Case Title: Commonwealth v. Vasquez

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-08-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12562 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  PEDRO VASQUEZ. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     December 6, 2018. - August 13, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Indigent.  Practice, Criminal, Request for fees and 
costs, Attorney's fees, Motion to suppress, Interlocutory 
appeal. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 30, 2015. 
 
 
Following review reported in 482 Mass. 850 (2019), an 
application for appellate attorney's fees and costs was filed in 
this court on September 23, 2019. 
 
 
 
Calvin C. Carr, pro se. 
 
Juan M. Rivera, pro se. 
 
Katherine E. McMahon, Assistant District Attorney 
(Maximilian J. Bennett, Assistant District Attorney, also 
present) for the Commonwealth. 
 
Daniel P. Sullivan for Executive Office of the Trial Court. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  The defendant, who at all relevant times was and 
continues to be indigent, was charged with murder in the first 
degree and two firearm-related offenses in April, 2015.  He was 
2 
 
 
convicted in February 2020 of murder in the second degree and 
the two firearm offenses.  He has appealed, but his appeal has 
not yet been entered in the Appeals Court. 
 
Before trial, the defendant filed several motions to 
suppress a variety of evidence, including witness 
identifications, evidence obtained from a search of his cell 
phone, cell site location information, and statements he had 
made to police in a custodial interrogation.  A judge in the 
Superior Court denied most of the motions but allowed the motion 
to suppress the custodial statements.  Both sides sought leave 
to appeal from the rulings that were adverse to them, pursuant 
to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as amended, 476 Mass. 1501 
(2017), and a single justice of this court granted both sides' 
applications.  On appeal, we affirmed in part and reversed in 
part the Superior Court judge's rulings.  Commonwealth v. 
Vasquez, 482 Mass. 850, 852 (2019) (Vasquez I). 
 
The matter now before us concerns a request for attorney's 
fees made by an attorney who claims to have been privately 
retained by the defendant for the sole purpose of opposing the 
Commonwealth's application for leave to appeal.  See Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 15 (d), as amended, 476 Mass. 1501 (2017).  The 
attorney asks to be paid slightly more than $40,000 for that 
purpose.  For the reasons that follow, we hold that no 
attorney's fees are required under rule 15 (d) in this 
3 
 
 
situation.  Rule 15 (d) is meant to reimburse defendants who pay 
for their own counsel with their own funds; it is not meant for 
attorneys who represent defendants whom they know to be 
indigent, and from whom they never expect to receive payment, 
even if, as here, the attorney claims to have been privately 
retained. 
 
Facts.  At his arraignment, the defendant was determined to 
be indigent, see S.J.C. Rule 3:10, as appearing in 475 Mass. 
1301 (2016); Superior Court Rule 53, as amended (Nov. 17, 1986), 
and attorney Calvin C. Carr was appointed to represent him.  
Mr. Carr represented the defendant in all of the proceedings in 
the Superior Court, including on the motions to suppress and at 
trial.  As court-appointed counsel, he was to be compensated for 
his services by the Committee for Public Counsel Services 
(CPCS).  Mr. Carr was assisted, behind the scenes, by attorney 
Juan M. Rivera, who also represented the defendant as a court-
appointed counsel in a different criminal case in the District 
Court.  Mr. Rivera did not enter an appearance in the murder 
case, was not assigned to the matter in any capacity by CPCS, 
and apparently was not being paid by Mr. Carr, CPCS, or the 
defendant for any assistance he was providing.1 
                                                          
 
 
1 Mr. Rivera indicates that he provided all of his behind-
the-scenes assistance "pro bono." 
4 
 
 
 
After the defendant's motions to suppress were decided, 
both sides indicated that they intended to appeal, and toward 
that end both sides filed applications in the county court 
requesting leave to appeal.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2).2  
The Commonwealth filed its application first, on November 2, 
2017, and the defendant filed his application on November 6, 
2017.  The defendant's application was signed and filed by 
Mr. Carr, although we now know that Mr. Rivera actually wrote 
the application.  Mr. Carr acknowledges that he only signed and 
filed it.  A question also arose along the way as to who would 
write the defendant's opposition to the Commonwealth's 
application.  Because of the press of other important work, 
Mr. Carr asked Mr. Rivera to take on that task as well.3  
                                                          
 
 
2 The rule provides:  "A defendant or the Commonwealth shall 
have the right and opportunity to apply to a single justice of 
the Supreme Judicial Court, in the form and manner prescribed by 
a standing order of that court, for leave to appeal an order 
determining a motion to suppress evidence prior to trial.  If 
the single justice determines that the administration of justice 
would be facilitated, the justice may grant that leave and may 
hear the appeal or may order it to the full Supreme Judicial 
Court or to the Appeals Court for determination."  Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as amended, 476 Mass. 1501 (2017). 
 
 
3 It appears that the responsibility for opposing a 
Commonwealth application for leave to appeal falls to the court-
appointed trial counsel in the first instance.  See Committee 
for Public Counsel Services (CPCS), Assigned Counsel Manual, 
Policies & Procedures, § 4.B.4.k (Jan. 1, 2019) (Assigned 
Counsel Manual) ("The conduct of interlocutory hearings, 
including the submission of briefs and oral argument, are 
ordinarily the responsibility of trial counsel, whether the 
hearing was initiated by counsel or by the prosecution.  Private 
5 
 
 
Mr. Rivera, feeling exhausted from having written the 
defendant's application, and having already contributed a 
significant amount of assistance without being paid, said that 
he could not take on that additional task without being paid.  
Mr. Carr represents that he then advised Mr. Rivera that, in 
order to be paid, he would have to get assigned to the case by 
CPCS. 
 
The plot thickens.  Neither Mr. Carr nor Mr. Rivera 
contacted CPCS about getting Mr. Rivera assigned to the case.  
Instead, Mr. Rivera entered into a written "fee agreement" with 
the defendant, whereby the defendant purported to promise to pay 
Mr. Rivera $250 an hour to represent him in opposition to the 
Commonwealth's application.  Mr. Rivera candidly acknowledges 
that, at the time he entered into this agreement with the 
defendant, he knew that the defendant was indigent and had no 
means to pay him, and indeed he acknowledges that he never 
expected to be paid anything by the defendant, at any time.  
With respect to actual payment, the agreement provided in 
relevant part: 
"It is understood that the Attorney shall make an 
application to the appropriate appellate court for costs 
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (d) and the Client hereby 
assents to the Attorney's recovery of said fee and 
                                                          
 
court-appointed trial counsel handling an interlocutory appeal 
should contact the CPCS Director of Criminal Appeals -- Private 
Counsel Division to determine whether assistance by appellate 
counsel is warranted"). 
6 
 
 
relinquishes any claim to any award of costs or fees by the 
appropriate appellate court. 
 
" . . . 
 
"It is understood by the parties that the Attorney shall 
recover his fees and costs upon application to the 
appropriate appellate court pursuant to Massachusetts Rules 
of Criminal Procedure 15 (d).  The Client shall take all 
steps necessary, as requested by the Attorney, to submit 
any affidavits and/or other documentation or evidence 
necessary for the Attorney to present said application to 
the court." 
 
 
In short, the defendant and Mr. Rivera had entered into an 
agreement which nominally obligated the defendant to pay 
Mr. Rivera $250 an hour for his services -- but which they both 
knew full well the defendant could not and would not ever pay -- 
with the expectation that the payment would be sought from, and 
made by, the district attorney and the Trial Court via a court 
order under rule 15 (d).4,5  Mr. Rivera then wrote, signed, and 
                                                          
 
 
4 The rule provides:  "If an appeal or application therefor 
is taken by the Commonwealth, the appellate court, upon the 
written motion of the defendant supported by affidavit, shall 
determine and approve the payment to the defendant of his or her 
costs of appeal together with reasonable attorney's fees to be 
paid on the order of the trial court upon the entry of the 
rescript or the denial of the application."  Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 15 (d), as amended, 476 Mass. 1501 (2017). 
 
 
5 As to the source of payments for fee awards made under 
rule 15 (d), see Commonwealth v. Augustine, 470 Mass. 837, 842 
n.11 (2015); Commonwealth v. Phinney, 448 Mass. 621, 624-625 
(2007), and cases cited.  The Trial Court is required to pay 
one-half of each such award from its annual budget 
appropriation; the remainder of each award is paid by the 
district attorney's office that pursued the interlocutory 
appeal.  See St. 2019, c. 41, § 2, line items 0330-0300 (Trial 
Court), and 0340-0500 (Hampden district attorney). 
7 
 
 
filed the defendant's opposition to the Commonwealth's 
application.6 
 
It was only after Mr. Rivera completed and filed his work 
that CPCS learned of Mr. Rivera's involvement.  That fact came 
to light when Mr. Carr sent an e-mail message to CPCS's director 
of criminal appeals for its private counsel division, which 
stated in its entirety:  "Need appellate counsel -- Juan Rivera 
is responding to [Commonwealth's] petition -- may make sense to 
have him assist here[.]  Let me know your thoughts[.]  Thanks."  
This appears to have been written in anticipation of one or both 
of the applications being allowed and the defendant needing 
counsel assigned by CPCS for an appeal to the full court.  There 
followed a series of e-mail messages between CPCS, Mr. Carr, and 
Mr. Rivera.  In a nutshell, CPCS seemed to be surprised to learn 
of Mr. Rivera's involvement in the case and questioned how he 
expected to be paid for the work he had done, to which 
Mr. Rivera replied that he was "privately retained solely for 
the Commonwealth's [r]ule 15 (a) (2) appeal response by the 
defendant."  CPCS expressed skepticism about his being paid in 
                                                          
 
 
6 Both Mr. Carr and Mr. Rivera are listed on the county 
court docket for the Commonwealth's application (no. SJ-2017-
412) as counsel of record for the defendant -- Mr. Carr because 
he was the court-appointed trial attorney and Mr. Rivera because 
he filed a notice of appearance.  Only Mr. Carr is listed as 
counsel of record on the docket for the defendant's application 
(no. SJ-2017-417). 
8 
 
 
these circumstances under rule 15 (d), citing Commonwealth v. 
Sparks, 431 Mass. 299 (2000).  Mr. Rivera responded that the 
situation in the Sparks case was different because in that case 
there was no contract between the client and the appellate 
attorneys, whereas in this case "there is a contract retaining 
me directly as appellate counsel by [the defendant], with a 
reference to [rule] 15 (d) for payment."  When asked by CPCS how 
he would be paid if the motion for fees were denied, Mr. Rivera 
responded:  "A motion to reconsider.  Failing that, what is your 
opinion?  Associate counsel voucher?[7]  I don't see the legal 
basis for the judge to do that under these circumstances.  The 
facts are distinguishable from Sparks in many ways." 
 
As stated, a single justice of this court granted both the 
defendant's application and the Commonwealth's application (over 
Mr. Rivera's opposition), and the cases then proceeded to the 
full court.8  CPCS assigned another attorney (one certified by 
CPCS to handle such appeals) to handle the two appeals.9  There 
                                                          
 
 
7 This appears to refer to CPCS's procedure by which a 
court-appointed attorney may engage an "associate counsel" to 
assist with certain tasks.  See Assigned Counsel Manual, supra 
at § 5.Y.1.  The assigned counsel submits a voucher to CPCS for 
the associate's time, and the associate is then compensated at 
the rate of forty-five dollars per hour.  Id. at § 5.Y.1.f. 
 
 
8 The single justice initially ordered the cases to proceed 
in the Appeals Court.  This court subsequently granted the 
defendant's application for direct appellate review. 
 
9 Mr. Rivera was not certified by CPCS to handle murder 
cases. 
9 
 
 
is no indication in the record before us, one way or the other, 
whether Mr. Rivera assisted with the appeals.  We note only that 
he did not file an appearance in the case when it was before the 
full court, until after we decided it. 
 
After we issued our opinion, see Vasquez I, supra, 
Mr. Rivera filed a request for attorney's fees and costs in the 
full court, pursuant to rule 15 (d), which the Commonwealth 
opposed.  He seeks to be compensated, as a privately retained 
attorney, for writing and filing in the county court the 
defendant's opposition to the Commonwealth's application for 
leave to appeal.  Specifically, he seeks fees in the amount of 
$40,125 and costs in the amount of $302.40.10  He does not seek 
any compensation for the work he did behind the scenes on the 
defendant's application for leave to appeal, or for any work he 
may have done behind the scenes in the full court.  The 
Commonwealth opposes both the entitlement to a fee in these 
circumstances and the amount of the fees sought.11 
                                                          
 
 
 
10 Counsel has filed an itemized list of his time spent on 
this matter, totaling 160.5 hours.  This includes, among other 
things, time spent researching and writing the defendant's 
opposition to the Commonwealth's request for leave to appeal 
(from November 3 to November 28, 2017); time spent preparing his 
motion for fees; and assorted other time spent in communication 
with the defendant, Mr. Carr, and CPCS. 
 
 
11 With respect to the amount requested, neither the 
district attorney nor the Trial Court opposes the hourly rate of 
10 
 
 
 
We referred Mr. Rivera's fees motion to a single justice 
for a recommendation.  The single justice held a hearing by 
telephone in which Mr. Carr, Mr. Rivera, prosecutors from the 
Hampden district attorney's office, and the general counsel for 
the Trial Court were present.  Having considered Mr. Rivera's 
motion and supporting documentation, the Commonwealth's 
opposition, Mr. Rivera's reply, the audio recording of the 
hearing, copies of e-mail messages supplied by Mr. Rivera at the 
single justice's request, and the single justice's 
recommendation, we are now in a position to rule on the motion. 
 
Discussion.  a. Entitlement to a fee.  The facts of this 
case are somewhat messy, but the legal analysis is really quite 
simple. 
"Although rule 15 (d) does not so state explicitly, our 
decisions have made clear since the rule was first adopted 
that it is not applicable to indigent defendants who are 
represented by counsel appointed or assigned by CPCS.  
Rather, the rule is intended for the benefit and protection 
of defendants who do not have appointed or assigned counsel 
and must incur fees for private representation to defend 
against a Commonwealth appeal. . . . Defendants with 
appointed or assigned attorneys are not required to expend 
their own funds for their representation.  Their defense, 
including a zealous defense against any Commonwealth 
appeal, is paid for by CPCS from its budget appropriation.  
See G. L. c. 211D" (footnote omitted). 
 
Commonwealth v. Augustine, 470 Mass. 837, 841 (2015), and cases 
cited.  Thus: 
                                                          
 
$250, but both claim that the time spent on the matter, and 
hence the total amount of fees sought, was excessive. 
11 
 
 
"Rule 15 (d) provides a needed measure of protection to the 
rights of defendants by seeking to equalize the resources 
of the defendant with those of the Commonwealth.  A 
defendant who is able to retain private counsel may not 
have the funds for an interlocutory appeal from a 
suppression motion on which he has prevailed.  The lawyer 
should not be placed in the untenable position of either 
volunteering his services on the appeal or abandoning the 
defendant.  These considerations are present in every case 
and especially operative when the case involves a 
significant constitutional issue on which the defense bar 
has an equal interest with the prosecution in establishing 
the law." 
 
Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 432 Mass. 613, 617 (2000).  In other 
words, the rule is for clients who are paying for their own 
representation.  If, in the course of the proceeding in the 
trial court, the Commonwealth takes a detour for an 
interlocutory appeal, the fee-paying client may not have the 
funds to pay his or her attorney to follow.  The rules fixes 
this by requiring the Commonwealth to pay in that situation. 
 
If that is not clear enough, we also have said that the 
rule is "a rule of 'reimbursement," and nothing more.  
Augustine, 470 Mass. at 842 n.10, quoting Reporters' Notes to 
Rule 15 (d), Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, at 1595 (LexisNexis 2014-2015) ("This subdivision was 
drafted to dispel any uncertainty concerning the defendant's 
right to reimbursement of his or her costs of appeal and 
attorney's fees" [emphasis added]).  If a defendant pays no fees 
for private representation -- and is never expected to pay 
12 
 
 
anything -- there is nothing to reimburse.  Augustine, supra at 
841-842.12 
 
In the Augustine case, we dealt with the situation where a 
private (non-CPCS) attorney agreed to represent an indigent 
defendant on a Commonwealth interlocutory appeal at no charge to 
the defendant.  Augustine, 470 Mass. at 841.  The defendant was 
entitled to (and initially had) an attorney assigned by CPCS to 
represent him, but he opted for the private counsel instead.  
Id. at 839.  We held that the private attorney was not entitled 
to be compensated by the Commonwealth pursuant to rule 15 (d) 
for his services.  Id. at 841-843.  The defendant paid the 
attorney nothing, so there was nothing to reimburse.  Id. at 
841-842.  We explained that the rule is for the defendant's 
benefit, i.e., to reimburse him or her for what he or she owes, 
and in that sense is quite different from other fee-shifting 
rules that permit counsel to be compensated even when the client 
owes nothing.  Id. at 842-843. 
 
To be sure, the defendant in this case signed a piece of 
paper saying that he agreed to pay Mr. Rivera at a rate of $250 
per hour for his services.  It was perfectly clear at the time, 
                                                          
 
 
12 Black's Law Dictionary 1539 (11th ed. 2019) defines 
"reimbursement" as "[r]epayment" or "[i]ndemnification."  
Webster's New World College Dictionary 1208 (4th ed. 2007) 
defines "reimburse" as "to pay back (money spent)" or "to repay 
or compensate (a person) for expenses, damages, losses, etc." 
13 
 
 
however, to both the defendant and Mr. Rivera, that the 
defendant could not afford to pay anything.  Mr. Rivera knew the 
defendant was indigent and was represented by counsel assigned 
by CPCS, and Mr. Rivera has acknowledged that he never expected 
to be paid anything by the defendant.  The plan, all along, was 
for the Commonwealth -- the district attorney and the Trial 
Court -- and not the defendant, to pay his fee.  The fee 
agreement was, in a word, illusory. 
 
There is no indication in the record before us of a genuine 
intent for the defendant ever actually to pay for private 
representation.  There is no evidence that the defendant paid a 
retainer or otherwise provided any collateral or security for 
what he purported to promise to pay; no evidence that the 
defendant in fact paid anything during the course of the 
representation; and no evidence that Mr. Rivera ever sent the 
defendant a bill or communicated with him in any way whatsoever 
about private payment between the time they signed the agreement 
and when Mr. Rivera applied to the court, one and one-half years 
later, for payment under rule 15 (d).  Indeed, all the 
indications are that the defendant would never pay anything out 
of pocket.13 
                                                          
 
 
13 The fee agreement itself is very telling.  Although it 
says that the defendant would pay $250 per hour, the provisions 
for where that money would come from make it plain that the 
attorney would obtain payment under rule 15 (d).  Those 
14 
 
 
 
Mr. Rivera argues that his situation is like that of the 
attorney in Commonwealth v. Murphy, 423 Mass. 1010 (1996).  It 
is not.  In that case, as here, the defendant was represented in 
the trial court by an attorney who had been appointed by CPCS, 
and on the Commonwealth's (in that case unsuccessful) 
application for leave to take an interlocutory appeal he was 
represented by private counsel.  Id. at 1010 & n.1.  Though it 
does not appear in the opinion in that case, the record of the 
case indicates that the attorney appointed by CPCS and the 
attorney privately retained by the defendant were professionally 
affiliated at the same firm.  Significantly, however, the record 
of the case also indicates that, when the motion for fees was 
litigated before the single justice, the Commonwealth conceded 
that the defendant was entitled to a fee award.  The 
Commonwealth only contested who should have to pay the fees; it 
argued that the award should be paid by CPCS.  The single 
justice rejected the Commonwealth's contention and ordered that 
the fees be paid by the district attorney's office. 
                                                          
 
provisions, which are quoted above, speak only in terms of the 
attorney being compensated, as if any fee award would belong to 
the attorney (e.g., that the attorney "shall recover his fees 
. . . upon application to the appropriate appellate court," and 
that the defendant "relinquishes any claim to any award of . . . 
fees").  The agreement says nothing about the defendant being 
reimbursed for anything he pays or owes. 
15 
 
 
 
The Commonwealth then moved for reconsideration, claiming 
that the single justice had "overlooked a fact, namely that the 
defendant was entitled to public counsel."  The Commonwealth 
also contended that the single justice had "misapprehended the 
law, namely, in ruling that the [d]istrict [a]ttorney should pay 
the attorney[']s fees and costs."  The single justice expressly 
denied reconsideration on the first point, noting that the 
Commonwealth had conceded the entitlement to a fee.  He allowed 
reconsideration as to the second point only and, after further 
analysis, allowed his earlier ruling (i.e., that the district 
attorney was required to pay the fees) to stand.  That was the 
posture of the case when the Commonwealth appealed to the full 
court. 
 
On appeal, although the Commonwealth sought again to 
challenge the defendant's entitlement to a fee award, the court 
did not address that issue, which was entirely understandable 
given the Commonwealth's initial concession that a fee award was 
in order and the single justice's express refusal to revive the 
question on reconsideration.  The only issue addressed by the 
court in that case, therefore, was who should pay the fee.  
Murphy, 423 Mass. at 1010 ("At issue is who should pay the 
attorney's fees determined and approved pursuant to Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 15 [d]").  The court's opinion in that case did not, as 
Mr. Rivera would have it, pass on the legitimacy of the private 
16 
 
 
counsel agreement in those circumstances, nor has any subsequent 
decision of the full court held that such an agreement in those 
circumstances -- or these -- was valid for purposes of 
rule 15 (d). 
 
In both Augustine, 470 Mass. at 840, and Commonwealth v. 
Sparks, 431 Mass. 299, 304 n.8 (2000), we acknowledged that 
there might be circumstances where an indigent defendant, faced 
with an interlocutory appeal by the Commonwealth, might 
legitimately retain private counsel to defend him or her in that 
proceeding.  Conceivably, for example, a defendant might have 
enough money or other assets to pay for private counsel for that 
limited task, yet not enough that would render him or her not 
indigent for purposes of having counsel assigned by CPCS; or a 
family member or friend might provide him or her with funds to 
pay for private counsel for the interlocutory appeal; or the 
private counsel might agree to represent the defendant for no 
fee or a significantly reduced fee.  But when we spoke in those 
cases about "an indigent defendant's right to dismiss appointed 
counsel and retain his [or her] own private counsel under a 
private payment arrangement," Sparks, supra at 304 n.7, or an 
indigent defendant's entitlement "to discharge his [or her] 
appointed counsel and retain private counsel on such terms as he 
[or she] was able," Augustine, supra at 843, we were speaking 
about bona fide private representation agreements by which a 
17 
 
 
defendant had paid or would pay for his or her own counsel.  We 
did not say or mean to suggest in those cases that an award of 
fees pursuant to rule 15 (d) is proper simply because a 
defendant has signed a paper promising to pay fees to a private 
counsel that he or she, and the attorney, know full well will 
never be paid.  As we said in Augustine, supra, "[i]f that were 
the case, indigent defendants always would be able to engage 
private counsel of their choice, in lieu of their court-
appointed counsel, at the Commonwealth's expense.  There is no 
such right." 
 
In this case, the indigent defendant had counsel assigned 
to him by CPCS, Mr. Carr.  If Mr. Carr was unable to represent 
him in defense of the Commonwealth's application for leave to 
appeal, he was entitled to have another qualified lawyer 
appointed by CPCS.  He did not have privately-retained counsel 
up to that point, and so was at no risk of having to pay more 
money to a privately-retained attorney when the Commonwealth 
sought to take its interlocutory appeal.  Nor was a previously-
retained private attorney placed in the untenable position of 
having to either abandon the defendant or represent him without 
getting paid.  As the Gonsalves and Augustine cases make plain, 
therefore, this case is simply not one that rule 15 (d) was 
18 
 
 
designed to cover.  See Augustine, 470 Mass. at 841; Gonsalves, 
432 Mass. at 617.14 
 
b. Amount of fees sought.  Although we conclude that the 
defendant is not entitled to be reimbursed, and therefore 
Mr. Rivera is not entitled to be paid, for anything pursuant to 
rule 15 (d), we are compelled to comment briefly on the amount 
of the fees sought.  We are not aware of any case, and none has 
been brought to our attention, where a fee award under 
rule 15 (d) in the neighborhood of $40,000 solely for an 
opposition to the Commonwealth's application for leave to appeal 
has been granted.  The hourly rate, as the Commonwealth 
concedes, may have been reasonable, but the time spent for the 
discrete task of preparing a twenty-six page opposition and for 
preparing a motion for fees -- a total of 160.5 hours -- was 
excessive.  Had the defendant been entitled to reimbursement of 
fees, we would have reduced the amount substantially.  While we 
cannot rule out the possibility entirely, it is difficult to 
imagine a situation -- it would likely require extraordinary 
                                                          
 
 
14 The Commonwealth contends that the defendant's recovery 
of fees is also precluded by the holding in Commonwealth v. 
Sparks, 431 Mass. 299 (2000), because here, as there, CPCS was 
not informed of the private counsel arrangement before it 
happened.  Because we base our holding on the principles set 
forth in the Gonsalves and Augustine line of cases, we need not 
address the Commonwealth's additional point, and accordingly we 
express no view as to whether Sparks would also bar recovery 
here. 
19 
 
 
circumstances -- where an expenditure of 160.5 hours would be 
appropriate for the limited task of writing an opposition to a 
request for leave to appeal (and preparing a motion for fees), 
especially for an attorney who was already well-versed in the 
specifics of the case and the task at hand. 
 
Conclusion.  The motion for attorney's fees and costs is 
hereby denied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.