Case Title: Harry Lee Butler v. Kenneth S. Tucker, etc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC10-2458

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2012-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-1133 
____________ 
 
HARRY LEE BUTLER,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-2458 
____________ 
 
HARRY LEE BUTLER,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
KENNETH S. TUCKER, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[July 12, 2012] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Harry Lee Butler was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 
death for the March 1997 murder of his former girlfriend, Leslie Fleming.  This 
Court affirmed Butler‘s conviction and death sentence on direct appeal.  See Butler 
 
 
v. State, 842 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2003).  On July 13, 2004, Butler filed a motion to 
vacate his conviction and death sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.851 in the Sixth Judicial Circuit in and for Pinellas County.  Butler 
filed an amended rule 3.851 motion on February 4, 2005.  The postconviction court 
held three evidentiary hearings on the motion, the first in May 2008, the second in 
November 2008, and the third in September 2009.  On May 13, 2010, the 
postconviction court entered an order denying relief. 
Butler now appeals the denial of his rule 3.851 motion and also petitions this 
Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), 
Fla. Const.  Having considered the briefs filed by the parties and having heard oral 
argument, we affirm the postconviction court‘s denial of relief and deny Butler‘s 
petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
 
We described the facts of this case when Butler‘s conviction and death 
sentence were reviewed on direct appeal: 
On the night of March 13, 1997, or early morning hours of 
March 14, 1997, Leslie Fleming (Fleming), also known as Bay, was 
stabbed multiple times and asphyxiated by her former boyfriend, 
Harry Butler (Butler).  Shawna Fleming (Shawna), Leslie‘s sister, 
discovered Fleming‘s body at about 7:15 a.m. on the morning of 
March 14 when LaShara Butler (LaShara), the couple‘s six-year old 
daughter, opened the apartment door for Shawna.  According to 
LaShara‘s trial testimony, on the night before the body was 
discovered, she had been sleeping with her mother when her father 
entered the bedroom, picked her up, and took her to her own room.  
 
 
LaShara testified that she saw his face during this process.  LaShara 
also stated she heard her mother say, ―Stop,‖ saw her father‘s leg 
pinning down her mother‘s leg, and heard her mother screaming as 
though she were being hurt.  Officer Scott Ballard, one of the first 
officers on the scene, testified that on the way to the police station, 
LaShara said, ―My daddy hurt mommy.  I heard him yelling at her.‖ 
 
Lola Young, a long-time neighbor of Fleming‘s who had also 
known Butler for some time, testified she saw Butler hiding in the 
bushes near Fleming‘s apartment between 3:30 and 4 a.m., around the 
same time as the murder.  She also stated that soon after seeing Butler, 
she saw a blue car speed through the housing complex, stop abruptly, 
pick up Butler, and speed off.  Latwanda Allen (Allen) testified that 
she, Butler and Martisha Kelly (Kelly) are cousins.  Allen said Kelly 
told her Butler killed Fleming.  At trial, Kelly denied having made the 
statement. 
 
. . . . 
 
Detective Green testified Kelly told him the murder weapon 
could be found in a dumpster near a food store where a pair of blue 
shorts, a white T-shirt, a pair of underwear, a towel, and a pair of 
tennis shoes having no laces were eventually found.  However, no 
weapon was recovered from this location.  Dr. Jeannie Eberhardt, a 
forensic scientist specializing in DNA serology, testified she found the 
presence of blood on the white T-shirt, but she was unable to confirm 
a DNA profile of the blood.  Blood stains found on the denim shorts, 
towel, and boxer shorts were also tested, with the same result.  The 
blood was either of an inadequate amount or degraded.  The dyes of 
the denim shorts inhibited DNA testing.  However, testing of the 
sneakers revealed a DNA profile consistent with that of the victim. 
 
Butler, 842 So. 2d at 821.   
At trial, Butler admitted that the sneakers were his, but he maintained that 
another man, Dennis Tennell, had borrowed them prior to Fleming‘s murder.  
Other testimony established that Butler moved out of the apartment he shared with 
 
 
Fleming on March 9, 1997, several days before the murder.  Lakisha Miller 
(nicknamed ―Red‖), Butler‘s cousin and Fleming‘s best friend, testified that Butler 
was upset because of the breakup and because Fleming was having an affair with 
another man, Adonis Hartsfield.  Terry Jackson, Butler‘s coworker, testified that 
the day before the murder, Butler said he was going to ―kill Bay and Red.‖  At the 
end of the guilt phase, the jury found Butler guilty of first-degree murder.  See id. 
at 821-22. 
 
At the penalty phase, the State relied on the evidence presented during the 
guilt phase, while the defense presented two witnesses: Butler‘s father, Junior 
Butler, and Butler‘s sister, Sandra Butler.  The jury recommended that Butler be 
sentenced to death by a vote of eleven to one.  The trial court conducted a Spencer1 
hearing at which the defense presented the testimony of a psychiatrist, Dr. Michael 
Maher.  The trial court later issued a sentencing order in which it concurred with 
the jury recommendation and sentenced Butler to death.  The court found one 
aggravating circumstance, that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel (HAC), no statutory mitigating circumstances, and four nonstatutory 
mitigating circumstances.  See Butler, 842 So. 2d at 822-23.2 
                                          
 
 
1.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
2.  The nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, and the weight assigned by 
the trial court to each circumstance, were as follows: ―(1) Butler was reared 
without his natural mother (some weight); (2) Butler is a loving and good son 
 
 
 
Butler raised six claims of error on direct appeal.  This Court rejected each 
claim and affirmed the conviction and death sentence.  First, we held that the trial 
court did not err in admitting evidence concerning prior acts of violence committed 
by Butler.  Id. at 823-27.  Second, we held that the trial court properly allowed Dr. 
Eberhardt, the State‘s DNA expert, to testify at trial.  Id. at 827-29.  Third, we 
rejected Butler‘s claim that the trial court should have granted his motion for a new 
trial because of the State‘s alleged failure to disclose a probation violation report 
concerning witness Lola Young.  Id. at 829-30.  Fourth, we held that Butler‘s 
challenge to the jury instruction on the HAC aggravator was unpreserved and 
without merit.  Id. at 830-31.  Fifth, we held that the trial court did not fail to 
consider mitigating evidence of Butler‘s impaired mental capacity.  Id. at 831-32.  
Finally, we held that Butler‘s death sentence was proportionate.  Id. at 832-34.  On 
rehearing, Butler argued that Florida‘s capital sentencing scheme violates the 
holding of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  We held that Florida‘s death 
penalty does not violate Ring.  Butler, 842 So. 2d at 834. 
 
Butler raised eleven issues in his amended rule 3.851 motion.  Butler‘s first 
claim concerned the State‘s failure to release evidence relating to postconviction 
DNA testing.  Butler argued in his second through tenth claims that his trial 
                                                                                                                                        
(some weight); (3) Butler is well thought of by neighbors and coworkers (slight 
weight); and (4) Butler has a long-term substance abuse problem (slight weight).‖  
Butler, 842 So. 2d at 823. 
 
 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 (1984).3  In his final claim, Butler argued that the cumulative effect of all 
alleged errors sufficiently prejudiced him as to merit relief.  Three evidentiary 
hearings were held on Butler‘s amended motion.  Two of Butler‘s trial attorneys, 
Richard Watts and Anne Borghetti, testified at the hearings.4  On May 8 and 9, 
2008, the postconviction court heard testimony regarding the development and 
presentation of evidence during the guilt phase of Butler‘s trial.  On November 6 
and 7, 2008, witnesses testified regarding Butler‘s claim that counsel was deficient 
during the penalty phase.  Finally, on September 29, 2009, Butler presented as a 
                                          
 
 
3.  Butler argued that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by (1) failing to 
adequately use a DNA expert to evaluate the DNA evidence found on Butler‘s 
sneakers; (2) failing to retain an independent expert in the area of child 
competency to challenge the testimony of LaShara Butler and in failing to object to 
a comment by LaShara that her father had been to jail; (3) failing to sufficiently 
investigate and cross-examine witness Terry Jackson; (4) failing to disclose that 
trial counsel Anne Borghetti had a conflict of interest due to her prior 
representation of Jackson; (5) failing to bring out at trial the fact that a bloody print 
was found on a telephone at the crime scene, or that in the alternative the State 
violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose evidence of 
the bloody print; (6) failing to object to the testimony of medical examiner Marie 
Hansen when she characterized some of the victim‘s injuries as ―torturous 
wounds‖; (7) erroneously arguing during opening statements that the DNA of an 
unidentified person was found on a door in Fleming‘s home; (8) failing to 
adequately prepare Butler to testify; and (9) failing to adequately investigate and 
present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase. 
 
4.  In its order denying relief, the postconviction court noted that Butler‘s 
third trial attorney, Michael Schwartzberg, had passed away in the time between 
Butler‘s trial and the postconviction evidentiary hearing and was thus unavailable 
to offer testimony. 
 
 
witness Professor David Dow of the University of Houston Law Center, who 
testified as an expert in norms and standards governing attorney conduct in death 
penalty litigation. 
 
The postconviction court entered an order on May 13, 2010, denying 
Butler‘s amended motion.  As to Butler‘s first claim, concerning the State‘s failure 
to furnish him with certain public records relating to DNA testing, the court denied 
the claim as moot, citing an acknowledgement by Butler‘s counsel that the issue 
had been resolved.  As to Butler‘s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
court denied each claim due to Butler‘s failure to establish deficiency or prejudice 
or both under the standards set out in Strickland and its progeny.  Lastly, the court 
held that because it found each of Butler‘s individual claims to be without merit, 
cumulative error analysis was not appropriate. 
 
Butler now appeals the postconviction court‘s denial of relief.  He argues 
that the postconviction court erred in denying relief based on each of his nine 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and further asserts cumulative error as a 
basis for relief before this Court.  In addition, Butler has filed an accompanying 
petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which he raises the following claims: (1) 
appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a petition for 
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court; (2) appellate counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by abandoning the claim that LaShara Butler was 
 
 
incompetent to testify at trial; (3) Florida‘s lethal injection protocol constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution; and (4) Butler‘s right against cruel 
and unusual punishment will be violated because he may be incompetent at the 
time of execution.  We address each of these claims below. 
II. 
RULE 3.851 MOTION 
 
A. 
Ineffective Assistance of Guilt Phase Counsel 
In claims I through VIII in his Initial Brief, Butler argues that the 
postconviction court erred in denying his claims that trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance during the guilt phase of his trial.  Claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel are governed by the decision of the United States Supreme 
Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and its progeny.  As the 
Supreme Court explained in Strickland, the right to counsel guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution ―is the right to the effective 
assistance of counsel.‖  Id. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 
771 n.14 (1970)).  For a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel to be considered 
meritorious, two requirements must be satisfied, commonly identified as 
―deficiency‖ and ―prejudice.‖ 
―First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the lawyer 
that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance 
 
 
under prevailing professional standards.‖  Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 
932 (Fla. 1986).  In order to meet this first prong of the Strickland test, ―the 
defendant must prove that counsel‘s performance was unreasonable under 
‗prevailing professional norms.‘‖  Floyd v. State, 18 So. 3d 432, 443 (Fla. 2009) 
(quoting Morris v. State, 931 So. 2d 821, 828 (Fla. 2006)). 
―Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that 
confidence in the outcome is undermined.‖  Maxwell, 490 So. 2d at 932.  To 
establish prejudice, the defendant must show that ―there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.‖  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
For the second prong, ―Strickland places the burden on the defendant, 
not the State, to show a ‗reasonable probability‘ that the result would 
have been different.‖  Wong v. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. 383, 390-91, 
175 L. Ed. 2d 328 (2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  
Strickland does not ―require a defendant to show ‗that counsel‘s 
deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome‘ of his 
penalty proceeding, but rather that he establish ‗a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in [that] outcome.‘‖  Porter v. 
McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 455-56, 175 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2009) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94). 
 
Everett v. State, 54 So. 3d 464, 472 (Fla. 2010). 
 
―Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law 
and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit 
 
 
court‘s factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but 
reviewing the circuit court‘s legal conclusions de novo.‖  Hitchcock v. State, 991 
So. 2d 337, 346 (Fla. 2008) (citing Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 
2004)).  With these standards in mind, we turn to Butler‘s claims of ineffectiveness 
of guilt phase counsel. 
 
 
1. 
DNA Evidence 
In his first claim, Butler challenges his trial attorneys‘ development and 
presentation of DNA evidence.  Butler‘s argument relies on the postconviction 
testimony of Dr. Elizabeth Johnson.  At trial, the State presented testimony by Dr. 
Jeannie Eberhardt, a serologist with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement 
(FDLE), who conducted pretrial testing on DNA samples collected in the 
investigation of Fleming‘s death.  On cross-examination, the defense questioned 
Dr. Eberhardt regarding two reports she authored concerning a pair of sneakers 
identified as belonging to Butler.  In the first report, dated August 18, 1997, Dr. 
Eberhardt reported on testing conducted on a blood DNA sample taken from the 
outside of the left sneaker.  Dr. Eberhardt determined that the sample was 
consistent with the DNA of Leslie Fleming.  In the second report, dated September 
3, 1997, Dr. Eberhardt reported on testing that was conducted on five DNA 
samples taken from inside the left sneaker.  She testified that three of the samples 
 
 
resulted in no reaction, while the results of testing on two of the samples, labeled 
56A-4 and 56A-5, were inconclusive. 
During postconviction proceedings, Dr. Johnson testified that despite the 
finding contained in Dr. Eberhardt‘s report, the samples inside the left shoe 
contained sufficient information to determine that the donor was male and to 
eliminate Butler as a source of the DNA.  Dr. Johnson explained that this 
information could not have been discovered by reading Dr. Eberhardt‘s report, 
which merely labeled the results as ―inconclusive,‖ but could have been found by 
reviewing the raw data contained in Dr. Eberhardt‘s bench notes.  Butler argues 
that this information would have supported his argument that another individual 
committed the murder, specifically by providing evidence that an unidentified male 
was wearing the shoes at the time of the murder.  He contends that his trial counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately consult with a DNA expert 
and for failing to obtain Dr. Eberhardt‘s bench notes in discovery.  Below, the 
postconviction court denied relief on these claims.  We affirm, finding neither 
deficiency nor prejudice in counsel‘s handling or presentation of this evidence. 
As to the deficiency prong, Butler‘s claims that counsel was deficient for 
failing to adequately consult with a DNA expert and for failing to obtain Dr. 
Eberhardt‘s bench notes are not supported by the record.  Richard Watts, one of 
Butler‘s trial attorneys, testified that the defense retained and consulted with DNA 
 
 
expert Dr. Gary Litman.  Watts testified that the defense obtained DNA laboratory 
reports from FDLE and provided them to Dr. Litman.  Watts stated that the defense 
would have relied on Dr. Litman to tell them whether they needed to take 
additional action, such as obtaining Dr. Eberhardt‘s bench notes.  Butler‘s 
deficiency claim is further undermined by the testimony of Dr. Johnson, who 
stated that a layman reading Dr. Eberhardt‘s report would not have been able to 
determine that the defendant was excluded as a source of the DNA sample taken 
from inside the left sneaker; only an expert reviewing Dr. Eberhardt‘s notes and 
worksheets could have uncovered that fact.  As the postconviction court concluded 
below, ―Because the record is devoid of any evidence suggesting that counsel 
failed to diligently investigate the DNA results or otherwise acted deficiently, they 
cannot be said to have provided ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard.‖ 
Nor do we find that Butler was prejudiced by the absence of the DNA 
evidence.   At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Dr. Johnson testified that 
there was no way to tell when or how the unidentified DNA was transferred to the 
shoe.  She noted that the DNA could have been deposited through sweat or could 
have been transferred to the shoe from something in the dumpster where the shoes 
were found.  The importance of this testimony is highlighted by the trial testimony 
of Detective Wilton Lee, Jr., who discovered the shoes in a convenience store 
dumpster not far from the crime scene.  Detective Lee stated that the shoes were 
 
 
located one half to three quarters of the way down inside the dumpster among bags 
of trash, rotten food, flies, and maggots, and that the shoes and clothing were wet 
from rain.  Since it could not be established whether the DNA was deposited 
before, during, or after the murder, this evidence would not have provided any 
significant support to the defense‘s argument that an unidentified third person 
committed the murder while wearing Butler‘s shoes. 
 
 
2. 
LaShara Butler 
Butler‘s next Strickland claim is directed toward the trial testimony of then 
seven-year-old LaShara Butler, daughter of defendant Harry Butler and victim 
Leslie Fleming.  At trial, LaShara testified that she was sleeping in her mother‘s 
room on the night of the murder when her father entered the bedroom, picked her 
up, and took her to her own room.  Butler, 842 So. 2d at 821.  During 
postconviction proceedings, Butler presented psychologist Dr. Janice Stevenson, 
who testified that during pretrial proceedings, the psychologist who evaluated 
LaShara, Dr. Joseph Crum, did not perform a sufficient evaluation to determine 
whether LaShara was competent to testify.  Dr. Stevenson noted the existence of 
tests which could have been used to determine whether LaShara was suffering 
from psychological trauma, which Dr. Crum failed to perform.  Dr. Stevenson 
stated that at the time of Butler‘s trial, it was not uncommon for defense attorneys 
 
 
to retain mental health experts to evaluate the competency of child witnesses and 
the credibility of their testimony. 
Here, Butler argues that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to retain an 
expert in child psychology and for failing to challenge LaShara‘s competency and 
credibility before the trial court and the jury.  In addition, Butler argues that 
counsel was deficient for failing to object to testimony by LaShara in which she 
indicated that her father had been to jail.  The postconviction court rejected both 
claims based on its determination that Butler failed to establish prejudice under 
Strickland with regard to either claim.  We agree. 
 
 
a. 
Failure to Consult Expert in Child Psychology 
Before trial, LaShara was evaluated by Dr. Crum at the request of the State 
Attorney‘s Office.  Dr. Crum was deposed by the Public Defender, who was then 
representing Butler, on August, 22, 1997.  In his deposition, Dr. Crum stated that 
he interviewed LaShara twice.  The first interview took place on March 24, 1997, 
ten days after her mother‘s death, and the second interview took place on April 2, 
1997.  Each interview lasted approximately forty-five minutes.  The purpose of the 
interviews was to assess LaShara‘s competency and to explore whether she was 
capable of testifying at trial.  Dr. Crum stated that he was not asked to assess 
LaShara‘s credibility.  He conducted an IQ test and found that LaShara‘s cognitive 
abilities fell within an average to high average range.  He determined that her 
 
 
ability to understand the difference between telling the truth and telling a lie was 
accurate for her age, and found no evidence of serious emotional difficulties that 
would impede her ability to testify.  Dr. Crum stated that he reviewed a videotape 
of LaShara‘s questioning by police and said that he asked LaShara briefly whether 
she remembered what happened to her mother, but also said that he did not inquire 
into the details of her memory. 
LaShara was deposed by defense attorney Michael Schwartzberg on April 7, 
1998.  On June 24, 1998, the defense filed a motion to determine LaShara‘s 
competency to testify.  A competency hearing was held shortly before trial.  Before 
the hearing, the court agreed, at the request of defense counsel, to review a 
videotape of the interview law enforcement officers conducted with LaShara 
shortly after her mother‘s murder.  At the competency hearing, the trial court 
questioned LaShara.  The court first asked LaShara general questions concerning 
where she lived, where she attended school, who her friends were, and whether she 
could remember things that happened when she was six years old.   The court then 
questioned LaShara concerning whether she knew the difference between the truth 
and a lie, whether she understood when something is make-believe, whether she 
knew the consequences of telling a lie, and whether she was able to take an oath 
and make a promise to tell the truth. 
 
 
LaShara was also questioned by both the State and the defense.  On direct 
examination by attorney Schwartzberg, LaShara admitted that her grandmother had 
repeatedly told her that her father killed her mother and had instructed her to tell 
the court that her father killed her mother.  Based on LaShara‘s testimony, defense 
counsel argued that LaShara‘s testimony was tainted by the continuous suggestions 
from her grandmother.  Counsel also discussed the interview police officers 
conducted with LaShara shortly after her mother‘s death.  Counsel argued that the 
officers were aware that Harry Butler was the primary suspect, that LaShara‘s 
statement that her father killed her mother was the result of suggestions by the 
officers, and that any statement made by LaShara after the interview would be 
tainted.  The court agreed with the defense that the officers exhibited bias in the 
videotaped interview.  Nonetheless, the court ruled that LaShara would be 
permitted to testify, explaining: 
The long of the short of it is I don‘t see anything that‘s going to taint 
her testimony as a matter of law where it should be excluded from the 
jury.  I will indicate to you that everything I have heard, everything I 
saw on that tape may go—will probably go into evidence if you all 
choose so that the jury can give it all proper weight.  But this child is 
bright, articulate, well able to express the things she has observed 
back then and now, and she is going to be on her own when you start 
asking her questions about what was said, what was discussed, what 
was asked, whether that suggested something. 
 
 
At trial, LaShara was first questioned by the State and was then cross-
examined by Schwartzberg.  LaShara admitted during cross-examination that she 
 
 
had a conversation with a policeman on the day following her mother‘s murder.  
She also agreed that her grandmother had told her ―a lot‖ that her father killed her 
mother.  She agreed that her grandmother becomes angry when she talks about 
LaShara‘s father; LaShara further admitted that when her grandmother gets angry, 
she also becomes angry.  Defense counsel also read from a deposition transcript 
LaShara‘s previous statements which conflicted in certain respects with statements 
she made at trial.  Schwartzberg later discussed weaknesses in LaShara‘s testimony 
when delivering the defense‘s closing argument, in which he argued to the jury that 
LaShara‘s testimony was unreliable and was the result of pressure from the police 
and from her grandmother to identify her father as the killer. 
 
Here, Butler argues that trial counsel was deficient for failing to have 
LaShara evaluated by an expert in child psychology.  He argues that if counsel had 
presented such an expert at the pretrial competency hearing, the trial court would 
have found LaShara incompetent to testify.  Butler further argues that even if the 
trial judge had found LaShara competent, an expert could have done more to call 
LaShara‘s reliability into question at trial, leading the jury to disregard her 
testimony and acquit Butler. 
 
First, we find that Butler has not established that counsel was deficient.  As 
discussed above, in order to satisfy the deficiency prong of Strickland, ―the 
defendant must prove that counsel‘s performance was unreasonable under 
 
 
‗prevailing professional norms.‘‖  Floyd, 18 So. 3d at 443 (quoting Morris, 931 So. 
2d at 828).  The only evidence supporting Butler‘s claim of deficiency is the 
testimony of Dr. Stevenson, who said that at the time of Butler‘s trial it was not 
uncommon for defense attorneys to employ experts in child competency to 
evaluate child witnesses.  However, Butler has not presented evidence that the 
failure to do so fell outside ―prevailing professional norms,‖ id., particularly in 
light of the efforts that were in fact made by Butler‘s counsel to exclude and 
discredit LaShara‘s testimony. 
 
Second, Butler has not established a reasonable probability that the result of 
the proceeding would have been different had such an expert been presented.  See 
Everett, 54 So. 3d at 472.  With regard to the trial court‘s decision to admit 
LaShara‘s testimony, this Court has explained: 
In Florida, whether a child witness is competent to testify is 
based on ―his or her intelligence, rather than his or her age, and, in 
addition, whether the child possesses a sense of obligation to tell the 
truth.‖  Lloyd v. State, 524 So. 2d 396, 400 (Fla. 1988); see Bell v. 
State, 93 So. 2d 575, 577 (Fla. 1957).  Accordingly, when evaluating 
the competency of a child, the trial court should consider the 
following:  
 
(1) whether the child is capable of observing and 
recollecting facts; (2) whether the child is capable of 
narrating those facts to the court or to a jury, and (3) 
whether the child has a moral sense of the obligation to 
tell the truth. 
 
Griffin v. State, 526 So. 2d 752, 753 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (citing 
Lloyd, 524 So. 2d at 400); see also Baker v. State, 674 So. 2d 199, 
 
 
200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).  The trial judge has the discretion to decide 
whether a witness of tender age is competent to testify and, 
accordingly, the decision to allow a child to testify is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion.  See Lloyd, 524 So. 2d at 400. 
 
Floyd, 18 So. 3d at 443-44. 
In the instant case, the trial court ruled that LaShara was competent to testify 
after a hearing in which LaShara was questioned by the court, the State, and the 
defense.  During the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Dr. Stevenson expressed 
the opinion that LaShara was not properly evaluated to determine whether she was 
suffering from trauma, which may have affected her ability to recall the events 
surrounding her mother‘s death.  Dr. Stevenson also explained that a child in 
LaShara‘s position would have been highly suggestible.  However, many of these 
issues were in fact raised by the defense at the pretrial competency hearing.  The 
trial court agreed that LaShara‘s testimony may have been affected by the bias of 
the adults around her, but found that these issues went toward the credibility of her 
testimony, not toward whether she was competent to testify as a matter of law.  
Whether LaShara‘s testimony was tainted by the bias of the police interviewer or 
her grandmother was also raised by the defense both during cross examination and 
during closing argument.  Thus, while an expert witness may have provided 
additional support to the defense‘s arguments, the trial court and the jury were 
already made aware of the issues raised by Dr. Stevenson.  Butler has not shown a 
 
 
reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different 
had such an expert been presented. 
 
 
b. 
Failure to Object 
Additionally, Butler argues that counsel rendered deficient performance in 
failing to object to a statement made by LaShara in the course of her trial 
testimony.  On direct examination, the prosecutor questioned LaShara regarding 
the house she lived in with her mother.  LaShara was asked how many other 
children lived with them.  She responded that her two younger sisters also lived 
there.  She then stated: ―When my daddy got out of jail one time, my other sisters 
and my one brother they came and then they left.‖  The State did not comment on 
or inquire further into LaShara‘s reference to her father‘s time in jail, but continued 
its questioning by asking where LaShara, her mother and her sisters slept when 
they lived in the house. 
Butler argues here that defense counsel should have objected to LaShara‘s 
statement, which he claims prejudiced his case by alerting the jury that he had 
previously been incarcerated.  We find that Butler was not prejudiced, however, 
because the jury was already aware of at least some of Butler‘s criminal history.  
For example, attorney Watts informed the jury in the defense‘s opening statement 
that Butler was a cocaine dealer and that he had previously been to jail for 
domestic battery.  Additionally, Butler himself testified that he had several prior 
 
 
felony convictions and had been to prison.  In light of this testimony, trial 
counsel‘s failure to object to LaShara‘s statement does not does not undermine 
confidence in the result of Butler‘s trial.  See Floyd, 18 So. 2d at 443. 
 
 
3. 
Terry Jackson 
Third, Butler argues that trial counsel was deficient for failing to sufficiently 
investigate and cross-examine witness Terry Jackson.  At trial, Jackson testified 
that he gave Butler a ride in his car the day before the murder, and that while they 
were driving Butler said he was going to ―kill Bay and Red,‖ i.e., Leslie Fleming 
and Lakisha Miller.  See Butler, 842 So. 2d at 822.  Butler alleges that evidence 
existed at the time of trial indicating that there were criminal charges pending 
against Jackson when Fleming‘s murder was being investigated and that Jackson‘s 
testimony was procured in exchange for favorable treatment.  Butler argues that 
had counsel conducted a sufficient investigation, counsel would have uncovered 
this evidence, which would have discredited Jackson‘s testimony.  Butler also 
contends that counsel should have cross-examined Jackson concerning 
inconsistencies between his testimony at trial and his initial police statement.  We 
agree with the postconviction court‘s finding that these claims are without merit. 
 
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, attorney Watts testified that he 
was unaware of any pending charges against Jackson and that he was not familiar 
with any deal Jackson might have received in exchange for his testimony.  The trial 
 
 
record shows that during pretrial proceedings, attorney Schwartzberg discussed 
Jackson‘s statement to law enforcement with the trial court and sought to have 
Jackson‘s statements excluded as irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.  The trial court 
denied the motion.  At trial, Schwartzberg cross-examined Jackson.  Jackson 
clarified his direct examination testimony, stating that Butler made the statement 
concerning Fleming and Miller while they were in Jackson‘s car, after Jackson 
agreed to drive Butler to the bank.  On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked 
Jackson whether he made a statement to the police after Fleming‘s murder.  
Jackson replied that he was questioned by law enforcement after being arrested on 
a misdemeanor warrant.  Jackson was not questioned by either party concerning 
the details of his arrest or whether he was charged with any offenses. 
 
Below, Butler submitted several documents relating to Jackson‘s criminal 
history to the postconviction court in support of his rule 3.851 motion to vacate his 
conviction and sentence.  One of the documents is a report by Detective Marvin 
Green concerning his investigation of several burglaries reported by victim Laticia 
Tucker.  In the report, Detective Green described how he and several other officers 
encountered Jackson on March 18, 1997, while investigating a homicide, and took 
Jackson into custody based on an outstanding misdemeanor warrant.  Detective 
Green wrote that he began to interview Jackson, who stated that he and Tucker had 
made amends and that she did not want to press charges.  Detective Green 
 
 
responded that he would contact Tucker after the interview.  Jackson then waived 
his Miranda5 rights and described the circumstances surrounding the alleged 
burglaries.  At the end of the report, Detective Green wrote that he contacted 
Tucker, who affirmed that she wanted the burglary charges to be dropped.  
Detective Green then stated in his report that the burglary cases would be closed 
because the victim did not want Jackson prosecuted. 
 
Additional documents concern an investigation of Jackson for the offense of 
throwing a deadly missile.  One of the documents is a police report dated May 27, 
1997, describing the incident.  The report states that an officer encountered a man 
who was bleeding from his right ear.  The man told the officer that someone had 
thrown a cement block through his car window.  Shortly thereafter, Jackson arrived 
on the scene and the man stated that Jackson was the one who threw the block.  
Jackson denied the accusation, but was placed under arrest and charged with 
throwing a deadly missile.  The report states that the officer could not locate any 
other witnesses to the incident.  Also included is a letter from the State Attorney‘s 
Office dated August 11, 1997, discussing the office‘s recommendation that no 
information be filed against Jackson due to a lack of corroborating evidence. 
 
Based on the documents described above, Butler has not established that 
Jackson‘s testimony was procured in exchange for any promise of leniency in his 
                                          
 
 
5.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
 
criminal cases.  The documents in fact show the opposite; Jackson‘s burglary 
charges were dropped because the victim decided not to press charges, while the 
charge of throwing a deadly missile was dropped due to a lack of corroborating 
evidence.  Under these circumstances, even if Butler‘s trial attorneys had 
investigated Jackson more thoroughly, Butler has not demonstrated that they would 
have discovered any evidence that would have aided his case.  Accordingly, we 
find that Butler has not established prejudice under Strickland. 
 
As to Butler‘s argument that trial counsel failed to impeach Jackson 
concerning inconsistencies between his initial statement and his testimony at trial, 
the postconviction court determined that the two statements were not inconsistent.  
In his trial testimony, Jackson explained that he and his brother encountered Butler 
in front of the Blue Chip Bar and that Butler asked for a ride to the bank.  Jackson 
stated that while they were driving, Butler told him that he was going to kill Bay 
and Red.  Butler asserts that in Jackson‘s statement to Detective Green, Jackson 
inconsistently claimed that he did not drive Butler anywhere.  The postconviction 
court rejected any claim of deficiency on the part of Butler‘s attorneys, observing:  
Looking at Jackson‘s statement to the police in full context, however, 
it appears that the detective was at that time asking Jackson if he aided 
Butler in the murder in any way, and so it is unclear whether the 
detective is asking Jackson if he drove Butler on March 12, 1997, or 
two nights later when the murder occurred. 
 
 
 
The postconviction court‘s description accurately characterizes Jackson‘s interview 
with Detective Green.  The relevant portion of the interview states: 
 
Q.  Did you in any way help Harry?  Drive Harry to the scene? 
 
A.  No. 
 
Q.  Did you take any items to hide for Harry? 
 
A.  No. 
 
Q.  Did you see Harry with any weapons at all? 
 
A.  No. 
 
While this exchange occurred immediately after Detective Green asked Jackson to 
describe the events of Wednesday, March 12 (the day Jackson claimed Butler 
made the statement that he wanted to kill Fleming and Miller), it is clear that 
Detective Green‘s question—whether Jackson ―dr[ove] Harry to the scene‖—was 
directed toward the murder itself.  Because the statements are not inconsistent, trial 
counsel‘s failure to raise the issue during cross-examination was not deficient and 
did not result in prejudice to Butler. 
 
 
4. 
Conflict of Interest 
In his fourth claim, Butler contends that he was denied effective assistance 
of counsel due to a conflict of interest between himself and attorney Anne 
Borghetti, who had previously represented witness Terry Jackson in a criminal 
case.  Butler argues that because Borghetti was ethically prohibited from revealing 
information she learned about Jackson in the course of her representation, and 
because Jackson was a material witness at Butler‘s trial, Borghetti‘s failure to 
disclose her prior representation prejudiced Butler‘s defense and violated his right 
 
 
to conflict-free counsel.  The following standard of review applies to Strickland 
claims based upon an alleged conflict of counsel: 
[I]n order to establish an ineffectiveness claim premised on an alleged 
conflict of interest the defendant must ―establish that an actual conflict 
of interest adversely affected his lawyer‘s performance.‖  A lawyer 
suffers from an actual conflict of interest when he or she ―actively 
represent[s] conflicting interests.‖  To demonstrate an actual conflict, 
the defendant must identify specific evidence in the record that 
suggests that his or her interests were compromised.  A possible, 
speculative or merely hypothetical conflict is ―insufficient to impugn 
a criminal conviction.‖ 
 
Hunter v. State, 817 So. 2d 786, 791-92 (Fla. 2002) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980)). 
 
Here, the evidence submitted to the postconviction court established that 
Borghetti was appointed to represent Jackson regarding the charge of throwing a 
deadly missile on June 19, 1997, after the Public Defender‘s Office withdrew from 
Jackson‘s case.  Borghetti filed a notice of appearance on June 26.  The letter from 
the State Attorney‘s Office declaring its intention not to prosecute Jackson on that 
charge is dated August 11.  Borghetti filed a notice of appearance in Butler‘s case 
approximately five months later, on January 15, 1998.  At the postconviction 
evidentiary hearing, Borghetti acknowledged that her signature appeared on the 
June 26 notice of appearance.  However, she testified that she had no recollection 
of representing Jackson, or even of speaking with him, and stated that her records 
contained no file under his name.  She explained that she was on the conflict 
 
 
counsel list at that time, and assumed that she was appointed to represent Jackson 
because of the withdrawal of the Public Defender‘s Office, but noted that she 
found no record of ever appearing in court on Jackson‘s behalf. 
 
Based on this evidence, Butler has not established that an ―actual conflict of 
interest adversely affected his lawyer‘s performance.‖  Hunter, 817 So. 2d at 791 
(quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350).  As the postconviction court determined in 
denying this claim, 
[A]ll evidence appears to indicate that all Borghetti did on the Jackson 
case was file a boilerplate notice of appearance before the State filed 
its notice that no information would be filed, that Borghetti did not 
even recall having briefly appeared in Jackson‘s case before 
representing Butler, and did not realize that there was any connection 
between the two men. 
 
Because there is no evidence in the record suggesting that Butler‘s interests were 
compromised by Borghetti‘s prior representation of Jackson, we affirm the 
postconviction court‘s decision. 
 
 
5. 
Unidentified Print 
Butler‘s next claim is based on the postconviction testimony of Carol 
Beauchamp, a latent print examiner with the Pinellas County Sheriff‘s Office.  
Beauchamp (née Davis) testified at Butler‘s trial concerning latent prints recovered 
from the crime scene.  At trial, Beauchamp testified that 113 prints were recovered 
from the crime scene, in the form of both lifts and photographs.  Of those 113 
prints, eighty-four had no comparable value, twenty-one were unidentified, and 
 
 
eight positive identifications were made.  Three of the identified prints were from 
Harry Butler, four were from Leslie Fleming, and one was from one of Fleming 
and Butler‘s daughters.  During postconviction proceedings, Beauchamp testified 
concerning one of the twenty-one unidentified prints.  The print was found on a 
telephone at the crime scene, was in blood, and appeared to Beauchamp to be a 
partial palm print.  Beauchamp said that she compared the print to available print 
sets from the defendant, the victim, and other individuals, but was unable to make 
a positive identification. 
 
Butler now argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 
failing to discover this print and by failing to alert the jury of its significance.  
Butler asserts that because the print was in the victim‘s blood, it could only have 
been left at the time of the murder.  Thus, the print supported trial counsel‘s 
argument that the murder was committed by an unidentified third person, and 
provided evidence that an unidentified person was at the scene of the crime.  In the 
alternative, Butler argues that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963), by failing to disclose the existence of the bloody print.  The postconviction 
court found both claims to be without merit, and we agree. 
a. 
Brady Claim 
 
Initially, we address the State‘s alleged failure to disclose evidence 
concerning the print and find Butler‘s claim unsupported by the record.  Under the 
 
 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Brady, ―the State is required to 
disclose material information within its possession or control that is favorable to 
the defense.‖  Floyd, 18 So. 3d at 450.  To prove the existence of a valid Brady 
claim, a defendant must demonstrate ―(1) that favorable evidence—either 
exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the 
State, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.‖  
Rodriguez v. State, 39 So. 3d 275, 285 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Riechmann v. State, 
966 So. 2d 298, 307 (Fla. 2007)).  To show that the defendant was prejudiced by 
the suppression of evidence, ―the defendant must demonstrate ‗a reasonable 
probability that the jury verdict would have been different had the suppressed 
information been used at trial.‘‖  Floyd, 18 So. 3d at 450 (quoting Smith v. State, 
931 So. 2d 790, 796 (Fla. 2006)). 
 
As to the second prong, ―this Court has explained that ‗[t]here is no Brady 
violation where the information is equally accessible to the defense and the 
prosecution, or where the defense either had the information or could have 
obtained it through the exercise of reasonable diligence.‘‖  Floyd, 18 So. 3d at 451 
(quoting Provenzano v. State, 616 So. 2d 428, 430 (Fla. 1993)).  In this case, the 
record establishes that evidence concerning the bloody print was not withheld from 
the defense.  Beauchamp testified that she provided copies of all identifiable prints, 
as well as a copy of her report containing the results of all fingerprint comparisons, 
 
 
to the defense.  Additionally, attorney Watts testified that evidence concerning the 
print was included in the materials provided to the defense and was further 
mentioned in the deposition of Donald Barker, the investigator who documented 
the print at the crime scene.   Under these circumstances, evidence of the print was 
clearly available to the defense.  Accordingly, Butler has failed to establish that 
evidence was ―willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State.‖  Rodriguez, 39 
So. 3d at 285.  Thus, Butler‘s Brady claim is without merit. 
b. 
Strickland Claim 
 
As to Butler‘s Strickland claim, the trial court held that the failure of counsel 
to highlight the significance of this print to the jury did not result in sufficient 
prejudice to warrant relief.  Again, this conclusion is supported by the evidence 
presented at trial and in the postconviction record.  Butler‘s prejudice argument is 
based on his contention that the existence of the bloody print supported his 
attorneys‘ argument at trial that the murder was committed by an unidentified third 
person.  However, according to Beauchamp‘s postconviction testimony, the print 
did not conclusively establish that a third person was at the crime scene.   
Beauchamp stated that the print appeared to her to be a partial palm print.  
She explained that while she compared the print to print sets from the victim, the 
defendant, and numerous other individuals, she was not able to identify its source.  
However, Beauchamp also explained that the area of the palm between the thumb 
 
 
and forefinger, which a person would use in grabbing an item, is not included on a 
standard set of fingerprint cards, but rather is only included if major case prints are 
taken.  Beauchamp said that she did not have a set of major case prints from Leslie 
Fleming.  Thus, she was unable to exclude the victim as a source of the print.  
Furthermore, Shawna Fleming, the victim‘s sister, testified that when she 
discovered Leslie‘s body on the morning of March 14, 1997, the body was next to 
the phone.  As the postconviction court also observed, Beauchamp testified that 
Dennis Tennell and Adonis Hartsfield, the two possible alternative perpetrators 
identified by the defense, were conclusively eliminated as sources of the print. 
In light of the fact that the victim could not be eliminated as a source of the 
bloody print, this evidence provides little support for the defense‘s argument that 
an unidentified third person was present at the scene of the murder.  Nor does the 
print negate or weaken other evidence of Butler‘s guilt, particularly Butler‘s 
statement that he intended to kill Leslie Fleming, LaShara Butler‘s identification of 
her father, and the fact that the victim‘s blood was found on Butler‘s shoes.  
Accordingly, counsel‘s failure to bring the print to the jury‘s attention does not 
undermine confidence in the result of the proceedings, and we affirm the 
postconviction court‘s denial of relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. 
Medical Examiner’s Testimony 
Butler‘s sixth Strickland claim is based on the asserted failure of his trial 
counsel to object to testimony by medical examiner Dr. Marie Hansen during the 
guilt phase.  The challenged statements were made during redirect examination.  
Dr. Hansen was asked by the State to define the phrase ―torturous wounds,‖ which 
she did.  When asked whether the victim‘s injures were torturous wounds, Hanson 
replied, ―[T]hey could be consistent with torture wounds, yes.‖  Butler argues that 
counsel should have objected to this statement as irrelevant and speculative.  He 
further argues that because Dr. Hansen is not an expert in neurology, she was not 
qualified to testify as to whether the victim was in pain. 
Below, the postconviction court rejected Butler‘s claims.  As to the issue of 
relevance, the court found that, during cross-examination, defense counsel 
questioned Dr. Hansen concerning the possibility that the victim was unconscious 
when the wounds were inflicted.  The postconviction court determined that in 
discussing the issue of torturous wounds, the State was attempting to establish that 
the victim was in fact conscious.  As to Dr. Hansen‘s qualifications, the court 
observed that ―[a]lthough Dr. Hansen testified that tortuous [sic] wounds hurt, she 
did not express any opinion as to whether the victim suffered; her testimony 
regarding tortuous [sic] wounds simply dealt with the possibility that the victim 
could have been conscious.‖  Thus, the court concluded that the testimony was not 
 
 
irrelevant or improper, and that any objection would have been rejected by the trial 
court.  See Hitchcock, 991 So. 2d at 361 (―Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective 
for failing to make a meritless objection.‖). 
These conclusions are supported by the record.  On direct examination, Dr. 
Hansen described the extent and nature of the victim‘s wounds.  She testified that 
the victim suffered twenty-five stab wounds, nine incised wounds, and eleven 
wounds that could not be labeled.  Some of these wounds were defensive in nature.  
Additionally, the victim exhibited swelling on her face and a fractured jaw, which 
Dr. Hanson explained was consistent with being struck with blunt force.  Multiple 
stab wounds were observed on the victim‘s neck.  Two of these wounds would 
have been fatal, causing the victim to bleed to death or causing her lungs to 
collapse.  Dr. Hanson also observed hemorrhage marks on the victim‘s neck, which 
were consistent with strangulation, asphyxiation, or suffocation. 
On cross-examination, the defense questioned Dr. Hanson as to whether the 
victim might have been unconscious when many of the wounds were inflicted.  Dr. 
Hansen explained that defensive wounds were indicative of consciousness or 
semiconsciousness, but otherwise agreed that there was no way to determine the 
order in which the victim‘s injuries were inflicted.  Dr. Hansen agreed that with the 
exception of the defensive wounds, the victim could have been unconscious when 
the injuries were inflicted.  On redirect examination, the State asked Dr. Hansen to 
 
 
explain to the jury the definition of a ―torturous wound.‖  She explained that 
torturous wounds are small wounds in the skin made in order to hurt or threaten a 
person.  Dr. Hansen stated that some of the wounds on the victim‘s chest, 
abdomen, and neck could be consistent with torturous wounds.  The State then 
questioned Dr. Hansen concerning the length of time it would take to render a 
person unconscious from asphyxiation.  Dr. Hansen responded that it would take 
―up to a couple minutes‖ if pressure to the neck were continuously applied.  The 
State then asked, ―Why would someone keep stabbing someone if they were 
unconscious?‖  The defense objected to the question as speculative, and the court 
sustained the objection. 
 
Although the trial court sustained the defense‘s objection to the State‘s final 
question, we agree with the postconviction court that the overall inquiry was 
relevant to the issues raised during the direct and cross-examinations of Dr. 
Hansen.  The defense sought to establish that the victim may have been 
unconscious when many of the wounds were inflicted.  In response, the State 
sought to establish that the wounds were torturous in nature, indicating that the 
perpetrator inflicted the injuries in an effort to inflict pain on a conscious victim.  
Further, contrary to Butler‘s argument, Dr. Hansen did not testify that the wounds 
in fact caused the victim pain, but only that they were ―consistent with‖ the type of 
wounds inflicted with the intent of causing pain.  Because this testimony was not 
 
 
irrelevant or improper, any objection would have been overruled.  Because 
―[c]ounsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make a meritless objection,‖ 
Hitchcock, 991 So. 2d at 361, we affirm the postconviction court‘s denial of relief. 
 
 
7. 
Defense Counsel’s Opening Statement 
Seventh, Butler argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
based on a statement made by defense attorney Richard Watts.  In the defense‘s 
guilt phase opening statement, Watts argued that Butler did not kill Leslie Fleming, 
that Butler‘s prosecution was the result of a rush to judgment by law enforcement, 
and that the jury would observe deficiencies in the State‘s evidence due to the 
State‘s failure to conduct a sufficient investigation of the murder.  In the course of 
the opening statement, Watts incorrectly informed the jury that blood was 
discovered on a sliding glass door at the victim‘s home containing DNA that 
belonged to neither Butler nor the victim.  Watts further asserted that the blood on 
the door belonged to the real killer.  In actuality, the blood was not found at 
Fleming‘s home, but was instead found on a door at the apartment where Butler 
was living at the time of the murder.  The State addressed the defense‘s mistake in 
its closing argument, emphasizing that all the blood found at the crime scene 
belonged to the victim and that there was no way to tell when the blood found in 
Butler‘s apartment was deposited there. 
 
 
Butler asserts that this error deprived him of a fair trial by undermining the 
defense‘s credibility with the jury.  Below, the postconviction court rejected 
Butler‘s claim, finding no reasonable possibility that the error impacted the result 
of the trial.  We agree.  First, as the postconviction court observed, Watts‘ 
statement was brief and did not become a focus of the trial.  Secondly, defense 
attorney Michael Schwartzberg acknowledged the error in his closing argument 
and sought to use it in the defense‘s favor.  During closing, Schwartzberg reiterated 
the defense‘s position that the arrest and prosecution of Butler was the result of a 
rush to judgment by police.  Schwartzberg admitted that the blood referred to in 
opening argument was found at Butler‘s apartment rather than Fleming‘s home.  
However, he noted that while the blood had been tested against DNA samples from 
Butler and Fleming, it had not been tested against the DNA of other individuals 
involved in the case.  Schwartzberg argued that law enforcement‘s failure to 
thoroughly evaluate the evidence provided further support for the defense‘s 
argument that law enforcement did not conduct a sufficient investigation.   
Based on this record, we agree that Butler has not demonstrated a reasonable 
probability that absent the error, the result of the proceedings would have been 
different.  See Everett, 54 So. 3d at 472.  Because Butler has not satisfied the 
prejudice prong of Strickland, we affirm the denial of relief on this claim. 
 
 
 
 
 
8. 
Butler’s Testimony 
In his final claim concerning ineffectiveness of guilt phase counsel, Butler 
argues that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately prepare 
him to testify at trial concerning his prior felony convictions.  During the guilt 
phase, Butler informed the jury on direct examination that he was ―on [his] way to 
prison‖ when he first met the victim.  On cross-examination, the State asked Butler 
how many felony convictions he had.  Butler responded, ―Approximately nine that 
I know of.‖  The State replied, ―How about ten?‖  Butler answered, ―Maybe so.‖  
Butler contends that counsel deficiently failed to instruct him not to discuss his 
criminal history and to make certain that Butler was aware of the number of his 
prior felony convictions.  The postconviction court rejected these claims, finding 
that counsel did not fail to prepare Butler to testify and that Butler was not 
prejudiced by the exchange with the State during cross-examination. 
 
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Richard Watts acknowledged that 
he intended to bring out Butler‘s prior felonies during direct examination as 
―anticipatory rehabilitation,‖ but stated that he forgot to do so.  Watts said that he 
discussed the issue with the State before trial and that they had agreed on the 
number of Butler‘s prior felonies.  Watts stated that he informed Butler before trial 
that the number of his prior felony convictions, but not the nature of those felonies, 
could be used against him if he testified. 
 
 
 
Based on this record, we find that Butler has not established prejudice under 
Strickland.  With regard to counsel‘s failure to tell Butler not to discuss his prior 
convictions, the jury was already aware prior to Butler‘s testimony that Butler had 
been a cocaine dealer and that he was previously arrested for domestic battery 
against Fleming.  As the postconviction court stated in denying this claim, 
Given this testimony, it would hardly be a surprise to the members of 
the jury that Butler had, at some point in his past, served time in 
prison.  While Butler‘s testimony was not helpful, this brief reference 
to serving time in prison cannot be said to have changed the outcome 
of the trial. 
 
Similarly, with regard to counsel‘s failure to bring out the number of prior felonies 
during direct examination and to make certain that Butler was aware of the number 
of his prior felonies, we find no reasonable probability of a different outcome.  The 
difference between Butler‘s answer of ―approximately nine‖ and the State‘s 
correction of ―ten‖ was negligible.  Because we find that Butler was not prejudiced 
under Strickland, we affirm the postconviction court‘s denial of this claim. 
 
B. 
Ineffective Assistance of Penalty Phase Counsel 
Next, Butler argues that the postconviction court erred in denying his claim 
that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance at the penalty phase of his trial.  In 
keeping with Strickland, ―To succeed in an ineffective assistance of penalty phase 
counsel claim, the claimant must demonstrate that counsel performed deficiently 
and that such deficiency prejudiced his defense.‖  Lynch v. State, 2 So. 3d 47, 70 
 
 
(Fla. 2008) (quoting Hannon v. State, 941 So. 2d 1109, 1124 (Fla. 2006)).  ―When 
evaluating claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigating 
evidence, this Court has phrased the defendant‘s burden as showing that counsel‘s 
ineffectiveness ‗deprived the defendant of a reliable penalty phase proceeding.‘‖  
Asay v. State, 769 So. 2d 974, 985 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Rutherford v. State, 727 
So. 2d 216, 223 (Fla. 1998)).  In meeting this burden, Butler ―must show that but 
for his counsel‘s deficiency, there is a reasonable probability he would have 
received a different sentence.‖  Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 453 (2009). 
At the postconviction evidentiary hearings, it was established that Butler was 
originally represented in his criminal case by the Public Defender‘s Office.  After 
the Public Defender withdrew due to a conflict of interest, the trial court appointed 
attorneys Michael Schwartzberg and Richard Watts to represent Butler.  Watts, in 
turn, retained attorney Anne Borghetti to assist in the preparation of Butler‘s case.  
Watts testified during postconviction proceedings that Schwartzberg took primary 
responsibility for the guilt phase of trial, while he and Borghetti were responsible 
for gathering mitigation to present during the penalty phase. 
Borghetti described the defense‘s investigation of Butler‘s background and 
its development of mitigating evidence.  She testified that she interviewed Butler, 
reviewed his school records, and prepared an assessment of his family history and 
upbringing.  Borghetti also interviewed members of Butler‘s family, including 
 
 
Butler‘s father Junior Butler, sister Sandra Butler, and brother Terry Butler, as well 
as Robin Green, Butler‘s former girlfriend and the mother of three of his children, 
and Butler‘s employer James Wood, who testified during the guilt phase.  An 
investigator was retained, although Borghetti admitted that the investigator was not 
specifically assigned to develop mitigating evidence.  The defense also consulted 
with Dr. Alfred Fireman, a forensic psychiatrist, who interviewed Butler and 
reviewed his medical records.6 
As to the penalty phase itself, Borghetti and Watts testified that the 
presentation of evidence did not go as planned.  The proceeding was held on 
Saturday, June 27, 1998, the day after the guilt phase was completed.  According 
to Watts, the jury was given the option of waiting until Monday to proceed with 
the penalty phase or to continue through the weekend, and opted to proceed on 
Saturday.  On the morning of the penalty phase, however, many of the defense‘s 
expected witnesses failed to arrive at court.  Watts explained that he intended to 
call several of Butler‘s friends and family members as witnesses, including Robin 
Green and Butler‘s son, Harry, Jr.  Watts said that he had considered the witnesses 
                                          
 
 
6.  Although Dr. Fireman was never called as a witness during the penalty 
phase, Borghetti acknowledged filing with the trial court a notice of intent to 
present Dr. Fireman‘s expert testimony concerning mental health mitigation.  
Borghetti did not recall the defense‘s specific reasons for not calling Dr. Fireman.  
During his own testimony, however, attorney Watts explained that he did not 
believe attempting to demonstrate mental health defects would have helped Butler 
before the jury. 
 
 
who failed to arrive to be the most persuasive.  Nonetheless, Watts decided to go 
ahead with the penalty phase, concluding that the jury would have been less 
favorable to Butler if the proceeding was delayed.  Watts also stated that in his 
experience reluctant witnesses are not very helpful.  He felt at the time of trial that 
if the witnesses intentionally chose not to show up, their testimony would likely be 
of limited value to the defense.  The defense thus proceeded with only two 
mitigation witnesses available: Junior Butler and Sandra Butler. 
Attorney Borghetti delivered the defense‘s penalty phase opening argument 
and conducted direct examinations of the two witnesses.  During postconviction, 
Borghetti explained that the two witnesses turned out to be less favorable than the 
defense had expected.  Borghetti said she had a difficult time getting Butler‘s 
father to say anything good about him.  Instead, Junior Butler was more focused on 
discussing his own experience of being accused of the murder of Butler‘s mother.  
Borghetti found Sandra Butler similarly unhelpful.  After describing her childhood 
experiences with her brother, Sandra, to the surprise of the defense, informed the 
jury of a dream she had the previous night in which God told her that Butler was 
guilty of the murder of Leslie Fleming.  In his own postconviction testimony, 
Watts agreed with Borghetti that the presentation of mitigating evidence did not go 
well.  He said that as a result of his experience in Butler‘s case, he now retains a 
 
 
mitigation specialist in every capital case and always places his expected penalty 
phase witnesses under subpoena. 
Following the testimony of Sandra Butler, the defense requested and the 
court granted a brief recess while the defense waited for Robin Green to arrive.  
When Green failed to arrive by the end of the recess, the defense rested.  The 
defense‘s closing argument was delivered by attorney Schwartzberg, who argued 
that Butler was under the influence of alcohol and cocaine on the night of the 
murder, which supported a finding that he was under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the offense.  See § 921.141(6)(b), 
Fla. Stat. (1997).  Schwartzberg relied in part on Butler‘s own guilt phase 
testimony, as well as on the testimony of other witnesses who had observed Butler 
using large amounts of alcohol and cocaine on the night of the murder.  Citing the 
testimony of Junior and Sandra Butler, Schwartzberg also argued that Butler grew 
up without his mother, that his grandmother also died when he was young, and that 
Butler had a troubled childhood.  Schwartzberg further argued that Butler was a 
good son, a good father, and suffered from a long-term substance abuse problem.  
In addition, Schwartzberg highlighted the guilt phase testimony of Butler‘s 
employer and coworkers that Butler was a hard worker and well regarded.  
Nonetheless, at the end of the penalty phase the jury returned a recommendation in 
favor of death by a vote of eleven to one. 
 
 
 
At a Spencer hearing several months later, the defense presented mental 
health testimony by Dr. Michael Maher, a psychiatrist.7  The trial court issued its 
sentencing order on January 11, 1999.  In following the jury recommendation, the 
court found one aggravator, that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or 
cruel, which the court assigned ―great weight.‖  As to the proposed statutory 
mitigation, the trial court rejected the defense‘s argument that Butler was under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance when the crime was 
committed.  The trial court next addressed and assigned weight to the following 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: (1) Butler was reared without his natural 
mother (some weight); (2) Butler had a troubled childhood (rejected); (3) Butler is 
a hard worker (rejected); (4) Butler is a good and loving father (rejected); (5) 
Butler is a good and loving son (some weight); (6) Butler is well thought of by 
                                          
 
 
7.  On direct appeal, this Court summarized Dr. Maher‘s Spencer hearing 
testimony as follows: 
 
Dr. Maher testified that he interviewed Butler concerning his use of 
drugs and his psychiatric background.  Butler informed him that he 
used a lot of cocaine on the night of murder, but he also said he did 
not commit the murder.  Dr. Maher indicated that one of the effects 
caused by the use of cocaine was irrational, repetitive actions.  He 
opined that the number of stab wounds in this case suggests this type 
of behavior.  Dr. Maher further opined that a child whose mother dies 
as a result of violence faces a great risk of participating in violence to 
resolve conflicts, especially when this factor is coupled with other 
dysfunctional social activities, such as drug use. 
 
Butler, 842 So. 2d at 822-23. 
 
 
neighbors and coworkers (slight weight); (7) Butler has a long-term substance 
abuse problem (slight weight). 
In rejecting and assigning weight to several of the proposed mitigators, the 
trial court cited a lack of evidence.  With regard to counsel‘s contention that Butler 
had a troubled childhood, the court observed that the only evidence supporting the 
aggravator was the testimony of Butler‘s father that the family was poor.  The 
court observed, ―Poverty is not a per se indicator of a troubled childhood, and the 
defendant offered no other evidence to convince the Court that this circumstance 
exists.‖  In assigning slight weight to the mitigator that Butler is well thought of by 
neighbors and coworkers, the court ―note[d] that the court file is devoid of letters 
or notes in support of the defendant.‖  As to Butler‘s long-term substance abuse 
problem, the court found that the only evidence supporting the mitigator was 
Butler‘s own testimony.  In determining that death was an appropriate sentence, 
the trial court explained that the aggravation was substantial while the mitigating 
circumstances were relatively minor. 
Following this Court‘s affirmance of Butler‘s conviction and death sentence, 
Butler filed his rule 3.851 motion for postconviction relief.  Regarding his claim of 
penalty phase ineffectiveness, Butler specifically alleged that his trial counsel 
rendered deficient performance by failing to conduct a sufficient investigation of 
his upbringing and family background, failing to retain and present a mitigation 
 
 
specialist, failing to place penalty phase witnesses under subpoena, and failing to 
retain and present a mental health expert.  Butler alleged in the motion that trial 
counsel should have discovered and presented mitigating evidence concerning his 
abandonment and emotional cut-offs during early childhood, chaotic family 
environment as a child, socioeconomic and educational deprivations during 
childhood, inadequate coping skills and impulse control, substance abuse, mental 
and emotional disorders, and possible brain damage. 
At the November 2008 evidentiary hearing, Butler presented witness 
testimony in support of his rule 3.851 motion.  Maude Brown, Butler‘s great-aunt, 
and Annie Brookins, who was related by marriage to a member of Butler‘s 
extended family, testified concerning Butler‘s family background and the 
circumstances of his childhood.  Both explained that Butler was raised on a 
tobacco farm in rural Georgia, that conditions on the farm were poor, lacking 
running water or electricity, and that the children would begin working on the farm 
at age six or seven and had limited access to education.  Butler‘s mother died in an 
apparent drowning accident when Butler was three years old, and Butler and his 
siblings were largely raised by their grandmother.  Butler‘s grandmother later died 
when Butler was ten years of age, at which time Butler was sent to live with his 
father in Florida.  Brookins testified that Butler played football in high school, got 
along well with other children, and seemed happy despite the family‘s poverty.  
 
 
Brown testified that she had little contact with Butler when he lived in Florida and 
did not know him as an adult.   
Shirley Furtick, a social worker, conducted a biopsychosocial assessment of 
Butler and testified as an expert in clinical social work.  Based on her 
investigation, Furtick provided the postconviction court with additional details 
concerning conditions on the farm where Butler was raised as well as Butler‘s 
personal history.  Like Brown and Brookins, Furtick described conditions on the 
farm as very poor.  The children lived in a two-bedroom shack belonging to 
Butler‘s grandmother which lacked electricity or running water.  The children were 
awoken early in the morning to work in the tobacco fields and were sometimes 
beaten by their grandparents if they failed to do so.  They were often 
undernourished and lacked clothes.  Following the death of Butler‘s grandmother, 
Butler and his siblings lived with their father in Florida.  Furtick stated that Junior 
Butler often left his children alone and that Butler was mostly raised by his older 
brother Terry, until Terry was arrested and sent to prison when Butler was fourteen 
years old.  Furtick testified that Butler attended high school in Florida, where he 
was a good football player but a poor student.  Butler dropped out of high school 
shortly before the twelfth grade because an injury prevented him from playing 
football.  Butler‘s then girlfriend, Green, became pregnant when he was eighteen 
 
 
years old and he took various jobs to support her.  Butler began selling drugs as 
well as using crack cocaine, and Green eventually ended the relationship. 
Butler also presented testimony by Dr. Glenn Caddy, a clinical and forensic 
psychiatrist.  Dr. Caddy interviewed Butler three times, reviewed his school and 
medical records, and consulted with Furtick concerning Butler‘s childhood and 
family history.  Dr. Caddy said that Butler described himself as a ―happy-go-lucky 
kid.‖  However, Dr. Caddy learned that Butler‘s mother reportedly drank alcohol 
when she was pregnant, that Butler observed a lot of violence as a child, and that 
as a child Butler had an extreme fear of the dark and suffered from stuttering and 
bed wetting.  Butler began using alcohol in his early teen years and drank heavily 
as an adult.  Dr. Caddy stated that Butler refused to submit to an IQ test but agreed 
to other psychological and intellectual testing.  Dr. Caddy determined that Butler 
functions at a third-grade level in reading, a second-grade level in spelling, and a 
fifth-grade level in arithmetic.  Dr. Caddy also determined that Butler suffers from 
―serious impairment‖ in abstract reasoning ability and scored in the ninth 
percentile of adults in memory function. 
In its order denying relief, the postconviction court found neither deficiency 
nor prejudice.  As to deficiency, the court found that Butler‘s trial attorneys 
conducted a sufficient investigation of Butler‘s background and made a reasonable 
strategic decision to go forward with the penalty phase as scheduled.  The court 
 
 
also rejected Butler‘s claim of deficiency regarding the failure to hire a mental 
health expert, finding that the evidence showed that trial counsel did retain Dr. 
Fireman to conduct a mental health evaluation of Butler and, based on the results 
of that evaluation, elected not to present his findings.  The court further determined 
that Butler was not prejudiced by any failure to conduct a more thorough 
presentation of mitigating evidence, explaining: 
[A]lthough the defense presented extensive testimony from several 
witnesses to establish the existence of additional mitigating evidence 
not presented at trial, the essence of this testimony amounted to things 
already heard, in a summary fashion, during trial proceedings: that 
Butler grew up poor, his mother and grandmother died when he was 
young, he moved around due to instability caused by the deaths of his 
mother and grandmother, he has little education and limited 
intellectual abilities, and has some problems with substance abuse.  
The court finds that none of this additional testimony was of such 
significance that, had it been presented during the penalty phase, it 
would have persuaded either the jury to recommend life or the court to 
ultimately impose a life sentence in this case. 
 
The postconviction court concluded that there was no reasonable probability that 
the additional testimony would have changed the outcome of the proceeding and, 
accordingly, denied Butler‘s claim.  Butler now appeals that decision. 
 
As discussed above, to be entitled to relief before this Court Butler must 
satisfy both the deficiency and prejudice prongs of the Strickland test.  See Lynch, 
2 So. 3d at 70.  As the postconviction record makes clear, the penalty phase of 
Butler‘s trial did not proceed as Butler‘s counsel anticipated.  Specifically, counsel 
admitted that they failed to take steps to ensure that their anticipated mitigation 
 
 
witnesses would be present at the penalty phase and did not retain a mitigation 
specialist to investigate Butler‘s background.  However, Butler bears the burden of 
proving not only that his attorneys were deficient, but also that he was prejudiced 
by such deficiency.8  ―In assessing prejudice, we reweigh the evidence in 
aggravation against the totality of available mitigating evidence.‖  Wiggins v. 
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003).  The question this Court must address is whether, 
                                          
 
8.  In arguing that his counsel was deficient, Butler presented the testimony 
of Professor David Dow of the University of Houston Law Center.  Professor Dow 
was admitted as an expert in norms and standards of attorney conduct in death 
penalty litigation.  In discussing the sufficiency of Butler‘s representation at trial, 
Professor Dow focused on the requirements of the 1989 American Bar Association 
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty 
Cases (―ABA Guidelines‖).  Although the ABA Guidelines were revised and 
updated in 2003, Professor Dow explained—as the United States Supreme Court 
has also stated—that the conduct of counsel must be evaluated under the standards 
that were in place at the time of the defendant‘s trial.  See Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 
S. Ct. 13, 16-17 (2009); but see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (observing that 
―[p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards 
and the like are guides to determining what is reasonable‖ in assessing attorney 
performance, but cautioning that ―they are only guides‖); see also Mendoza v. 
State, 87 So. 3d 644, 653 (Fla. 2011) (―The ABA Guidelines are not a set of rules 
constitutionally mandated under the Sixth Amendment and that govern the Court‘s 
Strickland analysis.  Rather, the ABA Guidelines provide guidance, and have 
evolved over time as has this Court‘s own jurisprudence.‖).  Professor Dow 
testified that pursuant to the ABA Guidelines, the retention of a mitigation 
specialist was part of the minimum standard of practice for defense attorneys 
trying capital cases in the late 1990s.  In Professor Dow‘s opinion, Butler‘s trial 
attorneys were deficient for failing to retain such a specialist to investigate Butler‘s 
personal background.  Professor Dow explained that a mitigation specialist would 
have been able to testify concerning Butler‘s background even if, as in fact 
occurred, other potential mitigation witnesses turned out to be unhelpful or 
unavailable.  Because we find that Butler has not established prejudice, it is 
unnecessary for this Court to address whether Butler has established deficiency as 
defined by Strickland and its progeny, and we decline to do so. 
 
 
had the jury and trial judge considered the total mitigating evidence presented both 
at trial and during postconviction proceedings and compared it with the 
aggravating circumstances, there is a reasonable probability Butler would have 
received a sentence of life in prison.  On review, we find no such probability. 
 
With regard to the totality of available mitigating evidence, the record 
supports the postconviction court‘s finding that the additional evidence presented 
at the postconviction evidentiary hearing, in essence, ―amounted to things already 
heard, in a summary fashion, during trial proceedings.‖  Despite the testimony of 
attorneys Borghetti and Watts that many of their expected witnesses failed to arrive 
at court and that Junior and Sandra Butler were less helpful than the defense had 
hoped they would be, the defense did succeed in presenting to the jury evidence 
that Butler‘s family was very poor, that Butler‘s mother died when he was young, 
that Butler was raised by his grandmother until her death several years later, that 
Butler and his siblings were then raised by their father who had little money, and 
that Butler suffered from problems with drugs and alcohol.  Counsel presented 
additional testimony concerning Butler‘s substance abuse through the Spencer 
hearing testimony of Dr. Maher, who explained to the trial court how Butler‘s 
cocaine use may have affected his actions on the night of the murder.   
Overall, the evidence presented at the postconviction evidentiary hearing 
does not materially alter the sentencing profile that was presented to the jury and to 
 
 
the trial court.  Butler argued in his rule 3.851 motion that counsel was deficient 
under Strickland for failing to retain a mitigation specialist and subpoena penalty 
phase witnesses.  Butler specifically relies on the testimony of Annie Brookins, 
Maude Brown, and Shirley Furtick to argue that counsel failed to present evidence 
of his troubled childhood.  While these witnesses provided more details concerning 
Butler‘s childhood poverty than was provided at trial, the evidence suffers from the 
same deficiency that the trial court found in its sentencing order, namely, that 
―[p]overty is not a per se indicator of a troubled childhood.‖  Indeed, some of their 
testimony contradicts Butler‘s claim.  Although Furtick, Brown, and Brookins 
described the impoverished conditions of Butler‘s early life, their testimony also 
established that from the ages of three to ten Butler was raised by his grandmother, 
who loved and cared for him.  That Butler‘s childhood was troubled is also partly 
contradicted by the testimony of Dr. Caddy, who said that Butler described himself 
as a ―happy-go-lucky kid.‖  Similarly, Brookins noted that when he lived in 
Florida, Butler played football and seemed happy despite his family‘s poverty.  
Moreover, despite Butler‘s contention that trial counsel was deficient for failing to 
subpoena penalty phase witnesses, no evidence was presented establishing what 
the absent witnesses would have told the jury and the trial court. 
 
Butler also argued in his rule 3.851 motion that trial counsel was deficient 
for failing to present testimony concerning mental health mitigation.  We agree 
 
 
with the postconviction court that the evidence of mental health issues presented at 
the postconviction evidentiary hearing was not ―of such significance that, had it 
been presented during the penalty phase, it would have persuaded either the jury to 
recommend life or the court to ultimately impose a life sentence in this case.‖  The 
only mental health testimony presented in postconviction, that of Dr. Caddy, 
concerned Butler‘s poor intellectual abilities and drug and alcohol abuse.  As to the 
evidence of drug and alcohol abuse, the jury was already made aware through the 
guilt phase testimony of Butler and other witnesses that Butler had used large 
amounts of alcohol and cocaine on the night of the murder.  With regard to 
Butler‘s intellectual abilities, while Dr. Caddy testified that Butler performs at a 
low level in reading, spelling, and arithmetic and suffers from poor memory 
function, he did not state that these deficiencies would have supported a finding, as 
trial counsel argued during the penalty phase, that Butler was under the influence 
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  Further, Dr. Caddy did not connect 
these deficiencies to the crime itself or explain how they would have affected 
Butler‘s actions at the time of the murder.  See Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216, 
224 (Fla. 1998) (finding mental health testimony to be of limited mitigating value 
where experts failed to connect the defendant‘s deficiencies to the murder).  As in 
 
 
Rutherford, there was no evidence that Davis‘s intellectual deficits ―contributed to 
his actions in effecting the murder.‖  Id.9 
 
While trial counsel‘s failure to present mitigating evidence may under some 
circumstances entitle a defendant to a new penalty phase, the evidence must be of 
such significance that its absence has resulted in the deprivation of a reliable 
sentencing proceeding.  See, e.g., Hildwin v. Dugger, 654 So. 2d 107, 109-10 (Fla. 
1995) (finding both deficiency and prejudice under Strickland where trial counsel 
―failed to unearth a large amount of mitigating evidence,‖ including two weighty 
                                          
 
 
9.  This is not to suggest, as the dissent cautions against, that this testimony 
would have been of no mitigating value.  Plainly, the jury and the trial court are 
required to consider as mitigation ―any aspect of a defendant‘s character or record. 
. . that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.‖  Lockett v. 
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).  For the purposes of assessing whether there is a 
reasonable probability that mental health evidence would have changed the 
outcome of the penalty phase, however, it is incumbent upon this Court to 
―reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating 
evidence.‖  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003).  In doing so, ―it is 
important to focus on the nature of the mental mitigation‖ presented in 
postconviction.  Rutherford, 727 So. 2d at 223.  Here, the mental health mitigation 
described by Dr. Caddy was largely confined to his conclusions that Butler has 
poor intellectual abilities and suffers from poor memory function.  That this 
testimony bears little relationship to Butler‘s behavior in committing the murder is 
a relevant consideration in determining whether the jury would have recommended 
or the trial court would have imposed a sentence of life imprisonment.  See id. at 
224; see also Hannon v. State, 941 So. 2d 1109, 1135 (Fla. 2006) (finding no 
reasonable probability of a different sentence where the postconviction mental 
health expert most favorable to the defendant ―could not translate any brain 
damage as having any conceptual or actual impact on Hannon‘s behavior, and 
there was no evidence to establish any nexus between Hannon‘s mental health and 
his behavior or as it related to the crimes‖). 
 
 
statutory mitigating circumstances).  By contrast, where the additional mitigation is 
minor or cumulative and the aggravating circumstances substantial, we have held 
that confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase is not undermined.  See, e.g., 
Breedlove v. State, 692 So. 2d 874, 877-78 (Fla. 1997) (finding no prejudice under 
Strickland where mitigating evidence presented in postconviction, particularly 
testimony concerning the defendant‘s drug addiction and beatings by his father, 
would not have changed the outcome in light of substantial aggravation in the 
record); see also Asay, 769 So. 2d at 988 (―[T]his Court has reasoned that where 
the trial court found substantial and compelling aggravation, . . . there was no 
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different had counsel 
presented mitigation evidence of the defendant‘s abused childhood, history of 
substance abuse, and brain damage.‖). 
 
In this case, although the trial court found only a single aggravating 
circumstance—that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel—that 
aggravator was particularly weighty.  In concluding that the aggravator was 
entitled to great weight, the trial court summarized the evidence on which it relied 
as follows: 
The evidence showed that Ms. Fleming was brutally stabbed, 
slashed, beaten, strangled, suffocated, and left for dead while her three 
little girls slept just down the hall.  According to the medical 
examiner, she was stabbed or slashed with a sharp instrument 45 times 
on her neck, torso, and lower abdomen.  Twenty-five of the wounds 
were deep stab wounds, and twenty of the wounds were wide, 
 
 
elongated incised wounds.  There were so many wounds, in fact, that 
the medical examiner testified that ―after a while describing them you 
run out of new words to describe them with.‖  Some of the wounds 
were consistent with ―torturous wounds‖ designed to torture or 
terrorize a victim.  Ms. Fleming, the medical examiner testified, had 
such wounds on her neck, chest, and abdomen.  Some of her wounds 
were ―defensive wounds‖ inflicted when a victim tries to shield vital 
body parts from an attacker.  A victim is, by definition, alive and 
conscious when such wounds are inflicted.  Ms. Fleming had six of 
these wounds on her hands, and additional arguable defensive wounds 
on her arms.  One stab wound went through her wrist.  In addition to 
the stabbing and slashing, Ms. Fleming was beaten.  The medical 
examiner testified that she had a fractured jaw, bruises in her mouth, 
swelling of her face and lips, and abrasions on her upper and lower 
lips.  In addition to the stabbing and slashing and beating, Ms. 
Fleming was strangled.  The medical examiner found petechiae in her 
left eye, a symptom consistent with pressure injury to the neck.  
Finally, a plastic bag was found on Ms. Fleming‘s face.  A pillow was 
on the floor next to her face.  The fatal wound, in the medical 
examiner‘s opinion, was a stab wound to the side of the neck which 
caused Ms. Fleming to bleed to death.  The entire episode lasted ten 
minutes or more, the medical examiner estimated. 
 
As we have observed, HAC is considered one of the weightiest aggravators in the 
statutory scheme.  See Aguirre-Jarquin v. State, 9 So. 3d 593, 610 (Fla. 2009).  
Given the extreme and prolonged nature of the assault and murder in this case, we 
find that the HAC aggravator far eclipses the evidence concerning Butler‘s 
disadvantaged upbringing, intellectual deficits, and substance abuse. 
Under these circumstances, we find no reasonable probability that the 
additional mitigating evidence would have convinced five jurors to change their 
recommendations from death to life imprisonment.  See Hodges v. State, 885 So. 
2d 338, 351 (Fla. 2004) (―Even with the postconviction allegations regarding 
 
 
Hodges‘ upbringing, it is highly unlikely that the admission of that evidence would 
have led four additional jurors to cast a vote recommending life in prison.‖).  
Because the evidence presented at the postconviction evidentiary hearings does not 
undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceedings, we find that Butler 
cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
postconviction court‘s denial of relief. 
 
C. 
Cumulative Error 
Finally, Butler argues that the combination of errors asserted above deprived 
him of a fundamentally fair trial as guaranteed by the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  As we have determined, however, none of Butler‘s individual 
claims of ineffectiveness of counsel warrant relief.  ―Where, as here, the alleged 
errors urged for consideration in a cumulative error analysis ‗are either meritless, 
procedurally barred, or do not meet the Strickland standard for ineffective 
assistance of counsel[,] . . . the contention of cumulative error is similarly without 
merit.‘‖  Bradley v. State, 33 So. 3d 664, 684 (Fla. 2010) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Israel v. State, 985 So. 2d 510, 520 (Fla. 2008)). 
III. 
HABEAS CORPUS 
 
Having concluded that the claims raised in Butler‘s appeal from the denial of 
his rule 3.851 motion for postconviction relief are without merit, we now turn to 
Butler‘s petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
 
 
A. 
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
In his first two habeas claims, Butler argues that his appellate counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance by (1) failing to argue on direct appeal that the trial 
court erred in allowing LaShara Butler to testify as a witness, and (2) failing to file 
a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court following this 
Court‘s affirmance of his conviction and death sentence.  ―Claims of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel are properly raised in a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus.‖  Floyd, 18 So. 3d at 458.  Consistent with Strickland, to determine 
whether a petitioner is entitled to relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel, this Court must evaluate, first, ―whether the alleged omissions 
are of such magnitude as to constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency 
falling outside the range of professionally acceptable performance,‖ and second, 
―whether the deficiency in performance compromised the appellate process to such 
a degree as to undermine confidence in the correctness of the result.‖  Cox v. State, 
966 So. 2d 337, 365 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 
(Fla. 1986)).   
―The defendant has the burden of alleging a specific, serious omission or 
overt act upon which the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be based.‖  
Anderson v. State, 18 So. 3d 501, 520 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Freeman v. State, 761 
So. 2d 1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000)).  ―Appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective 
 
 
for failing to raise meritless issues.‖  Id. at 521.  ―In fact, appellate counsel is not 
necessarily ineffective for failing to raise a claim that might have had some 
possibility of success; effective appellate counsel need not raise every conceivable 
nonfrivolous issue.‖  Valle v. Moore, 837 So. 2d 905, 908 (Fla. 2002).  Thus, 
where a habeas petitioner argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing 
to raise an issue, the claim will not warrant relief if the issue ―‗would in all 
probability have been found to be without merit‘ had counsel raised the issue on 
direct appeal.‖  Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000) (quoting 
Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So. 2d 84, 86 (Fla. 1994)). 
 
 
1. 
LaShara Butler 
 
We first address Butler‘s claim that his appellate counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance by failing to argue on direct appeal that the trial court erred 
in allowing LaShara Butler to testify at trial.  As we explained above in addressing 
Butler‘s claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel, ―In Florida, whether a child 
witness is competent to testify is based on ‗his or her intelligence, rather than his or 
her age, and, in addition, whether the child possesses a sense of obligation to tell 
the truth.‘‖  Floyd, 18 So. 3d at 443 (quoting Lloyd v. State, 524 So. 2d 396, 400 
(Fla. 1988)).  The decision to permit a child witness to testify is a matter within the 
discretion of the trial judge and is thus reviewed on appeal only for abuse of 
discretion.  See id. at 444.  Because we find that the trial court did not abuse its 
 
 
discretion in admitting LaShara‘s testimony, we conclude that appellate counsel 
was not ineffective for failing to raise this issue. 
 
As discussed previously in this opinion, the trial court conducted an 
extensive evaluation of LaShara‘s competency.  The presiding trial judge 
personally questioned LaShara concerning her ability to recall and discuss facts 
about her life and things she had observed when she was six years old, whether she 
could tell the difference between the truth and a lie, whether she understood when 
something is make-believe, whether she knew the consequences of telling a lie, 
and whether she was able to take an oath and make a promise to tell the truth.  The 
trial judge concluded that LaShara was ―bright, articulate, [and] well able to 
express the things she has observed,‖ and accordingly ruled that she would be 
permitted to testify. 
 
We addressed a closely related claim in Floyd.  There, the defendant argued 
that his trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland for failing to investigate and 
challenge the competency of two child witnesses.  We held in part that Floyd could 
not establish prejudice because the two witnesses were properly evaluated and 
admitted by the trial court.  Reviewing the record, we observed: 
LaJade proved her intelligence level by correctly counting numbers 
and reciting the alphabet.  She also understood her obligation to tell 
the truth ―no matter what.‖  Likewise, J.J. established his intelligence 
in that he stated his education level and the subjects he studied in 
school, and he made an earnest effort to pass the judge‘s ―quiz‖ on 
mathematics.  J.J. also understood the concept of lying, the 
 
 
consequence of lying, and his obligation to tell the truth.  Finally, J.J. 
promised to answer each question truthfully.  Based on their answers, 
the trial court properly concluded that LaJade and J.J. were competent 
witnesses, and any objection presented by trial counsel would have 
been meritless.  See Baker [v. State], 674 So.2d [199,] 200–01 [(Fla. 
4th DCA 1996)] (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court 
qualified a six-year-old child after the child demonstrated that she 
knew her age, where she went to school, where she went to church, 
and the colors of clothing; the child established that she possessed a 
sense to tell the truth; and the child stated that she knew it was wrong 
to lie). 
 
Floyd, 18 So. 3d at 444-45. 
The trial court asked similar questions and made similar findings in this 
case.  As in Floyd, the record demonstrates that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding that LaShara was competent to testify.  Because appellate 
counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless issue, we deny 
habeas relief as to this claim. 
 
 
2. 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
 
Additionally, Butler argues that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by failing to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States 
Supreme Court after his conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court on 
direct appeal.  Butler‘s claim is without merit, however, because the Supreme 
Court has held that ―a criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to 
counsel to pursue discretionary state appeals or applications for review in [the 
Supreme] Court.‖  Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587 (1982). 
 
 
In Wainwright, a Florida inmate filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 
federal district court.  Wainwright alleged that after his conviction and sentence 
were affirmed by the Third District Court of Appeal, his attorney filed a petition 
for review in this Court, which was denied as untimely.  Wainwright argued that 
his counsel‘s failure to timely file the petition constituted deficient performance 
under Strickland.  The federal district court denied the petition.  See Wainwright, 
455 U.S. at 586-87.  On granting review, the United States Supreme Court 
similarly rejected Wainwright‘s argument, observing that, as with petitions for 
certiorari filed in the United States Supreme Court, petitions for review in the 
Florida Supreme Court are discretionary.  Citing its decision in Ross v. Moffitt, 
417 U.S. 600 (1974), the Supreme Court observed that criminal defendants do not 
have a constitutional right to counsel to pursue discretionary state appeals or 
applications for review by the United States Supreme Court.  The High Court 
concluded:  ―Since respondent had no constitutional right to counsel, he could not 
be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel by his retained counsel‘s failure 
to file the application timely.‖  Wainwright, 455 U.S. at 587-88. 
Here, like Wainwright, Butler alleges that deficient conduct by his appellate 
counsel resulted in counsel‘s failure to seek discretionary review after the denial of 
relief in his direct appeal.  However, just as Wainwright had no constitutional right 
to the aid of counsel in seeking discretionary review in this Court, Butler had no 
 
 
constitutional right to the aid of counsel in seeking review in the United States 
Supreme Court.  Since Butler had no constitutional right to counsel, he cannot 
claim here that counsel‘s deficiencies deprived him of that right.10  Accordingly, 
we deny habeas corpus relief as to this claim. 
 
B. 
Constitutionality of Florida’s Lethal Injection Protocol 
 
Butler next argues that Florida‘s present method of execution by lethal 
injection entails an unconstitutional level of risk that it will cause extreme pain in 
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution.  Butler‘s only factual allegation supporting this claim is a reference to 
the December 2006 execution of Florida inmate Angel Diaz.  In Lightbourne v. 
McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 2007), this Court discussed the facts surrounding 
the Diaz execution and upheld Florida‘s revised lethal injection protocol against an 
Eighth Amendment challenge.  Subsequently, in Ventura v. State, 2 So. 3d 194 
(Fla. 2009), we held that Florida‘s lethal injection protocol survived constitutional 
scrutiny under each of the Eighth Amendment standards articulated by the United 
States Supreme Court in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008).  More recently, in 
                                          
 
 
10.  Butler‘s claim is distinguishable from that reviewed in Sims v. State, 998 
So. 2d 494 (Fla. 2008).  In that case, we held that in accordance with a criminal 
defendant‘s right to the assistance of counsel on direct appeal, appellate counsel 
must (1) notify the defendant in a timely manner that the appellate court has issued 
its decision, and (2) advise the defendant of his or her right to seek discretionary 
review in a pro se capacity.  See id. at 499, 501 n.6.  Butler does not allege that 
appellate counsel failed to take either action in this case. 
 
 
Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530 (Fla. 2011), we rejected a condemned inmate‘s 
argument that the Florida Department of Corrections‘ substitution of pentobarbital 
for sodium thiopental in its lethal injection procedure rendered Florida‘s method of 
execution unconstitutional. 
 
We explained in Valle that a ―a condemned inmate‘s burden of proof for 
mounting a successful Eight Amendment challenge to a state‘s lethal injection 
protocol‖ is governed by the standards set out in Baze: 
Although acknowledging that ―subjecting individuals to a risk of 
future harm—not simply actually inflicting pain—can qualify as cruel 
and unusual punishment,‖ the Supreme Court in Baze explained that 
to prevail on such a claim, condemned inmates must demonstrate that 
―the conditions presenting the risk must be ‗sure or very likely to 
cause serious illness and needless suffering,‘ and give rise to 
‗sufficiently imminent dangers.‘‖  553 U.S. at 49-50 (quoting Helling 
v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33, 34-35, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 125 L. Ed. 2d 
22 (1993)) (plurality opinion); see also Brewer v. Landrigan, 131 S. 
Ct. 445, 445, 178 L. Ed. 2d 346 (2010) (―[S]peculation cannot 
substitute for evidence that the use of the drug is ‗sure or very likely 
to cause serious illness and needless suffering.‘‖ (quoting Baze, 553 
U.S. at 50)).  That is, ―there must be a ‗substantial risk of serious 
harm,‘ an ‗objectively intolerable risk of harm‘ that prevents prison 
officials from pleading that they were ‗subjectively blameless for 
purposes of the Eighth Amendment.‘‖  Baze, 553 U.S. at 50 (quoting 
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 846 & n. 9, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 
128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994)).  This standard imposes a ―heavy burden‖ 
upon the inmate to show that lethal injection procedures violate the 
Eighth Amendment.  Id. at 53 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153, 175, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976)). 
 
Valle, 70 So. 3d at 539. 
 
 
 
Here, Butler‘s only factual basis for challenging Florida‘s lethal injection 
protocol—the execution of Angel Diaz—has previously been considered and 
rejected by this Court.  Butler has not cited any new evidence or advanced any 
other claim in support of his argument that Florida‘s method of lethal injection is 
unconstitutional.  Accordingly, we deny relief.  See Rigterink v. State, 66 So. 3d 
866, 898 (Fla. 2011) ( ―Rigterink neither relies on any new evidence concerning 
the substances injected or its injection procedures, nor does he advance any claims 
under the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Baze.‖). 
 
C. 
Butler’s Competence to Be Executed 
Finally, Butler argues that because he may be incompetent at the time of 
execution, Florida‘s capital sentencing statute violates the Eighth Amendment 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.  Butler acknowledges that this 
claim is not ripe for review and is raised here only for preservation purposes.  In 
Nelson v. State, 43 So. 3d 20, 34 (Fla. 2010), and State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 
137 n.19 (Fla. 2003), we rejected essentially identical claims where the petitioners 
likewise acknowledged that their claims were not ripe for review.  As this Court 
has explained, ―a claim of incompetency to be executed cannot be asserted until a 
death warrant has been issued.‖  Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1090, 1115-16 (Fla. 
2008) (citing Davis v. State, 875 So. 2d 359, 374 n.9 (Fla. 2003); Phillips v. State, 
 
 
894 So. 2d 28, 36 (Fla. 2004)).  Because no death warrant has been issued in this 
case, Butler‘s claim must be denied. 
IV. 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the trial court‘s denial of Butler‘s 
motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.851.  We also deny Butler‘s petition 
for writ of habeas corpus. 
 
It is so ordered. 
POLSTON, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, and CANADY, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part with an opinion, in which 
PARIENTE and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
LABARGA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
I concur in the majority decision to affirm the denial of postconviction relief 
as to the guilt phase.  I dissent, however, to affirmation of the denial of relief as to 
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase.  Defense 
counsel presented only two witnesses in mitigation.  Counsel chose to proceed to 
the penalty phase just one day after the conclusion of the guilt phase, even though 
many of what penalty phase counsel Watts described as his ―best‖ mitigation 
witnesses, not having been subpoenaed, failed to appear to testify as planned.  
Watts provided a purportedly strategic reason for going ahead without his full 
mitigation presentation—he believed the jury would be less favorable if the penalty 
 
 
phase was delayed and he believed the mitigation witnesses were reluctant and 
would therefore be less than helpful.  The fact that the only two witnesses he 
presented turned out to be less favorable than expected—an understatement 
considering Butler‘s sister related a dream in which God told her Butler committed 
the murder—suggests that counsel failed to adequately prepare their testimony.  
This failure became even more crucial when the remaining mitigation witnesses 
failed to appear.   
As the majority notes, majority op. at 40 note 6, at the evidentiary hearing, 
defense counsel Borghetti could not explain her reasons for not presenting the 
testimony of Dr. Alfred Fireman, a forensic psychiatrist, to testify to mental health 
mitigation, even though a notice of intent to call Dr. Fireman was filed.  Borghetti 
testified only that if Dr. Fireman was not called as a witness, it was most likely 
because of a strategic defense reason.  She did not share that reason with the 
postconviction court.  Watts‘ explanation for not presenting mental health 
mitigation to the jury through Dr. Michael Maher was that he did not believe that 
presentation of Butler‘s mental defects would be helpful.  He testified, ―I wasn‘t 
interested in showing that he had any mental defects.‖  He also justified that 
decision by stating, ―If there is a notion that there may be lingering doubt, we 
wouldn‘t want to show that his profile would be that of a perpetrator in a case like 
this.‖  Watts did not explain what portion of the mental mitigation would have 
 
 
portrayed Butler as a ―perpetrator.‖  Moreover, it is well established that lingering 
doubt is not proper mitigation in the penalty phase.  See, e.g., Williamson v. State, 
961 So. 2d 229, 237-38 (Fla. 2007) (reiterating that ―residual or lingering doubt . . . 
is not an appropriate matter to be raised in mitigation during the penalty phase 
proceedings in a capital case.‖) (quoting Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567, 572 n.5 
(Fla. 1996)).  Thus, lingering doubt does not qualify as a reasonable strategic 
reason for failing to present available mental mitigation.   
The explanations given by counsel do not reflect reasonable strategic 
choices by counsel under the circumstances in this case.  This Court explained in 
Willacy v. State, 967 So. 2d 131, 143 (Fla. 2007): 
―Under Strickland, ‗counsel has a duty to make reasonable 
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 
investigations unnecessary.‘ ‖  Marshall v. State, 854 So. 2d 1235, 
1247 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691); see also 
Carroll v. State, 815 So. 2d 601, 614-615 (Fla. 2002) (same).   
 
Id. at 143.  Moreover,    
strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts 
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and 
strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are 
reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional 
judgments support the limitations on investigation.  
 
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984)).  Therefore, strategic decisions must follow a 
reasonable and thorough investigation.  In assessing the reasonableness of an 
 
 
attorney‘s investigation ―a court must consider not only the quantum of evidence 
already known to counsel, but also whether the known evidence would lead a 
reasonable attorney to investigate further.‖  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527.  In my view, 
counsel in the present case made neither a reasonable investigation nor reasonable 
strategic choices based on the investigation they did undertake. 
 
The defense did present Dr. Maher at the subsequent Spencer hearing, 
although his testimony was fairly limited in scope and content.  He testified that he 
was asked to review the case ―within some relatively defined hypothetical 
parameters . . . that there was a first-degree murder conviction and that there was 
cocaine present at and around the time of the alleged behavior.‖  He interviewed 
Butler for about two hours but did not review extensive materials on the case.  His 
testimony was limited to explaining that cocaine use at the time of the crime could 
cause ―perseveration‖ or the repeated engaging in some action past a point where it 
serves a rational purpose.  Counsel later argued to the judge that this trait related to 
the nature of the crime committed in the case, involving as it did repeated stabbing.  
Dr. Maher also testified, based on hypothetical facts, concerning whether violence 
such as that Butler experienced as a child—his father was accused of killing his 
mother—would make that person more at risk of engaging in violent activities as 
an adult, especially if he or she is involved in drugs or dysfunctional social 
activities.  He opined that it would.  Dr. Maher did not review Butler‘s education 
 
 
or family history and did not discuss Butler‘s mental or educational deficits.  He 
also did not discuss how violence perpetrated against Butler or how the 
deprivations he endured as a child might have affected Butler‘s subsequent 
development and behavior.   
 
The majority describes at length the body of mitigation evidence that was 
presented at the evidentiary hearing in this postconviction proceeding.  Butler‘s 
great-aunt described the tragic history of Butler‘s early life.  Shirley Furtick 
described the biophysical assessment she performed and provided additional 
confirmation of Butler‘s sad childhood during which he lived with his grandmother 
and several other children in a shack with no electricity or running water.  Butler 
was forced to work in tobacco fields and went without sufficient food or clothing.11 
She testified that the children were beaten if they did not go to work in the fields as 
ordered.  Dr. Glenn Caddy provided evidence of Butler‘s emotional and mental 
problems as a child—Butler did very poorly in school, was slow, had an extreme 
fear of the dark, and suffered from stuttering and bedwetting.  Dr. Caddy also 
testified that Butler began his years of alcohol and drug abuse early and upon 
                                          
 
 
11.  Butler‘s sister testified during the penalty phase of trial that, although she 
worked in the tobacco field at her grandmother‘s house, she did not know if Butler 
was required to work in the tobacco fields.  Clearly, her testimony was not helpful 
in mitigation. 
 
 
administration of the Halstead Impairment Index test displayed a serious 
impairment in reasoning.    
Despite the limited mitigation presented at trial, and the substantial body of 
mitigation evidence presented during the evidentiary hearing, the postconviction 
court denied the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, finding that the 
―essence‖ of this ―extensive testimony‖ of additional mitigation was presented at 
trial because the jury heard that Butler grew up poor, lost his mother and 
grandmother at an early age, had little education, and ―some problem with 
substance abuse.‖  The majority concludes that prejudice has not been shown 
because the additional mitigation ―does not materially alter the sentencing profile 
that was presented to the jury and to the trial court.‖  Majority op. at 50.  I 
strenuously disagree with this assessment.12    
                                          
 
 
12.  I also disagree with the majority‘s suggestion, majority op. at 52, that in 
order for mental health mitigation to be of value, it must establish a connection 
between the defendant‘s deficiencies and the murder.  A plurality of the United 
States Supreme Court held in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), that in capital 
cases, ―the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer . . . not 
be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant‘s 
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant 
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.‖  Id. at 604.  Neither the 
Constitution nor our Supreme Court has required that mental mitigation somehow 
explain or excuse the crime.  It need only provide the jury with some aspect of the 
defendant‘s character or record that may serve as a basis upon which the jury 
might consider recommending life rather than death.  This view is reinforced by 
the United States Supreme Court in Ayers v. Belmontes, 549 U.S. 7 (2006), in 
which the Court‘s discussion reconfirmed that proper mitigation is not just 
mitigation that explains or excuses the crime, but is any mitigating factor 
 
 
Although the jury knew Butler grew up poor, they were deprived of the 
tragic details of the life Butler endured as a child in his violent environment.  
While the jury heard evidence that he had ―some problem with substance abuse,‖ 
they were deprived of details of the extent of that abuse, including the fact that he 
began using alcohol in his early teens and continued to drink heavily as an adult, 
and the effects that result from such abuse.  The United States Supreme Court held 
in Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447 (2009), that this Court made an 
unreasonable application of Strickland when it concluded that Porter was not 
prejudiced by counsel‘s failure to investigate and present certain mitigation, 
including mental mitigation disclosed at Porter‘s postconviction evidentiary 
hearing.  In addition to a brain abnormality, Porter had difficulty reading and 
writing, and limited schooling.  Porter also had a childhood history of physical 
abuse.  Id. at 454.  Indeed, in considering the mental mitigation presented at 
Porter‘s postconviction evidentiary hearing, the United States Supreme Court 
noted:   
                                                                                                                                        
concerning the defendant‘s background and character that provides a basis for the 
sentencer to impose a sentence less than death.  Id. at 12-13.  The Supreme Court 
in Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447 (2009), did not in any way indicate that the 
mental health mitigation this Court ―unreasonably discounted‖ was required to 
explain or excuse the crime.  Instead, the Court reemphasized that ―the 
Constitution requires that ‗the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to 
consider any relevant mitigating factor.‘ ‖  Porter, 130 S. Ct. at 454-55 (quoting 
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982)).   
 
 
The Florida Supreme Court either did not consider or unreasonably 
discounted the mitigation evidence adduced in the postconviction 
hearing.  Under Florida law, mental health evidence that does not rise 
to the level of establishing a statutory mitigating circumstance may 
nonetheless be considered by the sentencing judge and jury as 
mitigating.  See, e.g., Hoskins v. State, 965 So. 2d 1, 17-18 (Fla. 
2007) (per curiam).  Indeed, the Constitution requires that ―the 
sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to consider any relevant 
mitigating factor.‖  Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112, 102 
S. Ct. 869, 71 L. Ed.2d 1 (1982).  Yet neither the postconviction trial 
court nor the Florida Supreme Court gave any consideration for the 
purpose of nonstatutory mitigation to Dr. Dee‘s testimony regarding 
the existence of a brain abnormality and cognitive defects.  While the 
State‘s experts identified perceived problems with the tests that 
Dr. Dee used and the conclusions that he drew from them, it was not 
reasonable to discount entirely the effect that his testimony might 
have had on the jury or the sentencing judge. 
 
Porter, 130 S. Ct. at 454-55 (footnote omitted).  The Supreme Court concluded:  
―We do not require a defendant to show ‗that counsel‘s deficient conduct more 
likely than not altered the outcome‘ of his penalty proceeding, but rather that he 
establish ‗a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in [that] outcome.‘ 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-694, 104 S. Ct. 2052.  This Porter has done.‖  Porter, 
130 S. Ct. 455-56.   
 
As we noted in Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975 (Fla. 2009), in reversing and 
remanding for a new penalty phase, this Court also mandated a new penalty phase 
in Parker v. State, 3 So. 3d 974 (Fla. 2009), where counsel presented only a ―bare 
bones‖ outline of mitigation at trial and substantial mental mitigation was 
presented at the postconviction evidentiary hearing.  18 So. 3d at 1011.  The Court 
 
 
in Parker stated, ―The ABA Guidelines provide that investigations into mitigating 
evidence ‗should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating 
evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced 
by the prosecutor.‘ ‖  Parker, 3 So. 3d at 984-85 (citing the American Bar 
Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death 
Penalty Cases 11.4.1(C), at 93 (1989)).  ―Among the topics that counsel should 
consider presenting in mitigation are the defendant‘s medical history, educational 
history, employment and training history, family and social history, prior adult and 
juvenile correctional experience, and religious and cultural influences.‖  Id. at 985; 
see also Hurst, 18 So. 3d at 1011 (quoting same statement from Parker, 3 So. 3d at 
985).  The same principles articulated in Porter and Parker apply here and lead, in 
my view, to a holding that Butler‘s counsel failed to adequately represent him in 
the penalty phase; and based on the poor quality of mitigation presented below, 
coupled with the extensive mitigation that could have been presented, Butler has 
demonstrated prejudice under the second prong of Strickland. 
Even though Dr. Maher testified at the Spencer hearing that Butler‘s family 
history showed he was caught up in a cycle of violence, that testimony failed to 
establish the type and extent of the violence; consequently, the trial court 
concluded in its sentencing order that ―no evidence was presented that defendant‘s 
family circumstances included violence.‖  Evidence of violence in Butler‘s 
 
 
childhood was provided in the evidentiary hearing by witnesses who could and 
should have been identified and presented by penalty phase counsel.  Similarly, the 
trial court rejected the mitigating circumstance that Butler had a troubled childhood 
for lack of proof, noting that ―poverty is not a per se indicator of a troubled 
childhood.‖  Evidence of Butler‘s troubled childhood extending beyond just 
poverty was presented at the evidentiary hearing.  It included the fact that Butler‘s 
mother was murdered and he was sent to live with his grandmother, who cared for 
a number of other children in a shack without facilities.  He was made to work in a 
tobacco field at a young age, was often beaten, and was undernourished.  After his 
grandmother died, he returned to his father, where he was raised without much 
parental guidance.  His older brother was his primary caretaker, but was then 
imprisoned.  Butler dropped out of school and became an unwed father at age 
eighteen.  The fact that Butler was described as generally happy throughout this 
childhood in spite of the hardships should be counted as mitigation in and of itself, 
not as a fact refuting mitigation.  All this evidence, which could have been 
presented to the jury and judge in the penalty phase, establishes the troubled 
childhood mitigator that the trial court found unproven at trial. 
In the direct appeal, the majority concluded that the death sentence was 
proportional even though the trial court found only the HAC aggravator.  It is 
significant that in so holding, the majority noted the paucity of mitigation 
 
 
presented at the trial.  The majority stated that ―there was no evidence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance and little evidence of drug use.‖  Butler v. State, 
842 So. 2d 817, 833 (Fla. 2003).  Justice Pariente dissented in part, concluding 
inter alia that the death sentence in this single aggravator case was not 
proportional.  Id. at 840 (Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
Justice Pariente noted that although the trial court found no statutory mitigators, 
there was evidence that Butler was drinking and using cocaine on the night of the 
murder.  Id.  Further, Justice Pariente noted that Dr. Michael Maher testified in the 
Spencer hearing that the circumstances of the murder were consistent with the 
common effects of cocaine use in that they showed repetitive actions, such as the 
multiple stab wounds in this case.  Id.  Dr. Maher also testified that the violent 
death of Butler‘s mother when he was age eight created a greater risk that Butler 
would resort to violence to resolve conflicts as an adult, especially when combined 
with drug abuse.  Id.  Dr. Maher‘s testimony was not presented to the jury.   
 
Justice Pariente was justifiably troubled on direct appeal by the fact that the 
majority supported its finding of proportionality—despite the fact that this was a 
single aggravator case—by considering that the victim suffered several instances 
of prior abuse by Butler and that Butler was ―unfazed by the presence of the 
victim‘s children in the apartment at the time.‖  Id. at 841 (Pariente, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Butler, 842 So. 2d at 834).  I too am 
 
 
troubled by reliance on these nonstatutory grounds by the majority in the direct 
appeal.  These circumstances appear to be in the nature of improper nonstatutory 
aggravators.   
 
Now, on postconviction, we learn of the tragic circumstances of Butler‘s 
family life as a child and the history of his drug and alcohol use—the very type of 
mitigation that the direct appeal majority noted was lacking.  I simply cannot 
overlook the fact that this is a single—albeit weighty—aggravator case.  I am 
mindful that this Court has previously affirmed the death penalty in single-
aggravator cases where the single aggravator is weighty and where the mitigation 
is ―insubstantial.‖  Bevel v. State, 983 So. 2d 505, 524 (Fla. 2008).  Clearly, HAC 
is one of the ―most serious aggravators set out in the statutory sentencing scheme.‖  
Knight v. State, 76 So. 3d 879, 890 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Larkins v. State, 739 So. 
2d 90, 95 (Fla. 1999)), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2398 (2012).  However, this Court 
has also held that ―death is not indicated in a single-aggravator case where there is 
substantial mitigation.‖  Bevel, 983 So. 2d at 524 (quoting Almeida v. State, 748 
So. 2d 922, 933 (Fla. 1999)); see also Jones v. State, 705 So. 2d 1364, 1367 (Fla. 
1998) (―Under Florida‘s capital sentencing scheme, death is not indicated in a 
single-aggravator case where there is substantial mitigation.  Although this legal 
precept—and indeed the rule of objective, dispassionate law in general—may 
sometimes be hard to abide, the alternative—a Court ruled by emotion—is far 
 
 
worse.‖).  This Court earlier stated in Thompson v. State, 647 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 
1994), that ―[w]e have in the past affirmed death sentences that were supported by 
only one aggravating factor, but those cases involved either nothing or very little in 
mitigation.‖  Id. at 827 (quoting Songer v. State, 544 So. 2d 1010, 1011 (Fla. 
1989)).  In Nibert v. State, 574 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1990), this Court vacated a death 
sentence and remanded for imposition of a life sentence where the single 
aggravator was HAC and the trial court found no statutory mitigation but found 
―possible‖ nonstatutory mitigation involving Nibert‘s childhood.  Id. at 1061.  The 
Court found that additional mitigation was proven, including the fact that Nibert 
had an alcohol problem and was drinking at the time of the murder, suffered 
physical and psychological abuse as a child, felt remorse, had potential for 
rehabilitation, and according to an expert in the field of brain dysfunction, met the 
requirement for extreme mental or emotional disturbance and impairment of his 
capacity to control his behavior.  Id. at 1062-63.  In light of this other available 
mitigation, the Court in Nibert concluded that the death sentence in this single 
aggravator case was not proportional and remanded for a life sentence.  Id. at 1063.    
 
I cite these proportionality decisions not because we have proportionality as 
an issue in this postconviction appeal, but because they highlight the fact that if the 
extensive mitigation that was disclosed at the evidentiary hearing in this case had 
been presented to the jury and judge in Butler‘s trial, the mitigation would not have 
 
 
been ―insubstantial‖ as this Court essentially noted on appeal.  Instead, the 
mitigation would have placed this case in the same category as those cases cited 
above where we concluded that the death penalty was not proportional in single-
aggravator cases in which substantial mitigation was presented.  Thus, I dissent 
because it is apparent to me, given the substantial mitigation that could and should 
have been presented in the penalty phase of this trial, that this case would not have 
met the test of being one of the most aggravated and least mitigated of murders.  
See Rigterink v. State, 66 So. 3d 866, 898 (Fla. 2011) (―[T]his Court has an 
independent obligation to ensure that the death penalty is reserved for the most 
aggravated and least mitigated of murders.‖).   
For all the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse Butler‘s death 
sentence and remand for a new penalty phase proceeding. 
PARIENTE and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County,  
Frank Quesada, Judge - Case No. CRC97-04690CFANO-A 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Mark S. Gruber and Maria 
Perinetti, Assistant CCR Counsel, Middle Region, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Katherine Vickers 
Blanco, Tampa, Florida, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida 
 
 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent