Case Title: Crown Services, Inc. v. Miami Valley Paper Tube Co.

Citation: 2020-Ohio-4409

Docket Number: 2019-0665

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2020-09-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Crown Servs., Inc. v. Miami Valley Paper Tube Co., Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4409.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-4409 
CROWN SERVICES, INC., ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. MIAMI VALLEY PAPER TUBE 
COMPANY, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Crown Servs., Inc. v. Miami Valley Paper Tube Co., Slip 
Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4409.] 
Civil Procedure—R.C. 2505.02—Final, appealable order—Dismissal of case 
without prejudice based on forum non conveniens is not a final, appealable 
order because it does not prevent refiling and therefore does not affect a 
substantial right, determine the action, or prevent a judgment—Judgment 
affirmed. 
(No. 2019-0665—Submitted February 26, 2020—Decided September 15, 2020) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 108323. 
__________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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STEWART, J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal we consider whether a trial court’s order dismissing a 
case without prejudice based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens is a final, 
appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2505.02.  We hold that it is not, and therefore, 
we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} Appellant Crown Services, Inc., is an Ohio corporation with offices 
in Columbus, Ohio and Florence, Kentucky.  Crown provides temporary staffing 
services to its clients.  Appellee, Miami Valley Paper Tube Company, is an Ohio 
corporation with a manufacturing facility in Crittenden, Kentucky.  Miami Valley 
manufactures paper cores and tubes.  Appellant American Zurich Insurance 
Company is an insurance company that does business as a workers’ compensation 
insurer in Kentucky. 
{¶ 3} On September 21, 2015, Crown entered into a “General Staffing 
Agreement” with Miami Valley to provide temporary employees at Miami Valley’s 
Crittenden facility.  The staffing agreement required Crown to maintain workers’ 
compensation insurance for its employees in accordance with the laws of Kentucky.  
Crown’s workers’ compensation policy was with Zurich. 
{¶ 4} Although Crown was required to maintain a workers’ compensation 
policy in accordance with the laws of Kentucky, the staffing agreement contained 
a forum-selection clause establishing that the agreement is governed by the laws of 
Ohio.  The clause provides: 
 
The validity and interpretation of this Agreement shall be 
governed by and construed under, and the legal relations between 
the parties hereto will be determined in accordance with, the laws of 
the State of Ohio, without giving effect to such state’s conflict of 
law principles.  The parties agree to exclusive personal jurisdiction 
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and venue in any court of competent jurisdiction located in the State 
of Ohio. 
 
{¶ 5} On August 23, 2017, one of Crown’s employees was injured while 
working at Miami Valley’s Crittenden facility.  As a result, Crown and Zurich 
became obligated under Kentucky law to pay workers’ compensation benefits to 
the injured worker in the amount of $1,944,807.  Crown and Zurich filed a lawsuit 
against Miami Valley on August 22, 2018, seeking to recover the amount they had 
been required to pay.  The lawsuit was filed in the Cuyahoga County Court of 
Common Pleas in Ohio.  The complaint asserted that Crown’s employee was 
injured as the direct and proximate cause of Miami Valley’s breach of the staffing 
agreement, which required that Miami Valley properly train employees, provide 
employees with safe working conditions, and properly control and safeguard the 
premises of its facility. 
{¶ 6} On October 2, 2018, Miami Valley filed a motion for change of venue 
to the Common Pleas Court in Franklin County, Ohio, the county of Crown’s 
principal place of business.  The motion asserted that no party to the lawsuit had 
any connection to Cuyahoga County and thus, venue there was improper under 
Civ.R. 3(C). 
{¶ 7} Crown and Zurich opposed the motion, arguing that pursuant to the 
forum-selection clause in the staffing agreement, venue was proper in any Ohio 
court of competent jurisdiction.  On October 23, 2018, the trial court denied Miami 
Valley’s motion for change of venue. 
{¶ 8} Crown and Zurich filed an amended complaint in the Cuyahoga 
County Court of Common Pleas on November 3, 2018.  Miami Valley filed a 
motion to dismiss the complaint based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens.  
Specifically, Miami Valley argued that the action should be filed in the Circuit 
Court in Grant County, Kentucky.  Crown and Zurich opposed the motion, asserting 
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that the forum-selection clause in the staffing agreement controls where the action 
could be filed and that the clause should be enforced.  They further argued that 
despite the fact that the workplace injury occurred in Kentucky, Kentucky does not 
have a greater interest in the contract than Ohio. 
{¶ 9} Notwithstanding the forum-selection clause in the staffing agreement, 
the trial court dismissed the case, without prejudice, based on forum non 
conveniens.  In its analysis, the trial court discounted the private interests of the 
litigants based on the staffing agreement’s forum-selection clause.  Instead, the trial 
court considered public-interest factors affecting the citizens of Cuyahoga County 
and the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas and determined that the 
Kentucky court was a more convenient forum for this case because resolution of 
the dispute would involve the application of Kentucky workers’ compensation law 
and would require a Cuyahoga County jury to hear and resolve a factual dispute 
based on conduct that occurred in Kentucky.1  Accordingly, the court granted 
Miami Valley’s motion to dismiss on the condition that the company stipulate that 
it would not dispute jurisdiction in Kentucky.  Miami Valley filed the stipulation 
and the trial court dismissed the amended complaint without prejudice. 
{¶ 10} Crown and Zurich appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals.  
Miami Valley filed a motion to dismiss the appeal arguing that the trial court’s 
dismissal without prejudice pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens was 
not a final order under R.C. 2505.02. 
{¶ 11} Citing two cases from the Eighth District, the court of appeals 
dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction on the basis that a dismissal without 
                                                          
 
1.  Although not cited by the trial court, we note that the Supreme Court of the United States has 
said that when parties agree to a forum selection, they waive the right to challenge that forum as 
inconvenient, and that “ ‘a valid forum-selection clause [should be] given controlling weight in all 
but the most exceptional cases.’ ”  (Brackets in Atlantic Marine.)  Atlantic Marine Constr. Co., Inc. 
v. United States Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Texas, 571 U.S. 49, 63-64, 134 S.Ct. 568, 187 L.Ed.2d 
487 (2013), quoting Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 33, 108 S.Ct. 2239, 101 L.Ed.2d 
22 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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prejudice based on forum non conveniens is not a final, appealable order.  See 
Siegel v. Boss, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101934, 2015-Ohio-689; Century Business 
Servs., Inc. v. Bryant, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 80507 and 80508, 2002-Ohio-2967.  
The court’s journal entry further explained that this court’s decision in Natl. City 
Commercial Capital Corp. v. AAAA at Your Serv., Inc., 114 Ohio St.3d 82, 2007-
Ohio-2942, 868 N.E.2d 663, is distinguishable from this case because Natl. City 
involved a dismissal without prejudice based on personal jurisdiction rather than 
forum non conveniens.  Finally, the Eighth District noted that this court’s decision 
in Chambers v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 35 Ohio St.3d 123, 519 N.E.2d 370 
(1988), did not address whether Ohio’s district courts of appeals have jurisdiction 
to review a trial court’s dismissal without prejudice based on forum non 
conveniens. 
{¶ 12} We accepted Crown and Zurich’s appeal on the following 
proposition of law:  “A dismissal by a trial court of an action, otherwise properly 
venued, on the grounds of forum non conveniens constitutes a final, appealable 
order under R.C. 2505.02.” See 156 Ohio St.3d 1464, 2019-Ohio-2892, 126 N.E.3d 
1168. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 13} Article IV, Section 3(B)(2) of the Ohio Constitution provides that 
appellate courts have jurisdiction to review final orders and judgments.  A final 
order “ ‘dispos[es] of the whole case or some separate and distinct branch 
thereof.’ ”  Noble v. Colwell, 44 Ohio St.3d 92, 94, 540 N.E.2d 1381 (1989), 
quoting Lantsberry v. Tilley Lamp Co., Ltd., 27 Ohio St.2d 303, 306, 272 N.E.2d 
127 (1971). 
{¶ 14} R.C. 2505.02(B) defines a final order and provides:   
 
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An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, 
modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the 
following: 
(1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that 
in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment; 
(2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special 
proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after 
judgment; 
(3) An order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants 
a new trial; 
(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and 
to which both of the following apply: 
(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to 
the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in 
favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy. 
(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful 
or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all 
proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action. 
(5) An order that determines that an action may or may not 
be maintained as a class action; 
(6) An order determining the constitutionality of any 
changes to the Revised Code made by Am. Sub. S.B. 281 of the 
124th general assembly * * *; 
(7) An order in an appropriation proceeding that may be 
appealed pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 163.09 of the 
Revised Code. 
 
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{¶ 15} R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) provides that “[a]n order is a final order that may 
be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is  
* * * [a]n order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect determines 
the action and prevents a judgment.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 16} R.C. 2505.02(A)(1) defines “substantial right” as “a right that the 
United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a 
rule of procedure entitles a person to enforce or protect.”  Under the statute, 
however, the mere existence or implication of a substantial right in a case is 
insufficient to create a final order.  Instead, the “crucial question” is whether the 
order “affects a substantial right.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Bell v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 67 
Ohio St.3d 60, 63, 616 N.E.2d 181 (1993).  An order affects a substantial right 
“only if an immediate appeal is necessary to protect the right effectively.”  Wilhelm-
Kissinger v. Kissinger, 129 Ohio St.3d 90, 2011-Ohio-2317, 950 N.E.2d 516, ¶ 7, 
citing Bell at 63. 
{¶ 17} An order determines the action and prevents a judgment when it 
“dispose[s] of the merits of the cause or some separate and distinct branch thereof 
and leave[s] nothing for the determination of the court,” VIL Laser Sys., L.L.C. v. 
Shiloh Industries, Inc., 119 Ohio St.3d 354, 2008-Ohio-3920, 894 N.E.2d 303, ¶ 8.  
See also Natl. City, 114 Ohio St.3d 82, 2007-Ohio-2942, 868 N.E.2d 663, at ¶ 7.  
“A judgment that leaves issues unresolved and contemplates further action is not a 
final, appealable order.”  VIL Laser at ¶ 8.  For example, in VIL Laser, we found an 
order was not final and appealable because it gave a party the option of choosing 
between remittitur and a new trial for damages, notwithstanding the fact that the 
order stated that it was final and granted a new trial.  Id. at ¶ 9, 14.  In Natl. City, 
however, we found that an order dismissing an action based on lack of personal 
jurisdiction was a final, appealable order because it prevented refiling the action 
and because the trial court did not retain jurisdiction.  Id. at ¶ 8-9, 12. 
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{¶ 18} “The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may 
resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the 
letter of a general venue statute.”  Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507, 67 
S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947).  Forum non conveniens assumes proper 
jurisdiction and venue in the court in which the plaintiff has chosen to file a 
complaint and also assumes that jurisdiction and venue are proper in the court of 
another state or country.  Chambers, 35 Ohio St.3d at 126, 132, 519 N.E.2d 370. 
{¶ 19} In Chambers, we adopted the doctrine of forum non conveniens for 
use by Ohio courts.  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.  The plaintiffs in Chambers 
were from the United Kingdom.  Id. at 124.  They filed actions in Ohio against 
Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of 
business in Hamilton County, Ohio.  Id.  The underlying actions involved birth 
defects allegedly caused by a drug developed by the company to relieve nausea and 
vomiting during pregnancy.  Id.  A “counterpart of this drug * * * was marketed 
and distributed * * * by a wholly owned British subsidiary of Merrell-Dow, 
Richardson-Merrell, Ltd.”  Id.  Merrell-Dow filed a motion to dismiss based on 
forum non conveniens, arguing that the United Kingdom was a more convenient 
forum.  Id.  The trial court granted the motion conditioned on Merrell-Dow’s 
consent to be sued in the United Kingdom and its agreement to make any witnesses 
and documents available and to waive any applicable statute of limitations.  Id.  
“The court of appeals affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 
conditional dismissal of the actions in favor of the more appropriate British forum.”  
Id. 
{¶ 20} We affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that the 
decision to dismiss a complaint based on the common-law doctrine of forum non 
conveniens is within “the sound discretion” of Ohio trial courts and “may be 
employed pursuant to the inherent powers of such court to achieve the ends of 
justice and convenience of the parties and witnesses.”  Id. at paragraph one of the 
January Term, 2020 
 
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syllabus.  We also established that although forum non conveniens is not in conflict 
with the Rules of Civil Procedure, a court cannot dismiss a case based on forum 
non conveniens in order for the case to be transferred to a court in another Ohio 
county, because the “transfer of an action within the Ohio judicial system involves 
considerations wholly separate from a conditional dismissal and refiling outside 
Ohio” and is already governed by another rule.  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 131-132; see 
also State ex rel. Smith v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 106 Ohio St.3d 
151, 2005-Ohio-4103, 832 N.E.2d 1206, ¶ 15; State ex rel. Lyons v. Zaleski, 75 
Ohio St.3d 623, 624, 665 N.E.2d 212 (1996). 
{¶ 21} In this case, Crown and Zurich assert that a dismissal based on forum 
non conveniens must be a final, appealable order, in part because we established an 
abuse-of-discretion standard of review in Chambers.  We acknowledge that the 
Chambers opinion stated that the applicable standard for an appeal based on a 
forum non conveniens dismissal is to review for “a clear abuse of discretion.”  
Chambers, 35 Ohio St.3d at 127, 519 N.E.2d 370.  But our analysis does not end 
there.  Whether a dismissal based on forum non conveniens is a final, appealable 
order was not before the court in Chambers, and Chambers did not discuss—as 
Crown and Zurich have also neglected to do in this case—jurisprudence on the 
appealability of dismissals without prejudice.  In other words, the standard of 
review for a trial court’s dismissal of a case based on the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens is abuse of discretion—but only if that dismissal is a final order subject 
to review.  So we clarify here that a dismissal without prejudice based upon forum 
non conveniens is not a final, appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2505.02(B) and is 
therefore not subject to appellate review. 
{¶ 22} Crown and Zurich argue that our decision in Natl. City, 114 Ohio 
St.3d 82, 2007-Ohio-2942, 868 N.E.2d 663, should apply to cases involving 
dismissals based on forum non conveniens because the trial court did not retain 
jurisdiction over the case.  But Natl. City involved a dispute over personal 
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jurisdiction.  Id. at ¶ 4.  The plaintiff in Natl. City was seeking to enforce a forum-
selection clause in a contract, but the defendants moved to dismiss, claiming that 
Ohio did not have personal jurisdiction over them.  Id.  The trial court determined 
that there was no evidence in the record that the defendants were subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Ohio court.  Id. at ¶ 8.  We noted that a dismissal for lack of 
personal jurisdiction “ ‘operate[s] as a failure otherwise than on the merits,’ ” id., 
quoting Civ.R. 41(B)(4)(a), and that “[o]rdinarily, a dismissal ‘otherwise than on 
the merits’ does not prevent a party from refiling and, therefore, ordinarily, such a 
dismissal is not a final, appealable order.”  Id.  However, this court held that the 
dismissal satisfied R.C. 2505.02 because it prevented the plaintiff from refiling the 
action and left nothing for the trial court to determine.  Id. 
{¶ 23} By contrast, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, jurisdiction 
and venue are proper.  Whether the trial court retained jurisdiction is irrelevant 
because “ ‘ “[a] dismissal without prejudice leaves the parties as if no action had 
been brought at all.” ’ ”  C.H. v. O’Malley, 158 Ohio St.3d 107, 2019-Ohio-4382, 
140 N.E.3d 589, ¶ 18, quoting Denham v. New Carlisle, 86 Ohio St.3d 594, 596, 
716 N.E.2d 184 (1999), quoting DeVille Photography, Inc. v. Bowers, 169 Ohio St. 
267, 272, 159 N.E.2d 443 (1959).  Thus, a dismissal without prejudice based on 
forum non conveniens does not prevent refiling the action in any court, even in the 
court where the action was originally filed.  Furthermore, it is unclear how Crown 
and Zurich reached the conclusion that the dismissal without prejudice in this case 
prevents refiling in the trial court.  The only condition the trial court noted in the 
dismissal order was that Miami Valley must not dispute jurisdiction in Kentucky. 
The dissenting opinion reads this condition as an attempt by the trial court to require 
Crown and Zurich to file this action in Kentucky, thereby “eliminat[ing] Crown’s 
contractual right to litigate the case in Cuyahoga County” pursuant to the forum-
January Term, 2020 
 
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selection clause of the contract.  Dissenting opinion at ¶ 39.2  As we clearly establish 
in this opinion, that is not the case.  The trial-court order dismissing this case 
without prejudice does not prevent Crown and Zurich from refiling this action in 
any Ohio court of competent jurisdiction, including the Common Pleas Court in 
Cuyahoga County. 
{¶ 24} The dissenting opinion asserts that the dismissal affects a substantial 
right by abrogating constitutionally protected contractual rights.  The dissenting 
opinion further asserts that when there is a forum-selection clause in a contract, 
dismissing the action without prejudice based upon the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens prevents a judgment in the plaintiffs’ favor and determines the action 
by terminating the proceeding and therefore, is a final, appealable order within the 
meaning of Article IV, Section 3(B)(2) of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 2505.03.  
Although the dismissal order concerns a substantial right, it does not determine the 
action and prevent a judgment.  R.C. 2505.02(B)(1); see Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent 
State Univ., 44 Ohio St.3d 86, 88, 541 N.E.2d 64 (1989) (to be final, an order that 
affects a substantial right must also determine an action and prevent a judgment), 
citing R.C. 2505.02.  Here, the language of the trial court’s order dismissing the 
case without prejudice terminated the action but not on the merits.  See Goudlock 
v. Voorhies, 119 Ohio St.3d 398, 2008-Ohio-4787, 894 N.E.2d 692, ¶ 10, citing 
Chadwick v. Barba Lou, Inc., 69 Ohio St.2d 222, 226, 431 N.E.2d 660 (1982), fn. 
4.  The order does not prevent or require refiling in any particular court.  As 
acknowledged above, a valid forum-selection clause should be given controlling 
weight in all but the most exceptional cases.  Atlantic Marine Constr. Co. v. United 
                                                          
 
2.  Although the forum-selection clause states that the staffing agreement is to be governed by Ohio 
law and the parties agree to venue and personal jurisdiction in Ohio, the contract does not give 
Crown the “right to litigate the case in Cuyahoga County” as the dissenting opinion asserts.  
Dissenting opinion at ¶ 39. 
 
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States Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Texas, 571 U.S. 49, 63-64, 134 S.Ct. 568, 187 
L.Ed.2d 487 (2013).  The forum-selection clause in this contract is for any court of 
competent jurisdiction in Ohio, not just for the Cuyahoga County Court of Common 
Pleas.  The trial court may or may not have given proper weight to the forum-
selection clause in the parties’ contract, but regardless of this, the contract does not 
restrict the trial court’s authority to dismiss a case without prejudice based upon the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens, and the trial court’s decision in this case does 
not transform the dismissal into a final order under R.C. 2505.02.  Allowing for 
such a transformation is up to the General Assembly. State v. Smorgala, 50 Ohio 
St.3d 222, 223, 553 N.E.2d 672 (1990).  This court cannot ignore the criteria in 
R.C. 2505.02(B) in order to reach a legal conclusion with respect to R.C. 2505.03. 
{¶ 25} We recognize that Natl. City addressed whether a dismissal other 
than on the merits was a final, appealable order, and it involved circumstances 
under which a trial court’s dismissal was ordinarily not reviewable under R.C. 
2505.02.  However, in that case, there was a dispute over whether the trial court 
could adjudicate the case between the parties.  In the context of forum non 
conveniens, there is no question that the court can adjudicate the case between the 
parties; the court simply decides not to do so.  And that discretionary dismissal, 
made without prejudice, is not reviewable. 
{¶ 26} Finally, the dissenting opinion cites federal authority and a seminal 
treatise on federal practice and procedure to support its argument that a forum non 
conveniens dismissal is appealable when there is a forum-selection clause in a 
contract.  Dissenting opinion at ¶ 44.  It is true that a federal forum non conveniens 
dismissal is appealable.  See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 102 S.Ct. 
252, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981) (affirming the district court’s forum non conveniens 
dismissal without comment on the order’s appealability in a case where the chosen 
forum was the United States but the more convenient forum was Scotland); 15A 
Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 3914.12, at 726 
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(2d Ed.1992), fn. 23.  But in such a case, the dismissal means the case cannot be 
brought anywhere in the United States federal court system.  If another forum in 
the United States is more convenient, the proper vehicle is a motion to transfer 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1404(a).  Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 55, 134 S.Ct. 568, 187 
L.Ed.2d 487.3  And it is settled that an order granting or denying a motion to transfer 
a case is not immediately appealable.  See Miller v. Toyota Corp., 554 F.3d 653, 
655 (6th Cir.2009), quoting Lemon v. Druffel, 253 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir.1958) 
(“as a general matter at least, it has long been ‘settled that an order granting a 
transfer or denying a transfer is interlocutory and not appealable’ ”); 15A Wright, 
Miller & Cooper, Section 3914.12, at 718, fn. 5.  Thus, generally, an order 
enforcing a forum-selection clause will not be immediately appealable in the federal 
court system. 
{¶ 27} For an order to be final and appealable under R.C. 2505.02, it must 
be an order that “affect[s] a substantial right and in effect determine[s] the action 
and prevent[s] a judgment.”  VIL Laser, 119 Ohio St.3d 354, 2008-Ohio-3920, 894 
N.E.2d 303, at ¶ 7, citing R.C. 2505.02(B)(1).  A dismissal of a case without 
prejudice based upon forum non conveniens does not satisfy R.C. 2505.02, because 
it does not prevent refiling.  Thus, it does not affect a substantial right, determine 
the action, or prevent a judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 28} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the dismissal in this case, 
that is without prejudice, based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens, is not a 
final, appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2505.02.  We therefore affirm the judgment 
of the Eighth District Court of Appeals. 
                                                          
 
3.  Dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1406(a) is only allowed when venue is “wrong” or “improper,” 
which “depends exclusively on whether the court in which the case was brought satisfies the 
requirements of federal venue laws,” regardless of a forum-selection clause.  Atl. Marine at 55-56.  
See 28 U.S.C. 1391(b) (setting forth proper venue for civil actions brought in federal district courts). 
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Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, and DONNELLY, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by FRENCH, J. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 29} When a cause of action is brought in a particular forum pursuant to 
a forum-selection clause in a contract, a trial-court order dismissing that action on 
the basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens is a “final order” within the 
meaning of Article IV, Section 3(B)(2) of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. Chapter 
2505.  An order dismissing an action on that basis affects a substantial right by 
abrogating constitutionally protected contractual rights, it determines the action the 
plaintiff filed by terminating the proceeding, and it prevents a judgment in the 
plaintiff’s favor in that action.  See  R.C. 2505.02(A)(1) and (B)(1).  Because the 
Eighth District Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction to review the dismissal 
of the complaint in this case, I dissent from the majority’s judgment today to affirm 
the dismissal of the appeal of appellants, Crown Services, Inc., and American 
Zurich Insurance Company, for lack of jurisdiction. 
{¶ 30} This case, on the surface, might appear to concern only an arcane 
question of appellate jurisdiction.  However, its importance to the people and 
businesses of this state cannot be overstated.  At stake in this appeal is the freedom 
of Ohioans to bargain for forum-selection clauses in their contracts and to expect 
that the parties to them will live up to their side of the bargain.  A forum-selection 
clause is an indispensable tool of interstate and international business that allows 
contracting parties to avoid uncertainty in potential litigation by agreeing in 
advance on a forum that is acceptable to both parties.  See M/S Bremen v. Zapata 
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972); Claudio-De 
Leon v. Sistema Universitario Ana G. Mendez, 775 F.3d 41, 47 (1st Cir.2014).  
January Term, 2020 
 
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These clauses operate by “overrid[ing] the otherwise applicable rules (whether 
derived from statutes or rules of procedure) regarding venue and forum selection, 
including the forum non conveniens test.”  Ex parte Riverfront, L.L.C., 196 So.3d 
1167, 1173 (Ala.2015) (Murdock, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
result). 
{¶ 31} “ ‘The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may 
resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the 
letter of a general venue statute.’ ”  Chambers v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 35 Ohio St.3d 123, 125-126, 519 N.E.2d 370 (1988), quoting Gulf Oil Corp. 
v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947).  The doctrine 
provides criteria for deciding when the plaintiff’s choice of forum should be 
overridden because of its inconvenience to the defendant and witnesses or because 
the parties’ relationship to the forum does not justify the imposition on its courts 
and citizens.  Id. at 126-127. 
{¶ 32} In this case, appellee, Miami Valley Paper Tube Company, promised 
in its agreement with Crown Services to concede “exclusive personal jurisdiction 
and venue in any court of competent jurisdiction located in the State of Ohio.”  In 
reliance on the bargain that the parties struck, Crown Services and its insurer, 
American Zurich Insurance, filed suit against Miami Valley Paper Tube in the 
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, seeking indemnity against their liability 
on a workers’ compensation claim.  Miami Valley Paper Tube then sought to escape 
from the forum-selection clause it had signed, relying on the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens to have the complaint dismissed subject to Miami Valley Paper Tube’s 
stipulation that it would not dispute jurisdiction in the circuit court in Grant County, 
Kentucky, once the complaint was refiled there. 
{¶ 33} The trial court declined to give effect to the forum-selection clause 
that Miami Valley Paper Tube had freely bargained for and dismissed the complaint 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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without prejudice to refiling in Kentucky based on forum non conveniens.  Crown 
Services and American Zurich Insurance sought appellate review, but the Eighth 
District Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on the basis that a dismissal without 
prejudice based on forum non conveniens is not a final, appealable order.  In its 
ruling, the appellate court declined to follow our decisions in Chambers and Natl. 
City Commercial Capital Corp. v. AAAA at Your Serv., Inc., 114 Ohio St.3d 82, 
2007-Ohio-2942, 868 N.E.2d 663. 
{¶ 34} In Chambers, this court adopted the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens and also set forth “the applicable standard of review upon appeal from 
a forum non conveniens dismissal”—that is, abuse of discretion.  (Emphasis added.)  
35 Ohio St.3d at 127, 519 N.E.2d 370.  And in holding that a dismissal for lack of 
personal jurisdiction may be reviewed by an appellate court, this court cited 
Chambers as a case where the court had previously “reviewed a dismissal based 
upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens.”  Natl. City Commercial Capital Corp. 
at ¶ 11. 
{¶ 35} The Eighth District concluded that these cases had not specifically 
considered whether Ohio’s courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review a dismissal 
based on forum non conveniens.  It therefore relied on its own case precedent 
holding that a dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds is not a final order and 
dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 
{¶ 36} Article IV, Section 3(B)(2) of the Ohio Constitution establishes the 
appellate jurisdiction of Ohio’s courts of appeals:  
 
Courts of appeals shall have such jurisdiction as may be 
provided by law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments 
or final orders of the courts of record inferior to the court of appeals 
within the district, except that courts of appeals shall not have 
January Term, 2020 
 
17 
jurisdiction to review on direct appeal a judgment that imposes a 
sentence of death. 
 
R.C. 2501.02 effectuates this language, providing that the courts of appeals “shall 
have jurisdiction upon an appeal upon questions of law to review, affirm, modify, 
set aside, or reverse judgments or final orders of courts of record inferior to the 
court of appeals within the district.”  See also R.C. 2505.03. 
{¶ 37} R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) defines the term “final order” to include “[a]n 
order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect determines the action 
and prevents a judgment.”  A “substantial right” is defined as “a right that the 
United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a 
rule of procedure entitles a person to enforce or protect.”  R.C. 2505.02(A)(1). 
{¶ 38} There can be no question that the dismissal of appellants’ complaint 
affected a substantial right.  The freedom to contract is enshrined in Article II, 
Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution, and “[i]t has long been recognized that persons 
have a fundamental right to contract freely with the expectation that the terms of 
the contract will be enforced,” Nottingdale Homeowners’ Assn., Inc. v. Darby, 33 
Ohio St.3d 32, 36, 514 N.E.2d 702 (1987).  As we have explained, “[t]he right to 
contract freely with the expectation that the contract shall endure according to its 
terms is as fundamental to our society as the right to write and to speak without 
restraint.”  Blount v. Smith, 12 Ohio St.2d 41, 47, 231 N.E.2d 301 (1967).  And 
more specifically, we have upheld forum-selection clauses contained in commercial 
contracts between business entities such as Crown Services and Miami Valley 
Paper Tube.  E.g., Kennecorp Mtge. Brokers, Inc. v. Country Club Convalescent 
Hosp., Inc., 66 Ohio St.3d 173, 610 N.E.2d 987 (1993). 
{¶ 39} Crown Services and Miami Valley Paper Tube bargained for a 
forum-selection clause, and they both had the right to have it enforced by the trial 
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18 
courts of this state.  Crown Services exercised its contractual right under the forum-
selection clause and selected Cuyahoga County as the venue in this action.  When 
it agreed to be sued in any county in Ohio, Miami Valley Paper Tube waived its 
ability to contest the convenience of litigating this action in Cuyahoga County.  
Accordingly, when the trial court declined to enforce the forum-selection clause on 
the basis of forum non conveniens, it affected Crown Services’ substantial right—
in fact, the judgment of dismissal conditioned on Miami Valley Paper Tube’s 
refiling of the action in Kentucky eliminated Crown Services’ contractual right to 
litigate the case in Cuyahoga County. 
{¶ 40} “For an order to determine the action and prevent a judgment for the 
party appealing, it must dispose of the whole merits of the cause or some separate 
and distinct branch thereof and leave nothing for the determination of the court.”  
Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities v. Professionals Guild 
of Ohio, 46 Ohio St.3d 147, 153, 545 N.E.2d 1260 (1989).  An order that “leaves 
issues unresolved and contemplates further action is not a final, appealable order 
under [R.C. 2505.02(B)(1)] unless the remaining issue is mechanical and involved 
only a ministerial task.”  VIL Laser Sys., L.L.C. v. Shiloh Industries, Inc., 119 Ohio 
St.3d 354, 2008-Ohio-3920, 894 N.E.2d 303, ¶ 8.  And an order cannot prevent a 
judgment until it is journalized.  Cleveland v. Trzebuckowski, 85 Ohio St.3d 524, 
526, 709 N.E.2d 1148 (1999); Painter & Pollis, Ohio Appellate Practice, Section 
2:7 (2019). 
{¶ 41} Here, the dismissal disposed of all the claims before the court, 
leaving nothing further for the trial court to resolve.  There was no further action 
contemplated and the trial court did not reserve jurisdiction over the case.  As the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has explained, a dismissal 
on forum non conveniens grounds “ends the case before the court,” Manez v. 
Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, L.L.C., 533 F.3d 578, 583 (7th Cir.2008), and 
January Term, 2020 
 
19 
“the underlying litigation is finished,” id. at 584.  The dismissal also prevented a 
judgment in Crown Services’ favor; the order was journalized and the dismissal 
terminated the case.  See State ex rel. Fifth Third Mtge. Co. v. Russo, 129 Ohio 
St.3d 250, 2011-Ohio-3177, 951 N.E.2d 414, ¶ 17 (addressing a Civ.R. 41(A)(1) 
dismissal). 
{¶ 42} Therefore, when a cause of action is brought in a particular forum 
pursuant to a contract containing a forum-selection clause, a dismissal based on the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens is a final, appealable order pursuant to Article 
IV, Section 3(B)(2) of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 2505.03. 
{¶ 43} This conclusion accords with the prevailing rule in other 
jurisdictions that a dismissal based on forum non conveniens is final and 
appealable.  E.g., Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, L.L.C., ___ U.S. ___, 140 
S.Ct. 582, 590, 205 L.Ed.2d 419 (2020); Tucker v. Cochran Firm-Criminal Defense 
Birmingham, L.L.C., 2014 OK 112, 341 P.3d 673, ¶ 36; Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. 
Court ex rel. Clark Cty., 120 Nev. 222, 225, 88 P.3d 840 (2004); Beaven v. 
McAnulty, 980 S.W.2d 284, 289 (Ky.1998), superseded in part by statute as stated 
in Dollar General Stores, Ltd. v. Smith, 237 S.W.3d 162 (Ky.2007). 
{¶ 44} A contrary holding would render a ruling on forum non conveniens 
unreviewable, even when the trial court dismisses the action for refiling in a foreign 
country and denies a party of its bargain in a forum-selection clause.  Once the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens is applied, res judicata bars any further attempt 
to relitigate that issue, at least absent changed circumstances.  See Hernandez v. 
Karlin Foods Corp., 205 Ill.2d 581, 796 N.E.2d 1062 (2003); Gas Sensing 
Technology Corp. v. Ashton, 795 Fed.Appx. 1010, 1022 (10th Cir.2020); Seales v. 
Panamanian Aviation Co., 356 Fed.Appx. 461, 465 (2d Cir.2009); De Aguilar v. 
Boeing Co., 11 F.3d 55, 58-59 (5th Cir.1993); 18A Wright & Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, Section 4436 (3d Ed.2017); see also Parsons v. 
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20 
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 375 U.S. 71, 73, 84 S.Ct. 185, 11 L.Ed.2d 137 (1963) 
(holding that res judicata did not apply when “the material facts underlying the 
application of [forum non conveniens] in each forum were different in several 
respects”). 
{¶ 45} And to hold, as the majority does, that the dismissal without 
prejudice to refiling in Kentucky permits the refiling of this action in any Ohio court 
of competent jurisdiction, including the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, 
treats the trial court’s ruling on the substantive law as a nullity.  It also openly 
invites Crown Services to relitigate the enforceability of its forum-selection clause 
in any county in this state until it finds a forum willing to hear its complaint.  Such 
a holding is without precedent and runs counter to our judicial policies against 
forum shopping and multiplying litigation. 
{¶ 46} In any case, when the trial court dismissed this action without 
prejudice to refiling in Kentucky, the plain intent of that order was that the dismissal 
was with prejudice to refiling in Cuyahoga County and any other county in this 
state.  It intended to bind Miami Valley Paper Tube to its stipulation to litigate the 
case in Kentucky, and it cannot be said that the dismissal left the parties as if no 
action had been brought at all. 
{¶ 47} The trial court’s judgment decided the issue, subject only to reversal 
on appeal, and we do not permit parties to perpetually relitigate other decisions of 
a court on substantive law, even if they resolve the case other than on the merits of 
the underlying litigation.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Peoples v. Johnson, 152 Ohio St.3d 
418, 2017-Ohio-9140, 97 N.E.3d 426, ¶ 13 (rejecting a rule that would permit “the 
endless relitigation of a court’s [appellate] jurisdiction when [a party] has already 
had a full and fair opportunity to be heard”); Natl. City Commercial Capital Corp., 
114 Ohio St.3d 82, 2007-Ohio-2942, 868 N.E.2d 663, at ¶ 12 (“Even though the 
trial court’s dismissal of the action against the appellants, for lack of personal 
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21 
jurisdiction, is otherwise than on the merits, the trial court did not retain 
jurisdiction, and the dismissal is a final, appealable order”). 
{¶ 48} As a seminal treatise on practice and procedure has explained, “[t]he 
appealability of forum non conveniens dismissal orders is so well established * * * 
that most appeals are decided without comment on jurisdiction.”  15A Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 3914.12 (2d Ed.1992), fn. 23. 
{¶ 49} It should therefore come as no surprise that when we adopted the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens in Chambers, we saw no need to expressly state 
that dismissal on that basis is final and appealable.  In any case, we indicated that 
there was a right to appeal, and inferior courts lack authority to deviate from our 
precedent but rather “are required to follow the law as it is interpreted by this court,” 
Mannion v. Sandel, 91 Ohio St.3d 318, 322, 744 N.E.2d 759 (2001).  Even when 
our precedent appears to be in conflict with other decisions of this court (such as 
our caselaw discussing the appealability of dismissals without prejudice), a court 
of appeals must “follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the 
prerogative of overruling its own decisions,” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. 
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989).  The 
court of appeals’ failure to follow our caselaw, standing alone, is reversible error. 
{¶ 50} For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Eighth 
District Court of Appeals and remand this matter to that court to review the trial 
court’s forum non conveniens dismissal on the merits.  Because the majority does 
not, I dissent. 
 
FRENCH, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
LoPresti, Marcovy & Marotta, L.L.P., Timothy A. Marcovy, and Christian 
D. Foisy, for appellants. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
 
Rolfes Henry Co., L.P.A., John A. Fiocca Jr., and Matthew F.X. Craven, for 
appellee. 
_________________