Case Title: Payne v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 980559

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1999-01-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Stephenson, Senior Justice 
 
ERIC CHRISTOPHER PAYNE 
 
v.  Record No. 980559  
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Thomas N. Nance, Judge 
 
OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
January 8, 1999 
 
ERIC CHRISTOPHER PAYNE 
 
v. Record No. 980879 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HANOVER COUNTY 
Richard H.C. Taylor, Judge 
 
 
Eric Christopher Payne received two death sentences in each 
of these appeals.  Although Payne has waived his appeals of 
right, former Code § 17-110.1 (now Code § 17.1-313) mandates 
that we review the death sentences nonetheless.  In this review, 
we consider and determine whether the sentences were imposed 
"under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other 
arbitrary factor" and whether the sentences are "excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, 
considering both the crime and the defendant."  Former Code 
§ 17-110.1(C). 
I 
The Fazio Case
A 
 
Payne was charged with the capital murder of Sally Marie 
Fazio in the commission of robbery, in violation of Code § 18.2-
31(4), and with the capital murder of Fazio in the commission of 
rape, in violation of Code § 18.2-31(5) (the Fazio case).  In 
the first phase of a bifurcated trial, the jury found Payne 
guilty of both capital murders.  At the penalty phase of the 
trial, after hearing evidence of Payne's prior criminal history, 
the jury found the "future dangerousness" predicate and the 
"vileness" predicate to be present and unanimously fixed Payne's 
punishment at death for each of the two capital murder 
convictions.  Code § 19.2-264.2.  After considering a probation 
officer's report and conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial 
court sentenced Payne in accord with the jury verdicts. 
 
Payne filed a notice of appeal, but subsequently requested 
permission to waive his appeal of right.  We directed the trial 
court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether 
Payne's decision to waive his appeal was made knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently.  The trial court conducted such 
a hearing and found that Payne's waiver was made knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently, and we conclude that the record 
supports that finding. 
B 
 
2
 
The evidence in the Fazio case is undisputed.  On the 
evening of June 11, 1997, Payne saw Fazio outside her residence 
in the City of Richmond, caring for her sick dog.  When Fazio 
entered her house, Payne put a 22-ounce hammer in his pants, 
went to Fazio's front door, and asked to use the telephone. 
Fazio permitted Payne to use a portable telephone outside her 
house, and, after feigning a telephone call, Payne returned the 
telephone.  As he handed the telephone to Fazio, Payne forced 
his way into Fazio's house and struck her in the head with the 
hammer, knocking her down. 
 
Fazio briefly struggled with Payne and then attempted to 
flee down a hallway to her bedroom.  As she fled, she threw a 
chair behind her, attempting to block Payne.  Fazio tried to 
close the bedroom door, but Payne forced his way into the room.  
Fazio pleaded for her life and offered to write a check to 
Payne. 
 
Payne told Fazio that, if she removed her clothes, he would 
not hurt her.  Fazio removed her clothes, and Payne raped her.1 
During the attack, Payne repeatedly struck Fazio with the 
hammer. 
 
Thereafter, Payne took money from Fazio's pocketbook and 
ransacked her house looking for more money and guns.  He then 
                     
1 Payne admitted penetrating Fazio's vagina and ejaculating on 
her.   
 
3
removed his bloodstained clothing and dressed in sweatpants and 
a T-shirt belonging to Fazio.  He left the bloodstained clothing 
in Fazio's house. 
 
As Payne was preparing to leave the house, he noticed that 
Fazio was still breathing, so he hit her with the hammer several 
times in the head.  Fazio continued breathing, so Payne "hit her 
maybe ten, twelve times in the chest." 
 
Payne wrapped the hammer in a towel and subsequently threw 
the hammer out of his car window.  Later that night, Payne 
disposed of the clothing he had taken from Fazio's home in a 
dumpster at a public high school. 
 
The police recovered the hammer, and forensic evidence 
established that the hammer contained traces of blood consistent 
with Fazio's blood type.  Semen stains from a bedspread and 
clothing found at the crime scene were consistent with Payne's 
blood type and DNA profile. 
 
The medical examiner's autopsy revealed that Fazio had died 
from blunt force trauma to the head, the result of multiple 
blows that had caused fractures, contusions, hemorrhaging, and 
edema.  Fazio also had sustained multiple bone fractures and 
contusions to her chest and a fractured right middle finger. 
 
In the penalty phase of the trial, the Commonwealth 
presented evidence of Payne's prior criminal history.  This 
                                                                  
 
 
4
included the attempted rape and murder of Ruth Parham on June 5, 
1997.  The Commonwealth also presented evidence of an assault by 
Payne on Ridley Fleck and her eight-year-old son, W. Dean Fleck.  
This attack also occurred on June 11, 1997, shortly before Payne 
murdered Fazio.  Payne attacked the Flecks with a hammer, and he 
told the police that he attacked them because he wanted to 
incapacitate Ms. Fleck and take her elsewhere to rape her.  
Payne, however, was forced to leave the scene because Dean Fleck 
was screaming and fighting.  The Flecks both suffered skull 
fractures in the attack. 
C 
1 
 
We first consider whether the death sentences in the Fazio 
case were imposed "under the influence of passion, prejudice or 
any other arbitrary factor."  Former Code § 17-110.1(C)(1).  
Payne contends that a videotape of the crime scene and autopsy 
and crime scene photographs, presented during the guilt phase of 
the trial, were unduly graphic and were shown to inflame the 
passions of the jury.  He further contends that a crime scene 
videotape related to his earlier attempted rape and murder of 
Ruth Parham, presented during the penalty phase of the trial, 
also was unduly graphic. 
 
We consistently have held that the admission of photographs 
into evidence rests within the sound discretion of a trial 
 
5
court, and the court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless the record discloses a clear abuse of discretion.  Walton 
 v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 85, 91-92, 501 S.E.2d 134, 138 (1998); 
Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 459, 470 S.E.2d 114, 126, 
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 887 (1996); Washington v. Commonwealth, 
228 Va. 535, 551, 323 S.E.2d 577, 588 (1984), cert. denied, 471 
U.S. 1111 (1985).  Photographs of a victim are admissible to 
prove motive, intent, malice, premeditation, method, and the 
degree of atrociousness of the crime.  Walton, 256 Va. at 92, 
501 S.E.2d at 138; Goins, 251 Va. at 459, 470 S.E.2d at 126.  
Photographs that accurately portray the crime scene are not 
rendered inadmissible simply because they are gruesome or 
shocking.  Walton, 256 Va. at 92, 501 S.E.2d at 138; Gray v. 
Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 343, 356 S.E.2d 157, 173, cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 873 (1987); Washington, 228 Va. at 551, 323 
S.E.2d at 588.  Likewise, videotapes that accurately depict a 
crime scene are admissible to show motive, intent, method, 
malice, premeditation, and the atrociousness of the crime, even 
if photographs of the crime scene also have been admitted into 
evidence.  Stewart v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 222, 235, 427 S.E.2d 
394, 403, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 848 (1993). 
 
We have examined the videotapes of the Fazio crime scene 
and the Parham crime scene, the photographs of the Fazio crime 
scene, and the Fazio autopsy photographs.  While the photographs 
 
6
and videotapes are shocking and gruesome, they accurately depict 
the crime scenes and the conditions of the victims and are 
relevant to show motive, intent, method, malice, premeditation, 
and the atrociousness of the crimes.  They also are relevant to 
show the likelihood of Payne's future dangerousness.  Therefore, 
we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in 
admitting this evidence, and we reject Payne's contention that 
the evidence was so graphic as to unduly influence the emotions 
of the jury. 
 
Payne also contends that evidence about Dean Fleck's 
injuries and the Commonwealth's Attorney's references to the 
child's bravery in identifying Payne and, thereby, assisting in 
Payne's capture were intended to inflame the passions of the 
jury.  This evidence was presented in the penalty phase of the 
trial and was relevant to show Payne's future dangerousness.  
Furthermore, the Commonwealth's Attorney's remarks were accurate 
and based upon the evidence. 
 
Upon our review of the entire record in the Fazio case, 
having considered the contentions advanced by Payne, we conclude 
that the death sentences were not imposed under the influence of 
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. 
2 
 
We next consider whether the death sentences in the Fazio 
case are "excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed 
 
7
in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant."  
Former Code § 17-110.1(C)(2).  Pursuant to former Code § 17-
110.1(E), we have accumulated and reviewed the records in all 
capital murder cases decided by this Court, including both cases 
in which the death sentence was imposed and cases in which life 
imprisonment was imposed.  From these cases, we determine 
whether "juries in this jurisdiction generally approve the 
supreme penalty for comparable or similar crimes."  Stamper v. 
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 284, 257 S.E.2d 808, 824 (1979), 
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980).  In making this review, we 
have given particular attention to those cases in which the 
death sentence was based upon both the "vileness" and the 
"future dangerousness" predicates.  From this review, we 
conclude that Payne's sentences were neither excessive nor 
disproportionate to penalties generally imposed by other 
sentencing bodies in the Commonwealth for similar or comparable 
crimes.  See, e.g., Barnabei v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 161, 179-
80, 477 S.E.2d 270, 281 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1224 
(1997); Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 89, 445 S.E.2d 670, 
682, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 971 (1994); Satcher v. Commonwealth, 
244 Va. 220, 261, 421 S.E.2d 821, 845-46 (1992), cert. denied, 
507 U.S. 933 (1993); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295, 318-
20, 384 S.E.2d 785, 799-800 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 
(1990). 
 
8
II 
The Parham Case
A 
 
Payne pleaded guilty to the capital murder of Ruth Parham 
while in the commission of or subsequent to object sexual 
penetration and to the capital murder of Parham while in the 
commission of or subsequent to attempted rape, both in violation 
of Code § 18.2-31(5) (the Parham case).  The trial court 
accepted Payne's voluntary pleas and found him guilty of both 
capital murders. 
 
In a separate sentencing proceeding, the court found that 
the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt both 
aggravating factors; i.e., "vileness" and "future 
dangerousness."  The court imposed the death penalty for each 
offense. 
 
Payne filed a motion to waive his appeal of right, and we 
remanded the case to the trial court for a determination whether 
the waiver was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. 
Payne was examined, at his request, by a psychologist and was 
found to be competent to waive his appeal.  Thereafter, the 
trial court conducted a hearing and determined that Payne's 
waiver was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and 
we conclude that the record supports that determination. 
 
9
 
Although Payne waived his appeal of right, we must review 
the death sentences nonetheless.  Former Code § 17-110.1 (now 
Code § 17.1-313).  As previously noted, this mandatory review 
directs this Court to consider and determine whether the 
sentences were "imposed under the influence of passion, 
prejudice or any other arbitrary factor" and whether the 
sentences are "excessive or disproportionate to the penalty 
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the 
defendant."  Former Code § 17-110.1(C). 
B 
 
The evidence in the Parham case is undisputed.  On June 5, 
1997, Payne saw Parham enter an office building in Hanover 
County.  Payne concealed a large hammer inside his pants and 
entered the building.  He found Parham, a 61-year-old woman who 
cleaned the offices, in a lunchroom.  Payne asked Parham if he 
could use the telephone, and she consented. 
 
Parham had turned her back on Payne and had taken about 
three steps when Payne hit her in the back of her head with the 
hammer.  Parham fell facedown, and Payne began to rip off her 
clothes.  Payne fondled Parham's breast and inserted his finger 
into her vagina.  During the attack, Payne repeatedly struck 
Parham's head with the hammer. 
 
Parham sustained four depressed skull fractures, each of 
which was potentially fatal, and she also sustained a fractured 
 
10
nose and numerous facial and skull bruises and lacerations. 
Parham's left hand had on it traces of her blood and strands of 
her hair, indicating that she was alive during the bludgeoning, 
and her brain was extruding through one of her skull fractures. 
 
After the murder, Payne removed his shirt and used it to 
wipe doorknobs and other items he may have touched in the room.  
He then went throughout the building looking for another female 
victim before leaving.  Payne had decided not to rape Parham 
because "she did not appeal to him." 
 
In the sentencing proceeding, the trial court received 
evidence about Payne's prior criminal history.  Less than five 
months before Payne murdered Parham, he had been released on 
parole after serving approximately five years in prison for drug 
possession.  Payne told the police that, during the entire time 
he had been in prison, he had thought about raping and killing a 
woman.  The trial court heard about Payne's attack upon Fleck 
and her young son and Payne's murder of Fazio, details of which 
are more fully set forth in Part I, B hereof. 
C 
 
We first consider and determine whether the death sentences 
in the Parham case were imposed "under the influence of passion, 
prejudice or any other arbitrary factor."  Former Code § 17-
110.1(C)(1).  Payne contends that the Commonwealth's Attorney 
made improper remarks in the sentencing proceeding.  Payne 
 
11
complains that the prosecutor used the evidence of the Fazio and 
Fleck crimes to justify the death penalty.  He specifically 
complains about the prosecutor's referring to Payne as a 
"predator" and a "monster" and showing photographs of the 
victims to the court during the argument.  Payne asserts that 
the prosecutor's argument "had the desired effect on the court" 
because the court "described [him] as a mad dog who should be 
put in a gunny sack with some bricks and dropped off a bridge."  
Payne opines that this language by the court "is ample evidence 
that the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of 
passion and prejudice."  We do not agree.  When all of the trial 
court's remarks are read, it is apparent that, before imposing 
the death sentences, the court considered not only Payne's 
criminal history, but also his evidence in mitigation. 
 
With respect to the prosecutor's argument, we conclude that 
it constituted fair comment upon properly admitted evidence.  
The Commonwealth had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt that "there is a probability based upon evidence of the 
prior history of the defendant . . . that he would commit 
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing 
serious threat to society."  Code § 19.2-264.4(C) (emphasis 
added).  Therefore, evidence of Payne's other crimes was 
admissible.  See Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 346-47, 356 
S.E.2d 157, 175-76, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873 (1987); Pruett v. 
 
12
Commonwealth, 232 Va. 266, 283-85, 351 S.E.2d 1, 11-12 (1986), 
cert. denied, 482 U.S. 931 (1987). 
 
Having considered the entire record, we determine that the 
death sentences imposed upon Payne were not the product of 
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. 
D 
 
Payne makes no argument that his death sentences are 
excessive or disproportionate.  He assumes that we will consider 
all capital murder cases reviewed by this Court, and we have 
done so.  Suffice it to say, the evidence, including that of the 
crimes themselves and Payne's criminal history, is gruesome and 
shocking, and, when this case is compared to other attempted 
rape and/or robbery capital murder cases, we conclude that the 
sentences were neither excessive nor disproportionate.  See, 
e.g., Walton v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 85, 96, 501 S.E.2d 134, 
140-41 (1998); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 625, 499 S.E.2d 
538 (1998); Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 89, 445 S.E.2d 
670, 682, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 971 (1994); Satcher v. 
Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 261, 421 S.E.2d 821, 845-46 (1992), 
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 933 (1993). 
III 
 
The final issue we consider is common to both the Fazio and 
the Parham cases; that is, whether there can be more than one 
 
13
death sentence imposed when there is only one victim.2  Stated 
another way, we must determine whether the imposition of 
multiple death sentences violates the provision of the Fifth 
Amendment of the Federal Constitution which states that no 
person "shall . . . for the same offense . . . be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb."  This constitutional provision 
guarantees protection against (1) a second prosecution for the 
same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the 
same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for 
the same offense.  Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415 (1980); 
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); Blythe v. 
Commonwealth, 222 Va. 722, 725, 284 S.E.2d 796, 797 (1981). 
 
When multiple convictions occur in a single trial, only the 
third guarantee; i.e., against multiple punishments for the same 
offense, is pertinent to a double jeopardy inquiry.  Blythe, 222 
Va. at 725, 284 S.E.2d at 797-98; Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 
Va. 513, 529, 273 S.E.2d 36, 46-47 (1980), cert. denied, 451 
U.S. 1011 (1981).  In the single-trial setting, "the role of the 
constitutional guarantee is limited to assuring that the court 
does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing 
multiple punishments for the same offense."  Brown v. Ohio, 432 
                     
2 Although Payne did not pursue this issue at trial and has 
waived his appeal of right in these cases, we directed counsel 
to address the issue. 
 
 
14
U.S. 161, 165 (1977).  Thus, resolution of the question whether 
punishments imposed by a court are unconstitutionally multiple 
requires a determination of what punishments the legislature has 
authorized.  Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 688 (1980). 
 
In determining what punishments the General Assembly has 
authorized, we first look to the capital murder statute, Code 
§ 18.2-31.  That statute provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
 
The following offenses shall constitute capital 
murder, punishable as a Class 1 felony: 
. . . . 
4. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated 
killing of any person in the commission of robbery or 
attempted robbery; 
5. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated 
killing of any person in the commission of, or 
subsequent to, rape or attempted rape, . . . or object 
sexual penetration. 
(Emphasis added.)  Clearly, the language in Code § 18.2-31 
expresses the legislative intent that there are multiple capital 
offenses.   
Next, we look to the rule laid down in Blockburger v. 
United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).  In Blockburger, the Supreme 
Court stated that, "where the same act or transaction 
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, 
the test to be applied to determine whether there are two 
 
15
offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof 
of a fact which the other does not."  Id. at 304. 
 
In the Fazio case, Payne, "in the same act or transaction," 
violated "two distinct statutory provisions;" i.e., the killing 
of Fazio in the commission of robbery, in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-31(4), and the killing of Fazio in the commission of 
rape, in violation of Code § 18.2-31(5).  Each statutory 
provision required proof of a fact that the other did not.  
Therefore, the killing of Fazio constituted two capital 
offenses. 
 
Likewise, in the Parham case, Payne, "in the same act or 
transaction," violated "two distinct statutory provisions" of 
subsection 5 of Code § 18.2-31; i.e., the killing of Parham in 
the commission of attempted rape and the killing of Parham in 
the commission of object sexual penetration.  Again, each 
statutory provision required proof of a fact that the other did 
not.  Therefore, the killing of Parham constituted two capital 
offenses. 
 
Payne does not challenge the validity of his multiple 
convictions.  However, he suggests that one of his sentences in 
each case should be vacated.  We do not agree. 
We think it is clear, as well as logical, that the General 
Assembly intended for each statutory offense to be punished 
 
16
separately "as a Class 1 felony."3  It would be inappropriate for 
this Court, or the trial court upon remand, to arbitrarily 
choose which one of the two sentences should be vacated.  
Indeed, there would be no principled basis for making such a 
choice.  Nor do we think the Commonwealth should be required to 
elect at trial or on appeal which offense to have dismissed. 
 
We hold, therefore, that each conviction was for the 
violation of a distinct statutory provision for which a separate 
statutory punishment was authorized.  Consequently, the 
convictions and sentences do not violate the constitutional 
guarantee of protection against multiple punishments for the 
same offense. 
IV 
 
In sum, we determine that the death sentences were not 
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other 
arbitrary factor and are not excessive or disproportionate.  We 
further determine that the convictions and sentences do not 
violate the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgments in both cases. 
Record No. 980559 — Affirmed. 
Record No. 980879 — Affirmed. 
 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, dissenting in part. 
 
I respectfully dissent. 
                     
3 The authorized punishments for conviction of a Class 1 felony 
 
17
 
Today, for the first time, a majority of this Court 
concludes that by enacting Code § 18.2-31, our General Assembly 
has authorized the imposition of more than one death sentence 
for the capital murder of one victim.  Indeed in the present 
cases, the majority concludes that Eric Christopher Payne is 
properly subject to the imposition of four death sentences for 
the capital murder of only two victims.  I cannot join in such a 
patently strange result.  Moreover, in my view, such a result 
was not intended and, consequently, was not authorized by our 
General Assembly in enacting Code § 18.2-31. 
 
It is clear to me from our prior cases in which this issue 
was implicated that we have not permitted more death sentences 
to be imposed than there were victims.  See Clagett v. 
Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 472 S.E.2d 263 (1996), cert. denied, 
519 U.S. 1122 (1997)(vacating one sentence where five death 
sentences were imposed for murder of four victims); Williams v. 
Commonwealth, 248 Va. 528, 450 S.E.2d 365 (1994), cert. denied, 
515 U.S. 1161 (1995)(affirming five convictions of capital 
murder of two victims, but only one death sentence imposed for 
each victim); Wright v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 177, 427 S.E.2d 
379 (1993), remanded on other grounds, 512 U.S. 1217, aff’d., 
248 Va. 485, 450 S.E.2d 361 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1085 
(1995)(defendant convicted of two counts of capital murder of 
                                                                  
include death and life imprisonment.  Code § 18.2-10(a). 
 
18
one victim, but sentenced to one death penalty for both 
convictions); Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 384 S.E.2d 
757 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1063 (1990)(reducing five 
death sentences to four where there were only four victims). 
 
The majority correctly notes that the constitutional 
guarantee against multiple punishments for the same offense 
provided by the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution is 
limited to assuring in a single trial setting that the court 
does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing 
multiple punishments for the same offense. 
 
I agree with the majority that the resolution of that issue 
in the present cases requires a determination of the legislative 
intent underlying Code § 18.2-31.  I do not agree, however, that 
the language of that statute evinces the General Assembly’s 
intention that multiple punishments may be imposed for the 
killing of one person where more than one definition, or 
“offenses,” of capital murder is found to apply.  See Gray v. 
State, 463 P.2d 897, 911 (Alaska 1970). 
 
It is self-evident that there can be no more than one 
killing of the same person.  Accordingly, it necessarily follows 
that the killing of one person in the commission of the robbery 
and rape of that person is still but one killing.  Similarly, 
the killing of one person in the commission of the rape and 
object sexual penetration of that person is still but one 
 
19
killing.  I have no difficulty in concluding the General 
Assembly has always been well aware of these simplistic truths.  
For that reason alone, I conclude that by enacting Code § 18.2-
31, the General Assembly did not intend to authorize more death 
sentences than there are victims killed as a result of a 
defendant committing more than one of the enumerated “offenses” 
that “constitute capital murder.”  In short, more than one 
offense defined in Code § 18.2-31 may constitute the capital 
murder of a person but there can only be one capital murder 
penalty for the murder of that person. 
 
The real difficulty presented in these appeals is the 
appropriate remedy where two death sentences have been imposed 
for the capital murder of each victim.  I agree with the 
majority that we should not “arbitrarily choose which one of the 
two sentences should be vacated” in each case and that “the 
Commonwealth should [not] be required to elect” which offense to 
have dismissed.  Rather, I would apply the rationale of Wright 
and Williams and modify Payne’s sentences to impose a single 
death sentence upon the capital murder convictions for each 
victim.  In doing so, the patently strange and illogical result 
that would allow Payne to be sentenced to the penalty of four 
death sentences for killing two persons would be avoided. 
 
 
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