Case Title: Miller v. Dep't of Health

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0197

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-05-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
RICKY D. MILLER and CHRISTOPHER L. GONZALEZ v. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, TOM FORSLUND, Director, TOM JOHNSON, Chemical Testing Supervisor, JAMES L. MOORE, Laboratory Supervisor2012 WY 65Case Number: S-11-0197Decided: 05/09/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
RICKY 
D. MILLER and CHRISTOPHER L. 
GONZALEZ,Appellants(Petitioners),v.WYOMING 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, TOM FORSLUND, Director, TOM JOHNSON, Chemical Testing 
Supervisor, JAMES L. MOORE, Laboratory 
Supervisor,Appellees(Respondents).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County
The 
Honorable Michael K. Davis, Judge 
 
Representing 
Appellants:
Cole 
N. Sherard, Wheatland, WY.
 
Representing 
Appellees:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General, and Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy 
Attorney General.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
HILL, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      After being 
separately cited and arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol 
(DWUI) in violation of Wyoming law, Ricky D. Miller and Christopher L. Gonzalez 
petitioned the district court for review of agency inaction by the Wyoming 
Department of Health (WDOH).  Miller 
and Gonzalez requested that the district court require the WDOH to retroactively 
decertify the chemical test operators (hereinafter “officers”) who had performed 
chemical tests of Miller’s and Gonzalez’s breath to determine the quantity of 
alcohol in their respective bodies.  On motion by the WDOH, Tom Forslund, in 
his official capacity as director, Tom Johnson in his official capacity as 
chemical testing laboratory manager, and James L. Moore, in his official 
capacity as laboratory supervisor (collectively referred to as “Department”), 
the district court dismissed the “Petition for Judicial Review” on the grounds 
that Miller and Gonzalez lacked standing to bring the action and that the matter 
is not ripe for review.  Miller and 
Gonzalez now challenge the order dismissing their petition.  We affirm.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      Miller and 
Gonzalez present two issues for our consideration:
 
1.    
Is 
the Appellants’ Petition for Judicial Review, challenging the WDOH failure to 
decertify the officers’ certification to perform chemical analysis ripe for 
review by this Court?
 
2.    
Do 
the Appellants have standing to petition the district court to order the WDOH to 
decertify these officers for failing to comply with [its] own administrative 
rules and regulations for chemical testing?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      Miller and 
Gonzalez were separately arrested for DWUI in violation of Wyoming law 
prohibiting driving while legally intoxicated, as determined by blood alcohol 
content (BAC).  To determine their 
blood alcohol content, both submitted to chemical breath testing on an 
Intoximeter EC/IR II.  Miller was 
tested by a Platte County deputy sheriff.  Gonzalez was tested by a Guernsey police 
officer.  Both officers were 
initially certified to perform chemical breath testing by the 
WDOH.
 
[¶4]      Breath test 
results showed that both Miller and Gonzalez were driving under the influence of 
alcohol in violation of Wyoming law.  
Both Miller and Gonzalez have the DWUI administrative and/or criminal 
processing pending, including revocation of their driver’s licenses by the 
Wyoming Department of Transportation.
 
[¶5]      On April 5, 2011, 
Miller and Gonzalez sent a letter to the WDOH requesting that it retroactively 
decertify the officers’ permits to perform chemical breath testing “for failing 
to maintain their certification requirements in accordance with W.S. 
§ 31-6-105, et al and Wyoming Department of Health Rules and Regulations 
for Chemical Analysis for Alcohol Testing Chapter IV, Permit Requirements.”  The WDOH did not respond to the 
letter.
 
[¶6]      On April 22, 
2011, Miller and Gonzalez filed a “Petition for Judicial Review” with the 
district court.  The petition 
asserted that the Department “improperly certified or failed to decertify 
chemical test operators who have not properly received and maintained their 
certification requirements for chemical testing under WDOH Rules for Chemical 
Testing and W.S. § 31-6-105.”  Miller and Gonzalez argued that both of 
the Department’s officers who performed the chemical breath tests on Miller and 
Gonzalez, respectively, were “either not properly certified and/or failed to 
properly maintain their certification and should have been decertified in 
accordance with W.S. § 31-6-105.”  Miller and Gonzalez requested that the 
district court require the Department to decertify the officers, retroactive to 
the dates their respective certifications lapsed.
 
[¶7]      On May 13, 2011, 
the Department filed a motion to dismiss the petition.  The Department maintained that Miller 
and Gonzalez lacked standing to bring the action and, therefore, the petition 
must be dismissed under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted.  Miller 
and Gonzalez responded to the motion on June 3, 2011, arguing that they “have a 
legally recognizable interest in the officers’ certification to conduct chemical 
testing” as they “will be aggrieved and adversely affected if the breath tests 
are allowed to stand when the officers conducting the test were not properly 
certified.”  Specifically, Miller 
and Gonzalez “each ... [have] a driver’s license … that will be suspended if 
this court does not intervene.”
 
[¶8]      On June 21, 2011, 
a hearing was held on the matter.  
On July 7, 2011, the district court entered its “Order Granting 
Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss Petition for Review.”  The court granted the motion to dismiss 
“based on the doctrines of ripeness and standing.”  It found that Miller and Gonzalez “lack 
standing to bring this action as the Respondents are sufficiently removed from 
the Driving While Under the Influence (DWUI) process,” and that the “matter is 
not ripe for consideration by [the district court] as the DWUI administrative 
and/or criminal processes are still pending.”
 
[¶9]      Miller and 
Gonzalez timely appealed the district court’s order dismissing their 
petition.
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶10]   As the motion to dismiss filed in 
the district court was brought pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and Miller and Gonzalez are now 
appealing the district court’s order dismissing their petition, we review the 
order as follows:
 
            
When reviewing a W.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6) dismissal, this Court accepts all facts stated in the complaint as 
being true and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  We will sustain a W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) 
dismissal only when it is certain from the face of the [petition] that the 
[petitioner] cannot assert any facts which would entitle him to 
relief.
 
Herrig 
v. Herrig, 
844 P.2d 487, 490 (Wyo. 1992) (citations omitted).
 
[¶11]   “A motion to dismiss, even though 
sparingly granted, is the proper method for testing the legal sufficiency of the 
allegations and will be sustained when the complaint shows on its face that the 
plaintiff is not entitled to relief.”  
Mummery v. Polk, 770 P.2d 241, 
243 (Wyo. 1989).
 
[¶12]   Furthermore, as the WDOH is an 
“agency” as defined by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 16-3-101(b)(i) (LexisNexis 2011) (“Agency” means 
any … department… of the state, a county, city or town[.]), this Court 
reviews the final judgment of a district court regarding action taken by an 
administrative agency under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-115 (LexisNexis 
2011).
 
We 
structure our review as though the appeal were directly from the agency, giving 
no special deference to the findings of the district court, and we apply the 
same standard of review used by district courts under Wyo. Stat. Ann § 
16-3-114 (LexisNexis 
2005).
 
Escarcega 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. DOT, 2007 WY 38, ¶ 6, 153 P.3d 264, 267 
(Wyo. 2007).
 
[¶13]   Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(a) 
(LexisNexis 2011), “any person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact … by 
other agency action or inaction … is entitled to judicial review in the district 
court for the county in which the administrative action or inaction was 
taken[.]”  According to W.R.A.P. 
12.09(a), judicial review “shall be limited to a determination of the matters 
specified in Wyo. Stat. 16-3-114(c).”  
The matters specified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2011) 
are:
 
(c) To 
the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review 
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be 
taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court 
shall:
(i) Compel 
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and
(ii) Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:
(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;
(B) Contrary 
to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;
(C) In 
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;
(D) Without 
observance of procedure required by law; or
(E) Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.
 
[¶14]   Under § 16-3-115, “an aggrieved 
party may obtain a review of any final judgment of the district court under this 
act by appeal to the supreme court.”  See also W.R.A.P 12.01 and 
12.11.
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶15]   While it is clear that the district 
court and this Court are granted authority to review agency action or inaction 
by the Wyoming Statutes and Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure as previously 
set forth, it is critical to understand that judicial review of an agency action 
or inaction is “only for those persons 'aggrieved or adversely affected in fact’ 
by the challenged action.”  Jolley v. State Loan & Inv. 
Bd., 2002 WY 7, ¶ 7, 38 P.3d 1073, 1076 (Wyo. 
2002).
 
An 
aggrieved or adversely affected person is one who has a legally recognizable 
interest in that which will be affected by the action. Hoke v. Moyer, 865 P.2d 624, 628 (Wyo. 1993).  A potential litigant must show injury or 
potential injury by “alleg[ing] a perceptible, rather than a speculative, harm 
resulting from the agency action.”  
Foster’s, Inc. v. City of 
Laramie, 718 P.2d 868, 872 (Wyo. 
1986).  “'The interest which will 
sustain a right to appeal must generally be substantial, immediate, and 
pecuniary. A future, contingent, or merely speculative interest is ordinarily 
not sufficient.’”  L. Slash X Cattle Company, Inc. v. Texaco, 
Inc., 623 P.2d 764, 769 (Wyo. 1981) (quoting 4 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 
180).
 
Id. 
¶ 7, 
38 P.3d  at 1076-77 (quoting Roe v. Board 
of County Commissioners, Campbell County, 997 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Wyo. 
2000)).
 
[¶16]   In light of the foregoing 
authority, and for purposes of our discussion, we will first discuss the issue 
of standing, presented as Miller’s and Gonzalez’s issue number two on 
appeal.
 
Standing
 
[¶17]   The issue of standing, specifically 
whether or not Miller and Gonzalez have standing to petition the district court 
to order the Department to decertify its officers for failing to comply with its 
own administrative rules and regulations for chemical testing, dovetails 
significantly with the requirements that must be met in order for the court to 
have authority to review the Department’s action or 
inaction.
 
“Standing 
is a legal concept designed to determine whether a party is sufficiently 
affected to insure that the court is presented with a justiciable controversy.” 
 Roe v. Board of County Commissioners, Campbell County, 997 P.2d 1021, 1022 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Memorial Hospital of Laramie County v. Dep’t 
of Revenue and Taxation of State of Wyoming, 770 P.2d 223, 226 (Wyo. 1989) 
and Washakie County School District 
Number One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 316 (Wyo. 
1980)).
 
“The 
doctrine of standing is a jurisprudential rule of jurisdictional magnitude. 
 At its most elementary level, the 
standing doctrine holds that a decision-making body should refrain from 
considering issues in which the litigants have little or no interest in 
vigorously advocating.  Accordingly, 
the doctrine of standing focuses upon whether a litigant is properly situated to 
assert an issue for judicial or quasi-judicial determination.  A litigant is said to have standing when 
he has a “personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.”  This personal stake requirement has been 
described in Wyoming as a “tangible interest” at stake.  The tangible interest requirement 
guarantees that a litigant is sufficiently interested in a case to present a 
justiciable controversy.” 
 
State ex 
rel. Bayou Liquors, Inc. v. City of Casper, 906 P.2d 1046. 1048 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Schulthess 
v. Carollo, 832 P.2d 552, 556-57 (Wyo. 1992) (citations omitted)).
 
Roe, 
997 P.2d  at 1022-23.
 
Jolley, 
¶ 6, 38 P.3d  at 1076.
 
[¶18]   In the words of the United States 
Supreme Court:
 
Over 
the years, our cases have established thatmarker1fn0the 
irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, 
the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact -- an invasion of a legally 
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of -- the injury has to 
be fairly … trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not … the 
result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the 
court.  Third, it must be likely, as 
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision.
 
Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992) (internal 
citations and punctuation omitted).
 
[¶19]   Turning to this case, Miller and 
Gonzalez claim that they have standing to pursue their petition for review.  They assert that because they are 
subject to criminal penalties and are facing driver’s license suspensions if the 
chemical tests stand, they are “aggrieved or adversely affected” by the 
Department’s failure to properly certify or decertify the officers.  They each maintain that they have a 
legally protected right in their driver’s licenses.  They also maintain that they have a right 
to be tested by an officer possessing a “valid” permit to perform chemical 
analysis for alcohol, as evidenced by § 31-6-105 and WDOH Rules and Regulations 
for Chemical Analysis for Alcohol 
Testing; ch. 1, §§ 1, 2, and 4, ch. 4, §§ 2 and 3, and ch. 5, § 2 
(2004).  They contend that the 
officers who tested Miller and Gonzalez, respectively, did not have “valid” 
permits because they failed to maintain their certifications.  Notwithstanding, they contend that the 
Department has not followed its own rules and regulations and failed to 
decertify the offending officers.  
Therefore, according to Miller’s and Gonzalez’s argument, they “have been 
materially and substantially affected by the [WDOH’s] failure to follow [its] 
rules and regulations,” and as such, have standing to petition the court to 
order the Department to retroactively decertify the 
officers.
 
[¶20]   In response, the Department 
contends that the district court properly ruled that Miller and Gonzalez lack 
standing to challenge the Department’s certification decisions.  The Department argues that Miller and 
Gonzalez do not satisfy the three elements of standing as set forth in Lujan.  We agree with the Department and hold 
that the district court properly dismissed the petition for 
review.
 
(I). 
 Injury in 
Fact
 
[¶21]   “The irreducible constitutional 
minimum of standing contains three elements.  First, the plaintiff must have suffered 
an injury in fact[.]”  Lujan, 504 U.S.  at 
560.
 
[¶22]   While in their appeal to this Court 
Miller and Gonzalez do not specifically address the three elements of standing 
as set forth in Lujan, they maintain 
that they “were injured and they were adversely affected at the moment they 
submitted to a chemical test.”  “The 
Appellants’ licenses will be suspended if their breath tests are allowed to 
stand and used against them to revoke their driver’s licenses.”  Clearly, Miller and Gonzalez believe 
their “injury in fact” to be the potential suspension of their driver’s 
licenses.
 
[¶23]   However, at the time they filed 
their petition for review with the district court, Miller’s and Gonzalez’s 
driver’s licenses had not been suspended.  
The law on standing and judicial review of an agency action plainly 
indicates that the injury must be “perceptible, rather than a speculative, 
harm.”  Foster’s, 
Inc. v. City of Laramie, 718 P.2d 868, 872 (Wyo. 1986).  Thus, Miller and Gonzalez have not 
suffered an “injury in fact.”
 
(II). 
Causal 
Connection between the Injury and the Conduct Complained 
Of
 
[¶24]   “Second, there must be a causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of -- the injury has to 
be fairly … trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not … the 
result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.” 
 Lujan, 
504 U.S.  at 560 (internal citations and punctuation 
omitted).
 
When 
the suit is one challenging the legality of government action or inaction, the 
nature and extent of facts that must be averred (at the summary judgment stage) 
or proved (at the trial stage) in order to establish standing depends 
considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or 
forgone action) at issue.  If he is, 
there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him 
injury….  When, however, … a 
plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful 
regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is 
needed.
 
Id. 
at 
561 (emphasis in original).
 
[¶25]   In the present case, Miller and 
Gonzalez are not the “object[s] of the action (or forgone action) at 
issue.”  Lujan 504 U.S.  at 561.  
The “forgone action” or “agency inaction” Miller and Gonzalez 
challenge is the Department’s alleged failure to retroactively decertify the 
officers responsible for performing the respective chemical breath tests.  § 16-3-114(a).  Therefore, the “object[s]” of the 
“forgone action” or “agency inaction” are the officers, not Miller and Gonzalez. 
 The “allegedly unlawful regulation 
(or lack of regulation)” in this case is of someone else, and therefore, “much 
more is needed.”  Id.  Miller and Gonzalez simply cannot pass 
this test for causation.  The 
alleged failure of the Department to take action to decertify the officers’ 
permits to conduct chemical analysis did not cause Miller and Gonzalez to 
potentially lose their driver’s licenses.  
As argued by the Department, “[i]t is Miller’s and Gonzalez’s illegal 
behavior that threatens their driver’s licenses.”  We agree.  Any effect on Miller and Gonzalez by the 
Department’s alleged inaction is merely secondary and tenuous at 
best.
 
[¶26]   In order to meet the causation 
element of the standing test, Miller and Gonzalez rely on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-6-105(a) (LexisNexis 2011), which states, in part:
 
(a)  Chemical 
analysis of the person's blood, breath or urine to be considered valid under this section, shall be 
performed according to methods approved by the department of health and by an 
individual possessing a valid permit to conduct the analysis. 
 [Emphasis 
added.]
 
Miller 
and Gonzalez also rely on WDOH’s Rules and Regulations for Chemical Analysis for 
Alcohol Testing, ch. 1, § 1 which states:
 
Pursuant 
to Wyoming 
Statute 31-6-105 (a), for 
chemical analysis of the person’s blood, breath or urine to be considered valid 
it shall be performed according to methods approved by the Department of 
Health and by an individual possessing a valid 
permit issued by the Department of Health. The Department of Health may 
promulgate and approve satisfactory methods in order to ascertain the 
qualifications of individuals to conduct the analysis and it shall issue permits 
to qualified analysts. The Department shall terminate or revoke permits for 
analysts who do not meet the promulgated qualifications.  [Emphasis 
added.]
 
[¶27]   Furthermore, Miller and Gonzalez 
point to WDOH’s Rules and Regulations for 
Chemical Analysis for Alcohol Testing, ch. 1, § 2 
regarding the purpose for the rules.  The section states that the purpose of 
the rules is “to insure scientific validity and uniform standards of practice 
for chemical analysis of alcohol.”
 
[¶28]   Miller and Gonzalez ostensibly 
contend that the failure of the Department to ensure that the officers maintain 
their certification destroys the scientific integrity of the chemical breath 
tests.  It follows, then, that if 
the tests given to Miller and Gonzalez were scientifically inaccurate or 
invalid, they are directly injured by the Department’s failure to enforce its 
own rules and regulations.
 
[¶29]   However, there is no evidence in 
the record challenging the results of the tests nor is there any evidence that 
the tests given to Miller and Gonzalez were scientifically invalid.  Moreover, as aptly stated by the 
Department:
 
If 
Miller and Gonzalez believe that there is cause to question the scientific 
validity of the breath tests, their remedy is within the administrative license 
revocation proceedings pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-103, not in this 
action seeking retroactive decertification of the law enforcement officers’ 
certifications.1 
 
[¶30]   Therefore, even if we were to 
accept that Miller and Gonzalez were “injured in fact,” and, further, “accept[] 
all facts 
stated in the complaint as being true and view[] them in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff,” Miller and Gonzalez 
simply cannot show that any action or inaction by the Department “caused” the 
injury.  Herrig, 844 P.2d 490.  This brings us to the final element of 
the standing test as set forth in Lujan.
 
            
(III). 
Redressibility
 
[¶31]   Redressibility is the third element 
of the test for standing as set forth in Lujan, 504 U.S. 560.  It “must be likely, as opposed to merely 
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”  
Id.  In other words, in 
order for Miller and Gonzalez to have standing, they must be in a position such 
that if they were to prevail in proving the allegations in their petition, a 
judgment and order by the court would remedy their alleged 
injury.
 
[¶32]   It is perceivable that if Miller and Gonzalez were to be 
able to show that the chemical breath tests given to them, respectively, were scientifically invalid due to 
failure of the officers at issue to perform the tests correctly, and further 
show that the reason the tests were performed incorrectly is because of the 
Department’s failure to ensure they were properly trained, that Miller’s and 
Gonzalez’s “injury” (i.e., loss of driving privileges) could be remedied.  However, as pointed out previously when 
discussing causation, the petition for review does not challenge the results of 
the tests nor does it set forth any evidence that the tests given to Miller and 
Gonzalez were scientifically invalid.  
Moreover, as stated above by the Department:
 
If 
Miller and Gonzalez believe that there is cause to question the scientific 
validity of the breath tests, their remedy is within the administrative license 
revocation proceedings pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-103, not in this 
action seeking retroactive decertification of the law enforcement officers’ 
certifications.
 
[¶33]   Perhaps most importantly, however, 
Miller’s and Gonzalez’s petition for review does not ask the district court to 
rule on the scientific validity of the breath tests.  The petition asks the court to retroactively decertify the 
officers’ permits to perform chemical breath testing.  Miller and Gonzalez continually assert 
that they have been “aggrieved or adversely affected” as they are in jeopardy of 
having their driver’s licenses suspended for DWUI based on the results of their 
chemical breath tests.  They assert 
that “[t]heir chemical tests were performed and conducted by uncertified 
operators because of the WDOH’s failure to enforce [its] own rules and 
regulations.”  And, “[i]f the 
officers were not certified at the time of testing, the results of the test are 
inadmissible and cannot be used to suspend the Appellants driving 
privileges.”  “The Appellants would 
assert a chemical test performed by an officer without a valid certification requires a 
rescission of their license suspension” based on § 31-6-105(a) (emphasis 
added).
 
[¶34]   Stated another way, in terms of 
redressibility, Miller’s and Gonzalez’s injury (i.e., loss of driving 
privileges) could be remedied by retroactive decertification if they can show 
the tests were legally invalid because officers 
performed them without a “valid permit” pursuant to § 31-6-105(a).  However, Miller and Gonzalez admit in 
their petition for review that the officers at issue on appeal were originally 
certified to conduct chemical analysis.  
They also admit on appeal that Miller was tested by an officer who was 
“initially certified on December 7, 2009,” and Gonzalez was tested by an officer 
who was “initially certified on January 12, 2009.”  According to the record, there is no 
dispute over whether the officers in question were initially 
certified.
 
[¶35]   Consequently, Miller and Gonzalez 
must rely on their assertion that the officers “did not properly maintain their certification” 
because they failed to conduct necessary practice tests required to maintain certification as set forth in the 
WDOH’s Rules and Regulations for 
Chemical Analysis for Alcohol Testing, ch. 4, § 2, 
and they should have been “decertified” pursuant to the Department’s rules prior 
to the dates of Miller’s and Gonzalez’s respective 
arrests.
 
[¶36]   Miller and Gonzalez rely on WDOH’s 
Rules and Regulations for 
Chemical Analysis for Alcohol Testing, ch. 4, § 
2(ii)(A), which states in relevant part: “To maintain certification an operator 
shall perform a minimum of one (1) checklist every two months … In case of 
noncompliance, the state agency shall revoke certification.”  (Emphasis 
added.)
 
[¶37]   Miller and Gonzalez also rely on 
WDOH’s Rules and Regulations for 
Chemical Analysis for Alcohol Testing, ch. 4, § 3 
pertaining to revocation of permits, which states: “Permits may be revoked for failure to 
perform the required number of analyses as described above, for failure to 
follow prescribed procedures, or for failing a required practical and/or written 
examination.”  (Emphasis 
added.)
 
[¶38]   It is apparent that WDOH’s Rules 
and Regulations for 
Chemical Analysis for Alcohol Testing, ch. 4, §§ 
2(ii)(A) and 3 are not entirely consistent regarding whether the Department has 
a mandatory requirement to revoke certification for failure to properly maintain 
certification.  And further adding 
to the uncertainty is § 4 that states that once an officer is initially 
certified, his permit “shall be considered valid until the state agency deems 
otherwise, and so notifies the permittee[].”  Nevertheless, the question the district 
court was faced with is:  When it 
“accepts all facts stated in the complaint as being true and views them 
in the light most favorable to the [petitioner],” is it “certain from the face 
of the [petition] that the [petitioner] cannot assert any facts which would 
entitle him to relief?”  Herrig, 844 P.2d  at 490 (citations omitted). 
 In this case, in order to remedy Miller’s and Gonzalez’s injury, then, 
the district court would have had to order the Department to decertify the 
officers’ permits retroactive to the dates their respective 
certifications lapsed.
 
[¶39]   While there is uncertainty in the 
WDOH’s Rules and Regulations for 
Chemical Analysis for Alcohol Testing regarding 
when and under what circumstances the Department has an obligation to revoke an 
officer’s permit to perform chemical tests for failure to properly maintain his 
certification, we agree with the Department that there is “no authority to 
decertify officers retroactively, which is the only remedy that would provide 
the relief sought by Miller and Gonzalez.”  We agree with the Department 
that:
 
If 
the district court were to find that the [Department] erred in failing to 
decertify the officers, it could order that they be decertified prospectively, 
but there is no authority to retroactively order decertification.  Thus, the requested relief is not 
available nor can it redress the alleged injury.
 
[¶40]   For the reasons set forth above, we 
conclude that Miller and Gonzalez do not have standing to bring the action set 
forth in their petition for review.  The district court is 
affirmed.
 
Ripeness
 
[¶41]   We now turn to the remaining issue 
raised by Miller and Gonzalez: “Is 
the Appellants’ Petition for Judicial Review, challenging the WDOH failure to 
decertify the officers’ certification to perform chemical analysis ripe for 
review by this Court?”
 
[¶42]   In its order dismissing Miller’s 
and Gonzalez’s petition for review, the district court also found that the 
issues before it were “not ripe for consideration … as the DWUI administrative 
and/or criminal processes are still pending.”  “Ripeness is a question of law, which 
[this Court] review[s] de novo.”  Cosco v. Lampert, 2010 WY 52 ¶ 13, 
229 P.3d 962, 969 (Wyo. 2010) (internal quotation omitted).  However, because we find the issue on 
standing dispositive in this case, we need not address the question as to 
whether the issues raised by Miller and Gonzalez in their petition for review 
are ripe for review.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶43]   
Miller and Gonzalez lack standing to bring the action set forth in 
their “Petition for Judicial Review.”  
The district court is affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
  1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-103(b) (LexisNexis 
2011) states, in relevant part: 
 
The 
scope of a hearing for the purposes of this act shall cover the issues of … if a 
test was administered, whether the test results indicated that the person had an 
alcohol concentration of eight one-hundredths of one percent (0.08%) or 
more[.]