Case Title: Elliott v. State

Citation: 417 Md. 413

Docket Number: 24/10

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2010-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
HEADNOTE — CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE — SUA SPONTE
REVIEW — INEVITABLE DISCOVERY 
Generally, an appellate court will not raise an issue for the first time on appeal.  In the
present case, it was error for the appellate court to raise the issue of inevitable discovery, sua
sponte.  Applying the doctrine sua sponte would also result in unfair prejudice to the
defendant.  The State may not now benefit from a failed trial strategy or oversight, that of
choosing not to argue inevitable discovery at the suppression hearing, because doing so
prevented the defense from rebutting the doctrine below and challenging the evidence on
appeal.
HEADNOTE — CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE — DISCLOSURE OF A
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT
Although Maryland recognizes the privilege of the State to protect the identity of informants,
the privilege is limited by the defendant’s interest in a fair trial.  The court must properly
balance the public’s interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's
right to prepare his defense.  Disclosure in this case was required based on fundamental
fairness, because disclosure was material to the defendant’s right to prepare a defense and
the fair determination of probable cause. 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 24
October Term, 2010
WINSTON ELLIOTT
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
Opinion by Greene, J.
Adkins, J., joins in the judgment only.
Filed:   December 21, 2010
In this case, we are asked to determine whether the intermediate appellate court erred
in applying the doctrine of inevitable discovery sua sponte, where the State did not argue the
doctrine at any point during prior proceedings.  In addition, we are asked to determine
whether the Circuit Court erred in failing to grant defense counsel’s motion to compel
disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant where the identity of the informant was
material to the issue of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 12, 2006, Winston Elliott was arrested in a parking lot in Prince George’s
County, Maryland, based on information provided by a confidential informant (“CI”).  That
morning, a CI, who is a registered source with the Prince George’s County Police
Department, contacted Detective Melvin Powell of the Narcotics Enforcement Division of
the Prince George’s County Police Department.  Powell is the primary contact for the source
within the police department.  He testified that the CI previously provided information on
numerous occasions which was “accurate, [] proven and corroborated” and lead to the
“seizure of large quantities of marijuana” in previous cases.  Previously, the source had been
involved in buying and selling drugs, but police agreed not to arrest him in exchange for his
cooperation in future police investigations.  
The CI told Powell that a man named Winston would be arriving at a movie theater
near Marlow Heights later that day, in order to deliver a large quantity of marijuana.  The CI
described Winston as a slim, black male, approximately five feet, eight inches tall, with a
heavy Jamaican accent.  The CI contacted Powell a second time and told Powell that the
location had changed to the Southern Marketplace shopping center, with an estimated arrival
1 The informant initially told police the license plate number was “3BBY2L.”  The
license plate on Elliott’s car was “3BBY21.”
2 Whether the K-9 unit was actually called at this time is unclear.  The issue is relevant
to the determination of inevitable discovery and will be discussed infra.
2
time between 1:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m.  The CI also provided the officers with a description
of a black Nissan Maxima, including the license plate number, which later proved to be
almost an exact match to Elliott’s car.1  The police followed the tip and set up surveillance
in the parking lot.  The police were accompanied by the Special Operations Division
(“SOD”), also known as the SWAT team, which provides protection for undercover officers
by assisting in apprehension and safe detention of suspects, as well as agents from the Drug
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”). 
At approximately 1:20 p.m, Mr. Elliott entered the parking lot of the shopping center
driving a black Nissan Maxima, accompanied by his friend, Rowan Chambers.  Elliott parked
his car.  The two men then got out and started walking towards the shopping center.
Detective Crystal Mills, the lead investigator in Elliott’s case, testified that she called a K-9
unit to come to the location when the car arrived at the parking lot.2  The officers on the
scene determined that Mr. Elliott and his vehicle matched the description given by the CI,
and notified the SOD to make the apprehension.  An unmarked SOD police van then drove
toward Elliott and Chambers; four police officers jumped out of the van, identified
themselves as police, and ordered the men to put their hands up.  The officers pointed assault
rifles and sub-machine guns at the two men as they were handcuffed and forced to the
3
ground.  The men did not attempt to flee the scene.  The officers searched the men and
removed all of their possessions, including car keys from Mr. Elliott’s pants pocket. 
Once the men were secured, SOD officer Anthony Cline called over DEA Agent
Brian Silvestro, who was standing nearby.  Silvestro approached the officers and requested
the keys to the car.  Silvestro testified that upon approaching the vehicle, he smelled the odor
of marijuana emanating from the trunk.  Silvestro opened the trunk using the keys, saw a
large suitcase and two other bags, and smelled marijuana.  He then closed the trunk.  Agent
Silvestro testified at the suppression hearing that the K-9 unit arrived approximately 15
minutes after he opened the trunk.  When the K-9 unit arrived, Officer Andrew Logan and
the police dog conducted a scan of the vehicle, and the dog alerted to the trunk area.  The
officers then transported the two men and the car to the Oxon Hill police station for
processing.    The entire sequence of events, from the initial apprehension until Elliott was
placed in a police vehicle for transport to the police station, took about 30 minutes.  At the
police station, Agent Silvestro searched the vehicle and removed 20 pounds of marijuana
contained in the suitcase, which was wrapped securely in closed, thick plastic bags.  No
marijuana or drug paraphernalia was uncovered anywhere else in the vehicle.  No drugs or
weapons were found on the two men.
Based on the evidence seized, Elliott was charged with possession of marijuana and
possession with intent to distribute marijuana.  Elliott filed preliminary motions in the Circuit
Court for Prince George’s County.  He moved to suppress the drug evidence and to compel
disclosure of the identity of the CI.  The hearing on the motion to suppress was held on
4
January 19, 2007, and the hearing on the motion to compel disclosure of the identity of the
informant was held on February 16, 2007.  Elliott argued at the suppression hearing that he
was arrested when he was initially apprehended and ordered to the ground, and that the
information from the CI was insufficient on its own to establish probable cause for a
warrantless arrest.  Elliott therefore moved to suppress the evidence seized from the car under
the “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree” doctrine.  The Circuit Court judge denied the motion after
hearing testimony from four officers involved in the arrest.  The sole focus at the motions
hearing was whether the stop was a detention or arrest, and whether the information provided
by the CI was sufficient to furnish probable cause.  The court held that the initial seizure of
Elliott was an investigative detention supported by reasonable suspicion, and held that the
subsequent K-9 search provided the probable cause necessary to arrest Elliott and search the
car.  
On February 16, 2007, the Circuit Court held a hearing on the motion to compel
disclosure.  The parties incorporated the testimony of the suppression hearing by reference,
and no additional testimony was taken.  Elliott argued that the CI gave Elliott the drugs in
order to set him up, and informed the court that the intended defense at trial would be
entrapment.  The defense attorney, however, was not permitted to question officers at the
suppression hearing as to the identity of the CI.  When the defense presented their theory that
Elliott was set up by a specific person, the Circuit Court held that the State did not have to
disclose the identity of the CI because the defense was just “fishing” and in fact knew the
informant’s identity.  The Circuit Court denied the motion to compel, concluding that the
5
information was not relevant to any defenses or charges, and emphasizing the obligation of
the court to protect confidential sources. 
Mr. Elliott’s first trial was held on August 21-22, 2007.  The jury was unable to reach
a verdict and the court declared a mistrial.  The second trial was held on April 8-9, 2008, and
Elliott was found guilty on both counts.  At both trials, Elliott testified in his own defense,
presenting evidence to show lack of knowledge of the controlled dangerous substance, in
addition to  expanding on the defense’s theory of entrapment.  Elliott testified that he did not
know the marijuana was in the trunk of his car.  Rather, an acquaintance of Elliott’s, known
to him only as “Christopher Lodge,” was responsible for the drugs.   According to Elliott,
Lodge called Elliott the day before the incident, requesting that Elliott help store some of
Lodge’s possessions.  Lodge told Elliott that Lodge had a fight with his girlfriend and that
she had kicked him out of their shared apartment.  Mr. Lodge asked Elliott if Elliott could
help store Lodge’s belongings temporarily.  Elliott drove to Lodge’s apartment, and Lodge
placed a backpack, large suitcase, and garment bag in the trunk.  Elliott testified that he did
not get out of the car; he merely popped the trunk, allowing Lodge to place the items in the
trunk, and Lodge then closed the trunk.  The next morning, Elliott received a call from Lodge
asking Elliott to meet Lodge at the shopping center, in order for Lodge to retrieve his
belongings.  Elliott testified that following his arrest, he believed Lodge was the CI and was
unable to contact or locate Lodge.   In its rebuttal, the State called Detective Powell, who
testified he had never heard of Lodge.  Ultimately, Elliott was convicted as a result of the
second trial.
6
Elliott filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  Elliott argued that the
evidence of the contraband found in the trunk of the car should have been suppressed as the
product of an illegal arrest and that the failure to compel disclosure of the informant’s
identity precluded Elliott from effectively presenting his defense at trial.  The State
maintained that the initial stop of Elliott was an investigative detention, not an arrest, and that
the Circuit Court was correct in withholding the informant’s identity.  On November 3, 2009,
in an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed Elliott’s convictions.  The
court held that Elliott was in fact arrested, not merely detained, when he was initially
apprehended.  The court concluded, however, that the evidence was nonetheless admissible
under the inevitable discovery doctrine.  This issue was not raised or argued by either party;
rather, the court raised the issue sua sponte.  The intermediate appellate court also held that
the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to compel disclosure of the
confidential informant.  The court reasoned that the defense did not meet its burden of
showing a substantial reason why the identity was material to the defense.  As a result of the
court’s ruling, Mr. Elliott filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that the court erred in
deciding the issue sua sponte because the State had never raised the issue at any point during
any proceeding.  The court denied the motion without opinion. 
Elliott filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court.  The Questions Presented
were: 
I.  Did the [Court of Special Appeals] err in raising and deciding
inevitable discovery sua sponte, where the state failed to raise
it at any point during any of the proceedings? 
7
II.  Did the court err in refusing to compel disclosure of the
identity of the confidential informant, where petitioner’s defense
was that the informant was responsible for devising the
circumstances that led to his arrest?  
In its answer to the petition, the State filed a conditional cross-petition, asking this Court to
determine if:
The Court of Special Appeals erred in finding that the manner
in which the police detained Elliott prior to the canine search of
his vehicle constituted an arrest, and not an investigatory
detention?  
We granted both the petition and cross-petition.  Elliott v. State, 413 Md. 228, 991 A.2d
1273, 1275 (2010).  
 DISCUSSION
I.
Regarding the denial of a motion to suppress evidence: 
[A]n appellate court looks only to the evidence that was
presented at the suppression hearing.  The reviewing court views
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
and defers to the motions court with respect to its first level
factual findings.  The ultimate determination of whether there
was a constitutional violation, however, is an independent
determination that is made by the appellate court alone, applying
the law to the facts found in each particular case.”  
Belote v. State, 411 Md. 104, 120, 981 A.2d 1247, 1256 (2009) (internal citations omitted).
Specifically, this standard applies when evaluating whether a detention becomes a de facto
arrest, requiring probable cause.  See Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 498, 924 A.2d 1129,
1135 (2007).
8
Regarding the issue of disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant, the
ultimate decision is within the discretion of the trial court.  An appellate court will “look to
see whether the court applied correct legal principles and, if so, whether its ruling constituted
a fair exercise of its discretion.”  Edwards v. State, 350 Md. 433, 442, 713 A.2d 342, 346
(1998).  In determining whether a court properly exercised its discretion, the question “is
whether the court reached the right balance among the competing interests.”  350 Md. at 441,
713 A.2d at 346.
          We agree with the Court of Special Appeals that the detention of Elliott constituted an
arrest at the time the SWAT team apprehended him, and that the police lacked probable
cause to conduct a warrantless arrest.  We do not agree, however, with that court’s
determination sua sponte that the evidence was properly admitted under the doctrine of
inevitable discovery.  Despite this conclusion, we shall affirm the Court of Special Appeals’
determination that the Circuit Court’s denial of the motion to suppress was proper, because
the search of the vehicle was supported by probable cause.
A. Arrest
We defined the term “arrest” in  Bouldin v. State, 276 Md. 511, 350 A.2d 130 (1976).
We stated, “it is generally recognized that an arrest is the taking, seizing, or detaining of the
person of another (1) by touching or putting hands on him; (2) or by any act that indicates
an intention to take him into custody and that subjects him to the actual control and will of
the person making the arrest . . .”  276 Md. at 515-16, 350 A.2d at 133.  Recently, in
3 A “Terry” stop refers to a brief investigative detention which is justified when police
have an articulable, reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.  See Terry v.
United States, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 911 (1968).  The Terry
stop is “less intrusive than a formal custodial arrest,” is limited in duration, and purpose and
“can only last as long as it takes a police officer to confirm or dispel his suspicions.”  Swift
v. State, 393 Md. 139, 150, 899 A.2d 867, 873 (2006) (internal citations omitted).  
9
Longshore, we relied on Bouldin’s definition of arrest and considered the distinction between
a brief, investigative detention and a de facto arrest.  
In determining whether a Terry3 stop is elevated to a de facto arrest, courts will
consider many factors.  “Generally, a display of force by a police officer, such as putting a
person in handcuffs, is considered an arrest.”  Longshore, 399 Md. at 502, 924 A.2d at 1138.
This Court has, however, recognized certain limited circumstances when the use of force will
be considered reasonable as part of an investigative detention: where the use of force is used
to protect officer safety or to prevent a suspect’s flight.  399 Md. at 509, 924 A.2d at 1142.
The burden is on the State to prove that such special circumstances existed in order to justify
the officer’s use of force in an investigative detention.  Id.  (holding that there was “no
justification for placing Longshore in handcuffs” because there was no “reason to believe
that [the defendant] was armed or dangerous . . . [and] no reason to believe that [the
defendant] was a flight risk.”  399 Md. at 514, 515, 924 A.2d at 1145).
The State argued that we have approved of hard take-downs as “permissible Terry
detentions rather than as arrests,” relying on our opinion in Cotton v. State.  386 Md. 249,
872 A.2d 87 (2005) (holding that the defendant was not under arrest when he was handcuffed
and detained for twenty minutes while police investigated the scene).  The State misinterprets
4Although we have not enunciated a specific standard for proving special
circumstances, we discussed the issue in Longshore in the context of a reasonable Terry stop.
We quoted In re David S., 367 Md. 523, 789 A.2d 607 (2002), stating, “officers reasonably
could have suspected that [David S.] posed a threat to their safety [when the police saw David
S. place an object in his waistband].  Considering the totality of the circumstances, as they
appeared to the officers at the time, in order to maintain their safety, handcuffing [David S.]
and placing him on the ground for a brief time was reasonable and did not convert the
investigatory stop into an arrest.” Longshore, 399 Md. at 511, 924 A.2d at 1143 (quoting In
re David S., 367 Md. at 539-540, 789 A.2d at 616)(emphasis added).
10
our limited approval of hard take-downs.  In Cotton, we held that the temporary detention
by police of persons found in or around the premises “to minimize the risk of harm to both
police and occupants” did not reach the level of an arrest.  386 Md. at 258, 872 A.2d at 92.
The State, however, overlooks the fact that we sanctioned the use of force precisely because
one of the special circumstances listed above was present - reasonable suspicion of danger.4
The case does not stand for a blanket acceptance of hard take-downs absent specialized need,
which was made very clear in Longshore, decided two years after Cotton. 
In the present case, Elliott was arrested as he walked away from the vehicle he drove
to the parking lot. Applying the Bouldin definition, Elliott was seized and detained by the
physical touching of officers and by acts indicating an intent to take Elliott into custody.
Testimony at the suppression hearing by Officer Powell revealed that the arrest was made
two minutes after Elliott’s car arrived at the parking lot.  To confirm this, Powell later
admitted at trial that “we arrested him as soon as he arrived.”  This was also corroborated by
Agent Silvestro at trial, stating that the arrest signal was given once Mr. Elliott exited the car.
These statements indicate that the police believed Mr. Elliott to be under arrest when he was
11
initially detained.  Further, Officer Cline testified at the suppression hearing that the SOD
unit “drove the van towards the intended targets and we jumped out, placed them on the
ground and handcuffed them.”  He indicated that the officers were carrying M-4's, which are
short “assault rifle type [guns] for close quarters,” and MP-5's, which are a type of “sub-
machine gun.”  This “threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an
officer, [and] some physical touching of the person” would make “a reasonable person
[believe] that he was not free to leave.”  Swift v. State, 393 Md. 139, 150, 899 A.2d 867, 873
(2006).  Finally, as Officer Cline stated during his testimony at the suppression hearing, there
was “no attempt to flee whatsoever.”  There was therefore no indication that Elliott posed a
flight or safety risk in order to justify a hard take-down, which supports the holding that
Elliott was arrested when he was initially detained.
Having found that Elliott was arrested without a warrant, we must next decide if there
was probable cause to justify the arrest.  We agree with the Court of Special Appeals when
it held that the arrest was not supported by probable cause.  “Probable cause exists where the
facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution
in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be  arrested.”
Longshore, 399 Md. at 501, 924 A.2d at 1137 (quotations and alterations omitted).  When
officer apprehension of a suspect is based on information provided by a confidential
informant, reliability of the informant is “critical to any constitutional validity of the
warrantless seizure” of a person.  Lee v. State, 311 Md. 642, 653, 537 A.2d 235, 240 (1988)
12
(applying Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983)).  In
making this determination, we apply the “totality of the circumstances” test, which mandates
that we look to the veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge of the informant to establish
if the CI’s report furnishes probable cause.  311 Md. at 654, 537 A.2d at 240.  Prior relations
with the police and specificity of the tip contribute to this determination.  311 Md. at 654-55,
537 A.2d at 240.    
In Dixon v. State, 133 Md. App. 654, 758 A.2d 1063 (2000) the Court of Special
Appeals provided an in-depth analysis of our jurisprudence on the issue of confidential
informants providing reasonable suspicion and probable cause.  In Dixon, an officer received
a tip from a confidential informant with whom the officer had previously worked and
considered to be “reliable and accurate.”  133 Md. App. at 659, 758 A.2d 1066.  The
informant told the officer that a “black man named Orville Dixon would be transporting
approximately ten pounds of marijuana to [a department store parking lot] . . . at
approximately 8:15 p.m. in a dark-colored Acura to conduct a drug sale.”  Id.  Once police
saw Dixon get into his car, several unmarked police cars blocked his vehicle in, removed
Dixon from the car and handcuffed him.  133 Md. App. at 660, 758 A.2d 1066.  Police then
opened Dixon’s trunk without a search warrant and discovered marijuana.  Id.  Before trial,
the defense filed a motion to suppress evidence, claiming Dixon was unlawfully arrested
without probable cause.  133 Md. App. at 669, 758 A.2d 1070.  The State countered that the
stop was an investigatory detention supported by reasonable suspicion.  133 Md. App. at 669,
758 A.2d 1071.  The Circuit Court denied the motion to suppress and the evidence was
5 See also Lee, where we held, “Under the totality of the circumstances of the present
case at the time the police ordered the petitioners to lie prone the police had a relatively high
degree of reasonable and articulable suspicion that the petitioners were the robbers and were
carrying a handgun in the gym bag. But, at that time, the suspicion did not reach a level of
‘probability . . . of criminal activity’ sufficient for probable cause.” 311 Md. at 657, 537 A.2d
at 242 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 235, 103 S.Ct. at 2330). 
13
admitted.
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals held that Dixon was arrested in the parking
lot, rather than detained.  133 Md. App. at 673, 758 A.2d 1073.  Employing the totality of
the circumstances test, the Court of Special Appeals also held that the informant’s tip did not
provide probable cause to support the arrest.  The court stated: 
Probable cause in the context of an informant’s tip depends on
some combination of the substance of the tip and corroborative
observation by law enforcement of the suspect’s activities, some
of which may appear innocent on its face.  In the case of a
confidential informant, as opposed to an anonymous one,
evidence as to the informant’s demonstrated reliability is also
vital.
  
133 Md. App. at 695, 758 A.2d 1085.  The court then applied this reasoning to the case at
hand and held that the tip was not sufficiently corroborated and that the informant’s
reliability was undeveloped.  133 Md. App. at 696, 758 A.2d 1085.  
In this case, the officers were provided with a fairly specific tip from an apparently
reliable CI.  Similar to Dixon, while the information most assuredly provided articulable,
reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a brief investigative detention, the information was
not alone sufficient to furnish probable cause to arrest Elliott on the spot.5  The tip included
a description of the suspect, containing some specific information; it also contained
14
inaccurate and unverified statements.  Specifically, the CI described the suspect or driver’s
height as five feet eight, and Elliott is in fact five feet eleven.  Also, before arresting Elliott,
police did not ask Elliott whether his name was “Winston,” and did not ascertain whether he
had a heavy accent, both key elements in the description that the CI gave to Powell.  Instead
of asking Elliott his name or asking him to speak in order to verify either piece of
information, police immediately engaged in a hard-take down and handcuffed Elliott.  Again
similar to Dixon, at the time of the arrest, the police had not confirmed the claim that Elliott
was engaged in any illegal activity.  Rather, all the police knew at the time of arrest was that
a man who was similar in description to the description provided by the CI, had parked his
car and was walking toward a mall.  In fact, when asked by defense counsel whether Mr.
Elliott was acting “erratic or unusual,” Officer Cline testified, “No. You would think he was
normal [sic] shopping there.”  As the Court of Special Appeals noted, “[t]he only information
possessed by the police at the time of the arrest was based on the CI’s tip.”  Absent police
corroboration or specific information in the tip regarding future behavior, the remaining
facts, that a slim black male would be driving a black Nissan Maxima, are not sufficient to
provide probable cause.  Therefore, probable cause to arrest Mr. Elliott did not exist at the
time of his apprehension.  The Court of Special Appeals was correct in concluding that
Elliott was arrested during his initial detention and that the arrest was not supported by
probable cause.
B. Inevitable Discovery
Despite holding that Elliott was illegally arrested without probable cause, the Court
15
of Special Appeals nevertheless invoked the inevitable discovery doctrine, and upheld the
denial of the motion to suppress the evidence seized.  We hold that the intermediate appellate
court erred in raising the issue sua sponte, because the record below was not sufficiently
developed for the State to meet its burden of proving inevitable discovery by a
preponderance of the evidence, and applying the doctrine would result in unfair prejudice to
the defendant.
As we stated above, we are constrained to a review of the record of evidence
presented at the suppression hearing in determining whether a court may review an issue sua
sponte.  Belote v. State, 411 Md. 104, 120, 981 A.2d 1247, 1256 (2009).  We may only rely
on the “facts and information contained in the record of the suppression hearing” and will
defer to the hearing judge’s factual findings.  Longshore, 399 Md. at 498, 924 A.2d at 1135.
This case presents the question of whether an issue may be raised and determined at the
appellate level that was not raised at the suppression hearing and goes beyond the record
developed.  We have discussed extensively the scope of appellate review.  The scope of
appellate review is defined in Maryland Rule 8-131, which provides in part: “Ordinarily, the
appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have
been raised in or decided by the trial court, but the Court may decide such an issue if
necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another
appeal.”  Rule 8-131(a).  “This Court has often stated that the primary purpose of Rule 8-
131(a) is to ensure fairness for all parties in a case and to promote the orderly administration
of law.”  State v. Bell, 334 Md. 178, 189, 638 A.2d 107, 113 (1994) (internal citations
6 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states: “The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.” 
7 The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree doctrine states that “[w]hen government officials
violate the dictates of the Fourth Amendment, the usual remedy is to suppress any of the
16
omitted).  There are, however, 
[W]ell-recognized exceptions to this general principle.  One
exception is that where the record in a case adequately
demonstrates that the decision of the trial court was correct,
although on a ground not relied upon by the trial court and
perhaps not even raised by the parties, an appellate court will
affirm.  In other words, a trial court’s decision may be correct
although for a different reason than relied on by that court.
Robeson v. State, 285 Md. 498, 502, 403 A.2d 1221, 1223 (1979) (citations omitted).
Appellate review of issues not previously raised is therefore discretionary, but, “this
discretion should be exercised only when it is clear that it will not work an unfair prejudice
to the parties or the court.”  Bell, 334 Md. at 189, 638 A.2d 107 at 113.
As stated above, there must be an adequate record below in order to justify an
appellate court’s departure from the general rule against raising issues sua sponte.  In order
to determine whether the present case satisfies the exception, we must determine if the record
was adequate to justify the intermediate appellate court’s invocation of inevitable discovery.
As a preliminary matter, we have held that the usual remedy applied when police officers
violate the Fourth Amendment6 is to suppress the evidence obtained from the unlawful search
or seizure, pursuant to the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine.7  A warrantless search is
resulting physical, tangible materials and verbal evidence,” in order to ensure that the State
does not benefit by the “exploitation of that illegality.” Myers v. State, 395 Md. 261, 281-82,
909 A.2d 1048, 1060 (2006) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-86, 488,
83 S. Ct. 407, 416, 417, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 453-54, 455 (1963)).
17
presumptively unreasonable, but is subject to a few, limited exceptions.  Williams v. State,
372 Md. 386, 402, 813 A.2d 231, 241 (2002).  One such exception is the doctrine of
inevitable discovery, first recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Nix v. Williams,
467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1984).  The doctrine is used to overcome
the presumed suppression of evidence gained from an unlawful search.  The State must show,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the evidence inevitably would have been discovered
through lawful means.  See Williams, 372 Md. at 415, 813 A.2d at 250.  In determining
whether the doctrine should apply, courts should “focus on historical facts capable of easy
verification, not on speculation.”  Williams, 372 Md. at 418, 813 A.2d at 250. 
In Williams, police entered a hotel room without a warrant, arrested Williams, and
found cocaine in his pajamas.  372 Md. at 395, 813 A.2d at 236-37.  The discovery of the
evidence was then communicated to an officer standing by, and was used to furnish the
necessary probable cause to obtain a warrant for the search of the premises and seizure of the
evidence.  372 Md. at 396, 813 A.2d at 237.  Before trial, the defendant filed a motion to
suppress the cocaine seized.  372 Md. at 398, 813 A.2d at 238.  The State argued that the
search was justified by exigent circumstances because the police feared evidence would be
destroyed.  372 Md. at 398, 813 A.2d at 239.  The Circuit Court granted the motion to
suppress, finding that there was insufficient information to support probable cause and that
18
exigent circumstances did not exist.  Id.  On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals reversed,
holding that the inevitable discovery doctrine applied to the evidence and the trial court erred
in suppressing the evidence.  
The State then argued in this Court that the evidence would have been inevitably
discovered because the police were actively pursuing a search warrant and, presumably, the
police would have found the evidence if they waited at the premises for the search warrant
to be issued.  372 Md. at 418, 813 A.2d at 250.  We rejected this argument, pointing out that
the State must “demonstrate that the evidence inevitably would have been found.”  372 Md.
at 423, 813 A.2d at 253.  We reversed the intermediate appellate court’s judgment,
emphasizing that “speculation will not satisfy the demands of the inevitable discovery
doctrine,” and holding that the record was insufficient to establish that the drugs would have
been discovered during a lawful search.  372 Md. at 416, 813 A.2d at 249. 
In reaching this conclusion, we discussed examples of the reluctance of other courts
to apply inevitable discovery based on speculation.  We cited United States v. Boatright, 822
F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1987), where the government argued inevitable discovery based on police
seizure of evidence pursuant to an illegal entry, and the 9th Circuit held that the doctrine was
inapplicable.  We stated, “[s]ome courts have been reluctant to apply the doctrine to evidence
which is by its nature ephemeral or to evidence somehow dependant upon a person ‘waiting
patiently beside his [contraband] for an agent to arrive with a warrant.’” Williams, 372 Md.
at 425, 813 A.2d at 254 (quoting Boatright, 822 F.2d at 865).  Williams emphasized that the
“applicability of the inevitable discovery doctrine is a highly fact-based determination and
19
involves review by the trial court whether the evidence in question would have been found.”
372 Md. at 424, 813 A.2d at 254 (emphasis added).  We noted that the inevitable discovery
of the cocaine was “never raised or argued at the suppression hearing.”  Id.  The emphasis
on fact finding and the duty of the trial court is instructive, and demonstrates the limitation
on the ability of an appellate court to decide a factual issue.  A reasonable interpretation of
Williams suggests that absent evidence relating to inevitable discovery, the doctrine should
not be applied sua sponte because an appellate court’s determination of the issue would be
based on speculation rather than “historical facts that can be verified or impeached.”  Id.   
Stokes v. State is also instructive. 289 Md. 155, 423 A.2d 552 (1980).  In Stokes, we
emphasized the importance of determining what would have happened absent the illegal
activity.  We stated:
Jurisdictions which recognize the doctrine caution that courts
may not, under the guise of inevitable discovery, admit tainted
evidence after launching a speculative inquiry into what might
or could have occurred. . . . The significance of the word ‘would’
cannot be overemphasized.  It is not enough to show that
evidence ‘might’ or ‘could’ have been otherwise obtained.
289 Md. at 164, 423 A.2d at 556-57 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added) .  In Stokes,
evidence was obtained pursuant to an involuntary statement.  289 Md. at 162, 423 A.2d at
556.  The State argued that, even if the statement was involuntary, the evidence would have
been inevitably discovered by police conducting a lawful search.  Id.  We were not
persuaded.  We  said:  
The State has failed to meet even the most minimal requirements
of [the inevitable discovery] doctrine.  Although the
20
prosecution, seeking to invoke inevitable discovery, bears the
burden of establishing the admissibility of otherwise tainted
evidence, the state’s attorney here made no effort in the trial
court to demonstrate compliance with either prerequisite to
admissibility under this exception to the exclusionary rule.  It is
true that the State avows in this Court that the police, absent
Stokes’ statement, ‘would’ have searched the ceiling above
petitioner’s bedroom.  This unsupported assertion, however, is
no substitute for evidentiary proof.  The prosecution produced
no evidence tending to show that a predictable police procedure
existed for inspection of the room which would have resulted in
the discovery of the illegal narcotics.  It is now on appeal too
late to speculate about what procedures the police utilize . . .
[and] to further speculate whether following those prescribed
procedures would have revealed the location of the drugs.
289 Md. at 165-66, 423 A.2d at 557-58 (emphasis added).  Although the State, in Stokes,
argued inevitable discovery on appeal, it could not meet the burden of proving the exception
because no evidence was produced at the suppression hearing to support the exception, and
correspondingly no evidence for this Court to review.  289 Md. at 166, 423 A.2d at 558.  
In addition to determining whether the record is adequate to support a finding of
inevitable discovery, appellate courts must evaluate if the state’s failure to raise an issue at
the trial stage unfairly prejudiced the defendant’s case.  State v. Bell, 334 Md. at 188, 638
A.2d at 112.  One recognized form of prejudice results when the State’s failure to raise an
issue prevents the defendant from rebutting a claim or adducing evidence necessary to form
defenses.  This works in conjunction with the need to prove the adequacy of the record
because, “[i]f a party’s presentation of his or her case was prejudiced by an opponent’s
failure to raise an issue at the trial stage [or other proceeding] (i.e., the party did not adduce
the requisite evidence), then the record is necessarily lacking and will not be ‘adequate’ to
8 The Carroll doctrine refers to a Supreme Court case, which held that police may
search a vehicle if there is probable cause to believe a stopped vehicle contains “a crime -
connected item within the car” based on the exigency of the mobility of the vehicle.  State v.
Wallace, 372 Md. 137, 146, 812 A.2d 291, 296 (2002) (applying Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925)).
21
support the alternative ground raised on appeal.”  334 Md. at 188, 638 A.2d at 112-13. 
In State v. Bell, police stopped a suspect standing near a car and observed a vial of
white powder lying on the floor of the passenger seat.  334 Md. at 181, 638 A.2d at 109.
Under the authority of the Carroll doctrine,8 the police retrieved the vial.  334 Md. at 182,
638 A.2d at 109.  Subsequently, the police began an inventory search, expecting the vehicle
would be towed when other officers arrived on the scene.  Id.  In response to the defendant’s
motion to suppress, the State argued there were two distinct searches, each justified by
different exceptions, a Carroll search and an inventory search.  334 Md. at 182-83, 638 A.2d
at 112.  While the Court of Special Appeals upheld the Carroll exception as to the first
search, it held the inventory search was invalid.  334 Md. at 184, 638 A.2d at 110.  
On appeal, the State changed its argument, attempting to merge the searches and
justify both under Carroll.  Id.  This Court rejected the State’s ability to change the structure
of its argument for the first time on appeal.  334 Md. at 191, 638 A.2d at 114.  The Court
explained, “[b]y structuring its argument in such a way, the State dissuaded Bell from
offering evidence on the matters of probable cause for the second search and exigency of the
circumstances.”  Id.  This resulted in unfair prejudice because the defendant, “cannot be
expected to rebut possible justifications for the search on his own initiative.  The State may
22
not lead the defendant and the trial court down a primrose path, only to leave them stranded
when, on appeal, the State deems it advantageous to its strategy.”  Id.  In reaching this
conclusion, we were persuaded by a United States Supreme Court case dealing with the same
issue, Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 78 S. Ct. 1245, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1503 (1958),
in which the Supreme Court stated: 
To permit the Government to inject its new theory into the case
at this stage would unfairly deprive the petitioner of an adequate
opportunity to respond.  This is so because in the District Court
petitioner, being entitled to assume that the warrant constituted
the only purported justification for the arrest, had no reason to
. . . adduce evidence of his own to rebut the contentions that the
government makes here for the first time.
357 U.S. at 488, 78 S. Ct. at 1251, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 1510-1511 (1958); See also Bell, 334 Md.
at 189-90, 638 A.2d at 113, “[a] criminal defendant could suffer unfair prejudice if, for
example, the defendant’s response to a new argument posited by the State on appeal depends
on evidence which was not offered in the trial court.”). 
Although appellate courts have some discretion in raising different justifications for
lower court decisions, we may not use such discretion without restriction.  In the present
case, the record does not support a sua sponte holding of inevitable discovery.  We are bound
by the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.  Unfortunately, in this case the record
is not complete and cannot support a sua sponte finding of inevitable discovery.  Even
assuming arguendo that the evidence would inevitably have been discovered, the defense
was unfairly prejudiced by the issue being raised for the first time in the appellate court.
Further, any decision by the appellate court must be based on historical facts capable of easy
23
verification, rather than speculation, which cannot be done in this case.  See Williams, 372
Md. at 418, 813 A.2d at 250. 
Regarding the issue of inevitable discovery, we are bound by the facts in the record
before us.  The timing of the call to the K-9 unit is integral in determining whether the
evidence would have been inevitably discovered absent the illegality.  The exact timing of
the apprehension and the call to the K-9 unit, however, is unclear from the record.  While
Officer Mills testified that she called the K-9 unit before Elliott’s apprehension, Agent
Silvestro indicated that he opened the trunk of the car, smelled marijuana, and then closed
the trunk to wait for the K-9 unit.  This is consistent with the notion that the police waited
until Silvestro smelled the marijuana and then called the K-9 unit.  Apparently, the
suppression hearing judge thought this was the case, stating in his summation of the evidence
presented at the suppression hearing that, “[t]he investigation included the sniff or the smell
of the marijuana by DEA Agent Silvestro and then they called the drug dog.”  The distinction
is key to the determination of whether the record was sufficient to support a sua sponte
application of the inevitable discovery doctrine.  Despite the importance of this information
to the issue on appeal, the issue of timing was not argued at the suppression hearing because
it was not relevant to the issue of probable cause or the classification of the stop as a
detention versus an arrest.  The defense, therefore, had no impetus to challenge the apparent
discrepancy or to further question officers as to the precise timing of the call to the K-9 unit.
Furthermore, this case is like Williams, regarding the lack of clarity in the record.  In
Williams, the police could have waited for the pending search warrant to be processed before
24
making the arrest, rather than preemptively arresting Williams and searching him without a
warrant.  Here, police could have waited for the K-9 unit to arrive in order to obtain probable
cause to arrest Elliott and search the vehicle.  They knew in advance, based upon the
informant’s tip, that contraband would be in the trunk of the vehicle and the approximate
time of arrival.  Moreover, we do not know why the K-9 unit was not in the immediate
vicinity of the stop when it occurred.  Assuming the evidence here would have been
discovered because the K-9 unit was already on it’s way is “a speculative inquiry into what
might or could have occurred.”  We do not know how long Elliott intended to be at that
location or where he was headed before he parked the car, was arrested, and had his keys
taken from him by the police.  It appears from the officers’ suppression hearing testimony
that the police were able to approach the car and conduct a K-9 search as a direct result of
the illegal arrest.  Accordingly, consistent with Boatright, we cannot assume that Elliot
would have “waited patiently beside his [alleged] contraband” until the K-9 unit arrived.
Further, the State should not be permitted to benefit from the appellate court’s  raising
of an issue that the State did not raise at the suppression hearing pursuant to a failed “trial
strategy[,]” or oversight.  The State’s position at the suppression hearing was that the
detention of Elliott was lawful, and that the subsequent alert on the vehicle by the dog
provided the probable cause necessary to arrest.  Taking that legal position, which was
legally incorrect, and failing to argue an alternate theory to justify the admission of evidence
seized, was, therefore, subject to risks.  The State refused to concede any illegality in the
detention.  This strategic election, or oversight, was made to the State’s detriment, as we have
25
determined based on our review of the record that Elliott’s apprehension constituted an
arrest.  As in Williams, where the State elects to argue one exception to the warrant
requirement over another because the exceptions are contradictory or may undermine each
other, the failure to preserve the issue for appellate review in this case by raising inevitable
discovery or having it decided in the trial court cannot be remedied after the fact.  Similar to
Bell, the State may not now benefit from a failed trial strategy or oversight which unfairly
prejudices the defense’s ability to rebut evidence on appeal.  Instead, we “merely accept[]
the State’s presentation of the case.”
Finally, the defense was unfairly prejudiced in this case because counsel did not have
the opportunity to rebut the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine at the suppression
hearing, as the State did not raise the issue.  As in Bell, the defense was effectively dissuaded
from offering evidence regarding inevitable discovery, because the State did not raise the
issue and only argued the legality of the arrest.  The defense cannot, and should not be
expected to rebut all possible justifications for an illegal search in the event that a search or
arrest is later found invalid on appeal.  Similar to Stokes, there was no testimony as to police
procedure and what the police actually would have done absent the illegal arrest.
Specifically, we do not know whether it is typical police procedure, in a case involving
information furnished by a confidential informant, to call a K-9 unit as soon as a suspect is
spotted, or to wait until after the suspicion of drugs is verified.  In this case, either method
is plausible, but the record is not clear as to the underlying historical facts.  Our prior
reluctance to apply inevitable discovery absent a clear factual record, combined with the
26
failure of the State to raise the issue below and the resulting unfair prejudice to the defense,
precludes this Court and the intermediate appellate court from relying on the doctrine sua
sponte.
Notwithstanding our holding that the Court of Special Appeals erred in raising the
issue of inevitable discovery sua sponte, we nonetheless affirm the intermediate appellate
court in upholding the denial of the motion to suppress.  It is important to note that the
standard for reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress is different than the standard used in
reviewing whether an appellate court properly raised an issue sua sponte.  When reviewing
a denial of the motion to suppress, “we make our own independent constitutional appraisal”
and we must consider the facts in the light “most favorable to the State as the prevailing party
on the motion.”  Riddick v. State, 319 Md. 180, 183, 571 A.2d 1239, 1240-41 (1990).  In the
present case, the suppression hearing judge determined that the police officers conducted an
investigation and “after the smell of both the DEA Agent Silvestro and the smell of the K-9
dog, [the police] had probable cause to do the search.”  We agree with this determination for
two reasons.  First, from the beginning of the investigation, the police officers focused
primarily on the vehicle.  Second, in reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the State, the police called for the K-9 unit before Elliott was apprehended, and thus, “the
premature arrest of the appellant was not [necessarily] causally related to the discovery of
the marijuana and the motion to suppress properly was denied.” 
II.
The Court of Special Appeals erred in affirming the Circuit Court’s denial of the
27
motion to compel disclosure of the identity of the confidential informant.  In reviewing a trial
court’s determination not to compel disclosure, “we look to see whether the court applied
correct legal principles and, if so, whether its ruling constituted a fair exercise of its
discretion.”  Edwards v. State, 350 Md. 433, 442, 713 A.2d 342, 346 (1998).  This standard
applies in determining “whether the State’s privilege accedes to the defendant’s
constitutional rights of due process and confrontation.”  Brooks v. State, 320 Md. 516, 523,
578 A.2d 783, 786 (1990).  The burden is on the defendant to show a “substantial reason
indicating that the identity of the informer is material to his defense or the fair determination
of the case.”  320 Md. at 528 n.3, 578 A.2d at 789 n.3 (relying on Drouin v. State, 222 Md.
271, 286, 160 A.2d 85, 93 (1960)).  
Maryland has long recognized the privilege of the State to protect the identity of
informants.  Brooks, 320 Md. at 522, 578 A.2d at 786.  There are, however, certain
limitations on the State’s privilege to withhold the identity.  First, “[w]hile the State’s interest
in maintaining the anonymity of its informers is manifestly important, that interest is
necessarily circumscribed by the defendant’s interest in a fair trial.”  Id.  Thus, in Roviaro
v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S. Ct. 623, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1957), the Supreme Court
limited the privilege of nondisclosure based on principles of “fundamental requirements of
fairness.”  The Court stated, “[w]here the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the
contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is
essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way.”  353 U.S. at 60, 77
S. Ct. at 628, 1 L. Ed. 2d at 645.  Second, the privilege is limited to its underlying purpose:
28
“once the identity of the informer has been disclosed to those who would resent the
communication, the privilege no longer applies.”  Brooks, 320 Md. at 523, 578 A.2d at 786-
87.  
When evaluating whether the privilege applies, we have stated that “the key element
is the materiality of the informer’s testimony to the determination of the accused’s guilt or
innocence.”  Warrick v. State, 326 Md. 696, 701, 607 A.2d 24, 27 (1992).  In undertaking
this analysis, Roviaro established that judges must perform a balancing test, weighing “the
public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare
his defense.”  353 U.S. at 62, 77 S. Ct. at 628, 1 L. Ed. 2d at 646.  The balance will depend
on the circumstances, and a court should take “into consideration the crime charged, the
possible defenses, [and] the possible significance of the informer’s testimony.”  353 U.S. at
62, 77 S. Ct. at 629, 1 L. Ed. 2d at 646.  Further, the “right to produce one’s only defense
must predominate over protecting the State’s flow of information – as important as that
purpose may be.”  Hardiman v. State, 50 Md. App. 98, 109, 436 A.2d 929 (1981) (holding
that the trial court abused its discretion in not compelling the disclosure of the identity of the
confidential informant, where the state’s evidence consisted solely of the testimony of one
undercover officer based on information from a CI).  We have previously identified three
defenses which often require disclosure: entrapment, lack of knowledge, and mistaken
identity.  Brooks, 320 Md. at 523, 578 A.2d at 787. 
Further, in cases where the materiality of the informant’s identity arises in the context
of an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, this Court and the United States Supreme Court
29
have emphasized the importance of ensuring a fair determination of probable cause.  See
Edwards, 350 Md. at 446, 713 A.2d at 348.  Specifically, in a case involving a warrantless
search based on information provided by a CI, “the Government has been required to disclose
the identity of the informant unless there was sufficient evidence apart from his confidential
communication [to establish probable cause].”  Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 61, 77 S. Ct. at 628, 1
L. Ed. 2d at 645.  The trial judge has discretion to determine whether disclosure is warranted,
by taking into account whether probable cause is a significant issue in the case.  Edwards,
350 Md. at 445, 713 A.2d at 348.  As this Court stated in Edwards, “‘[i]f the accused asserts
any substantial ground indicating that the identity of the informer is material to his defense
or the fair determination of the case on the issue of probable cause, the trial court should
require the informant’s name to be given (or the evidence suppressed).’”  350 Md. at 446,
713 A.2d at 348 (quoting Drouin v. State, 322 Md. 271, 286, 160 A.2d 85, 92-93 (1960)).
Finally, in cases where the record is insufficient for the court to perform a balancing test, we
have recommended that the proper course should be for the court to hold an in camera
hearing, enabling the judge to speak with the informant and determine his or her role in the
matter.  This allows the court to make “an informed judgment as to whether the informant’s
identity should be disclosed.”  350 Md. at 446-47, 713 A.2d at 348. 
In this case, the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals did not apply the
correct legal principles.  The facts compelled a limit on the State’s privilege based on
fundamental fairness, because disclosure was both relevant and helpful.  The Circuit Court
judge stated, “the [c]ourt does have an obligation, . . . to make sure that these confidential
30
sources are protected, and I’m going to see – I’m going to do everything that I can to make
sure that they are protected.”  The motions court therefore did not perform a balancing test
but rather merely invoked and applied the State’s privilege.  
Further, had the court applied the Roviaro balancing test, Elliott’s right to prepare his
defense would outweigh the public interest in protecting the flow of information.  In
performing the balancing test, the motions judge should have taken into account the crime
charged and the possible defenses.  Contrary to the Court of Special Appeals’s holding, the
defendant satisfied his burden of showing a substantial reason why disclosure was material.
The defense stated, “our argument [is] that the confidential informant was part and parcel of
the transaction,” and further, “we think he’s a material witness.”  The identity of the CI was
material because it was relevant to the charges as well as the defenses raised.  Regarding the
charges, possession and possession with intent to distribute both require the State to prove
the defendant’s knowledge of such possession.  This element proved to be extremely relevant
and was obviously a concern for the jury, because in both trials, jurors sent notes to the court
asking if they could convict Elliott if he did not know the marijuana was in his trunk.
Therefore, the CI’s identity was material to Elliott’s case as it offered to negate the
knowledge element of the charges.  Additionally, both defenses raised by Elliott at trial, lack
of knowledge and entrapment, were identified in Brooks as defenses which will ordinarily
require the disclosure of the informant’s identity. 
The information provided by the CI in this case was also integral in establishing the
alleged probable cause to stop and search Elliott’s vehicle.  According to Elliott’s entrapment
31
defense, the CI was a material participant in the exchange, as the CI arranged it by delivering
the suitcase to Elliott.  The CI was the only source of information connecting Elliott with the
drugs; there were no drugs on his person or in the passenger compartment of the car, and no
drug paraphernalia or distribution paraphernalia were found.  Similar to Edwards, the case
against Mr. Elliott was based on the evidence seized from the vehicle and the admissibility
of that evidence “depended almost entirely on the credibility of the unnamed informant” who
provided the information about the drugs to the police.  350 Md. at 447, 713 A.2d at 349.
Under Roviaro, the State was required to disclose the identity because there was
“[in]sufficient evidence apart from his confidential communication” to establish probable
cause.  Therefore, Elliott was denied a fair determination on the issue.
Finally, the fact that Elliott claimed knowledge of the identity of the CI, in asserting
that the CI was Lodge, does not protect the State from disclosing the identity.  Rather, as
stated in Brooks, such  knowledge, if true, would destroy the privilege.  Elliott, however, was
never allowed to determine if his assumption was correct.  The Court of Special Appeals held
that Elliott undermined his own argument in requesting the disclosure, because his argument
implied he knew the CI was Lodge.  The intermediate appellate court, however, held that
Elliott did not in fact know the identity of the informant and therefore the privilege was not
destroyed.  Were it to stand, the holding of the Court of Special Appeals would completely
undermine a defendant’s ability to assert a defense.  Elliott believed he knew who the CI was,
but was not sure.  He was not permitted to question officers or obtain information.  Instead,
the motions judge told Elliott he could subpoena the person he believed was the CI.  This
32
results in circular logic.  The motions court denied Elliott’s motion because the court
believed Elliott knew the identity, but denied him ability to determine if his assumptions
were correct.  The court then held his assumed knowledge against him in refusing to vitiate
the privilege.  If Elliott was wrong in assuming the identity of the CI, then he could have
altered his trial strategy accordingly, rather than being forced to argue both entrapment and
lack of knowledge without being permitted to argue identity of the informant to the jury.  If
Elliott was correct, the privilege would have been vitiated.  Either way, Elliott needed police
confirmation to establish his defense and was unfairly prejudiced in not being able to do so.
We therefore reverse the Court of Special Appeals’s holding that the Circuit Court properly
denied the motion to disclose the identity of the confidential informant.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED.
CASE REMANDED TO THAT
COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO
REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE
GEORGE’S COUNTY AND REMAND
TO THAT COURT FOR A NEW
TRIAL.  COSTS IN THIS COURT
AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS TO BE PAID BY PRINCE
GEORGE’S COUNTY.
Judge Adkins joins in the judgment only.
33