Case Title: McIver v. State Highway Commission

Citation: 198 Kan. 678, 426 P.2d 118

Docket Number: 44,795

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1967-04-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
198 Kan. 678 (1967)
426 P.2d 118
OSCAR L. McIVER, Appellee,
v.
STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION OF KANSAS, Appellant.
No. 44,795

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 8, 1967.
John A. McKinnon, Assistant Attorney, argued the cause, and John H. Morse, Chief Attorney and John J. Mendive, Assistant Attorney, all attorneys for the State Highway Commission, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.
George E. McCullough, of Topeka, argued the cause, and W.L. Parker, Jr., Robert B. Wareheim, Reginald LaBunker and James L. Rose, all of Topeka, were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This appeal stems from a claim for workmen's compensation benefits as the result of an aggravated heart condition.
The claimant, 65 years of age, was a maintenance employee of the respondent, the State Highway Commission of Kansas. He was engaged in his employment at the time of the alleged heart injury and both parties were governed by the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The claimant had noticed chest pains and shortness of breath for about a month prior to his alleged injury on June 22, 1964. On the morning of this day he reported for work which, at this season, consisted of mowing the right of way. As he picked up his tools *679 consisting of a hammer, grease gun and miscellaneous wrenches he felt a severe pain in his chest. He rested for a short time and then got on his tractor and started mowing. The tractor which he was driving was difficult to operate. It tended to jerk the arms and shoulders. After he ate his lunch and rested for a time the pain became more severe. He attempted to call a doctor in the afternoon but could not reach him. He worked until five o'clock, went home, took a bath and ate his evening meal. He then called Dr. Brewer of Ulysses, Kansas, and was driven to the Memorial Hospital of that city for hospitalization.
Claimant was permitted to return to work for thirteen days, finishing on December 1, 1964, in order to get the necessary time for retirement benefits.
On December 15, 1964, he filed his claim for compensation. The special examiner found that claimant had not sustained the burden of proving that "personal injury by accident" occurred on June 22, 1964, and further that the evidence did not support the view that the heart injury arose out of the employment. The Workmen's Compensation Director sustained the findings of the special examiner denying compensation and claimant appealed to the district court. The reviewing court concluded:
Compensation was awarded in accordance with the conclusions and the respondent has appealed to this court.
We may reduce the issues by making a single statement of appellant's contentions  the district court erred in awarding workmen's compensation since there was no competent evidence that claimant suffered an injury by accident while in the course of his employment.
We must look to the medical testimony for the nature of claimant's injury and the effect of his labors upon his heart ailment.
Dr. Collins, an internal medicine practitioner including coronary heart conditions, testified as to claimant's condition:
"A. Yes, sir.
"A. Yes, sir, I think it did.
..............
"A. Yes, sir, for life."
This testimony is ample to support the district court's finding that "claimant's exertion [while employed] aggravated the pre-existing condition that necessitated his hospitalization."
The respondent calls our attention to the fact Dr. Collins' testimony was disputed. True, it was. Dr. Brewer, a general medical practitioner at Ulysses, Kansas, testified that in his opinion the claimant's work had nothing to do with his condition and did not aggravate his pre-existing heart ailment.
However, we cannot concern ourselves with the weight of the evidence or with conflicting testimony in reviewing a workmen's compensation case. Our consideration of the evidence is limited to the determination, as a matter of law, whether there is any substantial evidence to support the findings of the trial court. We stated in the recent case of Lees, Administrator v. White, 197 Kan. 118, 112, 415 P.2d 272:
The medical evidence was ample to establish the fact that claimant's pre-existing heart condition was aggravated by the stress of performing his ordinary labor to such an extent that he required hospitalization.
The troublesome question remains  does the severe aggravation of a pre-existing heart condition under the stress of ordinary labor resulting in disability constitute a "personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment" as that term is used in K.S.A. 44-501?
The respondent contends the evidence in this case did not even substantially prove that an accident befell the claimant because he was performing only the work which he normally performed.
We come to the simple question  what is an accident where a heart condition is involved?
As early as Gilliland v. Cement Co., 104 Kan. 771, 180 Pac. 793, this court, in dealing with a workmen's compensation case involving a pulmonary hemorrhage, approved the following definition of an accident:
The following language in the Gilliland case was also approved:
In Workman v. Johnson Bros. Construction Co., 164 Kan. 478, 190 *682 P.2d 863, we approved what was said in the Gilliland case and added:
In Kauffman v. Co-operative Refinery Assn., 170 Kan. 325, 225 P.2d 129, in considering the aggravation of an existing disease, it was held:
In Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 180 Kan. 295, 300, 303 P.2d 197, the court had under consideration an acute coronary occlusion and stated:
(See, also, Alpers v. George-Nielsen Motor Co., 182 Kan. 790, 324 P.2d 177.)
In Bohanan v Schlozman Ford, Inc., 188 Kan. 795, 366 P.2d 28, the court had under consideration a myocardial infarction causing death and stated:
In the most recent case, Mein v. Meade County, 197 Kan. 810, 421 P.2d 177, we dealt with a pre-existing heart condition and stated:
We have reviewed our decisions in some detail because of respondent's suggestion that the interpretation which this court has placed upon the Workmen's Compensation Act  considering aggravation of heart ailments as accidental injuries  is keeping persons with heart ailments out of employment due to the risk involved.
We first announced the rule in 1919. It would seem that a judicial construction that has been placed upon its language for 48 years must be deemed to have received the sanction and approval of the legislature. The failure of the legislature to disapprove the interpretation amounts to a ratification by it. The interpretation of this court is now as much a part of the legislative act as if embodied in it. Any change to be made in the act affecting policy should be made by the legislature. In Lees, Administrator v. White, supra, we stated:
We are forced to conclude that the evidence was sufficent to support the trial court's finding that claimant's exertion of ordinary labor aggravated the pre-existing heart condition necessitating his hospitalization, resulting in a personal injury by accident arising *684 out of and in the course of employment as that term is used in the Workmen's Compensation Act. (K.S.A. 44-501.)
The judgment is affirmed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.
PRICE, C.J., dissents.
FATZER, J., concurring:
I join in an affirmance of the judgment that the claimant sustained personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. I feel compelled to say, however, in my opinion, the findings of the district court disclosing the tractor the claimant was driving, "was one that was hard to steer because of counterbalance weights on the front wheels," was a finding the exertion of that work was more than ordinarily required in the performance of the claimant's regular employment.