Case Title: Freeman v. Holyfield

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1131370

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2015-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 04/17/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015
____________________
1131370
____________________
James Freeman
v.
Dewayne Holyfield et al.
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-14-42)
MOORE, Chief Justice.
James Freeman, the plaintiff below, a parolee whose
earlier parole from a life sentence for murder was revoked,
appeals the trial court's dismissal of his claims against the
1131370
City of Birmingham;  Dewayne Holyfield, a police officer for
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the City of Birmingham; Charles W. Edwards; and Alma Berry,
alleging 
false 
arrest, 
false 
imprisonment, 
and 
conspiracy. 
For
the reasons below, we affirm the trial court's order of
dismissal.
I. Facts
Freeman was convicted of first-degree murder on April 25,
1975, and was sentenced to life in prison. He was granted
parole on August 2, 1993. On July 10, 1995, Officer Holyfield
responded to a complaint that a man was beating a female near
14th Avenue North in Birmingham. Officer Holyfield drove to
that address and discovered a female whose neck had been
scratched and whose eyes were blackened and swollen. She
claimed that Freeman had attacked her. Based on this incident,
a warrant was issued the next day for Freeman's arrest. He was
Freeman never named the City of Birmingham as a
1
defendant, but he identifies the Birmingham Police Department
as a mailing recipient of his pleadings. The City of
Birmingham nevertheless participated in the lawsuit as if it
were a defendant. In their brief to this Court, the City of
Birmingham 
and 
Officer 
Dewayne 
Holyfield 
treat 
their 
pleadings
and filings in the trial court as joint, as though the City of
Birmingham were defending not just its own interests but the
interests of Officer Holyfield as well. However, the record
reveals that, in the trial court, the City of Birmingham and
its attorney never purported to represent Officer 
Holyfield or
to advance legal arguments on Officer Holyfield's behalf.
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arrested and charged with "domestic assault" hours after the
warrant was issued.
As a result of Freeman's arrest, Edwards, then the
executive director of the Alabama Board of Pardons and
Paroles, initiated parole-revocation proceedings against
Freeman. Berry was the parole-revocation hearing officer at
the proceedings. After affording Freeman the opportunity to
present evidence and to confront and examine witnesses, Berry
found sufficient evidence to support the charge of domestic
assault against Freeman. She recommended the revocation of
Freeman's parole. A member of the Board of Pardons and Paroles
(who is not a party to this action) subsequently adjudged
Freeman guilty of domestic assault and revoked his parole. At
the time his parole was revoked, no court had adjudged Freeman
guilty of domestic assault. 
Freeman was incarcerated after the revocation of his
parole, and he remained in prison until March 7, 2011, when he
was again released on parole. During his period of
imprisonment between 1995 and 2011, Freeman was denied parole
six times, based in part, he alleges, on his having committed
the offense of domestic assault, of which he had never been
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1131370
convicted. On January 12, 2012, Freeman reported to the
municipal court in Birmingham "to address the 1995 charge of
'domestic assault.'" He claims that, when he arrived at the
municipal court, he learned for the first time that the 1995
charge was assault and battery and not domestic assault. 
Freeman filed the present action in the Jefferson Circuit
Court on January 10, 2014, more than 18 years after the
revocation of his parole in 1995 and 2 years, 11 months, and
29 days after he appeared in the municipal court in Birmingham
and allegedly learned of the assault-and-battery charge
against him. His complaint alleged false arrest, false
imprisonment, and conspiracy by Edwards, Berry, and Officer
Holyfield and sought damages in excess of $16 million.  On
March 6, 2014, Edwards and Berry moved the trial court to
dismiss the claims against them or, in the alternative, to
enter a summary judgment in their favor. On March 10, 2014,
the trial court dismissed Freeman's claims against 
Edwards 
and
Berry on statute-of-limitations grounds. On March 14, 2014,
Freeman moved the trial court for an extension of time in
which to respond to Edwards and Berry's motion to dismiss,
although the trial court had already ruled on that motion. On
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March 19, 2014, the trial court purported to grant Freeman a
20-day extension and then, that same day, vacated the
extension as having been granted in error.
On March 24, 2014, the City of Birmingham filed a motion
to dismiss, alleging that Freeman's claims were barred by the
applicable statutes of limitations and by the notice-of-claim
statutes for municipalities. See § 11-47-23 and § 11-47-192,
Ala. Code 1975. The trial court scheduled a hearing on the
City of Birmingham's motion to dismiss for April 15, 2014, and
later rescheduled the hearing for April 29, 2014. On April 9,
2014, Freeman filed what he styled as a "motion for rehearing"
of the trial court's March 10, 2014, order dismissing his
claims against Edwards and Berry. On April 21, 2014, Freeman
filed a motion for a default judgment against Officer
Holyfield in which he alleged that his original complaint had
failed to name Officer Holyfield as a defendant  and noted
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that he had amended his complaint on February 13, 2014, "to
include [Officer] Holyfield as an alias in an attempt to have
[Officer Holyfield] served with the plaintiff's summons and
complaint." Freeman attached to his motion for a default
The original complaint did name Officer Holyfield as a
2
defendant.
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judgment a "Notice of No Service" indicating that Officer
Holyfield had not yet been served with the summons and
complaint. Freeman claimed in his motion for a default
judgment that Officer Holyfield "should be considered served"
because 
Freeman's 
"summons 
and 
complaint 
was 
[sic]
specifically 
addressed 
to 
[Officer 
Holyfield] 
..., 
and 
someone
from 
[Officer 
Holyfield's] 
office 
or 
department 
[subsequently]
filed a motion with the court." However, the trial court's
case-action-summary 
sheet 
indicates 
that 
Officer 
Holyfield 
had
been personally served by the sheriff on February 24, 2012. 
On April 29, 2014, the trial court dismissed Freeman's
claims against the City of Birmingham. The order of dismissal
did not mention Officer Holyfield, even though Officer
Holyfield, not the City of Birmingham, was the named defendant
in the action.  On June 6, 2014, Freeman filed a "Motion for
3
Rehearing," raising for the first time a 42 U.S.C § 1983
In their brief to this Court, the City of Birmingham and
3
Officer Holyfield allege that this April 29, 2014, order
"granted the Motion to Dismiss Holyfield and the City."
(Emphasis added.) However, the order states only that the
"City of Birmingham's motion to dismiss is hereby granted."
The motion itself, styled "City of Birmingham's Motion to
Dismiss," never mentioned Officer Holyfield except to state,
in its summary of the facts, that "[Freeman] claims he was
arrested by Officer Dewayne Holyfield of BPD [Birmingham
Police Department] in [sic] July 10, 1995."
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1131370
civil-rights claim and requesting that the trial court
reconsider its March 10, 2014, order that dismissed the claims
against Edwards and Berry. The motion does not mention the
April 29, 2014, order that dismissed the claims against the
City of Birmingham. The trial court scheduled a hearing on
Freeman's motion for rehearing for July 17, 2014. On July 14,
2014, Freeman filed a motion to vacate the March 10, 2014,
order in favor of Edwards and Berry.
On July 17, 2014, the trial court denied Freeman's motion
for a rehearing and his motion to vacate the March 10, 2014,
order, stating: "All defendants having been dismissed from
this action; the case is hereby dismissed." On August 5, 2014,
the trial court purported to grant Freeman's motion for a
default 
judgment 
against 
Officer 
Holyfield 
only 
to 
immediately
vacate that order as having been entered in error. On August
7, 2014, Freeman filed a notice of appeal. On November 12,
2014, this Court, noting that it was unclear whether there had
been a final adjudication as to Officer Holyfield, remanded
the case by order to the trial court. The order instructed the
trial court 1) to determine whether to make the March 10,
2014, and April 29, 2014, orders final pursuant to Rule 54(b),
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1131370
Ala. R. Civ. P.; 2) to determine whether another order of
adjudication was appropriate; or 3) to do nothing, in which
case the appeal would be dismissed as being from a nonfinal
order. In response, the trial court entered the following
order on November 14, 2014: "All claims made in the Complaint
filed in this matter against the defendants, including
Defendant Dewayne Holyfield, individually, are barred by the
Statute of Limitations. Therefore, this action is dismissed
with prejudice. ..."  
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We note that Freeman has never challenged the trial
court's dismissal of the City of Birmingham as a defendant,
either in the trial court or in his appellate briefs, nor did
he ever name the City of Birmingham as a defendant. Therefore,
we affirm the trial court's ruling dismissing the City of
Birmingham, and we analyze its judgment regarding only the
dismissal of Edwards, Berry, and Officer Holyfield.
II. Standard of Review
Officer Holyfield asks this Court in his brief 
to dismiss
4
Freeman's appeal as untimely. However, 
the trial court's order
in response to our remand order made all its adjudications
final for purposes of appeal on November 14, 2014. Therefore,
there is no timeliness issue.
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1131370
We review the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., by asking
"whether, when the allegations of the complaint are
viewed most strongly in the pleader's favor, it
appears that the pleader could prove any set of
circumstances that would entitle [him] to relief. In
making this determination, this Court does not
consider whether the plaintiff will ultimately
prevail, but only whether [he] may possibly prevail.
We note that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper
only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of the claim
that would entitle the plaintiff to relief."
Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993) (citations
omitted).
III. Discussion
A. Dismissal of Edwards and Berry 
The trial court ruled that Freeman's claims against
Edwards and Berry were barred by the applicable statutes of
limitations. Those claims included false imprisonment, the
statute of limitations for which, under § 6-2-34(1), Ala. Code
1975, is six years,  and conspiracy, the statute of
5
limitations for which, under § 6-2-38(l), Ala. Code 1975, is
Section 6-2-34(1) states: "The following must be
5
commenced within six years: ... Actions for any trespass to
person or liberty, such as false imprisonment ...."
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two years.  The trial court also ruled that Freeman's false-
6
arrest claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Freeman
fails to present any arguments regarding the statute of
limitations applicable to his false-arrest claim; therefore,
he has waived that issue, and we will not consider that issue.
Ex parte Riley, 464 So. 2d 92, 94 (Ala. 1985) (noting that the
failure by an appellant to argue an issue in his or her brief
waives the issue and precludes it from being considered on
appeal). 
"'"'The very basic and long settled rule of construction
of our courts is that a statute of limitations begins to run
in favor of the party liable from the time the cause of action
"accrues." The cause of action "accrues" as soon as the party
in whose favor it arises is entitled to maintain an action
thereon.'"'" Wheeler v. George, 39 So. 3d 1061, 1084 (Ala.
2009)(quoting Ex parte Floyd, 796 So. 2d 303, 308 (Ala. 2001),
quoting in turn Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So. 2d 516,
518–19 (Ala. 1979)). 
Section 6-2-38(l) states: "All actions for any injury to
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the person or rights of another not arising from contract and
not specifically enumerated in this section must be brought
within two years." See Boyce v. Cassese, 941 So. 2d 932, 944
(Ala. 2006)(citing § 6-2-38 as the applicable statute of
limitations for conspiracy).
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"False imprisonment consists in the unlawful detention of
the person of another for any length of time whereby he is
deprived of his personal liberty." § 6–5–170, Ala. Code 1975.
A claim of false imprisonment accrues on the date of arrest.
Jennings v. City of Huntsville, 677 So. 2d 228, 230 (Ala.
1996). See also Skinner v. Bevans, 116 So. 3d 1147, 1154 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2012)("A false-imprisonment claim accrues on the
date 
of 
arrest 
...."). 
Therefore, 
Freeman's 
false-imprisonment
claim accrued on his date of arrest on the charge of "domestic
assault," i.e., 
on July 11, 1995. His 
false-imprisonment 
claim
against Edwards and Berry was filed more than 18 years after
his arrest in 1995, far outside the 6-year statute-of-
limitations period.7
According to 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 7
7
(2011):
"A primary purpose of a statute of limitations
is to ensure timely notice to the defendant of a
claim against him or her, to permit the defendant to
take necessary steps to gather and preserve the
evidence needed to defend against the suit, so that
the defendant is not prejudiced by having an action
filed against him or her long after the time the
defendant could have prepared a defense against the
claim. Statutes of limitation are intended to
provide an adverse party a fair opportunity to
defend a claim, as well as to preclude claims in
which a party's ability to mount an effective
defense has been lessened or defeated due to the
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Freeman's conspiracy claim against Edwards and Berry
likewise fails because "liability for civil conspiracy rests
upon the existence of an underlying wrong and if the
underlying wrong provides no cause of action, then neither
does the conspiracy." Jones v. BP Oil Co., 632 So. 2d 435, 439
(Ala. 1993)(citing Allied Supply Co. v. Brown, 585 So. 2d 33,
36 (Ala. 1991), and Webb v. Renfrow, 453 So. 2d 724, 727 (Ala.
1984)). "Conspiracy is not an independent cause of action;
therefore, when alleging conspiracy, a plaintiff must have a
viable underlying cause of action." Drill Parts & Serv. Co. v.
Joy Mfg. Co., 619 So. 2d 1280, 1290 (Ala. 1993). See also
O'Dell v. State ex rel. Patterson, 270 Ala. 236, 240, 117 So.
2d 164, 168 (1959)("Where civil liability for a conspiracy is
sought to be enforced, the conspiracy itself furnishes no
cause of action. The gist of the action is not the conspiracy
alleged 
but 
the 
wrong 
committed."). 
Freeman's 
conspiracy 
claim
rests upon the underlying claim of false imprisonment, which
is barred by the statute of limitations. Thus, his conspiracy
passage of time." 
Freeman had ample time (almost two decades) to determine that
the 1995 charge against him was assault and battery rather
than domestic assault. His failure to do so denied Edwards and
Berry of an opportunity to defend against Freeman's claims.
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claim, being dependent on a barred claim, must fail.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment dismissing the claims
against Edwards and Berry. 
B. Dismissal of Officer Holyfield
The trial court identified the statutes of limitations as
the grounds for dismissing the claims against Officer
Holyfield. Freeman has not challenged that holding, although
he could have requested to brief this issue following the
trial court's return to our remand order. "[F]ailure to argue
an issue in brief to an appellate court is tantamount to the
waiver of that issue on appeal." Ex parte Riley, 464 So. 2d at
94. Because Freeman has waived any challenge to the trial
court's judgment in favor of Officer Holyfield on statute-of-
limitations grounds, we affirm the judgment of the trial court
dismissing Officer Holyfield.
IV. Conclusion
The trial court's judgment dismissing Freeman's claims
against all defendants is hereby affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Main, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Murdock, Shaw, and Bryan, JJ., concur in the result.
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