Case Title: STATE v. WILLIAMS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-96

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-05-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 14–0793 
 
Filed May 25, 2017 
 
 
STATE OF IOWA, 
 
 
Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
DEANTAY DARELLE WILLIAMS, 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.   
 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, 
Bradley J. Harris, Judge.   
 
 
The State of Iowa seeks further review of a court of appeals 
decision on discretionary review reversing the district court’s denial of 
Deantay Williams’s motion to dismiss.  DECISION OF COURT OF 
APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND 
CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.   
 
 
Cory Goldensoph, Cedar Rapids, and James M. Metcalf, Waterloo, 
for appellant.   
 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tyler J. Buller, Kevin Cmelik, 
and Alexandra Link (until withdrawal), Assistant Attorneys General, and 
Brian J. Williams and Tom Ferguson (until withdrawal), County 
 
2 
 
Attorneys, and Linda M. Fangman (until withdrawal), Assistant County 
Attorney, for appellee.   
 
Alan R. Ostergren, Muscatine, for amicus curiae, Iowa County 
Attorneys Association.   
 
 
 
3 
 
CADY, Chief Justice. 
 
In this case, we consider whether the speedy indictment rule 
requires the dismissal of a trial information against a defendant filed 
more than forty-five days after the defendant was taken into custody, 
interrogated, and released without the filing of a criminal complaint.  The 
district court held the rule did not require the charges to be dismissed.  
The court of appeals, relying on case precedent, reversed the district 
court.  On further review, we vacate the court of appeals and affirm the 
district court.  We conclude the speedy indictment rule is properly 
interpreted to commence upon arrest only when the arrest is completed 
by making an initial appearance.   
 
I.  Factual Background and Proceedings.   
 
This case comes before us on further review.  The court of appeals, 
on discretionary review of the district court’s denial of the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss, reversed the district court and dismissed the charges 
against Deantay Williams, Taevon Washington, and Cordarrel Smith.  On 
this further review, we focus solely on whether the defendants’ rights 
were violated by the failure to bring formal charges against these 
defendants within forty-five days of their arrest.  This case is submitted 
and decided together with State v. Washington, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 
2017), and State v. Smith, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 2017), which arise out of 
the same facts.   
 
At approximately 5:30 a.m. on June 10, 2012, the Waterloo Police 
Department responded to a call reporting a sexual assault.  Officers met 
with L.M., a minor.  L.M. told the officers she had been repeatedly 
sexually assaulted at a nearby house.  L.M. told the officers her friend, 
J.K., also a minor, was assaulted and was likely still inside the house.  
Officers went to the house and set up surveillance.  They considered the 
 
4 
 
house a “gang hang out,” possibly with weapons inside.  An officer took 
L.M. to a hospital for examination.   
 
At approximately 7:15 a.m., Deantay Williams, age seventeen, 
exited the house.  An officer stopped Williams, placed handcuffs on him, 
and conducted a pat-down search.  The officer found a marijuana pipe in 
a pocket.  The officer told Williams he was being detained, placed him in 
the back of a squad car, and drove him back to the house.   
 
A short time later, numerous officers entered the front door of the 
house with weapons drawn.  They found seven occupants in the living 
room and bedrooms, including Taevon Washington and Cordarrel Smith, 
as well as two other males and three females.  Officers also entered the 
basement and found J.K sitting on a mattress, crying.  An officer 
promptly took her to a hospital.  The police took the other occupants of 
the house into custody and transported them to the Waterloo police 
station.   
Williams, Washington, and Smith were separated, read their 
Miranda rights, and questioned by officers.  Williams and Washington 
admitted they had sexual intercourse with L.M. and J.K, but stated it 
was consensual.  Smith denied any sexual contact with L.M. or J.K.  A 
fourth male admitted to sexual contact with J.K., confirmed Washington 
and Williams had sexual contact with J.K., and confirmed Williams had 
sexual contact with L.M.  Police asked each male to consent to buccal 
and penile swabs.  Williams and Smith consented.  Washington refused, 
and police obtained a search warrant to perform the swabs.  The police 
then released each person from custody.  L.M. and J.K. were discharged 
from the hospital later that day after being examined and completing 
sexual assault testing.  No criminal complaints were filed.   
 
5 
 
On October 21, 2013, police obtained arrest warrants for Williams, 
Washington, Smith, and the fourth male and charged them with sexual 
abuse in the second degree.  Police arrested Smith and the fourth male 
on October 24, Williams on October 28, and Washington on October 29.  
After each person was taken into custody, they were taken before a 
magistrate to make an initial appearance.   
On November 1, 2013, now 510 days after the initial events, a 
Black Hawk County attorney filed a trial information accusing Williams, 
Washington, Smith, and the fourth male with sexual abuse in the second 
degree under Iowa Code section 709.3(3) (2011).1  The fourth male pled 
guilty.  Williams, Washington, and Smith filed a motion to dismiss for 
violation of their speedy indictment rights.  The district court held a 
hearing and denied the motions.  The district court drew a distinction 
between an arrest under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and 
an arrest under our speedy indictment rule.  Williams, Washington, and 
Smith filed for discretionary review.  In the meantime, the State filed 
amended charges against Williams, Washington, and Smith.  We granted 
the requests for discretionary review, stayed the proceedings before the 
district court, and transferred the cases to the court of appeals.  Williams 
moved to dismiss the amended charges.  This motion was denied, and he 
applied for discretionary review.  We granted the application and 
consolidated his appeals.  The court of appeals reversed the district court 
decisions, found Williams’s rights were violated under the speedy 
indictment rule, and remanded the case for dismissal of the November 1, 
2013 trial information and the amended charges.  The court of appeals 
1Except where otherwise noted, references to the Iowa Code are to the 2011 
edition.   
                                      
 
 
6 
 
relied on case precedent interpreting the speedy indictment rule to find 
the time to file an indictment commenced on June 10, 2012, when 
Williams reasonably believed he had been arrested.  We granted further 
review.   
II.  Stare Decisis.   
We begin by considering our devotion to stare decisis.  We do so 
because our existing caselaw can be applied to quickly resolve this case.  
See State v. Wing, 791 N.W.2d 243, 249 (Iowa 2010).  Yet, this caselaw is 
being challenged as incorrect.  Accordingly, we must consider the claim.  
See State v. Johnson, 257 Iowa 1052, 1056, 135 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Iowa 
1965) (“[H]igh courts have not only the right but the duty to change a 
past decision if it is erroneous . . . .”).  We adhere to our past cases as 
precedence, but we overturn the precedent if found to be clearly 
erroneous.  See McElroy v. State, 703 N.W.2d 385, 394–95 (Iowa 2005).  
We identified the reasons for this hesitance sixty years ago, stating, 
“Legal authority must be respected; not because it is venerable with age, 
but because it is important that courts, and lawyers and their clients, 
may know what the law is and order their affairs accordingly.”  Stuart v. 
Pilgrim, 247 Iowa 709, 714, 74 N.W.2d 212, 216 (1956).  However, 
“[s]tare decisis ‘should not be invoked to maintain a clearly erroneous 
result.’ ”  State v. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805, 813 (Iowa 2003) (quoting 
Miller v. Westfield Ins., 606 N.W.2d 301, 306 (Iowa 2000)).  The State 
asserts dismissal of the charges here is such a result, arguing that our 
line of cases interpreting the speedy indictment rule is inconsistent with 
 
7 
 
legislative intent.2  Thus, we proceed to consider if compelling reasons 
exist to overturn our prior interpretation.   
 
III.  Standard of Review.   
 
We review interpretations of the speedy indictment rule for errors 
at law.  See State v. Penn-Kennedy, 862 N.W.2d 384, 386 (Iowa 2015).  
“We are bound by the findings of fact of the district court if they are 
supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (quoting Wing, 791 N.W.2d at 
246).   
 
IV.  Analysis.   
This case follows a growing line of cases beginning in 1980 that 
has addressed the dismissal of criminal charges after an arrest for failing 
to comply with Iowa’s speedy indictment rule.  See, e.g., id. at 389–91; 
Wing, 791 N.W.2d at 248–51; State v. Dennison, 571 N.W.2d 492, 494–95 
(Iowa 1997); State v. Schmitt, 290 N.W.2d 24, 26–7 (Iowa 1980).  This 
rule has its roots in the more comprehensive right to speedy trial 
guaranteed under the United States and Iowa Constitutions.  U.S. Const. 
amend. VI; Iowa Const. art. I, § 10; see State v. Gebhart, 257 Iowa 843, 
847, 134 N.W.2d 906, 908 (1965), overruled on other grounds by State v. 
Johnson, 217 N.W.2d 609, 612 (Iowa 1974), and State v. Gorham, 206 
N.W.2d 908, 913 (Iowa 1973).  It has been part of the criminal procedure 
of this state since 1851.  See Iowa Code § 3248 (1851).  As a part of the 
2Williams responds first that the State failed to preserve error on this issue.  
This argument fails, as it would make little sense to require a party to argue existing 
law should be overturned before a court without the authority to do so.  See State v. 
Eichler, 248 Iowa 1267, 1270, 83 N.W.2d 576, 578 (1957) (“[I]t is the prerogative of this 
court to determine the law, and we think that generally the trial courts are under a duty 
to follow it as expressed by the courts of last resort . . . .”); see also Kersten Co. v. Dep’t 
of Soc. Servs., 207 N.W.2d 117, 121 (Iowa 1973) (“If trial courts venture into the 
business of predicting when this court will reverse its previous holdings . . . they are 
engaged in a high-risk adventure which we strongly recommend against.”).   
                                      
 
 
8 
 
broader right to a speedy trial in all criminal cases, the rule specifically 
addresses the time frame in which formal charges must be brought 
against 
an 
accused 
and 
requires 
the 
case 
be 
dismissed 
for 
noncompliance.  See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.33(2)(a).   
 
From 1851 to 1978, the statutory window of time to file an 
indictment under Iowa law commenced from the time the defendant was 
“held to answer.”  See Iowa Code § 3248 (1851); id. § 795.1 (1975).  The 
rule provided, “When a person is held to answer for a public offense, if an 
indictment be not found against him within thirty days, the court must 
order the prosecution to be dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary 
be shown.”  Id. § 795.1 (1975).   
The caselaw that inevitably develops around any rule or statute 
declared “held to answer” was a separate event from an “arrest.”  See 
State v. Mays, 204 N.W.2d 862, 866–67 (Iowa 1973).  We consistently 
determined the legislature intended the phrase “held to answer” to refer 
to that stage in the court process following an arrest when a magistrate 
makes a determination that there is probable cause the offense was 
committed and the accused committed the offense, or the time the 
defendant elected to waive this preliminary hearing.  See id.  In other 
words, the speedy indictment time period was tied to the fundamental 
probable-cause determination required under our law for the state to 
prosecute a person arrested and accused of a crime.  See State v. 
Morningstar, 207 N.W.2d 772, 774 (Iowa 1973) (“After preliminary 
examination showing sufficient reason to commit the accused, or on 
waiver by the accused, the magistrate orders that the accused be ‘held to 
answer.’ ” (quoting Iowa Code § 761.18 (1973))).  Without probable cause, 
no criminal prosecution in Iowa can take place.  See Iowa R. Crim. P. 
2.2(4)(e).  Instead, the court must dismiss the complaint.  Id.  Without 
 
9 
 
probable cause, the defendant is discharged and is no longer “held to 
answer.”   
 
Accordingly, the speedy trial rule in Iowa operated in two stages.  If 
an indictment was not found against the defendant within thirty days 
after the defendant was “held to answer,” the prosecution was required to 
be dismissed, absent good cause to the contrary or waiver.  Iowa Code 
§ 795.1 (1975).  The speedy trial rule next required that trial be held 
sixty days after indictment, absent good cause.  Id. § 795.2.  Together, 
the rules implemented the constitutional speedy trial protection by 
defining the inherent “indefiniteness in the meaning of the term.”  Pines 
v. Dist. Ct., 233 Iowa 1284, 1290–91, 10 N.W.2d 574, 578 (1943), 
overruled on other grounds by Gorham, 206 N.W.2d at 913; see also State 
v. Satterfield, 257 Iowa 1193, 1195–96, 136 N.W.2d 257, 258 (1965) 
(noting the rules “represent protection for one who is charged by a 
preliminary information, that he must be indicted promptly; and for one 
who is indicted, that he be given a speedy trial”).  Over time, the rules 
were modified to extend the time frames, and an additional rule was 
enacted to require the case be dismissed if not tried within one year after 
the original arraignment, absent good cause.  See Iowa R. Crim. P. 
2.33(2)(a)–(c).   
 
Two additional events occurred that substantially shaped the 
speedy trial landscape.  First, the preliminary examination process to 
determine the existence of probable cause in a criminal proceeding began 
to fall into relative obscurity.  See Charles A. Pulaski, Preliminary 
Examinations in Iowa: The Constitutional Considerations, 60 Iowa L. Rev. 
462, 469–70 (1975) (“[T]he short term benefits to be derived from 
bypassing the preliminary examination have prompted a majority of Iowa 
county attorneys to employ the true information procedure in most 
 
10 
 
cases. . . .  [M]ost contemporary trial courts appear to welcome the 
efficiency . . . .”).  If a defendant did not waive the preliminary hearing, 
the prosecutors would routinely file a trial information to avoid the 
necessity of the hearing.  See id.; see also State v. Clark, 258 Iowa 254, 
257, 138 N.W.2d 120, 122 (1965) (“As to the complaint that no 
preliminary hearing was provided, none was necessary.  A county 
attorney’s information had been filed. . . .  The procedure does not 
contemplate a preliminary hearing.”).  The endorsement by a judge on 
the trial information established a finding of probable cause, obviating 
the need for a hearing.  See State v. Shank, 296 N.W.2d 791, 792 (Iowa 
1980).  Thus, while the preliminary examination process still existed as 
part of the criminal process, it was rarely used.   
 
By the early 1970s, a second event emerged in Iowa to impact the 
development of the speedy indictment rule.  By this time, pretrial delay 
in criminal cases had been identified as a growing problem across the 
nation, and states were beginning to respond with various reform 
measures.  See Anthony Partridge, Legislative History of Title I of the 
Speedy Trial Act of 1974 11 (1980) (identifying twin goals of the Speedy 
Trial Act: “clarifying the rights of defendants” and “protecting society’s 
interest in bringing criminals to justice promptly”); Standards Relating to 
Speedy Trial 1 (Am. Bar Ass’n Tentative Draft 1967) (“Congestion in the 
trial courts of this country . . . is currently one of the major problems of 
judicial administration.”).  This concern reached Iowa and was in part 
responsible for a comprehensive review and major overhaul of the Iowa 
Criminal Code in 1976.  Part of the overhaul included the speedy 
indictment rule.  Effective in 1978, the legislature changed the triggering 
language of the rule from “held to answer” to “arrest.”  See 1976 Iowa 
 
11 
 
Acts ch. 1245, ch. 2, § 1301 (rule 27(2)(a)) (now codified as amended at 
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.33(2)(a)).  The amended provision provided,  
When a person is arrested for the commission of a public 
offense and an indictment is not found against him or her 
within forty-five days, the court must order the prosecution 
to be dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary is shown 
or the defendant waives his or her right thereto.   
Iowa Code § 813.2 (rule 27(2)(a)) (Supp. 1977).  At the time, the principal 
authors behind the Code revisions wrote that the speedy trial revisions 
did not express substantive changes, but resulted in “an approach not 
dissimilar from [the former rules].”  See 4 John L. Yeager & Ronald L. 
Carlson, Iowa Practice: Criminal Law and Procedure § 1242, at 298–99 
(1979).   
 
Our first opportunity to interpret the revised speedy indictment 
rule came in 1980.  Without mentioning the view of the principal 
authors, we took a different position.   
 
In Schmitt, the defendant escaped from a county jail where he was 
awaiting trial on the charges of burglary and possession of burglary 
tools.  290 N.W.2d at 25.  He was captured a few hours later by police 
officers.  Id. at 26.  An officer handcuffed him at the scene of the capture, 
placed him in a squad car, and returned him to the jail facility.  Id.  He 
was not separately booked and processed on a charge of escape and was 
not brought before a magistrate on any charge.  Id.  Instead, he was 
simply returned to his cell to continue to await trial on the burglary and 
possession of burglary tools charges.  Id.   
 
More than forty-five days after the escape and capture, the county 
attorney filed a trial information charging the defendant with escape.  Id.  
at 25–26.  The defendant subsequently moved to dismiss the charge 
under the speedy indictment rule on the grounds that it was filed more 
 
12 
 
than forty-five days after he had been arrested for that charge.  Id.  The 
defendant claimed he was arrested when captured, and this event 
triggered the new speedy indictment rule.  Id.   
 
We rejected the State’s argument that no “arrest[] for the 
commission of a public offense” occurs under the new speedy indictment 
rule when no criminal complaint alleging the commission of a public 
offense is filed against the arrested person and the person is not brought 
within the court process designed to adjudicate the complaint.  Id. at 26–
27.  Instead, we held the statutory change in the speedy indictment rule 
revealed a legislative intent to expand the former speedy indictment rule 
by using the moment a person is taken into custody as the only 
triggering event, even if the arrested person is not subsequently brought 
into the court process to answer to a criminal charge pursuant to the 
rules of criminal procedure.  Id. at 27.  We reached this conclusion by 
relying on the statutory definition of “arrest” under Iowa Code section 
804.5 (Supp. 1977), and the statutory requirements that follow an arrest 
under Iowa Code section 804.14.  Id. at 26–27.  Under section 804.5, an 
arrest means taking a person into custody “when and in the manner 
authorized by law.”  Iowa Code § 804.5.  Section 804.14 normally 
requires the person making the arrest to inform the person of the intent 
to arrest, the reason for the arrest, and the identity of the person making 
the arrest as a police officer.  Id. § 804.14.  We found the phrase “in the 
manner authorized by law” within the definition of an arrest under 
section 804.5 only referred to the manner or requirements of making an 
arrest within section 804.14.  Schmitt, 290 N.W.2d at 26.  We implicitly 
rejected the notion that taking a person into custody in the manner 
authorized by law included the other statutory provisions governing an 
arrest, such as the requirement for the arresting officer to take the 
 
13 
 
person before a magistrate.  Id. at 26; see also Iowa Code §§ 804.21, .22 
(Supp. 1977).  Instead, we stated that “the lack of follow-up of booking or 
charges does not eradicate the event or nullify it as an arrest.”  Schmitt, 
290 N.W.2d at 26.   
 
The speedy indictment cases that followed Schmitt have dealt with 
the impact of various collateral circumstances that can accompany an 
arrest.  See, e.g., Wing, 791 N.W.2d at 252–53 (applying rule to a brief 
arrest at the scene of an automobile stop followed by release of custody 
with a plan that the person would become a confidential informant).  
With inconsistent results, these cases have also dealt with circumstances 
to support an arrest, including circumstances like those in this case in 
which a person is taken into custody, interrogated, and released from 
custody without the filing of a criminal complaint.  See State v. Rains, 
574 N.W.2d 904, 910–11 (Iowa 1998) (holding arrest does not occur 
under the speedy indictment rule when the suspect is shot by a police 
officer, detained at the scene, and guarded at a hospital); Dennison, 571 
N.W.2d at 496–97 (holding arrest does not occur under the speedy 
indictment rule when police have authority to detain a person by 
transporting the person to the police station to invoke the implied-
consent procedures); State v. Gathercole, 553 N.W.2d 569, 571–74 (Iowa 
1996) (holding an arrest does occur under the speedy indictment rule 
when a defendant who waived extradition was served with an arrest 
warrant after being returned to Iowa, but not when taken into custody in 
the other state by an extradition agent); State v. Davis, 525 N.W.2d 837, 
840–41 (Iowa 1994) (holding the speedy indictment rule applies to 
defendants who are arrested and released to allow police to conduct the 
investigation); State v. Van Beek, 443 N.W.2d 704, 706–07 (Iowa 1989) 
(holding that the unconditional release of drug offense suspects after an 
 
14 
 
arrest did not violate speedy indictment rule), overruled by Davis, 525 
N.W.2d at 839; State v. Lasage, 523 N.W.2d 617, 620  (Iowa Ct. App. 
1994) (holding that the unconditional release of a murder suspect did not 
violate speedy indictment rule).  These cases have also excluded from the 
speedy indictment rule any new charges brought more than forty-five 
days after an arrest for a different offense, even though the new charges 
arose from the same incident.  See Penn-Kennedy, 862 N.W.2d at 389; 
State v. Lies, 566 N.W.2d 507, 509 (Iowa 1997); State v. Sunclades, 305 
N.W.2d 491, 494 (Iowa 1981).   
 
At times, we did rely on the statutory manner of making an arrest 
under section 804.14 to determine if the speedy indictment rule was 
triggered.  See Dennison, 571 N.W.2d at 495; Gathercole, 553 N.W.2d at 
572; Davis, 525 N.W.2d at 839.  Each time, however, we failed to further 
identify the other statutory requirements essential to completing the 
manner of arrest.   
Overall, our approach to the application of the speedy trial rule 
since Schmitt has been nuanced and subject to criticism.  See 4A B. John 
Burns, Iowa Practice Series™: Criminal Procedure § 7:3, at 84–91 (2016).  
Moreover, Iowa stands as the only jurisdiction in the country to interpret 
its speedy indictment rule to rely solely on the moment of arrest to 
trigger the rule.3   Additionally, it has created an inconsistency in the 
3First, not all jurisdictions provide a statutory right to speedy indictment.  See, 
e.g., State v. Hughes, 605 A.2d 1062, 1066–67 (N.H. 1992) (abandoning court-imposed 
“sixty-day rule” for speedy indictment and adopting balancing approach in the absence 
of statutory mandate).  Where there are speedy indictment statutes, a number of 
jurisdictions measure the time, as we used to, from the defendant’s preliminary hearing 
or a waiver thereof.   See Cal. Penal Code § 1382 (West, Westlaw current with urgency 
legis. through ch. 9 of 2017 Reg. Sess.); Md. R. Crim. P. § 4-102 (West, Westlaw current 
through legis. effective May 4, 2017); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-11-203(1) (West, Westlaw 
current with amendments received through Sept. 1, 2016); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 173.035(3) (West, Westlaw current through the 79th Reg. Sess. (2017)); N.M. R. Crim. 
P. 5-201(C) (West, Westlaw current with amendments received through Feb. 1, 2017); 
                                      
 
 
 
15 
 
rule so that adult offenders have the benefit of the “arrest” rule, while 
juvenile offenders must await transfer to adult court before they may 
assert speedy indictment protections, regardless of how long prior they 
were subjected to an arrest.  See State v. Harriman, 513 N.W.2d 725, 726 
(Iowa 1994); Bergman v. Nelson, 241 N.W.2d 14, 15 (1976); State v. 
White, 223 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Iowa 1974).   
 
In Wing, we rejected the suggestion to change course and align the 
meaning of “arrest” under our speedy indictment rule with the federal 
speedy indictment rule.  791 N.W.2d at 249.  “Arrest” under the federal 
speedy indictment rule means the time when the defendant is first 
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 971.01(2) (West, Westlaw current through 2017 Act 6, published 
April 25, 2017).  One jurisdiction measures the time from the defendant’s initial 
appearance before a magistrate.  See Me. R.U. Crim. P. 48(b)(2) (West, Westlaw current 
with amendments received through March 1, 2017).  A large number focus not on 
speedy trial, but excessive pretrial incarceration, and require discharge on a failure to 
bring the indictment.  See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 767.26 (West, Westlaw current 
through P.A. 2017, No. 33 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29-1201 
(West, Westlaw current through legislation effective March 30, 2017); N.C. Gen .Stat. 
Ann. § 15-10 (West, Westlaw current 2016 Reg. Sess., S.L. 2016-126 from the 2016 4th 
Extra Sess. and S.L. 2017-5, 2017-8, and 2017-9 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.); Texas Code 
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 32.01(a) (West, Westlaw current through 2015 Reg. Sess.); Va. 
Code Ann. § 19.2-242 (West, Westlaw current through the end of 2016 Reg. Sess. and 
2017 Reg. Sess. cc. 1 to 3, 32, 62, 82, 147, 156, 180, 181, 197, 287 & 314); Wash. 
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 3.2.1(f)(1) (West, Westlaw current with amendments through 
March 15, 2017); W. Va. Code Ann. § 62-2-12 (West, Westlaw current with legislation 
through March 14, 2017).  There appears to be only three other jurisdictions that 
measure speedy indictment from arrest.  One of these requires the defendant also be 
“held to answer” before the rule is implicated.  See Idaho Code Ann. § 19-3501(1) (West, 
Westlaw current with immediately effective legislation of the 1st Reg. Sess. of the 64th 
Legis.).  Another only applies if the defendant is held in continuous custody.  See Fla. R. 
Crim. P. 3.134 (West, Westlaw current with amendments through Feb. 15, 2017).  The 
third requires either charging or holding in continuous custody.  See La. Code Crim. 
Proc. Ann. art. 701(B)(1)–(2) (West, Westlaw current through 2017 1st Extraordinary 
Sess.).  This review fails to reveal a single jurisdiction that conducts a fact-specific 
inquiry on the circumstances of arrest before applying the speedy indictment rule.  If 
there are other jurisdictions that have, they appear to have abandoned the approach.  
Compare United States v. Beberfeld, 408 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding 
the six-month period for speedy trial runs from arrest, regardless of whether a charge is 
filed), with United States v. Hillegas, 578 F.2d 453, 457 (2d Cir. 1978) (“The line is 
drawn . . . at the point where charges are actually pending against an individual.”).   
________________________ 
 
16 
 
charged and held to answer for a charge.  See United States v. Sayers, 
698 F.2d 1128, 1130–31 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Speedy Trial, 45 Geo. 
L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 449, 458 & n.1284 (2016) (noting the federal 
time limit “does not begin when a defendant is arrested and released 
without being charged” and compiling cases).  We continued to apply a 
fact-based analysis to trigger the speedy indictment rule by focusing on 
the circumstances surrounding custody.  We even took a step further 
away from considering the comprehensive statutory manner of an arrest 
by defining an arrest for the purposes of the speedy indictment rule as of 
the time when seized under constitutional law.  Wing, 791 N.W.2d at 
248.   
We have never looked back to confront the obvious shortcoming in 
our analysis used in deciding to take the path followed in Schmitt.  In 
interpreting the speedy indictment rule in Schmitt, we properly relied on 
the statutory definition of an “arrest.”  See Schmitt, 290 N.W.2d at 26.  
We also properly considered the statutory requirements under Iowa Code 
section 804.14 that normally must occur as a part of an arrest.  See id.  
This requirement directs the person making the arrest to inform the 
person being arrested of the intention to arrest, the reason for the arrest, 
the identity of the person making the arrest as a peace officer, and the 
requirement for the person to submit to custody.  See Iowa Code 
§ 804.14.  If the arrest is by warrant, the person making the arrest may 
also be required to show the person the warrant.  See id.  These 
procedures describe the “manner authorized by law” in taking a person 
into custody.  See id. §§ 804.5, .14.   
 
The shortcoming of the important first step we took in Schmitt was 
the failure to identify and account for the other statutory directives 
applicable to taking a person into custody “in the manner authorized by 
 
17 
 
law.”  Id. § 804.5.  The critical point is that the manner of making an 
arrest under Iowa law does not end with the on-the-scene requirements 
identified in section 804.14.  Importantly, the process of arrest requires 
that the person arrested must also be taken from the scene to the 
nearest or most accessible magistrate without unnecessary delay.  Id. 
§§ 804.21, .22.  This procedure is a vital part of the arrest because it 
gives the arrested person the most protection.  See State v. Lee, 222 
N.W.2d 471, 473–74 (Iowa 1974).  Once the arrested person is before the 
magistrate, the arrest process is complete, the person is no longer under 
the control of the arresting officer, and all the rights under the law 
available to defendants become applicable, including the right to a 
probable-cause preliminary hearing and the right to a speedy indictment.  
See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.2(1)–(4).   
 
Accordingly, if a person is taken into custody “in the manner 
authorized by law,” the person will be taken before a magistrate, see id. 
r. 2.2(1), entitled to a preliminary hearing within ten days, see id. 
r. 2.2(4)(a), and entitled to be discharged if the magistrate finds no 
probable cause that a crime was committed or that the defendant did not 
commit the crime, see id. r. 2.2(4)(e).  Thus, while the time for bringing 
the indictment runs from the initial arrest, the necessity for a speedy 
indictment following an arrest is derived only from a finding of probable 
cause or the defendant’s waiver of a probable-cause hearing.  A speedy 
indictment is only needed when a defendant is arrested and 
subsequently held to answer by the magistrate following the arrest.   
 
It is understandable that we failed in Schmitt to consider the 
complete manner of making an arrest.  Unlike an arrest in most 
situations, the defendant in Schmitt had been in custody prior to his 
arrest, and it was logical for the arresting officers to return him to jail 
 
18 
 
instead of taking him before a magistrate.  See Schmitt, 290 N.W.2d at 
25–6.  Based on that perspective, we concluded “the actions taken” by 
the arresting officer and the “result[s] achieved fulfill[ed] the statutory 
criteria of an arrest.”  Id. at 26.  Clearly, the statutory objectives of an 
arrest for a criminal offense were not accomplished because the law also 
required the arresting officer to bring the person before a magistrate.  
See Iowa Code § 813.2 (1979) (Iowa R. Crim. P. 2(1)).   
In the cases leading up to the 1976 revisions, defendants were not 
only arrested, they were also charged by preliminary information, 
appeared before a magistrate, held in continuous custody, released on 
bail, or subjected to some combination of these normal incidents of 
prosecution.  See State v. Thomas, 222 N.W.2d 488, 490 (Iowa 1974); 
Lee, 222 N.W.2d at 472; Morningstar, 207 N.W.2d at 773; Mays, 204 
N.W.2d at 865.  If the legislature was responding to these holdings in 
1976, there is no evidence they intended the rule protect defendants not 
charged, held in continuous custody, or otherwise prosecuted.  
“Normally, the date of an arrest and the date of prosecution follow hand 
in hand,” but they can “become detached.”  Penn-Kennedy, 862 N.W.2d 
at 387, 388.  If they become detached, the operation of the rule becomes 
detached from its purpose and remedy.  There is no prosecution to 
dismiss, no defendant to release, and no bail money to return.  See Iowa 
R. Crim. P. 2.33(2)(d).  Instead, it operates only to accelerate the statute 
of limitations.  See Penn-Kennedy, 862 N.W.2d at 389–90.  Just like the 
arresting officers in Schmitt, we failed to consider all the required actions 
of an arrest as a part of “the statutory criteria of an arrest.”  Schmitt, 290 
N.W.2d at 26.  Had we not confined our analysis to the specific facts of 
the case, we would have considered the full statutory requirements of an 
 
19 
 
arrest, and we would have seen that the defendant in Schmitt was indeed 
arrested, but not in the manner authorized by law.   
The failure to account for the entire process of an arrest in Schmitt 
significantly undermines our confidence in the interpretation of the 
speedy indictment rule.  This shortcoming alone causes us to 
acknowledge our mistake and directs us to correct it.  The need to 
correct our mistake is also revealed by the inconsistent outcomes we 
have reached over the years and the inconsistent application of the 
speedy indictment rule that fails to give the same relief to juvenile 
offenders as it does to adult offenders and encourages the use of 
“placeholder” charges during the pendency of an investigation.  For 
example, the State argues Williams was not entitled to speedy indictment 
protection because he was a minor.  Under the State’s interpretation, 
Washington and Smith, both adults, would go free while Williams would 
not.  See Harriman, 513 N.W.2d at 726.  Alternatively, Williams was 
found with a marijuana pipe, a simple misdemeanor.  See Iowa Code 
§ 124.414(1)(a)(2), (2).  If the police would have charged Williams with 
this offense that would mean, under our precedent, that Williams was 
arrested for that offense only, and charges for sexual assault could come 
at any time within the statute of limitations.  See Penn-Kennedy, 862 
N.W.2d at 390.  Washington and Smith, found with no contraband, 
would obtain the benefit of the speedy indictment rule while Williams 
would not.  This is all regardless of the presence or absence of probable 
cause at any point in the investigation.   
 
The speedy indictment rule gives effect to the constitutional 
guarantee of speedy trial.  See Wing, 791 N.W.2d at 246; see also Iowa 
Const. art. I, § 10.   
 
20 
 
 
The purpose of these protections, both constitutional 
and statutory, is to relieve one accused of a crime of the 
hardship of indefinite incarceration awaiting trial or the 
anxiety of suspended prosecution, if at liberty on bail, and to 
require courts and peace officers to proceed with the trial of 
criminal charges with such reasonable promptness as proper 
administration of justice demands.   
State v. Allnutt, 261 Iowa 897, 901, 156 N.W.2d 266, 268 (1968), 
overruled on other grounds in Gorham, 206 N.W.2d at 913; see also Penn-
Kennedy, 862 N.W.2d at 387 (“As with all three segments of the speedy 
trial rule, the speedy indictment rule serves to ‘relieve an accused of the 
anxiety associated with’ the suspension of a prosecution, provide for the 
‘reasonably prompt administration of justice,’ prevent the loss of 
evidence, and maintain a fair process.” (quoting Wing, 791 N.W.2d at 
246–47)).  Here, the defendants did not need relief from “the hardship of 
indefinite incarceration,” or even “the anxiety of suspended prosecution.” 
Allnutt, 261 Iowa at 901, 156 N.W.2d at 268.  After the arrest, the police 
did not file a complaint.  The defendants did not appear before a 
magistrate for arraignment or undergo a preliminary hearing.  There is 
no argument of unreasonable delay or loss of evidence.  Dismissing the 
charges against these defendants does not reflect the aim and purpose of 
the constitutional right to a speedy trial.   
 
In the end, we cannot always rely on our venerable doctrine of 
stare decisis, or legislative acquiescence, to direct the outcome of cases.  
McElroy, 703 N.W.2d at 395 (“[W]e must remember that legislation 
sometimes persists on account of ‘inattention and default rather than by 
any conscious and collective decision.’ ” (quoting Ronald Dworkin, Law’s 
Empire 319 (1986))).  The course we must follow is not to ignore our 
mistakes, but to correct them.  See Stuart, 247 Iowa at 714, 74 N.W.2d 
at 216 (overruling precedent when “more mischief will be done” by 
adherence than overruling).  Thus, we do not take a different course from 
 
21 
 
the past out of dislike for the course taken, but to correct an incorrect 
analysis that sent us down the wrong path.  This correction will realign 
the speedy indictment rule so that it will be applied in all cases as 
intended by our legislature and serve the purposes of the rule.   
 
V.  Conclusion.   
 
Arrest for the purposes of the speedy indictment rule requires the 
person to be taken into custody in the manner authorized by law.  The 
manner of arrest includes taking the arrested person to a magistrate.  
The rule is triggered from the time a person is taken into custody, but 
only when the arrest is completed by taking the person before a 
magistrate for an initial appearance.  For these reasons, we vacate the 
court of appeals decision and affirm the judgment of the district court.  
Because we decide these cases on these grounds, we need not address 
the additional arguments raised by the parties and amicus.   
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT 
COURT 
JUDGMENT 
AFFIRMED 
AND 
CASE 
REMANDED 
FOR 
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.   
Waterman, Mansfield, and Zager, JJ., join this opinion.  Mansfield, 
J., files a specially concurring opinion in which Waterman and Zager, 
JJ., join.  Wiggins, J., files a dissenting opinion.  Hecht, J., files a 
separate dissenting opinion in which Appel and Wiggins, JJ., join.   
 
 
 
22 
 
#14–0793, State v. Williams 
MANSFIELD, Justice (concurring specially). 
I join the court’s opinion.  I write separately to emphasize that our 
caselaw prior to State v. Wing, 791 N.W.2d 243 (Iowa 2010), required a 
statutory arrest to trigger the speedy indictment rule.  In Wing, we 
jettisoned that approach and decided that a seizure for Fourth 
Amendment purposes was sufficient to start the clock running.  Id. at 
249.  We did so while acknowledging that a statutory arrest “is not 
coterminous with the standard used to determine whether a person has 
been seized for Fourth Amendment purposes.”  Id. at 248. 
In other words, Wing brought about a significant change in the 
law.  I think most Iowa prosecutors and defense attorneys would agree. 
Wing hasn’t worked out and this case illustrates why.  The 
Waterloo police were responding to an emergency report at 5:30 a.m. 
from a fifteen-year-old girl that she had been drugged and gang-raped in 
a house.  The girl further reported that her fifteen-year-old girlfriend 
might still be in the house and might also have been gang-raped.  The 
officers entered the house, found the other girl crying, and detained the 
occupants of the house as well as Deantay Williams who was walking 
away from the house.  The officers took statements from all the 
occupants and collected DNA samples from the five men and boys, 
including Williams.  They were then released.  No one was told he was 
arrested; no one was booked.  Many months later, the final DNA test 
results came back.  At this point, four of the five were formally arrested 
and charged, the DNA results having exonerated one of the five. 
Most people would consider the process I have described to be 
good police work.  It was fair to the State, the defendants, the victims, 
and particularly the individual who was exonerated and never charged.  
 
23 
 
But Wing wouldn’t allow it.  Instead, Wing forces the State into the 
following quandary: Do not take anyone into temporary custody, 
regardless of the circumstances or the emergency, or else you will have to 
bring your trial information against that person within 45 days.  Thus, 
Wing, predictably, leads to premature charging decisions. 
For decades prior to Wing, our court had consistently interpreted 
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(a) as being triggered by a 
statutory arrest, not mere Fourth Amendment custody.  Thus, in State v. 
Schmitt, we noted that rule 2.33(2)(a) (then rule 27(2)(a)) had been 
enacted simultaneously with Iowa Code sections 804.5 and 804.14 
(Supp. 1977) regarding arrest and needed to be construed with them.  
290 N.W.2d 24, 26 (Iowa 1980).  We said, “[W]e define ‘arrest’ in rule 
27(2)(a) to be the same as the definition provided in section 804.5, as 
explained in section 804.14.”  Id.  We overruled Schmitt in Wing when we 
swapped out statutory arrest for Fourth Amendment custody. 
But Schmitt was not the only decision overruled by Wing.  In State 
v. Gathercole, we held that a person who had been taken into custody in 
Utah by a private transport company and brought under guard to Iowa 
following extradition had not been arrested for speedy indictment 
purposes, noting, “We define an ‘arrest’ in speedy-trial cases by our 
general law of arrest under Iowa Code chapter 804 because rule of 
criminal procedure 27(2) and Iowa Code section 804.14, which describes 
the manner of making arrests, were enacted together.”  553 N.W.2d 569, 
572 (Iowa 1996). 
Then, in State v. Dennison, we stated, “This court has also rejected 
the contention that a de facto arrest triggers the speedy indictment time.”  
571 N.W.2d 492, 495 (Iowa 1997) (per curiam).  In Dennison, the 
defendant was “detained for investigative purposes for a relatively short 
 
24 
 
period of time” but no citation or complaint was issued.  Id. at 497.  
Approximately three months later, when the drug test results came back, 
the defendant was charged with OWI.  Id. at 493–94.  We found no 
speedy indictment violation.  Id. at 496–97.  We discussed the same 
policy consideration I’ve referred to above: 
If a defendant is arrested and charged with a crime, and that 
charge is later dismissed based upon a test result, it is 
inevitable the defendant will have suffered some adverse 
consequences from the arrest, such as enduring booking 
procedures, 
possible 
incarceration 
awaiting 
initial 
appearance, 
bond 
or 
release 
requirements, 
court 
appearances, expenditures for legal representation, and 
publication of the arrest in the newspaper. 
Id. at 497; see also id. (“[I]t is beneficial for both the State and the 
defendant for the officer to refrain from making an arrest and issuing a 
citation for a violation for which the most crucial evidence is not 
available.  Peace officers should not arrest individuals on insufficient 
evidence.”). 
Both the language and the results in Gathercole and Dennison are 
incompatible with what we said and did in Wing. 
Similarly, in State v. Davis, the officer took the defendant into 
custody, handcuffed him, completed a written citation and complaint, 
gave those forms to the defendant to sign, turned the defendant over to 
the jailer, and booked him.  525 N.W.2d 837, 838 (Iowa 1994).  We said 
that this “easily corresponds” to the statutory definition of arrest in Iowa 
Code sections 804.5 and 804.14.  Id. at 839.  It did not matter that the 
defendant had been released before his initial appearance.  Id. at 841; 
see also State v. Rains, 574 N.W.2d 904, 910 (Iowa 1998) (“The definition 
of ‘arrest’ for purposes of [the speedy indictment rule] is governed by the 
general law of arrest provided in Iowa Code chapter 804, specifically 
sections 804.5 and 804.14.”). 
 
25 
 
While our pre-Wing decisions consistently invoked the Iowa 
statutes on arrest, not the Fourth Amendment, they perhaps lacked 
some clarity as to when a statutory arrest occurs for speedy indictment 
purposes.  Today’s decision in my view helpfully draws a bright line.  I 
join it in full. 
Waterman and Zager, JJ., join this special concurrence. 
 
 
 
26 
 
#14–0793, State v. Williams 
WIGGINS, Justice (dissenting). 
I join Justice Hecht’s dissent and write separately to lament the 
majority’s departure from stare decisis.  In December 2010, the court 
correctly decided State v. Wing, 791 N.W.2d 243 (Iowa 2010) for all the 
reasons set forth in Justice Hecht’s dissent.  Nothing has changed since 
December 2010, except the members of the court.  Stare decisis should 
not depend on the members of the court at a given time.   
“Adherence to the principle of stare decisis does not permit a court 
to overrule past decisions simply because a majority of the court as 
constituted at a given point in time believes that a past decision was 
wrongly decided.”  Robert A. Sedler, The Michigan Supreme Court, Stare 
Decisis, and Overruling the Overrulings, 55 Wayne L. Rev. 1911, 1929 
(2009) [hereinafter Sedler].  In fact, “when a judge becomes a member of 
a court, the judge must accept prior decisions as controlling and must 
operate within the framework of the doctrine and precedent established 
by the court’s prior decisions.”  Id. at 1914. 
In the words of the author of the majority’s opinion, “We are slow 
to depart from stare decisis and only do so under the most cogent 
circumstances.”  Ackelson v. Manley Toy Direct, L.L.C., 832 N.W.2d 678, 
688 (Iowa 2013).  This case does not present those circumstances.   
Previously, we recognized 
[i]t is of the greatest importance that the law should be 
settled.  Fairness to the trial courts, to the legal profession, 
and 
above 
all 
to 
citizens 
generally 
demands 
that 
interpretations once made should be overturned only for the 
most cogent reasons. . . . [T]his does not mean that [the 
law’s] forward progress should be over the dead bodies of 
slain and discarded precedents.  Legal authority must be 
respected; not because it is venerable with age, but because 
it is important that courts, and lawyers and their clients, 
 
27 
 
may know what the law is and order their affairs 
accordingly. 
State v. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805, 813 (Iowa 2003) (alterations in original) 
(quoting Stuart v. Pilgrim, 247 Iowa 709, 714, 74 N.W.2d 212, 215–16 
(1956)).  
Another member of our court once wrote, “Stare decisis demands 
greater respect for our precedent.”  State v. Ambrose, 861 N.W.2d 550, 
563 (Iowa 2015) (Waterman, J., concurring specially).  Those words are 
just as applicable today.  However, what the majority does today is 
overrule a prior decision with which they disagree in order to advance 
their own view of the law.  See Sedler, 55 Wayne L. Rev. at 1912.  I write 
to question the majority’s abandonment of stare decisis and call for the 
restoration of the principle of stare decisis in Iowa jurisprudence.  See id. 
Accordingly, I dissent and join Justice Hecht’s dissent. 
 
 
 
28 
 
#14–0793, State v. Williams 
HECHT, Justice (dissenting). 
 
I believe the court of appeals correctly applied settled law requiring 
a speedy indictment.  Finding no persuasive ground for reversing a long 
line of our cases interpreting Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(a), 
I respectfully dissent.   
The majority correctly notes that prior to January 1, 1978, the 
state’s deadline for indicting a person suspected of committing a crime 
ran from the date the person was “held to answer.”  See Iowa Code 
§ 795.1 (1975).  In other words, prior to 1978 the speedy indictment 
clock began to run upon a finding of probable cause that an offense was 
committed and the accused committed it.  In what the majority describes 
as “a comprehensive review and major overhaul” of the Iowa Criminal 
Code that became effective in 1978, the legislature significantly changed 
the language upon which the speedy indictment rule is based. 
The former “held to answer” formulation for the commencement of 
the indictment timeline was deleted by the legislature in the new rule 
27(2)(a).  Under the new rule, the arrest was chosen as the event from 
which the indictment deadline is measured.  We first had occasion to 
interpret the new formulation of the speedy indictment rule in State v. 
Schmitt, 290 N.W.2d 24 (Iowa 1980).  In that case, Schmitt was in 
custody awaiting trial on a burglary charge.  Id. at 25.  He escaped from 
custody on October 18, 1978, but was found by a law enforcement officer 
later the same day, detained at gunpoint, handcuffed, and returned to 
jail.  Id. at 26.  More than ninety days passed before the state filed a new 
information charging Schmitt with the crime of escape from custody.  
Schmitt filed a motion to dismiss, contending the charge was untimely 
 
29 
 
because it was not filed within forty-five days after he was arrested.  Id. 
at 25.   
On appeal from the district court’s ruling denying the motion to 
dismiss, we focused on the textual difference between the former “held to 
answer” language in section 795.1 and the new speedy indictment 
timeline commencing under rule 27(2)(a) with an “arrest.”  We concluded 
the textual difference was significant and consequential. 
The terms are not synonymous.  As previously stated, 
“arrested” means being physically taken into custody in the 
manner authorized by law.  Formerly, physical restraint was, 
irrelevant to a determination of whether the defendant had 
been “held to answer.”  Rather, the term was narrowly 
defined to mean being held to answer by a preliminary 
examination or waiver of same. 
Id. at 27 (citation omitted).  Noting the obvious textual difference between 
the language in the former section 795.1 and the language in the new 
rule 27(2)(a), we concluded the information charging Schmitt with escape 
from custody was untimely because it was filed more than forty-five days 
after Schmitt’s arrest on October 18, 1978.  Our decision in Schmitt was 
based on the unambiguous text of the rule; it was faithful to the general 
principle that a modification of the language of a statute gives rise to a 
presumption that a change in the law was intended.  See Midwest Auto. 
III, LLC v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 417, 425 (Iowa 2002); State 
v. Ahitow, 544 N.W.2d 270, 273 (Iowa 1996); see also 1A Norman J. 
Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction 
§ 22.1, at 245–47 (7th ed. 2009).4 
4The majority cites a cryptic passage from an article written by Professor Yeager 
and Professor Carlson suggesting they intended no significant changes of the speedy 
indictment provisions in the Criminal Code overhaul enacted during the 1976 legislative 
session.  In assessing the meaning of rule 27(2)(a), now rule 2.33(2)(a), and the 
legislative intent behind it, I give great weight to the words actually appearing in the 
                                      
 
 
 
30 
 
In a series of cases decided after Schmitt, this court performed its 
proper appellate role—interpreting and applying the statutory definitions 
of arrest found in Iowa Code sections 804.5 and 804.14 to various and 
sundry fact patterns presenting speedy indictment claims.  See State v. 
Wing, 791 N.W.2d 243, 247–52 (surveying and synthesizing this court’s 
opinions interpreting “arrest” in the speedy indictment context).  In each 
of those cases, we applied rule 27(2)(a) or its successor, rule 2.33(2)(a), 
as they were written by the legislature.  In each instance, we focused 
faithfully on the text of the rule and decided whether an information was 
filed within the timeline provided by law under the circumstances.  
The majority abruptly changes course in this case, turning the 
clock back to the pre-1978 formulation of the rule.  Concluding this 
court got it wrong in Schmitt, the majority decides today that an arrest 
for purposes of the speedy indictment rule does not occur until one is 
held to answer.  I disagree for several reasons.   
The first reason is based on the text of the rule.  The plain 
language of rule 2.33(2)(a) does not include the “held to answer” doctrine 
that was put to rest by the legislature in 1978.  Well-established rules 
counsel against resuscitation.  Our role is “to interpret our rule 
according to the legislative intent as revealed by the language of the 
rule.”  State v. Dullard, 668 N.W.2d 585, 595 (Iowa 2003).  In performing 
our interpretive role, “[w]e determine legislative intent from the words 
chosen by the legislature, not from what it should or might have said.  
Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004).  It is 
not our role to extend, enlarge, or otherwise change the meaning of a 
rule, and substantially less weight to the post-hoc characterizations of intent offered up 
by the professors.     
________________________ 
 
31 
 
statute under the guise of construction.  Id.  We do not divine 
innovations or make improvements when interpreting the legislature’s 
work; rather, we interpret it as we find it.  State v. Spencer, 737 N.W.2d 
124, 129–30 (Iowa 2007).  In my view, my colleagues in the majority give 
too little attention to these rules limiting our interpretive license in 
restoring the “held to answer” framework abandoned nearly forty years 
ago by the legislature.   
Second, we have decided numerous speedy indictment cases in the 
thirty-seven years since Schmitt was decided.  See Wing, 791 N.W.2d at 
247–52 (surveying cases interpreting “arrest” in the speedy indictment 
context).  Notably, the legislature took no corrective action in the 
intervening decades suggesting we misunderstood its intention as we 
repeatedly measured the indictment deadline from the time of the arrest.  
This scenario is a textbook scenario for application of the doctrine of 
legislative acquiescence.  See Ackelson v. Manley Toy Direct, L.L.C., 832 
N.W.2d 678, 682, 688 (Iowa 2013) (considering legislature’s inactivity 
over twenty-seven-year period in response to our decisions holding the 
Iowa Civil Rights Act did not implicitly permit recovery of punitive 
damages); State v. Abrahamson, 746 N.W.2d 270, 277 (Iowa 2008) (“The 
legislature’s failure to amend the statute to enumerate multiple offenses 
suggests our understanding of the statute comports with the intent of 
the drafters.”); Iowa Dep’t of Transp. v. Soward, 650 N.W.2d 569, 574 
(Iowa 2002) (legislative inaction in response to this court’s interpretation 
of a statute given considerable weight).  If we misunderstood its intent in 
Schmitt or in our many other subsequent decisions measuring the 
indictment deadline from the point of arrest during the past three-and-
one-half decades, surely the legislature would have taken corrective 
 
32 
 
action.  Because the legislature did not take such action, my confidence 
that we got it right in Schmitt is all the stronger.5 
 
Third, this case starkly illustrates that if being “held to answer” is 
the trigger for the speedy indictment clock, a perverse incentive arises for 
law enforcement officers to delay prosecutions—conduct that is 
antithetical to the important goals of speedy trials.  See State v. 
Delockroy, 559 N.W.2d 43, 46 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (noting the purpose of 
procedural rules and constitutional provisions implementing speedy trial 
rules is to “relieve an accused of the anxiety associated with suspended 
prosecution and provide reasonably prompt administration of justice”).  
The acts that led to the sexual assault charges against Deantay Williams 
and two other men occurred in the early morning hours of June 10, 
2012.  Williams and the others were taken into custody, handcuffed, and 
taken to the police station for interrogation that same morning.  Williams 
and one of the others admitted during the interrogations that they had 
engaged in sexual intercourse with two fifteen-year-old girls who reported 
they had been raped.  Yet, the informations charging the three 
defendants were filed 510 days later.  Although the State claims the 
delay in filing the charges was attributable to the slow pace of DNA 
testing, the identity of Williams and one of the other defendants as 
participants in the alleged sexual abuse of both girls was not in dispute 
from day one.  During the long delay of 510 days, evidence likely grew 
stale and memories faded while Williams and the others waited, 
uncertain whether the prosecutions would go forward.  See State v. 
5The legislature’s acquiescence in our interpretation of the rule adds force to my 
view expressed above in note 1 that the actual words enacted by the legislature in rule 
2.33(2)(a) should be our polestar—not the summary characterization of the professors 
who assisted in the drafting. 
                                      
 
 
33 
 
Olson, 528 N.W.2d 651, 654 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (acknowledging that 
impairment of an accused’s defense due to diminished memories and 
loss of exculpatory evidence is considered the most serious form of 
prejudice arising from delayed prosecutions).   
The plain language interpretation of rule 2.33(2)(a) applied by this 
court for more than three decades and relied upon by the court of 
appeals in this case encouraged prompt prosecutions and promoted the 
goals of speedy trials guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution.  I 
would not abandon it.  Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals and remand to the district court for entry of a ruling 
dismissing the charges. 
 
Wiggins and Appel, JJ., join this dissent.