Case Title: Reid v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 981020

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1998-11-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
JAMES EDWARD REID, 
a/k/a JAMES EDWARD REED 
 
v. Record No. 981020   OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   November 6, 1998 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY 
Ray W. Grubbs, Judge 
 
 
On December 3, 1997, James Edward Reid pled guilty to 
three charges: (1) capital murder of Annie V. Lester during 
the commission of attempted rape and/or attempted robbery 
in violation of Code § 18.2-31; (2) attempted rape in 
violation of Code § 18.2-67.5; and (3) attempted robbery in 
violation of Code § 18.2-58.1  After accepting the pleas and 
hearing evidence about the commission of the offenses, the 
trial court found Reid guilty as charged. 
During the subsequent sentencing proceedings, the 
trial court heard evidence from both sides and received a 
pre-sentence report.2  The trial court then sentenced Reid 
to death for the capital murder conviction and imposed two 
ten-year sentences for the attempted rape and attempted 
robbery convictions.  In imposing the death penalty 
                     
1 Reid entered the guilty pleas pursuant to North 
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1973). 
 
2 The trial court conducted the first part of the 
penalty phase hearing on December 3, 1997, immediately 
pursuant to Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and -264.4(C), the trial 
court found that Reid’s conduct in committing capital 
murder was “outrageously vile, horrible and inhuman in that 
it involved such aggravated battery to the victim, that is 
. . . qualitatively and quantitatively . . . more culpable 
than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of murder.”  
 
On appeal, Reid contends that the trial court 
disregarded certain mitigating evidence and therefore erred 
in imposing the death penalty.3  Upon consideration of the 
record, briefs, and argument of counsel, we find no error 
in the judgment of the trial court.  Further, upon 
conducting our review pursuant to Code § 17-110.1(C), we 
conclude that the sentence of death in this case was not 
imposed “under the influence of passion, prejudice or any 
other arbitrary factor” and is not excessive or 
disproportionate.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment 
of the trial court. 
FACTS 
_________________ 
after finding Reid guilty.  The court reconvened the 
hearing on February 20, 1998. 
3 Reid is before this Court for automatic review of his 
death sentence under Code § 17-110.1. 
  Code § 17-110.1 was repealed and replaced by § 17.1-
313, effective October 1, 1998.  Because the parties 
briefed and argued this case under the provisions of § 17-
110.1, and because the relevant provisions remain unchanged 
in § 17.1-313, we will cite to § 17-110.1 in this opinion. 
 
 
2
“Since the Commonwealth prevailed in the trial court, 
we review the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth.”  Graham v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 79, 81, 459 
S.E.2d 97, 98, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 997 (1995) (citing 
Swann v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 222, 225, 441 S.E.2d 195, 
198, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 889 (1994)). 
In the afternoon on October 12, 1996, Lester’s cousin 
went to Lester’s house, and after finding the front screen 
door open, entered the house, discovered Lester’s body on 
the floor at the end of a bed, and observed debris all over 
the bedroom floor.  The cousin left and went to a 
relative’s house to call for emergency help, but then 
returned to Lester’s home and was there when the police 
arrived. 
Before disturbing the crime scene, the police made a 
video recording of the inside of Lester’s house.  The tape 
was admitted into evidence, and Officer Tommy Lawson 
narrated what was being seen as the trial court watched it.  
Blood was present throughout Lester’s home on such items as 
the kitchen floor, the back door and back door trim, the 
refrigerator, a can of milk, a wig lying on the kitchen 
floor, the door leading from the kitchen into a television 
room, scissors lying on a chair in the television room, the 
 
3
bed and headboard in the bedroom where Lester’s body was 
found, the cord of an electric heating pad that was under 
Lester’s head, and the seat of a chair beside her body.  
Several items of Lester’s clothing had blood on them, 
including a sweater, a slip, and a bra that was still 
fastened in the back but that “[was] broken in some fashion 
in the front.”  The bedroom was in complete disarray with 
dresser drawers on the floor and bed and clothing strewn 
all around.  A wine bottle was sitting on the floor at the 
foot of the bed. 
William Massello, the Assistant Chief Medical Examiner 
for Western Virginia, performed an autopsy on Lester.  He 
described Lester as an elderly, slender, and “somewhat 
emaciated” female.  During the autopsy, Massello observed 
14 stab wounds to the front of Lester’s neck and three stab 
wounds to her chin, one of which went into the jugular vein 
on the left side of her neck.  There were also five stab 
wounds to the front of Lester’s chest.  Massello testified 
that several of these wounds went through the chest wall 
into Lester’s left lung and into her heart.  In Massello’s 
opinion, the most rapidly lethal wounds were four of the 
stab wounds to the chest, which caused bleeding into the 
chest cavity and, in turn, caused Lester to die rapidly.  
According to Massello, all the stab wounds had a Z-shaped 
 
4
or H-shaped configuration consistent with injuries caused 
by two blades superimposed on one another or scissors 
blades. 
In addition to the stab wounds, Massello observed 
multiple lacerations and bruises on Lester’s body.  Some of 
these injuries on the top of Lester’s head and face were 
caused either by Lester’s head being struck with a blunt 
instrument, or by her head striking another object such as 
a door or wall.  Lester had lacerations on the right and 
left sides of her face and linear crush marks on the right 
side of her face.4  Finally, Lester sustained a fracture of 
the hyoid bone,5 resulting either from the force of 
strangulation or from being struck in that area with an 
object. 
 
The evidence linking Reid to the commission of these 
crimes consists, in part, of testimony from witnesses who 
saw Reid at or in the vicinity of Lester’s house on the day 
of her murder.  Around 10:30 a.m. on October 12, Reid 
                     
4 Massello opined that the can of milk found in 
Lester’s kitchen was the kind of instrument that could have 
caused some of the injuries to Lester’s head. 
 
5 Hyoid bone is defined as “a bone or complex of bones 
situated at the base of the tongue and developed from the 
second and third visceral arches, supporting the tongue and 
its muscles . . . .”  Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary 1111 (1993). 
 
 
5
secured a ride to Lester’s house with Haywood Alexander and 
Robert Smith.  Reid’s stated purpose for going to Lester’s 
house was to do some work there.6  En route to Lester’s 
home, Reid asked Alexander and Smith to stop at a store 
where Reid purchased a bottle of wine.  They then proceeded 
to Lester’s house, and upon arriving there, Reid exited the 
vehicle and walked around to the back of the house with his 
bottle of wine.  Alexander and Smith then left. 
Around 4:30 p.m. on that same day, George Eanes, who 
worked at Eanes Body Shop located across the street from 
Lester’s house, observed Reid walking across the street 
from the direction of Lester’s house.  Reid approached 
Eanes and asked for a ride.  Eanes explained to Reid that 
he was working on his vehicle and could not give him a ride 
at that time.  When asked at the trial to describe Reid’s 
appearance, Eanes stated that “[Reid] had a lot of blood on 
him and he was staggering.”7  After seeing the blood on 
Reid’s clothing, Eanes asked Reid how he got in that 
                     
6 Reid apparently had performed odd jobs for Lester on 
previous occasions and enjoyed discussing the Bible with 
her. 
 
7 Reid had blood on his sleeve, shoes, pants, and front 
of his coat. 
 
 
 
6
condition.  According to Eanes, Reid responded by referring 
to a former lover and stating that “he did it for love.”  
 
George W. Eanes, father of George Eanes, also saw Reid 
at the body shop and confirmed that Reid appeared to have 
been in a fight because he had blood all over him.  Eanes’ 
father stated that Reid smelled like a “brewery” but that 
he, nevertheless, agreed to give Reid a ride home.  During 
that drive, Reid explained to Eanes’ father that some 
person had given him some drugs and that they had gotten 
into an argument or fight. 
 
The results of forensic tests, fingerprint analyses, 
and handwriting comparisons also place Reid at Lester’s 
house on the day in question.  Forensic tests established 
that Reid’s DNA matched a stain abstracted from a cigarette 
butt found in Lester’s home.  A blood stain abstracted from 
the same cigarette butt was consistent with the DNA profile 
of Lester and Reid.  In addition, the forensic scientist 
who conducted these tests testified that Lester’s DNA was 
consistent with blood recovered from Reid’s jacket.  
Finally, two of Reid’s fingerprints were identified in 
blood found on the handset of a rotary telephone in 
Lester’s bedroom, and Reid’s handwriting was found on some 
papers recovered in Lester’s house. 
 
7
 
The Commonwealth presented all the foregoing evidence 
during the guilt phase of Reid’s trial but also relied upon 
it during the sentencing phase.  In addition, the 
Commonwealth presented testimony from Robert D. O’Neal, a 
probation officer.  O’Neal interviewed Reid while preparing 
the pre-sentence report.  During that interview, Reid 
stated to O’Neal that he did not remember anything about 
the incident.  According to O’Neal, Reid believes that he 
“blacked out” because he remembers being at Lester’s house 
prior to the offense but does not recall anything that 
transpired from that point until he awoke at home and found 
blood on his clothing. 
 
In mitigation, Reid presented evidence from three 
medical experts: Dr. Pogos H. Voskanian, a forensic 
psychiatrist; Dr. Stephen Herrick, a forensic psychologist; 
and Dr. Randy Thomas, a clinical psychologist.  Each of 
these witnesses discussed Reid’s medical and psychiatric 
conditions that, in their opinion, affect Reid’s ability to 
form the intent to commit a crime and that have caused Reid 
to experience “blackout” periods during which he is 
basically out of control and engages in disorganized, 
aggressive behavior toward an unlikely target. 
Three factors were significant to these medical 
experts in formulating their respective opinions.  First, 
 
8
Reid suffered a major head trauma as a result of an 
automobile accident in 1968 and was in a coma for at least 
five days.  The damaged area of Reid’s brain was the left 
temporal lobe and part of the frontal lobe, which affects 
an individual’s personality and ability to control 
impulses.  Thus, Reid does not resist acting on his 
impulses.  Second, Reid developed a seizure disorder 
shortly after the head injury.  According to Dr. Voskanian, 
Reid’s head trauma triggered the seizure disorder.  Because 
Reid has been noncompliant with taking his medication to 
control the seizures, he has experienced repeated seizures 
that have, in turn, progressively caused more damage to his 
brain.  Finally, Reid has a family history of alcoholism, 
has abused alcohol since age 15, and has had numerous 
admissions to both psychiatric hospitals and alcohol abuse 
rehabilitation centers.  Because of Reid’s brain injury, he 
is more vulnerable to the effects of alcohol and likely to 
become intoxicated more quickly than another person.  In 
addition, Reid is a binge drinker, meaning that he has not 
built up a tolerance for the effects of alcohol. 
Dr. Voskanian opined that Reid experiences “blackout” 
episodes when he is intoxicated.  During these episodes, 
Reid may not remember what he did five minutes ago but 
would retain his memory for established information such as 
 
9
his name and residence.  Dr. Voskanian further opined that 
Reid was in “an impaired state of consciousness” when he 
left Lester’s house because Reid said things that could not 
be understood and did nothing to conceal his bloody 
clothing. 
 
In summary, Dr. Voskanian stated that Reid’s head 
trauma, seizure disorder, long history of drinking, and 
serious medical conditions,8 could “have a significant 
impact on Mr. Reid’s ability to think clearly, or perform 
intentional acts.”  Dr. Voskanian also opined that these 
conditions could cause violent outbursts that Reid would 
not remember if he were intoxicated.  However, all three 
medical experts believed that Reid would not be susceptible 
to these violent outbursts if he were in a structured 
setting where he would not have access to alcohol. 
Some of Reid’s family members also testified that Reid 
is a different person when he is intoxicated.  His ex-wife, 
sister, and mother described Reid as a kind and considerate 
person when he is sober, but acknowledged that Reid has 
violent episodes during periods of intoxication.  They also 
confirmed that Reid cannot remember what he does when he is 
                     
8 Reid underwent cardiac by-pass surgery.  Several 
years after the surgery, Reid again had chest pains and 
suffered a myocardial infarction.  Reid has also been 
diagnosed with lung cancer. 
 
10
intoxicated.  For example, his ex-wife testified that Reid 
once stabbed her when he was intoxicated but that he had no 
recollection of the incident the next morning. 
ANALYSIS 
Under Code § 19.2-264.4(B), facts in mitigation that a 
trial court can consider in deciding whether to impose a 
sentence of death or life imprisonment may include the 
following:  
(ii) the capital felony was committed while the 
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance, . . . [and] (iv) at the time of 
the commission of the capital felony, the capacity of 
the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of law was significantly impaired. 
 
On appeal, Reid argues that the trial court erred by not 
considering evidence establishing these mitigating factors.  
Specifically, Reid contends that the court failed to 
address evidence showing Reid’s lack of planning or 
premeditation, lack of memory of the incident, and behavior 
subsequent to the commission of the crimes.  Reid also 
asserts that the trial court failed to consider the 
uncontradicted medical testimony regarding his medical and 
psychiatric impairments.  According to Reid, this evidence 
demonstrates not only that he was unaware of what he was 
doing at Lester’s home on the day in question but also that 
he cannot now remember anything about the incident.  Thus, 
 
11
Reid argues that his conduct in committing the murder of 
Lester cannot be deemed “vile” and that the trial court, 
therefore, erred by imposing a sentence of death based on 
the “vileness” factor. 
Reid’s arguments can be distilled into a single 
complaint that the trial court must not have considered his 
mitigating evidence since the court imposed the death 
penalty.  Reid asserts that, since his evidence was 
uncontradicted and is not inherently improbable or 
inconsistent, it had to be accepted as true.  Once that 
evidence was accepted as true, Reid contends that it 
negated the trial court’s finding of “vileness.”  In other 
words, Reid asserts that the trial court should have given 
controlling weight to his mitigating evidence.  We do not 
agree. 
Following a 15-minute recess after the close of the 
evidence in the penalty phase, the trial court announced 
its sentencing decision and, in doing so, stated, “The 
Court has the duty to consider all such evidence, both 
favorable to you and unfavorable presented relative to this 
hearing in ascertaining whether the crime of which you have 
been convicted is so atrocious that the death sentence 
should be imposed.”  Thus, we conclude that the trial court 
did, in fact, consider Reid’s mitigating evidence. 
 
12
We have addressed this type of complaint on at least 
two previous occasions.  First, in Correll v. Commonwealth, 
232 Va. 454, 468, 352 S.E.2d 352, 360, cert. denied, 482 
U.S. 931 (1987), the defendant argued, as does Reid, that 
the mitigating evidence was of such weight that the court 
could not have considered it and still sentenced him to 
death.  The mitigating evidence in that case established 
that Correll had a troubled childhood and unfortunate home 
situation.  Taking the view that such evidence tended to 
explain, but did not excuse, Correll’s commission of the 
capital murder, we concluded that “it did not require as a 
matter of law that the death penalty not be imposed.”  Id.  
We further stated that the fact-finder has a duty to 
consider mitigating evidence along with other evidence in 
determining the appropriate sentence but that the fact-
finder is “not required to give controlling effect to the 
mitigating evidence.”  Id. at 468-469, 352 S.E.2d at 360. 
Similarly, in Murphy v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 136, 
142, 431 S.E.2d 48, 52, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 928 (1993), 
we addressed the defendant’s argument that the trial court 
had failed to consider fully the evidence in mitigation of 
the imposition of the death penalty.  As in the present 
case, the trial court in Murphy stated on the record that 
it had considered all the evidence.  Relying on our 
 
13
decision in Correll, we concluded that the trial court had 
“maturely, carefully, and calmly deliberated the full range 
of issues.”  Id.
As in Correll and Murphy, the evidence upon which Reid 
relies is mitigating in that it shows “extenuating 
circumstances tending to explain, but not excuse, his 
commission of the crime.”  Correll, 232 Va. at 468, 352 
S.E.2d at 360 (quoting Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 
243, 253, 257 S.E.2d 797, 804 (1979), cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 1103 (1980)).  The trial court was not, however, 
required to give controlling weight to the mitigating 
evidence.  Id. at 469, 352 S.E.2d at 360. 
Moreover, Reid’s mitigating evidence does not, as a 
matter of law, negate the trial court’s finding of 
“vileness.”  Reid stabbed Lester 22 times and inflicted 
other wounds on her head, face, hyoid bone, and arms.  
According to the medical examiner, four of the five stab 
wounds to Lester’s chest were fatal.  From the presence of 
blood throughout Lester’s house, it can be inferred that 
Reid carried or dragged her body from the kitchen into the 
bedroom.  At some point, he also removed her clothes and 
ransacked her bedroom. 
Reid’s medical and psychiatric impairments, his 
periods of “blackout,” his lack of memory regarding the 
 
14
acts he committed at Lester’s home, and his behavior 
subsequent to the incident when he made no attempt to hide 
either his presence at Lester’s home or his blood-covered 
clothing do not change the fact that the commission of this 
crime was “outrageously . . . vile, horrible or inhuman, in 
that it involved . . . aggravated battery” to Lester.  Code 
§§ 19.2-264.2 and -264.4(C).  It was “qualitatively and 
quantitatively . . . more culpable than the minimum 
necessary to accomplish an act of murder.”  Smith v. 
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 478, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (1978), 
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979). We have never held that 
the “vileness” factor under Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and –
264.4(C) includes a requirement that a defendant’s mental 
state embrace the intent to commit an “outrageously or 
wantonly vile” murder, and we decline to do so now.  “The 
number or nature of the batteries inflicted upon the victim 
is the essence of the test whether the defendant’s conduct 
‘was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in 
that it involved . . . an aggravated battery.’”  Boggs v. 
Commonwealth, 229 Va. 501, 521, 331 S.E.2d 407, 421 (1985), 
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986) (quoting Code § 19.2-
264.2). 
PREJUDICE AND PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW 
OF DEATH SENTENCE 
 
15
Pursuant to Code § 17-110.1(C)(1), we are required to 
determine whether the death sentence in this case was 
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other 
arbitrary factors.  Upon careful examination of the record, 
we find no evidence that any such factor was present or 
influenced the trial court’s sentencing decision.  Indeed, 
Reid has not asserted that the imposition of the death 
penalty in this case was the result of passion or 
prejudice. 
We must also determine whether the sentence of death 
in this case is “excessive or disproportionate to the 
penalty imposed in similar cases.”  Code § 17-110.1(C)(2).  
In conducting this review, we have inspected the records of 
all capital cases presented to this Court including those 
cases in which the trial court imposed a life sentence 
instead of the death penalty.  In complying with the 
directive in Code § 17-110.1(C)(2) to compare “similar” 
cases, we have given particular attention to those cases in 
which the underlying felony predicates and the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crimes were 
the same as those in this case.  We have also focused on 
cases in which the death penalty was imposed solely on the 
basis of the “vileness” factor.  However, our 
proportionality review does not require that a given 
 
16
capital murder case “equal in horror the worst possible 
scenario yet encountered.”  Turner v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 
543, 556, 364 S.E.2d 483, 490, cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 
(1988). 
Based on this review, the Court concludes that Reid’s 
sentence of death is not excessive or disproportionate to 
sentences generally imposed in this Commonwealth for 
capital murders comparable to Reid’s murder of Lester.  
See, e.g. Fry v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 413, 463 S.E.2d 433 
(1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1110 (1996) (11 gunshot 
wounds to victim’s head, chest, and abdomen; victim dragged 
down dirt road while alive); Barnes v. Commonwealth, 234 
Va. 130, 360 S.E.2d 196 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1036 
(1988) (multiple gunshot wounds); Washington v. 
Commonwealth, 228 Va. 535, 323 S.E.2d 577 (1984), cert. 
denied, 471 U.S. 1111 (1985) (38 stab wounds to victim); 
Boggs, 229 Va. 501, 331 S.E.2d 407 (victim stabbed in two 
places and struck on head and neck multiple times).  As 
already stated, Reid inflicted 22 stab wounds upon the 
victim, four of which were lethal wounds to Lester’s chest, 
in addition to multiple other injuries.  Reid committed 
these acts while carrying or dragging Lester’s body through 
her house and removing her clothing. 
 
17
For these reasons, we find no error in the imposition 
of the sentence of death, nor do we perceive any reason to 
commute the death sentence.  Therefore, we will affirm the 
judgment of the trial court. 
Affirmed.
 
18