Case Title: Ayala v. Aggressive Towing and Transport, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 071451

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
LUIS AYALA, ADMINISTRATOR  
OF THE ESTATE OF  
JOSE MEDARDO AYALA, DECEASED 
 
v.  Record No. 071451 
 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
June 6, 2008 
AGGRESSIVE TOWING AND  
TRANSPORT, INC., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Leslie M. Alden, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
by receiving into evidence in a civil action, records of the 
guilty pleas of a nonparty and an order of conviction for 
involuntary manslaughter from a prior criminal action. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On April 26, 2004, Martir Udiel Reyes (“Reyes”) was 
driving a Honda Accord sedan on Interstate Route 95 North in 
Fairfax County, Virginia.  The car collided with a tow truck 
operated by Nye Ranae Clemons (“Clemons”), and owned by 
Aggressive Towing & Transport, Inc. (“Aggressive Towing”).  
Jose Medardo Ayala, who was seated in the right rear passenger 
seat of the Honda was killed instantly.  Reyes’ blood alcohol 
level was .13 at the time of the collision.  Reyes pled guilty 
to involuntary manslaughter in connection with the death of 
Jose Ayala, and was convicted of that offense in the Circuit 
Court of Fairfax County.  Additionally, Clemons was charged 
with driving while intoxicated, second offense.  His blood 
alcohol level was .20 at the time of the collision.  Clemons 
pled guilty to driving while intoxicated, first offense and 
was convicted. 
The Administrator of the Estate of Jose Ayala, Luis Ayala 
(“Ayala”), filed an action for wrongful death against Clemons, 
and Clemons’ employer Aggressive Towing.  Trial was scheduled 
for April 10, 2007.  On April 6, 2007, Clemons and Aggressive 
Towing requested an order requiring the transport of Reyes 
from the penitentiary to appear as a witness at trial.  The 
trial court denied the motion because Clemons and Aggressive 
Towing failed to comply with the scheduling order in the case 
and failed to timely supplement discovery. 
At trial, Ayala contended that the collision occurred as 
Clemons was merging into the far right lane from the shoulder.  
However, Clemons maintained that the collision occurred while 
his truck was stopped on the shoulder.  To support their 
theory that the collision was solely a result of Reyes’ 
negligence, Clemons and Aggressive Towing sought to introduce 
Reyes’ pleas and an order of conviction for involuntary 
manslaughter.  Ayala objected, arguing that the pleas and 
conviction order were inadmissible hearsay, were more 
prejudicial than probative, and that the declarant had to be 
unavailable in order for the evidence to be admissible as an 
admission against penal interest.  Further, Ayala argued that 
 
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because Clemons and Aggressive Towing procured the 
unavailability of Reyes, the pleas and conviction order were 
not admissible.  Additionally, Ayala maintained that the pleas 
and order of conviction were inadmissible under the “general 
rule that a judgment of conviction in a criminal prosecution 
does not establish in a subsequent civil action the truth of 
the facts on which it was rendered, and such judgment of 
conviction is not admissible in evidence.”  Ayala’s objections 
were overruled and the trial court held that the pleas and 
conviction order were admissible.  The jury rendered its 
verdict in favor of Clemons and Aggressive Towing. 
We granted Ayala this appeal on one assignment of error: 
“The trial court erred in admitting the plea [sic] and 
conviction for manslaughter of the nonparty driver of the 
vehicle in which Plaintiff’s decedent was a passenger inasmuch 
as Defendants procured the declarant’s unavailability at trial 
through neglect or willful inaction, and as such conviction 
was inadmissible under the well-settled precedent of this 
Court.”  
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Standard of Review 
 
Our review of the trial court’s decision to admit the 
judgment of conviction involves a question of law which we 
review de novo.  Alston v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 759, 764, 652 
 
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S.E.2d 456, 459 (2007).  The standard of review of a trial 
court’s ruling regarding whether the required foundational 
showing of the “unavailability” of an out-of-court declarant 
to provide live testimony has been made by the proponent 
offering hearsay statements from that declarant is the abuse 
of discretion test.  Burton v. Oldfield, 195 Va. 544, 550, 79 
S.E.2d 660, 665 (1954). 
 
As an initial matter, we note that the parties to this 
appeal are proceeding based upon a written statement of facts 
in lieu of a transcript pursuant to Rule 5:11(c).  While this 
manner of providing a record is permissible under our Rules, 
it often creates difficulty for the Court and the litigants on 
appeal.  For example, in this case, the record does not 
include the guilty pleas in question.  The record does contain 
the conviction order in question.  Clemons and Aggressive 
Towing seek to improperly supplement the record at this stage 
of the proceeding by attaching copies of the guilty pleas to 
their brief.  They further maintain that the guilty pleas were 
admitted into evidence.  Ayala responds in a reply brief that 
the guilty pleas were not admitted into evidence.  We will 
review the matter based upon the written statement of facts 
signed by the trial judge which concludes the following: “The 
Trial Court overruled Plaintiff’s objections and allowed 
 
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Defendants to introduce Mr. Reyes’ plea [sic] and conviction 
of manslaughter.” 
B. Use of the Judgment of Conviction 
Neither res judicata nor the collateral estoppel doctrine 
under Virginia law would permit any finding in the 
Commonwealth’s criminal case against Reyes to be used against 
a non-party, Ayala, in a later civil proceeding between other 
private parties.  First, Ayala was not a party in the criminal 
case brought by the Commonwealth against Reyes, and therefore, 
the mutuality of parties requirement for these doctrines is 
not met.  See Selected Risks Insurance Co. v. Dean, 233 Va. 
260, 263-64, 355 S.E.2d 579, 581 (1987) (Commonwealth and 
crime victim are not the same party for purposes of satisfying 
the mutuality requirement).  Second, “the general rule in 
Virginia is that ‘a judgment of conviction or acquittal in a 
criminal prosecution does not establish in a subsequent civil 
action the truth of the facts on which it was rendered . . . 
and such judgment of conviction or acquittal is not admissible 
in evidence.’ ”  Godbolt v. Brawley, 250 Va. 467, 470, 463 
S.E.2d 657, 659 (1995) (quoting Smith v. New Dixie Lines, 
Inc., 201 Va. 466, 472, 111 S.E.2d 434, 438 (1959)).  
Consequently, the trial court erred in admitting the prior 
judgment of conviction. 
C. Reyes’ Guilty Plea  
 
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Reyes is not a party to the present proceedings.  He was 
incarcerated at the time of this trial of civil claims between 
other persons.  Therefore, the evidentiary use of his 
admission of responsibility in the form of a guilty plea on 
manslaughter charges is not governed by statute1 or Rule,2 but 
by the hearsay exception doctrine governing declarations 
against a non-party’s penal interest.  Schmitt v. 
Commonwealth, 262 Va. 127, 144, 547 S.E.2d 186, 198 (2001).  
See Paden v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 595, 597, 529 S.E.2d 792, 
793 (2000).  This exception to the hearsay rule allows out-of-
court statements that tend to incriminate a declarant to be 
received in evidence upon a showing that the declaration is 
reliable and that the declarant is presently unavailable.  
Schmitt, 262 Va. at 144, 547 S.E.2d at 198; Ellison v. 
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 404, 408, 247 S.E.2d 685, 688 (1978).  
Prior decisions of this Court demonstrate that the proponent 
of the evidentiary use of an out-of-court statement under this 
                     
1 Code § 8.01-418 provides, in pertinent part: “Whenever, 
in any civil action, it is contended that any party thereto 
pled guilty or nolo contendere . . . in a prosecution for a 
criminal offense . . . which arose out of the same occurrence 
upon which the civil action is based, evidence of said plea 
. . . shall be admissible.”  In this case, Reyes is not a 
party to the civil action; consequently, the statute does not 
apply. 
2 Rule 3A:8 renders inadmissible certain withdrawn pleas 
but does not address the use of pleas that have not been 
withdrawn, or the use of pleas as evidence against a person 
other than the defendant who enters the plea.  See Rule 
3A:8(c)(5). 
 
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hearsay exception is required to demonstrate the use of 
reasonable diligence in seeking to obtain the declarant’s live 
testimony.  Wise Terminal Co. v. McCormick, 107 Va. 376, 378-
81, 58 S.E. 584, 585-86 (1907); see also Sapp v. Commonwealth, 
263 Va. 415, 425, 559 S.E.2d 645, 650 (2002); Schmitt, 262 Va. 
at 144, 547 S.E.2d at 198; Atkins v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 
160, 176, 510 S.E.2d 445, 455 (1999); Chandler v. 
Commonwealth, 249 Va. 270, 279 n.1, 455 S.E.2d 219, 224 n.1 
(1995); Ellison, 219 Va. at 408, 247 S.E.2d at 688. 
In this case, defendants failed to use reasonable 
diligence in seeking to obtain live testimony from Reyes.  A 
scheduling order was issued during the pretrial phases of the 
present civil case setting a deadline for the designation of 
all desired witnesses, but defendants failed to identify Reyes 
as required by that scheduling order.  Nor had defendants 
timely supplemented their discovery disclosures.  See Rule 
4:1(e)(2) (“A party is under a duty promptly to amend and/or 
supplement all . . . prior responses to [discovery requests] 
if the party learns that any such response is in some material 
respect incomplete or incorrect.”).  Although the case had 
been pending for one year, defendants moved for a 
transportation order only four days before the scheduled 
trial.  The trial court denied that motion because defendants 
had failed to designate Reyes as a witness as required by the 
 
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pretrial order and failed to supplement or amend relevant 
discovery responses.  No cross-error was assigned to that 
ruling by the defendants.  Consequently, we hold that 
defendants waived their right to call for production of Reyes 
as a live witness, and therefore failed to demonstrate 
reasonable diligence in seeking the presence of the live 
witness required as a prerequisite for evidentiary use of 
Reyes’ prior guilty plea as a declaration against penal 
interest at the trial.  See Wise Terminal Co., 107 Va. at 378-
81, 58 S.E. at 585-86 (finding proponent’s efforts 
insufficient to warrant use of witness’ testimony from prior 
trial).  It was therefore an abuse of discretion to admit the 
prior guilty plea into evidence. 
D. “Judicial Records” 
Finally, Clemons and Aggressive Towing argue that the 
plea and conviction order were admissible as “judicial 
records.”  Nothing in the statement of facts reveals any 
argument presented to the trial court on this question.  On 
appeal, Clemons and Aggressive Towing raise the provisions of 
Code § 8.01-389(A) in support of their argument.  However, we 
have no way of knowing whether the statute was the basis of 
the argument in the trial court or whether the trial court 
considered this particular statute in the context of our 
decisions regarding admissibility of conviction orders or the 
 
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legislature’s particular provisions for guilty pleas under 
Code § 8.01-418.  Accordingly we are unable to consider this 
question on appeal.  Rule 5:25. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court 
will be reversed and the matter will be remanded for a new 
trial. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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