Case Title: Devine v. Cook

Citation: 279 P.2d 1073, 3 Utah 2d 134

Docket Number: 

State: utah

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Date: 1955-02-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
3 Utah 2d 134 (1955) 279 P.2d 1073 JAMES S. DEVINE, MRS. JAMES S. DEVINE AND JANET GUSINDA, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, v. HELEN COOK AND W.S. HATCH CO., INC., DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS. No. 8145. Supreme Court of Utah. February 7, 1955. Dan S. Bushnell, Richards & Bird, Salt Lake City, for appellants. Stewart, Cannon & Hanson, Don J. Hanson, Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, Thornley K. Swan, Salt Lake City, for respondents. NORSETH, District Judge. The three actions involved in this case arose out of a single automobile collision which occurred in Davis County, Utah, September 7, 1951, at approximately 4:30 o'clock p.m. The plaintiffs James S. Devine, his wife Mrs. James S. Devine, and her sister Janet Gusinda sought to recover damages from Helen Cook and W.S. Hatch Company, Inc., defendants, for personal injuries sustained by each of the plaintiffs, and for property damage sustained to the automobile owned and driven by the plaintiff James S. Devine. The case was tried to a jury in Davis County, Utah, which returned a verdict of no cause of action against the three plaintiffs and in favor of both defendants. The facts of the case are briefly as follows: On September 7, 1951, James S. Devine, his wife Mrs. James S. Devine, and her sister Janet Gusinda, the plaintiffs, were all in the automobile operated by the plaintiff James S. Devine, who was proceeding north towards Ogden, Utah, on U.S. Highway 91. The collision occurred at the intersection of 1500 South Street, in Bountiful, Utah, and U.S. Highway 91. 1500 South Street runs east and west and crosses U.S. Highway 91. U.S. Highway 91 is a four-lane street running north and south, intersected by 1500 South Street, a two-lane highway running east and west. At the same time the Devine car was proceeding north, a tank truck and a four-wheel trailer and a tractor transporting a two-wheel semi-trailer, owned and operated by W.S. Hatch Company, Inc., were also proceeding north on the inside lane; that is, the lane nearest to the center dividing line of U.S. Highway 91. On 1500 South Street there is a stopsign both at the east and west, where the 1500 block intersects Highway 91. As the first truck of the Hatch Company approached 1500 South Street, the driver slowed down and gave a signal indicating he intended to make a left-hand turn into 1500 South Street. The second truck also slowed down, and both vehicles came to a complete stop at the intersection of 1500 South Street with U.S. Highway 91. As these vehicles approached 1500 South Street, and before stopping to make the left-hand turn, the first truck passed the Devine car, which was travelling north in the right-hand lane of Highway 91. At the time the first truck slowed down and stopped, Helen Cook, a defendant, was on 1500 South Street going east. Mrs. Cook stopped for the stopsign located on the south side of 1500 South Street. The trucks could not complete a left-hand turn into 1500 South Street until the Cook car had cleared the street. The driver of the first truck, after he had stopped, in some manner which is not entirely clear from the evidence, signalled or motioned the Cook car to proceed. Thereupon Mrs. Cook did proceed east across Highway 91. The Devine car continued to proceed north, and, according to the testimony of Mr. Devine, he did not see the Cook car in time to avoid a collision. He further testified that when he saw the Cook car he slowed down and turned his car to the right and attempted to avoid the collision. There is no evidence that excessive speed was involved in this case. Devine testified he was travelling about 35 miles per hour. The speed limit in this immediate area is 40 miles per hour. The driver of the first truck testified he did not remember motioning or signalling to Mrs. Cook. However, Mrs. Flora Hutchings, a witness called by the defendant Cook, testified that the driver of the truck had motioned or signalled to Mrs. Cook to proceed. This appeal is presented on three points by the plaintiffs, as follows: The instructions prejudicially accentuated the duty of the plaintiffs and minimized the duty of the defendants. It was error to instruct the jury on an issue of contributory negligence of the plaintiffs, Miss Gusinda and Mrs. Devine. The Court's instructions regarding contributory negligence were erroneous and prejudicial. The defendant and respondent W.S. Hatch Company, Inc. contends that the Court erred in failing to grant its motion for a directed verdict. The defendant and respondent Helen Cook contends that the plaintiffs failed to make timely or proper objections to the Court's instructions, and therefore plaintiffs should not be permitted to object to the instructions in the manner charged in the appeal. We, after a careful review of the entire record in this case, conclude that the plaintiffs' contentions are well taken, and that the Trial Court in its instructions did commit prejudicial error, (1) By the overaccentuation placed on the duties of the plaintiffs and by a lack of accentuation placed on the duties of the defendants. (2) That the Trial Court also committed prejudicial error in instructing the jury on the issue of contributory negligence of the two plaintiffs, guests in the automobile Mrs. James S. Devine and Janet Gusinda. It is apparent in this case that the pleadings and evidence did not warrant or support the instructions on contributory negligence of these two plaintiffs Mrs. Devine and Miss Gusinda. (3) That the Trial Court's instructions regarding contributory negligence was error and prejudicial. (4) That the Trial Court committed error in refusing to grant the motion of the defendant W.S. Hatch Company, Inc. for a directed verdict. (5) We also conclude that the contentions of the defendant Helen Cook that the plaintiffs failed to make timely or proper objections is not well taken, inasmuch as the record shows that certain exceptions to the instructions were taken, and certain objections were made by the plaintiffs relating to points raised by the plaintiffs in their appeal to this Court. In discussing the various points enumerated above, a summary of the points will be made in the order set out. (1) Overaccentuation. No particular objection can be raised to the instructions 1 to 4 inclusive. However, when these instructions are considered in conjunction with instructions 5, 7, 8 and 9, it can be readily seen that the instructions accentuated the duty of the plaintiffs and minimized the duty of the defendants. Let us consider briefly Instruction No. 4, a part of which is as follows: The Court in that same instruction advised the jury as follows: The Court instructed the jury that if the plaintiff Devine's negligence was the proximate cause of the collision, then the plaintiffs Mrs. Devine and Janet Gusinda could not recover against the defendants. In Instruction No. 6 the Court again reverts to the issues of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiffs Mrs. Devine and Janet Gusinda. The Court in this instruction identifies the two plaintiffs, the guests, and states it is the positive duty of the guests to see and warn the driver, if under the circumstances a reasonable and prudent person would do so, and later asserts that if they fail to see and advise the driver said conduct on their part constitutes negligence and bars recovery. This fails to take into account that in some circumstances to make an outcry might be an ill-advised thing to do, and that such warning by the guest would only be required if consistent with reasonable care; and also fails to include the necessary element of proximate cause. We now consider Instructions No. 7 and 9, wherein the Court charged the jury pertaining to the duty of the defendants Cook and W.S. Hatch Company, Inc. In Instruction No. 7 the Court states: The Court also in Instruction No. 7, in a negative manner, discussed whether the defendant W.S. Hatch Company, Inc., through its agent the driver, did undertake to determine whether the defendant Cook could safely enter and pass through the intersection, and instructed there was no duty except under certain conditions. In Instruction No. 8, pertaining to the duties of the plaintiff Devine, the Court instructed in part as follows: This instruction is positive in nature, as to what was required of the plaintiff Devine. We are of the opinion that this narrative instruction was unnecessary in view of Instruction No. 5 covering the duties of drivers generally, and in view of Instruction No. 4, on contributory negligence. The instructions were positive in nature as to what was required of the plaintiff Devine. Instruction No. 9 pertaining to the duty of the defendant Cook, is in part as follows: Construing this instruction with Instruction No. 8, it appears with certainty that Instruction No. 8, pertaining to the plaintiff Devine, was by its terms positive in nature, and Instruction No. 9, pertaining to the duty of the defendant Cook, was negative by its nature. We conclude that Instructions No. 4, 6 and 8, pertaining to the standard care required of the plaintiffs on contributory negligence, are positive and peremptory, and that Instructions No. 8 and 9 pertaining to the standard of care required of the defendant Cook are negative and nugatory. We are of the opinion further that the instructions cast doubt upon the case of the plaintiffs by the frequent use of the words "if any", in reference to the collision and injuries. The following parts of instructions given is illustrative: We conclude that the Court, by the qualifying terms used, cast doubt as to the existence of any injuries suffered by the plaintiffs and characterized the conduct of the plaintiffs as negligence. In holding that the Court erred in giving the instructions in this case, we cite with approval the law enunciated in the case of Keeshin Motor Express Co., Inc., v. Glassman, 219 Ind. 538, 38 N.E.2d 847, 850, in which the Court held as follows: In the case of Shields v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 99 Utah 307, 105 P.2d 347, 349, in which the Court stated: "The reiteration of given propositions to the jury in the instructions does not have judicial approval", and after reviewing the detailed instructions the Court stated: Even assuming that the instructions of the Court taken in their entirety could be considered correct as given, the continual repetition of instructions on contributory negligence and the positive delineation of the duties of the plaintiffs, as contrasted with the qualified negative statements of the duties of the defendants, unbalanced the instructions in favor of the defendants and influenced the jury in bringing its verdict of no cause of action as against all three plaintiffs, and therefore constituted reversible error. The second point raised by the appellants is that the Court committed error in instructing the jury on an issue of contributory negligence of the plaintiffs, Mrs. Devine and Miss Gusinda. We are of the opinion that the Court did commit error by so instructing the jury upon these points. It is to be noted that the defendants did not plead contributory negligence on the part of the two passengers, Mrs. Devine and Miss Gusinda. After the case had been tried, and after the Court had indicated the instructions which were to be given, the pleadings were permitted to be amended so as to raise the issue of contributory negligence as to the plaintiffs Mrs. Devine and Miss Gusinda. No witnesses other than these two plaintiffs testified. Their testimony, touching upon what they did and observed, is as follows: Upon cross examination the witness, Mrs. Devine, testified as follows: The testimony of the plaintiff Miss Gusinda in substance is much the same as that of the plaintiff Mrs. Devine. There was nothing inherently incredible or contradictory about their testimony and it conclusively indicates there was no legal basis to assume that either of the two passengers, Mrs. Devine and Miss Gusinda, did not act as a reasonable and prudent person would act under the circumstances. The law is amply clear that where there is no evidence of contributory negligence the jury should not be instructed on such issue. We approve the rule laid down touching upon this question in the following cases: Christensen v. Oregon Shortline Railroad Company, 35 Utah 137, 146, 99 P. 676, 680, 20 L.R.A.,N.S., 255, in which the Court stated as follows: White v. City of Trinidad, 10 Colo. App. 327, 52 P. 214, 216. In this case the Court discussed the issue of an instruction on contributory negligence, and stated as follows: Smith v. Oregon & N.W.R. Co., 33 Utah 129, 142, 93 P. 185. In this case the court held that where there was a plea of contributory negligence, but no evidence on which to predicate said plea, such an instruction should not have been given and also giving an instruction concerning an intervening cause without evidence to support the same constituted prejudicial error. In Belnap v. Widdison,[1] the Court stated as follows: In the case Clay v. Dunford,[2] the Court held it was prejudicial error to instruct on the assumption of risk when the facts in the case did not present such an issue. It is therefore apparent in this case the pleadings and evidence did not warrant or support the instructions on contributory negligence of the plaintiffs Mrs. Devine and Miss Gusinda, and the giving of said instructions was error. In Point 3 we are of the opinion that the Court's instructions regarding contributory negligence was error and prejudicial. In Instruction No. 4 the Court stated as follows: And Instruction No. 6, in part, provides: Our Court and the Courts of other states have considered the use of the words such as "to any extent," "however slight," or "in any degree," may qualify negligence, but not proximate cause. Slight negligence which is a proximate cause may be a defense, but negligence which is a slight cause is not a defense. The distinction between these two rules is considered in 65 C.J.S., Negligence, § 129, p. 742 and in part states as follows: Our Court in the case of Coray v. Southern Pacific Company, 112 Utah 166, 185 P.2d 963, 968, in discussing the question of proximate cause, approves the following from the Restatement of the Law of Torts: Also Cox v. Thompson, Utah, 254 P.2d 1047, 1051, which applies the substantial factor test in determining proximate cause. Section 465, Restatement of Torts, states as follows: Therefore it would be good reasoning, in determining proximate cause, the substantial factor test is the same when applied in determining negligence or contributory negligence. This question is further discussed in the following cases: Rush v. Lagomarsino,[3] Rainer Heat & Power Co. v. City of Seattle,[4] and Di Nucci v. Hager.[5] Attention is called to Johnson v. Lewis,[6] in which our Court recently had occasion to consider a similar instruction. In that case the words "`which in any manner, however slight,'" modified the conduct of the party rather than proximate cause. The instruction specifically stated in part as follows: Our Court, we think, properly construed the instruction to the effect that the words "which in any manner, however slight," modified the preceding words, "act" or "omission" and held, in accordance with the distinction heretofore discussed, that slight negligence may be sufficient as a defense while slight causation would not be sufficient. The Court in discussing the instruction stated as follows: It will be noted in the Johnson case no instruction was given defining negligence and proximate cause as to the defendants. We here observe that the phrases "to any extent," "however slight," and "in any degree" are usually used as argumentative phrases in requested instructions attempting to emphasize the duty of the party against whom directed and that it is ill-advised to use them in instructions even when they refer to negligence. From Instructions No. 4 and 6 in the present case it is clear that the Court used the phrase under discussion to modify proximate cause rather than negligent conduct. In Instruction No. 4 it was stated "contributory negligence which in any degree contributed to the happening of the accident." In Instruction No. 6 it was stated "contributory negligence which in any degree proximately contributed to the happening of the collision * * * and if such negligence proximately contributes to any extent, however slight, to produce their injury, they cannot recover." Even if we should assume that the instructions were technically correct, in view of other instructions concerning contributory negligence the giving of such instructions constituted prejudicial error. Attention is also directed to the following Utah cases, which received the approval of this Court, touching upon the duties of passengers or guests: Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287, in which the Court states: Hudson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,[7] in which the Court states: In Jackson v. Utah Rapid Transit Co.,[8] in which the Court states: This Court also concludes that the Trial Court committed error in refusing to grant the motion of the defendant W.S. Hatch Company, Inc. for a directed verdict. The motion should have been granted, because it appears from the record that the plaintiffs by a preponderance of the evidence, or by any evidence, failed to prove that the defendant Hatch committed any act of negligence which caused or contributed to the cause of the accident. It is to be recalled that the only act or omission on the part of Hatch Co. was that the driver of the Hatch vehicle, as testified to by Mrs. Cook and Mrs. Hutchings, by signal or some motion directed Mrs. Cook to proceed. We do not believe that it is the law, that the giving of such a signal was an act of negligence on the part of the driver. All the signal amounted to, if given, was a manifestation on the part of Metcalf to Mrs. Cook that as far as he was concerned Mrs. Cook could proceed. At the most all he did was to signal to Mrs. Cook and indicate, as far as Metcalf was concerned, he yielded her the right-of-way. She could see that he was on the left side of the cab of his truck and therefore in no position to see, or to give her any assurance, that there was no traffic approaching upon the right of his truck from the rear. We approve the rule laid down in the case of Harris v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 132 Kan. 715, 297 P. 718, 720, in which the Court states: In the case of Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680, 682, our Court granted a motion for a non-suit and affirmed that ruling on the ground that the plaintiff failed to show causal connection between the negligent conduct complained of by failing to give an arm signal. The Court in this opinion said: In concluding that the Trial Court committed error in not granting the defendant W.S. Hatch Company, Inc. motion for a directed verdict, we do not mean to say, nor to be understood as saying, that the decision reached in this case would be or should be applied to all cases involving signals or motions given by drivers of vehicles to others. It is possible that under certain conditions upon certain highways, such as hills or in the nighttime, a driver of a motor vehicle in signalling a car following such a vehicle to proceed, might, by such a signal or conduct on the part of the driver, be responsible for an accident in which the person relying upon such signal to proceed became involved. In considering the question raised by the defendant and respondent Cook, as to whether or not the plaintiffs failed to make timely or proper objections to the Court's instructions, attention is directed to the recent case of McCall v. Kendrick, 2 Utah 2d 364, 274 P.2d 962, 963, the Court stated as follows: It will be noted in the McCall case no objections or exceptions whatever were raised by the plaintiff to the Court's instructions during the trial of the case, and were raised only in the appeal to the Supreme Court. This, however, is not the fact in the instant case. The record shows that the plaintiffs made during the trial certain objections and took exceptions to the Court's rulings, and, while the plaintiffs could have been more explicit in taking exceptions and in making objections, we feel that such failure on the part of the plaintiffs is not sufficient to warrant a dismissal of plaintiffs' appeal. As to the defendant W.S. Hatch Company, Inc. the cause of action is dismissed. The balance of the case is remanded to the District Court of the Second Judicial District Court of Utah for a re-trial. Costs to appellants. McDONOUGH, C.J., and WADE, CROCKETT and WORTHEN, JJ., concur. HENRIOD, J., having disqualified himself does not participate herein. [1] 32 Utah 246, 90 P. 393, 395. [2] Utah, 239 P.2d 1075. [3] 196 Cal. 308, 237 P. 1066, 1067. [4] 113 Wash. 95, 193 P. 233, 236. [5] 184 Or. 555, 200 P.2d 380. [6] Utah, 240 P.2d 498, 500. [7] Utah, 233 P.2d 357, 358. [8] 77 Utah 21, 290 P. 970, 971.