Case Title: Curran v. Pasek

Citation: 

Docket Number: 93-267

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-12-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Curran v. Pasek1994 WY 139886 P.2d 272Case Number: 93-267Decided: 12/08/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Deirdre J. 
CURRAN,

Appellant, 
(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

Gregory J. PASEK, 
Personal Representative of the Estate of Harry Patrick McDonald, 
M.D.,

Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

Appeal from the United 
States District Court for the District of Wyoming, Clarence A. Brimmer, 
J.

 

Michael D. 
Zwickl of Beech Street Law Office, Casper, for 
appellant.

Robert M. 
Shively of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, for 
appellee.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,* 
MACY,** and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The certified 
questions before this court require us to test the application of the 
confidential marital communication privilege which prevents one spouse from 
testifying against the other. A doctor committed suicide and marijuana was found 
on his body. During the investigation of the suicide, a deputy sheriff 
questioned the doctor's widow and she indicated that her late husband was a 
frequent user of marijuana.

[¶2]      Appellant filed a 
malpractice action in the United States District Court for the District of 
Wyoming against the doctor's estate and subpoenaed the doctor's wife for a 
deposition. The doctor's personal representative moved to quash the subpoena 
asserting the privilege of confidential marital communications. A United States 
Magistrate for the District of Wyoming denied the motion. The personal 
representative appealed the ruling to the United States District Court for the 
District of Wyoming, and three questions of law were certified to this 
court.

I. CERTIFIED 
QUESTIONS

[¶3]      The three 
questions certified by the United States District Court for the District of 
Wyoming are:

(1) Is it the law of the 
state of Wyoming that the privilege protecting confidential marital 
communications between spouses survives the death of either 
spouse?

(2) If the answer to the 
preceding question is in the affirmative, then which spouse holds the 
privilege?

(3) If the answer to 
question (1) is in the affirmative, then may the privilege be waived, and if so, 
by whom?

II. 
FACTS

[¶4]      These certified 
questions arise out of a medical malpractice action filed by appellant, Deirdre 
J. Curran (Curran), against the estate of Dr. Harry McDonald, M.D., in the 
United States District Court for the District of Wyoming on December 21, 1992. 
Appellee, Gregory J. Pasek, is the personal representative of Dr. McDonald's 
estate.

[¶5]      Curran was 
injured in a one car accident on July 5, 1991. She was hospitalized in Gillette, 
Wyoming, with extensive lacerations to her arms and legs. In her complaint, she 
alleges that Dr. McDonald committed malpractice on July 19, 
1991.

[¶6]      Dr. McDonald 
committed suicide on July 23, 1992. Dr. McDonald's suicide was investigated by a 
Campbell County, Wyoming deputy sheriff. The deputy sheriff spoke to Dr. 
McDonald's wife, Julia Norton (Norton), the evening of the suicide. Norton told 
the deputy sheriff that Dr. McDonald was a frequent user of marijuana who "used 
marijuana on a daily basis except for the days he was on call." Curran 
subpoenaed Norton and sought to take her deposition. Curran wishes to introduce 
Norton's statements at trial as evidence of Dr. McDonald's 
negligence.

[¶7]      The personal 
representative filed a motion to quash the subpoena. A United States Magistrate 
for the District of Wyoming denied the motion. The personal representative 
appealed that ruling to the United States District Court for the District of 
Wyoming. Three questions of law were certified to this 
court.

III. 
DISCUSSION

[¶8]      The Wyoming 
legislature has codified both the confidential marital communication privilege 
and the privilege of spousal immunity. Wyo. Stat. § 1-12-104 (1988) 
provides:

No husband or wife shall 
be a witness against the other except in criminal proceedings for a crime 
committed by one against the other, or in a civil action or proceeding by one 
against the other. They may in all civil and criminal cases be witnesses for 
each other the same as though the marital relation did not 
exist.

[¶9]      Clarity and 
consistency demand that we distinguish between the confidential marital 
communication privilege and the privilege of spousal immunity. The privilege of 
spousal immunity may be invoked by the spouse who does not wish to be the 
instrumentality of condemnation directed at his or her partner. Engberg v. 
Meyer, 820 P.2d 70, 83 (Wyo. 1991). The confidential marital communication 
privilege is the privilege that ensures that private marital communications will 
remain private. Jackson v. State, 603 So. 2d 670, 671 (Fla.App. 
1992).

[¶10]   The confidential marital 
communication privilege is a privilege that was established at common law 
sometime after 1850. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2333 at 644 (McNaughton rev. 
1961). Wyo. Stat. § 1-12-104 is a codification of a common law privilege and we 
look to the common law history of the privilege in determining its 
purpose.

[¶11]   A privilege is a limitation on a 
court's ability to compel testimony regarding confidential communications that 
occur in certain relationships. 8 Wigmore, supra, § 2285 at 527. Wigmore 
identifies four primary characteristics of a privileged communication. Id. 
According to Wigmore, for a statement to qualify as a privileged communication, 
it must originate in confidence; confidence must be essential to the continued 
vitality of the relationship; the relationship must be one society is prepared 
to recognize; and any injury to the relationship caused by the revelation of the 
confidential communication must be greater than any benefit that results from 
revealing the confidential communication. Id.

[¶12]   Confidential marital communications 
satisfy these criteria and are, therefore, considered privileged. 8 Wigmore, 
supra, § 2332 at 642. We believe that at least one positive effect of the 
confidential marital communication privilege is that it enhances the quality of 
marital relationships by encouraging confidential communication between spouses. 
To fully understand the application of the confidential marital communication 
privilege, one must know what constitutes a confidential marital 
communication.

[¶13]   Whether a particular statement is a 
privileged confidential marital communication depends on the nature and 
character of the communication as well as the circumstances surrounding the 
utterance. Hunter v. Hunter, 169 Pa. Super. 498, 83 A.2d 401, 403 (1951). 
The communication must be delivered during marriage and in confidence. State 
v. Wright, 154 Vt. 512, 581 A.2d 720, 728-29 (1989), cert. denied, 
498 U.S. 1032, 111 S. Ct. 692, 112 L. Ed. 2d 682 (1991) (interpreting Vermont Rule 
of Evidence 504). See also, Shepherd v. State, 257 Ind. 229, 277 N.E.2d 165, 166 (1971) and People v. DeWitt, 173 Mich. App. 261, 433 N.W.2d 325, 
327 (1988). The privilege does not attach when the confidentiality of the 
communication is destroyed by revealing it in the presence of a third party. 
Chamberlain v. State, 348 P.2d 280, 286 (Wyo. 1960). See also, 8 
Wigmore, supra, § 2336 at 650-51.

[¶14]   It is generally accepted that the 
confidential marital communication privilege extends to communications and not 
to acts that are in no way communicative. 8 Wigmore, supra, § 2337 at 
657. Courts are divided on the question of how to determine whether conduct is 
communicative. This question is an issue of first impression before this 
court.

[¶15]   Courts apply one of two tests in 
determining whether certain conduct qualifies as a confidential marital 
communication. We refer to the tests as the "expectation test" and the 
"intentions test." Courts that apply the "expectation test" ask whether the 
conduct was undertaken in reliance on the confidences of the marital 
relationship, i.e., whether there was an expectation of confidentiality; and, if 
there was, the conduct is deemed a confidential marital communication. 
See, e.g., People v. Daghita, 299 N.Y. 194, 199, 86 N.E.2d 172, 
174 (1949); Menefee v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 900, 55 S.E.2d 9, 15 (1949); 
and State v. Robinson, 180 W. Va. 400, 376 S.E.2d 606, 610 
(1988).

[¶16]   The courts that apply the 
"intentions test" ask whether the conduct was intended to communicate a 
confidential message to the other spouse; only conduct intended to convey a 
confidential message qualifies as a confidential marital communication under 
this test. See, e.g., People v. Simpson, 39 Ill. App.3d 661, 669, 
350 N.E.2d 517, 524 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 68 Ill. 2d 276, 12 
Ill.Dec. 234, 369 N.E.2d 1248 (1977); State v. Newman, 235 Kan. 29, 680 P.2d 257, 266 (1984); State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 676 (Minn. 
1990); and State v. Hart, 391 N.W.2d 677, 679 (S.D. 1986). The federal 
courts apply the "intentions test." See, e.g., United States v. 
Estes, 793 F.2d 465, 467 (2nd Cir. 1986); United States v. Robinson, 
763 F.2d 778, 783 (6th Cir. 1985); and United States v. Smith, 533 F.2d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1976).

[¶17]   We find the rationale underlying 
the "intentions test" persuasive and adopt it as the rule in Wyoming. This test 
treats assertive conduct that is intended to communicate a confidential message 
from one spouse to another as a confidential marital communication. 
Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d  at 676. Conduct that is undertaken in reliance on 
the confidence of the marital relationship, i.e., with an expectation of 
confidentiality, is not necessarily considered a confidential marital 
communication. Id. The "intentions test" is a flexible analytical tool 
that allows a court to avoid erecting barriers to the truth while still 
protecting conduct that is intended to convey confidential messages between 
spouses.

[¶18]   Marriage was fostered at common law 
by promoting confidential communication between spouses. 8 Wigmore, 
supra, § 2285 at 527. Confidentiality was considered an essential element 
in the marital relationship and was encouraged by the confidential marital 
communications privilege. Id. Modern courts continue to recognize the 
strong public policy factors that support the privilege. Jackson, 603 So. 2d  at 671.

[¶19]   We hold that the primary purpose of 
the confidential marital communication privilege is to foster marital 
relationships by encouraging confidential communication between spouses and that 
this is the primary purpose the Wyoming legislature intended to further when it 
enacted Wyo. Stat. § 1-12-104.

[¶20]   We now turn to the first of the 
three questions certified to this court. The United States District Court for 
the District of Wyoming asks:

Is it the law of the 
state of Wyoming that the privilege protecting confidential marital 
communications between spouses survives the death of either 
spouse?

[¶21]   We begin by noting that during oral 
argument, both parties conceded that the confidential marital communication 
privilege survives the death of either spouse. Fox v. Fox, 75 Wyo. 390, 
403, 296 P.2d 252, 256 (1956) stated that "[c]onfidential communications between 
spouses should be protected after the death of either one of the spouses * * *." 
We find this statement and the rationale behind it persuasive. Confidential 
marital communications are encouraged when the confidentiality of those 
communications is protected. 8 Wigmore, supra, § 2341 at 
673.

[¶22]   The confidential marital 
communication privilege must extend beyond the death of either spouse or the 
guarantee of confidentiality is destroyed. Id. We hold that the 
confidential marital communications privilege survives the death of either 
spouse. To rule otherwise would thwart the very purpose of the confidential 
marital communication privilege.

[¶23]   The second question certified by 
the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming 
asks:

If the answer to the 
preceding question is in the affirmative, then which spouse holds the 
privilege?

[¶24]   In analyzing the privilege for 
anti-marital facts, referred to in Engberg, 820 P.2d  at 83, as the 
privilege of spousal immunity, Wigmore stated, "the privilege seems to be 
equally that of party and of witness." 8 Wigmore, 
supra, § 2241 at 254 (emphasis in original). In Engberg, we were 
interpreting Wyo. Stat. § 1-12-104, the same statute involved in this case. 
Engberg, 820 P.2d  at 82.

[¶25]   In Engberg, after analyzing 
the express language of the statute, we concluded that the legislature intended 
to make the spousal immunity privilege available to both the witness spouse and 
the party spouse. Id. at 83. We hold that the legislature codified the 
confidential marital communication privilege in Wyo. Stat. § 1-12-104 and 
intended to make the confidential marital communication privilege available to 
either spouse.

[¶26]   The third question certified by the 
United States District Court for the District of Wyoming 
asks:

If the answer to question 
(1) is in the affirmative, then may the privilege be waived, and if so, by 
whom?

[¶27]   The confidential marital 
communication privilege initially belongs to the spouse who communicates the 
confidential information. Fraser v. United States, 145 F.2d 139, 144 (6th 
Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 849, 65 S. Ct. 684, 89 L. Ed. 1409 
(1945). The spouse against whom the testimony is offered has the right to invoke 
the confidential marital communication privilege. Stein v. Superior Court of 
City and County of San Francisco, 174 Cal. App. 2d 21, 344 P.2d 406, 407 
(1959); Prink v. Rockefeller Center, Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 911, 398 N.E.2d 517, 520 (1979); People v. McCormack, 278 A.D. 191, 104 N.Y.S.2d 139, 143 (1951), aff'd, 303 N.Y. 782, 103 N.E.2d 895 
(1952).

[¶28]   If the party spouse refuses to 
waive the confidential marital communication privilege, the witness spouse 
cannot testify even if he or she waives the spousal immunity privilege. State 
v. Hastings, 466 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Iowa App. 1990). Only the party spouse can 
waive the confidential marital communication privilege with respect to 
information communicated in confidence to the other spouse. United States v. 
Lilley, 581 F.2d 182, 188-89 (8th Cir. 1978).

[¶29]   The party spouse may voluntarily 
waive the confidential marital communication privilege. 8 Wigmore, supra, 
§ 2340 at 671. To waive the confidential marital communication privilege, the 
party spouse must, in some way, destroy the confidentiality of the 
communication. Chamberlain, 348 P.2d  at 286 (information revealed to 
third party; privilege waived); White v. State, 268 P.2d 310, 313-14 
(Okla. Cr.App. 1954) (defendant testified on direct examination regarding a 
letter he wrote to his wife then objected to the admission of the letter as 
confidential marital communication; privilege waived); Allen v. State, 35 
Okla. Cr. 64, 248 P. 655, 656 (1926) (husband testified on direct examination as 
to confidential marital communications; privilege waived); State v. Cox, 
106 Utah 253, 147 P.2d 858, 859 (1944) (failure to object on grounds that former 
wife's testimony constituted confidential marital communication; privilege 
waived). The confidentiality cannot be destroyed by the witness spouse's 
testimony regarding the confidential communication. Hastings, 466 N.W.2d  
at 699.

[¶30]   We hold that the spouse against 
whom confidential marital communications are offered must waive the confidential 
marital communication privilege before the witness spouse can testify regarding 
those confidential marital communications. We also hold that once the party 
spouse has waived the confidential marital communication privilege, the 
non-party spouse may then elect to invoke or waive the privilege of spousal 
immunity.

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶31]   In response to the certified 
questions submitted, we hold that the privilege of confidential marital 
communications survives the death of either spouse; that the confidential 
marital communication privilege is available to both spouses; and that the 
confidential marital communication privilege must first be waived by the party 
spouse against whom the privileged communication will be used and that the 
non-party spouse may then elect to assert or waive the privilege of spousal 
immunity. 

 

FOOTNOTES

*Retired July 6, 1994.

**Chief Justice at time of oral argument.