Case Title: People v. Burns

Citation: 

Docket Number: 95987

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2004-04-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 95987-Agenda 7-January 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 							
ROBERT W. BURNS, Appellee.
Opinion filed April 15, 2004. 
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	At issue in this case is whether a respondent filing an application for
recovery under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (the SDPA) (725
ILCS 205/0.01 et seq. (West 2000)), is entitled to an independent
psychiatric examination. The appellate court reversed the La Salle County
circuit court's order denying respondent's motion for an independent
psychiatric exam, holding that a respondent in a recovery proceeding has
a due process right to such an exam. 337 Ill. App. 3d 224. We allowed
the State's petition for leave to appeal from the appellate court's decision.
177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

BACKGROUND
	On November 25, 1985, respondent, Robert W. Burns, was
charged by information with aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12-16. The information alleged that respondent
had placed his mouth on the penis of a boy who was under the age of 13
for purposes of his own sexual arousal. Thereafter, the State filed a
petition to declare respondent a sexually dangerous person under section
3 of the SDPA (725 ILCS 205/3 (West 2000)). 
	Under the SDPA, the State may seek an involuntary, indeterminate
commitment in lieu of a criminal prosecution if a defendant is charged with
a criminal offense and is believed to be sexually dangerous. See, e.g.,
People v. McDougle, 303 Ill. App. 3d 509, 515 (1999). Once the State
files a petition to declare the defendant sexually dangerous, the trial court
must appoint two psychiatrists to examine the defendant. 725 ILCS 205/4
(West 2000). A sexually dangerous person is defined as a person who has
suffered from a mental disorder for a period of not less than one year, who
has criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses, and who has
demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual assault or sexual
molestation of children. 725 ILCS 205/1.01 (West 2000). Proceedings
under the SDPA are civil in nature (725 ILCS 205/3.01 (West 2000)),
although a defendant is entitled to counsel and may demand a jury trial on
the State's petition (725 ILCS 205/5 (West 2000)). In addition, the State
must prove sexual dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt. 725 ILCS
205/3.01 (West 2000).
	Respondent waived his right to a jury trial on the State's petition to
declare him a sexually dangerous person. At respondent's bench trial,
Detective Lieutenant Tom Templeton of the La Salle County sheriff's
department testified that he arrested respondent on December 27, 1985,
for aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Templeton testified that after he gave
respondent his Miranda rights, respondent stated that he was willing to
talk and admitted that the allegations against him were true and that he had
placed the victim's penis in his mouth. Respondent told Templeton that he
had sexual urges toward children and that he had sexual contact with
children possibly on average of one child a day for the past four years.
Respondent would go to parks or would attempt to find jobs baby-sitting
or cleaning houses in order to facilitate his access to children.
	Dr. Carl Hamann, a medical doctor specializing in psychiatry, testified
that he had examined respondent and concluded that respondent was a
sexually dangerous person. Dr. Hamann testified that respondent had a
psycho-sexual disturbance with a great immaturity that had lasted for more
than a year. Respondent would be classified as a pedophile. The trial court
also reviewed the deposition testimony of Dr. Myer Kruglik. The parties
then stipulated that the victim, E.K., would testify that he is four years old
and that before Christmas of the previous year, he was awakened by
respondent "sucking his wee-wee."
	At the close of testimony, the circuit court found that the allegations
against respondent had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that
respondent was a sexually dangerous person within the meaning of the
SDPA. Pursuant to section 8 of the SDPA (725 ILCS 205/8 (West
2000)), the trial court ordered the Director of Corrections to take
guardianship of respondent and committed respondent to the custody of
the Department of Corrections (Department).
	On May 14, 2001, respondent filed the application for discharge
pursuant to section 9 of the SDPA (725 ILCS 205/9 (West 2000)).(1)
Section 9 provides that a person committed under the SDPA may file an
application at any time showing that he has recovered and requesting that
he be released. Once an application for discharge is filed, the psychiatrist,
sociologist, psychologist and warden of the institution where the applicant
is confined must prepare a socio-psychiatric report concerning the
applicant. 725 ILCS 205/9 (West 2000). In addition, the respondent is
entitled to the appointment of counsel and a jury trial on his application.
People v. Olmstead, 32 Ill. 2d 306, 314 (1965); 725 ILCS 205/5 (West
2000). Respondent's application for discharge alleged that respondent
had demonstrated that he was no longer sexually dangerous, that he had
attended group therapy and posed no risk to society or himself, that he
had addressed and resolved the issues that led to his offending behavior,
and that he had completed his treatment.
	Respondent filed several pro se motions along with his application for
discharge, including a motion to exclude the testimony and report of Dr.
Mark Carich and a motion for an independent psychiatric examination. In
his motion for an independent psychiatric examination, respondent alleged
that Dr. Ijaz Ahmad Jatala, a psychiatrist employed by the Department of
Corrections, would not give respondent an independent examination
because he was an employee of the State of Illinois and therefore would
comply with the Department's desire to find that respondent was still
sexually dangerous. Respondent also alleged that Dr. Jatala would not
conduct an independent examination but instead would prepare a socio-psychiatric report using boilerplate language and inserting respondent's
name. In his motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Carich, respondent
alleged that Dr. Carich is not a psychologist and therefore could not
prepare the socio-psychiatric report required under section 9 of the Act
(725 ILCS 205/9 (West 2000)). Respondent further alleged that if Dr.
Carich was called to testify on behalf of the State, he would give a biased
report that would be misleading and would include "untrue alleged facts"
concerning respondent.
	The trial court denied respondent's motion to exclude Dr. Carich's
report and testimony. The trial court also denied respondent's motion for
an independent psychiatric examination. Citing this court's decision in
People v. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d 318 (2001), the trial court stated that "it
couldn't be any clearer that the defendant doesn't have a right to an
independent doctor." The trial court also found that respondent had failed
to show bias on the part of the doctors working for the Department.
	The trial court then conducted a hearing on respondent's petition. At
the hearing, Dr. Carich testified that he had assessed and treated sexually
dangerous persons for 10 years and had supported a respondent's
application for discharge in 19 cases during that time. Dr. Carich stated
that respondent had refused to be interviewed in connection with his
application, so Dr. Carich based his testimony on his work with
respondent since 1989 and his review of respondent's records. Dr. Carich
testified that respondent had been committed for abusing more than 40
victims, both male and female, ranging in age from six months to nine years
old. Dr. Carich believed that respondent was still sexually dangerous even
though he had made some progress since his admission. Dr. Carich based
his opinion on the fact that respondent had dropped out of his treatment
program, had had sexual contact with other members of his group, and still
exhibited some antisocial and borderline behaviors. Respondent also had
performed poorly on a phallometric assessment for male infants, preschool
males, resisting noncompliant teen males, and child violence. Dr. Carich
believed that respondent presented a high risk to reoffend if he was
released at this point.
	On cross-examination, Dr. Carich testified that respondent had
substantially improved his phallometric scores between 1997 and 1999
and had attempted to rejoin his treatment program after dropping out.
During the time respondent was a member of the treatment group, he had
faithfully attended group and had dramatically improved his personal
hygiene and social skills. Dr. Carich also testified that respondent had self-reported 39 of his 40 victims and had accepted responsibility for his
offenses and had developed empathy for his victims.
	Dr. Jatala testified that he had diagnosed respondent as suffering from
pedophilia, voyeurism and exhibitionism. Based upon Dr. Jatala's review
of respondent's file and his work with respondent, Dr. Jatala concluded
that respondent was still sexually dangerous and would have a high risk of
reoffending if released into the community. On cross-examination, Dr.
Jatala acknowledged that he had seen respondent only six or seven times
in the past four years.
	Finally, respondent testified that he understood that his pattern of
engaging in sexual behavior with younger children was wrong. Respondent
did not believe he had been cured, but believed he could conduct himself
properly and keep from engaging in that type of behavior. Respondent
stated that he could not be around children anymore.
	Following testimony and closing arguments, the jury found that
respondent was still a sexually dangerous person. Accordingly, respondent
was remanded to the custody of the Department.
	Respondent appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court had
erred in denying his motion for an independent psychiatric examination and
had erred in denying his motion to strike Dr. Carich's report and
testimony. The appellate court agreed with respondent that he had a right
to an independent psychiatric examination under the due process clause
of the United States Constitution. 337 Ill. App. 3d 224, 227. The
appellate court noted that pursuant to Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976), courts must consider three
factors when considering a due process issue: (1) the liberty or property
interest with which the State has interfered; (2) the risk of erroneous
deprivation of the interest through the procedures already in place and the
probable value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3)
the effect the administrative and fiscal burdens would have on the State.
337 Ill. App. 3d at 227.
	With regard to the first factor, the appellate court found that there
was little question that a respondent's right to liberty is jeopardized under
the SDPA. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 227. With regard to the second factor, the
appellate court noted that at any stage in a commitment proceeding, a
respondent is at serious risk of his liberty being erroneously deprived. 337
Ill. App. 3d at 227. Consequently, a respondent at a commitment
proceeding and at a recovery proceeding must be provided the essential
protections available at a criminal trial, such as the right to a jury,
representation by counsel, and proof of sexual dangerousness beyond a
reasonable doubt. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 227. The appellate court concluded
that under notions of due process, the rights available to a respondent at
a commitment or recovery proceeding include the right to an independent
psychiatric examination. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 227. The appellate court
reasoned that disallowing a respondent's request for an independent
examination would place a respondent at an extreme disadvantage
because the jury is left only with the State expert's opinion as to the
respondent's mental state. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 227. The court
acknowledged that a respondent can bring a motion for appointment of an
independent expert at a recovery proceeding, but noted that such motions
are often denied by the court because the respondent fails to provide
evidence of bias or prejudice. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 228. The court found
this "safeguard" inadequate, because a respondent lacks the means with
which to prove bias or prejudice. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 228. The appellate
court conceded that providing a committed person with an independent
expert's examination would impose a significant fiscal burden on the State
because there is no limitation on the number of applications for recovery
or the time between each filing. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 228. However, the
court stated that it was not in a position to alter such legislative oversights.
337 Ill. App. 3d at 228. Based upon its analysis of the Mathews v.
Eldridge factors, the appellate court held that the trial court had violated
respondent's right to due process in denying his request for an
independent psychiatric examination. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 228.
	Given its finding that the trial court should have granted respondent's
motion for an independent psychiatric examination, it was unnecessary for
the appellate court to address the remaining issues raised by respondent
on appeal. However, for purposes of judicial economy, the appellate court
elected to address respondent's challenge to Dr. Carich's testimony and
report. The appellate court rejected respondent's claim that Dr. Carich's
report did not satisfy section 9 of the SDPA because Dr. Carich is not a
licensed psychologist. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 229. The appellate court noted
that the SDPA does not impose any licensing requirements for
psychologists who sign the section 9 socio-psychiatric report. 337 Ill.
App. 3d at 229. In addition, Dr. Carich had been found qualified to
render opinions for purposes of recovery applications in other appellate
cases. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 229.
	One justice dissented from the finding that Dr. Carich was qualified.
337 Ill. App. 3d at 229-30 (McDade, P.J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part). The partial dissent stated that although the SDPA does
not contain a licensing requirement, it does require that a respondent be
assessed by a psychologist. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 229-30 (McDade, P.J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part). The partial dissent noted that Dr.
Carich had a bachelor's degree in psychology, but a master's degree and
a doctorate in educational counseling, not in psychology. 337 Ill. App. 3d
at 231 (McDade, P.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). The partial
dissent maintained that Dr. Carich was not and had never been a
psychologist, and thus did not satisfy the plain language of the statute. 337
Ill. App. 3d at 231 (McDade, P.J., concurring in part & dissenting in
part).

ANALYSIS
	On appeal to this court, the State argues that due process does not
entitle a sexually dangerous person seeking discharge under section 9 of
the SDPA to an independent psychiatric expert at the State's expense.
The standard of review for determining whether an individual's
constitutional rights have been violated is de novo. See Patel v. Illinois
State Medical Society, 298 Ill. App. 3d 356, 370 (1998). The State
observes that this court has twice stated that respondents seeking
discharge under section 9 of the SDPA are not entitled to the appointment
of an independent psychiatric expert, first in People v. Capoldi, 37 Ill. 2d 11 (1967), then more recently in People v. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d 318
(2001). The State notes that the appellate court in this case did not even
cite Capoldi and did not analyze Trainor's due process holdings.
	In Capoldi, this court reviewed a trial court's order denying the
defendant's motion for a hearing on his recovery petition. Capoldi, 37 Ill. 2d 11. This court held that upon the filing of the defendant's application
for recovery under section 9, the trial court should have held a hearing to
determine if defendant had recovered. Capoldi, 37 Ill. 2d  at 18. The
Capoldi court also addressed the defendant's request for fees with which
to hire an independent psychiatrist. Capoldi, 37 Ill. 2d  at 18. This court
rejected defendant's request for fees, holding that:
		"There is no provision in the act entitling [defendant] to the
services of an independent psychiatrist and we do not believe
that such services are necessary to protect defendant's rights.
There has been no showing that the psychiatrists employed by
the Department of Mental Health and the Department of Public
Safety will not give an honest and unprejudiced opinion of the
defendant's mental condition, and in fact defendant alleges in his
1963 petition that he was interviewed by a member of the
penitentiary's psychiatric division and found to be 'recovered
from his mental condition.' " Capoldi, 37 Ill. 2d  at 18-19.
	Respondent claims that the State's reliance on Capoldi is misplaced.
Respondent contends that the Capoldi court concluded that the defendant
was not entitled to an independent psychiatric expert because a member
of the penitentiary's psychiatric division found the defendant to be
recovered. Here, in contrast, the psychologist and psychiatrist employed
by the Department found that respondent had not recovered.
	Respondent misapprehends the basis for this court's holding in
Capoldi. This court denied the defendant's request for an independent
psychiatrist in Capoldi because there is no provision in the SDPA entitling
a defendant to the services of an independent psychiatrist and because we
did not believe that such services were necessary to protect the
defendant's rights. See Capoldi, 37 Ill. 2d  at 18. Contrary to
respondent's interpretation of the Capoldi holding, the fact that the State
psychiatrist found the defendant to be recovered was not the basis for the
court's holding. Rather, it was in support of the holding denying an
independent psychiatric exam that we noted that the defendant had not
shown bias on the part of the State psychiatrists, and further noted that a
psychiatrist employed by the State had in fact found the defendant to be
recovered. See Capoldi, 37 Ill. 2d  at 18-19. Under Capoldi, then, a
respondent filing a recovery petition under section 9 of the SDPA is not
entitled to an independent psychiatric expert unless he can show that the
experts employed by the State will not give an honest and unprejudiced
opinion of the respondent's mental condition.
	Respondent additionally claims that the State's reliance on Capoldi
is misplaced because Capoldi was decided before the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985). In Ake, the Supreme Court held that
when a defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the
time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the
Constitution requires a state to provide access to a psychiatrist's
assistance on the issue of defendant's sanity if defendant cannot otherwise
afford a psychiatrist. Ake, 470 U.S.  at 74, 84 L. Ed. 2d  at 60, 105 S. Ct. 
at 1091-92. Respondent asserts that based upon Ake, a trial court in a
recovery proceeding also must provide an indigent respondent with access
to a psychiatrist's assistance.
	We disagree. Ake's holding applied to criminal trials. The instant
proceedings are civil in nature. See 725 ILCS 205/3.01 (West 2000).
Indeed, as the United States Supreme Court has stated, the fact that a
respondent in a proceeding under the SDPA is provided "some of the
safeguards applicable in criminal trials cannot itself turn these proceedings
into criminal prosecutions requiring the full panoply of rights applicable
there." Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 372, 92 L. Ed. 2d 296, 306, 106 S. Ct. 2988, 2993 (1986); see also Goetz v. Crosson, 967 F.2d 29, 33
(2d Cir. 1992) (court holds that Ake does not control issue off whether
indigent individual is entitled to independent psychiatric assistance at
commitment or retention hearing because constitutional protections
granted criminal defendants are not automatically extended to civil
commitment proceedings). Consequently, we find that Ake's holding does
not extend to proceedings under the SDPA.
	As the State observes, this court recently reaffirmed that a
respondent seeking discharge under section 9 of the SDPA is not entitled
to the appointment of an independent psychiatric expert. See Trainor,
196 Ill. 2d 318. At issue in Trainor was whether the State could move for
summary judgment on a respondent's application for recovery under
section 9 of the SDPA. In addressing the issue, this court first addressed
whether the State or the respondent bears the burden of proof in a
recovery proceeding. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d  at 326. Decisions of the
appellate court had placed the burden of proof on the respondent to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that he had recovered. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d  at 334. This court clarified that under a plain reading of the SDPA,
when a respondent files an application for recovery, the State must show
at the recovery hearing that the respondent is still sexually dangerous.
Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d  at 335. The State's burden of proof is beyond a
reasonable doubt. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d  at 335. This court further noted
that section 5 of the SDPA, providing a respondent with the right to
counsel and the right to demand a jury trial, also applies during a recovery
proceedings. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d  at 335. Given that the State bears the
burden of proof at the recovery proceeding and that a respondent has a
right to counsel and to demand a jury trial, this court held that summary
judgment was not appropriate in a recovery proceeding because summary
judgment would relieve the State of its burden of proof and would
circumvent a respondent's right to a jury trial. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d  at 340-41.
	In analyzing the procedure previously followed by the appellate court,
this court stated:
			"If the recovery hearing scheme created by the appellate
court, which places the burden of proof on the defendant, was
approved, a defendant would gain nothing in terms of an
opportunity to regain his freedom. Because, according to
Illinois law, the trial court is not required to provide an
independent psychiatrist to the defendant under the Act, the
defendant would have nothing but his own application to present
to the trier of fact. People v. McVeay, 302 Ill. App. 3d 960,
964 (1999). The necessarily limited allegations made in the
defendant's application alone would almost always be insufficient
to sustain the burden placed on him to show by a preponderance
of the evidence that he has recovered." (Emphasis added.)
Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d  at 339.
Moreover, in addressing the issue of summary judgment, this court again
stated: "As we have previously noted, defendant is not entitled to
appointment of an independent expert." Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d  at 341. 	Despite the preceding statements, respondent denies that Trainor
reaffirmed that a respondent in a recovery proceeding is not entitled to an
independent psychiatric expert. Respondent claims that because Trainor
changed prior case law concerning the burden of proof in a recovery
proceeding, so that the burden of proof in recovery proceedings is now
the same as the burden of proof at the initial determination, it follows that
because independent psychiatric evidence is required to initially commit a
respondent, independent psychiatric evidence is required at the recovery
stage.
	We are not persuaded by respondent's analysis. Although the
Trainor decision changed the burden of proof in a recovery proceeding
to the same burden as at the initial commitment proceeding, it does not
follow that a respondent is entitled to an independent psychiatric expert at
his recovery hearing. In fact, contrary to respondent's claim, a respondent
is not entitled to his own independent psychiatric expert at the initial
commitment proceedings under the SDPA. Rather, section 4 of the SDPA
provides that:
			"After the filing of the petition, the court shall appoint two
qualified psychiatrists to make a personal examination of such
alleged sexually dangerous person, to ascertain whether such
person is sexually dangerous, and the psychiatrists shall file with
the court a report in writing of the result of their examination, a
copy of which shall be delivered to the respondent." 725 ILCS
205/4 (West 2000).
At the initial commitment proceeding, then, the respondent is examined by
two psychiatrists appointed by the court. Nothing in section 4 of the
SDPA provides that a trial court must allow a respondent to retain his own
independent psychiatric expert. See 725 ILCS 205/4 (West 2000); see
also People v. McVeay, 302 Ill. App. 3d 960, 964 (1999) (nothing in
section 4 of the SDPA explicitly provides a respondent with the right to
retain or have appointed his own expert to perform a psychiatric exam).
	In any event, we need not speculate that Trainor intended to provide
that an independent psychiatric exam is required in a recovery proceeding.
Had this court intended to so provide, it certainly would have done so,
particularly since the appellate court in Trainor specifically addressed the
issue and held that a defendant in a recovery proceeding is not entitled to
the appointment of an expert of his own choosing. See People v. Trainor,
312 Ill. App. 3d 860, 862 (2000). Instead of reversing the appellate
court's ruling, Trainor twice quite clearly stated that a trial court is not
required to provide an independent psychiatrist during recovery
proceedings under the SDPA.
	As the State observed, the appellate court in this case did not even
cite Capoldi and did not address Trainor's statements that a respondent
in a recovery proceeding is not entitled to an independent psychiatric
exam. Rather, the appellate court held that the Supreme Court's decision
in Mathews v. Eldridge requires a trial court to provide an indigent
respondent in an SDPA recovery proceeding with an independent
psychiatric expert. Although Mathews concerned the procedural
safeguards required by the due process clause of the fifth amendment
before a person may be deprived of property, the United States Supreme
Court has since characterized the Mathews balancing test as setting forth
a general approach for testing challenged state procedures against a due
process claim in civil cases. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 444,
120 L. Ed. 2d 353, 362, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2576 (1992). Mathews
provides that three distinct factors must be considered to identify the
specific dictates of due process: (1) the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute safeguards; and (3) the government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedure requirement would entail.
Mathews, 424 U.S.  at 335, 47 L. Ed. 2d  at 33, 96 S. Ct.  at 903.
	With regard to the first factor, "civil commitment for any purpose
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process
protection." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323,
330-31, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1809 (1979). However, in analyzing the third
factor, it also is clear that the State has a strong interest in treating sexually
dangerous individuals and in protecting the community from the dangerous
tendencies of those individuals. Allen, 478 U.S.  at 373, 92 L. Ed. 2d  at
307, 106 S. Ct.  at 2994. Indeed, the purpose of the SDPA is to protect
the public by sequestering the sexually dangerous person until he is
recovered and to provide treatment to the sexually dangerous person so
that he may recover and be rehabilitated. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d  at 323-24.
Moreover, allowing the appointment of independent psychiatric experts
at the State's expense in recovery proceedings would impose significant
fiscal and administrative burdens, because there is no limit on the number
of applications for discharge that a respondent can file.
	The second Mathews factor addresses the adequacy of the statutory
procedures in light of the action taken. People ex rel. Sheppard v.
Money, 124 Ill. 2d 265, 276 (1988). The appellate court found that there
was a serious risk of an erroneous deprivation of a respondent's liberty
interest through the procedures used because disallowing a request for an
independent examination places a respondent at an extreme disadvantage.
337 Ill. App. 3d at 227. The appellate court held that unless a respondent
is provided an independent psychiatric expert, he is virtually incapable of
rebutting the State's evidence. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 227. The appellate
court also stated that the "additional safeguard" of allowing a respondent
to move for the appointment of an independent psychiatrist is inadequate
because a respondent lacks the means with which to prove that the State's
psychiatrists are biased or prejudiced, so that motions for an independent
expert are often denied. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 228.
	We disagree with the appellate court's analysis of the second factor
under Mathews. The appellate court incorrectly assumed that the
Department professionals at the institution where the applicant is confined
will prepare a biased and prejudiced socio-psychiatric report. We decline
to make such an assumption. We agree with the State that the Department
professionals who treat sexually dangerous persons such as respondent
are untainted by their employment given the nature of their professional
and fiduciary relationship with their patients. In addition, the Department
professionals treating respondent are most knowledgeable about
respondent's problems and progress toward recovery, and are in the best
position to know if respondent has recovered. See People v. Finkle, 214
Ill. App. 3d 290, 295-96 (1991) (Department experts have "superior
resources and expertise to deal with sexually dangerous persons. These
experts, of course, are most knowledgeable about a defendant's problems
and progress toward recovery"), overruled on other grounds, People
v. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d 318 (2001). Given the unique relationship between
the Department professional and the respondent, we cannot say that there
is a serious risk of an erroneous deprivation of a respondent's liberty
interest if the respondent's motion for an independent psychiatric
examination is denied. In fact, contrary to the appellate court's assumption
that a Department expert will always testify against a respondent's
discharge, we note that Dr. Carich had testified as an expert in sex
offender treatment at least 80 times and had supported a respondent's
application for discharge in 19 cases.
	Respondent, however, points to two section 9 recovery proceedings
in La Salle County in support of his argument that an independent
psychiatric examination is required. Respondent states that in both cases,
the juries allowed the conditional release of the respondents after the
respondents were allowed to have an independent psychiatric exam.
	We decline to attribute great weight to these two cases. We will not
presume that an independent psychiatric expert will always testify contrary
to the Department professionals or will always testify in favor of discharge.
See, e.g., People v. Burk, 289 Ill. App. 3d 270, 271-72 (1997)
(Department psychiatrist and an independent psychiatrist both concluded
that respondent remained sexually dangerous). That two discharge
applications were granted because independent psychiatric experts were
appointed does not establish that a respondent has a due process right to
such an expert.
	Finally, we disagree with the appellate court's conclusion that unless
a respondent is provided an independent psychiatric expert he is virtually
incapable of rebutting the State's evidence. There are numerous
safeguards in place to ensure the reliability of the recovery proceeding. As
the appellate court conceded, a respondent can move for the appointment
of an independent psychiatric expert if he believes that the Department
experts are biased and prejudiced. A respondent has the right to counsel
who can cross-examine the Department experts concerning any perceived
bias and prejudice. A respondent also has the right to a jury trial on his
recovery petition, as well as the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
See People v. Allen, 107 Ill. 2d 91, 102 (1985) (under Mathews,
privilege against self-incrimination would add little reliability to sexually
dangerous person proceedings because there are numerous safeguards
ensuring reliability, including the right to a jury trial, the requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the right to confront witnesses),
aff'd, 478 U.S. 364, 92 L. Ed. 2d 296, 106 S. Ct. 2988 (1986). The
application of the Mathews balancing test, then, establishes that due
process does not require the appointment of an independent psychiatric
expert for a respondent in a section 9 discharge proceeding.
	Respondent, however, offers an additional argument in support of his
claim that indigent respondents must be provided access to an
independent psychiatric examination in recovery proceedings. Respondent
observes that in a recent decision, People v. Masterson, 207 Ill. 2d 305
(2003), this court engrafted the requirements of the Sexually Violent
Persons Commitment Act (the SVPA) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West
2000)) into the SDPA with regard to volitional requirements. Respondent
further notes that the SVPA provides that if a person found to be sexually
violent petitions the court for conditional release, "the person who has
been committed may retain or, if he or she is indigent and so requests, the
court may appoint a qualified expert or a professional person to examine
him or her." 725 ILCS 207/55(a) (West 2000). Respondent therefore
asks this court to follow Masterson and engraft the provisions of section
55(a) of the SVPA into the SDPA.
	We find it unnecessary to engraft the provisions of section 55(a) of
the SVPA into the SDPA. In Masterson, this court held that the SVPA's
definition of the term "mental disorder" should be read into the SDPA.
Masterson, 207 Ill. 2d  at 329. The SDPA did not define the term "mental
disorder" and, thus, did not specifically address an individual's volitional
capacity or provide an explicit standard for gauging the probability or
likelihood that the subject of the sexually dangerous person proceeding
would commit sexual offenses in the future. Masterson, 207 Ill. 2d  at
328-29. In contrast, the SVPA defined "mental disorder" to mean "a
congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional
capacity that predisposes a person to engage in the commission of sex
offenses and results in serious difficulty controlling sexual behavior."
Masterson, 207 Ill. 2d  at 329. Because the term "mental disorder" in the
SDPA was ambiguous, this court looked to the SVPA, a similar statute,
to read defining language into the SDPA which had been omitted through
legislative oversight. Masterson, 207 Ill. 2d  at 329.
	In contrast to the ambiguity concerning the term "mental disorder,"
the SDPA clearly sets forth the procedures that apply when a respondent
files an application for discharge pursuant to section 9. Absent any
ambiguity in those procedures, there is no need to look to any similar
statutes to aid in construing section 9. Moreover, the discharge
procedures in the SDPA differ from those set forth in the SVPA because
they are directed at different categories of offenders. The SDPA provides
an alternative to criminal prosecution (see 725 ILCS 205/1.01 (West
2000)), while the SVPA provides for commitment in addition to criminal
proceedings (see 725 ILCS 207/40(a) (West 2000)). Consequently, we
see no need to incorporate the reexamination procedures set forth in the
SVPA into the discharge procedures in the SDPA.
	As a final matter, we address respondent's claim in his response brief
that the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude the testimony and
socio-psychiatric report of Dr. Mark Carich because Dr. Carich is not a
licensed psychologist. Respondent claims that section 9 requires that a
licensed psychologist prepare the socio-psychiatric report. Respondent
claims that because Dr. Carich is not a psychologist as defined by Illinois
law, the socio-psychiatric report presented in his case was improperly
prepared and improperly used as a basis for the denial of the recovery
petition.
	In response, the State observes that not only is Dr. Carich eminently
qualified, but the appellate court has repeatedly rejected challenges to his
qualifications. In addition, section 9 of the SDPA does not require that the
socio-psychiatric report be prepared by a licensed psychologist, but
instead merely requires that the report be prepared by a psychologist.
Finally, the State points out that section 3(e) of the Clinical Psychologist
Licensing Act exempts individuals employed by the state, such as
Dr.Carich, from the licensing provisions of the Licensing Act. See 225
ILCS 15/3(e) (West 2000).
	As the State observes, the appellate court on numerous occasions
has rejected challenges to Dr. Carich's qualifications in section 9
proceedings. In People v. Sizemore, 311 Ill. App. 3d 917 (2000),
overruled on other grounds, People v. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d 318 (2001),
the appellate court rejected the respondent's claim that Dr. Carich's
opinion should be viewed with skepticism because Dr. Carich did not
have a professional license. The court stated:
		"Dr. Carich worked as a psychologist for DOC for 13 years and
coordinated the sex-offender treatment programs at various
facilities. We find that Dr. Carich was qualified to render an
opinion that Sizemore was sexually dangerous and should not be
conditionally released." Sizemore, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 928.
	Subsequently, in People v. Kastman, the appellate court held that
section 9 of the SDPA does not mandate that the psychologist preparing
the socio-psychiatric report be licensed under the Licensing Act. People
v. Kastman, 335 Ill. App. 3d 87, 95 (2002). The Kastman court further
noted that section 3(e) of the Licensing Act "obviates the necessity of a
license for an individual employed by a state agency to perform the duties
of a psychologist." Kastman, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 96. Accord People v.
Trainor, 337 Ill. App. 3d 788, 793 (2003) (holding that a psychologist
who signs a socio-psychiatric report in a section 9 proceeding does not
need to hold a professional license, and further finding that Dr. Carich's
degrees and experience qualified him to render an opinion).
	We agree with the appellate court on this issue. With regard to the
socio-psychiatric report, section 9 of the SDPA provides:
		"The Director shall then cause to be prepared and sent to the
court a socio-psychiatric report concerning the applicant. The
report shall be prepared by the psychiatrist, sociologist,
psychologist and warden of, or assigned to, the institution
wherein such applicant is confined." 725 ILCS 205/9 (West
2000).
Nothing in this section mandates that the psychologist that prepares the
report be licensed, and we decline to read such a requirement into the
statute. As the State observes, where a licensed psychologist is required,
the General Assembly has clearly placed such a condition in the statute.
See 405 ILCS 5/3-504(d) (West 2000) (evaluation by a "licensed clinical
psychologist" can support emergency admission of minors to a mental
health facility); 725 ILCS 5/102-21(a) (West 2000) (for purposes of the
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, defining "clinical psychologist" to
mean "a psychologist licensed under the Clinical Psychologist Licensing
Act").
	In addition, as the appellate court recognized, Dr. Carich is exempt
from the licensing requirements under the Licensing Act. Section 3(e) of
the Licensing Act provides:
			"Nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit the services
and use of official title on the part of a person, not licensed under
the provisions of this Act, in the employ of a State *** insofar
that such services are a part of the duties in his or her salaried
position, and insofar that such services are performed solely on
behalf of his or her employer." 225 ILCS 15/3(e) (West 2000).
Dr. Carich's services as a psychologist are part of the duties of his salaried
position in the employ of the state and are performed solely on behalf of
the state. Consequently, as the appellate court has found, Dr. Carich is
exempt from the licensing requirements of the Licensing Act.
	Finally, we agree with the appellate court that Dr. Carich is eminently
qualified to render an opinion in a recovery proceeding. Dr. Carich has a
B.S. in psychology, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in counseling. From 1989 to
1995, Dr. Carich served as a psychologist administrator for the sexually
dangerous persons program at Menard Correctional Center. Since
December 1995, Dr. Carich has served as Psychologist
Administrator/Public Service Administrator at the Big Muddy River
Correctional Center, where sexually dangerous persons are confined. Dr.
Carich has held academic positions related to the treatment of sexual
offenders and has authored or coauthored at least 250 articles and
manuscripts, as well as several books, on the subject of sex offender
treatment and psychology. In fact, Dr. Carich is the principal designer of
the state's sexually dangerous persons program. Allison v. Snyder, 332 F.3d 1076, 1078 (7th Cir. 2003). Given his education and experience,
Dr. Carich clearly is qualified to submit socio-psychiatric reports and to
testify in discharge proceedings under section 9 of the SDPA. The
appellate court therefore properly affirmed the trial court's order denying
respondent's motion to strike Dr. Carich's testimony and the socio-psychiatric report.
	For all the foregoing reasons, we disagree with the appellate court's
holding that the trial court violated respondent's right to due process in
denying his request for an independent psychiatric examination. As we
held in Capoldi, a respondent filing an application for discharge pursuant
to section 9 of the SDPA is not entitled to an independent psychiatric
examination unless he can show that the experts employed by the State
are biased or prejudiced. We agree, however, with the appellate court's
finding that Dr. Carich's testimony and report satisfied section 9 of the
SDPA. The judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and the judgment
of the circuit court is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
 
1.                 Although the SDPA states that a respondent shall file an "application" for 
recovery, courts have also used the phrase "petition for recovery" in discussing a section 9 application. People v. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d 318, 332 (2001). In addition, the SDPA refers to a party filing a section 9 application as an applicant or a respondent, although some 
cases continue to use the term defendant.