Case Title: People v. Pitman

Citation: 

Docket Number: 95783

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 95783-Agenda 2-March 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. SHANE 							
PITMAN, Appellant.
Opinion filed June 17, 2004. 
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Shane Pitman, was indicted in the circuit court of
Macoupin County on one count of unlawful manufacture of cannabis, in
that he knowingly manufactured more than 500 grams but not more than
2,000 grams of a substance containing cannabis. 720 ILCS 550/5(e)
(West 1998). Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence and quash
arrest. Defendant moved to suppress, inter alia, marijuana plants seized
following a search of a farm occupied by defendant. At the close of a
hearing, the circuit court granted defendant's motion to suppress. The
State brought an interlocutory appeal to the appellate court pursuant to
our Rule 604(a)(1) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)). The appellate court, with
one justice dissenting, reversed the circuit court's suppression order and
remanded the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings. No.
4-01-0620 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
	We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R.
315(a)). We now reverse the judgment of the appellate court, affirm the
suppression order of the circuit court, and remand the cause to the circuit
court for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND
	The following witnesses testified at the suppression hearing: Alan
Bondy, Sherry White, Dale Reels, Ron Lewis, Amy Curtis, and Mary
Pitman. The hearing adduced the following pertinent evidence.
	Mary Pitman owned a 93-acre farm in Macoupin County, east of the
Village of Shipman. Pitman is defendant's mother and Sherry White's
aunt; White is defendant's cousin. The farm contained two residences, a
farmhouse and a trailer. In July 1999, White lived in the farmhouse;
defendant, his girlfriend Amy Curtis, and their two children lived in the
trailer.
	On Friday, July 16, or Saturday, July 17, 1999, White drove behind
a person she believed to be a police officer. She followed him to his home.
Unbeknownst to White, the officer was Alan Bondy, the chief of police for
the Village of Shipman. White knocked on his front door and they spoke
on his porch. According to White:
			"I knocked on the door and told him I had a question to ask
him, because I was living at a farm and keeping the upkeep, and
someone else that was living on the same farm, but down the
road, was growing marijuana, and I was wanting to know if I
would get into any trouble, or if the person that owned the land
would get their farm taken away, and if there was a couple that
lived there, and if they would get their kids taken away."
According to White, Bondy responded:
			"He said, 'It wouldn't be the Pitman farm out there, would it?'
I didn't say nothing, and I could tell he could tell by the look on
my face. But *** I said, 'Well, if you know if it's the Pitman
farm, why don't you go out there and bust him?' He said he
knew Shane Pitman had been growing marijuana for a while, and
they was after the bigger guys, that they weren't going to bother
him."
At the end of their conversation, according to White: "he told me that I
wouldn't get in no trouble, I more or less just took it that that would be it.
*** I turned around and left and went home *** [b]ack to the farm."
Their entire conversation lasted under a minute.
	White testified that she did not describe the location of the plants.
She did not give Bondy permission to come onto the premises to search.
She did not ask Bondy to have defendant arrested and the plants
removed. Between that day and July 20, White was never contacted by
anyone from the Illinois State Police. No law enforcement officer ever
asked her anything about the plants. She never gave anyone permission to
come onto the premises.
	Alan Bondy testified as follows. White knocked on his front door and
he answered. According to Bondy: "She introduced herself as Sherry
White, said she was renting a farm from her Aunt Mary out east of town."
Further: "She was concerned over cannabis being grown on the property
and was curious whether she would get in trouble or the owner of the
property, being her Aunt Mary, would be subject to lose the property
because of the cannabis being grown." Bondy asked White if defendant
was growing the marijuana, and White responded "yes." White asked
Bondy that if he knew that defendant was growing the marijuana, why did
Bondy not go out to the farm and arrest defendant? Bondy told White that
the farm was located outside of his jurisdiction.
	Further, according to Bondy, White gave him details as to where the
marijuana was growing on the premises:
			"She said that she had found 13 Dixie cups with starter plants
in them, she had found a patch of plants growing behind the barn,
behind the house that she lived in. The barn was behind the
house that she stayed in, and it was growing behind the barn, and
there was another patch across the creek that was growing, on
the other side of a hill or somewhere."
White informed Bondy that "Shane was cultivating, he was taking care of
the plants, and that's what made her nervous." However, White was
somewhat relieved when Bondy offered his opinion that the farm was not
in jeopardy because White came forward with this information, and
because Mary Pitman had no knowledge of defendant's activity.
	Bondy told White that he would have to relay the information to the
proper authorities. He told White that "the Drug Task Force would be out
there and do an investigation, and they would contact her." The entire
conversation lasted "[n]ot more than 5 to 10 minutes."
	According to Bondy, the extent of his involvement was that he took
a statement from White and relayed that information to the Illinois State
Police: "I was given information. I relayed the information on. I jotted the
information down on a piece of notebook paper, so that when the
information was relayed on I got it correct, and that was inadvertently
thrown away." Bondy telephoned the Task Force and left a message. The
following week, Dale Reels returned Bondy's call, and Bondy gave Reels
the information. Bondy told Reels that White "had came by the house, she
had expressed concern over the plants that were being grown on the
property and where they were being grown." Bondy told Reels that White
"wanted them [the marijuana plants] removed, and she wanted Shane
arrested."
	Dale Reels was a patrolman with the Carlinville police department,
assigned to the South Central Illinois Drug Task Force, which was a unit
of the Illinois State Police. At approximately 1 p.m. on Monday July, 19,
1999, Officer Reels telephoned Bondy. According to Reels, Bondy told
him: "She [White] went to him [Bondy] because she was concerned for
the welfare of the farm and concerned for her own welfare, because her
cousin, Shane Pitman, was growing cannabis on the farm." Reels had
known defendant for a few months because defendant had been a
confidential informant for the Drug Task Force. The next day, Tuesday,
July 20, 1999, Officer Reels drove to the Pitman farm. During his
testimony, Reels was asked whether there was "ample time for you to go
obtain a search warrant for the premises on the basis that there is cannabis
growing there," to which he answered, "There would have been time,
yes."
	Officer Reels arrived at the Pitman farm at approximately 2:25 p.m.
With him was Macoupin County deputy sheriff Ron Lewis, also assigned
to the Drug Task Force. Neither Reels nor Lewis had spoken with White
prior to that time. They went to the premises to interview White.
	The 93-acre farm was located along a road that ran north and south.
The farm was on the west side of the road; the farmhouse faced the road
to the east. A driveway off of the road was located on the north side of
the house. On one side of the driveway was a sign that read "Private
Property" and on the other side a sign that read "No Trespassing."
Defendant's trailer was located "at least a football field's length" north of
the house. The trailer had its own driveway off of the road. Reels and
Lewis had previously been to defendant's trailer when defendant had been
an informant.
	The testimony conflicts at this point. According to Reels and Lewis,
they both exited the automobile. They went to the front door of the house,
knocked, and called, "Anybody home?" Hearing no answer, they went to
the back door and knocked. Upon hearing no answer, they walked
toward the barn located behind the house.
	However, Amy Curtis, defendant's girlfriend, testified that on the
afternoon of July 20, 1999, she was driving past the farm when she saw
an automobile parked in the driveway. From previous encounters, she
recognized the automobile as an unmarked police car. She pulled into the
driveway behind the police car and exited her car. She saw one man on
the front porch at the door and another sitting in the police car. According
to Curtis: "I asked him [the man at the door] 'Can I help you?' And he
said 'I am looking for Sherry White.' " Curtis responded that White was
at work, but would return home between 3 and 3:30 p.m. Curtis then
returned to her car, backed out of the driveway, and drove up the road
to her trailer. She saw the police car back out of the driveway and drive
away from the house.
	Reels and Lewis were each asked whether a woman drove to the
house and asked them why they were there. Each responded that he could
not remember. Also, neither Reels nor Lewis could remember seeing the
"Private Property" and "No Trespassing" signs posted on the driveway.
	According to Reels and Lewis, after they received no answer at the
back door of the house, they walked away from the house and toward the
barn. That building was one of several outbuildings west of the house. The
barn was located approximately 50 yards directly behind the house. The
barn had large doors on the east and west sides. The south side of the
barn did not have a wall; rather, it had a canopy off of it that covered a
feedlot.
	The east doors of the barn were open. Reels and Lewis entered the
east side of the barn. Once inside, they first saw rolls of carpet and loose
straw. The officers next observed marijuana plants growing in the feedlot
on the south side of the barn. Some of the plants were planted in five-gallon buckets and some were planted in the ground. These mature plants
were at least four feet tall; many were taller than six feet. The plants were
interspersed with thick horseweeds that were six to eight feet tall. In
addition to these mature plants, Reels and Lewis observed small marijuana
plants in Dixie cups, known as starter plants, located outside along the
southwest side of the barn.
	Reels and Lewis testified that they did not see the marijuana plants
from any road, from the driveway, or even at the open doorway on the
east side of the barn. Rather, they could see the plants only after they
entered the barn.
	Reels and Lewis returned to their car and left the farm; they were on
the premises for no longer than five minutes. Approximately two hours
later, they returned with a third officer, Joe Konnecker. The three officers
set up surveillance at several points around the barn. At approximately 5
p.m., defendant appeared and entered the barn. The officers then took
defendant into custody and seized the marijuana plants.
	According to Reels and Lewis, after defendant was taken into
custody, White made her presence known to the officers, invited them into
the farmhouse, and made a handwritten statement. In her statement, White
stated that defendant had been planting many marijuana plants around the
barn and at various locations on the farm. She further stated: "[I] went in
town to ask Shipman Cop what I should do about all pot plants." She
stated: "[I] was wondering if Aunt Mary would get her farm taken away
or if Amy would get kids taken away or if I would get in any trouble
because I lived on farm," and "I was going to pull every plant just to keep
the rest of us out of trouble." However, White testified that she wrote the
statement only after the officers threatened her with a felony charge.
	The officers left defendant at the farm. On December 3, 1999,
defendant was indicted on one count of unlawful manufacture of cannabis
(720 ILCS 550/5(e) (West 1998)). Defendant was arrested on January
18, 2000.
	Defendant moved to quash his arrest and to suppress, inter alia, the
seized marijuana plants. At the close of the suppression hearing, the trial
court granted defendant's motion. The circuit court found that White never
consented to the officers' entry onto the property. Accordingly, the circuit
court concluded that "the search was improper because it was done as
part of a trespass." The circuit court suppressed the marijuana plants.
	On appeal, the appellate court, with one justice dissenting, reversed
the circuit court's suppression order. The appellate court held that
defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the barn area
because: (1) the area was outside of the curtilage of defendant's trailer and
the farmhouse, and (2) the barn was abandoned. Accordingly, the
appellate court concluded that the officers' entry into the barn did not
violate defendant's constitutional rights. In light of that conclusion, the
appellate court did not address whether White consented to the search.
No. 4-01-0620 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
Justice Cook dissented, stating:
			"I respectfully dissent and would affirm the decision of the trial
court. Defendant, who resided on the farm with the owner's
permission, clearly had standing to object to a search. I would
defer to the trial court's factual decision that the area in which the
search occurred was one in which defendant had a legitimate
expectation of privacy. It also seems clear that Sheri [sic] White
never consented to the July 20 entry onto the property."
The appellate court remanded the cause to the circuit court for further
proceedings. We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill.
2d R. 315(a)). Additional pertinent facts will be discussed in the context
of the issues raised on appeal.

ANALYSIS
	Defendant contends that the appellate court erred in reversing the
circuit court's order granting his motion to suppress. In reviewing a circuit
court's ruling on a motion to suppress, mixed questions of law and fact are
presented. Findings of historical fact made by the circuit court will be
upheld on review unless such findings are against the manifest weight of the
evidence. This deferential standard of review is grounded in the reality that
the circuit court is in a superior position to determine and weigh the
credibility of the witnesses, observe the witnesses' demeanor, and resolve
conflicts in their testimony. People v. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d 165, 175
(2003); People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 430-31 (2001). However,
a reviewing court remains free to undertake its own assessment of the
facts in relation to the issues presented and may draw its own conclusions
when deciding what relief should be granted. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d  at 175-76, quoting People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 51 (2001). Accordingly, we
review de novo the ultimate question of whether the evidence should be
suppressed. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d  at 431.
	This standard of review, based on Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996), supplants what
had been the traditional standard of review for suppression orders. See
Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d  at 430-31. This court formerly stated that a trial
court's ruling on a motion to suppress would not be disturbed on appeal
unless that ruling was manifestly erroneous, but de novo review was
appropriate where neither the facts nor the credibility of witnesses was
questioned. See, e.g., People v. Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d 211, 230 (1995);
People v. Foskey, 136 Ill. 2d 66, 76 (1990). We note for both bench
and bar that in our recent opinions in People v. Morris, 209 Ill. 2d 137,
153-54 (2004), and People v. Ledesma, 206 Ill. 2d 571, 576 (2003),
our reference to Mitchell was in error and does not signal a return by this
court to the previous standard of review. Therefore, to the extent that the
discussion of the standard of review in Morris and in Ledesma are
inconsistent with this opinion, those portions of Morris and Ledesma are
overruled. We reiterate today our adherence to the standard of review set
forth in Ornelas and adopted by Sorenson.
	The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects the
"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const., amend.
IV; see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669, 1675, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 1442 (1960) (observing that the fourth
amendment applies to state officials through the fourteenth amendment).
Similarly, article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution provides that the
"people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and other possessions against unreasonable searches [and] seizures." Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, §6. This court has interpreted the search and seizure
provision found in section 6 in a manner that is consistent with the fourth
amendment jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court. Gherna,
203 Ill. 2d  at 176; Fink v. Ryan, 174 Ill. 2d 302, 314 (1996).
Warrantless searches are generally considered unreasonable unless they
fall within a few specific exceptions. People v. Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d 153,
169-70 (1989); accord Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 585, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967); People v. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d 257, 262 (1997); United States v. Basinski, 226 F.3d 829, 833
(7th Cir. 2000).

I. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
	It is now fundamentally recognized that "the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places." Katz, 389 U.S.  at 351, 19 L. Ed. 2d  at 582,
88 S. Ct.  at 511. "But the extent to which the Fourth Amendment protects
people may depend upon where those people are." Minnesota v. Carter,
525 U.S. 83, 88, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373, 379, 119 S. Ct. 469, 473 (1998).
Accordingly, to claim the protection of the fourth amendment, a defendant
must demonstrate that he or she personally has an expectation of privacy
in the place searched and that his or her expectation is reasonable, i.e., an
expectation of privacy "that has 'a source outside of the Fourth
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property
law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.'"
Carter, 525 U.S.  at 88, 142 L. Ed. 2d  at 379, 88 S. Ct.  at 472, quoting
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 401 n.12,
99 S. Ct. 421, 430 n.12 (1978); accord Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220, 226-27, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 2580 (1979).

A. Curtilage
	Defendant initially contends that the State waived for appellate review
the issue of whether the barn was within the curtilage of the farmhouse or
the trailer. Defendant posits that the State's sole theory at the suppression
hearing was White's implicit consent to the search, and that the State
never raised the issue of curtilage. In the appellate court, according to
defendant, the State argued that defendant lacked standing to challenge
the legality of the search of the barn and the resulting seizure of the
marijuana plants. The appellate court reasoned: "While the State uses the
term 'standing,' the State essentially contends the area searched was not
protected against unreasonable searches and seizures because it was
outside the curtilage of both defendant's trailer and the farmhouse."
Defendant contends that the State waived the curtilage issue for review
and the appellate court should not have reversed the suppression order on
that basis.
	We cannot accept defendant's waiver argument. In the circuit court,
the State filed a motion to reconsider the suppression order. The State
contended that defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the barn because, inter alia, he lived a significant distance from the barn
"and it was not part of the curtilage of his mobile home." In denying the
State's motion to reconsider, the circuit court stated: "Essentially heard the
same arguments today that I heard before. Nothing new has been added."
We agree with the State that it sufficiently raised the argument that
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the barn.
Further, in light of the record, it was appropriate for the appellate court to
characterize the State's argument as an argument that the searched area
did not fall within the curtilage of defendant's residence.
	Turning to the merits, a person does not have a legitimate expectation
of privacy for actions conducted outside in fields, except in the area
immediately surrounding the home. The United States Supreme Court has
explained that
			"open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate
activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from
government interference or surveillance. There is no societal
interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, such as the
cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields. Moreover, as a
practical matter these lands usually are accessible to the public
and the police in ways that a home, an office, or commercial
structure would not be. It is not generally true that fences or 'No
Trespassing' signs effectively bar the public from viewing open
fields in rural areas. *** For these reasons, the asserted
expectation of privacy in open fields is not an expectation that
'society recognizes as reasonable.' " Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 179, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214, 224-25, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1741-42 (1984).
Thus, fourth amendment protection extends to a home's curtilage, i.e., the
land immediately surrounding and associated with the home. Conversely,
no legitimate expectation of privacy attaches to land outside of the home's
curtilage, i.e., open fields. Oliver, 466 U.S.  at 180, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 225,
104 S. Ct.  at 1742; People v. Nielson, 187 Ill. 2d 271, 280 (1999).
	In determining whether a particular area falls within a home's
curtilage, a court asks whether the area harbors the intimate activities
commonly associated with the sanctity of a person's home and the
privacies of life. The extent of the curtilage is determined by factors "that
bear upon whether an individual reasonably may expect that the area in
question should be treated as the home itself." United States v. Dunn,
480 U.S. 294, 300, 94 L. Ed. 2d 326, 334, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 1139
(1987); accord Nielson, 187 Ill. 2d  at 281; United States v. French,
291 F.3d 945, 951 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Mooring, 137 F.3d 595, 596 (8th Cir. 1998). These factors include: (1) the proximity of the
area claimed to be the home's curtilage; (2) whether the area is included
within an enclosure surrounding the home; (3) the nature of the uses to
which the area is put; and (4) the steps taken by the resident to protect the
area from observation by people passing by. Dunn, 480 U.S.  at 301, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 334-35, 107 S. Ct.  at 1139.
	The appellate court applied these factors as follows:
			"As to the first factor, the barn is located between 40 and 60
yards from the farmhouse, the closest residence even under
defendant's analysis. Such a substantial distance does not
support an inference that the barn should be treated as an
adjunct of the house. See Dunn, 480 U.S.  at 302, 94 L. Ed. 2d 
at 335, 107 S. Ct.  at 1140. Second, the barn was not within an
enclosure surrounding the farmhouse or the trailer. The open
nature of the land between the barn and the two residences
negates an expectation of privacy in the barn area. See People
v. Lashmett, 71 Ill. App. 3d 429, 437, 389 N.E.2d 888, 893
(1979).
			Third, the barn was no longer used for agricultural purposes
and was only used by Mary Pitman to store rolls of carpet. None
of the tenants on the farm used the barn area for 'intimate
activities of the home.' Last, nothing prohibited observation of
the barn area from those standing in the open field. The barn area
was not enclosed, the south side of the barn was open, and the
doors on the east and west sides were fully open. Mary Pitman
testified a 'no trespassing' sign and 'private property' sign were
posted at the entrance to the driveway. However, as the
Supreme Court has noted it is not generally true that 'no
trespassing' signs effectively bar the public from viewing open
fields in rural areas. Oliver, 466 U.S.  at 179, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at
224, 104 S. Ct.  at 1741.
			Accordingly, we find the curtilage of both the trailer and the
farmhouse did not extend to the barn area."
We agree with the appellate court's application of the Dunn factors to the
facts of this case.
	The facts presented here pertaining to curtilage are clearly
distinguishable from those presented in People v. Pakula, 89 Ill. App. 3d
789 (1980), a pre-Dunn decision. There, police officers observed from
an adjoining lot marijuana plants growing among tomato plants in a fenced,
suburban backyard. Applying Katz, the Pakula court held that the
defendant had demonstrated an expectation of privacy that society was
prepared to recognize. Pakula, 89 Ill. App. 3d at 793. In People v.
Schmidt, 168 Ill. App. 3d 873 (1988), the appellate court explained that
the result in Pakula would have been the same if the Pakula court had
applied the Dunn factors. The defendant's expectation of privacy in
Pakula would have been supported by evidence that the marijuana plants
"were found within the home's enclosure and among the family's food-producing plants. Such circumstances demonstrate that the area in
question was clearly an intimate part of the home life of the family and its
members." Schmidt, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 880 (explaining Pakula). In this
case, however, the evidence shows that the barn was not within the
curtilage of the farmhouse or the trailer.
	Based on this conclusion, the State reasons: "Because the barn was
not inside the curtilage, it was in 'open fields,' defendant had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in that structure, and it is not covered
by the fourth amendment." This reasoning lacks merit. Immediately after
concluding that the barn was not within the curtilage of the farmhouse or
the trailer, the appellate court stated:
			"However, our inquiry does not end there. In discovering the
cannabis plants, Reels and Lewis entered the barn itself. An
individual may have a protected expectation of privacy in a barn
located outside the home's curtilage. See Dunn, 480 U.S.  at
303-04, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 336-37, 107 S. Ct.  at 1141; United
States v. Hoffman, 677 F. Supp. 589, 596 (1988)."
The appellate court is correct. The Court in Dunn held that law
enforcement officers, without a warrant, could stand outside of a barn,
which was outside of the curtilage of the ranch house, and look inside the
barn's open front. Dunn, 480 U.S.  at 303-04, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 336-37,
107 S. Ct.  at 1141. "But Dunn did not hold that the police could enter
the barn itself." (Emphasis in original.) Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 2001).
	The government cannot search a home and its curtilage absent a
warrant or some exception to the warrant requirement.
		"But if a search occurs outside the home or the home's
curtilage-even if it is on private property-the Fourth
Amendment's guarantee applies only if the property owner has
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area. This is because the
Supreme Court has rejected a property-line approach to the
Fourth Amendment, concluding instead that the government may
enter a person's private property (outside of the curtilage) and
conduct a warrantless search, unless that individual has a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the property searched."
Siebert, 256 F.3d  at 654.
The fourth amendment protects structures other than dwellings, and those
structures need not be within the curtilage of the home. United States v.
Santa Maria, 15 F.3d 879, 882-83 (9th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases).
Thus, we consider whether defendant had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the barn.

B. Abandonment
	The appellate court answered this question in the negative, reasoning
as follows:
		"The record contains no facts that defendant utilized the barn
itself. With the doors unlocked and wide open as well as an open
side, the barn was not secured. The barn was no longer used for
agriculture [sic] purposes and contained carpet rolls owned by
Mary Pitman. The barn was essentially abandoned. Generally, no
expectation of privacy exists in property that has been
abandoned. [Citation.] Thus, defendant had no expectation of
privacy in the barn.
			Accordingly, the officers' entry into the barn and search of the
barn area did not violate defendant's constitutional rights.
			In light of our finding that defendant's constitutional rights
were not violated by the police officers' search, we need not
address whether White consented to the search."
We disagree with this reasoning.
	The controlling principles are settled:
			"Abandoned property is not subject to Fourth Amendment
protection. [Citations.] This is because Fourth Amendment
protection only extends to places and items for which a person
has a reasonable expectation of privacy, and no person can have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in an item that he has
abandoned. [Citations.] To demonstrate abandonment, the
government must establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant's voluntary words or conduct would lead a
reasonable person in the searching officer's position to believe
that the defendant relinquished his property interests in the item
searched or seized. [Citations.] Because this is an objective test,
it does not matter whether the defendant harbors a desire to later
reclaim an item; we look solely to the external manifestations of
his intent as judged by a reasonable person possessing the same
knowledge available to the government agents. [Citations.] We
look at the totality of the circumstances, but pay particular
attention to explicit denials of ownership and to any physical
relinquishment of the property. [Citations.]" Basinski, 226 F.3d 
at 836-37.
Accord United States v. Caballero-Chavez, 260 F.3d 863, 866-67
(8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hoey, 983 F.2d 890, 892-93 (8th Cir.
1993).
	The record in the present case is devoid of any evidence that
defendant relinquished his expectation of privacy in the barn. The officers
saw rolls of carpet in the barn. There was no evidence that defendant
physically relinquished the barn. There was no evidence that defendant
denied a possessory interest in the barn. These facts certainly do not
warrant the inference that defendant intended to abandon the barn. See
People v. Dorney, 17 Ill. App. 3d 785, 788 (1974). The appellate
court's conclusion to the contrary was erroneous.
	Thus, the question remains whether defendant had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the barn. We conclude that he had.
	Several factors should be examined to determine whether a
defendant possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy: (1) ownership
of the property searched; (2) whether the defendant was legitimately
present in the area searched; (3) whether defendant has a possessory
interest in the area or property seized; (4) prior use of the area searched
or property seized; (5) the ability to control or exclude others from the use
of the property; and (6) whether the defendant himself had a subjective
expectation of privacy in the property. People v. Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d 170, 191-92 (1986).
	In this case, the circuit court found as follows:
			"Testimony indicates that Pitman [defendant] lived on this
farm. His mother had given him authority over the farm, that he
had power of attorney, or whatever. He lived on the same farm.
His mother gave him run of the place.
			He was there to look after the place, so this defendant had
standing on this property. I don't think there's any question
about standing."
As did the United States Supreme Court, we admonish courts against
analyzing a legitimate expectation of privacy issue under the rubric of
"standing." See Carter, 525 U.S.  at 87-88, 142 L. Ed. 2d  at 379, 119 S. Ct.  at 472; Rakas, 439 U.S.  at 138-40, 58 L. Ed. 2d  at 398-99, 99 S. Ct.  at 427-29.
	The circuit court's findings of fact, with the entire record, support the
conclusion that defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
barn. Although defendant did not own the farm, and specifically the barn,
defendant clearly had a possessory interest in the entire farm and had the
ability to control or exclude others from the use of the property. The
record shows that Mary Pitman conferred on defendant the legal authority
to take care of the farm. For example, defendant had power of attorney
regarding acreage enrolled in the federal Conservation Reserve Program
(see generally 16 U.S.C. §3831 et seq. (2000); 7 C.F.R. §1410.1 et seq.
(2002)). White testified that defendant helped her to "fix the barn, roofs
on the barn." The illegal nature of defendant's activities did not make
defendant's expectation of privacy unreasonable. See United States v.
Vega, 221 F.3d 789, 797 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Fields, 113 F.3d 313, 321 (2d Cir. 1997). The Rakas Court explained that "one who
owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have
a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of [the] right to exclude."
Rakas, 439 U.S.  at 143 n.12, 58 L. Ed. 2d  at 401 n.12, 99 S. Ct.  at 430
n.12.
	Further, defendant need not have taken affirmative steps to proclaim
his expectation of privacy. The fact that the public could have discovered
the plants by trespassing on the farm fails to legitimize an otherwise invalid
search. The fact that parts of the barn's interior were visible did not mean
that defendant threw open the interior of the barn to general public
scrutiny. See Wilson v. Health & Hospital Corp. of Marion County,
620 F.2d 1201, 1212 (7th Cir. 1980). A defendant simply must
outwardly behave as a typical occupant of the space in which the
defendant claims an interest, avoiding anything that might publicly
undermine his or her expectation of privacy. Vega, 221 F.3d  at 797.
	We observe the dissent's emphasis "on whether or not the owners
and possessors of farm and business structures took sufficient steps to
impede access to those structures." Slip op. at 27 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). However, through authority granted by his mother, defendant
had the right to be in the barn, to possess it, and to exclude others from
it. These rights are sufficient to establish defendant's reasonable
expectation of privacy in the barn and thus to affirm the circuit court's
order. See Rakas, 439 U.S.  at 143 n.12, 58 L. Ed. 2d  at 401 n.12, 99 S. Ct.  at 430 n.12. We hold that defendant had a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the barn.
	To be sure, Reels and Lewis appear to have done no more than they
might properly have done with a search warrant, which they had several
days to obtain. As the Court in Katz observed:
		"It is apparent that the agents in this case acted with restraint.
Yet the inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed by the
agents themselves, not by a judicial officer. They were not
required, before commencing the search, to present their
estimate of probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral
magistrate. They were not compelled, during the conduct of the
search itself, to observe precise limits established in advance by
a specific court order. Nor were they directed, after the search
had been completed, to notify the authorizing magistrate in detail
of all that had been seized. In the absence of such safeguards,
this Court has never sustained a search upon the sole ground that
officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular
crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive
means consistent with that end. Searches conducted without
warrants have been held unlawful 'notwithstanding facts
unquestionably showing probable cause,' [citation], for the
Constitution requires 'that the deliberate, impartial judgment of
a judicial officer *** be interposed between the citizen and the
police ... .' [Citation.] 'Over and again this Court has
emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment
requires adherence to judicial processes,' [citation] and that
searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz, 389 U.S.  at
356-57, 19 L. Ed. 2d  at 585, 88 S. Ct.  at 514.
Since Reels and Lewis searched defendant's barn without a warrant, the
search is deemed unreasonable under the fourth amendment unless the
search falls within a specific exception. See People v. Bailey, 159 Ill. 2d 498, 503 (1994).

II. Consent
	A well-settled, specific exception to the fourth amendment's warrant
requirement is a search conducted pursuant to consent. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 858, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2043-44 (1973); People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 197 (1998). This
consent may be obtained not only from the individual whose property is
searched, but also from a third party who possesses common authority
over the premises. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148, 156, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2797 (1990); Bull, 185 Ill. 2d  at 197. A
court should not infer common authority from the mere property interest
a third person has in the property. The authority that justifies third-party
consent is not based on the law of property. Rather, such authority is
based on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint
access or control for most purposes. Therefore, it is reasonable to
recognize that any of the cohabitants has the right to permit the inspection
in his or her own right, and that the others have assumed the risk that one
of their number might permit a common area to be searched. United
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242, 250 n.7,
94 S. Ct. 988, 993 n.7 (1974); Bull, 185 Ill. 2d  at 197; accord Basinski,
226 F.3d  at 834. Further, "a warrantless search based on the consent of
a person having apparent, though not actual, authority to give such consent
is lawful if, at the time of the search, the police reasonably believe that
person to have common authority over the place or item to be searched."
Bull, 185 Ill. 2d  at 198, citing Rodriguez, 497 U.S.  at 186-89, 111 L. Ed. 2d  at 160-61, 110 S. Ct. at 2800-01; accord Basinski, 226 F.3d  at
834.
	In the suppression order, the circuit court focused on the issue of
whether White consented to the search. We earlier recounted the
conflicting testimony on this issue; we note additional evidence.
Specifically, Bondy testified that if the farm were located within Shipman:
"It would have been a different circumstances [sic]. I would have had to
handle the case. I probably would have went and looked for myself,
because she probably would have given me permission to search at the
time, and I would have went on the property and looked." Also during
Bondy's testimony, the following colloquy occurred:
			"[Defense counsel] Q. All right. Now during this conversation
that you had with her [White] on your front porch, did she give
you permission to go on the premises?
			A. I never asked.
			Q. That wasn't the question. Did she give you permission?
			A. No.
			Q. Give you permission to go on the premises?
			A. No.
			Q. Did you ask her for permission to go on the premises?
			A. No, I did not.
			Q. Did you ask her to sign any form of a consent to give you
or other law enforcement people permission to go on the
premises?
			A. No, I did not.
* * *
			[Prosecutor] Q. Due to the fact that she said she wanted
Shane arrested and the plants removed, what effect did that have
on your request or lack of request for a permission to search
form?
			A. I felt that she would entertain anyone coming out to talk to
her and show them where the plants were without any problem
because she was concerned over it and she wanted them
removed. So I didn't feel that there would be a problem.
			And when the Task Force contacted her, I am [sic] sure that
she would grant them permission. She wanted them removed."
Thus, Bondy himself did not believe that White had given him permission
to search. Rather, "she probably would have given" Bondy permission to
search, or she would have granted the drug task force permission to
remove the plants.
	The circuit court thoroughly discussed the evidence. Some of that
discussion is as follows:
			"First, what information the police had is, as I recall, is that
White-Bondy told them that White *** came in, talked about
three plots, was concerned about it, her aunt and *** someone's
children, and that Bondy told White he would contact the drug
task force.
			That's the information the police had. The location of the
marijuana Sherry White told Bondy, so they went to the
residence to talk to White. She wanted someone to talk to her,
and nowhere, even in Bondy's testimony, is there anything that
states: I want you to come out and tear up these plants.
			Her main concern, according to Bondy's testimony, is what
happens to my aunt? What happens to these kids if they find the
marijuana there? So, the police go to the house. Nobody is
home. They did not talk to White, never did, until after the search
was made.
* * *
			If a farmer walked into a police station and said, 'Hey, there's
some marijuana on my place. I would like you to come and talk
to me about it,' doesn't necessarily mean he's giving them
permission to go out there and take it. If he says, 'Go cut it
down,' that's a different story.
			The only information the police officers had here is that a lady
by the name of White came in, told Bondy something, and asked
Bondy to have the police contact her. From there on, the rest of
the things that the officers did was over and above and beyond
the information that they had.
* * *
			They had nobody's consent at that time. When they went out
there, no one had given them permission. Bondy hadn't given
them permission, Sherry White hadn't given them permission,
Shane Pitman hadn't given them permission, neither had Shane's
mother who owns the property.
			Now, what we're asked to do is take the information they
had and bootstrap it, and say, well, because she gave us this
information, she wanted us to go out there even when she wasn't
at home. She wanted us to go out there and pick up that stuff,
she wanted us to tear out the plants, and she wanted us to arrest
Shane. That's what we're asked to boot strap out of the little
information that the police had.
* * *
			They had no permission from anybody. The only permission
they had was to contact this lady to see what the heck she really
wanted, and they went far and above and beyond that, and it's
certainly not the situation where a farmer comes in and says, 'I
got marijuana. Go over there and cut it down.'
			No one gave these officers any authority. The only actual
authority they had, as I said before, was to contact Ms. White,
and once they did more than that, they exceeded their authority,
so the Motion to Suppress is allowed. The evidence seized is
suppressed."
The State contends, as an additional reason to affirm the appellate court,
that White expressly, or at least impliedly, consented to the search of the
barn. The State contends that the circuit court's finding to the contrary
was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
	We uphold the circuit court's finding of no consent. Whether consent
has been given is a question of fact to be determined initially in the circuit
court. Because a court of review is not in a position to observe witnesses
as they testify, it is not within the province of a court of review to assess
the credibility of witnesses. When the evidence on the issue of consent is
conflicting, this court will uphold the circuit court's finding unless it is
clearly unreasonable. People v. Ledferd, 38 Ill. 2d 607, 610 (1967);
People v. Peterson, 17 Ill. 2d 513, 514-15 (1959); see People v.
Bruce, 185 Ill. App. 3d 356, 368 (1989). After reviewing the evidence
presented at the suppression hearing, we cannot say that the circuit court's
finding of no consent was unreasonable.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is
reversed; the order of the circuit court of Macoupin County, which
granted defendant's motion to suppress, is affirmed; and the cause is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court order affirmed;
cause remanded.
	I agree with the majority's conclusions that the barn was in the open
fields, outside of the curtilage, and that Sherry White did not consent to
the search. I disagree, however, with the majority's conclusion that
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the barn. The
majority's analysis on this issue is at odds with all of the state and federal
cases that have considered searches of barns or outbuildings located on
farm property lying outside of the curtilage of a farmhouse. I therefore
dissent.
	Initially, I note that defendant's motion to suppress did not allege that
he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the barn. Nor did defendant
specifically raise this issue in the trial court. Instead, defendant only alleged
and argued that (1) police entered the premises without the consent of the
owner or tenant; (2) police were trespassing when they came onto the
property; and (3) there was no exigent circumstances to justify a
warrantless search. The burden of proof is on the defendant at a hearing
on a motion to suppress. 725 ILCS 5/114-12(b) (West 2002); People
v. Gipson, 203 Ill. 2d 298, 306 (2003). Only if the defendant makes out
a prima facie case that the evidence was obtained through an illegal
search does the burden shift to the State to counter with its own evidence.
Gipson, 203 Ill. 2d  at 306-07. Before a defendant can complain of a
violation of the fourth amendment, he has to make a showing that he has
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place or thing being searched
and that his expectation is reasonable. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373, 379, 119 S. Ct. 469, 472 (1998); Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 149, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 405, 99 S. Ct. 421, 433
(1978).
	Here, defendant did not make out a prima facie case showing that
he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the barn. Indeed, defendant
did not even allege that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
barn in his motion to suppress. As defendant himself noted in the waiver
portion of his brief, "[o]ne of the basic considerations supporting the rule
preventing a party from raising issues for the first time on appeal is that
'[t]he failure to urge a particular theory before the trial court will often
cause the opposing party to refrain from presenting available pertinent
rebuttal evidence' which could have a bearing on the disposition in
question." See People v. McAdrian, 52 Ill. 2d 250, 254 (1972); see also
People v. Holloway, 86 Ill. 2d 78, 91-92 (1981). This admonition is
particularly appropriate here. Defendant's failure to claim that he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the barn likely impacted the proofs
presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress. I would therefore find
that, at the very least, any insufficiency in the record should be resolved in
favor of the State. I would also find that the State correctly argued in its
motion to reconsider that defendant had failed to meet the threshold
requirement of showing that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the area searched.
	On the merits, the majority in effect holds that a person who has a
possessory interest in any kind of man-made structure lying outside of the
curtilage of a farmhouse also has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the structure. Citing People v. Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d 170, 191-92 (1986),
the majority notes several factors that should be used to determine
whether a defendant possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy: (1)
whether the defendant owned the property searched; (2) whether the
defendant was legitimately present in the area searched; (3) whether the
defendant had a possessory interest in the area searched or the property
seized; (4) prior use of the area searched or the property seized; (5) the
ability to control or exclude others' use of the property; and (6) whether
the defendant himself had a subjective expectation of privacy in the
property. Slip op. at 14. The majority then concludes that these factors
favor a finding that defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
barn.
	The problem with the majority's analysis is twofold. First, an
evenhanded application of the Johnson factors to the present case should
lead to the conclusion that defendant had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in this particular barn. Second, the factors enunciated in Johnson
are not meant to be an exhaustive list, nor are they necessarily the most
important factors to be considered when determining whether a defendant
possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy in a nonresidential structure
that lies outside the curtilage of a farmhouse.
	The question of whether defendant had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the area searched or the items seized must be resolved in view
of the totality of the circumstances of the particular case. Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d  at 192. The relevant facts and circumstances here, including the
Johnson factors, show that defendant did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the barn. First, it was undisputed that defendant
did not own the barn-Mary Pitman owned it. Second, defendant was not
present at the barn at the time it was searched and the marijuana plants
were discovered. Third, it does appear that defendant had a possessory
interest in the area searched. However, a possessory interest, standing
alone, is insufficient to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d  at 192. Fourth, there is no evidence that defendant
made any prior use of the property searched. Arguably, it could be said
that defendant incidentally used the barn in connection with his cultivation
of the marijuana plants outside the barn. However, an expectation of
privacy based on illegal activity is not one that society is prepared to
recognize as legitimate. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 401 n.12, 99 S. Ct. 421, 430 n.12 (1978). Fifth, there was
no evidence presented that defendant had a right to exclude others from
the barn. It was undisputed that defendant lived in a trailer on his mother's
farm and that he had power of attorney over the farmland enrolled in the
federal conservation program. However, I do not believe that these facts
establish that he had a right to exclude others from the barn. Furthermore,
even if defendant had both a possessory interest in the property and the
right to exclude others, this would not be sufficient in itself to show a
reasonable expectation of privacy where the barn was no longer being
used for agricultural purposes and was "wide open." As I will explain
more fully below, courts that have decided whether a defendant enjoyed
a reasonable expectation of privacy in a barn outside the curtilage have
looked to whether the barn was being put to a business use on behalf of
the farm and whether defendant took any reasonable steps to effect
privacy, such as closing and locking the barn doors. Finally, given the
wide-open nature of the barn and defendant's lack of use, it is clear
defendant himself had no subjective expectation of privacy in the area
searched. Defendant was not even effectively using the barn as a cover for
his illegal activity, as he grew marijuana outside of the barn.
	The majority cites to a footnote from Rakas for the proposition that
" 'one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all
likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of [the] right
to exclude.' " Slip op. at 15, quoting Rakas, 439 U.S.  at 143 n.12, 58 L. Ed. 2d  at 401 n.12, 99 S. Ct.  at 430 n.12. Rakas, however, did not
involve a barn lying outside the curtilage of a farmhouse. Instead, it
involved the question of whether passengers legitimately occupying a car,
owned by someone else, had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The
Court held that they did not. The portion of the footnote from Rakas
quoted above is best understood by pointing out that it was inserted to
explain the holding in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697, 80 S. Ct. 725 (1960), which found that a person need only be
legitimately on the premises of a residential dwelling to challenge the
validity of a search. The search here does not involve a residential
dwelling, and a different analysis applies. See, e.g., United States v.
Trickey, 711 F.2d 56, 58-59 (6th Cir. 1983) (when dealing with
nonresidential property, fourth amendment protections are "less significant
than they would be in the context of a home").
	Most all of the state and federal courts that have considered whether
a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in a barn outside the curtilage
have looked to whether the barn was still serving the agricultural purposes
of the farm or to whether the owner or occupier had taken reasonable
steps to effect privacy, such as closing and locking the barn doors. See,
e.g., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 315, 94 L. Ed. 2d 326,
343-44, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 1146-47 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting,
joined by Marshall, J.) (the Court assumed for the sake of argument that
the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a barn outside
the curtilage because the barn was an essential part of his farming
business); United States v. Pennington, 287 F.3d 739, 746 (8th Cir.
2002) (upheld search, finding that the defendant had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in an underground bunker located outside the
curtilage where the structure had a readily visible entranceway and no lock
or door impeding access); Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 654 (7th
Cir. 2001) (owners had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a barn that
had doors on it, which were often kept locked); Trickey, 711 F.2d  at 58
(defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in an outbuilding
located on residential property because defendant took steps to protect
his privacy by boarding up the windows); State v. Showalter, 427 N.W.2d 166, 170 (Iowa 1988) (defendant had reasonable expectation
of privacy in barn where it was locked and nailed shut); People v.
Weisenberger, 183 Colo. 353, 355-56, 516 P.2d 1128, 1129 (1973)
(fourth amendment protections applied to a chicken house located on the
defendant's farm, where the structure "was being put to an active
domestic use. It housed ten to fifteen laying hens and contained necessary
feed and water for their maintenance"); State v. Thompson, 820 S.W.2d 591 (Mo. App. 1991) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in barn that
was unlatched and had been put on the market for sale).
	Even though the majority of the United States Supreme Court in
Dunn accepted as true for the sake of argument the defendant's assertion
that the barn there enjoyed fourth amendment protection because it was
an essential part of the defendant's farm business, the Court declined to
hold that the barn afforded an independent expectation of privacy apart
from the farmhouse. In analyzing the point further, however, the dissent in
Dunn noted the principle that a barn ought to be constitutionally protected
if it is being used as part of a farming business. Dunn, 480 U.S.  at 315,
94 L. Ed. 2d  at 343-44, 107 S. Ct.  at 1146-47 (Brennan, J., dissenting,
joined by Marshall, J.). The dissent also noted that a barn used in farming
operations ought to be protected " 'if the owner or occupier takes
reasonable steps to effect privacy.' " Dunn, 480 U.S.  at 315, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 344, 107 S. Ct.  at 1146-47 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by
Marshall, J.), quoting United States v. Dunn, 766 F.2d 880, 885 (5th
Cir. 1985).
	Here, the record is quite clear that the barn was no longer used in
farming operations and that neither defendant nor anyone else took any
reasonable steps to protect the privacy of the barn's interior. Officer
Lewis testified that the barn had large doors on the east and west sides.
The barn doors on the east side were wide open, "at least 10 to 12 feet
if not more." The south side of the barn was "open to the air." The barn
was not being used to feed and shelter livestock, and there was no farm
machinery inside. The only things inside were a couple of old rows of
carpet and loose straw. Officer Reels testified that the barn was between
100 and 200 yards from defendant's trailer. The barn doors on the front
and back sides were wide open, with openings of about 20 feet. He also
noted that the south side of the barn did not even have a wall-it was
a three-sided building that was open on the south side. Under these
facts, I can only conclude that defendant had no reasonable expectation
of privacy in this particular barn. I also note that the totality of the
circumstances here clearly distinguish this case from any other reported
case where a defendant was found to have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a barn or other farm structure.
	Citing Wilson v. Health & Hospital Corp. of Marion County, 620 F.2d 1201, 1212 (7th Cir. 1980), the majority states that "[t]he fact that
parts of the barn's interior were visible did not mean that defendant threw
open the interior of the barn to general public scrutiny." Slip op. at 15-16.
By this, the majority means to imply that it is irrelevant to the fourth
amendment analysis that the barn doors were open by as much as 20 feet
and that the structure was missing an entire wall on the south side. This is
a truly remarkable position given the federal and state authority to the
contrary as noted above. It is even more remarkable when considering
that Wilson did not involve a structure on farm property lying outside the
curtilage. Rather, it involved a residence that had been damaged in a fire.
In that case, the door of the residence was not secured by the fire
department after it left the scene. Wilson was a civil case. It held only that
just because the door was unsecured, leaving unspecified portions of the
interior visible, did not "necessitate" the conclusion on summary judgment
that an expectation of privacy by the plaintiff was objectively
unreasonable. Wilson, 620 F.2d  at 1212. Wilson has no application here,
as a person obviously has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
dwelling place regardless of whether he leaves his doors open or
unlocked, and the case has nothing to do with a structure lying outside the
curtilage of a farmhouse.
	Rather than relying on the factually inapposite 1980 decision of the
Seventh Circuit in Wilson, the majority should have discussed the more
relevant and recent decisions of the Seventh Circuit in Siebert, of the
Eighth Circuit in Pennington, and of the Sixth Circuit in Trickey. Each of
these cases resolved the reasonable expectation of privacy issue by
placing the utmost emphasis on whether or not the owners and possessors
of farm and business structures took sufficient steps to impede access to
those structures. Siebert, 256 F.3d  at 654; Pennington, 287 F.3d  at
746; Trickey, 711 F.2d  at 58.
	From these cases, it is also clear that no federal court would hold, as
the majority does, that a possessory interest, plus the right to exclude
others, automatically creates a reasonable expectation of privacy in a
wide-open, three-sided barn lying in open fields.  Presumably, the majority
would find a reasonable expectation of privacy in any structure, no matter
how dilapidated and open to view, as long as the possessor has a right to
exclude others. This is a conclusion that finds no precedent in fourth
amendment law.
	For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the
appellate court. I believe it was correct when it determined that defendant
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in this particular barn because
there were "no facts that defendant utilized the barn itself," the barn "was
not secured," its doors were "wide open as well as an open side," and
"the barn was no longer used for agricultural purposes." See No.
4-01-0620 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.