Case Title: Malone v. Courtyard by Marriott L.P

Citation: 1996-Ohio-311

Docket Number: 19941413

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-02-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
MALONE ET AL., APPELLEES, v. COURTYARD BY MARRIOTT LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Malone v. Courtyard by Marriott L.P. (1996), ____Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Torts — Negligence — Safety and well-being of hotel guests — Damages — 
Absent proof of a defendant’s subjective knowledge of danger posed to 
another, a punitive damages claim against that defendant premised on the 
“conscious disregard” theory of malice is not warranted. 
Absent proof of a defendant’s subjective knowledge of danger posed to another, a 
punitive damages claim against that defendant premised on the “conscious 
disregard” theory of malice is not warranted. 
 
(No. 94-1413 — Submitted November 14, 1995 — Decided February 7, 
1996.) 
 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 93APE10-
1407. 
 
On July 21, 1989, appellees Lolita Malone and Karen Linda Meador 
traveled from Columbus to the Cincinnati area to attend the annual Kool Jazz 
Festival.  They arrived at a Courtyard by Marriott (“Marriott”) in Blue Ash, Ohio, 
at approximately 11:30 p.m. and were assigned Room 249.  The atmosphere at the 
hotel that night was described as being like a college dorm party. 
 
 
2
 
The tragic series of events underlying this case was set in motion when 
Malone and Meador encountered Vincent Gatewood at the hotel elevator.  
Gatewood introduced himself as Vincent Michaels and, after some initial small 
talk, accompanied Malone and Meador to their room.  Gatewood offered to get 
some drinks and appellees accepted. 
 
At approximately 12:30 a.m., while appellees were talking and drinking 
with Gatewood, Christopher Letkiewicz, a Marriott security guard, knocked on the 
door of Malone and Meador’s room and informed them of noise complaints.  
Meador told Letkiewicz that they would be more quiet.  Shortly thereafter, 
appellees asked Gatewood to leave the room so they could get dressed to go out to 
some area bars. Gatewood complied with this request. 
 
Gatewood returned to the appellees’ room around 1:30 and offered to guide 
them to the clubs.  Malone and Meador accepted his offer, and Gatewood led them 
in a separate car.  Appellees and Gatewood drove to three nightclubs between 1:30 
and 3:30 a.m., but did not enter any of them.  The three of them returned to the 
Marriott around 3:30 a.m. 
 
Gatewood accompanied appellees back to their room and opened their door 
after Meador supplied him with the key.  After entering the room, appellees told 
 
 
3
Gatewood that they were tired, but Gatewood insisted that they have another 
drink, and the appellees agreed.  While Gatewood was out of the room Meador 
changed into her bed clothes and got into bed.  However, Malone did not prepare 
for bed because she still hoped to see her boyfriend, Brian Hood, that morning.  
After a few minutes, Gatewood reentered appellees’ room with some wine coolers. 
 
At approximately 3:45 a.m. Malone received a telephone call from Hood, 
and the two talked about meeting at either the hotel or the home of one of Hood’s 
friends.1  Hood also spoke with Meador briefly and tried to convince her to 
accompany Malone, but Meador declined.  After Meador handed the telephone 
back to Malone, Gatewood approached her, leaned on her bed, and suggested that 
Meador stay at the hotel while Malone went out.  At that point, Meador informed 
Malone that she intended to accompany Malone on her visit to Hood.  Meador got 
out of bed and asked Gatewood to leave so that she could change into her street 
clothes.  Gatewood indicated that he did not want to leave, and Meador repeated 
her request.  Gatewood became angry and a brief shouting match ensued between 
Meador and him.  Fearing that Gatewood might become violent, Malone testified 
that she stepped between Gatewood and Meador and coaxed him out of the room.  
Gatewood loitered in the hallway for several minutes. 
 
 
4
 
At this point the account of events that morning diverge significantly.  At 
trial, appellees testified that once Meador was ready to leave with Malone, she 
realized that she had misplaced her room key.2  Assuming that Gatewood still had 
the key, Malone opened the door and asked Gatewood if he had Meador’s key. 
 
Appellees testified that Gatewood became enraged by this question, rushed 
the door, entered appellees’ room, pushed Malone toward the vanity area and 
began strangling her.  Meador moved toward Gatewood in an attempt to assist 
Malone, but Gatewood turned and struck her in the face.  Malone took advantage 
of this distraction and fled the room in an attempt to get to the elevator at the end 
of the hall.  Malone testified that Gatewood pursued her down the hallway, 
grabbed her before the elevator door opened and shoved her into his room, No. 
237, which was adjacent to the elevator.  Meador ran down the hallway, screaming 
for help.  Meador saw Gatewood and attempted to gain entry into the room to help 
Malone.  Gatewood first tried to block Meador’s entry, but then grabbed her, 
forced her into the room and threw her up against the wall.  She hit the dresser and 
landed on Malone. 
 
However, appellees had related a different version of this portion of events 
to Jean Reed, a social worker they met with on July 22, 1989.  Reed testified at 
 
 
5
trial that neither of the appellees mentioned anything to her about the first assault 
that occurred in their own room.  Reed stated that appellees told her that 
Gatewood returned to his room after shouting profanities in the hall.  Reed 
testified that Malone stated that she left her room and walked to the elevator, 
which she planned to take to the lobby to complain to the hotel staff about 
Gatewood.  When Malone neared the elevator, Gatewood emerged from his room, 
grabbed her, and dragged her into his room.  Meador, who had been monitoring 
Malone’s progress down the hall, witnessed Gatewood’s actions and ran to assist 
Malone.  At this point, appellees’ account to Reed and their trial testimony again 
converge. 
 
Once Malone and Meador were inside Gatewood’s room, they began 
screaming and pleading with Gatewood to let them go.  Gatewood ordered them to 
be quiet and threatened to kill them if they failed to cooperate.  He then told them 
to undress, and when they failed to comply, he ripped off their clothing.  Over the 
next three hours, Gatewood repeatedly raped appellees, Malone vaginally and 
Meador anally. 
 
At approximately 7:00 a.m., Malone, hoping to gain her and Meador’s 
release, told Gatewood that she and Meador were planning to meet friends in their 
 
 
6
room that morning, and that their absence might make their friends suspicious.  
Gatewood agreed to let appellees go, but told them that if they reported the rapes 
to the authorities, relatives of his in Columbus would find them and “get” them. 
 
Upon leaving Gatewood’s room, the appellees went to the hotel lobby to get 
another key to their room.  After obtaining a new key, appellees briefly returned to 
their room and then went to a local hospital.  They informed hospital personnel 
that they had been raped and were examined by a physician.  As recounted above, 
they also spoke to Reed, as well as representatives of the Blue Ash Police 
Department.  Criminal charges were brought against Gatewood, but the record in 
this case is silent on the outcome of those proceedings. 
 
On September 18, 1990, appellees filed a complaint in Franklin County 
Common Pleas Court against both Gatewood and Courtyard by Marriott, although 
Gatewood was later dropped as a party to the civil action.  This complaint was 
amended after the close of evidence at trial to include the Marriott Corporation.  In 
their amended complaint, appellees asserted that Marriott personnel negligently 
failed to respond to reports by other hotel guests of an “abusive situation.”  
Appellees also stated that Marriott’s alleged failure to respond to these calls from 
other guests was “willful, wanton, and reckless, and demonstrated a conscious 
 
 
7
disregard for the safety and well being of Malone and Meador when a great 
probability of harm existed,” entitling appellees to punitive damages. 
 
The matter went to trial on June 21, 1993.  Apart from the testimony of 
Malone, Meador, Hood, Letkiewicz and Reed, other relevant testimony included 
videotaped depositions of Michael and Leslie Macke and Eunela Williams, and 
subsequent live testimony by Mr. Macke.  These three individuals were guests at 
the Marriott on the same night that Malone and Meador were sexually assaulted. 
 
Mr. Macke, who was in Room 247, the room adjoining appellees’ room, 
testified that he made three separate calls to the Marriott front desk on the morning 
of July 22.  He first called at approximately 1:30 a.m. to make a general complaint 
about the level of noise and partying throughout the wing of the building in which 
he and his family were staying. 
 
His second call was placed around 3:30 a.m. after he had been awakened by 
a loud thud against the wall adjacent to the headboard of the bed.  Macke assumed 
that this noise came from the room on the opposite side of the wall.  His 
subsequent live testimony revealed that Macke had been referring to Room 245, 
which was neither appellees’ nor Gatewood’s room.  During his deposition 
testimony, Macke stated that he informed the front desk that “something had 
 
 
8
happened, that maybe there was some — some furniture being damaged or 
potentially being damaged or someone might be getting hurt * * *, something was 
happening that was not good and I thought perhaps they ought to come up and 
check it out.”  Macke testified that his third and final call was made between 4:30 
a.m. and 4:45 a.m., after appellees were already in Gatewood’s room.  The 
substance of this call, as Macke related it at trial, was that “something was going 
on, that someone might need some assistance, that I really didn’t know, but there 
were people running down the hall * * *.” 
 
Leslie Macke’s testimony differed somewhat from her husband’s on two 
particulars.  First, Mrs. Macke testified that only three or four minutes elapsed 
between her husband’s second and third calls to the front desk, rather than the 
hour to hour and fifteen minutes to which Mr. Macke testified.  The second 
significant inconsistency between  Mr. and Mrs. Macke’s testimony was Mrs. 
Macke’s recollection of the substance of her husband’s third call to the front desk.  
It was her testimony that Mr. Macke told the front desk that “[n]ow the girl is 
screaming in the hallway for help.” 
 
Eunela Williams also contacted the front desk on the morning of July 22, 
although there was some confusion in her testimony concerning the number and 
 
 
9
timing of the calls she made that morning. Williams first asserted that she made 
only one call to the desk after her husband and she were awakened by a loud bump 
at approximately 4:00 a.m.  After listening to what she assumed was a domestic 
squabble for approximately ten to fifteen minutes, she called the front desk.  She 
then moved back the time of her call to roughly two to three minutes after her 
husband and she were awakened by the noise.  She stated that she made only one 
call. 
 
After 
being 
pressed 
by 
appellees’ 
counsel, 
however, 
Williams 
acknowledged that she did make two calls, the first a few minutes after she was 
awakened and the second ten to fifteen minutes after the first. Williams testified 
that during one of her calls she asked the front desk “to send a security guard up 
because they were fighting and making a lot of noise.”  Williams specifically 
recalled that her second call consisted of a request for the front desk to “send 
someone up.” 
 
After the close of evidence, Marriott moved for a directed verdict on all of 
the appellees’ claims.  Judge Beverly Pfeiffer granted the motion on the punitive 
damages claim, but permitted the negligence claims to proceed to the jury.  The 
jury rendered a general verdict in favor of the defendants and against Malone, 
 
 
10
finding that Malone had been fifty-one percent comparatively negligent, and that 
her comparative negligence directly and proximately caused her injuries.  The jury 
also found that Meador had been comparatively negligent, but determined that her 
negligence was not a cause of her injuries.  The jury awarded Meador $300,000 in 
compensatory damages. 
 
Marriott moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the 
alternative, a new trial or remittitur.  Appellants’ motion for JNOV was overruled, 
but the trial court sustained the motion for a new trial on the grounds that the 
verdict for Meador was against the manifest weight of the evidence and the 
damages awarded were excessive. 
 
Malone and Meador appealed.  A split panel of the Franklin County Court 
of Appeals ruled that the directed verdict and the order for a new trial were 
erroneous. The appeals court opined that the testimony offered at trial established 
sufficient evidence of Marriott’s conscious disregard for appellees’ safety to create 
a question for the jury on the issue of punitive damages. 
 
On the issue of the trial judge’s order for a new trial, the court of appeals 
recognized that “the decision to grant a motion for a new trial rests within the 
sound discretion of the trial court, and that ruling will not be disturbed by a 
 
 
11
reviewing court absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion.”  
However, the court of appeals cast the abuse of discretion standard of review in 
terms of whether the verdict was supported by substantial evidence.  After 
reviewing the evidence presented at trial, the court of appeals concluded that 
substantial evidence existed to support the jury’s damage award to Meador, and 
that the trial court’s order for a new trial on both grounds cited was erroneous. 
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal.  
___________________ 
 
Lane, Alton & Horst, Gregory D. Rankin, Patrick H. Boggs and Robert B. 
Graziano, for appellees.  
 
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, David W. Alexander and Scott B. Pfahl, for 
appellants. 
___________________ 
 
WRIGHT, J.  At its core, this case presents two questions for our 
consideration.  First, was the trial court’s grant of Marriott’s motion for a directed 
verdict on the issue of punitive damages error?  Second, was the judge’s order for 
 
 
12
a new trial on Meador’s negligence claim error?  We answer these queries in the 
negative. 
 
Judge Pfeiffer’s directed verdict on the question of punitive damages should 
have been affirmed by the court of appeals.  In determining whether to direct a 
verdict, the trial court does not engage in a weighing of the evidence, nor does it 
evaluate the credibility of witnesses.  Ruta v. Breckenridge-Remy Co. (1982), 69 
Ohio St.2d 66, 67-68, 23 O.O.3d 115, 116, 430 N.E.2d 935, 937.  Rather, the court 
is confronted solely with a question of law:  Was there sufficient material evidence 
presented at trial on this issue to create a factual question for the jury?  Id. at 68-
69, 23 O.O.3d at 116, 430 N.E.2d at 938.  A motion for a directed verdict may be 
granted when “the trial court, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor 
of the party against whom the motion is directed, finds that upon any 
determinative issue reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion upon the 
evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse to such party, the court shall 
sustain the motion and direct a verdict for the moving party as to that issue.”  
Civ.R. 50(A)(4). 
 
The law of Ohio is clear on when punitive damages may be awarded: 
 
 
13
 
“[P]unitive or exemplary damages are not recoverable from a defendant in 
question in a tort action unless both of the following apply: 
 
“(1)  The actions or omissions of that defendant demonstrate malice * * *, 
or that defendant as principal or master authorized, participated in, or ratified 
actions or omissions of an agent or servant that so demonstrate; [and] 
 
“(2)  The plaintiff in question has adduced proof of actual damages that 
resulted from actions or omissions as described in division (B)(1) of this section.”  
(Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2315.21(B). 
 
Thus, as a threshold matter, Malone and Meador were obligated to present 
evidence of malice on the part of Marriott before their claim for punitive damages 
could proceed to the jury. 
 
Our case law defines “malice” as “(1)  that state of mind under which a 
person’s conduct is characterized by hatred, ill will or a spirit of revenge, or (2) a 
conscious disregard for the rights and safety of other persons that has a great 
probability of causing substantial harm.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Preston v. Murty 
(1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 334, 512 N.E.2d 1174, syllabus.  Because R.C. 2315.21 
does not provide its own definition of “malice,” this court has continued to apply 
Preston’s definition.  Cabe v. Lunich (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 598, 640 N.E.2d 159, 
 
 
14
paragraph one of the syllabus; Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr. (1994), 69 Ohio 
St.3d 638, 635 N.E.2d 331, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
The first type of malice articulated in Preston is not germane to this matter.  
Appellees argued, however, that sufficient evidence had been introduced at trial to 
create a question for the jury on the second definition of malice.  Specifically, 
appellees’ counsel pointed to the testimony of Eunela Williams, who stated that 
she contacted the front desk twice, roughly between 4:00 and 4:20 a.m., because 
she had heard an argument coming from Gatewood’s room.  Appellees contend 
that Marriott’s failure to respond to Williams’s complaints constituted a conscious 
disregard for the safety of Malone and Meador, and created a great probability of 
harm to them.  As a matter of law, this portrayal of Marriott’s response is 
inaccurate. 
 
Marriott’s alleged nonfeasance cannot be characterized as malice because 
the information provided to its employees was too ambiguous.  In Williams’s two 
telephone calls to the front desk, she complained only of someone “fighting and 
making a lot of noise,” and she requested that the front desk “send someone up.”  
Williams did not provide the front desk with information on the nature of the 
 
 
15
disturbance, and in her deposition testimony she characterized the noise from 
Gatewood’s room as a domestic quarrel. 
 
The apparent miscommunication between Williams and the front desk staff 
is significant because of this court’s pronouncements on the “conscious disregard” 
theory of malice.  As Chief Justice Moyer noted in Preston, an award of punitive 
damages based on conscious disregard malice requires “a positive element of 
conscious wrongdoing * * *.  This element has been termed conscious, deliberate 
or intentional.  It requires the party to possess knowledge of the harm that might 
be caused by his behavior.”  Preston, 32 Ohio St.3d at 335, 512 N.E.2d at 1176. 
 
In other words, Marriott, through its agents, must have actually known of 
the threat to its guests.  Absent such proof of a defendant’s subjective knowledge 
of the danger posed to another, a punitive damages claim against that defendant 
premised on the “conscious disregard” theory of malice is not warranted.  Since 
nothing in Williams’s calls to the front desk provided Marriott personnel with 
information about the physical threat confronting appellees, a charge to the jury on 
punitive damages would have been unjustified.  Accordingly, the trial court’s 
decision to direct the verdict was appropriate. 
 
 
16
 
It is significant to note that even if punitive damages were warranted in this 
case, Malone could not recover them because the jury did not award her 
compensatory damages. As we have held time and again, punitive damages may 
not be awarded when a jury fails to award compensatory damages. Bishop v. 
Grdina (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 26, 27, 20 OBR 213, 214, 485 N.E.2d 704, 705. 
 
The appellees attempt to circumvent this bar to Malone’s recovery of 
punitive damages by pointing out that Malone failed to recover compensatory 
damages under the negligence theory only because the jury found that she had 
been fifty-one percent comparatively negligent.  Since comparative negligence is 
not available as an affirmative defense for an action based on recklessness, 
appellees theorize that Malone could have recovered compensatory damages on a 
recklessness theory.  Such an award would also allow Malone to overcome the bar 
to punitive damages that was articulated in Bishop and elsewhere. 
 
Appellees then assert that the allegation of recklessness in count three of 
their complaint actually constituted a claim for both punitive and compensatory 
damages. The trial court’s decision to direct a verdict on the third count of their 
complaint thus prevented the jury from addressing recklessness as a basis for 
compensatory damages as well as punitive damages.  If the directed verdict on that 
 
 
17
issue were to be reversed, appellees contend that Malone could still attempt to 
recover compensatory and punitive damages. 
 
Although the court of appeals found this argument persuasive, it is flawed in 
one vital respect:  there is absolutely no indication in the pleadings, including the 
complaint amended after the close of evidence, that appellees ever pursued a 
compensatory damages claim based on recklessness.  In the first two counts of 
their amended complaint, Malone and Meador asserted negligence on the part of 
appellants and enumerated the harms for which they were seeking damages.  In the 
third count of the amended complaint, the appellees alleged that Marriott had 
engaged in “willful, wanton, and reckless” behavior on the morning of July 22, 
1989 and had shown “conscious disregard for the safety and well being of Malone 
and Meador when a great probability of harm existed, and as such, [Malone and 
Meador were] entitled to punitive damages.”  In no reasonable way can the 
appellees’ complaint be read as advancing a claim for compensatory damages 
based on recklessness.  Consequently, the jury was not deprived of an opportunity 
to determine the merits of such a claim, and Malone is not entitled to a new action 
based on recklessness. 
 
 
18
 
The trial court’s decision to order a new trial on Meador’s negligence claim 
was not erroneous, and the court of appeals’ reversal of that order was unfounded.  
Judge Pfeiffer’s order was predicated upon two subsections of Civ.R. 59(A), 
which state: 
 
“A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of 
the issues upon any of the following grounds: 
 
“* * * 
 
“(4)  Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under 
the influence of passion or prejudice;  
 
“* * * 
 
“(6)  The judgment is not sustained by the weight of the evidence * * *.” 
 
In evaluating the propriety of the trial court’s decision premised on the 
weight of the evidence, we must note that a reviewing court can reverse such an 
order for a new trial only upon a finding of an abuse of discretion.  Rohde v. 
Farmer (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 82, 52 O.O.2d 376, 262 N.E.2d 685, paragraph one 
of the syllabus.  “Abuse of discretion” connotes “an unreasonable, arbitrary or 
unconscionable attitude upon the part of the court.”  Poske v. Mergl (1959), 169 
Ohio St. 70, 75, 8 O.O.2d 36, 39, 157 N.E.2d 344, 348, citing Steiner v. Custer 
 
 
19
(1940), 137 Ohio St. 448, 19 O.O. 148, 31 N.E.2d 855; Klever v. Reid Bros. 
Express, Inc. (1951), 154 Ohio St. 491, 43 O.O. 429, 96 N.E.2d 781.  In addition, 
the abuse of discretion standard requires a reviewing court to “view the evidence 
favorably to the trial court’s action rather than to the original jury’s verdict.”  
Rohde, 23 Ohio St.2d at 94, 52 O.O.2d at 382, 262 N.E.2d at 692.  This deference 
to a trial court’s grant of a new trial stems in part from the recognition that the trial 
judge is better situated than a reviewing court to pass on questions of witness 
credibility and the “surrounding circumstances and atmosphere of the trial.”  
Rohde, 23 Ohio St.2d at 94, 52 O.O.2d at 382, 262 N.E.2d at 692. 
 
It is also important to note that the order of a new trial does not terminate a 
case; instead, it simply grants a new trial.  Unlike directed verdicts and judgments 
notwithstanding the verdict, an order for a new trial does not dispose of litigation; 
instead, its purpose is to prevent “‘miscarriages of justice which sometimes occur 
at the hands of juries,’” by presenting the same matter to a new jury.  Rohde, 23 
Ohio St.2d at 93, 52 O.O.2d at 382, 262 N.E.2d at 692, quoting Holland v. Brown 
(1964), 15 Utah 2d 422, 426, 394 P.2d 77, 79. 
 
In light of the standard of review and the policies underlying it, the trial 
court’s order for a new trial based upon the weight of the evidence does not appear 
 
 
20
to be arbitrary or capricious, given the evidence presented at trial and the 
seemingly contradictory verdicts rendered by the jury.  As Judge Pfeiffer stated in 
her decision of August 27, 1993, no proof of pecuniary loss to Meador was offered 
at trial.  The most compelling consideration in support of the trial judge’s order, 
however, was the jury’s incongruous determinations regarding Meador’s and 
Malone’s comparative negligence. 
 
The jury interrogatory forms indicate that both appellees were found 
negligent, but only Malone’s negligence was found to have caused her injuries.  
Such a disparate set of outcomes is difficult to understand when, as the trial judge 
noted, both Malone and Meador “invited Gatewood * * * to their room, had drinks 
with him, went out to several bars, and upon return again allowed him in their 
room.”  The trial court went on, recalling that “there were several opportunities for 
[Meador] to have called either hotel security or other law enforcement for 
assistance.  For example, Gatewood took Malone to his room leaving Meador 
outside free to return to her room and phone for assistance or knock on doors of 
other hotel guests for help.” 
 
A reasonable person confronted by such a set of facts could validly 
conclude that the jury’s verdict for Meador was against the manifest weight of the 
 
 
21
evidence.  We therefore find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in 
its determination that the verdict was not supported by the weight of the evidence.  
Accordingly, it is unnecessary for us to address the trial court’s conclusion that the 
verdict was excessive.  We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
reinstate both the trial court’s directed verdict and its order for a new trial for 
Meador. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent. 
 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
There was some confusion at trial as to where Malone and Hood were 
supposed to meet.  Malone testified that she was to meet Hood at his friend’s 
residence.  Hood testified that he could not recall what the arrangements had been 
that morning.  However, portions of Hood’s deposition testimony, which were 
read while he was on the witness stand, indicated that he had agreed to meet 
Malone at the Marriott. 
 
 
22
2. 
It was later determined that Meador had simply misplaced the key in 
appellees’ room. 
 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., dissenting.  I would affirm the court of appeals’ 
decision in its entirety.