Case Title: Lane v. Starke

Citation: 

Docket Number: 090404

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2010-04-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan,1 Koontz, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
WILLARD W. LANE, JR.  
 
v.  Record No. 090404 
         OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
JANICE L. STARKE, ET AL. 
 
April 15, 2010 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SURRY COUNTY 
W. Allan Sharrett, Judge 
 
 
This is an appeal from a final order in a suit to 
construe a will.  It presents questions concerning whether 
certain devises of real property created vested or contingent 
remainder interests and whether those future interests were 
subject to conditions precedent or conditions subsequent. 
Facts and Proceedings 
 
The facts are not in dispute.  Willard W. Lane, Sr. (the 
testator), a resident of Surry County, died on December 5, 
1991.  He was survived by his wife, Bernice J. Lane (the life 
tenant).  His will, dated in 1982, was admitted to probate.  
The will appointed the testator’s son, W. W. Lane, Jr., (Lane, 
Jr.) executor but he did not qualify as executor until 2006.  
 
The testator’s will contained the following provisions: 
Article II bequeathed all tangible personal property to the 
testator’s wife; Article III devised the testator’s home 
                     
1 Justice Keenan participated in the hearing and decision 
of this case prior to her retirement from the Court on March 
12, 2010. 
place, with 18 acres of land, to the testator’s wife in fee 
simple absolute.  Article IV provides:  “All the rest and 
residue of my estate I give, devise and bequeath to my wife, 
BERNICE J. LANE, for and during her natural life or until she 
remarries.”  Article V provides:  
 
Upon the death of my wife, she having survived 
me, or upon her remarriage, I give, devise and 
bequeath the property herein devised to her for her 
life or until her remarriage as follows: 
 
 
1.  I give, devise and bequeath that portion of 
the ROWELL PLACE [metes and bounds description] to 
my son, W.W. LANE, JR., upon the EXPRESS condition 
that he pay into my estate ONE-HALF (1/2) of the 
ASSESSED VALUE of such property. 
 
 
2.  I give, devise and bequeath the TWO HOUSES 
AND LOTS at SCOTLAND to my two daughters, JANICE L. 
STARKE and MOLLY L. RICKMOND, upon the EXPRESS 
condition that they pay into my estate ONE-HALF 
(1/2) of the ASSESSED VALUE of such property. 
 
(Emphasis in original.) 
 
 
The life tenant died on March 27, 2002, having never 
remarried.  No payment of one-half of the assessed valuations 
of the properties devised to her for her life had been made by 
Lane, Jr., Janice Starke and Molly Rickmond (collectively, the 
remaindermen).2 
 
In 2006 Lane, Jr., individually and as executor of his 
father’s will, filed this suit in the circuit court requesting 
                     
2 The term is used collectively, without regard to gender.  
Black's Law Dictionary 1406 (9th ed. 2009). 
 
 
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aid and direction as to the appropriate date upon which to 
determine the assessed valuations of the real property in 
which he and his sisters had been devised remainder interests 
by their father.  He asked the court to determine whether the 
date upon which the assessed valuations were to be determined 
should be (A) the date of the will, (B) the date of the 
testator’s death, or (C) the date of the life tenant’s death.3  
 
The complaint named as parties Lane’s sisters, Janice 
Starke and Mollie Rickmond, as well as Bryan Lane and Ricky 
Lane, who had not been mentioned in the testator’s will, on 
the ground that their interests might be affected by the 
court’s decision.  Bryan and Ricky Lane filed answers 
contending that the remaindermen had forfeited their remainder 
interests by failing to pay, before the death of the life 
tenant, into the testator’s estate, one-half of the assessed 
valuations of the properties devised to them, thus failing to 
comply with a condition precedent.  Bryan and Ricky Lane 
contended that the three remaindermen had been devised only 
                     
3 Lane, Jr. also attached to his complaint two pages of 
notes, purported to be in the testator’s handwriting, that had 
been found among his effects, asking the court to decide 
whether they were holographic codicils.  The court ruled that 
they were not testamentary in nature.  That ruling was not 
appealed and is not before us.  That ruling is, therefore, the 
law of the case. 
 
 
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contingent remainders that could not vest until the conditions 
precedent were met. 
 
After hearing evidence ore tenus and reviewing memoranda 
of counsel, the circuit court, in a memorandum opinion, held 
that Article V of the testator’s will created contingent 
remainders, not vested remainders; that the conditions had to 
be met before the death of the life tenant, which was not 
done; that the failure of the contingencies caused the 
properties to revert to the testator’s estate to be 
distributed through the residuary clause of his will; that the 
residuary clause devised the residue of the testator’s estate 
to the life tenant only for her life and that the residuary 
clause failed because the life tenant was deceased; and that 
the testator was therefore intestate as to the property 
devised under Article V, which would pass to the testator’s 
heirs at law under the statute of descent and distribution. 
The circuit court entered a final order to that effect.  We 
awarded Lane, Jr. an appeal. 4 
                     
4 We granted Lane, Jr.’s appeal individually, but refused 
to grant him an appeal in his capacity as executor.  
Accordingly, he appears as the sole appellant in his 
individual capacity. 
 
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Analysis 
 
The appeal questions the circuit court’s legal 
conclusions.  We review such questions de novo.  Turner v. 
Caplan, 268 Va. 122, 125, 596 S.E.2d 525, 527 (2004). 
 
The testator’s will is ambiguous in that it may be 
construed in different ways.  Gillespie v. Davis, 242 Va. 300, 
304, 410 S.E.2d 613, 615-16 (1991).  It does not explicitly 
provide for the time the assessed valuation of the devised 
parcels is to be ascertained.  That uncertainty creates doubt 
as to the amounts to be paid.  Those issues raise the 
fundamental legal questions whether the remainders are 
contingent on payment of the amounts due the estate, or 
whether the remainder interests vested at the testator’s 
death, leaving the requirements of payment as conditions 
subsequent.  In the latter case, the required payments would 
constitute liens upon the land, enforceable in equity, but 
would not defeat the remainder interests.  Gilley v. 
Nidermaier, 176 Va. 32, 41, 10 S.E.2d 484, 487-88 (1940). 
 
When testamentary language is clear and unambiguous, it 
will be applied as written unless it contravenes the law or 
public policy, because the testator’s intent is the “guiding 
star” in testamentary construction.  Smith v. Trustees of 
Baptist Orphanage, 194 Va. 901, 903, 75 S.E.2d 491, 493 
(1953).  When the language of a will is ambiguous, however, 
 
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leaving the testator’s intent unclear, the courts are guided 
by certain well-settled rules of construction.  See Clark v. 
Whaley, 213 Va. 7, 8-9, 189 S.E.2d 46, 47 (1972).  Perhaps the 
most time-honored of these canons of construction in Virginia 
is the “early-vesting” rule.  This Court, in Catlett v. 
Marshall, 37 Va. (10 Leigh) 83 (1839), construing the will of 
Thomas, Lord Fairfax dated in 1777, established the rule that 
“where no special intent to the contrary is manifested, the 
vesting of legacies shall be referred to the death of the 
testator.”  Id. at 96.   
 
More recently, we said: 
Our purpose of course is to find the testamentary 
intent.  If a will reflects a clear intent that the 
determination of beneficiaries be postponed until a 
life tenant's death, rather than the testator's 
death, we honor that intent.  See Griffin v. Central 
Nat'l Bank, 194 Va. 485, 74 S.E.2d 188 (1953).  But 
if a will is ambiguous in this regard, we invoke the 
aid of the canon of construction known as the early 
vesting rule.  Under that rule, "devises and 
bequests are to be construed as vesting at the 
testator's death, unless the intention to postpone 
the vesting is clearly indicated in the will".  
Chapman v. Chapman, 90 Va. 409, 411, 18 S.E. 913 
(1894). 
 
Clark, 213 Va. at 8-9, 189 S.E.2d at 47 (footnote omitted). 
 
Although the will in the present case postpones their 
enjoyment of the devises made to the remaindermen, there is no 
language in the testator’s will evidencing an intent to 
postpone the vesting of their remainder interests.  
 
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Accordingly, the early vesting rule applies.  We hold that the 
remainder interests vested at the time of the testator’s 
death. 
 
Similarly, when testamentary language requires that a 
monetary payment be made prior to the vesting of a future 
interest in a remainderman, the requirement will be treated as 
a condition precedent, but if the language does not 
necessarily provide that the payment must precede vesting, the 
condition is treated as a condition subsequent.  Wenner v. 
George, 129 Va. 615, 618, 106 S.E. 365, 366 (1921).  As we 
have previously observed: 
The courts have, wherever possible, construed a 
provision for the payment of a legacy, or a sum of 
money, as a charge rather than a condition 
precedent, in order that the estate may vest in the 
devisee.  Thus, where it appears from the language 
of the will that the testator intended to couple the 
payment of the legacy by the devisee with the devise 
of the land, so that the payment is to be made, 
because, or as a condition on which, the devise has 
been made, then the real estate is, in equity, 
chargeable with the payment of the legacy. 
 
Gilley, 176 Va. at 41, 10 S.E.2d at 487-88 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  We therefore hold that the monetary payments 
required by the will are conditions subsequent, constituting 
liens on the land devised, enforceable in equity. 
 
The circuit court's construction of the will leads to a 
partial intestacy. 
 
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No principle of testamentary construction is 
more firmly settled in Virginia than that there is a 
strong presumption that every testator intends to 
dispose of his entire estate . . . and the courts 
are inclined very decidedly against adopting any 
construction of wills which leaves the testator 
intestate as to any portion of his estate, unless 
that result is inescapable. 
 
First Nat'l Exchange Bank v. Seaboard Citizens Nat'l Bank, 200 
Va. 681, 685, 107 S.E.2d 408, 411 (1959) (quoting Arnold v. 
Groobey, 195 Va. 214, 224, 77 S.E.2d 382, 387 (1953)). 
 
Even though the remainder interests vested at the time of 
the testator’s death, the testator postponed their enjoyment 
by the remaindermen until the death of the life tenant.  
Therefore, their duty to make payment of one-half the assessed 
valuations of the lands devised to them did not arise until 
the death of the life tenant.  The amounts they are required 
to pay are therefore to be ascertained by the real estate 
assessments existing on that date.  See Armentrout v. 
Armentrout, 112 Va. 660, 663, 72 S.E.721, 722 (1911). 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons stated, we will reverse the judgment 
appealed from and remand the case to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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