Case Title: Estabrook v. Mazak Corp

Citation: 

Docket Number: 19S-CQ-590

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2020-03-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 19S-CQ-590 
Bradley A. Estabrook, 
Plaintiff, 
–v– 
Mazak Corporation, 
Defendant. 
Argued: January 30, 2020 | Decided: March 2, 2020 
Certified Question from the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana 
Case No. 1:16-CV-87-HAB 
The Honorable Holly A. Brady, Judge 
Opinion by Justice Slaughter 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices David, Massa, and Goff concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Mar 02 2020, 11:50 am
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Slaughter, Justice. 
The Indiana Products Liability Act contains what we have held is a ten-
year statute of repose. The statute requires a plaintiff to bring suit “within 
ten (10) years after the delivery of the product to the initial user or 
consumer.” The only exception is for an action accruing at least eight 
years but fewer than ten years after the product’s initial delivery. When 
that happens, a plaintiff can still sue within two years after accrual, even if 
more than ten years have elapsed since delivery. Because the statute has 
no other exceptions, we conclude its ten-year limitations period cannot be 
extended for any other reason—including a manufacturer’s post-sale 
repair, refurbishment, or reconstruction of a product. 
Background Facts and Procedure 
This case comes to us as a certified question from the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. In 2014, Plaintiff, 
Bradley A. Estabrook, was injured while working on a machine owned by 
his employer, General Products Corporation. GPC bought this machine 
from Defendant, Mazak Corporation, which delivered it new in 2003—
eleven years before Estabrook’s injury. 
In 2016, Estabrook filed a product-liability suit against Mazak in the 
Northern District of Indiana based on the court’s diversity jurisdiction, 
alleging the machine was unsafe due to a design defect. Indiana law 
governs this dispute, and both parties agree that strict application of the 
Act’s ten-year statute of repose would bar Estabrook’s suit. But the parties 
acknowledge a judicially created exception to the statute of repose, 
according to which rebuilding or reconditioning a product might create a 
“new product”, restarting the statutory clock. In a thoughtful opinion, the 
district judge observed that this exception has “questionable provenance” 
given that it originated in a federal case, that our court of appeals has 
incorporated it into Indiana law only in dicta, and that we have never 
interpreted the statute’s scope authoritatively. So the district court 
certified to us the following question of Indiana law: 
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Can the statute of repose codified in Ind. Code § 34-20-3-1(b) be 
extended by post-sale repair/refurbishment/reconstruction of 
the product and, if so, what is the appropriate test to be used to 
determine whether the seller has done sufficient work to 
trigger the extension? 
We accepted the certified question under Indiana Appellate Rule 64 and 
now answer it in the negative. 
Discussion and Decision  
A. The Act’s statute of repose contains no exception for a 
product’s repair, refurbishment, or reconstruction. 
A plaintiff whose cause of action is subject to the Indiana Products 
Liability Act must bring suit within two years after the action accrues but 
not more than ten years after the product was first delivered to the buyer. 
Ind. Code § 34-20-3-1(b). The Act says the following: 
(b) Except as provided in section 2 of this chapter [concerning 
asbestos-related actions], a product liability action must be 
commenced: 
 (1)  
within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues; or 
(2)  
within ten (10) years after the delivery of the product to 
the initial user or customer.  
However, if the cause of action accrues at least eight (8) years 
but less than ten (10) years after that initial delivery, the action 
may be commenced at any time within two (2) years after the 
cause of action accrues. 
Id. The statute is unambiguous. And because this is not an asbestos 
lawsuit, the statute contains only one exception of note—for an action 
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accruing “at least eight (8) but less than ten (10) years” after initial 
delivery. Id. Yet even this limited exception does not apply here. 
Estabrook sustained his injury eleven years after his employer received 
the product, so his cause of action did not accrue “less than ten (10) years” 
after delivery. 
Despite the statute’s plain meaning and its inapplicable exception, 
Estabrook asks that we interpret the statute to include a further exception 
for a product that undergoes enough transformation—whether due to 
repair, refurbishment, or reconstruction—that it no longer qualifies as the 
original product. The point of this proposed interpretation is to treat the 
modified product as a “new product” that restarts the clock for suing. 
Estabrook’s argument is not without some basis in case law, though our 
Court has yet to adopt it. And no other court to have addressed our 
statute of repose has applied the proposed “new-product” exception to 
resurrect an otherwise time-barred suit. Thus, the district court below is 
correct in observing that there is “no clear controlling precedent” on this 
issue. Estabrook v. Mazak Corp., No. 1:16-CV-87-HAB, 2019 WL 5418117, at 
*1 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 22, 2019). 
For nearly forty years, a few courts have suggested a possible 
unwritten exception to our statute of repose for modified products. For 
example, in 1983, the Southern District of Indiana hypothesized in dicta 
that Indiana’s limitations period might restart when a manufacturer 
refurbishes a product and puts it back into the stream of commerce by 
reselling it. See Denu v. Western Gear Corp., 581 F. Supp. 7, 8 (S.D. Ind. 
1983). But the court had no occasion to decide the issue on the limited 
factual record before it. “The extent and nature of the manufacturer[‘]s 
alteration, modification or reconditioning of the product are certainly 
material questions of fact which have a bearing on whether the 
manufacturer has introduced a ‘new’ product into commerce and whether 
he should be held liable for defects in that product.” Id. 
A decade later the Seventh Circuit, also in dicta, addressed the 
proposed Denu exception and broadened it to include any “reconstruction 
or reconditioning … which has the effect of lengthening the useful life of a 
product beyond what was contemplated when the product was first sold”. 
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Richardson v. Gallo Equip. Co., 990 F.2d 330, 331 (7th Cir. 1993). Without 
such an exception, Judge Posner wrote, “the statute would create an 
inefficient incentive to reconstruct or recondition old products rather than 
build new ones, in order to reduce expected liability costs; for under such 
a regime a product rebuilt after ten years would be immunized from 
liability.” Id. Again, however, the court had no occasion to decide the 
issue on the record before it because the manufacturer’s added safety 
features did not extend the product’s useful life. Id. 
Also in 1993, our court of appeals cited Denu as “instructive” in 
determining that the statute of repose would not bar suit “when a product 
has been reconditioned, altered, or modified to the extent that a ‘new’ 
product has been introduced into the stream of commerce.” Wenger v. 
Weldy, 605 N.E.2d 796, 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). But the court found no 
basis for affording relief on that record. Even if the proposed Denu 
exception had restarted the limitations period, the action still would have 
been untimely. Id. 
And as recently as 2010, our appellate court reaffirmed its embrace of 
the Denu exception in the abstract. See Florian v. GATX Rail Corp., 930 
N.E.2d 1190, 1200–02 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). But the court held that merely 
repainting a product within the ten-year period of repose did not 
incorporate a “new component” to the product and thus did not restart 
the clock. Id. at 1201–02. 
With these cases as precedent, Estabrook asks us to adopt a Denu-type 
exception that would restart the ten-year statute of repose when a 
manufacturer’s refurbishment efforts yield a “new product”. Such an 
approach would oblige courts to craft a test for assessing when a 
manufacturer’s modification to its product is sufficiently different in 
degree that the result is a new product, different in kind from its 
predecessor. We decline Estabrook’s invitation—both because the statute’s 
plain meaning does not permit it and because the task is not susceptible of 
a clear, bright-line legal rule. 
We begin by interpreting the statute “consistent with its plain meaning, 
by giving effect to what the legislature both said and did not say.” KS&E 
Sports v. Runnels, 72 N.E.3d 892, 907 (Ind. 2017). As we have noted, the 
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statute is straightforward. It contains only one exception irrelevant here. 
And it does not mention “repair”, “refurbishment”, “reconstruction”, or 
any comparable term that would authorize restarting the limitations clock 
when a manufacturer’s subsequent, post-delivery actions have 
purportedly transformed the “product” initially delivered. Given these 
textual constraints, we decline to interpret the statute of repose to include 
an exception for product modifications that the legislature could have 
enacted but did not. And, it goes without saying, the legislature can 
always amend the statute if it concludes, consistent with the Seventh 
Circuit’s opinion in Richardson, that sound public policy should not 
encourage manufacturers to modify existing products rather than build 
new ones by immunizing the former from liability. We express no view on 
these competing policy choices. They are for the legislature to weigh and 
decide. As we have noted previously, “[w]e neither applaud the wisdom” 
of the legislature’s policy choices, “nor condemn their folly.” Id. We 
merely interpret the statute the legislature enacts. The disputed statute 
before us today does not permit Estabrook’s proposed “new-product” 
exception. 
Though unnecessary to our disposition today, we also address the 
thorny issue of line drawing. If a court were to craft a “new-product” 
exception, what might it say? The inquiry recalls a longstanding 
philosophical issue of “object identity”, which asks what properties define 
an object. Stated differently, the issue is at what point do changes to those 
properties create a new, distinct object. This is an ancient, still-unsolved 
riddle of metaphysics, which Plutarch made famous with his “Ship of 
Theseus Paradox”. Plutarch put the question this way: Suppose Theseus 
sails back from Crete and docks his ship in an Athenian port. Over time, 
the Athenians, determined to preserve the ship, replace board after rotted 
board until they finally replace the last original piece. Plutarch asks, “Is 
this a new ship?” When a confident pupil answers “yes”, Plutarch follows 
up by posing the difficult line-drawing question: “With which board did 
the ship become new?” Just as Plutarch’s pupil was forced to answer the 
second question, so too would any court having to define when, 
specifically, a “new product’ was delivered to the initial user. Because we 
decide this case based on the statute’s plain meaning, we need not try to 
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resolve the line-drawing conundrum occasioned by this modern 
counterpart to Plutarch’s ancient riddle.  
We also reject Estabrook’s two other proposed grounds for adopting a 
“new-product” exception. The first ground—stare decisis—fails for the 
simple reason that no prior decision from our Court has embraced this 
exception, so there is nothing for us “to let stand”. It matters not that other 
courts—both state and federal—have paid lip-service to this exception. 
Such state and federal decisions may be persuasive, but they are not 
authoritative. And, relevant for stare decisis purposes, they are not binding 
on us, for we alone are the final arbiter of Indiana law and owe no 
deference to the interpretations of Indiana law pronounced by other 
courts. 
Estabrook’s other proposed ground for adopting a “new-product” 
exception—legislative acquiescence—also misses the mark. He argues that 
the legislature’s failure to act after other courts embraced the exception 
amounts to its implied endorsement of those views. Estabrook reads too 
much into the legislature’s silence. We do not know why the legislature 
did nothing in response to these decisions. Perhaps it is because, as 
Estabrook posits, the legislature believed these decisions to be correct. Or, 
alternatively, perhaps it is because the legislature was unmoved to act 
since no court to have embraced the exception granted relief by extending 
a plaintiff’s time to sue. We discern no basis for preferring one inference 
over another. Thus, Estabrook’s argument that the legislature has 
expressed its opinion through silence is better seen as the legislature’s 
failure to express an opinion at all. 
B. The legislature wrote “or” but meant “and”. 
Until now, we have confined our discussion to the plain meaning of 
Subsection 34-20-3-1(b)(2) and its limited exception for claims accruing 
more than eight years and fewer than ten years after the product’s initial 
delivery. But the careful reader will note another key feature of the statute 
warranting our attention and to which we now turn. 
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The conjunction separating the accrual and repose provisions in 
Subsections 1(b)(1) and 1(b)(2), respectively, is “or”—not “and”. Thus, 
read literally, the statute says that a product-liability action, to be timely, 
“must be commenced: (1) within two (2) years after the cause of action 
accrues; or (2) within ten (10) years after the delivery of the product to the 
initial user or customer.” I.C. § 34-20-3-1(b) (emphasis added). The plain 
meaning of the disjunctive “or” is that Estabrook’s product-liability action 
is timely if either of the statute’s two requirements is satisfied: either he 
sues within two years after his action accrues, or he sues within ten years 
after the product’s delivery to his employer. 
It is undisputed that Estabrook sued within two years after his claim 
accrued. His claim accrued when he was injured in November 2014. And 
he filed the underlying federal lawsuit in March 2016, well within the two-
year accrual period. Given the statute’s disjunctive “or”, that alone should 
suffice to make his suit timely, though he sued more than ten years after 
the product’s delivery in 2003. On this reading, the disjunct does not limit 
the time for filing suit but extends it. 
But for nearly forty years, that is not how we have interpreted this 
statute. In Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, 275 Ind. 520, 418 N.E.2d 207 
(1981), we rejected a literal construction of these disjunctive provisions 
and held that the “clear intention of the legislature … was to limit the time 
within which product liability actions can be brought.” Id. at 524, 418 
N.E.2d at 210. We explained that a contrary reading—interpreting “or” 
literally—would render part of the statute meaningless. 
Plaintiff correctly argues that the interpretation of the statute 
we now adopt, in effect, changes the disjunctive term “or,” 
which, of course, appears in the statute, to the conjunctive 
“and.” While terms of this type should ordinarily be given their 
literal and normal definition when it is apparent that the 
resulting meaning was intended, this Court is not bound to 
blindly give effect to the word “or,” when a disjunctive reading 
of the terms of the section would render meaningless a portion 
of the statute.  
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Id. at 526, 418 N.E.2d at 211.  
We reaffirm Dague’s interpretation of the statute as one of limitation 
and repose. And, like Dague, we agree that the statute’s best interpretation 
reads “or” as if it were “and”. We elaborate here only to make clear that 
we do not disregard the disjunctive “or” lightly or because doing so suits 
our own policy preferences. Rather, we conclude that that is the only 
interpretation consistent with the legislature’s stated preferences, as 
reflected in the entirety of its enactment. 
Two provisions undergird our conclusion. One is the last sentence in 
Section 34-20-3-1: “However, if the cause of action accrues at least eight (8) 
years but less than ten (10) years after that initial delivery, the action may 
be commenced at any time within two (2) years after the cause of action 
accrues.” In other words, if a plaintiff sues at least eight but fewer than ten 
years after the product’s initial delivery, the suit is still timely if filed 
within two years after its accrual. But if Subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) are 
disjuncts, then this is always true—no matter what—and the “However” 
sentence adds nothing because Subsection (b)(1) alone ensures that a 
product-liability action is timely if commenced “within two (2) years after 
the cause of action accrues”. Stated differently, the “However” sentence 
would be surplusage if we were to interpret “or” literally. That is because 
the disjunctive “or” would treat as timely any action filed within two 
years after its accrual. And it would not matter how long it took the 
plaintiff to file suit after the product was first delivered. Under our 
surplusage canon, we prefer interpretations that give effect to every word 
and eschew those that treat some words as duplicative or meaningless. 
The other key provision is Subsection 34-20-3-2(f), which further 
establishes that Section 1 is a “repose period”—meaning that it does not 
extend a plaintiff’s time to sue but limits it. “Except for the cause of action 
expressly recognized in this section [concerning asbestos], this section 
does not otherwise modify the limitation of action or repose period 
contained in section 1 of this chapter.” I.C. § 34-20-3-2(f) (emphasis 
added). As discussed above, Subsection 1(b)(2) would not be a statute of 
repose if we interpreted “or” literally by treating Subsections 1(b)(1) and 
1(b)(2) as disjuncts. We would have to ignore Subsection 2(f)’s plain 
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statement that Section 1 is a period of “repose” to give effect to the “or” in 
Subsection 1(b)(1). 
These provisions persuade us that this is one of those rare cases for 
invoking the absurdity doctrine. We apply the doctrine to give a statute 
“its obvious intended effect despite its plain text.” R.R. v. State, 106 N.E.3d 
1037, 1042 (Ind. 2018). The doctrine is “strong medicine” because it 
“defeats even the plain meaning of statutes.” Calvin v. State, 87 N.E.3d 474, 
477 (Ind. 2017). To apply the doctrine, we require a two-part showing that, 
in combination, sets “a very high bar.” R.R., 106 N.E.3d at 1042. The first is 
that the text imposes an outcome that no reasonable person could intend. 
Id. We find that requirement satisfied here. Given what the legislature said 
throughout Chapter 34-20-3, it intended Subsection 1(b) as a period of 
repose that limits a plaintiff’s claim under the Act. We would undermine 
that intention were we to interpret the statute as written with the 
disjunctive “or”.  
We also find the second requirement satisfied here—that the judicial 
remedy is easy, limited to “changing or supplying a particular word or 
phrase whose inclusion or omission was obviously a technical or 
ministerial error”. Id. (quoting A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 237–38 (2012)). The “fix” is what our 
forebears did in Dague—substituting “and” for “or” and thus reading the 
accrual and repose provisions in Subsections 1(b)(1) and 1(b)(2) not as 
disjuncts but conjuncts.  
Conclusion  
For these reasons, we answer the certified question in the negative and 
hold that Indiana Code section 34-20-3-1(b) is a statute of repose that 
cannot be extended by a manufacturer’s post-delivery repair, 
refurbishment, or reconstruction of the disputed product. 
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Goff, JJ., concur. 
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A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL L A N T 
John C. Theisen 
Nathaniel O. Hubley 
Theisen & Associates, LLC 
Fort Wayne, Indiana 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  A MI C US  CU R IA E  
I N D IA NA  T R IA L L AW Y E R S A SS O CIA T IO N  
Todd Barnes 
George & Farinas, LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana   
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL L E E 
Edward DeVries 
Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP 
Chicago, Illinois 
 
Edward M. O’Brien 
Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP 
Louisville, Kentucky 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AM I C U S CU R IA E  
P R O D U C T L IA BI LI TY  A DV IS O R Y  C O U NC I L, I N C . 
Jane Dall Wilson 
Bradley S. Boswell 
Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana