Case Title: McMillan v. Blue Ridge Cos.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 492A20

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2021-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-160 
No. 492A20 
Filed 17 December 2021 
ELIZABETH MCMILLAN and TIFFANY SCOTT 
 
 
v. 
BLUE RIDGE COMPANIES, INC., BLUE RIDGE PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, 
LLC, BRC CROSS CREEK, LLC d/b/a LEGACY AT CROSS CREEK, and 
FAYETTEVILLE CROSS CREEK, LLC d/b/a LEGACY AT CROSS CREEK, INC. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a)(4) from an order granting plaintiffs’ 
motion for class certification entered on 11 June 2020 by Judge Rebecca Holt in the 
Superior Court in Cumberland County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 30 August 
2021. 
 
Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman, PLLC, by Scott C. Harris and 
Patrick M. Wallace; and Edward H. Maginnis and Karl S. Gwaltney, for 
plaintiff-appellees.  
 
Cranfill Sumner, LLP, by Steven A. Bader and Richard T. Boyette, for 
defendant-appellant Blue Ridge Property Management, LLC. 
 
 
HUDSON, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
In this case we consider whether the trial court erred by granting plaintiffs’ 
motion to certify three classes for a class action lawsuit. Plaintiffs Elizabeth McMillan 
and Tiffany Scott are former tenants of residential apartments in Fayetteville, North 
Carolina, owned and managed by defendant Blue Ridge Property Management, LLC 
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(Blue Ridge). Plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit against the defendants alleging 
violations of N.C.G.S. § 42-46 (North Carolina Residential Rental Agreements Act, or 
NCRRAA) and N.C.G.S. § 75-50 et seq. (North Carolina Debt Collection Act, or 
NCDCA). Specifically, they moved the trial court to certify three classes of certain 
fellow tenants: the “Collection Letter Class,” the “Eviction Fee Class,” and the 
“Complaint-Filing Fee Class.” On 11 June 2020, the trial court granted plaintiffs’ 
motion to certify all three classes. On 10 July 2020, Blue Ridge appealed the class 
certification order directly to this Court under N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a)(4). Because we 
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm and remand for 
further proceedings. 
I. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
¶ 2 
 
The NCRRAA, in relevant part, authorizes landlords to assess certain fees 
against defaulting tenants “only if . . . the landlord filed and served a complaint for 
summary ejectment and/or money owed, the tenant cured the default or claim, and 
the landlord dismissed the complaint prior to judgment.” N.C.G.S. § 42-46(e) (2021). 
The NCDCA, in relevant part, broadly prohibits debt collectors from engaging in 
certain unauthorized practices, such as “[f]alsely representing the character, extent, 
or amount of a debt against a consumer or of its status in any legal proceeding” or 
“[f]alsely representing that an existing obligation of the consumer may be increased 
by the addition of [certain] fees.” N.C.G.S. § 75-54(4), (6) (2021). Here, plaintiffs allege 
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that Blue Ridge violated these Acts by unduly threatening (via collection letter) and 
assessing eviction fees and complaint-filing fees against tenants behind on rent before 
summary ejection complaints had been filed and before summary ejectment 
proceedings were complete. The merits of these substantive allegations are not at 
issue here. “In determining the propriety of a class action, the question is not whether 
the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, 
but rather whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met.” Eisen v. Carlisle & 
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974) (cleaned up). The only question before the Court 
at this stage is whether the classes were properly certified, not whether the plaintiffs’ 
claims will succeed. See id. at 177–78.  
¶ 3 
 
On 16 July 2018, plaintiffs filed a complaint as a putative class action against 
Blue Ridge and several related entities. Later, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the 
related entities from the suit pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) of the North Carolina Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Initially, plaintiffs alleged six claims for relief: (1) violation of 
N.C.G.S. § 42-46 (NCRRAA) (on behalf of all classes); (2) violation of N.C.G.S. § 42-
46 (NCRRAA) (on behalf of the Complaint-Filing Fee Class); (3) violation of N.C.G.S. 
§ 75-50 et seq. (NCDCA) (on behalf of all classes); (4) violation of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 et 
seq. (North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, or UDTPA) (on behalf 
of all classes); (5) a petition for an injunction pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1-485 et seq. (on 
behalf of the Complaint-Filing Fee Class); and (6) petition for declaratory judgment 
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pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1-253 (on behalf of all classes). On 26 November 2018, Blue 
Ridge filed its answer, denying liability. 
¶ 4 
 
On 8 March 2019, Chief Justice Beasley designated this matter as exceptional 
pursuant to Rule 2.1 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District 
Courts, and assigned the matter to Judge Rebecca Holt.  
¶ 5 
 
On 15 May 2019, plaintiff Elizabeth McMillan filed a partial motion for 
judgment on the pleadings. On 20 May 2019, Blue Ridge filed a motion to dismiss 
plaintiffs’ suit pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On 18 November 2019, the trial 
court denied in part and granted in part the motion. In part, the court ruled that the 
collection of eviction fees and complaint-filing fees violated the NCRRAA, but denied 
the motion as to Blue Ridge’s liability for sending collection letters under the NCDCA, 
leaving the matter to be tried. Also on 18 November 2019, the trial court denied in 
part and granted in part Blue Ridge’s motion to dismiss. Specifically, the court 
dismissed claims four and five (UDTPA violation on behalf of all classes and the 
petition for an injunction on behalf of the Complaint-Filing Fee Class) but left the 
remaining four claims intact.  
¶ 6 
 
On 5 December 2019, Blue Ridge filed a motion for partial summary judgment. 
On 6 December 2019, plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment. That 
same day, plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. On 11 June 2020, the court 
denied in part and granted in part plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment. 
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Specifically, the court ruled that Blue Ridge violated the NCRRAA and the NCDCA 
when it assessed eviction fees and complaint-filing fees against plaintiffs, and that 
the collection letters likewise violated the NCDCA. However, the court found that 
genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether the collection letters proximately 
caused actual injury to plaintiffs. Accordingly, the court denied plaintiffs’ motion for 
summary judgment on this issue. 
II. 
Standard of Review 
¶ 7 
 
This Court reviews a trial court’s class certification order for abuse of 
discretion. Fisher v. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp., 369 N.C. 202, 209 
(2016). “[T]he test for abuse of discretion is whether a decision is manifestly 
unsupported by reason, or so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a 
reasoned decision.” Frost v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 353 N.C. 188, 199 (2000) 
(cleaned up). Within this general standard, when addressing a class certification 
order, this Court has recognized that conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and 
findings of fact are considered binding if supported by competent evidence. Fisher, 
369 N.C. at 209. 
III. 
Analysis 
¶ 8 
 
Rule 23 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes class action 
lawsuits. Specifically, Rule 23 establishes that “[i]f persons constituting a class are 
so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of 
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them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on 
behalf of all, sue or be sued.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 23(a) (2019). “The party seeking 
to bring a class action under Rule 23(a) has the burden of showing that [certain] 
prerequisites to utilizing the class action procedure are present.” Crow v. Citicorp 
Acceptance Co., 319 N.C. 274, 282 (1987) (footnote omitted). 
¶ 9 
 
These prerequisites are well established. See, e.g., Faulkenbury v. Tchrs.’ & 
State Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 345 N.C. 683, 697 (1997) (repeating the prerequisites for class 
certification established by Crow, 319 N.C. at 282–83); Beroth Oil Co. v. N.C. Dep’t of 
Transp., 367 N.C. 333, 336–37 (2014) (same); Fisher, 369 N.C. at 209 (same). As an 
initial matter, the class representatives must demonstrate the existence of a class. 
Crow, 319 N.C. at 277. “A proper class exists ‘when the named and unnamed 
members each have an interest in either the same issue of law or of fact, and that 
issue predominates over issues affecting only individual class members.’ ” Fisher, 369 
N.C. at 209 (quoting Crow, 319 N.C. at 280). 
¶ 10 
 
In addition to this threshold requirement, “the class representatives must 
show: (1) that they will fairly and adequately represent the interests of all members 
of the class; (2) that they have no conflict of interest with the class members; (3) that 
they have a genuine personal interest, not a mere technical interest, in the outcome 
of the case; (4) that they will adequately represent members outside the state; (5) that 
class members are so numerous that it is impractical to bring them all before the 
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court; and (6) that adequate notice is given to all class members.” Id. (cleaned up) 
(quoting Faulkenbury, 345 N.C. at 697). 
¶ 11 
 
Once a party seeking class certification meets these requirements, “it is left to 
the trial court’s discretion whether a class action is superior to other available 
methods for the adjudication of the controversy.” Id. (cleaned up).  
Class actions should be permitted where they are likely to 
serve useful purposes such as preventing a multiplicity of 
suits or inconsistent results. The usefulness of the class 
action device must be balanced, however, against 
inefficiency or other drawbacks. . . . [T]he trial court has 
broad discretion in this regard and is not limited to 
consideration of matters expressly set forth in Rule 23 or 
in [existing caselaw].  
 
Crow, 319 N.C. at 284. Accordingly, “the touchstone for appellate review of a Rule 23 
order . . . is to honor the ‘broad discretion’ allowed the trial court in all matters 
pertaining to class certification.” Frost, 353 N.C. at 198.  
¶ 12 
 
Here, the trial court defined three classes as follows: 
The Collection Letter Class: All tenants of Blue Ridge’s 
Apartments in North Carolina who (a) at any point within 
the four (4) year period preceding the filing of Plaintiffs’ 
Complaint through June 25, 2018 (b) resided in one of the 
apartments managed by Blue Ridge in North Carolina (c) 
were sent the Second Collection Letter that (d) threatened 
to charge Eviction Fees when such amounts could not be 
claimed by Blue Ridge.  
 
Eviction Fee Class: All tenants of Blue Ridge’s 
Apartments in North Carolina who (a) at any point within 
the four (4) year period preceding the filing of Plaintiffs’ 
Complaint through June 25, 2018 (b) resided in one of the 
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apartments managed by Blue Ridge in North Carolina (c) 
were charged and (d) actually paid Eviction Fees prior to a 
North Carolina court awarding such Eviction Fees to Blue 
Ridge. 
 
The Complaint-Filing Fee Class: All tenants of Blue 
Ridge’s Apartments in North Carolina who (a) at any point 
within the four (4) year period preceding the filing of 
Plaintiff’s Complaint through June 25, 2018 (b) resided in 
one of the apartments managed by Blue Ridge in North 
Carolina (c) were charged a Complaint-Filing Fee before a 
complaint in summary ejectment was filed and served and 
paid it. 
 
¶ 13 
 
In support of its order certifying these classes, the trial court made the 
following findings of fact: 
11. Blue Ridge provides property management 
services to owners of residential apartment complexes in 
North Carolina. Blue Ridge’s property management 
services include the implementation of its General 
Collection Guidelines which require, among other things, 
that 
its 
on-site 
employees 
“must 
treat 
everyone 
consistently and that “[a]ll residents in the same situation 
must be treated the same.” 
 
12. On or after the 11th of the month, Blue Ridge 
employees send tenants who are delinquent with their rent 
a letter stating that continued nonpayment will result in 
“legal action” and that “[i]f legal action is necessary, any 
expenses we incur will be charged to your account” (Second 
Collection Letter”). The “expenses identified in the Second 
Collection Letter are the same as Eviction Fees. 
 
13. According to a stipulation signed by the parties, 
“Defendant Blue Ridge had a general policy to send 
templated written communications to the tenant. These 
written communications were known as the ‘Notice to pay 
– 2nd Notice’ and ‘Notice to Pay – Final Notice.’ ” The 
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stipulation also agreed that “the text of any Notice to Pay 
– 2nd Notice . . . that were generated for particular tenants 
is substantively similar . . .” 
 
14. If a tenant remains delinquent, Blue Ridge 
would start the eviction process. The eviction process 
included a summary ejectment action being filed against 
the delinquent tenant. Blue Ridge would also charge 
Eviction Fees to a delinquent tenant’s ledger. In some, but 
not all instances, Blue Ridge employees also charged 
tenants with an additional Complaint-Filing Fee equaling 
5% of the tenants’ monthly rent. At times, Blue Ridge 
posted the Complaint-Filing Fee to a tenant’s ledger before 
a summary ejectment complaint was filed and served. 
 
15. Blue Ridge considers that tenants owe the 
amounts set forth on their ledgers. 
 
16. Plaintiffs McMillan and Scott were residents at 
a Blue Ridge-managed property, Legacy at Cross Creek 
Apartments in Fayetteville, North Carolina. Plaintiffs 
McMillan and Scott received Second Collection Letters and 
were charged with and paid Eviction Fees and Complaint-
Filing Fees. 
 
¶ 14 
 
Blue Ridge points to three alleged errors in the trial court’s class certification 
order: (1) error in certifying the Collection Letter Class; (2) error in certifying the 
Eviction Fee Class and the Complaint-Filing Fee Class; and (3) error in the 
superiority determination. For the foregoing reasons, we see no merit to any of these 
challenges. 
A. Collection Letter Class 
¶ 15 
 
We must first determine whether the trial court erred in certifying the 
Collection Letter Class. Blue Ridge contends that the trial court erred in certifying 
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this class for three reasons: (1) class qualification focuses on whether the class 
members were “sent” a collection letter, rather than whether they “received” the 
letter; (2) class certification is improper when liability depends on how a class 
member reacted to the letter; and (3) actual and statutory damages available to the 
class cannot be shown by a class-wide theory of generalized proof. We address each 
argument in turn. 
¶ 16 
 
First, Blue Ridge argues that the trial court erred in defining the Collection 
Letter Class as those tenants who were “sent” the collection letter, as opposed to those 
who “received” the collection letter. This distinction is significant, Blue Ridge argues, 
because any alleged common injury proximately caused by the collection letter would 
first depend on whether the tenant actually received the letter. 
¶ 17 
 
We disagree. The trial court acted within its broad discretion in inferring that 
for the purpose of certifying this class, a letter sent was a letter received. See Parnell-
Martin Supply Co. v. High Point Motor Lodge, Inc., 277 N.C. 312, 320–21, (1970) 
(holding that a stipulation that a notice letter was sent established prima facie that 
the notice was received). Ample evidence supports this inference. For instance: Blue 
Ridge has admitted that the collection letters were indeed sent; Blue Ridge has not 
identified any evidence tending to rebut the corresponding inference that the letters 
were received; Blue Ridge stipulated that “the number of individuals who received 
the [collection letters] are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all 
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before the Court” (emphasis added); and the trial court found that the named 
plaintiffs had, in fact, “received” collection letters. This inference of receipt is further 
strengthened by the testimony of a Blue Ridge employee and witness that collection 
letters were not delivered by mail, but by direct email or hand-delivery to each 
tenant’s door. Accordingly, for the purpose of our review, drawing this inference from 
the uncontroverted testimony and stipulations was well within the broad discretion 
of the trial court. 
¶ 18 
 
Second, Blue Ridge argues that the Collection Letter Class certification is 
improper because liability depends not only on whether each class member received 
the letter, but also on how each class member reacted to the letter. For instance, Blue 
Ridge argues, if a collection letter recipient did not read the letter, did not understand 
the letter, or was in such an unfortunate financial position that he or she could not 
adjust their financial decisions based on the letter, then the letter would not 
proximately cause an injury, thus undermining the commonality of the class. 
¶ 19 
 
Third and relatedly, Blue Ridge asserts that the Collection Letter Class 
certification was erroneous because actual and statutory damages available to the 
class cannot be shown by a class-wide theory of generalized proof, as required for 
class certification. Based on the subjective reaction argument noted above, Blue Ridge 
argues that any actual damages suffered by class members because of a collection 
letter are unique to each member, and therefore not susceptible to a class-wide theory 
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of generalized proof. Likewise, Blue Ridge contends that the statutory damages 
sought by plaintiffs under the NCDCA are not susceptible to a class-wide theory of 
generalized proof because the amount will vary based on the nature and extent of 
each class member’s injury, and the court lacks objective criteria with which to 
calculate such damages. Accordingly, Blue Ridge argues that class certification here 
is improper.  
¶ 20 
 
These arguments mischaracterize the true nature of the alleged injury here, 
which is not grounded in an individualized subjective reaction and injury, but in a 
class-wide deprivation of statutory rights under the NCRRAA and NCDCA. As this 
Court recently noted in Comm. to Elect Dan Forest v. Emps Pol. Action Comm.: 
[O]ur courts have recognized the broad authority of the 
legislature to create causes of action, such as ‘citizen-suits’ 
and ‘private attorney general actions,’ even where 
personal, factual injury did not previously exist, in order to 
vindicate the public interest. In such cases, the relevant 
questions are only whether the plaintiff has shown a 
relevant statute confers a cause of action and whether the 
plaintiff satisfies the requirements to bring a claim under 
the statute. . . . The existence of the legal right is enough. 
 
376 N.C. 558, 2021-NCSC-6, ¶ 71. Later, in his concurring opinion, Chief Justice 
Newby specifically noted the NCDCA as an example of a statute that “provid[es] for 
specified statutory damages without requiring the plaintiff to prove actual injury.” 
Id. ¶ 96 (Newby, C.J., concurring). 
¶ 21 
 
Plaintiffs here allege precisely the type of injury contemplated by this Court in 
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Forest above: one that depends not on individualized harm, but on an informational 
injury and a deprivation of statutory rights. Id. ¶ 71; see N.C.G.S. § 75-56(b) (2021) 
(“Any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this Article with respect 
to any person is liable to such person in a private action . . . .”). As a result, the 
collection letters need not have caused each class member a personal, factual injury 
based on his or her subjective reaction to it, but only an informational injury based 
on alleged misrepresentations and misleading information contained in the letters, 
in violation of the statute.  
¶ 22 
 
Similarly, regarding damages, although different members of the class could 
indeed end up with different damages based on individual circumstances, these 
differences do not undermine the availability of a class-wide theory of generalized 
liability. Here, Blue Ridge stipulated that it “had a general policy to send templated 
written communications” to its tenants in forms “substantially similar” to the ones 
produced for this litigation. These admittedly uniform procedures pertained to the 
collection letters, eviction fees, and complaint-filing fees at issue here. At this 
preliminary stage where the only question regards the appropriateness of class 
certification, not the merits of plaintiffs’ claims or extent of plaintiffs’ damages, the 
uniformity of Blue Ridge’s procedures establishes a sufficiently generalized theory of 
alleged injury. Accordingly, the trial court acted within its broad discretion in finding 
that “common issues of fact and law are both central for all class members and are 
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susceptible to class-wide proof.” 
¶ 23 
 
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
certifying the Collection Letter Class. 
B. Eviction Fee Class and Complaint-Filing Fee Class 
¶ 24 
 
We must next determine whether the trial court erred in certifying the Eviction 
Fee Class and Complaint-Filing Fee Class, as defined above. Blue Ridge argues that 
findings of fact numbered 11 through 16 (quoted above) are insufficient to support 
the trial court’s subsequent legal conclusions that “common issues of fact and law 
predominate over any individual issues” and that “[t]he common issues of fact and 
law are both central for all class members and are susceptible to class-wide proof.” 
Further, Blue Ridge argues that the inadequacy of these findings prevents this Court 
from engaging in meaningful appellate review.  
¶ 25 
 
For support, Blue Ridge points to Nobles v. First Carolina Commc’ns, Inc., 108 
N.C. App. 127 (1992), and Elam v. William Douglas Mgmt., Inc., No. COA14-1377, 
2015 WL 2374524 (N.C. Ct. App. May 19, 2015) (unpublished). In Nobles, the trial 
court summarily denied the plaintiffs’ class certification motion without “specify[ing] 
which elements were lacking and [with] no other findings.” 108 N.C. App. at 132. The 
Court of Appeals subsequently deemed the trial court’s findings “inadequate to enable 
[the Court of Appeals] to determine whether the [trial] court’s decision was based on 
competent evidence.” Id. at 132–33. In Elam, the trial court provided five relatively 
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succinct findings of fact regarding the inferiority of a class action in comparison to 
alternative methods of adjudication, and thus denied plaintiffs’ motion for class 
certification. 2015 WL 2374524 at *2. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found these 
findings of fact sufficient. Id. at *5. 
¶ 26 
 
Here, Blue Ridge asserts that—similarly to Nobles and in contrast to Elam—
the trial court did not make sufficiently detailed findings of fact. Blue Ridge notes 
that the trial court’s class certification order included only six relatively cursory 
findings of fact (quoted above) detailing Blue Ridge’s uniform procedures for sending 
defaulting tenants collection letters and assessing eviction fees and complaint-filing 
fees. These findings, Blue Ridge argues, are insufficiently detailed to support the trial 
court’s subsequent conclusions of law regarding the existence of the three classes and 
to allow this Court the opportunity for meaningful appellate review. 
¶ 27 
 
We agree the trial court’s findings of fact are relatively succinct; but succinct 
does not necessarily mean inadequate. The trial court’s findings of fact plainly 
describe Blue Ridge’s procedures at issue, note the uniformity of their application, 
and establish that they were deployed on plaintiffs. Notably, Blue Ridge does not 
challenge the factual findings, and the subsequent conclusions of law are specifically 
tailored to reflect the practices described. Comparatively, these findings of fact are 
more extensive than those found inadequate in Nobles, and are far more comparable 
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to—and perhaps even more detailed than—those found adequate in Elam.1 While 
there is no bright line establishing a minimum number of factual findings or a 
minimum level of detail that will be deemed adequate, we cannot conclude that the 
facts here are insufficient to support the trial court’s subsequent legal determinations 
that “common issues of fact and law predominate over any individual issues” and that 
“[t]he common issues of fact and law are both central for all class members and are 
susceptible to class-wide proof.” For the same reasons, we cannot find that the trial 
court’s findings of fact are so deficient as to preclude this Court from engaging in 
meaningful appellate review. 
¶ 28 
 
In fact, the trial court’s succinctness here acts to support class certification 
rather than to undermine it; that is, because Blue Ridge’s procedures regarding the 
collection letters, eviction fees, and complaint-filing fees were admittedly uniform for 
all defaulting tenants, more detailed, tenant-specific factual findings are rendered 
unnecessary. Indeed, as noted within the trial court’s findings of fact, Blue Ridge’s 
own General Collection Guidelines require, among other things, that its employees 
“must treat everyone consistently” and that “[a]ll residents in the same situation 
must be treated the same.” The trial court’s findings of fact reflect this consistency.  
¶ 29 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
                                            
1 Notably, Elam is an unpublished decision which does not constitute controlling legal 
authority. 
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certifying the Eviction Fee Class and the Complaint-Filing Fee Class. 
C. Superiority Determination 
¶ 30 
 
We must last determine whether the trial court erred in its determination that 
a class action is superior to other available methods of adjudication.  
¶ 31 
 
As noted above, after a party seeking class certification satisfies the 
prerequisites, the trial court must determine, in its discretion, “whether a class action 
is superior to other available methods for the adjudication of th[e] controversy….’” 
Crow, 319 N.C. at 284.  
Class actions should be permitted where they are likely to 
serve useful purposes such as preventing a multiplicity of 
suits or inconsistent results. The usefulness of the class 
action device must be balanced, however, against 
inefficiency or other drawbacks. . . . [T]he trial court has 
broad discretion in this regard and is not limited to 
consideration of matters expressly set forth in Rule 23 or 
in [existing caselaw].  
 
Id. Accordingly, superiority determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See 
Fisher, 369 N.C. at 209.  
¶ 32 
 
Here, the trial court stated the following: 
28. The Court finds that here a class action is 
superior to all other available methods of adjudicating the 
controversy. There are relatively few evidentiary issues for 
the Court to decide and that, once decided, can be applied 
to the classes. If this action were not allowed to proceed as 
a class action, the same legal issues could be relitigated in 
potentially hundreds of individual cases in different courts 
throughout 
North 
Carolina, 
which 
could 
lead 
to 
inconsistent decisions. The benefits of litigating this case 
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as a class action overrides any drawbacks. Statutory 
damages in this case can be determined using objective 
criteria that is applicable class-wide, and the issues 
identified by Blue Ridge concerning ascertaining class 
members’ identities can be determined administratively. 
Further, potential statutory damages are not out of 
proportion to the harm caused. Lastly, Plaintiffs affirmed 
at the hearing that they are not seeking emotional distress 
damages or punitive damages. 
 
¶ 33 
 
Blue Ridge challenges three conclusions within this determination: (1) that 
statutory damages can be measured using objective, class-wide criteria; (2) that 
identifying class members can be done through administrative means; and (3) that 
class certification is preferrable when, as here, plaintiffs seek both statutory damages 
and attorneys’ fees. We again see no error, and address each in turn below. 
¶ 34 
 
First, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that statutory 
damages can be measured using objective, class-wide criteria. As noted above, when 
a statute creates a cause of action independent from a personal, factual, injury, “the 
relevant questions are only whether the plaintiff has shown a relevant statute confers 
a cause of action and whether the plaintiff satisfies the requirements to bring a claim 
under the statute.” Comm. To Elect Dan Forest, 2021-NCSC-6, ¶ 72. The NCDCA is 
one such statute. See id. ¶ 96 (Newby, C.J., concurring). Accordingly, statutory 
damages here could be determined based on the generalized theory of alleged class-
wide informational injuries and deprivation of statutory rights under the NCDCA.  
¶ 35 
 
Second, we cannot agree that the trial court acted unreasonably in concluding 
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that the identification of class members could be completed administratively and did 
not pose a significant impediment to class certification. Notably, class-member 
identification is only one of many factors that a trial court may consider within a 
superiority determination. See Crow, 319 N.C. at 284 (“[T]he trial court has broad 
discretion in this regard and is not limited to consideration of matters expressly set 
forth in Rule 23 or in [existing caselaw].”).  
¶ 36 
 
Here, based on the record before the trial court, the court had competent 
evidence that Blue Ridge produced ledgers of tenants that specifically identified those 
who were charged and paid eviction fees. Further, administrative class-member 
identification is supported by the precision with which the classes are defined 
(including use of the applicable date ranges and whether tenants were charged or 
“actually paid” the applicable fees) and the admitted uniformity with which Blue 
Ridge administered the letters and fees at issue. Although the trial court did not 
specify a method for class-member identification in its findings of fact, this does not 
amount to an abuse of discretion when it had competent evidence on which to base 
its conclusion that class-member identification could indeed be completed 
administratively.   
¶ 37 
 
Third, we are not persuaded by Blue Ridge’s claim that the trial court erred in 
its superiority determination because class certification is not preferred when, as 
here, the classes seek both statutory damages and attorneys’ fees. While statutory 
MCMILLAN V. BLUE RIDGE COS., INC. 
2021-NCSC-160 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
damages and attorneys’ fees are among the many factors that a trial court may 
consider within a class action superiority determination, neither dispositively 
renders a certain cause of action per se unsuitable for class certification. See Beroth 
Oil Co., 367 N.C. at 344 (“We generally agree that differences in the amount of 
damages will not preclude class certification so long as the [common] issue 
predominates”) (cleaned up). Instead, the question is whether the calculation of 
damages is “not merely a collateral issue,” but is so “inextricably tied” to the common, 
class-wide issue that it “is determinative of the [common] issue itself.” Id. In such 
cases, differing statutory damages or attorneys’ fees between class members may 
render the class action form inapt. See id.  
¶ 38 
 
Here, however, there is no indication, and Blue Ridge presents no argument, 
that differences in damages and fees are so inextricably tied to the alleged class-wide 
injury under the NCRRAA and NCDCA as to render the class action form inferior to 
other methods of adjudication. In fact, the trial court’s superiority determination 
includes numerous findings to the contrary, including that there were “relatively few 
evidentiary issues”; that class certification would avoid “the same legal issues [being] 
relitigated in potentially hundreds of individual cases in different courts throughout 
North Carolina, which could lead to inconsistent decisions”; and that “[t]he benefits 
of litigating this case as a class action overrides any drawbacks.” Accordingly, the 
trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in certifying the classes here despite 
MCMILLAN V. BLUE RIDGE COS., INC. 
2021-NCSC-160 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
potential collateral differences in damages and fees. 
IV. 
Conclusion 
¶ 39 
 
A trial court enjoys broad discretion in class certification, and honoring that 
discretion is the “touchstone” of appellate review of class certification orders. Here, 
we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the Collection 
Letter Class, Eviction Fee Class, and Complaint-Filing Fee Class for a class action 
lawsuit. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s class certification order and remand 
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
AFFIRMED.