Case Title: Calnan v. Hurley

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2024-04-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
 
 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2024 ME 30 
Docket: 
Ken-23-280 
Argued: 
February 6, 2024 
 
Decided: 
April 25, 2024 
 
Panel: 
STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ. 
 
 
CHRIS CALNAN et al. 
 
v. 
 
SAM HURLEY et al. 
 
 
LAWRENCE, J. 
[¶1]  Chris Calnan, seventeen named individuals, and 100 John and Jane 
Does (collectively, Calnan) appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court 
(Kennebec County, Murphy, J.) dismissing Calnan’s complaint for a declaratory 
judgment that Maine EMS lacked statutory authority to implement an 
immunization rule requiring emergency medical service (EMS) workers to be 
fully vaccinated against COVID-19 and influenza.  See 14 M.R.S. §§ 5953-54 
(2024).  We affirm the judgment.1   
 
1  Pursuant to the Maine Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Calnan also purported to seek 
damages, in the form of lost wages and lost benefits, caused by the implementation of the EMS 
immunization rule.  See 5 M.R.S. §§ 8002(4), 11001(1) (2024).  We need not address the 
unavailability of damages under the APA or Rule 80C given our ruling.  See id. §§ 8001-1108; M.R. 
Civ. P. 80C. 
 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  On August 12, 2021, the Department of Health and Human Services 
announced an emergency rule requiring that healthcare workers, including 
dental workers and EMS workers, be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 by 
October 1, 2021.2  See 10-144 C.M.R. ch. 264, §§ 1-2 (effective Aug. 12, 2021).  
In November 2021, the Department promulgated a nonemergency rule.  10-144 
C.M.R. ch. 264 (effective Nov. 10, 2021).  The Department excluded dental 
workers and EMS workers from the November 2021 rule.3  Id. §§ 1-2.  Maine’s 
Emergency Medical Services Board (EMS Board) promulgated an emergency 
immunization rule through 16-163 C.M.R. ch. 20, § 2 (effective Aug. 25, 2021) 
requiring EMS workers to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19; the rule 
expired on November 21, 2021.  The EMS Board then promulgated a 
nonemergency immunization rule that became effective on August 7, 2022.4  
See 16-163 C.M.R. ch. 21 (effective August 7, 2022). 
 
2  See Off. of Governor Janet T. Mills, Mills Administration Requires Health Care Workers To Be Fully 
Vaccinated Against Covid-19 By October 1, State of Me. (Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.maine.gov/ 
governor/mills/news/mills-administration-requires-health-care-workers-be-fully-vaccinated-
against-covid-19-october [https://perma.cc/RPW5-9HE4].   
3  Covid-19 Response, Covid-19 Vaccination in Maine, State of Me., https://www.maine. 
gov/covid19/vaccines/public-faq/health-care-worker-vaccination (last updated Nov. 10, 2021) 
[https://perma.cc/3H7Q-RRMW].   
4  The EMS Board has since amended chapter 21.  See 16-163 C.M.R. ch. 21 (effective Jan. 10, 2024).  
Chapter 21 now requires that Maine EMS workers be vaccinated against influenza (or otherwise wear 
 
 
 
3 
[¶3]  On December 13, 2022, Calnan filed a complaint for a declaratory 
judgment against Maine Emergency Medical Services and its director, Sam 
Hurley, (collectively, Maine EMS) in the Superior Court.  He attached multiple 
exhibits to the complaint, including the Department’s immunization rule, see 
10-144 C.M.R. ch. 264 (effective Nov. 10, 2021), the EMS Board’s emergency 
rule, see 16-163 C.M.R. ch. 20 (effective Aug. 25, 2021), the EMS immunization 
rule, see 16-163 C.M.R. ch. 21 (effective August 7, 2022), and minutes from the 
EMS Board’s meeting on the EMS immunization rule.   
[¶4]  On January 27, 2023, Maine EMS filed a motion to dismiss, arguing 
that Calnan failed to name the proper defendants to the action because the EMS 
Board should have been designated as a defendant, see M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2); 
that the court does not have jurisdiction over Calnan’s Rule 80C claim, see M.R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(1); and that the court should dismiss the declaratory judgment 
claim because Maine EMS did not exceed its statutory authority, there was no 
procedural defect in the rulemaking process, and there is no viable substantive 
challenge to the EMS immunization rule, see M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).   
 
a mask), mumps, rubella, rubeola, pertussis, and varicella, but not COVID-19.  16-163 C.M.R. ch. 21, 
§§ 1(4), 2, 4(1) (effective Jan. 10, 2024).  
Given our ruling in this case that the EMS Board has authority to issue immunization 
requirements, it does not matter which version of the rule we look at, and the new rule does not raise 
any mootness issues for this reason.   
 
 
4 
[¶5]  Calnan, on February 14, 2023, filed an opposing memorandum and 
a motion for summary judgment.  In his summary judgment motion, Calnan 
argued that Maine EMS exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating the 
EMS immunization rule and that Maine EMS did not follow the proper 
procedure in promulgating the rule.  On February 28, 2023, Maine EMS filed a 
memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss and in opposition to Calnan’s 
motion for summary judgment.   
[¶6]  On July 13, 2023, the court granted Maine EMS’s motion to dismiss 
and dismissed Calnan’s complaint with prejudice after concluding, as a matter 
of law, that Calnan’s challenges to the EMS immunization rule fail.5  The court 
first determined that Calnan did not misname a defendant because Maine 
Emergency Medical Services and Hurley were appropriately named, and the 
court could “simply recaption the matter to reflect the Board as the proper 
defendant.”6  The court then concluded that pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 8058 (2024), 
which provides for judicial review of rulemaking through a declaratory 
 
5  The court did not appear to rely on any exhibits attached to the complaint or motion to dismiss.  
Even if the court did, the matters possibly considered on the motion to dismiss were official public 
documents, which may be considered by the court on a motion to dismiss without the court having 
to convert the motion to one for summary judgment.  Moody v. State Liquor & Lottery Comm’n, 2004 
ME 20, ¶ 10, 843 A.2d 43.   
6  The court further noted that Calnan had appropriately named Maine EMS, a statutorily defined 
entity of which the EMS Board is a part, as a party in this matter.   
 
 
5 
judgment action, it had subject matter jurisdiction to consider Calnan’s 
challenge to the EMS Board’s rulemaking.7  5 M.R.S. § 8058(1).  The court next 
determined that the EMS Board acted within its authority in implementing the 
EMS immunization rule and, therefore, Calnan did not allege a claim upon 
which relief could be granted.  See M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  The court dismissed as 
moot Calnan’s motion for summary judgment and the remaining pending 
motions.  Calnan timely appealed.  M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1); 14 M.R.S. § 1851 
(2024).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶7]  In an appeal from an order granting a motion to dismiss, we review 
de novo the legal sufficiency of a complaint and “view the complaint in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it sets forth elements of a 
cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant 
to some legal theory.”  Doe v. Bd. of Osteopathic Licensure, 2020 ME 134, ¶ 6, 
242 A.3d 182 (quotation marks omitted).   
[¶8]  Calnan argues that Maine EMS was without statutory authority to 
implement the EMS immunization rule and that the rule is misaligned with the 
Maine EMS Act’s statement of purpose.  He also contends that there was a 
 
7  Calnan does not appeal this conclusion.   
 
 
6 
procedural defect in the rulemaking process of the EMS immunization rule, 
because the EMS Board should have promulgated the rule as a “major 
substantive rule” as opposed to a “routine technical rule.”  We address each of 
his arguments in turn.   
A. 
Statutory Authority 
 
[¶9]  “State agencies may exercise only that power which is conferred 
upon them by law.”  Molasses Pond Lake Ass’n v. Soil & Water Conservation 
Comm’n, 534 A.2d 679, 681 (Me. 1987).  An agency’s authority is determined by 
its enabling statute and is subject to the provisions of the APA.  See id.; State v. 
Fin & Feather Club, 316 A.2d 351, 355-56 (Me. 1974); Me. Turnpike Auth. v. 
Brennan, 342 A.2d 719, 723-25 (Me. 1975); Ne. Occupational Exch., Inc. v. State, 
540 A.2d 1115, 1117 (Me. 1988).  Under an enabling statute, a public body or a 
state agency may employ powers that are expressly granted, powers that are 
“reasonably inferred from powers expressly granted,” and powers that are 
“essential to give effect to powers expressly granted.”  Fin & Feather Club, 316 
A.2d at 355.  Title 5 M.R.S. § 8058(1) provides the standard by which we review 
a rule to determine if it exceeds an agency’s rule-making authority.  We have 
explained that 
[i]f the rule exceeds the rule-making authority of the agency, it is 
invalid.  5 M.R.S. § 8058(1).  If a rule does not exceed the 
 
 
7 
rule-making authority, the court next reviews “any other 
procedural error” related to the promulgation of the rule.  Id.  . . . 
Finally, if the rule is procedurally correct and within the agency’s 
rule-making authority, it is reviewed substantively “to determine 
whether the rule is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.”  Id.   
 
Conservation L. Found., Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 2003 ME 62, ¶ 21, 823 A.2d 
551.   
 
[¶10]  Whether Maine EMS exceeded its statutory authority in 
promulgating the EMS immunization rule is an issue of statutory interpretation.  
See id. ¶ 23.  We review de novo the interpretation of a statute.  Bd. Of 
Osteopathic Licensure, 2020 ME 134, ¶ 10, 242 A.3d 182.   
 
[¶11]  We use a two-part analysis in reviewing an agency’s interpretation 
of a statute it administers.  Guilford Transp. Indus. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 2000 
ME 31, ¶ 11, 746 A.2d 910.  If the statute is unambiguous, we give effect to the 
plain meaning of the statute.  Conservation L. Found., Inc., 2003 ME 62, ¶ 23, 823 
A.2d 551.  If it is ambiguous, we determine whether the agency’s interpretation 
was reasonable.  Id.; Guilford Transp. Indus., 2000 ME 31, ¶ 11, 746 A.2d 910.  
“[I]f the Legislature’s intent is not expressed unambiguously and the 
interpretation of the statutory scheme involves issues that are within the scope 
of the agency’s expertise, then the agency’s interpretation must be given special 
deference.”  Conservation L. Found., Inc., 2003 ME 62, ¶ 23, 823 A.2d 551; 
 
 
8 
Molasses Pond Lake Ass’n, 534 A.2d at 681.  “A particular statute is not reviewed 
in isolation but in the context of the statutory and regulatory scheme.”  
Conservation L. Found., Inc., 2003 ME 62, ¶ 23, 823 A.2d 551. 
[¶12]  The Maine Emergency Medical Services Act of 1982 (EMS Act) 
provides for the EMS system in Maine.  See 32 M.R.S. §§ 81-98 (2024).  Per the 
preamble in section 88, “the [EMS] Board, as established by [5 M.R.S. 
§ 12004-A(15) (2024)], is responsible for the emergency medical services 
program.”  The EMS Board’s express powers include “conduct[ing] an 
emergency medical services program to fulfill the purposes, requirements and 
goals” of the EMS Act and “adopt[ing] the forms, rules, procedures, testing 
requirements, polices and records appropriate to carry out the purposes, 
requirements and goals” of the EMS Act.  32 M.R.S. § 84(1)(A).   
Rules adopted pursuant to [the EMS Act] must include, but are not 
limited to, the following:  
 
(1) The composition of regional councils and the process by 
which they come to be recognized;  
 
(2) The manner in which regional councils must report their 
activities and finances and the manner in which those 
activities must be carried out under this chapter;  
 
. . .  
 
 
 
9 
(4) The requirements for licensure for all vehicles, persons 
and services subject to this chapter, including training and 
testing of personnel; and  
 
(5) Fees to be charged for licenses under this section. 
 
Id. § 84(1)(D).8  Section 81-A sets out a statement of purpose declaring that the 
EMS Act is intended “to promote and provide for a comprehensive and effective 
[EMS] system to ensure optimum patient care.”  The statement of purpose goes 
on to express the Legislature’s intent “to designate that a central agency be 
responsible for the coordination and integration of all state activities 
concerning [EMS] services,” including “the safe handling and transportation” of 
patients: 
 
It is the purpose of this chapter to promote and provide for a 
comprehensive and effective emergency medical services system 
to ensure optimum patient care.  The Legislature finds that 
emergency medical services provided by an ambulance service are 
essential services.  The Legislature finds that the provision of 
medical assistance in an emergency is a matter of vital concern 
affecting the health, safety and welfare of the public.  
 
It is the intent of the Legislature to designate that a central 
agency be responsible for the coordination and integration of all 
state activities concerning emergency medical services and the 
overall planning, evaluation, coordination, facilitation and 
regulation of emergency medical services systems.  Further, the 
Legislature finds that the provision of prompt, efficient and 
effective emergency medical dispatch and emergency medical care, 
a well-coordinated trauma care system, effective communication 
 
8  There is no item (3) in the statute.   
 
 
10 
between prehospital care providers and hospitals and the safe 
handling and transportation, and the treatment and nontransport 
under appropriate medical guidance, of the sick and injured are key 
elements of an emergency medical services system.  This chapter is 
intended to promote the public health, safety and welfare by 
providing for the creation of a statewide emergency medical 
services system with standards for all providers of emergency 
medical services.   
 
Id. § 81-A.  The statute unambiguously delegates to the EMS Board rulemaking 
authority regarding qualifications of EMS personnel, and its statutory purpose 
clearly vests the EMS Board with the responsibility of creating standards and 
qualifications for such personnel.   
[¶13]  Calnan argues that unlike in the chapter relating to the Department 
of Health and Human Services, see 22 M.R.S. § 802 (2024), which gives the 
Department of Health and Human Services express authority to promulgate 
immunization rules for healthcare workers, Section 81-A does not specifically 
confer such authority on the EMS Board.  Thus, he maintains, it is beyond the 
power of the EMS Board to address immunization in its rules.  We disagree.   
[¶14]  The EMS immunization rule is related to “the safe handling and 
transportation” of patients, 32 M.R.S. § 81-A; to “the treatment and 
nontransport under appropriate medical guidance, of the sick and injured,” id.; 
and to licensure qualifications for EMS workers, id. § 84(1)(G).  See id. 
 
 
11 
§ 84(1)(A); see, e.g., State v. Webber, 2000 ME 168, ¶¶ 7-9, 759 A.2d 724; State 
v. Dube, 409 A.2d 1102, 1104-05 (Me. 1979).   
[¶15]  Although there is no specific delegation of rulemaking authority to 
promulgate the EMS immunization rule, Calnan’s argument is unpersuasive for 
two reasons.  First, the Legislature’s delegation of rulemaking authority to the 
EMS Board is broad and comprehensive enough to include the EMS Board’s 
regulation of EMS workers in order to protect the health, safety, and welfare of 
patients.  See, e.g., Biden v. Missouri, 595 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 647, 652-55 (2022) 
(concluding that, in issuing a rule requiring health care workers to be 
vaccinated against COVID-19, the Secretary of Health and Human Services did 
not exceed its broad statutory authority to set conditions on health care 
workers to protect the health and safety of patients); Florida v. Dep’t of Health 
& Hum. Servs., 19 F.4th 1271, 1287-89 (11th Cir. 2021) (same); In re City of 
Newark, 264 A.3d 318, 325-27 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2021) (stating that the 
Mayor of Newark acted within the Mayor’s authority in issuing a COVID-19 
vaccination mandate for city employees even though there is no express 
statutory authority for such a mandate); cf. Headworks Hand Crafted Ales, Inc. v. 
Wash. State Liquor & Cannabis Bd., 540 P.3d 863, 870-71 (Wash. Ct. App. 2024) 
(indicating that the Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board has authority 
 
 
12 
to enforce a mask mandate through its statutory authority to “prescribe the 
conditions, accommodations, and qualifications requisite for the obtaining of 
licenses to sell alcoholic beverages” and to “regulate the sale of those beverages 
. . . in the interests of public health, safety, and morals” (quotation marks 
omitted)); Doane v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 2021 ME 28, ¶ 23, 250 A.3d 
1101 (“[B]ecause the subject matter of the regulation at issue here concerns 
public health and safety, a wide amount of rulemaking latitude may be 
necessary.”).  Second, the EMS immunization rule does not conflict with the 
statutory language.  See Coulombe v. Anthem Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Me., Inc., 
2002 ME 163, ¶ 17, 809 A.2d 613; Baker v. S.D. Warren Co., 2010 ME 87, ¶ 15, 3 
A.3d 380.   
[¶16]  Although Calnan challenges the EMS Board’s overall authority with 
regard to immunization, when the EMS Board initially promulgated the rule in 
2021, public policy supported requirements that certain people, especially 
healthcare workers such as EMS personnel, be vaccinated.  See In re City of 
Newark, 264 A.3d at 327 (“Th[e] right [‘to hire or direct its workforce’,] coupled 
with the clear national and state public policy to combat the health threats 
posed by COVID-19, supports the City’s authority to implement a vaccination 
mandate.”); Boston Firefighters Union, Loc. 718 v. City of Boston, 205 N.E.3d 282, 
 
 
13 
294-95 (Mass. 2023) (“[V]accination against COVID-19 not only protected the 
health of the city residents, but also protected the [City’s] ability to continue to 
maintain a sufficiently healthy workforce during the Omicron surge, as would 
be needed to deliver emergency public safety services to the residents of the 
city.”).  We conclude that the EMS Board did not exceed its statutory authority 
in issuing the EMS immunization rule.   
B. 
Alignment with Statutory Purpose 
[¶17]  The question of whether the EMS immunization rule is misaligned 
with the EMS Act’s statutory purpose is an issue of statutory interpretation that 
we review de novo.  See Bd. Of Osteopathic Licensure, 2020 ME 134, ¶ 10, 242 
A.3d 182. 
[¶18]  On appeal, Calnan selectively highlights parts of the EMS Act’s 
statement of purpose to support his contention that the EMS immunization rule 
is misaligned with it.  Contrary to Calnan’s winnowed articulation of the reasons 
for the statute, the EMS Act’s statement of purpose is quite sweeping.  The 
statement of purpose reflects that the EMS Act is intended “to promote and 
provide for a comprehensive and effective emergency medical services system 
to ensure optimum patient care.”  32 M.R.S. § 81-A.  “Key elements” of the EMS 
system include “the provision of prompt, efficient and effective emergency 
 
 
14 
medical dispatch and emergency medical care, a well-coordinated trauma care 
system, effective communication between prehospital care providers and 
hospitals and the safe handling and transportation, and the treatment and 
nontransport under appropriate medical guidance, of the sick and injured.”  Id.  
A rule requiring that EMS workers be immunized is aligned with the statute’s 
purpose of achieving “optimum patient care,” the “safe handling and 
transportation” of patients, and “the treatment and nontransport[,] under 
appropriate medical guidance, of the sick and injured” by ensuring that patients 
are not exposed to certain communicable diseases.  Id. 
[¶19]  Additionally, there is nothing in the statutory scheme evidencing 
any contrary purpose regarding the EMS Board’s authority with respect to 
immunizations.  Cf. Ne. Occupational Exch., Inc., 540 A.2d at 1116-18 (affirming 
a challenge to the Community Mental Health Services Act’s delegation of 
discretionary licensing and rulemaking authority to the Commissioner partly 
due to the Act’s purpose to promote and guide mental health programs within 
Maine). 
C. 
Procedural Defect  
[¶20]  The question of what kind of rule the EMS Board was required to 
promulgate is an issue of statutory interpretation that we review de novo.  See 
 
 
15 
Bd. of Osteopathic Licensure, 2020 ME 134, ¶ 10, 242 A.3d 182.  “An agency must 
comply with the APA before it adopts a rule; otherwise the rule has no legal 
effect.”  Roderick v. State, 2013 ME 34, ¶ 9, 79 A.3d 368.  The Maine APA divides 
agency rules authorized after January 1, 1996, into two categories: routine 
technical rules and major substantive rules.  See 5 M.R.S. § 8071(2) (2024).  
“Routine technical rules are procedural rules that establish standards of 
practice or procedure for the conduct of business with or before an agency and 
any other rules that are not major substantive rules . . . .”  Id. § 8071(2)(A).  
Major substantive rules, on the other hand, “[r]equire the exercise of significant 
agency discretion or interpretation in drafting.”  Id. § 8071(2)(B)(1).  Enabling 
statutes enacted after January 1, 1996, have been required to designate rules 
that an agency is authorized to adopt as either routine technical rules or major 
substantive rules.  See id. § 8071(1).9  Section 8071 states that “rules adopted 
pursuant to rule-making authorization delegated [by the Legislature] to an 
 
9  Section 8071(1) provides, 
All new rules authorized to be adopted by delegation of legislative authority that 
is enacted after January 1, 1996, including new rules authorized by amendment of 
provisions of laws in effect on that date, must be assigned by the Legislature to one of 
2 categories and subject to the appropriate level of rule-making procedures as 
provided in this subchapter.  The Legislature shall assign the category and level of 
review to all rules at the time it enacts the authorizing legislation.  The Legislature 
may assign different categories and levels of review to different types of rules 
authorized by the same legislation.   
 
 
16 
agency after January 1, 1996[,] are subject to the procedures” particularly 
required for routine technical rules or major substantive rules, depending on 
the category to which the Legislature assigns the rules. 
[¶21]  The rulemaking process for routine technical rules “includes the 
provision of notice to the public and pertinent legislative committees, 5 M.R.S. 
§§ 8053, 8053-A [(2024)]; a comment period, see id. § 8057-A(3); and an 
opportunity for aggrieved persons to seek judicial review, see id. § 8058.”10  
Wood v. Dep’t of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife, 2023 ME 61, ¶ 26, 302 A.3d 18; 
5 M.R.S. § 8071(3)(A).  Major substantive rules are subject to more demanding 
rule-making requirements under 5 M.R.S. § 8072 (2024).  The heightened 
requirements for major substantive rules include a notice and comment period 
as required for routine technical rules, but that process only results in a 
provisional adoption of such rules; major substantive rules are then subject to 
legislative review and authorization before final adoption can occur.  Compare 
id. §§ 8071-72 (describing the notice and comment period respect to major 
 
10  “[T]he rulemaking process required by Maine’s Administrative Procedure Act enhances 
accountability and ensures that the resulting regulations appropriately limit the authority of the 
agency and avoid arbitrary standards.”  Wood v. Dep’t of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife, 2023 ME 61, ¶ 26, 
302 A.3d 18.   
 
 
17 
substantive rules), with §§ 8053, 8053-A, 8057-A, 8071(2)(A) (describing the 
notice and comment period respect to routine technical rules).   
[¶22]  The EMS Board is authorized to adopt rules “to carry out the 
purposes, requirements and goals of [the EMS Act].”  32 M.R.S. § 84(1)(A).  
Section 84(1)(A) was enacted and became effective before January 1, 1996, and 
it has not been amended since to include a designation of whether the EMS 
Board’s rules are major substantive rules or routine technical rules.  Because 
the rulemaking authority granted to the EMS Board in section 84(1)(A) was 
effective before January 1, 1996, the immunization rule, which was adopted 
under that statutory authority, see 16-163 C.M.R. ch. 21 (effective August 7, 
2022), is not assigned to either category of rules, see 5 M.R.S. § 8071(2) (“There 
are 2 categories of rules authorized for adoption after January 1, 1996.” 
(emphasis added)).  Therefore, the immunization rules were subject only to the 
procedural requirements that apply to all rules and not to the additional 
procedural requirements that apply to major substantive rules.  See, e.g., 5 
M.R.S. § 8052 (2024) (enumerating requirements for an agency’s adoption of 
“any rule”); 5 M.R.S. § 8071(3)(B) (making major substantive rules subject to 
 
 
18 
the additional requirements of 5 M.R.S. § 8072).11  Additionally, there is nothing 
in the complaint or record before the court suggesting that the EMS Board did 
not comply with its rulemaking obligations pursuant to the Maine APA.12  
See, e.g., 5 M.R.S. §§ 8052, 8053, 8053-A, 8057-A(3) (containing requirements 
for adoption of any agency rule).   
[¶23]  Because the enabling statute gave a broad grant of authority to the 
EMS Board to promulgate rules related to the EMS program, the EMS 
immunization rule was consistent with the purposes of the EMS Act, and the 
EMS Board followed the applicable rule making process for the promulgation 
of the EMS immunization rule, we affirm the court’s judgment.   
The entry is: 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11  Calnan argues that the EMS immunization rule matches the definition of a major substantive 
rule and is therefore a major substantive rule.  The Legislature, however, has not said that agency 
rules adopted pursuant to authority granted prior to 1996 are assigned to the category that they 
would have been assigned to had they been authorized after 1996; rather, rules are major substantive 
or routine technical rules only when they are designated as such in enabling legislation adopted after 
January 1, 1996.   
12  “The possibility of arbitrary administrative decision-making . . . is assuaged by the formal APA 
rulemaking process.”  Wood, 2023 ME 61, ¶ 26, 302 A.3d 18 (quotation marks omitted).   
 
 
19 
Terry Mitrenga, Esq. (orally), Augusta, for appellants Chris Calnan et al.  
 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, Sarah Coleman, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), and 
Samantha Morgan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for 
appellees Sam Hurley and Maine Emergency Medical Services 
 
 
Kennebec County Superior Court docket number CV-2022-188 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY