Case Title: Snodgrass v. Rissler & McMurry Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-09-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Snodgrass v. Rissler & McMurry Co.1995 WY 165903 P.2d 1015Case Number: 94-278, 94-279Decided: 09/26/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
George 
William SNODGRASS, Phyllis J. Snodgrass, and Rodney L. Stalkup, 

Appellants 
(Defendants),

v.

RISSLER 
& McMURRY COMPANY, a Wyoming corporation, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff). 

 

RISSLER 
& McMURRY COMPANY, a Wyoming corporation,

 Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

George 
William SNODGRASS, Phyllis J. Snodgrass, and Rodney L. Stalkup, 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

Jeffrey 
C. Gosman of Gosman Law Offices, Casper, for Appellants Snodgrasses and 
Stalkup.

Donald 
J. Rissler and John R. Hursh of Central Wyoming Law Associates, Riverton, for 
Appellee and Cross-Appellant Rissler & McMurry 
Co.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., THOMAS, MACY and LEHMAN, JJ., and ROGERS, D.J. 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      These 
consolidated appeals arise out of a condemnation action initiated by Rissler 
& McMurry Company (Rissler) to obtain access to a ten-acre limestone mining 
quarry. In case 94-278, George and Phyllis Snodgrass and Rodney Stalkup 
(hereinafter Snodgrass), the owners of the land which Rissler sought to condemn, 
appeal the denial of an award of attorney fees. In case 94-279, Rissler appeals 
the awarding of costs to the landowners and the denial of an award of costs to 
Rissler.

[¶2]  We affirm.

[¶3]      In case 94-278, 
Snodgrass presents three issues for review:

1. 
Does Wyoming follow the general rule that if a condemnation action is either 
commenced or dismissed in bad faith or if the condemnor fails to prosecute the 
action diligently, attorney's fee[s] will be allowed?

2. 
If the answer to the first question is yes, then did the allegations contained 
in the [Snodgrass'] motion and brief in support of the award of attorney's fees 
and the taking of judicial notice of the entire record of proceedings in the 
case constitute sufficient evidence of "bad faith" to create a factual 
issue?

3. 
If a factual issue was presented did the court err in failing to take evidence 
on the issue to support a ruling?

Rissler 
responds with a single issue:

Did 
the court abuse its discretion in failing to award [Snodgrass] attorney fees in 
this condemnation proceeding?

In 
case 94-279, Rissler raises three issues:

[1.] 
Whether the court erred as a matter of law in awarding [Snodgrass] costs because 
the jury failed to return a verdict in an amount greater than [Rissler's] final 
offer.

[2.] 
Whether the court abused its discretion in not awarding [Rissler's] costs after 
an offer of judgment was tendered.

[3.] 
Whether the court abused its discretion in awarding specific cost items which 
are in excess of and/or not contemplated by Uniform District Court Rule 
501.

Snodgrass 
failed to file a brief in opposition in this case.

FACTS

[¶4]      The factual and 
procedural history of this case was set out in this court's opinions in Stalkup 
v. State Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 838 P.2d 705 (Wyo. 1992) and Rissler & 
McMurry v. Snodgrass, 854 P.2d 69 (Wyo. 1993). To recap, Rissler wanted to open 
a limestone quarry on State land near the Bessemer Bend area of Natrona County. 
The Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) granted a permit to Rissler to 
mine a ten-acre area which, under an exemption, does not require a mining 
permit. W.S. 35-11-401(e)(vi) (1988).

[¶5]      Rissler then 
sought an easement across Snodgrass' adjoining property for a road to haul the 
limestone. An agreement could not be reached between the parties, so Rissler 
filed a successful condemnation action and obtained a thirty-foot surface 
easement across the Snodgrass property. Thereafter, Snodgrass filed an action 
demanding that the DEQ and Rissler comply with the permitting process and 
requesting civil penalties and attorney fees.

[¶6]      In Stalkup, we 
affirmed the district court's dismissal of Snodgrass' action. We held that 
Rissler had complied with the notice and consent requirements of the ten-acre 
mining exemption. 838 P.2d  at 711. We also concluded that once Snodgrass' land 
was condemned, they were no longer an "affected landowner" and, consequently, 
could not seek civil damages against Rissler pursuant to W.S. 35-11-901(a) 
(1988).

[¶7]      Later, a trial 
was held on Snodgrass' eminent domain action seeking damages for the 
condemnation of their land. Rissler & McMurry, 854 P.2d  at 70. A jury 
awarded Snodgrass $182,034 for the 5.45 acres of land taken for the road. Id. On 
appeal, this court reversed concluding that a procedural error during jury 
deliberations amounted to plain error. 854 P.2d  at 71. We reversed and remanded 
for a new trial. Id.

[¶8]      Prior to retrial, 
Rissler moved to dismiss its condemnation action and the court granted the 
motion pursuant to W.R.C.P. 71.1(k)(3). A trial was then held on the amount of 
damages owed Snodgrass for the period of time when Rissler possessed the road. 
The jury returned a verdict of $8,284. That award is not at issue 
here.

[¶9]      The disputes in 
the two cases before us concern motions made by both parties in conjunction with 
the second trial. Snodgrass moved for an award of attorney fees based upon its 
allegation that Rissler had instituted the condemnation action in bad faith. 
Snodgrass further claimed that Rissler had not pursued the condemnation with 
diligence, also entitling them to an award of attorney fees. The trial court 
denied the motion, finding that the allegations of bad faith did not rise to the 
level of proof required. Snodgrass appeals that ruling in case 
94-278.

[¶10]   Snodgrass also sought an award of 
costs. Rissler moved for an award of its costs and objected to Snodgrass' 
motion, arguing that it had made an offer of judgment on June 13, 1994, of 
$7,103.50 plus a cattle guard with a fair market value of $3,550.00, for a total 
of $10,653.50 which was greater than the amount the jury awarded Snodgrass after 
the trial. The trial court overruled Rissler's objection, denied its motion and 
awarded Snodgrass costs based upon their status as the prevailing party. Rissler 
now appeals in case 94-279.

DISCUSSION

[¶11]   Snodgrass asks us to allow an 
action for attorney fees when a party has instituted or dismissed a condemnation 
proceeding in bad faith or has injected unwarranted delay by extending the 
proceeding in bad faith. We need not decide if, in such a situation, attorney 
fees are available because the record clearly indicates that there was no bad 
faith on the part of Rissler.

[¶12]   Wyoming follows the American rule 
that each party is normally responsible for his or her own attorney fees. Devous 
v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 845 P.2d 408, 418 (Wyo. 1993); UNC Teton 
Exploration Drilling, Inc. v. Peyton, 774 P.2d 584, 594 (Wyo. 1989). There are 
two exceptions to this rule: when there is an express statutory authorization or 
a contractual provision that allows for an award of attorney fees to a party. 
Devous, 845 P.2d  at 418. We have denied attorney fees where neither exception is 
applicable. Sheridan Commercial Park, Inc. v. Briggs, 848 P.2d 811, 817 (Wyo. 
1993). We have, however, allowed attorney fees in one situation even though 
there was no statutory or contractual basis for doing so. In a replevin action, 
a party may be awarded attorney fees when they can show that "fraud, malice, 
oppression or wilful wrong" has occurred. Olds v. Hosford, 354 P.2d 947, 950 
(Wyo. 1960).

[¶13]   In this case it is quite clear from 
the record that no "fraud, malice oppression or wilful wrong" is present. 
Snodgrass makes broad allegations of wrongful conduct on the part of Rissler. 
Snodgrass' claim of bad faith is premised on the contention that Rissler sought 
to circumvent the permitting process required under the Environmental Quality 
Act by utilizing the ten-acre exemption and when that strategy failed, Rissler 
then dismissed their condemnation action in bad faith - i.e., to avoid a large 
award.

[¶14]   The Snodgrass allegations are 
without merit or support in the record. Snodgrass asserts that Rissler used the 
ten-acre exemption solely to circumvent the full permitting process required for 
mining operations greater than such size. However, it is undisputable that 
Rissler complied with the law in mining the quarry pursuant to the ten-acre 
exemption, as this court has previously found. Stalkup, 838 P.2d  at 710-12. 
Quite simply, the law allowed Rissler to operate their ten-acre quarry; Rissler 
needed a road easement to remove the product of its mine, so it condemned 
Snodgrass' property. Id., at 708. Other than making broad claims of bad faith, 
Snodgrass fails to cite anything appearing in the record which could even 
remotely infer bad faith on the part of Rissler. We conclude that Rissler acted 
within the confines of the law in mining the quarry utilizing a ten-acre 
exemption and, therefore, there was no bad faith.

[¶15]   Snodgrass also claims that Rissler 
acted in bad faith by extending the condemnation proceeding over a long period 
of time. This claim is premised upon a finding that Rissler initiated the 
condemnation proceeding in bad faith. We have already rejected that claim; 
accordingly, this claim must also fail.

[¶16]   Finally, Snodgrass alleges that 
Rissler dismissed the condemnation action in bad faith. Again, we find no such 
evidence in the record. What the record does disclose is that Rissler abandoned 
its attempt to expand the quarry. The district court was required by W.R.C.P. 
71.1(k)(3) to allow dismissal upon a showing of good cause. The district court 
found good cause, and we find no abuse of discretion in that 
decision.

[¶17]   In case 94-279, Rissler argues that 
the district court abused its discretion in awarding Snodgrass costs pursuant to 
Uniform District Court Rule 501. Rissler also argues that it was an abuse of 
discretion for the court to deny Rissler costs. Rissler's claim is predicated 
upon its contention that the final award to Snodgrass was less than the amount 
offered them in Rissler's final offer of settlement.

[¶18]   On June 13, 1994, Rissler made an 
offer (hereinafter "first offer") under our Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure to 
Snodgrass for $7,103.50 plus the cost of a cattle guard Rissler had installed on 
the easement. That offer was rejected by Snodgrass, and Rissler responded with 
another offer (hereinafter "second offer") on June 17, 1994, for $9,000.00 in 
cash. Snodgrass did not accept that offer either; and, after trial, the jury 
awarded Snodgrass $8,284.00.

[¶19]   Rissler objects to the district 
court's award of costs to Snodgrass, arguing that the amount of its offer was 
greater than the final jury award and, pursuant to the terms of W.R.C.P. 68, it 
was entitled to costs. The district court overruled Rissler's objection, finding 
that the first offer was improper because it offered property when, in a suit 
for the recovery of money, only a money offer was proper. The district court 
noted that the second offer was also invalid since it did not comply with 
W.R.C.P. 68, as it was made less than ten days before the 
trial.

[¶20]   The second offer, since it was not 
made prior to ten days before trial, is ineffective under the rule; and the 
district court was correct in not considering it. Wright & Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 3003 (1973 & 1995 supp.); Cheek v. McGowan Elec. 
Supply Co., 511 So. 2d 977, 981-82 (Fla. 1987); W.R.C.P. 
68.

[¶21]   Rissler claims on appeal that the 
first offer was valid under Rule 68 and that the money offered, coupled with the 
value of the cattle guard, was greater than the subsequent judgment obtained by 
Snodgrass. Although in their Plaintiff's Motion for Costs Rissler sets out an 
itemized list of the value of the cattle guard and its installation costs, the 
offer of judgment simply recites the offer of the cattle guard; it does not set 
out a value for it.

[¶22]   An offer of judgment, to be 
effective, must be for a definite sum. Wright & Miller, at § 3002; Stockton 
Kenworth, Inc. v. Mentzer Detroit Diesel, Inc., 101 Nev. 400, 705 P.2d 145, 148 
(1985) ("the offer must be for a definite or ascertainable amount so that the 
parties can be unequivocally aware of what the defendant is willing to pay for 
his peace"); Davis v. Chism, 513 P.2d 475, 481 (Alaska 1973). Accordingly, since 
the offer must be for a definite or ascertainable amount, later proof cannot 
cure any defect in the offer since the party to whom the offer was made must 
base their decision to accept or reject solely on what is contained within that 
offer. A later motion is not the proper means to establish that value. 
Furthermore, a party is not entitled to more than one attempt to prove an 
element of their case. Pekas v. Thompson, 903 P.2d 532, 536 (Wyo. 1995). We find 
that the first offer of judgment by Rissler was ineffective for a failure to 
provide a definite sum and affirm the district court's denial of Rissler's 
motion for costs. We expect that in the future counsel will, when including 
anything in an offer for judgment where value is not easily ascertainable or 
subject to dispute, include proof of that value when making their 
offer.

[¶23]   Finally, Rissler claims that the 
district court abused its discretion when it allowed costs to Snodgrass as the 
prevailing party. After a careful review of the record, we find no abuse of 
discretion and affirm the district court's ruling in its entirety. 

CONCLUSION

[¶24]  There is no evidence in the record to 
support an allegation of bad faith on the part of Rissler in any aspect of this 
case, and the district court was correct in denying the motion for attorney 
fees. We also find no abuse of discretion in the disposition of costs by the 
district court. The district court is affirmed in cases 94-278 and 
94-279.