Case Title: People v. Pineda

Citation: 

Docket Number: S150509

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2022-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
SANTIAGO PINEDA, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S150509 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
NA061271 
 
 
June 27, 2022 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the 
Court, in which Justices Corrigan, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, 
and Guerrero concurred. 
 
Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion. 
 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA  
S150509 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
Defendant Santiago Pineda was convicted in Los Angeles 
County Superior Court of the murders of Rafael Sanchez (also 
known, and referred to at trial, as Juan Armenta) and Raul 
Tinajero.  (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).)1  Special circumstance 
allegations that the murder of Sanchez occurred during the 
commission of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), that the murder 
of Tinajero involved the killing of a witness (id., subd. (a)(10)), 
and that defendant had been convicted of multiple murders (id., 
subd. (a)(3)) were found true.  At the penalty phase of trial, the 
jury returned a sentence of death.   
On appeal, defendant asserts that a juror was improperly 
excused for cause, evidence was wrongly admitted, and other 
errors were committed at his trial that, individually and 
collectively, require reversal of the judgment.  We affirm the 
judgment in its entirety.   
I.  FACTS 
A. Guilt Phase 
The prosecution’s theory of the case was that defendant, 
accompanied by Tinajero, killed Sanchez in the early morning 
hours of March 7, 2002, by running him over with a car.  
Defendant was charged with Sanchez’s murder.  Tinajero then 
 
1  
All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to 
the Penal Code.  
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
testified at defendant’s trial, pursuant to a grant of immunity 
from prosecution.  That trial resulted in a mistrial after 
defendant’s attorney fell ill.  Defendant and Tinajero were both 
housed at the Men’s Central Jail in Los Angeles as defendant 
awaited retrial.  On April 20, 2004, defendant — who was 
supposed to be kept away from Tinajero — gained access to 
Tinajero’s cell and choked him to death.   
1. People’s Case 
a. Killing of Rafael Sanchez 
With Tinajero being unavailable to testify, his testimony 
at the previous trial was presented to the jury.  (See Evid. Code, 
§ 1291, subd. (a)(2).)2  Tinajero’s prior testimony described the 
events of March 6 and 7, 2002, as follows.   
On March 6, Tinajero and defendant were passengers in a 
car being driven by defendant’s friend.  Tinajero, who was 
18 years old at the time, had been defendant’s neighbor for 
years.  While they were stopped at an intersection, defendant 
engaged in a conversation with Sanchez, who was driving a 
nearby vehicle.  Tinajero had never met Sanchez before, and to 
his knowledge, neither had defendant.  Sanchez was driving a 
white Infiniti; Tinajero thought he looked drunk.  Defendant 
reached out of his vehicle to hand a bottle of tequila to Sanchez, 
who took a drink from the bottle and then returned it. 
Tinajero, defendant, and defendant’s friend then drove to 
defendant’s house in Wilmington, which was on a street that 
intersected with another street named Blinn.  Sanchez followed 
in his Infiniti.  The four men hung out in front of defendant’s 
 
2  
At the time he testified, Tinajero was in custody for forgery 
and driving a vehicle without permission. 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
3 
house for a while.  Tinajero, Sanchez, and defendant eventually 
decided to go to Long Beach to “pick up some girls.”  They left 
together in Sanchez’s Infiniti, with Sanchez driving.   
On the way, the men stopped at a house where defendant’s 
cousin joined them in the car.  After driving more, Sanchez 
stopped the car in an alley, where he, defendant, and 
defendant’s cousin all exited the vehicle to urinate.3  Defendant 
and his cousin then ran back to the Infiniti and drove away, 
stranding Sanchez.   
Defendant drove the Infiniti back to Wilmington and 
parked the car a block away from his house.  Defendant, his 
cousin, and Tinajero proceeded to defendant’s house.  Sanchez 
returned, now driving a Honda.  Sanchez wanted his Infiniti 
back and seemed upset.  Defendant falsely said that the vehicle 
was in Long Beach and told Sanchez he would help him find it.  
Sanchez, defendant, and Tinajero then left together in the 
Honda, with Sanchez driving.   
At some point, Sanchez stopped the Honda at his sister’s 
house and went inside.  Defendant and Tinajero did not join him.  
When Sanchez was inside the house, defendant told Tinajero 
that he intended to choke Sanchez and steal the Honda, too.  
Defendant asked Tinajero to participate, but Tinajero declined, 
saying he did not want to be involved.  Tinajero and defendant 
changed positions in the car, with defendant moving from the 
front seat to the backseat and Tinajero moving forward.  
After Sanchez returned, he drove his passengers around 
to find the Infiniti.  Defendant and Tinajero pretended to look 
 
3  
Tinajero testified that he and defendant had been 
drinking that day, with each of them consuming about six beers.   
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
4 
for the vehicle.  Sanchez eventually stopped the Honda in 
Palmer Court, an alley in Long Beach.  Defendant reached 
around the driver’s headrest and started to choke Sanchez.  
Sanchez did not resist.  Once it appeared that Sanchez had 
passed out, defendant opened the driver’s door from the inside 
and threw Sanchez out of the car, onto the ground.  Defendant 
then hopped into the driver’s seat.  Driving short distances 
forward and backward, he ran over Sanchez several times.  
Defendant and Tinajero took the Honda back to 
Wilmington.  There, the two men switched back to the Infiniti 
they had previously taken from Sanchez.  With defendant now 
driving the Infiniti, they returned to Palmer Court.  Defendant 
told Tinajero he wanted to “go check it out.”  When they arrived, 
defendant, driving fast, ran over Sanchez once again.  Tinajero 
was unsure whether defendant had seen Sanchez before striking 
him.   
The fire department arrived at the scene while defendant 
and Tinajero were still in the alley.  Defendant maneuvered the 
Infiniti so the fire engine could pass and then drove a short 
distance away.  He parked the car and walked back to the alley 
with Tinajero.  They saw the fire department attending to 
Sanchez.  Defendant and Tinajero then returned to the Infiniti 
and drove away, intending to return to Wilmington.  Before they 
could go far, they were pulled over by police and taken into 
custody.   
When in custody after his arrest, Tinajero told police that 
defendant had not run anyone over.  More than a week later, 
after he had been released and police came to his house to speak 
with him, Tinajero confessed to his and defendant’s involvement 
in Sanchez’s death.  
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
5 
Other witnesses also testified regarding the events 
leading to Sanchez’s death and the investigation that followed.   
Eduardo Quevedo, Sanchez’s close friend, testified that 
Sanchez had come to his apartment at around 11:00 p.m. on 
March 6, 2002.  Sanchez was with two other men, one of whom 
Quevedo identified in court as defendant. They arrived in 
Sanchez’s Infiniti.  Quevedo noticed that Sanchez was drunk.  
Sanchez declined Quevedo’s offer to take him home and left 
along with defendant and the other man.   
About a half-hour later, Sanchez returned on foot.  
Quevedo asked what had happened.  Sanchez said he had been 
beaten up and that the men he was with had taken his car.  
Sanchez seemed upset.  Quevedo tried to talk Sanchez into going 
home, but Sanchez told him to drive to an automobile repair 
shop where he worked.  Quevedo dropped Sanchez off at the 
shop and parked nearby to see what Sanchez would do.  He 
noticed Sanchez drive off in a Honda.  Quevedo tried to follow 
Sanchez, but was unsuccessful.  When returning home, at some 
point Quevedo saw Sanchez’s Infiniti pass by “really fast.”  He 
was unable to see who was driving.   
Sanchez’s sister, Patricia Armenta, testified that Sanchez 
visited her home in Long Beach at 1:30 a.m. on March 7, asking 
for something to eat.  He seemed angry, and said that his car 
had been stolen and that he knew who had done it.  Sanchez told 
her that the culprits lived in Wilmington on Blinn Street.  He 
added that he was going to go to where those people were 
located.  Sanchez was at Armenta’s house for 10 or 15 minutes.  
Before leaving, he said he had some people with him he was 
going to drop off.  
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
6 
Virginia Ramos and David Rodriguez testified that they 
were living on Palmer Court at the time of Sanchez’s death.  
Ramos recalled that she was up early during the morning of 
March 7 to get some milk for her daughter when she looked out 
her kitchen window and saw a dark-colored car parked outside.  
Normally no car would be parked there at night.  Rodriguez also 
saw a small dark car with a few people around it.  Between 
15 minutes and a half-hour later, their dog barked.  Rodriguez 
went outside.  The car was gone, and there was a man crawling 
on the ground.  The man was moaning, and Rodriguez thought 
he might be drunk, or that he might have been beaten.  
Rodriguez returned to his residence to call an ambulance and 
then went back outside.  Five or ten minutes later, a small white 
car turned into the alley, traveling at a speed that Rodriguez 
estimated as 25 to 30 miles an hour.  Rodriguez was quite sure 
the car had its lights on.  Rodriguez went inside because he did 
not want to see the man in the alley get hit.  Ramos and 
Rodriguez heard two thumps.  They both watched as the white 
car passed by their home.  The vehicle then made a three-point 
turn and headed the other way.  Ramos called 911, reporting 
that the man Rodriguez had called about earlier had since been 
run over by a car.  Rodriguez saw the white car become 
temporarily blocked in the alley by an arriving fire engine, and 
then leave the scene.   
Fire department personnel testified that at approximately 
1:50 a.m. on March 7, they responded to a report of a staggering 
man on Palmer Court in Long Beach.  Their progress into the 
alley was blocked by a white vehicle, with two male Hispanic 
passengers inside.  The vehicle had some damage to its front end 
and a broken windshield.  The white vehicle was maneuvered 
into a parking area so that the truck could pass.  The fire captain 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
7 
provided a description of the vehicle to dispatch.  Sanchez was 
found on the east side of Palmer Court, approximately 150 to 
200 feet from its north end.  He was in critical condition, lacked 
a pulse, and was not breathing.  Sanchez never regained a pulse 
or resumed breathing.   
A City of Long Beach police officer testified that he 
received a call early in the morning of March 7 regarding an 
injured pedestrian on Palmer Court.  He was advised that the 
person might have been hit by a vehicle.  A description of the car 
and the suspects was provided.  The officer saw a car matching 
this description half a block from Palmer Court.  The car did not 
have its headlights on.  The officer followed the car for a while, 
then pulled it over.  The vehicle was a white 1992 Infiniti G20 
with two occupants:  defendant and Tinajero.  The officer 
detected a scent associated with alcoholic beverages when he 
spoke with defendant.  Fire department employees who had 
placed the call identified the vehicle as the one they had seen at 
the scene of the incident.   
An accident investigator for the Long Beach Police 
Department testified that he responded to Palmer Court early 
in the morning of March 7.  From his investigation, he concluded 
that Sanchez had been struck once by a vehicle traveling 
southbound along Palmer Court.  He testified that although the 
Infiniti had damage to its front bumper and windshield, this 
damage appeared to have been older and not caused by a recent 
collision.  An examination of the underside of the Infiniti 
revealed fresh damage to a corner of the oil pan and scrape 
marks along the undercarriage.  The damage was consistent 
with the vehicle having something lodged against it and 
dragging it along the pavement.  From these observations, it was 
the investigator’s opinion that Sanchez had been lying flat on 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
8 
the ground at the time of impact.  The investigator estimated 
the speed of the vehicle at the time of impact as approximately 
30 to 35 miles per hour.4  A sample of red liquid recovered from 
the underside of the Infiniti subsequently tested positive for 
human blood and returned a one-in-564-trillion match with 
Sanchez’s DNA.   
A coroner’s office medical examiner testified that Sanchez 
died from multiple traumatic injuries resulting in blood loss and 
loss of vital functions.  Sanchez’s injuries included general 
abrasions, going in different directions, to the right side of his 
body; abrasions on his face; nine fractured ribs; a fractured right 
clavicle; bilateral fractures to the front of his pelvis; and 
lacerations to his lungs, liver, pancreas, bladder, and prostate.  
Sanchez had no brain trauma.  Sanchez also had a fractured 
hyoid bone in his neck and hemorrhages in the sclera of his eyes, 
injuries consistent with strangulation.  Sanchez had no illegal 
drugs in his system, but postmortem tests returned an elevated 
blood alcohol level.  In the examiner’s opinion, based on the 
injuries Sanchez received, including the multidirectional 
abrasions found on his body, he had been run over more than 
once.  On cross-examination, the witness testified it was possible 
 
4  
The Honda taken from Sanchez was recovered a few days 
later by Miguel Aranda, Sanchez’s employer at the automobile 
repair shop.  Aranda was not aware that the vehicle had been 
involved in a crime and did not pay attention to whether there 
was any damage to its body or windows.  The vehicle was 
impounded by law enforcement two months later, after a repair 
had been made to it.  A subsequent search of the vehicle yielded 
no trace evidence of it having been used to roll over someone.  
The responsible investigator testified that the undercarriage of 
the vehicle “was very clean,” which was unusual for a vehicle 
that had traveled more than 80,000 miles.   
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
9 
the abrasions could have been caused by a body tumbling as it 
was being moved along the ground.   
b. Killing of Raul Tinajero 
On March 11, 2002, defendant was charged with vehicular 
manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (c)(3)), driving under the influence, 
causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)), and leaving the 
scene of an accident (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a)) in connection 
with Sanchez’s death.  Defendant pleaded not guilty to these 
charges.  Tinajero testified at the preliminary examination.  The 
one count information filed by the prosecution after the 
preliminary examination alleged that defendant had murdered 
Sanchez (§ 187, subd. (a)).  Tinajero then testified at defendant’s 
trial, which resulted in a mistrial after defendant’s attorney 
became ill.  As explained below, Tinajero was killed before a 
retrial could occur.   
In April 2004, defendant and Tinajero were housed in 
separate areas of the Men’s Central Jail in Los Angeles.  
A directive that defendant and Tinajero be kept apart was in 
place.  
Three of Tinajero’s cellmates in cell D13 at the jail testified 
at trial.  This cell was at the end of its row in the 2200 module, 
on the jail’s 2000 floor.  Its interior was not visible to jail guards 
when they were positioned at the cell module’s officer station.  
The first cellmate to testify was Anthony Sloan, who was 
in custody on kidnapping charges at the time of the killing.  
Sloan related that on April 20, 2004, defendant came into the 
cell along with another cellmate, who was returning from a 
parole hearing.  Sloan recognized defendant from prior 
interactions and asked him what he was doing.  Defendant said 
that “Raul” was his “crimee” — meaning he was involved in the 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
10 
same criminal case as defendant — and was going to testify in 
the case.  Defendant went to the upper bunk where Tinajero was 
sleeping, jumped into position, and placed Tinajero into a 
headlock.  Tinajero struggled to break free, but could not escape 
the hold.  At some point, defendant told everyone else in the cell 
to look away.  Tinajero stopped moving.  Defendant stuck 
Tinajero’s head in the cell’s toilet for a few minutes, then threw 
his body on the floor and began to stomp on it.  Sloan heard a 
loud popping or snapping noise as defendant stomped on 
Tinajero.  Defendant then tied something around Tinajero’s 
neck, put him on a mat, threw a sheet over him, and positioned 
his body under a bed.   
Afterward, defendant cleaned up the cell and made phone 
calls using a phone in the cell.  Sloan heard defendant say, “Tell 
them it’s a touch down.”  Defendant then sent a note down the 
cell row to obtain some cigarettes and a light.  He told Sloan and 
the other cellmates that Raul had testified against him, that 
there had been a mistrial due to his attorney’s medical 
condition, and that he had a “better chance” if Tinajero could not 
testify again.  Defendant wrote the names and booking numbers 
of the remaining cellmates, as found on their jail-issued 
wristbands, in a notebook he had.  He told them, “You know 
what time it is.”  Sloan interpreted defendant’s statement as 
meaning that he “would probably be the next one if [he] was 
to . . . say anything.”   
Jail personnel came by for a clothing exchange while 
defendant was still in the cell after Tinajero’s death, but Sloan 
was scared and said nothing to them.  Later, when it was time 
for an inmate transfer from the Men’s Central Jail to another 
facility, the door to cell D13 opened and defendant left with 
another cellmate.  Sloan then called his attorney and his mother 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
11 
and told them what had happened.5  He did not report the killing 
to deputies at the jail at that time, for fear of being labeled a 
snitch.  But later, when the cell door was opened as another 
cellmate returned from a court date, Sloan and the other cell 
occupants all exited the cell and told a deputy there was a “man 
down” inside the enclosure.   
Matthew Good, another of Tinajero’s former cellmates, 
provided generally similar testimony.  He related that 
defendant came into the cell, found Tinajero asleep, and then 
proceeded to choke him, dunk his head in the toilet, and jump 
on his chest.  Defendant positioned Tinajero’s body on a mat that 
was then slid under a bunk, cleaned up the cell, used the phone, 
and then, while hanging out in the cell, told another inmate that 
the person he had killed intended to testify against him again.  
Before leaving the cell, defendant recorded the other cellmates’ 
names and booking numbers in his notebook.  
The third cellmate to take the stand, Gregory Palacol, 
testified that as he was returning from a parole screening on the 
morning of April 20, he encountered defendant in a waiting 
room area within his module.  Defendant asked Palacol what 
cell he was in.  When Palacol told him, defendant asked if there 
was someone named “Smoky from West Side” in the cell.  Palacol 
 
5  
Sloan’s mother testified that Sloan had called her from jail 
on April 20, 2004.  He told her that “one is here and one is gone,” 
leading her to infer that there was a dead body in his cell.  She 
then called and spoke with Sloan’s attorney, Andrew Stein.  
Stein, testifying upon Sloan’s waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege, stated that Sloan had called him at around 3:30 p.m. 
on April 20, 2004, “hysterical and almost in tears,” and told him 
that a man had entered his cell, instructed him to turn around, 
and killed one of his cellmates.  Stein thereafter called the jail 
to report what had occurred.   
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
12 
said that he thought so.  Palacol saw defendant pick up a 
homemade cross on a string, tear the cross off, and put the string 
in his pocket.  When it came time for inmates collecting in the 
waiting area to return to their cells, defendant followed Palacol 
to cell D13.  Tinajero was asleep in his bunk.  Defendant sat on 
the cell’s toilet bowl for a few minutes.  He then placed Tinajero 
in a headlock and pulled him off his bunk.  Defendant had 
Tinajero in a headlock for 10 or 15 minutes.  At some point, 
Tinajero stopped moving and appeared to have been rendered 
unconscious.  Defendant then put Tinajero’s head in the toilet, 
with Tinajero’s face in the water and defendant’s knee behind 
Tinajero’s neck.  Defendant flushed the toilet.  Defendant kept 
Tinajero’s head in the toilet for a few minutes, then laid him on 
the floor.  Defendant next put his foot on Tinajero’s neck and 
“started bouncing” on it.   
Palacol testified that defendant subsequently dressed 
Tinajero, put him on a mat, put a string around his neck, tore 
off Tinajero’s wristband and flushed it down the toilet, slid his 
body under a bunk, and cleaned up the cell.  Afterward, 
defendant made a few phone calls, then looked at magazines.  As 
had Sloan and Good, Palacol also testified about statements 
defendant made after the killing.  Defendant told him that 
Tinajero had been brought down from state prison to testify 
against him in an earlier murder case in which defendant had 
killed someone and taken his car.  Defendant said that getting 
rid of Tinajero would be better for his case.  Defendant left the 
cell several hours later, incident to a prisoner transfer.  
Similarly to Good and Sloan, Palacol testified that defendant 
recorded the remaining cellmates’ names and booking numbers 
before he left.   
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
13 
Jail records showed that at 5:02 a.m. on April 20, 
defendant was scanned into the inmate reception center, an area 
where inmates gathered to be taken to court.  He was scanned 
out at 8:31 a.m., meaning he had not gone to court.  Sometime 
between 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. on April 20, defendant tried to 
pass by officers who were supervising an inmate transfer line in 
the jail’s 2200 module.  Asked to identify himself and explain 
where he was going, defendant said that he was visiting from 
the jail’s 3000 floor to see his “cousin.”  Defendant was searched 
and directed back to his floor.   
Jail deputies were alerted to Tinajero’s death by Good and 
his other cellmates at around 4:20 p.m. on April 20.  When 
deputies responded to the cell, Tinajero’s body was found 
underneath a bunk, on a mat, covered with a blanket.  That 
evening, a sheriff’s deputy visited defendant due to his status as 
a known “keep-away” from Tinajero.  The deputy took 
defendant’s clothing, including his pants.  The deputy saw what 
he thought might be bloodstains on a pant leg.  The deputy also 
found a small notebook in defendant’s clothing.  The phrases “El 
Chingon” and “ES Wilmas,” and the names and booking 
numbers of Sloan, Palacol, Good, and a fourth cellmate, Shad 
Davies (who did not cooperate with the investigation into 
Tinajero’s death and did not testify at trial), were all written 
inside.  So too was the text “RT,” near which appeared a number 
that was one digit different from Tinajero’s booking number at 
the jail.  A search of defendant’s cell yielded transcripts of 
Tinajero’s prior testimony, other court documents, and police 
reports prepared in connection with the investigation regarding 
Sanchez’s death.  Two days later, a detective noticed a scratch 
or scratches on defendant’s right hand during an interview.   
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
14 
An investigator with the county coroner’s office who 
arrived at cell D13 on the evening of April 20 estimated 
Tinajero’s time of death as approximately 12:00 p.m.  The 
investigator noted bruising around Tinajero’s neck and 
bloodstains around Tinajero’s mouth, chest, clothing, and legs.  
There were also bloodstains on Tinajero’s boxer shorts but not 
on his pants, leading the investigator to conclude he had been 
redressed.  The investigator noted a pattern on Tinajero’s neck 
that was similar to the pattern on shoes worn by jail inmates. 
Tinajero’s wristband was missing.   
A medical examiner who performed an autopsy on 
Tinajero’s corpse determined that he died from asphyxia due to 
strangulation by ligature, although manual strangulation or an 
arm hold could not be excluded as the cause of death.  Tinajero 
had abrasions to the front and back of his neck; bruises to his 
neck, tongue, and upper back; blunt trauma to the neck; 
hemorrhages to his front neck muscles; an abrasion on his left 
shoulder; and minor abrasions on his right knee.  Petechiae 
(pinpoint hemorrhages) in Tinajero’s eyes and a fractured 
cricoid, an area of cartilage just beneath his voice box, also were 
consistent with strangulation.  Blood was coming out of 
Tinajero’s mouth, and there was dried blood on various parts of 
his body, which could have come from his mouth or from the 
abrasions around his knee.   
A forensic serologist who performed DNA tests on the 
blood found on defendant’s pants testified that it came from 
Raul Tinajero, with a probability of one in 110 quadrillion that 
someone else left the blood.  The serologist also obtained DNA 
profiles of four or more people from the ligature placed around 
Tinajero’s neck.  In addition to finding DNA consistent with 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
15 
Tinajero’s DNA profile on the ligature, the serologist determined 
that defendant could have been one of the donors.   
Two sheriff’s deputies testified concerning statements 
defendant made to them.  Jesus Argueta testified that sometime 
between May 3 and May 6, 2004, defendant called him to his cell 
and asked whether Argueta had heard “what happened.”  
Argueta had grown up in the same neighborhood as defendant 
and the two were acquaintances prior to defendant’s 
incarceration.  Argueta replied that he had not.  Defendant 
responded that he was being accused of killing his “crimee,” 
further explaining that he and the crimee had committed a 
murder together, and that “this fucker, he’s snitching on me, so 
we had to get rid of him.”  Now that the crimee was dead, 
defendant said, “[T]hey’re going to have to offer [him] a deal” 
because “they wouldn’t have shit on [him] now.”  Argueta did not 
take notes of the conversation, and did not report it to a superior 
until several days had elapsed.   
Josue Torres, another deputy sheriff, testified that on 
May 3, 2004, he was escorting defendant back from court.  
Defendant had previously a been a trusty, or helper, for Torres.  
Defendant was smiling at Torres and told him, “Hey, Torres, 
I did it,” elaborating that he had “killed the fool that snitched on 
him.”  Defendant told Torres that he had obtained approval to 
“take care of his business” by showing appropriate “paperwork” 
to the inmate who ran Tinajero’s floor at the jail.  Defendant 
further explained that he had procured a court pass belonging 
to someone else, left his cell, and went to a central inmate 
receiving station within the jail.  When his wristband was 
scanned there and found not to match his pass, defendant 
apologized and left.  But instead of going back to his cell, 
defendant went to Tinajero’s.  There, he saw Tinajero lying 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
16 
down.  Defendant got on top of Tinajero and flipped him over.  
Tinajero saw defendant and tried screaming for help.  
Defendant started choking him.  The two men struggled.  
Defendant put Tinajero’s head in the toilet and, with his knee 
atop Tinajero’s head, flushed the toilet to try to drown Tinajero.  
Once defendant saw that Tinajero was not moving, he checked 
for a pulse.  Finding none, defendant cleaned up the area, taking 
Tinajero’s wristband off and flushing it down the toilet.  He also 
took out his notebook and wrote down the names and booking 
numbers of the other inmates in the cell.  To make sure that 
Tinajero was dead, defendant stomped on his chest to see if 
there would be a reaction.  There was not.  He then stretched 
out a plastic trash bag and tied it tightly around Tinajero’s neck. 
Afterward, defendant waited in the cell until it was time for an 
inmate transfer, at which time he went back to his assigned 
cell.6   
Other witnesses during the prosecution’s case-in-chief 
testified regarding communications with defendant, incidents in 
which defendant committed rules violations at the jail, how the 
jail controlled and kept track of inmate whereabouts, and gang 
activity at the jail and its relationship to the Tinajero killing.   
Among this evidence, Irma Limas testified that she was 
employed as a corporate receptionist in April 2004 when she 
began to receive phone calls and letters from someone who 
identified himself as “Santi” and “Chingon.”  Limas told this 
person her name was “Irma Gardea”; this name, and Limas’s 
address and phone number, were written in the notebook found 
in defendant’s possession shortly after Tinajero’s death.  Santi, 
 
6  
When defendant subsequently took the stand, he denied 
making the statements to Argueta and Torres.   
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
17 
whom Limas never met in person during the course of their 
communications, said that he was in jail on a “187” (the Penal 
Code section for murder) for running over somebody.  At some 
point, Santi asked her to try to use her computer to determine if 
someone named Raul, whom Santi “needed to get ahold of,” also 
was in jail.  Santi told Limas that Raul was a “clown” who was 
testifying against him.  Limas did not comply with the request, 
but Santi later told her that a friend or “homie” of his had 
obtained the information for him.  Santi also told Limas that he 
had obtained a wristband from another inmate in an attempt to 
escape.  Limas authenticated letters and a card sent to her from 
“Chingon Santi” or just “Chingon.”  Another letter to Limas, 
signed “Santiago Pineda Hernandez Chingon,” provided that it 
was “from the Big Bad Ass ES Wilmas,” which Limas testified 
was a gang.  
Testimony from other witnesses delved into the policies, 
practices, and procedures that were in place at the Men’s 
Central Jail at the time of Tinajero’s death.  This testimony 
addressed, among other subjects, the extent to which possession 
of a court pass could enable an inmate to move freely around the 
jail.  A sheriff’s deputy testified that if an inmate wanted to get 
from his own cell to another area of the jail, he could leave his 
module using a court pass that might be obtained from another 
inmate.  If an inmate went to the jail’s inmate reception center 
with a pass, and it was at that time discovered that he was not 
going to court, he would be told to return to his cell module.  The 
same deputy agreed with the assertion that once an inmate left 
his floor with a pass, for the most part it was “really on the honor 
system for them to go to the right location.”  A majority of the 
general population inmates with passes would not have been 
handcuffed.  Defendant, being housed in the general jail 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
18 
population on April 20, 2004, would not have been handcuffed 
or escorted to different locations at that time, but instead would 
have been subject to the honor system described by the deputy.  
Upon arriving at a cell module, an inmate would have been 
asked for his name and whether he lived in the module.  
Wristbands or passes were generally not checked in these 
situations to confirm an inmate’s identity.   
A jail inmate and deputies also testified regarding a series 
of incidents, occurring before and after Tinajero’s death, in 
which defendant violated jailhouse rules by escaping from 
secure facilities or areas, possessing contraband, and not 
wearing his identifying wristband.  Witnesses also testified 
about gang influence and culture at the jail, especially as it 
related to the role of gangs in sanctioning retaliation against 
informants and whether gang members would rely on 
nonmembers to administer such punishment.  In his testimony 
concerning gangs at the jail, one witness, Deputy Javier Clift, 
was allowed to opine that defendant was a member of the 
Sureño gang.  Clift also testified regarding a letter he had 
intercepted, in which defendant wrote, “I go to trial next month, 
so I have decided to let my hair grow and with a clean shaved 
face with some retarded glasses and a nice suit, the not guilty 
look,” followed by a simple drawing of a smiling face.  Clift’s 
testimony regarding gangs and defendant’s gang membership, 
as well as the other gang and misconduct evidence described in 
this paragraph, will be discussed at greater length post, in 
addressing defendant’s claims that this evidence was admitted 
in error.   
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
19 
2. Defense Case 
A Long Beach police officer testified that he administered 
a drug recognition evaluation on defendant after his arrest 
during the early morning hours of March 7, 2002.  From this 
evaluation, the officer concluded that defendant was under the 
influence of a central nervous system stimulant, cannabis, and 
alcohol, and recommended that he be charged with driving 
under the influence.  Defendant told the officer that he had been 
using methamphetamine and marijuana earlier that evening.  
A breathalyzer test administered at the police station returned 
a blood alcohol concentration of .05 to .06 percent.7  A criminalist 
testified that a subsequent test of defendant’s urine returned 
positive results for amphetamine, cannabinoids, and cocaine 
metabolite.  The urine sample also contained a quantity of 
alcohol translating to a blood alcohol concentration of 
approximately .08 percent; however, testing of a blood sample 
taken from defendant returned no alcohol content.   
Defendant took the stand on his own behalf.  He testified 
that he and Tinajero had been drinking and using drugs when 
they met Sanchez.  The three men went to defendant’s house 
and drank some beer.  They left to acquire more drugs.  
Defendant acknowledged driving away and leaving Sanchez in 
an alley, but testified it was just a trick or a gag.  According to 
defendant, Sanchez was already at defendant’s house when 
defendant returned.  Defendant told Sanchez that he had taken 
his car just to play with him.  The three men then left to continue 
 
7  
This officer was briefly recalled as the sole witness offered 
by the People in rebuttal at the guilt phase.   
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
20 
looking for drugs, with Sanchez driving a Honda that he had 
brought to defendant’s home.   
Defendant further testified that after stopping at the 
house of Sanchez’s sister, the men went to Palmer Court to get 
drugs.  There were other people in the alley when they arrived.  
After Sanchez began to speak with them, a fight broke out.  As 
the men in the alley were striking Sanchez, defendant drove off 
in Sanchez’s car.  Defendant went to a friend’s house in his 
neighborhood, obtained a gun, and then returned to Palmer 
Court in Sanchez’s Infiniti, leaving the Honda in Wilmington.  
Defendant turned the Infiniti’s headlights off as he entered the 
alley.  As he was driving, defendant heard a “big bump” and then 
noticed that something was being dragged by the car.  He made 
a U-turn and told Tinajero to open the door to see what it was.  
It was Sanchez.  Defendant denied intentionally hitting Sanchez 
with the Infiniti.  The fire department arrived before defendant 
and Tinajero could take Sanchez to the hospital.  Defendant, 
being high and in the possession of a gun, drove off.   
Defendant also denied killing Tinajero.  He testified that 
while in custody at the Men’s Central Jail, he had received 
information that some people were going over to Tinajero’s cell.  
Defendant tried to make sure nothing would happen to Tinajero, 
and was told that nothing would occur that day, but heard that 
“they couldn’t just leave him alone, they had to at least regulate 
him.”8  Defendant went to Tinajero’s cell the next day because 
he did not want anything to happen to him.  Defendant believed 
it would be worse for his case if Tinajero was harmed; and that, 
in any event, no “regulation” of Tinajero had been properly 
 
8  
“Regulate,” in this context, means a beating administered 
by other inmates. 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
21 
authorized.  Tinajero, defendant testified, was already dead and 
tucked under the bunk in his cell by the time defendant arrived. 
Defendant acknowledged that he had made telephone calls from 
Tinajero’s cell.  Defendant explained that he feared being 
blamed for Tinajero’s death, and so he felt he had to contact 
people to do something.   
The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts and found 
all special circumstances to be true.  The case then proceeded to 
a penalty phase.  
B. Penalty Phase 
1. People’s Case 
The People’s witnesses at the penalty phase included 
several sheriff’s deputies who testified about incidents offered 
as section 190.3, factor (b) evidence, through which “criminal 
activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted 
use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use 
force or violence” can be introduced into evidence for 
consideration by the trier of fact.  To the extent that defendant 
argues this evidence should not have been admitted, the specific 
proof involved will be described later in this opinion.9   
Defendant does not challenge the introduction of evidence 
offered at the penalty phase under section 190.3, factor (b) 
regarding a jailhouse incident that took place on November 5, 
2004.  On that date, defendant (who by then was housed within 
the jail’s high security module) was seen in his cell drinking 
 
9   
Defendant also admitted to having incurred a conviction 
for grand theft auto, and the jury was advised at the penalty 
phase that it could consider this conviction as an aggravating 
circumstance if proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  (See § 190.3, 
factor (c).)   
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
22 
pruno, an alcoholic beverage covertly brewed by inmates.  When 
deputies tried to take the pruno away, defendant, who appeared 
to be intoxicated, said to one of them that for telling on him, he 
would stab him when he least expected it.  The deputy asked 
defendant if he was threatening him; defendant replied that he 
was.  Defendant was noncooperative as deputies tried to remove 
him from his cell.  A Taser was deployed, but it was ineffective 
due to the baggy clothing defendant was wearing.  Eventually 
defendant was handcuffed and removed from his cell.  During 
this process defendant was “thrashing about, using his legs, his 
hips, his feet, anything” to frustrate his extraction.  He spit on 
a deputy and kicked a deputy in the leg.   
Other witnesses at the penalty phase testified regarding 
their relationships with Sanchez, whom they referred to as Juan 
Armenta. 
Eduardo Quevedo testified that he had known Sanchez for 
eight years.  Quevedo testified that Sanchez was a “nice person” 
who “was always smiling,” would “always help everybody,” and 
“never asked for anything back.”   
Patricia Armenta, Rafael Sanchez’s sister, also returned 
to the stand and testified that her brother was a year and a half 
older than she was.  He was “the best” brother and “a good 
person” who “liked to help others.”  He also was a good uncle to 
her children.  He would bring presents to other people to make 
them happy.  He was a mechanic and hoped to open his own 
shop.  When Sanchez saw that someone’s car was not working, 
he would stop and help them; when someone’s car was broken 
down on the side of the road, he would give that person a ride.  
When Patricia Armenta was shown a photo of her brother after 
his death, she “wanted to die.”  She could only recognize his eyes 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
23 
in the photo.  She related that she was “not the same person” 
since her brother’s death.   
Maria Armenta, Rafael Sanchez’s mother, testified that 
she had learned on her birthday that her son had died.  Her son 
was a good person, a good father, a good brother, and a good son.  
He was “the biggest thing” to her, “her pride.”  She testified that 
“wherever there was a person that needed help, he was there.”  
Sanchez worked two jobs and lived with her after his wife and 
daughter moved to Minnesota.  Maria Armenta’s “life ended 
together with his”; she was “finished.”  By this, she meant that 
her “life has no meaning as it had before.”  She missed 
“everything” about her son.   
2. Defense Case 
Several of defendant’s family members and a family friend 
testified 
concerning 
the 
circumstances 
of 
defendant’s 
upbringing and their relationships with him.  Defendant’s 
father was an alcoholic who would beat him with a belt, hose, 
and other implements.  Defendant started to work at his father’s 
cabinet shop at a very young age.  He sometimes worked into 
the evening and on weekends, leaving little time for play.  
Defendant’s father encouraged him to fight and was proud of his 
son when he fought back against others.  Defendant would use 
money he earned working to help his family pay bills or to buy 
them shoes and clothes.  The testimony from defendant’s family 
members also touched upon defendant’s drug use, which 
included the abuse of heroin and cocaine.  
The defense presented additional witnesses to support its 
mitigation case.  Three teachers at defendant’s elementary 
school testified regarding their interactions with him.  Adrienne 
Davis, a clinical psychologist, testified that several factors, 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
24 
including a father with a substance abuse problem, poverty, 
early exposure to drugs and alcohol, family instability, abuse at 
the hands of a parent, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, 
and a lack of socialization opportunities may have predisposed 
defendant to commit, or contributed to his involvement in, the 
charged crimes.  Davis opined that defendant also lacked a 
positive role model whose influence might have offset the impact 
of these factors.  A correctional consultant, James Esten, 
testified regarding defendant’s possible custodial environment 
if he were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.   
3. People’s Rebuttal 
In rebuttal, the jury heard testimony from Luis Puig, a 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation employee, 
regarding why defendant would not necessarily be placed in one 
of the facilities Esten had described and about the differences 
between the conditions of confinement for prisoners sentenced 
to life without the possibility of parole and prisoners sentenced 
to death.  
The People presented evidence that contraband was found 
in defendant’s legal mail during a search of defendant’s cell 
occurring on December 29, 2006.  The jury also heard testimony 
regarding an incident at the jail on January 4, 2007 (after the 
commencement of the penalty phase), in which defendant was 
found to have in his possession sealed personal letters within an 
envelope marked “legal mail.”  It was a violation of jail rules for 
defendant to be in possession of sealed personal correspondence.  
Deputy Clift was recalled to the stand and testified regarding 
the contents of the letters seized from defendant at that time.   
After retiring to deliberate at the penalty phase, the jury 
sent a note to the trial court asking how to proceed because it 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
25 
was not unanimous regarding one of the counts.  Returning to 
the courtroom, the jury rendered a verdict of death for the 
murder of Raul Tinajero (count two).  After further dialogue 
with the court, the jury resumed its deliberations regarding the 
other count.  Two days later, the jury returned a verdict of death 
on count 1, the murder of Rafael Sanchez.  The trial court 
subsequently denied a defense motion for a new trial as well as 
the automatic motion for reduction of the penalty from death to 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  (§ 190.4.)   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Pretrial Issues 
1. Excusal of Juror for Cause  
Defendant argues that the trial court violated his rights 
under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and article I, sections 7, 15, 16, and 
17 of the California Constitution when it excused Prospective 
Juror J.W. for cause.  The trial court granted the People’s 
request to dismiss J.W. from service, finding him “disqualified 
both on the general circumstances of the answers that he’s given 
and on his penalty phase answers.”  We find no error. 
a. Facts 
Prospective Juror J.W. was excused for cause after 
completing a juror questionnaire and undergoing voir dire with 
the trial court and counsel.   
i. Juror Questionnaire 
J.W. expressed inconsistent views in his questionnaire 
responses.   
Some of J.W.’s responses indicated he would refuse to vote 
to convict defendant if doing so would make defendant eligible 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
26 
for the death penalty and that he would never under any 
circumstances vote for the death penalty.  After describing the 
allegations against defendant, the questionnaire asked, “No 
matter what the evidence shows, would you refuse to vote for 
guilt as to first degree murder or refuse to find the special 
circumstances true in order to keep the case from going to the 
penalty phase, where death or life in prison without the 
possibility of parole is decided?”  J.W. responded, “yes.”  
Meanwhile, J.W. responded “no” to the question, “Given the fact 
that you have two options available to you, can you see yourself, 
in the appropriate case, rejecting life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole and choosing the death penalty instead?”   
Conversely, other answers to questions posed in the juror 
questionnaire indicated that J.W. was prepared to consider the 
death penalty as a sentencing option.  J.W. answered “no” to the 
question, “If the jury found a defendant guilty of intentional first 
degree murder and found a special circumstance to be true, 
would you always vote against death, no matter what other 
evidence might be presented at the penalty hearing in this 
case?”  When asked whether he thought death or life without the 
possibility of parole was a worse sentence for a defendant, J.W. 
circled the latter option, explaining, “boring with no life.”  J.W. 
strongly agreed with the statement, “Anyone who intentionally 
kills another person should always get the death penalty,” 
adding, “an eye for an eye,” and he strongly disagreed with the 
statement, “Anyone who intentionally kills another person 
should never get the death penalty.”   
Among his other written responses to questions 
concerning the death penalty, J.W. answered, “only God has the 
right” to the question, “What is the view, if any, of your religious 
organization concerning the death penalty?”  J.W. responded 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
27 
with a “Yes” to a follow-up question inquiring if he felt obligated 
to accept that view, explaining, “same as above.”  As among 
“strongly in favor,” “moderately in favor,” “strongly against,” 
“moderately against,” or “neutral,” J.W. described his 
philosophical opinion regarding the death penalty as “neutral.”  
Where the questionnaire inquired whether he felt the death 
sentence was imposed “too often,” “too seldom,” “randomly,” or 
“about right,” J.W. circled “about right,” adding, “hard to take a 
life.”  In response to a question asking if he had thought about 
whether he was for or against the death penalty before coming 
into court, J.W. circled “yes,” with the explanation, “having to 
judge the right or the wrong.”  And J.W. responded with a “no” 
to a question asking whether his opinion about the death 
penalty had changed over the years.  
Some of J.W.’s other responses to questions posed in the 
questionnaire, although not directly concerned with the death 
penalty, would also become the subject of probing by counsel and 
the court in subsequent voir dire:  
• J.W. responded “no” to the question, “Can you set aside 
any sympathy, bias, or prejudice you might feel toward any 
victim, witness, or defendant?” and provided the explanation, 
“you need to be honest.” 
• He responded “no” to the question, “Will you consider 
along with all of the other evidence presented, the testimony of 
an unavailable witness (for example, one who is too ill to come 
to court) whose prior testimony is read to you?”  In response, 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
28 
J.W. explained, “[I]t’s hard to except 2nd hand information.”10  
Yet J.W. also answered “no” to the question, “Will you 
automatically reject the testimony of an unavailable witness 
merely because the actual witness is not present[?]”   
• He answered “yes” to the question, “If you believed that 
it was wrong for the prosecution to ask the Court to grant 
immunity from prosecution or to give special consideration in 
another case in exchange for a witness testifying here, would 
you hold that against the prosecution and refuse to convict even 
if shown the defendant is guilty[?]”  He explained, “If you have 
committed a crime, there should be immunity.”11   
 
J.W. also  responded “yes” to the question, “The testimony 
of a single witness is sufficient to prove any fact if you believe 
the witness.  Would you require more proof if you believe the 
witness is telling the truth?”  His questionnaire response 
elaborated, “I need to be sure.”  He answered “no” to the 
question, “During deliberations, it is the obligation of every juror 
to freely discuss the evidence and instructions with other jurors.  
Will you agree to tell the Court if anyone refused to deliberate 
with the rest of the jury?”  Here, J.W. explained in the 
questionnaire, “What is said in the room, stays in the room.” 
In another questionnaire response, J.W. stated that he 
could set aside his own beliefs and follow the law as the judge 
gave it to him, even if the instruction was different from a belief 
 
10  
Here and elsewhere in this opinion, we will in most 
instances repeat verbatim statements appearing in written 
documents such as juror questionnaires and letters, without 
making spelling or grammatical corrections. 
11  
It may be that J.W. intended to add the word “no” before 
“immunity,” but failed to do so.   
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
29 
or opinion that he held.  When asked if there was “any reason 
why [he] would prefer not to serve as a juror in this case,” J.W. 
responded, “no.”  He also responded “no” to the question, “Is 
there any reason why you would not be a fair and impartial juror 
for both the prosecution and the defense in this case?”   
ii. Voir Dire 
J.W. was questioned by the court and by counsel after he 
completed his questionnaire. 
The trial court first probed J.W. about his willingness to 
consider certain kinds of evidence.  When the court asked why 
he answered “no” to the question, “Can you set aside any 
sympathy, bias, or prejudice you might feel toward any victim, 
witness, or defendant?” and about his explanation, “[Y]ou need 
to be honest,” J.W. answered, “Oh, probably because of the 
circumstances as to how the trial is going to be run, whether, 
you know, if I try to set myself aside and say, okay, I think he’s 
not guilty or he is guilty.  [¶]  I would have to have a little bit 
more information as far as what I need to say or what I need to 
do.”  When the trial court inquired further and asked if J.W. 
could base his decision about “what happened” on facts rather 
than sympathy, bias, or prejudice, J.W. answered, “yes.”  After 
the trial court explained that as a juror, J.W. would have to try 
to evaluate a witness’s prior testimony under oath as he would 
the testimony of a live witness, J.W. said he could do so.  And 
following the trial court’s explanation regarding why a witness 
might be granted immunity from prosecution, J.W. said he had 
“no problem” with the idea of granting immunity to someone 
who might then serve as a witness.  
The trial court also asked J.W. several questions 
regarding his views on the death penalty and their potential 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
30 
bearing on his service as a juror.  When asked what he meant 
by his questionnaire response “an eye for an eye,” J.W. 
answered, “Well, you know, I thought about that question, and 
I had mixed emotions about it.  And I wasn’t sure whether I have 
the right to prosecute a person as an eye for an eye, and, you 
know, I really didn’t know how to answer that question.”  When 
the court then inquired if J.W.’s answer meant he would 
automatically vote for the death penalty if defendant was found 
guilty of first degree murder, J.W. said, “no.”  Regarding his 
“neutral” view toward the death penalty, J.W. said he so 
responded “because [he] was undecided” when he filled out the 
questionnaire, but now, “in some of the cases, I — I think a life 
sentence would be more — more to the liking on my side rather 
than the death penalty.”  The court followed up, “So you think 
instead of like an eye for an eye, you commit murder, you should 
be executed, you think the opposite?  Even if you commit a 
murder, you should get life without parole?”  J.W. answered, 
“Right.”  Yet when asked by the court whether, at any penalty 
phase, he would be “open to considering any aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, the good and the bad things about the 
defendant . . . in making that decision” regarding sentencing or 
whether he was “locked in to the decision of life without parole,” 
J.W. answered that he could make a fair decision either way, 
depending on the evidence.  
When the trial court asked about J.W.’s questionnaire 
response indicating that he felt obligated to accept the principle 
that “[o]nly God has the right” to take a life, J.W. responded, “At 
the time I answered that question, I had my mind fixed, but as 
it turns out, if I were in the same predicament, I would want — 
I would want to be tried fairly . . . .”  When the trial court asked 
J.W. to clarify what he was saying, J.W., repeated, “Well, if 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
31 
I was facing the same predicament and there was someone in 
the jury, I would want him to judge me fairly.”  When the trial 
court asked what the relationship was between the sentencing 
decision and being tried fairly, J.W. replied, “If it’s a death 
penalty, I deserve to have death penalty, but if there’s some 
circumstances in there that says, well, maybe I wasn’t totally 
within my own faculty, you know, when I did something, then 
I’m sorry I did it, but I did it anyway.”   
After the court turned the questioning over to counsel, 
J.W. responded affirmatively to questions by defense counsel 
asking whether he would be open-minded to both sentencing 
possibilities at a penalty phase, whether he could follow the 
court’s instructions at a penalty phase, whether he could 
evaluate defendant’s “background for what it is, make an honest 
decision about it,” and whether he could be fair at both phases 
of the trial.   
When it was the prosecution’s turn to pose questions, J.W. 
was asked, “Do you think, given all of your views about God and 
not liking to sit in judgment of people, that you can be a juror in 
this case?”  J.W. responded, “Now that I think of it, yeah, I could.  
We’ll all be judged some time, and we’ll be judged.”  Upon being 
requested to repeat his answer, J.W. said, “At some time in our 
life or after life, we’ll all be judged, so if I make — if I make a 
mistake now, I would be judged for it, but I will be forgiven, 
okay?  [¶]  So now if I — if I said yes, I can abide by the death 
penalty and then again I could say yes parole without the or — 
I could honestly make an honest judgment at that time knowing 
that what I say I may be forgiven for, whether I make the wrong 
choice or not.”  The prosecutor asked, “[A]re you going to be 
concerned when you go in the jury room though that you’re going 
to be forgiven when it’s your time for judgment?”  J.W. 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
32 
answered, “Uh-huh.”  The prosecutor followed up, “Are you 
going to be worried about the fact that in your beliefs that it’s 
the wrong decision?”  J.W. replied, “No, no, I won’t be.”  In 
response to a similar question asking whether he could return a 
penalty phase verdict of death, J.W. responded, “If all the 
circumstances — now that I think about it, with all the 
circumstances, if it pointed in that direction, yeah, I could.”  J.W. 
provided a similar response when the prosecutor asked whether 
he would be able to look at the defendant and his family in court 
and say that defendant deserves the death penalty.   
The prosecutor challenged J.W. for cause at the close of 
voir dire.  She argued, “I know what he said here he thinks he 
could do it . . . but throughout his paperwork he indicated there 
is no way he could do it.”  The prosecutor added that she felt 
from J.W.’s responses during voir dire that he was answering 
questions in a manner “he thought would keep him on” the 
jury.12  Defense counsel disagreed, stressing J.W.’s repeated 
averments that he could be fair and could return a death verdict.  
The trial court allowed the challenge for cause and 
dismissed J.W. from service.  The court believed that J.W. had 
“never explained to [him]” what wanting to be tried fairly meant, 
adding, “The problem is he lists in the wind.  He’s got in the 
questionnaire as far as the penalty is concerned ‘an eye for an 
eye,’ which would suggest you commit the crime of murder, you 
are to be executed.  [¶]  On the other side, he says only God can 
take a life.  Then I’ve tried to clarify which it is, one extreme or 
 
12   
Although not directly referenced by the prosecutor in 
making this argument, the record suggests that during voir dire 
J.W. answered some questions in the affirmative even before the 
attorney finished asking them. 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
33 
the other, and he has not made it clear which one it is.  [¶]  His 
statement that he can be fair isn’t the final conclusion.  [¶]  He 
is also so inexact in his answers.  When he says to the question, 
‘Can you set aside sympathy, bias or prejudice, you need to be 
honest,’ and I asked him what the heck that means, and he 
doesn’t give a valid answer to any of these questions.  [¶]  I think 
he’s disqualified both on the general circumstances of the 
answers that he’s given and on his penalty phase answers, and 
I will allow the challenge.”  
b. Analysis 
Substantial evidence supports the excusal of J.W. for 
cause.  In light of the conflicts across J.W.’s questionnaire 
responses and his answers to questions posed to him by the 
court and counsel, as well as the nature of those answers, it was 
within the trial court’s broad discretion to uphold the 
prosecution’s challenge.   
A prospective juror may be dismissed (i.e., excused from 
service as a juror) for cause.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 228; People 
v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 987‒988.)  Yet such a dismissal 
may be based on a juror’s personal views regarding capital 
punishment only if these “views would ‘prevent or substantially 
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance 
with his instructions and his oath.’ ”  (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 
469 U.S. 412, 424 (Witt).)  It is “clear that prospective jurors may 
not be disqualified from service simply because they object to the 
death penalty as a general matter” (People v. Peterson (2020) 
10 Cal.5th 409, 429) or because the prospective juror “might 
‘impose a higher threshold before concluding that the death 
penalty is appropriate’ ” (id., at p. 430).  The standard for 
dismissal for cause based on the juror’s views regarding the 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
34 
death penalty is instead whether, “after examining the available 
evidence, . . . the trial court [is] left with a definite impression 
that the prospective juror is unable or unwilling to faithfully and 
impartially follow the law” as instructed by the court.  (People v. 
Thompson 
(2016) 
1 Cal.5th 
1043, 1066.) 
 
This 
rule 
accommodates both the principle that a criminal defendant has 
a “right to an impartial jury drawn from a venire that has not 
been tilted in favor of capital punishment by selective 
prosecutorial challenges for cause” and the state’s “strong 
interest in having jurors who are able to apply capital 
punishment within the framework state law prescribes. ”  
(Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 9 (Uttecht).)   
The legal standard for dismissing a prospective juror for 
cause “does not require that a juror’s bias be proved with 
‘unmistakable clarity.’  This is because determinations of juror 
bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer sessions which 
obtain results in the manner of a catechism.  What common 
sense should have realized experience has proved:  many 
veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach 
the point where their bias has been made ‘unmistakably clear’; 
these veniremen may not know how they will react when faced 
with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to 
articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings.”  (Witt, supra, 
469 U.S. at pp. 424–425; see also People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 
8 Cal.5th 548, 607; People v. Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399, 426 
[“[j]urors commonly supply conflicting or equivocal responses to 
questions directed at their potential bias or incapacity to 
serve”].)   
When prospective jurors are questioned in person, a 
reviewing court considering whether substantial evidence 
supports a dismissal for cause generally must give deference to 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
35 
the trial court’s determinations.  (Uttecht, supra, 551 U.S. at 
p. 7.)  This deference recognizes that the trial court was “in a 
position to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the 
individuals who compose it, a factor of critical importance in 
assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.”  
(Id., at p. 9; see also Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 426 [“deference 
must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror”].)  
As we have explained, “ ‘ “ ‘[a] trial judge who observes and 
speaks with a prospective juror and hears that person’s 
responses (noting, among other things, the person’s tone of 
voice, apparent level of confidence, and demeanor), gleans 
valuable information that simply does not appear on the record.’  
[Citation.]”  [Citation.]’  [Citation.]  For this reason, ‘ “[o]n 
review of a trial court’s ruling, if the prospective juror’s 
statements 
are 
equivocal 
or 
conflicting, 
that 
court’s 
determination of the person’s state of mind is binding.  If there 
is no inconsistency, the reviewing court will uphold the court’s 
ruling if substantial evidence supports it.” ’ ”  (People v. Solomon 
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 830; see also Uttecht, at p. 7 [“when there 
is ambiguity in the prospective juror’s statements, ‘the trial 
court, aided as it undoubtedly [is] by its assessment of [the 
venireman’s] demeanor, [is] entitled to resolve it in favor of the 
State’ ”].)   
With regard to the consequences of an erroneous dismissal 
of a prospective juror for cause, although “ ‘[t]he general rule is 
that, absent a showing of prejudice, an erroneous excusal of a 
prospective juror for cause does not mandate the reversal of 
judgment’ ” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 866; see 
also People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1037 
(Carpenter); People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 656), if the 
wrongful excusal for cause is premised on a prospective juror’s 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
36 
views regarding the death penalty, a penalty phase verdict of 
death cannot stand (Gray v. Mississippi (1987) 481 U.S. 648, 
659).   
As previously set forth, J.W. responded “yes” to the 
questionnaire inquiry, “No matter what the evidence shows, 
would you refuse to vote for guilt as to first degree murder or 
refuse to find the special circumstances true in order to keep the 
case from going to the penalty phase, where death or life in 
prison without the possibility of parole is decided?” — and “no” 
to the question, “Given the fact that you have two options 
available to you, can you see yourself, in the appropriate case, 
rejecting life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and 
choosing the death penalty instead?”  These responses were 
suggestive of substantial impairment (see People v. Capistrano 
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 856‒857; People v. Riccardi (2012) 
54 Cal.4th 758, 780‒782), but they were also in some tension 
with other answers J.W. provided within the questionnaire.   
The trial court then properly provided for in-person 
examination of J.W.  This questioning delved into topics 
germane to the ultimate question of substantial impairment.  
J.W.’s answers to some of these questions could have reinforced 
concerns imparted by his questionnaire responses insofar as, 
among other things, they entailed multiple reversals of positions 
taken in his written answers (such as his affirmative response 
to the trial court’s inquiry, “So you think instead of like an eye 
for an eye, you commit murder, you should be executed, you 
think the opposite?  Even if you commit a murder, you should 
get life without parole?”).  The trial court could also properly 
take into account the meandering and inconclusive nature of 
J.W.’s responses to some of the questions that were posed to him 
during voir dire.  (See People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 900 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
37 
[finding no error in trial court’s ruling that a juror who “gave 
equivocal, conflicting, nonresponsive, and confusing answers 
when asked about his ability to set aside his personal views and 
follow the law,” after his questionnaire suggested his beliefs 
would affect his penalty decision, was substantially impaired]; 
Carpenter, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1036.)   
Although in the course of voir dire J.W. also asserted that 
he could be open-minded, follow the court’s instructions, and 
review the evidence fairly, it was appropriate for the trial court 
to evaluate the credibility of these and J.W.’s other answers.  
The trial court’s comments that J.W. “lists in the wind” and that 
J.W.’s “statement that he can be fair isn’t the final conclusion” 
convey a critical assessment of the prospective juror’s credibility 
during voir dire, including J.W.’s averments that he could 
faithfully and fairly apply the law as instructed.  Our review of 
the record leads us to conclude that there was an adequate basis 
for these credibility calls, and for the trial court’s accompanying 
excusal of J.W. from service, notwithstanding the presence of 
evidence that, if credited, could have led the trial court to draw 
different conclusions.  Even if J.W.’s impairment was not proved 
to a degree of absolute certainty, as we noted earlier, that is not 
the standard that applies here.  (See Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at 
pp. 424–425.)   
At oral argument, defense counsel pressed the position 
that the trial court conducted inadequate voir dire because it did 
not directly inquire about J.W.’s “yes” response to the “No 
matter what the evidence shows” question described above and 
his “no” response to the “Given the fact that you have two 
options available to you” question.  In light of the significant voir 
dire that did take place regarding topics germane to J.W.’s 
impairment, we disagree that such a specific line of questioning 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
38 
by the trial court was essential.  This case is distinguishable 
from People v. Woodruff (2018) 5 Cal.5th 697, People v. Stewart 
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, and People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 
946, all of which were cited by counsel at oral argument.  In 
those matters, we found error in the excusal of prospective 
jurors when the pertinent questionnaire responses indicated 
only personal opposition to the death penalty (Woodruff, at 
pp. 741‒742, 744), similar opposition to or qualms about the 
death penalty and a belief expressed by the potential jurors that 
their views toward the death penalty would prevent or perhaps 
(due to the relevant question’s phrasing) merely make it very 
difficult for them to vote to impose such punishment (Stewart, 
at pp. 446–449), or “the view that imprisonment for life without 
the possibility of parole represents a ‘worse’ punishment than 
death” (Heard, at p. 964).  The situation here is different in 
important respects.  Some of J.W.’s questionnaire responses 
were more reflective of substantial impairment than the 
responses in Woodruff, Stewart, and Heard were, and here 
pertinent voir dire took place that, combined with J.W.’s 
questionnaire responses, provided an adequate basis upon 
which to make a credibility determination and a finding of 
disqualification.  In Woodruff and Stewart, by contrast, no voir 
dire at all occurred.  (Woodruff, at p. 742; Stewart, at p. 445.)  
Voir dire did take place in Heard, but it “did not provide any 
indication that [the prospective juror’s] views regarding the 
death penalty would prevent or significantly impair him from 
following the controlling California law” (id., at p. 964), leaving 
the record in that case in a fundamentally different state than 
the record in this matter. 
Even though none of our prior cases involves facts 
identical to those before us, our treatment of the excusal of a 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
39 
prospective juror in People v. Phillips (2000) 22 Cal.4th 226 is at 
least somewhat instructive.  There, the possible juror provided 
several equivocal responses in his questionnaire, “but he also 
stated, ‘I will not vote to put any one to death.’  During voir dire, 
when asked about this statement, he said, ‘I’m trying to get out 
of it.  No, I mean I would do the right thing if I was put on a jury.  
I would do what the law says and . . . there’s just so much a 
parameter you are going with.’ ”  (Id., at p. 233.)  The juror 
“made a number of other equivocal and contradictory responses, 
but ultimately responded, ‘It would be hard,’ when asked 
whether he ‘could ever personally cast your vote to put him to 
death.’ ”  (Ibid.)  When the prosecutor challenged the juror for 
cause, the trial court stated that it “had ‘a lot of mixed feelings 
about him.’  It could not ‘tell . . . whether he’s lying and whether 
he isn’t, really.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Upon granting the motion, the court 
said, “ ‘It’s just that this man is too far out.  Maybe your [defense 
counsel’s] description is correct, he’s a kind of a philosophical 
[H]amlet.  But whatever it is he’s not a reliable one.’ ” (Ibid.)  On 
appeal, we found no error, reasoning that “[b]ecause the juror’s 
statements were equivocal and conflicting, we defer to the trial 
court’s determination.”  (Id., at p. 234.) 
Our analysis of one of the juror excusals in People v. 
Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335 (Bryant) also 
provides a useful reference point.  A prospective juror in that 
case stated in her questionnaire that “she did not ‘believe in the 
death penalty,’ or that California should have one,” that she 
“would not ‘be able to vote for the death penalty on another 
person if [she] believed, after hearing all the evidence, that the 
penalty was appropriate,’ ” and that “she would ‘automatically, 
in every case, regardless of the evidence, vote for life in prison 
without the possibility of parole.’ ”  (Id., at p. 401.)  According to 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
40 
the prospective juror, these had been her fixed views for at least 
10 years.  (Ibid.)  During voir dire, the juror “stated that she did 
not want to serve on the jury, but now believed that, despite her 
religious views, she could vote for the death penalty ‘[i]f it was 
required under the law.’  Although she initially stated that she 
did not think she could be a fair juror because of the child victim 
[in that case], when asked again whether she was biased, she 
answered, ‘Okay, I could be fair.’ ”  (Ibid.)  The juror later added 
“that although she still did not believe in the death penalty, she 
could impose it in light of her ‘civic duty,’ but would not be 
‘overjoyed’ in doing so.”  (Ibid.)  The trial court granted the 
prosecution’s challenge of the prospective juror for cause, 
finding her in-court statements “simply incredible in light of the 
decisiveness of the opposite views she had expressed in her 
questionnaire answers.”  (Ibid.)  Again, we found no error, 
concluding that “[t]he trial court reasonably credited [the 
prospective juror’s] answers demonstrating her impairment,” 
and “[t]he fact that the prospective juror at times claimed she 
believed she could perform her duties as a juror ‘did not prevent 
the trial court from finding, on the entire record, that [she] 
nevertheless held views . . . that substantially impaired her 
ability to serve.’ ”  (Id., at p. 402, quoting People v. Griffin (2004) 
33 Cal.4th 536, 561.)   
Acknowledging some differences between this case on the 
one hand and Phillips and Bryant on the other, it is nevertheless 
true that in each matter, the prospective juror gave an array of 
responses to questions bearing upon his or her ability to serve 
as a juror, some of which were indicative of substantial 
impairment.  In each case, the trial court engaged in voir dire — 
indeed, here there was extensive voir dire — to determine 
whether such impairment existed, and concluded that it did.  
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
41 
Having reviewed the record, we conclude here, as we did in 
Phillips and Bryant, that it contains no basis for reversal.  Even 
though some of J.W.’s responses, if credited, indicated an ability 
to properly discharge the duties of a juror, there was also 
sufficient evidence of substantial impairment to support a 
contrary determination.  The trial court’s ruling being supported 
by substantial evidence, we reject defendant’s claim of error in 
the excusal of J.W. for cause.13 
B.  Guilt Phase Issues14 
1. “Other Acts” Evidence 
Defendant contends that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error when it allowed the prosecution to introduce 
evidence at the guilt phase of trial concerning incidents at the 
Men’s Central Jail, occurring both before and after Tinajero was 
killed, in which defendant: (1) had, at various times, a 
sharpened piece of metal, a syringe, a razor blade, and an 
altered paper clip in his possession; (2) obtained an identifying 
wristband from an inmate who was leaving the central jail 
facility by telling its owner he would be beaten if he did not 
surrender it; (3) was on multiple occasions found traveling 
 
13  
Our resolution of this issue makes it unnecessary to decide 
whether in finding J.W. “disqualified both on the general 
circumstances of the answers that he’s given and on his penalty 
phase answers,” the trial court may have properly dismissed 
J.W. for cause for reasons unrelated to his views regarding the 
death penalty.  
14  
Insofar as defendant ascribes prejudice at both the guilt 
and the penalty phases of trial to asserted evidentiary errors 
occurring at the guilt phase, our opinion addresses his 
arguments relating to guilt and penalty under this heading, in 
conformity with the parties’ briefing.   
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
42 
within the jail without his wristband, in contravention of jail 
rules; and (4) escaped from a locked shower area within the jail.  
Within this same claim of error, defendant also brings a more 
general challenge to the admission of evidence regarding his 
contacts with Irma Limas.  
Defendant asserts that the admission of this evidence was 
improper under Evidence Code sections 352 and 1101 and 
violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  He 
characterizes this evidence as unduly prejudicial and irrelevant 
to any material issue at trial.  
 We find no reversible error.  By neglecting to raise a 
proper objection before the trial court, defendant failed to 
preserve his argument insofar as it pertains to the majority of 
Limas’s testimony — which does not implicate Evidence Code 
section 1101 in any event, and amounted to proper proof of 
defendant’s guilt.  As for testimony regarding defendant’s 
procurement of a wristband from another inmate, the incidents 
in which he was found without his wristband, and his escape 
from the shower area, all of this evidence was admissible, as the 
trial court determined, because it tended to show that defendant 
had sufficient knowledge of how to evade the jail’s security 
measures to allow him to move relatively freely around a 
supposedly secure jail environment.  To the extent that the 
admissibility of the other evidence described above may be less 
clear, we conclude that any error by the trial court in allowing 
its introduction when it did was harmless. 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
43 
a. The Other Acts Evidence Introduced at Trial 
Defendant asserts that evidence regarding the following 
incidents should have been excluded pursuant to Evidence Code 
sections 352 and 1101: 
 
Possession of Contraband:  The jury heard about three 
searches of defendant’s cell that yielded items defendant was 
not supposed to have in his possession.  On May 13, 2003, during 
a routine contraband search of a cell that defendant shared with 
other inmates, a shank (a metal bar with one end sharpened to 
a point) was found in a strap on a canvas bag.  The bag was in 
the area of the cell where defendant was bunking and contained 
defendant’s 
belongings 
and 
letters 
addressed 
to 
him.  
A subsequent search of defendant’s cell by sheriff’s deputies on 
July 13, 2004 (after Tinajero’s killing, by which time defendant 
was housed in a cell by himself) yielded a syringe and a razor 
blade that had been removed from its casing.15  Finally, on June 
17, 2005, an altered paper clip was found in defendant’s cell.  
Sheriff’s deputies testified at the guilt phase that an inmate 
could manipulate a modified paper clip to remove handcuffs, and 
the use of paper clips to escape from handcuffs also was the 
subject of testimony at the penalty phase.   
December 2003 Escape Attempt:  Luis Montalban testified 
that while he was incarcerated at the Men’s Central Jail in 
December 2003, defendant approached him and asked him for 
his wristband.  Montalban had been called to serve as a trusty 
 
15  
When testifying, defendant explained that he had the 
razor blade to sharpen pencils.  On cross-examination, the 
prosecutor asked defendant whether the razor and the shank 
also found in his possession could be used as stabbing weapons; 
defendant acknowledged that they could.   
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
44 
at an outdoors location in West Hollywood, where he would have 
significant freedom to move around.  When Montalban refused, 
defendant explained that Montalban would be “regulated” if he 
did not surrender the wristband.  Frightened, Montalban gave 
his wristband to defendant.  Defendant then left the jail in 
Montalban’s place.  Defendant’s plan was unsuccessful, and he 
was returned by bus to the Men’s Central Jail.  At that time, he 
was found to be wearing Montalban’s wristband and had in his 
possession a card that would allow him to be taken to West 
Hollywood as a trusty.   
This incident also was mentioned both earlier and later in 
the trial.  As previously noted, Irma Limas testified regarding 
Chingon/Santi’s acknowledgment of an unsuccessful escape 
attempt.  And when he took the stand on his own behalf, on 
cross-examination defendant admitted that he had tried to 
escape from Men’s Central Jail using a wristband procured from 
Montalban.   
Not Wearing Required Inmate Wristband:  On October 13, 
2004, a deputy noticed that defendant was not wearing his 
identifying wristband, as jail rules required.  The deputy who 
testified to this incident also recalled that defendant had 
removed his wristband on another occasion a week earlier, at 
which time he had been told not to remove it again.  A month 
later, on November 5, 2004, a sheriff’s deputy preparing inmates 
to be taken to the showers noticed that defendant was not 
wearing his wristband.  The wristband was later found in 
defendant’s cell.   
Escape from Locked Shower Area:  On July 30, 2005, 
defendant escaped from a locked shower area in the high 
security area of the jail.  Shortly after deputies left him in the 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
45 
shower area, defendant was spotted on closed-circuit television 
running back to his cell.  By the time deputies returned, 
defendant was already in his cell.  Defendant was covered with 
a thick lather from head to toe and had a large red mark across 
his back.  Deputies enlisted another inmate to try to replicate 
the escape.  This inmate managed to get out of the shower area 
by lathering himself with soap and crawling through an opening 
within the shower enclosure.  
Limas’s 
Testimony 
Regarding 
Her 
Contacts 
with 
Chingon/Santi:  Defendant also argues that the entirety of 
Limas’s testimony regarding her contacts with Chingon/Santi — 
including, but not limited to her description of Chingon’s escape 
attempt — should have been excluded as inadmissible 
propensity evidence.   
b. Procedural Background 
Prior to trial, the prosecution filed a motion in limine in 
which it requested a ruling regarding the admissibility of 
evidence pertaining to the December 2003 escape attempt, the 
discoveries of contraband in defendant’s cell, occasions in which 
defendant was not wearing a wristband while incarcerated, the 
July 2005 escape from the jail shower, and the November 2004 
incident, described ante, in which defendant was found to be in 
possession of pruno.  The prosecution argued that this evidence 
should be admitted “to show [defendant]’s knowledge of the 
inner-workings of the jail, and that he possessed the 
opportunity, contrary to lay intuition, to escape from one 
supposedly secure area of the jail into another, in order to 
commit the murder.”  The prosecution further explained that 
“[t]he issue of opportunity is material and can be expected to be 
in dispute in this case because it is reasonable to expect that it 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
46 
would be contrary to the assumption of the average juror that 
an inmate at Men’s Central Jail could move around freely in a 
secured environment in order to kill another inmate housed in 
a different area of the jail.”16  
The trial court received written opposition from the 
defense and heard argument from counsel.  The court ruled that 
the evidence covered by the People’s motion was admissible as 
part of the prosecution’s case-in-chief at the guilt phase of trial, 
except for the incident in which defendant was found in 
possession of pruno.  The trial court regarded the allowable 
evidence as “probative on the issue of [defendant’s] knowledge, 
his sophistication, the ability to move around the jail and do 
what was necessary to elude the authorities there.”  The court 
agreed with the prosecution that this evidence tended to show 
defendant’s knowledge of jail protocols and how to circumvent 
them, elaborating that “the lay person is going to think that if 
you’re locked into a jail cell, that’s the end of it, you don’t get out 
of that cell, you don’t get into someone else’s cell that’s locked 
down, just not a possibility.  They have to explain how that could 
happen, and this does explain that.”  
Before the jurors heard evidence regarding the May 2003 
jail cell search — which, aside from Limas’s testimony about 
Chingon/Santi mentioning a prior escape attempt, was the first 
 
16  
The prosecution also asserted in its motion in limine that 
the December 2003 escape attempt was admissible to help 
establish defendant’s identity as Tinajero’s killer.  On this 
subject, the prosecution asserted that Chingon/Santi’s reference 
to an escape attempt in his communications with Limas tended 
to prove that Limas’s correspondent was in fact defendant, and 
therefore connect defendant to this person’s other incriminating 
statements. 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
47 
time the jury heard evidence about any of the acts associated 
with this claim of error — they were instructed by the court as 
follows:  “Let me indicate that with this witness and with other 
witnesses talking about things that occur in the jail, they’re 
offered only to show the defendant’s knowledge of the operations 
of the jails and the limitations placed on inmates, not to show 
that he’s a person of bad character.”  The court added that 
“[t]here may be others as well on this general subject. . . . [¶]  It’s 
all limited to showing [defendant’s] knowledge of the operation 
of the jail and the limitations placed on inmates.”17  At the close 
of the guilt phase, the jury was instructed that the evidence that 
had been introduced showing that defendant committed crimes 
other than those for which he was on trial, “if believed, may not 
be considered by you to prove that the defendant is a person of 
bad character or that he has a disposition to commit crimes.  It 
may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of 
determining if it tends to show knowledge of jail procedures and 
rules as well as methods to overcome them.”  The jury was 
further instructed that it could not consider this evidence “for 
any other purpose.”   
 
17  
A somewhat similar advisement was given to the jury 
before it heard testimony regarding the July 2004 search of 
defendant’s cell that yielded a syringe and a razor blade.  At that 
time, the trial court told the jury, “Obviously we’re going 
through a number of incidents that don’t relate specifically to 
the homicides charged in Counts 1 and Count 2.  This goes to 
the knowledge of [defendant] of the jail rules and any incidents 
involving the ability to circumvent those rules.”   
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
48 
c. Analysis 
i. Legal Principles 
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) provides that, 
subject to certain exceptions, “evidence of a person’s character 
or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an 
opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances 
of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his 
or her conduct on a specified occasion.”  “Subdivision (b) of 
section 1101 clarifies, however, that this rule does not prohibit 
admission of evidence of uncharged misconduct when such 
evidence is relevant to establish some fact other than the 
person’s character or disposition” (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 
7 Cal.4th 380, 393 (Ewoldt)), with permissible purposes 
including but not limited to proving “motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, [or] absence of 
mistake or accident” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b)).  
Moreover, “to be admissible such evidence [of uncharged 
acts also] ‘must not contravene other policies limiting 
admission, such as those contained in Evidence Code section 
352.’ ”  (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 404.)  Evidence Code 
section 352 authorizes the exclusion of evidence by the trial 
court when its probative value is “substantially outweighed by 
the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue 
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue 
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”  
The “undue prejudice” that Evidence Code section 352 is 
concerned with “ ‘is that which “ ‘ “uniquely tends to evoke an 
emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and which 
has very little effect on the issues.” ’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Chhoun 
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 29 (Chhoun), italics omitted.)  
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
49 
As conveyed by the text of Evidence Code section 1101, 
subdivision (b), evidence of misconduct may be admissible to 
show “knowledge” or “opportunity,” among other permissible 
theories of relevance.  Regarding knowledge, “uncharged 
misconduct evidence might show that a person possesses 
relatively uncommon knowledge of a thing, technique, or 
method, and such knowledge makes it somewhat more likely 
that the person committed the act in question.”  (Leonard, The 
New Wigmore a Treatise on Evidence: Evidence of Other 
Misconduct and Similar Events (2019) § 6.5, p. 464; see also 
People v. Felix (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 177, 185–186; cf. U.S. v. 
Blitz (9th Cir. 1998) 151 F.3d 1002, 1008 (Blitz) [construing rule 
404 of the Fed. Rules Evid. (28 U.S.C.)]; U.S. v. Barrett (1st Cir. 
1976) 539 F.2d 244, 248 [same].)  We also have recognized 
circumstances in which evidence was properly admitted to show 
opportunity.  In People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, we 
determined that testimony that the defendant, charged with 
murder, claimed to enjoy sneaking up on people was not made 
inadmissible by Evidence Code section 1101, reasoning that this 
evidence “demonstrated that defendant had the ability to 
surprise the victims” and given that “[t]he manner in which the 
killer came into contact with the victims was unknown . . . [,] 
that defendant was capable of doing so without their awareness 
was certainly relevant to show opportunity.”  (Id., at p. 520.) 
We apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing 
a ruling on an objection under Evidence Code sections 352 and 
1101.  (Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 26, 27.)  A ruling subject 
to this standard of review “will not be disturbed except on a 
showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, 
capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
50 
manifest miscarriage of justice.”  (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 
20 Cal.4th 1, 9–10.)  
ii. Application 
At the outset, we reject defendant’s argument that Limas’s 
testimony regarding her contacts with Chingon/Santi should 
have been excluded as improper propensity evidence.  As the 
People observe, most of Limas’s testimony discussing her 
interactions with Santi, including Santi’s interest in locating 
“Raul,” is not “other acts” evidence subject to exclusion under 
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a).  Whether 
understood as “ ‘intrinsic’ ” evidence regarding motive and 
identity (3 Jones on Evidence (7th ed. 2022) § 17:13) or 
otherwise, this testimony was relevant to defendant’s guilt and 
cannot reasonably be regarded as proscribed proof of criminal 
propensity.   
Defendant’s failure to raise an appropriate objection 
before the trial court to the entirety of Limas’s testimony also 
makes defendant’s misunderstanding regarding Evidence Code 
section 1101’s scope largely academic.  At most, defendant 
preserved an objection to that portion of Limas’s testimony in 
which she recounted Santi’s statement that he had tried to 
escape from the jail facility.   
Concerning that statement, we conclude that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecution to 
offer evidence regarding defendant’s acquisition of Montalban’s 
wristband by means of threat, the instances in which defendant 
was found without his wristband, and the July 2005 escape from 
the jail shower.  As the trial court concluded, these episodes 
were probative of defendant’s knowledge regarding how to 
exploit weaknesses in jail security to move relatively freely 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
51 
around the jail.  Even though, as defendant emphasizes, these 
incidents were not factually identical to the circumstances 
surrounding Tinajero’s killing (with the proof at trial tending to 
show that defendant had obtained a court pass from another 
inmate to gain access to Tinajero’s module and cell), they were 
nonetheless relevant to how defendant could have made his way 
from his cell to an entirely different cell module in order to kill 
Tinajero.  This evidence tended to prove that defendant knew 
that jail protocols for keeping inmates in their proper places 
could be outmaneuvered and that he had the know-how to take 
advantage of these lapses.   
Meanwhile, the probative value of this evidence was not 
substantially outweighed by a probability of undue prejudice to 
defendant or another countervailing consideration.  (Evid. Code, 
§ 352.)  The evidence regarding defendant’s acquisition of a 
wristband from another inmate, his failure to wear his assigned 
wristband on other occasions, and his escape from the shower 
was not likely to provoke the sort of emotional response that 
Evidence Code section 352 is concerned with.  Furthermore, the 
testimony concerning these incidents was relatively brief, and 
the testimony was not likely to distract the jury by focusing its 
attention on ancillary issues, particularly in light of the limiting 
instructions given by the court.  We therefore perceive no abuse 
of discretion in the trial court’s ruling as it pertained to this 
evidence.18   
 
18  
Although the trial court did not explain that it had 
conducted an Evidence Code section 352 balancing analysis 
prior to authorizing the introduction of this evidence, it did 
reference section 352 in explaining why the evidence of 
 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
52 
Defendant argues that because he was found without a 
wristband and escaped from the locked showed area after the 
Tinajero killing, these particular incidents did not show he had 
relevant knowledge at the time of the Tinajero homicide.  This 
contention is contrary to the general rule that “[t]he 
circumstance that the uncharged [act] occurred after the 
charged offense does not” necessarily place the uncharged act 
outside the ambit of Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b).  
(People v. Balcom (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 425.)  In making his 
argument, defendant relies upon People v. Hendrix (2013) 
214 Cal.App.4th 216, in which the court stated that “to establish 
knowledge when that element is akin to absence of mistake, the 
uncharged events must be sufficiently similar to the 
circumstances of the charged offense to support the inference 
that what defendant learned from the prior experience provided 
the relevant knowledge in the current offense.”  (Id., at pp. 242–
243, italics added.)  But Hendrix was not concerned with 
uncharged acts occurring after a charged crime.  Both of the 
uncharged acts offered as evidence in that case occurred prior to 
the charged offense, and we do not read the analysis in Hendrix 
as expressing a categorical view on the issue defendant raises.   
Furthermore, we perceive no reason to adopt a strict rule 
that evidence showing a person possesses pertinent knowledge 
at some point after the charged crime can never shed light on 
whether the person had the same or similar knowledge at some 
earlier date.  In this case, a juror could plausibly infer from each 
 
defendant’s possession of pruno would be excluded.  This 
mention allows for an inference that the court engaged in the 
necessary weighing when considering the other evidence 
entailed by the People’s motion.  (People v. Harris (2013) 
57 Cal.4th 804, 845.) 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
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53 
of the described incidents that defendant had material 
knowledge regarding how to exploit weaknesses in jail security 
at the time Tinajero was killed.  (Accord, Blitz, supra, 151 F.3d 
at p. 1008 [“when the evidence of other acts is offered to prove 
knowledge, the other acts need not be similar to the charged acts 
as long they ‘ “tend to make the existence of the defendant’s 
knowledge more probable than it would be without the 
evidence” ’ ”].)  This inference is least compelling with regard to 
defendant’s escape from the shower area because of the factual 
differences between this incident and the circumstances around 
Tinajero’s homicide, as well as the time lag between the two 
events.  But it was still within the court’s discretion to conclude 
that this incident, involving an escape from a supposedly secure 
area of the jail, tended to prove that defendant knew how to 
circumvent the jail’s security measures when Tinajero was 
killed in April 2004, and that the passage of time and other 
differences between the two occasions went to the weight that 
could reasonably be attached to the shower escape in showing 
defendant’s knowledge at the time of the killing.   
It is less clear that the evidence that defendant possessed 
a shank, razor blade, syringe, and an altered paper clip should 
have been admitted at the guilt phase of trial.  As compared to 
the incidents involving escapes and defendant’s violation of the 
jail’s wristband protocols, these incidents had a significantly 
more attenuated relationship with the question of how 
defendant could have moved about the jail to commit the 
Tinajero murder.  Yet even if we were to assume that this 
evidence should not have been admitted at the guilt phase, any 
assumed error in this respect is properly regarded as harmless.  
In light of the powerful evidence of defendant’s culpability of the 
crimes and enhancements alleged against him — not least his 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
54 
confessions and the well-corroborated eyewitness testimony 
offered at trial — and the marginal nature of this proof in 
connection with the guilt determination (the prosecutor not even 
deigning to mention defendant’s possession of contraband in her 
guilt phase closing statement), it is not reasonably probable that 
a different result would have obtained at that phase of trial had 
this evidence not been offered as proof.  (People v. Watson (1956) 
46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).)19   
Insofar as defendant also asserts harm at the penalty 
phase from the assertedly erroneous introduction of this 
evidence at the guilt phase, his claim of prejudice fares no better.  
A trial error under state law will be regarded as prejudicial at 
the penalty phase if “there is a reasonable (i.e., realistic) 
possibility that the jury would have rendered a different verdict 
had the error or errors not occurred.”  (People v. Brown (1988) 
46 Cal.3d 432, 448 (Brown).)  This standard is “ ‘the same in 
substance and effect’ ” (People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 
961) as the standard for assessing the prejudicial effect of 
federal constitutional error, which considers “whether the error 
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” (ibid., citing Chapman 
v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman)).  “ ‘When 
evidence has been erroneously received at the penalty phase, 
this court should reverse the death sentence if it is “the sort of 
 
19  
Contrary to defendant’s assertions, any error in the 
admission of this evidence at the guilt phase of trial “was not of 
such gravity as to amount to a denial of [defendant’s] ‘due 
process right to a fair trial, an impartial jury, and a reliable 
penalty determination guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, 
and 
Fourteenth 
Amendments 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution.’ ”  (People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 356; 
see also People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439.) 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
55 
evidence that is likely to have a significant impact on the jury’s 
evaluation of whether defendant should live or die.” ’ ”  (People 
v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 917.)   
We perceive no reversible error under this standard.  
First, evidence regarding defendant’s possession of a shank, 
syringe, and razor blade in jail was a proper subject of the jury’s 
consideration at the penalty phase.  Possession of these 
instruments in jail constitutes a crime involving an implied 
threat of force or violence within the meaning of section 190.3, 
factor (b).  (§ 4502, subd. (a); People v. Delgado (2017) 2 Cal.5th 
544, 585–586 (Delgado); People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 
118‒119 [razor blade]; People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 292 
[shanks]; People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1082 [“ ‘mere 
possession of a potentially dangerous weapon in custody 
involves an implied threat of violence’ ”].)20  Well before trial 
began, the prosecution signaled its intent to rely upon evidence 
that defendant had possessed weapons while in jail as an 
aggravating factor at the penalty phase.  Furthermore, the 
jurors were instructed at the conclusion of the penalty phase 
that defendant’s possession of a weapon in jail could be 
considered as an aggravating circumstance only if proved 
 
20  
With regard to the syringe, the deputy who found it in 
defendant’s cell testified that it was approximately two and a 
half inches long, with a needle that was slightly more than half 
an inch in length.  According to the deputy, the syringe could be 
used to inject drugs or as a weapon.  Photographs of the syringe 
were introduced as exhibits, allowing us to assess its 
appearance.  We are satisfied from the foregoing that there was 
a sufficient basis for the jury at the penalty phase to consider 
defendant’s possession of the syringe as a possible violation of 
section 4502, subdivision (a).  (See People v. Hughes (2002) 27 
Cal.4th 287, 383; People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 589.)   
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
56 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The foregoing facts establish that 
there was no meaningful penalty phase error as to this evidence.  
This evidence was properly considered by the jury in making the 
penalty determination, even if it was prematurely introduced at 
the guilt phase of trial.  (Cf. People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 
197, 226; People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 613 [“The 
challenged evidence [introduced at the guilt phase] would 
clearly have been admissible at the penalty phase even if not at 
the guilt phase [citation], thus obviating any possible prejudice 
at that phase”].)21   
 
21  
Defendant also argues that “[b]ecause the trial court erred 
in admitting the other-acts evidence, the jury improperly was 
permitted to consider it at the penalty phase under [section 
190.3,] factor (a),” the aggravating circumstance providing for 
consideration of “[t]he circumstances of the crime of which the 
defendant was convicted” in determining the appropriate 
penalty.  (§ 190.3, factor (a); see People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 
686, 749 [“The ‘circumstances of the crime’ as used in section 
190.3, factor (a), ‘does not mean merely the immediate temporal 
and spatial circumstances of the crime.  Rather it extends to 
“[t]hat which surrounds materially, morally, or logically” the 
crime’ ”].)  We do not believe it reasonably possible that any 
error in admitting other acts evidence at the guilt phase of trial 
prejudiced defendant by allowing jurors to assign undue weight 
to these incidents at the penalty phase.  The jury was carefully 
instructed concerning how it could consider this evidence at the 
close of both the guilt and the penalty phases, being told at the 
guilt phase that these incidents could be considered only insofar 
as they might bear upon defendant’s knowledge of jail protocols 
and how to evade them, and being allowed to consider these 
incidents at the penalty phase as aggravating factor (b) 
evidence, if proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  Even if we were 
to assume for sake of argument that the jury also regarded these 
discrete acts as “circumstances of the crime” under section 
 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
57 
That leaves only an assumed error in the introduction of 
testimony that an altered paper clip was found in defendant’s 
cell more than a year after the Tinajero murder occurred.  
Unlike the evidence that defendant possessed a shank, razor 
blade, and syringe in jail, this evidence was not admissible at 
the penalty phase under section 190.3, factor (b).  (People v. 
Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 93‒94 [a defendant’s possession 
of a makeshift handcuff key in jail does not automatically 
qualify as factor (b) evidence].)  Yet we do not perceive a 
reasonable possibility of a different result had this evidence not 
been introduced.  (See People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 
208–209; Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 448.)  True:  evidence at 
the guilt phase that defendant had been found in possession of 
the altered paper clip may have informed the presentation of 
penalty phase testimony regarding prisoners’ use of distorted 
clips to escape from handcuffs, and the prosecutor did comment 
upon defendant’s possession of the altered clip during her 
closing argument at that latter phase of trial.  But no evidence 
was introduced that defendant in fact knew how to escape from 
handcuffs using an altered paper clip or that he had done so.  
Furthermore, the trial court did not include defendant’s 
possession of a paper clip in its recitation of the factor (b) 
evidence that could function as an aggravating circumstance.  
Finally, insofar as the evidence regarding an altered paper clip 
contributed to the prosecutor’s argument regarding defendant’s 
possible future dangerousness in prison, other, properly 
admitted 
evidence — 
including 
evidence 
detailing 
the 
 
190.3, factor (a), and assume further that this was 
impermissible, there is no reason to believe the jury accorded 
such weight to them within the parameters of that aggravating 
circumstance as to prejudice defendant under any standard. 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
58 
circumstances surrounding the Tinajero homicide itself — went 
to that same point, and far more powerfully.  In light of the other 
evidence before the jury, it is clear beyond any reasonable doubt 
that defendant’s possession of an altered paper clip did not 
impact the outcome at the penalty phase.  We conclude that 
defendant was not prejudiced at any phase of trial by any 
possible error in the admission of this evidence.   
2.  Evidence Regarding Gang Activity and 
Defendant’s Gang Membership  
Defendant also challenges the introduction of evidence 
regarding his gang membership and gang activity at the Men’s 
Central Jail.  He asserts that this evidence was inadmissible 
under Evidence Code sections 352 and 1101 and that its 
introduction violated his constitutional rights to due process, a 
reliable penalty determination, and a fundamentally fair jury.  
We find this argument forfeited as to some of the evidence 
involved and, in any event, meritless.   
a. The Gang Evidence Introduced at Trial 
The testimony and exhibits that defendant focuses upon 
with this contention represent a subset of the gang evidence that 
was introduced at trial, which will be discussed at some length 
below to provide context to defendant’s claim of error.   
i. Initial Testimony 
The subject of gangs or gang activity at the jail initially 
arose during the defense’s cross-examination of Anthony Sloan, 
the prosecution’s first witness concerning the Tinajero killing.  
During this cross-examination, Sloan testified that he had been 
a trusty in the gang module at the Men’s Central Jail and had 
been transferred from the gang module to the module where 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
59 
Tinajero was housed.22  When defense counsel asked if “there is 
going to be a hit in the jail or there’s going to be fighting, that 
the gang module is usually the individuals who carry it out, 
individuals in the gang module?” Sloan answered in the 
affirmative.  Sloan also agreed with counsel’s inquiry whether, 
as a trusty in the gang module, he “took kites [messages] from 
different members of that module” and “did things for them.”  
Sloan testified further regarding gang activity at the jail during 
redirect examination and recross-examination, without any 
objection under Evidence Code sections 352 or 1101 from either 
the prosecution or the defense.  For example, in the course of 
recross-examination, defense counsel asked, “[W]hen prison hits 
 
22  
Possibly foreshadowing an argument that Tinajero’s 
cellmates had killed him while administering gang-sanctioned 
retribution, the opening statement by defense counsel had 
noted, “Mr. Tinajero was what’s known in the jail as a rat or a 
snitch, and when you are a rat and a snitch in the jail, there is 
some liability, there is some danger based on that.  [¶]  I think 
the evidence will show Mr. Tinajero was placed in a cell with 
what, four other convicted felons . . . .  He wasn’t a keep away, 
at least from the other four convicted felons, and he ends up 
dead in the cell.  That’s not that strange when you are a rat or a 
snitch in jail.”   
Later, in his closing statement at the guilt phase,  defense 
counsel argued, “[I]f there’s going to be discipline issued out, it 
might come from state prison, it might come from high power, 
but it goes through the gang module.  They are the enforcers.”  
Describing Tinajero’s cellmates, counsel said, “and what do 
these guys, where do they work?  What a coincidence.  What a 
coincidence.  They are trusties in the gang module.”  The defense 
further argued to the jury that Tinajero’s death “wasn’t planned 
as a hit, a murder.  It was planned as a regulation that went too 
far, it got out of hand.”   
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
60 
are done . . . doesn’t high power basically send the order down 
to the gang module?”  Sloan professed not to know.   
Additional testimony regarding gang activity and gang 
influence at the jail was elicited by both the prosecution and the 
defense in the subsequent examination of Matthew Good, 
without any contemporaneous objection under section 352 or 
section 1101 of the Evidence Code.  Good testified on direct 
examination that he did not intervene when defendant was 
attacking Tinajero because “it’s one of those jail things where 
I don’t know where this came from,” meaning “it could be people 
higher up on the chain, people that are affiliated in there that 
are saying take care of this guy.”  On cross-examination, Good 
agreed with defense counsel that, for the most part, orders from 
“high power” went to the jail’s gang module to be carried out. 
The testimony that defendant casts as objectionable began 
with Limas’s subsequent testimony about the letter she had 
received from her correspondent that was signed, “Santiago 
Pineda Hernandez Chingon.”  In questioning Limas, the 
prosecutor observed that “up here in the letter it says, ‘From the 
big bad ass ES Wilmas.’ ”  The defense objected that the letter 
“speaks for itself”; the court overruled this objection.  The 
prosecutor continued, “East Side, ES Wilmas Ghost Town Locos, 
is that correct?”  Limas answered in the affirmative.  A few 
questions and answers later, the prosecutor asked, “And what’s 
ES, do you know?”  Limas answered, “East Side.”  The 
prosecutor followed up by asking, “Who called themselves East 
Side Wilmas?”  The defense objected on the ground that an 
inadequate foundation had been laid.  Before the court could 
rule on the objection, Limas answered, “It’s a gang.”  The court 
then overruled the objection, and Limas repeated her answer.   
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
61 
After Limas left the stand, other witnesses testified that 
the phrases “El Chingon” and “ES Wilmas” were written in the 
notebook found in defendant’s clothing after Tinajero’s killing, 
and that transcripts of Tinajero’s testimony and a police report 
regarding defendant’s arrest also had been found in the cell.  
Regarding the transcripts and report, a sheriff’s deputy testified 
(over a defense objection that this testimony lacked a sufficient 
foundation, which the trial court overruled) that this paperwork 
could be used to “shut the other guy [referring to a witness] up” 
and “get other people involved.”  Following up on the deputy’s 
reference to targeted inmates being subject to a “green light,” on 
cross-examination defense counsel inquired, “So if an inmate 
has a green light, any other inmate in the jail would have the 
okay to do something to that inmate?”  The deputy responded, 
“Generally with the green lighters, we’re talking about Hispanic 
gang member inmates, yes.”  Later in the course of cross-
examination, defense counsel returned to the subject, asking, 
“Once a person is on the green light, is he basically subject to 
attack by any gang member?” to which the deputy answered, 
“Yes, any Hispanic gang member.”  Additionally, Deputy Torres 
testified that defendant had told him he had secured permission 
to kill Tinajero by showing the inmate who ran the 2000 floor 
the proper “paperwork.”  Again, there were no objections under 
Evidence Code sections 352 or 1101 to any of this testimony.23 
 
23  
Defense counsel also asked Luis Montalban, who had 
testified that defendant had obtained his jail-issued wristband 
from him by means of threat, whether he (Montalban) was a 
“Southsider”; Montalban answered in the affirmative.   
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
62 
ii. Deputy Clift’s Testimony 
Deputy Clift testified after the presentation of the 
previously described evidence.  Before Clift took the stand, the 
prosecutor characterized him as a gang expert whose testimony 
would respond to the apparent defense theory that Tinajero’s 
cellmates, and not defendant, had been responsible for 
Tinajero’s death.  The prosecutor explained that “the defense 
has been trying to imply that it was the four guys living in the 
cell that killed Tinajero instead of [defendant].  He’ll explain 
why that would not be.”  The trial court observed in response, 
“This isn’t a case involving gang activity specifically, but the 
relevance of gangs is present to the extent that as we’ve heard 
some of the testimony, [defendant] received items, apparently 
clothing as well as wrist bands apparently through the use of 
threats of gang retaliation or group retaliation if an individual 
didn’t give it up, so it is relevant.”  The court added, however, 
that it “want[ed] to be cautious about the use of gang testimony 
because the California Supreme Court said it’s highly 
prejudicial.”  The defense did not object to Clift’s anticipated 
testimony at that time.   
Before the jury, Clift testified that based on his experience 
within the jails and jail culture, in his opinion Tinajero’s white 
cellmates would not have harmed Tinajero.  A defense objection 
to this testimony as lacking an adequate foundation was 
overruled.  The court did grant a defense motion to strike Clift’s 
answer to a follow-up question posed by the prosecutor, in which 
Clift explained that he premised his opinion on information he 
had received regarding the inmates’ criminal histories.  At a 
sidebar discussion, the judge explained he had thought the 
prosecution had called Clift to show that “whites are not aligned 
with the Hispanic gangs and would not carry out a hit for the 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
63 
Hispanic gangs,” which the court described as a more “generic 
thing” than going through “these individuals’ backgrounds and 
[saying] he knows that they wouldn’t commit a crime.”  The jury 
was instructed to disregard Clift’s testimony that his opinion 
was premised on information he had received regarding the 
inmates’ backgrounds.   
A hearing was then conducted outside of the jury’s 
presence.  (See Evid. Code, § 402.)  At this session, the 
prosecutor posed questions to Clift regarding the basis for his 
opinion that Tinajero’s cellmates would not have killed him.  
Clift explained that his opinion was premised on the cellmates’ 
backgrounds and on the fact that the victim was a Sureño gang 
member who was testifying against another Sureño gang 
member, a situation that Clift cast as “gang business” that 
Tinajero’s cellmates would not have been involved in.  The 
defense argued that Clift’s testimony on this topic was 
inadmissible because “for a person to get up and say this person 
didn’t do it but inferentially the other person did it” would 
violate defendant’s right to a jury trial.  The prosecutor 
responded that Clift’s testimony was appropriate because, “for 
the defense to be able to just get up there and say it was the four 
guys in the cell that did it probably . . . for the jury to 
understand why that probably didn’t happen, [Clift is] not 
saying it’s a hundred percent certainty, he’s saying based on his 
expert opinion, it is highly unlikely that these individuals would 
have committed this crime because they’re not part of the 
politics, and . . . it is probative and enlightening to this jury who 
doesn’t know anything about . . . the jail culture or the prison 
culture.”   
The trial court sustained the defense objection “to that 
testimony,” reiterating that “[t]he thing I thought we were going 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
64 
at was that the whites would not — the normal gang 
associations are such that whites would not carry out contracts 
to kill on behalf of the Hispanic gangs, but if that’s not the case, 
then there is no relevance to the testimony.”  The prosecutor 
agreed to limit Clift’s testimony in conformity with the court’s 
ruling.  After a discussion of other matters, the conversation 
returned to Clift’s anticipated testimony.  The prosecutor 
represented that she would ask Clift about the likelihood of 
nongang members carrying out “Sureno business”; whether, 
based on the content of letters defendant authored, he believed 
defendant was a Sureño gang member; whether there was a 
green light on Tinajero; whether permission was needed in jail 
to conduct a hit; and whether it was unusual for Sureños to carry 
out Sureño “business,” including their “own” business, among 
other topics of inquiry.  The defense replied that this proffer 
“seems to be the same old issue revisited again, trying to do 
indirectly what [the prosecutor] cannot do directly.”  Defense 
counsel continued, “I believe the People have tried to create an 
issue of gangs where it does not exist.  There is no — we have 
not introduced any testimony at this point to show that this was 
a gang hit.  The People have invented this issue, and now they’re 
trying to go further and call an expert to say it was not a gang 
killing, and I would submit it.”  The prosecutor responded that 
the defense had opened the door to this evidence by inquiring 
about a gang module in the jail and whether hits went through 
that module.  The court overruled the defense objection.   
Resuming his testimony before the jury, Clift testified that 
nongang members would not carry out a hit on a cellmate 
because “they don’t get involved in the political aspect or the 
business of the gangs.”  According to Clift, an inmate’s status as 
a trusty in the jail’s gang module did not mean that he would do 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
65 
“business” for the Sureño gang, including killing a snitch, 
“because they’re not involved in the business,” “can’t be trusted,” 
and “a lot of them don’t want to get involved.”  Over a defense 
objection on relevance grounds, which the court overruled, Clift 
testified that based on the contents of a letter Limas had 
previously described as well as another letter from defendant 
that Clift had intercepted, in his opinion defendant was part of 
the Sureño gang.  Clift regarded it as unlikely that an individual 
who was not a member of the Sureño gang would carry out a hit, 
even if that person hung out with the gang.  But he did not 
believe it would be unusual for somebody who was a member of 
the Sureño gang “to take care of their own business.”  Clift 
agreed with counsel’s assertion that within the jail there was a 
hierarchy of inmates who controlled the “power” within the 
institution.  It also would not be unusual, in Clift’s opinion, for 
someone interested in performing a “hit” on an inmate housed 
in a jail module to go to the inmate in charge of that module to 
secure permission first, and having “paperwork” on someone 
was significant because “if a gang member goes out and hurts 
another gang member, he has to have a reason for it . . . so what 
he’ll do, if he gets questioned by other gang members, he can 
always reveal this paperwork and show it to them and say, look, 
this person talked to law enforcement.”  
A break in the proceedings occurred shortly thereafter.  
During the break, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing 
that the prosecution “did indirectly what the court had 
prohibited them from doing directly.”  Counsel added that he 
thought “the relevancy of this testimony is very remote and it 
should be stricken under [Evidence Code section] 352 at least.”  
The trial court denied the motion, stating, “[T]he issue of gang 
activity is peripherally involved in this case, unfortunately, but 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
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66 
also is consistent with earlier information we had that 
[defendant] had received permission from or approval from, 
I was going to say shot callers, but other individuals in the — 
that had some control over the jail to carry out the hit, so that 
has to be explained as well.”   
After further direct examination and cross-examination, 
on redirect examination Clift testified that “the jail rules with 
the Sureno [are] if you’re a snitch, it’s automatic you will be 
killed,” with Clift agreeing with the prosecutor’s statement that 
“in a case where you have an inmate who testified against 
another, nobody is going to be told to regulate them, it’s going to 
be kill if an order did in fact go down.”  He further testified that 
although trusties not enrolled in a gang might be enlisted to 
perform favors for Sureño gang members, “as far as ordering a 
non Sureno to do a hit, that’s not going to happen” because 
“[t]hey cannot trust them to keep their mouth shut or to 
complete the operation.”  On recross-examination, Clift testified 
that “[g]reen light lists [come] from the shot callers of the jail, 
and it’s got to be approved, and before you attack someone, 
before you regulate anyone, you have to call and verify to make 
sure that that person should still be on the green light list.  You 
have to upgrade it.”   
iii. Cross-examination of Defendant  
The prosecution also inquired into defendant’s gang 
affiliation when he testified on his own behalf at the guilt phase.   
On direct examination, defendant denied being a Sureño 
gang member, testifying that he had only “associate[d]” with the 
Wilmas.  He explained that the Sureños were a prison gang and 
admitted only people who had served time in prison.  Prior to 
her cross-examination of defendant, the prosecutor advised the 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
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67 
trial court and defense counsel that she planned on questioning 
defendant about a statement he had made — “I ride for the Sur, 
one for all” — in one of the letters Clift had intercepted.  This 
letter, dated September 26, 2006, was directed toward a female 
inmate, Della Rose Santos.  Defense counsel stated, “Obviously 
we oppose that line of questioning on the letter itself . . . the 
letter, I don’t believe that was mentioned in direct.”  The court 
overruled the objection, finding the letter relevant to impeach 
defendant’s testimony. 
In her cross-examination of defendant, the prosecutor read 
a portion of the letter providing, “Grumpy told me about that 
guera that turned over the dime.  Their treating him bad but 
that will be straighten out soon we ride for the sur tu sabes babe, 
‘one for all, all for one.’ ”24  When asked to explain this text, 
defendant denied that “we ride for the sur” meant he was a 
Sureño gang member.  He testified, “When you’re in jail, you can 
only go — you have certain choices who to run with, and that’s 
the Southside, so a Southside runs with the Surenos, but the 
Surenos is only a prison gang, not an L.A. County jail gang.”  On 
further cross-examination, defendant admitted that he 
“claimed” membership in the Ghost Town Locos clique of the 
East Side Wilmas street gang.  Asked again specifically about 
the statement within the letter, “we ride for the sur,” defendant 
explained, “[S]ince there’s different people you run with in jail, 
you have to go along with what happens.”  
 
24  
At the penalty phase, Clift would testify that although 
“guera” means “light-skinned or light hair” in Spanish, in this 
context the word was used to refer “to Grumpy’s partner as a 
sissy or a bitch for snitching him off.”   
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
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68 
b. Analysis 
“The People are generally entitled to introduce evidence of 
a defendant’s gang affiliation and activity if it is relevant to the 
charged offense.”  (Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 31.)  
“Evidence of the defendant’s gang affiliation — including 
evidence of the gang’s territory, membership, signs, symbols, 
beliefs and practices, criminal enterprises, rivalries, and the 
like — can help prove identity, motive, modus operandi, specific 
intent, means of applying force or fear, or other issues pertinent 
to guilt of the charged crime.”  (People v. Hernandez (2004) 
33 Cal.4th 1040, 1049 (Hernandez).)  But “admission of evidence 
of a criminal defendant’s gang membership creates a risk the 
jury will improperly infer the defendant has a criminal 
disposition and is therefore guilty of the offense charged” (People 
v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 193), and “[t]rial courts 
should carefully scrutinize” such evidence (People v. Melendez 
(2016) 2 Cal.5th 1, 28 (Melendez)).  We review a trial court’s 
ruling allowing the presentation of such evidence for an abuse 
of discretion.  (Id., at p. 29.) 
i. Limas’s Testimony 
We conclude that defendant forfeited any argument that 
Limas’s testimony regarding the East Side Wilmas should have 
been excluded by the trial court under Evidence Code section 
352 or 1101.  Defendant did not raise a timely objection to 
Limas’s testimony on these grounds.  Although defendant did 
object to Limas’s testimony regarding the meaning of “East Side 
Wilmas” as lacking a sufficient foundation, this objection did not 
preserve the distinct argument that her testimony was 
inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352 or 1101.  (See 
People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 137‒138 (Valdez) 
[objections that testimony was irrelevant and lacked an 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
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69 
adequate foundation did not preserve argument on appeal that 
evidence was inadmissible under Evid. Code, § 352]; People v. 
Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 19–21 (Demetrulias) [trial 
objections that evidence was irrelevant, speculative, and lacked 
a proper foundation did not preserve argument that evidence 
was inadmissible under Evid. Code, § 1101].)   
Defendant asserts that before trial began, he raised an 
adequate objection to the introduction of gang evidence as 
unduly prejudicial.  This assertion is unfounded.  Defendant’s 
argument relies upon a discussion between counsel and the trial 
court that took place during the development of the jury 
questionnaire.  At that time, the prosecutor observed that the 
draft questionnaire asked prospective jurors about gangs, and 
opined that this questioning was appropriate because of the 
contents of the notebook found in defendant’s clothing and a 
witness (presumably Limas) who would testify at trial to 
statements made to her by someone who identified himself as 
“Chingon” from a “Wilmas” gang clique.  Defense counsel 
responded, “Your honor, I would strongly disagree with the 
People with respect to this being a gang case. . . .  And I don’t 
believe any references to gangs should be made.  [¶]  Gangs is 
very prejudicial, and the identification I believe by . . . the 
operative witness is established by her familiarity with the 
person that was speaking to her, and gangs doesn’t — gangs is 
only prejudicial.”  
The court then stated, “The only reason it would be in the 
questionnaire is to make sure that the jury is not overwhelmed 
emotionally by gang evidence of whatever kind that comes in.”  
After some additional back-and-forth, defense counsel said, 
“I believe the People should make an offer of proof as to why 
Wilmas and Chingon is important,” leading the prosecutor to 
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70 
explain how these words were connected to defendant in various 
ways.  The court then said it would leave questions about gangs 
out of the questionnaire if that was what the defense wanted.  
Defense counsel replied, “Yes.  That would be my request that it 
be left out.  [¶]  And before the People call the witness, perhaps 
we can have [an Evidence Code section] 402 hearing . . . with 
respect to that issue.”  To which the court responded, “Sure.  But 
you’re assuming for this position that she’s [referring to the 
prosecutor] going to get that evidence in,” which defense counsel 
agreed he was, “[a]nd in that case you don’t want the questions 
[about gangs] in the questionnaire.”  Defense counsel confirmed 
that he did not want those questions included.  The conversation 
then turned to other subjects. 
Counsel’s comments during the preparation of the jury 
questionnaire did not amount to an objection under section 352 
or section 1101 of the Evidence Code (or on any other basis) to 
the presentation of evidence regarding gangs at trial.  Defense 
counsel’s statement that he did not “believe any references to 
gangs should be made,” in that setting, raised a concern 
regarding the contents of the jury questionnaire.  With regard 
to the presentation of gang evidence at trial, counsel merely 
suggested the possibility of conducting an evidentiary hearing 
and neither requested nor received a ruling on the presentation 
of evidence relating to gangs at the jail — which, it should be 
noted, was later elicited first by the defense at trial.  Under the 
circumstances, the dialogue regarding the jury questionnaire 
neither presented nor preserved a claim that the court should 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
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71 
have kept gang evidence from the jury pursuant to Evidence 
Code section 352 or 1101.25  
Even if there had been a timely objection to Limas’s 
testimony under Evidence Code section 352 or 1101, which there 
was not, the trial court would not have abused its discretion by 
overruling it.  Limas’s testimony identifying “ES Wilmas” as a 
gang helped explain why this otherwise cryptic phrase might 
have been found in both correspondence addressed to her and in 
the notebook found in defendant’s cell, and on that basis 
provided additional proof that Santi/Chingon was in fact 
defendant.  (See People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 171 [a 
“defendant’s plea of not guilty put[s] all elements of each offense 
at issue”].)  More significantly (particularly in light of what the 
People correctly characterize as “overwhelming” proof that 
defendant and Santi/Chingon were one and the same), evidence 
of defendant’s gang affiliation provided a reason why he might 
have been authorized to kill Tinajero — someone who had 
snitched on a gang member — in a jailhouse environment 
where, as testimony elicited by both the defense and the 
 
25  
Defendant also argues that his failure to raise a 
contemporaneous objection to Limas’s testimony under 
Evidence Code sections 352 and 1101 should be excused because 
in reading from defendant’s letter, the prosecutor had already 
put objectionable content before the jury, and because Limas 
described the ES Wilmas as a gang before the trial court ruled 
on the defense’s foundational objection.  But timely objections to 
this evidence as unduly prejudicial and as improper proof of 
propensity were still necessary to preserve defendant’s 
arguments on appeal.  If these objections had been deemed 
meritorious, 
the 
trial 
court 
could 
have 
stricken 
any 
objectionable testimony from the record and instructed the jury 
to disregard the disputed questions and answers.  (See, e.g., 
Melendez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 33.)   
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72 
prosecution tended to show, gangs exerted significant influence 
over whether, how, and by whom violence could be employed.  
Given the relevance of Limas’s testimony on these points, its 
brevity, and the other surrounding circumstances (including the 
evidence that already had been introduced at trial regarding 
gang activity at the jail), we would not find error even if 
defendant had presented his contentions to the trial court.26   
ii. Clift’s Testimony 
We assume that defendant has preserved his argument 
challenging Clift’s testimony as inadmissible under Evidence 
Code section 352, but we conclude he did not preserve his claim 
of error under Evidence Code section 1101.  (See Valdez, supra, 
55 Cal.4th at p. 130 [objections before the trial court that 
evidence was “irrelevant, cumulative, lacking in foundation, or 
prejudicial” did not preserve a claim on appeal that the evidence 
was inadmissible under Evid. Code, § 1101]; People v. Doolin 
 
26  
It is unclear whether defendant also attacks the 
introduction of evidence relating to gangs that was proffered 
through witnesses other than Limas who testified before Clift 
took the stand and the defense made its first recognizable 
objection to the introduction of gang evidence as unduly 
prejudicial.  Were we to assume that defendant challenges the 
admission of this evidence, too, we would conclude that any 
appellate attack on this testimony as inadmissible under 
Evidence Code section 352 or 1101 has been forfeited due to 
defendant’s failure to register a timely and specific objection 
before the trial court that would preserve his arguments on 
appeal.  Additionally, much of this evidence was elicited by the 
defense or responsive to testimony elicited by the defense, and 
in any event, the trial court would not have abused its discretion 
in overruling an objection or objections under Evidence Code 
section 352 or 1101, due to this relevance of this evidence in 
fleshing out the gang dynamics at the Men’s Central Jail and 
their bearing upon the Tinajero killing.   
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
73 
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 437 [a trial objection under Evid. Code, 
§ 352 failed to preserve an objection under Evid. Code, § 1101 
for purposes of appeal].)  Ultimately, defendant’s claim of error 
under Evidence Code section 352 is unpersuasive, as would be 
any argument under Evidence Code section 1101, had it been 
preserved.   
As detailed in the foregoing summary of the evidence 
introduced at trial, Clift took the stand only after the jury had 
heard extensive testimony regarding gang activity at the Men’s 
Central Jail.  Some of this testimony was elicited by the defense, 
in line with a theory that Tinajero had been killed by his 
cellmates incident to a gang-ordered “regulation” that went too 
far.  In this vein, defense questioning of Good and Sloan had 
insinuated that Tinajero had been killed, intentionally or 
accidentally, by his cellmates at the direction of a jailhouse 
gang.   
In this context, Clift’s testimony was relevant to explain 
why the pertinent gang dynamics at the jail made it more, 
rather than less, likely that defendant had killed Tinajero.  
Clift’s testimony that a “hit” on a snitch would need the approval 
of gang authorities within the jail; that inmates who were not 
members of a gang would not be tasked with performing a hit, 
but a gang member with the proper “paperwork” would be 
allowed to take care of his own “business”; and that defendant 
was, in his opinion, a gang member all was relevant to and 
probative regarding the central contested issue surrounding the 
Tinajero killing, namely, whether defendant or Tinajero’s 
cellmates were responsible for Tinajero’s death.   
What is more, in light of all relevant circumstances, the 
probative value of this evidence in these respects was not 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
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74 
substantially outweighed by a probability of undue prejudice 
from the jury hearing about gang culture in jail and defendant’s 
relationship with gangs.  Defendant calls out Clift’s 
identification of him as a gang member as particularly 
prejudicial.  But by the time Clift testified, the jury already had 
heard from Limas about the “ES Wilmas” notation in a letter 
connected to defendant.  Moreover, placed in context, 
defendant’s gang membership did not evoke the sort of raw 
“ ‘ “ ‘ “emotional 
bias 
against 
the 
defendant 
as 
an 
individual” ’ ” ’ ” that might lead to an unjust outcome at trial.  
(Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 29.)  It instead served the more 
technical purpose of explaining how the gang bureaucracy at the 
jail might have sanctioned retribution against Tinajero by a 
fellow gang member.  We find no abuse of discretion in allowing 
Clift to testify as he did.27 
iii. Cross-examination of Defendant 
Lastly, defendant has forfeited any claim on appeal that 
the prosecution ran afoul of Evidence Code section 352 or 1101 
by cross-examining him regarding his gang membership.  As 
with his challenge to Limas’s testimony, defendant did not raise 
a contemporaneous objection at trial that this cross-examination 
was improper under these provisions.  Neither counsel’s position 
against including any mention of gangs in the jury 
questionnaire, nor his objection to cross-examination regarding 
 
27  
Moreover, the prosecutor only briefly touched upon the 
gang evidence in her closing statement at the guilt phase.  It was 
the defense that more extensively invoked the gang angle, 
describing Clift’s testimony as “very valuable” in its closing 
statement and characterizing it and other evidence regarding 
gangs as supportive of the defense theory of Tinajero’s death as 
a gang-authorized regulation “that went too far.”  
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
75 
the letter defendant wrote to Limas on the ground that it was 
outside the scope of direct examination, can reasonably be 
understood as raising such an objection.  And contrary to 
defendant’s assertion, his failure to raise a timely objection 
cannot be excused because it would have been futile in light of 
the trial court’s previous rulings regarding the admissibility of 
gang testimony; on the contrary, given the different evidence 
and circumstances associated with those rulings, “[t]he record 
in the present case does not establish any basis to excuse the 
defense’s failure to object.”  (People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 
691, 729, fn. 18.)28   
 
28  
Earlier, during the prosecution’s case-in-chief, the parties 
had briefed and presented argument regarding the admissibility 
of the letter discussing “Grumpy” and the “guera.”  But this 
discourse concerned the letter’s admissibility as section 190.3, 
factor (b) evidence at the penalty phase of trial.  At the time, 
before defendant took the stand in his defense, the prosecution 
did not seek to rely upon the letter at the guilt phase.   
In its briefing regarding the admissibility of the letter, the 
defense did identify Evidence Code sections 352 and 1101 as 
grounds for exclusion. The trial court subsequently observed 
that defendant’s reliance on Evidence Code section 1101 in this 
briefing was misplaced because the issue before the court was 
limited to the letter’s admissibility at the penalty phase, 
however, and defense counsel did not dispute this assessment.  
Under the circumstances, defendant’s subsequent decision 
to testify at the guilt phase made it incumbent on the defense to 
alert the trial court that defendant was maintaining an 
objection under Evidence Code sections 352 and 1101 to the use 
of the letter for impeachment purposes on cross-examination 
during the guilt phase defense case.  (See People v. Morris (1991) 
53 Cal.3d 152, 190 [to preserve an issue for appeal, a motion in 
limine is to be “made at a time before or during trial when the 
trial judge can determine the evidentiary question in its 
appropriate context”].)   
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76 
Were we to assume for sake of argument that defendant 
did not forfeit his challenge to this cross-examination, we would 
conclude that there was no error in allowing this inquiry.  This 
examination 
represented 
appropriate 
impeachment 
of 
defendant’s testimony on direct examination that he was not a 
Sureño gang member.  (People v. Hopson (2017) 3 Cal.5th 424, 
443 [“It is . . . well established that the prosecution can impeach 
a testifying defendant, just like any other witness”].)29  
3.  Testimony Regarding Defendant’s Possession of 
Shanks  
Defendant argues that reversible error occurred at the 
guilt phase when one of Tinajero’s cellmates, Palacol, was 
allowed to relate a statement by a sheriff’s deputy that 
defendant had possessed shanks in jail.  Defendant argues that 
this statement amounted to inadmissible hearsay and its 
introduction violated his rights to due process and a reliable 
penalty determination under the United States and California 
Constitutions.  As described below, we will assume that there 
was error under state law but find it harmless. 
a. Facts 
Palacol made two identifications of Tinajero’s killer 
shortly after the murder.  The first identification involved 
Palacol being shown only a single photograph, of defendant.  The 
second identification involved six photographs.  In questioning 
 
29   
Insofar as defendant may be understood to complain that 
the jury could have relied upon this and other gang evidence for 
improper purposes absent a limiting instruction by the trial 
court, this argument has been forfeited by his failure to request 
such an instruction in the proceedings below.  (Hernandez, 
supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1051–1052.)  
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77 
Palacol about the first identification, the prosecutor showed 
Palacol a photograph that had been marked as an exhibit and 
asked him if he recognized it.  Palacol said that he did, because 
a sheriff’s deputy had shown it to him.  When the prosecutor 
asked, “What were the circumstances of you being shown that 
photograph?,” Palacol began to answer, “He just, he said that he 
was having —.”  At that point defense counsel objected “as to 
what the deputy said.”  The prosecutor responded that the 
statement was “not offered for the truth at this time.”   
A sidebar conference followed, during which defense 
counsel advised the court that Palacol would testify that the 
deputy told him he had been having a problem with the person 
in the photograph, “catching with him a bunch of shanks or a lot 
of shanks in the jail.”  Defense counsel argued that this 
statement was “highly prejudicial” and “more prejudicial than 
probative.”  He also asserted that if the statement was not being 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, it was irrelevant.  
The prosecutor responded that this detail was relevant to “the 
circumstances of why [Palacol] was shown the photograph and 
then how he makes the identification as the one in the murder.”  
The prosecutor added that “while I know it may be prejudicial, 
the court already has ruled we’ll be getting into the fact he’s had 
shanks in jail,” so “it’s not like evidence they’re not going to 
have,” making the prejudicial effect only “minimal.”  The court 
overruled the defense objection.   
The prosecutor then resumed her examination of Palacol, 
asking, “When the deputy was showing you this photograph, 
what were the circumstances for why he was showing it to you?  
What did he say?”  Palacol answered, “He said he was having 
trouble with this person finding shanks and stuff on him, and 
he just showed it to me and asked me if that was the guy that 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
78 
was in [my] cell that did that,” referring to the homicide.  Palacol 
told the deputy that it was.   
b. Analysis 
Defendant argues that the trial court should have 
excluded the deputy’s statement regarding 
defendant’s 
possession of shanks because it was hearsay (see Evid. Code, 
§ 1200), irrelevant, and subject to exclusion under Evidence 
Code section 352.  Defendant further contends that jurors would 
not have applied the limiting instructions that were given to 
them regarding his violations of jail rules, described earlier in 
this opinion, as extending to this reference of him possessing 
shanks, meaning that the jury could have relied on the deputy’s 
statement to infer that defendant had a criminal disposition.  
In arguing that there was no error, the People assert that 
“[h]ad the prosecutor not asked Palacol about the circumstances 
surrounding the deputy’s inquiry, the jury would have been left 
to wonder why the deputy showed Palacol only that one 
photograph of appellant, rather than presenting him with a 
photographic lineup as the detectives later did.  This would have 
fueled a defense argument that the single photograph show-up 
was 
a 
suggestive 
identification 
that 
tainted 
Palacol’s 
subsequent six-photograph identification. . . .  [¶]  But because 
the trial court overruled appellant’s objection, the jury was able 
to hear testimony suggesting the purpose of the deputy’s inquiry 
was not to investigate the murder, but rather to follow up on a 
far less serious rule violation by appellant.”   
The People’s explanation is unpersuasive.  It is clear that 
the purpose of both identifications was to pinpoint Tinajero’s 
killer, not to investigate past incidents involving the possession 
of shanks.  Insofar as it could more plausibly be asserted that 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
79 
the deputy showed Palacol defendant’s photograph when 
investigating the Tinajero killing because defendant had 
previously possessed a shank, that theory of admissibility 
squarely implicates the hearsay issue identified by the 
defense.30  And even apart from the hearsay question, if 
evidence that a shank, syringe, and razor blade were found in 
defendant’s cell was inadmissible at the guilt phase (as allowed 
for earlier in our opinion), this assessment would have collateral 
consequences for the Evidence Code section 352 calculus 
applicable to the deputy’s statement.   
Any error in allowing Palacol to recite the deputy’s 
statement was incontestably harmless, however.  As previously 
explained in addressing defendant’s claim that the trial court 
should not have allowed the jury to hear evidence that he 
possessed shanks and other potential weapons while in jail, it is 
not reasonably probable that defendant would have obtained a 
more favorable result at the guilt phase had this evidence not 
been presented.  (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)31  It is also 
farfetched that the jury would have used this fleeting reference 
to defendant’s possession of shanks as a basis for inferring a 
criminal propensity given that it was instructed early on by the 
trial court that evidence regarding “things that occur in jail” was 
 
30  
The People do not attempt to justify the presentation of 
the disputed statement on the ground that, although hearsay, it 
fell within an exception to the hearsay rule. 
31  
As with the other testimony regarding defendant’s 
possession of contraband in jail, discussed ante, there is no 
reason to regard any mistake in allowing Palacol to testify 
regarding the deputy’s statement as being of such a magnitude 
that it violated defendant’s constitutional rights to a 
fundamentally fair trial and a reliable penalty determination.  
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
80 
admissible only for the limited purpose of showing defendant’s 
knowledge, and “not to show that he’s a person of bad character,” 
and was reminded in closing instructions that evidence that 
defendant committed crimes other than those for which he was 
on trial could be considered only for a limited purpose, and not 
“to prove that the defendant is a person of bad character or that 
he has a disposition to commit crimes.”  In light of these 
considerations, as well as the compelling evidence of defendant’s 
guilt offered at trial, it is not reasonably probable that any 
mistake in allowing Palacol to recite the deputy’s statement 
prejudiced defendant at the guilt phase.32  We also perceive no 
possible effect on the penalty phase result, particularly because, 
as has been discussed, evidence that defendant possessed a 
shank (among other potential weapons) was admissible at that 
stage of trial as section 190.3, factor (b) evidence.  Even if 
admitted in error, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
reference that Palacol testified to did not meaningfully affect the 
body of evidence relied upon by the jury in deciding the 
appropriate penalty or how this evidence was considered by the 
jury. 
 
32  
Additionally, we note that in overruling a hearsay 
objection raised by the defense during the testimony of the first 
witness to take the stand at the guilt phase, the court instructed 
the jury that “when I allow a statement by other than a witness 
while testifying, . . . it is not to prove the truth of the content, it 
is only to show information that the individual received, and 
then that might explain their conduct after that, but it does not 
prove that what that individual heard was true.”  
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
81 
C. Penalty Phase Issues 
1. Testimony Regarding Defendant’s Participation in 
Mutual Combat  
Defendant asserts error in the introduction of evidence at 
the penalty phase that he was involved in a 2002 fight at the 
jail.  He argues that this evidence constituted inadmissible 
hearsay and that its admission violated his constitutional rights 
to confront witnesses against him (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. 
Const., art. I, § 15) and a reliable penalty determination.  We 
again assume error but find it harmless.   
a. Facts 
Prior to the trial, the prosecution provided notice that it 
intended to offer section 190.3, factor (b) evidence that 
defendant had been involved in “mutual combat” at the Men’s 
Central Jail.  Before the penalty phase commenced, defendant 
objected to this incident on the basis that it did not involve 
criminal activity and therefore could not be admitted under 
factor (b).  The trial court overruled the objection.   
At the penalty phase, the People called Sheriff’s Deputy 
Patrick Morean as its sole witness regarding the incident.  
Morean testified that while on duty at the Men’s Central Jail on 
June 30, 2002, he was alerted to a fight in a large communal 
dayroom.  When Morean arrived in the dayroom, he encountered 
other deputies who “had already been interviewing and 
separating all of the inmates that were involved.”  As Morean 
began to repeat what another deputy at the scene had told him, 
defense counsel objected to “any hearsay.”  This objection was 
sustained.  Defense counsel objected, again successfully, on the 
same ground when the prosecutor asked Deputy Morean 
whether he had obtained any information regarding who started 
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82 
the fight.  Trying a different tack, the prosecutor then asked 
Morean — without objection — whether he had obtained 
information about who had started the fight.  Morean said that 
he had.  The prosecutor then inquired whether Morean made 
any observations regarding defendant’s possible involvement in 
the fight.  Morean replied that he noticed defendant had redness 
on both his left and his right knuckles and scratches on his back.  
Morean wrote a disciplinary report concerning defendant’s 
involvement in the incident.   
On cross-examination, Morean testified that he did not see 
the physical altercation take place and he did not know who the 
first aggressor was.  When Morean responded to the incident, 
“everyone was being separated and interviewed at that time.”  
He also explained that fights among inmates were very common 
at the jail.  
Commencing redirect examination, the prosecutor asked 
Morean whether he had information that defendant was not the 
victim.  This question was met with another hearsay objection 
by the defense.  In the sidebar conference that ensued, defense 
counsel stated that he was “planning to ask the court to strike 
the entirety of this officer’s testimony because it appears from 
the direct examination and cross-examination he had no 
firsthand knowledge of the incident nor does he have a present 
memory of that particular incident” and “renew[ed]” his “motion 
to strike for lack of firsthand knowledge.”  Counsel also argued 
that the People were attempting to “bootleg hearsay information 
into evidence through this officer.”  The court denied the motion 
“as to what he’s testified to,” observing that Morean “is a witness 
to the injuries on the defendant,” but sustained the hearsay 
objection.   
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Responding to a rephrased question from the prosecutor, 
Morean testified that he would not have written a report on 
defendant had he possessed information that defendant was the 
victim in the incident.  The defense initially objected to this 
exchange, but after saying, “Object,” counsel advised the court 
that he would “let the answer stay.”  In subsequent recross-
examination, Morean reiterated he did not personally observe 
any fight and testified that “all of [his] information is what [he] 
heard from someone else except for what [he] physically saw on 
[defendant’s] knuckles and back.”  After eliciting this testimony, 
defense counsel stated, “there would be a motion,” which the 
trial court denied.   
b. Analysis 
To repeat, among the factors to be considered at the 
penalty phase of a capital case is “[t]he presence or absence of 
criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or 
attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied 
threat to use force or violence.”  (§ 190.3, factor (b).)  “Criminal 
activity,” in this context, means “the commission of an actual 
crime, specifically, the violation of a penal statute.”  (People v. 
Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 72.)  Although the criminal activity 
need not have led to a conviction, the evidence nonetheless 
“must be sufficient to ‘allow a rational trier of fact to find the 
existence of such activity beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”  (People 
v. Jackson (2014) 58 Cal.4th 724, 759 (Jackson).)   
“[T]he proper admission of evidence under [section 190.3,] 
factor (b) is not based on the abstract, definitional nature of the 
offense, but on the conduct it involves.”  (Delgado, supra, 
2 Cal.5th at p. 583; see also People v. Thomas, supra, 52 Cal.4th 
at p. 363.)  “ ‘ “ ‘[A] trial court’s decision to admit “other crimes” 
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evidence at the penalty phase is reviewed for abuse of discretion, 
and no abuse of discretion will be found where, in fact, the 
evidence in question was legally sufficient.’ ” ’ ”  (Delgado, at 
p. 582.)  “ ‘[A]ny hypothetical juror whom the prosecution’s 
evidence might not have convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
must be presumed to have followed the court’s instruction to 
disregard the evidence’ ” if not adequately proved when, as is 
the case here, an appropriate instruction to this effect was given 
by the trial court.  (Id., at p. 588; see also People v. Tully (2012) 
54 Cal.4th 952, 1027 [“Whether the other crimes evidence is 
significant enough to be given weight in the penalty 
determination is a question for the jury”].)33 
“ ‘ “[W]here the prosecution’s evidence shows a jailhouse 
scuffle, the scene as witnessed does not suggest defendant may 
have been acting in self-defense, and defendant presents no 
evidence in mitigation, a finding of criminal assault is 
justified.” ’ ” (Jackson, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 760.)  Defendant 
 
33  
Regarding the consideration of section 190.3, factor (b) 
evidence at the penalty phase, the jury here was instructed, 
“Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that 
the defendant has committed the following criminal acts which 
involve the express or implied use of force or violence or the 
threat of force or violence:  physical assaults and threats against 
guards, possession of weapons, an attempted escape by violence, 
refusing to comply with guards’ orders where compliance would 
reduce danger to the guards, a fight with another inmate, 
creating a disturbance which endangered another inmate, and 
sending threatening letters.  Before a juror may consider any 
criminal acts as an aggravating circumstance in this case, a 
juror must first be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant did in fact commit the criminal acts.  A juror may not 
consider any evidence of any other criminal acts as an 
aggravating circumstance.”   
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argues that Morean had insufficient firsthand knowledge of any 
fight that would support the 2002 incident’s admission under 
factor (b), however.  He asserts that “[u]nless it were placed in 
context by the use of inadmissible hearsay evidence, the 
admissible evidence — namely, Morean’s testimony that he 
observed redness on the left and right knuckles of appellant’s 
hands and scratches on his back . . . — would have had no 
evidentiary value; the jury would be able to infer that appellant 
had engaged in an act involving force or violence only by 
indulging in speculation.”   
The People respond that defendant forfeited this 
argument by failing to timely object to Morean’s testimony, at 
the outset of direct examination, that he had been alerted to a 
fight in the dayroom.  (See People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756, 
781.)  The People reason that this testimony was received 
without objection, and neither the defense’s subsequently 
sustained hearsay objections, counsel’s comment at sidebar 
during redirect examination that he “was planning to ask the 
court to strike the entirety of [Morean’s] testimony,” nor 
counsel’s statement at the close of recross-examination that 
“there would be a motion” gave the court timely and appropriate 
notice that this testimony should be stricken.  (See People v. 
Caritativo (1956) 46 Cal.2d 68, 73 [“The rule is settled that 
where a [party] deliberately permits evidence to be given 
without objection in the first instance and then moves to strike 
it out on grounds readily available at the time the evidence was 
offered, [the party] waives such objections to the reception of the 
evidence”]; King v. Haney (1873) 46 Cal. 560, 563; cf. Rose v. 
State (1942) 19 Cal.2d 713, 742 [an overbroad motion to strike 
is properly denied].)  Defendant retorts that his initial hearsay 
objection, although interposed a few questions after Morean 
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first testified to the alert of a fight in the dayroom, “related to 
any, which is to say, all . . . hearsay testimony by Deputy 
Morean, and therefore operated to challenge the admission of 
his testimony that a fight had occurred in the day room.”  
Defendant further argues that trial counsel’s other protests 
before the trial court also functioned as hearsay and 
confrontation clause objections to this and other portions of 
Morean’s testimony. 
Defendant may well have the better of this argument.  It 
is nonetheless unnecessary for us to decide the forfeiture 
question.  Instead we may assume that the issue has been 
preserved and further assume error, because it is clear that any 
mistake in admitting Morean’s testimony was harmless under 
the standard articulated in Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at page 448 
and Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at page 24.  Even if were we to 
assume an error or errors that weakened or fundamentally 
compromised the proof regarding the dayroom incident as 
section 190.3, factor (b) evidence, in determining whether to 
sentence defendant to life without the possibility of parole or 
death, the jury could not have attached much significance to 
defendant’s participation in a jailhouse scuffle occurring almost 
two years before he committed the far more serious offense of 
murdering Tinajero.  The circumstances of the charged crimes 
and other properly admitted evidence of defendant’s criminal 
conduct involving force, violence, or the threat of force or 
violence undoubtedly loomed far larger in the jury’s mind when 
deciding upon the proper penalty.  Therefore, even assuming 
that defendant preserved his claim of error and that this claim 
has merit, we find no basis for reversal.   
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2. Admission of Other Factor (b) Evidence  
Defendant argues that the trial court should have 
excluded other evidence admitted under section 190.3, factor (b) 
at the penalty phase and that its failure to do so constituted 
error under the death penalty statute and violated his state and 
federal constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial by an 
impartial jury, equal protection, and a reliable penalty 
determination, as well as the constitutional bans on cruel and 
unusual punishment.  (U.S. Const., 6th, 8th, & 14th Amends; 
Cal. Const., art. §§ 1, 7, 15, 16 & 17.)  The discussion below 
addresses this evidence in the sequence it was introduced at 
that stage of trial.34 
a. Disobeying Order   
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the 
prosecution to introduce evidence of an altercation with a 
deputy sheriff at the jail.  On December 7, 2004, Deputy Jason 
Argandona was retrieving defendant from the court line and 
escorting him back to his jail module.  Defendant was in 
handcuffs with a waist chain at the time.  Argandona noticed 
that defendant had something in his hands and was attempting 
to conceal it in his waistband.  Concerned that defendant might 
be hiding a weapon, Argandona asked defendant to show his 
 
34  
Insofar as this claim also renews and extends defendant’s 
challenge to the admission of evidence regarding his possession 
of an altered paper clip to capture additional testimony offered 
at the penalty phase regarding the use of paper clips to escape 
from handcuffs, these arguments (assuming they have been 
preserved) fail for the reasons given earlier in this opinion.  As 
has been explained, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that 
evidence regarding defendant’s possession of an altered paper 
clip and how distorted paper clips can be used as handcuff keys 
did not affect the outcome at the penalty phase.   
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hands and what he was holding.  Defendant did not comply.  
Instead, he grasped the object and lowered his center of gravity, 
so that he “sort of ducked down and turned away” from 
Argandona.  Argandona initially described this as “a defensive 
stance or possibly an offensive stance” and replied in the 
affirmative when the prosecutor asked whether it “might” be 
described as “like a fighting stance.”  Argandona grabbed 
defendant and placed him against the wall.  Defendant 
responded by calling him names.  Argandona removed the object 
from defendant’s front waistband.  It turned out to be a bag of 
potato chips.  Defendant, having lost his canteen privileges, was 
not supposed to have this item in his possession.  
Defendant argues that this evidence was inadmissible at 
the penalty phase because the incident described by Argandona 
did not involve a crime involving force, violence, or the threat of 
force or violence.  The People respond that the evidence made 
out a violation of section 148 — which prohibits resisting, 
delaying, or obstructing a peace officer in the lawful 
performance of the officer’s duties — involving an implied threat 
of violence.   
We need not decide whether Argandona’s testimony 
qualified as proper section 190.3, factor (b) evidence because 
defendant failed to raise a sufficient objection before the trial 
court, forfeiting his claim of error on appeal.  “ ‘If the accused 
thinks evidence on any . . . discrete crime [introduced as 
evidence in aggravation at the penalty phase] is too 
insubstantial for jury consideration, he should be obliged in 
general terms to object, or to move to exclude or strike the 
evidence, on that ground.’ ”  (People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 
786, 827 (Turner); see also People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 
877, 928, fn. 23.)  One way to register such an objection is 
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through a motion in limine.  “ ‘[A] motion in limine to exclude 
evidence is a sufficient manifestation of objection to protect the 
record on appeal when it satisfies the basic requirements of 
Evidence Code section 353, i.e.:  (1) a specific legal ground for 
exclusion is advanced and subsequently raised on appeal; (2) the 
motion is directed to a particular, identifiable body of evidence; 
and (3) the motion is made at a time before or during trial when 
the trial judge can determine the evidentiary question in its 
appropriate context.’ ”  (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 
264, fn. 3.)   
Here, defendant did not object to this evidence when it was 
introduced at trial or request that Argandona’s testimony be 
stricken from the record.  Regarding a motion in limine, prior to 
the penalty phase, the defense objected to “some of” the 
incidents the People had identified as potential section 190.3, 
factor (b) evidence.  But the defense did not adequately 
communicate that this objection was directed toward the 
incident that Argandona testified to.  Having failed to raise a 
sufficiently specific objection to this evidence and there being no 
reasonable basis for us to conclude that an objection would have 
been futile, it is plain that defendant forfeited any challenge to 
the admission of this testimony, and we decline to address the 
merits of defendant’s claim of error.35   
 
35  
In any event, the introduction of this evidence could not 
have prejudiced defendant under any standard, whether viewed 
in isolation or in relation to the rest of the evidence offered at 
trial. 
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b. Evidence That Defendant Threatened Another 
Inmate 
Later in the penalty phase, Deputy Andrew Cruz testified 
that on June 7, 2005, as he prepared to handcuff defendant in 
advance of a court appearance, he heard defendant yelling, 
“Fuck you, Benji,” and “You’re a rat” at another inmate.  Cruz 
testified that the inmate being addressed had provided some 
information to deputies and that if someone is labeled a rat or a 
snitch, “it’s almost like a death wish,” because “when other 
inmates find out that [an inmate] is a rat, most inmates are 
assaulted.”  Based on his training and experience, Cruz believed 
what defendant had said placed the other inmate’s well-being in 
danger.  When Cruz told defendant to stop, defendant did not 
comply.  He persisted and “incited the other inmates on the row 
as well to begin calling [Benji] a rat,” creating what Cruz 
regarded as an officer safety issue.  When defendant was 
handcuffed and escorted off the floor, the other inmates on the 
row continued to yell, “Benji is a rat.”  On cross-examination, 
Cruz acknowledged that although Benji had provided some 
deputy personnel with information, he did not know what that 
information entailed.   
After Cruz was excused from the stand, defense counsel 
asked the court to instruct the jury to ignore his testimony on 
the ground that defendant’s conduct, as testified to, was not a 
crime.  The prosecutor replied that defendant’s conduct 
amounted to intimidation of a witness, citing sections 136.1, 
137, 139, and 140.  The court denied defendant’s request, 
explaining, “[I]t calls for extreme measures for the person to be 
called a rat.  It doesn’t have to be true, may not have said 
anything, but any inmate who hears that is likely to attack the 
person in custody in a situation where he can’t defend himself.”   
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On appeal, defendant renews his argument that the jury 
should not have been allowed to consider Cruz’s testimony as 
section 190.3, factor (b) evidence because defendant’s conduct 
did not amount to a crime.  Concerning section 140, defendant 
argues that “[o]n its face, [defendant’s] statement that ‘Benji is 
a rat’ did not express a ‘serious expression of an intent to commit 
an act of unlawful violence.’ ”  Instead, he argues, “[A]t most, the 
statement expressed scorn or contempt for snitches.  Indeed, the 
statement evinces no intent to do anything whatsoever.  This is 
especially true of any statements [defendant] made after he was 
handcuffed.”  In making this argument, defendant relies upon 
our decision in People v. Lowery (2011) 52 Cal.4th 419, 427 
(Lowery), in which this “ ‘serious expression’ ” language 
appears.36  
The People regard defendant as having forfeited his 
argument that this evidence was erroneously admitted.  The 
People also assert that this evidence comported with section 
190.3, factor (b) because a juror reasonably could have found 
that defendant’s conduct was “ ‘a serious expression of an intent 
to commit an act of unlawful violence.’ ”  (Lowery, supra, 
52 Cal.4th at p. 427.)  In the alternative, the People argue that 
any error was harmless.  
Unlike the situation with Argandona’s testimony, to which 
the defense never specifically objected, here the defense asked 
the court to instruct the jury to disregard Cruz’s testimony after 
 
36  
Defendant does not argue on appeal that section 140 
requires a closer connection between the information provided 
by a witness and the actual or attempted commission of a crime 
than was shown by the evidence introduced below.  We therefore 
have no occasion to construe the statute’s precise parameters in 
this respect.   
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he was excused from the stand.  We assume that this request to 
strike preserved defendant’s claim of error (see Turner, supra, 
10 Cal.5th at p. 827) and proceed to consider — and reject — the 
claim on the merits. 
Section 140 applies when a person “willfully uses force or 
threatens to use force or violence upon the person of a witness 
to, or a victim of, a crime or any other person . . . because the 
witness, victim, or other person has provided any assistance or 
information to a law enforcement officer, or to a public 
prosecutor in a criminal proceeding or juvenile court 
proceeding.”  (Id., subd. (a).)  “The acts proscribed in section 
140 . . . take place because the witness, victim, or informant has 
provided information or assistance to a law enforcement officer.  
The statute is retrospective rather than prospective and 
proscribes acts which are retaliatory rather than acts to 
intimidate.”  (People v. McDaniel (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 278, 
284, italics omitted.)  This crime does not require “that the 
defendant act with a specific intent to intimidate the particular 
victim,” nor that the threat be communicated to the witness or 
informant.  (Lowery, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 426.)  Nor does the 
statute require an immediate capacity to carry out the threat.  
(Id., at p. 428.)  But it does penalize only “those threatening 
statements that a reasonable listener would understand, in 
light of the context and surrounding circumstances, to 
constitute a true threat, namely, ‘a serious expression of an 
intent to commit an act of unlawful violence’ (Virginia v. Black 
[(2003)] 538 U.S. [343,] 359), rather than an expression of jest 
or frustration.”  (Id., at p. 427.)   
We conclude that defendant’s testified-to conduct — 
yelling, “You’re a rat” to a fellow inmate, refusing to stop when 
ordered to do so, and instead continuing and inciting other 
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inmates to join him in chanting “Benji is a rat” — could indeed 
have been regarded as “ ‘a serious expression of an intent to 
commit an act of unlawful violence’ ” (Lowery, supra, 52 Cal.4th 
at p. 427) against Benji for having provided assistance or 
information to sheriff’s deputies at the jail.   
To understand whether a statement reasonably would be 
understood as a threat, one must take into account all relevant 
surrounding circumstances.  (See In re George T. (2004) 
33 Cal.4th 620, 637‒638 [construing § 422]; People v. Mendoza 
(1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1340 (Mendoza) [same]; Planned 
Parenthood v. Amer. Coalition of Life (9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 
1058, 1079 [“without context, a burning cross or dead rat mean 
nothing”].)  Accounting for these facts, a juror reasonably could 
have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s 
persistent chanting of “Benji is a rat,” including his refusal to 
stop after being ordered to do so and his involvement of other 
inmates, conveyed a seriousness of purpose to inflict future 
harm.  (Cf. People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 136 [§ 190.3, 
factor (b) evidence that the defendant loudly referred to another 
inmate as a “ ‘snitch’ ” in front of other prisoners, with the inmate 
subsequently being assaulted, sufficient to show culpability for 
aiding and abetting an assault]; Burns v. Martuscello (2d Cir. 
2018) 890 F.3d 77, 91 [it is “well understood that inmates known 
to be snitches are widely reviled within the correctional system,” 
and “a number of courts have found an Eighth Amendment 
violation where a guard publicly labels an inmate as a snitch, 
because of the likelihood that the inmate will suffer great 
violence at the hands of fellow prisoners”].)  Although defendant 
did not explicitly declare that he or anyone else would harm 
Benji, “rigid adherence to the literal meaning of a communication 
without regard to its reasonable connotations derived from its 
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ambience would render [threat statutes] powerless against the 
ingenuity of threateners who can instill in the victim’s mind as 
clear an apprehension of impending injury by an implied menace 
as by a literal threat.”  (U.S. v. Malik (2d Cir. 1994) 16 F.3d 45, 
50; see also Mendoza, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1340, 1341 
[upholding conviction under § 422 where defendant’s statement 
to victim that “ ‘you fucked up my brother’s testimony.  I’m going 
to talk to some guys from Happy Town’ ” reasonably could have 
been construed, in context, as “a threat to bring a person to the 
attention of a criminal street gang as someone who has ‘ratted’ 
on a fellow gang member”].)   
Because the jury reasonably could have found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant manifested “ ‘a serious 
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence’ 
[citation], rather than an expression of jest or frustration” 
(Lowery, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 427), defendant’s claim of error 
fails. 
c.  Defendant’s Letter to Della Rose Santos  
During the penalty phase, the prosecution’s gang expert, 
Clift, was called back to the stand to testify regarding the 
September 2006 letter to Della Rose Santos, including the 
portion of the letter that stated, “Oh, yeah, Grumpy told me 
about that guera that turned over the dime.  Their treating him 
bad but that will be straighten out soon we ride for the sur tu 
sabes babe, ‘one for all, all for one.’ ”  The letter was signed, 
“Chingon,” followed by a set of symbols (three dots and two slash 
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lines).37  The prosecution argued that this letter was admissible 
as section 190.3, factor (b) evidence at the penalty phase because 
it evinced a threat against a witness.  (§ 140.)  After hearing 
argument from the parties, the trial court allowed the 
prosecution to offer portions of the letter, as interpreted by Clift, 
as section 190.3, factor (b) evidence.   
In his testimony, Clift explained that “Grumpy” was the 
street name of another gang member who was incarcerated on a 
murder charge, and who was housed on the same cell row as 
defendant.  Clift interpreted the letter as saying that the “guera” 
had snitched or ratted on Grumpy, that Grumpy had been 
locked down and isolated from the general population, and that 
the person who had snitched on Grumpy would soon “be taken 
care of,” meaning that the person would be either killed or 
assaulted.  Clift further testified that defendant was “offering 
up his services to help” with the assault or killing, “whether he 
does it himself or he assists in committing the murder or passes 
the word on to other people that would get this so-called snitch.”  
According to Clift, the symbols appearing next to “Chingon” in 
the letter’s closing signified the Mexican Mafia, explaining that 
“whenever a Sureno gang member . . . . believes in the Mexican 
Mafia’s philosophies, they will identify their gang with the 
No. 13,” which the symbols reflected.   
 
37  
When he was cross-examined at the guilt phase of trial, 
defendant acknowledged writing the letter and explained that 
Grumpy was his friend and neighbor in jail, who was in custody 
on a murder charge.  He testified that the reference in the letter 
to something being “straighten[ed] out” meant that “we were 
going to talk to the cops to leave him alone because they were 
beating him up.” 
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We agree with the People that Clift’s testimony concerning 
the letter, and the letter itself, were properly admitted as section 
190.3, factor (b) evidence because the letter could have been 
construed as threatening a witness, as prohibited by section 140.  
Defendant argues that, contrary to Clift’s interpretation, the 
letter is most reasonably interpreted not as a “ ‘serious 
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence’ ” 
(Lowery, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 427), but instead as merely, in 
defendant’s words, “an accurate comment on the ‘guera’s’ 
predicament:  he had snitched, and for that reason he was now 
in danger at the hands of virtually any [Sureño] member with 
whom he came in contact.”  As the People argue, a juror could 
have reasonably found otherwise with the requisite conviction.  
Even though the portion of the letter providing, “Oh, yeah, 
Grumpy told me about that guera that turned over the dime.  
Their treating him bad but that will be straighten out soon” does 
not expressly vow any personal involvement by defendant, the 
accompanying statement, “we ride for the sur tu sabes babe, ‘one 
for all, all for one’ ” suggests that defendant would be personally 
involved in threatening or committing violence against the 
informant.  There was no error in submitting this incident to the 
jury as a crime involving a threat of violence captured by section 
190.3, factor (b).  
d.  Defendant’s Letter to Ursula Gomez 
On January 8, 2007, during a break in the presentation of 
the defense case at the penalty phase, the prosecutor advised 
the court that jail staff had intercepted more letters authored by 
defendant.  The prosecutor explained that defendant had tried 
to smuggle these letters through his legal mail the previous 
week, only to have them seized by authorities.  One of these 
letters was addressed to a state prison inmate named Ursula 
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Gomez; another to an inmate named Robert De La Cruz.  The 
People requested permission to present these letters, and the 
circumstances surrounding their seizure, as evidence in its 
rebuttal presentation at the penalty phase.  The defense 
objected, arguing that these letters did not involve a crime of 
violence and therefore did not represent valid section 190.3, 
factor (b) evidence.   
The trial court ruled that portions of these letters involved 
threats prohibited under section 140 and were for that reason 
admissible as section 190.3, factor (b) evidence.  Regarding the 
letter to Gomez, the trial court also noted that “[p]art of this is 
rebuttal to the evidence that was offered in the defense, that he 
actually has been given ethics training by the family.  That was 
one of the justifications.”  The trial court also allowed the 
prosecution to show that the letters were seized as smuggled 
mail, explaining, “We’ve gone into a lot of what has happened in 
the county jail, and that’s why I’m allowing the defense to go 
into the circumstances of his confinement if he gets an LWOP 
[life without the possibility of parole] sentence from the jury, 
and so this is part of an exploration of that issue.  Is he going to 
. . . — present a future danger if he’s in LWOP custody, 
whatever that turns out to be.”   
Clift was recalled to the stand to testify regarding the 
letters.  Sections of the letter to Gomez were redacted and not 
put before the jury.  Unredacted parts of the letter provided, 
“News papers have been making me a celebrity.  Not that I don’t 
like it I love publicity.  Choww!  I’ll be handin out autographs so 
no mas pide si gustas ya que asta las estrellas te doy ati mija.  
Ha!  Ha!  I’m a lifer wacha and still feel like a million bucks!  . . .  
[¶]  I’m a dedicated Sureno to the fullest and death and through 
out my life style I stood for mines.  When I got torcido I cut old 
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boy loose and put on the zapatos to fight it myself.  But el destino 
had plans for him you know the rest.  [¶]  Pa mi no me importa 
if it’s a guy or girl that has to be cut loose in times like these you 
weigh things whoever has more weight stays and the less weight 
que se eche aperder.  But some people do not have the balls to 
say, ‘Sabes, I got this go ahead and take off.’  Once the trial is 
over the loose one better look out.  I don’t know much about the 
situation but if homie was sunk and according to what I heard a 
while back homie in deed should have stood up and taken that 
step further on his own.  Pero eso se require los que me sobran!  
And no you ain’t wrong in. . . .  [¶]  The D.A. is a joke I was 
laughing through out my trial.  All them compliments from her 
and the judge, serio, both kept saying I’m a smart motherfucker 
and that’s why I should get death to stop anything in the future 
they assume I’ll do up state. Again all lies I’m just a lil guy trying 
to survive.  [Here appeared a drawing of a smiling face, 
winking.]  . . .  [¶]  Okay and can you go, say, from 505 to 508?  
Or B yard to C or D yard?  Then that means you could see and 
talk to hinas from B, C and D yard from 9 am to 3 pm Mon — 
Fri?  Man!  Puro pinche party how about pisto?  I know drugs 
are everywhere and pisto tambien but do you drink it?  How 
about getting high?  I likes to cook too and know how to work 
with this canteen stuff so manda some recetas so I can hook it 
up when I hit state.  I don’t know if the canteen stuff you girls 
get is the same as for us in a Level 4 yeard but I think it’s cool 
que no?  . . .  [¶]  Listen if I run into Cris I will advice him to do 
right and I wont mention we talked about it.  I’m also gonna talk 
to a señor and see his response.” 
The letter was signed “Chingon Kanpol” with the text “ES 
Wilmas GTL” under the signature.   
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
99 
Clift gave the jury his interpretations of certain portions 
of the letter.  He testified that the last passage within the 
letter — “Listen if I run into Cris I will advice him to do right 
and I wont mention we talked about it.  I’m also gonna talk to a 
señor and see his response” — meant that defendant was “going 
to talk to Cris, Cris being the co-defendant of this woman that 
he’s writing a letter to, about the case [she was involved in], 
telling him that he should take all responsibility for the crime 
that Cris and this lady he’s writing the letter to were involved 
in, and he’s going to go talk to a senor and see what that senor 
recommends, ‘senor’ meaning a Mexican Mafia member.”  
According to Clift, defendant would ask the señor “if Cris should 
be killed or he should be beat up or threatened or taxed.”  The 
prosecutor clarified, “[S]o in reading this, is it your belief or 
opinion that the defendant is willing to harm Cris if he doesn’t 
do what he advises him to do as in taking the entire rap for the 
crime that they committed together?”  Clift answered, “[T]hat’s 
correct.”  After Clift testified regarding the letter to Gomez, the 
defense stipulated to the admission of the letter to De La Cruz 
in its entirety.38   
 
38 
The letter to De La Cruz included defendant’s statements, 
“I ain’t trippin’, this is the way we gangster’s roll the party ain’t 
over it’s just getting started.  [This statement was followed by a 
drawing of a smiling face.]  On the other hand la doña is takin 
it hard I expressed what’s in the near future and she felt better.  
She just blaims herself for my life style and she shouldn’t.  
I chose this vida and I’m gonna die living it the love for my jefa 
goes without saying but I lead a life that I can no longer walk 
away.  She understands. . . .  [¶] . . . My point is don’t get 
involved in the sureño politic because you do not have anyone to 
back you up if you make a minor error.  A lot of homies don’t, 
 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
100 
The People assert, again, that the letter to Gomez was 
admissible as section 190.3, factor (b) evidence because it 
manifested another threat to a witness prohibited by section 
140.  The People also argue that the letter and the 
circumstances surrounding its seizure were admissible to rebut 
evidence the defense had offered in mitigation through its 
correctional consultant.  We question whether the letter was 
admissible under section 190.3, factor (b) as evincing a violation 
of section 140, but agree that it, and testimony regarding how it 
was obtained, were admissible as rebuttal evidence. 
The People justify the admission of this evidence under 
section 190.3, factor (b) on the ground that “insofar as the letter 
indicated appellant would arrange with a ‘senor’ to have Cris 
attacked, it involved a threat ‘to use force or violence upon the 
person of a witness to a crime’ ” prohibited by section 140.  Yet 
section 140 reaches such threats only when they occur “because 
the witness, victim, or other person has provided any assistance 
or information to a law enforcement officer, or to a public 
prosecutor in a criminal proceeding or juvenile court 
proceeding.”  (Id., subd. (a).)  The People point to no testimony 
or other evidence in the record indicating that Cris had provided 
assistance or information to a law enforcement officer or 
prosecutor.  The ostensible purpose of defendant’s letter was to 
get Cris to talk to law enforcement and claim responsibility for 
 
thats why they don’t stand up to the repas.  Pero si tienas 
problemas for example the crimy issue you mention to me I could 
assist and the señores I know Tambien.  If something needs to 
be done don’t volunteer to do it wait till you’re asked.  But if you 
feel you can’t accomplish it for whatever reason speak up before 
you comit yourself.  Southsider and sureño are two different 
cosas.”  
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
101 
the crime, not to retaliate for his having provided information or 
other assistance to authorities.   
The People offer no other statutory hook justifying the 
admission of this letter under section 190.3, factor (b).  Yet that 
does not mean the trial court erred in allowing the letter and the 
circumstances surrounding its recovery to be offered as 
evidence.  The letter and defendant’s attempt to smuggle it out 
of jail through his mail amounted to proper rebuttal proof to 
defense evidence that had been offered at the penalty phase.  
“A trial court has broad discretion when determining the 
admissibility of rebuttal evidence . . . .”  (People v. Simon (2016) 
1 Cal.5th 98, 145.)  When the defense elicits testimony from 
experts suggesting that the defendant will not be dangerous in 
prison, the prosecution may, within reasonable parameters, 
offer proof suggesting the opposite.  (People v. Benson (1990) 
52 Cal.3d 754, 798.) 
Before the prosecution obtained a ruling on the 
admissibility of the letters to Gomez and De La Cruz, the 
defense announced that it intended to offer testimony from its 
correctional consultant, Esten.  The defense would characterize 
this testimony as concerned with “the ability of the correctional 
department to secure Mr. Pineda,” with defense counsel later 
explaining that “[t]he bottom line of what I plan to present is 
that the Department of Corrections can house him, and he 
would not be a threat to another inmate nor to the officers who 
protect the facility and the inmates.”   
When called to the stand, Esten described the conditions 
at the facilities where defendant was most likely to be housed, 
should he to be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.  
This testimony touched upon the safety precautions taken at 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
102 
those institutions. In response to defense counsel’s question 
whether defendant would pose a danger to inmates or staff if put 
in a secure housing unit, Esten replied, “I can’t say that.  I can 
only tell you that the California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation has means and ways of dealing with inmates of 
every ilk.  [¶]  Some of the disciplinaries that I have seen that 
he has been involved in in the course of the 90 cases I have 
reviewed are of the most serious.  That is what a security 
housing unit is made for.  That is what an indeterminate term 
in a security housing unit is designed for.  [¶]  Will he continue 
such behavior?  I’m not a seer.  I can’t tell you yes or no.  I don’t 
know.  I can tell you that he has been disciplinary free since July 
30 of ’05.  That in itself, given the previous record that he had, 
is quite remarkable, so it’s saying that he can do it when he sets 
his mind to it.”  
In other testimony elicited by the defense, Esten 
acknowledged that although one of the facilities that might 
house defendant, should he be sentenced to life without the 
possibility of parole, had been designed to break inmates’ gang 
allegiances, “for the most part, it has not worked . . . .  [M]any of 
them are still gang members and continue in the activities 
that . . . put them there.”  Upon follow-up questions from the 
defense, Esten also testified that at such facilities, inmates 
tended to band together along ethnic and geographic lines and 
that “[defendant] is a Southern Mexican.  He will run with other 
Southern Mexicans [in prison].  If he chooses not to run with 
other Southern Mexicans, he will receive pressure from those 
who are grouped together and essentially forced into that type 
of behavior or be excluded from association with them, which in 
many cases can be worse than being associated with them.”   
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
103 
The evidence regarding defendant’s letter to Gomez, 
including his attempt to smuggle this letter through his legal 
mail, represented a proper response to Esten’s testimony.  Proof 
that defendant had recently misused his legal mail privileges 
undermined the expert’s surmise that defendant may have 
turned a new leaf by being “disciplinary free” since July 2005.39  
The contents of the letter to Gomez also were responsive to 
Esten’s point that “the California Department of Corrections 
and Rehabilitation has means and ways of dealing with inmates 
of every ilk.”  The letter’s contents gave bite to the possibility 
that, 
notwithstanding 
this testimony, 
defendant might 
participate in gang activity at a facility where he would serve a 
sentence of life without the possibility of parole — as Esten 
conceded had occurred with other inmates.40    
The conclusion that the letter’s contents and the 
circumstances surrounding its interception represented proper 
rebuttal evidence finds support in our treatment of a similar 
issue in People v. Schultz (2020) 10 Cal.5th 623.  The defense 
evidence in mitigation there also included testimony from a 
penology expert who opined that the “defendant would conduct 
himself in an obedient and cooperative manner if sentenced to 
life in prison without the possibility of parole.”  (Id., at p. 664.)  
 
39  
The trial court also allowed the prosecution to cross-
examine Esten and offer evidence in its rebuttal case regarding 
the December 29, 2006 search of defendant’s cell that yielded 
contraband, but it did not permit the prosecution to inform the 
jury that this incident involved pornographic material.  
40  
This evidence having substantial rebuttal value that was 
not substantially outweighed by countervailing considerations, 
we reject defendant’s argument that it should have been 
excluded for all purposes under Evidence Code section 352. 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
104 
The trial court allowed the prosecution to respond by 
introducing evidence regarding (1) the defendant’s gang tattoos, 
which likely had been obtained in prison; (2) defendant’s 
correspondence with a gang member (though excluding the 
letters’ contents); and (3) the use of friendly appellations and 
valedictions by defendant and his correspondent in these letters.  
(Id., at pp. 665‒666.)  We held that the prosecution’s evidence 
amounted to fair rebuttal, citing to past cases that have reached 
similar conclusions on analogous facts.  (Id., at pp. 668–670, 
citing, e.g., People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 878.)  With 
regard to the letters, we explained, “[T]he fact defendant and a 
former leader of a white supremacist gang had exchanged 
letters in which defendant referred to the former gang leader as 
‘homey’ created an inference that undermined the expert 
testimony that defendant would make a positive adjustment to 
life in prison.”  (Schultz, at p. 669.) 
If there was any error in admitting the letter to Gomez, 
then, the mistake was that jurors should not have been allowed 
to consider its contents as section 190.3, factor (b) evidence — as 
the penalty phase jury instructions (which referenced “sending 
threatening letters” among the factor (b) evidence that was 
before the jury) allowed, and the prosecution’s closing 
arguments encouraged, them to do.  We do not regard any such 
misstep as having prejudiced defendant, however.  Given the 
permissible use of the letter as rebuttal evidence, as well as the 
circumstances of the crime and the other section 190.3, factor (b) 
evidence — including the letter to Della Rose Santos that could 
have been construed as threatening an informant and was, as 
previously determined, properly submitted to the jury as 
involving a possible violation of section 140 — it is not 
reasonably possible that the penalty phase result was affected 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
105 
by allowing the jury to consider this evidence as potentially 
aggravating on the specific ground that it manifested a crime 
involving a threat of force or violence.   
3. Trial Court’s Role with Factor (b) Evidence  
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred when it 
instructed the jury at the close of the penalty phase that 
evidence had been introduced for the purpose of showing 
defendant had committed “criminal acts which involve the 
express or implied use of force or violence or the threat of force 
or violence” and then summarized the section 190.3, factor (b) 
evidence that had been offered by the People.  Defendant asserts 
that the characterization of this evidence as “involv[ing] the 
express or implied use of force or violence or the threat of force 
or violence” usurped the role of the jury to determine whether 
these acts were in fact of such character, and for that reason 
contravened the death penalty statute and violated his state and 
federal constitutional rights to a jury trial, due process, and a 
reliable penalty determination.  
As defendant acknowledges, we have in prior cases 
rejected his argument regarding the respective roles of the court 
and the jury in connection with section 190.3, factor (b) evidence.  
We have determined that although “[t]he question whether the 
acts [offered as factor (b) evidence] occurred is certainly a factual 
matter for the jury, . . . the characterization of those acts as 
involving an express or implied use of force or violence, or the 
threat thereof, [is] a legal matter properly decided by the court.”  
(People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 720; see also 
Delgado, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 588–590.)  Defendant provides 
no persuasive reason why we should reconsider our prior 
conclusions, and we decline to do so.   
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
106 
4. Challenges to the Death Penalty and to Penalty 
Phase Jury Instructions  
Defendant attacks certain jury instructions that were 
given at his trial and various facets of our state’s death penalty 
statutory scheme.  We reject these arguments, as we have done 
in the past, as set out below. 
The roster of death-eligible defendants under section 
190.2 is not impermissibly overbroad; “California homicide law 
and the special circumstances listed in section 190.2 adequately 
narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death 
penalty . . . .”  (Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 43; see 
People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 853 (Leon).) 
Section 190.3, factor (a)’s direction that, in determining 
the appropriate penalty, the jury shall take into account any 
relevant “circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was 
convicted” does not result in the arbitrary and capricious 
imposition of the death penalty or cause California’s capital 
sentencing scheme to violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  
(Leon, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 853; People v. Winbush (2017) 
2 Cal.5th 402, 488 (Winbush).)   
We adhere to our earlier precedents holding that (1) the 
death penalty statute does not violate the United States 
Constitution insofar as it does not  require findings made beyond 
a reasonable doubt regarding the existence of specific 
aggravating factors (other than section 190.3, factors (b) and 
(c)), that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors, or 
that death is the appropriate sentence (Turner, supra, 
10 Cal.5th at p. 828; People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 605–
606); (2) a jury need not be instructed that the State has the 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
107 
burden of proof or persuasion regarding the existence of any 
factor in aggravation (again, except for section 190.3, factors (b) 
and (c)), whether aggravating factors outweigh mitigating 
factors, and the appropriateness of the death penalty; nor that 
it is presumed that life without the possibility of parole is an 
appropriate sentence  (Turner, at p. 828; People v. Romero and 
Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1, 57; People v. Adams (2014) 60 Cal.4th 
541, 581; People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 681); and (3) the 
death penalty scheme does not violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, 
or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
for failing to require “unanimous findings as to proof of each 
aggravating factor or unadjudicated crime” (Turner, at p. 828).   
There was also no error in the trial court’s failure to 
instruct the jury that there was no burden of proof, except again 
as to prior convictions and conduct admitted under section 
190.3, factors (b) and (c).  (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 
347.) 
The “so substantial” language within CALJIC 8.88 is 
neither overbroad nor unconstitutionally vague.  (Leon, supra, 
8 Cal.5th at p. 853.)  This instruction is also not constitutionally 
deficient for failing to explicitly instruct jurors that they are to 
return a sentence of life without the possibility of parole if they 
determine that the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating 
factors.  (Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 55.)   
The fact that the penalty phase jury instructions here did 
not set forth a burden of proof, except for the jury’s consideration 
of section 190.3, factors (b) and (c) evidence, did not 
impermissibly foreclose the consideration of constitutionally 
relevant mitigating evidence by improperly shifting burdens to 
the defense.  (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 478.)  Nor 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
108 
is an instruction explaining that jurors need not unanimously 
agree regarding the existence of particular mitigating factors 
constitutionally required (Bryant, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 457); 
here, in any event, the jury was instructed at the close of the 
penalty phase that it “need not be unanimous in finding that an 
aggravating or a mitigating circumstance exists.” 
The lack of a requirement that the jury make written or 
other specific findings at the penalty phase does not foreclose 
meaningful appellate review of defendant’s sentence or violate 
defendant’s rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  (Leon, supra, 
8 Cal.5th at p. 853; Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 490.) 
The use of adjectives such as “extreme” and “substantial” 
in describing certain kinds of mitigating evidence under section 
190.3 (e.g., § 190.3, factors (d), (g)) does not violate the Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution.  (Turner, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 828.) 
Defendant contends that the trial court’s failure to delete 
sentencing factors that are inapplicable to his case violated his 
constitutional rights.  Defendant identifies two factors as 
inapposite 
but 
nevertheless 
included 
in 
the 
court’s 
instructions — section 190.3, factor (e) (whether or not the 
victim was a participant in the defendant’s homicidal conduct or 
consented to the homicidal act) and factor (f) (whether the 
defendant reasonably believed the circumstances morally 
justified or extenuated his conduct).  But we have held that 
“[t]he court is not constitutionally obligated to delete 
inapplicable sentencing factors” (Turner, supra, 10 Cal.5th at 
pp. 828–829), and defendant offers no good reason why we 
should reach a different conclusion here. 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
109 
The absence of a specific advisement in the jury 
instructions regarding which of the sentencing factors set forth 
in CALJIC 8.85 were aggravating, which were mitigating, and 
which could be either aggravating or mitigating depending on 
the jury’s assessment of the evidence did not violate defendant’s 
constitutional right to a reliable and individualized sentencing 
determination.  (Leon, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 854.) 
The absence of intercase proportionality review as part of 
capital sentencing did not violate defendant’s constitutional 
rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  (Turner, supra, 
10 Cal.5th at p. 829; Leon, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 854)  
The fact that the penalty phase of a death penalty trial 
does not incorporate certain procedures found in noncapital 
trials does not violate equal protection.  (Turner, supra, 
10 Cal.5th at p. 829; People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 268; 
People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 590.) 
California’s use of the death penalty, whether at all or, in 
defendant’s words, “regular[ly],” does not violate international 
law or evolving standards of decency in violation of the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  
(Turner, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 829; Leon, supra, 8 Cal.5th at 
p. 854.) 
D. Cumulative Error  
Finally, defendant argues that even if individual errors at 
trial were harmless, their cumulative impact requires reversal 
of the judgment below.  We disagree.   
The foregoing analysis has held or assumed that the 
following errors may have occurred at trial, with the claims of 
error being preserved (or assumed to have been preserved) by 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
110 
the defense:  (1) the premature introduction of evidence 
regarding defendant’s possession of contraband in jail; (2) the 
admission of evidence concerning an altered paper clip and the 
possible use of such a clip; (3) Palacol’s recitation of a guard’s 
reference to defendant possessing shanks in jail; (4) the 
admission of evidence that defendant was involved in a jailhouse 
fight in 2002; and (5) the submission of the Gomez letter to the 
jury as section 190.3, factor (b) evidence, as opposed to it being 
used only for rebuttal.  Even if we were to regard all of these as 
missteps to determine their collective impact, we perceive no 
prejudice under any standard.   
The most compelling argument for finding prejudice 
relates to the impact this evidence might have had in 
persuading jurors that defendant was so incorrigibly dangerous 
as to make death the appropriate penalty.  Yet there is no 
realistic possibility that this evidence altered the perception 
generated by other, properly admitted evidence — most notably, 
the incident in which defendant threatened to stab a jail guard 
and kicked another; defendant’s threatening of another inmate 
by calling him a “rat” and leading other inmates to chant the 
same; the statements defendant made in his letter to Della Rose 
Santos; and the circumstances of the charged crimes, especially 
the murder of Tinajero, in which defendant navigated his way 
around jail security to kill another inmate, his erstwhile 
coperpetrator.  Even recognizing the significant emphasis the 
prosecutor placed on the section 190.3, factor (b) evidence in her 
closing statement at the penalty phase, it is clear beyond any 
reasonable doubt that any mistakes in the admission of certain 
evidence did not affect the outcome.  “ ‘Defendant has 
demonstrated few errors, and we have found each error or 
possible error to be harmless when considered separately.  
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
111 
Considering them together, we likewise conclude that their 
cumulative effect does not warrant reversal of the judgment.’ ”  
(People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 479–480; see also People 
v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 525 [finding four possible errors 
at the penalty phase nonprejudicial, whether considered alone 
or together].) 
III.  DISPOSITION 
We affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
GUERRERO, J.
 
1 
 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
S150509 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Liu 
 
The penalty phase of this capital case raises an issue 
under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
that I discussed recently in People v. McDaniel (2021) 12 Cal.5th 
97, 157 (McDaniel) (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).  The issue is this:  In 
Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, the high court held 
that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Id. at p. 490.)  “[T]he ‘statutory 
maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a 
judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the 
jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.  [Citations.]  In other 
words, the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum 
sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but 
the maximum he may impose without any additional findings.”  
(Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 303–304 (Blakely).) 
“Under 
[California’s] 
death 
penalty 
scheme, 
‘the 
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the 
facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant’ 
(Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 303) upon a conviction for first 
degree murder and special circumstance true finding — with 
nothing more — is life imprisonment without parole.  A death 
verdict is authorized only when the penalty jury has 
unanimously determined that ‘the aggravating circumstances 
outweigh the mitigating circumstances’ (Pen. Code, § 190.3; see 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Liu, J., concurring 
2 
People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 541–542, fn. 13, revd. on 
other grounds sub nom. California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 
538) — which necessarily presupposes that the penalty jury has 
found at least one Penal Code section 190.3 circumstance to be 
aggravating. . . .  Our cases have not satisfactorily explained 
why this additional finding of at least one aggravating factor, 
which is a necessary precursor to the weighing determination 
and is thus required for the imposition of a death sentence, is 
not governed by the Apprendi rule.”  (McDaniel, supra, 12 
Cal.5th at pp. 158–159 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).)  In McDaniel, I 
discussed this concern at some length and concluded that “the 
20-year arc of the high court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence 
[since 
Apprendi] 
raises 
serious 
questions 
about 
the 
constitutionality of California’s death penalty scheme.”  (Id. at 
p. 176.)  I continue to believe that “this court, as well as other 
responsible officials sworn to uphold the Constitution, [should] 
revisit this issue.”  (Ibid.) 
The case before us illustrates the problem.  At the penalty 
phase, the jury was instructed that any unadjudicated criminal 
acts by defendant Santiago Pineda had to be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt before they could be considered an 
aggravating circumstance under Penal Code section 190.3, 
factor (b).  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 83, fn. 33.)  The jury was also 
specifically instructed that unanimity was not required as to 
factor (b) findings.  Pineda argues that this lack of a unanimity 
requirement violates due process and the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments.  He acknowledges we have 
rejected this claim (see People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 
221–222; People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 590) but 
asks us to reconsider our precedent. 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Liu, J., concurring 
3 
In McDaniel, I explained the issue this way:  “Suppose the 
prosecution introduces evidence of three prior criminal acts (A, 
B, and C).  Some jurors may find that A was proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, but not B and C; other jurors may find B 
proven, but not A and C; others may find C proven, but not A 
and B; and still others may find none proven at all and instead 
find some other circumstance to be aggravating.  Or the jurors 
may find various prior crimes proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
but differ as to which one or ones are aggravating.  There is little 
downside for the prosecution to provide a broad menu of 
aggravating evidence for the penalty jury to consider . . . .  Our 
capital sentencing scheme allows the penalty jury to render a 
death verdict in these circumstances.  But I am doubtful the 
Sixth Amendment does.”  (McDaniel, supra, 12 Cal.5th at 
pp. 159–160 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.), citation omitted.)  The facts 
here present exactly this issue. 
The prosecutor introduced evidence of several prior crimes 
allegedly committed by Pineda while in custody:  (1) a June 2002 
fight in the jail dayroom; (2) Pineda’s possession of a shank in 
his jail cell in March 2003; (3) a December 2003 incident in 
which Pineda threatened another inmate to obtain his 
wristband, which he used in an attempted escape; (4) his 
possession of a razor blade removed from its casing and a 
syringe in his cell in July 2004; (5) a November 2004 incident in 
which he threatened to stab a deputy and assaulted another 
deputy by kicking and spitting at him; (6) a December 2004 
incident in which Pineda concealed an object (later found to be 
a bag of potato chips) from a deputy and, when challenged, 
assumed what the deputy described as a “defensive stance or 
possibly an offensive stance”; (7) a September 2005 incident in 
which he yelled that another inmate was a “rat” and led other 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Liu, J., concurring 
4 
inmates to chant the same; (8) a June 2005 incident in which he 
was found to be in possession of an altered paperclip, which, a 
deputy testified, could be used as a handcuff key; (9) Pineda’s 
September 2006 letter to Della Rose Santos, which was 
interpreted by a gang expert as an offer to assault or kill 
someone who had snitched on another member of the gang; and 
(10) his January 2007 attempt to smuggle out personal letters 
as “legal mail,” including one letter that appeared to refer to his 
murder of Tinajero and offered to pressure the recipient’s 
codefendant to take responsibility for their crime. 
Discussing this evidence, the prosecutor said in her 
penalty phase closing argument:  “This is where the defendant 
has earned his death sentence, because he has proven it over 
and over and over again that even locked up, he is not safe.  Even 
locked up, he can get around the rules.  Any rule you throw at 
him, he finds a way to circumvent it.  [¶]  . . . This evidence, 
ladies and gentlemen, of the defendant’s conduct while in 
custody proves to us that if the defendant is allowed to live, 
others [sic] lives are in danger.  Anybody who crosses this 
defendant’s path or the paths of his friends, for that matter, is 
in danger if this defendant is given the gift of life.”  The 
prosecutor subsequently added:  “And this evidence, this [Penal 
Code section 190.3,] factor (b) evidence . . . is enough to tip that 
scale in favor of a death verdict.”  Further, the prosecutor 
specifically told the jury that unanimity was not required with 
respect to the factor (b) evidence:  “So before you can use the 
evidence from factor (b) to add to the aggravating factors, you 
must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that we have 
proven each instance, each thing that happened here that’s up 
on this chart.  [¶] But it’s important to know that this is an 
individual determination.  Each one of you individually decides 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Liu, J., concurring 
5 
do I believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he was involved in 
the fight in the day room?  Do I individually believe he had a 
shank in his jail cell?  [¶] You don’t go back into the jury room 
and talk amongst each other did you believe it beyond a 
reasonable doubt?  Did you believe it beyond a reasonable doubt?  
No.  It’s your decision.  If you believe it happened beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you can use it in your determination as 
to the appropriate verdict.  It doesn’t matter what your fellow 
jurors think about that.” 
I find it troubling that the Penal Code section 190.3, factor 
(b) evidence offered here was not particularly strong.  For 
example, the primary evidence that Pineda participated in a 
fight in the Men’s Central Jail dayroom in June 2002 was the 
deputy’s observation that Pineda’s knuckles were red and that 
he had scratches on his back.  Coupled with the deputy’s 
testimony that he would not have written a report on Pineda for 
the incident if he had reason to believe that Pineda was the 
victim, the prosecutor asked the jury to infer from this evidence 
that Pineda was engaged in mutual combat and not self-defense, 
asserting that “you don’t get redness on your knuckles unless 
you’re hitting somebody else.”  The incident in which Pineda was 
alleged to have yelled, “You’re a rat” at another inmate would 
constitute criminal conduct in violation of Penal Code section 
140 only if the jury found that “a reasonable listener would 
understand [this statement], in light of the context and 
surrounding circumstances, to constitute a true threat, namely, 
‘a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence’ [citation], rather than an expression of jest or 
frustration.”  (People v. Lowery (2011) 52 Cal.4th 419, 427.)  
Similarly, his letter to Santos was subject to multiple 
interpretations.  A deputy testified that Pineda was offering to 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Liu, J., concurring 
6 
assault or kill an inmate who had snitched on another gang 
member when he wrote, “Grumpy told me about that guera that 
turned over the dime.  Their [sic] treating him bad but that will 
be straighten [sic] out soon we ride for the sur tu sabes babe, 
‘one for all, all for one.’ ”  But Pineda countered that he was 
offering to talk to the deputies to leave Grumpy alone “because 
they were beating him up.”  
Would the jury have determined that these incidents were 
unadjudicated crimes and thus aggravating circumstances 
under Penal Code section 190.3, factor (b) if unanimity and not 
just proof beyond a reasonable doubt were required?  Without a 
unanimity requirement, each juror was permitted to reach his 
or her own conclusion as to whether any of the ten incidents 
offered by the prosecutor had been satisfactorily proven to 
constitute prior criminal activity.  As the prosecutor said:  “If 
you believe it happened beyond a reasonable doubt, then you can 
use it in your determination as to the appropriate verdict.  It 
doesn’t matter what your fellow jurors think about that.”  
However, “[t]here is a world of difference between a unanimous 
jury finding of an aggravating circumstance and the 
smorgasbord approach that our capital sentencing scheme 
allows.”  (McDaniel, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 176 (conc. opn. of 
Liu, J.).)  Whether “the smorgasbord approach” comports with 
the Sixth Amendment is an issue this court should revisit soon. 
We need not confront the issue in this case, however, 
because any Apprendi error as to Penal Code section 190.3, 
factor 
(b) 
findings 
was 
harmless. 
 
(Washington 
v. 
Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212, 221–222 [Apprendi error is not 
structural and does not require reversal if harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt].)  In assessing whether Apprendi error is 
harmless, the high court has instructed that the proper inquiry 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Liu, J., concurring 
7 
is whether it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational 
jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.”  
(Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 18 (Neder).)  In 
conducting this inquiry, “a court, in typical appellate-court 
fashion, asks whether the record contains evidence that could 
rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted 
element.”  (Id. at p. 19; see id. at pp. 16–17 [finding Apprendi 
error is harmless where the evidence as to a disputed element 
was uncontested and “overwhelming”].)  Pineda’s briefing 
focuses specifically on the application of Apprendi to factor (b) 
evidence; while he says “there is no assurance the jury, or even 
a majority of the jury, ever found a single set of aggravating 
circumstances that warranted the death penalty,” he does not 
make an Apprendi argument specifically with regard to evidence 
concerning the circumstances of the crime that the prosecutor 
introduced under Penal Code section 190.3, factor (a).  I believe 
it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would 
have found the factor (a) evidence to establish an aggravating 
circumstance for purposes of capital sentencing. 
The evidence showed that Pineda murdered two people:  
Rafael Sanchez, in order to steal his car, and Raul Tinajero, in 
order to prevent him from testifying at Pineda’s retrial.  The 
prosecutor focused on the brutality of these murders in her 
closing argument:  “Think about [Sanchez] that day.  He met the 
defendant and [Tinajero], he befriended them and then he was 
betrayed by them.  Imagine the anger he felt when these guys 
he had just befriended stole his car.  And then imagine the relief 
he felt when he said, you know, give me my car back, and they 
go, okay, we’ll take you to your car, only to later realize he had 
been betrayed again when he felt the defendant’s hands reach 
around and encircle his neck.  [¶] Imagine the fear.  Imagine the 
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Liu, J., concurring 
8 
fear he felt when the defendant began to squeeze harder and 
harder and he could no longer take in a breath.  Squeeze so hard 
that he actually lost consciousness.  [¶] Then he’s shoved out of 
the car like he’s nothing, and the defendant starts running him 
over.  Imagine the pain he felt as the weight of his car ran him 
over again and again and again.  Imagine the agony he must 
have been feeling as his body was crushed under that weight.  
[¶] And then you can imagine the relief he must have felt when 
he actually saw that car drive away and he began the agonizing 
effort to crawl down the alley thinking, God, if I can just get to 
help, somebody can help me, I can survive this.  If I can just get 
out of this alley, maybe I’ll make it.  [¶] And that little glimmer 
of hope he had must have been crushed when he saw to his own 
horror his white Infiniti barreling down on him again, and then 
imagine the pain he must have felt when that car rolled over 
him again crushing his already mangled body again under the 
weight of the car.  [¶] He had to know at that point there was no 
chance he was going to survive.”  She continued:  “It was brutal, 
it was malicious, and it was sadistic, and count 1, the murder of 
[Sanchez], is more than enough to tip those scales in favor of a 
verdict of death.” 
The prosecutor offered similarly strong arguments 
regarding the circumstances of Pineda’s murder of Tinajero:  
“Now, think about [Tinajero]. . . . [¶] Imagine the terror he must 
have felt when he is ripped from a dead sleep with the 
defendant’s arm around his neck, when he opens his eyes and 
he sees it is the defendant.  He must have been thinking, oh, my 
god, I’m dead.  I am dead.  [¶] And he struggled.  He didn’t want 
to die. . . .  He struggled to get that guy’s arms off of his neck.  
He struggled so hard he was spitting up blood.  He struggled so 
hard he defecated on himself.  He struggled and then he stopped.  
PEOPLE v. PINEDA 
Liu, J., concurring 
9 
Then the struggle was over.  [¶] [Tinajero] was probably dead at 
this point, but did that stop the defendant?  No.  This was 
personal to the defendant. . . .  [¶] He shoves [Tinajero’s] head 
in the toilet.  It’s inhumane.  And then he flushes again and 
again.  [¶] But that’s not enough. . . .  Let’s humiliate, let’s just 
denigrate him as much as possible, and [Pineda] shoves him on 
the ground and he stomps on his neck so hard that the people in 
the cell could hear the bones crushing, the bones cracking. . . .  
[¶] But again dead isn’t enough for this guy.  So he takes that 
ligature and he ties it around [Tinajero’s] neck, and he ties it 
tight just to bring the point home you don’t mess with me.  
[¶] And then what does he do with [Tinajero]?  He shoves him 
under the bunk . . . like he’s a piece of meat, like he means 
nothing. . . .  And then he sits in the cell for hours chatting like 
it’s no big deal.  Hey, yeah, this is better for my case, yeah, you 
know, him or me.  [¶] It was no big deal to him.  He had just 
snuffed out the life of a human being and he acted like it was no 
big deal.” 
The aggravating evidence concerning the circumstances of 
the crime was very strong; it was also uncontested at the penalty 
phase.  I thus see no reasonable possibility that a rational jury 
would not have found one or more circumstances of the crime to 
constitute a factor in aggravation.  (Chapman v. California 
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; see Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at pp. 16–17.)  
On this basis, I concur in today’s judgment affirming Pineda’s 
death sentence.  And I join today’s opinion affirming the 
underlying convictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Pineda 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal XX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S150509 
Date Filed:  June 27, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  William R. Pounders 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael Hersek and Mary K. McComb, State Public Defenders, Gary 
D. Garcia and Jessica E. Oats, Deputy State Public Defenders, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Gerald A. 
Engler, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, James 
William Bilderback II and Scott A. Taryle, Deputy Attorneys General, 
for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Jessica E. Oats 
Deputy State Public Defender 
1111 Broadway, Suite 1000 
Oakland, CA 94607 
(510) 267-3300 
 
Scott A. Taryle 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90035 
(213) 269-6073