Case Title: Ex parte Advanced Disposal Services South, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1190148

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2020-09-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: September 18, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2020
____________________
1190148
____________________
Ex parte Advanced Disposal Services South, LLC; Advanced
Disposal Services Alabama Holdings, LLC; Advanced Disposal
Services, Inc.; Tallassee Waste Disposal Center, Inc.; and
Stone's Throw Landfill, LLC
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Jerry Tarver, Sr.
v.
Advanced Disposal Services South, LLC, et al.)
(Macon Circuit Court, CV-17-900076)
BRYAN, Justice.
1190148
Advanced Disposal Services South, LLC, Advanced Disposal
Services Alabama Holdings, LLC, Advanced Disposal Services,
Inc., Tallassee Waste Disposal Center, Inc., and 
Stone's Throw
Landfill, LLC (hereinafter referred to collectively as
"Advanced Disposal"),1 petition this Court for a writ of
mandamus ordering the Macon Circuit Court ("the trial court")
to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 19(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., the
action filed by Jerry Tarver, Sr., because, they say, the
action cannot proceed in the absence of the City of Tallassee
("the City") as a party.  We deny the petition.
Factual and Procedural Background
This is the second time these parties have appeared
before this Court. In Ex parte Advanced Disposal Services
South, LLC, 280 So. 3d 356 (Ala. 2018), Advanced Disposal
sought a writ of mandamus based on the trial court's refusal
to dismiss Tarver's action against Advanced Disposal on the
ground that Tarver failed to join the City as a necessary and
indispensable party pursuant to Rule 19, Ala. R. Civ. P.  We
1The materials before us on this petition for a writ of
mandamus do not differentiate among these various entities or
describe their respective roles, grouping them all together as
"Advanced Disposal." We have done the same.
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summarized the allegations of fact in Tarver's original
complaint and the pertinent procedural history as follows:
"The City owns and operates a sewer and
stabilization pond ('the stabilization pond'),
which, as of July 1, 2016, accepted and treated
waste from 1,782 residential customers and 18
commercial customers. Advanced Disposal entered into
an 'Agreement for Acceptance and Treatment of
Leachate' with the City ('the agreement') in which
the City agreed to accept and treat, for a fee,
leachate from Advanced Disposal's landfill. The
agreement defines leachate as 'any liquid, including
any soluble, suspended or miscible components in the
liquid, that has percolated through or emerged at
the 
Landfill 
from 
solid 
waste 
other 
than
construction/demolition waste and/or rubbish.' The
agreement also states that '[t]itle to and risk of
loss with respect to the leachate shall pass from
[Advanced Disposal] to [the] City at such time as
the leachate is delivered to the City's facility and
accepted by the City.' Finally, the agreement
includes 
indemnity 
clauses 
indemnifying 
both
Advanced Disposal and the City. Specifically, the
agreement provides that Advanced Disposal must
'defend, indemnify and hold the City harmless from
any and all liens, claims, judgments, liability,
causes of action of any type or nature, whether in
contract or in tort and whether legal or equitable
... arising from, related to and/or concerning the
execution of this Agreement.' The City agreed to
indemnify Advanced Disposal only where the damage
alleged is 'caused by the negligent acts of the City
during 
the 
term 
of 
this 
Agreement 
or 
any
misrepresentation by the City or breach of this
Agreement.'
"After the City accepts title to the leachate,
it treats the leachate with chlorine at its
stabilization pond. The City then discharges the
effluent into the Tallapoosa River ('the river')
pursuant 
to 
a 
National 
Pollutant 
Discharge
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Elimination System Permit ('the NPDES permit'). The
effluent mixes with the river water, which flows
several miles downstream to the intake point for the
Utilities Board of Tuskegee ('the utilities board'),
which treats the river water with chlorine and uses
other methods to prepare the water for consumption
by its consumers, including the plaintiff, Jerry
Tarver, Sr.
"In 
May 
2017, Tarver sued Advanced 
Disposal, the
utilities board, and fictitiously named defendants
in the Macon Circuit Court, seeking monetary damages
as well as injunctive relief for exposure to
allegedly contaminated water that had been illegally
'discharged' into the river and ultimately sold by
the 
utilities 
board 
for 
consumption 
by 
its
customers. The gist of the action can be gathered
from the 'overview' portion of the complaint, which
states, in relevant part:
"'2. As a result of the negligent,
unauthorized, unpermitted, and illegal
discharging 
of 
waste 
products 
and 
hazardous
chemicals 
and 
compounds 
into 
the 
Tallapoosa
River, the water treatment facilities in
Tuskegee 
and Macon County have been
providing polluted water to [Tarver] for
drinking, 
cooking, 
bathing, 
and 
...
everyday use. Instead of properly treating
the water from the Tallapoosa River, the
water 
treatment 
facilities 
made 
the
condition of the water worse.'
"(Emphasis added.) According to the complaint, both
the City and the utilities board use chlorine to
treat 
the 
leachate 
and 
the 
river 
water,
respectively, and, when the chlorine interacts with
leachate or polluted river water, it produces a
number 
of 
harmful 
chemicals 
referred 
to 
as
by-products with known short-term and long-term
health effects –- the most prevalent of those
by-products being haloacetic acids ('HAAs') and
total trihalomethanes ('TTHMs'). As for Advanced
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Disposal, the complaint alleges that Advanced
Disposal unlawfully discharges its leachate into the
City's stabilization pond, knowing that the leachate
cannot be properly treated before the resulting
effluent is discharged into the river. Tarver also
alleges 
that 
Advanced 
Disposal 
discharges
'pollutants' into various creeks and tributaries
flowing into the river in violation of its
storm-water discharge permit."
280 So. 3d at 358-59.
Advanced Disposal moved the trial court to dismiss the
action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7), Ala. R. Civ. P., arguing
that the City was a necessary and indispensable party pursuant
to Rule 19.  The trial court denied the motion, and Advanced
Disposal sought mandamus review of that decision.  After
recognizing that "'Rule 19 ... provides a two-step process for
the trial court to follow in determining whether a party is
necessary or indispensable,'" Advanced Disposal, 280 So. 
3d 
at
360 (quoting Holland v. City of Alabaster, 566 So. 2d 224, 226
(Ala. 1990)), we first considered whether the City was a
necessary party under Rule 19(a), Ala. R. Civ. P. –- the first
step in the two-step process, which requires consideration of
whether the absent party is a party "who should be joined if
feasible." 280 So. 3d at 361.  A majority of this Court agreed
that the City was a necessary party under Rule 19(a).  First,
based on Tarver's request for an "injunction 'precluding the
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Defendants from further destruction of the [river] and
[Tarver's] water supply,'" the Court held that "the City is a
necessary party under Rule 19(a)(1) because, in its absence,
Tarver cannot be accorded complete relief." 280 So. 3d at 362. 
The Court reasoned that, because the leachate constituted only
a small portion of the total amount of waste treated in the
stabilization pond, "enjoining the delivery of leachate to 
the
pond will have little, if any, impact upon the nature or
volume of the effluent the City ultimately discharges into the
river." Id.  Additionally, the Court 
"further conclude[d] that the City is a necessary
party under Rule 19(a)(2)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,]
because, the City, by entering into the agreement
pursuant to which it takes title to the leachate and
treats the leachate, has a legally protected
interest relating to the subject matter of this case
that will be affected by the outcome of Tarver's
claims. See Liberty National Life Ins. Co. v.
University of Alabama Health Servs. Found., P.C.,
881 So. 2d 1013, 1023 (Ala. 2003) (noting that this
Court has recognized that 'an interest created by a
contract 
is 
a 
legally 
protected 
interest').
Accordingly, the City is included within those
'persons to be joined if feasible' under Rule
19(a)."
280 So. 3d at 363.
However, we did not determine whether joinder of the
City, which is located in Elmore County, was feasible, nor did
we apply the second step of the two-step process provided for
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by Rule 19.  Specifically, we did not consider whether, if
joinder of the City was not feasible, "in equity and good
conscience the action should proceed among the parties before
it, or should be dismissed, the [City] being thus regarded as
indispensable." Rule 19(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  We stated:
"[W]e cannot determine at this juncture whether [the
City's] joinder is feasible, insofar as the City,
once joined, might object to venue in Macon County.
Accordingly, we issue the writ of mandamus and
direct the trial court to join the City as a
necessary party under Rule 19(a).  If the City, once
joined, objects to venue, Rule 19(a) requires the
trial court to dismiss it from the action and then
proceed under Rule 19(b) to determine, in accordance
with the stated factors, 'whether in equity and good
conscience the action should proceed among the
parties before it, or should be dismissed, the
[City] being thus regarded as indispensable."
280 So. 3d at 363 (footnote omitted).
We issued an opinion denying Tarver's application for
rehearing on December 14, 2018; while addressing several of
Tarver's objections to the decision on original submission,
the Court also reiterated that it "made no determination
whether joinder would be feasible or whether the City was an
indispensable party." 280 So. 3d at 366 (opinion on
application for rehearing).
Proceedings in the Trial Court Following Advanced Disposal
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Following our decision in Advanced Disposal, the trial
court entered an order joining the City as a necessary party
to Tarver's action against Advanced Disposal.  The City filed
an objection to venue in Macon County and asked the trial
court to dismiss the City from the action or, in the
alternative, to transfer the action to Elmore County.  In
light of the City's objection to venue in Macon County, which
objection all parties agreed was valid, Advanced Disposal
filed a motion to declare the City an indispensable party and
to dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 19(b) or, in the
alternative, to transfer the action to Elmore County.  The
Utilities Board of Tuskegee ("the utilities board") joined
Advanced Disposal's motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for
a change of venue.  
After the motions to dismiss were filed, Tarver filed a
second amended complaint and a response to the pending
motions.2  Tarver's second amended complaint did not name the
City as a party, despite this Court's decision in Advanced
Disposal and the trial court's order joining the City as a
2Tarver's first amended complaint was filed on July 27,
2018, while Advanced Disposal's first petition for a writ of
mandamus was pending in this Court. 
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necessary party.  In the second amended complaint, Tarver
modified his allegations of fact, the claims he asserted, and
the injunctive relief he sought against the defendants –-
Advanced Disposal, the utilities board, and Macon County Water
Authority ("MCWA")3 (hereinafter referred to collectively as
"the defendants").  In relevant part, Tarver alleged that he
had "consumed, or otherwise has been exposed to, water
contaminated with carcinogens that have ... been released or
discharged into the Tallapoosa River, which is the source of
the water ultimately consumed by and affecting" him; that "the
contamination of the Tallapoosa River complained of in this
complaint is a result of the wrongful release and discharging
by [Advanced Disposal] of industrial waste leachate generated
by Stone's Throw landfill"; that the "[i]ndustrial leachate
generated by [Advanced Disposal] is very different from the
other waste and wastewater received by the Tallassee Sewer and
Stabilization Pond [(referred to hereinafter as 'the City's
stabilization pond']; that [Advanced Disposal]'s industrial
3It appears that MCWA was first added as a defendant in
this action in Tarver's first amended complaint, filed on July
27, 2018. Like the utilities board, MCWA treats water from the
Tallapoosa River, after the water is first treated and
discharged by the City, and then sells that water to consumers
in Macon County.
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leachate contains "hazardous substances not present in the
'municipal waste deposited into the City's [stabilization]
pond by its other customers"; that Advanced Disposal "has
discharged into the City's [stabilization] pond leachate in
such quantities and of such quality, including both
concentration and constituents, incompatible with the known
technology of the [City's stabilization] pond"; that Advanced
Disposal knew that the City's stabilization pond was
"incapable of treating or filtering [Advanced Disposal]'s
leachate"; that Advanced Disposal "is the only source of
leachate discharged into the City's [stabilization] pond";
that Advanced Disposal's "leachate, even as a 
small percentage
of the total inflow into the City's [stabilization] pond,
results in a pass through of known carcinogens into the
Tallapoosa River"; that, "[d]ue to the concentration of
[Advanced Disposal]'s leachate and the constituents contained
therein, the only practical and viable way to prevent future
contamination of the Tallapoosa River is to require [Advanced
Disposal] to modify by pretreatment or otherwise the leachate
it draws from its landfill." Petition, Exhibit D, at 2-4.  
Tarver sought an injunction "requiring defendants to
cease and desist any further pollution of [Tarver's] water
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supply, and to remove their chemicals and toxins from the
water supply of [Tarver]." Specifically, Tarver sought,
"[a]mong 
other 
things, 
... 
an 
injunction requir[ing] 
[Advanced
Disposal], by pretreatment or otherwise, to remedy the
excessive quantities and hazardous quality of the leachate
generated by its Stone's Throw landfill."  Tarver included in
his second amended complaint what appears to be a statement of
his "reasons for nonjoinder" of the City pursuant to Rule
19(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.,4 stating:
"[Tarver] believes and alleges that the ...
defendants named herein are responsible for the
wrongs alleged, and that the City ... has done what
it can to cope with the problems caused by [Advanced
Disposal]'s dumping of its leachate into the City's
[stabilization] pond. ... Tarver believes that
[Advanced Disposal] and the other named defendants
are the only parties who can remedy the wrongs
alleged. ... Tarver therefore makes no claims
against the City."
In his response to the motions to dismiss for failure to
join an indispensable party, Tarver argued that the
allegations in his second amended complaint should be
considered for purposes of determining whether the City was an
4Rule 19(c) provides: "Pleading Reasons for Nonjoinder.
A pleading asserting a claim for relief shall state the names,
if known to the pleader, of any persons as described in
subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the
reasons why they are not joined."
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indispensable party under Rule 19(b) and that, since filing
his original complaint, he had had the opportunity to conduct
additional discovery and investigation, which allegedly
confirmed that, "although [Advanced Disposal]'s leachate is
indeed only a small percentage of the total volume of the
[City's stabilization] pond's influent, it is responsible for
100% of the outgoing carcinogenic contaminants that pollute
the Tallapoosa River."  Thus, Tarver said, he amended his
complaint to "clarify"
"(1) that the evidence is now clear that it is the
quantity, 
composition 
and 
concentration 
of
industrial leachate being dumped into the City's
[stabilization] pond, and not any other waste from
any other source, that is responsible for the
contamination of the Tallapoosa River and ...
Tarver's injuries; (2) that the evidence is now
clear that the only source of leachate is [Advanced
Disposal]; (3) that the only viable remedy for the
contamination of the Tallapoosa River is for
[Advanced 
Disposal] 
... 
(by 
pretreatment 
or
otherwise) to limit the quantity, composition and
concentration of the leachate it generates for
hauling to the City's [stabilization] pond, and (4)
that ... Tarver seeks no relief as to any other
portion 
of 
the 
City's 
[stabilization] 
pond's
influent or effluent ... and therefore makes no
claims against the City."
The trial court conducted a hearing on the pending
motions on September 17, 2019.  On October 8, 2019, the trial
court entered an order (1) dismissing the City from the action
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based on improper venue as to the City; (2) denying Advanced
Disposal's motion to dismiss Tarver's action, finding that the
City was not an indispensable party under Rule 19(b); and (3)
denying Advanced Disposal's request for alternative relief,
holding that Tarver's action would proceed in the trial court. 
Advanced Disposal timely petitioned this Court for a writ of
mandamus.
Standard of Review
It is well settled that a writ of mandamus is an
extraordinary remedy and that it is due to be issued only when
the party petitioning for the writ has demonstrated
"a clear legal right to the order sought, an
imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so, a lack of another
adequate remedy, and a proper invocation of the
jurisdiction of the court. Martin v. Loeb & Company,
Inc., 349 So. 2d 9, 10 (Ala. 1977). Mandamus is not
a substitute for appeal. State v. Cannon, 369 So. 2d
32, 33 (Ala. 1979)."
Ross v. Luton, 456 So. 2d 249, 254 (Ala. 1984).
In 
determining whether 
Advanced 
Disposal 
has 
demonstrated
a clear legal right to the relief it seeks –- an order
determining that the City is an indispensable party to
Tarver's action -- 
Advanced Disposal must demonstrate that the
trial court exceeded its discretion in concluding that the
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City was not an indispensable party and that the action could
proceed "in equity and good conscience" without the City. See
Melton v. Harbor Pointe, LLC, 57 So. 3d 695, 700 (Ala. 2010).
"There is no prescribed formula to be mechanically applied in
every case to determine whether a party is an indispensable
party or merely a proper or necessary one. This is a question
to be decided in the context of the particular case." J.R.
McClenney & Son, Inc. v. Reimer, 435 So. 2d 50, 52 (Ala. 1983)
(citing Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson,
390 U.S. 102 (1968)). 
Analysis
In Advanced Disposal, supra, a majority of this Court
held that the City was a necessary party under Rule 19(a);
although that determination was made based primarily on the
allegations in Tarver's original complaint, and although
Tarver's original complaint has been superseded and replaced
by Tarver's second amended complaint,5 we will assume, as the
5"An amended complaint supersedes the previously filed
complaint and becomes the operative pleading, unless it
subsequently is modified." Ex parte Puccio, 923 So. 2d 1069,
1072 (Ala. 2005) (citing Grayson v. Hanson, 843 So. 2d 146
(Ala. 2002)).  Advanced Disposal does not argue, and does not
cite any authority indicating, that the trial court could not
consider the allegations in Tarver's second amended complaint
in determining whether the City is an indispensable party
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trial court appears to have done below, that the City is still
a necessary party to this action under Rule 19(a). 
"If the court determines that the absentee is a person
who should be joined under Rule 19(a), '[r]ule 19(b) sets
forth four factors to consider in determining whether an
action should proceed in the absence of such a person.'" Ross,
456 So. 2d at 256 (quoting Mead Corp. v. City of Birmingham,
350 So. 2d 419, 421 (Ala. 1977)).  Rule 19(b) provides:
"(b) 
Determination 
by 
Court 
Whenever 
Joinder 
Not
Feasible. If a person as described in subdivision
(a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court
shall 
determine 
whether 
in 
equity 
and 
good
conscience the action should proceed among the
parties before it, or should be dismissed, the
absent person being thus regarded as indispensable.
The factors to be considered by the court include:
first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the
person's absence might be prejudicial to the person
or those already parties; second, the extent to
which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by
the shaping of relief, or other measures, the
prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether
a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be
adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an
adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for
nonjoinder."
Advanced Disposal argues that, despite Tarver's best
effort to diminish the City's role in the underlying dispute,
pursuant to Rule 19(b).
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it is still undisputed that Advanced Disposal delivers its
leachate to the City's stabilization pond where the leachate
is treated and "chemically altered" before it is discharged
into the Tallapoosa River ("the river") where it is then
collected and treated again by the utilities board and MCWA
and sold to individuals in Macon County, such as Tarver. 
Advanced Disposal further argues that, because the City's
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit ("the
NPDES permit") dictates the quality and quantity of effluent
it can discharge into the river, the City is "directly in the
center of the case [and is] the proximate cause of any alleged
pollutant discharged into the river." Petition at 15. 
Advanced Disposal contends that each of the Rule 19(b) factors
demonstrates that the City is an indispensable party to
Tarver's action against Advanced Disposal and that the action
cannot, in equity and good conscience, proceed without the
City.  We consider each Rule 19(b) factor in turn.
1. Prejudice
As to the first Rule 19(b) factor, which considers the
extent to which a judgment rendered in the City's absence
would be prejudicial to the City or to those already parties,
Advanced Disposal contends that "both [it] and the City face
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significant risk of prejudice by allowing this case to proceed
without the City." Petition at 21-22.  Advanced Disposal
contends that it will be prejudiced in the City's absence
because, given that the City takes "title, risk of loss, and
dominion" of the leachate once Advanced Disposal delivers the
leachate to the City's stabilization pond, it "exposes
Advanced Disposal to the risk of being found responsible for
the ownership, treatment, and discharge of a waste stream that
it does not own, treat, or discharge." Petition at 18. 
Advanced Disposal cites Whyham v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 96
F.R.D. 557 (M.D. Pa. 1982), in support of its position.  
In 
Whyham, 
the 
plaintiff 
sued 
the 
defendant, 
a
Pennsylvania company that designed and manufactured an
aircraft, asserting strict-liability claims after an aircraft
manufactured by the defendant crashed off the coast of
Scotland.  The defendant moved to dismiss the action based on
the plaintiff's failure to join as indispensable parties a
Scottish company that owned the aircraft at the time of the
crash and another Scottish company that had maintained and
inspected the aircraft.  The United States District Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania found that the Scottish
companies were necessary parties, that the absent Scottish
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companies could not be joined to the action, and that the
Scottish companies were indispensable parties under Rule 19,
Fed. R. Civ. P., which is nearly identical to Alabama's Rule
19.6  
Regarding the application of Rule 19(b), the Whyham court
found that both the defendant and the Scottish companies would
be prejudiced by the Scottish companies' absence from the
litigation.  Specifically with regard to the defendant, the
court found that "a judgment entered absent [the Scottish
companies'] 
presence 
subjects 
Defendant to 
being 
judged 
solely
responsible for a liability it possibly shares"; that the
defendant could not adequately present its defense in the
absence of the Scottish companies; and that the defendant
would be required to file a second action for indemnity or
contribution against the Scottish companies if the defendant
6See Committee Comments to Rule 19, Ala. R. Civ. P.
(noting that Alabama's Rule 19 "is identical to Federal Rule
19 except for elimination of language dealing with problems
related to service of process and subject matter jurisdiction
with which we are not concerned in state practice"). "We note
that federal decisions construing the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are persuasive authority in construing the Alabama
Rules of Civil Procedure because the Alabama Rules were
patterned after the Federal Rules." Ex parte Novus Utils.,
Inc., 85 So. 3d 988, 996 (Ala. 2011) (citing Borders v. City
of Huntsville, 875 So. 2d 1168 (Ala. 2003)).
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was found liable, which would subject the defendant to
"unnecessary waste of time, efforts, and costs of a second
proceeding." Whyham, 96 F.R.D. at 562. 
Although parts of Whyham have been discredited, see,
e.g., Angst v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 77 F.3d 701, 705
(3d Cir. 1996), and Incubadora Mexicana, SA de CV v. Zoetis,
Inc., 310 F.R.D. 166, 171 (E.D. Pa. 2015), Whyham does raise
important considerations for evaluating Rule 19(b) criteria. 
In Provident Tradesmens, supra, the United States Supreme
Court held that "Rule 19(b) suggests four 'interests' that
must be examined in each case to determine whether, in equity
and good conscience, the court should proceed without a party
whose absence from the litigation is compelled." 390 U.S. at
109.  One of the "interests" is that "the defendant may
properly wish to avoid multiple litigation, or inconsistent
relief, or sole responsibility for a liability he shares with
another." 390 U.S. at 110.  Although Advanced Disposal's
interest 
in 
avoiding 
multiple 
litigation, 
inconsistent 
relief,
and sole responsibility for liability it potentially shares
with the City must be properly considered, we find Whyham's
application limited in light of decisions by the United States
Supreme Court and the United States Courts of Appeals.
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In Temple v. Synthes Corp., 498 U.S. 5, 7 (1990), the
United States Supreme Court unequivocally held that it was
error for a lower court to label a joint tortfeasor an
indispensable party under Rule 19(b) based solely on
considerations of judicial economy and protecting the
defendant from the prejudice of multiple litigation.  The
Court 
acknowledged 
the interest 
in 
limiting 
multiple
litigation, but it also noted that "[i]t has long been the
rule that it is not necessary for all joint tortfeasors to be
named as defendants in a single lawsuit." 498 U.S. at 7. 
Additionally, to the extent that Advanced Disposal argues that
"[t]he risk in this case is not that Advanced Disposal will
shoulder a liability it 'possibly shares' with the City, but
that it will face a liability it simply doesn't have at all,"
Petition at 20, we are unpersuaded by this claim of
"prejudice."  Although we agree that, from a tactical
standpoint, Advanced Disposal's interests might be better
served if the City, as a potential joint tortfeasor, were
present in the action, if Advanced Disposal finds itself
facing a liability it purportedly does not have at all, it
would be because of a failure of its defense, not the absence
of the City from the litigation. Advanced Disposal has not
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demonstrated how the City's absence will hinder its ability to
present its defense, which appears to be that the City itself
is responsible for Tarver's injuries; Advanced Disposal has
posited no argument as to why it will be unable to cast the
blame entirely on the City if the City is not present in the
action.
Additionally, 
although 
Advanced 
Disposal 
generally
contends that the absence of the City "virtually guarantees
multiple litigation and potentially inconsistent relief," it
makes no effort to expound on that proposition.  To the extent
Advanced Disposal is referring to a potential action for
indemnity against the City should it be found liable to
Tarver, it is widely accepted that "potential indemnitors have
never been considered indispensable parties, or even parties
whose joinder is required if feasible." Pasco Int'l (London)
Ltd. v. Stenograph Corp., 637 F.2d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 1980)
(citing 3A Moore's Federal Practice § 19.07-1(2.-2), at n.32
(2d ed. 1979)). 
Further, to the extent Advanced Disposal argues that it
will be prejudiced by the City's absence because it could be
found 
"responsible for 
the 
ownership, 
treatment, 
and 
discharge
of a waste stream that it does not own, treat, or discharge,"
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Petition at 18, Tarver seeks damages from Advanced Disposal
based on its knowing delivery of leachate to the City in
quantities and quality that Advanced Disposal allegedly knew
the City's stabilization pond could not properly treat and an
injunction requiring Advanced Disposal to pretreat its
leachate or to otherwise deliver the leachate to the City in
a form that the City's stabilization pond could properly
treat; these requests for relief look to remedy Advanced
Disposal's actions before "title" of the leachate passes to
the City. 
Advanced Disposal also contends that the City will be
prejudiced by the City's absence in the underlying action
because, it says, the City's property –- i.e., the leachate –-
and its contractual rights will be "implicated." Petition at
20. It argues that "Alabama courts have time and again held
that parties claiming an interest in an action must be
joined." Petition at 21.  Our consideration of prejudice to
the City under the first factor of Rule 19(b) is closely
related to our conclusion in Advanced Disposal, supra, that
the City was a necessary party under Rule 19(a)(2) because the
City "has a legally protected interest relating to the subject
matter of this case that will be affected by the outcome of
22
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Tarver's claims." 280 So. 3d at 363.  Although the interests
at stake are similar, and we see no need to revisit our
conclusion in Advanced Disposal, our conclusion that the City
has a legally protected interest in the subject matter of this
case is not conclusive as to the question presented at this
stage of the proceeding: Would the absence of the City from
this action so prejudice its legally protected interest that,
in equity and good conscience, this action simply cannot
proceed without the City?  Because a dismissal of Tarver's
action is at stake, Rule 19(b) requires a closer examination
of exactly what "interest" of the City is at stake and whether
the interest is so jeopardized by the City's absence that this
action cannot proceed in the City's absence. See 7 Charles
Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1604 (4th
ed. 2019) ("Although there is significant coincidence between
the two provisions, it is important to note that the
protection against prejudice accorded by Rule 19(a) is not the
same as that provided by Rule 19(b). The two provisions have
different purposes. Rule 19(a) reflects an affirmative policy
of bringing all interested persons before the court, whereas
the object of Rule 19(b) is to determine whether it is
23
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possible to go forward with an action despite the nonjoinder
of someone whose presence is desirable but not feasible.").
However, in its petition, Advanced Disposal does not
attempt to define the precise interest at stake or the
ramifications for the City if it remains absent from this
action in light of the particular allegations in Tarver's
second amended complaint and the particular relief he seeks. 
The cases Advanced Disposal cites to support its argument that
any party with an "interest" in litigation is indispensable to
the action are distinguishable from the present case.  For
example, Albritton v. Dawkins, 19 So. 3d 241 (Ala. Civ. App.
2009), concerned a dispute over the plaintiffs' rights to a
piece of real property, but the plaintiffs did not join in the
action each individual who owned an interest in the real
property; thus, because a determination of the 
issue presented
to the trial court would impact the ownership interest of
several absent parties, the Court of Civil Appeals held that
those parties were "necessary and indispensable" to the
action.  Clearly, the present case is distinguishable because
Tarver is not attempting to "jeopardize" or otherwise impact
the City's "ownership interest" in the leachate.
24
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Regarding the City's contract rights that will be
"implicated," Advanced Disposal relies on the mere existence
of a contract between Advanced Disposal and the City in which
the City agreed to accept and treat the leachate for a fee. 
Although Advanced Disposal satisfied this Court that the
existence of that contract was sufficient to require the
City's joinder if feasible, it has not met its burden of
demonstrating that the rights of the City will be so unfairly
prejudiced in its absence that, in equity and good conscience,
this action cannot proceed without the City as a participant. 
Again, we find the cases Advanced Disposal cites to support
its argument distinguishable. For example, Advanced Disposal
cites Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir.
1975), for the proposition that "[n]o procedural principle is
more deeply imbedded in the common law than that, in an action
to set aside a lease or a contract, all parties who may be
affected 
by 
the 
determination 
of 
the 
action 
are
indispensable." (Emphasis added.)  We agree with that
statement of law, but it is clearly inapplicable in this case
because, unlike the circumstances in Lomayaktewa, Tarver, the
plaintiff, is not attempting to set aside a contract between
Advanced Disposal, the defendant, and an absent party, the
25
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City. See also National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v.
Rite Aid of South Carolina, Inc., 210 F.3d 246, 252 (4th Cir.
2000) (holding, in an action to determine an insurer's
obligation to its insured, a subsidiary, under the terms of an
insurance policy that was negotiated and entered into by the
subsidiary's parent company and in which the parent company's
conduct was at issue, that the parent company was an
indispensable party to the action and stating that a
"'contracting party is the paradigm of an indispensable
party'" (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Household Int'l,
Inc., 775 F. Supp. 518, 527 (D. Conn. 1991))); and County
Sanitation Dist. No. 2 of Los Angeles Cnty. v. Inland
Container Corp., 803 F.2d 1074, 1075-76, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986)
(holding, in an action to enjoin the defendant from acting in
a manner inconsistent with the terms of a contract between the
plaintiff and an absent party, which the absent party
allegedly breached for the benefit of the defendant, that the
absent party was indispensable).  In both Rite Aid and Inland
Container, the terms of the contract and the absent parties'
obligations under the contract were at the center of the
disputes.
26
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Advanced Disposal's bare assertion that the City would be
prejudiced because its contract rights were implicated is
insufficient to demonstrate that prejudice exists to the
extent that it should weigh in favor of the dismissal of
Tarver's action in the absence of the City. Even if we assume
that the leachate had value and that the City's obtainment of
title over the leachate was an interest the City wanted to
protect, Tarver's request for relief from Advanced Disposal
would not have an affect on the City's "interest" in the
leachate. Tarver is not seeking to "deprive" the City of its
interest in the leachate or to stop Advanced Disposal's
delivery of leachate to the City; he is simply asking the
trial court to order Advanced Disposal to pretreat the
leachate before it is delivered to the City –- and, thus,
before the City gains title to the leachate or any "rights" to
it under the contract -- so that the City's stabilization pond
can adequately treat the leachate before it is released into
the river.  At this juncture, there is nothing indicating that
Tarver's requested injunction would affect the City's right to
receive, or be paid for, the leachate.  
Finally, we must give some weight to the City's failure
to participate in the action when given the opportunity to do
27
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so.  The City's decision not to participate weighs in favor of
a conclusion that the City itself does not believe its absence
from the proceeding would result in any prejudice to it. Cf.
Dainippon Screen Mfg. Co. v. CFMT, Inc., 142 F.3d 1266, 1272
(Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Moreover, to the extent it would be
prejudiced if the suit were to proceed in its absence, [the
absent party] may intervene in the suit, and this 'opportunity
to intervene may be considered in calculating [any]
prejudicial effect.' Takeda v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 765 F.2d 815, 820 n.5 (9th Cir. 1985)."). 
Accordingly, considering the possibility of prejudice to
both Advanced Disposal and the City, we cannot conclude that
the potential for prejudice is so great or so certain that it
weighs in favor of a finding that the action cannot proceed,
in equity and good conscience, without the City.
2. Potential to Lessen Prejudice
The second Rule 19(b) factor requires consideration of
"the extent to which, by protective provisions in the
judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the
prejudice can be lessened or avoided."  Advanced Disposal
argues that it is "unaware of any protective measures by which
'prejudice can be lessened or avoided' in the City's absence"
28
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and that, therefore, the second Rule 19(b) factor weighs in
favor of finding that the City is indispensable. See Republic
of Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 865, 869, 870 (2008)
(after finding the existence of "substantial prejudice" to 
the
absent parties "if the action were to proceed in their
absence," the Court stated that "[n]o alternative remedies or
forms of relief have been proposed to us or appear to be
available" and concluded that this factor weighed in favor of
finding the absent parties indispensable under Rule 19(b)). 
Tarver, on the other hand, argues that, because there is no
risk of prejudice to either Advanced Disposal or the City,
there is no need for the Court to consider methods to lessen
or avoid prejudice if the action were allowed to proceed in
the City's absence. 
However, because of the polarity of the parties'
positions, they have overlooked some middle ground. As noted
above, 
avoiding 
multiple 
litigation 
and 
being 
held 
responsible
for a liability it potentially shares with the City are valid
concerns on Advanced Disposal's part.  However, the United
States Courts of Appeals have held that impleader under Rule
14, Fed. R. Civ. P., provides an option to a defendant to
lessen or avoid any potential for prejudice by a party's
29
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absence from a proceeding. For example, in Pasco, supra, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
considered whether an absent party, Croxford, who was the
agent of the defendant, Stenograph, and a potential
coconspirator of Stenograph's, was an indispensable party to
the plaintiff's action against Stenograph alleging breach of
contract and tort claims.  In discussing the potential
prejudice to Stenograph, the defendant, in the absence of
Croxford, its agent, as a party to the action, the court
stated:
"Quite apart from any prejudice to Croxford,
Stenograph argues that it will be prejudiced in two
ways by Croxford's absence from this suit. The first
alleged source of prejudice concerns the possibility
of an inconsistent result in any later litigation
between Stenograph and Croxford. If Stenograph is
found liable here, it may wish to assert a claim for
contribution or indemnity against Croxford. But,
potential indemnitors have never been considered
indispensable parties, or even parties whose joinder
is required if feasible. 3A Moore's Federal Practice
P 19.07-1(2.-2), at n.32 (2d ed. 1979). The same
situation as to indispensability and joinder applies
to joint tort-feasors subject to a possible right of
contribution. Id., at n.45. Since the liability of
potential indemnitors or joint tort-feasors is
'several,' one of a number of joint tort-feasors or
a tort-feasor with a potential indemnitor may be
sued alone.
"'The defendant, while he may be
entitled to contribution or indemnity,
cannot be subjected to double or multiple
30
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obligations since his liability is several
for the entire amount, and though a verdict
against 
him 
in 
a 
later 
suit 
for
contribution after a verdict against him in
the 
tort 
suit 
may 
be 
logically
inconsistent, it does not subject him to
inconsistent 
obligations.... 
To 
dismiss 
the
action on the ground that the absent person
is indispensable ... would be to deny a
principle 
(sic) 
aspect 
of 
several
liability.'
"Id. Stenograph can always protect itself from the
possibility of inconsistent verdicts by impleading
Croxford under Rule 14 as a person 'who is or may be
liable to (Stenograph) for all or a part of the
plaintiff's claim.' Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a). Contrary
to defendant's assertion, this does not use Rule 14
to thwart Rule 19. Rather, the existence of the Rule
14 provisions demonstrates that parties such as
Croxford who may be impleaded under Rule 14 are not
indispensable parties within Rule 19(b). If persons
subject to rights of indemnity or contribution were
always indispensable parties, there would not be a
need for the impleader provisions of Rule 14. See
Willis v. Semmes, Bowen & Semmes, 441 F. Supp. 1235,
1246 (E.D. Va. 1972); 3A Moore's Federal Practice P
19.07-1(2.-2), at 19-145 (2d ed. 1979).
"The second factor under Rule 19(b) provides
independent support for this conclusion. This factor
requires that the district court evaluate
"'the extent to which, by protective
provisions in the judgment, by the shaping
of relief, or other measures, the prejudice
can be lessened or avoided ....'
"Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). The Advisory Committee's
Note which was appended when Rule 19 was amended in
1966 indicates that the phrase 'other measures'
includes measures open to the defendant to avoid any
prejudice. 39 F.R.D. 88, 92 (1966). The opportunity
31
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of defendants to implead Croxford under Rule 14
avoids any potential for prejudice to Stenograph
from the possibility of inconsistent judgments."
Pasco Int'l, 637 F.2d at 503–04 (footnotes omitted; emphasis
added).
The Court of Appeals in Pasco also applied the
defendant's ability to implead the absent party as a third-
party defendant under Rule 14 to conclude that the defendant
would not be prejudiced by the potential unavailability of the
absent party's testimony if he was not made a party.  The
Court of Appeals stated: 
"This repeated application of Rule 14 to this
case means that all persons subject to impleader by
the defendant are not indispensable parties. This
is, however, merely an extension of the settled
doctrine that Rule 19(b) was not intended to require
the joinder of persons subject to impleader under
Rule 14 such as potential indemnitors. Advisory
Committee's Note to Rule 19, 39 F.R.D. 88, 91
(1966)."
Pasco, 637 F.2d at 505 n.20.
Like Rule 14(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 14(a), Ala. R.
Civ. P., provides a procedure for a defending party, referred
to as the "third-party plaintiff," to bring an action against
"a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to
the third-party plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's
claim against the third-party plaintiff."  Further, as to
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whether venue in Macon County would be proper if Advanced
Disposal filed an impleader action against the City, Rule
82(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides: "Whenever an action has been
commenced in a proper county, additional claims and parties
may be joined, pursuant to Rule[] 14 ..., as ancillary
thereto, without regard to whether that county would be a
proper venue for an independent action on such claims or
against such parties."  Thus, it appears that Advanced
Disposal could use third-party practice under the Alabama
Rules of Civil Procedure as a method of reducing any prejudice
it might be subject to by the possibility of multiple
litigation or inconsistent relief.
Although a majority of this Court held in Advanced
Disposal 
that 
the 
possibility 
of 
Advanced 
Disposal's 
impleader
of the City under Rule 14 had no bearing on its analysis of
whether the City was a party to be joined if feasible under
Rule 19(a), see Advanced Disposal, 280 So. 3d at 359 n.2, we
conclude that proper analysis of the Rule 19(b) factors
requires consideration of whether Rule 14 can be used to
lessen any potential prejudice to absent or present parties.
See 7 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1608 (4th ed. 2019) (stating that "absent persons
33
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or those who already are parties should be encouraged to take
steps to avoid the possibility of prejudice," that the use of
impleader is one method for doing so, and concluding: "In
short, the Rule 19(b) notion of equity and good conscience
contemplates that the parties actually before the court are
obliged to pursue any avenues for eliminating the threat of
prejudice.").  
Accordingly, we conclude that the 
second factor
weighs in favor of concluding that the City is not an
indispensable party.
3. Adequate Judgment
The third Rule 19(b) factor requires consideration of
whether "a judgment rendered in [the City's] absence will be
adequate."  Regarding this factor, the United States Supreme
Court, in Provident Tradesmens, stated:
"[T]here remains the interest of the courts and the
public in complete, consistent, and efficient
settlement of controversies. We read [Rule 19(b)'s]
third criterion, whether the judgment issued in the
absence of the nonjoined person will be 'adequate,'
to refer to this public stake in settling disputes
by wholes, whenever possible, for clearly the
plaintiff, who himself chose both the forum and the
parties defendant, will not be heard to complain
about the sufficiency of the relief obtainable
against them."
390 U.S. at 111. See also Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel,
553 U.S. 851, 870-71 (2008) (noting, where two absent foreign
34
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sovereigns asserted a right to certain assets that were the
subject of an interpleader action, that the absent sovereigns
would not be bound by a judgment in favor of the individuals
who were awarded the assets and that, therefore, proceeding in
the absence of the foreign sovereigns "would not further the
public interest in settling the dispute as a whole"); and
Northern Arapaho Tribe v. Harnsberger, 697 F.3d 1272, 1283
(10th Cir. 2012) (holding, in an action by a tribe to
determine whether part of its reservation was 
"Indian country"
and, thus, not subject to taxation by the state, that the
action could not proceed in the absence of another tribe that
was a "cotenant" on the same reservation because relief would
not be adequate; a judgment without the "cotenant tribe" would
not completely settle the underlying dispute regarding the
state's power to tax the land at issue because the absent
tribe could force the state to relitigate the issue in a
separate action, which could lead to inconsistent results).
Advanced Disposal argues that "Tarver's entire action
seeks redress for alleged pollution in his water supply, and
he cannot obtain that relief without the City." Petition at
23.  It contends that our conclusion regarding the application
of Rule 19(a)(1) in Advanced Disposal –- that, in the absence
35
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of the City, "complete relief [could not] be accorded among
those already parties" -- essentially answers this question. 
We disagree.  Although Rule 19(a)(1) and the third factor of
Rule 19(b) overlap to some degree, they are not identical.  A
majority of this Court in Advanced Disposal held that complete
relief could not be accorded among those already parties
because it appeared, from the facts available at that time, 
that Advanced Disposal's contribution of leachate to the
City's stabilization pond was so minimal that Tarver's
requested 
injunction 
would 
not 
have 
prevented 
the
contamination of his water supply.  However, at this stage of
the proceeding, and considering the second amended complaint,
we must consider whether the judgment will be adequate --
i.e., whether it will settle the underlying dispute.  
Our review of the second amended complaint convinces us
that Tarver can obtain adequate relief in the City's absence. 
The controversy involved in this action is the alleged
pollution of Tarver's water supply. The allegations in
Tarver's second amended complaint indicate that Advanced
Disposal is the sole source of leachate in the City's
stabilization pond and that Advanced Disposal's leachate is
the only reason the City's stabilization pond releases harmful
36
1190148
by-products into the river.  Thus, if Tarver is awarded his
requested injunction against Advanced Disposal so that
Advanced Disposal is required to pretreat the leachate before
it is delivered to the City, which, according to Tarver, would
allow the City to effectively treat the leachate before it is
released into the river, we fail to see how the injunction
would not settle the controversy at issue –- i.e., prevent
Tarver from being further supplied allegedly polluted water
from the river.  Advanced Disposal does not set forth any
argument specifically addressing Tarver's amended request for
injunctive relief –- which would require Advanced Disposal to
pretreat the leachate so that the City's stabilization pond
could adequately treat the leachate –- explaining why such
relief, in light of the above allegations of fact, would not
serve as adequate relief for Tarver, even in the City's
absence. 
Advanced Disposal also contends that any judgment in this
action without the City would be inadequate because, whether
Tarver or Advanced Disposal prevails, "it will inevitably lead
to further litigation over the City's liability, if any, for
Tarver's alleged injury." Petition at 24.  This subsequent
litigation could involve Advanced Disposal if the City asks
37
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Advanced Disposal to indemnify the City on any claim brought
by Tarver against the City.  As noted above, however, the
third factor considers the extent to which a judgment in the
present action settles the controversy at issue, which, in
this case, is Tarver's being provided allegedly polluted water
from the river.  Any conclusion that a judgment in this case
would not be adequate based on the possibility that Tarver
could sue the City would be based on speculation, especially
considering that Tarver explicitly stated in his second
amended complaint that he does not believe that any action on
the part of the City can remedy the wrongs alleged in that
complaint.  To the extent Tarver could seek monetary damages
from the City in a separate action to compensate him for past
harms, Advanced Disposal has not demonstrated that such an
action would prevent adequate relief in the present case.  If
the possibility of later litigation against an absent party
was always an indication that "adequate relief" could not be
provided in any particular case, then joint tortfeasors would
almost always be indispensable parties under Rule 19(b). 
However, as discussed supra, that is not the case. See Pasco,
637 F.2d at 505 (holding that the possibility of subsequent
litigation between either the plaintiff or the defendant and
38
1190148
the absent party, the absent party being either a joint
tortfeasor or a potential indemnitor, was not "an eventuality
that Rule 19 was designed to avoid" and concluding that the
possibility of further litigation was insufficient to 
make the
absent party indispensable under Rule 19(b)).  Accordingly,
this factor weighs in favor of the City not being
indispensable to the present action.
4. Adequate Remedy if Case Dismissed
The final factor we must consider under Rule 19(b) is
whether Tarver "will have an adequate remedy if the action is
dismissed 
for 
nonjoinder." 
 
Again 
citing 
Provident Tradesmens,
supra, Advanced Disposal argues that Tarver's interest under
the fourth Rule 19(b) factor is in having a forum in which to
litigate his claims –- not necessarily the forum of his choice
–- and it is undisputed that Tarver could have brought this
action against the defendants and the City in Elmore County.
See Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 109 ("[T]he plaintiff
has an interest in having a forum.  Before the trial, the
strength of this interest obviously depends upon whether a
satisfactory alternative forum exists.").
As he did before the trial court, Tarver argues that the
fact that there exists an alternate forum where the defendants
39
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and the City could be sued should be given little weight in
light of the fact that the other Rule 19(b) factors did not
weigh in favor of finding the City to be an indispensable
party to this action.  He also argues, as he did below, that
if this action is dismissed and he attempts to refile this
action against the defendants and the City, he will surely be
met with a statute-of-limitations defense asserted by those
parties.7 However, we see no need to determine whether
Tarver's claims would or would not be barred by the statute of
limitations if this action was dismissed and he was forced to
refile his claims in another forum. 
Even assuming that Tarver had an alternate forum in which
to file all of his claims, this fact, standing alone, does not
require a conclusion that the City is indispensable. "Because
Rule 19(b) does not state the weight to be given each factor,
the district court in its discretion must determine the
importance of each in the context of the particular case."
Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 104
F.3d 1205, 1211 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Glenny v. American
7There is no indication in the materials before this Court
that the defendants agreed to waive any applicable statute-of-
limitations defenses that might be available if Tarver was
required to refile this action in Elmore County.
40
1190148
Metal Climax, Inc., 494 F.2d 651, 653 (10th Cir. 1974)).  In
Pasco, supra, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that
"[t]he availability of an alternative forum is primarily of
negative significance under Rule 19. The absence of an
alternative forum would weigh heavily, if not conclusively[,]
against dismissal while the existence of another forum would
not have as significant an impact in favor of dismissal." 637
F.2d at 501 n.9.  In that case, although an alternative forum
was available, the court held that, "[w]hile the availability
of the alternative ... forum renders a Rule 19(b) dismissal
less onerous, 'we do not view the availability of an
alternative remedy, standing alone, as a sufficient reason for
deciding that the action should not proceed among the parties
before the court.'" Pasco, 637 F.2d at 501 (quoting
Bio-Analytical Servs., Inc. v. Edgewater Hosp., Inc., 565 
F.2d
450, 453 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing Bonnet v. Trustees of Schools
of Township 41 North, 563 F.2d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 1977))). The
court stated that the plaintiff had an interest in the forum
provided by federal law and chosen by him and that, "[t]o
outweigh the plaintiff's choice some additional interest of
the absent person, the other parties or the judicial system
must be found." Pasco, 637 F.2d at 501.  Despite the fact that
41
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the court in Pasco acknowledged that the absent party's
"activities are the central focus of this litigation," 637
F.2d at 504, and that there was a possibility of later
litigation between the parties present in the action and the
absent party, it concluded that these were not sufficient
reasons to "relegate this suit" to the alternate forum. 637
F.2d at 506.
We reach the same conclusion here. Tarver has an interest
in proceeding in his chosen forum, and Advanced Disposal has
not demonstrated that any of the other interests subject to
consideration under Rule 19(b) weigh so heavily in favor of
dismissal that the existence of an alternate forum should be
controlling. 
5. Final Considerations and Request for Alternate Relief
In its reply brief, Advanced Disposal argues that the
City plays such a central role in this action that its
presence is crucial. See B. Fernández & HNOS, Inc. v. Kellogg
USA, Inc., 516 F.3d 18, 27 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding, where the
complaint included 20 references to an absent affiliate that
was alleged to have committed the violations of law at issue
in the complaint, that, because the absent affiliate was "a
central player –- perhaps even the primary actor -- in the
42
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alleged breach, the practical course" was to proceed in a
forum where the absent affiliate could be joined).  For the
reasons stated herein, we disagree that this action cannot
proceed in equity and good conscience without the City. The
City's role in the underlying dispute potentially makes the
City a joint tortfeasor with Advanced Disposal, the utilities
board, and MCWA; it does not, however, make the City an
indispensable party under the particular facts of this case. 
Additionally, although the Court might prefer any
potential claims related to this action to be addressed at one
time in one forum, "judicial economy and convenience do not in
themselves provide grounds for dismissal" under Rule 19. 
Boone
v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 682 F.2d 552, 554 (5th
Cir. 1982). Advanced Disposal did not demonstrate that the
trial court exceeded its discretion by concluding that
Tarver's action could in equity and good conscience proceed
without the City.  Accordingly, Advanced Disposal has not
demonstrated that it has a clear legal right to an order
dismissing 
Tarver's 
action 
for 
failure 
to 
join 
an
indispensable party pursuant to Rule 19(b). 
Finally, we briefly address Advanced Disposal's request
for alternate relief –- an order requiring the trial court to
43
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transfer this action to Elmore County where the City could be
joined. Advanced Disposal has not cited any authority
indicating that a change of venue to Elmore County would be
appropriate in this case, especially in light of the fact that
we have concluded that the City is not an indispensable party
pursuant to Rule 19(b).8  Accordingly, Advanced Disposal's
request for alternate relief is denied.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Advanced Disposal's
petition for a writ of mandamus is denied.
PETITION DENIED. 
Parker, C.J., and Mendheim, Stewart, and Mitchell, JJ.,
concur.
Sellers, J., concurs in the result.
Bolin, J., dissents.
Wise, J., recuses herself.
8This Court has generally held that "'[t]he absence of a
necessary and indispensable party necessitates the dismissal
of the cause without prejudice or a reversal with directions
to allow the cause to stand over for amendment.'" Liberty
Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. University of Alabama Health Servs.
Found., P.C., 881 So. 2d 1013, 1022 (Ala. 2003) (quoting J.C.
Jacobs Banking Co. v. Campbell, 406 So. 2d 834, 850–51 (Ala.
1981)).  
44