Case Title: Stouffer v. Holbrook

Citation: 417 Md. 165

Docket Number: 25/10

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2010-11-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
J. Michael Stouffer v. Eric Holbrook, No. 25, September Term, 2010
CRIMINAL LAW – PROCEDURE – DIMINUTION CREDITS – GOOD-CONDUCT
CREDITS – RATE OF ACCRUAL – TERM OF CONFINEMENT – DRUG-RELATED OR
VIOLENT OFFENSE – CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ARTICLE – SECTIONS 3-701
AND 3-704(B)(2) – LEGISLATIVE INTENT – RULE OF LENITY – THE GENERAL
STATUTORY DIRECTION TO AGGREGATE MULTIPLE SENTENCES INTO A
SINGLE TERM OF CONFINEMENT SHOULD BE SUBORDINATED WHERE
NECESSARY TO AFFORD INMATES A BENEFIT MANDATED BY THE
LEGISLATURE.  WHEN THE LEGISLATURE USED THE PHRASE “TERM OF
CONFINEMENT” IN SECTION 3-704(B)(2), EITHER IT ENVISIONED INMATES LIKE
HOLBROOK EARNING GOOD-CONDUCT CREDITS “AS THOUGH THERE WERE
NO EXISTING SENTENCE” OR IT INJECTED ENOUGH UNCERTAINTY IN THE
STATUTE TO IMPLICATE THE RULE OF LENITY. 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 24-H-08-000388
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 25
September Term, 2010
                                                                             
J. MICHAEL STOUFFER
v.
ERIC HOLBROOK
                                                                             
 
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
                                                                             
Opinion by Harrell, J.
                                                                             
Filed:      November 22, 2010
1 For example, Professor Ester promised me that, if I finished law school and passed
the Bar examination, there would be no more math.  He was mistaken.  
This case is about the calculation of diminution credits, a topic that strikes dread into
the hearts of many trial and appellate judges.1  Fortunately, the panel of the Court of Special
Appeals that decided the present case was not terrorized by it and pulled a laboring oar in
fashioning a fine opinion.  We follow in their wake.  For many of the same reasons explained
by our appellate brethren, we conclude that Petitioner, the Division of Correction (“the
Division”), should have awarded Respondent, Eric Holbrook, good-conduct credits at the rate
of ten, rather than five, days a month.  Thus, we affirm.
I.
The facts accompanying this case, typical of reported cases involving disputes over
diminution credits, are extensive, as Holbrook is “no stranger to the Division of Correction.”
Sec’y of Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs. v. Hutchinson, 359 Md. 320, 322, 753 A.2d 1024, 1025
(2000).  The year of 1999 was a busy one for Holbrook.  In the Circuit Court for Wicomico
County, he was convicted of several non-violent, non-drug offenses.  At about the same time,
he was convicted also for distributing cocaine.  This latter offense, because it involved drugs,
is of some importance to this case, a point we shall return to later.  These 1999 convictions
resulted in combined sentences, including active and suspended time, that expired on 5 May
2009.  The lone drug offense, however, expired much sooner – on 20 October 2003. 
In April 2003, Holbrook was released on parole and, while on parole, committed an
assault in the second degree.  According to Maryland Code (2002), Criminal Law Article,
2 Under Section 14-101(a)(19)-(24), crimes of violence include assault in the first
degree, assault with intent to murder, assault with intent to rape, assault with intent to rob,
assault with intent to commit a sexual offense in the first or second degree, but not assault
in the second degree.
-2-
§ 14-101, second degree assault is not a crime of violence,2 another fact that becomes
especially pertinent in our analysis to follow.  Nonetheless, the Circuit Court found that the
assault constituted a violation of the terms and conditions of Holbrook’s parole.  As a result
of the parole violation, on 5 May 2006, the court ordered Holbrook to serve five years of
“back-up” time.  See Benedict v. State, 377 Md. 1, 8, 831 A.2d 1060, 1064 (2000) (“If the
defendant violates the probation . . . . [t]he court does not . . . impose or reimpose the
sentence”; it “merely determines how much of the unserved part of the sentence the
defendant must serve in prison.”).  For the second degree assault conviction, the court
sentenced Holbrook, on 14 November 2006, to a three year term, to run consecutively to the
back-up time.
While re-incarcerated, Holbrook earned certain diminution credits against his original,
pre-parole sentences.  The computation of those credits is not at issue here.  Trouble arose,
however, with the 598 good-conduct credits Holbrook earned against his new, post-parole
sentence for second degree assault (computed originally at the time at a rate of ten credits per
month).  Sometime after May 2007, the Division disallowed half of these credits, reducing
them to 299.  The Division claimed that, under Md. Code (1999, 2008 Repl. Vol.), Corr.
3 CS § 3-701 provides:
In this subtitle, “term of confinement” means:
(1)
the length of the sentence, for a single sentence;
or
(2)
the period from the first day of the sentence that
begins first through the last day of the sentence
that ends last, for:
(i)
concurrent sentences;
(ii)
partially concurrent sentences;
(iii)
consecutive sentences; or
(iv)
a 
combination 
of 
concurrent 
and
consecutive sentences.
4 CS § 3-704(b)(2) provides:
If an inmate’s term of confinement includes a consecutive or
concurrent sentence for a crime of violence as defined in §
14-101 of the Criminal Law Article or a crime of manufacturing,
distributing, dispensing, or possessing a controlled dangerous
substance in violation of §§ 5-602 through 5-609, § 5-612, or §
5-613 of the Criminal Law Article, the deduction described in
subsection (a) of this section shall be calculated at the rate of 5
days for each calendar month.
-3-
Servs. Art. (CS), §§ 3-7013 and 3-704(b)(2),4 Holbrook should have received just five credits
a month.
When a defendant is convicted of multiple crimes, multiple sentences may result.  For
purposes of determining the actual period of imprisonment, however, these sentences
typically are aggregated into a single “term of confinement,” defined as “the period from the
first day of the sentence that begins first through the last day of the sentence that ends last.”
CS § 3-701.  If the term of confinement includes a violent or drug-related offense, the
-4-
defendant may earn only five, as opposed to ten, good-conduct credits a month.  See CS §
3-704(b)(2).  That is true even if the majority of the other offenses are unrelated to violence
or drugs.
To justify disallowance of the higher rate of accrual in the present case, the Division
reasoned that Holbrook served a single, continuous term of confinement because he was
never outside its custody or supervision completely.  Thus, the single term of confinement
included the sentence for the 1999 drug-related crime (distributing cocaine).  The Division
concluded, on this basis, that Holbrook was entitled only to the lesser accrual rate of five
good-conduct credits a month.  In reply, Holbrook charged that the Division used improperly
the ambiguous statutory definition of the phrase “term of confinement” as a “device” to deny
him the more favorable rate.
Holbrook sought habeas corpus relief from the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.  That
Circuit Court found significant that the actual sentence for the 1999 drug conviction – the
conviction and sentence upon which the Division relied to disqualify Holbrook from
receiving ten good-conduct credits a month – had expired.  Consequently, the court
concluded that it was improper for the Division to include that conviction in the calculus of
the relevant term of confinement.  It ordered the Division to restore the revoked credits.
On the Division’s appeal, the Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion,
affirmed.    J. Michael Stouffer, Commissioner of Correction, et al. v. Eric Holbrook, No.
2708, September Term, 2008 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. February 5, 2010) (Rodowsky, J.).   After
conducting an extensive canvass of diminution credits jurisprudence (mostly cases of this
-5-
Court), the intermediate appellate court did not find particularly meaningful the expiration
of the sentence on the drug conviction.  Rather, it concluded that the “predomina[nt]
legislative intent, under the rule of lenity” demands that “inmates who are serving sentences
for non-violent, non-drug offenses earn [good-conduct credits] at the rate of ten days per
[month].”  Id., slip op. at 10.
We issued a writ of certiorari, on the Division’s petition, to consider whether:
Corr. Servs. Article Sec. 3-704(b)(2)[,] which provides that an
inmate whose term of confinement includes a sentence for a
crime of violence or a drug crime is to receive good conduct
credits at the rate of only five days per month over the term of
confinement, permit[s] an award of ten good conduct credits per
month on sentences in the term of confinement for non-violent,
non-drug crimes?
Stouffer v. Holbrook, 413 Md. 228, 991 A.2d 1273 (2010).  To the extent that “the general
direction to aggregate multiple sentences into a single term of confinement” would “den[y]
inmates the benefit of a law that the General Assembly intended be applicable to them,” we
shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.  Hutchinson, 359 Md. at 330, 753
A.2d at 1029 (clarifying the holdings of Md. House of Corr. v. Fields, 348 Md. 245, 703
A.2d 167 (1997), and Beshears v. Wickes, 349 Md. 1, 706 A.2d 608 (1998)).
II. 
We begin with a discussion of diminution credits.
Diminution credits are credits which can be “earned by inmates
to reduce the lengths of their confinements.”  See, e.g., Frost v.
State, 336 Md. 125, 128, 647 A.2d 106, 107 (1994).  “Assuming
an inmate does not forfeit diminution credits as the result of a
disciplinary hearing, the inmate can earn the right to be released
on a date much sooner than that designated by his or her original
-6-
term of confinement.”  Frost, 336 Md. at 128, 647 A.2d at 108
(citations omitted).  Once the inmate accumulates “sufficient
credits to earn entitlement to release, the inmate is deemed
released under ‘mandatory supervision.’”  Id.  
Fields, 348 Md. at 261, 703 A.2d at 175.  Under CS § 7-501(a), mandatory supervision is “a
conditional release from confinement [granted] to an inmate who is serving a term of
confinement of more than 18 months . . . to the jurisdiction of the Division of Correction .
. . and [who] has served the term or terms, less diminution credit[s].”
There are four types of diminution credits: good-conduct,
work (or industrial), educational, and special project credits.
Art. 27, § 700 [now CS § 3-701 et seq.]; see also Frost, 336 Md.
at 128, 647 A.2d at 107.  Good-conduct credits, which are the
subject of this appeal, are different from other diminution credits
in that they are deducted “in advance from the inmate’s term of
confinement, subject to the inmate’s future good conduct.”  Art.
27, § 700(d) [now CS § 3-704(a)]; see also Frost, 336 Md. at
128, 647 A.2d at 107.  Prior to October 1, 1992, inmates, upon
incarceration, were prospectively awarded five days of
good-conduct credits for each month of their sentence[,
regardless of the nature of their sentence. Md. Ann. Code Art.
27, § 700(d)(2) (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.)].
Fields, 348 Md. at 261, 703 A.2d at 175-76.  
In 1992, Art. 27, § 700 [now CS § 3-701 et seq.] was amended by Ch. 588 of the Acts
of 1992.  Under the amendment and its current iteration (Art. 27, § 700(d)(3) and CS § 3-
701(b)(1)(ii), respectively), inmates may be awarded now ten, rather than five, good-conduct
credits per month.   If their term of confinement “includes a consecutive or concurrent
sentence for a crime of violence . . . or a crime of manufacturing, distributing, dispensing,
or possessing a controlled dangerous substance,” however, Art. 27, § 700(d)(2) (now CS §
-7-
3-704(b)(2)) limits their credits to five a month.  At the Division’s behest, the Legislature
limited the amendment’s impact, making only those “‘terms of confinement imposed on or
after October 1, 1992’” eligible for the more favorable rate.  Fields, 348 Md. at 262, 703
A.2d at 176 (quoting Ch. 588 § 2 of the Acts of 1992).
The amendment did not alter, however, the definition of the phrase “term of
confinement.”  It meant (and continues to mean) “the period from the first day of the
sentence that begins first through the last day of the sentence that ends last . . . .”  CS § 3-
701.  We recognized in Fields that, when it enacted the 1992 amendment, “it appears . . . the
Legislature gave little thought to the definition of ‘term of confinement’ . . . .”  348 Md. at
264, 703 A.2d at 177.  The legislative history indicates only “that it was designed to ensure
that inmates serving more than one sentence at a time [would] not receive good-conduct
credits for more than one sentence.” Id. at 264-65, 703 A.2d at 177 (citing legislative history
of Ch. 354 of the Acts of 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although following the 1992 amendment the Legislature re-organized the Maryland
Code, including re-organizing then-existing provisions of Article 27, into a new article
entitled “Correctional Services,”  the substantive import of the provisions relevant to our
analysis did not change.  
III.
We turn now to a survey of our interpretation and application of CS §§ 3-701 and 3-
704(b)(2) in the relevant line of cases.
A.
Fields
-8-
Fields involved a defendant who was sentenced for daytime housebreaking and heroin
possession in 1988.  Before 1992, there was no difference in accrual rates for earning good-
conduct credits – regardless of whether these offenses were non-violent and non-drug, a
defendant received a maximum of five credits per month.  Eventually, Fields earned release
on mandatory supervision.  It was revoked, however, when Fields was convicted and
sentenced in 1994 for theft and malicious destruction of property offenses. 
The effective date of the 1992 legislative changes notwithstanding, the Division
prevented Fields from earning the new rate of ten credits a month against his post-1992 non-
violent, non-drug offenses (i.e., theft and malicious destruction of property).  The Division
argued that the amendment’s favorable rate was reserved only for those “term[s] of
confinement imposed on or after October 1, 1992.”  See Fields, 349 Md. at 263, 703 A.2d
at 176 (referencing indirectly Ch. 588 § 2 of the Acts of 1992).  Because Fields’s term of
confinement began before 1992, the Division claimed he was ineligible for the higher rate.
Deeming the phrase “term of confinement” ambiguous, we found – “[i]n light of the
legislative history of the 1992 amendment . . . [and] the applicability of the rule of lenity” –
that not “all sentences that overlap or run consecutively must aggregate for all purposes to
a single term of confinement.”  Fields, 348 Md. at 267-68, 703 A.2d at 178.
-9-
B.
Wickes
The year following the filing of our opinion in Fields, we decided Beshears v. Wickes,
349 Md. 1, 706 A.2d 608 (1998).  Like Fields, Wickes was serving a pre-1992 sentence when
he was released on mandatory supervision, only to be re-incarcerated for post-1992 offenses.
Unlike Fields, however, Wickes’s pre-1992 sentence was for a violent crime (i.e., rape).  
In denying Wickes the more favorable good-conduct credit rate installed by the 1992
amendment, the Division did not rely upon the fact that Wickes’s term of confinement was
imposed pre-1992, similar to the position it took in Fields.  Rather, it stressed the fact that
Wickes’s pre-1992 sentence was for a crime of violence.  It combined Wickes’s pre- and
post-1992 sentences into a single term of confinement under the aggregation principle of Art.
27, § 700(a).  Then, it disallowed Wickes from earning the more favorable rate under the
limiting provision in Art. 27 § 700(d)(2) (“inmate[s] whose term[s] of confinement include[]
a . . . sentence for . . . a crime of violence . . . .”).  Wickes, 349 Md. at 4, 706 A.2d at 609.
We disagreed with the Division, holding that Wickes was entitled to receive the more
favorable rate for his post-1992 non-violent, non-drug sentences.  Once again, we rejected
the principle that “‘all sentences that overlap or run consecutively must aggregate for all
purposes to a single term of confinement.’” Wickes, 349 Md. at 9, 706 A.2d at 612 (quoting
Fields, 348 Md. at 267-68, 703 A.2d at 178).
-10-
C.
Henderson
Before Wickes was decided, the Division employed a unified approach to
administering the good-conduct credits scheme.  Under this approach, all sentences
aggregated for all purposes into a single term of confinement.  In Wickes, we disapproved
of this approach, stating definitively that “[w]here a defendant is released on mandatory
supervision and later commits and is sentenced for a new crime . . . the new sentence and the
old sentence . . . do not aggregate to form one term of confinement for the purpose of [Art.
27] § 700 [(now CS § 3-704(b)(2))].”  Wickes, 349 Md. at 9, 706 A.2d at 612 (emphasis
supplied).
A few months after Wickes, this Court was compelled to confront, in Secretary of
Public Safety and Correctional Services v. Henderson, 351 Md. 439, 718 A.2d 1150 (1998),
its holding in Wickes.  Based on Wickes, the Division re-evaluated (and re-calculated) the
sentence and release dates for “about 2,000 inmates serving multiple sentences, one or more
of which was imposed before a release on mandatory supervision or parole and one or more
of which was imposed for conduct occurring while the inmate was on mandatory supervision
or parole.”  Henderson, 351 Md. at 446, 718 A.2d at 1154.  After disaggregating the multiple
sentences into two terms of confinement – before and after the release of the prisoners on
mandatory supervision or parole – the Division determined that approximately ninety inmates
had been released prematurely because of erroneous calculations of good-conduct credits.
It deemed these inmates “escaped prisoner[s].”  Henderson, 351 Md. at 447, 718 A.2d at
1155.  
-11-
Henderson was one such prisoner.  Originally, he was sentenced in 1975 for a
conviction of robbery with a deadly weapon.  Once paroled, he committed, and was
convicted and sentenced for, a separate offense, possession of a controlled dangerous
substance with intent to distribute.  As both of his sentences – pre- and post-parole – were
drug-related, he was “clearly . . . not eligible for the ten days a month good conduct credit.”
Henderson, 351 Md. at 446, 718 A.2d at 1154.  The only saving grace of Henderson’s
predicament, as it turned out, was the aggregation principle.  If the two ineligible sentences
were aggregated, to the surprise of many, he could be released from prison earlier.  Had
Wickes’s holding – that pre- and post-release sentences be disaggregated – been followed,
it would have worked against Henderson’s interest.
We concluded – based on the plain meaning of the statute, in these circumstances –
that the Division should have aggregated Henderson’s sentences into a single term of
confinement, leading to the earlier release date.  We explained that Wickes’s “expanded
‘holding’ . . . was not necessary in order to reach the result in Wickes.”  Henderson, 351 Md.
at 451, 718 A.2d at 1157.  Indeed, “all that we needed to say in Wickes” and “all that we said
in Fields . . . was that all sentences that overlap or run consecutively do not need to aggregate
‘for all purposes to a single term of confinement.’” Henderson, 351 Md. at 451-52, 718 A.2d
at 1157.
By enacting the diminution credit statute, the Legislature decided that qualifying
prisoners should be accorded certain benefits.  In Fields and Wickes, “[a]ggregation . . .
[would have] denied [those] inmates a legislatively mandated benefit.”  Henderson, 351 Md.
-12-
at 452, 719 A.2d at 1157.  In Henderson, we “learn[ed]” that disaggregation may cause the
same denial.  Henderson, 351 Md. at 451-52, 718 A.2d at 1157.   With the benefit of
hindsight, we should have relied, as we had in Fields, upon the legislative history and the
rule of lenity, as these “would have dictated the same result in Wickes . . . [and] Fields and
also confined the [disaggregation approach] to those situations in which strict application of
the . . . definition of ‘term of confinement’ would preclude inmates from receiving the benefit
of the 1992 [amendment] . . . .”  Henderson, 351 Md. at 445, 718 A.2d at 1154.
D.
Hutchinson
Just two years after Henderson, we decided the heretofore most recent diminution
credit case decided by this Court, Hutchinson.  Hutchinson was in and out of prison multiple
times, beginning in 1970.  Relevantly, in 1993, he was sentenced for a conviction of
possession with intent to distribute heroin.  Ultimately, he was released on mandatory
supervision, but that relative freedom was short-lived.  In 1996, he was convicted and
sentenced for possession with intent to distribute cocaine.  
Hutchinson argued for aggregation, claiming that his multiple sentences, imposed both
before and after mandatory supervision, should constitute a single term of confinement for
purposes of the diminution credit statute.  See Hutchinson, 359 Md. at 327-28, 753 A.2d at
1028.  His aim was to earn greater credits against his old, disqualifying sentence.  See id.
The Division disagreed, explaining that Hutchinson’s approach would 
lead to the absurd result of an inmate who commits a new crime
and receives a new sentence while on mandatory supervision
serving less time upon revocation of the mandatory supervision
-13-
than an inmate who does not commit a new crime and receives
no new sentence but whose mandatory supervision is revoked
for other reasons.
Hutchinson, 359 Md. at 328, 753 2d. at 1028.  The Division also relied upon the language
of CS § 7-504(b) (now CS § 7-504(c)), which provided that “an inmate may not be awarded
any new diminution credits after the inmate’s mandatory supervision has been revoked.”
Hutchinson, 359 Md. at 327, 753 A.2d at 1028.  The Division maintained steadfastly that CS
§ 7-504(b) meant “diminution credits may be awarded against a new sentence, but not until
the ‘old’ sentence has been fully served.”  Hutchinson, 359 Md. at 327, 753 A.2d at 1025.
We rejected both parties’ perspectives.  Hutchinson’s approach did not prevail
because, despite CS § 7-504(b)’s ambiguity, one thing was clear – the “General Assembly
did not intend for there to be any future diminution credits applied against the sentence(s) the
inmate was serving when placed on mandatory supervision.”  Hutchinson, 359 Md. at 330,
753 A.2d at 1029.  On the other hand, the “[Division’s] position . . . would deny prisoners
the full benefit of the laws,” for inmates are “entitled to begin earning good conduct credits
upon imposition of [new] sentence[s] . . . .”  Hutchinson, 359 Md. at 331, 753 A.2d at 1029-
30.  As a result, the Division’s position “fail[ed] to carry out the legislative intent” of the
General Assembly’s statutory scheme.  Hutchinson, 359 Md. at 331, 753 A.2d at 1029.  
To “fairly implement[]” the legislative intent, we held instead that “[p]risoners who
receive a new sentence[] for conduct committed while on mandatory supervision should
receive, and must be given, good conduct credits on that sentence[] as though there were no
existing sentence[].”  Hutchinson, 359 Md. at 331, 753 A.2d at 1030.  “[W]ith respect to the
5 In Wickes, we advanced two holdings.  The first was that “whenever an inmate is
released on mandatory supervision or parole and commits a new crime,” the old and new
sentences never aggregate, and it was broader than necessary.  Henderson, 351 Md. at 451,
718 A.2d at 1157 (discussing Wickes).  The second (and remaining valid) holding was that
the statute mandated “inmates be allowed ten . . . credit[s] against sentences imposed on or
after October 1, 1992 for non-violent, non-drug offenses” and that “to the extent . . . the
device of a single term of confinement . . . frustrate[s] that direction,” the rule of lenity is
implicated and requires resolution in the defendant’s favor.  Henderson, 351 Md. at 451-52,
718 A.2d at 1157 (discussing Wickes).
-14-
existing sentence,” however, the prisoner “gets no benefit from [good-conduct credits] . . .
.”  Id.  Thus, [f]or purposes of applying CS § 7-504(b), “the existing sentence[] . . . and any
new sentence[] . . . must be considered separately.”  Hutchinson, 359 Md. at 330-31, 753
A.2d at 1029.  
We concluded our analysis by summarizing our good-conduct credits jurisprudence.
In Fields, Wickes, and Henderson, we “learned” that:
[W]ith an increasing number of prisoners serving multiple
sentences – some concurrent, some consecutive, some imposed
at the same time, some imposed at different times, some
imposed before certain legislative enactments affecting
diminution credits, some imposed after those enactments – rules
governing diminution credits will affect different prisoners in
different ways.  A construction that will benefit one group will
often hurt another group.  A result that appears quite reasonable
in one circumstance may appear to be unreasonable in another.
Hutchinson, 359 Md. at 330, 753 A.2d at 1029.  Faced with such uncertainty and lack of
expertise, we walked in the footsteps of Fields and Henderson (and even Wickes5), relying
upon for conclusive guidance the legislative intent embodied in the diminution credit
6 As explained infra, after Hutchinson, the General Assembly recodified CS § 7-504,
adopting almost verbatim our interpretation of the awarding of good-conduct credits for old
and new sentences.  It is noteworthy that, while responding to Hutchinson, the Legislature
did not disapprove of our conclusion that, for certain purposes, old and new sentences should
be considered separately.
7 An examination of our jurisprudence reveals little debate about the proper standard
of review for an inmate’s habeas corpus challenge to a good-conduct credits decision by the
Division.  One of the few relevant cases, Pollock v. Patuxent Institution Board of Review,
374 Md. 463, 823 A.2d 626 (2003), involved an inmate who filed a habeas challenge to the
Patuxent Institution Board of Review’s revocation and subsequent non-renewal of his parole
because of a positive urinalysis.  After reciting our administrative standards of review, we
upheld ultimately the Board’s decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review.
Here, there is some uncertainty as to whether the Division’s revocation of 299 good-conduct
credits should be characterized as an administrative decision, legal interpretation, or
something else.  The parties do not brief this issue, however, presupposing instead that this
case presents an agency’s statutory interpretation.  As the parties do not contest hotly this
issue, we observe merely that assuming this is a matter of statutory interpretation and that the
Division’s decision is, therefore, entitled to some deference, our decision would remain the
same.
-15-
statutory scheme.  See id. (“The issue, ultimately, is one of legislative intent.”).6  If one thing
is clear, it is that, “as in Fields and Wickes[,] we subordinate[] the general direction to
aggregate multiple sentences into a single term of confinement when to do otherwise would
. . . den[y] inmates the benefit of a law that the General Assembly intended be applicable to
them . . . .”  Id.
IV.
Viewing the context of the present case in light of our good-conduct credits
jurisprudence,7 the Division tries nonetheless to persuade us that (1) the prior good-conduct
credit cases are not controlling or even relevant, and (2) the plain language of CS § 3-
704(b)(2) – the limiting provision – provides an easy and straightforward resolution.  The
8 In the present case at least, it is helpful to Holbrook’s cause, but unnecessary for us
to rely on the fact that, when Holbrook received his post-parole qualifying sentence, his pre-
parole disqualifying sentence – for distributing cocaine – had expired.  It would be entirely
dispositive if the term of confinement had expired, but it had not – there were other active
sentences keeping Holbrook under supervision.  Moreover, it does not appear that our
caselaw regarding the Legislature’s intent turns upon (or stresses) this sort of fact.
-16-
Division is wrong.
A.
Prior Good-Conduct Credit Cases
No doubt the four seminal cases discussed supra – Fields, Wickes, Henderson, and
Hutchinson – are factually and, in a few ways, legally distinct from the present case.  These
differences, however, are of no moment.  Although the Division is correct that Fields and
Wickes involved sentences imposed before and after 1992, that does not mean that their
holdings apply only to similarly situated sentencing timelines.  Moreover, while the Division
is correct that Hutchinson involved a different (and uncontested) provision of the diminution
statute than the present case, the Division ignores the fact that resolution of Hutchinson
hinged on the legislative intent and previous caselaw associated with the statutory
aggregation principle.  In the final analysis, the distinctions underlying the Division’s
particular (and somewhat tortured) view of our cases in the present case are not material.8
-17-
B.
Ambiguity in the Application of CS § 3-704(b)(2)
Aside from its attempts to distinguish the present case from our prior cases, the
Division asserts that this case identifies no ambiguity, for the controlling statutory provision
– CS § 3-704(b)(2) – clearly limits  the application of the more favorable rate to non-violent,
non-drug terms of confinement.  We disagree.  We do not consider CS § 3-704(b)(2) in
isolation.  This case (like Fields, Wickes, Henderson, and Hutchinson) requires us to consider
CS § 3-704(b)(2)’s use of CS § 3-701’s “term of confinement.”  In that endeavor, we
remember that “statutory construction is approached from a ‘commonsensical’ perspective.”
Fields, 348 Md. at 265, 703 A.2d at 177 (quoting Frost, 336 Md. at 137, 647 A.2d at 112).
Turning to CS § 3-701, we mentioned earlier that “it appears the Legislature gave little
thought to the definition of ‘term of confinement’ when it enacted Ch. 588 [the 1992
amendment].”  Fields, 348 Md. at 264, 703 A.2d at 177.  In fact,
[a] Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee floor report
explaining House Bill 1089, which changed the rate for
awarding good-conduct credits, used the term sentence rather
than term of confinement and stated that: “This bill may be
applied prospectively only (i.e.[,] to persons sentenced on or
after the effective date of the bill).”  Shortly after the statute at
issue was enacted, one of the sponsors of that bill, Delegate John
Arnick, was asked to explain the bill.  He stated: “If a person is
sentenced before October 1, he is not eligible for the additional
credits. A person sentenced on or after October 1 will receive
the additional credits.” 
Fields, 348 Md. at 265, 703 A.2d at 177.  Thus, while the legislation used the phrase “term
of confinement,” at the very least, a key legislator of the time equated it with “sentence.”
Common sense indicates, then, that the Legislature probably did not imbue the phrase with
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the broad application range that the Division suggests.
In determining whether “term of confinement” is ambiguous, we look to how it is used
and applied.  See Fields, 348 Md. at 266, 703 A.2d at 178 (“‘Statutes that are clear when
viewed separately may well be ambiguous where their application in a given situation . . . is
not clear.’”) (quoting Gardner v. State, 344 Md. 642, 648, 689 A.2d 610, 613 (1997)).  In
Fields, the defendant challenged how the Division applied the phrase “term of confinement”
– used in the clause restricting the more favorable rate to sentences imposed after 1992 – to
his situation.  See Fields, 348 Md. at 252, 703 A.2d at 171.  Although the present case
involves how the Division applied “term of confinement” to a different set of facts, involving
a different restricting clause (Ch. 588 § 2 of the Acts of 1992 versus CS § 3-704(b)(2)), we
find ambiguity here for at least one of the same reasons relied on in Fields – the Legislature
did not intend to make nonsensical distinctions.  
Indeed, in Fields, we described the situation of a hypothetical inmate who receives
a sentence before the 1992 amendment took effect, is released, and then commits another
offense after the 1992 effective date.  If he committed the post-1992 violation one day before
mandatory probation expired on the pre-1992 offense, the Division would lump the former
with the latter into one “term of confinement” and, thus, deny the inmate the more favorable
rate, resulting in a much longer period of actual imprisonment.  If the defendant committed
the post-1992 violation one day after mandatory probation expired, however, he or she would
be eligible for the 10-good-conduct-credits-a-month rate.  For present purposes, we need only
eliminate the focus on 1992 – if Holbrook committed the subsequent offense one day after
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his probationary period expired, he would have a much shorter period of actual imprisonment
than if he committed the offense one day before the expiration of his probationary period.
Surely, “the [L]egislature did not indicate an intent to make such a nonsensical distinction.”
Fields, 348 Md. at 267, 703 A.2d at 178.
By applying the phrase “term of confinement” to the context of this case and CS § 3-
704(b)(2), its meaning and purpose become only hazier.  The Legislature simply did not
foresee CS § 704(b)(2)’s application to Holbrook’s situation, where a defendant receives
multiple sentences, before and after being released on parole.  If the General Assembly had
any designs for the phrase “term of confinement,” and the aggregation principle embodied
therein, it was that “inmates serving more than one sentence at a time [should] not receive
good-conduct credits for more than one sentence.” Fields, 348 Md. at 264, 703 A.2d at 177
(citing legislative history of Ch. 354 of the Acts of 1991).  This does not clarify Holbrook’s
situation, as he seeks good-conduct credits on only one sentence, the second degree assault.
C.
Legislative Intent and the Rule of Lenity in Situations like Holbrook’s
Although in Henderson we said that “term of confinement” was not unclear or
ambiguous, that was only because, “in [that] instance,” “it d[id] not deprive Mr. Henderson
. . . of any legislatively created benefit.”  Henderson, 351 Md. at 452, 718 A.2d at 1157.
Thus, while we should avoid making broad prophylactic proclamations about the
applicability of the aggregation principle, we are able to say safely that where a statute
mandates that a specific group of persons be given a benefit, but its application deprives that
group of persons of the intended benefit, the statute may be unclear or ambiguous in
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application.  That is the situation here.  The Legislature mandated that inmates earn ten good-
conduct credits a month, so long as their term of confinement did not include other sentences
for certain ineligible, disqualifying offenses (those for violent or drug-related crimes) – i.e.,
“inmates [should] be allowed ten . . . credit[s] against sentences imposed on or after October
1, 1992 for non-violent, non-drug offenses . . . .”  Henderson, 351 Md. at 451, 718 A.2d at
1157 (discussing Wickes).  
At best, we might say that the Legislature intended that prisoners, like Holbrook, have
their pre-parole and post-parole sentences considered separately, if thereby they may access
the more favorable good-conduct credit rate.  Indeed, such a construction avoids the
nonsensical distinction described above, does not allow Holbrook to receive credits for more
than one sentence (or term of confinement), and serves to advance the purpose of the statute
– to relieve “prison overcrowding by moving non-violent [and, presumably, non-drug]
offenders through the system at a faster pace” and to incentivize these kinds of offenders “to
be on good behavior, because they will have more ‘good-conduct’ credits to lose if they
cause trouble.”  Floor Report, Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, H.B. 1089 (1992).
Holbrook remains a drug offender for purposes of his pre-parole sentences and the
subsequent violation of probation.  For purposes of his post-parole sentences, however, the
law may be said fairly to provide different treatment.  Indeed, upon conviction of the
subsequent second degree assault, Holbrook was sentenced first for violating probation and
required to serve the remainder of his still-existing sentences.  He  then was sentenced for
the separate, post-parole second degree assault and required to serve a separate sentence,
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which – in many ways – was independent from the original sentences and probation
violation.
At worst, even if the Legislature did not intend such a result, it injected enough
uncertainty into the statutory scheme, with respect to inmates in Holbrook’s situation, to
implicate the rule of lenity.  The Legislature did not deny clearly to inmates like Holbrook
receiving the more favorable rate, and, as a result, it is the Legislature, rather than affected
inmates, who must bear the consequences.  In any event, our approach is consistent with the
Legislature’s intent.  After interpreting the phrase “term of confinement” in a series of cases,
ending with Hutchinson, the Legislature did not disavow our reasoning or holdings.  See
Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 210, 438 A.2d 1301, 1305 (1981) (“The General Assembly
is presumed to be aware of this Court’s interpretation of its enactments and, if such
interpretation is not legislatively overturned, to have acquiesced in that interpretation.  This
presumption is particularly strong whenever, after statutory language has been interpreted
by this Court, the Legislature re-enacts the statute without changing in substance the
language at issue.”) (internal citations omitted).  Rather, in a 2002 amendment to the
diminution credit statutory scheme, the Legislature did quite the opposite:
BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That it is the intent of the
General Assembly that this Act shall be construed to be
consistent with the ruling of the Court of Appeals of Maryland
in Public Safety v. Hutchinson, 359 Md. 320[, 753 A.2d 1024]
(2000), and construed to require that if an inmate is convicted
and sentenced for a crime that is committed while the inmate is
on mandatory supervision, any diminution credits that have been
earned by the inmate prior to the date of the inmate’s release on
mandatory supervision are permanently revoked and eliminated
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and may not be applied to any previous, current, or future
sentence or term of confinement of the inmate.
Ch. 485 § 1 of the Acts of 2002.  In approving of our holding in Hutchinson, the Legislature
agreed that, in certain instances, it is appropriate to “subordinate[] the general direction to
aggregate multiple sentences into a single term of confinement” and to consider “the existing
sentence[] . . . and any new sentence[] . . . separately,” where “to do otherwise would . . .
den[y] inmates a [legislatively mandated] benefit . . . .”  Hutchinson, 359 Md. at 330-31, 753
A.2d at 1029.    Indeed, in the language of the amendment itself, the Legislature seems to
recognize as much, distinguishing clearly between “any previous, current, or future sentence,
or term of confinement of the inmate.”  Ch. 485 § 1 of the Acts of 2002 (emphasis added).
Determining in what instances sentences should be considered separately is a difficult
question.  We may say, as we did in Hutchinson, however, that “[p]risoners who receive a
new sentence[] for conduct committed while on mandatory supervision [or, in this case,
parole] should receive, and must be given, good conduct credits on that sentence[] as though
there were no existing sentence(s).”  Hutchinson, 359 Md. at 331, 753 A.2d at 1030.  We
observe that these kinds of prisoners, who are treated as though they had no existing
sentences, may earn those good-conduct credits at the more favorable rate, if none of their
new sentences disqualifies them.  Doing so accords with the Legislature’s intent. 
We go no further than that, limiting our reach to the facts of this case and those
similarly situated.  As we have “learned,” “[a] result that appears quite reasonable in one
circumstance may appear to be unreasonable in another.”  Hutchinson, 359 Md. at 330, 753
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A.2d at 1029.
Ordinarily, the Legislature entrusts the execution of its statutory scheme to the
Division.  In other words, the Legislature relies deliberately upon the Division and its
expertise to navigate the “arcane world of diminution credits” and to fulfill, on a daily basis
and at an individual level, its intent and purpose.  Hutchinson, 359 Md. at 321, 753 A.2d at
1024.  We appreciate the difficulty of that assignment.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED.  COSTS TO BE PAID
BY THE STATE.