Case Title: Boyd v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC20-108

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2021-05-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
____________ 
 
No. SC20-108 
____________ 
 
LUCIOUS BOYD, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
May 13, 2021 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal from an order 
summarily denying Lucious Boyd’s second successive motion to 
vacate his judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and 
sentence of death under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  
Because the order concerns postconviction relief from a capital 
conviction for which a sentence of death was imposed, this Court 
has jurisdiction of the appeal under article V, section 3(b)(1), of the 
Florida Constitution.  For the reasons below, we affirm. 
 
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I. BACKGROUND 
 
Boyd was convicted of first-degree murder, armed kidnapping, 
and sexual battery for offenses that occurred in 1998.  Boyd v. State 
(Boyd I), 910 So. 2d 167, 174 (Fla. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 
1179 (2006).  He was sentenced to death for the murder, and this 
Court affirmed his convictions and sentences on direct appeal.  Id.  
Since then, we have affirmed the denial of Boyd’s initial motion for 
postconviction relief and denied his petition for writ of habeas 
corpus, Boyd v. State (Boyd II), 200 So. 3d 685, 690 (Fla. 2015), 
denied a second petition for writ of habeas corpus, Boyd v. Jones 
(Boyd III), No. SC16-1812, 2017 WL 318931, at *1 (Fla. Jan. 23, 
2017), and affirmed the summary denial of Boyd’s first successive 
motion for postconviction relief, Boyd v. State (Boyd IV), 291 So. 3d 
900, 901 (Fla. 2020).  Boyd now appeals the summary denial of his 
second successive motion for postconviction relief, in which he 
asserted a claim of juror misconduct on the part of Tonja Striggles. 
 
According to the allegations of Boyd’s motion, Boyd discovered 
the basis for his present claim at a federal evidentiary hearing on a 
separate claim of misconduct involving the same juror.  At the 
federal hearing, which was convened to address a claim that juror 
 
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Striggles failed to reveal the full extent of her criminal history 
during voir dire,1 juror Striggles volunteered information about 
three topics pertinent to the present claim: (1) a familial connection 
she has to Boyd, (2) pretrial knowledge of the case, and (3) the side 
effects of medication she was taking at the time of Boyd’s trial.  
Boyd contends that juror Striggles’s failure to reveal this 
information during voir dire amounts to juror misconduct and 
entitles him to a new trial. 
 
The familial connection at issue is the marriage of juror 
Striggles’s first cousin to Boyd’s brother.  Juror Striggles’s 
testimony at the federal evidentiary hearing indicates that she 
learned about this relationship during a break in voir dire when she 
called her mother and revealed that she was being considered for 
jury service for a case involving Lucious Boyd.  Before the first 
break, the entire panel had been asked if anyone knew Boyd or 
recognized his name in connection with a “criminal setting.”  At that 
 
 
1.  We addressed the same claim in Boyd II and denied relief.  
Boyd II, 200 So. 3d at 694-98.  After an evidentiary hearing, the 
federal district court also denied relief but granted Boyd a certificate 
of appealability.  Boyd v. Inch, No. 16-62555-Civ-Gayles, 2019 WL 
3002922, at *13-*21, *42 (S.D. Fla. July 10, 2019).   
 
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time, juror Striggles said, “I have heard my family talk about it.  I 
don’t know if it’s the same gentleman, if it was related to the Boyd 
Funeral Home, but my family has spoken about it.”  Even though 
Boyd’s family owns the Boyd Funeral Home, there was no request 
for more information of juror Striggles at that time.  She was, 
however, asked to confirm that what she had heard would not affect 
her deliberations.  Specifically, among other assurances, when 
asked if what she heard would affect her deliberations, juror 
Striggles answered, “No, because I don’t know.”   
 
As revealed at the federal evidentiary hearing, during the 
phone call to her mother—which, again, would have occurred after 
the questioning just discussed—juror Striggles asked her mother if 
she knew Boyd.  In response, juror Striggles’s mother mentioned 
Boyd’s father’s name, told juror Striggles that Boyd’s brother was 
married to juror Striggles’s cousin, and advised her that she could 
not participate in the case because of that family relationship.  
Juror Striggles claimed at the federal evidentiary hearing to have 
raised an issue about her familial connection to Boyd during voir 
dire, such that everyone in the courtroom should have heard it.  
However, this claim is inconsistent with the voir dire transcript. 
 
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As for juror Striggles’s pretrial knowledge of the case, she 
revealed at the federal evidentiary hearing that the victim’s body 
was found near her home, that her neighbors had discussed the 
case, and that her family was in the habit of talking about the Boyd 
family all the time and still does so.  In reference to those 
discussions, juror Striggles explained at the federal evidentiary 
hearing that when she called her mother, she said, “[G]uess what, 
you know the body they found in Oakland Park, that’s the same 
person.  It’s Lucious Boyd . . . .”  Nevertheless, juror Striggles also 
testified at the federal evidentiary hearing that she does not “know 
the Boyds that well” and that her family primarily “deal[s] with” 
another family in the funeral business.  Juror Striggles further 
testified that she did not know anything about the case except what 
was presented in the courtroom, that she was not trying to get on 
the jury, and that she did not “go in trying to convict” Boyd, as she 
did not know him.  She felt that she was fair as a juror and based 
her verdict on the facts presented at trial, and nothing else. 
 
Regarding the medication she was taking during voir dire and 
the trial, juror Striggles said that it made her feel lethargic and 
 
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unable to focus well.  She testified that she had struggled to stay 
awake and felt “stoned.” 
 
Based on the new information received from juror Striggles, in 
combination with other matters that Boyd argued had a bearing on 
whether the omissions directly at issue show juror misconduct, 
Boyd requested a new trial or an evidentiary hearing.  The 
additional matters Boyd argued should be considered included the 
following: juror Striggles’s failure to reveal the full extent of her 
criminal history; an allegation that surfaced during Boyd’s penalty 
phase that certain unnamed jurors were discussing the case and 
Boyd’s personal history in the restroom of the courthouse;2 and an 
allegation, rooted in Boyd’s initial postconviction record and 
explored at the federal evidentiary hearing, that juror Striggles was 
untruthful during voir dire about her residential history.  Boyd 
explained that the purpose of the evidentiary hearing would be to 
take the testimony of trial counsel.   
 
2.  On direct appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s denial of 
Boyd’s claims related to alleged juror misconduct of unnamed 
jurors in the restroom.  Boyd I, 910 So. 2d at 178-79. 
 
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After receiving a response to Boyd’s motion from the State, the 
postconviction court summarily denied the motion without 
explaining its ruling. 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
Boyd raises two issues.  First, he contends that the 
postconviction court’s failure to hold a case management hearing, 
known as a Huff3 hearing, was error itself, particularly when paired 
with the lack of explanation for the denial of relief.  Second, Boyd 
argues that the denial of relief without an evidentiary hearing was 
error.  The State disagrees with both arguments and contends that 
Boyd’s substantive claim is procedurally barred at least in part. 
A. Failure to Hold a Huff Hearing 
 
In Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993), we held that, 
in proceedings on an initial postconviction motion in a case where 
the death penalty has been imposed, the postconviction court must 
hold a hearing where legal argument can be presented before ruling 
on the motion.  We have since explained that this requirement 
applies only to initial, not successive, postconviction motions, even 
 
 
3.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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though the better practice is to hold such a hearing on any 
postconviction motion in a case involving the death penalty.  Taylor 
v. State, 260 So. 3d 151, 157 (Fla. 2018) (discussing Groover v. 
State, 703 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 1997)).  Further, we have held that any 
error in failing to hold a Huff hearing on a successive postconviction 
motion is harmless if the motion is legally insufficient to warrant 
either relief or an evidentiary hearing.  Id. at 157-58.  What this 
means practically is that the postconviction court’s failure to hold a 
Huff hearing on Boyd’s motion is not reversible error in itself.  See 
id.  Thus, whether Boyd is entitled to relief depends on whether his 
motion was sufficient to require either an evidentiary hearing or a 
new trial.  See id.  As explained below, Boyd’s motion did not 
require either. 
B. Decision to Summarily Deny the Motion 
 
We review the summary denial of a postconviction motion de 
novo.  Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1081 (Fla. 2008).  Such 
a denial is permitted “[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case 
conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.”  Id. at 
1080-81 (quoting Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B)).  To determine if 
this standard is met, this Court must “accept the defendant’s 
 
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allegations as true to the extent that they are not conclusively 
refuted by the record.”  Id. at 1081 (citing Rolling v. State, 944 So. 
2d 176, 179 (Fla. 2006)).   
1. Procedural Bar 
 
This Court recently considered the procedural and substantive 
standards applicable to a postconviction claim of juror misconduct 
in Martin v. State, No. SC18-896 (Fla. May 6, 2021).  The procedural 
requirements outlined in Martin are satisfied in this case for the 
portions of Boyd’s claim that are based on information first 
discovered at the federal evidentiary hearing, as Boyd discovered 
that information within the year preceding the filing of his motion.  
Martin, slip op. at 13-16 (citing Diaz v. State, 132 So. 3d 93, 104-05 
(Fla. 2013), and Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A)).  However, the State 
argues, and we agree, that Boyd’s claim is procedurally barred to 
the extent it seeks to relitigate his prior claims concerning juror 
Striggles’s failure to reveal her criminal history and the allegation of 
juror misconduct that arose during Boyd’s penalty phase involving 
unnamed jurors who allegedly discussed extra-record information 
in the restroom during the guilt phase of the trial.  See Hendrix v. 
State, 136 So. 3d 1122, 1124 (Fla. 2014) (concluding that a 
 
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successive postconviction motion may not be used to relitigate 
claims that were raised and rejected on direct appeal or in prior 
postconviction proceedings).  To the extent Boyd’s present claim 
points to the record created with respect to those prior claims as 
information that a factfinder could consider in assessing whether 
juror Striggles engaged in misconduct when she failed to reveal her 
familial connection to Boyd and her pretrial knowledge of the case, 
we recognize the argument and address it below. 
2. Merits 
 
Under Martin, to prevail on a standalone postconviction claim 
of juror misconduct for failing to provide information during voir 
dire, the defendant must establish two prongs: first, that the juror 
failed “to answer honestly a material question on voir dire,” Martin, 
slip op. at 17 (quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 
464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984)), and second, that the juror was actually 
biased against the defendant, id. at 18 (quoting Boyd II, 200 So. 3d 
at 697).  We recognized in Martin that evidentiary hearings would 
sometimes be needed to resolve postconviction claims of juror 
misconduct.  Id. at 20.  However, we also cautioned that the 
questioning in such hearings would have to comply with section 
 
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90.607(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2020), which provides that “[u]pon 
an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror is not 
competent to testify as to any matter which essentially inheres in 
the verdict or indictment,” including “jurors’ emotions, mental 
processes, or mistaken beliefs.”  Martin, slip op. at 21 (quoting § 
90.607(2)(b) and then quoting Marshall v. State, 854 So. 2d 1235, 
1240 (Fla. 2003)). 
 
Regarding the first prong, we explained in Martin that “a 
mistaken but honest answer to a question—either because the juror 
mistakenly believed his answer was correct or because the question 
was unclear—will not warrant postconviction relief.”  Id. at 17-18.  
Additionally, we explained that “a ‘material’ question is one that has 
‘a natural tendency to influence, or [is] capable of influencing,’ the 
determination of whether a juror is actually biased against the 
defendant.”  Id. at 18 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 
16 (1999)).  Where the defendant alleges that a juror has been 
dishonest by failing to provide pertinent information in response to 
a material voir dire question, an evidentiary hearing is required to 
determine whether the apparent dishonesty was intentional unless 
 
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the record conclusively refutes any claim that it was or unless the 
point is rendered moot by the actual bias inquiry.  See id. at 16-17. 
 
Regarding the second prong, we explained in Martin that the 
definition of “actual bias” given in Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312 
(Fla. 2007), but not its standard for proving it, is appropriate for a 
postconviction claim of juror misconduct.  Martin, slip op. at 19-20.  
Thus, the actual bias required to be proven under Martin is “bias-
in-fact that would prevent service as an impartial juror.”  Id. at 19 
(quoting Boyd II, 200 So. 3d at 698 (quoting Carratelli, 961 So. 2d 
at 324)).  In explaining the standard for proving actual bias in a 
postconviction claim of juror misconduct, this Court clarified the 
plurality decision in Boyd’s initial postconviction appeal, which 
cited Carratelli’s requirement that actual bias be shown from the 
face of the voir dire record.  Id. at 16. 
 
We now apply Martin’s two-prong test to Boyd’s present claim 
and conclude that summary denial was proper because Boyd’s 
allegations of juror dishonesty and actual bias are legally 
insufficient to state a claim. 
a. Failure to Answer Honestly a Material Question in Voir Dire 
 
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First, Boyd’s motion is legally insufficient to establish that 
juror Striggles answered any material question dishonestly during 
voir dire.  Boyd’s claim concerning juror Striggles’s medication does 
not relate to any question asked on voir dire and, therefore, cannot 
satisfy the first prong of the Martin standard.4  Boyd’s claims 
regarding juror Striggles’s familial connection to him and her 
pretrial knowledge of the case do relate to material questions asked 
in voir dire but, as explained below, do not show dishonesty. 
 
4.  Moreover, as we cautioned in Martin, slip op. at 21-22, this 
claim cannot support postconviction relief because it is based on 
impermissible inquiry into juror Striggles’s subjective mental state.  
See Devoney v. State, 717 So. 2d 501, 502 (Fla. 1998) (explaining 
that Florida law does not allow inquiry into a juror’s subjective 
mental state, including any inquiry as to whether the juror 
“misunderstood the instructions of the [c]ourt [or] the statements of 
the witnesses or the pleading in the case” or any “other matter 
resting alone in the juror’s breast” (quoting Marks v. State Road 
Dep’t, 69 So. 2d 771, 774-75 (Fla. 1954))); § 90.607(2)(b), Fla. Stat. 
(2020) (“Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, 
a juror is not competent to testify as to any matter which essentially 
inheres in the verdict or indictment.”); accord Tanner v. United 
States, 483 U.S. 107, 113-16, 126-27 (1987) (holding, under a 
federal rule similar to the Florida rule governing juror inquiries, 
that a defendant was not entitled to a new trial where two jurors 
attested that some of the jurors, including one who came forward 
with an affidavit, had used drugs and alcohol during the trial in 
such a way as to affect their competence as jurors). 
 
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When juror Striggles’s federal evidentiary hearing testimony is 
compared to the voir dire transcript, it is clear that, according to the 
testimony on which Boyd relies as the new information supporting 
his motion, juror Striggles did not learn that she had a familial 
connection to Boyd until at least the first break in voir dire, which 
occurred after the panel was asked about any familiarity they had 
with Boyd or the case.  Notably, juror Striggles testified at the 
federal evidentiary hearing that, despite the familial relationship, 
she was “not really” familiar with the Boyd family and “didn’t know 
anything about Boyd until [she] ended up on the jury for this case.”  
The fact that juror Striggles asked her mother if she knew Boyd and 
was then advised of who he was in relation to his father and juror 
Striggles’s cousin indicates that juror Striggles was not personally 
familiar with him before that phone call.  Thus, juror Striggles’s 
federal evidentiary hearing testimony does not support a finding 
that juror Striggles knew about her familial relationship to Boyd 
when she was asked if she knew him or recognized his name in a 
“criminal case setting.”  On the contrary, it indicates that she 
learned about a familial connection to him later and that, even 
then, she was “not really” familiar with him.  For these reasons, the 
 
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portion of Boyd’s claim pertaining to juror Striggles’s familial 
connection does not satisfy the requirement of Martin that the juror 
be shown to have failed “to answer honestly a material question on 
voir dire.”  Martin, slip op. at 17 (quoting McDonough Power Equip., 
Inc., 464 U.S. at 556).   
 
Likewise, juror Striggles’s prior knowledge of the Boyd family 
and the case was not a source of dishonesty in response to a 
material voir dire question.  During voir dire, juror Striggles 
responded when potential members were asked if they had “any 
familiarity with the name Lucious Boyd in a criminal case setting.”  
She said, “I have heard my family talk about it.  I don’t know if it’s 
the same gentleman, if it was related to the Boyd Funeral Home, 
but my family has spoken about it.”  Juror Striggles then confirmed 
that she does not “believe everything [she] read[s] in the paper” and 
said that what she heard would not affect her deliberations.  Thus, 
she revealed during voir dire that she had heard something about 
the case, and she was not asked to provide more information.   
 
Juror Striggles did not reveal in response to the question 
about familiarity with Boyd’s name in a “criminal case setting” (a) 
that her family’s discussion of the case was not simply a casual 
 
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response to a news report but part of a habit of talking about the 
Boyd family “all the time” due to familiarity with them beyond news 
reports about this case and (b) that the victim’s body was found in 
her neighborhood and was discussed within the neighborhood.  
However, her failure to volunteer this additional information does 
not rise to the level of dishonesty, given that juror Striggles said at 
the time that she was not even sure whether the case involved “the 
same gentleman” her family had discussed, her federal evidentiary 
hearing testimony does not contradict this claim, and juror 
Striggles was not asked any follow-up questions concerning the 
discussions she had heard.  Juror Striggles might have revealed 
more if she had been asked more.  Id. at 20-21 (“[A] standalone 
juror misconduct claim is premised on a prospective juror’s alleged 
concealment of information during voir dire, despite counsel’s 
reasonable efforts to elicit that information.”).  
 
Although juror Striggles stated at the federal evidentiary 
hearing that she told her mother during voir dire that the case was 
about Boyd and the body found in Oakland Park, and this 
statement arguably contradicts her statement during voir dire that 
she did not know if the case involved “the same gentleman” that her 
 
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family had discussed, these two statements are reconcilable.  When 
both statements are considered together and in context of all of 
juror Striggles’s testimony, they do not show dishonesty.  Instead, 
they suggest that juror Striggles inferred that the case was indeed 
about “the same gentleman” after she mentioned the Boyd Funeral 
Home and, instead of being told that the case had no relation, was 
asked to confirm that she could put what she heard out of her 
mind.  For these reasons, Boyd’s motion does not show that juror 
Striggles was dishonest with respect to her pretrial knowledge.  Id. 
at 15. 
 
Although Boyd urges us to consider juror Striggles’s failure to 
reveal her full criminal history in voir dire, her alleged failure to 
accurately represent her residential history in voir dire, and the fact 
that, at trial, there was an allegation that unnamed jurors were 
discussing the case in the restroom, these matters do not support 
an inference of material dishonesty in relation to the subject matter 
of Boyd’s present motion.  Notably, the federal district court found 
that juror Striggles’s voir dire answers concerning her criminal 
history were not the result of a desire to deceive, but instead were 
“the product of confusion of her own creation.”  Boyd v. Inch, 2019 
 
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WL 3002922, at *20.  Regarding juror Striggles’s residential history, 
Boyd points out that, although she characterized herself as a 
“military brat” who is “from everywhere” during voir dire, 
information discovered during postconviction proceedings and 
discussed at the federal evidentiary hearing indicates that she had 
lived in one place for most of her life but had traveled often due to 
her father’s position in the Army.  This information is not materially 
inconsistent with her voir dire answers, which also included the fact 
that she had been in Fort Lauderdale “for about 30 something years 
on and off.”  As for the claim of improper juror discussions in the 
restroom, it is not clear that juror Striggles was one of the accused 
jurors, and, in any event, we explained on direct appeal that the 
trial court properly declined to question the jurors about this 
accusation because the testimony supporting it was neither 
coherent nor credible and the claim was inconsistent with the juror-
sequestration procedures that were observed during the trial.  Boyd 
I, 910 So. 2d at 178.  As indicated in our discussion of the 
procedural bar, Boyd cannot relitigate this determination.  See 
Hendrix, 136 So. 3d at 1124.  None of these tangential matters 
 
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show that juror Striggles gave materially dishonest testimony with 
respect to the matters directly at issue in Boyd’s timely claims. 
Ultimately, with respect to both her familial connection and 
her pretrial knowledge, juror Striggles’s federal evidentiary hearing 
testimony establishes that she was not proactive about engaging 
with the court as she made new connections in her mind, but not 
that she failed to answer a material question honestly when asked. 
b. Actual Bias 
 
Boyd’s motion also does not establish the actual bias required 
by Martin’s second prong.   
 
Juror Striggles’s federal evidentiary hearing testimony about 
her familial connection to Boyd shows only that she became aware 
of a distant familial connection to Boyd when she called her mother 
during voir dire but not that this connection impressed her one way 
or the other.  This information does not indicate that juror Striggles 
“could not be fair and impartial and follow the law as instructed by 
the trial court.”  Martin, slip op. at 19 (quoting Boyd II, 200 So. 3d 
696).    
 
As for juror Striggles’s federal evidentiary hearing testimony 
regarding pretrial knowledge, it indicates only that she was part of 
 
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or had at least overheard discussions of the case by her family and 
neighbors after the body was found near her home.  It does not 
indicate anything further about the content of those discussions.   
 
Further, juror Striggles’s federal evidentiary hearing testimony 
is consistent with her statement in voir dire that what she heard 
before trial could not affect her deliberations because she “[didn’t] 
know,” apparently meaning that she did not know at that time 
whether Boyd was guilty.  At the federal evidentiary hearing, juror 
Striggles testified that she did not know “anything about Boyd” 
until she was on this jury and that she reached her verdict based 
on the information presented in the courtroom, knowing nothing 
else about the case.  Also, she felt she was fair to Boyd and testified 
that she did not “go in trying to convict the man” because she did 
not know him.  Although such statements may not be dispositive 
when there are other indicators of bias, in this case, the statements 
that Boyd relies on do not establish actual bias when considered in 
context of the entire record, including juror Striggles’s assurances 
of impartiality—both during voir dire and at the federal evidentiary 
hearing—and the decision of Boyd and his counsel to accept juror 
 
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Striggles as a juror without further questioning concerning her 
family’s discussions of the case.5 
 
At most, juror Striggles’s testimony indicates that she had 
some level of preconceived notion about the case, but not a clear 
prejudgment of Boyd’s guilt.  A preconceived notion does not 
necessarily remove a juror’s ability to be impartial, particularly 
where, as here, the juror declares that she can “lay aside [her] 
impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence 
presented in court.”  Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 723 (1961).  In this 
case, juror Striggles has declared that she was fair and rendered 
her verdict based on the evidence presented in court.  The new 
information that Boyd has discovered about her pretrial knowledge 
does not contradict that declaration.  Therefore, it does not state a 
legally sufficient claim of actual bias. 
 
5.  Additionally, Boyd contends that juror Striggles’s failure to 
reveal her criminal history, her characterization of herself as a 
“military brat” who is “from everywhere,” and the allegation 
concerning mid-trial juror discussions in the restroom support his 
theory that juror Striggles’s failure to reveal her familial connection 
to him and pretrial knowledge of the case was due to bias.  We 
disagree.  For the same reasons discussed with respect to the 
material dishonesty prong, these matters do not support Boyd’s 
claim that juror Striggles’s was actually biased against him.  
 
 
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III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the summary denial of 
Boyd’s second successive motion for postconviction relief. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and 
GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion. 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LABARGA, J., dissenting. 
The majority has correctly determined that Boyd’s claim of 
juror misconduct, based on certain evidence revealed at the federal 
evidentiary hearing, is not procedurally barred.  However, the 
majority fails to conclude that this evidence—involving juror 
Striggles’s responses to material questions at voir dire—warrants an 
evidentiary hearing on Boyd’s claim of juror misconduct.  Thus, I 
respectfully dissent. 
Striggles’s testimony at the federal evidentiary hearing exposed 
significant inconsistencies with her answers at voir dire.  At voir 
dire, when the prosecutor asked prospective jurors if they were 
familiar with participants or witnesses, some of whom had the last 
 
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name “Boyd,” Striggles did not respond.  Additionally, when 
prospective jurors were asked if they were familiar with the name 
“Lucious Boyd” in a criminal context, Striggles merely responded 
that she had heard her family talk about the name, but she was not 
sure if the discussion was related to Boyd or, more generally, to the 
Boyd family’s funeral business. 
However, at the federal evidentiary hearing, Striggles testified 
that she was familiar with the name “Boyd” because her family 
talks about Boyd and his family frequently: “My family knows the 
Boyds as well as the Mizells and all of them.  Okay.  They talk about 
all of them and they are still talking about them.”  Additionally, 
when asked about her prior knowledge of Boyd’s case, Striggles 
said: “Okay.  So, I heard about it.  I mean, everybody heard about 
it.  Even my neighbors heard about it.  They found the body in 
Oakland Park.  I didn’t know it was related to the guy I was on the 
jury for.”  Upon further questioning about her knowledge of the 
murder, she stated: “Yes, it was there by my house.  It was out 
there by my house.” 
Particularly disturbing was the revelation at the federal 
evidentiary hearing that during a break in voir dire, Striggles called 
 
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her mother to talk about Boyd.  This phone call occurred after the 
prosecutor questioned prospective jurors about their familiarity 
with Boyd and their knowledge of his case.  During the phone call, 
Striggles said to her mother: “[G]uess what, you know the body they 
found in Oakland Park, that’s the same person.  It’s Lucious Boyd.”  
Striggles testified that during the phone call, her mother revealed 
the extent of their familial relationship with Boyd and told her that 
she should not serve on the jury.  However, Striggles did not bring 
this information to the Court’s attention when voir dire resumed.  In 
fact, even after another prospective juror suggested the following 
day that he might be familiar with the Boyd family and possibly 
Boyd himself, Striggles remained silent about her own connection to 
Boyd. 
The majority concludes that because counsel asked about 
prospective jurors’ familiarity with the name “Boyd” and Boyd’s 
criminal case before the phone call, Striggles could not have 
answered the voir dire questions dishonestly.  However, the timing 
and substance of the phone call strongly suggest that Striggles 
made the connection between the case involving the body found in 
the neighborhood park and Boyd before the break in voir dire, 
 
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because she testified that she told her mother—apparently without 
prompting—that the case involved Boyd.  It appears quite clear from 
the record that Striggles had ample prior knowledge of Boyd and his 
case when asked at voir dire but did not reveal it. 
The revelations at the federal evidentiary hearing call into 
serious question Striggles’s service on the jury that convicted Boyd, 
and they should, at a minimum, be further explored at an 
evidentiary hearing in the circuit court.  Because Boyd’s motion for 
postconviction relief based on a claim of juror misconduct is legally 
sufficient, I dissent. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County, 
Andrew L. Siegel, Judge – 061999CF005809A88810 
 
Neal Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Suzanne Myers 
Keffer, Chief Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and 
Scott Gavin, Staff Attorney, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, 
Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Leslie T. 
Campbell, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee