Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Barry LeSieur

Citation: 2013 WI 39

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2013-05-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
2013 WI 39 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP2763-D   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Barry LeSieur, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Barry LeSieur, 
          Respondent-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST LESIEUR     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 3, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
       
 
 
2013 WI 39
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP2763-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Barry LeSieur, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Barry LeSieur, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 3, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   In this matter, we consider a motion 
filed by the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) seeking a 
suspension of the license of Attorney Barry LeSieur to practice 
law in Wisconsin due to his alleged noncompliance with the 
conditions we imposed on his practice of law in a prior 
disciplinary opinion and order in this same proceeding.  See In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against LeSieur, 2010 WI 117, 329 
Wis. 2d 349, 789 N.W.2d 572 (LeSieur I).  Because it appeared 
No. 
2007AP2763-D   
 
2 
 
that there were factual issues regarding whether Attorney 
LeSieur had violated his obligations under LeSieur I, we 
referred the OLR's motion to a referee with directions to 
conduct a hearing, to make findings of fact and conclusions of 
law regarding whether or not Attorney LeSieur had complied with 
our 
order, 
and 
to 
make 
a 
recommendation 
regarding 
the 
appropriate type and level of sanction, if any, that the court 
should impose on Attorney LeSieur, if noncompliance was found.  
After receiving the referee's report and recommendation, we 
issued an order to Attorney LeSieur directing him to show cause 
why his license should not be suspended as recommended by the 
referee.  We now review the report and recommendation of the 
referee and Attorney LeSieur's response to the order to show 
cause. 
¶2 
Based on Attorney LeSieur's default as found by the 
referee, we conclude that Attorney LeSieur failed to comply with 
the order of this court in LeSieur I and with multiple orders of 
the referee.  We therefore determine that Attorney LeSieur's 
license to practice law in Wisconsin should be suspended until 
such time as he meets the requirements we set forth below, that 
the conditions on his practice of law in this state should be 
extended for an additional period of two years following the 
date on which his license is reinstated, and that he should be 
required to pay the full costs of this motion proceeding. 
¶3 
The conduct underlying the original charge against 
Attorney LeSieur was his third conviction for driving while 
No. 
2007AP2763-D   
 
3 
 
intoxicated (OWI).1  In addition to publicly reprimanding 
Attorney LeSieur, the court placed a number of conditions on his 
continued practice of law.  In particular, the LeSieur I 
decision and order required Attorney LeSieur to execute one or 
more releases that complied with the federal Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 201 et seq., and all applicable federal and state laws and 
that authorized the disclosure of his health records for each 
treatment provider who was providing or had provided alcohol-
related or substance abuse-related treatment or services to 
Attorney LeSieur within the preceding ten years.  The releases 
were to authorize disclosure to his treatment providers so that 
they could share information regarding his condition and to the 
OLR so that it could monitor his situation and ensure compliance 
with the conditions imposed on his practice.  The court's order 
in LeSieur I directed the OLR to maintain the confidentiality of 
all of the documents or information it received.  Our order 
required the release(s) signed by Attorney LeSieur to remain in 
effect for a period of two years.   
¶4 
The order in LeSieur I further required Attorney 
LeSieur to undergo an alcohol and other drug abuse (AODA) 
evaluation by a professional AODA counselor or treatment 
provider, who was to produce a written report of the evaluation.  
The written report was required to include recommendations for 
                                                 
1 Although it was Attorney LeSieur's third OWI conviction, 
it was the fifth time that he had been arrested for OWI. 
No. 
2007AP2763-D   
 
4 
 
Attorney 
LeSieur's 
continuing 
treatment 
or 
maintenance.  
Attorney 
LeSieur 
was 
ordered 
to 
comply 
with 
all 
such 
recommendations. 
¶5 
Finally, the LeSieur I order mandated that for a 
period of two years, Attorney LeSieur must undergo random 
alcohol and substance abuse screenings at his own expense.  The 
OLR was instructed to direct and monitor these screenings. 
¶6 
In June 2011 the OLR filed the motion now under 
consideration.2  Its motion simply moved the court to issue an 
order requiring Attorney LeSieur to show cause why his license 
should not be suspended for willful failure to comply with the 
conditions set forth in LeSieur I.  Supporting the motion was an 
affidavit of Linda Albert, the monitoring supervisor of the 
Wisconsin 
Lawyers 
Assistance 
Program 
(WisLAP). 
 
Albert's 
affidavit stated that following the issuance of the LeSieur I 
decision, the OLR had referred Attorney LeSieur to WisLAP as its 
designee for monitoring the conditions imposed on his practice.  
The affidavit provided a detailed recitation of WisLAP's 
interactions 
with 
Attorney 
LeSieur. 
 
After 
receiving 
a 
sufficient AODA assessment from the AODA counselor that Attorney 
LeSieur had been seeing and after discussions with Attorney 
LeSieur, WisLAP finally received a signed monitoring contract in 
March 2011.  Albert alleged that over the course of the next 
                                                 
2 As it did in In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Lister, 2012 WI 102, 343 Wis. 2d 532, 817 N.W.2d 867, the OLR 
filed the present motion for a suspension in the original 
disciplinary proceeding rather than initiating a separate 
investigation and new disciplinary proceeding. 
No. 
2007AP2763-D   
 
5 
 
month, Attorney LeSieur had violated the WisLAP monitoring 
contract and the conditions imposed in LeSieur I in a number of 
ways.   
¶7 
This court initially directed the OLR to provide the 
legal basis for bringing such an enforcement motion in the 
underlying disciplinary proceeding rather than filing a new 
complaint and to explain the nature of the suspension it was 
seeking.  The OLR subsequently responded that, although it could 
bring a new complaint alleging a charge of noncompliance with a 
court order, it brought the motion seeking an order to show 
cause as a way to expedite the matter.  It further stated that 
it was seeking an indefinite suspension of Attorney LeSieur's 
license until such time as he complied with the conditions 
imposed in LeSieur I.  Finally, it asserted that this court had 
a legal basis either under its contempt powers or its inherent 
authority to regulate the practice of law in this state to 
suspend Attorney LeSieur's license immediately after issuing an 
order to show cause and receiving a response. 
¶8 
Without deciding the motion, we issued an order on 
October 14, 2011, requiring Attorney LeSieur to file a response 
to the OLR's motion and referring the motion to a referee since 
there appeared to be potential disputes of fact.  Our order 
directed the referee to conduct an evidentiary hearing and then 
to file a report that contained (1) findings of fact "as to all 
relevant facts that relate to Attorney LeSieur's compliance or 
noncompliance with the conditions set forth in the court's 
[LeSieur I decision]," (2) conclusions of law as to "whether 
No. 
2007AP2763-D   
 
6 
 
Attorney LeSieur's conduct has or has not violated those 
conditions," and (3) a recommendation as to what sanctions or 
discipline, if any, should be imposed on Attorney LeSieur if he 
was found to have failed to comply with the conditions in 
LeSieur I.   
¶9 
Reserve Judge William Eich was ultimately appointed as 
the referee.  The OLR filed two motions before the referee.  One 
motion sought an order from the referee directing Attorney 
LeSieur to sign a new release of medical records.  Attorney 
LeSieur initially signed such a release on October 27, 2010, as 
required by the LeSieur I decision.  On October 26, 2011, 
however, Attorney LeSieur notified the OLR that he was revoking 
that release.  The OLR's motion asked the referee to order 
Attorney LeSieur to sign a new copy of that same release. 
¶10 Attorney LeSieur objected to signing another release 
form because he viewed the OLR's release as going beyond what 
this court had ordered in LeSieur I and because he viewed the 
information already released to have been improperly disclosed 
to inappropriate persons/entities, including WisLAP and others 
with whom WisLAP had spoken.  He also objected that the release 
violated both HIPAA and state law because it did not limit the 
use of the released information to the present disciplinary 
proceeding and because it did not require the return or 
destruction of all copies of released records upon completion of 
this disciplinary proceeding. 
¶11 The OLR's second motion asked the referee to order 
Attorney LeSieur to undergo an independent medical examination 
No. 
2007AP2763-D   
 
7 
 
(IME) by addiction psychiatrist Dr. Thomas Rowell.  The request 
for a second, independent examination by a specific addiction 
psychiatrist stemmed from WisLAP, which alleged that although 
Attorney LeSieur had undergone an AODA evaluation by the 
counselor he had already been seeing, in compliance with the 
LeSieur I requirement, he was not being sufficiently forthcoming 
with his counselor and other health care providers and not being 
sufficiently compliant with its monitoring program.  It made 
this evaluation by an independent addiction psychiatrist one of 
the terms of a modified monitoring contract that it demanded 
Attorney LeSieur must sign. 
¶12 Attorney LeSieur refused to execute the modified 
contract because, among other things, he viewed the requirement 
of another evaluation by an addiction psychiatrist as beyond the 
scope of the LeSieur I decision and as an additional financial 
burden he should not have to bear. 
¶13 In a decision and order dated February 28, 2012,3 the 
referee generally rejected Attorney LeSieur's objections to the 
OLR's release form as exceeding the scope of the LeSieur I 
decision, with the exception of a single phrase that the referee 
deleted.  The referee therefore found Attorney LeSieur to be out 
of compliance with his obligation to sign a release form and 
ordered Attorney LeSieur to execute the release proffered by the 
OLR (with the deletion of the single phrase). 
                                                 
3 The order was filed with the clerk of this court on 
March 1, 2012.  Because the referee referred to his decisions 
and orders by the dates on which he signed them, this opinion 
will also do so in order to avoid confusion. 
No. 
2007AP2763-D   
 
8 
 
¶14 The referee also rejected Attorney LeSieur's arguments 
against an order for an IME.  Attorney LeSieur contended that 
the referee lacked authority to issue such an IME order because 
(1) the rule of civil procedure authorizing IMEs, Wis. Stat. 
§ 804.10, speaks of "the court in which the action is pending" 
as the entity that can order an IME, and (2) an IME was not 
mentioned as one of the conditions of practice set forth in the 
LeSieur I decision.  The referee concluded that since SCR 22.16 
gave him the powers of a circuit court trying a civil matter, he 
had the authority to order an IME.  He also concluded that the 
results of an IME would be relevant to whether Attorney LeSieur 
had violated the conditions imposed in LeSieur I and to what the 
appropriate sanction might be.  He therefore ordered Attorney 
LeSieur to schedule an appointment with Dr. Rowell. 
¶15 When the referee learned that Attorney LeSieur had not 
complied with the February 28, 2012 order, he issued a second 
order on April 18, 2012, explicitly directing Attorney LeSieur 
to execute the revised medical release and to schedule an 
appointment with Dr. Rowell by April 25, 2012. 
¶16 Attorney LeSieur did not comply with the referee's 
orders.  Instead, he filed a motion for a protective order in 
this court seeking to have the referee's interlocutory orders 
declared unlawful and void.  In an order dated May 22, 2012, 
this court denied the motion as an improper attempt at an 
interlocutory 
appeal. 
 
Because 
Attorney 
LeSieur's 
motion 
complained that the OLR's release form was still broader than 
the language of the court's order in LeSieur I, the May 22, 2012 
No. 
2007AP2763-D   
 
9 
 
order further clarified that the release that Attorney LeSieur 
must sign should include the records of health care providers or 
mental health providers  
relating to the prescribing of, the use of, or the 
potential 
use 
of (1) potentially addictive pain 
medications, 
(2) 
anti-depressant 
or 
anti-anxiety 
medications, or (3) mood-altering medications.  The 
release need not authorize the disclosure of (a) 
medical records that were/are not created by treatment 
providers who are providing or have provided alcohol-
related 
or 
substance 
abuse-related 
treatment 
or 
services and (b) medical records that were/are not 
related to the prescribing of, the use of, or the 
potential 
use 
of (1) potentially addictive pain 
medications, 
(2) 
anti-depressant 
or 
anti-anxiety 
medications, or (3) mood-altering medications. 
The 
court 
also 
directed 
the 
referee 
to 
give 
further 
consideration to Attorney LeSieur's arguments that the OLR's 
release failed to comply with HIPAA and its regulations and with 
Wis. Stat. § 146.82. 
¶17 The referee invited additional briefing from Attorney 
LeSieur on the HIPAA and § 146.82 issues.  Attorney LeSieur 
argued that compliance with HIPAA required the releases to state 
(1) that the parties were prohibited from using or disclosing 
his protected health information for any purpose other than the 
present disciplinary proceeding, and (2) that all parties 
receiving copies of his protected health records must return or 
destroy those records at the conclusion of this proceeding.   
¶18 In addition, because Attorney LeSieur continued to 
refuse to sign the release or to schedule an IME with 
Dr. Rowell, the OLR filed a motion asking the referee to 
conclude that Attorney LeSieur was in default as a sanction for 
No. 
2007AP2763-D   
 
10 
 
his disobedience of the referee's orders and to issue a report 
on the basis of the allegations in the OLR's original motion for 
a suspension. 
¶19 In an order dated July 23, 2012, the referee addressed 
both the HIPAA issues and the OLR's motion for default.  With 
respect to the release form's compliance with HIPAA, the referee 
indicated that while he found the OLR's releases to be in 
compliance with HIPAA and applicable Wisconsin statutes, he 
nonetheless believed that "it would not be inappropriate" to add 
Attorney LeSieur's requested brief additions to the release 
forms, and he directed the OLR to do so.  The referee, however, 
found that Attorney LeSieur had failed to offer any reasons to 
make additional alterations to the releases.  He therefore once 
more ordered Attorney LeSieur to execute the release forms, as 
modified.  He also again ordered Attorney LeSieur to make an 
appointment for an IME with Dr. Rowell within 10 business days 
and to respond to the OLR's discovery requests. 
¶20 With respect to the OLR's default motion, the referee 
found that Attorney LeSieur's conduct was indeed egregious, 
which would support finding him to be in default.  The referee, 
however, declined to declare Attorney LeSieur to be in default 
or impose other sanctions at that time.  Giving Attorney LeSieur 
one more chance, the referee held the OLR's default motion in 
abeyance "pending [Attorney] LeSieur's compliance with the terms 
and conditions [of the July 23, 2012 order]." 
¶21 Attorney LeSieur responded to the July 23, 2012 order 
in three ways.  First, he sent a letter to the referee that 
No. 
2007AP2763-D   
 
11 
 
again argued that the referee lacked authority to order the IME.  
Second, Attorney LeSieur altered the release form in a number of 
significant ways that he believed to be appropriate, executed 
the revised form, and then sent it to the OLR.  Third, Attorney 
LeSieur did respond to the OLR's discovery requests, but the OLR 
asserted that several of his answers were nonresponsive to the 
actual requests.   
¶22 The OLR brought the alteration of the release form and 
its belief that some discovery responses were nonresponsive to 
the attention of the referee.  The OLR asked the referee to take 
up again its motion for sanctions, including a declaration of 
default, due to Attorney LeSieur's continuing noncompliance with 
the referee's orders. 
¶23 In light of Attorney LeSieur's response to his 
July 23, 2012 order, the referee proceeded to issue a final 
report and recommendation on August 16, 2012.   
¶24 The referee noted that where a respondent attorney 
engages in conduct during a disciplinary proceeding that is 
found to be egregious, a referee is warranted, as a sanction for 
violation of the referee's orders, to declare the respondent 
attorney to be in default and to proceed on the basis of the 
OLR's complaint.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kelly, 
2012 WI 55, ¶24, 341 Wis. 2d 104, 814 N.W.2d 844; In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Semancik, 2005 WI 139, ¶26, 286 
Wis. 2d 24, 704 N.W.2d 581. 
¶25 The 
referee 
once 
more 
found 
Attorney 
LeSieur's 
persistent and ongoing refusal to comply with the order of this 
No. 
2007AP2763-D   
 
12 
 
court and with the referee's orders to be egregious.  In 
particular, the referee pointed to the fact that Attorney 
LeSieur had willfully disobeyed the referee's three orders to 
execute the medical records release form and to schedule an IME 
with the designated addiction psychiatrist.  The referee further 
noted that in the ten months that had passed since the referral 
of the matter to the referee, the situation regarding Attorney 
LeSieur had remained essentially the same as it had been at the 
time of the court's order.  Although Attorney LeSieur had been 
ordered multiple times to execute the medical records release 
form, he still had not done so, except for signing a release 
form that he had unilaterally and significantly altered to 
comport with his view of what was lawful.  The referee therefore 
concluded that, based on the allegations contained in the OLR's 
motion and accompanying affidavit, which were now established as 
true due to Attorney LeSieur's default, Attorney LeSieur had 
intentionally failed to comply with the conditions imposed on 
his practice in this court's LeSieur I decision and with the 
referee's multiple orders. 
¶26 Given Attorney LeSieur's noncompliance and the court's 
concern for monitoring Attorney LeSieur's alcohol dependence, 
the referee made four recommendations to the court: 
• Attorney LeSieur's license to practice law in Wisconsin 
should be suspended forthwith; 
• Because Attorney LeSieur has not yet complied with the 
conditions imposed on his practice of law by this court 
in LeSieur I, those conditions should be extended for an 
No. 
2007AP2763-D   
 
13 
 
additional two years from the date of their expiration or 
the 
date 
on 
which 
Attorney 
LeSieur's 
license 
is 
reinstated, whichever is later; 
• Attorney 
LeSieur 
should 
be 
ordered 
to 
submit 
to 
monitoring of his compliance with those conditions by 
WisLAP, as the OLR's designee; and 
• Attorney LeSieur should be ordered to submit to an IME 
and evaluation by Dr. Rowell. 
¶27 Following the filing of the referee's report, although 
there is no rule that specifically authorizes an appeal from a 
referee's report in this type of situation, Attorney LeSieur 
filed a document labeled an "appeal" from the referee's report.  
The "appeal" made essentially the same arguments that Attorney 
LeSieur had made to the referee regarding the referee's lack of 
authority to order him to sign release forms or undergo an IME.  
It also objected to the presence or absence of certain language 
in the release forms. 
¶28 On September 17, 2012, in light of the referee's 
report and recommendation, this court issued an order directing 
Attorney LeSieur to show cause why his license should not be 
suspended.  Attorney LeSieur filed a short response, in which he 
essentially argued that this court's procedure for considering 
the OLR's motion was a violation of the court's own rules.  He 
noted this court's comments in In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Lister, 2012 WI 102, ¶¶19-22, 343 Wis. 2d 532, 817 
N.W.2d 867 (Lister II), where we recognized that there are no 
specific rules that address the post-discipline type of motion 
No. 
2007AP2763-D   
 
14 
 
filed by the OLR in that case and this one and explained the 
basis for referring the OLR's motion to a referee.  Attorney 
LeSieur argued that because the rules provide a complete 
procedure for investigating and prosecuting violations of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, the OLR and the 
court were bound to use only that procedure for litigating his 
alleged violation of his obligations under LeSieur I.  In other 
words, he contended that the OLR should have been required to 
obtain a finding of cause to proceed from a preliminary review 
committee and then should have filed a new disciplinary 
complaint rather than filing a sanction motion in the existing 
disciplinary 
case. 
 
According 
to 
Attorney 
LeSieur, 
that 
complaint should have been handled in the ordinary manner under 
SCRs 22.16-22.17, with a referral to a referee and then an 
opportunity for a full appeal.  In any event, he asserted that 
his appeal of the referee's report and recommendation was still 
proper under SCR 22.17 and that this court should review the 
referee's report in the context of his appeal (after full 
briefing and possibly oral argument). 
¶29 First, we will address Attorney LeSieur's arguments 
regarding the procedures used to resolve any factual issues 
regarding the OLR's motion and to review the referee's report 
and recommendation.  As an initial matter, while we again 
acknowledge that our rules do not contain an explicit procedure 
for resolving a motion alleging a violation of a prior 
disciplinary order in the same disciplinary proceeding, we 
reiterate that the procedure we followed in both Lister II and 
No. 
2007AP2763-D   
 
15 
 
this case follows a procedure similar to the one that we 
utilized in In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hetzel, 124 
Wis. 2d 462, 369 N.W.2d 394 (1985).  That procedure gave 
Attorney LeSieur notice of the allegations against him through 
the OLR's motion and allowed Attorney LeSieur the opportunity to 
present evidence and argument to a referee regarding what he did 
in response to our LeSieur I order and whether his actions 
violated his obligations under that order.  Although this 
court's rules provided the OLR a basis on which it could have 
chosen to proceed with an entirely new disciplinary complaint in 
a new proceeding, there is no existing rule that expressly 
requires it to initiate a separate disciplinary case when 
seeking to compel compliance with an order of this court.  Thus, 
we reject Attorney LeSieur's contention that our referral of the 
OLR's motion in the underlying disciplinary proceeding to a 
referee was a violation of our rules.   
¶30 We also reject Attorney LeSieur's argument that we are 
compelled to recognize his "appeal."  Rule 22.17 is part of the 
set of rules that govern the procedure for handling formal 
disciplinary complaints filed by the OLR.  Rules 22.11-22.18 
provide the procedure that is to be followed by the OLR and a 
respondent attorney for litigating and reviewing a formal 
complaint in the first instance.  Rule 22.17, which authorizes 
an appeal, is just one part of that procedure.  Thus, the 
context makes clear that SCR 22.17 applies to referee reports 
that are addressed to an OLR complaint.  Attorney LeSieur 
already had the benefit of such a full litigation procedure and 
No. 
2007AP2763-D   
 
16 
 
full appeal when the OLR's complaint in this case was initially 
considered.  This court ultimately rejected his appeal, and 
imposed a public reprimand and conditions on his continued 
practice of law.  LeSieur I, 329 Wis. 2d 349, ¶¶15, 18, 20-24. 
¶31 The OLR filed a motion in the same disciplinary 
proceeding seeking the imposition of a sanction due to Attorney 
LeSieur's failure to comply with the conditions we imposed.  
This was a motion in an existing proceeding and not a new 
complaint.  Thus, the full procedure of SCRs 22.11-22.18 did not 
apply by its terms.  Although we referred the motion to a 
referee for the completion of certain tasks, which mirrored the 
way in which a complaint would be handled, that does not mean 
that the report the referee filed in response to our referral 
order gives rise to a right to appeal under SCR 22.17.  Indeed, 
because we noted this fact in Lister II, we issued an order in 
that proceeding that afforded the parties an opportunity to 
object to the referee's report.  343 Wis. 2d 532, ¶23.  We did 
essentially the same thing in this case when we issued an order 
to show cause to Attorney LeSieur.  He was given notice of the 
referee's findings by receiving a copy of the referee's report 
and an opportunity to be heard regarding why the referee's 
findings should not lead to a suspension of his license to 
practice law in Wisconsin. 
¶32 We now turn to our review of the referee's report.  As 
in other review situations, we will affirm the referee's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we will 
review the referee's conclusions of law on a de novo basis.  
No. 
2007AP2763-D   
 
17 
 
Lister II, 343 Wis. 2d 532, ¶23; see also In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 
740 N.W.2d 125.  "We will determine the appropriate type and 
level of sanction or discipline given the particular facts of 
the case, independent of the referee's recommendation, but 
benefiting from it."  Lister II, 343 Wis. 2d 532, ¶23; see also 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 
261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶33 Our review of this case, however, is framed by the 
fact that the referee declared Attorney LeSieur to be in default 
due to his repeated refusal to comply with the orders of the 
referee.  Thus, the issues we review are limited to whether the 
referee erroneously exercised his discretion in finding that 
Attorney LeSieur had repeatedly disobeyed the referee's orders 
and therefore whether a declaration of default and the resulting 
disregard of his substantive arguments were proper.  See Martin 
v. Griffin, 117 Wis. 2d 438, 344 N.W.2d 206 (Ct. App. 1984) 
(limiting review of default judgment entered following failure 
to answer to whether trial court properly exercised its 
discretion in granting default and determining that defendant's 
substantive arguments had been waived by default). 
¶34 In this 
instance, the referee declared Attorney 
LeSieur to be in default, disregarded his substantive response 
to the OLR's motion, and proceeded on the basis of the facts 
alleged in the OLR's motion and supporting materials due to 
Attorney LeSieur's conduct during the consideration of the 
motion.  This is akin to a circuit court granting a judgment by 
No. 
2007AP2763-D   
 
18 
 
default in a civil case because the defendant failed to obey 
court orders or statutory requirements or to provide discovery.  
See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 802.10(7) (violation of scheduling or 
pretrial order), 804.12 (failure to provide discovery), and 
805.03 (failure to prosecute action or to comply with procedural 
statutes).  We have held that referees in disciplinary cases may 
similarly declare a respondent attorney to be in default when 
the attorney has disobeyed the referee's scheduling or pretrial 
orders, violated applicable rules of procedure, or failed to 
comply with his/her discovery obligations in the disciplinary 
proceeding.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Kelly, 2012 WI 55, ¶21, 341 Wis. 2d 104, 814 N.W.2d 844; In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Semancik, 2005 WI 139, ¶26, 286 
Wis. 2d 24, 704 N.W.2d 581; In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Haberman, 128 Wis. 2d 390, 391-92, 395, 382 N.W.2d 439 
(1986).  Because of the drastic nature of such a sanction, 
however, as in civil cases, we have required the referee to find 
that the respondent attorney's actions were "egregious" or "in 
bad faith" before declaring a respondent attorney to be in 
default.  Kelly, 341 Wis. 2d 104, ¶22 (citations omitted).  An 
"extreme, substantial and persistent" failure to follow a 
referee's orders without a clear and justifiable excuse can 
constitute egregious conduct.  See Industrial Roofing Serv. v. 
Marquardt, 2007 WI 19, ¶43, 299 Wis. 2d 81, 726 N.W.2d 898 
(citations omitted). 
¶35 In this case the referee found that Attorney LeSieur's 
repeated 
violation 
of 
his 
"pretrial" 
orders 
constituted 
No. 
2007AP2763-D   
 
19 
 
"egregious" conduct that warranted disregarding his response to 
the motion and proceeding on the basis of the allegations in the 
OLR's motion and supporting documents.  Generally, we will 
sustain such a finding and sanction "if there is a reasonable 
basis for the circuit court's [or referee's] determination that 
the noncomplying party's conduct was egregious and there was no 
'clear and justifiable excuse' for the party's noncompliance."  
Johnson v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 162 Wis. 2d 261, 276-77, 470 
N.W.2d 859 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Industrial 
Roofing, 299 Wis. 2d 81, ¶61; see also id., ¶41 (decision to 
impose sanction in standard civil action and the choice of which 
sanction to impose are reviewed for erroneous exercise of 
discretion).4   
¶36 The referee's finding of egregiousness and declaration 
of default is not an erroneous exercise of discretion in this 
case.  The evidence is clear that Attorney LeSieur has 
repeatedly and willfully refused to comply with the terms of 
orders issued both by the referee and this court.  In LeSieur I, 
this court ordered Attorney LeSieur to execute a release for 
certain categories of information.  He did execute such a 
release, but it is undisputed he then revoked that release 
                                                 
4 There is no issue in this case regarding whether an 
attorney's conduct can be imputed to a party for purposes of 
imposing a sanction because Attorney LeSieur has represented 
himself throughout this proceeding.  Cf. Industrial Roofing, 299 
Wis. 2d 81, ¶61 (erroneous exercise of discretion to impute 
attorney's conduct to client and enter a sanction of dismissal 
where client is blameless). 
No. 
2007AP2763-D   
 
20 
 
approximately one year later, one year prior to the expiration 
date for the release established by this court.  The referee 
ordered him on two occasions to sign a new copy of the release, 
from which one potentially problematic phrase had been removed.  
Attorney LeSieur, however, did not execute the release in 
compliance with either order.  He did not execute the release 
even after this court denied his motion for interlocutory review 
and directed the referee to proceed with the matter and give 
further consideration to Attorney LeSieur's arguments based on 
HIPAA and Wis. Stat. § 146.82.  Attorney LeSieur raised only two 
claims that the release form did not comply with those privacy 
provisions of state and federal law.  In an effort to address 
Attorney LeSieur's concerns, the referee directed the OLR to add 
language to the release form that addressed Attorney LeSieur's 
two requests and directed him yet again to execute the release 
as now revised.  Even after obtaining what he wanted, Attorney 
LeSieur still disregarded the referee's third order and signed 
the release only after substantially modifying it to his liking.   
¶37 Attorney LeSieur's noncompliance did not end with his 
refusal to execute a release form as ordered.  There is no 
dispute 
that 
he 
also 
repeatedly 
refused 
to 
undergo 
an 
independent medical examination by an addiction specialist.  The 
referee's orders to undergo such an examination were clear, but 
Attorney LeSieur willfully disobeyed the orders.  While he may 
not have agreed with the orders, Attorney LeSieur is not 
authorized to determine which orders he will obey and which he 
is entitled to flaunt or modify to his liking.  Especially once 
No. 
2007AP2763-D   
 
21 
 
this court had rejected his interlocutory appeal, he should have 
understood that he had no choice but to comply with the orders 
of the referee.  He continued, however, to refuse to undergo an 
IME, which supports a presumption that he has not been in 
compliance with his obligations under our order in LeSieur I and 
lacked a meritorious defense to the OLR's motion. 
¶38 Finally, we note that the referee found in one of his 
interlocutory orders that Attorney LeSieur had failed to comply 
with his obligations to respond to the OLR's discovery requests 
and 
that 
he 
had 
not 
provided 
a 
lawful 
basis 
for 
his 
noncompliance. 
 
His 
failure 
to 
provide 
proper 
discovery 
responses also warrants a presumption that he lacked a defense 
to the OLR's motion. 
¶39 Attorney LeSieur does not deny that these events 
happened or that he chose not to comply with the referee's 
orders.  An attorney is not free to disregard the orders issued 
by a referee in an attorney disciplinary proceeding, even when 
the attorney believes that the referee's orders are invalid or 
require modification.  Only this court may declare a referee's 
orders invalid or excuse an attorney from complying with them.  
We see no reason to invalidate the orders issued by the referee 
in this matter.  Attorney LeSieur's repeated and willful failure 
to comply with those orders is therefore egregious and merits 
finding him to be in default with respect to the OLR's motion.  
We therefore agree with the referee that the OLR's allegations 
that Attorney LeSieur failed to comply with the provisions of 
No. 
2007AP2763-D   
 
22 
 
this court's order in LeSieur I are accepted as true by virtue 
of Attorney LeSieur's default. 
¶40 We turn now to the appropriate sanction that should be 
imposed as a result of Attorney LeSieur's noncompliance with our 
orders.  Attorney LeSieur has been convicted on three occasions 
of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and was arrested 
on suspicion of that offense on two other occasions that did not 
result 
in 
valid 
convictions. 
 
Attorney 
LeSieur's 
record 
indicates a potential problem with alcohol and other addictive 
or mood-altering medications.  He claimed during the initial 
disciplinary proceeding that he has not consumed alcohol since 
2006.  If that is accurate, he is to be commended.  His 
refraining from alcohol indicates some recognition that he has 
problems in this area that require affirmative steps.  On the 
other hand, his actions since the release of LeSieur I indicate 
repeated attempts to thwart the monitoring of his condition by 
the OLR and its designee.  One who is truly eager to overcome 
any problems with alcohol or mood-altering medications would 
welcome assistance, but Attorney LeSieur has frustrated the 
efforts of this court, the referee, and WisLAP to ensure that he 
remains on a productive path.  This is a troubling pattern. 
¶41 We simply cannot tolerate such disobedience of our 
orders.  Accordingly, we will suspend Attorney LeSieur's license 
until he complies with the orders of this court.  To leave no 
room for doubt or argument, we will clarify the nature of the 
release Attorney LeSieur must now sign and we will expressly 
require him to undergo an independent medical examination by 
No. 
2007AP2763-D   
 
23 
 
Dr. Thomas Rowell or another addiction psychiatrist or other 
treatment provider designated by the OLR.  Given Attorney 
LeSieur's failure to comply thus far, the conditions that we 
imposed in LeSieur I and those we add in this opinion shall be 
extended to remain in effect for a period of two years from the 
date on which Attorney LeSieur's license is reinstated. 
¶42 We now turn to the issue of costs.  The OLR has 
indicated that the costs of this supplemental proceeding due to 
Attorney 
LeSieur's 
noncompliance 
were 
$8,987.16 
as 
of 
September 6, 2012.  We find no reason to depart from our general 
practice of requiring a respondent attorney, whose conduct 
caused the OLR to bring this proceeding, to pay the full costs 
of the proceeding.  Attorney LeSieur's conduct led to the filing 
of the OLR's motion and the resulting proceedings.  He should 
therefore be required to pay the associated costs. 
¶43 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Barry LeSieur to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended, effective May 20, 2013, 
until such time as he demonstrates full compliance with the 
following conditions and until further order of the court: 
(A) Barry 
LeSieur shall sign reciprocal releases of 
confidentiality.  Such release or releases shall authorize the 
disclosure of Barry LeSieur's health records possessed by each 
treatment provider who is providing or has provided alcohol-
related or substance abuse-related treatment or services to 
Barry LeSieur since September 30, 2000, and shall also authorize 
the disclosure by health care providers or mental health 
providers of health records relating to the prescribing of, the 
No. 
2007AP2763-D   
 
24 
 
use of, or the potential use of (1) potentially addictive pain 
medications, (2) anti-depressant or anti-anxiety medications, or 
(3) mood-altering medications.  Such release or releases shall 
authorize disclosure to all other health care or mental health 
providers covered by the release or releases and to the Office 
of Lawyer Regulation and those persons or entities that it 
designates to assist it in monitoring Barry LeSieur's compliance 
with his obligations under this order.  The Office of Lawyer 
Regulation and its designees shall maintain as confidential all 
information or documents received pursuant to such release or 
releases and shall use such information or documents for the 
purpose of monitoring Attorney LeSieur's compliance with the 
obligations imposed on him by the orders of this court.  The 
release or releases required by this paragraph shall remain in 
effect for a period of two years from the date on which Attorney 
LeSieur's license to practice law in Wisconsin is reinstated by 
this court.  The release or releases to be signed by Attorney 
LeSieur shall comply with this paragraph and may be in a form 
substantially similar to the release form attached as Exhibit 2 
to the referee's report filed on August 27, 2012, without any of 
the alterations made to that release form by Attorney LeSieur.  
The release form shall be modified to include the expiration 
date identified above.  Attorney LeSieur must sign the release 
or releases in the form provided to him by the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation and may not make any modifications or alterations to 
the language of the release.  For purposes of the return or 
destruction of disclosed medical records, this disciplinary 
No. 
2007AP2763-D   
 
25 
 
proceeding will be completed at such time as Attorney LeSieur is 
no longer subject to any conditions on his practice of law in 
Wisconsin. 
(B) Barry 
LeSieur 
shall 
schedule 
and 
undergo 
an 
independent medical examination and evaluation by Dr. Thomas 
Rowell or another addiction psychiatrist or other treatment 
provider designated by the Office of Lawyer Regulation.  The 
addiction psychiatrist or other treatment provider who performs 
this examination and evaluation shall provide to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation a written report, which assesses Barry 
LeSieur's substance abuse history and current status and makes 
specific 
recommendations 
for 
Barry 
LeSieur's 
continuing 
treatment or maintenance.  This written report shall be 
maintained by the Office of Lawyer Regulation and its designees 
as confidential pursuant to the release or releases described in 
the preceding paragraph.  If Attorney LeSieur attempts to 
schedule an appointment with Dr. Rowell and he is unable to see 
Attorney LeSieur within 60 days after the date of this order, 
the 
Office 
of 
Lawyer 
Regulation 
shall 
designate 
another 
addiction specialist or treatment provider who will be able to 
conduct the independent examination and evaluation within 60 
days.   
(C) Barry LeSieur shall enter into the amended monitoring 
contract with the Wisconsin Lawyers Assistance Program as 
previously submitted to him by that program. 
¶44 IT 
IS 
FURTHER 
ORDERED 
that 
prior 
to 
seeking 
reinstatement and continuing for a period of two years following 
No. 
2007AP2763-D   
 
26 
 
the reinstatement of his license, Barry LeSieur shall, at his 
own expense, submit to random alcohol and substance abuse 
screenings, directed and monitored by the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation and its designee. 
¶45 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Barry LeSieur shall comply 
with all written recommendations set forth in the original AODA 
evaluation and with all written recommendations set forth in the 
written evaluation report that results from the independent 
medical examination described in ¶43(B) of this opinion and 
order.  
¶46 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the conditions on Barry 
LeSieur's practice of law in Wisconsin set forth in this opinion 
shall remain in effect for a period of two years from the date 
on which this court reinstates Barry LeSieur's license to 
practice law. 
¶47 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Barry LeSieur shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding. 
¶48 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Barry LeSieur shall comply 
with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a 
person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
 
No. 
2007AP2763-D   
 
 
 
1