Case Title: Baca v. People

Citation: 336 P.2d 712

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1959-03-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
336 P.2d 712 (1959) Robert Dennis BACA, Plaintiff in Error, v. PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error. No. 18697. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. March 16, 1959. Rehearing Denied April 6, 1959. Walter L. Gerash, Denver, for plaintiff in error. *713 Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., and John W. Patterson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error. DOYLE, Justice. Plaintiff in error, defendant in the district court, seeks reversal of a conviction of burglary and conspiracy to commit burglary upon which was pronounced a sentence of six to ten years in the State Penitentiary. Defendant, together with one James Ferguson, was charged with the burglary of the PFAB Prescription pharmacy at 5190 West Colfax Avenue in Denver. He was apprehended inside the store on the morning of February 11, 1957 at 1:00 A.M. Entry had been gained by hammering a hole through the wall from an adjoining building. Brick and mortar dust on the clothing of the defendant attested to the fact that he had entered in this manner. Also found at the scene was a small bag containing articles which had been removed from the store, and gloves and two hammers which apparently had been used for the purpose of knocking out the bricks. When the officers arrested the defendant he was inside the store and had been hiding behind a counter. Lying under this counter, which was normally used for wrapping packages, on a shelf was a 38 calibre Smith and Wesson revolver fully loaded. Defendant was questioned by the arresting officer as to what he had been doing in the drug store and he said "What drug store?" and "I wasn't in any drug store." Two points are raised by the defendant on this review. They are paraphrased and summarized as follows: 1. That the trial court erred in refusing to grant a continuance in view of the fact that a conflict between the defendant and his attorney arose and was brought to the attention of the trial court. Defendant argues that this ruling was contrary to law and to Article II, Sections 16 and 25 of the Colorado Constitution and to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. 2. That the trial court erred in admitting People's Exhibit C, the pistol. Defendant contends that this exhibit was immaterial and highly inflammatory. The conflict between the defendant and his counsel arose because of the recommendation of the latter that defendant plead guilty. This occurred on October 31, 1957, the day on which the case had been set for trial. The following transpired: "Mr. Buckles: May it please the Court, in view of his statement, I would like to make a statement into the record. In this instance I represented the co-defendant named James Franklin Ferguson, Jr. I have become well acquainted with the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged felony commission, and in view of the overwhelming amount of evidence that I feel that the State is prepared to present and the utter lack of defense which is available to this charge, I have advised the defendant that in my opinion a plea of guilty should be entered. I have further advised the defendant that I am more than willing *714 to represent him to the limit of my capacities; however, I do not know what type of defense is available to me. Now, that is where I stand, your Honor, and I am perfectly willing to go ahead with the trial. The granting or denial of a motion for a continuance is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court, and a ruling thereon will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of that discretion. Harris v. Municipal Court of City and County of Denver, 123 Colo. 539, 234 P.2d 1055, Honda v. People, 111 Colo. *715 279, 141 P.2d 178. The trial court was here justified in denying the request. The period from February 13, the date of filing, until October 31, 1957 provided defendant ample opportunity to solve the problems with his counsel. It was within the province of the court to deny the requested continuance made on the morning of the trial. The fact that employed counsel had recommended that defendant change his plea from not guilty to guilty does not provide a ground for such counsel's dismissal on the day of the trial in favor of employed counsel, and does not of itself furnish a ground for continuance. It is argued that the court committed error in receiving the revolver in evidence. This is based on the argument that the revolver was not relevant to the issues which were being tried, and on the further ground that it was now shown to have been in the actual possession of the defendant, but was found afterward in the immediate area where the defendant was crouching. The contention that the revolver was not relevant regardless of whether the defendant had possession is not tenable. The revolver has as much relevancy as the burglar tools. These articles are all pertinent to the question whether the defendant had the requisite intent to commit a crime and as bearing on his motive for being in the drug store. It will be recalled that the defendant made no explanation concerning his presence in the store either at the time of his arrest or at the trial. The purpose of the district attorney in introducing this demonstrative evidence was obviously to foreclose argument by the defendant that he was a victim of circumstances. Hence, if the articles were so connected with the defendant that it can be fairly inferred that they were at the time of arrest, or had been immediately prior thereto, in his possession, they were properly received in evidence and the fact that they tend to be inflammatory does not render them inadmissible. Martinez v. People, 124 Colo. 170, 235 P.2d 810; Moya v. People, 88 Colo. 139, 293 P. 335. Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 238 (3rd Ed.) indicates that the decisions are liberal in approving the reception of this type of evidence. The author states: Collected in the footnote to this section are numerous decisions illustrating the principle. See also the very recent decision in Davis v. People, 137 Colo. 113, 321 P.2d 1103, which recognizes that such articles have probative value when they are found in the possession of the accused after the commission of the crime. Where, as here, the defendant is arrested inside a drug store under circumstances which conclusively establish that his entry has been unlawful, articles which are then found on the premises in the possession of defendant, or reasonably attributed to him, and which are foreign to the drug store, are admissible. The court's ruling with respect to the hammers is free from doubt. Its ruling on the admissibility of the gun is less so because its possession by defendant was not conclusively established. The district attorney sought to exclude other possibilities by showing that the proprietor had not left the gun there and that it had not been there when the store was closed. The effect of this was to warrant the trial judge in concluding that the defendant or his confederate had probably placed it there, especially since defendant was apprehended in the very locale where the gun was found. We hold that error was not committed in admitting the gun in evidence under the circumstances disclosed since possession can be established by circumstantial evidence, 12 C.J.S. Burglary § 51, p. 724. This is a procedure, however, which should be pursued with caution and only where the circumstances establishing possession are strong. The trial judge who was in a better position than is this Court to evaluate the gun's proximity to the defendant considered the question carefully and observed: The circumstances establishing possession by defendant of this weapon existed to a reasonable certainty and we hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in so ruling. In view of the overwhelming evidence in support of the verdict, the district attorney might well have refrained from offering the gun in evidence. It added little to the accumulation of evidence already before the jury. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the judgment should be and it is affirmed.