Case Title: State v. Sexton

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Sexton (2003-331); 180 Vt. 25; 904 A.2d 1133

2006 VT 55

[Filed 09-June-2006]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 2006 VT 55

                                No. 2003-331
    

  State of Vermont                               Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

  Jacob A. Sexton                                June Term, 2004


  James R. Crucitti, J.

  Robert Simpson, Chittenden County State's Attorney, and Pamela Hall
    Johnson, Deputy State's Attorney, Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

  Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, and Anna Saxman, Deputy Defender
    General, Montpelier, and William A. Nelson (On the Brief), Middlebury, for
    Defendant-Appellee.


  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J.,(FN1) Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Reiber, JJ.

       ¶  1.  REIBER, J.   We accepted this interlocutory appeal to
  consider whether a defendant charged with murder may assert either the
  defense of diminished capacity to reduce the offense to manslaughter, or
  insanity to excuse the offense entirely, where the voluntary use of illegal
  drugs was an essential causal factor in the defendant's psychotic state at
  the time of the offense.  Consistent with the law of this and other states,
  we conclude that a defendant in these circumstances  may argue for a
  reduction of the offense based upon an inability to form the requisite
  intent to commit murder, but may not be relieved entirely of responsibility
  for his or her criminal acts.  Accordingly, as explained more fully below,
  we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. 
   
       ¶  2.  Although this appeal is from a pretrial ruling, the material
  facts are largely undisputed.  On the night of September 27, 2000, police
  found a Japanese exchange student, Atsuko Ikeda, lying in the street in
  Winooski.  Ikeda had suffered serious injuries, and died shortly after
  transport to the hospital.  During the ensuing investigation, defendant
  walked onto the crime scene and lay down on the street in front of a police
  cruiser.  Upon questioning by the police, defendant reportedly said, "Just
  cuff me, I know I did something bad, I just don't know what."  Defendant
  was charged with Ikeda's murder.

       ¶  3.  While in custody, defendant informed the police that, on the
  day in question, he had killed his cat and then gone outside intending to
  kill a person.  He recalled lunging at a woman passing on a bicycle (later
  identified as Ikeda) and then beating her repeatedly until she stopped
  moving.  Defendant later told psychiatrists that he had taken a variety of
  illegal drugs during the six months preceding the incident.  Defendant
  recounted that for about two months, in July and August 2000, he took many
  "hits" of LSD, and that his last reported use of LSD was two to three weeks
  before the September killing.  Defendant explained that on the night of the
  incident he felt that he needed to kill people and "gather their souls."  
   
       ¶  4.  At defendant's arraignment on a charge of second-degree murder,
  the court ordered a psychiatric evaluation of defendant's competency and
  sanity. (FN2)  In December 2000, Dr. Robert Linder, the court-appointed
  psychiatrist, filed a lengthy report with the court, ultimately concluding
  that defendant was insane at the time of the offense.  The conclusion was
  based on a series of interviews with defendant and others, defendant's
  psychiatric and family history, and a battery of psychological tests from
  which Dr. Linder inferred that defendant was in a florid psychotic state at
  the time of the crime that prevented him from appreciating the wrongfulness
  of his conduct or conforming his conduct to the requirements of law.  Dr.
  Linder's preliminary diagnosis was that defendant suffered from either a
  previously undiagnosed mental disease involving a schizophrenic disorder,
  or a substance-induced psychosis.  At a later deposition in 2002, Dr.
  Linder noted that defendant's psychotic thoughts had largely resolved and
  that he had returned to his "usual self," suggesting a primary diagnosis of
  schizophrenoform disorder, in which psychotic symptoms last between one to
  six months.
    
       ¶  5.  In his December 2000 report, Dr. Linder indicated that
  defendant's mental state had improved over the course of their interviews
  and that he appeared to be competent to stand trial.  Based on the report,
  the parties stipulated to defendant's competency, and the court scheduled a
  hospitalization hearing.  Following the hearing, the court found that
  defendant was a person in need of treatment and ordered him committed to
  the Vermont State Hospital.  
  
       ¶  6.  In February 2001, defendant notified the State that he intended
  to present expert testimony in support of an insanity defense, and the
  court granted the State's motion for an independent psychiatric evaluation. 
  In April, the State's psychiatrist, Dr. Albert Drukteinis, filed a report
  concurring in Dr. Linder's opinion that defendant was psychotic at the time
  of the offense, but concluding that it was caused solely by defendant's
  voluntary use of illegal drugs.  Although Dr. Drukteinis observed signs of
  a personality disorder with narcissistic features, he found  no evidence
  that defendant suffered from a major thought disorder such as
  schizophrenia.  At a subsequent hearing on the State's motion to amend
  defendant's conditions of release, defendant's treating psychiatrist, Dr.
  Margaret Bolton, also diagnosed defendant as having a personality disorder,
  and agreed that defendant did not suffer from any major mental illness such
  as schizophrenia, as reported by Dr. Linder, or borderline personality, as
  suggested in an earlier report by Dr. Bertold Francke.  In June 2002, the
  court transferred custody of defendant to the Department of Corrections
  after concluding that his continued hospitalization was no longer
  justified.
   
       ¶  7.  In July 2002, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to
  prevent defendant from presenting an insanity defense at trial, arguing
  that Vermont law does not recognize temporary insanity caused by the
  voluntary use of drugs.  The State also moved to preclude a diminished
  capacity defense, asserting that second-degree murder based on wanton
  disregard for the likelihood that one's actions would naturally cause death
  or great bodily harm is a general intent crime to which the defense has no
  application.  After the parties submitted supplemental briefing, the court
  requested that defendant provide a concise statement of his theory as to
  the insanity defense. Defendant, in response, submitted a supplemental
  letter from Dr. Linder, reaffirming his earlier opinion that defendant was
  in the midst of a severe psychotic episode at the time of the offense,
  resulting from either a substance-induced psychosis or an underlying mental
  illness, such as schizophrenoform disorder, caused by the ingestion of
  illegal drugs in combination with an underlying psychological vulnerability
  that predisposed him to such a reaction.   

       ¶  8.  In March 2003, the court issued a written decision, concluding
  that second-degree murder based on wanton disregard of the likelihood that
  one's conduct would naturally cause death or great bodily harm is a
  specific intent crime in Vermont.  Therefore, it held that defendant was
  entitled to rely on the defense of diminished capacity due to voluntary
  intoxication.  The following June, the court issued a second decision,
  concluding that defendant was also entitled to argue that he was legally
  insane at the time of the killing.  Although the court ruled that "an
  individual whose mental state is altered solely because of the consumption
  and abuse of illegal drugs" may not assert an insanity defense, it found
  that one whose consumption of illegal drugs activates a latent mental
  disease or defect resulting in a psychotic reaction is entitled to a
  complete defense to the crime charged, unless the defendant knew or had
  reason to know that the drugs would elicit such a reaction.

       ¶  9.  The State moved for permission to pursue an interlocutory
  appeal of both orders.  The trial court granted the motions, certifying the
  following three questions, which we accepted for review: 

    (1) Does the issue of diminished capacity caused by voluntary
    intoxication by means of illegal drugs apply to a charge of second
    degree murder based upon wanton disregard of the likelihood that
    one's conduct would naturally cause death or great bodily harm, so
    as to reduce the offense to voluntary manslaughter?
     
    (2) Does the issue of diminished capacity caused by a combination
    of pre-existing mental condition and the effects of voluntary
    consumption of illegal drugs apply to a charge of second degree
    murder based upon wanton disregard of the likelihood that one's
    conduct would naturally cause death or great bodily harm, so as to
    reduce the offense to voluntary manslaughter?

    (3) Is the following a correct statement of Vermont law:

          The term "mental disease or defect" as used in 13 V.S.A. § 4801
        includes a mental condition caused by the voluntary consumption of
        illegal drugs if the drugs activate a latent mental disease or
        defect, and as a result of that mental disease or defect the
        individual has lost the capacity to appreciate the criminality of
        his conduct, or has lost the capacity to conform his conduct to
        the requirements of the law, unless the individual knew or had
        reason to know that the drug would activate the illness.  The
        resulting disease or defect must be recognized medically and must
        exist at the time of the offense, independent of any temporary
        intoxication or high that the drugs caused.  It does not  matter
        that the mental disease or defect was not permanent, if the
        condition lasted for a substantial time after the intoxicating
        effects of the illegal drugs had worn off.  A mental disease or
        defect cannot be caused solely by the consumption of an illegal
        drug.


                                     I.


       ¶  10.  This interlocutory appeal presents questions of law, and our
  review is therefore nondeferential and plenary.  State v. Koch, 169 Vt.
  109, 112,