Case Title: Griffith v. Blatt

Citation: 

Docket Number: S46476

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2002-08-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: AUGUST 15, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
PATRICIA E. GRIFFITH,
Appellant,
Petitioner on Review,
	and
PADDY O. GRIFFITH,
Plaintiff,
	v.
PHILIP E. BLATT, M.D.;
and
REED & CARNICK,
a division of Block Drug Company, Inc.,
a foreign corporation,
Defendants,
	and
WILLIAM A. STOUT,
doing business as
Hollywood Prescriptions;
and RUGBY LABORATORIES, INC.,
a foreign corporation,
Respondents,
Respondents on Review.
(CC 9502-01211; CA A93458; SC S46476)
	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted January 9, 2001.
	Lindsey Harris Hughes of Keating Jones Bildstein & Hughes,
P.C., Portland, argued the cause for petitioner on review. 
	G. Kenneth Shiroishi of Dunn Carney Allen Higgins & Tongue,
L.L.P., Portland, argued the cause for respondent on review,
William A. Stout.  
	I. Franklin Hunsaker of Bullivant Houser Bailey, P.C.,
Portland, argued the cause for respondent on review, Rugby
Laboratories, Inc. 
	Todd A. Bradley of Gaylord & Eyerman, P.C., Portland, filed
a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers
Association.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
and Riggs Justices.**
	DURHAM, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are reversed, and the case is remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings.
	*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Ann Fisher, Judge Pro Tempore, George M. Joseph, Judge Pro Tempore. 158 Or App 204, 973 P2d 385 (1999).
	**Kulongoski, J., resigned June 14, 2001, and did not
participate in the decision of this case; De Muniz and Balmer,
JJ., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
case.
	DURHAM, J.
	Plaintiff Patricia E. Griffith seeks review of a
decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the trial court's
summary judgment against plaintiff on her claims against
defendants Rugby Laboratories, Inc. (Rugby) and Stout. (1)  Griffith
v. Blatt, 158 Or App 204, 973 P2d 385 (1999).  Plaintiff claimed
that she was injured when she used a lotion, Lindane, that her
physician had prescribed.  Rugby manufactured the lotion and
Stout, a pharmacist, filled the prescription.  Plaintiff argued
that neither her physician nor Stout had warned her that Lindane
was toxic if used improperly.  The Court of Appeals determined
that plaintiff's claim against Rugby was not timely filed and
that the "learned intermediary" doctrine protected Stout from
liability.  We discuss that doctrine in greater detail later in
this opinion.  We affirm the Court of Appeals' determination that
the claim against Rugby was untimely, but conclude that the
learned intermediary doctrine does not protect Stout from
liability in this case.  Therefore, we reverse the decision of
the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for
further proceedings.  
	Because the trial court dismissed plaintiff's action on
summary judgment, ORCP 47, we view the evidence and all
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, the party opposing summary judgment. 
Jones v. General Motors Corp., 325 Or 404, 408, 939 P2d 608
(1997).  The Court of Appeals applied that standard in
summarizing the evidence as follows:  
		"On February 26, 1993, plaintiff visited Dr.
Philip Blatt, seeking treatment for a skin condition. 
Blatt gave plaintiff a prescription for two ounces of
Lindane, one percent lotion, instructing the pharmacist
to fill the prescription and to type 'As directed' on
the label.  Plaintiff took that prescription to Stout,
who filled the prescription, placing the lotion in a
plain prescription bottle which bore generic 'For
external use only' and 'Shake well' labels.  In
accordance with Blatt's instructions, Stout typed the
notation 'As directed' on the prescription label and
affixed that label to the bottle.  The bottle bore no
other instructions or warnings.  There is no evidence
that Stout gave plaintiff any verbal instructions or
warnings concerning the lotion including, particularly,
any warnings pertaining to frequency or duration of
use.
		"Plaintiff applied the lotion over her entire body
once a day, after her daily shower for five or six days
until she had used the entire bottle.  After each
application, plaintiff did not shower for the next 24
hours.  Properly used, Lindane lotion should be applied
no more than two times and should be washed off within
12 hours after any application.
		"Within a week to two weeks after beginning to use
the Lindane lotion, plaintiff began to suffer medical
problems, including convulsions, dizziness, weight
loss, hair loss, sleep disturbance, and cognitive
dysfunction.  On June 10, 1993, plaintiff watched a
segment of the television program "Good Morning
America," which featured a report about a child who had
suffered convulsions after overexposure to Lindane
lotion.  Immediately after that program, plaintiff
retrieved her empty bottle of Lindane lotion and told
her husband, 'This is the same stuff.'  In August 1993,
plaintiff consulted with a physician,[ (2)] who diagnosed
her symptoms to be the result of central nervous system
toxicity due to overexposure to Lindane lotion."
Griffith v. Blatt, 158 Or App 204, 207-09, 973 P2d 385 (1999).
	On February 23, 1995, plaintiff filed claims for
negligence against Stout, for medical malpractice against Dr.
Blatt, and for strict liability against Reed & Carnick, a drug
manufacturing company.  On June 12, 1995, plaintiff stipulated to
a dismissal of its claims against Reed & Carnick.
	On June 21, 1995, plaintiff filed an amended complaint
that alleged a medical malpractice claim against Blatt, a strict
liability claim against Rugby, and added a strict liability claim
to the negligence claim against Stout. (3)
	On Stout's motion for summary judgment, the trial court
concluded that ORS 30.905(2) barred plaintiff's product liability
claim against Stout.  ORS 30.905(2) provides:
		"Except as provided in ORS 30.907 and 30.908(1) to
(4), a product liability civil action shall be
commenced not later than two years after the date on
which the death, injury or damage complained of
occurs."
The trial court also dismissed plaintiff's negligence claim
against Stout.
	On Rugby's motion for summary judgment, the trial court
concluded that ORS 30.905(2) barred plaintiff's product liability
claim against Rugby.  The court reasoned that, even if the two-year limitations period commenced when plaintiff discovered her
injury rather than when the injury occurred, plaintiff had
discovered her injury, at the latest, when she watched the "Good
Morning America" program on June 10, 1993.  Therefore, according
to the court, the period of limitations began running more than
two years before June 21, 1995, when plaintiff filed her amended
complaint that named Rugby as a defendant.
	Plaintiff appealed.  Plaintiff argued that Rugby had
failed to establish that plaintiff had discovered her claim
against Rugby more than two years before plaintiff had filed her
amended complaint that named Rugby.  The Court of Appeals
declined to address plaintiff's arguments, opining that her
arguments on appeal differed from those presented to the trial
court.  Griffith, 158 Or App at 210.
	The Court of Appeals assumed for purposes of analysis
that plaintiff's strict liability claim against Stout was timely,
but concluded that the learned intermediary doctrine barred that
claim.  Id. at 211.  The Court of Appeals also concluded that
plaintiff's negligence claim against Stout failed because
plaintiff did not controvert Stout's affidavit averring that his
conduct satisfied the pertinent standard of care for pharmacists. 
Id. at 217.
	We first address the timeliness of plaintiff's claim
against Rugby.  As already noted, the Court of Appeals concluded
that plaintiff's arguments on appeal differed from those that she
had presented to the trial court and declined to address them. 
That response was correct with respect to some of plaintiff's
arguments in the trial court, such as whether plaintiff's delay
in filing a claim against Rugby was due to the tardiness of some
defendants in responding to plaintiff's request to file an
amended complaint.  However, plaintiff also contended, both in
the trial court and on appeal, that summary judgment was not
appropriate on Rugby's statute of limitations defense because the
record demonstrated the existence of a factual dispute about when
plaintiff had discovered that Rugby had injured her.  Plaintiff
challenged the trial court's contrary conclusion by citing
evidence in the record that arguably pointed to a different
answer.  However, she did not abandon her argument, summarized
above, merely by highlighting on appeal other evidence that, in
her view, also undermined the trial court's conclusion.  It
follows that the Court of Appeals erred in disposing of
plaintiff's arguments on preservation grounds.  Consequently, we
proceed to the merits of plaintiff's assignment that the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment on Rugby's statute of
limitations defense.
	Rugby's defense requires the court to apply ORS
30.905(2).  In addressing that question, the parties assumed,
from several opinions of the Court of Appeals, that the
limitations period in ORS 30.905(2) began running on the date
that plaintiff discovered her injury and the relationship of
Rugby's tortious conduct to that injury.  To test that
assumption, this court invited supplemental briefing from the
parties on the following question:  "Does the discovery rule
apply to ORS 30.905(2)?"  Understandably, the parties disagree
about the answer to that question.  However, for the reason
stated below, this court need not examine the parties' dispute
over that question.  
	In Gladhart v. Oregon Vineyard Supply Co., 332 Or 226,
26 P3d 817 (2001), this court interpreted ORS 30.905(2) and
concluded that that statute does not incorporate a discovery
rule.  The court determined instead that the limitations period
in that statute commences when the plaintiff's injury occurs,
whether or not the plaintiff has discovered the injury at that
time.  Id. at 234.  Plaintiff contends that the court should not
follow Gladhart here because Rugby failed to argue below that ORS
30.905(2) did not incorporate a discovery rule.  We reject that
argument because, as a practical matter, it would compel this
court to apply the statute in a manner that this court already
has rejected. 
	According to Gladhart, the two-year period of
limitations in ORS 30.905(2) commenced when plaintiff's injury
occurred.  Plaintiff used Lindane lotion for several days after
she filled her prescription for the lotion on February 26, 1993. 
She experienced adverse symptoms within a week or two.  However,
plaintiff first filed her amended complaint that named Rugby as a
defendant on June 21, 1995.  Because plaintiff filed her product
liability claim against Rugby more than "two years after the date
on which the * * * injury or damage complained of occur[red,]"
ORS 30.905(2), that claim is time-barred.  Consequently, the
trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for Rugby on
that claim.
	We next address plaintiff's claims for negligence and
for strict liability against Stout.  On review, plaintiff asserts
that she does not concede that Stout was entitled to summary
judgment on her negligence claim, but she presents no argument
against that conclusion.  In the absence of such an argument, we
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals on that issue without
further discussion.
	We turn to the issue of the timeliness of plaintiff's
strict liability claim against Stout.  As noted above, plaintiff
first alleged that claim in the amended complaint that she filed
on June 21, 1995.  Plaintiff argues that that claim is timely
because, among other reasons, it relates back to the filing date
of her original negligence complaint against Stout -- February
23, 1995 -- and, consequently, the amended complaint satisfies
the two-year limitation period set out in ORS 30.905(2).  In
response, Stout asserts that the amended complaint does not
relate back because the strict liability and negligence claims
involve different proof requirements and are subject to different
defenses.
	The rule that controls the relation back of a claim
alleged in an amended pleading is ORCP 23 C, which provides in
part:
		"Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction,
or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in
the original pleading, the amendment relates back to
the date of the original pleading."
In applying that rule, the court first must identify the
"conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be
set forth in the original pleading."  Second, the court must
determine whether the claim or defense alleged in the amended
pleading arose out of that conduct, transaction, or occurrence.
	The legislature made ORCP 23 C effective and first
operative on January 1, 1980 as one of the original provisions of
the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure.  Or Laws 1979, ch 284, §§ 3,
201.  ORCP 23 C codified the relation back doctrine that this
court had followed for many years in applying statutes of
limitation to amended pleadings.  See Brackhahn v. Nordling, 269
Or 667, 670-75, 526 P2d 221 (1974) (illustrating proposition and
providing examples).  Because the legislature intended to codify
rather than to alter this court's relation-back doctrine case
law, that case law provides helpful insight regarding the
legislature's intention in enacting ORCP 23 C.
	Plaintiff's original complaint, filed on February 23,
1995, alleged that plaintiff took a prescription for a lotion to
Stout's business, Hollywood Prescriptions, to be filled; that
Hollywood Prescriptions was negligent in failing to provide
instructions regarding proper use and warnings regarding the
dangers of overuse of the lotion; and that she used the lotion
and suffered numerous injuries.
	Plaintiff's first amended complaint, filed on June 21,
1995, added a claim for strict liability against Hollywood
Prescriptions.  The strict liability claim realleged the material
allegations of the negligence claim, summarized above.  That
claim also alleged that Hollywood Prescriptions distributed the
lotion and that it "was dangerously defective and unreasonably
dangerous in that it was sold without adequate instructions as to
its safe use, and adequate warnings that its use could lead to
[medical injuries]."
	The foregoing review of plaintiff's original and
amended pleadings demonstrates that her strict liability claim
against Stout arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or
occurrence that gave rise to her original negligence claim
against that defendant, specifically, the alleged inadequacy of
Stout's instructions and warnings regarding proper use of the
lotion.  Stout is correct in arguing that the proof requirements
for those claims are not identical, but the presence of different
or additional issues in an amended pleading does not preclude
application of the relation-back rule.  See Caplener v. U.S.
National Bank, 317 Or 506, 525, 857 P2d 830 (1993) (stating that
ORCP 23 C relates back amended pleading that adds "new theories
of liability in tort * * * [if they] arose out of the same
conduct, transaction, or occurrence alleged in the original
pleading"); Brackhahn, 269 Or at 673 ("Relating back is permitted
although the different cause of action in the amended complaint
involves some issues which are different or in addition to those
presented by the original complaint.").  Because plaintiff's
strict liability claim against Stout relates back to the date of
her original pleading by operation of ORCP 23 C, that claim was
filed timely under ORS 30.905(2).
	We turn finally to plaintiff's challenge to the Court
of Appeals' determination that the learned intermediary doctrine
bars plaintiff's strict liability claim against Stout.  Stout
asserts that this court should incorporate that doctrine into
Oregon strict liability law from the common law of negligence. 
This court has discussed aspects of that doctrine in two common
law negligence cases.  See Oksenholt v. Lederle Laboratories, 294
Or 213, 218, 656 P2d 393 (1982); discussing applicability of
doctrine in law of negligence); McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical,
270 Or 375, 385-90, 528 P2d 522 (1974) (same).  The difficulty
with Stout's argument is that it is not germane to a strict
liability claim.  The legislature has created a different
prototype -- a statutory scheme -- that controls the disposition
of strict liability claims.  See Kambury v. DaimlerChrysler
Corp., 334 Or 367, 374, ___ P3d ___ (2002) (so noting in context
of claim for remedy for death caused by product defect).  The
Court of Appeals' analysis of the learned intermediary doctrine
failed to acknowledge that Oregon statutes, not the common law,
govern plaintiff's strict liability claim and Stout's defenses. 
As the following discussion demonstrates, this court's
consideration of Stout's defense based on the learned
intermediary doctrine begins and ends with our construction of
the pertinent product liability statutes.
	ORS 30.900 provides the following definition for a
"product liability civil action":
		"As used in ORS 30.900 to 30.920, 'product
liability civil action' means a civil action brought
against a manufacturer, distributor, seller or lessor
of a product for damages for personal injury, death or
property damage arising out of:
		"(1) Any design, inspection, testing,
manufacturing or other defect in a product;
		"(2) Any failure to warn regarding a product; or
		"(3) Any failure to properly instruct in the use
of a product."
	Plaintiff's strict liability and negligence claims both
constituted a "product liability civil action."  ORS 30.920
provides the elements of a strict product liability claim:
		"(1) One who sells or leases any product in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to the property of the user or consumer
is subject to liability for physical harm or damage to
property caused by that condition, if:
		"(a) The seller or lessor is engaged in the
business of selling or leasing such a product; and
		"(b) The product is expected to and does reach the
user or consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it is sold or leased.
		"(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) of this
section shall apply, even though:
		"(a) The seller or lessor has exercised all
possible care in the preparation and sale or lease of
the product; and
		"(b) The user, consumer or injured party has not
purchased or leased the product from or entered into
any contractual relations with the seller or lessor.
		"(3) It is the intent of the Legislative Assembly
that the rule stated in subsections (1) and (2) of this
section shall be construed in accordance with the
Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 402A, Comments a to
m (1965).  All references in these comments to sale,
sell, selling or seller shall be construed to include
lease, leases, leasing and lessor.
		  "(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed
to limit the rights and liabilities of sellers and
lessors under principles of common law negligence or
under ORS chapter 72."
	Neither the text nor the context of those statutes
indicates that the legislature intended to relieve a seller from
potential strict product liability on the basis of the adequacy
of a manufacturer's product warnings to another intermediary
(here, the physician).  By contrast, Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, referred to in ORS 30.920(3),
indicates that the legislature intended to create no such
protection from strict liability.
	Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment h (1965),
provides in part that if a seller of a product
	"has reason to anticipate that danger may result from a
particular use, as where a drug is sold which is safe
only in limited doses * * * [the seller] may be
required to give adequate warning of the danger (see
Comment j), and a product sold without such warning is
in a defective condition."
(Emphasis supplied).  Comment j to that section requires a seller
to give a warning if the seller "has knowledge, or by the
application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight
should have knowledge" of the danger.
	Pursuant to ORS 30.920(3), we must construe ORS
30.920(1) and (2) "in accordance with" the cited comments to
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, including the two comments
quoted above.  The quoted comments indicate that a seller of a
drug may be required to give an adequate warning of the product's
danger to a consumer when the seller has knowledge or should have
knowledge of the danger.
	At this stage of the case, we need not address
precisely the extent of Stout's potential liability to plaintiff
under ORS 30.920 for a failure to warn.  It is sufficient for
present purposes to conclude that, contrary to Stout's argument,
Oregon's product liability statute does not create a defense to
strict liability based on the learned intermediary doctrine.  We
conclude, therefore, that Stout was not entitled to summary
judgment on plaintiff's strict liability claim.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are reversed, and the case is remanded to
the circuit court for further proceedings.



1. 	The claims of plaintiff Paddy O. Griffith are not
before this court on review.  Plaintiff's complaint identifies
defendant Stout as "William A. Stout, doing business as Hollywood
Prescriptions."  In this opinion, we refer to that party as
"Stout."

2. 	Plaintiff correctly points out that, according to the
record, plaintiff consulted with her physician regarding her
symptoms in July 1993, and first received, in August 1993, the
physician's diagnosis that her use of Lindane lotion had made her
ill.  We rely on those facts, rather than the slightly different
facts stated in the Court of Appeals opinion, but conclude that
the factual differences do not affect our analysis or
disposition.

3. 	The claims against Stout are compatible but not
identical bases of liability.  According to John W. Wade et al.,
Prosser, Wade and Schwartz's Cases and Materials on Torts, 694
(9th ed 1994):
		"'Products liability' is the umbrella term for the
liability of a manufacturer, seller or other supplier
of chattels, to one with whom he is not in privity of
contract, who suffers physical harm caused by the
chattel.  The liability may rest upon the supplier's
negligence or upon a warranty, or it may be based on
strict liability in tort."