Case Title: Ryll v. Columbus Fireworks Display Co., Inc.

Citation: 2002-Ohio-2584

Docket Number: 20001904

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Ryll v. Columbus Fireworks Display Co., Inc., 95 Ohio St.3d 467, 2002-Ohio-2584.] 
 
 
RYLL, APPELLANT, v. COLUMBUS FIREWORKS DISPLAY COMPANY, INC.; CITY 
OF REYNOLDSBURG ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Ryll v. Columbus Fireworks Display Co., Inc., 95 Ohio St.3d 467, 
2002-Ohio-2584.] 
Fireworks — Negligence — Liability of city sponsoring fireworks display when 
spectator is killed after being hit by exploding firework shell — City not 
immune under theory of sovereign community under R.C. Chapter 2744 or 
R.C. 1533.18 — Sponsoring a fireworks display is a proprietary function. 
(No. 2000-1904 — Submitted October 30, 2001 — Decided June 19, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, Nos. 99AP-1061 and 
99AP-1311. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶1} 
Appellant Deborah Ryll, administrator of the estate of Daniel Ryll, 
brought suit against appellees, including the city of Reynoldsburg and Truro 
Township, for the wrongful death of her husband, Daniel Ryll.  Mr. Ryll was 
killed when shrapnel from an exploding firework shell hit him during the July 4, 
1996 Reynoldsburg fireworks display. 
{¶2} 
Reynoldsburg held its annual fireworks display in Huber Park.  
Truro Township, the entity responsible for fire protection in Reynoldsburg, was 
required by R.C. 3743.54(C) to inspect the site prior to granting a permit for the 
fireworks discharge setup and was authorized to inspect the premises immediately 
prior to the exhibition.  An employee of Truro Township conducted an inspection 
on July 3, 1996, to ensure that the spectator area was the proper distance from the 
fireworks discharge area.  The inspector did not determine the types of shells to be 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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used in the fireworks display or detect that the shells had not been buried 
according to the National Fire Protection Association (“NFPA”) standards.  The 
NFPA standards, which were adopted pursuant to R.C. 3743.53(B), require shells 
to be buried at a depth of at least two-thirds of their length.  No Truro Township 
Fire Department employee inspected the site after the installation of the fireworks 
display. 
{¶3} 
On July 4, 1996, prior to the start of the fireworks display, 
Reynoldsburg used caution tape to designate the spectator safety area.  In 
determining the distance from the discharge at which the tape should be placed, 
Reynoldsburg did not consult the licensed fireworks shooter about the angulation 
or the placement of the fireworks.  Some spectators were as close as six hundred 
sixty feet from the discharge area.  According to NFPA standards, when vertical 
twelve-inch shells are to be used in the display, the safety area should be no closer 
than eight hundred forty feet from the discharge area. 
{¶4} 
During the July 4, 1996 fireworks display, a twelve-inch shell 
exploded inside its mortar tube.  A piece of shrapnel from the explosion struck 
Mr. Ryll, who was sitting with his family in the designated spectator safety area, 
approximately six hundred sixty feet from the discharge area.  Mr. Ryll died from 
the resulting injuries. 
{¶5} 
Reynoldsburg and Truro Township each filed separate motions for 
summary judgment in the trial court, both claiming sovereign immunity.  While 
the motions were pending, appellant reached a settlement agreement with 
Reynoldsburg and Truro Township that was contingent on the rulings on the 
motions for summary judgment.  Reynoldsburg agreed to pay $100,000 to 
appellant if its motion was granted and to pay $750,000 if its motion was denied.  
Truro Township agreed to pay $100,000 to appellant if its motion was granted and 
January Term, 2002 
 
 
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to pay $600,000 if its motion was denied.  The trial court denied both summary 
judgment motions. 
{¶6} 
Reynoldsburg and Truro Township appealed.  On September 5, 
2000, the appellate court reversed the trial court, holding that Reynoldsburg was 
immune from liability pursuant to R.C. 1533.181.  It also found that Truro 
Township was not liable for activities in Huber Park because the park is located in 
Reynoldsburg.  Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment to both 
Reynoldsburg and Truro Township.  Appellant’s motion for reconsideration was 
denied by the court of appeals on October 24, 2000.  Although the court 
recognized that Huber Park was located within Truro Township, it held that Truro 
Township could not be liable because it did not have administrative jurisdiction 
over the park. 
{¶7} The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
{¶8} The issue before this court is whether Reynoldsburg and Truro 
Township are immune from liability.  Some members of this court are on record 
as believing sovereign immunity to be an unconstitutional infringement of Section 
16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.  See Garrett v. Sandusky (1994), 68 Ohio 
St.3d 139, 141, 624 N.E.2d 704 (Pfeifer, J., concurring).  Today, however, we 
resolve the issue before us in favor of the appellant without addressing the 
constitutional issue. 
{¶9} The court of appeals found that Reynoldsburg was immune from 
liability based on R.C. 1533.181, which provides: 
{¶10} “(A)  No owner, lessee, or occupant of premises: 
{¶11} “(1)  Owes any duty to a recreational user to keep the premises safe 
for entry or use; 
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{¶12} “(2)  Extends any assurance to a recreational user, through the act 
of giving permission, that the premises are safe for entry or use; 
{¶13} “(3)  Assumes responsibility for or incurs liability for any injury to 
person or property caused by any act of a recreational user.” 
{¶14} The court of appeals stated, “R.C. 1533.181 provides owners, 
lessees, and occupants of property with immunity for all injuries incurred by 
‘recreational users,’ ” relying on Ross v. Strasser (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 662, 
688 N.E.2d 1120.  Without discussing the merits of Ross, which is not binding on 
us in any event, a plain reading of R.C. 1533.181 reveals the court of appeals’ 
conclusion to be overly expansive. 
{¶15} R.C. 1533.181(A)(1) does not state that a recreational user is owed 
no duty.  Instead, R.C. 1533.181(A)(1) immunizes an owner, lessee, or occupant 
of premises only from a duty “to keep the premises safe for entry or use.”  
(Emphasis added.)  The cause of the injury in this case had nothing to do with 
“premises” as defined in R.C. 1533.18(A).  The cause of the injury was shrapnel 
from fireworks, which is not part of “privately-owned lands, ways, waters, and * * 
* buildings and structures thereon.”  Id.  Accordingly, R.C. 1533.181(A)(1) and 
(2) do not immunize Reynoldsburg.  To hold otherwise would allow R.C. 
1533.181 to immunize owners, lessees, and occupants for any of their negligent or 
reckless acts that occur on “premises.”  The plain language of the statute indicates 
that the General Assembly had no such intention. 
{¶16} R.C. 1533.181(A)(3) does not immunize Reynoldsburg from 
liability because the injuries were not “caused by any act” of Daniel Ryll.  His 
only act was to be present. 
{¶17} In sum, we agree with the trial court that R.C. 1533.181 does not 
immunize Reynoldsburg from liability in this case, and we reverse the court of 
appeals on this issue. 
January Term, 2002 
 
 
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{¶18} The court of appeals found Reynoldsburg’s other arguments moot.  
Because of our decision, they are not, and we will now address the only one of 
those arguments brought to this court: whether Reynoldsburg is entitled to 
immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744. 
{¶19} It is uncontested that Reynoldsburg is a political subdivision.  
Therefore, the general rule of R.C. Chapter 2744 “that political subdivisions are 
not liable in damages” is applicable. Greene Cty. Agricultural Soc. v. Liming 
(2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 551, 556-557, 733 N.E.2d 1141.  We use a three-tier 
analysis to determine whether the general rule immunizes Reynoldsburg from 
liability in this case.  See id. at 556, 733 N.E.2d 1141; Cater v. Cleveland (1998), 
83 Ohio St.3d 24, 697 N.E.2d 610. 
{¶20} The first step is to determine whether sponsoring a fireworks 
display is a governmental function.  “R.C. 2744.01(C)(2) lists specific functions 
expressly designated as governmental functions.”  Greene Cty., 89 Ohio St.3d at 
557, 733 N.E.2d 1141.  None of these is applicable.  Accordingly, we look to R.C. 
2744.01(C)(1), which provides that a governmental function is any of the 
following: 
{¶21} “(a) A function that is imposed upon the state as an obligation of 
sovereignty and that is performed by a political subdivision voluntarily or 
pursuant to legislative requirement; 
{¶22} “(b) A function that is for the common good of all citizens of the 
state; 
{¶23} “(c) A function that promotes or preserves the public peace, health, 
safety or welfare [and] that involves activities that are not engaged in or not 
customarily engaged in by nongovernmental persons * * *.” 
{¶24} R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)(a) does not apply because Ohio does not 
require Reynoldsburg to sponsor a fireworks display.  R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)(b) does 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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not apply because the fireworks display benefited “only some of the citizens of the 
state, not all citizens.”  Greene Cty., 89 Ohio St.3d at 559, 733 N.E.2d 1141.  R.C. 
2744.01(C)(1)(c) does not apply because sponsoring a fireworks display is an 
activity customarily engaged in by nongovernmental persons.  The law regarding 
political subdivision liability is different when the political subdivision is engaged 
in a proprietary function.  R.C. 2744.01(G)(1)(b) defines “[p]roprietary function” 
as “one that promotes or preserves the public peace, health, safety, or welfare and 
that involves activities that are customarily engaged in by nongovernmental 
persons.”  In short, sponsoring a fireworks display is not a governmental function, 
it is a proprietary function.  Accordingly, Reynoldsburg is not entitled to 
sovereign immunity based on R.C. 2744.01(C). 
{¶25} The second tier of the analysis is to determine whether any 
exceptions to the general rule of immunity apply.  R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) states that, 
with certain exceptions, “political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss 
to person or property caused by the negligent performance of acts by their 
employees with respect to proprietary functions of the political subdivisions.”  
Having determined that sponsoring a fireworks display is a proprietary function, it 
is obvious that the R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) exception to the general rule of immunity 
applies and that it is possible for Reynoldsburg to be liable. 
{¶26} Accordingly, in the third tier of the analysis, we determine whether 
any defenses apply.  R.C. 2744.03.  After our review of R.C. 2744.03 and the 
record, we conclude that none of the defenses set forth in R.C 2744.03 applies to 
this case.  See Greene Cty., 89 Ohio St.3d at 561, 733 N.E.2d 1141. 
{¶27} In the interests of judicial economy, we have reviewed this issue 
even though the court of appeals did not.  Because this case involves determining 
whether summary judgment was appropriate, we have construed the evidence 
most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party.  See Temple v. Wean United, Inc. 
January Term, 2002 
 
 
7
(1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 4 O.O.3d 466, 364 N.E.2d 267.  Based on the 
above analysis, we conclude that Reynoldsburg is not entitled to summary 
judgment on the issue of sovereign immunity. 
{¶28} R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) does not apply, however, unless Reynoldsburg 
acted negligently.  There is evidence in the record that Reynoldsburg designated a 
safety area closer to the discharge area than called for by NFPA standards.  
Construing this evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, we 
conclude that there are factual issues that cannot be resolved as a matter of law.  
Therefore, summary judgment cannot be proper with respect to negligence. 
{¶29} Our analysis of the issues before us reveals that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion when it denied Reynoldsburg’s motions for summary 
judgment.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
remand to the trial court for the purpose of ensuring that the agreement between 
appellant and Reynoldsburg is enforced. 
{¶30} Next, we analyze whether Truro Township is entitled to immunity 
under R.C. Chapter 2744.  Again, we follow the three-tier analysis discussed 
above.  The first step is to determine whether inspecting a fireworks display is a 
government function.  The court of appeals ruled that Truro Township’s 
inspection of the fireworks display was a government function, relying on R.C. 
2744.01(C)(2)(a) and R.C. 3743.54(C). 
{¶31} R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(a) provides: 
{¶32} “(2) A ‘governmental function’ includes, but is not limited to, the 
following: 
{¶33} “(a) The provision or nonprovision of police, fire, emergency 
medical, ambulance, and rescue services or protection.” 
{¶34} Among the duties of a fire chief is to issue permits to licensed 
exhibitors of fireworks after inspecting the premises from which the fireworks 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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will be fired.  R.C. 3743.54(C).  We agree with the court of appeals that Truro 
Township’s inspection of the fireworks display was a governmental function. 
{¶35} The second step is to determine whether any exceptions to the 
general rule of immunity apply.  In defending against Truro Township’s motion 
for summary judgment, appellant asserted that R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) applied to 
Truro Township’s inspection of the fireworks display.  R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) 
provides: 
{¶36} “[P]olitical subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to 
person or property caused by their failure to keep * * * public grounds within the 
political subdivisions open, in repair, and free from nuisance.” 
{¶37} The court of appeals found that Huber Park was located within 
Reynoldsburg and not within Truro Township.  It is uncontested that Huber Park 
is located within Reynoldsburg.  This fact does not mean that Huber Park cannot 
also be within Truro Township.  Our reading of the record reveals that 
Reynoldsburg residents vote for Truro Township Trustees and that a former Truro 
Township Trustee believes Huber Park to be located within Truro Township.  
Further, our reading of the statute indicates that ownership of the park is not 
relevant.  Because this case involves determining whether summary judgment was 
appropriate, we must construe the evidence most strongly in favor of the 
nonmoving party.  See Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 
327, 4 O.O.3d 466, 364 N.E.2d 267.  We conclude that summary judgment is 
inappropriate on this issue because Huber Park is not as a matter of law not within 
Truro Township.  Accordingly, we reverse the court on appeals on this issue. 
{¶38} The record reveals that Truro Township inspected the premises 
prior to installation in accordance with R.C. 3743.54.  Satisfying this statutory 
requirement does not necessarily relieve Truro Township from liability for 
“failure to keep [Huber Park] free from nuisance.”  R.C. 2744.02(B)(3).  Truro 
January Term, 2002 
 
 
9
Township knew that there was going to be a fireworks display and knew that 
fireworks displays are potentially lethal.  Nothing in the record indicates that 
Truro Township attempted to determine whether the safety rules required by R.C. 
3743.53 were followed.  Construing this evidence most strongly in favor of the 
nonmoving party, we cannot say as a matter of law that Truro Township kept 
Huber Park free from nuisance.  Therefore, summary judgment cannot be proper 
with respect to nuisance. 
{¶39} Our analysis of the issues before us reveals that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion when it denied Truro Township’s motion for summary 
judgment.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
remand to the trial court for the sole purpose of ensuring that the agreement 
between appellant and Truro Township is enforced. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
RESNICK, J., concurs. 
 
DOUGLAS and F.E. SWEENEY, J J., concur in judgment only. 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring. 
{¶40} I concur in the judgment of the majority.  I do so, however, for 
different reasons. 
{¶41} In my view, despite the conclusions reached by the majority, I 
would hold that political subdivisions are no longer entitled to immunity pursuant 
to R.C. 1533.181.  R.C. 1533.181 does not, by its own terms, apply to publicly 
owned property.  Notwithstanding that the majority did not cite or rely on Johnson 
v. New London (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 60, 521 N.E.2d 793, it must have accepted 
the court’s holding in that case.  In Johnson, 36 Ohio St.3d 60, 521 N.E.2d 793, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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syllabus, we held, “A political subdivision has derivative immunity from tort 
liability to a recreational user of municipal property to the same extent that an 
owner of private land has, pursuant to R.C. 1533.181, immunity from tort liability 
to a recreational user of private property.  (Enghauser v. Eriksson Engineering 
Ltd. [1983], 6 Ohio St.3d 31, 6 OBR 53, 451 N.E.2d 228, followed; Marrek v. 
Cleveland Metroparks Bd. of Commrs. [1984], 9 Ohio St.3d 194, 9 OBR 508, 459 
N.E.2d 873, clarified.)” 
{¶42} The cause of action in Johnson arose after this court abolished 
common-law municipal sovereign immunity in Haverlack v. Portage Homes, Inc. 
(1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 26, 2 OBR 572, 442 N.E.2d 749, paragraph two of the 
syllabus, and Enghauser, 6 Ohio St.3d 31, 6 OBR 53, 451 N.E.2d 228, paragraphs 
one and two of the syllabus, but prior to the enactment of R.C. Chapter 2744, the 
Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 176, 141 Ohio Laws, 
Part I, 1699, 1703-1724.  Thus, in the absence of judicially created and statutorily 
enacted sovereign immunity (the period between Enghauser, decided July 20, 
1983, and the enactment of R.C. Chapter 2744, effective November 20, 1985), 
municipalities were, with the exceptions of judicial, legislative, and discretionary 
executive functions, subject to suit in the same manner as private litigants.  
Enghauser, 6 Ohio St.3d 31, 6 OBR 53, 451 N.E.2d 228, paragraph two of the 
syllabus.  In Johnson, we stated, “Since owners of private land are statutorily 
immune from tort liability to recreational users, and municipalities have, pursuant 
to Enghauser, only the same liability for negligent acts as do private persons, 
municipalities are immune from liability to recreational users of municipal 
property.” Johnson, 36 Ohio St.3d 60, 63, 521 N.E.2d 793. 
{¶43} Because the facts giving rise to Johnson took place prior to the 
legislature’s enactment of R.C. Chapter 2744, Johnson is inapplicable.  This may 
be, in fact, the reason that the majority does not cite Johnson.  However, as 
January Term, 2002 
 
 
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previously indicated, the majority cannot reach its conclusion with regard to R.C. 
1533.181 without the application of Johnson.  In any event, this court held in 
Johnson that political subdivisions are subject to suit by recreational users of their 
property in the same manner as private parties.  Johnson, 36 Ohio St.3d at 63-64, 
521 N.E.2d 793.  However, pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744, political subdivisions 
are no longer subject to suits in the same manner as private parties.  R.C. 
2744.02(A)(1) provides, “Except as provided in division (B) of this section, a 
political subdivision is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or 
loss to person or property allegedly caused by any act or omission of the political 
subdivision * * *.”  Therefore, it follows that political subdivisions should no 
longer be entitled to immunity derived from R.C. 1533.181, and the holding of 
Johnson should be limited. 
{¶44} Furthermore, the majority states, “Some members of this court are 
on record as believing sovereign immunity to be an unconstitutional infringement 
of Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.  See Garrett v. Sandusky (1994), 
68 Ohio St.3d 139, 141, 624 N.E.2d 704 (Pfeifer, J., concurring).”  While I agree 
with the conclusion reached in Justice Pfeifer’s concurrence in Garrett, I disagree 
slightly with the analysis he applied.  In Community Ins. Co. v. Ohio Dept. of 
Transp. (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 376, 750 N.E.2d 573, I pointed out that Garrett 
relies on the second sentence of Section 16, Article I, Ohio Constitution, which 
provides, “Suits may be brought against the state, in such courts and in such 
manner, as may be provided by law.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 387-388, 750 
N.E.2d 573 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  The waiver of immunity, expressed in the 
second sentence of Section 16, Article I, removes the cloak of sovereign immunity 
that was traditionally granted to the state.  However, political subdivision 
immunity did not originate with the traditional immunity accorded to the state.  
Butler v. Jordan (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 354, 358-361, 750 N.E.2d 554 (The 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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concept of state immunity evolved from the English common-law concept that 
“the King can do no wrong.”  Local government immunity can be traced to the 
English case of Russell v. Men of Devon [K.B.1788], 100 Eng.Rep. 359, and the 
misapplication of Russell by a Massachusetts court in 1812).  Moreover, the 
Revised Code specifically distinguishes between the state and political 
subdivisions, providing that “ ‘[s]tate’ does not include political subdivisions.”  
R.C. 2744.01(H) and R.C. 2743.01(A). 
{¶45} For these reasons, I do not believe that reference to the word ‘state’ 
in the second sentence of Section 16, Article I, has any application to political 
subdivisions.  Instead, I believe it to be a proper conclusion that a political 
subdivision is not entitled to immunity based upon the right-to-remedy provision 
of the first sentence of Section 16, Article I.  Community, 92 Ohio St.3d at 387-
388, 750 N.E.2d 573 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Additionally, I believe that R.C. 
Chapter 2744 violates the right to trial by jury provided for by Section 5, Article I, 
Ohio Constitution.  Butler, supra, 92 Ohio St.3d 354, 370-373, 750 N.E.2d 554.1 
{¶46} For the foregoing reasons, I concur in judgment only. 
 
F.E. Sweeney, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Cook, J., dissenting. 
{¶47} This case features intriguing legal issues within the context of a 
tragic set of circumstances.  But even when it is “tempting to us to consider” 
important legal questions, we must decline to do so when “the issue being 
appealed to us does not emanate from an order which is final and appealable.”  N. 
Canton v. Hutchinson (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 112, 114, 661 N.E.2d 1000.  Because 
                                                 
1.  For a full discussion of sovereign immunity, see Butler v. Jordan (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 354, 
750 N.E.2d 554, and Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 
312, 331-344, 662 N.E.2d 287 (Douglas, J., dissenting).   
 
January Term, 2002 
 
 
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there was never a final appealable order rendered by the trial court in this case, 
this court is without jurisdiction to decide the merits of the cause.  I therefore 
respectfully dissent. 
{¶48} An order is not final and appealable unless it falls within one of the 
categories of orders described in R.C. 2505.02.  See Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent 
State Univ. (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 86, 541 N.E.2d 64, syllabus.  It is well 
established that the orders appealed by Reynoldsburg and Truro Township to the 
court of appeals in this case—orders denying their respective summary-judgment 
motions—do not generally constitute final appealable orders under R.C. 2505.02.  
See, e.g., Stevens v. Ackman (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 182, 186, 743 N.E.2d 901; 
Celebrezze v. Netzley (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 89, 90, 554 N.E.2d 1292.  In this 
case, however, the court of appeals found the existence of final appealable orders 
because of what it described as the parties’ “high-low” settlement agreement.  
Because the parties had “determined all issues before the trial court” by way of 
settlement, the court of appeals found that the entire action had been determined, 
effectively converting the trial court’s denial of summary judgment into a final 
appealable order. 
{¶49} Although not citing it expressly, the court of appeals apparently 
relied upon R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) to find that the trial court’s order was final and 
appealable.  This provision defines as “final” an order that “affects a substantial 
right in an action that in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment.”  
The court of appeals made no express determination concerning the existence of 
these three factors.  See Stewart v. Midwestern Indemn. Co. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 
124, 126, 543 N.E.2d 1200 (to be a final appealable order under this definition, 
the order must affect a substantial right, determine the action, and prevent a 
judgment).  But because the parties’ settlement amount depended upon the way 
that the trial court ruled on the immunity issues, the court of appeals found that 
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the orders denying summary judgment fit within R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) because they 
affected a substantial right (i.e., the immunity of Reynoldsburg and Truro 
Township) and effectively determined the action in Ryll’s favor (i.e., the order 
“decided” that the city and township would pay the larger settlement amounts).  
The court of appeals’ rationale is flawed in at least three respects. 
{¶50} First, the court of appeals essentially allowed the parties to create a 
final appealable order by way of settlement.  There is no authority for the 
proposition that parties to an action may convert an otherwise interlocutory order 
into a “final order” under R.C. 2505.02.  Indeed, this court has rejected attempts 
by litigants and courts to create a final appealable order from a nonappealable 
interlocutory order.  See Noble v. Colwell (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 92, 96, 540 
N.E.2d 1381 (trial court’s use of Civ.R. 54[B] language does not turn an 
interlocutory order into a final appealable order); State ex rel. Overmeyer v. 
Walinski (1966), 8 Ohio St.2d 23, 24, 37 O.O.2d 358, 222 N.E.2d 312 
(“Mandamus cannot be used * * * [to] create an appeal from an order which is not 
a final order”).  If this court endorses the practice of converting nonappealable 
interlocutory orders into final appealable ones, it should explain why, when, and 
how that may occur under our substantive and procedural law rather than 
approving of it sub silentio in this case. 
{¶51} Second, the court of appeals’ rationale relies on an unduly 
expansive interpretation of the language in R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) requiring that a 
final order be one “that in effect determines the action.”  The court of appeals 
decided that the trial court’s denial of summary judgment determined the action 
simply because of the parties’ contingent settlement arrangement.  But “in effect 
determines the action” refers to the nature of the order itself, without reference to 
any settlement by the parties.  See Legg v. Fuchs (2000), 140 Ohio App.3d 223, 
227, 746 N.E.2d 1195 (“the relevant inquiry is whether the [order] adjudicated all 
January Term, 2002 
 
 
15
the issues”); cf. Yonkings v. Wilkinson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 225, 229, 714 
N.E.2d 394 (observing that the order at issue “determined the action because it 
answered the only question presented by the action”).  In this case, the trial court’s 
order simply denied the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, finding that 
neither defendant was entitled to immunity and that there remained genuine 
factual issues for the parties to litigate.  There is nothing about these orders that 
“determines” the action; indeed, a trial court denies summary judgment because 
there remain undetermined issues that preclude judgment as a matter of law.  See 
Civ.R. 56(C). 
{¶52} Finally, even if I could agree with the court of appeals that the trial 
court’s denial of summary judgment “determined the action,” the court of appeals’ 
finding of final appealability remains incorrect.  The court of appeals failed to 
explain why the trial court’s order prevented a judgment within the meaning of 
R.C. 2505.02(B)(1).  There is nothing about the denial of a summary-judgment 
motion that prevents a judgment.  See Celebrezze, 51 Ohio St.3d at 90, 554 
N.E.2d 1292.  And nothing in the nature of the parties’ settlement agreement 
changes this legal truism.  Indeed, if the court of appeals had properly dismissed 
the defendants’ appeal, the matter would have remained pending until there had 
been a judgment, whether a judgment of dismissal or a judgment in favor of one 
of the parties after further proceedings in the trial court. 
{¶53} Because the trial court’s order denying summary judgment was not 
a final appealable order, the court of appeals did not have jurisdiction to entertain 
the merits of the appeal before it.  Stevens, 91 Ohio St.3d at 186, 743 N.E.2d 901; 
see, also, Section 3(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio Constitution.  And because the court 
of appeals lacked jurisdiction, we are likewise without jurisdiction to reach the 
merits of the cause.  Stevens, 91 Ohio St.3d at 195-196, 743 N.E.2d 901.  I would 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
16
therefore vacate the judgment of the court of appeals, dismiss the appeal, and 
remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concur in the foregoing 
dissenting opinion. 
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Karr & Sherman Co., L.P.A., Keith M. Karr, Robert P. Sherman and 
Suzanne E. Kelly, for appellant. 
 
Gallagher, Gams, Pryor & Littrell and Timothy J. Ryan, for appellee Truro 
Township. 
 
Law Offices of Alan Wayne Sheppard, Alan Wayne Sheppard and Scyld 
D. Anderson, for appellee city of Reynoldsburg. 
 
Boyk & Crossmock, L.L.C., and Steven L. Crossmock, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
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