Case Title: State ex rel. Mora v. Wilkinson

Citation: 2005-Ohio-1509

Docket Number: 20041331

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2005-04-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Mora v. Wilkinson, 105 Ohio St.3d 272, 2005-Ohio-1509.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. MORA, APPELLANT, v. WILKINSON, DIR., ET AL., 
APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Mora v. Wilkinson, 105 Ohio St.3d 272, 2005-Ohio-1509.] 
Res judicata — Previous claims for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief 
bar mandamus claim — Court of appeals’ denial of writ of mandamus 
affirmed. 
(No. 2004-1331 — Submitted March 9, 2005 — Decided April 13, 2005.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Wayne County, No. 03-CA-0062. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In May 1990, a Wayne County jury convicted appellant, Juan 
Mora, a.k.a. Dan Mora, of three counts of rape, four counts of felonious sexual 
penetration, nine counts of gross sexual imposition, and three counts of corruption 
of a minor.  The Wayne County Court of Common Pleas sentenced Mora to 10 to 
25 years on each of the rape and felonious-sexual-penetration convictions and 2 
years on each of the gross-sexual-imposition and corruption-of-a-minor 
convictions.  The order specified that the sentences were to be served 
consecutively, for an aggregate prison term of 94 to 175 years.  The common 
pleas court noted that, by law, Mora’s minimum prison term of 94 years was 
reduced to 15 years. 
{¶ 2} On October 5, 1990, the common pleas court issued a nunc pro 
tunc order deleting the language that had reduced Mora’s aggregate minimum 
sentence to 15 years and replacing it with the following language:  “The twelve 
consecutive 2-year definite sentences * * * of 24 years shall be consecutive to the 
indefinite terms of 15 to 175 years * * *.” 
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{¶ 3} On appeal, the Court of Appeals for Wayne County reversed the 
common pleas court’s nunc pro tunc entry, reinstated the original aggregate 
minimum sentence of 15 years, and otherwise affirmed Mora’s conviction and 
sentence.  State v. Mora (Mar. 6, 1991), Wayne App. No. 2579, 1991 WL 35145, 
appeal not accepted for review (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 1419, 574 N.E.2d 1090.  
The court of appeals reasoned that the 15-year limitation on aggregate minimum 
prison terms set forth in former R.C. 2929.41(E), S.B. No. 51, 142 Ohio Laws, 
Part I, 1875, 1886, applied to all consecutive terms imposed, whether for definite 
or indefinite terms, or for combinations thereof.  Id. 
{¶ 4} On October 8, 1998, the common pleas court issued an entry 
reducing Mora’s aggregate minimum term of imprisonment to 15 years based on 
the court of appeals’ 1991 judgment. 
{¶ 5} In August 1999, we held that former R.C. 2929.41(E)(2) did not 
apply to definite sentences; in other words, the 15-year limitation applied only to 
the aggregate minimum term of indefinite sentences.  Yonkings v. Wilkinson 
(1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 225, 226-228, 714 N.E.2d 394; State ex rel. Hamann v. 
Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 96 Ohio St.3d 72, 2002-Ohio-3528, 771 N.E.2d 
254, ¶ 6. 
{¶ 6} In October 2002, Mora filed a complaint for declaratory judgment 
and injunctive relief in the common pleas court.  Mora claimed that appellee 
Reginald Wilkinson, Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and 
Correction (“ODRC”), and the chief legal counsel for ODRC had failed to comply 
with former R.C. 2929.41(E)(2) and the court of appeals and common pleas court 
orders to reduce his aggregate minimum prison term to 15 years.  Mora requested 
“a declaratory judgment that the [ODRC] comply with the mandates issued by the 
Ninth District Court of Appeals and the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas 
and for them to correct their records to reflect the correct and original sentence 
imposed.”  In November 2002, the defendants moved for summary judgment 
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based on Yonkings.  On January 3, 2003, the common pleas court granted 
summary judgment to the defendants and denied the relief requested by Mora. 
{¶ 7} Instead of appealing from the common pleas court judgment, in 
October 2003, Mora filed a petition in the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus 
to compel appellees, Wilkinson and various other ODRC employees, to comply 
with the 1991 court of appeals order and the 1998 common pleas court order and 
reduce his aggregate minimum term of imprisonment to 15 years.  Appellees 
answered the petition and subsequently moved for summary judgment based on 
res judicata.  Appellees claimed that the common pleas court’s January 3, 2003 
judgment on Mora’s claims for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief barred 
his mandamus claim. 
{¶ 8} On July 8, 2004, the court of appeals granted appellees’ motion 
and denied the writ. 
{¶ 9} Mora initially asserts that the court of appeals abused its discretion 
by denying his motion to strike appellees’ filings in the mandamus case.  Mora 
moved to strike appellees’ answer and motion for summary judgment because 
they were not captioned in the name of the state on his relation. 
{¶ 10} “A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to strike will not 
be overturned on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion.”  Samadder v. 
DMF of Ohio, Inc., 154 Ohio App.3d 770, 2003-Ohio-5340, 798 N.E.2d 1141, ¶ 
17; see, also, State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 
69 Ohio St.3d 217, 223, 631 N.E.2d 150.  “ ‘Abuse of discretion’ means 
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.”  State ex rel. Cranford v. Cleveland, 
103 Ohio St.3d 196, 2004-Ohio-4884, 814 N.E.2d 1218, ¶ 24. 
{¶ 11} The court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying Mora’s 
motion to strike.  R.C. 2731.04 specifies that actions for a writ of mandamus must 
be brought “in the name of the state on the relation of the person applying.”  We 
have dismissed petitions for writs of mandamus when the actions were not so 
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captioned, the respondents raised timely objections, and the relators failed to 
amend their petitions.  Litigaide, Inc. v. Lakewood Police Dept. Custodian of 
Records (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 508, 664 N.E.2d 521; see, also, Blankenship v. 
Blackwell, 103 Ohio St.3d 567, 2004-Ohio-5596, 817 N.E.2d 382, ¶ 34-37.  R.C. 
2731.04 and this precedent are inapplicable here because the alleged improper 
captioning was not on the petition.  Moreover, there is no evidence that Mora was 
prejudiced by appellees’ failure to properly caption their answer and motion for 
summary judgment.  The court of appeals properly denied Mora’s motion to 
strike. 
{¶ 12} Mora next asserts that the court of appeals erred in relying on res 
judicata to deny his request for a writ of mandamus. 
{¶ 13} “Under the doctrine of res judicata, ‘[a] valid, final judgment 
rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising 
out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous 
action.’ ”  State ex rel. Denton v. Bedinghaus, 98 Ohio St.3d 298, 2003-Ohio-861, 
784 N.E.2d 99, ¶ 14, quoting Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 
653 N.E.2d 226, syllabus. 
{¶ 14} In general, “[r]es judicata bars the litigation of all claims that either 
were or might have been litigated in a first lawsuit.”  Hughes v. Calabrese, 95 
Ohio St.3d 334, 2002-Ohio-2217, 767 N.E.2d 725, ¶ 12.  Unlike other judgments, 
however, “a declaratory judgment determines only what it actually decides and 
does not preclude other claims that might have been advanced.”  State ex rel. 
Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 59, 69, 765 N.E.2d 345; 1 
Restatement of the Law 2d, Judgments (1982) 337, Section 33, Comment c. 
{¶ 15} Res judicata barred Mora’s mandamus claim because he had raised 
the same claim about the 15-year aggregate minimum prison term against 
Wilkinson in his previous common pleas court action for declaratory judgment 
and injunctive relief.  In that prior case, Mora expressly requested that Wilkinson 
January Term, 2005 
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comply with the mandates of the common pleas court and the court of appeals.  
His mandamus claim makes the same request of Wilkinson and other ODRC 
employees in privity with Wilkinson. 
{¶ 16} Therefore, appellees were entitled to summary judgment and 
denial of the writ based on res judicata. 
{¶ 17} Finally, Mora waived his claim on appeal that the attachments to 
appellees’ motion for summary judgment were not certified, because he failed to 
raise this objection in the court of appeals.  See State ex rel. Ross v. State, 102 
Ohio St.3d 73, 2004-Ohio-1827, 806 N.E.2d 553, ¶ 7.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals.  We also deny Mora’s motion to strike 
appellees’ merit brief. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Juan Mora, pro se. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Scott M. Campbell, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellees. 
_____________________