Case Title: Honaker v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 39, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2002-08-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CHARLES D. HONAKER, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 39, 2002 
§ 
§  Court BelowSuperior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr.A. Nos. IN95-03-1911, -1913,
§  -1915, -1917, -1919, and -1922 
§  Cr. ID No. 9503009839 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 21, 2002 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: August 9, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, BERGER, and STEELE, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 9th day of August 2002, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the 
record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Charles Honaker, filed this appeal from the 
Superior Court’s denial of his motion for modification of sentence.  In his opening 
brief on appeal, Honaker raises two contentions.  First, Honaker contends that the 
Superior Court violated double jeopardy principles when it reimposed a sentence 
for violation of probation (VOP) that previously had been discharged as served.  
Second, Honaker asserts that the August 2001 VOP proceedings did not comport 
with due process requirements because he was not afforded a preliminary hearing 
prior to the VOP hearing. 
 
2 
 
(2) 
The State agrees that, in July 1999, the Superior Court discharged 
Honaker’s sentence in Cr.A. No. IN95-03-1919 as served.  The State further notes 
that the Superior Court, in a VOP proceeding in February 2000, reimposed the 
sentence in Cr.A. No. IN95-03-1919, and Honaker did not appeal from that 
judgment.  Honaker also failed to file an appeal from his August 2001 VOP 
sentence, which included a sentence for Cr.A. No. IN95-03-1919 of one year at 
Level V incarceration suspended entirely for one year at Level IV home 
confinement suspended after serving six months for six months at Level III 
probation.   
(3) 
Although Honaker failed to raise this issue earlier, the State 
nonetheless concedes that the Superior Court’s jurisdiction to reimpose a 
previously discharged sentence is questionable.  The State points out that, because 
the Superior Court denied Honaker’s motion to modify without requesting a 
response, the State has not had an opportunity to present its position to the Superior 
Court for its consideration.  The State therefore requests that the Superior Court’s 
judgment be vacated, in part, and the matter be remanded to the Superior Court for 
further consideration of this issue.  We agree that the Superior Court should 
reconsider this portion of its judgment after full briefing from both parties on this 
issue. 
 
3 
(4) 
With respect to Honaker’s second argument, the State points out that 
the VOP hearing was held within two weeks of Honaker’s presentment to a 
Superior Court Commissioner for a bail hearing.  The State contends that the 
August 2001 VOP proceedings comported with the requirements of Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 32.1 and that, in the absence of any specific prejudice, which 
Honaker does not assert, the Superior Court was not required to vacate the VOP 
sentence because of the lack of a preliminary hearing.  Having reviewed the record, 
we agree that the August 2001 VOP proceedings comported with due process 
requirements and that Honaker cannot establish any prejudice from the failure to 
hold a preliminary hearing.  Accordingly, we affirm this portion of the Superior 
Court’s judgment. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Superior Court’s judgment 
is AFFIRMED in part and VACATED in part.  This matter is REMANDED for 
further proceedings consistent with this Order.  Jurisdiction is not retained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_Myron T. Steele____________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice