Case Title: State v. Charles J. Hajicek

Citation: 2001 WI 3

Docket Number: 1998AP003485-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-01-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 3 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-3485 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Charles J. Hajicek,  
 
Defendant-Respondent.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  230 Wis. 2d 697, 602 N.W.2d 93 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
January 17, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
October 5, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
La Crosse 
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis G. Montabon 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
BABLITCH and BRADLEY, J.J., join dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Jennifer E. Nashold, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by 
Bruce J. Rosen, Susan C. Blesener and Pellino, Rosen, Mowris & 
Kirkhuff, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Bruce J. Rosen. 
 
2001 WI 3 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-3485-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Charles J. Hajicek,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   The petitioner, the State of 
Wisconsin, seeks review of a published decision by the court of 
appeals, State v. Hajicek, 230 Wis. 2d 697, 602 N.W.2d 93 (Ct. 
App. 1999), which affirmed a La Crosse County Circuit Court 
order granting a motion to suppress evidence.  The circuit 
court, Judge Dennis G. Montabon presiding, found that the 
evidence, obtained during a warrantless search of the residence 
of the respondent, Charles J. Hajicek (Hajicek), was the result 
of an unlawful police search, not a permitted probation search, 
as the State claimed.  The court of appeals affirmed, holding 
that the circuit court's determination that the search of 
FILED 
 
JAN 17, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-3485-CR  
 
 
2 
Hajicek's residence was a police search was not clearly 
erroneous. 
 
¶2 
We reverse.  We hold that the determination of whether 
a search is a police or probation search is a question of 
constitutional fact reviewed according to a two-step process.  
First, we review the circuit court's findings of historical fact 
under the clearly erroneous standard.  Second, we review the 
circuit court's determination of constitutional fact de novo.  
We apply this two-step standard of review and hold that the 
search of Hajicek's residence was a probation search. 
¶3 
The 
determination 
that 
the 
search 
of 
Hajicek's 
residence was a probation search is not the end of our inquiry. 
 We must also determine whether the search, as a probation 
search, was reasonable.  Such a search is reasonable if the 
probation officer has "reasonable grounds" to believe that a 
probationer has contraband.  In applying that standard, we hold 
that the probation search of Hajicek's residence was reasonable. 
  
I 
 
¶4 
In the summer of 1997, Hajicek was on probation with 
minimal supervision due to a 1995 conviction of possession of 
marijuana with intent to deliver.  On August 20, 1997, Hajicek's 
probation 
officer, 
Lynn 
Hightire 
(Hightire), 
received 
an 
anonymous tip that Hajicek was involved in drug use, drug 
trafficking, or both.  Shortly after receiving the tip, Hightire 
ordered a urinalysis for Hajicek.  On August 28, 1997, Hightire 
confirmed the information contained in the tip with the La 
No. 
98-3485-CR  
 
 
3 
Crosse County Sheriff's Department and forwarded Hajicek's file 
to the Corrections Supervisor in La Crosse County, William 
Hammes (Hammes). 
 
¶5 
Hammes decided to conduct a search of Hajicek's 
residence. On approximately August 28, 1997, Hammes contacted 
Investigator Kurt Papenfuss (Papenfuss) of the La Crosse County 
Sheriff's Department and Special Agent Jim Sielehr (Sielehr) of 
the Wisconsin Department of Justice, Division of Narcotics 
Enforcement (DNE) to verify the information contained in the 
tip.  Papenfuss and Sielehr told Hammes that the DNE was 
investigating 
Hajicek and 
searching 
Hajicek's 
garbage for 
evidence of drug trafficking in order to obtain a search 
warrant.  Sielehr asked Hammes to delay his search so that the 
DNE could continue its investigation.  Hammes agreed, and, 
during the delay of less than four weeks, did not contact 
Hajicek or order a urinalysis for him.   
 
¶6 
On September 24, 1997, Papenfuss, Sielehr, and DNE 
Special Agent Peter M. Thelen (Thelen) contacted Hammes and told 
him that the DNE had failed to obtain sufficient evidence for a 
search warrant of Hajicek's residence.  Hammes told Papenfuss 
that he would proceed with his search of Hajicek's residence and 
asked Papenfuss for assistance with the search.  Papenfuss 
agreed to assist.  Fifteen minutes before the search, Papenfuss 
notified the assistant district attorney of the impending 
search. 
 
¶7 
Hammes, Papenfuss, Sielehr, Thelen, and probation 
agent Michael Johnson (Johnson) went to Hajicek's residence.  
No. 
98-3485-CR  
 
 
4 
When Hajicek answered the door, Hammes identified himself and 
told Hajicek that he was there to conduct a search of the 
residence.  Before Hammes and Johnson proceeded with the search, 
Papenfuss and Sielehr secured Hajicek's residence by walking 
through the house.  Sielehr and Thelen watched Hajicek as Hammes 
and Johnson conducted the search.  Papenfuss followed Hammes as 
Hammes searched Hajicek's bedroom.  After Hammes found the drug 
Percocet in Hajicek's bedroom, Hammes placed Hajicek on a 
probation hold for possession of the Percocet.  Sielehr then 
placed Hajicek under arrest.   
¶8 
Hammes asked Hajicek if there was any marijuana in the 
residence.  Hajicek told Hammes about a duffel bag in the garage 
that contained approximately seven and one half pounds of 
marijuana.  After Hammes searched the garage and found the 
marijuana, the law enforcement officers decided to take Hajicek 
to jail and then to obtain a search warrant.  In the meantime, 
Hammes searched Hajicek's truck and found a large amount of 
cash.  Thelen was present during the search of the truck. 
¶9 
Law 
enforcement 
officers 
returned 
to 
Hajicek's 
residence with a search warrant.  Based upon the evidence found 
during the execution of the initial search warrant, they later 
obtained two additional search warrants. 
No. 
98-3485-CR  
 
 
5 
¶10 On November 3, 1997, Hajicek was charged with five 
felony drug offenses and one misdemeanor drug offense.1  On 
December 1, 1997, Hajicek moved to suppress the evidence found 
as a result of Hammes's and Johnson's search of his residence 
and the subsequent searches by the law enforcement officers.  
The circuit court granted Hajicek's motion, concluding that the 
search of Hajicek's residence was an unlawful police search and 
that the evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.   
¶11 The circuit court concluded that the search was a 
police search based on the following five findings of historical 
fact: (1) the law enforcement officers dictated the timing of 
the search because Hammes delayed the search at the request of 
law 
enforcement; 
(2) 
the 
law 
enforcement 
officers 
that 
participated in the search were the same officers that failed to 
                     
1 The five felony counts are as follows:  (1) possession of 
narcotic controlled substance with intent to deliver while 
within 1000 feet of certain places as drug repeater in violation 
of Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1m)(a); (2) possession of marijuana with 
intent to deliver within 1000 feet of certain places as drug 
repeater in violation of Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1m)(h)3; (3) 
possession of cocaine within 1000 feet of certain places as drug 
repeater in violation of Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(c); (4) 
possession of a Schedule II narcotic controlled substance while 
within 1000 feet of certain places as drug repeater in violation 
of Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(a)1; and (5) possession of a Schedule 
I narcotic controlled substance while within 1000 feet of 
certain places as drug repeater in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.41(3g)(a)1. 
The misdemeanor charge was for possession of Schedule IV 
controlled substance while within 1000 feet of certain places as 
an habitual criminal in violation of Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(b). 
    
No. 
98-3485-CR  
 
 
6 
obtain a search warrant during their investigation of Hajicek; 
(3) the law enforcement officers notified the assistant district 
attorney before conducting the search; (4) the law enforcement 
officers and the probation officers both failed to document 
their communications regarding the delay of Hammes' search; and 
(5) Hammes did not carry out the objectives of probation 
supervision during the delay of the search, since he failed to 
supervise Hajicek and to order a urinalysis of him.  The circuit 
court determined that these five findings of historical fact 
indicated that law enforcement objectives took precedence over 
probation objectives, turning the search of Hajicek's residence 
into a police search. 
¶12 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
suppression order.  The court of appeals concluded that the 
determination of whether a search is a police or probation 
search is a question of historical fact.  The court of appeals 
relied on State v. Griffin, 131 Wis. 2d 41, 388 N.W.2d 535 
(1986), aff'd, Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), and 
State v. Flakes, 140 Wis. 2d 411, 410 N.W.2d 614 (Ct. App. 
1987), to support its conclusion.  According to the court of 
appeals, the fact that both opinions use the word "finding" to 
describe the determination of whether a search is a police or 
probation search implies that it is a question of historical 
fact.  The court of appeals also relied on United States v. 
Jarrad, 754 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1985) and United States v. 
Richardson, 849 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1988).  In both cases the 
Ninth Circuit held that the determination of whether a search is 
No. 
98-3485-CR  
 
 
7 
a police or probation search is a question of fact reviewed 
under a clearly erroneous standard.  Jarrad, 754 F.2d at 1454; 
Richardson, 849 F.2d at 441.2   
¶13 The court of appeals treated the circuit court's 
determination that the search of Hajicek's residence was a 
police search as a question of historical fact, and held that 
the determination was not clearly erroneous.  According to the 
court, there was sufficient evidence in the record to support 
the five findings of historical fact relied on by the circuit 
court. 
II 
¶14 The first issue we address concerns the standard of 
review.  The determination of whether a search is a police or 
probation search presents a question of constitutional fact.  A 
question of constitutional fact is "one whose determination is 
'decisive of constitutional rights.'"  State v. Martwick, 2000 
WI 5, ¶17, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552 (citations omitted). 
 The United States Supreme Court has stated that constitutional 
facts 
are 
"issues 
which, 
though 
cast 
in 
the 
form 
of 
determinations of fact, are the very issues to review [for] 
which this Court sits."  Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 51 
(1949).  In Watts, the Court held that the voluntariness of a 
                     
2 In United States v. Jarrad, the court used the phrase 
"clearly erroneous" to describe the standard of review.  754 
F.2d 1451, 1454 (9th Cir. 1985).  In United States v. 
Richardson, the court cited to Jarrad for the standard of review 
but used the phrase "clear error."  849 F.2d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 
1988). 
No. 
98-3485-CR  
 
 
8 
confession is a question of constitutional fact, though cast in 
the form of historical fact.  338 U.S. at 51-52.  The Court held 
that the determination of voluntariness is a question of 
constitutional fact because the determination requires the 
application of a constitutional standard to uncontroverted 
facts.  Id. at 51.  Likewise, we conclude that the determination 
of whether a search is a police or probation search requires a 
conclusion based on uncontroverted facts.  Consequently, the 
determination of whether a search is a police or probation 
search is a question of constitutional fact.  It is a question 
whose "determination is 'decisive of constitutional rights.'"  
Martwick, 2000 WI 5 at ¶17.       
¶15 A question of constitutional fact presents a mixed 
question of fact and law reviewed with a two-step process.  
Martwick, 2000 WI 5 at ¶16; State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 
189, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998).  First, an appellate court reviews 
the circuit court's findings of historical fact under the 
clearly erroneous standard.3  Martwick, 2000 WI 5 at ¶18.  
Second, 
an 
appellate 
court 
reviews 
the 
circuit 
court's 
determination of constitutional fact de novo.  Id. 
¶16 In Martwick, we faced the issue of the standard of 
review in a curtilage case.  Id. at ¶16.  In concluding that 
review of a curtilage determination required a two-step process, 
we relied on Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996). In 
                     
3 The phrase "clearly erroneous" is used to describe the 
standard 
of review 
for 
findings 
of 
fact 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 805.17(2).  
No. 
98-3485-CR  
 
 
9 
Ornelas, 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
held 
that 
the 
determination of whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause 
exist to justify a warrantless search requires a two-step 
standard of review.  517 U.S. at 699.  The Court reviewed the 
determination of historical facts, the events leading up to the 
search, for clear error.  Id. at 696.4  The Court then reviewed 
the determination of whether the historical facts amount to 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause de novo.  Id. at 696-97. 
 The Court stated that applying a deferential standard of review 
to a trial court's ultimate determination of probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion would lead to "varied results" that "would 
be inconsistent with the idea of a unitary system of law."  
Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697.  By contrast, the Court stated that 
applying an independent standard of review to the ultimate 
determination of reasonable suspicion and probable cause will 
allow appellate courts to "maintain control of, and to clarify, 
the legal principles."  Id. 
¶17 We also relied on Wisconsin precedent for our decision 
in Martwick.  We stated that independent review of questions of 
constitutional fact "'provide[s] uniformity in constitutional 
decision-making.'"  Martwick, 2000 WI 5 at ¶20 (quoting 
Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 194).  Wisconsin courts have applied 
this two-step standard of review to "a variety of constitutional 
                     
4 In Ornelas v. United States, the Court stated that "'clear 
error' is a term of art derived from Rule 52(a) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and applies when reviewing questions 
of fact."  517 U.S. 690, 695 n.3 (1996).  
No. 
98-3485-CR  
 
 
10
challenges."  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 190.5  In addition, we 
noted that Wisconsin courts "traditionally appl[y] the two-step 
standard 
of 
review 
to 
constitutional 
search 
and 
seizure 
inquiries."  Martwick, 2000 WI 5 at ¶20.   
¶18 Therefore, independent review of the determination of 
whether a search is a police or probation search is consistent 
with 
both 
federal 
and 
Wisconsin 
precedent. 
 
Independent 
appellate review will provide uniformity in the decisions of 
whether a search is a police or probation search and will 
prevent varied results.  In addition, independent appellate 
review provides guidance to litigants, lawyers, and trial 
courts.      
¶19 Hajicek contends that the court of appeals was correct 
in holding that the determination of whether a search is a 
police or probation search is a question of historical fact.  
Hajicek argues that the conclusion that the search was a police 
search is subject only to the clearly erroneous standard of 
review.  Hajicek presents three arguments that we will address 
in turn.   
¶20 First, 
Hajicek 
argues 
that 
Wisconsin 
precedent 
supports the historical fact conclusion.  In both State v. 
Griffin and State v. Flakes, the word "finding" was used to 
describe the determination that a search was a lawful probation 
                     
5 In State v. Phillips, we provided several examples of 
constitutional 
challenges 
that 
appellate 
courts 
review 
independently of a trial court's conclusion.  218 Wis. 2d, 180, 
 190, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998). 
No. 
98-3485-CR  
 
 
11
search.  While Hajicek concedes that the word "finding" does not 
always refer to historical facts, Hajicek argues that in both 
cases the court implied that the determination of whether a 
search is a police or probation search is a question of 
historical fact because the court did not apply a de novo 
standard of review. 
¶21 We reject this argument.  The word "find" can refer to 
a historical fact or to a legal conclusion, as Hajicek concedes. 
 However, Hajicek is incorrect that State v. Griffin and State 
v. Flakes implied that the probation search determination is a 
question of historical fact.  Neither State v. Griffin nor State 
v. Flakes clearly delineates the proper standard of review to 
apply to the conclusion that a search is either a police or 
probation search.  
¶22 Second, Hajicek argues that we should be persuaded by 
the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit.  According to Hajicek, the Ninth Circuit has held 
that the determination of whether a search is a police or 
probation search is a question of fact subject to the clearly 
erroneous standard of review.  Hajicek relies on two Ninth 
Circuit cases that state that the determination of whether a 
probation officer acted as a "stalking horse" for police is a 
"question of fact, reviewed for clear error." 6  United States v. 
                     
6 The "stalking horse" determination is the same as the 
determination of whether a search is a police or probation 
search.  If a probation officer is a "stalking horse" for 
police, then the search is a police search. 
 
No. 
98-3485-CR  
 
 
12
Richardson, 849 F.2d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1988)(citing United 
States v. Jarrad, 754 F.2d 1451, 1454 (9th Cir. 1985)).  A 
"stalking horse" is "[s]omething used to cover one's true 
purpose; a decoy."  The American Heritage Dictionary 1751 (3d 
ed. 1992).  In the context of determining whether a search is a 
police or probation search, a "stalking horse" is a probation 
officer who uses his or her authority "to help the police evade 
the [F]ourth [A]mendment's warrant requirement."  United States 
v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 1991).  
¶23 We also reject this argument.  As Hajicek concedes, 
Ninth Circuit precedent is not binding on this court.  In 
addition, we decline to follow the Ninth Circuit's application 
of the clearly erroneous standard of review because both Ninth 
Circuit cases state that the "stalking horse" determination 
depends solely on the single fact of who initiates the search. 
Richardson, 849 F.2d at 441 (citing Jarrad, 754 F.2d at 1454). 
We apply de novo review because the determination of whether a 
search is a police or probation search requires a conclusion 
based on an analysis of all the facts surrounding the search. 
¶24 Third, Hajicek argues that 
the determination of 
whether a search is a police or probation search is not a 
question 
of 
constitutional 
fact 
because 
there 
is 
no 
constitutional principle to apply.  Hajicek relies on our 
decision in State v. McMorris, 213 Wis. 2d 156, 570 N.W.2d 384 
(1997), to support the proposition that the two-step standard of 
review 
requires 
application 
of 
a 
uniform 
constitutional 
principle. 
No. 
98-3485-CR  
 
 
13
¶25 Our holding in the instant case is consistent with our 
holding 
in 
McMorris. 
 
In 
McMorris, 
we 
held 
that 
the 
determination of "whether an independent source exists for an 
in-court identification made after a lineup that violated an 
accused's Sixth Amendment right to counsel" is a question of 
constitutional fact that requires the two-step standard of 
review.  213 Wis. 2d at 165.  To support our holding, we 
compared the issue of independent source for an in-court 
identification 
to 
the 
issue 
of 
suppression 
of 
evidence.  
McMorris, 213 Wis. 2d at 164-65.7  Likewise, we compare the 
police or probation search determination to the curtilage 
determination in Martwick.8 
                     
7 In State v. McMorris we stated:  
[t]his court has not previously discussed 
the 
applicable 
standard 
of 
review 
in 
determining whether an independent source 
exists for an in-court identification made 
after a lineup that violated an accused's 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  The court 
has, however, considered the standard of 
review applicable to an analogous issue of 
attenuation in the Fourth Amendment context. 
 In State v. Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d 441, 447-
48, 
477 
N.W.2d 
277 
(1991), 
this 
court 
characterized as a constitutional fact the 
question 
whether 
evidence 
should 
be 
suppressed as the fruit of a prior illegal 
search 
or 
whether 
the 
evidence 
was 
sufficiently attenuated so as to be purged 
of the taint.  
213 Wis. 2d 156, 164-65, 570 N.W.2d 384 (1997). 
No. 
98-3485-CR  
 
 
14
¶26 In summary, we hold that the determination of whether 
a search is a police or probation search is a question of 
constitutional fact that requires application of a two-step 
standard of review. 
III 
¶27 We now apply the two-step standard of review to the 
determination of whether the search of Hajicek's residence was a 
police or probation search.  First, we review the circuit 
court's findings of historical fact under the clearly erroneous 
standard.  Second, we review the circuit court's conclusion that 
the search was a police search de novo.  
¶28 We apply the clearly erroneous standard to the circuit 
court's findings of historical fact.  The five findings of 
historical fact that the circuit court relied on to conclude 
that the search was a police search are not clearly erroneous.  
There is support in the record for each of the five findings 
which are: (1) the law enforcement officers dictated the timing 
of the search because Hammes delayed the search at the request 
                                                                  
8 Both the police or probation search determination and the 
curtilage determination are questions of constitutional fact 
because both are decisive of constitutional rights.  The 
curtilage determination is decisive of constitutional rights 
because "the area in question is so intimately tied to the home 
itself that it should be placed under the home's 'umbrella' of 
Fourth Amendment protection."  United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 
294, 301 (1987).  Likewise, the police or probation search 
determination is decisive of constitutional rights because the 
nature of the search determines the scope of Fourth Amendment 
protection.  A police search must be based on a warrant issued 
upon probable cause or an exception to the warrant requirement, 
while a probation search must be based on reasonable grounds.  
No. 
98-3485-CR  
 
 
15
of law enforcement; (2) the law enforcement officers that 
participated in the search were the same officers that failed to 
obtain a search warrant during their investigation of Hajicek; 
(3) the law enforcement officers notified the assistant district 
attorney before the search; (4) the law enforcement officers and 
the 
probation 
officers 
both 
failed 
to 
document 
their 
communications regarding the delay of Hammes' search; and (5) 
Hammes did not carry out the objectives of probation supervision 
during the delay of the search, since he failed to supervise 
Hajicek and to order a urinalysis for him.  The circuit court 
relied on these five findings of historical fact to conclude 
that the search of Hajicek's residence was a police search. 
¶29 We apply de novo review to the circuit court's 
conclusion that the search of Hajicek's residence was a police 
search.  We do not agree with the circuit court's conclusion 
that the search was a police search.  We rely on the circuit 
court's entire findings of historical fact regarding the events 
during the search of Hajicek's residence to conclude that the 
search was a probation search.  Before Hammes and Johnson 
proceeded with the search, Papenfuss and Sielehr secured the 
residence by walking through the house.  As Hammes and Johnson 
conducted the search of Hajicek's residence, Sielehr and Thelen 
watched Hajicek.  Hammes conducted the search that resulted in 
the discovery of Percocet in Hajicek's bedroom and marijuana in 
Hajicek's garage.  The entire findings of historical fact 
regarding 
the 
events 
during 
the 
search 
demonstrate 
that 
probation officers Hammes and Johnson conducted the search and 
No. 
98-3485-CR  
 
 
16
law enforcement officers Papenfuss, Sielehr, and Thelen were 
present only for protective purposes.  Thus, the entire findings 
of historical fact regarding the events during the search of 
Hajicek's residence support the conclusion that the search was a 
probation search.  
¶30 In addition, our conclusion that the search of 
Hajicek's residence was a probation search is consistent with 
Wisconsin precedent.  In State v. Griffin, we held that a search 
was a probation search because the probation officers conducted 
the search while the police were present only for protection 
purposes.  131 Wis. 2d 41, 62-63, 388 N.W.2d 535 (1986), aff'd, 
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).  The probation 
officers searched Griffin's kitchen, bedroom, and living room 
while the police officers stayed with Griffin.  Id. at 56-57.  
In the instant case, the probation officers searched Hajicek's 
bedroom and garage while the law enforcement officers stayed 
with Hajicek. 
¶31 Hajicek argues that the circuit court was correct in 
concluding that the search was a police search based on the five 
findings of historical fact mentioned above.  The circuit court 
determined that these five findings of historical fact indicate 
that law enforcement objectives took precedence over probation 
objectives, turning the search of Hajicek's residence into a 
police search. 
¶32 We do not find this argument persuasive.  The five 
findings of historical fact relied on by the circuit court do 
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the search of 
No. 
98-3485-CR  
 
 
17
Hajicek's residence was a police search.  The five findings of 
historical fact clearly indicate that probation officer Hammes 
was cooperating with the law enforcement investigation of 
Hajicek, but cooperation does not change a probation search into 
a police search.   
¶33 Cooperation with law enforcement for the purpose of 
preventing crime is a specific goal of probation supervision.  
Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.01(5) (June, 1999).  The regulations 
in the Wisconsin Administrative Code provide that a specific 
goal of probation supervision is "[t]o cooperate with other 
public and private agencies in activities for the purpose of 
prevention 
of 
crime 
and 
to 
provide 
alternatives 
to 
institutionalization."  Id.  In addition, Wisconsin precedent 
supports 
probation 
searches 
based 
on 
cooperation 
between 
probation officers and law enforcement.  For example, the fact 
that the police provide the information that leads to a 
probation search does not make the probation search unlawful.  
State v. Griffin, 131 Wis. 2d at 57; State v. Flakes, 140 Wis. 
2d at 427.  Therefore, Hammes' cooperation with law enforcement 
does not change the search of Hajicek's residence from a 
probation search to a police search.9  
                     
9 In addition, the less than four-week delay of the search 
is consistent with the terms of Hajicek's probation supervision 
status.  At the time of the search, Hajicek was on probation 
with minimum supervision.  Minimum supervision requires only 
that the probation officer meet with the probationer once every 
90 days.  Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.03(22) (June, 1999).    
No. 
98-3485-CR  
 
 
18
¶34 In summary, the search of Hajicek's residence was a 
probation search.  We reach this conclusion because the 
probation 
officers 
conducted 
the 
search 
while 
the 
law 
enforcement officers were present at the search only for 
protective purposes, consistent with our holding in State v. 
Griffin.   
IV 
¶35 We now turn to the question of whether the search of 
Hajicek's residence was reasonable.  All searches and seizures, 
including probation searches, must be reasonable.  U.S. Const. 
amend. IV; Wis. Const. art. I, § 11.10  A reasonable search is 
                     
10  The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states:  
[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath 
or 
affirmation, 
and 
particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution states:  
[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause, supported by 
oath 
or 
affirmation, 
and 
particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
No. 
98-3485-CR  
 
 
19
one supported by a warrant or by probable cause.  Griffin v. 
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).  A warrantless search is 
unreasonable unless the search falls under a lawful exception.  
State v. Griffin, 131 Wis. 2d 41, 50, 388 N.W.2d 535 
(1986)(citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973)), 
aff'd, Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).  The state 
bears the burden of proving that an exception applies to any 
given search.  State v. Pallone, 2000 WI 77, ¶29, 236 Wis. 2d 
162, 613 N.W.2d 568. 
¶36 There is an exception to the warrant requirement for 
probation searches.  Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875-76 
(1987).  An exception to the warrant requirement exists when 
"'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, 
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.'" 
 Id. at 873 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 
(1985)(Blackmun, J., concurring)).  In Griffin v. Wisconsin, the 
United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a 
warrantless 
search 
of 
a 
probationer's 
home 
by 
probation 
officers.  483 U.S. at 872.  The special need justifying 
warrantless 
probation 
searches 
is 
the 
need 
to 
supervise 
probationers.  Id. at 875.  By supervising a probationer, the 
probation officer guarantees that the probationer observes the 
                                                                  
Both the United States Constitution and the Wisconsin 
Constitution guarantee the right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.  We ordinarily interpret Article I, 
Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution in accordance with the 
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 195.   
No. 
98-3485-CR  
 
 
20
restrictions placed upon the probationer's liberty during the 
probation.  Id.  "These restrictions are meant to assure that 
the probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and 
that the community is not harmed by the probationer's being at 
large."  Id.  The special need for ensuring that probationers 
are rehabilitated and that the public is protected creates an 
exception to the warrant or probable cause requirement for 
reasonable searches.  Id.  at 875-76.  
¶37 The exception to the warrant requirement for probation 
searches provides that a probation officer may search a 
probationer's residence if the probation officer has reasonable 
grounds to believe that a probationer has contraband.  State v. 
Griffin, 131 Wis. 2d 41, 60, 388 N.W.2d 535 (1986), aff'd, 
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).  In State v. Griffin, 
we held that a probation officer had reasonable grounds to 
search Griffin's residence based on the Wisconsin Administrative 
Code regulations for the supervision of probationers.  131 Wis. 
2d at 61-62.  The regulations in the Wisconsin Administrative 
Code set forth a list of factors to be considered in the 
determination of whether there are reasonable grounds for a 
probation search.  Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.21(7) (June, 
1999).11  
                     
11 The following factors are to be considered in the 
determination of whether a probation officer has reasonable 
grounds to conduct a probation search: 
No. 
98-3485-CR  
 
 
21
¶38 In State v. Griffin, the probation officer had 
reasonable grounds to search Griffin's residence because the 
probation officer received information, provided by an anonymous 
informant, that Griffin may have contraband in his apartment.  
Id. at 63-64 (citing Wis. Admin. Code § HSS 328.21(6)(b)).12  In 
addition, the probation officer had reasonable grounds to search 
                                                                  
(a) The observations of staff members.  (b) 
Information provided by informants.  (c) The 
reliability of the information provided by 
an informant.  In evaluating the reliability 
of the information, the [probation officer] 
shall 
give 
attention 
to 
the 
detail, 
consistency 
and 
corroboration 
of 
the 
information provided by the informant.  (d) 
The 
reliability 
of 
the 
informant. 
 
In 
evaluating 
the 
informant's 
reliability, 
attention shall be given to whether the 
informant has reason to supply inaccurate 
information.  (e) 
The activity of 
the 
[probationer] that relates to whether the 
[probationer] might possess contraband or 
might have used or be under the influence of 
an intoxicating substance.  (f) Information 
provided 
by 
the 
[probationer] 
that 
is 
relevant to whether the [probationer] has 
used, possesses or is under the influence of 
an intoxicating substance or possesses any 
other contraband.  (g) The experience of a 
staff member with that [probationer] or in a 
similar circumstance.  (h) Prior seizures of 
contraband from the [probationer].  (i) The 
need to verify compliance with rules of 
supervision and state and federal law. 
Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.21(7). 
12 Chapter HSS 328 was renumbered Chapter DOC 328 in April, 
1990.  In Chapter HSS 328, the list of factors for reasonable 
grounds was set forth in subsection six.  In Chapter DOC 328, 
the list of factors for reasonable grounds is set forth in 
subsection seven.  
No. 
98-3485-CR  
 
 
22
Griffin's residence because the informant was a Beloit detective 
who had no reason to provide false information.  Id. at 64 
(citing 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ 
HSS 
328.21(6)(c) 
and 
(d)).  
Therefore, we held that reliable information that a probationer 
possesses contraband provided the reasonable grounds for a 
lawful probation search.  Id. 
¶39 In State v. Flakes, 140 Wis. 2d 411, 427-28, 410 
N.W.2d 614 (Ct. App. 1987), the court of appeals held that a 
probation officer had reasonable grounds to search Flakes' 
residence based on the factors provided in the Wisconsin 
Administrative Code.  The court held that a probation officer 
had reasonable grounds to conduct a probation search based on 
information provided by a police officer.  Id. (citing Wis. 
Admin. Code § HSS 328.21(6)).  The police informed Flakes' 
probation officer about an arrest for marijuana delivery, about 
their suspicion that Flakes had more marijuana in his apartment, 
and that Flakes had refused consent for the police to search his 
apartment.  Id. at 427.  The court held that detailed 
information from a reliable source about Flakes' activities, 
combined with the probation officer's knowledge of Flakes' 
history, provided the reasonable grounds for a probation search 
of Flakes' apartment.  Id. at 427-28 (citing Wis. Admin. Code 
§ HSS 328.21(6)(b), (c), (d), (e) and (g)). 
¶40 In the instant case, probation officer Hammes had 
reasonable grounds for a probation search of Hajicek's residence 
based on the factors provided in the Wisconsin Administrative 
Code.  Hammes searched Hajicek's residence based on information 
No. 
98-3485-CR  
 
 
23
 provided by an informant.  Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.21(7)(b) 
(June, 1999).  Hammes received an anonymous tip that Hajicek was 
involved in drug use, drug trafficking, or both.  Hammes 
searched Hajicek's residence because the information contained 
in the anonymous tip was reliable and the informant was 
reliable.  Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.21(7)(c) and (d) (June, 
1999).  The La Crosse County Sheriff's Department and the DNE 
verified the information contained in the anonymous tip by 
telling Hammes that the information was similar to information 
that they had from their investigation of Hajicek.  Following 
the application of the factors for reasonable grounds applied in 
State v. Griffin and State v. Flakes, we conclude that reliable 
information from a reliable source that a probationer possesses 
contraband provides reasonable grounds for a probation search of 
the probationer's residence. 
¶41 There is nothing in the record to persuade us that 
Hammes did not have reasonable grounds for the probation search 
of Hajicek's residence.  The fact that Hammes delayed his search 
at the request of law enforcement does not affect the reasonable 
grounds for the search.  There is no requirement in the 
regulations 
in 
the 
Wisconsin 
Administrative 
Code 
that 
a 
probation officer must search a probationer's residence as soon 
as the probation officer has the reasonable grounds to do so.  
The state has satisfied its burden in this case. 
V 
¶42 In conclusion, we hold that the determination of 
whether a search is a police or probation search is a question 
No. 
98-3485-CR  
 
 
24
of constitutional fact reviewed with a two-step process.  First, 
an appellate court reviews the circuit court's findings of 
historical fact under the clearly erroneous standard.  Second, 
an appellate court reviews the circuit court's finding of 
constitutional fact de novo.  We apply the two-step standard of 
review and hold that the search of Hajicek's residence was a 
probation search.  We further hold that the probation search of 
Hajicek's residence was reasonable.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
court of appeals decision that affirmed the circuit court's 
order granting Hajicek's motion to suppress the evidence 
obtained in the search. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the case is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
No. 98-3485.ssa 
 
1 
¶43 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).  I 
agree with the circuit court and court of appeals and dissent on 
three grounds. 
¶44 First, I agree with the court of appeals that the 
circuit court's determination that the search of the defendant's 
home was a police search should be reviewed under the clearly 
erroneous standard.  The majority opinion's adoption of the de 
novo standard contravenes Wisconsin and federal law. 
¶45 Second, whatever the standard of review, the search in 
this case was that of law enforcement.  The search of the 
defendant's 
home 
without 
a 
warrant 
violated 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment. 
¶46 Third, even if it was a probation search, the search 
of the defendant's home without a warrant violated the Fourth 
Amendment under the circumstances of this case. 
¶47 I would affirm the court of appeals, which affirmed 
the circuit court's suppression order. 
 
I 
 
¶48 Under existing Wisconsin case law, as well as the case 
law from other jurisdictions, the question of whether a 
probation officer acts as a stalking horse for law enforcement 
No. 98-3485.ssa 
 
2 
officers 
should 
be 
reviewed 
under 
the 
clearly 
erroneous 
standard. 
¶49 First, the majority opinion's error in concluding that 
the question of whether a search is a police or probation search 
should 
be 
reviewed 
de 
novo 
is 
based 
on 
its 
erroneous 
characterization 
of 
the 
question 
before 
us 
as 
one 
of 
constitutional fact. 
¶50 The majority opinion explains that a question of 
constitutional fact has been defined as one whose determination 
is decisive of constitutional rights. Majority op. at ¶14.  I 
agree that this is the definition of constitutional fact. 
¶51 Unfortunately the majority opinion does not apply this 
definition in the present case. The question of whether a search 
is 
a 
police 
or 
probation 
search 
is 
not 
decisive 
of 
constitutional rights in this case.  As the court of appeals 
explained and as the majority opinion recognizes, the ultimate 
constitutional issue, that is, the constitutional fact in this 
case, is whether the search (whether by a probation officer or a 
police officer) was reasonable and conformed to the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 
That 
ultimate 
constitutional 
fact, 
the 
reasonableness of the search, should be decided de novo by this 
court after the relevant facts are determined by the circuit 
court.  Whether the search is by a probation officer or police 
officer is not a decisive constitutional determination of 
reasonableness; therefore, it should be treated as an historical 
fact to be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.  As is 
evident in the majority opinion, the majority appears to have 
No. 98-3485.ssa 
 
3 
decided that it wishes to exercise de novo review and then 
labels the issue as one of constitutional fact. 
¶52 Second, the majority opinion blithely ignores this 
court's 
most 
recently 
adopted 
analytical 
framework 
for 
determining the appropriate standard of review of constitutional 
issues.  In State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101, 237 Wis. 2d 197, 614 
N.W.2d 477, this court explained that the difference between 
historical facts, constitutional facts, and mixed questions of 
fact and law is "fuzzy" at best.  Thus the Byrge court decided 
that the standard of review of a constitutional issue should 
depend on the court's determination of which "judicial actor is 
better positioned than another to decide a matter."13  The "best 
institutional actor" analysis presents a workable framework for 
determining the standard of review even when the issue (such as 
competency to stand trial) is unquestionably decisive of 
constitutional 
rights. 
 
The 
majority 
opinion 
ought 
to 
forthrightly adopt and apply the analysis used in Byrge. 
Instead, the majority opinion, without citing Byrge, much less 
                     
13 State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101, ¶39, 237 Wis. 2d 197, 614 
N.W.2d 477.  See also State v. Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d 214, 234, 
558 N.W.2d 626 (1997) (C.J. Abrahamson concurring) ("The 
standard for appellate review of an issue thus depends on a 
determination of whether an appellate court or a trial court is 
the more appropriate and competent forum to make the particular 
decision."); State v. McMorris, 213 Wis. 2d 156, 165-66, 570 
N.W.2d 384 (1997) (treating the issue of independent source for 
in-court identification like the issue of purging evidence of 
the taint of illegal search as a constitutional fact; allowing 
independent review to enable appellate courts to flesh out the 
rule and provide guidance to litigants, lawyers, and trial and 
appellate courts and to provide uniformity in constitutional 
decision-making). 
No. 98-3485.ssa 
 
4 
forthrightly explaining what it is doing, applies the Byrge 
analysis in a back-handed way, justifying the creation of the 
new question of constitutional fact by noting that "independent 
appellate review" is important because it "provides guidance to 
litigants, lawyers, and trial courts."  Majority op. at ¶18. 
¶53 In Byrge the court applied the clearly erroneous 
standard of review to the constitutional determination of 
whether a defendant was competent to stand trial because "the 
decision pivots on factors only a trial court can appraise."  
Byrge, 237 Wis. 2d at ¶44.  The circuit court's ability to 
observe the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, stated 
the Byrge court, made the circuit court "the judicial actor best 
positioned to apply a legal standard to the facts."  Byrge, 237 
Wis. 2d at ¶44; see also ¶45.  
¶54 I would apply the Byrge institutional analysis to the 
question at issue in this case.  Whether the search of the 
defendant's home was a probation or a police search presents a 
fact-driven inquiry.  Indeed, the particular circumstances of 
this case highlight the circuit court's essential role as fact-
finder.  Neither the probation officer nor the law enforcement 
officers kept any record of their communications regarding the 
defendant, leaving witness testimony as the only means of 
assessing the basis for this search.  
¶55 The circuit court was in the best position to evaluate 
the testimony, weigh the witnesses' credibility, and determine 
whether this search was driven by law enforcement or probation 
objectives.  By opting for de novo review, the majority opinion 
No. 98-3485.ssa 
 
5 
has rejected the circuit court's credibility assessments and 
weighing of the evidence. 
¶56 Third, the majority's break from Byrge is even more 
surprising in light of the State's and majority opinion's 
failure to identify a single case in any jurisdiction that has 
treated the determination of whether a search is a probation or 
police search as anything other than a finding of fact subject 
to review under the clearly erroneous standard.  
¶57 As the majority opinion recognizes, Wisconsin case law 
can be interpreted as treating this question as one of fact.  
Majority op. at ¶21. 
¶58 Furthermore, several federal courts have applied the 
clearly erroneous standard of review.  The majority opinion 
declines to follow the Ninth Circuit's standard of review, as 
articulated in United States v. Richardson, 849 F.2d 439 (9th 
Cir. 1988), and United States v. Jarrad, 754 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 
1985).  The majority contends that these cases rest on the sole 
issue of whether the probation officer initiated the search, 
whereas the majority believes a broader factual analysis is 
necessary.  Majority op. at ¶23. 
¶59 More recent Ninth Circuit cases involving probation 
versus police searches apply the majority opinion's broader 
factual analysis.  Nonetheless, these cases still treat the 
No. 98-3485.ssa 
 
6 
trial court's conclusion as a question of historical fact.14  
Other federal courts have followed the Ninth Circuit's lead.15  
Several state courts have also followed the Ninth Circuit.16 
                     
14 For example, in United States v. Watts, 67 F.3d 790 (9th 
Cir. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 519 U.S. 148 (1997), the 
court of appeals stated that "[t]he appropriate inquiry is 
whether the probation officer used the probation search to help 
police evade the Fourth Amendment's usual warrant and probable 
cause requirements or whether the probation officer enlisted the 
police to assist his own legitimate objectives."  Even with the 
broader fact inquiry, the standard of review remained clearly 
erroneous.  Watts, 67 F.3d at 794.  
15 At least two other circuits have followed the Ninth 
Circuit in treating the question of probation versus police 
search as a question of fact reviewable under the clearly 
erroneous standard.  See, e.g., United States v. Cardona, 903 
F.2d 60, 65 (1st Cir. 1990) ("The law will not allow a parole 
officer to serve as a cat's paw for the police.  . . .  When and 
if the integrity of a challenged action is controverted, the 
dispute is determinable as a question of fact on a case-by-case 
basis."); United States v. McFarland, 116 F.3d 316, 318 (8th 
Cir. 1997) ("Parole and police officers may work together, 
however, provided the parole officer is pursuing parole-related 
objectives and is not merely a 'stalking horse' for the police. 
 . . .  In this case, the district court found [the probation 
officer] authorized the police to carry out the challenged 
searches to determine if McFarland was violating his parole.  
This factual finding is not clearly erroneous.") (citations 
omitted). 
No. 98-3485.ssa 
 
7 
¶60 The great weight of persuasive authority belies the 
majority's statement, majority op. at ¶18, that its conclusion  
is consistent with federal and Wisconsin precedent.  Rather, it 
appears that the majority opinion stands alone in creating a 
question of constitutional fact where none existed before. 
 
II 
 
¶61 Whether a clearly erroneous standard or a de novo 
standard of review is applied, the circuit court correctly ruled 
                                                                  
16 See, e.g., State of Hawaii v. Proprios, 879 P.2d 1057, 
1064 
(Haw. 
1994) 
("Notwithstanding 
the 
existence 
of 
an 
objectively 
valid 
probationary 
purpose, 
we 
hold 
that 
a 
warrantless probationary search is unreasonable if it is 
conducted for a subjectively improper purpose.  As indicated 
previously, whether a particular search is improper 'is a 
question of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard of 
review.'"); State v. Cowans, 717 N.E. 2d 298, 307 (Ohio 1999) 
("Based upon the testimony presented and the trial court's 
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the trial court 
made a factual finding that [the probation officer] was not 
acting as a stalking horse for the deputies.  Instead, the court 
found, she 'had her own objectives in conducting the search.'  
We are bound by that finding unless the record contains 
insufficient 
evidence 
to 
support 
it."); 
Commonwealth 
v. 
Williams, 692 A.2d 1031, 1037 n.11 (Pa. 1997) ("[E]vidence 
should be suppressed if the parole agent switches hats and acts 
as a 'stalking horse' for the police by circumventing the 
requirement for a warrant.  . . .  Here, the suppression court 
explicitly found that the parole agent who conducted the search 
was not acting in such a capacity.  . . .  [N]o evidence in the 
record even remotely suggests that the trial court erred in 
reaching this conclusion."). 
No. 98-3485.ssa 
 
8 
that the probation officer "changed hats" and was serving to 
advance law enforcement goals, rather than probation goals.17  
¶62 Law enforcement officers needed probable cause and a 
warrant to search the defendant's home.  They had neither.  The 
search therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. 
¶63 The 
majority 
opinion 
promises 
guidance 
for 
how 
probation officers, law enforcement officers, lawyers, and 
courts can distinguish between a probation and police search.  
Majority op. at ¶18.  The guidance appears in two short 
conclusory paragraphs, paragraphs 32 and 34, as follows: 
 
The five findings of historical fact clearly indicate 
that probation officer Hammes was cooperating with the 
law enforcement investigation of Hajicek . . . .18 
 
[C]ooperation does not change a probation search into 
a police search.19  . . .  
                     
17 The circuit court correctly concluded that "[a]lthough 
there may be facts and exigent circumstances in a different case 
which would justify a probation officer's decision not to 
supervise a client at the behest of law enforcement, this is not 
such a case." 
18 Majority op. at ¶32.  The circuit court's findings upon 
which the majority opinion bases its legal determination that a 
probation search occurred are as follows: Law enforcement 
officers dictated the timing of the search, participated in the 
search, and notified the assistant district attorney before the 
search; the police officers and probation officer failed to 
document their communications with each other; the probation 
officer 
did 
not 
carry 
out 
the 
objectives 
of 
probation 
supervision and failed to supervise the probationer for more 
than three weeks during the delay of the search.  Majority op. 
at ¶28. 
19 Majority op. at ¶32. 
No. 98-3485.ssa 
 
9 
 
[T]he search of Hajicek's residence was a probation 
search . . . because the probation officers conducted 
the search while the law enforcement officers were 
present at the search only for protective purposes.20 
 
¶64 Does the majority opinion provide guidance about what 
constitutes acceptable "cooperation"?  Does the majority opinion 
conclude that cooperation never changes a probation search into 
a police search?  Clearly that cannot be so.  I agree that 
cooperation does not of itself turn a probation search into a 
police search.  Common sense tells us, however, that at some 
point cooperation may transform the probation officer into a 
stalking horse.  At some point, the probation officer has, as 
the circuit court stated, "changed hats" and is serving a law 
enforcement rather than probationary function.  Yet the opinion 
does not intimate that there are any limits on cooperation. 
¶65 Indeed, the word "cooperation" does not appropriately 
describe the situation here.  I agree with the circuit court 
that the probation officer "changed hats" and was serving a law 
enforcement rather than probationary function.  The probation 
officer allowed law enforcement to dictate his operations.  The 
probation officer agreed to allow law enforcement officers to 
interfere with ordinary probationary supervision and to delay a 
probationary search for more than three weeks.  Law enforcement 
                     
20 Majority op. at ¶34. 
No. 98-3485.ssa 
 
10
officers were not able to obtain a search warrant because their 
information was not good enough and then the probation officer 
worked with these same officers on a "probation" search looking 
for the same evidence as the aborted search warrant would have 
sought.21 
¶66 Does the majority opinion provide guidance about how 
to distinguish a probation search from a law enforcement search? 
Does the majority opinion conclude that so long as the probation 
officers, not the police officers, physically conduct the search 
with the law enforcement officers present for protective 
purposes, the search is a probation search?  Clearly that cannot 
be so. Such a rule would put form over substance and make a 
mockery of the stalking horse doctrine.  But that's what the 
opinion appears to say. 
¶67 Guidance?  I think not.  Puzzlement?  I think so.  The 
question the readers should ask, after reading the majority 
opinion, is whether they can hypothesize any realistic fact 
situation in which a probation officer who performs a search 
under the protection of the very law enforcement officers with 
whom they have been "cooperating" would be transformed into a 
stalking horse.  I fear that no such situation exists. 
                     
21 In most instances, in contrast to this case, law 
enforcement asks the probation officer to conduct a search. 
No. 98-3485.ssa 
 
11
¶68 When the probation officer is serving law enforcement 
objectives, as is the case here, a search warrant is necessary 
under the Fourth Amendment.  I would therefore affirm the 
circuit court's suppression order. 
 
III 
 
¶69 Even viewing the search as a probation search, I 
conclude that the warrantless search of the defendant's home was 
unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment.  The State bears 
the burden of persuasion in this case on the reasonableness of 
the search without a warrant. 
¶70 The majority opinion's conclusion that this probation 
search was reasonable relies on the U.S. Supreme Court's 
decision in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), as well 
as 
the 
agency 
regulations 
regarding 
probation 
searches.  
Reliance on both of these authorities is misplaced. 
¶71 In Griffin, the Supreme Court articulated two reasons 
for declining to require probation officers to obtain a search 
warrant.  Neither of these reasons applies to the facts of this 
case. 
¶72 First, the Griffin Court stated that "[a] warrant 
requirement would interfere to an appreciable degree with the 
probation system, setting up a magistrate rather than the 
No. 98-3485.ssa 
 
12
probation officer as the judge of how close a supervision the 
probationer requires."  Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876.  Here, 
however, law enforcement officers interfered with the probation 
officer's plan to search the defendant's home immediately.22  
Moreover, the probation officer opted to forgo all supervisory 
activities in order to avoid alerting the defendant to the law 
enforcement investigation.  The need to avoid interference with 
probationary objectives was not present in this case because law 
enforcement had already interfered.  Therefore Griffin's narrow 
exception to the warrant requirement does not apply. 
¶73 Second, the Griffin Court stated that "the delay 
inherent in seeking a warrant would make it more difficult for 
probation 
officers 
to 
respond 
quickly 
to 
evidence 
of 
misconduct . . . and would reduce the deterrent effect that the 
possibility 
of 
expeditious 
searches 
would 
otherwise 
create . . . ."  Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876 (citations omitted).  
Yet here, the probation officer allowed law enforcement to delay 
his intended search for more than three weeks, three weeks 
during which the probation officer deliberately avoided taking 
any action whatsoever to supervise the defendant in a manner 
consistent with his probationary objectives.  The need to avoid 
                     
22 See circuit court order at 7 ("Although Hammes felt he 
had good cause to do a probation search, he did not do so at the 
behest of law enforcement."). 
No. 98-3485.ssa 
 
13
delay in responding to evidence of a probationer's misconduct 
was not present in this case.  Griffin's narrow exception to the 
warrant requirement does not apply.  
¶74 The majority does not explain how the probation 
officer's failure to take any supervisory action whatsoever for 
almost a month is consistent with probationary objectives, 
objectives which the Griffin Court described as "protecting the 
public interest" and having in mind "the welfare of the 
probationer (who in the regulations is called a client)." 
Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876.  When the probation officer's actions 
are fundamentally inconsistent with the important probationary 
objective of active supervision, Griffin's narrow exception 
allowing 
warrantless 
searches 
that 
advance 
probationary 
objectives no longer applies. 
¶75 The majority opinion also relies on the probation 
officer's compliance with the Wisconsin Administrative Code.  
This reliance is misplaced as well.  The majority contends that 
the probation officer followed Wis. Admin. Code § 328.21(7)(b) 
in searching Hajicek's home.  Majority op. at ¶40.  Further, the 
majority has found that the more than three-week delay in 
searching the defendant's home did not violate any provision of 
the Wisconsin Administrative Code.  Majority op. at ¶41. 
¶76 The majority opinion overlooks the fact that the 
probation officer violated Wis. Admin. Code § 328.30, which 
No. 98-3485.ssa 
 
14
requires 
probation 
officers 
to 
document 
all 
of 
their 
communications regarding a case, including "maintain[ing] a 
chronological log of all case related contacts."  Here, the 
defendant's 
probation 
officer 
documented 
none 
of 
his 
communications with law enforcement officials.  When asked 
during the suppression hearing why he failed to document any of 
his communications, in violation of Wis. Admin. Code § 328.30, 
the probation officer answered simply, "I just didn't."  The 
majority opinion's conclusion also ignores the uncontradicted 
testimony of Professor Walter Dickey, the former head of the 
Department of Corrections and the drafter of the precursor of 
the applicable Wisconsin Administrative Code rules, regarding 
the violations that occurred in this case. 
¶77 The probation officer's violations of administrative 
procedures further undermine the majority's conclusion that the 
officer was acting reasonably and in conformance with legitimate 
probation objectives when he searched the defendant's home 
without a warrant. 
¶78 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶79 I am authorized to state that Justices WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent.