Case Title: Smith v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC13-4

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2014-09-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC13-4 
____________ 
 
JOSEPH P. SMITH,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[September 11, 2014] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal from an order denying a motion to 
vacate a judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and a sentence of death.  
We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
FACTS 
A jury convicted Joseph Peter Smith of the kidnapping, capital sexual 
battery, and first-degree murder of an eleven-year-old girl.  Smith v. State, 28 So. 
3d 838, 850 (Fla. 2009).  In the decision on direct appeal, this Court described in 
detail the circumstances of the murder and the evidence presented during trial.  See 
id. at 844-50.  The jury recommended that Smith be sentenced to death for the 
 
 
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murder by a vote of ten to two.  Id. at 851.  The trial court followed the 
recommendation and sentenced Smith to death.  Id. at 852.  Six aggravating 
circumstances were found by the trial court: 
(1) Smith committed the felony while he was on probation, see § 
921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003) (moderate weight); (2) the murder was 
committed while Smith was engaged in the commission of a sexual 
battery or kidnapping, see § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2003) 
(significant weight); (3) the murder was committed for the purpose of 
avoiding lawful arrest, see § 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (2003) (great 
weight); (4) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel 
(HAC), see § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (2003) (great weight); (5) the 
murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP), see § 
921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (2003) (great weight); and (6) the victim was 
under twelve years of age, see § 921.141(5)(l), Fla. Stat. (2003) (great 
weight). 
Id. (footnote omitted).  The trial court found no statutory mitigating circumstances, 
but concluded that thirteen nonstatutory factors had been established: 
(1) a long and well-documented history of mental illness (moderate 
weight); (2) a long and well-documented history of drug abuse 
(moderate weight); (3) longstanding severe pain from back injuries 
that contributed to his addiction (little weight); (4) Smith repeatedly 
sought help for his problems (little weight); (5) Smith was repeatedly 
denied treatment or received inadequate treatment (little weight); (6) 
positive qualities, including—(a) skills as a mechanic, plumber, and 
carpenter; (b) performance of kind deeds for others; (c) love and 
support with his family; (d) despite his incarceration, attempts to exert 
a positive influence on family members; (e) artistic skills; and (f) he 
cares about animals (moderate weight); (7) providing information that 
led to the resolution of this case (very little weight); (8) his family 
assisted law enforcement with Smith’s knowledge and cooperation 
(slight weight); (9) demonstration of spiritual growth (moderate 
weight); (10) maintenance of gainful employment (slight weight); (11) 
he is a loving father to his three daughters (moderate weight); (12) 
 
 
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remorse (little weight); and (13) he is amenable to rehabilitation and a 
productive life in prison (little weight). 
Id. at 852-53 (footnote omitted).   
 
Smith presented thirteen challenges on direct appeal, and the State presented 
one challenge in a cross-appeal.  The challenges by Smith were: (1) the State 
violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment when it failed to 
present the biologists who performed the DNA tests on the known sample taken 
from Smith and the unknown semen sample taken from the victim’s shirt; (2) the 
trial court erred when it allowed the medical examiner to present opinion testimony 
that the victim had been sexually assaulted; (3) the trial court erred when it failed 
to suppress the statements of Smith’s brother; (4) the trial court erred when it failed 
to strike nine jurors for cause; (5) the trial court erred when it admitted certain 
photos of the victim; (6) the trial court improperly doubled the aggravating factors 
that the murder was committed during the course of a sexual battery upon a child 
under the age of twelve, and the victim of the murder was under the age of twelve; 
(7) the statutory aggravating circumstance that the victim was under the age of 
twelve is unconstitutional; (8) the trial court erred when it found the avoid arrest 
aggravating circumstance; (9) the trial court erred when it found the CCP 
aggravating circumstance; (10) the trial court erred when it ruled that Smith’s 
mother and sister would be subject to cross-examination by the State if they 
testified during the penalty phase; (11) the trial court erred when it refused to allow 
 
 
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Smith to make a statement of allocution before the jury; (12) section 775.051, 
Florida Statutes (2004), violates due process; and (13) Florida’s death penalty 
sentencing scheme violates Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  Smith, 28 So. 
3d at 853-73.  On cross-appeal, the State contended that the trial court erred when 
it held that the prior violent felony conviction aggravating circumstance was not 
applicable to the murder.  Id. at 876-77.1   
 
This Court held that the trial court erroneously denied two for-cause juror 
challenges, but determined that the error was harmless.  Id. at 859-61.  We also 
struck the CCP aggravating circumstance, but held that any error by the trial court 
with regard to the finding of this aggravating factor was harmless.  Id. at 868.  
With respect to the avoid arrest aggravating factor, this Court stated: 
We need not address the substance of this claim because we 
conclude that even if we were to find that competent, substantial 
evidence does not support this aggravator as asserted by Smith, any 
error is harmless. . . .  The trial court expressly stated that any one of 
the aggravators found (except felony probation) was sufficient to 
outweigh the mitigating factors due to the totality of the aggravating 
factors that we uphold and affirm today.  There is no possibility that 
any erroneous finding on this issue affected the sentence imposed.  
Smith is not entitled to a new penalty phase. 
                                          
 
1.  Smith previously pled no contest to a 1993 charge of aggravated battery.  
Id. at 876.  The State contended that this no contest plea constituted a conviction 
for purposes of the capital sentencing statute and, therefore, qualified as a prior 
violent felony conviction under the statute.  Id. at 877. 
 
 
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Id. at 866-67.  We also determined that (1) the trial court should have excluded the 
testimony of the medical examiner that ligature strangulation is “highly associated” 
with sexual battery, and (2) the prosecutor made an improper comment that Smith 
should receive the death penalty because he left the body “exposed to animals, 
predators in the woods.”  Id. at 856-57, 862 n.15.  However, because neither 
challenge was preserved, we considered only whether they amounted to 
fundamental error, and concluded that they did not.  Id. at 857, 862 n.15. 
 
We rejected all other claims presented by Smith and affirmed his convictions 
and sentences.  Id. at 853-74, 878.  We also rejected the issue presented by the 
State on cross-appeal.  Id. at 878.   
 
Smith subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 that presented the following claims:  (1) 
Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-3.5(d)(4) and Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.575 are unconstitutional and denied Smith the assistance of counsel in 
pursuing postconviction relief; (2) the trial court unconstitutionally instructed the 
jury that its role is merely “advisory”; (3) Florida’s death penalty statute is 
unconstitutional as applied pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000), and Ring; (4) execution by lethal injection or electrocution violates the 
Eighth Amendment; (5) Florida’s capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional 
because it fails to (a) provide a standard for determining that aggravating 
 
 
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circumstances “outweigh” mitigating circumstances, (b) define “sufficient 
aggravating circumstances,” and (c) adequately define the aggravating 
circumstances; (6) Florida’s capital sentencing procedure lacks the independent 
reweighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances required by Proffitt v. 
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); (7) the aggravating circumstances have been applied 
in a vague and inconsistent manner; (8) Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is 
unconstitutional because it presumes that death is an appropriate sentence upon the 
finding of a single aggravating factor, and also requires a defendant to establish 
that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances for a life 
sentence to be appropriate; (9) section 945.10, Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional 
because it precludes Smith from knowing the identity of execution team members; 
and (10) cumulative error.  Smith further alleged that to the extent trial counsel and 
appellate counsel failed to present certain claims listed above, they were 
ineffective.2   
                                          
 
2.  Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are not cognizable in 
postconviction motions, but rather are to be raised in habeas corpus proceedings.  
Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 660 (Fla. 2000).  Smith has not filed a habeas 
corpus petition with this Court.  Moreover, because all claims presented by Smith 
are without merit, even if Smith had presented his ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel challenges in a habeas proceeding, he would not be entitled to 
relief.  See Johnson v. Moore, 837 So. 2d 343, 347 (Fla. 2002) (“Appellate counsel 
cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a claim that was not preserved 
below or that is without merit.”). 
 
 
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Smith asserted in his motion for postconviction relief that none of the claims 
presented required an evidentiary hearing.  The postconviction court heard oral 
argument on the motion and subsequently issued an order that summarily denied 
all claims.   
This appeal followed.   
ANALYSIS 
Juror Interviews 
 
Smith asserts that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.575 and Rule 
Regulating the Florida Bar 4-3.5(d)(4), which prohibit interviews of jurors by a 
party or counsel except under limited circumstances, are unconstitutional.  This 
claim is procedurally barred because it could have been raised on direct appeal.  
See, e.g., Reese v. State, 14 So. 3d 913, 919 (Fla. 2009); Israel v. State, 985 So. 2d 
510, 522 (Fla. 2008).  Moreover, this Court has consistently rejected constitutional 
challenges to the rules in question.  See, e.g., Reese, 14 So. 3d at 919; Barnhill v. 
State, 971 So. 2d 106, 116-17 (Fla. 2007).  Further, in Troy v. State, 57 So. 3d 828, 
842 (Fla. 2011), we rejected the challenge of a defendant that the postconviction 
court had “fail[ed] to explain why academics, journalists, and lawyers not 
connected to his case can conduct ‘fishing expedition’ interviews while trial and 
postconviction counsel are precluded from doing so.”  Thus, Smith’s similar 
challenge is without merit.   
 
 
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We note that Smith has failed to present a single factual allegation that juror 
misconduct occurred during his capital trial.  Instead, he asserts that criminal 
defense counsel should have unlimited authority to conduct interviews to probe 
jurors for possible misconduct.  We decline to change the rules of procedure to 
permit criminal defense counsel to conduct fishing expeditions any time a 
conviction is obtained.  Where a party or counsel has reason to believe that a 
verdict may be subject to legal challenge, the rules delineate procedures to be 
followed for seeking juror interviews.  However, where no such belief is present, 
as in this case, we decline to allow defense counsel to have unfettered access to 
jurors.   
We affirm the denial of this claim.   
Caldwell v. Mississippi 
Smith contends that the trial court improperly instructed the jury that its role 
is merely “advisory,” in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).3  
                                          
 
3.  Although the heading of this claim in Smith’s brief alleges that trial 
counsel was ineffective in the failure to present this challenge, the argument 
provides no elaboration with regard to counsel’s ineffectiveness and contains no 
analysis of this issue.  This Court has previously held that “[v]ague and conclusory 
allegations on appeal are insufficient to warrant relief.”  Heath v. State, 3 So. 3d 
1017, 1029 n.8 (Fla. 2009) (“Heath has waived his cumulative-error claim because 
his brief includes no argument whatsoever and instead consists of a one-sentence 
heading in his brief.”); see also Doorbal v. State, 983 So. 2d 464, 482-83 (Fla. 
2008) (“Doorbal neither states the substance of any of the claims that were 
summarily denied, nor provides an explanation why summary denial was 
inappropriate or what factual determination was required on each claim so as to 
 
 
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This challenge is procedurally barred.  See Jones v. State, 928 So. 2d 1178, 1182 
n.5 (Fla. 2006) (holding that a Caldwell claim is procedurally barred if not raised 
on direct appeal).  Further, this Court has repeatedly rejected Caldwell challenges 
to the current standard jury instructions.  See, e.g., Rigterink v. State, 66 So. 3d 
866, 897 (Fla. 2011); Globe v. State, 877 So. 2d 663, 673-74 (Fla. 2004).4  
Accordingly, the postconviction court properly denied this claim. 
Apprendi and Ring 
 
Smith asserts that the postconviction court erred when it held that Florida’s 
capital sentencing statute is not unconstitutional as applied pursuant to Apprendi 
and Ring.  On direct appeal, Smith presented a Ring challenge, which was rejected: 
In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), the United States 
Supreme Court invalidated sentencing schemes where the trial court 
was responsible for (1) the finding of an aggravating circumstance 
which rendered a defendant eligible for the death penalty, and (2) the 
ultimate decision to impose a death sentence.  According to Smith, 
                                                                                                                                        
necessitate an evidentiary hearing.  We conclude that this general, conclusory 
argument is insufficient to preserve the issues raised in the 3.851 motion, and, 
therefore, this claim is waived.”).  Based upon our precedent, we hold that Smith’s 
assertion of ineffective assistance under this claim—and any other claim where 
ineffectiveness is solely referenced in the heading—is waived.   
 
Moreover, because all claims presented by Smith are without merit, even if 
he had not waived the ineffective assistance challenges, he would not be entitled to 
relief.  See Lukehart v. State, 70 So. 3d 503, 513 (Fla. 2011) (“[C]ounsel cannot be 
deemed ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless claim.”). 
4.  Although the instructions provided to the jury during the penalty phase of 
Smith’s trial are not identical to the instructions contained in Florida Standard Jury 
Instruction (Criminal) 7.11, the instructions given do not differ materially from the 
standard jury instructions. 
 
 
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Florida constitutes a “judge-sentencing” state and, therefore, its 
sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment. 
Smith’s claim is without merit.  This Court has repeatedly held 
that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme does not violate the United 
States Constitution under Ring.  See, e.g., Gore v. State, 964 So. 2d 
1257, 1276-77 (Fla. 2007); Hannon v. State, 941 So. 2d 1109, 1147 
(Fla. 2006); Jones v. State, 845 So. 2d 55, 74 (Fla. 2003).  Further, in 
Owen v. Crosby, 854 So. 2d 182, 193 (Fla. 2003), this Court rejected 
a Ring challenge where the trial court found as an aggravating 
circumstance that the defendant committed the murder during the 
commission of a burglary or sexual battery.  In reaching this 
determination, the Court noted that this particular aggravator 
“involve[s] circumstances that were submitted to a jury and found to 
exist beyond a reasonable doubt.”   
In the instant case, a jury convicted Smith of sexual battery 
upon a child less than twelve years of age and kidnapping.  Since the 
jury determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith committed 
these crimes, Smith’s Ring challenge is without merit on this 
additional basis.  Accordingly, this claim is denied. 
 
28 So. 3d at 873-74.  As we noted on direct appeal, a Ring challenge by Smith is 
without merit because the trial court found as an aggravating circumstance that the 
murder was committed during the course of a sexual battery and a kidnapping, and 
a unanimous jury verdict was returned in connection with both charges.  Id. at 873-
74.  Further, we have repeatedly rejected the contention that aggravating 
circumstances must be alleged in the indictment for a death sentence to be 
constitutional.  See, e.g., Pham v. State, 70 So. 3d 485, 496 (Fla. 2011); Coday v. 
State, 946 So. 3d 988, 1006 (Fla. 2006).    
 
This claim was properly denied.   
Florida’s Death Penalty Statute 
 
 
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According to Smith, Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional based 
on additional theories.  We disagree.  Nearly identical challenges to those 
presented by Smith were raised unsuccessfully in Miller v. State, 926 So. 2d 1243 
(Fla. 2006).  The defendant in Miller asserted: 
Florida’s capital sentencing statute fails to provide a necessary 
standard for determining that aggravating circumstances “outweigh” 
mitigating factors, does not define “sufficient aggravating 
circumstances,” and does not sufficiently define each of the 
aggravating circumstances; Florida’s capital sentencing procedure 
does not have the independent reweighing of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances required by Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 
(1976); the aggravating circumstances have been applied in a vague 
and inconsistent manner . . . and Florida law violates the Eighth 
Amendment in creating a presumption of death if a single aggravating 
circumstance is found, which occurs in every case of felony murder 
and nearly every premeditated murder. 
Id. at 1259-60.  We held in Miller that these challenges were procedurally barred 
because they were not presented on direct appeal and further concluded that they 
were without merit.  Id. at 1260.  We reject Smith’s challenges here for the same 
reasons.   
 
The challenge to methods of execution is also procedurally barred and 
without merit.  See, e.g., Kilgore v. State, 55 So. 3d 487, 511-12 (Fla. 2010); Wyatt 
v. State, 71 So. 3d 86, 112 (Fla. 2011) (“We deny relief because the Court has 
consistently rejected these claims, and Wyatt has not made any additional 
allegations that would call into question the State’s current methods of 
execution.”). 
 
 
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We affirm the denial of this claim.   
Section 945.10 
 
Smith contends that the postconviction court erred when it failed to conduct 
an evidentiary hearing on the constitutionality of Florida’s lethal injection 
procedures and, more specifically, section 945.10, Florida Statutes.  However, the 
postconviction motion expressly provided that an evidentiary hearing was not 
sought with regard to this claim.  Accordingly, Smith’s assertion of error is 
unpreserved.  See Jimenez v. State, 997 So. 2d 1056, 1072 (Fla. 2008) (holding 
that a claim of factual innocence was not preserved for appeal where the defendant 
did not present this claim to the postconviction court during the successive rule 
3.851 proceeding (quoting Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332, 338 (Fla. 1982) 
(“[F]or an argument to be cognizable on appeal, it must be the specific contention 
asserted as legal ground for the objection, exception, or motion below.”))).5  
Further, Smith presents new arguments on appeal that were never presented to the 
postconviction court.  To the extent Smith presents claims not previously asserted, 
they are also unpreserved for review.  See Jimenez, 997 So. 2d at 1072; Steinhorst, 
412 So. 2d at 338.   
                                          
 
 
5.  Moreover, we have reviewed the postconviction motion and conclude 
that even if Smith had sought an evidentiary hearing on this claim, one would not 
have been warranted. 
 
 
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With regard to the claims that were presented below, and are therefore 
preserved, we have previously rejected constitutional challenges to section 945.10.  
See, e.g., Darling v. State, 45 So. 3d 444, 447-48 (Fla. 2010) (“Darling simply 
requests that we recede from prior precedent so that he may engage in an in-depth 
review of his executioners’ qualifications and training. We refuse to do so.”); 
Henyard v. State, 992 So. 2d 120, 130 (Fla. 2008) (“We previously found section 
945.10 facially constitutional and decline to recede from our decision now.”).  
Accordingly, we conclude that this challenge is without merit. 
Cumulative Error 
Finally, where the individual claims asserted by a capital defendant are held 
to be procedurally barred or without merit, a claim of cumulative error fails.  See 
Lukehart, 70 So. 3d at 524 (quoting Israel, 985 So. 2d at 520).  Because we have 
rejected each of Smith’s challenges on appeal, he is not entitled to relief based 
upon cumulative error.   
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, we affirm the order of the trial court denying 
postconviction relief. 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
 
 
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Sarasota County,  
Andrew D. Owens, Jr., Judge - Case No. 582004CF002129XXXANC 
 
James Vincent Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, 
Tampa, Florida, and Robert T. Strain, Assistant-Capital Collateral Regional 
Counsel, Middle Region, Tampa, Florida, and Ann Marie Mirialakis, Assistant-
Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Carol Marie 
Dittmar, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee