Case Title: University of Wyoming v. Gressley

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96-10

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-04-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
University of Wyoming v. Gressley1999 WY 46978 P.2d 1146Case Number: 96-10, 96-9Decided: 04/29/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING THROUGH ITS TRUSTEES INCLUDING:

ELIZABETH A. KAIL, W. PERRY DRAY, DAN KINNAMAN, 
FORREST KEPLER, HARRY LEE

HARRIS, PETER M. JORGENSEN, GERALDINE KIRK, JERRY 
SAUNDERS, M.D.,

DAVE BONNER, DEBORAH HEALY HAMMONS, DAVID W. "BUD" 
UPDIKE, and

F. RICHARD BROWN, in their official capacities, 
(Appellants) (Defendants),

v.

GENE M. GRESSLEY, (Appellee) (Plaintiff). 

 

GENE M. GRESSLEY, (Appellant) (Plaintiff), 

v. 

HELEN DEUTSCH; and UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING THROUGH ITS 
TRUSTEES INCLUDING: ELIZABETH

A. KAIL, W. PERRY DRAY, DAN 
KINNAMAN, FORREST KEPLER, HARRY LEE

HARRIS, PETER M. JORGENSEN, GERALDINE KIRK, JERRY 
SAUNDERS, M.D.,

DAVE BONNER, DEBORAH HEALY HAMMONS, DAVID W. "BUD" 
UPDIKE, and

F. RICHARD BROWN, in their official capacities, 
(Appellees) (Defendants).

 

                          
  

 

Appeals from the District Court of Albany 
County The Honorable Arthur T. Hanscum, Judge.

 Ford T. Bussart of Bussart, West, Rossetti, Piaia 
& Tyler, P. C., Rock Springs, Wyoming, Representing University of 
Wyoming, et. al.

Walter Urbigkit of Frontier 
Law Center, Cheyenne, Wyoming, Representing Gene M. 
Gressley.

 

    Before LEHMAN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN,* and TAYLOR,** JJ.

   * Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

  ** Retired November 2, 
1998.

  

    
THOMAS, Justice.

   
[¶1]      In this case, we address questions of 
issue and claim preclusion ascribable to the efforts of Gene M. Gressley 
(Gressley) to challenge his discharge as Assistant to the President for the 
American Heritage Center and as a professor by the University of Wyoming 
(University). Gressley challenged his discharge by pursuing formal 
administrative proceedings provided by University regulations and by a civil 
action in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming. He did 
not seek judicial review of the decision of the Board of Trustees of the 
University to approve his discharge. The state district court dismissed 
Gressley's claims relating to breach of his employment contract because of the 
prior resolution of those claims and the issues encompassed in them by the 
administrative proceedings pursuant to the University regulations and the 
federal court action. A collateral issue is raised in an appeal by the 
University from the ruling of the state district court that it is an agency 
under state administrative law, which must formally adopt rules under the 
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act in order to exclude Gressley from access to 
documents and records in the care, custody and control of the University. We 
affirm the decision of the state district court in all 
respects.

 

  [¶2]      In the Brief of Appellants/Defendants, 
filed on behalf of the University, actually the individual members of the 
University's Board of Trustees in their official capacities, the issues are 
stated as:

 

A. Did the Trial Court err in determining that the 
University of Wyoming is an Aagency" for purposes of rule-making requirements of 
the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, §§ 16-3-101 through 16-3-115, W.S. 
1977 Republished Edition?

 

B. Did the Trial Court err in ordering the University 
of Wyoming to adopt an "APA-Sufficient" rule for access by Plaintiff to the 
business records of the University's American Heritage 
Center?

 

  In the Brief of Appellee Gene M. 
Gressley, his position on the University's appeal is stated 
as:

 

A. Whether the University of Wyoming is a state 
agency, dependent upon legislative control and subject to the Wyoming Public 
Records Act (Wyo. Stat. § 16-4-101 et seq.) and the rule making requirements of 
the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (Wyo. § Stat. 16-3-101 et seq.) on the 
restrictions which it imposed on access to the records of the American Heritage 
Center?

 

  [¶3]      In Gressley's appeal, the issues set 
forth in the Opening Brief of Appellant/Plaintiff, Gene M. Gressley 
are:

 

            A. Is the 
plaintiff's contract claim timely?

 

B. Are plaintiff's claims barred by his alleged 
failure to exhaust state remedies?

 

            C. Does 
collateral estoppel apply?

 

            D. Are 
plaintiff's claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
cognizable?

 

            E. Does res 
judicata apply?

 

  In the Brief of Appellees/Defendants 
University of Wyoming, the issues are not stated as such, but the following 
points are argued in the brief:

 

1. The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies bars all of 
appellant/plaintiff's claims for relief

 

2. The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars all of 
appellant/plaintiff's claims for relief

 

3. It is settled federal and Wyoming law that the 
University of Wyoming and its Trustees in their official capacities are not 
"persons" subject to suit as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Appellant/plaintiff's second and fourth 
claims for relief are therefore not cognizable

 

4. Appellant/plaintiff's request for injunctive 
relief failed to show that he would prevail on the merits of his underlying 
claim, and the federal court's ruling is res judicata

  

5. The administrative process utilized by the 
University of Wyoming to effect appellant/plaintiff's termination is 
valid

 

  In the Reply Brief of Gene M. Gressley, 
this analysis of issues is included:

 

Some road map for direction finding is required to 
take the Gressley Appeal Brief with its recitation of five issues and argument 
enumeration to relate the Appellant's brief text to the five 
non-parallel arguments presented by 
the University of Wyoming as Appellee.

 

The motion to dismiss from which this appeal was 
taken followed adverse Wyo. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) complaint dismissal of Plaintiff 
Gressley's first, second and fourth claim. The broad language utilized by the 
court in stating the basis for decision cannot be reconciled to the status of 
the claims in the Complaint nor does Appellee provide any rationalization for 
the applied scope of the Court's decision except as to one of Appellant's five 
issues where a directly stated response is made (Claim 
Four).

 

  [¶4]      Gressley first became a member of the 
University faculty in 1956 when he was hired as an Archivist and an instructor. 
In 1959, he was promoted to Assistant Professor, and in 1960, the University 
granted him tenure. In 1962, he was promoted to Associate Professor. He also 
served the University as Assistant Director of the library; the Director of the 
Division of Rare Books and Special Collections; Research Professor of American 
Studies; and, in 1964, Gressley became a full Professor of the University 
library. Previously in 1969, he had been appointed Director of American Studies, 
and later he was made Assistant to the President for the American Heritage 
Center. In February of 1988, the President of the University reassigned Gressley 
to the position of Assistant to the President for the American Heritage Center, 
in addition to his status as a Professor.

 

  [¶5]      In 1991, the President of the University 
and Gressley disagreed about his new job description and the responsibilities 
associated with that position. The disagreement caused the President to write 
two letters to Gressley, one dated June 6, 1991, and a second dated July 30, 
1991, in which the President outlined Gressley's duties. The thrust of these letters was to 
advise Gressley that he no longer would be permitted to independently 
communicate with donors or patrons in soliciting funds or acquisitions for the 
American Heritage Center. Gressley was told that he was to function as a 
University Professor performing appropriate academic research and teaching. The 
President and the University believe that Gressley continued to communicate with 
American Heritage Center donors and patrons after his authority to do so had 
been withdrawn.

 

  [¶6]      On November 10, 1991, the President 
filed a recommendation for Gressley's dismissal as a tenured professor of the 
University.  Because of his tenure, 
Gressley's termination had to be for cause, and the dismissal necessarily had to 
be accomplished pursuant to University Regulation 801 (Regulation 801). This 
regulation provides for preliminary proceedings designed essentially to bring 
about an informal resolution between the University and the faculty member. 
Section 1(a)(3) of Regulation 801 provides:

 

If at any time during the preliminary proceedings the 
faculty member requests that the formal proceedings be held, these shall be 
initiated within one month or the matter shall be dropped.

 

  [¶7]      In a letter dated August 11, 1992, 
Gressley's attorney requested the University Aagain to file the charges * * 
*."1 On November 10, 1992, the 
President's formal charges were sent directly to Gressley in a statement of 
grounds for dismissal, along with a copy of Regulation 801. Enclosed were an 
initial list of witnesses to be called by the University and a copy of the 
President's letter to the chair of the faculty senate.  The letter to the chair advised that the 
Ad Hoc Hearing Committee should be appointed pursuant to Regulation 801, if 
Gressley requested a hearing within twenty days. In a letter dated November 16, 
1992 to the chair of the faculty senate, Gressley moved to dismiss the charges 
as untimely. At the same time, he also requested a public hearing, and he 
submitted a formal answer to the charges on January 15, 
1993.

 

  [¶8]      The hearing Gressley requested was held 
from January 25 through January 29, 1993, and again during the evenings of 
February 1 through 10, 1993, before the faculty senate's Ad Hoc Hearing 
Committee (Committee). The Committee concluded that the University failed to 
initiate formal proceedings within a month of the request of August 11, 1992, 
from Gressley's attorney under Regulation 801, Section 1(a)(3) pertaining to 
Apreliminary proceedings * * *."  
The Committee decided, however, that it was not empowered to dismiss the 
charges as untimely because its existence and jurisdiction are described, and 
come into effect, after the preliminary proceedings described in Section 1(a)(3) 
of Regulation 801 have been exhausted. The Committee found that six charges 
against Gressley could not be established by clear and convincing evidence, but 
it concluded that adequate cause existed for his dismissal based upon a 
Acontinuance pattern of interference with the administration of the [American 
Heritage Center] regarding donor matters;" "evidence of neglect of duty by the 
failure or refusal to account for University property;" and "misrepresentations 
about a valuable * * * painting belonging to the University." The recommendation 
by the Committee to dismiss Gressley was unanimous, and was dated March 2, 
1993.

 

   [¶9]   According to Regulation 801, 
Section 1(e)(3), the process for dismissal continues in this 
way:

 

The decisions of the Hearing Committee will either be 
sustained by the Trustees, or the proceeding returned to the Committee with 
specific objections.  If 
returned, the Committee will then reconsider, taking into account the stated objections and 
receiving new evidence if necessary. The Trustees will make a final decision 
only after study of the Committee's reconsideration.

 

  (Emphasis added.) Oral arguments were 
presented to the Board of Trustees on May 5, 1993, at an open hearing, and the 
Board of Trustees designated the record on appeal it considered in arriving at 
its decision. With some exceptions, the Board of Trustees accepted and adopted 
the findings and conclusions submitted 
by the Committee. The Board of Trustees concluded insubordination to the 
President could be adequate cause, in and of itself, for dismissal of a tenured 
faculty member. More pertinently, however, the Board of Trustees found that the 
charges against Gressley were brought in a timely manner because the parties mutually had waived the preliminary 
proceedings set forth in Regulation 801, Section 1(a). In support of waiver, the 
following evidence was listed in the Board of Trustees' decision in May 
1993:

 

3. That the April 20, 1992, letter from [the 
President's counsel] to [Gressley's counsel] * * * contained a request that Dr. 
Gressley notify [the President's counsel] whether he wanted "to utilize the 
faculty committee process provided by University Regulations", or if he was 
waiving the informal process.

 

4. That [Gressley's counsel] advised [the President's 
counsel] in writing on April 27, 1992 that he was waiving a faculty committee 
meeting process and ". . . there is no point in meeting with the president." * * 
*

 

            * * 
*

 

6. That the August 11, 1992 letter from [Gressley's 
counsel] to [the President's counsel] * * * asking for the matter to proceed to 
a public forum, had no application to the one month deadline set out in 
University Regulation 801, 3, Section 
1(a)(3) as these proceedings had already been waived.

 

(Emphasis added.) The Board 
of Trustees ruled that after the preliminary proceedings were waived by the 
faculty member, the University was not bound by the one-month requirement in 
that section, and it was Anot intended as an absolute bar to dismissal 
proceedings."

  

  [¶10] 
  The Board of Trustees found 
that adequate cause existed to dismiss Gressley because of insubordination to 
the President. In so doing, the Board of Trustees concluded to disregard 
testimony elicited from a witness who had been accused of defamation by 
Gressley. The Board of Trustees did, however,   
unanimously sustain the Committee's decision to dismiss together with the 
recommendations of the President on the conditions of dismissal. Since the Board 
of Trustees did not overrule the Committee's decision, but sustained it instead, 
the matter was not returned to the Committee for any further deliberations.  Gressley did not seek judicial review of 
the decision of the Board of Trustees.

 

  [¶11] 
  Gressley's next effort to 
challenge his discharge was to file a claim in accordance with the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act, which he did on July 2, 1993. He then filed a civil 
action in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming.  Gressley v. Deutsch, 890 F. Supp. 1474 
(D. Wyo. 1994). In that action, his amended complaint advanced six claims for 
relief:

 

(1) breach of contract against the Trustees of the 
University of Wyoming; (2) a claim against all defendants pursuant to  42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of due 
process; (3) a claim against [the President of the University] and the Trustees, 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violation of his first amendment rights to 
freedom of speech and association; (4) a defamation claim against [an American 
Heritage Center donor] and [the President of the University] for defamation; (5) 
a claim for injunctive and declaratory relief against [the President of the 
University] and the Trustees; and (6) a claim for punitive damages against [the 
President of the University] and [the American Heritage Center 
donor].

 

Gressley, 890 F. Supp.  at 
1482. Gressley's complaint was met by motions to dismiss on behalf of all of the 
defendants. Id. The United States District Court dismissed all six claims with 
prejudice. Id. at 1504. It ruled that all of the claims brought pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 were precluded and that the pendant state claims, breach of 
contract and defamation need not be addressed because the court was without 
jurisdiction to entertain them. Gressley, 890 F. Supp.  at 1504. The rationale 
for that decision was that Gressley's contract claim against the Board of 
Trustees is an action against the State of Wyoming within the meaning of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-35-101(Michie Cum. Supp. 1994). Gressley, 890 F. Supp.  at 1487. 
For that reason, it had to be pursued in accordance with the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-39-101 to 1-39-120 (Michie Cum. 
Supp. 1994). Gressley, 890 F. Supp.  at 1487. The federal court dismissed the 
contract claim because "`[o]riginal and exclusive jurisdiction for any claim 
under this act shall be in the district courts of Wyoming. . . .'" Gressley, 
890 F. Supp.  at 1487 (quoting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-117(a)) (emphasis in 
original).

 

  [¶12] 
  In addition, the United 
States District Court held that the University was immune pursuant to the 
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,2 and the purchase of liability 
insurance by the University did not waive that federal immunity. Gressley, 890 F. Supp.  at 1488. The federal court also ruled, that even if it acknowledged 
jurisdiction over prospective injunctive relief under the Eleventh Amendment, 
Gressley failed to show a substantial likelihood that he would prevail on the 
merits with respect to any right of reinstatement. Gressley, 890 F. Supp.  at 
1489.

 

  [¶13] 
  The federal court also held 
that the President and the Board of Trustees in their individual capacities were 
entitled to the defense of qualified immunity because termination of Gressley 
came within the ambit of discretionary function. Id. at 1492. In addition, the 
federal court ruled that Gressley had failed to plead sufficient facts to 
demonstrate that the President and the Board of Trustees violated any clearly 
established law, or facts sufficient to establish bias on the part of the Board 
of Trustees. Id. at 1496. Further, the federal court held that Gressley could not demonstrate any 
prejudice because formal proceedings were instituted by the President instead of 
the appropriate administrative officer appointed by the President, and, even 
assuming the charges against Gressley were not timely brought, that would not 
suffice to permit Gressley to overcome the defense of qualified immunity. Id. at 
1498. As a final matter, the federal court ruled that the President's action of 
prohibiting Gressley from sending a form letter to some three hundred donors did 
not constitute a violation of his right of free speech or his right to freedom 
of association because it was an expression of Gressley's disgruntlement over 
his employment status rather than a letter touching Aupon a matter of public 
concern." Id. at 1502. The federal court 
ruled that the University's interest in protecting its relationship with patrons 
and donors of the American Heritage Center out-weighed any interest of Gressley 
in communicating his job dissatisfaction to those same individuals. Id. at 
1503.

 

  [¶14] 
  The federal court captured 
the essence of its ruling when it said:

 

To summarize: this Court lacks jurisdiction over 
plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against [the President of the University] 
and the University of Wyoming Board of Trustees, in their official capacities; 
Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to support a conspiracy claim 
against Defendant,  [donor]; the Board of Trustees are 
absolutely immune from any suit for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 
and  Plaintiff's amended complaint, 
alone, is insufficient to meet his burden of showing both facts and law to establish that defendants are not 
entitled to qualified immunity with respect to his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. 
Finally, in light of this Court's determination that all of Plaintiff's 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 claims are precluded, Plaintiff's pendant state claims, breach of 
contract and defamation, need not be addressed since this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to entertain them. See, 28 U.S.C. § 1441.

 

  
Gressley, 890 F. Supp.  at 1504.

 

  [¶15] 
  On November 1, 1994, 
Gressley filed an action in the state district court naming the same defendants 
as those involved in the federal court action. He asserted six claims for 
relief:

 

            1. Breach of 
contract against the University.

 

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation of Gressley's First 
Amendment rights to freedom of speech versus the 
University.

 

            3. Defamation 
versus the donor to the American Heritage Center.

 

            4. Injunctive and 
declarative relief versus the Board of Trustees.

 

            5. Punitive 
damages versus the donor to the American Heritage Center.

 

            6. Public Records 
Act versus the Board of Trustees.

 

  Specifically, the sixth claim for 
relief, relating to the Public Records Act, stated:

 

The Trustees have refused to allow Plaintiff access 
to the files of the American Heritage Center to write an accurate history of the 
Center. Their actions in so doing violate the Wyoming Public Records 
Act.

 

  [¶16] 
  The University filed a 
motion to dismiss Gressley's first, second, and fourth claims for relief, and 
for partial summary judgment on his sixth claim for relief. The motion to 
dismiss asserted the statute of limitations; failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies; and collateral estoppel or res judicata as a bar to Gressley's claims 
for relief. Gressley filed motions on several dates in which he opposed the 
dismissal of his action.  The last 
motion was filed February 21, 1995, and it was entitled Plaintiff's Affidavit in 
Opposition to Defendant University of Wyoming's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
the Wyoming Public Records Act. Briefs were filed by both sides, and the state 
court heard oral arguments on June 30, 1995.

 

  [¶17] 
  In the district court's 
decision letter filed on September 18, 1995, the district court advised that it 
would dismiss all of Gressley's claims, except the district court "granted 
partial summary judgment on his sixth claim for relief both on substantive and 
procedural grounds." The district court determined that any rule or regulation 
restricting Gressley's access to the resources in the American Heritage Center 
"must comply with the Wyoming Public Records law and must be promulgated in 
compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act." The appeal to this court was 
taken from the order entered consistently with the district court's decision 
letter.

 

  [¶18] 
  When we are called upon to 
review a summary judgment, our review is de novo upon the same record materials 
that were presented to the trial court. We afford no special deference to the 
ruling of the trial court on the motion for summary judgment. E. g., Ahrenholtz 
v. Time Ins. Co., 968 P.2d 946, 949 (Wyo. 1998); 40 North Corp. v. Morrell, 964 P.2d 423, 426 (Wyo. 1998); Diamond Surface, Inc. v. Cleveland, 963 P.2d 996, 
1000 (Wyo. 1998); Garcia v. UniWyo Federal Credit Union, 920 P.2d 642, 645 (Wyo. 
1996); Reno Livestock Corp. v. Sun Oil Co. (Delaware), 638 P.2d 147, 150 (Wyo. 
1981); Laird v. Laird, 597 P.2d 463, 466 (Wyo. 1979). The position of the party 
opposing the motion for summary judgment is given all favorable inferences that 
fairly may be drawn from the record. E. g., Garcia, 920 P.2d  at 645; Tidwell v. 
HOM, Inc., 896 P.2d 1322, 1325 (Wyo. 1995); Adkins v. Lawson, 892 P.2d 128, 130 
(Wyo. 1995). If the decision of the district court is correct on the law we 
affirm, but if it is not correct we must do what is necessary to correct it. E. 
g., Collier v. Hilltop Nat. Bank, 920 P.2d 1241, 1242 (Wyo. 1996); Trefren v. 
Lewis, 852 P.2d 323, 325 (Wyo. 1993); Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game 
and Fish Com'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993).

 

  [¶19] 
  The parties to this case do 
not debate any factual issues, and it is apparent that there is no genuine issue 
of material fact.  Under those 
circumstances, if the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law, we will affirm the lower court's order granting summary judgment. American 
Nat. Bank of Cheyenne, Wyo. v. Miller, 899 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Wyo. 1995); Makinen 
v. PM P. C., 893 P.2d 1149, 1153 (Wyo. 1995); Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 884 P.2d 968, 971 (Wyo. 1994). We can affirm an order granting summary judgment on any 
legal grounds appearing in the record.  
Rue v. Carter, 919 P.2d 633, 634 (Wyo. 1996); State ex rel. Bayou 
Liquors, Inc. v. City of Casper, 906 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Wyo. 
1995).

 

  [¶20] 
  Gressley contends in his 
brief and argument that the statute of limitations found in the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act; res judicata; collateral estoppel; or a failure to 
exhaust his administrative remedies do not stand as a bar to his action in this 
case. The district court decided otherwise, ruling that Gressley's breach of 
contract action against the University should be dismissed on the basis of all 
of these theories of defense.

 

  [¶21] 
  We have held that the 
related doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to final 
determinations by administrative agencies. Slavens v. Board of County Com'rs for 
Uinta County, 854 P.2d 683, 685 (Wyo. 1993). In that case, we applied collateral 
estoppel, sometimes described as issue preclusion, in reviewing the final 
decision of the board of county commissioners because such agencies deal 
primarily with issues rather than with claims that can be pleaded in an action 
in court. The doctrine of issue preclusion prevents the relitigation of issues 
actually and necessarily decided previously in an action between the same 
parties.  Willowbrook Ranch, Inc. v. 
Nugget Exploration, Inc., 896 P.2d 769, 772 (Wyo. 1995). Collateral estoppel 
forecloses relitigation when the issue presented is identical to one determined 
in a prior proceeding; when the prior proceeding produced a decision on the 
merits of the issue; when the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted 
was a party, or in privity with the party, in the prior proceeding; and when the 
party against whom issue preclusion is asserted had a full and fair opportunity 
to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. Kahrs v. Board of Trustees for 
Platte County School Dist. No. 1, 901 P.2d 404, 406 (Wyo. 1995). See Slavens, 
854 P.2d  at 686.

 

  [¶22] 
  As was true in Kahrs, 
Gressley can recover under his breach of contract claim only if it is determined 
that his termination by the University was unlawful. Kahrs, 901 P.2d  at 406; 
Slavens, 854 P.2d  at 686. As a tenured employee, Gressley's termination had to 
be a termination for cause, and this is the issue that directly was determined 
first by the Committee, and again by the Board of Trustees at the next level of 
the proceedings required under Regulation 801. Gressley's situation is very 
similar to that of Kahrs.

 

  [¶23] 
  The issues presented to the 
Board of Trustees in the board hearing and to the court in this lawsuit are 
identical. The Board of Trustees did make a final determination on the merits in 
their unanimous finding that good cause existed to terminate Gressley's 
employment with the University. Gressley did not seek judicial review of the 
adverse decision against him. The Board of Trustees and Gressley, the parties in 
the administrative hearing, are the same parties in this lawsuit. Gressley was 
permitted to present all of his evidence and exhibits in the hearing, and he 
thus was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the propriety of his 
dismissal. The federal court ruled that there were not sufficient facts to 
establish any bias on the part of the Board of Trustees, and that Gressley's 
rights to due process had not been violated in any respect. Gressley complains 
that he has not had an opportunity to be heard, but he had that opportunity 
before the Board of Trustees, which had full authority to hear the case and to 
terminate him. If Gressley's complaint is that he did not have a judicial 
hearing as compared to an administrative hearing, he would have been afforded 
the judicial hearing had he sought review in the state district court. He did 
not, and it follows that the district court appropriately applied collateral 
estoppel to Gressley's breach of contract claim, and properly precluded Gressley 
from relitigating that issue in the district court.

 

  [¶24] 
  As did Kahrs, Gressley 
relies upon a right to bring an independent action in the district court under 
W. R. A. P. 12.12, which provides:

 

The relief, review, or redress available in suits for 
injunction against agency action or enforcement, in actions for recovery of 
money, in actions for a declaratory judgment based on agency action 
or inaction, in actions seeking any common law writ to compel, review or 
restrain agency action shall be available by independent action notwithstanding 
any petition for review.

 

We rejected this argument 
when we stated in Slavens, 854 P.2d  at 687, "W. R. A. P. 12.12 is not an 
exception to the doctrine of collateral estoppel." We reiterated that concept in 
Kahrs, 901 P.2d  at 408. As in the prior cases, in which we invoked collateral 
estoppel, we hold that the issue of cause for termination; the foundation for 
entitlement to injunctive relief; the identity of parties; and the opportunity 
for a full and fair hearing on the question of the lawfulness of the discharge 
all have been afforded in the administrative proceeding. We hold that Gressley's 
contract claim is foreclosed based upon issue preclusion. As in Kahrs, since 
Gressley was precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from maintaining 
the state district court action, there is no need to address the question of 
whether the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act bars the action for breach of 
contract. See Kahrs, 901 P.2d  at 408. 

 

  [¶25] 
  Gressley asserts that his 
second claim for relief, which he brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation 
of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech, is not foreclosed because the 
federal court concluded it lacked jurisdiction over his claims brought there 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In making this argument, Gressley does not credit the scope of the federal 
court decision. The federal court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over the 
President and the Board of Trustees in their official capacity, but it ruled on 
the merits that the Board of Trustees enjoyed immunity from a suit for damages 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that the complaint was not sufficient to meet 
Gressley's burden of showing facts and law to establish that the defendants were 
not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to those claims. Gressley, 890 F. Supp.  At 1504. It was from that premise that the federal court determined it 
did not have jurisdiction to entertain the pendant claims of breach of contract 
and defamation. Id.

 

  [¶26] 
  The lack of jurisdiction 
over the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the President and the Board of Trustees 
in their official capacities was premised upon the Eleventh Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States. Even so, the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims in the 
state district court were subject to dismissal because, in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction 
over the President, as an individual, and the individual members of the Board of 
Trustees, the federal court did adjudicate the issues of absolute immunity and 
qualified immunity. Gressley, 890 F. Supp.  at 1489-98. In light of that 
determination, there is no set of facts 
pursuant to which the President and the Board of Trustees, in their official 
capacities, are not entitled to qualified immunity in the state district court. 
The issues are identical whether the President and the Board of Trustees are 
sued as individuals or in their official capacities. The federal court's 
determination of these issues results in collateral estoppel with respect to 
Gressley's attempt to present them again in the state district court. In its 
ruling, the district court dismissed the second claim for relief by applying the 
doctrine of res judicata.  The 
district court stated:

 

Although the state court may exercise jurisdiction 
over a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, the United States District Court, District of 
Wyoming, has exercised jurisdiction over many of the claims raised in 
plaintiff's claims in this action and all such claims are barred as a matter 
of comity and "claims preclusion," excepting as the claim involves the portion of 
plaintiff's sixth claim for relief that relates to the restriction of 
plaintiff's access to the American Heritage Center's records and 
files.

 

  (Emphasis added.)

 

  [¶27] 
  We perceive this ruling by 
the district court to be accurate, and we hold that the federal court 
effectively disposed of Gressley's claims of violation of his right to freedom 
of speech, his right to association, his right to procedural due process, his 
right to substantive due process, and any other claims asserted pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. The federal court had subject matter jurisdiction to resolve 
those claims, and we affirm the holding of the district court that "all such 
claims are barred * * *." They were asserted and finally decided in the federal 
court. The crux of res judicata is that a claim once decided is finally decided, 
and in this case, the doctrine applies to bar all of Gressley's claims pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

 

  [¶28] 
  The only claim presented in 
the state district court that was not resolved is Gressley's attack upon Athe 
legality of rules instituted by the University to limit or regulate [Gressley's] 
access to library resources of the American Heritage Center."  The position of the University as to 
this question is untenable.  Our 
holding that the issue of unlawful discharge is foreclosed as a matter of 
collateral estoppel assumes the applicability of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114 
(Michie 1997), which provides in pertinent part:

 

(a) Subject to the requirement that administrative 
remedies be exhausted and in the absence of any statutory or common-law 
provision precluding or limiting judicial review, any person aggrieved or 
adversely affected in fact by a final decision of an agency in a contested case, 
or by other agency action or inaction, or any person affected in fact by a rule 
adopted by an agency, is entitled to judicial review in the district court for 
the county in which the administrative action or inaction was taken, or in 
which any real property affected by the 
administrative action or inaction is located, or if no real property is 
involved, in the district court for the county in which the party aggrieved or 
adversely affected by the administrative action or inaction resides or has its 
principal place of business. The procedure to be followed in the proceeding 
before the district court shall be in accordance with rules heretofore or 
hereinafter adopted by the Wyoming supreme court.

 

In order to have the benefit 
of the holding that the breach of contract claim is barred, the University must 
be an agency. The University appears to be content to be an agency for that 
purpose.

 

  [¶29] 
  It argues, however, that 
while it is subject to the Wyoming Public Records Act, it is not an agency for 
purposes of applying the statutory requirements under the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act. We cannot support this claim of a dual institutional personality. 
In Awe v. University of Wyoming, 534 P.2d 97 (Wyo. 1975), we dealt with the 
question of whether an action against the Board of Trustees of the University of 
Wyoming was an action against the state. 
The agency status of the University was not directly before us, but we did 
remark:

 

The plaintiffs seem to find some magic in the use by 
the legislature of the term Abody corporate" in referring to the board of 
trustees of the University of Wyoming (§ 21-352, W.S. 1957). An examination, 
however, of the duties of the board of 
trustees fails to distinguish it from the highway commission or the game and 
fish commission or the state board of charities and reform or the numerous other 
commissions and boards charged with the management and operation of a multitude 
of state agencies.

 

  Awe, 
534 P.2d  at 101.

 

  [¶30] 
  The Game and Fish 
Commission and the Highway Commission are agencies that are required to 
promulgate rules and regulations pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act. We perceive no justification to treat the University of Wyoming 
any differently, especially in light of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-101(b)(i) (Michie 
Cum. Supp. 1996), providing:

 

"Agency" means any authority, bureau, board, 
commission, department, division, officer or employee of the state, a county, 
city or town or other political subdivision of the state, except the 
governing body of a city or town, the state legislature and the 
judiciary[.]

 

(Emphasis added.) The 
exceptions from the reach of the statute are defined clearly, and we can only 
conclude that had there been a legislative intent to also except the University 
of Wyoming, it would have been included in the exceptions.

 

  [¶31] 
  We affirm the Amended Order 
Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First, Second and Fourth 
Claims for Relief in all respects, and we also affirm the ruling of the district 
court that the University of Wyoming is a Astate agency" for purposes of the 
rule-making requirements of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure 
Act.

 

            

FOOTNOTES

1 In his 
Brief, Gressley contends the formal dismissal proceeding was commenced in April 
of 1992. There is no date set forth on the General Summary of Charges included 
in the record. It is clear that the asserted April date is inaccurate because 
counsel for Gressley in the August 11, 1992, letter stated: "As you know, you 
supplied us with informal charges against Gene in April, 1992. * * *  Accordingly, I must ask you again to 
file the charges as this seems the only way Gene may have to clear his name." 
(Emphasis added).

 

2 The 
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that "[t]he 
Judicial power to the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit 
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another state, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." 
This language has been interpreted to foreclose suits by citizens residing in a 
state from federal court actions against that state. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 504, 33 L. Ed. 842 (1890).