Case Title: Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Hackett

Citation: 2011-Ohio-3096

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Hackett, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-3096.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-3096 
CINCINNATI BAR ASSOCIATION v. HACKETT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Hackett,  
Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-3096.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Participation in employment agreement that 
restricts rights of an attorney to practice after termination of agreement — 
Consent-to-discipline agreement — Public reprimand. 
(No. 2011-0308 — Submitted March 23, 2011 — Decided June 30, 2011.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 10-082. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Paul L. Hackett III of Cincinnati, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0040638, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1988. 
On October 11, 2010, relator, Cincinnati Bar Association, filed a complaint 
charging respondent with offering or participating in an employment agreement 
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that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship 
and that provides for an illegal or clearly excessive fee. 
{¶ 2} The parties submitted a consent-to-discipline agreement pursuant 
to Section 11 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints 
and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
of the Supreme Court (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”). A panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommended the acceptance of the 
proposed consent to discipline, affidavit, exhibits, and rule violations.  The board 
adopted the panel’s recommendation, as do we.  Accordingly, we publicly 
reprimand respondent for his misconduct. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 3} The stipulated facts of this case and respondent’s admissions show 
that in February 2002, respondent entered into an employment agreement with an 
associate that stated that upon his termination, the associate would no longer 
continue to represent or attempt to represent clients of respondent’s firm whose 
claims had been assigned to him for representation.  The employment agreement 
further provided that if a client chose to leave respondent’s firm and thereafter be 
represented by the associate, the associate would pay respondent’s firm 95% of 
any attorney’s fees generated by that case, based upon a 33.3% contingent fee 
agreement.  Respondent also used the same form of employment contract when he 
hired another associate. 
{¶ 4} On April 14, 2009, ten days before his termination, the associate 
executed a contingency fee agreement on behalf of respondent’s law firm to 
represent a client in a personal injury matter.  On June 30, 2009, the client advised 
respondent that he had decided to retain respondent’s former associate to handle 
his case.  Respondent acknowledged receipt of the client’s letter on August 10, 
2009, and requested instructions from the client as to the disposition of his file, 
but he never received a response. 
January Term, 2011 
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{¶ 5} In the fall of 2009, respondent learned that the client’s case had 
been settled and that the settlement check had been sent to his former associate.  
Respondent filed suit in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas on October 
29, 2009 to enforce the employment agreement and to recover fees paid to his 
former associate.  The trial court granted the associate’s motion to dismiss the 
complaint, holding that the employment agreement violated Ohio’s public policy 
favoring a client’s freedom to choose a lawyer and observing that it may also 
violate Prof.Cond.R. 1.5 and 5.6.  Hackett v. Moore, 160 Ohio Misc.2d 107, 
2010-Ohio-6298, 939 N.E.2d 1321, ¶ 5, 9-10.  Respondent did not appeal that 
decision and has disavowed further use of the employment contract. 
{¶ 6} Based upon these facts, the parties have stipulated and the panel 
and board have found that respondent’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.5 
(prohibiting a lawyer from making an agreement for, charging, or collecting an 
illegal or clearly excessive fee) and 5.6 (prohibiting a lawyer from offering or 
participating in an employment agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to 
practice after termination of the relationship). 
{¶ 7} “There is nothing more critical to the professional relationship 
between attorney and client than the trust and confidence of the person being 
represented.”  Fox & Assoc.  Co., L.P.A. v. Purdon (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 69, 71, 
541 N.E.2d 448.  In Akron Bar Assn. v. Miller (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 6, 9, 684 
N.E.2d 288, we recognized that a lawyer’s job is not to sell a good or a service or 
to simply supply the means of achieving a client’s goals.  Rather, a lawyer’s 
fiduciary duty to his client requires him to deliberate with and counsel the client 
to make wise decisions in furtherance of those goals.  Id., citing Kronman, The 
Lost Lawyer (1993) 128-129.  To that end, the lawyer’s duties of trust and 
confidence and the ethical rules incumbent upon Ohio lawyers require that “the 
personal desires of the lawyer must be subordinated to those of the client.”  Id. 
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{¶ 8} We have held that “[a] client has an absolute right to discharge an 
attorney or law firm at any time, with or without cause, subject to the obligation 
to compensate the attorney or firm for services rendered prior to the discharge.”  
Reid, Johnson, Downes, Andrachik & Webster v. Lansberry (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 
570, 629 N.E.2d 431, paragraph one of the syllabus.  This right would be hollow 
if the discharged attorney could prevent other attorneys from assuming the 
client’s representation.  As the official comments to Prof.Cond.R. 5.6 explain, any 
agreement that restricts the right of lawyers to practice after leaving a firm limits 
both their professional autonomy and the client’s freedom to retain a lawyer of 
their choice.  Prof.Cond.R. 5.6, official comment [1]. 
{¶ 9} In this case, respondent sought to restrain his former associates 
from taking clients with them when they left his firm.  His employment contract 
required a departing associate who continued to represent the firm’s former 
clients to remit 95% of the fees generated in the clients’ cases to respondent 
regardless of the proportion of the work that each attorney performed.  If 
enforced, this clearly excessive fee would create an economic deterrent for the 
departing attorney that would adversely affect the clients’ right to retain an 
attorney of their own choosing.  Therefore, we agree that respondent has violated 
both Prof.Cond.R. 1.5 and 5.6. 
Sanction 
{¶ 10} In recommending a sanction for respondent’s misconduct, the 
board considered the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10. The parties have stipulated to, and the panel and board have found, just one 
aggravating factor – respondent’s use of the unethical employment agreement 
with more than one associate.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(d).  As mitigating 
factors, however, the panel and board cite respondent’s lack of a prior disciplinary 
record, the absence of a dishonest motive, his cooperation in this disciplinary 
proceeding, and evidence of his good character, including his exemplary service 
January Term, 2011 
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as a Lt. Colonel in the United States Marine Corps.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(a), (b), (d), and (e).  We accept all but one of these findings. 
{¶ 11} Pursuant to BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(b), the absence of a 
dishonest or selfish motive may be considered as a mitigating factor.  Conversely, 
the presence of a dishonest or selfish motive may be considered as an aggravating 
factor pursuant to BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b).  While respondent did not 
possess a dishonest motive, the employment agreement that he entered into with 
his associates provided that he would receive 95% of the fees generated if a client 
followed the associate when the associate left the firm, regardless of the amount 
of work respondent performed on a case.  Therefore, we conclude that respondent 
possessed a selfish motive,  consider that motive to be an aggravating factor, and 
reject the parties’ stipulation that respondent’s lack of a dishonest motive is a 
mitigating factor.  Nonetheless, in light of the remaining mitigating factors and 
the fact that no client suffered harm, we agree that a public reprimand is the 
appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct. 
{¶ 12} Accordingly, respondent is publicly reprimanded for his violations 
of Prof.Cond.R. 1.5 and 5.6.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Rosemary D. Welsh and Linda A. Ash, for relator. 
Gallagher Sharp, Timothy T. Brick, and Monica A. Sansalone, for 
respondent. 
______________________