Case Title: State ex rel. Kelsey Hayes Co. v. Grashel

Citation: 2013-Ohio-4959

Docket Number: 2012-0032

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-11-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Kelsey Hayes Co. v. Grashel, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4959.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-4959 
THE STATE EX REL. KELSEY HAYES COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. GRASHEL 
 ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. Kelsey Hayes Co. v. Grashel,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4959.] 
Workers’ compensation—Voluntary abandonment of workforce precludes 
compensation for permanent total disability. 
(No. 2012-0032—Submitted July 9, 2013—Decided November 14, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 10AP-386,  
2011-Ohio-6169. 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Kelsey Hayes Company appeals the judgment of the Tenth District 
Court of Appeals, which denied its request for a writ of mandamus to require the 
Industrial Commission to vacate its order awarding former employee Arthur 
Grashel permanent-total-disability compensation after he had retired.  Kelsey 
Hayes contends that the commission abused its discretion when it concluded that 
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Grashel had not voluntarily abandoned the workforce and had remained eligible 
for permanent-total-disability benefits. 
{¶ 2} Because the Industrial Commission had conclusively established in 
March 2005 that the exacerbation of Grashel’s symptoms that forced him to stop 
working in 2004 was caused by smoking, not by the allowed conditions in his 
claim, the commission abused its discretion when it determined that Grashel’s 
decision to stop working was not a voluntary abandonment of the workforce.  
Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
{¶ 3} Grashel worked as a machinist for Kelsey Hayes.  He filed a 
workers’ compensation claim that was allowed for hypersensitivity pneumonitis 
and hypersensitivity-induced reactive upper-airway disease, with June 13, 2001, 
recognized as the date of injury.  He received temporary-total-disability 
compensation for a period of time and then returned to work in May 2003 on the 
assembly side of the plant, away from the fumes that aggravated his condition. 
{¶ 4} Eventually, his symptoms returned.  He stopped working on 
September 20, 2004, on the advice of his treating physician, Dr. Pue.  Grashel 
moved for temporary-total-disability compensation for the period September 20, 
2004, through November 15, 2004, supported by records from Dr. Pue. 
{¶ 5} On November 17, 2004, shortly after Grashel stopped working, he 
was examined by David M. Rosenberg, M.D., who concluded: 
 
Mr. Grashel has mild airflow obstruction, which is unchanged 
compared to two years ago.  This mild airways disease * * * 
undoubtedly relates to his long and continued cigarette smoking.  
He has only a mild degree of impairment, and clearly is not 
disabled from performing his employment.  * * * [T]here is no 
objective basis to indicate this has been related to either of the 
allowed conditions of hypersensitivity-induced reactive airways 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
disease or hypersensitivity pneumonitis (HP).  He clearly does not 
have HP based on the absence of interstitial changes on chest X-
ray, a normal diffusing capacity and no evidence of restriction.  
Also, he does not have hypersensitivity-induced reactive airways 
disease.  He simply has mild obstructive lung disease related to his 
long and continued * * * smoking history, and his treatment since 
September is simply for this respiratory problem. 
 
{¶ 6} At the end of 2004, Grashel, then age 62, elected to take Social 
Security retirement benefits because he had not returned to work. 
{¶ 7} Following a hearing on February 22, 2005, a staff hearing officer 
denied Grashel’s request for temporary-total-disability compensation.  The 
commission relied on Dr. Rosenberg’s opinion that Grashel’s smoking-related 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease caused his exacerbated symptoms.  The 
hearing officer determined that Grashel was not disabled when he left work in 
September 2004 due to his allowed conditions.  In doing so, the commission 
rejected the evidence submitted from Dr. Pue—his note dated September 20, 
2004, and his record of a November 8, 2004 office visit—both of which merely 
acknowledged the exacerbation of Grashel’s symptoms and attributed them to his 
allowed conditions.  The commission’s 2005 order became final. 
{¶ 8} On May 5, 2005, Grashel filed his first application for permanent-
total-disability compensation.  A staff hearing officer concluded that Grashel 
retained some capacity to work and denied his application.  The hearing officer 
acknowledged that Grashel “testified at [the] hearing that he was forced to take an 
early social security retirement due to having no income since September of 2004, 
as his temporary total disability compensation after September of 2004 was 
denied in this claim.” 
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{¶ 9} On July 18, 2007, Grashel filed a second application for 
permanent-total-disability compensation supported by a June 11, 2007 report from 
Dr. Pue, in which he opined that Grashel was permanently and totally disabled.  A 
staff hearing officer awarded Grashel compensation as of June 11, 2007, the date 
of Dr. Pue’s report.  The order did not mention Grashel’s retirement in 2004. 
{¶ 10} On February 24, 2009, the Tenth District Court of Appeals issued a 
limited writ ordering the commission to rehear the matter and to consider whether 
Grashel had voluntarily abandoned the workforce when he retired in 2004.  State 
ex rel. Kelsey Hayes Co. v. Grashel, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-484, 2009-
Ohio-818. 
{¶ 11} Following a hearing on September 1, 2009, a staff hearing officer 
again awarded Grashel permanent-total-disability benefits.  The hearing officer 
concluded that Grashel had left the workforce due to the allowed conditions in his 
claim; thus, he remained eligible for permanent-total-disability benefits.  The 
hearing officer further relied on Dr. Pue’s June 11, 2007 report to conclude that 
Grashel was permanently and totally disabled. 
{¶ 12} Kelsey Hayes filed another complaint for mandamus, alleging that 
the commission abused its discretion when it granted permanent-total-disability 
compensation to Grashel.  The court of appeals denied the writ. 
{¶ 13} This cause is now before the court on an appeal as of right. 
{¶ 14} “An employee who retires prior to becoming permanently and 
totally disabled is precluded from eligibility for permanent total disability 
compensation only if the retirement is voluntary and constitutes an abandonment 
of the entire job market.”  State ex rel. Baker Material Handling Corp. v. Indus. 
Comm., 69 Ohio St.3d 202, 631 N.E.2d 138 (1994), paragraph two of the 
syllabus.  In 2009, when the commission adjudicated Grashel’s request for 
permanent-total-disability compensation, it had to determine whether Grashel had 
voluntarily abandoned the workforce in September 2004.  “If evidence of 
January Term, 2013 
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voluntary removal or retirement is brought into issue, the adjudicator shall 
consider evidence that is submitted of the injured worker’s medical condition at or 
near the time of removal/retirement.”  Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(1)(d). 
{¶ 15} Contrary to this directive, the commission did not consider all the 
evidence of Grashel’s medical condition at the time he left the workforce.  The 
commission did not consider Dr. Rosenberg’s November 2004 opinion or the 
commission’s 2005 order that conclusively determined that Grashel’s increased 
symptoms were caused by a nonallowed condition. 
{¶ 16} Instead, the commission relied on medical evidence that it had 
rejected in 2005—a note from Dr. Pue dated September 20, 2004, written on a 
prescription slip, which stated that Grashel should be removed from the work 
environment immediately due to increased symptoms, and a report based on 
Grashel’s office visit of November 8, 2004.  Because it is inconsistent for the 
commission to reject Dr. Pue’s opinion in 2005 but rely on it in 2009, the opinion 
cannot constitute evidence to support the commission’s decision that Grashel’s 
allowed conditions caused the exacerbation of his symptoms.  State ex rel. 
Zamora v. Indus. Comm., 45 Ohio St.3d 17, 19, 543 N.E.2d 87 (1989). 
{¶ 17} The court of appeals cited an exception to Zamora to justify the 
commission’s use of Dr. Pue’s records to corroborate Grashel’s testimony.  State 
ex rel. Verbanek v. Indus. Comm., 73 Ohio St.3d 562, 653 N.E.2d 374 (1995).  
Verbanek recognized that a claimant’s medical history given to a physician may 
be severed from that physician’s opinion.  This is because the credibility of the 
claimant’s recited medical history does not depend on the opinion.  But in this 
case, there is nothing to sever from Dr. Pue’s statements in 2004 that could be 
used to corroborate Grashel’s testimony.  The exception to Zamora does not 
apply.  The entire record of Dr. Pue is tainted and cannot be considered as 
evidence to support the commission’s decision. 
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{¶ 18} Kelsey Hayes further maintains that not only did Grashel 
voluntarily retire in 2004 but that he also failed to seek other employment or 
vocational training, thereby abandoning the entire job market and making himself 
ineligible for compensation for permanent total disability.  State ex rel. Baker 
Material Handling Corp, 69 Ohio St.3d 202, 631 N.E.2d 138, paragraph two of 
the syllabus. 
{¶ 19} We agree that the evidence clearly demonstrates that Grashel had 
abandoned the entire job market.  After he stopped working in September 2004, 
there is no evidence that he sought other employment.  He did not attempt 
vocational rehabilitation despite statements from his treating physician indicating 
that he could return to work in an environment away from the fumes that had 
aggravated his condition.  In October 2005, Grashel testified before the 
commission that he had opted to take an early social security retirement for 
financial reasons after his claim for temporary-total-disability compensation was 
denied in 2005. 
{¶ 20} Therefore, based upon the evidence before the commission, 
Grashel was not disabled by his allowed conditions when he stopped working on 
September 20, 2004.  Thus, he voluntarily abandoned the workforce at that time 
and eventually the entire job market.  Therefore, he was not eligible for 
permanent-total-disability compensation after retirement. 
{¶ 21} We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and grant a writ of 
mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its previous order and issue a new 
order denying permanent-total-disability compensation. 
Judgment reversed 
and writ granted. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and KENNEDY, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent. 
____________________ 
January Term, 2013 
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PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 22} I respectfully dissent.  I believe that the record contains evidence 
supporting the Industrial Commission’s decision in 2009 that Arthur Grashel left 
the workforce in September 2004 because of increased symptoms related to the 
allowed conditions in his industrial claim.  Therefore, I agree with the court of 
appeals that the commission did not abuse its discretion when it determined that 
Grashel had not voluntarily abandoned the workforce. 
{¶ 23} The majority opinion states that the commission conclusively 
established in 2005 that Grashel’s increased symptoms were due to his history of 
smoking.  The issue before the commission at that time, however, was whether 
Grashel was temporarily disabled in 2004 as a result of his allowed conditions.  
The parties did not litigate and the commission did not address the issue of 
voluntary abandonment at that time. 
{¶ 24} In 2009, when that issue was directly before the commission, the 
hearing officer relied on Grashel’s testimony that he had been forced to stop 
working because of his industrial injury.  The commission used Dr. Pue’s 
September 20, 2004 note and November 8, 2004 medical record merely to 
corroborate Grashel’s testimony that he left work in 2004 due to breathing 
problems related to the industrial injury even though the industrial injury was not 
the proximate cause of claimant’s disability.  As the court of appeals reasoned, the 
commission may reject one conclusion of a medical report yet draw its own 
conclusion from the same medical information.  State ex rel. Fries v. Workers’ 
Comp. Bur., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 01AP-721, 2002-Ohio 3252, ¶ 9.  
{¶ 25} Once the commission determined that Grashel’s job departure was 
involuntary, the employer’s argument of voluntary abandonment failed, and there 
was no need for the commission’s analysis to continue. Thus, the commission did 
not abuse its discretion when it did not address whether Grashel had abandoned 
the entire job market. 
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{¶ 26} The commission has the exclusive responsibility to assess the 
weight and credibility of the evidence; our role is limited to determining whether 
there is evidence in the record to support the commission’s stated basis for its 
decision.  State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc., 31 Ohio St.3d 18, 20-21, 508 
N.E.2d 936 (1987).  Although there may be evidence that could support a 
different decision, that alone does not mean that the commission abused its 
discretion.  State ex rel. Dingus v. Quinn Dev. Co., 70 Ohio St.3d 580, 639 N.E.2d 
1184 (1994).  Because the commission’s decision that Grashel did not voluntarily 
abandon his employment was supported by evidence, the commission did not 
abuse its discretion when it awarded Grashel permanent-total-disability 
compensation.  I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
FRENCH and O’NEILL, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
Critchfield, Critchfield & Johnston, Ltd., and Susan E. Baker, for 
appellant. 
Philip J. Fulton Law Office, Chelsea J. Fulton, and Michael P. Dusseau, 
for appellee Arthur Grashel. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and LaTawnda N. Moore, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
________________________