Case Title: Commonwealth v. Harris

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12607

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-03-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12607 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  BRIAN K. HARRIS. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     November 5, 2018. - March 29, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, 
JJ. 
 
 
Firearms.  License.  Constitutional Law, Right to bear arms, 
Right to travel.  Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, 
Conduct of prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Lowell Division of 
the District Court Department on May 1, 2017. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Barbara Savitt Pearson, 
J., and the cases were tried before James W. Coffey, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Christopher DeMayo for the defendant. 
 
Ashlee R. Mastrangelo, Assistant District Attorney (Melissa 
Weisgold Johnsen, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, & Thomas E. Bocian, 
Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  This case concerns challenges to the firearms 
 
 
2 
licensing statute by the defendant, a firearm owner licensed to 
carry firearms in New Hampshire, who moved to the Commonwealth 
and did not obtain a Massachusetts firearm license within the 
sixty-day statutory time period for new residents. 
 
Upon his return from a brief visit to New Hampshire, the 
defendant, who was intoxicated, got into a confrontation with 
his girlfriend in the early morning hours of September 12, 2015; 
she fled the apartment and called police.  Officers returned 
with her to the apartment and spoke with the defendant, who 
agreed that he owned a Glock 43 pistol, and told them that it 
was in the trunk of his vehicle.  Officers retrieved the weapon 
for "safekeeping" and kept the defendant overnight at the police 
station for his own safety after they determined he was too 
intoxicated to drive. 
 
The defendant was not arrested, but two criminal complaints 
subsequently issued from the District Court charging him with 
unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (h) (1); unlawful possession of ammunition in violation of 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h) (1); and unlawful possession of a firearm 
in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).1  A District Court jury 
                     
 
1 Initially, the defendant also was charged with unlawful 
possession of a large capacity weapon or large capacity feeding 
device, in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m).  The 
Commonwealth did not proceed to trial on that charge.  In 
addition, the Commonwealth entered nolle prosequi with respect 
to the charge of unlawful possession of a firearm in violation 
 
 
3 
convicted the defendant on all charges.  He appealed, and we 
allowed his application for direct appellate review. 
 
The defendant challenges the denial of his motion to 
dismiss the complaint charging unlawful possession of a firearm 
in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), on constitutional 
grounds.2  In the alternative, he requests a new trial on the 
grounds of asserted errors in the jury instructions and 
purported prejudice as a result of assertedly improper 
questioning of a witness by the prosecutor.  We affirm.3 
 
Discussion.  1.  Motion to dismiss.  a.  Factual 
background.  The limited facts before the judge were drawn 
predominantly from a police report submitted as an exhibit to 
the defendant's motion to dismiss. 
 
In January 2015, Patty4 and the defendant started dating.  
At the time, Patty was living in an apartment in Tewksbury.  In 
late May 2015, the defendant moved into Patty's apartment. 
                     
of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h) (1).  The conviction of unlawful 
possession of ammunition in violation of G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (h) (1), was placed on file, and the defendant was 
sentenced to the mandatory minimum sentence of eighteen months' 
incarceration for unlawful possession of a firearm in violation 
of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). 
 
 
2 The defendant did not appeal from his other convictions. 
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Attorney 
General. 
 
 
4 A pseudonym. 
 
 
4 
 
On June 4, 2015, Patty and the defendant removed some of 
her belongings from the apartment to make room for the 
defendant's belongings.  That night, the defendant woke Patty by 
yelling.  He pushed her across the room and pinned her to a 
wall.  The defendant had found a photograph of Patty's former 
boyfriend.  The defendant said that he would "mutilate" the 
former boyfriend "in front of [Patty] . . . or worse."  He also 
said that he would "assassinate anyone [he] want[ed] anytime 
[he] want[ed]," and told Patty that he was "the most brutal 
person [she] will meet."  The defendant counted rounds of 
ammunition and identified jackets he would wear at his victims' 
funerals. 
 
On September 11, 2015, the defendant and Patty were in the 
Tewksbury apartment.  They had a verbal argument about Patty's 
work schedule, during which the defendant was verbally abusive.  
He went to the bedroom closet, where he retrieved a weapon that 
Patty identified as his "Glock."  There was no indication that 
the firearm was loaded, but Patty also saw ammunition. 
 
The defendant removed articles of his clothing from the 
closet; packed them, with the Glock, in a backpack; and left the 
apartment.  The defendant planned to "stay in New Hampshire for 
the night."  The defendant did not end up staying in New 
Hampshire.  Rather, at approximately 1 A.M. on September 12, 
2015, "after drinking," he came home to Tewksbury.  He was 
 
 
5 
intoxicated.  Patty was asleep and did not hear the defendant 
enter the apartment. 
 
The defendant "threw on the lights and pulled the blankets 
off" Patty.  He became enraged when she told him that "he was 
drunk" and that she "wanted nothing to do with him in [that] 
state."  He began throwing items around and "trashing the 
apartment," while yelling at Patty and using obscene language. 
 
Thinking about the Glock and the defendant's earlier 
actions, Patty became fearful for her safety.  In an attempt to 
calm the defendant, Patty called his father, but this resulted 
in the defendant becoming yet more enraged.  Patty grabbed her 
dog and keys, and called police as she fled the apartment; the 
defendant ran after her.  After Patty got into her vehicle, the 
defendant "banged on" its exterior.  Patty drove to a 
prearranged location, where she waited for the police. 
 
At approximately 1:30 A.M., multiple uniformed officers 
responded in marked cruisers.  Patty informed them that she was 
unsure if the defendant "had the Glock in [his] vehicle or in 
his possession," and consented to a protective sweep of the 
apartment. 
 
The officers formed a contact team and entered the 
apartment building.  An officer used a cellular telephone to 
call the defendant, and requested that he step outside.  The 
defendant complied.  He said that he "had gone out drinking" 
 
 
6 
before "coming home" to Tewksbury.  He also acknowledged that he 
did not have a Massachusetts firearm license.  Instead, he 
produced a New Hampshire firearm license.  The defendant said 
that he had a Glock 43 (a nine millimeter pistol) in the trunk 
of his vehicle.  He consented to a search of the vehicle, during 
which officers located the firearm and ammunition. 
 
At the scene, Patty requested an emergency protection order 
under G. L. c. 209A.  A judge issued the order, which was served 
on the defendant.  Pursuant to the order, officers confiscated 
the defendant's firearm and ammunition for safe keeping.  While 
they were doing so, the defendant commented that he "had 
connections" and would regain possession of the Glock.  He also 
said that the protection order "won't stick."  The defendant was 
not arrested.  Rather, he was placed in protective custody when, 
after he failed multiple sobriety tests, officers determined 
that he would be unable to drive safely from the scene. 
 
As a result of the restraining order, the Atkinson, New 
Hampshire, police chief revoked the defendant's New Hampshire 
firearm license. 
 
Criminal complaints against the defendant ultimately were 
filed; he moved to dismiss the complaints.  At a hearing on the 
motion, the defendant asserted an affirmative defense predicated 
on his by-then-revoked New Hampshire firearm license.  In 
addition, he maintained that he was a New Hampshire resident who 
 
 
7 
had been traveling "in or through the Commonwealth" at the time 
of the domestic dispute.  The judge noted, however, that the 
defendant's residency status was a disputed issue of fact that 
could not be decided on a motion to dismiss.  The judge denied 
the defendant's motion and found probable cause to believe the 
defendant was a resident of the Commonwealth and had been living 
with Patty in Tewksbury while unlawfully possessing a firearm.  
We discern no error in the judge's decision. 
 
b.  Massachusetts firearm license.  In his motion to 
dismiss, the defendant raised both facial and as-applied 
challenges to the constitutionality of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).  
On appeal, he pursues only a facial challenge, and that only 
summarily.5 
 
"A facial challenge is an attack on a statute itself as 
opposed to a particular application."  Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 
S. Ct. 2443, 2449 (2015).  "Facial challenges are disfavored" 
                     
 
5 Often, as here, those who do not apply for a Massachusetts 
firearm license are not entitled to assert as-applied challenges 
to the licensing laws because they cannot demonstrate that they 
sought, and were denied, a Massachusetts firearm license.  See 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 58 (2011).  The defendant 
gave no indication that he had applied for a Massachusetts 
firearm license.  Nor has he argued that applying for a license 
would have been futile.  See Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 848 F.3d 614, 
620-621 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 500 (2017).  
Therefore, he would not have been able to proceed on an as-
applied challenge.  See Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 479 Mass. 527, 
539 n.10, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 276 (2018); Commonwealth v. 
Allen, 474 Mass. 162, 174 (2016); Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 
Mass. 572, 590 (2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1262 (2012). 
 
 
8 
because they "run contrary to the fundamental principle of 
judicial restraint" and "threaten to short circuit the 
democratic process by preventing laws embodying the will of the 
people from being implemented in a manner consistent with the 
Constitution" (citation omitted).  See Washington State Grange 
v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450-451 
(2008).  See also Hightower v. Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 76-77 (1st 
Cir. 2012).  A facial challenge fails when the statute at issue 
has a "plainly legitimate sweep" (citation omitted).  Washington 
State Grange, supra at 449. 
 
General Laws c. 269, § 10 (a), provides for punishment of 
any individual who, "except as provided or exempted by statute, 
knowingly has in his possession; or knowingly has under his 
control in a vehicle; a firearm, loaded or unloaded." 
 
The statute defines a number of categories of persons who 
are "exempted by statute" from punishment under G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a).  Exemptions apply to new residents of the 
Commonwealth, see G. L. c. 140, § 129C (j); holders of a 
Massachusetts firearm license, see G. L. c. 140, §§ 131 (a), 
(b), 131F; holders of certain firearm licenses issued by other 
jurisdictions, see G. L. c. 140, §§ 129C (u), 131G; those with 
firearm identification (FID) cards who possess firearms in their 
residences or places of business, see G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a) (1); G. L. c. 140, § 129C; and certain nonresidents 
 
 
9 
traveling in or through the Commonwealth, see G. L. c. 140, 
§§ 129C (h), 131F, 131G.  In addition, exemptions exist for 
specific types of firearms, certain persons, and specified uses.6 
 
The defendant contends that the statutory exemption for an 
individual who possesses a Massachusetts firearm license, see 
G. L. c. 140, §§ 131 (a), (b), 131F; G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (2), 
(3), on its face violates Federal due process protections and 
rights under the Second Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, because, to invoke the exemption, a defendant must 
proffer evidence of a Massachusetts firearm license.  The 
defendant argues that the initial burden of production as to a 
license, or lack thereof, should rest on the Commonwealth 
because "lack of a license" is an element of G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a), rather than an affirmative defense to the offense.  On 
this basis, the defendant asks this court to reverse the denial 
of his motion to dismiss and, accordingly, his conviction under 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). 
 
This court previously has rejected similar arguments.  We 
have long held that possession of a Massachusetts firearm 
license is an affirmative defense to G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), and 
not an element of that offense.  See Commonwealth v. Allen, 474 
Mass. 162, 174 (2016); Commonwealth v. Gouse, 461 Mass. 787, 
                     
 
6 See G. L. c. 140, §§ 121, 129C (a)-(u), 131, 131F, 131G; 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (1)-(4). 
 
 
10 
803-805 (2012); Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 Mass. 572, 582 
(2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1262 (2012).  Because it is an 
affirmative defense, a defendant has the initial burden of 
production as to possession of a Massachusetts firearm license.  
See Gouse, supra at 802.  "If such evidence is presented, 
however, the burden is on the prosecution to persuade the trier 
of facts beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not 
exist" (citation omitted).  Id.  See G. L. c. 278, § 7.7  This 
system comports with due process, Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 461 
Mass. 821, 834-835 (2012), and the Second Amendment.  See 
Commonwealth v. Eberhart, 461 Mass. 809, 813 (2012); Gouse, 
supra at 801; Commonwealth v. Loadholt, 460 Mass. 723, 727 
(2011). 
 
Moreover, the defendant's argument cannot redress his 
grievance, i.e., the denial of his motion to dismiss.  As noted, 
he argues that "the prosecution must prove non-licensure" as an 
element of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).  It was undisputed, however, 
                     
 
7 In relevant part, G. L. c. 278, § 7, states that "[a] 
defendant in a criminal prosecution, relying for his 
justification upon a license . . . shall prove the same; and, 
until so proved, the presumption shall be that he is not so 
authorized."  This court has said that "[a]lthough the language 
of § 7 suggests that the defendant must shoulder the entire 
burden of proof (i.e., the burden of production and the burden 
of persuasion) as discussed, we have interpreted it only to 
impose the burden of production on the defendant, maintaining 
the ultimate burden of disproving a properly raised affirmative 
defense on the prosecution."  Commonwealth v. Gouse, 461 Mass. 
787, 807 (2012). 
 
 
11 
that the defendant lacked a Massachusetts firearm license.  He 
told police that he did not have a Massachusetts firearm 
license, and agreed in his memorandum in support of his motion 
to dismiss, as well as at the hearing on that motion, that he 
lacked such a license.  In his appellate brief, the defendant 
asserts that he "did not have a Massachusetts firearms license."  
Therefore, even if licensure were an element of G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a), there was no doubt that the defendant lacked a 
Massachusetts firearm license.  The judge did not err in denying 
the motion to dismiss. 
 
c.  Traveling in or through the Commonwealth.  General Laws 
c. 140, § 129C (h), establishes a statutory exemption that may 
be raised as an affirmative defense to an alleged violation of 
G. L. c. 269, § 10.  See G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (4).  Under 
G. L. c. 140, § 129C (h), nonresidents may travel "in or through 
the commonwealth" while in "[p]ossession of rifles and shotguns 
and ammunition," provided that the "rifles or shotguns are 
unloaded and enclosed in a case." 
 
In his memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss, and 
at the motion hearing, the defendant argued that he was a 
resident of New Hampshire who "fit[] precisely within the class 
of exempted persons . . . set forth" in G. L. c. 140, 
§ 129C (h).  The judge determined, however, that there was no 
probable cause to believe that the defendant was traveling in or 
 
 
12 
through the Commonwealth.  Rather, she found probable cause to 
believe that the defendant was living in the Commonwealth with 
his girlfriend.8 
 
On appeal, the defendant adopts a new and different 
argument.  He contends that G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), and G. L. 
c. 140, § 129C (h), are facially unconstitutional because, taken 
together, they violate the right to interstate travel, the right 
to equal protection, and rights guaranteed by the Second 
Amendment, as they prohibit a nonresident from traveling in or 
through the Commonwealth with a handgun, unless the nonresident 
first obtains a Massachusetts firearm license.  Therefore, the 
defendant argues, the judge erred in denying the motion to 
dismiss. 
 
The defendant's arguments are unavailing.  On appeal, he 
does not explain how G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), and G. L. c. 140, 
§ 129C (h), act together to prohibit nonresidents from traveling 
with handguns in or through the Commonwealth.  As indicated, he 
provided no such explanation below.  Nor does he address on 
appeal the language of G. L. c. 140, § 131G, under which a 
nonresident of Massachusetts, who is a resident of the United 
                     
 
8 As discussed, G. L. c. 140, § 129C (h), exempts 
nonresidents who are traveling in or through the Commonwealth 
with rifles and shotguns.  There is no indication that the 
defendant ever possessed a rifle or a shotgun in the 
Commonwealth.  Accordingly, G. L. c. 140, § 129C (h), is 
inapplicable to these facts. 
 
 
13 
States, and who possesses a firearm permit or license issued by 
a jurisdiction that prohibits licensure of felons and those 
convicted of certain narcotics offenses, "may carry a pistol or 
revolver in or through" Massachusetts for a number of purposes. 
In any event, because the defendant did not raise this argument 
below, it is waived.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 13 (a) (2), as 
appearing in 442 Mass. 1516 (2004).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Alexis, 481 Mass. 91, 101 (2018); Commonwealth v. Bettencourt, 
447 Mass. 631, 633 (2006). 
 
d.  New Hampshire firearm license.  The defendant argues 
that, at the time police took the Glock for "safekeeping," he 
possessed a valid New Hampshire firearm license that allowed him 
to carry firearms in the Commonwealth notwithstanding any 
Massachusetts firearms provisions.  The United States Supreme 
Court has said, however, that the full faith and credit clause9 
"does not compel a state to substitute the statutes of other 
states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter 
concerning which it is competent to legislate" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 
232 (1998).  In our Federal system, "each state is permitted to 
                     
 
9 Article IV, § 1, of the United States Constitution states, 
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the 
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other 
State.  And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the 
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be 
proved, and the Effect thereof." 
 
 
14 
create its own laws so long as they do not run afoul of the 
Constitution, federal laws, and treaties."  Hamilton v. 
Pallozzi, 848 F.3d 614, 628 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 
500 (2017).  See art. VI, cl. 2, of the United States 
Constitution. 
 
At the time police discovered the defendant's firearm, a 
New Hampshire statute allowed a New Hampshire licensee to "carry 
a loaded pistol or revolver in [that] state."10  See N.H. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 159:6.  Although the Commonwealth afforded 
exceptions to nonresidents who possessed certain firearm and 
hunting licenses issued by other jurisdictions, see G. L. 
c. 140, §§ 129C (f), 131G, and allowed nonresidents to obtain 
temporary firearm licenses, see G. L. c. 140, § 131F, no statute 
in the Commonwealth granted full reciprocity to holders of New 
Hampshire firearm licenses.  Similarly, when New Hampshire's 
licensing requirement was in effect, the statute did not provide 
reciprocity to holders of Massachusetts firearm licenses.  See 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 159:6-d. 
 
The privilege to conceal and carry a loaded pistol or 
revolver that was conferred by New Hampshire's firearm licensing 
                     
 
10 In 2017, New Hampshire repealed its licensure 
requirement, see 2017 N.H. Laws § 1:1, effective Feb. 22, 2017; 
this allowed its residents to conceal and carry loaded pistols 
and revolvers in New Hampshire without a license.  See N.H. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 159:6.III. 
 
 
15 
statute, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 159:6, is conferred in the 
Commonwealth through a "Class A" license, the issuance of which 
is subject to limitations for certain classes of persons, such 
as convicted felons, substance abusers, and the mentally ill.  
See G. L. c. 140, § 131 (a), (d).11  See, e.g., Chief of Police 
of Worcester v. Holden, 470 Mass. 845, 853 (2015); Jefferson, 
461 Mass. at 830; Loadholt, 460 Mass. at 726 & n.6.  A New 
Hampshire firearm license was available to any "suitable 
person."  See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 159:6(I)(a). 
 
Ultimately, this matter concerns different jurisdictions 
making differing determinations about firearm licensing and 
regulation.  See Hamilton, 848 F.3d at 628 & n.15.  The 
Commonwealth is not required to substitute its statutes for 
those of New Hampshire.  See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. 
Industrial Acc. Comm'n of Cal., 306 U.S. 493, 502 (1939) ("the 
conclusion is unavoidable that the full faith and credit clause 
does not require one state to substitute for its own statute, 
applicable to persons and events within it, the conflicting 
                     
 
11 We note that Federal law contemplates similar 
restrictions on the possession and transport of firearms.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) ("It shall be unlawful for" felons, 
fugitives, users or addicts of controlled substances, those with 
mental illness, aliens, dishonorably discharged service members, 
those subject to protection orders, and those convicted of 
domestic violence to "possess" or "transport" interstate "any 
firearm or ammunition").  See also District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-627 (2008). 
 
 
16 
statute of another state"). 
 
The judge who denied the defendant's motion to dismiss 
found probable cause to believe that the defendant had been 
living in Massachusetts when police became aware of his firearm.  
The facts available indicated that, at that point, the defendant 
had been a resident of Massachusetts for several months. 
 
Under Massachusetts requirements, a "new resident moving 
into the commonwealth, with respect to any firearm . . . then in 
his [or her] possession," may lawfully possess such firearms 
"for [sixty] days," G. L. c. 140, § 129C (j), after which he or 
she must obtain a Massachusetts firearm license in order to 
possess the firearm outside the home or place of business.12  See 
                     
 
12 In Commonwealth v. Wood, 398 Mass. 135, 137 (1986), this 
court addressed whether G. L. c. 140, § 129C (j), served as an 
exemption to the version of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), that was 
then in effect.  At that time, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), punished 
those who "carrie[d]" firearms, and G. L. c. 140, § 129C (j), 
exempted those who "possesse[d]" firearms.  See Wood, supra; St. 
1990, c. 511, §§ 2, 3.  Therefore, this court concluded that 
G. L. c. 140, § 129C (j), did not serve as an exemption to G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (a).  See Wood, supra.  General Laws c. 269, 
§ 10 (a), was amended in 1990, however, to prohibit the unlawful 
"possession" of a firearm.  See St. 1990, c. 511, §§ 2, 3.  The 
purpose of the amendment was to "regulate the possession of 
firearms . . . for the immediate preservation of the public 
welfare."  See St. 1990, c. 511.  The amendment remains 
applicable today.  See G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).  Therefore, G. L. 
c. 140, § 129C (j), which applies to the possession of firearms, 
now serves as an exemption to G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), which 
prohibits the unlawful possession of firearms.  See Commonwealth 
v. Cornelius, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 413, 419 (2010) ("by satisfying 
the exception set out in G. L. c. 140, § 129C[j], new 
residents . . . satisfy the firearm exemption set out in G. L. 
c. 269, § 10[a][4], for a limited period of time, without also 
 
 
17 
G. L. c. 140, § 131 (a), (b); G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (2).  The 
defendant could have applied for a Massachusetts firearm license 
within the sixty-day period following his arrival in the 
Commonwealth, but during more than three months of residency, he 
chose not to do so.  There was no error in the denial of the 
motion to dismiss. 
 
2.  New trial.  In the alternative, the defendant seeks a 
new trial on the grounds of purportedly improper jury 
instructions13 and the prosecutor's questioning of one of the 
witnesses. 
 
a.  Jury instructions.  The defendant argues that a new 
trial is required because the judge denied his request for an 
instruction on 18 U.S.C. § 926A, as well as because the judge 
assertedly did not instruct on G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (1).  This 
latter instruction was not requested at trial, but in fact was 
                     
complying with the provisions of G. L. c. 140, § 131G"). 
 
 
13 The defendant also contends that the Commonwealth 
"misconstrued" the firearm-licensing statute during closing 
argument by addressing a statutory exemption that was available 
to a nonresident "passing through [the Commonwealth] with his 
firearm."  The defendant did not object at trial.  Thus, we 
review for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 460 Mass. 781, 788 (2011).  
General Laws c. 140, §§ 131F and 131G, allow nonresidents of the 
Commonwealth to travel in or through Massachusetts with a pistol 
or revolver, provided several conditions are met.  The judge 
instructed the jury as to both G. L. c. 140, §§ 131F and 131G.  
The Commonwealth's closing argument did not misconstrue the 
applicable statutory provisions.  Therefore, the defendant's 
argument is without merit. 
 
 
18 
given by the judge.  The defendant contends further that the 
instructions deprived him of an affirmative defense under G. L. 
c. 140, § 129C (j), and potentially confused the jury.  The 
defendant did not object to the instructions at trial. 
 
We evaluate the instructions provided to a jury "as a 
whole, looking for the interpretation a reasonable juror would 
place on the judge's words," and not in a hypermechanical manner 
(citation omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 
349 (2016). 
 
i.  Interstate transportation of firearms.  Because the 
defendant requested an instruction with respect to 
18 U.S.C. § 926A, and objected when the request was denied, we 
review for prejudicial error.14  See Commonwealth v. Okoro, 471 
Mass. 51, 67 (2015).  Under that analysis, we determine, first, 
whether there was error and, if so, whether the error was 
prejudicial.  See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 591 
(2005).  An error is not prejudicial when we can say with 
confidence that it "did not influence the jury, or had but very 
slight effect" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Brown, 456 
Mass. 708, 725 (2010).  On the other hand, if we are unable to 
say "with fair assurance," and "after pondering all that 
                     
14 The defendant argues also that 18 U.S.C. § 926A preempts 
the Massachusetts firearms statutes.  As the judge properly 
denied the request for an instruction on 18 U.S.C. § 926A, we 
need not reach this issue.  See 18 U.S.C. § 927. 
 
 
19 
happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, 
that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error," 
then the error was prejudicial (citation omitted).  See Allen, 
474 Mass. at 168. 
 
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 926A, any person who is not 
prohibited under Federal law from transporting, shipping, or 
receiving a firearm 
"shall be entitled to transport a firearm for any 
lawful purpose from any place where he may lawfully 
possess and carry such firearm to any other place 
where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm 
if, during such transportation the firearm is 
unloaded, and neither the firearm nor any ammunition 
being transported is readily accessible or is directly 
accessible from the passenger compartment of such 
transporting vehicle." 
 
 
The defendant maintains that 18 U.S.C. § 926A is applicable 
here because, at the time his firearm was discovered by 
Tewksbury police, he was a nonresident "in the midst of a trip" 
from Londonderry, New Hampshire, to Atkinson, New Hampshire, "by 
way of Tewksbury."  The defendant points to no authority 
supporting his interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 926A, nor are we 
aware of any. 
 
This provision consistently has been construed to "allow[] 
a person to transport a firearm and ammunition from one state 
through a second state to a third state, without regard to the 
second state's gun laws, provided that the traveler is licensed 
to carry a firearm in both the state of origin and the state of 
 
 
20 
destination and that the firearm is not readily accessible 
during the transportation."  Revell v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & 
N.J., 598 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 
1178 (2011).  See 18 U.S.C. § 926A; Torraco v. Port Auth. of 
N.Y. & N.J., 615 F.3d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 2010) (18 U.S.C. § 926A 
"allows individuals to transport firearms from one state in 
which they are legal, through another state in which they are 
illegal, to a third state in which they are legal, provided that 
several conditions are met").  See also Bieder v. United States, 
662 A.2d 185, 188-189 (D.C. 1995) (where possession of firearm 
is lawful in Virginia and New York, 18 U.S.C. § 926A warrants 
instruction for defendant arrested in District of Columbia while 
driving from Virginia to New York). 
 
We decline to depart from the accepted understanding of 
18 U.S.C. § 926A.  Therefore, we consider whether an instruction 
concerning that statute was warranted given the facts at trial.  
From the time he moved to Tewksbury in late May 2015, until 
September 12, 2015, the defendant possessed at least one handgun 
in the Tewksbury apartment.  As a new resident of the 
Commonwealth, he was afforded sixty days in which to obtain a 
Massachusetts FID card or firearm license.  See G. L. c. 140, 
§ 129C (j); G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (4).  There is no indication 
that the defendant did so, or attempted to do so, during this 
period. 
 
 
21 
 
On September 11, 2015, the defendant placed a handgun in a 
backpack and transported it from Tewksbury to a shooting range 
in New Hampshire.  He spent several hours at the range, and 
thereafter "had a couple beers."  After several hours of 
drinking beer, the defendant drove to Londonderry, New 
Hampshire, to deposit multiple firearms in a storage unit.  He 
then drove to Manchester, New Hampshire, where he dropped off a 
friend.  He returned to Tewksbury between 11:30 P.M. on 
September 11 and 1 A.M. on September 12.  Officers responded to 
the scene at approximately 1:30 A.M. on September 12 and later 
discovered the Glock in the trunk of the defendant's vehicle. 
 
In sum, on the evening of September 11, 2015, the defendant 
began his journey in the Commonwealth, he sojourned in New 
Hampshire, and he returned to Massachusetts sometime late in the 
evening on September 11 or in the early morning hours of 
September 12.  He did not transport a firearm "from one state 
through a second state to a third state."  Revell, 598 F.3d at 
132.  See Torraco, 615 F.3d at 132.  Moreover, because he had 
not obtained a Massachusetts FID card or firearm license within 
sixty days of moving to the Commonwealth, he was unable lawfully 
to possess firearms in the Commonwealth, and therefore was 
unable to transport firearms lawfully into or from the 
Commonwealth pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 926A.  See Torraco, supra 
at 138 (because petitioners "began the pertinent legs of their 
 
 
22 
travels in New Jersey," under 18 U.S.C. § 926A, "possession and 
carriage of the firearms in that state needed to be lawful" in 
order for that statute to apply). 
 
There was no error in the trial judge's decision that an 
instruction concerning the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 926A was 
not warranted. 
 
ii.  Residence or place of business.  The defendant argues 
for the first time on appeal that the judge erred in not 
instructing the jury to consider whether he had possessed the 
firearm outside his residence or place of business.  The 
defendant did not request the instruction at trial, nor did he 
object.  Therefore, we must determine whether there was a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See Jefferson, 
461 Mass. at 836.  We conclude there was not. 
 
General Laws c. 269, § 10 (a) (1), establishes a statutory 
exemption that allows an individual who has a Massachusetts FID 
card lawfully to possess a firearm in his or her residence or 
place of business.  See Powell, 459 Mass. at 587-588 ("FID card 
allows the holder to own or possess a firearm within the 
holder's residence or place of business").  See also 
Commonwealth v. McGowan, 464 Mass. 232, 240-241 (2013).  Thus, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (1), is an affirmative defense.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Anderson, 445 Mass. 195, 214 (2005).  
Although the defendant did not raise this defense, the judge, as 
 
 
23 
was proper, nonetheless instructed the jury that G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a) (1), "exempts a defendant . . . who was present in or 
on his or her residence or place of business."  The defendant is 
mistaken in his argument before this court that the judge did 
not instruct on this exemption. 
 
In any event, the firearm was recovered from the 
defendant's vehicle, and, at trial, he argued consistently that 
he had no residence or place of business in the Commonwealth.  
The defendant, therefore, provided little basis for the judge to 
have instructed on G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (1).  Moreover, there 
was no indication that the defendant had applied for or obtained 
an FID card.  Absent such a card, the defendant could not have 
been acquitted under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (1).  He suffered no 
prejudice. 
 
iii.  Sixty-day grace period and temporary licenses.  The 
defendant argues that the jury instruction with respect to G. L. 
c. 140, § 129C (j), deprived him of a "potential" defense under 
that provision.  In addition, he argues that a portion of the 
instruction might have confused the jury concerning temporary 
Massachusetts firearm licenses that are issued under G. L. 
c. 140, § 131F.  Because the defendant did not object at trial, 
we review for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  
See Jefferson, 461 Mass. at 836. 
 
Because the defendant did not have a Massachusetts firearm 
 
 
24 
license, the central issue at trial was whether he was living in 
Massachusetts on September 12, 2015, and, if so, for how long 
prior to that date.  The Commonwealth's theory was that the 
defendant lived in Massachusetts from late May 2015 through 
September 12, 2015, a period of more than sixty days.  The 
defendant maintained that he had never lived in Massachusetts. 
 
A number of provisions of the Massachusetts firearm 
licensing scheme create exceptions for new residents and 
nonresidents.  The judge properly instructed the jury on them. 
 
As discussed, for example, G. L. c. 140, § 129C (j), 
provides a sixty-day period during which a new resident of the 
Commonwealth who arrives in Massachusetts with firearms may 
possess those firearms without a Massachusetts FID card or 
firearm license.  See G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (4).  In his 
charge, the judge explained that G. L. c. 140, § 129C (j), 
exempted any "new resident moving into the Commonwealth with 
respect to a firearm, rifle, shotgun, or ammunition then in his 
possession for [sixty] days after" moving to "the Commonwealth." 
 
Because G. L. c. 269 does not define the term "resident," 
the judge instructed that a defendant "can only have one 
domicile under the law," but "can have lots of residences[,] so 
we use the [term] residence in its common everyday meaning and 
understanding that a person may have more than one residence at 
any one given time."  The judge instructed further that, for the 
 
 
25 
purposes of G. L. c. 140, § 129C (j), the Commonwealth had the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
had been a Massachusetts resident. 
 
While the defendant did not request an instruction on G. L. 
c. 140, § 129C (j), the evidence suggested that he was a new 
resident of the Commonwealth.  Accordingly, the judge properly 
instructed the jury on that provision.  See Commonwealth v. 
Gonzalez, 465 Mass. 672, 682 (2013).  Relying on these 
instructions, had the jury found that the defendant was a 
resident of the Commonwealth on September 12, 2015, but that he 
had resided in Massachusetts for fewer than sixty days, they 
would have been required to acquit him. 
 
In addition, the judge instructed that a nonresident who 
obtains a Massachusetts temporary firearm license pursuant to 
G. L. c. 140, § 131F, lawfully may carry firearms in the 
Commonwealth for specific purposes.  The judge also explained 
that, under G. L. c. 140, § 131G, a nonresident without a 
Massachusetts firearm license may carry 
"a pistol or revolver in or through the Commonwealth 
for the purpose of taking part in a pistol or revolver 
competition or attending any meeting or exhibition of 
any organized group of firearm collectors or for the 
purpose of hunting provided that such person is a 
resident of the United States and has a permit or 
license to carry firearms issued under the laws of any 
state, district, or territory which has licensing 
requirements which prohibit the issuance of permits or 
licenses to persons who have been convicted of a 
felony or who have been convicted of unlawful use or 
 
 
26 
possession or sale of narcotics or harmful drugs." 
 
 
Given these instructions, had the jury found that the 
defendant was a nonresident when police discovered his firearm, 
and that he had acquired a temporary Massachusetts firearm 
license under G. L. c. 140, § 131F, or that he was traveling in 
or through Massachusetts to participate in a firearm 
competition, a firearm collectors' meeting or exhibition, or to 
hunt, they would have been obligated to acquit him. 
 
In sum, the instructions encompassed exemptions under which 
the defendant could have been acquitted regardless of whether 
the jury found that he was a resident, as the Commonwealth 
asserted, or a nonresident, as he maintained.  The instructions 
accurately informed the jury of the elements of the offense, as 
well as the affirmative defenses.  They did not deprive the 
defendant of an affirmative defense under G. L. c. 140, 
§ 129C (j), and were not likely to confuse the jury with respect 
to the exemption for nonresidents who possess Massachusetts 
temporary firearm licenses.  See G. L. c. 140, § 131F.  We 
conclude that the instructions did not create a substantial risk 
of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
b.  Asserted prosecutorial misconduct.  The defendant 
contends that the Commonwealth caused him prejudice by asking 
Patty whether he "had something against Massachusetts."  Because 
the defendant did not object, we review for a substantial risk 
 
 
27 
of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 460 
Mass. 781, 788 (2011). 
 
During cross-examination, defense counsel asked Patty 
whether the defendant told "just about everybody that he had no 
intention of ever living in Massachusetts," to which Patty 
responded, "I can't answer that in a yes or no without 
explanation."  On redirect, the Commonwealth probed the same 
issue; the prosecutor asked whether the defendant had told Patty 
that he "never wanted to live in Massachusetts," but nonetheless 
had moved into the Tewksbury apartment with her.  Patty answered 
in the affirmative.  The prosecutor then clarified, "So he had 
something against Massachusetts . . . [b]ut he found himself 
here anyway?"  To which Patty responded, "Correct." 
 
Evidence "that otherwise may be inadmissible may become 
admissible where the defendant opens the door to its admission."  
Commonwealth v. Quinn, 469 Mass. 641, 732-733 (2014).  Here, 
"defense counsel invited a fuller explanation" of Patty's 
testimony, see Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 479 
(2010), and the prosecutor was permitted to respond.  See id. 
 
The defendant's dislike of Massachusetts was a cornerstone 
of his defense strategy.  On direct examination of the 
defendant's uncle, counsel asked, "[H]as [the defendant] ever 
expressed any statement about living in Massachusetts?"  The 
uncle responded, "He dislikes Massachusetts."  Later, the 
 
 
28 
defendant himself testified, "I'm not good with [Massachusetts] 
gun laws. . . .  I just don't like -- I don't like it down here 
basically."  Given this, the question that the prosecutor posed 
to Patty did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.