Case Title: Ex parte Michael Booker. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Michael Booker v. State of Alabama)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1070376

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2008-04-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 04/25/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
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before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1070376
_________________________
Ex parte Michael Booker
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re:  Michael Booker
v.
State of Alabama)
(Chambers Circuit Court, CC-96-434.61;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-06-1730)
LYONS, Justice.
Michael Booker petitioned this Court for a writ of
certiorari to review whether the Court of Criminal Appeals
1070376
2
erred in affirming the Chambers Circuit Court's order denying
his Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition.  We issued the writ
of certiorari to review whether Booker's claim alleging that
the State presented insufficient evidence to support his
convictions is precluded from appellate review.  For the
reasons discussed below, we affirm, on a different rationale,
the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Michael Booker pleaded guilty to two counts of capital
murder and one count of attempted murder in March 1998.  After
a jury trial on the capital offenses pursuant to § 13A-5-42,
Ala. Code 1975, which allows a capital defendant to plead
guilty but requires the State to prove the defendant's guilt
to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury convicted Booker
of the capital charges.  The trial court sentenced him to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole on each capital
conviction and to life imprisonment on the attempted-murder
conviction.  Booker later appealed his convictions and
sentences to the Court of Criminal Appeals.  In April 1998,
the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Booker's appeal as
1070376
3
untimely filed.  Booker v. State, 738 So. 2d 944 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1998) (table). 
In November 2006, Booker, for the third time, petitioned
the trial court for postconviction relief under Rule 32, Ala.
R. Crim. P., alleging, among other things, that the State
presented insufficient evidence to the jury to support his
capital convictions.  The trial court denied the petition as
untimely filed and as successive.  Booker then appealed the
trial court's denial of his Rule 32 petition to the Court of
Criminal Appeals.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment of
the trial court in an unpublished memorandum.  Booker v. State
(No. CR-06-1730, Oct. 26, 2007), __ So. 2d __ (Ala. Crim. App.
2007) (table).  That court concluded in its unpublished
memorandum that Booker's insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim
was without merit because he had pleaded guilty to the charged
offenses.  Relying on Waddle v. State, 784 So. 2d 367 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2000), the Court of Criminal Appeals also held that
"a challenge to the lack of a factual basis for a guilty plea
is nonjurisdictional" and therefore subject to the procedural
bars of Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P.  Consequently, the Court of
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Criminal Appeals concluded that the trial court correctly
found that Booker's claim that the evidence was insufficient
to support his convictions for capital murder was precluded
under Rule 32.2(b), Ala. R. Crim. P., as successive, and under
Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R. Crim. P., as untimely filed. 
Booker then petitioned this Court for certiorari review.
We granted the petition to determine whether the decision of
the Court of Criminal Appeals in this case conflicts with
Elder v. State, 494 So. 2d 922 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986), and
Davis v. State, 682 So. 2d 476 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995).  
II. Standard of Review
"'This Court reviews pure questions of law in criminal
cases de novo.'"  Ex parte Morrow, 915 So. 2d 539, 541 (Ala.
2004) (quoting Ex parte Key, 890 So. 2d 1056, 1059 (Ala.
2003)).
III. Analysis
To analyze whether the decision of the Court of Criminal
Appeals conflicts with Elder and Davis, and thus whether the
Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that Booker's
insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim is precluded, we must
determine whether insufficiency of the evidence to support the
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5
conviction is a jurisdictional defect when a defendant enters
a plea of guilty to a capital offense  pursuant to § 13A-5-42,
Ala. Code 1975.  Section 13A-5-42 provides:
"A defendant who is indicted for a capital
offense may plead guilty to it, but the state must
in any event prove the defendant's guilt of the
capital offense beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.
The guilty plea may be considered in determining
whether the state has met that burden of proof.  The
guilty plea shall have the effect of waiving all
non-jurisdictional 
defects 
in 
the 
proceeding
resulting in the conviction except the sufficiency
of the evidence.  A defendant convicted of a capital
offense after pleading guilty to it shall be
sentenced according to the provisions of Section
13A-5-43(d)."
(Emphasis added.)  This Court has not previously interpreted
§ 13A-5-42.  
Booker correctly asserts that in Elder and Davis the
Court of Criminal Appeals held that failure to prove a
defendant's guilt in a capital case beyond a reasonable doubt
to a jury, as required by § 13A-5-42, is a jurisdictional
defect.  See Benton v. State, 887 So. 2d 304, 306 n. 1 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2003) ("We recognize that Cox v. State, 462 So. 2d
1047 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985), and Elder v. State, 494 So. 2d
922 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986), cite § 13A-5-42, Ala. Code 1975,
for the proposition that the requirement that a defendant's
1070376
6
guilt be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt is
jurisdictional.").  In Davis, 682 So. 2d at 479 n. 2, the
Court of Criminal Appeals relied on Cox and Elder to note that
"the requirement in § 13A-5-42 that the appellant's guilt be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury is jurisdictional."
In Cox v. State, 462 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Ala. Crim. App.
1985), the trial court, without empaneling a jury, accepted a
defendant's plea of guilty to a capital offense and sentenced
him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
The trial court later held a hearing in which the defendant
again entered a plea of guilty to the same capital offense.
Cox, 462 So. 2d at 1049.  The trial court then empaneled a
jury, which heard the State's prima facie case and returned a
verdict of guilty.  Id.  The trial court again sentenced the
defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole.  Id.  In analyzing the defendant's assertion that his
right to be free from double jeopardy had been violated
because the trial court had sentenced him twice for the same
offense, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that "[§] 13A-5-42
... required that [the defendant's] guilt be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt by a jury, even though he had pleaded guilty.
1070376
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This requirement could not be waived.  It was jurisdictional."
462 So. 2d at 1051. 
In Elder, 494 So. 2d at 922, the defendant contended that
the trial court had improperly accepted his plea of guilty
under § 13A-5-42 because, he claimed, "the jury was selected
by the agreement of both the prosecution and the defense."  In
considering whether the trial court had jurisdiction to accept
the defendant's plea of guilty, the Court of Criminal Appeals
held that "[w]ith regard to a guilty plea in a capital case,
the requirement of § 13A-5-42 that the accused's guilt be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury is jurisdictional."
Elder, 494 So. 2d at 923 (citing Cox, 462 So. 2d at 1051).  
In Benton, a plurality opinion, the Court of Criminal
Appeals, after acknowledging the holding in Cox and Elder of
the jurisdictional status of the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt requirement in § 13A-5-42, stated:
"However, those cases [Cox and Elder] and §
13A-5-42, Ala. Code 1975, do not stand for the
proposition that the sufficiency of the evidence
must be reviewed on direct appeal, whether or not
preserved at the trial court level, or on collateral
review if a direct appeal has not been pursued.
Rather, the jurisdictional matter to which they
refer is the procedural requirement that, when a
defendant pleads guilty to a capital offense, the
State must still prove the defendant's guilt to a
1070376
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jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  To hold otherwise
would 
provide 
for 
plain 
error 
review 
in 
a
non-death-penalty case and would thus violate the
plain language of Rules 45A and 45B, Ala. R. App.
P."
887 So. 2d at 306 n. 1.
Booker contends that Judge Wise's opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part in Benton, 887 So. 2d at 308,
correctly states that interpreting § 13A-5-42 as providing
that an insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim is jurisdictional
is consistent with Davis, Elder, and Cox.  Judge Wise
reasoned:
"An individual who pleads guilty to capital
murder faces only two possible punishments--life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole or
the death penalty.  Given these circumstances,
together with the plain language of § 13A-5-42, it
seems clear that the Legislature's intent was to
provide individuals pleading guilty to the most
serious criminal offense encompassed in Alabama law
an elevated level of appellate review.  ...  Such a
conclusion is consistent with this Court's holdings
in Davis v. State, 682 So. 2d 476, 479 n. 2 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1995); Elder v. State, 494 So. 2d 922,
923 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); and Cox v. State, 462
So. 2d 1047, 1051 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985), which
recognize that when a defendant pleads guilty to
capital murder the State must nevertheless prove
each element of capital murder beyond a reasonable
doubt to the jury, and that such a requirement is
jurisdictional.
"... [A]llowing a defendant to challenge the
sufficiency 
of 
the 
State's 
evidence 
in 
a
1070376
9
capital-murder guilty-plea proceeding is consistent
with the plain language of § 13A-5-42, which makes
no 
distinction 
regarding 
a 
challenge 
to 
the
sufficiency of the evidence based on the sentence
imposed."
Benton, 887 So. 2d at 308-09.   
   
The State contends that the Court of Criminal Appeals
correctly upheld the trial court's denial of Booker's Rule 32
petition because, it says, Booker's insufficiency-of-the-
evidence claim is precluded as successive and untimely.  See
Rules 32.2(b) and (c), Ala. R. Crim. P.  The State argues that
the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly treated Booker's
insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim as a challenge to the
factual basis for the guilty plea, which it contends is a
nonjurisdictional claim.  The State relies upon Wright v.
State, 902 So. 2d 720 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004), and Faulkner v.
State, 741 So. 2d 462 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999), for the
proposition that "issues related to the sufficiency of the
factual basis for a guilty plea are usually not jurisdictional
in nature."  902 So. 2d at 734 n. 7 (Shaw, J., concurring
specially).  However, neither Wright nor Faulkner dealt with
a plea of guilty to a capital offense under § 13A–5-42.  In
Wright, a jury found the defendant guilty of robbery in the
1070376
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second degree, and in Faulkner, the jury found the defendant
guilty of sodomy in the first degree.  Likewise, the Court of
Criminal Appeals relied on a noncapital case, Waddle v. State,
784 So. 2d 367 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000), to hold that Booker's
petition was precluded because "a challenge to the lack of a
factual basis for a guilty plea is nonjurisdictional." 
The State also contends that the decision of Court of
Criminal Appeals here does not conflict with Davis, Elder, or
Cox  because, it says, those cases merely recognize that the
procedural requirement that a defendant's guilt be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury is jurisdictional and that
it is not waived by entry of the guilty plea.  The State makes
the following distinction: When a defendant enters a plea of
guilty in a capital case pursuant to § 13A-5-42, the State's
failure to prove the defendant's guilt to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt is a jurisdictional defect, while the State's
failure to present sufficient evidence to support the
conviction is a nonjurisdictional defect.  To support this
distinction, the State relies on the previously quoted portion
of the main opinion in Benton, 887 So. 2d at 306 n. 1, which
limited the holdings of Cox and Elder by stating that "the
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11
jurisdictional matter to which they refer is the procedural
requirement that, when a defendant pleads guilty to a capital
offense, the State must still prove the defendant's guilt to
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."  
We conclude that the foregoing limitation of Cox and
Elder recognized in Benton is founded upon an erroneous
reading of § 13A-5-42 in Cox and Elder.  The plain meaning of
§ 13A-5-42 is simply that insufficiency of the evidence in a
capital case is a nonjurisdictional defect that is not waived
by a guilty plea.  "In determining the meaning of a statute or
a court rule, this Court looks first to the plain meaning of
the words as they are written."  Ex parte Ward, 957 So. 2d
449, 452 (Ala. 2006) (emphasis added).  "Words used in a
statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and
commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is used
a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly
what it says."  IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602
So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992). 
We are here construing an exception to the rule set forth
in a criminal statute, § 13A–5-42 -- "[t]he guilty plea shall
have the effect of waiving all non-jurisdictional defects in
1070376
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the proceeding resulting in the conviction except the
sufficiency of the evidence." (Emphasis added.)  It is well-
established law that "'criminal statutes should not be
"extended by construction."'"  Ex parte Mutrie, 658 So. 2d
347, 349 (Ala. 1993) (quoting Ex parte Evers, 434 So. 2d 813,
817 (Ala. 1983), quoting in turn Locklear v. State, 50 Ala.
App. 679, 282 So. 2d 116 (1973)).  Moreover, "exceptions [in
statutes], as a general rule, should be strictly, though
reasonably construed, and are to be extended only so far as
their language warrants."  State v. Praetorians, 226 Ala. 259,
260, 146 So. 411, 412 (1933).  
The exception in § 13A-5-42 does not go so far as to make
a claim of insufficiency of the evidence jurisdictional
because that status is not essential to achieving the obvious
purpose of the exception--insulating a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence from waiver by the plea of guilty
to a capital offense.  In other words, assuming appropriate
preservation of the error in the trial court, a capital
defendant on direct appeal, relying on § 13A-5-42, can assert
insufficiency of the evidence without being subject to a
contention by the State that the entry of the guilty plea
1070376
13
waived any such defect.  If the sufficiency-of-the-evidence
error was not preserved, the conviction that was the basis of
an appeal on this ground would be affirmed.  
To interpret the exception in § 13A-5-42 as stating that
a 
challenge 
to 
the 
sufficiency 
of 
the 
evidence 
is
jurisdictional improperly extends the exception beyond its
purpose and outside its context.  We therefore expressly
overrule Cox, Elder, and Davis to the extent that they are
inconsistent with this opinion.  Once the interpretation of §
13A-5-42 stemming from Cox and Elder is set aside as
erroneous, the distinction recognized in Benton in order to
circumvent these cases becomes unnecessary, and we therefore
also overrule Benton to the extent it is inconsistent with
this opinion.  Thus, we overrule Cox, Elder, Davis, and
Benton, and we hold that pursuant to § 13A-5-42 the State's
failure to present sufficient evidence to prove a defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is a nonjurisdictional defect
that, when adequately preserved, may be raised on appeal after
a defendant pleads guilty to a capital offense. 
IV. Conclusion 
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In summary, the trial court denied Booker's Rule 32
petition alleging insufficiency of the evidence to support his
convictions for two counts of capital murder and attempted
murder based on preclusion under Rule 32.  The Court of
Criminal Appeals agreed that the petition did not allege a
jurisdictional defect and affirmed the trial court's finding
that Booker's claim was precluded.  However, the Court of
Criminal Appeals, in reaching the conclusion that Booker's
claim was nonjurisdictional, relied upon the noncapital case
of Waddle v. State, 784 So. 2d 367 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000), and
did not consider the effect of § 13A-5-42, dealing with claims
of insufficiency of the evidence in capital cases.  We have
done so and, by overruling Cox, Elder, Davis, and Benton,
cases from the Court of Criminal Appeals construing §
13A-5-42, we hold, as a matter of first impression, that
pursuant to § 13A-5-42 the State's failure to present
sufficient evidence to prove a defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt is a nonjurisdictional defect that, when
adequately preserved, may be raised on appeal after a plea of
guilty to a capital offense.  Because the rationale of this
Court also supports the trial court's holding, albeit on
1070376
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different grounds than those relied upon by the Court of
Criminal Appeals, we affirm the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals.
AFFIRMED.
See, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and Murdock,
JJ., concur.
Cobb, C.J., recuses herself.