Case Title: Martens v. Johnson County Bd. of Com'rs

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97-90

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-02-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Martens v. Johnson County Bd. of Com'rs1998 WY 19954 P.2d 375Case Number: 97-90Decided: 02/24/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

 

Steven A. and Rebecca L. MARTENS, Petitioners 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

JOHNSON COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, Respondent (Defendant), 

 

L.A. Wuthier and Lucile Wuthier, Trustees of the L.A. 
Wuthier Trust and the Lucile Wuthier Trust, 
Defendants/Intervenors,

 and 

Creed Law, Clarene Law, and L-LM Partnership, a 
Wyoming Partnership, Intervenors.

 

Appeal from District Court, 
Johnson County, John C. Brackley, J.

 

Katherine L. Mead, Jackson, 
for Appellants Steven A. and Rebecca L. Martens.

Greg L. Goddard, Johnson 
County Attorney, Buffalo (argued); Theodore E. Lauer, Director, and James Kaste, 
Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance Program at the University of 
Wyoming, Laramie, for Appellees Board of County Commissioners of Johnson 
County.

Dennis Kirven, Buffalo, 
for Intervenors L.A. Wuthier and Lucille Wuthier as Trustees of the L.A. 
Wuthier Trust and the Lucille Wuthier Trust.

 

Before TAYLOR, 
C.J., and THOMAS, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ., and DONNELL, District 
Judge.

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1] Appellants Steven and 
Rebecca L. Martens (Martens) petitioned the Board of County Commissioners of 
Johnson County (Board) to establish a private road in Johnson County to their 
landlocked property located in Johnson County. The Board ordered that the road 
be established in Sheridan County, and Martens appeal this decision as well as 
the Board's requirements that they pay for surveys prior to hearing their 
petition and that they notify landowners whose property was not crossed by their 
proposed roads.

 

[¶2] We reverse and remand 
with directions to appoint viewers and appraisers to map a road consistent with 
the Martens' petition to establish a private road in Johnson 
County.

 

                                             
ISSUES

 

[¶3] The Martens present 
these issues: 

 

I. 
Whether the County Commission acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner when 
it required two surveys to be conducted in order to make a Petition for 
Establishment of a Private Road?

 

II. Whether the County Commission unlawfully imposed 
requirements upon the Appellants in its Interim Order which are in excess of 
their legal authority?

 

III. Whether the County Commission acted in excess of 
its authority when it instructed the viewers and appraisers that they could 
establish a private road to the Appellants' property in another 
county?

 

IV. If the Court finds that the County Commission 
acted outside of its jurisdiction in establishing a private road in an adjoining 
county, is the petitioner entitled to a credit for costs paid by him for 
services of the viewers and appraisers, and for reimbursement of costs incurred 
for the preparation of two needless surveys?

 

[¶4] The Board presents 
these issues:

 

I. 
Is the Board of County Commissioners of Sheridan County a proper party to this 
proceeding for judicial review of administrative action?

 

II. Did the Board of County Commissioners of Johnson 
County act within its statutory authority when it located a private road in 
Sheridan County?

 

III. Did the Board of County Commissioners of Johnson 
County act within its statutory authority when it stayed the Martens' 
application for a private road until the Martens gave notice to additional 
landowners?

 

IV. Is it within the permissible bounds of discretion 
for the Board of County Commissioners to require a survey of a proposed private 
road before accepting an application and ordering a hearing 
thereon?

 

V. Is it appropriate for this court to decide the 
issue of costs when the issue was not litigated in the action, before the Board 
of County Commissioners, and Appellants have not presented a cogent legal theory 
of recovery?

 

[¶5] Appellees L.A. Wuthier 
and Lucille Wuthier, Trustees of the L.A. Wuthier Trust and Lucille Wuthier 
Trust (Wuthiers) present these issues:

 

A. Whether the Board of County Commissioners for 
Sheridan County have standing to appeal?

 

B. Did the Board of County Commissioners for Johnson 
County, Wyoming, have authority to locate a private roadway in Sheridan County, 
Wyoming, under Wyo. Stat. § 24-9-101?

 

C. Did the Board of County Commissioners for Johnson 
County, Wyoming, properly approve a report of the viewers locating a road in 
Sheridan County, Wyoming?

 

                                              
FACTS

 

[¶6] In February of 1994, 
Martens purchased unimproved real property in Johnson County. The property is 
bordered on the west by heavily timbered U.S. Forest Service lands of the 
Bighorn National Forest, on the north by the Sheridan-Johnson County line, the 
North Piney Creek and steep, rocky, mountainous terrain, and on the south by 
steep, mountainous terrain. The Martens had no access to the property and, in 
June of 1994, they applied to the Board to establish a private road to their 
property pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 24-9-101. The county attorney of Johnson 
County required the Martens to survey the proposed route before the Board would 
hear the petition despite the fact that the plain language of the statute did 
not require that a survey be performed until such time as the road was located 
by the viewers and appraisers. The Martens identified two routes and conducted 
two surveys of those routes which crossed the property of Louis Aime Wuthier and 
Lucile B. Wuthier. They properly notified these landowners. These proposed 
routes involved only lands in Johnson County. 

 

[¶7] In its first 
consideration, the Board denied the petition based upon allegations by adjoining 
landowners that the Martens' property was not landlocked because easements 
across the land of Creed and Clarene Law provided access. Martens tell us that a 
court order declared that the alleged easements were invalid and did not provide 
access to the property. The Martens again applied for the establishment of a 
private road in Johnson County, and the parties stipulated that the property was 
landlocked. The Wuthiers again objected 
to the proposed route on the grounds that the Martens had not adequately studied 
alternative routes and had made an application in bad faith because the Martens 
failed to recognize the historical and archaeological significance of the Wagon 
Box Fight Site1 over which the proposed roads would 
pass.

 

[¶8] A hearing was held by 
the Board on January 15, 1996, and evidence was presented on the reasonableness 
of locating the road on the lands of the Wuthiers, across the Wagon Box Fight 
Site, and on the existence of alternative routes both in Johnson County and in 
Sheridan County. On January 18, 1996, the Board ordered the Martens to give 
notice of their intent to establish a private road to a number of landowners 
whose properties were not crossed by the Martens' proposed roadway but across 
whose lands potential alternate routes existed. The Board also directed that the 
proceedings be stayed until the Martens amended their application to include 
other landowners "whose lands potentially provide a site for a private road." 
One of those landowners is the L-LM Partnership which does own land in Sheridan 
County but does not own property in Johnson County. The Martens objected but 
complied with the interim order because it was not 
appealable.

 

[¶9] Viewers and appraisers 
were appointed on March 21, 1996, to establish a private road, and a hearing was 
held on May 7, 1996.  Despite 
objections from many of the property owners in Sheridan County, the county 
attorney and the Board instructed the viewers and appraisers that they were 
free, if they so chose, to establish a private road in Sheridan County. On June 
18, 1996, the Martens received the recommendation of the viewers and appraisers 
which established the private road to the Martens' landlocked property from a 
public road in Sheridan County. Their report recited that the viewers and 
appraisers met on seven separate days and visited the scene and considered 
alternative routes for the road. The viewers and appraisers determined that the 
road should be located across the lands of the Laws in Sheridan County, provided 
a legal description and a plat of the road, and assessed damages. This proposed 
road was not one of the two proposed by the Martens. The Martens also paid for a 
survey of this proposed road.

 

[¶10] On June 28, 1996, the 
L-LM Partnership and Creed Law and Clarene Law filed an objection to the report 
of the viewers and appraisers, reiterating their claim of lack of jurisdiction 
by the Board and effect on the Law lands and objecting to the measure of damages 
assessed. On December 20, 1996, the Board approved the report of the viewers and 
appraisers and declared the private road established. In separate actions, 
Sheridan County and the Martens filed a petition for review in the district 
court; and at the request of the Martens, the district court certified this case 
to this Court. This Court consolidated the two cases; however, on August 6, 
1997, this Court, on its own motion, dismissed the suit by the Sheridan County 
Board of County Commissioners. Consequently, it is not necessary to address 
appellees' arguments concerning Sheridan County's standing in this 
opinion.

 

                                           
DISCUSSION

 

[¶11] Our scope of review of 
agency orders is defined by WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c) (1997), which in pertinent 
part states: 

 

(c) To the extent necessary to make a decision and 
when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, 
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action. * * * The reviewing court shall: 
* * *

 

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings and conclusions found to be:

 

(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law.

 

Reaves v. Riley, 782 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Wyo. 1989). No deference is given to an agency's conclusions of law. 
If the correct rule of law has not been invoked and correctly applied, then we 
correct the agency's errors. Dunning v. Ankney, 936 P.2d 61, 63 (Wyo. 
1997).

 

[¶12] WYO. STAT. § 24-9-101 
(1993) governs the establishment of private roads:

 

Any person whose land has no outlet to, nor 
connection with a public road, may apply in writing to the board of county 
commissioners of his county for a private road leading from his premises to some 
convenient public road. At least sixty (60) days prior to applying to the board, 
the applicant shall give notice in writing to the owner, resident agent or 
occupant of all lands over which the private road is applied for, of his intent 
to apply for a private road. . . . At the hearing, all parties interested may 
appear and be heard by the board as to the necessity of the road and all matters 
pertaining thereto. Upon the hearing of the application, whether the owner or 
others interested appear or not, if the board finds that the applicant has 
complied with the law and that the private road is necessary, the board shall 
appoint three (3) disinterested 
freeholders and electors of the county, as viewers and appraisers, and shall 
cause an order to be issued directing them to meet on a day named in the order 
on the proposed road, and view and locate a private road according to the 
application therefor, and to assess damages to be sustained thereby. If for any 
reason the viewers and appraisers are unable to meet at the time set by the 
board to view the proposed road, they may fix some other date, but shall give 
notice in writing to the owner, resident agent or occupant of the lands over 
which the road is proposed to be laid of the time and place where the viewers 
will meet, at least ten (10) days before viewing the road, at which time 
and place all persons interested may 
appear and be heard by the viewers. Before entering upon their duties the 
viewers shall take and subscribe to an oath that they will faithfully and 
impartially perform their duties under their appointment as viewers and 
appraisers. The viewers shall then proceed to locate and mark out a private road 
in accordance with the application or in such other manner and location they 
deem appropriate, provided the location of the road shall not be marked out to 
cross the lands of any person whose lands were not described in the application 
and who was not given notice of the application. The proposed road shall not 
exceed thirty (30) feet in width from a certain point on the premises of the applicant to some certain point on 
the public road, and shall be located so as to do the least possible damage to 
the lands through which the private road is located. The viewers shall also at 
the same time assess the damages sustained by the owner over which the road is 
to be established and make full and true returns, with a plat of the road to the 
board of county commissioners.

 

[¶13] In the few decisions 
in which we have interpreted WYO. STAT. § 24-9-101, which became effective in 
1895, the following rules have emerged. This statute provides that "[a]ny person 
whose land has no outlet to, nor connection with a public road" may apply for a 
private road to connect his premises to a convenient public road. The statute is 
rooted in the concept of a private way of necessity as stated in Section 32 of 
Article 1 of the Wyoming Constitution:

 

Private property shall not be taken for private use 
unless by consent of the owner, except for private ways of necessity  * * *.

 

Reaves, 782 P.2d  at 1137; 
Snell v. Ruppert, 541 P.2d 1042, 1045-46 (Wyo. 1975); see also Meyer v. Colorado 
Cent. Coal Co., 39 Wyo. 355, 271 P. 212 (1928) (recognizing that the legislature 
can establish procedure for creating a private way). In McIlquham v. Anthony 
Wilkinson Live Stock Co., 18 Wyo. 53, 104 P. 20 (1909), we said that the purpose 
of a way of necessity was to allow for the use and enjoyment of one's land. We 
also said that the right to a way "is an incorporeal right appurtenant to the 
estate granted, and not a personal right or one incident to personal property." 
McIlquham, 18 Wyo. at 63, 104 P.  at 22; Reaves, 782 P.2d  at 1137. Our Reaves 
decision held that the same principle applies under this statute, and because 
the common purpose of either a common law way of necessity or a statutory 
private road is to allow the use and enjoyment of specific property, the right 
to either is incident to the ownership of the property. Reaves, 782 P.2d  at 
1137.

 

[¶14] We have recognized 
that the procedure to establish a private road set forth in the statutes 
requires a due process hearing because of the property rights that are involved. 
Gold v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Teton County, 658 P.2d 690, 695-96 (Wyo. 
1983).  A due process hearing must 
be provided by the board of county commissioners, and the affected landowner 
must be afforded a right to appear before the board to contest both the taking 
and the damage awards determined by the appraisers. Id.; Carney v. Bd. Of County 
Comm'rs of Sublette County, 757 P.2d 556, 559-560 (Wyo. 
1988).

 

[¶15] In ascertaining the 
legislative intent from the language of the statute, we have noted that the 
legislature intended the procedure under the statute to provide in a local forum 
a readily available, economically affordable, and time efficient method to 
obtain a means of access to property. McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1288 
(Wyo. 1980). We have also stated that an application for a private road under 
WYO. STAT. § 24-9-101 must be brought in good faith, and that it was the 
legislature's intent that convenience and reason should prevail in the 
establishment of roads, but that the route chosen does not have to be the most 
convenient and reasonable route possible. Dunning, 936 P.2d at 64-65; Lindt v. 
Murray, 895 P.2d 459, 462 (Wyo. 1995); McGuire, 608 P.2d  at 1286.  The legislature intended to allow the 
applicant to choose the general location of the road. Dunning, 936 P.2d  at 65. 
The viewers and appraisers must establish the exact location of the road in a 
manner that minimizes damage to the land through which it passes. Id.  An applicant may propose alternative 
routes, but is not obligated to do so. When the applicant proposes alternative 
routes, the plain language of § 24-9-101 requires an applicant to give notice to 
only the persons who own or occupy the land over which the proposed road will 
pass. Id. A landlocked property owner cannot be forced "to choose a wholly 
illogical, uneconomic, and unproductive road." Id. (quoting Ferguson Ranch, Inc. 
v. Murray, 811 P.2d 287, 290 (Wyo. 1991)). Under the McGuire case, a petitioner 
is required to study alternative routes but is not required to document his 
study before making his application. Dunning, 936 P.2d  at 
66.

 

[¶16] An administrative 
agency has only those powers which are expressly provided by statute. Id. at 64; 
Wagoner v. State Dept. of Administration and Information, 924 P.2d 88, 90-91 
(Wyo. 1996). In the context of § 24-9-101, this Court expressly 
stated:

 

Neither the county commissioners nor the district 
court [is] at liberty to graft onto the statute that which [it] think[s] ought 
to be included or to delete that which [it] find[s] inconvenient. Neither they 
nor we have authority to add to or delete from a statute.

 

Dunning, 936 P.2d  at 64-65 
(quoting McGuire, 608 P.2d at 1287). We also stated that an application for a 
private road under § 24-9-101 must be brought in good 
faith.

 

[T]he applicant must make his request in good faith 
and the route chosen must be reasonable and convenient but, the route chosen 
does not have to be the most convenient and reasonable route possible taking 
into account all possible routes. It must be simply a reasonable and convenient 
route.

 

Dunning, 936 P.2d  at 65 (quoting McGuire, 608 P.2d at 
1286) (footnote omitted). 

 

[¶17] In Dunning, we held 
that the board in that case had improperly used the good faith language in 
McGuire to require the applicant to give notice to all adjoining landowners even 
though the proposed road would pass over only some of the land. That expansion 
of the statutory requirements was improper and had, in fact, been expressly 
forbidden by this Court in McGuire. Dunning, 936 P.2d  at 65. Dunning also is 
applicable to the issue of whether an applicant must provide a survey before 
consideration. We there held that an applicant does not have to document its 
study. Id. at 66.

 

[¶18] In this case, the 
Martens point out the similarities between this Board's actions and the board's 
actions in Dunning and request reversal and remand based upon that decision. The 
Martens are, of course, correct. The Board improperly expanded the statutory 
requirements when it demanded that the Martens survey their proposed roads and 
notify additional landowners who would be impacted by possible routes before 
their application was accepted for consideration. The statute does not require 
that a survey be included in an application, and only landowners adjoining the 
Martens' proposed roads needed to be notified. The Board was then required to 
take evidence whether Martens had offered a reasonable route. The Board has not 
declared that proposed route unreasonable.

 

[¶19] The Board contends, 
however, that, under the statute, one can reasonably infer authority to locate 
roads in another county if that best serves the interests involved. The Board is 
an administrative agency and has only those powers granted by the state 
constitution or statute. Although WYO. STAT. § 24-9-101 does not expressly state 
that the county's powers are limited to property in that county, in WYO. STAT. § 
18-2-101(a)(iv) (1997), the legislature has acted to limit the Board's authority 
to property of the county.  This 
Board has no authority to act in another county, and its actions impacting 
property in another county are without jurisdiction and void. Additionally, as 
Martens point out, Dunning established that the Board cannot consider and 
establish a road that is not proposed by the applicant. The Martens never 
proposed a route through Sheridan County, and the Board erred in considering and 
establishing a road in another county.

 

[¶20] The Wuthiers contend 
that the Board does not have the authority to establish a road through a 
national historic landmark. Under the statute, the Board does have the authority 
to do so. Martens must, of course, provide evidence that it is reasonable to do 
so. See Dunning, 936 P.2d  at 66. The statute then directs the viewers and 
appraisers to mark out a road that minimizes damages. Any other protection for 
the landmark offered by federal law would also have to be considered by the 
Martens and the Board in determining whether the proposed road is 
reasonable.

 

[¶21] Finally, the Martens 
request that the monies they have paid to establish an unlawful road should be 
credited and applied towards the additional expense that will be incurred when a 
second group of viewers and appraisers is appointed to carry out establishment 
of a lawful road. They also contend that they should be reimbursed for the 
expense of preparing the two needless surveys that the Board required before 
accepting their application for consideration. The Board argues that the Martens 
have not presented a legal theory upon which this Court can award costs and 
contends that resolution of this issue of costs is more appropriately decided by 
the Board. We order the Board to credit the amount already spent by the Martens 
and apply it towards any additional expense incurred in establishing the 
proposed road after a hearing determines if it is reasonable and convenient. We 
also order that the Martens be allowed to request reimbursement for the two 
needless surveys and present evidence to the Board. The Board should issue 
findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting its decision on the issue of 
reimbursement.

 

[¶22] We reverse the order 
of the Board and remand for a hearing in accordance with the specific directions 
of this opinion.

 

          

FOOTNOTES

1The 
Wagon Box Fight was a dramatic battle between woodcutters and soldiers from Fort 
Phil Kearny and the Sioux Indians which occurred on August 2, 1867. Led by Red 
Cloud, Crazy Horse, and High-Back-Bone, Indian forces surrounded the military 
escort for the woodcutters and waged a battle for several hours. The military 
escort arranged wagon boxes as a fragile fortification and fought from behind 
them until help arrived and the Indians withdrew. Their survival somewhat erased 
the stigma and humiliation of an earlier disastrous military defeat known as the 
Fetterman Massacre. T.A. LARSON, HISTORY OF WYOMING, 28-29 (1965).