Case Title: Mynes v. Brooks

Citation: 2009-Ohio-5946

Docket Number: 20090054

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-11-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Mynes v. Brooks, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5946.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2009-OHIO-5946 
MYNES ET AL., APPELLEES, v. BROOKS ET AL.; JDG HOME  
INSPECTIONS, INC., ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Mynes v. Brooks, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5946.] 
Appellate procedure — Final orders — R.C. 2711.02(C) — Order granting or 
denying stay pending arbitration is immediately appealable without 
certification pursuant to Civ.R. 54(B). 
(No. 2009-0054 — Submitted September 2, 2009 — Decided  
November 18, 2009.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Scioto County, No. 07CA3185, 
2008-Ohio-5613. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
R.C. 2711.02(C) permits a party to appeal a trial court order that grants or denies 
a stay of trial pending arbitration, even when the order makes no 
determination pursuant to Civ.R. 54(B). 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
I 
{¶ 1} The Fourth District Court of Appeals certified the following issue 
pursuant to Section 3(B)(4), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution and App.R. 25: 
“whether R.C. 2711.02 orders, which are not applicable to all the parties or 
claims, are final appealable orders without Civ.R. 54(B) language.”  For the 
reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the Fourth District Court of 
Appeals.  An order granting or denying a stay of trial pending arbitration issued 
under R.C. 2711.02(B) is a final, appealable order under R.C. 2711.02(C), even 
without satisfying the requirements of Civ.R. 54(B). 
II 
{¶ 2} Timothy and Janeen Mynes, appellees, aver that they purchased a 
house that, unbeknownst to them at the time of purchase, contained dangerous 
mold and structural defects.  The Myneses sued, asserting mainly that persons 
involved with the sale of the home had knowingly concealed or negligently failed 
to discover and report the defects in the home. 
{¶ 3} Among the defendants are appellants, JDG Home Inspections, Inc., 
d.b.a. the HomeTeam Inspection Service, and Tim Gambill, an employee of JDG 
(collectively, “the home inspectors”), who had contracted with the Myneses to 
perform a presale home inspection.  The contract between the Myneses and the 
home inspectors contained an arbitration provision. 
{¶ 4} The Myneses had originally agreed to a stay of the claims against 
the home inspectors pending arbitration, while the case proceeded against the 
remaining defendants; the trial court rendered an agreed order to that effect.  
However, the Myneses subsequently filed a motion for relief from that order, 
which the trial court granted.  The trial court issued a new order, declining to stay 
the matter and ordering the home inspectors to participate in the lawsuit. 
January Term, 2009 
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{¶ 5} The home inspectors filed an appeal from the new order, but the 
court of appeals dismissed their appeal.  The court of appeals held that the order 
was “final” under R.C. 2711.02(C) but that it was not a final, appealable order, 
because it did not meet the requirements of Civ.R. 54(B).  Finding no final, 
appealable order, the court of appeals held that it was without jurisdiction to 
consider the appeal. 
{¶ 6} The court of appeals certified that its holding in this case conflicted 
with the decision of the Sixth District Court of Appeals in Stewart v. Shearson 
Lehman Bros., Inc. (1992), 71 Ohio App.3d 305, 593 N.E.2d 403, and the 
Eleventh District Court of Appeals in Barnes v. Andover Village Retirement 
Community, Ltd., Ashtabula App. No. 2006-A-0039, 2007-Ohio-4112.  We 
recognized the conflict.  Mynes v. Brooks, 120 Ohio St.3d 1523, 2009-Ohio-614, 
901 N.E.2d 24. 
III 
{¶ 7} During the pendency of this case, we issued an opinion regarding 
final, appealable orders under similar facts and a similar statute in Sullivan v. 
Anderson Twp., 122 Ohio St.3d 83, 2009-Ohio-1971, 909 N.E.2d 88.  We 
conclude that the reasoning of Sullivan applies with equal force to the issue before 
us today. 
{¶ 8} In Sullivan, we examined R.C. 2744.02(C), which provides: “An 
order that denies a political subdivision or an employee of a political subdivision 
the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability as provided in this chapter or any 
other provision of the law is a final order.”  Id. at ¶ 9.  In that case, the trial court’s 
order denied the township’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the issue of 
political subdivision immunity in a multiparty, multiclaim lawsuit.  That order did 
not finally determine all claims, nor did it include the certification required by 
Civ.R. 54(B).  Id.  Nevertheless, we reasoned that the “general rules regarding 
final, appealable orders in multiparty and/or multiclaim cases” that “involve the 
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tandem of R.C. 2505.02(B)[1] for substance and Civ.R. 54(B)[2] for procedure” did 
not apply to the order at issue.  (Footnotes added.)  Id. at ¶ 10, citing Noble v. 
Colwell (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 92, 97, 540 N.E.2d 1381. 
{¶ 9} Civ.R. 54(B) certification ordinarily serves to confirm that the trial 
court has determined that its order should be appealable.  The trial court makes 
                                                 
1. 
{¶ a} R.C. 2505.02(B) provides:  
{¶ b} “(B) An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or 
reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following: 
{¶ c} “(1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect determines 
the action and prevents a judgment; 
{¶ d} “(2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon a 
summary application in an action after judgment; 
{¶ e} “(3) An order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new trial; 
{¶ f} “(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to which both of the 
following apply: 
{¶ g} “(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the provisional 
remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the appealing party with respect to the 
provisional remedy. 
{¶ h} “(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy 
by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the 
action. 
{¶ i} “(5) An order that determines that an action may or may not be maintained as a class 
action; 
{¶ j} “(6) An order determining the constitutionality of any changes to the Revised Code 
made by Am. Sub. S.B. 281 of the 124th general assembly, including the amendment of sections 
1751.67, 2117.06, 2305.11, 2305.15, 2305.234, 2317.02, 2317.54, 2323.56, 2711.21, 2711.22, 
2711.23, 2711.24, 2743.02, 2743.43, 2919.16, 3923.63, 3923.64, 4705.15, and 5111.018, and the 
enactment of sections 2305.113, 2323.41, 2323.43, and 2323.55 of the Revised Code or any 
changes made by Sub. S.B. 80 of the 125th general assembly, including the amendment of 
sections 2125.02, 2305.10, 2305.131, 2315.18, 2315.19, and 2315.21 of the Revised Code. 
{¶ k} “(7) An order in an appropriation proceeding that may be appealed pursuant to 
division (B)(3) of section 163.09 of the Revised Code.” 
 
2. 
{¶ a} Civ.R. 54(B) provides: 
{¶ b} “When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action whether as a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and whether arising out of the same or separate 
transactions, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may enter final judgment as to one or 
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no 
just reason for delay. In the absence of a determination that there is no just reason for delay, any 
order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims 
or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, shall not terminate the action as to any of 
the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time 
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties.” 
January Term, 2009 
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this determination “in order to further the efficient administration of justice and to 
avoid piecemeal litigation or injustice attributable to delayed appeals.”  Id. at ¶ 11, 
citing Wisintainerv. Elcen Power Strut Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 352, 356-357, 
617 N.E.2d 1136; Noble, 44 Ohio St.3d at 96, 540 N.E.2d 1381. 
{¶ 10} But in Sullivan, we held that such a determination by the trial court 
was not necessary; the General Assembly had already made the determination that 
such orders were immediately appealable by indicating, in R.C. 2744.02(C), that 
the orders are “final.”  Id. 122 Ohio St.3d 83, 2009-Ohio-1971, 909 N.E.2d 88, at 
¶12. 
{¶ 11} We find Sullivan controlling in this case.  Like Sullivan, this action 
involves multiple parties and claims, and the order did not contain the Civ.R. 
54(B) certification.  And, as in Sullivan, the order in this case was a final, 
appealable order according to statute, even without Civ.R. 54(B) certification. 
{¶ 12} R.C. 2711.02(C) provides: “[A]n order * * * that grants or denies a 
stay of a trial of any action pending arbitration * * * is a final order and may be 
reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed on appeal pursuant to the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure and, to the extent not in conflict with those rules, Chapter 
2505. of the Revised Code.”  Just as with the statute in Sullivan, the General 
Assembly has already determined that orders under the ambit of R.C. 2711.02(C) 
are final and appealable.  Therefore, there is no need for the trial court to 
determine whether to certify the order for appeal. 
IV 
{¶ 13} R.C. 2711.02(C) permits a party to appeal a trial court order that 
grants or denies a stay of trial pending arbitration, even when the order makes no 
determination pursuant to Civ.R. 54(B).  Therefore, we answer the certified 
question in the affirmative and reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.  The 
court of appeals decided this case on jurisdictional grounds and declined to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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address the merits of appellant’s assignment of error.  Therefore, this cause is 
remanded to the court of appeals for consideration of the merits. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents and would affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 14} For the reasons expressed in my dissent in Sullivan v. Anderson 
Twp., 122 Ohio St.3d 83, 2009-Ohio-1971, 909 N.E.2d 88, I again respectfully 
dissent. The trial court has been given authority under Civ.R. 54(B) to decide 
whether to render final orders appealable in multiparty litigation; this authority is 
not affected by R.C. 2711.02(C).  I would answer the certified question in the 
negative and would affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Madison & Rosan, L.L.P., and Kristin E. Rosan, for appellees. 
 
Scott L. Braum & Assoc., Ltd., and Scott L. Braum, for appellants. 
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