Case Title: JEFFREY H. REICHERT V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-05-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
JEFFREY H. REICHERT V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 62134 P.3d 268Case Number: 05-71, 05-172Decided: 05/17/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
JEFFREY 
H. REICHERT,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofGoshenCounty

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Dion J. Custis, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Causey.               

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

[¶1] 
Jeffrey H. Reichert pled guilty to two counts of felony conversion of grain in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 11-11-117(b) (LexisNexis 2003)1 and one count of felony check fraud 
in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-702(a)(b)(iii) (LexisNexis 2003).2  The district court sentenced him to a 
term of three to five years for felony check fraud and two terms of eight to 
fourteen years for felony conversion with the sentences to be served 
consecutively, but suspended execution of the second felony conversion sentence 
and imposed instead fourteen years of supervised probation to begin upon Mr. 
Reichert's release from incarceration.  
Dissatisfied with his sentence, Mr. Reichert appeals, claiming the 
district court erred in denying his motions to withdraw his guilty plea; 
ineffective assistance of counsel; judicial bias; and prosecutorial bias.  We affirm.    

  

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Reichert 
presents the following issues for our review:

 
 
I.          
The appellant's case was prejudiced due to the denial of the motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea and the motion to recuse the 
judge.

 
 
II.          
The appellant was denied effective assistance of 
counsel.

 
 
III.         
The appellant was prejudiced due to the judicial bias caused by the 
conflict of interest since one of the growers was related to the 
judge.

 
 
IV.        The 
appellant was prejudiced due to the judicial bias caused by the political 
influence regarding his case.

 
 
V.        The 
appellant was prejudiced due to the conflict of interest with the prosecuting 
attorney.

 
 
The 
State re-phrases the issues as follows:

 
 
I.          
Did appellant receive effective assistance of 
counsel?

 
 
II.          
Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion 
to withdraw guilty plea?

 
 
III.         
Did judicial bias exist in appellant's case, and was appellant's motion 
for recusal of judge improperly denied?

 
 
IV.        Did 
prosecutorial bias exist in appellant's case?

 
 
FACTS

            

[¶3] On 
September 14, 2004, the Goshen County attorney's office filed an information and 
criminal warrant in circuit court alleging Mr. Reichert committed ten counts of 
felony conversion of grain in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 11-11-117(b) and 
one count of felony check fraud in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-3-702(a)(b)(iii).  The information 
and warrant alleged on ten occasions from December 10, 2003, until April 6, 
2004, Mr. Reichert converted to his own use over $500,000 worth of grain, 
specifically pinto beans, accepted from customers for storage at his 
warehouse.  The information also 
alleged Mr. Reichert issued a check from his bank account dated August 12, 2004, 
for $1,675.00 without having sufficient funds in the account to cover the 
check.  

 
 
[¶4] Mr. 
Reichert was arrested and made an initial appearance in circuit court on 
September 14, 2004.  Defense counsel 
entered an appearance on behalf of Mr. Reichert on September 20, 2004.  Defense counsel and the State began plea 
agreement discussions as a result of which on October 21, 2004, the county 
attorney's office reduced from ten to two the felony conversion counts.  The amended information alleged the 
conversions giving rise to the first count took place between June 1, 2000, and 
August 31, 2003, and those giving rise to the second count occurred between 
September 1, 2003, and August 31, 2004.  
With regard to the felony check fraud count, the amended information 
specified fifteen insufficient funds checks Mr. Reichert allegedly wrote on his 
account in the months of July and August, 2004. 

                
        

[¶5] On 
October 27, 2004, Mr. Reichert appeared in district court and, pursuant to the 
plea agreement, entered a plea of guilty to the charges.  On January 10, 2005, the district court 
held a sentencing hearing.  Mr. 
Reichert presented the testimony of three witnesses:  his wife, a friend and a former 
customer.  The State presented 
testimony and statements from fifteen victims of Mr. Reichert's offenses, 
including the testimony of a state senator.  Most of the victims asked the district 
court to impose a harsh sentence.  
The State argued for incarceration and restitution.  Defense counsel argued for 
probation.  After hearing the 
testimony and arguments, the district court sentenced Mr. Reichert as 
follows:  Count I (felony conversion 
of grain)  8 to 14 years incarceration; Count II (felony conversion of grain)  
8 to 14 years incarceration; Count III (felony check fraud)  3 to 5 years 
incarceration.  The district court 
ordered the sentences on Counts I and III to be served consecutively, suspended 
the sentence on Count II and ordered Mr. Reichert to be placed on supervised 
probation for a period of fourteen years following his release from 
incarceration.  The district court 
also ordered Mr. Reichert to pay restitution in the amount of $1,026,204.61. 

 
 
[¶6] New 
counsel entered an appearance on behalf of Mr. Reichert and filed a notice of 
appeal from the judgment and sentence.  
Three days later, he filed a motion to stay the time for filing an 
appellate brief in this Court in order to allow him to file a motion to withdraw 
his guilty pleas in the district court.  
This Court granted the motion to stay.

 
 
[¶7] On 
April 18, 2005, Mr. Reichert filed motions in district court: 1) for recusal of 
the prosecuting attorney; 2) for recusal of the district judge; and, 3) to 
withdraw his guilty pleas.  He 
asserted the prosecutor was biased and prejudiced because members of his family 
were victims of the alleged crimes and the judge was biased and prejudiced 
because his brother was a victim of the crime.  Additionally, Mr. Reichert claimed his 
sentence was the result of political influence.  In support of his motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea, Mr. Reichert asserted:  
his plea was based on representations of defense counsel that as a first 
time offender, Mr. Reichert likely would receive a sentence of probation; he was 
forced to plead guilty; he was not advised of the possible consequences of a 
guilty plea or defenses to the charges; the prosecutor agreed to work with 
defense counsel to reach a sentencing agreement but the plea was entered without 
any such agreement; the judge and the prosecutor had conflicts of interest to 
which defense counsel did not object; the judge's decisions were influenced by 
outside factors; and he did not enter his plea knowingly or voluntarily.         

 
 
[¶8] As 
a consequence of Mr. Reichert's motions, a special prosecutor assumed 
representation of the State and another judge was assigned to consider the 
recusal motion.  After a hearing, 
the alternate judge denied the recusal motion, finding it was not promptly made 
and the supporting affidavit was insufficient to demonstrate the original judge 
was incapable of rendering his decisions and performing his functions 
impartially.  Specifically, the 
alternate judge concluded no evidence was presented that the judge's brother was 
a victim of the crime as alleged and a judge may not be removed for cause 
"simply on the basis that [his] brother was, at one time, a customer of the 
defendant."  Upon entry of the order 
denying the recusal motion, the original district judge resumed authority over 
the case.

 
 
[¶9] On 
June 7, 2005, the district court conducted a hearing on Mr. Reichert's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea.  In 
addition to considering the parties' written submissions on the motion, the 
district court heard the testimony of Mr. Reichert, his sister, his wife and the 
attorney who represented him through his sentencing hearing.  On June 9, 2005, the district court 
issued a decision letter in which it concluded Mr. Reichert failed to establish 
any basis for withdrawing his guilty plea.  
The district court entered an order denying the motion to withdraw guilty 
plea on June 23, 2005, and Mr. Reichert appealed to this Court from that 
order.     

            

            STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶10]  The standard for withdrawing a guilty 
plea is governed by W.R.Cr.P. 32(d). Ingersoll v. State, 2004 WY 102, ¶ 12, 
96 P.3d 1046, 1050 (Wyo. 2004).  
Pursuant to that rule, a defendant must show "manifest injustice" when he 
seeks to withdraw his plea after sentencing.  Id.  We review whether a trial court properly 
denied a post-sentence motion for withdrawal under an abuse of discretion 
standard, meaning we determine whether the trial court could reasonably conclude 
as it did and whether any facet of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious.  Id.  The 
findings of fact that led to denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea are 
subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.  McCard v. State, 2003 WY 142, 
¶ 8, 78 P.3d 1040, 1043 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶11] 
The examination of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a 
showing that counsel's performance was deficient and the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense.  Ingersoll, ¶ 13, 96 P.3d  at 1050.  In other words, to warrant reversal on a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must show his counsel 
failed to render the sort of assistance offered by a reasonably competent 
attorney and the failure to render such assistance prejudiced the defense of the 
case.  Ingersoll, ¶ 14, 96 P.3d  at 1050.  When a guilty plea is challenged based 
upon ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant, to establish prejudice, 
must show a reasonable probability, but for counsel's errors, a plea of guilty 
would not have been entered and the defendant would have insisted on going to 
trial.   Ingersoll, ¶ 13, 96 P.3d  at 
1050.  A strong presumption is 
invoked that counsel rendered adequate and reasonable assistance.  Id.  The burden is on the defendant to 
overcome this presumption.  
Id.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
 
 
1.   Denial of Motion to Withdraw Guilty 
Plea

 
 
[¶12]   W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) provides in 
pertinent part as follows:

 
 
If a 
motion for withdrawal of a plea of guilty . . . is made before sentence is 
imposed, the court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the 
defendant of any fair and just reason. At any later time, a plea may be set 
aside only to correct manifest injustice.

 
 
Mr. 
Reichert moved to withdraw his guilty plea after sentence was imposed; 
therefore, he was required to demonstrate manifest injustice in order to succeed 
on his motion. 

 
 
"Manifest 
injustice' contemplates a situation that is unmistakable or indisputable, was 
not foreseeable, and affects the substantial rights of a party. It is, in part, 
intended to address a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete 
miscarriage of justice or an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands 
of fair procedure.'"

 
 

Reyna v. 
State, 2001 
WY 105, ¶ 27, 33 P.3d 1129, 1137-38 (Wyo. 2001) (citations omitted). 

 
 
[¶13] 
Mr. Reichert claims his motion to withdraw his guilty plea should have been 
granted because:  1) he relied on 
defense counsel's assurances that he would be sentenced to probation and did not 
know he would be sentenced to a lengthy prison term; and 2) the judge and 
prosecutor were biased and prejudiced.  
He asserts these factors constituted manifest injustice.  We address them separately. 

 

            
a.         
Reliance on Advice From Counsel

 
 
[¶14] 
The first question raised by Mr. Reichert's claim is whether he entered his plea 
knowingly and intelligently.  A 
guilty plea is valid only when it represents a voluntary and intelligent choice 
among the alternative courses of action open to a defendant.  Ingersoll, 2004 WY 102, ¶ 15, 96 P.3d  at 
1051, fn. 1.  Pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 
11(b), the district court was required to inform Mr. Reichert of:  the nature of and penalties for the 
charges filed against him; his right to be represented by an attorney, plead not 
guilty, be tried by a jury, and choose not to testify; his right to plead guilty 
and waive his right to trial; and the fact that any statements made by him in 
court under oath could be used against him.  Pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11(d), the 
district court was required to ensure Mr. Reichert's plea was 
voluntary.

 
 
The 
court shall not accept a plea of guilty . . . without first, by addressing the 
defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is voluntary and 
not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement. 
The court shall also inquire as to whether the defendant's willingness to plead 
guilty . . . results from prior discussions between the attorney for the state 
and the defendant or the defendant's attorney.

 
 
With the 
W.R.Cr.P. 11 requirements in mind, we begin our analysis of Mr. Reichert's claim 
by reviewing what occurred at the arraignment.

 
 
[¶15] 
Mr. Reichert appeared in district court for his arraignment on October 27, 
2004.  The district court asked Mr. 
Reichert whether he had been able to talk with his attorney about the case and 
if he was satisfied with his representation so far.  Mr. Reichert responded affirmatively to 
both questions.  The district court 
reviewed the charges and the maximum possible penalty for each and asked Mr. 
Reichert whether he understood the charges and penalties and had any questions 
about them.  Mr. Reichert said he 
understood and had no questions.  
The district court inquired whether Mr. Reichert understood everything up 
to that point in the hearing.  Mr. 
Reichert said he did.

 
 
[¶16] 
The district court then explained the presumption of innocence, the State's 
burden to prove each of the elements of the crimes charged and Mr. Reichert's 
right to plead not guilty, go to trial, confront the witnesses against him, 
present his own witnesses, have legal representation, testify or not testify and 
appeal.  The district court asked 
Mr. Reichert if he understood these rights, whether they made sense to him and 
whether he had any questions.  Mr. 
Reichert stated he understood his rights and had no questions.  The district court advised Mr. Reichert 
he also had the right to plead guilty and by doing so would give up his right to 
a trial, the presumption of innocence and his right to silence.  The district court stated:  

 
 
No one 
can ever make you plead a certain way. You always have the right to plead not 
guilty. If anyone should try to coerce you or force you into how you are going 
to plead, you should let [counsel] know or let me know. That would be 
improper.

 
 
            
Do you feel that anyone has tried to do that to you up to this point in 
the case?

 
 
Mr. 
Reichert responded, "No." 

 
 
[¶17] 
The district court then asked about the terms of the plea agreement.  The State explained Mr. Reichert agreed 
to plead guilty to all three counts and provide a factual basis for each 
count.  In exchange, the State 
agreed not to file additional charges and to obtain the agreement of the 
United 
States not to file additional charges against 
Mr. Reichert.  Defense counsel 
concurred in the State's description of the agreement.  The district court repeated the 
essential terms of the agreement and stated: 

 
 
Mr. 
Reichert, under this plea agreement, there is no guarantee of what the sentence 
will be; and you will have a felony conviction on three counts. 

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
Is that 
the agreement as you understand it, sir?

 
 
            
MR. REICHERT:  
Yes.

 
 
            
THE COURT:  Is that 
satisfactory to you?

 
 
            
MR. REICHERT:  
Yes.

 
 
            
THE COURT:  Has anyone forced 
you or coerced you to enter into this agreement?

 
 
            
MR. REICHERT:  No. 

 
 
Mr. 
Reichert then pleaded guilty to the three counts. 

 
 
[¶18] As 
the factual basis for his plea, Mr. Reichert testified on the dates identified 
in the information he, in his capacity as the owner and operator of Mountain 
States Commodities, acquired beans worth over $500 from customers, sold the 
beans and converted the money to his own use.  He also testified on the dates in 
question he wrote checks totaling more than $3,000 on his bank account without 
having sufficient funds in the account to cover the checks. 

 
 
[¶19] 
The record does not indicate Mr. Reichert's pleas and the factual basis for them 
were given other than voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.  The district court fully informed him 
concerning the maximum penalties for the charged offenses and advised him no one 
could make him plead a certain way and if anyone tried to do so he should inform 
the court.  He was further 
specifically advised there were no guarantees about sentencing. 

 
 
[¶20] 
Likewise the transcript of the January 10, 2005, sentencing hearing contains 
nothing suggesting Mr. Reichert wished to withdraw his pleas, was coerced into 
entering them or entered them without being advised of his rights.  The first suggestion the pleas were 
coerced or made unknowingly and unintelligently came after the district court 
imposed a more severe sentence than either Mr. Reichert or defense counsel 
expected.  Then, represented by 
substitute counsel, Mr. Reichert moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, claiming he 
did not enter them knowingly and intelligently because defense counsel failed to 
adequately explain the potential consequences of the pleas.  Specifically, he claimed defense counsel 
"promised" he would receive probation if he pled guilty, he relied on defense 
counsel's "promise" in pleading guilty and manifest injustice occurred when he 
was sentenced not to probation as defense counsel "promised" but instead to a 
lengthy prison term. 

 
 
[¶21] In 
addition to the district court's advisements, Mr. Reichert testified defense 
counsel discussed the maximum sentences with him before the arraignment.  Mr. Reichert also testified defense 
counsel informed him early on he believed probation was likely because Mr. 
Reichert had no prior criminal history, was a long-standing member of the 
community, and saved the court a lengthy trial and associated expense.  He testified defense counsel advised him 
he thought the district court would look upon him favorably and sentence him to 
probation if he cooperated fully with the State and federal agents and agreed to 
convey all of his assets as restitution to the victims.  Mr. Reichert testified defense counsel 
later told him he was concerned the district court might impose a prison 
sentence of eighteen to twenty-four months.  Consistent with his discussions with Mr. 
Reichert, however, defense counsel argued for probation at sentencing.  

 
 
[¶22] 
Defense counsel's testimony at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty 
pleas was consistent with Mr. Reichert's testimony as far as the latter 
testimony went. Like Mr. Reichert, defense counsel testified he initially 
believed his client would receive probation because he had no prior criminal 
record, had long-standing involvement in the community and seemed willing to 
cooperate.  Defense counsel also 
testified, as did Mr. Reichert, he only later became concerned the court might 
impose a prison term. Defense counsel further testified the reason for his 
concern was, over the course of his representation, the seriousness of the 
allegations giving rise to the charges grew. Specifically, defense counsel 
testified a much greater amount of money was involved than Mr. Reichert 
initially had told him. 

 
 
[¶23] 
Defense counsel testified Mr. Reichert told him at first he had the assets to 
fully re-pay his customers.  As the 
case progressed, it became apparent the amount was much greater than Mr. 
Reichert had indicated and he did not have the financial resources to pay the 
people back.  Defense counsel 
testified:

 
 
Early on 
in my representation of Mr. Reichert, when I thought we were dealing with 13,000 
bags of beans or 20,000  as it progressed, there was a point in time when we 
were dealing with criminal charges. But I still believed  because he told me he 
had the ability to do something about this  I still believed that if he did the 
things I asked him to do there was a very good chance of him getting probation. 
And I'm sure I told him that.

 
 
            
But the case continued to change, dramatically. And there came a point in 
time when it was obvious that he hadn't told me everything. And I was dealing  
by the time this case was over, I was dealing with a far more serious set of 
facts than I ever imagined at the beginning.

 
 
[¶24] 
Despite the increasing seriousness of the charges, defense counsel testified he 
personally did not believe Mr. Reichert would be sentenced to a lengthy period 
of incarceration; it was his hope if Mr. Reichert did as he recommended in terms 
of pleading guilty, repaying the victims, cooperating with the State and 
acknowledging his wrongdoing, the district court would be lenient in 
sentencing.  Defense counsel 
testified, however, Mr. Reichert did not do as he recommended and as the 
sentencing approached, he became more convinced Mr. Reichert would spend time in 
jail.  Defense counsel testified he 
told Mr. Reichert the State's case against him was mounting and becoming more 
and more serious.  Defense counsel 
testified both he and the district court advised Mr. Reichert a prison sentence 
was possible.  Still, defense 
counsel argued for probation at sentencing.  Defense counsel testified he was shocked 
when the district court imposed sentence and believed it was excessive. 

 
 
[¶25] In 
Hicklin v. State, 535 P.2d 743 (Wyo. 
1975), we held the receipt of erroneous advice from counsel concerning the 
likely sentence was not a sustainable ground for withdrawing a guilty plea where 
there is no showing of actual reliance on statements of the prosecutor or judge 
in entering the plea.  We adhere to 
that holding now.  Although defense 
counsel's early belief that the sentence would likely be probation may have had 
some influence on Mr. Reichert's decision to plead guilty, the record shows Mr. 
Reichert's primary reason for pleading guilty was to avoid other charges.  

 
 
[¶26] 
Mr. Reichert testified he told the judge at the arraignment his plea was 
voluntary because he believed if he did not plead guilty the United States 
would bring additional charges against him.  He testified:  "[T]he plea agreement was based 
primarily on the fact  or solely on the fact that the prosecution would keep 
the federal charges at bay."  He 
also testified:  

 
 
[defense 
counsel] also indicated to me verbally in his office several times that if I 
don't accept the plea as it was stated, that it could go back to the drawing 
board and  and [the prosecutor] could go back to the day when he was stating 
that there could be a possible 150 counts and this and that, and that if I 
didn't accept it that it could be changed just that fast.

 
 

Q.    
Okay. 
And are you stating now that for some reason you believe that that was not 
true?

 
 
A.  Oh, I'm not saying that at all. That's why I plead 
guilty.

 
 
He 
said:

 
 

I was 
agreeing to those terms [of the plea agreement] again, 
only to avoid additional charges 
that I felt were  were looming or lurking overhead if . . . I changed my mind. 
That's how [defense counsel] described it to me, that this was a one-shot deal, 
that the charges couldn't be negotiated here at sentencing, and that if I didn't 
go along with it now that it could upset the whole thing and additional charges 
could be filed.

 
 
(emphasis 
added).   

 
 
[¶27] 
Thus, the record clearly shows Mr. Reichert entered into the plea agreement, 
having been fully informed of the charges to which he was pleading and the 
maximum penalties, expressly for the purpose of avoiding additional state and 
federal charges  charges which had the potential to result in an even lengthier 
sentence than the one ultimately imposed.  
The fact that Mr. Reichert agreed to plead guilty to avoid more serious 
charges and in the hope of receiving probation only to have the district court 
impose a more severe penalty than Mr. Reichert and defense counsel expected does 
not give rise to a "fundamental defect" resulting in "a complete miscarriage of 
justice" or an "omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair 
procedure."  Reyna, ¶ 27, 33 P.3d  at 1137-38. 

 
 
[¶28] We 
conclude Mr. Reichert has failed to meet his burden of showing the district 
court abused its discretion when it denied his motion.  Having carefully examined the record 
before us, we hold Mr. Reichert has not demonstrated the district court's ruling 
resulted in manifest injustice.  He 
has not shown a fundamental defect resulting in a complete miscarriage of 
justice or an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair 
procedure.  Considering all of the 
circumstances, the district court's imposition of a more severe penalty than 
defense counsel believed was appropriate and advised Mr. Reichert was likely 
does not constitute manifest injustice.

 
 
            
b.         
Prosecutorial and Judicial Bias

 
 
[¶29] 
Mr. Reichert also claims manifest injustice requiring reversal of the denial of 
his motion occurred when the district court judge and prosecutor remained on the 
case despite alleged personal biases.  
In the case of the judge, Mr. Reichert also claims manifest injustice 
occurred because the judge was improperly influenced by political and social 
pressure. 

 
 
[¶30] 
Concerning the prosecutor's personal bias, Mr. Reichert testified three members 
of the prosecutor's family were victims of his offenses.  He testified the prosecutor's father 
also was a leading member of a victim growers group made up of eight to twelve 
victims who acted as liaison between the prosecution and the victims. 
Additionally, the prosecutor was listed as the registered agent for the victim 
growers group.  

 
 
[¶31] At 
the arraignment, the prosecutor disclosed his relationship with three of the 
victims.

 
 
[The 
state]:  The state would offer  and 
as you have probably observed in reading through the amended information, I have 
a family member, and a family member by marriage, and an extended family member, 
who are victims in this matter.

 
 
            
I have reviewed the ethical rules which apply to conflicts and cannot 
find any conflict, nor do I think I have a personal conflict. I do not receive 
any pecuniary interest in the outcome of this case, directly or indirectly. I 
have disclosed that to [defense counsel] and Mr. Reichert from the very 
beginning. It's my understanding that they do not have any objection from a 
prosecution standpoint or defense standpoint with the prosecution for me to 
continue with the case; and I would like to certainly present that to the court 
on the record, and you know if we have a response from [defense counsel] or Mr. 
Reichert.

 
 
            
THE COURT:  [Counsel], the 
prosecutor has indicated that he doesn't feel he has a conflict of interest 
under the rules of professional responsibility, but I would call for your 
response to his disclosure that some of the alleged victims are related to 
him.

 
 
            
[Defense counsel]:  Your 
Honor, [the state] and I have discussed this, and I agree with the 
representation he has made to the court, and we will agree with him that there 
is no conflict.

 
 
If he 
had concerns about the prosecutor's relationship with the three victims, Mr. 
Reichert did not inform the court at that time or any other time prior to 
raising the issue in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  Once he raised the issue, the prosecutor 
removed himself from the case and a special prosecutor stepped in to represent 
the State.  The special prosecutor 
represented the State at the hearing on Mr. Reichert's motion to withdraw his 
plea. 

 
 
[¶32 
Rule 1.7 of the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct addresses conflicts of 
interest in pertinent part as follows:

                        

(b) A 
lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be 
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to . . . a third person, or 
by the lawyer's own interests, unless:

                 (1) the lawyer 
reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; 
and

      (2)     the client consents after consultation. 

 
 
The 
comment to Rule 3.8, which addresses special responsibilities of prosecutors, 
states:

 
 
[1] A 
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that 
of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see 
that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon 
the basis of sufficient evidence. Precisely how far the prosecutor is required 
to go in this direction is a matter of debate and varies in different 
jurisdictions. 

 
 
The 
comment references the ABA Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to Prosecution 
Function, which in Standard 3-1.3 provides:

 
 
(f) A 
prosecutor should not permit his or her professional judgment or obligations to 
be affected by his or her own political, financial, business, property, or 
personal interests. 

 
 
In 
addition to these provisions, the preamble to the Rules of Professional Conduct 
states:

 
 
   [8] In the nature of law practice 
. . . conflicting responsibilities are encountered. * * * The Rules of 
Professional Conduct prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts. Within the 
framework of these Rules many difficult issues of professional discretion can 
arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive 
professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the 
rules.

 
 
[¶33] 
None of these provisions expressly prohibits a prosecutor from representing the 
State in a case where family members are victims of the offense charged.  However ill-considered it might appear 
on the surface, we conclude no manifest injustice resulted from the prosecutor's 
representation of the State despite his familial relationship with three of the 
victims.  We are satisfied the 
prosecutor promptly and fully disclosed the relationship.   Nothing in the record suggests his 
relationship with the victims affected him in carrying out his responsibility to 
minister justice, influenced the outcome of the case or prejudiced Mr. Reichert 
in any way.  In addition, Mr. 
Reichert waived any objection to the prosecutor's participation in the 
case.  We hold the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying the plea withdrawal motion on the basis 
of prosecutorial bias.3     

    

[¶34] We 
turn to the claim of the judge's personal bias.  Mr. Reichert testified he accepted 
delivery of the judge's brother's beans for storage, sold the bean crop without 
the brother's knowledge and when the brother later decided to sell, generated 
the appropriate paperwork and presented a check for payment. Knowing there were 
not sufficient funds in the account to cover the check, Mr. Reichert asked the 
brother to wait to cash the check.  
A few days later, the brother asked Mr. Reichert's wife who worked at the 
bank to deposit the check.  She did 
so and the check bounced.  Mr. 
Reichert made good on the check and the judge's brother was not one of the 
victims of Mr. Reichert's crimes.  
Still, Mr. Reichert asserts, the fact that the judge's brother was a 
customer likely prejudiced the judge.  

 
 
[¶35] 
Mr. Reichert also claims the district court judge was biased and prejudiced 
because he was influenced by the involvement of political officials and the 
public.  In his motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea, Mr. Reichert stated:  
"The political presence of the governor and some of his comments and the 
testimony of Senator Meier may have influenced Judge Kautz into imposing an 
excessive sentence . . . ."  Mr. 
Reichert testified:

 
 
[A]fter 
the arraignment, after the plea was entered, that's really when things started 
to really stir within the community. 

 
 
            
That's when [the judge] started to receive political pressure. He 
received a tremendous amount of social pressure, as well as the personal 
pressure that he had from his relationship with his brother being 
involved.

 
 
Mr. 
Reichert further testified a newspaper reported the governor attended a meeting 
with the grower victims.  When asked 
whether the department of agriculture could extend Mr. Reichert a loan to pay 
back the victims, leaving the victims whole and Mr. Reichert owing the 
department of agriculture, the newspaper reported the governor as saying "Mr. 
Reichert's not going to be making much money where he's going in the near 
future."  Mr. Reichert pointed to 
that statement from the newspaper, as "the political influence that might have 
affected the outcome of this sentence."  

 
 
[¶36] 
Mr. Reichert also cited the testimony of a state senator at the sentencing 
hearing as improperly influencing the judge.  The senator, one of fifteen victims who 
testified or presented a statement at the hearing, asked the judge to sentence 
Mr. Reichert to four to eight years imprisonment for check fraud to be served 
consecutively to ten to fourteen years for conversion, and a suspended sentence 
of ten to fourteen on the second conversion count.          
 

            

[¶37] We 
have defined bias and prejudice as follows:  prejudice involves a prejudgment or 
forming of an opinion without sufficient knowledge or examination; bias is a 
leaning of the mind or an inclination toward one person over another.  Cline v. Sawyer, 600 P.2d 725, 729 
(Wyo. 
1979).  A mere allegation of 
judicial bias is insufficient to form a basis for disqualification; sufficient 
facts showing bias must be presented in the affidavit supporting the 
motion.  Pearson v. State, 866 P.2d 1297, 1300 
(Wyo. 
1994).  Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 
40.1(b)(2), Mr. Reichert was required to submit an affidavit stating sufficient 
facts to show the existence of judicial bias or prejudice against him.4  Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 401(b)(2), the 
judge should have been recused if a reasonable person, assuming the facts in the 
affidavit were true, could infer that he had a bias or prejudice preventing him 
from dealing fairly with Mr. Reichert.

 

[¶38] 
Mr. Reichert submitted an affidavit stating in pertinent 
part:

 
 
                        
* * *

 
 

2.      
I owned 
and operated Mountain States Commodities.

3.      
Lowell 
Kautz, Wayne Korell, Beth Korell, and Alan Korell were all customers of Mountain 
States Commodities.

4.      
As a 
long time resident of Torrington, Wyoming, I know that Lowell Kautz is the 
brother of Judge Keith Kautz.

5.      
During 
court Pat Korell [the prosecutor] admitted that his father, step-mother and 
uncle were all victims in this matter.

6.      
Pat 
Korell's father was appointed to the board of the victim-grower's committee 
which helped to establish how they would receive 
restitution.

 
 
We 
conclude these facts were not sufficient to cause a reasonable person to infer 
the judge was biased or prejudiced against Mr. Reichert.  We agree with the conclusion reached by 
the district judge assigned to decide the recusal motion  a judge may not be 
removed for cause simply on the basis that his brother was, at one time, a 
customer of the defendant.

 
 
[¶39] We 
likewise find nothing in the testimony presented at the plea withdrawal hearing 
from which a reasonable person could infer the judge was biased or 
prejudiced.  Some of Mr. Reichert's 
testimony concerning the judge's bias, such as the governor's statement at the 
victim growers' meeting as reported in the newspaper, was hearsay.  Evidence presented in support of a 
motion to disqualify a judge is generally insufficient when it is supported 
merely by hearsay.  In re Claim of Farman, 841 P.2d 99, 101 
(Wyo. 
1992).  Much of the rest of Mr. 
Reichert's testimony was speculation, which we also find insufficient to support 
a motion to disqualify.  Simply 
stated, there was no evidence showing the district court judge prejudged the 
case or formed an opinion without sufficient knowledge or examination.  There likewise was no showing the judge 
had a leaning of the mind or an inclination toward one person over another.  We hold the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying the plea withdrawal motion.

   

2. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

 
 
[¶40] 
The only ineffective assistance of counsel claims that survived Mr. Reichert's 
guilty pleas are claims directly related to the voluntariness of his 
plea.

 
 
"Where a 
defendant has entered a guilty plea, he may challenge his subsequent conviction 
on appeal only with respect to matters which affect the voluntariness of his 
plea or the subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court. When a guilty plea 
has been entered upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of that plea may 
depend on the extent to which that advice comports with the constitutional 
guarantee to the effective assistance of counsel."

 
 

Rutti v. 
State, 2004 
WY 133, ¶ 21, 100 P.3d 394, 404 (Wyo. 2004) (citations omitted).  Mr. Reichert bears the burden of proving 
both that counsel's performance was deficient and the deficient performance 
produced actual prejudice.  
Id.

 
 
[¶41] To 
warrant reversal on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Reichert 
must show counsel failed, in light of all circumstances existing at the time of 
the alleged act or omissions, to employ such judgment or render such assistance 
as would have been offered by a reasonably competent attorney under like 
circumstances.  Rutti, ¶ 23, 100 P.3d  at 405.  Counsel's ineffectiveness must be so 
serious as to undermine this Court's confidence that the outcome was fair.  Id.  Moreover,

 
 
"When an 
attorney has allegedly misadvised his client with respect to the entry of a 
guilty plea, a determination must be made of whether the decision to plead and 
forego the defense of his case resulted in prejudice to the client. That 
determination involves two interrelated questions:  whether, in the absence of counsel's 
error, the recommendation of a reasonably competent attorney concerning the plea 
would differ from that given; and whether, absent the error, the outcome of a 
trial would have been more advantageous to the client than the result of his 
plea. The defendant may also establish the necessary prejudice by proof of 
circumstances indicating that, in deciding whether or not to plead guilty, he 
placed special emphasis on the challenged aspect of his attorney's advice. He 
must suggest to the reviewing court a plausible reason why, had his 
representation been as he claims it should have been, he would have chosen to 
forsake the benefits of the plea agreement for the risks of 
trial."

 
 

Id. 
(citations omitted).

 
 
[¶42] 
From the record before us, we conclude Mr. Reichert has failed to meet his 
burden of proving either defense counsel's performance was deficient or he 
suffered prejudice as a result.  The 
record simply does not support Mr. Reichert's claim that defense counsel did not 
properly advise him concerning the effect of a guilty plea and misled him to 
believe he would receive probation or a shorter prison sentence.  

 
 
[¶43] 
Based upon the information he had early on in the case, defense counsel advised 
Mr. Reichert he thought probation was likely.  As circumstances changed and it became 
apparent the amount of money involved was much greater than he had been told and 
Mr. Reichert did not have the ability to pay it back, defense counsel advised 
Mr. Reichert he was concerned jail time was a real possibility.  Defense counsel testified he explained 
the terms of the plea agreement to Mr. Reichert and was certain he understood 
them.  He, and the district court, 
explained the maximum sentences that could be imposed for the crimes 
committed.  Defense counsel 
testified Mr. Reichert knew the prosecutor intended to argue for prison time at 
sentencing.  Defense counsel 
testified he made no promises to Mr. Reichert other than to represent him the 
best he could.  He did not force Mr. 
Reichert to plead guilty, threaten him or promise him he would get 
probation.  He told Mr. Reichert his 
sentence depended in large part on his ability to pay back the money he owed 
people for their crop.  He 
testified:

 
 
I told 
him one of the things he needed to do right away was to find a job and start 
paying these people back. I told him he needed to raise money in whatever way he 
could. Sell everything you have except your home, to try to pay these people 
back. I tried to get him to understand the seriousness of what he had done and 
to  you know, act accordingly. 

 
 
When all 
of those things sort of came together  he wasn't able to come up with the 
money, he wasn't finding work, he continued to act as though  almost as though 
he were the victim in this. That's when I became convinced that he probably was 
going to spend some time in prison. I still did not think he would spend the 
time that he was sentenced to. 

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
And [the 
prosecutor] indicated to me that if [Mr. Reichert] made some real progress in 
the direction of paying these people that  his attitude, or his statement to me 
about how we would argue sentencing at sentencing would change. He didn't say 
flat out to me  you know, I'm going to do this or the other thing. He made 
clear to me that if Mr. Reichert took some real steps in the direction of making 
these people whole, his approach would be different at sentencing. But that 
never occurred.

 
 
From the 
record before us, we conclude defense counsel provided the assistance a 
reasonably competent attorney would have provided under similar, and changing, 
circumstances.  Mr. Reichert has 
failed to carry his burden of demonstrating defense counsel's performance was 
deficient.5            

 
 
[¶44] 
Mr. Reichert presents no argument as to how his decision to plead guilty and 
forego trial prejudiced him.  He 
fails to assert, much less show, how the outcome would have been more 
advantageous to him had he gone to trial rather than entering a plea.  Absent the presentation of any argument 
on these key issues, we hold Mr. Reichert has failed to carry his burden of 
proving he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged ineffectiveness. 

 
 
[¶45] 
Mr. Reichert also contends defense counsel's assistance was ineffective in that 
he failed to assert the claims of prosecutorial and judicial bias.  The record shows defense counsel 
considered both issues and discussed them with Mr. Reichert.  Defense counsel testified he believed 
the prosecutor and the judge were fair and would handle the case in an unbiased 
manner.  Defense counsel testified 
after discussing the issues with Mr. Reichert, he made the tactical decision 
that Mr. Reichert was better off with the assigned prosecutor and judge than he 
would be asking for a different judge and prosecutor.   We find nothing in the record to 
support the claim that these decisions were deficient.  Rather, we conclude they were consistent 
with the tactical decisions of a reasonably competent attorney acting under 
similar circumstances.

 

[¶46]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
11-11-117(b) provided in pertinent part:

 
 
   (b)  Any warehouseman or person operating a 
warehouse who converts to his own use or that of another, any grain stored or 
accepted for storage of the value of five hundred dollars ($500) or more, is 
guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned for not to exceed fourteen (14) 
years. 

 
 

2Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-3-702(a)(b)(iii) provided:

 
 
   (a)  Any person who knowingly issues a check 
which is not paid because the drawer has insufficient funds or credit with the 
drawee has issued a fraudulent check and commits fraud by 
check.

   * * *

   (b)  Fraud by check 
is:

    * * 
*

         
(iii)  A felony punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the fraudulent check was for the sum 
of five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more, or if the offender is convicted of 
fraud by check involving two (2) or more checks issued within any sixty (60) day 
period in the state of Wyoming totaling five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more 
in the aggregate.

 
 

3Federal 
prosecutors are statutorily prohibited from representing the government in any 
matter in which they, their family or their business associates have an 
interest.  18 U.S.C. §§208(a).  Although our statutes and rules do not 
contain a similar prohibition, it would seem advisable for prosecutors to avoid 
even the appearance of impropriety, by refraining from representing the state in 
prosecutions involving family members as victims or defendants. 

 
 

4RULE 40.1 
TRANSFER OF TRIAL AND CHANGE OF JUDGE

 
 
(b) Change of 
Judge.

 
 
* * 
*

            
(2) Disqualification for Cause.  
Whenever the grounds for such motion become known, any party may move for 
a change of district judge on the ground that the presiding judge:  (A) has been engaged as counsel in the 
action prior to being appointed as judge;  
(B) is interested in the action;  
(C) is related by consanguinity to a party;  (D) is a material witness in the 
action;  or (E) is biased or 
prejudiced against the party or the party's counsel.  The motion shall be supported by an 
affidavit or affidavits of any person or persons, stating sufficient facts to 
show the existence of such grounds.  
Prior to a hearing on the motion any party may file 
counter-affidavits.  The motion 
shall be heard by the presiding judge, or at the discretion of the presiding 
judge by another judge.  If the 
motion is granted, the presiding judge shall immediately call in another judge 
to try the action.

 
 

5Even if the 
record established defense counsel's performance was deficient, which it does 
not, Mr. Reichert's claim of ineffectiveness would fail. We have previously held 
that a defendant is not prejudiced by advice which is merely misleading if the 
trial court, prior to taking his plea, has corrected any misunderstanding 
engendered by that advice. Wilson v. State, 2003 WY 59, ¶ 11, 68 P.3d 1181, 1188 (Wyo. 2003).