Case Title: STATE v PAULSON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1975-08-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12910 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1975 - STATE O F MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -VS - LEON ALBERT PAULSON, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable C. B.Sande, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : ~ o b e r t L. Stephens, Jr. argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas A, Rudewitz, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Harold F, Hanser, County Attorney, argued, Billings, Montana Submitted: June 18, 1975 Decided :j4UB J r. .To' F i l e d : - 1 - j r ~ Clerk M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. Defendant Leon Albert Paulson appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict i n t h e d i s t r i c t court, Yellowstone County, convicting him of criminal possession of marijuana, a felony. O n July 21, 1974, Craig Cunningham, a Yellowstone County deputy s h e r i f f then attached t o the city-county narcotic squad, received a telephone c a l l from one Sergeant Wolf of the Metropol- i t a n Narcotics Team, Tucson, Arizona. Wolf relayed information 18 given him by an informant who was involved i n making shipment cases almost exclusively f o r h i s department, and t h a t h i s r e l i a b i l i t y had proven t o be very high i n the past." The Tucson I f o f f i c e r t o l d Cunningham t h a t i n 1974 the informant had made more cases f o r them than he had the previous year, a l l involving ship- I t ments of narcotics. The information was received via several telephone conversations over a period of time beginning shortly before noon and ending about f i v e o r s i x t h a t Sunday afternoon, July 21. Cunningham was t o l d a shipment of narcotics would be brought by airplane i n t o Billings by a white male, i n h i s e a r l y twenties, about s i x f e e t t a l l , with sandy colored h a i r ; i n h i s possession would be a brown Samsonite suitcase, double zippered with a single s t r a p , with a claim check attached marked with a specific number; and t h e bag would contain about 30 pounds of marijuana . That evening a t 7:30, the due time of the Western Airlines f l i g h t from the south, Officers Cunningham and Wickhorst, were a t the Billings Logan International Airport and went t o the baggage area where they i d e n t i f i e d the bag and sent i t up the ramp t o t h e claim area. Defendant Paulson picked up the bag and attempted t o place it i n a locker. Before he could get it e n t i r e l y inside the locker, the o f f i c e r s approached and arrested him f o r posses- sion of dangerous drugs. Paulson was read h i s r i g h t s and frisked f o r weapons. A t t h e police s t a t i o n the suitcase was opened with a key provided by defendant, inside was found 25 pounds and 12 ounces of what was l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d t o be marijuana. The marijuana was i d e n t i f i e d by Cunningham, the a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r , through the use of the "valtox f i e l d drug t e s t i n g k i t " , a s e t of commercial chemicals used by police departments. A l - though Cunningham was not a trained chemist, he had been trained i n the use of the k i t f o r f i e l d t e s t purposes. A t t r i a l it was established t h a t Cunningham had handled nearly 200 a r r e s t cases f o r drugs and could i d e n t i f y such substance by s i g h t and s m e l l . The same was t r u e of the other a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r , Wickhorst . The opinions of Cunninghim and Wickhorst were l a t e r corroborated by a s t a t e chemist, A. B. Meinikoff of Missoula, Montana. The case was s e t f o r t r i a l September 11, 1974, but t h a t t r i a l date was vacated. The hearing on defendant's motion t o suppress evidence was held on September 30, 1974. O n October 4, 1974, defendant f i l e d an a f f i d a v i t t o disqualify t h e presiding judge, but was denied. This Court i n response t o a p e t i t i o n f o r supervisory control on October 11, 1974, sustained t h a t denial. T r i a l was held, defendant convicted, and he now appeals. O n appeal, defendant contends section 95-1806(f), R.C.M. 1947, which authorizes the motion t o suppress evidence i l l e g a l l y seized, i s unconstitutional i n t h a t it places the "burden of proof" on the defendant. H e r e , the record i s u t t e r l y devoid of a showing t h i s s t a t u t e was challenged before the d i s t r i c t court. Rather, the f a c t s show defendant, a t the suppression hearing, went so f a r a s t o remind the court t h a t he was the moving party and was required t o put on h i s evidence f i r s t . O n appeal, t h i s Court can consider f o r review only those issues raised i n the t r i a l court. Spencer v. Robertson, 151 Mont. 507, 445 P.2d 48; Clark v. Worrall, 146 Mont. 374, 406 P.2d 822. Defendant next contends the d i s t r i c t court abused i t s discretion i n denying h i s a f f i d a v i t of disqualification. A s heretofore stated, t h a t issue was presented t o t h i s Court by a p e t i t i o n f o r supervisory control on October 11, 1974, and denied. W e find no reason t o d i s t u r b t h a t ruling. Defendant next alleges t h a t during t h e course of t r i a l , the s t a t e called one of the a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r s t o t e s t i f y and on the i d e n t i t y of the evidence seized,/ defense counsel cross- examined vigorously f o r t h e purpose of establishing t h e t e s t s used were unreliable. A t t h a t point the s t a t e offered t o withdraw a portion of the evidence and have it flown t o Missoula f o r i d e n t i f i - cation by the s t a t e chemist. Defense counsel objected on grounds t h a t (1) no s t a t e chemist had been endorsed on t h e Information; (2) h i s case had been prepared i n reliance of t h e endorsements; and, (3) prejudice would inure t o defendant r e s u l t i n g from actual surprise. The next day the s t a t e chemist did, i n f a c t , t e s t i f y i n sponsorship of h i s t e s t r e s u l t s . Defense counsel then requested a continuance f o r the purpose of rebutting t h a t testimony; t h i s was denied by the t r i a l court. Defendant now a l l e g e s the t r i a l court improperly allowed the s t a t e t o endorse the witness a f t e r t h e t r i a l began, and f a i l u r e t o grant h i s continuance was error. The s t a t u t e i n question, section 95-1503(d), R.C.M. 1947, s t a t e s : "If the charge i s by information o r indictment, it s h a l l include endorsed thereon, the names of t h e witnesses f o r t h e s t a t e , i f known." (Emphasis added). From the record, there was no allegation the prosecutor was i n violation of the s t a t u t e , and it appears he had not planned on t h e additional witness a t the time t h e o r i g i n a l Information was f i l e d . Neither i s there any charge the prosecutor was attempting t o gain undue advantage, o r t o fraudulently deceive opposing counsel. Thus, the r e a l issue i s the denial of t h e motion f o r continuance . Motions f o r continuance a r e addressed t o the discretion of t h e t r i a l court and t h e granting of a continuance has never been a matter of r i g h t . Williams v. United States, 203 F.2d 85. The d i s t r i c t court cannot cverturned on appeal absence a showing of prejudice t o the movant. S t a t e v, Kuilman, 1 1 1 Mont. ~ e f e n d a n t ' s argument therefore must stand o r f a l l on the issue of prejudice, f o r the d i s t r i c t court can be said have abused i t s discretion only i f i t s ruling was prejudicial. W e have not found a single case, including those c i t e d by defendant, i n which the denial of a motion f o r continuance was reversed without a showing of r e s u l t i n g prejudice t o the movant. In S t a t e v. Cooper, 146 Mont. 336, 342, 406 P.2d 691, t h i s Court explained the purpose behind t h e s t a t u t e with which we a r e now concerned: "R.C.M. 1947, section 94-6208 [section 95-1503 (d) 1, requires t h e county attorney t o endorse upon the information a t the time of f i l i n g 'the names of the 1 witnesses f o r the s t a t e , i f known. The purpose i s t o protect the defendant from surprise and unfair ad- vantage and t o afford him a f a i r opportunity t o adequately defend himself." Clearly, t h i s Court may not reverse t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s ruling unless these important considerations have been offended by it. What then, i s the proper standard f o r determining whether prejudice resulted under the circumstances of the r u l i n g here? The N e w Mexico Supreme Court i n S t a t e v. Edwards, 54 N.M. 189, 217 P.2d 854, 856, spoke t o t h i s point i n t h i s language: "Whether names of witnesses may be endorsed during t r i a l i s a matter r e s t i n g within the sound discretion of the court. It i s not enough t h a t a defendant claim surprise o r prejudice i n the c a l l i n g of an adverse witness o r one whose name does not appear upon the information charging him with crime. Nor i s the mere admission of testimony of such witness, e r r o r ; r a t h e r , e r r o r follows from a denial of an oppor- t u n i t y t o rebut the objectionable evidence. When i t i s made t o appear t h a t testimony of the witness i s such t h a t it cannot be reasonably anticipated, post- ponement o r continuance of the hearing is available t o a defendant t o meet it and i f application therefor i s denied, prejudice being shown, reversal w i l l follow. I I (Emphasis supplied). Here, it i s c l e a r defendant could have reasonably a n t i c i - pated t h e testimony of the s t a t e chemist, and further, t h a t he had ample opportunity t o rebut the evidence which, from h i s stand- point, was objectionable. Defense counsel obviously planned i n advance t o challenge the s t a t e ' s method of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , a s he arranged f o r two experts t o support t h a t challenge. H e was a l s o given a sample of the substance i n question so t h a t an independent t e s t could be made. Defendant's t h i r d issue alleges t h e d i s t r i c t court erred i n several evidentiary rulings. F i r s t , he alleges no proper founda- t i o n was offered t o support testimony t h a t t h e police o f f i c e r s could i d e n t i f y marijuana by sight and smell. W e disagree. Both men s t a t e d they had been assigned t o the city-county narcotics squad f o r over two years, and had attended law enforcement seminars on t h a t precise subject. They had made about two hundred a r r e s t s involving marijuana and had further tested the substance through t h e use of t h e i r f i e l d k i t s . Section 93-401-27, R.C.M. 1947, provides a witness may 11 give h i s opinion of a question o r science, a r t , o r trade, when he i s s k i l l e d therein." A n individual may c e r t a i n l y qualify a s an expert e i t h e r by study or experience. S t a t e v. Keeland, 39 Mont. 506, 104 P. 513. The competency of a witness t o t e s t i f y a s an expert i s a question f o r the t r i a l c o u r t ' s discretion. S t a t e v. Askin, 90 Mont. 394, 3 P.2d 654. I n l i g h t of the background and experience of these witnesses here, i t was not e r r o r t o allow the jury t o consider t h e i r opinions and substantial evidence e x i s t s t o support t h e i r finding. Defendant maintains the police o f f i c e r ' s testimony regarding h i s telephone conversations with the Tucson a u t h o r i t i e s was hearsay. This conclusion is not supported by law. The testimony was introduced only f o r the purpose of demonstrating t h e existence of probable cause t o make the a r r e s t without a warrant and sub- sequent search. The United States Supreme Court i n Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 36, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L ed 2d 726, 739, speaking t o the hearsay question held: "* > k *That t h i s information was hearsay does not destroy i t s r o l e i n establishing probable cause. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 93 L ed 1879, 69 S.Ct. 1302 * * " n. In Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 3 L ed 2d 327, 79 S.Ct. 329, (1959), w e held t h a t information from a r e l i a b l e informer corrobor- ated by t h e agents' observations a s t o the accuracy of t h e informer's descr@ion of t h e accused and of h i s presence a t a p a r t i c u l a r place, was s u f f i c i e n t t o estab- l i s h probable cause f o r an a r r e s t without a warrant. I I In the i n s t a n t case, the f a c t s came from o f f i c i a l police reports. It i s well s e t t l e d t h a t police o f f i c e r s may r e l y on information coming t o them from o f f i c i a l sources a s well a s other known r e l i a b l e sources. People v. Schellin, 227 Cal,App,(2d) 245, 38 Cal.Reptr. 593, 597, c e r t . denied 397 U.S. 1003, 85 S.Ct. 726, 13 L ed 2d 704 (1965); People v. Melchor, 237 Cal.App.2d 685, 47 Gal-Reptr. 235; Walker v. State, 237 M d . 516, 206 A.2d 795. A motion f o r directed verdict was entertained and denied by t h e t r i a l court. Defendant bases h i s allegation of e r r o r regarding t h i s denial on two grounds (1) the s t a t u t e under which he was charged prohibits only t h e species of cannabis s a t i v a 1, and (2) the prosecution f a i l e d t o prove t h a t the substance pos- sessed by defendant was actually among those prohibited by s t a t u t e . W e disagree. Competent evidence was introduced a t t r i a l t o es- t a b l i s h t h a t the substance was i n f a c t cannabis s a t i v a 1. The jury chose t o believe t h e s t a t e ' s witness, there was ample evidence t o j u s t i f y i t s decision. In State v. Metcalf,, 153 Plont. 369, 379, 457 P.2d 453, t h i s Court held: I I In t h i s jurfsdiction a directed verdict i n a criminal case i s given only where the s t a t e f a i l s t o prove i t s case and there i s no evidence upon which a jury could base i t s verdict. State v. Yoss, 146 Mont. 508, 409 P.2d 452; S t a t e v. Willicombe, 130 Mont. 325, 301 P.2d 1116; S t a t e v. Welch, 22 Monte 92, 55 P. 927." The d i s t r i c t court was correct i n denying the motion f o r directed verdict . Finally, defendant challenges t h e warrentless search and subsequent seizure a s unsupported by probable cause o r any other l e g a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n . The s t a t e urges the search and seizure was valid a s incident t o a lawful a r r e s t . The Fourth Amendment t o the United States Constitution t o l e r a t e s warrantless searches incident t o a valid a r r e s t where t h e existence of probable cause supports police conduct. See: United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L ed 2d 653; Ker v. California, supra. Under t h e f a c t s here, the a r r e s t was amply j u s t i f i e d by probable cause, therefore the search in- cident thereto was valid, The judgment i s affirmed. \ P W e Concur: /".. .? . . b -; / i 5 - ' *,r . ' i 1 *8J* , , . " ? % b - - r . . M , , , , , , , , , , , ,.?%kc z . , C C C , C I - ; i i i - " - 1 & 4 r *. - Chief Justice Justices.