Case Title: Parrish v. Jones

Citation: 2013-Ohio-5224

Docket Number: 2012-0623

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-12-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Parrish v. Jones, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-5224.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-5224 
PARRISH, ADMR., APPELLEE, v. JONES ET AL.; SKOCIK ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Parrish v. Jones, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-5224.] 
Directed verdict—Civ.R. 50—Trial court should exercise great caution in 
sustaining a motion for a directed verdict on the opening statement of 
counsel—Although a trial court is not required to consider allegations 
contained in the pleadings when ruling on a motion for directed verdict 
made on the opening statement of an opponent, the pleadings may be used 
by the court in liberally construing the opening statement in favor of the 
party against whom the motion is made—A trial court may grant a motion 
for directed verdict made at the close of a party’s opening statement only 
when that statement indicates that the party will be unable to sustain its 
cause of action or defense at trial. 
(No. 2012-0623—Submitted March 12, 2013—Decided December 4, 2013.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Ross County, No. 11CA3238,  
2012-Ohio-1145. 
____________________ 
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  “A trial court should exercise great caution in sustaining a motion for a 
directed verdict on the opening statement of counsel.”  Brinkmoeller v. 
Wilson, 41 Ohio St.2d 223, 325 N.E.2d 233 (1975), syllabus. 
2.  Although a trial court is not required to consider allegations contained in the 
pleadings when ruling on a motion for directed verdict made on the 
opening statement of an opponent, the pleadings may be used by the court 
in liberally construing the opening statement in favor of the party against 
whom the motion is made. 
3. A trial court may grant a motion for directed verdict made at the close of a 
party’s opening statement only when that statement indicates that the party 
will be unable to sustain its cause of action or defense at trial. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} We accepted this certified conflict to determine whether a trial 
court must consider the allegations set forth in the pleadings in addition to the 
opening statement when ruling on a motion for directed verdict made at the close 
of an opponent’s opening statement.  We hold that although a trial court is not 
required to consider allegations contained in the pleadings when ruling on a 
motion for directed verdict made on the opening statement of an opponent, the 
pleadings may be used by the court in liberally construing the opening statement 
in favor of the party against whom the motion is made.  We affirm the judgment 
of the court of appeals that reversed the granting of a directed verdict, albeit on 
different grounds. 
I.  Facts 
{¶ 2} In 2005, appellee, Sandy Parrish (“Parrish”), the administrator of 
the estate of Karen Parrish, filed wrongful-death and survival actions in the Ross 
County Court of Common Pleas arising from the allegedly negligent care and 
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death of Karen Parrish.  Parrish alleged that on December 30, 2004, Karen was 
admitted to the Adena Regional Medical Center under the care of Michael Jones, 
D.O.  Parrish further alleged that Dr. Jones had diagnosed Karen with an acute 
peripheral-nerve disorder.  Karen was then transferred to a rehabilitation center, 
and during her stay there, appellant Christopher J. Skocik, D.O., was assigned to 
provide her medical care. 
{¶ 3} In the complaint, Parrish alleged that the medical staff treating 
Karen had administered treatment negligently and, specifically, that they had 
failed to prescribe anticoagulation therapy; that they had failed to properly treat, 
diagnose, and monitor her; and that they had failed to timely respond with 
medical intervention.  Parrish alleged that as a direct and proximate result of the 
negligence, Karen had suffered a premature death after experiencing 
cardiopulmonary arrest and hypoxia due to pulmonary emboli with saddle 
embolus and deep-vein thrombosis. 
{¶ 4} Parrish’s complaint originally named as defendants Dr. Jones, 
Adena Regional Medical Center Corporation, Chillicothe Nursing and 
Rehabilitation Center, L.L.C., and several John or Jane Does.1  In July 2006, the 
trial court granted Parrish leave to add appellants, Skocik and Family Medicine of 
Chillicothe, Inc. (“the Skocik defendants”), as new party defendants. 
{¶ 5} The case proceeded to a jury trial in January 2011.  At the close of 
Parrish’s opening statement, the Skocik defendants moved for directed verdict 
pursuant to Civ.R. 50, contending that Parrish had failed to meet the burden of 
establishing a case of medical malpractice against them, because he had failed to 
set forth in his opening statement a standard of care, deviation from that standard, 
and causation. 
                                                 
1 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Chillicothe Nursing and Rehabilitation 
Center, L.L.C., in October 2009.  Parrish voluntarily dismissed Adena Regional Medical Center 
Corporation as a defendant in October 2010. 
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{¶ 6} Parrish’s counsel had argued that the codefendant, Dr. Jones, 
would present expert testimony critical of Dr. Skocik: “Doctor Jones, through his 
attorneys, have hired a medical expert, Doctor Writ[e]sel who I had mentioned, 
who will tell you that it was Doctor Skocik’s fault.  That it was Doctor Skocik’s 
fault for not ordering the proper D.V.T. prophylaxis in time.  I’ll let Doctor 
Skocik’s attorneys argue for Doctor Skocik about that.” 
{¶ 7} The trial court granted the motion for directed verdict and rendered 
judgment in favor of the Skocik defendants.  The trial proceeded with Jones as the 
sole defendant, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Jones. 
{¶ 8} Parrish appealed and argued in part that the trial court had erred by 
failing to consider the complaint, along with the opening statement, in ruling on 
the motion for directed verdict.  The Fourth District Court of Appeals reversed the 
trial court’s decision.  The court of appeals held that the trial court was required to 
consider both the opening statement and the complaint before determining 
whether a directed verdict is appropriate.  The court of appeals remanded the case 
for the trial court to revisit its ruling on the motion in light of the allegations made 
in the complaint. 
{¶ 9} The Fourth District certified that its holding was in conflict with 
the holding of the Tenth District Court of Appeals in Blankenship v. Kennard, 
10th Dist. Franklin No. 92AP-415, 1993 WL 318825 (Aug. 17, 1993).  We 
determined that a conflict exists on the issue “ ‘[w]hether a trial court is required 
to consider the allegations contained in the pleadings, along with the opening 
statement, when ruling on a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of 
opening statement.’ ”  132 Ohio St.3d 1421, 2012-Ohio-2729, 969 N.E.2d 270. 
II.  Analysis 
{¶ 10} This case presents us with an opportunity to clarify the standard a 
trial court should use in ruling on a motion for directed verdict made after an 
opening statement.  We hold that although the trial court is not required to 
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consider the pleadings when ruling on a Civ.R. 50(A)(1) motion, in liberally 
construing the motion in favor of the opposing party, it may do so.  We answer the 
certified question in the negative.  We hold further that a trial court may grant a 
motion for directed verdict made at the close of a party’s opening statement only 
when that statement indicates that the party will be unable to sustain its cause of 
action or defense at trial. 
A.  Background of Civ.R. 50 
{¶ 11} To address the present issues, we must first place Civ.R. 50(A) in 
its proper context among the civil rules that provide for the resolution of a case 
before the case reaches the jury.  Different rules allow the termination of a case at 
different points in the litigation. 
1.  Civ.R. 12:  Motions to Dismiss and for Judgment on the Pleadings 
{¶ 12} Civ.R. 12 provides for motions and pleadings to be made by a 
defendant after receiving a complaint, and Civ.R. 12(B) provides for the filing of 
a motion to dismiss based upon a failure to state a claim for relief:  
 
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any 
pleading * * * shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto 
if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the 
option of the pleader be made by motion:  * * * (6) failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted * * *.  A motion making 
any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further 
pleading is permitted. 
 
In addition to the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) pleading or motion, Civ.R. 12(C) provides for a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings:  “After the pleadings are closed but within 
such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the 
pleadings.”  If a party has pled or moved to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) or 
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moved for judgment on the pleadings under Civ.R. 12(C), Civ.R. 12(D) provides 
that the pleading or motion “shall be heard and determined before trial on 
application of any party.” 
2.  Civ.R. 56:  Summary Judgment 
{¶ 13} Summary judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56 is another method 
available to a party seeking to avoid a trial and is used when the facts of a case are 
allegedly undisputed.  A motion for summary judgment is based on evidence 
presented to the court and allows consideration of facts beyond the allegations 
included in the pleadings:   
 
Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, 
affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, 
if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  * * * A summary judgment shall not 
be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or stipulation, and 
only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds can 
come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the 
party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, 
that party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation 
construed most strongly in the party’s favor. 
 
Civ.R. 56(C). 
3.  Civ.R. 50:  Directed Verdict 
{¶ 14} Once a jury has been convened and trial has started, a party may no 
longer file a motion for judgment on the pleadings or for summary judgment.  
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That time has passed.  But a motion for directed verdict may be possible.  Civ.R. 
50(A), which addresses a motion for directed verdict, reads in full: 
 
 
(1) When made.  A motion for a directed verdict may be 
made on the opening statement of the opponent, at the close of the 
opponent’s evidence or at the close of all the evidence. 
(2) When not granted.  A party who moves for a directed 
verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may 
offer evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without 
having reserved the right so to do and to the same extent as if the 
motion had not been made. A motion for a directed verdict which 
is not granted is not a waiver of trial by jury even though all parties 
to the action have moved for directed verdicts. 
(3) Grounds.  A motion for a directed verdict shall state the 
specific grounds therefor. 
(4) When granted on the evidence.  When a motion for a 
directed verdict has been properly made, and the trial court, after 
construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against 
whom the motion is directed, finds that upon any determinative 
issue reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion upon the 
evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse to such party, 
the court shall sustain the motion and direct a verdict for the 
moving party as to that issue. 
(5) Jury assent unnecessary.  The order of the court 
granting a motion for a directed verdict is effective without any 
assent of the jury. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
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{¶ 15} Thus, a motion for directed verdict can be made at three separate 
points after the trial has commenced: after an opponent’s opening statement, at 
the close of an opponent’s evidence, or at the close of all the evidence.  Civ.R. 
50(A)(1). 
{¶ 16} Motions for directed verdict are most commonly made after an 
opponent’s case in chief or at the close of all evidence.  Civ.R. 50(A)(4) sets forth 
a standard for granting a motion for directed verdict made after evidence has been 
submitted:  “[A]fter construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party 
against whom the motion is directed, * * * reasonable minds could come to but 
one conclusion upon the evidence submitted.”  This standard corresponds to the 
standard established for summary judgment in Civ.R. 56,  that “reasonable minds 
can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against 
whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have 
the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s favor.” 
{¶ 17} Civ.R. 50(A) does not set forth a standard a trial court is to use in 
determining the motion for directed verdict before evidence is produced.  The 
ultimate question before us in this case, then, is what standard the court must 
apply in determining whether to grant a motion for directed verdict made at the 
earliest possible point, i.e., after opening statement. 
B.  A trial court is not required to consider the pleadings in ruling on a 
motion for directed verdict following an opening statement 
{¶ 18} In answering the question of the applicable standard, we first 
address the conflict question certified in this case:  whether a trial court is 
required to consider the allegations contained in the pleadings, along with the 
opening statement, when ruling on a motion for a directed verdict made at the 
close of opening statement.  The Fourth District Court of Appeals answered that 
question by stating that a trial court must consider the allegations contained in the 
pleadings.  2012-Ohio-1145, ¶ 12-13.  The Tenth District previously answered 
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that question by stating that a trial court should not consider the pleadings.  
Blankenship v. Kennard, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 93AP-415, 1993 WL 318825. 
{¶ 19} The Skocik defendants agree with the Tenth District and assert that 
Civ.R. 50, when it is construed in pari materia with Civ.R. 12, does not 
contemplate consideration of the pleadings.  They reason that a complaint that 
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted would be dismissed before 
trial begins and thus that every lawsuit proceeding to trial is presumed to be based 
upon a complaint that states a claim for relief.  But this assumes that any motion 
that could have been made, would have been made—a dubious premise.  Because 
they presume that cases proceeding to trial have satisfied the burden under Civ.R. 
12 (even if the pleadings are unchallenged), the Skocik defendants argue that a 
trial court must consider something different from those pleadings before it rules 
on a motion for directed verdict made after opening statement. 
{¶ 20} In response, Parrish argues that because opening statements are not 
evidence, we should continue to follow the common-law rule that a court must 
consider the pleadings when ruling on an early motion for directed verdict.  See 
Vest v. Kramer, 158 Ohio St. 78, 107 N.E.2d 105 (1952). 
{¶ 21} As a technical matter, Civ.R. 50 does not mandate the court’s 
consideration of the pleadings when a motion for directed verdict is made before 
evidence is presented.  Even though Civ.R. 50 does not set forth a standard, 
reading the rule in pari materia with other civil rules, we conclude a trial court is 
not required to consider the pleadings when ruling on a directed-verdict motion at 
this point in a trial. The timing of the directed-verdict motion is important.  A 
Civ.R. 12(B) motion is made during the pleading stage and accordingly focuses 
upon information contained within the pleadings.  A motion for summary 
judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56 goes one step further and allows consideration of 
various information gathered and presented to the court before trial commences.  
A motion for directed verdict made at the conclusion of an opponent’s opening 
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statement focuses on what has been said during the opening statement.  And 
motions for directed verdict following the presentation of evidence focus on the 
evidence submitted to the court during trial. 
{¶ 22} The Ohio Jury Instructions explain the purpose of opening 
statements by stating:  “[C]ounsel will outline in an opening statement what they 
expect their evidence will be.  These opening statements are not evidence. They 
are a preview of the claims of each party designed to help you follow the evidence 
as it is presented.”  Ohio Jury Instructions, CV Section 301.05(5) (Rev. Jan. 21, 
2011).  Moreover, opening statements, aside from not being considered as 
evidence, may also be waived by a party. 
{¶ 23} Because the civil rules distinguish motions for directed verdict 
following opening statement pursuant to Civ.R. 50 from motions for judgment on 
the pleadings pursuant to Civ.R. 12, it follows that each motion has a different 
focus.  We cannot hold that trial courts are required to consider the pleadings 
when ruling on a motion for directed verdict following opening statement, 
because the motion focuses on what was said during the opening statement, and 
the trial court may be able to dispose of the motion solely upon the basis of the 
statement and without consulting the pleadings.  Thus, we hold that a trial court 
that rules on such a motion is not required to consider the allegations contained in 
the pleadings. 
C.  A trial court may consider the pleadings in ruling on a motion for 
directed verdict following an opening statement 
{¶ 24} Although a court is not required to consider the pleadings in ruling 
on a motion for directed verdict made at the conclusion of an opponent’s opening 
statement, this does not mean that a court is forbidden from considering the 
pleadings in ruling on the motion.  Indeed, we have previously held in a personal-
injury lawsuit alleging the negligence of a taxicab company that a “defendant’s 
motion for a directed verdict, made after counsel for plaintiffs’ opening statement 
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in [the] case, should have been overruled, based upon the totality of facts asserted 
in the opening statement plus the admissions in defendant’s answer.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Brinkmoeller v. Wilson, 41 Ohio St.2d 223, 225, 325 N.E.2d 233 (1975).  
Brinkmoeller thus allows a court to consider the pleadings. 
{¶ 25} The syllabus language of Brinkmoeller is pertinent to the issue 
before us today: 
 
A trial court should exercise great caution in sustaining a 
motion for a directed verdict on the opening statement of counsel; 
it must be clear that all the facts expected to be proved, and those 
that have been stated, do not constitute a cause of action or a 
defense, and the statement must be liberally construed in favor of 
the party against whom the motion has been made. 
 
(Emphases added.)  Id. at syllabus.  In Brinkmoeller, we offered two instructions 
to trial courts considering these motions:  (1) exercise great caution in sustaining 
the motion and (2) liberally construe the opening statement in favor of the party 
against whom the motion is made. 
{¶ 26} Because in Brinkmoeller we permitted the consideration of a 
party’s answer, instructed courts to exercise great caution in granting motions for 
directed verdict made at this stage, and mandated liberal construction of the 
motion in favor of the opposing party, we hold that trial courts may consider the 
pleadings in determining whether to grant a motion for directed verdict made after 
an opening statement. The dissenting opinion in this case acknowledges that 
Brinkmoeller allows a trial court to consider admissions made in a party’s answer, 
but it also agrees with the Skocik defendants’ argument that allowing 
consideration of the pleadings renders Civ.R. 50(A) meaningless.  The Tenth 
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District adopted this reasoning in its opinion in the certified-conflict case, 
Blankenship v. Kennard, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 93AP-415, 1993 WL 318825. 
{¶ 27} But we do not agree that Civ.R. 50(A) is rendered meaningless 
when a trial court is permitted to consider the pleadings when ruling on a motion 
for directed verdict after an opening statement.  A motion for directed verdict may 
be granted without referring to the pleadings when an assertion is made during 
opening statement that indicates that the party will be unable to sustain its claim 
or defense at trial.  The assertion may occur, for example, when a plaintiff admits 
an affirmative defense that bars the claim or states explicitly that a certain element 
of the claim cannot be established.  While these types of assertions are 
undoubtedly rare during opening statements, it is conceivable that they may be 
made; and if they are made, Civ.R. 50(A) provides a mechanism by which the 
opposing party may move for directed verdict. 
{¶ 28} The Skocik defendants argue that a “plaintiff should be required to 
state with particularity during opening statement those facts intended to be proven 
upon which the plaintiff’s claim is based, without the necessity of consulting the 
complaint which may well contain only bare-bones allegations giving notice of 
the claim.”  We do not agree that this specificity is required during opening 
statements. 
{¶ 29} Opening statements are not evidence; they serve merely as 
previews of a party’s claims and are designed to help the jury follow the evidence 
as it is presented later in the trial.  Ohio Jury Instructions, CV Section 301.05(5).  
Because opening statements function to prepare the jury for the presentation of 
evidence during the later stages of the trial, it would be inappropriate to require 
that parties state with particularity during opening statement all facts upon which 
their claims or defenses are based or risk losing a case on directed verdict. 
{¶ 30} The dissent relies on R.C. 2315.01(A)(1) to conclude that a party 
who chooses to make an opening statement must state a claim or defense in the 
January Term, 2013 
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opening statement in order to avoid a directed verdict.  This conclusion, however, 
overlooks the discretionary nature of R.C. 2315.01, which provides that trials 
shall proceed in the order set forth in that section “unless for special reasons the 
court otherwise directs.”  R.C. 2315.01(A)(1) thus does not even require that 
parties make opening statements, let alone address all issues in an opening 
statement.  The dissent’s reading of the statute overlooks the nonevidentiary role 
of opening statements and effectively takes away the discretion given to trial court 
judges to deviate from the statute “for special reasons.” 
D.  When a motion for directed verdict following an opening statement may 
be granted 
{¶ 31} An opening statement need not discuss every element of a claim or 
defense.  But the question remains:  What standard should a trial court follow 
when a party has moved for directed verdict following an opening statement? 
{¶ 32} Brinkmoeller provides that before a motion for directed verdict 
following an opening statement is granted, “it must be clear that all the facts 
expected to be proved, and those that have been stated, do not constitute a cause 
of action or a defense.”  Id., 41 Ohio St.2d 223, 325 N.E.2d 233, syllabus.  Only if 
the opening statement shows that a party is completely unable to sustain a cause 
of action should the court take the case away from the jury by directing a verdict.  
A directed verdict was granted, for example, after a plaintiff in a products-liability 
case conceded in opening statement that deicing equipment it claimed was 
defective had not been activated prior to a plane crash.  United States Aviation 
Underwriters, Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 149 Ohio App.3d 569, 2002-Ohio-5429, 
778 N.E.2d 122 (9th Dist.)  The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial 
court because the admission in the opening statement showed that the plaintiff 
would not be able to prove the causation element of its claim.  Id. at ¶ 20.  Accord 
King v. Joern, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 91 CA 03, 1992 WL 126196, *2 (May 21, 
1992) (plaintiff admitted during opening statement that one of the defendants, a 
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realtor, had not been consulted until after the closing on the sale of the property 
and thus could not have had a duty to disclose the condition of the property to the 
plaintiff). 
{¶ 33} If, however, it is unclear from the opening statement whether the 
party against whom the motion is made can proceed with its case, the court must 
determine whether that party has otherwise set forth a cause of action or defense.  
It is at this point that the court may choose to consult the pleadings to determine 
whether “all the facts expected to be proved, and those that have been stated, do 
not constitute a cause of action or a defense,” pursuant to Brinkmoeller.  In short, 
the court must give the party against whom the motion is made the benefit of the 
doubt. 
{¶ 34} The language in Brinkmoeller calling for the liberal construction of 
an opening statement indicates that motions for directed verdict made following 
an opening statement will be granted only in rare instances.  If the court considers 
all information before it, such as the opening statement and the pleadings, and 
finds that what the party has set forth constitutes a claim or defense, the court 
should deny the motion; however, a party cannot sabotage its own case during 
opening statement and expect to prevail against a motion for directed verdict. 
{¶ 35} In this case, when the Skocik defendants moved for directed 
verdict, they argued that during his opening statement, Parrish had failed to cite 
any deviation from a standard of care by Dr. Skocik and had not connected Dr. 
Skocik to the alleged wrongdoing.  Although Parrish may have failed to mention 
certain elements of his claim against the Skocik defendants during the opening 
statement, that failure in and of itself did not permit the trial court to grant a 
directed verdict in their favor, because Parrish did not indicate an inability to 
sustain his cause of action.  Although Parrish’s counsel focused on Dr. Jones 
during the opening statement, he had also sued the Skocik defendants, and Parrish 
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should have been permitted to present proof of the Skocik defendants’ negligence 
at trial. 
{¶ 36} We disagree with the Fourth District’s determination that the trial 
court was required to consider the pleadings, but because the opening statement 
should have been construed liberally in favor of Parrish, we affirm the court of 
appeals’ judgment that reversed the decision granting the motion for directed 
verdict. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 37} We resolve the certified conflict by holding that a trial court is not 
required to consider the allegations contained in the pleadings along with the 
opening statement when ruling on a Civ.R. 50(A) motion for directed verdict, but 
that in liberally construing the opening statement in favor of the party against 
whom a motion for directed verdict has been made, a trial court may consult the 
pleadings. 
{¶ 38} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals 
reversing the trial court’s decision to grant the motion for directed verdict, and we 
remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL and KENNEDY, JJ., dissent. 
____________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 39} Respectfully, I dissent.  I believe that the majority’s holding 
renders Civ.R. 50(A) virtually meaningless because it permits a trial court to grant 
a directed verdict at the close of opening statement only if a party effectively 
admits that the party cannot sustain a claim or defense.  I would hold that a trial 
court may grant a motion for a directed verdict if a party fails to set forth a 
concise claim or defense in opening statement. 
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{¶ 40} Civ.R. 50 does not articulate what a court must consider in 
deciding whether to grant a motion for directed verdict made at the close of an 
opening statement.  However, R.C. 2315.01(A)(1) and (2) provide that at opening 
statement, “[t]he plaintiff concisely shall state the plaintiff’s claim, and briefly 
may state the plaintiff’s evidence to sustain it” and “[t]he defendant briefly shall 
state the defendant’s defense, and briefly may state the defendant’s evidence in 
support of it.”  A statute and a civil rule, if complementary, must be construed in 
pari materia.  See Knittle v. Big Turtle II Condominium Unit Owners Assn., Inc., 
46 Ohio App.3d 59, 61, 545 N.E.2d 916 (11th Dist.1988).  Construing Civ.R. 
50(A) in pari materia with R.C. 2315.01(A)(1), I would hold that when a party 
chooses to make an opening statement, the party must state a claim or defense in 
the opening statement in order to avoid a directed verdict. 
{¶ 41} I agree also with the Tenth District Court of Appeals’ holding in 
Blankenship v. Kennard, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 92AP-415, 1993 WL 318825 
(Aug. 17, 1993).  In Blankenship, the plaintiff’s opening statement failed to allege 
any negligence on the part of one defendant.  The plaintiff argued that the court 
should incorporate the allegations in his pleadings into his opening statement by 
reference. 
{¶ 42} The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument for two reasons.  First, 
the court stated that “[b]y the time the actual fact-finding process has begun, a 
plaintiff should be able to make a statement in court which concisely states the 
reason why a named defendant should be held liable.  Simple fairness for those 
who are being sued demands no less.”  Id. at * 2. 
{¶ 43} Second, the court held that adopting the plaintiff’s argument 
 
would render Civ.R. 50(A) meaningless for all practical purposes. 
The only time when a directed verdict could be granted at the close 
of opening statement would be when the complaint also failed to 
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state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Presumably, in 
such circumstances, the complaint would already have been 
dismissed or summary judgment would have been granted long 
before trial. For Civ.R. 50 to be meaningful in allowing a directed 
verdict at the close of opening statement, the rule must 
contemplate a review of what was actually set forth in opening 
statement. 
 
Id. 
{¶ 44} Finally, in Brinkmoeller v. Wilson, 41 Ohio St.2d 223, 225, 325 
N.E.2d 233 (1975), this court considered a plaintiff’s opening statement and 
admissions by the defendant in determining whether to grant a motion for a 
directed verdict at the close of an opening statement. 
{¶ 45} Therefore, I would hold that a trial court may grant a motion for a 
directed verdict if a party fails to set forth a concise claim or defense in their 
opening statement.  In determining whether a party has set forth a concise claim 
or defense, the court may consider only the opening statement and any admissions 
that were made in a party’s answer or pursuant to Civ.R. 36.  In making that 
analysis,  
 
[a] trial court should exercise great caution in sustaining a motion 
for a directed verdict on the opening statement of counsel; it must 
be clear that all the facts expected to be proved, and those that have 
been stated, do not constitute a cause of action or a defense, and 
the statement must be liberally construed in favor of the party 
against whom the motion has been made. 
 
Brinkmoeller v. Wilson, 41 Ohio St.2d 223, 325 N.E.2d 233 (1975), syllabus. 
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Stating a Medical-Malpractice Claim During Opening Statement 
{¶ 46} A plaintiff may avoid a directed verdict at the close of an opening 
statement if he or she sets forth a prima facie case of medical malpractice in 
opening statement.  See Berlin v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 
No. 85123, 2005-Ohio-4160, ¶ 56-58.  A prima facie case of medical malpractice 
requires a “showing that: (1) the physician deviated from the ordinary standard of 
care exercised by other physicians, i.e. the physician was negligent and (2) such 
deviation was the proximate cause of the patient’s injury.”  Egleston v. Fell, 6th 
Dist. Lucas No. L-95-127, 1996 WL 50161, *2 (Feb. 9, 1996), citing Bruni v. 
Tatsumi, 46 Ohio St.2d 127, 346 N.E.2d 673 (1976), paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
Parrish’s Malpractice Case 
{¶ 47} While in large part the majority opinion sets forth the cogent facts, 
in my view there are some important facts that have been omitted.  First, Parrish 
dismissed Dr. Skocik from the case.  After Dr. Skocik was dismissed from the 
case, Parrish deposed Dr. Jones’s expert witness, Dr. Writesel, who opined that 
Dr. Skocik had “grossly mismanaged” Parrish’s care.  Because of Dr. Writesel’s 
testimony, Parrish amended his complaint to add Dr. Skocik as a defendant for a 
second time. 
{¶ 48} Second, Dr. Skocik’s answer denied breaching any standard of 
care, and there are no Civ.R. 36 admissions by Dr. Skocik in the record. 
{¶ 49} And finally, when discussing Dr. Skocik’s motion for a directed 
verdict, the trial judge asked Dr. Jones’s counsel if he had “any words of 
wisdom.”  Counsel responded: “Judge I think this is an issue between the plaintiff 
and the defendant.  I don’t know that I have a dog in this hunt.  I mean this—the 
opening—the opening statement of the plaintiff is what their case is against 
Doctor Skocik and against me.  I do not have a cross-claim against Doctor 
Skocik.” 
January Term, 2013 
19 
 
Parrish’s Opening Statement 
{¶ 50} The following are excerpts from Parrish’s opening statement at 
trial: 
 
Let me get started.  There’s two rules in medicine that 
every doctor in this case is going to agree on.  That a doctor should 
never place his patient in unnecessary danger and two, a doctor 
should always attempt to do what is safest for his patient.  If a 
doctor violates these rules then he is responsible for the harm he 
causes. 
* * * 
We have sued Doctor Jones.  We have sued Doctor Jones 
because he has failed to meet the standard of care required of a 
physician discharging a patient like Karen Parrish.  Doctor Jones 
was Karen’s attending physician.  He was her neurology 
specialist—he was treating her Guillain-Barre Syndrome.  He was 
working with other consultants to assist him in making sure Karen 
was kept safe.  He was her discharging physician.  He’s the one 
who filled out the continuity of care and told the other facility what 
to do until a doctor came and saw her.  Doctor Jones will tell you 
that he knew of the day he discharged her that Karen was still at 
high risk for developing blood clots.  He knew that Doctor Saad 
had her on D.V.T. prophylaxis.  Blood clot protection.  Lovenox.  
Doctor Jones will admit that Lovenox was the most effective 
way—and all the doctors will admit this—that Lovenox was the 
most effective way while Karen was still immobile, until she could 
get that strength back to pump her calve muscles, Lovenox was the 
most effective way of keeping those blood clots from forming.  But 
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Doctor Jones failed to put Lovenox or D.V.T. prophylaxis onto his 
continuity of care form. 
* * * 
I had this case reviewed by a neurologist by the name of 
Joe Campellone.  He is a neurologist out of the Philadelphia area, 
Jersey, who has a special interest in Guillain-Barre, he’s seen a lot 
of it in his time and he’s looked at this case and he discharges 
patients.  * * *  Doctor Campellone will tell you Lovenox needed 
to be given to Karen as soon as she got within that twenty four 
hour period, as soon as she got to the Chillicothe Rehab.  Doctor 
Campellone will tell you that in medical probability, more likely 
than not, if Karen was on the Lovenox as she should have been, the 
blood clots would not have formed and those blood clots would not 
have traveled to her lung and she would not have died. 
Other experts will say the same thing.  Doctor Skocik will 
have two experts here.  Doctor Cefalu, a geriatric expert, a person 
who works in the nursing home setting and Doctor Wald, a 
neurologist * * *.  They will testify to the same thing, that Karen 
was at a high risk for clots.  She needed to be on Lovenox and it 
was Doctor Jones’ responsibility to have her on the Lovenox.  One 
of Doctor Jones’ own experts, Doctor Writ[e]sel,  will say the 
same thing, that she needed to be on the Lovenox.  Doctor Jones 
didn’t do it. He chose not to do that.  He chose to terminate the 
Lovenox and hope something else would happen.  When he didn’t 
put the Lovenox or the D.V.T. prophylaxis on that, he chose not to 
do what was safe and he put Karen Parrish in unnecessary harm.  
Doctor Jones has refused to take responsibility for the harm he 
caused and that is why we’re here. That’s why we’re here. 
January Term, 2013 
21 
 
* * * 
* * * Doctor Jones, through his attorneys, have hired a 
medical expert, Doctor Writ[e]sel who I had mentioned, who will 
tell you that it was Doctor Skocik’s fault.  That it was Doctor 
Skocik’s fault for not ordering the proper D.V.T. prophylaxis in 
time.  I’ll let Doctor Skocik’s attorneys argue for Doctor Skocik 
about that.  But, there is a reason for continuity of care forms.  
That’s the communication bridge between one doctor to the next so 
that the patient doesn’t get lost. 
After all the evidence is presented on these issues, I believe 
you’ll find that Doctor Jones just forgot.  I think he just forgot to 
put the D.V.T. prophylaxis in there.  He ran a red light.  Anyone 
can make a mistake, but when you make a mistake, it is wrong to 
try to evade your responsibility, that’s why we’re here.  You have 
the power as a jury, after listening to the evidence, you have the 
power to hold Doctor Jones responsible for the harm he caused. 
 
Parrish Failed to Set Forth a Prima Facie Medical-Malpractice Claim Against 
Dr. Skocik in the Opening Statement 
{¶ 51} At the close of Parrish’s opening statement, Dr. Skocik’s counsel 
moved for a directed verdict.  After a discussion between the judge and counsel, 
and without giving Parrish’s counsel an opportunity to amend his opening 
statement, the trial court granted Dr. Skocik’s motion for a directed verdict. 
{¶ 52} In his opening statement, Parrish’s counsel set forth a prima facie 
case of medical malpractice against Dr. Jones.  However, even construing the 
facts in a light most favorable to Parrish, he did not set forth a prima facie claim 
of malpractice against Dr. Skocik.  Parrish did not claim that Dr. Skocik had 
breached a standard of care regarding Karen Parrish’s care or that any breach of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
care proximately caused her death.  And Dr. Skocik made no admissions in his 
answer or pursuant to Civ.R. 36 that would assist Parrish in making his medical-
malpractice case against Dr. Skocik. 
{¶ 53} Construing the facts in a light most favorable to Parrish, Parrish 
merely asserted that Dr. Jones had an expert who would say that it was Dr. 
Skocik’s fault and that Parrish would let Dr. Skocik’s lawyer argue for him.  
However, Dr. Jones never filed a cross-claim against Dr. Skocik.  Therefore, Dr. 
Jones was not obligated to set forth a claim or defense against Dr. Skocik, and the 
question whether Dr. Jones could or would establish a claim or defense against 
Dr. Skocik was not relevant when the trial court was ruling on Dr. Skocik’s 
motion for directed verdict at the close of Parrish’s opening statement. 
{¶ 54} Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, 
reinstate the judgment of the trial court granting Dr. Skocik’s motion for a 
directed verdict, and remand the case for dismissal.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
 
Rourke & Blumenthal, L.L.P., Kenneth S. Blumenthal, and Jonathan R. 
Stoudt, for appellee. 
 
Arnold, Todaro & Welch Co., L.P.A., Kevin W. Popham, and Gregory B. 
Foliano, for appellants. 
________________________