Case Title: Commonwealth v. Gonzalez

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12936

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12936 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  EDWARD GONZALEZ. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     December 2, 2020. - June 16, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel, Waiver of 
constitutional rights, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to 
suppress, Assistance of counsel, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement.  Evidence, 
Voluntariness of statement. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on July 22, 2016. 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by John S. 
Ferrara, J. 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Gaziano, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by him to 
the Appeals Court.  After review by the Appeals Court, the 
Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate 
review. 
 
 
Katherine E. McMahon, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Marissa Elkins for the defendant. 
 
 
2 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  The defendant was arrested on charges of 
murder in the first degree, G. L. c. 269, § 1; and possession of 
a firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).  Police 
interviewed him in an interrogation room at the Springfield 
police department shortly after he was arrested.  Although the 
defendant initially agreed to waive his Miranda rights and speak 
with police, approximately twenty minutes after the interview 
began, he requested to speak with an attorney and the interview 
was terminated.  Following a period of forty-five minutes during 
which the defendant remained in the interrogation room with one 
of the officers who had been conducting the interview, the 
defendant again waived his Miranda rights and agreed to speak 
with police; he was interviewed again for approximately one 
hour.  The defendant subsequently sought to suppress all of the 
statements he made after having invoked his right to counsel.  A 
Superior Court judge allowed the motion to suppress after 
concluding that the Commonwealth had not established beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant reinitiated the interview 
and knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right 
to counsel.  Deferring to the judge's findings of fact and 
credibility determinations, we affirm the decision allowing the 
motion to suppress. 
 
1.  Factual background.  We summarize the relevant facts 
from the judge's findings following a three-day evidentiary 
3 
 
hearing on the motion to suppress, supplemented by other 
undisputed evidence introduced at the hearing that is not 
contrary to the judge's findings.  See Commonwealth v. Alexis, 
481 Mass. 91, 93 (2018), citing Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 
472 Mass. 429, 431 (2015). 
 
The defendant was arrested on May 26, 2016, in connection 
with a backyard shooting that had taken place in Springfield in 
January of that year.  The victim was the father of a State 
police trooper, and the case became "high profile."  The day 
before the defendant's arrest, a codefendant, who had been 
identified through deoxyribonucleic acid testing of evidence 
found at the scene, had been arrested in Holyoke; when 
interviewed over a period of four to five hours, he pointed to 
the defendant as also having been involved in the shooting.  
Several officers of the Springfield police department, including 
the captain of the major crimes unit and two of the detectives 
who later interviewed the defendant, were present in Holyoke and 
watched the interrogation of the codefendant.  On the basis of 
that interview, Springfield police Captain Trent Duda obtained a 
warrant for the defendant's arrest.  The defendant was arrested 
at 12:30 A.M. on May 26, and brought to the Holyoke police 
station, where he underwent a "courtesy" booking and was given 
Miranda warnings; about forty-five minutes later, he was 
transported to Springfield police headquarters. 
4 
 
 
Because the defendant's primary language was Spanish, Duda 
assigned a Spanish-speaking detective, Jose Canini, who had 
watched the interview of the codefendant, and Sergeant Jeffrey 
Martucci, the most senior officer on duty apart from Duda, to 
interview the defendant.  The interview began at 1:52 A.M. on 
May 26, 2016, and was audio-video recorded.  Martucci advised 
the defendant that he was under arrest for murder and had the 
defendant read the Miranda1 warnings in English; Martucci 
testified that he did so after the defendant had told the 
officers that he could understand, read, and speak English.  The 
defendant waived his rights, signed the waiver form, and agreed 
to speak with the officers.  While most of this interview was 
conducted in English, the defendant's speech and his responses 
to certain questions indicated some difficulty comprehending 
English, and more comfort speaking in Spanish.  Certain 
questions were posed by Canini in Spanish, and the defendant 
sometimes answered in the same language.2 
 
 
1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-445 (1966). 
 
 
2 At the beginning of the interview, the officers engaged in 
the following exchange with the defendant, with Canini and the 
defendant conversing in Spanish, concerning his ability to make 
a telephone call: 
 
Canini:  "Do you want to call anybody when we're done?" 
 
The defendant:  "I'm going to call my -- my wife." 
 
5 
 
 
During this interview, the defendant denied any involvement 
in the shooting.  In response to Martucci's and Canini's 
repeated assertions that someone had placed the defendant at the 
scene, the defendant asked the officers who had done so and 
requested to see any photographs, video recordings, or other 
incriminating evidence showing that he had been there.  
Approximately fifteen minutes into the interview, Duda, who had 
been monitoring the interrogation through a live audio-video 
feed, became frustrated and felt that the interview was "going 
 
Canini:  "He's gonna give a call to his wife.  When we're 
done." 
 
The defendant:  "Yes." 
 
Canini:  "When we're done, he's gonna call his wife." 
 
Martucci:  "OK.  So, all right.  We'll let you use the 
phone when we're done talking, if that's -- if that's fine 
with you." 
 
The defendant:  "Huh?" 
 
Canini:  "So, when we're done." 
 
The defendant:  "Oh, and he -- he, again, like he said --" 
 
Canini:  "No, he said, 'When we're done, I'm going to -- 
we'll let you talk to your wife.'  Is that all right with 
you?  Yes or no?" 
 
The defendant:  "Right now, or what?" 
 
Canini:  "Whatever you want." 
 
The defendant (in English):  "Yeah, when we're done." 
 
Martucci:  "OK.  Great." 
6 
 
off the rails" because the defendant was asking more questions 
than he was answering.  Duda entered the interrogation room and 
began yelling and swearing at the defendant.  Among other 
things, Duda said that the defendant might be a "big tough guy" 
in Holyoke but he "ain't shit" in Springfield, and there were 
many "enemies" in jail.  Duda told the defendant, "I'm done with 
you. . . .  Either you come clean, or you get booked and you go 
to fucking jail for murder.  That's all it comes down to.  
That's all it comes down to, dude.  I don't give a fuck about 
you.  I don't care.  You're in here, sitting here, to tell a 
story.  Either you tell it, or you don't."3  According to the 
transcript, the defendant responded, "No, I ain't speaking."  
Duda then left the room and the interrogation continued, with 
Canini and Martucci placing increased pressure on the defendant 
to explain his involvement in the shooting, using profanity and 
telling him it was over and he was going to jail, while the 
defendant asked, "Why -- why are you yelling at me?" 
 
A few moments after Duda walked out, the defendant asked, 
in Spanish, "Can I call my lawyer?"  Canini initially responded, 
 
 
3 At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Duda agreed that 
the transcript of the first interview did not indicate that he 
had participated in it, and that certain statements, including 
instances of profanity and yelling, were incorrectly attributed 
in the transcript to Martucci, when in fact it was Duda who had 
made the statements.  The other officers who testified at the 
hearing also were asked about, and recognized, this discrepancy 
in the transcript. 
7 
 
in Spanish, "OK?  Someone put you there.  Someone put you there, 
OK?"  The defendant again asked in Spanish, "Can I call my 
lawyer?"  The following exchange then took place: 
Canini (in English):  "So -- he's asking for the lawyer." 
 
Martucci:  "You want what?" 
 
The defendant:  "My lawyer." 
 
Martucci:  "You want your lawyer?" 
 
The defendant:  "Yeah." 
 
Martucci:  "OK.  Alright.  It's 2:11 A.M.  We're gonna 
conclude this investigation, and --" 
 
Canini:  "Call them, and turn it off." 
 
Martucci:  "Yep.  Give me a sec.  I'm gonna call down, turn 
off the video, and you're gonna be booked for murder, OK?" 
 
The defendant:  "Call my -- call my lawyer." 
 
Canini:  "OK.  He's gonna turn this off." 
 
Martucci:  "We're gonna stop interviewing you, and you'll 
be booked for murder." 
 
Canini:  "You're gonna be booked for murder." 
 
The defendant:  "Alright.  Call my lawyer." 
 
Canini:  "You can call your murder -- your lawyer -- later 
on." 
 
Martucci:  "Can you have them turn off Room A, please?  
Yep.  Have them turn it off." 
 
The defendant:  "Because, right now . . . ." 
 
Canini:  "Stop talking.  You just said you want a lawyer, 
and we can't talk to you." 
 
8 
 
 
The judge found that the defendant said that he wanted his 
attorney four times before the interview was terminated.  The 
judge noted that it was clear from Canini's words and tone that 
he was frustrated and angry that the defendant had asked for 
counsel. 
 
Martucci left the room, and Canini remained alone with the 
defendant in the interview room, waiting to be told to bring the 
defendant to booking.  All four of the officers involved in the 
interviews testified that the process for booking a defendant 
who had been arrested for murder differed from other bookings, 
and that a supervisor -- that night, either Duda or Martucci -- 
would call the booking sergeant to arrange a time to bring such 
a defendant down to the first floor for booking, something 
detectives could do only with a supervisor's authorization.  
Although defendants arrested for murder sometimes would be 
brought a telephone in the interview room, ordinarily they would 
be given the opportunity to make a telephone call when they 
reached the booking area.  While waiting to go to booking, a 
defendant who had been arrested for murder would not be left 
alone. 
 
None of the interrogating officers testified as to the 
identity of the officer who had been in charge of the booking 
area at the time, or which officer ultimately called to have the 
defendant brought down to the first floor for booking, nor could 
9 
 
they explain the reasons for the delay in bringing the defendant 
to be booked.  Duda testified that he "assumed" that Martucci 
had called the booking supervisor,4 and did not know the reason 
for the delay in bringing the defendant down to be booked.  
Martucci testified that he did not remember if he had called the 
booking supervisor. 
 
At the evidentiary hearing, Canini said that, while waiting 
to be brought to booking, the defendant asked to use the 
bathroom and Canini escorted him, handcuffed, to the bathroom, 
which was down the hall on the second floor.  Canini and the 
defendant encountered Duda in the hallway; Duda testified that 
they did not speak.  Canini then brought the defendant back to 
the interrogation room and engaged in conversation.  Canini 
could not recall any of the topics they discussed, although he 
stated that the conversation involved "some general talk, but 
not about what was going on," and that the defendant "did not 
say anything of evidentiary significance."  Canini did remember, 
"[W]e weren't silent in there.  I'll tell you that much, we 
weren't silent."  Canini also testified that the defendant asked 
what would happen next and Canini explained the booking process, 
stating that "at some point he was going to go downstairs.  He 
was going to be in front of a sergeant, they were going to ask 
 
 
4 In his decision, the judge employed quotation marks around 
this word. 
10 
 
him questions, he would get a phone call, he'd get fingerprinted 
and photographed."  The defendant later told Canini that he 
would "talk to him but, did not want to get yelled at."  Canini 
did not prepare a report memorializing this conversation, nor 
was the conversation recorded. 
 
Canini recounted that, after the defendant had indicated 
that he was willing to resume the interview without having 
counsel present, Duda entered the interview room and told Canini 
to bring the defendant down for booking.  According to Canini, 
it was then that Canini told Duda that the defendant was willing 
to speak once again with police.  Duda testified that he had 
been sitting in his office when someone advised him that the 
defendant wanted to resume speaking with the officers; Duda 
could not remember who had told him of this development.  The 
judge noted that Duda had watched the first interview of the 
defendant on the monitor from the detective's room, but could 
not remember what he did after the defendant invoked his right 
to counsel.  The judge also commented that Detective Edward 
Podgurski had watched "bits and pieces" of the interview on the 
remote monitors, but did not remember doing so after the 
defendant invoked his right to counsel.  The judge observed that 
Duda had remained at the police station after the invocation, 
notwithstanding the large number of hours he already had worked 
11 
 
by that point, and that he was not then scheduled to be on duty, 
but could not recall the work he had done. 
 
Approximately forty-five minutes after the conclusion of 
the first interview, Podgurski and Canini commenced a second 
recorded interview of the defendant, at 2:56 A.M.  On 
instruction by Duda, Podgurski showed the defendant the Miranda 
waiver form that the defendant had executed at the beginning of 
the first interview.  Podgurski told the defendant, "And you 
signed off on this Miranda form earlier this evening.  
Approximately not even about a half hour-hour ago, and I just 
wanna –- We gave you an opportunity to go the bathroom and as we 
were bringing you to get booked you said you wanted to talk to 
us again."  The defendant responded, "Um-huh."  Podgurski 
confirmed, "Is this correct?" and the defendant again said, "Um-
huh." 
 
Podgurski then repeated the Miranda warnings and asked, 
"Having these rights in mind . . . , do you want to talk 
to . . . Canini and myself right now about what you are being 
charged with?"  The defendant responded, "Um-huh."  The 
defendant then went on to speak to the officers for slightly 
more than one hour.  The defendant was interviewed by State 
police in a subsequent interview, concerning a different 
investigation, at around 4 A.M. 
12 
 
2.  Procedural background.  The defendant filed a motion in 
the Superior Court to suppress the statements he made to police 
after he initially invoked his right to counsel.  Following a 
three-day evidentiary hearing, the judge allowed the motion to 
suppress; the judge reasoned that the Commonwealth had failed to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had 
reinitiated communication with the police after he invoked his 
right to counsel.  The Commonwealth sought leave to pursue an 
interlocutory appeal in the county court pursuant to Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as amended, 476 Mass. 1501 (2017), and a 
single justice of this court allowed the appeal to proceed in 
the Appeals Court.  The Appeals Court reversed the allowance of 
the motion to suppress, on the ground that the judge's 
inferences and conclusions were not supported by the record, see 
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 1107 (2019), and we 
allowed the defendant's petition for further appellate review. 
3.  Standard of review.  In reviewing a ruling on a motion 
to suppress, "we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact 
absent clear error but conduct an independent review of [the 
judge's] ultimate findings and conclusion of law."  Commonwealth 
v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 652 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Clarke, 461 Mass. 336, 340 (2012).  "The determination of the 
weight and credibility of the testimony is the function and 
responsibility of the judge who saw and heard the witnesses, and 
13 
 
not of this court."  Commonwealth v. Neves, 474 Mass. 355, 360 
(2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Moon, 380 Mass. 751, 756 (1980).  
At the same time, we "make an independent determination of the 
correctness of the judge's application of constitutional 
principles to the facts as found."  Commonwealth v. Howard, 469 
Mass. 721, 726 (2014), S.C., 479 Mass. 52 (2018), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004).  See 
Commonwealth v. Miller, 486 Mass. 78, 81-82 (2020), citing 
Clarke, supra. 
Our deference to the judge's assessment of the weight and 
credibility of testimonial evidence includes inferences "derived 
reasonably from the testimony."  Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 426 
Mass. 703, 708 (1998).  "[T]he drawing of permissible inferences 
in an action at law is a question of fact; it is a function of 
the fact finding tribunal and not of this court on review of 
questions of law."  Commercial Credit Corp. v. Commonwealth 
Mtge. & Loan Co., 276 Mass. 335, 340 (1931).  Nonetheless, the 
deference accorded to the factual findings of a motion judge who 
saw and heard the witnesses does not extend to documentary 
evidence, such as recorded statements.  Although "an appellate 
court may independently review documentary evidence, and . . . 
lower court findings drawn from such evidence are not entitled 
to deference . . . [,] findings drawn partly or wholly from 
testimonial evidence are accorded deference, and are not set 
14 
 
aside unless clearly erroneous. . . .  The case 'is to be 
decided upon the entire evidence,' however, giving 'due weight' 
to the judge's findings that are entitled to deference" 
(citation omitted).  Tremblay, 480 Mass. at 654-655. 
 
4.  Discussion.  At the hearing on the motion to suppress, 
as before this court, the parties agreed that the evidence at 
the hearing established that the defendant was in custody when 
he made the statements, he was given proper Miranda warnings, 
and he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his 
Miranda rights.  After speaking to the officers for some 
minutes, he then undoubtedly invoked his right to counsel.  The 
parties also agree that the conduct of the officers, evident on 
the audio-video recording of the first interview, clearly 
supports the judge's finding that the tenor of the interview was 
aggressive, and that Canini was angry and frustrated by the 
defendant's decision to invoke his right to speak with an 
attorney.  The judge did not specifically discuss Martucci's 
feelings, but the portion of the last minutes of the interview 
that the judge quoted in his decision also supports a similar 
conclusion. 
 
Thus, given the absence of dispute on these points, the two 
narrow questions before us, as at the hearing, concern, first, 
the events between the first interview and the second interview, 
during the forty-five minute period in which no recording took 
15 
 
place, where the judge found that the Commonwealth had not 
established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had 
reinitiated a conversation with police; and, second, whether the 
defendant's right to a telephone call under G. L. c. 276, § 33A, 
was violated by the officers' far less than adequate 
explanations of the right, their apparent disregard for ensuring 
that he could exercise that right, or their failure to allow him 
to use a telephone once the interview was over, after having 
said that he would be able do so at that time.5  While all of the 
witnesses were cross-examined on these issues, after having 
allowed suppression as a result of the first issue, the judge 
did not make any findings or rulings as to whether the statute 
was violated and the defendant was deprived of his rights under 
it; we, too, discern no need to reach the issue, given our 
conclusion on the question of reinitiation. 
 
a.  Reinitiation after invocation of right to counsel.  The 
defendant asserts that there was no error in the judge's 
decision that the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden to show 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant reinitiated the 
 
 
5 There also is some indication, based on the officers' 
explanations at the beginning of the first interview, that the 
defendant did not fully understand his right to use a telephone 
or their explanations, and the structure of the questions posed 
appeared designed to obtain an affirmative response to waiting 
until after the interview before making any calls.  Ultimately, 
however, the defendant acceded to the proposal that he would 
call his wife after the interview ended ("when we're done"). 
16 
 
conversation with police; he maintains that this court should 
defer to the judge's explicit inference that Canini's presence 
in the interrogation room, and his "general" conversation, were 
designed to, and indeed did, "effect[]" the defendant's decision 
to speak to police without an attorney present.  The defendant 
argues that the judge's finding that Canini's and Podgurski's 
"self-serving" statements about what occurred during the 
unrecorded period "shed[] no light" on what actually happened 
was fully supported by the record. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the judge's finding that the 
Commonwealth did not meet its burden to prove that the defendant 
initiated the "further communications, exchanges, or 
conversations" with police is not supported by the record, where 
the judge made no explicit finding that Canini was not credible, 
and where Canini testified that no conversation about the 
offense took place during the period in which he was alone with 
the defendant in the interrogation room.  The Commonwealth 
maintains that this court is in as good a position as was the 
judge to review the audio-video recordings and the defendant's 
one-word responses at the beginning of the second interview 
"corroborate" Canini's testimony that, sometime after his 
invocation of his right to counsel, the defendant requested to 
speak with police so long as they did not "yell" at him.  The 
Commonwealth argues as well that the judge did not appropriately 
17 
 
consider the Commonwealth's corroborating evidence, specifically 
the audio-video recording of the beginning of the second 
interview, which, both Podgurski and Canini testified, showed 
the defendant's reinitiation and corroborated Canini's testimony 
that the defendant voluntarily reinitiated the interview and 
waived his right to counsel.  The Commonwealth contends that 
this evidence demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his 
right to silence and right to counsel, see Edwards v. Arizona, 
451 U.S. 477, 484-486 (1981), and that the judge engaged in 
"impermissible speculation" in reaching his conclusion that the 
Commonwealth failed to meet its burden. 
 
We conclude that there was no error in the judge's 
findings, including his reasonable inferences drawn from 
testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress, that the 
Commonwealth failed to meet its burden to show, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the defendant had reinitiated 
conversation with police.  Accordingly, the order allowing 
suppression of the defendant's statements after he invoked his 
right to counsel must be affirmed. 
 
i.  Invocation of right to counsel.  The Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o 
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself."  In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 
18 
 
444 (1966), the United States Supreme Court extended this 
protection against self-incrimination to custodial 
interrogations and required that law enforcement officers 
provide warnings to a suspect "that any statement he does make 
may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to 
the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed."  See 
Commonwealth v. Hoyt, 461 Mass. 143, 149 (2011). 
 
A defendant's invocation of his or her right to counsel 
must be "scrupulously honored."  Commonwealth v. Thomas, 469 
Mass. 531, 541 (2014), quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 
103–104 (1975).  See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-485.  Once a 
defendant invokes his or her right to counsel, all questioning 
must cease.  See id. at 484; Thomas, supra at 539.  Questioning 
may not resume until an attorney is obtained for the suspect and 
is present, or the suspect initiates "further communication, 
exchanges, or conversations with the police.  See Thomas, supra, 
quoting Edwards, supra at 484-485.  If a defendant does 
reinitiate further communication, "[t]he Commonwealth has the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that subsequent 
events indicated a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of 
the right to have counsel present and of the right to remain 
silent."  Commonwealth v. Rankins, 429 Mass. 470, 473 (1999), 
citing Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 (1983).  See 
Commonwealth v. Monroe, 472 Mass. 461, 468 (2015). 
19 
 
 
To determine whether the Commonwealth has met this burden, 
a reviewing court must "examine whether, in light of the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the 
statement, the will of the defendant was overborne to the extent 
that the statement was not the result of a free and voluntary 
act."  Commonwealth v. Selby, 420 Mass. 656, 663 (1995), S.C., 
426 Mass. 168 (1997).  See Miller, 486 Mass. at 87–88.  It is 
not enough to show that a defendant agreed to speak to police 
after a repetition of the Miranda warnings.  See Edwards, 451 
U.S. at 484-485; Thomas, 469 Mass. at 539.  Otherwise put, the 
Commonwealth must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that 
police did not initiate the discussion that led to the defendant 
rescinding the invocation of the right to counsel.  See Hoyt, 
461 Mass. at 151.  Once invoked, a reviewing court indulges "in 
every reasonable presumption against" a defendant's waiver of 
his or her constitutional rights.  Commonwealth v. Anderson, 448 
Mass. 548, 554 (2007), quoting Commonwealth v. Torres, 442 Mass. 
554, 571 (2004). 
 
ii.  Analysis.  While the judge stopped short of explicitly 
stating that any of the officers were "credible" or "not 
credible," he substantively and repeatedly indicated his 
expressed view that the "self-serving" testimony by Canini and 
Podgurski "sheds no light on what transpired" after the first 
recording ended.  Indeed, the judge's reference to the "second" 
20 
 
interview, twice, in quotation marks, plainly suggests some 
skepticism about the defendant's reinitiation.  In particular, 
the judge pointed to Podgurski's recorded statement at the 
beginning of the second interview, "We gave you an opportunity 
to go to the bathroom and as we were bringing you to get booked 
you said you wanted to talk to us again," to which the defendant 
responded, "Um-huh."  This statement was contrary to testimony 
by all of the other officers, as well as the summary of the 
reinitiation by Canini, depicted within minutes on the same 
audio-video recording, that the defendant was never brought to 
booking. 
The judge also pointed to Canini's insistence that the 
"general" talk in which he and the defendant engaged for forty-
five minutes (the substance of which Canini could not remember) 
"did not discuss any aspect of the case."  The judge noted that, 
had the Commonwealth had the burden to prove this assertion by a 
"mere preponderance of the evidence," Canini's testimony, "if 
the court credits Canini's assertion," "might suffice," but it 
did not meet the Commonwealth's actual burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The judge then found that Canini, "clearly 
displeased with [the defendant's] invocation of his right to 
counsel, continued to speak with him," and that that it was 
"reasonably inferred that Canini's object in his continued 
21 
 
conversation with [the defendant] was to persuade him to change 
his mind" regarding the invocation of his right to counsel. 
The judge also noted that Canini, as well as the other 
experienced officers involved in the investigation, "necessarily 
understood that evidence of [the defendant's] conversation with 
Canini after his invocation of his right to counsel would be 
important," but opted not to record the conversation despite the 
ready availability of the means to do so, and not to document it 
in a report.  Both of these reasonable inferences provide 
support for the judge's evident suspicion that, in that forty-
five minute time period, the involved officers convinced the 
defendant to waive his constitutional rights. 
 
Relatedly, the judge discredited some of the testimony by 
the other interrogating officers.  The judge found that "the 
conversation [during the interim period] was likely being 
monitored by other officers, including [Duda]," notwithstanding 
Duda's assertions that, after having observed (and interrupted) 
the first interview, he had not watched the monitor after the 
invocation, yet he could not explain what he was working on 
during that time, nor why he would remain at the police station 
for so many hours when he was not scheduled to be present.  The 
judge also pointed to Podgurski having watched some portions of 
the first interview remotely, as well as his presence in the 
building long after his shifts ordinarily would have ended, and 
22 
 
his lack of any memory of the work he was conducting during the 
period when the interrogation room was not being recorded. 
Because the judge's ultimate conclusion regarding the 
voluntariness of the defendant's second waiver of his right to 
counsel "is so dependent on an assessment of witness 
credibility," specifically Canini's credibility, "and is based 
on what we consider to be a reasonable inference, we defer to 
[his] finding."  Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 424 
Mass. 501, 553 (1997).  As discussed, substantial deference is 
due to a motion judge's findings of fact and drawing of 
reasonable inferences, which "need only be reasonable and 
possible," not "necessary or inescapable" (citation omitted).  
Kennedy, 426 Mass. at 708.  "The drawing of permissible 
inferences in an action at law is a question of fact; it is a 
function of the fact finding tribunal and not of this court on 
review of questions of law."  Commercial Credit Corp., 276 Mass. 
at 340. 
Here, no clear error is apparent in the judge's findings 
and rulings, and the record, to the extent it exists, supports 
the judge's findings.  Consistent with the judge's ultimate 
determination are the undisputed facts that Gonzalez was kept in 
a small interrogation room for an extended period of time with 
an officer who had been openly hostile toward him, but who was 
the only Spanish-speaking detective available, and that the 
23 
 
"general" conversation, regardless of intent, did have the 
effect of reversing the defendant's prior decision to obtain 
legal assistance.  See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 476 Mass. 725, 
738-739 (2017); Commonwealth v. Brant, 380 Mass. 876, 883, cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980). 
 
In sum, we discern no error in the judge's determination 
that the Commonwealth has not proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the events following the defendant's initial invocation of 
his right to counsel indicate a subsequent voluntary, knowing, 
and intelligent waiver of his constitutional right to counsel 
under the Fifth Amendment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order allowing motion  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  to suppress affirmed.