Case Title: Moore v. Hinkle

Citation: 

Docket Number: 990912

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2000-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton,1 Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, 
and Kinser, JJ. 
 
SYLVESTER MOORE 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 990912 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
March 3, 2000 
GEORGE M. HINKLE, WARDEN 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
F. Bruce Bach, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal from the denial of a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus in the trial court, we primarily consider whether 
an attorney’s failure to prepare adequately for trial because of 
professional and personal concerns constitutes a “conflict of 
interest” with respect to his representation of the client, 
resulting in a presumption of prejudice to the client, and 
requiring that the conviction of the client be vacated. 
BACKGROUND 
 
 
On March 18, 1996, the grand jury of the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County (the trial court) returned an indictment against 
Sylvester Moore for the abduction of Nina C. Heckler with intent 
to defile in violation of Code § 18.2-48.  On July 30, 1996, the 
trial court conducted a jury trial on the indictment.  Moore was 
represented by his retained counsel, Dominick A. Pilli.  Moore 
elected not to testify or put on any other evidence at this 
                     
1Justice Compton participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on 
February 2, 2000. 
trial.  The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict and, 
consequently, the trial court declared a mistrial.  The case was 
continued for retrial on September 9, 1996. 
 
In the six weeks between the mistrial and the scheduled 
retrial, Pilli devoted his time exclusively to other 
professional matters, travelling out of state on business “for 
another practice” during the first half of August.  While Pilli 
was out of state, his grandmother died.  Pilli delayed his 
return to Virginia for another two weeks, returning to Virginia 
on September 5, 1996. 
 
During Pilli’s absence, Moore repeatedly contacted Pilli’s 
office by telephone, leaving messages for Pilli.  In these 
messages, Moore indicated that he believed he had a “valid 
defense” and that he wanted Pilli to prepare a motion to 
suppress a statement Moore had made to the police and a motion 
to exclude Moore’s prior criminal record.  Moore further 
expressed a desire to present “his side of the story” through 
his own testimony. 
 
On Friday, September 6, 1996, Pilli filed a motion for a 
continuance, asserting that he had not had time to prepare the 
motions Moore had requested or to discuss with Moore his desire 
to testify.  In arguing for the continuance, Pilli was candid in 
stating that his “family was more important” to him than his 
duty to Moore.  The Commonwealth opposed any continuance because 
 
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Heckler had moved to Texas and had to make special arrangements 
with her employer to return for trial. 
 
The trial court denied the motion for a continuance, 
indicating that a written motion to suppress could be heard on 
the morning of trial.  Pilli then stated that he would not be 
able to adequately represent Moore and requested to withdraw as 
Moore’s counsel.  The trial court indicated that his motion to 
withdraw could also be considered on the day of trial and that 
Pilli should “spend a good deal of the weekend working on the 
case.” 
 
On Monday, September 9, 1996, Pilli arrived late for court 
and again requested a continuance, asserting that he had not had 
time to prepare the suppression, exclusion, and withdrawal 
motions and had not been able to consult with Moore except 
briefly the previous day.  Pilli further asserted that if the 
trial court would not grant the continuance, he would ask the 
trial court to permit him to withdraw because “Mr. Moore is not 
going to want me as his counsel.”  The trial court denied both 
the motion for a continuance and the motion to withdraw.  Pilli 
then responded, “Your Honor, I’m not going to be able to do a 
trial today.  I think it would be ineffective assistance of 
counsel for Mr. Moore.”  Pilli further stated that “emotionally 
and mentally, . . . I’m not prepared.” 
 
3
 
Thereafter, Moore, who was wearing jail clothing, was 
brought to the courtroom.  The trial court asked if he had been 
given the opportunity to dress in street clothes, and Moore 
responded that he “would like to address the court.”  Moore 
contended that he had not dressed in street clothes because “Mr. 
Pilli wasn’t all for my case.”  Moore then asked the trial court 
to permit Pilli to withdraw and appoint new counsel because “I 
ain’t getting no fair trial, cause he’s not ready.” 
 
The trial court asked Pilli to explain again why he was not 
prepared for trial.  Pilli reiterated that his “unique practice” 
required him to travel and that following the death of his 
grandmother he had focused his attentions on his personal life.  
Pilli indicated that when Moore had contacted him about the 
case, Pilli had told Moore, “Mr. Moore, at this time I just 
don’t care.”  Pilli further told the trial court that “I still 
don’t [care] right now . . . .  I cannot sit down right now and 
just concentrate on this case.” 
 
The trial court denied Moore’s motion, stating that neither 
Moore nor Pilli had adequately explained why Pilli would not be 
able to represent Moore in a retrial of a case Pilli had tried 
only six weeks before.  Pilli again asserted that “I cannot have 
a trial today . . . I just can’t do a trial today.”  The trial 
court indicated that Pilli was “verging right on the border of 
contempt.”  After another extended colloquy between Pilli and 
 
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the trial court, Pilli concluded by stating “Mr. Moore does not 
want me to represent him.”  The trial court indicated that it 
would not change its prior ruling and that the matter would have 
to be resolved on appeal. 
 
After Moore entered a plea of not guilty, he again told the 
trial court that he was not satisfied with Pilli’s 
representation and that he was not ready for trial.  The trial 
court proceeded with the trial.  Pilli actively participated in 
the voir dire of the potential jurors and made an opening 
statement.  The Commonwealth called Heckler as its first 
witness.  During the direct examination of Heckler, Pilli raised 
an objection to certain aspects of her testimony.  The trial was 
recessed for the day before the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s 
direct examination of Heckler. 
 
The following morning, Pilli was again late for court.  
When the trial court requested an explanation, Pilli asserted 
that he “had five cases to get continued this morning” and 
complained that the trial court was not sympathetic to his 
circumstances, stating, “I’m about at the edge with you.  I’m 
trying to be proper.  I know I’m stepping on the bounds, but I 
did . . . .”  At that point, the trial court interrupted Pilli 
and held him in summary contempt of court. 
 
The trial continued, with Pilli again actively 
participating in cross-examination of Heckler and the 
 
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Commonwealth’s other witnesses.  The evidence as developed at 
trial showed that Moore, a stranger to Heckler, had entered her 
vehicle while she was stopped at a gasoline station.  Although 
Heckler screamed for him to get out of the car, Moore refused.  
Heckler drove for several blocks hoping that Moore would then 
leave the car.  Heckler stopped at another gasoline station, got 
out of her car, and demanded that Moore leave the vehicle.  
Moore responded that she should “[g]et back in the car, or I’m 
going to kill you.”  Heckler obeyed and after driving several 
more blocks, Moore grabbed Heckler’s thigh and told her that he 
planned to engage in sexual activity with her. 
 
Heckler was ultimately able to escape from Moore by 
feigning acquiescence and then taking refuge in the home of a 
stranger who assisted her in calling the police.  Moore 
attempted to follow Heckler inside this home, but was arrested 
outside the home by police responding to Heckler’s call.  In a 
statement to police, Moore admitted that he had “been smoking 
marijuana and drinking and that he just got into the car to get 
himself together.”  Moore denied touching Heckler and making 
sexually suggestive comments to her. 
 
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s evidence, Pilli 
made a motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence, which was 
denied.  Pilli then indicated that the defense would not present 
any evidence.  Pilli offered jury instructions, opposed the 
 
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Commonwealth’s instructions, and made a closing statement to the 
jury.  After the jury returned a verdict against Moore, the 
Commonwealth, without objection, presented evidence of Moore’s 
prior criminal record.  Pilli presented no evidence during the 
sentencing phase, but did argue to the jury that Moore was a 
“productive citizen” and that the jury should impose a lenient 
sentence. 
 
The jury returned a verdict for life imprisonment.  The 
trial court confirmed the verdict and sentenced Moore to a term 
of life imprisonment, suspending all but ten years of the 
sentence. 
 
Moore filed an appeal in the Court of Appeals of Virginia 
asserting, inter alia, that the trial court erred in denying the 
two motions for continuances and that Pilli had been ineffective 
as counsel.  The Court of Appeals refused Moore’s petition with 
respect to the continuances issue, holding that “[d]espite 
[Pilli’s] assertion that he was unprepared for trial, he never 
demonstrated how the circumstances had changed after having 
represented [Moore] at trial six weeks earlier . . . [Pilli] did 
not proffer the evidence he claimed [Moore] wanted him to 
present at the second trial, nor did he vouch how that evidence 
might affect his representation of [Moore].”  The Court further 
noted that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may not 
be raised on direct appeal.  Although Moore was awarded an 
 
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appeal on another issue, he subsequently sought to withdraw his 
appeal, and the appeal was ultimately dismissed for failure to 
file an opening brief. 
 
On October 26, 1998, Moore filed a pro se petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus in the trial court.  In a supporting 
brief, Moore asserted that Pilli’s representation of Moore had 
been adversely affected by a “conflict of interest” as a result 
of Pilli’s having devoted his time between Moore’s first and 
second trial to other professional and personal matters.2  Moore 
contended that Pilli’s efforts on Moore’s behalf in the second 
trial fell below the acceptable standard for effective 
assistance of counsel, and, since the ineffective representation 
arose from a conflict of interest, no showing of actual 
prejudice to his case was required to establish that he had not 
received a fair trial.  Moore further contended that if a 
showing of prejudice was required, Pilli’s failure to counsel 
Moore about his right to testify or to prepare him to testify, 
Pilli’s failure to prepare and present the motions to suppress 
Moore’s statement to the police and to exclude his prior 
                     
2In the petition, Moore also made reference to the fact that 
on January 9, 1998, in response to a complaint filed by Moore, 
the Virginia State Bar took disciplinary action in the form of a 
private reprimand with terms against Pilli.  We note, however, 
that a determination that a disciplinary rule has been violated 
does not in itself establish that the conduct in question fell 
below the constitutional standard for effective assistance of 
counsel.  Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 753 n.6 (1983).  
 
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criminal record, Pilli’s failure to conduct “meaning[ful] cross-
examination of the complaining witness,” and Moore’s loss of 
opportunity to appear before the jury in street clothes, were 
all inherently prejudicial to Moore’s case.3
 
The Commonwealth responded to Moore’s petition by filing a 
motion to dismiss.  Without conceding that Pilli’s 
representation of Moore was ineffective, the Commonwealth 
contended that there was no “conflict of interest” in Pilli’s 
representation of Moore since both were united in their request 
for a continuance and Moore voiced no objection to Pilli’s 
continuing representation if that continuance were granted.  The 
Commonwealth further contended that if Pilli’s representation 
was nonetheless ineffective, Moore had failed to demonstrate 
actual prejudice by showing that the motions to suppress Moore’s 
statement to the police and to exclude his prior criminal record 
were meritorious.  Similarly, the Commonwealth contended that 
Moore failed to proffer the evidence he would have given if 
allowed to testify, or what other evidence Pilli might have 
developed on cross-examination of the Commonwealth’s witnesses 
or by direct examination of witnesses not called.  The 
                     
3Throughout these proceedings, Moore did not proffer any 
evidence to support his requested motions to suppress his 
statements to the police or to exclude his prior criminal record 
or in support of his “valid defense” that had not been advanced 
during the first trial. 
 
 
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Commonwealth did not address Moore’s contention that appearing 
in jail clothing was prejudicial to his case. 
 
On February 9, 1999, the trial court granted the 
Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss.  In doing so, the trial court 
conducted an independent review of the trial record, but did not 
hold an evidentiary hearing.  In the order dismissing the 
petition, the trial court incorporated into the record by 
reference the record of Moore’s second trial.  This appeal 
followed. 
DISCUSSION 
 
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the defendant must first demonstrate that his 
attorney’s conduct “fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.”  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 
(1984).  Furthermore, the defendant bears the burden of showing 
not only that his counsel’s performance was deficient but also 
that he was actually prejudiced as a result.  Murray v. 
Griffith, 243 Va. 384, 388, 416 S.E.2d 219, 221 (1992).  In 
order to establish prejudice, the evidence must show that “there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  However, 
prejudice will be presumed where “an actual conflict of interest 
adversely affected [the] lawyer’s performance.”  Cuyler v. 
 
10
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980).  An actual conflict of 
interest exists when the attorney’s interests and the 
defendant’s interests “diverge with respect to a material 
factual or legal issue or to a course of action.”  Id. at 356 
n.3. 
A. Pilli’s Conduct as an Attorney 
 
When a petition for a writ of habeas corpus raises the 
question of ineffective assistance of counsel, the initial 
inquiry must be whether the attorney’s representation was so 
deficient as to fall below the minimum acceptable standard of 
care and skill which a reasonably competent attorney would 
exercise under the factual circumstances of the particular case.4  
The Commonwealth contends that under the standard discussed in 
Strickland, Moore has failed to establish that Pilli’s 
representation was deficient.  We disagree. 
                     
4The Commonwealth contends that Moore failed to raise the 
issue of whether Pilli’s representation of Moore constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel in the absence of a conflict 
of interest within the question presented by his petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus.  However, Moore’s claim of prejudice 
arising from a conflict of interest necessarily includes a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel generally.  Moreover, the 
thrust of Moore’s argument in his supporting memorandum clearly 
implicates the alternative theories of prejudice arising from a 
conflict of interest and actual prejudice, the Commonwealth 
responded to both of these arguments in its motion to dismiss, 
and the trial court ruled on each theory when granting the 
motion to dismiss.  Accordingly, we hold that Moore adequately 
preserved both issues for appeal, and we will address both 
issues in this opinion. 
 
 
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In Strickland, the Supreme Court said that “the defendant 
must show . . . that counsel made errors so serious that counsel 
was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by 
the Sixth Amendment.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  The Court 
cautioned, however, against second-guessing counsel’s 
representation through hindsight.  Instead, the Court stated 
that “a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must 
judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the 
facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s 
conduct.”  Id. at 690.  Furthermore, the Court recognized that 
“[t]he reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or 
substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or 
actions.”  Id. at 691. 
 
Here, the record clearly demonstrates that Pilli’s conduct 
prior to the retrial fell well below any acceptable standard of 
reasonable and adequate preparation for trial.  Although Pilli’s 
desire to attend to his other area of practice and the 
unforeseen family responsibilities that arose thereafter were 
understandable impediments to his ability to give his full 
attention to Moore’s case, the fact remains that until four days 
prior to the retrial Pilli had no direct communication with 
Moore and had done nothing to prepare for the retrial.  
Moreover, despite the trial court’s willingness to allow Pilli 
to prepare the suppression and withdrawal motions over the 
 
12
intervening weekend and to argue them prior to trial, Pilli made 
no effort to take advantage of this opportunity.  These tasks 
are clearly within the ability of a reasonably competent 
attorney.  Pilli’s explanation for his lack of conscientiousness 
does not excuse his failure to comport with minimal professional 
standards. 
 
Similarly, despite the fact that Pilli actively 
participated in the trial as it developed, the record 
demonstrates that Pilli did not represent Moore in accordance 
with Moore’s wishes.  Nothing in the record suggests that 
Pilli’s failure to present the requested motions or to call 
Moore to testify on his own behalf resulted from strategic 
decisions made by Pilli.  Rather, as Pilli’s and Moore’s own 
comments demonstrate, Pilli simply had no regard for Moore’s 
requests and no desire to do more than “go through the motions” 
of representing Moore during the trial. 
 
Based on the foregoing facts, we conclude that Pilli’s 
actions were not acceptable conduct for an attorney and amounted 
to a deficient representation of Moore during his second trial. 
B. The “Conflict of Interest” Issue 
 
As noted above, to prevail on the constitutional claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, Moore must demonstrate that 
Pilli’s deficient conduct resulted in prejudice to him, either 
because it arose from an actual conflict of interest or because 
 
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the failure to present evidence or to prevent the Commonwealth 
from presenting evidence would have altered the jury’s verdict.  
Moore first contends that Pilli’s attention to other matters, 
professional and personal, constitutes a “conflict of interest” 
which gives rise to the presumption of prejudice.  We disagree. 
 
An actual conflict of interest exists where counsel has 
responsibilities to other clients or personal concerns that are 
actively in opposition to the best interests of the defendant.  
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50.  An 
actual conflict may arise, for example, in the circumstance of 
counsel’s representation of more than one defendant in 
connection with the same criminal charge, see, e.g., Cuyler, 446 
U.S. at 348; Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482 (1978), or 
where a defendant’s counsel has a professional relationship with 
the prosecution.  See, e.g., United States v. Goot, 894 F.2d 
231, 236-37 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811 (1990). 
 
Nothing in the record suggests that Pilli’s other practice 
obligation or his family responsibilities conflicted with his 
representation of Moore in the sense that these matters were in 
opposition to the best interests of Moore.  Rather, these were 
matters that simply competed for Pilli’s time.  In this respect, 
Pilli is no different from any other attorney who must manage 
professional and personal responsibilities.  The mere fact that 
an attorney fails to properly manage his time, resulting in the 
 
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interests of some clients being addressed to the detriment of 
others or the interests of all being subordinated to the 
attorney’s personal concerns, does not give rise to an “actual 
conflict of interest” in the context of a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
 
Moreover, while such mismanagement may give rise to a 
possible disciplinary complaint against the attorney, an 
attorney’s desire to protect himself against a later charge of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, standing alone, does not 
constitute a per se conflict of interest.  See O’Dell v. 
Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 688, 364 S.E.2d 491, 500, cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988); Carter v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 
42, 47, 427 S.E.2d 736, 740 (1993).  Here, the record 
demonstrates that Pilli was fully cognizant of the possibility 
that he might be subject to a charge of ineffective assistance 
of counsel by Moore, and, accordingly, there can be no 
presumption that Pilli would have acted to conceal his alleged 
misbehavior to Moore’s detriment.  See Carter, 16 Va. App. at 
47, 427 S.E.2d at 740.  To the contrary, Pilli was wholly 
forthcoming to both Moore and the trial court in expressing his 
belief that he was not able adequately to represent Moore. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that Moore has failed to demonstrate 
that Pilli had an actual conflict of interest that would give 
 
15
rise to a presumption of prejudice to the outcome of Moore’s 
second trial. 
C. Actual Prejudice
 
Finally, Moore contends that, even if Pilli’s deficient 
representation did not arise from an actual conflict of 
interest, the record supports a finding that Moore was actually 
prejudiced by Pilli’s representation.  We disagree. 
 
Moore’s burden in the trial court was to show that there 
was a “reasonable probability” that but for Pilli’s deficient 
representation the outcome of the trial would have been 
different.  In order to demonstrate this reasonable probability, 
a petitioner must not simply indicate what actions a competent 
attorney would have taken on his behalf, but also show that the 
impact of those actions would almost certainly have resulted in 
the reduction of the charge against him or in his acquittal. 
 
Moore first points to Pilli’s failure to prepare for trial 
and to meet with him at length.  As discussed above, this lack 
of diligence on Pilli’s part contributed to his inability to 
provide Moore with effective representation.  However, these 
failures do not in and of themselves demonstrate prejudice to 
Moore’s case.  The record must show what a reasonably competent 
attorney would have accomplished by avoiding them. 
 
Moore contends that had Pilli adequately prepared for trial 
and consulted with Moore, Moore would have been able to testify 
 
16
in his own behalf.  However, the record is devoid of any 
evidence or proffer of what Moore would have testified had he 
decided to do so.  The record contains only the bare assertion 
that Moore believed he had a “valid defense” and wanted to tell 
the jury “his side of the story.” 
 
During oral argument, Moore’s counsel conceded that the 
record was insufficient to establish that Moore might have given 
credible testimony to rebut the Commonwealth’s evidence.  
Counsel asserted, however, that a reasonable inference from the 
record would be that Moore would have, at a minimum, 
affirmatively stated his innocence and that this testimony might 
have influenced the jury in his favor.  However, the wholly 
speculative nature of what effect such testimony might have had 
on the jury, being nothing more than a reiteration of Moore’s 
plea of not guilty, is so remote as to fall well short of the 
standard of “reasonable probability” needed to find actual 
prejudice to the outcome of Moore’s trial. 
 
Moore further contends that he was prejudiced by appearing 
in jail clothing rather than in street clothes.  Moore asserts 
that having lost confidence in his attorney, his decision to 
forego appearing in street clothes arose from Pilli’s 
ineffective representation.  Although the Commonwealth failed to 
address this issue at trial or on appeal, the record is clear 
that Moore was afforded the opportunity to change into street 
 
17
clothes, but voluntarily declined to do so.  Regardless of his 
motivation for so doing, under the “invited error” doctrine 
Moore may not benefit from his voluntary choice to place himself 
at a disadvantage.  See, e.g., Saunders v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 
399, 400, 177 S.E.2d 637, 638 (1970); Clark v. Commonwealth, 202 
Va. 787, 791, 120 S.E.2d 270, 273 (1961); Hundley v. 
Commonwealth, 193 Va. 449, 454, 69 S.E.2d 336, 339 (1952). 
 
In the concluding paragraph of his brief, Moore recounts 
without elaboration Pilli’s other failures as counsel, including 
the failure to file the suppression motion, the lack of 
“meaningful cross-examination” of the victim, and the failure to 
present any evidence during the sentencing phase of the trial.  
In each of these instances, the record contains nothing from 
which we can determine what the content or import of these 
actions would have been had Pilli carried through with Moore’s 
instruction to oppose the introduction of his statement, pursue 
a more vigorous cross-examination, or put on evidence relevant 
to sentencing.  In short, Moore relies on the facts that 
establish Pilli’s deficient representation, rather than pointing 
to any meaningful evidence that he was prejudiced by that 
representation. 
 
The Commonwealth’s evidence at trial fully supports the 
jury’s verdict, and nothing in the record of the subsequent 
habeas corpus proceeding contradicts that evidence.  
 
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Accordingly, we hold that Moore has failed to establish that 
Pilli’s deficient representation prejudiced his case such that 
there was a “reasonable probability” that the outcome of the 
trial would have been different. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err 
in dismissing Moore’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.  
Accordingly, the judgment will be affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
 
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