Case Title: State v. Cummins

Citation: 347 N.W.2d 571

Docket Number: 

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1984-04-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
347 N.W.2d 571 (1984) STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Michael Joe CUMMINS, Defendant and Appellant. Cr. No. 960. Supreme Court of North Dakota. April 24, 1984. *572 Mark R. Boening, States Atty., Dickinson, for plaintiff and appellee. William G. Heth, Dickinson, for defendant and appellant. PEDERSON, Justice. In spite of Cummins' testimony that he had consumed an excessive amount of alcohol and that he was so intoxicated that he did not know if he had or had not raped Leona, the jury found him guilty of gross sexual imposition (§ 12.1-20-03, NDCC), a class A felony. He was sentenced to serve 20 years in the state penitentiary with eight years suspended. The significant question on this appeal is whether or not, in the light of Cummins' defense, the jury was properly instructed. The evidence is overwhelming and uncontradicted that Cummins overpowered Leona in her home and had sexual intercourse with her by force and against her will. Other than the issue relating to jury instructions, the errors argued by Cummins, if they occurred, are harmless beyond any reasonable doubt, did not affect Cummins' substantial rights, and should be disregarded. Rule 52(a), NDRCrimP. The trial court refused to give the following instructions requested by Cummins: In a civil case, Wasem v. Laskowski, 274 N.W.2d 219, 226 (N.D.1979), we said that parties are entitled to have their theory of the case presented to the jury. In criminal cases we have stated the rule: The crime of gross sexual imposition as defined in § 12.1-20-03, NDCC, does not require any specific culpability: Section 12.1-02-02(2), NDCC, provides: "If a statute or regulation thereunder defining a crime does not specify any culpability and does not provide explicitly that a person may be guilty without culpability, the culpability that is required is willfully." The general rule is that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a crime of general intent. See e.g., United States v. Lavallie, 666 F.2d 1217 (8th Cir.1982); State v. Kills Small, 269 N.W.2d 771 (S.D. 1978). Section 12.1-04-02(1), NDCC, provides in part: "Intoxication is not a defense to a criminal charge.... Evidence of intoxication is admissible whenever it is relevant to negate or to establish an element of the offense charged." There was no objection and so the trial court appropriately admitted the evidence relating to Cummins' intoxicated condition which he offered in his defense. The court gave the following instruction: The instruction was more favorable to Cummins than he was entitled to under North Dakota law. It was not error to refuse to instruct as to the definition of "knowingly" or "intentionally." The judgment and sentence are affirmed. ERICKSTAD, C.J., and SAND, VANDE WALLE and GIERKE, JJ., concur.