Case Title: ANTHONY MEIMA, an Individual V. THOMAS C. BROEMMEL, as Trustee of the Northern Commercial Trust dated July 24, 2001; and THOMAS BROEMMEL, Individually

Citation: 

Docket Number: 04-159

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
ANTHONY MEIMA, an Individual V. THOMAS C. BROEMMEL, as Trustee of the Northern Commercial Trust dated July 24, 2001; and THOMAS BROEMMEL, Individually2005 WY 87117 P.3d 429Case Number: 04-159Decided: 08/05/2005
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
ANTHONY 
MEIMA, an Individual,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
THOMAS 
C. BROEMMEL, as Trustee

of the 
Northern Commercial Trust dated

July 24, 
2001; and THOMAS

BROEMMEL, 
Individually,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants).

 
 

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
            
John M. Kuker and Matthew H. Romsa of Romsa & Kuker, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

 
 
            
Michael E. Warren of Sawyer & Warren, P.C., Torrington, Wyoming.

 
 
 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant, 
Anthony Meima (Meima), met the appellee, Thomas C. Broemmel (Broemmel), in 
2001.  The two subsequently 
discussed several business propositions, including Broemmel's involvement in 
financing Meima's purchase of a house in Torrington and Broemmel's investment in Meima's real 
property in California (also known as the Baltic 
properties).  The parties executed 
numerous documents in that regard; however, their business relationship 
deteriorated and a lawsuit was filed.  
Following a bench trial, the district court essentially entered a 
judgment in favor of Broemmel.  
Meima appeals from the district court's judgment and claims that the 
district court erred in several respects.  
We will affirm.

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      We find that the 
dispositive issues in the instant case are as follows:

 
 
            
1.         
Whether the district court erred in finding insufficient intent to create 
an express trust regarding the Torrington house, 
and whether we should address Meima's issue concerning the imposition of a 
constructive trust on the Torrington house and/or the Baltic 
properties?

 
 
            
2.         
Whether the district court erred in finding that an oral contact between 
the parties did not exist prior to July 24, 2001?

 
 
            
3.         
Whether the district court erred in rejecting Meima's claims that the 
July 24, 2001, lease/purchase agreement was invalid due to a lack of 
consideration, economic duress, undue influence, or unconscionability of 
terms?

 
 
            
4.         
Whether the district court's judgment directly affected the title to the 
Baltic properties?

 
 
            
5.         
Whether the district court erred in other aspects of its 
judgment?

 
 

 
 
[¶3]      Meima, a 
self-described real estate investor,1 was searching for a new residence 
following a divorce in which his wife received or "wasted," according to Meima, 
up to fifteen residential properties valued at over $2 million.  He was admittedly "quite sensitive to 
losing houses" following the divorce and most recently had bought a house in 
Colorado with 
a girlfriend.  The girlfriend 
obtained the loan to buy the house, the house was titled in her name, and Meima 
contributed $25,000.00 to $30,000.00 in equity money towards the purchase.  When the relationship ended, Meima lost 
his equity money and needed to find another residence.  He ultimately searched for a residence 
in Wyoming 
because of the moderate pricing relative to the quality of the housing, and 
because it "was a good market to buy."

 
 
[¶4]      Meima and 
Broemmel met at a Denver gun show in early 2001.2  The two proceeded to discuss Broemmel's 
role in potentially financing Meima's purchase of a house in Torrington and other 
business propositions.  They 
ultimately executed several documents in this regard.  We will set forth the pertinent contents 
of these documents and detail each party's trial testimony regarding the 
progression of their business relationship, the documents at issue, and their 
disputes.  We will then summarize 
the district court's resolution of the resulting 
litigation.

 
 

 
 
[¶5]      On February 20, 
2001, Meima signed a contract to buy real estate located in Torrington.  The document named the Northern 
Commercial Trust3 as the buyer, provided that title 
to the house would be conveyed to the "Northern Commercial Trust," offered a 
purchase price of $186,000.00 (a $1,000.00 cashier's check purchased by "Anthony 
Meima" had been remitted as earnest money), indicated that the offer was 
"contingent upon loan approval" with financing to be "Other," and set a June 16, 
2001, closing date.  On February 21, 
2001, the seller submitted a counter-offer to Meima that increased the purchase 
price to $198,000.00 and the total earnest money to $5,000.00, required the 
buyer to provide a "satisfactory letter of prequalification from [a] lender by 
March 30, 2001," and set a mandatory closing date of June 11, 2001 (or the buyer 
would forfeit the earnest money).  
The buyer subsequently agreed to the increased purchase price and earnest 
money (another $4,000.00 cashier's check had been remitted by "Anthony Meima" on 
April 10, 2001) and to provide "a cash sale commitment or lender 
prequalification letter on April 15, 2001."

 
 
[¶6]      On April 29, 
2001, Meima signed (and Broemmel signed as a "Witness") an addendum to the house 
purchase contract stating that all "financing contingencies shall be removed," 
"Buyer and Seller shall proceed with dates set for closing," and "Buyer agrees 
to the disclosure of the attached financial statement to the Seller."  The attached financial statement was the 
"Personal Financial Statement" of Broemmel and his wife, Lani K. Lee.  The seller apparently agreed to the 
addendum on May 7, 2001.

 
 
[¶7]      On May 25, 2001, 
a Real Estate Purchase Option was executed between David A. Kubich,4 as seller, and "Tom C. Broemmel or 
Assigns," as buyer, which option was recorded June 11, 2002.  The option granted Broemmel the 
exclusive right to purchase the "Baltic-Birchville Properties" (including 
specified mineral interests and "all rights and interests acquired from Meima" 
in these properties, situate in California) (hereinafter "the Baltic 
properties") for $140,000.00 if Broemmel exercised the option prior to November 
25, 2002.  Meima had purchased the 
Baltic properties, "mountain property" north of Lake Tahoe, in 1979 for $800,000.00.

 
 
[¶8]      On June 11, 2001, 
Meima signed another addendum to the house purchase contract that extended the 
closing date to "on or before August 9, 2001," required Meima to submit an 
additional $10,000.00 in earnest money by June 12, 2001, and obligated Meima to 
pay eight percent interest on the balance of the purchase price until the 
closing date.  The seller signed the 
addendum on June 12, 2001, and a cashier's check for $10,000.00 was issued on 
June 12, 2001, listing the purchaser as "[A]nthony 
[M]eima."

 
 
[¶9]      Meima and 
Broemmel then executed a July 24, 2001, "Terms of Lease/Purchase Agreement" that 
included the following terms:

 
 
(a)       Broemmel 
will pay $185,817.91 to finance the balance of the Torrington house purchase 
price for "Anthony Meima."  Broemmel 
will "hold [the] property in trust for Meima on a lease/purchase for a price 
determined by all costs and expenses incurred by Broemmel to acquire that 
property and under" the other conditions set forth in the 
agreement.

 
 
(b)       Meima will pay 
a monthly "lease payment" of $2,000.00, which payments will not be applied to 
offset the amount Broemmel contributed to the house's purchase price.  If the "full home 
loan" is not paid in full within one year, the monthly lease payments will 
increase to $2,500.00.

 
 
(c)        Meima 
will pay all "taxes, insurance, assessments and all costs and expenses incurred 
by Broemmel associated" with the house.

 
 
(d)       Meima will 
provide Broemmel the Celina Flat Mine property "free and clear of encumbrances" 
as "additional collateral . . .." The property is "valued at $70,000" and if 
Meima "defaults in monthly payments for 2 months, Broemmel may sell original 
property and X' property to recover all costs and expenses incurred by 
Broemmel."  
"[T]his property reverts back to Meima" when Broemmel is paid "all moneys 
due him . . .."

 
 
(e)       Meima will also 
provide to Broemmel a collection of Mauser rifles "at a cost of $16,500.00.  If Meima defaults 
in monthly payments for 2 months, Meima relinquishes all equity in Mauser 
rifles[.]"

 
 
(f)         
Meima will pay Broemmel a $10,000.00 profit in addition to the "lease 
payments" for financing the house.  The $10,000.00 profit may be paid from the 
"profit" on the Baltic properties or from stock options related to the Baltic 
properties.5  Meima will also provide Broemmel a new 98K 
Mauser Rifle as "partial payment for financing this house."

 
 
(g)       Meima "grants" 
Broemmel, "as trustee, total control of the Baltic properties to sell or do 
[whatever] is necessary to recover any losses incurred as a result of the 
purchase of said property."  Broemmel will remain as "trustee" for "2 
years or as long as Broemmel has not been paid off for the purchase of Meima's 
home."

 
 
(h)        "It is 
further agreed . . . that when the Baltic properties are sold, [Broemmel] will 
receive 20% of the profit and 50% of any stock options received as a result of 
the sale."

 
 
"Tom Broemmel" signed the agreement as "Owner," and 
"Anthony Meima" signed the agreement as "Buyer."

 
 
[¶10]   The "Buyer" listed on the Torrington house closing statement 
dated July 24, 2001, is "Thomas Broemmel, Trustee of the Northern Commercial 
Trust."  On 
July 24, 2001, the Torrington house was deeded to 
"THOMAS BROEMMEL, Trustee of the Northern Commercial Trust, dated the 24th day of July, 2001 . . .."

 
 
[¶11]   On July 25, 2001, a Promissory Note was 
executed between the "Borrower," "Anthony Meima," and the "Lender," "Thomas C. 
Broemmel and Lani K. Lee."  In it, the Borrower promised to pay 
$185,817.91 ("with no interest") and $2,000.00 "monthly lease payments" (that 
will not "reduce the amount of this note") to the Lender subject to the 
conditions of an "Addendum to Promissory Note dated July 25, 2001 Terms of 
Lease/Purchase Agreement."  The addendum contains many of the same terms 
as the July 24, 2001, lease/purchase agreement, with the following 
exceptions:

 
 
(a)       Broemmel, "as 
trustee of Northern Commercial Trust, has sole authority to sell or convey said 
property in his own name until he is paid in full the $185,817.91 and all costs 
and expenses associated with this acquisition."  "The Northern Commercial Trust is limited to 
an agreement by Tom Broemmel to hold [the Torrington house] for the benefit of 
Anthony Meima pending performance of all terms of this preceding lease/purchase 
agreement by Anthony Meima."  If "Meima defaults in monthly payments for 2 
months, Broemmel may sell [the Torrington house] and Celina Flat Mine properties 
to recover the principal, all costs and expenses incurred by Broemmel."

 
 
(b)       Meima will 
provide Broemmel a collection of "13-98K Mauser rifles to Broemmel at a cost of 
$16,500.00.  If 
Meima defaults in monthly payments for 2 months, Meima relinquishes all equity 
in Mauser rifles."  
A list of the rifles was attached.

 
 
(c)        When the 
Baltic properties are sold, "Broemmel will receive 20% of the sales price if the 
sales price is $500,000 or less to a maximum of $100,000[] and 50% of any stock 
options received as a result of the sale."

 
 
(d)       Broemmel will 
allow Meima to sell the Baltic properties or the Celina Flat Mine property 
"provide[d] the proceeds are applied toward the retirement of the 
$185,817.91[.]"

 
 
[¶12]   On July 27, 2001, "Anthony Meima" 
granted a specific power of attorney to Broemmel "in all matter[s] relating to 
the" Torrington house on behalf of him 
"personally and for my trust, Northern Commercial Trust . . .."6  In turn, Broemmel signed an Agreement to 
Execute Power of Attorney on July 27, 2001, promising to execute a specific 
durable power of attorney for "Anthony Meima" to have "sole authority and 
discretion of the Baltic Properties," although Meima's authority was to cease if 
Meima defaulted on the promissory note dated July 25, 2001.

 
 
[¶13]   On April 1, 2002, a Mortgage Deed With 
Release of Homestead was executed naming the Northern Commercial Trust dated 
July 24, 2002 (although it presumably meant to say 2001), as mortgagor, Thomas 
C. Broemmel and Lani K. Lee as the mortgagees, and the Torrington house as the 
mortgaged property for $185,817.91.  The mortgage was signed by Thomas C. Broemmel 
for the Northern Commercial Trust.

 
 
[¶14]   In June 2003, a portion of the Baltic 
properties was sold to Michael Sinclair for about $440,000.00.  Broemmel was named 
as the property's seller.  After accounting for costs associated with 
the sale, the balance of $381,603.21 was distributed as follows:  $142,000.00 to 
Broemmel for "partial repayment," $30,000.00 to Meima's financial backer, 
$22,600.00 to Meima's trial attorney "for outstanding legal fees,"7 and $187,003.21 to Meima's trial attorney's 
trust account.  
Eventually, by "mutual agreement," $20,000.00 was distributed to Broemmel 
and $15,000.00 was distributed to Meima from the trust account.

 
 

 
 
[¶15]   Meima testified that he expressed his 
need for someone to finance the purchase of a home when he met Broemmel in 
2001.  Broemmel 
replied that he was in the process of selling a building in Denver,8 and was indeed 
seeking "investment opportunities . . .."  Meima reportedly offered Broemmel a twenty 
percent "net profit interest" in the Baltic properties (with Meima bearing all 
of the marketing expenses) as "compensation"9 for financing 
the Torrington house purchase, and 
Broemmel said "sure, I will do that."  During the next "month or so," Meima remained 
in "frequent" contact with Broemmel in that regard and personally met with 
Broemmel three to five times.

 
 
[¶16]   Meima had considered several other 
financing options (a co-signer, optioning or pledging other property, or a loan 
through an acquaintance at a financial institution), but ultimately concluded 
that Broemmel was "so agreeable that there was no necessity in bringing in four 
or five competing offers."  Meima also claimed that he was "unknown in 
Wyoming" and his "credit had been 
destroyed in the divorce," so he was "not a good lending prospect in the eyes of 
institutions."  
Besides, according to Meima, there

 
 
were escape clauses in the contract [to purchase the house 
in Torrington] and it was a long closing at [the seller's] request; so there was 
plenty of time to put something in place; and, again, I could find any number of 
reasons to back out of the deal and recover the $5,000 earnest money.

 
 
[¶17]   Meima had negotiated, or was 
negotiating, a sale of the Baltic properties to David Kubich, a timber land and 
sawmill owner, whereby Mr. Kubich would purchase the properties for $120,000.00 
and grant Meima an option to repurchase the properties by November 15, 2002, for 
$140,000.00 (ten percent simple interest with no other conditions or 
complications, according to Meima).  Meima testified that he needed to end the 
"endless arguments" with his ex-wife about the value of the properties, and to 
clear title and obtain new title insurance to the properties "particularly with 
respect to the mineral rights, and . . . a sale to a third individual 
was the cleanest way to take care of that and to satisfy any and all residual 
claims from my ex-wife on the property."  Meima's ex-wife had signed purchase option 
agreements up to a value of $3.8 million and "knew the potential [value] was 
there."

 
 
[¶18]   Meima wanted to tie in the Kubich 
option with the Torrington house purchase.  He essentially 
wanted to provide Broemmel a purchase option (by assigning Mr. Kubich's "minimal 
cost position" in the Baltic properties to Broemmel) so that Broemmel would have 
collateral or security for his role in financing Meima's purchase of the 
Torrington house.  Broemmel would also 
be reimbursed for the house purchase out of Meima's eighty percent share of the 
profits from the Baltic properties, but it was "never the agreement" that 
Broemmel would be reimbursed for the cost of exercising the Kubich option (the 
two also did not discuss or agree on rent or any other payments with respect to 
the house purchase).  
Meima had Broemmel sign a disclosure statement that Meima's ex-wife 
"would never find out about this" because Meima did not "want her reinvolved in 
a California divorce.  You can come back 
20 years later and make some sort of claim on some sort of pretext.  I was tired of 
that."

 
 
[¶19]   Meima had discussed the value of the 
Baltic properties with Broemmel "in detail" and told Broemmel the properties 
were worth $2.5 million.  Broemmel went to California in April 2001, to 
confirm personally the value of the Baltic properties (at least to the extent of 
the $140,000.00 cost of exercising the Kubich option).  At that time, the 
above-referenced April 29, 2001, addendum to the Torrington house purchase contract 
was executed, in which all financial contingencies were removed from the house 
purchase contract and Broemmel's financial statement was submitted to the 
house's seller.  
According to Meima, Broemmel had by then agreed to finance the Torrington house purchase, and Meima 
proceeded with the Kubich transaction.10  Meima would not 
have participated in the transaction if Broemmel had not signed the addendum to 
the Torrington house 
purchase contract because there was no "compelling necessity" to sell the Baltic 
properties to Mr. Kubich unless Broemmel financed the Torrington house purchase and 
participated in the profit-splitting arrangement on the Baltic properties.  Broemmel also 
"subsequently agreed in writing to exercise the Kubich option;" he "bought a 20 
percent net profit interest in the property by exercising the Kubich 
option."

 
 
[¶20]   The documents for the June 2001 closing 
on the Torrington house were sent to 
Broemmel and there was no indication that "anything was amiss."  Upon receiving the 
documents, Broemmel refused to proceed with the transaction because "his wife 
would divorce him . . .."  According to Meima, his contract with the 
seller of the house was a "specific performance contract," and Meima had 
"everything at risk;" Broemmel was "basically in total control of everything I 
had" at "no cost to himself for a year and a half" (the time period in which 
Broemmel could exercise the Kubich option on the Baltic properties).  Meima "was in a 
total loss position of everything with no place to live, [and] having lost all 
the cash [he] could raise at that point in time"he was "compelled to try to 
work out whatever was necessary to get" Broemmel to proceed with the Torrington house purchase.  Meima worked with 
his realtor and the seller (who was "quite traumatized") to extend the closing 
on the house.  
In order to obtain the extension, the seller required Meima to submit an 
additional $10,000.00 "nonrefundable deposit" or earnest money the next day.11

 
 
[¶21]   Ten to fourteen days later, Broemmel 
said he "would come to Denver about the house" 
and Meima ultimately met with Broemmel around July 24, 2001.  Broemmel "worked . 
. . up" a contract on his computer (the July 24, 2001, "Terms of Lease/Purchase 
Agreement") and "presented" it to Meima.  With respect to the particular terms of the 
contract, Meima testified as follows:

 
 
(a)       The terms as to 
rent, taxes, insurance, assessments, costs, and expenses were Broemmel's 
"demand[s]" and were "not discussed."  Broemmel also stated that he "didn't care how 
long it went at $2500 a month . . .."

 
 
(b)       Broemmel 
"wanted additional collateral" and asked what Meima's Celina Flat Mine property 
was worth.  
Meima replied that it was worth $10,000.00 or more and Broemmel "wrote in 
$70,000 as an additional lien against that."  Meima did not volunteer this property, and the 
property was not part of his understanding of the parties' original 
agreement.

 
 
(c)        Broemmel 
had seen the firearms referred to in the agreement at the Denver gun show.

 
 
(d)       Broemmel 
wanted, without discussion, the additional $10,000.00 profit.

 
 
(e)       Broemmel 
"wanted total control over all property, all assets, and that was, essentially, 
nonnegotiable.  
We did establish a two-year term as a reasonable time period to sell or 
deal on the California property, and he agreed 
to stand in as trustee for that time period."  It was "always a condition of" Meima's that 
Broemmel "be trustee [of the Northern Commercial Trust] and not owner of 
record."

 
 
(f)         The 
provision as to the profits from the sale of the Baltic properties went "back to 
the original verbal discussions with an agreement . . . that there would be a 
split of that initially of 20 percent, net, to" Broemmel.

 
 
[¶22]   According to Meima, Broemmel also 
wanted a promissory note "for his wife," and drafted the July 25, 2001, addendum 
to the promissory note the following day.  Meima testified that, regarding the "trust" 
language contained in this addendum, he "never would have begun the relationship 
[with Broemmel] if title was to be taken in Torrington in any other format than 
Northern Commercial Trust and Broemmel as a trustee."  He added that 
Broemmel was to act as the trustee for Meima's benefit, and was to resign as 
trustee when the $185,817.91 was paid in full.

 
 
[¶23]   Meima claimed that he signed these 
written documents because he "really [had] no option at this time because 
Broemmel controlled without any recourse against him, he controlled the 
California property;" if 
Meima did not sign the agreements, Broemmel could "liquidate the Torrington property and liquidate the 
California property, and there was, 
essentially, no provision for any recourse against that."  Virtually none of 
the terms were negotiated (or had been discussed previously), "there was no way 
to negotiate," and Meima was "under duress."  Yet, Meima admitted that he was able to 
clarify a couple of points and that he "got . . . some terms regarding Northern 
Commercial Trust" into "all the purchase agreements."  Meima similarly 
testified that Broemmel drafted the July 27, 2001, power of attorney relating to 
the Torrington house and Meima signed it because he "had no option;" Broemmel 
"controlled all the property."

 
 
[¶24]   Meima paid the monthly rent payments 
through March 2002, but did not pay the property taxes or insurance on the 
Torrington house.12  At times, a 
financial backer made the rent payments directly to Broemmel on Meima's 
behalf.  Meima 
felt at some point that due to "financial constraints" he "had to market the 
California property" and stopped 
paying the rent.  
Thereafter, the parties' relationship went "rapidly down hill."

 
 
[¶25]   Following the June 2003 sale of a 
portion of the Baltic properties to Mr. Sinclair, Broemmel "immediately" 
demanded $142,000.00 from the sale proceeds.  There was never an agreement that Broemmel 
was to receive these funds; it was merely paid at "his request."  Meima testified 
that Broemmel was the owner of record for the Baltic properties, subject to the 
July 27, 2001, power of attorney and the parties' profit-splitting 
agreement.

 
 

 
 
[¶26]   When the parties met in 2001, Broemmel 
mentioned that he was in the process of selling a building in Denver and was interested in 
purchasing firearms collections.  Broemmel did not recall discussing any other 
potential business transactions with Meima at that time.  After Broemmel 
moved to North Carolina on April 10, 2001, 
he had a "lot" of contact with Meima, who became "very persistent" and "very 
aggressive . . .."

 
 
[¶27]   Meima was interested in "having his own 
home" and at some point offered Broemmel "some incentives" to finance the 
Torrington house purchase.  The parties 
discussed the Baltic properties (including the Kubich option), valued at over $2 
million according to Meima, because Meima was attempting to transfer the 
properties so his ex-wife would acquiesce to the transfer without having "any 
information how valuable it was . . .."13  Meima promised that 
in exchange for financing the Torrington house purchase, Broemmel 
would receive twenty percent of the "realized profits on the sale or the 
development of the" Baltic properties, and that was "part of . . . our 
agreement."

 
 
[¶28]   Broemmel could not make any commitments 
until April, because he would not have any funds until his own building was sold 
(it sold April 4, 2001).  While the parties talked for "quite some 
time" about Meima's proposal, Broemmel "was never enthusiastic about it.  I knew I would 
probably run it by my wife, and she [would be] against it . . .."14  However, if Broemmel "could get in and out of 
that thing in a short period of time [(six months)], like Mr. Meima told me, 
then it would be okay" and the proposal seemed like a "worthwhile item to take a 
look at . . .."  
According to Broemmel, Meima assumed "I was going to do it from the get 
go.  His 
interpretation of my enthusiasm when I didn't have the wherewithal to do it was 
way beyond what the reality was."  Nevertheless, Broemmel verbally "made a 
commitment" to Meima to finance the Torrington house purchase sometime 
after April 10, 2001.15

 
 
[¶29]   Broemmel did not recall telling Meima 
the night before the June 2001 closing on the Torrington house that Broemmel would 
not proceed with the purchase because his wife would object.  Rather, according 
to Broemmel, Meima "hadn't any document for me or any money commitment or 
anything.  It 
couldn't have been closing;" Meima "didn't have any financial commitment or firm 
resources that would allow anyone to close the night before [the closing]."  Broemmel similarly 
did not recall ever threatening to not exercise the Kubich option.

 
 
[¶30]   Prior to the July 2001 closing on the 
Torrington house, Broemmel began 
putting together the agreement he and Meima had "talked about.  We had to have an 
agreement before we entered into this contract."  Broemmel testified as follows regarding the 
July 24, 2001, lease/purchase agreement, the July 25, 2001, promissory note, and 
the July 25, 2001, addendum to the promissory note:

 
 
Well, it was a summation of all that we had talked about 
over the previous months on the different conditions for the purchase of the 
house; and I knew that if I was going to be able to some time in the future 
justify this to my wife, I would have to make sure that I am very well covered, 
collaterallywise, or I would risk serious injury to my marriage; so I made sure 
I reiterated what we had already agreed upon and made sure the collateral was 
sufficient that I didn't think I had a problem if he would default.

 
 
Q [Broemmel's counsel:]      Is there anything 
there that was not agreed to before the document was signed?

 
 
A         I 
don't think that we had come to a conclusion yet on the monthly payments that 
were going to be necessary; and I told him that I had to have this paid back in 
6 months, and he said that he could do it; and I said, well, I will charge you 
$2,000 a month then for the rent on the place to encourage, make sure I do get 
this paid back, because I don't want to jeopardize my relationship with my wife. 

 
 
            
He had already agreed to most of the other terms.  He did provide 
additional collateral by saying he had an additional piece of property, the 
Celina Flat one, and he gave me that information; and as far as the rifles are 
concerned, the collection, he had a fellow that had it, and he didn't want to 
lose that collection; so I paid $16,500 and kept possession of it; and it was 
stipulated that if he defaults payment for two weeks, I will keep his equity in 
it; even though I don't know how much more than the $16,500 it was worth.

 
 
Meima never objected to any of the terms of these 
agreements (which agreements were an "assimilation of what [Meima] said, what we 
had agreed upon, except, basically, for the rent issue") and Broemmel merely 
"put things in writing which we agreed upon" ("we were trying to get exactly 
what we needed before the sale actually took place").16

 
 
[¶31]   Regarding the trust language in 
particular, Broemmel testified that he did not know anything about trusts and 
initially wanted to have the Torrington house titled 
solely in his name.  
Meima convinced him to "switch[] it" to a trustee; Broemmel would have 
"complete say over anything that goes on inside the trust; and there is no way 
that [Broemmel] could get taken advantage of . . .."17  That "sounded 
logical" to Broemmel and he "went ahead and proceeded."

 
 
            
[Meima's counsel:]    Did you take this property as 
trustee of Northern Commercial Trust under your own type of trust agreement, a 
verbal agreement that you had, that you would hold that property in trust for 
Mr. Meima?

 
 
            
A         We 
did it specifically for this transaction.  That's all I can say.  I never saw another 
trust, so I can't say it was for that trust or for whatever trust.  We just named that 
trust for that transaction.

            

Q         And 
you would be a trustee, correct?

 
 
            
A         
Yes.

 
 
            
Q         And 
in your written agreements, the ones that . . . we have been looking 
at, there is a first one and then an addendum, marked Exhibit 14 and 15, you put 
it in there to hold it for the benefit of Meima, correct?

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
Q         
Okay, No. 10.

 
 
            
A         
Yes.

 
 
            
Q         So 
you were acting as a trustee in that capacity?

 
 
            
A         
Yes.

 
 
            
Q         And 
you and your wife loaned money to the Northern Commercial Trust so the trust 
could invest in the property?

 
 
            
A         I 
came there to take possession in my own name.  I didn't feel comfortable about the trust, 
no; but when he assured me that everything is in place, then I went ahead and 
took possession as the trustee.

 
 
Broemmel further stated during his testimony that the trust 
purchased the Torrington property, that Broemmel was "still trustee," that 
Broemmel lent money to the trust for the Torrington house purchase, and that 
Broemmel was holding the Torrington house in trust for Meima pending Meima's 
performance of the lease/purchase agreement.

 
 
[¶32]   Broemmel also agreed at some point to 
exercise the Kubich option and it was "always" his understanding that he would 
be reimbursed for the costs to exercise the option; Meima's testimony to the 
contrary was "absurd."  In order to obtain the money to exercise the 
option, Broemmel ultimately contributed $40,000.00, and another individual 
agreed to contribute $100,000.00 if Broemmel would pay him $40,000.00 in 
interest.  
Broemmel testified that Meima agreed to this arrangement and to reimburse 
Broemmel for both the $140,000.00 to exercise the option, as well as the 
$40,000.00 in interest Broemmel paid to the third individual.  When a portion of 
the Baltic properties was sold in 2003, Broemmel received $142,000.00 
(apparently $2,000.00 in expenses were incurred in exercising the option) and 
paid $140,000.00 of it to the third individual.18

 
 
[¶33]   Broemmel paid the property taxes and 
insurance on the Torrington house.  Broemmel ultimately 
claimed that he was owed $185,817.91 for his initial contribution to the 
Torrington house purchase, $45,500.00 in rent from April 2002 through October 
2003, $2,762.00 for insurance paid on the Torrington house, $4,195.73 for taxes 
paid on the Torrington house, the $10,000.00 profit for financing the Torrington 
house purchase, and some other amounts that are not of consequence to this 
appeal.

 
 
The Lawsuit and the District Court's Decision

 
 
[¶34]   In August 2002, Meima filed a complaint 
against Broemmel (individually and as trustee of the Northern Commercial Trust 
Dated July 24, 2001) and Broemmel's wife19 seeking to 
quiet title to the Torrington house in Meima.  Meima claimed that 
he was the owner of the house and that Broemmel had no interest in the property 
based on Meima's (as well as his predecessors') "actual, open, notorious, 
visible, exclusive and continuous possession of" the property "for a period of 
ten (10) years immediately preceding the date of the commencement of this 
action."  He 
further sought such "further relief as to th[e] court appears just and equitable 
in the premises."

 
 
[¶35]   In his answer to Meima's complaint, 
Broemmel claimed an interest in the Torrington house and denied that 
Meima had an interest in the house.  Broemmel counterclaimed against Meima, 
asserting that:  
(a) Broemmel, as Trustee of the Northern Commercial Trust dated July 24, 
2001, owned the property and that Meima resided on the property as a lessee; (b) 
that Meima and Broemmel entered into a "type of Promissory Note, Lease Purchase 
Agreement" (the July 25, 2001, Addendum to Promissory Note); (c) that Meima was 
delinquent in his rental payments and had not reduced the amount of the 
promissory note; and (d) that Broemmel was owed $185,817.91 as well as expenses, 
including taxes, insurance, assessments, rent, and the $10,000.00 profit.

 
 
[¶36]   Meima answered Broemmel's 
counterclaims, and included additional factual representations and claims 
against Broemmel seeking a permanent injunction enjoining Broemmel from 
transferring the Torrington house and Meima's 
personal property, and declaratory relief based on economic duress, undue 
influence, and unconscionability regarding the terms of the Lease/Purchase 
Agreement, Promissory Note, Addendum to Promissory Note and Mortgage.  Broemmel then filed 
a brief answer to Meima's new claims.

 
 
[¶37]   The district court held a bench trial 
in October 2003.  
Meima and Broemmel were the only witnesses who testified during the 
trial.  The 
district court issued a lengthy, detailed decision letter in April 2004, which 
letter included the following findings:

 
 
(a)       The district 
court aptly noted that this "case presents a good example of why attorneys 
should be consulted before business agreements are finalized."

 
 
(b)       The district 
court deemed "all pleadings amended to conform to the evidence."

 
 
(c)        Meima 
"had been in a difficult divorce in California, and wanted to conduct 
business without his ex-wife being able to track or locate his assets."

 
 
            
(d)       Meima and 
Broemmel verbally initiated two business deals encompassing vague terms and 
contradictory documents.  They ultimately reached two agreements:  one for the 
Torrington house purchase and 
another for Broemmel's investment in the Baltic properties.  The parties 
"presented disputes" regarding each agreement at trial, requiring the district 
court to ascertain the terms, and meaning, of each agreement.  Each party 
ultimately "construed those vague terms to their advantage" and "attempted to 
persuade the Court that the agreements, whether verbal or written, entirely 
favored each side."

 
 
(e)       Neither "of the 
primary parties appeared particularly credible" but Meima's testimony 
"especially lacked credibility."20

 
 

 
 
[¶38]   The district court found that Broemmel 
agreed to finance Meima's purchase of the Torrington house in late April 2001, 
"but the parties had not agreed to terms (method, interest, repayment, etc)" 
and proceeded to discuss "the terms of the loan" throughout the summer.  "In essence, in 
April, 2001, the parties made an agreement to agree" and did not mutually assent 
to sufficiently specific terms at that time.  By June 11, 2001, the parties had still not 
"worked out all the conditions" on the house purchase and Meima's testimony that 
a complete agreement existed before June 11, 2001, and that Broemmel then 
"backed out at the last minute to extract additional profit," was "not credible 
or persuasive."  
Meima "created his financial condition and wanted to hide assets," and 
Broemmel did not "intend to provide financing until sufficient terms of 
repayment, interest and collateral were agreed upon;" Broemmel's reluctance was 
not "wrongful."

 
 
[¶39]   Instead, the parties agreed to terms 
sometime after June 11, 2001, and the terms were written into the July 24, 2001, 
lease/purchase agreement.  Meima did not object to any of the contract 
terms, complied with the terms by paying rent and transferring the rifles to 
Broemmel, and had assets and failed to explain "why he [did not] utilize those 
assets to support his purchase" of the Torrington house.  Accordingly, 
Broemmel was not "coercive" and Meima's testimony to the contrary was not 
persuasive.  
The district court found that no additional consideration was provided 
for the July 25, 2001, promissory note, the addendum to that promissory note, or 
the subsequent mortgage.

 
 
[¶40]   The district court concluded that Meima 
paid rent to Broemmel from August 2001 to March 2002, but did not pay rent 
thereafter, nor did Meima pay the property taxes or the insurance for the 
Torrington house.  
Due to Meima's default, the district court found that Meima owed 
$60,500.00 in rent through April 2004, $4,195.73 in property taxes, and 
$2,762.00 for property insurance, and that Broemmel's $10,000.00 profit had 
previously been satisfied from the Baltic properties sale proceeds consistent 
with the lease/purchase agreement.  The district court declared that Broemmel 
held title to the Torrington house as an individual, 
issued an order of ejectment, and terminated the lease/purchase agreement.

 
 
            
(B)  The Baltic Properties

 
 
[¶41]   Meima owned and hoped to sell the 
Baltic properties, which properties had a potential value of $2.5 million "if 
properly marketed."  
Meima initially sold the properties to Mr. Kubich for $120,000.00, and 
Mr. Kubich agreed that Meima could repurchase the Baltic properties for 
$140,000.00.  
According to the district court, Meima participated in this transaction 
to keep the value of the properties, and/or the properties, "away from [Meima's 
ex-]wife" and Meima was either "unwilling or unable" to obtain financing from a 
commercial lender to repurchase the property from Mr. Kubich.  Meima asked 
Broemmel to assume, and pay the $140,000.00 to exercise, the option to 
repurchase the properties from Mr. Kubich (this served to further hide the 
properties from Meima's ex-wife and provided Meima the financial backing he 
"apparently did not have").  Meima and Broemmel planned to sell the 
properties for a profit, and agreed that Broemmel would "get his $140,000.00 
back and receive 20% of the net profits from the eventual re-sale" of the 
properties.

 
 
[¶42]   The district court found that the 
parties reached an agreement on the Baltic properties sometime prior to May 25, 
2001; the Baltic properties agreement was separate from the Torrington house purchase, and 
Broemmel agreed to participate in the Baltic properties transaction as an 
"investment."21  The district court concluded that the terms 
of the parties' agreement on the Baltic properties were as follows:  (a) Broemmel would 
obtain and exercise the Kubich option for $140,000.00; (b) Broemmel would 
control the sale of the Baltic properties until he recovered the money he lent 
Meima to purchase the Torrington house or for two years, whichever time period 
was longer; and (c) the proceeds from future sales of the Baltic properties 
would be applied to recover Broemmel's $140,000.00 (plus costs) and the balance 
(after expenses) would be divided eighty percent to Meima and twenty percent to 
Broemmel, with any stock options split "50-50."

 
 
[¶43]   While the July 24, 2001, lease/purchase 
agreement contained terms from the parties' Torrington house purchase contract 
and the parties' Baltic properties agreement, the lease/purchase agreement did 
not contain all of the parties' terms regarding the Baltic properties.  The district court 
proceeded to construe the following term that did appear in the lease/purchase 
agreement:

 
 
"[Meima] further grants Tom Broemmel, as trustee, total 
control of the Baltic properties to sell or do what[ever] is necessary to 
recover any losses incurred as a result of the purchase of said property.  Broemmel will 
remain as trustee for 2 years or as long as Broemmel has not been paid off for 
the purchase of Meima's home."

 
 
The district court found that the term "losses" in this 
provision was ambiguous.  According to the district court, the parties 
anticipated that "losses" would exist before the Baltic properties were sold and 
that the parties intended that such "losses" include the $140,000.00 Broemmel 
paid to exercise the Kubich option.  The district court also found that the term 
"trustee" in this provision was ambiguous because the identities of the trust, 
settlor, beneficiary, and trust terms remained unclear and the parties did not 
intend to create a trust with this language.  Instead, the parties intended that for the 
requisite time period, Broemmel would have the sole authority to approve or 
reject sales of the Baltic properties in order to ensure that he was paid the 
amount he contributed to the Torrington house purchase and the $140,000.00 he 
invested to exercise the Kubich option.  The district court concluded that this 
construction was consistent with the parties' verbal agreement in early 
2001.

 
 
[¶44]   In the fall of 2002, Meima negotiated 
the sale of a portion of the Baltic properties; the sales price was ultimately 
$440,000.00.  
In order to sell this portion of the properties, Broemmel had to pay 
$140,000.00 plus $2,000.00 in expenses to exercise the option to purchase the 
properties from Mr. Kubich.  The district court found that Broemmel 
"obtained title" to the properties by exercising the option, but "acknowledge[d] 
that he only holds the [balance of the properties] subject to the 20%-80% 
[profit-splitting] agreement."  After paying the costs and taxes resulting 
from the sale, $381,603.21 of the sales proceeds remained and were distributed 
as follows: $187,003.21 to Meima's trial attorney's trust account, $22,600.00 to 
Meima's trial attorney, $30,000.00 to Meima's financial backer, and $142,000.00 
to Broemmel.  
Broemmel later received $20,000.00 from the balance retained by Meima's 
trial attorney's trust account, and Meima similarly received $15,000.00.22  The district court found that the proceeds 
from this sale should have been distributed as follows:  $142,000.00 to 
Broemmel, $191,682.56 to Meima (eighty percent), and $47,920.65 to Broemmel 
(twenty percent).

 
 

 
 
[¶45]   We review a district court's express 
findings of fact following a bench trial according to the clearly erroneous 
standard.  We 
do not

 
 
substitute ourselves for the trial court as a finder of 
facts; instead, we defer to those findings unless they are unsupported by the 
record or erroneous as a matter of law.  Life Care Centers of 
America, Inc. v. Dexter, 2003 WY 38, ¶ 7, 65 P.3d 385, ¶ 7 (Wyo.2003).  We affirm the trial 
court's findings if there is any evidence to support them.  Id.  We accept the 
evidence of the prevailing party as true and give that party the benefit of all 
favorable inferences that can fairly be drawn from the evidence while 
disregarding conflicting evidence.  Narans v. 
Paulsen, 803 P.2d 358, 360 (Wyo.1990).  A reviewing court will not set aside the 
court's findings merely because it might have reached a different result.  Conner v. Board of County Commissioners, Natrona 
County, 2002 WY 148, ¶ 23, 54 P.3d 1274, ¶ 23 (Wyo.2002).  A finding can be 
"clearly erroneous" even though there is evidence to support it, if after a 
review of the entire record, the court "is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed."  Hammons v. Table 
Mountain Ranches Owners Association, Inc., 2003 WY 85, ¶ 12, 72 P.3d 1153, ¶ 
12 (Wyo.2003).

 
 

Keever v. Payless Auto Sales, Inc., 2003 WY 147, ¶ 7, 79 P.3d 496, 498 (Wyo. 
2003).  "Due regard is given to the opportunity of 
the trial judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and our review does 
not entail weighing disputed evidence.'"  Saulcy Land Co. v. 
Jones, 983 P.2d 1200, 1203 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting Springer v. 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Wyoming, 944 P.2d 1173, 1175-76 (Wyo. 1997)).

 
 

 
 

 
 
[¶46]   Meima first argues that the district 
court erred in finding that Meima, as settlor, did not create an express trust 
in which Broemmel, as trustee, would hold the Torrington house in trust for Meima, 
the trust's sole beneficiary.  He contends that all of the parties' written 
agreements (including the July 24, 2001, lease/purchase agreement) "refer to Tom 
Broemmel as trustee and/or underscore the fact that he was to hold the 
Torrington property in trust'" for Meima, and that Broemmel admitted in his 
pleadings and trial testimony that he was to hold the Torrington house "in 
trust" for Meima.

 
 
[¶47]   Meima further asserts that Broemmel 
breached his fiduciary duties as trustee because:  (a) Broemmel forced Meima to agree to the 
unconscionable terms contained in the July 24, 2001, lease/purchase agreement; 
(b) Broemmel pledged the Torrington house as collateral for his purchase (as an 
individual) of pawn shops in Kentucky;23 and (c) 
Broemmel mortgaged the Torrington house to himself in 2002.  Accordingly, Meima 
argues that he (as the trust's beneficiary) is entitled to the $16,000.00 in 
rent he paid to Broemmel (less the amount Broemmel paid in property taxes and 
insurance), and that the Torrington house should be conveyed to Meima because 
the district court ordered that Broemmel be reimbursed for the money Broemmel 
contributed to the purchase of the Torrington house.

 
 
[¶48]   Broemmel argues that sufficient 
evidence supported the district court's decision that an express trust did not 
exist and that Meima "wants ownership of the home without having to pay anything 
for it."  
According to Broemmel, he never intended to "even have a trust;" it was 
"solely Meima's idea . . .."  There was "no intent to create a trust by a 
settlor," there "was really not even a settlor, unless Broemmel was so 
designated," and there was no "ascertainable beneficiary, unless it was 
Broemmel."  
Broemmel claims that Meima had a right to lease the Torrington house and to purchase the 
property if he complied with the terms of the lease agreement.  If a trust did 
exist, Broemmel was the settlor and beneficiary; if Meima was the beneficiary, 
he did not comply with the terms of the trust in order to receive the benefit 
therefrom.

 
 
[¶49]   The district court found as 
follows:

 
 
The second sentence of the [July 24, 2001, lease/purchase 
agreement] states that Broemmel would "hold the property in trust for Meima on a 
lease/purchase."  
When Broemmel paid the balance of the purchase price for the house at 
closing he received a deed listing the grantee as "Thomas Broemmel, Trustee of 
the Northern Commercial Trust, dated the 24th 
day of July, 2001."  
The evidence established that there was no trust dated July 24, 
2001.  Meima 
had created a revocable trust called the Northern Commercial Trust in March, 
1998, but that trust obviously is not related to the transactions in this 
case.  That 
trust requires the trustee to pay the trust's income to Meima.  In 2001, [the] 
parties obviously intended that all rent be paid to Broemmel.  The 1998 trust 
anticipates that the trustee will continue to act after Meima's death and 
provides for his children.  In 2001, the parties obviously intended for 
Broemmel to be involved with the house only until he was fully paid.  The 1998 Northern 
Commercial Trust establishes Joseph W. Hartnett, not Broemmel, as trustee.

 
 
Although the parties used the term "in trust," the evidence 
establishes that they did not intend or create what the law recognizes as a 
trust.  Their 
use of that term, both in the July 24, 2001, document and in the deed obtained 
on that date, was intended to describe the lease-purchase relationship whereby 
Broemmel would own the property and transfer it to Meima when Meima fully 
paid.  The 
Court finds that Broemmel is the owner of the residence, and that it is subject 
to a lease-purchase for Meima.  This conclusion is consistent with Meima's 
representations to State Farm Insurance in August, 2003.

 
 
. . .

 
 
The Court finds that the parties intended for Broemmel to 
own the Torrington residence and to lease it 
to Meima.  
Title would be transferred to Meima when he fully paid his 
obligations.

 
 
[¶50]   We have previously

 
 
determined that "a trust is a fiduciary relationship in 
which one person is the holder of the title to property subject to an equitable 
obligation to keep or use the property for the benefit of another."  Scotti's Drive In Restaurants, Inc. v. Mile High-Dart In 
Corp., 526 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Wyo.1974).  "The elements of a valid trust include a 
competent settlor and trustee, intent by the settlor to create a trust, 
ascertainable trust res, sufficiently ascertainable beneficiary or 
beneficiaries, a legal purpose, and a legal term."  Hilbert v. Benson, 917 P.2d 1152, 1157 (Wyo.1996) 
(citing McGinnis v. McGinnis, 391 P.2d 927, 933 
(Wyo.1964); Dallas Dome Wyoming Oil Fields Co. v. 
Brooder, 55 Wyo. 109, 127-28, 97 P.2d 311, 318 (1939); State v. Underwood, 54 Wyo. 1, 25, 86 P.2d 707, 714 
(1939)).

 
 

Jewish Community Ass'n of Casper v. Community First Nat. 
Bank, 6 P.3d 1264, 1266 (Wyo. 2000).

 
 
[¶51]   We are particularly concerned in the 
instant case with whether the purported settlor exhibited the requisite intent 
to create a trust.  
One treatise states the following in that regard:

 
 
            
No particular form of words or conduct is necessary for the manifestation 
of intention to create a trust.  It is possible to create a trust without 
using the word "trust" or "trustee."  Conversely, the mere fact that these words 
are used does not necessarily indicate an intention to create a trust.  The question in 
each case is whether the settlor manifested an intention to create the kind of 
relationship that to lawyers is known as a trust, that is to say, whether the 
settlor manifested an intention to impose upon himself or upon a transferee of 
the property equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of 
another person.

 
 

I William F. Fratcher, Scott on 
Trusts, § 24 (4th ed. 1987).24

 
 

[¶52]   Generally, the "question whether the 
parties in their dealings have created a trust is one of fact to be determined 
largely by ascertaining the intent of the parties.  The intent to 
create the trust must be clear and unequivocal."  76 Am.Jur.2d Trusts § 57 (2005) (footnotes omitted).  See generally also, 
for example, Matter of Estate of Daniels, 665 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Colo. 1983) and Matter of Estate 
of Binder, 386 N.W.2d 910, 912 (N.D. 1986).  Such intent can be inferred

 
 
from the nature of property transactions, the circumstances 
surrounding the holding of and transfer of property, the particular documents or 
language employed, and the conduct of the parties.  . . .  While such an 
inference is not to come easily"[c]lear, explicit, definite, unequivocal and 
unambiguous language or conduct" establishing the intent to create a trust is 
required . . .no particular language must be used to create a trust 
or to manifest the necessary intention to create a trust.

Bishop and Diocese of Colorado v. Mote, 716 P.2d 85, 100-01 (Colo.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 826 (1986) (emphasis in original).  See also Matter of Estate of Vallery, 883 P.2d 24, 27 
(Colo.App. 1993).25

 
 
[¶53]   This issue arises amidst a myriad of 
incongruent and inconsistent documents, legal terminology, witness testimony 
(mostly self-serving and of dubious value due to the district court's 
credibility findings), and positions advocated by the parties.26  It appears from our review of the 
circumstances that different aspects of the language contained in the written 
documents at issue, and of the conduct relative to the Torrington house purchase, can be 
relied upon to support opposite conclusions.  For example, on the one hand:

 
 
(a)       In the sales 
contract between Meima and the Torrington house seller, the Northern Commercial 
Trust was named as the buyer, the house was to be conveyed to the Northern 
Commercial Trust, and "Anthony Meima" executed the agreement on behalf of the 
Northern Commercial Trust (listing an address in Nevada 
City, CA).  One might infer that Meima initially intended 
his Northern Commercial Trust of 1998 to be involved in this matter, and the 
parties now apparently agree that the 1998 Northern Commercial Trust is not the 
trust referred to in later documents.

 
 
(b)       The July 24, 
2001, agreement  
states that "Broemmel agrees to hold property in trust for Meima," refers 
to "Meima's home," and to whatever extent it may be relevant, uses "trustee" 
language in referring to Broemmel and the Baltic properties.

 
 
(c)        The 
closing statement for the Torrington house purchase 
names "Thomas Broemmel, Trustee of the Northern Commercial Trust" as the buyer 
and was signed by "Thomas Broemmel, Trustee."

 
 
(d)       The Torrington house was deeded to 
"THOMAS BROEMMEL, Trustee of the Northern Commercial Trust, dated the 24th day of July, 2001."

 
 
(e)       The July 25, 
2001, Promissory Note states that for "value receive[d], to wit: Property held 
in trust, [the Torrington house,]" Meima promises 
to pay Broemmel $185,817.91.  The July 25, 2001, addendum further states 
that "Broemmel agrees to hold property in trust for Meima," that "Broemmel, as 
trustee of Northern Commercial Trust, has sole authority to sell or convey said 
property in his own name until he is paid in full the $185,817.91 and all costs 
and expenses associated with this acquisition," that the "Northern Commercial 
Trust is limited to an agreement by Tom Broemmel to hold [the Torrington house] 
for the benefit of Anthony Meima pending performance of all terms of this 
preceding lease/purchase agreement by Anthony Meima," and uses "trustee" 
language in referring to Broemmel and the Baltic properties.

 
 
(f)         The 
July 24, 2002, mortgage names the Northern Commercial Trust as mortgagor of the 
Torrington house and Broemmel and 
his wife as mortgagees; Thomas C. Broemmel signed the mortgage on behalf of the 
Northern Commercial Trust.27

 
 
[¶54]   Other circumstances place this language 
and conduct in an entirely different context, especially given the level of 
clarity required in order to infer the intent to create a trust.  For example:

 
 
            
(a)       Meima, 
individually, apparently contributed the earnest money for the Torrington house purchase.

 
 
(b)       Broemmel, 
individually, is named as the buyer of the Kubich option.

 
 
(c)        The July 
24, 2001, agreement (signed by Broemmel as "Owner" and Meima as "Buyer") is 
titled "Lease/Purchase Agreement," states that Broemmel agrees to hold the 
Torrington house "in trust for Meima on a lease/purchase" 
(emphasis added), uses the terms "home loan" and "debt" in referring to the 
Torrington house purchase, requires that Meima pay a monthly "lease payment" and 
a $10,000.00 "profit" to Broemmel, requires Meima to pay Broemmel the 
$185,817.91 (plus expenses) Broemmel contributed to the Torrington house 
purchase, requires Meima to pay all property taxes, insurance, costs and 
expenses, and details the additional "collateral" available to Broemmel in the 
event of Meima's "default."  The agreement also does not appear to 
delineate any particular duties for Broemmel regarding the Torrington house.

 
 
(d)       Meima 
subsequently paid rent for several months and transferred rifles to Broemmel 
consistent with the terms of the agreement.

 
 
(e)       The July 25, 
2001, "Promissory Note" names Meima (individually) as the "Borrower" and 
Broemmel and his wife (individually) as the "Lender," states that Meima promises 
to pay the Lender $185,817.91, a $2,000.00 monthly "lease payment" and 
$10,000.00 "profit," that upon the occurrence of a "default" event the 
Borrower's obligations "shall become due immediately, without demand or notice," 
and requires Broemmel to execute a deed "giving up any and all further interest 
he may have" in the Torrington house upon his receipt of all moneys due 
Broemmel.  The 
July 25, 2001, addendum also contains the same language we emphasized in the 
previous subsection of this opinion.

 
 
(f)         On 
July 27, 2001, "Anthony Meima" granted "Thomas C. Broemmel" a "Specific Power of 
Attorney" in all matters relating to the Torrington house, on behalf of Meima 
"personally and for [his] trust, Northern Commercial Trust," and further granted 
Broemmel the authority to sell the property to satisfy the promissory note if 
Meima defaulted on the note.

 
 
(g)       Meima declared 
to the Torrington house insurer that he was 
"not the owner of" the house.

 
 
(h)        In a 
March 2002 receipt to Meima acknowledging that Meima had paid rent through 
February 2002, Broemmel signed the receipt individually as "Landlord."

 
 

[¶55]   Considering our appellate standard of 
review and the particular circumstances of the instant case,28 we conclude 
as the Colorado Supreme Court did in Matter of Estate of 
Daniels, 665 P.2d  at 596, wherein the court found that when different aspects of 
the relevant evidence could support opposite conclusions regarding a settlor's 
intent to create a trust, the "trial court's conclusion, based on this 
conflicting evidence, that [the settlor] had no intent to create the trust is 
therefore binding upon us."

 
 
[¶56]   Meima also argues that we should impose 
a constructive trust in favor of Meima on both the Torrington house and the Baltic 
properties.  
Broemmel contends that we should not consider Meima's argument because 
this issue was not raised at trial.  In response to Broemmel's argument, Meima 
merely states that it is "clear that the existence of a trust relationship was 
at issue throughout this case, be it express, oral, constructive or 
otherwise."  We 
will

 
 
ordinarily entertain only arguments raised in the court 
below.  Cooper v. Town of Pinedale, 1 P.3d 1197, 1208 
(Wyo.2000).  
Exceptions to this rule exist if the argument is jurisdictional, or if it 
is "of such a fundamental nature that it must be considered."  Id.  (citing WW Enterprises v. City of Cheyenne, 956 P.2d 353, 356 
(Wyo.1998) and Bredthauer v. TSP, 864 P.2d 442, 447 
(Wyo.1993)).

 
 

Hammons v. Table Mountain Ranches Owners Ass'n, 
Inc., 2003 WY 85, ¶ 17, 72 P.3d 1153, 1156 (Wyo. 
2003).  We conclude that Meima has not directed us to 
specific evidence indicating that this issue was sufficiently raised in the 
district court, and does not argue that the issue meets either of the 
above-listed exceptions.

 
 

 
 
[¶57]   Meima contends that the district court 
erred in finding that an oral contact between the parties did not exist prior to 
July 24, 2001.  
According to Meima, "the record shows that the parties had a meeting of 
the minds and intended that an oral contract exist by May 25, 2001," the terms 
of which oral contract were purportedly as follows:

 
 
(a)       Broemmel would 
finance "roughly" $190,000.00 of the Torrington house purchase for Meima in exchange 
for twenty percent of the "net profits of any future sales of the California properties[,] valued at 
over $2,500,000.00, if said properties were purchased from Mr. Kubich by either" 
Broemmel or an assignee;

 
 
(b)       the Torrington house would be purchased 
by the Northern Commercial Trust and held in trust by Broemmel for Meima's 
benefit;

 
 
(c)        the 
Kubich option would be assigned to Broemmel so that "he could purchase the 
California properties and hold 
clear title to them in his name" subject to the agreement to split any net 
profits; and

 
 
(d)       Meima would 
market, develop, and sell the Baltic properties.

 
 
Meima concludes that Broemmel subsequently breached this 
oral contract, and that the July 24, 2001, lease/purchase agreement is void due 
to a lack of additional consideration.

 
 
[¶58]   Meima's argument as to the existence, 
and terms, of such an oral contract is based on his own trial testimony,29 his particular characterization of the record 
according to that testimony, and these resulting suppositions:

 
 
(a)       The record does 
not contain any evidence that the assignment of the Kubich option to Broemmel in 
May 2001 was a gift, so "clearly, the conveyance was made in consideration for 
something."  It 
is "illogical, counter-intuitive, and against the weight of the entire record 
for the District Court to assume that Meima would transfer the rights to $2.5 
million worth of real estate to Broemmel without having a contract in 
place."  If 
there was no contract, Meima "clearly would not have taken the steps necessary 
to secure a real estate purchase option allowing" Broemmel to purchase the 
Baltic properties for only $140,000.00.

 
 
(b)       The parties 
"must have" agreed they would share in the development and sale of the Baltic 
properties, or why would Broemmel execute the April 29, 2001, addendum to the 
Torrington house purchase contract that removed all of the financing 
contingencies?  
The parties "must have" agreed to contract terms prior to that time, or 
why would Broemmel agree to provide a copy of his financing statement to the 
seller of the Torrington house in April 2001?

 
 

"Whether an oral contract exists is a question of fact to 
be determined by the trier of fact."  Fowler v. Fowler, 
933 P.2d 502, 504 (Wyo. 1997).  The premise of Meima's argument on this issue 
presumes that his trial testimony was credible.  The district court found that Meima's trial 
testimony "especially lacked credibility."  Issues of "credibility and the weight to be 
given to testimony are matters to be resolved by the trier of fact" and we "may 
not substitute our judgment for that of a trial court with respect to issues 
concerning credibility."  Wallop v. Wallop, 
2004 WY 46, ¶ 10, 88 P.3d 1022, 1025 (Wyo. 2004).  See also Keever, 
2003 WY 147, ¶ 14, 79 P.3d  at 500.  Accordingly, we need not consider this issue 
further.

 
 

 
 
[¶59]   Meima asserts that the district court 
erred in rejecting his claims that the parties' July 24, 2001, lease/purchase 
agreement was invalid due to a lack of consideration, economic duress, undue 
influence, or unconscionability of terms.  On appeal, however, Meima's arguments are 
similarly based on his trial testimony and his particular view of the record 
according to that testimony.  For example:

 
 
(a)       In a single 
paragraph, Meima argues that because the parties had a valid oral agreement in 
April or May of 2001, the July 24, 2001, lease/purchase agreement was void due 
to a lack of consideration for additional terms that, "[a]ccording to Mr. 
Meima's testimony," the parties had not previously discussed;

 
 
(b)       In asserting 
that the July 24, 2001, lease/purchase agreement was void due to economic duress 
or undue influence, Meima:  (1) reiterates his prior contention that the 
parties had a valid oral agreement prior to the lease/purchase agreement; 
(2)  references 
"evidence" that he claims "overwhelmingly supports [Meima's] testimony" that 
Broemmel "had, in fact, controlled most of [Meima's] assets as of July 24, 
2001;" (3) argues that the evidence "suggests" Broemmel "would have backed out 
of the second closing" if Meima did not agree to the terms contained in the July 
24, 2001, lease/purchase agreement; and (4) concludes that Broemmel "forced" the 
lease/purchase agreement on Meima because he demanded such additional terms 
"only after [he] obtained complete control over nearly all of [Meima's] assets," 
and Meima "involuntarily accepted the terms" because he had no "other meaningful 
choice" or alternative; and

 
 
(c)        In 
arguing that the lease/purchase agreement was void due to unconscionable terms, 
Meima references his prior arguments on economic duress/undue influence and 
merely states that Broemmel therefore deprived Meima of "a meaningful choice 
about whether or not to enter an inequitable agreement" with no "opportunity for 
meaningful negotiations regarding the terms of the agreement."

 
 
We need not address these issues because the applicable 
standard of review precludes us from substituting our judgment for that of the 
district court regarding the credibility of Meima's trial testimony, and from 
reweighing disputed evidence.

 
 

 
 
[¶60]   Meima contends that despite the fact 
that the issues concerning the Baltic properties were "primarily separate and 
unrelated" to the instant quiet title action regarding the Torrington house, and 
that the district court did not "have all of the evidence on the issue[s]" 
because "neither party intended to argue the terms of the California property 
agreement, except to the extent it pertained to the Torrington property," the 
district court nevertheless "chose to create and construe agreements between 
[the parties] pertaining to" the Baltic properties.  He asserts that 
since the Baltic properties are situate in California, the district court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction to affect the title to, and the disposition of, such 
properties by virtue of its judgment in the instant case.  According to Meima, 
we should therefore void that portion of the district court's judgment.

 
 
[¶61]   We first note that the nature and 
extent of the parties' agreement on the Baltic properties, in terms of the 
personal rights and obligations of each party to the other, was clearly at issue 
in the instant case.30  Some of the terms of the parties' agreement 
on the Baltic properties appear in several exhibits attached to the parties' 
pretrial pleadings, which pleadings also contain a myriad of facts, claims and 
defenses (seemingly both legal and equitable in nature).  At trial, Meima 
testified extensively about the Baltic properties, including:  (a) his personal 
history with the properties; (b) his dealings with Broemmel, Mr. Kubich, Meima's 
ex-wife, Calais Resources, a financial backer, and Mr. Sinclair (who bought a 
portion of the properties in 2003), regarding the properties; (c) the 2003 sale 
of a portion of the properties and the manner in which the proceeds were, and 
should be, distributed between Meima and Broemmel; and (d) that he was seeking, 
in terms of what he wanted the district court "to do," an "order on a fair 
disbursal of the remaining" 2003 sale proceeds.  Broemmel similarly testified as to:  (a) his dealings 
with Meima and Calais Resources on the Baltic properties; (b) Meima's dealings 
with his ex-wife relative to the properties; and (c) the terms of, and 
circumstances surrounding, his exercise of the Kubich option.

 
 
[¶62]   Meima's attorney also introduced into 
evidence several trial exhibits that: (a) either contained contractual terms 
relative to the Baltic properties or detailed conduct that each party claims 
supports his view of the agreements at issue; (b) included the closing 
statements from the 2003 sale of a portion of the Baltic properties indicating 
how the sale proceeds were distributed; and (c) included Meima's trial 
attorney's trust account records detailing additional disbursements of the 2003 
sale proceeds and the balance in the trust account that the district court 
needed to allocate between the parties.  In Meima's closing arguments, he conveyed his 
view of the terms of the parties' agreement on the Baltic properties, and 
specifically asked the district court to disburse the proceeds from the 2003 
sale of a portion of the Baltic properties according to his particular view of 
the parties' agreement.  Broemmel similarly argued for his version of 
the parties' agreement and asked the district court to disburse the 2003 sale 
proceeds accordingly.

 
 
[¶63]   The district court noted in its 
findings that the "parties presented disputes regarding [the Torrington house purchase agreement 
and the Baltic properties agreement], and a decision in this case requires the 
Court to ascertain the meaning of these contracts," and also stated the 
following in response to Meima's post-trial objections to the district court's 
judgment:

 
 
[Meima] claims that the parties' agreement about California property (the Baltic 
property) was not at issue in this case.  The Court found all pleadings should be 
amended to conform to the evidence.  The evidence and the argument of counsel 
clearly put the interpretation of the parties' relationship on the Baltic 
property, and allocation of proceeds from the Baltic property, at issue.  [Meima] 
specifically asked the Court to order distribution of proceeds from sale of some 
of the Baltic property.  The Court had to interpret the parties' 
agreement about the Baltic property to accurately order a distribution of the 
proceeds.

 
 

[¶64]   The only legal issue analyzed by Meima 
(and which is supported by citation to pertinent legal authority) is whether the 
district court's judgment directly affected the title to real property located 
in another state.  
"We distinguish between a judgment directed at the property itself and 
one directed against the owner of the property."   Breitenstine v. 
Breitenstine, 2003 WY 16, ¶ 26, 62 P.3d 587, 594 (Wyo. 2003).  We have stated that we

 
 
think the issue settled, at least since Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 30 S. Ct. 3, 54 L. Ed. 65, 23 L.R.A.,N.S., 924 (1909), that the court of one state has no power 
to directly affect title to land located wholly within the borders of 
another.  
Decrees and judgments purporting to this effect are void, and to the 
extent the decree before us purports to so do it must fail.  However, we 
consider it equally well established that a court of equity having authority to 
act upon the person may indirectly act upon real estate located in another 
state, through the instrumentality of its equity power over the person.  Fall v. Eastin, supra; Rozan v. 
Rozan, 49 Cal. 2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957), reh. denied; Weesner v. Weesner, 168 Neb. 346, 95 N.W.2d 682 (1959); McElreath v. McElreath, 162 Tex. 190, 345 S.W.2d 722, reh. 
denied, (1961); 34 A.L.R.3d 962.

 
 

Kane v. Kane, 577 P.2d 172, 175-76 (Wyo. 1978).

 
 
[¶65]   While no appellate issue has been 
raised as to the res judicata or collateral estoppel effect of the judgment in 
the instant case, we find that the following general statement is also relevant 
to our discussion of this issue:

 
 
            
Even in actions not limited to an attempt, at the situs of real property, 
to compel a party to execute a conveyance of the property in compliance with an 
order by a court in another state directing him to convey such property, it has 
been held in a number of cases that where a court has jurisdiction over the 
parties to an action which is within its jurisdictionsuch as an action 
involving divorce, fraud, partnership, trusts, breach of contract, or 
cancellation of instrumentsthe court has the power fully to adjudicate the 
parties' respective rights involved in the action, and under such circumstances 
a decree dealing with out-of-state real property, though incapable of operating 
directly on such property as an in rem decree, is entitled to res judicata or 
collateral estoppel effect as an in personam determination of the parties' 
personal rights or equities with respect to such property.

 
 

Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Res 
Judicata or Collateral Estoppel Effect, In State Where Real Property Is Located, 
of Foreign Decree Dealing With Such Property, 32 A.L.R.3d 1330, 1341 (1970 
and Supp. 2005).  See generally also, 
for example, Allis v. Allis, 378 F.2d 721 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 953 (1967); Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 
455, 680 P.2d 1355, 1361 (1984); Lyle Cashion Co. v. 
McKendrick, 227 Miss. 894, 87 So. 2d 289 (1956); Small v. Carey, 269 Or. 35, 
522 P.2d 1202 (1974); and Silver Surprize, Inc. v. 
Sunshine Mining Co., 74 Wash. 2d 519, 445 P.2d 334, 338-39 (1968).

 
 
[¶66]   It is undisputed that the district 
court had personal jurisdiction over both parties in the instant case, and 
neither party alleges on appeal that the district court lacked such 
jurisdiction.  
The district court established, and construed, the terms of the parties' 
agreement concerning the Baltic properties based on the evidence presented at 
trial.  It then 
entered a judgment based on its findings (as previously set forth herein), in 
which judgment it ordered Meima to pay Broemmel $27,920.65 for Broemmel's 
remaining share of the profit from the 2003 sale of a portion of the Baltic 
properties (the balance of the proceeds after Broemmel had been reimbursed 
$142,000.00 for exercising the Kubich option and disbursed an additional 
$20,000.00), and that any "profits received from the remaining unsold Baltic 
properties . . . should be divided" eighty percent to Meima and twenty percent 
to Broemmel.

 
 
[¶67]   We conclude that the district court's 
judgment did not directly affect the title to the Baltic properties.  Indeed, the title 
to the Baltic properties was not the subject matter of the instant case.  The parties 
essentially agreed that Broemmel (by virtue of his having previously exercised 
the Kubich option) held title to the Baltic properties subject to the terms of 
whatever enforceable agreements the parties had executed.  The district 
court's findings and judgment instead focused on determining the personal rights 
and obligations of each party to the other, such as the relationship of the 
Baltic properties agreement to the Torrington house purchase and the nature and 
terms of the parties' agreement on the Baltic properties (including the Kubich 
option and particularly whether Broemmel was entitled to reimbursement for the 
$142,000.00 he paid to exercise the Kubich option, as well as how existing and 
future profits from the sales of the Baltic properties should be distributed 
between the parties).31  To that extent, the district court's judgment 
clearly was proper.

 
 

 
 
[¶68]   Meima contends that, assuming that this 
Court affirms the district court on the issues previously discussed herein, the 
district court's judgment was nevertheless erroneous.  He first argues 
that the district court should have credited Meima for the $15,000.00 in earnest 
money he paid towards the purchase of the Torrington house.  In advancing this 
argument, Meima does not cite to any pertinent legal authority, or any 
contractual term, indicating that he was entitled to such a credit.

 
 
[¶69]   Meima similarly claims that the 
district court erred in not granting Meima a $70,000.00 credit for the Celina 
Flat Mine property.  
According to Meima, he was entitled to that credit because "this property 
has already been conveyed" to Broemmel.  Meima does not cite to any pertinent legal 
authority in advancing this argument, nor does he direct us to any evidence in 
the record indicating that the Celina Flat Mine property actually was ever conveyed to Broemmel.32

 
 
[¶70]   Meima lastly asserts that the district 
court erroneously construed the following term of the parties' agreement on the 
Baltic properties:

 
 
8.         
[Meima] further grants Tom Broemmel, as trustee, total control of the 
Baltic properties to sell or do [whatever] is necessary to recover any losses 
incurred as a result of the purchase of said property.

 
 
The district court found that the term "losses" was 
ambiguous, that the parties anticipated that losses would exist before the 
Baltic properties were resold, and that one such loss was the $140,000.00 
Broemmel paid to exercise the Kubich option.  Meima claims that the district court's 
construction was "clearly erroneous and not supported by the evidence" and 
offers his own construction of the provision at issue.33

 
 

[¶71]   It does not appear from Meima's 
appellate argument that he disagrees with the district court's finding that the 
term "losses" was ambiguous.  If a contract term is ambiguous, extrinsic 
evidence may be considered to determine the intent of the parties.  Brown v. Johnston, 2004 WY 17, ¶ 23, 85 P.3d 422, 429 
(Wyo. 2004).  In that instance, "there exists a question 
of intent which the trier of fact must resolve.'"  Western Utility 
Contractors, Inc. v. City of Casper, 731 P.2d 24, 28 (Wyo. 1986) (quoting Goodwin v. 
Upper Crust of Wyoming, Inc., 624 P.2d 1192, 1195 (Wyo. 1981)).  Based on our review of the record, we find no 
reason to disturb the district court's findings on this issue.  See Western Utility Contractors, Inc., 731 P.2d  at 
28.

 
 
[¶72]   We affirm.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

  1Meima testified 
that he had been "involved in real estate a long time" and was "profitable" in a 
venture for twenty to twenty-five years that marketed property and reinvested 
the profits in residential rentals.  Yet, according to Meima, the "biggest deal I 
have done [was] still under a billion [dollars]."

 
 
  2Meima testified 
that it was "around the first of February," and Broemmel testified that it was 
the "first part of 2001 . . .."

 
 
  3Meima was the 
settlor of a Northern Commercial Trust by virtue of a written document executed 
in March 1998.  
However, on appeal the parties agree that this particular trust is not 
the trust referred to in subsequent documents.

 
 
  4Mr. Kubich 
signed the option on May 29, 2001, and Patricia Kubich signed the option on July 
19, 2001.

 
 
  5At some point, 
Meima and Broemmel discussed an arrangement whereby Calais Resources would grant 
them stock options and pay all costs associated with the Baltic properties 
(including the costs necessary to exercise the Kubich option) and reimburse 
Meima for his monthly rental payments on the Torrington house.  This arrangement 
ultimately did not come to fruition.

 
 
  6Meima 
apparently revoked this power of attorney in August 2002.

 
 
  7Meima stated 
that the $22,600.00 was for "legal services related to the Torrington property" and time spent 
on a Canadian proposal apparently unrelated to the transaction.  According to Meima, 
$8,000.00 of the legal fees were returned to him due to an overpayment.

 
 
  8Meima recalled 
that Broemmel was not "certain" at that time when the building in Denver would sell, but that Broemmel 
could have told him it would probably sell in April.

 
 
  9Meima 
characterized it as an "investment proposition," rather than "borrowing 
money."

 
 
  10According to 
Meima, the balance of the $120,000.00 in sale proceeds from Mr. Kubich (after 
expenses) was disbursed to Meima's ex-wife and her attorney (who was "totally 
corrupt"); the ex-wife "signed off" and was "out of the picture."

 
 
  11A cashier's 
check was purchased by "[A]nthony [M]eima" on June 12, 2001.  Meima testified 
that he liquidated some firearms to obtain these funds.

 
 
  12In a letter to 
the property insurance company, Meima stated "I am not the owner of the 
property," "I have no contract with anyone to pay insurance on this property," 
and "[t]here are no circumstances under which I will pay insurance on this 
property."

 
 

13According to 
Broemmel, Meima repeatedly explained

 
 
how badly his 
wife had connived or worked in consort with the attorney that she had, as well 
the judge, . . . and that the judge and the attorney had ruled against him, 
which wasn't fair, and he lost two or three, four million dollars.  He got nothing out 
of all of his property he had; and he had extensive holdings in rental 
properties.  I 
felt sorry for him.

 
 
Broemmel 
testified that Meima was the "most paranoid person I have ever seen when it 
c[a]me to his wife.  
He was afraid to have a telephone in his name.  He was afraid to 
communicate in any way with anyone where they might be able to get his phone 
number, and he was a mess."

 
 

14Ultimately, 
Broemmel's wife discovered these transactions and it "cost" him a divorce.

 
 

15On 
cross-examination, Broemmel further acknowledged:  (a) on April 29, 2001, when Broemmel agreed 
to submit his financial statement to the Torrington house seller, he understood 
that there were "significant ramifications for doing so" because Meima was 
"committing the Kubich option" to Broemmel; (b) Broemmel "at some point" 
committed to financing the Torrington house purchase, "for which [Broemmel was] 
going to get 20 percent of the California properties as compensation"; and (c) 
Broemmel was aware that Meima "had put down an additional $10,000, so he had a 
total of $15,000" in the Torrington house.

 
 
  16According to 
Broemmel, the rent was included in the agreements "in lieu of interest," as an 
incentive for Meima to pay off the house purchase quickly; Meima paid rent to 
Broemmel as an individual, not as a trustee.  Broemmel also had never heard of the Celina 
Flat property before and Meima "volunteered" that property as additional 
collateral.

 
 
  17Meima "talked 
[Broemmel] into doing it; and [Broemmel] didn't know anything about it.  [Meima] just said 
[Broemmel was] totally protected if [he had] a trust."

 
 
  18Meima 
testified that he did not agree to pay Broemmel this $40,000.00 in interest; 
that was only disclosed to Meima after Broemmel had already exercised the 
option.  The 
district court found that Broemmel "originally agreed to hold and exercise the 
option without any mention of interest on the purchase price.  There was no 
consideration for any subsequent agreement for $40,000 of interest.  . . .  Any interest 
expense he incurred is outside the parties' agreement and Broemmel's own 
responsibility."

 
 
  19Broemmel's 
wife apparently transferred any interest she had in the Torrington house to Broemmel, so the 
district court found that Broemmel was, "for all practical purposes, the 
Defendant in this case."

 
 
  20In an order 
responding to Meima's post-trial objections to the district court's judgment, 
the district court stated that Meima's trial testimony was "nearly devoid of 
credibility . . .."

 
 
  21The district 
court rejected Meima's argument that Broemmel agreed to finance the Torrington 
house purchase prior to July 2001 solely in exchange for Broemmel's 
participation in the Baltic properties deal because Broemmel did not agree "to 
provide a no-interest loan without collateral or a time for payment in return 
for a potential profit from the Baltic" properties.

 
 
  22Fifteen 
dollars for wire transfer fees was also apparently paid from the trust 
account.

 
 

23Meima testified 
that at some point, Broemmel said he wanted to "liquidate" the Torrington house in order to buy pawn 
shops in Kentucky.  Broemmel testified 
that he had pledged his financial interest in the Torrington house as "collateral" to purchase 
three pawn shops in Kentucky.  He granted the 
creditor an option to purchase the house, but the creditor had "no intention of 
coming here to exercise it or to take the property."

 
 

24See also Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts § 24 cmt. b (1959) and 76 Am.Jur.2d Trusts § 58 (2005).

 
 

  25According to 
76 Am.Jur.2d Trusts, supra, § 59 (footnotes 
omitted):

 
 
            
Ordinarily an intention to create a trust may be manifested by inference 
from those things which a trustor has said or done, from the nature of a 
transaction, or from the circumstances surrounding creation of the purported 
trust.  That 
is, when the language of the parties fails to clearly indicate their intention 
to create an express trust, such intention may be ascertained by other objective 
manifestations of intent, such as the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
transactions and the relationship of the parties.  The intent to create a trust can be inferred 
from the nature of property transactions, the circumstances surrounding the 
holding of and transfer of property, the particular documents or language 
employed, and the conduct of the parties, although the inference of an intent to 
create a trust must come from clear, explicit, definite, unequivocal, and 
unambiguous language or conduct.

 
 
  26For example, 
Meima stated in his answer to Broemmel's counterclaims (as well as other 
pleadings) that despite Meima's objections, Broemmel "insisted he hold title to 
the property in his name as trustee of [Meima's] revocable trust" and that the 
Northern Commercial Trust dated July 24, 2001, "has never existed."  Broemmel has also 
at times seemed to acknowledge in pleadings and during his trial testimony that 
a trust existed and that he was the trustee.

 
 
  27According to 
the district court, "Broemmel became concerned that he could not act as the 
owner under the lease-purchase agreement because he did not appear as the record 
owner.  In an 
ill-advised attempt to remedy this problem Broemmel executed a mortgage covering 
the residence in favor of himself . . .."

 
 

  28"[I]n general 
at least, no trust is created where the transaction is as consistent with 
another type of transaction as with that of a trust.'"  Dallas Dome Wyoming Oil Fields Co. v. Brooder, 55 
Wyo. 109, 97 P.2d 311, 317-18 
(1939) (quoting 65 C.J. 280).

 
 
  29Meima cites to 
seven pages of Broemmel's testimony in support of his general statement that 
"the record shows that the parties had a meeting of the minds and intended that 
an oral contract exist by May 25, 2001," but does not specifically analyze that 
testimony.  The 
testimonial excerpts do not reflect the entirety of Broemmel's testimony and any 
attempt to corroborate Meima's testimony is unavailing because the district 
court found that Meima's testimony was not credible.

 
 
  30In arguing 
that the Baltic properties were "primarily separate and unrelated" to the 
instant case, Meima makes no attempt to analyze, and does not cite to any 
pertinent legal authority addressing, the district court's subject matter 
jurisdiction vis a vis the particular claims 
asserted, or the relief sought, by the parties.

 
 

  31See generally Markel v. Phoenix 
Title & Trust Co., 100 Ariz. 53, 410 P.2d 662, 664 (1966) and MacDonald v. Dexter, 234 Ill. 517, 85 N.E. 209, 212 
(1908) ("[w]hatever right or claim appellant might 
have as to the profits would not require the court to deal directly with the 
land itself, and would not, therefore, affect the real estate; hence it affords 
no objection to the jurisdiction of the Missouri court, which had all the 
parties in interest before it, even though the land out of which the profits 
were to arise was without the jurisdiction of the court").

 
 

32The July 24, 
2001, lease/purchase agreement did state that Meima would provide the Celina 
Flat Mine property to Broemmel "free and clear of encumbrances" and Broemmel 
could sell the property if Meima defaulted in his monthly payments for two 
months.  
However, the only other evidence on this issue appears to be:  (a) the district 
court's statement in response to Meima's post-trial objections to the district 
court's judgment that it had merely found that Broemmel held the Celina Flat 
Mine property as "collateral only;" and (b) Broemmel's trial testimony that he 
"never put a lien on that Celina property.  I just trusted it was there."

 
 
  33The only 
pertinent legal authority Meima cites to support this argument is the Black's 
Law Dictionary definition of "option."