Case Title: Schutter v. Soong

Citation: 873 P.2d 66

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 1994-05-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
873 P.2d 66 (1994) 76 Hawai'i 187 David C. SCHUTTER, Attorney at Law, Applicant-Petitioner, v. The Honorable Melvin SOONG, Judge of the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawai`i, Respondent. No. 17282. Supreme Court of Hawaii. May 2, 1994. *68 Brook Hart of Hart & Wolff, Honolulu, for applicant-petitioner. Steven Michaels, Deputy Atty. Gen., Honolulu, for respondent. Before MOON, C.J., and KLEIN, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA and RAMIL, JJ. RAMIL, Justice. Attorney David C. Schutter (Schutter) petitions this court for a special proceeding to review his two convictions for contempt of court and for writs of mandamus and prohibition. Schutter contends that the convictions for contempt of court and sentences should be vacated because: (1) First Circuit Court Judge Melvin Soong (Judge Soong) failed to disqualify himself; (2) the actions for which he was cited with contempt did not constitute contempt; (3) Judge Soong failed to make an on-the-record determination of whether Schutter understood the contempt charges; (4) Judge Soong erred when he denied Schutter the right to pre-sentence allocution; and (5) the contempt of court sentences were unreasonably severe. We agree only insofar as Judge Soong denied Schutter his right to pre-sentence allocution. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence against Schutter and remand for resentencing. The contempt convictions in question arose during the civil medical malpractice jury trial of Aga v. Hundahl, Civil No. 91-2292.[1] During the course of the trial, Judge Soong cited Schutter, plaintiffs' counsel, twice for criminal contempt of court. The record indicates that throughout the Aga trial, Schutter directed numerous "attacks" at Judge Soong. For example, on May 19, 1993, Schutter accused the court of having ruled on the basis of anger and prejudice and stated that the court was "leaning over backwards to try to help them [defendant and defense counsel] to violate every rule in this courtroom." Later that same day, Schutter moved to strike an answer that he felt was a "speech." The court denied the motion explaining that both parties had made "speeches," and that the parties should "move forward." Schutter responded by stating in the presence of the jury that, "steamrollers move forward, your Honor, trials are supposed to decide questions." The court, thereafter, called both counsel to the bench. During the bench conference, Schutter accused the court of "going out of [its] way to prejudice [plaintiffs] in front of the jury." The court put Schutter on notice that any comments he may have with respect to the court should be made at the bench. Schutter responded, "I just beg and pray that some day we get a fair trial in this case and I hate to have to have my client go through the expense of appeal and remand. Why not give it to us now?" Schutter, however, continued to challenge the court, in the jury's hearing, on whatever perceived injustice he inferred from the court's rulings. Another example occurred later that same day during Schutter's cross-examination of a defense witness. Defense Counsel Dennis O'Connor (O'Connor) objected to Schutter's question regarding an answer in the witness' prior deposition. O'Connor stated that the question as asked by *69 Schutter did not include the entire answer given in the deposition. Schutter was asked by the court to read the answer. Schutter responded, "My God. Am I going to be subjected to this harassment throughout without any help." At this point, the court took a recess and asked to meet with both counsel in chambers. The following discussion ensued: The court felt it necessary to again place Schutter on notice that he control his temper. Schutter responded by putting the court on "notice" that he would continue to respond in the "appropriate manner" if the court continued to slant the record to favor the defendant. Schutter also accused the court and O'Connor of participating in a "two man congame" during bench conferences with O'Connor "telling" the court how to rule. He concluded with "Jesus Christ, judge. Let's have a fair trial. Stop trying your damnedest to influence the jury against me." Despite being put on notice a second time, Schutter continued to challenge the court's authority. Thus, on the following day, May 20, 1993, the court issued a third warning to Schutter. Before issuing the warning the court excused the jury and took a short recess; the following then ensued: Later, when Schutter became upset because defendant's expert witness was allowed to explain his answers, he stated in a bench conference: Schutter's first contempt charge arose later that day when Schutter asked defendant's expert witness a question. O'Connor objected on the basis that the question had previously been answered in detail. After several arguments by both counsel, the court asked, "What are you asking him, Mr. Schutter?" The following then occurred: The first contempt charge, however, did not stop Schutter from continuing to challenge the court's authority. The court charged Schutter with a second count of contempt the following day. The charge arose after Schutter objected to O'Connor's question on redirect as being beyond the scope of the cross-examination. Both Judge Soong and O'Connor stated that they could not recall if it was beyond the scope. The following then occurred: Thereafter, the court excused the jury and took a short recess. When the court reconvened the following proceedings were had in open court: This second contempt charge did not deter Schutter from continuing to attack the court. Schutter continued to accuse the court of attempting to make a fool out of him. Schutter also challenged the court by stating, "You want to play games, Your Honor, I can play games too." This behavior even continued while counsel discussed the jury instructions with the court. When the court accepted a jury instruction over Schutter's objection, Schutter stated: The court, however, did not cite Schutter with any additional counts of criminal contempt. At the conclusion of the trial, on May 28, 1993, the court attempted to proceed with the two contempt charges against Schutter. Schutter, however, requested a continuance. Schutter also informed the court that by seeking a continuance he was not attempting to waive any arguments, and thereafter, informed the court that he intended to file an affidavit of bias and prejudice to disqualify the court from handling the contempt proceedings. The court then informed Schutter that it intended to hear the matter pursuant to Evans v. Takao, 74 Haw. 267, 842 P.2d 255 (1992). The court then granted the continuance. After the court granted the continuance, Schutter again asked that the court withhold its ruling until he had an opportunity to obtain counsel and until the court heard his motion to disqualify. The court scheduled the proceedings to take place in two weeks, as requested by Schutter. Later, on June 4, 1993, the court, at the request of Schutter, continued the matter to June 18, 1993. Schutter's office was notified by telephone and reminded to file the motion for disqualification before the hearing date. Schutter, however, did not file a motion to disqualify the court until after the court held a hearing on the contempt charges. At the June 18, 1993 hearing, Schutter was represented by James Duffy (Duffy). The proceedings began with Judge Soong reading the basis for the first charges against Schutter. The court then stated, "Mr. Duffy, do you understand the charges the Court has brought against Mr. Schutter; and do you wish to be heard on the merits of this matter?" Duffy responded, "No, we don't. We feel that what's yelling to one person, perhaps, is not yelling to someone else. But we do not choose to contest either of the two charges, Your Honor." The court, then held Schutter guilty of Direct Summary Criminal Contempt of the Court. The court then read the charge for the second count. The court stated that Schutter had shouted his implication that the court was working with defense counsel. When Duffy was asked whether he understood the charge, he responded that he understood the charge, but that the transcript did not reflect any shouting. The court agreed and limited the charge to the implication that the court was favoring the defense. Duffy again stated that the charge was not contested. Accordingly, the court held Schutter guilty of Direct Summary Criminal Contempt of the Court. Before sentencing began, Duffy requested that he be heard on the sentencing. The court responded that it would allow Duffy to speak after sentencing. Thereafter, the court sentenced Schutter to four days of incarceration for the first count and eight days for the second count. Duffy was then allowed to speak. In his statement, Duffy attempted to explain that Schutter's behavior was due to his attempt to help the Aga family. Duffy also asked that the court reconsider its sentence. Schutter was then allowed to speak. The following ensued:[3] After Schutter had his opportunity to address the court, Duffy again requested that the court consider suspending a substantial portion of the jail time. Judge Soong stated that he would take the matter under advisement and stayed the mittimus. On June 24, 1993, the court entered its findings and judgment on the charges. The next day, on June 25, 1993, the court denied Schutter's oral motion for reconsideration of the sentence. On July 14, 1993, the day mittimus was to be issued, Judge Soong held hearings on Schutter's motions: (1) to disqualify him and vacate the contempt convictions and sentences; (2) to withdraw the no contest pleas; (3) for re-sentencing because of a denial of Schutter's right to pre-sentence allocution; (4) for bail pending appellate review; and (5) for a stay of mittimus. Schutter was represented by attorney Brook Hart (Hart). Hart *83 asked the court to consider the fact that Schutter and Duffy believed a plea agreement was reached informally between Judge Soong and Duffy.[4] Hart argued that because Schutter believed an agreement was in place, and the court did not allow Schutter to make a statement prior to sentencing, "caused Mr. Schutter to lose his composure to the point where instead of a full and complete apology, he also used the occasion to reflect on his negative feelings about the matter." The court denied the motions to disqualify it, to withdraw the no contest pleas, and for re-sentencing. Judge Soong did, however, grant a zero bail amount, and mittimus was stayed until further notice. In his petition, Schutter alleges several errors below. Initially, we address Schutter's argument that Judge Soong should have disqualified himself. The State counters that Schutter waived his right to seek a disqualification of Judge Soong, in that Schutter did not file a motion to disqualify until July 14, 1993. According to the plain language of the statute, Schutter's affidavit should have been filed before the contempt proceedings. However, because Judge Soong ruled on the motion to disqualify himself, Schutter's failure to file a timely motion will not be deemed a waiver of his right to seek a disqualification, and we may review the decision of the lower court. Cf. State v. Przeradski, 5 Haw.App. 29, 31-32, 677 P.2d 471, 474-475 (1984) (if an appellant fails to move to suppress evidence before trial, but the judge rules on the motion to suppress during trial, the appellant has not waived his right to object and an appellate court may review the lower court decision). Schutter contends that his convictions and sentences should be vacated because Judge Soong failed to disqualify himself from presiding over the contempt proceedings. The State counters that Judge Soong was not required to disqualify himself. Both parties rely on Evans v. Takao, 74 Haw. 267, 842 P.2d 255 (1992). In Evans, Judge Takao found petitioner Christopher Evans (Evans) in contempt of court during trial. However, at the request of Evans, Judge Takao withdrew the sentence and postponed further hearings until the conclusion of trial. Id. at 274-275, 842 P.2d at 259. At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Takao held a hearing on the contempt charge. After Judge Takao read the charges against Evans, his counsel replied that "we understand the charge." Id. at 275-276, 842 P.2d at 259-260. At the request of Evans, Takao granted another continuance. Evans, thereafter, moved for writs of prohibition and mandamus in this court, prohibiting Judge Takao from pursuing a criminal contempt of court charge *84 against Evans, or in the alternative, to transfer the proceedings to another judge. Id. at 278, 842 P.2d at 261. Evans argued, inter alia, that the contempt proceedings should not be conducted before Judge Takao. Id. at 287, 842 P.2d at 264. We held that where the contempt is "committed in the immediate view and presence of the court[] or under such circumstances that the court has knowledge of all facts constituting the offense[,]" the determination of whether the contempt proceedings may be had before the accuser depends on the nature of the alleged misconduct and the character of the judge's response to the misconduct. Id. at 290-91, 842 P.2d at 265-66, (citing State v. Brown, 70 Haw. 459, 467, 776 P.2d 1182, 1188 (1989); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 503 n. 10, 94 S. Ct. 2697, 2705-06 n. 10, 41 L. Ed. 2d 897 (1974)). We further stated that: Id. at 291-292, 842 P.2d at 266 (citations omitted). Based on the above, we concluded that the record did not reflect a "personal sting" upon Judge Takao such that Judge Takao lost his capacity to perform his duties without bias or prejudice. Moreover, the record was devoid of any evidence of animosity by Judge Takao against Evans. Specifically, Judge Takao provided Evans with reasonable notice of the charges against him, as well as an opportunity to be heard. Judge Takao also withdrew his judgment and sentence, twice granted Evans' requests for a continuance and "responded to Evans' allegedly contemptuous conduct dispassionately and with a decorum befitting a judicial proceeding." Id. at 293, 842 P.2d at 267. Thus, we held that due process did not require that the proceedings be held before someone other than Judge Takao. Id. The instant case, however, is distinguishable from Evans. As stated supra, Evans sought a hearing before a judge other than Judge Takao, but he had not filed a HRS § 601-7(b) affidavit as was done by Schutter. Where an affidavit is timely filed pursuant to HRS § 601-7(b), we must accept the facts alleged in the affidavit as true, and our only function is to determine whether the facts sufficiently establish a personal bias and prejudice. State v. Mata, 71 Haw. 319, 325, 789 P.2d 1122, 1126 (1990). However, while the essential documentation of Schutter's motion to disqualify was his affidavit, we may consider the entire record when the affidavit to disqualify is based upon matters of record. Peters v. Jamieson, 48 Haw. 247, 257, 397 P.2d 575, 582 (1964). Moreover, Id. (citations omitted). Thus, because the motion to disqualify is based on matters of record, we review the entire record and the affidavit to determine whether Schutter has established facts which show a "personal" bias against him. Furthermore, in order to establish a "personal" bias, Schutter must be able to show "marked personal feelings ... on both sides inflicting lingering personal *85 stings" on Judge Soong. We conclude that Schutter has not met this burden. Throughout the Aga trial, Schutter continually challenged the court and accused Judge Soong of being biased. However, the record reflects that Judge Soong did not react in anger, warned Schutter several times that his behavior was improper, and only cited Schutter with contempt when the misconduct was in the jury's presence. Judge Soong also gave Schutter reasonable notice of the charges and allowed Schutter to respond to each of the charges. Moreover, Judge Soong twice granted Schutter's request for a continuance, allowing Schutter to obtain counsel. Judge Soong also released Schutter on his own recognizance and did not require Schutter to post bail. Finally, Judge Soong stayed the mittimus in order for Schutter to resolve a matter he was trying before the federal courts and to petition this court for special proceedings. Thus, we conclude that at all times, Judge Soong conducted himself with the utmost judicial decorum and impartiality, despite Schutter's continuous attacks on the court. We therefore hold that Judge Soong did not err when he denied Schutter's disqualification motion. Schutter was charged with direct summary criminal contempt, a situation that arises when the alleged offense is committed in the immediate view and presence of the court or under circumstances where the court has knowledge of all of the facts constituting the alleged offense. Evans, 74 Haw. at 279, 842 P.2d at 265 (citations omitted). The court issued the charges pursuant to HRS § 710-1077 (1985 & Supp.1992), which provides in part: Thus, according to the statute: Evans, 74 Haw. at 282-83, 842 P.2d at 262. In cases like the present case, where conviction and sentencing is postponed until the conclusion of the trial, "the alleged contemnor `should have reasonable notice of the specific charges and an opportunity to be heard in his own behalf.'" Id. at 283, 842 *86 P.2d at 263 (citations omitted). The only procedural issues, then, are whether Schutter received adequate and particularized notice of the charges against him and was given the opportunity to be heard in his own behalf. When Judge Soong initially cited Schutter for contempt, he both described the conduct that he believed was contemptuous, and cited the statute under which Schutter was being charged. Thereafter, at the contempt hearing, Judge Soong once again detailed the specific charges and the statute. Pursuant to Evans, this is sufficient to establish reasonable and adequate notice. Schutter, however, makes two arguments that he was not given adequate notice. His first argument is that Judge Soong failed to make an on-the-record determination, by personally questioning Schutter, as to whether Schutter understood the charges. This argument is without merit. During the Aga trial, after reciting very specific charges, Judge Soong inquired as to whether Schutter understood the charges. Schutter responded that he did not. We, however, find that Schutter's response was argumentative and not an indication that he did not understand the charges. At the contempt hearings, Judge Soong made a second inquiry by asking Duffy whether or not he understood the charges. While Duffy did not specifically state that he understood the charges, he did state that they (he and Schutter) did not choose to contest either of the charges. As stated previously by the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), when a defendant is heard through counsel, he has been afforded a fair opportunity to be heard prior to sentencing. State v. Medeiros, 8 Haw.App. 39, 47, 791 P.2d 730, 735, cert. denied, 71 Haw. 669, 833 P.2d 901 (1990) (whether the defendant must be questioned personally before sentencing, and whether he must speak personally, or whether his counsel may speak for him, depends on whether the statute concerned specifically requires that the defendant answer personally). Thus, because Judge Soong was very specific when citing Schutter, and asked Duffy whether Schutter understood the charges, Schutter has not established a lack of adequate notice. Schutter's next argument pertains to his second citation for contempt. Schutter claims he was not afforded reasonable notice of the charges because at the contempt proceedings Judge Soong stated that Schutter was "yelling" when Schutter implied that Judge Soong was working with O'Connor. This argument is also without merit because the record shows that when Duffy pointed out that the record did not reflect any "yelling," Judge Soong limited the charge to the implication that the court was favoring the defense. Accordingly, Schutter was afforded reasonable and adequate notice of the charges. Although the opportunity to be heard was not an issue in Evans, in a footnote we cited the United States Supreme Court and stated that an opportunity to be heard does not mean: Evans, 74 Haw. at 283 n. 4, 842 P.2d at 263 n. 4 (citing Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 499, 94 S. Ct. 2697, 2703, 41 L. Ed. 2d 897 (1974)). The footnote further noted that the United States Supreme Court has also acknowledged the recommendation of the American Bar Association Advisory Committee that "`[b]efore imposing any punishment for criminal contempt, the judge should give the offender notice of the charges and at least a summary opportunity to adduce evidence or argument relevant to guilt or punishment.'" Id. (citing Taylor, 418 U.S. at 499 n. 8, 94 S. Ct. at 2703-04 n. 8). In the instant case, Schutter was afforded an opportunity to be heard immediately following *87 his citations during trial. He was not, however, allowed to speak prior to sentencing.[5] Clearly, had Judge Soong immediately sentenced Schutter following Schutter's allocution during trial, the conviction and sentences would be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion. However, in the instant case, Judge Soong postponed conviction and sentencing until the conclusion of trial. Thus, pursuant to Evans and Taylor, Schutter had the right to pre-sentence allocution at the proceedings held after trial. The State contends that Schutter was not denied the opportunity to be heard because Schutter was heard immediately following the citations and later, following a preliminary announcement of sentencing. Specifically, the State argues that the sentence was not actually imposed at the contempt hearings because the court took the motion for a reduction in the sentence under advisement. Although not cited by the State, there is case law that supports the State's argument. In State v. Medeiros, 8 Haw.App. 39, 791 P.2d 730, cert. denied, 71 Haw. 669, 833 P.2d 901 (1990), the defendant appealed her conviction for theft in the fourth degree, a petty misdemeanor. After a bench trial, the trial court found her guilty on November 30, 1988 and immediately sentenced her to five days in jail. The court, however, stayed the mittimus pending the disposition of a co-defendant's case and the receipt of a pre-sentence report which the court ordered. Id. at 42, 791 P.2d at 733. Later, on February 22, 1989, the court "again considered" the defendant's sentence, along with a motion for reconsideration of the sentence. Id. at 46, 791 P.2d at 735. On appeal, the defendant argued, inter alia, that she was not afforded an opportunity to be heard prior to her sentencing hearing on November 30, 1988, or at the hearing to reconsider on February 22, 1989. Id. at 47, 791 P.2d at 735. The ICA stated that: Id. at 48, 791 P.2d at 736. We, however, find Medeiros to be in error. Once a defendant is denied the opportunity to be heard, this denial of due process cannot be corrected later at a motion for reconsideration. We, therefore, overrule Medeiros insofar as it holds that the denial of the right to pre-sentence allocution may be cured later at a hearing to reconsider the sentence. Accordingly, we hold that Schutter was denied his right to pre-sentence allocution, and therefore, this matter should be remanded for re-sentencing before a new sentencing judge.[6] Finally, Schutter contends that he was merely zealously representing his client. While every counsel has the right to pursue *88 every claim, if a ruling is unfavorable, "it is not counsel's right to resist it or to insult the judge his right is only respectfully to preserve his point for appeal." Evans, 74 Haw. at 291 n. 9, 842 P.2d at 266 n. 9, (citing In re Nam, 65 Haw. 119, 127, 648 P.2d 1101, 1106 (1982)). Clearly, Schutter went beyond his right of zealous representation when he yelled at the court and implied that the court was "working with" defense counsel. Schutter, nevertheless, attempts to argue that his conduct was not contemptuous, and that he is "absolutely innocent as the driven snow." We disagree. Schutter's behavior was reprehensible. We cannot fathom any situation that would warrant counsel yelling at the court or blatantly stating, in the presence of the jury, that the court is working with opposing counsel. These are simply contemptuous acts that we find to be inexcusable. This court in In re Nam, 65 Haw. at 128, 648 P.2d at 1107, took the opportunity to call Disciplinary Rule 7-106(C)(6) to the attention of the bar: In re Nam, 65 Haw. at 128, 648 P.2d at 1107. Once again, we refuse to "equate an attorney's contempt for the court with courage or his insults with independence and we will protect the orderly processes of justice." Id. at 128, 648 P.2d at 1107. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence imposed against Schutter and remand for resentencing before a new sentencing judge. [1] Arguments regarding the merits of Aga are presented to us in a separate appeal, No. 17330. [2] Although not an order of the court, the court had previously asked Schutter to stop referring to O'Connor as "Senator" O'Connor (O'Connor is a former State Senator). [3] In all fairness to the parties, and to ensure that the statement is not taken out of context, Schutter's statement is quoted in its entirety. [4] Hart argued that Duffy and Schutter understood that Schutter was to make a "full and complete and appropriate apology" and the court would sentence Schutter to twelve days of incarceration, but would suspend ten days. Duffy's understanding was later confirmed by his affidavit filed in this court. Judge Soong responded, during the hearing, that "there was no agreement with respect to time. There was talk in the neighborhood of two to four days, depending upon Mr. Schutter's extent of apology." [5] There is some evidence in the record that an agreement was reached between Judge Soong and Duffy regarding the sentencing. The substance of the agreement seems to indicate that if Schutter gave an appropriate apology, Judge Soong would sentence Schutter to twelve days, but would suspend eight to ten days depending on the extent of the apology. With respect to the agreement, there appears to have been a misunderstanding between the parties. It appears that Judge Soong understood that he would sentence Schutter and then hear the extent of Schutter's apology, while Schutter understood that he would apologize prior to the sentencing. However, because we conclude that Schutter should have been given the opportunity to be heard prior to sentencing, we need not discuss this issue. [6] It should be noted that we are remanding the re-sentencing to a new sentencing judge because remanding the matter to Judge Soong would be an inadequate remedy, as Judge Soong has previously determined the appropriate length of the sentence. This, however, is not an indication that Judge Soong in any way conducted himself in an inappropriate manner. As we stated supra, we find that Judge Soong conducted himself with the utmost judicial decorum and impartiality.