Case Title: Blondell v. Baltimore Police

Citation: 341 Md. 680

Docket Number: 68/95

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1996-03-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Charles R. Blondell v. Baltimore City Police Department, No. 68,
1995 Term.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW--Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights--If a
police officer rejects an offer of summary punishment, the Chief of
Police may proceed to form a hearing board pursuant to either 
§ 727(d)(1) or § 727(d)(3) of the LEOBR.  Maryland Code (1957, 1991
Repl. Vol., 1995 Cum. Supp.) Art. 27, §727(d).
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW--Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights--If a
police officer rejects an offer of summary punishment and a hearing
is conducted pursuant to § 727(d)(1), the punishment the hearing
board may impose is not limited to the maximum penalty for summary
punishment.  A hearing board convened pursuant to § 727(d)(1) may
impose any punishment up to and including termination.  Maryland
Code (1957, 1991 Repl. Vol, 1995 Cum. Supp.) Art. 27, § 727(d)(1).
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW--Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights
(LEOBR)--Under §§ 727(f) and 734A of the LEOBR, police departments
may only offer summary punishment for minor violations of police
regulations.  To determine whether an offense is "minor," courts
should consider the nature of the underlying conduct in light of
any departmental regulations defining or enumerating minor
offenses.  Maryland Code (1957, 1991 Repl. Vol., 1995 Cum. Supp.)
Art. 27, §§ 727(f), 734A.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 68
September Term, 1995
___________________________________
CHARLES R. BLONDELL
v.
BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
___________________________________
Murphy, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Raker, J.
___________________________________
        Filed:                
      Unless otherwise indicated, all cites herein are to Maryland
1
Code (1957, 1987 Repl. Vol., 1991 Cum. Supp.) Article 27, §§ 727-
734D.  The LEOBR is presently codified at Maryland Code (1957, 1991
Repl. Vol., 1995 Cum. Supp.) Article 27, §§ 727-734D.  The
provisions at issue in this case have not substantively changed
from the 1991 version.
In this case, we are asked to interpret §§ 727, 733, and 734A
of the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBR), which
govern punishment for violations of police regulations.   The
1
question presented is whether the LEOBR prohibits the Police
Department from adding new charges against an officer after the
officer rejects the Department's initial offer of punishment.  We
shall hold that in this case, the Department's decision to add a
new charge did not violate the LEOBR.
I.
In December, 1990, Captain Charles Blondell of the Baltimore
City Police Department was accused of reporting a fabricated sexual
harassment complaint against one of his subordinates.  The Police
Department's Internal Investigation Division (IID) conducted an
investigation and concluded that Blondell knew the complaint lacked
merit when he filed it.  IID therefore sustained a charge of
general misconduct against Blondell.  Both IID and Blondell's
commanding officer, Colonel Christian, recommended a severe letter
of reprimand as punishment.  On review, the Deputy Commissioner of
the Administrative Bureau concluded that the offense warranted
additional punishment, adding three days' loss of vacation leave to
-2-
      The Baltimore City Police Department regulations governing
2
the administrative disciplinary process are contained in General
Order 48-77, issued July 1, 1977.  The Order provides that in cases
where IID determines a complaint is "sustained," the accused
officer's commanding officer makes the initial recommendation of
punishment, but the IID case file and the initial punishment
recommendation then proceed through the chain of command to the
Deputy Commissioner, who may accept or reject the initial penalty
recommendation.  Baltimore City Police Department, General Order
48-77, at C-1 (July 1, 1977).
      Section 734D provides that "[a]ny officer may waive in
3
writing any or all rights provided in this subtitle."  Thus, an
officer may always waive the right to a hearing and accept
punishment.
      Section 730(a) provides, in pertinent part, that:
4
(a) Notice; record. -- If the investigation or
interrogation of a law enforcement officer
results in the recommendation of some action,
such as demotion, dismissal, transfer, loss of
pay, reassignment, or similar action which
would be considered a punitive measure, then,
except as provided under subsection (c) of
this section and except in the case of summary
punishment or emergency suspension as allowed
by § 734A of this subtitle and before taking
(continued...)
the penalty.2
On October 15, 1990, the Deputy Commissioner informed Captain
Blondell of the findings of the IID investigation and offered him
punishment of a severe letter of reprimand and three days loss of
vacation leave if Blondell agreed to forego a hearing.  See 
§ 734D.   Blondell declined the offer, exercising his statutory
3
right to a hearing under the LEOBR.  See § 730(a); see also
Baltimore City Police Department, General Order 48-77, at C-2 (July
1, 1977) (Annex C) [hereinafter Gen'l Order 48-77].   In accord
4
-3-
     (...continued)
4
that action, the law enforcement agency shall
give notice to the law enforcement officer
that he is entitled to a hearing on the issues
by a hearing board.  The notice shall state
the time and place of the hearing and the
issues involved.
(emphasis added).
      Annex H of General Order 48-77, entitled "Office of Legal
5
Advisor:  Responsibility in Cases Under Internal Investigation,"
provides that:
Upon notification from the Deputy Commissioner,
Administrative Bureau, that an Administrative Hearing is
to be held as the result of an internal investigation,
the Legal Advisor shall:
1. review the investigative file and proceed on its
merits or request further investigation and/or
clarification from IID;
2. upon the completion of the review of the entire
investigation, prepare the appropriate departmental
charges and specifications to support the charges;
3. upon the accused member's retention of either
departmental or private counsel, review defense
counsel's request for pertinent material and if
deemed justified, provide defense counsel with
appropriate applicable portions;
4. set a date for the hearing consistent with the
necessity to insure both a speedy hearing and due
process;
5. present the department's case before the
Administrative Hearing Board.
with police regulations, IID forwarded the case file to the Legal
Affairs Division for review in preparation for the hearing.  See
Gen'l Order 48-77, at C-2 and H-1.   In conducting the review,
5
Legal Affairs noted that Blondell had made several false statements
-4-
      Section 734 provides that:
6
Any law enforcement officer who is denied any
right afforded by this subtitle may apply at
any time prior to the commencement of the
hearing before the hearing board, either
individually or through his certified or
recognized employee organization, to the
circuit court of the county where he is
regularly employed for any order directing the
law enforcement agency to show cause why the
right should not be afforded.
in the course of the conduct that led to the general misconduct
charge and, therefore, requested that IID conduct further
investigation.  At the conclusion of the investigation, IID
recommended adding a charge of false statements to the charge of
general misconduct.  The Deputy Commissioner approved addition of
the false statements charge.  Legal Affairs notified Captain
Blondell of the two charges against him on February 19, 1991. 
On March 28, 1991, before any hearing board was convened,
Captain Blondell filed a complaint and petition to show cause in
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City pursuant to LEOBR § 734.6
Blondell 
requested 
ex 
parte, 
interlocutory, 
and 
permanent
injunctive relief to prevent the Police Department from proceeding
with the hearing.  Blondell contended that the Police Department's
addition of the false statements charge after he had been offered
what he termed "summary punishment" for the general misconduct
charge violated §§ 727(d)(3) and 733 of the LEOBR.  The Police
Department moved for dismissal or, in the alternative, for summary
-5-
judgment, but the Circuit Court denied the Department's motion.
The Circuit Court held a hearing on April 20, 1994, and denied
Blondell's request for an injunction.  At the conclusion of Captain
Blondell's case, the trial judge granted the Police Department's
motion for judgment because she concluded the punishment offered to
Captain Blondell was not summary punishment and, therefore, the
statutory limitations on summary punishment did not apply.  In
explaining her ruling, the trial judge stated:
I find based on the evidence in this case that
the punishment that was offered was not
summary punishment, for a number of reasons[.]
[F]irst of all, it is arguably not a minor
infraction 
for 
which 
Detective 
Captain
Blondell 
was 
investigated. 
. 
. 
. 
The
Commissioner has not delegated the authority
to anyone else.  He retains the authority in
himself.  The offense is and remains in
dispute.  And the punishment was greater than
the limitation that is placed on it in the
summary punishment definition in section F of
subsection 727.  And what makes it greater is
not the issue of whether a three day loss of
vacation is greater or less than a three day
suspension.  But it's the fact that a severe
letter of reprimand was recommended.  That
certainly is much greater than just a three
day suspension or fine of $150.00.  So in this
case, I find that summary punishment was not
invoked, and therefore, . . . the hearing
board of the department is not limited to
recommending 
sanctions 
offered 
in 
the
memorandum of October 18th, 1990.
The trial judge also concluded that Captain Blondell had not proven
that the Department added the second charge in retaliation for his
request for a hearing.
Blondell noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special
-6-
      Section 727(d)(3) provides that:
7
If a law enforcement officer is offered
summary punishment imposed pursuant to § 734A
and refuses, the chief may convene a one-
member or more hearing board and the hearing
board shall have only the authority to
recommend the sanctions as provided in this
subtitle for summary punishment.  If a single
member hearing board is convened, that member
need not be of the same rank.  However, all
other provisions of this subtitle shall apply.
(continued...)
Appeals.  The intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial
court's decision, concluding that the punishment offered to
Blondell was not summary punishment because his offense was not
"minor."  Blondell v. Baltimore City Police Dept., 104 Md. App. 69,
76, 655 A.2d 34, 38 (1995).  The Court of Special Appeals also
concluded that Captain Blondell had not met his burden of proving
the Department's retaliatory motive under § 733.  Id. at 79-80, 655
A.2d at 38-39; see also DiGrazia v. County Executive, 288 Md. 437,
448, 418 A.2d 1191, 1197 (1980) (employee must "show that the
questioned conduct was a substantial or motivating factor" in the
employer's decision).  We subsequently granted Blondell's petition
for a writ of certiorari.
II.
Captain Blondell contends that when an officer rejects an
offer of summary punishment, the Chief of Police must form a
hearing board pursuant to § 727(d)(3) of the LEOBR.   Section
7
-7-
     (...continued)
7
(emphasis added).
727(d)(3) limits the penalty that the hearing board may impose to
the maximum penalty available for summary punishment, i.e., up to
three days suspension without pay or a fine of $150.  Blondell
argues that the punishment offered to him by the Police Department
was summary punishment.  Therefore he concludes that a hearing
board may not impose a penalty on him that exceeds the maximum
penalty available for summary punishment.  He asserts that by
adding a false statement charge to the initial charge of general
misconduct, the Police Department subjected him to punishment that
could exceed the summary punishment limits, violating § 727(d)(3)
of the LEOBR.  Blondell also argues that the Department added the
false statement charge in retaliation for his decision to request
a hearing, violating § 733 of the LEOBR.
The Police Department contends that its initial offer of
punishment to Captain Blondell did not constitute summary
punishment.  Therefore, the Department argues, the statutory
limitation on penalties for summary punishment does not apply.  In
addition, the Department contends that even if the initial offer
did constitute summary punishment, the penalty cap does not
automatically apply in all cases where an officer rejects summary
punishment.  
The central statutory interpretation dispute in this case is
whether, in addition to the method prescribed in § 727(d)(3), the
-8-
      Section 727(d)(1) provides that:
8
["Hearing board" means:] A board which is
authorized by the chief to hold a hearing on a
complaint against a law enforcement officer
and which consists of not less than three
members, except as provided in paragraphs (2)
and (3) of this subsection, all to be
appointed by the chief and selected from law
enforcement officers within that agency, or
law enforcement officers of another agency
with the approval of the chief of the other
agency, and who have had no part in the
investigation or interrogation of the law
enforcement officer.  At least one member of
the hearing board shall be of the same rank as
the law enforcement officer against whom the
complaint has been filed.
Section 727(d)(1) does not impose any limitation on the penalty the
hearing board may impose.
Police Chief may also choose to form a hearing board under 
§ 727(d)(1) in cases of summary punishment.  The Department
contends that it may proceed to hearing under either § 727(d)(1)8
or § 727(d)(3).  The penalty limitations only apply when the Chief
of Police elects to proceed via § 727(d)(3) rather than §
727(d)(1).  Since no hearing has yet been held in this case, and no
choice has been made between the two hearing board mechanisms, the
Department contends that no violation has occurred.  Finally, the
Department argues that Captain Blondell offered no proof of
retaliatory motive, as required to demonstrate a violation of LEOBR
§ 733.
III. 
-9-
A.
In construing the LEOBR provisions at issue in this case, we
apply the paradigm of statutory construction developed in numerous
decisions of this Court.  As we have often stated, "the cardinal
rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the
legislative intention."  Fikar v. Montgomery County, 333 Md. 430,
434, 635 A.2d 977, 979 (1994) (quoting Taxiera v. Malkus, 320 Md.
471, 480, 578 A.2d 761, 765 (1990) (citations omitted)); Police
Comm'r v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 418, 379 A.2d 1007, 1010 (1977).
The primary indicator of the Legislature's intent is the language
of the statute.  Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 672, 659 A.2d 1347,
1350 (1995).  We interpret statutes to give every word effect,
avoiding constructions that render any portion of the language
superfluous or redundant.  Warsame v. State, 338 Md. 513, 519, 659
A.2d 1271, 1273 (1995); see also 2A Sutherland Statutory
Construction § 46.06, at 119-20 (5th ed. 1992 & 1995 Cum. Supp.).
In addition, we construe the statute as a whole, interpreting each
provision of the statute in the context of the entire statutory
scheme.  Warsame, 338 Md. at 519, 659 A.2d at 1273 (citing GEICO v.
Insurance Comm'r, 332 Md. 124, 132, 630 A.2d 713, 717 (1993)); see
also 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.05, at 103 (5th ed.
1992 & 1995 Cum. Supp.).  If the statutory language, read in its
entirety, is clear and unambiguous, and comports with the
Legislature's purpose, we need not inquire further to discern the
-10-
      Maryland was the first state to enact a Law Enforcement
9
Officers' Bill of Rights.  B. Warnken, The Law Enforcement
Officers' Privilege Against Compelled Self-Incrimination, 16 U.
Balt. L. Rev. 452, 452 (1987).  Several other states have followed
suit.  See, e.g., Cal. Gov't Code §§ 3300-3311 (West 1995); Fla.
Stat. § 112.532 (1995); Va. Code Ann. §§ 2.1-116.1 to 2.1-116.9
(Michie 1995).  For a proposed model law, see Warnken, supra, at
513-37.  
      The LEOBR defines "hearing" as a "meeting in the course of
10
an investigatory proceeding . . . conducted by a hearing board for
the purpose of taking or adducing testimony or receiving other
(continued...)
statute's meaning.  Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65, 73, 591 A.2d 481,
385 (1991).  
B.
Applying these principles to the statutory provisions at issue
in this case, we first observe that the purpose of the LEOBR is "to
guarantee that certain procedural safeguards be offered to police
officers during any investigation and subsequent hearing which
could lead to disciplinary action, demotion, or dismissal."  Abbott
v. Administrative Hearing Bd., 33 Md. App. 681, 682, 366 A.2d 756,
757 (1976) (Eldridge, J., specially assigned), cert. denied, 280
Md. 727 (1977); see also Chief, Mont. Police v. Jacocks, 50 Md.
App. 132, 135, 436 A.2d 930, 932 (1981); B. Warnken, The Law
Enforcement 
Officers' 
Privilege 
Against 
Compelled 
Self-
Incrimination, 16 U. Balt. L. Rev. 452 (1987).   To effectuate this
9
purpose, the LEOBR guarantees police officers the right to a
hearing 
when 
a 
departmental 
investigation 
results 
in 
a
recommendation of punitive action.   The statute also states,
10
-11-
     (...continued)
10
evidence."  § 727(e).
      The LEOBR also permits punishment to be administered without
11
a hearing if an officer has been charged with and convicted of a
felony.  § 730(c).
      General Order 48-77 provides that:
12
Summary punishment may be imposed for minor violations of
departmental rules and regulations when:
1. the facts which constitute the minor violations
are not in dispute; and
(continued...)
however, that an officer may always waive the right to a hearing
and accept punishment.  § 734D.  
11
The LEOBR specifically provides for an expedited form of
punishment known as "summary punishment," which is conditioned on
the officer's waiver of the right to a hearing.  §§ 727(f), 734A.
Section 727(f) of the LEOBR defines "summary punishment" as:
punishment imposed by the highest ranking
officer of a unit or member acting in that
capacity, which may be imposed when the facts
constituting the offense are not in dispute.
Summary punishment may not exceed three days
suspension without pay or a fine of $150.
Section 734A further provides that:
(1) Summary punishment may be imposed for
minor violations of departmental rules and
regulations 
when 
(i) 
the 
facts 
which
constitute the minor violation are not in
dispute; (ii) the officer waives the hearing
provided by this subtitle; and (iii) the
officer accepts the punishment imposed by the
highest ranking officer of the unit to which
the officer is attached.
See Gen'l Order 48-77, at C-1;  see also Intern. Broth. Police v.
12
-12-
     (...continued)
12
2. the accused member waives the right to a hearing
board; and
3. the accused member accepts the punishment
approved by the Police Commissioner;
4. summary punishment may not exceed three days
suspension without pay or a fine of $150.00 per
Article 27 Section 727E.
Gen'l Order 48-77, at C-1 (emphasis added).  This description of
summary punishment differs slightly from the statutory definition
in § 727(f) of the LEOBR because under the Baltimore Police
Department's regulation, the accused officer's unit commander does
not have the authority to impose summary punishment.  Instead, the
commander may recommend punishment, but the Chief of Police retains
ultimate 
authority 
to 
approve 
or 
reject 
the 
commander's
recommendation.  The regulation does not conflict with the LEOBR,
however, because § 734A also states that "[t]he provisions of this
subtitle are not intended to prohibit summary punishment . . . by
higher ranking law enforcement officers as may be designated by the
head of a law enforcement agency."  (emphasis added).
Town of Portsmouth, 506 A.2d 540, 541 (R.I. 1986) (defining
"summary punishment" under Rhode Island's LEOBR as "a two-day
suspension 
without 
pay, 
imposed 
for 
minor 
violations 
of
departmental rules and regulations involving an incident in which
the facts are not in dispute.").  If a police department offers
summary punishment but the officer refuses it, however, the
Department must hold a hearing.  §§ 730(a), 734A.
C.
Once the right to a hearing is triggered, the LEOBR provides
three alternative procedures for forming a hearing board.  The
procedures that may be used to form the hearing board vary based on
-13-
     
 Section 727(d)(2) provides that if the accused police
13
officer is a member of a unit that has designated an exclusive
collective bargaining agent, and the collective bargaining agent
has negotiated an another method of establishing a hearing board,
the accused officer may choose between the three-person board
described in § 727(d)(1) and the alternative board as defined by
collective bargaining agreement.  § 727(d)(2).  In this case, the
record does not indicate whether or not Officer Blondell is a
member of a collective bargaining unit that has negotiated an
alternative hearing board mechanism.
whether or not summary punishment has been offered and refused.
In cases that do not involve summary punishment, the Chief of
Police typically proceeds to form a hearing board under 
§ 727(d)(1).  See supra note 8.  Section 727(d)(1) requires the
Chief of Police to select a hearing board composed of at least
three members, including one member of the same rank as the accused
officer.  The members of the hearing board must not have taken part
in the investigation or interrogation of the accused officer.  The
statute also provides a second alternative procedure for forming a
hearing board as negotiated by collective bargaining, which is not
in issue here.   § 727(d)(2). 
13
The procedures for forming a hearing board differ in cases
where summary punishment has been offered and refused.  For
example, § 727(d)(3) of the statute provides a method of forming a
hearing board that may only be used in cases of summary punishment.
Section 727(d)(3) provides, in pertinent part, that: 
the chief may convene a one-member or more
hearing board and the hearing board shall have
-14-
only the authority to recommend the sanctions
as provided in this subtitle for summary
punishment.  If a single member hearing board
is convened, that member need not be of the
same rank [as the accused officer].  However,
all other provisions of this subtitle shall
apply.
(emphasis added).  Furthermore, in summary punishment cases, unlike
other cases, the police officer may not elect the alternate
collective bargaining procedure for forming a hearing board.  
§ 727(d)(2)(vii).  
We now turn to the central statutory interpretation dispute in
this case:  whether, in addition to the "one-member or more"
hearing board under § 727(d)(3), the Police Chief may also choose
to form a three-member hearing board under § 727(d)(1) in summary
punishment cases, and thereby to proceed with no "cap" on the
permissible punishment.  We shall conclude that the statute does
permit the Police Chief to choose between these two methods.
In construing the statute, we first consider its plain
language.  The language of § 727(d)(3) clearly indicates that in
cases where an officer refuses summary punishment, the Chief of
Police may convene a "one-member or more" panel.  Because an
officer who refuses summary punishment has an absolute right to a
hearing under § 730(a), the use of the permissive word "may" in 
§ 727(d)(3) suggests that another mechanism of creating a hearing
board must also be available.  
In addition, if the Legislature intended the method in 
-15-
      When the LEOBR was first enacted in 1974, it did not contain
14
a provision for summary punishment.  1974 Md. Laws ch. 722.  The
Legislature amended the statute in 1975, adding provisions
governing summary punishment.  1975 Md. Laws, ch. 809.  Under the
1975 amendments, if an officer refused an offer of summary
punishment, the only available method of forming a hearing board
was the three-member or more board now described in § 727(d)(1).
Subsequently, the Legislature amended the statute again in 1977 to
provide for the "one-member or more" hearing board now described in
§727(d)(3).  1977 Md. Laws ch. 366.  The amendment providing for
the alternate method of forming a hearing board as determined by
collective bargaining, now codified at § 727(d)(2), was added in
1989.  1989 Md. Laws ch. 516. 
When the Legislature added § 727(d)(2), the General Assembly
expressly stated that the  collective bargaining method of forming
a hearing board may not be used in cases of summary punishment.  
§ 727(d)(2)(vii).  If the Legislature believed that the language of
the statute clearly indicated that only "one-member or more"
boards, as described in § 727(d)(3), could be used in cases of
summary punishment, the General Assembly presumably would not have
added the limiting language to § 727(d)(2)(vii).
§ 727(d)(3) to be the exclusive method of forming a hearing board
in summary punishment cases, and to thereby limit the penalty the
hearing board can impose in all summary punishment cases, it would
presumably have said so.  For example, the Legislature could have
revised § 727(d)(1), the provision which describes formation of
three-member hearing boards, to indicate that the ordinary three-
member board mechanism was no longer available in cases of summary
punishment.   The Legislature did not limit § 727(d)(1) in this
14
fashion, and we shall not interpret the statute to add a limitation
the Legislature did not impose.  See Shah v. Howard County, 337 Md.
248, 254-55, 653 A.2d 425, 428 (1995).  Therefore, we conclude that
the Chief of Police may choose to convene a three-member board
pursuant to § 727(d)(1) in summary punishment cases, and if the
-16-
Police Chief does proceed under § 727(d)(1), there is no cap on the
punishment the hearing board may impose.  
We shall also construe the statute as a whole to determine its
meaning.  Parrison v. State, 335 Md. 554, 559-61, 644 A.2d 537,
539-40 (1994); 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.05, at 103
(5th ed. 1992 & 1995 Cum. Supp.).  In describing the general
procedure for forming a hearing board, § 727(d)(1) states that all
hearing boards must "consist[] of not less than three members,
except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection."
The structure of the statute thus indicates that the "one-member or
more" board described in § 727(d)(3) serves only as an exception to
the general requirement that a hearing board must include at least
three members.  We therefore determine that § 727(d)(3) was only
intended to provide an additional hearing board mechanism in cases
of summary punishment, not to displace § 727(d)(1).  
We conclude that the Legislature intended to provide the Chief
of Police with the administrative flexibility to permit increased
punishment if additional violations came to light after an officer
refused summary punishment.  Because summary punishment offers are
made based on preliminary investigation, prior to legal review and
formal charging, additional violations may be discovered, as in
this case, during follow-up investigation after summary punishment
is rejected.  See Gen'l Order 48-77, at H-1, supra note 5.  Cf.
Holcomb v. City of Los Angeles, 259 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (App. 2 Dist.
-17-
1989) (held permissible for hearing board to increase punishment
from initial offer of five days' suspension to fifteen days'
suspension based on new evidence presented at hearing that was not
available during preliminary investigation).  By permitting the
Police Chief to choose between the three-person hearing board in 
§ 727(d)(1) and the one-person or more hearing board in 
§ 727(d)(3), the Legislature therefore allowed the Chief the
discretion to determine whether or not the summary punishment cap
should apply after refusal of summary punishment.
Accordingly, we interpret the language of the statute to
provide alternative methods of forming a hearing board depending on
whether the department initially offered summary punishment.  In
cases where the department did not initially offer summary
punishment, the police officer may choose between the ordinary
mechanism for forming a three-member board under § 727(d)(1) and
the collective bargaining method under § 727(d)(2).  In summary
punishment cases, the Chief of Police may choose between the three-
member board under § 727(d)(1) and the "one-member or more" board
under § 727(d)(3).  We conclude that the statute expresses these
alternatives in sufficiently plain terms that we need not seek
extrinsic sources of information on the legislative intent.
Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65, 73, 591 A.2d 481, 485 (1991); Potter
v. Bethesda Fire Dep't, 309 Md. 347, 353, 524 A.2d 61, 63-4 (1987)
(quoting State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 421, 348 A.2d 275, 278
-18-
(1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 942 (1976)).
-19-
D. 
In addition to providing police officers with the right to a
hearing in disciplinary actions, as outlined above, the LEOBR
further protects police officers by prohibiting the police
department from retaliating against officers for exercising their
statutory or constitutional rights.  Section 733 of the LEOBR
states that:
A 
law 
enforcement 
officer 
may 
not 
be
discharged, disciplined, demoted, or denied
promotion, transfer, or reassignment, or
otherwise discriminated against in regard to
his employment or be threatened with any such
treatment, by reason of his exercise of or
demand 
for 
the 
rights 
granted 
in 
this
subtitle, or by reason of the lawful exercise
of his constitutional rights.
The employee bears the burden of proving retaliatory action in
violation of § 733.  DiGrazia v. County Executive, 288 Md. 437,
448, 418 A.2d 1191, 1197 (1980).  Specifically, the employee must
"show that the questioned conduct was a substantial or motivating
factor" in the employer's decision.  Id., 418 A.2d at 1197.  If the
employee meets this requirement, the burden shifts to the employer
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the action or
decision would have been the same absent the employee's exercise of
or demand for his rights.  Id., 418 A.2d at 1197.  Therefore,
"[t]he issue is to be resolved in favor of the employee only if the
court finds that he would have been reemployed but for the
protected conduct."  Id., 418 A.2d at 1197-98 (citations omitted).
-20-
-21-
       We observe that although the LEOBR does not define "minor
15
offenses," the Baltimore City Police Department has issued General
Order 48-77, entitled "Departmental Administrative Disciplinary
Process," which describes summary punishment and, in a separate
section, provides a non-exhaustive list of "minor offenses."  Gen'l
Order 48-77, at A-1, C-1.  The General Order provides, in pertinent
part, that:
When an alleged or observed infraction does
not involve persons outside the department and
is of a minor nature, commanding officers will
not look to higher authority to initiate
action.  Such cases are the responsibility of
the commanding officers to resolve and they
will be expected to take necessary action
without delay.  Examples of such cases include
(continued...)
IV.
A.
We next consider whether the addition of the "false
statements" charge after Captain Blondell refused the initial offer
of punishment violated the LEOBR provisions analyzed above.  We
shall first consider whether the Department's initial offer of
punishment to Blondell constituted "summary punishment," applying
the statutory definition of summary punishment described in Section
III.B, supra.
First, we observe that if an officer's offense is not minor,
the Department may not offer summary punishment.  § 734A.  In this
case, the conduct at issue was fabrication of a sexual harassment
charge against a subordinate.  We agree with the conclusion of the
trial court and the Court of Special Appeals that this type of
conduct could not plausibly be termed a "minor" offense.   See
15
-22-
     (...continued)
15
but are not limited to:
a. lateness,
b. uniform and equipment violations,
c. personal appearance infractions,
d. minor omissions in assigned duties,
e. minor infractions of departmental
regulations concerned with efficiency or
safety.
Id. at A-1 (emphasis added).  Thus, although LEOBR does not define
what constitutes a "minor" infraction, the Baltimore City Police
Department has developed its own guidelines regarding what types of
offenses should be deemed "minor." 
 
As a general principle of administrative law, we have stated
that:
In the matter of statutory construction it is
well understood that the view taken of a
statute by administrative officials soon after
its passage is strong, persuasive influence in
determining the judicial construction and
should not be disregarded except for the
strongest and most urgent reasons.
Holy Cross Hosp. v. Health Services, 283 Md. 677, 685, 393 A.2d
181, 185 (1978) (Holy Cross I), rev'd in part on other grounds, 290
Md. 508, 431 A.2d 641 (1981) (Holy Cross II).  Therefore, unless
the agency's interpretation conflicts with the statutory language,
we will often defer to an administrative agency's interpretation of
a statute when their interpretation occurs soon after passage of
the statute.  Balto. Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Barnes, 290 Md. 9,
14-15, 427 A.2d 979, 982 (1981).  
In this case, the Department promulgated the portion of
General Order 48-77 describing "minor violations" on July 1, 1977.
The provisions of the LEOBR relating to summary punishment were
enacted on May 15, 1975, and took effect on July 1, 1975.  1975
Maryland Laws ch. 809. We believe the agency's interpretation of
the term "minor" was sufficiently proximate to enactment of the
summary judgment provisions to warrant judicial deference.
Moreover, the Police Department possesses relevant experience to
determine what disciplinary problems should be deemed "minor."  
(continued...)
-23-
     (...continued)
15
Blondell v. Baltimore City Police Dept., 104 Md. App. 69, 76, 655
A.2d 34, 38 (1995).  Therefore, the Department could not offer
summary punishment for this type of offense without violating both
the LEOBR and its own regulations.
In addition, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that
the punishment offered to Blondell exceeded the maximum penalty
available for summary punishment.  The Department offered Captain
Blondell punishment of three days' loss of vacation leave plus a
severe letter of reprimand.  We need not determine whether three
days' loss of vacation leave is equivalent to three days'
suspension without pay, the maximum penalty available for summary
punishment, because we conclude that the addition of a severe
letter of reprimand increases the penalty beyond the summary
punishment limitations.  The Police Department does not issue a
severe letter of reprimand for every violation.  Moreover, the
Department uses two types of reprimand letters: an ordinary
reprimand letter, which simply informs the officer of a violation,
and a severe letter of reprimand, which advises the recipient that
any future violation may result in dismissal.  We therefore
conclude that the combined punishment of a severe letter of
reprimand plus three days' loss of vacation exceeds the maximum
allowable summary punishment.  
Based on both the nature of Captain Blondell's offense and the
-24-
      The Police Department also contends that its initial offer
16
of punishment to Blondell did not constitute summary punishment
because Blondell disputed the facts, declined to waive his right to
a hearing, and refused to accept the punishment offered.  The
Department misreads the statute.  While summary punishment, as
defined in §§ 727(f) and 734A of the LEOBR, requires that the facts
must be undisputed, the officer must waive the right to a hearing,
and the officer must accept punishment, these elements are not
prerequisites to an offer of summary punishment, but rather, they
are conditions that must be met before an offer of summary
punishment may be executed.  Section 734A provides that "summary
punishment may be imposed" if these conditions are fulfilled, and
we interpret "imposed" to mean "executed," not merely "offered." 
amount of punishment the Department initially offered him, we
conclude that the Department's initial offer of punishment was not
summary punishment.   Therefore, the hearing board was not limited
16
to the maximum penalty available for summary punishment.  
B.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the initial punishment offered
in this case was summary punishment, the officer's rejection of the
offer would not necessarily limit the punishment a hearing board
could impose to the maximum penalty available for summary
punishment.  When an officer rejects an offer of summary
punishment, the LEOBR requires the Chief of Police to choose
between two methods of proceeding to hearing.  As discussed in
Section III.B, supra, the Police Chief could proceed to form a
hearing board under either the three-member hearing board mechanism
described in § 727(d)(1) or the one-member or more mechanism in 
-25-
     
 We acknowledge that the LEOBR provisions at issue here do
17
not provide a police officer with notice, prior to the
administrative hearing, of whether the Police Department's offer of
punishment constitutes summary punishment.  Furthermore, the Police
Department's regulations also do not provide the officer with
notice of what type of punishment he is being offered, because the
(continued...)
§ 727(d)(3).  If the Chief of Police elects to proceed under 
§ 727(d)(3) rather than under § 727(d)(1), the hearing board may
not impose punishment greater than the maximum allowable summary
punishment, i.e., three days' suspension without pay or a $150
fine.  In comparison, if the Chief of Police elects to proceed
under § 727(d)(1), the hearing board may impose any punishment up
to and including termination.  
Because the Chief of Police has discretion to proceed either
under § 727(d)(1) or § 727(d)(3), hearing boards are not limited to
the summary punishment penalties in all cases where an officer
rejects an offer of summary punishment.  The summary punishment cap
does not apply unless the Chief of Police decides to proceed under
§ 727(d)(3).  Since no hearing board mechanism had yet been
selected when Captain Blondell instituted this action, the Police
Department has not yet taken any action that would limit the
penalty imposed by the hearing board to the maximum penalty
available for summary punishment.  Thus, the Police Department did
not violate any provision of the LEOBR merely by deciding to add a
false statements charge to Captain Blondell's offenses, which might
have subjected him to punishment greater than summary punishment.17
-26-
     (...continued)
17
same form may be used to offer the officer summary punishment or
punishment greater than summary punishment.  See Gen'l Order 48-77,
at C-1-1 and C-2-1 (Form 77/175 and Form 77/402).  Revising the
regulations is a matter for the Police Department.
 
C.
Captain Blondell also contends that the Police Department
decided to add a false statement charge against him after he
refused summary punishment in order to retaliate against him for
exercising his statutory right to a hearing, in violation of § 733.
We find little support for this argument in the record.  Captain
Blondell argues that the timing of the Police Department's decision
to add another charge indicates that the action "smacks of
retaliation."  He also points to the testimony of Sergeant Puller,
the IID detective who investigated his case, that the possibility
of additional charges after refusal of summary punishment "could
have [the] . . . effect" of coercing officers to forego their right
to a hearing.  
We agree with the conclusion of the trial court and the Court
of Special Appeals that Captain Blondell did not meet his burden of
proving that his rejection of summary punishment was a "substantial
or motivating factor" in the Department's decision to add the
second charge.  See Blondell v. Baltimore City Police Dept., 104
Md. App. 69, 79-80, 655 A.2d 34, 38-39 (1995); see also DiGrazia,
288 Md. at 448, 418 A.2d at 1197.  Captain Blondell's evidence
-27-
merely suggests that the general practice of adding a new charge
after an officer refuses summary punishment may, in theory, have
coercive effects.  He offered no evidence, however, that in his
case, the Police Department's decision to add the false statement
charge was motivated by his refusal of the Department's initial
offer of punishment.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Police
Department's disciplinary procedures in Captain Blondell's case did
not violate the LEOBR.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.  COSTS TO BE PAID
BY THE APPELLANT.