Case Title: SALLY JO GRANZER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0010

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-10-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
SALLY JO GRANZER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 118193 P.3d 266Case Number: No. S-08-0010Decided: 10/08/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
SALLY 
JO GRANZER,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; David 
E. Westling, Senior Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Westling.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda 
Pojman, Assistant Attorney General; Jenny Lynn Craig, Assistant Attorney 
General.  Argument by Ms. 
Craig.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, C.J., files a dissenting opinion, 
in which GOLDEN, J., joins.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      Sally Jo Granzer 
challenges her conviction for endangering a child by knowingly and willfully 
allowing her to enter and remain in a dwelling where Ms. Granzer knew 
methamphetamine was stored.  She 
argues that the jury was not instructed properly on the "enter" element of the 
crime and that there was insufficient evidence that methamphetamine was stored 
in the dwelling.  We conclude that 
Ms. Granzer is entitled to a new trial because the jury was instructed 
improperly and she was prejudiced by the improper instruction.  The trial evidence on the "store" 
element was, however, sufficient.  
We reverse and remand for a new trial.      

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The issues for 
our decision in this case are:  

 
 
            
1.         
Whether the trial court committed reversible error by omitting statutory 
language from the instruction on the elements of child 
endangerment.

 
 
            
2.         
Whether the State produced sufficient evidence to prove that 
methamphetamine was stored in Ms. Granzer's dwelling. 

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Ms. Granzer 
lived in a trailer house in Campbell 
County, Wyoming.  She rented a room in the trailer to 
Melissa Selfe, who had a two year old daughter, GL.  GL did not live with Ms. Selfe all of 
the time, but she did occasionally stay with her.     

 
 
[¶4]      On October 10, 
2006, investigators went to Ms. Granzer's home to investigate an allegation that 
she was involved with methamphetamine.  
Ms. Granzer, Ms. Selfe and GL were present when the investigators 
arrived.  As they were searching, 
the investigators found numerous drug paraphernalia items, including three 
methamphetamine smoking pipes and a light bulb used to smoke the drug.  All of the items contained 
methamphetamine residue.  They also 
found two baggies with methamphetamine residue under the couch cushions and a 
baggie with a quantifiable amount of the drug between the cushion and arm rest 
of a recliner where Ms. Granzer was sitting during the search.  One of the investigators believed that 
Ms. Granzer had removed the baggie from her pocket and attempted to secret it in 
the chair.   

 
 
[¶5]      Ms. Granzer was 
arrested and charged with endangerment of a child, GL, in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-4-405(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2007).  At the conclusion of the trial, the jury 
returned a guilty verdict.  The 
district court entered judgment on the jury's verdict and sentenced Ms. 
Granzer.  She appealed.      

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
            
1.         
Jury Instructions

 
 
[¶6]      Ms. Granzer 
was convicted of child endangerment in violation of § 6-4-405(a)(iii).  That statute states in pertinent part: 

 
 
(a) 
. . . [N]o person shall knowingly and willfully cause or permit any child 
to:

 
 
. 
. . .

            
            
(iii) Enter and remain in a 
room, dwelling or vehicle that the person knows is being used to manufacture or 
store methamphetamines, or the hazardous waste created by the manufacture of 
methamphetamines.

 
 

Id. 
(emphasis added).  The jury was 
instructed on the elements of the crime as follows:  

            

            
The necessary elements of the crime of Child Endangerment, as charged in 
this case, are:

 
 
1. 
  On or about the 10th day 
of October, 2006;

2.      
In 
Campbell County, Wyoming;

3.      
The 
Defendant, Sally Jo Granzer;

4.      
Knowingly 
and willfully permitted;

5.      
A 
child (GL); 

6.      
To 
remain 
in a dwelling;

7.      
That 
the Defendant knew was being used to store 

      
methamphetamine.

            

(emphasis 
added).  It is readily apparent that 
the instructions omitted the "enter" element of the crime by simply instructing 
the jury that the State was required to prove that she permitted the child to 
"remain" in the dwelling.  Ms. 
Granzer did not, however, offer an instruction containing the correct language 
or otherwise object to the jury instruction.    

 
 
[¶7]      Before we address 
the error, we must determine the correct standard of review.  Ms. Granzer suggests that the 
instructional error was fundamental, warranting automatic reversal.  The State argues that in order to 
reverse, we must conclude that Ms. Granzer was prejudiced by the error.    

 
 
[¶8]      We generally give 
significant deference to the trial court in instructing the 
jury:

 
 
"The 
trial judge is afforded latitude to tailor the instructions to the facts of the 
case, and reversible error will not be found as long as the instructions when 
viewed as a whole and in the context of the entire trial fairly and adequately 
cover the issues."

 
 

Lapp 
v. State, 2004 
WY 142, ¶ 7, 100 P.3d 862, 864-65 (Wyo. 2004), quoting Wilson v. State, 14 P.3d 912, 915 (Wyo. 
2000) (citations omitted).

 
 
[¶9]      Normally, in 
absence of a proper objection, we review a claim involving incorrect jury 
instructions using the plain error standard.  Butz v. State, 2007 WY 152, ¶ 18, 167 P.3d 650, 655 (Wyo. 2007); Lapp, ¶ 7, 
100 P.3d  at 864.  Under the plain 
error standard, the appellant must show a clear and unequivocal rule of law was 
violated, the violation clearly appears in the record, and it resulted in denial 
of a substantial right to her material prejudice.  Butz, ¶ 18, 167 P.3d  at 655.  See also, Simmons v. State, 2003 WY 84, ¶ 25, 72 P.3d 803, 812 (Wyo. 2003).  Thus, in 
the typical case, in order to justify reversal, the trial court's error in 
instructing the jury must be prejudicial.  
Heywood v. State, 2007 WY 149, 
¶ 26, 170 P.3d 1227, 1234 (Wyo. 2007).  

 
 
[¶10]   Nevertheless, we have also stated 
that the trial court commits a fundamental error, and reversal is required, when 
it fails to give an instruction on an essential element of a criminal 
offense.  Lapp, ¶ 10, 100 P.3d  at 865; Reilly v. State, 2002 WY 156, ¶ 20, 55 P.3d 1259, 1267 (Wyo. 2002).  Proper 
instructions on the elements of the crime are necessary because an accused in a 
criminal prosecution can only be convicted upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
of each element of the crime charged.  
Id.  
"The test of whether a jury has been properly instructed on the 
necessary elements of a crime is whether the instructions leave no doubt as to 
the circumstances under which the crime can be found to have been 
committed."  Lapp, ¶ 10, 100 P.3d  at 865, citing Wheaton v. State, 2003 WY 56, ¶ 20, 68 P.3d 1167, 1176 (Wyo. 2003).   

 
 
[¶11]   Our precedent stating that an error 
in instructing the jury on the elements of the crime is fundamental suggests 
that once an error is established, reversal is warranted without regard to 
whether the error prejudiced the defendant.  It appears that this statement of 
Wyoming law originated in Vigil v. State, 859 P.2d 659 (Wyo. 1993).   In that case, the trial court 
incorrectly instructed the jury on the elements of manslaughter pursuant to a 
superseded statute.  The defense did 
not, however, object to the incorrect instruction.  Ostensibly applying the plain error 
standard of review, we stated:

 
 
            
 There is no question as to 
what occurred at trial.  The trial 
judge instructed the jury on the elements of the crime of involuntary 
manslaughter, but substituted the terms culpable neglect and criminal 
carelessness for recklessness.  This 
amounts to an obvious transgression of the requirement that the trial judge must 
instruct the jury on the necessary elements of the crime charged.  Sanchez v. State, 751 P.2d 1300, 1307 
(Wyo.1988);  Horn v. State, 554 P.2d 1141, 1143 
(Wyo. 
1976).

 
 
            
In addition, this instructional error adversely affected one of Vigil's 
substantial rights.  Vigil, as the 
accused in a criminal prosecution, can only be convicted upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of each element of the crime charged.  Stuebgen v. State, 548 P.2d 870, 879 
(Wyo. 1976);  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970).  Clearly, the jury did not find that the 
State had proven that Vigil acted recklessly beyond a reasonable doubt because 
the jury was not instructed that recklessly was an element of involuntary 
manslaughter.  Hence, Vigil's right, 
to only be convicted based on a finding of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
each element of the crime charged, was denied.

 
 
            
Therefore, because the manslaughter instruction neglected to include an 
essential element of the crime for which Vigil was convicted, we hold that the 
trial court committed plain error.  
This court is certainly not alone in declaring the existence of plain 
error under these circumstances.  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit indicated that 
"[s]tate and federal courts alike have long recognized that the failure to give 
any instruction on an essential element of a criminal offense is fundamental 
error, requiring reversal of the defendant's conviction."  Cole v. Young, 817 F.2d 412, 423 (7th 
Cir.1987).  See also 2 Charles Alan Wright, Federal 
Practice and Procedure:  Criminal 2d 
§ 487, at 723 (1982).

 
 

Id. 
at 662.    

 
 
[¶12]   Vigil cites a Seventh Circuit case, Cole v. Young, 817 F.2d 412 
(7th Cir. 1987), as authority that failing to instruct on an 
essential element of the crime is fundamental error.  In that case, the defendant was 
convicted of mayhem under Wisconsin law, but 
the trial court neglected to instruct the jury on the essential element of great 
bodily harm.  Id. at 423.  The Seventh Circuit ruled that "the 
complete failure to give any jury instruction on an essential element of the 
offense charged, under circumstances indicating that the jury was not otherwise 
informed of the necessity of proof of the element, is a violation of due 
process" and, consequently, a fundamental error.  Id.  
The Seventh Circuit declined, however, to rule on whether such error 
could ever be considered harmless, i.e. that the defendant was not prejudiced by 
the instructional error, because in that case it was sufficient "to hold that 
the omission of a great bodily harm instruction may have contributed to the 
verdict" and that the conviction must be reversed.  Id. at 427.  Thus, it is not completely clear what 
the scope of the "fundamental error" ruling was in Cole. 

 
 
[¶13]   Based on the statement of the law 
in Vigil, we have repeatedly stated 
that failure to give an instruction on an essential element of the crime is 
fundamental error.  See, e.g., Butz, ¶ 18, 167 P.3d  at 655; Heywood, ¶ 26, 170 P.3d  at 1234; Seymore v. State, 2007 WY 32, ¶ 9, 152 P.3d 401, 404 (Wyo. 2007); Lapp, ¶ 
10, 100 P.3d  at 865.  Our case law 
does not, however, clearly explain what that means or the effect of a finding of 
"fundamental error."  In Miller v. State, 904 P.2d 344, 349 
(Wyo. 1995), 
we stated:

 
 
Failure 
to instruct properly on an element of a crime can be plain error.  Vigil, 859 P.2d  at 662.  Failure to instruct properly on an 
element of a crime does not constitute plain error where that element is not 
contested at trial, or where evidence of the defendant's guilt is 
overwhelming.  People v. Cowden, 735 P.2d 199, 202 
(Colo.1987).  The omission of this 
definition was not plain error because the specific definition of unlawful was 
not a contested issue at trial.  It 
was undisputed at trial that if the kidnapping had occurred, it would have been 
accomplished violently.  Miller did 
not contend that his ex-wife and children would have left willingly.  Because the omission of this statutory 
definition did not contribute to his conviction, Miller was not 
prejudiced.

 
 
[¶14]   The Miller case indicates that even when the 
trial court erred by failing to instruct on an essential element of a crime, a 
defendant who did not object at trial still must show prejudice in order to 
warrant reversal of his conviction.  
On the other hand, there are also cases where this Court has reversed 
simply because the trial court failed to instruct on an essential element of the 
crime, without specifically inquiring into whether or not the defendant was 
prejudiced by the failure.  See, e.g., Reilly, ¶¶ 18-20, 55 P.3d at 1266-67; Gabbert v. State, 2006 WY 108, ¶ 15, 141 P.3d 690, 696 (Wyo. 2006); Seymore, 
 ¶ 15, 152 P.3d  at 
406-07.

 
 
[¶15]   Vigil was decided in 1993 and Cole was a 1987 case.  Subsequent to those decisions, the 
United States Supreme Court has provided more definitive guidance on whether 
reversal is warranted any time the trial court fails to instruct the jury on an 
essential element of a crime.  In Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 144 L. Ed. 2d 35 (1999), the United States Supreme Court ruled that 
an error in failing to instruct the jury on an essential element of an offense 
is not part of the limited class of fundamental constitutional errors "so 
intrinsically harmful as to require automatic reversal (i.e. affect substantial 
rights) without regard to their effect on the outcome."  Id. 
at 7.  See also, Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 124 S. Ct. 7, 157 L. Ed. 2d 263 (2003).  

 
 
[¶16]   In concluding that the failure to 
instruct on an element of an offense is not a fundamental constitutional error, 
the Supreme Court distinguished between structural errors and trial errors.  Structural errors are defects affecting 
the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply errors in the 
trial process itself.  Neder, 527 U.S.  at 8, citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1991).  The United States Supreme Court ruled 
that most instructional errors do not undermine the foundation of a criminal 
trial and, consequently, are not "fundamental" or "structural."  Id.  
at 10-11 (distinguishing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 124 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1993) which held that a defective reasonable 
doubt instruction was not subject to harmless error analysis because it vitiated 
all of the jury's findings, i.e. it 
was a structural error).  Being 
simple trial errors, instructional errors that are preserved at trial warrant 
analysis under the harmless constitutional error standard described in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 
23-24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967).  Under Chapman, the reviewing court may 
disregard errors that are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.   Id.  

 
 
[¶17]   We recently employed the 
structural/trial error dichotomy in Large 
v. State, 2008 WY 22, ¶ 23, 177 P.3d 807, 814 (Wyo. 2008).  In Large, we revisited long standing 
precedent which stated that it was error per se for a prosecutor to elicit a 
witness's opinion about the defendant's guilt and the defendant need not show 
prejudice in order to obtain a reversal of his conviction.  Overruling our precedent, we decided 
that "[w]hile it may be error to admit an opinion of guilt, it is trial error 
rather than structural error. . . . Accordingly, we will no longer treat a 
prosecutor-elicited opinion of guilt as error per se." Id., ¶ 30, 177 P.3d  at 816.  Because Ms. Large did not object to the 
trial testimony that she was guilty, we reviewed her claim under our typical 
plain error standard, which requires a showing of material prejudice.  Id., ¶ 31, 177 P.3d  at 816-17.  

 
 
[¶18]   
Based upon the federal cases and Large, we conclude that a trial court's 
failure to instruct on an element of a crime is not a structural or fundamental 
error, but rather a trial error.  
Thus we will not apply an "error per se" type analysis to such claims of 
error.  Instead, when, as in Neder, the defendant objected to the 
erroneous instructions at trial, the appellate court reviews the claim for 
harmless error.  See W.R.Cr.P. 52(a).1  The United States 
Supreme Court has directed that, in such cases, the government has the burden of 
proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See, e.g., Chapman, 386 U.S.  at 24; United States v. Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81 n. 7, 124 S. Ct. 2333, 159 L. Ed. 2d 157 (2004). 

 
 
[¶19]   However, when, like here and in Large, the defendant did not lodge an 
appropriate trial objection, the plain error standard of review applies.  See, W.R.Cr.P. 52(b);2 United States v. Robertson, 473 F.3d 1289, 1291 (10th Cir. 2007).  As we explained earlier, under the plain 
error standard, the appellant must show a clear and unequivocal rule of law was 
violated, the violation clearly appears in the record, and it resulted in denial 
of a substantial right to her material prejudice.  Butz, ¶ 18, 167 P.3d  at 655.  See also, Simmons, ¶ 25, 72 P.3d  at 812.  In contrast to the situation where a 
proper trial objection is lodged, when error is not preserved, it is the 
appellant's obligation to establish that she was prejudiced.  Robertson, 473 F.3d  at 1292-93.  See also, United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-35, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1993) (applying 
F.R.Cr.P. 52(b)).    

      

[¶20]   The State concedes that the 
district court violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law by failing to 
instruct the jury, in accordance with § 6-4-405(a)(iii), that the prosecution 
was required to prove Ms. Granzer permitted GL to enter and remain in the 
dwelling.  The second factor of the 
plain error test is also satisfied in this case because the instructional error 
clearly appears in the record.

 
 
[¶21]   We now turn to the third 
elementwhether the instructional error resulted in a denial of a substantial 
right to Ms. Granzer's material prejudice.  
As we noted in Miller, failure 
to instruct on an essential element is not reversible if the element was not 
contested or "where evidence of the defendant's guilt is overwhelming" because, 
under those circumstances, the defendant suffers no prejudice from the 
violation.  Miller, 904 P.2d  at 349.  Ms. Selfe testified that the child's 
grandmother brought GL to her early that morning and Ms. Granzer did not arrive 
until later.  Ms. Selfe stated that 
she did not talk to Ms. Granzer about GL coming to stay at the trailer because 
she had not seen Ms. Granzer for three days.    

 
 
[¶22]   The State argues that the jury 
could have rejected Ms. Selfe's testimony because she was a long time friend of 
Ms. Granzer's.  If the jury 
disregarded Ms. Selfe's testimony then it could have inferred Ms. Granzer was at 
the trailer when the child arrived and, consequently, allowed her to enter the 
dwelling.  Moreover, Ms. Granzer's 
children told one of the investigators that they had visited their mother at her 
residence on October 9, 2006, and played with GL.  The children's statements were 
inconsistent with the implication from Ms. Selfe's testimony that Ms. Granzer, 
her children and GL were not at the trailer on October 9, 2006.  Given the disputed evidence, Ms. Granzer 
was entitled to a jury determination on the "enter" element.  She was, therefore, materially 
prejudiced by the instructional error and is entitled to a new 
trial.

 
 

2.         
Sufficiency of the 
Evidence

 
 
[¶23]   Ms. Granzer argues that there was 
insufficient evidence that methamphetamine was stored in the trailer.  Although we are reversing on the jury 
instruction issue, we must also consider this issue because, if the evidence was 
insufficient as a matter of law, Ms. Granzer is entitled to be acquitted on the 
charge and the State may not re-try her.  
See e.g., Wease v. State, 2007 WY 176, ¶ 30, 170 P.3d 94, 104 (Wyo. 2007); Dunsmore v. 
State, 2007 WY 40, ¶ 21, 153 P.3d 275, 281 (Wyo. 2007).  In determining whether there was 
sufficient trial evidence to sustain a conviction, we apply the following 
standard of review:

 
 
When 
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court accepts as true the 
State's evidence and affords it those inferences which may be reasonably and 
fairly drawn from it.  Jones v. State, 2006 WY 40, ¶ 9, 132 P.3d 162, 165 (Wyo. 2006).  We do 
not consider conflicting evidence or inferences that can be drawn from such 
evidence.  Id. Our duty is 
to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or 
even could, have come to the same result as the jury actually did.   Id.

 
 

Kelly 
v. State, 2007 
WY 45, ¶ 11, 153 P.3d 926, 928 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶24]   Both parties use the definition of 
"store" found in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary:  "Store:  to place or leave in a location . . . 
for preservation or later use or disposal."  http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/store.  Ms. Granzer claims that, because the 
only measurable amount of methamphetamine was in the bag from her pocket which 
she attempted to hide between the armrest and cushion of the recliner, there is 
no evidence that methamphetamine was "stored" in the trailer.  She claims that the evidence established 
that the methamphetamine located in the house was obviously for her use, not 
storage.

  

[¶25]   We are not persuaded by Ms. 
Granzer's argument.  In fact, the 
argument proves exactly what it tries to dispute.  When she tried to hide the bag of 
methamphetamine in the recliner, she was, without question, placing it in a 
location for preservation or later use.  
Moreover, the other physical evidence in the case was sufficient to allow 
the jury to reasonably conclude that methamphetamine was stored in the 
trailer.   The statute does not 
specify any particular amount of methamphetamine that must be stored in the 
dwelling.  There were numerous 
implements for smoking methamphetamine containing residue in the trailer, 
including a light bulb in the kitchen cupboard with food stuff, a pipe under the 
mattress, and a pipe in a laundry basket.  
There were also bags with residue in the couch cushions.  The jury could certainly infer from the 
evidence that methamphetamine was stored in the trailer.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶26]   The trial court erred when it 
failed to instruct the jury on the "enter" element of the crime as set out in § 
6-4-405(a)(iii).  Following federal 
law, we conclude the instructional error was not fundamental.  Because she failed to object to the 
erroneous instruction at trial, Ms. Granzer was required to show plain error in 
order to justify reversal.  We 
conclude the instructional violation rose to the level of plain error because 
the evidence on the "enter" element was disputed; consequently, Ms. Granzer 
suffered material prejudice.  As to 
the second issue, the State presented sufficient evidence to establish the 
"store" element of the crime.     

 
 
[¶27]   Reversed and remanded for a new 
trial.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Rule 52(a) 
states:  "Harmless error.  Any 
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights 
shall be disregarded."

 
 

2Rule 52(b) 
states:  "Plain error.  Plain 
errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were 
not brought to the attention of the court."

 
 

VOIGT, 
Chief Justice, dissenting, in which GOLDEN, Justice, joins.

 
 
[¶28]   
I respectfully dissent because, even though I agree with the majority 
that reversal should flow from the instructional error, I would also reverse on 
the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence, which would result in reversal for 
entry of a judgment of acquittal.  
The failure of the district court adequately to instruct the jury as to 
the elements of the offense charged was exacerbated in this case by the dearth 
of evidence that the appellant "stored" methamphetamine in the home at a time 
that she allowed the child to "enter and remain" in the home.  It appears undisputed that the appellant 
arrived at the home just shortly before the officers did, that when she arrived 
she was not aware that the child was there, and that the only methamphetamine 
present, other than trace amounts in empty baggies, was in her pocket when she 
entered.  Evidence that the 
appellant may have at other times in the past allowed the child to enter and 
remain in the home, at which time there may or may not have been methamphetamine 
"stored" there, is irrelevant.  I 
would reverse and remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal because there was 
insufficient evidence to convict.

 
 
[¶29]   The temporal factor is significant 
in this case both in regard to the definition of the crime and to the 
appellant's theory of defense.  The 
legislature defined the crime as "knowingly and willfully" allowing a child to 
"enter and remain" in a dwelling "being used" to store methamphetamines.  See majority opinion supra ¶ 6.  Neither an inference of previous 
permission for the child to enter the dwelling, nor an inference of previous use 
of the dwelling to store methamphetamines, is sufficient to prove that a crime 
occurred on October 10, 2006.  In 
other words, the State did not prove the confluence of actus reus and mens rea.  Specifically, there was no proof that 
the appellant allowed a child to enter and remain in the house at a time that 
she knew methamphetamine was being stored there.  Furthermore, I would find that, as a 
matter of law, the appellant's attempt to hide the methamphetamine she had in 
her pocket when she entered the house is not what the legislature had in mind 
when it required as an element of the crime that methamphetamine be 
"manufactured" or "stored" in the room, dwelling, or vehicle.  This was a simple possession 
case.