Case Title: JESUS CERVANTES ESCARCEGA v. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-03-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
JESUS CERVANTES ESCARCEGA v. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION2007 WY 38153 P.3d 264Case Number: No. 06-58Decided: 03/08/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
                                                                                                

JESUS 
CERVANTES ESCARCEGA,

Appellant 
(Petitioner),

 
 
 v.

 
 
STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex 
rel., 

WYOMING 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,     

Appellee 
(Respondent).

 

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCarbonCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

R. 
Michael Vang of Brown & Hiser LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; 
Douglas Moench, Senior Attorney General; and Dana J. Lent, Assistant Attorney 
General.  

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant Jesus 
Cervantes Escarcega's driver's license was suspended for six months under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-6-107 (LexisNexis 2005) and Appellant was disqualified from 
operating a commercial vehicle for one year pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-7-305 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2006) because he refused to submit to 
chemical testing after being arrested for driving while under the influence of 
alcohol (DWUI) while operating a non-commercial vehicle.  The arresting officer informed Appellant 
that his motor vehicle operating privileges would be suspended if he refused to 
submit to chemical testing, but did not inform Appellant that his commercial 
driver's license (CDL) would be suspended for one year.  The Office of Administrative Hearings 
(OAH) and, subsequently, the district court, upheld the suspension of 
Appellant's license and his commercial vehicle disqualification.  We affirm.

 
 
 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Did the OAH and 
district court err in upholding a CDL disqualification for refusal to submit to 
chemical testing in the course of an arrest for DWUI where the holder of the CDL 
was arrested while driving a non-commercial motor vehicle, and where the 
arresting officer recited the statutory implied-consent warning mandated for use 
during the stop of a non-commercial vehicle, but where the officer did not 
recite the statutory implied-consent warning for use during the stop of a 
commercial vehicle?

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On June 16, 2004, 
the Wyoming Department of Transportation (WYDOT) sent all CDL holders a letter 
notifying them of changes to Wyoming's laws affecting commercial drivers, 
including the fact that refusal to submit to a chemical alcohol level test would 
result in a one year CDL disqualification under the new 
laws.

 
 
[¶4]      At 4:40 a.m. on 
April 16, 2005, Officer Reynolds of the Rawlins Police Department stopped 
Appellant for speeding.  Appellant 
was driving a non-commercial vehicle.  
Appellant exhibited signs of alcohol consumption and possible 
intoxication and the officer asked whether Appellant had been drinking.  Appellant admitted to having consumed 
seven beers earlier in the evening and agreed to perform field sobriety 
maneuvers.  Appellant failed 
adequately to perform those field sobriety tests.  Officer Reynolds administered a portable 
breath test, which indicated a presumptive blood alcohol level of 0.20 
percent.  The officer placed 
Appellant under arrest for DWUI.  
Officer Reynolds then asked Appellant to submit to further chemical 
testing but Appellant declined to submit to those tests.  The officer informed Appellant, in 
accordance with the requirements of Wyoming's implied consent law, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 31-6-102 (LexisNexis 2005), that refusal to submit to chemical 
testing would result in loss of his privilege to operate a motor vehicle for six 
months.  The officer did not inform 
Appellant of any consequences specifically related to Appellant's CDL.  Appellant refused to submit to further 
chemical testing even after Officer Reynolds warned him a second time that his 
privileges to operate a motor vehicle would be suspended for six months if he 
refused to comply with the request.

            

[¶5]      WYDOT issued 
notices of intent to suspend Appellant's driver's license for six months and to 
disqualify his CDL for one year.1  Appellant requested a contested case 
hearing and filed written argument with the OAH requesting relief from 
suspension of his license and from disqualification of his CDL because the 
officer failed to warn him of the prospect of the disqualification when he 
requested that Appellant submit to chemical testing.2  The OAH upheld the suspension of 
Appellant's driver's license and the disqualification of his CDL.  Appellant requested judicial review of 
the OAH decision.  The district 
court issued a Decision Letter and an Order upholding both the six-month 
suspension of Appellant's driver's license and the year-long disqualification of 
his CDL.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      This Court 
reviews the final judgment of a district court regarding action taken by an 
administrative agency under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-115 (LexisNexis 2005).  We structure our review as though the 
appeal were directly from the agency, giving no special deference to the 
findings of the district court, and we apply the same standard of review used by 
district courts under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114 (LexisNexis 2005).  Atchison v. Career Serv. Council, 664 P.2d 18, 
20 (Wyo. 
1983).  Section 16-3-114 states, in 
relevant part:

 
 
(c)    To the extent necessary to 
make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all 
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, 
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action.  In making the following 
determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it 
cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
(ii)    Hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:

 
 
(A)    Arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

 
 
(B)    Contrary to constitutional 
right, power, privilege or immunity; 

 
 
(C)    In excess of statutory 
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

 
 
(D)    Without observance of 
procedure required by law; or

 
 
(E)    Unsupported by substantial 
evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute. 

 
 
[¶7]      Appellant raises 
no issues of fact or evidentiary weight in this appeal.  The only issue presented here is that of 
interpretation of Wyoming's implied consent law.  We review questions of statutory 
interpretation de novo.  Perry v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2006 WY 61, ¶ 10, 134 P.3d 1242, 1245 (Wyo. 2006).  We will affirm an agency's decision if 
it is made in accordance with the law.  
Buehner Block Co. v. Wyo. Dep't of 
Revenue, 2006 WY 90, ¶ 11, 139 P.3d 1150, 1153 (Wyo. 
2006).

 
 
[¶8]      We review a 
statute to determine the meaning intended by the Legislature.  "If the words convey a definite meaning, 
which involves no absurdity or contradiction with other parts of the instrument, 
then that meaning apparent on the face of the instrument is the one which alone 
we are at liberty to say was intended to be conveyed . . . ."  Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 50 P. 819, 821 
(1897).  "We construe the statute as 
a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe 
together all parts of the statute in pari 
materia."  Dep't of Revenue & Taxation v. 
Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1994).  

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

Wyoming's Implied Consent 
Law

 
 
[¶9]      Wyoming law provides that 
every driver on our roads is deemed to have consented to chemical testing in the 
course of an arrest for DWUI.  The 
implied consent statute requires that an arresting officer warn the arrestee 
that refusal to submit to chemical tests will result in loss of driving 
privileges for six months.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102 states:

 
 
(a)    If arrested for an offense as 
defined by W.S. 31-5-233:

 
 
(i)     Any person who drives 
or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a public street or 
highway in this state is deemed to have given consent, subject to the provisions 
of this act, to a chemical test or tests of his blood, breath or urine for the 
purpose of determining the alcohol concentration or controlled substance content 
of his blood.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
(ii)    For tests required under this 
act, the arrested person shall be advised that:

 
 
(A)    His failure to submit to all 
required chemical tests requested by the peace officer shall result in the 
suspension of his Wyoming driver's license or his privilege to operate a motor 
vehicle for a period of six (6) months for a first offense or eighteen (18) 
months for a second or subsequent offense as provided by W.S. § 
31-6-107[.]

 
 
[¶10]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-307 
(LexisNexis 2005) sets forth the warnings afforded to a driver stopped for DWUI 
in a commercial vehicle.  Section 
31-7-307 states:

 
 
(a)    A person who drives or is in 
actual physical control of a commercial motor vehicle within this state is 
deemed to have given consent, subject to the provisions of this section to a 
chemical test or tests of his blood, breath or urine for the purpose of 
determining alcohol or controlled substance concentration in his 
blood.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
(c)    For tests required under this 
section, the person shall be advised that:

 
 
(i)     His failure to submit 
to all required chemical tests shall result in a disqualification of his 
commercial driver's license.  The 
disqualification shall be from a minimum of one (1) year to 
life[.]

 
 
[¶11]   That section provides a statutorily 
mandated warning of the penalties in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-305, under which 
Appellant's CDL was disqualified.  
Section 31-7-305 states:

 
 
(a)    Any person is disqualified 
from driving a commercial motor vehicle for a period of not less than one (1) 
year if convicted of a first violation arising from separate incidents 
of:

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
(v)    Refusal to submit to a test 
to determine the driver's alcohol concentration while driving or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle[.]

 
 
[¶12]   Appellant was in "actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle" at the time of his arrest and was therefore entitled 
to the non-commercial vehicle warnings under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102.  The parties do not contest Appellant's 
entitlement to the non-commercial implied consent warnings or that the arresting 
officer gave Appellant those warnings.  
Appellant, however, argues that the officer was also required to warn him 
of the consequences to his CDL.  
Appellant claims that the warning contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-307 
must be given before the state can disqualify a driver's CDL for one year.  We find that the implied consent and 
commercial driver licensing statutes do not lend themselves to that 
interpretation.  

 
 
[¶13]   Although the implied consent and 
commercial license statutes interact with one another on several levels, they 
are separate.  The implied consent 
statute requires that the non-commercial implied consent warning be given to all 
drivers of motor vehicles for tests "required under this act."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102(a)(ii) 
(emphasis added).  The definitional 
section of that statute defines "this act" as Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-101 through 
§ 31-6-107, the implied consent statute itself.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-101.  Tests required under the act are 
chemical tests pursuant to an arrest for DWUI in any motor vehicle.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102(a).  

 
 
[¶14]   The implied consent requirements 
for commercial motor vehicle drivers are in a separate statute 
altogether, and are even more limited in their application.  Those requirements apply only to 
tests "required under this 
section."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 31-7-307(c) (emphasis added).  
Section 31-7-307(c) describes the implied consent warnings due "[a] 
person who drives or is in actual physical control of a commercial motor vehicle 
within this state . . . ."  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-7-307(a).  Appellant 
was not driving or in control of a commercial motor vehicle when he was stopped 
and arrested for DWUI.  He was, 
therefore, not entitled to the warning contained in § 31-7-307, which applies 
only to drivers arrested for DWUI while driving a commercial motor 
vehicle.

 
 
[¶15]   The statutes are unambiguous on 
this point.  When a statute is not 
ambiguous on its face, we do not resort to the rules of statutory 
construction.  State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 373, 376 (Wyo. 1997).  Because Wyoming law on this point is clear, we will 
not consider the materials related to legislative history or the various 
statutory and case materials from other jurisdictions3 presented by Appellant.  

 
 
[¶16]   This Court has interpreted 
Wyoming's 
implied consent laws and the statutory warnings on several occasions.  However, most of those cases involved 
admissibility of chemical tests administered pursuant to a DWUI arrest and not 
the suspension of a driver's license for refusal to submit to such a test.  See State v. Chastain, 594 P.2d 458, 461 
(Wyo. 1979), overruled in part by Olson v. State, 698 P.2d 107 (Wyo. 
1985).

 
 
[¶17]   We modified the rules for implied 
consent warnings slightly in Nesius v. 
State Dep't of Revenue & Taxation, 791 P.2d 939 (Wyo. 1990) to require 
that drivers be informed that they had no right to an attorney before deciding 
whether or not to refuse chemical testing pursuant to a DWUI arrest.  The extra warning was added to avoid 
confusing the implied consent warnings, which occur in the moments immediately 
preceding the request for consent to a chemical test, with the Miranda warnings, which occur during any 
arrest  We did not find that the 
statute was ambiguous but instead decided, in the interest of prudence, that we 
would require the extra safeguard to prevent any confusion created by the two 
warnings coming so quickly on each other's heels during the arrest.  Id. 
at 943.  There is no such concern 
here.  

 
 
[¶18]   In State v. Marquez, 638 P.2d 1292 (Wyo. 
1982), overruled in part on other grounds 
by Olson v. State, 698 P.2d 107 
(Wyo. 1985), we considered the question of what information had to be conveyed 
during a DWUI request for chemical testing in order to comply with the statutory 
warning provisions of the implied consent statute.  At the time, there was conflicting 
language in the statute and we resorted to the tenets of statutory construction 
to determine legislative intent.  
Id. at 
1294-1295.  Those conflicting 
statutory provisions have since been reconciled and, in any case, are not at 
issue here.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102(a) and § 
31-6-103(b) (LexisNexis 1977).  The 
statute is unambiguous as to what warning is required during the stop of a 
non-commercial vehicle.

 
 
[¶19]   The Legislature has mandated 
specific warnings to all drivers that there are consequences to their 
non-commercial driver's licenses for refusing to submit to chemical testing 
subsequent to an arrest for DWUI.  
The prospect of those consequences encourages drivers to submit to 
chemical testing, and serves to aid the state in achieving the legitimate goals 
of removing drunk drivers from the road and imposing proper penalties on 
offenders.  Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 18, 99 S. Ct. 2612, 2621, 61 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1979).  The law also 
clearly requires law enforcement officers to give specific warnings to drivers 
arrested for DWUI in commercial vehicles that there will be consequences to 
their CDLs if they refuse chemical testing.  That statutory warning is calculated to 
reach those most likely affected (someone driving a commercial vehicle legally 
must possess a CDL) and provides significant incentive for those individuals to 
submit to chemical testing.  The 
Legislature did not choose to require the commercial vehicle warning during the 
stop of a non-commercial vehicle, where a comparatively small percentage of 
those stopped are likely to benefit from, or be affected by, such a 
warning.

 
 
[¶20]   It would be impractical to require 
that an arresting officer convey all the information in both statutory schemes 
to an arrestee before requesting a specimen for chemical testing.  The implied consent and various driver's 
license statutes contain multiple interrelated provisions for penalties that may 
be heightened or vary according to the circumstances of each violation.  To require a detailed recitation of all 
statutory penalties involved in a traffic stop would be a misuse of law 
enforcement resources and would not serve the purpose of the implied consent 
statutes.  The implied consent law 
was intended as a complement to the DWUI statute and was designed to facilitate 
tests for intoxication, not to inhibit the ability of the state to keep drunk 
drivers off the road.  Chastain, 594 P.2d  at 
461.

 
 
[¶21]   Implied consent is, by nature, implied in law.4  Merely by choosing to drive a motor 
vehicle on the roads of this state, a driver agrees to submit to chemical 
testing in the event of his arrest for DWUI.  The consequences for refusing a chemical 
test are published law, of which every citizen is presumed to have 
knowledge.  See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199, 
111 S. Ct. 604, 609, 112 L. Ed. 2d 617 (1991).  The Legislature has created a few 
limited exceptions to that rule by requiring that specific warnings be given to 
drivers in certain situations before penalties can be imposed.  Appellant here was given the precise 
warning required by the applicable statutes for a driver stopped in a 
non-commercial vehicle.  He was 
entitled to no more and no less.    

 
 
Due 
Process of Law

 
 
[¶22]   Perhaps realizing the serious 
difficulty of arguing non-compliance with the statutory scheme where the 
warnings given to Appellant fulfilled the statutory requirement to the letter, 
Appellant attempts to raise the issue of due process in this appeal.  However, "neither the district court nor 
this Court has the authority in an administrative agency appeal to address a 
petition for review regarding the constitutionality of a statute.  Rather, the correct course is an 
independent action for declaratory judgment."  Torres v. State ex. rel. Wyo. Worker's 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 92, ¶ 6, 95 P.3d 794, 795 (Wyo. 2004).  We held in Riedel v. Anderson (In re Conflicting Lease Applications), 
972 P.2d 586 (Wyo. 1999) that an administrative agency lacks 
authority to determine the constitutionality of a statute.  "This is so whether the question is the 
constitutionality of the statute per se or the constitutionality of the statute 
as applied."  Id. at 587.  Appellant argues that Wyoming's motor vehicle 
code is unconstitutional because it did not require sufficient due process 
before Appellant could be deprived of his CDL.  The proper vehicle for such an argument 
is a declaratory judgment action brought under W.R.A.P. 12.12.  Id.  We will, therefore, not address 
Appellant's argument on the subject, or the State's response to that 
argument.

 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶23]   There is no statutory requirement 
that an officer read the statutory implied consent warning for the stop of a 
commercial vehicle to the driver of a non-commercial vehicle when requesting a 
specimen for chemical testing pursuant to a DWUI arrest.  The OAH and the district court properly 
upheld the suspension of Appellant's driver license as well as the 
disqualification of his CDL and we affirm.

 
 
 
 

FOOTNOTES

1A copy of 
the notice of suspension of Appellant's driver's license was submitted to the 
OAH and is part of the record on appeal.  
Neither party submitted a copy of the CDL disqualification notice to this 
Court; however, both parties refer to that notice in their briefs, and neither 
party contests its existence.  

2Appellant 
requested a contested case hearing without specifying whether he wished to 
contest the license suspension or the commercial disqualification.  WYDOT's acceptance of that request only 
addresses the six-month implied consent suspension of Appellant's non-commercial 
license.  The OAH addressed both 
issues in its decision but Appellant did not raise the issue of the suspension 
of his non-commercial driver's license in this appeal.  We will, therefore, only consider the 
merits of Appellant's argument with regard to the disqualification of his 
CDL.  

3Appellant 
cites numerous Texas and Wisconsin cases in his brief but does not provide us with 
the statutes those cases interpret or any argument that they are comparable to 
Wyoming's 
statutory scheme.  Appellant also 
provides this Court with an implied consent warning from Maryland, without any citation to Maryland authority or evidence that the Maryland implied consent scheme is similar to the 
Wyoming 
statutes.  Futher, the Court feels 
compelled to note, since Appellant did not, that the Texas cases upon which Appellant relies were superseded by 
statutory changes to the Texas implied consent laws in 2001.  The Supreme Court of Texas confirmed in Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Alford, 209 S.W.3d 101, 102 (Tex. 2006), that under current law in that 
state, the commercial implied consent warning is only required during the stop of a 
commercial vehicle.  Citation to 
Wisconsin authority is inapposite as well because the Wisconsin statutory scheme 
is not similar to the Wyoming implied consent and commercial 
driver's license laws. 

4Black's 
Law Dictionary defines implied consent as "1.  Consent inferred from one's conduct 
rather than from one's direct expression. . . ."  Black's Law Dictionary 323 (8th ed. 
2004).