Case Title: State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 2002-Ohio-1363

Docket Number: 20001824

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-03-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. v. Indus. Comm., 94 Ohio St.3d 467, 2002-Ohio-1363.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. LTV STEEL COMPANY, APPELLEE, v. INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLEE; HARUBIN, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. v. Indus. Comm. (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 
467.] 
Workers’ compensation — Application for permanent total disability 
compensation cannot be denied on ground that claimant rejected a bona 
fide job offer, when — Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(1), construed and 
applied. 
(No. 00-1824 — Submitted November 27, 2001 — Decided March 27, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 99AP-1054. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J.  In 1984, John W. Harubin injured his back while working as 
a laborer for LTV Steel.  His claim was allowed for “bilateral lumbar 
radiculopathy.”  Since then, he has suffered from persistent back pain and has 
undergone surgery. 
 
Harubin worked intermittently until 1991, when he apparently qualified 
for temporary total disability compensation (“TTD”).  His TTD ended in August 
1994 after Dr. Cynthia Taylor determined that Harubin had reached maximum 
medical improvement.  She reported that Harubin was capable of work under the 
following restrictions:  “He will require sedentary type work that does not involve 
any repetitive lifting.  He is able to lift up to 20 pounds on an occasional basis.  
He needs freedom to sit and stand as needed for his low back pain.  He is unable 
to perform prolonged standing activities.” 
 
In July 1995, Harubin applied for permanent total disability compensation 
(“PTD”) while under Dr. Atef A. Eltomey’s care.  The Industrial Commission 
(“commission”) granted this compensation beginning on January 15, 1997, the 
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2 
day Dr. Sheldon Kaffen, an orthopedic surgeon, reported that Harubin was unable 
to engage in any sustained remunerative employment.  The commission also 
denied PTD for the preceding period commencing with Harubin’s last TTD 
payment.  It found that in 1995,  LTV Steel had offered Harubin a light-duty job 
that was within Harubin’s physical restrictions at the time the offer was made, and 
that since Harubin had rejected the offer, PTD was precluded for the interim 
period. 
 
LTV Steel then filed for the instant writ in the court of appeals, asserting  
that Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(1)(e) precluded Harubin’s PTD award.  LTV 
Steel also contested the commission’s award for a variety of other reasons, 
including the commission’s allegedly unjustified denial of LTV Steel’s motion to 
depose Dr. Kaffen and its failure to find that surveillance videotapes established 
Harubin’s continued physical capacity to work in the job LTV Steel offered him.  
The Court of Appeals for Franklin County granted the writ and found that the 
commission had abused its discretion in granting PTD after Harubin rejected a job 
offer within his medical restrictions. The court of appeals considered the Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(1)(e) issue dispositive and, thus, did not address LTV 
Steel’s ancillary arguments.  The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as 
of right. 
 
Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(1) specifies that its “guidelines shall be 
followed by the adjudicator in the sequential evaluation of applications for 
permanent total disability compensation.”  Division (D) lists the circumstances 
under which a claimant can be found to qualify as permanently and totally 
disabled.  The enumerated circumstances (apart from those relevant to a statutory 
R.C. 4123.58[C] loss) state that PTD shall be denied if, after a hearing, the 
adjudicator finds that (1) the claimant is engaged in sustained remunerative 
employment, (2) the claimant is medically able to return to his or her former job, 
(3) the claimant voluntarily removed himself or herself from the workforce, (4) 
January Term, 2002 
3 
the claimant has refused a bona fide job offer of sustained remunerative 
employment within his or her capabilities, (5) the claimant’s condition is 
temporary, (6) the claimant’s  advanced age is the sole or primary obstacle to 
sustained remunerative employment, or (7) a nonallowed condition is the cause of 
the claimant’s  inability to perform sustained remunerative employment.  Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(1)(b) through (i).  If the claimant clears these hurdles, 
the adjudicator next determines whether nonmedical or vocational factors 
preclude a PTD award under division (D)(2). 
 
Ohio Adm.Code 4123-3-34(D)(1)(e), governing bona fide job offers, 
states: 
 
“If, after hearing, the adjudicator finds that the claimant is offered and 
refuses and/or fails to accept a bona fide offer of sustained remunerative 
employment that is made prior to the pre-hearing conference described in 
paragraph (C)(9) of this rule where there is a written job offer detailing the 
specific physical/mental requirements and duties of the job that are within the 
physical/mental capabilities of the claimant, the claimant shall be found not to be 
permanently and totally disabled.” 
 
This case is confusing because the commission reached legally conflicting 
conclusions.  First, it awarded PTD to Harubin commencing January 15, 1997, 
knowing that such an award was not possible if Harubin had refused a qualifying 
offer of employment.  Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(1)(e).  Then, the 
commission denied Harubin’s request for PTD from the date of the last payment 
of TTD through January 14, 1997, on the basis that Harubin had refused a good-
faith job offer. 
 
Ohio Adm.Code 4123-3-34(D)(1)(e) does not state on whose medical 
opinion the employer’s offer of employment is to be based.  The court of appeals, 
in adopting the magistrate’s decision, asserted that there was some evidence in the 
record (for example, Dr. Taylor’s August 29, 1994 report) to support the 
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commission’s conclusion that when Harubin refused LTV’s offer of employment, 
he was physically capable of performing the job.  We agree.  However, there is 
also some evidence in the record (for example, Dr. Kaufman’s April 25, 1995 
report) to support the commission’s implicit conclusion that Harubin did not 
refuse a qualified offer of employment because he was not capable of performing 
any sustained employment.  It is not necessary for us to determine which report is 
more persuasive because there is dispositive factual evidence in the record. 
 
The letter in which LTV offered a job to Harubin contained the following 
sentence: “This job has been provided to your attending physician for review, as it 
pertains to your existing restrictions.”  After receiving notice of LTV Steel’s job 
offer and having recently examined Harubin, Dr. Eltomey maintained that 
Harubin should be evaluated for PTD because of “persistent symptomatology, 
lack of improvement to different therapeutic modalities, persistent chronic left S1 
radiculoneuritis, and a previous history of aggravation of his symptoms with any 
minimal activity.”  As the dissenting judge in the court of appeals wrote, “[i]n 
short, Mr. Harubin’s treating neurosurgeon did not release him for the job or 
agree that Mr. Harubin was medically capable of performing it.”  Accordingly, 
despite LTV Steel’s best efforts, it did not offer Harubin a qualifying job whose 
refusal by Harubin would preclude PTD pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-
34(D)(1)(e). 
 
Based on the record before us, we conclude that Harubin did not reject a 
bona fide job offer and that his PTD claim cannot be rejected on that ground.  We 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.  We remand the cause to that court 
for further proceedings to determine whether the other challenges raised by LTV, 
which were not ruled upon by the court of appeals, have merit. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
January Term, 2002 
5 
 
DOUGLAS, J., dissents. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., dissents, would reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals, and would reinstate the order of the Industrial Commission. 
 
COOK, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent.  I find the majority 
opinion to be confusing and internally contradictory particularly on the issue of 
the job offer.  I believe that the determination of the commission was exactly 
right.  I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the order 
of the commission. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent.  I would affirm the judgment 
of the court of appeals for the reasons stated in the court of appeals’ opinion and 
the decision of its magistrate. 
__________________ 
 
Manos, Pappas & Stefanski Co., L.P.A., Leonard J. Pappas, James A. Neff 
and Janice T. O’Halloran, for appellee LTV Steel. 
 
Hahn & Pollock, Victor H. Hahn and Candace M. Pollock; Steward Jaffy 
& Assoc. Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy and Marc J. Jaffy, for appellant. 
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