Case Title: ANNA MARIE FERNANDEZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 04-213

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
ANNA MARIE FERNANDEZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 8126 P.3d 111Case Number: 04-213, 04-214Decided: 01/12/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
ANNA 
MARIE FERNANDEZ,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),)

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
ANNA 
MARIE FERNANDEZ,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
            
Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric Johnson, 
Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; Jenny L. Craig, Student Director; Eric 
Heimann, Intern; and Timothy Justin Forwood, Intern.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and DONNELL, 
D.J.

 
 

VOIGT, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Anna Fernandez 
pled guilty to three counts of felony welfare fraud and four counts of felony 
cocaine-related charges, which cases were consolidated for sentencing before the 
district court.  Fernandez now 
challenges these judgments and sentences, claiming that the State violated plea 
agreements in both cases during the sentencing hearing.  We affirm.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶2]      On January 16, 
2003, an Information was filed in circuit court charging Fernandez with three 
counts of fraudulently obtaining welfare benefits, in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 42-2-112(h) (Michie 1997), and two counts of fraudulently obtaining food 
stamps, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 42-2-112(a) (Case No. 04-214, "the 
welfare fraud case").

 
 
[¶3]      Fernandez was 
subsequently charged with four counts unrelated to the welfare fraud case:  two counts of delivery of cocaine, in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2001); one count of 
possession with intent to deliver cocaine, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1031(a)(i); and one count of conspiracy to deliver cocaine, in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1042 (LexisNexis 
2001) (Case No. 04-213, "the cocaine case").

 
 
[¶4]      The cases 
proceeded separately through the court system until sentencing.  On September 18, 2003, an agreement was 
reached wherein Fernandez pled no contest to three of the five counts in the 
welfare fraud case and the State agreed to recommend probation at 
sentencing.  The remaining two 
counts were dismissed by the State.  
Sentencing on the welfare fraud case was delayed pending the outcome of 
the cocaine case.

 
 
[¶5]      Fernandez pled 
guilty to all charges in the cocaine case on April 12, 2004.  The welfare fraud case was consolidated 
with the cocaine case and a sentencing hearing was held on July 12, 2004.  At that hearing, the district court 
sentenced Fernandez to imprisonment for forty-two months to eight years on each 
count in the cocaine case, the sentences to run concurrently.  The district court further imposed a 
three- to five-year term of imprisonment in the welfare fraud case, but 
suspended that sentence and placed Fernandez on probation for five years.  The sentences in the two cases were to 
run consecutively, with the cocaine sentence to be served prior to the welfare 
fraud sentence. On July 19, 2004, the district court issued written orders 
confirming the oral sentences.  It 
is from those judgments and sentences that Fernandez now 
appeals.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      Our standard for 
reviewing claimed breaches of plea agreements is well 
known:

 
 
            
"When a plea of guilty rests to any significant degree on a promise or 
agreement by the State, that promise must be fulfilled.  Whether the prosecutor has violated the 
plea agreement is a question that is reviewed de novo."  Herrera v. State, 2003 WY 25, ¶ 8, 64 P.3d 724, ¶ 8 (Wyo.2003).  A plea 
agreement is a contract between the defendant and the State and thus general 
principles of contract law apply to the agreement.  

 
 

Rutti v. 
State, 2004 
WY 133, ¶ 42, 100 P.3d 394, 410 (Wyo. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1990 
(2005).

 
 
            
Furthermore, we have said that the prosecutor may not play fast and loose 
with the established terms of a plea agreement and must explicitly stand by 
those terms agreed upon.  Herrera [v. State, 2003 WY 25] at ¶ 18, [64 P.3d 724, 729 (Wyo.2003)].  If the 
prosecutor's performance of the terms of a plea agreement is not possible, a 
withdrawal of the plea is the correct remedy.  The prosecutor's remedy was not to 
violate or mischaracterize the agreement but rather move to withdraw the plea 
agreement if she did not wish to be bound to its terms.  Neither the principles of fairness nor 
the principles of contract law allow the State to retain the benefit of the 
agreement while avoiding its obligation.  
See State v. Rardon, 2002 MT 345, ¶ 18, 313 Mont. 321, 61 P.3d 132, ¶ 
18 (Mt.2002).  "[I]t would be unfair 
to accept a guilty plea where part of the bargain, upon which the plea was 
based, was breached.  The defendant 
had not agreed to plead guilty to charges under terms other than those set forth 
in the agreement."  Cardenas v. Meacham, 545 P.2d 632, 638 
(Wyo.1976) (explaining the rationale behind the Santobello [v. New 
York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971)] decision.)

 
 

Ford v. 
State, 2003 
WY 65, ¶ 18, 69 P.3d 407, 412 (Wyo. 2003).

  
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
            
Welfare Fraud Plea Agreement

 
 

[¶7]      Fernandez claims 
that the State breached the plea agreement in the welfare fraud case when it 
argued at the consolidated sentencing hearing for a term of incarceration in the 
cocaine case.  When reviewing 
breaches of plea agreements, we apply a two-part test.  We "(1) examine the nature of the 
promise; and (2) evaluate the promise in light of the defendant's reasonable 
understanding of the promise at the time the plea was entered."  Schade v. State, 2002 WY 133, ¶ 5, 53 P.3d 551, 554 (Wyo. 2002).  Because we have not been presented with 
plea agreements reduced to writing, "we must look to the recitation of the plea 
agreement given at the change of plea hearing to determine the terms of the 
agreement."  Ford, 2003 WY 65, ¶ 12, 69 P.3d  at 
411.

 
 
[¶8]      The express terms 
of the plea agreement in the welfare fraud case are not at issue here.  At the change of plea hearing, counsel 
for Fernandez detailed both the nature of the promise and Fernandez's 
understanding of the plea agreement:

 
 
            
[Defense counsel]:  . . 
.  In exchange for Ms. Fernandez's 
pleading guilty to three of the five counts charged in the information, the 
district attorney's office has agreed to recommend a three- to five-year 
suspended sentence with five years of probation with a suggestion that the Court 
end probation earlier when restitution is paid in full prior to the end of the 
five years.  The restitution amount 
would be stipulated to [be] $6,500.

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
            
There are other charges that are pending before another judge and that 
this does not have anything to do with that.

 
 
            
An additional agreement is that the suggestion of a three- to five-year 
suspended sentence as to all counts would be concurrent both as to the suspended 
portion and as to the period of probation and that's as to this case 
only.

 
 
            
I believe that's the total of the plea agreement.

 
 
            
[Prosecutor]:  (Nodded 
head.)

 
 
            
THE COURT:  Is that your 
understanding also, Ms. Fernandez?

 
 
            
[Fernandez]:  Yes, it is, 
Your Honor.

 
 
[¶9]      The issue here is 
whether the State complied with the undisputed terms of this agreement.  At the consolidated sentencing hearing 
for both the welfare fraud and the cocaine cases, the State characterized the 
agreement as follows:

 
 
            
[Prosecutor]:  . . .  [T]he agreement as outlined was to 
recommend probation on this offense to give her an opportunity to pay the 
restitution that would be due and owing.  
The agreement was entered into and brought before this Court with the 
understanding that the drug cases were still outstanding and would most likely 
result in a Women's Center incarceration for the time while the welfare fraud 
was specifically to be addressed on the record to that case only -- 

 
 
[¶10]   Defense counsel objected to this 
statement and later explained:

 
 
            
[Defense Counsel]:  My 
objection, Your Honor, I just want to make it clear before I start.  My objection to [the prosecutor's] 
comments, I believe her comments regarding the welfare fraud case, those were to 
be suspended based on an understanding that she was to get a sentence at the 
penitentiary is not true and is not reflected in the record, but I have not read 
it today.  My understanding is that 
she may have been contemplating, but that does not mean that's part of the 
agreement.  And my guess is that is 
what she was contemplating, but I believe those comments are 
inappropriate.

 
 
[¶11]   Fernandez claims that, by stating 
that "the drug cases were still outstanding and would most likely result in a 
Women's Center incarceration," the State breached the plea agreement reached in 
the welfare fraud case.  She 
contends that the State was representing to the district court that, as part of 
the plea agreement in the welfare fraud case, Fernandez had agreed to accept a 
term of incarceration in the cocaine case.  
After reviewing the transcripts from sentencing and the record as a 
whole, we are satisfied that the welfare fraud plea agreement was not 
breached.

 
 
[¶12]   The prosecutor's statement did not 
violate the plea agreement.  The 
State clearly represented to the district court that the welfare fraud plea 
agreement "was specifically to be addressed on the record to that case only." 
 Nonetheless, Fernandez claims that 
the State impermissibly argued that incarceration was "contemplated" in the 
cocaine case and that Fernandez had agreed to such incarceration.  At sentencing, the State and Fernandez 
engaged in a lengthy argument about what was and was not "contemplated" in the 
welfare fraud plea agreement and whether Fernandez had agreed to incarceration 
as part of that agreement.  
Throughout this discussion, however, the State was careful to clarify 
that the plea agreement was unrelated to any sentencing recommendation in the 
cocaine case:

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  . . .  I want the record to be very clear that 
at the change of plea hearing on the welfare fraud case that was before this 
Court at that time, [defense counsel] stated on two different occasions 
acknowledgement that the agreement in that case only had to do with the welfare 
fraud and there were other charges pending in front of another Court and that we 
weren't going to discuss those.

 
 
[¶13]   The district court, moreover, 
understood from the discussion at sentencing that the plea agreement did not 
include, nor was the prosecutor claiming that it included, any agreement 
regarding the cocaine charges:

 
 
            
THE COURT:  Here's the way I 
understand the plea agreement:  It 
was three to five, suspended, on the welfare fraud . . . .

 
 
            
With regards to the cocaine charges, that's all up in the air that there was no agreement with regards to 
that.  I think [defense 
counsel's] point was the probation in this case, the welfare fraud wasn't agreed 
to under a contemplation, under agreement, that it's okay we'll take probation 
on this because we're going to get jail on the cocaine - - it's all up in the 
air with regards to what is going to happen on the cocaine 
charges.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶14]   The State performed its part of the 
plea agreement by recommending suspended forty-two month to five year sentences 
to be served concurrently, with five years probation.  The State's argument for a term of 
incarceration in the cocaine case did not breach that agreement because, as the 
State made clear and the district court understood, the plea agreement in the 
welfare fraud case did not include any agreement in the cocaine case.  It is true that some confusion was 
created by the prosecutor's saying that the "agreement was entered into and 
brought before this Court with the understanding that the drug 
cases were still outstanding and would most likely result in a Women's Center 
incarceration."  (Emphasis 
added.)  One definition of 
"understanding" is, after all, "agreement."  Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 
1289 (10th ed. 1999).  However, in the ensuing discussion, the 
prosecutor made it clear that such an understanding was not part of the 
agreement.  Accordingly, we find 
that the State did not breach the terms of the welfare fraud plea agreement and, 
therefore, affirm the judgment and sentence in Case No. 
04-214.

 
 
            
Cocaine Case Plea Agreement

 
 

[¶15]   Any plea agreement in the cocaine 
case was also unwritten.  We 
therefore look to the recitation of the plea agreement at the change-of-plea 
hearing to attempt to determine whether an agreement existed and, if so, the 
content of such agreement.  Ford, 2003 WY 65, ¶ 12, 69 P.3d  at 
411.

 
 
            
[Defense attorney]:  Miss 
Fernandez will be pleading to the counts of the information as charged.  The only understanding that I have is 
that her guilty plea and factual basis to these, the district attorney will 
agree that she's accepted responsibility for her acts.

 
 
 [¶16]  Fernandez claims that the State breached 
its promise to "agree that she's accepted responsibility for her acts" when it 
made the following argument at the consolidated sentencing 
hearing:

 
 
            
[Prosecutor]:  . . .  The bottom line is this, as was put on 
the record before Judge Grant, she entered those pleas essentially cold 
with no sentencing agreement with the understanding that if she did accept 
responsibility for her ongoing drug trafficking behavior, that the state would 
take that into account in terms of its recommendation as to how long she 
should go to Women's Center.

 
 
            
The problem is that the presentence report indicates that she doesn't 
believe she has pled to possession with intent to deliver or any other delivery 
offenses and clearly that's not what the record shows.  She did in fact plead guilty to 
possession with intent to deliver and delivery of two counts and the additional 
counts of conspiracy.

 
 
  

            
The 
facts are outlined on the record that indicate as to what behavior she was 
pleading guilty to, but she has now turned around and said, no, I'm guilty of 
agreeing to being in the drug business but I didn't do these other 
things.

 
 
            
[Defense attorney] just indicated that that presentence report is 
substantially correct, so I don't understand how she can now argue 
that that's acceptance of responsibility for that 
behavior.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶17]   Defense counsel objected to parts 
of the statement dealing with the welfare fraud plea agreement, but not to these 
"responsibility" arguments.  The 
initial question we must answer, then, is whether to review this alleged error 
under the de novo standard set out 
above or under the plain error standard of W.R.Cr.P. 52(b) and W.R.A.P. 9.05 as 
applied in Rutti, 2004 WY 133, 100 P.3d 394.

 
 

[¶18]   In Rutti, 2004 WY 133, ¶ 40, 100 P.3d  at 
410, the 
appellant had agreed to plead guilty to two counts against him and, in exchange, 
the State agreed to dismiss two other counts charged in the information.  The appellant argued that his plea 
agreement was breached when the State dismissed the two counts without prejudice 
such that they could be charged again at a later date.  Id.  However, Rutti never objected to the 
State's actions in the trial court.  
Id.  We said that the

 
 
first 
hurdle, then, is to prove plain error.  
Once again, "[p]lain error will not be assigned unless: (1) the record 
clearly reflects the incidents urged as error; (2) appellant is able to 
demonstrate violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and (3) it is 
shown that a substantial right of the appellant was materially 
abridged."

 
 

Id. at ¶ 
41, 100 P.3d  at 410 (quoting 
Seymour v. State, 949 P.2d 881, 883 (Wyo. 1997)).

 
 
[¶19]   Because Fernandez raises this issue 
for the first time on appeal, we think it clear that our review must be under 
the plain error standard.  
Therefore, we must first determine whether the record clearly reflects 
the incidents urged as error.  The 
thrust of Fernandez's argument is that the plea agreement recited by Fernandez's 
attorney was breached by the State's argument at sentencing.  As set out fully above, the record is 
clear as to which statements Fernandez is challenging.  

 
 

[¶20]   While the record is clear in that 
regard, Fernandez fails to show that, based on this record, a plea agreement 
actually existed.  Therefore, we 
cannot find that the second prong of the plain error analysis has been 
satisfied.  Under our plain error 
standard of review, an appellant must demonstrate a violation of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law.  As we have 
often stated, when a defendant pleads guilty in reliance on a promise from the 
State, the State must fulfill that promise.  Rutti, 2004 WY 133, ¶ 42, 100 P.3d  at 
410.  Fernandez has not shown this rule was 
violated because she has failed to show that she pled guilty in reliance on a 
plea agreement with the State.

 
 
[¶21]   Because Fernandez failed to object 
to the prosecutor's comments, our review is difficult.  As quoted above, the prosecutor spoke at 
length about Fernandez's failure to accept responsibility for the charges 
against her.  The prosecutor also 
expressly characterized Fernandez's pleas in the cocaine case as "cold" and made 
"with no sentencing agreement."  
Prompted by the State's argument, the district court also discussed 
Fernandez's acceptance of responsibility in both cases in great 
detail:

 
 
            
THE COURT:  . . .  This Court does have some questions, 
frankly, with regards to whether or not Ms. Fernandez is taking responsibility 
for her wrongful conduct.  And notes 
in the presentence report on page six at the bottom of the page with regards to 
welfare fraud.

 
 
            
The probation officer reports that "The defendant maintains that her 
actions do not constitute fraud.  
Mainly, because Tim Pena is in fact not the father of her daughter.  She accepted this plea agreement only as 
a measure of good faith because in doing so she thought she would receive 
leniency in a pending drug offense."  
Which is sort of reverse, I think, of the argument that I heard with 
regard to the state's position.

 
 
            
She also states that "The plea agreement is in fact a sort of scam 
perpetrated upon her by the district attorney's office.  She further reports that the matter in 
her case has been complicated by the shuffle of defense attorneys and an 
attorney had not adequately represented her.  She took the plea agreement because she 
believes that fighting the pending welfare case would be more difficult and only 
create more problems for her in other cases pending in 
court."

 
 
            
The Court would note, although the Court has not reviewed the record, the 
Court recalls numerous opportunities this Court had to observe Ms. Fernandez in 
court and while I can't point to anything in the record, the Court recalls -- 
certainly had some questions that at all of those hearings there was a sense 
that Ms. Fernandez was very reluctant to be held accountable and take 
responsibility for her actions, although in the end she did enter a guilty plea 
to all three counts, which is certainly some sort of accountability.  There's no doubt about 
that.

 
 
[¶22]   However, even after these lengthy 
discussions, Fernandez failed to object.  
Indeed, at the district court level, Fernandez has never attempted to 
withdraw her guilty pleas in the cocaine case.  Based on Fernandez's failure to object 
or attempt to withdraw her pleas, we are presented with an ambiguous and 
contradictory record.  

 
 

[¶23]   We interpret plea agreements under 
contract principles.  Rutti, 2004 WY 133, ¶ 42, 100 P.3d  at 
410.  A central tenet of contract law is that, 
in order for a contract to be formed, the parties must mutually assent to the 
same terms.  Parkhurst v. Boykin, 2004 WY 90, ¶ 18, 
94 P.3d 450, 459 (Wyo. 2004).  In the instant case, we are unable to 
conclude that Fernandez and the State mutually assented to a plea 
agreement.  We are presented with 
only one statement in the record that tends to show that a plea agreement 
existed, namely that "the district attorney will agree that she's accepted 
responsibility for her acts."  On 
the other hand, we are presented with pages of transcript which, if a plea 
agreement actually existed, would seem to violate any such unconditional 
agreement or, at the very least, prompt Fernandez to object to the State's 
arguments.  We will not assume a 
plea agreement existed where the conduct of the parties does not support the 
existence of such an agreement and the terms recited in the record are not 
sufficiently definite to enable us to ascertain the content of the 
agreement.  See Roussalis v. Wyoming Med. Ctr., 
Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 231-32 (Wyo. 2000) and Engle v. First Nat'l Bank of Chugwater, 
590 P.2d 826, 831 (Wyo. 1979).

 
 
[¶24]   Because we must find any error to 
be clearly evident from the record, and because there was no objection or other 
attempt to clarify the record at trial, we cannot resolve ambiguity against the 
State and assume that it breached a plea agreement that was referred to only in 
passing by defense counsel and never mentioned at sentencing.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment and 
sentence in Case No. 04-213.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶25]   The State did not breach the plea 
agreement entered in the welfare fraud case and we are unable to discern any 
plea agreement in the cocaine case.

 
 
[¶26]   We affirm.