Case Title: State v. Edsall

Citation: 385 So. 2d 207

Docket Number: 

State: louisiana

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Date: 1980-05-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
385 So. 2d 207 (1980) STATE of Louisiana v. Charles J. EDSALL. No. 65900. Supreme Court of Louisiana. May 30, 1980. Rehearing Denied July 7, 1980. *208 William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edwin O. Ware, Dist. Atty., Greg Fowler, Edward E. Roberts, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee. Gravel, Roy & Burnes, Richard V. Burnes, Alexandria, for defendant-appellant. DENNIS, Justice.[*] Defendant, Charles J. Edsall, pleaded guilty to armed robbery, La.R.S. 14:64, following an unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence, and reserved his right to appeal. See State v. Crosby, 338 So. 2d 584 (La. 1976). He was sentenced to serve twenty-five years imprisonment at hard labor. He appealed and assigns as errors the trial court's rulings on the merits and procedural aspects of his motion to suppress. At the conclusion of the motion to suppress hearing the trial judge dictated his reasons for judgment. His findings of fact, for which there is warrant in the record, are as follows: 1. The Search and Seizure Were Lawful When we apply the pertinent rules of law to these facts we conclude that (a) the officers lawfully detained the defendant for questioning because they had reasonable cause to suspect that he had committed the robbery; (b) the officer observed the .357 magnum in "plain view" because he was entitled as a safety precaution to a general visual survey of the vehicle from his position outside to determine if there was an accomplice in the truck; (c) the officers' search of the truck came within the ambit of the "automobile exception" to the constitutional requirement of a warrant because they had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of a crime and there were exigent circumstances requiring an immediate warrantless search. A law enforcement officer may stop a person in a public place for questioning whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit an offense. La.C.Cr.P. art. 215.1. Reasonable cause for an investigatory stop or detention is something less than probable cause. Nevertheless, it requires the detaining officer to have articulable knowledge of particular facts sufficient reasonably to suspect the detained person of criminal activity. *210 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); State v. Wilson, 366 So. 2d 1328 (La.1978). In the present case the detaining officer did have articulable knowledge of particular facts sufficiently reasonable to suspect the defendant of having committed an armed robbery at Mack's Exxon Service Station in Alexandria. The officer knew that the robbery had been committed approximately thirty to seventy minutes earlier that evening by a person driving an 18-wheel "White freight liner." The defendant's vehicle fitted in detail one of the police radio descriptions of the robber's truck. When the defendant dismounted, the detaining officer could see that he matched one description of the armed robber which had been broadcast over police radio. In order for the "plain-view" doctrine to be applicable there must have been a prior justification for an intrusion into a protected area, in the course of which evidence was discovered inadvertently, or an officer must have inadvertently observed evidence of a crime from a vantage point without intrusion upon a protected area, and it must have been immediately apparent without close inspection that the items were evidence or contraband. When an officer observes evidence of a crime before entering a protected area, he may not seize the evidence without first obtaining a warrant, absent exigent circumstances or another exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Brown, 370 So. 2d 525 (La. 1979); State v. Parker, 355 So. 2d 900 (La. 1978). Here, the officer observed the .357 magnum on the seat of the truck without entering a protected area. As we observed in State v. Brown, supra, 370 So. 2d at 527, which presented similar circumstances, the officer "was entitled as a precaution for his own safety to a general visual survey of the vehicle from his position outside to determine if there was anyone in the car." Our conclusion is not altered by the fact that in the present case the officer had to step up on the side of the truck to shine his flashlight into its cab. Under the circumstances of this case, in which policemen were searching for an armed robber who had seriously wounded his victim, and in which the possibility of an accomplice had not yet been ruled out, a general survey of the vehicle for the protection of the officers reasonably called for the officer's actions. Likewise, as in State v. Brown, supra, the .357 magnum was immediately recognizable as the same kind of weapon that had been used in the armed robbery. Consequently, the officers, who knew that the descriptions of the defendant, his 18-wheeler, and his weapon all matched those reported by witnesses, had probable cause to believe that the defendant was the armed robber and that the truck contained contraband or evidence of the crime. Thus, it only remains to be shown that the officers' entrance into the truck and seizure of the evidence therein was permissible under the "automobile exception" to the constitutional requirement of a warrant. This Court has explained its view of the "automobile exception" in several recent cases. For example, in State v. Lewis, 378 So. 2d 396 (La.1979), we said: Although the high court has not established a clear definition of the automobile exception, we think the facts of the present case bring the search here within its ambit. Probable cause to search the truck existed, as we have seen, because it was linked to the robbery by its own description and that of the defendant and the robbery weapon. Furthermore, under the facts of this case, the officers were faced with exigent circumstances requiring that they either seize and hold the vehicle before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate or carry out an immediate search without a warrant. The truck was stopped in a public place, on the side of U.S. Highway 165 near the small town of Pollock, Louisiana. It was therefore accessible to anyone who might have a reason to move it or remove evidence from it. Under all of the circumstances, the election of the officers to conduct an immediate search was a reasonable course and does not require that we invalidate their action. 2. The Alleged Violation of Sequestration Does Not Require Reversal. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to preclude the testimony of witness Leslie Graham because of a violation of a rule of sequestration. The hearing on defendant's motion to suppress spanned two days: Friday, September 21, *212 1979 and Tuesday, September 25, 1979. Several witnesses, including Officer William Hilton, were placed under a rule of sequestration, with the judge explaining to the witnesses that they were not to discuss the case with anyone until the matter was concluded. On Monday, September 24, 1979, the district attorney held a meeting in his office which included four officers, who were not under the rule of sequestration, and Officer Hilton. At the meeting Hilton took part in a discussion about Leslie Graham, an individual Hilton remembered talking to on the night of the robbery. One officer present at the meeting, Officer Woodson, remembering that Graham had given a good description of the truck used in the robbery, discussed this description with the district attorney. Officer Hilton also picked up Leslie Graham at an airport in Alabama and brought him back to testify. The defendant contends, based upon these violations of the rule of sequestration, that the testimony of Graham should be excluded. While an order of sequestration is intended to assure that a witness will testify as to his own knowledge of a case, not every violation of a sequestration order must result in exclusion of the witness' testimony. State v. Lewis, 367 So. 2d 1155 (La.1979). In the present case the trial judge ruled that Graham's testimony should not be precluded. We affirm his ruling because there is no evidence that either Graham's or Hilton's testimony was tainted by the violation. Although Hilton testified after his violation, his initial testimony, which occurred prior to the violation, completed the most significant part of his testimony, namely, his testimony as to the description of the truck used in the robbery. Although Officer Hilton picked up Graham at the airport when he was brought back to testify, Hilton denied talking to Graham about the robbery and the defense failed to introduce any evidence which would indicate the contrary. For the reasons assigned, the defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed. AFFIRMED. [*] The Honorable Edward A. de la Houssaye, III participated in this decision as an Associate Justice pro tempore.