Case Title: In the Matter of Marjonie Diane Gabriel

Citation: 

Docket Number: 18S-DI-6

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2019-04-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 18S-DI-6 
In the Matter of 
Marjonie D. Gabriel, 
 Respondent. 
Decided: April 11, 2019 
Attorney Discipline Action 
Hearing Officer Robert C. Reiling 
Per Curiam Opinion 
Chief Justice Rush, and Justices David, Slaughter, and Goff concur. 
Justice Massa not participating. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Apr 11 2019, 2:49 pm
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Per curiam. 
We find that Respondent, Marjonie Gabriel, committed attorney 
misconduct by knowingly disobeying court orders. For this misconduct, 
we conclude that Respondent should be suspended for 90 days with 
automatic reinstatement. 
This matter is before the Court on the report of the hearing officer 
appointed by this Court on the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary 
Commission’s verified disciplinary complaint. Respondent’s 2009 
admission to this state’s bar subjects her to this Court’s disciplinary 
jurisdiction. See IND. CONST. art. 7, § 4. 
Procedural Background and Facts  
In 2008, Respondent left a prosecutorial position in California and 
returned to Indiana to care for her father, who was in deteriorating health. 
Respondent’s father also was in the midst of a separation from his wife 
(Respondent’s estranged mother), who was sequestering and possibly 
dissipating marital assets.1 That fall, Respondent’s father executed a 
power-of-attorney appointing Respondent as his attorney-in-fact and 
stating, in part, that Respondent “shall be entitled to reimbursement for all 
reasonable expenses incurred on my behalf and . . . may also be entitled to 
reasonable compensation for any services provided.”  
In 2010, a guardianship was opened in Hamilton Superior Court and 
Respondent was appointed as guardian of her father’s person. In 2012, 
Respondent was appointed by the guardianship court as successor 
guardian of her incapacitated father’s estate. 
In the first several years following her return to Indiana, Respondent 
expended considerable sums of her own savings on her father’s behalf. 
During this time Respondent also experienced significant health issues of 
                                                 
1 Respondent’s father petitioned for marital dissolution in late 2008, but those proceedings 
ultimately were dismissed in 2012 due to concerns about Respondent’s father’s competency. 
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her own, resulting in major medical bills and Respondent’s inability to 
consistently maintain a law practice in Indiana. Respondent’s personal 
savings and assets soon were depleted, and she alternately found herself 
living temporarily with friends or out of her own vehicle. 
At some point in late 2013 or early 2014, the guardianship received 
about $40,000 in proceeds from the sale of Respondent’s parents’ marital 
residence.2 Beginning around the same time, Respondent made dozens of 
payments and withdrawals from the estate to herself without obtaining 
the requisite court approval and in violation of a restraining order that 
had been issued by the guardianship court. During that period, 
Respondent also failed to file required accountings and failed to comply 
with several court orders to do so. In early 2016 the guardianship court 
held Respondent in contempt, appointed a successor guardian, and again 
ordered Respondent to provide an accounting. Respondent did not do so 
and was held in contempt again in November 2016. Meanwhile, 
Respondent’s father passed away in September 2016. 
The Commission charged Respondent with violating Indiana 
Professional Conduct Rule 3.4(c) based on her knowing disobedience of 
the guardianship court’s orders. Respondent admitted, and the hearing 
officer found, that Respondent violated this rule. 
The Commission also charged Respondent with violating Rule 8.4(b), 
based on the Commission’s allegations that Respondent’s actions 
amounted to criminal conversion and/or exploitation of an endangered 
adult. The hearing officer concluded that the Commission had failed to 
sustain its burden of proving this charge. 
Discussion and Discipline 
The Commission has petitioned this Court to review the hearing 
officer’s findings and conclusions that the Commission failed to prove a 
                                                 
2 By this time Respondent’s mother had been residing out-of-state for several years and 
Respondent’s father was residing in an assisted living facility. 
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violation of Rule 8.4(b). The Commission carries the burden of proof to 
demonstrate attorney misconduct by clear and convincing evidence. See 
Ind. Admission and Discipline Rule 23(14)(g)(1). While the review process 
in disciplinary cases involves a de novo examination of all matters 
presented to the Court, the hearing officer’s findings nevertheless receive 
emphasis due to the unique opportunity for direct observation of 
witnesses. See Matter of Campanella, 56 N.E.3d 631, 633 (Ind. 2016). 
The crime of conversion is committed when a person “knowingly or 
intentionally exerts unauthorized control over property of another 
person[.]” I.C. § 35-43-4-3(a). The hearing officer found, among other 
things, that even assuming Respondent’s exercise of control over 
guardianship funds was unauthorized, Respondent reasonably believed 
under the circumstances that her actions were authorized. In so finding, 
the hearing officer expressly credited Respondent’s own testimony and 
evidence in support, as well as relevant testimony from the judge who 
had presided over the guardianship matter. (HO’s Report at 10-12, 16). 
The Commission’s brief in support of its petition for review points to 
contrary evidence, perhaps most notably that the proceeds from the sale 
of the marital residence were subject to a restraining order. However, 
keeping in mind the Commission’s burden of proof and the emphasis we 
afford factual findings arising from the hearing officer’s opportunity to 
observe witnesses directly and adjudge their credibility, we find sufficient 
support in this record for the finding that Respondent reasonably believed 
her actions were authorized. And from this finding we conclude, as did 
the hearing officer, that the Commission failed to prove Respondent acted 
with the requisite mens rea to support a finding of criminal conversion. See 
JET Credit Union v. Loudermilk, 879 N.E.2d 594, 597-98 & n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2008); see also Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 412-13 (7th Cir. 2010). 
As relevant here, criminal exploitation is committed when a person 
“recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally exerts unauthorized use of . . . the 
property of . . . an endangered adult . . . for the person’s own profit or 
advantage[.]” I.C. § 35-46-1-12(a). An “endangered adult” is defined by 
several conjunctive elements, one of which is that the person is “harmed 
or threatened with harm as a result of . . . exploitation of the individual’s 
personal services or property.” I.C. § 12-10-3-2(a). Among other things, the 
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hearing officer found that Respondent’s conduct was not done for her 
own profit or advantage because she used the guardianship funds at issue 
as partial reimbursement for expenses she had advanced and liabilities 
she had incurred to provide care for her father. The hearing officer further 
found that Respondent’s father suffered no actual harm from 
Respondent’s conduct and, under the particular circumstances present 
here, no potential harm. (HO’s Report at 14-15). Again, although the 
Commission points to contrary evidence, we find sufficient support in the 
record for the hearing officer’s findings and conclude, as did the hearing 
officer, that the Commission failed to sustain its burden of proving that 
Respondent committed criminal exploitation. 
Because the Commission failed to establish that Respondent committed 
criminal conversion or exploitation, we find in favor of Respondent on the 
Rule 8.4(b) charge. We also find that Respondent violated Rule 3.4(c) as 
charged and admitted, and we turn now to the matter of sanction. 
Respondent’s failings in this case were not insignificant. She repeatedly 
failed to comply with court orders and mismanaged guardianship funds. 
But unlike cases such as Matter of Emmons, 68 N.E.3d 1068 (Ind. 2017), 
upon which the Commission heavily relies in its sanction analysis, 
Respondent’s conduct was not criminal in nature. Also unlike Emmons, 
Respondent’s misuse of guardianship funds was not intended to inure to 
Respondent’s benefit or the ward’s detriment, nor did it actually do so. To 
the contrary, Respondent was striving under very difficult circumstances 
to help her ailing father, and in the big picture her various expenditures of 
personal and guardianship assets resulted in a net gain for her father. 
None of this excuses her repeated disobedience of court orders (nor does 
Respondent suggest it does), but we agree with the hearing officer that it 
presents compelling mitigation in this case. 
We find instructive Matter of Mercho, 78 N.E.3d 1101 (Ind. 2017), 
another case in which the Commission alleged but failed to prove that an 
attorney’s misuse of funds held in a fiduciary capacity was criminal in 
nature. The sanction imposed in Mercho included 90 days of active 
suspension. We also credit the hearing officer’s view, informed by his 
firsthand observation of four days of witness testimony in this matter, that 
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Respondent’s transgressions “trace[ ] to the unique, extremely difficult 
circumstances” with which she was confronted and “do[ ] not otherwise 
raise serious concerns about Respondent’s general character and fitness to 
practice law.” (HO’s Report at 17).  
With these considerations in mind, we conclude that a suspension of 90 
days with automatic reinstatement is appropriate discipline for 
Respondent’s misconduct.  
Conclusion 
Respondent already is under an order of suspension for dues 
nonpayment. For Respondent’s professional misconduct, the Court 
suspends Respondent for a period of 90 days, effective from the date of 
this opinion. Respondent shall fulfill all the duties of a suspended attorney 
under Admission and Discipline Rule 23(26). At the conclusion of the 
period of suspension, provided there are no other suspensions then in 
effect, Respondent shall be automatically reinstated to the practice of law, 
subject to the conditions of Admission and Discipline Rule 23(18)(a). The 
costs of this proceeding are assessed against Respondent, and the hearing 
officer appointed in this case is discharged. 
Rush, C.J., and David, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur. 
Massa, J., not participating. 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  RES P O N DE N T  
Peter J. Rusthoven 
Jack L. Stark, Jr. 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  I ND I A NA SU P RE ME CO U R T 
D I SC I PL I NA R Y C OMM ISS I O N 
G. Michael Witte, Executive Director 
Angie L. Ordway, Staff Attorney 
Indianapolis, Indiana