Case Title: Sucik v. State

Citation: 344 Md. 611

Docket Number: 16/96

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1997-02-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Timothy Ray Sucik v. State of Maryland
No. 16, September Term, 1996
[CRIMINAL LAW - WHETHER THE SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE
WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE SHOULD BE VACATED NOTWITHSTANDING
THE FACT THAT THE DEFENDANT DID NOT ASK THE TRIAL COURT FOR A PRE-
SENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT REQUIRED BY STATUTE]
2
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 16
September Term, 1996
_____________________________________
TIMOTHY RAY SUCIK
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
____________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Raker,
Murphy, Robert C.
   (retired, specially assigned)
JJ.
____________________________________
OPINION BY MURPHY, J.
____________________________________
       Filed:  February 14, 1997
     The court provided "stand-by" counsel for Sucik.
1
Timothy Ray Sucik was charged by criminal information with the
fatal stabbing of his estranged wife, Marian Grace Sucik.  As
required by Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, §
412(b), the State formally notified him that it intended to seek a
sentence of life without possibility of parole, which "means
imprisonment for the natural life of an inmate under the custody of
a correctional institution . . . ."  Code, Art. 27, § 412(f)(2).
A person who receives such a sentence "is not eligible for parole
consideration and may not be granted parole at any time during the
term of the sentence."  Maryland Code (1957, 1993 Repl. Vol., 1996
Cum. Supp.) Art. 41, § 4-516(d)(3)(i).  
After Sucik was found competent to stand trial in the Circuit
Court for Washington County, he exercised his Sixth Amendment right
to represent himself.  State v. Miller, 337 Md. 71, 86, 651 A.2d
845 (1994); Snead v. State, 286 Md. 122, 123-24, 406 A.2d 98
(1979).   Immediately following the jury's verdict that Sucik was
1
guilty of first degree murder, the trial court announced that it
would sentence him that day.
Maryland Code (1957, 1993 Repl. Vol., 1996 Cum. Supp.) Art.
41, § 4-609(d) requires a presentence investigation report (PSI)
     A pro se defendant is not relieved of the obligation to raise
2
objections or make requests in a timely manner.  Grandison v.
State, 341 Md. 175, 195, 670 A.2d 398 (1995).
2
before a judge may sentence a person to prison for life without the
possibility of parole.  Specifically, this statute provides that
the PSI include "a victim impact statement as provided under
Article 27, § 781 of the Code" and that the PSI
shall be completed by the Division of Parole and
Probation, and shall be considered by the court . . .
before whom the separate sentencing proceeding is
conducted . . . .
No one — not the court, the State, Sucik,  or Sucik's stand-by
2
counsel — even mentioned the statutory requirement that a PSI be
obtained, and none was prepared.  
At sentencing, the prosecutor presented to the trial court a
letter in which Mary Reid, the victim's grandmother, told of the
pain she felt since Marian was murdered.  Ms. Reid accused Sucik of
being a liar and having mistreated her granddaughter during the
marriage.  "I feel Tim has gone over the edge," she wrote, "and
should have life in prison without parole."  Along with Ms. Reid's
letter, the trial court took into consideration certain letters and
drawings Sucik had sent to various people as well as a competency
report from the Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center.  
Sucik appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, raising three
issues, one of which was that his sentence of life without parole
was improper because the trial court had not obtained the required
PSI.  The intermediate court in an unreported opinion agreed that
3
the PSI was mandatory but refused to vacate Sucik's sentence
because he had "failed to make any request whatsoever for a pre-
sentence investigation" when the trial court declared that
sentencing would be held the day of the verdict.  Sucik, the court
observed, 
was unquestionably aware that he faced a possible
sentence of life without parole.  In fact, [Sucik] did
not even mention his wish to have a pre-sentence
investigation considered when the trial judge was
discussing what information he would consider with
respect to sentencing.  [The State] admits that, had
[Sucik] asked for a pre-sentence investigation, the court
undoubtedly would have postponed disposition until such
time as a report could be obtained.  [Sucik], by not
objecting to sentencing without a PSI, waived his right
to have this issue considered on appeal.
The Court of Special Appeals found no merit in Sucik's two
other issues, neither of which is before us, and it affirmed the
judgment against him.  Sucik then petitioned for a writ of
certiorari, which we granted.  The sole question before us is
whether, in the circumstances, the sentence of imprisonment for
life without the possibility of parole should be vacated
notwithstanding the fact that Sucik did not ask the trial court for
the PSI required by statute.  
There are three possible sentences for first degree murder.
One is death, which requires aggravating circumstances not present
in this case.  See Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27,
§ 413(d).  The second is imprisonment for life, and the third is
the one imposed on Sucik: life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole.  This last sentence was created by the General Assembly
4
by its enactment of Chapter 237 of the Acts of 1987.  See Collins
v. State, 318 Md. 269, 298, 568 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1031
(1990).
When it established the new penalty of life without parole,
the General Assembly found that
[l]ife imprisonment without the possibility of parole is
needed as a sentencing option in first degree murder
cases because there are people committing heinous crimes;
for example, serial killers, who are not eligible for the
death penalty.  In addition, a death penalty proceeding
is a long, expensive process and a tremendous drain on
resources.  Life without parole would be less costly and
would have the effect of preventing the defendant from
killing again.
Woods v. State, 315 Md. 591, 601, 556 A.2d 236 (1989), quoting
Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Summary of Committee Report
from the Committee Report System of the Department of Legislative
Reference, 1987 General Assembly of Maryland at 3.  It was for
special cases — and special defendants — that the legislature
created this enhanced penalty.
Whether an inmate is eventually paroled is ordinarily not a
judicial determination.  "Unless a statute provides to the
contrary, courts are not empowered to determine whether or when a
prisoner should be released on parole."  State v. Parker, 334 Md.
576, 596 n. 9, 640 A.2d 1104, (1994).  That power rests with the
executive branch, specifically with the Maryland Parole Commission,
under procedures and criteria established by the legislature.  See,
Maryland Code (1957, 1993 Repl. Vol., 1996 Cum. Supp.) Art. 41, §§
4-501(5), 4-504(a)(1); Patuxent v. Hancock, supra, 329 Md. at 573.
     In response to Nelson v. State, the General Assembly amended
3
Article 41, § 4-609(c)(1) to make the preparation of presentence
reports discretionary in cases involving misdemeanors that result
in death or serious physical injury and felonies in general.  Acts
of 1990, ch. 256; Department of Legislative Reference Bill Analysis
of SB 272.  Significantly, however, the legislature left intact the
language in § 4-609(d) requiring presentence reports to be prepared
and considered before a court imprisons someone for life without
possibility of parole.
5
Before 1987, Article 41, § 4-609(d)'s requirement that a PSI
be prepared and considered by the court before sentencing applied
only to capital cases.  At the same time it crafted life without
parole as a sentencing option, the General Assembly specifically
added "imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole" as
the only other penalty for which § 4-609(d) mandates that a PSI be
prepared and considered by the sentencing court.  Acts of 1987, ch.
237.
The State agrees with Sucik that the provision in § 4-609(d)
calling for a PSI is mandatory.  See Nelson v. State, 315 Md. 62,
553 A.2d 667 (1989).   But the State suggests that the trial court
3
may ignore this requirement and mete out a sentence of life without
parole when a defendant has not requested a PSI.
Section 4-609(d) imposes no duty on a defendant to request a
presentence report.  This is in contrast to the provision contained
in Article 27, § 412(b) placing on the State the burden of
notifying the defendant that he or she faces a possible sentence of
life without parole.  In essence, the State asks this Court to
construe the statute as implying that a defendant is obliged to
6
request a PSI if he or she wants the court to weigh its findings
when deciding whether to impose a sentence of life without parole.
Manifestly, we cannot read into the statute a requirement that it
does not contain.  "Because an enhanced punishment statute is
'highly penal, [it] must be strictly construed.'"  Taylor v. State,
333 Md. 229, 237, 634 A.2d 1322 (1993), quoting Jones v. State, 324
Md. 32, 38, 595 A.2d 463 (1991).
The statute does, however, create a duty for the trial court.
Before imposing this particular sentence, which is a punishment
second only to death in its severity, the court must consider the
findings contained in a PSI prepared by the Division of Parole and
Probation.  If the court fails to do so, it errs by imposing a
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 
The statutes that concern presentence investigations indicate
"a growing awareness and appreciation by the legislature of the
important role a presentence investigation report plays in the
sentencing process."  Nelson v. State, supra, 315 Md. at 69-70.  It
is to ensure that sentences are fair and just — both to defendants
and to society at large — that the General Assembly mandated
obtaining PSIs in cases where the penalty could be death or
imprisonment for life without possibility of parole.  A PSI in a
case where the possible penalty is life without parole ensures that
that 
sentence 
will 
be 
imposed 
only 
after 
all 
relevant
considerations are taken into account.
In its brief, the State "agrees that a PSI serves general
     The State's reliance on the death penalty case of Williams v.
4
State, 342 Md. 724, 763 n. 13, 679 A.2d 1106 (1996), for a contrary
result is misplaced.  There, in dictum involving an issue not then
properly before us, we said "that the unobjected to failure to
prepare the PSI . . . may not be grounds for reversal."  We did not
thereby purport to conclude, one way or the other, whether failure
to object to the absence of a PSI constituted a waiver of that
mandatory requirement.  
       We do not mean to imply that when, pursuant to a plea
5
agreement, the defendant and the State agree to a sentence of life
imprisonment without parole, the court must first consider a pre-
sentence investigation.
7
societal goals" but contends that the failure to obtain one in this
case is but "a procedural error," which cannot be attacked for the
first time on appeal.  We disagree.  When a trial court ignores the
PSI requirement, it acts counter to the requirements of the very
law that makes possible a sentence of life without parole.  Sucik's
sentence does not rest on the foundation the General Assembly
mandated for cases such as his.   For these reasons the Court of
4
Special Appeals abused its discretion in declining to consider the
error raised by Sucik, despite his having failed to preserve the
issue.  
We vacate his sentence of imprisonment for life without the
possibility of parole and remand his case to the Circuit Court for
Washington County for resentencing.5
SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE REMANDED
TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR WASHINGTON
COUNTY FOR A NEW SENTENCING HEARING.
8
COSTS TO BE PAID BY WASHINGTON
COUNTY.