Case Title: Franklin v. Industrial Comm'n

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96857

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2004-05-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 96857-Agenda 7-March 2004.
SANDRA FRANKLIN, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIALCOMMISSION (Carson Pirie Scott & Company, Appellant).
 Opinion Filed May 20, 2004.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Claimant Sandra Franklin sought compensation under the Workers'
Compensation Act (the Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2000)), for
an injury to her left arm suffered at work during a physical altercation with
coemployee Geniver Mohan on February 18, 2001. An arbitrator of the
Industrial Commission of Illinois (the Commission) found that the injury did
not arise out of claimant's employment and was therefore not
compensable. Claimant appealed to the Commission. The Commission
also found that the injury did not arise out of claimant's employment, on
the ground that claimant was an aggressor in the fight that caused the
injury. Claimant appealed to the circuit court of Cook County, which
confirmed the decision of the Commission. However, the Industrial
Commission Division of the appellate court reversed, holding that the
Commission erred when it found that both claimant and Mohan were
aggressors. 341 Ill. App. 3d 128. The appellate court remanded the cause
to the Commission to find which employee was the aggressor. 341 Ill.
App. 3d at 136. We granted employer Carson Pirie Scott & Company's
petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315). We
now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND
	Claimant was a cosmetic artist and counter manager in employer's
River Oaks store, in Calumet City. She was assigned primarily to sell
Elizabeth Arden cosmetics. Her assigned work area was a rectangular
counter, or "bay," with an opening at one end. Coemployee Mohan
worked in a bay near claimant's, selling Fashion Fair cosmetics. On
February 18, 2001, claimant's left arm was seriously injured during a fight
between claimant and Mohan.
	Claimant filed a petition for adjustment of claim, and her case was
heard by an arbitrator. The arbitrator denied compensation on the ground
that the fight between claimant and Mohan was personal in nature or,
alternatively, claimant was the aggressor. Claimant appealed to the
Commission, which found that the fight was work related. However, the
Commission denied compensation on the ground that claimant was an
aggressor.
	The evidence heard by the arbitrator and relied upon by the
Commission was as follows. Both claimant and Mohan received part of
their compensation in the form of commissions. According to employer's
policy, cosmetics salespersons were to sell their assigned product lines
only, except that if a customer first purchased a product from an
employee's line, the employee could follow the customer to another
counter and make further sales from other product lines to that customer.
Also, employees were permitted to sell products from another employee's
counter if the other employee was busy with other customers. Claimant
testified that these rules applied to all cosmetics sales persons and that
both she and Mohan were aware of the rules.
	Claimant testified that she began having problems with Mohan in
August of 2000 when Mohan made sales from claimant's counter in
violation of the rules, and claimant complained to management. Her
complaint resulted in a meeting between claimant, Mohan, and
management. Claimant testified that after that meeting, she had four or five
encounters with Mohan in which Mohan bumped claimant in a threatening
way. Claimant testified she made written reports of three of these
encounters.
	On February 18, 2001, at about 4 p.m. there were three or four
customers at claimant's counter. Claimant testified she told the customers
that she would take care of each in turn, and the customers agreed to wait
for her. Mohan approached one of the customers and asked to help her.
Claimant testified that the customer told Mohan that she was going to wait
for claimant, and Mohan then became verbally abusive toward the
customer. Claimant testified that she called for a manager. Manager
Barbara Gerrard arrived and spoke to the customer. Meanwhile, Mohan
was shouting threats at claimant and pointing her finger at claimant.
Gerrard instructed Mohan to return to her bay. However, when Gerrard
left, Mohan exited her bay and approached claimant's bay, shouting at
claimant, pacing back and forth, and threatening claimant. Claimant felt
frightened, began crying, and left the sales floor. She returned about 20
minutes later with aspirin and picked up a cup to get water.
	Claimant testified that at this point Mohan again approached
claimant's bay, shouting at her and threatening her. Claimant went to
another bay, called security, and was told to remain at her bay and that
security would direct a video camera at claimant's bay. Claimant testified
that when she returned to her bay, Mohan was there, shouting and
threatening. Claimant told Mohan to "do what you do best." Claimant
testified that Mohan then approached with arms outstretched, grabbed
claimant by the left arm and hair, and pulled claimant towards her.
Claimant testified that she responded by striking Mohan twice "as hard as
[she] could" on the head with the cup claimant was still holding in her right
hand. Another employee separated the two women. Claimant's left arm,
which had previously undergone surgery to treat cancer, was seriously
injured.
	The employer called Mohan as a witness but she refused to testify,
citing her fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
	Courtney Harris sold Lancome cosmetics from the same bay as
claimant. Harris testified that immediately before the fight Mohan
approached their bay. Claimant told Mohan that she was not afraid of her.
At the same time Mohan was telling claimant that claimant could not order
Mohan around. Mohan then moved around a display table to the opening
of claimant's bay. Claimant did not advance toward Mohan, but turned to
face her. Harris testified that she did not see the fight itself.
	Barbara Gerrard, who was store manager on duty on the day of the
fight, testified concerning events prior to the fight. Ellyn Edwards, loss
prevention manager for the employer, testified concerning written reports
that claimant filed regarding earlier confrontations with Mohan. The
testimony of Gerrard and Edwards contradicted claimant's testimony
about the events leading to the fight on a number of points. For example,
while claimant testified that in November of 2000 she made a written
report to a security agent named Haskell of an incident between her and
Mohan, Edwards testified that no such report was filed and that Haskell
did not work at the River Oaks store during November of 2000.
	A videotape, recorded at the time of the fight by a store security
camera, was entered into evidence. The Commission viewed the tape and
found that it showed Mohan approaching claimant with her arms folded.
It then showed claimant striking Mohan twice with the cup. The camera's
view of claimant was partially obscured by a display rack. Claimant
testified on rebuttal that the tape did not depict everything that happened
during the fight. The Commission found that in the videotape it appears
claimant struck the first blow.
	Both the arbitrator and the Commission found claimant was not
credible. The Commission cited a number of reasons, including conflicts
within claimant's testimony, conflicts between claimant's testimony and
other witnesses, and conflicts between claimant's testimony and the
videotape. Finally, the Commission found parts of claimant's testimony
were implausible, such as her claim that she was initially an innocent
bystander in a dispute between Mohan and a customer who preferred to
wait to be served by claimant. The Commission relied on the testimony of
Harris and on the videotape to find that claimant was an aggressor in the
fight along with Mohan. On that basis the Commission denied
compensation. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that
the Commission erred when it denied compensation based on a finding
that claimant was an aggressor, as opposed to finding that either claimant
or Mohan was the aggressor. 341 Ill. App. 3d at 136. The employer has
appealed from that judgment. Thus our review concerns whether the
Commission erred in its application of the aggressor defense.

ANALYSIS
	When the Commission reviews an arbitrator's decision, it exercises
original and not appellate jurisdiction, regardless of whether it hears
additional evidence. Paganelis v. Industrial Comm'n, 132 Ill. 2d 468,
483 (1989). No reviewing court may overturn a decision of the
Commission unless the decision is contrary to law or is based on factual
determinations against the manifest weight of the evidence. Fitts v.
Industrial Comm'n, 172 Ill. 2d 303, 307 (1996). Review of Commission
decisions regarding questions of law is de novo. Butler Manufacturing
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 85 Ill. 2d 213, 216 (1981).
	An injury is compensable under the Act only if the claimant proves
by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury both occurred in the
course of and arose out of the employment. Sisbro, Inc. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 207 Ill. 2d 193, 203 (2003). An injury arises out of the
employment if it results from a risk that originates in, or is incidental to, the
employment. Sisbro, 207 Ill. 2d  at 203. When a fight at work arises out
of a purely personal dispute, resulting injuries do not arise out of the
employment. Castaneda v. Industrial Comm'n, 97 Ill. 2d 338, 342
(1983). On the other hand, fights arising out of disputes concerning the
employer's work are risks incidental to the employment, and resulting
injuries are compensable. Fischer v. Industrial Comm'n, 408 Ill. 115,
119 (1951). However, injuries to the aggressor in such a fight are not
compensable. Container Corp. of America v. Industrial Comm'n, 401 Ill. 129, 133 (1948). We refer to the rule that an aggressor's injuries are
not compensable as the "aggressor defense."
	We first announced the aggressor defense in Triangle Auto Painting
& Trimming Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 346 Ill. 609 (1931). In
Triangle Auto Painting, the claimant was injured in a fight at work over
the use of a paint spray gun. After reviewing precedents holding that
injuries in fights arising out of work-related disputes are injuries arising out
of the employment, we held the aggressor's injuries in such a fight
nevertheless do not arise out of the employment. Triangle Auto Painting,
346 Ill.  at 618. We reasoned that the aggression negates all causal
connection between the work and the injury, so that the work is neither
"the proximate nor a contributing cause of the injury." Triangle Auto
Painting, 346 Ill.  at 617. Instead, the cause of the injury is the
aggressor's "own rashness." Triangle Auto Painting, 346 Ill.  at 618.
	Subsequent opinions have applied the rule of Triangle Auto
Painting without repeating its reasoning. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 78 Ill. 2d 260 (1980). However, the aggressor
defense continues to be based on the statutory requirement that injuries
are not compensable unless they arise out of the employment. See 820
ILCS 305/2 (West 2000).
	The appellate court suggested that it is time "to revisit the continuing
vitality of the aggressor defense." 341 Ill. App. 3d at 135-36. As just
noted, Triangle Auto Painting reasoned that aggressive acts by the
claimant may break the causal connection between the employment and
the injury. This is not the only area of workers' compensation law where
the claimant's acts may negate a causal connection between the
employment and the injury. See, e.g., Howell Tractor & Equipment Co.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 78 Ill. 2d 567, 574-75 (1980) (holding claimant's
injuries not compensable because, while it was reasonable and foreseeable
that a traveling employee would go to a bar with coworkers at 10 p.m.,
it was not reasonable or foreseeable for him to attempt to return to his
motel by walking three miles at 2 a.m. through an unsavory section of an
unfamiliar town). Cf. Union Starch, Division of Miles Laboratories,
Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 56 Ill. 2d 272, 277-78 (1974) (holding that
the Commission could find the injury compensable where it was not
unreasonable or unexpected for employee to seek fresh air by stepping
through window onto roof when going onto the roof for fresh air through
other windows was a long-standing practice in which employer
acquiesced). Thus, the aggressor defense is part of Illinois workers'
compensation law because of the need to determine whether an act of
fighting is causally connected to the employment.
	The aggressor defense is not expressly provided in the Act. Rather,
the aggressor defense is a rational construction of what the legislature
intended when it required that compensable injuries must arise out of the
employment. Triangle Auto Painting, 346 Ill.  at 618 (concluding that "it
is not within the intent of the act that an employee be protected against the
consequences of a fight in which he was the aggressor"). Since Triangle
Auto Painting announced the aggressor defense more than 70 years ago,
the legislature has not abolished it, which it could have done at any time.
We therefore presume that the legislature acquiesces in our construction
of the legislative intent. People v. Drakeford, 139 Ill. 2d 206, 215
(1990), quoting Miller v. Lockett, 98 Ill. 2d 478, 483 (1983).
	In sum, because the Act still requires a causal connection between
the employment and the injury, the aggressor defense remains vital in
Illinois.
	As explained above, the aggressor defense applies only when the
claimant's conduct negates the causal connection between the employment
and the fight. The question of who made the first physical contact, while
important to determining whether that has occurred, is not decisive. Ford
Motor Co., 78 Ill. 2d  at 263. Rather, a claimant's conduct must be
judged in light of the totality of the circumstances. Ford Motor Co., 78 Ill. 2d  at 263. The circumstances obviously include the conduct of the other
participant or participants in the fight. See Ford Motor Co., 78 Ill. 2d  at
263. Thus, whether a claimant's conduct rises to the level that triggers the
aggressor defense depends in large part on the degree to which the other
participant in the dispute has provoked her. For example, to respond to
a brief exchange of words over a minor workplace mishap by seeking out
the other employee a half an hour later and angrily threatening to cut his
throat triggers the defense. Container Corp. of America, 401 Ill.  at 133.
To respond to threatening and abusive behavior by reflexively pushing the
other employee away does not trigger the defense. Ford Motor Co., 78 Ill. 2d  at 263-64. For a manager to attempt to evict a discharged
employee who refuses to leave the premises by taking a guard's pistol and
approaching the employee with the pistol drawn and leveled does trigger
the defense. Riley v. Industrial Comm'n, 394 Ill. 126, 130 (1946).
	Whether a claimant is an aggressor is a question of fact, and the
Commission's finding must be upheld unless it is against the manifest
weight of the evidence. Ford Motor Co., 78 Ill. 2d  at 264. Nevertheless,
if the Commission relies on a legally erroneous premise to find a fact, the
resulting decision is contrary to law and must be reversed. See Freeman
United Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 188 Ill. 2d 243 (1999).
In Freeman United the Commission found that the claimant failed to
prove a causal connection between his injury and his employment because
the claimant had not presented evidence of exposure to coal dust. We
held that requiring the claimant to present evidence of exposure conflicted
with the statutory presumption that coal miners are exposed to coal dust,
and we concluded that therefore the Commission's decision was contrary
to law. Freeman United, 188 Ill. 2d  at 245-46.
	In this case, the Commission reasoned that,
		"both [claimant's] and Mohan's continued course of aggressive
conduct *** and their failure to withdraw from the conflict
allowed for an escalation of said conflict that ultimately resulted
in the acts of physical violence exhibited by both employees.
[Claimant] and Mohan were in fact equal participants in the
altercation marking them both as the aggressor. As such, the
Commission finds [claimant] to be an aggressor in the altercation
and therefore is not entitled to compensation under the Act."
Franklin v. Carson Pirie Scott, Ill. Ind. Comm'n Rep.
2002IIC0166 (March 5, 2002).
The Commission applied a standard whereby aggressive conduct leading
to a fight, combined with failure to avoid a fight by withdrawing from the
dispute when possible, marks a claimant as an aggressor. Based on that
standard the Commission found that both claimant and Mohan were
aggressors and only on that basis concluded that claimant was an
aggressor not entitled to compensation.
	In reversing the Commission, the appellate court held that only one
participant in a fight may be deemed an aggressor. 341 Ill. App. 3d at
136. In dissent, one justice of the appellate court suggested that the
Commission's finding that Mohan was an aggressor is irrelevant, and the
Commission must be affirmed so long as its conclusion that claimant was
an aggressor is supported by the evidence. 341 Ill. App. 3d at 137
(McCullough, P.J., dissenting). The Commission was not required to
decide whether Mohan was an aggressor. The Commission had to
consider Mohan's conduct only as part of the circumstances against which
it judged claimant's conduct. However, for the following reasons, the
appellate court correctly reversed the Commission without deciding
whether the Commission's finding was supported by the evidence.
	The employer points out that we have never held that multiple
aggressors are impossible as a matter of law. It is possible to imagine
scenarios in which it would be appropriate to find multiple aggressors,
particularly, as one of the two dissenting appellate court justices
suggested, where more than two employees are involved. See 341 Ill.
App. 3d at 137 (McCullough, P.J., dissenting). However, it is not merely
an accident of grammar that prior cases have always spoken of the
aggressor. A typical fight involving two employees has only one aggressor.
When one employee escalates the dispute, he changes the circumstances
and typically makes it reasonable for the other employee to respond in
kind. This is not to condone answering violence with violence. It is to
acknowledge that a claimant's conduct must be judged in light of the
circumstances, and the circumstances include the conduct of others.
	In this case, nothing in the record indicates anything other than a
typical fight. Therefore the appellate court correctly held that the
Commission erred when it denied compensation based on its finding that
both claimant and Mohan were aggressors. The Commission must decide
whether claimant was the aggressor.
	The parties point out that in many cases it is difficult to identify the
aggressor. However, even though it is often a difficult task, it is also a
familiar one, both in law and in daily life. We do not agree with the
employer that the difficulty of identifying the aggressor is a reason to
expand the aggressor defense to allow the Commission to find that both
participants in a typical fight were aggressors.
	When a decision of the Commission is set aside, but the facts found
by the Commission are sufficient to determine the correct decision, a
reviewing court may simply enter the correct decision. 820 ILCS
305/19(f)(2) (West 2000). See, e.g., Butler Manufacturing, 85 Ill. 2d 
at 216. However, when it is not clear from the record what decision is
required, the appropriate remedy is to remand to the Commission so that
it may decide in the first instance. Furlong Construction Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 71 Ill. 2d 464, 470 (1978). Original jurisdiction is
vested in the Commission, even though it is reviewing the decision of an
arbitrator without hearing additional evidence. Paganelis, 132 Ill. 2d  at
483. In this case, it is not clear from the record whether, had it not erred,
the Commission would have found that claimant was the aggressor.
Therefore the appellate court correctly remanded the cause so the
Commission could correctly apply the aggressor defense in the first
instance.
CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate
court, which remanded the cause to the Commission for further
proceedings.
Affirmed.