Case Title: PETE STAMPER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 85-36

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-05-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
PETE STAMPER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 67701 P.2d 557Case Number: 85-36Decided: 05/24/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
PETE STAMPER, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Rehearing Denied June 25, 
1985.

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, FremontCounty, Elizabeth A. Kail, 
J.

 
 
ORDER THAT 
NOTICE OF APPEAL BE CONSIDERED A PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI; ORDER GRANTING 
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI; AND ORDER AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO 
DISMISS

[¶1.]     This case came before 
the court upon its own motion to consider the jurisdiction of this court to hear 
an appeal from the Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, entered by the Fremont 
County District Court, Ninth Judicial District, against the defendant, Pete 
Stamper. The court having examined the files and record in this case and being 
fully advised in the premises finds that:

[¶2.]     1. An information has 
been filed in the district court charging the defendant with aggravated assault 
and battery with a dangerous or deadly weapon, § 6-4-506(b), W.S. 1977 (now § 
6-2-502, W.S. 1977, 1984 Cum.Supp.), for an incident which occurred July 10, 
1981. The defendant moved the court to dismiss the information on the ground 
that the trial of this charge would place him twice in jeopardy for the same 
offense. The district court denied this motion to dismiss, finding expressly 
that retrial would not violate the defendant's rights under the double jeopardy 
clauses of the Wyoming and United States Constitutions. The 
defendant filed a Notice of Appeal, seeking review of the district court's 
order.

[¶3.]     2. This court, in the 
case of Stamper v. State, Wyo., 672 P.2d 106 (1983), determined that no right of appeal exists from an order denying 
a motion to dismiss an action, because such order is not a final order as 
defined in Rule 1.05, W.R.A.P. We held that the writ of certiorari is an 
adequate and appropriate remedy by which a defendant may separately assert and 
litigate to finality his claim that he is placed in double jeopardy, in 
accordance with Abney v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 651, 97 S. Ct. 2034, 52 L. Ed. 2d 651 (1977); and Peterson v. State, Wyo., 586 P.2d 144 
(1978). Therefore, it is appropriate to consider the defendant's Notice of 
Appeal in the instant case as a petition for a writ of 
certiorari.

[¶4.]     3. In the case of Stamper v. State, supra, this court 
considered the identical claim of double jeopardy brought by the identical 
defendant, based on the identical files and record that are presently before 
this court. We held in Stamper v. 
State, supra, 672 P.2d  at 106-107, that:

"* * * [T]he Writ of 
Certiorari should be granted in this case; the files and record of this court 
are sufficient to apprise the court of the facts surrounding the claim of double 
jeopardy and the denial of the Motion to Dismiss by the district court; there is 
no necessity in this case for further briefing or argument of either the facts 
or the law; the retrial of Pete Stamper does not place him twice in jeopardy 
because the reversal of his prior conviction was premised upon the incorrect 
receipt of evidence and an incorrect instruction (see Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978)); and the denial of the Motion to Dismiss by the 
district court should be affirmed * * *."

Accordingly, we 
issued an order granting the writ of certiorari and affirming the district 
court's order refusing to dismiss the criminal action against Pete 
Stamper.

[¶5.]     4. In an unpublished 
order, this court withdrew the order issued in Stamper v. State, supra, on the ground 
that no case against Pete Stamper was pending in district court upon which an 
adjudication could be had or which the defendant could move to 
dismiss.

[¶6.]     5. The defendant now 
stands charged with violating § 6-4-506(b), W.S. 1977 (now § 6-2-502, W.S. 1977, 
1984 Cum.Supp.), and, therefore, his claim that retrial places him in double 
jeopardy is ripe for review. Except for the existence of pending criminal 
charges, the factual and legal grounds for our disposition in Stamper v. State, supra, remain 
unchanged. Therefore, the petition for certiorari should be granted and the 
Order Affirming the Denial of the Motion to Dismiss, issued by this court in Stamper v. State, supra, and 
subsequently withdrawn should be reinstated.

[¶7.]     It therefore 
is

[¶8.]     ORDERED that the Notice 
of Appeal filed herein by Pete Stamper on January 9, 1985, be, and the same 
hereby is, considered a petition for a writ of certiorari; and it further 
is

[¶9.]     ORDERED that the writ 
of certiorari be, and the same hereby is, granted to the extent required for 
review of the Order Denying the Motion to Dismiss, entered by the district 
court; and it further is

[¶10.]  ORDERED that the action of the district 
court in denying the Motion to Dismiss by Pete Stamper based upon his claim of 
double jeopardy be, and the same is hereby, affirmed. 

ROSE, Justice, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part.

[¶11.]  The majority recognize that the federal 
and state constitutions mandate 
review of Pete Stamper's double jeopardy challenge prior to a second trial. 
Accordingly, the court grants the extraordinary writ of certiorari to provide a 
remedy where no right of appeal exists. Instead of affording the defendant 
meaningful review of his claim, however, the majority rule on this relatively 
complex double-jeopardy question without benefit of briefing or oral argument 
and with what appears to me to be only a cursory analysis of controlling 
authority. I would have afforded the defendant and the State an opportunity to 
fully develop their respective positions, so that we might decide this 
constitutional issue on the soundest foundation possible.

[¶12.]  In my concurring and dissenting opinion 
in Stamper v. State, Wyo., 672 P.2d 106, 
107-109 (1983), I reviewed the basis for our reversal of Stamper's original 
conviction and concluded that retrial in this case will subject the defendant to 
double jeopardy. We overturned his conviction of aggravated assault with a 
deadly weapon in Stamper v. State, 
Wyo., 662 P.2d 82 (1983), on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to warrant 
instructing the jury on such offense. By granting the State a second chance to 
amass enough evidence to obtain a conviction of aggravated assault with a deadly 
weapon, we place Stamper twice in jeopardy for the same offense. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978). The State had one fair opportunity to prove its case 
against Stamper and that is all the constitution allows.

[¶13.]  For these reasons more fully developed in 
my concurring and dissenting opinion in Stamper v. State, supra, 672 P.2d  at 
107-109, I concur only in that portion of the Order granting review through the 
writ of certiorari; I dissent to the extent that it dispenses with argument from 
the parties and affirms the denial of the motion to 
dismiss.