Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Bunstine

Citation: 2012-Ohio-977

Docket Number: 2011-0647

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-03-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Bunstine, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-977.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-977 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. BUNSTINE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Bunstine,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-977.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of Rules of Professional Conduct, including 
engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice—Six-
month suspension stayed on condition. 
(No. 2011-0647—Submitted September 20, 2011—Decided March 13, 2012.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 10-065. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Edward Royal Bunstine, of Chillicothe, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0030127, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1981.  In August 2010, relator, disciplinary counsel, filed a complaint against 
respondent, alleging that his actions in a criminal investigation involving 
acquaintances violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (a lawyer shall 
not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 
8.4(h) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on the fitness 
to practice law). 
{¶ 2} A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline heard the matter.  It concluded that respondent had violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) and (h), but not 8.4(c), and recommended that the charge be 
dismissed.  The panel further recommended that respondent be publicly 
reprimanded for his misconduct. 
{¶ 3} The board adopted most of the panel’s report but found that 
respondent had also violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c).  As a result, the board 
recommended a six-month suspension from the practice of law in Ohio.  
Respondent filed objections to the board’s report. 
{¶ 4} After considering the arguments presented in the briefs and in oral 
argument, we accept the board’s findings of professional misconduct and the 
recommendation for a six-month suspension; however, we order a stay of all six 
months of the suspension. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 5} The actions giving rise to the complaint began with a disagreement 
between two families.  Russell Creed was a long-time friend of Ed DeLong and 
his wife, Bonnie DeLong.  At various times over the years, all three had taken 
Schedule II or III analgesics prescribed by their respective physicians, and they 
would occasionally give each other this medication if one of them was in need but 
unable to get to a pharmacy right away to fill or renew a prescription. 
{¶ 6} On September 17, 2007, Ed DeLong discovered that some of his 
pain medication was missing.  After Bonnie denied taking the pills, he accused 
Russell Creed of taking them.  When contacted, Russell confirmed that he had 
taken some of the medication, and he immediately went to the DeLongs to return 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
it.  Convinced that Russell had not returned the full amount, Ed threatened to 
contact law enforcement.  Russell’s wife, Natalie, in turn, threatened to file 
charges against Bonnie for having given Russell pills in the past. 
{¶ 7} Respondent received a frantic phone call at home from Natalie 
Creed, who reported that the Ross County Sheriff’s Department had visited their 
home.  Respondent knew the Creeds and the DeLongs socially.  Respondent told 
Natalie that he would talk to the DeLongs to “see what [he] could find out about 
the situation.” 
{¶ 8} When respondent contacted the DeLongs, both expressed 
misgivings about having called the sheriff’s office, fearing that they may have 
gotten Russell into real trouble.  Rather than suggest that the DeLongs contact the 
sheriff’s office directly and withdraw the accusation against Russell, respondent 
agreed to prepare affidavits for the couple to sign.  According to Bonnie DeLong,1 
she assumed that respondent was preparing the documents as a friendly favor, and 
no fee was ever discussed or a bill for services ever received.  She denied that the 
couple ever considered respondent to be their legal representative in the matter. 
{¶ 9} The affidavits stated that Russell and Bonnie had exchanged 
prescription medication in the past and articulated the DeLongs’ current belief 
that Russell had simply “borrowed” some medication as he had done before.  
Both affidavits indicated that the DeLongs had asked respondent to prepare the 
documents and deliver them to the sheriff’s office.  Ed and Bonnie DeLong 
signed these statements on September 19. 
{¶ 10} On September 20, detective David Bower of the Ross County 
Sheriff’s Department met with respondent.  Bower told him that Ed DeLong had 
contacted the sheriff’s department concerning his affidavit, and Bower indicated 
that respondent may have done something wrong.  When Bower asked respondent 
                                                 
1  Ed DeLong is since deceased and did not testify in the disciplinary proceeding. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
for the affidavits, respondent refused, claiming that he had an attorney-client 
relationship with the DeLongs that prevented him from surrendering the 
documents. 
{¶ 11} Bower threatened respondent with arrest, prompting respondent’s 
agreement to release the documents if the DeLongs’ consent was obtained.  
Consent was obtained and the affidavits were surrendered.  Respondent drafted a 
second affidavit that Bonnie signed on October 1, 2007.  It stated in part: 
 
It was acknowledged and agreed that Mr. Bunstine would 
not release the Affidavits to anyone without our authorization.  
Further, we authorized Mr. Bunstine to destroy the Affidavits if he 
felt that this would be in the best interest of me and my husband. 
Mr. Bunstine advised both me and my husband that he 
would protect our interest and that the Affidavits could not, and 
would not, be released or the contents divulged if the Affidavits 
would place a negative light against my husband and I. 
 
{¶ 12} The focus of the sheriff’s investigation gradually shifted from 
Russell Creed to respondent and the affidavits that he had created.  While the 
investigation failed to prove that anything in the original affidavits was false, it 
nevertheless culminated in respondent’s no-contest plea to two counts of 
disorderly conduct, which arose from the assertions that he made to the sheriff’s 
office regarding the affidavits. 
{¶ 13} Respondent’s conduct after the affidavits were created is the focus 
of this disciplinary proceeding.  Respondent has asserted that all of his actions 
were consistent either with the DeLongs’ wishes or his duty to them as their 
attorney. Relator has accused respondent of fabricating an attorney-client 
relationship with the DeLongs and argues that respondent’s refusal to surrender 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
the affidavits was motivated solely by his desire to shield himself from potential 
criminal charges in connection with those documents. 
{¶ 14} The board found that the evidence did not support respondent’s 
claims, and we agree.  There is no evidence that the DeLongs retained respondent 
as their legal representative.  Bonnie DeLong testified that she and her husband 
did not understand that respondent was acting as their attorney, and no fee 
agreement or other contract between respondent and the DeLongs was ever 
produced.  Respondent persists, arguing that the preparation of the affidavits 
implicitly gave rise to an attorney-client relationship.  Even if true, however, his 
refusal to surrender the affidavits ignores that (1) the documents were prepared 
specifically for the sheriff, (2) the documents contained the DeLongs’ express 
consent to their release, and (3) respondent went to the sheriff’s office for the 
express purpose of giving those documents to a department representative. 
{¶ 15} The evidence also does not support respondent’s contention that he 
was only heeding the DeLongs’ instructions in attempting to retain the affidavits.  
Respondent cites Bonnie’s October 1, 2007 affidavit, which states that respondent 
was to keep and destroy the original affidavits if he believed that they contained 
information that was detrimental to the DeLongs.  Respondent, however, knew 
that Bonnie’s admission to sharing scheduled medication could subject her to 
prosecution, yet he included that admission in the original affidavits and took 
them to the sheriff’s office—actions utterly inconsistent with his purported 
instructions.  The October affidavit is nothing more than a belated fabrication of 
instructions made for the sole purpose of trying to justify respondent’s actions. 
{¶ 16} The board was also troubled by respondent’s admission that he 
received $1,000 from Russell Creed after charges against Creed had been 
dropped.  Respondent waited eight months before reporting this money to the 
authorities investigating him, and he did so only after learning that Creed had told 
them of the payment.  These actions, coupled with his preparation of affidavits 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
that arguably exonerated Creed at Bonnie DeLong’s expense, prompted the 
board’s concern that respondent may have actually been representing Russell 
Creed. 
{¶ 17} We agree with the board that respondent’s actions violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) and (h).  We also agree with the board’s determination that 
respondent’s actions violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c)’s prohibition against 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.  Respondent insists that such a 
finding is inappropriate since the board found no evidence that the September 
affidavits contained untrue statements.  Respondent’s focus, however, is too 
narrow.  Regardless of the truthfulness of the affidavits, much of respondent’s 
testimony about his actions after the affidavits were prepared cannot be reconciled 
with the actions themselves and are a deliberate misrepresentation of what 
actually occurred in this case. 
Sanction 
{¶ 18} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and sanctions 
imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 
2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  We also weigh evidence of the 
mitigating and aggravating factors listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B).  Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 19} The board found two mitigating factors: (1) the absence of a prior 
disciplinary record and (2) the imposition of other penalties or sanctions by virtue 
of his negotiated misdemeanor no-contest plea. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a) 
and (f).  It also found two aggravating factors, concluding that respondent acted 
with a selfish motive and that he refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of 
his conduct. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b) and (g). 
{¶ 20} Respondent objects to both aggravating factors, but again we agree 
with the board.  His continued insistence that his actions were motivated by a 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
desire to protect the DeLongs, not himself, is not supported by the evidence.  
Respondent’s attempts to retain the September affidavits were clearly intended to 
protect himself, not the DeLongs.  Moreover, his preparation of Bonnie DeLong’s 
second affidavit—which contradicts much of what she had averred in her first 
one—was clearly intended to extricate respondent from the situation he found 
himself in after he had refused to surrender the initial affidavits.  We thus agree 
that BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b) is an aggravating factor in this case. 
{¶ 21} We reach the same conclusion regarding BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(g).  Respondent’s contention that if he did anything wrong, he accepts 
responsibility for it, does not constitute an acknowledgement that he did act 
inappropriately. 
{¶ 22} Generally, a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) warrants an actual 
suspension from the practice of law.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Potter, 126 Ohio 
St.3d 50, 2010-Ohio-2521, 930 N.E.2d 307, ¶ 10.  There are, however, exceptions 
in which we have stayed the suspension on the condition that the respondent 
commit no further disciplinary violations. 
{¶ 23} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Ricketts, 128 Ohio St.3d 271, 2010-
Ohio-6240, 943 N.E.2d 981, we imposed a six-month stayed suspension on an 
attorney who had misrepresented the encumbered status of land in order to 
deceive creditors.  Despite a finding that respondent had violated DR 1-
102(A)(4), the predecessor of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), we imposed the stayed 
suspension, writing: 
 
Although 
we 
find 
that 
respondent 
intended 
to 
make 
misrepresentations that could mislead others, we do not think that 
he did so in a malicious or selfish manner.  Respondent honestly 
wanted to fulfill the wife’s wish to pay all creditors fully, and he 
believed that everyone would be paid if he could discourage 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
creditors from seeking the company’s unencumbered assets.  
Everyone did get paid in this instance, and there was no showing 
that anyone was harmed by the misrepresentations. 
The presence of this laudable motive does not excuse his 
behavior or prevent us from sanctioning him; the methods used by 
respondent in this matter could easily have been used for more 
malicious ends and to cause greater harm.  It does, however, make 
us believe that this is a one-time ethical lapse by an attorney with 
an otherwise sterling reputation that does not merit an actual 
suspension from the practice of law. 
 
Ricketts at ¶ 41-42. 
{¶ 24} The case at bar is distinguishable from Ricketts in that respondent 
acted with a selfish motive.  On the other hand, there were no misrepresentations 
in the documents that gave rise to this controversy, unlike in Ricketts.  Thus, on 
balance, we find Ricketts to be instructive. 
{¶ 25} We also believe that as in Ricketts, a laudable intent did, at one 
point, exist.  Respondent’s decision to become involved in the Creed-DeLong 
matter appeared to stem from a sincere desire to resolve a matter between four 
individuals that he knew to be longtime friends.  Unfortunately, baseless 
accusations about the veracity of the affidavits that he had prepared suddenly 
subjected respondent to scrutiny that he never anticipated. As respondent stated 
later, he wishes that he had never taken Natalie Creed’s phone call. 
{¶ 26} Respondent’s arguably good intentions, however, do not excuse his 
subsequent behavior or prevent the imposition of a sanction.  When respondent 
learned that Ed DeLong had made accusations about the truthfulness of the 
affidavits that respondent had prepared, respondent attempted to shield these 
documents from inspection by suggesting that he had an attorney-client 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
relationship with the DeLongs that, even if present, would not have prevented him 
from releasing the affidavits.  Respondent then created a second affidavit for 
Bonnie’s signature to support the assertion that he could not release the affidavits 
without the DeLongs’ consent.  Such misconduct requires more than a public 
reprimand. 
{¶ 27} Respondent has practiced law in the state of Ohio for 30 years 
without any prior disciplinary record.  As in Ricketts, we believe that this was a 
one-time ethical lapse that is unlikely to be repeated, and thus it does not merit an 
actual suspension from the practice of law.  Therefore, we suspend respondent 
from the practice of law in Ohio for six months, but we stay all six months on the 
condition that respondent commit no further disciplinary violations.  If respondent 
violates this condition, the stay will be lifted, and respondent will serve the six-
month suspension.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., dissent and 
would impose a six-month actual suspension. 
__________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Heather Coglianese, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Edward R. Bunstine, pro se. 
______________________