Case Title: JOSEPH BLAND PHILLIPS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 05-240

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-02-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
JOSEPH BLAND PHILLIPS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 25151 P.3d 1131Case Number: 05-240Decided: 02/13/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
JOSEPH 
BLAND PHILLIPS,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofFremontCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Domonkos.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Mackenzie Williams, 
Student Intern.  Argument by Mr. 
Williams.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      A jury found the 
appellant guilty of third-degree sexual assault and interference with a peace 
officer.  The appellant seeks 
reversal of the judgment and sentence entered thereafter, on two grounds:  one, that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct during closing argument; and two, that the jury was improperly 
instructed on the law.

 
 
[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]     1.   Did the prosecutor commit 
misconduct by referring to the appellant as a pedophile during rebuttal closing 
argument?

 
 
2.   Did the district court err in 
instructing the jury as to a statutory defense to a crime that was not 
charged?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      The appellant 
befriended the victim and her mother in 1997, when the victim was nine years 
old.  Over time, he allowed the 
victim to ride his horses, hired her to work in his automotive repair shop, and 
regularly gave her gifts, including a horse, tack, and a truck.  The relationship between the appellant 
and the victim began to change, however, when she reached the age of 
fifteen.  The appellant began to get 
"pushy," forcing the victim to accompany him whenever he wished.  He became angry and jealous if she spent 
time with her friends.

 
 
[¶5]      On November 29, 
2003, the appellant and the victim went to a friend's house to feed horses.  At some point after feeding the horses, 
the appellant and the victim had sexual intercourse.  She testified that the sexual act was 
not consensual, and that the appellant had forcibly stripped off her clothes and 
held her down.  He testified, to the 
contrary, that she voluntarily stepped into the shower with him and that the 
intercourse was consensual.  At the 
time, he was sixty-two and she was fifteen.

 
 
[¶6]      The incident 
caused the victim to become pregnant, which fact became known to the 
appellant.  On June 21, 2004, while 
the victim was again accompanying the appellant to feed horses, her water 
broke.  The appellant took her to 
the hospital, where he filled out admission paperwork claiming that she was 
thirteen months older than her actual age, and claiming to be her father.  The victim gave birth to a 
daughter.  Upon the victim's release 
from the hospital, the appellant took her to a friend's house, and lied to her 
mother and the police about her whereabouts.  Three days later, police officers 
happened to chance upon the victim at the appellant's business.  They returned her to her 
mother.

 
 
[¶7]      Through an 
Amended Information, the appellant eventually was charged with three 
crimes:  (1) third-degree sexual 
assault, a felony;1 (2) interference with custody, a 
felony;2 and (3) interference with a peace 
officer, a misdemeanor.3  The jury found him guilty of the first 
and third counts, but not the second.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Did the 
prosecutor commit misconduct by referring to the appellant as a pedophile during 
rebuttal closing argument?

 
 
[¶8]      The prosecutor's 
statement at issue was made during the State's rebuttal closing argument, and 
the statement was followed by an objection, so we apply the following standard 
of review:

 
 
            
Where there has been an objection below, claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct are reviewed under a harmless error standard:

 
 
Wyoming 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.04 states that "any error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded by the 
reviewing court."  Wyoming Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 52(a) and Wyoming Rule of Evidence 103(a) contain similar 
provisions.  The test for harmless 
error is as follows:

 
 
"An 
error is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might 
have been more favorable to the defendant if the error had never occurred.  To demonstrate harmful error, the 
defendant must show prejudice under circumstances which manifest inherent 
unfairness and injustice or conduct which offends the public sense of fair 
play.'"

 
 

Condra 
v. State, 2004 
WY 131, ¶ 7, 100 P.3d 386, 389 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 
10, 63 P.3d 875, 881 (Wyo. 2003)). . . .

 
 
            
We decide claims of prosecutorial misconduct by reference to the entire 
record, and where the claim is one of improper argument, we consider it in the 
context of the entire argument.  Law [v. State], 2004 WY 111, ¶ 12, 98 P.3d 
[181,] 191 [(Wyo. 2004)]. . . .  The 
question is whether, "based on the entire record, a reasonable possibility 
exists that, in the absence of the error, the verdict might have been more 
favorable to the accused."  Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 103, ¶ 56, 
98 P.3d 143, 157 (Wyo. 2004).  "The 
burden of establishing prosecutorial misconduct rests upon the appellant who 
raises the issue."  Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 32, 43 P.3d 80, 
94 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 

Butcher 
v. State, 2005 
WY 146, ¶¶ 38-39, 123 P.3d 543, 554 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶9]      This standard of 
review requires us to consider the challenged statement in the context of the 
entire closing argument, and also in the context of the entire trial.  In his opening statement, the prosecutor 
described how the appellant met the victim and her mother, how the friendly 
relationship developed over time, and how the appellant frequently gave gifts to 
the victim.  He did not suggest that 
the relationship was that of a pedophile grooming a victim.  In his initial closing argument, he did 
make the following statements:

 
 
I think 
you all know that the defendant knew exactly what he was doing all along.  He manipulated [the victim] into a 
position where he could have sex with her, and then he manipulated her into 
remaining quiet.

 
 
Defense 
counsel made no objection to these comments, choosing instead to respond to them 
in his own closing argument as follows:

 
 
            
The way the State has this made up, though, it's like from the day that 
she was 9 years old, he's been heaping all these presents on her, so that he 
could commit  according to her, at least  a forcible rape at the age of 
15.  They asked you to listen to the 
facts and see if that makes sense.

 
 
[¶10]   In his rebuttal closing, the 
prosecutor responded, in turn, with the following:

 
 
            
The defense argued that Joe Phillips  that in order to convict the 
defendant  you are going to have to believe that Joe Phillips had this sinister 
plan beginning at age 8, to shower [the victim] with presents and then employ 
[her], give her all his trust and responsibility, and that he fostered this 
relationship to the point where he could have sex with her at some point down 
the road.

 
 
            
I don't think you have to believe that in order to convict the 
defendant.  But I think that's 
exactly what happened.  It's called 
"grooming."  And that's what 
pedophiles do.

 
 
[¶11]   The bases for defense counsel's 
objection were that there had been no evidence admitted that the appellant was a 
pedophile, and that the prosecutor's statement was "simply inflammatory."  The objection was overruled.  We can readily conclude that the 
appellant is correct and that his objection should have been sustained.  There was no such evidence presented to 
the jury, and the prosecutor's statements amounted to nothing less than his own 
testimony, which is forbidden.  Lafond v. State, 2004 WY 51, ¶ 35, 89 P.3d 324, 336 (Wyo. 2004).  
Furthermore, calling the appellant a pedophile was certainly 
inflammatory, which is also forbidden.  
Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 
24, 63 P.3d 875, 884-84 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶12]   We cannot say, however, that the 
prosecutor's use of the word "pedophile" produced material prejudice to the 
appellant; that is, that the verdict might have been more favorable to the 
appellant had that single word not been uttered.  It was not error for the prosecutor to 
describe the appellant's conduct with the victim as "manipulative" or 
"grooming," because those conclusions were reasonable inferences that could be 
drawn from the evidence that was presented.  Inasmuch as the appellant admitted 
having sexual intercourse with the victim on the date alleged, the only real 
issue regarding the third-degree sexual assault charge was whether he knew her 
age at the time.  With all of the 
testimony about that question throughout the trial, it is extremely doubtful 
that the use of this one irrelevant word affected the 
outcome.

 
 
Did the 
district court err in instructing the jury as to a statutory defense to a crime 
that was not charged?

 
 
[¶13]   The appellant was charged with 
third-degree sexual assault, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(i), 
which statute is set forth in detail in footnote 1 herein.  As part of its pretrial submissions, the 
State proffered a jury instruction based upon WPJIC 10.303 (1978), a pattern 
instruction that exists today as WPJIC 23.10 (2004).  The proferred instruction read as 
follows:

 
 
            
It is no defense to a charge of soliciting, procuring or 
knowingly encouraging a person under the age of sixteen (16) years to engage in 
illicit sexual relations intrusion that the person under sixteen (16) 
years of age consented to engage in sexual relations.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  The instruction was given 
to the jury, over defense counsel's objection, that it was not directed toward 
the elements of the crime with which the appellant was 
charged.

 
 
[¶14]   Defense counsel was right.  The pattern instruction was derived 
from, and is a defense to the crime defined in, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-104 
(LexisNexis 2005), which reads as follows:

 
 
            
Except under circumstances constituting sexual assault in the first, 
second or third degree as defined by W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304, anyone who 
has reached the age of majority and who solicits, procures or knowingly 
encourages anyone under the age of sixteen (16) years or a person purported to 
be under the age of sixteen (16) years to engage in illicit sexual penetration 
or sexual intrusion as defined in W.S. 6-2-301 or knowingly causes or encourages 
any person to solicit, procure or encourage a person under the age of sixteen 
(16) years or a person purported to be under the age of sixteen (16) years to 
commit any illicit sexual penetration or sexual intrusion as defined in W.S. 
6-2-301 is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be imprisoned for a 
term of not more than five (5) years.

 
 
[¶15]   This instruction should not have 
been given to the jury, primarily because it has nothing to do with the charged 
crime.  The district court's reason 
for overruling the objection was that "the defendant's testimony was that this 
encounter with [the victim] and the shower was consensual on her part."  The elements instruction, however, 
already informed the jury that the alleged crime consisted of inflicting sexual 
intrusion upon a person under the age of sixteen years, and the court also gave 
the appellant's proffered affirmative defense instruction, which read as 
follows:

 
 
            
It is an affirmative defense to Sexual Assault in the Third Degree that 
the Defendant reasonably believed that the victim was sixteen (16) years of age 
or older.  If you find, from 
consideration of all the evidence, that the Defendant, Joseph Bland Phillips, 
reasonably believed that the victim, [], was sixteen (16) years of age, or 
older, at the time of the offense, then you must find the Defendant not guilty 
of Sexual Assault in the Third Degree.

 
 
That 
instruction, which correctly states the law, is based upon Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-308(a) (LexisNexis 2005), and it does apply to third-degree sexual 
assault.

 
 
[¶16]   We conclude that, when all of the 
instructions are considered together, the appellant cannot show that he was 
prejudiced.  Three basic and 
necessary principles of law were imparted to the jury:  (1) the elements of the charged 
crimethird-degree sexual assaulthad to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; 
(2) consent of a victim under the age of sixteen is not a defense; but (3) a 
reasonable belief that the victim is sixteen or older is a defense.  While facts concerning consent were 
presented to the jury by both sides, the case did not turn on that 
question.  Rather, the case turned 
upon the question of whether the appellant reasonably believed the victim was 
sixteen years old.  Furthermore, a 
correct instruction that consent is no defense could have been, and should have 
been, given.  Under all these 
circumstances, we cannot conclude that the appellant was prejudiced by the 
mis-worded but fundamentally correct instruction that was given.  The instruction was not so misleading 
that it likely confused the jury.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶17]   Neither the singular occurrence of 
prosecutorial misconduct in rebuttal closing argument, nor the instructional 
error prejudiced a material right of the appellant, and he was not denied his 
right to a fair trial.

 
 
[¶18]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-304 (LexisNexis 2005) provides in pertinent part as 
follows:

 
 
(a)    An actor commits sexual 
assault in the third degree if, under circumstances not constituting sexual 
assault in the first or second degree:

(i)     The actor is at least 
four (4) years older than the victim and inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim 
under the age of sixteen (16) years[.]

 
 

2Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-204 (LexisNexis 2005) provides in pertinent part as 
follows:

 
 
(a)    A person is guilty of 
interference with custody if, having no privilege to do so, he 
knowingly:

(ii)     Fails or refuses to 
return a minor to the person entitled to custody.

 
 

3Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-5-204 (LexisNexis 2005) provides in pertinent part as 
follows:

 
 
(a)    A person commits a 
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, a fine of 
not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or both, if he knowingly 
obstructs, impedes or interferes with or resists arrest by a peace officer while 
engaged in the lawful performance of his official 
duties.