Case Title: Minton v. Frank

Citation: 545 S.W.2d 442

Docket Number: B-5816

State: texas

Court: Texas Supreme Court

Date: 1976-10-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
545 S.W.2d 442 (1976) Roy Q. MINTON et al., Petitioners, v. Raymond FRANK, Respondent. No. B-5816. Supreme Court of Texas. October 13, 1976. *443 Clark, Thomas, Winters & Shapiro, John Coates and Barry Bishop, Austin, for petitioners. Waggoner Carr and Robert L. Crider, Austin, for respondent. DENTON, Justice. This suit involves the construction of Article 2372p-3 Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes Annotated[1] which provides for the licensing and regulation of bail bondsmen. The suit was brought by Roy Q. Minton and Bob Kuhn, as licensed attorneys who represent clients in criminal cases, to obtain an injunction against Travis County Sheriff Raymond Frank from enforcing certain provisions of the Act. The trial court granted petitioners' motion for summary judgment, and the court of civil appeals reversed. 531 S.W.2d 413. We reverse the judgment of the court of civil appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court. The trial court granted petitioners' motion for summary judgment and permanently enjoined respondent from imposing certain provisions of Article 2372p-3 against the petitioners. The judgment further provided: The court of civil appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Article 2372p-3 contained both licensing and regulating provisions, and that while attorneys were exempt for the licensing provision, all bondsmen, licensed or otherwise, were subject to the regulatory provisions of the Act. Material provisions of Article 2372p-3 read as follows: Sec. 9. (a) No license may be issued to any person who: Sec. 14. The sheriff of any county has the sole responsibility of receiving and approving bail bonds for the purpose of gaining the release of a named principal held in custody by any authority in his county upon accusation of an offense of which the county or district court has jurisdiction. The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain legislative intent. State v. Shoppers World, Inc., 380 S.W.2d 107 (Tex.1964). Where the intent is apparent from the words of the statute, it is not necessary for this Court to make any analysis of the extrinsic evidence of legislative intent. Calvert v. British-American Oil Producing Co., 397 S.W.2d 839 (Tex.1965). The respondent posted requirements regarding the execution of bail bonds to be enforced by his office upon all bondsmen, including attorneys who represent clients. The requirements included a deposit of $1000 cash or a certificate of deposit, or execution of a deed of trust on unencumbered non-homestead property in the amount of at least $10,000. These requirements are the same requirements imposed upon licensees in section 6 of the Act except for the difference in the amount of the cash deposit. The question is not whether attorneys are exempt from the Act's "licensing" provision or the so-called "regulating" provisions of the Act as the court of civil appeals has viewed it, but whether attorneys who actually represent clients in criminal cases must comply with the requirements imposed under section 6 of the Act. We think the clear intent of the Act, taken in its entirety, is to exempt qualified attorneys from the provisions of section 6. It necessarily follows that otherwise qualified attorneys are exempt from respondent's bonding requirements set out in his "Surety Bond Procedures." Section 6 provides detailed licensing procedures under the Act, and sets out the requirements imposed upon an applicant prior to the issuance of the licenses. Qualified attorneys, being clearly exempt from the requirement of obtaining a license, are not required to comply with the requirements imposed upon an "applicant" for a license under section 6(d) of the Act. We construe the judgment of the trial court to so hold. Attorneys are subject to article 2372p-3, to the extent that section 3(b) prohibits them from engaging in the practices made the basis for revocation of a license under the Act, and provides that if they are found guilty of such practices they may not thereafter claim the excemptions for attorney. Attorneys are also subject to section 4 of the Act which gives the sheriff the authority to examine under that any bondsman, and to disapprove a bond if, within his discretion the security is not sufficient. Article 17.11 of the Code of Criminal; Procedure directs the officer taking a bail bond to require evidence of the sufficiency of the security offered. Section 14 of the Act gives the sheriff the sole responsibility of receiving and approving bail *446 bonds. The trial court correctly held petitioners are subject to the provisions of chapter 17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with the making and sufficiency of bail bonds. The judgment of the court of civil appeals is reversed and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. [1] Statutory references are to Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes Annotated.