Case Title: Walden Behavioral Care v. K.I.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11704

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-04-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11704 
 
 
WALDEN BEHAVIORAL CARE  vs.  K.I. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     December 2, 2014. - April 9, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
 
Mental Health.  Practice, Civil, Commitment of mentally ill 
person, Waiver.  Psychotherapist.  Witness, Psychiatric 
examination, Privilege.  Evidence, Privileged 
communication.  Privileged Communication.  Waiver. 
 
 
 
 
Petition for civil commitment filed in the Waltham Division 
of the District Court Department on August 13, 2012.  
 
 
The case was heard by Gregory C. Flynn, J.  
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Stan Goldman for the respondent. 
 
Diane M. Geraghty Hall for the petitioner. 
 
Jennifer Honig, Phillip Kassel, Robert Fleischner, & Stan 
Eichner, for Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee & others, 
amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  Walden Behavioral Care, a facility for the 
treatment of mentally ill patients, brought a petition in the 
 
 
2 
District Court pursuant to G. L. c. 123, §§ 7, 8, seeking to 
commit K.I. involuntarily and retain him in its facility.  K.I. 
filed a motion in limine to exclude from the commitment hearing 
testimony concerning statements he had made to his treating 
psychiatrist at Walden Behavioral Care.  K.I. claimed that his 
statements were protected by the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege as defined in G. L. c. 233, § 20B, and that the 
psychiatrist was precluded from testifying to those statements 
or to his opinion of K.I.'s mental or emotional condition based 
on those statements.  
A District Court judge denied K.I.'s motion, concluding 
that the psychotherapist-patient privilege was overcome by an 
exception to the privilege set forth in G. L. c. 233, § 20B (a).   
At the commitment hearing, the psychiatrist was permitted to 
testify to statements made to him by K.I., and to his opinion 
that K.I. was suicidal.  Based on this testimony, K.I. was 
committed to Walden Behavioral Care for six months.  K.I. 
appealed the commitment order to the Appellate Division of the 
District Court; in a divided opinion, the court affirmed the 
commitment.  K.I. appealed, and we transferred the case from the 
Appeals Court on our own motion.   
We conclude that the exception to the psychotherapist-
patient privilege established in G. L. c. 233, § 20B (a), 
applies in the circumstances presented.  Notwithstanding the 
 
 
3 
absence of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the privilege, 
there was no error in permitting the psychiatrist to testify at 
the involuntary commitment hearing concerning K.I.'s statements.1 
Background.  In August, 2012, a physician petitioned for 
K.I.'s emergency admission to Walden Behavioral Care pursuant to 
G. L. c. 123, ' 12 (a).2  In a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 123, 
§ 12 (a), a physician wrote that K.I. was experiencing auditory 
hallucinations and attempting to kill himself by running into 
traffic.  Within two hours of his arrival, K.I. was examined by 
a physician who authorized K.I.'s commitment to the facility for 
three days "for care and treatment" pursuant to G. L. c. 123, 
§ 12 (b).  See Reida v. Cape Cod Hosp., 36 Mass. App. Ct. 553, 
555-556 (1994).  During this three-day period, Dr. David 
Brendel, a psychiatrist, provided diagnosis of and treatment to 
K.I.  In his capacity as superintendent of Walden Behavioral 
Care, Brendel thereafter filed a petition for K.I.'s continuing 
                     
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the Mental Health Legal 
Advisors Committee, the Center for Public Representation, and 
the Disability Law Center on behalf of the respondent. 
 
2 General Laws c. 123, § 12 (a), authorizes "any" licensed 
physician to apply for a person's admission to a "facility 
authorized" to provide mental health treatment, whom the 
physician has reason to believe would pose "a likelihood of 
serious harm by reason of mental illness" if not hospitalized.  
See Reida v. Cape Cod Hosp., 36 Mass. App. Ct. 553, 556 (1994).  
Any "qualified psychologist, qualified psychiatric nurse mental 
health clinical specialist, or licensed independent clinical 
social worker" also may do so.  G. L. c. 123, § 12 (a).  
 
 
4 
commitment under G. L. c. 123, §§ 7, 8.3  At no time was K.I. 
warned that, in certain circumstances, his statements to his 
treating psychiatrist might be admissible in future legal 
proceedings.    
K.I. filed a motion in limine to exclude Brendel's 
testimony regarding K.I.'s statements.  K.I. maintained that his 
statements were protected by the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege, and that the sole potentially applicable exception to 
the privilege was set forth in G. L. c. 233, § 20B (b), 
concerning statements made to a psychiatrist in the course of 
court-ordered examinations.  K.I. argued that the statements 
therefore were tantamount to statements made in the course of a 
court-ordered examination, and, because he had not been informed 
that his communications to Brendel would not be privileged, as 
required by G. L. c. 233, § 20B (b), this exception was 
unavailable and his privileged statements should not have been 
admitted.  A District Court judge denied K.I.'s motion, 
concluding that the psychotherapist-patient privilege was 
overcome by the imminent harm exception to the privilege set 
forth in G. L. c. 233, § 20B (a); the judge determined that the 
                     
3 Pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 12 (d), a person must be 
discharged after three days unless the superintendent of a 
facility applies for a commitment order under G. L. c. 123, 
§§ 7, 8, or the person chooses to remain voluntarily. 
 
 
 
 
5 
exception provided by G. L. c. 233, § 20B (b), was inapplicable.  
Brendel testified at the commitment hearing that K.I. had 
made repeated statements that voices were telling him to kill 
himself by overdosing on Oxycodone, and that he had access to 
Oxycodone in his apartment and intended to overdose when he was 
released.  Based on these statements, Brendel testified to his 
opinion that K.I. was suicidal, and, if released, would pose a 
likelihood of serious harm to himself by reason of his mental 
illness.4  On the basis of this testimony, a District Court judge 
ordered K.I. committed to Walden Behavioral Care for six months. 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  We review questions 
of statutory interpretation de novo.  Sheehan v. Weaver, 467 
Mass. 734, 737 (2014).  "[T]he statutory language itself is the 
principal source of insight into the legislative purpose."  
Hoffman v. Howmedica, Inc., 373 Mass. 32, 37 (1977).  In 
conducting our review, "a statute must be interpreted according 
to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words 
construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, 
considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the 
mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to 
be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may 
be effectuated."  Worcester v. College Hill Properties, LLC, 465 
                     
4 Dr. David Brendel testified also to his diagnosis of K.I. 
as having schizophrenia, paranoid type. 
 
 
6 
Mass. 134, 139 (2013), quoting Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. 
President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 
(2006).  
2.  Psychotherapist-patient privilege.  The 
psychotherapist-patient privilege set forth in G. L. c. 233, 
§ 20B, applies to exclude from court proceedings, and from 
legislative and administrative proceedings, statements made by a 
patient to a psychotherapist relative to the diagnosis or 
treatment of the patient's mental or emotional condition.  
General Laws c. 233, § 20B,5 provides, in relevant part: 
"[I]n any court proceeding and in any proceeding 
preliminary thereto and in legislative and administrative 
proceedings, a patient shall have the privilege of refusing 
to disclose, and of preventing a witness from disclosing, 
any communication, wherever made, between said patient and 
a psychotherapist relative to the diagnosis or treatment of 
the patient=s mental or emotional condition."   
 
The privilege "continue[s] in effect after [a] patient" has been 
hospitalized in a mental health facility.  G. L. c. 233, § 20B.  
The statute enumerates six exceptions where "[t]he privilege 
granted hereunder shall not apply."  Id.  Two of those 
exceptions, G. L. c. 233, § 20B (a), (b), are at issue here. 
                     
5 G. L. c. 233, § 20B, defines "Communications" as 
including: 
 
"[C]onversations, correspondence, actions and 
occurrences relating to diagnosis or treatment, before, 
during, or after institutionalization, regardless of the 
patient's awareness of such conversations, correspondence, 
actions and occurrences, and any records, memoranda or 
notes of the foregoing." 
 
 
7 
 
General Laws c. 233, § 20B (a) (imminent harm exception), 
permits disclosure by a psychotherapist of otherwise privileged 
communications made by a patient in the following circumstances:   
"If . . . in the course of his diagnosis or treatment 
of the patient, [a psychotherapist] determines that the 
patient is in need of treatment in a hospital for mental or 
emotional illness or that there is a threat of imminently 
dangerous activity by the patient against himself or 
another person, and on the basis of such determination 
discloses such communication either for the purpose of 
placing or retaining the patient in such hospital, provided 
however that the provisions of this section shall continue 
in effect after the patient is in said hospital, or placing 
the patient under arrest or under the supervision of law 
enforcement authorities."   
 
General Laws c. 233, § 20B (b) (court-ordered examination 
exception), allows disclosure of otherwise privileged 
communications by a patient to a psychotherapist: 
"If a judge finds that the patient, after having been 
informed that the communications would not be privileged, 
has made communications to a psychotherapist in the course 
of a psychiatric examination ordered by the court, provided 
that such communications shall be admissible only on issues 
involving the patient's mental or emotional condition but 
not as a confession or admission of guilt."  
 
3.  Analysis.  As discussed below, the only exception to 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege that applies in the 
present circumstances is the imminent harm exception, G. L. 
c. 123, § 20B (a).  We decline to extend our holding in 
Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 398 Mass. 516, 524-526 
(1986), to apply the court-ordered examination exception, G. L. 
c. 123, § 20B (b), to examinations, by a diagnosing or treating 
 
 
8 
psychotherapist, of a patient involuntarily committed to a 
mental health facility pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 12 (b).   
a.  Applicability of G. L. c. 123, § 20B (a), the imminent 
harm exception.  "Testimonial privileges 'are exceptions to the 
general duty imposed on all people to testify' and therefore 
'must be strictly construed.'"  Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 438 
Mass. 325, 330 (2002), quoting Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 
390 Mass. 357, 359 (1983), cert. denied sub nom. Keefe v. 
Massachusetts, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984).  See Matter of Roche, 381 
Mass. 624, 634 n. 12 (1980).  
As pertinent to the facts of this case, the plain language 
of G. L. c. 233, § 20B (a), states that the imminent harm 
exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege applies where 
two conditions are met.  First, a psychotherapist has determined 
in the course of diagnosis or treatment that a patient "is in 
need of treatment in a hospital for mental or emotional illness" 
or "there is a threat of imminently dangerous activity by the 
patient against himself or another person"; second, the 
psychotherapist's disclosure of the statement is "for the 
purpose of placing or retaining" the patient in a hospital for 
treatment of such mental illness.  Based on Brendel's testimony, 
K.I.'s statements indicated that he posed a threat of imminently 
dangerous activity against himself.  Brendel, a psychotherapist, 
disclosed the statements in order to place or retain K.I. in 
 
 
9 
Walden Behavioral Care, a facility for the treatment of mentally 
ill patients.   Thus, on its face, the imminent harm exception 
appears to apply in these circumstances.   
Nonetheless, the statutory language does not state 
explicitly that the imminent harm exception applies to 
statements made to a psychotherapist by a patient while the 
patient is involuntarily committed to a mental health facility.  
We consider the language of G. L. c. 233, § 20B (a), together 
with the statutory scheme governing civil commitment 
proceedings, see G. L. c. 123, §§ 7, 8, to ascertain whether the 
Legislature intended the imminent harm exception to be available 
in these circumstances.6  See Commonwealth v. Semegen 72 Mass. 
App. Ct. 478, 480 (2008) ("where possible, we must seek to 
harmonize the provisions of any statute with related provisions 
where they are part of a single statutory scheme").   
Involuntary civil commitment proceedings are commenced to 
prevent the imminent "discharge of [a patient from a facility] 
[when it] would create a likelihood of serious harm."  Acting 
                     
6 General Laws c. 123, § 7 (a), authorizes a superintendent 
of a mental health facility to petition for the commitment and 
"retention of any patient" at that facility upon a determination 
by the superintendent that "the failure to hospitalize would 
create a likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental 
illness."  A court "shall not order the commitment of a person 
at the facility . . . unless it finds after a hearing that (1) 
such person is mentally ill, and (2) the discharge of such 
person from a facility would create a likelihood of serious 
harm."  G. L. c. 123, § 8 (a). 
 
 
10 
Supt. of Bournewood Hosp. v. Baker, 431 Mass. 101, 105 (2000), 
quoting G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 (a), 8 (a), 11.  An element of proof 
in involuntary commitment cases is "the imminency of discharge."  
Acting Supt. of Bournewood Hosp. v. Baker, supra.  In the 
context of involuntary commitment proceedings, a "likelihood of 
serious harm" is defined as including "a substantial risk of 
physical harm to the person himself as manifested by evidence 
of, threats of, or attempts at, suicide or serious bodily harm."  
G. L. c. 123, § 1.  When a patient who has been involuntarily 
committed in a mental health facility communicates to his or her 
psychotherapist that he or she intends to commit suicide upon 
release, the communication manifests precisely that type of a 
"likelihood of serious harm" that falls within the meaning of G. 
L. c. 123, § 7 (a). 
Brendel's testimony during K.I.'s involuntary commitment 
proceeding included statements K.I. had made during Brendel's 
diagnosis of K.I. to determine whether he was suicidal and what, 
if any, course of treatment should be pursued.  Based on these 
communications, Brendel determined that there was a "threat of 
imminent dangerous activity by the patient against himself," and 
disclosed K.I.'s communications "for the purpose of . . . 
retaining [K.I.] in [Walden Behavioral Care]."  See G. L. c. 
233, § 20B (a).  The language supporting the imminent harm 
exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege in G. L. c. 
 
 
11 
233, § 20B (a), tracks that which supports a patient's 
involuntary commitment to or retention in a mental health 
facility.  The statutes therefore may be understood as working 
in concert to provide hospitalization and treatment to a patient 
who is at imminent risk of serious bodily harm.  No language in 
either statute suggests that the Legislature intended to 
preclude a psychotherapist from disclosing a patient's 
statements in these circumstances, unless the psychotherapist 
has first warned the patient that a disclosure might be made.7 
Indeed, the plain language of G. L. c. 233, § 20B (a), 
contemplates that statements might be made by a patient during 
the course of diagnosis and treatment that reveal that the 
patient would be a danger to himself or herself if released from 
a treatment facility, and permits disclosure of such statements 
for the purpose of retaining the patient in the facility for 
treatment.  As we said in Commonwealth v. Lamb, 365 Mass. 265, 
268 (1974) (Lamb), the exception in G. L. c. 233, § 20B (a), 
applies "to a situation in which the patient is not 
                     
7 By contrast, the Legislature clearly expressed its intent 
that a victim's communications to a sexual assault counselor be 
kept "confidential."  See G. L. c. 233, § 20J ("sexual assault 
counselor shall not disclose such confidential communication 
without the prior written consent of the victim"; such 
communications "shall be inadmissible in any criminal or civil 
proceeding without the prior written consent of the victim").  
Likewise, sexual assault counselors are not included within the 
definition of psychotherapists in G. L. c. 233, § 20B, and 
communications made to them are not subject to the exceptions to 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege in that statute.  
 
 
12 
institutionalized or is about to be discharged from an 
institution," and the patient makes disclosures during the 
course of treatment that reflect the patient's need for 
treatment of mental or emotional illness in a hospital setting.8  
This is consistent with the Legislature's intent in enacting G. 
L. c. 233, § 20B (a), which was to "dispense with the privilege 
when there is an imminent threat that a person who should be in 
custody will instead be at large."9  Lamb, supra.  
K.I. argues that, at some point during the course of 
                     
8 K.I. contends that, because a commitment petition under 
G. L. c. 123, § 7, may be filed only to seek retention of a 
patient in a mental health facility, the patient will "already 
[be] in the custody of State officials," and 
"institutionalized," and, therefore, the patient will not be 
"about to be discharged."  Commonwealth v. Lamb, 365 Mass. 265, 
268 (1974) (Lamb).  Patients who are temporarily civilly 
committed must be discharged after the statutory commitment 
period, unless a petition is filed pursuant to G. L. c. 123, 
§ 12 (d).  See note 3, supra.  Civil commitment proceedings 
determine whether an individual will be discharged from an 
institution.  Only then would the "failure to hospitalize . . . 
create a likelihood of serious harm" under G. L. c. 123, 
§ 7 (a).  See Acting Supt. of Bournewood Hosp. v. Baker, 431 
Mass. 101, 105 (2000) ("An element of proof in such cases is the 
imminency of discharge of the patient from the facility"). 
 
9 We determined that the imminent harm exception was 
inapplicable in the circumstances in Lamb, supra at 268, 
because, there, the Commonwealth had filed a petition to commit 
the petitioner indefinitely to the treatment center as a 
sexually dangerous person, G. L. c. 123A, § 6, and a 
psychiatrist had been appointed "to examine [the petitioner] and 
report to the court" in connection with that petition.  Lamb, 
supra at 266.  Notwithstanding his claim that the circumstances 
are similar, K.I.'s situation is not analogous. 
 
 
 
 
13 
diagnosis and treatment of a patient who is temporarily 
committed on an involuntary basis, a psychotherapist's role will 
shift, and his or her examination of the patient will no longer 
be solely to treat, but also to determine whether an involuntary 
commitment petition should be filed.  At that point, K.I. 
contends, the patient's statements would no longer be used 
solely for treatment purposes, and therefore we should read the 
exception in G. L. c. 233, § 20B (a), to permit a 
psychotherapist to disclose communications only if the 
psychotherapist's determination of imminent harm is made 
"solely" or "exclusively" for treatment purposes.  We decline to 
do so, as this would in essence require that we "read into [the] 
statute a provision which the Legislature did not see fit to put 
there, [and to] add words that the Legislature had an option to, 
but chose not to include."  See Massachusetts Insurers 
Insolvency Fund v. Smith, 458 Mass. 561, 567 (2010), citing 
General Elec. Co. v. Department of Envt'l Protection, 429 Mass. 
798, 803 (1999).  
b.  Applicability of G. L. c. 123, § 20B (b), the court-
ordered examination exception.  The policy objective of G. L. 
c. 233, § 20B (b), is "to permit a court to utilize expert 
psychiatric evidence by ordering an examination."  Lamb, supra 
at 269.  "[T]he statute recognizes that such court-initiated 
interviews entail certain risks for the person to be examined."  
 
 
14 
Id.  Requiring a Lamb warning before such an examination, which 
is conducted in anticipation of a future proceeding, strikes the 
Legislature's intended "balance between the need for fairness 
and disclosure to the patient and full information for the 
court."  Id. at 270.   
K.I. argues that Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 
398 Mass. 516, 524-526 (1986), enlarged the scope of the 
exception in G. L. c. 233, § 20B (b), to cover examinations not 
made pursuant to court order, where the patient's communications 
will be used at a future legal proceeding, such as one seeking a 
patient's involuntary commitment pursuant to G. L. c. 123, §§ 7, 
8.  This argument is unavailing.  
In Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, supra at 518, 
the Department of Youth Services sought to extend a juvenile's 
commitment to the department beyond his eighteenth birthday.  To 
that end, it retained a clinician specifically to evaluate the 
juvenile on behalf of the department, and to testify at a 
hearing to extend his commitment.  We concluded that the 
patient-psychotherapist privilege applied where the Commonwealth 
chose to have a psychiatrist interview a juvenile in custody and 
where the psychiatrist did not precede those conversations with 
the Lamb warnings.  Id. at 525.  See Commonwealth v. Callahan, 
440 Mass. 436, 441 (2003).  Our holding that Lamb warnings were 
required in those circumstances was based on the Commonwealth's 
 
 
15 
decision to retain the psychiatrist for the purpose of 
interviewing the juvenile in order to seek an extension of his 
commitment.  We said there that "warnings are required by reason 
of G. L. c. 233, § 20B, . . . and do not depend on whether the 
Commonwealth chooses to interview . . . on its own 
initiative . . . or to seek court permission" (citation 
omitted).  Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, supra at 
526.  We did not consider the applicability of G. L. c. 233, 
§ 20B (a), nor did we conclude that G. L. c. 233, § 20B (b), 
would apply to any examination, whether court ordered or not.   
Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. Seabrooks, 433 Mass. 439, 
450-451 (2001), we defined the limits of our holding in 
Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, supra.  We considered 
the examination of a potentially suicidal defendant and the 
subsequent admission of his statements, as well as the examining 
psychotherapist's opinion thereof, at his criminal trial. 
Commonwealth v. Seabrooks, supra at 446-447.  The defendant in 
that case was charged with murder and had been placed on a 
suicide watch at the jail where he was being held pending trial.  
Id. at 446.  A psychotherapist examined him to determine whether 
the defendant was suicidal and needed to be hospitalized because 
he was "at acute current risk of hurting himself."  Id.  To 
rebut the testimony of defense experts that the defendant 
suffered from an acute stress disorder, the psychotherapist was 
 
 
16 
allowed to testify, over the defendant's objection, that, based 
on the psychotherapist's suicide risk assessments, the defendant 
was not suffering from such a disorder.  Id. at 447.  We held 
that G. L. c. 233, § 20B (b), was not applicable in those 
circumstances because the psychotherapist's "examinations were 
not ordered by the court or sought by the prosecution, and were 
not conducted in anticipation of a future proceeding in which 
the defendant's mental capacity would be at issue."  Id. at 450-
451.10  
As with the circumstances of the examination conducted in 
Commonwealth v. Seabrooks, supra, G. L. c. 233, § 20B (b), does 
not apply here.  K.I.'s examination was not ordered by a court, 
nor sought by the Commonwealth for the purpose of supporting a 
petition seeking K.I.'s involuntary commitment.  As such, K.I.'s 
examination was "not conducted in anticipation of a future 
proceeding in which the [patient's] mental capacity would be at 
issue."  Brendel examined K.I. to determine the "care and 
treatment" K.I. needed.  See G. L. c. 123, § 12 (b).  In these 
                     
10 The psychotherapist "conducted the risk assessments to 
identify whether the defendant was at imminent risk of harming 
himself and to recommend any necessary precautions or 
treatment." Commonwealth v. Seabrooks, 433 Mass. 439, 450 
(2001).  We held that the psychotherapist's testimony properly 
was admitted under G. L. c. 233, § 20B (c), because the 
defendant had "introduced his mental and emotional condition as 
an element of his" defense.  Commonwealth v. Seabrooks, supra at 
448.   
 
 
 
 
17 
circumstances, the exception provided by G. L. c. 233, 
§ 20B (b), is not applicable.  There was no requirement that a 
Lamb warning be given before Brendel examined K.I., and no error 
in the admission of Brendel's testimony about K.I.'s statements 
at the commitment hearing.   
Judgment affirmed.