Case Title: Collison v. City of Milwaukee Board of Review

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018AP000669

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2021-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
2021 WI 48 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP669 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Ronald L. Collison, 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
City of Milwaukee Board of Review, 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 388 Wis. 2d 621,935 N.W.2d 553 
(2020 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 2, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 11, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Glenn H. Yamahiro   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
ROGGENSACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ZIEGLER, 
C.J., and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by James E. Goldschmidt and Quarles & Brady LLP, 
Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by James E. Goldschmidt. 
 
For the respondent-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
James M. Carroll, assistant city attorney; with whom on the 
brief was Tearman Spencer, city attorney. There was an oral 
argument by James M. Carroll. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of The Wisconsin 
Realtors Association and NAIOP-Wisconsin by Thomas D. Larson, 
Madison.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2021 WI 48 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP669 
(L.C. No. 
2017CV4572) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Ronald L. Collison, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Milwaukee Board of Review, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 2, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
ROGGENSACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ZIEGLER, 
C.J., and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   The 
petitioner, 
Ronald 
Collison, seeks review of an unpublished per curiam decision of 
the court of appeals affirming the City of Milwaukee Board of 
Review's (Board) determination that his property was properly 
No. 
2018AP669   
 
2 
 
assessed at a value of $31,800.1  Collison argues that because 
the property is contaminated he cannot sell it, and that 
accordingly the assessed value should be zero dollars. 
¶2 
Specifically, Collison contends that the assessor 
erred by basing the assessment on the property's income-
generating potential as a parking lot without reducing the value 
to account for the contamination that is present.  He further 
argues that the City of Milwaukee Environmental Contamination 
Standards (CMECS) conflict with Wis. Stat. § 70.32 (2017-18).2 
¶3 
We conclude that by utilizing the income approach to 
value the property according to its highest and best use as a 
parking lot, the assessor properly considered the impairment of 
the value of the property due to contamination in arriving at a 
valuation pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1m).  Further, we 
decline to address Collison's challenge to the CMECS because the 
assessor did not rely on the CMECS in the assessment of 
Collison's property. 
¶4 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
                     
1 State ex rel. Collison v. City of Milwaukee Bd. of Rev., 
No. 2018AP669, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 
2019) (per curiam) (affirming the order of the circuit court for 
Milwaukee County, Glenn H. Yamahiro, Judge). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2018AP669   
 
3 
 
I 
¶5 
Since 1979, Collison has owned a piece of property in 
downtown Milwaukee.  Located two blocks from Fiserv Forum, the 
new Milwaukee sports arena, it includes a two-story steel and 
wood framed commercial building and an asphalt parking lot with 
space for approximately 12-15 vehicles.  The building previously 
housed a dry cleaning business that closed in 2005 and is 
currently vacant. 
¶6 
In 2012, the City of Milwaukee issued a permit for the 
removal of four underground storage tanks on the property.  
After removal of the tanks, a subsequent soil analysis found 
contamination from petroleum and perchloroethylene solvents.  
The soil analysis did not include a statement regarding how much 
it would cost to remediate the property, and the circuit court 
ultimately determined that there was no evidence that the soil 
analysis was presented to the Board during its proceedings. 
¶7 
For the 2016 assessment year, the City assessed the 
property and determined the fair market value to be $31,800.  As 
part of this assessment, the City found that the building had no 
value.  In arriving at the $31,800 valuation, the City's 
assessor used the "income approach," basing the assessment on 
rental income that could be obtained from the property's 
existing parking lot.  The assessor examined other comparably 
assessed downtown parking lots and observed that rental income 
had indeed been collected from the property in the past, as 
Collison had previously rented nine of the parking spaces, 
generating $540 per month in income.   
No. 
2018AP669   
 
4 
 
¶8 
Collison appealed the assessment to the Board.  The 
Board held a hearing, at which Collison and the assessor offered 
testimony. 
¶9 
Before 
the 
Board,3 
Collison 
contended 
"that 
the 
property has no assessed value at this time because it has no 
market value."  He explained, "People are not interested in 
purchasing a property, such as this one, simply because it has 
contamination on it."  Further, Collison asserted that the 
amount of contamination on the property is such "that anyone 
that would purchase the property would have to pay for the 
remediation[,]" the cost of which could reach "perhaps even into 
the millions of dollars." 
¶10 Legally, Collison argued that the assessment was in 
error because it contravenes Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1m).4  In 
Collison's estimation, the assessor did not follow the statute's 
dictate to consider the impairment of the property's value due 
to the contamination in arriving at a valuation, and instead 
followed the CMECS,5 which indicate that a property is to be 
                     
3 Collison represented himself through the petition for 
review stage of this case, appearing pro se before the Board, 
the circuit court, and the court of appeals. 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 70.32(1m) provides:  "In addition to the 
factors set out in sub. (1), the assessor shall consider the 
impairment of the value of the property because of the presence 
of a solid or hazardous waste disposal facility or because of 
environmental pollution, as defined in s. 299.01(4)." 
5 In relevant part, the CMECS set forth: 
Burden of Proof on Taxpayer . . . Contamination must 
be substantiated through an independent environmental 
(continued) 
No. 
2018AP669   
 
5 
 
valued as if it were uncontaminated unless the landowner pays 
for a "phase II" environmental site assessment detailing the 
contamination. 
¶11 The assessor also testified before the Board.  He 
recognized that the property is contaminated, but stated that 
"[i]t's just an unknown extent and/or cleanup costs associated 
with the cleanup with the contamination."  Regarding the 
necessary 
documentation 
to 
establish 
the 
extent 
of 
the 
contamination, the following exchange occurred between several 
Board members and the assessor: 
Mr. Evans [Board member]:  So, if the contamination 
was factually known, would that affect the assessment, 
value assessment of the property? 
Mr. Wiegand [Assessor]:  Yes. 
Mr. Volkman [Board member]:  Will you accept only a 
phase one, phase two?  Or will you accept somebody 
giving you a quote, as to what it takes? 
Mr. Wiegand:  Um, we will accept any written, 
verifiable evidence done by an expert. 
                                                                  
expert.  This step is no different from providing 
independent appraisals to defend values on appeal.  
The minimum level of acceptable substantiation will be 
a comprehensive Phase II Audit, setting forth (among 
other pertinent information) the type, level and 
source of contamination and the suggested method or 
methods for remediation.  Without this information, 
property must be valued as if uncontaminated.  All 
information we obtain from owners/agents regarding 
potential 
contamination 
will 
be 
considered 
open 
records to the public. 
No. 
2018AP669   
 
6 
 
¶12 With regard to his use of the income approach and the 
consideration of the rental income that could be generated by 
the on-site parking lot, the assessor testified:  
[T]here is a great need for parking in this area and 
contaminated sites can be encapsulated and used as 
parking lots.  I think as long as there is potential 
to——or the owner is using it as a parking lot, we 
could consider using . . . the income approach, as 
long as there's income being derived from the site.  
¶13 He 
further 
explained, 
"I 
don't 
know 
if 
the 
contamination is $50,000, or $800,000.  We're valuing the, the 
parking lot based on its income potential.  The potential to 
park the vehicles at this point, whether contaminated or 
not . . . and that's how the city is assessing the property." 
¶14 The 
Board 
ultimately 
upheld 
the 
assessment 
and 
Collison sought certiorari review in the circuit court.  He 
renewed the same arguments he made before the Board, namely that 
the CMECS conflict with Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1m) and that the 
assessor did not consider the impairment of the property's value 
due to the contamination as required by § 70.32(1m) and the 
Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual (WPAM). 
¶15 The circuit court affirmed the Board.  It did not 
squarely address Collison's contention that the CMECS conflict 
with Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1m) because, in its estimation, the 
record did not demonstrate that the Board or the assessor 
actually relied on the CMECS requirements.  In other words, the 
circuit court determined that Collison's "arguments fail because 
the assessor and the Board recognized the contamination even 
though Petitioner has not completed or sought a Phase II audit."  
No. 
2018AP669   
 
7 
 
It 
further 
explained 
that 
"[w]hile 
the 
challenged 
CMECS 
provision could conceivably result in an assessment that 
disregards evidence of contamination if a Phase II Audit is not 
provided, this did not occur with Petitioner's assessment." 
¶16 Next, the circuit court determined that "[t]he record 
does not reveal any error by the assessor in applying the WPAM 
or the statutes, and Petitioner fails to establish how the 
City's 2016 assessment deviates from either."  In the circuit 
court's estimation, Collison failed to bring forward "credible 
evidence to challenge the assessor's conclusion that use of the 
Income Approach results in an assessed value of $31,800."  It 
reached this conclusion because "Petitioner did not provide the 
Board with any data contradicting the assessor's calculations, 
nor did Petitioner suggest an alternative valuation method that 
would 
have 
better 
reflected 
the 
property's 
fair 
market 
value. . . . A mere assertion that no one will purchase the 
property is insufficient." 
¶17 The circuit court further stated that "[t]he assessor 
did not fail to take into consideration the impairment of the 
property's value due to contamination as required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.32(1m)."  Indeed, it concluded that the assessor's use of 
the income approach was driven by the presence of the 
contamination:  "By determining that the property's highest and 
best use was to produce income from existing parking spaces, the 
assessor recognized the very poor condition of the land and 
difficulty of future development for a better use such as a high 
end apartment building or similar commercial use." 
No. 
2018AP669   
 
8 
 
¶18 Collison appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.  
State ex rel. Collison v. City of Milwaukee Bd. of Rev., No. 
2018AP669, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2019) 
(per curiam).  The court of appeals determined that "Collison 
has not shown why his unsubstantiated claim that the property 
has a market value of zero dollars is more accurate than [the 
assessor's] decision to use an income approach to determine 
market value based on the best use of the property as a parking 
lot."  Id., ¶6.  Further, the court of appeals agreed with the 
circuit court's determination that the challenge to the CMECS 
was not ripe for determination.  Id., ¶7.  It thus concluded 
that "the assessor did not ignore the contamination of the 
property in valuing it, and the Board did not ignore the 
contamination in upholding that valuation."  Id.  Collison 
petitioned for this court's review. 
II 
¶19 This 
case 
arrives 
here 
on 
certiorari 
review.  
"Certiorari is a mechanism by which a court may test the 
validity 
of 
a 
decision 
rendered 
by 
a 
municipality, 
an 
administrative agency, or an inferior tribunal."  Ottman v. Town 
of Primrose, 2011 WI 18, ¶34, 332 Wis. 2d 3, 796 N.W.2d 411.   
¶20 On certiorari review, we examine the decision of the 
board of review, not the decision of the circuit court or court 
of appeals.  Sausen v. Town of Black Creek Bd. of Rev., 2014 WI 
9, 
¶5, 
352 
Wis. 2d 576, 
843 
N.W.2d 39; 
see 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.47(13).  Our review is limited to whether the board's 
actions were:  (1) within its jurisdiction; (2) according to 
No. 
2018AP669   
 
9 
 
law; (3) arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable and represented 
its will and not its judgment; and (4) supported by evidence 
such that the board might reasonably make the order or 
determination in question.  Sausen, 352 Wis. 2d 576, ¶6. 
¶21 In 
our 
review, 
we 
must 
engage 
in 
statutory 
interpretation.  The interpretation of a statute presents a 
question of law this court reviews independently of the 
determinations rendered by the circuit court and court of 
appeals.  Hinrichs v. DOW Chem. Co., 2020 WI 2, ¶26, 389 
Wis. 2d 669, 937 N.W.2d 37. 
III 
¶22 We begin with a review of the statutory background 
underlying 
this 
case, 
including 
general 
tax 
assessment 
methodology pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 70.32 and this court's 
precedent.  Subsequently, we discuss the law related to 
contaminated property and examine Collison's contention that the 
assessment in this case contravened the statutory mandate that 
contamination of property be considered in arriving at a 
valuation. 
A 
¶23 Valuation of real estate for tax assessment purposes 
is governed by Wis. Stat. § 70.32.  Subsection (1) of this 
statute dictates that property shall be valued "in the manner 
specified in the Wisconsin property assessment manual" and 
additionally sets forth a hierarchical valuation methodology.  
Metro. Assocs. v. City of Milwaukee, 2018 WI 4, ¶31, 379 
Wis. 2d 141, 905 N.W.2d 784. 
No. 
2018AP669   
 
10 
 
¶24 As clarified in State ex rel. Markarian v. City of 
Cudahy, 45 Wis. 2d 683, 686, 173 N.W.2d 627 (1970), the text of 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) lists three sources of information in a 
specific order, with this order being indicative of the quality 
of information each source provides.  Metro. Assocs., 379 
Wis. 2d 141, ¶31.  This methodology has been described by courts 
as providing three "tiers" of analysis.  Id. (citation omitted). 
¶25 The best information of a property's fair market value 
is an arm's-length sale of the subject property.  Id., ¶32.  
Examination of a recent arm's length sale is known as a "tier 1" 
analysis.  Id.  This is the first source of information an 
assessor should look to in conducting an assessment.  If there 
is no recent sale of the subject property, the appraiser then 
moves to tier 2, examining recent, arm's-length sales of 
reasonably 
comparable 
properties 
(the 
"sales 
comparison 
approach").  Id., ¶33. 
¶26 When both tier 1 and tier 2 are unavailable, an 
assessor then moves to tier 3.  Id., ¶34.  Under tier 3, an 
assessor may consider all the factors collectively which have a 
bearing on value of the property in order to determine its fair 
market value.  Id.  These factors include cost, depreciation, 
replacement value, income, industrial conditions, location and 
occupancy, sales of like property, book value, amount of 
insurance carried, value asserted in a prospectus and appraisals 
produced by the owner.  Id. (citing State ex rel. Mitchell Aero, 
Inc. v. Bd. of Rev. of City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 268, 278, 
246 N.W.2d 521 (1976)).  As relevant here, the income approach, 
No. 
2018AP669   
 
11 
 
"which seeks to capture the amount of income the property will 
generate over its useful life," fits under the umbrella of tier 
3 analysis.  Metro. Assocs., 379 Wis. 2d 141, ¶34. 
B 
¶27 With this necessary general background on assessment 
methodology in hand, we address next the law related to 
contaminated property and examine Collison's argument that the 
assessor did not properly consider the contaminated nature of 
the property in arriving at a valuation.  Viewed within the 
certiorari review framework, Collison's argument is one that the 
Board did not act according to law when it upheld the 
assessment. 
¶28 The requirement that an assessor consider a property's 
contamination arises from Wis. Stat. § 70.32, which contains a 
provision directed at contaminated properties.  Specifically, 
§ 70.32(1m) sets forth:  "In addition to the factors set out in 
sub. (1), the assessor shall consider the impairment of the 
value of the property because of the presence of a solid or 
hazardous waste disposal facility or because of environmental 
pollution, as defined in s. 299.01(4)."6 
                     
6 Pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 299.01(4), 
"environmental 
pollution" is defined as "the contaminating or rendering unclean 
or impure the air, land or waters of the state, or making the 
same injurious to public health, harmful for commercial or 
recreational use, or deleterious to fish, bird, animal or plant 
life." 
No. 
2018AP669   
 
12 
 
¶29 Guidance on valuing contaminated property is provided 
by the WPAM.  See Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) (explaining that 
property "shall be valued by the assessor in the manner 
specified in the Wisconsin property assessment manual").  It 
acknowledges 
the 
"unique 
valuation 
problem" 
posed 
by 
contaminated property due to the difficulty in identifying 
contamination.  1 Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual 8-42 
(2016).7  Despite the identified difficulty, the WPAM reinforces 
that "[b]oth Wisconsin Statutes and appraisal principles require 
the assessor to consider the effect of contamination on the 
value of real estate."  Id. at 8-43 (citing § 70.32(1m)). 
¶30 Largely, the WPAM addresses "more common situations 
where the extent of contamination and its effect on value are 
readily identified and measured."  Id. at 8-46.  However, it 
also recognizes that "there may be some situations where the 
extent of contamination is unknown and thus the effect on value 
is difficult to measure."  Id.  In such a situation, "it is not 
possible to develop specific procedures for dealing with this 
uncertainty," but the WPAM provides assessors with a framework 
for gathering information "to help estimate the effect of 
contamination on value."  Id. 
¶31 By way of example, the WPAM provides: 
[A]lthough there may not be sales of truly comparable 
contaminated property, there may be sales of other 
contaminated property indicating a range of values or, 
                     
7 All references to the Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual 
are to the 2016 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2018AP669   
 
13 
 
possibly, a percentage adjustment the assessor can use 
to reflect the contamination.  Similarly, although an 
environmental engineer may not be able to estimate a 
specific cost to cure the contamination, the engineer 
may be able to estimate a range of costs and what are 
the probabilities that the cost to cure lies on the 
high or low end of the range.  Properties with a great 
deal of uncertainty should be closely monitored and 
reviewed 
each 
year 
as 
more 
information 
becomes 
available to reduce the degree of uncertainty. 
Id. 
¶32 In this case, the parties agree that the subject 
property is contaminated, but the extent of that contamination 
is unknown.  As to the method of valuation, the assessor here 
utilized the income approach to value Collison's property.  
There had been no arm's length sale of the property, and the 
assessor testified that "[t]he cost approach and the sales 
comparison approach were not applicable."   
¶33 Collison argues that the assessor did not properly 
consider the property's contaminated nature in arriving at the 
valuation of $31,800.  In Collison's view, considering the 
contamination cannot equate with merely using the income 
approach instead of the sales approach, and it cannot equate 
with merely assigning no value to the building.  He argues, 
contrary to the assessor's determination, that the property 
actually has no value whatsoever because it cannot be sold. 
¶34 We are unpersuaded by Collison's argument.  Contrary 
to Collison's contention, the fact that the property is 
contaminated drove the entire assessment in this case, as will 
be further explained below.  
No. 
2018AP669   
 
14 
 
¶35 As we must, we begin with the language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.32(1m) and its requirement that the assessor "consider the 
impairment of the value of the property" due to contamination.  
See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 
58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  "Statutory language 
is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that 
technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their 
technical or special definitional meaning."  Id.  We also 
interpret statutory language "in the context in which it is 
used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to 
the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and 
reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46. 
¶36 In the context of this case, we must determine what it 
means for the assessor to "consider" the impairment of the value 
of the property caused by the contamination.  Looking to an 
established 
dictionary 
for 
assistance, 
we 
observe 
that 
"consider" is defined as "to take into account."8  Thus, we must 
determine whether the assessor here took into account the 
impairment of the value of the property caused by the 
contamination in arriving at the valuation of $31,800. 
                     
8 Consider, 
Merriam-Webster 
Online 
Dictionary, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consider 
(last 
visited 
May 
27, 
2021); 
see 
also 
State 
v. 
Sample, 
215 
Wis. 2d 487, 499, 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998) ("For purposes of 
statutory 
interpretation 
or 
construction, 
the 
common 
and 
approved usage of words may be established by consulting 
dictionary definitions."). 
No. 
2018AP669   
 
15 
 
¶37 In this task, we begin with the proposition that "real 
estate must be valued at its highest and best use."  Allright 
Props., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2009 WI App 46, ¶18, 317 
Wis. 2d 228, 767 N.W.2d 567.  Applied here, the assessor 
determined that, given the property's location and taking into 
account the presence of contamination, the highest and best use 
in its current state is a parking lot. 
¶38 Indeed, the assessor testified about the potential for 
income:  
[T]here is a great need for parking in this area and 
contaminated sites can be encapsulated and used as 
parking lots.  I think as long as there is potential 
to——or the owner is using it as a parking lot, we 
could consider using . . . the income approach, as 
long as there's income being derived from the site.   
Thus, as this testimony demonstrates, it was the contamination 
that drove the assessor's decision to use the income approach to 
value the property, and to value the property according to its 
highest and best use as a parking lot.   
¶39 The record reflects a recognition that the property 
could have been valued much higher but for the contamination.  
The property is in a prime location near the new Milwaukee Bucks 
stadium.  One of the Board members stated at the hearing that 
"with 
all 
the 
development 
that's 
happening 
in 
that 
area, . . . this property could be worth a lot of money once the 
groundwater and the soil has been remediated." 
¶40 It follows from this that if the property were not 
contaminated, a parking lot would no longer be the highest and 
best use of the property.  By valuing the property as a parking 
No. 
2018AP669   
 
16 
 
lot using the income approach, the assessor took into account, 
or "considered," the impairment of the value of the property due 
to contamination in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1m).9 
¶41 Although 
the 
WPAM 
itself 
provides 
no 
specific 
procedure for dealing with uncertainty like that presented here, 
see 1 Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual 8-46, the assessor's 
consideration of the impairment of the value of the property due 
to contamination by valuing the property as a parking lot using 
the income approach was consistent with the International 
Association of Assessing Officers (IAAO) standards, which are 
incorporated by the WPAM.10  Specifically, IAAO Standard on the 
Valuation of Properties Affected by Environmental Contamination 
§ 4.1 discusses the value in use of a contaminated property and 
provides in relevant part that "[v]alue in use suggests that a 
property which is still in use, or which can be used in the near 
future, has a value to the owner."  It further specifies that 
"[t]his would be true even if costs to cure environmental 
                     
9 The dissent contends that in order to "consider" the 
impairment of the value due to contamination, the assessor's 
report must demonstrate a reduction in value by a specific 
number.  See dissent, ¶¶68, 74.  Such a requirement finds no 
support in the text of Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1m).  The statute 
requires only that the assessor "consider" the impairment of 
value due to contamination, not that he "reduce the value by a 
certain number from the value of the property if it were not 
contaminated."  See Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1m). 
10 "Whether or not the IAAO Standards appear in the WPAM, 
the most current version in effect on January 1 of a given 
assessment year is incorporated by reference in the manual."  1 
Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual 1-3. 
No. 
2018AP669   
 
17 
 
problems exceed the nominal, unencumbered value.  The value in 
use 
will 
most 
nearly 
reflect 
the 
market 
value 
of 
the 
property . . . ."  Int'l Ass'n of Assessing Officers, Standard 
on the Valuation of Properties Affected by Environmental 
Contamination § 4.1 (2016).11 
¶42 The assessment here is consistent with this principle.  
It recognizes that the highest and best use of the property as a 
parking lot has value to the owner even if the cost to cure 
environmental problems exceeds the value of the property.   
¶43 Additionally, Collison's argument that the property 
has no value whatsoever is unpersuasive for two reasons.12  
First, 
it 
ignores 
the 
established 
three-tiered 
valuation 
methodology.  By arguing that the value is zero because it 
cannot be sold, Collison urges the court to require the assessor 
to use either an arms-length sale or sales comparison approach 
and go no further.  Collison's proposed approach ignores the 
tier 3 approaches that the law dictates the assessor must use in 
the absence of information on tiers 1 and 2.  
                     
11 All references to the IAAO Standard on the Valuation of 
Properties Affected by Environmental Contamination refer to the 
2016 version unless otherwise indicated. 
12 See also Bonnie H. Keen, Tax Assessment of Contaminated 
Property:  Tax Breaks for Polluters?, 19 B.C. Env't Aff. L. Rev. 
885, 906-08 (1992) (explaining that "the majority of cases have 
rejected taxpayers' assertions of zero or nominal value" and 
collecting cases); Peter J. Patchin, Valuation of Contaminated 
Properties, 56 Appraisal J. 7, 13 (1988) (stating that a 
conclusion 
that 
contaminated 
property 
is 
"worthless" 
is 
"unreasonable when the property is still being utilized by its 
present owner for some useful purpose"). 
No. 
2018AP669   
 
18 
 
¶44 Second, 
Collison's 
argument 
ignores 
that 
it 
is 
Collison's burden to present evidence before the Board to 
support his proposed valuation of zero, which he did not do.  
See Sausen, 352 Wis. 2d 576, ¶10.  Like our case law, the IAAO 
standards make clear that in a case of contamination, the burden 
is on the taxpayer to demonstrate the extent of the damage.  
Int'l Ass'n of Assessing Officers, Standard on the Valuation of 
Properties Affected by Environmental Contamination § 5.1 ("The 
property owner must provide clear documentation of the nature 
and extent of environmental contamination.  Accurate and 
detailed maps must be included as part of this documentation.")  
By imploring the court to adopt a value of zero for his property 
despite not presenting evidence to support such a theory, 
Collison is asking the court to allow him to sidestep his 
burden, which we will not do. 
¶45 As 
a 
final 
matter, 
we 
decline 
to 
address 
the 
additional issue presented in Collison's petition for review and 
briefing, i.e., whether the CMECS conflict with Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.32(1m).13 
 
Although 
Collison 
asserts 
that 
the 
CMECS 
unlawfully require a phase II assessment, the assessor testified 
that he would have accepted "any written, verifiable evidence 
                     
13 The dissent states that "[w]e asked the parties to 
address whether MECS were consistent with the statutes."  
Dissent, ¶77.  Such a statement could be read to indicate that 
the court sua sponte asked the parties to brief the question.  
That is not correct——the issue was raised in Collison's petition 
for review. 
No. 
2018AP669   
 
19 
 
done by an expert[,]" and not only a phase II assessment of the 
property as evidence of contamination.   
¶46 As both the circuit court and court of appeals 
determined, the Board did not reject Collison's challenge on the 
basis that he lacked a phase II assessment.  The legal question 
Collison presents, while interesting, is not reachable on the 
facts of this case.  We will therefore not depart from our 
general practice that this court will not offer an advisory 
opinion or make a pronouncement based on hypothetical facts.  
State v. Grandberry, 2018 WI 29, ¶31 n.20, 380 Wis. 2d 541, 910 
N.W.2d 214.   
¶47 In sum, we conclude that by utilizing the income 
approach to value the property according to its highest and best 
use as a parking lot, the assessor properly considered the 
impairment of the value of the property due to contamination in 
arriving at a valuation pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1m).  
Further, we decline to address Collison's challenge to the CMECS 
because the assessor did not rely on the CMECS in the assessment 
of Collison's property. 
¶48 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2018AP669.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶49 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   (dissenting).  As the 
City of Milwaukee's appraiser, Jim Wiegand, said, "we recognize 
the site is contaminated."  Once the presence of contamination 
is found on a property, Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1m) requires the 
taxation assessor1 to consider the "impairment of the value of 
the property" that is due to contamination.  However, Wiegand's 
appraisal, upon which the assessor relied, did not follow 
§ 70.32(1m).  Instead, it appears that Wiegand applied the 
Milwaukee Environmental Contamination Standards (MECS), which 
directed 
the 
appraiser 
to 
value 
the 
property 
"as 
if 
uncontaminated" unless the taxpayer meets MECS's burden of 
proving the costs of clean-up.   
¶50 I respectfully dissent because the majority opinion 
affirms the Board of Review's decision sustaining Wiegand's 
appraisal, which appraisal did not follow the law.2  I also write 
because I conclude that MECS do not comply with Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.32(1m) and therefore, it is unlawful to apply MECS in 
taxation appraisals of contaminated properties.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶51 The City agrees that Ronald Collison's property is 
environmentally contaminated.  The contamination was caused by 
leaking from underground storage tanks that once contained 
                     
1 The City of Milwaukee is the assessor of taxes due on real 
estate within its boundaries.  Wiegand is the appraiser for the 
City who determined the market value of the property.   
2 Majority op., ¶3. 
No.  2018AP669.pdr 
 
2 
 
petroleum products and perchloroethylene, solvents used in a dry 
cleaning business that operated on the property in 1979 when 
Collison purchased it.  As Board member, Volkman, pointed out, 
the City has long been aware of the contamination because the 
City built an alley on the edge of Collison's property and found 
evidence of these pollutants leaching into city property.  He 
was surprised that the City did not do anything about cleaning 
up the contamination.   
¶52 Wiegand's appraisal recognized the contamination and 
related that "owner has provided a copy of a Tank System Site 
Assessment Report (TSSA) dated July 19, 2012 from Endpoint 
Solutions.  This report details the removal of four underground 
storage tanks (UST's) and a comprehensive analytical soil sample 
report."3  The appraisal continues to relate that the "Report [of 
Endpoint Solutions] did not make any recommendations regarding 
cost or remediation. . . .  The owner has not provided any 
report detailing clean-up costs.  Lacking detailed, a Phase II 
environmental study, it remains unclear as to the extent of 
contamination that exists on the site or any associated clean-up 
costs."4  
                     
3 Appraisal, Non-Electronic Record Item, p. 4. 
4 Id.   
No.  2018AP669.pdr 
 
3 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶53 We review the decision of the Board of Review, not the 
decision of the circuit court or the court of appeals.  
Steenberg v. Town of Oakfield, 167 Wis. 2d 566, 571, 482 N.W.2d 
326 (1992).  Our review is under certiorari standards where we 
determine whether the Board's actions were:  (1) within its 
jurisdiction; (2) according to law; (3) arbitrary, oppressive, 
or unreasonable and represented its will and not its judgment; 
and (4) supported by evidence such that the Board might 
reasonably make the decision now under review.  Sausen v. Town 
of Black Creek Bd. of Rev., 2014 WI 9, ¶¶5, 6, 352 Wis. 2d 576, 
843 N.W.2d 39.   
¶54 Our review falls under the second certiorari standard 
because Collison claims that the Board of Review did not act 
according to the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1m), i.e., 
that it did not act according to law.  Although the Board 
presumes that the valuation is correct pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.47(8)(i), there is no presumption that the Board acted 
according to law when it adopted Wiegand's valuation.  Rather, 
"[w]hether the Board acted according to law is a question of law 
that we decide independently."  State ex rel. Peter Ogden Fam. 
Tr. of 2008 v. Bd. of Rev., 2019 WI 23, ¶24, 385 Wis. 2d 676, 
923 N.W.2d 837.  In order to resolve whether the Board acted 
according to law, we interpret and apply § 70.32(1m).  Again, 
these 
tasks 
present 
questions 
of 
law 
that 
we 
decide 
No.  2018AP669.pdr 
 
4 
 
independently of the decisions of the Board, the circuit court 
and the court of appeals.  Id.   
B.  Relevant Statutes 
¶55 Real estate is valued for taxation purposes by the 
criteria set out in Wis. Stat. § 70.32.  Provisions relevant to 
Wiegand's appraisal of Collison's property provide: 
(1)  Real property shall be valued by the assessor in 
the 
manner 
specified 
in 
the 
Wisconsin 
property 
assessment manual provided under s. 73.03(2a) . . . at 
the full value which could ordinarily be obtained 
therefor at private sale.  In determining the value, 
the assessor shall consider recent arm's-length sales 
of the property to be assessed . . . ; recent arm's-
length sales of reasonably comparable property; and 
all 
factors 
that, 
according 
to 
professionally 
acceptable appraisal practices, affect the value of 
the property to be assessed.   
. . . . 
(1m)  In addition to the factors set out in sub. 
(1), the assessor shall consider the impairment of the 
value 
of 
the 
property 
because 
of 
the 
presence 
of . . . environmental 
pollution, 
as 
defined 
in 
s. 299.01(4). 
§ 70.32. 
¶56 Collison claims that the City did not act in accord 
with Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1m) because he provided proof that his 
property was contaminated, but the City did not consider the 
impairment of the value of the property because of contamination 
as § 70.32(1m) requires.  Rather, the City contended that 
Collison was required to provide "verifiable written evidence 
pertaining to the extent or cleanup costs" for the contamination 
in order to have his property value reduced.  Accordingly, the 
No.  2018AP669.pdr 
 
5 
 
interpretation and application of § 70.32(1)(m) are central to 
the case before us.   
C.  Wiegand's Appraisal 
¶57 Wiegand used the income approach to value Collison's 
property.  He did so by following the 2016 Wisconsin Property 
Assessment Manual (WPAM),5 as Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) directs, and 
by employing MECS to the acknowledged contamination.  In order 
to place issues in the context this case presents, a brief 
review of principles that underlie taxation appraisals will be 
helpful.   
¶58 Assessments for taxation purposes are valid for the 
current 
year, 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.10 
establishing 
the 
assessment date as January first.  "The assessment is based on 
the status of the property as of the close of that day."6   
¶59 As 
WPAM 
explains, 
"There 
are 
three 
traditional 
approaches to developing the opinion of value:  the sales 
comparison 
approach, 
the 
cost 
approach, 
and 
the 
income 
approach."7  For taxation valuations, the "Markarian hierarchy" 
is used.8  State ex rel. Kesselman v. Bd. of Rev. for Vill. of 
Sturtevant, 133 Wis. 2d 122, 128-34, 394 N.W.2d 745 (1986).  The 
Markarian hierarchy requires:  
                     
5 All references to the Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual 
are to the 2016 version.   
6 Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual (WPAM) at 7-21. 
7 Id. at 7-22. 
8 Id. at 7-23. 
No.  2018AP669.pdr 
 
6 
 
[A]ssessors to first use a recent arm's length sale of 
the subject property.  If there is no such sale, the 
next step is to use recent comparable sales of other 
properties.  Only if there are no recent comparable 
sales of other properties should the assessor proceed 
to other indicators of value that include the income 
and cost approaches to value.[9]   
¶60 Valuation 
by 
the 
income 
approach 
employs 
capitalization of income, as explained in WPAM.  "This method 
assumes the gross rental under a ground lease is at current 
market levels.  Net rental after deduction of the owner's 
expenses 
(insurance, 
management) 
is 
capitalized 
at 
an 
appropriate rate into an estimate of land value."10  Direct 
capitalization, as described in WPAM, was used by Wiegand to 
determine the value of Collison's property.11 
¶61 WPAM also addresses contaminated properties "where the 
extent of contamination is unknown and thus the effect on value 
is difficult to measure."12  In those circumstances, the 
guidelines in ch. 8 of WPAM "provide a framework the assessor 
can use to gather information to help estimate the effect of 
contamination on value."13  Contamination attaches a stigma to 
property 
"that 
makes 
it 
less 
desirable 
than 
comparable 
properties."14   
                     
9 Id. (citing State ex rel. Markarian v. City of Cudahy, 45 
Wis. 2d 683, 686, 173 N.W.2d 627 (1970)). 
10 Id. at 9-11.   
11 Id. at 9-15; Appraisal, Non-Electronic Record Item, p. 4.   
12 WPAM at 8-46. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
No.  2018AP669.pdr 
 
7 
 
¶62 There is nothing in Wiegand's income-based valuation 
that refers to impairment of value, even though Wiegand's 
appraisal confirmed both his knowledge of contamination and his 
receipt of a detailed contamination report from Endpoint 
Solutions. 
 
Rather, 
Wiegand 
supported 
using 
his 
$31,800 
valuation as the appraisal for taxation with the following 
statement:  "As of January 1st 2016, The City of Milwaukee 
Assessor Office did not have any verifiable written information 
pertaining to the extent or clean-up costs associated with any 
perceived contamination at the subject property."15   
D.  Wisconsin Stat. § 70.32(1m) 
¶63 The 
purposes 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
and 
application are 
to apply the meaning of the words the 
legislature chose to undisputed facts presented.  Jefferson v. 
Dane Cnty., 2020 WI 90, ¶21, 394 Wis. 2d 602, 951 N.W.2d 556.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 70.32(1m) provides:   
In addition to the factors set out in sub (1), the 
assessor shall consider the impairment of the value of 
the 
property 
because 
of 
the 
presence 
of . . . environmental 
pollution, 
as 
defined 
in 
s. 299.01(4)."[16]   
¶64 I begin by interpreting the plain meaning of the words 
that the legislature chose.  State v. Mercado, 2021 WI 2, ¶43, 
                     
15 Appraisal, Non-Electronic Record Item, p. 7. 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 299.01(4) provides that "'Environmental 
pollution' means the contaminating or rendering unclean or 
impure the air, land or waters of the state, or making the same 
injurious 
to 
public 
health, 
harmful 
for 
commercial 
or 
recreational use, or deleterious to fish, bird, animal or plant 
life." 
No.  2018AP669.pdr 
 
8 
 
395 Wis. 2d 296, 953 N.W.2d 337.  "'Statutory language is given 
its 
common, 
ordinary, 
and 
accepted 
meaning, 
except 
that 
technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their 
technical or special definitional meaning.'"  Id. (quoting State 
ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110).   
¶65 The plain meaning of the words the legislature chose 
for Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1m) places two duties on the assessor 
when property is contaminated.  First, the assessor is to apply 
the assessment factors in subsection (1), which require the use 
of WPAM and the Markarian hierarchy that I explained above.  
Second, "the assessor shall consider the impairment of the value 
of the property" due to contamination.  Stated otherwise, 
subsection (1m) places an affirmative obligation on the assessor 
to act.  It requires that the effect of contamination on the 
value of the property be addressed by the assessor.   
¶66 Focusing on the term, "impairment," I note that common 
synonyms 
for 
impairment 
are:  damage, 
injury, 
and 
loss.  
Thesaurus, Microsoft January 27, 2021.  A common dictionary 
definition for impairment is that which is "diminished in some 
material respect."  Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 574 
(1974).   
¶67 The 
assessor 
is 
to 
"consider" 
the 
impairment.  
Deliberate, ponder and think-through are all synonyms for 
consider.  Thesaurus, Microsoft January 27, 2021.  All synonyms 
require the assessor to take some action because of the 
No.  2018AP669.pdr 
 
9 
 
impairment caused by contamination of the property.  He is not 
free to ignore the impairment.   
¶68 However, 
Wiegand's 
appraisal 
never 
mentions 
"impairment" or any other synonym to show that he considered the 
effect of contamination on the value of the property.  By 
ignoring impairment, he failed to provide an appraisal in 
compliance with the legislature's directive in Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.32(1m).  Stated otherwise, the value he found by the income 
approach was not diminished in any respect because of the 
presence of contamination.17   
¶69 Instead 
of 
following 
the 
statutory 
directive, 
Wiegand's appraisal placed additional requirements on Collison.  
For example, Wiegand says that the owner should have provided 
"verifiable written information pertaining to the extent or 
cleanup costs associated with any perceived contamination on the 
subject property."  However, there is nothing in Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.32(1m) that requires, or even suggests, that the owner do 
so.  The legislature placed all the duties found in § 70.32(1m) 
on the assessor, not on the property owner.   
¶70 Because the Board of Review sustained Wiegand's 
appraisal, which was not prepared consistent with Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.32(1m), the Board's decision was not made according to law.  
                     
17 I do not contest that the property owner must show that 
the property is contaminated before the burden of Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.32(1m) applies to the assessor.  However, here, Collison 
provided an environmental report from Endpoint Solutions showing 
contamination, and all parties agreed that the property was 
contaminated. 
No.  2018AP669.pdr 
 
10 
 
Therefore, I would reverse its decision and remand to the Board 
so that it can request an appraiser to consider the impairment 
of value caused by contamination as § 70.32(1m) requires.18   
E.  Majority Opinion 
¶71 The majority opinion asserts that the assessor did 
consider the impairment due to contamination because the 
appraiser valued the property based on the income approach.19  To 
support this assertion, the majority quotes the appraiser's 
statement that there is a "need for parking in this area and 
contaminated sites can be encapsulated and used as parking 
lots."20  The majority then concludes that "it was the 
contamination that drove the assessor's decision to use the 
income approach to value the property."21  This conclusion 
ignores Exhibit 3, prepared by Wiegand, as his written valuation 
report, and it also ignores the Markarian hierarchy that must be 
used for taxation appraisals according to WPAM and Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.32(1).  
¶72 I begin with the appraiser's report.  Prior to 
calculating the market value under the income approach that is 
before us in this review, Wiegand noted that he could not use 
other valuation methods for this property.  He explained that 
                     
18 I take no position on the dollar valuation of the 
impairment due to contamination.  That is a matter left to the 
professional expertise of an appraiser.    
19 Majority op., ¶3. 
20 Majority op., ¶38. 
21 Id.  
No.  2018AP669.pdr 
 
11 
 
"the Direct Sales Comparison Approach was considered but not 
applied due to difficulty finding sales of similar properties."22  
He also considered the cost approach to value, but concluded it 
was not "the most reliable indication of value for the subject 
property given the age of the structure and difficulties in 
estimating depreciation."23  It was only after determining that 
other valuation approaches were not available that Wiegand moved 
to the income approach where he applied direct capitalization of 
income to determine value.   
¶73 The 
appraiser's 
report 
contained 
a 
step-by-step 
calculation from which he derived the market value of $31,800.  
It shows in clear terms that he did not employ an income-based 
valuation due to his consideration of contamination.  Rather, he 
employed 
direct 
capitalization 
of 
income 
because 
he 
was 
following the Markarian hierarchy required by WPAM, and it was 
the one valuation method available for this property.  First, he 
determined projected annual revenue based on what Collison had 
been paid in the past.  Next, he deducted an amount equivalent 
to a 30 percent vacancy rate as an expense.  Then, he 
capitalized the resulting number, $4,082, by 12.841 percent, 
which was "a market derived capitalization rate of 10.00% plus 
an effective tax rate of 2.841%."24  Under the Markarian approach 
                     
22 Appraisal, Non-Electronic Record Item, p. 5. 
23 Id. 
24 Report of Jim Wiegand, Senior Property Appraiser, Exhibit 
3, p. 6.   
No.  2018AP669.pdr 
 
12 
 
to taxation valuation, the income method is appropriate when 
recent sales or comparable sales are not available.25  State ex 
rel. Markarian v. City of Cudahy, 45 Wis. 2d 683, 686-87, 173 
N.W.2d 627 (1970).  That is what happened here.  
¶74 I have no problem with the value the appraiser 
calculated through direct capitalization of income.  His 
calculations were properly done.  My objection is that he did 
not reduce the $31,800 value by any amount based on "impairment 
of the value of the property because of the presence of [] 
environmental pollution" as Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1m) requires. 
¶75 There simply are no facts from which to conclude that 
Wiegand used the capitalization of income approach to consider 
the effect of environmental contamination on the value of 
Collison's property as the majority opinion has done.  In order 
to come to its conclusion, the majority opinion ignored 
Wiegand's step-by-step valuation that is set out in Exhibit 3.  
His testimony and the exhibit he prepared belie the majority 
opinion's conclusion.   
¶76 Furthermore, the majority's conclusion that Wiegand 
used 
the 
income 
approach 
to 
consider 
impairment 
of 
the 
property's value due to contamination is new law, without 
citation to authority or reasoning to support it.  The majority 
opinion will create unending confusion in what has been a 
consistent approach to taxation valuations where capitalization 
of income has been well accepted as part of the Markarian 
                     
25 WPAM at 7-23 (citing Markarian, 45 Wis. 2d at 685-86).   
No.  2018AP669.pdr 
 
13 
 
hierarchy when comparable sales are not available,26 but never 
before used to "consider the impairment of the value of the 
property because of . . . environmental pollution."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.32(1m). 
F.  MECS Validity 
¶77 We asked the parties to address whether MECS were 
consistent with the statutes.  Because they give burdens to 
property owners that are inconsistent with the plain meaning of 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) and (1m), I conclude that they are 
unlawful and their use should be discontinued in regard to 
valuations of contaminated property.   
¶78 As foundation for the following discussion, I review 
what MECS require of the taxpayer and the appraiser in regard to 
valuing contaminated property.  First, MECS place a "BURDEN OF 
PROOF ON TAXPAYER."27  MECS require the taxpayer to prove that 
contamination exists:  "The appraiser should not assume that a 
specific property type has contamination without appropriate 
substantiating evidence."28  Second, "[c]ontamination must be 
substantiated 
through 
an 
independent 
environmental 
expert. . . .  The minimum level of acceptable substantiation 
will be a comprehensive Phase II Audit, setting forth (among 
other pertinent information) the type, level and source of 
                     
26 WPAM at 7-23. 
27 Milwaukee Environmental Contamination Standards (MECS) at 
A-App. 057.  
28 Id.   
No.  2018AP669.pdr 
 
14 
 
contamination 
and 
the 
suggested 
method 
or 
methods 
for 
remediation."29  Third, "[w]ithout this information, property 
must be valued as if uncontaminated."30  Fourth, reductions in 
valuations are tied to clean up costs:  "Adjustments to the 
assessments will be based on clean up costs with consideration 
of discounting these costs for time."31  Fifth, "[p]roperty 
assessments which have been adjusted for contamination shall be 
designated as unfinished ("U" symbol) assessment."32 
¶79 Here, Collison provided a contamination report from 
Endpoint Solutions.  It detailed the removal of four underground 
storage tanks and provided "a comprehensive analytical soil 
sample report"33 of environmental contamination.  In addition, 
all parties agreed that Collison's property was contaminated.  
Therefore, despite MECS's Phase II requirement, the assessor's 
duties under Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1m) were clearly triggered in 
this case.    
¶80 In his Appraisal Report, Wiegand explained that one of 
the purposes of his appraisal was that it be in accord with 
"procedures of the City of Milwaukee Assessor's Office," i.e., 
MECS.34  He also said that the City Assessor's Office did not 
                     
29 Id. 
30 Id.   
31 Id. at A-App. 058.  
32 Id. 
33 Appraisal, Non-Electronic Record Item, p. 4. 
34 Id., p. 2. 
No.  2018AP669.pdr 
 
15 
 
have any verifiable written information pertaining to the clean-
up costs associated with contamination of Collison's property.  
From this statement and his failure to address impairment of 
value due to contamination, it appeared that he applied MECS's 
requirement that without a Phase II report showing the costs of 
clean-up the property is to be assessed as if uncontaminated.  
¶81 Wiegand's appraisal ignored all impairment of the 
value of Collison's property due to contamination, as his 
written report, Exhibit 3, explained in step-by-step detail.  
This is confirmed by the MECS directive set forth in the 
following footnote.35  And finally, under MECS, if Wiegand had 
considered an impairment due to contamination, he would have 
specially marked his assessment because MECS provides that 
property assessments "adjusted for contamination shall be 
designated 
as 
unfinished 
("U" 
symbol) 
assessment." 
 
The 
assessment for Collison's property did not have a "U" symbol 
showing that it had been adjusted for contamination. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶82 In conclusion, I respectfully dissent because the 
majority 
opinion 
affirms 
the 
Board 
of 
Review's 
decision 
sustaining Wiegand's appraisal, which appraisal did not follow 
the law.36  I also write because I conclude that MECS do not 
                     
35 As MECS provides, "The starting point for determining 
market value for properties affected by contamination is the 
unencumbered, or unimpaired value.  This is the value that a 
property would have if no adjustment were made for any 
environmental problems.  Unencumbered value is obtained using 
standard appraisal methods."  MECS at A-App. 064.   
36 Majority op., ¶3. 
No.  2018AP669.pdr 
 
16 
 
comply with Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1m) and therefore, it is unlawful 
to apply MECS in taxation appraisals of contaminated properties.   
¶83 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and Justice REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this 
dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  2018AP669.pdr 
 
 
 
1