Case Title: Jim Parker Building Company, Inc. v. G&S Glass & Supply Company, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1090784

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2011-03-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: 03/11/2011
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
_________________________
1090784
_________________________
Jim Parker Building Company, Inc.
v.
G&S Glass & Supply Company, Inc.
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-09-903089)
PARKER, Justice.
Jim Parker Building Company, Inc. ("Parker"), appeals
from an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court denying its
motion to intervene, to compel arbitration, and to stay the
1090784
In Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Graybar Electric
1
Co., [Ms. 1090422, Sept. 30, 2010] ___ So. 3d ____ (Ala.
2010), this Court explained:
"'[T]he purpose of a payment bond required under
the little Miller Act is to "shift the ultimate risk
of nonpayment from workmen and suppliers to the
surety."' [Federal Ins. Co. v.] Kruger, 829 So. 2d
[732,] 736 [(Ala. 2002)] (quoting American Sur. Co.
v. Hinds, 260 F.2d 366, 368 (10th Cir. 1958)). 'The
purpose of the [little Miller] act is to provide
security for those who furnish labor and material in
performance of government contracts as a substitute
for unavailable lien rights, and is liberally
construed to accomplish this purpose.' Headley v.
Housing Auth. of Prattville, 347 So. 2d 532, 535
(Ala. Civ. App. 1977)."
2
underlying litigation.  We affirm in part, reverse in part,
and remand.
I. Facts and Procedural History
On September 24, 2009, G&S Glass & Supply Company, Inc.
("G&S"), filed a complaint against Western Surety Company
("Western") pursuant to § 39-1-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975,
commonly referred to as Alabama's little Miller Act.  In the
complaint, G&S asserted, among other things, that it had
served as a subcontractor to Parker on a construction project
at the University of Alabama in Huntsville ("the project");
that Western had provided "the payment bond to Parker for the
[p]roject";  that G&S completed its work on the project on
1
1090784
___ So. 3d at ____.
3
April 10, 2009, including "additional work necessitated by
alterations in the plans and drawings by the project architect
Chapman-Sisson Architects" ("CSA"); that CSA had "accepted and
approved G&S'[s] work" and had issued a "Certificate of
Substantial Completion" on April 24, 2009; that G&S had made
demands for payment on both Parker and Western; and that G&S
"ha[d] not been fully paid for its work."  G&S alleged that
Western had violated Alabama's little Miller Act and sought
recovery under a theory of quantum meruit.
  
On November 5, 2009, Parker filed a motion seeking an
order allowing it to intervene in G&S's action against
Western; compelling arbitration of all claims between Parker
and G&S and staying G&S's action against Western pending
resolution of the arbitration proceeding.  In its motion,
Parker asserted, in relevant part:
"Pursuant to the terms of the payment bond,
Parker ..., as principal, and Western ..., as
surety, are 'jointly and severally' responsible for
paying for labor and materials provided in the
performance of work on the Project. Thus, should G&S
ultimately prevail on its claim against Western ...,
Parker 
... 
would 
potentially 
be 
jointly 
and
severally liable for satisfying such judgment.
Parker ... seeks to intervene in this action to
protect its interests under the payment bond and in
1090784
The Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically
2
provide for a "motion to reconsider."  It is clear from the
substance of G&S's motion, however, that the motion is a Rule
59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to alter, amend, or vacate the
trial court's order.  Thus, we will consider G&S's motion as
a timely filed Rule 59(e) motion.  See Ex parte Alfa Mut. Gen.
Ins. Co., 684 So. 2d 1281, 1282 (Ala. 1996) ("[T]his Court
4
the determination of the issue of legal liability.
See Olive v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 456 So.
2d 310 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984). Parker['s] ...
interests would be seriously prejudiced if it were
not allowed to intervene and participate in this
action."
  
Parker 
attached 
to 
its 
motion certain exhibits,
including, among others, a copy of a contract entitled
"Alabama Subcontract Agreement" entered into by Parker and G&S
("the contract").  Parker also attached to its motion a
counterclaim Parker sought to file against G&S if its motion
to intervene was granted, seeking damages allegedly incurred
"as a result of delays caused by G&S'[s] inadequate and
incomplete work and G&S'[s] failure to timely complete its
work in the Project."  
On November 24, 2009, the trial court entered an order
granting in its entirety Parker's motion to intervene, to
compel arbitration, and to stay the litigation.  On the same
day, G&S filed a document styled "motion to reconsider
order,"  arguing that "the effect of the Court's November 24,
2
1090784
looks to the essence of a motion, rather than its title, to
determine how that motion is to be considered under [the
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure].").
5
2009 Order compelling arbitration is to strip G&S of its
rights under the Little Miller Act to litigate its claims
against Western ... in Circuit Court and forces it to
arbitrate its claims against Parker -- an option G&S declined
to pursue when filing the Little Miller Act claim solely
against Western."  Parker filed a response to G&S's motion to
reconsider, arguing, among other things, that "G&S'[s] claim
that the Court's Order compelling arbitration and staying this
litigation somehow strips G&S of its rights under the Little
Miller Act is ... absurd" because, it said, the trial court's
order "merely stays this litigation until such time as the
dispute 
between 
G&S 
and 
Parker 
... 
is 
resolved 
in
arbitration."  After a hearing, the trial court entered an
order on January 29, 2010, granting G&S's motion to
reconsider; vacating its November 24, 2009, order; and denying
Parker's motion to intervene, to compel arbitration, and to
stay the litigation.  Parker appealed.
II. Standards of Review
1090784
Parker's motion to intervene did not state whether it
3
sought permissive intervention or intervention as of right.
For the reasons discussed in Part III. A., infra, we treat the
motion as one seeking permissive intervention under Rule
24(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  
6
"The standard of review for a denial of a motion
for permissive intervention[ ] is whether the trial
3
court abused its discretion. Universal [Underwriters
Ins. Co. v. East Central Alabama Ford-Mercury,
Inc.,] 574 So. 2d [716,] 723 [(Ala. 1990)]. See
also, New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. United Gas
Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1984)
('when we are asked to review a denial of permissive
intervention, the question on appeal is not whether
"the factors which render permissive intervention
appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
24(b) where present," but is rather "whether the
trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion in
denying the motion"'). Again, we see no reason to
depart from the Federal courts' interpretation of
the corresponding Federal rule." 
Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Anglen, 630 So. 2d 441, 443
(Ala. 1993).
"'"[T]he standard of review of a trial court's
ruling on a motion to compel arbitration at the
instance of either party is a de novo determination
of whether the trial judge erred on a factual or
legal issue to the substantial prejudice of the
party seeking review."' Vann v. First Cmty. Credit
Corp., 834 So. 2d 751, 752-53 (Ala. 2002) (quoting
Ex parte Roberson, 749 So. 2d 441, 446 (Ala. 1999)
(emphasis omitted)). 'The party seeking to compel
arbitration has the initial burden of proving the
existence 
of 
a 
written 
contract 
calling 
for
arbitration and proving that that contract evidences
a 
transaction 
involving 
interstate 
commerce.'
Polaris Sales, Inc. v. Heritage Imports, Inc., 879
So. 2d 1129, 1132 (Ala. 2003). '"'[A]fter a motion
1090784
7
to compel arbitration has been made and supported,
the burden is on the non-movant to present evidence
that the supposed arbitration agreement is not valid
or does not apply to the dispute in question.'"'
Kenworth of Birmingham, Inc. v. Langley, 828 So. 2d
288, 290 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Fleetwood Enters.,
Inc. v. Bruno, 784 So. 2d 277, 280 (Ala. 2000),
quoting in turn  Jim Burke Auto., Inc. v. Beavers,
674 So. 2d 1260, 1265 n. 1 (Ala. 1995))."
I.C.E. Contractors, Inc. v. Martin & Cobey Constr. Co., [Ms.
1080619, September 17, 2010] ___ So. 3d ____, ____ (Ala.
2010).
III. Discussion
The issues presented in this appeal are whether the trial
court exceeded its discretion in denying Parker's motion to
intervene and whether the trial court erred in denying
Parker's motion to compel arbitration. 
A. The Motion to Intervene
"[A] denial of a motion to intervene is always an
appealable order."  Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Raine, 905 So. 2d
832, 833 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) (citing Kids' Klub II, Inc. v.
State Dep't of Human Res., 763 So. 2d 259, 260 (Ala. Civ. App.
2000); Alabama Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Howard, 534 So. 2d
609 (Ala. 1988)).
1090784
8
Initially, we note that Parker's motion to intervene did
not state whether it sought intervention as of right under
Rule 24(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., or permissive intervention under
Rule 24(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.; the motion simply seeks an order
allowing Parker to intervene "pursuant to Rule 24 of the
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure."  This Court has previously
treated such motions as a request for intervention under both
rules.  See GEICO Ins. Co. v. Lyons, 658 So. 2d 445, 446 (Ala.
1995) ("Because GEICO's motion to intervene ... did not
specify whether it sought intervention as of right under Rule
24(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., or permissive intervention under Rule
24(b), we treat it as a request for intervention under both
procedures."), overruled on other grounds, Ex parte State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 764 So. 2d 543 (Ala. 2000).  However, on
appeal, Parker argues only that it should be allowed to
intervene permissively in G&S's action under Rule 24(b).  See
Parker's brief, at 12-20.  Because Parker has not presented
any argument regarding intervention as of right under Rule
24(a), we will review the propriety of the trial court's
denial of Parker's motion to intervene only insofar as the
1090784
G&S contends that Parker "waived any argument that the
4
trial court erred in denying it permissive intervention by not
arguing permissive intervention before the trial court."
G&S's brief, at 14.  However, as noted, Parker's motion to
intervene did not specify whether it sought to intervene under
Rule 24(a) or Rule 24(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Furthermore,
accepting 
G&S's 
hypertechnical 
argument 
would 
contravene 
"'the
liberal atmosphere of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which are
to be construed "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action."'"  Ex parte Caremark RX, Inc.,
956 So. 2d 1117, 1129 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Randolph County v.
Thompson, 502 So. 2d 357, 365 (Ala. 1987), quoting in turn
Rule 1, Fed. R. Civ. P.); see also Rule 1(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.
("These rules shall be construed and administered to secure
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action.").
9
motion seeks permission to intervene under Rule 24(b).   See
4
Tucker v. Cullman-Jefferson Counties Gas Dist., 864 So. 2d
317, 319 (Ala. 2003) ("'An appeals court will consider only
those issues properly delineated as such, and no matter will
be considered on appeal unless presented and argued in
brief.'" (quoting Braxton v. Stewart, 539 So. 2d 284, 286
(Ala. Civ. App. 1988), citing Ex parte Riley, 464 So. 2d 92
(Ala. 1985))).
In QBE Insurance Corp. v. Austin Co., 23 So. 3d 1127
(Ala. 2009), this Court explained the field of operation for
Rule 24(b):
"Rule 24(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that on
a timely motion the court may permit anyone to
intervene when a statute confers a conditional right
1090784
G&S contends that Parker "waived its argument regarding
5
the timeliness of its motion to intervene" because, G&S says,
"Parker for the first time argues in its brief to this Court
that it should be allowed to intervene under Rule 24(b)."
G&S' brief, at 18.  For the reasons stated above, we reject
this contention.  See supra note 4.
10
to intervene or when an applicant's claim or defense
and the main action share a common question of law
or fact. Rule 24(b) goes on to provide that '[i]n
exercising its discretion the court shall consider
whether the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties.'"
23 So. 3d at 1131.
The first requirement of Rule 24(b) is that a motion for
permissive intervention be timely filed;  that determination
5
is within the sound discretion of the trial court.  See QBE
Ins. Corp., 23 So. 3d at 1131; Farmers Ins. Exch., 905 So. 2d
at 834 (citing Mutual Assurance, Inc. v. Chancey, 781 So. 2d
172 (Ala. 2000), citing in turn Universal Underwriters Ins.
Co. v. Anglen, 630 So. 2d 441 (Ala. 1993)).  This Court has
applied the following factors in assessing the timeliness of
a motion to intervene:
"'(1) [T]he length of time during which the
would-be intervenor knew or reasonably
should have known of his interest in the
case before he petitioned for leave to
intervene; (2) the extent of prejudice to
the existing parties as a result of the
would-be intervenor's failure to apply as
1090784
11
soon as he knew or reasonably should have
known of his interest; (3) the extent of
prejudice to the would-be intervenor if his
petition is denied; and (4) the existence
of unusual circumstances militating either
for or against a determination that the
application is timely.'"
QBE Ins. Corp., 23 So. 3d at 1132 (quoting United States v.
Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1983)).
The first factor we must consider is the length of time
the would-be intervenor knew or reasonably should have known
of its interest in the case before it sought intervention.
"The would-be intervenor must act promptly in protecting its
interest."  QBE Ins. Corp., 23 So. 3d at 1132.  In this case,
Parker acted promptly to protect its interest, filing its
motion to intervene on November 5, 2009, only six weeks after
G&S filed its complaint on September 24, 2009.  This factor
weighs in favor of finding that Parker's motion to intervene
was timely.
The second factor we must consider is "'the extent of
prejudice to the existing parties as a result of the would-be
intervenor's failure to apply as soon as [it] knew or
reasonably should have known of [its] interest.'"  QBE Ins.
Corp., 23 So. 3d at 1133 (quoting United States v. Jefferson
1090784
12
County, 720 F.2d at 1516).  "[D]iscovery considerations are
important in determining whether a motion to intervene is
timely."  QBE Ins. Corp., 23 So. 3d at 1133 (citing Chiles v.
Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (11th Cir. 1989)).  Parker
asserts the following on appeal: 
"[N]o substantial discovery has yet taken place
between the parties. Although G&S has issued written
discovery requests to Western ..., Western ... has
not yet responded to such requests. ... In fact, at
the time Parker ... filed its Motion, Western['s]
... responses to the discovery requests were not yet
due. ... Further, no depositions have taken place,
nor have any been noticed. The entire record
consists only of notices of intent to serve various
subpoenas, objections to those notices, and the
pleadings relating to the issue now before this
Court. Thus, because no substantial discovery has
yet taken place, Parker['s] ... intervention in this
action would not in any way prejudice the existing
parties to this litigation." 
Parker's brief, at 13-14.  The record on appeal supports
Parker's assertion, and G&S does not dispute it.  This factor
also weighs in favor of finding that Parker's motion to
intervene was timely.
The third factor we must consider is "'the extent of
prejudice to the would-be intervenor if [its] petition is
denied.'  With regard to this factor, 'the thrust of the
inquiry must be the extent to which a final judgment in the
1090784
13
case may bind the movant even though he is not adequately
represented by an existing party.'"  QBE Ins. Corp., 23 So. 3d
at 1133 (quoting United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d
at 1517).  Regarding this factor, Parker contends, among other
things, that "[it] should not be denied its right to intervene
and defend claims that ultimately would establish its own
liability, if any; such would clearly be prejudicial."
Parker's brief, at 15.  Conversely, G&S contends that "Alabama
law will not bind Parker to the final judgment in the lawsuit
between G&S and Western to which Parker is not a party."
G&S's brief, at 28.
In Ex parte Flexible Products Co., 915 So. 2d 34 (Ala.
2005), this Court noted the well established principle that
"'[c]ollateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, is
available as a defense to relitigation of an issue in a
subsequent suit between the same parties which is not on the
same cause of action.'" 915 So. 2d at 45 (quoting Martin v.
Reed, 480 So. 2d 1180, 1182 (Ala. 1985) (emphasis added)).
The Court, however, also noted that "the doctrine of mutuality
of estoppel[, i.e., the requirement that the parties be
identical,] may be satisfied by less than a perfect identity
1090784
14
of the parties in the first and second actions, as when
particular parties are in privity."  Ex parte Flexible
Products Co., 915 So. 2d at 48.  "The test for determining if
two parties are in privity focuses on identity of interest."
Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 566 So. 2d 723, 726 (Ala. 1990)
(citing Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 349
So. 2d 1113, 1116 (Ala. 1977)).  "'Privity' is a flexible
legal 
term, 
comprising 
several 
different 
types 
of
relationships and generally applying when a person, although
not a party, has his interests adequately represented by
someone with the same interests who is a party."  EEOC v.
Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 383 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004)
(citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-43 (1940)).
Privity is present here because Western and Parker
unquestionably share an identical interest in the underlying
litigation.  As noted, Western and Parker are jointly and
severally liable under the payment bond to pay all persons and
entities who supplied labor and materials for the project;
thus, if G&S obtains a judgment against Western, then Western
could seek indemnification from Parker.  Hence, Western and
Parker would benefit equally from a determination that G&S is
1090784
15
not entitled to recover compensation under the payment bond
for its work on the project.
In its action against Western, G&S claims that it
properly completed its work on the project, and, thus, G&S
says, it is entitled to receive payment under the payment bond
for that work; Western, however, takes the opposite position.
As noted, Parker seeks to file a counterclaim against G&S for
damage incurred in repairing and completing G&S's allegedly
incomplete and inadequate work.  In Parker's counterclaim, the
factual issue whether G&S properly completed its work on the
project will be crucial in determining if any liability exists
on the part of G&S.  However, because Western and Parker are
in privity, the determination of the same factual issue from
G&S's action against Western would be binding in Parker's
action against G&S that being the case, Parker would be
collaterally estopped from relitigating that issue in any
action it may have against G&S.  Thus, this factor weighs in
favor of finding that Parker's motion to intervene was timely.
The fourth factor we must consider is the existence of
unusual circumstances militating either in favor of or against
a determination that the motion to intervene is timely.  QBE
1090784
16
Ins. Corp., 23 So. 3d at 1133-34.  Neither Parker nor G&S has
shown the existence of any unusual circumstances that would
support their respective arguments regarding the trial court's
disposition of the motion to intervene.  Based on the
foregoing discussion of the four factors to be applied in
assessing the timeliness of a motion to intervene, we conclude
that Parker's motion to intervene was timely.  
Because Parker has not alleged that a statute confers a
conditional right to intervene in this case, we must now
consider whether any of Parker's claims or defenses and the
main action share a common question of law or fact.  See QBE
Ins. Corp., 23 So. 3d at 1131; Rule 24(b).  As previously
stated, G&S's action against Western and Parker's counterclaim
against G&S share at least one crucial common question of fact
-- whether G&S adequately and timely completed its work on the
project.  
Finally, we must consider whether Parker's intervention
in G&S's action against Western will unduly delay or prejudice
the adjudication of the rights of the original parties (G&S
and Western); we conclude that Parker's intervention in G&S's
action will do neither.  As noted, G&S's action was in the
1090784
17
early stages of discovery when Parker moved to intervene in
that action; thus, Parker's intervention will likely cause
only a relatively minor delay in the proceedings below.
Furthermore, Parker's intervention will not unduly prejudice
G&S because, as previously stated, G&S's action and Parker's
counterclaim involve at least one common question of fact.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court
erred in denying Parker's motion insofar as it sought to
intervene in G&S's action against Western.  Accordingly, the
trial court's order is due to be reversed as to this issue.
See Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 270 (5th Cir.
1977) ("'With little strain on the court's time and no
prejudice to the litigants, the controversy can be stilled and
justice completely done' if the appellants are granted
permission to intervene." (quoting McDonald v. E.J. Lavino
Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1074 (5th Cir. 1970))).
B. The Motion to Compel Arbitration
As noted, the party seeking to compel arbitration has the
initial burden of proving the existence of a written contract
calling for arbitration and proving that that contract
evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce.  See
1090784
18
I.C.E. Contractors, Inc., supra.  Parker's entire argument in
moving the trial court to compel arbitration is set forth
below, verbatim:
 
"Upon 
granting 
Parker['s] 
... 
motion to
intervene, the Court should compel G&S to arbitrate
all disputes between G&S and Parker ..., including
those 
claims 
included 
in 
Parker['s] 
...
counterclaim. Section 17 of the Alabama Subcontract
Agreement (hereinafter the 'Subcontract', a copy of
which is attached as Exhibit 'B') provides that all
disputes, controversies, and claims between Parker
... and G&S be settled by binding arbitration
administered by the American Arbitration Association
('AAA')."
Parker correctly states that the contract contains a
provision calling for arbitration; G&S does not dispute this.
However, Parker wholly failed to allege that the contract
evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce; in
fact, Parker failed to even mention the phrase "interstate
commerce" in its motion to compel arbitration.  In its
opposition to G&S's motion to reconsider, Parker did state
that "a provision requiring arbitration of disputes between
the parties and which involves interstate commerce is
specifically enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act."
However, Parker's statement regarding interstate commerce was
merely a recitation of the law applicable to a ruling on a
1090784
19
motion to compel arbitration; it was not a specific allegation
that the transaction in this case involves interstate
commerce.
Also, the contract does not show on its face that the
transaction involves interstate commerce.  Notably, the
contract fails to state that either Parker or G&S engages in
business outside Alabama; instead, the contract merely states
that both Parker and G&S have their principal offices in
Alabama.  See Bowen v. Security Pest Control, Inc., 879 So. 2d
1139, 1142 (Ala. 2003) (holding that a transaction involved
interstate commerce, in part, because one of the parties to
the transaction engaged in commerce in both Alabama and
Georgia); Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 57
(2003) (holding that Congress's Commerce Clause power extended
to the transaction in that case because, among other things,
one of the parties to the transaction "engaged in business
throughout the southeastern United States"). 
     Furthermore, Parker submitted no evidence showing that
any materials, supplies, or equipment used in the project were
purchased from businesses in other states.  See Elizabeth
Homes, L.L.C. v. Cato, 968 So. 2d 1, 4 n. 1 ("Evidence that a
1090784
20
builder obtained materials and components for a house from
out-of-state suppliers is sufficient to establish that a
transaction for the construction and sale of a house
sufficiently involved interstate commerce for purposes of the
[Federal Arbitration Act]." (citing Elizabeth Homes, L.L.C. v.
Gantt, 882 So. 2d 313, 315-17 (Ala. 2003))).  Moreover,
because the hearing in this case was not transcribed, nothing
presented at that hearing may form the basis for reversing the
trial court's denial of Parker's motion to compel arbitration.
See generally Gotlieb v. Collat, 567 So. 2d 1302, 1304 (Ala.
1990) ("[T]his Court is limited to a review of the record
alone, and the record cannot be changed, altered, or varied on
appeal by statements in briefs of counsel. ... The appellants
bear the burden of ensuring that the record on appeal contains
sufficient evidence to warrant reversal.").
     In short, Parker has failed to show on the record that it
met its burden of supporting its motion to compel arbitration.
Therefore, insofar as it denied the motion to compel
arbitration, the trial court's order is due to be affirmed.
In Jim Burke Automotive, Inc. v. Beavers, 674 So. 2d 1260,
1090784
21
1265-66 (Ala. 1995), this Court affirmed the trial court's
denial of a motion to compel arbitration, stating:
"Jim Burke's motion to compel arbitration fails
even to allege that the transaction involves
interstate commerce; the closest it comes is to say
that 
'when 
an 
agreement substantially affects
interstate commerce and contains specific provisions
requiring 
arbitration of disputes between the
parties, that agreement is specifically enforceable
under the Federal Arbitration Act.' This is a
general statement of the law, not an allegation that
the transaction in question involves interstate
commerce. Attached to the motion is a copy of the
contract, but it does not show on its face that the
transaction involves interstate commerce, certainly
not so plainly as to require a reversal of the
denial of the motion. Codefendant American Bankers
Life Assurance Company of Florida asserted in its
answer that it was 'a foreign corporation licensed
to do business in the State of Alabama,' but this
fact is not cited in the record as a ground for
granting Jim Burke's motion. A hearing was held, but
it was not transcribed; thus, nothing presented at
that hearing can be cited as a basis for reversing
the denial of arbitration."
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's order
insofar as it denied Parker's motion to compel arbitration and
to stay the litigation.  We reverse the trial court's order
insofar as it denied Parker's motion for permission to
1090784
Because we conclude that the trial court correctly denied
6
Parker's motion insofar as it sought to compel arbitration of
all claims between Parker and G&S, we need not reach the issue
whether the trial court erred in denying Parker's motion
insofar as it sought to stay G&S's action against Western
pending resolution of the arbitration proceeding. 
22
intervene.  We remand the cause for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.6
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED. 
Cobb, C.J., and Stuart, Shaw, and Wise, JJ., concur.