Case Title: Campus v. State

Citation: 483 P.2d 275

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1971-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
483 P.2d 275 (1971) William T. CAMPUS, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Montana and James Estelle, Warden of the Montana State Prison, Respondents. No. 12045. Supreme Court of Montana. March 31, 1971. *276 David Patterson (argued), Missoula, for petitioner. Robert Woodahl, J.C. Weingartner, Helena, Byron L. Robb, Jack Shanstrom (argued), Livingston, for respondents. CASTLES, Justice. This is an original proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus by an inmate of the Montana State Prison. The petition was filed on his behalf by the Montana Defender Project following its investigation of this case. The petition discloses that William T. Campus, petitioner herein, aged 19, was charged in the district court of Park County with the sale of dangerous drugs to Patrick Moen, Randy Carrier, and Judy Noe in violation of section 54-132, R.C.M. 1947, of the Montana Dangerous Drug Act. Petitioner first entered a plea of "not guilty", later changed his plea to "guilty", and was sentenced to a term of 4 1/2 years in the Montana State Prison, with credit given for 105 days served in the county jail from the time of arrest to the time sentence was pronounced. Prior to sentencing, the court "had familiarized itself with all of the evidentiary matter that was in the custody of the Police Department" and "observed the quantity of hashish that the defendant was apprehended with and familiarized himself with all of the evidence" and at that time informed defendant's counsel "that the minimum sentence he would give in the case would be four and one half years", according to recitals in the transcript of the "evidentiary" hearing, held some five days after sentencing. It appears from the record made at a hearing on September 24, 1970, which was at the time the case was to be set for jury trial, that a change of plea from "not guilty" to "guilty" was desired by defendant. From this record it appears that defendant's counsel had consulted with the judge in a form of "plea bargaining" theretofore. The record makes it clear that defendant and his counsel were fully advised, were aware that the judge would not defer imposition of the sentence under the statutory presumption, and knowingly acquiesced in that decision. The record discloses the following: At the evidentiary hearing five days later, (the delay appears to have been for court and counsel convenience), the defendant and his counsel chose not to put on any evidence, counsel merely choosing to cross-examine the state's witnesses. It seems clear that a statutory disputable presumption such as we have here, which standing by itself is a form of indirect evidence for the benefit of the defendant, is the type of benefit that can be waived. The record here indicates clearly that it was waived, as we shall develop further. *278 However, petitioner's counsel, on this application, insists that regardless of his waiver under the rules laid down in State v. Simtob, 154 Mont. 286, 462 P.2d 873, the record made at the evidentiary hearing did not show evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption. Counsel insists that something more than evidence of the crime charged must be shown. Under section 54-129(k), R.C.M. 1947, "sell" means to sell, exchange, give or dispose of to another, or to offer or agree to do the same. Section 54-132(a), R.C.M. 1947, makes it a criminal sale of dangerous drugs "if he sells * * * and does not come within the exceptions of section 3 [54-131]." (Emphasis supplied). Thus the legislature adopted a definition of the word sell that is so broad that it includes a mere offer to give a minute quantity of a variety of defined dangerous drugs which includes four general categories, depressants, stimulants, hallucinogenic and narcotic drugs. Under this sweeping scope of the act, a mere offer to give a useful, though regulated and prescribed, drug is placed in the same category as the professional pushing of hard narcotics. But the legislature provided for a sentence in section 54-132(b) of from one year to life imprisonment. A sentencing judge's discretion is vast indeed, subject only to review by the Sentence Review Division of this Court or by this Court itself. It seems then that the legislature when it provided in section 54-132(b) "Any person of the age of 21 years or under convicted of a first violation under this section shall be presumed to be entitled to a deferred imposition of sentence." had in mind the broad scope of the act. The deferring of imposition of sentence under section 95-2206, R.C.M. 1947, is for a maximum period of three years. What then, does this statutory "presumption" mean? It is clear from its language that it is not conclusive nor is the deferred sentence mandatory in every case. The legislature has not provided any guidelines, but with such a broad sweeping definition of the crime permitting such severe penalty limits, one year to life, there necessarily, if we are to give any meaning to the word "presumption", must be reasonable limits. To overcome the presumption, we established in State v. Simtob, 154 Mont. 286, 291, 462 P.2d 873, 876, that the record before the sentencing court must show evidence. We said in discussing the meaning of a presumption: Also in section 93-1301-7, above referred to, disputable presumptions, such as we have here, include "That a person intends the ordinary consequence of his voluntary act." (Subsec. 3); and "That acquiescence followed from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the right or fact." (Subsec. 27). Herein we find the waiver and acquiescence by the defendant. In Simtob we did not find aggravating evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption. However, because of the importance of the problem, we will look to the evidentiary hearing to determine whether aggravating circumstances did exist. In the instant case, is there not more than a "mere sale of a mere dangerous drug"? (Admittedly in Simtob, the nature of the drug, LSD, nor its quantity, 31 1/2 lids, impressed this Court as being sufficient to make it aggravated in a possession charge). *279 Here, we have two pounds of hashish something more in both quantity and type than a mere marihuana cigarette. We have a sale to three minors, one a mere 15 year old; we have more than a "mere" sale, that is, an offer to give; rather, we have a commercial sale; we have evidence, not contradicted, by the 15 year old girl that defendant got the hashish in Germany when he was in the service. These matters were sufficient to overcome the statutory "presumption". The 1971 Legislature by Senate Bill 270, Chapter 228, Laws of 1971, changed somewhat the language of section 54-133, R.C.M. 1947, as regards the crime of possession. It left intact the presumption on sentence contained in section 54-132(b) as to sale. Since we still have these statutory presumptions, some confusion appears in what type of evidence is sufficient to overcome the presumption. First, we interpret it to mean that the record itself must disclose the evidence, as we held in Simtob. Second, the evidence may be contained either within or without the proof of the crime itself. Third, the aggravating circumstances should be some substantial evidence over and above the simple facts of a prima facie case. Finally, it is clear that this Court will require hearings and a record to disclose the aggravating evidence, if there be no express voluntary waiver as in this case. While these are general basic rules, necessarily we must determine the sufficiency of aggravation on a case-by-case basis. Previously, on March 23, we issued an order in this cause giving the state and the district court an opportunity to respond to the petitioner's allegations and set a further hearing for March 29. On that date the district court appeared as did counsel for petitioner. Full argument was had. From what we have heretofore said, it appears that no grounds for habeas corpus are shown. Accordingly, the petition is denied. HASWELL, JOHN C. HARRISON and DALY, JJ., concur.