Case Title: Heather A. Rippl v. Board of Bar Examiners

Citation: 2002 WI 15

Docket Number: 2000AP002706-BA

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-02-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 15 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-2706-BA 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of the Bar Admission of 
Heather A. Rippl: 
 
Heather A. Rippl,  
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Board of Bar Examiners,  
 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
BAR ADMISSION OF RIPPL 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 22, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 3, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner there were briefs by Michael B. Van 
Sicklen and Foley & Lardner, Madison, and oral argument by 
Michael B. Van Sicklen. 
 
For the respondent the cause was argued by Thomas J. 
Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2002 WI 15 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-2706-BA  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of the Bar Admission of 
Heather A. Rippl: 
 
Heather A. Rippl,  
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Board of Bar Examiners,  
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 22, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of Board of Bar Examiners' decision.   Decision 
reversed; matter remanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM   This is a review, pursuant to SCR 
40.08(5),1 of the final decision of the Board of Bar Examiners 
(Board) declining to certify that the petitioner, Heather A. 
                                                 
1 References to supreme court rules will be to those in 
effect after October 1, 2000.   
SCR 40.08(5) provides that "[a] petition to the supreme 
court for review of an adverse determination of the board under 
this rule shall be filed with the clerk within 30 days of the 
date on which written notice thereof was mailed to the 
applicant." 
No. 
00-2706-BA   
 
2 
 
Rippl, satisfied the character and fitness requirement for 
admission to the Wisconsin bar set forth in SCR 40.06(1).2  We 
reverse and remand the matter to the Board for further 
proceedings. 
¶2 
We preface our analysis by stating that we appreciate 
the Board's concern regarding this candidate.  The Board 
conducts a character and fitness inquiry for every applicant who 
seeks admission to the State Bar of Wisconsin.  See SCR 
40.06(1).  In Ms. Rippl's case, that inquiry revealed some 
troubling incidents in Ms. Rippl's past that raised substantial 
questions about her fitness to practice law.  The fact that most 
of these incidents occurred when Ms. Rippl was younger, and 
before she sought and obtained psychiatric treatment, does not 
divest them of relevance.  Our task here is to determine whether 
these incidents are sufficiently serious that the candidate 
should be permanently excluded from admission to the bar.   
¶3 
We also recognize that the Board is in a delicate 
position when a bar applicant's character certification presents 
a "close call."  The duty to examine applicants' qualifications 
for bar admission rests with the Board.  Matter of Bar Admission 
                                                 
2 SCR 40.06(1) provides: 
(1) An applicant for bar admission shall establish good 
moral character and fitness to practice law.  The purpose of 
this requirement is to limit admission to those applicants found 
to have the qualities of character and fitness needed to assure 
to a reasonable degree of certainty the integrity and the 
competence of services performed for clients and the maintenance 
of high standards in the administration of justice. 
No. 
00-2706-BA   
 
3 
 
of Childs, 101 Wis. 2d 159, 303 N.W.2d 663 (1981).  However, it 
is this court that retains supervisory authority over bar 
admissions.  See SCR 30.02.3  If the Board admits a questionable 
candidate, that admission effectively deprives this court of the 
opportunity to review the Board's decision because, obviously, a 
successful applicant will not seek review of the Board's 
decision. 
 
For 
that 
reason, 
we 
perceive 
the 
Board's 
unwillingness to approve the candidate in a close case such as 
this 
as 
a 
tacit 
recognition 
of 
this 
court's 
ultimate 
responsibility for regulating admission to the Wisconsin bar. 
¶4  However, while we appreciate that the Board may have 
felt constrained to find that Ms. Rippl's various infractions 
precluded certifying her character and fitness for purposes of 
bar admission, we are of the opinion that incidents the Board 
relied upon, while certainly troubling, are not of sufficient 
gravity to warrant a conclusion that Ms. Rippl should be forever 
barred from admission to the practice of law in this state.   
¶5 
In so holding we are influenced by Ms. Rippl's strong 
academic record, which she achieved while working several jobs 
and performing extensive community service.  We are also 
influenced 
by 
Ms. 
Rippl's 
evidence 
of 
rehabilitation 
as 
reflected in the glowing testimonials provided by numerous 
                                                 
3 SCR 30.02 provides:  Official duties 
Board members, board staff and board counsel acting in the 
course of their official duties under the statutes and SCR 
chapters 30, 31 and 40 and supreme court orders are acting on 
behalf of the supreme court. 
No. 
00-2706-BA   
 
4 
 
employers for whom Ms. Rippl worked.  We also note that it does 
not appear that Ms. Rippl willfully failed to disclose any 
relevant information on her bar application.  See SCR 22.46(2).4   
Finally, we consider that the negative effect of her earlier 
conduct is diluted by the questionable reliability of some of 
the information concerning that conduct. 
¶6 
We therefore conclude that Ms. Rippl's record, while 
troubling in certain of its particulars, is not sufficient, when 
reviewed in the context of this proceeding, to warrant the 
conclusion that she has failed to establish the requisite 
character and fitness to be admitted to the practice of law in 
Wisconsin. 
¶7 
With that preface, we turn to the specifics of this 
case.  Ms. Rippl had a difficult childhood.  In her early teens 
she left home and lived in foster care homes, group homes and 
youth centers.  She enrolled at the UW-Madison in the fall of 
1989. Prior to the start of fall semester classes she withdrew 
from school and moved to California.  She returned to school in 
January 1990 and resided in a campus residence hall for her 
freshman year.  During this semester Ms. Rippl's college 
roommates accused her of stealing personal items from them.  Ms. 
Rippl denied the charges but was convicted, following a jury 
                                                 
4 SCR 22.46(2) provides:  
(2) In the investigation, the applicant shall make a full 
and fair disclosure of all facts and circumstances pertaining to 
questions involving the applicant's character and fitness. 
Failure to provide information or misrepresentation in a 
disclosure constitutes grounds for denial of admission. 
No. 
00-2706-BA   
 
5 
 
trial, of misdemeanor theft.5  That fall a neighbor for whom she 
babysat also accused Ms. Rippl of taking property from her.  She 
was not formally charged in connection with the matter although 
she later admitted she "had the items." 
¶8 
In 1994 Ms. Rippl received her undergraduate degree in 
Psychology from the UW-Madison, graduating in five years, with 
honors.  She supported herself through college by working 
several jobs and performed extensive community service.   
¶9 
In 1995 Ms. Rippl enrolled in law school at the UW-
Madison.  She maintained a good grade point average, earned a 
Law Merit Scholarship and was selected as a managing editor of 
the Wisconsin Law Review.  She worked multiple jobs and 
performed extensive community service.  Her employers uniformly 
spoke highly of her work ethic and character.  During law school 
she also sought psychiatric counseling from Dr. Julie Nielsen, a 
Board certified psychiatrist with the University of Wisconsin 
Student Health Service. 
¶10 In November 1997, during her last year of law school, 
Ms. Rippl sought admission to the bar pursuant to SCR 40.03 (the 
"diploma privilege").  In connection with her application, Ms. 
Rippl disclosed that she had received treatment for mild 
depression while in law school and that she had been prescribed 
Prozac.  She also disclosed the misdemeanor theft conviction 
                                                 
5 Ms. Rippl was convicted of taking a silver bracelet valued 
at approximately $7 from her college roommate.  The conviction 
was 
formally 
expunged 
from 
Ms. 
Rippl's 
record 
upon 
her 
satisfactory completion of her two-year probationary sentence. 
 
No. 
00-2706-BA   
 
6 
 
from her freshman year in college.  In June 1998 she voluntarily 
supplemented 
her 
bar 
application, 
disclosing 
a 
municipal 
ordinance citation for disorderly conduct that occurred during 
her third year of law school.  The citation stemmed from an 
argument with a police officer outside her residence when Ms. 
Rippl "lost her temper" because the officer declined to move his 
unmarked vehicle, which was blocking her own car. 
¶11 Ms. Rippl graduated from the University of Wisconsin 
Law School in 1998.  However, the disclosures in her bar 
application prompted the Board to require that Ms. Rippl submit 
to an independent psychological evaluation by a Board approved 
psychologist.  Dr. Michael Speirer, a forensic psychologist, 
conducted the evaluation and issued his initial report in 
February 
1999.  At the 
Board's 
request 
he 
submitted a 
supplemental report dated May 12, 1999. 
¶12 On July 15, 1999, the Board issued an initial ruling 
denying Ms. Rippl's application on the grounds that she had 
failed to demonstrate that she satisfied the character and 
fitness requirement for bar admission set forth in SCR 40.06(1). 
Ms. Rippl timely objected to the Board's initial ruling and 
requested and received a hearing.  At the hearing on March 21, 
2000, Ms. Rippl submitted numerous affidavits in support of her 
application from several former and current employers, including 
two circuit court judges.6  She submitted her own affidavit 
                                                 
6 We take this opportunity to remind the judiciary to review 
SCR 60.03(2).  See also Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Waddick, 2000 WI 11, 232 Wis. 2d 733, 605 N.W.2d 861.  
No. 
00-2706-BA   
 
7 
 
addressing the incidents that formed the factual basis for the 
Board's initial adverse decision.  She offered testimony from 
several 
witnesses 
including 
several 
previous 
and 
current 
employers.  She responded to questions from the Board and 
provided the sworn medical opinion of her own psychiatrist.   
¶13 On September 6, 2000, the Board issued its final 
decision declining to certify that Ms. Rippl had satisfied the 
requirements for admission to practice.  The final decision was 
the same, in all material respects, as the initial decision.  
Ms. Rippl sought review of the Board's final decision in this 
court pursuant to SCR 40.08(5). 
¶14 Ms. Rippl contends that the Board's decision reflects 
an erroneous exercise of discretion because the Board's findings 
do not reflect consideration of any of the evidence she 
submitted at the evidentiary hearing.  She contends further that 
the record evidence does not support several of the Board's 
factual findings and maintains that she did satisfy the criteria 
for admission to the bar set forth in SCR 40.06(1).  
¶15 We first address the relevant legal standards and 
applicable standard of review.  A candidate for admission to the 
bar bears the burden of proof to establish the qualifications 
for bar admission set forth in SCR 40.027 including the character 
                                                 
7 SCR 40.02 provides:  Qualifications generally 
A person who meets all of the following qualifications 
shall be admitted to practice law in this state by order of the 
supreme court:  
(1) Has attained the age of majority under the law of this 
state.  
No. 
00-2706-BA   
 
8 
 
and fitness requirement set forth in SCR 40.06.  See SCR 40.07.8 
Pursuant to SCR 40.06(3),9 the applicant must establish character 
and fitness to the satisfaction of the Board, whose duty it is 
to certify to this court the character and fitness of qualifying 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2) Satisfies the legal competence requirements by diploma 
privilege (SCR 40.03), bar examination (SCR 40.04) or proof of 
practice elsewhere (SCR 40.05).  
(3) Satisfies the character and fitness requirements set 
forth in SCR 40.06.  
(4) Takes the oath or affirmation prescribed in SCR 40.15 
in open court before the supreme court or a justice thereof or 
before a member of the highest court of another jurisdiction or 
a person authorized by that jurisdiction to administer the 
attorney's oath for bar admission there or before a judge of the 
U.S. District Court or Court of Appeals or a justice of the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
(5) Subscribes the roll of attorneys maintained by the 
clerk of the supreme court or has his or her name entered 
thereon by the clerk.  
8 SCR 40.07 provides that "[t]he burden of proof shall be on 
the applicant to establish qualifications under SCR 40.02. 
Refusal of an applicant to furnish available information or to 
answer questions relating to the applicant's qualifications 
shall 
be 
deemed 
a 
sufficient 
basis 
for 
denial 
of 
the 
certification for admission." 
9 SCR 40.06(3) provides: 
An applicant shall establish to the satisfaction of the 
board that the applicant satisfies the requirement set forth in 
sub. (1). The board shall certify to the supreme court the 
character and fitness of qualifying applicants. The board shall 
decline to certify the character and fitness of an applicant who 
knowingly makes a materially false statement of material fact or 
who 
fails 
to 
disclose 
a 
fact 
necessary 
to 
correct 
a 
misapprehension known by the applicant to have arisen in 
connection with his or her application. 
No. 
00-2706-BA   
 
9 
 
applicants.  Matter of Bar Admission of Martin, 181 Wis. 2d 27, 
29, 510 N.W.2d 687 (1994).   
¶16 In a review pursuant to SCR 40.08(5) of an adverse 
determination of the Board, the court adopts the Board's 
findings of fact if they are not clearly erroneous.  Matter of 
Bar Admission of Crowe, 141 Wis. 2d 230, 232, 414 N.W.2d 41 
(1987). 
 
The 
court 
then 
determines 
whether 
the 
Board's 
conclusions of law based on those facts are proper.  In making 
that determination, the court is appreciative of the Board's 
experience in administering the court's bar admission rules, but 
the court is obligated to make its legal determinations de novo.  
Matter of Bar Admission of Rusch, 171 Wis. 2d 523, 492 N.W.2d 
153 (1992).  Like the Board, we consider whether the applicant 
possesses the character and fitness to practice law using the 
guidelines established in BA 6.0210 and BA 6.03.11   
                                                 
10 BA 6.02 provides: Relevant conduct 
The revelation or discovery of any of the following should 
be treated as cause for further inquiry before the Board decides 
whether the applicant possesses the character and fitness to 
practice law: 
(a) unlawful conduct 
(b) academic misconduct 
(c) false 
statements 
by 
the 
applicant, 
including 
concealment or nondisclosure 
(d) acts involving dishonestly or misrepresentation 
(e) abuse of legal process 
(f) neglect of financial responsibilities 
(g) neglect of professional obligations 
No. 
00-2706-BA   
 
10 
 
¶17 We now turn to the Board's factual findings as set 
forth in its final decision, which are as follows:  
 
A. The applicant was discharged from employment in 
1988 [while a high school car hop at A & W] for a 
cash drawer discrepancy, which she blamed on her 
probation officer;  
 
B. the applicant was arrested in 1990, and later 
tried and convicted for theft from her college 
roommate, denied and continues to deny the truth 
of the facts, blaming her roommate; 
                                                                                                                                                             
(h) violation of an order of a court 
(i) evidence of mental or emotional impairments 
(j) evidence of drug or alcohol dependency 
(k) denial of admission to the bar in another jurisdiction 
on character and fitness grounds 
(l) disciplinary action by a lawyer disciplinary agency or 
other 
professional 
disciplinary 
agency 
of 
any 
jurisdiction  
11 BA 6.03 provides that the Board shall consider: 
(a) the applicant's age at the time of the conduct 
(b) the recency of the conduct 
(c) the reliability of the information concerning the 
conduct 
(d) the seriousness of the conduct 
(e) the mitigating or aggravating circumstances 
(f) the evidence of rehabilitation 
(g) the applicant's candor in the admissions process 
(h) the materiality of any omissions or misrepresentations 
(i) the number of incidents revealing deficiencies 
No. 
00-2706-BA   
 
11 
 
C. the applicant was accused of theft in 1991, while 
on probation for the above-described conviction, 
by a neighbor whose children she was hired to care 
for, giving a false name to the police at the 
time, later denying she did so; 
 
D. the applicant was dropped from the Deferred 
Prosecution Program while on probation for the 
conviction described in (A) above for the reason 
that she did not cooperate, though the applicant 
blamed being so dropped on her financial status;  
 
E. the applicant left her first law school without 
paying tuition, subsequently agreed to pay it, but 
failed to do so pursuant to that agreement;  
 
F. the applicant acquired——and paid——enough parking 
tickets to, in her words, "wallpaper a room" 
evincing a continuing disregard for the law;  
 
G. the applicant was involved in an altercation with 
a police officer in 1998 while in law school, 
blamed her car for causing the problem for which 
she was ultimately cited, received——and paid——a 
citation for disorderly conduct;  
 
H. the applicant admitted the excessive use of 
alcohol while in college, but refused to discuss 
her 
use 
of 
other 
drugs 
with 
the 
evaluator . . . thereby 
concealing 
and 
not 
disclosing relevant facts; 
 
I. on several instances, sufficient to suggest a 
pattern, the applicant took 
action to avoid 
stress, including dropping out of undergraduate 
school in her freshman year, dropping out of law 
school in her first year, flying to Rome then 
flying to Amsterdam on short notice because of a 
"sense of increasing stress at work" (returning on 
the eve of a scheduled evaluation appointment), 
both in 1998 while her application for admission 
to the practice of law was pending and while 
active inquiries to her remained open. 
 
J. The applicant stated that her medication makes her 
"not suicidal for the most part." 
No. 
00-2706-BA   
 
12 
 
Additional factual findings regarding Ms. Rippl's personality 
profile were derived from the psychological reports submitted by 
Dr. Speirer.   
¶18 Record evidence supports many of the Board's factual 
findings.  We have already noted that Ms. Rippl was convicted of 
misdemeanor theft for taking a bracelet from her roommate during 
her freshman year in college.  Ms. Rippl also admits that the 
same year she also took items from a neighbor whose children she 
was hired to care for and that she initially refused to 
cooperate with the investigating police officer, although she 
was not formally charged in connection with the incident. It is 
also undisputed that in 1998 Ms. Rippl was cited for disorderly 
conduct stemming from the aforementioned altercation with a 
police officer.  And, Ms. Rippl admits to having received 
numerous parking tickets while in law school. 
¶19 These 
factual 
findings 
depict 
a 
candidate 
who 
certainly merits the Board's concern.  And, like the Board, we 
find the degree of prevarication that accompanies Ms. Rippl's 
explanations for various incidents a point of concern.  However, 
we are compelled to conclude that the record does not support a 
number of the Board's factual findings or the adverse inferences 
drawn from them.  Our own review of the record also suggests 
that there is more to Ms. Rippl than the Board's factual 
findings, taken alone, would suggest. 
¶20 For example, the Board found that when Ms. Rippl was 
still in high school, in 1988, she was "discharged" from her 
employment as an A & W "carhop" "for a cash drawer discrepancy, 
No. 
00-2706-BA   
 
13 
 
which she blamed on her probation officer."  However, the record 
does not support the finding that Ms. Rippl was under the 
supervision of a probation officer at that time or that she was 
discharged in connection with that incident or, indeed, that the 
"cash drawer discrepancy" was anything more than an accident.  
In her sworn affidavit, Ms. Rippl explains that on one occasion 
she apparently lost a $50 bill during a shift.  She says that 
she told her manager of the cash shortfall and that they jointly 
concluded that the bill may have blown away or otherwise been 
lost.  She acknowledges that she was "scolded for being sloppy 
and inattentive" but denies that she was discharged or otherwise 
charged in connection with this incident and there is no record 
evidence to the contrary.  
¶21 The Board also found that Ms. Rippl was dropped from 
the deferred prosecution program for "failure to cooperate."  
Ms. Rippl acknowledges that she failed to complete the program.  
However, she avers that it was because she was unable to comply 
with the financial requirements associated with participation in 
the program and notes that her failure to complete the program 
did not affect her successful completion of probation.  The 
record evidence before this court simply does not support the 
finding that willful lack of cooperation was the reason for Ms. 
Rippl's failure to complete the program. 
¶22 In a similar vein, the Board initially found that Ms. 
Rippl left her first law school without paying $525.83 owed for 
tuition and "subsequently failed to follow through on an 
agreement to pay the tuition."  But, by the time of the 
No. 
00-2706-BA   
 
14 
 
evidentiary hearing, it is undisputed that Ms. Rippl had paid 
the outstanding tuition bill in full.  However, the Board's 
final decision makes the same factual finding regarding the 
unpaid tuition and does not reflect that the tuition bill was 
paid.   
¶23 We also conclude that the fact that Ms. Rippl admitted 
that she received enough parking tickets in her words, to 
"wallpaper a room" does not support the Board's inference that 
Ms. Rippl thus evinces a "continuing disregard for the law."  In 
her sworn affidavit, Ms. Rippl explains that she intended that 
comment as a "sarcastic, off-the-cuff remark . . . meant for 
comic effect."  It is also undisputed that she promptly paid 
each of the tickets.  Her comment may have been ill advised in 
the context of this proceeding, but we cannot agree that 
numerous paid parking tickets, without more, necessarily evince 
a "continuing disregard for the law."   
¶24 The Board made the further finding that Ms. Rippl had 
admitted the excessive use of alcohol while in college and that 
she refused to discuss her use of illegal drugs with Dr. 
Speirer.  In her sworn affidavit, Ms. Rippl admits that she 
occasionally drank to excess when she was a college student at 
the University of Wisconsin–Madison.  She emphatically denies 
any use of illegal drugs.  She maintains that she does not have 
a drinking problem and that no one has ever suggested that she 
has a problem with alcohol.   
¶25 The record supports her assertion.  Dr. Speirer's 
report explicitly notes that "adult drinking has never been a 
No. 
00-2706-BA   
 
15 
 
problem . . . and no one has identified it as a problem."  
Therefore, while the Board's factual finding may have some 
support in the record, there appears to be no record evidence to 
support the Board's apparent inference that Ms. Rippl currently 
suffers from chemical dependency issues that might affect her 
ability to practice law. 
¶26 Similarly, the Board found Ms. Rippl's medication 
makes her "not suicidal for the most part."  Ms. Rippl admits to 
occasional suicidal tendencies prior to November 1996 and that, 
prior 
to 
December 
1997, 
Prozac 
was 
prescribed 
for 
her 
depression.  She maintains that she has now been "free of any 
symptom of depression for over a year and a half." She avers 
further that she "is not suicidal."  Therefore, the significance 
of the Board's finding is unclear, particularly in light of Dr. 
Nielsen's sworn statement opining that Ms. Rippl's psychological 
condition "warrants pharmacological treatment ONLY if it recurs" 
and that it "will NOT impair her ability to practice law 
independently and unsupervised."  (Emphasis in original).   
¶27 We briefly address the Board's findings regarding Ms. 
Rippl's personality profile.  In each of its initial and final 
decisions the Board relies heavily on the two psychological 
reports submitted by Dr. Speirer.  Ms. Rippl does not challenge 
Dr. Speirer's conclusions.  Rather, Ms. Rippl argues that the 
No. 
00-2706-BA   
 
16 
 
Board's findings with respect to her psychological profile take 
the negative aspects of Dr. Speirer's reports out of context.12   
¶28 Dr. Speirer stated that Ms. Rippl's background and 
behavior raised concerns about her honesty, trustworthiness, and 
integrity.  However, he acknowledged positive character traits 
as well, stating that "[Ms. Rippl] is capable of working 
independently and is likely to function and be seen as a 
reliable employee."   
¶29 We decline to conclude that the Board's factual 
findings regarding Ms. Rippl's psychological profile are clearly 
erroneous.  However, we note that in making its findings of 
fact, the Board appears to have completely discounted the sworn 
opinion of Ms. Rippl's treating psychiatrist during law school, 
Dr. Julie Nielsen, a Board certified psychiatrist.   
¶30 The Board contends that it is entitled to "choose the 
more negative evaluation of Dr. Speirer" over the conclusions of 
Dr. Nielsen, who opined that Ms. Rippl is psychologically fit to 
                                                 
12 One troubling procedural irregularity in this case 
involves the fact that Ms. Rippl was told she would be entitled 
to a copy of Dr. Speirer's report, for which she paid.  Ms. 
Rippl did receive a copy of the initial report.  However, the 
Board requested that Dr. Speirer prepare a supplemental report.  
Neither Ms. Rippl nor her counsel learned of or received a copy 
of the supplemental report until the very end of the evidentiary 
hearing the following year.  As we have previously cautioned the 
Board in a case involving a similar evidentiary issue, it would 
have been the "better practice" for the Board to have notified 
Ms. Rippl of the supplemental report and of the Board's intent 
to rely on that report in reaching a determination on the 
question of her character and fitness for bar admission.  See 
Matter of Bar Admission of Radtke, 230 Wis. 2d 254, 267, 601 
N.W.2d 642 (1999).  
No. 
00-2706-BA   
 
17 
 
practice law.  The Board explains further that "[e]vidence 
showing that Rippl did well in law school, works hard, is self-
reliant and performed community service does not answer the 
Board's concerns."13  The Board thus discounted the professional 
recommendations Ms. Rippl produced, asserting that these lawyers 
and judges: 
 
. . . were not in a good position to address these 
questions either.  They observed her working under 
close supervision as a law clerk or its equivalent 
where she neither personally handled other people's 
property nor got individually involved in the heat of 
legal advocacy and where she was likely to be on her 
best behavior in any event. 
¶31 Thus, the Board explains that it did not ignore the 
evidence introduced at the hearing; rather, it deemed that 
evidence "essentially irrelevant" to the question whether Ms. 
Rippl has the necessary character and fitness to practice law.  
The Board maintains that, in any event, it is not required to 
specify the evidence it declined to rely on.   
¶32 We agree that it is enough if the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are sufficiently specific to indicate that 
the Board undertook a reasonable examination of the facts and 
the law.  See, e.g., State v. Jeske, 197 Wis. 2d 905, 912, 541 
                                                 
13 Specifically, the Board explains that it was concerned 
about Ms. Rippl's "history of theft and other financial 
difficulties."  In the Board's judgment, Ms. Rippl's "passive 
aggressive personality . . . raises questions about her ability 
to 
maintain 
appropriate 
professional 
behavior 
in 
her 
relationships 
with 
judges, 
opposing 
attorneys, 
and 
others 
involved 
in 
the 
stressful 
environment 
of 
adversarial 
litigation."   
 
No. 
00-2706-BA   
 
18 
 
N.W.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1995).  Unfortunately, in this case, the 
Board's final decision is virtually identical to its initial 
decision.  As such, the final decision does not reflect the 
Board's 
consideration 
of 
the 
extensive 
documentary 
and 
testimonial evidence offered at the hearing, thereby hindering 
our review.   
¶33 However, we need not review or adopt every finding of 
fact of the Board.  We are of the opinion that the incidents the 
Board relied upon, while troubling, are not of sufficient 
gravity to warrant a conclusion that Ms. Rippl failed to meet 
her burden to establish character and fitness to practice law. 
¶34 As we noted previously, in reaching this conclusion we 
are influenced by evidence of Ms. Rippl's rehabilitation, as 
demonstrated by the positive testimonials provided by numerous 
employers for whom Ms. Rippl worked, describing Ms. Rippl as 
"diligent, trustworthy and hardworking" and who aver she 
"demonstrated honesty and integrity, and at all times acted in 
an 
ethical 
and 
responsible 
manner". 
 
We 
find 
these 
recommendations highly relevant to the question of whether Ms. 
Rippl 
can 
maintain 
appropriate 
professional 
behavior 
and 
demeanor.  We also note that both Dr. Nielsen and Dr. Speirer 
agreed that: 
 
Heather Rippl is a bright and capable individual with 
a well-developed intellect.  She is an analytical 
thinker, 
can 
reason 
well 
and 
manifests 
strong 
determination and zeal.  She has the ability to pursue 
both personal and intellectual interests that reflect 
a high level of tenacity.   
No. 
00-2706-BA   
 
19 
 
¶35 In addition, Dr. Nielsen offered the following sworn 
opinion of Ms. Rippl's disturbing behavior in college: 
 
The 
behaviors 
by 
Heather . . . are 
not 
extraordinarily unusual nor indications of a character 
pathology for a young adult like Heather coping with 
uncertain and challenging personal relationships while 
trying to do well in a rigorous academic program.  In 
Heather's case it is important to note that she 
affirmatively and voluntarily sought out appropriate 
assistance when she felt she needed it.  She did so 
while holding down part-time jobs concomitant to 
performing at a very high level at both undergraduate 
and law school levels.  Heather was not forced to see 
me or to request medication; rather, she proceeded in 
a very mature fashion to seek assistance when and as 
she needed it. 
¶36 We also considered Ms. Rippl's strong academic record, 
particularly in light of the fact that she achieved this 
academic record while working several jobs and performing 
extensive community service.   
¶37 The court takes seriously its responsibility for 
matters of bar admission and we do not make this decision 
lightly.  We contemplated admitting this candidate subject to 
some sort of monitoring requirements as we have done in 
disciplinary cases involving attorneys with a history of 
chemical dependency.  See, e.g., Reinstatement of License of 
Burke, 211 Wis. 2d 166, 564 N.W.2d 340 (1997).  Ultimately, we 
deemed such an option impractical here.  We also considered 
upholding the Board's refusal to certify the applicant's 
character but indicating that she could reapply for admission to 
the bar after some period of time, as we have done in other 
cases.  See, e.g., Matter of Bar Admission of Radtke, 230 
No. 
00-2706-BA   
 
20 
 
Wis. 2d 254, 601 N.W.2d 642 (1999).  However, more than four 
years have passed since Ms. Rippl first sought admission to the 
bar in November 1997.  We conclude that no purpose would be 
served by requiring additional delay. 
¶38  Ultimately, we are of the opinion that the incidents 
from Ms. Rippl's past, while certainly troubling, are not of 
sufficient gravity for us to conclude that Ms. Rippl should be 
forever barred from admission to the practice of law in this 
state.  Indeed, we hold that the record evidence, taken as a 
whole, does not support the conclusion that she has failed to 
establish the requisite character and fitness to be admitted to 
the practice of law in Wisconsin. 
¶39  Because 
we 
reverse 
the 
decision 
of 
the 
Board 
declining to certify Ms. Rippl's character and fitness for bar 
admission for the reasons stated, it is unnecessary to address 
the constitutional arguments set out in her brief.  
¶40 IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Board of Bar 
Examiners' declining to certify that Heather A. Rippl has 
satisfied the requirements for admission to the practice of law 
in Wisconsin is reversed and the matter is remanded to the Board 
for further action consistent with this opinion.   
 
No. 
00-2706-BA   
 
 
 
1