Case Title: Tennessee Valley Printing Company, Inc., and Michelle Rupe Eubanks v. Health Care Authority of Lauderdale County and the City of Florence d/b/a Coffee Health Group

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1090945

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2010-10-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:10/29/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
____________________
1090945
____________________
Tennessee Valley Printing Company, Inc., and Michelle Rupe
Eubanks
v.
Health Care Authority of Lauderdale County and the City of
Florence d/b/a Coffee Health Group
Appeal from Lauderdale Circuit Court
(CV-10-900042)
BOLIN, Justice.
The Tennessee Valley Printing Company, Inc., which
publishes the TimesDaily newspaper in Florence, and one of its
reporters, Michelle Rupe Eubanks (hereinafter collectively
1090945
2
referred to as "the TimesDaily"), appeal from the trial
court's judgment holding that the Health Care Authority of
Lauderdale County and the City of Florence d/b/a Coffee Health
Group ("the Health Care Authority") do not have to disclose
certain records requested by the TimesDaily pursuant to the
Open Records Act, § 36-12-40, Ala. Code 1975.  
Facts and Procedural History
The Health Care Authority was organized pursuant to the
Health Care Authorities Act of 1982 ("the HCA"), codified at
§ 22-21-310 et seq., Ala. Code 1975.  It is a public
corporation that owns the Eliza Coffee Memorial Hospital in
Florence and the Shoals Hospital in Muscle Shoals.  In fiscal
years 2008 and 2009, the Health Care Authority failed to meet
the financial covenants of bonds it had issued to the public.
The Health Care Authority hired a financial consultant, FTI
Consulting, Inc., to study the operations and business
prospects of the two hospitals owned by the Health Care
Authority and to make recommendations for improvement.  In
June 2009, FTI delivered its report to the board of directors
of the Health Care Authority.  The Health Care Authority then
began to search for a transaction partner that would allow it
1090945
The Health Care Authority board of directors has 11
1
members: the chairman of the Lauderdale County Commission, the
mayor of the City of Florence, 6 residents of the county and
city appointed by the county commission (3) and the city
council (3), and 3 physicians appointed by the staff of the
hospitals owned by the Health Care Authority.
3
to retire the bond indebtedness and to provide additional
capital for operating the two hospitals.  The Health Care
Authority received four bid proposals from potential partners.
The Health Care Authority promised the potential partners that
their bids would be confidential.   On February 15, 2010,
Eubanks requested all electronic-mail correspondence between
the employees of the two hospitals, the Health Care Authority
board of directors, and any elected official regarding the
sale of the two hospitals.  On February 23, 2010, the board of
directors of the Health Care Authority met and voted 10 to 1
to accept the proposal received from RegionalCare Hospital
Partners, Inc.   Eubanks made several oral and written
1
requests for information, including the four proposals, the
letter of intent from RegionalCare, the report issued by FTI,
and any preliminary draft of any contract for the sale of the
two hospitals.  
On March 10, 2010, the TimesDaily filed a verified
complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the
1090945
4
Health Care Authority. The TimesDaily alleged that the Health
Care Authority had been engaged in efforts to sell and/or to
transfer the management of two hospitals subject to the Health
Care Authority's control and that, as a governmental entity,
the Health Care Authority's records regarding the proposed
sale and/or transfer of public assets were subject to the Open
Records Act.  The TimesDaily further alleged that the
ownership and management of the hospitals was a matter of
public concern and that the Health Care Authority had refused
to provide information regarding the proposed sale and/or
transfer of management.  On March 11, 2010, the TimesDaily
filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, seeking to
delay a proposed vote by the Florence City Council on a letter
of intent from RegionalCare to purchase the publicly owned
hospital 
properties 
under the Health 
Care Authority's
jurisdiction.  That same day, the TimesDaily amended its
complaint to petition for a writ of mandamus requiring the
Health Care Authority to allow it to inspect and copy certain
requested records regarding the proposed sale.
On March 12, 2010, the Health Care Authority filed an
answer to the verified complaint, as amended, generally
1090945
In supporting its conclusion that the Health Care
2
Authority was acting in the nature of a private business, the
trial court used the phrase "administrative and proprietary"
regarding the records created by a health-care authority.  It
appears that the trial court is referring to the difference
between governmental functions and the functions of private
business.  See City of Selma v. Dallas County, 964 So. 2d 12
(Ala. 2007)(holding that a governmental function is not
proprietary in nature but is performed under the police power
to promote the health and well being of the people).  Nothing
indicates that a "trade secret" or other proprietary
information is included in the requested documents.  
5
denying the allegations, and it filed a motion in opposition
to the request for a temporary restraining order.  On March
23, 2010, the trial court entered an order holding that the
TimesDaily was not entitled to the requested information:
"[T]he 
legislature 
granted 
to 
Public 
Health
Authorities, 
including 
the 
defendant, 
greater
flexibility than other public entities and in
exempting from the Open Meeting Act and 'other
similar law' exempted their administrative and
proprietary acts from the Open Records Act.
  This
[2]
however would not exempt government functions from
the Open Records Act.
"The Court finds that the transaction in
question is an administrative or proprietary act and
the requested records are therefore not subject to
the Open Records Act.  To find otherwise would make
to no avail the flexibility envisioned by the
Legislature in [§] 22-21-312(3) and the exemption in
[§] 22-21-316."    
The TimesDaily timely appealed.  In its brief on appeal, the
TimesDaily does not refer to its request for the report from
1090945
6
FTI.  The Health Care Authority recognized this omission in
its brief, and, in its reply brief, the TimesDaily does not
refer to its request for the FTI report.  We will assume,
therefore,  that the TimesDaily is no longer seeking access to
that report.
Discussion
The issue is whether the Health Care Authority, which was
established pursuant to the HCA, has to disclose to the
TimesDaily records regarding the sale of the assets of two
hospitals under its control, in accordance with the Open
Records Act.  
Section 36-12-40, the Open Records Act, provides, in
pertinent part, that "[e]very citizen has a right to inspect
and take a copy of any public writing of this state, except as
otherwise provided by statute." 
"The Open Records Act is remedial and should
therefore be liberally construed in favor of the
public. As we stated in Chambers v. Birmingham News
Co., 552 So. 2d 854, 856 (Ala. 1989):
"'It is clear from the wording of [the Open
Records Act] that the legislature intended
that the statute be liberally construed. In
addition, we note, statutes intended for
the public benefit are to be construed in
favor of the public. Gant v. Warr, 286 Ala.
387, 240 So. 2d 353 (1970).'"
1090945
7
Water Works & Sewer Bd. of Talladega v. Consolidated Publ'g,
Inc.,  892 So. 2d 859, 862 (Ala. 2004).  "[T]he party refusing
disclosure shall have the burden of proving that the writings
or records sought are within an exception and warrant
nondisclosure of them."  Chambers v. Birmingham News Co., 552
So. 2d 854, 856-57 (Ala. 1989).  
The term "public writing" is not defined in the Open
Records Act.  However, in Stone v. Consolidated Publishing
Co., 404 So. 2d 678, 681 (Ala. 1981), this Court stated with
regard to § 36-12-40 that a "'public writing' ... is such a
record as is reasonably necessary to record the business and
activities required to be done or carried on by a public
officer so that the status and condition of such business and
activities can be known by [the] citizens."
In creating a State Records Commission, the legislature
in § 41-13-1, Ala. Code 1975, defined the term "public
records":
"As used in this article, the term 'public
records' shall include all written, typed or printed
books, papers, letters, documents and maps made or
received in pursuance of law by the public officers
of the state, counties, municipalities and other
subdivisions of government in the transactions of
public business and shall also include any record
authorized to be made by any law of this state
1090945
8
belonging or pertaining to any court of record or
any other public record authorized by law or any
paper, pleading, exhibit or other writing filed
with, in or by any such court, office or officer."
Although § 41-13-1 is included in Title 41, which regulates
the retention and disposal of public records, "we doubt the
Legislature intended to make a distinction between a 'public
writing' and a 'public record.'" Stone v. Consolidated Publ'g,
404 So. 2d at 680.  This Court has applied the definition from
Stone in several cases. See Ex parte Gill, 841 So. 2d 1231,
1233-34 (Ala. 2002); Birmingham News Co. v. Muse, 638 So. 2d
853, 854 (Ala. 1994); and Chambers v. Birmingham News Co., 552
So. 2d at 856.
In the HCA, the legislature authorized the creation of
health-care authorities as public corporations in order to
effectuate its intent, which it set out in § 22-21-312, Ala.
Code 1975:
"The Legislature hereby finds and declares:
"(1) That publicly-owned (as distinguished from
investor-owned and community-nonprofit) hospitals
and 
other 
health 
care 
facilities 
furnish 
a
substantial part of the indigent and reduced-rate
care and other health care services furnished to
residents of the state by hospitals and other health
care facilities generally; 
1090945
9
"(2) That as a result of current significant
fiscal and budgetary limitations or restrictions,
the state and the various counties, municipalities,
and educational institutions therein are no longer
able to provide, from taxes and other general fund
moneys, all the revenues and funds necessary to
operate such publicly-owned hospitals and other
health care facilities adequately and efficiently;
and 
"(3) 
That 
to 
enable 
such 
publicly-owned
hospitals and other health care facilities to
continue to operate adequately and efficiently, it
is 
necessary 
that 
the 
entities 
and 
agencies
operating them have significantly greater powers
with respect to health care facilities than now
vested in various public hospital or health-care
authorities and corporations and the ability to
provide a corporate structure somewhat more flexible
than those now provided for in existing laws
relating to the public hospital and health-care
authorities. 
"It is therefore the intent of the Legislature
by the passage of this article to promote the public
health of the people of the state (1) by authorizing
the 
several 
counties, 
municipalities, 
and
educational institutions in the state effectively to
form public corporations whose corporate purpose
shall be to acquire, own and operate health care
facilities, and (2) by permitting, with the consent
of 
the 
counties 
or 
municipalities 
(or 
both)
authorizing 
their 
formation, 
existing 
public
hospital corporations to reincorporate hereunder. To
that 
end, 
this 
article 
invests 
each 
public
corporation so organized or reincorporated hereunder
with all powers that may be necessary to enable it
to accomplish its corporate purposes and shall be
liberally construed in conformity with said intent."
1090945
10
The primary rule of rules of statutory construction is to
ascertain the intent of the legislature.  With that in mind,
this Court has stated:
"One 
of 
the 
fundamental 
rules 
of 
statutory
construction is that a court is to determine and
give effect to the Legislature's intent in enacting
a statute.  Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 740 So.
2d 392 (Ala. 1999).  In construing acts of the
Legislature, we ascertain its intent from the
language used in the statute itself, if possible, as
well as from the reason and necessity for the act
and the goals the Legislature sought to accomplish.
McGuire Oil Co. V. Mapco, Inc., 612 So. 2d 417 (Ala.
1992); Advertiser Co. v. Hobbie, 474 So. 2d 93 (Ala.
1985).  If the statute is ambiguous, then we 'may
consider conditions that might arise under the
provisions of the statute and examine results that
would flow from giving the language in question one
particular meaning rather than another.' Norfolk S.
Ry. Co., 740 So. 2d at 396."
Bleier v. Wellington Sears Co., 757 So. 2d 1163, 1168 (Ala.
2000).
The open-meetings law was first enacted in 1915 and the
Open Records Act first appeared in the 1923 Code of Alabama.
When the HCA was adopted in 1982, the legislature expressly
exempted meetings of health-care authorities from the open-
meetings law.  As originally enacted, §  22-21-316(c)
provided: "The board shall hold regular meetings ... and must
upon call of the chairman of the authority ... hold a special
1090945
Effective October 1, 2005, § 13A-14-2 was repealed.  See
3
Act No. 2005-40, Ala. Acts 2005.  The reference in § 22-21-
316(c) has been changed to "Chapter 25A, Title 36."
11
meeting, none of which meetings shall be subject to the
provisions of section 13A-14-2 or other similar law."   The
3
legislature 
specifically 
exempted 
health-care 
authorities 
from
the open-meetings law.  Had the legislature intended to exempt
health-care authorities from the Open Records Act, it could
easily have done so.  Both the open-meetings law and the Open
Records Act were in existence when the legislature enacted the
HCA.  "[T]he Legislature, in enacting new legislation, is
presumed to know the existing law."  Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Alabama, Inc. v. Nielsen, 714 So. 2d 293, 297 (Ala. 1998).
The phrase "or other similar law" in § 22-21-316(c) is
used after the specific reference to the open-meetings law.
We recognize that both the open-meetings law and the Open
Records Act have the general goal of transparency in
government and the peoples' right to access to public
information.  However, we cannot infer that the legislature
intended to exempt health-care authorities from the Open
Records Act by its use of the phrase "or other similar law"
because, again, had the legislature wanted to exempt the
1090945
Section 36-12-40 contains a specific exemption for
4
"registration 
and 
circulation 
records 
and 
information
concerning the use of the public, public school or college and
university libraries of this state."   After the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, § 36-12-40 was amended to add
an exemption for certain homeland-security information.   
12
records of local health-care authorities from the Open Records
Act, it could have specifically done so.   It appears that the
phrase "or other similar law" directly references § 13A-14-2,
and, in fact, the legislature in 2005 repealed § 13A-14-2 and
adopted a new open-meetings law, which contains more detail
and regulations on public meetings, i.e., an "other similar
law."  Moreover, § 36-12-40 provides for exceptions to the
Open Records Act "otherwise expressly provided by statute,"4
and the legislature has created numerous statutory exemptions
to the Open Records Act for entities whose records would
"otherwise" be subject to public disclosure.  See, e.g.,  §
12-21-3.1, Ala. Code 1975 (law-enforcement investigative
reports are not public records and are protected from
disclosure); § 12-21-6, Ala. Code 1975 (hospital records
produced pursuant to a subpoena are confidential, other than
to those who are provided access by the court order); § 22-6-
9, Ala. Code 1975 (identity of Medicaid recipients); § 22-11A-
2, Ala. Code 1975 (reports required by the State Board of
1090945
13
Health regarding cases or suspected cases of notifiable
diseases or health conditions are confidential, with certain
exceptions); and § 22-11A-14, Ala. Code 1975 (reports required
of physicians diagnosing or treating sexually transmitted
diseases are confidential, with certain exceptions).  Had the
legislature intended to exempt the records of health-care
authorities from public disclosure, it could have made those
records confidential as it has done on numerous occasions.
Additionally, the legislature requires that health-care
authorities established under the HCA keep records of closed
meetings and that those records are prima facie evidence of
the matters of the health-care authority.  In § 22-21-316(c),
after 
exempting 
health-care 
authorities 
from 
the 
open-meetings
law, the legislature went on to provide:
"Any matter on which the board is authorized to act
may be acted upon at any regular, special or called
meeting. At the request of any director, the vote on
any question before the board shall be taken by yeas
and 
nays 
and 
entered 
upon 
the 
record. 
All
resolutions adopted by the board shall constitute
actions of the authority, and all proceedings of the
board shall be reduced to writing and signed by the
secretary of the authority and shall be recorded in
a well-bound book. Copies of such proceedings, when
certified by the secretary of the authority, under
the seal of the authority, shall be received in all
courts as prima facie evidence of the matters and
things therein certified."
1090945
14
Under the HCA, health-care authorities are exempt from
certain laws applicable to governmental entities.  Health-
care-authority board members, officers, and employees are
exempt from the Ethics Act. § 22-21-334, Ala. Code 1975.
Health-care 
authorities 
do 
not 
have 
to 
comply 
with
competitive-bid laws.  § 22-21-335, Ala. Code 1975.  The
legislature provided for these express exemptions along with
the express exemption from the open-meetings law.  However,
the HCA makes no reference to the Open Records Act.
Because the HCA does not prevent disclosure of the
requested records, we now turn to our caselaw regarding the
Open Records Act.  In Stone, 404 So. 2d at 681, we defined a
"public writing" as "such a record as is reasonably necessary
to record the business and activities required to be done or
carried on by a public officer so that the status and
condition of such business and activities can be known by
[the] citizens."  In Water Works & Sewer Board v. Consolidated
Publishing, supra, it was necessary to define "public
officer":
"The term 'public officer' is defined in the Alabama
Code, not coincidentally, in the same title and
chapter as the Open Records Act.  We choose to
employ this definition of 'public officer or
1090945
15
servant' in our application of the Stone definition
of 'public writing.' Section 36-12-1, Ala. Code
1975, reads:
"'A public officer or servant, as used
in this article, is intended to and shall
include, in addition to the ordinary public
offices, departments, commissions, bureaus
and boards of the state and the public
officers and servants of counties and
municipalities, 
all 
persons 
whatsoever
o c c u p y i n g  
p o s i t i o ns  
i n  
s t a t e
institutions.'"
Consolidated Publ'g, 892 So. 2d at 863.  In Consolidated
Publishing, this Court held that because the water works and
sewer board, a public corporation, had the qualities of an
agency of the City, for the purposes of the Open Records Act
its employees are "public officers" of the City and are
subject to the Open Records Act. Consolidated Publishing sued
the water works board and its records custodian to force the
water works board to allow it access to certain of the board's
records pursuant to the Open Records Act. The water works
board argued that because it was a public corporation, it was
not subject to the Open Records Act.  The trial court held
that the water works board was subject to the Open Records Act
but that some of the records Consolidated Publishing sought
were excluded from public disclosure.  The water works board
1090945
16
appealed from the holding that it was subject to the Open
Records Act, and Consolidated Publishing appealed from the
holding that certain records it sought were shielded from
public disclosure.  
This Court noted in Consolidated Publishing that the Open
Records Act should be construed in favor of the public because
the legislature intended such a construction and the Open
Records Act was intended for the public benefit. The Open
Records Act provides that "[e]very citizen has a right to
inspect and take a copy of any public writing of this state,
except as otherwise expressly provided by statute."  The
Court, using the definition from Stone, stated that a public
writing is a record reasonably necessary to record the
business and activities required of a public officer.
Therefore, if the employees of the water works board were
public officers, then their records would be subject to the
Open Records Act.  We noted that the water works board
provides the residents of the City with water and sewer
service, a municipal function.  We held that because a water
works board performs a municipal function, it is an agency of
the municipality it serves.  Therefore, the employees of the
1090945
17
water works board were public officers and its records were
subject to the Open Records Act.  
In the present case, we conclude that the Health Care
Authority is a local governmental entity.  We find support for
this in the HCA itself, which provides that a health-care
authority is designated as an instrumentality of its
authorizing subdivision.  § 22-21-318(c)(2).  Here, that would
be Lauderdale County and the City of Florence.  Eight of the
11 members of the board of the Health Care Authority are
either members as a result of their elected position or
appointed by the City and the County in accordance with § 22-
21-316(a).  Unlike a private entity, the Health Care Authority
has the power of eminent domain, to take private property for
public use. §  22-21-319.  Public health-care authorities are
exempt from usury laws, interest laws, § 22-21-328, Ala. Code
1975, and from paying property or income taxes. § 22-21-333,
Ala. Code 1975.  The income from securities issued by a
health-care authority is not taxable. § 22-21-333.  Health-
care authorities can also be designated as the recipient of
proceeds from public-hospital taxes. § 22-21-338, Ala. Code
1975.   It is important to note that while health-care
1090945
18
authorities have the power to purchase property, they are
prohibited from selling "substantially all [their] assets"
"without the prior approval of the governing body of each
authorizing subdivision." § 22-21-318(a)(7), Ala. Code 1975.
Also, the attorney general addressed this question in an
advisory opinion, which we find supportive of our conclusion
that the Health Care Authority is a governmental entity.  See
Ala. Atty. Gen. Op. 2008-004 (Oct. 2, 2007).  In 2007, the
Henry County Health Care Authority, Inc., asked the attorney
general for an advisory opinion as to whether it had to
disclose to the public the annual salaries of top-level-
management executives who were hired without advertisement by
the health-care authority and its subsidiaries, based upon the
degrees and professional experience those professionals
possessed.  The health-care authority was established pursuant
to the HCA, and it owned a hospital and two assisted-living
facilities.  The health-care authority was composed of nine
members, five of whom were appointed by the county commission
and four of whom were selected by the health-care authority.
The health-care authority received a portion of the county's
ad valorem tax revenues.  The health-care authority argued
1090945
19
that disclosure of the executives' salaries to the public
would compromise its ability to remain competitive in
recruiting top-level management and in hiring, as well as
retaining, such employees whose salaries would be disclosed.
The health-care authority argued that it was neither fully
private nor fully governmental in nature and not subject to
the Open Records Act.  The attorney general opined that the
health-care authority was a public corporation and that
pursuant to § 22-21-318(c)(2), the health-care authority was
designated 
as 
an 
instrumentality 
of 
its 
authorizing
subdivisions.  The attorney general further noted that a
majority of the board of directors was appointed or elected by
the governing body in accordance with § 22-21-316(a).  The
attorney general also opined that in accordance with the Open
Records Act and the holding in Water Works & Sewer Board v.
Consolidated Publishing, supra, the business records of the
health-care authority were public records and the salaries
paid to top-level-management executives employed by the
health-care authority were a matter of public record.  The
attorney general also referred to two earlier attorney general
opinions that held that the contracts of coaches at a state
1090945
20
university are public records and that salary, race, and sex
were among the information that must be disclosed, and an
opinion that determined that information concerning the names,
titles, and compensation of county employees is a matter of
public record to be made available to the public.   
We also find support for our conclusion in two federal
cases addressing this issue.  In Todorov v. DCH Healthcare
Authority, Inc., 921 F.2d 1438, 1461 (11th Cir. 1991), the
court, in addressing the HCA, held: "It is apparent from [the
HCA] that the Alabama Legislature made any hospital organized
pursuant to the [HCA] a local government entity, labeling such
a hospital a 'political subdivision of the state.'"  In Askew
v. DCH Healthcare Authority, Inc., 995 F.2d 1033 (11th Cir.
1993), the plaintiffs brought an antitrust action against a
health-care 
authority 
to 
prevent 
the 
authority 
from
effectuating its proposed acquisition of a private health-care
facility.  The federal district court denied the health-care
authority's motion for a summary judgment, ultimately entered
a judgment for the plaintiffs, and the authority appealed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the  Eleventh Circuit
reversed the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that
1090945
21
the 
health-care 
authority 
qualified 
as 
a 
"political
subdivision of the state" for purposes of antitrust immunity
and that, therefore, it was authorized by the state to acquire
the private health-care facility. 995 F.2d at 1037.
   
We now turn to whether the requested documents are exempt
under the exceptions set out in Stone.  In Stone, we stated:
"This is not to say, however, that any time a public
official keeps a record, though not required by law,
it falls within the purview of s 36-12-40. McMahan
v. Trustees of the University of Arkansas, 255 Ark.
108, 499 S.W.2d 56 (1973). It would be helpful for
the 
legislative 
department 
to 
provide 
the
limitations by statute as some states have done.
Absent legislative action, however, the judiciary
must apply the rule of reason. State v. Alarid, 90
N.M. 790, 568 P.2d 1236 (1977). [1] Recorded
information 
received 
by 
a 
public 
officer 
in
confidence, [2] sensitive personnel records, [3]
pending criminal investigations, and [4] records the
disclosure of which would be detrimental to the best
interests of the public are some of the areas which
may not be subject to public disclosure.  Courts
must balance the interest of the citizens in knowing
what their public officers are doing in the
discharge of public duties against the interest of
the general public in having the business of
government carried on efficiently and without undue
interference. MacEwan v. Holm, 226 Or. 27, 359 P.2d
413 (1961)."
404 So. 2d at 681.  
In Water works & Sewer Board v. Consolidated Publishing,
this Court declined to abandon the balancing test adopted in
1090945
22
Stone absent legislative action.  The balancing test requires
that the interest of the citizens in monitoring public
officers be balanced against the interest of the general
public in "having the business of government carried on
efficiently and without undue influence." 404 So. 2d at 681.
"However, it must be noted that this 'rule of
reason' shall not be applied so as to hamper the
liberal construction of § 36-12-40.  The exceptions
set forth in Stone must be strictly construed and
must be applied only in those cases where it is
readily apparent that disclosure will result in
undue harm or embarrassment to an individual, or
where the public interest will clearly be adversely
affected, when weighed against the public policy
considerations 
suggesting 
disclosure. 
These
questions, of course, are factual in nature and are
for the trial judge to resolve."
Chambers, 552 So. 2d at 856.
The two exceptions applicable here are: 1) recorded
information received by a public officer in confidence and 2)
records the disclosure of which would be detrimental to the
best interest of the public.  We recognize that the Health
Care Authority assured the four bidders that their bids for
purchasing the assets of the Health Care Authority would be
confidential. 
In Birmingham News Co. v. Muse, 638 So. 2d 853 (Ala.
1994), the issue was whether Auburn University's response to
1090945
23
an inquiry from the National Collegiate Athletic Association
("NCAA") was a public writing subject to inspection and
copying pursuant to the exceptions set out in Stone as
information received by a public officer in confidence.  The
record in Muse established that NCAA investigations are
conducted without subpoena power, which may require promises
of 
confidentiality 
to 
obtain recorded statements from
witnesses who are often minors and student athletes.  The
Court noted that Auburn University, as a member of the NCAA,
was functioning as a member of a voluntary, self-policing
institution and that there is no state law requiring Auburn
University to respond to NCAA inquiries or investigations.
Although Auburn University is a state institution, its
response did not necessarily become a public record subject to
disclosure simply because of that fact.  Accordingly, there
was no showing that Auburn University's response was a public
record as a matter of law.   This Court went on to apply
Stone's "rule of reason" in determining whether Auburn
University's response and supporting documents were public
records subject to disclosure and that the confidentiality
inherent in the investigation should be honored unless
1090945
24
overcome by a compelling state interest.  Muse, 638 So. 2d at
857.  Because the trial court had not viewed the documents in
question, the Court remanded the  case for an in camera review
and a determination as to whether each document was subject to
public disclosure.  
In the present case, unlike Muse, there was no evidence
indicating that the potential bids or the letter of intent to
purchase a publicly owned hospital required confidentiality.
The Health Care Authority contends that if bidders are not
protected by confidentiality, they might not submit a bid
because sensitive corporate information would be released to
other corporations.  A general suggestion by a governmental
entity that disclosure would likely result in competitive harm
to the person submitting the information is not sufficient.
See Burke Energy Corp. v. Department of Energy, 583 F. Supp.
507, 511 (D.C. Kan. 1984)("[T]o support a finding of
confidential information, there must be independent evidence
to support it, such as evidence that disclosure will likely
result in harm to the person's competitive position; a blanket
allegation of harm does not alone constitute sufficient
evidence."); Black Hills Alliance v. United States Forest
1090945
25
Serv., 603 F. Supp. 117 (D.C. S.D. 1984)(requirement that
affiants are competent to testify whether disclosure would
likely result in substantial competitive harm to the person
submitting the information was questioned where affiants are
representatives of the agency possessing the information
rather than the corporation that submitted it).  This case is
also distinguishable from Muse in that public approval of the
sale of the assets of the Health Care Authority is required by
state law.  Additionally, no informants or minors are involved
in this case. 
"[E]ntities doing business with government agencies and
submitting records to them in connection therewith should be
aware that regardless of agency promises that documents will
be kept confidential, public record suits can nevertheless be
successful.  Thus, it is not safe to assume confidentiality
agreements 
with 
government 
agencies 
will 
be 
legally
enforceable." 
 
Theresa 
M. 
Costonis, 
What 
Constitutes
Commercial or Financial Information, Exempt from Disclosure
Under State Freedom of Information Acts, 5 A.L.R. 6th 327, §
3 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
"'[A] private party cannot render public records
exempt 
from 
disclosure 
merely 
by 
designating
1090945
26
information it furnishes a governmental agency
confidential.' [Sepro Corp. v. Florida Dep't of
Envtl. Prot., 839 So. 2d 781, 784 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2003)].  The right to examine these records is
a right belonging to the public; it cannot be
bargained 
away 
by 
a 
representative 
of 
the
government." 
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Associated Press, 18 So.
3d 1201, 1208-09 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).  In San Gabriel
Tribune v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 3d 762, 192 Cal.
Rptr. 415 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983), a newspaper sought disclosure
of financial statements prepared in connection with a
municipality's exclusive long-term waste-disposal contract
with a garbage company.  The California court concluded that
the garbage company waived any privacy interests it may have
had by voluntarily injecting itself into the public arena by
seeking a rate increase and submitting financial data in
support of the increase.
The other applicable exception from Stone that may
prevent disclosure of the requested documents is whether the
records sought are records the disclosure of which would be
detrimental to the best interest of the public.  In Chambers,
supra, a newspaper requested applications, resumés, and other
related materials  regarding the position of coordinator of
1090945
27
water and sewer services for the county.  The county
commission and county personnel department refused the
newspaper's request on the grounds that the documents were
recorded information received by a public officer in
confidence, that they were sensitive personnel records, and
that they were records the disclosure of which would be
detrimental to the best interest of the public.  The trial
court ordered that the documents be disclosed, noting that
none of the documents contained a request to be kept
confidential and that no promise of confidentiality was made,
that the documents were public writings necessary to carry out
the business of a public officer, and that none of the
documents contained any sensitive material that would require
an exception to disclose.  This Court affirmed the judgment of
the trial court, stating:
"Doubtless, exceptions to the broad language of
§ 36-12-40 are needed and should be applied under
appropriate circumstances. But, we emphasize that
these exceptions must be narrowly construed and
their application limited to the circumstances
stated herein, for it is the general rule, and has
been the policy of this state for a number of years,
to advocate open government. The Stone exceptions
were not intended, nor shall they be used, as an
avenue for public officials to pick and choose what
they believe the public should be made aware of."
1090945
28
552 So. 2d at 857.
  
In the present case, the Health Care Authority states in
its brief:
"[The Health Care Authority's] interest is not
rooted in preventing disclosure of confidential
information to the media or concerned citizens.
Instead, the threat lies with the harm that will
occur if sensitive, confidential information is
disclosed to their competitors.  Instead of viewing
this as an attempt by [the Health Care Authority] to
withhold secret information, [TimesDaily's] Brief at
15-17, [TimesDaily] and this Court should view [the
Health Care Authority's] actions for what they truly
are: an effort to balance the public's need to
receive information with the need to maintain
confidentiality in business transactions for the
benefit of [the Health Care Authority's] patients,
employees, doctors and the surrounding community.
 
"[The Health Care Authority] recognizes [its]
responsibility to be as forthcoming with the public
as possible, which is why [it] released material
terms of the transaction. This does not mean,
however, that the need to provide information to the
public always supercedes the need to prevent the
release of sensitive information to competitors.
Instead, some sensitive terms must be protected from
disclosure for the sake of the hospital[s'] ability
to survive in the health care market.  It is
therefore in the public's best interest for this
Court to recognize the unique nature of health care
authorities, and protect the records regarding the
sale of [the Health Care Authority's] assets from
disclosure."
The Health Care Authority fails to explain how the
release of the proposals of the four bidders, the letter of
1090945
29
intent from the winning bidder, and electronic mail from
hospital employees and board members regarding the sale would
be a detriment to the sale of the Health Care Authority's
assets.  At this point,  the four bidders have presented their
proposals.  There is no danger of one bidder seeing another
bidder's proposal before presenting a bid to the Health Care
Authority.   The Health Care Authority, with one dissent,
voted to accept the winning bidder's letter of intent to
purchase.  When the trial court issued its order, it appears
that the city council and county commission had voted on the
letter of intent.  The Health Care Authority's argument that
competitive harm will befall the hospitals if those documents
are now disclosed or that the disclosure will affect the
hospitals' ability to survive in the health-care market is
unpersuasive because the requested documents relate to the
sale of the assets of the hospitals.  The sale of the assets
of the public hospitals eliminates their need to remain
competitive with private hospitals.
Conclusion
The Health Care Authority's assets were accumulated
through the use of statutorily authorized governmental powers,
1090945
30
including eminent domain and the issuance of tax-free bonds,
and had the enabling act for the Health Care Authority so
provided, taxation would have been an available source of
revenue. The public should be allowed to scrutinize the sale
of those assets.  We agree with the Health Care Authority that
documents relating to the day-to-day operations of the
hospitals would likely not be subject to public disclosure.
Documents relating to patients, physicians, and employees of
the hospitals are protected from disclosure under numerous
state and federal laws.  Additionally, the HCA protects public
health-care authorities from the competitive-bid process,
which prevents certain disclosures and promotes competition
with private hospitals.  However, we are limited to the facts
before us, and the documents requested here relate only to the
final sale of those assets.  Pursuant to § 22-21-339, Ala.
Code 1975, when a health-care authority has no outstanding
securities and when no other obligations assumed by the
authority are outstanding, the board of directors may declare
the authority dissolved.  The sale of assets of a public
hospital and possibly the ultimate disposition of that
hospital, which provides care to the citizens in the
1090945
31
community, should be a matter open for public discourse.  This
follows the legislature's requirement that elected officials
of the health-care authority's authorizing subdivisions (here
the City Council of Florence and the Lauderdale County
Commission) vote on the sale of those public assets. 
"Citizens are entitled to information regarding
the affairs of their government. Alabama's Open
Records Act first appeared in the 1923 Code of
Alabama and represents a long history of openness.
The Open Records Act is remedial and should
therefore be construed in favor of the public. The
statutory 
and 
judicially 
created 
exceptions
generally protect an individual's privacy, the
integrity of a criminal investigation, public safety
and 
security, 
or 
privileged 
information. 
The
exceptions to the Open Records Act should be
strictly construed, because the purpose of the Open
Records Act is to permit the examination of public
writings and records."
Allen v. Barksdale, 32 So. 3d 1264, 1274 (Ala. 2009).
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court
and remand the case for further proceedings. As stated above,
the sale of the assets of the Health Care Authority, a public
corporation, is subject to the Open Records Act. This Court
has not reviewed the requested documents submitted under seal,
and we remand this cause for the trial court to again review
the requested documents to ascertain whether any statutory
1090945
32
exemptions or other exemptions provided by law are applicable,
consistent with this opinion. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Parker,
and Shaw, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs specially in part and dissents in
part.
1090945
33
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially in part and dissenting
in part).
The trial court's judgment in favor of the Health Care
Authority of Lauderdale County and the City of Florence d/b/a
Coffee Health Group ("the Health Care Authority") was based on
its conclusion that the Health Care Authorities Act of 1982,
§ 22-21-310 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the HCA"), excepted the
Health Care Authority from Alabama's Open Records Act.  I
concur in the main opinion insofar as it concludes that  the
trial court erred in this legal conclusion.  My view of this
issue is influenced by the fact that the focus of the
pertinent section of the HCA, § 22-21-316(c), Ala. Code 1975,
is not on exempting the Health Care Authority itself from the
open-meetings law and "similar laws," but on exempting the
meetings of the Health Care Authority from the open-meetings
law and similar laws:  "The board shall hold regular meetings
..., may hold other meetings ..., and must upon call of the
chairman of the authority ... hold a special meeting, none of
which meetings shall be subject to the provisions of [the
open-meetings law] or other similar law."  
1090945
34
Although I thus agree with the conclusion reached in the
main opinion that the trial court's judgment was based on an
improper rationale (i.e., that the Health Care Authority is
not governed by the Open Records Act) and therefore must be
reversed for that reason, I decline to join in the discussion
that follows this conclusion.  
In Stone v. Consolidated Publishing Co., 404 So. 2d 678,
681 (Ala. 1981), this Court provided in reference to the Open
Records Act the following definition of a "public writing": a
record "reasonably necessary to record the business and
activities required to be done or carried on by a public
officer so that the status and condition of such business and
activities can be known by our citizens."  (Some emphasis
added.)  We also identified in Stone some "areas" where, even
if a document constitutes a "public writing" or public record,
it may be exempt from the requirements of the Open Records
Act, and further noted the "rule of reason" and "balancing"
that are to attend the application of the stated exemptions or
"limitations":
"This is not to say, however, that any time a public
official keeps a record, though not required by law,
it falls within the purview of § 36-12-40. McMahan
v. Trustees of the University of Arkansas, 255 Ark.
1090945
35
108, 499 S.W.2d 56 (1973). It would be helpful for
the 
legislative 
department 
to 
provide 
the
limitations by statute as some states have done.
Absent legislative action, however, the judiciary
must apply the rule of reason. State v. Alarid, 90
N.M. 790, 568 P.2d 1236 (1977). [1] Recorded
information 
received 
by 
a 
public 
officer 
in
confidence, [2] sensitive personnel records, [3]
pending criminal investigations, and [4] records the
disclosure of which would be detrimental to the best
interests of the public are some of the areas which
may not be subject to public disclosure.  Courts
must balance the interest of the citizens in knowing
what their public officers are doing in the
discharge of public duties against the interest of
the general public in having the business of
government carried on efficiently and without undue
interference. MacEwan v. Holm, 226 Or. 27, 359 P.2d
413 (1961)."
404 So. 2d at 681.  In Chambers v. Birmingham News Co., 552
So. 2d 854, 856 (Ala. 1989), this Court stated that the
questions that must be answered "are factual in nature and are
for the trial judge to resolve." (Emphasis added.)
It 
may 
well 
be 
that the bids submitted by the
unsuccessful bidders in this case meet the above-quoted
definition of a "public writing" as set out in Stone.  At the
least, it could be argued that the drafts of the definitive
agreement and internal e-mails of employees and board members
do not meet that definition.  In each instance, however, the
determination whether the documents in question meet that
1090945
36
definition and, even if they do, how then to apply the above-
referenced "rule of reason" and "balanc[ing]" tests in order
to determine if those documents fall within an exemption, are
tasks that "are factual in nature and are for the trial judge
to resolve."  To the extent the main opinion does not leave it
to the trial court to address these matters on remand, I
respectfully dissent.