Case Title: HANKINSON v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 01-124

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
HANKINSON v. STATE2002 WY 8647 P.3d 623Case Number: 01-124Decided: 06/06/2002
 

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

                        
                        
                        
            
            
                        

ANTHONY 
DUSTIN HANKINSON, 

Appellant(Defendant),

v.

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable John Perry, Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth M. 
Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Ryan R. 
Roden, Assistant Appellate Counsel. 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling and Robin Sessions Cooley, Senior Assistant Attorneys 
General.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

  
 

            
HILL, 
Justice. 

[¶1]            
Appellant, Anthony Hankinson (Hankinson), was convicted of conspiracy[1] to commit 
aggravated assault and battery2  He submits this appeal contending that 
there is not sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.  We will 
affirm.

ISSUE

[¶2]      The only issue 
presented for our review is whether or not sufficient evidence is present to 
sustain Hankinson's conviction, although it is couched in terms of possible 
abuse of discretion by the district court in denying his motion for judgment of 
acquittal3 
which was made after all evidence had been received, including Hankinson's 
testimony.

FACTS

[¶3]      Our recitation of 
the facts pertinent to the resolution of the issue raised in this appeal need 
only be very brief.  Hankinson and 
Lester Poague got drunk on July 25, 2000.  
They decided to go to the business owned by Daryl Coast (Coast) and give 
him a beating, because of grievances against Coast, real or imagined, the 
details of which are not pertinent to this appeal and which Hankinson was unable 
to articulate in a manner that made much sense.  After drinking most of the day, 
Hankinson and Poague went to Coast's place of business and broke in the 
door.  Once inside, they looked for 
Coast because they wanted to "kick his ass."  Because Coast was a much bigger man than 
Poague, Poague had armed himself with an axe handle from Hankinson's pickup 
truck.  According to both Hankinson 
and Poague, Hankinson's main purpose in being there was to make sure his brother 
did not enter into the fight on Coast's side.  Hankinson's brother was a good friend of 
Coast's.  However, Coast was not at 
his business, so the two vandals scattered business papers and about two or 
three hundred pennies from a cash box onto the counter and the floor, poured 
fingernail polish on a credit card machine, and Hankinson defecated on the 
floor.  As the two were leaving, 
Hankinson took a coffee can, which was used as an ashtray for the business (and 
the can apparently contained a few of the pennies which were strewn about the 
business), and threw it into the back of his pickup truck, along with the empty 
bottle of fingernail polish.  
Hankinson took those two items because he thought his fingerprints might 
be on them.

[¶4]            
Hankinson subsequently was charged with burglary4 with intent to commit 
aggravated assault and battery on the person of Coast, burglary with intent to 
commit larceny, based on the removal of the coffee can and some of the pennies, 
as well as the conspiracy charge described 
above.

[¶5]      The jury found 
Hankinson not guilty on the two burglary charges, but guilty of the conspiracy 
charge.

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶6]      The benchmark for 
review of sufficiency of the evidence claims is whether the evidence, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is such as to permit a 
reasonable trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Statezny v. State, 2001 WY 22, 
¶15, 18 P.3d 641, ¶15 (Wyo. 2001).  
Moreover, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury.  Rather, we determine whether a quorum of 
reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have found the 
essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  Saiz v. State, 2001 WY 76, ¶17, 
30 P.3d 21, ¶17 (Wyo. 2001).

DISCUSSION

[¶7]      The central 
thrust of Hankinson's appeal is that he was too drunk to have formed the 
specific intent to conspire with Poague in the first place and, to the extent 
they discussed a "plan" to beat up Coast using the axe handle, it did not rise 
to the level of a conspiracy, as that word is viewed in the context of the 
criminal law.  Conspiracy is defined 
as follows in Black's Law Dictionary 305 (7th ed. 
1999):

Conspiracy, n.  An agreement by two or more persons to 
commit an unlawful act; a combination for an unlawful purpose.  In criminal law, conspiracy is a 
separate offense from the crime that is the object of the conspiracy . . . 
.

. . . 
.

"[Conspiracy 
is an] elastic, sprawling and pervasive offense, . . . so vague that 
it almost defies definition.  
Despite certain elementary and essential elements, it also, 
chameleon-like, takes on a special coloration from each of the many independent 
offenses on which it may be overlaid.  
It is always predominantly mental in composition' bec ause it consists 
primarily of a meeting of minds and an intent."  Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445-48, 69 S. Ct. 716, 719-20 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
concurring).

[¶8]      In Jasch v. 
State, 563 P.2d 1327, 1332 (Wyo. 1977), we defined a conspiracy as an 
agreement between two or more persons to do an unlawful act.  The crime of conspiracy is complete when 
an agreement has been made and overt acts are performed to further the unlawful 
design.  Also see Phillips v. 
State, 835 P.2d 1062, 1067-68 (Wyo. 1992).  Conspiracy is a specific intent crime 
and is commonly defined as an agreement between two or more persons to commit an 
unlawful act.  Under widely adopted 
statutory concepts, a conspiracy is completed when an agreement has been made 
and some overt act is performed in furtherance of the conspiracy.  The agreement that must be shown to 
support a conviction of a conspiracy to commit a crime is not the same as the 
"meeting of the minds" demanded for a contract.  A mere tacit understanding will suffice, 
and there need not be any written statement or even a speaking of words, which 
expressly communicates agreement.  
Wehr v. State, 841 P.2d 104, 109-10 (Wyo. 1992); Rands v. 
State, 818 P.2d 44, 46 (Wyo. 1991); Bigelow v. State , 768 P.2d 558, 
562 (Wyo. 1989); also see Burk v. State, 848 P.2d 225, 234-35 (Wyo. 
1993).  Wyoming has adopted the 
unilateral theory of conspiracy and, thus, a person who believes he is 
conspiring with another to commit a crime is a danger to the public regardless 
of whether the other person, in fact, has agreed to commit the crime.  Miller v. State, 955 P.2d 892, 
897-98 (Wyo. 1998).  The jury was 
properly instructed with respect to conspiracy:

In determining whether a conspiracy existed, the 
jury should consider the acts and declarations of all the alleged 
participants.  However, in 
determining whether a particular defendant was a member of the conspiracy, if 
any existed, the jury should consider only his acts and statements.  He cannot be bound by the acts or 
declarations of other participants until it is established that a conspiracy 
existed, and that he was one of its members.

While conspiring involves an agreement to 
violate the law, it is not necessary that the persons charged met together and 
entered into an express or formal agreement, or that they stated in words or 
writing what the scheme was or how it was to be effected.  It is sufficient to show that they came 
to a mutual understanding to commit the crime.

If it is established beyond a reasonable doubt 
that a conspiracy existed and that the Defendant was one of its members, then 
the acts and declarations of any other member of such conspiracy in or out of 
such Defendant's presence, done in furtherance of the objects of the conspiracy, 
and during its existence, may be considered as evidence against such 
Defendant.  When persons enter into 
an agreement to commit a crime, they become agents for one 
another.

When two individuals are associated throughout 
an entire criminal enterprise, it is not necessary to prove that each of them 
did that which was necessary to establish each element of an offense; it is 
sufficient to show that they were associated together in doing that which 
comprises each element of the offense.

[¶9]      The trial court 
also properly instructed the jury on the law pertaining to the circumstances 
under which a person charged with a specific intent crime may defend on the 
basis of voluntary intoxication.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-202 (LexisNexis 2001),5 
W.P.J.I.Cr. 8.18 (1996); Brett v. State, 961 P.2d 385, 391-92 (Wyo. 
1998); and see Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379, 382-83 (Wyo. 1992); 
and R.W. Gascoyne, Annotation, Modern Status of the Rules as to Voluntary 
Intoxication as Defense to Criminal Charge, 8 A.L.R.3d 1236, esp. § 4 (1966 
and Supp. 2001).  The instruction 
given was this:

Evidence has been introduced tending to show 
that the Defendant was suffering from self-induced 
intoxication.

Self-induced intoxication is a defense to the 
crimes charged if the Defendant was intoxicated to such a degree that he was 
unable to formulate the intention to commit the crimes, or to form an agreement 
to commit these crimes.

            
Intoxication is self-induced if it is caused by substances which the 
Defendant knows or ought to know have the tendency to cause intoxication and 
which he knowingly and voluntarily introduced into his body.  The fact that the Defendant was 
dependent upon the intoxicating substance is not relevant in determining whether 
his intoxication was self-induced.

            
Accordingly, if you find that the Defendant, at the time of the crimes 
charged, was suffering from self-induced intoxication to such a degree that 
there is a reasonable doubt in your minds whether the Defendant possessed the 
mental ability to form the intention to commit the crimes charges, then you 
should find the Defendant not guilty.

[¶10]            
Whether or not Hankinson was so drunk that he could not form the 
requisite specific intent, and whether Hankinson actually engaged in a 
conspiracy to commit the crime of aggravated assault and battery on Coast, were 
questions for the jury.  There was 
evidence that suggested that Hankinson was relatively lucid on the night of the 
crime.  During the crimes, Hankinson 
had to make decisions and take actions that required some presence of mind and 
volition, even if those actions were only the basest form of stupidity.  In light of this evidence, the jury 
could reasonably have inferred that Hankinson acted with specific intent, even 
though there was a great deal of evidence to indicate that Hankinson was very 
drunk and, in his own testimony, he claimed to be in an alcoholic blackout at 
the time.  Likewise, though the 
agreement that Poague and Hankinson made to assault Coast was crude and ill 
conceived, the jury could reasonably have inferred that a conspiracy was 
present.  Hankinson's argument 
focuses on his own view of the facts, rather than that view which might have 
been taken by reasonable jurors.

[¶11]   Finally, Hankinson contends that 
the jury's verdicts are so inconsistent that they cannot stand.  We do not agree.  In this regard, Hankinson contends that 
the jury determined there was not evidence that he had the intent to commit 
burglary, and, therefore, he could not have the intent necessary to engage in a 
conspiracy either.  The jury might 
well have decided that Hankinson did not intend to commit burglary, though that 
is speculation.  However, the jury 
could, and did, infer from all of the evidence that Hankinson conspired with 
Poague to assault Coast, even though it was obvious to all that their efforts in 
that regard were, fortunately, in vain.  
In several instances, this Court has said that consistency in a jury's 
verdict is not necessary.  
Eatherton v. State, 810 P.2d 93, 98 (Wyo. 1991); Lessard v. 
State,  719 P.2d 227, 230-32 
(Wyo. 1986).  Professor Wright 
states the rule in his treatise as follows:

In 
a case in which there are multiple counts, each one is treated as if it were a 
separate indictment.  The verdict on 
the various counts need not be consistent.  
An acquittal on one count does not prevent conviction on another, even 
though the evidence is the same and defendant could not have committed one crime 
without committing both, so long as the evidence is sufficient to support 
conviction on the count on which a guilty verdict was 
reached.

Doud 
v. State, 845 P.2d 402, 407 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting 3 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 514 at 14-16 (1982)).

[¶12]   The Judgment and sentence of the 
district court are affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-303 (LexisNexis 2001) 
states:

§ 
6-1-303. Conspiracy; renunciation of criminal intention; 
venue.

            
(a)  A 
person is guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime if he agrees with one (1) or 
more persons that they or one (1) or more of them will commit a crime and one 
(1) or more of them does an overt act to effect the objective of the 
agreement.

            
(b)  A person is not liable under this section if after 
conspiring he withdraws from the conspiracy and thwarts its success under 
circumstances manifesting voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal 
intention.

            
(c)  A conspiracy may be prosecuted in the county where the 
agreement was entered into, or in any county where any act evidencing the 
conspiracy or furthering the purpose took 
place.

2 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502 (LexisNexis 2001) 
states:

§ 
6-2-502. Aggravated assault and battery; 
penalty.

            
(a)  A 
person is guilty of aggravated assault and battery if 
he:

(i)  Causes 
serious bodily injury to another intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human 
life;

(ii)  Attempts 
to cause, or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a 
deadly weapon;

(iii)  Threatens 
to use a drawn deadly weapon on another unless reasonably necessary in defense 
of his person, property or abode or to prevent serious bodily injury to 
another;  
or

(iv)  Intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to a woman whom he knows is 
pregnant.

            
(b)  Aggravated assault and battery is a felony punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years.

3 
W.R.Cr.P. 29 states:

Rule  29.  Motion for judgment of 
acquittal.

            
(a) 
At close of evidence. -- Motions for directed verdict are abolished and 
motions for judgment of acquittal shall be used in their place.  The court on motion of a defendant or of 
its own motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more 
offenses charged in the indictment, information or citation after the evidence 
on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction 
of such offense or offenses.  If a 
defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence 
offered by the state is not granted, the defendant may offer evidence without 
having reserved the right.

            
(b) Reservation of decision. -- If a motion for judgment of acq 
uittal is made at the close of all the evidence, the court may reserve decision 
on the motion, submit the case to the jury and decide the motion either before 
the jury returns the verdict or after it returns a verdict of guilty or is 
discharged without having returned a verdict.

            
(c) After discharge of jury. -- If the jury returns a verdict of 
guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict, a motion for judgment 
of acquittal may be made or renewed within 10 days after the jury is discharged 
or within such further time as the court may fix during the 10-day period.  If a verdict of guilty is returned, the 
court may on such motion set aside the verdict and enter judgment of acquittal 
within 10 days after such motion is filed, and if not so entered shall be deemed 
denied, unless within such 10 days the determination shall be continued by order 
of the court, but a continuance shall not extend the time to a day more than 30 
days from the date the verdict is returned.  If no verdict is returned, the court may 
enter judgment of acquittal.  It 
shall not be necessary to the making of such a motion that a similar motion has 
been made prior to the submission of the case to the 
jury.

            
(d) Conditional ruling on motion for new trial. -- If a motion for 
judgment of acquittal after verdict of guilty under this rule is granted, the 
court shall also determine whether any motion for a new trial should be granted 
if the judgment of acquittal is thereafter vacated or reversed, specifying the 
grounds for such determination.  If 
the motion for a new trial is granted conditionally, the order thereon does not 
affect the finality of the judgment.  
If the motion for a new trial has been granted conditionally and the 
judgment is reversed on appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate 
court has otherwise ordered.  If 
such motion has been denied conditionally, the appellee on appeal may assert 
error in that denial, and if the judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent 
proceedings shall be in accordance with the order of the appellate 
court.

4 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301 (LexisNexis 2001) 
states:

§ 
6-3-301. Burglary; aggravated burglary; 
penalties.

            
(a) 
A person is guilty of burglary if, without authority, he enters or remains in a 
building, occupied structure or vehicle, or separately secured or occupied 
portion thereof, with intent to commit larceny or a felony 
therein.

            
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, burglary is a 
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of 
not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or 
both.

            
(c) Aggravated burglary is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not 
less than five (5) years nor more than twenty-five (25) years, a fine of not 
more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00), or both, if, in the course of 
committing the crime of burglary, the person:

(i) 
Is or becomes armed with or uses a deadly weapon or a simulated deadly 
weapon;

(ii) 
Knowingly or recklessly inflicts bodily injury on anyone; 
or

            
            
(iii) Attempts to inflict bodily injury on 
anyone.

            
(d) As used in this section "in the course of committing the crime" 
includes the time during which an attempt to commit the crime or in which flight 
after the attempt or commission occurred.

5  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-202 (LexisNexis 
2001) states:

§ 
6-1-202. Being under the influence not a defense; effect upon intent; 
"self-induced."

            
(a) 
Self-induced intoxication of the defendant is not a defense to a criminal charge 
except to the extent that in any prosecution evidence of self-induced 
intoxication of the defendant may be offered when it is relevant to negate the 
existence of a specific intent which is an element of the 
crime.

            
(b) Intoxication is self-induced if it is caused by substances which the 
defendant knows or ought to know have the tendency to cause intoxication and 
which he knowingly and voluntarily introduced or allowed to be introduced into 
his body unless they were introduced pursuant to medical advice.  The fact that the defendant is dependent 
upon the intoxicating substance is not relevant in determining whether his 
intoxication is self-induced.