Case Title: State ex rel. Quest Diagnostics, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n

Citation: 2023-Ohio-2213

Docket Number: 2022-0567

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2023-07-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Quest Diagnostics, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2213.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-2213 
THE STATE EX REL. QUEST DIAGNOSTICS, INC., APPELLEE, v. INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Quest Diagnostics, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., Slip 
Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2213.] 
Workers’ compensation—Voluntary abandonment of employment—Industrial 
injury did not cause claimant’s wage loss—Judgment affirmed. 
(No. 2022-0567—Submitted February 28, 2023—Decided July 5, 2023.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 20AP-246, 2022-Ohio-1093. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant Industrial Commission of Ohio granted appellant Quintina 
L. Stone’s request for temporary-total-disability (“TTD”) compensation.  Stone’s 
employer, appellee Quest Diagnostics, Inc. (“Quest”), requested a writ of 
mandamus from the Tenth District Court of Appeals ordering the commission to 
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reinstate the order of its staff hearing officer, who had denied Stone’s TDD 
application.  The court of appeals granted the writ, concluding that the commission 
had misapplied the law of voluntary abandonment as announced in State ex rel. 
Klein v. Precision Excavating & Grading Co., 155 Ohio St.3d 78, 2018-Ohio-3890, 
119 N.E.3d 386.  Both Stone and the commission have appealed.  We affirm the 
Tenth District’s judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Claimant’s Injury and Relocation 
{¶ 2} Stone, a phlebotomist, began her employment with Quest in 1991.  In 
February or March 2018, Stone notified her supervisor that she would be moving 
to California with her husband, who was taking a new position there.  Stone 
expressed her desire to transfer her employment within the company and, according 
to her affidavit, was told that she would be permitted to transfer. 
{¶ 3} In September 2018, Stone and her husband were notified of his 
specific reassignment location and that he was to start working there on October 
29.  On October 3, Stone submitted multiple transfer requests with Quest in 
California, which were signed and dated by her supervisor. 
{¶ 4} Three days later, Stone was injured at work when she fell from a 
stepladder.  Her workers’ compensation claim was allowed for various shoulder 
injuries.  On October 8, Stone’s physician released her to work with temporary 
restrictions.  Stone was off work briefly due to her injury and then took a previously 
scheduled vacation.  She returned to work with light-duty restrictions on October 
22.  For the next few days, Stone’s responsibilities consisted of greeting patients as 
they entered the office. 
{¶ 5} On October 24, Stone informed her supervisor that she was moving 
to California on October 27.  Stone had not received any response to her transfer 
requests.  Stone and her supervisor called Quest’s recruiting office, which informed 
January Term, 2023 
 
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them that Stone could not transfer her employment because she was not certified as 
a phlebotomist in California. 
{¶ 6} This new information did not change Stone’s plans to relocate, and 
Stone’s supervisor asked for a resignation letter.  Stone sent her supervisor an email 
saying, “I am putting in my resignation with Quest Diagnostics due to moving to 
California this Saturday,” and she moved on or about October 27.  In an affidavit, 
Stone refers to the resignation letter as a “transfer document” because she intended 
to become certified and continue to work for Quest. 
{¶ 7} Stone became certified as a phlebotomy technician in California on 
March 9, 2019.  Stone avers, “If HR and my supervisor would have provided me 
the proper information, I would have been certified in April 2018.  I could have 
been working light duty here in California while pending surgery.”  She further 
avers that she will return to Quest in California once she is medically able to do so.  
However, there is no evidence in the record that Quest has agreed to reemploy her. 
B.  Commission Hearing and Orders 
{¶ 8} In June 2019, Stone applied for TTD compensation beginning 
October 27, 2018, and continuing until she is medically able to return to work.  A 
district hearing officer for the commission found that Stone’s decision to resign and 
relocate was a voluntary removal from her position of employment, for which TTD 
compensation is not payable, and denied her request. 
{¶ 9} Stone’s appeal to a commission staff hearing officer (“SHO”) was 
denied on the same grounds.  The SHO believed Stone’s testimony that she had no 
intent to abandon the workforce but observed that “there was no guarantee of a job 
transfer with the Employer and there was no job offer” when Stone resigned and 
relocated.  Thus, the SHO found that Stone had voluntarily resigned, precluding 
compensation. 
{¶ 10} The commission, exercising its continuing jurisdiction under R.C. 
4123.52, accepted Stone’s request for reconsideration to correct a perceived error 
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of law.  It determined that in denying compensation, the SHO had misapplied the 
law of voluntary abandonment.  The commission concluded that Stone was entitled 
to TTD compensation because she did not intend to abandon the workforce and did 
not voluntarily remove herself from her former position of employment.  Stone was 
awarded TTD compensation from October 27, 2018, through July 31, 2019, to 
continue upon submission of supporting medical evidence of ongoing disability.  
Quest’s request for reconsideration of this decision was denied. 
C.  Mandamus Action 
{¶ 11} Quest filed a mandamus action in the Tenth District Court of 
Appeals, requesting a writ ordering the commission to vacate its award of TTD 
compensation and to reinstate the SHO’s order.  Quest alleged that there had been 
no legal basis for the commission to exercise its continuing jurisdiction because the 
SHO’s order contained no clear mistake of fact or law. 
{¶ 12} The Tenth District concluded that the commission had 
misinterpreted and misapplied the law of voluntary abandonment.  2022-Ohio-
1093, 187 N.E.3d 678, ¶ 4, 13.  The court issued a writ ordering the commission to 
vacate its order and to enter an order denying Stone’s request for TTD 
compensation.  Id. at ¶ 13, 56. 
{¶ 13} Both Stone and the commission appealed.1 
II.  LEGAL STANDARDS 
A.  Standard of Review 
{¶ 14} A writ of mandamus will issue if the relator establishes a clear legal 
right to the relief requested and a clear legal duty of the respondent to provide such 
 
1. Quest suggests that we should strike the commission’s notice of appeal as untimely filed.  
However, the commission’s notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 6.01(C)(1) 
(“If a party timely files a notice of appeal in the Supreme Court, any other party may file a notice of 
appeal * * * within the time prescribed by division (A)(1) or (2) of this rule or ten days after the first 
notice of appeal was filed, whichever is later”).  Stone filed her notice of appeal on May 11, 2022, 
and the commission filed its notice on May 20, 2022. 
January Term, 2023 
 
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relief.  State ex rel. McCormick v. McDonald’s, 141 Ohio St.3d 528, 2015-Ohio-
123, 26 N.E.3d 794, ¶ 11.  “It is well settled that the commission is responsible for 
making factual findings.  Such findings will be disturbed only if the commission 
abuses its discretion, which occurs only if there is not ‘some’ evidence to support 
the finding.”  (Citation omitted.)  State ex rel. Ohio Presbyterian Retirement Servs., 
Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 151 Ohio St.3d 92, 2017-Ohio-7577, 86 N.E.3d 294, ¶ 12.  
But “[a] mandatory writ may issue against the Industrial Commission if the 
commission has incorrectly interpreted Ohio law.”  State ex rel. Gassmann v. Indus. 
Comm., 41 Ohio St.2d 64, 65, 322 N.E.2d 660 (1975). 
B.  Temporary-Total-Disability Compensation 
{¶ 15} Pursuant to R.C. 4123.54 and 4123.56, employees are entitled to 
receive a portion of their wages when they are temporarily and totally disabled as 
a result of a workplace injury.  The purpose of TTD compensation is to compensate 
injured workers for their loss of earnings.  State ex rel. Ohio State Univ. v. Pratt, 
169 Ohio St.3d 527, 2022-Ohio-4111, 206 N.E.3d 708, ¶ 17.  “Therefore, ‘in order 
to qualify for TTD compensation, the claimant must show not only that he or she 
lacks the medical capability of returning to the former position of employment but 
that a cause-and-effect relationship exists between the industrial injury and an 
actual loss of earnings.’ ”  Id., quoting State ex rel. McCoy v. Dedicated Transport, 
Inc., 97 Ohio St.3d 25, 2002-Ohio-5305, 776 N.E.2d 51, ¶ 35; see also R.C. 
4123.54(A) (every employee who is injured in the course of employment “is 
entitled to receive the compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury”).  
“ ‘In other words, it must appear that, but for the industrial injury, the claimant 
would be gainfully employed.’ ”  Pratt at ¶ 17, quoting McCoy at ¶ 35. 
{¶ 16} Voluntary abandonment of employment is an affirmative defense to 
a claim for TTD compensation.  See State ex rel. Pacheco v. Indus. Comm., 157 
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Ohio St.3d 126, 2019-Ohio-2954, 132 N.E.3d 670, ¶ 26; but see R.C. 4123.56(F).2  
In Klein, we held that “when a workers’ compensation claimant voluntarily 
removes himself from his former position of employment for reasons unrelated to 
a workplace injury, he is no longer eligible for [TTD] compensation, even if the 
claimant remains disabled at the time of his separation from employment.”  Klein, 
155 Ohio St.3d 78, 2018-Ohio-3890, 119 N.E.3d 386, at ¶ 29. 
{¶ 17} Klein overruled precedent, returning to the “fundamental tenet of 
[TTD] compensation: that the industrial injury must cause the worker’s loss of 
earnings.”  Id. at ¶ 18, citing McCoy at ¶ 35.  “[I]t would not serve the purpose of 
[TTD] compensation to award compensation to a worker whose own actions, and 
not his workplace injury, have prevented his return to his former position of 
employment.”  Klein at ¶ 22, citing State ex rel. Ashcraft v. Indus. Comm., 34 Ohio 
St.3d 42, 43-44, 517 N.E.2d 533 (1987). 
{¶ 18} Importantly, we recently clarified that Klein did not change the focus 
from abandonment of the workforce.  Pratt, 169 Ohio St.3d 527, 2022-Ohio-4111, 
206 N.E.3d 708, at ¶ 21-24.  It remains that “the key question is whether an injured 
worker who is no longer in the former position has abandoned the workforce, not 
merely abandoned the former position.”  Id. at ¶ 18.  This inquiry is consistent with 
R.C. 4123.56, which provides that TTD compensation shall not be made for any 
period, inter alia, “ ‘when work within the physical capabilities of the employee is 
made available by the employer or another employer.’ ”  (Emphasis added in 
Pratt.)  Id. at ¶ 19, quoting R.C. 4123.56(A).  As we have maintained, the “question 
is whether [the] circumstances demonstrate a voluntary abandonment of the 
workforce—permanent or temporary—such that the injured worker’s wage loss is 
 
2. Effective September 15, 2020, R.C. 4123.56(F) expresses “the intent of the general assembly to 
supersede any previous judicial decision that applied the doctrine of voluntary abandonment to a 
claim brought under this section.”  This provision does not apply here, however, because the 
commission decided Stone’s claim before the effective date.  See 2020 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 81; Pratt 
at ¶ 10, fn. 2. 
January Term, 2023 
 
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not the result of the work injury.  In other words, do the circumstances indicate that 
the injured worker would be working—somewhere—but for the injury?”  Id. at 
¶ 24. 
{¶ 19} In this context, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary is 
causal, not volitional—i.e., a voluntary abandonment is one that is not causally 
related to the industrial injury.  State ex rel. Rockwell Internatl. v. Indus. Comm., 
40 Ohio St.3d 44, 46, 531 N.E.2d 678 (1988).  Hence, an injury-induced departure 
from the workforce (involuntary abandonment) and a departure based on the 
claimant’s intentional conduct (voluntary abandonment) are mutually exclusive.  
The former is compensable; the latter is not. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
{¶ 20} Here, the commission found that Stone’s clear intent was to maintain 
employment with Quest through a transfer within the company to a phlebotomist 
position in California, that Stone justifiably relied on her supervisor’s assurances 
that a transfer would be permitted, and that the totality of Stone’s statements and 
actions “demonstrate it was never her plan to abandon the workforce.”  These 
findings are supported by Stone’s affidavits and hearing testimony and by the fact 
that she eventually obtained her California phlebotomy certification.  The 
commission concluded that these facts demonstrate that Stone “did not voluntarily 
remove herself from her former position of employment, and therefore, she is 
entitled to receive [TTD] compensation for the allowed conditions.” 
{¶ 21} Stone and the commission contend that the commission’s order 
should be upheld under the “some evidence” standard.  However, the facts in this 
case are not in dispute.  The issue is whether the commission properly applied the 
law to the undisputed facts. 
{¶ 22} Had Stone not been injured, she would have experienced the same 
wage loss upon relocating to California without the proper certification.  And had 
Stone remained employed by Quest in Ohio, she would not have experienced any 
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wage loss.  Accordingly, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Stone’s industrial 
injury was not the “but for” cause of her lost earnings.  Albeit understandable, 
Stone’s reasons for abandoning the workforce and experiencing lost wages lack the 
necessary causal relationship to her industrial injury.  “Eligibility for [TTD] 
compensation has always depended on whether the separation from employment 
was injury-induced.”  (Emphasis added.)  Klein, 155 Ohio St.3d 78, 2018-Ohio-
3890, 119 N.E.3d 386, at ¶ 28, citing State ex rel. Lackey v. Indus. Comm., 129 
Ohio St.3d 119, 2011-Ohio-3089, 950 N.E.2d 542, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 23} The commission misinterpreted and misapplied the law of voluntary 
abandonment as it relates to Stone’s request for TTD compensation.  Accordingly, 
Quest has demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief requested and a clear legal 
duty on the part of the commission to provide that relief.  See McCormick, 141 Ohio 
St.3d 528, 2016-Ohio-123, 26 N.E.3d 794, at ¶ 11. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 24} We affirm the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals 
granting Quest’s request for a writ of mandamus. 
Judgment affirmed. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, 
and DETERS, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., Brian P. Perry, and Christen S. Hignett, for 
appellee. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Jacquelyn McTigue, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellant Industrial Commission of Ohio. 
Jurus, Workman & Muldoon, L.L.C., and Robert B. Bumgarner, for 
appellant Quintina L. Stone. 
_________________