Case Title: Burns v. Ashley

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1170565

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2018-09-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: September 28, 2018
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2018
____________________
1170565
____________________
Beverly Burns, Michael Ashley, and Debbie Elrod
v.
Joe Keith Ashley and James Wayne Ashley
Appeal from Etowah Circuit Court
(CV-15-900664)
BRYAN, Justice.
Beverly 
Burns, 
Michael 
Ashley, 
and 
Debbie 
Elrod
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "the appellants")
appeal from a judgment of the Etowah Circuit Court ("the
circuit court") denying the appellants' will contest,
1170565
admitting to probate the will of Rheba Sue Ashley ("Rheba"),
and issuing letters testamentary to James Wayne Ashley
("James").  For the reasons set forth herein, the circuit
court's judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction, and the
appeal must therefore be dismissed.
Facts and Procedural History
On February 15, 2015, Rheba died testate, survived by her
five children: the appellants, James, and Joe Keith Ashley. 
On April 22, 2015, James petitioned the Etowah Probate Court
("the probate court") for probate of a will executed by Rheba
in 2014, which provides that the appellants are each to
receive $10 from Rheba's estate and that James is to receive
the remainder of Rheba's estate, and for letters of
administration with the will annexed.1  The probate court did
not admit the will to probate or appoint a personal
representative of Rheba's estate.2
1Rheba's 2014 will also provides that James "has full
discretion to distribute any asset from [Rheba's] estate to
... Joe Keith Ashley at any time he sees fit."
2Rheba's 2014 will appoints Kimberly McWhorter executor,
but on May 4, 2015, McWhorter renounced her appointment.  See
§ 43-2-25, Ala. Code 1975.
2
1170565
On June 10, 2015, the appellants filed in the probate
court a "Complaint Contesting Will" in which they alleged that
Rheba had executed a prior will before she executed the 2014
will; that they were beneficiaries under the prior will; and
that James used undue influence to procure Rheba's execution
of the 2014 will.  Simultaneously, the appellants filed in the
probate court a petition to transfer the will contest to the
circuit court pursuant to § 43-8-198, Ala. Code 1975. 
However, the probate court did not enter an order transferring
the will contest to the circuit court.
On July 15, 2015, the parties filed in the probate court
a joint motion seeking the appointment of Jonathan Welch as
special administrator ad colligendum until the probate court
appointed a personal representative of Rheba's estate.  See §
43-2-47, Ala. Code 1975.  That same day, the probate court
granted the parties' motion and issued Welch letters of
administration ad colligendum, which authorized Welch to
collect and to preserve the assets of Rheba's estate until the
probate court appointed a personal representative of the
estate, 
at 
which 
time 
Welch's 
authority 
as 
special
3
1170565
administrator ad colligendum would terminate.  See § 43-2-
47(d).
On August 18, 2015, the appellants filed in the circuit
court a petition for the removal of the administration of
Rheba's estate from the probate court, see § 12-11-41, Ala.
Code 1975, and, on November 5, 2015, the circuit court entered
an order to that effect.  The circuit court subsequently held
an evidentiary hearing and, on February 13, 2018, entered a
judgment denying the will contest, admitting Rheba's 2014 will
to probate, and issuing letters testamentary to James.  The
appellants filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the
February 
13, 
2018, 
judgment, 
and 
the 
circuit 
court
subsequently modified its judgment with respect to one
evidentiary finding.  However, the circuit court's modified
evidentiary finding did not alter its original rulings denying
the will contest, admitting Rheba's 2014 will to probate, and
4
1170565
issuing letters testamentary to James.3  The appellants timely
appealed.
Discussion
"Although 
neither 
party 
raises 
a 
question 
before
this 
Court 
regarding 
the 
circuit 
court's
subject-matter 
jurisdiction 
to 
consider 
the
appellants' 
will 
contest, 
the 
absence 
of
subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, and it
is the duty of an appellate court to notice the
absence of subject-matter jurisdiction ex mero motu.
See MPQ, Inc. v. Birmingham Realty Co., 78 So. 3d
391, 393 (Ala. 2011).  If the circuit court's
jurisdiction to consider the will contest was never
properly invoked, then the judgment entered on
[February 13, 2018], is void and [will] not support
3The circuit court's February 13, 2018, judgment found
that the appellants
"provided no evidence showing that at the time the
2014 Will was made that the relationship between
[James] and his mother had so changed from the
natural mother and child relationship so that the
mother was now rendered subservient to the child. 
However, even if the Court was to find that such
evidence existed so that the burden shifted to
[James] to rebuff the contention that there had been
undue influence, there was no showing of actual
fraud or coercion in regard to the 2014 Will.  Nor
was there any evidence presented that the 2014 Will
did not reflect the testamentary intent of [Rheba]."
In its postjudgment order, the circuit court modified the
February 13, 2018, judgment to reflect that "sufficient
evidence was presented that the relationship between [James]
and his mother had changed to the point the mother was
subservient." 
 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Aside 
from 
that
modification, however, the circuit court refused to 
modify the
judgment.
5
1170565
an appeal.  MPQ, 78 So. 3d at 394 ('"A judgment
entered 
by 
a 
court 
lacking 
subject-matter
jurisdiction is absolutely void and will not support
an appeal; an appellate court must dismiss an
attempted appeal from such a void judgment."'
(quoting Vann v. Cook, 989 So. 2d 556, 559 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2008)))."
McElroy v. McElroy, [Ms. 1160394, Dec. 15, 2017] ___ So. 3d
___, ___ (Ala. 2017).
"'In Alabama, a will may be contested
in two ways: (1) under § 43-8-190, Ala.
Code 1975, before probate, the contest may
be instituted in the probate court or (2)
under § 43-8-199, Ala. Code 1975, after
probate and within six months thereof, a
contest may be instituted by filing a
complaint in the circuit court of the
county in which the will was probated.'
"Stevens v. Gary, 565 So. 2d 73, 74 (Ala. 1990)."
Bond v. Pylant, 3 So. 3d 852, 854 (Ala. 2008).
In this case, the probate court never admitted Rheba's
will to probate.  Thus, pursuant to § 43-8-190, Ala. Code
1975, the appellants properly filed their will contest in the
probate court.  Bond, supra.  As noted, the appellants,
simultaneously with the filing of their will contest, sought
to transfer the will contest to the circuit court.  The
transfer to circuit court of a will contest pending in probate
6
1170565
court is governed by § 43-8-198, which provides, in pertinent
part:
"Upon the demand of any party to the contest,
made in writing at the time of filing the initial
pleading, the probate court, or the judge thereof,
must enter an order transferring the contest to the
circuit court of the county in which the contest is
made, and must certify all papers and documents
pertaining to the contest to the clerk of the
circuit court ...."
(Emphasis added.)
"The jurisdiction conferred on the circuit court by
this section of the Code is a statutory and limited
jurisdiction.  Ex parte Pearson, 241 Ala. 467, 3 So.
2d 5 (1941).  Because will contest jurisdiction is
statutorily conferred, the procedural requirements
of the applicable statute must be complied with
exactly."
Kaller v. Rigdon, 480 So. 2d 536, 538 (Ala. 1985) (emphasis
added).  See also Bullen v. Brown, 535 So. 2d 76, 78 (Ala.
1988) ("It is clear that will contest jurisdiction, being
statutorily conferred, must 
comply 
with 
the 
statutory 
language
strictly in order to quicken jurisdiction of the appropriate
court." (emphasis added)); and Marshall v. Vreeland, 571 So.
2d 1037, 1038 (Ala. 1990) (holding that compliance with § 43-
8-198 
is 
what 
gives 
a 
circuit 
court 
subject-matter
jurisdiction over a will contest pending in the probate
court).  
7
1170565
Thus, a circuit court cannot assume jurisdiction over a
will contest pending in probate court absent strict compliance
with the procedural requirements of § 43-8-198.  One of the
procedural requirements of § 43-8-198 necessary to invoke a
circuit court's jurisdiction over a will contest pending in
probate court is that the probate court in which the will
contest is pending must enter an order transferring the will
contest to the circuit court; a circuit court cannot "reach
down" and remove a will contest from probate court.  See
DuBose v. Weaver, 68 So. 3d 814, 817 n. 3 (Ala. 2011)
(recognizing the distinction between the authority of a
probate court to transfer a pending will contest and the
authority of a circuit court to remove the administration of
a decedent's estate).  Here, the probate court did not enter
an order transferring the appellants' will contest to the
circuit court, although it had an imperative duty to do so. 
See Ex parte McLendon, 824 So. 2d 700, 705 (Ala. 2001).  Thus,
the procedural requirements of § 43-8-198 were not satisfied,
and, as a result, the circuit court never obtained
jurisdiction over the will contest.  Kaller, supra; Bullen,
supra; Marshall, supra.  Accordingly, the circuit court's
8
1170565
February 13, 2018, judgment, insofar as it denied the
appellants' will contest, is void and will not support the
appellants' appeal.  McElroy, supra.
Consistent with our duty to notice ex mero motu the
absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, McElroy, supra, we
also conclude that the circuit court's November 5, 2015, order
removing the administration of Rheba's estate from the 
probate
court is void and that, as a result, the circuit court did not
obtain jurisdiction over the administration of the estate.
Pursuant 
to 
§ 
12-11-41, 
Ala. 
Code 
1975, 
the
administration of an estate "may be removed from the probate
court to the circuit court at any time before a final
settlement thereof."  However, a circuit court "cannot assume
jurisdiction over the administration of an estate when the
administration has not yet begun," and "the initiation of
administration is a matter exclusively in the jurisdiction of
the probate court."  Ex parte Smith, 619 So. 2d 1374, 1375-76
(Ala. 1993) (emphasis added).  "In stating in Ex parte Smith
that '[t]he circuit court cannot assume jurisdiction over the
administration of an estate when the administration has not
yet begun,' 619 So. 2d at 1375–76, this Court was referring to
9
1170565
subject-matter jurisdiction."  Ex parte Berry, 999 So. 2d 883,
887 (Ala. 2008).
Regarding when the administration of an estate begins,
this Court has held that "the mere filing of a petition for
the administration of an estate does not in itself begin the
administration; rather, the probate court must act upon the
petition and thereby activate the proceedings, which may
thereafter be subject to removal to the circuit court."  Ex
parte Smith, 619 So. 2d at 1376.  In Ex parte Baker, 183 So.
3d 139 (Ala. 2015), this Court discussed the duties of a
special administrator ad colligendum in considering whether
the 
Chilton 
Probate 
Court's 
appointment 
of 
such 
an
administrator 
constituted 
an 
"act 
upon 
the 
petition"
sufficient to initiate the administration of an estate:
"[A] 
special 
administrator 
ad 
colligendum 
is
appointed at the discretion of the probate court for
the specific purpose of collecting and preserving
the assets of the estate when necessary, i.e., when
no full-blown general administration of an estate
has been ordered and no personal representative has
been appointed.  See Smith v. Snider, 497 So. 2d 484
(Ala. 
1986). 
 
The 
special 
administrator 
ad
colligendum is not a personal representative of an
estate and has only limited authority, because he or
she may take no action with regard to any estate
matters other than what is permitted by § 43–2–47[,
Ala. Code 1975]. Smith, supra.  The special
administrator ad colligendum has no authority to
10
1170565
deal with the duties and obligations of the
administration of an estate and acts only as an
officer or agent of the probate court for the
purpose of collecting and preserving the assets of
the decedent until proper letters testamentary or of
administration are granted and the administration of
the estate is initiated.  DuBose [v. Weaver, 68 So.
3d 814 (Ala. 2011)], Smith, supra.  See also Arnold
v. Garrison, 255 Ala. 11, 49 So. 2d 787 (1950)
(holding 
that 
the 
special 
administrator 
ad
colligendum is merely an officer or agent of the
probate court)."
183 So. 3d at 143-44 (emphasis added). 
Thus, given that a special administrator ad colligendum
is not a personal representative of a decedent's estate and is
vested with only limited authority to collect and preserve the
assets of the estate until a personal representative of the
estate is appointed, the Baker Court concluded that the
Chilton 
Probate 
Court's 
appointment 
of 
a 
special 
administrator
ad colligendum "was insufficient to initiate the general
administration of the estate."  183 So. 3d at 143 (emphasis
added).  Accordingly, the Court held that, 
"[b]ecause the probate proceeding was purportedly
removed from the probate court to the circuit court
before the initiation of the administration of [the
decedent's] estate ..., the circuit court did not
obtain proper jurisdiction of the matter.  Thus, the
circuit court's orders removing the matter from the
probate court and subsequently denying Ruth's
petition [for appointment as administrator of the
11
1170565
estate] and appointing Huebner as administrator were
void and must be vacated."  
183 So. 3d at 144.
Similarly, in this case, the only action the probate
court has taken with respect to James's petition to probate
Rheba's 2014 will is the appointment of Welch as administrator
ad colligendum of Rheba's estate.  Pursuant to Ex parte Baker,
Welch's appointment was insufficient to initiate the general
administration of Rheba's estate.  Thus, because the probate
court has not initiated the general administration of Rheba's
estate, the circuit court could not assume jurisdiction over
the administration.  Ex parte Smith, supra; Ex parte Berry,
supra.  Accordingly, the circuit court's November 5, 2015,
order purporting to remove the administration of Rheba's
estate from the probate court and its February 13, 2018,
judgment, insofar as it admitted Rheba's will to probate and
issued letters testamentary to James, are void for lack of
jurisdiction and must therefore be vacated.  Ex parte Baker,
supra.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed herein, the circuit court's 
November 
5, 
2015, 
order 
purporting 
to 
remove 
the
12
1170565
administration of Rheba's estate from the probate court and
its February 13, 2018, judgment are void.  Because a void
judgment will not support an appeal, McElroy, supra, we
dismiss the appeal and direct the circuit court to vacate both
the November 5, 2015, order and the February 13, 2018,
judgment.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Stuart, C.J., and Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Main, Wise, and
Mendheim, JJ., concur.
Sellers, J., dissents.
13
1170565
SELLERS, Justice (dissenting).
  
I respectfully dissent. I believe that the probate
judge's authentication of the record dated November 6, 2015,
substantially complies with Ala. Code 1975, § 43-8-198.  As
the main opinion points out, that section requires that the
probate court "must enter an order transferring the contest to
the circuit court of the county in which the contest is made,
and must certify all papers and documents pertaining to the
contest to the clerk of the circuit court."   There is no
question that the probate judge certified all papers and
documents filed in the probate court in his authentication of
the record.  Included in those documents was an order from the
circuit court removing the administration of the estate to
that 
court. 
The 
probate 
court's 
certification, 
while
admittedly not an order per se, substantially complies with
the statute in that the probate court acknowledges that the
parties desire to take advantage of the equitable powers
embodied in the circuit court and to have their will contest
heard in that court. This is not an example of a circuit court
improperly reaching down to remove a will contest without the
knowledge or consent of the probate court. Rather, the probate
14
1170565
court 
here 
is 
an 
accomplice 
in 
removing 
the 
case,
acknowledging and confirming, if not consenting, to the
transfer.  To now cause the parties who have litigated their
issues to, in effect, start over seems to exalt form over
substance. The language contained in the probate court's
authentication of the record comes very close to the substance
of an order and clearly transfers the case file to the circuit
court; I am not sure an order could accomplish more. After
this case has proceeded through the circuit court, to now 
require the probate court to enter an order to effectively
accomplish what was implicit in the authentication seems a
waste of judicial economy. I therefore dissent from the main
opinion. 
15