Case Title: CHESTER DARRAL FLETCHER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0258

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
CHESTER DARRAL FLETCHER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 167Case Number: No. S-09-0258Decided: 12/21/2010NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

CHESTER 
DARRAL FLETCHER,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender, and Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Kerin.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Leda M. 
Pojman, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Pojman.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Chester Darral 
Fletcher pleaded guilty to attempted manslaughter, but challenges the district 
court's findings of his competence to proceed both to trial and sentencing.  Fletcher also disputes the court's 
denial of his motion to change his plea to "not guilty by reason of mental 
illness or deficiency."  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Fletcher raises 
two issues before this Court:

 
 

1.            
The 
trial court erred in its decisions that [Fletcher] was competent to proceed to 
trial and to sentencing.

 
 

2.            
The 
trial court erred in refusing to allow [Fletcher] to change his plea to "not 
guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency."

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Sometime in 
the 1990's, Chester Fletcher and Clay Coleman moved from Virginia to Sheridan 
and rented an apartment together.  
After their relationship deteriorated in 1998, Coleman obtained a civil 
judgment against Fletcher.  As a 
result, Fletcher's car and motorcycle were seized.  In both 2004 and 2006, Fletcher stole 
and wrecked Coleman's car.

 
 
[¶4]      On July 9, 2007, 
Fletcher fired shots at Coleman in the Cody Wal-Mart parking lot and fled the 
scene.  No one was injured in the 
shooting.  Fletcher was later 
apprehended at his home in Cody and charged with one count of attempted 
first-degree murder, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-301(a)(i) and 
6-2-101(a) (LexisNexis 2009), and one count of reckless endangering, in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-504(a) (LexisNexis 
2009).

 
 
[¶5]      After being bound 
over to district court, Fletcher filed a motion to suspend the proceedings 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303 (LexisNexis 2009) to determine if, as a 
result of mental illness, he was competent to proceed.  Also, the motion "wondered" if, at the 
time of the crime, he lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness 
of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.  Miller v. State, 755 P.2d 855, 861 (Wyo. 
1988); see also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-304(a) (LexisNexis 2009).  His motion was granted.  An evaluation conducted by Dr. Cathy 
Buckwell at the Wyoming State Hospital concluded that Fletcher was not suffering 
from a mental illness, and that he did not meet the statutory requirements for 
establishing the defense of not guilty by reason of mental illness.  See § 7-11-304.

 
 
[¶6]      Fletcher pleaded 
not guilty to all charges via video arraignment on November 6, 2007.  His jury trial was set for April 28, 
2008; however, less than a month before trial, he filed a motion for a 
competency hearing on the grounds that his own psychiatrist, Dr. Trent Holmberg, 
had found him not competent to proceed.  
The competency hearing was set twice, and continued twice, at the request 
of Fletcher.  Fletcher also waived 
his speedy trial rights.  The 
competency hearing was set for a third time in May of 2008.  Prior to that hearing, Fletcher was 
re-evaluated by Dr. Buckwell on May 20-21, 2008, at the Wyoming State 
Hospital.  Although Dr. Buckwell 
concluded that Fletcher had paranoid personality disorder, she continued to 
diagnose him as competent.  Both 
Drs. Buckwell and Holmberg testified at length during Fletcher's competency 
hearing on June 10, 2008, after which the court found him competent to proceed 
to trial.

 
 
[¶7]      Two weeks prior 
to trial, Fletcher filed a late motion to add to his plea of not guilty a plea 
of not guilty by reason of mental illness, pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(1)(B) and 
12.2(a), and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-304(c) (LexisNexis 2009), which allow a 
defendant to do so after arraignment for good cause.  The State objected to Fletcher's motion, 
and the district court ultimately denied the motion.

 
 
[¶8]      On September 19, 
2008, pursuant to a plea agreement, Fletcher pleaded guilty to one count of 
attempted manslaughter, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-105(a)(i) 
and 6-1-301(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2009).

 
 
[¶9]      Fletcher's 
sentencing hearing was scheduled for January 16, 2009, but he filed a motion to 
continue the hearing and suspend proceedings, arguing that the medical records 
he received from Park County Detention Center indicated his deteriorating mental 
health, making him unfit to proceed with sentencing.  The court heard testimony from a doctor 
of nursing practice from the detention center and granted Fletcher's motion to 
continue.  The court also ordered 
the parties to agree upon a designated examiner.

 
 
[¶10]   The parties could not agree on the 
examiner, so the court ordered Fletcher to be examined by the Wyoming State 
Hospital.  Dr. Ronna Dillinger, a 
psychology intern at the Wyoming State Hospital, found Fletcher competent to be 
sentenced.

 
 
[¶11]   On April 13, 2009, Fletcher filed a 
motion requesting permission to be examined by an examiner of his choice.  The State filed an objection and after a 
hearing, the court denied the motion, finding Fletcher competent to be 
sentenced.  On August 24, 2009, 
Fletcher was sentenced to not less than 18 years nor more than 20 years in the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary.  This 
appeal followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

 
[¶12]   In Follett v. State, 2006 WY 47, ¶ 10, 132 P.3d 1155, 1159 
(Wyo. 2006), we stated:

 
 
In 
deShazer [v. State], 2003 WY 98, ¶ 12, 74 P.3d  at 1244-45, we adopted the standards articulated by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit to review competency 
issues.

 
 
Although 
competence is a factual issue, that term . . . is not self-defining.  Because competency to stand trial is an 
aspect of substantive due process, . . . the legal standard by which competency 
is to be evaluated is constitutionally mandated. Accordingly, the components of 
that standard, required as they are by the Constitution, do not vary according 
to the views of a particular court.  The Constitution can require but one 
gauge against which to determine whether, because of his mental condition, a 
defendant's due process rights are violated by requiring him to stand trial. 
 The content of the standard of 
competency is therefore a question of law which we review de 
novo.

 
 

Id. 
(citations omitted).  We look to the 
following standard in evaluating the sufficiency of the processes used by the 
trial court in determining whether a defendant is competent to continue with 
legal proceedings:

 
 
Once 
the trial court has "evaluated a defendant's competency by the correct standard, 
the second inquiry on review is whether the trial court's determination of a 
defendant's competency is fairly supported by the record of the proceeding at 
which the determination [is] made. . . .  In other words, 
the substantial evidence standard of review governs the second inquiry. "  [State v.] Soares, 81 Haw. 332, 916 P.2d [1233], 
1251 [(Haw. Ct. App. 1996)].

 
 

deShazer, 
2003 WY 98, ¶ 13, 74 P.3d  at 1244-45.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶13]   
In his first issue, Fletcher argues that the district court erred 
when it found him competent to proceed to trial and sentencing, and that his 
mental state warranted a different result.

 
 
A 
criminal defendant may not be tried unless he is competent, and he may not waive 
his right to counsel or plead guilty unless he does so "competently and 
intelligently." Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 125 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1993), quoting Johnson 
v. Zerbst, 
304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938).  The same standard of competency applies 
whether a defendant goes to trial or pleads guilty.  Godinez, 509 U.S.  at 398.  The United States Supreme Court has ruled 
that a defendant is competent, under the standards of due 
process, if he has " sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with 
a reasonable degree of rational understanding' and has 'a rational as well as 
factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' " Godinez, 509 U.S. 
at 396, quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1960) (per curiam).  The determination of whether a defendant 
is mentally fit to proceed must be made by the trial court.  Hayes v. 
State, 599 P.2d 558, 563 (Wyo. 1979). "It is not in the nature of a defense to the 
charge.  It is a threshold issue, 
necessary to be resolved to prevent a violation of due process through 
conviction of a person incompetent to stand trial." Id. Moreover, the 
competency requirement continues from the time of arraignment through 
sentencing.  See Godinez, 509 U.S. 
at 403 (Kennedy, J., concurring); deShazer 
v. State, 
2003 WY 
98, ¶ 20, 74 P.3d 1240, 1248 (Wyo. 2003).

 

 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-11-301 et. seq. sets forth the requirements for 
determining whether a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial.  The statutes are designed to protect 
criminal defendants' due process rights. deShazer, 2003 WY 98, ¶ 26, 
74 P.3d  at 1251.  Under the 
principles articulated in Godinez and the clear language of the statutes, 
the statutory requirements pertain to all trial court proceedings, including 
change of plea proceedings.

 
 

Follet, 
¶¶ 8-9, 132 P.3d  at 1158.

 
 
[¶14]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303 
(LexisNexis 2009) provides, in pertinent part:

 
 
§ 
7-11-303.  Examination of accused to determine fitness to proceed; 
reports; commitment; defenses and objections.

            
(a)  If it appears at any stage of a criminal proceeding, by 
motion or upon the court's own motion, that there is reasonable cause 
to   believe that the accused has a mental illness or deficiency 
making him unfit to proceed, all further proceedings shall be 
suspended.

            
(b)  The court shall order an examination of the accused by a 
designated examiner. The order may include, but is not limited to, an 
examination of the accused at the Wyoming state hospital on an inpatient or 
outpatient basis, at a local mental health center on an inpatient or outpatient 
basis, or at his place of detention.

(c) Written 
reports of the examination shall be filed with the clerk of court.  The report shall include: 

(i) Detailed 
findings; 

(ii) An 
opinion as to whether the accused has a mental illness or deficiency, and its 
probable duration; 

(iii) An 
opinion as to whether the accused, as a result of mental illness or deficiency, 
lacks capacity to comprehend his position, to understand the nature and object 
of the proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner, and 
to cooperate with his counsel to the end that any available defense may be 
interposed; 

(iv) Repealed 
by Laws 2009, ch. 31, § 2. 

(v) A 
recommendation as to whether the accused should be held in a designated facility 
for treatment pending determination by the court of the issue of mental fitness 
to proceed; and 

(vi) A 
recommendation as to whether the accused, if found by the court to be mentally 
fit to proceed, should be detained in a designated facility pending further 
proceedings.

 
 
[¶15]   Pursuant to the district court's 
July 2007 order, Dr. Cathy Buckwell, of the Wyoming State Hospital, interviewed 
Fletcher for two hours in order to assess the issue of his competency.  Her "summary of findings" reads as 
follows:

 
 
[Fletcher] 
appears to have a poor educational background and impoverished social 
upbringing.  He stated several times 
that he did "what his daddy raised him to do."  He appears to have a very concrete way 
of viewing right and wrong.  He 
rationalized that if an individual is stealing from you and the law cannot do 
anything about it, then one must protect oneself in any way possible.  His reasoning is that of a vigilante who 
"takes the law into their own hands."  
This is a weak argument in the eyes of the law, but it is not necessarily 
due to mental illness or deficiency.  
It is unlikely that if Fletcher has a mental illness, such as a paranoid 
personality disorder that he would not have come to the attention of the 
community, family, or others before this time.  It is unusual that he would exhibit such 
poor judgment and not have a history of similar acts or behaviors that appeared 
irrational or impulsive. The relationship with [the victim] seems to have been 
quite emotional to provoke such a violent reaction.  Both men are claiming that it is the 
other who has stolen money and abused them.  This suggests there is a more complex 
relationship than that of friends.  
This hypothesis may explain more fully why Fletcher feels victimized by 
[the victim] and his actions.

 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
REGARDING COMPETENCY TO PROCEED

It 
can be stated with a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that Fletcher 
does have the basic capacity to comprehend his position, understand the nature 
and object of the proceedings against him, conduct his defense in a rational 
manner, and the ability to cooperate with his counsel to the end that a defense 
may be interposed on his behalf.

 
 
[¶16]   Dr. Holmberg's conclusions after 
interviewing Fletcher on March 1, 2008, were different than Dr. 
Buckwell's:

 
 

Opinions 
Regarding Competency to Proceed:  It is my opinion with a reasonable 
degree of medical probability that [Fletcher] is not competent to proceed.  There is significant evidence for a 
mental illness (Delusional Disorder) as well as a series of mental deficiencies 
(probable Borderline Intellectual Functioning, possible early dementia and 
possible history of brain damage resulting in epileptic seizures).  His mental deficiencies and mental 
illness in my opinion significantly reduce his ability to appreciate the legal 
position in which he presently finds himself.  Certainly there are some knowledge gaps 
with respect to courtroom personnel and procedure, but overall his factual 
understanding is relatively intact.  
However a rational as well as 
factual understanding of his position is required.  In my opinion, his paranoid delusions 
render him unable to make a rational appraisal of his situation.  This also makes him unlikely to follow 
the advice of his attorney as he is still convinced he was fully justified to do 
what he (allegedly) did and if he can get in front of a jury and explain his 
"side" they will immediately understand and let him go free.  Thus, he has an unrealistic view of his 
chances of succeeding if his case were to go to trial.  He also stated that the police do not 
have any evidence against him.  It 
was not clear if this is a delusional belief or if it reflects ignorance of the 
facts of the case.  Additionally, 
[Fletcher] has significant trouble communicating.  He has both expressive and receptive 
language dysfunction.  This means 
that he has significant difficulty understanding spoken language and also has 
deficits in his ability to express himself such that he can be understood.  [Italics in 
original.]

 
 
Recommendations

In 
my opinion, [Fletcher] is potentially restorable to competency with 
treatment.  His mental illness is 
treatable but has never been treated.  
His various mental deficiencies are not treatable, although his seizures 
can be prevented with the continued use of his antiepileptic medications.  His communications problems are somewhat 
treatable.  If he is remanded to the 
State Hospital for treatment, a speech pathologist could be asked to consult and 
possibly treat any language abnormalities that are identified.  A workup with an educational 
psychologist is advisable, to rule out Mental Retardation.

 
 
[¶17]   During Fletcher's June 2008 
competency hearing, both doctors testified at length about the findings in their 
evaluations, as well as the difference between paranoid personality disorder and 
delusional disorder.  Again, the 
doctors reached different conclusions:  Dr. Buckwell could not find that Fletcher 
had a mental illness although he appeared to be suffering from paranoid 
personality disorder.1  However, she concluded that Fletcher was 
fit to proceed to trial.  On the 
other hand, Dr. Holmberg testified that Fletcher did suffer from mental illness 
 specifically, a delusional disorder, and that he was unfit to proceed to 
trial.  Taking both doctors' 
testimonies into account, the court found Fletcher competent to proceed to 
trial, as he had the capacity to comprehend his position, and he understood the 
nature and the object of the proceedings.

 
 
[¶18]   Our job is to determine whether or 
not there was substantial evidence presented to find Fletcher competent to 
proceed to trial and whether or not there was substantial evidence to find 
Fletcher competent to proceed to sentencing.  We will address both questions 
below.

 
 
[¶19]   Fletcher argues that he was 
delusional and was thus unfit to proceed to trial; however, he does not 
elaborate as to why his delusions affected his fitness to proceed to trial.  In fact, Dr. Buckwell found Fletcher to 
not only have "awareness and understanding of his charges," but that he even 
understood the difference between a felony and a misdemeanor, the potential 
penalties of each, and the serious nature of the charges.  "He demonstrated some fear about his 
chances of acquittal and stated that he is now afraid he would not have a good 
chance of convincing a jury."  
Without extensively repeating the doctors' evaluations in bulk, suffice 
it to say that our extensive review of the record illustrates the doctors' 
differences of opinion.  Dr. 
Buckwell maintained throughout her evaluations of Fletcher that he was 
competent, while Dr. Holmberg concluded after his assessment of Fletcher that he 
was not.

 
 
[¶20]   When a district court is faced with 
conflicting 
expert reports, it "does not clearly err simply by crediting one opinion over 
another where other record evidence 
exists to support the conclusion."  Battle v. United States, 419 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming a district court's finding of competence 
despite differing expert opinions on the defendant's competence).  United States v. Jones, 200 Fed. Appx. 915, 920 (11th Cir. Fla. 
2006).

 
 
[¶21]   Although Dr. Holmberg provided his 
qualified opinion that Fletcher was not competent, it was not clearly erroneous 
for the district court to favor the more comprehensive report from Dr. Buckwell, 
which concluded that Fletcher was competent to proceed.  First, Dr. Buckwell's evaluations of 
Fletcher, featuring a series of clinical interviews and objective psychological 
tests occurring on three separate occasions and lasting for six hours each, were 
notably lengthier than Dr. Holmberg's one-time, three-hour long evaluation that 
did not include any psychological testing.  See United States v. 
Izquierdo, 448 F.3d 1269, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding no clear 
error where the district court favored an expert opinion based on months of 
evaluation over a conflicting expert evaluation conducted over two days).  Second, Dr. Buckwell's findings, in 
particular areas, were more extensive and considered a broader array of factors 
and utilized more resources in forming her expert opinion than did Dr. 
Holmberg's.  In fact, much of Dr. 
Holmberg's diagnosis relied heavily upon a letter from Fletcher's ex-wife.  Finally, evidence indicating Fletcher's 
behaviors may have stemmed to a degree from a paranoid personality disorder 
which, as conceded by Dr. Holmberg, is not a mental illness under Wyoming law, 
and that the disorder may have played a role in his rationalizations relating to 
this case.  Dr. Holmberg admitted 
that the personality defects suffered by Fletcher could explain some of his 
findings.  Dr. Buckwell conducted 
the more extensive evaluation and provided the definitive conclusion that 
Fletcher was competent.  Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the 
district court committed clear error in crediting Dr. Buckwell's finding of 
Fletcher's competence.

 
 
[¶22]   Fletcher's argument that the 
district court erred in pronouncing him competent to proceed to sentencing is 
also meritless.  Fletcher raised his 
competency, yet again, on the day of sentencing, after a Park County Detention 
Center nurse noted Fletcher's mental condition had "deteriorated."  The State Hospital was once again 
assigned to determine Fletcher's competency to proceed to sentencing.  Specifically, Dr. Ronna Dillinger, a 
psychology resident supervised by Dr. Buckwell, interviewed Fletcher for 139 
minutes.  She also interviewed the 
Park County Detention Center official, Fletcher's neighbor, and Fletcher's 
sister.  Dr. Dillinger also reviewed 
Fletcher's forensic evaluations, his presentence investigation report, and a 
summary of care from Frontier Neurosciences.  Dr. Dillinger indicated that Fletcher 
appeared to have a chronic mental illness, and she determined such did not 
interfere with his competency to proceed to sentencing.

 
 
[¶23]   On appeal, Fletcher argues that the 
district court had an obligation to "do more than adopt, without question, the 
contradictory findings" of Dr. Dillinger.  
However, Fletcher provides no citation to authority indicating the court 
was required to further inquire into Fletcher's competency.  A court may order additional psychological 
testing if it "desires more information than is otherwise available to it as a 
basis for determining the mental condition of the defendant."  Jones, 200 Fed. Appx. at 921.  Here, Fletcher underwent an initial 
competency examination by two doctors, and an 
additional evaluation by Dr. Dillinger.  The district court had abundant 
information from which to determine Fletcher's competency and to decide to 
utilize the information on hand rather than order additional studies.  We conclude that it did not abuse its 
discretion in finding Fletcher competent to proceed to 
sentencing.

 
 
Motion 
to Amend Plea

 
 
[¶24]   Fletcher argues that the district 
court abused its discretion when, approximately two weeks prior to trial, it 
denied his motion to amend his plea to a plea of not guilty by reason of mental 
illness.

 
 
[¶25]   W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(1)(B) and 12.2 read 
in pertinent part:

 
 
Rule 
11.  
Pleas.

(a)  Alternatives  

            
(1)  In General. A defendant may plead not guilty, not guilty 
by reason of mental illness or deficiency, guilty, or nolo contendere.  If a defendant refuses to plead or if a 
defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty.

.

(B)  Mental 
Illness or Deficiency.  A plea of 
"not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency" may be pleaded orally or 
in writing by the defendant or the defendant's counsel at the time of the 
defendant's arraignment or at such later time as the court may for good cause 
permit.  Such a plea does not 
deprive the defendant of other defenses and may be coupled with a plea of not 
guilty.

 
 
W.R.Cr.P. 
12.2  Rule 12.2.  Defense of 
mental illness or deficiency.

 
 
(a)  Plea  If a defendant intends to rely 
upon the defense of mental illness or deficiency at the time of the alleged 
offense, the defendant shall enter a plea of not guilty by reason of mental 
illness or deficiency at arraignment.  
For good cause the court may permit he plea to be entered at alater 
time.  If there is a failure to comply with the 
requirements at this subdivision evidence of mental illness or deficiency may 
not be introduced.

 
 
[¶26]   Fletcher also points us to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-11-304 (LexisNexis 2009).  
That statute reads as follows:

 
 

§ 
7-11-304.  Responsibility for criminal conduct; plea; examination; 
commitment; use of statements by defendant.

 
 

(a) A 
person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of the criminal 
conduct, as a result of mental illness or deficiency, he lacked substantial 
capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of law.  As used in this section, the terms mental 
illness or deficiency mean only those severely abnormal mental conditions that 
grossly and demonstrably impair a person's perception or understanding of 
reality and that are not attributable primarily to self-induced intoxication as 
defined by W.S. 6-1-202(b).

(b) As 
used in this section, the terms "mental illness or deficiency" do not include an 
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial 
conduct.

(c) Evidence 
that a person is not responsible for criminal conduct by reason of mental 
illness or deficiency is not admissible at the trial of the defendant unless a 
plea of "not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency" is made.  A plea of "not guilty by reason of mental 
illness or deficiency" may be pleaded orally or in writing by the defendant or 
his counsel at the time of his arraignment.  The court, for good cause shown, may also 
allow that plea to be entered at a later time.  Such a plea does not deprive the 
defendant of other defenses.

(d) In 
all cases where a plea of "not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency" 
is made, the court shall order an examination of the defendant by a designated 
examiner.  The order may include, 
but is not limited to, an examination of the defendant at the Wyoming state 
hospital on an inpatient or outpatient basis, at a local mental health center on 
an inpatient or outpatient basis, or at his place of detention.  In selecting the examination site, the 
court may consider proximity to the court, availability of an examiner and the 
necessity for security precautions.  If the order provides for commitment of 
the defendant to a designated facility, the commitment shall continue no longer 
than a forty-five (45) day period for the observation and evaluation of the 
mental condition of the defendant, which time may be extended by the approval of 
the court.

(e) If 
an examination of a defendant's fitness to proceed has been ordered pursuant to 
W.S. 7-11-303, an examination following a plea of "not guilty by reason of 
mental illness or deficiency" shall not occur, or be ordered, until the court 
has found the defendant is competent to proceed under W.S. 
7-11-303.

(f) A 
written report of the examination shall be filed with the clerk of court.  The report shall 
include:

(i) Detailed 
findings, including, but not limited to, the data and reasoning that link the 
opinions specified in paragraphs (ii) and (iii) of this 
subsection;

(ii) An 
opinion as to whether the defendant has a mental illness or 
deficiency;

(iii) An 
opinion as to whether at the time of the alleged criminal conduct the defendant, 
as a result of mental illness or deficiency, lacked substantial capacity to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law.

(g) The 
clerk of court shall deliver copies of the report to the district attorney and 
to the defendant or his counsel.  The report shall not be a public record 
or open to the public.  If an 
examination provided under subsection (d) of this section was conducted, the 
report may be received in evidence and no new examination shall be required 
unless requested under this subsection.  Within five (5) days after receiving a 
copy of the report, the defendant or the state, upon written request, may obtain 
an order granting an examination of the defendant by a designated examiner 
chosen by the requester of the examination.

(h) Except 
as otherwise provided in this subsection, no statement made by the defendant in 
the course of any examination or treatment pursuant to this section and no 
information received by any person in the course thereof is admissible in 
evidence in any criminal proceeding on any issue other than that of the mental 
condition of the defendant.  If the 
defendant testifies in his own behalf, any statement made by him in the course 
of any examination or treatment pursuant to this section may be 
admitted:

(i) For 
impeachment purposes; or

(ii) As 
evidence in a criminal prosecution for perjury.

 
 
[¶27]   Fletcher argues good cause existed 
for him to change his plea.  His 
defense counsel explained that although at his arraignment a plea of not guilty 
was entered, good cause existed to change that plea because Fletcher's 
competency was questionable.

 
 
[¶28]   
In an effort to bear out his argument, Fletcher first attempts to 
distinguish his case from Wilkening v. 
State, 2005 WY 127, ¶ 15, 120 P.3d 680, 684-85 (Wyo. 2005).  In Wilkening, a mental evaluation was done 
prior to trial where Wilkening was found competent.  On the morning of trial, defense counsel 
requested to change the plea but produced no new psychiatric or psychological 
evidence.  The trial court denied 
the motion to change the plea and pointed out that the court had concerns about 
the timing of the request in terms of Wilkening trying to "manipulate the 
system."  Id.

 
 
[¶29]   We do not see Fletcher's suggested 
demarcation between Wilkening and 
this case.  Although experts 
differed as to the mental status of Fletcher, the court had already credited one 
doctor's evaluation over the other.  
Also, the record is clear that Fletcher's not guilty plea was not entered 
into by mistake, inadvertence, or ignorance.  In fact, defense counsel considered the 
alternative, which was to add an accompanying plea of not guilty by reason of 
mental illness.  Moreover, during 
his arraignment, Fletcher acknowledged that he understood his right to plead 
however he wanted.  Defense counsel 
conceded during the motion to amend plea hearing that a not guilty by reason of 
mental illness plea had been "considered and evaluated" prior to 
arraignment.  There is no right to a continual succession of competency 
hearings in the absence of some new factor, and the Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure do not place a duty on the trial judge to hold hearing after hearing 
in the absence of some appearance of change in the defendant's condition since 
the ruling on competency was originally made.  See Mozee v. Commonwealth, 769 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Ky. 
1989).

 
 

[¶30]   Here, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Fletcher's motion to 
change his plea, as it did not consider there was good cause to do 
so.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶31]   We conclude that the district court 
did not err when it found Fletcher competent to proceed to trial and to 
sentencing.  Furthermore, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Fletcher's motion to 
add to his plea of not guilty, a plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness. 
 The district court's judgment and 
sentence are affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Paranoid personality disorder apparently does not rise to the level of a 
"mental illness" as defined by the Wyoming Statutes.  However, it is classified as a mental 
health disorder by the American Psychiatric Association in the DSM-IV 
(1994).