Case Title: Nelson v. Warden

Citation: 

Docket Number: 002301

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2001-09-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present: All the Justices 
 
ROBERT NELSON, JR. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 002301 
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO
 
 
 
September 14, 2001 
WARDEN OF THE KEEN MOUNTAIN 
CORRECTIONAL CENTER 
 
UPON A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
This case involves a "Baker claim," i.e., one arising 
from this Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Baker, 258 
Va. 1, 516 S.E.2d 219 (1999) (per curiam), aff'g Baker v. 
Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 306, 504 S.E.2d 394 
(1998) (failure to notify juvenile's parents of proceedings 
in juvenile court renders void subsequent criminal 
convictions in circuit court).1  The present claim is 
asserted in an original petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus filed in this Court by Robert Nelson, Jr. (Nelson), 
against the Warden of the Keen Mountain Correctional Center 
(the Warden). 
 
According to the allegations of the petition, Nelson 
was arrested in January 1985 at the age of seventeen for 
two counts of armed robbery, two counts of abduction, one 
count of receiving stolen property, and one count of sexual 
assault.  He was "arraigned" in the Juvenile and Domestic 
Relations District Court of Fairfax County and then brought 
before that court in March 1985 for a transfer hearing.  
The juvenile court transferred him to the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County for trial as an adult.  He pled guilty to 
the offenses in circuit court and was sentenced to serve 
forty-eight years in the penitentiary. 
 
Nelson alleges in his habeas petition that his father 
was not notified of the initiation of the proceedings in 
juvenile court or of the transfer hearing.2  Nelson alleges 
that the juvenile court's failure to notify his father of 
the proceedings rendered his convictions in the circuit 
court unlawful and void.3
                                                             
1 For convenience, we will refer to the Court of 
Appeals’ decision as Baker I and our decision as Baker II 
or, collectively, as Baker. 
 
2 Nelson makes no complaint about notice to his mother. 
 
3 At the time of the juvenile proceedings in this case, 
Code § 16.1-263(A) provided that “[a]fter a petition has 
been filed, the court shall direct the issuance of 
summonses, one directed to the child, . . . and another to 
the parents . . . .”  At its 1999 session, the General 
Assembly substituted “at least one parent” for “the 
parents” in § 16.1-263(A).  1999 Va. Acts ch. 952.  
 
Code § 16.1-263(E) provides that "[n]o such summons or 
notification shall be required if the judge shall certify 
on the record that . . . the identity of [the father] is 
not reasonably ascertainable."  The judge made no such 
certification in this case. 
 
Code § 16.1-264(A) provides that if a person other than the 
juvenile defendant cannot be found or his post office 
 
2
 
Nelson not only invokes our decision in Baker II but 
also our decision in David Moore v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 
431, 527 S.E.2d 406 (2000).  In Baker II, we affirmed the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals "[f]or the reasons set 
forth in the opinion of" that court.  258 Va. at 2, 516 
S.E.2d at 220.  In its judgment, the Court of Appeals 
reversed the criminal convictions of a seventeen-year-old 
defendant, stating that "[b]ecause the notice of the 
initiation of juvenile proceedings was not properly served 
on the required parties, the transfer of jurisdiction [to 
the circuit court] was ineffectual and the subsequent 
convictions are void."  28 Va. App. at 315, 504 S.E.2d at 
399. 
 
In David Moore, we applied Baker II and held that, 
because of the failure to notify the defendant’s father of 
the initiation of juvenile court proceedings, "the juvenile 
court . . . never acquired the authority to exercise its 
jurisdiction to conduct the transfer hearing that resulted 
in the transfer of Moore’s case to the circuit court.  
Accordingly, the circuit court never acquired the authority 
to exercise its jurisdiction to try Moore for the criminal 
                                                             
address cannot be located, the court may order service of 
the summons upon him by publication. 
 
 
 
3
offenses charged in the indictments, and Moore's 
convictions in the circuit court are void."  David Moore, 
259 Va. at 440, 527 S.E.2d at 411. 
 
Nelson argues that his case “falls squarely within the 
rule enunciated by this Court” in Baker II and David Moore, 
that his convictions, therefore, are void, and that habeas 
corpus is a proper method of redress.  Nelson argues 
further that, because his convictions are void, they are 
subject to attack "at any time, in any way, by anybody, 
whether the attack be direct or collateral," and, 
accordingly, his petition for a writ of habeas corpus is 
not barred by the statute of limitations contained in Code 
§ 8.01-654(A)(2).4
 
For his part, the Warden contends that Nelson's 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is barred by the 
                     
4 Code § 8.01-654(A)(2) provides that a habeas corpus 
petition attacking a criminal conviction or sentence, 
except for cases in which a death sentence has been 
imposed, “shall be filed within two years from the date of 
final judgment in the trial court or within one year from 
either final disposition of the direct appeal in state 
court or the time for filing such appeal has expired, 
whichever is later.”  This statute became effective July 1, 
1998.  We allowed petitioners whose time for filing would 
have expired prior to the effective date of the statute an 
extra year, or until June 30, 1999, for the filing of 
petitions for habeas corpus.  Final judgment on Nelson's 
convictions was entered in June 1985.  He did not file his 
petition until September 21, 2000, beyond the statutory 
period and the extra year.  Of course, he takes the 
position his case is not subject to the statute. 
 
4
statute of limitations contained in Code § 8.01-654(A)(2).  
However, the Warden makes the overriding argument that this 
Court should “take the opportunity to clarify the area of 
the law concerned in this [case], hold that lack of notice 
to a parent in juvenile court proceedings renders a 
judgment voidable and not void and overrule the prior 
decisions in David Moore and Baker to the extent they hold 
otherwise.”  We will consider this argument first. 
 
The Warden’s argument implicates, of course, the 
principles of stare decisis.  In Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. 
Dean, 233 Va. 260, 355 S.E.2d 579 (1987), we stated as 
follows: 
 
In Virginia, the doctrine of stare decisis is 
more than a mere cliche.  That doctrine plays a 
significant role in the orderly administration of 
justice by assuring consistent, predictable, and 
balanced application of legal principles.  And when a 
court of last resort has established a precedent, 
after full deliberation upon the issue by the court, 
the precedent will not be treated lightly or ignored, 
in the absence of flagrant error or mistake. 
 
Id. at 265, 355 S.E.2d at 581.  “Our strong adherence to 
the doctrine of stare decisis does not, however, compel us 
to perpetuate what we believe to be an incorrect 
application of the law.”  Nunnally v. Artis, 254 Va. 247, 
253, 492 S.E.2d 126, 129 (1997). 
 
In David Moore, this Court undertook to explain its 
decision in Baker II.  David Moore, 259 Va. at 434, 527 
 
5
S.E.2d at 407 ("[t]he primary focus of this appeal is a 
determination of the scope of our recent decision in [Baker 
II])."  While neither the Court of Appeals' opinion in 
Baker I nor ours in Baker II mentioned the phrase "subject 
matter jurisdiction," we made a point in David Moore of 
"emphasizing the necessary distinction to be drawn . . . 
between the power of a court to adjudicate a specified 
class of cases, commonly known as 'subject matter 
jurisdiction,' and the authority of a court to exercise 
that power in a particular case."  Id. at 437, 527 S.E.2d 
at 409. 
 
We said that "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is granted 
by constitution or statute," that "[i]t cannot be waived," 
that "any judgment rendered without it is void ab initio," 
and that "lack of subject matter jurisdiction 'may be 
raised at any time, in any manner, before any court, or by 
the court itself.' "  Id. (quoting Humphreys v. 
Commonwealth, 186 Va. 765, 772, 43 S.E.2d 890, 893 (1947)).  
We made plain, however, that the lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction was not at issue in David Moore.  Rather, we 
said that the issue was "the unique statutory framework 
whereby a juvenile court and in turn a circuit court 
acquire the authority to exercise their subject matter 
 
6
jurisdiction."  259 Va. at 438, 527 S.E.2d at 409.  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
After noting the Court's emphasis on the distinction 
between subject matter jurisdiction and the authority to 
exercise that jurisdiction, the Court's next step should 
have been to demonstrate the difference resulting from the 
distinction.  Yet, we made a distinction without a 
difference for, with our very next step, we elevated the 
failure of a court to comply with the requirements for 
exercising its authority to the same level of gravity as a 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
We stated that " '[a] court's authority to exercise 
its subject matter jurisdiction over a case may be 
restricted by a failure to comply with statutory 
requirements that are mandatory in nature and, thus, are 
prerequisite to a court's lawful exercise of that 
jurisdiction.' "  Id. at 437, 527 S.E.2d at 409 (quoting 
Dennis Moore v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 405, 409, 527 S.E.2d 
415, 417 (2000)).5  In other words, we made the statutory 
                     
5 Dennis Moore and David Moore are two different 
defendants.  Dennis Moore involved Code § 16.1-269.6(E), 
which provides that "[a]ny objection to the jurisdiction of 
the circuit court pursuant to [Article 7 of Chapter 11 of 
Title 16.1] shall be waived if not made before 
arraignment."  This Court said in David Moore that the 
section was inapplicable because it relates to a defect in 
a transfer hearing while David Moore claimed a defect in 
 
7
requirements both mandatory and jurisdictional.  We also 
made clear that the requirements were not subject to waiver 
by the juvenile's failure to object to a defect in the 
proceedings.  David Moore, 259 Va. at 439, 527 S.E.2d at 
410. 
 
We are of opinion David Moore is flawed by our failure 
to recognize that, in the legal and factual framework in 
which the decision was made, a different outcome should 
have resulted from the distinction we drew between subject 
matter jurisdiction and the authority to exercise that 
jurisdiction.  Analysis of the framework begins with our 
decision in Peyton v. French, 207 Va. 73, 147 S.E.2d 739 
(1966), cited in both Baker I and David Moore. 
 
In Peyton v. French, the juvenile court "certified" a 
sixteen-year-old juvenile to the circuit court for trial on 
larceny and breaking and entering charges.  Neither of the 
juvenile's parents was present, they had not received any 
notice to appear, and a guardian ad litem was not appointed 
                                                             
the initiation of the juvenile proceedings.  David Moore, 
259 Va. at 440, 527 S.E.2d at 411.  Another statute, Code 
§ 16.1-269.1(E), addresses defects in the initiation of 
juvenile proceedings.  It provides that "[a]n indictment in 
the circuit court cures any error or defect in any 
proceeding held in the juvenile court except with respect 
to the juvenile's age."  However, both § 16.1-269.1(E) and 
§ 16.1–269.6(E) apply only to offenses committed after July 
1, 1996.  As noted supra in the text, Nelson's offenses 
were committed in 1985. 
 
8
to represent the juvenile.  He was convicted in circuit 
court and sentenced to the penitentiary.  We said "the 
failure of the juvenile court to comply with the applicable 
statutes rendered the circuit court proceedings void."  Id. 
at 80, 147 S.E.2d at 743.  Similar results were reached 
under like circumstances in Gregory v. Peyton, 208 Va. 157, 
156 S.E.2d 624 (1967), Gogley v. Peyton, 208 Va. 679, 160 
S.E.2d 746 (1968), Pruitt v. Peyton, 209 Va. 532, 165 
S.E.2d 288 (1969), and Jones v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 425, 
192 S.E.2d 775 (1972), all referring back to Peyton v. 
French. 
 
As Justice Kinser's dissent in David Moore aptly 
points out, while we did not specify in Peyton v. French 
and its progeny that we were considering subject matter 
jurisdictional defects, the question of the juvenile 
court's subject matter jurisdiction was implicated because 
we allowed the defendants in those cases to mount 
collateral attacks upon their convictions.  David Moore, 
259 Va. at 444, 527 S.E.2d at 413.  And as the dissent 
further notes, there were two statutory provisions in 
effect at the time the Peyton v. French line of cases was 
decided that rendered the defects jurisdictional rather 
than procedural.  Id. at 445, 527 S.E.2d at 413-14. 
 
9
 
Former Code § 16.1-172 provided that "[i]n no case 
shall the hearing proceed until the parent or parents of 
the child . . . have been notified."  (Emphasis added.)  
And former Code § 16.1-173 provided that when no person 
required to be notified by former Code § 16.1-172 was 
present for the hearing, the "court shall, before 
proceeding with the hearing, appoint a . . . guardian ad 
litem to represent the interests of the child."  (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
However, beginning in 1968, the General Assembly made 
a series of dramatic changes in the jurisdictional aspect 
of the notice requirements of the juvenile statutes.  That 
year, the General Assembly deleted from former Code § 16.1-
173 the requirement that the "court shall, before 
proceeding with the hearing," appoint a guardian ad litem 
when no person required to be notified was present at the 
hearing.  And, in 1977, the General Assembly removed from 
former Code §  16.1-172 the provision that "[i]n no case 
shall the hearing proceed" until the juvenile's parent or 
parents have been notified.  Significantly, the General 
Assembly has not replaced the language deleted from former 
Code §§ 16.1-172 and –173 with anything remotely suggesting 
an intention to re-institute a jurisdictional requirement 
in the notice provisions of the juvenile statutes. 
 
10
 
In 1973, the General Assembly enacted Code § 16.1-
176.2 (now Code § 16.1-270).  This new section provided 
that at any time prior to a transfer hearing, “a child 
. . ., with the written consent of his counsel, may elect 
in writing to waive the jurisdiction of the juvenile court 
and have his case transferred to the appropriate court of 
record."  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Furthermore, subsequent decisions of this Court 
substantially impacted the jurisdictional aspect of the 
notice requirements of the juvenile statutes.  In 1976, 
prompted in large part by the enactment of Code § 16.1-
176.2 permitting a juvenile to waive the jurisdiction of 
the juvenile court, this Court decided that a statutory 
provision stating that the juvenile court shall give 
parents notice in writing of a transfer hearing was 
procedural and not jurisdictional in nature.  Turner v. 
Commonwealth, 216 Va. 666, 222 S.E.2d 517 (1976).  We said, 
"especially is the jurisdictional argument negated by the 
. . . provision that the transfer hearing itself may be 
waived."  Id. at 669, 222 S.E.2d at 520.  As a result, we 
held that "any departure from [the] requirement [of written 
notice] may be cured or waived by the appearance of proper 
 
11
and necessary parties and a failure to object to inadequacy 
of notice."  Id. at 668, 222 S.E.2d at 519.6  
 
In Jamborsky v. Baskins, 247 Va. 506, 442 S.E.2d 636 
(1994), the circuit court failed to comply with the then 
current juvenile transfer statute, which provided that the 
circuit court shall, within twenty-one days after receipt 
of the case from juvenile court, conduct an examination to 
determine if there had been compliance with the statute.  
Code § 16.1-269(E) (repealed by 1994 Va. Acts ch. 859 and 
949) (see present Code § 16.1-269.6(B)).  The Court of 
Appeals issued a writ of prohibition against further 
proceedings in the circuit court, holding that the twenty-
one day requirement was mandatory and jurisdictional.  We 
reversed, holding that the twenty-one day provision was 
"directory and procedural, rather than mandatory and 
jurisdictional."  Id. at 511, 442 S.E.2d at 639. 
 
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, we are not 
obliged to uphold a decision that is itself at odds with 
precedent previously established by this Court "after full 
                     
6 The view expressed in David Moore that the notice 
requirements of the juvenile statutes are jurisdictional in 
nature and cannot be waived is contradicted by Morrison v. 
Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 387 S.E.2d at 753 (1990).  After 
noting that "there is a significant difference between 
subject matter jurisdiction and the other 'jurisdictional' 
elements," including notice jurisdiction, we stated that 
 
12
deliberation upon the issue," Selected Risks, 233 Va. at 
265, 355 S.E.2d at 581, that fails to give proper effect to 
“the interposition of legislative power," Postal Telegraph-
Cable Co. v. Farmville & Powhatan R.R. Co., 96 Va. 661, 
662, 32 S.E. 468, 469 (1899), and that “has produced 
‘confusion,’ ” United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 711 
(1993).  David Moore suffers from all of these ills. 
 
David Moore is at odds with Turner, Jamborsky, and 
Morrison, precedents previously established by this Court 
after full deliberation upon the issues and never 
overruled.  It fails to give proper effect to the 
interposition of legislative power, exemplified by the 
substantial statutory changes evincing legislative intent 
to make the notice provisions of the juvenile statutes 
procedural and not jurisdictional.  And it certainly has 
produced confusion among the bench and bar of this 
Commonwealth. 
 
We indicated supra that we thought a different outcome 
should have resulted in David Moore from the distinction we 
drew between subject matter jurisdiction and the authority 
to exercise that jurisdiction.  In our opinion, the 
different outcome should have consisted of a finding that 
                                                             
"[s]ubject matter jurisdiction alone cannot be waived."  
Id. at 169, 387 S.E.2d 755. 
 
13
the statutory requirement of notice to parents was not 
jurisdictional but procedural in nature, that a failure to 
notify parents could be waived by a failure to object, and, 
correspondingly, that a failure to comply with the 
requirement rendered subsequent convictions voidable and 
not void.  To the extent David Moore conflicts with these 
views, it is overruled. 
 
Baker, however, should not suffer the same fate.  The 
voiding of Baker's convictions was predictable.  In this 
context, a matter is void either because it has been null 
from the beginning (void ab initio) or because it is 
declared null although seemingly valid until that point in 
time (voidable).  See Black's Law Dictionary 1568 (7th ed. 
1999).  Neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court 
classified Baker's convictions as void ab initio, and they 
were not void ab initio because David Moore makes clear 
that both the juvenile court and the circuit court in Baker 
possessed subject matter jurisdiction.  David Moore, 259 
Va. at 437-38, 527 S.E.2d at 409.  But when the Court of 
Appeals determined that Baker's father was not given the 
notice required by the version of Code § 16.1-263(A) then 
in effect and, significantly, it was clear Baker had 
preserved the error both by filing in circuit court a 
motion to dismiss before he was indicted and by timely 
 
14
raising the issue on appeal, the Court of Appeals was bound 
to declare void what theretofore had been merely voidable. 
 
In contrast, Nelson did not preserve the error in the 
juvenile court's failure to give his father notice and did 
not raise the issue until he filed his petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus in this Court.  Because Nelson's 
convictions were merely voidable, his failure to raise the 
issue in a timely manner constitutes a waiver of the error 
and results in the dismissal of his petition.  In light of 
this disposition, we do not reach any of the other issues 
in the case. 
Petition dismissed. 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, with whom JUSTICE HASSELL and JUSTICE 
KEENAN join, dissenting. 
 
 
I respectfully dissent.  Today, although expressly 
acknowledging “ ‘[o]ur strong adherence to the doctrine of 
stare decisis,’ ” a new majority of this Court overrules 
our prior decision in David Moore v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 
431, 527 S.E.2d 406 (2000), after concluding that decision 
is “flawed by our failure to recognize that, in the legal 
and factual framework in which the decision was made, a 
different outcome should have resulted from the distinction 
we drew between subject matter jurisdiction and the 
authority to exercise that jurisdiction.”  The new majority 
 
15
reasons that “the different outcome should have consisted 
of a finding that the statutory requirement of notice to 
parents was not jurisdictional but procedural in nature, 
that a failure to notify parents could be waived by a 
failure to object, and, correspondingly, that a failure to 
comply with the requirement rendered subsequent convictions 
voidable and not void.”  (Emphasis added).  Of course, 
because David Moore is otherwise dispositive of the issue 
whether the convictions of Robert Nelson, Jr. in June 1985 
were merely voidable and not void, it is necessary for the 
majority now to cast the decision in David Moore aside in 
order to reach a different outcome in Nelson’s case and to 
dismiss his petition.   
 
In my view, David Moore was correctly decided and is 
entirely consistent with established precedent of this 
Court.  Beyond question it was decided after full 
deliberation upon the issue presented.  However, I do not 
dissent here merely to defend our decision in David Moore.  
I do so also because the new majority in this case 
necessarily labors to obtain a desired “outcome,” and in 
that process brings into question whether this Court 
consistently heeds its pronouncement that “the doctrine of 
stare decisis is more than a mere cliché.”  Selected Risks 
Ins. Co. v. Dean, 233 Va. 260, 265, 355 S.E.2d 579, 581 
 
16
(1987).  I cannot join in an opinion that fosters the 
perception that this Court does not. 
 
With regard to our decision in David Moore, and the 
precedent upon which it relies, the failure of the juvenile 
court to give parental notification of the initiation of 
proceedings against a juvenile alleged to have committed a 
criminal offense, as required by the then applicable 
provisions of Code §§ 16.1-263 and 16.1-264, is 
particularly significant.  That notification is critical to 
the proper application of the unique statutory scheme in 
which such a juvenile is initially brought within the 
purview of the juvenile court system and then “transferred” 
to the appropriate circuit court to be tried as an adult.  
Under this unique statutory scheme the juvenile court is 
given “exclusive original jurisdiction” over all cases 
involving a juvenile who is alleged to have committed a 
criminal offense.  Code § 16.1-241.  Thus, the circuit 
court has no jurisdiction over such cases in the absence of 
the juvenile court’s compliance with a mandatory procedure 
to invoke its initial exclusive jurisdiction and thereby 
subsequently to transfer a juvenile to be tried as an adult 
in the circuit court.  It is that process, whether labeled 
jurisdictional or mandatory, that is the focus of the 
present case, just as it was in Peyton v. French, 207 Va. 
 
17
73, 147 S.E.2d 739 (1966), subsequently in Commonwealth v. 
Baker, 258 Va. 1, 516 S.E.2d 219 (1999)(per curiam), aff’g 
Baker v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 306, 504 S.E.2d 394 
(1998) (hereafter Baker II and Baker I, respectively), and 
thereafter in David Moore. 
 
In this context, it has long been understood and 
accepted that a juvenile, even one alleged to have 
committed a serious crime, is to be treated differently 
from an adult when the juvenile’s conduct brings him within 
the purview of the juvenile court system.  One difference 
is that a child is entitled to the guidance of his parents 
or guardian at a juvenile court proceeding.  Undoubtedly, 
the most significant proceeding in a juvenile court is when 
a juvenile is transferred to a circuit court to be tried as 
an adult.  See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 
(1966).  Thus, in French, where, among other things, the 
juvenile court failed to give the required parental notice 
of the initiation of the proceedings in that court, we 
noted that the juvenile court had exclusive original 
jurisdiction over the offense alleged to have been 
committed by the juvenile.  We also observed that “the 
clear purpose and intent of the Juvenile and Domestic 
Relations Court Law cannot be achieved if it is not 
mandatory that the proceedings set forth in [the several 
 
18
statutes requiring the filing of a petition and parental 
notification prior to certifying a juvenile’s case to the 
circuit court] be complied with.  Indeed, the very language 
of the statutes makes it mandatory that the aforesaid . . . 
statutes be followed before criminal jurisdiction in a 
proper court of record comes into being.”  207 Va. at 79, 
147 S.E.2d at 743 (emphasis added).  Accordingly, we 
expressly and purposefully held that “the failure of the 
juvenile court to comply with the applicable statutes 
rendered the circuit court proceeding void.”  Id. at 80, 
147 S.E.2d at 743 (emphasis added). 
 
Relying, in part, upon our decision in French, the 
Court of Appeals in Baker I held that “[b]ecause the notice 
of the initiation of juvenile court proceedings was not 
properly served [on the juvenile’s biological father as 
required by the then applicable version of Code § 16.1-
263], the transfer of jurisdiction was ineffectual and the 
subsequent convictions [of the juvenile in the circuit 
court] are void.”  28 Va. App. at 315, 504 S.E.2d at 399 
(emphasis added).  In reaching this judgment, the Court of 
Appeals drew upon its prior decision in Karim v. 
Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 767, 779, 473 S.E.2d 103, 108-09 
(1996) (en banc), wherein it stated that “the provisions of 
Code §§ 16.1-263 and 16.1-264, ‘relating to procedures for 
 
19
instituting proceedings against juveniles, are mandatory 
and jurisdictional’ and the failure to ‘strictly follow’ 
these notice procedures denies a juvenile defendant ‘a 
substantive right and the constitutional guarantee of due 
process.’ ”  Baker I, 28 Va. App. at 310, 504 S.E.2d at 396 
(emphasis added).  In Baker II, we affirmed this judgment 
of the Court of Appeals “[f]or the reasons set forth in the 
opinion” in Baker I.  Indeed, these decisions reflect our 
consistent observation that “jurisdiction of the person and 
the proceeding is the very basis of a full and fair hearing 
at a criminal trial.”  Gogley v. Peyton, 208 Va. 679, 682, 
160 S.E.2d 746, 748 (1968). 
 
Contrary to the position now taken by the majority in 
the present case, there is no suggestion in French, Baker 
I, or Baker II that our use of the term “void” was intended 
to mean “voidable.”  Remarkably, the majority finds its 
only support in Black’s Law Dictionary 1568 (7th ed. 1999) 
to reason that by not characterizing a void judgment as 
“void ab initio” such a judgment is merely voidable 
“because it is declared null although seemingly valid until 
that point in time.”  I am unaware that the appellate 
courts of this Commonwealth are so imprecise when 
concluding that a particular judgment is either “void” or 
“voidable.”  See, e.g., Roach v. Director, Dep’t of 
 
20
Corrections, 258 Va. 537, 547, 522 S.E.2d 869, 873 (1999); 
Pigg v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 756, 760, 441 S.E.2d 216, 
219 (1994)(en banc). 
 
Moreover, the view now taken by the majority with 
regard to Baker I and Baker II, that because the juvenile 
there preserved the error of the failure of the juvenile 
court to give the required parental notice “the Court of 
Appeals was bound to declare void what theretofore had been 
merely voidable,” is at best circular reasoning.  In 
reality, the majority equates the preservation of the error 
with an analysis of the character of the error.  However, 
if the error causes a judgment to be void, that is, a 
nullity, the failure to preserve that error in the trial 
court or upon appeal does not and cannot cause the judgment 
to be merely voidable.  Rather, the void judgment may be 
challenged “at any time, in any manner, before any court, 
or by the court itself.”  Humphreys v. Commonwealth, 186 
Va. 765, 772, 43 S.E.2d 890, 893 (1947).  And so it was in 
Baker II that after careful consideration we specifically 
declined the Attorney General’s request that we apply our 
judgment in that case prospectively only and held that 
retrospective application was mandated.  258 Va. at 2, 516 
S.E.2d at 219. 
 
21
 
With this background, we next decided David Moore.  
The issue presented was whether the failure to give the 
statutory notice of the initiation of juvenile court 
proceedings to a juvenile’s parent was a defect in the 
proceedings such that it was not subject to waiver by the 
juvenile either in the juvenile court or the circuit court.  
Because David Moore had raised no such objection either in 
the juvenile court or the circuit court where he was 
convicted of various criminal offenses as an adult, we took 
the opportunity to determine the scope of our decision in 
Baker II where, as previously noted, the juvenile preserved 
the objection.  The majority in the present case, as if 
newly discovered, finds a flaw in our analysis because in 
David Moore “we made the statutory requirements [of 
parental notification] both mandatory and jurisdictional.”  
But, we did so expressly because in Baker II we adopted the 
reasoning of the Court of Appeals in Baker I that such 
requirements are “mandatory and jurisdictional.”  Despite 
its assertion to the contrary, the majority does have “the 
same quarrel with Baker [II] as with David Moore;” the 
majority simply wants to now declare “voidable” what has 
consistently been declared “void.”∗
                     
 
∗ The majority also concludes that “David Moore is at 
odds” with our prior decisions in Turner v. Commonwealth, 
 
22
 
In David Moore we explained why Code § 16.1-269.1(E) 
(indictment in circuit court cures any error or defect in 
any proceeding held in juvenile court except with respect 
to juvenile’s age) was not applicable to Moore’s case.  
This provision applies only to offenses committed on or 
after July 1, 1996.  Nelson’s offenses were committed in 
1985 and, therefore, this provision does not apply to his 
case.  In David Moore, we also addressed Code § 16.1-
269.6(E) (any objection to the jurisdiction of the circuit 
court waived if not made before arraignment).  This statute 
                                                             
216 Va. 666, 222 S.E.2d 517 (1976), Jamborsky v. Baskins, 
247 Va. 506, 442 S.E.2d 626 (1994), and Morrison v. 
Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 387 S.E.2d 753 (1990).  None of these 
cases, however, involved a “Baker claim.”  Turner involved 
a failure to give written notice of a transfer hearing.  
Jamborsky involved a failure of the circuit court to 
conduct an examination within twenty-one days after receipt 
of the case to determine whether a transfer was proper.  We 
held that these statutory requirements were procedural and 
not mandatory and jurisdictional.  Morrison was a medical 
malpractice case and, obviously, does not purport to 
address the jurisdictional aspect of the statutory mandate 
of parental notification of the initiation of juvenile 
court proceedings specifically addressed in French, 
Baker I, Baker II, and David Moore. 
 
 
Moreover, the enactment of Code § 16.1-176.2 (now Code 
§ 16.1-270) permitting a juvenile to waive a transfer 
hearing does not lessen the jurisdictional aspect of the 
requirement of parental notification of the initiation of 
juvenile court proceedings against a juvenile alleged to 
have committed a criminal offense.  This statute 
necessarily assumes that there is an otherwise proper 
proceeding to be waived in the first place; it is not a 
curative statute such as Code §§ 16.1-269.1(E) and 16.1-
269.6(E). 
 
23
also does not apply to offenses committed prior to July 1, 
1996 and, therefore, does not apply to Nelson’s case. 
 
The significance of these statutory enactments then 
becomes readily apparent in the context of what the 
majority appropriately labels a “Baker claim.”  In short, 
with regard to offenses committed by a juvenile prior to 
July 1, 1996, the failure of the juvenile court to give the 
statutorily mandated parental notification of the 
initiation of proceedings in that court is a defect in the 
proceedings such that the circuit court has no jurisdiction 
over the juvenile’s case and the circuit court’s judgment 
of conviction is void and not merely voidable.  As such, 
the judgment is subject to successful attack by a 
subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Nelson’s 
claims fall well within this analysis and the applicable 
timeframe. 
 
Finally, the majority’s acknowledgment of our 
adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis in the present 
case rings hollow in light of our prior considerations of 
the issue addressed.  After this Court issued its per 
curiam opinion in Baker II, the Commonwealth filed a 
petition to reconsider.  The Commonwealth stated in its 
petition to reconsider: 
 
24
 
Within a matter of days, if not hours, of this Court’s 
decision [in Baker], Virginia prisoners seized upon the 
Court’s citation of Gogley [v. Peyton, 208 Va. 679, 160 
S.E.2d 746 (1968)] in support of the proposition that a so-
called “Baker” error raises a matter of “subject matter” 
jurisdiction that may be raised at any time, regardless of 
whether the alleged lack of notice to a biological parent 
had been raised at trial and on direct appeal . . . . 
 
 
It is a matter of utmost importance to the 
Commonwealth, therefore, that the Court grant rehearing in 
order to thoroughly and carefully consider, and expressly 
decide, whether a so-called “Baker” error raises an issue 
of “subject matter” jurisdiction that may be raised at any 
time and never may be waived, or whether it merely raises a 
matter of “notice” jurisdiction, unlike “subject matter” 
jurisdiction, [which] is an issue that must be raised at 
trial and preserved for direct appeal. 
 
The Court declined the Commonwealth’s invitation because 
the Court was of the view that a circuit court cannot 
acquire subject matter jurisdiction over a juvenile’s case 
if the juvenile court failed to give the statutorily 
required parental notification of the initiation of 
proceedings in the juvenile court. 
 
I also observe that the majority fails to mention or 
discuss this Court’s decision in Jackson v. Warden, 259 Va. 
566, 529 S.E.2d 587 (2000), which should be controlling in 
this case.  Chauncey Jacob Jackson, who had been convicted 
and sentenced to death, Jackson v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 
675, 499 S.E.2d 538 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1067 
(1999), filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus styled 
Chauncey Jacob Jackson, Petitioner v. John B. Taylor, 
 
25
Warden Sussex I State Prison, Record No. 991477.  Jackson 
asserted, among other things, in his petition that his 
convictions were void because the juvenile court failed to 
notify his father of the juvenile court proceedings, citing 
our decision in Baker II and the Court of Appeals’ decision 
in Baker I. 
 
In response, the Commonwealth stated in its motion to 
dismiss:   
 
In an attempt to circumvent his default/waiver of his 
[Baker claim], Jackson asserts that a “Baker” error is a 
subject matter jurisdiction that absolutely voids his 
conviction and that can be raised at any time.  The error 
identified in Baker v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 306, 504 
S.E.2d 394 (1998), affirmed, 258 Va. 1, 516 S.E.2d 219 
(1999) and alleged by Jackson, however, is not the type of 
“subject matter” jurisdiction defect that may be raised at 
any time.  It is, rather, a mere defect in “notice” 
jurisdiction which, as with any jurisdictional defect other 
than one of subject matter jurisdiction, “will be 
considered waived unless raised in pleadings filed with the 
trial court and properly preserved on appeal.” 
 
 
The Commonwealth essentially relied upon the same 
argument and cases in its motion to dismiss in Jackson v. 
Warden that it relied upon in Baker II and in the present 
proceeding.  A panel of this Court denied Jackson’s 
petition for habeas corpus.  Jackson filed a petition for 
rehearing that was considered by the full Court.  Jackson 
reasserted his jurisdictional arguments in his petition for 
a rehearing. 
 
26
 
The full Court, upon consideration of the petition for 
rehearing, unanimously held that the circuit court did not 
have jurisdiction to try Jackson for the capital murder and 
related offenses.  In its published order, this Court 
stated: 
On consideration of the petition of petitioner to 
set aside the judgment rendered herein on the 
18th day of November, 1999 and grant a rehearing 
thereof, it is ordered that the said judgment 
dismissing the petition be reversed and set aside 
and a rehearing is granted. 
 
 
On consideration of the pleadings filed in this case, 
the Court is of opinion that the Circuit Court of the City 
of Norfolk never acquired jurisdiction to try the 
petitioner for capital murder and five companion felonies.  
David Moore v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 431, 527 S.E.2d 406 
(2000).  Accordingly, a writ of habeas corpus is awarded 
the petitioner and petitioner’s convictions for capital 
murder, attempted robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, 
two counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a 
felony and receipt of stolen property are vacated.  This 
matter is remanded to the Circuit Court of the City of 
Norfolk for a new trial if the Commonwealth be so advised. 
 
 
The Clerk of this Court shall certify copies of this 
order to the petitioner, to the respondent, to the Clerk of 
the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, and to the 
Attorney General of Virginia which certification shall have 
the same force and effect as if a writ of habeas corpus 
were formally issued and served. 
 
Jackson v. Warden, 259 Va. at 566-67, 529 S.E.2d at 587 
(emphasis added). 
 
It is abundantly clear from the record in Jackson v. 
Warden that this Court unanimously and expressly rejected 
the arguments that the Commonwealth again advances today 
 
27
and which the majority, after a change of mind, has decided 
to embrace.  Procedurally, the Jackson v. Warden case is 
virtually identical to the present case.  Jackson, just as 
Nelson, did not assert during the trial of the underlying 
convictions that the Commonwealth failed to notify a parent 
of proceedings in the juvenile court.  Jackson, just as 
Nelson, alleged in his habeas petition that his father was 
not notified of the initiation of proceedings in the 
juvenile court or of the transfer hearing.  Jackson, just 
as Nelson, alleged that the juvenile court’s failure to 
notify his father of the proceedings rendered his 
convictions in the circuit court void. 
 
Thus, I fail to understand how the majority, which 
participated and voted in Jackson v. Warden, can somehow 
conclude that David Moore is at odds with precedent 
previously established by this Court after full 
deliberation upon the issue.  The majority simply ignores 
the record and our published decision in Jackson v. Warden 
as if that case does not exist.  This Court did not err in 
Baker II, David Moore, and Jackson v. Warden.  Rather, the 
majority has abandoned the consistent and longstanding 
juvenile court jurisprudence of this Court, dating back to 
the French decision, to reach a different outcome, abruptly 
discarding the principle of stare decisis. 
 
28
 
Because I would hold that Nelson’s convictions were 
void and not merely voidable, I would also hold that his 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is not barred by the 
statute of limitations contained in Code § 8.01-654(A)(2).  
Accordingly, I would grant the relief sought by Nelson in 
his habeas corpus petition and remand this case to the 
trial court for a new trial if the Commonwealth be so 
advised. 
 
 
29