Case Title: Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Morris, et al. v. State of New Jersey

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-3-98

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 1999-07-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ, writing for a unanimous Court. The issue in this appeal is whether the construction and related borrowing costs associated with building, renovating and expanding judicial facilities ( capital costs ) are to be assumed by the State under a 1992 amendment to the New Jersey Constitution, N.J. Const. Art. VI, VIII, 1, that governs state funding of the judicial system. Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 58 ( SCR-58 ), later adopted as Article VI, Section VIII, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution, was first proposed on May 21, 1992. Its purpose was to require the State to assume greater responsibility for the funding of the judicial system. It provided for state assumption of certain judicial and probation costs incurred by the counties. SCR-58 also included a non-exclusive list of particular items of judicial costs to be funded by the State. As originally proposed, the definition of judicial costs did not contain an explicit exclusion for judicial facility costs. On June 8, 1992, the Senate Judiciary Committee amended SCR-58 to clarify that costs presently borne by the counties with regard to the operation and maintenance of facilities used by the courts and probation departments would not be assumed by the State. Judicial facility costs were then defined as costs borne by the counties prior to July 1, 1993 with regard to the operation and maintenance of facilities used by the courts or judicial employees, and excluded from the definition of judicial costs. The Committee did not mention capital costs in its revision and did not explain the significance of the July 1, 1993 date. On June 15, 1992, the Committee held a public hearing on SCR-58. Chief Justice Robert N. Wilentz submitted a Statement in support, as did the New Jersey State Bar Association. Both statements praised the amendment as a critical step in the administration of equal justice for the people of New Jersey, focusing on the substantial benefit to be derived from unification of the court system through the equalization of funding for the programs and services provided by the courts. Neither statement referred to judicial facilities. On June 29, 1992, the Legislature approved the revised version of SCR-58, allowing the amendment to be put to a public vote in the November 1992 general election. Neither the ballot question nor the accompanying interpretative statement specifically referred to judicial facilities or to capital costs. The proposed amendment was approved by the electorate and became effective on December 3, 1992. The Morris, Camden and Bergen County Boards of Chosen Freeholders sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether the amendment requires the State or the County to pay for construction costs and capital costs for new or expanded facilities or judicial facility costs after July 1, 1993. The trial court dismissed the action for declaratory judgment and held in favor of the State, reasoning that the term certain judicial costs was ambiguous and that even if the court were to include capital costs within the meaning of judicial costs, the State would not automatically be responsible because the State is required to assume only certain, but not all judicial costs. Thus, the trial court concluded that the amendment had no impact on the responsibility for supplying physical facilities for the court system, and held that the counties remain responsible for the capital costs of constructing court facilities for the Law Division and the Family Part pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2B:6-1b. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the trial court, also focusing on the phrase certain judicial costs. Because capital costs were not mentioned in the definition of judicial costs or judicial facility costs, the Appellate Division determined that the State's only affirmative obligation was to provide facilities for the Supreme Court, the Appellate Division, and the Chancery Division. HELD: Article VI, Section VIII, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution does not require the State to assume the capital costs of judicial facilities. 1. Because prior to the amendment, counties financed expenditures for judicial services through property taxes, and because significant disparities existed among the counties' property tax bases, it was not possible to unify management structures or equalize the allocation of resources throughout the judicial system. (pp. 11-13) 2. Before the amendment, both the Supreme Court Committee on Efficiency in the Operations of the Courts of New Jersey and the New Jersey County and Municipal Government Study Commission ( Commission ) recommended state financing of the trial courts to allow for the allocation of resources throughout the total system according to priorities set by the Judiciary, the Commission specifically recommending that the state pay capital and maintenance expenses. (pp. 13-14) 3. The type of items enumerated in the judicial cost definition suggests that the Legislature intended to shift costs associated with judicial personnel and supplies to the State, and not the capital costs of judicial facilities. (pp. 15-17) 4. Nothing in the legislative history or other extrinsic sources suggests that the Legislature intended that the State finance the capital costs of judicial facilities. (pp. 17-18) 5. The most sensible reading of the July 1, 1993 date is that the counties will retain responsibility for providing court facilities for the Law Division and the Family Part, consistent with N.J.S.A. 2B:6-1b. (pp. 18-20) 6. That the Legislature intended to shift only the costs associated with judicial personnel and supplies to the State is supported by earlier studies of the issue. Although the Commission recommended that the State assume capital and maintenance expenses, it noted that few states have financed those expenses. In this context, the Legislature's adoption of the Commission's recommendation for full state support of personnel and supplies and its exclusion of the word capital from the list of enumerated judicial costs to be assumed by the State can be understood only as a rejection of the Commission's capital costs recommendation. (pp. 20-22) 7. Where a constitutional term is ambiguous, contemporaneous legislative understanding may be helpful in discovering the meaning of that term. Contemporaneous legislation supports the conclusion that capital costs did not shift from the counties to the State under the amendment. (pp. 23-24) 8. An ordinary voter presented with the interpretive statement would not understand the amendment to shift the capital costs of judicial facilities to the State. The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ's opinion. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF THE COUNTY OF MORRIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Respondent. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF THE COUNTY OF CAMDEN, Plaintiff-Intervenor- Appellant, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Respondent. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF THE COUNTY OF BERGEN, Plaintiff-Intervenor- Appellant, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Respondent. Argued October 26, 1998 -- Decided July 20, 1999 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 311 N.J. Super. 587 (1998). Ronald Kevitz, Morris County Counsel, argued the cause for appellant Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Morris. Ellen D. Julis, Bergen County Counsel, argued the cause for appellant Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Bergen. Charles Dante DiPirro, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Peter Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Jaynee LaVecchia, Former Assistant Attorney General, on the brief). David A. Wallace, Warren County Counsel, argued the cause for amicus curiae, Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Warren. The opinion of the Court was delivered by PORITZ, C.J. This appeal raises the question whether the construction and related borrowing costs associated with building, renovating and expanding judicial facilities, hereinafter usually referred to as "capital costs," are to be assumed by the State under a 1992 amendment to the New Jersey Constitution, N.J. Const. art. VI, VIII, 1, that governs state funding of the judicial system. Prior to the amendment, the responsibility for financing the courts was controlled by statute. As enacted in 1991, Title 2B recodified the division of financial responsibility between the State and the twenty-one counties that had been in place for many years. See Law Revision Commission Comment to N.J.S.A. 2B:5-1 (explaining that the new Title 2B "attempt[s] to reflect current law and practice" with respect to responsibility for judicial costs).See footnote 11 N.J.S.A. 2B:6-1a allocates to the State the costs of physical facilities for the Supreme Court, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court, and the General Equity Part of the Chancery Division of the Superior Court, whereas N.J.S.A. 2B:6-1b requires the various counties to pay for housing the Law Division and the Family Part of the Chancery Division of the Superior Court. We must now determine the impact, if any, of the constitutional amendment on the statutory allocation of fiscal responsibility for judicial facilities between the State and the twenty-one counties. I Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 58 ("SCR-58"), later adopted by the electorate as Article VI, Section VIII, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution, was first proposed on May 21, 1992. The purpose of SCR-58 was to require the State to assume greater responsibility for the funding of the judicial system. Toward that end, SCR-58 provided for state assumption of "certain judicial and probation costs" incurred by the counties. Constitutional Amendment--Judicial and Probation Costs--Transfer from Counties to State, S.C.R. No. 58, 1a(1), 1992 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. A-3, A-3 (West) (Constitutional Amendment). SCR-58 also included a non-exclusive list of particular items of "judicial costs" to be funded by the State. See id. 1b(3), at A-4. As originally proposed, the definition of "judicial costs" in SCR-58 did not contain an explicit exclusion for "judicial facility costs." On June 8, 1992, the Senate Judiciary Committee amended SCR-58 to "clarify that costs presently borne by the counties with regard to the operation and maintenance of facilities used by the courts and probation departments would not be assumed by the State." Senate Judiciary Comm., Statement to Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 58, at 1 (June 8, 1992). "Judicial facility costs" were then defined as "costs borne by the counties prior to July 1, 1993 with regard to the operation and maintenance of facilities used by the courts or judicial employees," Constitutional Amendment, supra, 1b(1), at A-3, and excluded from the definition of "judicial costs," id. 1b(3), at A-4. The Committee did not, however, mention capital costs in its revision, nor did it explain the significance of the "July 1, 1993" date. As revised, SCR-58 provided, in pertinent part: 1. a. On or before July 1, 1997: (1) The State shall be required to pay for certain judicial and probation costs; (2) All judicial employees and probation employees shall be employees of the State; and (3) Any judicial fees and probation fees collected shall be paid to the State Treasury. (3) "Judicial costs" means the costs incurred by the county for funding the judicial system, including but not limited to the following costs: salaries, health benefits and pension payments of all judicial employees, juror fees and library material costs, except that judicial costs shall not include costs incurred by employees of the surrogate's office or judicial facility costs[.] [Id. 1, at A-3 - A-4.] On June 15, 1992, the Committee held a public hearing on SCR-58. Chief Justice Robert N. Wilentz submitted a Statement in support, Public Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm. on Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 58, June 15, 1992, at 70-81 (Wilentz Statement), as did the New Jersey State Bar Association ("NJSBA"), id. at 82-86 (NJSBA Statement). Both Statements praised the amendment as a critical step in the administration of "equal justice" for the people of New Jersey. Wilentz Statement, supra, at 78; see also NJSBA Statement, supra, at 83. In the words of Chief Justice Wilentz: As far as I am concerned the greatest benefit of this constitutional amendment is its promise of giving us a truly well managed judiciary for the benefit of our citizens. It will give them better justice. This constitutional amendment will also bring about other substantial improvements. The judiciary will become fully accountable, it will no longer be uncertain, both internally and in its relation to others to whom it should be accountable, including you, why its costs in one vicinage far exceed those in others, why its productivity in one vicinage falls far short of what it is in others, why in one vicinage we need twenty people per judge while in another we need only ten. The answer today is impossibly indefinite, ambiguous, uncertain, all because we have so many different systems, ultimately all because we cannot rationalize our own budgets or control our own work force. . . . The constitutional amendment will finally, for the first time in our history, start to bring equal justice to all of our citizens. Those counties today that devote more money to justice than others, either because they are richer or more willing, or both, usually get what their money pays for, . . . justice with all of the court-related programs that are so necessary today, the availability of complementary dispute resolution, the services of highly-trained professional staff, all as compared to the justice received by those in the less fortunate counties, threadbare justice with long waiting lines, lacking many of the attributes found in other counties. Neither the Statement of the Chief Justice nor that of the NJSBA referred to judicial facilities. Rather, both Statements focused on the substantial benefit to be derived from unification of the court system through the equalization of funding for the "programs and services" provided by the courts. NJSBA Statement, supra, at 83; see also Wilentz Statement, supra, at 76. On June 29, 1992, the Legislature approved the revised version of SCR-58, allowing the amendment to be put to a public vote at the November 1992 general election. The ballot question read as follows: "Shall the amendment to Article VI, agreed to by the Legislature requiring the State to assume by July 1, 1997 certain costs now borne by the counties through the county property tax levy in connection with the judicial system, be adopted?" In addition, the following interpretative statement appeared on the ballot: Adoption of this amendment would require the State to assume by July 1, 1997 certain costs now borne by county taxpayers in connection with the judicial system. County employees employed by the court system and all employees of county probation departments would become State employees by that date. The State would be responsible for their salaries, health benefits and pension payments. As of that date, all judicial fees and probation fees would be paid to the State Treasury. The proposed amendment was approved by the electorate and became effective on December 3, 1992. Subsequently, the Administrative Office of the Courts asked the Attorney General to advise the courts whether, by virtue of the adoption of the amendment, the State had assumed responsibility for the costs of operating, maintaining, constructing and/or expanding court facilities. On September 23, 1996, the Attorney General issued an informal opinion interpreting the amendment. Letter from Peter Verniero, Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, to James J. Ciancia, Director, Administrative Office of the Courts (Sept. 23, 1996). The Attorney General understood "certain" judicial costs to signify that the State was required to assume "some, but not all, judicial costs." Id. at 2. Concerning the "judicial facility costs" exclusion, the opinion concluded that the July, 1, 1993 date was intended merely to indicate "the kinds of costs for which the counties will remain responsible." Id. at 3. By this reasoning, the counties remained responsible for costs incurred in "operating, maintaining, constructing, expanding and renovating" current and future court facilities for the Law Division and the Family Part. Id. at 7. Plaintiff Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Morris, joined by the Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Camden and the Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Bergen, sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether the amendment "requires the State or the County to pay for construction costs and capital costs for new or expanded facilities or judicial facility costs after July 1, 1993." Judge Stanton entertained motions for summary judgment from the parties and issued a decision in which he dismissed with prejudice the declaratory action and held in favor of the State. II It is helpful to first place the amendment in its historical context by examining the events leading up to SCR-58. Over the past three decades, the New Jersey trial courts have gradually moved from a county- to a state-based system. The Judicial Article of the New Jersey Constitution of 1947 specifically provided for county courts. N.J. Const. art. VI, I, 1 (stating that "[t]he judicial power shall be vested in a Supreme Court, a Superior Court, County Courts and inferior courts of limited jurisdiction") (amended in 1978 to omit reference to "County Courts"). These courts were historically funded at the local level. In 1978 and 1983, the voters approved two constitutional amendments and took a giant step toward unification of the State Judiciary. The 1978 amendment abolished the County Courts and transferred the County Court judges to the State Superior Court system. See Assembly Concurrent Resolution No. 38 (filed July 25, 1978). The 1983 amendment transferred the County District Court judges and the County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court judges to the Superior Court system by abolishing the County District Courts, and by replacing the County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court with the Family Part of the Chancery Division. See Assembly Concurrent Resolution No. 84 (filed Feb. 10, 1983). As a result, the State assumed responsibility for the salaries of all state judges. Although there were no longer any county courts or county judges, the trial court system continued to be primarily staffed by county employees and funded by county governments. Judicial costs were allocated as follows: the counties bore the costs of providing the salaries of judicial personnel, resources and supplies, and facilities for the Law Division and the Family Part; the State was responsible for the other parts of the Superior Court and the Supreme Court. See Law Revision Commission Comment to N.J.S.A. 2B:5-1. The counties financed expenditures for judicial services through property taxes, but competing demands for monies raised locally adversely affected the courts. Moreover, the 1976 "CAP" law generally prohibited property tax increases in excess of five percent of the previous year's tax levy. See N.J.S.A. 40A:4-45.4. Most important, significant disparities existed among the counties' property tax bases resulting in varying levels of support for the courts and seriously affecting the provision of uniform, quality judicial services across the State. Under multicounty funding it was not possible to unify management structures or equalize the allocation of resources throughout the judicial system. In an effort to address these concerns even before the 1983 amendment, Chief Justice Wilentz created the Supreme Court Committee on Efficiency in the Operations of the Courts of New Jersey. The Committee was established in 1980 and presented its final report in May 1982. Final Report of the Supreme Court Committee on Efficiency in the Operations of the Courts of New Jersey (1982) (Efficiency Committee Report). In its report, the Committee described the New Jersey trial court system as fragmented, lacking "single, centralized control over the allocation or use of court resources." Id. at iv. The Committee recommended state financing of the trial courts to "allow the Chief Justice to allocate resources throughout the total system according to priorities set by the Judiciary." Id. at 117. III "'The polestar of constitutional construction is always the intent and purpose of the particular provision.'" State v. Apportionment Comm'n, 125 N.J. 375, 382 (1991) (quoting Gormley v. Lan, 88 N.J. 26, 37 (1981)). We seek in construing the language of our Constitution "to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting it." Gangemi v. Berry, 25 N.J. 1, 10 (1957). This means that, generally, where the language is unambiguous or unequivocal, the words of a constitutional provision should be given their plain meaning. Ibid. Where the text is unclear or ambiguous, however, a court may look to sources beyond the Constitution itself to ascertain the fundamental purpose underlying the language. Lloyd v. Vermeulen, 22 N.J. 200, 206 (1956). Moreover, even when the words appear to be clear and unambiguous, if the "'true sense and meaning of the language used'" suggests a different meaning, that meaning will prevail. Apportionment Comm'n, supra, 125 N.J. at 381-82 (quoting Lloyd, supra, 22 N.J. at 206). We begin our analysis by turning to the plain language of the 1992 amendment. The amendment requires the State to assume "certain" judicial costs, N.J. Const. art. VI, VIII, 1a(1), but not all judicial costs. Immediately we find ambiguity, which lies in the uncertain identity of those "certain" judicial costs. The amendment provides a nonexclusive list of costs, including "salaries, health benefits and pension payments of all judicial employees, juror fees and library material costs," id. 1b(3), that are to be covered by the State. As Judge Stanton recognized, however, the definition of "judicial costs" is IV Recognizing that "words are inexact tools at best," we have stated that in construing constitutional provisions, "resort may freely be had to the pertinent constitutional and legislative history for aid in ascertaining the true sense and meaning of the language used." Lloyd, supra, 22 N.J. at 206; see also Atlantic City Racing Ass'n v. Attorney General, 98 N.J. 535, 542 (1985); New Jersey Pharm. Ass'n v. Furman, 33 N.J. 121, 130 (1960). One piece of legislative history discussing the amendment is the Committee Statement included with the revision to SCR-58. The Statement explained that the "judicial facility costs" exclusion was designed to "clarify that costs presently borne by the counties with regard to the operation and maintenance of facilities used by the courts and probation departments would not be assumed by the State." Senate Judiciary Comm., Statement to Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 58, at 1 (June 8, 1992). Judge Stanton observed that capital costs are simply not mentioned. Board of Chosen Freeholders, supra, 311 N.J. Super. at 645 (Law Div.). For that reason, the Statement provides no evidence that the Legislature intended state assumption of the capital costs of judicial facilities under the amendment. That the Legislature intended to shift only the costs associated with judicial personnel and supplies to the State is supported by earlier studies of this issue. As far back as May 1982, the Supreme Court Committee on Efficiency in the Operations of the Courts of New Jersey recommended state financing of the trial courts to "allow the Chief Justice to allocate resources throughout the total system according to priorities set by the Judiciary." Efficiency Committee Report, supra, at 117. Five years later, the State of New Jersey County and Municipal Government Study Commission recommended that all of the operating costs of the courts should be assumed by the State. Judicial Unification, supra, at 63. The Commission also said that the State should assume capital and maintenance expenses, id. at 58, at the same time noting that few states financed those expenses, id. at 4. Indeed, as of 1987, only six states were responsible for the costs of capital and maintenance, and four of those states either did not have county governments or had never provided for county-governed courts. Id. at 58. The assumption of capital and maintenance costs, in the view of the Commission, is the most complex form of assumption, and it is also very costly to the state. It involves facility surveys to determine the relationship between space occupied by the courts and space occupied by other agencies, the divergent need for improvement or expansion of facilities in each of the counties, and endless negotiations with local governments and state officials as to the "best" way to accomplish the transfer. V In addition to legislative history, we have considered statutory enactments that were adopted at about the same time as the constitutional provision at issue in order to determine the purpose and intent of the provision. Atlantic City Raceway Ass'n, supra, 98 N.J. at 548; New Jersey Pharm. Ass'n, supra, 33 N.J. at 130; Lloyd, supra, 22 N.J. at 210. Where a constitutional term is ambiguous, contemporaneous legislative understanding may be helpful in discovering the meaning of that term. Lloyd, supra, 22 N.J. at 210. Contemporaneous legislation supports our conclusion that capital costs did not shift from the counties to the State under the amendment. The State Judicial Unification Act, N.J.S.A. 2B:10-1 to -9, ("Unification Act"), enacted on December 6, 1993 to implement the amendment, requires the State to assume "judicial costs" by January 1, 1995, N.J.S.A. 2B:10-4a. The Unification Act defines "judicial costs" as "the costs incurred by the county for funding the judicial system, including but not limited to the following: salaries, health benefits and pension costs of all judicial employees, juror fees, library material costs, and centrally-budgeted items such as printing, supplies, and mail services." N.J.S.A. 2B:10-3c. N.J.S.A. 2B:10-7a, in turn, provides that each county and the State should jointly develop a list of "the furnishings and office equipment currently used by the courts which shall become the property of the State on January 1, 1995." The Legislature once again did not include judicial facility costs within the State's assigned costs although the furnishings and office equipment that shifted to state ownership were specifically mentioned. As Judge Stanton observed, although the Unification Act mandated that the State assume responsibility for furnishings, office equipment and supplies used by the court system, the Act was "totally silent" concerning which entity, the State or each county, was to provide courtrooms, chambers, and other facilities for all the courts.See footnote 55 Board of Chosen Freeholders, supra, 311 N.J. Super. at 649 (Law Div.). The silence of the Legislature can be read only as an exclusion. To suggest otherwise would result in the allocation of a substantial fiscal responsibility to the State without any explicit declaration of an intent to do so. JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ's opinion. NO. A-3/4/5 BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF THE COUNTY OF MORRIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Respondent. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF THE COUNTY OF CAMDEN, Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellant, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Respondent. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF THE COUNTY OF BERGEN, Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellant, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED