Case Title: State v. Matthews

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018AP002142

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2021-05-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
2021 WI 42 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP2142 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In re the commitment of Tavodess Matthews: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Tavodess Matthews, 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 392 Wis. 2d 715 946 N.W.2d 200  
PDC No:2020 WI App 33 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 14, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 22, 2021 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Maxine A. White   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Dustin C. Haskell, assistant state public defender. 
There was an oral argument by Dustin C. Haskell. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Sara Lynn Shaeffer, assistant attorney general; with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Sara Lynn Shaeffer. 
 
 
2021 WI 42 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2018AP2142 
(L.C. No. 
2018CI3) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the commitment of Tavodess Matthews: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Tavodess Matthews, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
May 14, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   This case is about whether 
Tavodess Matthews timely requested a judicial substitution under 
Wis. Stat. § 801.58(1) (2019-20).1  Section 801.58(1) entitles a 
party in a civil case to substitute the assigned circuit court 
judge if, among other things, that party files a written 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2018AP2142   
 
2 
 
substitution request before "the hearing of any preliminary 
contested matters."  Matthews filed his substitution request 
after the circuit court granted his motion to adjourn a 
scheduled probable cause hearing under Wis. Stat. ch. 980.  We 
hold that Matthews' substitution request was timely because his 
motion to adjourn is not a "preliminary contested matter" per 
that phrase's accepted legal meaning and the circuit court heard 
no other such matter before Matthews filed his request.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals. 
I 
¶2 
This case arises from the early stages of proceedings 
to commit Matthews as a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. 
ch. 980.2  After the State files a petition to commence ch. 980 
proceedings, the circuit court must "hold a hearing to determine 
whether there is probable cause to believe that the person named 
in the petition is a sexually violent person."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.04(2).  The circuit court must hold a probable cause 
hearing for a person already in the State's custody "no later 
than 10 days after the person's scheduled release or discharge 
date."  Id.  If the court determines that there is probable 
cause to believe that the person is sexually violent, then the 
Department of Health Services evaluates the person to determine 
                                                 
2 Although commitment proceedings under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 
resemble criminal proceedings in some respects, they are civil 
actions. 
 
See 
State 
v. 
Carpenter, 
197 
Wis. 2d 252, 
541 
N.W.2d 105 (1995).  Thus, the civil judicial substitution 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 801.58(1), applies.  See State v. 
Brown, 215 Wis. 2d 716, 573 N.W.2d 884 (Ct. App. 1997). 
No. 
2018AP2142   
 
3 
 
whether that is in fact the case.  § 980.04(3).  Otherwise, the 
circuit court must dismiss the petition.  Id. 
¶3 
Here, after the State filed its ch. 980 petition, the 
circuit court set a probable cause hearing for August 15, 2018 
(eight days after Matthews' scheduled release from the Green Bay 
Correctional Institution), and 
appointed two attorneys to 
represent Matthews.  Matthews' attorneys met with him for the 
first time on the morning of the probable cause hearing.  That 
same morning, Matthews' attorneys told the State they intended 
to ask the circuit court to adjourn the hearing because they 
needed more time to prepare.  As a result, the State told its 
sole witness not to appear. 
¶4 
At the outset of the probable cause hearing, the 
circuit court acknowledged that the parties were "not going 
forward with the hearing."3  
Matthews' counsel requested 
additional time to prepare, noting that Matthews had no 
objection to rescheduling the hearing outside of the 10-day 
window required under Wis. Stat. § 980.04(2).  The State 
objected to the adjournment "for the record," but admitted that 
it was "in a somewhat difficult position" as it had let go of 
its witness for the day.  Despite its "disappointment," the 
circuit court agreed to reschedule the hearing so long as 
Matthews waived his statutory right to a probable cause 
determination within 10 days of his scheduled release.  Matthews 
                                                 
3 The Honorable Michelle A. Havas of the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court presided. 
No. 
2018AP2142   
 
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did so, and the circuit court rescheduled the hearing for 
August 29. 
¶5 
The morning of the rescheduled hearing, Matthews' 
counsel filed a written request under Wis. Stat. § 801.58(1) to 
substitute the circuit court judge.  Section 801.58(1) provides 
that a party in a civil action, such as a ch. 980 commitment 
proceeding, may request to substitute the circuit court judge 
before "the hearing of any preliminary contested matters" but 
"not later than 60 days after the summons and complaint are 
filed."  § 801.58(1).  Matthews argued that his motion was 
timely because he filed it only 33 days after the State filed 
its ch. 980 petition and, since the circuit court had not 
actually commenced the probable cause hearing, it had not yet 
heard a "contested matter."  The circuit court disagreed, 
finding Matthews' request untimely because the State's objection 
to Matthews' motion to adjourn rendered the matter "contested."  
The circuit court also noted that it had made the "substantive 
decision" to accept Matthews' time-limit waiver, so it was too 
late for Matthews to request a substitution.  Upon review,4 Chief 
Judge Maxine A. White of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court 
agreed with the circuit court's determination, explaining that 
Matthews' time waiver constituted a preliminary contested 
matter. 
                                                 
4 See Wis. Stat. § 801.58(2). 
No. 
2018AP2142   
 
5 
 
¶6 
The court of appeals accepted Matthews' interlocutory 
appeal and affirmed the circuit court's ruling.5  State v. 
Matthews, 2020 WI App 33, 392 Wis. 2d 715, 946 N.W.2d 200.  
Relying mainly upon Sielen6 and Galaxy Gaming,7 the court of 
appeals reasoned that the circuit court had heard a preliminary 
contested matter when it granted Matthews' motion to adjourn the 
probable cause hearing because the circuit court could have 
denied Matthews' motion and held the hearing——a decision that 
would have "obviously implicated the merits."  Id., ¶19 (quoted 
source omitted).  The court of appeals explained that both the 
scheduled probable cause hearing and Matthews' motion to adjourn 
that hearing were, in a literal sense, "contested":  Matthews 
and the State disagreed about whether there was probable cause 
to commit Matthews and the State objected to Matthews' motion to 
adjourn the hearing.  See id.  The court of appeals therefore 
held that the circuit court had heard a preliminary contested 
matter 
prior 
to 
Matthews' 
judicial 
substitution 
request, 
rendering that request untimely.  We granted Matthews' petition 
for review. 
                                                 
5 A party must receive leave from the court of appeals to 
appeal a non-final circuit court order.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.03. 
6 State ex rel. Sielen v. Cir. Ct. for Milwaukee Cnty., 176 
Wis. 2d 101, 499 N.W.2d 657 (1993). 
7 DeWitt Ross & Stevens, S.C. v. Galaxy Gaming & Racing Ltd. 
P'ship, 2003 WI App 190, 267 Wis. 2d 233, 670 N.W.2d 74, rev'd 
in part on other grounds, 2004 WI 92, 273 Wis. 2d 577, 682 
N.W.2d 839. 
No. 
2018AP2142   
 
6 
 
II 
¶7 
This case turns on our interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.58(1), which is a question of law that we review de novo.  
See Moreschi v. Vill. of Williams Bay, 2020 WI 95, ¶13, 395 
Wis. 2d 55, 953 N.W.2d 318.  In relevant part, § 801.58(1) 
provides as follows: 
Any party to a civil action or proceeding may file a 
written request . . . for a substitution of a new 
judge for the judge assigned to the case.  The written 
request shall be filed preceding the hearing of any 
preliminary 
contested 
matters 
and, 
if 
by 
the 
plaintiff, not later than 60 days after the summons 
and complaint are filed . . . . 
¶8 
Our focus here is specifically on the phrase "the 
hearing of any preliminary contested matters," which both 
parties recognize as the crux of the case.  Matthews maintains 
that we have previously held that only substantive issues are 
preliminary contested matters.  According to Matthews, a motion 
to adjourn a probable cause hearing is not a substantive issue; 
therefore, it is not a preliminary contested matter.  He also 
argues that a party timely files a substitution request if it 
does so before the circuit court actually hears a substantive 
issue.  The State counters that the circuit court held a hearing 
on a preliminary contested matter when it commenced what was 
scheduled to be a probable cause hearing.  The State asserts 
that because Matthews filed his substitution request after he 
appeared at that hearing, his substitution request was untimely. 
¶9 
We resolve this dispute first by interpreting the 
phrase "preliminary contested matters" and then by analyzing 
No. 
2018AP2142   
 
7 
 
what it means for there to be "the hearing of" such matters.  
The goal of statutory interpretation is to give the statutory 
text its "full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  We generally give words their 
common, everyday meaning, "but we give legal terms of art their 
accepted legal meaning."  Estate of Matteson v. Matteson, 2008 
WI 48 
¶22, 
309 
Wis. 2d 311, 
749 
N.W.2d 557; 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 990.01(1).  When the legislature adopts a phrase from the 
common law that has a specific legal meaning and does not 
otherwise define it, we presume that the legislature adopts the 
phrase's specific legal meaning.  Bank Mut. v. S.J. Boyer 
Constr., Inc., 2010 WI 74, ¶39, 326 Wis. 2d 521, 785 N.W.2d 462; 
see also Strenke v. Hogner, 2005 WI 25, ¶28, 279 Wis. 2d 52, 694 
N.W.2d 296 
(explaining 
that 
when 
the 
legislature 
uses 
a 
"specific common law phrase," we presume it does so with "full 
knowledge" of that phrase's meaning).  That principle applies 
with at least equal force when the legislature amends a statute 
to incorporate language from one of this court's decisions, 
resulting in a "significant revision to the language in which we 
are interested."  See White v. City of Watertown, 2019 WI 9, 
¶10, 385 Wis. 2d 320, 922 N.W.2d 61.  Indeed, a statute's 
background, encompassing its "previously enacted and repealed 
provisions," can provide helpful context for a plain-meaning 
analysis.  United States v. Franklin, 2019 WI 64, ¶13, 387 
Wis. 2d 259, 928 N.W.2d 545; see also Richards v. Badger Mut. 
Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581. 
No. 
2018AP2142   
 
8 
 
¶10 Applying these principles to Wis. Stat. § 801.58(1) 
reveals two things.  First, that "preliminary contested matters" 
has a specific legal meaning, which the legislature explicitly 
adopted when it amended § 801.58(1).  And second, that there is 
no "hearing of" a preliminary contested matter until a court 
actually hears such a matter. 
A 
¶11 The phrase "preliminary contested matters" has a 
specific legal meaning referring to pretrial issues that go to 
the ultimate merits of the case.  The roots of this meaning can 
be traced to the court's interpretation of a mid-nineteenth 
century change-of-venue statute.  That statute provided that 
when a party requested a change of venue because of the 
presiding judge's "prejudice," the judge had no discretion to 
deny the request.  Wis. Stat. ch. 51, § 1 (1853); Rines v. 
Boyd, 7 
Wis. 155, 
157 
(1859); 
Baldwin 
v. 
Marygold, 
2 
Wis. 419, 420 (1853). 
¶12 The timeliness of such change of venue requests hinged 
upon 
whether 
the 
trial 
judge 
had 
already 
decided 
some 
substantive question.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Winchell v. Cir. 
Ct. of Waukesha Cnty., 116 Wis. 253, 93 N.W. 16 (1903); 
Swineford v. Pomeroy, 16 Wis. 553, 554-55 (1863).  In Swineford, 
the court explained that, under "a rational construction," the 
change-of-venue statute was meant to prevent a party from 
changing the venue after the trial judge "ruled contrary to 
[that party's] expectations or unfavorably to" it.  16 Wis. 
at 555.  Thus, a party's venue-change request was untimely if 
No. 
2018AP2142   
 
9 
 
made after the trial judge called the jury or issued a ruling.  
Id.  If, however, a party made such a request after the court 
placed a matter "on the calendar for trial" but before it ruled 
on any issues, the request was timely.  See Eldred v. Becker, 60 
Wis. 48, 48, 18 N.W. 720 (1884).  In essence, a party could 
request a change of venue only if the trial judge had not yet 
decided a contested matter. 
¶13 That reasoning has informed both the development of 
the judicial substitution statute and our interpretation of it.  
In the statute's initial form, its text reflected our change-of-
venue jurisprudence in that it allowed a party to request a 
judicial substitution "before the first day of the term of court 
at which the case is triable or within 10 days after the case is 
noticed for trial."  Wis. Stat. § 261.08 (1971-72).  The statute 
left open the question of whether a party could request a 
judicial substitution after a judge had ruled on pretrial issues 
but before the case had been noticed for trial. 
¶14 We took up that question in Pure Milk Products 
Cooperative v. National Farmers Organization, 64 Wis. 2d 241, 
219 N.W.2d 564 (1974).  There, drawing heavily from our change-
of-venue jurisprudence, we held that "the legislature could not 
have intended by the wording of" the substitution statute to 
allow a party to substitute a judge after "the hearing of a 
contested motion [that] implicates the merits of the action."  
Id. at 249.  We explained that other jurisdictions with similar 
judicial substitution statutes required a party to file its 
substitution 
request 
before 
"the 
hearing 
of 
contested 
No. 
2018AP2142   
 
10 
 
preliminary matters."  Id. at 248.  Our survey of the case law 
revealed 
that, 
in 
the 
judicial 
substitution 
context, 
a 
preliminary contested matter is more than just a preliminary 
issue 
over 
which 
the 
parties 
disagree 
(or, 
literally, 
"contest").  Rather, the phrase carries a particular common law 
meaning referring to a substantive pretrial matter that relates 
to the "ultimate issues" of the case.  See id. at 248-50; Bahr 
v. Galonski, 80 Wis. 2d 72, 87, 257 N.W.2d 869 (1977).  We 
ultimately accepted that specific common law meaning as the 
meaning of "preliminary contested matters" in the judicial 
substitution statute. 
¶15 Shortly 
thereafter, 
the 
legislature 
codified 
our 
decision in Pure Milk Products via an amendment to the judicial 
substitution statute (now Wis. Stat. § 801.58).8  See State ex 
rel. 
Sielen 
v. 
Cir. 
Ct. 
for 
Milwaukee 
Cnty., 
176 
Wis. 2d 101, 113, 499 N.W.2d 657 (1993) (explaining that this 
amendment "is a codification" of the court's decision in Pure 
Milk Products) (quoting State ex rel. Carkel, Inc. v. Cir. Ct. 
for Lincoln Cnty., 141 Wis. 2d 257, 265, 414 N.W.2d 640 (1987)).9  
As amended——and as it reads today——the statute requires a party 
to file its substitution request before "the hearing of any 
                                                 
8 In 1975, this court renumbered Wis. Stat. § 261.08 as 
§ 801.58. 
9 See also See State v. Norwood, 2005 WI App 218, ¶12, 287 
Wis. 2d 679, 706 N.W.2d 683; City of LaCrosse v. Jiracek 
Cos., 108 Wis. 2d 684, 694, 324 N.W.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1982); 
Kroll v. Bartell, 101 Wis. 2d 296, 302, 304 N.W.2d 175 (Ct. 
App. 1981). 
No. 
2018AP2142   
 
11 
 
preliminary contested matters."  See § 15, ch. 135, Laws 
of 1977; Wis. Stat. § 801.58(1).  The legislature's adoption 
verbatim of the phrase "preliminary contested matters" instructs 
that the phrase means the same thing in § 801.58(1) as it did in 
Pure 
Milk 
Products.10 
 
See 
White, 
385 
Wis. 2d 320, 
¶10 
(explaining that "a significant revision to the language in 
which we are interested" assists in determining a statute's 
plain meaning); Strenke, 279 Wis. 2d 52, ¶¶30-31, 39 (holding 
that when the legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) to 
include the common law phrase "disregard of rights," that phrase 
retained its "specific" common-law meaning). 
¶16 In the 41 years since the legislature codified Pure 
Milk Products, Wisconsin courts have interpreted "preliminary 
contested matters" consistent with its accepted legal meaning.  
Pretrial motions that directly implicate the merits of a case, 
such as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 
Carkel, 141 Wis. 2d at 261, and a motion to compel discovery, 
Sielen, 176 Wis. 2d at 113-14, are preliminary contested 
                                                 
10 Indeed, the Judicial Council's note to the 1977 statutes 
plainly confirms that conclusion: 
Section 801.58 of the statutes has been changed in a 
number of significant ways.  The statute states that a 
substitution of judge request in a civil action or 
proceeding is timely only if made before the hearing 
of a preliminary contested matter, codifying Pure Milk 
Products Coop. v. NFO. 
Judicial Council Note, 1977, Wis. Stat. § 801.58 (citation 
omitted); see also, e.g., Sands v. Whitnall Sch. Dist., 2008 
WI 89, ¶27, 312 Wis. 2d 1, 754 N.W.2d 439. 
No. 
2018AP2142   
 
12 
 
matters.  The former implicates a case's merits because, if the 
circuit court grants the motion, it has decided that there is no 
claim for it to hear.  E.g., PRN Assocs. LLC v. DOA, 2009 WI 53, 
¶¶26-27, 317 Wis. 2d 656, 766 N.W.2d 559.  The latter implicates 
the merits because the circuit court could "impose a sanction 
that precludes a party from submitting any evidence," thus 
making it impossible for that party to prove the merits of its 
claim.  See Sielen, 176 Wis. 2d at 114.  Similarly, because an 
initial commitment proceeding decides the ultimate merits 
regarding 
commitment 
under 
ch. 51, 
that 
proceeding 
is 
a 
preliminary contested matter for the purposes of a commitment 
extension proceeding.  State ex rel. Serocki v. Cir. Ct. for 
Clark Cnty., 163 Wis. 2d 152, 159-60, 471 N.W.2d 49 (1991). 
¶17 Conversely, this court, as well as the court of 
appeals, has held that procedural issues that have no direct 
effect on the merits of a case are not preliminary contested 
matters.  For example, a circuit court judge's decision whether 
to accept a family court commissioner's proposed alimony-
modification order, although "not perfunctory" and requiring the 
judge to "ascertain" the merits of the proposed order, is not a 
preliminary contested matter under § 801.58(1).  State ex rel. 
Tarney v. McCormack, 99 Wis. 2d 220, 234, 298 N.W.2d 552 (1980).  
Motions to join additional parties and to intervene are also not 
preliminary contested matters.  See City of La Crosse v. Jiracek 
Cos., 108 Wis. 2d 684, 688-89, 694-95, 324 N.W.2d 440 (Ct. 
App. 1982) 
(allowing 
substitution 
requests 
after 
deciding 
motions to join and intervene).  To be sure, these are 
No. 
2018AP2142   
 
13 
 
preliminary matters that parties routinely contest.  But as our 
jurisprudence makes clear, they fall outside the accepted legal 
meaning of "preliminary contested matters." 
¶18 Because "preliminary contested matters" has a specific 
legal meaning, there is no need to parse the phrase's individual 
words in search of each word's non-technical meaning.  See S.J. 
Boyer Constr., 326 Wis. 2d 521, ¶52.  For the same reason, it 
matters not whether either party in fact contested a preliminary 
matter.  Instead, we treat the phrase "preliminary contested 
matters" 
as 
one 
unit 
with 
a 
specific 
legal 
meaning:  a 
substantive issue that goes to the ultimate merits of a case. 
B 
¶19 We next analyze what it means for there to be "the 
hearing of" preliminary contested matters.  The State urges that 
Matthews' substitution request is untimely because he filed it 
after appearing at what was set as a contested probable cause 
hearing.  According to the State, it is irrelevant whether the 
circuit court actually reached the substance of the merits issue 
at that hearing. 
¶20 Our decisions in Tarney and Serocki, however, strongly 
favor Matthews' argument that there is no "hearing of" a 
preliminary contested matter until the circuit court in fact 
hears such a matter.  In Tarney, we explained that § 801.58(1) 
requires a party to file its substitution request "before the 
judge has heard" a preliminary contested matter.  99 Wis. 2d 
at 234 (emphasis added).  We reiterated that position in 
Serocki, concluding that a party must request substitution 
No. 
2018AP2142   
 
14 
 
"before the circuit court reaches a substantive issue."  163 
Wis. 2d at 156 (emphasis added).  A judge cannot "reach" a 
substantive issue without first "hearing" arguments on that 
issue.  Merely scheduling a hearing about a substantive issue is 
insufficient.  See Eldred, 60 Wis. at 48. 
¶21 Our 
conclusion 
is 
consistent 
with 
the 
policy 
underlying § 801.58(1).  As we stated in Carkel, the statute's 
policy is to prevent a party unhappy with how a judge is 
"handling" a preliminary contested matter from requesting a 
different judge "simply because the litigant believes things are 
going badly."  141 Wis. 2d at 265 (quoted source omitted).  That 
is, a party may not "'test the waters' with a particular judge 
before requesting substitution."  Serocki, 163 Wis. 2d at 156 
(quoting Carkel, 141 Wis. 2d at 265); see also Swineford, 16 
Wis. at 555.  But a judge must first hear a substantive issue——
not just schedule to hear one——before a party has tested the 
proverbial waters. 
¶22 The bottom line is that whether a party has timely 
filed its judicial substitution request turns on what issues a 
circuit court has already heard.  It is irrelevant whether a 
judge schedules to hear a preliminary contested matter or 
whether 
a 
party 
actually 
contests 
a 
preliminary 
issue.  
Accordingly, we hold that a party's substitution request is 
timely if it is made before a judge in fact hears a substantive 
issue that goes to the ultimate merits of the case. 
No. 
2018AP2142   
 
15 
 
C 
¶23 Turning to the facts in this case, we conclude that 
the circuit court heard no preliminary contested matter prior to 
Matthews' filing his judicial substitution request.  By the time 
Matthews filed his request on August 29, the circuit court had 
addressed only his motion to adjourn the August 15 hearing.  At 
that hearing, although it was "set as a contested probable cause 
hearing," no party "presented its views" on whether the State 
had probable cause to commit Matthews.  Cf. Carkel, 141 Wis. 2d 
at 265.  Rather, the entire discussion revolved around Matthews' 
motion to adjourn.  The circuit court's decision to grant the 
motion had no effect on the ultimate merits of whether Matthews 
is a subject for commitment under Wis. Stat. ch. 980.  Matthews' 
waiver of his right to have a probable cause hearing within 10 
days of his release from prison was part and parcel of his 
motion to adjourn.  It was not, contrary to the circuit court's 
conclusion, a standalone substantive issue that "directly 
affected the presentation" of his case.  Accordingly, Matthews 
timely requested a judicial substitution. 
III 
¶24 Under Wis. Stat. § 801.58(1), a party timely files a 
judicial substitution request if, prior to that filing, the 
circuit court has heard no preliminary contested matter.  The 
phrase "preliminary contested matter" has an accepted legal 
meaning that refers to a substantive issue that goes to the 
ultimate merits of the case.  Here, because the circuit court 
heard no such matter prior to Matthews filing his judicial 
No. 
2018AP2142   
 
16 
 
substitution request, his request was timely.  We therefore 
reverse the court of appeals and remand the cause for further 
proceedings. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
No. 
2018AP2142   
 
 
 
1