Case Title: Lavin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.

Citation: 193 Kan. 22, 391 P.2d 992

Docket Number: 43,502

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1964-05-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
193 Kan. 22 (1964)
391 P.2d 992
RICHARD E. LAVIN, by and Through His Next Friend and Natural Guardian, JOHN R. LAVIN, Appellant
v.
THE STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE COMPANY, Bloomington, Illinois, Appellee.
No. 43,502

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 9, 1964.
Robert L. Boyce, Jr., of Kansas City, argued the cause, and Howard Washburn and John C. Eisele, both of Kansas City, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Gerald L. Rushfelt, of Kansas City, argued the cause, and J. Milton Sullivant, Lewis C. Smith, Clifford T. Mueller, Richmond M. Enochs, and Ralph D. Lamar, all of Kansas City were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROBB, J.:
This is an appeal from certain orders of the trial court sustaining demurrers to counts I and II of plaintiff's amended petition and entering judgment for defendant thereon, overruling plaintiff's objection to the submission of defendant's motion to make definite and certain, and the sustaining of defendant's motion to make definite and certain.
The specifications of error follow the statements in the notice of appeal.
Count I of plaintiff's amended petition alleged that John R. Lavin owned three motor vehicles insured by defendant in three separate and distinct insurance policies each of which contained a provision for payment of medical expenses in the amount of $500. Richard Lavin, son of John, who resided in his father's household, was injured on June 10, 1961, while occupying a 1955 Chevrolet convertible, one of Lavin's three insured vehicles, when it was struck by an automobile operated by Richard Greenlee *23 at Forty-second and Gibbs Road in Wyandotte county. Richard Lavin's resulting medical and hospital expenses totaled in excess of $1500. The other two insured vehicles owned by John Lavin were a 1954 Chevrolet half ton truck and a 1961 Ford sedan.
All requirements devolving upon plaintiff in furnishing proof of claim under the conditions of the policy were complied with including payment to defendant of all premiums due. Defendant paid plaintiff the sum of $500 under the medical payment coverage on the 1955 Chevrolet convertible but was indebted to plaintiff on its policy issued on September 23, 1960, covering the 1954 Chevrolet truck. It denied plaintiff's claim and failed and refused to pay the $500 under the policy covering such truck.
Count II showed that on June 2, 1961, defendant had issued a policy covering the 1961 Ford sedan delivered to John Lavin about June 1, 1961. Other allegations were identical with those set forth in count I except that count II in addition relied on the clause of the policy under "Definitions" headed "Newly Acquired Automobile," reading "... or the company insures all automobiles owned by the named insured on the date of its delivery ...," and giving the named insured thirty days following such delivery date in which to notify the company, on the basis that the 1961 Ford was alleged to be a "newly acquired automobile." On this count plaintiff also sought recovery of $500 under the medical payment coverage aggregating the sum of $1,000 on both counts, plus the costs of the action, including $1,000 attorney fees divided into $500 on each count.
Plaintiff had filed his original petition on March 7, 1962, and that petition was attacked by a motion to strike the words, "... and in all things repudiated the same, stalling and postponing and advancing no valid excuse for not paying plaintiff the benefits provided under said policy," which motion was sustained. On May 24, 1962, defendant moved to make the petition definite and certain by attaching copies of the insurance policies and setting out facts making the 1961 Ford a newly acquired automobile. At the hearing on the motion to make definite and certain on June 1, 1962, plaintiff objected thereto on the ground that all objections to the form of a pleading should be taken up at one time, but the trial court overruled such objection and then sustained both parts of defendant's motion to make definite and certain, *24 which ruling is, therefore, one of the issues here for appellate review.
On August 2, 1962, defendant attacked the amended petition by a demurrer to each count (1) for its failure to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action (2) plaintiff had no legal capacity to sue and (3) the action was not prosecuted by the real party in interest.
The trial court's journal entry of judgment filed on January 9, 1963, was in conformity with its earlier letter to the parties dated November 7, 1962, which reads:
"Gentlemen:
"(1) while occuping the owned auto, or
"(2) through being struck by the owned auto, or
"So, we must look to the exclusions.
On page 2 of the policy (exhibit "A") we find insuring agreement I, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
"COVERAGE C  Medical Payments. To pay reasonable expenses incurred within one year from the date of accident for necessary medical ... services....
On page 4 of the policy under "Exclusions  Insuring Agreements I and II" is to be found the following:
..............
Medical payment provisions in automobile insurance policies are relatively new as was stated in Severson v. Milwaukee Automobile Ins. Co., 42 A.L.R.2d 976, 979, and our attention is not directed to nor has our research produced any case directly in point. However, the Severson case (1953) quoted from 8 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 4896, p. 312, where it was stated that under the so-called medical endorsement any passenger or occupant of the insured's car who is injured in an accident may recover medical expenses up to a stipulated amount, usually $500 per person. Such recovery is completely independent of liability on the part of the insured. Insurance under the medical endorsement clause is closely akin to a personal accident policy.
Many authorities from other jurisdictions have been cited by the parties which are persuasive but are so distinguishable they cannot be decisive of our particular problem. Defendant, as well as the trial court, relies on Mallinger v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 253 Iowa 222, 111 N.W.2d 647, which involved a farm tractor being operated upon a public highway at the time of the accident. The trial court allowed recovery but it was reversed by the Supreme Court of Iowa with directions that plaintiff's petition be dismissed. One Justice dissented, and a specially concurring opinion written by another Justice, joined in by two other Justices, reads:
The reported facts in the majority opinion of the Iowa court in the Mallinger case do not contain the question raised in this appeal.
Defendant cites other cases from foreign jurisdictions but they, too, are distinguishable when carefully studied. In truth and in fact we think that exclusion clauses (i) (2) and (i) (3) as shown in the trial court's letter memorandum create an ambiguity when considered together. The most persuasive case to come to our attention is that of Southwestern Fire and Casualty Company v. Atkins, 346 S.W. 892 (rehearing denied June 8, 1961), wherein there was one insurance policy which covered two automobiles with a $500 limit on medical payment to each person injured. The *27 premium for coverage on car No. 1 was $8.00 and the additional premium for coverage on car No. 2 was $7.00. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals there stated:
The above Court then further stated:
The general rules of construction set out in the above opinion by the Texas court are the same as rules that have been adopted in our jurisdiction. (6 West's Kansas Digest, Insurance, § 146, p. 163, et seq., Pocket Part, Insurance, § 146.5 (3), p. 48; 3 Hatcher's Kansas Digest, rev. ed., Insurance, §§ 40, 42, and Cum. Supp., Insurance, §§ 40, 42, p. 55.)
See, also, National Surety Corp. v. Western Fire & Indemnity Co., 318 F.2d 379, 386, where the above Southwestern Fire and Casualty Company case was cited on the general rule that ambiguous provisions in insurance contracts are construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured.
We are convinced the three separate and district policies issued herein and the premiums paid thereon create a situation where two constructions may be placed on the exclusion clauses in regard to insuring agreements I and II, coverage C where the insurance does not apply under (i) (2) and where (i) (3) creates confusion and ambiguity so as to require application of general rules of construction and the policies must be construed according to those general rules. It follows we must hold the trial court committed reversible error in its orders sustaining defendant's demurrers to both counts of plaintiffs amended petition and in entering judgment thereon for defendant.
The other contention raised in the appeal regarding a procedural matter need not be reviewed.
Judgment reversed with directions to the trial court to overrule the demurrers and to proceed with the trial.
FONTRON, J., not participating.
PARKER, C.J., and PRICE, J., dissent.