Case Title: In re Honorable Geoff L. Robison

Citation: 

Docket Number: 18S-JD-466

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2019-02-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 18S-JD-466 
In the Matter of the Honorable  
Geoff L. Robison, Judge of the  
New Haven City Court, 
Respondent. 
 
Decided: February 4, 2019 
Judicial Discipline Action 
Per Curiam Opinion 
All Justices concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Feb 04 2019, 2:12 pm
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 18S-JD-466 | February 4, 2019 
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Per Curiam.  
On September 21, 2018, the Indiana Commission on Judicial 
Qualifications filed a “Notice of the Institution of Formal Proceedings and 
Statement of Charges” (“Complaint”) against the Respondent, Geoff L. 
Robison. Respondent timely filed an Answer, and a panel of Masters was 
appointed on November 1, with a hearing scheduled to commence on 
January 24, 2019.  
On December 31, 2018, the parties tendered a “Conditional Agreement 
and Petition to Dismiss Matter as Moot.” On January 15, 2019, the Court 
issued an order accepting the conditional agreement, dismissing this 
matter as moot, and discharging the appointed Masters. We now write to 
further explain this disposition.  
Stipulated Facts  
Respondent, at all times pertinent to the charges, was the judge of the 
New Haven City Court. Respondent is not an attorney.   
Respondent resigned as judge of the New Haven City Court effective 
December 26, 2018. That same day, the New Haven City Council 
unanimously voted to close the New Haven City Court, effective 
December 31. The parties’ Conditional Agreement, which this Court 
accepted on January 15, 2019, prohibits Respondent from future judicial 
service.  
Discussion 
When Respondent took office in 2000, only circuit court, superior court, 
and appellate judges were required to be Indiana-licensed attorneys. Ind. 
Const. Art. 7, §§ 7, 10; Ind. Code § 33-29-1-3. In 2015, Indiana Code section 
3-8-1-1.5 was amended to require judicial candidates of all town courts 
and certain city courts to be Indiana attorneys in good standing. Non-
attorney judges, like attorney judges, are ethically bound by the Rules of 
the Code of Judicial Conduct. See Ind. Code of Judicial Conduct, 
Application 1(A). 
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The Complaint alleges, and Respondent admits, that in 2003, the New 
Haven City Court and the Allen County prosecutor entered into a written 
Agreement by which the Prosecutor’s Diversion Fund would pay the City 
of New Haven up to $25 for each infraction deferral contract the New 
Haven City Court executed. In April 2015, the prosecutor informed 
Respondent that he and his staff were no longer authorized to use the 
prosecutor’s signature stamp to execute infraction deferral agreements 
and that infraction cases would no longer be filed in New Haven City 
Court. 
After this conversation, Respondent and his staff continued to use the 
prosecutor’s signature stamp to execute infraction deferral agreements 
pursuant to the 2003 Agreement. In his Answer, Respondent claims that 
the prosecutor’s unilateral change in filing policies breached this 
Agreement, and argues that it was the prosecutor’s responsibility, not the 
court’s, to ensure that local law enforcement agencies were made aware of 
this policy change and amended their filing practices accordingly.  
Indiana Code section 34-28-5-1(f) provides that individuals who were 
under 18 at the time of an offense are not eligible for an infraction deferral 
program if the alleged violation falls under certain categories, including 
traffic regulations, driver’s license violations, and open alcoholic beverage 
violations. Respondent admits that he placed juveniles in the infraction 
deferral program, thereby violating section 34-28-5-1(f), and explains he 
was unaware of the change in Indiana law that made minors ineligible for 
infraction deferrals. 
Finally, the Complaint alleges that during the course of the prosecutor’s 
investigation into juvenile infraction deferral agreements, she discovered 
that Respondent had accepted payments on 10 or more infraction cases 
without adjudicating the cases. In September 2017, while dismissing 
juvenile infraction cases, Respondent also dismissed some of these partial-
payment cases. Such dismissals prevented the prosecutor from refiling 
these infractions in Allen Superior Court.  
The Commission charged Respondent with violating five provisions of 
the Code of Judicial Conduct: 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 18S-JD-466 | February 4, 2019 
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• Rule 1.1, requiring judges to comply with the law; 
• Rule 1.2, requiring judges to avoid impropriety and act at all times in 
a manner promoting public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity; 
• Rule 2.2, requiring judges to uphold and apply the law and to 
perform all judicial duties fairly and impartially;  
• Rule 2.9(A), prohibiting judges from initiating, permitting, or 
considering ex parte communications; and 
• Rule 2.12(A), requiring judges to ensure that court staff, court 
officials, and others subject to the judge’s direction and control act in 
a manner consistent with the judge’s obligations under the Code.  
Respondent, who admits many of the Commission’s factual assertions 
but denies that he committed judicial misconduct, is not an attorney and is 
no longer a judge. The court over which he presided no longer exists, and 
he has consented to a prohibition on future judicial service. In the order 
dismissing this matter, we explained that continued litigation would be an 
inefficient use of limited judicial resources. See In re Chapala, 902 N.E.2d 
218, 219 (Ind. 2009).  
But we write to clarify municipal courts’ power to administer infraction 
cases and infraction deferral agreements and to caution judicial officers on 
the impropriety of assuming the prosecutor’s duties.   
Infraction proceedings are civil, as opposed to criminal, in nature. State 
ex rel. City of New Haven v. Allen Superior Court, 699 N.E.2d 1134, 1136 (Ind. 
1998). The prosecuting attorney is empowered to enforce infraction 
statutes on behalf of the State. Ind. Code § 34-28-5-1(a). Pursuant to this 
authority, prosecuting attorneys and attorneys for municipal corporations 
can establish infraction deferral programs by which defendants may seek 
dismissal of an infraction by paying certain fees and fulfilling other 
conditions. Ind. Code § 34-28-5-1(g). When a defendant complies with the 
terms of an infraction deferral agreement, “the prosecuting attorney or the 
attorney for the municipal corporation shall request the court to dismiss 
the action.” Id.  
Put simply, trial courts may neither dismiss these deferral cases sua 
sponte nor use the prosecutor’s signature stamp to administer or execute 
infraction deferral agreements. Either action is an improper assumption of 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 18S-JD-466 | February 4, 2019 
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the prosecutor’s distinct role and flouts the Code of Judicial Conduct’s 
overarching goal of an independent, fair, and impartial judiciary. 
Respondent is not the first Indiana judge to face such allegations. See 
Public Admonition of the Honorable Martha C. Hagerty, Fremont Town 
Court (Feb. 9, 2015) (admonishing non-attorney judge for repeatedly 
engaging, or allowing staff to engage, in ex parte conversations with a 
traffic infraction litigant and his attorney); Public Admonition of the 
Honorable Martha C. Hagerty, Fremont Town Court (Nov. 19, 2012) 
(admonishing non-attorney judge for repeatedly engaging in ex parte 
conversations with the prosecutor and traffic infraction litigants); Public 
Admonition of the Honorable Roger L. Huizenga, Walkerton Town Court 
(June 22, 2009) (admonishing non-attorney judge for participating in an ex 
parte conversation with a defendant about the status of her traffic 
infractions and for assuming the role of the prosecutor when negotiating a 
resolution to the defendant’s case). See also In re Harkin, 958 N.E.2d 788 
(Ind. 2011) (attorney judge suspended without pay for 60 days for 
establishing unauthorized deferral program for traffic offenses).  
While municipal courts are created by statute and empowered to 
decide only certain cases, their status as “special courts” does not absolve 
them of the duties of a separate but co-equal branch of government. 
Municipal court judges, like all judges, must endeavor to maintain, 
preserve, and protect the independence of Indiana’s judiciary, even when 
administering the lowest-level civil and criminal offenses.  
With this opinion, we terminate the disciplinary proceedings relating to 
the circumstances giving rise to this case. Because this action was 
dismissed without a hearing and without a finding of misconduct by the 
panel of Masters, Respondent will not be assessed costs. See Ind. Admis. 
Disc. R. 25(IV).  
All Justices concur.  
 
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A TT O R N E Y F O R  RESP O N D E NT  
J. Michael Loomis 
Loomis Law Office 
Fort Wayne, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  I ND I A NA C OM MIS SI ON  O N J U DI C IAL  
Q U AL I FI CA TI O NS  
Adrienne L. Meiring, Counsel to the Commission 
Marcus A. McGhee, Staff Attorney to the Commission 
Indianapolis, Indiana