Case Title: Weaver v. Mitchell

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Weaver v. Mitchell1986 WY 72715 P.2d 1361Case Number: 84-194, 84-195Decided: 03/18/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VIRGIL R. WEAVER, NEIMAN 
SAWMILLS, INC. AND JAMES S. NEIMAN, APPELLANTS 
(DEFENDANTS),

v.

PRESTON MITCHELL AND MARILYNN 
MITCHELL, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS). PRESTON MITCHELL AND MARILYNN MITCHELL, HUSBAND AND WIFE, 
APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

VIRGIL R. WEAVER, NEIMAN 
SAWMILLS, INC. AND JAMES S. NEIMAN, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

* Reassigned to BROWN, J., December 23, 
1985.

Appeal from the District 
Court, CrookCounty, Paul T. Liamos, 
Jr., J.

Tom C. Toner, 
Sheridan, and David F. Palmerlee, Buffalo, for appellants in 
case

No. 84-194 and appellees 
in case No. 84-195.

R. Douglas 
Dumbrill of Hughes & Dumbrill, Sundance, for appellants in case No. 84-195 and 
appellees in case No. 84-194.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, ROSE 
(Retired) and ROONEY (Retired), JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Preston Mitchell 
suffered personal injuries when struck by a protruding log which had been 
dislodged from a load of logs being hauled by Virgil R. Weaver. A jury by 
general verdict awarded Mitchell an amount that apparently covered loss of 
earnings, pain and suffering, and medical expenses. He was also awarded punitive 
damages and costs. Marilynn Mitchell, wife of Preston Mitchell, received an 
award for loss of consortium.

[¶2.]     We will affirm in part 
and reverse in part, and remand the case to the trial court for further 
proceedings.

[¶3.]     In case No. 84-194, we 
have reworded and simplified the issues raised by appellants Virgil R. Weaver, 
Neiman Sawmills, Inc., and James S. Neiman as follows:

I

[¶4.]     Was the jury adequately 
instructed on

1) Defendant's theory of 
standards of care, and

2) duty to mitigate 
damages.

II

[¶5.]     Was the foundation for 
an economist's testimony sufficient?

III

[¶6.]     Was the foundation for 
medical expenses sufficient?

IV

[¶7.]     Was it reversible error 
to refuse to instruct the jury to reduce damages awarded for loss of future 
earnings to present value?

V

[¶8.]     Is a wife entitled to 
recover for loss of consortium, and, if so, should her recovery for loss of 
consortium be reduced by the percentage of fault attributed to the husband? 

VI

[¶9.]     Was the award for 
punitive damages proper?

VII

[¶10.]  Were the costs awarded appellees 
proper?

[¶11.]  In case No. 84-195 Preston and Marilynn Mitchell cross appeal and raise a 
single issue as follows:

"Should the district 
court restrict Preston and Marilynn Mitchell's 
recovery of costs to amounts, which by design, undercompensate them for 
legitimate expenses of litigation?"

[¶12.]  Preston Mitchell was employed by Preston 
Mitchell Logging Company, as a log skidder.1 On June 29, 1982, Mr. Mitchell 
parked his pickup truck on a narrow, single-lane dirt and gravel road, not 
pulling entirely off the road. He crossed the road to talk to three log skidders 
employed by another sawmill. After visiting with the three men, Mitchell 
returned to his pickup and climbed in the back to get a tool from the toolbox. 
At this time a logging truck driven by Virgil Weaver was coming down the road 
toward Mitchell's parked vehicle. The Weaver truck was hauling logs between 
twelve and forty-five feet long. The logs were secured by a single cable 
overbind, wrapped around the logs about eight feet from the front of the load. 
One of the logs on top of the load had become displaced. The front of the log 
was held in the cable overbind while the other end of the log had swung out at 
an angle to the right side of the log truck. Mitchell's parked vehicle was in 
the path of the dislodged log. People in the area saw that the protruding log on 
the Weaver truck was on a collision course with Mitchell, who was standing in 
the back of his pickup. These people tried to warn Weaver by shouting and waving 
their arms. Weaver thought they were greeting him and waved back. As Weaver 
drove past Mitchell's vehicle, the protruding log struck Mitchell, causing the 
injury giving rise to this lawsuit. It was then that Weaver saw the protruding 
log in his right-hand mirror for the first time.

[¶13.]  Neiman Sawmills, Inc., is Weaver's 
employer, and James S. Neiman is President of Neiman Sawmills, Inc. Preston Mitchell filed an action against Virgil R. Weaver, 
Neiman Sawmills, Inc., and James S. Neiman, asking for special, general and 
punitive damages. Marilynn Mitchell's claim was for loss of 
consortium.

[¶14.]  The case was tried to a jury the last 
week in May, 1984. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of Preston and Marilynn Mitchell and apportioned fault as 
follows: Forty percent to Virgil R. Weaver, fifty percent to James S. Neiman and 
ten percent to Preston Mitchell. The jury found damages to be: Preston Mitchell, 
$151,840 and Marilynn Mitchell, $37,960. Punitive damages were also assessed 
against Virgil R. Weaver in the sum of $50 and against James S. Neiman for 
$75,000.

I

[¶15.]  Appellants complain that the trial court 
refused to give two special instructions regarding parked vehicles. The essence 
of one proposed instruction was that a proper lookout for approaching vehicles 
should be maintained, while the second instruction stated that those who park 
vehicles should take measures to prevent collisions. The court's Instruction No. 
2 succinctly states the basis of appellees' claim for damages and appellants' 
theory of defense. Instruction No. 4 is a neutral instruction in that it is 
applicable to the drivers and operators of both vehicles involved in this case. 
This instruction generally instructs on the duties of drivers and operators and 
specifically imposes a duty to keep a proper lookout. Instruction No. 5 
specifically addresses improperly parked vehicles.

[¶16.]  The trial court is not obligated to give 
instructions in the language of their proponent and may refuse proposed 
instructions, though correct, if the principles embodied in the requested 
instructions are covered by other instructions. Britton v. State, Wyo., 643 P.2d 935 
(1982). The instructions given by the court adequately covered the duty to keep 
a proper lookout and the duty with respect to parked vehicles. In apportioning 
fault the jury attributed ten percent to Preston Mitchell. The jury apparently 
understood appellants' theory of defense, and also found some fault with 
Mitchell's parking and/or his lookout.

[¶17.]  Appellants contend that it was error for 
the court to refuse a mitigation of damages instruction. Ordinarily, the burden 
of proving that damages could be mitigated is cast on the party who is at fault 
or who commits the wrong.2 Truck Terminal, Inc. v. Nielsen, 80 
Wyo. 223, 339 P.2d 413 (1959). See also, 25A C.J.S. Damages § 144(e), p. 21 
(1966).

[¶18.]  During the time appellants claim Preston 
Mitchell could have worked to mitigate damages, he was engaged substantially 
full-time in a rigorous physical therapy program to strengthen his injured leg. 
There was medical testimony that the exercise program was required by a doctor 
and was beneficial to him. This resulted in reducing damages for which 
appellants might otherwise have been liable. Mitchell progressively gained 
strength and endurance as a result of the rehabilitation program. From this 
appellants infer that Mitchell could have, and should have, become gainfully 
employed in order to minimize damages. This inference is not sufficient to 
overcome the direct testimony that the exercise program was required by the 
doctor, and that the program was substantially full-time and was, in fact, 
successful.

[¶19.]  Mitchell's ability to work was only 
inferred, and there was no evidence that there was opportunity for him to obtain 
employment or that he unreasonably refused employment. Appellants failed to meet 
their burden of proving that Mitchell could have mitigated 
damages.

[¶20.]  Appellants attempted to offer evidence 
that Mitchell was receiving worker's compensation benefits. Apparently, they 
were aware of the rule that worker's compensation benefits are not considered in 
mitigation of damages. 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 209, p. 292 (1965). Appellants 
contended at trial that they were not proposing this evidence for the purpose of 
reducing damages but to show that Mitchell had a motive for not returning to 
work. The trial court apparently thought this theory of admitting evidence of 
worker's compensation benefits received to be subterfuge and would not admit it. 
We agree with the trial court.

[¶21.]  The trial court was correct in its 
determination that there was no evidence of Mitchell's failure to mitigate 
damages, and therefore, an instruction on mitigation was not 
proper.

II

[¶22.]  Dr. James A. Evenson, an 
economist-lawyer, testified in support of Preston Mitchell's claim for economic 
loss. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in admitting economic 
testimony and charts prepared by Dr. Evenson based on assumptions of disability. 
They also contend that these assumptions were contrary to medical testimony, 
were based on wage growth assumptions unrelated to Preston Mitchell's 
occupation, and furthermore, were unrelated to wage earners in Wyoming.

[¶23.]  The trial court, relying on Rules 702 and 
703, Wyoming Rules of Evidence, permitted the economist to testify as an expert 
on economic loss. These rules provide:

"Rule 702. Testimony by 
experts.

"If scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 

"Rule 703. Basis of 
opinion testimony by experts.

"The facts or data in the 
particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those 
perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in 
evidence."

Appellants 
complain that exhibits demonstrating economic loss were admitted without 
foundation [¶24.]   and were speculative. They also 
complain that the exhibits and the economist's testimony reflect a national wage 
growth rate rather than a local growth rate. A further complaint is that 
appellants were not permitted to conduct voir dire of the economist to establish 
that his conclusions as shown on the demonstration charts were without 
foundation and were speculative.

[¶25.]  Charts were introduced into evidence 
showing the method employed by the economist in determining the probable 
economic loss suffered by Preston Mitchell. One chart showed economic losses 
based on the assumption that Mitchell would be able to return to work as a 
logger, but with a reduction in capacity of twenty percent. This assumption 
resulted in a projected lost earning capacity of $156,794. A second chart showed 
economic losses based on the assumption that Mitchell would never be able to 
return to logging and would have to work as a mechanic in the future. This 
assumption resulted in a projected lost earning capacity of 
$269,236.

[¶26.]  In support of the first assumption, 
Thomas J. Gasser, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, testified that in his opinion 
Mitchell would be able to work at no more than fifty percent of his previous 
proficiency as a logger the first year he returned to work, and that his 
proficiency would gradually increase to seventy to seventy-five percent. 
Mitchell indicated he had doubts that he would ever regain the proficiency that 
he had before the accident.

[¶27.]  Dr. Gasser further testified that if 
Mitchell tried log skidding again and decided to give it up for medical reasons 
that the decision would be "medically justified." In fact, Mitchell worked as a 
mechanic from March to November 1983, but was laid off because his physical 
condition was such that it was not profitable to his employer. Still, it is 
arguable that plaintiffs' Exhibit 43, which assumes Mitchell would never be able 
to return to logging and would have to work as a mechanic, was not supported by 
medical evidence. However, the jury award was substantially less than the 
economic loss shown by this particular exhibit or the testimony in support 
thereof. If the exhibit was erroneously admitted, it was of no significance 
since the jury award was not based on this exhibit.

[¶28.]  Appellants complain that Dr. Evenson, the 
economist, based his economic loss charts and testimony on the assumption that 
Mitchell's earnings would have increased 8.7 percent each year, the 8.7 percent 
figure being the average growth rate in the private sector in the entire 
United 
States. They further argue that Dr. Evenson did 
not provide or use wage data relevant to the lumber industry in Wyoming or CrookCounty, but instead, used wage data for 
all occupations in the United 
States. Appellants contend that these figures, 
in order to be accurate, must be limited to a particular group of employees to 
which Mitchell belongs (loggers), and to the locality in which he works 
(Wyoming or, if possible, CrookCounty). At trial appellants introduced 
Wyoming Employment Security Commission (WESC) statistics showing that the annual 
growth rate for loggers for the last nineteen years was five percent rather than 
8.7 percent.

[¶29.]  On cross-examination Dr. Evenson 
explained why the statistics suggested by appellant were not 
used:

"State of Wyoming statistics? 
Doesn't exist in the form that we need, and the answer is yes, in the past I've 
checked with Wyoming, all the mountain states, and going into the midwest to 
find the, the data that you need for these growth rates by the vector of the 
economy. It just doesn't exist on a state level, not in the form we need. I know 
of no economist in probably 15 states that is able to utilize state data for 
growth rates."

Appellants 
attempted to have the economist make a projection of economic loss based on WESC 
statistics. Dr. Evenson said:

"* * * [I]f that's the 
way you want to perceive it. You don't have any seasonal adjustments here. In 
other words, your employment can go up and down. It depends on the point in 
time. If you want to take that and do it, you can. I don't think as an economist 
I can say there is a correct procedure, you see."

[¶30.]  In any event, an 8.7 percent average 
growth rate suggested by appellees and a five percent average growth rate 
suggested by appellants were before the jury, and it was free to choose which 
rate it found more realistic. The verdict was general, and we cannot tell which, 
if either, growth rate percentage was considered by the jury. It is significant 
that the jury verdict was less than the projected loss of earnings suggested by 
Dr. Evenson.

[¶31.]  We cannot say that the trial court abused 
its discretion in letting the testimony of Dr. Evenson stand together with the 
charts illustrating his testimony on projected economic loss. Neither can we say 
that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow appellants to 
conduct voir dire of the economist to establish that his conclusions, as shown 
on the demonstration charts, were without foundation and 
speculative.

[¶32.]  We recently addressed the basis of expert 
opinion testimony in Thomas v. Metz, 714 P.2d 1205 (Wyo., 
1986). That case involved a medical malpractice action wherein appellant claimed 
it was error for physicians testifying on behalf of the defendant doctor to base 
their opinion in part upon his deposition. We noted that the defendant's 
deposition was only one of several documents relied upon by the experts. We held 
the trial court had discretion to allow opposing counsel to voir dire an expert 
witness regarding the basis of his opinion before such opinion was expressed, or 
wait until cross-examination:

"Ordinarily, it is within 
the sound discretion of the trial court whether voir dire of a witness will be 
allowed, or whether counsel must wait until cross-examination to attack the 
credibility of an expert witness. Such rulings will not be overturned on appeal 
absent a showing of prejudicial error. In Reed v. Hunter, Wyo., 663 P.2d 513, 
517-518 (1983), this court stated:

"`* * * [T]he purpose of 
the identical counterparts in the Federal Rules of Evidence was not to provide 
for blanket admissibility of expert opinion testimony. The trial court remains 
vested with discretion in deciding whether to exclude such testimony because it 
is deemed unnecessary or not helpful to the trier of the factual issues in 
reaching an independent conclusion as to the facts. The adequacy of any 
foundation for such opinion testimony is subject to scrutiny through 
cross-examination. [Citation.] * * *'

"It should also be noted 
that if the credibility of an expert witness is still in question after 
cross-examination, counsel may then move to strike the testimony from the 
record." Thomas v. Metz, supra, at 
1207-1208.

The adequacy of 
foundation for Dr. Evenson's opinion was tested by extensive 
cross-examination.

III

[¶33.]  Appellants complain that there was no 
evidence indicating medical expenses incurred by Mitchell were reasonable and 
that because of this deficiency in proof the jury should not have been allowed 
to consider such expenses.

[¶34.]  Mitchell testified without objection as 
to the amount of his medical expenses. Appellants moved for a directed verdict 
with respect to medical expenses contending, as they do on appeal, that there 
was no evidence of reasonableness. Appellants apparently abandoned this motion, 
however, because they failed to object to the court's instruction on medical 
expenses, or to submit an instruction that they deemed appropriate. 

[¶35.]  The court instructed the jury that 
"Preston Mitchell has incurred medical expenses to date of $12,891.45." Failure 
to object to this instruction is tantamount to stipulating to the reasonableness 
of medical expenses, or at a minimum, abandonment of the motion for a directed 
verdict as to medical expenses.

[¶36.]  We could also affirm the trial court on 
this issue under the rationale of Northwest States Utilities Co. v. Ashton, 51 
Wyo. 168, 65 P.2d 235, 242 (1937). We said:

"* * * While it is no 
doubt true that the measure of what plaintiff may recover in a personal injury 
action is not the obligation he has incurred or the sum he has paid out for 
medical fees and hospitalization, but only such sum as was reasonably and 
necessarily incurred or paid (17 C.J. 915), nevertheless, we think under the 
authorities these matters may be determined by the jury from the evidence of the 
character of the injury and of the medical services and treatment rendered, 
together with the charge made therefor, especially when no objection is raised 
until after the taking of evidence is closed. 
[Citations.]"

[¶37.]  We do not suggest that direct proof of 
reasonableness be neglected at trial. Here, appellees could have easily avoided 
the problems and hazards of this issue by utilizing Rule 36, Wyoming Rules of 
Civil Procedure W.R.C.P. (Requests for Admission) or producing evidence of 
necessity and reasonableness at trial.

IV

[¶38.]  Appellants requested an instruction as 
follows:

"In determining the 
amount of damages for any loss of earnings and medical expenses which will be 
incurred in the future, it is the duty of the jury to ascertain and fix the 
present worth in dollars of such future damages.

"A lump sum of money 
received today is worth more than the same sum paid in installments over a 
period of months or years because a sum received today can be invested and earn 
money at current interest rates. By making a reduction for the earning power of 
money, your answer will reflect the present value in dollars of an award of 
future damages."

[¶39.]  During the testimony of Dr. Evenson, it 
appears that he in fact reduced the projected future loss of earnings to reflect 
a present value. He testified:

"Now, once you get the 
annual loss of 8,686, the next thing you're faced with is what's the present 
value of that loss. And I'll rewrite my figures on what's called - if you, as 
jurors, if you determine there's a loss, that money is in today's money and it 
can earn interest. * * *

"If you, as jurors, 
determine there's a loss it's less than that because you can earn interest on 
that. That's what's called present value.

"The present value of 
that is 7,877.

"And I'll - okay. What 
this means is 7,800 now invested for a year will grow to that 8,600, but that 
shaded area is what's called present value. That is what you need today to pay 
for his loss next year.

* * * * * 
*

"What you are interested 
in, again, are these present values. That is those little shaded areas. That's 
what is called the present value of the loss for the year. It's like creating a 
little bank account for what you need to set aside for that year of his 
worklife."

[¶40.]  The expert witness reduced the projected 
loss of earnings to present value and explained this principle to the jury; 
therefore, it was not error for the trial court to refuse to give appellants' 
proposed instruction.

V

[¶41.]  The jury awarded appellee Marilynn 
Mitchell $37,960 for loss of consortium.3 Appellants contest the propriety of 
this award.

[¶42.]  In Bates v. Donnafield, Wyo., 481 P.2d 347 (1971), we held that a wife 
may not recover for loss of consortium resulting from injuries to her husband. 
Our determination in that case was based on the common law which provided that 
although a husband had a cause of action for the loss of consortium for injuries 
to his wife caused by the negligence of a third party, the wife had no such 
cause for injuries negligently inflicted on her husband. Appellees invite us to 
reexamine this court's determination in Bates v. Donnafield, 
supra.

[¶43.]  We have not hesitated to overrule cases 
that were based on what was perceived to be the common law at the time the 
decisions were handed down. McClellan v. Tottenhoff, Wyo., 666 P.2d 408 (1983); and Collins v. MemorialHospital of Sheridan County, Wyo., 521 P.2d 1339 (1974). We are justified 
in overruling prior cases grounded on the common law if they stand for an unfair 
and improper rule or have outlived their usefulness, and do not meet changing 
needs.

[¶44.]  This court has previously explained the 
relationship of the common law to the jurisprudence of this 
state.

"The adoption of common 
law by Wyoming 
was not an adoption of a set code of law. By nature, the common law is not a set 
code of law. Nor was the adoption one of static and nonchanging law. The statute 
(§ 8-1-101, W.S. 1977) by which such adoption was made 
reads:

"`The common law of 
England as modified by judicial 
decisions, so far as the same is of a general nature and not inapplicable, 
and all declaratory or remedial acts or statutes made in aid of, or to supply 
the defects of the common law prior to the fourth year of James the First 
(excepting the second section of the sixth chapter of forty-third Elizabeth and 
ninth chapter of thirty-seventh Henry Eighth) and which are of a general nature 
and not local to England, are the rule of decision in this state when not 
inconsistent with the laws thereof, and are considered as of full force until 
repealed by legislative authority.' (Emphasis supplied.)" Choman v. Epperley, Wyo., 592 P.2d 714, 716 
(1979).

"* * * Our statute (Sec. 
26-101) [now § 8-1-101, W.S. 1977 (Aug. 1978 Replacement)] does not state what 
are the judicial decisions to which reference is made. However, it is, and has 
been, the constant practice of courts in common law jurisdictions to freely cite 
cases from other common-law courts, and we take it that the legislature had in 
mind the judicial decisions of all of the various jurisdictions. The cases may 
differ; one court may take one view, another another. Hence we cannot consider 
these various decisions as the law in this state, but as interpretations of the 
common law, and we are at liberty to adopt that interpretation which seems to be 
the best." In re Smith's Estate, 55 Wyo. 181, 97 P.2d 677, 681 
(1940).

[¶45.]  The court of appeals in Arizona has also 
explained the relationship of the common law to the development of state 
law.

"* * * The main 
characteristic of the common law is its dynamism. It does not remain static. The 
common law is not a thing of chiseled marble to be left unchanged for 
centuries.

"`Inherent in the common 
law is a dynamic principle which allows it to grow and to tailor itself to meet 
changing needs within the doctrine of stare decisis, which, if correctly 
understood, was not static and did not forever prevent the courts from reversing 
themselves or from applying principles of common law to new situations as the 
need arose. If this were not so, we must succumb to a rule that a judge should 
let others "long dead and unaware of the problems of the age in which he lives, 
do his thinking for him." [Citation.]'" Lewis v. Wolf, 122 Ariz. App. 567, 596 P.2d 705, 706 (1979), citing Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis.2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105, 110 
(1962).

 

The common-law rule that 
a wife was not entitled to damages for loss of consortium had its genesis in a 
social, economic and political climate entirely foreign to Wyoming in 1986. It would 
indeed be ironic if the "EqualityState" continued to deny women the right 
to damages for loss of consortium, and at the same time allowed a man a cause of 
action for loss of consortium.

"* * * A wife said the 
ancient precedents, could not sue because she was a legal nonentity. And, even 
if she could, she had no cause of action to assert because a servant has no 
`right' to the services of her master. But none of this is true today, either as 
a matter of fact or as a matter of law. The Married Women's Acts and common 
constitutional provisions have wrought a revolutionary change. Legally, today 
the wife stands on a par with her husband. Factually, as we well know, her 
position is no less than that of an equal partner. The precedents of the older 
cases are not valid precedents. They are violative of women's statutory rights 
and constitutional safeguards. They are out of harmony with the conditions of 
modern society. They do violence to our convictions and our principles. We 
reject their applicability. The reasons for the old rule no longer obtaining, 
the rule falls with it. The obstacles to the wife's action were judge-invented 
and they are herewith judge-destroyed. * * *" Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227, 234 (1960), per 
Justice Talbot Smith.

[¶46.]  We agree with the remarks of Justice 
Smith of the Michigan Supreme Court. In reading them we are reminded of the 
immortal words of the Great Sachem, smoke signal authority, who upon seeing the 
mushroom cloud at Yucca Flats on July 16, 1945, exclaimed, "Holy cow, I wish I 
had said that!"

[¶47.]  The Restatement is in accord with 
Montgomery v. 
Stephan, supra:

"Action by One Spouse for 
Harm Caused by Tort Against Other Spouse.

"(1) One who by reason of 
his tortious conduct is liable to one spouse for illness or other bodily harm is 
subject to liability to the other spouse for the resulting loss of the society 
and services of the first spouse, including impairment of capacity for sexual 
intercourse, and for reasonable expense incurred by the second spouse in 
providing medical treatment.

"(2) Unless it is not 
possible to do so, the action for loss of society and services is required to be 
joined with the action for illness or bodily harm, and recovery for loss of 
society and services is allowed only if the two actions are so joined." 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 693 (1977).

See also, 
Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 87 U.S. App.D.C. 57, 183 F.2d 811, 23 
A.L.R.2d 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied 340 U.S. 852, 71 S. Ct. 80, 95 L. Ed. 2d 624, overruled on other grounds in Smither & Co., Inc. v. Coles, 
1957, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 68, 242 F.2d 220, cert. denied 354 U.S. 914, 77 S. Ct. 1299, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1429.

[¶48.]  In accordance with the above principles, 
we overrule Bates v. Donnafield, supra, insofar as it denied a woman a cause of 
action for loss of consortium.

[¶49.]  The trial court should have reduced the 
award to Marilynn Mitchell by the percentage of fault attributed her husband, 
Preston Mitchell. A cause of action for loss of consortium is a derivative 
action, and the causal negligence of the injured spouse limits recovery of the 
claiming spouse under the comparative negligence statute, § 1-1-109(b)(ii), W.S. 
1977. Eggert v. Working, Alaska, 599 P.2d 1389 (1979). Heft & Heft, 
Comparative Negligence Manual § 3.570 (1985).

VI

[¶50.]  We will reverse the punitive damages 
award. Punitive damages are not a favorite of the law and are to be allowed with 
caution within narrow limits. Town of Jackson v. 
Shaw, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1246 (1977). Since the purpose 
of punitive damages is not to compensate a plaintiff, but to punish a defendant 
and deter others, such damages are to be awarded only for conduct involving some 
element of outrage, similar to that usually found in crime. Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 908 Comment b (1979). The purpose of punitive damages is not to 
provide a windfall to plaintiffs and their attorneys, but is to publicly condemn 
some notorious action or inaction on the part of the defendant. Sinclair Oil 
Corporation v. Columbia Casualty Company, Wyo., 
682 P.2d 975 (1984); and Campen v. Stone, Wyo., 635 P.2d 1121 
(1981).

[¶51.]  We have approved punitive damages in 
circumstances involving outrageous conduct, such as intentional torts, torts 
involving malice and torts involving willful and wanton misconduct.4 Punitive damages are not 
appropriate in circumstances involving inattention, inadvertence, 
thoughtlessness, mistake, or even gross negligence. Danculovich v. Brown, 
Wyo., 593 P.2d 187 (1979).

[¶52.]  Although degrees of negligence are not 
considered in comparative negligence, it must be remembered that the traditional 
concept of gross negligence visualized less culpable conduct than willful and 
wanton conduct. Gross negligence has been defined as:

"* * * Indifference to 
present legal duty and to utter forgetfulness of legal obligations so far as 
other persons maybe be affected. It is a heedless and palpable violation of 
legal duty respecting the rights of others. The element of culpability which 
characterizes all negligence is in gross negligence magnified to a high degree 
as compared with that present in ordinary negligence. Gross negligence is a 
manifestly smaller amount of watchfulness and circumspection than the 
circumstances require of a person of ordinary prudence. But it is something less 
than the willful, wanton and reckless conduct. * * *" Altman v. Aronson, 231 
Mass. 588, 121 N.E. 505, 506, 4 A.L.R. 1185 (1919).

[¶53.]  Willful and wanton misconduct is the 
intentional doing of an act, or an intentional failure to do an act, in reckless 
disregard of the consequences and under circumstances and conditions that a 
reasonable person would know, or have reason to know that such conduct would, in 
a high degree of probability, result in harm to another. Danculovich v. Brown, 
supra.

[¶54.]  Appellees direct our attention to several 
policies and circumstances that they contend manifest willful and wanton 
misconduct on the part of appellant James S. Neiman that justified the punitive 
damages award. Appellees' argument with respect to some of these alleged 
derelictions manifests a measure of hyperbole. Appellees' principal focus is on 
the manner in which Neiman Sawmills secured the logs on their trucks during 
transit. The logs on the truck were secured by an overbind wrapped around them. 
The overbind was positioned about eight feet behind the front of the load. The 
overbind is a high tensile steel cable specially designed for hauling logs. The 
load is held in place, not only by the overbind, but also by side stakes on the 
trailer and by positioning the logs on the trailer in the grooves formed by the 
base logs.

[¶55.]  As indicated in the factual recitation, a 
log became displaced and protruded to the right. This log struck Preston 
Mitchell, who was standing in his parked truck. Hindsight suggests that if an 
additional overbind had been positioned near the rear of the load, the offending 
log may not have become dislodged and the accident would have been avoided. We 
agree that appellants were negligent in not using multiple overbinds. There is 
no evidence, however, that their practice amounted to wanton and willful 
misconduct.

[¶56.]  Mitchell testified that truck drivers he 
had worked with the last ten years generally used only one overbind. He further 
stated that he did not recall telling Mr. Neiman or any of the truck drivers 
that using one overbind was an unsafe practice. Mr. Neiman had used one overbind 
on his logging trucks since 1958, and before the present accident, the Neiman 
logging trucks had never had an accident arising from a log coming loose from 
the load. One of appellees' witnesses, a log hauler, testified that it was the 
policy of all the log haulers in the Hulett area, including Neiman Sawmills and 
himself, to use one overbind. The testimony regarding custom and history does 
not tend to negative negligence on the part of Neiman Sawmills or Virgil Weaver. 
However, this evidence tends to demonstrate that appellants' conduct was not 
wanton and willful. Significantly, most of the testimony in this regard came 
from appellees' witnesses.

[¶57.]  The other evidence produced by appellees 
to demonstrate wanton and willful misconduct is even less convincing than the 
absence of a second overbind. There is no evidence that the alleged defective 
road repairs (cribbing) contributed to dislodging the offending log. The 
consequence of such deficiency is merely speculative. The lack of safety rules 
and regulations relate directly to the custom of using a single overbind, which 
we have already discussed. We do not see anything in the hiring and training of 
Virgil Weaver by Nieman Sawmills that suggests wanton and willful misconduct. 
Weaver was hired after he submitted a written application, and was interviewed 
regarding his experience as a logger. Additionally, another logging company gave 
Weaver a favorable recommendation. He was also required to pass a physical 
examination and procure a Wyoming Class A driver's license. Following 
training by two of Neiman's experienced drivers, Weaver was not allowed to drive 
alone until he was considered to be capable of handling the job as a log hauler 
and being accepted as a good driver. Mr. Neiman had been assured that Weaver 
could do the job and drive on his own.

[¶58.]  The jury award of punitive damages 
against Virgil Weaver was $50. Because of this insignificant award we will not 
concern ourselves with this matter. De minimis non curat lex. We do not see 
anything that suggests wanton and willful misconduct on the part of Weaver, 
including the way he loaded his truck or the speed he was driving, or his 
lookout procedure and failure to heed a warning. Sometimes the line between 
conduct justifying punitive damages and less culpable conduct is indeed fine. 
Sinclair Oil Corporation v. Columbia Casualty Company, supra. Here, the conduct 
of appellant does not approach that fine line. Appellees presented a series of 
apparent negligent acts of omission and commission and, through skillful trial 
advocacy, parlayed them into a verdict for punitive 
damages.

[¶59.]  The trial court should have directed a 
verdict in favor of appellants on the issue of punitive damages. We reverse the 
punitive damages award.

VII

[¶60.]  In their final issue appellants object to 
costs assessed by the court. In their cross appeal (case No. 84-195) Preston and Marilynn Mitchell complain that the court 
improperly disallowed part of the costs. We will dispose of the Mitchell cross 
appeal in connection with appellants' final issue.

[¶61.]  Appellees filed a bill of costs covering 
six items:

1. Court and service fees 
                                                    
$ 96.96

2. Travel expenses of 
plaintiffs' attorneys                           
1,173.83

3. Reporting fees                                                                  
1,635.68

4. Photographs, visual 
aids, reports, supplies, etc.                      
589.17

5. Witness fees and 
mileage                                                           
8,881.55

6. Telephone and postage 
                                                  
254.27

 __________

            
Total                                                                                        
$12,631.46

[¶62.]  Appellants filed an objection to the bill 
of costs alleging that appellees were seeking recovery of expenses not 
authorized by statute, that the claimed costs were excessive, and that there was 
no evidence of the reasonableness or necessity of the claimed costs. Upon 
hearing, the trial court awarded appellees costs of $9,184.84, and on its own 
motion, also ordered appellants to pay to the Clerk of the District Court jury 
services in the amount of $2,206.64.

[¶63.]  The jury costs assessed against 
appellants payable to the county must be disallowed. The matter of costs is 
strictly statutory; costs were not allowed as a rule at common law. Mader v. 
Stephenson, Wyo., 481 P.2d 664 
(1971).

[¶64.]  Rule 38(b)(3), W.R.C.P., regarding jury 
fees provides:

"All demands for trial by 
jury shall be accompanied by a deposit of twelve dollars ($12.00). The jury fees 
in cases where jury trials are demanded shall be paid to the clerk of the court, 
and by him paid into the county treasury at the close of each week, and he shall 
tax as costs in each such case, and in all other cases in which a jury trial is 
had, a jury fee of twelve dollars ($12.00), to be recovered of the unsuccessful 
party, as other costs, and in case the party making such deposit is successful, 
he shall recover such deposit from the opposite party, as part of his costs in 
the case."

[¶65.]  Rule 38(b)(3) is authority for appellees 
to recover the $12 jury fee from appellants, but does not authorize the 
assessment of costs against appellants for jury services.

[¶66.]  This court held in Johnson v. State, 
Wyo., 532 P.2d 598 (1975), that the costs of prosecution do not include jury expenses of 
mileage and per diem. The rationale for our holding in that case and Arnold v. State, 76 Wyo. 445, 306 P.2d 368 (1957), regarding jury 
expenses is also applicable here. Furthermore, a court may not award costs to an 
entity which was not a party to the litigation. 20 Am.Jur.2d Costs § 26, p. 21 
(1965); and 20 C.J.S. Costs § 107, p. 352, (1940).

[¶67.]  The court awarded appellees costs for 
expert witness fees to two physicians, and expert witness fees for the services 
of a lawyer-economist. The statute allowing expert witness fees is § 
1-14-102(b), W.S. 1977:

"In any civil or criminal 
case, any party may call expert witnesses to testify and if the court finds any 
witness to be a qualified expert and the expert gives expert testimony which is 
admitted as evidence in the case, the expert witness shall be allowed witness 
fees of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) per day or such other amount as the court 
allows according to the circumstances of the case. Expert witness fees may be 
charged as costs against any party or be apportioned among some or all parties 
in the discretion of the court."

[¶68.]  In Stevenson v. Henning, Del.Supr., 268 A.2d 872 (1970), quoting with approval State v. 0.0673 Acres of Land, etc., Del. 
Supr., 224 A.2d 598, 602 (1966), the Delaware Supreme Court 
stated:

"Witness fees allowed 
under § 8906 should be limited to time necessarily spent in attendance upon the 
court for the purpose of testifying. This does not include time spent in 
listening to other witnesses for `orientation', or in consulting and advising 
with a party or counsel or other witnesses during the trial. * * *"5

The Delaware statute authorizing expert witness fees is not 
significantly different than Wyoming's statute, § 1-14-102, W.S. 
1977.

[¶69.]  The expert witness fees allowed as costs 
by the court in this case included time not necessarily spent in court 
attendance for purposes of testifying and should therefore be deleted. 
Furthermore, costs under the limitation that we have indicated should be 
supported by evidence of reasonableness. Buttrey Food Stores Division v. 
Coulson, Wyo., 620 P.2d 549, 20 A.L.R. 4th 549 
(1980).

[¶70.]  In the Mitchells' cross appeal, they 
contend that the trial court erred in disallowing part of their costs. The trial 
court disallowed $1,299.35 for discovery depositions, $254.27 for telephone and 
postage, $589.17 for photographs, medical records, X-rays and visual aids, and 
$1,173.83 for mileage, motel and meals. These latter expenses were incurred by 
the Mitchells' attorney in taking depositions.

[¶71.]  In Roberts Construction Company v. 
Vondriska, Wyo., 547 P.2d 1171, 1183 (1976), we quoted 
with approval Wyoming Central Irr. Co. v. LaPorte, 26 Wyo. 522, 188 P. 360, 362 
(1920):

"* * * [T]he matter of 
costs is purely statutory as costs were not allowed as a rule at common law. We 
of course have no statute which purports to authorize the charging of such a 
survey as is here involved, as an item of cost."

In the same case 
we also said: "* * * What constitutes proper costs in an action, to be assessed 
against the losing party, is not very clearly established by either statute or 
rule. * * *" Id., at 1182.

[¶72.]  We recently considered the issue of 
whether the costs of discovery depositions are recoverable in State v. 
Dieringer, Wyo., 708 P.2d 1, 11-12 (1985), wherein we 
stated:

"With respect to costs of 
discovery depositions, we espouse the rule that if the discovery deposition is 
reasonably necessary for the preparation of the case, then there is no abuse of 
discretion on the part of the district judge in awarding such costs. 
[Citations.] With respect to the exercise of discretion as to such costs, 
however, the burden must be upon the party seeking the award of costs to justify 
to the district court that those costs were reasonably necessary for the 
preparation of the case for trial. If the depositions are introduced at the 
trial, or are used for purposes of impeachment or refreshing the recollection of 
a witness at the trial that would ordinarily satisfy the burden of demonstrating 
that they were reasonably necessary. Other uses of the deposition in connection 
with the trial proceedings such as motions for summary judgment might serve to 
persuade the district court that the depositions were reasonably necessary, but 
it would not be required to so conclude. * * *" See also, Duffy v. Brown, 
Wyo., 708 P.2d 433 (1985).

[¶73.]  The trial court properly disallowed the 
costs incurred by the Mitchells' attorney for mileage, per diem, telephone 
expenses, postage, photographs, medical records, x-rays and visual aids. Kiefel 
v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 404 F.2d 1163, 12 A.L.R.Fed. 895 (7th Cir. 1968), 
cert. denied 395 U.S. 908, 89 S. Ct. 1750, 23 L. Ed. 2d 221, reh. denied 395 U.S. 987, 89 S. Ct. 2128, 23 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1969); Turner v. Willis, 59 Haw. 319, 582 P.2d 710 (1978); Brown v. Citizens National Bank of Cheyenne, Wyo., 269 P. 40 (1928); Wright, Miller & 
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2666 (1983); 20 C.J.S. Costs § 
252 (1940). We hold that the cost of depositions introduced into evidence, or 
that are necessarily and reasonably used at trial to impeach testimony of 
adverse witnesses or to refresh the recollection of a witness, are proper 
expenses and may be assessed as costs.

[¶74.]  In summary, we affirm the general verdict 
in favor of Preston Mitchell and the judgment in favor of Marilynn Mitchell for 
loss of consortium. However, both must be reduced by the percentage of fault 
attributed to Preston Mitchell (ten percent). Section 1-1-109(b)(ii), W.S. 1977. 
We reverse that portion of the judgment awarding punitive damages to Preston 
Mitchell. The judgment granting costs is reversed in part, and affirmed in part, 
and remanded to the district court for a rehearing and entry of an order not 
inconsistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 A log skidder operates a 
rubber-tired machine, places cables on trees that have been cut down, and pulls 
the trees to a landing from which they are loaded onto 
trucks.

2 An exception to this 
general rule is when a wronged party has, within his peculiar knowledge, facts, 
information or materials not readily available to the party at fault. In these 
circumstances the wronged party is obligated to show that damages could not be 
mitigated. Rapidol Co. v. Howe Co., 144 Wn. 543, 258 P. 469 
(1927).

3"Consortium. Conjugal 
fellowship of husband and wife, and the right of each to the company, society, 
co-operation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation. * * 
`Loss of consortium' means loss of society, affection, assistance and conjugal 
fellowship, and includes loss or impairment of sexual relations. * * *" Black's 
Law Dictionary, p. 280 (5th ed. 1979).

4 Intentional Torts (e.g., 
assault or battery): Condict v. Condict, 
Wyo., 664 P.2d 131 (1983); and Petsch v. 
Florom, Wyo., 538 P.2d 1011 (1975). Malicious 
Prosecution: Cates v. Eddy, 
Wyo., 669 P.2d 912 
(1983).

False Arrest: 
Town of Jackson v. Shaw, Wyo., 
569 P.2d 1246 (1977).

Trespass: Sears 
v. Summit, Inc., Wyo., 616 P.2d 765 (1980); and 
Hall Oil Co. v. Barquin, 33 Wyo. 92, 237 P. 255 
(1925).

Operating Motor 
Vehicle Under Influence of Drugs or Alcohol: Campen v. Stone, Wyo., 635 P.2d 1121, 32 
A.L.R. 4th 410 (1981).

5 10 Del.C. § 8906 
provides:

"The fees for witnesses 
testifying as experts or in the capacity of professional men in cases in the 
Superior Court, and the Court of Chancery, within this State, shall be fixed by 
the court in its discretion, and such fees so fixed shall be taxed as part of 
the costs in each case and shall be collected and paid as other witness fees are 
now collected and paid."