Case Title: City of North Las Vegas v. State Employee-Mgmt. Relations Bd.

Citation: 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 57

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2011-09-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
comm ae

427 Nev, Advance Opinion 57
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS AND No. 54849
INORTH LAS VEGAS POLICE
DEPARTMENT,
Appellants,

" FILED
THE STATE OF NEVADA LOCAL
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE- SEP 29 2011
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS BOARD space uncevan
AND ERIC SPANNBAUER, oc eS
Respondents. or Soren

 

 

‘Appeal from a district court order denying a petition for
judicial review in a local government employment matter. Eighth Judicial
District Court, Clark County; Kathy A. Hardcastle, Judge.

Affirmed.
Nicholas G. Waskov, Acting City Attorney, L. Steven Demaree, Chief
Deputy City Attorney, and Chris Davis, Deputy City Attorney, North Las

Vegas
for Appellants,

 

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, and Scott R. Davis, Deputy
‘Attorney General, Carson City,

for Respondent State of Nevada Local Government Employee-
Management Relations Board,

Law Office of Daniel Marks and Adam Levine and Daniel Marks, Las
Vegas,
for Respondent Eric Spannbauer.

     

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

2405

 

 
7

OPINION
[By the Court, CHERRY, J.

In this appeal from a district court order denying a petition for
jjudicial review, we first consider the Employee-Management Relations
[Board’s (EMRB) power to consider respondent Eric Spannbauer's NRS
Chapter 288 claims involving prohibited labor practices by a local
government employer. In doing s0, we determine whether the six-month
doadline for filing claims with the EMRB under NRS 288.110(4) is subject
to equitable tolling. We conclude that, like the federal statute on which it
iwas based and the limitations periods of other similar remedial statutes,
NRS 288.110(4) is a statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling.
Therefore, even when a local government employee files a complaint
against the employer more than six months after the complained-of act
loccurred, the complaint might be timely based on the doctrine of equitable
tolling. In the matter before us, we conclude that equitable tolling applied
to allow the EMRB to hear Spannbauer's claims of NRS Chapter 288
violations because he was diligent in filing his claims after acquiring
knowledge of such violations,

We next consider the merits of the EMRB's decision and, thus,
whether there was substantial evidence to support the EMRB's findings
that Spannbauer’s employers, appellants the City of North Las Vegas and
the North Las Vegas Police Department, impermissibly interfered with
‘Spannbauer’s right to a predisciplinary hearing and discriminated against
Spannbauer on the basis of his gender. After carefully reviewing the
record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the EMRB's
finding that the Department interfered with the right to a predisciplinary

hearing and discriminated against Spannbauer on the basis of his gender.

 

 
om ie

As such, we affirm the district court's order denying the City and the
Department's petition for judicial review.
FACTS

Spannbauer was hired by the North Las Vegas Police

 

Department as a police officer and placed on probationary status for the
first 18 months of employment. While still a probationary employee, in
2005, Spannbauer conducted a traffic stop on a female driver for allegedly
not coming to a complete stop at a red light. After the driver was unable
to provide Spannbauer with proof of registration and insurance,
Spannbauer followed her to her nearby residence to retrieve the
documents. Thereafter, the driver's husband submitted a complaint to the
Department, asserting that Spannbauer had made sexually inappropriate
comments when he accompanied the driver to her residence to retrieve the
registration and insurance documents. Consequently, the Department's
Internal Affairs Division commenced an investigation. While the
investigation was ongoing, Spannbauer's probationary period ended,
apparently with no adverse consequences precluding him from being
confirmed as a nonprobationary police officer. Once the investigation
concluded, however, the Department charged Spannbauer with
unprofessional conduct and unsatisfactory work performance and placed
him on administrative leave

Although Spannbauer initially was assigned a union
representative, before the internal affairs investigation concluded, the
representative was removed by Dave Smith, President of the North Las
Vegas Police Department Association. Spannbauer was not assigned a
new representative, but Mark Paresi, Chief of Police for the Department,
told Smith that the Department had the option of treating Spannbauer as
a probationary employee, and Smith told Spannbauer that the

 

 
Department might treat him as a probationary employee. Smith also told
iSpannbauer that Paresi believed that it was in Spannbauer's best interest
jto resign, as no other law enforcement agency could look at Spannbauer's
file in regard to future employment. Then, Smith advised Spannbauer
that he could either resign or proceed with a predisciplinary hearing as a
probationary employee. The Department prepared a letter of agreement

for Spannbauer to sign, On November 7, 2005, Spannbauer resigned,

 

signing the letter of agreement, in which he agreed that he would neither

sue nor make any other claim:

 

against the City or the Department in
[consideration for the internal affairs investigation being closed,

Approximately five months later, on April 5, 2006,
Spannbauer learned that, around the same time that he had faced
disciplinary charges, a female probationary employee of the Department
also had been charged with unprofessional misconduct, albeit while off
duty, and had been disciplined for the misconduct after the probationary
period was over. The female employee received a two-week suspension
without pay. The Department did not consider treating the female
‘employee as a probationary employee, nor did it give her the option to
resign.!

Approximately two months after learning of the female
employee's charges and discipline, on June 1, 2006, Spannbaver filed a
complaint with the EMRB against the Association, the City, and the

 

‘Phe incident that gave rise to the female employee's misconduct
charges was not discussed in detail in the record. However, Spannbauer
testified that the employee and her boyfriend, who was a convicted felon,
had been drinking and, while driving, were pulled over by the police, who
found marijuana and a pipe in the car.

 

 
x.

 

Department, alleging multiple prohibited practices in violation of NRS
Chapter 288, including gender discrimination. Although NRS 288.110(4)
provides that the EMRB may not consider complaints filed more than six
ter the complained-of incident, the EMRB asserted jurisdiction
over Spannbauer's claims based upon the doctrine of equitable tolling,

months

 

apparently concluding that Spannbauer did not know and could not have

 

known about any violation of his rights until he learned of the different
treatment received by the female employee. An evidentiary hearing was
conducted over six days between October 22, 2007, and February 11, 2008.

During the hearing, Smith, the Association president,
acknowledged that Spannbauer was a confirmed, nonprobationary
employee at the time the disciplinary charges were brought against him.
However, Smith stated that Paresi, the Department chief, had asserted
that Spannbauer nevertheless could be considered a probationary
employee for purposes of discipline, since Spannbauer was a probationary
employee when the incident occurred. Also during the hearing,
Spannbauer testified that Smith told him that he was going to be treated
as a probationary employee and that existing caselaw supported him being
treated as a probationary employee. Spannbauer also testified that Smith,
based on Paresi’s assertions, told him that his law enforcement career
would be over if he did not resign, and that the Association would not
represent him if it he was treated as a probationary employee. Further,
Spannbauer testified that he reluctantly signed the letter of agreement
based on Smith's opinions. Spannbauer testified that he was not advised
about his rights under the collective bargaining agreement between the
Association and the City, he was not provided with all of the internal
affairs records in order to properly defend himself, he was never advised

 
that he could challenge his probationary status or file a grievance, and
neither Smith nor his prior representative filed a grievance regarding
policy violations during the internal affairs investigation interviews of
other officers. Paresi did not testify at the EMRB hearing.

Initially, the EMRB found that Spannbauer's complaint was
filed in a timely manner because Spannbauer did not know and could not
have known about a violation of his rights until he learned of the different
treatment received by the female employee, The EMRB also found that
the City and the Department had committed prohibited labor practices,
and that the Association had breached its duty of fair representation.
Specifically, the EMRB found, among other thing:

 

that: (1) Spannbauer

was a local government employee as defined in NRS 288.050, (2) there was

 

no verification of whether caselaw existed supporting the City and the
Department treating Spannbauer as a probationary employee, (3) no
evidence was presented that Spannbauer’s probationary period was
extended, (4) the City and Department did not fully investigate this
matter, (5) the Department's internal investigation was conducted
contrary to its policy, (6) Spannbauer resigned based upon the
misinformation conveyed to him concerning his probationary status with
the Department, and (7) the City and the Department had improperly
treated Spannbauer and the female employee differently in violation of
NRS 288.270. The EMRB ordered that the City, Department, and
Association refrain from prohibited labor practices and reinstated
Spannbauer to his prior position of paid administrative leave pending a

predisciplinary hearing.
‘The City and the Department petitioned the district court for
judicial review. ‘The district court denied the petition, finding that the

 

 
EMRB's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was neither
arbitrary nor capricious. The City, on behalf of itself and the Department,
filed this appeal.

DISCUSSION
‘Standard of review
‘This court, like the district court, gives considerable deference
to the EMRB's rulings. Truckee Meadows v. Int'l Firefighters, 109 Nev.

367, 369, 849 P.2d 343, 345 (1993); see_also NRS 233B.135(3)(e), (0.
“Unless the board should act arbitrarily, unreasonably or capriciously
beyond administrative boundaries the courts must give credence to the
findings of the board. An agency charged with the duty of administering
an act is impliedly clothed with power to construe it as a necessary
precedent to administrative action.” Local Gov't Emp. v. General Sales,
98 Nev. 94, 97, 641 P.2d 478, 480 (1982) (quoting Clark Co. Sch, Dist. v.
Local Gov't, 90 Nev. 442, 446, 530 P.2d 114, 117 (1974)). Nonetheless, we
independently review purely legal determinations, Rio All Suite Hotel &
Casino v, Phillips, 126 Nev. _, _, 240 P.8d 2, 4 (2010). Our review is
limited to the record before the agency. Garcia v, Seolari’s Food & Drug,
125 Nev. 48, 56, 200 P.3d 514, 520 (2009); see NRS 233B.135(1)(b).

‘The EMRB had authority to hear Spannbauer' :
‘month deadline under NRS 288,110(4) is eubject to equitable tolling
‘The City and the Department contend that the EMRB lacked

jurisdiction to hear Spannbauer’s complaint because the complaint was

filed more than six months after any possible adverse employment action

*The Association is not a party to this appeal.

 

 
and thus was filed past the six-month period for filing claims set forth in
NRS 288.110(4), We disagree.

NRS 288.110(4) provides that the EMRB “may not consider
any complaint or appeal filed more than 6 months after the occurrence
which is the subject of the complaint or appeal.” In Cone v. Nevada
Service Employees Union, 116 Nev. 473, 477 n.2, 998 P.2d 1178, 1181 n.2
(2000), and in Rosequist v, International Ass'n of Firefighters, 118 Nev.
444, 447, 49 P.3d 651, 653 (2002), overruled on other grounds by Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Thorpe, 123 Nev. 565, 573 n.22, 170 P.3d 989, 995 n.2
(2007), we described, without discussion, NRS 288.110(4)'s six-month

deadline as a statute of limitations. Given the purpose behind the

 

statute—to establish a time frame for filing claims with the EMRB—this
description as a statute of limitations is not inaccurate. Cf, Black's Law
Dictionary 1546 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “statute of limitations” as “a
statute establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date
when the claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or was discovered)’).
Further, the six-month deadline for instituting claims with the National
Labor Relations Board, upon which the EMRB was based, is likewise
considered a statute of limitations. See N.L.R.B. vy. Public Service Elec,
and Gas Co., 157 F.3d 222, 227-28 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussing the six-month
limitations period of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) section
10), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)); Truckee Meadows, 109 Nev. at 375, 849 P.2d at
348-49 (recognizing that, when considering the operation of NRS Chapter
288, this court is guided by federal precedent interpreting the NLRA).
‘Under this statute of limitations, claims accrue when the
violation or injury occurs. With regard to the NLRA, several federal

circuit courts apply the “unequivocal notice” rule, which means that the

 

 
or

limitations period begins to run “when the victim of an unfair labor
practice receives unequivocal notice of a final adverse decision.” Public
Service Blee, and Gas Co, 157 F.3d at 227 (internal quotation omitted);

see, eg., Wright v. AmSouth Bancorporation, $20 F.8d 1198, 1201-02
(11th Cir. 2003); Bailey v. United Airlines, 279 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir.
2002); Taylor Warehouse Corp, v, NLRB. 98 F.9d 892, 899 (6th Cir.
1996); U.S. Can Co. v. N.L.R.B,, 984 F.2d 864, 867 (7th Cir, 1993);
NLRB. v. Drywall, 974 F.2d 1000, 1003 (8th Cir. 1992); NLRB. v.

Glover Bottled Gas Corp., 905 F.2d 681, 684 (2d Cir, 1990). Likewise, we
interpret the NRS Chapter 288 limitations period to start running when
the alleged victim receives unequivocal notice of a final adverse decision.
‘See Cone, 116 Nev. at 47 n.2, 998 P.2d at 1181 n.2 (indicating that the
six-month period is triggered when the complainant becomes aware that a
prohibited practice actually happened); see generally Nevada State Bank
v, Jamison Partnership, 106 Nev. 792, 800, 801 P.2d 1377, 1382 (1990)
(etating that a “statute of limitation[s] will not commence to run until the
aggrieved party knew, or reasonably should have known, of the facts
giving rise to the breach’).

With regard to Spannbauer's claims, the period would have
started at least by the time Spannbauer resigned on November 6, 2005.
But like other statutes of limitations, NRS 288.110(4)'s deadline is subject
to the equitable defenses of waiver, estoppel, and tolling. See Zipes v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 885, 393, 395 n.11 (1982) (explaining
that because Title VII claims (like NRS Chapter 288 claims) were modeled
after the NLRA’s remedial provisions, Title VIL, like the NLRA, includes a
statute of limitations subject to equitable defenses).

 

 
oo <a

Here, Spannbauer asserts that his claims were subject to
equitable tolling. As recognized by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
equitable tolling “focuses on ‘whether there was excusable delay by the
plaintiff: Ifa reasonable plaintiff would not have known of the existence of
a possible claim within the limitations period, then equitable tolling will
serve to extend the statute of limitations for filing suit until the plaintiff
can gather what information he needs.” Lukovsky v, City and County of
‘San Francisco, 635 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Johnson x.
Henderson, 314 F.3d 409, 414 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Black's Law
Dictionary 618 (9th ed. 2009) (equitable tolling is defined as “[t]he doct
that the statute of limitations will not bar a claim if the plaintiff, despite

 

e

diligent efforts, did not discover the injury until after the limitations
period had expired”). ‘The EMRB's reasonable conclusion that equitable
tolling is permitted with respect to claims that are before it is entitled to
deference. General Sales, 98 Nev. at 98, 611 P.2d at 480.

We have previously recognized equitable tolling for
discrimination claims addressed to the Equal Rights Commission under
NRS Chapter 613. Copeland v. Desert Inn Hotel, 99 Nev. 823, 826, 673
P.24 490, 492 (1983) (providing that “procedural technicalities that would
bar claims of discrimination will be looked upon with disfavor"). In
Copeland, we stated that the following factors, among any other relevant
considerations, should be analyzed when determining whether equitable
tolling will apply: the claimant's diligence, knowledge of the relevant facts,
reliance on misleading authoritative agency statements and/or misleading
‘employer conduct, and any prejudice to the employer. Id.

When considering these factors within the context of this case,
it becomes clear that justice requires the statute of limitations to be tolled.

10

 

 
H

an 0s

In this case, Spannbauer learned on April 5, 2006, that the City and the
Department had treated a female employee under investigation, and
ultimately charged with unprofessional conduct, differently than it had
treated him, even though both investigations and further charges were
based on conduct that had occurred when they were probationary
employees. In particular, evidence in the record demonstrates that, while
Spannbauer was threatened with discipline as a probationary employee,
the female employee was not. Less than two months after discovering this,

 

information, Spannbauer diligently filed his EMRB complaint. In doing
s0, Spannbauer filed his complaint in an expeditious manner after
obtaining knowledge of an NRS Chapter 288 violation and reason to
question the Department's prior statements regarding his probationary
status. Further, prejudice to the City and the Department is lacking. See
Copeland, 99 Nev. at 826, 673 P.2d at 492. Thus, equity requires that the
RS 288.110(4) six-month statute of limitations be tolled to give
Spannbauer an opportunity to file his prohibited labor practices claims
with the EMRB.

Merits of the EMRB decision
After addressing the threshold issue of the EMRB's authority

to hear Spannbauer's complaint, we must consider the EMRB's decision on
‘the merits, including whether substantial evidence supports its findings
that the City and the Department interfered with, restrained, and/or
coerced Spannbauer into forgoing his right to a predisciplinary hearing
and, in so doing, discriminated against Spannbauer,
Interference with Spannbauer's right to a predisciplinary hearing
‘The City and the Department contend that substantial
evidence does not support the EMRB's conclusion that the Department
improperly deprived Spannbauer of a predisciplinary hearing. While

n

 

 
om ie

conceding that Spannbauer might have been told by his union
representative that the Department was considering treating him as a
probationary employee, the City and Department deny any further
conversation on the subject with Spannbauer or his representative until
being informed that Spannbauer had decided to resign, And pointing out
that Spannbauer voluntarily resigned, the City and the Department argue
that nothing in the record supports the conclusions that resignation was
“thrust upon” Spannbauer and that the City and Department interfered
with, coerced, or restrained Spannbauer from pursuing a predisciplinary
hearing. We disagree.

‘The record reveals that the City and Department discouraged
Spannbauer from proceeding with a hearing and prompted his resignation
by indicating that he might be treated as a probationary employee, which
could severely limit his future career prospects. Moreover, he was allowed
to resign only after signing a waiver of his rights to pursue claims against
the City and Department. By doing so, the City and Department
interfered with Spannbauer’s right to a predisciplinary hearing, which is a
violation of his undisputed rights under the collective bargaining
agreement between the City and the Department. Accordingly, the
EMRB’s findings are not arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious, and there
exists substantial evidence to support its finding that the City and
Department violated Spannbauer's right to proceed through the grievance
process.

Gender discrimination

‘The City and the Department also contend that the EMRB
erred in finding that they discriminated against Spannbauer on the basis
of his gender. It is a prohibited labor practice for an employer to willfully
discriminate on the basis of sex. NRS 288.270(1)(. The focus of our

12

 

 
inquiry is whether the Department treated Spannbauer less favorably
than his female colleague because of his gender. Apeceche v. White Pine
Co, 96 Nev. 723, 726, 615 P.2d 975, 977 (1980). The EMRB concluded
that the testimony presented established that the City and Department
treated two officers differently without a rational reason for doing so. ‘The
EMRB found that both incidents leading to the internal investigations
‘occurred during the officers’ probationary periods and that any subsequent
discipline would not occur until the officers were confirmed. Additionally,
the EMRB found that the female officer was never given the option of
resigning, We conclude that the EMRB did not err in finding that the City
and Department discriminated against Spannbauer on the basis of his
gender,

A prima facie case of unlawful discrimination is established if
the employees can “show that (1) they belonged to a protected class; (2)
they were qualified for their jobs; (3) they were subjected to an adverse
‘employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees not in their
protected class received more favorable treatment.” Moran v. Selig, 447
F.3d 748, 753 (9th Cir. 2006); see Apeceche, 96 Nev. at 726, 615 P.2d at
977 (listing similar factors in establishing a prima facie caso of
discrimination); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
n.13 (1973) (providing that “the prima facie proof required from [one
plaintifi] is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual

situations”). “Once a prima facie case of discrimination is established, the
burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.” Apeceche, 96 Nev. at 726, 615,
P.2d at 977; see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.

 

 
‘The parties do not dispute that the first two prongs were
‘met—that Spannbauer is a member of a protected class and that he wa
qualified for the job—thus, we do not consider those prongs. As to the
third prong, although the City and Department argue that Spannbauer
did not receive an adverse employment action because he resigned, as
noted above, substantial evidence established that his resignation wa
fendered in response to misleading factual statements about his
probationary status. Thus, his resignation constitutes an adverse
employment action.

‘The major contested issue here is prong four—whether a
similarly situated female employee was treated more favorably.
“[Individuals are similarly situated when they have similar jobs and
display similar conduct.” Vasquez v, County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634,
641 (9th Cir, 2003), There must be “a reasonably close resemblance of the

 

facts and circumstances of the plaintiff's and comparator's cases, rather
than a showing that both cases are identical.” Ruiz_v. County of
Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 494 (24 Cir. 2010) (quoting Graham _v. Long
Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 40 (24 Cir. 2000)). Moreover, common sense
dictates that employees do not always have to engage in the exact same
offense as a prerequisite for finding them similarly situated. Lynn_v.
Deaconess Medical Center-West Campus, 160 F.3d 484, 488 (8th Cir.
1998), abrogated on other grounds by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643
F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011). “[E]mployees need not be identical; they must
simply be similar ‘in all material respects.” Nicholson v. Hyannis Air
Service, Inc, 580 F.3d 1116, 1125 @th Cir, 2009) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Moran, 447 F.3d at 755). While the “plaintiff need not

 

demonstrate an exact correlation with the employee receiving more

uu

 

om ae
favorable treatment in order for the two to be considered similarly-
situated|,] ... the plaintiff and the employee with whom the plaintiff seeks
to compare himself or herself must be similar in all of the relevant
aspects.” Clayton v. Meijer. Inc, 281 F.3d 605, 611 (6th Cir. 2002)
(emphasis and internal quotations omitted).

In determining whether two employees are similarly situated,
we adopt the analytical framework espoused by the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals in Ruiz v. County of Rockland, 609 F.3d at 493-94, and the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp.,
281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir, 2002). A court must look at all relevant
factors, depending upon the context of the case, and such factors may
include: (1) whether the employees were subject to the same performance
evaluation standards; (2) whether the employees engaged in comparable
conduct; (3) whether the employees dealt with the same supervisor; (4)
whether the employees were subject to the same disciplinary standards;
and (5) whether the employees had comparable experience, education, and
qualifications, if the employer took these factors into account in making its
decision. Ruiz, 609 F.3d at 493-94; Patterson, 281 F.3d at 680.

Here, the inquiry into whether Spannbauer and the female
employee were similarly situated presents a question of fact. Beck v.
United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 506 F.3d 874, 885 n.5 (9th
Cir. 2007). “A court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
administrative agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of
fact.” State, Dep't of Mtr. Vehicles v. Becksted, 107 Nev. 456, 458, 813
P.2d 995, 996 (1991).

We conclude that the EMRB did not abuse its discretion in

finding that Spannbauer established a prima facie case of discrimination

 

 
on

on the basis of his gender because substantial evidence was presented
demonstrating that a female colleague facing similar circumstances with

similar qualifications was treated more favorably in all relevant aspects in

 

satisfaction of the fourth prong of the unlawful-discrimination test.
Despite the fact that Spannbauer's conduct occurred while on duty and the
female officer’s conduct occurred while off duty, both officers were alleged
to have exhibited unprofessional conduct. Both officers were subject to the
same 18-month probationary period and were under Chief Paresi’s
supervision. In addition, both officers were subject to an internal affairs
investigation, Moreover, both officers were probationary employees when
their misconduct occurred, but received or would have received any
discipline once they were confirmed, Although the situations surrounding
Spannbauer and the female officer are not identical, the EMRB's
conclusion that they were similarly situated is reasonable and supported
by substantial evidence, as they have similar jobs, were investigated for
reasonably similar conduct and charged with actions unbecoming of a
police officer, and were both probationary officers of the Department.
However, Spannbauer was essentially forced to resign before receiving any
discipline, whereas the female officer was not made to resign, but allowed
to face discipline, for which she was given a two-week suspension without
pay but then was able to return to her employment. Thus, the fourth
prong was met, Moreover, the City and Department failed to rebut
Spannbauer's prima facie case by establishing a _ legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for treating Spannbauer differently from the
female officer. Ruiz, 609 F.3d at 492 (citing Holcomb v. Jona College, 521
F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2008)). ‘Therefore, there is substantial evidence to
support the EMRB’s finding that the City and Department discriminated

 

 
a 00 ie

 

against Spannbauer on the basis of his gender in violation of NRS
288.110(1)(. For the foregoing reasons, we also conclude that the EMRB
appropriately disregarded the resignation agreement, including the
substantial evidence that the agreement
culmination of prohibited practices in violation of NRS 288.270(1).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying the

covenant not to sue, as there w:

   

 

wi

   

City and the Department's petition for judicial review.

 

 

Ld.
Cherry
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Deux lets
Douglas
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Pickering
Hardesty Parraguirre

sWe decline to address Spannbauer's arguments regarding the
district court's grant of a stay, as Spannbauer did not move to lift the stay
and his arguments are not properly before this court in the context of the
City and Department's appeal from the district court's final order.

Ww