Case Title: State v. Hill

Citation: 1996-Ohio-222

Docket Number: 19950202

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-03-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Hill, Appellant. 
[Cite as State v. Hill (1996), _____ Ohio St.3d _____.] 
Criminal law -- Aggravated murder -- Death penalty upheld, when. 
 
(No. 95-202--Submitted December 6, 1995--Decided March 5, 
1996.) 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, Nos. C-
910916 and C-940487. 
 
On May 31, 1991, defendant-appellant, Genesis Hill, crept into 
his girlfriend’s apartment in Cincinnati and surreptitiously removed 
their six-month old daughter, Domika Dudley.  On June 2, police 
found Domika’s body, wrapped in trash bags, in a vacant lot behind 
Hill’s house. 
 
Hill, age nineteen, and Teresa Dudley, age eighteen, lived near 
each other and had an on-going relationship.  Their daughter, 
Domika Dudley, was born in November 1990.  Around May 29, 1991, 
Barbara Janson, a neighbor, heard Teresa “making silly little 
comments” to Hill that she was going to take him to court for child 
support.  Hill replied that “he’d kill that little bitch before he paid 
 
2
anything.”  Teresa recalled Hill saying, “I bet I don’t pay,” when she 
asked him about child support.  
 
On May 31, in the late afternoon, Hill and Teresa were together 
in Hill’s yard.  Teresa became upset, they argued, and Teresa went 
home.  That evening, Teresa went to sleep in her mother’s second-
floor apartment in the same room as Domika.  Between 11:00 p.m. 
and midnight, Janson and another neighbor saw Hill enter the front 
yard of Teresa’s apartment building, but they did not see Hill leave.  
That front entrance was the only entry way to her apartment except 
for the back yard which was enclosed by a high wall.  Ten to fifteen 
minutes after the neighbors saw Hill, Teresa came out and said 
Domika was missing.  
 
Teresa went to Hill’s home, but was told that Hill  was not there 
and did not have the baby.  Hill lived in the same building as did his 
uncle and two aunts.  Just then, Hill appeared, but he denied 
knowing where his daughter was.  A neighborhood search for 
Domika by police proved unsuccessful.  Hill appeared unconcerned, 
 
3
did not participate in the search, and was “snickering” and “grinning” 
as Teresa talked to police about their missing baby.  
 
Around 5:45 a.m., June 1, Teresa and one of Hill’s aunts found 
a distinctive blue and pink barrette on the floor of Hill’s garage.  That 
barrette was identical to one used in Domika’s hair before she went 
to sleep.   
 
On the afternoon of June 2, police found a suspicious SMA® 
baby formula carton in an overgrown vacant lot behind Hill’s garage.  
That box was not there on the day before when police searched the 
lot.  Domika’s body was inside the carton.  A plastic shopping bag 
and three plastic trash bags had been successively wrapped around 
her body.  Black electrical tape was wrapped around the outer trash 
bag.  
 
A man’s blue shirt, with white and red stripes, was tied around 
Domika’s head.  Teresa and Janson identified this shirt as one that 
“looks like” a shirt Hill owned.  
 
Domika died as a result of three skull fractures, and she had 
been dead for more than twelve hours.  Either a strong, blunt force 
 
4
had struck her head, or her head had been crushed.  She might have 
been injured in a fall, but it seems only if another force had hit her 
during or after the fall.  She was wearing only a diaper and two 
barrettes.  
 
The baby formula box, in which Domika was found, was similar 
to one that Hill’s aunt had placed in the trash pile next to Hill’s 
garage.  The box was in the trash on June 1, but not on June 2.  
Batch numbers on a SMA® can from the aunt’s pantry matched 
batch numbers on the box in which Domika was found.  Hill’s uncle 
was unable to find the black electrical tape that he kept in a tool box. 
 
A forensic expert testified that the last trash bag wrapped 
around Domika had once been directly attached to a trash bag found 
in Hill’s kitchen.  Microscopic grain, crease, and other distinctive 
marks made in the manufacturing process matched exactly on the 
two trash bags.  
 
At Teresa’s apartment, police found Hill’s right thumb print on a 
hallway light bulb near where Teresa and Domika had slept.  When 
Teresa went to sleep that night, the hallway door had been partly 
 
5
open and the light had been on.  When she awoke and discovered 
Domika missing, the light bulb was unscrewed. 
 
On the evening of June 2, the day Domika’s body was found, a 
Cincinnati bus driver overheard a conversation on his bus.  One 
young man, crying and upset, told another, “he could not believe 
what he had done to a little baby.”  The man further said, “he thought 
he might get the chair for it.”  After the bus driver heard the news 
about a dead baby, police were called.  The bus driver picked Hill out 
of a photo array as the young man crying on the bus.  
 
A grand jury indicted Hill on two felony-murder counts in 
violation of R.C. 2903.01: murder during an aggravated burglary 
(Count I) and during a kidnapping (Count II).  Each aggravated 
murder count contained two death-penalty specifications under R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7)(murder during an aggravated burglary and murder 
during a kidnapping).  Count III charged aggravated burglary in 
violation of R.C. 2911.11, and Count IV charged kidnapping in 
violation of R.C. 2905.01.  Hill pled not guilty.  
 
6
 
At trial, numerous friends and relatives testified for Hill and 
described his activities on the evening of May 31.  Defense 
witnesses suggested that only two trash bags had been in the 
kitchen; that Teresa was not a good mother; that she had been 
aggressive towards Hill on May 31; that she had access to the trash 
bags in Hill’s kitchen; and that she may have “planted” the barrette 
on the garage floor. 
 
Hill testified as to his activities on May 31.  He admitted he had 
been in the hallway, outside Teresa’s door, around 11:00 p.m., and 
had unscrewed the light bulb.  He claimed he only “whistled” to 
Teresa.  When she did not answer, he left and went out the front, the 
same way he came in.  He said he then “[w]ent on about [his] 
business” (drinking with friends).  In his narrative testimony, Hill 
implicitly denied taking Domika, but he did not explicitly do so.  
Cross-examination revealed discrepancies between his testimony 
and his statements to police and two mental health professionals.  
 
The  jury found Hill guilty as charged. 
Penalty Phase Evidence 
 
7
 
Numerous relatives testified regarding Hill’s character.  One 
aunt described him as “kind,” “sweet,” and “gentle.”  Another aunt 
said he was a “loving, caring” person who was always helpful.  
Others described him as a “good person,” a “very nice person,” “very 
outgoing,” and one who “treats people very well.”  His grandparents 
and other relatives described the difficult environment in which Hill 
was raised and expressed their love and understanding for him.  His 
juvenile case worker described him as “likable” and “respectable,” 
although easily “intimidated.”  
 
According to the record, Hill was born on June 7, 1971, and his 
mother suffered from serious depression and chronic emotional 
problems.  Hill grew up in an extremely poor and drug-infested 
neighborhood, with a lot of “negative influences” and “temptations.”  
His family was very poor.  Hill’s father, an ex-convict, had only a 
distant relationship with him and contributed little to his support or 
upbringing.  Hill left school after the eighth grade.  
 
In his opening statement, trial counsel conceded Hill had a 
juvenile record for arson, burglary, resisting arrest, and tampering 
 
8
with a coin machine.  Family members also disclosed that Hill had 
become involved with drugs and gangs as a youngster, and had  
“sold drugs to have things *** to survive” and to support himself.  
 
Dr. Nancy Schmidtgoessling found Hill to be of average 
intelligence with the capacity to develop job skills and educate 
himself.  However, Hill had always struggled academically.  At 
fourteen, Hill started using drugs and alcohol.  At sixteen, Hill had 
“problems with serious depression, and wrote suicide notes.”  At 
seventeen, a psychiatric evaluation found that he suffered from 
“major depression with psychotic features” and he reportedly 
experienced 
auditory 
hallucinations. 
 
But, 
in 
June 
1991, 
Schmidtgoessling found that Hill was rational and intelligent, had no 
mental disease or defect, and was not suffering from major 
depression.  
 
In an unsworn statement, Hill said, “I feel hurt.  Growing up was 
hard.  A lot of things wasn’t right for me,” and he “struggled to 
survive.”  He was “sorry that you all have to be here,” “sorry that the 
baby [was] gone,” and “sorry for the family.”  He neither admitted nor 
 
9
denied killing Domika.  After hearing the evidence, the jury 
recommended the death penalty.   
 
After the jury recommended death, Hill appeared before the 
judge for sentencing.  At that hearing, Hill told the court that he was 
“sorry you have to judge me.  ***  [I] just hope and pray that you can 
spare my life.”  His probation officer asserted that Hill told him that he 
“did not brutally nor intentionally kill that baby.  He told me it was an 
accident.”  After explaining its reasons, the trial court then imposed 
the death penalty.  
 
Upon appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the convictions and 
sentence of death.  The case is now before us on an appeal as of 
right. 
 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Christian J. Schaefer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
H. Fred Hoefle and Chuck R. Stidham, for appellant. 
 
Moyer, C.J.  Appellant has raised twenty-six propositions of 
law.  We have reviewed each and, for the reasons stated, we find 
that none justifies reversal of appellant’s convictions for the crimes of 
 
10
aggravated murder, aggravated burglary, and kidnapping.  We have 
also independently reviewed the record, weighed the aggravating 
circumstances against the mitigating factors, and examined the 
appropriateness and proportionality of the death sentence in this 
case.  Upon review of the record, we affirm appellant’s convictions 
and death sentence. 
I 
Prosecutorial Misconduct-Penalty Phase 
 
In his first and second propositions of law Hill contends that, at 
the close of the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecutor engaged in 
misconduct in the presentation of his closing argument.  Hill claims 
that the prosecutor improperly attempted to focus the jury's attention 
upon nonstatutory aggravating circumstances in the form of evidence 
of the nature and circumstances of the crime, e.g., that the crime was 
brutal, and that the victim was defenseless.    Hill complains of the 
prosecutor’s comment on the victim’s age, status, helplessness and 
injuries,  as well as the fact that Domika was kidnapped while her 
mother slept. 
 
11
 
Hill's argument that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by 
arguing nature-and-circumstances evidence is foreclosed by the 
syllabus in State v. Gumm (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 653 N.E.2d 253, 
where we held, as a matter of statutory interpretation of R.C. 
2929.03(D), that a prosecutor at the penalty stage of a capital trial may 
introduce and comment upon, inter alia, evidence that is relevant to 
the aggravating circumstances specified in the indictment of which the 
defendant was found guilty, and evidence rebutting the existence of 
any statutorily defined or other mitigating factors first asserted by the 
defendant.  While Hill acknowledges Gumm's holding, he suggests 
that our interpretation of R.C. Chapter 2929 in Gumm invalidates 
Ohio's entire death penalty statutory framework as unconstitutional.  
He infers that this court is constitutionally required to impose severe 
restrictions upon the scope of a prosecutor's argument to the jury in 
the penalty phase of a capital trial, and that to do otherwise allows the 
imposition of an unreliable death sentence.  
 
We reject Hill's arguments, which, in large part, are repetitious of 
those made in Gumm.  As we there recognized, the United States 
 
12
Supreme Court has consistently relied upon the premise that both the 
criminal and his crime are properly considered in determining the 
propriety of imposing a death sentence.  Similarly, while recognizing 
that a sentence of death may not be made under sentencing 
procedures that create a substantial risk of being inflicted in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner, that court nevertheless has approved 
of the presentation of   a "wide scope of evidence and argument *** at 
presentence hearings."   Gregg v. Georgia (1976),  428 U.S. 153, 203-
204, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2939, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 891-892.  See, e.g., 
California v. Ramos (1983), 463 U.S. 992, 1008, 1035 S.Ct. 3446, 
3457, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171, 1185; Gumm at syllabus.  The court has 
expressly refused to "fashion general evidentiary rules, under the 
guise of interpreting the Eighth Amendment, which would govern the 
admissibility of evidence at capital sentencing proceedings."  Romano 
v. Oklahoma (1994), 512 U.S. ____, 114 S. Ct. 2004, 2011, 129 L. Ed. 
2d 1, 12-13. 
 
In the penalty phase of a capital trial, an Ohio jury is statutorily 
required to "consider" all of the evidentiary factors identified in the first 
 
13
paragraph of R.C. 2929.03(D)(1).  Our syllabus in Gumm  reflected 
that statutory provision. The second paragraph of R.C. 2929.03(D)(1) 
provides, however, that the jury's ultimate recommendation as 
between a life or death sentence is dependent upon the jury's 
balancing of whether the “aggravating circumstances the defendant 
was found guilty of committing” (i.e., the R.C. 2929.04 specifications 
identified in the indictment) "are sufficient to outweigh the factors in 
mitigation of the imposition of the sentence of death."  In Gumm, we  
recognized it to be improper for a prosecutor to argue to a jury that 
individual facts surrounding an aggravated murder “are the 
aggravating circumstances” in a death penalty case.  Such statements 
are improper, however, not because they seek to focus the jury’s 
attention on the facts surrounding the crime, but rather because they 
misstate Ohio law.  Nature-and-circumstances facts are not 
“aggravating circumstances” as the term is used in R.C. 2929.03 and 
2929.04, or as that term is properly incorporated into jury instructions 
given to guide a jury in coming to its ultimate recommendation.   At the 
same time, however, pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(D) as interpreted in 
 
14
Gumm, a prosecutor may incorporate proven facts surrounding a 
murder into the state’s closing argument even when those proven 
facts could increase rather than decrease the likelihood that a 
sentence of death will ultimately be recommended.  Cf.  Romano v. 
Oklahoma, 512 U.S.  at _____,  114 S.Ct. at 2009-2010,  129 L.Ed.2d 
at 10-11. 
 
Our holding in Gumm is necessary in order to harmonize the 
various subsections of R.C. 2929.03(D).  Acceptance of Hill’s 
argument would effectively eliminate the first paragraph of R.C. 
2929.03(D)(1), as well as the first phrase of R.C. 2929.03(D)(2), both 
of which require a jury to "consider" a wide range of evidence during 
the penalty phase of the trial, as well as counsel’s arguments.   
 
We will not interpret Ohio’s capital sentencing statute to require 
a jury to make its recommendation between life and death in a factual 
vacuum.  Nor will we accept  an interpretation of Ohio’s statutes which 
runs the risk of resulting in the same kind of unbalanced presentation 
found unnecessarily unfair to the state in Payne v. Tennessee (1991), 
501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, where "‘a parade of 
 
15
witnesses may praise the background, character and good deeds of 
Defendant *** without limitation as to relevance, but nothing may be 
said that bears upon the character of, or the harm imposed, upon the 
victims.’"  Id., 501 U.S. at 826, 111 S.Ct. at 2609, 115 L.Ed.2d at 736.  
We will not sanction a procedure by which counsel for a criminal 
defendant is provided full opportunity to vigorously argue the full range 
of mitigating evidence procured on behalf of his or her client, while his 
adversary, the prosecutor, is precluded from vigorously arguing the 
entire scope of facts surrounding the act of murder of which the 
defendant has been convicted.  We instead affirm the view of Justice 
Cardozo, as did the majority of the United States Supreme Court in 
Payne, that "‘[j]ustice, though due to the accused, is due to the 
accuser also.’" Id. at 827, 111 S.Ct. at 2609, 115 L.Ed.2d at 736, citing 
Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934), 291 U.S. 97, 122, 54 S.Ct. 330, 338, 
78 L.Ed. 674, 687.  In short, a capital defendant in Ohio is not 
statutorily or constitutionally entitled to protection during the 
sentencing process from the facts he himself created in committing his 
crime. 
 
16
 
Our conclusions are reinforced by the recognition that there is no 
constitutional requirement that aggravating circumstances be “weighed 
against” mitigating factors, nor does the Constitution require that the 
sentencing process "be transformed into a rigid and mechanical 
parsing of statutory aggravating factors."  Barclay v. Florida (1983), 
463 U.S. 939, 950, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 3425, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134, 1144.  
Similarly, “[i]f the State chooses to permit the admission of victim 
impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the 
Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar."  Payne, at 827, 111 S.Ct. at 
2609, 115 L.Ed.2d at 736.  The Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution does require, however,  that a defendant be found 
guilty of at least one valid, limiting, statutory aggravating circumstance, 
and that the defendant be provided full opportunity to present evidence 
in mitigation. Zant v. Stephens (1983), 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 
77 L.Ed.2d 235.  Our interpretation of Ohio's death penalty statutes 
preserves these constitutional requisites, and guards against arbitrary 
imposition of a death sentence by limiting the class of death-eligible 
murderers to those who are found guilty of at least one of the 
 
17
statutorily-defined aggravating circumstances enumerated in R.C. 
2929.04(A). 
 
Hill concedes that defense counsel made no objection 
whatsoever to any portion of the prosecutor's argument.  Because Hill 
failed to object at trial, his challenges to the prosecutor's argument 
must be analyzed according to plain-error standards, and his death 
sentence should be reversed only if error is found and that error is 
deemed to have denied him a fair trial.  State v. Wade (1978), 53 Ohio 
St.2d 182, 7 O.O.3d 362, 373 N.E.2d 1244; State v. Campbell (1994), 
69 Ohio St.3d 38, 41, 630 N.E.2d 339, 345.  The United States 
Constitution does not require us to hold that the traditional 
prosecutorial role of vigorously presenting and arguing admissible 
evidence must or should be restrained in a capital case beyond the 
limits constitutionally required in other criminal cases. A death 
sentence need not be reversed on constitutional grounds even when 
prosecutorial 
comment 
is 
"‘undesirable 
or 
even 
universally 
condemned,’" unless the prosecutor's comments "‘so infected the trial 
with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 
 
18
process.’"  Darden v. Wainwright (1986), 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 
2464, 2471, 91 L.Ed.2d 144, 157.  
 
While the prosecutor did improperly characterize the facts 
surrounding 
the 
crime 
as 
“the 
aggravating 
circumstances,”  
misstatements of that nature do not mandate reversal of Hill’s 
sentence, where, as here, the trial court correctly instructed the jury 
as to the precise aggravating circumstances, thereby negating any 
confusion arising from the prosecutor’s imprecision.  See Gumm at 
422, 653 N.E.2d at 263.   See, also, Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 
at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2012, 129 L.Ed.2d at 13-14. 
 
The prosecutor commented on Hill’s prior criminal record 
(including delinquency adjudications for burglary, arson, breaking into 
a coin box, resisting arrest), his history as a drug dealer, and his 
mental condition.  Hill, however, offered extensive character 
evidence, and Hill’s own witnesses and opening statement during the 
sentencing proceeding discussed the topics he now complains about.  
The prosecutor could fairly comment on facts properly in evidence 
and argue the relative value of mitigation offered.  State v. Greer 
 
19
(1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 236, 253, 530 N.E.2d 382, 402; State v. Clark 
(1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 252, 254-255, 527 N.E.2d 844, 848-849.  
Thus, the prosecutor properly argued the relative mitigating weight 
that should be given to accused’s age.  See  Gumm, at syllabus. 
 
Hill also complains the prosecutor asked the jury to perform “a 
necessary function to maintain the civilized order in society” and 
commented that “the ultimate punishment must be inflicted to 
maintain a civilized law and order[ed] society.”  Yet this brief 
comment, responding to a defense argument referring to the Bible, in 
the context of Hill’s entire trial, did not rise to the level of a denial of 
due process.  See State v. Murphy (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 554, 571, 
605 N.E.2d 884, 899; State v. Beuke (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 29, 33, 
526 N.E.2d 274, 280. 
 
Error arising from the prosecutor’s excessive comment on the 
unsworn nature of Hill’s statement and the fact that Hill could not be 
cross-examined, if any, was harmless.  See State v. Lorraine, 66 
Ohio St.3d at 419, 613 N.E.2d at 218; State v. DePew (1988), 38 
Ohio St.3d 275, 284; 528 N.E.2d 542, 553.  Hill’s second proposition 
 
20
of law asserting error in the overruling of a motion in limine to limit 
the prosecution’s argument lacks merit since the denial of a motion in 
limine does not preserve a claimed error for review in the absence of 
a contemporaneous objection at trial.  State v. Brown (1988), 38 Ohio 
St.3d 305, 528 N.E.2d 523, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
 
In proposition twelve, Hill argues the prosecutor improperly 
cross-examined a defense psychologist as to whether Hill suffered 
from a mental disease or defect or understood right from wrong.  
However, Hill introduced evidence as to his past mental problems 
and his psychological and mental condition in an effort to prove a 
mitigating “other factor.”  See R.C. 2929.04(B)(7).  The prosecutor’s 
cross-examination helped define the parameters of the defense 
claims, and was not improper.  See Evid.R. 611(B); State v. Evans 
(1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 231, 244, 586 N.E.2d 1042, 1054. 
II 
Prosecutorial Misconduct-Guilt Phase 
 
In his third proposition of law, Hill argues the prosecutor’s guilt-
phase argument was improper.  In final argument, the prosecutor 
 
21
“tossed” a shirt on defense counsel’s table, and the shirt “slid on the 
slick surface and came to rest on the table in front of” Hill and “may 
have” contacted Hill’s hands.  Hill responded, “Don’t throw that at 
me,” and Hill’s counsel objected.  The trial court did not observe any 
“contact” between Hill and the shirt.   
 
“[T]he touchstone of due-process analysis in cases of alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability 
of the prosecutor.”  Smith v. Phillips (1982), 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 
S.Ct. 940, 947, 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 87; see State v. DePew, 38 Ohio 
St.3d at 284, 528 N.E.2d at 553.  The prosecutor may well have 
improperly handled the exhibit by tossing it on the defense table.  
Yet, assuming arguendo that the toss of the shirt was improper, we 
find no prejudice to Hill in light of the overwhelming evidence of his 
guilt.  Compare State v. Webb (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 325, 328, 638 
N.E.2d 1023, 1028; State v. Landrum (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 
110, 559 N.E.2d 710, 717. 
 
Hill also complains the prosecutor suggested that Hill lacked 
remorse, that he lied in testimony, and that his counsel tried to 
 
22
confuse the jury.  However, Hill failed to object to these remarks and 
thus waived all but plain error.  State v. Slagle (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 
597, 604, 605 N.E.2d 916, 924-925; Crim.R. 52(B). 
 
We find neither plain nor prejudicial error.  Counsel could 
legitimately point out that Hill did not react when scenes of his dead 
child were shown.  An accused’s face and body are physical 
evidence, and a prosecutor can comment on them.  State v. Lawson 
(1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 336, 347, 595 N.E.2d 902, 911; State v. 
Brown, 38 Ohio St.3d 305, 317, 528 N.E.2d 523, 538.  The 
prosecutor also referred to defense counsel making “an effort really 
to defend the client, but also to confuse the jury, which I think goes 
hand in hand[.]”   The comment, read in full context, represented an 
inartful attempt to convince the jury that defense counsel’s 
interpretation of the evidence should be rejected.  We do not believe 
the comment deprived Hill of a fair trial. 
 
The prosecutor improperly interjected his personal opinion that 
Hill lied.  State v. Apanovitch (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 19, 24, 514 
N.E.2d 394, 400.  Yet, the prosecutor did not suggest that the jury 
 
23
should doubt Hill’s credibility based simply on the fact that the 
prosecutor believed him to be a liar, but rather referred to evidence of 
Hill’s inconsistent statements, which suggested falsity.  Moreover, Hill 
can scarcely complain since his counsel repeatedly used variations 
of personal belief, “I think” or “I believe,” in the preceding argument.  
See, e.g., State v. Rogers (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 427, 28 OBR 480, 
504 N.E.2d 52, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
 
Isolated comments by a prosecutor are not to be taken out of 
context and given their most damaging meaning.  Donnelly v. 
DeChristoforo (1974), 416 U.S. 637, 647, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 
431.  A closing argument must be viewed in its entirety to determine 
prejudice.  State v. Byrd (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 79, 82, 512 N.E.2d 
611.  Viewed in its entirety, the prosecutor’s mistakes in argument 
neither materially prejudiced Hill nor denied him a fair trial.  See State 
v. Loza (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 61, 78, 641 N.E.2d 1082, 1102. 
 
In proposition eighteen, Hill argues the prosecutor improperly 
showed a photo of Domika’s body to witness Teresa Dudley, and 
asked her to identify it.  Teresa reacted emotionally, started sobbing, 
 
24
and left the stand.  Hill’s counsel moved for a mistrial and asserted 
she was still “screaming and yelling” in the hall six to ten minutes 
later.  However, Teresa resumed testifying without further incident or 
reference to the photograph. 
 
The impact of emotional outbursts at trial by witnesses or 
spectators cannot be judged by an appellate court on a cold record.  
“Was the jury disturbed, alarmed, shocked or deeply moved? *** 
These questions necessarily depend upon facts which no record can 
reflect.”  State v. Bradley (1965), 3 Ohio St.2d 38, 40, 32 O.O.2d 21, 
22, 209 N.E.2d 215, 216.  Normally, only the trial judge can make the 
necessary factual determinations on these questions. “[H]is findings 
thereon will not be disturbed on review in the absence of evidence on 
the face of the record clearly and affirmatively showing that the jury 
was improperly affected ***.”  Bradley at 41, 32 O.O.2d at 22, 209 
N.E.2d at 217.  Accord State v. Morales (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 252, 
255, 513 N.E.2d 267, 271. 
 
The prosecutor did not err by placing Teresa on the stand, nor 
by showing her the child’s photo.  She was an essential witness 
 
25
relating relevant, crucial testimony.  She testified about Hill’s refusal 
to support Domika and his breaking their window, with a brick, 
causing her mother to banish Hill.  Teresa identified the shirt 
wrapped around Domika’s body as identical to one Hill owned.  
Teresa placed three barrettes in Domika’s hair that night; she later 
found one on the floor in Hill’s garage.  Showing her the photo of 
Domika’s body was a natural part of her testimony.  Domika was 
taken from her presence.  Only Teresa could readily confirm Hill’s 
identity as the father or testify that he lacked her permission to enter 
the apartment or take Domika.  
 
In fact, Hill cross-examined Teresa extensively and elicited 
favorable testimony.  Teresa confirmed she had no custody order 
and that Hill treated children kindly and had once taken Domika with 
permission.  Teresa also agreed she permitted Hill to visit her, and 
that she and Hill were involved in an ongoing sexual relationship.  
 
Nothing suggests that the prosecutor called Teresa to evoke 
sympathy or an emotional outburst.  Compare State v. Tyler (1990), 
50 Ohio St.3d 24, 35, 553 N.E.2d 576, 591; State v. Williams (1988), 
 
26
38 Ohio St.3d 346, 354, 528 N.E.2d 910, 919.  The trial court 
instructed the jury not to be influenced by sympathy or prejudice.  
Under all the circumstances, no “clear, affirmative evidence” exists 
that Teresa’s earlier outburst deprived Hill of a fair trial.  State v. 
Morales, 32 Ohio St.3d at 255, 513 N.E.2d at 271.  Thus, we reject 
proposition eighteen. 
III 
Sufficiency of Evidence  
 
In propositions of law thirteen through sixteen, Hill argues the 
evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions.  In a review for 
sufficiency following a conviction, we must consider the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the prosecution.  Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 
443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560; State v. Jenks (1991), 
61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus.  
Moreover, the evaluation of the weight of the evidence and credibility 
of witnesses are jury issues.  State v. Waddy (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 
424, 430, 588 N.E.2d 819, 825; State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio 
St.2d 230, 39 O.O.2d 366, 227 N.E.2d 212.  We find the evidence 
 
27
adequately proved Hill’s guilt of aggravated murder, kidnapping, and 
aggravated burglary. 
 
The evidence supported the jury’s finding that Hill was 
Domika’s killer.  Two witnesses identified Hill as entering Teresa’s 
yard within fifteen minutes of Domika’s disappearance.  They did not 
see him leave.  Hill admitted he was there, and his thumbprint on the 
unlit hall light bulb confirmed this.  Domika’s body was found in a 
vacant lot behind his garage.  Hill’s shirt and trash bags from his 
apartment were wrapped around her body.  She had been stuffed in 
a carton, which had been earlier discarded near Hill’s garage.  Her 
barrette was found on Hill’s garage floor.  Finally, a disinterested bus 
driver reported that,  on the day Domika was found dead,  Hill said 
that he would “get the chair” for what he did to a baby.  
 
Hill argues that no proof exists that he purposefully killed 
Domika.  However, Domika died as a result of multiple blunt force or 
blunt impacts to her head.  Her three skull fractures could not have 
been caused by a simple fall.  Violent shaking, in addition to blunt 
trauma, may have contributed to her death, but the coroner 
 
28
concluded Domika died as a result of homicide, not accident.  Hill 
had vowed never to pay child support and to “kill that little bitch” first.  
In view of Domika’s injuries and Hill’s declared intentions, the jury 
could reasonably find that Hill purposefully killed Domika. 
 
In proposition of law fourteen, Hill argues that as Domika’s 
natural father, he has equal rights to her custody under Ohio law and 
cannot be convicted of kidnapping her.  Admittedly, R.C. 3109.03 
specifies that when a husband and wife are divorced or living 
separate and apart, “they shall stand upon an equality as to the 
parental rights and responsibilities ***.”  Pasqualone v. Pasqualone 
(1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 96, 100, 17 O.O.3d 58, 61, 406 N.E.2d 1121, 
1124, recognized that “[i]n the absence of an agreement or binding 
court order, parents have equal rights to custody ***.”  Accord In re 
Corey (1945), 145 Ohio St. 413, 31 O.O. 35, 61 N.E.2d 892.  
However, R.C. 3109.03 deals with a husband and wife, not the rights 
of a putative father who has neither acknowledged paternity nor 
supported the child.  See, also, R.C. 3109.12; 3111.03. 
 
29
 
Moreover, R.C. 2905.01(A),  in defining the crime of 
kidnapping, specifies that, “No person *** [if under thirteen, by any 
means] shall remove another from the place where he is found or 
restrain him of his liberty, for any of the following purposes: *** (3) To 
terrorize, or to inflict serious physical harm on the victim *** .”  No 
exception is made for either a father or mother.  Other deprivation-of-
liberty crimes, with different elements, specifically exclude parents by 
use of the term, “without privilege to do so.”  See R.C. 2905.02; 
2905.03; 2905.05.  See, also, R.C. 2905.04(C).  We find that the 
absence of any reference to privilege in R.C. 2905.01 evinces a clear 
legislative intent to forbid kidnapping by any person regardless of 
parental rights. 
 
Hill took Domika from her mother’s presence, without waking 
the mother, and therefore clearly did not kill her at the scene.  
Approximately thirty minutes later, Hill reappeared without Domika.  
The jury could find that the injuries inflicted closely followed the 
kidnapping in time, but they were distinct and separate offenses.  
State v. Simko (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 483, 488, 644 N.E.2d 345, 351; 
 
30
see State v. Morales, 32 Ohio St.3d at 255-256, 513 N.E.2d at 272.  
The jury could also reasonably find Hill intended to inflict serious 
harm at the time he took Domika.  Thus, the evidence supports the 
jury’s verdict of guilt of the crime of kidnapping.  
 
Hill further argues he had permission to enter the Dudley 
residence at any time; hence, he could not be guilty of burglary.  At 
trial, Teresa acknowledged that Hill was allowed to visit the hallway.  
He also regularly visited her apartment and spent the night there.  
 
However, Teresa denied Hill had permission “that night” to visit 
her apartment.  Also, Hill admitted to police and testified that he had 
broken a Dudley apartment window some three months before.  As a 
result, Teresa’s mother refused to allow Hill to come back, and 
Teresa confirmed this.  In sum, the jury could reasonably find Hill 
lacked consent for entry.  Moreover, his unauthorized taking of 
Domika would have revoked any prior consent.  See State v. Bonnell 
(1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 179, 183, 573 N.E.2d 1082, 1086; State v. 
Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 115, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 
383, 388-389. 
 
31
 
Hill further argues that the jury’s consideration of two unproved 
capital specifications skewed the weighing process.  However, the 
evidence proved Hill’s guilt, as the principal offender, of both the 
kidnapping and aggravated burglary death-penalty specifications.  
Thus we reject propositions of law thirteen through sixteen. 
IV 
Admission of accused’s statements / Search results 
 
In proposition seventeen, Hill argues the trial court erred in 
admitting rebuttal prosecution evidence as to pretrial statements he 
made during court-ordered interviews about his mental condition.  In 
his testimony, Hill denied previously saying he had been at a family 
picnic all day.  In rebuttal, a psychiatrist and a mental health 
interviewer testified that Hill told them that he had spent all day May 
31 at a family picnic.  Hill argues these statements were inadmissible 
because these mental health professionals did not advise him of his 
Miranda rights and his counsel was not present.  
 
However, the prosecutor could properly impeach Hill with 
evidence of these prior inconsistent statements.  Evid.R. 613(B).  
 
32
Under Harris v. New York (1971), 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 
L.Ed.2d 1, the state can use an accused’s voluntary, but un-
Mirandized statement, to impeach trial testimony.  “The shield 
provided by Miranda [v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 
16 L.Ed.2d 694] cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by 
way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior 
inconsistent utterances.”  Harris, 401 U.S. at 226, 91 S.Ct. at 646, 28 
L.Ed.2d at 5.  Accord State v. Maupin (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 473, 
480-481, 71 O.O.2d 485, 330 N.E.2d 708, 714.  Michigan v. Harvey 
(1990), 494 U.S. 344, 110 S.Ct. 1176, 108 L.Ed.2d 293, reaffirming 
Harris, held that an accused’s voluntary statement could be used to 
impeach even when the statement was taken in violation of the right 
to have counsel present. 
 
Here, Hill voluntarily talked to trained listeners and had an 
opportunity on the stand to explain his statements.  Harris and 
Harvey permit such rebuttal evidence.  Estelle v. Smith (1981), 451 
U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359, concerns direct, not 
rebuttal, use of evidence and is not on point.  Also, while Hill objected 
 
33
to being cross-examined as to his prior statements, he did not object 
to the rebuttal testimony and waived the issue.  
 
In proposition of law twenty-two, Hill argues his pretrial 
statements to police were inadmissible.  In his June 1 and June 4 
statements, Hill denied responsibility and described his activities on 
May 31 and June 1.  As Hill points out, these statements were 
inconsistent with each other and with his trial testimony.  At a 
suppression hearing, Hill testified police never advised him of his 
rights and that he signed Miranda forms without reading them.  
Police officers testified that they informed Hill of his rights, that he 
read and signed the Miranda forms, and that he talked freely and 
willingly.  
 
“[T]he weight of the evidence and credibility of witnesses are 
primarily for the trier of the facts.  ***  This principle is applicable to 
suppression hearings as well as trials.”  State v. Fanning (1982), 1 
Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 1 OBR 57, 58, 437 N.E.2d 583, 584.  The trial 
court chose not to believe Hill and rejected his motion to suppress.  
The police testimony supports admissibility, and we find no basis to 
 
34
reverse the trial court.  State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 
582 N.E.2d 972, 982; State v. Smith (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 284, 287-
288, 574 N.E.2d 510, 514-515. 
 
In proposition twenty-three, Hill challenges the admission of 
evidence, principally the trash bags, seized from his residence on 
June 2.  Hill testified that police never explained the search-consent 
form which he and his uncle signed but did not read.  But police 
officer Robert Steinher testified that he thoroughly explained the 
consent form, and Hill and his uncle both signed it.  
 
The trial court resolved the conflicting testimony and rejected 
Hill’s motion to suppress.  The totality of the circumstances supports 
the voluntariness of Hill’s consent.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte 
(1973), 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854; State v. 
Barnes (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 203, 208-209, 25 OBR 266, 271, 495 
N.E.2d 922, 926.  We reject propositions seventeen, twenty-two and 
twenty-three as lacking merit. 
V 
Verdict Form/Correction of the Record 
 
35
 
In his fourth and fifth propositions, Hill argues his rights were 
infringed because the jury’s sentencing verdict originally showed a 
November 19, 1991, file stamped date although the trial’s penalty 
phase did not begin until November 20 and ended November 22, 
1991.  
 
On December 28, 1993, the trial court held hearings on this 
issue.  A contemporaneous clerical note on the indictment shows the 
jury sentencing verdict was rendered on November 22, as does the 
trial transcript.  The prosecutor also testified that the jury did not 
reach any verdict before the hearing and only one death penalty 
verdict form existed.  That form, given to the jury on November 22, at 
the end of the penalty hearing, was blank and unsigned by jurors.  
After arguments and evidence, the trial court corrected the record to 
change the journal entry date on the jury’s verdict form to November 
22.  
 
In this case, Hill continues to argue an issue he lost in his prior 
attempt to stop the trial court from correcting this record.  In State ex 
rel. Hill v. Niehaus (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 507, 508, 628 N.E.2d 1376, 
 
36
1377, we held “[t]he trial court has authority to resolve disputes and 
correct factual errors in a trial record, including disputes over when a 
verdict form was filed ***.”  Accord App.R. 9(E); Crim.R. 36.  
Evidence at the hearing supports the trial court’s ruling, and we find 
no basis to reverse that ruling or our decision in State ex rel. Hill v. 
Niehaus, supra.  We reject Hill’s fourth and fifth propositions. 
 
We note another oversight relating to verdict forms in this case.  
In referring to the life verdict form, the trial court read it as, “We, the 
jury, in the issue joined, find the mitigating factors outweigh the 
aggravating circumstances *** and recommend *** [life without parole 
consideration for thirty or twenty full years] [emphasis added].”  
However, Hill waived the issue by not objecting at trial or at the court 
of appeals. 
 
We find no plain error.  The verdict form the jury signed and the 
court’s instructions stated the correct standard that aggravating 
circumstances must outweigh mitigating factors beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  State v. [Jeffrey] Hill (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 433, 437-438, 653 
N.E.2d 271, 277.  Nonetheless, we urge trial judges and counsel to 
 
37
use the utmost caution and precision in referring to the absolute 
requirement that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating 
factors beyond a reasonable doubt before the death sentence can be 
imposed.  R.C. 2929.03. 
VI 
Defects in prior sentencing opinions 
 
In his sixth through eighth propositions of law, Hill attacks the 
sentencing opinions issued by the trial court and court of appeals.  
We reject any claims of reversible error. 
 
As Hill points out, the trial court erred in not filing its sentencing 
opinion until April 1, 1993, although it imposed the death penalty on 
December 6, 1991.  R.C. 2929.03(F) requires sentencing opinions to 
be filed within fifteen days of the imposition of a death sentence.  
However, Hill was not prejudiced.  At the time he imposed the death 
sentence, the trial judge explained his reasons.  Hill’s appeal was not 
delayed, and Hill had full opportunity to argue to the court of appeals 
(as well as this court) any asserted deficiency in the written opinion.  
See State v. Martin (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 122, 132, 19 OBR 330, 
 
38
339, 483 N.E.2d 1157, 1166-1167; see State v. Scott (1986), 26 Ohio 
St.3d 92, 105, 26 OBR 79, 90, 497 N.E.2d 55, 66. 
 
Hill also argues the trial court failed to articulate reasons why 
the aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating factors.  
However, the trial judge did evaluate the mitigating factors presented 
at the time he sentenced Hill.  Moreover, our “independent review of 
a sentence will cure any flaws in the trial court’s opinion.”  State v. 
Fox (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 183, 191, 631 N.E.2d 124, 131; State v. 
Lewis (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 200, 204, 616 N.E.2d 921, 925; and 
State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 170, 555 N.E.2d 293, 304, all 
held that a trial court’s failure to explain why aggravating 
circumstances outweighed mitigating factors may be corrected by our 
independent sentence assessment. 
 
We reject Hill’s claim that the trial court erred in evaluating 
mitigating evidence.  “In fact, the assessment and weight to be given 
mitigating evidence are matters for the trial court’s determination.”  
State v. Lott at 171, 555 N.E.2d at 305; State v. Fox at 193, 631 
 
39
N.E.2d at 132.  Even if there were errors, our independent 
reassessment will cure them.  Lott, supra. 
 
Hill further argues for rejection of the death sentence because 
the trial court found that Hill was innocent and “mercy should be 
granted.”  Admittedly, the trial court wrote imprecisely, “The Court 
finds that the mitigating circumstances were that the defendant was 
young and innocent and that mercy should be granted in imposing 
sentence.”  
 
However, Hill’s claim that the trial judge thought Hill innocent of 
the crimes and specifications set forth in the indictment is inaccurate. 
Earlier in the opinion, the trial court specifically found that “[t]he 
defendant was guilty of purposely taking the life of a child *** .”  
Further, “[t]he Court finds that as a principal offender the defendant 
kidnapped a young child and purposely killed the child during the 
course of the kidnapping and aggravated burglary.” 
 
The court’s contemporaneous sentencing remarks also refute 
any claim the judge thought Hill innocent:  “You irresponsibly created 
a life, brought into this world a child unwanted, unloved, and uncared 
 
40
for by you *** [.]  Then, to avoid responsibility for this action, you took 
that life coldly and calculatingly, simply to avoid your responsibilities.”  
Again, any deficiency in the trial court’s opinion is cured by our 
independent sentence reassessment.  Lott, supra. 
 
Hill also attacks the opinion of the court of appeals because it 
fails, in Hill’s view, to state why the aggravating circumstances 
outweigh mitigating factors.  However, we find the court of appeals 
carefully evaluated the aggravating circumstances and Hill’s 
mitigating evidence in its independent sentence assessment.  Within 
that assessment, the court of appeals explained why it found the 
aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating factors.  
 
Moreover, only R.C. 2929.03(F), applicable to trial courts, 
imposes a requirement for explaining “the reasons why the 
aggravating circumstances *** outweigh the mitigating factors.”  No 
such requirement exists in R.C. 2929.05, which governs appellate 
sentencing 
decisions. 
 
Finally, 
our 
independent 
sentence 
assessment can cure any deficiency in the court of appeals’ opinion.  
 
41
State v. Simko, 71 Ohio St.3d at 493, 644 N.E.2d at 354; State v. 
Green (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 141, 150, 609 N.E.2d 1253, 1261. 
VII 
Ineffective Assistance 
 
In his ninth proposition, Hill claims his counsel was ineffective 
during his trial.  However, reversal of a conviction or sentence on 
ineffective assistance requires that the defendant show, first, that 
“counsel’s performance was deficient” and, second, that “the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense *** so as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial.”  Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 
668, 687, 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; State v. 
Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373. 
 
Hill fails to establish his counsel’s performance fell “below an 
objective standard of reasonable representation.”  State v. Bradley, 
at paragraph two of the syllabus.  Counsel need not raise meritless 
issues such as those in several propositions  Counsel’s decision not 
to object to the prosecutor’s guilt or sentencing arguments 
represented a reasonable tactical choice, as did not objecting to the 
 
42
form of questions.  The prosecutor did not improperly lead witnesses.  
Nor was the scope of redirect beyond that of the cross-examination.  
Also, objections “‘tend to disrupt the flow of a trial’” and “‘are 
considered technical and bothersome’” by a jury.  State v. Campbell,  
69 Ohio St.3d at 53, 630 N.E.2d at 352.  In sum, Hill has not rebutted 
the applicable “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within 
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”  Strickland, 
supra, at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694. 
 
Nor has Hill demonstrated prejudice -- “a reasonable probability 
that, were it not for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have 
been different.”  State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 
373, at paragraph three of the syllabus.  The evidence of guilt was 
compelling; hence, his complaints about issues like question format 
are inconsequential. 
VIII 
Cumulative error/Trial judge intervention 
 
In his tenth proposition, Hill argues the cumulative effect of 
errors, especially prosecutorial misconduct, and his lack of effective 
 
43
counsel denied him a fair trial and just result.  But his claims of error 
lack merit. 
 
“[T]here can be no such thing as an error-free, perfect trial, and 
*** the Constitution does not guarantee such a trial.”  United States v. 
Hasting (1983), 461 U.S. 499, 508-509, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1980, 76 
L.Ed.2d 96, 106.  Hill received a fair trial, few errors were found, and 
any error found did not prejudice his substantial rights.  Such errors 
cannot become prejudicial by sheer weight of numbers.  State v. 
Davis (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 326, 348, 581 N.E.2d 1362, 1380. 
 
In his eleventh proposition, Hill generally complains about the 
plain-error rule and argues that trial judges should intervene more 
often to protect an accused from an ineffective counsel.  However, 
we have recently reaffirmed the plain-error rule.  State v. Campbell, 
69 Ohio St.3d at 40-41, 630 N.E.2d at 344-345.  Additionally, trial 
courts cannot interfere with counsel’s trial tactics or representation of 
their clients.  A trial court’s authority to declare a mistrial sua sponte 
is limited.  See State v. Glover (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 18, 517 N.E.2d 
900.  Thus, we reject both Hill’s tenth and eleventh propositions. 
 
44
IX 
Settled Issues 
 
Hill’s remaining propositions of law raise settled issues of law.  
Prospective juror Marianne Lewis was properly excused for cause, 
and the trial court used the correct constitutional standard to death-
qualify the jury.  See Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 105 
S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841; State v. Tyler, 50 Ohio St.3d at 30, 553 
N.E.2d at 586; State v. Rogers (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 174, 17 OBR 
414, 478 N.E.2d 984, paragraph three of the syllabus.  Hill failed to 
object at trial and preserve for review any issue relating to the jury 
verdict as a recommendation. (e.g. 1776)  State v. Underwood 
(1983), 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332, syllabus; 
Crim.R. 30(A).  In fact, no error occurred. State v. Woodard (1993), 
68 Ohio St.3d 70, 76-77, 623 N.E.2d 75, 80; State v. Grant (1993), 
67 Ohio St.3d 465, 472, 620 N.E.2d 50, 61. Hill is entitled to only six 
not twelve peremptory challenges.  State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 
365, 582 N.E.2d 972, 981; State v. Greer, at paragraph two of the 
syllabus.  Our system of proportionality review does not infringe the 
 
45
Constitution.  State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 176-177, 
15 OBR 311, 322, 473 N.E.2d 264, 279; State v. Sowell (1988), 39 
Ohio St.3d 322, 335, 530 N.E.2d 1294, 1308.  Finally, we reject Hill’s 
constitutional attack on Ohio’s death penalty statue.  State v. Mills, 
62 Ohio St.3d at 371, 582 N.E.2d at 985; State v. Sowell at 336, 530 
N.E.2d at 1309. 
X 
INDEPENDENT SENTENCE ASSESSMENT 
 
In his twenty-fourth proposition, Hill argues the prosecution 
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating 
circumstances outweighed relevant mitigating factors; hence, he 
argues the death penalty is inappropriate.  Our independent 
sentence reassessment resolves that issue. 
 
After independent assessment, we find the evidence clearly 
proves the aggravating circumstances for which Hill was convicted, 
i.e., murder during a kidnapping and aggravated burglary.  As to 
possible mitigating factors, we find nothing in the nature and 
circumstances of the offense to be mitigating.  Hill secretly kidnapped 
 
46
his daughter from her mother, while both slept.  Then he brutally 
killed her, denied knowing where she was while neighbors searched, 
and later disposed of her body as though it were trash. 
 
Hill’s history and background provide mitigating features.  
Admittedly, Hill had a difficult life growing up in an urban slum.  His 
mother was depressed and poor, and he lacked a strong, supportive 
father.  Relatives also described him as sweet, kind and gentle, and 
several family members clearly loved and cared for him.  Yet, even 
his relatives, in effect, conceded that Hill never outgrew nor 
overcame the difficult challenges present in his youth.  No evidence 
exists of a favorable work record; instead, Hill appears to have 
chosen to use and sell drugs to support himself.  Although of average 
intelligence, he quit school after the eighth grade.  He fathered a 
daughter, but evaded suggestions he support the child.  In sum, we 
accord his history and background only modest weight.  We find 
nothing in his character to be mitigating. 
 
As to the statutory mitigating factors, R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) 
through (6), only (B)(4), his youth, is applicable.  Hill was born on 
 
47
June 7, 1971, and thus was fully nineteen on May 31, 1991, the date 
of the offense.  Yet, at trial, the possibility was raised that he was 
born on June 7, 1972, making him not quite nineteen on May 31, 
1991.  However, even if only eighteen, Hill, with average intelligence, 
had been out of school for years, had been involved in gangs, and 
had fathered a child.  Thus, he was mature enough to be fully 
accountable for his acts.  Cf. State v. Lorraine, 66 Ohio St.3d at 429, 
613 N.E.2d at 224; State v. Slagle, 65 Ohio St.3d at 613, 605 N.E.2d 
at 931. 
 
As to “other factors” as contemplated by R.C. 2929.04(B)(7), 
none appear to possess significant weight.   Hill’s vague expressions 
of remorse are not determinative.  Rehabilitation does not appear 
likely. Cf. State v. Fox, 69 Ohio St.3d 183, 194-195, 631 N.E.2d 124, 
133.  Dr. Schmidtgoessling’s testimony fails to establish any 
significant mental state entitled to mitigating weight. Admittedly, Hill 
underwent a psychiatric evaluation a few years previously and was 
then thought to suffer from mental problems.  However, no evidence 
established that he suffered from any mental problems at the time of 
 
48
the offense.  Similarly, in view of the evidence, we accord no weight 
to residual doubt. 
 
We find that the aggravating circumstances outweigh Hill’s 
youth and the modest mitigating features of his history and 
background.  Thus, we find the death penalty is appropriate.  His 
victim was young, innocent, and helpless.  As her father, he had a 
responsibility to nurture and protect her.  Instead, by stealth and 
burglary, he kidnapped her from her mother, purposefully murdered 
her, and then callously disposed of her body.  Although Hill came 
from a deprived background, he has demonstrated neither the desire 
nor effort to rise above the unfortunate circumstances of his birth 
despite family members who loved and assisted him. 
 
Imposing the death penalty in this case is appropriate and not 
excessive nor disproportionate when compared with the penalty in 
similar felony-murder cases of kidnapping.  State v. Joseph (1995), 
73 Ohio St.3d 450, 653 N.E.2d 285; State v. Simko, supra; State v. 
Scudder (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 263, 643 N.E.2d 524; State v. Fox, 
supra; State v. Jells (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 22, 559 N.E.2d 464; State 
 
49
v. Brewer (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 50, 549 N.E.2d 491; and State v. 
Morales, supra.  The death penalty is also proportionate and not 
excessive when compared with felony-murder cases involving 
burglary.  State v. Campbell, supra; State v. Franklin (1991), 62 Ohio 
St.3d 118, 580 N.E.2d 1; State v. Bonnell, supra; and State v. 
Landrum, supra. 
 
Accordingly, we affirm the convictions and death penalty. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., CONCUR. 
 
DOUGLAS and WRIGHT, JJ., concur in judgment only.