Case Title: Stahulak v. City of Chicago

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84104

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1998-09-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Stahulak v. City of Chicago, No. 84104 (9/24/98) 
                              Docket No. 84104--Agenda 24--May 1998. 
           JOSEPH STAHULAK, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO 
                              et al., Appellees. 
 
             JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the court: 
             The issue in this case is whether a union employee covered 
           by a collective-bargaining agreement has standing to challenge 
           an arbitration award in circuit court absent allegations that the 
           union breached its duty of fair representation. The appellate 
           court held that the employee had no such standing. It therefore 
           reversed the circuit court's judgment in favor of the employee 
           and remanded with directions to dismiss the employee's 
           complaint. 291 Ill. App. 3d 824. We allowed the employee's 
           petition for leave to appeal (166 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now affirm. 
             The pertinent facts are these. The City of Chicago (City) 
           hired Joseph Stahulak as a firefighter in December 1990. The 
           City and the Chicago Firefighters Union, Local No. 2, 
           International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO-CIC (Union), 
           are parties to a collective-bargaining agreement which governs 
           the terms and conditions of employment of City firefighters. 
           Under the agreement, firefighters are subject to a one-year 
           probationary period. 
              On November 16, 1991, prior to completing his 
           probationary period, Stahulak was discharged for violating the 
           City residency requirement. The Union filed a grievance on his 
           behalf and on behalf of two other employees, arguing that the 
           City violated section 16.2 of the collective-bargaining 
           agreement, which requires the City to follow certain procedures 
           before terminating an employee. 
              The grievance proceeded to arbitration. In an award issued 
           January 28, 1993, the arbitrator found that the protections of 
           section 16.2 applied to probationary employees. The arbitrator 
           therefore sustained the grievance; however, he did not grant the 
           subject employees unconditional reinstatement. He merely 
           reinstated them to probationary status for the purpose of making 
           the safeguards of section 16.2 available to them pending a final 
           decision of the Chicago fire department. 
              After returning to probationary status, Stahulak was placed 
           on paid administrative leave. He was ultimately discharged on 
           March 29, 1993, based, again, on his violation of the residency 
           requirement. Stahulak then filed a two-count complaint in circuit 
           court of Cook County against the City; the Chicago fire 
           department; Raymond E. Orozco, fire commissioner of the City 
           of Chicago; and the Union. Count I asked the court to vacate the 
           arbitration award, alleging that the arbitrator exceeded his 
           powers in fashioning the remedy in this case. Count II asserted 
           a cause of action for a common law writ of certiorari, but 
           merely repeated the same allegations challenging the arbitration 
           award in Count I. 
              Pretrial proceedings ensued and the parties eventually filed 
           cross-motions for summary judgment. The circuit court granted 
           summary judgment in favor of Stahulak, setting aside the 
           arbitrator's award and remanding the matter for arbitration with 
           a finding that Stahulak had been an employee for over one year. 
             The appellate court reversed and remanded with instructions 
           to dismiss Stahulak's complaint. 291 Ill. App. 3d 824. It noted 
           that under section 16 of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act 
           (5 ILCS 315/16 (West 1996)) and the Illinois Uniform 
           Arbitration Act (710 ILCS 5/12 (West 1996)), proceedings to 
           vacate an arbitration award entered pursuant to a collective- 
           bargaining agreement must be brought by the parties to the 
           agreement. 291 Ill. App. 3d at 829. In this case, the City and the 
           Union are parties to the agreement, but Stahulak as an 
           individual is not. The appellate court reasoned that an individual 
           employee is not entitled to judicial review of a grievance 
           proceeding or arbitration unless the employee can show that his 
           union's conduct in processing the grievance was arbitrary, 
           discriminatory, or in bad faith. 291 Ill. App. 3d at 832. Here, 
           Stahulak made no allegations that the Union breached its duty 
           of fair representation. Therefore, the court concluded that 
           Stahulak lacked standing to bring a suit to overturn the 
           arbitration award in this case. 
             Before this court, Stahulak contends that he has standing to 
           challenge the arbitration award in circuit court without the 
           burden of proving that the Union breached its duty of fair 
           representation in the underlying proceeding. According to 
           Stahulak, the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (5 ILCS 315/1 
           et seq. (West 1996)) allows an individual employee to bring a 
           grievance, compel arbitration, receive an award, and seek to 
           vacate the award in circuit court. 
              The City and the other defendants disagree. They argue 
           that Stahulak lacked standing to bring this suit based on sections 
           8 and 16 of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Act) (5 
           ILCS 315/8, 16 (West 1996)). This argument is well taken. 
           Section 16 of the Act provides: 
               "After the exhaustion of any arbitration mandated by 
                        this Act or any procedures mandated by a collective 
                        bargaining agreement, suits for violation of agreements *** 
                        between a public employer and a labor organization 
                        representing public employees may be brought by the 
                        parties to such agreement in the circuit court in the county 
                        in which the public employer transacts business or has its 
                        principal office." 5 ILCS 315/16 (West 1996). 
             Under the plain language of this statute, only the parties to 
           a collective-bargaining agreement may attack an arbitration 
           award in circuit court. Section 8 of the Act further specifies that 
           "[t]he grievance and arbitration provisions of any collective 
           bargaining agreement shall be subject to the Illinois 'Uniform 
           Arbitration Act.' " 5 ILCS 315/8 (West 1996). The Uniform 
           Arbitration Act, in turn, provides that: "[u]pon application of a 
           party" a court shall consider vacating an arbitration award. 710 
           ILCS 5/12(a) (West 1996). Therefore, as under the Act, the 
           Uniform Arbitration Act requires arbitration awards to be 
           challenged in court by the parties to the collective-bargaining 
           agreement. 
             Based on the foregoing provisions, we agree that because 
           Stahulak is not a party to the agreement, he lacks standing to 
           bring the suit at issue here. The principle that individual 
           employees represented by a union cannot bring a suit to 
           overturn the outcome of a grievance procedure or arbitration is 
           further supported by Illinois case law. See Mahoney v. City of 
           Chicago, 293 Ill. App. 3d 69, 73-74 (1997), Parks v. City of 
           Evanston, 139 Ill. App. 3d 649, 652 (1985), Consentino v. Price, 
           136 Ill. App. 3d 490, 495 (1985). These cases hold that an 
           individual union member is entitled to judicial review of 
           grievance procedures or arbitration, only if the individual proves 
           that the union's conduct in processing the grievance was 
           arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Parks, 139 Ill. App. 3d 
           at 652, Consentino, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 495. 
             Stahulak makes no allegations that his union breached its 
           duty of fair representation in the underlying proceedings. Yet, 
           he contends that he still had standing to attack the arbitration 
           award in this case, claiming that it is not necessary to make 
           such allegations against a union. Stahulak urges this court to 
           follow Svoboda v. Department of Mental Health & 
           Developmental Disabilities, 162 Ill. App. 3d 366 (1987), which 
           held that individual employees have standing to bring suit to 
           vacate an arbitrator's award and are not required to allege and 
           prove that the union did not adequately represent them at earlier 
           stages. 
             In reaching its holding, the court in Svoboda relied on 
           section 6(b) of the Act, which provides that: 
               "Nothing in this Act prevents an employee from 
                        presenting a grievance to the employer and having the 
                        grievance heard and settled without the intervention of an 
                        employee organization; provided that the exclusive 
                        bargaining representative is afforded the opportunity to be 
                        present at such conference and that any settlement made 
                        shall not be inconsistent with the terms of any agreement in 
                        effect between the employer and the exclusive bargaining 
                        representative." 5 ILCS 315/6(b) (West 1996). 
           The court reasoned that section 6(b) clearly allows an individual 
           employee to bring a grievance on his own without the aid of his 
           union and that this section should be read in conjunction with 
           section 16. Svoboda, 162 Ill. App. 3d at 368. After reading these 
           sections together, the court in Svoboda was convinced that "it 
           was not the legislature's intent to allow suits to vacate an 
           arbitrator's award to be brought by unions which have instituted 
           grievance procedures on behalf of their members, but not suits 
           by members who have brought grievance procedures on behalf 
           of themselves." Svoboda, 162 Ill. App. 3d at 369. 
             We decline to follow Svoboda because we disagree with the 
           court's interpretation of section 6(b). Under our reading of 
           section 6(b), that section is limited to allowing an employee to 
           present a grievance to an employer at the initial stage of the 
           grievance process, and to settle the grievance at a conference at 
           which the union has an opportunity to be present. We find 
           nothing in section 6(b) which allows an employee to pursue a 
           grievance through the entire dispute resolution procedure, 
           including arbitration and the filing of a suit to challenge an 
           arbitration award, when an employee's union has chosen not to 
           do so. 
             This construction of the statute underlies the collective- 
           bargaining agreement involved in this case. Under that 
           agreement, which establishes a three-tier grievance procedure, 
           only the Union can invoke the higher stages of the grievance 
           process. According to section 10.2 of the agreement, an 
           individual employee or the Union may initiate the first step, 
           which involves taking up the grievance with the employer's 
           authorized representative. The two subsequent steps, which 
           include appealing the grievance to the fire commissioner and 
           then invoking arbitration, are to be initiated by the Union in its 
           capacity as a party to the collective-bargaining agreement. 
             Our construction of section 6(b) is further supported by 
           federal precedent. Section 159(a) of the Labor Management 
           Relations Act (LMRA) is virtually identical to section 6(b). It 
           states that the designated union shall be the exclusive bargaining 
           representative of the employees provided: 
             "That any individual employee or group of employees shall 
                        have the right at any time to present grievances to their 
                        employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the 
                        intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the 
                        adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective- 
                        bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided 
                        further, That the bargaining representative has been given 
                        an opportunity to be present at such an adjustment." 
                        (Emphasis in original.) 29 U.S.C. sec. 159(a) (1994). 
           Like section 6(b), this provision of the LMRA grants individual 
           employees the right to present a grievance to their employers 
           and resolve such a grievance without taking any formal steps 
           against the employer. The federal courts have recognized, 
           however, that once the union and employer invoke arbitration, 
           only these parties have standing to challenge an award. Shores 
           v. Peabody Coal Co., 831 F.2d 1382, 1383 (7th Cir. 1987). 
           Individual employees represented by a union lack standing to 
           seek judicial review of a grievance procedure unless they prove 
           that their union breached its duty of fair representation. Shores 
           v. Peabody Coal Co., 831 F.2d 1382, 1383-84 (7th Cir. 1987); 
           Anderson v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 773 F.2d 880, 881-82 
           (7th Cir. 1985); see Vaca v. Sipes,  386 U.S. 171 , 185-86, 17 L. Ed. 2d 842, 855, 87 S. Ct. 903, 914 (1967). Our interpretation 
           of section 6(b) is therefore consistent with the federal court's 
           interpretation of the virtually identical provision in the LMRA. 
             Finally, Stahulak contends that he should not be deprived 
           of the opportunity to petition the circuit court to overturn the 
           arbitration award merely because he worked with the union in 
           the first instance. Relying on Svoboda, Stahulak argues that he 
           should not have to give up the ability to protect his employment 
           when he chooses to be represented by a union and the union 
           declines to further prosecute an action after the arbitration 
           award. Svoboda, 162 Ill. App. 3d at 373. He cites to the court's 
           reasoning in Svoboda that such an outcome "would have the 
           effect of dissuading an employee from working with the union 
           at the initiation of grievance proceedings." Svoboda, 162 Ill. 
           App. 3d at 373. 
              As the appellate court pointed out in this case, Stahulak's 
           assertions overlook the fact that the collective-bargaining 
           agreement negotiated between his union and the City serves as 
           the basis for his claim that he was improperly discharged. 
           Stahulak did not give up the ability to protect his employment 
           by joining a union. Instead, the specific procedures for 
           terminating an employee outlined in section 16.2 of the 
           agreement provided Stahulak with the grounds to challenge his 
           termination. Without these protections contained in the 
           agreement, Stahulak has no judicially enforceable right to 
           protect his job. 
              The general purpose of collective bargaining is to enable 
           employees to pool their economic strength by joining together 
           in a union to improve conditions of employment as a collective 
           group. Garcia v. Zenith Electronics Corp., 58 F.3d 1171, 1175 
           (7th Cir. 1995). In exchange for the benefits provided by the 
           collective-bargaining agreement, Stahulak gave up his individual 
           right to bargain with the City. We agree with the Supreme 
           Court's reasoning when it addressed this issue in Vaca v. Sipes, 
 386 U.S. 171 , 17 L. Ed. 2d 842, 87 S. Ct. 903 (1967). In Vaca, 
           the Supreme Court held that if individual union members could 
           challenge their union's resolution of a grievance, 
               "the settlement machinery provided by the contract 
                        would be substantially undermined, thus destroying the 
                        employer's confidence in the union's authority and 
                        returning the individual grievant to the vagaries of 
                        independent and unsystematic negotiations." Vaca v. Sipes, 
                        386 U.S.  at 191, 17 L. Ed. 2d  at 858, 87 S. Ct.  at 917. 
            Therefore, we hold that individual employees represented by a 
           union should only be allowed to seek judicial review of an 
           arbitration award if they can show that their union breached its 
           duty of fair representation. Because Stahulak made no such 
           allegations, he lacked standing to bring a suit to overturn the 
           arbitration award in this case. 
             The standing issue is dispositive of this appeal. There is no 
           need to address the merits of the underlying labor dispute. For 
           the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is 
           affirmed. 
 
           Affirmed.