Case Title: ROBERT J. PROKOP, M.D. V. TIM HOCKHALTER; GERI HOCKHALTER; TOM McJUNKIN; and TIMBER CREEK OUTFITTERS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 05-170

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
ROBERT J. PROKOP, M.D. V. TIM HOCKHALTER; GERI HOCKHALTER; TOM McJUNKIN; and TIMBER CREEK OUTFITTERS2006 WY 75137 P.3d 131Case Number: 05-170Decided: 06/28/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
ROBERT J. PROKOP, 
M.D.

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
TIM HOCKHALTER; GERI HOCKHALTER; 
TOM McJUNKIN; and TIMBER CREEK OUTFITTERS,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants).

 
 
Certified Questions from 
the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
The Honorable Robert H. Henry, Judge

 
 
Representing Appellant:

Robert J. Prokop, M.D., pro se, Wilber, Nebraska.

 
 
Representing Appellees:

Monty Barnett and James M. Meseck, of White and 
Steele, Denver, Colorado.

            

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This case comes 
before this Court as two certified questions from the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.  The 
first question asks us to consider whether the two-year statute of limitations 
contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a) (LexisNexis 2005) applies to actions 
against licensed outfitters and professional hunting guides.  If we conclude that the two-year 
limitations period does apply, the second question asks us to consider whether 
it applies to both contract and tort claims.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The certified 
questions are as follows:

 
 

1.                  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
23-2-407 provides for licensing outfitters and professional guides.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a) requires 
that actions "arising from an act, error or omission in the rendering of 
licensed or certified professional or health care services be brought within . . 
. two (2) years of the date of the alleged act."  Does this two-year statute of 
limitations apply to actions against licensed outfitters and professional 
guides?  

 
 

2.                  
The Wyoming Supreme Court 
has referred to § 1-3-107(a) as "the professional malpractice statute," and 
stated that "the premise of professional malpractice is usually based in 
tort."  See Richardson Assocs. v. Lincoln-Devore, Inc., 806 P.2d 790, 800 (Wyo. 
1991).  If the two-year limitation 
period applies to actions against outfitters and professional guides, does it 
apply to contract claims as well as tort claims?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Tim and Geri 
Hockhalter are the owners and operators of Timber Creek Outfitters.  Timber Creek Outfitters is licensed as 
an outfitter by the State of Wyoming Board of Outfitters and Professional Guides 
("the Board").  Tim Hockhalter and 
Tom McJunkin are licensed as professional hunting guides.  

 
 
[¶4]      Robert Prokop, 
M.D., hired Timber Creek Outfitters to take him on a guided bighorn sheep hunt 
near Cody, Wyoming.  
The hunting trip commenced on September 23, 2001.  Mr. McJunkin acted as Dr. Prokop's 
guide.  On September 26, 2001, Dr. 
Prokop terminated his hunt.  He did 
not harvest a bighorn sheep during the hunt.

 
 

[¶5]      On October 1, 
2003, Dr. Prokop filed a pro se 
complaint in federal district court against Timber Creek Outfitters, Tim and 
Geri Hockhalter, and Tom McJunkin.  
He asserted claims for breach of contract, negligence, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  
The federal district court granted summary judgment based on Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-3-107(a), the two-year statute of limitations applicable to 
professional services.  Dr. Prokop 
appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.  The tenth circuit presented certified 
questions to us, which we agreed to answer.  

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      We review 
certified questions pursuant to W.R.A.P. 11.  According to Rule 11.01, we may answer a 
question of law "which may be determinative of the cause" pending in the 
certifying court and "concerning which it appears there is no controlling 
precedent" from this Court.  
Id.  "[Q]uestions of the application of the 
law, including identification of the correct rule, are considered de novo."  Pinnacle Bank v. Villa, 2004 WY 150, ¶ 
5, 100 P.3d 1287, 1289 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting EOG Resources, Inc. v. State, 2003 WY 
34, ¶ 7, 64 P.3d 757, [759] (Wyo. 2003)).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

Two-Year Professional 
Negligence Statute of Limitations

 
 
[¶7]      The first 
certified question asks us to determine whether the two-year statute of 
limitations contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a) applies to licensed 
outfitters and professional guides.  
Section 1-3-107(a) provides, in relevant part:

 
 
(a)    A cause of action arising 
from an act, error or omission in the rendering of licensed or certified 
professional or health care services shall be brought within the greater of the 
following times:

 
 
         
(i)   Within two (2) 
years of the date of the alleged act, error or omission, except that a cause of 
action may be instituted not more than two (2) years after discovery of the 
alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant can establish that the alleged 
act, error or omission was:

 
 
               
(A) Not reasonably discoverable 
within a two (2) year period; or

 
 

(B)        
The claimant failed to 
discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two (2) year period 
despite the exercise of due diligence.  

 
 
While this Court has 
never addressed the question, in Walters 
v. Grand Teton Crest Outfitters, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 1442 (D. Wyo. 1992), the 
federal district court held that a licensed outfitter is not a professional and, 
therefore, the two-year statute of limitations did not apply.  Dr. Prokop argues that the rationale 
articulated in Walters should be 
applied by this Court.  Timber Creek 
Outfitters, the Hockhalters, and Mr. McJunkin, on the other hand, urge us to 
adopt the reasoning we applied in Rawlinson v. Greer, 2003 WY 28, ¶¶ 
15-16, 64 P.3d 120, 123-24 (Wyo. 2003), where we concluded that realtors are 
professionals subject to the two-year statute of limitations.    

 
 
[¶8]      The 
Walters case predated our decision in Rawlinson and, at the time, 
the appropriate analysis for determining whether someone fell within the 
"professional" category for the purposes of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a) had not been fully developed by this 
Court.  In Walters, the court looked to the 
definition of "professional" found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
9-2-1803(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 1991) to determine whether an outfitter 
would be considered a professional.  
That statute requires at least one year of specialized post-secondary 
education in order to fall within the professional category.  Because no specific schooling is 
required for an outfitter to obtain its license, the court concluded that an 
outfitter was not a professional and, therefore, the two-year statute of 
limitations for professionals was inapplicable.  Walters, 804 F. Supp.  at 1446.   

 
 

[¶9]      Section 9-2-1803(a)(iii) defines the term "professional" as it is 
used in the Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act, 9-2-1801 et seq., not as it is used in the Code 
of Civil Procedure, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a), where the two-year limitations period for professionals is 
found.  In Rawlinson, ¶ 14, 
64 P.3d  at 123, we did not rely upon § 9-2-1803(a)(iii) when we set forth the analytical framework 
for determining whether someone is a "licensed . . . or certified professional" 
within the meaning of § 1-3-107(a).  
Rather, we applied this Court's well-settled rules of statutory 
interpretation:

 
 
[W]e must apply our well 
established test for interpreting statutes:
 
 
We first decide whether 
the statute is clear or ambiguous.  
This Court makes that determination as a matter of law.  A statute is unambiguous if its wording 
is such that reasonable persons are able to agree as to its meaning with 
consistency and predictability.  A 
statute is ambiguous only if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to 
varying interpretations.

 
 
If we determine that a 
statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the 
statute.

 
 
We begin by making an 
inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed 
according to their arrangement and connection.  We construe the statute as a whole, 
giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all 
parts of the statute in pari materia.

 
 
If we determine that the 
statute is ambiguous, we resort to general principles of statutory construction 
to determine the legislature's intent.

 
 

Id. (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted).  In 
applying this analysis in the context of realtors, we concluded that "because 
licensure is required before a person may work in the real estate profession, 
realtors would seem to fall under the plain language of § 1-3-107(a)."  
Id., ¶ 16, 64 P.3d  at 124.  In Rawlinson we also pointed out that the § 
1-3-107(a) two-year statute of limitations has been applied to a number of other 
types of licensed professionals, including physicians, attorneys, surveyors, 
accountants, and chiropractors.  Id., ¶ 15, 64 P.3d  at 123-24 (citing Edwards v. Fogarty, 962 P.2d 879 (Wyo. 
1998) (the statute applies to physicians); Murphy v. Housel & Housel, 955 P.2d 880 (Wyo. 1998) (the statute applies to attorneys); Bredthauer v. Christian, Spring, Seilbach 
and Associates, 824 P.2d 560 (Wyo. 1992) (the statute applies to land 
surveyors); Mills v. Garlow, 768 P.2d 554 (Wyo. 1989) (the statute applies to accountants); Echols v. Keeler, 735 P.2d 730 (Wyo. 
1987) (the statute applies to chiropractors)).  

 
 
[¶10]   The Wyoming Outfitters and Guides 
Act requires that outfitters and guides obtain a license and sets forth 
qualifications necessary for licensure:
 
 
§ 23-2-407.   License required for outfitters 
and professional guides.

 
 

(a)         
No person shall hold 
himself out as, engage in the business of or act in the capacity of an outfitter 
or shall engage in the occupation of a professional guide as an independent 
contractor or as an agent or employee, unless he is licensed as an outfitter or 
professional guide pursuant to this act.

 
 

(b)         
No person engaged in the 
business of or acting in the capacity of an outfitter or a professional guide is 
entitled to maintain an action for compensation of outfitting or guiding 
services provided to any other person unless he is licensed under this act at 
the time of providing services.

 
 

Outfitters and guides are 
also regulated by the State through the Board of Outfitters and Professional 
Guides.  See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 23-2-411 & 23-2-413 (LexisNexis 2005) (setting forth 
qualifications for outfitter licensure and requiring examination prior to 
licensure).   

 
 
[¶11]   The plain 
language of the Wyoming Outfitters and Guides Act defines guides as 
"professional."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
23-2-407 (LexisNexis 2005).  
Furthermore, both outfitters and guides must be licensed before they can 
engage in the business of outfitting or guiding. Id.  In order to become a licensed outfitter, 
an applicant must have "[e]xperience as a licensed professional guide for not less than 
one (1) year or similar experience accepted by the board."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-411(a)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2005) (emphasis added).  
Section 1-3-107(a) states that a "cause of action arising from an 
act, error or omission in the rendering of licensed or certified professional . . 
.  services shall be brought" within two 
years.  (Emphasis added.)  Consequently, 
we need not look any further than the plain language of § 1-3-107(a) 
to conclude that the two-year statute of 
limitations applies to causes of action arising from an act, error or omission 
in the rendering of licensed outfitter or professional guide services.  
 
 
Statute of Limitations 
for Contract Claims

 
 
[¶12]   Having concluded that the two-year 
statute of limitations applies to licensed outfitters and professional guides, 
we must now turn to the question of whether the limitation period applies to 
contract claims as well as tort claims.  
While we have referred to section 1-3-107(a) as "the professional 
malpractice statute," and we have recognized that "the premise of professional 
malpractice is usually based in tort," see Richardson Assocs. v. Lincoln-Devore, 
Inc., 806 P.2d 790, 800 (Wyo. 1991), we have not limited malpractice 
actions to tort claims.  For 
example, in legal malpractice actions, we have recognized that claims may be 
based upon breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty theories.  Peterson v. Scorsine, 898 P.2d 382, 387 
(Wyo. 1995); Jackson State Bank v. King, 844 P.2d 1093, 1096-97 (Wyo. 1993).  

 
 
[¶13]   Section 1-3-107(a) states that the 
two-year statute of limitations applies to "[a] cause of action arising from an 
act, error or omission in the rendering of licensed or certified professional . 
. . services."  This language does 
not specifically refer to malpractice or tort actions, but rather applies to 
causes of action arising from the rendering of services.  To conclude that it did not apply to 
breach of contract claims would defeat the purpose of the statute, essentially 
subjecting licensed professionals to a longer statute of limitations when they 
perform services pursuant to a contract.1  

 
 
[¶14]   In Thunderbasin Land, Livestock & Inv. Co. 
v. Laramie County, 5 P.3d 774, 782 (Wyo. 2000), we recognized that "a specific statute controls over a general statute on the 
same subject." (citing Rock Springs Ford 
Nissan v. State Bd. of Equalization, Wyoming Dept. of Revenue, 890 P.2d 1100, 1103 
(Wyo.1995)).  Other courts 
have applied this rule of statutory preference in the context of statutes of 
limitations.  That is, when there is 
a specific statute of limitations for professionals, that statute governs over 
more general statutes of limitations.  
In Reinke Manufacturing Co., Inc. 
v. Hayes, 590 N.W.2d 380, 387-88 (Neb. 1999), the Supreme Court of Nebraska 
explained:

 
 
Section 25-205 is a general statute of limitations for 
written contract claims. See Kratochvil 
v. Motor Club Ins. Assn., 
255 Neb. 977, 
588 N.W.2d 565 (1999).  
Additionally, we have held that § 25-222 is a special statute of 
limitations for professional negligence. Swassing v. Baum, 195 Neb. 651, 240 N.W.2d 24 
(1976). In Kratochvil v. Motor Club Ins. Assn., supra, we stated that, generally, 
absent a more specific statute, actions on written contracts may be brought 
within 5 years pursuant to § 25- 205. We explained, however, that "[a] special 
statute of limitations controls and takes precedence over a general statute of 
limitations because the special statute is a specific expression of legislative 
will concerning a particular subject.'"  
Kratochvil v. Motor Club Ins. 
Assn., 255 Neb. at 986, 588 N.W.2d at 573(quoting Murphy v. Spelts-Schultz Lumber Co., 240 Neb. 275, 481 N.W.2d 422 
(1992)). Therefore, if Reinke's claims arise from its professional relationship 
with Hayes, then § 25-222 is the applicable statute of limitations and § 25-205 
is not "more direct" or "equally applicable" to Reinke's breach of contract 
claim.

 
 

By alleging various 
theories of recovery, Reinke attempts to parse its claims in order to obtain the 
advantage of longer periods of limitation and avoid the statutory bar of § 
25-222. If all of Reinke's claims are 
based on a single professional relationship, however, they may not be separated 
into various parts to allow different periods of limitation to be applied. 
See Maloley v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 
Inc., 246 Neb. 701, 523 N.W.2d 27 
(1994). In Swassing v. Baum, 195 Neb. at 657, 240 N.W.2d  
at 28, we explained that "we do not believe that the Legislature in adopting the 
special statute of limitations for professional negligence, section 25-222, 
R.S.Supp., 1974, intended that the various aspects of the whole professional 
relationship should be separated. . . ." Therefore, if Reinke's claims are for 
professional malpractice, whether pled in tort or contract, the statute of 
limitations for professional negligence contained in § 25-222 applies. See, Witherspoon v. Sides Constr. Co., 219 
Neb. 117, 362 N.W.2d 35 (1985); Lincoln Grain v. Coopers & Lybrand, 215 Neb. 289, 338 N.W.2d 594 
(1983).

 
 
(Second emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶15]   We find this rationale to be 
persuasive.  If all of the claims 
against a licensed outfitter or professional guide arise from services provided 
as a result of the professional relationship, the claims may not be separated to 
provide a longer statute of limitations for the contract claim.  The more specific statute of limitations 
for professionals governs the relationship.  

 
 
ANSWERS TO CERTIFIED 
QUESTIONS

 
 
[¶16]   In summary, we answer the certified 
questions as follows:

 
 

1.                  
The two-year statute of 
limitations set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a) applies to actions against 
licensed outfitters and professional guides.

 
 

2.                  
If a cause of action 
against a licensed outfitter or professional guide arises from an act, error or 
omission in the rendering of licensed or certified professional services, the 
two-year statute of limitations set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a) 
applies regardless of whether the claim is pled in tort or 
contract.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The Wyoming 
statutes provide a ten-year statute of limitations for actions based upon 
contracts or written agreements, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(i) (LexisNexis 
2005), and an eight-year statute of limitations for actions based upon contracts 
not in writing, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(ii)(A) (LexisNexis 2005).