Case Title: State of Florida v. Gerald Eugene Clarke

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC00-960

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2002-02-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC00-960
____________
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Petitioner,
vs.
GERALD EUGENE CLARKE,
Respondent.
[February 7, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
The State of Florida petitions this Court for writ of mandamus seeking
reinstatement of an appeal.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(8), Fla. Const.
FACTS
The relevant facts in the instant case are as follows:  Clarke was
charged with DUI manslaughter in Pinellas County.  He filed a
demand for speedy trial.  The trial court subsequently sanctioned the
State for a discovery violation by excluding certain State witnesses
-2-
and evidence.  The State filed a timely notice of appeal of the
suppression/sanction order and sought an extension of speedy trial
pending its appeal.  The trial court denied the State’s request.  The
trial court eventually discharged Clarke on the DUI manslaughter
charge based on a speedy trial violation.  
The State appealed the discharge.  Clarke moved to dismiss the
State’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction arguing that the trial court had
refused to extend the time for speedy trial pending appeal and the
time had since run.  The district court granted the motion and
dismissed the appeal.  After the district court denied rehearing, the
State petitioned this Court for mandamus relief arguing that the
district court improperly dismissed the appeal.  
ANALYSIS
When a defendant has made a demand for speedy trial, and has
not been brought to trial within the specified time under the rules, the
defendant “shall be forever discharged from the crime.”  Fla. R.
Crim. P. 3.191(p)(3).  Nevertheless, Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.140(c)(1)(F) expressly states that the State has the right to appeal an order
“discharging a defendant under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191.” 
-3-
Nowhere in rule 9.140 does it provide that the State must obtain an extension of
speedy trial time in order for its right to appeal a rule 3.191 discharge to be
preserved.  Therefore, we conclude the district court erred in dismissing the State’s
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
The confusion in this case apparently arose because of the case State ex rel.
Girard v. McNulty, 348 So. 2d 311, 312 (Fla. 1977), cited by Clarke.  In McNulty,
this Court stated:
If the time under the [speedy trial] Rule was not validly extended, then
it has expired and [the defendant], upon proper motion, and finding of
availability for trial, must be forever discharged from the crime. 
Discharge moots the State’s appeal so that the district court has lost
jurisdiction and should be prohibited from proceeding on it.
348 So. 2d at 312 (citation and footnote omitted).   Clarke argues that under the
above holding in McNulty, the district court lost jurisdiction to hear the State’s
appeal of Clarke’s discharge when the speedy trial time expired and the State had
been unable to obtain an extension.  Having reviewed McNulty, we conclude that
Clarke’s interpretation of that case is incorrect.  
In McNulty, the defendant moved to dismiss an information for failure to
allege grounds necessary to charge a felony.  348 So. 2d at 311.  The circuit court
granted the motion.  Id.  The State appealed and also moved to extend the speedy
trial time, which the trial court granted.  Id.  The defendant filed a motion to dismiss
1   Further, even if Clarke’s interpretation of McNulty were correct, the rule
governing the State's right to appeal in criminal cases has been amended since the
issuance of McNulty to expressly authorize the appeal of a speedy trial discharge.  See
In re Proposed Florida Appellate Rules, 351 So. 2d 981, 983 (Fla. 1977).  The rule
addressing State appeals in effect at the time this Court considered McNulty did not
expressly provide that the State could appeal such a discharge.  See Fla. R. App. P.
6.3 (1977).   It is well established that the right of the State to appeal in criminal cases
-4-
the State’s appeal, claiming that the speedy trial time had not been validly extended
and therefore the appeal was moot.  Id. at 312. The district court denied the motion
and the defendant filed a petition for writ of prohibition with this Court seeking to
prohibit the district court from hearing the appeal.  Id.  This Court eventually held
that the speedy trial time was validly extended.  Id.
In McNulty, the trial court denied a motion to discharge the case for a
speedy trial violation.  Therefore, the appeal of an order discharging a defendant for
a speedy trial violation was never directly at issue in McNulty.  Rather, the only
issue discussed by the McNulty Court was whether a district court could review a
dismissal of a charging information if the case had already been discharged for a
speedy trial violation.  The McNulty Court held that the discharge on a speedy trial
violation would moot the State’s appeal of the dismissal of the charging
information.  Thus, McNulty only addressed the appeal of the dismissal of the
charging information and not the appeal of a discharge (because a discharge never
occurred).1
is based purely in statute.  See State v. Allen, 743 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
(citing Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 685 So. 2d 773 (Fla.
1996)).  Nevertheless, in light of the subsequent amendment to the appellate rules, to
the extent that McNulty construes the rule of appellate procedure governing the State's
right to appeal in criminal cases, we conclude that the applicability of McNulty to
Clarke's discharge is questionable. 
-5-
Applying the above interpretation of McNulty to the facts of the instant case
leads to the following analysis: In the instant case, there were two appeals--the
appeal from the trial court’s suppression/sanction order and the appeal from the
discharge.  Since the State was unable to obtain an extension of the speedy trial
time, under this Court’s holding in McNulty, the district court lost jurisdiction to
consider the State’s appeal of the suppression order when the trial court discharged
Clarke based upon a speedy trial violation.  Nevertheless, the State still has the right
to appeal the discharge, and the district court still has jurisdiction to consider the
discharge pursuant to rule 9.140(c)(1)(F).  Should the district court ultimately
conclude that the trial court’s discharge was in error, the State’s appeal of the trial
court’s suppression/sanction order will no longer be moot and the district court’s
review of that order may proceed. 
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court should not have dismissed
the State's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  Therefore, we grant the petition and
-6-
order that the Second District Court of Appeal reinstate the State’s appeal. 
However, because we trust that the Second District Court of Appeal will fully comply
with the dictates of this order, we withhold issuance of the writ. 
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Original Proceeding - Writ of Mandamus
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Robert J. Krauss, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Chief of Criminal Law, and Wendy Buffington, Assistant
Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
for Petitioner
Byron A. Lorrier and Joseph T. Hobson of McFarland, Gould, Lyons, Sullivan &
Hogan, P.A., Clearwater, Florida,
for Respondent