Case Title: Nord v. Guy

Citation: 141 N.W.2d 395

Docket Number: 

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1966-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
141 N.W.2d 395 (1966) O. C. NORD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. William L. GUY, Governor, Arne Dahl, Commissioner of Agriculture and Labor, and Helgi Johanneson, Attorney General, constituting the Industrial Commission of the State of North Dakota; and Martin J. Kruse, John Conrad, Albert Haas, Elvira Jestrab, Mildred Johnson, Fred R. Orth and Henry P. Sullivan, as the State Board of Higher Education of the State of North Dakota, Defendants and Respondents. No. 8285. Supreme Court of North Dakota. March 23, 1966. *396 Shaft, Benson, Shaft & McConn, Grand Forks, for plaintiff and appellant. Helgi Johanneson, Atty. Gen., and Gerald W. VandeWalle, Asst. Atty. Gen., Bismarck, for defendants and respondents. KNUDSON, Judge. This is an appeal from a summary judgment of the District Court for Burleigh County dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff challenging the constitutionality of Chapter 155, Session Laws of 1965, hereinafter designated as the Act. The pertinent part of the Act provides: The material facts necessary to the determination of the issues are not in dispute and are summarized in the trial court's order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment and denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, as follows: *400 The plaintiff has challenged the constitutionality of the Act as being in violation of the following provisions of the North Dakota Constitution: In considering the challenge to the constitutionality of the Act every presumption in favor thereof will be adopted. We said in Wilder v. Murphy, 56 N.D. 436, 218 N.W. 156, that: We are guided by certain rules that control in the consideration of the challenge to the constitutionality of the Act made by the plaintiff. In Wilder v. Murphy we said: Does the legislature, in the Act, "declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles which are to control," and is the administrative body invested only with the power "to ascertain the facts and conditions to which the policy and principles apply"? We are of the opinion, and we so hold, that the Act does not "declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles which are to control" but, in fact, attempts to delegate to the Board powers and functions of the Legislature, and that the Act is unconstitutional. The first paragraph of Section 25 of the Constitution reads as follows: The plaintiff points out in support of his contention the following: The Board of Higher Education is a constitutional body created by Article 54 of the North Dakota Constitution approved and ratified by the people on June 30, 1938, for the control and administration of the educational institutions of higher education, and by section 8 thereof Article 54 was made self-executing. The respondents argue that the State Board of Higher Education is a constitutional body created for the control and administration of state institutions of higher education and that, therefore, our decisions in the cases of Wilder v. Murphy and Kaufman v. Davis are not controlling. They point out that these cases were decided before the adoption of Article 54 and during the time when the control and administration of our educational institutions was in the Board of Administration. As the Board of Administration was created by the legislature the respondent agrees that the legislature was prohibited by Section 25 of the Constitution from delegating legislative power to the State Board of Administration. Article 54 of our Constitution created the State Board of Higher Education for the "control and administration" of state institutions of higher education of the State and provides its powers in Section 6 of the Act. Section 6(a) provides: Section 6(b) provides that the State Board of Higher Education shall have full authority over the institutions with the right, among its other powers, to prescribe, limit or modify the courses offered in the institutions and in furtherance of its power may delegate to its employees details of the administration. It shall have full authority to organize and reorganize "within constitutional and statutory limitations" the work of each institution and do everything necessary and proper for the efficient and economic administration of the institution. Section 6(c) directs the Board to prescribe for said institutions standard systems of accounts and records and to make regular reports to the legislature and the governor. *402 Section 6(d) directs the State Board of Higher Education to prepare and present to the State Budget Board and to the legislature a single unified budget covering the needs of all the institutions under its control. Section 6(e) provides that the Board "shall have the control of the expenditure of the funds belonging to, and allocated to such institutions and also those appropriated by the legislature," but "that funds appropriated by the legislature and specifically designated for any one or more of such institutions, shall not be used for any other institution." We must examine Article 54 of the Constitution to determine whether it grants to such Board jurisdiction to carry out the functions attempted to be delegated to such Board under Section 19 of the Act. This Article grants to the State Board of Higher Education power for the "control and administration" of the institutions described therein. The word "control" is defined as a "power or authority to manage, direct, superintend, restrict, regulate, govern, administer, or oversee." See Black's Law Dictionary, Third Edition. Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabridged defines the word "control" as "to exercise restraining or directing influence over: regulate, dominate, rule: have power over" and "power or authority to guide or manage: directing or restraining domination." The word "administration" is defined as "performance of executive duties: management, direction, superintendence." See Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabridged. Thus it becomes clear that the Board is created for the "control and administration" of the said educational institutions, which in general terms means the management and supervision thereof. Section 6(a), which incorporates by reference the existing powers of the State Board of Administration as they existed at the time of the adoption of Article 54, does not incorporate powers to make decisions for the providing of facilities as defined by Chapter 155. The Act defines the word "facilities" to mean and include "buildings used for classroom, library, laboratory, workshop, administration and maintenance purposes, and landscaping, furnishings, and equipment associated therewith." The State Board of Administration was created by Chapter 71, Session Laws of 1919, "for the general supervision and administration of all State Penal, Charitable, and Educational Institutions of the State, and the General Supervision of the Public and common Schools of the State." The State Board of Administration possessed no legislative powers. Their powers were supervisory and administrative only. Thus the State Board of Higher Education in assuming the powers of the State Board of Administration was not vested with legislative powers. We now examine Sections 6(b) through 6(e) in the light of the declaration of purpose that the Board is created for the "control and administration" of the State institutions of higher education. It is clear that these powers vested in the State Board of Higher Education are administrative. The constitutional provision does not create a "miniature legislature." The Board of Higher Education became a part of the executive branch of government. For the reasons aforesaid, the respondents' argument must fail and the constitutionality of Chapter 155 of the Session Laws of 1965 will be tested in accordance with the principles handed down in the case of Wilder v. Murphy, 56 N.D. 436, 218 N.W. 156, and State ex rel. Kaufman v. Davis, 59 N.D. 191, 229 N.W. 105. This court, in Wilder v. Murphy and Kaufman v. Davis, considered the question of the delegation of legislative power involving the authority of the Board of Administration to enter into arrangements with holding associations for the construction *403 of dormitories at any of the educational institutions of the state. In Wilder v. Murphy, this court, in construing Chapter 257, Session Laws of 1927, held that it delegated legislative power to an administrative board in violation of section 25 of the Constitution, whereas in State ex rel. Kaufman v. Davis this court, in construing Chapter 102, Sessions Laws of 1929, held that it does not delegate legislative power to the Board of Administration in violation of section 25. This court, in distinguishing between the two statutes, said in Kaufman v. Davis: How do the provisions of the Act under consideration here compare with the standards set forth in Wilder v. Murphy and in Kaufman v. Davis? The present Act falls into the same objectionable pattern that was held to be unconstitutional in Wilder v. Murphy as an unlawful delegation of legislative power. In this case the Legislature has not determined the question of the necessity of any particular type of building, at any particular institution, nor laid down any rule to guide the Board of Higher Education in determining these questions. It has authorized the construction of facilities at some or all of the institutions. It has attempted to delegate to the Board the power to determine what facilities shall be constructed at the different institutions, and the amount, if any, to be expended at each. This, we find, is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. Wilder v. Murphy, 56 N.D. 436, 218 N.W. 156. The Board of Higher Education is granted the power to "declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles which are to control." This is a legislative function. As we hold the Act unconstitutional, because it delegates legislative powers to the Board of Higher Education in violation of Section 25 of the North Dakota Constitution, it is not necessary to pass on the other challenges to the constitutionality of the Act. The summary judgment appealed from is reversed and the cause is remanded with direction that summary judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff. TEIGEN, C.J., STRUTZ and ERICKSTAD, JJ., and ILVEDSON, D.J., concur. Honorable ROY A. ILVEDSON, District Judge of the Fifth Judicial District, sitting in place of Honorable THOMAS J. BURKE.