Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V KOBEAY QURAN SWAFFORD

Citation: 

Docket Number: 136751

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2009-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FILED MARCH 18, 2009 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 136751 
 
KOBEAY QURAN SWAFFORD, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH   
 
MARKMAN, J.   
 
We granted leave to appeal in this case to consider whether the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers (IAD), MCL 780.601, requires that a detainer be lodged 
at the institution where the defendant is incarcerated, and, if so, whether there was 
sufficient evidence in this case that the detainer was properly lodged.  The trial 
court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges with prejudice as a result 
of the prosecutor’s failure to bring defendant to trial within 180 days of receiving 
defendant’s request for a final disposition, in violation of Article III(a) of the IAD.  
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the IAD is not applicable because the 
prosecutor lodged the detainer against the defendant with the United States 
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion 
 
Chief Justice: 
Marilyn Kelly 
 
 
Justices: 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Diane M. Hathaway 
 
 
 
 
 
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Marshals rather than the federal prison in which defendant was incarcerated.  
However, there is no language in the IAD that indicates that it is only applicable 
when the detainer was originally lodged with the institution in which the defendant 
is incarcerated, and in this case it is undisputed that the institution in which 
defendant was incarcerated received the detainer.  The clear language of the IAD 
states that if a “detainer has been lodged against the prisoner,” and the prosecutor 
fails to bring a defendant to trial within 180 days of receiving the defendant’s 
request for a final disposition made while the defendant is serving a term of 
imprisonment, the court “shall enter an order dismissing the [complaint] with 
prejudice,” MCL 780.601 (emphasis added).  That is precisely what happened in 
this case.  Therefore, we have no choice but to reverse the Court of Appeals and 
reinstate the trial court’s order dismissing the charges with prejudice.  However 
harsh and inflexible a remedy for failure to comply with the IAD this may be 
adjudged, it is plainly what our Legislature requires.       
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Defendant was charged in Michigan with first-degree murder, assault with 
intent to commit murder, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a 
felony.  He was subsequently arrested on an unrelated federal bank robbery charge 
in Tennessee.  On June 1, 2004, the Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office 
(hereinafter referred to as “the prosecutor”) sent a written detainer against 
defendant to the U.S. Marshals in Tennessee.  Defendant pleaded guilty to the 
federal charges and was sentenced to federal prison on November 19, 2004.  On 
 
 
 
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March 2, 2005, the federal prison authorities where defendant was imprisoned 
(hereinafter referred to as “the Bureau of Prisons”) verified the detainer that was 
lodged against defendant with the prosecutor.1  The Bureau of Prisons provided 
the prosecutor and the court clerk with notice of defendant’s request for 
disposition of the Michigan charges.2  This notice was received by the prosecutor 
and the court clerk on March 7, 2005.3  On June 15, 2005, the prosecutor signed an 
                                              
1 In a correspondence with defendant, a prison official stated, “I verified the 
request to lodge a detainer . . . .”  Stamped on a copy of the letter that 
accompanied the detainer is a notation dated March 2, 2005, indicating that the 
detainer was verified with a paralegal in the Wayne County Prosecutor’s 
extradition unit. 
2 This notice states:  
The above named defendant is requesting disposition on the 
outstanding charges you have filed against him as a detainer . . . .  
An inmate requesting disposition of detainers in accordance with 
Article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act must be 
brought to trial within 180 days of your receipt of this request.   
At the same time, the Bureau of Prisons also submitted a document to the 
prosecutor that provides, “A detainer has been filed against this subject in your 
favor for: 1st Degree Murder, we will again notify you approximately 60 days 
prior to actual release.”  On June 4, 2005, the Bureau of Prisons sent a letter to the 
prosecutor that provides:  
 
The above named inmate has requested disposition on 
outstanding charges which were filed against him as a detainer . . . .  
As you know, once an inmate requests disposition under the IAD 
they must be brought to trial within 180 days of your receipt of the 
request.  Ninety of the allotted 180 days elapsed effective June 25, 
2005. 
3 Fex v Michigan, 507 US 43, 52; 113 S Ct 1085; 122 L Ed 2d 406 (1993), 
provides that the IAD’s 180-day time limit begins running when the prosecutor 
receives the defendant’s request for trial. 
 
 
 
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“Agreement on Detainers” that states, “I propose to bring this person to trial on the 
indictment, information or complaint named in the offer within the time specified 
in Article III(a) of the Agreement on Detainers.”4  However, defendant was not 
arraigned in Michigan until October 6, 2005, which everybody agrees was more 
than 180 days after the prosecutor received defendant’s request for a final 
disposition.   
Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss the charges on the ground that the 
prosecutor had failed to bring him to trial within 180 days of receiving defendant’s 
request for a final disposition in violation of Article III(a) of the IAD, MCL 
780.601.  The trial court granted this motion and dismissed the charges with 
                                              
4 At the top of this form, it states, “This form should only be used when an 
offer of temporary custody has been received as the result of a prisoner’s request 
for disposition of a detainer.”  This form also indicates that it was “[i]n response to 
[the Bureau of Prisons’] letter of March 2, 2005.”  On September 16, 2005, when 
the prosecutor failed to bring defendant to trial within 180 days, the Bureau of 
Prisons sent the prosecutor a letter stating:  
The above named inmate requested disposition of the 
outstanding charges that you have filed against him as a detainer on 
03-02-2005.  Under Article III of the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers, an inmate must be brought to trial within 180 days after 
he requests disposition and the forms are received by the appropriate 
officials.  Our records indicate the forms required under the 
provisions of the IAD were received and signed for by your office 
on 03-07-2005. . . .  Since 180 days have elapsed since you received 
this request for disposition, we have advised, by copy of this letter to 
the inmate, that he may petition the appropriate court for dismissal 
of the outstanding charges.   
Finally, the Bureau of Prisons’ “Release Authorization” indicates a “Release 
Date” of “10-05-05”; under the word “Method” appear the initials “IAD”; and 
after “Detainer,” the “Yes” box is checked. 
 
 
 
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prejudice.  The prosecutor appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding 
that the IAD does not apply because defendant was not serving a term of 
imprisonment when the detainer was lodged against him.  People v Swafford, 
unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 27, 2007 
(Docket No. 268499) (Swafford I).      
Defendant filed a timely application for leave to appeal in this Court.  We 
vacated the Court of Appeals judgment and remanded the case to that court for 
reconsideration in light of the documentation that defendant had attached to his 
application for leave to appeal in this Court.  People v Swafford, 480 Mich 881 
(2007).5   
                                              
5 In a concurring statement, Justice Corrigan raised specific questions for 
the Court of Appeals to address.  Specifically, she asked: 
(1) Was the panel correct that People v Monasterski, 105 
Mich App 645 (1981), and People v Wilden (On Rehearing), 197 
Mich App 533 (1992), hold that “a detainer filed against a jail 
inmate before he begins serving a prison sentence is insufficient to 
implicate the IAD,” and, if so, (2) are the holdings in Monasterski 
and Wilden consistent with the language of article III of the IAD? 
After the Court of Appeals rendered its first decision, but before this Court vacated 
that decision, defendant was brought to trial, convicted as charged, and sentenced 
to life in prison.  Defendant should not have been brought to trial at that time.  The 
Court of Appeals decision reversing the trial court’s dismissal of charges and 
remanding the case for trial had not taken effect, because defendant had filed a 
timely appeal to this Court.  MCR 7.215(F)(1)(a).  Moreover, during the pendency 
of a timely appeal to this Court, a Court of Appeals decision remanding to a lower 
court for further proceedings is automatically stayed, unless the Court of Appeals 
or this Court orders otherwise.  MCR 7.302(C)(5).  Neither this Court nor the 
Court of Appeals ordered further proceedings to begin notwithstanding 
 
 
 
 
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On remand, the Court of Appeals, in a split decision, again reversed the 
trial court’s dismissal of the charges, holding that the IAD did not apply because 
the prosecutor had not delivered the detainer to the institution in which defendant 
was serving his sentence, i.e., the Bureau of Prisons.  People v Swafford (On 
Remand), unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 
18, 2008 (Docket No. 268499) (Swafford II).  However, the dissenting judge 
concluded that  
the correspondence sent by the prosecutor’s office to the United 
States Marshall on June 1, 2004 . . . became a valid detainer for 
purposes of the IAD no later than March 2, 2005, when it 
accompanied defendant to federal prison, was verified, and the 
prosecutor was notified that defendant was requesting disposition on 
the outstanding charges filed against him.  [Id. at 1 (Zahra, J., 
dissenting).]   
Defendant again filed an application for leave to appeal in this Court, and this 
time, we granted defendant’s application for leave to appeal.  People v Swafford, 
482 Mich 1015 (2008).   
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case involves the interpretation of the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers Act, MCL 780.601.  Questions of statutory interpretation are questions 
of law that this Court reviews de novo.  People v Osantowski, 481 Mich 103, 107; 
748 NW2d 799 (2008). 
 
                                              
defendant’s timely appeal.  Accordingly, the trial court did not have proper 
jurisdiction to bring defendant to trial or convict defendant. 
 
 
 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
“Forty-eight States, [including Michigan,] the Federal Government, and the 
District of Columbia . . . have entered into the Interstate Agreement on Detainers . 
 .  .  .”  Alabama v Bozeman, 533 US 146, 148; 121 S Ct 2079; 150 L Ed 2d 188 
(2001).  The IAD “creates uniform procedures for lodging and executing a 
detainer, i.e., a legal order that requires a State in which an individual is currently 
imprisoned to hold that individual when he has finished serving his sentence so 
that he may be tried by a different State for a different crime.”  Id.6  Article I of the 
IAD indicates that its purpose is to “encourage the expeditious and orderly 
disposition” of “charges outstanding against . . . prisoner[s].”  MCL 780.601.  
Article III(a) of the IAD provides, in pertinent part:     
Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment 
in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever 
during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending 
in any other party state any untried indictment, information or 
complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against 
the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty 
days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting 
officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officers’ 
jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his 
request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, 
information or complaint . . . .  [Id.]   
Article V(c) of the IAD states, in relevant part: 
[I]n the event that an action on the indictment, information or 
complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not 
                                              
6 Article II(a) of the IAD defines “state” to include “the United States of 
America.”  MCL 780.601.  
 
 
 
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brought to trial within the period provided in Article III . . . , the 
appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, 
information or complaint has been pending shall enter an order 
dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon 
shall cease to be of any force or effect.  [Id.] 
In this case, the Wayne County Prosecutor lodged a detainer against 
defendant, and while defendant was serving a term of imprisonment at a federal 
institution, defendant made a written request with the prosecutor for a final 
disposition of the pending Michigan charges.  Thereafter, the prosecutor failed to 
bring defendant to trial within 180 days as is required by Article III(a) of the IAD.  
Article V(c) of the IAD, MCL 780.601, states that if a trial is not brought within 
the period provided in Article III(a), “the . . . court . . . shall enter an order 
dismissing the [complaint] with prejudice . . . .”  (Emphasis added.)  Therefore, the 
trial court in this case properly dismissed the charges with prejudice. 
In its first opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court on the basis 
that the IAD was not applicable because defendant was not serving a term of 
imprisonment when the prosecutor lodged the detainer against him.  However, the 
IAD does not require that the detainer be lodged while the defendant is serving a 
term of imprisonment.  Instead, Article III(a) requires that “during the continuance 
of the term of imprisonment,” a charge must be “pending . . . on the basis of which 
a detainer has been lodged.”  (Emphasis added.)  The Legislature’s use of the 
passive voice makes when the detainer was lodged irrelevant as long as it was 
lodged before the defendant requested a final disposition.  Furthermore, “a 
detainer remains lodged against a prisoner without any action being taken on it.”  
 
 
 
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People v McLemore, 411 Mich 691, 692 n 2; 311 NW2d 720 (1981) (citation and 
quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).  See also United States v Mauro, 436 
US 340, 360; 98 S Ct 1834; 56 L Ed 2d 329 (1978).  Therefore, the IAD applies as 
long as a “detainer has been lodged against the [defendant],” and the defendant, 
while serving a term of imprisonment in one party state, has charges pending 
against him in another party state, and causes a written request for a final 
disposition to be delivered to the prosecutor and the court.  Upon receiving that 
request, the prosecutor must bring the defendant to trial within 180 days.  That is, 
although the defendant must be serving a term of imprisonment when the out-of-
state charges are pending and when he files a request for a final disposition, the 
defendant does not have to be serving a term of imprisonment when the detainer is 
first lodged.  Because a detainer had been lodged against defendant, and because 
he was serving a term of imprisonment when he requested a final disposition on 
the pending out-of-state charges, the prosecutor was required to bring defendant to 
trial within 180 days of receiving defendant’s request for trial. 
As discussed earlier, this Court vacated that Court of Appeals judgment and 
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of defendant’s 
documentation.  On remand, the Court of Appeals again reversed the trial court’s 
dismissal of the charges.  However, this time it did so on a different rationale.  The 
Court of Appeals correctly recognized that the two cases that it had previously 
relied upon-- People v Monasterski, 105 Mich App 645; 307 NW2d 394 (1981), 
and People v Wilden (On Rehearing), 197 Mich App 533; 496 NW2d 801 (1992)-- 
 
 
 
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are readily distinguishable from the instant case.7  It further recognized that if the 
prosecutor in this case had sent the detainer to the Bureau of Prisons, “the fact that 
the prosecutor lodged the detainer before defendant was imprisoned would be 
irrelevant” and “we would be compelled to find that the provisions of the IAD 
                                              
7 In Monasterski, the defendants argued that the IAD had been violated 
because their trial was not commenced within 120 days of their arrival in 
Michigan, as required by Article IV(c) of the IAD.  However, the Court of 
Appeals held that because the defendants never began serving terms of 
imprisonment in Indiana (they were simply held in a county jail in Indiana 
pending extradition), the IAD was not even applicable.  Monasterski, 105 Mich 
App at 653.  In Wilden, the defendant argued that his return to a federal 
correctional facility on September 21, 1990, before trial, violated the IAD because 
Article IV(e) of the IAD provides that  
[i]f trial is not had on any . . . complaint . . . prior to the prisoner’s 
being returned to the original place of imprisonment . . . such . . . 
complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court 
shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.  [MCL 
780.601.]  
However, the Court of Appeals held that because the defendant had not “entered 
upon a term of imprisonment” as of September 21, 1990, the IAD was not even 
applicable.  Wilden, 197 Mich App at 539.  Moreover, the Court of Appeals in 
Wilden recognized that the prosecutor had lodged detainers against the defendant.  
Id. at 538.  This recognition undercuts the prosecutor’s argument in the instant 
case that communications sent before a prisoner begins a term of imprisonment are 
not detainers.   
 
Unlike Monasterski and Wilden, the instant case involves Article III(a) of 
the IAD, which provides that when a defendant is serving a term of imprisonment 
in one state and another state has lodged a detainer against the defendant, the latter 
state has 180 days to bring the defendant to trial after it receives the defendant’s 
written request for a final disposition of the outstanding charges.  And, unlike the 
defendants in Monasterski and Wilden, the defendant in the instant case had begun 
to serve a term of imprisonment in the federal prison on the critical date, i.e., when 
defendant requested a final disposition of the outstanding charges. 
 
 
 
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were violated and that the convictions against defendant must be vacated.”  
Swafford II, supra at 5.   
However, the Court of Appeals concluded that because the prosecutor never 
sent a detainer directly to the Bureau of Prisons, where defendant was serving his 
sentence, no valid detainer under the IAD was ever filed.  It explained that, 
although the IAD does not define the term “detainer,” several cases have defined 
the term “detainer” as a “‘notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner 
is serving a sentence . . . .’”  McLemore, 411 Mich at 692 n 2, quoting Mauro, 436 
US at 359 (quotation marks omitted).  The Court of Appeals held that because the 
prosecutor sent the detainer to the U.S. Marshals rather than the Bureau of Prisons, 
the detainer was not valid, and, thus, the IAD did not apply.    
The dissenting judge, on the other hand, recognized that, 
[a]lthough the June 1, 2004, correspondence was filed with the U.S. 
Marshal before defendant was imprisoned, it is without dispute that 
the correspondence followed defendant to federal prison, where a 
federal prison official verified “the request to lodge a detainer,” the 
prosecutor’s office caused the clerk of the court to certify the 
warrant and complaint, and the federal prison official subsequently 
sent the prosecutor a letter stating that “[a] detainer has been filed 
against this subject in your favor.”  [Swafford II, supra at 1 (Zahra, 
J., dissenting) (citation omitted).]   
The dissenting judge emphasized that the “federal institution in which defendant 
was imprisoned regarded the detainer as lodged once it was verified, as evidenced 
by the sending of the detainer letter” and “the prosecutor’s conduct supports the 
conclusion that [she] also viewed the detainer as being properly lodged,” because 
“the prosecutor ultimately filed all the documents that would be consistent with 
 
 
 
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the understanding that an IAD detainer had been lodged with the federal prison.”  
Id. at 1-2.  Accordingly, the dissent concluded that the detainer had been properly 
lodged with the Bureau of Prisons and that the IAD was violated when defendant 
was not brought to trial within 180 days.   
We agree with the dissenting judge.  Contrary to the conclusion of the 
Court of Appeals majority, there is no requirement in the IAD that the prosecutor 
initially file the detainer with the institution in which the prisoner is serving his 
sentence.  Article III(a) simply states that it is applicable where “a detainer has 
been lodged against the prisoner.”  MCL 780.601.  There is no language in the 
IAD that requires the prosecutor to initially lodge the detainer with any specific 
institution.  Although caselaw generally describes a detainer as a “‘notification 
filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence,’” McLemore, 
411 Mich at 692 n 2, quoting Mauro, 436 US at 359, these descriptions are merely 
meant to provide guidance on the meaning of “detainer” in the absence of a 
statutory definition.  These cases do not support the proposition that a detainer that 
the prosecutor initially filed with another institution, i.e., the U.S. Marshals, but 
which nevertheless reaches the institution in which the prisoner is serving his 
sentence, is not a valid detainer for purposes of the IAD.8  Further, as discussed 
                                              
8 The question at issue in both McLemore and Mauro was whether a writ of 
habeas corpus constitutes a detainer for purposes of the IAD.  Further, McLemore, 
on which the prosecutor relies because it states that a detainer is a “‘notification 
filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving sentence,’” McLemore, 411 
Mich at 692 n 2, quoting Mauro, 436 US at 359, also states that “the provisions of 
 
 
 
 
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earlier, nothing in the actual language of the IAD requires the prosecutor to 
initially file the detainer with the institution in which the defendant is serving his 
sentence.  Instead, Article III(a) simply requires the prosecutor to bring the 
defendant to trial within 180 days when “a detainer has been lodged against the 
prisoner” and, while serving a term of imprisonment, the defendant causes to be 
delivered to the prosecutor and the court a written request for a final disposition.  
In this case, (1) “a detainer [had] been lodged against [defendant],” and (2) while 
he was serving a term of imprisonment, defendant caused to be delivered to the 
prosecutor and the court a written request for a final disposition.  Therefore, the 
IAD was breached when defendant was not brought to trial within 180 days.9      
Finally, the facts of this case make it clear that both parties invoked the 
IAD for purposes of bringing defendant to trial.  The institution in which 
defendant was serving his sentence received the prosecutor’s detainer, the 
                                              
the [IAD] apply if a participating jurisdiction which has untried charges against a 
prisoner lodges a detainer with the jurisdiction where the prisoner is incarcerated . 
. . .”  Id. at 694, citing Mauro (emphasis added).  In the instant case, there is no 
question that the prosecutor lodged a detainer with the jurisdiction in which 
defendant was incarcerated when it lodged the detainer with the U.S. Marshals and 
where defendant was incarcerated in a federal prison.   
9 The Court of Appeals noted that “the parties provide only scant 
information indicating how the Bureau of Prisons received notification that 
defendant had outstanding criminal charges in Michigan.”  Swafford II, supra at 8 
(emphasis added).  However, how the Bureau received notice is not particularly 
relevant.  All that is relevant for purposes of the IAD is that the Bureau received 
notice and passed it on to defendant, who, while serving a term of imprisonment, 
then filed a written request for a final disposition with the prosecutor and the 
court. 
 
 
 
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institution confirmed the detainer with the prosecutor, the prosecutor expressly 
agreed to bring defendant to trial within 180 days of receiving defendant’s request 
for trial as is required by Article III(a), and the prosecutor obtained custody of 
defendant through the IAD.  In a correspondence with defendant, a federal prison 
official stated, “I verified the request to lodge a detainer . . . .”  Stamped on the 
letter that accompanied the June 1, 2004, detainer is a notation dated March 2, 
2005, indicating that a federal prison official verified the detainer against 
defendant with the extradition unit of the Wayne County Prosecutor.  The Bureau 
of Prisons further provided the prosecutor and the court clerk with notice of 
defendant’s request for a final disposition of the Michigan charges that stated:  
The above named defendant is requesting disposition on the 
outstanding charges you have filed against him as a detainer. . . .  An 
inmate requesting disposition of detainers in accordance with Article 
III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act must be brought to 
trial within 180 days of your receipt of this request.   
It is undisputed that the prosecutor received this notice on March 7, 2005.  The 
Bureau of Prisons also submitted a document to the prosecutor that provides, “A 
detainer has been filed against this subject in your favor for: 1st Degree Murder, 
we will again notify you approximately 60 days prior to actual release.”  
Subsequently, the Bureau of Prisons sent a letter to the prosecutor that stated:  
 
The above named inmate has requested disposition on 
outstanding charges which were filed against him as a detainer. . . .  
As you know, once an inmate requests disposition under the IAD 
they must be brought to trial within 180 days of your receipt of the 
request.  Ninety of the allotted 180 days elapsed effective June 25, 
2005.   
 
 
 
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In response, the prosecutor signed an “Agreement on Detainers” that states, “I 
propose to bring this person to trial on the indictment, information or complaint 
named in the offer within the time specified in Article III(a) of the Agreement on 
Detainers.”  This agreement also states that “[t]his form should only be used when 
an offer of temporary custody has been received as the result of a prisoner’s 
request for disposition of a detainer” and that “[this form is] in response to [the 
Bureau of Prisons’] letter of March 2, 2005.”  When the prosecutor failed to bring 
defendant to trial within 180 days, the Bureau of Prisons sent the prosecutor a 
letter stating: 
 
The above named inmate requested disposition of the 
outstanding charges that you have filed against him as a detainer on 
03-02-2005.  Under Article III of the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers, an inmate must be brought to trial within 180 days after 
he requests disposition and the forms are received by the appropriate 
officials.  Our records indicate the forms required under the 
provisions of the IAD were received and signed for by your office 
on 03-07-2005. . . .  Since 180 days have elapsed since you received 
this request for disposition, we have advised, by copy of this letter to 
the inmate, that he may petition the appropriate court for dismissal 
of the outstanding charges.   
Finally, the Bureau of Prisons’ “Release Authorization” indicates a “Release 
Date” of “10-05-05”; under the word “Method” appear the initials “IAD”; and 
after “Detainer,” the “Yes” box is checked.   
In this case, it is utterly clear that the prosecutor lodged a detainer against 
defendant, that both the Bureau of Prisons and defendant were aware of this 
detainer, that the prosecutor was aware that the Bureau of Prisons was in 
possession of the detainer, and that defendant caused a written request for a final 
 
 
 
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disposition to be delivered to the prosecutor and the court while defendant was 
serving a term of imprisonment.  Therefore, the IAD is clearly applicable, and 
Article III(a) was indisputably violated when defendant was not brought to trial 
within the proper time frame.  Because Article V(c) expressly states that if the 
defendant is not “brought to trial within the period provided in Article III . . . , the 
appropriate court . . . shall enter an order dismissing the [charges] with prejudice,” 
the trial court here properly dismissed the charges against defendant.  “Any other 
reading of [the IAD] would allow the Government to gain the advantages of 
lodging a detainer against a prisoner without assuming the responsibilities that the 
[IAD] intended to arise from such an action.”  Mauro, 436 US at 364.  The 
prosecutor here failed to satisfy these responsibilities. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The clear language of the IAD, MCL 780.601, states that if the prosecutor 
fails to bring a defendant to trial within 180 days of receiving the defendant’s 
request for a final disposition made while the defendant is serving a term of 
imprisonment if a “detainer has been lodged against the prisoner,” the court “shall 
enter an order dismissing the [complaint] with prejudice.”  Because that is 
precisely what happened in this case, we reverse the Court of Appeals and 
reinstate the trial court’s order dismissing the charges with prejudice.10  However 
                                              
10 Because we are reinstating the trial court’s order dismissing the charges 
against defendant, defendant’s convictions and sentences arising from these 
 
 
 
 
17
harsh and inflexible a remedy for failure to comply with the IAD this may be 
adjudged, it is plainly what our Legislature requires. 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
Marilyn Kelly 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Diane M. Hathaway 
                                              
charges must be set aside.  Defendant’s motion to remand for an evidentiary 
hearing is denied because it is now moot.