Case Title: State ex rel. Sharif v. McDonnell

Citation: 2001-Ohio-240

Docket Number: 20001238

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-02-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Sharif v. McDonnell, 91 Ohio St.3d 46, 2001-Ohio-240.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. SHARIF, APPELLEE, v. MCDONNELL, JUDGE, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Sharif v. McDonnell (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 46.] 
Mandamus sought to compel common pleas court judge to issue findings of fact 
and conclusions of law in compliance with court of appeals’ order to issue 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on an appeal of the dismissal of a 
petition for postconviction relief — Court of appeals’ grant of writ 
affirmed. 
(No. 00-1238 — Submitted December 13, 2000 — Decided February 7, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 77120. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Abdul K. Sharif, appellee, was convicted of murder on June 
15, 1989, in Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court.  The Court of Appeals for 
Cuyahoga County affirmed this judgment on March 18, 1991, State v. Sharif, 
Cuyahoga App. No. 30260, unreported, and we overruled a motion for leave to 
appeal this decision on August 7, 1991, 61 Ohio St.3d 1431, 575 N.E.2d 219. 
 
Sharif filed a petition for postconviction relief on August 11, 1999, and 
Judge Nancy R. McDonnell, appellant, to whom the case was assigned, dismissed 
the petition summarily on August 18, 1999, apparently because Sharif had not 
timely filed the petition.  On September 16, 1999, Judge McDonnell denied 
Sharif’s motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Sharif appealed the 
dismissal of his petition to the court of appeals, and that court, on April 3, 2000, 
ordered, sua sponte:  “[T]he appeal is dismissed pursuant to R.C. 2953.21.  Once 
the trial court issues findings of fact and conclusions of law, appellant may file an 
appeal.” Judge McDonnell did not issue any findings of fact or conclusions of 
law. 
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Sharif then filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals 
for Cuyahoga County seeking to compel Judge McDonnell to issue findings of 
fact and conclusions of law according to the court of appeals’ order.  The same 
panel of the court of appeals that dismissed the appeal in the postconviction-relief 
matter granted the requested writ. 
 
The court of appeals, in granting the writ, first noted that R.C. 2953.21 did 
not appear to require Judge McDonnell to issue findings of fact and conclusions 
law because Sharif had not timely filed his petition.  The court, nevertheless, ruled 
that the law-of-the-case doctrine required Judge McDonnell to issue these 
findings and conclusions.  According to the court of appeals, under this doctrine, 
its order on the dismissal of the petition for postconviction relief was the law of 
that case on the legal questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the 
case.  This same panel has since ruled, in State ex rel. Jackson v. Cuyahoga Cty. 
Court of Common Pleas (Aug. 31, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 77999, unreported, 
2000 WL 1231480, that a trial court has no duty to issue findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on an untimely filed petition for postconviction relief. 
 
This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
We do not decide whether a trial court must issue findings of fact and 
conclusions of law when a petitioner untimely files his petition for postconviction 
relief.  But we hold that under the law-of-the-case doctrine, Judge McDonnell 
must issue findings of fact and conclusions of law in this case because the court of 
appeals’ order that she issue findings and conclusions is the law for all subsequent 
proceedings in this case.  Thus, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
Sixteen years ago, in Nolan v. Nolan (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 11 OBR 1, 
462 N.E.2d 410, we explained the law-of-the-case doctrine, which we set forth in 
the syllabus: 
 
“Absent extraordinary circumstances, such as an intervening decision by 
the Supreme Court, an inferior court has no discretion to disregard the mandate of 
January Term, 2001 
3 
a superior court in a prior appeal in the same case.  (State ex rel. Potain v. 
Mathews [1979], 59 Ohio St.2d 29, 32 [13 O.O.3d 17, 18-19, 391 N.E.2d 343, 
345], approved and followed.)” 
 
We explained that, under this doctrine, a reviewing court’s decision was 
the law in the reviewed case for all legal questions and for all subsequent 
proceedings in the case.  We observed that “the rule is necessary to ensure 
consistency of results in a case, to avoid endless litigation by settling the issues, 
and to preserve the structure of superior and inferior courts as designed by the 
Ohio Constitution.”  As it operates, “the doctrine functions to compel trial courts 
to follow the mandates of reviewing courts.”  11 Ohio St.3d at 3, 11 OBR at 2-3, 
462 N.E.2d at 412-413. 
 
In State ex rel. Potain v. Mathews, the decision that Nolan approved and 
followed, decided five years earlier, the court ruled that a trial court must “follow 
the mandate, whether correct or incorrect, of the Court of Appeals.  A lower 
court has no discretion, absent extraordinary circumstances, to disregard the 
mandate of a superior court in a prior appeal in the same case.” (Emphasis added.)  
59 Ohio St.2d at 32, 13 O.O.3d at 18, 391 N.E.2d at 345. 
 
Consequently, Judge McDonnell had to comply with the court of appeals’ 
order to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Mandamus, moreover, is 
an appropriate remedy to enforce the law-of-the-case doctrine.  Potain; State ex 
rel. Heck v. Kessler (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 98, 100, 647 N.E.2d 792, 795.  Further, 
as we noted, the same appellate panel issued the order on the petition for 
postconviction relief and the decision on this writ of mandamus.  This panel is in 
the best position to state the import of its order on the appeal of the dismissal of 
the petition for postconviction relief. 
 
Judge McDonnell argues that R.C. 2953.21 through 2953.23 do not entitle 
Sharif to findings of fact and conclusions of law.  She argues, further, that 
granting him this writ provides him a benefit that no one else receives.  According 
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to Judge McDonnell, this application of the law-of-the-case doctrine achieves an 
unjust result, an outcome against which Nolan cautions.  We disagree. 
 
We have not yet decided whether a petitioner who files an untimely 
petition for postconviction relief need not receive findings of fact and conclusions 
of law if the trial court dismisses the petition.  Thus, this question does not have a 
definitive answer.  We do not conclude that an unjust result occurs if the critical 
question in the reviewed case is still in dispute. 
 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent for two 
reasons.  First, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the law-of-the-case 
doctrine compelled the trial judge to render findings of fact and conclusions of 
law regarding the dismissal of petitioner’s postconviction-relief petition.  The 
April 3, 2000 order of the court of appeals stated: “[T]he appeal is dismissed 
pursuant to R.C. 2953.21.  Once the trial court issues findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, appellant may file an appeal.”  In my view, this order did not 
mandate the trial judge to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Instead, 
the order merely instructed the petitioner when it would be proper to file his 
appeal, i.e., that it would be proper to file an appeal only when the trial court 
rendered findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Because the law-of-the-case 
doctrine only requires a lower court to follow a mandate of a reviewing court, and 
this was not a mandate, the law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply to these facts. 
 
Second, I find it especially troubling that the majority decides not to 
decide whether a trial court must issue findings of fact and conclusions of law 
when a petitioner untimely files his or her petition for postconviction relief.  I 
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believe that this issue was properly presented on appeal.  The court of appeals 
acknowledged that the trial judge did not have a legal duty to issue findings of 
fact and conclusions of law when dismissing an untimely petition.  If we require 
judges to render findings on untimely appeals, the time limits become 
meaningless.  Thus, petitioner clearly was not entitled to a writ of mandamus.  
See State ex rel. Manson v. Morris (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 440, 613 N.E.2d 232 (to 
be entitled to a writ of mandamus, a relator must establish [1] that he or she has a 
clear legal right to the relief prayed for, [2] that respondents are under a clear 
legal duty to perform the act, and [3] that relator has no plain and adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of law).  Therefore, I would hold that the petitioner 
did not have a right to findings of fact and conclusions of law on his untimely 
petition. 
 
Moreover, the majority’s decision achieves an unjust result by providing 
petitioner with a benefit that no other defendant in Ohio receives, namely, 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in an untimely petition for postconviction 
relief.  Accordingly, I dissent and would reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
 
RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting 
opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Abdul K. Sharif, pro se. 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Randi 
Marie Ostry, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
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