Case Title: State v. Peter Papasavvas

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-02-00

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2002-02-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). PER CURIAM The Court previously affirmed Peter Papasavvas's conviction and death sentence. This appeal addresses his challenge to the proportionality of that sentence. On the evening of April 25, 1996, police arrived at Papasavvas's home in Iselin to serve an arrest warrant on an unrelated matter. Earlier that day, Papasavvas had been told that his brother had attempted suicide. When Papasavvas saw the officers, he fled from his house on foot, dressed only in his underwear. Four blocks away, Papasavvas broke into the basement of a house owned by Mildred Place, a sixty-four year-old woman who lived alone. Mrs. Place returned home from a church function at approximately ten o'clock that evening. Unaware that Papasavvas was hiding in her basement, she spoke with a friend on the phone until 10:30 p.m. What happened next is contested by the parties. Mrs. Place's body, however, was discovered lying at the bottom of the basement stairs. One of her earrings and two of her sweater buttons were found at the top of the stairs, together with her slip and girdle, which had been cut, apparently by a pair of pinking shears. An autopsy revealed that Mrs. Place had sustained multiple physical injuries, including fractured vertebrae and ribs, hemorrhages, abrasions and extensive bruising. Those injuries, according to the State's experts, were consistent with a fall down the steps. The medical examiner also discovered spermal fluid on Mrs. Place's body, although there was no evidence of penetration. According to the Attorney General, Papasavvas broke into Mrs. Place's house to obtain clothing, stole money and credit cards, and then heard Mrs. Place return home. He emerged from the basement and ambushed her. After knocking her to the floor, he dragged her across the room and asphyxiated her by tying a belt around her head and mouth, impeding her breathing. He then proceeded to cut off her clothes piece by piece. The cuts were straight, indicating that Mrs. Place was motionless at the time. When he finished removing her clothes, Papasavvas sexually assaulted and sodomized Mrs. Place. According to the State, after the sexual assault, Papasavvas strangled Mrs. Place and threw her down the basement stairs where she was found the following day. The State's medical examiner concluded that Mrs. Place died of asphyxiation as a result of the belt around her mouth. The Public Defender offers a contrary account. Papasavvas broke into Mrs. Place's house to steal clothing and money. He heard Mrs. Place return home, but tried to remain hidden in the basement until she went to sleep. The plan went awry, however, when Mrs. Place opened the basement door and surprised Papasavvas, who was still dressed only in his underwear. To prevent her from screaming, Papasavvas placed her in a sleeper hold. When she lost consciousness, he let her go and she accidentally fell down the basement stairs and broke her neck- an injury so severe that it may have caused her death. Mistakenly believing that Mrs. Place was feigning death, Papasavvas threatened to sexually assault her so that she would stop pretending. When she did not respond, he proceeded to have sexual contact with her as evidenced by the semen found on Mrs. Place's body. After Mrs. Place's death, Papasavvas rummaged through her pocketbook and closets, stealing some clothing, two credit cards, and a telephone calling card. At 11:15 p.m., Papasavvas used Mrs. Place's telephone to call his own house. He stole Mrs. Place's automobile and drove to New York City, where he spent the night with Rosa Talbert, a female acquaintance. The next day, he and Talbert made a purchase at a liquor store with Mrs. Place's credit card. Papasavvas left Talbert's apartment two days later, leaving behind Mrs. Place's clothing. Nineteen days after the murder, Papasavvas turned himself in to the police. During the guilt phase, Papasavvas introduced evidence of his life history. Born in 1972, he was one of four siblings. His childhood is most remarkable for the verbal and physical abuse he endured. Whenever Papasavvas's father suspected his sons were misbehaving, he would take all three children down to the basement, strip them, tie them to a column, and beat them with a belt or stick. His father was also known to squeeze his sons' toes with pliers. While in junior high school, Papasavvas developed behavioral problems that led to truancy and erratic scholastic performance. He began abusing drugs and alcohol. At age fifteen, he was arrested for the first time and charged with burglary and theft, receiving a probationary sentence that he violated. Over the next several years, Papasavvas was repeatedly convicted for shoplifting, theft, and burglary. As the misbehavior increased, so did the abuse at home. In 1989, Papasavvas dropped out of high school. That same year, he received court-ordered in-patient counseling for a twenty-day period. Doctors diagnosed him with adolescent adjustment reaction. In 1993, Papasavvas suffered a serious head injury in a motorcycle accident and was comatose for nearly three weeks. A CT scan revealed a fluid buildup in both frontal lobes, the area of the brain where high-level reasoning, judgment, and decision making take place. After the accident, Papasavvas's personality changed, and he became more violent. Papasavvas's alcohol abuse and criminal activity also escalated. Not surprisingly, the Public Defender and the Attorney General reached conflicting conclusions regarding Papasavvas's psychiatric condition. The Public Defender's experts testified that Papasavvas suffered a severe brain injury that further impaired his pre-accident deficiencies in judgment and inhibiting responses. They stated that stressful conditions magnified his cognitive deficits. Experts testifying on behalf of the State acknowledged that Papasavvas suffered a moderate to severe head injury in the motorcycle accident, but concluded that his cognitive functioning has returned to its pre-accident level. They testified that the head injury played no role in the murder and that Papasavvas's actions comprised part of a continuum of misbehavior that had begun in his childhood. The jury convicted Papasavvas of knowing or purposeful murder by his own conduct, felony murder, burglary, robbery, auto theft and credit-card theft. It acquitted Papasavvas of aggravated sexual assault, but convicted him of aggravated sexual contact. In the penalty phase, the State sought to establish the c(f)(g) (felony murder) and c(4)(f) (escape detection) aggravating factors. The State relied on the evidence presented in the guilt phase. Papasavvas relied on the psychiatric testimony offered at the guilt phase and introduced additional evidence from family members of the abuse he had endured as a child. The jury unanimously concluded that the State had established the felony-murder aggravating factor. Five of the twelve jurors found the State also had established the escape-detection aggravating factor. Three jurors found the c(5)(a) (extreme emotional disturbance) mitigating factor, but the jury unanimously rejected the c(5)(d) (diminished capacity) mitigating factor. With respect to the c(5)(h) (catch-all) mitigating factor, all twelve jurors found that Papasavvas suffered from a mental defect, disorder, or other mental disturbance. The jury unanimously determined that the felony-murder aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. HELD: Papasavvas has met his burden of establishing that his death sentence is disproportionate, and that sentence is vacated. 1. The Court conducts proportionality review to ensure that a specific defendant's death sentence is not disproportionate when compared to similarly situated defendants. Proportionality review consists of two steps - frequency analysis and precedent-seeking review. In frequency analysis, the Court relies on the salient-factors test, a measurement of the relative frequency of death sentences in factually similar cases. Death-eligible cases are assigned to thirteen categories based on the statutory aggravating factors, and then subdivided according to circumstances that serve either to aggravate or to mitigate the blameworthiness of the defendants in the cases. The Court determines that this case should be assigned to the F-1 cell - murder committed during a residential robbery. The statistics do not demonstrate a societal consensus for or against the use of the death penalty in cases falling within the F-1 category. (Pp. 12-18) 2. Precedent-seeking review entails the examination of the facts of similar death-eligible cases to determine whether the death sentence is aberrant when compared to the sentences in those other cases. Reliance on the facts of the case presents a unique challenge here, because the Attorney General and the Public Defender continue to dispute certain facts. In determining the appropriate version of events, the Court accepts uncontroverted facts and, where facts are disputed, it extracts from the jury's findings of guilt and innocence the version of events essential to the verdict. The only fact still disputed by the parties and not resolved by the jury's verdict is whether Papasavvas ambushed Mrs. Place or was surprised by her. The reason the Court accepts all of the facts that are essential to the jury's verdict is because it can be sure the State bore its burden of proving those facts beyond a reasonable doubt. Where, as here, the verdict does not provide assurance of the State's version, it should not prevail. The dissent urges the use of the standards applicable to an acquittal motion and a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict to establish the factual record, essentially giving the benefit of the doubt to the State. Adoption of those standards here is improper. Although the burden is on defendant in proportionality review, that burden applies only after the facts have been established. A presumption in favor of the defendant is the vantage point from which the factual predicate must be established. The State's version of the disputed facts - that Papasavvas ambushed Mrs. Place - is not essential to the verdict. The Court therefore assumes that Papasavvas was surprised by Mrs. Place while he hid in the basement. (Pp. 18-22) 3. The components by which a defendant's culpability is measured are not disputed. They are divided into three categories: the defendant's moral blameworthiness, the degree of victimization, and the defendant's character. With respect to moral blameworthiness, the Court examines motive, premeditation, justification or excuse, evidence of mental disease, defect or disturbance, and other factors. Assessing the facts of this case, the Court finds Papasavvas's moral blameworthiness to be moderate. Victimization is evaluated by examining the violence and brutality of the murder and injury to nondecedent victims. Though terrible, Mrs. Place's injuries, when viewed against the backdrop of the horrific acts of gratuitous violence that inhabit the death penalty universe, are not among the most egregious. Nonetheless, the degree of victimization overall was high. Finally, the Court considers Papasavvas's character, which includes prior record, other unrelated acts of violence, cooperation, remorse, and capacity for rehabilitation. Papasavvas has both a juvenile and adult record. Although his criminal history is significant, it is offset by the absence of violent offenses prior to this offense. The Court finds Papasavvas's overall culpability to be moderate based on the three-part model of criminal culpability. (Pp. 22-28) 4. In precedent-seeking review, the Court uses the same comparison group that was used in the salient-factors test. The State suggests that the cases in the F-1 category are not genuinely comparable because none involved defendants who sexually attacked their victims in addition to robbing and killing them. Comparing Papasavvas to five other defendants who murdered and committed a sexual crime against an elderly victim, only one of those defendants was capitally prosecuted, and none received the death penalty. And, comparing him to the twelve cases in the D-2 category, consisting of non-aggravated sexual-assault murders, only one, Ambrose Harris, received a death sentence. Harris's culpability far exceed that of Papasavvas. If these are the comparison cases, Papasavvas's death sentence is clearly disproportionate. Returning to the F-1 category, the parties agree on ten cases. The Court agrees to add four of the five additional cases requested by the Public Defender and five of the eight requested by the State. Out of all of these defendants, only one, Nathaniel Harvey, received a death sentence. Harvey had an extensive criminal history of serious, violent crimes, and in his case, a jury found the torture/depravity aggravating factor. Harvey is far more culpable than Papasavvas. Of the remaining life-sentenced members, the Court deems all but three to be at least as culpable or more culpable than Papasavvas. The Court concludes that Papasavvas has demonstrated that he has been singled out unfairly for the death penalty. (Pp. 28-47) The death sentence imposed on Papasavvas is VACATED, and the matter is remanded for sentencing consistent with this opinion. JUSTICE STEIN, has filed a separate, concurring opinion, to address the dissent's assertion that the State's version of disputed factual issues should prevail in proportionality review. He expresses the view that this conclusion is erroneous because it is based on a mistaken assumption that proportionality review essentially constitutes a defendant's challenge to the reasonableness of a jury's verdict, rather than a determination whether a death sentence is disproportionate in comparison to sentences imposed in comparable cases. JUSTICE COLEMAN, has filed a separate dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICES VERNIERO and LaVECCHIA join, expressing the view that the majority's proposed standard for resolving disputed facts permits it to ignore facts that were not critical to Papasavvas's guilt but were nonetheless highly persuasive in the jury's determination that the aggravating factor outweighed any mitigating factors. He concludes that where disputed facts have not been resolved by the jury's verdicts, a reasonable inference arises that the jury relied on those facts that are most consistent with its imposition of the death sentence - which generally means accepting the State's version. He finds that Papasavvas's death sentence is not disproportionate based on either the undisputed facts or a combination of the undisputed and disputed facts. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, LONG, and ZAZZALI join in this opinion. JUSTICE STEIN also has filed a concurring opinion. JUSTICE COLEMAN has filed a dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICES VERNIERO and LaVECCHIA join. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. PETER PAPASAVVAS, Defendant-Appellant. Argued October 24, 2000 -- Decided February 14, 2002 On proportionality review of a death sentence imposed in the Superior Court, Law Division, Middlesex County. James K. Smith, Jr., Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Smith and Claudia Van Wyk, Deputy Public Defender II, on the briefs). Bennett A. Barlyn, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). PER CURIAM Last term, we affirmed Peter Papasavvas's conviction and death sentence for the murder of Mildred Place. State v. Papasavvas, 163 N.J. 565 (2000) (Papasavvas I). We preserved his right to challenge the proportionality of his death sentence. Id. at 626. We now conclude that Papasavvas was unfairly singled out for the ultimate sanction of death. In reaching that conclusion, we remain keenly aware that Papasavvas committed a terrible crime that, standing alone, might legitimately be viewed as deathworthy. Such is not the inquiry on proportionality review, however. Proportionality review is a unique endeavor in our law: Unlike direct review, proportionality review does not question whether an individual death sentence is justified by the facts and circumstances of the case or whether, in the abstract, the sentence imposed on a defendant is deserved on a moral level. On the contrary, its role is to place the sentence imposed for one terrible murder on a continuum of sentences imposed for other terrible murders to ensure that the defendant has not been singled out unfairly for capital punishment. [State v. Timmendequas, __ N.J. __, __ (2001) (internal citations omitted) (Long, J., dissenting) (slip op. at 1-2).] When that singular process is carried out, Peter Papasavvas cannot be condemned to death. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. PETER PAPASAVVAS, Defendant-Appellant. STEIN, J., concurring I join in the Court's thoughtful and persuasive opinion. I write separately only to address a narrow but important aspect of the dissenting opinion that, in my view, is based on an erroneous conception of the nature of proportionality review. The Court's opinion concludes that for purposes of proportionality review, those factual issues that are disputed by the parties but not essential to the jury's verdict should be resolved by accepting the defendant's version for purposes of precedent-seeking review. Ante at ____ (slip op. at 22). Our dissenting colleague concludes to the contrary that where disputed facts have not been resolved by the jury's guilty or not guilty verdicts, a reasonable inference arises that the jury relied on those facts that are most consistent with its imposition of the death sentence. That generally means accepting the State's version of the facts. Post at ___ (slip op. at 12). Our dissenting colleague supports the conclusion that the State's version of disputed factual issues should prevail by characterizing a claim of disproportionality as in effect, a motion by the defendant to set aside the penalty-phase jury's verdict of death on the ground that it is an aberration. Post at ___ (slip op. at 9). Accordingly, the dissent asserts that the appropriate standard to determine which of two conflicting versions of evidence should be accepted in proportionality review proceedings is the standard established under Rule 3:18-2 (motion for judgment of acquittal after discharge of jury), and its counterpart for civil cases. That standard requires the Court to consider whether the evidence, viewed in its entirety, . . . and giving the State the benefit of all of its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, is sufficient to enable a jury to find that the State's charge has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Kluber, 130 N.J. Super. 336, 341-42 (App. Div. 1974), certif. denied, 67 N.J. 72 (1975). My disagreement with the dissent's justification for resolving disputed factual issues in favor of the State is that it proceeds on the mistaken assumption that proportionality review essentially constitutes a defendant's challenge to the reasonableness of the jury's determination to impose the death penalty. To the contrary, as this Court made crystal clear in State v. Marshall, 130 N.J. 109, 132-33 (1999), the primary focus is not on the reasonableness of the jury's sentence of death, but rather on how that sentence compares to jury dispositions in comparable cases: We offer this preliminary observation. The Attorney General, in briefs and at oral argument, objects to the inclusion of non-penalty-phase homicide cases in the universe, contending that consideration of such cases questions the correctness of the prosecutor's discretion to seek or not to seek a death penalty in a specific case. In our view, that objection misconceives the issue. Courts that conduct proportionality review by considering both death-sentenced cases and life-sentenced penalty-phase cases focus not on whether the jury decision was correct, but rather on whether the differences in the dispositions of comparable homicide cases are relevant to whether the death sentence under review may be disproportionate. [(Citations omitted) (emphasis added).] In the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark proportionality review decision, Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43, 79 L. Ed. 2d 29, 36, 104 S. Ct. 871, 875-76 (1984), the Court's opinion described clearly and concisely that the focus of proportionality review is not on the correctness of the jury's verdict in the specific case, but rather on whether the verdict is disproportionate when compared to other defendants convicted of the same offense: The proportionality review sought by Harris, required by the Court of Appeals, and provided for in numerous state statutes is of a different sort. This sort of proportionality review presumes that the death sentence is not disproportionate to the crime in the traditional sense. It purports to inquire instead whether the penalty is nonetheless unacceptable in a particular case because disproportionate to the punishment imposed on others convicted of the same crime. We made virtually the same observation in State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 326 (1987) when Chief Justice Wilentz observed: Proportionality review has a function entirely unique among the review proceedings in a capital proceeding. Proportionality review, in the context of a capital sentencing scheme, is not appellate review to ensure that the aggravating factors outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt all the mitigating factors, L. 1985, c. 178, or to determine if the death sentence is disproportionate to the crime in violation of the ban against cruel and unusual punishment. That death is not disproportionate in the sense of being a cruel and unusual punishment is presumed by the nature of the review. Rather, the purpose of review here is of a different sort. . . . It purports to inquire instead whether the penalty is nonetheless unacceptable in a particular case because disproportionate to the punishment imposed on others convicted of the same crime. (quoting Pulley v. Harris, supra, 465 U.S. at 43, 709 L. Ed. 2d at 36, 104 S. Ct. at 876). [(Citations omitted)]. Justice Brennan's dissent in Pulley, supra, also emphasized that the focus of comparative proportionality review is not on whether the jury in the case at hand committed error, but rather on whether a death sentence is disproportionate when compared with the sentences among similarly situated defendants: Disproportionality among sentences given different defendants can only be eliminated after sentencing disparities are identified. And the most logical way to identify such sentencing disparities is for a court of statewide jurisdiction to conduct comparisons between death sentences imposed by different judges or juries within the State. This is what the Court labels comparative proportionality review. Although clearly no panacea, such review often serves to identify the most extreme examples of disproportionality among similarly situated defendants. At least to this extent, this form of appellate review serves to eliminate some of the irrationality that currently surrounds imposition of a death sentence. If only to further this limited purpose, therefore, I believe that the Constitution's prohibition on the irrational imposition of the death penalty requires that this procedural safeguard be provided. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. PETER PAPASAVVAS, Defendant-Appellant. COLEMAN, J., dissenting Today, for the first time, the Court finds a defendant's death sentence disproportionate. In the past, the Court has vacated thirty-six of fifty-one death penalties imposed since 1982 because of trial errors but never because of disproportionality. Significantly, in all of those cases the State was entitled to seek the death penalty in a retrial. The Court's decision today is very different in that the State is forever barred from seeking a sentence of death for the grotesque murder of Mrs. Place. Although I harbor serious concerns in respect of the methodology we use for proportionality review, see Barry Latzer, The Failure of Comparative Proportionality Review of Capital Cases (With Lessons From New Jersey), 64 Alb. L. Rev. 1161, 1198 (2001) (referring to Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High Courts After Gregg: Only The Appearance of Justice , 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 130, 184 (1996)), under the existing paradigm I do not find defendant's death sentence to be disproportionate based on either the undisputed facts or a combination of the undisputed and disputed facts. I respectfully disagree with the Court's holding and therefore dissent. [Ante at (slip op. at 19).] Under the Court's standard, it can simply ignore those facts that were not critical to guilt or innocence but were nonetheless highly persuasive in the jury's determination of whether the aggravating factor outweighed any mitigating factors. Those facts are extremely relevant when deciding whether one case is comparable to another when conducting precedent-seeking review. That death-worthiness determination is made independently of the jury's finding that the defendant committed a knowing or purposeful murder by the defendant's own conduct. Therefore, the standard adopted by the majority converts the Court from the Court of last resort, see N.J. Const. 1947, art. VI, to some sort of super rescue-mission. Whitefield v. Blackwood, 101 N.J. 500, 501 (1986)(Clifford, J., concurring). To avoid having the Court act as a super rescue-mission, prosecutors in all likelihood will request that special interrogatories be submitted to the penalty jury for a determination of disputed death-worthiness facts that are extremely relevant to precedent-seeking review. A sentence of death is unique both in terms of finality and severity. State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 326-27 (1987). In order to ensure that it is applied in a fair, just, and rational manner, many precautions have been taken. We catalogued some of those precautions in State v. Marshall, 130 N.J. 109 (1992)(Marshall II), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929, 113 S. Ct. 1306, 122 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1993): In Ramseur, we undertook to narrow imprecise [c(4)(c)] statutory language in order to render it constitutional. In Gerald, we interpreted the Act to limit the sentence of death to those who intended to kill, not just injure. In Bey II, we rejected any idea of a mechanical or numerical balancing of factors in the death-sentencing process. We made it clear that jurors must be instructed that it is they who must make the qualitative judgment about who shall live or who shall die. In Zola, we recognized the request that defendants be permitted to plead for life at the hands of a jury. In State v. Davis, we allowed any relevant evidence bearing on the defendant's potential for rehabilitation to be presented to a jury in a capital- sentencing phase. [Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 192 (citations omitted).] It is ultimately the jury, however, that must decide whether a specific defendant deserves to die for the murder. The statistics demonstrate that New Jersey juries impose the death penalty sparingly.See footnote 88 Thus, once a jury decides to impose the death sentence, our role, as a reviewing court, is a limited one. As we explained in Martini II, supra, proportionality review is not intended to validate the death sentence, but is instead a vehicle to ensure that the penalty-phase jury's decision is not insupportable. Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 22. That purpose stems from the mandate of the statutory language itself: the Supreme Court * * * shall determine whether the sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant . Thus, our search is not for proportionality, but rather one in which our goal is to determine whether the jury's decision to sentence a defendant to death is comparable to decisions reached in the appropriate capital cases in our universe of cases. The question is whether other defendants with similar characteristics generally receive sentences other than death. The dissent finds a palpable bias in favor of the proportionality of a death sentence. That bias, if present, does not stem from what our colleague describes as a selective and convenient rationalization. Rather, our imposing on the defendant the burden of showing disproportionality stems from the statutory language itself, discussed above. It is settled law. We held as much in Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 343, 349. The dissent unearths nothing new or treacherous, here. On the contrary, it simply attempts to rewrite established proportionality jurisprudence. Therefore, the statement that the Court is determined to put the burden of proof on the defendant, although accurate, is hardly a damning accusation. [Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 22-23 (citations omitted).] [Id. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 573 (citation omitted).] Although a claim of disproportionality is essentially a motion by the defendant to vacate the jury's verdict of a sentence of death, analytically that application is similar to a motion in civil cases for an involuntary dismissal under Rule 4:37-2(b) which follows the same standard for determining motions for judgment under Rule 4:40-1 at the close of all the evidence or at the close of evidence offered by an opponent, or motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 4:40-2. Under that standard, 'the court must accept as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and must accord him [or her] the benefit of all legitimate inferences which can be deduced therefrom.' Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 535 (1995) (quoting Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment on R. 4:40-2 (1991)). Another way to articulate the same standard is to treat plaintiff's [or the State's] proofs as uncontradicted. Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399, 402 (1984). Decisions on motions filed pursuant to Rules 4:37-2(b), 4:40-1, and 4:40-2, require the trial court to examine the identical evidence presented to the jury. This Court in proportionality review cases in which disputed facts relevant to whether cases are similar for precedent-seeking review have not been resolved by the jury, performs functions similar to those performed by the trial court under Rules 3:18-1, 3:18-2, 4:37-2(b), 4:40-1, and 4:40-2. I recognize that the standard I have adopted is not a perfect analogy for proportionality review. But unlike the majority's free-floating standard, my standard is grounded in well-established criminal procedural jurisprudence. I believe that [l]aws, like houses, lean on one another. Edmund Burke, Tracts Relating to Popery Laws (1765), reprinted in IX The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke 452, 453 (Paul Langford et al. eds.) (1991). To summarize, under the standard I would adopt, I conclude that where disputed facts have not been resolved by the jury's guilty or not guilty verdicts, a reasonable inference arises that the jury relied on those facts that are most consistent with its imposition of the death sentence. That generally means accepting the State's version of the facts. That is not the case, however, with respect to evidence presented solely to establish an element of an offense for which the defendant was acquitted. In addition to applying such an inference in the present case, there are legal reasons under the New Jersey Criminal Code for rejecting some of defendant's factual-legal assertions. For example, under the Code, a person need not intend the death of his victim in order to be death eligible. It suffices in a purposeful serious bodily injury (SBI) capital murder case if it was the defendant's conscious object to cause serious bodily injury that then resulted in the victim's death, [when the defendant] knew that the injury created a substantial risk of death and that it was highly probable that death would result. State v. Cruz, 163 N.J. 403, 417-18 (2000). In a knowing SBI capital murder case, it suffices if the defendant was aware that it was practically certain that his conduct would cause serious bodily injury that then resulted in the victim's death [when the defendant] knew that the injury created a substantial risk of death and that it was highly probable that death would result. Id. at 418; accord State v. Simon, 161 N.J. 416, 448-49 (1999). Therefore, in order for defendant to have been sentenced to death in the present case, based on the instructions given to the jury, the jury must have found that defendant by his own conduct purposely or knowingly caused the death of Mrs. Place or intended serious bodily injury knowing that it was highly probable that death would result from the injury. Defendant contends that he only intended to induce Mrs. Place to become unconscious by placing her in a sleeper hold, but that she died when she accidentally fell down the basement stairs. The prosecutor, on the other hand, argued to the jury that defendant assaulted Mrs. Place, strangled her with his hands and her belt, and threw her down the stairs. It is apparent from the jury's verdict that it rejected defendant's version. If it had believed defendant's version, it could not have found him to be death eligible. There is a substantial amount of evidence in the record to support that finding. Furthermore, the few facts that are disputed do not support defendant's version of how the victim died. For example, defendant presented a diminished capacity defense at trial that was rejected by the jury. He also proposed the diminished capacity mitigating factor at the penalty phase, but it was unanimously rejected. Moreover, defendant's conduct following the murder is not consistent with a diminished capacity defense. Immediately after the murder, defendant placed a call from Mrs. Place's home. He had the presence of mind, however, to first dial *67 so that Mrs. Place's telephone number would not appear on the caller identification box at his house. The question of whether defendant vaginally and anally raped Mrs. Place is easily resolved because the jury made specific findings on this issue. At the guilt phase the jury acquitted defendant of aggravated sexual assault but convicted him of aggravated sexual contact, a lesser-included offense. Thus the jury found there was no aggravated sexual assault. The aggravated sexual contact found by the jury, however, was bizarre and repulsive in that Mrs. Place's private parts were left exposed and there was evidence that defendant ejaculated near her anus. Finally, the fact that the jury did not find the c(4)(f) aggravating factor based on an attempt to avoid detection or prosecution for robbery or burglary is not determinative of whether defendant stole the victim's property before or after he murdered her. It is undisputed that defendant burglarized the victim's home before he murdered her. Nonetheless, the jury did not find that the purpose of the murder was to escape detection or prosecution for that burglary. That does not mean, however, that the gravity of the burglary should be minimized. Indeed, defendant has argued to this Court that it was the burglary and not the robbery that led to Mrs. Place's death. As stated previously, I view this case as one in which both the burglary and the robbery contributed to the murder regardless of whether the property was stolen before or after the murder. See N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(1). Furthermore, the jury's rejection of the escape detection aggravating factor may not have benefitted defendant in the eyes of the jury because death-sentencing rates in cases with two or more aggravating factors [are] lower than for those cases with one aggravating factor. In re Proportionality Review Project, supra, 161 N.J. at 88. [Chew II, supra, 159 N.J. at 210-11 (citing Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 155) (citations omitted).] The cases to which the Court compares a specific defendant's case are selected from the universe of cases that is used for frequency review analysis. State v. Feaster, supra, 165 N.J. at 403. [Id. at __ (slip op. at 41).] I also note that Durden gave false information to the police. I believe, however, that defendant's case involves greater aggravating evidence. Durden's victim died from a single stab wound to the chest, whereas defendant assaulted, gagged, and threw Mrs. Place down the stairs. Unlike defendant, Durden did not sexually abuse his victim. In view of the additional aggravating evidence in defendant's case, I am unable to conclude that Durden's life sentence supports defendant's claim of disproportionality. I agree with the majority's evaluation of Albert Fain, Harold Perry and Charles Ploppert. In respect of Fain and Perry, their culpability is similar, whereas Ploppert's life sentence does not support defendant's claim of disproportionality. Id. at __ (slip op. at 43). NO. A-2 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. PETER PAPASAVVAS, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED (A) Victim is a Public Servant: (B) Prior Murder Conviction without A above; (C) Contract Killing without A-B above; (D) Sexual Assault without A-C above (subdivided into (1) aggravated and (2) other); (E) Multiple Victims without A-D above (subdivided into (1) aggravated and (2) other); (F) Robbery without A-E above (subdivided into (1) home, (2) business, and (3) other); (G) Torture/Depravity without A-F above; (H) Abduction without A-G above; (I) Arson without A-H above; (J) Escape Detection without A-I above; (K) Burglary without A-J above; (L) Grave Risk of Death to others without A-K above; and (M) Victim Under 14 Years Old without A-L above.