Case Title: Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Glatki

Citation: 2000-Ohio-354

Docket Number: 19992270

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2000-04-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Glatki, 88 Ohio St.3d 381, 2000-Ohio-354.] 
 
 
 
 
 
CLEVELAND BAR ASSOCIATION v. GLATKI. 
[Cite as Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Glatki (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 381.] 
Attorney at law — Misconduct — Permanent disbarment — Engaging in a 
pattern of neglect with respect to client matters that caused potentially 
serious harm to clients — Accepting retainer and not refunding the 
unearned portions upon request — Receiving records and not returning 
them upon request. 
(No. 99-2270 — Submitted February 9, 2000 — Decided April 5, 2000.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 99-27. 
 
In June 1997, Hyancinth Marson and her husband paid respondent, Susan M. 
Glatki of Beachwood, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0052533, a retainer of $250 
to represent them in an adoption matter.  The Marsons did not hear from 
respondent for several months, despite repeated attempts by them to contact her 
about the status of their case.  Finally, in October 1997, respondent telephoned the 
Marsons and assured them that she would proceed with the adoption.  Respondent, 
however, never filed for adoption.  In December 1997, the Marsons hired a new 
attorney, who requested that respondent deliver their file to her, including records, 
i.e., medical reports and birth certificate, that the Marsons had given respondent.  
Respondent never returned the requested records, and the Marsons had to obtain 
the copies of the records themselves a second time. 
 
In August 1995, Lisa Nagle retained respondent to represent her in 
recovering a loan she had made to her former employer.  Nagle paid respondent 
$650 in attorney fees.  Respondent filed a complaint that was dismissed because 
respondent failed to appear for a scheduled hearing.  After the dismissal was 
vacated, the defendants in the case filed a counterclaim against Nagle.  Respondent 
 
 
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never notified Nagle of the pretrial or trial dates and erroneously advised Nagle 
that judgment would be entered in her favor.  On the day before trial, respondent 
failed to attend the final pretrial conference and instead filed a notice of dismissal 
without Nagle’s permission.  The court dismissed Nagle’s complaint and granted a 
default judgment on the defendants’ counterclaim against Nagle in the amount of 
$2,000.  Respondent never informed Nagle that the default judgment had been 
entered against her, that a judgment lien had been placed on her residence, or that 
her complaint had been dismissed.  Nagle subsequently negotiated her own 
settlement of the dispute with her former employer. 
 
In August 1997, Julie R. Hamilton paid respondent a $500 retainer to file a 
motion for temporary emergency custody to remove her daughter from her ex-
husband’s custody.  In September 1997, respondent prepared the motion and an 
affidavit that Hamilton signed, and respondent advised Hamilton that she would 
file the motion immediately.  Respondent did not file the motion and did not 
respond to Hamilton’s inquiries about the motion until July 1998.  At that time, 
respondent had Hamilton sign another affidavit and again assured her that the 
motion would be filed immediately.  But respondent did not file the motion and 
stopped all communication with Hamilton. 
 
In September 1997, Eugene Jones paid respondent a retainer of $500 to draft 
the necessary documents for his divorce.  Respondent did not draft the documents 
and did not respond to Jones’s attempts to contact her.  In June 1998, Jones 
terminated respondent’s representation of him and requested a refund of the 
retainer.  Respondent never returned any portion of the retainer, and Jones 
eventually representing himself in divorce proceedings brought by his wife, who 
had retained her own attorney. 
 
In May 1997, Ralph E. Spyres paid respondent a retainer of $500 and later 
paid her an additional $1,000 to represent him in obtaining back child support 
 
 
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payments.  Respondent failed to provide Spyres with copies of pleadings that she 
claimed to have filed on his behalf, and in February 1998, Spyres notified 
respondent that he was terminating her representation.  Spyres requested a billing 
statement for all work performed by respondent, a copy of his file, and all child 
support payments that she had obtained on his behalf.  Respondent never provided 
Spyres a billing statement or a copy of his file.  Spyres also believed that 
respondent kept any child support funds she obtained for her own personal use. 
 
Marson, Nagle, Hamilton, Jones, and Spyres filed grievances against 
respondent with relator, Cleveland Bar Association.  Respondent did not respond 
to relator’s inquiries about the grievances or otherwise cooperate with relator’s 
investigation of the grievances. 
 
On July 6, 1999, relator filed an amended complaint charging respondent 
with multiple violations of the Disciplinary Rules and a Rule for the Government 
of the Bar.  After respondent failed to answer, the matter was referred to a master 
commissioner under Gov.Bar R. V(6)(F)(2) on relator’s motion for default 
judgment. 
 
The master commissioner found the facts as previously set forth and further 
found that relator had not sufficiently documented its allegation that respondent 
had retained child support funds recovered on behalf of Spyres.  The master 
commissioner concluded that respondent’s conduct with respect to all five clients 
violated DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglecting an entrusted legal matter), 7-101(A)(1) 
(failing to seek lawful objectives of client), and 7-101(A)(2) (failing to carry out 
contract of employment).  The master commissioner further concluded that 
respondent violated DR 9-102(B)(4) (failing to promptly pay or deliver to client 
upon request the funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the 
lawyer that the client is entitled to receive) “with respect to each grievant by failing 
to return the unearned portion of their respective retainers.” 
 
 
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The master commissioner found respondent’s conduct to be similar to that of 
the respondent in Columbus Bar Assn. v. Emerson (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 375, 704 
N.E.2d 238, and recommended that she be indefinitely suspended from the practice 
of law in Ohio.  The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the 
Supreme Court (“board”) adopted the findings, conclusions, and recommendation 
of the master commissioner. 
__________________ 
 
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue and Robert S. Faxon; Willacy & Lopresti and 
Keith A. Ganther, for relator. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  In disciplinary proceedings, the complaint must allege the 
specific misconduct that violates the Disciplinary Rules, and the relator must prove 
such misconduct by clear and convincing evidence.  Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Reid 
(1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 327, 331, 708 N.E.2d 193, 197; Gov.Bar R. V(6)(J).  
Applying  this standard here, we adopt the findings and conclusions of the board 
insofar as it concluded that respondent’s conduct regarding her five clients violated 
DR 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(1), and 7-101(A)(2).  We further find that although the 
board did not so conclude, relator charged and proved by the requisite clear and 
convincing evidence that respondent’s conduct in the Marson, Nagle, and 
Hamilton matters violated DR 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).  Relator misrepresented the status 
of each of these cases to her clients. 
 
We also disagree with the board’s conclusion that respondent violated DR 9-
102(B)(4) with respect to each client by failing to return the unearned portions of 
their respective retainers.  Relator never charged any violation of this Disciplinary 
Rule in the Nagle and Hamilton matters.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Simecek 
(1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 320, 322, 699 N.E.2d 933, 934-935 (procedural due process 
 
 
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requires fair notice of the precise nature of attorney disciplinary charges).  And 
there was no evidence of a request for a refund of the retainer, which is required 
for a violation of DR 9-102(B)(4), in either the Nagle or Hamilton matters. 
 
Nevertheless, we concur in the board’s conclusion that respondent violated 
DR 9-102(B)(4) by not refunding the retainer upon request in the Jones matter 
because the violation was both properly charged and proven.  We further conclude 
that respondent violated DR 9-102(B)(4) in the Marson and Spyres matters, but by 
failing to provide copies of their files upon request rather than the unearned 
portions of their retainers as the board determined.  Like the Nagle and Hamilton 
matters, there was no evidence that Marson or Spyres requested refunds of their 
retainers. 
 
Based on the foregoing facts and conclusions, we next consider the 
appropriate sanction.  In determining the appropriate sanction, we consider not 
only the duty violated but also the lawyer’s mental state, the injury caused, and the 
existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances.  See Warren Cty. Bar Assn. 
v. Bunce (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 112, 115, 689 N.E.2d 566, 568. 
 
Under the first three steps of this determination, the American Bar 
Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions support disbarment of 
respondent, who engaged in a pattern of neglect with respect to client matters that 
caused potentially serious injuries to her clients.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Brown (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 316, 320-321, 720 N.E.2d 525, 529, quoting 
American Bar Association Center for Professional Responsibility, Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991 & Amend.1992), Standard 4.41.  Respondent 
also violated duties to three of her clients by not returning upon request the 
property or money to which they were entitled.  Further, respondent violated duties 
to the public, DR 1-102(A)(4), and the profession, Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G). 
 
 
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Under the final step of our determination, we note that there was evidence of 
several aggravating circumstances, i.e., a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, 
lack of cooperation in the disciplinary process, and, in the Jones matter, a failure to 
make restitution.  See Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, 
Proposed Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and 
Hearings, Section 10(A), Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Ohio Official 
Reports, Nov. 22, 1999 Advance Sheets.  By contrast, no evidence of any 
mitigating circumstances is evident from the record. 
 
Therefore, we are persuaded that a more severe sanction than the indefinite 
suspension recommended by the board is warranted.  We note that unlike Emerson, 
the case the board relied upon, some violations of DR 9-102(B)(4) were charged 
and proven here.  We hold that accepting retainers and not refunding the unearned 
portions of them upon request, as in the Jones matter, and receiving records and 
not returning them upon request, as in the Marson matter, are tantamount to a 
misappropriation of client funds and property.  As we have consistently held, the 
normal sanction for misappropriation of client funds coupled with neglect of client 
matters is disbarment.  Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Komarek (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 90, 
96, 702 N.E.2d 62, 67.  No mitigating circumstances exist that would warrant a 
lesser sanction here. 
 
Based on the foregoing, respondent is hereby permanently disbarred from 
the practice of law in Ohio.  Costs taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent and would suspend 
respondent indefinitely.