Case Title: Conkey v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 128, 2022

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2022-12-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
SHAMIR CONKEY, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 128, 2022 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§ Cr. ID No. 1911011245 (N) 
§  
§ 
 
 
Submitted: December 15, 2022 
Decided: 
December 19, 2022 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief and the appellee’s motion 
to remand, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
A Superior Court jury found the appellant, Shamir Conkey, guilty of 
first-degree robbery, second-degree assault (as a lesser-included offense of first-
degree assault), and second-degree reckless endangering.  On March 25, 2022, the 
court sentenced Conkey as follows:  for first-degree robbery, to twenty-five years of 
incarceration, suspended after five years for decreasing levels of supervision; for 
second-degree assault, to eight years of incarceration, suspended after two years for 
one year of probation; and for second-degree reckless endangering, to one year of 
incarceration, suspended for one year of probation.  This is Conkey’s direct appeal. 
 
2
(2) 
Conkey’s trial counsel, an attorney with the Office of Defense Services 
(“ODS”), filed a notice of appeal on Conkey’s behalf.  A different ODS attorney 
later substituted as counsel for Conkey in this appeal.  Counsel filed a brief and a 
motion to withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26(c), asserting that, based upon a 
conscientious review of the record, the appeal is wholly without merit.  After 
reviewing the record for arguably appealable claims,1 this Court granted the motion 
to withdraw and appointed substitute counsel, directing counsel to brief whether 
second-degree assault and second-degree reckless endangering should have merged 
for sentencing in the circumstances of this case, as well as any other issues presented 
by the record.  
(3) 
Substitute counsel filed an opening brief on Conkey’s behalf, arguing 
that second-degree assault and second-degree reckless endangering should have 
merged for sentencing.  In response, the State concedes that the offenses should have 
merged in the circumstances of this case and requests that the case be remanded for 
resentencing.  Conkey’s counsel has indicated that he does not oppose the motion 
for remand.  Under the circumstances, we conclude that the appropriate course of 
action is to remand this matter to the Superior Court so that Conkey may be 
resentenced. 
 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80, 82-83 (1988); Leacock v. State, 690 A.2d 926, 927-28 (Del. 
1996). 
 
3
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the matter is REMANDED to 
the Superior Court for further action in accordance with this order.  Jurisdiction is 
not retained. 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Chief Justice