Case Title: BRIAN KEITH FARMER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
BRIAN KEITH FARMER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 162124 P.3d 699Case Number: 04-188Decided: 12/21/2005
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
BRIAN 
KEITH FARMER,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Ken 
Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Tina N. 
Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; Tonya A. Morse. 

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Assistant 
Attorney General.              
            

                        
            

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Brian K. Farmer 
appeals his conviction for aggravated assault.  Mr. Farmer contends the district court 
erred in determining that a witness was unavailable and allowing the prior 
testimony of that witness into evidence.  
Mr. Farmer also claims that the district court failed to properly 
instruct the jury and that he was prejudiced by prosecutorial misconduct during 
closing arguments.  We 
affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Farmer 
presents the following issues on appeal: 

 
 
I.          
Whether the trial court erred in admitting the prior testimony of a 
witness, John Biddix, because

 
 
            
A.  The witness was not 
legally unavailable, or

 
 
            
B.  [Mr. Farmer] was denied 
his rights under the confrontation clause due to ineffective assistance of 
counsel in the first trial?

 
 
II.          
Whether the trial court erred in denying that certain jury instructions 
be given?

 
 
III.         
Whether prosecutorial misconduct deprived [Mr. Farmer] of his 
constitutional right to a fair trial?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The criminal 
charges brought against Mr. Farmer arose from an incident which culminated in 
the stabbing of Joshua Goodhue.  At 
the time of the incident, Mr. Goodhue and Mr. Farmer were neighbors in a mobile 
home park.  They lived across the 
street from one another.  According 
to Mr. Farmer, he was asleep in his home when he was awakened by loud noises 
which he thought were beer bottles hitting his trailer.  He went outside to investigate.  Initially, he thought the commotion was 
caused by the occupant of a vehicle which he observed in the neighborhood.  He yelled at the occupant in the 
car.  When the car left, he focused 
his attention on Mr. Goodhue's residence.  
Several individuals were present at the Goodhue home.  They heard Mr. Farmer yelling.  They approached the fence bordering Mr. 
Farmer's property.  Words were 
exchanged and the altercation escalated.  

            

[¶4]      According to the 
State, after the initial verbal confrontation, Mr. Farmer jumped the fence and 
attacked Jack Biddix.  John Biddix 
then entered the fray in an attempt to help his brother.  After a brief scuffle, Mr. Farmer 
retreated to his home.  The others 
returned to the Goodhue property.  
Several remained outside.  A 
short time later, Mr. Farmer reemerged from his residence.  He jumped over his fence, crossed the 
road, entered Mr. Goodhue's property and stabbed Mr. Goodhue in the chest.  Mr. Farmer left the property and 
returned to his home.

 
 
[¶5]      Mr. Farmer did 
not dispute that he stabbed Mr. Goodhue.  
He did, however, provide a different version of the incident.  According to Mr. Farmer, Mr. Goodhue and 
his companions initiated the confrontation.  They threw bottles at him.  They pulled him over his fence.  He sought refuge under a car parked on 
the street in an effort to protect himself.  When he saw his opportunity to escape, 
he took it.  While climbing out from 
under the car he was confronted by Mr. Goodhue and he stabbed him in 
self-defense.

 
 
[¶6]      Mr. Farmer was 
charged with aggravated assault.  He 
was tried twice.  He was found 
guilty of aggravated assault at his first trial.  He appealed.  While his appeal was pending, the 
parties stipulated that Mr. Farmer was entitled to a new trial because he had 
not been represented by counsel at his preliminary hearing.  The case was remanded and a second 
preliminary hearing was held.  Mr. 
Farmer was bound over for trial and a second jury trial was scheduled to begin 
November 3, 2003.

 
 
[¶7]      John Biddix, one 
of the participants in the altercation, testified at Mr. Farmer's first 
trial.  Shortly before the second 
trial, the State advised that it could not locate Mr. Biddix and intended to 
present his prior trial testimony as evidence in the second trial.  Mr. Farmer objected on the basis that 
the State had failed to establish that Mr. Biddix was unavailable and that he 
had not been effectively cross examined during the first trial.  A hearing was held during which the 
State presented evidence regarding its efforts to locate Mr. Biddix.  The district court concluded that the 
prior testimony was admissible because Mr. Biddix was unavailable and Mr. Farmer 
had adequate opportunity to cross examine him during the first trial.  The second jury trial was held and Mr. 
Farmer was found guilty of aggravated assault.  The judgment and sentence of the 
district court was entered on May 28, 2004.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
A.  Admissibility of Prior 
Testimony

            

[¶8]      We review issues 
concerning the admissibility of evidence as follows:

 
 
Evidentiary 
rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court . . . .  This Court will generally accede to the 
trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence unless that court 
clearly abused its discretion.  We 
have described the standard of an abuse of discretion as reaching the question 
of the reasonableness of the trial court's choice.  Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria.  It also means exercising sound judgment 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously.  In the 
absence of an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's 
determination.  The burden is on the 
defendant to establish such abuse.

 
 

Holloman 
v. State, 2005 
WY 25, ¶ 10, 106 P.3d 879, 883 (Wyo. 2005).  

 
 
[¶9]      Mr. Farmer claims 
the district court abused its discretion by admitting the prior testimony of 
John Biddix.  Prior testimony of a 
witness may be properly admitted if:  
(1) the witness is unavailable; (2) the former testimony was given by the 
witness while he was testifying under oath; and (3) the party against whom the 
testimony is offered had the opportunity and a similar motive to develop the 
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination at the time of the former 
testimony.  W.R.E. 804(b)(1);1 Grable v. State, 649 P.2d 663, 671 
(Wyo. 1982); Rodriguez v. State, 711 P.2d 410, 413 
(Wyo. 
1985).  See also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 
68-69, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1374, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004) and Vigil v. State, 2004 WY 110, ¶ 18, 98 P.3d 172, 177-79 (Wyo. 2004) (recognizing that a defendant's constitutional 
right to confront a witness is not violated when the witness is unavailable and 
the defendant has had prior opportunity to cross examine the witness).    Mr. Farmer does not dispute 
that Mr. Biddix testified as a witness under oath at his first trial.  He claims the district court erred in 
admitting the testimony because the State failed to prove that Mr. Biddix was 
unavailable.  He also asserts that 
he was denied an adequate opportunity to cross examine Mr. Biddix due to 
ineffective assistance of counsel in the prior trial.      

     

[¶10]   A witness is unavailable if he 
"[i]s absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable 
to procure his attendance by process or other reasonable means."  W.R.E. 804(a)(5).  The burden of proof is on the 
prosecution to establish that the witness is unavailable to testify at trial 
despite its good faith efforts to obtain his presence.  Grable, 649 P.2d  at 672.  Mr. Farmer contends the State failed to 
establish that it used reasonable efforts to locate Mr. Biddix.  

 
 
[¶11]   After reviewing the evidence 
presented by the State, the court determined that Mr. Biddix was 
unavailable.  The court 
explained:

 
 
In this 
case, and beginning in October, efforts were undertaken by the District 
Attorney[']s Office through Ms. Lynch to attempt to locate Mr. John Biddix.  And she's testified as to those efforts 
that were made.

 
 
It is 
obvious from the testimony that Mr. Biddix is not in NatronaCounty or in the immediate area; those 
efforts were exhausted.

 
 
To 
suggest that she would be required to go to the Child Support Enforcement 
Division when a bench warrant was issued for Mr. Biddix and still active would 
be futile.  I mean, if they knew 
where he was, he wouldn't have a bench warrant; he would have been arrested or 
appeared.

 
 
In 
addition, going to Montana or further 
researching Montana, when Montana has an active 
NCIC warrant, would also be futile.  
Because if it was known where he existed in Montana or any information there, there wouldn't be an 
active NCIC warrant in Montana [for] 
extradition.

 
 
But most 
importantly, here is a brother who's told Ms. Lynch that he is somewhere in 
Florida.  He does not know where.  He has absconded or conceal[ed] himself 
because of the existing warrants.  
And, obviously, there's nothing to indicate that Florida authorities had 
had any contact or interaction with him based upon the NCIC information.  And, also, I believe there's a CAD 
information, as well.

 
 
So, the 
best we know is, he's somewhere in Florida.  
Efforts have been made, before talking to his brother, to locate his 
brother which was some difficulty [sic].

 
 
But the 
question is: Were the efforts reasonable in light of the information and in 
light of the various warrants that clearly indicate, at least since November, 
that  I think the testimony is that in November of 2002 Mr. Biddix [had] 
apparently left the state.

 
 
Given 
the fact that there are the existing warrants from Natrona, Mills, or the City 
of Casper, and the activity from Montana and the absence, after talking with various 
officers and individuals in NatronaCounty, he cannot be 
located.

 
 
Reasonable 
efforts were made to locate him elsewhere.  
And there's no information to indicate where he is.  So I believe based upon the testimony 
and based upon the case law, that reasonable efforts were made to locate Mr. 
Biddix and to obtain his presence in this case.

 
 
While, 
[defense counsel], there may be a number of things you would suggest could have 
been done, the [question] is:  Were 
the efforts taken reasonable in the light of the facts and circumstances as 
articulated by the Court.  And I 
find that they were reasonable.

 
 
And that 
pursuant to Wyoming case law and the Rules of [Evidence] 
804(b)(1), Mr. John Biddix is an unavailable witness.

 
 
Our 
review of the record supports the factual findings of the district court.  

 
 
[¶12]   Janeice Lynch, the Victim Witness 
Director for the prosecutor's office, testified regarding her efforts to locate 
Mr. Biddix.  Ms. Lynch initiated her 
efforts to serve subpoenas on prospective witnesses in mid October.  In the course of performing her duties, 
she was told by several individuals that Mr. Biddix had left town.  She checked with local law enforcement 
but received no helpful information regarding the current whereabouts of Mr. 
Biddix.  She located Jack Biddix, 
who informed her that his brother, John, had left Casper in November 2002 and was in Florida.  He did not provide a specific address or 
identify the city in which his brother was living.  He told Ms. Lynch that his brother would 
not return to Wyoming because of active arrest warrants that 
were pending against him.  Evidence 
was also introduced establishing the existence of several active warrants 
against Mr. Biddix from Wyoming and one from 
Montana.  The warrants were issued in 2002 and 
2003.  One of the warrants related 
to the failure of Mr. Biddix to appear for an extradition hearing on the 
Montana 
charges.

 
 
[¶13]   Mr. Farmer contends that the 
efforts of the State to locate Mr. Biddix were insufficient.  He faults the State for failing to 
contact the local child support enforcement office and law enforcement in 
Montana and Florida.  
He also suggests that additional inquiry should have been made with other 
relatives of Mr. Biddix.  

 
 
[¶14]   The determination of whether a 
witness is unavailable is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court and 
we will not overturn its determination absent a showing of an abuse of 
discretion.  Grable, 649 P.2d  at 672.  "[T]he lengths to which the prosecution 
is required to proceed . . . is a question of reasonableness."  Id.  The prosecution is not required to 
engage in futile acts to procure a witness.  Id.  The evidence established that Mr. Biddix 
had been absent from Wyoming for approximately one year.  The existence of active arrest warrants 
helped explain his absence and the difficulty in obtaining a current address for 
Mr. Biddix.  The district court 
could properly conclude that the State acted reasonably in its efforts to locate 
Mr. Biddix.  We find no abuse of 
discretion in the district court's determination that Mr. Biddix was unavailable 
to testify at Mr. Farmer's second trial.  

 
 
[¶15]   Next, Mr. Farmer contends that he 
was denied an adequate opportunity to develop Mr. Biddix's testimony at the 
first trial.  He acknowledges that 
he was represented by counsel who questioned Mr. Biddix.  However, Mr. Farmer claims that the 
cross examination was inadequate.  
In support of his position, he points to the relatively few questions 
asked of Mr. Biddix by defense counsel.  
He also questions other aspects of defense counsel's performance in the 
first trial in an effort to bolster his claim.  Mr. Farmer's complaints concerning 
defense counsel's performance at the first trial do not establish ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  

 
 
Whether 
to cross-examine and the extent of cross-examination are strategic decisions. 
The risk of excessive cross-examination is that the witness may reconcile 
inconsistencies, additional unfavorable testimony may be elicited, and 
ineffective efforts to attack credibility may in fact enhance the witness's 
testimony.  Smith v. 
State, 959 P.2d 1193, 1198 (Wyo. 1998). Speculation as to how the cross-examination 
could have been conducted differently does not meet the Strickland test 
for ineffective assistance. 

 
 

Barkell 
v. State, 2002 WY 
153, ¶ 23, 55 P.3d 1239, 1244 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
[¶16]   Under the federal constitution, we 
need only be satisfied that Mr. Farmer had an opportunity for cross 
examination.  Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S. Ct. 292, 294, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1985).  
"[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective 
cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and 
to whatever extent, the defense might wish."  Id. 
(Emphasis in original.)  See also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 53, 107 S. Ct. 989, 999, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987) (holding that the Confrontation 
Clause is satisfied so long as the defense is given "wide latitude" to confront 
witnesses, and that inquiry into counsel's effectiveness in cross-examination is 
not required); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 73, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2543, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980) (holding that no 
inquiry into "effectiveness" is required).  

 
 
[¶17]   We have previously applied a 
four-part test to determine whether prior testimony is admissible without 
offending the defendant's right of confrontation.  Prior testimony is 
admissible

 
 
when the 
prior testimony was given under oath, when it was given while the defendant was 
represented by counsel, when the defendant's counsel could and did cross-examine 
the witness, and when cross-examination which would be conducted at trial would 
not touch upon any new and significantly material line of 
inquiry.

 
 

Rodriguez, 
711 P.2d  
at 415.

 
 
[¶18]   It is undisputed that the first 
three elements of the test were met.  
Mr. Farmer claims, however, that the absence of Mr. Biddix from trial 
deprived him of the opportunity to pursue a "new and significantly material line 
of inquiry."  Mr. Farmer alleges 
that he was prevented from exploring inconsistencies in the testimony of John 
and Jack Biddix.2  We are satisfied that such examination 
does not constitute a new material line of inquiry.  Mr. Farmer was presented with an 
adequate opportunity to explore John Biddix's recollection of events during the 
first trial.  He was able to comment 
upon the discrepancies in testimony of the Biddix brothers in closing argument 
at the second trial.  We find that 
the prior testimony of John Biddix meets our four-part test and find no abuse of 
discretion in the district court's evidentiary ruling that such testimony was 
admissible.

 
 
B.  Proposed Jury 
Instructions

 
 
[¶19]   Mr. Farmer also challenges the 
district court's rejection of three of his proposed jury instructions.  Specifically, Mr. Farmer claims the 
district court's refusal to give his proposed jury instructions V, Q and R 
constituted fundamental error requiring reversal.  We disagree.  

 
 
[¶20]   When reviewing questions involving 
jury instructions, we afford the trial court significant deference.  Lapp v. State, 2004 WY 142, ¶ 7, 100 P.3d 862, 864-65 (Wyo. 2004).  Jury "[i]nstructions must be 
considered as a whole, and individual instructions, or parts of them, should not 
be singled out and considered in isolation." Giles v. State, 2004 WY 101, ¶ 14, 96 P.3d 1027, 1031 (Wyo. 2004).  We 
confine our review to a "search for prejudicial error."  McWilliams v. Wilhelm, 893 P.2d 1147, 
1148 (Wyo. 
1995).  "[A]s long as the 
instructions correctly state the law and the entire charge covers the relevant 
issue, reversible error will not be found."  Giles, ¶ 14.   

            

[¶21]   Proposed jury instruction V 
concerns the elements of aggravated assault and states: 

 
 
The 
elements of the crime of Aggravated Assault and Battery, as charged in this case, 
are:

 
 
1.         
On or about the 4th day of July, 2001

2.         
In the County of Natrona, and State of Wyoming

3.         
The Defendant, Brian K. Farmer

4.         
Intentionally caused

5.         
Bodily injury to another person, Josh Goodhue

6.         
With a deadly weapon

7.         
And the Defendant, Brian K. Farmer, did not act in 
self-defense.

 
 
If you 
find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements has 
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the Defendant 
guilty.

 
 
If, on 
the other hand, you find from your consideration of all of the evidence that any 
of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should 
find the Defendant not guilty.

 
 
While we 
agree with Mr. Farmer that this proposed instruction covers the elements of 
aggravated assault and is a correct statement of law, we have previously held 
that a district court may "properly refuse a requested instruction, even if 
correct, where other instructions have sufficiently covered the principles of 
the requested instruction."  Witt v. State, 892 P.2d 132, 142 
(Wyo. 
1995).  In this case, the district 
court gave Instruction No. 11 which states:

 
 
            
The elements of the crime of Aggravated Assault and Battery, as charged in this case, 
are:

 
 

1.                  
On or 
about the 4th day of July, 
2001

2.                  
In the 
County of Natrona, and State of Wyoming

3.                  
The 
Defendant, Brian K. Farmer

4.                  
Intentionally 
caused

5.                  
Bodily 
injury to another person, Josh Goodhue

6.                  
With a 
deadly weapon

7.                  
And the 
Defendant did not act in self-defense. 

 
 
If you 
find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements has 
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the Defendant 
guilty.

 
 
If, on 
the other hand, you find from your consideration of all of the evidence that any 
of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should 
find the Defendant not guilty.

 
 
The only 
discernible difference between Mr. Farmer's proposed instruction and Instruction 
11 is that Mr. Farmer's name does not appear twice in the given 
instruction.  The elements of 
aggravated assault are the same in both instructions as is the burden of proof 
required.  We find no error in the 
district court's failure to give this instruction.

 
 
[¶22]   Mr. Farmer also claims error 
concerning his proposed instructions Q and R.  Mr. Farmer contends that his theory of 
the case centered on self-defense, the defense of others and the protection of 
his home and habitation.  At trial, 
Mr. Farmer claimed that his fiancé was inside his trailer and he was trying to 
protect her throughout the incident.  
Mr. Farmer also claimed that he was protecting his home.  His proposed Instructions Q and R 
state:  

 
 
[Proposed 
Instruction Q]

 
 
A person 
may defend his home or habitation against anyone who manifestly intends or 
endeavors in a violent or riotous manner, to enter that home or habitation and 
who appears to intend violence to any person in that home or habitation.  The amount of force which the person may 
use in resisting such trespass is limited by what would appear to a reasonable 
person, in the same or similar circumstances, necessary to resist the violent or 
unlawful entry.  A person is not 
bound to retreat even though a retreat might safely be made.  A person may resist force with force, 
increasing it in proportion to the intruder's persistence and violence if the 
circumstances apparent to him are such as would excite similar fears and a 
similar belief in a reasonable person.  
If the person kills under the influence of such fear, the homicide is not 
a felonious homicide but is justified.

 
 
[Proposed 
Instruction R]

 
 
            
If the defendant at his place of residence had reasonable ground[s] to 
believe and actually did believe that he was in imminent danger of death or 
serious bodily harm and that the use of deadly force was necessary to repel such 
danger, he was not required to retreat or to consider whether he could safely 
retreat.  The defendant was entitled 
to stand his ground and use such force as was reasonably necessary under the 
circumstances to save his life or protect himself or others from serious bodily 
harm.

 
 
Mr. 
Farmer claims the district court erred by failing to give these proposed 
instructions because they support his theory of the case.  

 
 
[¶23]   We have previously recognized that 
"a defendant has the right to have instructions on his theory of the case or his 
theory of defense presented to the jury if the instructions sufficiently inform 
the jury of the theory or defense and if competent evidence exists which 
supports the law expressed in the instructions."  Thom v. State, 792 P.2d 192, 195 
(Wyo. 
1990).   However, we have also 
noted that "[n]ot every instruction must be given simply because there is a 
claim that it incorporates a theory of the case."  Wilkening v. State, 922 P.2d 1381, 1383 
(Wyo. 
1996).  A trial court may properly 
refuse to give a proposed instruction if it is erroneous, confusing, 
argumentative, or if the instruction unduly emphasizes one aspect of the case, 
the law, or the defendant's version of the events.  Madrid v. State, 910 P.2d 1340, 1346 
(Wyo. 1996); Jansen v. State, 892 P.2d 1131, 1140 
(Wyo. 1995); Virgilio v. State, 834 P.2d 1125, 1128 
(Wyo. 
1992).  Additionally, "instructions 
not based on the evidence can be properly refused."  Chavez-Becerra v. State, 924 P.2d 63, 67 (Wyo. 
1996).

 
 
[¶24]   Despite Mr. Farmer's contentions 
that he was defending his property, no evidence was adduced at trial indicating 
the victim or his friends ever entered Mr. Farmer's property or attempted to 
enter his trailer.  In this regard, 
the trial court determined:

 
 
With the 
state of the evidence at this point in time, I don't see any evidence that would 
support a reasonable factual basis for giving Instruction Q, which is pattern 
8.06 and deals with a defense of home or habitation against anyone who 
manifestly intends or endeavors in a [riotous manner] to enter that home or 
habitation.

 
 
            
In this case, the only evidence that the Court has heard is that these 
individuals, viewing in the light most favorable to Mr. Farmer, grabbed him over 
the fence and pulled him over the fence.  
And he then crawled under the car and was observing those people while he 
was under the car.  And he noted 
that he didn't know where the others were.

 
 
            
But there's no evidence of them approaching the trailer house in terms of 
the door or even that they were over there beating on his trailer on the 
back.  There's no indications [sic] 
that anyone was trying to enter his home.  
And so based upon the pattern instructions and based upon the evidence at 
this state, I'm going to decline Instruction Q.

 
 
The 
district court also reviewed proposed instruction R and determined that the 
instruction was not appropriate because other instructions covered the issue and 
no competent evidence existed to support the instruction.  The record reflects the following 
exchange between the court and defense counsel regarding proposed instruction 
R:

 
 
THE 
COURT:             
Well, and I think Instruction 18 covers a situation that we're dealing 
with and that is, as reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. 
Farmer, he was pulled over the fence . . . , and then he crawled under the car 
in an effort to protect himself.  
And while under the car, he then got a knife out and thought this was his 
chance, and stabbed the guy, and then went back into his home. 

 
 
            
I mean, he was pulled off of the fence.  And as far as the protection of LeiLani 
and others, it's already contained in the Instruction Number 
17.

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:      I 
would agree, your Honor.  The only 
difference is the protection of the home.  
The initial episode that started all of this was an attack against the 
house.  Him not - - Mr. Farmer not 
knowing what was going on, went outside - - armed himself, went outside for the 
protection of not only himself, LeiLani, and the home, but he didn't know who 
was out there and what they were doing.  
That's what started all of this episode, and that's why we've asked for 
it to begin with.

 
 
THE 
COURT: All right.

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:      I 
think that's different than what you stated in 18.  I think 18 does discuss Mr. Farmer and 
others, but it doesn't talk about one's right to protect their 
home.

 
 
THE 
COURT: Okay.  And your objection is noted and the 
Court will decline to give the instruction for two reasons.  One is the nature of the defense is, it 
is already, I believe, set forth in 17, 18, and I think even 19.  And here's the other one, and which is 
more pertinent.  When this 
altercation occurred, these people weren't beating on his trailer.  They weren't beating on his door.  There's no evidence to show that his 
defense was to protect his property from someone trying to ram it with a car or 
any other thing.

            

            
And 
given the evidence that's been presented at this time, the Court does not feel 
that this - - there is a factual basis to support this particular 
instruction.  And so I'll decline to 
give it.

 
 
[¶25]   Our review of the record supports 
the evidentiary findings of the district court.  No evidence exists in the record which 
would support Mr. Farmer's theory of defense as reflected in instructions Q and 
R.  It is undisputed that the 
stabbing of Mr. Goodhue did not take place on Mr. Farmer's property.  The jury was appropriately instructed by 
instructions 16 through 20 concerning the theories of self-defense and the 
defense of others.3  There was no evidence to support 
instructions regarding the defense of the home and the duty to retreat.  Accordingly, we find no abuse of 
discretion in the trial court's refusal to give the proposed 
instructions.

 
 

C.  Prosecutorial 
Misconduct

 
 
[¶26]   In his final claim of error, Mr. 
Farmer contends the prosecutor made several improper and prejudicial comments 
during closing arguments.  Mr. 
Farmer made no objection to the State's closing argument at trial.  As a result, our review is limited to an 
analysis under the plain error standard:

 
 
"First, 
the record must be clear as to the incident which is alleged as error.  Second, the party claiming the error 
amounted to plain error must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law was violated.  Finally, that 
party must prove a substantial right has been denied him and, as a result, he 
has been materially prejudiced."

 
 

Wilks v. 
State, 2002 
WY 100, ¶ 7, 49 P.3d 975, 981 (Wyo. 2002).  
Mr. Farmer bears the burden of proving prejudice.  Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339, 346 
(Wyo. 
1990).  We measure the propriety of 
closing arguments in the context of the entire argument and compare them with 
the evidence produced at trial.  Wilks, ¶ 26.  We will only reverse a conviction for 
prosecutorial misconduct when we find that there was a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice.  Hodgins v. State, 962 P.2d 153, 157 
(Wyo. 
1998).  Furthermore, we note that 
"[p]lain error in closing argument must remain hard to find because otherwise 
the trial court becomes charged with an adversary responsibility to control 
argument even when objection is not taken by the opposing attorney."  Harper v. State, 970 P.2d 400, 403 
(Wyo. 
1998).

 
 
[¶27]   Mr. Farmer relies on three comments 
advanced by the State during its closing argument to support his contention of 
prosecutorial misconduct:  (1) the 
amount of alcohol consumed by the victim and his companions was insufficient to 
make a difference in the perception of events they claim; (2) the statements 
made by various witnesses at trial are substantially similar to previous 
statements that were made after the event; and (3) the testimony of the 
witnesses was consistent to what happened that night.  Mr. Farmer claims these statements 
demonstrate that the State impermissibly vouched for the credibility of its 
witnesses.  Mr. Farmer relies on our 
holding in Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 
20, 63 P.3d 875 (Wyo. 2003) to support his position.  

 
 
[¶28]   In Dysthe, the prosecutor made the 
following statements during closing arguments:

 
 
"These 
witnesses, despite the fact that they are users, were credible.  They were very credible.  They were more credible because of the 
very fact that they have a relationship with this Defendant.  More credible because, if you couldn't 
tell, I certainly could; they didn't like me asking them questions.  They didn't want to be telling me 
anything."  

 
 

Id., ¶ 
28.  We found that the prosecutor's 
comments crossed the line between legitimate argument and illegitimate vouching 
for the credibility of the State's witnesses and we reversed.  Id., ¶ 33.  Reversal is appropriate in situations 
where this line is crossed.  

 
 
            
"When the prosecutor asserts his credibility or personal belief, an 
additional factor is injected into the case.  This additional factor is that counsel 
may be perceived by the jury as an authority whose opinion carries greater 
weight than their own opinion:  that 
members of the jury might be persuaded not by the evidence, but rather by a 
perception that counsel's opinions are correct because of his position as 
prosecutor, an important state official entrusted with enforcing the criminal 
laws of a sovereign state.  While 
the prosecutor is expected to be an advocate, he may not exploit his position to 
induce a jury to disregard the evidence or misapply the law."  

 
 

Lane v. 
State, 12 P.3d 1057, 1065 (Wyo. 2000).

 
 
[¶29]   Upon examination of the statements 
challenged by Mr. Farmer, we do not find that the prosecutor's comments were 
improper.  Unlike the prosecutor's 
comments in Dysthe, the prosecutor 
did not reference his own beliefs nor did he specifically comment upon the 
credibility of the witnesses.  We 
have previously noted that the State may assist the jury by reflecting upon the 
evidence and drawing reasonable inferences which logically flow from that 
evidence.  Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106, 1116 
(Wyo. 
1992).  Placed in proper context, 
the prosecutor's statements are properly viewed as comments upon the evidence 
and nothing more.  Accordingly, we 
find no error.

 
 
[¶30]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1W.R.E. 
804(b)(1) states:

Hearsay 
exceptions.  The 
following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable 
as a witness:

 
 
(1)  Former Testimony.  Testimony given as a 
witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a 
deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another 
proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a 
civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and 
similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect 
examination[.]

 
 

2The 
inconsistencies related to the initial contact between Mr. Farmer and Jack 
Biddix and the length of time which elapsed between Mr. Farmer's escape and his 
return to stab Mr. Goodhue.  John 
Biddix testified that ten minutes elapsed.  
Jack Biddix testified that only a minute or two 
elapsed.

 
 

3Jury 
instructions 16 through 20 state:

 
 
Instruction 
No. 16

 
 
Before 
the defendant may be convicted of any crime, the State must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in 
self-defense.

 
 
 
 
 
 
Instruction 
No. 17

 
 
It is 
lawful for a person who is being assaulted to defend himself from attack if he 
has reasonable grounds for believing and does believe that bodily injury is 
about to be inflicted upon him.  In 
doing so he may use all force which would appear to a reasonable person, in the 
same or similar circumstances, to be necessary to prevent the injury which 
appears to be imminent.

 
 
Instruction 
No. 18

 
 
If the 
defendant had reasonable grounds to believe and actually did believe that he or 
another was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm from which the 
defendant could save himself or another only by using deadly force against the 
other person, the defendant had the right to use deadly force in self-defense of 
himself or defense of another.  
"Deadly force" means force which is likely to cause death or serious 
bodily harm.

The 
circumstances under which the defendant acted must have been such as to produce 
in the mind of a reasonably prudent person, similarly situated, the reasonable 
belief that the other person was about to kill the defendant or another or do 
serious bodily harm to the defendant or another.  The danger must have been apparent, 
present and imminent or must have appeared to be so under the 
circumstances.

If the 
defendant believed that he or another was in imminent danger of death or serious 
bodily harm, and that deadly force was necessary to repel such danger, and if a 
reasonable person in a similar situation seeing and knowing the same facts would 
be justified in believing that he was in similar danger, the defendant would be 
justified in using deadly force in self-defense of himself or defense of 
another.  The defendant would be 
justified even though the appearance of danger later proved to be false and 
there was actually neither purpose on the part of the other person to kill the 
defendant or another or do the defendant or another serious bodily harm, nor 
imminent danger that it would be done, nor actual necessity that deadly force be 
used in self-defense of himself or defense of another.  If the person so confronted acts in 
self-defense or defense of another upon such appearance of danger from honest 
belief, the right of self-defense of himself or defense of another is the same 
whether the danger is real or merely apparent.

 
 
Instruction 
No. 19

 
 
Generally, 
the right to use self-defense is not available to one who is the aggressor or 
provokes the conflict.  However, if 
one who provokes a conflict thereafter withdraws from it in good faith and 
informs his adversary by words or actions that he wants to end the conflict, and 
he is thereafter attacked, he then has the same right of self-defense as any 
other person.  This right of 
self-defense extends not only against the actual assailant, but also to those 
acting in concert with the assailant.

 
 
 
 
Instruction 
No. 20

            

One who 
has reasonable grounds to believe that another will attack him, and that the 
anticipated attack will be of such a character as to endanger his life or limb, 
or to cause him serious bodily harm, has a right to arm himself for the purpose 
of resisting such attack.

  

If the 
defendant armed himself in reasonable anticipation of such an attack, that fact 
alone does not make the defendant the aggressor or deprive the defendant of the 
right of self-defense.