Case Title: R.C.R., INC., a Wyoming Corporation, and JON R. GRAY V. ROBERT E. DELINE and ANNABELLE M. DELINE

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0029

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-08-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
R.C.R., INC., a Wyoming Corporation, and JON R. GRAY V. ROBERT E. DELINE and ANNABELLE M. DELINE2008 WY 96190 P.3d 140Case Number: S-07-0029Decided: 08/15/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
R.C.R., 
INC., a Wyoming Corporation, and JON R. 
GRAY,Appellants(Defendants),v. ROBERT E. DELINE and 
ANNABELLE M. DELINE,Appellees(Plaintiffs).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCarbonCounty

The 
Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

Steven 
F. Freudenthal of Freudenthal Salzburg & Bonds, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

J. 
Kent Rutledge of Lathrop & Rutledge, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming; and 
Frederick B. Skillern of Montgomery Little Soran 
& Murray, P.C., Denver, 
Colorado.  Argument by Mr. 
Skillern.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellants, 
R.C.R., Inc., and Jon R. Gray (hereafter Gray), assert that the district court 
erred:  (1)  In finding that the Appellees, Robert 
and Annabelle Deline (Delines), were not violating the terms of a 1979 easement 
they had across Gray's lands; (2) in concluding that an Affidavit Affecting 
Title filed by Gray in the Carbon County Clerk's Office was void and had no 
affect on the Delines' property interests; and (3) in enjoining Gray from 
posting signs along the disputed easement to the effect that the Delines' use of 
the easement was very limited, as well as enjoining Gray from frustrating the 
Delines' use of the easement by the locking of easement gates.  We will affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Gray states these 
issues:

 
 
A.  Whether 
principles against splitting causes of action, of judicial estoppel, of 
collateral estoppel and of res judicata, as applied to the facts contained in 
the pleadings, evidence, findings, conclusions and rulings in the easement 
litigation and the private road litigation[,] bar the Delines' 
claims?

 
 
B.  Whether 
the district court erroneously applied 
Lozier v. Blattland Investments, LLC, 2004 WY 132, 100 P.3d 380 (Wyo. 2004), 
without regard to the factual differences in that the Delines do not own the 
Rainbow Canyon Fishing Club property and no common source of title for the lands 
at issue, or the applicable rules against splitting causes of action, of 
judicial estoppel, of collateral estoppel and of res 
judicata?

 
 
C.  Whether 
controlling legal principles prohibit the unilateral expansion of the 
size of the dominant estate to be served by the 1979 Hill easement? 
[Emphasis in original.]

 
 
The 
Delines did not do a formal statement of the issues, but we glean this from the 
summary of their arguments:

 
 
A.  The 
claims of the [Delines] are not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel 
because no issue of interpretation of the 1979 easement was raised until after 
RCR I and RCR II were litigated.

 
 
B.  The 
trial court properly interpreted the 1979 easement to give effect to the intent 
of the parties according to the principles of easement interpretation found in 
Lozier v. Blattland 
Investments.

 
 
C.  The 
Delines and their predecessors in title have not used the Hill easement to serve 
other "non-dominant" properties, but rather have only enjoyed their right as 
owners of Lot 5 to use the lands of Rainbow 
Canyon, Inc., for recreational purposes.

            
1.  The Delines have not added to the dominant estate because 
they do not own the adjacent parcels that are allegedly being 
added.

            
2.  RCR's interpretation of the 1979 easement is overly 
formalistic because the Delines own an independent private road easement over 
the RCR property to access Lot 
3.

            
3.  RCR's interpretation of the 1979 easement increases the 
burden on the servient estate and the Delines' interpretation decreases the 
burden.

            
4.  Gray and RCR should be estopped from arguing the dominant 
estate has been expanded because of their knowledge that Hill was using the 
estate to fish in the EncampmentRiver.

            
5.  The trial court's ruling best gives effect to the intent of 
the parties concerning the reasonable use of the dominant 
estate.

 
 
In 
his reply brief, Gray perceives the Delines to have raised these additional 
issues:

 
 
A.  Despite 
the trial court in the easement litigation having rejected any access rights for 
the fishing club or its members based on prescriptive use for failure to 
overcome the presumption of permissive use, Hill's prior ownership of Rainbow 
Canyon stock conferred access rights on the Delines upon purchase of the Hill 
lot to the Delines' riverside lot, the 118-acre fishing club and the 40% 
addition to the Hill lot.

 
 
B.  [The 
Delines'] suggested application of Lozier 
v. Blattland Investments, LLC, 100 P.3d 380 (Wyo. 2204) will require each and every owner 
of a servient estate to litigate each easement to determine what properties 
constitute the dominant estate.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      This case has 
become quite complicated because of its long history, because of the many 
parties involved in it and the historical roles played by those parties' 
predecessors in interest and successors in interest, and because of the two 
prior trips it has had to this Court in order to settle other aspects of this 
bitterly disputed case (not to mention other pending cases and issues).  At the outset, it is useful to know that 
Rainbow Valley, Inc., is a Fishing Club and the Delines are members of that 
Club.  The Club is a corporation and 
each member of the Club held stock in it.  
However, the Fishing Club itself has not been a party in most of this 
litigation.  In addition to the 
Delines, there were three other members when the Club was founded.  However, as is revealed more fully 
below, one of those members (Mr. Hill) lost his interest in the Club in an 
unrelated legal proceeding.  That 
interest was acquired by Gray, albeit indirectly.  See Hill v. Value Recovery Group, L.P., 964 P.2d 1256 (Wyo. 1998) (James C. Hill, who figures prominently in this case, is 
the "Hill" in that case, and Gray was a principal in Value Recovery Group, 
L.P.).

 
 
[¶4]      In the case R.C.R., Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc., 
978 P.2d 581, 584-86 (Wyo. 1999) (hereafter RCR I), we decided this much about the 
correlative rights of the parties before us in this 
appeal:

 
 
In 
1959, Rainbow Canyon, Inc.  
(RainbowCanyon) purchased land adjacent to the EncampmentRiver in Carbon County, Wyoming.  
RainbowCanyon was incorporated by 
George B. Kelley, Stephen G. Burg, Edwin F. Deline, and Walter W. Deline as a 
fishing club, and each held one share in the corporation.  Each shareholder also received a 
one-half acre lot on the RainbowCanyon property.  The individual plaintiffs in this case 
are the successors in interest to the original RainbowCanyon shareholders.  (FN1).

 
 
            
The property was originally accessed by a Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 
road, which required fording the EncampmentRiver from the west to the east side of 
the river.  In 1960, Walter Deline 
asked Kermit Platt, who owned land adjoining the Rainbow Canyon property to the 
south, about purchasing a parcel of his land on the east side of the river so 
the property could be accessed from the county road.  Mr. Platt did not wish to sell; however, 
he agreed to an access road across his land and suggested a contractor to blade 
a road through the sagebrush.  No 
other individual directly sought permission to cross Mr. Platt's property at 
that time, but each of the original owners, and their successors in interest, 
used the road.

 
 
            
In 1969, the Hills [James C. Hill and his wife] purchased an interest in 
RainbowCanyon.  Around 1976, they decided to build a 
home.  The bank, which financed a 
portion of the Hills' construction costs, required a valid, recorded access 
easement to the Hills' property.  On 
February 20, 1979, in a document entitled "Easements," Mr. and Mrs. Platt 
granted the Hills an easement for ingress and egress from the county road to the 
Hills' property across the Platts' property.  The document was properly executed and 
recorded.

 
 
            
The document provides, in pertinent part:

 
 
      FOR AND IN 
CONSIDERATION OF THE SUM OF Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other good and valuable 
consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, Kermit C. Platt and 
Barbara P. Platt, husband and wife, hereinafter called the Grantor (whether one 
or more), hereby grants unto James C. Hill and Sandra L. Hill, husband and wife, 
P.O. Box 6, Encampment, Wyoming, their heirs and assigns, hereinafter called 
Grantee (whether one or more), * * *

 
 
* 
* * a perpetual right of way and easement to maintain, inspect, operate and 
travel upon an access road from the existing county road to the Grantees' tract 
of land situate in the SE 1/4SE 1/4 of Section 9, Township 15 North, Range 83 
West of the 6th P. M., over, across and upon the lands owned by the Grantor in 
the E 1/2 of Section 16, Township 15 North, Range 83 West of the 6th P. M., 
together with the right of ingress and egress to and from said land for any and 
all purposes necessary and incident to the exercise by the Grantee of the rights 
granted by this easement and right of way.  

 
 
      Grantor shall 
have the right to use and enjoy the above described premises and the Grantee 
shall not interfere with the Grantors' use and occupancy of said land and shall 
not build, create or permit any obstructions or excavations or ditches which 
would interfere with the safety or grazing of livestock; provided, however, 
Grantor shall not exercise such use and enjoyment in a manner that will impair 
or interfere with the exercise by Grantee of any of the rights herein 
granted.  

 
 
      The terms, 
conditions and provisions of this agreement shall be binding upon and inure to 
the benefit of the parties hereto, their heirs, executors, administrators, 
successors, assigns and legal representatives.  All rights herein granted may be 
released or assigned in whole or in part.

 
 
            
In 1990, Jon R. and Martha K. Gray purchased the northern 90 acres of the 
Platt's property, and, in 1992, they acquired the remaining 230 acres of the 
parcel.  The warranty deeds included 
language indicating that the deeds were subject to all easements, reservations, 
restrictions, and rights-of-way of record or apparent on the grounds.  The recorded Hill easement was thus 
excepted from the deeds, and the title insurance policy also excepted the Hill 
easement.  Title to the entire 
parcel was eventually transferred to R.C.R., Inc., a corporation owned by the 
Grays.  R.C.R., Inc. subsequently 
sold the southern 230 acres to Alex J. Horst.

 
 
            
In 1993, Mr. Gray wrote the RainbowCanyon shareholders a letter, proposing to give them a 
written easement for either:  1) a 
conveyance of some RainbowCanyon land to him and cross-fishing 
rights, or 2) an equal share of ownership in Rainbow Canyon, Inc. and certain 
amendments to its bylaws.  On June 
11, 1994, R.C.R., Inc. and Mr. Horst granted RainbowCanyon an easement across a portion of the 
Gray and Horst lands.  That easement 
did not follow the route of the existing access road and, by its own terms, has 
now expired.  In the fall of 1994, 
Mr. Gray sent the shareholders an invoice for trespassing fees in the amount of 
$4,800 for six months.

 
 
            
Rainbow Canyon, Inc. and its shareholders brought a quiet title action, 
alleging, under various theories, their rights to access across the property 
owned by the defendants, R.C.R., Inc. and Mr. Horst.  The defendants counterclaimed, also 
seeking to have their title quieted.  
The trial court granted a partial summary judgment, concluding that the 
Hills have a valid, appurtenant easement across the defendants' property, but 
leaving for trial the issue of the precise location of the easement.  A two and one-half day bench trial was 
held June 5 through June 7, 1996.  
On January 17, 1997, the trial court entered its Judgment, quieting title 
in R.C.R., Inc. and Mr. Horst, subject to the Hill easement.  The court reiterated its previous ruling 
that the Hill easement is valid, and set the exact location of the 
easement.  The court determined that 
the other plaintiffs took nothing in the action; they have not 
appealed.

 
 
            
On January 31, 1997, R.C.R., Inc. and Mr. Horst filed a Motion to Alter 
or Amend Judgment pursuant to W.R.C.P. 59(e).  They noted that the trial exhibit 
attached to the court's judgment and delineating the fixed location of the Hill 
easement as "the purple road" (Exhibit 33) was unclear in that it appeared to 
include splinter routes accessing the Palmer and Deline lots on the Rainbow 
Canyon property.  In addition, it 
was not possible to ascertain the location of the easement on the black and 
white copy provided to counsel.  The 
defendants also argued that the easement was intentionally drafted as a 
permanently floating servitude, and the court should not have fixed the 
location.

 
 
            
On February 26, 1997, the Hills filed their Motion to Alter or Amend 
Judgment based on a clerical mistake in the judgment, pursuant to W.R.C.P. 
60(a).  The Hills pointed out that 
Exhibit 33 did not depict the southern part of Mr. Horst's property or the 
county road, and thus the Judgment did not locate the entire Hill easement 
which, by its terms, provides access from the county road to the Hill 
property.  The Hills offered a 
substitute map, Exhibit A, which included the county road and all of Mr. Horst's 
property.

 
 
            
The court held a hearing on the parties' motions to alter or amend.  As of May 30, 1997, no decision had been 
rendered on the outstanding motions, and R.C.R., Inc. and Mr. Horst filed a 
Notice of Appeal from the Judgment, which was docketed in this court as No. 
97-225.

 
 
            
On June 4, 1997, the trial court entered its Amended Judgment, granting 
the Hills' motion, and granting the R.C.R., Inc./Horst motion in part.  Specifically, the judgment was altered 
to substitute Exhibit A as the attachment which shows the location of the Hill 
easement.  The court delineated the 
easement with Xs, and clarified that the easement accessed only the Hills' 
lot.  Finally, the court ordered the 
parties to share the cost of a metes and bounds survey of the fixed location of 
the Hill easement.  On June 30, 
1997, R.C.R., Inc. and Mr. Horst filed a Notice of Appeal from the Amended 
Judgment, which was docketed in this court as No. 97-226.

 
 
            
Docket Nos. 97-225 and 97-226 were consolidated on appeal.  We subsequently granted Mr. Horst's 
motion to dismiss him as an appellant.

_______

(FN1.) 
The Kirk Company acquired Mr. Kelley's interest; the Palmers acquired Mr. Burg's 
interest; Robert and Annabelle Deline acquired Edwin Deline's interest; and the 
Hills acquired Walter Deline's interest.

 
 
[Other 
footnotes omitted.]

 
 
[¶5]      We went on to 
approve, as well, the district court's amendment of its original judgment, which 
dealt with what we will hereafter call the "Hill 
Easement:"

 
 
Location 
of Hill Easement

 
 
            
Having determined that the Hill easement is a valid, appurtenant 
easement, we turn to the matter of its location.  The trial court, applying the principles 
set out in Edgcomb v. Lower Valley Power 
and Light, Inc., 922 P.2d 850 (Wyo.1996), determined that the easement was a 
floating easement which had been located by historic use.  R.C.R., Inc. contends the Hills' 
easement is a permanently floating servitude and, therefore, the court erred 
when it fixed the location of the easement.  Their position is that Edgcomb is factually different from, and 
should not control the outcome of, the case at bar.  In the alternative, R.C.R., Inc. argues 
that the servient estate should be allowed to fix the permanent location in the 
first instance.

 
 
            
The "Easements" document does not specify the location of the 
easement.  An express easement which 
does not state the location of the easement is called a floating easement.  Edgcomb, 922 P.2d  at 855; Bruce & 
Ely, supra, ¶ 7.02 [2].  Floating easements, because they are not 
limited to any specific area on the servient tenement, burden the entire 
servient estate.  Bruce & Ely, 
supra, ¶ 7.02[3].  Although R.C.R., Inc. uses the term 
"permanently floating servitude," they do not argue that the Hill easement 
should remain indefinite and unfixed in its location.  Their argument is that the "Easements" 
document reserves a right in the servient estate to locate and relocate the 
easement periodically.

 
 
            
In support of its position, R.C.R., Inc. directs our attention to the 
following language in the granting instrument:

 
 
Grantor 
shall have the right to use and enjoy the above described premises and the 
Grantee shall not interfere with the Grantors' use and occupancy of said land 
and shall not build, create or permit any obstructions or excavations or ditches 
which would interfere with the safety or grazing of 
livestock[.]

 
 
            
They believe that the above language, along with the use of the term "an" 
access road as opposed to "the" access road, demonstrates the parties' intent 
that the easement not be permanently located but, instead, subject to periodic 
relocation by the servient estate.  
While the above language limits the Hills' use of the easement so as not 
to interfere with the Grantors' use and occupancy, we do not find that language 
susceptible to the broad interpretation assigned by R.C.R., Inc. The instrument 
does not reserve to the servient estate either the right to locate the easement 
in the first instance, or the right to unilaterally relocate the 
easement.

 
 
            
Once a court concludes that the location or the dimensions of an easement 
are not adequately described in the instrument, it generally examines the 
surrounding circumstances to determine the intent of the parties.  Edgcomb, 922 P.2d  at 855 (quoting Bruce 
& Ely, supra, ¶ 7.02 [2] 
[b]).  The parties are presumed to 
have intended an easement that is reasonably convenient or necessary under the 
circumstances.  Id. Courts look to various factors to 
establish a reasonable description of the easement, including the purpose of the 
easement, the geographic relationship between the dominant and servient estates, 
and the benefit to the easement holder compared to the burden on the servient 
estate holder.  Id. "Use existing at the 
time the easement was created is considered strong evidence of the intended 
location and dimensions of the easement.  
* * *  Use commenced after 
the execution of the easement to which the servient estate owner acquiesces is 
also persuasive."  Bruce & Ely, 
supra, ¶ 7.02[2][b].  The court must be careful to determine 
the location of the easement on the basis of circumstances at the time the 
easement was created.  Id.

 
 
            
The trial court, relying on this court's decision in Edgcomb, determined that the location of 
the Hill easement was fixed by historic use.  Edgcomb involved a floating easement for 
a power transmission line.  Applying 
the principles set out in the preceding paragraph, this court held that the 
parties' intent, evidenced by the granting instrument, was that the easement 
would become definitely located once the line was constructed.  922 P.2d  at 855-56.  The court determined the easement was 
defined by the current location of the transmission line.  Id. 
at 855.

 
 
            
R.C.R., Inc. believes the case at bar is distinguishable from Edgcomb because multiple routes have 
been used over the years to access the RainbowCanyon property.  However, at the time the Hill easement 
was granted in 1979, only one road traversed the Platt property, the road that 
was constructed around 1960 to provide Mr. Deline access to his land in 
RainbowCanyon.  That road was referred to as the "orange 
road" throughout the proceedings.  
When Mr. Platt was asked, during his deposition, whether he gave Mr. Hill 
permission to use a particular road in the written easement, he responded, 
"There was no particular road, because there was only one road."  Mr. Platt's testimony is strong evidence 
that the parties intended the easement to be located on the one and only access 
road in existence at the time the easement was granted--the orange 
road.

 
 
            
R.C.R., Inc. argues that the servient estate should designate the 
location of the easement in the first instance.  A number of courts hold, where the 
location of an easement has not been defined, that the servient estate should 
designate the location of the easement in the first instance.  4 Richard R. Powell & Patrick J. 
Rohan, Powell on Real Property 
§ 34.12[2] n.19 and cases cited therein; Bruce & Ely, supra, ¶ 7.02[2][a].  However, as discussed above, the intent 
of the parties in this case is that the easement was defined by the access road 
in existence at the time the easement was created.  In any event, Mr. Platt, the Grantor and 
original servient estate holder, was involved in the construction of the 
original access road.

 
 
            
Sometime in the early to mid-1980s, Mr. Platt relocated a portion of the 
road, which had often drifted shut in the winter, to the top of a hill where the 
wind could sweep it bare.  The new 
route, referred to as the "purple road," overlapped the orange road to a 
significant degree, retained the original termini, and was agreeable to the 
Hills.  The Hills accessed their 
property via the purple road from the time it was built until 1995, when Mr. 
Gray unilaterally relocated a portion of the road.  The relocated segment, designated as the 
"pink road," entered the RainbowCanyon property at a different location 
than the purple road, and required the Hills to enter their property from their 
back yard.  The trial court, in its 
original Judgment, disregarded the pink road and fixed the purple road as the 
permanent location of the easement.

 
 
            
The fact that the permanent location designated by the court, the purple 
road, deviated slightly from the original route, is inconsequential considering 
that both parties were in agreement with the move.  "An easement holder and the servient 
estate owner may relocate the easement by mutual consent."  Ericsson v. Braukman, 111 Or.App. 57, 
824 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1992) (quoting Bruce & Ely, supra, ¶ 7.03[1][c]).  In addition, the court properly 
disregarded Mr. Gray's unilateral relocation of the road.  The general rule, which we adopt here, 
is that unilateral relocation of an easement is not permitted, absent an express 
provision in the granting instrument.  
Bruce & Ely, supra, 
¶ 7.05[1].  A unilateral 
relocation rule would introduce considerable uncertainty into land ownership and 
incite litigation.  Stamatis v. Johnson, 71 Ariz. 134, 224 P.2d 201, 
203 (1950); see also Davis v. Bruk, 
411 A.2d 660, 665 (Me.1980).  In 
addition, the easement holder could be subject to harassment by the servient 
owner's attempts to relocate to serve his own conveniences.  Davis, 411 A.2d  
at 665.  A handful of courts permit 
the servient estate owner to unilaterally relocate the easement if the original 
termini are retained and the easement holder is not materially 
inconvenienced.   Bruce & 
Ely, supra, ¶ 7.05[4].  However, even if we were to apply this 
exception, the record fully supports the court's decision.  Mr. Hill testified that he was not 
notified about the relocation beforehand, and the new road required him to enter 
the RainbowCanyon property through his 
back yard instead of through his front entrance, which had been specially 
designed and landscaped.

 
 
            
We hold that the trial court properly applied the law to the facts of 
this case to determine the location of the Hill easement.  The Judgment entered by the trial court 
is affirmed except to the extent it was amended as described in the following 
section.

 
 

RCR, 
Inc., 
978 P.2d  at 587-89.

 
 
[¶6]      Over the years 
prior to Gray's acquisition of his lands, all Fishing Club members had access to 
the Fishing Club lands across the lands owned by Gray's predecessors in 
interest.  However, Gray would not 
allow such access, and in RCR I the 
district court found that the Fishing Club members had no "right" (by 
prescriptive easement or otherwise) to cross Gray's lands.  Thus, the Fishing Club members sought a 
private road.  In R.C.R., Inc. v. Deline, 2003 WY 62, 70 P.3d 214 (Wyo. 2003) (hereafter RCR 
II), we affirmed an order of the district court which, in turn, had affirmed 
an order of the Board of County Commissioners of Carbon County, establishing a 
private road in favor of the Delines (and other members of the Fishing Club), 
across Gray's property.   That 
road was entirely separate and apart from the Hill Easement.  In that case, Gray did not challenge the 
Fishing Clubs members' right to the road, but only the damages awarded by the 
county commissioners.  A factor in 
the location of that road was to minimize any interference caused by the private 
road with Gray's plan to subdivide the lands he owned (i.e., it was laid out 
along section lines only, rather than the more direct route originally sought by 
the Delines, et al.).  We note that 
the private road was designed to provide the Delines, as well as other lot 
owners in the Fishing Club, with access to their lots on the Fishing Club 
property.  The bulk of the Fishing 
Club acreage was a common/shared area, but each member had a lot on which to 
place a mobile home or other structure.  
One of the issues raised by Gray in this case was whether or not that 
road could be further used by the Delines for access from their lot, across 
Fishing Club lands, to other locations within the Fishing Club lands.  Gray's contention in this regard also 
extended to Fishing Club members using the private road to access other lands 
that are not at issue in this litigation, to which the Fishing Club and its lot 
owners had obtained access (the Fishing Club members also had access to other 
nearby lands for the purpose of fishing, including lands on the opposite bank of 
the Encampment River from the Fishing Club).  Gray puts great emphasis on the fact 
that the members of the Fishing Club had access via the private road, but the 
Club itself did not have a right to the private road.  We also take note that while the Hill 
Easement is less than one full type-written page in length, and the description 
of the private road fills about two full pages (including a map of it), Gray 
devotes almost 35 pages in his brief to describe what those two documents 
purportedly mean, although they are quite plain and straight forward on the face 
of things.  We also note that the 
right to use the private road was given to the parties to that litigation, as 
well as " their heirs, successors and assigns and all subsequent owners of the 
Benefited Lands."

 
 
[¶7]      Because of 
financial and other problems, eventually Hill found it necessary to sell his 
home and the lot it was on.  The 
Delines purchased it.  Of course, 
Deline also acquired the Hill Easement across Gray's lands with that 
purchase.  The necessity for Hill's 
sale was brought about by an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding initiated by a 
company controlled by Gray.  Gray 
acquired Hill's stock in the Fishing Club from his bankruptcy estate.  Gray has used his position as a 
stockholder in a manner that the other stockholders objected to, and that matter 
is now before this Court in GOB, L.L.C. 
v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc., et al., Case No. S-08-0035.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      "Final orders and 
judgments entered in declaratory judgment proceedings may be reviewed as in 
other civil actions."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-37-109 (LexisNexis 2007).  "When a 
declaratory judgment proceeding involves the determination of an issue of fact, 
the issue may be tried and determined as in other civil actions."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-111 (LexisNexis 
2007):

 
 
Following 
a bench trial, this Court reviews a district court's decision using a clearly 
erroneous standard for factual findings, but a de novo standard for conclusions 
of law.  Belden v. Thorkildsen, 2007 WY 68, 
¶ 11, 156 P.3d 320, 323 (Wyo.2007).  
The issue in this case presents a question of law, so we do not defer to 
the district court's conclusion, and uphold it only if it is correct.  Eklund v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2004 WY 
24, ¶ 10, 86 P.3d 259, 262 (Wyo.2004).

 
 

Pinther 
v. Ditzel, 
2007 WY 116, ¶ 3, 163 P.3d 816, 817 (Wyo. 2007).  In the instant case we are confronted 
with both questions of fact and questions of law.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      As we begin this 
phase of our resolution of this appeal, we summarize that the Delines had access 
to the Fishing Club land via the private road obtained by the members of that 
Club.  They also had access to the 
property formerly owned by Hill via the easement obtained by Hill from Gray's 
predecessors in interest.  The 
instant disputes arose, inter alia, because of an "Affidavit Affecting Title" 
that Gray caused to be recorded on July 13, 2004, in the Carbon County Clerk's 
Office.  That document 
provided:

 
 
Jon 
R. Gray, of lawful age and being duly sworn and says that:

 
 
            
1.  He is the President of R.C.R., Inc., a Wyoming corporation, with 
mail address at 
P.O. Box 
747, Saratoga, Wyoming, 82331
, and makes this AFFIDAVIT of his own personal 
knowledge.

            
2.  R.C.R., Inc. is the owner of certain lands lying and being 
in Carbon County, Wyoming, described in Exhibit A, attached 
hereto.

            
3.  Robert E. Deline and Annabelle Deline, husband and wife, 
(The Delines) are the owners of a residence lying and being on certain lands in 
Carbon County, Wyoming described in Exhibit B, attached 
hereto.

            
4.  Access to the land in Exhibit B is over the lands in 
Exhibit A, by virtue of an EASEMENT, recorded in Book 694, Page 236, in the 
records of the Carbon County Clerk, confirmed by the Supreme Court of 
Wyoming.

            
5.  The land described in Exhibit B is a lot 150 feet by 150 
feet and the EASEMENT is appurtenant to and for the benefit only to this land 
and no other, and any attempt to use the EASEMENT to access other lands is a 
legal violation of the specific terms of the EASEMENT.

            
6.  R.C.R., Inc. demands strict compliance with the terms of 
the EASEMENT and the Order of the Court.

            
7.  The easement granted to The Delines, Gary L. and Nancy J. 
Palmer and Kirk Company, Applicants for a private road, and William Irvin, Kirk 
Company's successor in titled [sic], by virtue of the private road action before 
the Commissioners of Carbon County, by Order attached hereto as Exhibit C, does 
not allow access to the lands described in Exhibit B or any other lands except 
the "Benefited Lands" set forth in the Order.

 
 
[¶10]   The Delines were interested in 
marketing the "Hill House."  Gray 
believed that the Delines were exaggerating the extent of the easement across 
his lands to the Hill House.  
Therefore, he began locking gates and placed a sign on the easement to 
the Hill House that read:

 
 
NOTICE

 
 
BY 
COURT ORDER, THIS ROAD IS A 30 FEET EASEMENT RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF THE 
CLERK'S OFFICE OF CARBONCOUNTY, BOOK 694, PAGE 236.  IT IS ONLY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE LAND 
DESCRIBED.

 
 
THE 
LAND IS A LOT 150 FEET X 150 FEET. WHITE FENCE POST ON THE LAND LOT LINES ON 
BOTH SIDES OF THE RED GATE INDICATES THE EAST AND WEST 
LOT LINES.

 
 
ANY 
ACCESS BY ANY MEANS BEYOND THESE LINES AND BEYOND 150 FEET TO THE BACK IS A 
TRESPASS.  A VIOLATION MAY RESULT IN 
LEGAL ACTION OR THE GATE MAY BE LOCKED.  
IF QUESTIONS, CONSULT WITH YOUR ATTORNEY.  STRICTLY 
ENFORCED.

 
 
[¶11]   It is Gray's position that the 
Delines could only use the Hill Easement to get to the Hill House, as well as 
the 150-foot square lot, i.e., 22,500 square feet, on which it was 
constructed.  Gray contended that 
the Delines could not go off that lot to cross over lands owned by the Fishing 
Club, even though the House was entirely surrounded by Fishing Club lands.  Indeed, there were "informal" roads within the boundaries of the Fishing 
Club that could be used to traverse those lands so as to reach the homes of 
other Club members and to reach the river for fishing and other recreational 
activities.  Moreover, as one exited 
the Hill House, the Hill Easement crossed the private road that was available to 
the Delines and other Club members.  
It was Gray's position that the Delines could not use the easement and 
make a right turn off the easement in order to use the private road to go to the 
riverside properties and the fishing areas.

 
 
[¶12]   For these reasons, the Delines 
filed a complaint for declaratory relief and for injunctive relief.  The relief requested was that the 
district court declare that the Delines could leave the boundaries of the 
150-foot square Hill House lot so as to enjoy the Fishing Club lands and, 
furthermore, that they could use the Hill Easement and make a right turn onto 
the private road.  In addition, they 
asked that the district court declare the affidavit set out above to be null and 
void and of no effect whatsoever.  
Finally, they asked the district court to enjoin Gray from improperly 
locking gates and from posting signs that served to cast doubt upon, or to 
otherwise defame, their title to the Hill Easement or the Hill House.  As we noted in our introduction, the 
district court essentially granted the Delines all the relief they sought in 
their complaint.

 
 
[¶13]   The district court conducted two 
days of hearings on August 14 and 15, 2005.  One day of hearing was devoted to the 
preliminary injunction, which the district court granted.  The other was devoted to all other 
issues, including making the injunction permanent.  We continue our discussion, quoting from 
the district court's "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment:"

 
 
            
A dispute has arisen over the scope of the Delines' use of the 1979 
Easement.  At the time the Hill 
house was constructed in the late 1970's, certain improvements appurtenant to 
the house encroached beyond the boundaries of Lot 5 on the east and north onto 
the lands of RainbowCanyon.  Subsequently, after complaints were made 
by Gray, RainbowCanyon granted an easement allowing use of RainbowCanyon property for driveway access to the 
north side of the Hills' property, for a septic system serving the Hill 
property, and for a propane tank.  
Exhibit 19.  Gray asserts 
that these appurtenances to Lot 5 constitute a 
trespass, by means of an unauthorized expansion of the dominant estate as 
defined in the 1979 Easement.

 
 
            
[The Delines] seek a declaratory judgment that historical use of Lot 5 by 
Mr. and Mrs. Hill and now by Mr. and Mrs. Deline do not violate the terms of the 
1979 Easement.  Specifically they 
seek a declaratory judgment that they have the right to proceed from their 
property to the other lot that they own along the EncampmentRiver (Lot 3), as well as to use all of the lands of 
RainbowCanyon for recreational 
purposes.  Specifically, they also 
request a declaratory judgment that proceeding to Lot 3 along the course of 
their Private 
Road, after having accessed Lot 5 by use of the 1979 Easement, does not constitute a 
trespass on RCR's property or an abuse of their rights under the 1979 
Easement.  They further seek a 
declaratory judgment that an affidavit recorded by Gray on behalf of RCR in the 
real property records [of] CarbonCounty, Exhibit 6, does not affect title 
to their property.  Finally, Mr. 
and Mrs. Deline seek a permanent injunction barring Mr. Gray and RCR from 
placing signs on fences and gates on or near the easement which declare that the 
Delines or imply that the Delines are in violation of the terms of the easement 
and threatening to close the easement.

 
 
            
RCR and Gray deny that the Delines are entitled to a declaratory judgment 
and argue that:  (1) any travel by 
the Delines past the boundary of Lot 5 constitutes a trespass on the RCR 
property and a violation of the Hill easement, as this would constitute use of 
the easement for another dominant estate not identified in the Hill easement; 
(2) that the encroachments on Rainbow Canyon land by the Delines as owners of 
Lot 5, consisting now of periodic use of a rough driveway around to the north 
side of the house on Lot 5 and use of the septic field on Rainbow Canyon 
property constitutes a violation of the Hill easement for the same reason; and 
(3) that any method of transportation by the Delines from the house on Lot 5 to 
their trailer on Lot 3, by means of the private road to Lot 3 or otherwise, 
constitutes a similar trespass and violation of the Hill 
easement.

 
 
            
The Court begins with the basic principles of the law of easements and 
interpretation.  When construing an 
easement, we seek to determine the intent of the parties to the easement.  "To determine the intent of the parties, 
the context in which the easement was drafted must be considered."  Lozier v. Blattland Investments, LLC, 
100 P.3d 380, 383-84 (Wyo. 2004).  
"Words are given the plain meaning and effect that reasonable persons 
would give them at the time and place of their use."  Id.

 
 
            
Consistent with the holding of the Court in the Lozier case, this Court admitted 
extrinsic evidence at trial with regard to the context in which the Hill 
easement was drafted in 1979.

 
 
            
As one authority states,

 
 
      The intention of 
the parties to an expressly created servitude [i.e., easement] is ascertained 
from the servitude's language interpreted in light of all the 
circumstances.  Relevant 
circumstances include the location and character of the properties burdened and 
benefited by the servitude, the use made of the properties before and after 
creation of the servitude, the character of the surrounding area, the existence 
and contours of any general plan of development for the area, and the 
consideration paid for the servitude.

 
 

Restatement 
(Third) Property (Servitudes), 
§ 4.1, comment c (2000).  The 
evidence here establishes that the 1979 easement was created in order to 
document an existing, historical right of access.  Mr. Hill acquired his Lot 5 as a 
privilege of membership in the RainbowCanyon fishing club.  As he testified, his only reason for 
building a home on Lot 5 was to enjoy the privileges of membership in 
RainbowCanyon, and specifically to fish in EncampmentRiver.  His recreational activities were well 
known to Kermit Platt.  They were 
friends and frequently fished together.  
The Court finds that Mr. Hill had historically accessed Lot 5 through the 
lands of RCR's predecessor, and that Mr. Hill went from the confines of his lot 
to use the lands of RainbowCanyon and the adjoining lands of 
RainbowCanyon for fishing and 
other recreational purposes with the full knowledge and approval of Mr. and Mrs. 
Platt.

 
 
            
The Court finds that Mr. Gray was also familiar with this use of the 1979 
Easement to access Lot 5, and was familiar with the use of the RainbowCanyon lands by Mr. Hill for recreational 
purposes.  The Court finds that Mr. 
Gray made no objection to Mr. Hill's recreational activities until disputes 
arose in the late 1990's regarding the location of the access road for the 1979 
Easement and use of the access road by other members of RainbowCanyon.

 
 
            
In short, the context in which the Hill easement was drafted in 1979 was 
that of a simple agreement to document an existing way of necessity.  There is no evidence to show that the 
parties intended that Mr. Hill and his family not be allowed to go beyond the 
150 foot square confines of Lot 5, and there is no evidence to suggest that 
anyone intended that Mr. Hill not be able to fish on the lands of RainbowCanyon while residing at this house.  One cannot read such a limitation from 
the plain language of the easement.

 
 
            
Further, interpreting the easement to allow the owner of the dominant 
estate to use other property rights appurtenant to ownership of the land, such 
as a license to go fishing on Rainbow Canyon land and the easement for certain 
physical encroachments convenient to the use of the house on Lot 5, is not 
inconsistent with the express terms of the 1979 Easement.  The Court finds that Mr. Platt and Mr. 
Hill and their spouses did not intend to limit the historically unrestricted use 
of the easement, and did not intend to limit the Hills' use of Lot 5 to enjoy the fishing on adjoining lands.  To suggest that Platt and Hill intended 
that Hill could legally access his property, but that he could not go fishing, 
is simply unreasonable under the circumstances of this case.  Mr. Hill clearly intended to use his 
property, the dominant estate, to its full extent.  To paraphrase the opinion of the Court 
in Lozier, the Court has been shown 
no reason, and can imagine none, why either Hill or Platt would have intended to 
prevent [Hill] from using his land as a base from which he could go fishing 
along the lands of the fishing club of which he was a member.  100 P.3d  at 380, 
385.

 
 
            
Gray and RCR argue that the beneficiary of an appurtenant easement is not 
entitled to use the servient estate (RCR's property) for the benefit of property 
other than the dominant estate, i.e., Lot 
5.  While this accurately states an 
accepted rule of the common law of easements, this rule does not support Gray's 
position here.  The Delines do not 
wish to use the servient estate to benefit the lands of RainbowCanyon.  He does not argue that members of 
RainbowCanyon at large can use the 
1979 Easement, nor that the owners of Lots 1, 2 and 3 can use the 1979 
Easement.  No additional dominant 
estate is served by the 1979 Easement, nor is such proposed by [the 
Delines].  Rather, the Delines, as 
did the Hills before, simply use the lands of Rainbow Canyon, Inc., to increase 
their enjoyment of the dominant estate, Lot 
5.  The Court finds that no 
additional dominant estate is being attached to the Hill easement by virtue of 
the Delines' use of other easements or licenses appurtenant to their land or 
their membership in Rainbow Canyon, Inc.

 
 
            
The rule against using an easement for the benefit of property other than 
the dominant estate "reflects the likely intent of the parties by setting an 
outer limit of the potential increase in use of an easement brought about by 
normal development of the dominant estate."  Restatement, section 4.11, comment 
b.  Applying this rule of law to 
prevent the Delines from traveling beyond the strict confines of Lot 5 to use the lands of Rainbow Canyon, Inc., would not 
serve the purpose of the rule. The Court finds that the Delines do not increase 
any use of the roads across RCR property when [the Delines] go fishing, travel 
to the homes of other Rainbow Canyon members, or engage in other recreational 
activities from their home.  Indeed, 
if Mr. and Mrs. Deline decide to walk from their house on Lot 5 to their Lot 3, 
river [lot], taking a direct course across the land of Rainbow Canyon, rather 
than by driving along the course of the private road over RCR's property, they 
impose a lesser burden on the servient estate, not more.

 
 
            
The Court also finds that [the Delines] have an unlimited right of use of 
the private road easement to access Lot 3.  Nothing in the private road decree 
limits the Delines['] use of this road, or provides that this road cannot be 
used in combination with other access rights.  It is the nature of a private road 
easement created pursuant to statute that its right of access is 
unrestricted.

 
 
            
Finally, the Court finds that the claims of [the Delines] are not barred 
by res judicata or collateral estoppel.  
No issue regarding the use of lands other than Lot 5 as a violation of the scope of the 1979 Easement was 
raised or considered in RCR I.  See Bard Ranch Company v. Weber, 557 P.2d 722, 726-27 (Wyo. 1976) ("former judgment not dispositive 
of any claim that might have been brought into the litigation but was 
not.").

 
 
Are 
the Delines' Claims Barred by:

 
 
            
(1)  Splitting Causes of 
Action

 
 
[¶14]   Gray contends that if the Delines 
wanted to litigate the issues resolved in this case, then they had to have 
raised those issues in RCR I, because 
the rule against splitting causes of action prohibits them from now pursuing any 
matters related to the Hill Easement.  
We agree that Wyoming has recognized the rule against 
splitting causes of action.  Foianini v. Brinton, 855 P.2d 1238, 1240 
(Wyo. 1993); 
and see generally 1A C.J.S. Actions 
§§ 224-233 (2005).  In that case we 
cited the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments § 24 for guidance in determining the dimensions of the word 
"claim" for purposes of applying the rule against splitting causes of 
action.  We also noted that that 
rule and res judicata are closely related rules.  Much like the Foianini case, the circumstances at 
large here do not form "a convenient trial unit."  Indeed, while we do not intend to assign 
"blame" here, it appears that Gray has relentlessly pursued legal, as well as 
perhaps some extra-legal, remedies in his campaign to frustrate the Delines' 
enjoyment of their property.  It is 
Gray who has created, or recreated, causes of action that the Delines, of 
necessity, had to pursue in self-defense.  
The purpose of the rule against splitting causes of action is "to promote 
fairness to the parties by protecting defendants against fragmented, harassing, 
vexatious, and costly litigation, and the possibility of conflicting 
outcomes."  1A C.J.S. Actions § 226 (2005).  While Gray is nominally the "defendant" 
in this litigation (as he has been in the past as well), it is Gray's 
conduct/misconduct that has necessitated all of the legal proceedings concerning 
the Fishing Club.  Although Gray did 
not develop this issue in much detail or with much clarity, it is evident from 
the record that the Delines' lawsuit was prompted by harassment from Gray and 
that the outcome of this case is wholly consistent with RCR I.  The Delines' action was not barred by 
the rule against splitting causes of action.

 
 
            
(2)  Judicial Estoppel 

 
 
[¶15]   Judicial estoppel is applied to 
foreclose a party from maintaining inconsistent positions in judicial 
proceedings.  The doctrine is 
applied sparingly and not in a highly technical manner that prevents litigation 
on the merits.  Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2004 WY 31, 
¶ 16, 86 P.3d 863, 869 (Wyo. 2004).  
We have also held that judicial estoppel

 
 
is 
sometimes referred to as a doctrine which estops a party to play fast and loose 
with the courts or to trifle with judicial proceedings.  It is an expression of the maxim that 
one cannot blow hot and cold in the same breath.  A party will just not be allowed to 
maintain inconsistent positions in judicial 
proceedings....

 
 

Allen 
v. Allen, 
550 P.2d 1137, 1142 (Wyo.1976).  
Judicial estoppel requires that "where a man is successful in the 
position taken in the first proceeding, then that position rises to the dignity 
of conclusiveness."  Erhart v. Flint Engineering & 
Const., 939 P.2d 718, 724 (Wyo.1997) (citing Hatten Realty Co. v. Baylies, 42 
Wyo. 69, 290 P. 561, 566 (1930)).  There is no 
indication in the record or briefs that Berg was ever successful in the position 
at issue; but since the judicial estoppel argument is not supported by cogent 
argument or pertinent authority, we will not consider it.  See May v. May, 945 P.2d 1189, 1191 
(Wyo.1997)

 
 

Cross 
v. Berg Lumber Co., 
7 P.3d 922, 930-31 (Wyo. 2000).

 
 

[¶16]   Gray's 
claim of judicial estoppel is based upon his contention that the Delines should 
be estopped from claiming that the 1979 easement benefits Rainbow Canyon, Inc., 
lands because they did not seek to have Rainbow Canyon, Inc., added as a party 
to the private road litigation.  The 
present litigation does not, however, seek to adjudicate the right of Rainbow 
Canyon, Inc., or any of its owners to use the 1979 easement.  Rather, this litigation concerns the 
Delines' use of the 1979 easement as access to the former Hill property and, in 
turn, the appurtenant right to then enjoy the use of RainbowCanyon lands.  We conclude 
that judicial estoppel does not apply to the circumstances presented here.  See Wilson v. Lucerne Canal and Power Co., 
2007 WY 10, ¶¶ 27-28, 150 P.3d 653, 663-64 (Wyo. 
2007).

 
 
(3)  Collateral 
Estoppel

 
 
[¶17]   Collateral estoppel bars 
re-litigation of previously litigated issues (as contrasted with "claims"), as 
well as issues which could have been but which were not raised in the prior 
litigation.  Pokorny v. Salas, 2003 WY 159, 
¶¶ 12-20, 81 P.3d 171, 175-77 (Wyo. 2003).  These factors are used in the analysis 
of collateral estoppel:  (1) Whether 
the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with the issue 
presented in the present action; (2) whether the prior adjudication resulted in 
a judgment on the merits; (3) whether the party against whom the collateral 
estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication; and (4) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is 
asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior 
proceeding.  RCR I dealt only with the location and 
not its scope and hence collateral estoppel did not bar the Delines from 
pursuing this litigation.  Moreover, 
it was Gray's conduct in attempting to unilaterally limit the Delines' use of 
the easement and otherwise interfere with their property rights that 
necessitated this litigation.  See 
Wilson,  ¶¶ 21-25, 150 P.3d  at 
662-63.

 
 
[¶18]   The only one of those four factors 
that is met here is that the parties are the same.  The issues are not identical, there was 
a determination on the merits but both the issues and the claims are entirely 
different here, and the Delines did not have an opportunity to litigate the 
issues now before us because they had not yet come to light.  The Delines' action was not barred by 
the principles that constitute collateral estoppel.

 
 
            
(4)  Res Judicata

 
 
[¶19]   Res judicata bars the re-litigation 
of previously litigated claims or causes of action, as well as claims that could 
or should have been raised in the prior litigation.  Pokorny, ¶¶ 12-20, 81 P.3d  at 
175-77.  These factors are applied 
to the analysis of res judicata:  
(1) Identity in parties; (2) identity in subject matter; (3) the issues 
are the same and relate to the subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the 
persons are identical in reference to both the subject matter and the issues 
between them.  Our resolution of the 
collateral estoppel contentions applies equally to res judicata.  Res judicata did not bar this 
litigation, which was prompted almost exclusively by Gray's improper 
interference with the Delines' property rights.  See Wilson, 
¶¶ 21-25, 150 P.3d  at 662-63.

 
 
Erroneous 
Application of Lozier v. 
Blattland

 
 
[¶20]   Gray contends that the 
interpretation the district court placed on Lozier v. Blattland, 2004 WY 132, 100 P.3d 380 (Wyo. 2004) changes the law dramatically because its "implicit" holding 
"requires a new evidentiary hearing in all cases to determine the intention of 
the parties, even where the matter has been previously and fully 
litigated[.]"  Continuing, Gray 
postulates that "[s]uch a construction will substantially chill the free 
transferability of any real property which is a subservient estate to any 
easement since the scope and burden of that easement would be subject to 
re-interpretation and re-evaluation at any time a dominant estate holder 
requested."

 
 
[¶21]   We need not set out our holding in 
Lozier here.  It suffices to note that Gray grossly 
exaggerates the doom that the district court's application of that case, in 
these circumstances, spells for owners of servient estates.  To allay any lingering concerns, we do 
not view the district court's decision in this case as 
altering/expanding/contracting the essence of our holding in Lozier in any way.

 
 
Unilateral 
Expansion of Size of Dominant Estate

 
 
[¶22]   Gray also contends that the 
district court's order amounts to allowing the Delines to unilaterally expand 
the size of the dominant estate.  We 
assume the word "size" is emphasized because Gray made no claim that the 
"burden" on the easement had been expanded and the facts establish that the 
Delines used the easement at issue only a few times a year.  The Delines do not live on the Fishing 
Club property (either at the Hill House or their riverside property).  Rather, they visit it for purposes of 
recreation (mostly fishing) a few times a year.  However, Gray contends that when the 
Delines do visit their properties, the easement only allows them to go to the 
lot on which the Hill House is located.  
The expansion that Gray is concerned about is that the Delines have 
"persisted" in departing the lot on which the Hill House is located and going 
onto the lands of the Fishing Club.  
They also go to and from the Hill lot across a driveway to their house 
and that driveway is, at least in part, on Fishing Club land and not the Hill 
lot.  In addition, the Delines go 
onto another bit of land that the Fishing Club allows them to use near the Hill 
House for a septic field.  They also 
drive on the easement to get to the private road and then make a right turn to 
go down to the river on the private road, or a left turn to leave the area by 
way of the county road.  Finally, 
they occasionally access their one-half acre riverside lot by going across the 
Fishing Club lands on informal roads 
that the Fishing Club members have created.

 
 
[¶23]   We conclude that the district court 
did not err in taking evidence about the circumstances which surrounded the 
creation of the easement and that none of its findings of fact is clearly 
erroneous.  Indeed, the district 
court took a very sensible and rational approach to resolving this festering 
conflict by applying a process which very closely resembled the process, as 
described by Powell in his treatise on Property:

 
 
§ 
34.12  Determining extent of 
Easements Created by Written Instrument

 
 
            
The "extent" of an easement includes not only its duration but also its 
constituent ingredients while it lasts.  
The constituent ingredients frequently include not only a primary right, 
such as a right to a way across the servient tenement, but also supplementary or 
secondary rights that serve to effectuate the primary right, such as the 
privilege of entering on a servient tenement for needed acts of repair or 
maintenance of the way.  The 
resulting aggregation of privileges held by a dominant owner takes its basic 
framework from the kind of easement in question, differing greatly, for example, 
in an easement of way, an easement for irrigation, and an easement in a party 
wall.  The most significant factor 
concerning the extent of an easement is the manner in which the easement is 
created.  Most easements have as an 
ingredient in their creation a written instrument containing language that helps 
in determining the easement's extent.  
Others do not have this factor and their extent must be inferred wholly 
from the circumstances surrounding their creation.

 
 
            
The most common situation within the scope of this section is the case in 
which a deed of conveyance purports to create a specific 
easement.

 
 
            
This ingredient brings into the picture all of the established techniques 
for the construction of written instruments (see § 24.03 above).  Thus, with respect to the scope of the 
easement created, courts stress the primary control exercised by the language of 
the creating conveyance.  They 
recognize also the imperfections of language, especially as it is found in the 
instruments of conveyancers, and utilize for the resolution of ambiguities the 
circumstances of the instrument's formulation.  Sometimes, these circumstances are 
utilized still more generously for the manufacture of an intent attributed to 
the conveyer.  With respect to the 
scope of easements, five types of circumstances are frequently important, 
namely:

 
 
            
(1)  whether the easement was created by grant or by 
reservation;

            
(2)  whether the conveyance was, or was not, 
gratuitous;

            
(3)  the use of the servient tenement prior to the 
conveyance;

            
(4)  the parties' practical construction of the easement's 
scope; and

            
(5)  the purpose for which the easement was 
acquired.

 
 
            
There is considerable strength in the constructional preference for 
resolving ambiguities of a conveyance in favor of the conveyee.  This tends to cause ambiguities as to 
the extent of an easement to be resolved in favor of the conveyee owner of the 
dominant tenement, but against conveyors who have reserved easements in their 
own favor.  When the conveyance is 
gratuitous, the effort to give effect to the words as they were understood by 
the conveyee diminishes, and, within the limits set by the rules of evidence, 
the court seeks to ascertain the subjective intent of the 
conveyor.

 
 
            
When the conveyance affects only a part of the conveyor's land and, prior 
to the conveyance, there has been a quasi-easement as between parts of the 
conveyor's land (see § 34.08 above).  This prior use of the quasi-servient 
parcel can help in determining the scope of an easement incompletely described 
in the conveyance.

 
 
            
When a conveyance is unclear as to the scope of the intended easement, 
the subsequent behavior of the parties can constitute a practical construction 
furnishing the missing details.

 
 
            
Courts generally hold, where the scope of an easement is unclear, that 
the servient tenant in the first instance, and the dominant tenant secondarily, 
has the power to define the scope by reasonable action.

 
 
.

 
 
            
It is often said that the parties are to be presumed to have contemplated 
such a scope for the created easement as would reasonably serve the purposes of 
the grant.  This provides a factor 
of elasticity, which has been most useful.  
Under this presumption, many courts have liberally read in expansions of 
the permitted use caused by technological innovations, by subsequent 
developments of the locality, or by changes in the use of the dominant parcel 
said to have been "contemplated by the parties."

 
 
4 
Powell on Real Property, § 34.12 
(Michael Allen Wolf ed., LexisNexis Matthew Bender 
2007-2008).

 
 
[¶24]   The language of the easement is set 
out in detail in our recitation of the decision we made in RCR I, above.  The uses the Delines make of the 
easement are reasonable in every respect, given the language used in the written 
conveyance.  Those uses are much the 
same as the uses made by Hill and contemplated by Platt (although perhaps 
somewhat less than the uses made by Hill).  
The district court did not err by going outside the four corners of the 
easement to ascertain its "extent" or "scope," and its conclusions are wholly 
consistent with governing law.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶25]   We find no merit in any of Gray's 
contentions.  Therefore, the 
judgment of the district court is affirmed.