Case Title: Oliver v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: CR95-30

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Samuel Willie OLIVER v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 95-30                                           ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered March 18, 1996


1.   Constitutional law -- denial of counsel -- issue must be
     raised on direct appeal or be waived. -- The denial of counsel
     under the Sixth Amendment is an issue more appropriately
     raised on direct appeal than in an A.R.Cr.P. Rule 37 petition;
     the supreme court perceived no good reason for permitting a
     defendant to pursue a direct appeal on unrelated grounds while
     saving denial of counsel for Rule 37 relief and as "insurance"
     in the case of an adverse appellate decision; in the present
     case, appellant knew what his counsel status was at trial and
     to the extent that his Sixth Amendment rights were impaired,
     the issue should have been raised on direct appeal; instead,
     appellant contended in his direct appeal that evidence was
     insufficient for his conviction; the supreme court held that
     the issue of denial of counsel must be raised on direct appeal
     or be waived.

2.   Constitutional law -- denial of counsel -- cases indicating
     issue may be raised in Rule 37 petition overruled. -- Where
     earlier cases indicated that denial of counsel may be raised
     in a Rule 37 petition, the supreme court overruled them to the
     extent that they stood for the proposition.

3.   Constitutional law -- denial of counsel -- new requirement for
     raising issue on direct appeal applied prospectively. -- Where
     appellant could justifiably have relied on the cases now
     overruled, the supreme court concluded that fairness dictated
     a prospective application of the holding that the issue of
     denial of counsel must be raised on direct appeal or waived.

4.   Constitutional law -- right to counsel -- constitutionally
     guaranteed. -- The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
     United States Constitution guarantee that any person brought
     to trial in any state or federal court must be afforded the
     fundamental right to assistance of counsel before that person
     can be validly convicted and punished by imprisonment.

5.   Constitutional law -- right to counsel -- accused has right to
     represent himself -- waiver -- must be voluntary, knowing, and
     intelligent. -- An accused has a constitutional right to
     represent himself and to make a voluntary, knowing, and
     intelligent waiver of his constitutional right to the
     assistance of counsel in his defense; but every reasonable
     presumption must be indulged against the waiver of fundamental
     constitutional rights; the burden is on the State to show that
     an accused voluntarily and intelligently waived his
     fundamental right; determining whether an intelligent waiver
     of the right to counsel has been made depends in each case on
     the particular facts and circumstances, including the
     background, the experience, and the conduct of the accused.

6.   Constitutional law -- right to counsel -- trial court must
     inquire of accused's ability to retain counsel and explain
     right to attorney. -- The trial court must inquire of an
     accused's ability to retain counsel, and if the accused is an
     indigent, counsel must be appointed for him; the trial court
     must do more than just make an inquiry; it must explain to the
     accused that he is entitled, as a matter of law, to an
     attorney and must question him to see whether he can afford to
     hire counsel.

7.   Constitutional law -- right to counsel -- financial capability
     to hire counsel not explored by trial court -- appellant
     relinquished representation to standby counsel. -- The present
     case exhibited deficiencies in the trial court's necessary
     inquiry into the risk of appellant's self-representation where
     appellant's financial capability to hire counsel was not
     explored; throughout his trial, however, appellant had standby
     counsel who not only advised but also actively represented him
     during most of the proceeding, cross-examining witnesses,
     lodging objections, presenting the motion for directed
     verdict, and delivering the closing argument; thus, it
     appeared that early in his trial, appellant effectively
     relinquished representation to his standby counsel.

8.   Constitutional law -- right to counsel -- appellant was not
     denied right to counsel -- trial court's finding not clearly
     erroneous. -- Although it expressed serious concerns about
     standby counsel's having been appointed the day of the trial
     and thus having no knowledge of the case and reiterated that
     the failure of the trial court to inquire into appellant's
     financial ability to hire counsel was error, the supreme court
     noted that those concerns were offset by the considerations
     that appellant was adamant in wanting to proceed pro se,
     making no reference to a destitute status, that counsel did
     more than stand by but, rather, provided active
     representation, and that an accused has the constitutional
     right, which appellant invoked, to represent himself; under
     the totality of these circumstances, though the trial court
     erred in not inquiring into Oliver's financial situation, the
     supreme court declined to hold that appellant was denied his
     right to counsel or that the trial court's finding on this
     point, following a Rule 37 hearing, was clearly erroneous.

9.   Appeal & error -- appellant's obligation to obtain ruling at
     trial. -- Where the trial court did not specifically rule on
     the issue concerning whether appellant's defense was hampered
     because the State had not furnished him information about the
     arresting officer's medical condition when denying the Rule 37
     petition, and the supreme court could not determine from the
     court's order whether it was considered or decided, it was
     appellant's obligation to obtain a ruling on the point in
     order to preserve the issue for appeal.


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court; David Bogard, Judge;
affirmed.
     Morehead & Morehead, by: Robert F. Morehead, Esq., for
appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  David R. Raupp, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.March 18, 1996       *ADVREP7*






SAMUEL WILLIE OLIVER,
                    APPELLANT,

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS,
                     APPELLEE,

CR 95-30




APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. CR 92-2006,
HON. DAVID BOGARD, JUDGE,




AFFIRMED.




                    Robert L. Brown, Justice.

     Appellant Samuel Willie Oliver raises two points in his appeal
of four convictions for delivery of crack cocaine.  He first
contends that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel
and did not waive such.  He, secondly, urges that his due process
rights were violated owing to lack of information about the
arresting officer's medical condition.  Neither point has merit,
and we affirm.
     Samuel Oliver was charged with four counts of delivery of
crack cocaine.  The State's principal witness was an undercover
investigator, Thomas Washington, who made the four drug purchases
from Oliver.  Officer Washington later became ill.  He originally
suffered from environmental encephalitis and multiple brain
aneurysms.  He also suffered from sarcoidosis, a disease in which
lesions develop throughout the body.  Oliver tried to discover
Officer Washington's medical records, and his request was denied by
the trial court.
     Prior to trial, Oliver retained four different attorneys for
his defense, and each one was terminated at his request.  The last
termination of counsel occurred at the omnibus hearing before trial
commenced, where Oliver announced his intention to proceed pro se. 
The following colloquy occurred between Oliver and the trial court:
          SAM OLIVER: I'm doing my own pro se.
          JOE OLIVER: He's doing his own pro se.
          SAM OLIVER: I filed my own motions already.
          JOE OLIVER: And he subpoenaed --
          SAM OLIVER: Thomas Washington.
          JOE OLIVER: -- Thomas Washington, and we have a copy
     of the subpoenas right here, both of them.
          COURT: Well, I've got to -- to recommend you not do
     this, Mr. -- both Mr. Olivers, you know.
          SAM OLIVER: I want to represent --
          COURT: You're proceeding by yourself and think
     you're -- as I've told you before, I think that dangerous
     to do that.
                              ....
          COURT: Well, I can't force you to have an attorney. 
     You see, I can't force one on you and I think it's
     against your better interest to do that, but I can't make
     you --
          SAM OLIVER: I'm prepared --
          COURT: -- have an attorney.
          SAM OLIVER: I'm prepared for the case today.
          COURT: At the trial of this case, I will still have
     an attorney sitting at the counsel table in case you need
     one.
          SAM OLIVER: No, I don't think so, Your Honor, 'cause
     --
          COURT: Well, I think so we will.  We will have an
     attorney sitting at the counsel -- you don't have to use
     him.
          COURT: You can ignore him.  That's your prerogative,
     but there will be one available for you.
                              ....
          Okay, Mr. Smedley, [attorney], I'm going to relieve
     you.  These gentlemen don't want your services.
          SMEDLEY: Thank you.
          COURT: That's against my advice, once again for the
     record, --
          SMEDLEY: It's against my advice, too.
          COURT: -- but they don't have to -- they don't have
     to have an attorney.
The trial court permitted Oliver to proceed pro se, and standby
counsel played an active role in the trial.  Oliver was found
guilty on all four counts and received a cumulative sentence of
twenty years.  He appealed his conviction on the basis of
insufficiency of the evidence, and the Court of Appeals upheld it
in an unpublished opinion.  Denial of counsel was not an issue on
appeal.
     Oliver next filed a petition for relief under Ark. R. Crim. P.
37.  He alleged in his petition that he was denied his Sixth
Amendment right to an attorney and was forced to proceed pro se. 
He also alleged that the State withheld essential evidence
(Washington's medical history) in violation of Ark. R. Crim. P. 17
and Brady v. Maryland,