Case Title: State v. Wilson

Citation: 235 S.E.2d 219, 293 N.C. 47

Docket Number: 

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1977-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
235 S.E.2d 219 (1977) 293 N.C. 47 STATE of North Carolina v. Reginald WILSON. No. 106. Supreme Court of North Carolina. June 13, 1977. *221 Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty. Gen., by Charles M. Hensey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State of North Carolina. Dallas Clark, Jr., Greenville, court-appointed counsel for defendant-appellant. HUSKINS, Justice: Defendant moved to suppress his in-court identification by the prosecuting witness on the ground that its exclusion is required by the due process clause of the Federal Constitution. Denial of this motion constitutes defendant's first assignment of error. It is proper to note at this point that G.S. 15A-974(1), pursuant to which defendant's motion is purportedly filed, mandates the suppression of evidence only when the evidence sought to be suppressed is obtained in violation of defendant's constitutional rights. Such is not the case here. Defendant candidly concedes in his brief that "there was no constitutional [sic] out-of-court confrontation or any pretrial identification procedure suggestive and conducive to mistaken identification." Defendant confines his argument to the contention that Mrs. White had no adequate opportunity to observe him, thus rendering her testimony so weak and unreliable that it should have been excluded and nonsuit entered at the close of the State's evidence. For that reason defendant argues that the court erroneously admitted Mrs. White's in-court identification of him. While ordinarily the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony is exclusively a matter for the jury, this rule does not apply when the only testimony justifying submission of the case to the jury is inherently incredible and in conflict with the physical conditions established by the State's own evidence. State v. Miller, 270 N.C. 726, 154 S.E.2d 902 (1967). Defendant seeks the benefit of this rule, thus requiring an examination of the Miller decision. In Miller, the Hall Oil Company building in Charlotte was broken and entered by two or more men on the night of 28 September 1966 and a safe was damaged in an effort to force it open. The exterior of the building was well lighted by street lights, floodlights at the front and back, and spotlights attached to the eaves. The building was 286 feet from a Texaco service station with a vacant lot between. The only evidence tending to identify defendant as one of the burglars was the testimony of a 16-year-old witness who identified defendant in a lineup as one of the persons he had seen at the scene of the crime. The witness was never *222 closer than 286 feet to a man he saw running alongside the Hall Oil Company building. The witness had never seen the man theretofore and testified he saw this man run once in each direction, peep around the corner of the building and look in the direction of the witness. The witness could not describe the man except to say that his clothes were dark. Held: The uncontradicted testimony as to the physical facts was insufficient to support the subsequent identification of defendant with that degree of certainty which would justify submission of the case to the jury. Our holding was based on the general rule that evidence which is inherently impossible or in conflict with indisputable physical facts or laws of nature is not sufficient to take the case to the jury. State v. Cox, 289 N.C. 414, 222 S.E.2d 246 (1976); Jones v. Schaffer, 252 N.C. 368, 114 S.E.2d 105 (1960). The holding in Miller has no application where, as here, "there is a reasonable possibility of observation sufficient to permit subsequent identification." State v. Miller, supra. In such event the credibility of the witness and the weight of his or her identification testimony is for the jury. State v. Cox, supra; State v. Humphrey, 261 N.C. 511, 135 S.E.2d 214 (1964). Here, Mrs. White had an opportunity to view defendant who was within eight to ten feet of her. The kitchen light was illuminating the area where defendant was pushing the bicycle. She had seen defendant earlier that summer when both were meeting and passing on the street. She did not know his name but knew he was Sister Wilson's son. She told her husband when he came home a few minutes later that the man with the bicycle was Sister Wilson's son. She told Detective Tripp the same thing and positively identified defendant at a pretrial photographic viewing. The court found as a fact on a pretrial voir dire that she based her identification on the initial recognition of defendant as Sister Wilson's son when she saw him in her bedroom on the night in question. Her identification testimony is clear and unequivocal. Thus the record discloses plenary competent evidence, corroborated by the physical facts and by other witnesses, to support the findings of the trial judge. Such findings are conclusive when supported by competent evidence. State v. Simmons, 286 N.C. 681, 213 S.E.2d 280 (1975); State v. Taylor, 280 N.C. 273, 185 S.E.2d 677 (1972). Defendant's argument goes only to the weight of Mrs. White's identification testimony and not to its competency. Contradictions and discrepancies, even in the State's evidence, are for the jury to resolve and do not warrant nonsuit. State v. Mabry, 269 N.C. 293, 152 S.E.2d 112 (1967); 4 N.C. Index 3d, Criminal Law § 104, and cases there cited. The identification testimony of Mrs. White was properly admitted. Defendant's first assignment challenging its competency is overruled. Defendant next assigns as error the denial of his motion to strike the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. White concerning the ownership of the bicycle. He argues that the bill of indictment is fatally defective because it does not allege the ownership of the bicycle and therefore it was prejudicial error to allow proof of ownership without allegation. This constitutes defendant's second assignment. We commence with the observation that defendant was not charged with larceny. Rather, he was charged with burglary in the first degreebreaking and entering during the nighttime of an occupied dwelling or sleeping apartment with intent to commit a felony therein, i.e., the felony of larceny. Felonious intent is an essential element of burglary which the State must allege and prove, "and the felonious intent proven, must be the felonious intent alleged. . . ." State v. Jones, 264 N.C. 134, 141 S.E.2d 27 (1965). In an indictment for burglary it is not sufficient to charge generally an intent to commit "a felony" in the dwelling house of another. "The particular felony which it is alleged the accused intended to commit must be specified. . . . The felony intended, however, need not be set out as fully and specifically as would be required *223 in an indictment for the actual commission of said felony, where the State is relying only upon the charge of burglary. It is ordinarily sufficient to state the intended offense generally, as by alleging an intent to steal the goods and chattels of another then being in said dwelling-house, or to commit therein the crime of larceny, rape, or arson. [Citations omitted.]" State v. Allen, 186 N.C. 302, 119 S.E. 504 (1923); accord, State v. Tippett, 270 N.C. 588, 155 S.E.2d 269 (1967). The indictment attacked in the case before us reads as follows: We are of the opinion that this indictment meets the standards prescribed by the foregoing principles of law. Having specified defendant's ulterior intent, i.e., the intent to commit larceny the State was required to prove that intent at the time of the breaking and entering in order to make out the offense of burglary. With respect to that offense, however, there was no necessity to allege or prove that defendant intended to steal any particular item of property owned by any particular individual. The actual commission of the intended felony, i.e., larceny, is not essential to the crime of burglary. State v. Bell, 385 N.C. 746, 208 S.E.2d 506 (1974). "The crime of burglary is completed by the breaking and entering of the occupied dwelling of another, in the nighttime, with the requisite ulterior intent to commit the designated felony therein, even though, after entering the house, the accused abandons his intent through fear or because he is resisted." State v. Wells, 290 N.C. 485, 226 S.E.2d 325 (1976); accord, State v. Allen, supra. Here, these principles were included in the trial judge's charge as follows: Allegation and proof that defendant intended to steal the goods and chattels of another located in the burglarized dwelling, i.e., to commit the crime of larceny, is sufficient. The additional allegation specifying the Schwinn bicycle and the proof concerning its ownership was surplusage and entirely harmless. Defendant's second assignment is overruled. The record discloses that before any objection was interposed to defense counsel's argument to the jury, he had already made the following argument: Defense counsel then pointed to what he conceived to be the weakness in Mrs. White's identification testimony and continued his jury argument as follows: At this point the prosecutor's objection was sustained and defense counsel continued in these words: "The statute has been read to you. And I am absolutely certain in my heart that you understand the seriousness with which you must treat this case." At the close of the court's charge to the jury one juror asked: "Did you say we are not to consider possible punishment when we think of others?" After a consultation at the bench during which defense counsel requested the court to charge the jury that it "should be impressed with the seriousness of its duty in deliberating upon the case since its deliberations could result in life imprisonment should it reach a verdict of guilty," the court refused to give such charge and answered the juror's question as follows: Defendant contends the trial court erred (1) in sustaining the prosecutor's objection to the quoted portion of his jury argument relative to the punishment defendant would receive if found guilty and (2) in refusing to instruct the jury regarding the seriousness of its duty and the punishment which would result from a guilty verdict. This constitutes defendant's third assignment. In State v. Rhodes, 275 N.C. 584, 169 S.E.2d 846 (1969), we held that, except in capital cases, the presiding judge fixes the punishment for a convicted defendant within the limits provided by the applicable statute while the jury discharges its duty when it returns a verdict of guilty or not guilty. ". . . In the absence of some compelling reason which makes disclosure as to punishment necessary in order `to keep the trial on an even keel' and to insure complete fairness to all parties, the trial judge should not inform the jurors as to punishment in non-capital cases. If information is requested he should refuse it and explain to them that punishment is totally irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence. When, however, such information is inadvertently given the error will be evaluated like any other." (Emphasis added.) State v. Rhodes, supra; accord, State v. Henderson, 285 N.C. 1, 203 S.E.2d 10 (1974); State v. Watkins, 283 N.C. 504, 196 S.E.2d 750 (1973). In State v. Dillard, 285 N.C. 72, 203 S.E.2d 6 (1974), we held that defense counsel could not make an argument to the jury upon the question of the punishment to be imposed, that is, that he had no right to argue the question of punishment in the sense of attacking the validity, constitutionality, or propriety of the imposition of the death penalty provided by law. To like effect is State v. Britt, 285 N.C. 256, 204 S.E.2d 817 (1974), in which Justice Branch, writing for the court, said: Based on the language of G.S. 84-14 that in jury trials "the whole case as well of law as of fact may be argued to the jury," we held in State v. McMorris, 290 N.C. 286, 225 S.E.2d 553 (1976), that defense counsel had the right to inform the jury that conviction would necessarily result in imposition of a life sentence. There, Justice Exum, writing for the court, said: Applying these principles to defendant's first contention we hold that the trial court did not err in excluding the contested portion of defense counsel's jury argument. Both before and after the excluded portion, counsel informed the jury of the consequences of a conviction and stated that, in light of those consequences, the jury should give the matter close attention and its most serious consideration. These statements were in all respects proper. State v. McMorris, supra. In the contested portion, however, counsel gave his argument a different slant. There, counsel implied that identification of the defendant was based on a fleeting view and that, while such a view may be sufficient to convict in some situations, it is inadequate to convict in this case because the punishment is so severe. Thus counsel was asking the jury to consider the punishment as part of its substantive deliberations and this he may not do. The trial judge correctly excluded that portion of defendant's jury argument. By his second contention under this assignment, defendant argues that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it "should be impressed with the seriousness of its duty in deliberating upon the case since its deliberations could result in life imprisonment should it reach a verdict of guilty." We do not agree. The trial judge is not required to instruct the jury that upon conviction a sentence of life imprisonment will be imposed. See State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480, 231 S.E.2d 833 (1977); State v. McMorris, supra; State v. Rhodes, supra. Such an instruction may be given or withheld in his discretion and the exercise of that discretion will not, absent abuse, be disturbed on appeal. State v. Bumper, 275 N.C. 670, 170 S.E.2d 457 (1969); Welch v. Kearns, 261 N.C. 171, 134 S.E.2d 155 (1964). No abuse of discretion is shown. Defendant's third assignment of error is overruled. Defendant's fourth assignment addressed to the charge is without merit and requires no discussion. When read contextually, the charge as a whole is free from prejudicial error. Defendant's motion in arrest of judgment is based on the alleged insufficiency of the indictment argued under his second assignment of error. The question posed here was resolved against him there and deserves no further discussion. We hold the motion was properly denied. Defendant's motion to set aside the verdict is addressed to the discretion of the trial court and refusal to grant it is not reviewable in the absence of abuse of discretion. State v. Downey, 253 N.C. 348, 117 S.E.2d 39 (1960). Nothing presented shows abuse of discretion in this aspect of the trial. *226 Defendant having failed to show prejudicial error, the verdict and judgment must be upheld. NO ERROR.