Case Title: Dunbar v. State

Citation: 2013-Ohio-2163

Docket Number: 2012-0565

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-05-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Dunbar v. State, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-2163.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-2163 
DUNBAR, APPELLEE, v. THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Dunbar v. State, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-2163.] 
Wrongful imprisonment —Compensation—Eligibility—R.C. 2743.48—Claimant 
who pled guilty to offense for which he was imprisoned is precluded from 
being declared a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” even if the guilty 
plea was vacated on appeal. 
(No. 2012-0565—Submitted February 6, 2013—Decided May 30, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 97364, 
2012-Ohio-707. 
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
One who has been convicted of a felony on a plea of guilty that is subsequently 
vacated on appeal is not eligible to be declared a wrongfully imprisoned 
individual in order to pursue damages against the state of Ohio in the 
Court of Claims.  (R.C. 2743.48(A)(2), construed.) 
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} The issue in this appeal is whether a guilty plea to a felony 
prevents a claimant from qualifying as a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” for 
purposes of pursuing damages against the state of Ohio in the Court of Claims 
when the guilty plea is subsequently vacated on appeal.  We hold that it does. 
Case Background 
{¶ 2} The facts in this case are not in dispute.  In November 2004, Lang 
Dunbar struck his live-in fiancée, knocked her to the ground, and twisted her legs.  
The couple’s two children witnessed the incident.  Dunbar then instructed his 
fiancée that she was not to leave the house and not to answer the door.  For four 
or five days following the incident, Dunbar’s fiancée remained inside the house, 
and a week later, she filed a complaint with the Cleveland Police Department.  
Dunbar was charged with domestic violence, to which he pled no contest.  The 
Cleveland Municipal Court found him guilty and sentenced him to 180 days. 
{¶ 3} In January 2005, Dunbar was indicted on three counts of felony 
abduction and one count of domestic violence stemming from the same incident. 
A plea agreement was reached in which Dunbar would plead guilty to one count 
of abduction in exchange for a recommended sentence of community control, but 
the trial court sentenced him instead to two years in prison.  Dunbar appealed, and 
the Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed.  State v. Dunbar, 8th Dist. No. 
87317, 2007-Ohio-3261 (“Dunbar I”).  The court of appeals concluded that the 
trial court erred by failing to advise Dunbar of the possibility of deviation from 
the recommended sentence of community control and by not giving him the 
opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea when the trial court decided to impose a 
prison sentence.  Id. at ¶ 141.  Upon remand, the court of appeals instructed the 
trial court to vacate Dunbar’s plea.  Id. at ¶ 193. 
{¶ 4} On remand, the case went to trial.  A jury convicted Dunbar of one 
count of abduction, and he was sentenced to a five-year prison term.  Once again, 
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the Eighth District reversed the conviction. State v. Dunbar, 8th Dist. No. 92262, 
2010-Ohio-239 (“Dunbar II”).  The court of appeals concluded that there was no 
evidence that Dunbar restrained his fiancée’s liberty by force or threat of force in 
the days after the domestic-violence incident.  Id. at ¶ 24.  Dunbar’s conviction 
and sentence were vacated, and he was ordered discharged. 
{¶ 5} On August 16, 2010, Dunbar filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga 
County Court of Common Pleas requesting that he be declared a wrongfully 
imprisoned person, a declaration required by statute before damages may be 
sought against the state in the Court of Claims.  R.C. 2743.48(B)(2) and (E).  
Dunbar and the state filed motions for summary judgment, but neither filed any 
evidence in support, requesting instead that the trial court take judicial notice of 
the earlier proceedings. 
{¶ 6} The trial court found that Dunbar’s earlier guilty plea, vacated on 
appeal in Dunbar I, did not bar proceedings under R.C. 2743.48.  Dunbar’s 
motion for summary judgment was granted, and he was declared a wrongfully 
imprisoned individual.  The state appealed. 
{¶ 7} In affirming the trial court’s finding that Dunbar’s prior guilty plea 
did not disqualify him from recovery under R.C. 2743.48, the Eighth District 
Court of Appeals relied on a case from the Fourth District, which stated: 
 
“R.C. 2743.48 is ambiguous to the extent that it does not 
explicitly state whether only valid guilty pleas will preclude 
recovery, or whether guilty pleas that are void will also preclude 
recovery.  R.C. 2743.48’s purpose of redressing existing wrongs 
would not be served by withholding relief from individuals who 
were wrongfully induced to enter a guilty plea.  The narrowest 
interpretation of R.C. 2743.48, which would preclude recovery 
even if the guilty plea is nugatory and has no effect at law, would 
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thwart the remedial goals of the statute.  On the other hand, 
interpreting R.C. 2743.48 liberally would result in assuring that a 
plea that has been determined to have no legal effect does not, if 
fact, have any legal effect upon either the criminal or civil matters 
associated with the case.  This would further the remedial goals of 
the statute by addressing the particularly egregious wrong of 
imprisoning an individual not only wrongfully, but also 
unconstitutionally.” 
 
Dunbar v. State, 8th Dist. No. 97364, 2012-Ohio-707, ¶ 15 (“Dunbar III”), 
quoting State v. Moore, 165 Ohio App.3d 538, 2006-Ohio-114, 847 N.E.2d 452, 
¶ 23 (4th Dist.).  The Eighth District reasoned, “Because a void guilty plea has no 
effect at law, it does not exist for purposes of determining whether a person has 
the right to seek compensation under R.C. 2743.48.”  Id. at ¶ 16.  The appellate 
court then concluded that because Dunbar’s plea was not entered knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently, it was void and did not preclude a declaration that 
Dunbar was a wrongfully imprisoned person.  Id. at ¶ 17. 
{¶ 8} The state filed a discretionary appeal with this court, and we 
accepted the state’s first proposition of law: “R.C. 2743.48(A)(2) bars an action 
for wrongful imprisonment when the claimant pleads guilty, including in cases 
where the claimant’s conviction was vacated on appeal.”  Dunbar v. State, 132 
Ohio St.3d 1461, 2012-Ohio-3054, 969 N.E.2d 1230. 
Analysis 
{¶ 9} This court recently summarized Ohio’s wrongful-imprisonment 
statute in Doss v. State, 135 Ohio St.3d 211, 2012-Ohio-5678, 905 N.E.2d 1229:    
 
The General Assembly has developed a two-step process to 
compensate those who have been wrongfully imprisoned. The first 
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step is an action in the common pleas court seeking a preliminary 
factual determination of wrongful imprisonment; the second step is 
an action in the Court of Claims to recover money damages.  
Griffith v. Cleveland, 128 Ohio St.3d 35, 2010-Ohio-4905, 941 
N.E.2d 1157, paragraph two of the syllabus.  The wrongful-
imprisonment statute, R.C. 2743.48, was added to the Revised 
Code in 1986 by Sub.H.B. No. 609 “to authorize civil actions 
against the state, for specified monetary amounts, in the Court of 
Claims by certain wrongfully imprisoned individuals.” 141 Ohio 
Laws, Part III, 5351.  The statute was designed to replace the 
former practice of compensating those wrongfully imprisoned by 
ad hoc moral-claims legislation.  Walden v. State, 47 Ohio St.3d 
47, 49, 547 N.E.2d 962 (1989).  Under the statutory scheme, a 
claimant must be determined to be a “wrongfully imprisoned 
individual” by the court of common pleas before being permitted 
to file for compensation against the state of Ohio in the Court of 
Claims.  R.C. 2305.02 and 2743.48(B)(2); Griffith v. Cleveland, 
paragraph two of the syllabus. 
 
Id. at ¶ 10.  When the General Assembly enacted the current statutory scheme, it 
“intended that the court of common pleas actively separate those who were 
wrongfully imprisoned from those who have merely avoided criminal liability.” 
Walden at 52. 
{¶ 10} R.C. 2743.48 provides: 
 
(A) As used in this section and section 2743.49 of the 
Revised Code, a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” means an 
individual who satisfies each of the following: 
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(1) The individual was charged with a violation of a section 
of the Revised Code by an indictment or information, and the 
violation charged was an aggravated felony or felony. 
(2) The individual was found guilty of, but did not plead 
guilty to, the particular charge or a lesser-included offense by the 
court or jury involved, and the offense of which the individual was 
found guilty was an aggravated felony or felony. 
(3) The individual was sentenced to an indefinite or definite 
term of imprisonment in a state correctional institution for the 
offense of which the individual was found guilty. 
(4) The individual’s conviction was vacated, dismissed, or 
reversed on appeal, the prosecuting attorney in the case cannot or 
will not seek any further appeal of right or upon leave of court, and 
no criminal proceeding is pending, can be brought, or will be 
brought by any prosecuting attorney, city director of law, village 
solicitor, or other chief legal officer of a municipal corporation 
against the individual for any act associated with that conviction. 
(5) Subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to 
imprisonment, an error in procedure resulted in the individual's 
release, or it was determined by the court of common pleas in the 
county where the underlying criminal action was initiated that the 
charged offense, including all lesser-included offenses, either was 
not committed by the individual or was not committed by any 
person. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 11} Thus, a claimant in a civil case for wrongful imprisonment must 
satisfy all five factors by a preponderance of the evidence before he or she can be 
January Term, 2013 
 
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declared a “wrongfully imprisoned individual.” Doss, 135 Ohio St.3d 211, 2012-
Ohio-5678, 905 N.E.2d 1229, at paragraph one of syllabus.  In this case, the 
disputed issue is whether R.C. 2743.48(A)(2), relating to the nonexistence of a 
guilty plea, has been satisfied. 
{¶ 12} The state argues that the plain text of R.C. 2743.48(A)(2) demands 
a reversal in this case because Dunbar at one time had pled guilty to the abduction 
offense.  And to be eligible for compensation, Dunbar would need a judicially 
crafted exception to the portion of the statute that disqualifies claimants who have 
pled guilty, allowing recovery when guilty pleas are vacated.  Such an exception 
would swallow the rule, the state maintains, because all claimants must show that 
their convictions were vacated, dismissed, or reversed on appeal under R.C. 
2743.48(A)(4), and the vacation of the conviction would include the guilty plea as 
well.  The requirement that a claimant “did not plead guilty” would have no 
meaning according to Dunbar’s reading. 
{¶ 13} Dunbar argues that the state’s reading of R.C. 2743.48 is counter to 
the clear intent of the statute.  He contends that R.C. 2743.48 is remedial in 
nature, enacted to right the state’s wrong of incarcerating innocent individuals and 
that pursuant to R.C. 1.11, the statute should be liberally construed.  Dunbar 
asserts that his initial guilty plea was void and therefore had no legal 
consequence.  He also reasons that R.C. 2743.48(A)(2) is ambiguous because it 
does not address the effect of a void or vacated guilty plea on a subsequent 
conviction.  He maintains that his later plea of not guilty, the trial, and the 
resultant conviction satisfy the requirements of R.C. 2743.48. 
{¶ 14} As a preliminary matter, we must address the contention that 
Dunbar’s guilty plea is void and therefore has no legal consequence.  The Eighth 
District stated, “Without knowledge that the court might impose a prison 
sentence, Dunbar’s plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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was void, and therefore, does not preclude his wrongful imprisonment claim.”  
Dunbar III, 2012-Ohio-707, at ¶ 17. 
{¶ 15} Notwithstanding this court’s recent exception for sentencing errors, 
especially those involving postrelease control, this court has traditionally held that 
a judgment is void ab initio only when a court acts without subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  See State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 
N.E.2d 306, ¶ 27; Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 
N.E.2d 992, syllabus.  The basis for vacating Dunbar’s plea was the trial court’s 
failure to advise him that it could deviate from the recommended sentence of 
community control and impose a prison term.  Although the trial court erred in the 
exercise of its jurisdiction, it did not act without jurisdiction.  Therefore, the plea 
was voidable rather than void, and the fact that the plea was vacated on appeal 
does not mean it never existed. 
{¶ 16} We now turn to Dunbar’s argument that R.C. 2743.48 is 
ambiguous because it does not state specifically whether vacated guilty pleas are 
to be included in R.C. 2743.48(A)(2)’s disqualification for individuals who pled 
guilty to the relevant offense.  In essence, Dunbar wants us to read ambiguity into 
the statute based on the facts and circumstances of his case.  However, ambiguity 
in a statute exists only if its language is susceptible of more than one reasonable 
interpretation. See, e.g., State ex rel. Toledo Edison Co. v. Clyde, 76 Ohio St.3d 
508, 513, 668 N.E.2d 498 (1996). Thus, inquiry into legislative intent, legislative 
history, public policy, the consequences of an interpretation, or any other factors 
identified in R.C. 1.49 is inappropriate absent an initial finding that the language 
of the statute is, itself, capable of bearing more than one meaning. See Fairborn v. 
DeDomenico, 114 Ohio App.3d 590, 593, 683 N.E.2d 820 (2d Dist.1996). 
{¶ 17} Dunbar contends that a vacated guilty plea should not be 
considered when determining whether a person is a “wrongfully imprisoned 
individual” because the vacated plea no longer has any legal effect at law.  But we 
January Term, 2013 
 
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must apply the statute as it is written.  Here, the statute expressly provides that to 
demonstrate that he is a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” pursuant to R.C. 
2743.48, the claimant must satisfy each of the provisions of R.C. 2743.48(A)(1) 
through (5).  Gover v. State, 67 Ohio St.3d 93, 95, 616 N.E.2d 207 (1993).  This 
includes the express requirement that the claimant did not plead guilty to the 
particular offense. 
{¶ 18} Although R.C. 2743.48 does not specifically address a vacated 
guilty plea, we do not agree that this makes the statute ambiguous. 
 
The Legislature will be presumed to have intended to make no 
limitations to a statute in which it has included by general language 
many subjects, persons or entities, without limitation. It is a 
general rule that courts, in the interpretation of a statute, may not 
take, strike or read anything out of a statute, or delete, subtract or 
omit anything therefrom. To the contrary, it is a cardinal rule of 
statutory construction that significance and effect should if 
possible be accorded every word, phrase, sentence and part of an 
act. 
 
Wachendorf v. Shaver, 149 Ohio St. 231, 237, 78 N.E.2d 370 (1948). 
{¶ 19} Under the plain language of R.C. 2743.48(A)(2), a person who has 
pled guilty to an offense is not eligible to be declared a wrongfully imprisoned 
individual.  We are to presume that all guilty pleas, even those that are later 
vacated, are included because the statute itself provides no exception for a person 
whose guilty plea is vacated on appeal and is otherwise able to satisfy the 
remaining requirements of R.C. 2743.48(A).  The General Assembly has created 
exceptions for individuals whose guilty pleas have been vacated in other 
instances.  For example, R.C. 2961.02(B) bars individuals who plead guilty to 
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certain disqualifying felony offenses from holding public office; but an exception 
allows them to hold office if the “plea * * * is reversed, expunged, or annulled” or 
if they receive a full pardon.  R.C. 2961.02(C).  No similar exception, however, 
appears in the wrongful-imprisonment statute.  As Dunbar basically 
acknowledges, we would be required to create one.  But this is an exception that 
belongs within the purview of the General Assembly. 
{¶ 20} Dunbar argues that giving legal effect to a vacated guilty plea in 
this one context would undermine consistency in our jurisprudence and would be 
contrary to the intent behind the wrongful-imprisonment statute.  Although the 
vacated guilty plea no longer has any effect in Dunbar’s criminal case, the guilty 
plea nonetheless did occur and was entered on his behalf.  The General Assembly 
created the claim for wrongful imprisonment and placed limitations upon the 
categories of persons who are eligible for compensation.  One limitation is that 
the claimant cannot have pled guilty to the offense.  Unfortunately for Dunbar, the 
General Assembly did not provide an exception for guilty pleas that are later 
vacated.  We therefore hold one who has been convicted of a felony on a plea of 
guilty that is subsequently vacated on appeal is not eligible to be declared a 
wrongfully imprisoned individual in order to pursue damages against the state of 
Ohio in the Court of Claims. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 21} Based on the plain language of R.C. 2743.48, a person who pled 
guilty to an offense is not eligible to be declared a “wrongfully imprisoned 
individual” for that offense, even if the plea is later vacated on appeal.  The 
judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause is 
remanded to the trial court for the entry of an order of dismissal. 
Judgment reversed, 
and cause remanded. 
January Term, 2013 
 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and 
O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Friedman & Gilbert and Terry H. Gilbert, for appellant. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor 
General, and Peter K. Glenn-Applegate, Deputy Solicitor; and Timothy J. 
McGinty, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and T. Allan Regas, Assistant 
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
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