Case Title: Alderson v. County of Alleghany

Citation: 

Docket Number: 022578

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2003-09-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
J. CHRIS ALDERSON, ET AL. 
 
 
                                OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 022578              JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
September 12, 2003 
COUNTY OF ALLEGHANY 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALLEGHANY COUNTY 
Duncan M. Byrd, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a special legislative 
enactment regarding property taxes violates the Constitution 
of Virginia.  Effective July 1, 2001 the City of Clifton Forge 
reverted to town status.  Upon reversion, the residents of the 
former City of Clifton Forge became residents of Alleghany 
County and the new town of Clifton Forge.  This reversion was 
accomplished by agreement pursuant to Code § 15.2-3400 and was 
approved by the Virginia Commission on Local Government and a 
three-judge court pursuant to §§ 15.2-2907 and 15.2-3000.  
Left unresolved, however, was the issue of personal property 
assessment and levy upon citizens of the former City of 
Clifton Forge. 
 
The 2002 Session of the General Assembly, by vote of 40 –
 0 in the Senate and 99 – 0 in the House, passed Senate Bill 
246 providing for Chapter 78 of the 2002 Acts of Assembly 
(“Chapter 78”).  The Bill provided that “an emergency exists 
and this act is in force from its passage.”  The Governor 
signed the Bill on March 6, 2002. 
 
 
Chapter 78 provided that: 
 
1.  § 1.  Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, any assessment of 
tangible personal property as of January 
1, 2001, for tangible personal property 
located in the Town of Clifton Forge, with 
such assessment being made by the 
commissioner of the revenue of Alleghany 
County, shall be valid, regardless that 
residents of the Town of Clifton Forge 
were residents of an independent city, the 
City of Clifton Forge, on January 1, 2001.  
In addition, the levy or imposition of 
tangible personal property taxes for the 
entire 2001 tax year based upon such 
assessments shall also be valid subject to 
the following: 
 
1.  Such assessments upon the 
residents of the Town of Clifton Forge 
shall be deemed to have been assessments 
made to levy all tangible personal 
property taxes upon such persons for a 
period covering two separate tax years, 
the first beginning January 1, 2001, 
through 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 2001, and 
the second beginning July 1, 2001, through 
12:00 p.m. on December 31, 2001; 
 
2.  The tangible personal property 
assessments by the county commissioner of 
the revenue on the residents of the Town 
of Clifton Forge applicable to the tax 
year beginning January 1, 2001, through 
12:00 p.m. on June 30, 2001, shall be 
deemed to have been assessments made by 
the commissioner of the revenue of the 
City of Clifton Forge for such short tax 
year.  The tangible personal property 
taxes imposed by the City of Clifton Forge 
based upon such assessments shall have met 
the requirement of Article X, Section 1 of 
the Constitution of Virginia that all 
property, except as provided in the 
Constitution, shall be taxed.  In 
 
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addition, such tangible personal property 
taxes applicable to the tax year beginning 
January 1, 2001, through 12:00 p.m. on 
June 30, 2001, shall be levied at the 
tangible personal property tax rates in 
effect in the City of Clifton Forge as of 
January 1, 2001, but the amount of tax due 
shall be reduced by one-half to reflect 
the short tax year beginning January 1, 
2001, through 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 2001; 
and 
 
3.  The tangible personal property 
assessments by the county commissioner of 
the revenue on the residents of the Town 
of Clifton Forge applicable to the tax 
year beginning July 1, 2001, through 12:00 
p.m. on December 31, 2001, shall be deemed 
to have been assessments made by the 
county commissioner of the revenue on the 
residents of the Town of Clifton Forge who 
also became residents of the county on 
July 1, 2001.  The tangible personal 
property taxes levied by Alleghany County 
based upon such assessments shall be 
levied at the tangible personal property 
tax rates in effect in Alleghany County as 
of January 1, 2001, but the amount of tax 
due shall be reduced by one-half to 
reflect the short tax year beginning July 
1, 2001, through 12:00 p.m. on December 
31, 2001. 
 
§ 2.  Any tangible personal property 
taxes levied by the Town of Clifton Forge 
upon town residents for the tax year 
beginning July 1, 2001, through 12:00 p.m. 
on December 31, 2001, shall be valid.  
However, the amount of tax due shall be 
determined using tangible personal 
property tax rates in effect in the town 
as of July 1, 2001, and the amount of tax 
due shall be reduced by one-half to 
reflect a short tax year beginning July 1, 
2001, through 12:00 p.m. on December 31, 
2001. 
 
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2.  That an emergency exists and this act 
is in force from its passage. 
 
Chapter 78 validates the assessment of the County 
Commissioner of Revenue upon property located in the former 
City of Clifton Forge on January 1, 2001 and validates the 
levy of taxes by the County for the year 2001 on the following 
basis: 
a. 
for Town residents the tax year is divided into two 
“short tax years” representing the first half of the 
calendar year and the second half of the calendar year; 
b. 
assessments by the County are “deemed” to be 
assessments by the City in the first short tax year and 
are levied upon at the tax rate in effect in the City 
on January 1, 2001 and thereafter reduced by one-half 
to reflect the shortened period; 
c. 
for the second short tax year, residents of the Town 
are subject to levy at tax rates in effect in the 
County as of January 1, 2001 and thereafter reduced by 
one-half to reflect the shortened period.1 
 
 
Upon assessment and levy by the Commissioner of the 
Revenue of Alleghany County for personal property taxes for 
the calendar year 2001, J. Chris Alderson and other citizens 
of the former City of Clifton Forge (“Taxpayers”), fully paid 
their property taxes due on a timely basis.  Thereafter, 
pursuant to Code § 58.1-3984, they brought suit in the Circuit 
Court of Alleghany County “for correction and invalidation of 
                     
1 Additionally, Chapter 78 validated any separate taxation 
imposed by the Town for the tax year 2001 at tax rates in 
effect as of July 1, 2001 in the Town and thereafter reduced 
by one-half to reflect the shortened period of town status 
during 2001.  Taxes levied by the new Town of Clifton Forge 
are not the subject of this appeal. 
 
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taxes on tangible personal property” and seeking a refund of 
taxes paid.  In their suit, Taxpayers did not mention Chapter 
78; nonetheless, Taxpayers asserted that “[b]etween January 1, 
2001 and December 31, 2001 (or July 1, 2001), the County of 
Alleghany had no authority, whether by statute, ordinance, or 
the Constitution of Virginia to tax any personal property 
physically located and normally garaged in the City of Clifton 
Forge, Virginia.” 
Alleghany County demurred and maintained that Chapter 78 
authorized the Commissioner of the Revenue of Alleghany County 
to assess and levy upon personal property garaged in the City 
of Clifton Forge on January 1, 2001.  After a hearing upon the 
demurrer, the trial court entered an order declaring that “the 
Amended Petition should be and it is hereby deemed to allege 
that said Chapter 78 of the Acts of Assembly (Senate Bill 246) 
is unconstitutional.”  The order further recited that the 
demurrer remained under advisement.  After submission of 
briefs and argument of counsel, the trial court issued a 
letter opinion which was incorporated by reference into the 
final order.  The letter opinion recited in part that: 
“Counsel for the petitioner concedes that if Senate Bill 246 
is constitutional, then their case becomes moot and the 
demurrer should be sustained and the petition dismissed.”  The 
final order of the trial court held that Chapter 78 did not 
 
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violate the Constitution of Virginia, sustained the demurrer, 
and dismissed the petition.  Taxpayers appeal the adverse 
judgment of the trial court. 
ANALYSIS
 
 
The only question before the Court on appeal is whether 
Chapter 78 violates the Constitution of Virginia.  Chapter 78 
was enacted in response to the unique circumstances arising 
from the reversion of the City of Clifton Forge to town 
status.  The Act references Article X, § 1 of the Constitution 
of Virginia requiring uniformity of property taxation.  “The 
dominant purpose of [this constitutional provision] is to 
distribute the burden of taxation, so far as is practical, 
evenly and equitably.”  Board of Supervisors v. 
Telecommunications Indus., 246 Va. 472, 477, 436 S.E.2d 442, 
445 (1993) (quoting R. Cross, Inc. v. City of Newport News, 
217 Va. 202, 207, 228 S.E.2d 113, 117 (1976)).  Because “tax 
day” for the purpose of assessment of personal property in 
Alleghany County was January 1, 2001 (Code § 58.1-3515), and 
reversion from status as an independent city to that of a town 
within Alleghany County was effective July 1, 2001, without 
the provisions of Chapter 78, Taxpayers would be free from any 
personal property taxes for the calendar year 2001.  Chapter 
78 sought to remedy this potential non-uniformity in the 
assessment and levy upon personal property.  This isolated 
 
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remedy provides a solution to a nonrecurring problem.  
Irrespective of the General Assembly’s motivation, the 
question remains whether Chapter 78 violates the Constitution 
of Virginia. 
 
Taxpayers’ assignments of error are somewhat overlapping 
and duplicative in nature; however, their challenge to the 
constitutionality of Chapter 78 is fairly stated and discussed 
herein.2  Of course, we must consider these questions with a 
presumption of validity which attaches to every enactment of 
the General Assembly.  Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs., 
257 Va. 1, 9, 509 S.E.2d 307, 311 (1999). 
I. 
 
 
Taxpayers note that tangible personal property is subject 
to “local taxation only, and shall be assessed for local 
taxation in such manner and at such times as the General 
Assembly may prescribe by general law.”  Va. Const. Art. X, 
§ 4.  Situs for assessment and taxation of Taxpayers’ tangible 
personal property is the City of Clifton Forge on “tax day,” 
January 1, 2001.  Code §§ 58.1-3511, 58.1-3515; Shelor Motor 
Co. v. Miller, 261 Va. 473, 476, 544 S.E.2d 345, 346 (2001).  
                     
2 Taxpayers assert that they did not have the opportunity 
to vote for any public officials of Alleghany County who 
imposed personal property taxes upon them for 2001; however, 
Taxpayers make no legal argument to support their contention 
that such circumstances render Chapter 78 unconstitutional.  
Accordingly, we will not consider this issue.  Rule 5:17. 
 
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Article X, § 1 of the Constitution of Virginia provides in 
part that “All property, except as hereinafter provided, shall 
be taxed.  All taxes shall be levied and collected under 
general laws and shall be uniform upon the same class of 
subjects within the territorial limits of the authority 
levying the tax . . . .”  Because Taxpayers were residents of 
the City on January 1, 2001, they argue that they were not 
“within the territorial limits” of Alleghany County and cannot 
be subject to taxation by the County. 
 
Article X, § 4 provides that tangible personal property 
may be made subject to local taxation “in such manner and at 
such times as the General Assembly may prescribe by general 
law.”  It is clear that the determination of situs and “tax 
day” is within the power of the General Assembly.  It has done 
so with general laws in Code §§ 58.1-3511 and 58.1-3515.  But, 
Article IV, § 14 provides in part that “[t]he General Assembly 
shall not enact any local, special, or private law” in cases 
involving “the assessment and collection of taxes.” 
 
The Constitution of Virginia also provides for special 
acts concerning local government.  Article VII, § 2 provides 
in pertinent part: “The General Assembly may also provide by 
special act for the organization, government, and powers of 
any county, city, town, or regional government, including such 
powers of legislation, taxation, and assessment as the General 
 
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Assembly may determine . . . .”  Under the provisions of Art. 
VII, § 1, such a special act is defined as “a law applicable 
to a county, city, town, or regional government and for 
enactment shall require an affirmative vote of two-thirds of 
the members elected to each house of the General Assembly.” 
 
At first glance, the provisions of Art. IV, § 14 appear 
in conflict with Art. VII, § 2.  But, this is not our first 
glance at these provisions of the Constitution.  Sections 63 
and 64 of the 1902 Constitution of Virginia are essentially 
the same as Article IV, §§ 14 and 15 of the 1971 Constitution.  
Additionally, § 117 of the 1902 Constitution is essentially 
the same as Art. VII, § 2 of the 1971 Constitution.  
Considering the potential conflict between these provisions 
under the 1902 Constitution, we held: 
sections 63 and 64 must be read in connection 
with section 117, [which] was designed to 
enable municipal corporations, because of their 
peculiar problems, ‘to care for their special 
interests,’ and that, ‘Usually this could be 
done by general laws . . . but the Convention 
realized that there might be cases where it 
would be desirable to confer special powers, or 
special privileges . . . .’ 
 
Fallon Florist v. City of Roanoke, 190 Va. 564, 573, 58 S.E.2d 
316, 320 (1950) (quoting City of Portsmouth v. Weiss, 145 Va. 
94, 106, 133 S.E. 781, 784 (1926)).  Also, in Pierce v. 
Dennis, 205 Va. 478, 485, 138 S.E.2d 6, 12 (1964), we held 
that the more specific authorization in § 117 controls over 
 
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the general restrictions in §§ 63 and 64 and we further stated 
that “[l]aws for the organization and government of cities and 
towns were specially provided for in § 117, and that section, 
and not § 64, must be looked to when the validity of such laws 
is questioned.”  This understanding of the interplay between 
these two provisions in the Constitution has continued after 
adoption of the 1971 Constitution.  Infants v. Virginia Hous. 
Dev. Auth., 221 Va. 659, 675, 272 S.E.2d 649, 658-59 (1980).  
When an act of assembly involves “the organization, 
government, and powers of any county, city, town or regional 
government, including such powers of legislation, taxation, 
and assessment” the authorization found in Art. VII, §§ 1 and 
2 prevails over the restrictions found in Art. IV, § 14. 
 
Chapter 78 most assuredly is special legislation.  It was 
passed by unanimous vote of both houses of the General 
Assembly.  It was enacted in the context and aftermath of a 
reorganization of governmental units, most particularly the 
dissolution of an independent city and its reversion to the 
status of a town.  Furthermore, Chapter 78 clearly involves 
powers of taxation and assessment specifically referenced in 
Art. VII, § 2.  Chapter 78 does not determine assessments nor 
does it establish tax rates.  Rather, it creates two short tax 
years compatible with the date of reversion to town status, 
validates the assessment of the County and the tax rate of the 
 
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City for the first short tax year, and validates the 
assessment of the County and the tax rate of the County for 
the second short tax year.  Chapter 78 has the effect of 
adjusting the situs requirements provided under general law to 
adjust for the special and non-recurring circumstances 
presented in 2001 involving the reversion of the City of 
Clifton Forge to town status.  Chapter 78 had the additional 
effect of achieving uniformity required by Art. X, § 1 with 
respect to the citizens of the County.  Chapter 78 is not an 
unconstitutional violation of Art. IV, § 14 because it is 
specifically authorized by Art. VII, § 2. 
II. 
 
 
Taxpayers argue that Chapter 78 violates the uniformity 
requirement of Art. X, § 1 in its imposition of taxes by the 
County upon former city residents for the second short tax 
year.  They assert that persons moving into the County after 
January 1, 2001 are not subject to personal property taxes by 
the County for the year 2001 because there is no proration of 
personal property taxes.  Taxpayers maintain that by reversion 
to town status, they “moved” into the County effective July 1, 
2001.  They argue that subjecting them to taxation by the 
County for the second short tax year while other persons who 
physically moved into the County after January 1, 2001 are not 
subject to taxation, results in lack of uniformity. 
 
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As previously discussed in section I above, the General 
Assembly, by the enactment of Chapter 78, in effect, adjusted 
the general situs and tax day provisions Code §§ 58.1-3511 and 
58.1-3515 to meet the special and non-recurring circumstances 
presented by reversion to town status.  Taxpayers did not 
“move” as they suggest.  The structure of government 
applicable to them changed.  The General Assembly was 
authorized by the provisions of Art. VII, § 2 to address these 
unique circumstances.  Contrary to Taxpayers’ argument, 
Chapter 78 provides greater uniformity in tax burdens than 
would the situation in which taxpayers would be free from all 
personal property taxation by the County. 
III. 
 
 
Taxpayers contend that the retroactivity of Chapter 78 
violates the ex post facto prohibition found in Art. I, § 9 of 
the Constitution of Virginia.  The constitutional prohibition 
against ex post facto laws applies only to criminal 
proceedings.  Huffman v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 530, 532, 172 
S.E.2d 788, 789 (1970). 
 
Additionally, Taxpayers appear to argue that retroactive 
application of Chapter 78 is unconstitutional because “it 
attempts to validate the unconstitutional acts of the County,” 
and it violates the rights of Taxpayers “to be free of County 
taxation of their tangible personal property until next tax 
 
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year.” The General Assembly has the power to enact curative 
acts with retroactive application provided that such acts are 
not arbitrary and do not disturb vested rights, impair 
contractual obligations, or violate due process.  Colonial 
Pipeline Co. v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 517, 521, 145 S.E.2d 
227, 231 (1965).  “No one has the vested right to be free of 
taxation, nor does he have the constitutional right to know 
that a tax will be levied in such a manner that he may avoid 
it.”  Id.  Taxpayers do not assert any vested rights that have 
been disturbed or any contractual obligations that have been 
impaired.  Furthermore, as previously discussed in section I 
above, the General Assembly did not act arbitrarily or without 
authority in the enactment of Chapter 78. 
IV. 
 
 
Finally, Taxpayers argue that Art. VII, § 7 provides that 
“[n]o ordinance or resolution appropriating money exceeding 
the sum of five hundred dollars, imposing taxes, or 
authorizing the borrowing of money shall be passed except by a 
recorded affirmative vote of a majority of all members elected 
to the governing body.”  Taxpayers appear to assert that this 
constitutional provision “trumps” the authority granted by 
Art. VII, § 2 and because Chapter 78 is not a local ordinance, 
the imposition of taxes is unconstitutional.  Taxpayers 
misconstrue the effect of Chapter 78.  Chapter 78 does not 
 
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enact any ordinance, impose any tax, or set any tax rate.  
Rather, Chapter 78 validates the assessment and levy of taxes 
under existing ordinances and establishes two short tax years 
to accommodate the change in government structure.  It does so 
by special act adjusting general situs and tax day provisions 
in this unique and non-recurring situation. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
We hold that Chapter 78 does not violate the Constitution 
of Virginia.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court 
will be affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
 
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