Case Title: Parsons v. Associated Banc-Corp

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2014AP002581

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2017-04-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
2017 WI 37 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP2581 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Taft Parsons, Jr. and Carol Parsons, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
 
Associated Banc-Corp, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
XYZ Insurance Company, 
          Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2016 WI App 44 
Reported at: 370 Wis. 2d 112, 881 N.W.2d 793 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 13, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 2, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Jeffrey A. Conen 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J. joined by ABRAHAMSON, J. 
dissents (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: KELLY, J. did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Robert G. Pyzyk, James J. Carrig and Niebler, Pyzyk, Roth and 
Carrig, LLP, Menomonee Falls.  Oral argument by James J. Carrig. 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants, there was a brief by Alex 
Flynn, Marjorie R. Maguire and Alex Flynn and Associates, S.C.,  
Milwaukee.  Oral argument by Alex Flynn. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Jonh E. Knight, Kirsten 
E. Spira and Boardman & Clark LLP, Madison, for Wisconsin 
Bankers Association. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Michael J. Cerjak, 
PKSD, Milwaukee, Mark L. Thomsen and Cannon & Dunphy, S.C., 
Brookfield for Wisconsin Association for Justice. 
 
 
2017 WI 37
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP2581 
(L.C. No. 
2011CV8389) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Taft Parsons, Jr. and Carol Parsons, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Associated Banc-Corp, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
XYZ Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant. 
FILED 
 
APR 13, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published 
decision 
of 
the 
court 
of 
appeals, 
Parsons 
v. 
Associated Banc-Corp, 2016 WI App 44, 370 Wis. 2d 112, 881 
N.W.2d 793, which reversed the Milwaukee County circuit court's1 
order granting Associated Banc-Corp's ("Associated") motion to 
strike Taft and Carol Parsons' ("the Parsons") demand for a 
jury. 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Jeffrey A. Conen presided. 
No. 
2014AP2581   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The Parsons are approaching a trial in their lawsuit 
against 
Associated 
for 
alleged 
racketeering 
activity 
and 
negligent hiring, training, and supervision.  We are asked to 
decide what form that trial will take.  The Parsons seek a jury 
trial, but Associated asserts that the Parsons contractually 
waived their right to a jury several years ago, before this 
litigation arose.  
¶3 
There are two basic issues on this appeal.  First, we 
must examine whether the pre-litigation jury waiver provision in 
the contract between the Parsons and Associated is enforceable, 
either with or without proof extrinsic to the terms of the 
contract that the Parsons knowingly and voluntarily agreed to 
this waiver.  Second, if we conclude that the provision is 
enforceable, we must examine whether Associated's motion to 
strike the Parsons' jury demand was untimely.  
¶4 
We conclude that the pre-litigation jury waiver 
provision in the contract between the Parsons and Associated is 
enforceable 
and 
that 
Associated 
does 
not 
need 
to 
offer 
additional proof that the Parsons knowingly and voluntarily 
agreed to this waiver.  We further conclude that Associated's 
motion to strike the Parsons' jury demand was not untimely.  
Consequently, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
and remand the case to the circuit court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶5 
In part because of the unusual posture of this case, 
the facts pertaining to this lawsuit are largely unimportant to 
No. 
2014AP2581   
 
3 
 
the disposition of this appeal.  On May 26, 2011, the Parsons 
sued Associated in Milwaukee County circuit court asserting 
claims pertaining to, in the words of the Parsons, "a failed 
construction project in inner-city Milwaukee."  
¶6 
More specifically, the Parsons' complaint contains the 
following relevant allegations.  In or before 2002, Taft Parsons 
("Taft") "conceived of the idea to turn the run-down houses on 
his block into modern affordable rowhouses."  The Parsons 
obtained financing for this project through State Financial 
Bank, Associated's predecessor in interest.2  According to the 
Parsons, however, Associated "conspired with, aided, and/or 
allowed the general contractor and project manager [of the 
project] to improperly take hundreds of thousands of dollars of 
construction funds from the [Parsons] causing the [Parsons] 
substantial injury."  The complaint asserted ten causes of 
action and, importantly, demanded a 12-person jury. 
¶7 
On December 12, 2012, the Parsons filed an amended 
complaint asserting eight causes of action.  Before this court, 
the Parsons contend that they have now "limited their case" to 
the following two claims presented in their amended complaint: 
(1) racketeering activity in violation of Wis. Stat. § 946.83(1) 
                                                 
2 For simplicity, we will refer to both State Financial Bank 
and Associated as "Associated" for the remainder of this 
opinion.  We express no position on the merits of the underlying 
dispute. 
No. 
2014AP2581   
 
4 
 
(2013-14);3 and (2) negligent hiring, training, and supervision.  
In their amended complaint the Parsons again demanded a 12-
person jury.  On January 9, 2013, the Parsons submitted the jury 
fee to the circuit court.  
¶8 
On May 14, 2014, Associated filed a motion to strike 
the Parsons' jury demand.  Associated provided the circuit court 
with a Promissory Note for several hundred thousand dollars 
dated May 26, 2004 and listing Taft as "Borrower" and Associated 
as "Lender."  The note contained the following relevant 
language: 
WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL.  THE BORROWER AND THE LENDER (BY 
THEIR 
ACCEPTANCE 
HEREOF) 
HEREBY 
VOLUNTARILY, 
KNOWINGLY, IRREVOCABLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY WAIVE ANY 
RIGHT TO HAVE A JURY PARTICIPATE IN RESOLVING ANY 
DISPUTE 
(WHETHER 
BASED 
UPON 
CONTRACT, 
TORT 
OR 
OTHERWISE) BETWEEN OR AMONG THE BORROWER AND THE 
LENDER ARISING OUT OF OR IN ANY WAY RELATED TO THIS 
DOCUMENT, 
ANY 
OTHER 
RELATED 
DOCUMENT, 
OR 
ANY 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BORROWER AND THE LENDER. THIS 
PROVISION IS A MATERIAL INDUCEMENT TO THE LENDER TO 
PROVIDE THE FINANCING DESCRIBED HEREIN OR IN OTHER 
LOAN DOCUMENTS.  
. . .  
PRIOR 
TO 
SIGNING 
THIS 
NOTE, 
BORROWER 
READ 
AND 
UNDERSTOOD ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THIS NOTE . . . . 
BORROWER AGREES TO THE TERMS OF THE NOTE. 
(Boldface omitted from first four words and last paragraph.)  A 
few lines below this text was Taft's signature.  Accordingly, 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2014AP2581   
 
5 
 
Associated asked the court to strike the Parsons' jury demand 
"because it was contractually waived." 
¶9 
The Parsons offered a number of arguments in response 
to the motion to strike; the following ones are relevant to this 
appeal.  First, while conceding that "the statutes do not 
provide a deadline for an opposing party to object to a jury 
demand," the Parsons argued that Associated's motion to strike 
was untimely and that Associated had waived its right to object 
to the jury demand.  Second, the Parsons claimed that because of 
the lack of Wisconsin case law regarding contractual jury 
waivers, the circuit court was not required to enforce the jury 
waiver provided by Associated.  Third, the Parsons contended 
that Carol Parsons ("Carol") had not signed the Promissory Note 
and thus had not waived her right to a jury.  Finally, the 
Parsons asserted that Taft "had no freedom not to sign the 
Promissory Note for the construction loan."  
¶10 With regard to this final argument, the Parsons 
attached an affidavit in which Taft swore to the following, 
among other things: Taft "never noticed any jury waiver clause 
in the Promissory Note . . . because [he] was not given time to 
review the loan documents prior to the closing"; Taft "had no 
counsel" at the time he signed the Promissory Note; Taft was 
told "that if [he] 
did not sign the closing documents 
immediately, [Associated] would withdraw its support for the 
construction project"; if Taft "had not gotten the construction 
loan," tens of thousands of dollars he had already obtained 
under another loan "for pre-construction costs would have been 
No. 
2014AP2581   
 
6 
 
down the drain, and [he] would still have owed that money"; Taft 
"did not knowingly and freely waive any right to a jury trial"; 
and Taft signed the Promissory Note "under pressure." 
¶11 On October 24, 2014, the circuit court granted 
Associated's motion to strike the Parsons' jury demand.  Citing 
as 
"particularly 
relevant 
considerations" 
"the 
parties' 
sophistication, whether the contract was procured fraudulently, 
and whether the jury waiver clause is conspicuous," the circuit 
court concluded that the waiver was enforceable.  The circuit 
court explained in part: 
[Taft] is an intelligent business man who undoubtedly 
has experience reviewing paperwork and entering into 
contracts; 
he 
surely 
knows 
the 
importance 
of 
thoroughly reviewing documents. . . . [T]he promissory 
note also contained multiple bold, capital letter 
acknowledgements above the signature line.  The jury 
waiver clause is set off from the rest of the document 
by bold, capital letters, stating "WAIVER OF THE JURY 
TRIAL." [sic] It is unlikely that [Taft] overlooked 
the jury waiver clause as the promissory note itself 
is just a two-page document.  Finally, Wisconsin 
courts presume that a party to a contract had 
knowledge of it and consented to its terms. 
¶12 The circuit court rejected the Parsons' timeliness 
argument in part because the Parsons had not provided any law 
establishing that Associated's putative delay in objecting to 
the jury demand waived Associated's right to object to the 
demand.  With regard to the Parsons' claim that Carol was not 
bound by the jury waiver, the court concluded: 
The argument made in the Parsons' brief . . . was 
superficial.  Regardless, the jury waiver applies to 
"any dispute . . . between or among the Borrower and 
the Lender arising out of" the promissory note[,] any 
No. 
2014AP2581   
 
7 
 
other related document, or "any relationship between 
the Borrower and the Lender."  As [Carol]'s claims are 
ones arising out of the relationship between the 
borrower and the Bank, the waiver clause also applies 
to her. 
The circuit court ordered that the Parsons' cause would be heard 
by court trial. 
¶13 On November 25, 2014, the Parsons petitioned the court 
of appeals for leave to appeal a non-final order.  On 
December 12, 2014, the court of appeals granted the petition.  
On May 20, 2016, in a published opinion, the court of appeals 
reversed the decision of the circuit court and remanded the case 
for a jury trial.  Parsons, 370 Wis. 2d 112, ¶1. 
¶14 The court of appeals began with the broad proposition 
that a person may waive his or her right to a jury trial under 
Article I, section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Id., ¶16.  
However, the court of appeals concluded that Associated bore the 
burden of demonstrating that the Parsons "understood the scope 
of and the specific nature of the rights given up by the 
waiver."  Id., ¶31.  Relying on Taft's affidavit, the court 
determined that Associated had not met that burden and that the 
circuit court erred in concluding otherwise.  See id., ¶¶29-31. 
¶15 The court of appeals then explained that because "the 
additional question of whether the waiver clause is invalid 
because it is unconscionable may well arise during trial, as it 
did at oral argument, [it would] consider whether the clause, on 
the record before [it], survives an unconscionability analysis."  
Id., ¶32.  The court of appeals concluded the waiver was 
procedurally and substantively unconscionable.  Id., ¶39. 
No. 
2014AP2581   
 
8 
 
¶16 The court of appeals also considered whether the 
circuit court erred in allowing Associated to object to the 
Parsons' jury demand and concluded it had erred for three 
reasons.  First, Associated had forfeited its right to object 
because its objection was not timely.  Id., ¶22.  Second, 
Associated had waived its right to object under Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.01(3).  Id.  Third, Associated was "equitably estopped 
from making its much belated claim for a court trial."  Id., 
¶23.  The court of appeals remanded the case for a jury trial.  
Id., ¶1. 
¶17 On June 9, 2016, Associated filed a petition for 
review in this court.  On September 13, 2016, we granted the 
petition. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶18 In this case we interpret Article I, section 5 of the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
 
We 
review 
state 
constitutional 
questions de novo.  State v. Lagrone, 2016 WI 26, ¶18, 368 
Wis. 2d 1, 878 N.W.2d 636 (quoting State v. Schaefer, 2008 WI 
25, ¶17, 308 Wis. 2d 279, 746 N.W.2d 457).   
¶19 We also interpret and apply Wis. Stat. § 805.01 ("Jury 
trial of right.").  "'Statutory interpretation and application 
present questions of law that we review de novo while benefiting 
from the analyses of the court of appeals and circuit court.'"  
Journal Times v. Racine Bd. Police & Fire Comm'rs, 2015 WI 56, 
¶42, 362 Wis. 2d 577, 866 N.W.2d 563 (quoting 118th St. Kenosha, 
LLC v. DOT, 2014 WI 125, ¶19, 359 Wis. 2d 30, 856 N.W.2d 486). 
No. 
2014AP2581   
 
9 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶20 We first address whether the pre-litigation jury 
waiver provision in the contract between the Parsons and 
Associated 
is 
enforceable. 
 
 
We 
then 
address 
whether 
Associated's motion to strike the Parsons' jury demand is 
untimely.    
 
A.  Whether the Pre-litigation Jury Waiver Provision in the 
Contract between the Parsons and Associated is Enforceable 
¶21 That a person may waive his or her right to a civil 
jury trial in Wisconsin is already settled law.  Under Article 
I, section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution: 
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and 
shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the 
amount in controversy; but a jury trial may be waived 
by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed 
by law.  Provided, however, that the legislature may, 
from time to time, by statute provide that a valid 
verdict, in civil cases, may be based on the votes of 
a specified number of the jury, not less than 
five−sixths thereof. 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 5 (emphasis added).   
¶22 The Wisconsin Statutes set forth a number of ways in 
which a civil jury trial may be waived.  For example, under Wis. 
Stat. § 805.01(2), "Any party entitled to a trial by jury or by 
the court may demand a trial in the mode to which entitled at or 
before 
the 
scheduling 
conference 
or 
pretrial 
conference, 
whichever is held first.  The demand may be made either in 
writing or orally on the record."  § 805.01(2).  However,  
[t]he failure of a party to demand in accordance with 
sub. (2) a trial in the mode to which entitled 
constitutes a waiver of trial in such mode.  The right 
No. 
2014AP2581   
 
10 
 
to trial by jury is also waived if the parties or 
their attorneys of record, by written stipulation 
filed with the court or by an oral stipulation made in 
open court and entered in the record, consent to trial 
by the court sitting without a jury. 
§ 805.01(3).  Further, under Wis. Stat. § 814.61(4), "If the 
jury fee is not paid, no jury may be called in the action, and 
the action may be tried to the court without a jury."  
§ 814.61(4).  See generally Rao v. WMA Sec., Inc., 2008 WI 73, 
¶¶19-20, 310 Wis. 2d 623, 752 N.W.2d 220 (discussing the same 
statutes); Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 2005 WI 85, 
¶¶28-29, 282 Wis. 2d 69, 698 N.W.2d 643 (same).  "Wisconsin 
Stat. §§ 805.01(3) and 814.61 are but two examples of how waiver 
may be effectuated."  Phelps, 282 Wis. 2d 69, ¶28.   
¶23 The central question in this case, therefore, is not 
whether a civil jury trial may be waived, but instead whether a 
pre-litigation jury waiver provision in a contract constitutes 
waiver "in the manner prescribed by law."  Wis. Const. art. I, 
§ 5.   
¶24 We observe that the parties have not presented us with 
a statute governing contractual jury waivers.  However, as we 
will now explain, that is not dispositive of the issue.  It is 
true that in another context——interpretation of the "powers, 
duties and compensation" of the attorney general pursuant to 
Article VI, section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution——this court 
has interpreted the word "law" in the phrase "prescribed by law" 
to mean statutory law.  See, e.g., State v. City of Oak Creek, 
2000 WI 9, ¶19, 232 Wis. 2d 612, 605 N.W.2d 526.  And 
"[u]ndoubtedly, there is a natural presumption that identical 
No. 
2014AP2581   
 
11 
 
words used in different parts of the same act are intended to 
have the same meaning."  Atl. Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 
286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932).  Yet this presumption "is not rigid 
and readily yields whenever there is such variation in the 
connection in which the words are used as reasonably to warrant 
the conclusion that they were employed in different parts of the 
act 
with 
different 
intent." 
 
Id. 
 
Here, 
a 
number 
of 
considerations lead us to conclude that the phrase "prescribed 
by law" in Article I, section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution is 
not restricted to statutory law.   
¶25 As 
a 
preliminary 
matter, 
we 
note 
the 
obvious 
proposition that the phrase "prescribed by law" is susceptible 
to a broader definition than simply "prescribed by statute."  
The word "law" can denote "[t]he aggregate of legislation, 
judicial precedents, and accepted legal principles," not just 
legislation.  Law, Black's Law Dictionary 1015 (10th ed. 2014).  
Likewise, to "prescribe" simply means "[t]o dictate, ordain, or 
direct; to establish authoritatively (as a rule or guideline)." 
Prescribe, id. at 1373.4 
                                                 
4 The phrase "prescribed by law" appeared in the original 
version of Article I, section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
adopted in 1848.  Both "law" and "prescribe" carried similar 
definitions during that time period.  One legal dictionary of 
the time defines "law" in part as follows:  
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP2581   
 
12 
 
¶26 Next, 
we 
must 
acknowledge 
a 
second, 
related 
interpretative presumption, namely the intuitive presumption 
that "different words have different meanings."  Pawlowski v. 
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 WI 105, ¶22, 322 Wis. 2d 21, 777 
N.W.2d 67 ("When the legislature chooses to use two different 
words, we generally consider each separately and presume that 
different words have different meanings."); Antonin Scalia & 
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 170 (2012) ("A word or phrase is 
presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a text; a material 
variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning."). While 
Article I, section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides that 
"a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
[T]hat body or system of rules which the government of 
a country has established for its internal regulation, 
and for ascertaining and defining the rights and 
duties 
of 
the 
governed, . . . commonly 
called 
municipal or civil law, and, in popular language, "the 
law of the land."  The municipal law of England is 
composed of written and unwritten laws (lex scripta 
and lex non scripta): or, in other words, of the 
statutes of the realm, and of the custom of the realm, 
otherwise termed the "common law[";] on both of which 
branches of the law the superior courts exercise their 
judgment, giving construction and effect to the 
former, and by their interpretation declaring what is, 
and what is not the latter. 
Henry James Holthouse, A New Law Dictionary 245 (2d ed., Boston, 
Charles C. Little and James Brown, London, Thomas Blenkarn 
1850).  Another contemporaneous dictionary defines "prescribe" 
in part as "[t]o set or lay down authoritatively for direction; 
to give as a rule of conduct.  To direct."  2 John Boag, A 
Popular and Complete English Dictionary 1016 (Glasgow, William 
Collins 1848). 
No. 
2014AP2581   
 
13 
 
manner prescribed by law," that sentence is immediately followed 
by this sentence: "Provided, however, that the legislature may, 
from time to time, by statute provide that a valid verdict, in 
civil cases, may be based on the votes of a specified number of 
the jury, not less than five−sixths thereof."  Wis. Const. art. 
I, § 5 (emphases added).  The fact that the same section in the 
state 
constitution 
refers 
generally 
to 
a 
matter 
being 
"prescribed 
by 
law" 
and 
specifically 
to 
the 
legislature 
"provid[ing]" something "by statute" strongly suggests that 
"law" in that section has a broader meaning than simply 
"statutory law."  
¶27 We turn now to a significant factor in our analysis: 
this is not the first time this court has addressed the question 
of whether the manner of jury waiver under Article I, section 5 
of the Wisconsin Constitution must find prior authorization in a 
statute.  In interpreting the meaning of "prescribed by law" in 
the attorney general section of our constitution in City of Oak 
Creek, we declared that "this court has consistently stated that 
the phrase 'prescribed by law' in art. VI, § 3 plainly means 
prescribed by statutory law."  
City of 
Oak Creek, 232 
Wis. 2d 612, ¶19.  But just the opposite is true with regard to 
Article I, section 5: as made clear by our decision in 
Theuerkauf v. Schnellbaecher, 64 Wis. 2d 79, 218 N.W.2d 295 
(1974), a long line of early cases of this court determined, 
without any reference to an authorizing statute, that a jury 
trial had been waived.  See Theuerkauf, 64 Wis. 2d at 87 (citing 
Leonard v. Rogan, 20 Wis. 568 (*540), 571 (*543) (1866); Charles 
No. 
2014AP2581   
 
14 
 
Baumbach Co. v. Hobkirk, 104 Wis. 488, 80 N.W. 740 (1899); 
McCormick v. Ketchum, 48 Wis. 643, 4 N.W. 798 (1880); Wooster v. 
Weyh, 194 Wis. 85, 216 N.W. 134 (1927); Gifford v. Thur, 226 
Wis. 630, 276 N.W. 348 (1938)).  
¶28 Thus this court announced in 
Theuerkauf: "[T]he 
conclusion has been reached that [Wis. Stat. §] 270.32"——the 
predecessor to the current Wis. Stat. § 805.015——"does not state 
the exclusive conditions for finding waiver of jury trial."  
Theuerkauf, 64 Wis. 2d at 87.  In referring, after stating this 
proposition, to cases where no statute at all was cited in 
discussions of jury waiver, the Theuerkauf court was plainly 
implying not that conditions for finding waiver of a jury trial 
could be found in other statutes, but that some such conditions 
had their source independent of any statute enacted by the 
legislature.  This proposition was hinted at later in Rao, where 
we looked to "court-promulgated rule[s] of pleading, practice, 
or procedure" as well as "case law interpreting and applying 
these rules" to determine "the manner by which a party waives 
its Article I, Section 5 right of trial by jury."  Rao, 310 
Wis. 2d 623, ¶¶35 n.25, 45 (citing Phelps, 282 Wis. 2d 69, ¶28).6  
                                                 
5 See Sup. Ct. Order, Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 
Wis. 2d 585, 585-86, 689-90, 760 (1975). 
6 That is not to say that our case law has been wholly 
consistent.  In Bennett v. State, a criminal case, this court 
noted in passing that: 
Under 
[Article 
I, 
section 
5 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution], this court has repeatedly held that a 
party to an action may waive the right of trial by 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP2581   
 
15 
 
¶29 It makes sense to interpret Article I, section 5 in 
this fashion given the often broad definition of the term 
"waiver."  See, e.g., Rao, 310 Wis. 2d 623, ¶22 (quoting State 
v. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, ¶18 n.11, 294 Wis. 2d 62, 716 N.W.2d 886) 
("[A] party's 'waiver' of the Article I, Section 5 right of 
trial by jury need not be a 'waiver' in the strictest sense of 
that word, that is, an 'intentional relinquishment of a known 
right.'"); William R. Anson, Principles of the Law of Contract 
419 (Arthur L. Corbin ed., 3d Am. ed. 1919), quoted in Black's, 
supra ¶25, at 1813 ("The term waiver is one of those words of 
indefinite connotation in which our legal literature abounds; 
like a cloak, it covers a multitude of sins.").  Interpreting 
"prescribed by law" to mean "prescribed by the legislature" 
assigns to the legislature the task of defining all the possible 
ways a person might waive his or her right to a jury trial.  
Interpreting the phrase to, for example, encompass the common 
law, allows the legislature to enumerate additional, specific 
manners of waiver, or to preclude particular manners of waiver 
                                                                                                                                                             
jury, not only in the manner prescribed by law, but by 
not taking exceptions on the trial of an action 
without a jury, the right to which is secured to him 
by this section.   
Bennett v. State, 57 Wis. 69, 74 (1883).  For the reasons 
provided in this opinion, we conclude that the proper inquiry 
under Article I, section 5, is to examine whether a particular 
form of jury waiver not particularly described in a statute is 
nevertheless "prescribed by law" other than statutory law, 
rather than to anchor that form to some (unexplained) basis 
independent of the constitutional text, as Bennett appears to 
have done.  
No. 
2014AP2581   
 
16 
 
if it so desires.  This latter is the more reasonable 
interpretation, and thus the likelier one. 
¶30 For all of these reasons, we conclude that the text of 
Article I, section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution does not 
limit the manner of jury trial waiver to those set forth by 
statute.  Consequently, we may look to other sources of law to 
determine whether the Parsons' putative waiver of their right to 
a jury trial was valid.  This particular case may be resolved by 
turning to common law——specifically, to longstanding principles 
of contract law in Wisconsin. 
¶31 "Wisconsin public policy favors freedom of contract."  
Solowicz v. Forward Geneva Nat'l, LLC, 2010 WI 20, ¶34, 323 
Wis. 2d 556, 780 N.W.2d 111 (citing AKG Real Estate, LLC v. 
Kosterman, 2006 WI 106, ¶34, 296 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 835); see 
also Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 521, 405 N.W.2d 303 (1987) 
("Wisconsin courts have long recognized the importance of 
freedom of contract and have endeavored to protect the right to 
contract."). "[F]reedom of contract rests on the premise that it 
is in the public interest to accord individuals broad powers to 
order their affairs through legally enforceable agreements."  
Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & Bishop, Ltd., 2015 WI 65, ¶38 n.24, 
363 
Wis. 2d 699, 
866 
N.W.2d 679 
(alteration 
in 
original) 
(quoting E. Allan Farnsworth, 2 Farnsworth on Contracts § 5.1, 
at 1 (3rd ed. 2004)).  That is, "individuals should have the 
power 
to 
govern 
their 
own 
affairs 
without 
governmental 
interference."  Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 211, 321 
N.W.2d 173 (1982).  
No. 
2014AP2581   
 
17 
 
¶32 There is no reason why waiver of a person's Article I, 
section 5 right to a jury trial should constitute an exception 
to our general presumption in favor of freedom of contract.  "It 
is well settled that constitutional rights . . . may be waived."  
Booth Fisheries Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 185 Wis. 127, 132, 200 
N.W. 775 (1924), aff'd, 271 U.S. 208 (1926).  Moreover, the 
action a party must take to waive his or her Article I, section 
5 right to a jury trial pursuant to statute is quite minimal.  
For example, as explained above, a jury may be waived simply by 
failure to pay the required fee.  Wis. Stat. § 814.61(4).  
Compared to a potentially accidental waiver like that, there is 
nothing inherently unjust about allowing parties to agree 
voluntarily to forego a jury in advance of trial. 
¶33 In fact, the legislature has indicated agreement with 
this conclusion.  Wisconsin Stat. ch. 218 ("Finance Companies, 
Auto Dealers, Adjustment Companies and Collection Agencies") 
contains a provision which states that "[e]xcept as provided 
[elsewhere], provisions of an agreement which do any of the 
following are void and prohibited: . . . waive the dealer's or 
distributor's 
right 
to 
a 
jury 
trial." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0114(9)(a)2.  The chapter defines "agreement" to mean "a 
contract that describes the franchise relationship between 
manufacturers, distributors, importers and dealers."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0101(1) (emphasis added).  In other words, the legislature 
has, in a very narrow context, prohibited contractual jury 
waivers.  It would be strange for the legislature to foreclose 
such waivers under these limited circumstances if it thought 
No. 
2014AP2581   
 
18 
 
contractual jury waivers were prohibited in general due to a 
lack of express statutory authorization.7   
¶34 Accordingly, 
we 
conclude 
that, 
consistent 
with 
longstanding principles of contract law in Wisconsin, the pre-
litigation jury waiver provision in the contract between the 
Parsons and Associated is enforceable. 
¶35 As explained, the court of appeals concluded that 
Associated bore the additional burden of demonstrating that the 
Parsons "understood the scope of and the specific nature of the 
rights given up by the waiver."  Parsons, 370 Wis. 2d 112, ¶31.  
We disagree.  First of all, as is apparent from our previous 
discussion, "a party's 'waiver' of the Article I, Section 5 
right of trial by jury need not be a 'waiver' in the strictest 
sense of that word, that is, an 'intentional relinquishment of a 
known right.'"  Rao, 310 Wis. 2d 623, ¶22 (quoting Kelty, 294 
Wis. 2d 62, ¶18 n.11). 
¶36 Second, in Wisconsin, "[w]here the terms of a contract 
are clear and unambiguous, we construe the contract according to 
its literal terms.  'We presume the parties' intent is evidenced 
by the words they [choose], if those words are unambiguous.'"  
Tufail v. Midwest Hosp., LLC, 2013 WI 62, ¶26, 348 Wis. 2d 631, 
                                                 
7 Nor was the legislature simply considering arbitration 
agreements; Wisconsin Stat. § 218.0114(9)(b)1. explains that 
"[n]otwithstanding 
par. 
(a)2." 
and 
subject 
to 
certain 
conditions, "an agreement may provide for the resolution of 
disputes 
by 
arbitration, 
including 
binding 
arbitration."  
§ 218.0114(9)(b)1.  
No. 
2014AP2581   
 
19 
 
833 N.W.2d 586 (citation omitted) (quoting Kernz v. J. L. French 
Corp., 2003 WI App 140, ¶9, 266 Wis. 2d 124, 667 N.W.2d 751).  
While "the presumption is not conclusive in all cases," "[i]t is 
a familiar rule that those who sign written instruments are 
presumed to know their contents and their legal effect."  
Creasey Corp. v. Dunning, 182 Wis. 388, 396, 196 N.W. 775 
(1924).  "Men, in their dealings with each other, cannot close 
their eyes to the means of knowledge equally accessible to 
themselves and those with whom they deal, and then ask courts to 
relieve them from the consequences of their lack of vigilance."  
Kruse v. Koelzer, 124 Wis. 536, 541, 102 N.W. 1072 (1905). 
¶37 The words of the Parsons' contract are unambiguous.  
By those words, both Associated and the Parsons waived any right 
to a jury trial.  Further, the contract provides, in boldface, 
that "PRIOR TO SIGNING THIS NOTE, BORROWER READ AND UNDERSTOOD 
ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THIS NOTE."  "It is not the function of 
the court to relieve a party to a freely negotiated contract of 
the burdens of a provision which becomes more onerous than had 
originally been anticipated."  Ash Park, LLC, 363 Wis. 2d 699, 
¶38 (quoting 11 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 1:1 
(4th ed. 2002)).  We conclude that Associated does not need to 
offer 
additional 
proof 
that 
the 
Parsons 
knowingly 
and 
voluntarily agreed to this waiver. 
¶38 Before 
proceeding, 
we 
address 
Taft's 
affidavit.  
Relying on the affidavit, the court of appeals suggested that 
Associated had obtained the jury waiver provision fraudulently.  
However, "a party seeking to invalidate a provision in a 
No. 
2014AP2581   
 
20 
 
contract . . . has the burden of proving facts that justify a 
court's reaching the legal conclusion that the provision is 
invalid."  Wisconsin Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 2006 WI 
53, ¶30, 290 Wis. 2d 514, 714 N.W.2d 155.  The circuit court was 
"unpersuaded" by the allegations in Taft's affidavit and 
apparently found them to be incredible, relying in part on its 
view of Taft's business acumen and the specific characteristics 
of the waiver itself.  The record adequately supports the 
circuit court's determination, and thus the court of appeals was 
not entitled to substitute its own view of the evidence for the 
circuit court's view of the evidence.  See, e.g., Lemke v. 
Lemke, 2012 WI App 96, ¶55, 343 Wis. 2d 748, 820 N.W.2d 470 
("[A]n appellate court does not find facts."); State v. Turner, 
136 Wis. 2d 333, 343, 401 N.W.2d 827 (1987) ("In general, we are 
bound not to upset the trial court's findings of historical or 
evidentiary fact unless they are contrary to the great weight 
and clear preponderance of the evidence."); 
Klein-Dickert 
Oshkosh, Inc. v. Frontier Mortg. Corp., 93 Wis. 2d 660, 663, 287 
N.W.2d 742 (1980) ("[W]hen the trial judge acts as the finder of 
fact, he is the ultimate and final arbiter of the credibility of 
witnesses.  When more than one inference can be drawn from the 
credible evidence, the reviewing court must accept the inference 
drawn by the trier of fact.").   
¶39 The court of appeals did not stop there, additionally 
concluding that the clause was substantively and procedurally 
unconscionable.  Parsons, 370 Wis. 2d 112, ¶¶32-39.  The court 
of appeals explained that it was addressing this question 
No. 
2014AP2581   
 
21 
 
because it "may well arise during trial, as it did at oral 
argument."  Id., ¶32.  Given the posture of the case, the 
findings of the circuit court regarding the affidavit, and the 
skeletal state of the record, the decision of the court of 
appeals to reach out and opine on unconscionability was 
erroneous.  The conclusion of the court of appeals that the 
Parsons' contractual jury waiver is unconscionable is reversed.  
The circuit court may decide on remand whether (and if so, when) 
unconscionability may be addressed.8 
B.  Whether Associated's Motion is Untimely 
¶40 We have concluded that that the pre-litigation jury 
waiver provision in the contract between the Parsons and 
Associated is enforceable.  But the Parsons counter Associated's 
waiver claim with a "waiver" claim of their own: they claim that 
Associated waited too long to object to the Parsons' jury demand 
                                                 
8 The Parsons argued before the circuit court that Carol was 
not bound by the jury waiver signed by Taft.  The circuit court 
rejected that argument, characterizing it as "superficial."  
Despite this warning, the Parsons' argument on this issue before 
this court is a single paragraph long and does not cite to any 
legal authorities.  "[W]e do not usually address undeveloped 
arguments," and we will not do so here.  State v. Gracia, 2013 
WI 15, ¶29 n.13, 345 Wis. 2d 488, 826 N.W.2d 87. 
Additionally, the parties do not develop arguments that we 
should analyze waiver of any statutory right to a jury trial the 
Parsons possess differently from how we analyze waiver of their 
constitutional right to a jury trial, so we do not do so.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 805.01(1) ("The right of trial by jury as declared 
in article I, section 5, of the constitution or as given by a 
statute and the right of trial by the court shall be preserved 
to the parties inviolate."). 
No. 
2014AP2581   
 
22 
 
and thus may not now do so.  The circuit court below rejected 
this claim in part because the Parsons had not provided law 
supporting it.  The court of appeals reversed this conclusion, 
stating that Associated had forfeited the right to strike the 
Parsons' jury demand, had waived the right under Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.01(3), and were equitably estopped from asserting the 
right.  Parsons, 370 Wis. 2d 112, ¶¶21-23.  We disagree with all 
three determinations. 
¶41 The only statutory authority provided in this case is 
Wis. Stat. § 805.01, which states in relevant part: 
(1)  Right Preserved.  The right of trial by jury 
as 
declared 
in 
article 
I, 
section 
5, 
of 
the 
constitution or as given by a statute and the right of 
trial by the court shall be preserved to the parties 
inviolate. 
(2)  Demand.  Any party entitled to a trial by 
jury or by the court may demand a trial in the mode to 
which entitled at or before the scheduling conference 
or pretrial conference, whichever is held first. The 
demand may be made either in writing or orally on the 
record. 
(3)  Waiver.  The failure of a party to demand in 
accordance with sub. (2) a trial in the mode to which 
entitled constitutes a waiver of trial in such mode. 
§ 805.01(1)-(3) 
(emphases 
added). 
 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded Associated was bound by the emphasized text because 
Associated viewed itself as "entitled to a trial . . . by the 
court."  See Parsons, 370 Wis. 2d 112, ¶22.  One problem with 
the reasoning of the court of appeals is that, pursuant to it, 
both Associated and the Parsons could waive any entitlement to a 
mode of trial and the mode of trial would remain undetermined.  
No. 
2014AP2581   
 
23 
 
In any event, Associated was not, in fact, "demand[ing] a trial 
in the mode to which entitled."  It was instead moving to strike 
the Parsons' jury demand because the Parsons were not themselves 
"entitled to a trial by jury."  These are not identical actions.  
See Judicial Council Committee Note, 1974, to Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.01, S. Ct. Order, Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 Wis. 2d at 
690 ("The reference to trial by the court is included because 
Wisconsin, 
unlike 
most 
states, 
has 
long 
recognized 
a 
constitutional right to trial by the court in appropriate 
cases." (citing Callanan v. Judd, 23 Wis. 343 (1868)).  
¶42 The parties devote a significant amount of briefing to 
establishing with precision the timeline below and whether 
Associated's putative delay was reasonable in light of various 
events that occurred as litigation proceeded.  In the absence of 
a statutory directive, we cannot conclude that the circuit 
court——the entity with the best grasp of the unfolding of the 
proceedings 
below 
and 
of 
the 
relative 
equities 
of 
the  
situation——erroneously exercised its discretion in allowing 
Associated to rely on its otherwise-enforceable agreement with 
the Parsons not to try this case before a jury.  C.f., e.g., 
Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 502 F.3d 212, 220, 226-27 
(3d Cir. 2007) (reviewing district court's decision not to 
"bar[] DaimlerChrysler's motion to strike Tracinda's jury demand 
on the basis of laches" after DaimlerChrysler waited three years 
to 
file 
the 
motion 
under 
abuse-of-discretion 
standard).  
Further, having contracted away their right, any reliance that 
the Parsons might have had on Associated's initial acquiescence 
No. 
2014AP2581   
 
24 
 
in their unfounded demand for a jury trial was not reasonable.  
Because reasonable reliance is a requirement of equitable 
estoppel, Associated is not equitably estopped from striking the 
Parsons' demand.  See Affordable Erecting, Inc. v. Neosho 
Trompler, Inc., 2006 WI 67, ¶33, 291 Wis. 2d 259, 715 N.W.2d 620 
("There are four elements of equitable estoppel: (1) action or 
non-action; (2) on the part of one against whom estoppel is 
asserted; (3) which induces reasonable reliance thereon by the 
other, either in action or non-action; (4) which is to the 
relying party's detriment." (emphasis added) (citing Village of 
Hobart v. Brown Cnty., 2005 WI 78, ¶36, 281 Wis. 2d 628, 698 
N.W.2d 83)).   
¶43 In sum, Associated's motion to strike the Parsons' 
jury demand was not untimely. 
¶44 Before we conclude, we stress that the Parsons are not 
being denied their day in court.  We simply decide today that 
any trial that occurs on remand will be a bench trial.  We add 
that the circuit court may determine, as this litigation 
proceeds, whether the Parsons may bring additional arguments 
related to the validity of any agreements into which they 
entered with Associated. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶45 We conclude that the pre-litigation jury waiver 
provision in the contract between the Parsons and Associated is 
enforceable 
and 
that 
Associated 
does 
not 
need 
to 
offer 
additional proof that the Parsons knowingly and voluntarily 
agreed to this waiver.  We further conclude that Associated's 
No. 
2014AP2581   
 
25 
 
motion to strike the Parsons' jury demand was not untimely.  
Consequently, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
and remand the case to the circuit court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
¶46 DANIEL KELLY, J., did not participate. 
 
No.  2014AP2581.awb 
 
1 
 
¶47 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The right to a 
jury trial is a bedrock principle upon which this state is 
founded.  Article I, section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
guarantees that the "right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate . . . but . . . may be waived by the parties in all 
cases in the manner prescribed by law . . . ."  This case 
requires us to examine the prescribed manner by which a party 
may contractually waive this guaranteed right. 
¶48 Specifically we address whether Taft and Carol Parsons 
("the Parsons") waived the right to a jury trial when Taft 
Parsons signed several loan documents, including one that 
contained a provision waiving the right to a have a jury resolve 
any claims against the lending institution. 
¶49 The majority concludes that the pre-litigation jury 
waiver provision in the contract between the Parsons and 
Associated Bank-Corp ("Associated") is enforceable.  Majority 
op., ¶45.  In reaching its conclusion, the majority opinion 
ignores both significant precedent and the facts of this case. 
¶50 Following 
a 
clear 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
directive, numerous federal circuits have determined that a 
party must voluntarily and knowingly agree to a jury waiver.  
Rather than examining the totality of the circumstances, the 
majority instead rests on an ipse dixit analysis——if the jury 
waiver 
clause 
states 
that 
the 
waiver 
is 
knowingly 
and 
voluntarily made, then it must be so. 
¶51 The damaging effect of the majority's departure from 
this well-established rule is demonstrated by the egregious 
No.  2014AP2581.awb 
 
2 
 
facts of this case, which the majority to a large extent also 
ignores.  Indeed, the facts here are so egregious that the court 
of 
appeals 
determined 
that 
the 
jury 
waiver 
clause 
was 
unenforceable because it "is both procedurally and substantively 
unconscionable."1  Parsons v. Associated Banc-Corp, 2016 WI App 
44, ¶39, 370 Wis. 2d 112, 881 N.W.2d 793. 
¶52 According to the amended complaint, an affidavit, and 
the documents of record, the Parsons planned a townhouse 
development to refurbish their neighborhood, but their plans 
went awry during the course of dealing with the bank.  Instead 
of a townhouse development they were faced with bankruptcy, 
foreclosure and loan repayment demands for work that was never 
done.  The loan officer involved was convicted of bank fraud in 
federal court related to a different townhouse project, with 
remarkably similar facts to those presented here. 
¶53 Among the many documents he presented for their 
signature was a promissory note that contained a jury waiver 
clause.  The Parsons were not allowed any time to review the 
documents or consult with an attorney before signing them.  The 
loan officer threatened them by stating that he would withdraw 
the construction loan if they did not promptly sign the 
documents.  Faced with the option of losing it all or promptly 
signing the documents, Taft Parsons signed.  In their complaint 
                                                 
1 "Unconscionability has often been described as the absence 
of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties, together 
with contract terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other 
party."  Wisconsin Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 2006 WI 53, 
¶32, 290 Wis. 2d 514, 714 N.W.2d 155. 
No.  2014AP2581.awb 
 
3 
 
the Parsons allege multiple acts of fraud, extortion and threats 
that occurred under the bank's watch. 
¶54 Additionally, Associated waited years to object after 
the Parsons demanded a jury trial in compliance with Wisconsin's 
civil procedure statutes.  The majority pays no heed to this 
delay, however, concluding that Associated's motion to strike 
the Parsons' jury demand was timely.  Majority op., ¶4. 
¶55 Contrary to the majority, I conclude that Associated 
Bank has not met its burden of proving that the Parsons 
knowingly and voluntarily waived their right to trial by jury.  
I further determine that Associated's motion to strike the 
Parsons' jury demand was untimely.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
I 
¶56 In the span of only three paragraphs, the majority 
opinion dispenses with the question of whether Associated must 
demonstrate that the Parsons knowingly and voluntarily waived 
their right to a jury trial.  See majority op., ¶¶35-37.  
Ignoring relevant precedent including the numerous federal 
circuits that have addressed this issue, the majority determines 
that "Associated does not need to offer additional proof that 
the Parsons knowingly and voluntarily agreed to this waiver."  
Id., ¶37. 
¶57 Relying instead on this court's decision in Rao v. WMA 
Securities, Inc., the majority asserts that "a party's 'waiver' 
of the Article I, Section 5 right of trial by jury need not be a 
'waiver' in the strictest sense of that word, that is, an 
No.  2014AP2581.awb 
 
4 
 
'intentional relinquishment of a known right.'"  Majority op., 
¶35 (quoting Rao, 2008 WI 73, ¶22, 310 Wis. 2d 623, 752 
N.W.2d 220).  Additionally, it contends that Associated need not 
demonstrate that the waiver was knowing and voluntary because 
the 
terms 
of 
the 
Parsons' 
contract 
with 
Associated 
are 
unambiguous.  Majority op., ¶¶36-37. 
¶58 Despite its proffered rationales, the majority opinion 
finds little support in the law.  First, its reliance on Rao is 
misplaced.  In Rao, this court concluded that the circuit court 
did not violate the defendant's right to a jury trial because 
the defendant waived its right to a jury in the manner 
prescribed by law set forth in Wis. Stat. §§ 804.12(2) (failure 
to make discovery; sanctions) and 806.02 (default judgment).  
310 Wis. 2d 623, ¶5. 
¶59 Taking language out of context, the majority quotes 
Rao for the proposition that a jury waiver need not be an 
intentional relinquishment of a known right.  Majority op., ¶35 
(quoting Rao, 310 Wis. 2d 623, ¶22).  However, the majority 
ignores that Rao did not address contractual waiver of the 
right.  Rather, the context in which Rao made this statement was 
in addressing the consequences of a party's failure to comply 
with statutory requirements.  See Rao, 310 Wis. 2d 623, ¶22 (a 
party may waive the right to a trial by jury "by failing to 
assert the right timely (as when a party fails to demand a jury 
trial timely in accordance with § (Rule) 805.01) or by violating 
a law setting conditions on the party's exercise of the jury 
No.  2014AP2581.awb 
 
5 
 
trial right (as when a party fails to pay the jury fee timely in 
accordance with Wis. Stat. § 814.61)."). 
¶60 Second, the majority superficially addresses the issue 
of a contractual waiver by citing the basic principle that where 
the terms of a contract are unambiguous, we presume the parties 
intent is reflected in those words.  Majority op., ¶36 (quoting 
Tufail v. Midwest Hosp., LLC, 2013 WI 62, ¶26, 348 Wis. 2d 631, 
833 N.W.2d 586).  The majority reasons that "it is a familiar 
rule that those who sign written instruments are presumed to 
know their contents and their legal effect."  Majority op., ¶36 
(quoting Creasy Corp. v. Dunning, 182 Wis. 388, 396, 196 N.W. 
775 (1924).  Accordingly, it concludes that because the words of 
the contract are unambiguous, "[b]y those words, both Associated 
and the Parsons waived any right to a jury trial."  Majority 
op., ¶37. 
¶61 Reliance on general principles regarding freedom of 
contract is insufficient when a contract waives a constitutional 
right.  K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 756 (6th 
Cir. 1985).  Indeed, none of the cases cited by the majority as 
support for its conclusion——that Associated need not offer 
additional proof of knowing and voluntary waiver——even addresses 
the waiver of a constitutional right.2 
                                                 
2 See Tufail v. Midwest Hosp., LLC, 2013 WI 62, ¶26, 348 
Wis. 2d 631, 833 N.W.2d 586 (addressing a contract dispute 
between a landlord and a tenant over the terms of a commercial 
lease of property); Kernz v. J.L. French Corp., 2003 WI App 140, 
¶9, 
266 
Wis. 2d 124, 
667 
N.W.2d 751 
(employment 
contract 
dispute); Creasy Corp. v. Dunning, 182 Wis. 388, 396, 196 
N.W. 775, 
778 
(1924) 
(action 
to 
recover 
payment 
for 
merchandise); Kruse v. Koelzer, 124 Wis. 536, 541, 102 N.W. 1072 
(continued) 
No.  2014AP2581.awb 
 
6 
 
¶62 Third, in its fervor to genuflect at the altar of 
freedom of contract, the majority ignores the significant 
precedent that has addressed the means by which a party may 
contractually waive its right to a jury trial.  As the United 
States Supreme Court explains, courts should "indulge every 
reasonable presumption" against waiver of a jury trial due to 
the right's fundamental nature.  Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy to 
Use of Bogash, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) (citations omitted); see 
also D.H. Overmyer Co. Inc., of Ohio v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 
186 (1972) ("[W]e do not presume acquiescence in the loss of 
fundamental rights.") (citation omitted).  Indeed, it has 
instructed that waivers be intentional.  Brookhart v. Janis, 384 
U.S. 1, 4 (1966); see also Bogash, 301 U.S. at 393; Ohio Bell 
Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n of Ohio, 301 U.S. 292, 307 
(1937); D.H. Overmyer, 405 U.S. at 187. 
¶63 The United States Supreme Court has directed, "for a 
waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there 
was an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
right or privilege."  Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 4 (internal 
citation omitted).  In accordance with this directive, numerous 
federal circuits that have considered this issue have concluded 
that a jury waiver clause can only be effective where a party 
agrees to the provision knowingly and voluntarily.  See Tracinda 
Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 502 F.3d 212, 222 (3d Cir. 2007) 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1905) (action brought to reform a warranty deed); Ash Park, LLC 
v. Alexander & Bishop, Ltd., 2015 WI 65, ¶38, 363 Wis. 2d 699, 
866 N.W.2d 679 (action seeking specific performance of real 
estate purchase agreement). 
No.  2014AP2581.awb 
 
7 
 
("To be valid, a jury waiver must be made knowingly and 
voluntarily based on the facts of the case.") (citations 
omitted); Med. Air Tech. Corp. v. Marwan Inv., Inc., 303 F.3d 
11, 19 (1st Cir. 2002) ("courts will not enforce the jury waiver 
unless it was entered into knowingly and voluntarily"); Seaboard 
Lumber Co. v. United States, 903 F.2d 1560, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 
1990) ("Waiver requires only that the party waiving such right 
do so 'voluntarily' and 'knowingly' based on the facts of the 
case."); Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 833 (4th 
Cir. 1986) ("Where waiver is claimed under a contract executed 
before litigation is contemplated, we agree with those courts 
that have held that the party seeking enforcement of the waiver 
must prove that consent was both voluntary and informed."); 
K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 756 ("Those cases in which the validity of a 
contractual wavier of jury trial has been in issue have 
overwhelmingly applied the knowing and voluntary standard."); 
Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 
1977) ("It is elementary that the Seventh Amendment right to a 
jury is fundamental and that its protection can only be 
relinquished knowingly and intentionally.").  But see IFC Credit 
Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 
992-94 (7th Cir. 2008) (declining to follow other federal 
circuits). 
¶64 Additionally, the predominant federal rule comports 
with analogous Wisconsin case law, such as the contractual 
waiver-of-venue cases.  Brunton v. Nuvell Credit Corp., 2010 WI 
50, ¶34, 325 Wis. 2d 135, 785 N.W.2d 302 ("[T]he waiver of a 
No.  2014AP2581.awb 
 
8 
 
fundamental 
constitutional 
right 
requires 
a 
knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary waiver.").  It is also in accord with 
the principle that the waiver of a constitutional right requires 
a voluntary act.  Wendlandt v. Indus. Comm'n, 256 Wis. 62, 66, 
39 N.W.2d 854 (1949). 
¶65 Whether a waiver of a constitutional right was knowing 
and voluntary is a fact-specific inquiry that is "separate and 
distinct from the operation of rules of substantive contract 
law . . . ."  K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 756.  As the relevant case law 
instructs, this inquiry should focus on the totality of the 
circumstances.  See, e.g., Med. Air Tech., 303 F.3d at 19 n.4. 
¶66 This inquiry emphasizes the relative bargaining power 
of the parties, as well as other factors including the 
respective roles of the parties in determining the terms of the 
waiver, the amount of time the waiving party had to consider the 
waiver and whether the waiving party was represented by counsel.  
See Nat'l Equip. Rental, 565 F.2d at 258 (emphasizing the 
parties' inequality in bargaining power); Med Air Tech., 303 
F.3d at 19 n.4 (setting forth factors that have been considered 
as part of a totality of the circumstances analysis). 
II 
¶67 Although the question of whether a party knowingly and 
voluntarily waived the right to a jury is a fact-specific 
inquiry, the majority opinion asserts that "[i]n part because of 
the unusual posture of this case, the facts pertaining to this 
lawsuit are largely unimportant to the disposition of this 
appeal."  Majority op., ¶5.  The majority fails to explain how 
No.  2014AP2581.awb 
 
9 
 
the procedural posture of this case is so unusual.  This case is 
before the court because the Parsons appeal a non-final order of 
the circuit court granting Associated's motion to strike the 
Parsons' jury demand. 
¶68 Based on this slight justification, the majority 
opinion neglects to set forth or analyze the facts of the case 
beyond a brief summary of the allegations in the Parsons' 
complaint.  Because the majority fails to do so, I set forth the 
necessary facts that inform the totality of the circumstances 
analysis.  Like the court of appeals, I consider the allegations 
in 
the 
complaint, 
the 
loan 
documents, 
and 
the 
Parsons' 
affidavit.3 
¶69 The events that gave rise to this appeal began when 
the Parsons obtained a home equity loan in the amount of $40,000 
and a construction loan in the amount of $774,000 from State 
Financial Bank.4  They obtained these loans because they wanted 
to 
convert 
deteriorating 
properties 
in 
their 
Milwaukee 
neighborhood, including their own home, into a townhouse 
project. 
                                                 
3 Additionally, the majority asserts that the court of 
appeals erred in considering the facts alleged in Taft Parsons 
affidavit, which is a part of the evidentiary record in this 
case.  Majority op., ¶38.  According to the majority, the 
circuit court was "unpersuaded" by the allegations in the 
affidavit and "[t]he record adequately supports the circuit 
court's determination . . . ."  Id.  However, because the 
majority fails to set forth the parts of the record it believes 
supports 
the 
circuit 
court's 
interpretation, 
it 
is 
the 
majority's reasoning here that is unpersuasive. 
4 Associated Bank acquired State Financial Bank in 2006. 
No.  2014AP2581.awb 
 
10 
 
¶70 The loan documents were signed by Aaron Moeser, a bank 
employee who was later convicted in federal court for fraudulent 
activity stemming from a loan scandal involving a similar 
townhouse construction project.  Before any work was done on the 
Parson's townhouse project, the Parsons were instructed to sign 
five additional loan documents consisting of thirty pages of 
pre-printed forms, one of which contained the jury waiver clause 
at issue here. 
¶71 According to Taft Parsons' affidavit, his objections 
to the new loan documents were met with threats from Moeser to 
pull the construction loan.  This would have left the Parsons 
with debt even when no construction had been completed.  Taft 
received no explanation of any terms in the documents except 
oral instructions to insert a specific interest rate.  The bank 
refused to allow him the time and opportunity to read the 
documents or consult an attorney.5 
¶72 Additionally, the loan documents gave State Financial 
Bank and Wisconsin Title Closing & Credit Services the authority 
to approve the contractor's construction draw requests.  State 
Financial Bank and the title company were also given sole 
responsibility for verifying that the contractor had performed 
the construction and other work on the project for which it 
requested payment.  The documents also allowed payments for 
services that were not authorized on the project budget and 
                                                 
5 There is no evidence in the record contradicting the 
factual assertions made in the Parsons' affidavit. 
No.  2014AP2581.awb 
 
11 
 
secured all of the debt, including the construction loan, with a 
mortgage on the Parsons' home. 
¶73 After the loan documents were signed, multiple draws 
were approved over the Parsons' objections, despite the fact 
that no actual work had begun on the townhouse project.  The 
Parsons later received a notice of tax levy against the 
contractor from the IRS, indicating that it owed over $300,000 
in taxes.  It ordered the townhouse project to pay the IRS any 
money the project was obligated to pay the contractor.  The 
Parsons then discovered a number of unpaid judgments against the 
contractor and forwarded the IRS notice and their findings to 
Moeser. 
¶74 Moeser 
ended 
the 
construction 
loan 
and 
stopped 
payments to the contractor.  This left the Parsons with a debt 
for the loan proceeds that had already been paid.  The Parsons 
were unable to pay and State Financial Bank commenced a 
foreclosure action against the Parsons' home.  State Financial 
Bank was taken over by Associated Bank, which continued the 
foreclosure action.  The Parsons filed for bankruptcy, but made 
payments to the bank on the home equity loan, which resulted in 
dismissal of the foreclosure action. 
¶75 I proceed next to apply those facts to the law.  As 
set forth above, the federal circuits addressing this issue 
emphasize the relative bargaining power of the parties in 
considering whether a party knowingly and voluntarily agreed to 
waive the right to a jury trial.  This case is analogous to 
Nat'l Equip. Rental, in which the owner of a small construction 
No.  2014AP2581.awb 
 
12 
 
company entered into a predatory loan agreement when he could 
not satisfy obligations on debt owed for construction equipment.  
565 F.2d at 256-57.  The pre-printed loan documents contained a 
jury waiver clause, which the Second Circuit concluded was 
unenforceable.  Id. at 258. 
¶76 Examining the circumstances of the jury waiver, the 
Nat'l Equip. Rental court determined that "it is clear that 
Hendrix did not have any choice but to accept the NER contract 
as written if he was to get badly needed funds."  Id.  Thus, the 
Second Circuit concluded that "[t]his gross inequality in 
bargaining power suggests, too, that the asserted waiver was 
neither knowing nor intentional."  Id. 
¶77 Similarly, the facts in the record here demonstrate 
that the Parsons did not voluntarily assent to the jury waiver 
clause.  The complaint and Taft Parsons' affidavit contain facts 
sufficient to show that the promissory note was presented to him 
as a "take-it-or-leave-it" deal.  He was told to sign it 
immediately 
or 
risk 
having 
Moeser 
cancel 
the 
$774,000 
construction loan.  This would have left the Parsons with 
$40,000 in debt on the home equity loan, with no work having 
been completed on the townhouse project. 
¶78 A number of other factors may be considered in a 
totality of circumstances analysis.  Med Air Tech., 303 F.3d at 
19 n.4.  These include, but are not limited to the respective 
roles of the parties in determining the terms of the waiver, the 
amount of time the waiving party had to consider the waiver and 
whether the waiving party was represented by counsel.  Id. 
No.  2014AP2581.awb 
 
13 
 
¶79 A 
number 
of 
factors 
that 
do 
not 
support 
a 
determination that a waiver was knowing and voluntary are 
present in this case.  The Parsons had no role in determining 
the terms of the waiver, which was included among five pre-
printed 
loan 
documents 
totaling 
nearly 
thirty 
pages.  
Additionally, Taft Parsons was given no time to sign the waiver 
and was not permitted the opportunity to consult with counsel. 
¶80 Finally, under this court's decision in Brunton, the 
party seeking to enforce the waiver of a constitutional right 
has the burden of showing that a person had actual knowledge he 
was waiving a constitutional right.  325 Wis. 2d 135, ¶36 
("Establishing that a party knew of the right at issue is 
essential to establishing waiver.").  In this case, Associated 
Bank has presented no evidence rebutting the facts presented in 
Taft Parsons' affidavit.  By failing to do so Associated has not 
met its burden of proof.  See, e.g., Lane v. Sharp Packaging 
Sys., Inc., 2002 WI 28, ¶41, 251 Wis. 2d 68, 640 N.W.2d 788 
(resolving discovery dispute on the basis of an uncontested 
affidavit); see also Schroeder v. Wacker, No. 2000AP83–FT, 
unpublished slip op., ¶17 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2000) (relying 
on an uncontested affidavit to prove damages). 
¶81 Accordingly, I conclude that Associated Bank has not 
met its burden of proving that the pre-litigation jury waiver 
provision in the contract between the Parsons and Associated 
Bank was made knowingly and voluntarily. 
No.  2014AP2581.awb 
 
14 
 
III 
¶82 Finally, I turn to the majority's conclusion that 
Associated's motion to strike the Parsons' jury demand was 
timely.  Majority op., ¶43. 
¶83 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 805.01, a party may demand a 
trial in the mode to which it is entitled at or before the 
scheduling conference or pretrial conference, whichever is held 
first: 
(1) 
RIGHT PRESERVED.  The right of trial by jury as 
declared in article I, section 5, of the 
constitution or as given by a statute and the 
right of trial by the court shall be preserved 
to the parties inviolate. 
 
(2) 
DEMAND.  Any party entitled to a trial by jury 
or by the court may demand a trial in the mode 
to which entitled at or before the scheduling 
conference or pretrial conference, whichever is 
held first.  The demand may be made either in 
writing or orally on the record. 
 
(3) 
WAIVER.  The failure of a party to demand in 
accordance with sub. (2) a trial in the mode to 
which entitled constitutes a waiver of trial in 
such mode. . . .  
¶84 The Parsons' complaint and amended complaint made a 
demand for a jury trial and the jury fee was timely paid.  
Associated filed multiple pleadings with no objection to the 
jury demand.  However, three years into litigation, at the third 
pretrial conference, the bank raised an off-the-record objection 
to the Parsons' jury demand.  It then filed a motion to strike 
the Parsons' jury demand, arguing that when Taft Parsons signed 
the promissory note with the waiver clause ten years earlier, 
the Parsons waived any right to a jury trial involving the bank. 
No.  2014AP2581.awb 
 
15 
 
¶85 Nevertheless, the majority reasons that Associated was 
not demanding a trial in the mode to which it was entitled.  
Majority op., ¶41.  Instead, the majority contends that it was 
moving to strike the Parsons' jury demand because the Parsons 
were not themselves entitled to a jury trial.  Id. 
¶86 The majority further refuses to apply equitable 
estoppel because "having contracted away their right, any 
reliance that the Parsons might have had on Associated's initial 
acquiescence in their unfounded demand for a jury trial was not 
reasonable."  Majority op., ¶42.  Thus, the majority concludes 
that 
"[b]ecause 
reasonable 
reliance 
is 
a 
requirement 
of 
equitable estoppel, Associated is not equitably estopped from 
striking the Parsons' demand."  Id. (citing Affordable Erecting, 
Inc. v. Neosho Trompler, Inc., 2006 WI 67, ¶33, 291 Wis. 2d 259, 
715 N.W.2d 620. 
¶87 Contrary to the majority, I conclude that even if the 
bank's objection were timely as the majority claims, the bank is 
equitably estopped from raising this objection three years into 
litigation.  Equitable estoppel generally bars one party from 
taking a position upon which another party relies and then 
subsequently changing that position to the detriment of the 
relying party.  See Affordable Erecting, 291 Wis.2d 259, ¶33 
("There are four elements of equitable estoppel:  (1) action or 
non-action; (2) on the part of one against whom estoppel is 
asserted; (3) which induces reasonable reliance thereon by the 
other, either in action or non-action; (4) which is to the 
relying party's detriment.") (citation omitted). 
No.  2014AP2581.awb 
 
16 
 
¶88 The bank's failure to challenge the Parsons' jury 
demand led the Parsons to spend three years preparing for a jury 
trial.  A review of the record reveals numerous motions, 
hearings, and other activity demonstrating that the parties were 
moving toward trial. 
¶89 It was reasonable for the Parsons to prepare for a 
jury trial because not only did they timely demand one, the bank 
actively participated in pre-trial litigation.  As the court of 
appeals explained, participation by the bank without objection 
to the mode of trial "is both action (actually participating) 
and inaction (not objecting to the mode of trial) upon which the 
Parsons reasonably relied."  Parsons, 2016 WI App 44, ¶23. 
¶90 I agree with the court of appeals that changing the 
mode of trial three years into the case is detrimental to both 
the 
Parsons 
and 
to 
reasonable 
and 
efficient 
court 
administration.  Thus, I conclude that even if the bank's 
objection were timely, it is equitably estopped from making its 
much belated claim for a court trial. 
¶91 Contrary to the majority, I conclude that Associated 
Bank has not met its burden of proving that the Parsons 
knowingly and voluntarily waived their right to trial by jury.  
I further determine that Associated's motion to strike the 
Parsons' jury demand was untimely.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶92 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2014AP2581.awb 
 
1