Case Title: In re A.M.L.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 69A20

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2021-03-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-21 
No. 69A20 
Filed 19 March 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF: A.M.L., G.J.L., B.J.B., J.E.B., T.R.B., Jr. 
 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from orders entered on 
26 November 2019 by Judge Jeanie R. Houston in District Court, Wilkes County. 
This matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 11 February 2021 
but determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) 
of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
Erika Leigh Hamby for petitioner-appellee Wilkes County Department of Social 
Services. 
 
Poyner Spruill LLP, by John Michael Durnovich and Christopher S. Dwight, 
for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Sydney Batch for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
 
BARRINGER, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Respondent-mother appeals from the trial court’s 26 November 2019 orders 
terminating her parental rights in her minor children A.M.L. (Allie),1 G.J.L. 
(Gregory), T.R.B., Jr. (Teddy), J.E.B. (Johnson), and B.J.B. (Braxton).2 Upon careful 
                                            
1 Pseudonyms are used throughout this opinion to protect the identities of the 
juveniles. 
2 While the parental rights of the children’s fathers were also terminated, neither 
father appealed the trial court’s termination orders nor are they parties to this appeal. The 
trial court terminated the parental rights of Teddy, Johnson, and Braxton’s father in the 
IN RE A.M.L., G.J.L., B.J.B., J.E.B., T.R.B., JR. 
2021-NCSC-21 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
consideration, we affirm the trial court’s orders terminating respondent-mother’s 
parental rights. 
I. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
¶ 2 
 
The Wilkes County Department of Social Services (DSS) first became involved 
with respondent-mother almost a decade and a half before the ultimate termination 
of her parental rights. In July of 2005, DSS conducted a family assessment based on 
allegations of neglect. At that time, respondent-mother’s eldest child, Allie, was 
barely one year old, while her little brother, Gregory, was only a few months old. 
Since that first assessment, respondent-mother has incurred more than a dozen 
subsequent DSS assessments, subjecting Allie and Gregory, as well as their younger 
brothers Teddy, Johnson, and Braxton, to multiple placements in foster care, three 
placements in case management, and numerous case decisions for services needed or 
services recommended. 
¶ 3 
 
 On 25 January 2018, DSS received a report alleging drug use in respondent-
mother’s home while her five children—thirteen-year-old Allie, twelve-year-old 
Gregory, ten-year-old Teddy, three-year-old Johnson, and three-year-old Braxton—
were locked in a room. DSS’s investigation confirmed the allegations. Allie and 
Gregory reported that their parents invited strange men into the home, permitted 
                                            
same 26 November 2019 orders that terminated respondent-mother’s parental rights. As for 
Allie and Gregory’s father, the trial court terminated his parental rights by a different order 
entered in a separate termination hearing. 
IN RE A.M.L., G.J.L., B.J.B., J.E.B., T.R.B., JR. 
2021-NCSC-21 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
drug use in the home, used drugs themselves, and locked the children in a room for 
hours at a time, leaving Allie to care for her younger siblings. Further, respondent-
mother encouraged Allie and Gregory to use marijuana, and Gregory, influenced by 
the encouragement, used marijuana. 
¶ 4 
 
In response, DSS attempted to place the children in safety resource 
placements. However, both placements failed—the first caregiver was unable to care 
for the children and the second disregarded the safety plan and allowed the parents 
unsupervised time alone with the children. As a result, DSS obtained nonsecure 
custody of the children and filed juvenile petitions alleging that the children were 
neglected juveniles. After a hearing on 19 March 2018, the trial court entered a 
disposition order on 28 June 2018 adjudicating the children to be neglected juveniles, 
ordering custody of the children to remain with DSS, and granting supervised 
visitation to respondent-mother on the condition that she pass random drug screens. 
¶ 5 
 
DSS prepared a case plan that required respondent-mother to take parenting 
classes, complete a substance abuse assessment and follow any treatment 
recommendations, complete a mental health assessment and follow any treatment 
recommendations, participate in a recovery group, obtain and maintain appropriate 
housing and employment, complete random drug screens, attend a group designed to 
assist with special needs children, develop knowledge of Johnson’s diagnosis and 
needs, attend all visitations, sign a voluntary support agreement, remain in contact 
IN RE A.M.L., G.J.L., B.J.B., J.E.B., T.R.B., JR. 
2021-NCSC-21 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
and attend meetings with DSS, refrain from criminal activity, and provide written 
statements as to why the children were placed in DSS custody. 
¶ 6 
 
In the permanency planning and review orders entered after a 25 June 2018 
hearing, the trial court found that respondent-mother had made no progress on her 
case plan. After signing the case plan, respondent-mother had failed two drug screens 
(testing positive for methamphetamine and OxyContin), been incarcerated twice in 
the prior three weeks, failed to comply with any of DSS’s requests, maintained 
minimal contact with the social worker, and only visited once with all five children. 
In addition, since the children entered custody on 31 January 2018, respondent-
mother had incurred twenty-six criminal charges. As a result, the trial court left 
custody of the children with DSS, set the primary plan for the children as adoption 
with a secondary plan of custody with an approved caregiver, and relieved DSS of 
further efforts towards reunification. 
¶ 7 
 
In an order filed following the next permanency-planning hearing on 
4 February 2019, the trial court found that respondent-mother had made “very little 
progress” on her case plan and still “need[ed] significant substance abuse and mental 
health treatment.” Due to its assessment, the trial court made no changes to custody, 
visitation, or the children’s permanent plans. 
¶ 8 
 
On 4 March 2019, DSS filed petitions to terminate respondent-mother’s 
parental rights due to her neglect and willful failure to make reasonable progress 
IN RE A.M.L., G.J.L., B.J.B., J.E.B., T.R.B., JR. 
2021-NCSC-21 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2). In addition, DSS alleged that grounds existed 
to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights in Teddy, Johnson, and Braxton for 
dependency under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6). The trial court held the termination 
hearing on 13 June and 1 July 2019. 
¶ 9 
 
On 26 November 2019, the trial court entered orders terminating respondent-
mother’s parental rights. After making extensive findings of fact, the trial court 
concluded that grounds existed to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights in 
each child pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (6) and that it was in each 
child’s best interests to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights. Respondent-
mother appeals from these termination orders. 
II. 
Standard of Review 
¶ 10 
 
The Juvenile Code provides a two-step process for termination of parental 
rights consisting of an adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage. N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-
1109 to -1110 (2019). During the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden 
of proving by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that one or more grounds for 
termination exists. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e)–(f). If the petitioner meets this burden, the 
matter proceeds to the dispositional stage where the trial court must determine 
whether termination of parental rights is in the children’s best interests. N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1110(a). 
IN RE A.M.L., G.J.L., B.J.B., J.E.B., T.R.B., JR. 
2021-NCSC-21 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 11 
 
This Court reviews the trial court’s adjudication of grounds to terminate 
parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) “to determine whether the findings are 
supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support the 
conclusions of law.” In re N.G., 374 N.C. 891, 895 (2020) (quoting In re Montgomery, 
311 N.C. 101, 111 (1984)). If a finding of fact is supported by clear, cogent, and 
convincing evidence, it “is deemed conclusive even if the record contains evidence that 
would support a contrary finding.” In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 379 (2019). Meanwhile, 
findings of fact “not challenged by respondent are deemed supported by competent 
evidence and are binding on appeal.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407 (2019). Finally, 
this Court reviews de novo “whether a trial court’s findings of fact support its 
conclusions of law.” In re J.S., 374 N.C. 811, 814 (2020). 
III. 
Analysis 
¶ 12 
 
Respondent-mother challenges all three grounds for termination adjudicated 
by the trial court. Since “an adjudication of any single ground for termination under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) will suffice to support a trial court’s order terminating parental 
rights,” this Court need only uphold one of the statutory grounds adjudicated by the 
trial court. In re L.M.M., 375 N.C. 346, 349 (2020). 
¶ 13 
 
The second ground adjudicated for the termination of respondent-mother’s 
parental rights was for willfully leaving her children in foster care or placement 
outside the home without making reasonable progress, per N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). 
IN RE A.M.L., G.J.L., B.J.B., J.E.B., T.R.B., JR. 
2021-NCSC-21 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
To terminate parental rights under this provision, the trial court must find that 
respondent-mother (1) “willfully left the juvenile[s] in foster care or placement outside 
the home for more than 12 months,” and (2) respondent-mother did not show 
“reasonable progress under the circumstances . . . in correcting those conditions which 
led to the removal of the juvenile[s].” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) (2019). 
¶ 14 
 
In adjudicating grounds for the termination of respondent-mother’s parental 
rights, the trial court made the following findings of fact:3 
16. The minor child[ren have] remained in the care and 
custody of the Wilkes County Department of Social 
Services continuously since January 31, 2018 and 
therefore, [have] been in the care and custody of [DSS] 
for approximately sixteen (16) months at the time of 
this hearing. 
. . . . 
18. Investigator Norwood spoke to [Allie] who indicated 
that there was active drug use in the home, some drug 
use in front of the children, Respondent Mother 
encouraged the older children to use marijuana, and 
[Allie] and her siblings were locked in a room while she 
was made to provide care for them. 
. . . . 
20. At the time of the report the family was living in a 
house on Boone Trail. [Allie] got an award from school 
and was excited to show her mother and step-father. 
She went into the bathroom and saw Mother with a 
needle in her arm and step-father with a cloth around 
                                            
3 The quoted language comes from the order terminating respondent-mother’s 
parental rights in Allie. While the trial court entered separate orders for each child, the 
orders are nearly identical as to the findings and conclusions related to respondent-mother. 
IN RE A.M.L., G.J.L., B.J.B., J.E.B., T.R.B., JR. 
2021-NCSC-21 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
his arm. 
21. [Allie] confirmed that Respondent Mother and her 
step-father were aware that the children had been 
offered marijuana by a cousin and they allowed at least 
one of the children to use marijuana. 
. . . . 
26. After the minor child[ren] w[ere] placed into the care 
and custody of [DSS], a Family Services Case Plan was 
developed on February 27, 2018 for Respondent Mother 
to address the conditions that led to the minor 
child[ren]’s removal from the home specifically: 
substance abuse, parenting skills, and mental health. 
27. Respondent Mother signed her Family Services Case 
Plans with [DSS] on May 1, 2018, after the minor 
child[ren] had been in care for over four months. 
28. Prior to May 1, 2018 Respondent Mother was not 
cooperating with the agency, she was not maintaining 
contact with the Social Worker, and was not utilizing 
visitation with the minor child[ren]. 
. . . . 
33. Subsequent to the minor child[ren] coming into the 
care of [DSS], Respondent Mother obtained 26 new 
criminal charges in four surrounding counties. These 
charges included breaking and entering, simple 
possession of controlled substances, and larceny. She 
spent some time in jail after initially being charged, but 
she did not have any lengthy period of incarceration. 
. . . . 
35. [DSS] sent referrals for substance abuse and mental 
health assessments to Daymark Recovery in May 2018. 
Respondent Mother did not complete assessments with 
Daymark until approximately March 2019 while in 
IN RE A.M.L., G.J.L., B.J.B., J.E.B., T.R.B., JR. 
2021-NCSC-21 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
Case 
Management 
with 
her 
new 
child. 
This 
assessment appeared to be only a substance abuse 
assessment, and did not appear to include a mental 
health assessment. 
36. Respondent Mother tested positive for buprenorphine 
at the time of her assessment with Daymark in March 
2019. When questioned about being positive for 
buprenorphine, she told the assessors that she was 
participating in treatment with Rowan Psychiatric. 
Due 
to 
her 
reported 
compliance 
with 
Rowan 
Psychiatric, she was not given any recommendations 
by Daymark other than to continue in treatment. 
37. [DSS] was unaware of the mother’s participation with 
Rowan Psychiatric until receiving the assessment from 
Daymark Recovery. [DSS] cannot verify that the 
mother 
completed 
an 
assessment 
at 
Rowan 
Psychiatric, 
or 
that 
she 
was 
receiving 
the 
comprehensive treatment including medication and 
counseling. 
38. The Social Worker requested Respondent Mother’s 
records from Rowan Psychiatric. The Social Worker 
received records for Respondent Mother, but those 
records primarily consisted of drug screen results. Most 
screens were negative, but the records did indicate that 
the mother tested positive for oxymorphone in 
November 2018. Respondent Mother began attending 
Rowan Psychiatric in September 2018. 
. . . . 
46. Respondent Mother was requested to attend Recovery 
Seekers or a similar group for individuals in recovery. 
She has not participated in such a group. 
47. Respondent Mother was to participate in random drug 
screens to demonstrate compliance with substance 
abuse treatment, and appropriate use of medication. 
Mother was called for approximately twenty-three 
IN RE A.M.L., G.J.L., B.J.B., J.E.B., T.R.B., JR. 
2021-NCSC-21 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
random drug screens. 
a. She failed to show for screens eight times . . . . 
b. Respondent Mother appeared and passed drug 
screens nine times . . . . 
c. 
Respondent Mother appeared and failed drug 
screens five times on the following dates: 
February 6, 2018 failed for methamphetamine, 
July 16, 2018 failed for amphetamine, October 1, 
2018 failed for oxymorphone, November 6, 2018 
failed for oxymorphone, and May 16, 2019 failed 
for amphetamine and methamphetamine. 
48. Respondent Mother asserted that she believed she 
failed the May 16, 2019 drug screen due to taking 
Zyrtec and Sudafed for allergies and congestion. The 
[c]ourt did not find this assertion compelling. 
. . . . 
55. Respondent Mother indicates that she attends Rowan 
Psychiatric for Subutex treatment, and states that she 
has appointments once a month to receive her 
medications, attend counseling, and see her doctor. She 
indicates that she is drug tested when she visits the 
doctor, and that she is receiving treatment for bi-polar 
as well. 
56. Respondent Mother acknowledged that she did not 
inform the Social Worker about her participating in 
treatment at Rowan Psychiatric or the prescription 
medication(s) she received as part of that treatment. 
. . . . 
60. Respondent Mother claims to be drug free for 6 to 7 
months, but failed drug screens in November 2018 and 
May 2019. 
61. Respondent Mother tends to overstate her periods of 
IN RE A.M.L., G.J.L., B.J.B., J.E.B., T.R.B., JR. 
2021-NCSC-21 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
sobriety. . . . 
. . . . 
64. Respondent Mother attributed [her] late start working 
on the Case Plan to not having a hard copy of the Case 
Plan to reference. The [c]ourt did not find this 
persuasive as Respondent Mother had participated in 
multiple cases of Case Management with [DSS] in the 
past and had always been able to complete those items 
timely. 
65. Respondent Mother and her husband in fact completed 
their Voluntary Services Plan for their newest child 
within 60 days. 
66. The minor child[ren] . . . have been in the care of [DSS] 
on two other occasions due to similar allegations 
regarding 
substance 
abuse. 
On 
both 
occasions 
Respondent Mother complied with her Family Services 
Case Plan and the children were returned to her care 
only to reenter care again due to the same or similar 
concerns of substance abuse. 
67. Respondent Mother admitted that even without a hard 
copy Case Plan to reference, due to her past 
involvement with [DSS] she was aware that she would 
need to take parenting classes, and address her 
substance abuse concerns. 
. . . . 
69. Though Respondent Mother purports to have been 
working a substance abuse treatment plan through 
Rowan Psychiatric since September 2018, she has 
failed at least three drug screens since September 
2018. 
70. Respondent Mother reports that she is being treated 
for bipolar though her records received from Rowan 
Psychiatric do not reveal a mental health assessment 
IN RE A.M.L., G.J.L., B.J.B., J.E.B., T.R.B., JR. 
2021-NCSC-21 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
or any mental health treatment. 
. . . . 
72. Respondent Mother has not adequately addressed her 
substance abuse or mental health issues . . . . 
¶ 15 
 
After making these findings, the trial court concluded 
[t]hat upon clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the 
minor child[ren have] been willfully left in foster care for 
more than twelve (12) months without Respondent Mother 
making reasonable progress to correct the conditions that 
led to [their] removal, specifically substance abuse, 
parenting skills, and mental health. Considering that 
Respondent Mother has made very little progress on her 
Family Services Case Plan, and there is no evidence she 
has adequately addressed these issues outside of a Case 
Plan, and she ultimately did not maintain a stable bond 
between herself and the minor child[ren]. Therefore, the 
Petitioner has shown that grounds exist pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) 
to 
terminate 
Respondent 
Mother’s parental rights. 
¶ 16 
 
On appeal, respondent-mother concedes that she left her children in foster care 
for sixteen months, exceeding the twelve months required to terminate parental 
rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). However, respondent-mother contests several 
of the trial court’s findings of facts, as well as its conclusion to terminate her parental 
rights, arguing that she substantially complied with the case plan. 
A. Challenge to the Trial Court’s Finding That There Was Time Available 
for Respondent-Mother to Complete the Case Plan 
¶ 17 
 
Respondent-mother begins by challenging the trial court’s findings concerning 
her lack of progress before signing the case plan on 1 May 2018. According to 
IN RE A.M.L., G.J.L., B.J.B., J.E.B., T.R.B., JR. 
2021-NCSC-21 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
respondent-mother, she was not provided a copy of her case plan when DSS first 
created it on 27 February 2018. However, the trial court considered this assertion in 
its findings of fact, noting that respondent-mother had successfully completed two 
previous case plans and thus “was aware that she would need to take parenting 
classes[ ] and address her substance abuse concerns.” Moreover, respondent-mother 
testified that she knew from the beginning that, regardless of the case plan, she 
needed to address her substance abuse issues. Yet despite this knowledge, 
respondent-mother did not point to a single action taken prior to 1 May 2018 that 
addressed either her parenting or substance abuse issues. 
¶ 18 
 
Additionally, the trial court noted that respondent-mother’s alleged “late start 
working on the Case Plan” was not persuasive because she had previously completed 
two other case plans in a timely manner. The record supports this determination. 
DSS created the case plan on 27 February 2018. Even if respondent-mother did not 
receive a copy of the case plan until 1 May 2018, she was without a physical copy for 
at most sixty-two days. In comparison, the termination hearing occurred a full year 
after 1 May 2018, on 13 June and 1 July 2019, giving respondent-mother ample time 
to comply with the case plan after she signed it. Accordingly, the trial court did not 
err by finding that respondent-mother had sufficient time—namely an entire year—
to make reasonable progress on the case plan, regardless of the two months she may 
have been without a physical copy. 
IN RE A.M.L., G.J.L., B.J.B., J.E.B., T.R.B., JR. 
2021-NCSC-21 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 19 
 
In a similar vein, respondent-mother challenges finding of fact 28—that she 
was not cooperating with DSS, not maintaining contact with the social worker, and 
not visiting her children prior to 1 May 2018. This finding of fact has no impact on 
our analysis. Accordingly, we decline to address respondent-mother’s assignment of 
error regarding finding of fact 28. As previously noted, even ignoring the two months 
that elapsed between the case plan’s creation and the day it was signed, respondent-
mother still had more than a full year to make reasonable progress on the case plan. 
Regardless of her behavior during the two months when she allegedly was unable to 
contact the social worker or visit the children, her actions during the next year were 
sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that she failed to make reasonable 
progress on her case plan. 
B. Challenge to the Trial Court’s Finding That Respondent-Mother Did Not 
Make Progress on the Case Plan 
¶ 20 
 
Respondent-mother’s primary argument is that her actions in the year before 
the termination hearing contradict the trial court’s findings that she made very little 
progress on her case plan. However, the trial court acknowledged these actions in its 
findings of fact; they simply were not enough to comprise reasonable progress. After 
careful review, we hold that the trial court’s conclusion that grounds for termination 
of respondent-mother’s parental rights existed under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) was 
supported by the findings of fact, and so we affirm. 
IN RE A.M.L., G.J.L., B.J.B., J.E.B., T.R.B., JR. 
2021-NCSC-21 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 21 
 
As this Court has recognized, “in order for a respondent’s noncompliance with 
her case plan to support the termination of her parental rights, there must be a nexus 
between the components of the court-approved case plan with which the respondent 
failed to comply and the conditions which led to the child’s removal from the parental 
home.” In re J.S., 374 N.C. at 815–16 (cleaned up) (quoting In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. at 
385). In this case, the nexus is respondent-mother’s substance abuse, which directly 
led to the children’s removal on 31 January 2018 and had previously led to her losing 
custody of the children on multiple other occasions. Accordingly, the case plan created 
by DSS was tailored to help respondent-mother overcome her substance abuse issues, 
as well as address her parenting skills and mental health struggles. While 
respondent-mother emphasizes the progress she made on the parenting skills portion 
of the case plan, the trial court’s findings focused on the true gravamen of her case—
her substance abuse—as well as her mental health struggles. Since “we review only 
those findings needed to sustain the trial court’s adjudication,” we address only her 
substance abuse and mental health issues. See In re J.S., 374 N.C. at 814. 
¶ 22 
 
As previously noted, respondent-mother’s substance abuse has resulted in 
DSS’s recurring involvement with the family and the children’s placement in DSS 
custody on multiple prior occasions. Respondent-mother testified that she had 
attempted recovery numerous times and agreed with Allie’s testimony that she has 
been in a cycle of recovery and relapse. In its findings, the trial court noted that 
IN RE A.M.L., G.J.L., B.J.B., J.E.B., T.R.B., JR. 
2021-NCSC-21 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
respondent-mother had been “in recovery on at least three prior occasions” and had 
“admit[ed] and acknowledged a history of substance abuse in her written statements 
as to why the children were brought into care, as well as during conversation with 
the Social Worker.” 
¶ 23 
 
Although respondent-mother recognized that her substance abuse resulted in 
losing custody of her children, she failed to make adequate progress to address it 
during the sixteen months following the children’s removal. Respondent-mother’s 
case plan required her to complete a substance abuse assessment, submit to drug 
screens, and participate in a group recovery program. In May 2018, DSS referred 
respondent-mother to Daymark Recovery for a substance abuse assessment as part 
of the case plan concerning Allie, Gregory, Teddy, Johnson, and Braxton, but 
respondent-mother never went. Instead, it was not until she was completing her case 
plan regarding a different child, her infant born on 18 January 2019, that 
respondent-mother went to Daymark Recovery for an assessment in March 2019. In 
addition, although respondent-mother was required to attend a recovery group, she 
never participated in one. 
¶ 24 
 
Even more concerning, respondent-mother repeatedly failed drug screens 
throughout the pendency of her case, including one less than a month before the 
13 June 2019 termination hearing. Of the more than twenty random drug screens 
DSS requested, respondent-mother failed five screens, did not show up for an 
IN RE A.M.L., G.J.L., B.J.B., J.E.B., T.R.B., JR. 
2021-NCSC-21 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
additional eight screens, and passed only nine. Moreover, the trial court’s findings 
reveal that out of the five drugs screens respondent-mother failed, three of them 
occurred after respondent-mother purported to have begun participating in substance 
abuse treatment through Rowan Psychiatric in September 2018.4 The most recent 
failed screen—at which respondent-mother tested positive for amphetamine and 
methamphetamine—occurred on 16 May 2019, less than one month before the 
termination hearing. While respondent-mother asserted that this failed screen was 
due to taking Zyrtec and Sudafed for allergies and congestion, the trial court gave 
little weight to the explanation, specifically stating that it “did not find this assertion 
compelling.” 
¶ 25 
 
Respondent-mother argues that she made such substantial progress in 
addressing her substance abuse that the trial court erred by finding sufficient 
grounds to terminate her parental rights. In support of this contention, respondent-
mother relies on her own testimony that she completed a substance abuse assessment 
at Rowan Psychiatric and was participating in treatment. The trial court considered 
this evidence in making its decision. However, the trial court found respondent-
mother’s assertions were undermined by her failure to report any of this treatment 
                                            
4 The findings further show that two of respondent-mother’s missed drug screens 
occurred after she purported to have been seeking treatment at Rowan Psychiatric. 
IN RE A.M.L., G.J.L., B.J.B., J.E.B., T.R.B., JR. 
2021-NCSC-21 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
to DSS—and, more importantly, the fact that DSS’s record request to Rowan 
Psychiatric revealed primarily drug screen results. 
¶ 26 
 
According to the social worker’s testimony, Rowan Psychiatric reported that 
respondent-mother was not participating in a full substance abuse program and had 
not completed a substance abuse assessment. Instead, respondent-mother was only 
participating in a methadone treatment program. Based on the social worker’s 
testimony and the records Rowan Psychiatric provided DSS, which consisted 
primarily of drug screen results, the trial court found that DSS could not “verify that 
[respondent-mother] completed an assessment at Rowan Psychiatric, or that she was 
receiving comprehensive treatment.” 
¶ 27 
 
The second focus of the trial court’s findings was respondent-mother’s mental 
health issues. On appeal, respondent-mother does not challenge any of the trial 
court’s findings concerning her failure to make reasonable progress toward improving 
her mental health. Therefore, these findings “are deemed supported by competent 
evidence and are binding on appeal.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 407. 
¶ 28 
 
While N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) does not require parents to “fully satisfy all 
elements of the case plan goals,” they must at least make more than “ ‘extremely 
limited progress’ in correcting the conditions leading to removal.” In re B.O.A., 372 
N.C. at 385 (quoting In re J.S.L., 177 N.C. App. 151, 160, 163 (2006)). The findings 
above show that despite respondent-mother recognizing that her substance abuse 
IN RE A.M.L., G.J.L., B.J.B., J.E.B., T.R.B., JR. 
2021-NCSC-21 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
issues were the primary reason she kept losing custody of her children, she still failed 
to show reasonable progress under her case plan, particularly in correcting the 
conditions which led to the removal of her children. Respondent-mother frequently 
skipped drug screens; failed a number of the drug screens, including one less than a 
month before the termination hearing; did not participate in any support group; and, 
at best, participated in only limited treatment. These facts, combined with 
respondent-mother’s noncompletion of any of the mental health aspects of the case 
plan, support the trial court’s conclusion that she failed to make reasonable progress 
to remedy the conditions that led to the children’s removal, regardless of respondent-
mother’s steps toward improving her parenting skills. 
C. Challenge to the Trial Court’s Finding of Willfulness 
¶ 29 
 
Respondent-mother also challenges the trial court’s conclusion that her failure 
to make reasonable progress was willful. This Court has already established that 
“[t]he determination that respondent acted ‘willfully’ is a finding of fact rather than 
a conclusion of law.” In re J.S., 374 N.C. at 818. In addition, a “finding that a parent 
acted ‘willfully’ for [the] purposes of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) does not require a 
showing of fault by the parent.” Id. at 815 (cleaned up) (quoting In re Oghenekevebe, 
123 N.C. App. 434, 439 (1996)). It simply requires respondent-mother’s “prolonged 
inability to improve her situation, despite some efforts in that direction.” Id. (quoting 
In re J.W., 173 N.C. App. 450, 465 (2005)). 
IN RE A.M.L., G.J.L., B.J.B., J.E.B., T.R.B., JR. 
2021-NCSC-21 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 30 
 
The evidence reviewed above already establishes respondent-mother’s 
prolonged failure to improve her situation. Further, respondent-mother’s willfulness 
was confirmed by her ability to complete the case plan for her infant child. While 
respondent-mother argues that DSS’s determination not to seek custody of that child 
contradicts the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights in the rest of the 
children, it actually highlights her willfulness. After all, respondent-mother 
completed the case plan concerning her infant child, leading DSS to not seek custody 
of the newborn. In contrast, as discussed above, respondent-mother did not make 
reasonable progress on the case plan concerning the rest of her children. Moreover, 
the trial court noted that on two previous occasions respondent-mother had timely 
completed her assigned case plans. Given this evidence, we uphold the portion of the 
trial court’s orders finding that respondent-mother’s failure to make progress on the 
case plan in this case demonstrated willfulness. 
IV. 
Conclusion 
¶ 31 
 
The trial court did not err by terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights. 
Contrary to respondent-mother’s arguments, the trial court’s findings involving the 
ample time respondent-mother had to make progress on her case plan, her failure to 
adequately address her substance abuse and mental health issues, and the 
willfulness of her actions were all supported by clear, cogent, and convincing 
evidence. When considered in conjunction with respondent-mother’s admission that 
IN RE A.M.L., G.J.L., B.J.B., J.E.B., T.R.B., JR. 
2021-NCSC-21 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
the children were in DSS custody for more than twelve months, the findings support 
the trial court’s conclusion that grounds for termination existed under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(2). Since respondent-mother has not challenged the trial court’s 
determination that termination was in the best interests of the five children, the trial 
court properly terminated her parental rights in Allie, Gregory, Teddy, Johnson, and 
Braxton. As a result, we affirm the orders of the trial court. 
AFFIRMED.