Case Title: Ray v. Gream

Citation: 860 S.W.2d 325

Docket Number: 

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 1993-08-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
860 S.W.2d 325 (1993)
Ollie RAY, et al., Respondents,
v.
Marvin C. GREAM, Jr., et al., Appellants.
No. 75499.

Supreme Court of Missouri En Banc.
August 17, 1993.
*326 Lawrence H. Rost, New Madrid, for appellants.
W. Edward Reeves, Caruthersville, Charles Sampson Williams, Kennett, for respondents.
LIMBAUGH, Judge.
This is an appeal in a will contest case. The trial court entered judgment upon a jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs, the contestants of the will of Myrtle F. Peterson. Defendants, the proponents of the will, appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, which reversed the judgment on the ground that the trial judge erred in failing to strike from the venire certain prospective jurors who the proponents challenged for cause. Having reviewed that issue on transfer from the Court of Appeals, we determine that there was no error, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Mrs. Peterson, widowed and childless, died on September 15, 1990, at age 79. Proponents of the will are two brothers, Marvin C. Gream, Jr. and Ronnie Lee Gream, who were not related to Mrs. Peterson. The Gream brothers, however, were longtime neighbors and friends with Mrs. Peterson. They farmed approximately 2,200 acres in the Missouri Bootheel, including a 140 acre tract that they had rented from Mrs. Peterson since about 1970. Contestants of the will, on the other hand, are Mrs. Peterson's two half brothers and a half sister.
On April 22, 1990, Mrs. Peterson was severely injured in an automobile accident that left her paralyzed from the neck down, and as a result of that injury, she was hospitalized *327 until her death. During that time, she executed a power of attorney in favor of Marvin Gream so that he could handle her financial affairs while she was incapacitated. Subsequently, Mr. Gream, a nonlawyer, prepared a will for Mrs. Peterson by using his own will as a model. This was done apparently at Mrs. Peterson's request. Though paralyzed, she then, with the assistance of Mr. Gream, placed a "x" on the signature line. Two witnesses to the purported execution of the will signed the will while all were present. Adjacent to the "x" mark, Mr. Gream then wrote "Myrtle F. Peterson, Marvin C. Gream, Jr., Power of Attorney."
Under the terms of the will, Mrs. Peterson devised her 140 acre farm to the proponents, the Gream brothers, and she bequeathed her remaining property to the contestants, her half brothers and half sister. After the will was admitted to probate, this action was commenced. The allegations of contestants' petition included failure to comply with statutory requirements for the execution of wills as well as fraud and lack of testamentary capacity.
The proponents' sole point on appeal is that the trial judge erred by denying their challenges for cause against six members of the jury panel "who stated a clear and unequivocal bias against a person outside the family who is left property by a decedent." The more particular issue, as we see it, concerns the propriety and effect of efforts to rehabilitate those prospective jurors.
Because the dialogue at voir dire between the judge, the counsel, and the prospective jurors is critical to a resolution of the issue presented, we quote extensively from the record. The pertinent exchange began when counsel for the will proponents asked whether "anyone [has] any preconceived notion or otherwise about leaving property to someone outside your family?" In response to that question, the voir dire continued as follows:
MARY ANN SANDERS: No.
At this point, the trial judge began to question the prospective jurors, and the following exchanges took place:
Following additional, unrelated questions, the panel was excused and the court took up the question of challenges for cause:
Thereafter, the court denied the challenges for cause against prospective jurors Tanner, Riley, Prince, Pujol, Richards, and Roberts. The proponents, the Gream brothers, used their peremptory strikes to remove Tanner, Riley and Prince, but Pujol and Richards served on the jury. Roberts, the remaining venireperson, did not make the panel of eighteen.
The statutory grounds applicable to the challenges for cause raised in this case are found in § 494.470, RSMo Supp.1992 that states:
Our standards for reviewing rulings on challenges for cause are well established. Trial courts are given broad discretion to determine whether prospective jurors are qualified, and rulings on that issue "will not be disturbed on appeal unless [they constitute] a clear abuse of discretion and a real probability of injury to the complaining party." State v. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Mo.banc), cert. denied, ___U.S.___, 111 S. Ct. 2918, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1991); State v. Walton, 796 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Mo. banc 1990). Mindful that the trial court is in a better position to determine the qualifications of prospective jurors, doubts as to the trial court's findings will be resolved in its favor. Walton, 796 S.W.2d  at 378. The critical question in reviewing the exercise of discretion is whether the challenged venirepersons *332 indicated unequivocally their ability to evaluate the evidence fairly and impartially. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d  at 7; State v. Lingar, 726 S.W.2d 728, 734 (Mo. banc 1987).
Applying these principles to the facts at hand, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the challenges for cause. All of the prospective jurors who made the panel were successfully rehabilitated. Although those jurors initially indicated a bias in favor of the family members contesting the will and against the non-family members who were proponents of the will, the court found, after its independent inquiry, that the jurors could set aside any "preconceived notions" and judge the case fairly and impartially by the facts presented and the applicable law. The fact that some of the jurors used imprecise language such as "I think I could" or "I would hope I could" does not necessarily make their responses equivocal. These expressions, we have noted, are merely the vernacular to express affirmative responses. State v. Griffin, 756 S.W.2d 475, 481 (Mo. banc), cert. denied 490 U.S. 1113, 109 S. Ct. 3175, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1036 (1989); State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Mo. banc), cert. denied 454 U.S. 933, 102 S. Ct. 432, 70 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1981). We defer to the trial court's determination that the responses were not equivocal.
Proponents cite the venerable case of Theobald v. St. Louis Transit Co., 191 Mo. 395, 90 S.W. 354 (1905), for two propositions:
1. It is an abuse of discretion to fail to strike a prospective juror who clearly admits bias even when the juror says that he or she can set aside that bias; and
2. It is improper for the judge to rely solely on the conclusions of the prospective jurors in determining whether they can be impartial.
In Theobald, a prospective juror had been injured in a streetcar accident eight or nine years before trial. During voir dire the juror indicated that he had nothing against the particular defendant, a streetcar company, but stated that he had entertained a prejudice against streetcar companies for all the years since his accident. Upon further examination, the juror concluded that he could be impartial despite his earlier experience. In holding that the juror should have been stricken for cause, this Court stated:
Theobald, 90 S.W.  at 359.
In what we believe is an expansive and unwarranted reading of this passage from Theobald, the proponents suggest that all prospective jurors who preliminarily admit to actual bias, as opposed to the mere possibility of bias, are irreversibly unfit for service and are not subject to rehabilitation. However, to glean from Theobald that all beliefs or opinions on a relevant issue must always result in disqualification would be to eliminate all persons for cause. As the trial court aptly observed in its examination of the prospective jurors, "all of us have preconceived thoughts about a myriad of things." Nevertheless, a distinction may be made between deep-seated and enduring bias that is often borne of a personal, specific and directly adverse experiencethe kind of prejudice evidenced by the juror in Theobaldand a general opinion or belief that may be prejudicial in nature but moderate in degree one that would not necessarily impact on a juror's ability to be impartial. In this regard, Theobald clarifies its holding in the following passage:
It is on these precepts, reaffirmed in cases as recent as Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d  at 8, and Griffin, 756 S.W.2d  at 481, that we have traditionally evaluated evidence of juror bias.[1]
The questions posed in this case and the degree of bias to which the prospective jurors initially admitted are more akin to the situation in Beard v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 323 S.W.2d 732 (Mo.1959). During voir dire in the Beard case, defendants' counsel asked the prospective jurors if they felt, "in your own mind that every employee who is injured while in the service of his employer should be entitled to some compensation regardless of the circumstances under which the accident occurred?" Id. at 737. In analyzing the responses of the several members of the jury panel who stated that the employee should be paid, this Court stated:
Id. The court disposed of the defense counsel's argument that the responses to his question indicated a disqualifying prejudice or bias, stating: "Any supposed implication that any venireman was of a `deep-seated conscientious' belief that in all circumstances the employer should pay and regardless of any question of the employer's fault was self drawn and injected by defendants' counsel in the course of his inquiry." Id. This Court held, therefore, that the trial judge had not abused his discretion in refusing to strike the prospective jurors for cause. Id. See also Cleghorn v. Terminal R.R. Assoc. of St. Louis, 289 S.W.2d 13 (Mo.1956); Timmerman v. Terminal R.R. Assoc. of St. Louis, 362 Mo. 280, 241 S.W.2d 477 (1951).
The effect of the proponents' questions in this case was to elicit a natural and not unexpected response from the members of the jury panel that property in their own family should not be left to someone outside of their family. Given only this hypothetical possibility without any elaboration about the actual facts of the case or the law applicable to the case, the affirmative responses of the jurors were not automatically disqualifying. Moreover, from a thorough review of the voir dire transcript, it is clear that none of the six prospective jurors in question demonstrated the degree of bias that would not "readily yield to evidence" and that would preclude rehabilitative efforts.
Contestants also cite Theobald in support of their argument that the trial court improperly relied on the jurors' conclusory statements that they could be impartial. Theobald states:
Theobald, 90 S.W.  at 359. According to the proponents, the case at bar is identical to Theobald. In each case, the only evidence of the jurors' ability to divest themselves of bias was their own conclusion to that effect, and therefore, the jurors were allowed to be the judges of their own qualifications. The proponents add that the only way to rehabilitate jurors who show actual prejudice is to elicit facts that would show that the "nature, character, and cause" of the bias are such that the bias can be set aside and the case judged impartially.
To address proponents' contentions, we first note that it is proper for the trial court to consider the juror's testimony concerning his or her ability to act impartially. Walton, 796 S.W.2d at 377-378; State v. Reynolds, 619 S.W.2d 741, 749 (Mo.1981). This idea is set out more fully in 47 Am. Jur.2d Jury § 210, where it is stated: "A juror's answers on voir dire to questions touching his state of mind are primary evidence of his competency. His testimony or opinion derived from his own consciousness is relevant, competent, and primary evidence on the issue of his indifference and impartiality."
The key point of Theobald is not that the court is prohibited from basing its determination on the opinions or conclusions of the jurors, but that the trial court must make an independent determination of the jurors' qualifications. That task is accomplished when the trial court reviews and evaluates the jurors' conclusions and weighs them against the earlier admissions of prejudice. It is in that sense that the requirement for an independent determination is not inconsistent with the court's reliance on those conclusions.
In some cases, such as Theobald,[2] the initial indication that a juror is prejudiced may be so strong as to require more than the testimony that the prejudice can be set aside. In these instances, the opinion or conclusion of the jurors must be discounted, at least to some extent, and absent other evidence that the juror could in fact serve impartially, the challenge for cause should be sustained.
On the other hand, the self-assessment of prospective jurors that they can set aside their bias is, in most cases, sufficient evidence, in and of itself, to support the trial court's determination that the juror is not disqualified. For example, Feltrop, Walton, and Lingar, the sole evidence that jurors could overcome their previous indication of bias were their own conclusory statements to that effect. Indeed, reliance on such evidence is the common and long-accepted practice of our trial courts.
In sum, we hold that the jurors in question did not exhibit the degree of bias that would automatically disqualify them from serving and that the trial court appropriately considered the testimony of those jurors that they could set aside their stated bias and serve impartially. As stated earlier, the trial court's determination of the jurors' qualifications was not an abuse of discretion.
The judgment is affirmed.
COVINGTON, C.J., HOLSTEIN, BENTON, PRICE, ROBERTSON, JJ., and SMITH (GERALD), Special Judge, concur.
THOMAS, J., not sitting.
[1]  See also State v. Debler, 856 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. banc 1993), that distinguishes between the disqualifying bias of those who have formed an opinion on the material facts of the case, see § 494.470.1, and other types of bias that are merely "opinions about `larger issues' "opinions that all prospective jurors will have to some extent. Under § 494.470.2, that type of bias is disqualifying "only if [the prospective jurors'] views would preclude following the instructions given by the court." Debler, 856 S.W.2d  at 645.
[2]  See also State v. Lovell, 506 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. banc 1974); State v. Holliman, 529 S.W.2d 932 (Mo.App.1975).