Case Title: Commonwealth v. Squire

Citation: 

Docket Number: 082440

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2009-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and Millette, 
JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
v.  Record No. 082440 
 
 
OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         ELIZABETH B. LACY 
FRANKIE LEE SQUIRE  
 
         NOVEMBER 5, 2009 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENSVILLE COUNTY 
W. Allan Sharrett, Judge 
 
 
The Commonwealth appeals from the trial court’s order 
dismissing the Commonwealth’s petition for the civil commitment 
of Frankie Lee Squire as a sexually violent predator pursuant to 
the Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act (the 
Act), Code §§ 37.2-900 through -920.  Because we conclude that 
the trial court’s judgment was not plainly wrong or without 
evidence to support it, we will affirm the judgment of the trial 
court. 
Squire was convicted of rape in 1994 and sentenced to 15 
years imprisonment with 8 years suspended.  He was released on 
parole in 1999, but in 2003 his probation was revoked and a 
portion of his suspended sentence was imposed because of two 
convictions for assault and battery.  He was again released from 
prison in 2004, but Squire was returned to prison in 2006 after 
he was arrested for attempted breaking and entering and violated 
the conditions of his release.  In October 2007, the 
Commonwealth filed a petition to civilly commit Squire as a 
sexually violent predator (SVP).  The trial court found probable 
cause to believe that Squire was a SVP on December 19, 2007.  
Following a bench trial held September 15, 2008, the trial court 
dismissed the petition for civil commitment, stating that 
There’s no question that the defendant has been 
convicted of a sexually violent offense.  There is no 
question in the Court’s mind that he has a mental 
abnormality or a personality disorder.  And there’s 
no question in the Court’s mind that that makes it 
difficult for him to control his predatory behavior. 
The nub of this case in the Court’s opinion is 
whether all of that makes him likely to engage in 
sexually violent acts.  The standard of proof is 
clear and convincing evidence . . . . 
[S]o for almost six years [the defendant] has been at 
large in the community. . . . [H]e has not sexually 
reoffended either by charge, conviction or 
institutional infraction.  And when the Court looks 
at that conduct of the defendant, . . . it simply 
cannot say that it is convinced that he will probably 
offend sexually. 
 
The Commonwealth filed a timely appeal to this Court. 
DISCUSSION 
To establish that Squire is a sexually violent predator, 
the Commonwealth was required to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that he had been convicted of a sexually violent 
offense and that, because of a mental abnormality or personality 
disorder, he finds it difficult to control his predatory 
behavior which makes him likely to engage in sexually violent 
acts.  Code §§ 37.2-900 and -908.  The trial court concluded 
that the Commonwealth did not provide clear and convincing 
evidence that Squire was likely to engage in sexually violent 
 
2
acts and dismissed the Commonwealth’s petition.  In this appeal, 
the Commonwealth challenges this finding, arguing that the 
exhibits and uncontradicted testimony of two experts left the 
trial court with “the only reasonable conclusion . . . that 
Squire is a sexually violent predator.” 
In reviewing the Commonwealth’s challenge to the trial 
court’s judgment, we review the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Squire, the prevailing party below, and will not reverse the 
judgment of the trial court unless it is plainly wrong or 
without evidence to support it.  Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 
216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). 
In this case the only testimony presented was that of the 
Commonwealth’s expert witnesses, Dr. Doris E. Nevin and Dr. Evan 
S. Nelson.  The experts agreed that Squire had a mental 
abnormality or personality disorder and, as relevant here, 
because of this disorder, Squire was likely to commit sexually 
violent offenses in the future. 
In considering Squire’s personal history, Dr. Nelson noted 
that Squire’s risk of re-offending was higher because his first 
sex offenses appeared while he was young, he had violated the 
terms of his parole and probation, and when he is under the 
influence of alcohol, his risk of re-offending increases 
dramatically.  Dr. Nevin referred to Squire’s failure to 
 
3
complete a thorough sex offender treatment program, sexual 
deviance, substance abuse, non-compliance with supervision, and 
distorted attitudes justifying sex offending as contributing to 
Squire’s risk of re-offending. 
The experts also administered actuarial risk assessment 
instruments.  The Sex Offense Risk Assessment Guide (SORAG) 
instrument used by Dr. Nelson is based on the arrests for 
violent offenses and is not limited to arrests for sexually 
related offenses.  Squire scored sixth in nine risk categories 
in the test, which categorized him at more risk for offending 
than the average sex offender.   On the Violence Risk Appraisal 
Guide (VRAG) instrument used by Dr. Nevin, Squire scored a +16, 
which is in the moderate high range and indicates a 55% 
probability of a violent offense within seven years and a 64% 
probability within ten years.   
Both Dr. Nevin and Dr. Nelson used the Static-99 test. 
Squire scored a six on Dr. Nevin’s test which put him in the 
highest category of risk for re-offending.  A score of six means 
a statistical likelihood of re-offending of 39% within five 
years, 45% within seven years and 52% within 10 years.  When 
applied by Dr. Nelson, Squire scored either a five or seven.  A 
score of five sets the statistical risk of re-offending at 33% 
within five years.  In response to questions by the court, the 
experts agreed that Squire’s score on the Static-99 in 2007 
 
4
would have been the same at the time of his release from 
incarceration in 1999.  The experts agreed that while the tests 
put Squire in a specific category of risk of re-offending, they 
could not say that Squire would be one of the individuals who 
would re-offend. 
The record also shows that Squire had not been charged with 
or convicted of any offenses of a sexual nature since 1999.  
Squire was not incarcerated for a number of years during that 
time – from 1999 to 2003 and from 2004 to 2006.  In 2001 his 
probation officer removed Squire from supervised probation 
because of his compliance with the probation requirements. 
Based on this record we cannot say that the trial court’s 
judgment that the Commonwealth did not provide clear and 
convincing evidence that Squire is likely to commit sexually 
violent acts was plainly wrong or without evidence to support 
it.  While the experts testified that, in their opinion, Squire 
was a sexually violent predator and was likely to commit violent 
sexual acts, the opinion of experts is not dispositive.  Code 
§ 37.2-908(C).  The trial court specifically stated that it 
“listened carefully to the reports” of the experts but that it 
also considered “the chronology of the defendant’s life.”  As 
shown by the record, Squire had no incidents of a sexual nature 
for almost 10 years, since 1999, whether he was in the community 
or incarcerated.  This evidence suggests that Squire’s actions 
 
5
were, as a matter of fact, not consistent with the statistical 
predictors of re-offending and stood in contrast to the experts’ 
opinions on the likelihood of Squire committing future violent 
sexual acts.  Thus, the trial court’s findings were not plainly 
wrong or without evidence to support them. 
In support of its position, the Commonwealth also argues 
that the trial court erred as a matter of law because in stating 
that Squire had a mental abnormality or personality disorder, 
“the trial court had necessarily found” that Squire was “likely 
to engage in sexually violent offenses” because the Act defines  
“mental abnormality” or “personality disorder,” as “a congenital 
or acquired condition that affects a person's emotional or 
volitional capacity and renders the person so likely to commit 
sexually violent offenses that he constitutes a menace to the 
health and safety of others.”  Code § 37.2-900.  We disagree 
with the Commonwealth for two reasons. 
Considering the trial court’s statements as a whole, it is 
clear that in stating Squire had a mental abnormality or 
personality disorder, the court was not using those terms as 
dispositive of whether that disorder made him likely to engage 
in sexually violent acts.  The trial court treated these two 
findings as distinct considerations.  This is consistent with 
the analysis we have applied in other cases.  For example, in 
Commonwealth v. Allen, 269 Va. 262, 271, 609 S.E.2d 4, 10 
 
6
(2005), even though both parties’ experts testified that the 
respondent had a personality disorder, that finding did not end 
the inquiry.  The contested issue on appeal was whether because 
of the personality disorder, Allen was likely to engage in 
sexually violent acts.  Id. at 275-76, 609 S.E.2d at 12-13. 
In Commonwealth v. Miller, 273 Va. 540, 552-53, 643 S.E.2d 
208, 215 (2007), the Court again stated that the Commonwealth 
had the burden of proving both that the respondent had a mental  
abnormality or personality disorder and that because of such 
condition the respondent “was likely to commit sexually violent 
offenses.”  In making this determination, the Court reviewed the 
entire record and recited the particular elements of the 
respondent’s mental disorders that made the respondent likely to 
engage in sexually violent acts.  Id. at 551-53, 643 S.E.2d at 
214-15.  These cases demonstrate that the mere use of the phrase 
mental abnormality or personality disorder does not 
automatically invoke a conclusion that a respondent is likely to 
engage in sexually violent acts. 
Furthermore, the analysis adopted by the Court in those 
cases is also consistent with the actions of the General 
Assembly in defining mental abnormality and personality disorder 
and then defining a sexually violent predator as one who has 
such a mental condition and such condition renders the 
individual likely to commit sexually violent acts.  If the 
 
7
finding of a mental abnormality or personality disorder 
satisfied subsection (ii) of the definition of SVP in Code 
§ 37.2-900, as the Commonwealth suggests, then the language in 
that part of the definition relating to loss of control and 
likelihood of committing a sexually violent act would be 
superfluous.  We do not consider actions of the General Assembly 
to be superfluous; instead, we seek to provide meaning to all 
the words of a statute.  Northampton County Bd. of Zoning 
Appeals v. Eastern Shore Dev. Corp., 277 Va. 198, 202, 671 
S.E.2d 160, 162 (2009).  Guided by this principle, we conclude 
that the General Assembly in defining a SVP considered the 
existence of a mental abnormality or personality disorder as an 
element separate from the likelihood of engaging in sexually 
violent acts. 
Finally, we reject the Commonwealth’s reliance on language 
in Shivaee v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 112, 613 S.E.2d 570 (2005), 
as support for its position.  The language cited by the 
Commonwealth is found in a discussion of defendant Butler’s 
assertion that the Act was constitutionally infirm because the 
definition of SVP was too vague.  Id. at 124-25, 613 S.E.2d at 
577.  In the course of that discussion we said that the language 
in the SVP definition regarding the likelihood of engaging in 
sexually violent acts “may be redundant” because of the 
definition of “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder.”  
 
8
Id.  That statement falls far below an affirmative conclusion 
that the finding of a mental abnormality as a matter of law is a 
finding that the respondent is a SVP.  More importantly, the 
language relied upon by the Commonwealth was only dicta.  
Butler’s void for vagueness challenge to the Act failed because 
Butler did not assert that his conduct fell outside the purview 
of the statute and therefore he could not assert the vagueness 
of the statute on behalf of others.  Id. at 125, 613 S.E.2d at 
577. 
In summary, for the reasons stated above, we hold that 
there is no error in the judgment of the trial court, and 
accordingly, we will affirm that judgment. 
Affirmed. 
 
9