Case Title: Trumbull Cty. Bar Assn. v. Rucker

Citation: 2012-Ohio-5642

Docket Number: 2012-1341

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-12-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Trumbull Cty. Bar Assn. v. Rucker, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5642.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5642 
TRUMBULL COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. RUCKER. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Trumbull Cty. Bar Assn. v. Rucker,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5642.] 
(No. 2012-1341—Submitted August 22, 2012—Decided December 5, 2012.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 12-028. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Gilbert Robert Rucker III of Warren, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0034535, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1986.  
On April 16, 2012, relator, Trumbull County Bar Association, charged respondent 
with professional misconduct in one client matter.  Relator alleged that Rucker 
had neglected the client matter, failed to reasonably communicate with the client, 
failed to deposit the client’s funds in an interest-bearing client trust account, and 
charged the client a fee denominated as “nonrefundable” without also advising the 
client in writing that the client may be entitled to a refund of the fee. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 2} A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline considered the cause on the parties’ consent-to-discipline agreement.  
See BCGD Proc.Reg. 11. 
{¶ 3} In the consent-to-discipline agreement, Rucker stipulates to the 
facts as alleged in relator’s complaint and agrees that his conduct violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in 
representing a client), 1.4 (requiring a lawyer to reasonably communicate with a 
client), 1.5(d)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from charging a fee denominated as 
“nonrefundable” without simultaneously advising the client in writing that the 
client may be entitled to a refund of all or part of the fee if the lawyer does not 
complete the representation), 1.15(a) (requiring a lawyer to hold property of 
clients in an interest-bearing client trust account, separate from the lawyer’s own 
property), 1.15(c) (requiring a lawyer to deposit legal fees and expenses that are 
paid in advance into a client trust account, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as 
fees are earned or expenses incurred), 1.15(d) (requiring a lawyer to promptly 
deliver to a client any funds or property that the client is entitled to receive and 
upon the client’s request, to promptly render a full accounting of such funds or 
property), and 8.4(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from violating or attempting to violate 
the Rules of Professional Conduct). 
{¶ 4} The parties stipulate that mitigating factors include the absence of 
a prior disciplinary record, absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, a timely 
good-faith effort to make restitution, full and free disclosure and a cooperative 
attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, and reputation of good character in 
the community.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e).  The 
parties also stipulate that there are no aggravating factors.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)  Based upon the facts of Rucker’s misconduct and the substantial 
mitigating factors, the parties stipulate that a public reprimand is the appropriate 
sanction for Rucker’s misconduct. 
January Term, 2012 
 
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{¶ 5} The panel and board found that the consent-to-discipline 
agreement conforms to BCGD Proc.Reg. 11 and recommend that we adopt the 
agreement in its entirety.  We agree that Rucker violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4, 
1.5(d)(3), 1.15(a), (c), and (d), and 8.4(a) and that this conduct warrants a public 
reprimand.  Therefore, we adopt the parties’ consent-to-discipline agreement. 
{¶ 6} Accordingly, Rucker is hereby publicly reprimanded for his 
violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(d)(3), 1.15(a), (c), and (d), and 8.4(a).  
Costs are taxed to Rucker. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
_________________________ 
Edward L. Lavelle and Randil Rudloff, for relator. 
Gilbert Robert Rucker III, pro se. 
                               ________________________