Case Title: Singleterry v. City of Albuquerque

Citation: 632 P.2d 345, 96 N.M. 468

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1981-04-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
632 P.2d 345 (1981) 96 N.M. 468 Monte R. SINGLETERRY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, Defendant-Appellant. No. 13171. Supreme Court of New Mexico. April 3, 1981. *346 William L. Kraemer and Gary Daves, Deputy City Attys., Albuquerque, for defendant-appellant. *347 Michael L. Danoff, Albuquerque, for plaintiffs-appellees. FEDERICI, Justice. Appellees (Singleterrys) own property on which their home is located in the City of Albuquerque. Their deed to the property contains a restrictive covenant requiring them to construct a block wall at least five feet high on their property boundaries with adjoining lots. Singleterrys constructed a wall eight feet high. A City zoning ordinance applicable to this area apparently limits fence or wall heights to eight feet. Singleterrys built a tennis court in their back yard and then applied for a variance to allow them to build a chainlink fence thirteen feet high along a side boundary of their property for the width of one end of the tennis court. The application was eventually granted, with the City Council allowing a chainlink fence twelve feet high. However, it imposed the conditions that: (1) the fence had to be a clear chainlink fence, and (2) the block wall had to be lowered to a height of forty-two inches. The Commissioners felt this would create a workable compromise for the adjoining landowner, who protested the variance. Singleterrys did not appeal this decision. About eleven months after the variance was granted, Singleterrys constructed the twelve-foot high chainlink fence, but did not lower the height of the block wall. They subsequently applied for another variance, requesting a twelve-foot high chainlink fence without the condition to lower the height of the wall. The application was denied at all administrative levels. Singleterrys then petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the district court pursuant to Section 3-21-9, N.M.S.A. 1978. The trial court reversed the prior administrative decisions and ordered the City to allow the variance without imposition of the condition to lower the wall. The City appeals. We reverse. The issues we discuss on appeal follow: I. Whether the trial court could give any weight to the restrictive covenants in making its decision. II. Whether the City could properly attach conditions to the variance granted. III. Whether the trial court correctly found that the City Council had abused its discretion. The trial court made the following finding of fact: Based in part upon this finding, the trial court concluded: It is well established that zoning ordinances cannot relieve private property from valid restrictive covenants if the ordinances are less stringent. Ridge Park Home Owners v. Pena, 88 N.M. 563, 544 P.2d 278 (1975). However, it is equally well-settled that restrictive covenants do not control a decision on the question of whether a variance should be granted by a zoning authority in a variance proceeding. Only private parties possess the right to enforce restrictive covenants. Suess v. Vogelgesang, 151 Ind. App. 631, 281 *348 N.E.2d 536 (1972); Whiting v. Seavey, 159 Me. 61, 188 A.2d 276 (1963); In Re Michener's Appeal, 382 Pa. 401, 115 A.2d 367 (1955). See also R.M. Anderson, 3 American Law of Zoning 2d § 18.75 (1977). But cf. Francis v. Rios, 350 F. Supp. 1130 (D.V.I. 1972), where the court stated that the Planning Board should confine its discretion in granting exceptions to situations where restrictive covenants do not create a bar. In In Re Michener's Appeal, supra, the court stated: Id., 382 Pa. 401, 115 A.2d at 369. In Whiting v. Seavey, supra, the court was faced with a situation similar to ours here. The court found: Id., 159 Me. 61, 188 A.2d at 280-81. The logic behind this reasoning is explained in In Re Michener's Appeal, supra: Id., 382 Pa. 401, 115 A.2d at 370. Thus, Singleterrys were faced with two choices when the variance was granted: (1) they could elect not to proceed under the variance; or (2) they could proceed under the variance and risk defending a lawsuit for violation of restrictive covenants. While we think a zoning authority should consider restrictive covenants in a variance proceeding, as was suggested in Francis v. Rios, supra, the zoning authority is not bound by restrictive covenants in granting a variance. Here, there is evidence in the record showing that the zoning authority knew of the restrictive covenants, yet determined to impose conditions on the variance which would violate the restrictive covenants. Nonetheless, it was within the Commission's discretion to do so. It was error for the trial court to give conclusive weight to the restrictive covenants in making its decision. Singleterrys concede that cities have the power to impose reasonable conditions on variances. Such conditions are allowed by statute. Section 3-21-8, N.M.S.A. 1978 *349 (Cum.Supp. 1980), provides that a zoning authority may: In this case, the trial court found that Singleterrys applied for a variance requesting a standard twelve-foot chainlink fence. The variance granted was for an open chainlink fence and there could be no vines or other foliage so as to impair one's aesthetic view. Although the City had at some previous time approved the existent eight-foot high block wall, the condition imposed required this wall to be reduced to a height of forty-two inches. Based upon these facts found by the trial court, the conditions imposed meet the criteria set forth in Section 3-21-8. Singleterrys do not attack this. Rather, they argue that conditions imposed cannot require illegal conduct. Gerla v. City of Tacoma, 12 Wash. App. 883, 533 P.2d 416 (1975). We agree. However, we have not been directed to any law making it illegal to reduce a wall height to forty-two inches. Even if such conduct were illegal, Singleterrys were not required to comply with the variance. They could have done nothing at all. The conditions imposed by the Environmental Planning Commission here were within the standards set forth in Section 3-21-8, and could be properly imposed. The standard of the district court's review of the zoning authority's decision is explained in Llano, Inc. v. Southern Union Gas Co., 75 N.M. 7, 11, 399 P.2d 646, 649 (1964), quoted with approval in Coe v. City of Albuquerque, 76 N.M. 771, 774, 418 P.2d 545-48 (1966): It does not matter what the judgment of the trial court would have been when presented with a request for a variance. So long as the zoning authority's decision was not fraudulent, arbitrary or capricious, it must stand. Coe v. City of Albuquerque, supra. While the trial court could consider the restrictive covenants involved here, there is no other evidence found by the trial court to constitute arbitrary or capricious conduct by the zoning authority. Violation of restrictive covenants alone is not a sufficient basis for finding an abuse of discretion in a variance proceeding. Apparently the trial judge was of the view that in variance proceedings the zoning authority could not impose conditions which conflict with the restrictive covenants. We have considered other issues raised on appeal and deem it unnecessary to address them in light of our disposition of the issues above. The trial court is reversed. Judgment should be entered sustaining the decision of the zoning authority in this matter. IT IS SO ORDERED. EASLEY, C.J., and RIORDAN, J., concur.