Case Title: Shackleford v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 001795

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2001-06-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present: All the Justices 
 
DORIAN LEE-KIRK SHACKLEFORD 
 
v.  Record No. 001795  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     June 8, 2001 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
Dorian Lee-Kirk Shackleford, a juvenile and citizen of 
Jamaica, was charged with delinquency in petitions alleging 
that he had committed three drug-related offenses.  The 
juvenile and domestic relations district court (juvenile 
court) subsequently transferred Shackleford to the circuit 
court.  There, the court tried Shackleford as an adult in a 
bench trial and convicted him of possession with intent to 
distribute cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-248, 
transporting one ounce or more of cocaine into the 
Commonwealth with the intent to sell or distribute in 
violation of Code § 18.2-248.01, and possession of a 
firearm with intent to distribute a controlled substance in 
violation of Code § 18.2-308.4(B).1  Shackleford then 
appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals.  That 
court affirmed the convictions.  Shackleford v. 
                     
1 The circuit court sentenced Shackleford to a total of 
23 years, with 16 years suspended; a fine of $2,500; and a 
suspension of his operator’s license for a period of six 
months. 
Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 307, 329, 528 S.E.2d 123, 134, 
(2000). 
On appeal to this Court, Shackleford challenges the 
jurisdiction of the circuit court because his parents did 
not receive notice of certain proceedings, the 
voluntariness of his statement to police, the seizure of 
certain physical evidence, and the sufficiency of the 
evidence.  Finding no error, we will affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
FACTS 
We will recite the evidence presented at trial in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing 
party before the circuit court.  Johnson v. Commonwealth, 
259 Va. 654, 662, 529 S.E.2d 769, 773, cert. denied, ___ 
U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 432 (2000); Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 
Va. 54, 60, 515 S.E.2d 565, 568 (1999), cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 1125 (2000).  We also accord that evidence all 
inferences fairly deducible from it.  Horton v. 
Commonwealth, 255 Va. 606, 608, 499 S.E.2d 258, 259 
(1998) (citing Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 
352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975)). 
Two law enforcement officers with the Virginia State 
Police, Special Agent J.C. Miers, III, and Trooper Mike 
Hall, were conducting an undercover drug interdiction at 
 
2
the Greyhound bus station in Lynchburg.  At approximately 
10:15 a.m. on January 7, 1998, Miers and Hall observed 
Shackleford exit a bus that had just arrived.  At some 
point after Shackleford entered the bus terminal, he 
approached Miers, who was wearing civilian clothes, and 
asked for the telephone number of a local taxicab company.  
Miers found a listing for taxicabs in a telephone directory 
and pointed it out to Shackleford.  After Shackleford made 
a telephone call, Miers displayed his police badge to 
Shackleford and asked to speak with him.  Shackleford 
agreed and accompanied Miers to a corner inside the bus 
terminal where they engaged in further conversation. 
During that conservation, Miers asked Shackleford why 
he was in Lynchburg.  In response, Shackleford stated that 
he was traveling from New York to Lynchburg to visit his 
sick aunt in the hospital and that there were things in his 
carry-on bag that she needed.2  According to Miers, 
Shackleford then changed his story by stating that his aunt 
was not in the hospital but at her residence, and that he 
was going to take a taxicab to some other location where 
his aunt would pick him up later.  Miers testified that he 
then became suspicious and asked Shackleford for permission 
                     
2 That carry-on bag was the only luggage that 
Shackleford had with him. 
 
3
to search the bag.  Shackleford did not consent, stating 
that the bag contained his aunt’s personal items and that 
he did not know what was in the bag. 
The taxicab arrived then, and Shackleford told the 
taxicab driver to take him to a motel just north of the 
city limits of Lynchburg.  After Shackleford got into the 
taxicab with his bag, the taxicab left the bus terminal; 
Hall and Miers, traveling in separate vehicles, followed 
the taxicab.  En route, Miers and Hall both observed 
Shackleford shifting from side to side in the taxicab and 
leaning over.  When the taxicab arrived at the motel, 
Shackleford exited on the passenger side, set his bag on 
the ground, and left the back door of the taxicab open.  
Miers then advised Shackleford that he was free to go but 
that his bag had to remain there long enough for a dog 
trained in the detection of narcotics (K-9 unit) to sniff 
it.3  Miers testified that Shackleford then stated, “you can 
go ahead and search my bag, there’s no drugs or anything in 
it.” 
While Miers was talking with Shackleford at the motel, 
Hall requested and received permission from the taxicab 
                     
3 Prior to arriving at the motel, Hall called another 
law enforcement agency and requested that a K-9 unit be 
taken to the motel.  When Shackleford arrived at the motel, 
a uniformed police officer was already there with the dog. 
 
4
driver to search the taxicab.  During that search, Hall 
discovered a semi-automatic weapon “under the lip part of 
the backseat” on the passenger side of the taxicab.  The 
weapon was in a white, opaque shopping bag.  Hall then 
requested the uniformed officer “to run” the K-9 unit on 
the vehicle, and when he did so, the “dog alerted” on a 
package wrapped in tape.  That package was located 
underneath the front, passenger seat and contained 14 
plastic baggies, each of which contained an off-white 
substance later determined to be a total of 194.96 grams of 
cocaine.  The taxicab driver testified that he had cleaned 
his taxicab the previous night and that Shackleford was his 
first fare that day.  The driver further stated that he 
heard what sounded like someone sticking a bag or paper 
under the seat while en route from the bus terminal to the 
motel, although he admitted he did not see Shackleford 
doing so. 
After the gun and cocaine were discovered, Miers 
placed Shackleford under arrest and transported him to the 
police station.  At the station, Miers advised Shackleford 
of his Miranda rights, and because Shackleford had already 
told Miers that he was 17 years old, Miers also advised him 
that he could have his parents present during questioning.  
Shackleford signed a waiver-of-rights form and, without 
 
5
requesting the presence of either a lawyer or his parents, 
stated that he was a naturalized citizen and was staying in 
New York.  He also told Miers that his father and mother 
were estranged, that his father lived in Jamaica, and that 
his mother had taken a trip to that country. 
In a hand-written statement, Shackleford said that he 
had received an anonymous telephone call advising that he 
could earn some money if he did as he was told.  According 
to Shackleford, the caller knew Shackleford needed money.  
The caller directed Shackleford to pick up a bag at a 
certain location and never to look inside the bag.  After 
writing out that statement, Shackleford told Miers that he 
picked up the bag at a city park in the borough of the 
Bronx in New York City and that he then purchased a one-way 
bus ticket from New York City to Lynchburg with money that 
he found in an outside pocket on the bag.4
The petitions filed in the juvenile court charging 
Shackleford with the drug-related offenses listed 
Shackleford’s mother’s name and address.  They also 
contained the name of Shackleford’s father and listed his 
address as Kingston, Jamaica.  Pursuant to Code § 16.1-
269.1, the Commonwealth moved to transfer Shackleford to 
 
6
the circuit court.  After a hearing on that motion, the 
juvenile court found probable cause to believe that 
Shackleford had committed the delinquent acts alleged, see 
Code § 16.1-269.1(A)(2); and that Shackleford was 14 years 
of age or older, was competent to stand trial and was “not 
a proper person to remain within the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court.”  Code § 16.1-269.1(A)(4).  Accordingly, 
the juvenile court transferred Shackleford to the circuit 
court to be tried as an adult. 
Shackleford appealed the transfer decision to the 
circuit court pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.4.  Prior to the 
hearing on that appeal, Shackleford moved to continue the 
proceedings because his mother had not been notified of the 
hearing.  The circuit court denied the motion, and 
subsequently advised the Commonwealth that it could seek 
indictments.  See Code § 16.1-269.6(B). 
After the grand jury returned a three-count indictment 
against Shackleford, he moved to dismiss that indictment, 
in part, because of the lack of notice to his parents.  He 
argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because 
neither of his parents was notified of the hearing in 
circuit court regarding his appeal of the transfer 
                                                             
4 At trial, Shackleford testified that he followed the 
caller’s instructions because the caller threatened harm to 
 
7
decision.  He also objected to the court’s jurisdiction 
because his father was not notified of either the 
initiation of proceedings in the juvenile court or the 
transfer hearing in that court.  The circuit court 
overruled the motion. 
Prior to trial, Shackleford moved to suppress his 
statement and the physical evidence found in the taxicab.  
The circuit court also overruled that motion. 
ANALYSIS 
Shackleford’s assignments of error raise three 
separate questions: (1) whether the circuit court had 
jurisdiction to try Shackleford on the indictment because 
his parents did not have notice of certain proceedings, (2) 
whether his statement to law enforcement officials was 
voluntarily given and the physical evidence was legally 
seized, and (3) whether there was sufficient evidence to 
support his convictions.  We will address these questions 
in that order. 
I. PARENTAL NOTIFICATION 
The question of parental notification involves 
different facts and issues with regard to each of 
Shackleford’s parents.  Hence, we will consider each parent 
separately. 
                                                             
Shackleford’s family if he did not do so. 
 
8
First, as to Shackleford’s mother, he contends that 
the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to try him on the 
indictment because his mother was neither notified of nor 
present at the hearing before the circuit court on his 
appeal of the transfer decision.5  In making this argument, 
Shackleford relies on the provision in Code § 16.1-263(B) 
requiring that “[n]otice of subsequent proceedings shall be 
provided to all parties in interest.”  According to 
Shackleford, the hearing in circuit court on his appeal of 
the transfer decision was a “subsequent proceeding[],” 
about which his mother should have received notice. 
 
We do not accept Shackleford’s contention that his 
mother did not have notice of that hearing in circuit 
court.  At the transfer appeal hearing, Shackleford’s 
juvenile probation officer testified that he spoke with 
Shackleford’s mother on the morning of that hearing.  She 
                     
5 Shackleford makes only a jurisdictional argument with 
regard to the lack of notice to his mother.  He does not 
contend that he was prejudiced in any other way because of 
her failure to attend the hearing on his appeal of the 
transfer decision. 
Shackleford also does not contest the fact that his 
mother received notice of the petitions and initiation of 
proceedings in the juvenile court, and a summons advising 
her of the time, date, and place of the initial hearing on 
those petitions.  Additionally, Shackleford’s counsel 
acknowledged to the circuit court that Shackleford’s mother 
received notice of and was present at the transfer hearing 
conducted in juvenile court. 
 
 
9
told the probation officer that she could not travel from 
New York to attend the hearing because of her financial 
situation and work schedule.  The probation officer 
testified similarly at a subsequent hearing on 
Shackleford’s motion to dismiss the indictment.  At that 
hearing, the circuit court made a factual finding that 
Shackleford’s mother had notice of the transfer appeal 
hearing in circuit court.  That factual finding is 
supported by sufficient evidence.  See Schneider v. 
Commonwealth, 230 Va. 379, 382, 337 S.E.2d 735, 736 
(1985) (factual findings of court will not be disturbed on 
appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support 
them).  Accordingly, we hold that Shackleford’s mother had 
actual notice of the transfer appeal hearing in circuit 
court and that such notice satisfied any statutory notice 
requirements of Code § 16.1-263(B).  Roach v. Director, 
Dep’t of Corrections, 258 Va. 537, 544-45, 522 S.E.2d 869, 
872 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 965 (1999); see also 
Turner v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 666, 668, 222 S.E.2d 517, 
519 (1976).6
                     
6 Because Shackleford’s mother had actual notice, we do 
not reach the question whether a hearing in circuit court 
on an appeal of a transfer decision by the juvenile court 
is a “subsequent proceeding[]” under Code § 16.1-263(B).  
Nor do we decide whether the absence of such notice has any 
 
10
 
We now turn to the issue regarding notice to 
Shackleford’s father.  Unlike his mother, Shackleford’s 
father received neither notice of the petitions and 
initiation of proceedings in the juvenile court nor the 
summons specified in Code § 16.1-263(A).  The father also 
did not have notice of the hearing in circuit court on the 
transfer appeal, nor did he voluntarily appear at any of 
the proceedings in either the juvenile court or the circuit 
court.  Relying on the decision in Commonwealth v. Baker, 
258 Va. 1, 516 S.E.2d 219 (1999) (per curiam), aff’g 28 Va. 
App. 306, 504 S.E.2d 394 (1998), Shackleford argues that 
the lack of notice to his father divested the circuit court 
of its jurisdiction to try him on the indictment after his 
transfer from juvenile court. 
 
Pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.6(E), Shackleford raised 
the lack of notice to his father in his motion to dismiss 
the indictment, which he filed and the circuit court heard 
before Shackleford’s arraignment.7  Nevertheless, the Court 
of Appeals held that, because the offenses were committed 
after July 1, 1996, the provisions of Code § 16.1-269.1(E) 
                                                             
jurisdictional or constitutional implications as argued by 
Shackleford. 
 
7 Code § 16.1-269.6(E) provides that “[a]ny objection 
to the jurisdiction of the circuit court pursuant to this 
article shall be waived if not made before arraignment.” 
 
11
are controlling.  That section states that “[a]n indictment 
in the circuit court cures any error or defect in any 
proceeding held in the juvenile court except with respect 
to the juvenile’s age.”  In Dennis Moore v. Commonwealth, 
259 Va. 405, 410, 527 S.E.2d 415, 418 (2000), this Court 
held that a defect caused by failure to notify a 
defendant’s biological father of the initiation of juvenile 
court proceedings was cured by a grand jury indictment.  
Citing Dennis Moore, the Court of Appeals concluded that, 
since Shackleford did not raise the failure to comply with 
the parental notification provisions in Code §§ 16.1-263(A) 
and –264 before the indictment was returned in circuit 
court, that indictment cured any defect resulting from the 
lack of notice to his father.  Shackleford, 32 Va. App. at 
318, 528 S.E.2d at 129.  The Court of Appeals reached the 
same conclusion regarding the failure to notify 
Shackleford’s father of the hearing in circuit court on the 
transfer appeal.  Id. at 319, 528 S.E.2d at 129. 
Shackleford contends that our decision in Dennis Moore 
is inapposite.  In that case, the juvenile court certified 
felony charges to the grand jury after conducting a 
preliminary hearing under Code §§ 16.1-269.1(B) and (C).  
Dennis Moore, 259 Va. at 408, 527 S.E.2d at 416-17.  In 
contrast, Shackleford’s transfer to circuit court was under 
 
12
Code § 16.1-269.1(A), and he then appealed that transfer 
decision pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.4.  The provisions of 
Code § 16.1-269.4 authorize an appeal only from a transfer 
decision made under subsection A of Code § 16.1-269.1.  
Shackleford argues that the procedural posture of his case 
is, therefore, different from that in Dennis Moore.  Noting 
what he terms as a conflict between the provisions of Code 
§§ 16.1-269.1(E) and –269.6(E), he argues that Code § 16.1-
269.1(E) does not cure the notice defects because he timely 
raised his objection before arraignment in accordance with 
Code § 16.1-269.6(E). 
Shackleford is correct about the procedural 
distinction between his case and the circumstances in 
Dennis Moore.  However, that distinction is not 
dispositive.  The terms of Code § 16.1-269.6(E) establish a 
deadline before which any objections to the jurisdiction of 
the circuit court based on defects in the transfer process 
must be raised.  See David Moore v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 
431, 440, 527 S.E.2d 406, 410-11 (2000) (holding that 
waiver prescribed by Code § 16.1-269.6(E) applies only to 
defects in transfer proceedings conducted pursuant to 
Article 7).  According to the provisions of that section, 
the deadline for making such objections is the date of 
 
13
arraignment.  If they are not raised before arraignment, 
the objections are waived. 
In contrast, Code § 16.1-269.1(E) is not a “waiver” 
provision but rather a “curative” one.  This section states 
that an indictment “cures any error or defect in any 
proceeding held in the juvenile court.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Although Shackleford timely raised his objection to the 
jurisdiction of the circuit court before his arraignment 
pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.6(E), the alleged defect based 
on the failure to comply with the notice requirements of 
Code §§ 16.1-263(A) and –264 with regard to his father was 
cured by the indictment.  In other words, the indictment 
cured the defect raised in Shackleford’s objection before 
he made the objection. 
As this Court noted in David Moore, 259 Va. at 440, 
527 S.E.2d at 411, “the legislature has the authority to 
provide for a waiver of a defect in the transfer 
proceeding.”  Likewise, the legislature has the authority 
to create a cure for any defect in the proceedings in 
juvenile court, thereby eliminating certain objections 
before the deadline by which they would otherwise have to 
be raised.  Thus, we hold that any alleged defects in the 
juvenile proceedings with regard to Shackleford’s father 
were cured by the indictment and that the circuit court, 
 
14
therefore, was not in any manner divested of its 
jurisdiction to try Shackleford on the charges set forth in 
the indictment. 
This holding also applies to the lack of notice to 
Shackleford’s father about the hearing in circuit court on 
the transfer appeal.  While we recognize that Code § 16.1-
269.1(E) speaks in terms of curing defects in the 
proceedings in the juvenile court, an appeal from a 
transfer decision under Code § 16.1-269.4 is the final step 
in the transfer process commenced under Code § 16.1-
269.1(A).  We believe that the legislature intended for an 
indictment to cure any defects in that entire process.  
Thus, the indictment also cured the failure to notify 
Shackleford’s father of the hearing in circuit court on the 
transfer appeal.8
II. STATEMENT AND PHYSICAL EVIDENCE 
In this assignment of error, Shackleford asserts three 
reasons why the circuit court should have suppressed his 
statement and the physical evidence.  Two of those reasons 
relate solely to his statement: (1) that his rights under 
                     
8 At the hearing in circuit court on the transfer 
appeal, Shackleford did not object to the lack of notice of 
that hearing to his father, as he did with regard to his 
mother.  Shackleford did not raise the lack of notice to 
his father with regard to the transfer appeal hearing in 
 
15
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional 
Protocol on Disputes (Vienna Convention), 21 U.S.T. 77, 
T.I.A.S. No. 6820 (Apr. 24, 1963), and the Due Process 
Clause of the Constitution of the United States were 
violated because he was never advised of his right to speak 
with an official of the Jamaican Embassy, and (2) that he 
was improperly advised of his Miranda rights because the 
police officer modified the waiver-of-rights form to say 
that Shackleford had a right to have a lawyer “or parents” 
present during interrogation. 
The third reason pertains to his statement as well as 
the seizure of the firearm and cocaine.  Shackleford claims 
that he was detained at the motel when Miers told him that 
his bag had to remain there until the K-9 unit sniffed it.  
According to Shackleford, that detention was without 
“reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot” and 
in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.  Thus, argues 
Shackleford, suppression of the evidence is required under 
the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine because the 
illegal detention led to both his statement and discovery 
of the physical evidence.  We find no merit in any of these 
arguments. 
                                                             
circuit court or the proceedings in juvenile court until he 
filed his motion to dismiss the indictment. 
 
16
First, in Kasi v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 407, 419, 508 
S.E.2d 57, 64 (1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1038 (1999), 
this Court addressed a defendant’s claim that a violation 
of his rights under the Vienna Convention required 
suppression of a confession.  There, we held, contrary to 
Shackleford’s argument, that the provisions of the Vienna 
Convention create no legally enforceable individual rights.  
Id.  Continuing, we stated that Article 36, the same 
provision upon which Shackleford relies, “merely deals with 
notice to be furnished to the consular post of a national’s 
state when the national is arrested or taken into custody 
in a foreign state.”9  Id.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
any failure to advise Shackleford about his purported right 
to speak with an official of the Jamaican Embassy did not 
violate the Vienna Convention or any rights secured to him 
by the Constitution of the United States.  Likewise, to the 
extent that Shackleford suggests that he would not have 
pled guilty if he had been advised that he could contact 
the Jamaican Embassy, that contention is, at best, 
speculative.  See id.
                     
9 After the Commonwealth learned that Shackleford was a 
Jamaican citizen, it sent a letter dated March 9, 1998, to 
an official of the Jamaican Embassy, detailing the charges 
that had been placed against Shackelford and advising where 
Shackleford was being detained.  The Commonwealth also 
 
17
Next, with regard to the waiver-of-rights form, 
Shackleford contends that Miers’ addition of the words “or 
parents” to that form minimized the importance of the right 
to counsel and caused him to believe that he had the right 
to have either counsel or his parents present during 
interrogation, but not both.  In pertinent part, the 
modified, preprinted form that Shackleford signed contained 
the following information: 
 
 
YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO TALK TO A LAWYER OR PARENTS 
FOR ADVICE BEFORE WE ASK YOU ANY QUESTIONS AND TO HAVE 
A LAWYER OR PARENTS WITH YOU DURING QUESTIONING. 
 
Miers testified that he told Shackleford that, since 
Shackleford was a juvenile, he had the right to have his 
parents present “in addition to or in substitute for a 
lawyer.” 
 
We conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that 
“Shackleford voluntarily and knowingly waived his Fifth 
Amendment rights to remain silent and to have counsel 
present during a custodial interrogation.”  Shackleford, 32 
Va. App. at 323, 528 S.E.2d at 131.  The modification to 
the waiver-of-rights form did not diminish Shackleford’s 
right to counsel.  Considering Miers’ additional 
explanation to Shackleford, we fail to see how Shackleford 
                                                             
explained the proceedings then pending in the juvenile 
court. 
 
18
could have been misled into believing that, if he asked to 
have his parents present during the questioning, he could 
not also have counsel present. Moreover, Shackleford did 
not request to have either present during the 
interrogation; so, the options presented to Shackleford 
regarding his rights did not, in fact, lead to any election 
that even arguably affected his right to counsel.  Miers 
also testified that Shackleford acknowledged that he 
understood his rights and so indicated by checking the 
appropriate box on the waiver form and signing it.  
Therefore, we find that Shackleford was fully advised of 
his Miranda rights and voluntarily waived them.  The Court 
of Appeals did not err in upholding the circuit court’s 
refusal to suppress Shackleford’s statement. 
 
Last, we do not decide whether Miers’ statement at the 
motel that Shackleford was free to go but that his bag had 
to remain there long enough for the narcotics dog to sniff 
it was tantamount to detaining Shackleford.  The physical 
evidence that Shackleford claims should have been 
suppressed was not found on his person or in the bag.  
Rather, the weapon and cocaine were found in the taxicab 
that Shackleford had exited.  At that point, Shackleford 
had no expectation of privacy in the items that he left in 
the taxicab.  See Bramblett v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 263, 
 
19
274, 513 S.E.2d 400, 408, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 952 
(1999) (defendant had no expectation of privacy in box left 
at sister’s home).  And, Hall searched the taxicab only 
after the taxicab driver consented to the search.  See 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (search 
conducted pursuant to valid consent does not implicate 
Fourth Amendment). 
 
Once the firearm was lawfully seized and the package 
was discovered in the taxicab, probable cause existed to 
place Shackleford under arrest.  Consequently, 
Shackleford’s statements were made after his lawful arrest 
and after he had been advised of his Miranda rights.  Thus, 
as the Commonwealth argues, there simply was no “fruit” 
from the allegedly “poisonous tree.”  Neither the physical 
evidence nor Shackleford’s statement was obtained in 
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
 
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence after a 
conviction, we consider that evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, and we affirm the conviction 
unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support 
it.  Horton, 255 Va. at 614, 499 S.E.2d at 262 (citing 
Higginbotham, 216 Va. at 352, 218 S.E.2d at 537)).  The 
circuit court sitting without a jury in this case acted as 
 
20
the fact finder; hence, the court’s judgment is accorded 
the same weight as a jury verdict.  Evans v. Commonwealth, 
215 Va. 609, 613, 212 S.E.2d 268, 271 (1975).  As the fact 
finder, the court “need not believe the accused’s 
explanation and may infer that he is trying to conceal his 
guilt.”  Black v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 838, 842, 284 
S.E.2d 608, 610 (1981). 
After reviewing the evidence and considering 
Shackleford’s arguments, we conclude, as did the Court of 
Appeals, that there is sufficient evidence to support his 
convictions.  We need not repeat all the evidence and 
reasons outlined by the Court of Appeals that warrant this 
conclusion.  See Shackleford, 32 Va. App. at 324-29, 528 
S.E.2d at 132-34 for a discussion of these points.  
However, we will emphasize some key reasons why the Court 
of Appeals did not err in finding sufficient evidence to 
support the convictions.  In doing so, we reiterate that 
the circuit court, as the fact finder, was not bound to 
accept Shackleford’s explanation and may have concluded 
that he was lying to conceal his guilt.  See Black, 222 Va. 
at 842, 284 S.E.2d at 610. 
First, in regard to his conviction for possession of 
cocaine with the intent to distribute, Shackleford asserts 
that he had no idea what was in the bag that he brought to 
 
21
Lynchburg from New York City at the request of an allegedly 
anonymous telephone caller.  He claims that the 
Commonwealth failed to prove that he was aware of the 
presence and character of the substance, and that he was 
intentionally and consciously in possession of it.  See 
Gillis v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 298, 301, 208 S.E.2d 768, 
771 (1974) (“[t]o establish possession of a controlled 
substance, it generally is necessary to show that the 
defendant was aware of the presence and character of the 
particular substance and was intentionally and consciously 
in possession of it”). 
Relevant to this issue is the fact that Shackleford 
gave several inconsistent statements.  He first told Miers 
that his aunt was in the hospital but later said that she 
was at her residence.  Then, after removing the firearm and 
package of cocaine from his bag, hiding them in the 
taxicab, and exiting the taxicab, he declared to Miers, 
“you can go ahead and search my bag, there’s no drugs or 
anything in it.”  However, at the bus terminal, Shackleford 
would not consent to a search of the bag on the pretext 
that it contained his aunt’s personal items. 
 
Shackleford also asserts that the Commonwealth did not 
establish that he intended to distribute cocaine.  This 
argument overlooks the fact that a police officer, who 
 
22
testified as an expert in the use and distribution of 
narcotics, stated that illegal drugs are routinely packaged 
in individual bags to facilitate distribution.  The package 
found in the taxicab contained 14 plastic baggies, each 
containing cocaine, which, according to the expert, has a 
street value of approximately $100 to $150 per gram. 
As to the conviction for transporting more than one 
ounce of cocaine into the Commonwealth, Shackleford attacks 
the testimony of the forensic scientist who tested the 
substance in the 14 baggies.  Shackleford claims that, 
since the forensic scientist did not determine what portion 
of the 194.96 grams of substance was actually cocaine, the 
Commonwealth failed to establish that he transported the 
requisite one ounce.  He also challenges the fact that the 
circuit court took judicial notice of the fact that 194.96 
grams is more than one ounce. 
 
Contrary to Shackleford’s argument, a conviction under 
§ 18.2-248.01 does not require the Commonwealth’s forensic 
scientist to test each gram of the substance to determine 
its purity.  That section provides that “it is unlawful for 
any person to transport into the Commonwealth . . . with 
intent to sell or distribute one ounce or more of cocaine, 
coca leaves or any salt, compound, derivative or 
preparation thereof . . . .”  We agree with the Court of 
 
23
Appeals that the plain terms of this statute “mandates that 
the quantity of the mixture—the ‘compound’ or 
‘preparation’—rather than the purity of the cocaine in the 
mixture” is to be used to determine the weight of the 
substance transported into the Commonwealth.  Shackleford, 
32 Va. App. at 328, 528 S.E.2d at 134.  We also conclude 
that the circuit court did not err in taking judicial 
notice of the conversion ratio between grams and ounces.  
See Ryan v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 439, 445, 247 S.E.2d 698, 
703 (1978) (“[c]ourts may take judicial notice of generally 
known or easily ascertainable facts”). 
Finally, on the conviction for possession of the 
firearm, Shackleford posits that the evidence did not 
establish that he was in possession of the firearm while 
also knowingly and intentionally possessing cocaine.  He 
concedes that he was in possession of the firearm once he 
opened the bag and found the weapon inside, but argues 
that, after he hid the firearm under the seat of the 
taxicab, he no longer possessed it.  During the brief time 
of admitted possession, Shackleford claims that he was not 
simultaneously aware of the character and presence of the 
cocaine. 
 
Since we have already concluded that the evidence was 
sufficient to convict Shackleford of possession of cocaine 
 
24
with intent to distribute, the evidence is likewise 
sufficient to support his conviction for possession of the 
firearm.  Shackleford concedes that he possessed the 
weapon. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we conclude that the Court of 
Appeals did not err in affirming Shackleford’s convictions.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, with whom JUSTICE KEENAN joins, dissenting. 
 
 
I respectfully dissent.  I do so because, in my view, 
the majority effectively usurps for this Court an authority 
that properly rests exclusively with the General Assembly 
by altering the meaning of the express language of the 
statutes pertinent to this appeal.  Specifically, in the 
context of this case the majority expands the meaning of 
the express language of Code § 16.1-269.1(E) to render 
meaningless the equally express language of Code § 16.1-
269.6(E). 
 
Code § 16.1-269.1(E) provides, in pertinent part, 
that:  “An indictment in the circuit court cures any error 
or defect in any proceeding held in the juvenile court 
 
25
except with respect to the juvenile’s age.”  (Emphasis 
added).  Code § 16.1-269.6(E) provides that:  “Any 
objection to the jurisdiction of the circuit court pursuant 
to this article shall be waived if not made before 
arraignment.”  (Emphasis added). 
 
Undoubtedly, with regard to an offense committed by a 
juvenile on or after July 1, 1996, we have held that “an 
indictment by a grand jury cures any defect or error . . . 
which has occurred in any juvenile court proceeding” 
pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.1(E).  Dennis Moore v. 
Commonwealth, 259 Va. 405, 410, 527 S.E.2d 415, 418 (2000).  
However, that case, unlike the present case, did not 
involve an appeal pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.4 of a 
transfer decision by the juvenile court under Code § 16.1-
269.1(A).  Moreover, in David Moore v. Commonwealth, 259 
Va. 431, 527 S.E.2d 406 (2000), we explained that “[t]he 
plain language of [Code § 16.1-269.6(E)] clearly manifests 
legislative intent that any defect in the transfer 
proceedings conducted in the juvenile court as provided in 
Article 7 is waived such that the circuit court acquires 
the authority to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction 
over the offenses charged against the juvenile unless the 
juvenile raises an objection based on a defect in the 
juvenile court transfer hearing prior to arraignment in the 
 
26
circuit court.”  (Additional emphasis added).  Id. at 440, 
527 S.E.2d at 410-11. 
 
In the present case, Dorian Lee-Kirk Shackleford 
challenged the jurisdiction of the circuit court based on a 
defect in the juvenile court transfer hearing and he did so 
prior to his arraignment in the circuit court in accord 
with Code § 16.1-269.6(E).  The defect created by the lack 
of the required notice to his father of that transfer 
hearing is not disputed.  Nevertheless, the majority 
concludes that, notwithstanding the provisions of Code 
§ 16.1-269.6(E), under Code § 16.1-269.1(E) “the indictment 
cured the defect raised in Shackleford’s objection before 
he made the objection.”  To support this conclusion the 
majority reasons that although “Code § 16.1-269.1(E) speaks 
in terms of curing defects in the proceedings in the 
juvenile court, an appeal from a transfer decision under 
Code § 16.1-269.4 is the final step in the transfer process 
commenced under Code § 16.1-269.1(A)” and that “the 
legislature intended for an indictment to cure any defects 
in that entire process.”  Under this reasoning, for all 
practical purposes, any objection to the jurisdiction of 
the circuit court pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.6(E) could 
never be effective, even though timely asserted, once an 
indictment has been returned against the juvenile 
 
27
defendant.  Certainly, the legislature did not intend to 
create a right under Code § 16.1-269.6 without a remedy.∗
 
It should be self-evident that the proceeding held in 
the circuit court on an appeal of a transfer decision is 
not a “proceeding held in the juvenile court.”  Moreover, 
Code § 16.1-269.1(E) makes no reference to a “final step in 
the transfer process;” the majority simply adds that 
language, as it must, in order to support its expanded 
interpretation of the express terms of this statute.  But, 
“[c]ourts are not permitted to add language to a statute 
nor are they ‘permitted to accomplish the same result by 
judicial interpretation.’ ”  Burlile v. Commonwealth, 261 
Va. 501, 511, 544 S.E.2d 360, 365 (2001) (quoting Harbor 
                     
∗Code § 16.1-272.1, enacted in 2000, further undermines 
the majority’s conclusion with regard to the legislative 
intent embodied in Code § 16.1-269.1(E).  This statutes 
provides, in pertinent part, that: 
 
In addition to any other curative provisions, 
waivers, procedural defaults, or requirements for 
timely objections, including but not limited to 
those in . . . subsection E of § 16.1-269.1 and 
subsection E of § 16.1-269.6, any claim of error 
or defect under this chapter, jurisdictional or 
otherwise, that is not raised within one year 
from the date of final judgment of the circuit 
court or one year from the effective date of this 
act, whichever is the later, shall not constitute 
a ground for relief in any judicial proceeding. 
 
If the majority’s expanded interpretation of Code § 16.1-
269.1(E) is correct, then the inclusion of that Code 
 
28
Cruises, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 458, 461, 230 S.E.2d 
248, 250 (1976)). 
 
In my view, under Code § 16.1-269.1(E) the effect of 
an indictment in the circuit court is to cure defects in 
the juvenile proceedings for purposes of establishing the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court, and not 
to divest the circuit court of its authority under Code 
§ 16.1-269.6 to consider objections to and appeals of a 
transfer decision by the juvenile court made prior to 
arraignment on that indictment.  See David Moore v. 
Commonwealth, 259 Va. at 437, 527 S.E.2d at 409 
(distinguishing between the power of a court to adjudicate 
a specified class of cases and the authority of a court to 
exercise that power in a particular case).  Where, as here, 
the record shows that the Commonwealth failed to provide 
both of Shackleford’s parents with notice of the 
proceedings in the juvenile court as then required by Code 
§§ 16.1-263 and 16.1-264, Code § 16.1-269.6(E), in addition 
to the other provisions of Code § 16.1-269.6, provided 
Shackleford the right to assert that defect in the 
subsequent proceedings held in the circuit court.  
Moreover, that defect caused the transfer of jurisdiction 
                                                             
section in Code § 16.1-272.1 would have been entirely 
unnecessary.  Clearly the legislature concluded otherwise. 
 
29
from the juvenile court to the circuit court to be 
ineffectual and Shackleford’s subsequent convictions to be 
void.  See Baker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 1, 2, 516 S.E.2d 
219, 220 (1999) (per curiam), aff’g Baker v. Commonwealth, 
28 Va. App. 306, 504 S.E.2d 394 (1998).  The circuit court 
erred in failing to exercise its authority to remand the 
case to the juvenile court for further proceedings in order 
to ensure that both of Shackleford’s parents were provided 
with the then required notice of the proceedings against 
him. 
 
For these reasons, I would reverse Shackleford’s 
convictions and remand the case for further proceedings.  
Accordingly, I would not reach the other issues raised by 
Shackleford in this appeal. 
 
 
30