Case Title: State ex rel. Triplett v. Ross

Citation: 2006-Ohio-4705

Docket Number: 20060742

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-09-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Triplett v. Ross, 111 Ohio St.3d 231, 2006-Ohio-4705.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. TRIPLETT v. ROSS, JUDGE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Triplett v. Ross, 111 Ohio St.3d 231, 2006-Ohio-4705.] 
Prohibition — Writ sought to prevent municipal court, judge, and clerk from 
ordering court-appointed attorneys to complete declaration specified by 
Ohio Patriot Act — Writ granted in part and denied in part. 
(No. 2006-0742 ─ Submitted August 8, 2006 ─ Decided September 13, 2006.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an action for a writ of prohibition to prevent a municipal 
court and its judge and clerk from ordering attorneys who seek court 
appointments to complete and return a declaration specified by the Ohio Patriot 
Act to certify that they do not provide material assistance to a terrorist 
organization.  Because the Ohio Patriot Act does not require that the declaration 
be completed when the attorney makes less than $100,000 annually from these 
appointments, we grant the writ in part. 
{¶ 2} On December 14, 2005, the General Assembly enacted the Ohio 
Patriot Act, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 9 (“S.B. 9”), to implement the provisions of the 
“Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001,” Pub.L.No. 107-
056, 115 Stat. 272, as amended.  One of the purposes of the act, according to its 
title, is “to establish requirements for state and local compliance with federal 
homeland security authorities and laws pertaining to terrorism and homeland 
security.”  See, also, R.C. 9.63.  Another purpose of the Ohio Patriot Act is “to 
limit licensing, employing, and doing business with persons who have provided 
material assistance to an organization on the United States Department of State 
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Terrorist Exclusion List.”  Governor Taft signed the Ohio Patriot Act on January 
11, 2006, and the act became effective on April 14, 2006.  S.B. 9. 
{¶ 3} The Ohio Patriot Act requires the Director of Public Safety to 
prepare a document to serve as a declaration of material assistance/nonassistance, 
which includes six questions to determine whether applicants for certain identified 
licenses, persons doing business with a government entity, or applicants under 
final consideration for government employment have provided material assistance 
to an organization on the United States Department of State Terrorist Exclusion 
List.  R.C. 2909.32, 2909.33, and 2909.34.  The declaration requires that the 
persons answer the following questions: 
{¶ 4} “(1) Are you a member of an organization on the U.S. Department 
of State Terrorist Exclusion List? 
{¶ 5} “(2) Have you used any position of prominence you have within 
any country to persuade others to support an organization on the U.S. Department 
of State Terrorist Exclusion List? 
{¶ 6} “(3) Have you knowingly solicited funds or other things of value 
for an organization on the U.S. Department of State Terrorist Exclusion List? 
{¶ 7} “(4) Have you solicited any individual for membership in an 
organization on the U.S. Department of State Terrorist Exclusion List? 
{¶ 8} “(5) Have you committed an act that you know, or reasonably 
should have known, affords ‘material support or resources’ to an organization on 
the U.S. Department of State Terrorist Exclusion List? 
{¶ 9} “(6) Have you hired or compensated a person you knew to be a 
member of an organization on the U.S. Department of State Terrorist Exclusion 
List or a person you knew to be engaged in planning, assisting, or carrying out an 
act of terrorism?”  See R.C. 2909.32(A)(2)(b), 2909.33(A)(1), and 2909.34(A)(1). 
{¶ 10} An affirmative answer or a failure to answer “no” to any of the 
questions on the declaration serves as a disclosure that the person provided 
January Term, 2006 
3 
material assistance to an organization listed on the terrorist exclusion list, which 
would generally result in the denial of a state license, or the denial of a contract or 
employment with the state, its instrumentalities, and its political subdivisions.  
R.C. 2909.32(C); 2909.33(B), (C), and (D); and 2909.34(B) and (C). 
{¶ 11} On April 10, 2006, four days before the effective date of the Ohio 
Patriot Act, respondent Bellefontaine Municipal Court Clerk Marty Carmean 
issued a memorandum on the letterhead of respondent Bellefontaine Municipal 
Court directed to all counsel who seek or obtain court appointments to represent 
indigent persons in the municipal court.  Carmean instructed these attorneys to 
immediately complete and return, pursuant to S.B. 9, the “Declaration Regarding 
Material Assistance/Nonassistance to a Terrorist Organization” prepared by the 
Ohio Department of Public Safety, Division of Homeland Security.  The 
declaration included the six questions specified in the Ohio Patriot Act.  The form 
is titled “Government Business and Funding Contracts” and notes that “[i]n the 
event of a denial of a government contract or government funding due to a 
positive indication that material assistance has been provided to a terrorist 
organization, or an organization that supports terrorism as identified by the U.S. 
Department of State Terrorist Exclusion List, a review of the denial may be 
requested.”  The certification at the end of the declaration specifies that “if this 
declaration is not completed in its entirety, it will not be processed and [the 
person] will be automatically disqualified” from doing business with the state 
government. 
{¶ 12} Relator, Marc S. Triplett, is an attorney licensed in Ohio who has 
sought and obtained court appointments to represent indigent persons in the 
Bellefontaine Municipal Court.  Triplett remains interested in obtaining municipal 
court appointments but does not want to complete the declaration.  Triplett did not 
fill out, sign, and return the declaration to Carmean.  Notwithstanding Triplett’s 
refusal to complete the declaration, the municipal court has appointed him to 
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represent an indigent person after the April 14, 2006 effective date of the Ohio 
Patriot Act.  Triplett does not make $100,000 or more per year from his court 
appointments. 
{¶ 13} On April 14, 2006, Triplett filed this action for a writ of 
prohibition against respondents, Bellefontaine Municipal Court, municipal court 
Judge John L. Ross, and Carmean.  In his complaint, Triplett requests a 
peremptory writ to order respondents (1) “to cease efforts to have attorneys who 
seek court appointments from Bellefontaine Municipal Court to represent the 
indigent accused in that court complete and return the Form,” (2) “to cease 
declaring that failure of an otherwise licensed, willing, and eligible attorney to 
complete and return the Form will be a disqualification from obtaining court 
appointments in the Bellefontaine Municipal Court,” and (3) “not to remove his 
name from the list of those who are eligible to receive and do receive court 
appointments in Bellefontaine Municipal Court.” 
{¶ 14} In his initial pleadings, Triplett acknowledged the applicability of 
the Ohio Patriot Act to court appointments of attorneys to represent indigent 
persons.  For example, in his complaint, Triplett asserted that a failure to answer 
questions in the declaration would disqualify a person from any government 
contract, including, specifically in this case, from receiving court appointments to 
represent indigent persons charged with crimes who were subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Bellefontaine Municipal Court.  And in Triplett’s brief in 
support of his complaint, Triplett specified that “the General Assembly, through 
the Ohio Patriot Act, has declared that only persons who attest that they are not 
terrorists, do not employ terrorists, and do not provide material support to 
terrorists may represent indigent persons on appointment in the courts of Ohio” 
and that “by sending the form to ‘All Court Appointed Counsel,’ the 
Bellefontaine Municipal Court, its Clerk, and its Judge have implemented that 
requirement.” 
January Term, 2006 
5 
{¶ 15} Triplett claimed he was entitled to the requested extraordinary 
relief in prohibition because the pertinent portions of the Ohio Patriot Act, i.e., 
R.C. 2909.32 and 2909.33, unconstitutionally usurped the Supreme Court of 
Ohio’s exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law.  Respondents submitted 
an answer and a motion to dismiss.  Because Triplett challenged the 
constitutionality of R.C. 2909.32 and 2909.33, Ohio Attorney General Jim Petro 
filed a motion to intervene as a respondent, and an answer. 
{¶ 16} Based upon Triplett’s complaint and the parties’ pleadings, we 
granted an alternative writ, granted the Attorney General’s motion to intervene, 
and issued a schedule for the presentation of evidence and briefs.  State ex rel. 
Triplett v. Ross, 109 Ohio St.3d 1492, 2006-Ohio-2762, 848 N.E.2d 856.  The 
parties stipulated to the evidence.  The Ohio Public Defender and the Ohio 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers filed amicus curiae briefs in support of 
Triplett. 
{¶ 17} This cause is now before us for a consideration of the merits. 
Prohibition:  Court Appointments 
{¶ 18} Triplett asserts that no court, court clerk, or judge can condition 
court appointments or other matters of the practice of law upon completion of the 
“Declaration Regarding Material Assistance/Nonassistance to a Terrorist 
Organization.”  In order to be entitled to the requested extraordinary relief in 
prohibition, Triplett must establish that (1) the municipal court, its judge, and its 
clerk are exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power 
is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ will result in injury for which no 
other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Brown v. 
Butler Cty. Bd. of Elections, 109 Ohio St.3d 63, 2006-Ohio-1292, 846 N.E.2d 8, ¶ 
21. 
{¶ 19} As previously mentioned, Triplett requests a writ of prohibition, in 
part, to prevent the municipal court respondents from disqualifying an otherwise 
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eligible attorney who has not completed the declaration from obtaining court 
appointments and to prohibit those respondents from removing his name from the 
list of attorneys eligible to receive court appointments. 
{¶ 20} Triplett has failed to prove the necessary requirements for the writ 
as to this claim.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Enyart v. O’Neill (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 
655, 656, 646 N.E.2d 1110 (relators in prohibition case bear the burden of proof).  
The parties’ stipulated evidence establishes that respondents have not conditioned 
Triplett’s eligibility for municipal court appointments on his completion of the 
declaration.  Instead, Triplett has been appointed to represent at least one indigent 
person in the municipal court despite his refusal to complete and return the 
declaration. 
{¶ 21} Triplett is correct that our issuance of an alternative writ in this 
case stayed during the pendency of this action the municipal court respondents 
from disqualifying him from appointments based on his refusal to complete and 
return the declaration.  See S.Ct.Prac.R. X(6) (“an alternative writ in a prohibition 
case stays proceedings in the action sought to be prohibited until final 
determination of the Supreme Court”); State ex rel. Downs v. Panioto, 107 Ohio 
St.3d 347, 2006-Ohio-8, 839 N.E.2d 911, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 22} His suggestion that the municipal court respondents would not 
have appointed him in the absence of the alternative writ, however, is not 
supported by the evidence.  In their motion to dismiss the complaint, which 
preceded our alternative writ, the municipal court respondents specifically 
asserted that “despite Relator’s failure to complete and return the required form, 
he has remained on Respondents’ court appointed counsel list and has continued 
to receive appointments.  The law simply prohibits him from being paid from 
government funds.”  Therefore, the municipal court respondents have consistently 
acted so as not to condition court appointments upon the completion of the 
declaration. 
January Term, 2006 
7 
{¶ 23} Therefore, notwithstanding the language in the declaration, 
respondents have neither automatically disqualified Triplett from obtaining 
municipal court appointments nor removed his name from the list of those 
attorneys eligible to be appointed.  Consequently, Triplett is not entitled to a writ 
of prohibition to prevent actions that respondents have not performed and have 
shown no indication of performing, i.e., disqualifying attorneys who fail to 
complete the declaration from obtaining court appointments and removing their 
names from the list of appointment-eligible attorneys.  Cf. State ex rel. Denton v. 
Bedinghaus, 98 Ohio St.3d 298, 2003-Ohio-861, 784 N.E.2d 99, ¶ 26 (“to the 
extent that [relators] sought to prevent a policy that had already been discontinued 
by [respondents], their prohibition claim was moot”); State ex rel. Consumers’ 
Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 102 Ohio St.3d 301, 2004-Ohio-2894, 809 N.E.2d 
1146, ¶ 12 (request for writ of prohibition to prevent commission from granting 
applications for rehearing rendered moot when commission denied applications).  
Accordingly, we deny the writ as to this claim. 
Prohibition:  Applicability of R.C. 2909.33 
{¶ 24} Triplett’s primary claim in his complaint is for a writ of prohibition 
to order the municipal court respondents “to cease efforts to have attorneys who 
seek court appointments from Bellefontaine Municipal Court to represent the 
indigent accused in that court complete and return the Form.”  The municipal 
court respondents claim they are authorized to enforce the declaration-completion 
requirement under R.C. 2909.33, which they contend permits them to withhold 
payment for Triplett’s representation of indigent persons in the municipal court. 
{¶ 25} Although Triplett requested the extraordinary relief in prohibition 
based upon the unconstitutionality of R.C. 2909.32 and 2909.33, Triplett now 
asserts that these provisions are not applicable to court appointments to represent 
indigent persons and thus cannot support the municipal court respondents’ 
requirement that he complete the declaration. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 26} Triplett did not allege or argue in his complaint or brief in support 
of his complaint that R.C. 2909.32 and 2909.33 are inapplicable to him or other 
attorneys seeking to be appointed by a municipal court to represent indigent 
persons.  Nor did he seek to amend his complaint to raise this claim.  We granted 
an alternative writ based upon the allegations of the complaint and the 
accompanying 
argument 
presented 
by 
Triplett, 
which 
attacked 
the 
constitutionality of R.C. 2909.32 and 2909.33 as applied to the appointment of 
counsel.  The parties presented evidence without notice that the claim that the 
statutes did not apply was being raised.  The Attorney General expressly sought to 
intervene in this case to uphold the constitutionality of R.C. 2909.32 and 2909.33.  
Under comparable circumstances, we have held that we need not consider the 
merits of the improperly raised claim.  See State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing 
Co. v. Cleveland, 106 Ohio St.3d 70, 2005-Ohio-3807, 831 N.E.2d 987, ¶ 64. 
{¶ 27} Nevertheless, we hold that this issue is properly before us, even 
though Triplett did not specifically raise this issue in his complaint and brief in 
support, because his complaint’s primary prohibition claim is broad enough to 
encompass the issue.  More significantly, neither the municipal court respondents 
nor the Attorney General objects to the resolution of this issue, and they have 
presented argument concerning it.  There is no evidence or assertion that 
Triplett’s nonconstitutional claim prejudiced respondents in defending against this 
prohibition action.  See Civ.R. 15(B) (“When issues not raised by the pleadings 
are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all 
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings”); see, also, In re Election 
Contest of Democratic Primary Held May 4, 1999 for Clerk, Youngstown Mun. 
Court (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 258, 264, 725 N.E.2d 271; State ex rel. Taxpayers 
Coalition v. Lakewood (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 385, 391, 715 N.E.2d 179; and State 
ex rel. BSW Dev. Group v. Dayton (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 338, 344, 699 N.E.2d 
1271 (holding that we need not consider certain claims when those claims had not 
January Term, 2006 
9 
been tried with the express or implied consent of the parties pursuant to Civ.R. 
15(B)).  Accordingly, we proceed to consider this claim. 
{¶ 28} Triplett and amici initially assert that the municipal court 
respondents are exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power by requiring that 
attorneys seeking court appointments complete the declaration.  This assertion has 
merit.  A court or judge exercises judicial authority in appointing counsel.  See, 
e.g., State ex rel. Gains v. Maloney, 102 Ohio St.3d 254, 2004-Ohio-2658, 809 
N.E.2d 24 (writ of prohibition granted to prevent common pleas court judge from 
appointing outside counsel to represent judge in habeas corpus case); State ex rel. 
Marsteller v. Maloney, Mahoning App. No. 04-MA-279, 2005-Ohio-1836, ¶ 29 
(judge had exercised judicial authority for purposes of prohibition claim by 
appointing counsel to represent estate to pursue appeal); see, also, Eichenberger v. 
Petree (1992), 76 Ohio App.3d 779, 782, 603 N.E.2d 366 (appointment of 
attorney by court to represent an indigent client “is clearly a judicial act”). 
{¶ 29} With regard to the second element needed to establish his right to a 
writ of prohibition, Triplett and amici claim that the municipal court respondents’ 
exercise of their power to require an attorney seeking court appointments to 
complete the Ohio Patriot Act declaration before the attorney is entitled to be paid 
for an appointment is unauthorized by law because the act does not mandate that 
the declaration be completed in these circumstances.  Conversely, respondents 
claim that the municipal court’s practice is expressly authorized by the act, 
specifically R.C. 2909.33. 
{¶ 30} In interpreting a statute, a court’s paramount concern is legislative 
intent.  State ex rel. United States Steel Corp. v. Zaleski, 98 Ohio St.3d 395, 2003-
Ohio-1630, 786 N.E.2d 39, ¶ 12.  To determine this intent, we read words and 
phrases in context and construe them in accordance with the rules of grammar and 
common usage.  R.C. 1.42; Hedges v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 109 Ohio St.3d 
70, 2006-Ohio-1926, 846 N.E.2d 16, ¶ 24. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 31} R.C. 2909.33 provides: 
{¶ 32} “(A)(1) The director of public safety shall prepare a document to 
serve as a declaration of material assistance/nonassistance for the state, any 
instrumentality of the state, and any political subdivision of the state to use to 
determine whether any person, company, affiliated group, or organization, or 
person who holds, owns, or otherwise has a controlling interest in a company, 
affiliated group, or organization, has provided material assistance to an 
organization listed on the United States department of state terrorist exclusion list.  
The declaration shall be substantially in the same format and of the same content 
as set forth in division (A)(2)(b) of section 2909.32 of the Revised Code. 
{¶ 33} “(2) The director shall make the declaration of material 
assistance/nonassistance available to the state, instrumentalities of the state, and 
political subdivisions of the state, along with a then-current copy of the terrorist 
exclusion list.  The director may adopt rules that govern the preparation of the 
declaration and the distribution of the declaration and terrorist exclusion list. 
{¶ 34} “(3)(a) Any state agency, instrumentality, or political subdivision 
of the state, for purposes of business it conducts and funding it provides, may 
adopt a procedure under which it precertifies any person, company, affiliated 
group, or organization as not providing material assistance to an organization on 
the terrorist exclusion list.  The precertification this division describes shall be 
granted to any person, company, affiliated group, or organization that submits a 
completed copy of the declaration prepared pursuant to this section, with an 
answer of ‘no’ to all questions.  A precertification pursuant to this division is 
effective for one year. 
{¶ 35} “(b) Any person, company, affiliated group, or organization that is 
precertified pursuant to this division and that takes any action or learns of 
anything that would result in an answer of ‘yes’ to any question on the declaration 
of material assistance/nonassistance this division requires, shall cease to represent 
January Term, 2006 
11 
that it is precertified and, within thirty days of taking that action or learning the 
new information, shall notify every state agency, instrumentality, or political 
subdivision with which it is precertified to request the precertification be 
rescinded. 
{¶ 36} “(c) When applying for a contract, falsely representing 
precertification, or representing precertification when that precertification has 
been rescinded or should have been rescinded pursuant to this division, is a felony 
of the fifth degree. 
{¶ 37} “(B) Any person who is provided a declaration of material 
assistance/nonassistance pursuant to this section shall complete that declaration.  
Any answer of ‘yes’ to any question, or the failure to answer ‘no’ to any question, 
on the declaration shall serve for purposes of this section as a disclosure of the 
provision of material assistance to an organization that is listed on the terrorist 
exclusion list. 
{¶ 38} “(C) Prior to entering into a contract to conduct business or receive 
funding, any person, company, affiliated group, or organization, and any person 
who holds, owns, or otherwise has a controlling interest in a company, affiliated 
group, or organization that conducts any business with or receives funding in an 
aggregate amount greater than one hundred thousand dollars annually from the 
state, any instrumentality of the state, and any political subdivision of the state, 
excluding the amount of any personal benefit, shall certify that it does not provide 
material assistance to any organization on the United States department of state 
terrorist exclusion list.  The certification shall be made by completing the 
declaration of material assistance/nonassistance described in division (A) of this 
section. 
{¶ 39} “(D)(1) The state, an instrumentality of the state, or a political 
subdivision of the state shall conduct no business with or provide any funding to 
any person, company, affiliated group or organization, or any person who has a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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controlling interest in a company, affiliated group, or organization unless that 
person, company, affiliated group, or organization is certified as division (C) of 
this section requires.  The state, instrumentality, or subdivision shall provide the 
declaration prepared pursuant to division (A) of this section, along with a then-
current copy of the terrorist exclusion list, to any person, company, affiliated 
group, or organization that is not precertified and for which certification is 
required.  If a contract is entered into pursuant to competitive bidding or another 
competitive process, the state, instrumentality, or subdivision need provide the 
declaration and list only to the person selected and only if that person is not 
precertified. 
{¶ 40} “(2) No person, company, affiliated group or organization, or any 
person who holds, owns, or otherwise has a controlling interest in a company, 
affiliated group, or organization shall enter into a contract to conduct business 
with or receive funding from the state, an instrumentality of the state, or a 
political subdivision of the state unless it is certified as division (C) of this section 
requires.” 
{¶ 41} The preeminent provision of R.C. 2909.33 is contained in 
subdivision (C), which requires that before “entering into a contract to conduct 
business or receive funding” with a political subdivision of the state, any person 
conducting business with or receiving funding in an aggregate amount greater 
than $100,000 per year must certify that the person does not provide material 
assistance to any organization on the United States Department of State terrorist-
exclusion list by completing the declaration.  This declaration is the form 
prepared by the Director of Public Safety that was sent by the municipal court 
respondents to Triplett and other attorneys seeking court appointments.  The 
municipal court respondents argued in their motion to dismiss that this declaration 
is properly founded on the state’s authority to contract. 
January Term, 2006 
13 
{¶ 42} The municipal court respondents’ assertion that their demand that 
Triplett and other attorneys seeking court appointments complete this declaration 
was authorized by R.C. 2909.33 is incorrect for the following reasons. 
{¶ 43} First, the parties stipulated that Triplett does not earn more than 
$100,000 per year from his court appointments.  Under the clear language of R.C. 
2909.33(C), Triplett is not required to complete the declaration to be eligible for a 
court appointment. 
{¶ 44} Second, the municipal court respondents admit that R.C. 2909.33 
is inapplicable to “court appointments in Bellefontaine Municipal Court.”  They 
claim that the declaration “does not impact in any manner one’s ability to receive 
court appointments in the Bellefontaine Municipal Court.” 
{¶ 45} Third, R.C. 2909.33(D)(1) does not authorize the municipal court 
respondents or any other state entity to withhold funding for any court 
appointment of Triplett.  It is true that R.C. 2909.33(D)(1) specifies that “[t]he 
state, an instrumentality of the state, or a political subdivision of the state shall 
conduct no business with or provide any funding” to any person or entity unless 
that person or entity is “certified as division (C) of this section requires.”  But the 
key phrase is “as division (C) of this section requires.”  R.C. 2909.33(C) applies 
only to persons and entities receiving funding pursuant to government contracts in 
an aggregate amount greater than $100,000.  Therefore, the prohibition in R.C. 
2909.33(D) is similarly limited.  See State ex rel. Choices for South-Western City 
Schools v. Anthony, 108 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-5362, 840 N.E.2d 582, ¶ 46 
(statutory provisions relating to the same subject matter must be construed in pari 
materia and harmonized so as to give full effect to the provisions). 
{¶ 46} The Attorney General argues that, regardless of these provisions of 
R.C. 2909.33, the municipal court respondents are justified in requiring that 
attorneys seeking court appointments complete the declaration because it is an 
appropriate precertification under R.C. 2909.33(A)(3)(a), which gives state 
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agencies, instrumentalities, and political subdivisions the discretion to “adopt a 
procedure under which it precertifies” any person or entity “as not providing 
material assistance to an organization on the terrorist exclusion list.”  For the 
following reasons, the Attorney General’s argument lacks merit. 
{¶ 47} First, there is no evidence that the municipal court respondents 
were precertifying attorneys under R.C. 2909.33(A)(3)(a).  The municipal court 
respondents do not argue that they were doing so.  In fact, they used the 
declaration required by R.C. 2909.33(C) instead of the precertification form 
permitted by R.C. 2909.33(A)(3)(a) that was prepared by the Director of Public 
Safety.  There was also no properly adopted local court rule requiring 
precertification. 
{¶ 48} Second, the apparent purpose of the precertification provision is to 
allow persons and entities who must sign the declaration form to avoid doing so 
on multiple occasions.  See R.C. 2909.33(A)(3)(a) (“A precertification pursuant to 
this division is effective for one year”); R.C. 2909.33(D)(1) (“The state, 
instrumentality, or subdivision shall provide the declaration prepared pursuant to 
division (A) of this section, along with a then-current copy of the terrorist 
exclusion list, to any person, company, affiliated group, or organization that is not 
precertified and for which certification is required”). There is no indication in 
either the text of R.C. 2909.33 or the Legislative Service Commission’s analysis 
of S.B. 9 that the General Assembly intended to authorize the precertification of 
persons pursuant to R.C. 2909.33(A)(3)(a) who will not be required to file the 
declaration required by R.C. 2909.33(C).  See LSC Analysis of Am.Sub.S.B. 9, 
http://lsc.state.oh.us.  This interpretation of precertification is also supported by 
R.C. 2909.33(A)(3)(c), which provides that a false representation of 
precertification “[w]hen applying for a contract” is a felony.  This indicates that 
precertification is not intended to apply to noncontractual situations like a court’s 
appointment of counsel. 
January Term, 2006 
15 
{¶ 49} Therefore, notwithstanding the respondents’ arguments to the 
contrary, R.C. 2909.33 did not authorize them to require attorneys seeking court 
appointments who make less than $100,000 annually from these appointments, 
like Triplett, to complete the declaration of material assistance/nonassistance.  
Therefore, the municipal court respondents’ requirement is an unauthorized 
exercise of judicial power. 
{¶ 50} Finally, because neither R.C. 2909.33 nor any other statute, rule, or 
precedent authorizes the municipal court respondents to require Triplett and other 
attorneys who make less than $100,000 annually from court appointments to 
complete the declaration, the municipal court respondents patently and 
unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to do so, and the availability of an adequate 
remedy is immaterial.  See State ex rel. Buck v. Maloney, 102 Ohio St.3d 250, 
2004-Ohio-2590, 809 N.E.2d 20, ¶ 16 (if an inferior court patently and 
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to act, prohibition will issue to prevent the 
further unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the results of any 
previous unauthorized acts).  Therefore, we grant the requested writ of prohibition 
to prevent the municipal court respondents from requiring attorneys who seek 
court appointments to represent indigent defendants and make less than $100,000 
per year from those appointments to complete the declaration.  See Gains, 102 
Ohio St.3d 254, 2004-Ohio-2658, 809 N.E.2d 24, ¶ 11 (“Because neither the 
pertinent statutes nor precedent authorized [the judge] to appoint outside counsel 
in the habeas corpus case, we grant the requested writ of prohibition”). 
Prohibition:  Constitutionality of R.C. 2909.32 and 2909.33 
{¶ 51} Triplett also alleged in his complaint and brief in support that R.C. 
2909.32 and 2909.33 are unconstitutional because they usurp this court’s 
exclusive jurisdiction under Section 2(B)(1)(g), Article IV of the Ohio 
Constitution over all matters related to the practice of law in Ohio.  Following the 
issuance of the alternative writ, however, Triplett specified in his merit brief that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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“[t]his is not the proper venue for a challenge to the constitutionality of the law, 
and [he] is doing no such thing.”  The amici curiae also do not challenge the 
constitutionality of these statutes. 
{¶ 52} By now expressly disclaiming reliance on his original challenge to 
the constitutionality of R.C. 2909.32 and 2909.33, Triplett has waived that issue.  
See, e.g., State ex rel. Love v. Cuyahoga Cty. Prosecutor’s Office (1999), 87 Ohio 
St.3d 158, 159, 718 N.E.2d 426 (court did not address whether relator in 
mandamus case was entitled to relief under R.C. 149.43, the Public Records Act, 
because he disclaimed relief under the statute). 
{¶ 53} More important, we need not resolve this issue because Triplett is 
entitled to the writ based on his claim that R.C. 2909.33 did not authorize the 
municipal court respondents to require that he complete and return the declaration 
when seeking court appointments.  Consequently, resolution of the constitutional 
issue is unnecessary.  State ex rel. Essig v. Blackwell, 103 Ohio St.3d 481, 2004-
Ohio-5586, 817 N.E.2d 5, ¶ 34, quoting State ex rel. DeBrosse v. Cool (1999), 87 
Ohio St.3d 1, 7, 716 N.E.2d 1114 (“ ‘[c]ourts decide constitutional issues only 
when absolutely necessary’ ”). 
Legislative Policy for the Patriot Act 
{¶ 54} Although Triplett recognized in his brief in support of his 
complaint that this is not the forum to debate the policy behind the enactment of 
the Ohio Patriot Act, he nevertheless proceeds to do so by claiming that the 
statutory requirement that persons and entities sign the declaration is “deeply 
offensive,” does “nothing to prevent terrorism,” and is foolish. 
{¶ 55} We cannot address these contentions.  “ ‘It is not a court’s function 
to pass judgment on the wisdom of the legislation, for that is the task of the 
legislative body which enacted the legislation.’ ”  Klein v. Leis, 99 Ohio St.3d 
537, 2003-Ohio-4779, 795 N.E.2d 633, ¶ 14, quoting Arnold v. Cleveland (1993), 
67 Ohio St.3d 35, 48, 616 N.E.2d 163.  “The Ohio General Assembly, and not this 
January Term, 2006 
17 
court, is the proper body to resolve public policy issues.”  Johnson v. Microsoft 
Corp., 106 Ohio St.3d 278, 2005-Ohio-4985, 834 N.E.2d 791, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 56} In addition, as respondents note, Triplett’s contention that the Ohio 
Patriot Act would prevent attorneys from representing terrorists because this 
would constitute prohibited material assistance to the terrorists lacks merit.  Legal 
representation does not constitute “material support or resources” for purposes of 
the Ohio Patriot Act.  R.C. 2909.21(I) and 2909.32(A)(2)(b). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 57} Triplett 
presents 
a 
sometimes 
perplexing 
and 
internally 
inconsistent argument in support of his claim for extraordinary relief in 
prohibition.  He first challenged the constitutionality of the Ohio Patriot Act but 
later abandoned that argument.  He raises the inapplicability of the Ohio Patriot 
Act but he did not include that claim in his complaint or seek leave to amend his 
complaint to raise the claim.  He acknowledged the impropriety of prohibition to 
second-guess the wisdom of the legislative policies behind the Ohio Patriot Act 
but then attacked those policies.  He seeks to prevent respondents from removing 
his name from the list of eligible attorneys for municipal court appointment, but 
there is insufficient evidence that respondents either have done so or are about to 
do so. 
{¶ 58} The municipal court respondents have also presented inconsistent 
contentions, e.g., first claiming that they are exercising judicial authority and then 
contending that they are not. 
{¶ 59} Despite these shortcomings in the parties’ arguments, respondents 
have consented to the court’s resolution of Triplett’s nonconstitutional claim, and 
Triplett has established his entitlement to a writ of prohibition to prevent the 
municipal court respondents from requiring him to complete the declaration 
regarding material assistance/nonassistance to a terrorist organization before he 
can be appointed to represent indigent defendants.  He has not established his 
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18 
 
entitlement to a writ of prohibition to prevent the municipal court respondents 
from declaring that the failure of an eligible attorney to complete the declaration 
will disqualify that attorney from obtaining court appointments and forbidding the 
removal of his name from the eligible-attorneys list for court appointments, 
because there is no evidence that the municipal court officials have done so or 
intend to do so. 
{¶ 60} Accordingly, we grant a writ of prohibition to prevent the 
municipal court respondents from requiring that Triplett complete and return the 
declaration regarding material assistance/nonassistance to a terrorist organization.  
We deny the remainder of the requested writ. 
Writ granted in part 
and denied in part. 
 
RESNICK, PFEIFER, O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LANZINGER, J., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 61} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s denying in part the writ 
of prohibition to prevent Triplett’s disqualification from court appointments for 
failure to sign the Ohio Patriot Act declaration.  Instead, I would grant the writ in 
its entirety.  I recognize that the partial grant produces the same result – Triplett 
does not need to file the declaration – but I do not agree with the rationale for the 
partial denial. 
{¶ 62} The majority denies a writ as to the issue of whether the 
Bellefontaine Municipal Court may disqualify Triplett from its appointment list.  
The court reasons that Triplett remains on the appointed list and has in fact 
received an appointment since this action was filed.  The court contends in this 
respect only that Triplett cannot be paid for his appointment.  This assertion 
January Term, 2006 
19 
makes the fact that the court is still willing to appoint Triplett meaningless.  It 
turns Triplett’s representation into automatic pro bono work. Therefore, I would 
grant the entire writ. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 63} While I do not disagree with the majority’s holding that the Ohio 
Patriot Act does not require an attorney to sign a declaration that he or she has not 
provided material assistance to a terrorist organization, I must dissent because I 
believe that the court need not grant this relief.  This is not a prohibition case.  A 
writ of prohibition is “[a]n extraordinary writ issued by an appellate court to 
prevent a lower court from exceeding its jurisdiction.” Black’s Law Dictionary 
(8th Ed.2004) 1248. See State ex rel. Carmody v. Justice (1926), 114 Ohio St. 94, 
97, 150 N.E. 430 (“The writ of prohibition is a specific remedy of an 
extraordinary character, and issues because of the absence or inadequacy of 
ordinary remedies. Its proper scope and purpose is to keep inferior courts and 
tribunals within the limits of their own jurisdiction, and prevent their 
encroachment upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals”); State ex rel. Harrison v. 
Perry (1925), 113 Ohio St. 641, 646, 150 N.E. 78, quoting State ex rel. Nolan v. 
ClenDening (1915), 93 Ohio St. 264, 112 N.E. 1029 (“ ‘The writ may be invoked 
against inferior courts or inferior tribunals, ministerial or otherwise, that possess 
incidentally judicial or quasi judicial powers, to keep such courts or tribunals 
within the limits of their own jurisdiction.’ ”).  It is a tool for correcting 
jurisdictional issues only; it should not be used as a substitute for an appeal or 
another action. 
{¶ 64} We have consistently held that a writ of prohibition is an 
extraordinary writ and should be issued only under limited circumstances.  “ ‘The 
writ of prohibition is a high prerogative writ, to be used with great caution in the 
furtherance of justice and only where there is no other regular, ordinary and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
adequate remedy.’ ”  Id., quoting State ex rel. Nolan v. ClenDening (1915), 93 
Ohio St. 264, 112 N.E. 1029. 
{¶ 65} To that end, we have adopted and consistently applied a three-
pronged test: “In order to be entitled to the requested writ of prohibition, relators 
must establish that (1) the [respondent] is about to exercise quasi-judicial [or 
judicial] power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) 
denying the writ will result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in 
the ordinary course of law.”  State ex rel. Brown v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Elections, 
109 Ohio St.3d 63, 2006-Ohio-1292, 846 N.E.2d 8, ¶ 21; see, also, State ex rel. 
Caley v. Tax Comm. of Ohio (1934), 129 Ohio St. 83, 87, 1 O.O. 415, 193 N.E. 
751.  Specifically amplifying the third prong, this court has stated that “[i]t is a 
general principle relative to the extraordinary writ of prohibition that the writ will 
not issue where there is an adequate remedy at law, or in equity, readily available 
to the applicant, either by appeal, or writ of error, or any other writ, motion, or 
proceeding appropriate to the relief, such as injunction, mandamus, quo warranto, 
etc.” (Emphasis added). Harrison, 113 Ohio St. at 648-649, 150 N.E. 78. 
{¶ 66} When this law is applied to the facts before us, it is clear that a writ 
of prohibition should not lie.  First, as to the second prong of the test, the power 
the municipal court exercised to require relator to complete the declaration was 
authorized by statute.  R.C. 2909.32 et seq.  While the majority ultimately has 
determined that the Ohio Patriot Act does not apply in this situation, that result 
was not patently and unambiguously clear.  The trial court applied the statute and 
produced a result that this court has found to be in error. 
{¶ 67} The writ of prohibition can and should be used only to prevent the 
clearly erroneous assumption of jurisdiction by a court or other officer.  In State 
ex rel. Connor v. McGough (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 188, 191, 546 N.E.2d 407, we 
held that while “[p]rohibition is not a substitute for an appeal[,] * * * since 
personal jurisdiction is so totally lacking in this case, we hold it to be too harsh to 
January Term, 2006 
21 
require [relator] to defend major litigation through an appeal simply to 
demonstrate a right so well established.”  However, when applying the second 
prong of the test, we have also held that “ ‘[w]here a court has full and complete 
jurisdiction of the subject-matter of an action therein pending, a writ of 
prohibition will not be awarded to prevent an anticipated erroneous judgment. An 
adequate remedy is available by proceeding in error.’ ” State ex rel. Caley v. Tax 
Comm. of Ohio (1934), 129 Ohio St. 83, 88, 1 O.O. 415, 193 N.E. 751, quoting 
State ex rel. Carmody v. Justice (1926), 114 Ohio St. 94, 150 N.E. 430.  A 
municipal court clearly has authority to authorize compensation for assigned 
attorneys who represent indigent persons.  The facts of this case fall into the latter 
precedent, that is, the erroneous application of clearly granted jurisdiction, rather 
than the former precedent of a court attempting to exercise jurisdiction it clearly 
does not possess. 
{¶ 68} This is not a case in which the lack of jurisdiction is so obvious, 
such as when a municipal court seeks to award a judgment in excess of the 
statutory limit of its jurisdiction or when a juvenile court seeks to exercise 
jurisdiction over a felony-murder case.  A writ of prohibition is not a substitute 
for an appeal, and when it is not patently and unambiguously clear that a court is 
about to exercise jurisdiction it does not possess, the writ should not lie. 
{¶ 69} Second, the relator has other adequate remedies in the course of 
law through an action for declaratory judgment, an appeal, an injunction, or even 
through the writ of mandamus.  At the very least, Triplett’s action is premature.  
While it would have been inconvenient, Triplett should have represented his client 
and, upon completion of the representation, applied for compensation.  Once the 
municipal court denied his request for compensation, Triplett could have filed a 
complaint for a writ of mandamus that would order the municipal court to 
compensate him.  This court has consistently declined to issue a writ of 
prohibition simply to avoid or expedite expensive litigation.  State ex rel. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
Cleveland Trust Co. v. Pethtel (1940), 137 Ohio St. 525, 19 O.O 240, 30 N.E.2d 
991. See, also, State ex rel. Caley v. Tax Comm. of Ohio (1934), 129 Ohio St. 83, 
88, 193 N.E. 751 (“The principle is well established in Ohio that such writ may 
not be employed as a convenient short cut to a final determination of rights of 
litigants”). 
{¶ 70} Too often, lawyers mistake a writ of prohibition for the opposite of 
a writ of mandamus.  It is not and should not be so used.  I would deny the 
requested writ of prohibition because the municipal court has the authority to act 
on the matter before it and relator has an adequate remedy at law. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
___________________ 
 
Jeffrey M. Gamso, Legal Director, ACLU of Ohio Foundation, Inc., for 
relator. 
 
Daniel L. Bennett, Assistant Bellefontaine Municipal Prosecuting 
Attorney, for respondents Judge John L. Ross, Clerk Marty Carmean, and 
Bellefontaine Municipal Court. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Frank M. Strigari, Assistant Attorney 
General, for intervening respondent Attorney General of Ohio. 
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, 
Assistant Public Defender; Charles B. Clovis, urging granting of writ for amici 
curiae Ohio Public Defender and Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
______________________