Case Title: Bigley v. Craven

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88-169

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-02-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Bigley v. Craven1989 WY 49769 P.2d 892Case Number: 88-169Decided: 02/23/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
JAMES 
BIGLEY AND ROCHELLE BIGLEY, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

 
 
v.

 
 
JAMIE LYN 
CRAVEN, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court, SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, J. 

 
 
Jeffrey A. 
Tennyson of Robert N. Williams, P.C., Jackson, for appellants.

 
 
Ford T. 
Bussart and Lisa A. Botham of Greenhalgh, Bussart, West & Rossetti of 
Rock Springs, for appellee.

 
 
Before THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and 
GUTHRIE, J., Retired.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellants James and 
Rochelle Bigley appeal from a jury verdict in their favor awarding James Bigley 
$9,100 for personal injury damages against appellee Jamie Craven. Bigleys assert 
the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that if it was unable to 
apportion the damages between Mr. Bigley's pre-accident and post-accident 
physical conditions, then it could find Jamie Craven, who caused the accident, 
to be responsible for the entire damages. We hold the trial court erred and 
affirm on the issue of liability, reverse on the issue of damages, and remand 
for a new trial in accordance with this decision.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶2.]     Before the May 6, 1983, 
rear-end motor vehicle collision, which gave rise to this action, James Bigley 
suffered from mild and infrequent symptoms of pain and discomfort caused by 
degenerative changes in his cervical spine which were the result of both the 
natural aging process and a 1978 motor vehicle accident. According to Mr. 
Bigley's testimony at trial, he was in fair condition and had no problems with 
his neck about a month after the 1978 accident. He further testified that within 
a few months after the 1978 accident he had resumed most of his pre-accident 
physical activities. Other than an infrequent stiff neck upon awakening in the 
morning, he was not limited in his activities before the 1983 accident giving 
rise to this action. This condition was confirmed by the trial testimony of 
Meade Davis, M.D., and trial testimony by deposition of J. Charles Rich, 
M.D.

 
 

[¶3.]     On May 6, 1983, the 
Bigleys were occupants of their VW van stopped at a traffic light at an 
intersection in Rock Springs, Wyoming, when Craven negligently drove her car 
into the rear-end of the Bigleys' van. This collision injured Mr. Bigley's neck. 
According to Dr. Rich's testimony, Mr. Bigley's symptoms following the 1983 
accident were stiffness and soreness in his neck, numbing sensations into the 
fourth and fifth fingers of both hands, some muscle tenderness on the right side 
of his neck, and diminished cervical range of motion. In Dr. Rich's opinion, Mr. 
Bigley had sustained a fairly severe acceleration-deceleration injury on an 
already abnormal neck. Dr. Rich explained that as of 1978 Mr. Bigley had 
cervical degenerative disk disease changes; as of 1983 he noted similar changes 
between Mr. Bigley's fifth and sixth cervical vertebrae which were "perhaps 
related to his normal activities," and "not necessarily * * * related to a 
previous injury." According to Dr. Rich, Mr. Bigley, like other men of his age 
with degenerative neck changes, is more likely to experience a prolonged period 
of symptoms following injury, increased tendency to excessive muscle tightness, 
and a longer recovery period. On cross-examination by appellee's counsel, Dr. 
Rich clarified that he was not quantifying the amount of injury Mr. Bigley 
sustained as a result of the 1983 accident, and he testified that the 1978 
accident was sufficient to make him more vulnerable to the 1983 accident. He 
also stated that he accepted the radiologist's opinion that Mr. Bigley's 
cervical degeneration increased due to the 1983 accident. On redirect 
examination, Dr. Rich summarized his views that the 1983 injury aggravated a 
preexisting condition; Mr. Bigley sustained the super-imposition of an 
acceleration-deceleration of the cervical spine on a neck that already had 
evidence of degenerative disk disease; the neck was less well able to tolerate 
that trauma than someone else's neck might have been; and the symptoms 
experienced by Mr. Bigley were consistent with those to be expected in that kind 
of injury.

 
 

[¶4.]     Dr. Davis' testimony 
was similar to Dr. Rich's. In Dr. Davis' view, Mr. Bigley had degenerative 
changes in his neck that were probably aggravated by the 1978 injury, and the 
degenerative changes were again aggravated and worsened by the 1983 accident. 
Explaining, Dr. Davis stated, "what we're really trying to distinguish here I 
think it's a magnitude * * * of his injury as a result of the normal 
wear-and-tear changes of day-to-day life versus the more sudden and more rapid 
rate of advances, changes that might incur [sic] from actual injuries on the 
subject." In his opinion, the 1983 accident caused additional damage to Mr. 
Bigley's neck that "resulted in the production of symptoms or increased symptoms 
over and above what he had." When asked on direct examination by Mr. Bigley's 
counsel whether he could apportion the damages between Mr. Bigley's preexisting 
condition and the aggravation of that condition caused by the 1983 accident, Dr. 
Davis answered that Mr. Bigley's present physical limitations of no heavy 
lifting or long driving periods seem to be related to symptoms as a result of 
the 1983 accident and those changes probably are permanent. On cross-examination 
by appellee's counsel, Dr. Davis agreed that in his opinion three conditions 
existed in Mr. Bigley's neck: (1) natural degenerative condition as a result of 
the aging process; (2) some degenerative condition as a result of the 1978 
accident; and (3) some degenerative condition as a result of the 1983 
accident.

 
 

[¶5.]     Against this 
evidentiary background, the Bigleys requested the trial court to instruct the 
jury as follows:

 
 
Plaintiffs' 
Proposed Instruction No. 14

 
 
     When there is a 
pre-existing condition, and where trauma aggravates the pre-existing condition, 
and no apportionment of the disability between that caused by the pre-existing 
condition and that caused by the trauma can be made, in such case, even though a 
portion of the present and future disability is directly attributable to the 
pre-existing condition, the defendant whose act or negligence was the cause of 
the trauma is responsible for the entire damage.

 
 

[¶6.]     The trial court refused 
to give that requested instruction; instead, it instructed the jury as 
follows:

 
 
Instruction 
No. 15

 
 
A person 
who has a condition or disability at the time of any injury is not entitled to 
recover damages for the pre-existing condition. However, he is entitled to 
recover damages for any aggravation of such pre-existing condition directly 
resulting from the injury.

 
 
This is 
true even if the person's condition or disability made him more susceptible to 
the possibility of ill effects than a normally healthy person would have been, 
and even if a normally healthy person would not have suffered any substantial 
injury.

 
 
Where a 
pre-existing condition or disability is so aggravated, the damages as to such 
condition or disability are limited to the additional injury caused by the 
aggravation.

 
 

[¶7.]     The Bigleys do not 
dispute the propriety of this given instruction, but contend it did not 
sufficiently cover their theory of the case in light of the evidence presented 
in support of that theory. This court has consistently held "that a party is 
entitled to have a jury instruction upon its theory of the case but only if such 
theory is supported by competent evidence and a proper request for the 
instruction is made. " Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, Inc., 731 P.2d 1195, 1199 
(Wyo. 
1987).

 
 

[¶8.]     Bigleys properly 
objected to the trial court's refusal to give their requested instruction. 
W.R.C.P. 51; Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 767 P.2d 158, 162 (Wyo. 1989). Our standard 
of review for alleged error in jury instructions is:

 
 
[A] finding 
of error is not alone sufficient to reverse; prejudicial error must be found. 
Walton v. Texasgulf, Inc., Wyo., 634 P.2d 908 (1981). Prejudicial error 
is never presumed; it must be established by the parties. Pure Gas and Chemical 
Company v. Cook [526 P.2d 986 (Wyo. 1974)]. If it is established that an 
instruction or instructions had a tendency to confuse or mislead the jury with 
respect to the applicable principles of law, reversal is proper. 9 Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2558, p. 668 (1971); see also, 
Marken v. Empire Drilling Company, 75 Wyo. 121, 293 P.2d 406 
(1956).

 
 
Cervelli v. 
Graves, 661 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Wyo. 1983).

 
 

[¶9.]     In Condict v. 
Whitehead, Zunker, Gage, Davidson & Shotwell, P.C., 743 P.2d 880, 885-86 
(Wyo. 1987), we observed from 1 California Forms of Jury Instruction, Procedures 
and Instructions § 1.13[3] (1987): "If it appears that giving or refusing to 
give an instruction was likely to mislead the jury and become a factor in its 
verdict, then the instructional error is prejudicial and a court should not 
speculate on what may have been the basis for the jury's 
verdict."

 
 

[¶10.]  Mindful of this standard, we now 
determine whether the trial court's refusal to give the Bigleys' requested 
instruction was error and, if so, whether that error was prejudicial in the 
sense which the standard articulates.

 
 

[¶11.]  Simply stated, the Bigleys assert that, 
in view of the evidence presented relating to Mr. Bigley's physical condition 
before and after the 1983 collision, the jury had difficulty in determining the 
amount of Mr. Bigley's disability to be assessed against Craven because of her 
fault in causing Mr. Bigley's injuries in the 1983 accident. Specifically, the 
Bigleys contend that the jury, not the judge, should decide whether Mr. Bigley's 
disability from the 1983 accident can be segregated from his condition before 
that accident, based on evidence that reasonably suggests a jury could decide 
either way. In support of their position, the Bigleys rely on Newbury v. Vogel, 
151 Colo. 520, 379 P.2d 811 (1963), as their standard bearer, as well as other 
Colorado decisions1 and decisions from several other 
jurisdictions.2 In Newbury, as a result of a motor 
vehicle collision, the plaintiff, like Mr. Bigley, suffered an acute spinal 
sprain which was superimposed on a preexisting arthritic condition. Newbury, 379 P.2d  at 812. As here, some medical testimony held that part of the plaintiff's 
post-accident disability and condition was attributable to the pre-accident 
condition and part to the accident, but no one could say how much was due to one 
or the other. On the other hand, some other medical evidence showed that all of 
the plaintiff's complaints were due to the pre-accident condition. The trial 
court gave the jury an instruction quite similar to instruction No. 15 given 
here and refused to give an instruction similar to Bigleys' requested and 
rejected instruction here. Id. 379 P.2d  at 812. On appeal, the Colorado 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiff was entitled to an 
instruction advising the jury if it could not apportion the plaintiff's 
disability between the preexisting condition and the trauma caused by the 
accident, then the defendant was liable for the entire damage resulting from the 
disability. Id. 379 P.2d  at 813.

 
 

[¶12.]  Opposing the Bigleys' view, Craven argues 
that an injured party is not entitled to a Newbury-like instruction unless that 
party shows that his disability cannot be apportioned based on the evidence 
presented at trial. In support of her claim, Craven relies principally on 
McDonald v. United Airlines, Inc., 365 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1966) and LaMoureaux 
v. Totem Ocean Trailer Express, Inc., 632 P.2d 539 (Alaska 1981). In 
McDonald, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's refusal to give a 
Newbury-like instruction on a record revealing the plaintiff made no attempt to 
show impossibility of apportionment. McDonald, 365 F.2d  at 594. In contrast, 
Bigleys' evidence was sufficient to present a jury question on whether 
apportionment was possible. In LaMoureaux, the Alaska Supreme Court upheld the 
trial court's refusal to give a Newbury-like instruction on a record containing 
no evidence that apportionment was impossible.

 
 

[¶13.]  The LaMoureaux court recognized, however, 
that a case might exist in which the plaintiff, who has presented evidence of 
his preexisting condition, "may still be confronted with the problem of the 
inability of the medical experts to determine the amount of aggravation." 
LaMoureaux, 632 P.2d  at 545. The court identified McNabb v. Green Real Estate 
Co., 62 Mich. App. 500, 233 N.W.2d 811, 819 (1975), to be that case and to stand 
as authority for the principle that the injured party may be entitled to an 
instruction imposing the entire damages on the wrongdoer where there is evidence 
that apportionment is impossible. LaMoureaux, 632 P.2d  at 545. In McNabb, the 
Michigan Court of Appeals, also drawing upon Newbury, held that a clear factual 
basis existed for the trial court's correctly giving the Newbury-like 
instruction. In its holding, the Michigan court said:

 
 
[T]he 
challenged instruction accurately states the policy of this jurisdiction and was 
correctly given. It has long been established that a wrongdoer takes an injured 
person as he finds him, and, that, if the defendant's wrongful conduct is proved 
by a preponderance of the evidence to be a proximate cause of the aggravation of 
a latent disability, he is liable for such aggravation. Schwingschlegl v. City 
of Monroe, 113 Mich. 683, 72 N.W. 7 (1897); 2 Restatement of 
Torts 2d, § 461 P. 502; 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, § 20.3, p. 1127. 
More significant is the policy of this jurisdiction as to the apportionment of 
the burden for uncertainty of damages. As the trial court noted in the second 
emphasized portion, uncertainty as to causation should be resolved in favor of 
the victim.

 
 
This policy 
does not, as defendant claims, remove from a plaintiff the burden of showing 
that the negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause of the injury. 
Schwingschlegl v. City of Monroe, supra. It merely gives the benefit of 
any doubt in determining damages to the party whom the jury has found to have 
been wronged.

 
 
McNabb, 233 N.W.2d  at 820.

 
 

[¶14.]  Synthesizing these cases, we conclude 
they can most rationally be reconciled in terms of the evidentiary state of the 
record in this case. If the record contains conflicting evidence on whether or 
not apportionment can be made, then a question of fact is presented which the 
fact finder, not the trial judge, must resolve. In that circumstance, the fact 
finder must be properly instructed when that is the evidentiary state of the 
record. Short v. Spring Creek, 731 P.2d  at 1199.

 
 

[¶15.]  Turning our attention on the subject of 
apportionment of damages to the familiar surroundings of our own jurisprudence, 
we identify Chrysler Corporation v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123 (Wyo. 1978), and more 
recently, Hashimoto, as instances where this court has discussed this subject, 
albeit in somewhat different contexts. In Todorovich, the plaintiff received 
back injuries when the motor vehicle he was operating was struck from the rear 
by a following motor vehicle. During the collision a seat bracket on the 
plaintiff's seat broke, causing, in the experts' opinions, a lumbar spine injury 
more pronounced than and different from that which would have resulted had the 
seat bracket not failed. In one of its appellate issues, Chrysler claimed the 
jury instructions were defective in not explaining that Chrysler's liability, as 
a vehicle manufacturer, was "`for that portion of the damage or injury caused by 
the defective design over and above the damage or injury that probably would 
have occurred as a result of the [rear-end] impact or collision absent the 
defective design.'" Todorovich, 580 P.2d  at 1130 (quoting Larsen v. General 
Motors Corp. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968)). To this claim, we replied that 
Chrysler's concept assumed the application of an apportionment rule to Mr. 
Todorovich's injuries. We recognized that if apportionment can be achieved, 
apportionment assumes that liability can be identified and attributed to 
contending tort feasors for separate injuries, not for the same injury. Further, 
we noted "our view that in a case which involves an injury that is not 
divisible, apportionment * * * cannot rationally be applied." Id. We stated that "we 
rely upon Restatement Torts, 2d § 433A, p. 434 (1965). The injuries sustained by 
Todorovich are incapable of any logical, reasonable, or practical division." 
Id. at 
1130-1131. The cited Restatement section provides:

 
 
§ 433A. 
Apportionment of Harm to Causes

 
 
(1) Damages 
for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes 
where

 
 
(a) there 
are distinct harms, or

 
 
(b) there 
is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single 
harm.

 
 
(2) Damages 
for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or more 
causes.

 
 
In comment 
a to this section, we find:

 
 

The rules 
stated apply also where one 
or more of the contributing causes is an innocent one, as where the negligence of a defendant combines 
with the innocent conduct of another person, or with the operation of a 
force of nature, or with a pre-existing condition which the defendant 
has not caused, to bring about the harm to the 
plaintiff.

 
 
Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 433A, comment a at 434-35 (1965) (emphasis 
added).

 
 

[¶16.]  Further, comment i to subsection (2) of 
the Restatement section, states:

 
 
     Certain kinds of harm, 
by their very nature, are normally incapable of any logical, reasonable, or 
practical division. * * * By far the greater number of personal injuries * * * 
are thus normally single and indivisible. Where two or more causes combine to 
produce such a single result, incapable of division on any logical or reasonable 
basis, and each is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, the courts 
have refused to make an arbitrary apportionment for its own sake, and each of 
the causes is charged with responsibility for the entire 
harm.

 
 
     Such entire liability 
is imposed where some of the causes are innocent * * * It is imposed where 
either cause would have been sufficient in itself to bring about the result * * 
*.

 
 
Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 433A, comment i at 439-40 (1965).

 
 

[¶17.]  This authority leads us to Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 434 at 447 (1965), which states:

 
 
§ 434. 
Functions of Court and Jury

 
 
(1) It is 
the function of the court to determine

 
 
(a) whether 
the evidence as to the facts makes an issue upon which the jury may reasonably 
differ as to whether the conduct of the defendant has been a substantial factor 
in causing the harm to the plaintiff;

 
 
(b) whether 
the harm to the plaintiff is capable of apportionment among two or more causes; 
and

 
 
(c) the 
questions of causation and apportionment, in any case in which the jury may not 
reasonably differ.

 
 
(2) It is 
the function of the jury to determine, in any case in which it may reasonably 
differ on the issue,

 
 
     (a) whether the 
defendant's conduct has been a substantial factor in causing the harm to the 
plaintiff, and 

 
 
     (b) the apportionment 
of the harm to two or more causes.

 
 
Comment d 
to this section states:

 
 
     The question whether 
the harm to the plaintiff is capable of apportionment among two or more causes 
is a question of law, and is for the decision of the court in all cases. Once it 
is determined that the harm is capable of being apportioned, the actual 
apportionment of the damages among the various causes is a question of fact, 
which is to be determined by the jury, unless the evidence is such that 
reasonable men could come to only one conclusion.

 
 

[¶18.]  A decade after Todorovich we faced and 
answered an apportionment of damages question in Hashimoto. There, a plaintiff 
injured in one rear-end collision sought damages from the defendant for injuries 
the plaintiff received months later in a second rear-end collision not involving 
the first defendant. We upheld the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury 
that in a successive impact case the first defendant has the burden to prove and 
apportion the plaintiff's damages resulting from injuries for which that 
defendant is responsible or, if that apportionment is not possible, the first 
defendant may then be liable for all damages, including those resulting from 
injuries subsequently suffered by the plaintiff. In arriving at that decision we 
distinguished the successive impact situation there presented and also found in 
Bruckman v. Pena, 29 Colo. App. 357, 487 P.2d 566 (1971), from a preexisting 
condition scenario, such as presented here. We said:

 
 
     We are cognizant, as 
was the Bruckman court, of the principle that when a tort feasor injures someone 
with a preexisting condition, he is liable for the total damage when no 
apportionment between the pre-existing condition and the damage defendant caused 
can be made. Thus, the defendant must take his victim as he finds him. See 
Alexander v. White, 488 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Colo. App. 1971), where the Bruckman 
situation is distinguished from a pre-existing condition 
scenario.

 
 
Hashimoto, 
767 P.2d  at 161.

 
 

[¶19.]  We note that the Alexander court relied 
on Newbury in distinguishing the preexisting condition situation from the 
successive impact situation. Alexander v. White, 488 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Colo. App. 
1971).

 
 

[¶20.]  Based on our review and consideration of 
the foregoing authorities, we conclude that the trial court's refusal to give 
the Bigleys' requested instruction was error. The trial court erroneously 
determined, based on the evidence, that Mr. Bigley's disability was capable of 
apportionment between his preexisting condition and his post-accident condition. 
We hold that if, as here, the record contains conflicting evidence on whether or 
not apportionment can be made, then a question of fact is presented which the 
jury as fact finder must resolve under proper instructions. Part of those 
instructions must include the charge that if the jury is unable to apportion the 
plaintiff's disability between preexisting and accident-caused conditions, then 
the defendant is liable for the entire disability.

 
 

[¶21.]  Having found the trial court erred in 
refusing to give the Bigleys' requested instruction, we must next decide whether 
that error was prejudicial in the sense which our standard of review 
articulates. The Bigleys have established that the trial court's refusing to 
give their requested apportionment instruction was likely to mislead the jury 
and become a factor in its verdict.

 
 

[¶22.]  In the face of conflicting evidence on 
apportionment of damages, the trial court instructed the jury it could award 
damages only for the aggravation of the preexisting condition, not the 
preexisting condition itself. Had the jury been properly instructed on this 
issue, it may have awarded damages for that preexisting condition as well. We 
will not "speculate on what may have been the basis for the jury's verdict * * 
*." 1 California Forms of Jury Instruction, 
Procedures and Instructions § 1.13[3] (1987).

 
 

[¶23.]  We reverse and remand to the trial court 
with directions to enter judgment against the defendant on the issue of 
liability and to grant a new trial solely on the issue of damages in conformity 
with the views expressed in this opinion.

 
 

[¶24.]  Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded with instructions.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Hylton v. Wade, 29 
Colo. App. 98, 478 P.2d 690 (1970); Moyer v. Merrick, 155 Colo. 73, 392 P.2d 653 
(1964); Intermill v. Heumesser, 154 Colo. 496, 391 P.2d 684 (1964); Koch v. 
Stephens, 37 Colo. App. 561, 552 P.2d 525 (1976), reversed sub nom. Stephens v. 
Koch, 192 Colo. 531, 561 P.2d 333 (1977); Hildyard v. Western Fasteners, Inc., 
33 Colo. App. 396, 522 P.2d 596 (1974); Brittis v. Freemon, 34 Colo. App. 348, 
527 P.2d 1175 (1974); Brooks v. Reiser, 483 P.2d 389 (Colo. App. 
1971).

 
 

2 Matsumoto v. Kaku, 52 
Haw. 629, 484 P.2d 147 (1971); Bachran v. Morishige, 52 Haw. 61, 469 P.2d 808 
(1970); Kawamoto v. Yasutake, 49 Haw. 42, 410 P.2d 976 (1966); Bushong v. Kamiah 
Grain, Inc., 96 Idaho 659, 534 P.2d 1099 
(1975); Blaine v. Byers, 91 Idaho 665, 429 P.2d 397 
(1967).