Case Title: State v. Reynolds

Citation: 229 Or. 167, 366 P.2d 524

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1961-11-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Affirmed November 22, 1961.
*168 Brice L. Smith, Portland, argued the cause and submitted the brief for appellant.
Donald B. Bowerman, Deputy District Attorney, Clackamas County, Oregon City, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was William E. Schumaker, District Attorney, Clackamas County, Oregon City.
Before McALLISTER, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, PERRY, GOODWIN and LUSK, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
ROSSMAN, J.
This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment, based upon a verdict which the Circuit Court for Clackamas County entered against him. The indictment upon which the judgment is based charged the defendant with a violation of ORS 483.602.
The sole assignment of error states:
The demurrer was predicated upon a contention that the "indictment fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a crime."
The indictment reads:
ORS 583.602 provides:
The defendant's attack upon the indictment contends that it is insufficient because (1) the indictment did not charge violation of subsections (2)(a) and (b) of ORS 583.602; that is, failure of the defendant to have (a) given his name, address and the registration number of his vehicle to the driver of the other car and (b) exhibited upon request his operator's license and (2) it did not charge the defendant with knowledge that he had injured or killed some one or had damaged a vehicle. Defendant therefore contends that the indictment failed to state facts sufficient to constitute the crime described in ORS 483.602.
We will first consider defendant's contention that the indictment must fail because it did not specifically charge the defendant with failure to conform with sections (2)(a) and (b) of ORS 483.602.
1. An indictment is sufficient if it sets forth the elements of the crime so as to inform adequately the defendant of the charge he must answer. Barber v. Gladden, 210 Or 46, 309 P2d 192; State v. Chapin, 74 Or 346, 144 P 1187; ORS 132.540; 27 Am Jur, Indictments and Informations, § 98. The Chapin decision declares, at page 351:
*171 It is explained in 27 Am Jur, Indictments and Informations, § 98, page 658, that:
The above principles render it evident that the indictment before us was not called upon to charge the defendant with violation of sections (2)(a) and (b) of ORS 483.602. The latter requires that the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident which results in injury to a person must do the following:
2, 3. When it is charged in an indictment, as was done in the present case, that the defendant was involved in an accident resulting in injury to another and that he failed to stop his vehicle at the scene of the accident and render assistance, it should not be necessary to allege also violation of sections (2)(a) and (b) of ORS 483.602. If it is charged and proved that the defendant failed to stop at all, it is necessarily implied that he did not conform with any of the duties required of him by section (2) of ORS 483.602, which could only have been complied with in the event he had stopped and remained for the needed amount of *172 time at the scene of the accident. Further, violation of each separate section of the hit-and-run statute (ORS 483.602) is a separate offense, so violation of each section need not be alleged in order to charge the defendant with an indictable crime.
4. The gist of the offense for which the defendant was indicted is that he failed to stop his vehicle so that he could comply with the requirements of section (2) of ORS 483.602. This was clearly spelled out in the indictment which charged that the defendant did "unlawfully and feloniously fail to immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident and to render aid and assistance." Such language clearly and concisely informs the defendant of the charge he is called upon to answer, which is all that is required of an indictment. The sufficiency of an indictment does not depend on the use of the precise words set forth in the statute.
5. Defendant further contends that the indictment is fatally defective for the reason that it is not alleged that the defendant knew that he was involved in an accident resulting in the injury or death of another.
Assuming, without so deciding, that it is necessary to allege in an indictment that the person accused of violating the provisions of ORS 483.602 knew his vehicle was "involved in an accident which results in injury or death to any person," we are of the opinion that knowledge on the part of the defendant in the case before us is sufficiently alleged.
An indictment which charges that a person "unlawfully and feloniously" performed an act is equivalent to alleging that he knowingly did so, and thus supplies the element of knowledge where that element is necessary for averment in the indictment. Bise v. United States, 144 F 374 (8th Cir); People v. Mosier, *173 73 App Div 5, 76 NYS 65; 16 Words and Phrases (Perm Ed), pages 673-676; Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed). In Bise v. United States, supra, a conviction for receiving property which had been feloniously taken from another, knowing the same to have been taken or stolen, was sustained on appeal. It was contended that the indictment was fatally defective because it failed to allege, in effect, knowledge on the part of the accused. At page 375 the court said, in that regard:
Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed) defines the word "feloniously" as:
Thus, since the indictment in question sufficiently apprised the accused of the crime for which he was charged under ORS 483.602 and, in addition, alleged the equivalent of "knowledge" or "criminal intent" on the part of the accused, we dismiss the assignment of error as lacking in merit.
Affirmed.