Case Title: Horwitz v. Holabird & Root

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89351

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2004-05-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 89351-Agenda 31-September 2000.
TEM HORWITZ et al., Appellees, v. HOLABIRD & ROOT et al., 							Appellants.
Opinion Filed May 20, 2004. 
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	Plaintiffs, Tem Horwitz and Horwitz Matthews, Inc. (collectively,
Horwitz Matthews), filed a six-count complaint in the circuit court of
Cook County against the law firm of Sabo & Zahn (the firm) and its
clients, defendants Holabird & Root, Jeffrey Case, Gerald Horn, and
James Baird (collectively, Holabird & Root), alleging, inter alia, tortious
interference with business relationships. Sabo & Zahn is not involved in
this appeal, and only count VI is at issue here. Count VI sought relief
against Holabird & Root as a principal who acted by and through its
attorneys, Sabo & Zahn.
	The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Holabird &
Root, ruling as a matter of law that Holabird & Root could not be liable
for its attorneys' actions. Horwitz Matthews appealed and the appellate
court reversed and remanded, with one justice dissenting. 312 Ill. App. 3d
192. We granted Holabird & Root's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.
2d R. 315. We now must decide whether, and if so when, a client may be
held vicariously liable for an attorney's allegedly intentional tortious
conduct.

BACKGROUND		
Holabird & Root is a general partnership in the architectural business.
Case, Horn, and Baird are its partners. Holabird & Root retained Sabo
& Zahn to collect a debt incurred by Horwitz Matthews for architectural
services. Horwitz Matthews is an Illinois corporation that develops real
estate with private investors. In the course of representing Holabird &
Root, Sabo & Zahn obtained a judgment against Horwitz Matthews.
	In response to a citation to discover assets, Horwitz Mathews
provided Sabo & Zahn with various tax returns. According to
uncontradicted deposition testimony, this tax information was the subject
of a confidentiality agreement. Specifically, Sabo & Zahn agreed not to
disclose the tax information to anyone outside its law firm. Through
discovery, Sabo & Zahn also learned the identity of several business
associates and investors of Horwitz Matthews. Sabo & Zahn contacted
at least 40 of these business associates and investors by letter, informing
them that on its tax returns Horwitz Matthews had apportioned itself a
greater percentage than it was entitled of the partnership business. The
letters also stated that the partnership's tax filing showed the investors'
share of the loss was underreported. The letters were on the firm's
stationery and stated, "we represent Holabird & Root who have a
judgment against Horwitz Matthews."
	Horwitz Matthews filed a six-count complaint against Sabo & Zahn
and Holabird & Root. The trial court dismissed counts I through IV,
sounding in defamation and levied at both Sabo & Zahn and Holabird &
Root. Count V sought relief solely against Sabo & Zahn. Count VI sought
relief for tortious interference with business relationships solely against
Holabird & Root as a principal acting by and through its attorneys, Sabo
& Zahn.
	The trial court granted Holabird & Root's subsequent motion for
summary judgment on count VI and ruled as a matter of law that Holabird
& Root could not be held liable for its attorneys' actions. Horwitz
Matthews appealed. In reversing the grant of summary judgment in favor
of Holabird & Root, the appellate court held that the attorney-client
relationship in this case was one governed by the laws of agency with
Holabird & Root as the principal and Sabo & Zahn as the agent. 312 Ill.
App. 3d at 195-96. The appellate court reasoned that, although attorneys
are independent contractors of their clients regarding their physical
activities (Washington v. Caseyville Health Care Ass'n, 284 Ill. App.
3d 97, 101 (1996)), there were no allegations of "any physical activities
undertaken by Sabo & Zahn; therefore, [Sabo & Zahn] would not be an
independent contractor in its relationship with the Holabird & Root
defendants." 312 Ill. App. 3d at 196. According to the appellate court,
Sabo & Zahn's misconduct could be attributed to Holabird & Root under
the law of agency, binding principals by their chosen agents' deeds. 312
Ill. App. 3d at 195-96; see Diersen v. Chicago Car Exchange, 110 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1997).
	The appellate court also found that a genuine issue of material fact
existed concerning whether Sabo & Zahn acted within the scope of its
authority in sending the letters to the various business partners of Holabird
& Root. 312 Ill. App. 3d at 196-97. In support of this conclusion, the
appellate court relied on the discovery depositions of Werner Sabo and
James Zahn. Each stated that the firm was performing a task it had been
hired to accomplish. The appellate court also relied on defendant James
W. Baird's discovery deposition statement that the letters sent by Sabo
& Zahn indicated to him that the law firm was pursuing the fee in an
"aggressive way" and that the firm was "serving them as their clients."
	Finally, the appellate court held that a genuine issue of material fact
existed as to whether Holabird & Root ratified Sabo & Zahn's
misconduct. According to the appellate court,
			"It is not clear from the record when the Holabird & Root
defendants became aware of the letters, and when they did, if
they ever disapproved of the letters being mailed or if by their
silence and conduct they approved the letters. Whether the
Holabird & Root defendants' actions or lack thereof constituted
a ratification is a question of fact." 312 Ill. App. 3d at 197.
Given the appellate court's opinion that there were genuine issues of
material fact, the appellate court remanded the cause for further
proceedings.
	In dissent, Presiding Justice Hoffman stated that the decision was
flawed. 312 Ill. App. 3d at 198 (Hoffman, P.J., dissenting). The dissent
concluded that, in cases involving an attorney pursuing a claim without
further direction, the attorney should be held to be an independent
contractor. 312 Ill. App. 3d at 198-99 (Hoffman, P.J., dissenting).
According to the dissent, since Sabo & Zahn was an independent
contractor, Holabird & Root could not be held vicariously liable for its
allegedly tortious conduct. The dissent reasoned that there was no
vicarious liability primarily because an employer has no "right to control
the manner of doing the work" performed by the independent contractor.
See Hartley v. Red Ball Transit Co., 344 Ill. 534, 538-39 (1931).
	According to the dissent, even if Sabo & Zahn is deemed to be
Holabird & Root's agent, summary judgment was appropriately granted
to Holabird & Root because Sabo & Zahn acted outside the scope of its
authority. 312 Ill. App. 3d at 199 (Hoffman, P.J., dissenting). The dissent
reasoned:
			"[T]he general retention of an attorney to do all things
necessary to pursue a claim should, as a matter of law, be
interpreted as authorizing the attorney only to do all things legal
and proper to pursue the claim and should not be construed,
without more, as giving the attorney direction or permission to
commit a tortious act. Where there is no evidence that the client
expressly or impliedly authorized, directed, knew of, or ratified
the alleged tortious conduct of its attorney, it should not be
presumed that, merely because the parties stand in the
relationship of attorney-client, the client intended or authorized
the tortious conduct or that the conduct was within the scope of
the attorney's duties." 312 Ill. App. 3d at 199-200 (Hoffman,
P.J., dissenting).
	Concerning the propriety of summary judgment, the dissent further
stated:
			"In this case, there is no evidence that the alleged tortious
content of the letters sent to the business associates and investors
of Horwitz Matthews was ordered or directed by Holabird &
Root, nor do I believe that there is any evidentiary material in the
record that creates a genuine issue of fact on the question of
whether the Holabird & Root defendants knew of the contents
of the letters before they were sent by Sabo & Zahn. [Jeffrey]
Case and [James] Baird, both Holabird & Root partners, denied
seeing the letters before they were sent. Their testimony
constitutes the only competent evidentiary material of record on
the issue since, as the appellate court points out, the most that
Sabo & Zahn is able to say is that no one at the firm can recall
whether the letters were shown to anyone at Holabird & Root
before they were sent." 312 Ill. App. 3d at 199 (Hoffman, P.J.,
dissenting).
	Holabird & Root now appeals.

ANALYSIS
	Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West
2000); Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal Hospital, 156 Ill. 2d 511,
517-18 (1993). Summary judgment should not be granted unless the right
of the moving party is clear and free from doubt. Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240 (1986). While the nonmoving party in a summary judgment
motion is not required to prove his or her case, the nonmovant must
present a factual basis arguably entitling that party to a judgment.
Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493,
517-18 (2000). We review de novo all cases involving summary
judgment. Espinoza v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 165 Ill. 2d 107,
113 (1995).
	Holabird & Root's arguments on appeal essentially follow the
reasoning expressed in Presiding Justice Hoffman's dissent. Initially,
Holabird & Root maintains that the specific factual situation in this case is
one of first impression for this court. Accordingly, Holabird & Root
contends that the cases cited by Horwitz Matthews and the appellate
court are inapposite and do not control the disposition.
	As we stated in Gomien v. Wear-Ever Aluminum, Inc., 50 Ill. 2d 19 (1971):
			"Generally, it is the law that a master is liable for the acts of
his servant committed within the scope of his employment; that
a principal is liable for the acts of his agent performed within the
scope of the agency; but neither is liable for the acts of an
independent contractor unless the act or omission causing harm
was pursuant to the order or direction of the principal or
employer, or unless under certain circumstances, the principal or
employer failed to exercise reasonable care in selecting a careful
and competent contractor." Gomien, 50 Ill. 2d  at 21.
In the attorney-client relationship, clients are generally bound by their
attorneys' acts or omissions during the course of the legal representation
that fall within the apparent scope of their attorneys' authority. See, e.g.,
Webster v. Hartman, 195 Ill. 2d 426, 433 n.1 (2001) ("this court has
long held that counsel must possess express consent or authorization to
compromise or settle a case"). Moreover, the attorney-client relationship
is a fiduciary relationship. See, e.g., In re Imming, 131 Ill. 2d 239, 252-53 (1989); In re Schuyler, 91 Ill. 2d 6, 11 (1982). As fiduciaries,
attorneys owe to their clients "the basic obligations of agency: loyalty and
obedience." Restatement (Second) of Agency §14N, Comment a, at 80
(1958). Nonetheless, this case does not involve an attorney's duty to a
client, but rather an attorney's duty to a third party. Thus, Holabird &
Root has accurately pointed out that there is no Illinois decision addressing
whether clients may be held liable for their attorneys' alleged intentional
torts against a third party undertaken without the direction or knowledge
of the client.
	In Flight Kitchen, Inc. v. Chicago Seven-Up Bottling Co., 22 Ill.
App. 3d 558 (1974), heavily relied upon by Horwitz Mathews, the
plaintiff filed an action to recover damages allegedly suffered by reason of
an averred trespass to its property by the defendant's attorney. In
enforcing a judgment rendered on behalf of the plaintiff against a third
party, the attorney wrongfully directed the sheriff to levy against the
property of an innocent third party. The client was fully aware of the levy
against the wrong party. In fact, the client executed a bond to institute the
levy proceeding. Thus, the misconduct engaged in by the attorney was
committed with the full knowledge and direction of the client. Flight
Kitchen, 22 Ill. App. 3d at 563. That is not the case here. A factual
scenario more clearly on point was presented in a case cited by Holabird
& Root, In re Berry Publishing Services, Inc., 231 B.R. 676 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1999).
	In Berry, a party attempted to purchase a bankruptcy debtor's
interest in certain assets at a court-approved sale. The purchaser later
commenced a cause of action against the bankruptcy trustee and the
trustee's attorney, alleging tortious interference with the purchaser's
contracts or prospective business relationships. The claims stemmed from
a letter sent by the trustee's attorney without the knowledge of the trustee
to several of the purchaser's clients, opining that the purchaser had not
actually acquired the assets at issue. In addition to recovery against the
trustee's attorney, the purchaser also sought recovery against the trustee
premised upon an agency law theory of vicarious liability. The bankruptcy
court held that the purchaser could not recover from the trustee on such
a theory. Berry, 231 B.R.  at 682.
	Applying Illinois law, the court held that a principal is not liable for an
agent's torts, provided the agent is not an employee of the principal.
Berry, 231 B.R.  at 682, citing Anderson v. Marathon Petroleum Co.,
801 F.2d 936, 938 (7th Cir. 1986), citing Gomien, 50 Ill. 2d  at 21.
According to the Berry court, although the attorney-client relationship is
governed by agency principles, the attorney is considered a classic
independent contractor. Berry, 231 B.R.  at 682, citing Hoffman &
Morton Co. v. American Insurance Co., 35 Ill. App. 2d 97, 102-03
(1962). The Berry court specifically relied on the following passage of the
Seventh Circuit's opinion in Anderson:
		" 'The reason for distinguishing the independent contractor from
the employee is that, by definition of the relationship between a
principal and an independent contractor, the principal does not
supervise the details of the independent contractor's work and
therefore is not in a good position to prevent negligent
performance, whereas the essence of the contractual relationship
known as employment is that the employee surrenders to the
employer the right to direct the details of his work, in exchange
for receiving a wage. The independent contractor commits
himself to providing a specified output, and the principal monitors
the contractor's performance not by monitoring inputs-i.e.,
supervising the contractor-but by inspecting the contractually
specified output to make sure it conforms to the specifications.' "
Berry, 231 B.R.  at 682, quoting Anderson, 801 F.2d  at 938.
The Berry court concluded that there was no authority to depart from this
rule in cases concerning an attorney-client relationship. Berry, 231 B.R. 
at 681.
	The courts of our sister states are, however, divided on the issue of
imposing vicarious liability for the actions of attorneys. In some
jurisdictions, the courts find no vicarious liability. See Baldasarre v.
Butler, 132 N.J. 278, 625 A.2d 458 (1993) (an innocent client should
not be held vicariously liable for the wrongful conduct of his or her
attorney if the client does not direct, advise, consent to or participate in the
attorney's improper conduct); Lynn v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 3d 346, 225 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1986); Plant v. Trust Co. of Columbus,
168 Ga. App. 909, 310 S.E.2d 745 (1983); see also Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Protective National Insurance Co., 631 So. 2d 305 (Fla.
App. 1993) (an insurance company is not vicariously liable for the
malpractice of the attorney it selects to defend the insured); Brown v.
Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 90 N.C. App. 464, 369 S.E.2d 367 (1988), aff'd, 326 N.C. 387, 390 S.E.2d 150 (1990) (since
attorneys employed by insurance company were independent contractors,
their negligence, was not imputable to insurance company); Feliberty v.
Damon, 72 N.Y.2d 112, 120, 527 N.E.2d 261, 265, 531 N.Y.S.2d 778, 782 (1988) (vicarious liability produces an untenable result where on
the one hand a party is prohibited from conducting the litigation or
controlling the decisions of the attorney and on the other hand that party
is charged with responsibility for the lawyer's day-to-day independent
professional judgments). Other jurisdictions impose vicariously liability,
holding the attorney-client relationship is a principal-agent relationship.
See Stumpf v. Continental Casualty Co., 102 Or. App. 302, 794 P.2d 1228 (1990); Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Wilson, 768 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (but see Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 76-77 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (client not automatically liable for tortious
conduct of attorney)); Peterson v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., N.A.,
296 Ark. 201, 753 S.W.2d 278 (1988); United Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Groen, 486 N.E.2d 571 (Ind. App. 1985);
Continental Insurance Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281
(Alaska 1980); Nyer v. Carter, 367 A.2d 1375 (Me. 1977).
	After careful consideration of this conflicting authority, we conclude
that when, as here, an attorney acts pursuant to the exercise of
independent professional judgment, he or she acts presumptively as an
independent contractor whose intentional misconduct may generally not
be imputed to the client, subject to factual exceptions. See Lynn, 180 Cal. App. 3d  at 348-49, 225 Cal. Rptr.  at 429. Individuals more often than
not seek the assistance of an attorney because they are unfamiliar with the
law and unable to perform the work themselves. See slip op. at 25
(McMorrow, C.J., dissenting, joined by Garman, J.). Therefore, an
attorney usually pursues a client's legal rights without specific direction
from the client, using independent professional judgment to determine the
manner and form of the work.
	An independent contractor is defined by the level of control over the
manner of work performance. Hartley v. Red Ball Transit Co., 344 Ill. 534, 539 (1931).
		"An independent contractor is one who undertakes to produce
a given result but in the actual execution of the work is not under
the orders or control of the person for whom he does the work
but may use his own discretion in things not specified *** [and]
without his being subject to the orders of the [person for whom
the work is done] in respect to the details of the work." Hartley,
344 Ill.  at 539.
That someone is an independent contractor does not bar the attachment
of vicarious liability for her actions if she is also an agent. See Petrovich
v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 17, 31 (1999) ("[a]s
a general rule, no vicarious liability exists for the actions of independent
contractors. Vicarious liability may nevertheless be imposed for the actions
of independent contractors where an agency relationship is established").
A person may be both an independent contractor and an agent with the
authority both to control the details of the work and also "the power to act
for and to bind the principal in business negotiations within the scope of
[the] agency." See Hoffman & Morton Co. v. American Insurance Co.,
35 Ill. App. 2d 97, 103 (1962). As a general rule, attorneys fit squarely
within this category. Nonetheless, when attorneys act pursuant to the
exercise of independent professional judgment, they possess such
considerable autonomy over the details and manner of performing their
work that they are presumptively independent contractors for purposes of
imposing vicarious liability. Accordingly, where a plaintiff seeks to hold a
client vicariously liable for the attorney's allegedly intentional tortious
conduct, a plaintiff must prove facts demonstrating either that the client
specifically directed, controlled, or authorized the attorney's precise
method of performing the work or that the client subsequently ratified acts
performed in the exercise of the attorney's independent judgment. If there
is no evidence that the client directed, controlled, authorized, or ratified the
attorney's allegedly tortious conduct, no vicarious liability can attach.
	Here, the record contains no evidence that the content of the
allegedly tortious letters was directed, controlled, or authorized by
Holabird & Root. Nor is there any evidentiary material in the record
creating a genuine issue of fact on the question of whether Holabird &
Root knew of the contents of the letters before they were sent by Sabo &
Zahn. The evidence deposition testimony relied on by the appellate court
does not raise a question concerning this issue. That Sabo & Zahn
believed that the firm was performing the task it had been hired to
accomplish does not address the issue of whether Holabird & Root knew
of the letters or the letters' content. Similarly, James W. Baird's
statements that the letters indicated that the law firm was pursuing the fee
in an "aggressive way" and that the firm was "serving them as their clients"
does not contradict his testimony that he was unaware of the letters until
after the letters were sent. The only evidence in the record concerning the
contents of the letters is deposition testimony indicating that Sabo & Zahn
agreed not to disclose the tax information to anyone outside its law firm.
Accordingly, there was no question of fact raised as to whether Holabird
& Root authorized, directed, or controlled the content of the letters.
	Turning to the parties' final argument, ratification of an unauthorized
act is tantamount to an original authorization and confirms what was
originally unauthorized. Jones v. Beker, 260 Ill. App. 3d 481, 485
(1994). The principle behind the doctrine of ratification is that the person
ratifying secures a benefit through the actions of another who is acting on
his behalf with apparent or implied authority. Swader v. Golden Rule
Insurance Co., 203 Ill. App. 3d 697, 704-05 (1990). If there is no
benefit, ratification will not be implied. Jones, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 485; see
also Stathis v. Geldermann, Inc., 295 Ill. App. 3d 844, 858 (1998)
(ratification may be inferred from surrounding circumstances, including
long-term acquiescence, after notice, to the benefits of an allegedly
unauthorized transaction). The record in this case is devoid of any
suggestion that could support an inference Holabird & Root benefitted in
any way from Sabo & Zahn's alleged interference with the business
relationships of Horwitz Matthews. Without a question of fact concerning
whether Holabird & Root derived a benefit from the allegedly tortious
letters, there could be no ratification and summary judgment was
appropriately granted to Holabird & Root.
	In rendering our holding, we acknowledge that attorneys remain
bound by strong ethical obligations to their clients and that the attorney-client relationship is fiduciary in nature. As a fiduciary relationship, there
are a myriad of circumstances where attorneys act as agents for their
clients. The situation at hand is simply not one of them. We further
acknowledge that our holding conflicts with the comment following section
253 of the Restatement of Agency:
			"The principal is liable [for its agent's conduct] only if [that]
conduct *** is, in part at least, to carry out the purposes of the
principal. The situation most frequently aris[es] *** [when] an
attorney at law tortiously institutes or continues civil or criminal
proceedings, or is guilty of oppressive or wrongful conduct
during the course of the proceedings, in order that he may
enforce a claim of the principal. The fact that the attorney is
subject to discipline by the court does not prevent the client from
being liable for his conduct." Restatement (Second) of Agency
§253, Comment a (1958).
We disagree with the Restatement's discounting that attorneys are
constrained by certain court-imposed ethical considerations that serve to
distance their behavior from their clients. Attorneys cannot blindly follow
their clients' directions, even if those directions are particular and express,
if doing so would require them to violate their ethical obligations. See 134
Ill. 2d R. 1.1 et seq. (Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct). In
representing a client, Rule 2.1 mandates that a lawyer exercise
independent professional judgment. 134 Ill. 2d R. 2.1. The rules of legal
ethics are aimed at protecting the attorney-client relationship, maintaining
public confidence in the legal profession, and ensuring the integrity of
judicial proceedings. SK Handtool Corp. v. Dresser Industries, Inc.,
246 Ill. App. 3d 979, 989 (1993). A lawyer is prohibited under Rule
1.2(f) from acting on behalf of a client in any manner that serves merely to
harass or maliciously injure another. 134 Ill. 2d R. 1.2(f). An intentional
tort as alleged here would arguably fall within the parameters of the type
of behavior prohibited by Rule 1.2(f). Further, Rule 1.2(i) provides that
"[w]hen a lawyer knows that a client expects assistance not permitted by
these Rules or other law, the lawyer shall consult with the client regarding
the relevant limitations on the lawyer's conduct." 134 Ill. 2d R. 1.2(i).
Similarly, Rule 1.16(a)(1) states that a lawyer representing a client before
a tribunal shall withdraw from employment if: "(1) the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that the client is bringing the legal action,
conducting the defense, or asserting a position in the litigation, or is
otherwise having steps taken, merely for the purpose of harassing or
maliciously injuring any person." 134 Ill. 2d R. 1.16(a)(1).
	The preamble to the Rules of Professional Conduct likewise
emphasizes the weighty obligations attorneys undertake in the practice of
law:
			"The practice of law is a public trust. Lawyers are the trustees
of the system by which citizens resolve disputes among
themselves, punish and deter crime, and determine their relative
rights and responsibilities toward each other and their
government. Lawyers therefore are responsible for ***
maintaining public confidence in the system of justice by acting
competently and with loyalty to the best interests of their clients;
by working to improve that system to meet the challenges of a
rapidly changing society; and by defending the integrity of the
judicial system against those who would corrupt, abuse or
defraud it." 134 Ill. 2d Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct,
Preamble, at 470.
	Were we to hold otherwise, we would in effect compel clients in
similar cases to oversee or micromanage every action taken by their
attorneys during the course of the attorney-client relationship, and obligate
clients to take control of their representation at the slightest hint of
potentially wrongful conduct on the part of their attorneys. See Bradt v.
West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 76-77 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); see also slip op. at
31 (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting, joined by Garman, J.). Such close
monitoring would be impossible for most clients. See Bradt, 892 S.W.2d
at 76-77; see also slip op. at 30 (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting, joined by
Garman, J.). Moreover, most clients are not qualified to undertake that
type of monitoring. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 647,
8 L. Ed. 2d 734, 747, 82 S. Ct. 1386, 1397 (1962) (Black, J., dissenting,
joined by Warren, C.J.) (it cannot be said that there is a duty for a client
to try to supervise the daily professional services of the attorney); see also
slip op. at 30 (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting, joined by Garman, J.). The
obligation to supervise an attorneys' conduct would make plaintiffs
reluctant to file suit and make defendants hesitant to defend themselves
vigorously. See Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 76-77 (Tex. Ct. App.
1994); see also slip op. at 30-31 (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting, joined by
Garman, J.). This would not only chill the willingness of Illinois citizens to
vindicate their legal rights, "it would make them ultimately responsible for
their own legal representation-the very act for which they hire an attorney
in the first place." Bradt, 892 S.W.2d at 76-77; see also slip op. at 31
(McMorrow, C.J., dissenting, joined by Garman, J.).
	Given our holding that Sabo & Zahn was acting as an independent
contractor of Holabird & Root, and not an agent, when it sent the
allegedly tortious letters, we need not address the parties' arguments
concerning whether Sabo & Zahn acted outside the scope of its authority
because an employer has no right to control the manner of performance
used by an independent contractor. See Hartley v. Red Ball Transit Co.,
344 Ill. 534, 538-39 (1931).
	The misunderstanding of this opinion apparent in both dissents
prompts us to respond to several issues. First, Justice Freeman's dissent
is based on the errant notion that, because an individual may be both an
independent contractor and an agent, an attorney is at all times both.
Second, according to Justice Freeman's dissent, Petrovich overruled
Gomien. The dissent is wrong on both counts. In Petrovich, a patient
who was a member of a health maintenance organization (HMO) sued the
HMO for medical malpractice, alleging that the HMO was vicariously
liable for the conduct of the participating physician who had treated her.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the HMO and the patient
appealed. The appellate court reversed and remanded. Petrovich v.
Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc., 296 Ill. App. 3d 849 (1998). This
court affirmed, holding that an HMO may be held vicariously liable for the
negligence of its independent contractor physicians under the doctrines of
apparent authority and implied authority. Petrovich, 188 Ill. 2d  at 31-52.
In order for vicarious liability to attach for an independent contractor's
actions in such situations, there must either be: (1) a "holding out," meaning
that the HMO, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that the physician who was alleged to be
negligent was an agent or employee of the HMO (Petrovich, 188 Ill. 2d
at 34); or (2) facts and circumstances showing that the defendant exerted
sufficient control over the alleged agent so as to negate that person's status
as an independent contractor (Petrovich, 188 Ill. 2d at 42). Neither
theory to overcome independent contractor status was raised by the
plaintiffs before this court or before the trial court. Therefore, Petrovich
is of no avail to plaintiffs here. Moreover, contrary to the dissent's
assertion, Gomien remains good law. Unless Petrovich is satisfied, there
is, generally, no vicarious liability for an independent contractor's actions.
	Third, Justice Freeman's invocation of Rankin v. Heidlebaugh, 321
Ill. App. 3d 255, 266-67 (2001), is likewise ineffective. Rankin involved
the potential vicarious liability of an organization, Equip for Equality (EFE),
for the actions of one of its attorney employees and had absolutely nothing
to do with the potential vicarious liability of a client for the conduct of
retained counsel. Fourth, the other Illinois cases cited in Justice Freeman's
dissent do not run counter to our opinion. For example, as discussed
previously, Flight Kitchen involved misconduct engaged in by an attorney
with the full knowledge and direction of the client. Flight Kitchen, 22 Ill.
App. 3d at 563. Moreover, in Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512 (1998),
Doyle v. Shlensky, 120 Ill. App. 3d 807 (1983), and Danforth v.
Checker Taxi Co., 114 Ill. App. 2d 471 (1969), vicarious liability for an
attorney's actions was not at issue.
	Fifth, Justice Freeman's dissent asserts that we rely too heavily on
Berry because it was "wrongly decided," contradicts Petrovich, and
relies on Anderson, a case that has nothing to do with attorneys. We
acknowledge that the Berry court's statement, "a principal is not liable for
an agents' [sic] torts," taken out of context, contradicts Petrovich. That
statement, however, was made in relation to a discussion distinguishing
between an independent contractor and an employee for the purposes of
imposing vicarious liability.
	Sixth, Justice Freeman's dissent expresses concern that several of the
foreign jurisdiction cases that we have cited with approval are insurance
cases. Unfortunately, it is often not possible to find factual scenarios
directly on point when deciding a particular issue. In such cases, general
propositions of law are often taken from factually similar cases and applied
to the scenario at hand. That the dissenter frowns on this practice is of no
consequence.
	Finally, the misunderstanding of our holding apparent in Justice
Freeman's dissent can be most vividly seen in the statement that "the
majority disavows basic black-letter principles of agency law when it
holds that principals are not liable for their agents' conduct within the
scope and in the service of the agency." Slip op. at 41 (Freeman, J.,
dissenting). We are not disavowing black-letter agency law. We
acknowledge that principals are liable for their agents' conduct within the
scope and in the service of the agency. Irrespective of this principle, we
hold that an attorney can be both an independent contractor and an agent,
but regarding particular conduct is either one or the other, not both. Thus,
there is no basis for the straw man "distinction" drawn by the dissent
between a "normal agent" and an attorney. Slip op. at 42 (Freeman, J.,
dissenting). In the case at bar, plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that there
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Sabo & Zahn was
acting as the agent of Holabird & Root when it engaged in the allegedly
tortious conduct. Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that
Holabird & Root was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
	Additionally, Chief Justice McMorrow's dissent is precariously close
to agreeing with the majority opinion. Chief Justice McMorrow plainly
agrees with our answer to the central question presented by this appeal:
whether, and if so, to what extent, clients may be held vicariously liable for
the intentional torts of their attorneys. Her dissent, like the majority
opinion, answers that question in the affirmative, qualifying that answer in
essentially the same manner as the majority: "In order to hold a client liable
for the intentional torts of the client's attorney, a plaintiff would be required
to produce evidence that the client authorized, directed, had knowledge
of or ratified the attorney's misconduct." Slip op. at 34 (McMorrow, C.J.,
dissenting, joined by Garman, J.). Moreover, we agree with Chief Justice
McMorrow that it cannot be presumed an intentional tort as alleged here,
or, for that matter, any other illegal or unethical act, lies within the scope
of the attorney-client relationship. Slip op. at 34 (McMorrow, C.J.,
dissenting, joined by Garman, J.). We further agree that it should be
presumed, as a matter of public policy, that clients hire attorneys to pursue
legal remedies in a legal and ethical manner; and that, since attorneys stand
in a fiduciary relationship to their clients and are officers of the court,
clients are reasonably justified in expecting that their attorneys will
represent them ethically and within the bounds of the law. Slip op. at 34
(McMorrow, C.J., dissenting, joined by Garman, J.).
	Chief Justice McMorrow parts company with the majority by her
agreement with Justice Freeman that an attorney is both an agent and an
independent contractor at all times, even when the attorney allegedly
commits an intentional tort and there is no proof that the client directed,
controlled, authorized, or ratified the attorney's conduct. In order to avoid
Justice Freeman's conclusion that a client, in every instance, is vicariously
liable for retained counsel's intentionally tortious actions committed within
the scope of the agency (see Restatement (Second) of Agency §216,
Comment a (1958); accord Peddinghaus v. Peddinghaus, 314 Ill. App.
3d 900, 904 (2000); Letsos v. Century 21-New West Realty, 285 Ill.
App. 3d 1056, 1069 (1996)), Chief Justice McMorrow distinguishes
attorneys from all other types of agents and carves out an exception to the
vicarious liability rule based on that distinction. While Chief Justice
McMorrow's position is not completely untenable, we believe that our
opinion presents the more reasoned approach. Rather than fashion a
wholesale exception to the agency rules for attorneys, we merely
distinguish situations in the attorney-client relationship where, as here,
vicarious liability is claimed by a third party for the alleged intentional
tortious conduct of the attorney.
	Moreover, contrary to Chief Justice McMorrow's protestations, our
holding in this case does not alter the core relationship between the
attorney and client. Nor does it impact the ability of an attorney to bind his
or her client in a traditional, representational context. See In re Marriage
of Marr, 264 Ill. App. 3d 932, 935 (1994) ("Generally, a client is bound
by the acts or omissions of his attorney within the scope of the attorney's
authority"). We continue to affirm the long-standing principles of an
attorney's fiduciary obligations and ethical responsibilities to a client that
exist at all times during the representational relationship. See Imming, 131 Ill. 2d  at 252; Schuyler, 91 Ill. 2d  at 11; see also 134 Ill. 2d R. 1.1 et
seq. (Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct). Rather, this opinion must be
understood as limited to the narrow scope of vicarious liability claims
against a client based upon an attorney's alleged intentional tortious
conduct.
	
CONCLUSION 	 	
	For the above-stated reasons, we hold generally that attorneys may
be both independent contractors and agents but, regarding specific
conduct, are either one or the other. We further hold that for purposes of
imposing vicarious liability for allegedly tortious conduct, when attorneys
act pursuant to independent professional judgment, they are presumptively
independent contractors whose alleged misconduct may not be imputed
to their clients, unless it is shown that the client directed, controlled,
authorized, or ratified the alleged misconduct. Since there was no genuine
issue of material fact presented regarding whether Holabird & Root
directed, controlled, authorized, or ratified the allegedly tortious conduct
of Sabo & Zahn, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and
affirm the judgment of circuit court of Cook County granting summary
judgment to Holabird & Root.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW, dissenting:
	This appeal presents an important issue of first impression for this
court: whether, and if so, to what extent, clients may be held vicariously
liable for the intentional torts of their attorneys. The majority holds that
attorneys are nonagent independent contractors whose intentional
misconduct may not be imputed to the client, unless a plaintiff proves facts
demonstrating either "that the client specifically directed, controlled, or
authorized the attorney's precise method of performing the work or that
the client subsequently ratified acts performed in the exercise of the
attorney's independent judgment." Slip op. at 9. Applying this rule to the
facts before it, the majority also holds that the circuit court properly
granted summary judgment to the client, Holabird & Root, finding that
there was no evidence giving rise to a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Holabird & Root authorized, directed, had prior knowledge of,
or ratified the allegedly tortious conduct of its attorneys, Sabo & Zahn.
	I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority. It is my view
that the appellate court below was correct in determining that an agency
relationship exists between an attorney and client. It is also my position
that the appellate court correctly held that, under the facts presented in this
cause, summary judgment was improperly granted by the circuit court
because there exists a genuine issue of material fact both with respect to
whether Sabo & Zahn was acting within the scope of its authority when
it engaged in the allegedly tortious conduct, and whether Holabird & Root
subsequently ratified the conduct of Sabo & Zahn. I would arrive at this
conclusion, however, somewhat differently than the appellate court below.
	The central issue presented in this case reaches the core of the
relationship between an attorney and a client: to what extent can an
attorney bind his or her client for the actions taken by the attorney? In
order to answer this question, it is necessary to briefly review basic
principles of the law of agency, and the differences between an "agent"
and an "independent contractor." In general, an agency relationship is
characterized by a fiduciary affiliation between two individuals in which the
principal exercises some degree of control over the conduct of the agent,
and the agent has the power to act on behalf of the principal. Restatement
(Second) of Agency §1 (1958); see also 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency §§1, 2
(1986). Section 2 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency defines an
independent contractor as "a person who contracts with another to do
something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the
other's right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the
performance of the undertaking." Restatement (Second) of Agency §2(3)
(1958). Notably, section 2 of the Restatement also provides that an
independent contractor "may or may not be an agent." Restatement
(Second) of Agency §2(3) (1958). Thus, under the Restatement, the
concept of an "independent contractor" and "agent" are not mutually
exclusive. The comments to section 2 of the Restatement explain that,
generally, an "agent who is not a servant is *** an independent contractor
when he contracts to act on account of the principal." Restatement
(Second) of Agency §2, Comment b, at 13 (1958). However, "not all
independent contractors are agents." Restatement (Second) of Agency
§2, Comment b, at 14 (1958). For example, "one who contracts for a
stipulated price to build a house for another and who reserves no direction
over the conduct of the work is an independent contractor; but he is not
an agent, since he is not a fiduciary, has no power to make the one
employing him a party to the transaction, and is subject to no control
over his conduct." (Emphasis added.) Restatement (Second) of Agency
§2, Comment b, at 14 (1958).
	Thus, a fundamental distinguishing characteristic between an agent
and an independent contractor is that an agent stands in a fiduciary
position with respect to the principal, whereas an independent contractor
is not a fiduciary of the principal. "The agency relation results if, but only
if, there is an understanding between the parties which *** creates a
fiduciary relation in which the fiduciary is subject to the directions of the
one on whose account he acts." Restatement (Second) of Agency §1,
Comment b, at 9 (1958); see also Restatement (Second) of Agency §13,
Comment b, at 59 (1958) ("The fact that an agent is subject to ***
fiduciary duties distinguishes him from other persons who have power to
affect the interests of others; and the understanding that one is to act
primarily for the benefit of another is often the determinative feature in
distinguishing the agency relation from other relations").
	Section 14N of the Restatement (Second) of Agency more clearly
states the concept that an individual may be characterized as both an
agent and an independent contractor. This section provides that "[o]ne
who contracts to act on behalf of another and subject to the other's
control except with respect to his physical conduct is an agent and also an
independent contractor." Restatement (Second) of Agency §14N (1958).
Particularly relevant to the matter before us, the comment to section 14N
discusses the dual roles that an attorney plays during the representation of
a client. Comment a to section 14N explains that "most of the persons
known as agents, that is *** attorneys *** are independent contractors
as that term is used in the Restatement of this Subject, since they are
contractors but, although employed to perform services, are not subject
to the control or right to control of the principal with respect to their
physical conduct in the performance of the services." (Emphasis added.)
Restatement (Second) of Agency §14N, Comment a, at 80 (1958). The
comment goes on to explain that, even though attorneys may be
considered independent contractors, they nevertheless also "fall within the
category of agents," because "[t]hey are fiduciaries; they owe to the
principal the basic obligations of agency: loyalty and obedience."
Restatement (Second) of Agency §14N, Comment a, at 80 (1958).
	Whether an attorney is characterized as an agent or an independent
contractor affects the vicarious liability of the client for the attorney's
conduct. A principal is liable for the acts of an agent committed within the
scope of the agent's authority. Brubakken v. Morrison, 240 Ill. App. 3d
680, 686 (1992). Conversely, no vicarious liability exists for the conduct
of independent contractors. Petrovich, 188 Ill. 2d  at 31. However,
"[v]icarious liability may nevertheless be imposed for the actions of
independent contractors where an agency relationship is established."
Petrovich, 188 Ill. 2d  at 31.
	 Although the majority correctly acknowledges that an attorney may
simultaneously be an agent and an independent contractor (slip op. at 9),
the majority nevertheless incorrectly holds that "regarding particular
conduct [an attorney] is either one or the other, but not both" (slip op. at
15). Based upon the apparent, yet incorrect, premise that the concept of
an "agent" and an "independent contractor" are mutually exclusive, the
majority concludes that "when attorneys act pursuant to the exercise of
independent professional judgment, they possess such considerable
autonomy over the details and manner of performing their work that they
are presumptively independent contractors for purposes of imposing
vicarious liability." Slip op. at 9. The majority justifies this holding by
reasoning that although an attorney is vested with a classic hallmark of an
agent- " 'the power to act for and to bind the principal in business
negotiations within the scope of [the] agency' " (slip op. at 9, quoting
Hoffman & Morton Co. v. American Insurance Co., 35 Ill. App. 2d
97, 103 (1962))-an attorney is not an agent because he or she is also an
independent contractor who "acts pursuant to the exercise of independent
professional judgment." Slip op. at 9. The majority concludes that,
"presumptively," unless it is shown otherwise, an attorney is not an agent
at all. In my opinion, the majority's holding is inconsistent with fundamental
principals of agency law, as set forth above, which provide that: (1) the
concepts of "agent" and "independent contractor" are not mutually
exclusive; and (2) while the relationship of an attorney to a client may be
characterized, in some respects, as that of an independent contractor, it
nevertheless remains a relationship of agency to the extent that an attorney
is a fiduciary to the client.
	Under the majority's holding, an Illinois attorney, when acting
"pursuant to independent professional judgment," is now considered a
nonagent independent contractor. See slip op. at 17. The comments to
section 14N of the Restatement (Second) of Agency define a "non-agent
independent contractor" as an individual "who contracts to accomplish
something for another or to deliver something to another, but who is not
acting as a fiduciary for the other." (Emphasis added.) Restatement
(Second) of Agency §14N, Comment b, at 80-81 (1958). I cannot agree
with the majority's apparent position that, as of today, the attorney-client
relationship in Illinois is now simply a relationship wherein an attorney,
when "acting pursuant to independent professional judgment," is an
independent contractor who does not act as a fiduciary for the client, and
who, therefore, neither stands in a position of confidence or trust with
respect to the client, nor owes a duty of loyalty or obedience to the client.
I cannot support such a result.
	For almost a century, this court has repeatedly held that, as a matter
of law, the existence of an attorney-client relationship creates a fiduciary
relationship between those parties. E.g., In re Imming, 131 Ill. 2d 239,
252-53 (1989); In re Schuyler, 91 Ill. 2d 6, 11 (1982); Gaffney v,
Harmon, 405 Ill. 273, 277 (1950); People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n
v. Charone, 288 Ill. 220, 228 (1919). Indeed, the majority readily
acknowledges that the relationship between a client and an attorney is
fiduciary in nature. See slip op. at 6 ("the attorney-client relationship is a
fiduciary relationship"); slip op. at 15 ("attorneys stand in a fiduciary
relationship to their clients"). It is well settled that a fiduciary relationship
is an agency relationship. Latimer v. Perry, 410 Ill. 119, 128 (1951);
American Environmental, Inc. v. 3-J Co., 222 Ill. App. 3d 242, 249
(1991). When two parties enter into an agency relationship, "the principal
has the right to control the conduct of the agent and the agent has the
power to affect the legal relations of the principal." Taylor v. Kohli, 162 Ill. 2d 91, 95 (1994). Indeed, it is precisely because an attorney stands in
a fiduciary relationship to the client that the attorney has the power to act
for and to bind the client to matters within the scope of the attorney's
agency. Restatement (Second) of Agency §1, Comment e (1958); see
also In re Marriage of Marr, 264 Ill. App. 3d 932, 935 (1994)
("Generally, a client is bound by the acts or omissions of his attorney
within the scope of the attorney's authority"); Hoffman & Morton Co. v.
American Insurance Co., 35 Ill. App. 2d 97, 102-03 (1962) (an agent,
"[w]hen properly authorized *** makes contracts or other negotiations of
a business nature on behalf of the principal, by which his principal is
bound").
	Despite acknowledging, as it must, that an attorney-client relationship
creates a fiduciary relationship between those parties, the majority
nevertheless holds that, when an attorney exercises "independent
professional judgment," the attorney's status automatically shifts from that
of an agent of the client to an independent contractor. In other words, in
the view of the majority, an attorney is no longer an agent of the client,
even though he or she always stands in a fiduciary relationship to the client,
when the attorney acts pursuant to "independent professional judgment."
This reasoning is in error. An attorney's exercise of "independent
professional judgment" is the very essence of the attorney's relationship
to the client. Indeed, Rule 2.1 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct
mandates that, "[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise
independent professional judgment and render candid advice." 134 Ill. 2d
R. 2.1.Therefore, because an attorney is required to exercise independent
professional judgment during the course of representation of a client, the
majority's holding leads to the conclusion that an attorney is a non-agent
independent contractor throughout the duration of the client's
representation.
	The majority assures that its holding today neither "alter[s] the core
relationship between the attorney and client" nor "impact[s] the ability of
an attorney to bind his or her client in a traditional representational
context." Slip op. at 16. I disagree. The flaws inherent in the majority's
protestations are apparent from the majority's statement that it
"continue[s] to affirm the long-standing principles of an attorney's fiduciary
obligations," and the majority's citation to case law holding that " 'a client
is bound by the acts or omissions of his attorney within the scope of the
attorney's authority.' " Slip op. at 21-22, quoting In re Marriage of
Marr, 254 Ill. App. 3d 932, 935 (1994). As set forth above, a fiduciary
obligation arises from an agency relationship, a relationship which the
majority today holds is nonexistent when an attorney exercises
independent professional judgment. Similarly, any discussion of the "scope
of the attorney's authority" is defined by the scope of the attorney's
agency relationship with the client, a relationship which the majority has
found does not exist when an attorney exercises independent professional
judgment during the representation of a client.
	It is my position that, as a result of the majority's holding that during
the course of representing their clients Illinois attorneys are nonagent
independent contractors, the court's opinion today calls into question the
ability of attorneys to bind their clients in any legal or business dealings
conducted by the attorney on behalf of the client. As stated, it is by
operation of agency principles that an attorney has authority to bind a
client with respect to acts performed by the attorney within the scope of
the agency. It is foreseeable that a client, unhappy with a transaction,
would rely upon the majority's holding to argue that because his or her
attorney was merely an independent contractor, the client is not bound by
any actions that the attorney performed during the course of the legal
representation. Under the majority's holding, not only is the power of an
attorney to act on behalf of a client limited, but those third parties with
whom the attorney must deal may legitimately question whether the
attorney has the necessary authority to negotiate for and bind the client.
	In light of our own long-settled precedent which establishes that the
fiduciary relationship between an attorney and client renders an attorney
an agent of his or her client, there is considerable cause to question the
basis of the majority's holding in this case that because an attorney is an
independent contractor, the attorney, therefore, is not an agent of the
client. Review of the majority opinion, which not only effectively overrules
a long line of precedent, but also calls into question the ability of Illinois
attorneys to bind their clients to any matters the attorney engages in on the
client's behalf, appears to lead to the conclusion that this is a decision
aimed at achieving a particular result: the nonliability of a client, in
virtually every instance, for the intentional torts of the client's attorney.
	The majority attempts to somewhat ameliorate the result in this matter
in several ways. The majority repeatedly characterizes its holding that an
attorney is an independent contractor as a "presumption" limited to
vicarious liability claims against a client based upon an attorney's alleged
intentional tortious conduct. See, e.g., slip op. at 8 ("[W]e conclude that
when, as here, an attorney acts pursuant to the exercise of independent
professional judgment, he or she acts presumptively as an independent
contractor whose intentional misconduct may generally not be imputed to
the client, subject to factual exceptions"); slip op. at 9 ("when attorneys
act pursuant to the exercise of independent professional judgment, they
possess such considerable autonomy over the details and manner of
performing their work that they are presumptively independent contractors
for purposes of imposing vicarious liability"); slip op. at 17 ("[F]or
purposes of imposing vicarious liability for allegedly tortious conduct,
when attorneys act pursuant to independent professional judgment, they
are presumptively independent contractors whose alleged misconduct may
not be imputed to their clients"). The majority further holds that its
presumptive general rule of nonliability may be rebutted, and vicarious
liability can attach, if a plaintiff proves either that (1) the client specifically
directed, controlled or authorized the attorney's precise method of
performing the work, or (2) that the client subsequently ratified the
attorney's allegedly tortious acts. Slip op. at 17.
	Under the majority's view, then, it is only upon proof of either of
these two elements that an attorney becomes an agent of a client for
whose acts the client may be vicariously liable. It would follow, then, that
it would only be upon such proof that a client would be bound by the
conduct engaged in by his or her hired attorney, because only then would
the attorney be considered an agent of the client. As explained above, this
holding is contrary to basic black-letter principles of agency law, which
stand for the proposition that an attorney may be characterized,
simultaneously, as both an agent and an independent contractor. Under the
majority's holding, an attorney will never be an agent of his or her client,
as long as the attorney abides by professional standards of ethics and
satisfies his or her obligation to exercise "independent professional
judgment" during the representation of the client. In this way, the
majority's presumption effectively becomes irrebutable. In addition, by
holding that an attorney is not an agent when acting in accordance with his
or her independent professional judgment, the majority also calls into
question the fiduciary obligations which an attorney owes to a client as a
result of the agency relationship. By dispensing with the agency
relationship, the majority also dispenses with the attorney's fiduciary
obligations to the client.
	The difficulties which are apt to flow from the majority's holding
cannot be overstated. In addition to the several serious concerns I have
outlined above, I note that in practical application the majority's holding
will be unworkable, as the status of an attorney will constantly be in flux.
In apparent acknowledgment that its holding is problematic, the majority
attempts to explain the result in this case by stating that, "[a]s a fiduciary
relationship, there are a myriad of circumstances where attorneys act as
agents for their clients. The situation at hand is simply not one of them."
Slip op. at 11. This statement will do little to provide guidance to the
bench and bar in addressing similar cases in the future. To the contrary, it
will cause additional confusion. After holding that attorneys are nonagent
independent contractors, the majority backtracks and states that there are
"circumstances" where attorneys act as "agents." However, under the
majority's holding today, these undefined "circumstances" cannot include
actions where the attorney exercises his or her professional judgment, the
very reason why an individual retains an attorney's services in the first
place. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, I submit that the majority's
holding is untenable.
	I am, therefore, in agreement with the dissenting opinion filed by
Justice Freeman that the majority errs in holding that attorneys are
independent contractors to which traditional agency principles do not
apply. My position mirrors that of Justice Freeman to the extent that,
under application of basic principles of agency law and this court's own
precedent, an attorney is both an independent contractor and an agent for
his or her client. Accordingly, as the attorney-client relationship is one of
agency, it is proper to apply principles of agency law in resolving the
matter before us. Finally, I also am in agreement with Justice Freeman that
the majority relies upon inapposite and unpersuasive authority in arriving
at the opposite conclusion.
	I cannot join Justice Freeman's dissent, however, with respect to his
conclusion that, under agency law principles, a client, in every instance, is
vicariously liable for the intentionally tortious actions of his or her attorney
committed within the scope of the agency. It is my position that, as a
matter of public policy, a plaintiff who attempts to hold a client liable for
the intentional torts of that client's attorney must show more than the mere
existence of an attorney-client relationship. For the reasons set forth
below, I would hold that, because an attorney is readily distinguishable
from other agents, it should not be presumed that intentional, tortious acts
performed by an attorney automatically fall within the scope of the
attorney's agency. Rather, as a matter of public policy, it should be
presumed that a client hires an attorney to pursue legal remedies in a
lawful and ethical manner, and that because an attorney not only has a
fiduciary obligation to his or her client but is also an officer of the court, the
client is justified in expecting that any activities engaged in on the client's
behalf are ethical and within the bounds of the law. It is this presumption
which should set the parameters of an attorney's authority in his or her
representation of a client.
	Attorneys are unique agents. First, an attorney must be licensed by
the state, in accordance with both the Attorney Act (705 ILCS 205/0.01
et seq. (West 2002)), and the rules of this court. Although other
professions also have licensing requirements, attorneys, in addition to
meeting specific academic requirements and passing the bar examination,
must also be "of good moral character and general fitness to practice law."
188 Ill. 2d R. 701(a). In addition, an attorney is different from other
licensed professionals in that every person admitted to practice law as an
attorney in this state must take and subscribe the following oath: "I do
solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be), that I will support the
constitution of the United States and the constitution of the state of Illinois,
and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of attorney and
counselor at law to the best of my ability." 705 ILCS 205/4 (West 2002).
The taking of an oath is a condition precedent to the practice of law in this
state and is imposed by the legislature. In re Anastaplo, 3 Ill. 2d 471,
475 (1954).
	This court has repeatedly made clear that the practice of law is a
privilege and not a right. In re Anastaplo, 3 Ill. 2d  at 475. It is only upon
satisfaction of the above-enumerated requirements that an individual is
awarded a license to practice law. A license to practice law makes the
holder of that license an officer of the court. In re D'Angelo, 126 Ill. 2d 45, 56 (1988); In re Anastaplo, 3 Ill. 2d  at 475; In re Both, 376 Ill. 177,
182 (1941). This court has made it clear that, "a lawyer, as an officer of
the court, holds a position of public trust" (In re Anastaplo, 3 Ill. 2d at
478), and, as such, "an attorney's professional conduct must be above
reproach" (In re D'Angelo, 126 Ill. 2d at 56). Indeed, one court has
accurately described attorneys as having a "superior" agency status, due
to their unique roles as officers of the court and the heightened duty which
attaches to attorneys as a result of this "quasi-judicial status." Clark v.
Burden, 917 S.W.2d 574, 575 (Ky. 1996). In Clark, the Supreme
Court of Kentucky described the attorney-client relationship as follows:
			" 'The relationship is generally that of principal and agent;
however, the attorney is vested with powers superior to those of
any ordinary agent because of the attorney's quasi-judicial status
as an officer of the court; thus, the attorney is responsible for the
administration of justice in the public interest, a higher duty than
any ordinary agent owes his principal. Since the relationship of
attorney-client is one fiduciary in nature, the attorney has the duty
to exercise in all his relationships with this client-principal the
most scrupulous honor, good faith and fidelity to his client's
interest.' " Clark, 917 S.W.2d  at 575, quoting Daugherty v.
Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Ky. App. 1978).
	This court has similarly emphasized the heightened duty attendant to
attorneys as a result of the unique role attorneys play in our society. We
have stated that, because attorneys are officers of the court,
		 "it is their duty to aid in the establishment of truth and the due
administration of justice. [Citation.] When a license is granted to
one to practice law by this court he assumes grave
responsibilities, which only those worthy of trust and confidence
and possessed of absolute fidelity and honesty should bear.
Confidences are reposed in them; interests of great magnitude,
and even the life, liberty and character of their fellow-men, are
entrusted to their care. [Citation.] A license granted by this court
to practice is a guaranty that, so far as this court is advised, the
person holding such license is a fit and proper person to assume
the responsibilities, to enjoy and safe-keep the confidences of
others, and to aid and assist them in the care and management of
their legal business and affairs." People ex rel. Chicago Bar
Ass'n v. Czarnecki, 268 Ill. 278, 294 (1915).
See also People v. Shirley, 214 Ill. 142, 150-51 (1905). In other words,
"[t]he relation of the court and its attorneys to the people is one of high
responsibility, involving on the one hand complete trust and confidence
and on the other absolute fidelity and integrity." In re Both, 376 Ill.  at
182.
	The preamble to the Rules of Professional Conduct also emphasizes
the serious responsibilities attorneys undertake in the practice of law:
			"The practice of law is a public trust. Lawyers are the trustees
of the system by which citizens resolve disputes among
themselves, punish and deter crime, and determine their relative
rights and responsibilities toward each other and their
government. Lawyers therefore are responsible for ***
maintaining public confidence in the system of justice by acting
competently and with loyalty to the best interests of their clients;
by working to improve that system to meet the challenges of a
rapidly changing society; and by defending the integrity of the
judicial system against those who would corrupt, abuse or
defraud it." 134 Ill. 2d Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct,
Preamble, at 470.
Because the lawyer-client relationship is a fiduciary relationship based on
trust and confidence, "[s]uch confidence can only be maintained if the
lawyer acts competently and zealously pursues the client's interests within
the bounds of the law. 'Zealously' does not mean mindlessly or unfairly or
oppressively. Rather, it is the duty of all lawyers to seek resolution of
disputes at the least cost in time, expense and trauma to all parties and to
the courts." 134 Ill. 2d Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, Preamble,
at 472.
	To this end, the Rules of Professional Conduct provide a framework
for attorney conduct. For example, Rule 1.2(f)(1) states that a lawyer shall
not "file a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial or take
other action on behalf of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously
injure another." 134 Ill. 2d R. 1.2(f)(1). Rule 1.2(i) provides that "[w]hen
a lawyer knows that a client expects assistance not permitted by these
Rules or other law, the lawyer shall consult with the client regarding the
relevant limitations on the lawyer's conduct." 134 Ill. 2d R. 1.2(i). Indeed,
Rule 1.16(a)(1) states that "[a] lawyer representing a client before a
tribunal shall withdraw from employment (with permission of the tribunal
if such permission is required), and a lawyer representing a client in other
matters shall withdraw from employment, if: (1) the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that the client is bringing the legal action,
conducting the defense, or asserting a position in the litigation, or is
otherwise having steps taken, merely for the purpose of harassing or
maliciously injuring any person." 134 Ill. 2d R. 1.16(a)(1).
	Thus, as an officer of the court, an attorney has a heightened duty to
deal honestly and fairly with his or her client, with the court and with the
public. In obtaining a law license, an attorney takes an oath that he or she
will uphold the law, and in granting an attorney a license to practice law,
this court has determined that the attorney is a fit and proper person to
assume these heightened responsibilities. Accordingly, a client would be
justified in having a heightened expectation that his or her attorney will
represent the client in a manner that is fair, honest and ethical in all
respects. Therefore, I would hold that public policy dictates that the
ordinary rules of agency, which would make a client vicariously liable for
the intentional tortious actions of his or her attorney simply because of the
agency relationship which exists as a result of their attorney-client
relationship, should not apply to this unique agent. More specifically, I
believe that it should not be presumed that the allegedly tortious acts of the
attorney were done within the scope of the attorney's authority. Rather,
I believe that the most appropriate manner of resolving this issue was
proposed by Justice Hoffman, who submitted a separate opinion below.
Based upon the premise that attorneys are agents of their clients, Justice
Hoffman reasoned that
			"the general retention of an attorney to do all things necessary
to pursue a claim should, as a matter of law, be interpreted as
authorizing the attorney only to do all things legal and
proper to pursue the claim and should not be construed,
without more, as giving the attorney direction or permission to
commit a tortious act. Where there is no evidence that the client
expressly or impliedly authorized, directed, knew of, or ratified
the alleged tortious conduct of its attorney, it should not be
presumed that, merely because the parties stand in the
relationship of attorney/client, the client intended or authorized
the tortious conduct or that the conduct was within the scope of
the attorney's duties. The undesirable implications of a contrary
position seem rather obvious. Clients who in good faith employ
an attorney will be exposed to vicarious liability for the attorney's
tortious conduct when, as a practical matter, the client is in no
position to control the attorney's conduct." 312 Ill. App. 3d at
199 (Hoffman, P.J., dissenting).
	I would hold that, when assessing the liability of a client for the
tortious acts of the client's attorney, we should not presume that the scope
of the attorney's authority extends to encompass intentional misconduct.
To the contrary, as a matter of public policy, we should presume that: the
client hired the attorney to pursue legal remedies in a legal and ethical
manner; and that, because the attorney stands in a fiduciary relationship to
the client and is an officer of the court, the client is justified in expecting
that the attorney will represent the client ethically and within the bounds of
the law. It is this presumption that should define the scope of the
attorney's authority in representing the client. It would then be incumbent
upon the party seeking to hold the client liable to rebut this presumption
by producing evidence that the client authorized, directed, had knowledge
of or ratified the attorney's misconduct, so as to bring that misconduct
within the scope of the attorney's authority. It is well settled that "[t]he
client is not liable *** for acts of the attorney which are outside the scope
of the attorney's authority. Thus, a client is not responsible for any illegal
action taken or directed by his attorney which the client did not advise,
consent to, participate in, and which was not justified by any authority he
had given." 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client §190, at 309 (1980). The
proposed analysis which I employ serves not only to protect an innocent
client who hired an attorney in good faith who thereafter engaged in
misconduct not known to the client, but it would also allow a plaintiff to
hold vicariously liable those clients who authorized, directed, had
knowledge of or ratified the attorney's misconduct.
	A contrary result imposing vicarious liability upon a client in every
instance of intentional tortious misconduct by the client's attorney would
mean that clients would be forced to micromanage the conduct of their
attorneys. This would require that the client be appraised of every step
taken by the attorney during the course of the legal proceedings. It is
precisely because clients have no expertise in the law that they hire
attorneys for their specialized legal skill, and it would be manifestly unfair
to hold a client liable for the intentional torts of his or her attorney if the
client did not authorize or direct those actions, and if the client was
unaware of those actions. Indeed, "[m]ost clients cannot possibly monitor
their attorneys to the degree that would be required to meet such an
obligation, and most, clearly, are not qualified for such monitoring,
anyway. Imposing such an obligation on clients would, unjustly, make
plaintiffs reluctant to file suit, and defendants far too tentative about
defending themselves vigorously. This would not only chill the willingness
of *** citizens to vindicate their legal rights, it would make them ultimately
responsible for their own representation-the very act for which they hire
an attorney in the first place." Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 77 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1994).
	In the words of the majority, the holding set forth in its own opinion
is "precariously close" to agreeing with the position I take in this dissenting
opinion. According to the majority, it is in agreement with my position that
a client is not vicariously liable for the intentional torts of his or her attorney
unless the plaintiff proffers evidence that the client authorized, directed,
had knowledge of or ratified the attorney's misconduct. Slip op. at 17.
The majority also states that it agrees with my position "that it cannot be
presumed that an intentional tort as alleged here, or, for that matter, any
other illegal or unethical act, lies within the scope of the attorney-client
relationship." Slip op. at 15. The majority further states that it agrees with
my position that "it should be presumed, as a matter of public policy,  that
clients hire attorneys to pursue legal remedies in a legal and ethical
manner; and that, since attorneys stand in a fiduciary relationship to their
clients and are officers of the court, clients are reasonably justified in
expecting that their attorneys will represent them ethically and within the
bounds of law." Slip op. at 15-16.
	The majority states, however, that it departs from my position based
upon my agreement with Justice Freeman that "an attorney is both an
agent and an independent contractor at all times." Slip op. at 16. The
majority notes, however, that I, unlike Justice Freeman, "distinguish[ ]
attorneys from all other types of agents and carve[ ] out an exception to
the vicarious liability rule based on that distinction." Slip op. at 16.
Although, in the view of the majority, my position in this dissenting opinion
is "not completely untenable," the majority adheres to the belief that its
own opinion "presents the more reasoned approach." Slip op. at 16. The
majority arrives at this conclusion based upon the following reasoning:
"Rather than fashion a wholesale exception to the agency rules for
attorneys, we merely distinguish situations in the attorney-client
relationship where, as here, vicarious liability is claimed by a third party for
the alleged intentional tortious conduct of the attorney." Slip op. at 16.
	I respectfully submit that it is the majority which is unnecessarily and
improperly creating a wholesale change to the traditional laws of agency
with the issuance of its opinion. As explained above, the majority's holding
rests upon incorrect premises and uses reasoning which is sure to
engender confusion and uncertainty among the bench and bar. In contrast,
the proposed analysis which I employ does not attempt to alter the well-established black-letter principles of agency law, but, instead, seeks to
carve out a limited public policy exception to those traditional principles
when a plaintiff is seeking to hold a client liable for the intentional torts of
the client's attorney. As set forth above, my proposed analysis is straight-forward. As the attorney-client relationship is one of agency, it is proper
to apply principles of agency law in resolving the matter before us.
However, because an attorney is a unique agent, as a matter of public
policy it should be presumed that a client hires an attorney to pursue legal
remedies in a lawful and ethical manner, and, therefore, that only such
lawful actions fall within the scope of an attorney's authority in his or her
representation of a client. Accordingly, to hold a client vicariously liable
for the intentionally tortious acts of his or her attorney, a plaintiff must
proffer sufficient facts to establish that the client authorized, directed, had
knowledge of or ratified the attorney's misconduct, so as to bring that
misconduct within the scope of the attorney's authority.
	Applying my proposed analysis to the case at bar, I agree with the
appellate court below, and also with Justice Freeman's dissent, that there
are sufficient facts presented to withstand summary judgment. The
purpose of summary judgment is to determine whether there are any
genuine issues of material fact. Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240
(1986). The grant of summary judgment is appropriate where the
pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits and exhibits on file, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, establish that there
is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2002);
Petrovich, 188 Ill. 2d  at 31. Although summary judgment is to be
encouraged as an expeditious method of disposing of a lawsuit, it is a
drastic measure and should be allowed only when the right of the moving
party to judgment is free and clear from doubt. Olson v. Etheridge, 177 Ill. 2d 396, 404 (1997). A triable issue of fact exists where there is a
dispute as to a material fact or where, although the facts are not disputed,
reasonable minds could differ in drawing inferences from those facts.
Petrovich, 188 Ill. 2d  at 31. The standard of review in cases involving
summary judgment is de novo. Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance
Co., 183 Ill. 2d 342, 349 (1998).
	Unlike the majority, I cannot conclude that, as a matter of law,
Holabird & Root is not liable for the actions of its attorneys and therefore
entitled to summary judgment. A review of the record reveals that
sufficient evidence was presented by plaintiffs to give rise to a question of
fact as to whether Holabird & Root expressly or impliedly authorized,
directed, or knew of the alleged tortious conduct of its attorneys, Sabo &
Zahn. For example, the record reflects that during his deposition
testimony, a principal of Holabird & Root stated that the letters sent out
by Sabo & Zahn indicated to him that the law firm was pursuing the fee in
an "aggressive way" and that the firm was "serving them as their clients."
The record also reflects that in their depositions, attorneys of the Sabo &
Zahn firm stated that in sending out the letters, they were doing what they
were hired to do. In addition, in its motion for summary judgment,
Holabird & Root stated that the letters were a discovery tool in litigation.
The above evidence gives rise to a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the client authorized, directed, or knew of the allegedly tortious
acts committed by Sabo & Zahn, and thus created a genuine issue of fact
with respect to whether the complained-of acts fell within the attorneys'
scope of authority. As stated, summary judgment is a drastic measure, and
is not appropriate when the right of the moving party to judgment is not
free and clear from doubt
	Finally, even if the actions of Sabo & Zahn were determined to fall
outside the scope of its authority in representing Holabird & Root, a
genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether Holabird & Root
subsequently acquiesced to, or ratified, the misconduct. Ratification occurs
when the principal becomes aware of an unauthorized transaction, yet
retains the benefits of the transaction or takes a position inconsistent with
nonaffirmation. Stathis v. Geldermann, Inc., 295 Ill. App. 3d 844, 858
(1998). For ratification to take place, the principal must, with full
knowledge of the act, evidence an intent to comply with, and be bound
by, the transaction. Peskin v. Deutsch, 134 Ill. App. 3d 48, 55 (1985).
Ratification may be inferred from surrounding circumstances, including
long-term acquiescence, after notice, to the benefits of an allegedly
unauthorized transaction. Stathis, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 858.
	The majority holds that the circuit court appropriately granted
summary judgment on this issue because "[t]he record in this case is
devoid of any suggestion that could support an inference Holabird & Root
benefitted in any way from Sabo & Zahn's alleged interference with the
business relationships of Horwitz Matthews." Slip op. at 10. I disagree
with the majority. Rather, I am in agreement with the appellate court
below that it is unclear from the record before us when Holabird & Root
became aware of the letters, and, when they did, if they disapproved of
the letters being mailed or whether Holabird & Root's subsequent silence
amounts to a ratification of this conduct. Accordingly, whether the acts or
omissions of Holabird & Root constituted a ratification of the conduct of
Sabo & Zahn is an issue of fact precluding the entry of summary judgment.
	For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that, in the course of
representing a client, an attorney is both an agent and an independent
contractor. I would also hold that, as a matter of public policy, a plaintiff
who attempts to hold a client liable for the intentional torts of that client's
attorney must show more than the mere existence of an attorney-client
relationship. Because an attorney is a unique agent, it should not be
presumed that intentional, tortious acts performed by an attorney
automatically fall within the scope of the attorney's agency. Rather, as a
matter of public policy, it should be presumed that an attorney is
authorized only to do all things legal and proper to pursue a client's claim.
In order to hold a client liable for the intentional torts of the client's
attorney, a plaintiff would be required to produce evidence that the client
authorized, directed, had knowledge of or ratified the attorney's
misconduct, so as to bring that misconduct within the scope of the
attorney's authority. I also would hold that, under the facts presented in
the instant cause, summary judgment was improperly granted.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
	JUSTICE GARMAN joins in this dissent.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, also dissenting:
	I respectfully dissent.
	The question raised in this appeal is simple: May a client be held
vicariously liable for tortious conduct committed by counsel during
litigation on the client's behalf in furtherance of that litigation? The majority
holds that a client can only be liable when the client "specifically directed,
controlled, or authorized the attorney's precise method of performing the
work or *** subsequently ratified acts performed in the exercise of the
attorney's independent judgment." Slip op. at 9. I believe this position is
inconsistent with basic agency law which this court has previously
endorsed. The majority's holding is also inconsistent with previous
decisions directly on point by our appellate court, the Seventh Circuit, the
Restatement (Second) of Agency, and the vast majority of foreign
jurisdictions to have addressed the issue. Accordingly, I respectfully
dissent.
	Black-letter agency law tells us that there are three types of
relationships in vicarious liability analysis: master/servant, principal/agent,
and independent contractor. See Restatement (Second) of Agency §2
(1958). The relationships of master/servant and independent contractor
are mutually exclusive-a subordinate is either an independent contractor
or a servant, not both. Restatement (Second) of Agency §220 (1958).
But the relationships of independent contractor and agent are not mutually
exclusive; one may be both an independent contractor and an agent, as
the appellate majority noted. 312 Ill. App. 3d at 196. See also
Restatement (Second) of Agency §2(3) (1958) ("[a]n independent
contractor *** may or may not be an agent"). In fact,
		"most of the persons known as agents, that is, *** attorneys,
*** are independent contractors as the term is used in the
Restatement of this Subject, since they are contractors but,
although employed to perform services, are not subject to the
control or right to control of the principal with respect to their
physical conduct in the performance of the services. However,
they fall within the category of agents. They are fiduciaries; they
owe to the principal the basic obligations of agency: loyalty and
obedience." (Emphases added.) Restatement (Second) of
Agency §14N, Comment a (1958).
	So far, the majority and I are in agreement-the majority recognizes
that "a person may be both an independent contractor and an agent." Slip
op. at 9. Yet, the majority immediately thereafter states that an attorney
should not be treated as an agent because of precisely those attributes
which make the attorney an independent contractor-"autonomy over the
details and manner of performing their work." Slip op. at 9. Thus,
according to the majority, even though "a person may be both an
independent contractor and an agent," attorneys are not agents, because
they are independent contractors. This about-face is confusing at best.
	The fact that someone is an independent contractor does not bar the
attachment of vicarious liability for his actions if he is an agent, as this court
explicitly held less than five years ago. Petrovich v. Share Health Plan
of Illinois, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 17, 31 (1999) ("As a general rule, no
vicarious liability exists for the actions of independent contractors.
Vicarious liability may nevertheless be imposed for the actions of
independent contractors where an agency relationship is established"). To
the extent that our decision in Gomein says otherwise, it is incorrect and
was overruled by Petrovich.(1)
	Simply put, a principal is liable for its agent's conduct within the
scope of the agent's authority. Brubakken v. Morrison, 240 Ill. App. 3d
680, 686 (1992). Liability is not limited to those cases in which the
principal authorized the specific conduct of the agent. Restatement
(Second) of Agency §216 (1958). Although a principal is not liable for
physical harm caused by negligent physical conduct of an agent who is
also an independent contractor (Restatement (Second) of Agency §250
(1958)), a principal is liable for the agent's conduct in matters which the
agent has the right to direct under the agreement creating the agency
relation, even if the principal is wholly unaware of the specific conduct in
question. Restatement (Second) of Agency §216, Comment a (1958).
Accord Peddinghaus v. Peddinghaus, 314 Ill. App. 3d 900, 904
(2000); Letsos v. Century 21-New West Realty, 285 Ill. App. 3d 1056,
1069 (1996). Cf. Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512, 517 (1998) ("[u]nder
the doctrine of respondeat superior, a principal may be held liable for the
tortious actions of an agent which cause a plaintiff's injury, even if the
principal does not himself engage in any conduct in relation to the
plaintiff").
	The Restatement (Second) of Agency contains an entire title devoted
exclusively to "Agents' Torts-Liability Not Dependent Upon Relation of
Master And Servant." Restatement (Second) of Agency, ch. 7, topic 2,
tit. C (1958). Moreover, section 253 of the Restatement speaks to the
precise situation presented in this case. That section, entitled "Tortious
Institution or Conduct of Legal Proceedings," states that
			"A principal who authorizes a servant or other agent to
institute or conduct such legal proceedings as in his judgment are
lawful and desirable for the protection of the principal's interests
is subject to liability to a person against whom proceedings
reasonably adapted to accomplish the principal's purposes are
tortiously brought by the agent." Restatement (Second) of
Agency §253 (1958).
The comments to section 253 explain that
			"The principal is liable only if the conduct of the agent is, in
part at least, to carry out the purposes of the principal. The
situation most frequently arising which involves the rule stated in
this Section is that in which an attorney at law tortiously
institutes or continues civil or criminal proceedings, or is guilty
of oppressive or wrongful conduct during the course of the
proceedings, in order that he may enforce a claim of the
principal. The fact that the attorney is subject to discipline by the
court does not prevent the client from being liable for his
conduct." (Emphases added.) Restatement (Second) of Agency
§253, Comment a (1958).
Accord 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client §190 (1980) ("A client is liable to
a third person injured by an act of the attorney done in the execution of
matters within his authority, and according to the ordinary rules of agency,
a client may be bound by *** the tortious institution, continuation, or
prosecution of legal proceedings to enforce the client's claim").
	Additionally, although the majority contends that "there is no Illinois
decision addressing whether clients may be held liable for their attorneys'
alleged intentional torts against a third party undertaken without the
direction or knowledge of the client" (slip op. at 6), Illinois courts have
imposed vicarious liability for the actions of an attorney in the conduct of
litigation. See Rankin v. Heidlebaugh, 321 Ill. App. 3d 255, 266-67
(2001); Flight Kitchen, Inc. v. Chicago 7-Up Bottling Co., 22 Ill. App.
3d 558 (1974). See also Doyle v. Shlensky, 120 Ill. App. 3d 807, 820
(1983) ("[t]he attorney-client relationship is one of agent-principal[,] ***
and the general rule is that 'the client is bound by the acts and omissions
of his lawyer-agent in the prosecution of a remedy' "), quoting Danforth
v. Checker Taxi Co., 114 Ill. App. 2d 471, 476 (1969).
	Rankin v. Heidlebaugh is instructive. There, our appellate court
specifically held that the organization Equip for Equality (EFE) was itself
directly subject to sanctions under Supreme Court Rule 137 for the
actions of its attorney. There was no showing in that case that EFE
"specifically directed, controlled, or authorized the attorney's precise
method of performing the work" or "subsequently ratified acts performed
in the exercise of the attorney's independent judgment" (see slip op. at 9).
Nevertheless, the appellate court concluded that EFE was sanctionable
because "[a] principal is liable for the acts of its agent committed within the
scope of her authority. *** [W]e conclude that EFE is responsible as
principal for the sanctionable conduct of its agent, Karen Kauffman."
Rankin, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 266-67.
	The majority relies heavily on In re Berry Publishing Services, Inc.,
231 B.R. 676 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999), which held that a purchaser in
bankruptcy could not hold the trustee liable for purported misconduct by
the trustee's attorney. Slip op. at 6-7. However, as the majority
recognizes, Berry Publishing relied exclusively upon Anderson v.
Marathon Petroleum Co., 801 F.2d 936, 938 (7th Cir. 1986), a case
which had nothing to do with attorneys. The question there was whether
Marathon should be held liable for a tank cleaner's failure to provide
proper respirators to the tank cleaner's employees. There was no
principal/agent relationship between Marathon and the tank cleaner; the
question was solely whether that relationship was one of master/servant
or the tank cleaner was an independent contractor. Berry Publishing
erred in relying on Anderson without considering whether the agency
nature of the attorney/client relationship was relevant to the vicarious
liability analysis. Moreover, Berry Publishing overlooked Seventh Circuit
case law postdating Anderson. See Diersen v. Chicago Car Exchange,
110 F.3d 481, 489 n.9 (7th Cir. 1997) (" 'attorney's errors and
misconduct are attributed to his clients. The clients are principals, the
attorney is an agent, and under the law of agency the principal is bound by
his chosen agent's deeds' "), quoting United States v. 7108 W. Grand
Ave., 15 F.3d 632, 634 (7th Cir. 1994). Berry Publishing also failed to
discuss Flight Kitchen. Moreover, Berry Publishing begins its analysis
of this issue by stating that "[u]nder Illinois law a principal is not liable for
an agents' [sic] torts, provided the agent is not an employee" Berry
Publishing, 231 B.R. at 682), a position which is flatly incorrect. See
Petrovich, 188 Ill. 2d  at 31 ("[v]icarious liability may nevertheless be
imposed for the actions of independent contractors where an agency
relationship is established"). The case was wrongly decided and the
majority errs in relying upon it.
	Further, the split in other jurisdictions is far more lopsided than the
majority represents. See slip op. at 7-8. For example, the cases listed in
the majority's "see also" string citation (Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v.
Protective National Insurance Co., 631 So. 2d 305 (Fla. App. 1993);
Feliberty v. Damon, 72 N.Y.2d 112, 527 N.E.2d 261, 531 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1988); Brown v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 90 N.C.
App. 464, 369 S.E.2d 367 (1988), aff'd, 326 N.C. 387, 390 S.E.2d 150 (1990)) are wholly inapposite. Rather than a third party suing a client
for the actions of his attorney, these cases involve a client suing his
attorney and the entity paying for that attorney, meaning there is no
principal/agent relationship between the attorney and the defendant.(2) Also
factually distinguishable is Baldasarre, in which an attorney represented
both sides of a real estate deal and one client sued the other for the
attorney's failure to disclose information.(3)
	Thus, only two of the foreign cases on which the majority relies are
on point. One of these cases, Lynn, must be discounted because it relies
wholly on Merritt, which, again, is inapposite. This leaves the majority
with a single case which supports it, Plant v. Trust Co. Of Columbus,
168 Ga. App. 909, 310 S.E.2d 745 (1983). However, I note that even
the appellate court of Georgia, the majority's sole supporter, has not
decided this issue uniformly. See Atlantic Co. v. Farris, 62 Ga. App.
212, 215-16, 8 S.E.2d 665, 669 (1940) ("the client is bound, according
to the ordinary rules of agency, by the acts of his attorney[;] *** the client
may be liable for a trespass committed by his attorney that he in no way
authorized, except by his general employment of the attorney, or for the
tortious institution, continuation, or prosecution of legal proceedings to
enforce the client's claim").
	On the other hand, most of the cases in which the majority concedes
that clients have been held liable for their attorneys' actions, under the
precepts of agency law, are quite on point. See, e.g., Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co. v. Wilson, 768 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988);
Peterson v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 296 Ark. 201, 753 S.W.2d 278 (1988); United Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Groen,
486 N.E.2d 571 (Ind. App. 1985); Nyer v. Carter, 367 A.2d 1375
(Me. 1977). Indeed, the wealth of authority directly on point which runs
counter to the majority is even greater than the majority recognizes. See,
e.g., SEI Corp. v. Norton & Co., 631 F. Supp. 497, 503 n.6 (E.D.
Penn. 1986) ("[client] is liable to [opposing party] for his attorney's
wrongful conduct during the course of the judicial proceeding irrespective
of the fact that his attorney may be subject to judicial discipline"); Bridge
C.A.T. Scan Associates v. Ohio-Nuclear Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1187, 1197
(S.D.N.Y 1985) ("A client and his attorney stand in the relationship of
principal and agent. As such, a client may be responsible for statements
made for the purpose of aiding, and within the scope of, his legal
representation"); Otto v. Levy, 244 A.D. 349, 353, 279 N.Y.S. 462,
467 (1935) ("As their attorney *** was acting within the general scope
of his authority, they are liable for his unlawful act"); Hewes v. Wolfe, 74
N.C. App. 610, 619, 330 S.E.2d 16, 22 (1985) ("In circumstances in
which an attorney at law *** is guilty of oppressive or wrongful conduct
during the course of the proceeding in order to enforce a claim of the
principal, the principal is liable for the attorney's wrongful acts"). Thus the
split in other jurisdictions is not nearly as balanced as the majority
suggests. Our holding puts Illinois in a distinct minority.
	More importantly, however, the majority disavows basic black-letter
principles of agency law when it holds that principals are not liable for their
agents' conduct within the scope and in the service of the agency. See,
e.g., Petrovich, 188 Ill. 2d  at 31; Rankin, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 266-67;
Flight Kitchen, 22 Ill. App. 3d 558; Restatement (Second) of Agency
§253 (1958); 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client §190 (1980). See also
Diersen, 110 F.3d  at 489 n.9.
	I recognize the public policy argument that clients should be entitled
to assume that attorneys will behave properly. See slip op. at 11-13. It is,
of course, reprehensible when an attorney oversteps the bounds of
appropriate behavior in the service of his client's cause. But the whole
field of vicarious liability concerns situations in which someone entrusted
with authority or responsibility falls short or acts wrongly in their
principal's service. I do not agree that we should create a special rule for
attorneys, simply because attorneys are subject to disciplinary rules.
	In this regard I note, first, that the Restatement directly states that
"[t]he fact that the attorney is subject to discipline by the court does not
prevent the client from being liable for his conduct." Restatement (Second)
of Agency §253, Comment a (1958). See also SEI Corp., 631 F. Supp. 
at 503 n.6 ("[client] is liable to [opposing party] for his attorney's wrongful
conduct during the course of the judicial proceeding irrespective of the fact
that his attorney may be subject to judicial discipline"). Second, I note that
a principal can be held liable even for criminal actions by his agent-the
fact that an agent's actions are criminal does not automatically mean that
no respondeat superior liability will lie. Deloney v. Board of Education
of Thornton Township, 281 Ill. App. 3d 775, 783 (1996), citing
Restatement (Second) of Agency §231 (1958). I assume that the majority
is not suggesting that ordinary people are more lax in their observance of
the criminal code than attorneys are with respect to the profession's ethical
rules. But otherwise, what is the basis for the majority's distinction-that an
attorney's tortious conduct is so inherently unforeseeable that a principal
cannot be held liable, whereas a normal agent's illegal activity may still
form the basis for a principal's liability?
	I believe the analogy to violations of the criminal law is instructive,
because when courts do reject vicarious liability in the context of a
criminal act by the agent, it is because the criminality of the act is found to
have taken the act outside the scope of the employment or agency. I
believe that this inquiry forms the proper focus in cases seeking to hold
clients liable for the wrongdoing of their attorneys. The question should be
whether the attorney was conducting matters with which he had been
entrusted, and was motivated at least in part by his desire to serve his
client, when he committed the tort. In the case at bar, I agree with the
appellate court that there are sufficient facts to survive summary judgment
on this issue. See 312 Ill. App. 3d at 196 (principal of Holabird & Root
stated in a deposition that the letters the law firm sent out "indicated to him
that the law firm was pursuing the fee in an 'aggressive way' and that the
firm was 'serving them as their clients' "; attorneys stated in depositions
that they were doing what they were hired to do; and Holabird & Root
asserted in its motion for summary judgment that the letters "were a
discovery tool in litigation"). Therefore, there is no basis for concluding as
a matter of law that the attorneys' actions were outside the scope of the
agency. And thus, as nearly every court to consider the question has
agreed, the client may potentially be held liable for its attorney's actions.
	I finally submit that the rule suggested by the majority is ill-advised as
a matter of public policy. I believe the majority is unwittingly encouraging
the retention of attorneys who operate at or beyond the boundaries of law
and ethics. The majority would hold that no matter what an attorney does,
the client is not liable for any acts except those he "specifically directed,
controlled, or authorized." Under such a rule, an unscrupulous client could
freely hire an attorney known to "push the envelope" and then, ostrich-like, hide his head in the sand so as to disavow any specific involvement
in the attorney's methods, and walk away from any wrongdoing
committed by his chosen agent on his behalf in the service of his cause.
	I firmly believe in the upstanding moral character of the membership
of the Illinois bar. The Chief Justice's observations regarding the ethical
constraints within which Illinois attorneys are required to operate are
entirely correct-although I must note that the majority's alteration of the
laws of agency is not restricted to attorneys licensed in this state, or even
in this country. But despite my conviction that very few would stoop to
take advantage of it, I cannot endorse the perverse incentive system the
majority creates today.
	The majority holds that traditional agency principles do not apply in
the context of attorneys, a quintessential agent.(4) See Link v. Wabash R.R.
Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34, 8 L. Ed. 2d 734, 740, 82 S. Ct. 1386, 1390
(1962) ("Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in
the action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or
omissions of this freely selected agent. Any other notion would be wholly
inconsistent with our system of representative litigation, in which each
party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent"); Restatement
(Second) of Agency §14N, Comment a (1958). Along the way, the
majority ignores previous holdings of this court regarding general agency
principles (see Petrovich, 188 Ill. 2d  at 31; Woods, 181 Ill. 2d at 517),
relies on inapposite and ill-founded authority from other jurisdictions, and
diverges from the Restatement, the Seventh Circuit, and our own appellate
court, each of which has arrived at what I submit is the proper conclusion,
that a client may be held vicariously liable for the actions of his chosen
counsel, his agent, by application of ordinary principles of agency law. The
majority's concern that holding the client accountable for the attorney's
actions will require the client to oversee the attorney's actions overlooks
that all agency liability is based on the premise that it is the client's
responsibility to choose its agent carefully, at risk of being held liable for
their actions if they behave wrongly in promoting the principal's interests
in those actions with the conduct of which they are entrusted.
	Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
1.              
          
           
          
           
             
            
             
  
 The majority distinguishes Petrovich from Gomein on the basis that Petrovich involved apparent and 
implied authority. Slip op. at 13. These doctrines were involved in Petrovich because a physician is not an agent of an HMO under 
ordinary agency principles. But by distinguishing the cases on this basis, and maintaining that Gomein remains good law, the majority 
is stating that according to Illinois law a principal is not liable for the acts of an independent contractor who is an actual 
agent (Gomein), but a principal is liable for the acts of an independent contractor who is an apparent agent (Petrovich).
2.                
  The majority characterizes my criticism of its reliance on these cases as "concern that several of the foreign 
jurisdiction cases *** are insurance cases" and finds this point to be "of no consequence." Slip op. at 14. The majority misunderstands me. 
I have no objection to taking "general propositions of law *** from factually similar cases," when on-point support is lackingas it surely 
is for the majority's position. My concern is that these cases are not factually similar because the insurer-defendants did not have 
an attorney-client relationship with the lawyers whose conduct aggrieved the plaintiffs. In failing to recognize the relevance of the 
attorney-client agency relationship to vicarious liability analysis the majority sadly repeats the analytical error committed in Berry 
Publishing.         
        
         
        

3.             The holding of Baldasarre is also unclearalthough the court at one point 
states that a client cannot be liable for the acts of an attorney, who is an independent contractor, it elsewhere recognizes that an 
attorney is a client's agent, and that a principal is ordinarily liable for the tortious acts of an agent acting within the scope of his 
authority. Compare Baldasarre, 132 N.J. at 288-89, 625 A.2d  at 463-64, with Baldasarre, 132 N.J. at 290, 625 A.2d  at 464-65. 
 

4.   In its briefings to this court Holabird & Root explicitly states that
it does "not dispute[]" that "in Illinois there is an agency relationship
between an attorney and client."