Case Title: Goode v. Wainwright

Citation: 410 So. 2d 506

Docket Number: 61693

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1982-02-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
410 So. 2d 506 (1982)
Arthur F. GOODE, III, Petitioner,
v.
Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Etc., Respondent.
No. 61693.

Supreme Court of Florida.
February 23, 1982.
*507 Wilbur C. Smith, III, of Smith, Carta, Ringsmuth & Kluttz, Fort Myers, for petitioner.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Charles Corces, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
We have for consideration a petition for writ of habeas corpus attacking the competency of petitioner Goode's attorney on appeal from his conviction and a motion for stay of execution.
Petitioner's conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court, Goode v. State, 365 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1978), and his petition for writ of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court. Goode v. Florida, 441 U.S. 967, 99 S. Ct. 2419, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1074 (1979).
A motion to vacate judgment and sentence was denied by the trial judge. Upon appeal this order was affirmed. Goode v. State, 403 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 1981). Thereafter the Governor issued a warrant ordering petitioner's execution to be held on March 2, 1982. These proceedings resulted.
Petitioner argues that the trial judge committed error in three regards: (1) he sentenced petitioner to death because he believed petitioner might be released on parole and commit further acts of violence in the future, (2) he found petitioner's mental condition to be a mitigating circumstance but failed to recite that finding of fact and thus petitioner was denied effective appellate review in this Court, and (3) the sentencing judge applied the incorrect burden of proof in determining whether evidence established mitigating or aggravating circumstances. He contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective because he failed to raise the issues that the judge improperly considered non-statutory aggravating circumstances, that the sentencing judge failed to recite the finding of a mitigating circumstance which he in fact found, and that the sentencing judge applied an incorrect burden of proof in determining whether the evidence established mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
At trial petitioner insisted upon representing himself, but, nevertheless, the court appointed counsel with whom he could consult during trial. Petitioner admitted his guilt and requested that he be given the death sentence. It was in this light that appellate counsel sought reversal. In our opinion affirming the judgment and sentence we said:
365 So. 2d 384.
At the sentencing hearing, attorney Smith, the former attorney for petitioner, argued that petitioner should have been given life imprisonment. In his statement to the court Smith said:
The trial judge made specific findings as to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances before sentencing petitioner "to the penalty of death." After ordering that appropriate appellate proceedings be instituted, the trial judge said:
Petitioner argues that his appellate counsel failed to raise as error the consideration by the trial judge that petitioner might commit further acts of violence in the future and that he might be released at some future date. Petitioner relies upon Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1979), where the same trial judge, while imposing a death sentence, made the following statement:
373 So. 2d  at 885.
In Miller it is apparent that the likelihood of the defendant committing further acts of violence in the future was considered as an aggravating factor and that, in the absence of the uncertainty of a life sentence, the judge would not have imposed the sentence of death. It is apparent on the face of the sentence that this was a part of the weighing process.
Goode is different. In this case, the trial judge imposed the sentence and, in reply to statements made by attorney Smith, explained why the result of his weighing process was proper. It does not appear that the trial judge committed reversible error, so appellate counsel was not ineffective when he failed to raise this question on appeal.
Also, appellate counsel did not have the benefit of Miller, as this decision was rendered after the decision in Goode. In any event, the record fails to show that the trial judge improperly considered non-statutory aggravating circumstances.
On appeal from the judgment and sentence, appellate counsel argued that the trial judge erred in not finding and weighing the following mitigating circumstances: (1) that Goode committed the capital felony while under the influence of extreme mental and emotional disturbance and (2) that Goode's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law was substantially impaired, in view of the psychiatric testimony that such circumstances existed. The record discloses that the above question was raised by appellate counsel, so petitioner's second ground for relief is without merit.
In the appeal from the judgment and sentence, the record discloses that appellate counsel argued that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to state that mitigating circumstances do not have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt but by a preponderance of the evidence. He also argued that the court may have improperly required evidence in mitigation to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence before considering it in sentencing. Therefore, petitioner's third ground for relief is without merit.
The facts of the present case do not support petitioner's claim. He had effective assistance of counsel during his appeal. Therefore, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is dismissed and the motion for stay of execution is denied.
Motion for Rehearing will not be considered.
SUNDBERG, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, ALDERMAN, McDONALD and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.