Case Title: PETERS v. WEST PARK HOSPITAL

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-273

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-09-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
PETERS v. WEST PARK HOSPITAL2003 WY 11776 P.3d 821Case Number: 02-273Decided: 09/17/2003
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

JUDY 
E. PETERS,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

WEST 
PARK HOSPITAL; KAREN BEEMER,

Director 
of Radiology Services at West Park

Hospital; 
and WEST PARK HOSPITAL

RADIOLOGY 
TECHNICIAN JOHN DOE,

 

Appellees(Defendants).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Douglas McCalla, Roy A. Jacobson, Jr. and Larissa A. Ferullo of Spence, 
Moriarity & Shockey, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellees:

 

            
William P. Schwartz of Ranck & Schwartz, Jackson, 
Wyoming.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN and VOIGT, JJ., and JAMES, D.J. and BROOKS, 
D.J.

 

 

 

            
BROOKS, District Judge.

 

[¶1]      This is a medical 
negligence action brought by the appellant, Judy Peters (Peters), against the 
appellees, West Park Hospital and two employees of the hospital (the 
Hospital).  Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 
41(a)(1), Ms. Peters sought to voluntarily dismiss her case without 
prejudice.  The district court, upon 
the Hospital's motion, instead dismissed the matter with prejudice on the 
grounds that the limitations period in the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act had 
not and could never be complied with.

 

[¶2]      We hold that 
under the circumstances presented here, the district court could not dismiss Ms. 
Peters' case with prejudice, and, therefore, we must 
reverse.

 

 

[¶3]      Does the filing 
of a voluntary dismissal without prejudice pursuant to W.R.C.P. 41(a)(1) 
preclude the district court from dismissing the case with prejudice? 

 

 

[¶4]      Ms. Peters' 
complaint alleges that on August 18, 2000, she was admitted to West Park 
Hospital in Cody for hip replacement surgery and follow-up care. Ms. Peters 
contends that on August 25, 2000, while in the radiology department of the 
Hospital, a radiology technician improperly manipulated and handled Ms. Peters, 
thereby causing a broken left leg.

 

[¶5]      The complaint was 
filed on August 21, 2002.   The 
Hospital filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 19, 2002.  The Hospital alleged in their motion 
that Ms. Peters had failed to comply with Wyo. Stat. Ann § 1-39-113 (LexisNexis 
2003).  That provision requires that 
prior to suit being filed against a governmental entity, a statutorily-proper 
written notice of claim must first be submitted to the governmental entity.  Compliance with the claim process must 
also be pled in the complaint against the entity.

 

[¶6]      We have 
previously held that the district court has no subject-matter jurisdiction where 
the complaint against a governmental entity fails to allege that the claim 
process had been followed.  Dee 
v. Laramie County, 666 P.2d 957, 958-59 (Wyo. 1983).  In apparent acknowledgment that the 
Hospital was a governmental entity and that no notice of claim had been filed as 
required, Ms. Peters filed a Notice of Dismissal Without Prejudice pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 41(a)(1) on October 21, 2002.  
The Hospital then filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss Complaint And Objection to Notice of Dismissal Without Prejudice.  It was the Hospital's position that the 
complaint should be dismissed with prejudice since the limitation period in the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act could never be complied 
with.

 

[¶7]      The district 
court agreed with the Hospital and dismissed Ms. Peters' complaint with 
prejudice on October 23, 2002.  Ms. 
Peters then filed a Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's Order of 
Dismissal With Prejudice.  The 
district court denied Ms. Peters' motion.

 

 

[¶8]      This appeal 
centers on an interpretation of W.R.C.P. 41(a)(1) (Rule 41(a)(1)).  Questions of law are reviewed by this 
Court de novo.  Jessen v. 
Jessen, 2002 WY 33, ¶ 7, 41 P.3d 543, 545-46 (Wyo. 2002); 
In re DCP, 2001 WY 77, ¶ 7, 30 P.3d 29, 30 (Wyo. 2001).

 

 

[¶9]      At the heart of 
this appeal is the effect of filing a Rule 41(a)(1) motion.  Rule 41(a)(1) provides, in pertinent 
part:

 

(a)       
Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 

 

(1)       By 
Plaintiff . . . (i)       by filing a 
notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an 
answer or of a motion for summary judgment . . ..

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶10]   This is a matter of first 
impression before this Court.  
However, numerous other jurisdictions have considered the application of 
Rule 41(a)(1).  We have previously 
acknowledged that since the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure are patterned after 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal court interpretations of their 
rules are highly persuasive in our interpretation of the corresponding Wyoming 
rules.  Glover v. Giraldo, 
824 P.2d 552, 556 (Wyo. 1992); 
Farrell v. Hursh Agency, Inc., 713 P.2d 1174, 1178 n.4 (Wyo. 
1986).

 

[¶11]   The federal courts that have 
discussed Rule 41(a)(1) almost uniformly enforce the rule as written.  For example, in Marex Titanic, Inc. 
v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 2 F.3d 544, 545 (4th Cir. 1993), 
the district court denied the plaintiff's Rule 41(a)(1) motion for voluntary 
dismissal and allowed an intervener to file a claim.  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed, holding:

 

If 
the plaintiff files a notice of dismissal before the adverse party serves it 
with "an answer or a motion for summary judgment," the dismissal is available as 
a matter of unconditional right . . . and is self executing . . 
..

 

Id. 
at 546.

 

[¶12]   In American Soccer Co., Inc. v. 
Score First Enterprises, a Div. of Kevlar Industries, 187 F.3d 1108, 1109 
(9th Cir. 1999), 
the plaintiff filed a Rule 41(a)(1) motion before an answer or motion for 
summary judgment had been served.  
The defendant then filed a motion to vacate the voluntary dismissal, and 
the district court thereafter dismissed the case with prejudice.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals again 
reversed and found that Rule 41(a)(1)

 

confers 
on the plaintiff

 

"an 
absolute right to voluntarily dismiss his action prior to service by the 
defendant of an answer or a motion for summary judgment.  . . ."

 

Wilson 
v. City of San Jose, 
111 F.3d 688, 692 (9th Cir.1997) 
. . ..

 

This 
"absolute right" for a plaintiff voluntarily to dismiss an action . . . leaves 
no role for the court to play[.]

 

American 
Soccer Co., Inc., 
187 F.3d  at 1110.

 

[¶13]   Numerous other federal court 
decisions have reached the same conclusion.  See, for example, Wilson v. 
City of San Jose, 111 F.3d 688, 692 (9th Cir. 1997); 
Williams v. Clarke, 82 F.3d 270, 272 (8th Cir. 1996); 
Aamot v. Kassel, 1 F.3d 441, 443-45 (6th Cir. 1993); 
Pedrina v. Chun, 987 F.2d 608, 609-10 (9th Cir. 1993); 
Safeguard Business Systems, Inc. v. Hoeffel, 907 F.2d 861, 863-64 (8th 
Cir. 1990); 
Matthews v. Gaither, 902 F.2d 877, 879-80 (11th Cir. 1990); 
Aero-Colours, Inc. v. Propst, 833 F.2d 51, 52 (5th Cir. 
1987); 
and Manze v. State Farm Ins. Co., 817 F.2d 1062, 1065-66 (3rd Cir. 
1987).

 

[¶14]   This Court is aware of only one 
narrow judicially-created exception to the general rule.  In Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American 
Cyanamid Co., 203 F.2d 105, 107 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 964 (1953), 
the district court held a hearing on a preliminary injunction which lasted 
several days and during which the merits of the case were raised.  The district court entered a decision on 
the merits before the voluntary dismissal was filed, and, therefore, in the 
context of that case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the purpose 
of the rule would not be served.  
Id. at 108.  In 
virtually all other reported cases, the courts have upheld plaintiffs' right to 
a voluntary dismissal without prejudice prior to the filing of an answer or 
summary judgment by the defendants.

 

[¶15]   In the case now before this Court, 
the Hospital contends that the district court properly dismissed the action with 
prejudice.  It is the Hospital's 
assertion that under the two year limitation period set forth in the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act, Ms. Peters could never file a timely claim, and, 
therefore, the district court had the inherent power to dismiss Ms. Peters' 
claim with prejudice.1  In response, Ms. Peters argues that the 
dismissal with prejudice prevented her from developing facts that would lengthen 
the limitation period under the "continuing course of treatment doctrine."2  There is no question that by dismissing 
the action with prejudice, Ms. Peters was foreclosed from pleading and proving 
facts that potentially could extend the limitation period.

 

 

[¶16]   Rule 41(a)(1) is 
straightforward.  The language of 
the rule leaves little room for judicial interpretation.  In ordinary civil cases, a notice of 
dismissal that complies with the rule ends the proceedings.  The dismissal is effective immediately 
and no court order is required.  
Wilson, 111 F.3d  at 692; 
Williams, 82 F.3d  at 272; 
Hamilton v. Shearson-Lehman American Exp., Inc., 813 F.2d 1532, 1534-35 
(9th Cir. 1987).

 

[¶17]   Rule 41(a)(1) is designed to 
designate a time frame within which the resources of the court and the defendant 
have yet to be committed so that dismissal without consequence is 
appropriate.  That time frame ends 
when either an answer or motion for summary judgment has been filed and 
served.  Safeguard Business 
Systems, Inc., 907 F.2d  at 863.

 

Rule 
41(a)(1) is "designed to permit a disengagement of the parties at the behest of 
the plaintiff . . . in the early stages of the suit, before the defendant has 
expended time and effort in the preparation of his case."

 

Pedrina, 
987 F.2d  at 610 (quoting Armstrong v. Frostie Co., 453 F.2d 914, 916 (4th Cir. 1971)).

 

[¶18]   In this matter, a Rule 41(a)(1) 
motion was properly filed by Ms. Peters.  
It is undisputed that no answer or motion for summary judgment was ever 
filed by the Hospital.

 

[¶19]   Given that the Rule 41(a)(1) motion 
was properly filed by Ms. Peters, the case was therefore rendered a nullity, as 
if the suit had never been filed.  
Williams, 82 F.3d  at 273.  The district court's role in the case 
was thus ended.  This was a matter 
of right belonging to Ms. Peters, conferred by the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and which cannot be undone by the court.  American Soccer Co., Inc., 187 F.3d  at 1110.

 

[¶20]   In light of the plain language of 
W.R.C.P. 41(a)(1), the decision of the district court is reversed and remanded, 
and the above matter shall be deemed dismissed without prejudice as of October 
21, 2002, the date on which Ms. Peters' motion for voluntary dismissal was 
filed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1Wyo. Stat. Ann § 1-39-113 provides, in pertinent 
part:

 

(a)        No 
action shall be brought under this act against a governmental entity unless the 
claim upon which the action is based is presented to the entity as an itemized 
statement in writing within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error 
or omission, except that a cause of action may be instituted not more than two 
(2) years after discovery of the alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant 
can establish that the alleged act, error or omission 
was:

 

(i)  Not reasonably 
discoverable within a two (2) year period; 
or

 

(ii)  The claimant failed 
to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two (2) year period 
despite the exercise of due diligence.

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann § 1-3-107 (LexisNexis 2003), pertaining to limitation 
of actions in rendering health care services, provides, in pertinent 
part:

 

(a)        A 
cause of action arising from an act, error or omission in the rendering of 
licensed or certified professional or health care services shall be brought 
within the greater of the following times:

 

(i)  Within two (2) years 
of the date of the alleged act, error or omission, except that a cause of action 
may be instituted not more than two (2) years after discovery of the alleged 
act, error or omission, if the claimant can establish that the alleged act, 
error or omission was:

 

(A)  Not reasonably 
discoverable within a two (2) year period; 
or

 

(B)  The claimant failed 
to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two (2) year period 
despite the exercise of due diligence.

 

 

  2In Metzger v. Kalke, 709 P.2d 414, 417 (Wyo. 
1985), we held that "the act, error or omission which starts 
the running of the statute of limitations against medical malpractice actions is 
the termination of the course of treatment for the same or related illnesses or 
injuries."