Case Title: State v. Facyson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 262PA13

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2014-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
 
 NO. COA12-1321 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 7 MAY 2013 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Moore County 
No. 10 CRS 53284, 53470; 11 CRS 
51566 
BRUCE TYLER MURCHISON 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 8 August 2012 by 
Judge James M. Webb in Moore County Superior Court.  Heard in 
the Court of Appeals 13 March 2013. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney 
General James M. Stanley, Jr., for the State. 
 
William B. Gibson, for Defendant. 
 
 
DILLON, Judge. 
 
 
Bruce Tyler Murchison (Defendant) appeals from judgments 
revoking his probation and activating his suspended sentences.  
We reverse.  
I. Factual & Procedural Background 
On 17 November 2011, Defendant pled guilty pursuant to a 
plea arrangement to two counts of assault with a deadly weapon 
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with intent to kill, one count of assault with a deadly weapon, 
and one count of possession of marijuana with intent to sell or 
deliver.  Although Defendant was sentenced to 24 to 38 months 
imprisonment for each count of assault with a deadly weapon with 
intent to kill and 6 to 8 months imprisonment for the remaining 
convictions, the court suspended these sentences and placed 
Defendant on supervised probation.  One condition of Defendant’s 
probation was that he “[c]ommit no criminal offense in any 
jurisdiction.”  See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(1) (2011).   
On 2 February 2012 and 13 February 2012, Defendant’s 
probation officer, Leslie Tyree (Officer Tyree), filed reports 
alleging that Defendant had violated the conditions of his 
probation by, inter alia, committing the offense of assault with 
a deadly weapon, missing curfews, and failing to seek counseling 
for anger management and drug-related problems.  Consequently, 
the court modified the terms of Defendant’s probation and 
ordered that Defendant be incarcerated for a period of 90 days.  
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(d2) (2011). 
On 21 June 2012, Officer Tyree filed additional reports 
alleging that Defendant had again violated the terms of his 
probation “in that [Defendant] ha[d] been charges (sic) with 
first degree burglary, first degree kidnapping and assault with 
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a deadly weapon on 06/17/2012.”  The matter came on for hearing 
in Moore County Superior Court on 8 August 2012.  At the 
hearing, Officer Tyree testified over objection that Defendant’s 
mother had told her that Defendant had broken into a residence 
occupied by Defendant’s mother and girlfriend and that Defendant 
had brandished a knife while the two occupants hid in a closet 
“[b]ecause they were scared that [Defendant] was going to hurt 
them or kill them.”  Officer Tyree testified that her account of 
this incident was based upon a telephone conversation that she 
had had with Defendant’s mother.  Officer Tyree further 
testified that Defendant had been charged in connection with the 
incident and that the case was pending in Lee County.  The State 
subsequently introduced over objection a computer printout from 
the 
Administrative 
Office 
of 
the 
Courts 
indicating 
that 
Defendant had been indicted for first degree burglary in Lee 
County.   When asked on direct examination whether she had 
“concerns” about Defendant remaining on probation, Officer Tyree 
responded, “I have a feeling he’s going to kill somebody.”  On 
cross examination, Officer Tyree admitted that she had not 
reviewed Defendant’s mother’s statement to the police or the 
subsequently compiled police report in order to verify that they 
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were consistent with the account that had been related to her by 
Defendant’s mother during their telephone conversation.   
 
On 9 August 2012, the trial court entered judgments in 
which it found and concluded that Defendant had “violated a 
valid condition of probation” and ordered that Defendant’s 
“probation be revoked, that the suspended sentence be activated, 
and [that Defendant] be imprisoned” as originally prescribed in 
the 17 November 2011 judgments.  The trial court further ordered 
that the sentences – 28 to 35 months imprisonment for each of 
the two counts of assault with a deadly with intent to kill and 
6 to 8 months imprisonment for the remaining convictions – be 
served consecutively.  Defendant appeals. 
II. Analysis 
 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in revoking 
his probation because the State failed to produce any competent 
evidence demonstrating that he had committed a criminal offense.  
More 
specifically, 
Defendant 
argues 
that 
Officer 
Tyree’s 
testimony and reports were based entirely on hearsay and thus 
could not serve as competent evidence in support of revocation.  
We agree. 
 
Preliminarily, we note that are our disposition of this 
matter is governed by the following standard of review: 
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A proceeding “to revoke probation [is] often 
regarded as informal or summary,” and the 
court is not bound by strict rules of 
evidence. 
An 
alleged 
violation 
by 
a 
defendant of a condition upon which his 
sentence is suspended “need not be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. All that is 
required is that the evidence be such as to 
reasonably satisfy the judge in the exercise 
of his sound discretion that the defendant 
has violated a valid condition upon which 
the sentence was suspended.”  “The findings 
of the judge, if supported by competent 
evidence, and his judgment based thereon are 
not reviewable on appeal, unless there is a 
manifest abuse of discretion.” 
 
State v. Tennant, 141 N.C. App. 524, 526, 540 S.E.2d 807, 808 
(2000) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (alteration in 
original). 
 
As previously stated, the terms of Defendant’s probation 
mandated 
that 
he 
“[c]ommit 
no 
criminal 
offense 
in 
any 
jurisdiction.”  Our General Statutes specifically authorize the 
trial judge to revoke probation upon determining that a 
condition of this nature has been violated.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
15A-1344(a) (2011); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(1) (2011).  
“[T]he burden of proof is upon the State to show that the 
defendant has violated one of the conditions of his probation.” 
State v. Seagraves, 266 N.C. 112, 113, 145 S.E.2d 327, 329 
(1965). 
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The State’s evidence here regarding the alleged criminal 
offense by Defendant consisted of Officer Tyree’s testimony 
relating what Defendant’s mother had told her about the 
incident1, her verified probation violation reports and a 
printout reflecting a pending burglary charge against Defendant 
in Lee County.  It is well established that a trial court may 
not revoke probation “solely upon a pending criminal charge; a 
conviction or a plea of guilty is required.”  State v. Causby, 
269 N.C. 747, 749, 153 S.E.2d 467, 469 (1967) (citing State v. 
Coffey, 255 N.C. 293, 121 S.E.2d 736 (1961); State v. Guffey, 
253 N.C. 43, 116 S.E.2d 148 (1960); State v. Hardin, 183 N.C. 
815, 112 S.E. 593 (1922)).  The trial court’s decision to revoke 
probation must be based upon its own independent judgment and 
findings of fact.  See State v. Monroe, 83 N.C. App. 143, 145-
                     
1 We note that the State argues that Defendant failed to preserve 
his objection to Officer Tyree’s hearsay testimony under N.C. R. 
App. P. 10(a)(1) (2013) by failing to state the specific ground 
for his objection.  At the hearing, Defendant’s counsel objected 
when Officer Tyree was asked, “And what did [Defendant’s mother] 
tell you?”  Defendant’s counsel also objected following Officer 
Tyree’s statement that “[Defendant’s] mother called me the next 
day telling me what happened.”  Defendant’s counsel, however, 
did not specifically state the ground for either objection.  
Nonetheless, the trial court overruled each objection.  After 
careful review of the transcript, we believe that Defendant’s 
objections to Officer Tyree’s hearsay testimony were properly 
preserved under Rule 10(a)(1) because the ground for each 
objection 
was 
“apparent 
from 
the 
context” 
and 
Defendant 
“obtain[ed] a ruling” from the trial court each time.    
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46, 349 S.E.2d 315, 317 (1986) (affirming the trial court’s 
decision to revoke probation where “the judge upon revoking 
defendant’s probation made independent findings of his own as to 
the commission of [the alleged] crimes” and “did not base his 
holding of revocation solely upon pending criminal charges”); 
State v. Debnam, 23 N.C. App. 478, 480, 209 S.E.2d 409, 410 
(1974).  The issue in the present case thus becomes whether 
Officer Tyree’s testimony and reports served as competent 
evidence sufficient to support revocation.   
In resolving this issue, we find instructive this Court’s 
prior ruling in State v. Pratt, 21 N.C. App. 538, 204 S.E.2d 906 
(1974).  In Pratt, the trial court determined that the defendant 
had violated a condition of her probation requiring that she 
“[r]emain within a specified area and [] not change [her] place 
of 
residence 
without 
written 
consent 
of 
[her] 
probation 
officer.”  Id. at 539, 204 S.E.2d at 906.  At the revocation 
hearing, the defendant’s probation officer testified that she 
had been unable to locate the defendant after several visits to 
her purported address and had been informed by a third party 
that the defendant was “running a club” in Moore County; a 
second witness also testified that he had been unable to locate 
the defendant after attempting to visit her several times and 
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that, on one of his visits, “a lady came to the door and stated 
that defendant no longer lived there.”  Id. at 540-41, 204 
S.E.2d at 907.  On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court’s 
decision to revoke probation, holding that “there was no 
competent evidence that defendant had changed her address in 
violation of a provision of her probation.”  Id. at 540, 204 
S.E.2d at 907 (emphasis in original).  We explained our 
reasoning as follows: 
Although there was direct evidence that on 
eight or ten occasions defendant was not 
found at the place that was supposed to be 
her residence, the evidence which tended to 
show that she had established her residence 
elsewhere was hearsay and insufficient to 
support the order of revocation. 
Id. at 541, 204 S.E.2d at 907-08 (emphasis added).  Similarly, 
in State v. Hewett, 270 N.C. 348, 154 S.E.2d 476 (1967), our 
Supreme Court concluded that “[s]ome of [the trial court’s] 
findings of fact [were] based on hearsay evidence, and should 
not have been considered by the judge” in determining that the 
defendant had violated a condition of his probation.  Id. at 
356, 154 S.E.2d at 482.  The trial court’s decision in Hewett 
was ultimately upheld, however, because there was “enough 
competent evidence in the record to support the judge’s crucial 
findings of fact that the defendant ha[d] willfully” violated a 
condition of his probation.  Id.  The Hewett court noted that 
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the competent evidence supporting the trial court’s decision in 
that case was “plenary.”  Id. at 357, 154 S.E.2d at 482. 
Here, our review of the transcript reveals that Officer 
Tyree, who was the only witness for the State, had no firsthand 
knowledge of the incident that served as the basis for the 
allegations in her reports.  It is apparent that Officer Tyree 
gleaned what little she knew of the alleged crimes from a 
telephone conversation that she had had with Defendant’s mother 
the day after the incident.  Officer Tyree’s allegations and 
testimony relating this conversation consisted entirely of 
hearsay2 and, under Hewett, “should not have been considered by 
the judge.”3  Hewett, 270 N.C. at 356, 154 S.E.2d at 482.  Those 
portions of Officer Tyree’s testimony not based upon hearsay 
pertained only to Defendant’s past violations and had no bearing 
on the allegations at issue; and, unlike in Hewett, in this case 
there was no additional witness evidence supporting the trial 
court’s finding that a probation violation had occurred.   
With respect to Officer Tyree’s probation reports, we 
                     
2 Our General Statutes define “hearsay” as “a statement, other 
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or 
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted.”  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 801(c) (2011). 
3 Although not critical to our holding, we note Officer Tyree’s 
concession that she had not taken any steps to corroborate the 
allegations relayed to her by Defendant’s mother. 
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recognize that our Courts have previously allowed a verified 
report from a probation officer to serve as competent evidence 
in a probation revocation hearing, even though the report itself 
would otherwise be considered hearsay.  State v. Duncan, 270 
N.C. 241, 246, 154 S.E.2d 53, 58 (1967).  However, it appears 
that in those cases, the verified probation reports contained 
the firsthand observations of the probation officers.  See id. 
at 243-44, 154 S.E.2d at 55-56; State v. Hunnicutt, _ N.C. App. 
_, _, _ S.E.2d _, _, (2013) (holding that probation officer’s 
report alleging that the defendant had failed to report to his 
supervising officer in violation of a condition of his probation 
constituted competent evidence in support of revocation).  Here, 
the allegations set forth in Officer Tyree’s reports and during 
her testimony were not based upon her firsthand observations, 
rendering her reports and testimony more analogous to the 
hearsay evidence presented in Hewett and Pratt, which was held 
to be incompetent.     
 
In light of the foregoing, we must hold that the evidence 
presented at the revocation hearing was not competent so “as to 
reasonably satisfy the judge in the exercise of his sound 
discretion that the defendant ha[d] willfully violated a valid 
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condition of probation.”  Hewett, 270 N.C. at 356, 154 S.E.2d at 
482 (emphasis added). 
REVERSED. 
Judges CALABRIA and ERVIN concur.  
Report per Rule 30(e).