Case Title: Havel v. Villa St. Joseph

Citation: 2012-Ohio-552

Docket Number: 2010-2148

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-02-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Havel v. Villa St. Joseph, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-552.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-552 
HAVEL, APPELLEE, v. VILLA ST. JOSEPH ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Havel v. Villa St. Joseph, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-552.] 
Trials—Bifurcation of claims—R.C. 2315.21—Civ.R. 42—R.C. 2315.21(B) 
creates, defines, and regulates a substantive, enforceable right to separate 
stages of trial relating to the presentation of evidence for compensatory 
and punitive damages in tort actions and therefore takes precedence over 
Civ.R. 42(B) and does not violate the Ohio Constitution, Article IV, 
Section 5(B). 
(No. 2010-2148—Submitted September 21, 2011—Decided February 15, 2012.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 94677, 
2010-Ohio-5251. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
R.C. 2315.21(B) creates, defines, and regulates a substantive, enforceable right to 
separate stages of trial relating to the presentation of evidence for 
compensatory and punitive damages in tort actions and therefore takes 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
precedence over Civ.R. 42(B) and does not violate the Ohio Constitution, 
Article IV, Section 5(B). 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} The Eighth District Court of Appeals certified a conflict between 
its decision in this case and a decision of the Tenth District Court of Appeals in 
Hanners v. Ho Wah Genting Wire & Cable SDNBHD, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-361, 
2009-Ohio-6481, on the following question: “Whether R.C. 2315.21(B), as 
amended by S.B. 80, effective April 7, 2005 is unconstitutional, in violation of 
Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, because it is a procedural law 
that conflicts with Civ.R. 42(B).” 
{¶ 2} In 1968, voters adopted an amendment to the Ohio Constitution 
commonly referred to as the Modern Courts Amendment that effectuated judicial 
reform.  Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 5(B); see generally Milligan and 
Pohlman, The 1968 Modern Courts Amendment to the Ohio Constitution, 29 Ohio 
St.L.J. 811 (1968).  The Modern Courts Amendment conferred authority on the 
Supreme Court of Ohio to promulgate rules relating to matters of procedure in 
courts of Ohio, while the right to establish the substantive law in Ohio remained 
with the legislative branch of government.  Procedural rules promulgated pursuant 
to the Modern Court Amendment supersede conflicting statutes that affect 
procedural matters but cannot “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.”  
Id. 
{¶ 3} Both R.C. 2315.21(B) and Civ.R. 42(B) deal with the issue 
whether the trial of a tort action should be bifurcated for the purpose of addressing 
claims for compensatory and punitive damages.  R.C. 2315.21(B) provides that 
upon the motion of any party in a tort action in which a claim for compensatory 
damages and a claim for punitive damages are made, the trial shall be bifurcated.  
Civ.R. 42(B), on the other hand, vests a trial court with discretion to order a 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, third-party claim, or issue, 
when doing so would promote convenience, avoid prejudice, or when it would be 
economically prudent or efficient to do so. 
{¶ 4} In addition to the obvious question of judicial discretion regarding 
whether to bifurcate damages claims, the related question presented by this case is 
whether R.C. 2315.21(B) creates a substantive, enforceable right to bifurcation or 
whether it is a procedural matter that conflicts with Civ.R. 42(B). 
{¶ 5} In the uncodified language of 2004 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 80 (“S.B. 
80”), 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, 7915, the legislature expressed its intent to create a 
right to bifurcate claims for compensatory damages from claims for punitive 
damages in tort actions.  Thus, R.C. 2315.21(B) creates, defines, and regulates a 
substantive, enforceable right to separate stages of trial relating to the presentation 
of evidence for compensatory and punitive damages in tort actions.  Accordingly, 
we answer the certified question in the negative because R.C. 2315.21(B) 
supersedes Civ.R. 42(B) and does not violate the separation of powers required by 
the Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 5(B), as it is a substantive law that 
prevails over a procedural rule. 
Background 
{¶ 6} On October 3, 2008, Villa St. Joseph, a nursing-home facility in 
Garfield Heights, Ohio, associated with the Village at Marymount, admitted John 
E. Havel for rehabilitation following hip surgery.  While receiving care, he 
developed severe decubitus ulcers that required surgery.  Following that surgery, 
on January 21, 2009, Maple Wood Care Centre, a nursing home in Streetsboro, 
Ohio, admitted him for continued care and rehabilitative assistance.  There he 
contracted bacterial sepsis, necessitating treatment that he received at both 
Marymount and Lakewood Hospitals.  Havel died on August 29, 2009, from 
bacterial sepsis caused by skin ulcers. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
{¶ 7} Sandra Havel (“Havel”), as the personal representative of the estate 
of John Havel, filed a complaint seeking both compensatory and punitive 
damages from Villa St. Joseph, Village at Marymount, Maple Wood Care Centre 
and Northern Health Facilities, Inc., d.b.a. Maple Wood Care Centre, and 
Extendicare Health Services, Inc., alleging claims for medical malpractice, 
wrongful death, and violations of the Ohio Nursing Home Patients’ Bill of Rights 
pursuant to R.C. 3721.13.  Villa St. Joseph and Village at Marymount 
(collectively, “Villa St. Joseph”) moved to bifurcate the trial into two stages 
pursuant to R.C. 2315.21(B): an initial stage relating only to the presentation of 
evidence and determination by the jury as to the recovery of compensatory 
damages, and, if necessary, a second stage involving the presentation of evidence 
and determination by the jury with respect to the recovery of punitive damages.  
The trial court denied the motion to bifurcate without stating a reason. 
{¶ 8} Villa St. Joseph appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, 
which affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  The appellate court held that R.C. 
2315.21(B) is unconstitutional because it conflicts with Civ.R. 42(B), in violation 
of the separation of powers required by the Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 
5(B), by purporting “to legislate a strictly procedural matter already addressed by 
the Civil Rules.”  8th Dist. No. 94677, 2010-Ohio-5251, ¶ 27.  The court further 
determined that R.C. 2315.21(B) did not grant a right, but rather “specifies ‘ “the 
machinery for carrying on the suit” ’ by telling courts ‘the procedural 
prioritization’ for determining compensatory and punitive damages at trial.”  Id., 
quoting Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Bogle, 115 Ohio St.3d 455, 2007-Ohio-5248, 875 
N.E.2d 919, ¶ 16, quoting Jones v. Erie RR. Co., 106 Ohio St. 408, 412, 140 N.E. 
366 (1922). 
{¶ 9} The court certified its decision to be in conflict with the Tenth 
District Court of Appeals in Hanners, and we agreed to resolve the conflict 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
between these appellate districts, 127 Ohio St.3d 1530, 2011-Ohio-376, 940 
N.E.2d 985. 
Constitutionality of R.C. 2315.21(B) 
{¶ 10} Villa St. Joseph asserts that R.C. 2315.21(B) is constitutional 
because no conflict exists between the statute and Civ.R. 42(B), and, therefore, 
the statute does not violate the Modern Courts Amendment.  It further contends 
that even if a conflict exists, R.C. 2315.21(B), as specified in the uncodified 
language accompanying the statute, creates a substantive right.  Villa St. Joseph 
argues that although the plain language of the statute setting forth the procedure 
for bifurcation is not ambiguous, it is ambiguous whether R.C. 2315.21(B) 
created a substantive right to bifurcation of the trial for determining compensatory 
and punitive-damages claims.  According to Villa St. Joseph, the uncodified 
language of the statute eliminates that ambiguity and evinces the intent of the 
legislature to create a substantive right to bifurcation.  For these reasons, Villa St. 
Joseph petitions this court to conclude that R.C. 2315.21(B) is constitutional. 
{¶ 11} Havel urges that R.C. 2315.21(B) is unconstitutional because it 
violates the Modern Courts Amendment, contending that bifurcation is a matter of 
procedural law, not substantive law, and the mandatory bifurcation process set 
forth in R.C. 2315.21(B) conflicts with the discretionary bifurcation procedure 
conferred by Civ.R. 42(B), and, therefore, the rule prevails over the statute.  
Further, Havel relies on State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 
86 Ohio St.3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (1999), for the proposition that this court has 
already determined that the statute does not create a substantive right.  She also 
maintains that no ambiguity exists in the codified language of the statute to justify 
consideration of its uncodified language, which, in its final analysis, she asserts 
supports her position that R.C. 2315.21(B) is a procedural law. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
Issue of Conflict 
{¶ 12} The Modern Courts Amendment of 1968 empowers this court to 
create rules of practice and procedure for the courts of this state.  In Proctor v. 
Kardassilaris, 115 Ohio St.3d 71, 2007-Ohio-4838, 873 N.E.2d 872, we 
explained that Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 5(B) “expressly states that 
rules created in this manner ‘shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive 
right.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 17.  “Thus, if a rule created pursuant to Section 5(B), Article IV 
conflicts with a statute, the rule will control for procedural matters, and the statute 
will control for matters of substantive law.”  Id. 
{¶ 13} The plain language of R.C. 2315.21(B) creates no ambiguity 
regarding its application: a trial court, on the motion of any party, is required to 
bifurcate a tort action to allow presentation of the claims for compensatory and 
punitive damages in separate stages.  The statute provides: 
 
 
(1) In a tort action that is tried to a jury and in which a 
plaintiff makes a claim for compensatory damages and a claim for 
punitive or exemplary damages, upon the motion of any party, the 
trial of the tort action shall be bifurcated as follows: 
 
(a) The initial stage of the trial shall relate only to the 
presentation of evidence, and a determination by the jury, with 
respect to whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover compensatory 
damages for the injury or loss to person or property from the 
defendant. During this stage, no party to the tort action shall 
present, and the court shall not permit a party to present, evidence 
that relates solely to the issue of whether the plaintiff is entitled to 
recover punitive or exemplary damages for the injury or loss to 
person or property from the defendant. 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
 
(b) If the jury determines in the initial stage of the trial that 
the plaintiff is entitled to recover compensatory damages for the 
injury or loss to person or property from the defendant, evidence 
may be presented in the second stage of the trial, and a 
determination by that jury shall be made, with respect to whether 
the plaintiff additionally is entitled to recover punitive or 
exemplary damages for the injury or loss to person or property 
from the defendant. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Id. 
{¶ 14} The language of Civ.R. 42(B) is also unambiguous: it vests a trial 
court with discretion to order a separate trial of any claims or issues and applies to 
all civil actions.  Specifically, it provides:  
 
 
The court, after a hearing, in furtherance of convenience or 
to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to 
expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim, 
cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate 
issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, or 
third-party claims, or issues, always preserving inviolate the right 
to trial by jury. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  
 
{¶ 15} Although, in some instances, the statute and the rule can be applied 
without conflict, such as when a tort action is not involved, there is an 
inconsistency between the statute and the rule when an action falls within the 
parameters of R.C. 2315.21(B). 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
Substantive versus Procedural Law 
{¶ 16} Given that an inconsistency exists, the statute’s constitutionality 
depends upon whether it is a substantive or procedural law.  In Krause v. State, 31 
Ohio St.2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736 (1972), overruled on other grounds by 
Schenkolewski v. Cleveland Metroparks Sys., 67 Ohio St.2d 31, 426 N.E.2d 784 
(1981), paragraph one of the syllabus, we defined “substantive” in context of the 
constitutional amendment to mean “that body of law which creates, defines and 
regulates the rights of the parties.  * * * The word substantive refers to common 
law, statutory and constitutionally recognized rights.”  Id. at 145.  By contrast, 
procedural law “prescribes methods of enforcement of rights or obtaining 
redress.”  Roe v. Planned Parenthood Southwest Ohio Region, 122 Ohio St.3d 
399, 2009-Ohio-2973, 912 N.E.2d 61, ¶ 34, citing French v. Dwiggins, 9 Ohio 
St.3d 32, 34, 458 N.E.2d 827 (1984). 
{¶ 17} A right is defined as “[a] power, privilege, or immunity secured to 
a person by law,” as well as “[a] legally enforceable claim that another will do or 
will not do a given act.”  Black's Law Dictionary 1436 (9th Ed.2009).  Compare 
R.C. 2505.02(A)(1) (defining a "substantial right" for the purpose of defining a 
final order as a "right that the United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a 
statute, the common law, or a rule of procedure entitles a person to enforce or 
protect").  Thus, classification of R.C. 2315.21(B) as a substantive or procedural 
law depends upon whether the statute creates a right. 
{¶ 18} We are aided in our analysis of whether R.C. 2315.21(B) is 
substantive or procedural by examining previous decisions from our court 
involving similar issues. 
{¶ 19} In State v. Hughes, 41 Ohio St.2d 208, 324 N.E.2d 731 (1975), we 
considered a conflict between R.C. 2945.68, which granted appellate courts the 
discretion to allow the state to file a bill of exceptions in a criminal matter, and 
App.R. 4(B), which permitted the state to appeal as of right in criminal cases.  In 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
determining that the rule must yield to the statute, we held that R.C. 2945.68 
granted the state “a substantive right of appeal which did not exist at common law 
prior to the adoption of Section 6 of Article IV of the Ohio Constitution (now 
Section 3 of Article IV), and the implementing legislation contained in R.C. 
2945.67 through 2945.70.”  Id. at 210.  The purpose of R.C. 2945.67 through 
2945.70 also served as a basis for that determination: those statutes granted 
“jurisdiction to appellate courts to hear appeals by the prosecution in criminal 
cases” as well as created “a substantive right in the prosecution to bring such 
appeals in the instances permitted by R.C. 2945.70 and the decisions interpreting 
that section.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 210-211. 
{¶ 20} We also recognized the statutory creation of a right in State v. 
Rahman, 23 Ohio St.3d 146, 148, 492 N.E.2d 401 (1986), which held that R.C. 
2945.42 conferred a substantive right upon the accused in a criminal trial to 
exclude privileged spousal testimony concerning a confidential communication 
and, as a substantive right, the spousal privilege could not be limited by a rule of 
evidence addressing the competency of a spouse to testify. 
{¶ 21} The statutes at issue in Hughes and Rahman did not contain 
express language declaring the creation of a substantive right.  Nonetheless, in 
determining that those statutes created substantive rights, our analyses considered 
the operative effect of each statute.  Similarly, here, the express language of the 
statute does not declare the creation of a right, but its operative effect creates a 
right because a party in a tort action is entitled to bifurcation upon request; thus, 
we must determine if application of the procedural rule would invalidate that 
right. 
{¶ 22} In State v. Greer, 39 Ohio St.3d 236, 530 N.E.2d 382 (1988), we 
considered the interplay between R.C. 2945.21(A)(2), which allowed a defendant 
to exercise 12 preemptory challenges during voir dire, and Crim.R. 24(C), which 
limited the number of preemptory challenges that could be exercised to six.  We 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
held that the rule regulated the application of the substantive right created by 
statute but did not restrict the right to the extent that it constituted a “de facto 
abrogation or the modification of the right itself.”  Id. at 245-246. 
{¶ 23} In the instant case, applying Civ.R. 42(B) to tort actions in which a 
party has requested bifurcation pursuant to R.C. 2315.21(B) would nullify the 
statute to the extent that a judge’s refusal to bifurcate the trial would constitute a 
“de facto abrogation” of the mandatory bifurcation provided by the statute. 
Mandatory Bifurcation 
{¶ 24} In Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 115 Ohio St.3d 455, 2007-Ohio-5248, 875 
N.E.2d 919, we addressed whether the prima facie filing requirements of R.C. 
2307.92 and R.C. 2307.93 were substantive or procedural in the context of a 
federal preemption analysis.  We concluded that the statutes were procedural in 
nature because they did not grant any rights or impose any duties that gave rise to 
a cause of action and stated, “[T]he impact of these statutes is to establish a 
procedural prioritization of the asbestos-related cases on the court's docket.  
Nothing more.  Simply put, these statutes create a procedure to prioritize the 
administration and resolution of a cause of action that already exists.”  Id. at ¶ 16. 
{¶ 25} Unlike the statutes at issue in Norfolk, however, R.C. 2315.21(B) 
does more than set forth the procedure for the bifurcation of tort actions: it makes 
bifurcation mandatory.  Indeed, mandatory bifurcation in tort actions did not exist 
prior to the amendment of R.C. 2315.21(B) by S.B. 80.  Cf. Viers v. Dunlap, 1 
Ohio St.3d 173, 438 N.E.2d 881 (1982) (R.C. 2315.19(A)(1), which codified the 
doctrine of comparative negligence, was “substantive in nature and effect,” id. at 
177, because “[w]here before a defendant was shielded from liability by a 
plaintiff's contributory negligence, this defendant no longer enjoys such 
protection.  Where before a plaintiff who was contributorily negligent was denied 
recovery, he is now * * * entitled to damages.  To characterize * * * such a 
fundamental change in the law as affecting only trial procedure and the mode by 
January Term, 2012 
11 
 
which a remedy is effected defies logic”).  Even the dissent recognizes that the 
statute takes away the discretion granted to a judge to allow bifurcation by 
permitting parties to demand bifurcation. 
{¶ 26} By eliminating judicial discretion, R.C. 2315.21(B) creates a 
concomitant right to bifurcation: because the court cannot deny a request for 
bifurcation under the specified circumstances, the statute turns a request into a 
demand for or an entitlement to bifurcation by controlling the outcome.  We have 
previously recognized that a statute may create a right when it contains mandatory 
language and restricts judicial or agency discretion.  See, e.g., State v. Coffman, 
91 Ohio St.3d 125, 127, 742 N.E.2d 644 (2001) (former R.C. 2947.061(B) did not 
create a right to shock probation because “the statute committed decisions 
regarding shock probation to the plenary discretion of the trial court” and its terms 
“were permissive in nature”); State ex rel. Duganitz v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 
77 Ohio St.3d 190, 672 N.E.2d 654 (1996) (relator did not have a clear legal right 
to be released from parole pursuant to former R.C. 2967.16 because the decision 
to grant a final release from parole rested with the Ohio Adult Parole Authority 
and, therefore, the statute did not mandate release); Cleveland Produce Co. v. 
Dennert, 104 Ohio St. 149, 135 N.E. 531 (1922), syllabus (G.C. 11470, which 
required a trial court to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law when 
requested by a party following a bench trial, conferred “a substantial right” upon 
the requesting party; its provisions were “mandatory” and the failure of a court to 
issue such findings constituted reversible error).  Compare Cleveland Constr., Inc. 
v. Cincinnati, 118 Ohio St.3d 283, 2008-Ohio-2337, 888 N.E.2d 1068, ¶ 17 
(contractor had no property interest in a contract because the city had “extensive 
discretion” in considering bids).  R.C. 2315.21(B), like the statute in Krause, 
“falls within that body of law traditionally denominated substantive.  It both 
defines and regulates the rights of parties.”  31 Ohio St.2d at 145, 285 N.E.2d 
736. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
Uncodified Statutory Language 
{¶ 27} The express language of the codified portion of S.B. 80 does not 
convey whether R.C. 2315.21(B) is a substantive or procedural law.  We 
confronted a similar situation in State ex rel. Loyd v. Lovelady, 108 Ohio St.3d 86, 
2006-Ohio-161, 840 N.E.2d 1062.  The issue there concerned whether R.C. 
3119.961 et seq. conflicted with Civ.R. 60(B), in violation of the Modern Courts 
Amendment.  R.C. 3119.962 provided, “Upon the filing of a motion for relief 
under section 3119.961 of the Revised Code, a court shall grant relief from * * * a 
child support order under which a person or male minor is the obligor” pursuant 
to specified conditions.  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 3119.961(A) allowed the motion 
to be filed notwithstanding provisions to the contrary in Civ.R. 60(B).  Like the 
statute at issue here, R.C. 3119.961(A) contained no ambiguity as to its 
application; it divested trial courts of the discretion conferred by Civ.R. 60(B) in 
granting a motion for relief from judgment by mandating that, upon the filing of a 
motion, courts “shall grant relief” from a child-support order provided that the 
obligor met the designated criteria. 
{¶ 28} We began by acknowledging that all statutes enjoy a strong 
presumption of constitutionality and that legislative intent is the paramount 
concern of a court when interpreting a statute.  Loyd at ¶ 13.  Applying the well-
settled rule of statutory construction requiring a court to “ ‘first look at the words 
of the statute itself’ to determine legislative intent,” we concluded that “it [was] 
not clear from the statute itself whether it was intended to be substantive or 
procedural.”  Id., quoting Carnes v. Kemp, 104 Ohio St.3d 629, 2004-Ohio-7107, 
821 N.E.2d 180, ¶ 16.  We resolved that lack of clarity by considering the 
statements expressed by the General Assembly in the uncodified language in 
connection with R.C. 3119.961 et seq., noting that “although R.C. 3119.961 and 
3119.962 are necessarily packaged in procedural wrapping, it is clear to us that 
the General Assembly intended to create a substantive right to address potential 
January Term, 2012 
13 
 
injustice.”  Id. at ¶ 14.  Thus, because R.C. 3119.961(A) created a substantive 
right, as stated in the uncodified language of the statute, it did not “violate the 
separation of powers required by Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio 
Constitution.”  Id. at ¶ 15. 
{¶ 29} Similarly, in this case, the statements made by the General 
Assembly in the uncodified language of S.B. 80 compel the conclusion that 
although R.C. 2315.21(B) may be “packaged in procedural wrapping,” it is a 
substantive law because it creates a right to “address potential injustice.”  As in 
Lovelady, resort to uncodified law is proper here because uncertainty exists 
whether R.C. 2315.21(B) is substantive or procedural and no rule of construction 
precludes our review of uncodified law in an effort to ascertain legislative intent. 
{¶ 30} The uncodified language of S.B. 80 includes a “statement of 
findings and intent” made by the General Assembly.  S.B. 80, Section 3, 150 Ohio 
Laws, Part V, at 8024.  In its statement, the General Assembly asserted, “The 
current civil litigation system represents a challenge to the economy of the state of 
Ohio,” and recognized that “a fair system of civil justice strikes an essential 
balance between the rights of those who have been legitimately harmed and the 
rights of those who have been unfairly sued.”  Section 3(A)(1) and (2), id.  The 
General Assembly further declared that “[r]eform to the punitive damages law in 
Ohio [was] urgently needed to restore balance, fairness, and predictability to the 
civil justice system.”  Section 3(A)(4)(a), id. at 8025. 
{¶ 31} The uncodified language of the statute also distinguishes 
noneconomic damages, which “are intended to compensate person for the 
person’s loss,” from punitive damages, which “are intended to punish a defendant 
for wrongful conduct.”  Section 3(A)(6)(a), id. at 8027.  Among its findings, the 
General Assembly explained: 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
 
(d) While pain and suffering awards are inherently 
subjective, it is believed that this inflation of noneconomic 
damages is partially due to the improper consideration of evidence 
of wrongdoing in assessing pain and suffering damages. 
 
(e) Inflated damage awards create an improper resolution of 
civil justice claims.  The increased and improper cost of litigation 
and resulting rise in insurance premiums is passed on to the 
general public through higher prices for products and services. 
 
(f) * * * In cases in which punitive damages are requested, 
defendants should have the right to request bifurcation of a trial to 
ensure that evidence of misconduct is not inappropriately 
considered by the jury in its determination of liability and 
compensatory damages.  As additional protection, trial and 
appellate courts should rigorously review pain and suffering 
awards to ensure that they properly serve compensatory purposes 
and are not excessive. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Section 3(A)(6)(d) through (f), id. at 8028. 
{¶ 32} These findings and statements by the General Assembly 
demonstrate its intent to create a substantive right to ensure that evidence of 
misconduct is not inappropriately considered by the jury in its assessment of 
liability and its award of compensatory damages.   The dissent claims that R.C. 
2315.21(B) is “no different” from other “legislative attempts to influence 
courtroom practice and procedure” that “we have overruled” in the past. 
{¶ 33} The cases cited by the dissent, however, merely underscore that 
when a statute and rule conflict, the statute will prevail in matters of substantive 
law and the rule will prevail in matters of procedural law.  In none of those cases 
did we undertake a substantive-versus-procedural analysis, nor did any involve a 
January Term, 2012 
15 
 
statute where the divestiture of discretion created a right, as here.  In addition, 
those cases actually bolster our analysis and our result because they recognize that 
it is appropriate to consider the operative effect of the statute or rule in question 
when determining whether the statute is substantive or procedural.  In Alexander 
v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., for example, we said that “the effect of Civ.R. 54(B) 
[was] purely procedural” and did not “affect” a “substantive right.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Id., 49 Ohio St.2d at 159, 359 N.E.2d 702. 
{¶ 34} Contrary to the unsupported contention of the dissent, R.C. 
2315.21(B) is not a procedural statute because it pertains to a procedural issue: as 
noted in Lovelady, which the dissent refers to but does not distinguish, a statute 
may create a substantive right despite being “packaged in procedural wrapping.”  
Id., 108 Ohio St.3d 86, 2006-Ohio-161, 840 N.E.2d 1062, at ¶ 14. 
{¶ 35} Accordingly, R.C. 2315.21(B) does not violate the Ohio 
Constitution, Article IV, Section 5(B) and is constitutional because it is a 
substantive law that prevails over a procedural rule.  Inherent in our conclusion is 
rejection of the argument that dicta contained in Sheward, which described the 
former version of R.C. 2315.21(B) as governing a procedural matter, should 
control our determination here.  We have acknowledged that “R.C. 2315.21 is 
admittedly similar to the punitive-damages statute struck down in Sheward,” 
Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 
420, ¶ 108, but despite the similarity, Sheward never considered the bifurcation 
question we confront in this case.  Thus, we are not required to follow out-of-
context dicta as precedent.  Arbino at ¶ 93, 108. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 36} R.C. 2315.21(B) creates a substantive right to bifurcation in tort 
actions when claims for compensatory and punitive damages have been asserted.  
Thus, R.C. 2315.21(B) creates, defines, and regulates a substantive, enforceable 
right to separate stages of trial relating to the presentation of evidence for 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
compensatory and punitive damages in tort actions and therefore takes precedence 
over Civ.R. 42(B) and does not violate the Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 
5(B). 
{¶ 37} Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the negative and 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment reversed. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in judgment only. 
PFEIFER and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
MCGEE BROWN, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 38} The Modern Courts Amendment to the Ohio Constitution gives the 
Supreme Court of Ohio exclusive authority over standards for practice and 
procedure in Ohio courts.  Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 5(B).  The 
constitutional provision also prohibits the General Assembly from enacting laws 
that conflict with our court rules. 
{¶ 39} The statute before us, R.C. 2315.21(B), clearly conflicts with the 
rule we have established, Civ.R. 42(B), which governs motions for bifurcation.  
Contrary to the express command of Article IV, Section 5(B), however, the 
majority concludes that the General Assembly may override our rule in this 
context.  This conclusion represents a sharp turn in our jurisprudence, and it 
dangerously unsettles the balance of power struck by the Modern Courts 
Amendment.  Therefore, I must respectfully dissent. 
{¶ 40} In the past, we have carefully guarded our rulemaking authority 
against legislative attempts to influence courtroom practice and procedure.  For 
example, we have overruled legislative attempts to undermine our rules with 
respect to the consolidation of claims, Dir. of Highways v. Kleines, 38 Ohio St.2d 
317, 320, 313 N.E.2d 370 (1974) (holding that “the management of cases lies 
January Term, 2012 
17 
 
within the discretion of the court”); pleading requirements, Rockey v. 84 Lumber 
Co., 66 Ohio St.3d 221, 225, 611 N.E.2d 789 (1993) (concluding that Civ.R. 8(A) 
prevails over R.C. 2309.01 with respect to pleading requirements because the 
court’s rules “must control over subsequently enacted inconsistent statutes 
purporting to govern procedural matters”); the joinder and separation of claims, 
Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 49 Ohio St.2d 158, 159-160, 359 N.E.2d 702 
(1977) (“Questions involving the joinder and separation of claims and the timing 
of appeals are matters of practice and procedure within the rule-making authority 
of this court * * *”).  R.C. 2315.21(B) is no different.  While purporting to create 
“fairness” in the trial of tort cases, the General Assembly has usurped the court’s 
authority by mandating how cases should be tried. 
{¶ 41} Our precedent in this area is clear and well reasoned.  We have 
followed the express language of the Modern Courts Amendment by invalidating 
statutes that override our rules governing procedural issues in Ohio courts.  The 
hallmark of such unconstitutional statutes is that they purport to influence the 
mechanics of the courtroom or “ ‘the machinery for carrying on [a] suit.’ ”  
Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Bogle, 115 Ohio St.3d 455, 2007-Ohio-5248, 875 N.E.2d 
919, ¶ 16, quoting Jones v. Erie RR. Co., 106 Ohio St. 408, 412, 140 N.E. 366 
(1922).  However, we have held that Article IV, Section 5(B) does not limit the 
General Assembly’s authority to affect substantive rights, “ ‘which give rise to a 
cause of action.’ ”  Id., quoting Jones at 412.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Loyd v. 
Lovelady, 108 Ohio St.3d 86, 2006-Ohio-161, 840 N.E.2d 1062. 
{¶ 42} The majority largely sidesteps our precedent regarding the 
substantive/procedural dichotomy.  Instead, it defers to the General Assembly’s 
purported intention that R.C. 2315.21(B) relates to a substantive right.  Setting 
aside the problematic nature of the majority’s conclusion—which it divines from 
a compilation of uncodified “findings and statements” rather than any express 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
statutory language—the Ohio Constitution does not entitle the General Assembly 
to predetermine the constitutionality of its laws. 
{¶ 43} We look to legislative intent to clarify ambiguous statutory 
language, but this statute is not ambiguous.  We should not resort to legislative 
intent to determine that a statute is constitutional simply because the General 
Assembly intended it to be so.  Only the courts may rule on a statute’s 
constitutionality. 
{¶ 44} To the extent that the majority undertakes an analysis of R.C. 
2315.21(B), it apparently concludes that the statute creates a substantive right for 
defendants to limit the introduction of evidence of misconduct when juries 
consider compensatory damages.  However, the conduct and control of trials is 
procedural, not substantive.  Trial judges are in the best position to determine how 
a trial should proceed and to limit or prevent the introduction of prejudicial 
evidence.  Civ.R. 42 provides this authority. 
{¶ 45} Moreover, the uncodified commentary on which the majority relies 
hardly marks the creation of a right.  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 80, Section 3(A)(6)(f) 
suggests, “[D]efendants should have the right to request bifurcation to ensure that 
evidence of misconduct is not inappropriately considered by the jury * * *.”  150 
Ohio Laws, Part V, 7915, 8028.  But defendants, like plaintiffs, have long enjoyed 
that right under Civ.R. 42(B). 
{¶ 46} Bifurcation is a classic courtroom procedural issue.  A motion for 
bifurcation involves a question of how best to manage the competing interests of 
efficiency and prejudice in the courtroom, and we have determined that judges are 
best situated to answer that question.  See Civ.R. 42(B).  Indeed, in some cases 
judges may find bifurcation wasteful or unfair, and our rule recognizes the 
discretion of judges to manage their cases with an eye toward those practical and 
important considerations. 
January Term, 2012 
19 
 
{¶ 47} The conflict here is undeniable: whereas Civ.R. 42(B) gives 
discretion over bifurcation motions to judges, R.C. 2315.21(B) takes that 
discretion away and allows parties to demand bifurcation, even if the judge 
determines that bifurcation will not serve the efficiency or fairness of the 
proceedings. 
{¶ 48} Like the statutes we previously invalidated in this context, R.C. 
2315.21(B) purports to control not the underlying right or duty giving rise to the 
cause of action, but rather the court’s procedure in handling the cause of action.  
Unlike other areas in which the legislature can clearly enact substantive law, such 
as criminal sentencing,1 R.C. 2315.21(B) mandates bifurcation and gives parties, 
rather than courts, discretion over its appropriateness.  The statute is not about a 
substantive right; it is about court procedure. 
{¶ 49} The Ohio Constitution vests this court with responsibility to 
superintend Ohio’s courts.  I would follow our jurisprudence and hold that trial 
courts, not the legislators, are best situated to determine when bifurcation is 
appropriate.  In so holding, we would protect the independence of Ohio’s 
judiciary and its rightful role to determine how trials should proceed. 
{¶ 50} R.C. 2315.21(B) is a procedural law mandating how judges should 
conduct their trials, and it clearly conflicts with Civ.R. 42(B).  Therefore, 
pursuant to the Modern Courts Amendment of the Ohio Constitution, I would find 
the statute unconstitutional.  I respectfully dissent. 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
The Dickson Firm, L.L.C., and Blake A. Dickson, for appellee. 
Bonezzi, Switzer, Murphy, Polito & Hupp Co., L.P.A., Bret C. Perry, 
Stephen J. Hupp, and Donald J. Richardson, for appellants. 
                                                          
 
1 See 2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 86 (effective September 30, 2011) (broadly expanding judicial 
discretion over criminal sentencing). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor 
General, and Laura Eddleman Heim, Deputy Solicitor, urging reversal on behalf 
of amicus curiae state of Ohio. 
 
Davis & Young and Richard M. Garner, urging reversal on behalf of 
amicus curiae Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys. 
 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Anne Marie Sferra, and Bridget Purdue Riddell, 
urging reversal on behalf of amici curiae Ohio Alliance for Civil Justice, Ohio 
Hospital Association, and Physician Insurers Association of America. 
 
Law Offices of John C. Camillus, L.L.C., and John C. Camillus, urging 
affirmance on behalf of amicus curiae Ohio Association for Justice. 
______________________