Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Janet L. Heins

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2016AP002454-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2017-10-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
2017 WI 93 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP2454-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Janet L. Heins, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Janet L. Heins, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HEINS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
October 19, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
      
 
 
2017 WI 93
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP2454-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Janet L. Heins, Attorney at Law:   
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
 
Complainant,   
 
 
v. 
 
Janet L. Heins,   
 
 
Respondent.   
FILED 
 
OCT 19, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review a report filed by Referee 
James W. Mohr, Jr., concluding, based on a stipulation filed by 
the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) and Attorney Janet L. 
Heins, that Attorney Heins committed six counts of professional 
misconduct as alleged in the OLR's complaint.  The referee 
agrees with the parties that a public reprimand is appropriate 
discipline 
for 
Attorney 
Heins' 
misconduct. 
 
The 
referee 
recommends, consistent with the stipulation, that we require 
Attorney Heins to submit the attorney fee dispute with her 
No. 
2016AP2454-D   
 
2 
 
former client, J.R., to binding arbitration, that we direct her 
to abide by any ensuing arbitration order, and that she be 
assessed the full costs of the proceeding, which are $2,378.02 
as of July 24, 2017.  
¶2 
After careful review, we accept the referee's factual 
findings, conclusions of law, and recommendation.  We commend 
the referee for his report, which helpfully sets forth the 
framework 
for 
consideration 
of 
the 
parties' 
stipulation, 
establishes the factual basis for his legal conclusions, and 
provides a reasoned analysis and authority supporting his 
recommendation to accept the stipulated discipline.  
¶3 
We agree that a public reprimand is appropriate here, 
and we agree that Attorney Heins should be required to submit 
her fee dispute with J.R. to binding arbitration, to comply with 
any resulting arbitration award, and that she shall bear the 
full costs of this proceeding.  The OLR does not seek 
restitution and, based on this record, restitution is not 
warranted at this time. 
¶4 
Attorney Heins was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1991.  She resides and practices law in Mequon.  
She has no prior discipline.1   
                                                 
1 On April 19, 2016, this court, in response to a motion 
from the OLR, issued an order directing Attorney Heins to show 
cause, in writing, why her license should not be suspended for 
willful failure to cooperate with the OLR's investigation into 
one of the matters at issue here.  On May 4, 2016, the OLR 
received a response from Attorney Heins and withdrew its motion. 
No. 
2016AP2454-D   
 
3 
 
¶5 
On December 15, 2016, the OLR filed a six-count 
complaint against Attorney Heins alleging misconduct involving 
three client matters.  The OLR initially sought a 60-day license 
suspension and an order requiring Attorney Heins to submit a fee 
dispute with a client to binding arbitration.  Attorney Heins, 
by counsel, filed an Answer characterizing the OLR's allegations 
as 
a 
failure 
"to 
fully 
meet 
a 
handful 
of 
technical 
requirements." 
¶6 
Referee Mohr was appointed.  At an ensuing scheduling 
conference, the referee scheduled a two-day evidentiary hearing 
to commence June 19, 2017. 
¶7 
On June 14, 2017, the OLR and Attorney Heins executed 
and filed a stipulation.  In the stipulation, Attorney Heins 
states that she: 
[A]dmits the allegations contained in that Complaint 
and agrees that OLR can prove the allegations of six 
(6) counts of misconduct and that the referee may use 
the factual allegations in the Complaint as an 
adequate 
factual 
basis 
in 
the 
record 
for 
a 
determination of misconduct as to each of those 
counts. 
¶8 
The stipulation further provides that the parties 
agree that a public reprimand is the appropriate level of 
discipline for Attorney Heins' misconduct and that she should be 
ordered to submit her fee dispute with J.R. to binding 
arbitration before the State Bar Fee Arbitration Program and 
comply with any arbitration award, subject to any rights and 
remedies provided for by the Program's rules. 
No. 
2016AP2454-D   
 
4 
 
¶9  In the stipulation, Attorney Heins further avers that 
the stipulation did not result from plea bargaining; she fully 
understands the misconduct allegations; she fully understands 
her right to contest the matter; she fully understands the 
ramifications of her entry into the stipulation; she fully 
understands her right to consult with counsel, states that she 
has in fact consulted with counsel; and states that her entry 
into the stipulation is made knowingly and voluntarily. 
¶10 The referee noted that this stipulation was filed 
after all discovery was completed, shortly before the hearing.  
The referee observed that the effect of the stipulation was 
essentially an admission to all of the material allegations of 
the complaint.  The referee construed the stipulation as a 
withdrawal of all defenses to the complaint and a plea of no 
contest.  Proceeding consistent with SCR 22.14(2),2 the referee 
ascertained whether there was an adequate factual basis for each 
allegation, then made a determination of misconduct with respect 
to each allegation.   
                                                 
2 SCR 22.14(2) provides: 
The respondent may by answer plead no contest to 
allegations of misconduct in the complaint.  The 
referee shall make a determination of misconduct in 
respect to each allegation to which no contest is 
pleaded and for which the referee finds an adequate 
factual basis in the record.  In a subsequent 
disciplinary or reinstatement proceeding, it shall be 
conclusively presumed that the respondent engaged in 
the misconduct determined on the basis of a no contest 
plea. 
 
No. 
2016AP2454-D   
 
5 
 
¶11 The first two counts of the complaint involve Attorney 
Heins' representation of J.R.  The complaint alleged and the 
parties stipulated that Attorney Heins represented J.R. in an 
employment matter.  On February 16, 2012, they entered into a 
written fee agreement providing that $25,000 in advance fees 
paid by J.R. would be placed in Attorney Heins' business 
account.  The written agreement further provided that Attorney 
Heins would provide an accounting of the fees earned.  The 
agreement provided that if there was any dispute about fees, she 
would give notice to J.R. and, if the dispute was not resolved, 
she would submit the dispute to binding arbitration through the 
State Bar Fee Arbitration Program.  
¶12 By December 2014, all but $645.23 of the $25,000 in 
advance fees had been billed.  J.R. made a second advance 
payment of fees in the amount of $3,000. 
¶13 In January 2015, Attorney Heins sought to withdraw as 
counsel for J.R., citing health issues.  On February 12, 2015, 
she sent J.R a "Final Statement" of fees.  Attorney Heins 
indicated that a refund in the amount of $1,411.53 was due and 
she paid that amount to him.  The statement did not contain the 
notices required by former SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m)b.3 
                                                 
3 Effective July 1, 2016, substantial changes were made to 
Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15, the "trust account rule."  See S. 
Ct. Order 14-07, (issued Apr. 4, 2016, eff. July 1, 2016).  
Because the conduct underlying this case arose prior to July 1, 
2016, unless otherwise indicated, all references to the supreme 
court rules will be to those in effect prior to July 1, 2016. 
Former SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m)b. provided: 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP2454-D   
 
6 
 
¶14 Ten days later, on February 22, 2015, J.R. notified 
Attorney Heins that he disputed the fees charged and asked for a 
"significant refund" of the total $28,000 he had paid.  
¶15 On February 24, 2015, Attorney Heins indicated she 
would not be making an additional refund.  On March 2, 2015, 
J.R. again disputed the fees.  In the summer of 2015, J.R. 
submitted the fee dispute with Attorney Heins to the State Bar 
Fee Arbitration Program.  
                                                                                                                                                             
A lawyer who accepts advanced payments of fees 
may deposit the funds in the lawyer's business 
account, provided that review of the lawyer's fee by a 
court of competent jurisdiction is available in the 
proceeding to which the fee relates, or provided that 
the lawyer complies with each of the following 
requirements: 
b. Upon termination of the representation, the 
lawyer shall deliver to the client in writing all of 
the following: 
1. a final accounting, or an accounting from the 
date of the lawyer's most recent statement to the end 
of the representation, regarding the client's advanced 
fee payment with a refund of any unearned advanced 
fees;  
2. notice that, if the client disputes the amount 
of the fee and wants that dispute to be submitted to 
finding arbitration, the client must provide written 
notice of the dispute to the lawyer within 30 days of 
the mailing of the accounting; and  
3. notice that, if the lawyer is unable to 
resolve the dispute to the satisfaction of the client 
within 30 days after receiving notice of the dispute 
from the client, the lawyer shall submit the dispute 
to binding arbitration. 
 
No. 
2016AP2454-D   
 
7 
 
¶16 Attorney Heins did not respond to any correspondence 
sent to her by the State Bar Fee Arbitration Program and failed 
to submit to arbitration. 
¶17 Count One of the complaint alleged that, by failing to 
provide to J.R., at the termination of her representation of 
him, all notices required by former SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m)b., 
Attorney Heins violated that rule. 
¶18 Count Two alleged that, by failing to submit the fee 
dispute with J.R. to arbitration, Attorney Heins violated former 
SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m)c.,4 which provided that upon timely receipt of 
written notice of a dispute from the client, the lawyer shall 
attempt to resolve that dispute with the client, and if the 
dispute is not resolved, the lawyer shall submit the dispute to 
binding arbitration with the State Bar Fee Arbitration Program 
or a similar local bar association program.  
¶19 The referee found that, based upon Attorney Heins' 
admission that her final statement to J.R. of February 12, 2015, 
"did 
not 
contain 
the 
notices 
required 
by 
former 
SCR 20:l.15(b)(4m)b.2. and 3." and based upon the absence of any 
                                                 
4 Former SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m)c. provided: 
Upon timely receipt of written notice of a 
dispute from the client, the lawyer shall attempt to 
resolve that dispute with the client, and if the 
dispute is not resolved, the lawyer shall submit the 
dispute to binding arbitration with the State Bar Fee 
Arbitration Program or a similar local bar association 
program within 30 days of the lawyer's receipt of the 
written notice of dispute from the client. 
No. 
2016AP2454-D   
 
8 
 
information in the record that a court of competent jurisdiction 
approved Attorney Heins' fee, the referee found there was an 
adequate factual basis in the record to support the misconduct 
alleged in Count One. 
¶20 The referee found that, based upon Attorney Heins' 
admission that she did not respond to or participate in the 
State Bar Fee Arbitration Program, there was an adequate factual 
basis in the record to support the misconduct alleged in Count 
Two. 
¶21 Counts Three through Five of the complaint involved 
Attorney Heins' representation of M.I. in connection with an 
employment matter.  In early November 2015, M.I. opted to 
settle; settlement funds were deposited into Attorney Heins' 
trust account on November 3, 2015.  M.I. was entitled to $3,750 
of the funds. 
¶22 By early December 2015, M.I. had not received his 
portion of the settlement.  Over the next month, M.I. exchanged 
several emails with Attorney Heins regarding the funds.  
¶23 On January 19, 2016, Attorney Heins drafted a check 
from her client trust account to M.I. for the funds.  The check 
was twice rejected for insufficient funds, resulting in fees 
charged to M.I. by his own bank. 
¶24 On March 1, 2016, Attorney Heins drafted a second 
check which included the bank charges M.I. had incurred, plus 
his portion of the fees.   That check was honored. 
¶25 The OLR examined Attorney Heins' bank records and 
determined that between November 3, 2015, and January 31, 2016, 
No. 
2016AP2454-D   
 
9 
 
the balance in her trust account was below the amount that was 
owed to M.I. 
¶26 Between February 2016 and April 2016, the OLR sent 
Attorney Heins a series of letters seeking her response to 
allegations regarding M.I., and advising Attorney Heins of her 
duty 
to 
cooperate 
with 
the 
OLR's 
investigation 
under 
SCR 21.15(4) and SCR 22.03(6).  Attorney Heins did not submit a 
complete or timely response.  Eventually, on April 19, 2016, 
this court issued an order directing Attorney Heins to show 
cause why her license should not be suspended for willful 
failure to cooperate with the investigation.  On May 4, 2016, 
the OLR received, via fax from Attorney Heins, a response to the 
OLR's letter of March 25, 2016.  The OLR then withdrew its 
motion. 
¶27 Count Three alleged that by failing to hold in trust 
funds 
belonging 
to 
M.I., 
Attorney 
Heins 
violated 
SCR 20:1.15(b)(l).5 
¶28 The referee found that, based upon the undisputed 
evidence that there were, at various times, insufficient funds 
in Attorney Heins' trust account to pay M.I. what was owed him, 
                                                 
5 SCR 20:1.15(b)(l) provides: 
A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 
lawyer's own property, that property of clients and 
3rd parties that is in the lawyer's possession in 
connection with a representation.  All funds of clients 
and 3rd parties paid to a lawyer or law firm in 
connection with a representation shall be deposited in 
one of more identifiable trust accounts. 
No. 
2016AP2454-D   
 
10 
 
there was an adequate factual basis in the record to support the 
claim of misconduct in Count Three. 
¶29 Count Four alleged that by failing to promptly deliver 
to M.I. the settlement funds belonging to him, Attorney Heins 
violated former SCR 20:1.15(d)(1).6 
¶30 The referee found that based upon the undisputed 
factual admissions in the record that Attorney Heins had 
received settlement funds on November 3, 2015, but did not pay 
them to M.I. until on or after March 1, 2016, Attorney Heins did 
not "promptly deliver to the client" the settlement funds that 
the client was entitled to receive and that therefore there was 
an adequate factual basis in the record to support the 
misconduct alleged in Count Four. 
¶31 Count Five alleged that by failing to timely respond 
to the OLR's investigative letters of February 17 and February 
22, 2016, Attorney Heins violated SCR 22.03(2), enforceable by 
SCR 20:8.4(h), and, by willfully failing to timely provide the 
trust account records requested in the OLR's letters of 
                                                 
6 Former SCR 20:1.15(d)(1) provided: 
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a 
client has an interest, or in which the lawyer has 
received notice that a 3rd party has an interest 
identified by a lien, court order, judgment, or 
contract, the lawyer shall promptly notify the client 
or 3rd party in writing.  Except as stated in this 
rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with 
the client, the lawyer shall promptly deliver to the 
client or 3rd party any funds or other property that 
the 
client or 3rd party is entitled to receive. 
No. 
2016AP2454-D   
 
11 
 
February 17 
and 
March 
25, 
2016, 
Attorney 
Heins 
violated 
SCR 22.03(2) and (6),7 enforceable by SCR 20:8.4(h).8  
¶32 The referee found that based upon the undisputed facts 
in the record that Attorney Heins refused on several occasions 
to furnish information requested by the OLR in correspondence, 
and only supplied the complete information after the OLR was 
required to file a Motion and Order to Show Cause, there was an 
adequate factual basis in the record to support the misconduct 
alleged in Count Five.   
                                                 
7 SCR 22.03(2) and (6) provide: 
(2) Upon 
commencing 
an 
investigation, 
the 
director shall notify the respondent of the matter 
being investigated unless in the opinion of the 
director the investigation of the matter requires 
otherwise.  The respondent shall fully and fairly 
disclose all facts and circumstances pertaining to the 
alleged misconduct within 20 days after being served 
by ordinary mail request for a written response.  The 
director 
may 
allow 
additional 
time 
to 
respond.  
Following receipt of the response, the director may 
conduct further investigation and may compel the 
respondent to answer questions, furnish documents, and 
present 
any 
information 
deemed 
relevant 
to 
the 
investigation.   
(6) In the course of the investigation, the 
respondent's 
wilful 
failure 
to 
provide 
relevant 
information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a 
disclosure are misconduct, regardless of the merits of 
the matters asserted in the grievance. 
8 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to fail to cooperate in the investigation of a 
grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required 
by 
SCR 
21.15(4), 
SCR 
22.001(9)(b), 
SCR 
22.03(6), 
or 
SCR 22.04(1)." 
No. 
2016AP2454-D   
 
12 
 
¶33  Count 
Six 
of 
the 
complaint 
alleged 
that 
on 
September 10, 2015, another of Attorney Heins' clients, M.J., 
presented for payment a check from Attorney Heins' trust account 
in the amount of $600, representing his portion of a settlement.  
The check was returned for insufficient funds.  On that date 
Attorney Heins had a zero balance in her trust account. 
¶34 The following day, Attorney Heins made deposits 
totaling $600 into her trust account.  M.J. again presented the 
check on September 16, 2015.  This time, the check cleared the 
bank.  
¶35 Count Six alleged that by failing to hold in trust 
funds 
belonging 
to 
M.J., 
Attorney 
Heins 
violated 
SCR 20:l.15(b)(1).  The referee found that, based upon the 
undisputed evidence in the record, that the $600, which was owed 
to M.J., was not in Attorney Heins' trust account when the check 
was first presented for payment, there was an adequate factual 
basis in the record to support misconduct as alleged in Count 
Six. 
¶36 Accordingly, based upon the stipulation filed on June 
14, 2017, and for the reasons set forth above, the referee 
found, as proven fact, each and every factual allegation in the 
OLR's complaint.  Further, the referee concluded that the record 
was sufficient to support his determination that Attorney Heins 
violated the supreme court rules as alleged in the OLR's 
complaint.  
No. 
2016AP2454-D   
 
13 
 
¶37 No appeal from the referee's report was filed so our 
review proceeds under SCR 22.17(2).9  In conducting our review, 
we uphold a referee's findings of fact unless they are shown to 
be clearly erroneous, and we review the referee's conclusions of 
law de novo.   See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Carroll, 2001 WI 130, ¶29, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 636 N.W.2d 718; In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sosnay, 209 Wis. 2d 241, 
243, 562 N.W.2d 137 (1997).  We determine the appropriate level 
of discipline to be imposed under the circumstances, independent 
of the referee's recommendation.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 
N.W.2d 686. 
¶38 There is no showing that any of the referee's findings 
of fact, which are derived from the parties' stipulation, are 
clearly erroneous.  Accordingly, we adopt them.  We also agree 
with the referee's conclusions of law that Attorney Heins 
violated the supreme court rules set forth above.  
¶39 The referee then considered the appropriate discipline 
for Attorney Heins' misconduct.  The parties jointly requested 
the referee recommend a public reprimand and that Attorney Heins 
                                                 
9 SCR 22.17(2) provides:  
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court 
shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or 
modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline.  The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
2016AP2454-D   
 
14 
 
be ordered to submit her fee dispute with J.R. to binding 
arbitration before the State Bar Fee Arbitration Program and 
comply with any arbitration award, subject to any rights or 
remedies provided for by the Program's rules. 
¶40 The referee conducted an independent assessment of 
whether the stipulated discipline was appropriate.  The referee 
set 
forth 
the 
relevant 
factors 
to 
be 
considered 
when 
ascertaining the appropriate sanction for misconduct, including 
the seriousness, nature, and extent of misconduct, the level of 
discipline needed to protect the public and the legal system 
from repetition of the misconduct, the need to impress on the 
attorney the seriousness of the misconduct, and the need to 
deter others from committing similar acts.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Hammis, 2011 WI 3, 331 Wis. 2d 19, 793 
N.W.2d 884. 
¶41 The referee observed that there was no evidence of 
prior disciplinary proceedings against Attorney Heins.  The 
referee noted that this proceeding involves misconduct in three 
separate 
client 
matters, 
including 
failure 
to 
abide 
by 
agreements with a client, failure to obey supreme court rules 
concerning fee disputes, several trust account violations, 
including being "out of trust" on numerous occasions, and 
failure to cooperate with the OLR's investigation.  The referee 
deemed these "serious allegations of misconduct extending over 
several years."  The referee deemed particularly troublesome 
Attorney Heins' refusal to follow through on both her written 
No. 
2016AP2454-D   
 
15 
 
agreement and supreme court rule requiring participation in the 
State Bar Fee Arbitration Program. 
¶42 The referee observed that on previous occasions, this 
court has imposed public reprimands in similar cases.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Halverson, 225 Wis. 2d 215, 591 
N.W.2d 821 (1999) (public reprimand imposed on attorney with no 
prior discipline who failed to supply requested information to 
clients, failed to refund fees, and failed to cooperate with 
OLR); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Grapsas, 174 
Wis. 2d 816, 498 N.W.2d 400 (1993) (imposing public reprimand on 
attorney with no prior discipline who failed to cooperate with 
OLR, failed to refund fees to a client, and failed to respond to 
requests for information from the client); In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Adent, 2016 WI 19, 367 Wis. 2d 372, 877 
N.W.2d 364 (accepting stipulation and imposing public reprimand 
on attorney for trust account violations).  
¶43 On balance, the referee determined that a public 
reprimand is appropriate discipline here and that the court 
should order Attorney Heins to submit her fee dispute with J.R. 
to binding arbitration before the State Bar Fee Arbitration 
Program, and to fully and promptly comply with that proceeding 
as well as with any arbitration award or other orders that may 
be made in connection with those proceedings.  The referee added 
that if Attorney Heins fails to comply, the OLR should be 
authorized to request the court re-open this matter to consider 
additional discipline.  Finally, the referee recommends we 
No. 
2016AP2454-D   
 
16 
 
impose the full costs of this proceeding on Attorney Heins.  We 
agree with the referee's analysis. 
¶44 IT IS ORDERED that Janet L. Heins is publicly 
reprimanded. 
¶45  IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Janet L. Heins shall, if 
she has not already done so, promptly submit her fee dispute 
with J.R. to binding arbitration before the State Bar Fee 
Arbitration Program, and shall fully and promptly comply with 
that proceeding as well as with any arbitration award or other 
orders that may be made in connection with those proceedings.  
¶46 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Janet L. Heins shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are $2,378.02 as 
of July 24, 2017. 
¶47 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Director of the Office 
of Lawyer Regulation shall advise the court if there has not 
been full compliance with all conditions of this order.  If 
Janet L. Heins fails to comply with our directive to submit her 
fee dispute to binding arbitration, the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation may request the court re-open this matter to consider 
imposition of additional sanctions. 
 
 
 
No. 
2016AP2454-D   
 
 
 
1