Case Title: Hill, Delton Eugene v. State

Citation: 355 Md. 206

Docket Number: 130/98

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1999-07-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Delton Eugene Hill v. State of Maryland
No.  130, Sept.  Term, 1998
Motion for mistrial based on improper closing argument by prosecutor not necessarily untimely
when made immediately after jury retires; complaint over denial of such motion not necessarily
unpreserved for appellate review; prosecutor’s plea to convict defendant in order to protect their
communities wholly improper and may be basis for mistrial.
0
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
Case No.  CT961273X
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No.  130
September Term, 1998
______________________________________
DELTON EUGENE HILL
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Raker
Wilner
Cathell,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
______________________________________
Filed:   July 30, 1999
The question before us is whether, despite concluding that a prosecutor’s closing
argument was improper and subject to objection, the Court of Special Appeals erred in
holding that the denial of petitioner’s motion for mistrial based on that impropriety was not
preserved for appellate review because the motion was not made until after the jury left the
courtroom to deliberate.  Our answer to that question, on the facts of this case, is “yes.”  In
his brief, petitioner seeks to enlarge the issue and have us resolve the complaint that the
Court of Special Appeals declined to address — that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the motion.  As that issue was not raised in his petition for certiori, however, it is
not before us.
BACKGROUND
While conducting surveillance of an area in Prince George’s County known for
frequent open-air drug sales, Corporal Alvin Sanders observed a station wagon parked on a
restaurant parking lot.  He saw at least two individuals approach the driver’s side and
exchange objects with the driver, whom he later identified as petitioner, Delton Hill, but
could not see what was exchanged.  When Hill drove away, Sanders followed.  After
observing Hill proceed through a stop sign without stopping, Sanders executed a traffic stop
which, because of concern over the conduct of one or more of the passengers in the rear seat
of Hill’s car,  grew into a felony stop, involving backup units.  A subsequent search of the
car revealed a handgun protruding from under the driver’s seat, a brown medicine bottle
containing suspected crack cocaine in the front console, and two “rocks” of suspected
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cocaine on the floor beneath the back seat.  According to Sanders, following his arrest, Hill
admitted that the gun was his and that he kept it for protection.  Hill was charged with
transporting a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, in violation of Maryland
Code, Article 27, § 291A(b)(1), possession of a firearm after having been so convicted, also
in violation of that section, and possession of cocaine.  A jury in the Circuit Court for Prince
George’s County convicted Hill of the first two counts, dealing with the firearm, but was
unable to reach a verdict on the cocaine possession charge.  The court merged the two
convictions and sentenced Hill on the first count to four years imprisonment.
Only two witnesses testified, both called by the State.  Corporal Sanders
testified as noted above, but said that he made his observations from his cruiser parked some
distance — he estimated about 2,000 feet — away, using binoculars.  It was just before 9:00
on a February night, although the parking lot area was well-lit from outside lighting.
Although defense counsel noted that Sanders had not mentioned Hill’s admission regarding
the gun in the officer’s report, counsel did not otherwise impeach that admission.  He did,
however, cross-examine Sanders at some length regarding the officer’s ability to see, from
such a distance — more than the length of six football fields — the drug transactions he
claimed to have seen.  The State’s second witness was Kevin Barnett, a friend of Hill.
Barnett said that Hill picked him up, that they drove to the restaurant and went in for about
five minutes to buy food, that when they returned to the car several people approached from
both the driver’s and passenger’s side, that two people asked for a ride and got into the car,
and that they then left.  He said that he never saw Hill in possession of either drugs or a gun
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and that he saw no drug transactions during the time he was with Hill.  Barnett was not a
helpful witness for the State. 
The issue before us emanates, ultimately, from the insistence of the prosecutor,
throughout the trial and over constant objection, on informing the jurors that they had a
responsibility to keep their community safe from people like Hill.  In a soup to nuts
performance, the prosecutor, whether through inexperience or a more disturbing disdain for
proper conduct, began his inappropriate remarks with the very first statement he made to the
jury and did not end them until the very last statement he made, paying utterly no attention
to the numerous objections that were sustained by the court.  He commenced his opening
statement by noting that his broken foot would mend but wondering if society would mend
— “[s]ociety full of people like Mr. Hill who carry guns and drugs.”  An objection to that
remark was sustained.  In the next breath, however, he continued that “[o]ne only needs to
read the paper to know what that does to our community.”  An objection to that also was
sustained.  After very briefly recounting the events leading to the officer’s stop of the car,
he told the jury, “what happens next is why you are here and why you’ve been chosen to send
a message to protect our community.”  (Emphasis added.)  Objection sustained.  Undeterred,
he completed his opening statement by telling the jury that “[i]n the end, we’re going to ask
you to do the just thing, the right thing, the thing that protects all of us and keeps this
community safe.”  Objection sustained.  On that performance alone, Hill moved for a
mistrial, which the court denied in favor of informing the jury that opening statements were
not supposed to be argument and that the jury should not consider anything that the court
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declared objectionable.
The assault resumed when the prosecutor began his closing argument, the relevant
portion of which was as follows:
“MR.  JOHNSON:  Thank you, Your Honor.  Good
morning, ladies and gentlemen.  Defense counsel yesterday I
suppose wanted to make the State feel guilty because we
mentioned the community of which you are a part.  It is your
community, and it is important.  What you do here today sends
a message, whatever you decide.  And make no mistake about
it; Delton Hill will go back and tell his cronies and buddies
about what is going on here today.
MR.  WOOD:  Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Overruled.  This is argument.
MR.  JOHNSON:  So, what you do here today is
extremely important.  Perhaps defense counsel is lucky enough
to go home to Potomac or River Road — 
MR.  WOOD: Objection.
THE COURT:  Sustained.
MR.  JOHNSON:   — but people here in Prince George’s
County are in crisis.  Whether you’re in Greenbelt, Accokeek,
Adelphi, Largo, it doesn’t matter, because Prince George’s
County is in a crisis.
MR.  WOOD: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR.  JOHNSON:  People wonder why we can’t get 4-
star restaurants here.
MR.  WOOD: Objection, Your Honor.
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THE COURT:  Sustained
MR.  JOHNSON:  People like Delton Hill.  This case is
about accountability.  Will he be held accountable, or is it okay
to say, do what you want?  It’s your community.  No, it’s not
your community; it’s our community.  This is your turn to do
something about it.
MR.  WOOD: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.”
Defense counsel retorted that he did not live in Potomac, an affluent Washington
suburb, but in the District itself, and he suggested that the prosecutor’s recurring references
to “take back your community” were an indication that he did not want the jury to decide the
case on the evidence, because he had no evidence.  The prosecutor sent “these subliminal
messages” because he did not want to talk about the facts.  In rebuttal, the prosecutor
responded to counsel’s attack on the State’s evidence, interspersing his argument with such
remarks, to which objections were sustained, as “[b]ut defense lawyer, in his attempt to get
him off” and “his buddy, who is still here today cheering him on.”  Apparently unable to
resist the urge, he ended his argument: “What message will you send Delton Hill?  Is it, it’s
your community, do whatever you want . . . Or is it your community?”
Hill objected to that last remark, but the objection was not ruled upon.  Instead, the
court immediately excused the alternate juror, swore the bailiff, and sent the jury to
deliberate.  The transcript shows that the bailiff was sworn at 11:23 a.m., and that the jury
retired one minute later, at 11:24.  Counsel promptly, to “complete the record,” moved for
 In its brief, the State notes that the transcript does not reveal how much time elapsed
1
between the close of argument and the swearing of the bailiff and suggests the possibility that there
was a break in the proceeding — that some significant amount of time may have elapsed between the
end of the argument and the making of the motion for mistrial.  Although the transcript does not
specify that time interval, it gives no indication whatever that there was any break in the proceeding,
as it does on other occasions when there was a break.  See Transcript of January 6, 1997, Vol. I at
1-15 and 1-38.  The only reasonable inference from the transcript is that there was no break and that
less than a minute elapsed between the end of the argument and the swearing of the bailiff.
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a mistrial based on the closing argument of the State regarding “sending a message.”   The
1
court denied the motion, stating as its reason that it had sustained counsel’s objections and
told the jury that closing arguments were not evidence.  That matter took three minutes.  The
transcript shows that, immediately upon denying the motion, the court went into recess, at
11:27 a.m.  The jury sent out a note at 12:02, and the parties and the court gathered briefly
to deal with it.  After being excused for lunch, at about 12:30, the jury resumed its
deliberations and, at some point just before 4:51 p.m., it informed the court that it had
reached a verdict on the first two counts, but not on the third.
Hill complained again of the prosecutor’s conduct in a motion for new trial, arguing
that, unlike the situation regarding the reception of evidence, when the sustaining of an
objection precludes the jury from hearing and being tainted by the improper evidence, the
damage from the prosecutor’s improper remarks was done before an objection could be
lodged.  He urged that the case was a close one, evidenced in part by the fact that the jury
could not agree on whether Hill was in possession of the cocaine found in the car, and he
stressed the persistence of the prosecutor’s prejudicial conduct and its effect on diverting the
jury’s attention from the evidence to the “gut level reaction” that “[y]ou let this man off, you
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are hurting your community.”  The court denied the motion, noting:
“The majority of the objections raised by defense counsel
in the State’s closing argument were sustained by me.  And in
exercising my function as the trial Judge, and my review and
recollection of what occurred during the course of this trial, I do
not find that this Defendant did not receive a fair trial.”
In his appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Hill complained about the denial of his
motions regarding both the State’s opening statement and closing argument.  With respect
to the former, the intermediate appellate court, in its unreported opinion affirming the
judgment, agreed that the prosecutor “should not have asserted that the jurors were chosen
to send a message that would protect the community,” but held that the trial judge “saved the
situation for the [S]tate” by ruling promptly and decisively that the jury was not to consider
that improper remark.  With respect to the motion based on the State’s closing argument, the
court determined:
“Whether appellant was entitled to a mistrial as a result of the
prosecutor’s final and/or rebuttal argument is an issue that has
not been preserved for our review.  Objections to improper
argument must be ‘interposed either (1) immediately after the
allegedly improper comments are made, or (2) immediately after
the argument is completed.’  Grier v. State, 116 Md. App. 534,
545 (1997).  Appellant had a valid objection to the prosecutor’s
request that jurors consider their own interests.  Such a ‘golden
rule’ argument is inappropriate.  Holmes v. State, 119 Md. App.
518, 527 (1998).  Had the motion for mistrial been made before
the jurors were excused from the courtroom, Judge Spellbring
would have been positioned to deliver another curative
instruction and/or take other appropriate action (e.g. admonish
the prosecutor) short of declaring a mistrial.”
Having made that finding, the Court of Special Appeals went on to disapprove of the
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prosecutor’s “intemperate appeals to class prejudice and passion,” but returned, in the end,
to its determination, which was dispositive, that “had he been requested to do so before
deliberations began, Judge Spellbring would have yet again (1) evaluated the harm caused
by the prosecutor’s unfair arguments, and (2) taken the curative steps necessary to prevent
injustice.”  That, the court held, “is why we shall not order a new trial in this case.”
In his petition for certiorari, petitioner raised the single question, “[w]hether the Court
of Special Appeals erred in ruling that a motion for mistrial, made after the jury retired to
deliberate, on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, was properly
denied because untimely.”
DISCUSSION
The first thing we need to do is to restate the question raised by petitioner in order for
it to conform to the facts.  The Court of Special Appeals did not rule that the motion was
properly denied because it was untimely.  The trial judge did not deny the motion because
it was untimely, but because he believed that it had no merit — that, in light of his advice
to the jury to disregard statements to which objections had been sustained, petitioner was not
entitled to a mistrial.  The issue of timeliness arose only in connection with whether
petitioner’s complaint about the trial judge’s ruling was preserved for appellate review.
Though affirming the ultimate judgment, as the issue of the prosecutor’s opening statement
was addressed on its merits, the appellate court did not affirm the trial judge’s ruling relating
to the improper closing argument, but rather declined to address it on the ground that the
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complaint over that argument was not preserved.
Our recasting of the issue in this manner, given the facts of the case, does not amount
to a material change in the issue.  It does, however, point up a fallacy in the assumption made
by the Court of Special Appeals — that, had the motion been made before the jury retired,
the trial court would have “taken the curative steps necessary to prevent injustice.”  The
record shows, quite clearly, that no different action would have been taken than was, in fact,
taken.  The impropriety of the prosecutor’s remarks was raised not only in the motion for
mistrial but later in the motion for new trial.  On neither occasion did the State argue, nor did
the trial judge mention, the question of timeliness.  On both occasions, the judge denied the
motion solely because of his conclusion that petitioner was not entitled, on the merits, to the
relief he requested.  The judge never suggested that, had the motion been made a minute or
two earlier, he would have been inclined to give some further instruction or taken some other
intermediate action.  He was convinced that he had already done all that needed to be done
to counteract the prosecutor’s remarks.
The question, then, is more appropriately put: did the Court of Special Appeals err in
holding, as a matter of law or inflexible appellate policy, that a defendant fails to preserve
for appellate review a complaint over the denial of a motion for mistrial based on improper
closing argument by a prosecutor if the motion is made after the jury has retired to consider
its verdict but before the jury has announced the reaching of a verdict?  In this case, that
question is laden with the intermediate appellate court’s further conclusion, with which we
heartily agree, that the prosecutor’s argument was, indeed, wholly improper and
 Our decision in Grier was not filed until a month after the Court of Special Appeals decided
2
this case.  That court’s reliance on its earlier reported opinion was, therefore, entirely appropriate.
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presumptively prejudicial — that petitioner “had a valid objection to the prosecutor’s request
that the jurors consider their own interest.”
As noted, in reaching its conclusion that objections to improper argument are
unpreserved for appellate review unless made immediately after the improper comment is
made or immediately after the argument is completed, the Court of Special Appeals relied
on its earlier holding in Grier v. State, 116 Md. App. 534, 545, 698 A.2d 1133, 1138 (1997).
Some comment about that case is in order.  It involved three issues: whether a general
objection sufficed to preserve a complaint about the admission of the defendant’s post-arrest
silence; whether the admission of that evidence was, in any event, harmless; and whether the
defendant’s complaint about the prosecutor’s comment on the post-arrest silence in closing
argument was preserved for appellate review.  The court found against Grier on all three
issues, concluding that the general objection did not preserve the objection, that the evidence
was harmless, and that the objection to closing argument was also not preserved.
The first thing to note is that, on further review in that case, we concluded that the
general objection was sufficient to preserve Grier’s objection to the evidence and that the
admission of that evidence was both  erroneous and prejudicial.  We  reversed the judgment
of the Court of Special Appeals on those grounds.  Grier v. State, 351 Md. 241, 718 A.2d
211 (1998).   We did not address, in our Grier, the third issue of whether the defendant’s
2
objection to the State’s closing argument was preserved.  That issue was not raised in the
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petition for certiorari and, in light of our holding on the other issues, it would have been
moot in any event.  Had the Court of Special Appeals reached the correct conclusion in Grier
on the first two issues, we presume that it too would have found the third issue moot and, for
that reason, declined to address it.
Apart from that, the facts in Grier were different from those here.  The prosecutor
commented on Grier’s post-arrest silence in the opening of his closing argument, without
objection.  He commented on it again in his rebuttal argument, also without objection.  The
jury was excused for lunch and told to report back at 2:00 to begin deliberations.  During the
luncheon recess, defense counsel called the judge’s chambers and left a message on the
judge’s voice mail complaining about the comment made during the rebuttal argument.  It
was not until after the jury had been deliberating for over an hour, however, that counsel
lodged a proper motion for a mistrial.  Analogizing the situation to a complaint over jury
instructions, which Maryland Rule 4-325(e) requires be made “promptly after the court
instructs the jury,” the Court of Special Appeals determined:
“This case is a classic example of the logistical problems
involved in (1) reassembling everyone whose presence is
required before the problem can be addressed, (2) hearing from
counsel at a point in time when the comments at issue, and  tone
of voice with which they were delivered, are fresh in everyone’s
mind, (3) resolving the issue of what — if anything — should
be done under the circumstances, and (4) returning the jurors to
the jury box soon enough for the trial court to ‘strike while the
iron is hot.’”
Grier v. State, 116 Md. App. at 545, 698 A.2d at 1138.
On that basis, the court stated that it would continue to hold that objections to
-12-
improper argument are timely if interposed either immediately after the allegedly improper
comment is made or immediately after the argument is completed, but would decline requests
to review improper argument objections “that were not presented to the trial judge until after
the jurors have been excused from the courtroom.”  Id. 
We share the concerns alluded to by the Court of Special Appeals, although they do
not necessarily lead to the conclusion reached by that court.  Maryland Rule 4-323(a)
requires that objections to evidence be made at the time the evidence is offered or as soon
thereafter as the grounds for objection become apparent, and specifies that, if not so made,
are waived.  Rule 4-323(c) provides, in relevant part, that, for the purpose of review of any
other ruling or order, it is sufficient that the party, at the time the ruling or order is made or
sought, makes known to the court the action desired.  If a party has no opportunity to object
to a ruling or order when it is made, the absence of an objection at that time does not
constitute a waiver.  Although not stated as directly as in § (a) of the Rule, the clear inference
in § (c) is that, if there is an opportunity to object to an order or ruling when made, the
failure to do so (and to inform the court of the relief requested) may constitute a waiver. 
There are three problems with the intermediate appellate court’s approach in this case.
First, counsel did object to the prosecutor’s closing remarks when they were made.  Most of
the objections were promptly ruled upon, but the last one was not; it was apparently
overlooked by the court, which turned instead to dismissing the alternate juror, swearing the
bailiff, and sending the jury to deliberate.  Although counsel could have interrupted the court
and, prior to the retirement of the jury, expanded his objection to include a request for
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mistrial and insisted on a ruling, he did not, as in Grier, wait an inordinate amount of time,
but presented his request as soon as the court concluded its various remarks.  Second,
without commenting on whether the trial judge could have denied the motion for mistrial on
the ground of untimeliness under the facts of this case, he did not do so.  As indicated, he
denied the motion solely because he found, on the merits, that petitioner was not entitled to
that relief, and not because he believed that the motion was untimely.  The appellate court
interposed a defense to the motion, on its own initiative, that was never considered by the
trial court.
Finally, and most significant, entertainment of the motion when it was made did not
present the problems noted by the Court of Special Appeals in Grier.  The motion was not
based on an isolated remark, and it is clear that what was sought was more than just another
curative instruction or the sustaining of the last objection.  The point made was that the jury
had been contaminated both by the prosecutor’s improper (and, it appears, factually
erroneous) reference to where defense counsel lived and by his persistent references to the
need for the jurors to convict petitioner in order to preserve the quality of their own
communities.  The granting of a mistrial on that ground would not have required the
inconvenient reassembling of anyone — everyone but the jury was still in the courtroom and
the jury’s presence was not required —  and the motion and argument on it were presented
just moments after the comments complained of were made, when they were still fresh.
Obviously, the trial judge, in entertaining and ruling upon the motion, did not find its timing
inconvenient.
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For the reasons noted by the Court of Special Appeals in Grier, motions for mistrial
should be made before the jury retires, and a defendant who fails to make such a motion in
a timely manner risks its proper denial on that ground alone.  Especially when the court
might find that alternative relief, such as a curative instruction, would have sufficed to cure
any error or prejudice, it may deny the motion if made too late for the court conveniently to
give such an instruction.  Retirement of the jury does not, however, act as a complete and
inflexible termination of the right to make such a motion.  For one thing, if the court were
inclined to grant a mistrial, thereby ending the authority of the jury to decide the case, no
substantial prejudice to the parties arises from the fact that the jury has already begun
deliberations.  Indeed, the same grounds may be raised in a motion for new trial made after
a verdict is rendered.  Moreover, although often inconvenient, it is possible to give
supplemental instructions to a jury after it has retired.  See Maryland Rule 4-325(a) (court
may supplement instructions after closing arguments “when appropriate”).  The giving of
such supplemental instructions is generally within the discretion of the trial court.  Lovell v.
State, 347 Md. 623, 657, 702 A.2d 261, 278 (1997).
We do not suggest that it is never appropriate for an appellate court to apply Rule 4-
323(c) and decline to address a complaint over the denial of a mistrial that is not timely
made.  The Rule authorizes that approach.  When, as here, however, (1) the motion is not
unduly delayed and timeliness is not raised as a defense in the trial court, (2) the trial court
does not consider timeliness, even as an alternative ground, but denies the motion on the
ground that no further relief is called for, (3) no prejudice to the court or either party is
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indicated, and (4) the appellate court determines that the complaint underlying the motion
is valid, a complaint that the motion was improperly denied should be addressed on appeal
and not found unpreserved. 
  For the reasons noted, we shall vacate the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals
and remand the case for consideration of petitioner’s complaint about the denial of his last
motion for mistrial.  In that consideration, the court must be guided by two equally important
principles.  There is, first, the general rule that “[o]rdinarily, the decision whether to grant
a motion for a mistrial rests in the discretion of the trial judge” and that appellate review “is
limited to whether there has been an abuse of discretion in denying the motion.”  State v.
Hawkins, 326 Md. 270, 277, 604 A.2d 489, 493 (1992), quoting, in part, from Kosmas v.
State, 316 Md. 587, 594, 560 A.2d 1137, 1141 (1989) and White v. State, 300 Md. 719, 737,
481 A.2d 201, 210 (1984), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 322 Md.  738, 589 A.2d
969 (1991).  As the Hawkins court pointed out:
“The fundamental rationale in leaving the matter of prejudice vel
non to the sound discretion of the trial court is that the judge is
in the best position to evaluate it.  The judge is physically on the
scene, able to observe matters not usually reflected in a cold
record.  The judge is able to ascertain the demeanor of the
witnesses and to note the reaction of the jurors and counsel to
inadmissible matters.  That is to say, the judge has his [or her]
finger on the pulse of the trial.”
State v. Hawkins, supra, 326 Md. at 278, 604 A.2d at 493.
That principle remains firm, and it obviously limits the scope of appellate review of
the trial court’s decision.  That limited review, however, does not authorize a “rubber
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stamping” of the ruling or an abdication of the appellate court’s ultimate responsibility to
determine whether (1) there was an adequate basis for the motion, and (2) if so, the denial
of the motion was sufficiently prejudicial to constitute an abuse of discretion.  
The case most often cited in dealing with complaints over remarks made by a
prosecutor in opening statement or closing argument is Wilhelm v. State, 272 Md. 404, 326
A.2d 707 (1974), which actually was a consolidation of two cases — Wilhelm v. State and
Cook v. State.  In Wilhelm, where the defendant was charged with assault to murder a police
officer, the complaint was over the prosecutor’s informing the jury, in opening statement,
that “this is your occasion to do something about” the “hue and cry of police protection.”
Wilhelm moved for mistrial based on that one remark.  The complaint in Cook, a murder
case, was the prosecutor’s informing the jury, in closing argument, that over 300 people had
been murdered in Baltimore City in the last year, that an unknown number of persons had
been robbed with weapons, and that the victims were most often people unable to fight back.
Cook’s motion for mistrial also was denied.
After an exhaustive review of the case law to that point and a close look at the record,
we affirmed the convictions of the two defendants.  As to closing argument, we noted that
counsel has the right “to make any comment or argument that is warranted by the evidence
proved or inferences therefrom” and that the prosecutor is free “to comment legitimately and
to speak fully, although harshly, on the accused’s action and conduct if the evidence supports
his comments . . . .”  Id. at 412, 326 A.2d at 714.  The prosecutor, we continued, “may
discuss the facts proved or admitted in the pleadings, assess the conduct of the parties, and
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attack the credibility of witnesses,” and, in that regard, “may indulge in oratorical conceit
or flourish and in illustrations and metaphorical allusions.”  Id. at 413, 326 A.2d at 714.
Citing Esterline v. State, 105 Md. 629, 66 A. 269 (1907), however, we cautioned that
counsel is not permitted to comment on facts not in evidence or state what could have been
proven, and that “[p]ersistence in such course of conduct may furnish good grounds for a
new trial.”  Id.  at 413, 326 A.2d at 714.  We cited Wood v. State, 192 Md. 643, 652, 65 A.2d
316, 320 (1949) and Contee v. State, 223 Md. 575, 584, 165 A.2d 889, 894-95 (1960) for
the further propositions that “appeals to class prejudice or to passion are improper and may
so poison the minds of the jurors that an accused may be deprived of a fair trial” and that
“the State’s Attorney has an obligation to refrain from making any remark — within the
hearing of the jury — which is likely or apt to instigate prejudice against the accused.”
Wilhelm, supra, 272 Md. at 414-15, 326 A.2d at 715.
Wilhelm also confirmed that “not every ill-considered remark made by counsel, even
during the progress of the trial, is cause for challenge or mistrial” and that “[w]hat exceeds
the limits of permissible comment depends on the facts in each case.”  Id.  at 415, 326 A.2d
at 715.  Even when a clearly improper remark is made, a mistrial is not necessarily required.
As we indicated  at 423-24, 326 A.2d at 720:
“When in the first instance the remarks of the State’s
Attorney do appear to have been prejudicial, a significant factor
in determining whether the jury were actually misled or were
likely to have been misled or influenced to the prejudice of the
accused is whether or not the trial court took any appropriate
action, as the exigencies of the situation may have appeared to
require, to overcome the likelihood of prejudice, such as
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informing the jury that the remark was improper, striking the
remark and admonishing the jury to disregard it.”
We pointed out that when such action has been taken by the trial court and found to
be sufficient on appellate review, the judgment has not been reversed, but, “[c]ontrariwise,
where no such action was taken by the trial court the prejudice found to have existed were
grounds for reversal.” Id. at 424, 326 A.2d at 720-21 (citing Shoemaker v. State, 228 Md.
462, 180 A.2d 682 (1962) and Meno v. State, 117 Md. 435, 83 A. 759 (1912)).
We affirmed the judgment in Wilhelm, noting that there was just the one improper
remark that was not repeated, that it was not the kind of remark “screaming out for the
forceful interdiction of the trial judge,” and that the evidence of Wilhelm’s guilt was
overwhelming.  We thus concluded that the single remark did not infect his trial with
unfairness and was not likely to have prejudiced him.  We affirmed in Cook because the
prosecutor’s remark about the numbers of murders and armed robberies in Baltimore City
was, more or less, a matter of common knowledge or general notoriety.
These principles have been repeated and applied many times since Wilhelm, most
recently in Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 722 A.2d 887 (1999).  There, we confirmed that,
although attorneys “are afforded great leeway in presenting closing arguments to the jury,”
there “are limits in place to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial.”  Id. at 429-30, 722
A.2d at 901-02.  We restated, as well, that not every improper remark necessarily mandates
reversal, that reversal is required only when it appears that the prosecutor’s remarks actually
misled the jury or were likely to have misled or influenced the jury to the defendant’s
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prejudice, and that that determination lies within the discretion of the trial court.  See also
Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 596 A.2d 1024 (1991), cert.  denied, 503 U.S. 972, 112 S. Ct.
1590, 118 L. Ed.  2d 307 (1992); Johnson v. State, 325 Md. 511, 601 A.2d 1093 (1992);
Evans v. State, 333 Md. 660, 637 A.2d 117, cert.  denied, 513 U.S. 833, 115 S. Ct.  109, 130
L. Ed. 2d 56 (1994).
In judging the conduct of the prosecutor, and the court’s response to that conduct, in
the light of these standards, the Court of Special Appeals should take note, both as a general
introduction and as a fundamental governing precept, of the principle enunciated more than
60 years ago by the United States Supreme Court in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78,
88-89, 55 S. Ct. 629, 633, 79 L. Ed. 1314 (1935), that a prosecutor is not the representative
of an ordinary party to a controversy “but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all” and whose interest in a criminal
prosecution “is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”  The Court
continued:
“He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor — indeed, he
should do so.  But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at
liberty to strike foul ones.  It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction
as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.”
In State v. Torres, 554 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Wash. App. 1976), the Washington court
made the telling point that “[a] prosecutor must always remember that he or she does not
conduct a vendetta when trying any case, but serves as an officer of the court and of the state
with the object in mind that all admissible evidence and all proper argument be made, but
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that inadmissible evidence and improper argument be avoided.”  
The Court of Special Appeals will undoubtedly also remain cognizant of its own
conclusion that appeals to jurors to convict a defendant in order to preserve the safety or
quality of their communities are improper and prejudicial.  As it noted in its opinion in this
case, in Couser v. State, 36 Md. App. 485, 374 A.2d 399 (1977), aff’d on other grounds, 282
Md.  125, 383 A.2d 389, cert.  denied, 439 U.S. 852, 99 S. Ct.  158, 58 L. Ed.  2d 156
(1978), it had declared improper a prosecutor’s statement to the jury that “by your vote you
can say no to drug dealers, to people who rain destruction.”  See also Holmes v. State, 119
Md. App. 518, 705 A.2d 118, cert.  denied, 350 Md.  278, 711 A.2d 870 (1998).  Courts
throughout the country have condemned arguments of that kind, which are unfairly
prejudicial and risk diverting the focus of the jury away from its sole proper function of
judging the defendant on the evidence presented.  See Arrieta-Agressot v. United States, 3
F. 3d 525, 527 (1st Cir.  1993) (criminal trial is “not the occasion for superheated rhetoric
from the government urging jurors to enlist in the war on drugs”); United States v. Solivan,
937 F.2d 1146 (6th Cir. 1991) (government prosecutors are not at liberty to urge jurors to
convict defendants as blows to the drug problem faced by society or specifically within their
communities, or to send messages to all drug dealers; such appeals are extremely prejudicial
and harmful to the constitutional right of fair trial); United States v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d
1434 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1085, 105 S. Ct. 1847, 85 L. Ed. 2d 146 (1985)
(the evil lurking in such appeals is that the defendant will be convicted for reasons wholly
irrelevant to his own guilt or innocence); United States v. Barlin, 686 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1982);
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Powell v. United States, 455 A.2d 405 (D.C. App. 1982); Jenkins v. State, 563 So. 2d 791
(Fla. App. 1990); State v. Apilando, 900 P.2d 135 (Haw. 1995); State v. Draughn, 602
N.E.2d 790 (Ohio App. 1992); State v. Goode, 650 A.2d 393 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1994).
The Court of Special Appeals will also need to take account of the persistency of the
prosecutor’s conduct — continuing to make these remarks time and again despite the court’s
rulings that the remarks were improper.  A court obviously commits no error when it sustains
objections to impermissible comments or gives a proper curative instruction, if that is all that
is requested.  There is a risk, however, when the prosecutor persistently ignores those rulings
and continues in an improper course of conduct, that the jury may come to regard the court’s
rulings as rote window dressing and thus pay less attention to them.  The number of such
rulings may actually assume an inverse significance — the more of them, the less weight
each or all of them will have — in which event only a mistrial may serve to remedy the error.
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
VACATED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT
FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THIS OPINION; COSTS IN THIS COURT TO
BE PAID BY PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY.