Case Title: Stebbins v. Heidebrecht

Citation: 186 Kan. 484, 350 P.2d 783

Docket Number: 41,741

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1960-04-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
186 Kan. 484 (1960)
350 P.2d 783
THOMAS E. STEBBINS, Appellee,
v.
LEVON J. HEIDEBRECHT, Appellant, and DARRELL D. STEBBINS, Appellee.
No. 41,741

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 9, 1960.
Roy U. Jordan, of Emporia, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
*485 Roscoe W. Graves, of Emporia, argued the cause for the appellee, Thomas E. Stebbins, and Richard Mankin, of Emporia, guardian ad litem for Darrell D. Stebbins, appellee, was with him on the brief.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRICE, J.:
This was an action by Thomas E. Stebbins, in whose name the certificate of title to an automobile was registered, against defendant Heidebrecht to recover for damage to the automobile resulting from an intersection collision. At the time in question the car was being driven by plaintiff's minor son, Darrell D. Stebbins. Pursuant to a motion by defendant Heidebrecht, an order was entered making the son Darrell a party defendant.
The case was tried by the court entirely on a stipulation of facts. Judgment was entered for plaintiff father, and defendant Heidebrecht (hereafter referred to as defendant) has appealed.
The stipulation of facts follows:
Although variously stated in the briefs, the sole and basic question involved is who, under the facts, is the real party in interest and thus entitled to bring the action  the father or the son.
G.S. 1949, 60-401, provides that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.
Two provisions of our motor vehicle act (G.S. 1957 Supp.) provide:
Plaintiff father contends that as the certificate of title to the car was registered in his name he, insofar as defendant is concerned, is the "owner" thereof, and, within the meaning of the mentioned statutes, is the real party in interest and entitled to maintain the action.
Defendant, on the other hand, while conceding that under the stipulated facts the contributory negligence of the son would not be imputable to the father so as to bar the father's recovery, contends that under the stipulation the son, in truth and in fact, was the actual owner of the car and therefore the action must be brought by him  in which event he, the defendant, would be able to set up as a defense the admitted contributory negligence of the son.
In passing, it should be noted that while some mention is made in defendant's brief of the fact the insurance company had "fully compensated" for the damage (which, however, is not borne out by the stipulation), nevertheless, the question before us is narrowed down to that previously stated  who, under the stipulation, is the real party in interest  the father or the son.
Decisions dealing with the "registration of title" statute, above, are of little or no assistance in the matter before us for most, if not all, have to do with questions arising out of situations involving either innocent purchasers, mortgagors, mortgagees, automobile dealers, insurers, or other matters concerning the purchasing public. And neither do we consider the few authorities from other jurisdictions to be of any particular value on the question presented.
Notwithstanding the fact we are not here concerned with any dispute between father and son as to ownership, we recognize fully the persuasiveness of defendant's argument as to why, under the stipulated facts, the son should be considered and held to be the actual "owner" of the car and therefore the proper party plaintiff. Nevertheless, we are convinced that under the facts *488 of this case, and narrowed to the question presented, the father, in whose name the car was registered, must, within the meaning of G.S. 1949, 60-401, above, be considered to be the real party in interest. To hold otherwise would open the door to all manner of claims under varying situations and circumstances, and result in confusion and uncertainty on the question of "proper party plaintiff" in cases involving damage to automobiles.
We therefore hold that the father is "the real party in interest" and thus the proper party plaintiff.
The judgment is affirmed.
JACKSON, J., (dissenting):
Finding myself unable to agree with the conclusion reached by the majority of the court, I must dissent.
I believe that the real question in this case has been misstated by the parties. I would agree that the father as a trustee for his son is the real party in interest and may bring the action as plaintiff, cf. G.S. 1949, 60-403. But the plaintiff's son, who was the negligent driver of the car, and who under the stipulated facts was the beneficial owner of the car, has been made a party to the action. In my opinion, under the facts, the negligence of the beneficial owner of the car would bar the recovery of a judgment by the holder of the bare legal title.
Several of the former cases of this court have recognized the beneficial ownership of automobiles in persons who were not the holders of the certificate of title.
In the case of In re Estate of Baumstimler, 159 Kan. 316, 153 P.2d 927, an intervivos gift was held valid as against third parties although the donor retained the certificate of title in his own name.
In Weaver v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 168 Kan. 80, 211 P.2d 113, an equitable owner of an automobile, although he had not as yet acquired any certificate of title, was held to have an insurable interest in the car.
In Fruit v. Stacy, 168 Kan. 632, 215 P.2d 140, a dealer had sold an automobile to a purchaser, and delivered a certificate of title using the wrong engine numbers. The purchaser was allowed to sue the dealer for misrepresentations concerning the car, and the defense based on the defective certificate was held to be of no merit.
In Crow v. Hershberger, 170 Kan. 492, 226 P.2d 846, it was held that an owner of an automobile could establish his interest therein as against one holding the certificate of title.
*489 There can be no question but that G.S. 1959 Supp. 8-135, is designed to and does protect bona fide purchasers and mortgagees for value. But this is not such a case.
In my opinion, the judgment of the district court in this $500 law suit should be reversed.