Case Title: Tywanda F. Luckett v. Aaron C. Bodner, M.D.

Citation: 2009 WI 68

Docket Number: 2007AP000308

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2009-07-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
2009 WI 68 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP308 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Robin Luckett as Special Administrator of the 
Estate of Tywanda Luckett, Tyquone Luckett, Joe 
Bohannon, Shenara Bohannon minor(s) by their 
Guardian ad Litem, J. Michael End and State of 
Wisconsin Department of Health and Family 
Services, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
     v. 
Aaron C. Bodner, M.D., The Medical Protective 
Company, Aurora Sinai Medical Center and 
Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc., 
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners, 
Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc., 
Prithipal S. Sethi, M.D., Medical College of 
Wisconsin Affiliated Hospitals, Inc. and Injured 
Patients & Families Compensation Fund, 
          Defendants-Co-Appellants-Petitioners, 
David Paul Altman, M.D. and Wisconsin Patients 
Compensation Fund, 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 312 Wis. 2d 480, 751 N.W.2d 902 
(Ct. App. 2008-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 7, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Christopher R. Foley   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ROGGENSACK and GABLEMAN, JJ., join the 
concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-appellants-petitioners, Aaron C. Bodner, 
M.D. and Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc., there 
were briefs by Paul H. Grimstad, Ryan R. Graff, and Nash, 
 
 
2 
Spindler, Grimstad & McCracken, Manitowoc, and oral argument by 
Scott L. Howie (Pro Hac Vice) and Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, 
Chicago, Ill. 
 
For the defendants-co-appellants-petitioners, Prithipal S. 
Sethi, M.D., Medical College of Wisconsin Affiliated Hospitals, 
Inc. and Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc., there 
were briefs by Steven P. Sager and Sager, Colwin, Samuelsen & 
Associates, S.C., Fond du Lac, and oral argument by Steven P. 
Sager. 
 
For the defendants-appellants-petitioners, Aurora Sinai 
Medical Center and The Medical Protective Company, and the 
defendants-co-appellants-petitioners, 
Injured 
Patients 
& 
Families Compensation Fund, there were briefs by Lori Gendelman, 
Laurie J. McLeRoy, and Otjen, Van Ert & Weir, S.C., Milwaukee, 
and Maria K. Schneider and Gutglass, Erickson, Bonville & 
Larson, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Scott L. Howie (Pro Hac 
Vice) and Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, Chicago, Ill. 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief by J. 
Michael End, Jerome A. Hierseman, and End, Hierseman & Crain, 
LLC, Milwaukee, and oral argument by J. Michael End. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 68
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
No.  2007AP308  
(L.C. No. 
2003CV7355) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Robin Luckett as Special Administrator of the 
Estate of Tywanda Luckett, Tyquone Luckett, Joe 
Bohannon, Shenara Bohannon minor(s) by their 
Guardian ad Litem, J. Michael End and State of 
Wisconsin Department of Health and Family 
Services, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Aaron C. Bodner, M.D., The Medical Protective 
Company, Aurora Sinai Medical Center and 
Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, 
Inc.,  
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, 
Inc., Prithipal S. Sethi, M.D., Medical College 
of Wisconsin Affiliated Hospitals, Inc. and 
Injured Patients & Families Compensation Fund, 
 
          Defendants-Co-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
David Paul Altman, M.D. and Wisconsin Patients 
Compensation Fund, 
 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2007AP308   
 
2 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   The 
defendants 
(physicians, hospitals, and insurers)1 seek review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals affirming an order 
of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Christopher R. Foley, 
Judge,2 in favor of the plaintiffs.3  The circuit court granted 
the plaintiffs' motion under Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2) (2005-06)4 to 
withdraw three admissions that the plaintiffs made in response 
to the defendants' request for admissions.  The court of appeals 
affirmed the order of the circuit court.   
¶2 
The single issue presented for our review is whether 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in 
                                                 
1 There are three groups of defendants: Aaron C. Bodner, 
M.D. and Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc.; Aurora 
Sinai Medical Center, Inc., The Medical Protective Company, and 
Injured Patients and Families Compensation Fund; Prithipal S. 
Sethi, M.D., Medical College of Wisconsin Affiliated Hospitals, 
Inc., and Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc.  Each 
group filed its own briefs.  We generally treat the defendants 
as a single entity and, when addressing the defendants' 
arguments, do not always state which defendants proffer which 
arguments. 
2 Luckett v. Bodner, No. 2007AP308, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2008).   
3 The plaintiffs are Robin Luckett as Special Administrator 
of the Estate of Tywanda Luckett; Tyquone Luckett, Joe Bohannon, 
and Shenara Bohannon, minors, by their Guardian ad Litem, J. 
Michael End; and State of Wisconsin Department of Health and 
Family Services. 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2007AP308   
 
3 
 
granting the plaintiffs' motion to withdraw the admissions that 
the plaintiffs made in response to the defendants' request. 
¶3 
The circuit court permitted the plaintiffs to withdraw 
three different admissions relating to whether Tywanda Luckett 
was in a persistent vegetative state.  The first and third 
admissions concern Ms. Luckett's condition during the period 
from July 22, 2005, to October 2, 2005.  The second admission 
concerns 
Ms. 
Luckett's 
condition 
during 
the 
period 
from 
September 29, 2000, to July 22, 2005. 
¶4 
The plaintiffs now do not wish to withdraw their first 
and third admissions.  In their brief and during oral argument 
to this court, they stated that their affirmative responses to 
the defendants' first and third requests to admit are correct.  
In other words, the plaintiffs admit that Ms. Luckett was in a 
persistent vegetative state on July 22, 2005——the date of the 
plaintiffs' 
admissions——and 
that 
Ms. 
Luckett's 
persistent 
vegetative state was permanent on July 22, 2005, persisting 
until her death in October 2005.   
¶5 
The plaintiffs now seek to withdraw only their 
admission in response to the second request for admissions, 
namely that Ms. Luckett was in a persistent vegetative state 
from the time that she entered Silver Spring Health and 
Rehabilitation Center on September 29, 2000, until July 22, 
2005, the date of the plaintiffs' admissions. The second 
admission covers the largest expanse of time and subjects the 
defendants to the largest exposure for liability.  We consider 
the circuit court's decision without the plaintiff's concession 
No. 
2007AP308   
 
4 
 
of fact relating to the first and third admissions in this 
court.   
¶6 
We conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in permitting the plaintiffs to withdraw 
the admissions.  We conclude that under Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2), 
withdrawal of the admissions will subserve the presentation of 
the merits of the action, and that the defendants did not show 
that they will be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the 
merits by withdrawal of the admissions.  
¶7 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals affirming the circuit court's order allowing the 
plaintiffs to withdraw the admissions.  We remand the cause to 
the circuit court for further proceedings not inconsistent with 
this opinion. 
I 
 
¶8 
We briefly summarize the relevant facts and report 
additional facts later in the opinion as we discuss the issue 
presented.   
¶9 
On August 4, 2000, Dr. Bodner performed a tubal 
ligation on Tywanda Luckett at her request.  Within a short time 
a small mass was found in Ms. Luckett's abdomen near the tubal 
ligation site.  After emergency surgery and post-operative care, 
Ms. Luckett suffered cardiac arrest and permanent severe brain 
damage.  Upon discharge from the hospital on September 29, 2000, 
Ms. Luckett was transferred to a long-term care facility where 
she remained until her death.   
No. 
2007AP308   
 
5 
 
¶10 On December 5, 2003, Ms. Luckett, her three minor 
children, and the Wisconsin Department of Health and Family 
Services filed a medical malpractice action against Dr. Aaron 
Bodner, Dr. Prithipal Sethi, Dr. David Chua, Dr. Jonathan 
Robinson, Dr. David Altman, Aurora Sinai Medical Center, the 
Medical College of Wisconsin Affiliated Hospitals, Physicians 
Insurance Company of Wisconsin, the Medical Protective Company, 
and the Wisconsin Patients' Compensation Fund.  The complaint 
alleges, in essence, that the negligence of the defendant 
doctors 
caused 
Ms. 
Luckett 
to 
suffer 
severe 
hypoxic 
encephalopathy, a form of brain damage.     
 
¶11 On June 22, 2005, Aurora Sinai Medical Center and the 
Medical Protective Company sent the plaintiffs three requests 
for admissions pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 804.11(1):5 
REQUEST TO ADMIT NO. 1: Admit that Tywanda Luckett is 
presently in a persistent vegetative state. 
REQUEST TO ADMIT NO. 2: Admit that Tywanda Luckett has 
been in a persistent vegetative state since she was 
admitted to Silver Spring Health and Rehabilitation 
Center [a long-term care facility that admitted Ms.  
Luckett on September 29, 2000, shortly after she 
suffered brain damage]. 
REQUEST TO ADMIT NO. 3: Admit that the persistent 
vegetative state of Tywanda Luckett is permanent. 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 804.11(1)(a) provides in relevant part 
that "[e]xcept as provided in s. 804.015, a party may serve upon 
any other party a written request for the admission, for 
purposes of the pending action only, of the truth of any matters 
within the scope of s. 804.01 (2) set forth in the request that 
relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application 
of law to fact, including the genuineness of any documents 
described in the request." 
No. 
2007AP308   
 
6 
 
¶12 The request for admissions was accompanied by two 
interrogatories 
and 
a 
request 
for 
production. 
 
The 
interrogatories and request for production applied only if the 
plaintiffs refused the request for admissions in whole or in 
part.  They essentially required the plaintiffs to disclose any 
evidence supporting the position that Ms. Luckett was not in a 
persistent vegetative state.   
¶13 The request for admissions and the interrogatories 
were obviously designed to eliminate a possible element of 
damages, namely pain and suffering for the described period.  On 
July 22, 2005, plaintiffs' counsel responded in the affirmative 
to each of the three requested admissions. 
 
¶14 On August 31, 2005, the circuit court entered a 
scheduling 
order, 
which 
provided 
that 
a 
final 
pretrial 
conference would be held on January 19, 2007, and that a three-
week jury trial would commence on February 5, 2007.  The circuit 
court ordered the parties to complete all discovery on or before 
the date of the final pretrial conference.   
¶15 Ms. Luckett died on October 2, 2005.6   
                                                 
6 Relying upon a document that two of the defendants filed 
with the circuit court, the court of appeals stated in its 
opinion that Luckett died on August 2, 2005.  See Luckett v. 
Bodner, No. 2007AP308, unpublished slip op., ¶2 & n.2 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Apr. 22, 2008).  In their briefs to this court, however, 
the parties agree that the correct date of death is stated in 
the plaintiffs' motion for substitution of a party and in the 
circuit court's order granting that motion.  The plaintiffs' 
motion and the circuit court's order each state that Luckett 
died on October 2, 2005. 
No. 
2007AP308   
 
7 
 
 
¶16 On January 18, 2007 (the day before the final pretrial 
conference and 18 months after the admissions), counsel for the 
plaintiffs e-mailed counsel for the defendants to inform them 
that plaintiffs' counsel was "withdrawing [his] admission that 
[Ms. Luckett] was in a persistent vegetative state from the time 
of her admission to Silver Spring [Health and Rehabilitation 
Center]."  Counsel explained that in final trial preparation, he 
had found the following documents suggesting that Ms. Luckett 
may not have been in a persistent vegetative state: 
• 
A note written by Dr. John R. McGuire on April 11, 
2001, stating that Ms. Luckett "was able to follow 
simple commands and nod her head 'yes' or 'no' to 
simple questions." 
• 
A note written by Dr. Thomas Kidder on April 26, 
2001, stating, "It is difficult to tell but I 
believe she is able to comprehend some of what is 
said to her . . . ." 
• 
A note written by Dr. Kidder on June 21, 2001, 
stating that Luckett was "very frightened and 
fearful" and that Luckett seemed "to be able to 
indicate yes or no."     
• 
A "swallow study report" of June 21, 2001, stating 
that Ms. Luckett "appeared very tentative and 
frightened."   
¶17 Counsel for the plaintiffs apparently overlooked these 
items 
in 
2,000 pages of medical records in making the 
admissions.  The defendants had the same 2,000 pages of medical 
records. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Upon Ms. Luckett's death, the circuit court granted the 
plaintiffs' motion to substitute the administrator of Ms. 
Luckett's estate as a party. 
No. 
2007AP308   
 
8 
 
¶18 At the final pretrial conference the following day, 
January 19, 2007, counsel for the plaintiffs orally moved to 
withdraw his prior admissions.  Plaintiffs' counsel explained 
that these records indicate that Ms. Luckett was aware of what 
was going on.  The circuit court gave counsel for the defendants 
an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs' motion.  Defense 
counsel argued that they would be prejudiced by the withdrawal 
of the admissions.  All counsel, as well as the circuit court, 
agreed that if the circuit court granted the plaintiffs' motion 
to withdraw the admissions, the circuit court would have to 
adjourn the impending trial.  Everyone agreed that the parties 
were not then prepared to litigate the issue whether Ms. Luckett 
had been in a persistent vegetative state. 
¶19 The circuit court asked the parties if they would like 
to revisit the issue early the following week so that they would 
have the opportunity to furnish the court with additional input.  
No party asked for an opportunity to address the issue further.  
The circuit court took down each attorney's e-mail address and 
promised to send a decision later that same day. 
¶20 The circuit court granted the plaintiffs' motion to 
withdraw the admissions.    
¶21 Dr. Bodner, Dr. Sethi, Aurora Sinai Medical Center, 
the 
Medical 
College 
of 
Wisconsin 
Affiliated 
Hospitals, 
Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, and the Medical 
Protective Company petitioned for leave to appeal the circuit 
court's nonfinal order.  Dr. Altman and the Wisconsin Patients 
Compensation Fund did not join in the appeal.  Dr. Chua and Dr. 
No. 
2007AP308   
 
9 
 
Robinson 
prevailed 
on 
summary 
judgment 
motions 
and 
were 
dismissed from the action. 
¶22 In sum, the allegedly negligent medical incidents 
occurred 
in August/September 2000; the complaint alleging 
medical malpractice was filed December 5, 2003; the defendants 
requested the admissions in June 2005 and the plaintiffs made 
the admissions in July 2005; Ms. Luckett died on October 2, 
2005; and the motion to withdraw the admissions was made on 
January 19, 2007.  When the plaintiffs made their admissions, 
the plaintiffs in effect eliminated any claims they may have had 
for Ms. Luckett's conscious pain and suffering during the period 
from September 29, 2000, until her death five years later.  In 
withdrawing these admissions, plaintiffs' counsel acknowledged 
that the earlier admissions were his "mistake" and the mistake 
was not discovered until counsel was "doing final trial 
preparation."  All the records in question were in the 
defendants' possession as well as the plaintiffs'.   
¶23 The court of appeals granted the defendants' petition 
for leave to appeal from the adverse order of the circuit court 
allowing withdrawal of the admissions.  In a split decision, the 
court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's order allowing the 
plaintiffs to withdraw the admissions.  
II 
¶24 Two standards of review apply in the present case. 
¶25 The court must interpret Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2).  The 
interpretation of a statute promulgated under this court's rule-
making authority presents a question of law, which this court 
No. 
2007AP308   
 
10 
 
reviews independently of the circuit court and court of appeals 
but benefiting from their analyses.7   
¶26 The court must also determine whether the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion in allowing the 
plaintiffs to withdraw admissions under Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2).   
¶27 Wisconsin Stat. § 804.11(2) governs withdrawal or 
amendment of a party's admission.  It provides that the circuit 
court may permit withdrawal or amendment of an admission when 
two conditions are met:8 (A) "the presentation of the merits of 
the action will be subserved thereby"; and (B) "the party who 
obtained 
the 
admission 
fails 
to 
satisfy 
the 
court 
that 
withdrawal or amendment will prejudice the party in maintaining 
the action or defense on the merits."9  The statute provides in 
full as follows:  
Effect of admission. Any matter admitted under this 
section is conclusively established unless the court 
on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the 
admission. 
The 
court 
may 
permit 
withdrawal 
or 
amendment when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the party who 
obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that 
withdrawal or amendment will prejudice the party in 
maintaining the action or defense on the merits. Any 
admission made by a party under this section is for 
the purpose of the pending action only and is not an 
                                                 
7 Trinity Petroleum, Inc. v. Scott Oil Co., 2007 WI 88, ¶32, 
302 Wis. 2d 299, 735 N.W.2d 1. 
8 See Mucek v. Nationwide Commc'ns Inc., 2002 WI App 60, 
¶34, 252 Wis. 2d 426, 643 N.W.2d 98 ("Section 804.11(2) provides 
that a court may permit withdrawal of an admission if two 
conditions are met." (quotation marks omitted)).  
9 Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2).   
No. 
2007AP308   
 
11 
 
admission for any other purpose nor may it be used 
against the party in any other proceeding. 
¶28 The language in Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2) at issue in the 
present case, namely the second sentence, "was adopted from and 
is nearly identical to its counterpart provision in [Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 36(b)]."10  Rule 36(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides in relevant part that "the court may permit 
withdrawal or amendment [of an admission] if it would promote 
the presentation of the merits of the action and if the court is 
not persuaded that it would prejudice the requesting party in 
maintaining or defending the action on the merits."   
¶29 When "a state rule mirrors the federal rule, we 
consider federal cases interpreting the rule to be persuasive 
authority."11  When interpreting Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2), the 
court may therefore seek guidance in federal cases interpreting 
Rule 36(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.   
¶30 The texts of Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2) and Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 36(b), as well as the case law, demonstrate that under Wis. 
Stat. § 804.11(2), "a court may permit withdrawal if both 
statutory conditions are met[.]"12  The "two requirements must be 
met before an admission may be withdrawn: (1) presentation of 
the merits of the action must be subserved, and (2) the party 
                                                 
10 Mucek, 252 Wis. 2d 426, ¶29. 
11 State v. Evans, 2000 WI App 178, ¶8 n.2, 238 Wis. 2d 411, 
617 
N.W.2d 220 
(citing 
State 
v. 
Cardenas-Hernandez, 
219 
Wis. 2d 516, 528, 579 N.W.2d 678 (1998)). 
12 See Mucek, 252 Wis. 2d 426, ¶34 (internal quotation marks 
omitted; emphasis added). 
No. 
2007AP308   
 
12 
 
who obtained the admission must not be prejudiced by the 
withdrawal."13  The lack of prejudice to the nonmoving party in 
maintaining 
the 
action 
or 
defense 
on 
the 
merits 
is 
a 
prerequisite of withdrawal under Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2), not a 
policy goal that may be weighed or balanced against other goals.  
¶31 We now turn to the standard for review of the circuit 
court's 
order 
permitting 
the 
plaintiffs 
to 
withdraw 
the 
admission.  The circuit court's order allowing withdrawal or 
amendment of an admission under Wis. Stat. § 804.11 lies within 
the circuit court's discretion.14  This court will uphold the 
circuit court's order if the circuit court applies a proper 
standard of law, examines the relevant facts, and reaches a 
conclusion that a reasonable court could reach, demonstrating a 
rational process.15   
¶32 In the present case the issue of erroneous exercise of 
discretion in allowing the plaintiffs to withdraw the admission 
                                                 
13 Sonoda v. Cabrera, 255 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2001). 
See also Am. Auto. Ass'n v. AAA Legal Clinic of Jefferson 
Crooke, P.C., 930 F.2d 1117, 1119 (5th Cir. 1991) ("[W]hile the 
district court has considerable discretion over whether to 
permit withdrawal or amendment of admissions, that discretion 
must be exercise within the bounds of this two-part test: 1) the 
presentation of the merits must be subserved buy allowing 
withdrawal or amendment; and 2) the party that obtained the 
admissions must not be prejudiced in its presentation of the 
case by their withdrawal." (footnote omitted)). 
14 Mucek, 252 Wis. 2d 426, ¶25 (citing Schmid v. Olsen, 111 
Wis. 2d 228, 237, 330 N.W.2d 547 (1983)). 
15 Mucek, 252 Wis. 2d 426, ¶25 (citing Loy v. Bunderson, 107 
Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982)). 
No. 
2007AP308   
 
13 
 
turns on whether the circuit court applied the proper standard 
of law.  The circuit court, in interpreting and applying Wis. 
Stat. § 804.11(2), identified the two parts of § 804.11(2) but 
did 
not 
explicitly 
determine 
whether 
withdrawal 
of 
the 
plaintiffs' 
admission 
would 
prejudice 
the 
defendants 
in 
maintaining their defense on the merits. In its written 
decision, the circuit court acknowledged that the prejudice 
issue is "difficult to assess" and that "significant prejudice 
concerns exist."  It recognized that the plaintiffs' motion to 
withdraw the admissions would "necessitat[e] additional expert 
evaluation, 
testimony 
and 
related 
discovery" 
and 
would 
"require[] 
adjournment 
of 
the 
impending 
trial 
and 
add[] 
significant expense[.]"  The circuit court, however, did not 
explicitly 
determine 
whether 
its 
"significant 
prejudice 
concerns" amounted to prejudice to the defendants for purposes 
of Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2).  
¶33 Furthermore, the circuit court seemed to interpret 
Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2) as establishing a two-factor balancing 
test rather than as setting forth two independent requirements.  
The circuit court stated that the answer in the present case 
"lies in the balancing of the two prongs" of Wis. Stat. 
§ 804.11(2).  The circuit court further stated that it would 
grant the plaintiffs' motion to withdraw the admissions because 
"[w]hile significant prejudice concerns exist, the fairness 
issue implicated by the possibility that Ms. Luckett was 
conscious of the catastrophic injuries she suffered cries out 
for resolution on the merits." 
No. 
2007AP308   
 
14 
 
¶34 The court of appeals did not view the circuit court as 
having misinterpreted Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2).  Some of the 
defendants assert that the circuit court erroneously interpreted 
the statute.      
¶35 When a circuit court applies an incorrect standard of 
law in making a discretionary decision, the circuit court has 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion.16 
 
This 
court 
has 
concluded, however, in Schmid v. Olsen, 111 Wis. 2d 228, 237, 
330 N.W.2d 547, that although the circuit court did not 
articulate or apply the criteria of Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2) as a 
basis for its decision permitting withdrawal of an admission, 
reversal was not automatic.17 
¶36 The defendants do not ask this court to remand the 
matter to the circuit court to exercise its discretion a second 
time after applying a proper interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
16 Schmid v. Olsen, 111 Wis. 2d 228, 237, 330 N.W.2d 547 
(1983) ("A reviewing court is obliged to uphold a discretionary 
decision of a trial court, if it can conclude ab initio that 
there are facts of record which would support the trial judge's 
decision had discretion been exercised on the basis of those 
facts.")  
17 See Schmid, 111 Wis. 2d at 237 ("The [circuit] court did 
not articulate as the basis for its decision the two criteria of 
sec. 804.11(2), Stats.  It is well established that a decision 
which requires the exercise of discretion and which on its face 
demonstrates no consideration of any of the factors on which the 
decision should be properly based constitutes an abuse of 
discretion as a matter of law.  If a trial judge bases the 
exercise of his discretion upon a mistaken view of the law, his 
conduct is beyond the limits of his discretion.  Even though 
there was an abuse of discretion in the case before us, reversal 
by this court is not automatic." (internal citations omitted)).  
No. 
2007AP308   
 
15 
 
§ 804.11(2).  The defendants ask this court to reverse the order 
of the circuit court and the court of appeals on the ground that 
withdrawal of the admissions is precluded as a matter of law.  
The defendants maintain that withdrawal of the admissions will 
prejudice them as a matter of law in maintaining their defense 
on the merits.    
¶37 Adhering to Schmid v. Olsen, we examine the record to 
determine whether it supports the circuit court's ultimate 
decision to allow withdrawal of the plaintiffs' admissions.  We 
conclude that the record supports the conclusion (A) that 
withdrawal of the admissions will subserve the presentation of 
the merits; and (B) that the defendants will not be prejudiced 
by withdrawal of the admissions in maintaining their defense on 
the merits. 
A 
¶38 The first requirement of Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2) 
emphasizes the importance of having the action resolved on the 
merits.18  The circuit court determined that withdrawal of the 
plaintiffs' admissions will subserve the presentation of the 
                                                 
18 See Perez v. Miami-Dade County, 297 F.3d 1255, 1266 (11th 
Cir. 2002) ("This part of the test emphasizes the importance of 
having the action resolved on the merits[.]" (quotation marks 
and citation omitted)); Raiser v. Utah County, 409 F.3d 1243, 
1246 (10th Cir. 2005) (same; quoting Perez).   
See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 36, Notes of the Advisory 
Committee on the 1979 amendments (stating that Fed. R. Civ. P. 
36(b) "emphasizes the importance of having the action resolved 
on the merits, while at the same time assuring each party that 
justified reliance on an admission in preparation for trial will 
not operate to his prejudice."). 
No. 
2007AP308   
 
16 
 
merits of the action because "[i]f, as the [newly-discovered] 
entries in the medical records . . . arguably indicate, Ms. 
Luckett was capable of and did experience pain and suffering for 
the extended period between the time she lapsed into a coma to 
the time of her death, it is appropriate for the jury to 
consider that fact and, if liability is established, award 
damages to compensate that loss."   
¶39 The defendants generally do not challenge the circuit 
court's 
determination 
that 
withdrawal 
of 
the 
plaintiffs' 
admissions will subserve the presentation of the merits of the 
action.   
¶40 Some defendants argue that withdrawal of an admission 
cannot subserve the presentation of the merits of the action 
unless the admission is "squarely and conclusively contradicted 
by something in the court's record."19  This argument does not 
comport with the case law.  Both state and federal cases have 
concluded that withdrawal or amendment of an admission will 
                                                 
19 Petitioners' Reply Brief of Aurora Sinai Medical Center, 
Inc., the Medical Protective Company and the Injured Patients & 
Families Compensation Fund at 9. 
The dissent asserts that the plaintiffs arguably submitted 
evidence to justify the withdrawal of the admission to the 
second request but that no evidence was submitted to justify the 
withdrawal of admissions number one and three.  The defendants 
do not make this argument. 
It is not unreasonable, however, to conclude that the 
entries in the medical records from 2001 "arguably indicate" 
that Ms. Luckett was capable of and perhaps experienced pain and 
suffering during the periods covered by the first and third 
admissions. 
No. 
2007AP308   
 
17 
 
promote the presentation of the merits of the action even when 
the admission is not conclusively contradicted by something in 
the record.20 
¶41 The circuit court's discretionary determination that 
withdrawal of the plaintiffs' admissions will subserve the 
presentation of the merits of the action was not an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.  The parties in the instant case 
evidently regard the question of Ms. Luckett's damages for 
conscious pain and suffering as a key issue that they will 
dispute at trial.  The plaintiffs' admissions, if allowed to 
stand, would effectively eliminate a determination on the merits 
of these issues.  Thus, granting the plaintiffs' motion to 
withdraw the admissions will aid in the ascertainment of the 
truth and the development of the merits.  We therefore turn to 
                                                 
20 See, 
e.g., 
Schmid 
v. 
Olsen, 
111 
Wis. 2d 228, 
330 
N.W.2d 547 (1983) (concluding that the presentation of the 
merits of the action would be subserved by withdrawal of Olsen's 
admission that he was 70% liable for Schmid's damages, although 
the extent of Olsen's liability was disputed and was not 
conclusively shown); Conlon v. United States, 474 F.3d 616, 622 
(9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the presentation of the merits 
of the action would be promoted by withdrawal of Conlon's 
admission that "neither the issuing of the warrant [for his 
arrest], his arrest or his subsequent incarceration were caused 
by negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of United States 
employees," although nothing conclusively demonstrated that 
Conlon's admission was false); Manatt v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Co., 122 F.3d 514, 517 (8th Cir. 1997) ("In the circumstances of 
this 
case, 
'the 
prospect 
of 
deeming 
[the] 
controverted 
fact[] . . . as having been admitted seems . . . to be anathema 
to the ascertainment of the truth.'" (quoting White Consol. 
Indus., Inc. v. Waterhouse, 158 F.R.D. 429, 433 (D. Minn. 1994) 
(brackets and ellipses in Manatt))). 
No. 
2007AP308   
 
18 
 
the second requirement in Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2), relating to 
prejudice in maintaining a defense on the merits.  
B 
¶42 Under Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2), a circuit court may 
allow withdrawal of an admission if "the party who obtained the 
admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal . . . will 
prejudice the party in maintaining the action or defense on the 
merits."   
¶43 The "prejudice" contemplated by Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2) 
"is not simply that a party [obtaining the admissions] would be 
worse off without the admissions."21  To demonstrate prejudice in 
maintaining the action or defense on the merits, the party who 
obtained the admission "must show prejudice in addition to the 
inherent consequence that the party will now have to prove 
something that would have been deemed conclusively established 
if the opposing party were held to its admissions."22   
¶44 Prejudice in maintaining the action or defense on the 
merits "relates to the difficulty a party [here the defendants] 
may face in proving its case, e.g., caused by the unavailability 
of key witnesses, because of the sudden need to obtain evidence 
with respect to the questions previously answered by the 
admissions."23  The prejudice inquiry requires a court to "focus 
                                                 
21 Mucek, 252 Wis. 2d 426, ¶30 (citations omitted).   
22 Id.   
23 Brook Village N. Assocs. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 686 F.2d 66, 
70 (1st Cir. 1982). 
No. 
2007AP308   
 
19 
 
on the prejudice that the nonmoving party [here the defendants] 
would suffer at trial."24   
¶45 It is the defendants' burden to demonstrate that 
withdrawal or amendment of the admissions will prejudice them in 
maintaining their defense on the merits.25   
                                                                                                                                                             
See also Conlon, 474 F.3d at 622 (quoting Hadley v. United 
States, 45 F.3d 1345, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Brook 
Village, 686 F.2d at 70)); Raiser v. Utah County, 409 F.3d 1243, 
1246 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Hadley, 45 F.3d at 1348 (quoting 
Brook Village, 686 F.2d at 70)); Kerry Steel, Inc. v. Paragon 
Indus., 106 F.3d 147, 154 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Prejudice under Rule 
36(b) . . . 'relates to special difficulties a party may face 
caused by a sudden need to obtain evidence upon withdrawal or 
amendment of an admission.'" (quoting Am. Auto. Ass'n v. AAA 
Legal Clinic of Jefferson Crooke, P.C., 930 F.2d 1117, 1120 (5th 
Cir. 1991) (citing Brook Village, 686 F.2d at 70))); F.D.I.C. v. 
Prusia, 18 F.3d 637, 640 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Gutting v. 
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 710 F.2d 1309, 1314 (8th Cir. 1983) 
(quoting Brook Village, 686 F.2d at 70)); Am. Auto. Ass'n v. AAA 
Legal Clinic of Jefferson Crooke, P.C., 930 F.2d 1117, 1120 (5th 
Cir. 1991) ("Courts have usually found that the prejudice 
contemplated by Rule 36(b) relates to special difficulties a 
party may face caused by a sudden need to obtain evidence upon 
withdrawal or amendment of an admission." (citing Brook Village, 
686 F.2d at 70)); Smith v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 837 F.2d 
1575, 1578 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Brook Village, 686 F.2d at 
70); 7 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 36.13, 
at 36-46 (3d ed. rev. 2008) ("Rule 36(b) contemplates prejudice 
arising from the difficulty a party may face in proving its case 
because of the sudden need to obtain evidence required to prove 
the matter that has been admitted." (footnote omitted)). 
24 Conlon, 474 F.3d at 622. 
No. 
2007AP308   
 
20 
 
¶46 The defendants offer numerous arguments in support of 
their position that withdrawal of the plaintiffs' admissions 
will prejudice them in maintaining their defense on the merits.  
We examine each of these arguments in turn. 
¶47 The defendants contend that because granting the 
plaintiffs' motion meant adjourning the trial for additional 
discovery, the defendants are prejudiced as a matter of law in 
maintaining their defense on the merits.  The defendants rely on 
two decisions of the court of appeals, Mucek v. Nationwide 
Communications, Inc., 2002 WI App 60, 252 Wis. 2d 426, 643 
N.W.2d 98, and Estate of Hegarty v. Beauchaine, 2006 WI App 248, 
297 Wis. 2d 70, 727 N.W.2d 857, in support of their position 
that the circuit court may not permit withdrawal or amendment of 
an admission under Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2) when additional 
discovery and adjournment of the trial would result.   
¶48 We do not agree with the defendants' interpretation of 
Mucek or Estate of Hegarty.  These cases demonstrate, as the 
                                                                                                                                                             
25 See Conlon, 474 F.3d at 622 ("The party relying on the 
deemed admission has the burden of proving prejudice."); Raiser, 
409 F.3d at 1246 ("The second Rule 36(b) factor requires [the 
nonmoving party] to show that it would be prejudiced by the 
withdrawal of [the] admissions[.]"); Prusia, 18 F.3d at 640 
("[T]he party who obtained the mistaken admission . . . has the 
burden of proving that an amendment would prejudice him." 
(citations omitted)); 7 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal 
Practice § 36.13, at 36-44 (3d ed. rev. 2008) ("The party who 
obtained the admission must show the court that it will be 
prejudiced if the amendment or withdrawal is allowed." (footnote 
omitted)). 
No. 
2007AP308   
 
21 
 
circuit court recognized,26 that it lies within the circuit 
court's 
discretion 
to 
find 
prejudice 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 804.11(2) on the ground that withdrawal or amendment of an 
admission 
would 
necessitate 
additional 
discovery 
and 
an 
adjournment of the trial.  Neither case demonstrates that 
prejudice is established as a matter of law when withdrawal or 
amendment of an admission would necessitate additional discovery 
and adjournment of the trial.   
¶49 In the Mucek case, the circuit court denied Nationwide 
Communications' motion to withdraw admissions, concluding that 
withdrawal would prejudice Mucek in maintaining the action on 
the merits.  In assessing the prejudice to Mucek, the circuit 
court focused largely on Nationwide Communications' ongoing 
failure to comply with the court's discovery orders.  On appeal, 
Nationwide Communications argued that the circuit court had 
applied an improper standard of law.   
¶50 The court of appeals sustained the circuit court's 
determination, concluding that "a trial court may consider a 
party's 
history 
of 
discovery 
abuse . . . when 
determining 
prejudice under § 804.11(2) . . . ."27  The court of appeals 
reasoned that "[a] party's ongoing failure to provide documents 
and information will frequently magnify the importance of 
                                                 
26 The circuit court's written decision states: "[R]esultant 
adjournment and additional discovery is sufficient to establish 
prejudice so as to justify denial of the request to withdraw an 
admission." (citing Mucek, 252 Wis. 2d 426, ¶32 n.8). 
27 Mucek, 252 Wis. 2d 426, ¶28.   
No. 
2007AP308   
 
22 
 
requests for admissions precisely because the requesting party 
has already been deprived of requested information and is all 
the more dependent on admissions to identify what is actually in 
dispute."28 
¶51 The court of appeals also opined, in a footnote, that 
the circuit court's prejudice determination could be sustained 
because withdrawal of Nationwide Communications' admissions 
likely would necessitate an adjournment of the trial so that 
Mucek could obtain additional evidence.  The court of appeals 
stated that "[a]n adjournment of the trial and the need to again 
attempt 
discovery 
would 
itself 
constitute 
prejudice 
to 
Mucek[.]"29  The Mucek court of appeals further stated that "[a] 
trial court's general authority to maintain the orderly and 
prompt 
processing 
of 
cases 
provides 
authority 
to 
deny 
withdrawal, 
apart 
from 
the 
two 
factors 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 804.11(2)."30  The circuit court in the present case apparently 
concluded, within its discretion, that despite the fact that the 
lawsuit was over three years in duration and pending over six 
years after the alleged negligence, it could maintain sufficient 
order in the proceedings if the trial were adjourned and 
additional discovery conducted. 
                                                 
28 Mucek, 252 Wis. 2d 426, ¶31.   
29 Mucek, 252 Wis. 2d 426, ¶32 n.8 (citing Equal Employment 
Opportunity Comm'n v. Jordan Graphics, Inc., 135 F.R.D. 126, 
128-29 (W.D.N.C. 1991)). 
30 Mucek, 252 Wis. 2d 426, ¶35.   
No. 
2007AP308   
 
23 
 
¶52 In Estate of Hegarty, the circuit court denied a 
defendant insurer's motion to withdraw admissions, concluding in 
part that withdrawal would prejudice the Estate in maintaining 
the action on the merits.  The circuit court stated that the 
motion for withdrawal had come "pretty late in the game" and 
that withdrawal would mean that the Estate "would have to do 
more discovery."31   
¶53 The court of appeals upheld the circuit court's 
exercise of discretion.  It agreed with the circuit court that 
withdrawal of the admissions would mean "a substantial amount of 
new discovery . . . causing additional delays in an already very 
long process."32  It sustained the circuit court's determination 
that 
the 
requirement 
of 
additional 
discovery, 
and 
the 
concomitant delay in the action, would prejudice the Estate.33 
¶54 In both Mucek and Estate of Hegarty, the court of 
appeals 
sustained 
the 
circuit 
court's 
discretionary 
determination that withdrawal of an admission would result in 
prejudice for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2).  Neither the 
Mucek court of appeals nor the Estate of Hegarty court of 
appeals addressed the issue whether the circuit court would have 
erred if it had granted the motions for withdrawal in those 
cases.  Accordingly, neither case demonstrates that prejudice is 
established as a matter of law when withdrawal or amendment of 
                                                 
31 Estate of Hegarty, 297 Wis. 2d 70, ¶29.   
32 Id., ¶40.   
33 Id.   
No. 
2007AP308   
 
24 
 
an 
admission 
would 
necessitate 
additional 
discovery 
and 
adjournment of the trial. 
¶55 The federal case law is similar to Mucek and Estate of 
Hegarty.  Several federal district courts have examined the need 
for additional discovery or adjournment of the trial when 
determining whether withdrawal or amendment of an admission 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b) will result in prejudice.34     
¶56 No federal decision holding that a federal district 
court is required to find prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b) 
when withdrawal would necessitate additional discovery and 
adjournment of the trial has been brought to the court's 
attention.  The fact that a trial must be adjourned, or that the 
time for discovery must be enlarged, does not necessarily mean 
that the non-moving party will suffer prejudice in maintaining 
the action or defense on the merits.  In examining prejudice, 
the courts should "focus on the prejudice that the nonmoving 
party would suffer at trial."35  
                                                 
34 See 
Equal 
Employment 
Opportunity 
Comm'n 
v. 
Jordan 
Graphics, Inc., 135 F.R.D. 126, 129 (W.D.N.C. 1991), cited in 
Mucek, 252 Wis. 2d 426, ¶32 n.8 (finding prejudice because 
permitting withdrawal "may require additional discovery and 
would most likely delay the disposition of th[e] matter"); 
Ropfogel v. United States, 138 F.R.D. 579, 584 (D. Kan. 1991) 
(finding prejudice in part because withdrawal could "greatly 
delay the trial of this matter"); Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. 
Deutz-Allis Corp., 120 F.R.D. 655, 659 (E.D.N.C. 1988) (finding 
prejudice in part because withdrawal would interject a new 
"issue in the case upon which no discovery has heretofore been 
undertaken").  
35 See, e.g., Brook Village, 686 F.2d at 70; Conlon, 474 
F.3d at 622. 
No. 
2007AP308   
 
25 
 
¶57 We therefore turn to the defendants' arguments about 
the prejudice they will suffer at trial.   
¶58 Although adjournment of the trial may give the 
defendants sufficient time to prepare to litigate the question 
whether Ms. Luckett was in a persistent vegetative state, the 
defendants contend that they will be prejudiced for purposes of 
Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2) because the plaintiffs' admissions and 
subsequent 
withdrawal 
caused 
the 
defendants 
to 
forgo 
opportunities to procure relevant evidence that they can no 
longer obtain.  They argue that as a result of the admissions, 
they did not conduct an independent medical examination of Ms. 
Luckett, and that as a result of the withdrawal of the 
admissions they will have to rely upon Ms. Luckett's medical 
records 
and 
cross-examination 
of 
Ms. 
Luckett's 
treating 
physician at trial. 
¶59 The defendants argue that they have lost their 
opportunity to make use of a particular expert knowledgeable 
about persistent vegetative states, namely Dr. Ronald Cranford.  
Dr. Cranford passed away between the date of the plaintiffs' 
admissions and the date that the plaintiffs moved to withdraw 
the admissions. 
¶60 Federal courts have recognized that the prejudice 
required to be shown by a party objecting to a motion for 
withdrawal of admissions relates to the difficulty the party may 
No. 
2007AP308   
 
26 
 
face in proving its case because of the unavailability of key 
witnesses in light of the delay.36 
¶61 Dr. Cranford looked at some of Ms. Luckett's records 
to determine whether Ms. Luckett fit the characteristics of one 
in a persistent vegetative state.  Upon receipt of the 
plaintiffs' admissions, the defendants advised Dr. Cranford that 
his services were no longer needed.  The defendants argue that 
it was the plaintiffs' admissions that effectively deterred the 
defense from asking Dr. Cranford to examine Ms. Luckett's 
medical 
records 
and 
to 
perform 
an 
independent 
medical 
examination to determine whether she was in a persistent 
vegetative state.  The defendants claim that had there been a 
denial of the requested admissions in July 2005, there would 
have been a period from July 22 until October 2, 2005, when 
(with hindsight on the death of Ms. Luckett) Dr. Cranford would 
have done an independent medical examination.  After the 
plaintiffs' admissions, such an examination was not necessary, 
the defendants argue, and the intervening death of Ms. Luckett 
made any medical examination impossible.  Indeed, the crux of 
the defendants' arguments about prejudice is that Ms. Luckett's 
death after the plaintiffs' admissions prejudiced the defendants 
in refuting the plaintiffs' claim for conscious pain and 
suffering.  
                                                 
36 The defendants cite Raiser v. Utah County, 409 F3d 1243, 
1247 (10th Cir. 2005), and Sonoda v. Cabera, 255 F.3d 1035, 1039 
(9th Cir. 2001). 
No. 
2007AP308   
 
27 
 
¶62 The defendants offer no evidence or argument that a 
medical examination of Ms. Luckett between July and October 2005 
would have enabled Dr. Cranford or any other medical examiner to 
evaluate Ms. Luckett's condition from September 29, 2000, 
through July 22, 2005.  The defendants acknowledge that they do 
not know (and the record does not show) whether an independent 
medical examination would have helped the defendants in refuting 
the plaintiffs' claim for conscious pain and suffering.  Rather, 
the 
defendants 
argue 
that 
their 
independent 
examination 
"wouldn't have hurt the defense, and that is prejudice."37  We do 
not equate the defendants' inability to introduce evidence that 
does not hurt the defense with prejudice to the defense in 
maintaining a defense on the merits.  
¶63 The 
defendants 
had 
the 
opportunity 
to 
make 
an 
independent medical examination of Ms. Luckett before the 
admissions.  They did not, even though their request for 
admissions, along with the accompanying interrogatories and 
request for production, demonstrate that the question whether 
Ms. Luckett was in a persistent vegetative state was not 
settled.  As the court of appeals stated, the "defendants had 
numerous opportunities to request an order for a medical 
examination in connection with several Wis. Stat. § 802.10(3) 
scheduling orders issued between the commencement of this 
litigation on December 5, 2003, and the July 22, 2005, admission 
                                                 
37 Reply Brief of Defendants-Appellants, Aaron C. Bodner, 
M.D., and Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc. at 11. 
No. 
2007AP308   
 
28 
 
at issue here.  None of the defendants made such a request."38  
The plaintiffs' motion to withdraw the admissions did not cause 
the defendants' sudden difficulty in maintaining their defense 
on the merits.  
¶64 The defendants also assert that the withdrawal of the 
admissions will prejudice them in maintaining their defense 
inasmuch 
as 
they 
did 
not 
depose 
certain 
health 
care 
professionals 
on 
the 
issue 
of 
Ms. 
Luckett's 
persistent 
vegetative state.39  The defendants argue that as a result of the 
admissions they lost the opportunity to depose these relevant 
witnesses when their memories were still fresh about their 
personal experiences with Ms. Luckett. The defendants assert 
that had the plaintiffs not made the admissions in July 2005, 
the 
defendants 
might 
have 
deposed 
these 
health 
care 
professionals after July 2005.  The defendants assert that 
"[t]he delay in reaching discovery on her persistent vegetative 
state was entirely attributable to the plaintiffs' admission 
that Ms. Luckett was in such a state and was not conscious of 
any pain and suffering."40  
                                                 
38 Luckett v. Bodner, No. 2007AP308, unpublished slip op., 
¶24 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2008). 
39 A total of 26 depositions were taken from November 24, 
2004, to January 31, 2007.  Depositions were taken of every 
named physician defendant and treating health care provider from 
November 2004 to June 15, 2005.  Depositions were also taken of 
plaintiffs' experts from November 8, 2005, to July 26, 2006, and 
of defense experts from December 15, 2006, to January 31, 2007. 
40 Petitioners' Brief of Aurora Sinai Medical Center, Inc., 
The Medical Protective Company and The Injured Patients & 
Families Compensation Fund at 16. 
No. 
2007AP308   
 
29 
 
¶65 We are not persuaded by this argument.  It is hard to 
understand why the defendants' failure to depose witnesses about 
Ms. Luckett's state of consciousness of pain and suffering is, 
as the defendants assert, entirely the plaintiffs' fault.  The 
depositions 
could 
have 
been 
taken 
before 
the 
July 
2005 
admissions.   
¶66 The defendants try to explain their failure to do an 
independent medical examination or to take depositions on the 
issue of Ms. Luckett's persistent vegetative state by asserting 
that until the plaintiffs' motion in 2007 to withdraw the 
admissions, conscious pain and suffering was never an issue in 
the case.  The defendants urge that from the filing of the suit 
until January 18, 2007, all counsel were proceeding under the 
assumption that Ms. Luckett was in a persistent vegetative 
state.  
¶67 The 
defendants explain that "[f]or the defense, 
however, that assumption needed to be confirmed or the possible 
claim of conscious pain and suffering dealt with, by defense 
experts.  The confirmation . . . was accomplished by the July 22 
admissions . . . ."41  We do not find this explanation of the 
                                                 
41 Defendants-Co-Appellants-Petitioners, Prithipal S. Sethi, 
M.D., Medical College of Wisconsin Affiliated Hospitals, Inc., 
and Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc.'s Reply 
Brief at 4.  See also Defendants-Co-Appellants-Petitioners, 
Prithipal 
S. 
Sethi, 
M.D., 
Medical 
College 
of 
Wisconsin 
Affiliated Hospitals, Inc., and Physicians Insurance Company of 
Wisconsin, Inc.'s Brief and Appendix at 11 (The defendants 
explain the inconsistency, asserting that the issue of Ms. 
Luckett's state of consciousness "was only considered by the 
defense as a 'rule out' possibility until the admissions of July 
22, 2005."). 
No. 
2007AP308   
 
30 
 
defendants' assertion of reliance on the parties' assumptions of 
Ms. Luckett's persistent vegetative state to be a convincing 
explanation of the defendants' failure to conduct an independent 
medical examination or to get additional depositions between 
September 29, 2003, and July 22, 2005.  The defendants will not 
be prejudiced by being placed in the same position they would 
have been had the admissions not been mistakenly made on 
July 22, 2005. 
¶68 The argument that the defendants will be prejudiced 
because witnesses' memories have faded is also not persuasive.  
The medical records indicating that Ms. Luckett may not have 
been in a persistent vegetative state are dated April and June 
2001.  Four years would have already elapsed between the 
observations in 2001 and any depositions that could have been 
taken in 2005 if the plaintiffs had not made the admissions.  
Memories of a patient's condition in 2001 through 2004 had 
undoubtedly already faded by July 2005.  These memories, in all 
likelihood, were not fresh in July 2005 and also were not fresh 
in 2007 when the admissions were withdrawn.   
¶69 The 
defendants 
also 
assert 
that 
they 
will 
be 
prejudiced because the withdrawal of the admissions may increase 
their financial exposure.  The defendants point out that after 
the plaintiffs' admissions, their liability for damages for pain 
and suffering was for the 33 days that Ms. Luckett may have 
suffered conscious pain from the date of the operation until 
September 29, 2000.  With the withdrawal of the admissions, the 
defendants face liability for many months that Ms. Luckett may 
No. 
2007AP308   
 
31 
 
have suffered conscious pain, namely from September 29, 2000, 
until her death.  The defendants argue that the withdrawal of 
the admissions thus adds an uncapped claim for conscious pain 
and suffering that could significantly increase a verdict 
against them in the instant case.  The withdrawal of the 
admissions therefore left the defendants potentially liable for 
an uncapped claim for more damages for conscious pain.  
¶70 We agree with the circuit court that the defendant's 
"increased exposure . . . [is not] a pertinent consideration on 
the prejudice prong" of Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2).  The defendants' 
increased exposure results from the defendants' having to 
litigate a question (Ms. Luckett's capacity to experience 
conscious pain and suffering) that the defendants would have had 
to litigate in the absence of an admissions.  The case law is 
clear that the party opposing a motion to withdraw or amend an 
admission "must show prejudice in addition to the inherent 
consequence that the party will now have to prove something that 
would have been deemed conclusively established if the opposing 
party were held to its admissions."42  As we have stated, the 
defendants will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on 
the merits if they are placed in the same position they would 
have been in had the admissions not been mistakenly made.   
¶71 The defendants urge that withdrawal of the plaintiffs' 
admissions should not be permitted because the plaintiffs cannot 
                                                 
42 Mucek, 252 Wis. 2d 426, ¶30. 
No. 
2007AP308   
 
32 
 
show excusable neglect or good cause.43  Section 804.11(2) does 
not, however, make "excusable neglect" a prerequisite for 
withdrawal or amendment of an admission.  As the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has explained, a court 
must "consider the effect upon the litigation and prejudice to 
the resisting party, rather than focusing on the moving party's 
excuses for an erroneous admission."44 
¶72 In sum, the circuit court record is sufficient to 
support the circuit court's discretionary determination to allow 
the plaintiffs to withdraw the admissions.  For the reasons set 
forth, we conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in granting the plaintiffs' motion to 
withdraw the admissions. 
¶73 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals affirming the circuit court's order allowing the 
plaintiffs to withdraw the admissions.  We remand the cause to 
                                                 
43 During the final pretrial hearing, the circuit court 
stated that it is "understandable that given the volume of 
records that are involved, given the length of treatment, the 
complexity of medical issues, et cetera, that [the records 
suggesting that Ms. Luckett was conscious in 2001 were] 
quote/unquote missed."  The circuit court did not explicitly 
determine whether the failure of plaintiffs' counsel to discover 
the records earlier resulted from "excusable neglect."   
44 Prusia, 18 F.3d at 640 (quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  See also Federal Procedure: Lawyer's Edition (2007) 
§§ 26.749-.750, at 520 ("The moving party's excuse for its 
erroneous 
admission 
is 
not 
a 
relevant 
consideration 
in 
determining 
a 
motion 
to 
withdraw 
or 
amend 
an 
admission. . . . [Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b)] does not require the 
moving party to prove excusable neglect." (footnotes omitted)). 
No. 
2007AP308   
 
33 
 
the circuit court for further proceedings not inconsistent with 
this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the Court of Appeals is 
affirmed.  
No.  2007AP308.akz 
 
1 
 
¶74 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
in the majority opinion and concur with that opinion in that the 
majority concludes that the defense failed to meet its burden to 
show "that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice the party in 
maintaining the action or defense on the merits."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 804.11(2) (emphasis added).   
¶75 Indeed, 
the 
circuit 
court 
erred 
in 
applying 
a 
balancing test in the case at issue.  It was the circuit court's 
duty to consider the two conditions set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 804.11(2): (1) the circuit court may permit withdrawal or 
amendment of an admission when the presentation of the merits of 
the action will be subserved thereby, and (2) the party who 
obtained 
the 
admission 
fails 
to 
satisfy 
the 
court 
that 
withdrawal or amendment will prejudice the party in maintaining 
the action or defense on the merits.  Instead of making findings 
as to the prejudice element, the circuit court wrongfully 
applied a balancing test.  As a result, one remedy could be to 
remand this case to the circuit court to reach a conclusion 
regarding prejudice.  However, given the record in this case and 
the timing of the relevant events, a remand is unnecessary.   
¶76 I concur with the majority opinion in that the defense 
failed to meet its burden to show that withdrawal of the 
admission would prejudice them in maintaining an action or 
defense on the merits.  The circuit court gave the defense an 
opportunity to produce such evidence, but the defense failed to 
do so.  As a result, upon review of this record, the defense did 
not make a showing that at the time the admission was obtained, 
No.  2007AP308.akz 
 
2 
 
it could have gone back several years previous to determine 
whether Luckett was in a persistent vegetative state.   
¶77 As for the critical nature of the timing in this case, 
the parties now agree that as of July 22, 2005, Ms. Luckett was 
in a persistent vegetative state.  See majority op., ¶4.  
Between April 1, 2001, and June 21, 2001, Ms. Luckett's medical 
records indicate that Ms. Luckett was aware of events and was 
responsive to questions.  On June 22, 2005, the defense sought 
the relevant admissions regarding Ms. Luckett's persistent 
vegetative state.  The relevant admissions were obtained in July 
of 2005.  Ms. Luckett died a few months later, on October 2, 
2005.  On January 18, 2007, the plaintiff sought to withdraw the 
previously made admission.   
¶78 These facts beg the following question in this case: 
Had the admission not been made in July of 2005, what could the 
defense have done in 2005 or 2007 to evaluate Ms. Luckett's 
condition in 2001?  The defense did not produce any proof that 
it was prejudiced in pursuing a defense on the merits.  In other 
words, the trial court was not presented with any persuasive 
argument that had the defense not obtained the 2005 admission, 
or had the admission not been withdrawn in 2007, that the 
defense could have done something different to have refuted the 
2001 interval.  If there was an admission or if there was not an 
admission, it is almost irrelevant, given the timing of the 
admission and the fact that as of the time of the 2005 admission 
she was in a persistent vegetative state.  There is nothing in 
the record to reflect that the withdrawal of the admission 
No.  2007AP308.akz 
 
3 
 
affects the defense differently now.  This case is not one in 
which the admission is made contemporaneously with or on the 
heels of a lucid interval.  Had that been the case, we could 
certainly reach a different conclusion, so long as some evidence 
was presented regarding prejudice.  In this case, Ms. Luckett 
was responsive in 2001; the admission was in July of 2005, a 
time when everyone agrees Ms. Luckett was in a persistent 
vegetative state; her death was on October 2, 2005; the 
withdrawal occurred on January 18, 2007.  It is difficult to 
determine how anything other than a paper review could have been 
conducted in 2005 and the same is true for 2007 or even at 
present. 
 
Nothing 
exists in the record to refute that 
conclusion.   
¶79 The problem with the defense's argument now is that 
even if the defense is placed back in the position they would 
have been at the time of the admission, the defense fails to 
show that an expert would be able to do something different than 
he or she could do now.  The burden was on the defense to show 
the circuit court how they are prejudiced by that admission 
being withdrawn and how it impacts their ability to go back any 
differently than it does now.  If the timing of the persistent 
vegetative state admission and withdrawal were different, then 
the outcome in this case could be different.  There simply is no 
showing of that prejudice. 
¶80 Finally, I would note that the trial court is in a 
position to create a fair process by which a trial on the merits 
can occur and that there is no undue prejudice as this case goes 
No.  2007AP308.akz 
 
4 
 
forward.  There may be issues that arise regarding the effect of 
the late withdrawal on the expert's opinions.  The trial court 
will need to address those in due course and create an even 
playing field.  Trial courts utilize a variety of techniques to 
ensure fairness and this trial court should do the same. 
¶81 For the foregoing reason I concur. 
¶82 I am authorized to state the Justices PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence. 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶83 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  In affirming the 
decision of the court of appeals, the majority seriously 
undermines the value of Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2) (2007-08)1 and 
rewrites the law on erroneous exercise of discretion.  To 
understand the damage that is being done, we must examine the 
facts and law in full. 
I 
¶84 Chapter 804 in the Wisconsin Code of Civil Procedure 
pertains to "Depositions and Discovery."  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 804.11, entitled "Requests for admission," is a vital part of 
this chapter. 
¶85 Under Wis. Stat. § 804.11(1)(a), "a party may serve 
upon any other party a written request for the admission, for 
purposes of the pending action only, of the truth of any matters 
within the scope of s. 804.01(2)."  Section 804.01(2)(a) 
explains that "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any 
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter 
involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim 
or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or 
defense of any other party."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶86 This is straightforward.  The rationale for the rule 
is explained in a 1976 commentary on "new" Chapter 804 in the 
Marquette Law Review: "This rule [section 804.11] replaces 
former section 889.22 with the language of Federal Rule 36 and 
offers a much improved procedure for obtaining from a party 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
2 
 
admissions of facts and other items of proof over which there is 
no dispute and which can be costly and time-consuming to prove 
at trial."  Patricia Graczyk, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil 
Procedure Chapter 804, 59 Marq. L. Rev. 463, 519 (1976) 
(emphasis added). 
¶87 In this case, one of the defendants sent three 
requests for admission to the plaintiffs, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 804.11.  The requests were sent on June 22, 2005.  By that 
time, 
the 
parties 
had 
taken 
depositions 
of 
every 
named 
physician-defendant as well as the following treating health 
care providers: Julie Cavey, Sandra Daniels, Jessica Graessner, 
Chung Mea Ha, M.D., Marilyn Kuester, Helen Meissner, and Richard 
Mueller.  Inasmuch as the parties already had depositions from 
many of the fact witnesses, it was completely reasonable for the 
defendants to seek admissions of facts "over which there [wa]s 
no dispute and which [could] be costly and time-consuming to 
prove at trial."  Id.  Most competent advocates would do no 
less. 
¶88 The majority puts an ominous spin on these common 
sense requests for admission: 
The defendants had the opportunity to make an 
independent medical examination of Ms. Luckett before 
the admissions.  They did not, even though their 
request[s] 
for 
admission[], 
along 
with 
the 
accompanying 
interrogatories 
and 
request 
for 
production, demonstrate that the question whether Ms. 
Luckett was in a persistent vegetative state was not 
settled.  As the court of appeals stated, the 
"defendants had numerous opportunities to request an 
order for a medical examination in connection with 
several . . . scheduling orders issued between the 
commencement of this litigation . . . and the July 22, 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
3 
 
2005, admission[s] at issue here.  None of the 
defendants made such a request." 
Majority op. ¶63 (emphasis added). 
¶89 Elsewhere in the opinion, the majority asserts that 
"[t]he defendants had the same 2,000 pages of medical records" 
as the plaintiffs.  Id., ¶17. 
¶90 There are implications in these statements.  The first 
is that the defendants should have combed through 2,000 pages of 
medical records and conducted a medical examination of Tywanda 
Luckett, even though the plaintiffs did not.  The second 
implication is that perhaps the defendants did comb through the 
medical records and unearth what the plaintiffs eventually 
discovered.  In that event, the defendants’ requests for 
admission were nothing more than a skillful effort to euchre 
plaintiffs' counsel into making fatal admissions.  If this is 
what happened, then defendants' counsel were not surprised and 
ought not complain about their self-created predicament. 
¶91 The problem is that these expectations and suspicions 
are not grounded in the record.  Without justification, the 
majority 
treats 
the 
defendants 
as 
though 
they 
possessed 
unlimited time and money to conduct investigation and discovery 
and their requests for admission were an effort to pull a fast 
one on the plaintiffs rather than employ a valuable tool to 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
4 
 
narrow the facts in dispute.2  When the supreme court engages in 
this sort of second-guessing, it invites courts to speculate 
                                                 
2 The majority claims that the issue of "whether Ms. Luckett 
was in a persistent vegetative state was not settled" because 
counsel made the requests for admission, which were also 
accompanied by interrogatories and a request for production.  
Majority op., ¶63.  The majority's statement implies that the 
parties thought Ms. Luckett's persistent vegetative state was in 
doubt.  However, the majority's claim is unsupported by the 
record.  In fact, the record supports the opposite conclusion, 
i.e., the parties in this case were proceeding under the 
assumption that Ms. Luckett was in a persistent vegetative state 
from the time she entered the Silver Spring Health and 
Rehabilitation Center until the time of her death.  It was not 
until the late afternoon of January 18, 2007, when plaintiffs' 
counsel states he first uncovered the notes from 2001, that this 
working assumption was questioned.   
Requesting the admissions and including an interrogatory 
and request for production does not suggest that the issue of 
Ms. Luckett's persistent vegetative state was in question, 
because "requests for admission are not designed to discover 
facts."  Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Requests for Admission in Wisconsin 
Procedure: Civil Litigation's Double-Edged Sword, 78 Marq. L. 
Rev. 625, 632 (1995).  In particular, the party requesting the 
admission "is assumed [to] . . . know[] the facts before asking 
an adverse party to admit that the statement is true."  Id.   
In 
addition, 
interrogatories 
and 
other 
requests 
for 
discovery are often included with requests for admission.  See, 
e.g., Asea, Inc. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1244 
(9th Cir. 1981) ("Each of the requests for admissions was 
accompanied by an interrogatory . . . .").  This is often the 
case because the responding party may not provide straight-
forward, unequivocal answers to the requests.  See Kinsler, 
supra, at 631.  If the responding party denies the requests for 
admission, then the interrogatories and other forms of discovery 
are used to probe the facts and reasoning allegedly supporting 
the denial.  See, e.g., Asea, 669 F.2d at 1244 ("[The 
interrogatories] asked that if the railroads' response was 
anything other than an unqualified admission, they should state 
the facts, documents and witnesses upon which the response was 
based.").  The interrogatories and request for production in 
this case were propounded for this latter purpose: 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
5 
 
about 
the 
motivation 
behind 
requests 
for 
admission 
and 
undermines the value of this discovery tool in civil practice. 
II 
¶92 It is against this background that we examine the 
majority's review of the circuit court's decision. 
¶93 On June 22, 2005, Aurora Sinai Medical Center and the 
Medical Protective Company sent the plaintiffs three requests 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: If you deny that Tywanda 
Luckett is in a persistent vegetative state or, 
alternatively, deny information sufficient to form a 
belief as to whether she is in a persistent vegetative 
state, then itemize each and every behavior, action or 
response either solicited or observed by any health 
care provider or lay person, which you contend is 
inconsistent with a diagnosis of persistent vegetative 
state.  Identify, by name, address and, if relevant, 
position title, of  each individual who has seen any 
such behavior or actions on the part of Tywanda 
Luckett which are inconsistent with a persistent 
vegetative state. 
 
ANSWER: Not applicable. 
 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify (by name and 
professional address) any health care providers who 
have reached a diagnosis other than a persistent 
vegetative 
state 
to 
explain 
Tywanda 
Luckett's 
condition. 
 
ANSWER: Not applicable. 
 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: Produce any medical 
records, 
notes 
or 
other 
written 
or 
visual 
documentation which evidences that Tywanda Luckett is 
in a neurologic condition other than a persistent 
vegetative state. 
 
ANSWER: Not applicable. 
In light of these considerations, the majority's claim that 
Ms. Luckett's persistent vegetative state was in doubt when the 
requests for admission were made is unsupported.   
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
6 
 
for admission.  On July 22, 2005, plaintiffs' counsel responded 
in the affirmative to each of the three requested admissions and 
said that the interrogatories and the request for production 
were "not applicable."  On January 18, 2007, the day before the 
final 
pretrial 
conference, 
plaintiffs' 
counsel 
notified 
defendants' counsel that the plaintiffs were withdrawing their 
three admissions.  Counsel's e-mail to that effect was sent at 
2:57 p.m.  The hearing on the request to withdraw the admissions 
was held at 9 a.m. the next morning. 
¶94 It should be noted that plaintiffs’ counsel did not 
send the aforementioned e-mail to the circuit court.  The court 
did not learn about plaintiffs’ discovery and request to 
withdraw admissions until the following morning.  The circuit 
court, intently focused on multiple pending motions, was given 
no advance notice about the critical decision it would be asked 
to make.  At the informal hearing in chambers, the court may not 
have been given copies of the medical records in question or a 
copy of the e-mail, because it is clear that the court, like 
several of the attorneys, occasionally misstated the facts. 
¶95 When there is a motion or request to withdraw 
admissions previously made, the court must interpret and apply 
Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2).  That subsection reads, in part, as 
follows: 
"The 
court 
may 
permit 
withdrawal . . . when 
the 
presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved 
thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to 
satisfy the court that withdrawal . . . will prejudice the party 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
7 
 
in maintaining the action or defense on the merits."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 804.11(2). 
¶96 The majority opinion correctly states that the text of 
Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2), as well as the case law, demonstrates 
that 
"'a 
court 
may 
permit 
withdrawal 
if 
both 
statutory 
conditions are met[.]'"  Majority op., ¶30 (quoting Mucek v. 
Nationwide Commc'ns, Inc., 2002 WI App 60, ¶34, 252 Wis. 2d 426, 
643 N.W.2d 98) (emphasis and alteration in majority opinion). 
¶97 The majority opinion also correctly states that the 
circuit court's decision is a discretionary decision.  Id., ¶31.  
"This court will uphold the circuit court's order if the circuit 
court [1] applies a proper standard of law, [2] examines the 
relevant facts, and [3] reaches a conclusion that a reasonable 
court could reach, [4] demonstrating a rational process."  Id. 
(citing Mucek, 252 Wis. 2d 426, ¶25 (citing Loy v. Bunderson, 
107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982))).3 
                                                 
3 In 1981, this court explained what is necessary to sustain 
a circuit court's exercise of discretion: 
A discretionary determination, to be sustained, must 
demonstrably 
be 
made 
and 
based 
upon 
the 
facts 
appearing in the record and in reliance on the 
appropriate and applicable law.  Additionally, and 
most importantly, a discretionary determination must 
be the product of a rational mental process by which 
the facts of record and law relied upon are stated and 
are considered together for the purpose of achieving a 
reasoned and reasonable determination. 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
8 
 
¶98 In reviewing a discretionary decision, each of these 
factors should be considered. 
¶99 First, the circuit judge applied an incorrect standard 
of law because he stated that the answer "lies in the balancing 
of the two prongs" (factors).  This is what the judge wrote: 
[T]here 
is 
a 
two-pronged 
analysis 
required 
in 
assessing the propriety of withdrawal of an admission.  
First, will the presentation of the merits of the 
action be subserved[?]  Second, will the party who 
previously obtained and relied upon the admission be 
prejudiced[?] . . .  [T]he resultant obligation to 
prove a fact that had been conclusively established 
does not establish prejudice.  However, resultant 
adjournment and additional discovery is sufficient to 
establish prejudice so as to justify denial of the 
request to withdraw an admission. 
 
I have little hesitance in concluding that the 
first prong of the analysis is established. . . .  
 
The second prong is more difficult to assess.  We 
are on the verge of trial.  All parties have expended 
considerable time, effort and resources in preparation 
for trial.  We have dedicated a significant block of 
our calendar (as have all the lawyers and, to a lesser 
extent, 
some 
of 
the 
witnesses) 
to 
this 
trial.  
Allowing 
the 
withdrawal, 
necessitating 
additional 
expert evaluation, testimony and related discovery, 
requires adjournment of the impending trial and adds 
significant expense. 
 
The proper answer to this dilemma lies in the 
balancing of the two prongs.  In that regard, I have 
                                                                                                                                                             
Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981) 
(emphasis added).  On the other hand, "if the facts of record 
fail to support the trial court's decision, or if our review of 
the record indicates that the trial court applied the wrong 
legal standard, we will reverse the trial court's decision as an 
erroneous exercise of discretion."  Johnson Bank v. Brandon 
Apparel Grp., Inc., 2001 WI App 159, ¶8, 246 Wis. 2d 828, 632 
N.W.2d 107 (citing Meier v. Champ's Sport Bar & Grill, Inc., 
2001 WI 20, ¶42, 241 Wis. 2d 605, 623 N.W.2d 94). 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
9 
 
little difficulty reaching the conclusion that the 
motion should be granted. 
Letter from Christopher R. Foley, Circuit Judge, Milwaukee 
County, to Counsel for the Parties (Jan. 19, 2007) (emphasis 
added (internal footnotes and citations omitted)) [hereinafter 
Letter from Judge Foley]. 
¶100 The court applied the wrong standard of law, and it is 
quite obvious that the court relied upon the wrong standard of 
law to overcome the existence of prejudice.  The court 
acknowledged that "significant prejudice concerns exist."  Id.  
The court spelled out some of those concerns in its letter.  Id.  
And the court explained its understanding that "resultant 
adjournment and additional discovery is sufficient to establish 
prejudice."  Id.  In short, the court found prejudice.  
Nonetheless, 
it 
still 
permitted 
withdrawal 
of 
the 
three 
admissions.  At a minimum, this court should remand the case for 
an evaluation of a motion to withdraw, applying proper legal 
standards.  This is precisely what the court ordered in Schmid 
v. Olsen, 111 Wis. 2d 228, 239, 330 N.W.2d 547 (1983). 
¶101 The 
second 
deficiency 
in 
the 
circuit 
court's 
determination is that the court failed to "examine[] the 
relevant 
facts." 
 
Majority 
op., 
¶31 
(citing 
Mucek, 
252 
Wis. 2d 426, ¶25 (citing Loy, 107 Wis. 2d at 414-15)).   
¶102 The defendants requested three admissions: 
REQUEST TO ADMIT NO. 1: Admit that Tywanda 
Luckett is presently in a persistent vegetative state. 
REQUEST TO ADMIT NO. 2: Admit that Tywanda 
Luckett has been in a persistent vegetative state 
since she was admitted to the Silver Spring Health and 
Rehabilitation Center. 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
10 
 
REQUEST TO ADMIT NO. 3: Admit that the persistent 
vegetative state of Tywanda Luckett is permanent.   
The plaintiff admitted each request. 
¶103 Eighteen months later and less than three weeks before 
a scheduled trial, the circuit court permitted the plaintiffs to 
withdraw each admission. 
¶104 The plaintiffs arguably submitted evidence to justify 
the withdrawal of their admission to request number two.  The 
plaintiffs submitted evidence that, on April 11, 2001, April 26, 
2001, and June 21, 2001, doctors made notes indicating signs of 
Ms. Luckett's consciousness and comprehension.   
¶105 Conversely, plaintiffs did not submit any evidence of 
Ms. Luckett’s consciousness or comprehension during the last 
half of 2001, or at any time in 2002, 2003, 2004, or 2005.  
Hence, there was no evidence submitted to justify the withdrawal 
of admission number one and no evidence submitted to justify the 
withdrawal of admission number three.   
¶106 Plaintiffs’ counsel repeatedly suggested that the 
trial would have to explore Ms. Luckett’s consciousness up to 
her death, and the circuit court adopted that suggestion.  
Clearly, the court intended to open up the entire period between 
September 29, 2000, and October 2, 2005, a five year period.  
The court stated as follows: 
 
This brief letter will serve to apprise you of my 
decision with respect to Mr. End's[, plaintiffs' 
counsel,] motion to withdraw his admission that Ms. 
Luckett was in a persistent vegetative state from late 
August, 2000, until the time of her death. . . .  The 
admission acknowledged an inability on the part of Ms. 
Luckett to [refute proof that she was in a persistent 
vegetative state] during the period between late 
August, 2000 and the time of her death. . . .  If, as 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
11 
 
the entries in the medical records referenced in this 
morning's arguments arguably indicate, Ms. Luckett was 
capable of and did experience pain and suffering for 
the extended period between the time she lapsed into a 
coma to the time of her death, it is appropriate for 
the jury to consider that fact . . . . 
Letter from Judge Foley (emphasis added). 
¶107 The circuit court's decision not only forced the 
defendants to face exposure for all of 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 
and nine months of 2005 but also justified its decision, in 
part, on consideration of pain and suffering during a period of 
time in 2000 (late August and most of September), when there was 
no admission of a persistent vegetative state requested and no 
admission given.  This period in 2000 was already open to proof 
of pain and suffering.   
¶108 In short, the court expanded the defendants' exposure 
to a claim of pain and suffering from roughly two months to 
approximately 60 months (October 2000 to September 2005), when 
there was no evidence proffered to support a conclusion that Ms. 
Luckett was not in a persistent vegetative state during 51 of 
those 60 months (July 2001 to September 2005) and at least one 
other fact was misunderstood. 
¶109 In making its decision to permit withdrawal of 
admissions one and three, the court did not have any facts to 
justify withdrawal.  The court could not have examined the 
relevant facts if there were no facts to examine. 
¶110 The 
third 
deficiency 
in 
the 
circuit 
court's 
determination 
is 
that, 
after 
significantly 
expanding 
the 
defendants' period of exposure to damages, the court reached a 
decision that no reasonable judge could reach.  The court 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
12 
 
commented as follows: "The [Wisconsin Patients Compensation] 
Fund . . . noted in their argument in opposition to the motion 
their concern with respect to significantly increased exposure.  
I don't view that as a pertinent consideration on the prejudice 
prong."  Id.  The circuit court did not give a legal reason for 
its answer.  It gave a factual reason: 
If the plaintiff can establish [that] Ms. Luckett 
experienced pain and suffering during this period as a 
result of negligence on the part of any of the health 
care providers, damages should be awarded.  If she did 
not, or if the plaintiff cannot adequately prove that 
she did, no damages will be awarded. 
Id. 
¶111 This answer completely misses the point.  Noneconomic 
damages for pain and suffering are not a fixed amount unless 
there is a cap on them.  Thus, no reasonable judge would open up 
defendants to an additional 51 months of exposure to unlimited 
noneconomic damages unless there were facts to justify that 
additional exposure.  The plaintiffs submitted no such facts, 
yet the circuit court made its decision anyway.  
¶112 In my view, and also in the view of the majority, the 
circuit court applied the wrong legal standard.  The court also 
failed to examine the relevant facts in that there were no facts 
to support withdrawal of two of the three admissions.  It 
misstated facts in its written decision in relation to August 
and September 2000, showing that it was operating under a 
misunderstanding.  Finally, the court concluded that requiring 
the defendants to defend 30 times the period of exposure that 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
13 
 
they had to defend before the requested withdrawal was a factor 
that it could not even consider in assessing prejudice. 
¶113 This was an erroneous exercise of discretion.  When 
the majority disregards a court's multiple errors, it rewrites 
the law on erroneous exercise of discretion.  
III 
¶114 Luckett v. Bodner represents a perfect storm for 
defendants in a medical malpractice case. 
¶115 The Wisconsin legislature imposed a cap on noneconomic 
damages in medical malpractice cases in 1995.  See 1995 Wis. Act 
10.  Among other things, the legislature amended Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(4) 
to 
limit 
total 
noneconomic 
damages 
for 
each 
occurrence in a medical malpractice case on or after May 25, 
1995, to $350,000, which amount was to be adjusted at least 
annually to reflect changes in inflation measured by the 
consumer price index.  See Wis. Stat. § 893.55(4)(d) (1997-98).  
The constitutionality of the cap was upheld in Guzman v. St. 
Francis 
Hospital, 
Inc., 
2001 
WI 
App 
21, 
¶¶1, 
25, 
240 
Wis. 2d 559, 623 N.W.2d 776.  In July 2005, the cap stood at 
$445,755.  This was the amount Ms. Luckett was slated to 
receive, and it was likely the amount that the defendants would 
have conceded if their liability was established. 
¶116 On July 14, 2005, the supreme court decided that this 
cap was unconstitutional.  Ferdon v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. 
Fund, 2005 WI 125, ¶187, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440.  
Hence, the statute that existed and limited noneconomic damages 
in a medical malpractice case at the time when Ms. Luckett 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
14 
 
suffered injury no longer exists.  A new statute has been 
enacted, but it was not effective until April 6, 2006, more than 
six months after Ms. Luckett's death.  See 2005 Wis. Act 183.  
Consequently, there is no statutory limitation on noneconomic 
damages in this case. 
¶117 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04 is Wisconsin's wrongful death 
statute.  The cap on nonpecuniary wrongful death damages in the 
case of a deceased adult is $350,000.  Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4).  
This award covers "loss of society and companionship [and] may 
be awarded to the . . . children . . . of the deceased."  Id. 
¶118 In Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, ¶6, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 
682 N.W.2d 866, this court determined that the noneconomic 
damages recoverable against health care providers for wrongful 
death in a medical malpractice case were limited to the 
statutory cap for noneconomic damages from wrongful death.  This 
cap was in lieu of, not in addition to, the statutory cap on 
noneconomic 
damages 
for 
medical 
malpractice. 
 
See 
id.  
Significantly, the facts in Maurin involved a child who died 
less than 48 hours after the medical malpractice and was not 
conscious for most of that time.  Id., ¶¶10-13. 
¶119 In Bartholomew v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation 
Fund, 2006 WI 91, ¶3, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216, the court 
overruled Maurin.  The July 7, 2006 decision reflected a divided 
court on the question of whether plaintiffs, like the plaintiffs 
here, can collect medical malpractice noneconomic damages and 
wrongful death noneconomic damages.  See id., ¶4. 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
15 
 
¶120 Ferdon was the law of Wisconsin when the plaintiffs in 
this case made their admissions in July 2005.  Ferdon and 
Bartholomew were the law in 2007 when the circuit court 
permitted the admissions to be withdrawn.   
¶121 To sum up, under the law of Wisconsin on January 19, 
2007, the circuit court knew that it was exposing the defendants 
to an award of unlimited noneconomic damages for pain and 
suffering over a potential five-year period.  Yet, like the 
majority opinion, it refused to take that factor into account in 
evaluating prejudice. 
¶122 The majority writes as follows: "We agree with the 
circuit court that the defendant's 'increased exposure . . . [is 
not] a pertinent consideration on the prejudice prong' of Wis. 
Stat. § 804.11(2)."  Majority op., ¶70 (alteration and ellipsis 
in majority opinion).  Then, the majority adds the following: 
"The defendants' increased exposure results from the defendants 
having to litigate a question (Ms. Luckett's capacity to 
experience conscious pain and suffering) that the defendants 
would have had to litigate in the absence of admissions."  Id. 
¶123 The latter statement is unsupported and plainly wrong.  
Had there been no admissions, the defendants would have forced 
the plaintiffs to go through the medical records 18 months 
sooner based on the defendants' interrogatories and request for 
production.  The defendants' own experts also would have 
examined the records, and they would have been able and 
motivated to examine Ms. Luckett when it was still possible to 
do so.  Almost certainly, the defendants would have been able to 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
16 
 
reduce the period of exposure and would seriously have explored 
settlement.  The case would not have come to this court. 
IV 
¶124 Unique 
among 
discovery 
procedures, 
requests 
for 
admission under Wis. Stat. § 804.11 are used "to define and 
limit the controversy between parties to a lawsuit, thus freeing 
the court and the parties to concentrate on the matters at the 
heart of the dispute."  Robert B. Corris and Mark M. Leitner, 
Requests for Admission, in Wisconsin Discovery Law and Practice, 
§ 5.4 (Feb. 2006).4  In 1962, Professor Ted Finman explained the 
importance of defining and limiting the issues in a law suit 
through the use of requests for admission: 
A definition of the controversy is essential. . . .  A 
precise statement of the opposing contentions focuses 
the attention of the litigants and the tribunal on the 
critical questions.  This permits the litigants to 
direct 
their 
necessarily 
limited 
investigative 
                                                 
4 See also Mucek v. Nationwide Commc'ns, Inc., 2002 WI App 
60, ¶31, 252 Wis. 2d 426, 643 N.W.2d 98 ("The purpose of the 
admissions process 'is to expedite trial by establishing certain 
material facts as true . . . thus narrowing the range of issues 
for trial.'" (ellipsis in original) (quoting Asea, 669 F.2d at 
1245)); Edwin E. Bryant, 4 Wisconsin Pleading and Practice 
§ 31:44 (4th ed. 2003) ("The purpose of the admissions process 
is to expedite trial by establishing certain material facts as 
true, thus narrowing the range of issues for trial."); Jay E. 
Grenig, 3 Wisconsin Practice Series: Civil Procedure § 411.1 (3d 
ed. 2003) ("Section 804.11 is intended to expedite the trial and 
to relieve the parties of the cost of proving facts that will 
not be disputed at trial, the truth of which is known to the 
parties or can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry."); Jay E. 
Grenig and Jeffrey S. Kinsler, 8 Wisconsin Practice Series: 
Civil Discovery § 12:61 (2d ed. 2005) ("The admissions serve to 
eliminate disputes of material fact . . . ."); Kinsler, supra, 
at 632 ("Requests for admission define and limit the controversy 
between parties to a lawsuit, freeing the court and the parties 
to concentrate on matters at the heart of the dispute."). 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
17 
 
capacities to the determinative issues. . . .  And, 
since obscurely defined questions sometimes cause 
erroneous decisions, a precise definition promotes an 
accurate and just resolution of the dispute. 
 
A controversy should be limited as well as 
defined.  It is self-evident, even in an adversary 
system, that contentions not subject to good faith 
dispute should be resolved through concession rather 
than by submission to a judge or jury. . . .  [W]hen a 
contention cannot be honestly and reasonably disputed, 
the adversary approach delays and even endangers a 
just resolution of the case. . . .  
 
Through 
such 
definition 
and 
limitation, 
admissions promote both efficiency and economy in 
resolving disputes.  If a point is conceded, litigants 
need not expend effort in investigations concerning it 
nor incur expense in presenting evidence to prove it.  
Judicial administration is also aided.  Admissions 
reduce the time required to try a case. . . .  
Finally, admissions encourage litigants to evaluate 
realistically the hazards of trial and thus tend to 
promote settlements. 
Ted Finman, The Request for Admissions in Federal Civil 
Procedure, 71 Yale L.J. 371, 375-76 (1962) (internal footnotes 
omitted).5 
                                                 
5 See also Kinsler, supra, at 633 
 
No suit can be tried without some definition of 
its factual and legal boundaries.  A definition of the 
controversy is essential.  Admissions facilitate the 
defining of a controversy by eliminating issues from 
the case that are not in controversy and by narrowing 
those issues that are in controversy. . . .  
 
A controversy should be limited as well as 
defined.  Contentions not subject to good faith 
dispute should be resolved through concession rather 
than by submission to a judge or jury.  When a 
contention cannot be honestly and reasonably disputed, 
the adversarial approach delays and even endangers a 
just 
resolution 
of 
the 
issues. 
 
Limiting 
the 
controversy promotes efficiency and economy in civil 
litigation, resulting in lower costs for clients and 
lawyers. 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
18 
 
¶125 The reason requests for admission are so effective in 
defining and limiting the issues in a controversy is because, 
unlike other forms of discovery, such as depositions and 
interrogatories, "matter[s] admitted under [Wis. Stat. § 804.11 
are] conclusively established unless the court on motion permits 
withdrawal 
or 
amendment 
of 
the 
admission." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 804.11(2).6  In fact, because admissions are considered 
"conclusively 
established" 
once 
made, 
they 
supersede 
the 
pleadings.  Jay E. Grenig and Jeffrey S. Kinsler, 8 Wisconsin 
Practice Series: Civil Discovery § 12:61 (2d ed. 2005); Jeffrey 
S. Kinsler, Requests for Admission in Wisconsin Procedure: Civil 
Litigation's Double-Edged Sword, 78 Marq. L. Rev. 625, 657 
(1995).   
¶126 As a result, "'the party securing admissions [may] 
rely on their binding effect.'"  Schmid, 111 Wis. 2d at 236 n.4 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Internal footnotes omitted.) 
6 See also Estate of Hegarty v. Beauchaine, 2006 WI App 248, 
¶38, 297 Wis. 2d 70, 727 N.W.2d 857 ("When a party responds to a 
request for an admission by admitting a matter, the admission 
conclusively establishes the issue, unless the court permits 
withdrawal.") (citing Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2)); Bryant, supra, 
§ 31:50 ("Unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or 
amendment of the admission, any matter admitted under the 
statute is conclusively established."); Robert B. Corris and 
Mark M. Leitner, Requests for Admission, in Wisconsin Discovery 
Law and Practice, § 5.10 (Feb. 2006) ("Perhaps the most 
significant fact about requests for admissions is that, with 
very few exceptions, a response that admits the matter requested 
conclusively puts that matter to rest."); Grenig, supra, § 411.5 
("A matter admitted under Section 804.11 is conclusively 
established, unless the court permits withdrawal or amendment of 
the admission."); Kinsler, supra, at 657 ("Any matter admitted 
under section 804.11 is conclusively established, unless the 
court permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission."). 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
19 
 
(quoting Rainbolt v. Johnson, 669 F.2d 767, 768 (D.C. Cir. 
1981)).7  "This binding effect [is what] sets requests for 
admission apart from all other discovery procedures and, in 
effect, places such admissions on par with judicial admissions."  
Kinsler, supra, at 657. 
¶127 Considering this binding effect, counsel faced with a 
request for admission must provide a deliberate, "'studied 
response.'"  Grenig and Kinsler, supra, § 12:61 (quoting 
McSparran v. Hanigan, 225 F. Supp. 628, 637 (E.D. Pa. 1963)); 
see also Finman, supra, at 421 ("[T]he procedure through which a 
party becomes bound [is not] 'technical.'  Admissions are not 
the result of inadvertence or inattention to procedural niceties 
but of a litigant's deliberate, conscious choice."); Kinsler, 
supra, at 657 ("An answer to a request . . . is . . . a studied 
response, made under sanctions against easy denials . . . .").  
In particular, "[t]he more harmful the impact an admission may 
have upon a case, the more scrutiny an attorney should devote to 
uncovering objections or drafting good-faith qualifying answers 
                                                 
7 See also Corris and Leitner, supra, § 5.10 ("[S]ection 
804.11 permits the party securing admissions to rely on their 
binding effect.") (internal quotations omitted); Grenig, supra, 
§ 411.5 ("The party securing admissions may rely on the binding 
effect of the admissions."); Grenig and Kinsler, supra, § 12:61 
("The requesting party is entitled to rely on the binding effect 
of the admission."); Kinsler, supra, at 657 ("The party securing 
admissions may rely on the binding effect of the admissions.").  
In addition, the Advisory Committee Notes on the 1970 amendments 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36 state that the amendments 
clarify "the binding effect of an admission."  See Ted Finman, 
The Request for Admissions in Federal Civil Procedure, 71 Yale 
L.J. 371, 418 n.188 (1962) ("It seems likely that the draftsmen 
of 
the 
Rules 
intended 
admissions 
to 
be 
binding 
and 
conclusive."). 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
20 
 
or denials."  Kinsler, supra, at 647.  If counsel is careless or 
inattentive in making the admission, "it would be neither fair 
nor just to" allow withdrawal of the admission "at the risk of 
harming [the] opponent" who reasonably relied on the admission's 
binding effect.  Finman, supra, at 424. 
¶128 If counsel makes a mistake in responding to a request 
for admission, the circuit court has authority to grant 
withdrawal of the admission, but "only if 'the merits of the 
action will be subserved' and if the party who benefits from the 
admission 'fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal . . . will 
prejudice' the benefitting party."8  Mucek, 252 Wis. 2d 426, ¶26 
(quoting Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2)) (emphasis added and ellipsis in 
original).  However, "courts should be cautious in permitting 
the withdrawal . . . of admissions."  Grenig and Kinsler, supra, 
§ 12:71; Kinsler, supra, at 657.9  In fact, doubt over whether to 
                                                 
8 Circuit courts have discretionary authority to permit 
withdrawal of a litigant's response to a request for admission, 
but that discretion must be exercised within the two-prong test 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 804.11(2).  Estate of Hegarty, 297 
Wis. 2d 70, ¶38; Corris and Leitner, supra, § 5.24; Grenig and 
Kinsler, supra, § 12:71; Kinsler, supra, at 662.  A circuit 
court's discretionary decision is to be upheld if it "examined 
the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, 
demonstrating a rational process, reached a conclusion that a 
reasonable judge could reach."  Mucek, 252 Wis. 2d 426, ¶25 
(citing 
Loy 
v. 
Bunderson, 
107 
Wis. 2d 400, 
414-15, 
320 
N.W.2d 175 (1982)). 
9 See also Finman, supra, at 422 
Easy 
withdrawal . . . would 
make 
reliance 
on 
admissions impossible and thus would tend to destroy 
the value of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 36.  
Consequently, though courts should have power to grant 
relief, the rules regulating this matter should be 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
21 
 
allow withdrawal "should be resolved against the party seeking 
withdrawal, since the opposite approach would undermine reliance 
on admissions."  Finman, supra, at 423 n.205.  Professor Finman 
even suggests that "a showing of exceptional circumstances 
should always be required" for a court to allow withdrawal of an 
admission.  Id. at 426. 
¶129 Moreover, under Wis. Stat. § 804.11, courts generally 
apply a broad standard when determining whether prejudice exists 
in a particular case.10  Grenig and Kinsler, supra, § 12:71 ("The 
courts have applied a somewhat liberal standard in determining 
the existence of prejudice."); Kinsler, supra, at 663 (same).  
Specifically, "any adverse effect on a litigant's 'general 
preparation' 
of 
an 
aspect 
of 
its 
case 
caused 
by 
belated . . . withdrawal 
of 
admissions 
may 
constitute 
prejudice."  Corris and Leitner, supra, § 5.24 (quoting Schmid, 
                                                                                                                                                             
designed to prevent injudicious exercise of that 
power. 
. . .  If a decision permitting withdrawal would 
make lawyers reluctant to rely on admissions, relief 
should be denied. 
(Emphasis added.) 
10 In the context of Wis. Stat. § 804.11, prejudice "relates 
to the difficulty a party may have in proving its case because 
of a sudden need to obtain evidence supporting the matter 
previously admitted."  Corris and Leitner, supra, § 5.24; see 
also Grenig and Kinsler, supra, § 12:71; Kinsler, supra, at 662.  
In other words, "[p]rejudice means more than an adverse effect 
on the requesting party's case," Kinsler, supra, at 663, or 
"that the party who obtained the admission now has to convince 
the jury of" the truth of the matter previously admitted, 
Bergemann v. United States, 820 F.2d 1117, 1121 (10th Cir. 
1987). 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
22 
 
111 Wis. 2d at 239 (emphasis added)); Jay E. Grenig, 3 Wisconsin 
Practice Series: Civil Procedure § 411.5 (3d ed. 2003); Grenig 
and Kinsler, supra, § 12:71; Kinsler, supra, at 662-63; see also 
Finman, supra, at 422.   
¶130 Typically, "[p]rejudice stems from the requesting 
party's reliance on the binding effect of the admission."  
Grenig and Kinsler, supra, § 12:71; Kinsler, supra, at 662.11  In 
fact, prejudice is most likely to be found in cases where trial 
is imminent and the party benefitting from the admission forgoes 
discovery on the matter admitted.  Corris and Leitner, supra, 
§ 5.24; Grenig and Kinsler, supra, § 12:71; Kinsler, supra, at 
663.12  In such a situation, allowing the withdrawal of an 
admission would likely result in delay or adjournment of the 
trial, added time and cost for additional discovery, and 
possibly a much more costly search for evidence or witness 
                                                 
11 See also Finman, supra, at 422 ("If a decision permitting 
withdrawal would make lawyers reluctant to rely on admissions, 
relief should be denied."). 
12 See also Finman, supra, at 422 
 
Evidence available at one stage of a case may be 
unavailable at a later date.  Consequently a party who 
assumes that an admission has eliminated the need for 
evidence can be prejudiced by its withdrawal.  He may 
be unable to obtain evidence that was previously 
available to him.  Clearly, if a court concludes that 
withdrawal would cause prejudice to a party who has 
relied on the admission, withdrawal should be denied. 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
23 
 
testimony, all of which have been found to be prejudicial.  See 
Kinsler, supra, at 663.13 
¶131 In this case, the prejudice that will result from 
allowing 
the 
plaintiffs 
to 
withdraw 
their 
admissions 
is 
conspicuously obvious.  As Judge Fine stated in his dissent in 
the court of appeals, "The prejudice to the defendants here is 
palpable and outrageous."  Luckett v. Bodner, No. 2007AP308, 
unpublished slip op., ¶29 (Wis. Ct. App. April 22, 2008) (Fine, 
J., dissenting).   
¶132 When the circuit court decided to allow the withdrawal 
of the three admissions, it knew the prejudicial consequences of 
its ruling.  The projected three-week trial scheduled for 
February 5, 2007, would have to be rescheduled.  This would 
cause additional delay in a case that had been ongoing since 
December 5, 2003, and had already been bumped once the year 
before.  This was prejudice in and of itself because it delayed 
the final disposition of the matter, it caused an increase in 
                                                 
13 See also Estate of Hegarty, 297 Wis. 2d 70, ¶¶39-40 
(deciding that prejudice would result if the withdrawal was 
allowed in light of the following facts: (1) the party relying 
on the admission operated under the assumption that the admitted 
matter was not an issue and conducted no discovery on it, and 
(2) there would need to be "a substantial amount of new 
discovery" that would "caus[e] additional delays in an already 
very long process"); Mucek, 252 Wis. 2d 426, ¶32 n.8 ("An 
adjournment of the trial and the need to again attempt discovery 
would itself constitute prejudice to [the party relying on the 
admissions]." (citing EEOC v. Jordan Graphics, Inc., 135 F.R.D. 
126, 128-29 (W.D.N.C. 1991))). 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
24 
 
costs, and it disrupted the judicial process.14  Judge Foley 
recognized this in his letter to the parties granting the 
request to withdraw the admissions.  Letter from Judge Foley, 
supra ("[R]esultant adjournment and additional discovery is 
sufficient to establish prejudice so as to justify denial of the 
request 
to 
withdraw 
an 
admission.") 
(citing 
Mucek, 
252 
Wis. 2d 426, ¶32 n.8). 
¶133 Approving the circuit court's decision now confirms 
and exacerbates this prejudice.  The defendants will be required 
"to undertake a lengthy, laborious and costly search for 
additional evidence," regarding whether Ms. Luckett was in a 
persistent vegetative state and when she entered that state.  
Grenig and Kinsler, supra, § 12:71.15  This is not to say that, 
                                                 
14 Estate of Hegarty, 297 Wis. 2d 70, ¶40 ("If the amendment 
would 
have 
been 
allowed . . . this 
late 
in 
the 
game, . . . logically a substantial amount of new discovery 
would have been required, causing additional delays in an 
already 
very 
long 
process. . . .  
[T]he 
judicial 
process 
itself[] would have been prejudiced." (internal quotations 
omitted)); Mucek, 252 Wis. 2d 426, ¶32 n.8 ("An adjournment of 
the trial and the need to again attempt discovery would itself 
constitute 
prejudice . . . ."); 
Kinsler, 
supra, 
at 
663 
("Prejudice has been found when the withdrawal . . . will 
require a delay of the trial or additional discovery."). 
15 See, e.g., Weva Oil Corp. v. Belco Petroleum Corp., 68 
F.R.D. 663, 666-67 (N.D. W. Va. 1975) 
From 
the 
record 
before 
the 
court, 
it 
can 
be 
ascertained that while the introduction of such 
evidence could in all probability be accomplished, the 
task would be lengthy, laborious and extremely costly 
to Belco.  In considering the weight of prejudice in 
such circumstances, the court must not treat lightly 
such burdens when visited upon a litigant, especially 
when that litigant has properly utilized the [Federal] 
Rules of Civil Procedure to advance his litigation 
toward a just, speedy, and inexpensive conclusion. 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
25 
 
if plaintiffs' counsel would have denied the requests for 
admission in July 2005, the defendants would not have had to 
undertake such a search for this evidence.  They would have done 
so immediately, which is evidenced by the interrogatories and 
request for production included with the requests for admission.  
See, supra, ¶9 n.2.  However, having to undertake that search 
for evidence now, as opposed to July 2005, significantly 
prejudices the defendants for several reasons.  First, Ms. 
Luckett passed away on October 2, 2005, more than two months 
after the admissions were made.  Therefore, the defendants were 
unable in January 2007 and are unable now to conduct an 
independent, physical examination of Ms. Luckett so that their 
expert or experts can opine on her neurological status and any 
other matters of significance concerning a claim for conscious 
pain and suffering.16   
                                                                                                                                                             
(Internal ellipses, quotations, and citation omitted.)  
16 Both the majority and concurring opinions argue that 
"[t]he defendants offer no evidence or argument that a medical 
examination of Ms. Luckett between July and October 2005 would 
have enabled [the defendants' expert] or any other medical 
examiner to evaluate Ms. Luckett's condition from September 29, 
2000, through July 22, 2005."  Majority op., ¶62; see also 
concurring op., ¶¶3, 5-6.  This argument fails to appreciate 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
allowed 
withdrawal 
of 
all 
three 
admissions, which covers the period of time from July 22, 2005, 
the date of the admissions, through October 2, 2005, the date of 
Ms. Luckett's death.  Certainly, if the requests for admission 
were denied in July 2005, the defendants could have undertaken 
an independent medical examination of Ms. Luckett to determine 
whether she was currently in a persistent vegetative state and 
whether her condition was permanent.   
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
26 
 
¶134 Second, the defendants' expert witness, retained to 
analyze Ms. Luckett's persistent vegetative state,17 was called-
off after the admissions were made.  Since that time, the widely 
recognized expert witness also passed away.  This will require 
that the defendants find and retain a new expert or experts who 
must start the analysis from the beginning without any knowledge 
of the case, thus increasing the defendants' costs.  This 
constitutes prejudice because it "relates to the difficulty [the 
defendants will] have in proving [their] case because of a 
sudden need to obtain evidence supporting the matter previously 
admitted."  Corris and Leitner, supra, § 5.24; see also Grenig 
and Kinsler, supra, § 12:71; Kinsler, supra, at 662.   
                                                                                                                                                             
Moreover, 
the 
majority 
and 
concurring 
opinions 
hold 
defendants' counsel to an unreasonably high standard.  It must 
be remembered that the first notice of the motion to withdraw 
the admissions came less than 24 hours before the hearing.  
Counsel can hardly be expected to have formulated highly 
technical medical arguments for what an expert could or could 
not do in evaluating Ms. Luckett if given the opportunity in 
July 2005.  Counsel did the best they could under the 
circumstances by making the obvious point that their ability to 
defend against a claim of conscious pain and suffering was 
impaired by the fact that the patient was no longer living when 
withdrawal of the admissions was permitted.  
17 The defendants had retained the preeminent medical expert 
regarding persistent vegetative states, Dr. Ronald Cranford.  Dr 
Cranford is well-known for his commentary on the Terri Schiavo 
matter in 2005.  See, e.g., Ginia Bellafante, The Power of 
Images to Create a Cause, N.Y. Times, March 27, 2005, at 3; 
Benedict Carey and John Schwartz, Most Experts Say They See 
Little Chance of Recovery, N.Y. Times, March 26, 2005, at 9; 
John Schwartz and Denise Grady, A Diagnosis With a Dose Of 
Religion, N.Y. Times, March 24, 2005, at 20.  Dr. Cranford 
passed away on May 31, 2006. 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
27 
 
¶135 Finally, because the defendants never focused on 
whether Ms. Luckett was in a persistent vegetative state——it was 
assumed all along that she was——they may be required to re-
depose many, if not all the witnesses who cared for or treated 
Ms. Luckett.  This is yet another example of the prejudice that 
will result from allowing the withdrawal of these admissions.  
See Corris and Leitner, supra, § 5.24 ("[A] party is prejudiced 
when trial is imminent and the party, in reliance on its 
opponents' admissions, has forgone discovery that would have 
explored facts established by the admissions."); Grenig and 
Kinsler, supra, § 12:71 (same); Kinsler, supra, at 663 (same). 
¶136 In addition, as noted, permission to withdraw the 
admissions greatly increased the defendants' exposure in terms 
of time (from two months to more than 60 months) and in terms of 
noneconomic damages.  See, supra, ¶¶32-41.  Defendants' various 
counsel told the circuit court that withdrawal "impacts the 
damages in this case," "turns this case . . . upside down at 
this stage," "potentially changes the value of [this] case by 
millions of dollars,[18]" and "dramatically affects the positions 
                                                 
18 Attorney Paul Grimstad for the defense also made the 
following statement to the circuit court: 
 
We have, in fact, relied upon these admissions as 
we prepared this case for trial.  Not only relied upon 
them as part of our preparation but we have reported 
to our respective clients when we have been asked to 
analyze, to evaluate, this case in terms of potential 
value.  We have used those admissions as part of our 
evaluation . . . . 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
28 
 
of the insurance companies and Fund."  To deny the prejudicial 
effect of these withdrawals is to deny reality.19 
¶137 Furthermore, 
counsel 
for 
one 
of 
the 
defendants 
complained that there was no excusable neglect.  The motion to 
withdraw the previously made admissions was not motivated by the 
discovery of new evidence.  Instead, the basis for the motion to 
withdraw the admissions was four notes created in April and June 
2001, which were in the plaintiffs' counsel's possession long 
before he responded affirmatively to the requests for admission.  
As Professor Finman stated, "Admissions are not the result of 
inadvertence or inattention to procedural niceties but of a 
litigant's deliberate, conscious choice."  Finman, supra, at 
421.  It is hard to excuse the neglect of a party that made 
these key admissions without first examining existing records in 
its 
possession 
or 
conferring 
with 
pertinent 
health 
care 
                                                 
19 See Zimmermann v. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., 529 
F. Supp. 2d 254, 268 (D. Mass. 2008) ("If Defendants' attempt to 
withdraw 
their 
admissions is . . . a change in litigation 
strategy . . . it 
would 
betray 
the 
underlying 
purpose 
of 
[requests for admission] to allow withdrawal of these admissions 
when discovery has been conducted and motions have been prepared 
in reliance on a particular legal theory."); Branch Banking and 
Trust Co. v. Deutz-Allis Corp., 120 F.R.D. 655, 659 (E.D.N.C. 
1988): 
When a party directs its resources, fiscal, physical 
and otherwise, to those issues it reasonably believes 
are the only ones left to be resolved, an abrupt 
change in the status of the litigation occasioned by 
motion of opposing counsel, which had it occurred 
early on would likely have effected a distinctly 
different allocation of resources, should only be 
allowed upon a showing that the [Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure] 36(b) Test is met by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
29 
 
providers at Silver Spring Health and Rehabilitation Center.  
See Kinsler, supra, at 647 ("The more harmful the impact an 
admission may have upon a case, the more scrutiny an attorney 
should devote to uncovering objections or drafting good-faith 
qualifying answers or denials.").  Given counsel's oversight, 
"it would be neither fair nor just to protect [the plaintiffs] 
at the risk of harming" the defendants who reasonably relied on 
the admissions.  Finman, supra, at 424. 
¶138 It should be noted that Judge Foley was concerned at 
the January 19, 2007 hearing that delaying the trial might 
remove him from the case.  In fact, unless special arrangements 
are made, Judge Foley will not handle this case on remand 
because of judicial rotation.  Additionally, Attorney Paul 
Grimstad, counsel for Dr. Bodner and Physician's Insurance 
Company of Wisconsin, like Ms. Luckett and the expert witness, 
has now passed away.  The ill-advised and unsupported decision 
of the circuit court essentially nullified years of work and 
vast amounts of money at the expense of the defendants. 
¶139 The circuit court's conclusion is not one that a 
reasonable judge could have made after considering the relevant 
facts and applying the proper standard of law.  It is not 
supported by the record.  Therefore, this court should remand 
this case to the circuit court for a determination of prejudice. 
¶140 Finally, in order for requests for admission to 
continue to play a useful and effective role in pretrial 
discovery, parties must be able to rely upon the binding effect 
of the admissions once they are made.  Therefore, admissions 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
30 
 
must be difficult to withdraw.  Otherwise, lawyers may stop 
making requests for admission, causing needless litigation, 
costly discovery, and less-efficient trial practice.  The 
majority opinion in this case makes it altogether too easy for 
parties to withdraw their previously made admissions.  In so 
doing, 
the 
majority 
tacitly 
diminishes 
the 
value 
and 
effectiveness of requests for admission in civil practice.    
V 
¶141 The majority refuses to remand this matter for a new 
hearing on the plaintiffs' request to withdrawal the three 
admissions.  In light of that decision and multiple other 
factors discussed herein, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
No.  2007AP308.dtp 
 
1