Case Title: Turcq v. Shanahan

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-12-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Turcq v. Shanahan1997 WY 144950 P.2d 47Case Number: 96-236Decided: 12/16/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

DONNA TURCQ, n/k/a DONNA SASSO,  

Appellant (Defendant), 

 

v. 

 

DEBRA L. SHANAHAN,  

Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from The District Court, Albany County 

Arthur T. 
Hanscum, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Becky N. 
Klemt of Pence & MacMillan, Laramie.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

Mason F. 
Skiles (argued) and Joseph A. Rodriguez of Skiles & Associates, LLC, 
Laramie.

 

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

THOMAS, Justice. 

[¶1]      The issues in 
this case arise out of a rather singular infliction of harm upon Debra L. 
Shanahan (Shanahan), an animal control officer, by a Great Dane owned by Donna 
Turcq, n/k/a Donna Sasso (Turcq). When Turcq left the Great Dane unattended, but 
tied, in her back yard, Shanahan answered a call complaining of the dog's 
barking. Shanahan was injured when she attempted to force the animal into her 
animal control vehicle. Turcq appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict 
in favor of Shanahan, raising as a primary issue the failure of the theory of 
the case instruction, given by the court at Shanahan's request, to adequately 
advise the jury of the element of proximate causation. Collateral issues relate 
to the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to Turcq's negligence and, in 
the alternative, proximate cause; the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the 
award of damages by the jury; and the refusal of the trial court to require the 
jury to itemize damages on the verdict form. We hold that, when the theory of 
the case instruction offered by Shanahan is read with all of the instructions, 
the law given to the jury relative to proximate cause was correct; there was 
sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's findings of negligence and proximate 
cause; and the trial court did not err in not requiring the jury to itemize 
damages on the verdict form. The Judgment entered in the trial court based upon 
the jury verdict is affirmed.

 

[¶2]      The issues 
asserted in the Brief of Appellant are:

 

I.          
Was there insufficient evidence for the jury to have found the dog owner 
negligent, or if the dog owner was negligent, for the jury to have found that 
negligence to have proximately caused the animal control officer's 
injuries?

 

II.          
Did the trial court err in giving the animal control officer's "theory of 
the case" instruction to the jury?

 

III.         Was 
there insufficient evidence for the jury to have made its damage award to the 
animal control officer?

 

IV.        Did the 
trial court err in refusing to require the jury to itemize damages on the 
verdict form?

 

In the Brief of Appellee the 
same issues are adopted with minor editorial differences.

 

[¶3]      On May 9, 1991, 
Shanahan was employed as an animal control officer by the City of Laramie. On 
that day, she responded to a complaint from neighbors that a dog was barking at 
Turcq's residence. Shanahan was familiar with the neighborhood because she had 
been dispatched to Turcq's residence five times previously to address complaints 
of a barking dog. When she arrived at Turcq's residence, Shanahan discovered 
that the source of the complaint was Turcq's Great Dane, which was tied up in 
Turcq's back yard.

 

[¶4]      Shanahan 
determined that Turcq was not at home, and she placed a warning notice on the 
front door of the house. Shanahan then obtained a heavy leather leash from her 
vehicle, and proceeded into the back yard in order to impound the Great Dane. In 
the back yard, she first attempted to stop the animal from barking by talking to 
it. After a short time, a young boy, who was familiar with the Great Dane, 
arrived at the scene, and he began petting the dog and talking to it. The dog 
then stopped barking, and Shanahan approached the dog and began to pet it. She 
placed the leash over the dog's head, and lead it to her vehicle in front of the 
residence.

 

[¶5]      When Shanahan 
reached the vehicle, she wrapped the leather leash around the dog's nose and jaw 
as a precautionary measure, but when she leaned over the Great Dane, in order to 
lift it into the back of the vehicle, the dog escaped from the temporary muzzle. 
It was able to reach Shanahan's head; open its jaws wide enough to surround her 
head; and inflict severe bites. Ultimately the dog released Shanahan, and she 
was able to radio the police dispatcher for assistance. As a result of those 
bites, Shanahan suffered severe injuries to her head and her 
jaw.

 

[¶6]      Shanahan brought 
this action to recover for her injuries, relying upon the theories of negligence 
and strict liability. A summary judgment was entered dismissing the strict 
liability claim, and the case went to trial before a jury of six persons upon 
Shanahan's claim of negligence. At the trial, the court submitted a theory of 
the case instruction offered by Shanahan which stated:

 

It is the Plaintiff, Debra Shanahan's theory of the 
case that Defendant was negligent in tying the dog up in the back yard of her 
residence and it was the negligence of the Defendant that was the proximate 
cause of the Plaintiff's injuries.

 

More specifically stated, it is the Plaintiff's 
contention that the Defendant had a legal duty, set out by city ordinance, to 
keep her dog from becoming a nuisance by continually barking; that the Defendant 
knew of this duty and that if her dog continued to bark some type of action 
would be taken by the animal control officer. The Defendant breached this duty 
by allowing her dog to bark and that as a result of the Defendant's breach of 
duty to keep the dog from barking the Plaintiff was dispatched to the 
Defendant's residence to take some action in regard to the barking dog. As a 
result of her being forced to take some action in regard to the barking dog, 
Plaintiff suffered severe injuries. Plaintiff further states that it was 
foreseeable to the Defendant that if the dog continued to bark an animal control 
officer would be dispatched to the residence to take some action regarding the 
dog and that some injury or harm might result from the Defendant's failure to 
control her barking dog. As a result of the injuries suffered by Plaintiff, 
because of Defendant's breach of duty, Plaintiff suffered damages. It was the 
negligence of the Defendant which was the foreseeable and proximate cause of 
Plaintiff's injuries.

 

[¶7]      The trial court 
also submitted two additional instructions addressing the concept of proximate 
cause. Jury Instruction No. 12 advised the jury:

 

An injury or damage is caused by an act, or a failure 
to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or 
omission played a substantial part in bringing about the injury or 
damage.

(See Wyoming Civil Pattern 
Jury Instruction, No. 3.04 (1994) for identical language.) Jury Instruction No. 
26 stated that:

The law does not charge a person with all the 
consequences of a wrongful act, but ignores remote causes and only looks to the 
proximate cause.

 

[¶8]      Following 
deliberations, the jury returned a verdict in which it found that 45% of the 
total fault should be attributed to Shanahan and 55% of the total fault should 
be attributed to Turcq. It found that the total of damages sustained by Shanahan 
was $150,000, of which $6,000 should be attributed to past medical expenses and 
$4,000 should be attributed to future medical expenses. Although, the trial 
court ruled that the evidence was not sufficient to support the $4,000 award for 
future medical expenses, it entered a judgment upon the verdict in which 
Shanahan was awarded $82,500, with statutory interest, and costs in the amount 
of $976.54. Turcq has appealed from that judgment.

 

[¶9]      By our decisions, 
the elements of a negligence claim are firmly established as: 1) a duty owed by 
the defendant to the plaintiff; 2) a breach of that duty by the defendant; 3) 
the breach is the proximate cause; 4) of injuries to the plaintiff. Vasquez By and Through Vasquez v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 913 P.2d 441, 443 (Wyo. 1996); Downen v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 887 P.2d 515, 520 (Wyo. 1994). Proximate cause is explained as "the accident or injury 
must be the natural and probable consequence of the act of negligence." Bettencourt v. Pride Well Service, Inc., 
735 P.2d 722, 726 (Wyo. 1987); followed 
in, Natural Gas Processing Co. v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Wyo. 1994); Lynch v. Norton Const., Inc., 861 P.2d 1095, 1099 (Wyo. 1993). The ultimate test of proximate cause is foreseeability 
of injury. Stephenson v. Pacific Power 
& Light Co., 779 P.2d 1169, 1178 (Wyo. 1989); McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 
414 (Wyo. 1983). In order to qualify as a legal cause, the conduct must be a 
substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's injuries. Natural Gas Processing Co., 886 P.2d  at 
1186; Stephenson, 779 P.2d  at 
1178.

 

[¶10]   The primary claim of error made by 
Turcq in this case is that the theory of the case instruction, offered by 
Shanahan and given by the trial court, did not adequately articulate the element 
of proximate causation. We recognize that a party is entitled to have the jury 
instructed upon its theory of the case, assuming that the theory is supported by 
competent evidence. Thunder Hawk By and 
Through Jensen v. Union Pacific R. Co., 891 P.2d 773, 783 (Wyo. 1995); Haderlie v. Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703, 
718 (Wyo. 1993). In evaluating jury instructions as a matter of law, our rule 
is:

 

 

In considering the validity of instructions to a 
jury, we must determine whether the instructions, taken as a whole, adequately 
advise the jury of the applicable law. 
Banks v. Crowner, 694 P.2d 101 (Wyo. 1985). Proper instructions should be 
clear declarations of the pertinent law. Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, Inc., 731 P.2d 1195 (Wyo. 1987). The ruling of a trial court on an instruction will not 
constitute reversible error unless there is a showing of prejudice, which 
connotes a demonstration by the complaining party that the instruction misled or 
confused the jury with respect to the applicable principles of law. DeJulio v. Foster, 715 P.2d 182 (Wyo. 
1986).

 

L.U. Sheep Co. v. Board of County Com'rs of County of 
Hot Springs, 790 P.2d 663, 672 (Wyo. 
1990); followed in, Thunder Hawk, 891 P.2d  at 782-83. See also Vasquez, 913 P.2d  at 443.

 

[¶11]   We agree with the comment of the 
trial court that Shanahan's theory of the case instruction was not as concise as 
it might have been. It did, however, adequately inform the jury with respect to 
the applicable principles of law. When considered together with Jury Instruction 
No. 12 and Jury Instruction No. 26, quoted above, which were given to the jury 
to avoid confusion upon the question of proximate cause, we are satisfied that 
the jury was adequately instructed. The theory of the case instruction offered 
by Shanahan was not erroneous in light of all the 
instructions.

 

[¶12]   Turcq also argues that there was 
not sufficient evidence of negligence and proximate cause to support the verdict 
in favor of Shanahan. When we analyze a claim of error attacking the sufficiency 
of the evidence, our review is conducted in accordance with this 
standard:

 

The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence is well established. On review, this court assumes that the evidence in 
favor of the successful party is true. Richardson v. Schaub, 796 P.2d 1304, 
1309 (Wyo. 1990). We leave out of consideration entirely the evidence presented 
by the unsuccessful party that conflicts with the evidence of the successful 
party, and we afford to the evidence of the successful party every favorable 
inference that may be reasonably and fairly drawn from it. Richardson, 796 P.2d  at 1310; DeJulio v. Foster, 715 P.2d 182, 185 
(Wyo. 1986).

 

Kadrmas v. Valley West Homeowner's 
Ass'n, 848 P.2d 826, 828 (Wyo. 
1993); followed in, Cundy Asphalt Paving 
Const., Inc. v. Angelo Materials Co., 915 P.2d 1181, 1183 (Wyo. 
1996).

 

[¶13]   Our cases establish that the owner 
of a dog can be held liable for injuries proximately caused as a result of the 
dog owner's negligent care and control of a domestic animal, or upon "duties 
created by state statutes or municipal ordinances which alter the duties imposed 
by common law * * *." Williams v. 
Johnson, 781 P.2d 922, 923 (Wyo. 1989). See also, Endresen v. Allen, 574 P.2d 1219, 1222-23 (Wyo. 1978). In this instance, there is no dispute that Turcq had 
a duty to keep her Great Dane from barking. She not only had a duty to care for 
and control her animal in a reasonable manner, but she also had a duty to insure 
that her animal did not violate the ordinance of the City of Laramie relating to 
barking dogs. It is equally clear from the record that Turcq's duty was breached 
when she left the Great Dane tied up in the back yard of her residence, and the 
dog then barked for at least two hours. The record also demonstrates that 
Shanahan suffered severe injuries because of the bites inflicted by the Great 
Dane.

 

[¶14]   The focus of the issue is whether 
the Turcq's failure to prevent the dog from barking was a proximate cause of the 
injuries to Shanahan. Proximate cause is a question of fact in the usual case, 
reserved for the determination by the trier of fact, unless the evidence is such 
that reasonable minds could not disagree. Duncan v. Town of Jackson, 903 P.2d 548, 
553 (Wyo. 1995); Downen, 887 P.2d  at 
520; Lynch, 861 P.2d  at 1099. As we 
have earlier stated, the ultimate test of proximate cause is foreseeability of 
the injury. Stephenson, 779 P.2d  at 
1178; McClellan, 666 P.2d  at 
414.

 

[¶15]   The evidence in this record 
establishes that Turcq was aware that the Great Dane consistently barked. 
Shanahan had been dispatched to Turcq's residence five previous times to address 
complaints about the dog barking. The former chief of police for the City of 
Laramie testified that, if an owner was in violation of the city ordinance and 
the animal control officer was unable to contact the owner, the procedure to be 
followed was for the animal control officer to impound the animal and attempt to 
notify the owner. It was foreseeable that an animal control officer would be 
summoned to Turcq's residence to respond to any complaint of the dog barking, 
and if Turcq was not at home, it was foreseeable that the animal control officer 
would take appropriate steps to impound the animal. The thrust of this evidence 
is that reasonable minds could arrive at the conclusion that the incident was 
foreseeable, and that Turcq's failure to satisfy her duty of caring for and 
controlling her Great Dane proximately resulted in the injuries to 
Shanahan.

 

[¶16]   Turcq also attacks the sufficiency 
of the evidence of damages to justify the award made by the jury. Shanahan 
sought damages for past and future medical care; past and future mental and 
emotional pain; past and future loss of enjoyment of life; past and future loss 
of wages; permanent disfigurement and disability; and an impaired earning 
capacity. Shanahan's testimony established that, after the dog bit her, she was 
taken to a hospital by ambulance where doctors placed approximately two hundred 
stitches into her head. She later was referred to a specialist for treatment of 
her jaw which she was unable to open because of scar tissue which formed from 
the dog bite. At one point, she was referred to a brain injury recovery program 
for rehabilitation. At the time the trial was held, Shanahan still had problems 
with her vision, memory lapses, headaches, and a loss of hearing. The product of 
these injuries was that she was medically terminated as an animal control 
officer for the City of Laramie. The claims for lost wages resulted from the 
termination.

 

[¶17]   The jury found that Shanahan's 
total damages were $150,000, which included $6,000 in past medical expenses and 
$4,000 in future medical expenses.1 With the evidence introduced at 
trial relating to all of Shanahan's difficulties, the evidence was sufficient to 
support the finding by the jury of total damages of $150,000. The jury 
attributed 45% of the fault to Shanahan for her injuries, and pursuant to the 
comparative fault statute, Shanahan's award was reduced to 55% of the $150,000. 
WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109 (Supp. 1995).

 

[¶18]   Turcq's final claim of error 
challenges the refusal of the trial court to require the jury to itemize damages 
on the verdict form. The submission of or the failure to submit a particular 
form of special verdict is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court. Duffy v. Brown, 708 P.2d 433, 439 (Wyo. 
1985), and cases there cited; Tadday v. 
National Aviation Underwriters, 660 P.2d 1148, 1153 (Wyo. 1983); North Central Gas Co. v. Bloem, 376 P.2d 382, 385 (Wyo. 1962). All of these cases interpret and apply WYO. R. CIV. P. 49. 
Turcq objected to the verdict form at trial, and the issue is preserved for 
appeal. Duffy, 708 P.2d  at 439. The 
rationale supplied by the trial court for the special verdict form which 
encompassed only past medical expenses and future medical expenses, involved two 
propositions. First, the damages for past medical expenses were stipulated to be 
$5,997, and the district court wanted to insure that the jury would not award 
any amount beyond that figure. Second, the trial court was in doubt as to 
whether Shanahan had adequately established future medical expenses, and wanted 
to reserve judgment on that issue, pursuant to WYO. R. CIV. P. 50, if the jury 
found future medical expenses. In this particular instance, we discern no abuse 
of discretion on the part of the trial court in refusing to require itemization 
of general damages or other special damages on the verdict 
form.

 

[¶19]   The Judgment entered by the trial 
court on the jury verdict in this case is affirmed.

 

Footnotes

1 The district judge, in accordance with 
WYO. R. CIV. P. 50, ruled that the $4,000 awarded by the jury in future medical 
expenses was not supported as a matter of law because Shanahan had failed to 
present sufficient evidence of future medical 
expenses.