Case Title: Collier v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2007-09-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Collier v. State1996 WY 101920 P.2d 265Case Number: 96-37Decided: 07/17/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
Bobby J. COLLIER,

 Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of 
Wyoming,

 Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court of Fremont County, Nancy J. Guthrie, J.

Bobby J. 
Collier, pro se.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; and D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR* and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice effective 
July 1, 1996.

MACY, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Bobby 
Collier appeals from the district court's order which denied his motion to 
correct an illegal sentence.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant 
presents two issues for our review:

ISSUE I

The District Court erred 
in [o]rdering Appellant to reimburse his Court Ordered Public Defender for his 
legal services without first determining Appellant's ability to pay as required 
by § 7-6-106.

ISSUE II

The District [Court] 
erred when it changed the Original Judgment and Sentence [p]ursuant to a Motion 
for Sentence Reduction and . . . Motion For Post Conviction Relief, thereby 
legally eliminating the Court[']s Original Judgment and Sentence imposing 
restitution, Crime Victims Compensation Fund, and reimbursement costs of the 
Public Defender[']s legal services. Appellant's Constitutional rights are being 
violated under both State and Federal Law, in that he is still being compelled 
to comply with said orders that no longer are valid under the Original Judgment 
and Sentence.

FACTS

[¶4]      On June 10, 1988, 
Appellant, who was on parole for a first-degree sexual assault conviction, was 
driving his truck on a street in Shoshoni when he saw an acquaintance (the 
victim) of his. Appellant stopped and offered to give the victim a ride, and she 
got into his truck. The victim was a nineteen-year-old female who was trying to 
locate her father. Appellant agreed to help the victim find her father, but, 
instead of doing so, he drove her to a secluded area east of town. He stopped 
the truck under the pretext of having to go to the bathroom. After exiting his 
truck, he walked around to the passenger door, opened it, and struck the victim 
in the face, breaking her nose. He then pulled her out of the truck and sexually 
assaulted her.

[¶5]      Appellant was 
charged with first-degree sexual assault, and a public defender was appointed to 
represent him. Appellant initially pleaded not guilty but later withdrew his 
plea and pleaded guilty in exchange for the State's agreement to recommend that 
he be given a maximum sentence of thirty years rather than the potential life 
sentence. The district court sentenced Appellant to serve a prison term of not 
less than twenty years nor more than thirty years and ordered that the sentence 
was to run consecutively to any sentence which might be reimposed in the event 
that Appellant's parole on his prior first-degree sexual assault conviction was 
revoked. The district court also ordered Appellant to pay $338.65 in restitution 
to the victim, $50 to the crime victims' compensation account, and $250 for his 
public defender's services.

[¶6]      At a later 
hearing, the district court reduced Appellant's sentence for this crime so that 
his prison term would run concurrently with the prison term which was reimposed 
when his parole was revoked. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to correct an 
illegal sentence, claiming that his concurrent sentences were being incorrectly 
managed at the penitentiary. He alleged that his latest twenty- to thirty-year 
sentence should be deemed to have commenced at the same time as his prior 
sentence did and that the latest sentence should end upon the expiration of his 
prior sentence. The district court denied that motion.

[¶7]      Appellant also 
filed various other motions wherein he attacked the district court's order which 
required him to pay $250 for his public defender's services. The district court 
denied those motions as well. Appellant appeals to this Court.

DISCUSSION

A. Ability to 
Pay

[¶8]      Appellant claims 
that the district court erred in ordering him to pay $250 for his public 
defender's services without first determining his ability to pay. WYO. STAT. § 
7-6-106(c) (1995) addresses orders which require defendants to reimburse the 
State. That section provides in pertinent part:

(c) To the extent that a 
person receives the services set out in W.S. 7-6-104, and is able to provide 
some funds toward the costs associated with such services, the presiding court 
may order the person to reimburse the state for the cost of the services 
provided. In making such an order, the court shall consider the financial 
resources of the person and the expenses and services provided. . . 
.

Section 
7-6-106(c).

[¶9]      We have examined 
this ability-to-pay issue on previous occasions. King v. State, 780 P.2d 943, 
957-58 (Wyo. 1989); Juarez v. State, 791 P.2d 287, 289 (Wyo. 1990); Seaton v. 
State, 811 P.2d 276, 283-84 (Wyo. 1991). In King, the district court ordered the 
appellant to repay $2,750 to the State for the public defender's services. 780 P.2d  at 957. Although the district court inquired into the appellant's financial 
resources, it did so after it had ordered reimbursement when it was determining 
whether to certify the appellant's indigency for purposes of providing counsel 
on appeal. 780 P.2d  at 957-58. We held that the district court erred in ordering 
reimbursement without first determining the appellant's ability to pay. 780 P.2d  
at 957.

[¶10]   We also addressed the issue in 
Juarez. In that case, the appellant filed an affidavit, requesting that the 
court appoint an attorney to represent him. 791 P.2d  at 287. The affidavit 
revealed that the appellant was not employed, did not have any money, and did 
not own a vehicle or property and that neither the appellant's family nor his 
friends could contribute any money toward his defense. 791 P.2d  at 287-88. The 
appellant listed debts which included $5,000 that he owed to his lawyer and an 
unknown amount that he owed for child support. 791 P.2d  at 288. At his 
sentencing hearing, the public defender advised the trial court that the 
appellant worked in the construction industry and earned more per hour than the 
public defender was earning. Id. The transcript did not contain any other 
information, discussion, or findings with regard to the appellant's financial 
situation. Id. We concluded that the provisions of § 7-6-106(c) required the 
trial court to make express findings about the factors contained in the 
statutory language and that the record failed to show that the trial court made 
findings with respect to the appellant's ability to pay for his public 
defender's services. 791 P.2d  at 289.

[¶11]   In Seaton, the record revealed that 
the appellant was an unemployed, divorced female with a fifteen-year-old son. 
811 P.2d  at 280. According to the last entry of the record, which post dated the 
entry of her sentence, the appellant had lost her house and her car, and she had 
sold most of her furniture to get money to live on. Id. She did not have any 
real income, and she was trying to get public assistance for subsistence funds. 
Id. She had unpaid medical expenses as well as other bills and expenses. Id. We 
held that the district court improperly ordered reimbursement without first 
determining the appellant's ability to pay. 811 P.2d  at 283-84.

[¶12]   In the case at bar, the district 
court specifically informed Appellant at his arraignment of the possibility that 
he might be required to reimburse the State for his public defender's services. 
With regard to that possibility, the district court inquired into Appellant's 
employment history and financial position. It determined that, prior to his 
arrest, Appellant was earning about $6 per hour and that Appellant owned a truck 
which was worth approximately $1,000. The district court advised Appellant that 
it might be necessary to sell the truck to pay for the public defender's 
services. At the sentencing hearing, the district court informed Appellant that, 
in deciding what the sentence should be, it had considered the presentence 
investigation report as well as all other matters of record before the court. It 
then ordered Appellant to pay $250 for his public defender's 
services.

[¶13]   Record evidence showed that, before 
imposing the reimbursement obligation, the district court inquired into and 
considered Appellant's financial circumstances, intending to possibly order such 
an obligation. While we have previously interpreted § 7-6-106(c) as requiring 
record evidence of a district court's evaluation or determination with respect 
to a defendant's ability to pay, we have never required that the district court 
enter a specific oral or written conclusion that such an ability existed. We, 
therefore, conclude that the district court determined Appellant's ability to 
reimburse the State $250 for his public defender's services before it ordered 
him to do so.

B. Other 
Arguments

[¶14]   Appellant argues that the district 
court's sentence reduction vacated those portions of the original sentence on 
which the district court was silent. Specifically, he claims that the limited 
sentence reduction effectively vacated his obligations to reimburse the State 
for his public defender's services, to pay restitution, and to pay a crime 
victims' compensation account surcharge. Appellant also interjects a variety of 
other assertions into his brief which are difficult to characterize with any 
precision.

[¶15]   Not only has Appellant failed to 
provide any cogent argument or pertinent authority in support of these 
arguments, but he also did not present any of these arguments to the district 
court, raising them for the first time in this appeal. We, therefore, will not 
consider these issues now. Cotton v. Brow, 903 P.2d 530, 532 (Wyo. 1995); Hiltz 
v. Robert W. Horn, P.C., 910 P.2d 566, 572 (Wyo. 1996).

CONCLUSION

[¶16]   The district court did not err in 
the proceeding below.

[¶17]   Affirmed.