Case Title: Townsend v. Integrated Manufacturing and Assembly

Citation: 

Docket Number: 424, 2013

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2013-10-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LOUISE TOWNSEND,  
 
Claimant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
INTEGRATED 
MANUFACTURING AND 
ASSEMBLY, 
 
           Employer Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 424, 2013 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  C.A. No. N13A-02-003 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                         Submitted: August 29, 2013 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: October 7, 2013 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 7th day of October 2013, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening 
brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it 
appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
This is an appeal from the Superior Court’s July 30, 2013 order 
dismissing an appeal from the January 14, 2013 decision and order of the Industrial 
Accident Board (the “Board” or the “IAB”), which dismissed the petition for 
compensation due of the claimant-appellant, Louise Townsend.  The employer-
appellee, Integrated Manufacturing and Assembly (“Integrated”), has moved to 
 
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affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face 
of the opening brief that this appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record before us reflects that, in May 2008, Townsend, through 
counsel, filed a petition with the IAB alleging that she suffered an injury to her 
right knee while working at Integrated.  The petition originally was scheduled to be 
heard in September 2008.  However, during a medical examination by a defense 
expert, an issue arose concerning a possible psychological component of 
Townsend’s alleged injury.  A continuance of the hearing was granted to allow for 
a psychological examination of Townsend by the defense.   
 
(3) 
The hearing on Townsend’s petition was re-scheduled for October 
2008.  In September 2008, Townsend’s counsel withdrew.  Later that month, 
Townsend was hospitalized with depression and her IAB case was stayed.  New 
counsel entered his appearance in the case in December 2008.  The hearing was 
then re-scheduled for April 8, 2009.  Because Integrated was having difficulty 
getting Townsend to cooperate with medical examinations, the hearing date again 
was continued until June 5, 2009.   
 
 
 
(4) 
A hearing took place on May 21, 2009 to address multiple issues, 
including Townsend’s current deteriorated psychological state, her lack of 
cooperation with medical examinations scheduled by the defense, her failure to 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
 
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produce requested medical documents and her inability to produce a medical 
expert on her behalf.  The Board stayed the case pending Townsend’s recovery.  
The matter remained stayed for almost three years.   
 
(5) 
In March 2012, Integrated moved for dismissal of Townsend’s 
petition.  A hearing was held on the motion on May 17, 2012.  Townsend’s counsel 
informed the Board that his client’s condition had not changed and she remained 
unable to participate in the prosecution of her claims.  The Board denied 
Integrated’s motion to dismiss, but lifted the stay.  Townsend’s petition was 
scheduled to be heard on September 17, 2012.  Prior to the hearing, Townsend’s 
counsel withdrew.      
 
(6) 
A legal hearing was held on September 13, 2012 to address 
Townsend’s failure to respond to Integrated’s request for production of medical 
records.  Townsend’s husband and daughter appeared and informed the Board that, 
due to her psychological condition, Townsend remained unable to participate in the 
proceedings.  The Board advised them to retain Delaware counsel and continued 
the hearing until January 8, 2013.  Another hearing was held on December 13, 
2012 on Integrated’s renewed motion to dismiss Townsend’s petition.  The Board 
advised Townsend’s husband and daughter that, because Townsend was not 
competent to represent herself at the hearing, Delaware counsel had to be retained 
 
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to represent her by the hearing date of January 8, 2013 or her petition would be 
dismissed.    
 
(7) 
On January 8, 2013, Townsend’s husband and daughter again 
appeared in her place.  They informed the Board that Townsend was still 
psychologically unable to appear to present her case.  Delaware counsel had not 
been retained to represent Townsend, no medical evidence had been submitted on 
her behalf and no medical expert had been retained to support her claims.  On 
January 14, 2013, the Board issued its order dismissing Townsend’s petition.   
 
(8) 
The matter was then appealed to the Superior Court.  The record 
reflects that Townsend’s husband and daughter, and not Townsend, filed the appeal 
papers in the Superior Court.  On February 28, 2013, Integrated filed a motion to 
dismiss the appeal on that ground.  On April 17, 2013, the Superior Court informed 
Townsend that she had 30 days in which to retain Delaware counsel to respond to 
the motion to dismiss.  On May 28, 2013, Townsend’s husband sent a letter to the 
Superior Court judge stating that he was attempting to engage Delaware counsel.  
On July 30, 2013, in the absence of any evidence that Townsend was now capable 
of representing herself or that Delaware counsel would be entering an appearance 
on behalf of Townsend, the Superior Court issued its decision dismissing the 
appeal on the ground that, by filing the appeal, Townsend’s husband and daughter 
had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. 
 
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(9) 
As best the Court can discern based upon the papers filed, the grounds 
for this appeal are that Townsend currently has discomfort in her legs, which she 
attributes to her employment at Integrated, and that Townsend’s husband and 
daughter were not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law because they were 
acting pursuant to a power of attorney. 
 
(10) The unauthorized practice of law occurs where there is an exercise of 
judgment on a matter of Delaware law by a person not admitted to the Delaware 
Bar on behalf of another person.2  Under well-settled Delaware law, a non-party to 
a lawsuit has no standing to file an appeal in a Delaware court.3  Only a member of 
the Delaware Bar, a party appearing pro se or an attorney appearing pro hac vice 
may participate in such an appeal.4  Dismissal is the proper remedy where a party 
is incapable of representing themselves and an appeal has been filed in a Delaware 
court on behalf of that party by a non-party who is not an attorney permitted to 
practice law in the State of Delaware.5  Having carefully reviewed the parties’ 
submissions and the record below, we conclude that the Superior Court, having 
provided Townsend ample opportunity to retain Delaware counsel to represent her 
                                                 
2 Delaware State Bar Ass’n. v. Alexander, 386 A.2d 652, 654, 661 (Del. 1978). 
3 Townsend v. Griffith, 570 A.2d 1157, 1158 (Del. 1990) (citing Del. Const. art. IV, §11, Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 10, §960, Supr. Ct. R. 7 and Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 
534, 541-49 (1986)). 
4 Id. (citing Delaware State Bar Ass’n v. Alexander, 386 A.2d 652 (Del. 1978)). 
5 Townsend v. Griffith, 570 A.2d at 1158. 
 
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interests, properly dismissed the appeal from the IAB filed by Townsend’s 
husband and daughter.         
 
(11) It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by settled 
Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, there was no 
abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                                 
6 As a result of this Court’s Order on Integrated’s motion to affirm, Integrated’s motion to strike 
and motion to dismiss, as well as the responses thereto, are moot and will not be considered by 
the Court.