Case Title: VJL v. RED and DDD

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-00-11

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-02-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
VJL v. RED and DDD2002 WY 2539 P.3d 1110Case Number: C-00-11Decided: 02/13/2002

October Term, A.D. 2001

 

IN THE 
MATTER OF THE ADOPTION

OF THAT 
CERTAIN INFANT BOY BORN

FEBRUARY 
16, 1993 AT THE JOHNSON

COUNTY 
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL,

BUFFALO, 
JOHNSON COUNTY, WYOMING:

 

VJL, 

Appellant(Petitioner) 
,

 

v.

                                                                                                

RED and 
DDD,
Appellees(Respondents) 
.

 

 

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

James 
P. Castberg, Sheridan, WY.

 Representing 
Appellee DDD:

Robert 
W. Brown of Lonabaugh and Riggs, Sheridan, WY.

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

  

LEHMAN, 
Chief Justice. 

[¶1]      VJL 
appeals from a district court order denying her challenge to adoption 
proceedings which began nearly nine years ago when she signed a relinquishment 
and consent to adoption of her infant son following his birth in February of 
1993.  Because we are cited to no 
authority supporting the specific claims made by VJL on appeal and because the 
interests of the child seem best served by maintenance of the status quo and 
finalizing this litigation, we affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      VJL, the 
biological mother, states the issues as follows:

 

Issue 
I

Did the 
district court commit error in entering its final order denying all claims on 
August 22, 2000,

(a)  Denying 
the appellant's motion for relief from judgment or order modifying visitation of 
minor child entered July 11, 2000?

(b)  Denying 
the appellant's motion for new trial, amendment of the judgment and order to 
modify order of visitation entered July 11, 2000?

 

Issue 
II

Did the 
district court commit error in denying the appellant's motion to reject the 
report filed by the mediator by entry of the court's final order denying all 
claims on August 22, 2000? 

 

Issue 
III

Did the 
district court commit error in failing to rule on the appellant's motion to 
reconsider filed September 7, 2000?

 

 

Appellee 
DDD, the adoptive mother, presents the following 
arguments:

 

I.  Appellant's brief 
presents no cogent authority for its Issues I and III.

 

II.  The trial court 
properly denied appellant's petitions and motion filed on July 21, 
2000.

 

III.  The factual issues 
alleged in appellant's March 17, 2000 Petition for Modification of Order 
Dismissing Petition to Vacate or Annul Adoption did not entitle appellant to a 
hearing following mediation.

 

IV.  The Stipulation of 
June 15, 2000, was conducted in accordance with recognized standards and rules 
and should not be overturned.

 

V.  The Stipulated 
Settlement signed by the parties at the end of the mediation session is a 
binding contract and must be enforced.

 

VI.  The district court 
did not commit error in failing to rule on appellant's Motion to Reconsider 
filed on September 7, 2000.

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      The events giving 
rise to this case began in late 1992 or early 1993 when VJL was expecting the 
birth of a child.  At the time, 
VJL's supervisor at work was DDD.  
They apparently discussed the impending birth and agreed that when the 
child was born DDD and her husband, RED, would adopt him.1  

 

[¶4]      On February 16, 
1993, VJL gave birth to a baby boy.  
Physical custody of the child was immediately relinquished to DDD and 
RED.  The same day, within hours of 
the child's birth, a relinquishment of custody and consent to adoption was 
presented to VJL in the hospital by a lawyer representing DDD and RED.  VJL signed the form, agreeing to the 
adoption of her son by DDD and RED.  
On February 19, 1993, DDD and RED filed a petition for adoption in 
district court, asking the court to enter an interlocutory decree pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-111(a) (LexisNexis 2001) awarding them care and custody 
of the child and allowing them to exercise all rights of natural parents.  The court entered an interlocutory 
decree on April 13, 1993.  Although 
no hearing transcript is contained in the record, it appears that a hearing was 
held prior to entry of the interlocutory decree as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-22-106 (LexisNexis 2001).  Six 
months later, on August 26, 1993, DDD and RED filed an application for final 
decree of adoption in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-112 (LexisNexis 
2001).  A decree of adoption was 
entered August 31, 1993, giving DDD and RED full custody and control of DRD 
along with all rights and obligations of natural parents with respect to him. 

 

[¶5]      Seven months 
later, on April 4, 1994, VJL filed a petition to vacate or annul the 
adoption.  In Count I of her 
petition, under the caption "Fraud," VJL claimed that in return for her consent 
to the adoption, DDD and RED orally agreed to an "open" adoption allowing for 
visitation, telephone calls, and other contact between VJL and the child.  VJL claimed that DDD and RED violated 
this part of the agreement.  In 
Count II, VJL claimed that she agreed to the adoption under duress in that DDD's 
position of authority over her at work made it impossible for her to retract her 
consent to the proposed adoption.  
Count III claimed that the consent signed by VJL on February 16, 1993, 
was invalid because she was suffering from the effects of prolonged labor, sleep 
deprivation and narcotics given to her during labor.  Count IV alleged that VJL and the child 
are American Indians, that the adoption, therefore, fell under the Indian Child 
Welfare Act of 1978, (ICWA) 25 U.S.C. 1913, and that the proceedings failed to 
comply with the provisions of that Act.

 

[¶6]      DDD and RED 
timely answered, denying all claims of fraud, duress, invalid consent and 
applicability of the ICWA.  VJL 
thereafter filed a motion for temporary visitation which DDD and RED opposed and 
the court denied by order dated September 27, 1994.  

 

[¶7]      Apparently, 
nothing further happened with respect to VJL's petition until more than six 
months later when she filed a brief in support of her claim that the ICWA 
applied to the adoption proceedings.  
VJL's brief was followed rapidly by the filing of a motion for partial 
summary judgment and supporting memorandum by DDD and RED in which they argued 
that summary judgment in their favor was appropriate on the issue of the 
ICWA.  On April 25, the court 
entered an order allowing the Northern Arapaho Tribe to intervene in the 
proceedings pursuant to the ICWA. 

 

[¶8]      On June 5, 1995, 
the tribe filed a notice of intervention, a verification of status notifying the 
court that the Tribe considered VJL and her child to be Northern Arapaho Indians 
and a petition to invalidate the decree of adoption as violative of the 
ICWA.  DDD and RED responded on 
September 26, 1995, with a second motion for partial summary judgment and 
supporting memorandum, again arguing that the ICWA did not apply because the 
child is not an Indian.  The Tribe 
and VJL simultaneously filed separate motions for summary judgment and 
supporting memoranda in which they claimed the child is an Indian and the ICWA 
applies.  

 

[¶9]      After a hearing 
on October 24, 1995, the court entered an order on January 2, 1996, granting 
partial summary judgment in favor of DDD and RED and against the Tribe and VJL, 
finding that the child is not an "Indian child" for purposes of the ICWA and the 
Act does not apply.  The Tribe filed 
a motion for reconsideration; but, before any action was taken on the motion, 
the Tribe and the adoptive parents reached a settlement agreement which the 
court approved by order dated January 23, 1996.  The agreement provided that the Tribe 
would withdraw its motion for reconsideration in exchange for the agreement of 
DDD and RED to inform the child of his Indian heritage and take him to tribal 
cultural events annually.  VJL was 
not a party to the agreement.    

 

[¶10]   On February 6, 1996, VJL filed a 
motion asking the court to reconsider its ruling on summary judgment and its 
order approving the settlement agreement.  
No further action was taken in the case until nearly six months later 
when, on July 30, 1996, the court summarily denied VJL's motion without any 
explanation.  

 

[¶11]   Two and a half months later, on 
October 16, 1996, VJL asked the court to set the remaining issues for 
trial.  The court issued an order 
for a scheduling conference to be held January 14, 1997, a year after the 
court's summary judgment order and three years after VJL filed her petition to 
vacate the adoption.  At the 
scheduling conference, the matter was set for trial on April 29, 1997.  The trial did not take place as 
scheduled because the parties reached a settlement agreement. 

 

[¶12]   Under the terms of the settlement, 
VJL agreed to drop her legal challenge to the adoption in exchange for the 
agreement of DDD and RED to allow her to have visitation with the child for two 
hours at least two times per month until the child reached the age of six 
years.  At that time, the agreement 
provided, visitation could be increased if the child desired.  The agreement also provided that VJL 
would not reveal to the child that she was his biological mother and that DDD 
and RED retained the right to decide whether and when to tell him.  Pursuant to the parties' agreement, the 
court entered an order dismissing the petition to vacate the adoption on June 9, 
1997. 

 

[¶13]   Nearly three years later, on March 
17, 2000, VJL filed a petition for modification of the court's June 9, 1997 
order.  Alleging that the child had 
requested more time with her and her other children, VJL sought increased 
visitation.  VJL simultaneously 
filed a motion for alternative dispute resolution.  On April 18, 2000, DDD2 filed an opposition to the petition 
for modification.  Thereafter, on 
May 9, 2000, the parties filed joint motions for mediation and for appointment 
of a guardian ad litem.  Pursuant to 
the parties' request, the court entered an order on May 10, 2000, setting the 
matter for mediation and appointing a mediator. 

 

[¶14]   A mediation was held on June 15, 
2000, culminating in another settlement agreement in which the parties agreed 
that VJL would continue to have visitation with the child two times per month 
for two hours and that, beginning at age ten, the child would be interviewed 
every six months by an independent third party to determine his wishes with 
respect to visitation with VJL.  VJL 
and DDD agreed to abide by his wishes.  
In accordance with that agreement, the court entered an order modifying 
visitation on July 11, 2000. 

 

[¶15]   On July 21, 2000, VJL, appearing 
pro se for the first time in the proceedings, filed motions asking the court for 
relief from the July 11 order.  VJL 
alleged various irregularities in the mediation process, including bias and 
prejudice by the mediator, violations of due process and inadequate legal 
representation.  

 

[¶16]   On August 3, 2000, the mediator, 
apparently on his own initiative, filed a report in response to VJL's motions in 
which he set forth his view of what occurred during the mediation and his 
"observations" of VJL's behavior.3  DDD also filed a response and, 
simultaneously, a petition to terminate visitation.  On August 22, 2000, the court entered a 
final order denying all pending claims.  
VJL, again represented by counsel, timely appealed the court's order. 

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶17]   Adoption was not known at common 
law and is a creature of statute to be strictly construed.  JK v. MK, 5 P.3d 782, 787 (Wyo. 
2000) (citing Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d 974, 979 (Wyo. 1982)).  Since adoption is entirely statutory, 
the proceedings must be conducted in substantial conformity with the statutory 
provisions.  Matter of TR, 
777 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Wyo. 1989) (citing MVF v. MF, 766 P.2d 550, 552 
(Wyo. 1988)).

 

[¶18]   One of the most basic principles we 
seek to promote in adoption cases is the best interests of the child.  JK, at 788 (citing Matter of 
TR, at 1118).  Finality of 
decision and bringing an end to litigation are almost invariably in the best 
interests of the child.  Matter 
of TR, at 1115) (Urbigkit, J., concurring) (citing In Interest of 
JL, 761 P.2d 985 (Wyo. 1998)).   

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

1.  Alleged error in 
denying VJL's motions of March 17 and July 21, 
2000

 

[¶19]   VJL claims that the district court 
erred in denying without a hearing her March 17, 2000 petition for modification 
of the June 9, 1997 order dismissing the case.  She asserts that sufficient changes in 
circumstances had occurred to raise significant factual questions requiring a 
hearing on the issue whether visitation should be modified.  VJL further asserts that the district 
court compounded the error already committed when it then proceeded to decide 
without a hearing her motions of July 21, 2000, seeking relief from the final 
order in this case.

 

[¶20]   VJL makes no cogent argument and 
cites no authority at all for her claim that she was entitled to a hearing on 
either the March 17 or July 21 motions, and we summarily affirm.  Stone v. Stone, 7 P.3d 887, 891 (Wyo. 2000); May v. May, 945 P.2d 1189, 1191 (Wyo. 
1997).

 

2.  Alleged error in 
denying VJL's motion to reject the mediator report

 

[¶21]   VJL next claims that the district 
court erred in denying her motion to reject the report filed by the mediator on 
August 3, 2000.  Again, VJL cites no 
authority for her contention that the mediator's report was improper or should 
not have been considered, nor does she present cogent argument, and we affirm as 
to this issue.  Stone, at 
891; May, at 1191.

 

3.  Alleged error in 
failing to hear or rule on VJL's September 7, 2000 motion to 
reconsider

 

[¶22]   The last issue raised by VJL is 
that the district court erred, first, in failing to hold a hearing on her motion 
to reconsider and, then, in failing to rule on the motion.  As with her other issues, VJL cites no 
authority for her contention and presents no argument beyond the bare assertion 
that the district court erred.  
Absent cogent argument and pertinent authority, we decline to address 
it.  Stone, at 891; 
May, at 1191.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶23]   This is yet another sad case 
illustrating the difficulties inherent in the efforts of our justice system to 
deal fairly but quickly with adoption cases so as to bring about finality.  The baby boy in this case was born 
February 16, 1993, and delivered only hours later by the biological mother into 
the custody of DDD and RED with her consent to adoption.  Just over a year later, with time to 
reconsider, second guess, and feel badly about her decision, VJL sought relief 
in the courts from what may have been a decision made in haste without 
sufficient information concerning the ramifications of her decision.  For reasons which do not appear in the 
record, DDD and RED agreed when the boy was four years old to allow regular 
visits between the boy and his biological mother, visits which, it appears from 
the record, have been regular and continuous since 1997.

 

[¶24]   Now, due to a confluence of forces, 
we are asked to decide whether the circumstances of a young boy in almost his 
ninth year of life who has been raised continuously from birth by DDD but who 
also knows and has regularly visited his biological mother since he was four 
should suddenly change.  However, 
VJL has given us no authority, no cogent argument, no basis for reversing the 
final order in this case.  Absent 
such a basis, we look to the best interests of the child which seem best served 
by maintaining the status quo and by ending this litigation once and for 
all.

 

[¶25]   For these reasons, we 
affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1There 
are no transcripts of hearings or other evidentiary materials contained in the 
record in this case.  For the court 
to reconstruct the facts, therefore, we look to the admissions of the parties 
contained in the pleadings and other documents in the record. 

  2RED apparently committed suicide in 
June of 1997. 

  3We make no ruling as to the 
propriety of the mediator's report.  
We note only that the function of a mediator is to be a conciliator, to 
bring parties together in an effort to reconcile their differences.  Interjecting oneself into court 
proceedings after the fact of the mediation as basically a witness to discredit 
the truthfulness and character of a party to the mediation would not seem to 
comport with the functions of a mediator.