Case Title: Bd. of Managers of the Courtyards at the Woodlands Condominium Ass'n v. IKO Chicago, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83578

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1998-06-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Bd. of Managers v. IKO Chicago, No. 83578 (6/18/98) 
 
              Docket No. 83578--Agenda 15--March 1998 
        BOARD OF MANAGERS OF THE COURTYARDS AT THE WOODLANDS 
     CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, Appellee, v. IKO CHICAGO, INC., et al. 
              (Johnston Associates, Inc., Appellant). 
                    Opinion filed June 18, 1998. 
 
          CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court: 
          Plaintiff, Board of Managers of the Courtyards at the Woodlands 
     Condominium Association, filed a complaint against the developers of the 
     condominium, Zale Groves, Inc., Zale Group, Inc., Zale Enterprises, Inc., and Zale 
     Construction Company (collectively, the Zale defendants), for alleged defects in 
     the design and construction of the development's roofs. The Zale defendants filed 
     a third-amended third-party complaint against Johnston Associates, Inc. (Johnston), 
     and certain other entities which contracted with the Zale defendants to build the 
     roofs. At issue in this case is the contract between Zale Construction Company 
     and Johnston in which Johnston agreed to furnish architectural and design services 
     for the buildings. The contract also included an arbitration clause. Based upon this 
     clause, Johnston filed a written demand for arbitration with the American 
     Arbitration Association. Johnston also filed a motion to compel arbitration and 
     stay the third-party claims against it pursuant to section 2(a) of the Illinois 
     Uniform Arbitration Act (710 ILCS 5/2(a) (West 1994)). Relying on J.F. Inc. v. 
     Vicik, 99 Ill. App. 3d 815 (1981), the trial court denied Johnston's motion, finding 
     that the issues and parties were so "intertwined" and "interconnected" that "they 
     could not be resolved without all the parties being a part of this litigation." 
     Johnston appealed to the appellate court, which affirmed the trial court's decision. 
     See 288 Ill. App. 3d 801, 807. We granted Johnston's petition for leave to appeal 
     (166 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now reverse the decision of the appellate court. 
 
                           BACKGROUND 
          The detailed facts of the case are fully set forth in the appellate court 
     opinion. 288 Ill. App. 3d 801. We will provide the relevant background necessary 
     to dispose of the issue presented. 
          The plaintiff maintains the common elements of a 128-building 
     condominium development in Buffalo Grove, Illinois. In 1994, plaintiff filed a 
     complaint against the Zale defendants seeking damages for alleged defects in the 
     design and construction of the condominium's roofs. On March 1, 1996, the Zale 
     defendants filed their third-amended third-party complaint against IKO Chicago, 
     Inc., W.A. Anderson Construction Company, Lenny Szarek, Inc., Prate Roofing, 
     Inc., S.J. Nitch/Roof Brokers, Inc., All American Roofing, Inc., and Johnston. The 
     Zale defendants premised their third-party action solely on theories of conditional 
     contribution or indemnification. The Zale defendants did not allege any 
     independent causes of action against any third-party defendant. 
          In count VII of the third-amended third-party complaint, the Zale 
     defendants alleged that they entered into a written contract with Johnston in which 
     Johnston agreed to furnish architectural and design services for the buildings. The 
     Zale defendants further alleged that "the actions of which plaintiff complains in 
     its fifth amended complaint are services furnished in part by third party defendant 
     [Johnston]." 
          The contract between Johnston and Zale Construction Company included 
     the following provision: 
               "Either party may demand in writing arbitration of all claims, 
                    disputes or questions of this Contract or breach thereof in 
                    accordance with the prevailing rules of the American Arbitration 
                    Association, within reasonable time before the date legal 
                    proceedings would be barred by applicable statute of limitations, 
                    and judgment upon the award rendered by the arbitrators shall be 
                    final and may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof." 
     Based on this arbitration clause, Johnston filed and served a written demand for 
     arbitration with the American Arbitration Association on April 4, 1996. On that 
     same day, Johnston filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay the third-party 
     claims against it pursuant to section 2(a) of the Illinois Uniform Arbitration Act 
     (the Act) (710 ILCS 5/2(a) (West 1994)). 
          Plaintiff, the Zale defendants, and W.A. Anderson Construction Company 
     opposed Johnston's motion, relying on the decision in Vicik. The Vicik court held 
     that the policy favoring arbitration may give way to competing policies favoring 
     joinder of claims in light of the following factors: decreased delay, complexity and 
     costs, resolution of common issues in a single forum, desirability of consistent 
     results, and prejudicing or affecting parties who did not execute an arbitration 
     agreement. 288 Ill. App. 3d at 806. The Zale defendants argued that Johnston's 
     motion should be denied because the "issues in this case are inextricably 
     intertwined, intermingled and dependent upon each other such that the issues 
     raised in count VII cannot be severed." 
          Johnston responded by stating that since there was no dispute as to the 
     agreement to arbitrate, its motion should be granted. Johnston argued that the trial 
     court should not apply the Vicik analysis because Vicik has been criticized by 
     Illinois courts. Johnston further argued that the public policy considerations 
     enumerated in Vicik were insufficient to override the general rule in Illinois that 
     arbitration agreements in multiparty proceedings should be enforced. 
          On June 11, 1996, the trial court denied Johnston's motion based on the 
     reasoning in Vicik. While recognizing the validity of the arbitration agreement, the 
     trial court nonetheless found that the "problems would be enormous" if it were to 
     allow arbitration to proceed either before or during litigation of the underlying 
     action. The court stated that inconsistent results "might prejudice various other 
     parties in this litigation. And prejudice is one of the factors that the court is 
     considering here in relying on its ruling." On appeal, the appellate court affirmed 
     the trial court. The court applied the Vicik factors and concluded that prejudices 
     and inequities might result if the court compelled arbitration in this case. 288 Ill. 
     App. 3d at 806-07. 
 
                            ANALYSIS 
          Johnston argues that the trial court erred in denying arbitration once the 
     court found that a valid arbitration agreement existed. Johnston bases this 
     argument upon section 2(a) of the Act, which provides: 
                    "On application of a party showing an [arbitration] 
                    agreement ***, and the opposing party's refusal to     arbitrate, 
                    the court shall order the parties to proceed with arbitration, but if 
                    the opposing party denies the existence of the agreement to 
                    arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to the determination of 
                    the issue so raised and shall order arbitration if found for the 
                    moving party, otherwise, the application shall be denied." 710 ILCS 
                    5/2(a) (West 1994). 
     Based on the plain language of the statute, Johnston is correct that at a hearing to 
     stay a judicial proceeding and to compel arbitration, the trial court should concern 
     itself solely with whether an agreement exists to arbitrate the dispute in question. 
     See J&K Cement Construction, Inc. v. Montalbano Builders, Inc., 119 Ill. App. 
     3d 663, 669 (1983). 
          Here, the parties do not deny the existence of the arbitration clause in the 
     contract between Johnston and Zale Construction Company. The plaintiff and Zale 
     defendants argue, however, that compelling arbitration would lead to inconsistent 
     results, compromise judicial economy, and prejudice nonsignatories to the 
     arbitration agreement because the third-party claims are "inextricably intertwined 
     with the claims alleged by the plaintiff." Johnston responds that its "contractual 
     right to arbitration and Illinois' public policy favoring arbitration outweigh 
     concerns regarding judicial economy, duplication of effort and possibly 
     inconsistent results." 
          The parties request that this court resolve the conflict between important 
     state polices favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements and the policies 
     supporting joinder and the resolution of multiparty conflicts in a single forum. 
          It is a well-established principle that arbitration is a favored alternative to 
     litigation by state, federal and common law because it is " `a speedy, informal, 
     and relatively inexpensive procedure for resolving controversies arising out of 
     commercial transactions.' " J&K Cement Construction, Inc., 119 Ill. App. 3d at 
     667-68, quoting Layne-Minnesota Co. v. Regents of the University of Minnesota, 
     266 Minn. 284, 287-88, 123 N.W.2d 371, 374 (1963); First Condominium 
     Development Co. v. Apex Construction & Engineering Corp., 126 Ill. App. 3d 
     843, 846 (1984). In Illinois, the general rule is that agreements to arbitrate will be 
     enforced despite the existence of claims by third parties or of pending multiparty 
     litigation. See Iser Electric Co. v. Fossier Builders, Ltd., 84 Ill. App. 3d 161, 166 
     (1980); Kostakos v. KSN Joint Venture No. 1, 142 Ill. App. 3d 533, 538 (1986); 
     J&K Cement Construction, Inc., 119 Ill. App. 3d at 674; Diersen v. Joe Keim 
     Builders, Inc., 153 Ill. App. 3d 373, 377 (1987); Jacob v. C&M Video, Inc., 248 
     Ill. App. 3d 654, 657 (1993). However, Vicik carved an exception to this rule. 
          In Vicik, homeowners contracted with a general contractor for the 
     construction of a home. After a dispute arose between these parties, materialmen 
     and subcontractors filed suit to foreclose their mechanics' liens. In response, the 
     general contractor filed a motion to compel arbitration of its dispute with the 
     homeowners. The homeowners sought to consolidate the foreclosure actions and 
     stay the arbitration proceeding. The trial court denied the homeowner's motion. 
     The appellate court reversed, concluding that the policy favoring joinder 
     outweighed that favoring arbitration, where enforcement of the arbitration 
     agreement would violate the very policy under which arbitration is favored. 
     Accordingly, the Vicik court specified that arbitration may be enjoined in 
     multiparty litigation under "strictly limited circumstances": 
               "Where an arbitration agreement involves some, but not all, of the 
                    parties to multiparty litigation, the policy favoring arbitration must 
                    be weighed against the policies favoring joinder of claims. Where 
                    arbitration would increase rather than decrease delay, complexity 
                    and costs, it should not receive favored treatment. However, it is 
                    not sufficient to show merely that litigation would be the speedier 
                    and more economical means of resolving controversy. It also must 
                    be shown that the issues and the relationships among the parties to 
                    the multiparty litigation are closely intermingled. Factors to be 
                    considered are whether the claims of all the parties arise from the 
                    same project and involve common issues and evidence. Also 
                    important is the    possibility of inconsistent results." Vicik, 99 
                    Ill. App. 3d at 819-20. 
          Various districts of the appellate court have repeatedly criticized and 
     distinguished Vicik. See Kelso-Burnett Co. v. Zeus Development Corp., 107 Ill. 
     App. 3d 34, 42-43 (2d Dist. 1982); First Condominium Development Co. v. Apex 
     Construction & Engineering Corp., 126 Ill. App. 2d 843, 849 (1st Dist. 1984). In 
     fact, the First, Second, and Fourth Districts have expressly declined to follow 
     Vicik. See Geldermann, Inc. v. Mullins, 171 Ill. App. 3d 255, 261 (1st Dist. 1988); 
     Landmark Properties, Inc. v. Architects International-Chicago, 172 Ill. App. 3d 
     379, 384 (1st Dist. 1988); M.D. Building Material Co. v. 910 Construction 
     Venture, 219 Ill. App. 3d 509, 519 (1st Dist. 1991); J&K Cement Construction, 
     Inc. v. Montalbano Builders, Inc., 119 Ill. App. 3d 663, 675-82 (2d Dist. 1983); 
     Kurland Steel Co. v. Carle Foundation Hospital, 185 Ill. App. 3d 624, 628-29 (4th 
     Dist. 1989). These districts have held that public policy considerations supporting 
     joinder do not outweigh the policy in Illinois favoring arbitration. See J&K 
     Cement Construction, Inc., 119 Ill. App. 3d at 675-82; Kurland Steel Co., 185 Ill. 
     App. 3d at 629. 
          The plaintiff and Zale defendants argue that the Vicik factors support the 
     trial court's decision in this case because (1) the Zale defendants did not initiate 
     the lawsuit; (2) the underlying action and the third party claims are inextricably 
     intertwined, intermingled and dependent upon each other; and (3) there would be 
     increased costs and inefficiencies if they are forced to defend claims in both 
     proceedings. Therefore, they argue that the plaintiff's claims and the Zale 
     defendants' third- party claims should not be severed. 
          Notwithstanding the fact that the Vicik factors, when applied to this case, 
     could support the trial court's decision to deny Johnston's motion to compel 
     arbitration, we reject the Vicik court's use of balancing factors in determining 
     whether to compel arbitration in a multiparty litigation. We agree with Johnston 
     that once the trial court determines that a valid arbitration agreement exists, the 
     court must compel arbitration, even when the principle litigation involves parties 
     that are not signatories to the arbitration agreement. 
          We base this holding primarily on our adherence to the right of parties to 
     freely contract. Arbitration is "consensual"; a creature of contract (T. Stipanowich, 
     Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The Search for Workable Solutions, 72 
     Iowa L. Rev. 473 (1987)). This is evidenced by section 1 of the Act, which 
     provides: 
                    "A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to 
                    arbitration or a provision in a written contract to submit to 
                    arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties is 
                    valid, enforceable and irrevocable save upon such grounds as exist 
                    for the revocation of any contract ***." 710 ILCS 5/1 (West 1994). 
     In essence, once a contract containing a valid arbitration clause has been executed, 
     the parties are irrevocably committed to arbitrate all disputes arising under the 
     agreement. First Condominium, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 846. The parties, therefore, are 
     bound by their contract with its obligations, duties, and liabilities. 
          We believe that Johnston is entitled to the benefit of its bargain. If we 
     were to deny Johnston's request for arbitration, arbitration clauses would be 
     considered meaningless and we would deny parties the right to their contractually 
     chosen method of dispute resolution. This result would undermine the status of 
     arbitration in Illinois. 
          Furthermore, although the Act does not contain provisions specifically 
     addressing multiparty disputes, the Seventh Circuit in Galt v. Libbey-Owens-Ford 
     Glass Co., 376 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1967), stated that section 2(d) shows that the 
     legislature contemplated multiplicity of actions and provides a court with two 
     options: stay the entire proceeding pending arbitration, or, if the issue is severable, 
     the stay may be granted with respect to that issue only. 710 ILCS 5/2(d) (West 
     1994). The Galt court explained: 
               "In enacting the Uniform Arbitration Act, the [Illinois] Legislature 
                    has not eradicated a chancellor's inherent powers, but the 
                    legislature has determined in Section 2 that it is no longer equitable 
                    to enjoin arbitration to prevent multiplicity of actions." Galt, 376 F.2d  at 716. 
     See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,  460 U.S. 1 , 20, 74 L. Ed. 2d 765, 782, 103 S. Ct. 927, 939 (1983) (holding that the Federal 
     Arbitration Act "requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to 
     an arbitration agreement" and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement 
     "notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying 
     dispute but not to the arbitration agreement" (emphasis added)). Accord Dean 
     Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd,  470 U.S. 213 , 84 L. Ed. 2d 158, 105 S. Ct. 1238 
     (1985). 
          We believe the provisions of the Act militate against the contention that 
     a party to an arbitration agreement may choose between the judicial or arbitration 
     forum. We further believe that the legislature intended to place arbitration 
     agreements upon the same footing as other contracts and to override the 
     judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate. A contrary view 
     would allow a general contractor to simply have arbitration clauses in all of its 
     contracts save one and then seek redress in the court. If it felt it had a better 
     chance at arbitration, it could select that route. See Stillwater Leased Housing 
     Associates v. Kraus-Anderson Construction Co.,  319 N.W.2d 424 , 427 (Minn. 
     1982). We do not believe that the legislature intended to allow parties to "opt out" 
     of arbitration agreements at their convenience. 
          Parenthetically, the Zale defendants argue that their third-party claim is not 
     "ripe" for arbitration because any determination on Zale's contingent claim must 
     await resolution of plaintiff's own claims against the Zale defendants. However, 
     Johnston did state in the circuit court that arbitration of the third-party claims 
     against it could be postponed pending a determination of liability in the principle 
     action. We view this arrangement as a viable solution to the parties' concerns 
     regarding judicial economy, increased costs and contract enforcement. Johnston 
     would be allowed to arbitrate its dispute with Zale Construction Company only 
     if the Zale defendants are found liable, thus preventing the parties from arbitrating 
     unnecessarily. 
          The plaintiff and Zale defendants, nevertheless, argue that allowing 
     arbitration between two of the parties in a multiparty litigation would frustrate the 
     goals of judicial economy. However, Illinois courts have repeatedly held that 
     judicial economy is an insufficient basis for denying arbitration. See J&K Cement 
     Construction, Inc., 119 Ill. App. 3d at 676; Kostakos, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 538; 
     TDE Ltd. v. Israel, 185 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1068 (1989). Moreover, where the 
     issues and relationships are sufficiently interrelated and the result of arbitration 
     may be to eliminate the need for court proceedings, then the goals of judicial 
     economy and of resolving disputes outside of the judicial forum are met. 
     Kostakos, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 538. 
          Specifically, the Zale defendants argue that allowing arbitration in this case 
     would frustrate the goals of judicial economy because the arbitration hearings are 
     likely to interfere with evidence controlled by the plaintiff and subject to one or 
     more protective orders previously entered in the underlying litigation. They also 
     argue that plaintiff's litigation costs will increase since it will have some role in 
     the arbitration proceedings, whether as a witness or being compelled to take part 
     in discovery. 
          We disagree with the Zale defendants' contentions. If the principal 
     litigation goes forward, followed by the arbitration between Zale Company and 
     Johnston, the arbitrators will have access to the records of the principal litigation, 
     thereby diminishing discovery costs and participation of nonsignatory parties to 
     the arbitration agreement, inconsistent results and conflicting rulings with respect 
     to the collection of evidence. The trial court could stay apportionment of the 
     liability, if any, pending the arbitrator's determination of whether the liability 
     imposed on the Zale defendants is due to the architectural design of the roofs. 
     Even if more effort or resources are required, this is not unfair to either the Zale 
     defendants or Johnston because they agreed in writing to resolve their disputes in 
     arbitration. By agreeing to arbitrate disputes with Johnston, the Zale defendants 
     also agreed to accept the possible inconveniences associated with resolving the 
     dispute in separate forums. 
          The Zale defendants also argue that plaintiff will be prejudiced by 
     Johnston's absence. In particular, they argue that if Johnston knows that Zale will 
     have to arbitrate its design liability claims after already having to try plaintiff's 
     construction defect claims, Johnston will have little incentive to engage in 
     settlement discussions prior to trial. Without any willingness to settle on 
     Johnston's part, Zale may not want to enter into meaningful settlement discussions 
     with plaintiff prior to trial. We do not believe that the Zale defendants' mere 
     speculation regarding the prejudice against nonsignatories to an arbitration 
     agreement warrants denial of Johnston's contractual right to arbitrate the Zale 
     defendants' claim against it. 
          Plaintiff and the Zale defendants also contend that arbitration should not 
     proceed in this case because a jury may ultimately have to decide which Zale 
     entity is liable to the plaintiff. We fail to recognize the relevancy of this 
     contention to the enforcement of the arbitration agreement between Johnston and 
     the Zale defendants. 
          Lastly, plaintiff and the Zale defendants argue that because Johnston did 
     not have arbitration agreements with Zale Groves, or Zale Enterprises, both of 
     whom have third-party claims against Johnston, Johnston should be compelled to 
     participate in the trial proceedings. Johnston claims, however, that after the trial 
     court denied its motion to compel, Johnston plead the existence of arbitration 
     agreements as a bar to all claims from the Zale defendants on the basis that when 
     the complete contracts are disclosed all will have arbitration agreements. This 
     issue is for the trial court to determine. If the court finds that a valid arbitration 
     agreement exists between Johnston and Zale Groves and Johnston and Zale 
     Enterprises, the trial court must compel arbitration. If a valid arbitration agreement 
     does not exist, the third-party claims brought by Zale Groves and Zale Enterprises 
     must be litigated in a judicial forum. 
 
                           CONCLUSION 
          In conclusion, we hold that agreements to arbitrate must be enforced 
     despite the existence of claims by third parties or of pending multiparty litigation. 
     Therefore, Vicik is overruled. The decisions of the circuit and appellate courts are 
     reversed. 
 
                                              Judgments reversed. 
 
 
          JUSTICE BILANDIC, dissenting: 
          The majority precludes trial courts from ever exercising discretion when 
     presented with a motion to compel arbitration of a single claim in a multiparty, 
     multiclaim case. Under the majority's holding, a motion to compel arbitration 
     must be granted regardless of the inequities and inefficiencies that might result. 
     I disagree with the majority's adoption of an absolute rule requiring the 
     enforcement of arbitration agreements in all cases regardless of the circumstances. 
     I therefore dissent. 
          It is true that, generally, agreements to arbitrate will be enforced despite 
     the existence of multiple parties or multiple claims. See Iser Electric Co. v. 
     Fossier Builders, Ltd., 84 Ill. App. 3d 161, 166 (1980). I do not disagree with this 
     as a general rule. In certain, very limited circumstances, however, the policy 
     favoring arbitration should yield to considerations of judicial economy, efficiency 
     and fairness. Where, as here, arbitration will cause increased delay, costs and 
     complexity and will create the potential for inconsistent results, a motion to 
     compel arbitration is properly denied. 
          A review of the complete procedural context of this case reveals why the 
     trial court's decision to deny Johnston's motion was correct. This case involves 
     one plaintiff, four defendants and seven third-party defendants. The plaintiff 
     condominium board sued the four Zale defendants, alleged to be the developers 
     of the condominiums, charging them with defects in the condominiums' roofs. The 
     four Zale defendants filed third-party claims for contribution or indemnification 
     against seven subcontractors, including Johnston. Johnston is alleged to be the 
     architectural firm that provided architectural and design services for the buildings, 
     including the roofs. The other six named subcontractors are alleged to have 
     furnished various materials and labor for the condominiums. The asserted liability 
     of the Zale defendants is apparently based upon the actions of these subcontractors 
     in designing and constructing the condominiums' roofs. Each of the Zale 
     defendants' third-party claims seeks damages from the third-party defendants only 
     in the event that the Zale defendants are found liable to the plaintiff. Only 
     Johnston's subcontract contained an arbitration clause. 
          The interrelationship of these claims is such that the rights and liabilities 
     of all the parties may not be equitably and consistently determined in separate 
     proceedings. All of the claims arise out of the same construction project, relate to 
     the same alleged defects and involve the designs provided by Johnston. Moreover, 
     the evidence presented on each claim will be substantially the same. The asserted 
     liability of the Zale defendants, as the developers, is vicarious for the acts of the 
     subcontractors who designed and constructed the condominiums. Consequently, 
     in order to establish the Zale defendants' liability, the plaintiff will attempt to 
     show that the roofs are defective and that the defects resulted from faulty design 
     or construction or both. The Zale defendants, in addition to defending against the 
     plaintiff's claim, will attempt to show that the defects, if any, were the result of 
     the actions of the third-party defendants in designing or constructing the roofs. 
     Each third-party defendant, Johnston included, will in turn attempt to prove that 
     its actions did not cause a defect in the roofs. It must be emphasized that the 
     claim against Johnston, like the other third-party claims, is entirely derivative. The 
     Zale defendants seek damages from Johnston only in the event that they are held 
     liable to the plaintiff. If judgment is entered in favor of the Zale defendants, there 
     will be no need to resolve the third-party claim against Johnston. If, on the other 
     hand, judgment is entered against the Zale defendants, proper apportionment of 
     the liability may require a determination of Johnston's liability. A single trier of 
     fact should determine the defendants' and the third-party defendants' respective 
     liabilities, if any, to the plaintiff and among each other. 
          Further, given the role played by Johnston in the construction project, 
     Johnston may be crucial to a complete resolution of this litigation. Presumably, 
     the other six subcontractors followed the design prepared by Johnston in executing 
     their contractual functions. Those subcontractors may attempt to defend the third- 
     party actions on the ground that they acted in accordance with the designs 
     provided by Johnston. In fact, one of those subcontractors, W.A. Anderson 
     Construction Company, alluded to such a defense in a brief filed in the circuit 
     court in opposition to Johnston's motion. Accordingly, even if Johnston is not a 
     party to the litigation, evidence relating to its performance on the project will be 
     necessary to fully resolve the other claims. Moreover, as noted by the majority, 
     Johnston may remain a third-party defendant in this litigation even if its motion 
     to compel is granted. Johnston's demand for arbitration was filed against Zale 
     Construction only, not the other Zale defendants. Thus, even if Johnston's motion 
     to compel arbitration and stay proceedings is granted, Johnston may remain in the 
     circuit court proceedings with respect to the third-party claims filed by the other 
     Zale defendants. The majority acknowledges this possibility, but nonetheless 
     orders that the single claim by Zale Construction against Johnston proceed 
     separately in an arbitral forum. Slip op. at 10. 
          In addition, the potential exists for inconsistent results if the claim against 
     Johnston proceeds in an arbitral forum. In the judicial proceeding, the trier of fact 
     could potentially find for the plaintiff and against the Zale defendants without 
     placing any responsibility on the six subcontractors who remained in the action, 
     finding instead that Johnston's design caused the roof defects. In the arbitration, 
     however, the arbitrators could conclude that the roof defects were the result of 
     improper construction, not Johnston's designs. 
          Finally, allowing arbitration of the claim against Johnston will increase 
     costs and will be a highly inefficient use of resources. As demonstrated above, the 
     claim against Johnston is so interwoven with the nonarbitrable claims that 
     substantially the same evidence would be presented in both the litigation and the 
     arbitration. The Zale defendants will be compelled to present the same evidence 
     and arguments in two different forums. In addition, although Johnston stated in 
     the circuit court that arbitration "could" await a determination of liability in the 
     principal action, there is no indication in the record that Johnston has agreed to 
     postpone the arbitration proceeding. Rather, in its brief, Johnston merely states that 
     the arbitrator has the discretion to decide when to schedule the arbitration hearing. 
     Accordingly, it is conceivable that the arbitration would take place before the 
     resolution of the principal action. 
          The reason that arbitration is a favored method of dispute resolution in this 
     state is that it is viewed as "easier, quicker and more economical" than litigation. 
     First Condominium Development Co. v. Apex Construction & Engineering Corp., 
     126 Ill. App. 3d 843, 846 (1984). In this case, however, enforcing the arbitration 
     agreement will increase costs and complexity and will substantially delay the 
     complete resolution of the case. In these limited circumstances, the trial court 
     should have the discretion to deny arbitration. The trial court in this case correctly 
     balanced the countervailing interests and denied Johnston's motion to compel 
     arbitration. I would affirm the appellate court's affirmance of the trial court's 
     ruling. 
 
          JUSTICE HARRISON joins in this dissent. 
 
          JUSTICE HARRISON, also dissenting: 
          I agree with Justice Bilandic's dissent. In addition, I would hold that J.F. 
     Inc. v. Vicik, 99 Ill. App. 3d 815 (1981), was correctly decided and should not be 
     overruled.