Case Title: State v. Briney

Citation: 

Docket Number: S055567

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2008-12-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: December 31, 2008
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent
on Review,
v.
CHASON LYNN BRINEY,
Petitioner
on Review.
(CC041329M;
CA A128505; SC S055567)
En Banc
On review from the
Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted
September 17, 2008.
Garrett A. Richardson,
Multnomah Defenders, Inc., Portland, argued the cause and filed the petition
for petitioner on review.
Ryan Kahn, Assistant Attorney
General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review.  With him on the
brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor
General.
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
The decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed,
and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Josephine
County Circuit Court, Pat Wolke, Judge. 216 Or App 337, 172
P3d 305 (2007).
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
This case concerns the meaning of the
statutory definition of "firearm," ORS 166.210(3), as that term is
used in describing the crime of carrying a concealed firearm under ORS
166.250(1)(a), set out post.  Defendant was charged with carrying a
concealed firearm, a pistol, in violation of ORS 166.250(1)(a).  In his trial
to the court, defendant argued that, because the pistol had a broken firing pin
at the time he carried it, it was not "readily capable of use as a
weapon" and therefore was not within the statutory definition of a firearm. 
In response, the trial court ruled that, although the evidence showed that a
replacement firing pin was not immediately available to defendant, his pistol nevertheless
fell within the statutory definition of a firearm.  The trial court convicted defendant
of unlawfully carrying a concealed firearm and the Court of Appeals affirmed
that judgment without written opinion.   State v. Briney, 216 Or
App 337, 172 P3d 305 (2007).  We allowed defendant's petition for review and
now, for the reasons that follow, reverse the judgment of the trial court and
the decision of the Court of Appeals.  We conclude that, in this case, defendant's
pistol was not "readily capable of use as a weapon" and, therefore,
was not a concealed firearm prohibited under ORS 166.250(1)(a).
The facts are undisputed.  In
September 2004, Grants Pass police officers responded to a report of a possible
forced entry into a motor vehicle.  At the scene of the reported incident, Officer
Peil encountered defendant and two other suspects.  Peil asked defendant for
consent to search his person.  Defendant immediately responded, "All I
have is this," and produced a small pistol from his pocket.  Defendant
gave the pistol to Peil, who identified it as a Raven Arms .25 caliber
semi-automatic pistol.  The pistol belongs to a group of weapons colloquially
known as "Saturday Night Specials," cheaply made handguns typically
costing less than $100.  The officer examined it, discovering a single round
positioned in the chamber and additional rounds in the magazine.
Defendant informed the officer that
the pistol lacked a working firing pin, rendering it incapable of firing
despite the fact that it was loaded.  Peil nevertheless cited defendant for
carrying a concealed firearm in violation of ORS 166.250(1)(a).
Before trial, an Oregon State Police criminalist
confirmed defendant's claim that the weapon did not have a working firing pin
and could not be fired without one.  The criminalist, however, successfully
fired the weapon after obtaining and installing a functional firing pin.  The
parties stipulated that the installation process, once the pin was obtained,
would take only a matter of minutes for someone familiar with firearms.
The parties also stipulated that a
firing pin that could render the pistol operational was not available at any Grants
Pass area gun store at the time of defendant's arrest, but could have been
obtained by mail order or over the Internet at a cost of between $5 and $15. 
Overnight delivery was generally available for an increased fee.
At trial, both parties focused on
whether defendant's inoperative pistol was nevertheless "readily capable
of use as a weapon," a necessary characteristic for the pistol to be
considered a "firearm" as defined in ORS 166.210(3).(1) 
Defendant argued that, because a replacement firing pin for the pistol was at
least an overnight delivery interval away, the pistol could not
"readily" be used as a weapon and therefore fell outside the
statutory definition of a "firearm."  In response, the state cited
several Oregon cases for the proposition that the dispositive factor in
determining whether a weapon was "readily capable" of use was not the
length of time needed to procure parts to make the weapon operational, but
rather the ease with which such a conversion could occur.(2)
The trial court agreed with the
state, concluding that the Court of Appeals decisions on which the state had
relied clearly established that defendant's pistol fell within the statutory
definition of a "firearm."  In a letter opinion, the trial court
wrote:
"There is no question that this gun was
capable of being a firearm.  It was a firearm absent a firing pin.  With the
addition of the firing pin, it would have worked as a normal gun would.
"'Capable' is modified by the word
'readily' in the statute.  The State reads this modification as 'easily
capable' and the defense as 'quickly capable.'  Absent case law, the
Court would agree with the Defense; but in Olson v. Lampert, 185 Or App
477, the Court of Appeals does not concern itself with how quickly or easily
defendant could have obtained a bolt to insert into the rifle * * *.  Applying
this reasoning to our case, it does not depend on how long and difficult it
would have been to obtain and install a firing pin to make this gun operable."
(Emphasis in original.)
The trial court subsequently found
defendant guilty of unlawfully carrying a "firearm concealed upon the
person," ORS 166.250(1)(a), a Class A misdemeanor.  As noted, defendant
appealed that judgment and the Court of Appeals affirmed it without opinion. 
We allowed defendant's petition for review to construe the meaning of the term
"firearm" in ORS 166.250(1)(a), and more specifically, the meaning of
the phrase "readily capable of use as a weapon" as it is used to
define a "firearm" in ORS 166.210(3).
On review, defendant reiterates his argument
that the pistol he carried was not "readily capable of use as a weapon"
because (1) it did not have a functional firing pin, and (2) the fastest a replacement
could be procured was by overnight delivery following a mail order or Internet
purchase.  In essence, defendant's position is that, to unlawfully carry a
concealed firearm in violation of ORS 166.250(1)(a), the concealed weapon must either
be fully operational at the time that it is being unlawfully carried, or promptly
capable of being made so at that time.  As set out in greater detail below, the
state, for its part, argues that, in this case, "readily capable" should
not be read to encompass the sense of immediacy for which defendant argues.
We begin with the text and context of
the statutes at issue here using the familiar methodology set out in PGE v.
Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). 
Defendant was convicted of violating ORS 166.250(1)(a), which provides, in
part:
"Except as otherwise provided in this
section or ORS 166.260, 166.270, 166.274, 166.291, 166.292, or 166.410 to
166.470, a person commits the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm if the
person knowingly:
"(a) Carries any firearm concealed upon the
person[.]"(3)
"Firearm," in turn, is defined in ORS 166.210:
"As used in ORS 166.250 to 166.270, 166.291
to 166.295 and 166.410 to 166.470:
"* * * * *
"(3) 'Firearm' means a weapon, by whatever
name known, which is designed to expel a projectile by the action of powder and
which is readily capable of use as a weapon."
 (Emphasis added.)
The statute's first requirement that
the pistol be designed to expel a projectile is not at issue here.  Defendant's
pistol, despite being cheaply manufactured and distributed, functions like any
other firearm, and the parties have stipulated to that fact.  The parties also
agree that, for purposes of this case, the phrase "use as a weapon"
refers to only the employment of a firearm to fire bullets.(4)
The statute's second requirement,
however, presents an issue of first impression for this court:  In considering
the crime of unlawfully carrying a concealed firearm, when is a firearm
"readily capable of use as a weapon"?  Because the legislature has
not defined "readily" or "capable" as those terms are used
in ORS 166.210(3), and because those words are words of common usage, we give
them their plain, ordinary meaning.  PGE, 317 Or at 611.  The most common
definition of "capable" in use today is "constituted, situated,
or characterized as susceptible or open to being affected."  Webster's
Third New Int'l Dictionary 330 (unabridged ed 2002).  A pistol that lacks a
working firing pin is nevertheless "susceptible or open to being
affected" by the relatively minor repair of reinstalling a new firing pin
that would allow the pistol to function as designed; thus such a pistol is
"capable" of use as a weapon.
Here, however, as the trial court
recognized, the word "readily" is an adverb that modifies the
adjective "capable."  Under the dictionary definition that is most
applicable in this case, "readily" means:
"a :  with prompt willingness :  without
hesitating, quibbling, or delaying:  with alacrity : WILLINGLY *
* * b : with fairly quick efficiency : without needless
loss of time : reasonably fast :  SPEEDILY * * * c :  with
a fair degree of ease :  without much difficulty :  with
facility:  EASILY * * *."
Id. at 1889.
Defendant argues from that definition
that his pistol was not "readily" capable of use as a weapon because
it could not, with reasonable speed, be made capable of firing.  The state responds
that the term "readily" does not mean "immediately" and
contrasts the phrases "readily capable" and "presently
capable" as they are used in ORS 161.015 to support its argument.  The state
notes that the legislature has defined "dangerous weapon" in ORS
161.015(1) as
"any weapon, device, instrument, material or substance
which under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used or
threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or serious
physical injury."
(Emphasis added.)  At the same time, the state continues, the
legislature has defined "deadly weapon" in ORS 161.015(2) as
"any instrument, article or substance specifically
designed for and presently capable of causing death or serious physical
injury."
(Emphasis added.)  In a nutshell, the state contends that,
because "readily capable" and "presently capable" are
applied in different ways within the same statute, the two phrases must have
different meanings.  Under the state's theory, because "presently"
implies immediacy, "readily" must contemplate a less immediate, more
flexible standard.  The state therefore argues that the term should be read to
imply relative promptness and ease, a condition that was present in this case
because the replacement firing pin -- although not immediately at hand -- was
nevertheless (1) generally available, (2) relatively cheap, and (3) could be installed
quickly once procured.
We agree that "readily"
does not necessarily mean "immediately," but in our view, the
resolution of this case does not turn on that unremarkable proposition.  Although
the term "readily" may not mean presently or immediately, it encompasses
a temporal quality as it used in ORS 166.210(3).  Many of the qualifiers used
within the dictionary definition, e.g., "with fairly
quick efficiency," "without needless loss of time,"
and "reasonably fast" (emphases added), suggest as much.  However,
our conclusion in that regard does not, without more, establish that the
legislature intended the term's elasticity to encompass the 12- to 24-hour
delivery interval that necessarily would have had to have elapsed here before
the pistol could have been made capable of use as a weapon.
Consequently, we next examine, as
context for the statutes at issue here, earlier versions of Oregon's concealed
firearms laws.  See In re Marriage of Crocker, 332 Or 42, 49, 22 P3d 759
(2001) (under PGE paradigm, court considers earlier versions of statutes
at first level of analysis); Krieger v. Just, 319 Or 328, 336, 876 P2d
754 (1994) (PGE paradigm includes earlier versions of same statute as
part of statute's context).  By 1868, Oregon statutes had established a
relatively unfettered right (at least for white males) to "have, hold, and
keep" a variety of firearms for personal use and protection:
"Every white male citizen of this state above
the age of sixteen years shall be entitled to have, hold, and keep, for his own
use and defense, the following fire-arms, to wit:  Either or any one of the
following-named guns, and one revolving pistol; a rifle, shot-gun (double or
single barrel), yager, or musket, the same to be exempt from execution, in all
cases, under the laws of Oregon."
General Laws of Oregon 1868, § 1.(5) 
In 1885, the legislature enacted the state's first general prohibition against
carrying concealed weapons.  Specifically included among a long list of
prohibited items was "any revolver, pistol, or other firearm," the
use of which could injure the person or property of another:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to
carry concealed about his person in any manner whatever any revolver, pistol,
or other firearm, or any knife (other than an ordinary pocketknife), or any
dirk or dagger, slung-shot, or metal knuckles, or any instrument by the use of
which injury could be inflicted upon the person or property of any other
person."
General Laws of Oregon 1885, § 1.
In 1925, the legislature amended its
blanket ban on concealed weapons to allow concealed firearms to be carried with
the proper license.  At the same time, a provision was added to clarify that a
firearm carried openly in a belt holster was not "concealed":
"Except as otherwise provided in this act,
it shall be unlawful for any person within this state to carry concealed upon
his person or within any vehicle which is under his control or direction any
pistol, revolver or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person without
having a license to carry such firearm, as hereinafter provided in section 8
hereof. * * * Firearms carried openly in belt holsters shall not be
deemed to be concealed within the meaning of the section."
General Laws of Oregon 1925, ch 260, § 5 (emphasis added).(6) 
In creating that regulatory framework, however, the 1925 legislature did not expressly
define the term "firearm."  It was not until 1977 that the
legislature enacted the definition that is the subject of our discussion here.
In 1977, the legislature's definition
of "firearm" was set out in ORS 166.210.  Except for its references
to different kinds of gun powder, that definition was identical to the present definition. 
Today, definitions for 11 other terms in addition to "firearm" have significantly
expanded the content of ORS 166.210.  In 1977, however, the statute provided a
much smaller set of definitions for use in delineating firearm-related offenses
and penalties.  As relevant here, the definitional sections of ORS 166.210
(1977) provided:
"As used in ORS 166.230, 166.250 to 166.270,
166.280, 166.290 and 166.410 to 166.470:
"(1) 'Firearm' means a weapon, by whatever
name known, which is designed to expel a projectile by the action of black
powder or smokeless powder and which is readily capable of use as a weapon.
"(2) 'Pistol,' 'revolver,' and 'firearms
capable of being concealed upon the person,' apply to and include all firearms
having a barrel less than 12 inches in length."
Although ORS 166.210(1) defined the
term "firearm" broadly for purposes of the applicable 1977 statutes,
the term itself had a limited application.  At the time, when the legislature
used "firearm" in a particular provision, the word was consistently coupled
with the phrase "capable of being concealed upon the person" and
generally accompanied by references to pistols and revolvers -- weapons that,
by design, were usually more concealable than other firearms, such as rifles.  Under
ORS 166.250(1) (1977), for example, the unlawful concealment of a firearm on
one's person was addressed in specific terms to
"any person who possesses or has in his possession any machine
gun, or carries concealed upon his person or within any vehicle which is under
his control or direction any pistol, revolver or other firearm capable of
being concealed upon the person, without having a license to carry such a
firearm[.]"
(Emphasis added.)  The same was true of the statute
prohibiting convicted persons from possessing firearms:
"Any person who has been convicted of a
felony under the law of this state or any other state, or who has been
convicted of a felony under the laws of the Government of the United States,
who owns, or has in his possession or under his custody or control any pistol,
revolver, or other firearms capable of being concealed upon the person, or
machine gun, commits the crime of exconvict [sic] in possession of a
firearm."
ORS 166.270(1) (1977) (emphasis added).  See also ORS
166.230 (1977) (increasing punishment for felonies committed with any
"pistol, revolver, machine gun or other firearm capable of being concealed
upon the person"); ORS 166.420 (1977) (misdemeanor for gun dealers to sell
or transfer a "pistol, revolver, or other firearm, of a size capable of
being concealed upon the person" without recording date of sale and
manufacturer's number or identifying marks); ORS 166.440 (1977) (misdemeanor
for unlicensed persons to sell "any pistol, revolver or other firearm
capable of being concealed upon the person"); ORS 166.470 (1977) (misdemeanor
for knowingly selling or transferring "any pistol, revolver or other
firearm capable of being concealed upon the person" to persons prohibited
from lawfully possessing such weapons).
The foregoing statutory history
helps to identify the legislative policy that underlies the prohibition against
carrying a concealed firearm in this state.  When the legislature first defined
"firearm," its primary focus, demonstrated by its use of the term in
ORS chapter 166, was on the actual or potential concealment of such weapons. 
However, since 1925, the provisions enacted by the legislature to criminalize
the carrying of a concealed weapon have all made clear that "[f]irearms
carried openly in belt holsters are not concealed within the meaning of this
section."  ORS 166.250(3).  Had the legislature intended the statutory
prohibition against carrying concealed firearms to act as a general restriction
on the ability to carry handguns or to serve as the ultimate protection against
the use of such weapons, it would not have created, in the same provisions, an
exception for firearms carried openly in a holster.  The fact that it did,
however, evinces a different policy rationale, one aimed at providing notice to
those who may come into contact with an individual carrying a firearm.
That rationale -- ensuring the
public's ability to assess whether a person is presently in possession of a
weapon -- is the legislative purpose often identified with the enactment of weapons
concealment statutes around the country.  The Iowa Supreme Court, for example,
has stated:
"We discern the policy underlying the
prohibition against concealed weapons to be based on the protection of those
persons who may come into contact with a weapon bearer.  If a weapon is not
concealed, one may take notice of the weapon and its owner and govern oneself
accordingly.  No such opportunity for cautious behavior or self-preservation
exists for one encountering a bearer of a concealed weapon."
State of Iowa v. Rodney Newsom, 563 NW2d 618,
619-20 (1997).  See also James Dorelus v. State of Florida, 747 So2d
368, 370 (1999) (Florida prohibition against carrying concealed weapons aimed
at preventing those with weapons from taking "undue advantage" of
unsuspecting adversaries who are not aware the person is carrying a weapon).
Given what we believe to be
the legislative policy underlying the enactment of the concealed weapons
statutes in Oregon, we think that, in order for a firearm to be "readily
capable of use as a weapon" for the purposes of ORS 166.250(1)(a), the
legislature intended that the firearm either be operational or promptly able to
be made so at the time that an individual is alleged to be unlawfully
carrying it concealed.(7)
The record here establishes that a
firing pin necessary to make the pistol operational was unavailable locally, and
was at least an overnight delivery interval away, approximately 12 to 24
hours.  Because the pistol could not promptly be made to fire at the time
defendant was alleged to have unlawfully carried it, defendant was not guilty
of carrying a concealed firearm in violation of ORS 166.250(1)(a), and the
trial court should have granted defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. The
text of that definition is set out in full below.  At the time of trial, the
definition of "firearm" was numbered as ORS 166.210(2).  The statute
was amended in 2007 and the definition renumbered as ORS 166.210(3), but its
text remained unchanged.  Or Laws 2007, ch 368, § 1.  For ease of reference,
this opinion uses the current citation throughout.
2. The
state supported its argument with Court of Appeals decisions.  See, e.g.,
Olson v. Lampert, 185 Or App 477, 60 P3d 544 (2002),  rev den,
355 Or 391 (2003) (holding that a rifle lacking a bolt was "readily
capable of use as a weapon," despite the fact that the defendant did not
have the bolt and the person holding it refused to relinquish possession); State
v. Goltz, 169 Or App 619, 10 P3d 955 (2000), rev den, 331 Or 583
(2001) (holding that a rational jury could conclude that a disassembled
nine-millimeter handgun, with all of the parts on site, could be considered
readily capable of being used as a weapon); State v. Gortmaker, 60 Or
App 723, 655 P2d 575 (1982), aff'd on other grounds, 295 Or 505, 668 P2d
354 (1983) (holding that a pistol that lacked its firing mechanism, which could
be replaced in three to four minutes by a gunsmith at a cost of $6, was
"readily capable of use as a weapon").
3. The
provision does not apply to persons "licensed under ORS 166.291 and
166.292 to carry a concealed handgun."  ORS 166.260(1)(h).
4. At
least one Court of Appeals decision has read "use as a weapon" in an
extremely broad manner, concluding that it means use as any kind of weapon,
such as a small club.  See State v. Hash, 34 Or App 281, 285, 578 P2d 482
(1978), rev den, 284 Or 1 (1978) (so stating).  Here, however, the state
notes that, "for the purposes of this case, this court need evaluate
'firearm' only in terms of its capability to be used as a gun."  (Emphasis
in original.)
5. Yager
is defined, in part, as an obsolete term for a "short-barrelled [sic]
large-bore rifle of a type formerly popular in the South and Southwest."  A
Dictionary of Americanisms On Historical Principles 1895 (1951).
6. A virtually identical provision remains in effect today as ORS 166.250(3): 
"Firearms carried openly in belt holsters are not concealed within the
meaning of [ORS 166.250]."
7. We
note that, although the definition of "firearm" has not changed
substantively in over 30 years, the substance and focus of the statutes to
which it applies have.  See, e.g., ORS 166.270 (amended 1989) (Class C
felony for a convicted felon to possess, have custody of, or control any
"firearm"); ORS 166.429 (amended 1989) (Class B felony to ship,
transport, receive, sell or otherwise furnishes any "firearm" to
another knowing that the weapon will be used in furtherance of a felony); ORS
166.450 (amended 1989) (unlawful to intentionally alter, remove or obliterate
identification number of any "firearm" for an unlawful purpose).