Case Title: Hatheway v. Bd of Regents - UI

Citation: 

Docket Number: 39507

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2013-09-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO   
Docket No. 39507 
LILLIAN HATHEWAY, 
 
       Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF IDAHO, and 
UNIVERSITY OF IDAHO, 
 
       Defendants-Respondents. 
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Lewiston, April 2013 Term 
 
2013 Opinion No. 99 
 
Filed:  September 6, 2013 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District, State of Idaho, 
Latah County.  Hon. Jeff M. Brudie, District Judge 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.  
Winston & Cashatt Lawyers, PS, Coeur d’Alene, for appellant.  Scott Atkinson 
Gingras argued. 
Paine Hamblen, LLP, Coeur d’Alene, for respondents.  Peter C. Erbland argued. 
__________________________________ 
 
 
BURDICK, Chief Justice 
 
 
Appellant, Lillian Hatheway, appeals the Latah County district court’s dismissal on 
summary judgment of all of her claims against Respondents, the Board of Regents of the 
University of Idaho and the University of Idaho (collectively “the University”). Hatheway 
worked at the University as an administrative assistant from 1999 until 2008 when she resigned. 
On October 22, 2008, she sued the University for age discrimination, hostile work environment, 
retaliation, constructive discharge, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Hatheway began working for the University of Idaho in 1999. She held the position of 
Administrative Assistant II in the associate dean’s office. In September 2002, Hatheway 
transferred to the English Department where she continued to hold the same position and title. 
2 
 
Dr. David Barber was her supervisor until July 2005 when Dr. Kurt Olsson was appointed chair 
of the English Department. Around September 2005, the position of financial technician within 
the English Department became vacant, and a search committee was formed that included 
Hatheway. The committee unanimously agreed that the best applicant for the position was 
Deborah Allen. Allen, who had a bachelor’s degree and the qualifications critical to the 
position’s needs, was already a University employee and was earning a higher wage than was 
contemplated for the position. Allen accepted the position after Dr. Olsson was able to negotiate 
a wage that was competitive with the wage she had been earning, although it was still less than 
her previous wage.  
 
Shortly after Allen was hired in the English Department, Hatheway expressed her 
discontent with the fact that Allen was paid a higher hourly wage than her despite Allen having 
less “Hay Points”1 than Hatheway. Dr. Olsson explained that Allen’s wage “was a function of 
her previous salary, market forces, and our needs.” In her deposition, Hatheway admitted that the 
problem started for her when Allen was hired and paid a wage higher than her own. Further, she 
stated that she would have been satisfied and felt the issue had been resolved if she had been 
reimbursed at an equal pay rate as Allen. At the end of 2005, Dr. Olsson completed Hatheway’s 
performance evaluation for the year and ranked her as exceeding expectations in all categories.  
 
Hatheway claims that her work environment became negative and hostile after the 
President of the University, Timothy White, gave his State of the University Address on May 1, 
2006. In one part of his speech, President White appears to urge older employees to retire when 
they become less productive. In relevant part, President White stated: 
And finally on the whole compensation issue, we share a responsibility to recruit 
faculty and staff here and to retain them. I want to add the third “R” in that now. 
We also have a responsibility to retire. And when we get to that point in life 
where we’re not as productive, where it’ll help the university and our programs 
that we care so deeply about, recruit a young entry-level or mid-career person. It 
is time to get out of the way. Now there are legitimate reasons why people can’t 
retire. They’re my age and they’ve got a two year old at home, so they need a job. 
Maybe it’s a health insurance issue and they don’t quite yet qualify for health 
insurance. We have to look at the barriers that are getting in the way for those 
                                                 
1 In her brief, Hatheway described the “Hay Point factor analysis” as “a method of job measurement used to 
establish the relative significance of jobs as they fit within an organization.” She goes on to state that “her job at the 
University required knowledge of and how to interpret University policies and procedures” and that “Hay points 
means that your job is considered a little more difficult and is a scale for the University to determine pay.” In Dr. 
Olsson’s written response to Hatheway’s complaints, he states that “Hay points only allow the institution to place a 
position in a given pay grade; they are not designed or intended to address equity issues within a grade.”  
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who may want to go to a part-time appointment or to fully retire. […]I am 
supportive of a concept where we could somehow bridge, on a part-time basis. 
Take care of some of these unusual costs for a limited time, to let people say, 
“You know, I can do this now. I can get out of the way.” Let us commit those 
resources to some other permanent hire. It’s a very important thing that we have 
to get into our conversations.  
 
On March 23, 2007, Hatheway received her second performance evaluation from Dr. 
Olsson, which rated her as “needing improvement” in six categories with detailed comments 
explaining the negative ratings.  Hatheway was also provided with a Professional Development 
Plan (“PDP”) designed to improve her performance in the coming year. Hatheway was unhappy 
with her performance evaluation and met with Dr. Olsson to discuss it the following day. 
Hatheway claims that Dr. Olsson could not give any specific instances related to her 
performance issues stated in the evaluation.2  In contrast, Dr. Olsson asserts that the reason for 
Hatheway’s more negative performance evaluation was because of her continued unprofessional 
conduct of voicing her complaints and dislike of Allen and Dr. Olsson to others within the 
Department. Allen had reported her unpleasant encounters to Dr. Olsson and had brought her 
concerns to the University’s Human Resources Department. Indeed, Allen submitted her 
resignation in January 2007 before Dr. Olsson had completed Hatheway’s performance 
evaluation for 2006. Dr. Olsson claims that Allen cited increasingly unpleasant encounters with 
Hatheway as the reason for her resignation. Dr. Olsson further claims that Allen only withdrew 
her resignation after she received an outpouring of support from the Department’s faculty 
members.  
 
In June, Hatheway received a letter stating that the Joint Finance and Appropriations 
Committee awarded a five percent average Change in Employee Compensation, but listed 
Hatheway’s hourly rate as $13.03, the same it had been the previous year. The letter does not 
give any reason for the lack of change in her salary, but Hatheway points to a University policy 
that precludes employees who receive “needs improvement” performance reviews from 
receiving automatic raises.  
 
On April 30, 2007, Hatheway filed a University Problem Solving Request because of 
what she claims was an unwarranted and unsupported poor annual employment review, which 
                                                 
2 It appears that Dr. Olsson’s main concern was Hatheway complaining to other faculty members. That this concern 
was raised at the meeting with Hatheway is corroborated by Dr. Olsson’s e-mail to the Director of Employment 
Services, April Preston. In this e-mail, Dr. Olsson states that “I walked through the evaluation with her. She wanted 
names, of course, but backed off immediately when I told her I would not provide them.”  
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worsened her treatment in the Department. Dr. Olsson sent a letter to Hatheway summarizing 
their discussions during the problem solving session and explaining why he would not be 
increasing Hatheway’s salary to match Allen’s. On August 28, 2007, Hatheway filed a complaint 
with the Idaho Human Rights Commission claiming that Dr. Olsson gave her a poor performance 
review because of her age and then harassed and retaliated against her when she complained 
about discrimination. Hatheway claims that after filing her claim she continued to be isolated in 
her employment, left out of critical communications, and to have numerous essential job duties 
taken away from her. 
 
Because of Hatheway’s claims against Dr. Olsson, the Associate Dean prepared her 
performance evaluation for 2007, which contained two “needs improvement” ratings.  In June, 
Hatheway received a letter stating that employees with an average or meets requirements 
performance rating would receive a 1% raise and that her hourly rate was $13.03, which was the 
same it had been the year before. A few days later, Hatheway received the same letter again, but 
it stated that her hourly rate would be $13.41. 
 
Hatheway claims that she suffered severe emotional stress and anxiety over her working 
conditions, which resulted in dizziness and a rise in blood pressure. She tendered her resignation 
from the University on August 28, 2008. 
 
Shortly after resigning her position at the University, Hatheway filed a claim against the 
University for age discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, and negligent infliction 
of emotional distress. The University filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss all 
of these claims. The district court granted the University’s motion, finding that Hatheway failed 
to show that “she was discharged or was subjected to adverse decisions by her employer and, but 
for her age, the discharge or adverse decisions would not have occurred.”  Hatheway challenges 
this dismissal on appeal and asks this Court to reverse the district court’s opinion and order.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Summary judgment must be entered when “the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” I.R.C.P. 56(c). In 
reviewing the appeal of an order granting summary judgment, this Court applies the same 
standard as trial court. Patterson v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310, 315, 256 
P.3d 718, 723 (2011). This Court liberally construes disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving 
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party and “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor 
of the nonmoving party.” Id. Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmoving party fails 
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case 
on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Hatheway brought several claims against the University under the Idaho Human Rights 
Act [IHRA] including claims for age discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation. 
She also brought a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court 
dismissed all of Hatheway’s claims and found that she failed to show that she was constructively 
discharged or that age was the “but for” cause of the alleged adverse employment actions.  
A. The district court correctly dismissed Hatheway’s age discrimination claim. 
Hatheway brings her age discrimination claim for disparate treatment under the IHRA, 
which has the stated purpose of providing “for execution within the state of the policies 
embodied in the federal … Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 [ADEA]….” I.C. § 
67-5901. Both the federal and state acts provide that it is unlawful “to fail or refuse to hire, to 
discharge, or to otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to compensation or the 
terms, conditions or privileges of employment” because of the individual’s age. I.C. § 67-5909; 
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Federal law guides this Court’s interpretation of the IHRA. Ostrander v. 
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, Inc., 123 Idaho 650, 653, 851 P.2d 946, 949 (1993).  
This Court has held that to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, Hatheway 
must demonstrate that: (1) she was an employee at least 40 years of age; (2) she was performing 
her job in a satisfactory manner; (3) her employer took adverse employment action against her; 
and (4) her position was filled by a younger person of equal or lesser qualifications. Waterman v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 146 Idaho 667, 672, 201 P.3d 640, 645 (2009). Since Waterman was 
decided, the United States Supreme Court has established a heightened burden of proof for 
disparate treatment claims by requiring a plaintiff claiming intentional discrimination under the 
ADEA to prove that age was the “but-for” cause of the alleged adverse employment decision. 
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009) (holding that the “because of” language 
in the ADEA requires proof of “but-for” causation). Thus, Hatheway must ultimately establish 
that the University would not have taken the challenged action but for her age.  
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In this case, the district court concluded that under the ruling in Gross, “the third element 
of an age discrimination claim requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that ‘but for’ plaintiff’s age, she 
would not have been discharged or would not have suffered from adverse actions by her 
employer.” The district court then found that Hatheway failed to meet this element because she 
did not show that she had been constructively discharged or that her age was the “but-for” cause 
of her negative performance reviews or any other adverse actions Dr. Olsson may have taken. 
Hatheway argues that she presented both direct and indirect evidence that (1) constructive 
discharge and adverse employment actions occurred and (2) age was the “but-for” cause of those 
actions. Hatheway also argues that this Court should apply the burden-shifting analysis from 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), to age discrimination cases, and that 
summary judgment was not appropriate in this case under that analysis. 
Because federal law guides this Court’s interpretation of the IHRA, we apply the 
quantum of proof and standards promulgated in discrimination cases arising under the ADEA.  
Thus, in cases where the plaintiff puts forward indirect evidence of age discrimination, the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis applies at the summary judgment stage. See e.g., 
Onyiah v. St. Cloud State Univ., 684 F.3d 711, 716 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 
411 U.S. at 802–03). Since Hatheway has not put forward any direct evidence of age 
discrimination, we analyze her claim under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.  
This Court has previously applied the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis to 
discrimination claims arising under the IHRA. See e.g., Bowles v. Keating, 100 Idaho 808, 812, 
606 P.2d 458, 462 (1979). In Bowles this Court stated that: 
[W]e accept the principle that a complainant may prove a prima facie unlawful 
discrimination case without proving an employer’s intent to discriminate, thereby 
shifting the burden of producing evidence to the employer to give a lawful 
explanation for its treatment of the complainant. 
Id. Thus, under this analysis, once the plaintiff succeeds in making out a prima facie case of age 
discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the defendant “to articulate some legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If 
the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff has the burden of producing evidence to show that 
the proffered reason is in fact pretext for unlawful discrimination. Bowles, 100 Idaho at 814, 606 
P.2d at 464. The burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff. Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000).  
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In this case, the district court erred in requiring Hatheway to present evidence of but-for 
causation as part of her prima facie case. “[A] plaintiff’s burden is much less at the prima facie 
stage than at the pretext stage.” Hawn v. Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1158 (9th Cir. 
2010). Simply establishing a prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination 
“because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the 
consideration of impermissible factors.” Bowles, 100 Idaho at 813, 606 P.2d at 463 (quoting 
Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 573 (1978)). The purpose of applying the 
“McDonnell Douglas division of intermediate evidentiary burdens” is “to bring the litigants and 
the court expeditiously and fairly to [the] ultimate question” of whether the defendant 
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 
U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Requiring a plaintiff to put forward evidence of but-for causation at the 
prima facie stage eliminates the intermediate evidentiary burdens at the heart of the McDonnell 
Douglas analysis by forcing the plaintiff to immediately address the ultimate question. 
Accordingly, most courts apply Gross’s but-for causation standard at the pretext stage of the 
analysis, not the initial prima facie case. See, e.g., Tusing v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 
639 F.3d 507, 516 (8th Cir. 2011); Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 107 (2d 
Cir. 2010); but see Shelley v. Geren, 666 F.3d 599, 608 (9th Cir. 2012) (“At trial, [the plaintiff] 
must carry the burden to prove that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of his non-selection.”). Therefore, 
the first question this Court must address is whether Hatheway has established a prima facie case 
of employment discrimination. 
1. Prima Facie Case  
The only element at issue in Hatheway’s prima facie case is whether she has presented 
sufficient evidence to raise a material issue of fact as to whether she suffered an adverse 
employment action. Both the ADEA and I.C. § 67-5909 make it unlawful to discriminate against 
protected individuals in the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. 29 
U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); I.C. § 67-5909(1). Thus, adverse actions other than a discharge or refusal to 
hire may be an adverse employment action under those statutes. Hatheway first argues that the 
University’s conduct made her working conditions so intolerable that she was forced to resign. 
Hatheway contends that even if this Court finds that the University’s conduct was not sufficient 
to support her constructive discharge claim, the alleged conduct still constitutes adverse 
employment actions for the purposes of her disparate treatment claim.  
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a. Constructive Discharge 
 “Under the constructive discharge doctrine, an employee’s reasonable decision to resign 
because of unendurable working conditions is assimilated to a formal discharge for remedial 
purposes. The inquiry is objective: Did working conditions become so intolerable that a 
reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign?” Waterman, 
146 Idaho at 672, 201 P.3d at 645 (quoting Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1184 (9th Cir. 
2007)).  
The Ninth Circuit has held that: 
[C]onstructive discharge occurs when the working conditions deteriorate, as a 
result of discrimination, to the point that they become sufficiently extraordinary 
and egregious to overcome the normal motivation of a competent, diligent, and 
reasonable employee to remain on the job to earn a livelihood and to serve his or 
her employer. We set the bar high for a claim of constructive discharge because 
federal antidiscrimination policies are better served when the employee and 
employer attack discrimination within their existing employment relationship, 
rather than when the employee walks away and then later litigates whether his 
employment situation was intolerable. 
Poland, 494 F.3d at 1185 (citation omitted). 
 
“Whether working conditions were so intolerable and discriminatory as to justify a 
reasonable employee’s decision to resign is normally a factual question for the jury.” Wallace v. 
City of San Diego, 479 F.3d 616, 626 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., 
Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir. 1996)). However, an isolated incident of mistreatment is not 
enough.  Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 900 (9th Cir. 2000). In order to survive 
summary judgment, an employee must show “aggravating factors such as a continuing pattern of 
discriminatory treatment.” Id. For example, in Huskey the Ninth Circuit found that an employee 
did not establish a continuing pattern of discrimination when he alleged that he experienced a 
lower performance evaluation, cold relationships with his supervisors and staff, harsh criticisms 
from his supervisors, reassignments, significantly reduced responsibilities, and was told that he 
should look for a new job and that if he stayed at the office, he would be sent to counseling. See 
id. at 896–98. The Ninth Circuit found that this conduct was not sufficiently intolerable to 
constitute a constructive discharge and upheld the district court’s dismissal of the claim on 
summary judgment. See id. at 901.  
Hatheway argues that three aspects of her working conditions, taken together, amounted 
to constructive discharge: (1) the University paid its new hire who was younger than Hatheway a 
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higher salary, although she had less tenure and less “Hay Points” than Hatheway; (2) after raising 
this issue with Dr. Olsson, Hatheway received back-to-back negative evaluations; and (3) after 
President White’s speech about older workers needing to retire, the University began a pattern of 
behavior that affected Hatheway’s conditions of employment. Hatheway claims that this pattern 
of behavior included Dr. Olsson keeping her out of the loop of communications, changing her 
work area without notice, failing to follow-up and have required meetings with her, and taking 
away several of her essential job functions.  
This case is similar to Huskey, except that Hatheway’s allegations are largely less severe 
than the plaintiff’s allegations in Huskey. Taking all of the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Hatheway, she has not raised a material issue of fact as to whether she was constructively 
discharged. Like the employee in Huskey, Hatheway received negative performance evaluations 
and alleged cold working relationships with her supervisor. She does not present any facts that 
this conduct was discriminatory in nature. The only age related remarks that Hatheway points to 
were not directed at her. Therefore, Hatheway has not presented sufficient evidence to raise a 
material issue of fact on her constructive discharge claim.  
b. Adverse Employment Actions 
Since the University’s actions are insufficient to constitute constructive discharge, the 
next question is whether its actions otherwise constitute adverse employment actions. In 
Waterman, this Court cited the United States Supreme Court’s definition of a tangible 
employment action as a “significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing 
to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a 
significant change in benefits.” Waterman, 146 Idaho at 672, 201 P.3d at 645 (quoting 
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)). This Court further cited to a Sixth 
Circuit case in which demotion without change in pay, benefits, duties, or prestige was 
insufficient. Id. (citing Kocsis v. Multi–Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 887 (6th Cir. 1996)). 
Therefore, adverse employment actions in Idaho include significant changes in employment 
status that affect the employee’s benefits or monetary compensation.  
In this case, Hatheway does not claim that she was demoted, reassigned, or that her 
benefits were changed significantly. She claims that the following acts amount to adverse 
employment actions: being “kept out of the loop,” being paid less than Allen, receiving negative 
employment evaluations, and having certain duties shifted away from her.  
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“Mere ostracism in the workplace” does not constitute an adverse employment action. 
Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp., 79 F.3d 859, 869 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, her claim that 
she was “kept out of the loop” is not an adverse employment action.  
While a reassignment with significantly different duties may be an adverse employment 
action, mere inconveniences or an alteration of job responsibilities are not adverse employment 
actions. Jones v. Oklahoma City, 617 F.3d 1273, 1279 (10th Cir. 2010). Hatheway claims that 
the following job duties have been taken away from her: (1) working with alumni; (2) 
maintaining and creating websites; (3) inventory tracking; and (4) the elimination of the decision 
to cross-train her position with the Financial Tech position. Even if true, the reallocation of these 
duties hardly amounts to a significant change in her employment. The University admits that 
tasks within the Department may shift depending on who was available and that Dr. Olsson 
sometimes performed clerical duties, but it asserts that Hatheway’s job description was never 
revised. It further states that the reason she was less involved with alumni relations was because 
those functions were increasingly computerized by the central office. Hatheway does not claim 
that she was reassigned or that she has “significantly different responsibilities.” Rather, she 
claims that “essential job duties” were taken away from her, but does not explain how any of the 
tasks she claims were taken away are essential to her job description. Viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to Hatheway, the removal of these job duties is not an adverse 
employment action.  
Nor does the University paying Allen a higher salary than Hatheway constitute an 
adverse action. Rather, the University’s only actions were hiring Allen, with Hatheway’s 
approval, for a different position than Hatheway’s, and negotiating a salary with Allen that was 
slightly higher than Hatheway’s salary. Hatheway’s salary was never lowered and Hatheway 
does not argue, nor does the record show, that hiring Allen at a different salary affected 
Hatheway’s compensation in any way. The alleged fact that Hatheway had more “Hay Points” 
than Allen does not mean that Allen and Hatheway occupied the same position or were similarly 
situated. Hatheway bears the responsibility of showing that similarly situated co-workers were 
treated differently. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258. In order to be similarly situated, the comparative 
employees must have been dealt with by the same supervisor, been subjected to the same 
standards, and have engaged in similar conduct. See Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 
634, 641 (9th Cir. 2003). Hatheway does not allege that she is similarly situated to Allen or that 
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she performed the same job, only that she has more “Hay Points.” Therefore, the University’s 
refusal to raise Hatheway’s Assistant II salary to the same as Allen’s Financial Tech salary is not 
an adverse employment action.  
Finally, Hatheway claims that the two negative employment evaluations she received 
were adverse employment actions because receiving negative evaluations precludes an automatic 
pay raise and makes her eligible for being put on probation. Receiving “needs improvement” 
ratings in several categories on her annual employment evaluation did not lower Hatheway’s 
salary, but it may have prevented her from receiving automatic pay raises. The only year 
Hatheway did not receive a pay increase was 2007, following her negative performance review 
from 2006.  
Generally, formal criticism or poor performance evaluations alone are not adverse 
employment actions. Primes v. Reno, 190 F.3d 765, 767 (6th Cir. 1999). However, a negative 
performance evaluation is an adverse employment action if it precludes the employee from 
receiving an automatic pay raise. Tuttle v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 474 F.3d 307, 322 (6th Cir. 
2007) (“a negative performance evaluation does not constitute an adverse employment action 
unless the evaluation has an adverse impact on an employee’s wages or salary”); Rabinovitz v. 
Pena, 89 F.3d 482, 488–89 (7th Cir. 1996) (loss of a bonus is not an adverse employment action 
in cases where the employee is not automatically entitled to the bonus). Because the University 
does not dispute that Hatheway’s negative employment evaluation precluded her from receiving 
an automatic pay raise, it constitutes an adverse employment action and she has succeeded in 
establishing a prima facie case for discrimination.  
2. Hatheway has failed to establish a nexus between her negative employment 
evaluations and any discriminatory intent. 
To overcome the inference of discrimination established by Hatheway’s prima facie case, 
the University must articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for giving her negative employment 
evaluations. Hatheway does not dispute that the University met its burden. The University 
offered evidence to support its assertion that Hatheway received needs improvement ratings on 
several performance areas in her 2006 evaluation because of her continued unprofessional 
conduct of voicing her complaints and dislike of Allen and Dr. Olsson to others within the 
Department. Indeed, Hatheway’s 2006 performance evaluation is very specific as to how 
12 
 
Hatheway failed to meet expectations. With regard to Hatheway’s performance in the area of 
civility, an area she received a needs improvement rating, Dr. Olsson wrote:  
[T]his year there have been repeated instances of Lillian acting unprofessionally 
toward another staff member, and in venting about that person and the department 
chair in front of others in the unit. Against her co-worker, often when I have been 
away from the office, she has repeatedly launched tirades, it appears without 
provocation. These confrontations have not reflected civility or respect; they have 
sometimes merely been hurtful. 
After praising Hatheway’s initiative in addressing students’ problems, Dr. Olsson provides a 
similar critique of Hatheway’s unprofessional conduct in commenting on his needs improvement 
rating of Hatheway’s performance in the area of “Innovation/Initiative/Problem Solving: 
When faced with things she does not like, however, she sometimes fails to exhibit 
like virtues; nor has she been effective in identifying areas for personal or 
organizational change. Here the venting referred to above, which has on occasion 
led to threats and inappropriate name-calling, solves nothing and only decreases 
her own and others’ effectiveness, productivity, and service.   
These explanations for the needs improvement ratings are legitimate and 
nondiscriminatory. Thus, we reach the final stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis: whether 
Hatheway demonstrated that the University’s proffered reasons are merely pretext for 
discrimination. A plaintiff can establish pretext by showing either that a discriminatory reason 
more likely motivated the employer or that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of 
credence. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. If Dr. Olsson honestly believed his reason for giving 
Hatheway a negative performance evaluation, Hatheway cannot meet her burden. See Gordon v. 
United Airlines, Inc., 246 F.3d 878, 889 (7th Cir. 2001). Generally, a plaintiff demonstrates 
pretext by showing that “the employer’s stated reason for the adverse employment action either 
(1) has no basis in fact, (2) was not the actual reason, or (3) is insufficient to explain the 
employer’s action.” White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 393 (6th Cir. 2008).  
On appeal Hatheway does not dispute any of the behavior listed as grounds for her needs 
improvement rating. Rather, she points to the lack of any previous negative performance 
evaluations, her nomination for employee of the year, and certain age-related comments as proof 
that Dr. Olsson’s proffered reasons are merely pretext. To survive summary judgment, Hatheway 
must provide sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that, but for her age, 
she would not have received a negative performance evaluation. She has failed to meet this 
burden.  
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Past positive performance reviews are not sufficient evidence alone to rebut the reasons 
given for Hatheway’s negative 2006 performance review. Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-
Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 528 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Pretext is not established by virtue of the fact that an 
employee has received some favorable comments in some categories or has, in the past, received 
some good evaluations.”). Neither her positive performance review, which was based mainly on 
a time period before Allen was hired, nor her nomination for employee of the year rebut Dr. 
Olsson’s assertion that Hatheway complained about Allen and Dr. Olsson in an unprofessional 
manner. Hatheway must establish a nexus between Dr. Olsson’s allegedly discriminatory motive 
and the negative review she received. See Waterman., 146 Idaho at 673, 201 P.3d at 646. Stray 
remarks are insufficient. Id. Thus, statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by 
decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself are not sufficient to satisfy Hatheway’s 
burden of demonstrating animus. Blizzard v. Marion Tech. College, 698 F.3d 275, 287 (6th Cir. 
2012); Ezold, 983 F.2d at 545 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Stray remarks by non-decisionmakers or by 
decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely given great weight....”). 
Hatheway points to three incidents to support her assertion that Dr. Olsson’s reasons for 
giving her a negative performance review were merely pretextual: (1) President White’s May 
2006 state of the University address in which he stated that employees should get “out of the 
way” for “a young entry level or midcareer person” when they become less productive; (2) Dr. 
Olsson stating during a faculty meeting that he was looking for a “young and energetic” person 
to fill the coordinator position for the Masters of Fine Arts Program; and (3) Dr. Olsson asking 
Hatheway whether she was coming back after her vacation.  
Neither of the first two statements relate to Hatheway’s employment or to her negative 
performance evaluations. It is questionable that the President of the entire University would be 
considered the decisionmaker as to Hatheway’s performance evaluations. Moreover, his 
statements are ambiguous because they could easily relate to tenure. See Blizzard, 698 F.3d at 
287 (holding that employer’s statements to the plaintiff that “most of the people here are the old 
people like you” and that another employee had “been in his job too long” were ambiguous 
because they could easily refer to tenure). Such comments absent any context or evidence of 
intent do not establish a nexus between the employer’s alleged discriminatory motive and the 
adverse actions the employee suffered. Waterman, 146 Idaho at 673, 201 P.3d at 646 (comments 
referring to the employer as a “young company” did not establish discriminatory intent). 
14 
 
Similarly, age-related comments made by the decisionmaker about another employee do not 
establish the necessary nexus absent any other evidence contradicting the employer’s legitimate 
employment reasons. See O’Connor v. DePaul Univ., 123 F.3d 665, 671–72 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(finding age-related comments made about different employees were alone insufficient to 
establish pretext where plaintiff was dismissed for writing harassing letters to a co-worker).  
While the third comment Hatheway points to at least relates to her employment, it does 
not establish discriminatory intent on Dr. Olsson’s part. A single inquiry by an employer as to an 
employee’s plans for retirement does not necessarily show animosity towards age. Greenberg v. 
Union Camp Corp., 48 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 1995). Giving Hatheway the benefit of any 
inferences that can be drawn, as we must when reviewing a grant of summary judgment, these 
comments taken together might hint at discrimination. However, a rational jury could not say 
they are sufficient to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that discrimination was the “but-
for” cause of Hatheway’s negative performance evaluations. Without presenting any evidence to 
contradict the core facts put forward by Dr. Olsson as the legitimate reason for his evaluation, 
these comments are insufficient to establish pretext.  
Although Hatheway has established a prima facie case of age discrimination, she has 
failed to show that the University’s proffered reasons for her negative performance evaluation 
were pretextual. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment regarding 
Hatheway’s age discrimination claim.  
B. The district court correctly dismissed Hatheway’s hostile work environment claim. 
 
To establish a prima facie hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must raise a triable 
issue of fact as to whether “the workplace [was] permeated with discriminatory intimidation, 
ridicule, and insults that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] 
employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 
17, 21, (1993) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “The working environment must both 
subjectively and objectively be perceived as abusive.” Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 
917, 923 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
To determine whether a hostile work environment exists, courts look to all of the circumstances 
including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically 
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes 
with an employee’s work performance.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.  
15 
 
 
Hatheway contends that the same facts that support her constructive discharge claim also 
support her hostile work environment claim. She claims that the alleged conduct was sufficiently 
severe or pervasive that it altered the conditions of her employment. However, the majority of 
what Hatheway alleges as conduct that altered the conditions of her employment was not 
discriminatory, but rather amounts to no more than getting the cold shoulder. She does not 
explain how this conduct was severe or pervasive nor does she cite any case law in support of her 
argument. Therefore, this Court affirms the district court’s dismissal of Hatheway’s hostile work 
environment claim on summary judgment.  
C. The district court correctly dismissed Hatheway’s retaliation claim. 
 
The IHRA prohibits retaliation against persons who file a complaint alleging 
discriminatory actions prohibited under the IHRA. I.C. § 67-5911. Idaho Code Section 67-5911 
provides that:  
It shall be unlawful for a person or any business entity subject to regulation by 
this chapter to discriminate against any individual because he or she has opposed 
any practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual has made a 
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or litigation under this chapter. 
“A claim under I.C. § 67-5911 is commonly referred to as a retaliation cause of action.”  
Patterson v. State, Dept. of Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310, 318, 256 P.3d 718, 726 (2011). In 
order to establish a prima facie retaliation claim, Hatheway must demonstrate that: “(1) she 
engaged in protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a 
causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Id. Protected 
activities include: “(1) opposing an unlawful employment practice; and (2) participating in a 
statutorily authorized proceeding.” Id. To prove the “adverse employment action” element of a 
retaliation claim a plaintiff must show that “a reasonable employee would have found the 
challenged action materially adverse,” i.e., that the action “well might have dissuaded a 
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington, 548 U.S. 
at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted). The causal link element “may be established by an 
inference derived from circumstantial evidence, such as the employer’s knowledge that the 
employee engaged in protected activities and the proximity in time between the protected action 
and the allegedly retaliatory employment decision.” Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1376 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a retaliatory motive for adverse employment 
16 
 
actions may be inferred when they occur “fairly soon after the employee’s protected expression.” 
Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 
Hatheway contends that she engaged in protected activities when she filed a problem 
solving request with the University that notified its compliance officer about her perceived age 
discrimination and when she filed her age discrimination claim with the Idaho Human Rights 
Commission. She then argues that she suffered adverse employment actions after engaging in 
these protected activities, which included “poor evaluations, isolation, failure to receive increases 
in pay, and removal of her employment duties.” While Hatheway has engaged in protected 
activity, she has not demonstrated either that she was subjected to an adverse employment action 
or a causal link between the protected activities and the alleged retaliatory action.  
 
The district court concluded that the chronology of Hatheway engaging in protected 
activity as compared to the alleged adverse employment actions does not support her retaliation 
claim.  In relevant part the district court stated: 
Ms. Hatheway filed her Problem Solving Request Form with the University on 
April 30, 2007; she met with the University’s human rights compliance officer on 
May 30, 2007, and she filed her complaint with the Idaho Human Rights 
Commission on August 29, 2007. After Ms. Hatheway had engaged in the listed 
activities, she received a performance evaluation that included only two “needs 
improvement” ratings, a significant decrease from the thirteen “needs 
improvement” ratings she received prior to engaging in the listed activities. In 
addition, in 2008 Ms. Hatheway received a 3% wage increase. The evidence 
simply does not support Ms. Hatheway’s claim of retaliation. While her 
perception that Dr. Olsson avoided communicating with her and that her job 
responsibilities had changed to some degree may be accurate, there is no evidence 
that the University retaliated against her because she engaged in protected 
activities.  
 
Thus, the majority of the adverse employment actions she alleges actually occurred 
before she engaged in any protected activity. While her 2007 employment evaluation was not 
quite as good as it had been in 2005, it was better than the year before and it did not cause her to 
lose an automatic pay raise. The remaining adverse employment actions she claims, isolation and 
removal of employment duties, are not adverse for the purposes of her retaliation claim. Nor has 
she shown any change in these activities from before and after she engaged in protected activity. 
Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this claim as Hatheway 
has failed to establish all of the elements of her prima facie case.  
D. The district court correctly dismissed Hatheway’s negligent infliction of emotional 
distress claim. 
17 
 
Idaho recognizes the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress where the employer 
owes the employee a legal duty.  Nation v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 144 Idaho 177, 191, 158 P.3d 
953, 967 (2007). A legal duty is one recognized by law that requires the defendant to conform to 
a certain standard of conduct. Id. at 189, 158 P.3d at 965.  The IHRA does create certain duties 
for employers, the violation of which could form the basis of a negligent infliction of emotional 
distress claim. Hatheway contends that because the district court erred in dismissing her claims 
under the IHRA, it also erred in dismissing her negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.  
Because we affirm the dismissal of all of Hatheway’s claims under the IHRA, we affirm 
the dismissal of Hatheway’s emotional distress claim.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
We affirm the district court’s judgment dismissing all of Hatheway’s claims. Costs to the 
University. 
 
Justices EISMANN, J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON, CONCUR.