’s failure to provide the notice to Petitioner required
by HRS § 657-5 was error."

Petitioner also asserts that the jurisprudence
interpreting Hawai'i and U.S. Constitutions has “enshrined” a
protection of notice that extends to his claim against
Respondent’s failure to notify him. Petitioner does not make any
discernable argument regarding the constitutionality of the HRS
land HRCP notice requirements. As such, this argument may be
disregarded by the court. Nozton v, Admin, Dir. of the Court, 80
Hawai'i 197, 200, 908 P.2d $45, 548 (1995) (citing HRAP Rule

28(b) (7) (“Points not argued may be deemed waived.”)),

 

M Petitioner axgues that the declarations of Mr, Borman, which we
offered to show that Respondent was unaware of Petitioner's address during the
Cine wien notice should have been given, should not have been adaitted at the
RCP fale c0(b) hearing. Me. Bowman's sffigavit stated that Respondent
Believed that Petitioner hed resided in various places around the country,
Uncluding Florida and colorado. Petitioner asserts that Bowan's testinony
was “double hearsay(]” “Hearsay ia  statenent, other than one made by the
Gecharant white cestitying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
Drove the matter asserted.” Hawai'i Rules of Evidence (BRE) Rule 801 (Supp.
Boor

 

  

 

 

 

Respondent correctly points out that Bowman's statement was not
offered to prove that Petitioner hed in fact Lived in those places? but
fethers that Respondent believed Petitioner was absent’ from Hawas'i and was
Glsticwt to locate. Hence, in adaitting Bowman’ s testimony, the court did
hot viclate the ARE bar agsinet hearsay.” In any event, whether or not
Bowman's testinony should have been admitted ie irrelevant to our
Geternination, as we have concluded that the failure to provide notice was
hemless, Seo discossion intza.

 

 

  

 

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2a 128 (1996;

 

reconsideration denied, 80 1 357, 910
Nevertheless, the notice requirement in HRS § 657-5 would satisfy
constitutional requirements.

wv.

a.

Respondent argues that even if the HRS § 657-5 notice
requirement supercedes HRCP Rule 5(a), the order granting the
extension is not void because the failure to provide notice was
harmless error. In support of its harmless error argument,
Respondent cites to Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple v. Sullivan,
87 Hawai'i 217, 953 P.2d 1315 (1998) (hereinafter Korean Buddhist

Temple). In Korean Buddhist Temple, it was held that “fal
constitutional error is harmless so long as ‘the court. . . is

able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt."” Id. at 245, 953 P.2d at 1343 (quoting Chapman w
California, 286 U.S. 18, 24 (1966)) (brackets omitted). In that
case, the Dae Won Sa Temple organization (the Temple) appealed the
State’s denial of a height variance to its temple structure. Id.
at 222-23, 953 P.2d at 1320-21. The Temple claimed that its
religion required that the structure be built according to certain
standards “in order to maintain the necessary ‘balance and
harmony." Id, at 234, 953 P.2d at 1332, After a public hearing
regarding the Temple's request for the height variance before
hearing officer, the Director of the Department of Land

Uti1ization (Director) denied the Temple’s request for a variance

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Eds at 224-25, 953 P.2d at 1322-23. The Zoning Board of Appeals
(2BA) heard the Temple’s appeal and affirmed the Director’s
decision. Id at 227-28, 953 P.2d at 1325-26.

‘The Temple argued

  

that ite procedural rights were viol
Of examination of the Director with
St least one expert, presented to the Director privately by
Ais staff, before he made his decision, in rebuttal to the
(Temple’s} evidence of the religious significance of the
Building in question.”

by “the prohibition
pect to docunents and

 

 

Id. at 241, 953 P.2d at 1339 (brackets in original). At the
administrative hearing, the hearing officer did not allow cross-
examination. Id, at 224, 953 P.2d at 1322, However, at the 2BA
hearing, the parties were allowed to call and cross-examine
witnesses. Id. at 227, 953 P.2d at 1325. At the ZBA hearing, the
Director testified that he had reviewed evidence proffered by his
staff that was not introduced at the public hearing, but had not
considered it in making his decision. Id. at 241, 953 P.2d at
1339. The evidence consisted of a book on Buddhism and advice
fron “an unidentified ‘qualified individual’ regarding the
Buddhist belief system.” Id. The Z8A sustained the City’s
objection to the Tenple’s continued cross-examination as to the
identity of the individual since the evidence was not actually
considered by the Director. Id, at 228, 953 P.2d at 1326.

Despite the fact that consideration of the outside
sources violated HRS § 91-13 (1993), which states that “[n]o
official of an agency who renders a decision in a contested case

shall consult any person on any issue of fact except upon notice

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eee

and opportunity for all parties to participate,” this court

  

determined that the Temple was not prejudiced by the Director’ s
actions. Id, at 241-42, 953 P.2d at 1339-40. Tt was concluded
that the Director’s reliance on the ex parte evidence had no
Bearing on his denial of the height variance because religion was
never a factor in whether the variance would be granted. Id.
Because the ex parte information was immaterial and did not affect
the outcome, this court concluded that the Director's violation of

HRS § 91-13 was harmless error. Id.

Additionally, Respondent cites In re Genesys Data
Technologies, Inc., 95 Hawai'i 33, 18 P.3d 895 (2001), which

involved HRCP Rule 54(c), for the proposition that “the extension
order is not void and reversible error simply because it was
issued without notice.” In that case, the defendant-debtor,
Genesys Data Technologies (Data), argued in its defense in an
unrelated federal bankruptcy hearing that the underlying default
judgment entered against it in the first circuit court was void,
because the plaintiff-creditor had failed to provide notice to
Data, as required under HRCP Rule 54(c), of the specific amount of
damages sought. Genesys, 95 Hawai'i at 35, 18 P.3d at 697. In
the underlying action for breach of contract and tortious
interference with contractual relationship, the plaintiff had
sought “[gleneral, special, treble and punitive damages in an
amount to be determined at trial,” as well as attorneys’ fees and

other related costs. Id, at 36, 18 P.3d at 898. The Fourth

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Circuit Court of Appeals, which heard the bankruptcy case on

 

appeal, certified to this court the question of whether the

default judgment against Data was void under HRCP Rule 54(c)."*

 

Id. at 37, 18 P.3d at 899.
upon this court’s review of the issue, it was
acknowledged that “the award of a default judgment in violation of
RCP Rule 54(c) implicates the defendant’s right to due process.”

Id. at 38, 18 P.3d at 900, This court recognized that “it}he
purpose of [HRCP Rule $4(c)] is to provide a defending party with

adequate notice upon which to make an informed judgment on whethe

 

to default or actively defend the action.” Id. (citations
omitted). Despite the fact that the defendant had not been
notified of the specific damage amount sought, it was concluded
that a failure to provide notice does not necessarily render the
default judgment void:

W)hile the failure to give the required notice i generally
regarded as 2 serious procedural irregularity that may afford
Ene basis for reversal’cn appeal, of for relief under an
appropriate clause of Rule 60(b) and in conjunction with
Other’ irregularities may render the jodgnent void, the -exxor
‘should not usually be created so serious es to render the

 

 

ne ot ith at tines,
ace Rule S4(c) (2008) states as follows:

benand for judgment. A judgment by default shall not.
be different in kind from or

forin the denind for iudament.— Except as toa party
Sgetnst whos a Judgeent is entered oy default, every final
Jadgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose
favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not
demanded such relief in the party's pleadings.

(atalics in original.)
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Id, at 40, 18 P.3d at 902 (emphasis added) (quoting Richardson vs

   

Lane, 6 Haw. App. 614, 622, 736 P.2d 63, 69 (1987)).

This court considered especially relevant to the
question of harmless error the fact that, although Data had not
received notice of the specific or additional amounts sought
before entry of default, Data did receive such notice prior to
entry of the default judgment. Id, at 43, 18 P.3d at 905. Based
on the fact that “Data had an opportunity to challenge [the
specific] amounts at the damage hearing or move to set aside the
entry of default(,]” the court concluded that “Data was provided
with sufficient notice of the actual amount of damages sought and
an opportunity to defend against it prior to the entry of
judgment [,]” and therefore the procedural violation was harmless.
Id. Additionally, this court noted that “even after the circuit
court entered judgment in the requested amounts, Data had an
opportunity to challenge the default judgment pursuant to HRCP
Rule 60(b)” and thus “is now precluded from collaterally attacking
the judgment.” Ide

In opposition, Petitioner does not assert that the court
improperly entered the default judgment against him in the 1993
foreclosure case, but argues that, regardless of default, the
motion to extend is “null and void” because he did not receive
notice as required by HRS § 657-5. Petitioner cites Stafford v.
Dickison, 46 Haw. 52, 59, 374 P.2d 665, 670 (1962), for the

proposition that a default judgement is void where lack of notice

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denied the defendant the right to put forth a defense. Stafford
is distinguishable from this case. In Stafford, the defendant had
actively participated by filing an answer and counterclaim. Id.
at 53, 374 P.2d at 667, It appeared that his attorney had failed
to notify the defendant of his withdrawal from the case just prior
to the pre-trial conference. Id. at 62, 374 P.2d at 671.

‘The defendant challenged the entry of default judgment
against him, because he had answered, and because he was not
provided notice of the default judgment under HRCP Rule 55(b) (2).
Id. at 58, 374 P.2d at 669. Based on the fact that the defendant
had previously appeared in the case to defend himself against the
suit, and the court’s determination that “defendant! s
nonappearance (at the pre-trial conference] was due to the court's
abuse of discretion in permitting the withdrawal of his counsel
without notice[,]” ids at 63, 374 P.2d at 671, the court held that
“(t}here has been a denial of due process and the judgment is
void{,]" id. at 63, 374 P.2d at 672. Stafford emphasized that

(t)he requirement of due process does not mean that every
Srder entered without notice and a preliminary adversary
hearing offends due process. The adequacy of notice and
hearing respecting procesdings that say affect party's
Fighta earns, toa considerable extent, on the knowledge
Ghich the cifcusstances show auch party say be taken to have
Of the consequences of his own conduct

 

 

 

 

 

Id, (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The

defendant in Stafford made an effort to participate in the

 

Litigation prior to his lawyer withdrawing from the ci See id.
at 53, 374 P.2d at 667. By contrast, Petitioner never made an

appearance nor did he offer any defense to the claims made by

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Respondent in the original 1993 action. Furthermore, Petitioner
does not make any discernable argument that the extension of
judgment deprived him of substantive rights on the merits or that
he was without knowledge that his conduct throughout the case was
Likely to have adverse consequences, namely default and an
extension of the judgment. See ids at 63, 374 P.2d at 671-72.

B.

Petitioner correctly asserts that a judgment may be
declared void upon a HRCP Rule 60(b) (4) motion regardless of how
much time has passed between entry of judgment and filing the
motion. See In re Hana Ranch Co., 3 Haw. App. 141, 146, 642 P.2d
938, 941 (1982). Respondent counter-argues that because the court
heard Petitioner's HRCP Rule 60(b) (4) motion, he has had an
opportunity to challenge the extension on its merits and lost.
Respondent finds support for this view in Blaney v, West, 209 F.3d
1027 (7th cir. 2000).

In Blaney, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
held that insufficient notice may constitute harmless error if
there had been an opportunity to challenge the ruling on its
merits, either by seeking reconsideration under FRCP Rule 59(e) or
seeking relief from final judgment through a FRCP Rule 60(b)
motion. Id, at 1032. Blaney involved an age discrimination suit

filed by Blaney that had been dismissed without giving him actual

23
 

 

Id. at

 

notice of the disnis
1031. Blaney argued that because the plain meaning of FRCP Rule
4(m) required notice, the dismissal should be overruled. Id. The
Seventh Circuit Court disagreed, reasoning that Blaney’s
opportunity to challenge the judgnent via a Rule 59 motion to
reconsider or a FRCP Rule 60(b) (4) challenge to the underlying
judgment meant that the trial court has had an opportunity to
decide the case on its merits. Id. at 1032.

The opportunity to address the case on its merits meant
that Blaney was not prejudiced by the lack of notice, rendering
the error harmless. Id. That holding is in line with the First
and Ninth Circuits, which have held that defective service is
harmless error where the party has had the opportunity to move for
reconsideration or to move to void the judgment. See Carela vs
Velez, 814 F.2d 821 (1st Cir. 1987) (trial court's order of
dismissal itself gives plaintiff notice and an opportunity to
respond where plaintiff had an opportunity to file and did file 2
motion for reconsideration following dismissal for defective
service); hale v, United States, 792 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1986)
(plaintite not prejudiced by lack of notice when plaintiff had an

uence 4(m) states:

Lf a defendant is not served within 120 days after the
‘Gomplaint is filed, the covrt=-on motion or on its own after
notice to the plaintiff--mist dismiss the action without
prejudice against that defendant or order that service be
Bade within « specified tine, But if the plaintif? shows
(Good cause for the failure, che court must extend the time
for service for an appropriate period. This subdivision (m)
does not apply to service in a foreign country under Rule
48) oF 4G)

  

   

 

     

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adequate opportunity to demonstrate good cause in FRCP Rule 60(b)
motion following dismissal).

Importantly, this court has also addressed the issue of
whether HRCP Rule 60(b) motions provide an adequate opportunity to
challenge a judgment on the merits. As noted previously, in
Genesvs, we stated that the defendant “had an opportunity to
challenge the default judgment pursuant to HRCP Rule 60(b).” 95
Hawai'i at 43, 18 P.3d at 905. ‘The defendant's failure to do so
precluded it from “collaterally attacking the judgment.” Id.
Likewise, Petitioner has had the opportunity to be heard on the
merits of his case when he challenged the extension through a HRCP
Rule 60(b) (4) motion. In his ARCP Rule 60(b) (4) motion,
Petitioner did not challenge the underlying judgment or offer any
affirmative defenses to the extension of judgment. Therefore, the
circumstances surrounding Petitioner's case do not rise to the
level of seriousness necessary to justify voiding the judgment.
See id.

Petitioner has not shown that he was prejudiced by
Respondent's failure to notify him of the extension of judgment.
Even if Petitioner had received notice of the motion to extend and
had been present at the hearing, the outcome would have been the
same, Petitioner never appeared to defend himself in the original
‘action or raised any defenses to the original default judgment.

He did not contest the validity of the original judgment at the

HRCP Rule 60(b) hearing, nor did he claim that he ever satisfied

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the Judgnent by paying Respondent. The court had all the
information it needed to determine that the extension should be
granted. As such, the extension without notice under HRS § 657-5
must be viewed as harmless error.”
ve

‘the dissent “agree(s} with much of the majority’s
analysis.” Dissenting opinion at 1. However, the dissent
believes that, despite the fact that the court had subject matter
Jurisdiction, id. at 21, it “exceeded its authority” in extending
the judgment without notice and therefore the judgment is void,
id. at 8, 17. Nevertheless, the dissent maintains that, upon
remand, nothing “would preclude the [court] from granting
[Respondent’s] motion to extend the deficiency judgment,” based on
the very same motion that suffered from the notice deficiency.
da at 19-20. We find the dissent’s position untenable because
(2) contrary to its position, 2 judgnent is void only if the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction, jurisdiction over the person,
or violated due process and none of those requirements were
violated heres (2) the federal and state cases cited by the

dissent do not hold that a judgment is void when “entered without

 

© Respondent cites to HRS § 657-18 (1993), which tolls “causes of
actions” if the defendant is ost of state and unavailable, arguing that the
Sktension of judgment should be tolled because Petitioner was outside the
State, Petitioner saintains that “[eJhe TCA erred by ignoring the clear
Gkpredsion of [legislative intent found in HRS 634-36 [(1993)] authorizing
Substitute service by personal service out-of-state and by certified,
Eogistered, of express mali.” This court has held that where service of
Beecess by public notice would have sufficed, causes of action are not tolled.

‘Hee ¥. Muranaka, 99 Hawaii 496, 57 P.3a 413 (2002). Furthermore, because
me have determined thet the order extending the judgment is not void,
Respondent's argument is moot.

 

 

 

 

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authority,” see id. at 67 (3) the cases it cites pertaining to

 

notice requirement are in the context of summary judgment under

HRCP Rule $6 and are subject to harmless error analysis rather
than a harmful per se rule the dissent advocates; (4) under HRCP

Rule 61, the *

 

armless error” rule, a judgment or order is not to
be disturbed absent conflict with the substantial rights of the
parties, which is not the case here; and (5) the dissent’s
formulation is intrinsically a harmless error one.

AL

Initially the dissent points to Wong Kwai Tong v. Choy
Yin, 31 Haw. 603 (Haw. Terr. 1930), and Cooper v. Smith, 70 Haw.
443, 776 B.2d 1178 (1989), to support its argument that a judgment
or order may be voided on the jurisdictional ground that the court
“exceeded its authority.” See dissenting opinion at 3-7.

However, neither of those cases is apposite, because neither
stands for the proposition contended nor pertains to a notice
requirement that is the crux of the instant case.

In Wong Kwai Tong, the statute at issue did not grant
the divorce court the power to divide the husband’s real estate as
the cirevit court had done. 31 Haw. at 606, 609. Therefore, “the
judicial order providing that the wife should ‘have the right to
occupy the home she is now living in’ was beyond the jurisdiction
of the court and void.” id, at 609. There is no indication that
the decision in Wong Kwai Tong established some jurisdictional

category outside of subject matter or personal jurisdiction. As

27
 

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this court observed, “even when a court has jurisdiction over the

parties and the subject matte:

 

yet it may lack jurisdiction to
make the particular decree which it attempts to make(.)" Id. at
606 (emphasis added). Only the obvious proposition that there are
mits on a court's subject matter jurisdiction was reiterated,
because it does not automatically follow that “where @ court has
once acquired jurisdiction, it has a right to decide every
question which arises in the cause[.]” Id. at 607.
Cited as hypothetical examples of instances when a court
would be considered to have exceeded its jurisdiction were (1)
“[il£, for instance, the action be upon a money demand, the court
; has no power to pass judgment of imprisonment (;]” (2) “(if
the action be for a libel or personal tort, the court cannot order
in the case @ specific performance of a contract(s]” (3) “[i]£ the
action be for the possession of real property, the court is
powerless to admit in the case the probate of 2 will.” Id. at
608. Those examples indicate that Wong Kwai Tong was not
referring to the kind of procedural defect present in the instant
case, but to situations where the court had been granted a
particular type of limited subject matter jurisdiction and
exceeded it. Thus, although the circuit court had jurisdiction
over the general subiect matter of the divorce decree, it did not

have jurisdiction, or exceeded the bounds of the subject matter

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appropriately before it,” with regard to the particular provision,

regarding the division of property, and, therefore, that provision

was void. Id, at 606, 609. This does not provide any support for
hat a party's viol

somehow causes a court to “exceed its jurisdiction.”

By contrast, in the instant case, the court did not
wnake[] a decree which is not within the powers granted to it by
the law of its organization{.]” See id. at 606. To the contrary,
it is manifest from the language of HRS § 657-5 that granting 2
motion for extension is within the court's power. The error in
the instant case is not that the court was without power to extend
the judgment, and therefore without jurisdiction, but that the
creditor failed to notify the judgment debtor of the extension.

As distinguished from Mong Kwai Tong, where the court acted beyond
the limited grant of subject matter jurisdiction, failure of
notice here is a procedural, as opposed to jurisdictional, matter,
and is therefore controlled by the precepts of due process and

harmless error, as our cases have held. See infra.

 

this court 4n Mona Huai Tong referred to “excess” of jurisdiction
and “lack” of jurisdiction interchangeably. Ses ig, at 606, 607. The defect
San be referred to as an “excess” of Jurisdiction where the court has subject
matter jurisdiction except over an igaue which was decided outside of irs
power. "By the sane token, as to the particular provision “providing that, the
Nive should thave the right to occupy the hone she is now Living int," 4d.
at 609, jurisdiction was completely absent, and accordingly, had the court in
fiong Kal tong oniy attempted co effect a division of property Between the
Parties and nothing more, it would have Been completely without jurisdiction.
Hence, the difference in’ terminology was not matersal~

 

   

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B
Cooper also does not support the dissent’s position.
‘The dissent states that Cooper “auggestied) that a court’s

judgment may also be void when it is entered without authority.”
Dissenting opinion at 6 (emphasis added). As the dissent
acknowledges, the aforementioned proposition was nota holding in
Cooper. See id, The dissent concedes, as it must, that Cooper
expressly declared that “only” three grounds support a void
judgment. Id. (citation omitted). Reversing the circuit court in

Cooper," this court clarified that “Lal iudgment is not void

because it {may be] erroneous. It is void only if the court that
nd ed ju the ro

i a na ent a

flaw.” 70 Haw. at 454, 776 P.2d at 1181 (quoting 11 C. Wright &

 

A, Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862, at 198-200
(1973) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphases added). This
court determined in Cooper that “[nJothing in the record indicates
the family court's decree was afflicted with any of these
infirmities (,]” and therefore, the judgment was not void. Id.
‘The dissent apparently seizes on dicta in footnote

number 1 in Cooper to support its theory that a judgment may be
void where the court is “without authority” to enter the judgment.

pas

 

nting opinion at 6 (citing Cooper, 70 Haw. at 454 n.1, 776

 

th Cooper, the cixeuit court had invalidated a provision ins
divorce decree that Nad been agreed upon by the parties and approved by the
fanily court because it wes an cunentorceable penalty and’ () therefore void."
70 daw. at 450, 776 P.2d at 1179.

 

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P.2d at 1181 9.1). In that footnote, however, this court merely
noted that HRS $ 580-S6(d) “deprives the family court of power to
divide the personal estate of the parties after the lapse of the
given period over the objections of either party(,]" but that
the statute would not have deprived the family court of authority
to enforce the division made by agreement of the parties in that
case, Cooper, 70 Haw. at 454 n.1, 776 P.2d at 1162 n.1.

Because that discussion was not necessary to this
court's decision, and because this court concluded that the
statute was inapplicable to the facts of that case, Cooper was not
concerned with whether the statutory requirement was procedural or
jurisdictional, whether a related error would be subject to
harmless error analysis, or whether the statutory limitation would
have been an appropriate basis for collateral attack.”

The Limited grounds for voiding a judgment adopted in
Cooper remain unchanged despite the dissent’s effort to extract a
fourth ground evincing a void judgment from Cooper. According to
right & Miller, “{a) judgment . . . is void only if the court
that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of
the parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due

process of law.” 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and

 

© If this dicta signifies anything, it is the sane proposition
outlined gupza with regard to Mana Huai Tong, that, although the court had
Gmnaral subject matter Juriadiction over the divorce, the paxticular matter of
Eie"Eivision of the personal estate of the partics was Gayand the subject
matter jurisdiction granted by the statute

 

   

8 tndeeds Cooper indicates the opposite by confining the bases for
voiding @ judgeant under Role é0(b) to challenges based on personal
Jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, or aue process

31

 

 
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Erocedure § 2862, at 326-29 (1995) (footnotes omitted). Although
the treatise notes that “{ejtate law may have some relevance in
determining whether a judgment is void, particularly if it goes
beyond federal law and would strike down a judgment that federal
law would permit{,]” it does not refer to additional circumstances
under which a judgment may be considered void other than those
Listed above, the same grounds adopted in Cooper. See id, at 325
(footnote omitted).

As the dissent concedes, none of the grounds for a void
judgment as set forth in Cooper, i.e., lack of subject matter
Jurisdiction, jurisdiction over the parties, or due process, are
present in the instant case. See dissenting opinion at 3, 8, 21.
Cooper, then, offers no support for the dissent’s position. on
the other hand, it confizms that the three grounds for a void
judgment are not present in the instant case inasmuch as the
circuit court had subject matter and personal jurisdiction and
Petitioner's due process rights have not been violated.

c.

Furthermore, our cases subsequent to Cooper have
continued to recognize that collateral attack under Rule 60(b) (4)
is limited to three categories of void judgments. For example, in
Genesys, this court held that “*[1]n the sound interest of
finality, the concept of void judgment must be narrowly

restricted.’” 95 Hawai'i at 38, 18 P.3d at 900 (quoting

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Dillingham Inv, Corp, v, Kunio Yokovama Trust, 8 Haw. App. 226,
233, 797 P.2d 1326, 1320 (1990)). Genesys reiterated as follows:
Tek obese oa

‘Tag? (Goepert, 70 Maw. (at) tot, 176 Fe2d Tat) lie),
70" aaw. 449, 776 P28 1378 (2988).

ReneS Gicetion ther the cizcult couse lacked
= spies pth
Thute Our analvais focuses upan whether the circuit
E2girsontry of judgment was consistent wich gue process.

 

Id. (emphases added); see also Dillingham, 8 Haw. App. at 233-34,
797 P.2d at 1320 (1990) [Jn the sound interest of finality, the
concept of void judgment must be narrowly restricted . . . if a
court has the general power to adjudicate the issues in the class
of suits to which the case belongs then its interim orders and
final judgments, whether right or wrong, are not subject to
collateral attack, so far as jurisdiction over the subject matter
is concerned” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) );
Int] Sav. & Loan Ass'n, Ltd, v. Woods, 69 Haw. 11, 18 731 P.2d
151, 156 (1987) (stating that finality refers to “very real
interests,” “not merely those of the immediate parties but also
those that pertain to the smooth functioning of our judicial
systen” (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation
omitted) ); Impact Fin, Servs, v. Kamaaina Termite & Pest Control.
Inca, No. 27887, at 9 (App. Sept. 29, 2008) (mem.) ("ta judgment
4s void only if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of
either the subject matter or the parties or otherwise acted in a
manner inconsistent with due process of law’ . . . (tjherefore,

Min the sound interest of finality, the concept of void judgment

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must be narrowly restricted’” (quoting Citicorp Mertaage, Inc, vw
Bartolome, 94 Hawai'i 422, 428, 16 P.3d 827, 833 (App. 2000))).

The dissent maintains that Genesys did not “consider (]
whether a court’s judgent was void because the court exceeded its
authority in entering the judgment.” Dissenting opinion at 3. To
the contrary as noted above, this court appropriately started with
the well-settled proposition that there are limited bases for
collateral attack of a judgment as void, and confined itself to
those bases. See Genesvs, 95 Hawai'i at 38, 18 P.34 at 900. That
this court did not consider whether violation of the notice
requirement caused the court “to exceed its authority” was not an
oversight but an application of Rule 60(b) (4) consistent with
other cases in our jurisdiction.

>.
Despite controlling precedent in our jurisdiction, the

dissent cites to federal law regarding FRCP Rule 60(b) (4).

 

% ERCP and HRCP Rules 60(b) (4) are almost identical, FRCP Rule 60
(©) (4) provides:

(b) Grounds for Relief from 2 Final Judgnent, Order,

Proceeding. On notion and just terms, the court may

Felieve a party or its legal representative fron a final

Sagmenc) Seder, er proceeding for the following reasons
seedy the Sudgeent ts voudl-]

 

 

HRCE Rule 60(b)(4) similarly states:

(b) Mistakes, inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly
discovered evidence; fraud, ete. On notion and upon such
forms as are just, che court may relieve a party oF
party's legal representative fron a final Judgnent, order,
br proceeding for the following reasons: -. (4) the
Jusiment i void.)

 

This court has said that “FRCP Rule 60(b) and HRCP 60(b) are identical. Wh
a'tauaii vale of procedure is modeled after a federal rule, ‘the

       

continue...

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“SPOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

Dissenting opinion at 7-8. However, the dissent’s reliance on
those cases, again, is based on its view that they “strongly
suggest," rather than hold, that a judgment is void where a court
“exceed(s] its authority.” Id. at @ (citing United States vw.
Indoor Cultivation Equip, From High Tech Indoor Garden Supply, 55
F.3d 1311, 1316 (7th Cir, 1995) and Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d
1000, 1005 (Sth cir. 1998)).

In Indoor Cultivation, the Seventh Circuit's analysis
does not sustain the dissent's argunent that a notice requirement
is jurisdictional, inasmuch as the case involved a statute of
Limitations, not a notice requirement, and because that court
declined to decide whether the 60-day requirement was procedural
or jurisdictional, and thus did not address the question of
harmless error. See 55 F.3d at 1313-14, 1317. The Seventh
Circuit concluded that the court lacked authority to enter a
judgment against the defendant's property where the government had
failed to commence a forfeiture action within the period

prescribed by statute. 55 F.3d at 1317. Carter involved a

 

interpretation of (the rule] by the federal courte [ie] deened to be hishly
persuasive in the reasoning of this court.’

118 Hawai's 385, 403, 191 P-24 1062, 1080 (2008) (quoting Haxada v.Susns, °0
Haw. 528, 532, 845 P.24 376, 380 (1968)) (brackets in original)

 

he case revolved around provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988, codifiea at SC. 5 888, which “[gavel omere of [) conveyances
(seized by the governnent for drug-related offenses] several procedural rights
hot enjoyed by Glaimanta in other federal forfeiture actions.” id. at 1313-
“Most relevant” was 21 U.S.C. § 888(c), which "require(a] the government to
file its complaint for forfeiture against any conveyance it [had]
‘Srug-telated offense not later than 60 days after a claimant con
jeizure by filing a claim and cost bond.” id, at 1313-14. Appellant argued
and the Seventh circuit agreed that “bezauee the government dia not #ile sts

       

 

   

 

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wrongful death suit in which the underlying proceeds were to go to
the decedent’s minor son. 136 F.3d at 1003. the child’s mother
had settled the claim with the City of New Orleans without
judicial review, which was required under Louisiana law. Id. at
1007-08. Although concluding that because the child's rights hed
not been protected by judicial review, the consent judgment had
no legal effect,” id. at 1008, the Carter court did not hold
that the defect was jurisdictional and qualified its decision by
emphasizing that Rule 60(b) was an “extraordinary remedy” employed

only to do “substantial justice,” which in that case was necessary

because of the state’s special concern for the protection of the

 

xights of minor children, id. at 1007-08.
civit complaint seeking the forfeiture of his property until... over

eighteen months after he filed the appropriate claims and cost bonds, the only
jurisdiction the district court retainea over these three conveyences,
according to § 898(c), was to order their return to [the appelisnt) and
Prevent any forfeiture of them from taking place.” ia, at E31

‘That court based its decision on the “evident” legislative purpose
to protect innocent owners. Id. at 1315-16. As to the statutory invents the
Court stated that “{blecause conveyances seized under the forfeicure law can
Fenain tied up during the pendency of . .. proceadings for sonths en end,
innocent owners may be deprived of their principal node of transportation’ for
extended periods of time... [and] ‘the conveyances returned te innocent
owners may be worth substantially lesa: sss” dd. at isle:

   

 

 

tg Te Fifth Cirouit discussed circumstances under which « judgnent
nay be void under FACP Rule 60(bj (4) in Gaztar. In sts FRCP Rule €0(b)
notion, the City had not alleged that the court lacked jurisdiction oF that
due process was violated, "but instead insisted that Carter's own procederal
failures rendered the Judgnent void." [4. at 1006. in ie discussions the
court recognized that "[sjone circuits have noted that a judgnent is vols If
the rendering court was powerless to enter ie [ulhile such holdings most
obviously allude to a jurisdictional defect, they allow enough. room eo capture
within their reach situations where the parties’ failure to follow relevent
law or procedure in securing the judgment will undermine its eltimate
validity.” Id (citation omitted)

 

 

To that end, the Fifth Circuit concluded that “fulitinately, the
statute and the jurisprodence elevate the protection of the selicate interests
Sf the minor ** Ide at 1008 (emphasis added).
No similar considerations are presear in the instant case. Furthermore, the
‘continue

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Furthermore, the dissent does not address federal cases
that have held, contrary to the dissent’s position, that violation
of a notice requirement is not appropriate grounds for voiding a
judgment. For inetance, in Farm Credit Bank of Baltimore vy.
Eerrera-Goitia, the appellants used FRCP Rule 60(b) (4) “{to
contest] the validity of the district court’s confirmation order
based upon the Bank's alleged failures (1) properly to give notice
of the public sale, and (2) properly to name the junior lienholder
as a party.” 316 F.3d 62, 68 (1st Cir. 2003). Appellants argued
that “the district court's actions patently exceeded its power.”
Id.

In dismissing that argument, that court noted that "(t]o
support this extravagant suggestion, the appellants charge that
‘the foreclosure proceedings were fraught with material defects.
The defects that they cite - if defects at all - are technical in

naturé i i in short, the

 

case rested on Fifth Circuit precedent on the issue. That court had
previously held that

[for adults functioning on behalf of minors there remains =
continuing duty to act in the best, interests of the
child-vas a prodent administrator,” La. Code. Civ. Proc.
fart. 4262-and to seek and cotain prior coure approval under
4271 before compromising those interest”. Conbramises

Sit}he courts of Louisiana have been most
sive of the minor's interest. in the area of settlenent

snd have not hesitates to nullify any settlement
OF compromise that was not judicially approved.”

Ad. (quoting Johnson v. Ford Motor Company, 707 F.2d 183, 194 (Sth Cir. 1963)
{exphases in original).—No such precesent exists in this court regarding the
notice requirement in ERS'§ 657-9. Instead, this court's precedent indicates
that failure to comply with a notice requirement is subject tos harnless
error snalysis. see, end Genesve, 55 Hawai'i 33, 18 F.3d 895; Jansen s.
BEALL, 53 law, 201, 491 P.dd S47 (2971).

37

 

       

 
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appellant received all the process that was due.” Id. (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted). Apparently finding no due process

violation, the First Circuit rejected appellant’s argument that
the judgment was void because the court had “exceeded its power”
based on “technical” defects, such as “failure to name... a
party... and. . . failure to aive notice . . . in strict
accordance with Puerto Rico law.” See id. (emphases added); see
also U.S. v. Martin, 395 F. Supp. 954, 960-961 (D.C.N.Y. 1975)
(holding that “even assuming arguendo both that there was an oral
agreement not to take a default judgment without prior notice and
that the agreement constituted an appearance by Martin for the
purposes of [FRCP] Rules 55(b) and 77(d), the resulting failure to
give notice of the application for and the entry of the default
judgment is a procedural rather than a jurisdictional defect which
does not necessarily render the judoment void”) (emphases added).
The dissent concedes that Cooper and the foregoing federal cases
do not hold that 2 judgment’ is void when a court “exceeds its

authority” and do not involve notice requirements. See dissenting

opinion at 6, 8, 9. In sum, they are not determinative of this
vi.
AL

Because none of the foregoing cases involve a notice
requirement, the dissent apparently turns to decisions

interpreting the notice requirement in HRCP Rule S6(c) as

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illustrative of its view that “a violation [of notice) may, in
some circumstances, give rise to a jurisdictional defect.” Id. at
9. But the act consistent with
the proposition that failure to provide notice is subject toa
harmless error analysis. Indeed, those cases reflect that a
party's failure to comply with a notice requirement is subject to
harmless error analysis.

The dissent relies on Clarke v. Civil Service
Commission, 50 Haw. 169, 434 P.2d 312 (1967) and Jensen. In
Clarke, an institution superintendent who had been dismissed from
his job appealed the circuit court’s sua sponte grant of sumary
judgment to the Civil Service Commission, alleging several points
of error. 50 Haw. at 169-70, 434 P.2d at 312-13. At a pre-trial
conference, “[a]fter a review of memoranda filed by the parties,
the court decided to treat the appellees’ supplemental menorandun
as a motion for sunmary judgnent and thereupon dismissed the
appeal.” Id, at 170, 434 P.2d at 313. As this court noted, that
court erred when it “proceeded to grant summary judgment to the
appellees without notice to the appellant and without a hearing on
the matter,” in contravention of the requirements of HRCP Rule
56(c). da (emphasis added). subsection (c) of Rule 56,
“require{d) that the motion for sunmary judgment be served ‘at

Least 10 days before the time fixed for the hy

 

ring.” Id. Tt

 

soned that “(t]his provision can only be interpreted as

requiring that the time for a hearing be fixed; that the adverse

39
 

POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

party be given notice of such settings and that a hear:
be held on the matter.” Id. (emphasis added).

From the foregoing the dissent maintains that “{sJuch an
error is harmful per ge." Dissenting opinion at 10. aut the
trial court in Clarke had failed to satisfy any of the notice and
hearing requirements, and therefore Clarke cannot stand for the

solitary proposition that failure of the notice requirement would

 

have risen to reversible error per se. Cf. Genesys, 95 Hawai’
40, 18 P.3d at 902 (noting that “while the failure to aive the
required notice is generally regarded as a serious procedural
irregularity that may afford the basis . . . for relief under an
appropriate clause of Rule 60(b) and in conjunction with other
Anmegularities may render the judoment void, the error should not
usually be treated as so serious as to render the judgment void”)
(brackets and citation omitted) (emphasis added) .

The dissent disputes that as between notice and hearing
requirements the absence of a hearing was the “primar(y]
concern[].” Dissenting opinion at 11. Nevertheless, that is what
this court said:

The appellant specifies several
the trial court in dismissing th
‘think that only one of such allecations is vital to the
aanosition of Eble ansaal. Appellant contends thet the_caurt
Sonmitted reversible error when it cranted summary 1adgmeat™
Sits oun notion without aicina opposing counsel an

Soportunity te be heard on the matter-

   

rors allegedly comitted by
‘appeal below.” However, we

  

lark, 50 Haw. at 170, 434 P.2d at 313 (emphases added). The
dissent also maintains that Clarke referred to “[a] well-settled

[proposition] in federal courts that . . . in the absence of such

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notice and hearing, the court is without juriediction to grant
sunmary judgment.” Dissenting opinion at 11. However, Clarke did
not say that violation of a notice requirement was harmful per se,
but held that “the trial court erred in dismissing the appeal
without notice and without @ hearing.” 50 Haw. at 170, 434 2.24
at 313, Likewise, as noted supra, this court held in Cooper that
[a] judgment is not void because it {may be] erroneous.” 70 Haw.
at 454, 776 2.24 at 1181 (brackets in original) (citation
omitted).

Additionally, Clarke is distinguishable because there
the appellant had his case dismissed without ever having the
opportunity to raise defenses to summary judgment on the merits.
See 50 Haw, at 169-70, 434 P.2d at 312-13. By contrast, here
Petitioner received notice and an opportunity to raise defenses on
the merits both in the original proceeding and in the Rule 60(b)
hearing. Therefore, Clarke is not controlling.”

B.

Any question arising from Clarke about whether lack of
notice was harmful per se vas answered in the negative in Jensen.
In Jensen, this court clarified Clarke and concluded that although
denial of an opportunity to be heard under HRCP Rule 56 is
reversible error because it affects “substantial rights,” failure

of notice under HRCP Rule 56(c) is subject to a harmless error

 _-merefore, we disagree with the dissent that Clarke dictates that
the error is harmful per se or jurisdictional in this case. See Dissenting
opinion at 17 2.6

 

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analysis. 53 Haw. at 202-03, 491 P.2d at 548. After the
defendant in Jansen moved for summary judgment, “the trial judge
(had) asked for argument on the motion by written memoranda,
setting neither a time limit for the submission of menoranda nor a
date for oral hearing." Id, at 201-02, 491 P.2d at 548. The
trial judge had then granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. Id, at 202, 491 P.2d at 548. Jensen manifestly held
that the HRCP Rule 56(c) notice requirement is subject to a

harmless error analysis.

Plaintifés assert that the failure of the trial court to
Comply with the notice snd hearing requirements of [3RCP)
Rule S6(c) is reversible ersor, this court has held that,

 

f “the coure at every stage of the

Broceeding
ove think The proper
Standava of appellate review under (HRCP] Role 56(e) if $2

s in the absence of showing Of actus] harm

On’ the other hand, we think the dispensing with the
‘Gidmmant, ‘contrary to the requirement of (WACP] Rule 36(c),

Epustrongly affects che substantial sights of the parties ds
Tocconstitute harmfal ersor per se.

Id. (citations omitted)" (emphases added).

 

This court directed that the “proper standard of
appellate review . . . is to treat periods of notice less than ten
days as pon-preiudicial, in the absence of . . . actual harm” a

contrasted to “dispensing with the opportunity to be heard” which

 

was “harmful error per se.” See id, (emphases added).
Accordingly, this court emphasized that failure of notice was

“non-prejudicial” in the absence of actual harm, and not “harmful

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per se” as the dissent would contend. See id, The dissent’s
rationale then directly conflicts with Jensen's view that reserved
the harmful per se designation for the lack of a hearing, and not
for a defect in notice.
c

According to the dissent, Clarke and its progeny stand
for the proposition that with respect to “HACP Rule 56(c)'s notice
requirement, [where] there has been at least some notice of the
hearing, the aggrieved party must show that he has been prejudiced
+ ++ (blut, if . . . there has been ne notice of the hearing,
then . . . the violation is jurisdictional in nature and thus
harmful per se.” Dissenting opinion at 15 (emphases in original).

However, Shelton Engineering Contractors, Ltd. ve
Hawaiian Pacific Industries, Inc., indicated that, despite the
fact that Clarke used the term “jurisdiction,” the notice
provision in Rule $6(c) was not in fact jurisdictional, even when
it came to the necessity for compliance with the “Literal
Keauixement of the rule." See 51 Hew. 242, 246, 456 P.2d 222, 225
(1969) (emphasis added). Shelton was the first case to construe
Clarke. As the dissent acknowledges, in Shelton, “because the
non-noving party had not shown that he had been harmed by not
having a full ten days’ notice, we would not disturb the entry of
sunmary judgment on the ground that HRCP Rule 56(c) had been
violated.” Dissenting opinion at 12 (citing Shelton, 51 Haw. at

246, 456 P.2d at 225) (emphasis added).

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FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER’
As noted before, Jensen clarified the notice rule,
holding that “absent a showing of harm, the failure of the trial
court to comply with the requirement of ten days' notice of
hearing set forth in (HRCP) Rule $6(c) is not reversible errorl,]”
53 Haw. at 202, 491 P.2d at 548 (emphasis added), without any
qualification as to substantial compliance, some compliance, or
any compliance. This court did not indicate that in cases where
no notice was provided, the court is deprived of jurisdiction or
that the defect is harmful per se as the dissent now proposes.

see id.

 

The dissent’s position is put to rest by Querubin v.
Thronas, 107 Hawai'i 48, 109 P.3d 689 (2005). Decided subsequent
to Clarke, Querubin dealt directly with a fact situation in which
the Appellants had received no notice of summary judgment under
Rule 56(c). Id, at 59, 109 P.3d at 700. That case considered
“noteworthy that the [ICA] has held that ‘violation of the notice
requirement does not automatically result in a reversal,’ insofar
as ‘Clarke's progeny holds that absent a showing of harm, the
failure of the trial court to comply with the requirement of ten
days’ notice of hearing set forth in RCP Rule $6(cl is not
xeversible error.’” Id. at 58, 109 P.3d at 699 (quoting Kau we

City and County of Honolulu, 6 Haw. App. 370, 372-73, 722 P.2d
1043, 1045) (1986) (emphases and some internal quotation marks

omitted) (emphasis added). ‘This court recognized in Querubin that
***FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***
“in contrast to Kau and Shelton, the Appellants had no notice that
Thronas was seeking summary judgment against them precisely
because he had not, in fact, moved for sumary judgment against
them” and because “the circuit court gave the [a)ppellants no
notice that it was treating Thronas's joinder as an MSJ against
them.” Ida at $9, 109 P.3d at 700 (emphases in original).

Despite the fact that no notice had been given, as is
the case here, this court did not say that the failure of notice
was per se harmful or that it deprived the court of jurisdiction.
See id. To the contrary, this court folloed the established rule
in this jurisdiction for analyzing failures of notice and
determined that “the [a]ppellants were obviously. and actually
preiudiced by the lack of notice” and “that the circuit court
erred in sua sponte . . . granting Thronas's MSJ via joinder,

+ without providing the [alppellants notice and an oral
hearing.” Id. at 59-60, 109 P.34 at 700-01 (emphases in
original).

Therefore, according to Querubin, violations of the
notice requirement in Rule 56(c), whether complete or paxtial, are
subject to a harmless error analysis and are not jurisdictional
defects as the dissent would have it. Tf harmless error were not
the doctrine to apply as to the failure to give any notice,
‘Querubin would not have engaged in an “actual prejudice” analysis.
If anything, Querubin solidifies this court’s position that ao

notice is not harmful error per se. With all due respect,

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Querubin cannot be squared in principle (as neither can our other
cases referred to above) with the dissent’s contradictory position
thet the failure to give notice is harmful per se rather than
subject to harmless error analysis.

vir.

Additionally, it does not follow that failure of notice
under HRS § 657-5 is harmful per se or jurisdictional. The
dissent draws its conclusion that “the circuit court exceeded its
jurisdiction under HRS § 657-5,” dissenting opinion at 17, from
the fact that “use of the word ‘shall’ [in HRS § 657-5) strongly
implies that notice is mandatory” and, in this case, no notice was
given, id. at 16. But the language of HACP Rule 56(c) similarly
mandates that “[t]he motion shall be filed and served not less
than 18 davs before the date set for the hearing.” (Emphases
added.)?” It is indisputable that the cases construing the notice
requirement in HRCP Rule 56(c) hold that failures to comply with
the requirement that notice be provided within specified time
limits do not constitute reversible error per se. Therefore, the
cases interpreting the notice requirement in Rule 56(c) plainly do

not stand for the proposition that jurisdiction is nullified when

 

» At the time of Clarke, Jensen, shelton, and Kay the requirenent
was 10 days insteag of 18, “The Fle was amended subsequently. dae Order
Rnending the Hawai't Rules of Civil Procedure. (Sept. 11y 1996) Order Amending
Rules eid) and S6(c) of the Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure (May 15, 1997).

46

 

 

 
***FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

the clear and seemingly mandatory requirement of a rule or statute
4s violated.”
vin.

The dissent also conflicts with HRCP Rule 61, the
“harmless error” rule, As this court pointed out in Jensen,
“[t)he requirement of showing that the error is prejudicial stems
from [HRC] Rule 61." That rule provides that

[njo error
evidence and np-egror-or defect in sny ruling or order or in
Snything done er omitted by the court or by any of the
parties ip around for granting 2 new trial or for setting
Seige a verdict or for vacating, modifying, ox othandiae
disturbing 2 iudanent or order, unless refusal to tare such
Sction spposre to the court ANGalaiasen wich substantial

"The court st every stage of the proceeding gust

‘in the preceeding

either the adaission or the exclusion of

 

 

(Emphases added. )
Where it is necessary to set aside a judgment in order

to do “substantial justice” or to safeguard “substantial rights,”

 

™ Similarly, although the dissent attempts to distinguish Stafford
and Korean Budsnist Tenple as being due process cases, gag dissenting opinion
at 2) in Doth cases the statute or rule at issue contained similarly mandatory
Janguage and there was no question that the procedures violated were
tinder the plain language of the rule of statute. Yet this court did not
conclude that jurisdiction vas lacking. Stafford dealt with violation of #RCP
Rule $5(b) (21, aoe 46 daw, at $8, 374 .2d at 669, which provides that “[i)f
the party against whom judgment by default is sought hss speared in the
action, the party . . - ahall be served with written notice of the application
for judguent' at least 3 days prior to the hearing on such application.”
(Smphasis added.) Oespite the plain requirenent in the rule, this court
“concluded that failure to give the notice of an application for default
judgment required by Rule $8(b) (2) does not in itself render the judgment void
Bue Instead 1s a procedural irregularity which may be rectified by appropriate
Beans.” 1d. at 60, 374 P.2d at 670 (citations omitted

‘Likewise, in Korean Buddhist Temple, th
was mandatory: "Wp ofticial of an agency who renders a decision in a contested
case shall congule any person on any issue of fact except upon notice and
Spportunsty for all parties to participate.” 67 Hawai at 241, 993 P.2a at
{EEs" (quoting HRS § 51-13 (1993)} (emphases adced) (brackets onitted).
Despite the seemingly mandatory language, this court could “discern no
fisiudice to the Temple's substantial rights... snd [therefore held) that
Tie-ercor wae harmless.” id, at 242, 953 7.24 at 1340 (emphases added)

 

 

 

 

fanguage of the statute

 

      

 

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our courts may act pursuant to HRCP Rule 61. Because, as here,
the defect is not inconsistent with substantial justice, we are in
no position to set aside the judgment. See, e.a., In re Doe, 100
Hawai'i 335, 343-344, 60 P.3d 285, 293-294 (2002) (although under
HRS §§ 587-1 and 587-26, the Department of Human Services has an
obligation to offer a service plan “to provide ‘every reasonable
opportunity’ for a parent to be reunited with his or her child”
and “[mJerely proffering a list of phone numbers may fall short of
the policy[,]” no “substantial prejudice resulted to Mother” under
Hawai'i Family Court Rules Rule 61 where “(i]t [was] apparent that
Mother was unwilling to participate in DHS services”) (brackets
omitted); Dang v. F and § Land Development Corp., 62 Haw. 583,
592, 618 P.2d 276, 282-83 (1980) (“[w]ith respect to the
contention that the trial court erred in admitting testimony . . .
we find this did ‘not affect the substantial rights’ of
plaintiffs” under HRCP Rule 61); Nishitani v. Baker, 62 Hawai‘
281, 292, 921 P.2d 1182, 1193 (App. 1996) ("[s]ince Defendants
would have been ‘affected’ by the notice of substitution, we agree
that [the p]laintiff’s failure to serve them violated HRCP Rule
5(a). However, based on our review of the record in this case, we
conclude that such failure did not affect (the dlefendants’
substantial rights and was, thus, [under HRCP Rule 61) harmless
error”); In.xe § Children, No. 28565, at 4 (App. Sept. 22, 2008)
(S00) (citing HRCP Rule 61 and holding that “{g]iven that Father

does not explain how he was prejudiced by the court's denial of

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his oral motions to continue, we fail to see how the court abused

its discretion by denying said motions”).

Neither Petitioner nor the dissent can make any
colorable argument that the result in this case is “inconsistent
with substantial justice.” See HRCP Rule 61. Consequently, the
dissent’s formulation upends the objectives of Rule 61. In
insisting on a mechanistic application of procedural requirenents,
regardless of whether the court's ultimate judgment was consistent
with substantial justice, the dissent opens all judgments to
collateral attack. It ignores the command in HRCP Rule 61 that “a
judgment or order” is not to be “disturb[ed)” unless inconsistent
with substantial justice.

me.

‘The dissent’s formulation is at its core, no different
from the harmless error analysis. But the dissent’s construct
nisapplies HRS § 657-5 and undermines the precedents established
in our cases on notice defects discussed supra and calls into
question their viability.

The dissent does not explain why lack of notice in this

case was harmful, or why the notice requirement under HRS § 657-5

 

% As explained at length gupca, Petitioner's “substantial rights”
were not affected here. Initisily, ne was provides notice of tne original
action and felled to defend it, Then, although he was not timely provided
Rotice of extension, he was subsequently put on notice and filed a Rule 60(b)
notion £0 set aside the judguent. In the course of his motion and the male
Goib) hearing, ne made no argument in his defense on the merits, Or ever
Glained that the original Judgsent was faulty or that he had ever attempted to
Gatlety the judgments Nor has he made any such argunent on appeal to the ICA
or to this court, At this point, Petitioner has hed nore than sufficient
proce!

 

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ID absolute while the requirement under HACP Rule 56(c) is subject
to a harmless error analysis. Anomalousiy, the dissent states
that because Petitioner “has actual notice of [Respondent's]
motion to extend . . . the statute's notice requirement has now
been satisfied.” See dissenting opinion at 18 (emphasis added).
‘This after-the-fact formulation incongruously rests on the same

facts that this opinion says rendered the notice error harmless.

Consequently, the dissent reaches the same result as would obtain
hart ror , see id. at 18-21, because its

formulation 4s intrinsically a harmless error one.
a.
‘The dissent argues that “the circuit court did not have
jurisdiction to grant [Respondent’s) motion before [Petitioner]

was afforded notice” and yet “the circuit court would have

Jurisdiction to grant the motion on remand, because [Petitioner]
has now been afforded such notice.” Id. at 20 (emphases added) -

But the dissent’s contention that the requirements have “now been
satisfied” is a concession that undercuts its jurisdictional
argument, The requirements have “now been satisfied” only because
Petitioner received notice years later when Respondent filed a
notice of foreign judgment in the district court in Denver,
Colorado, Under those circumstances, it cannot reasonably be
argued as the dissent does “that HRS § 657-5's requirenents,
including its notice requirement, have now been satisfied,” id. at

19, without doing violence to the ordinary language of the

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Statute, The only way to reconcile this circumstance is to deen
the initial failure to give notice as harmless. In essence, what
the dissent refers to as “harmful [error] pax ga” is in fact
rendered harmless error under its own formulation.
8.
Furthermore, the dissent’s mechanistic approach elevates
form over substance. Although the dissent maintains that

“ [petitioner] had to receive notice of the motion before the

 

circuit court could grant [Respondent's] motion{,]” the dissent
relies on notice the Respondent received after the fact to supply
“jurisdiction to grant the motion on remand{.]” See id, at 20
(enphases added). Thus, the dissent maintains that even though
the court was without jurisdiction to grant the motion previously,
because Petitioner gained notice years after the fact by other
means, the court’s jurisdiction to grant the very same motion has
“now” been restored. This exercise is a meaningless one, because
the dissent voids a judgment, then resurrects it on the same basis
on which it voided the judgment.
c

Additionally, the dissent’s construct is antithetical to
its own jurisdictional argument. If, as the dissent maintains,
failure of notice is “harmful per ge,” and a jurisdictional
defect, see id, at 10, then the order must be void because, under
the dissent’s theory, the court lacked jurisdiction to enter it.

If the order was void for lack of jurisdiction, the case must be

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dismis: The

 

 

je cannot be remanded in the same proceeding to
@ court that the dissent has determined lacked jurisdiction
because of the failure to give notice. See, e.c., Hawaii Hone:
Infusion Assocs, v, Befitel, 114 Hawai'i 87, 93, 157 P.3d 526, 532
(2007) (holding that “initiating an HRS § 91-7 action in the wrong
circuit is a defect of jurisdiction mandating dismissal [and
alccordingly, we vacate the first circuit court’s judgment and
remand with instructions to dismiss [the] declaratory action”);
Korean Sa Concerné
gf PAlolo, 107 Hawai'i 371, 384, 114 P.3d 113, 126 (2005) (holding
that circuit court's judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction,
retaining Jurisdiction solely to correct court’s error in assuming
jurisdiction, and thereby remanding to the circuit court to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction); Ditto v, McCurdy, 103 Hawai'i
153, 157, 80 P.3d 974, 978 (2003) (“it is well settled that an
appellate court is under an obligation to ensure that it has
jurisdiction to hear and determine each case and to dismiss an
appeal on its own motion where it concludes it lacks jurisdiction
. + + [and t)herefore, [w]hen we perceive a jurisdictional defect
in an appeal, we must, sua sponte, dismiss that appeal”) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).

If the case must be dismissed, then Respondent must
refile its motion to extend. See Eto, 99 Hawai'i at 502-03, 57
P.3d at 427-28 (holding that where first case was dismissed

without prejudice, second complaint was not an amendment but was a

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new filing for statute of limitations purposes and therefore tine:

 

barred); Clary Corp, v, Smith, 949 S.W.2d 452, 459 (Tex. App.
1997) (holding that where the plaintiffs were dismissed from a
previous action due to lack of jurisdiction, “it was as if they
had never filed suit,” and, therefore, the second complaint “was a
new lawauit because it was made post-dismissal”).

D,

The dissent however “do[es] not believe it necessary for
[Respondent] to file a new motion on remand.” Dissenting opinion
at 20. The dissent cites Clarke for the proposition that the case
could be remanded on the premise that in Clarke the error was
harmful per se. Id. at 20-21. But first, as discussed supra,
Clarke did not hold that a defective notice was harmful ver se.
See 50 Haw, at 170, 434 P.2d at 313. Second, in clarifying
Clarke, Jensen expressly held that failure of notice was subject
to “actual harm” analysis, whereas the lack of a hearing and not
failed notice was the defect that was “harmful per se.” See 53
Haw. at 202, 491 P.2d at 548. Third, Querubin concluded that
where there was no notice this court on review would determine
whether the appellants had been “actually prejudiced,” not that
such notice defect was deemed harmful per se. See 107 Hawai'i at
59, 109 P.3d at 700.

Furthermore, in the other cases relied upon by the
dissent, there is no indication that upon remand the court could

then do what it was without jurisdiction to do in the first

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oe
instance. In Wong Kwai Tong, because the circuit court did not

have power under the divorce statute to enter that order, it was

  

void. See 31 Haw. at 609. No set of circumstances could have
changed the court's authority such that remand would have been
appropriate, Similarly, Cooper provides no support for remand and
reinstatement following the voiding of a judgment because this
court concluded in that case that the provision at issue was not
woid. See 70 Haw, at 454, 776 P.2d at 1182.

The federal cases relied on by the dissent also do not
Provide any support for the argument that the court could do the
very thing it was held not to have power to do upon remand and
based upon the same motion. In Indoor Cultivation, the only power
‘the court had on remand was to “vacate[] the judgment under [FRCP]
Rule 60(b) (4) and return{] the conveyances... .” 55 F.3d at
1317, There was no action the court could take pursuant to the
government’s infirm complaint. Finally, in Carter, the Fifth
Circuit did not remand but “affirm[ed] the district court's
decision, finding that the district court () properly set aside
the consent judgment pursuant to (FRCP) Rule 60(b) (4) (.]” 136
F.3d at 1012, There was no suggestion that the same consent
judgment could be reinstated upon remand. Therefore, the
dissent’s cases do not support the proposition that the court
could “grant{] [Respondent's] motion to extend the deficiency

judgment on remand.” Dissenting opinion at 19.

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e

HRS 657-5 provides that “{nJo extension of a judgment or
decree shall be granted unless the extension is sought within ten

of inal jecree wi ”
(Bmphasis added.) The original judgment was entered on Decenber
21, 1993. Therefore, were Respondent to attempt to refile or
reinstate its motion after the extension order was set aside for
lack of jurisdiction under the dissent’s formulation, the second
filing or reinstatement of the motion to extend would fall outside
of the ten-year statutory period. Under the dissent’s view,
Respondent would be entitled to reinstate or resort to its motion
“ad infinitum.” See Sluka v. Herman, 229 Neb. 200, 201-02, 425
N.W.24 891, 892 (1988).

In Ete, this court held that, although the Plaintiff's
first complaint had been filed within the statutory period, but
dismissed due to lack of service, the Plaintiff’s second
complaint, which was identical to the first, was time-barred as it
was filed outside the statute of limitations, 99 Hawai'i at 502-
03, 57 P.3d at 427-28. This court stated that “if a court
dismisses an initial action, the applicable statute of limitations
does not toll unless a savings statute exists which provides for

the filing of the second action within a specific amount of

 

time(.1” Id. at 502, 57 P.3d at 427 (footnote omitted); see also
Aluka, 229 Neb, at 202, 425 N.W.2d at 892 (stating that “the

filing of a petition does not toll the running of a statute of

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Limitations for the purpose of bringing subsequent actions on the

sane set of facts” and “(t)o interpret the law in that fashion
Would create a situation in which a plaintiff could file, have
dismissed, refile, and have dismissed, an action, ad infinitum”);
Slary, 949 $.W.2d at 459 (holding that “[wjhen a cause of action
4s dismissed (for want of jurisdiction) and later refiled,
Limitations are calculated to run from the time the cause of
action accrued until the date that the claim is refiled . .
because a dismissal is equivalent to a suit never having been
filed”). Consequently, Respondent would be precluded from
refiling the motion to extend as it would be untimely.

Following the dissent’s rationale, if Respondent were
allowed to refile or reinstate its motion after the statutory
period had in fact run, the statutory mandate that “(nJo extension
of a judgment or decree shall be granted unless the extension is
sought within ten years” would be nullified. See HRS § 657-5.
Under the dissent's formulation, Respondent is allowed to
reinstate its motion for an extension of judgment after the time
for seeking an extension had expired. The dissent’s approach then
would have far reaching adverse consequences for the viability of
HRS § 657-5.

x

HRS § 657-5 required that Respondent provide notice to

 

Petitioner prior to entry of the extension of judgment. However,

on the facts of this case, the court’s extension of judgment was

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harmless error because Petitioner had an opportunity to be heard
in his HRCP Rule 60(b) hearing, offered no defense on the merits
to the original judgment or to the judgment extension, and

therefore has not demonstrated any prejudice resulting from the
lack of notice. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the

March 30, 2008 judgment of the ICA is affirmed.

Gary Victor Dubin (Lon
fayvu wien him on the fipl—

tpaieation) eee

oer toner defendant

Eppellant. Q——"

peter Van Nane Esser

(Wark T. shklov and Michel Yount, Duby >

fe okazani wien him on the

pratt s tespense). for

respondent /plaintift-
appellee Bank of Hawaii.

37