Case Title: Coleman v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 214, 2001

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2002-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
DEA D. COLEMAN,
)
)  No. 214, 2001
Defendant Below,
)
Appellant,
)  Court Below:  Family Court
)  of the State of Delaware in
v.
)  and for Sussex County
)
STATE OF DELAWARE,
)  Case No. 00279619
)  File No. 0008009500
Plaintiff Below,
)
Appellee
)
Submitted:  February 7, 2002
Decided:  March 18, 2002
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and STEELE, Justices.
O R D E R
This 18th day of March 2002, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties
it appears to the Court that:
(1)
In August 2000, the Delaware State Police arrested Appellant,
Defendant-below, Dea D. Coleman on charges of Riot, Hindering Prosecution, and
Resisting Arrest.  Before trial, the State informed the Family Court that it would
not pursue the charge of Riot and would instead move to amend the information to
allege a charge of Disorderly Conduct.  The Family Court dismissed this charge at
trial when the State failed to amend the information as stated.  In April 2001, the
Family Court returned a verdict on the remaining two charges.  The Court
2
determined that Coleman was not guilty on the charge of Hindering Prosecution,
but found her delinquent on the charge of Resisting Arrest.
(2)
The charges arose from an incident surrounding the questioning of a
separate suspect on drug charges.  As several officers attempted to detain the
suspect, a crowd including Coleman gathered at the scene.  As the crowd became
increasingly hostile to the police, Detective Wayne Warren arrested one of its most
vocal members, Yanta Clanton.  The trial judge’s findings indicate that Coleman
then approached Warren and shouted obscenities at him.  After Warren warned her
to step back, she again approached him and he pushed her to the ground, informing
her that she was under arrest.  At that point, Coleman disappeared into the crowd.
However, Coleman remained at the scene and the officers handcuffed her and
placed her in custody a short time later.  At the time trial commenced, the State
contended that Coleman attempted to pull away from Warren when he attempted to
place handcuffs on her.
(3)
An individual is guilty of resisting arrest when “the person
intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a peace officer from effecting an
arrest or detention of the person or another person or intentionally flees from a
peace officer who is effecting an arrest.”1 The facts alleged by the State reveal two
separate incidents, each of which separately meet criteria for resisting arrest.  The
                                                
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 § 1257.
3
first instance is Coleman’s retreat into the crowd after Warren had announced that
she was under arrest.  If proved, as the trial court believed they were, these facts
would amount to an act of “intentionally flee[ing] from a peace officer who is
effecting an arrest.”  The second incident was Coleman’s alleged “pulling away”
when the officers later attempted to handcuff her.  That would be an act of
intentionally attempting to prevent an officer from “effecting the arrest or detention
of the person.”
(4)
The State’s information charged that Coleman resisted arrest when
she “attempted to pull away from [Detective Warren] when [he] attempted to place
handcuffs on her after [he] told her she was under arrest.”2  After testimony from
the arresting officer that Coleman did not, in fact, pull away from him when he
placed handcuffs on her, the State moved to amend the information by removing
the portions relating to placing Coleman in handcuffs.  The trial judge took the
matter under advisement and granted the State’s motion at the conclusion of trial.
The trial judge then found that the State proved that Coleman had returned to the
crowd after Detective Warren announced that she was under arrest and that this
action met the elements of Resisting Arrest as stated in the amended information.
                                                
2 Testimony at trial and the trial judge’s findings of fact indicate that Detective Rodney Layfield
placed the handcuffs on Coleman after being informed that she was under arrest by Detective
Warren.  However, this discrepancy is in no way dispositive of this case.
4
(5)
Family Court Criminal Rule 7(e) allows the Court to amend an
indictment or information at any time before the verdict or finding if no additional
or different offense is charged and if substantial rights to the defendant are not
prejudiced.  We find that the amendment in question charged an additional offense.
Coleman’s actions, as originally alleged by the police, constituted two separately
identifiable instances of resisting arrest.  The first was Coleman’s return to the
crowd after Warren announced that she was under arrest.  The second was her
“pulling away” as Layfield attempted to place her in handcuffs.  The State’s
original information charged Coleman only with the single count stemming from
the handcuffing incident that the State specifically referenced in the information.
The State moved to amend the information only after it was readily apparent that
the facts would not support a conviction for the handcuffing incident.  In this
instance, the amendment required that Coleman defend against elements of
Resisting Arrest that were wholly distinct from those originally charged.  This
constitutes an additional offense and thus falls outside the permissible scope of
Rule 7(e).
(6)
Finally, we have long held that the purpose of Rule 7(e) is to afford
the accused two protections: (i) notice of the charges against him so that he has an
opportunity to prepare an adequate defense and (ii) prevention of an individual
5
twice being placed in jeopardy for the same offense.3  The State’s failure to include
Coleman’s “disappearance” into the crowd as an act of alleged misconduct in its
information before trial impermissibly denied her the very notice that an
information or indictment is intended to provide.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, that the Family Court’s judgment of
delinquency be REVERSED.
BY THE COURT:
_/s/ Myron T. Steele_______________
Justice
                                                
3 Keller v. State, 425 A.2d 152, 155 (Del. 1981) (citing State v. Blendt, 120 A.2d 321 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1956).