Case Title: Jennifer M. Woodward v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC18-291

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2019-12-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC18-291 
____________ 
 
JENNIFER M. WOODWARD, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
December 19, 2019 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We initially accepted jurisdiction to review the decision of the Fourth 
District Court of Appeal in Woodward v. State, 238 So. 3d 290 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2018), on grounds of express and direct conflict with decisions of other district 
courts of appeal.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  Having considered the decision 
of the Fourth District and the parties’ arguments, upon further review, we have 
determined that we should exercise our discretion and discharge jurisdiction.  
Accordingly, we hereby dismiss review. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, and MUÑIZ, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
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NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED.  
 
LABARGA, J., dissenting. 
 
 
When confronted with disruptive behavior in the courtroom, our courts must 
be able to immediately address such conduct and restore order.  To that end, I fully 
recognize the necessity of the direct contempt power and support its use under 
appropriate circumstances.  Moreover, I agree with the district court’s conclusion 
in Woodward that a verbatim transcript of direct criminal contempt proceedings is 
not required.  However, I dissent from the majority’s decision to discharge 
jurisdiction in this case, where the order adjudicating Woodward guilty of direct 
criminal contempt is inadequate to support her conviction. 
 
Indeed, it has long been recognized that to protect its authority and preserve 
the order of its proceedings, a court must be able to act swiftly and decisively to 
punish disruptive or disrespectful acts committed in its presence.  See Ex parte 
Edwards, 11 Fla. 174, 186 (Fla. 1866) (explaining the contempt power “is the great 
bulwark established by the common law for the protection of courts of justice, and 
for the maintainance [sic] of their dignity, authority and efficiency”).  Florida Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 3.830, “Direct Criminal Contempt,” authorizes courts to 
summarily exercise their direct contempt powers, but given the potential 
consequences of a contempt adjudication, the rule also provides steps that a court 
 
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must take to ensure a defendant’s right to due process of law.  Rule 3.830 provides 
as follows: 
 
A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the court 
saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt committed in the 
actual presence of the court.  The judgment of guilt of contempt shall 
include a recital of those facts on which the adjudication of guilt is 
based.  Prior to the adjudication of guilt the judge shall inform the 
defendant of the accusation against the defendant and inquire as to 
whether the defendant has any cause to show why he or she should 
not be adjudged guilty of contempt by the court and sentenced 
therefor.  The defendant shall be given the opportunity to present 
evidence of excusing or mitigating circumstances.  The judgment shall 
be signed by the judge and entered of record.  Sentence shall be 
pronounced in open court. 
 
Although a verbatim transcription of the direct contempt proceeding is not 
necessary to serve these ends, due process requires that there be some record from 
which it is possible to determine what the contemptuous conduct was, what 
mitigating or excusing circumstances were present, and whether the trial court 
followed the rule 3.830 procedure. 
In this case, the entire record of the direct criminal contempt proceeding 
consists of a single-page handwritten order adjudicating Woodward guilty of direct 
criminal contempt.  The portion of the order that addresses direct criminal 
contempt, the first paragraph, states in full: 
 
Jennifer Woodward is hereby sentenced to 15 days in the 
Broward County Jail for repeatedly refusing to answers [sic] 
questions posed to her under oath by attorney Marc [sic] Manceri and 
this Court after [being] repeatedly directed to do so by this Court and 
her totally disruptive behavior before this Court to the point of making 
 
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+ turning the subject hearing into a circus[-]like atmosphere after 
[being] repeatedly warned to cease and desist this behavior.[1] 
 
 
Here, the content of the court’s order is paramount because it is the only 
record for appellate purposes.  As the sole record of Woodward’s direct criminal 
contempt proceeding, this order is wholly inadequate.  First, the order provides 
only a general description of Woodward’s conduct.  Second, it does not reflect that 
the trial court followed the rule 3.830 procedure by informing Woodward it was 
considering holding her in direct criminal contempt before actually doing so.  
Third, the order does not reflect that the trial court allowed Woodward to show 
cause why she should not be held in contempt or to present evidence to mitigate or 
excuse her guilt. 
 
To support Woodward’s conviction for direct criminal contempt, more is 
needed than a conclusory statement that she behaved contemptuously and was 
sentenced therefor.  When the order adjudicating the defendant guilty is the only 
record of the proceeding, that order must state the factual basis for the conviction 
                                          
 
 
1.  In the second paragraph, the trial court held Woodward in indirect 
criminal contempt, a finding reversed by the Fourth District Court of Appeal 
because there was no evidence in the record to support it.  See Woodward v. State, 
238 So. 3d 290, 293 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). 
 
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and must also affirmatively reflect that the trial court followed the procedure 
required by rule 3.830.2 
 
The deficiencies in the trial court’s order make it impossible to determine 
whether Woodward received due process of law.  Despite these deficiencies, the 
effect of the majority’s decision to discharge jurisdiction is that her contempt 
conviction will stand.  Especially troubling is that although the record reflects that 
Woodward was arrested, it is unclear whether she has served her sentence.  It is 
therefore possible that despite any record proof of the trial court’s efforts to afford 
Woodward the required procedural protections, the majority’s decision will yet 
require her to surrender to the Broward County Sheriff’s Office to serve fifteen 
days in jail. 
 
Regardless of whether Woodward has served her sentence, requiring her to 
serve a custodial sentence for direct criminal contempt amounts to a miscarriage of 
justice where the court’s contempt order fails to show that she received due 
process.  Although I do not believe that a verbatim transcript of direct criminal 
                                          
 
 
2.  Although not relevant to the legal sufficiency of the order, I am 
concerned that the contempt order at issue in this case was handwritten, evidently 
while the judge was still on the bench immediately after the events in question.  
When sentencing a person to a term in the county jail after a summary proceeding, 
a minimum standard would require that the judge take a momentary recess to 
return to chambers, reflect calmly on the situation, and rather than hurriedly filling 
out a form order, type an order on the computer that meets the requirements of rule 
3.830. 
 
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contempt proceedings is necessary to protect contemnors’ due process rights, I 
cannot ignore the possibility that Woodward’s conviction is based on a flawed 
proceeding in which she did not receive due process of law.  I therefore dissent 
from the discharge of jurisdiction. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D16-2413 
 
 
(Broward County) 
 
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Benjamin Eisenberg, Assistant Public 
Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Celia A. Terenzio, 
Bureau Chief, and Heidi L. Bettendorf, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm 
Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent