Case Title: Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Energy Fac. Siting Coun.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2019-08-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 47	
August 1, 2019	
371
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
FRIENDS OF THE COLUMBIA GORGE,
Northwest Environmental Defense Center, 
Oregon Natural Desert Association, 
Oregon Wild, 
Hood River Valley Residents Committee, 
Columbia Riverkeeper, 
Wildlands Defense, 
Greater Hells Canyon Council, and 
Oregon Coast Alliance,
Petitioners,
v.
ENERGY FACILITY SITING COUNCIL 
and Oregon Department of Energy,
Respondents.
(EFSC 52017) (SC S065478)
On judicial review from the Energy Facility Siting 
Council.*
Argued and submitted December 5, 2018.
Gary K. Kahn, Reeves Kahn Hennessy & Elkins, 
Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petition­
ers. Also on the briefs were Nathan J. Baker and Steven 
D. McCoy, Friends of the Columbia Gorge, Portland, Peter 
J. Broderick, Northwest Environmental Defense Centers, 
Portland, and Peter M. Lacy, Oregon Natural Desert 
Association, Portland.
Denise G. Fjordbeck, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, 
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondents. Also on 
the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and 
Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Walters, Chief Justice, and Balmer, Nakamoto, 
Flynn, Duncan, Nelson and Garrett, Justices.**
______________
	
**  Judicial review from a final order of the Energy Facility Siting Council.
	
**  Kistler, J., retired December 31, 2018, and did not participate in the deci­
sion of this case.
372	
Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Energy Fac. Siting Coun.
BALMER, J.
The rules approved by the Energy Facility Siting Council 
through Permanent Administrative Orders EFSC 4-2017 
and EFSC 5-2017 are invalid.
Case Summary: Petitioners challenged the validity of rules modified by 
the Energy Facility Siting Council. The modified rules governed the process for 
amending a site certificate. Petitioners argued that rules were invalid because 
the council failed to comply with required rulemaking procedures and because 
the rules exceeded the council’s statutory authority. Held: (1) When adopting, 
amending, or repealing a rule, an agency must substantially comply with the 
requirements of ORS 183.335; (2) ORS 183.335(3)(e)(C) requires an agency to 
maintain a record of the agency’s responses to certain comments, but the statute 
does not require the agency to create a response if the agency has not already 
done so; (3) to invalidate rules based on the argument that subsequent notices 
failed to comply with ORS 183.335(2)(d), a petitioner must establish that the 
agency’s earlier notice failed to provide adequate notice of the rules adopted, 
amended, or repealed by the agency; (4) oral statements discussing how an 
agency might determine whether rules are accomplishing their objective are 
insufficient to substantially comply with ORS 183.335(3)(d); (5) the council did 
not exceed its statutory authority when it permitted its staff to determine, with 
respect to a request to amend a site certificate, whether there would be a public 
hearing and whether the public could request a contested case hearing; (6) the 
council exceeded its statutory authority by adopting rules that limited the scope 
of judicial review of an order amending a site certificate.
The rules approved by the Energy Facility Siting Council through Permanent 
Administrative Orders EFSC 4-2017 and EFSC 5-2017 are invalid.
Cite as 365 Or 371 (2019)	
373
	
BALMER, J.
	
The Energy Facility Siting Council modified its rules 
that govern amending site certificates. Petitioners challenge 
the validity of the new rules, arguing that the council failed 
to comply with required rulemaking procedures and that 
the rules exceed the council’s statutory authority. For the 
reasons that follow, we agree with some, but not all, of those 
grounds and conclude that the rules are invalid.
I.  BACKGROUND
	
The council consists of seven public members, ORS 
469.450(1), who oversee the development of large energy 
facilities in Oregon, including electric power generating 
plants, high-voltage transmission lines, gas pipelines, and 
radioactive waste disposal sites, among other projects, ORS 
469.300(11). The council carries out that task by issuing site 
certificates to developers. See ORS 469.320(1) (“[N]o facility 
shall be constructed or expanded unless a site certificate 
has been issued for the site.”). A site certificate authorizes 
the certificate holder to construct, operate, and retire a facil­
ity on an approved site, subject to the conditions that the 
council includes in the certificate. ORS 469.401(1); see ORS 
469.300(26) (defining “site certificate”).
	
Because site certificates address how and where 
large energy facilities will operate, applications for site cer­
tificates are often long, with many technical details that 
raise complicated questions of law and policy. To help resolve 
those complexities, the legislature has tasked the Oregon 
Department of Energy (ODOE) to provide “clerical and 
staff support” for the council. ORS 469.450(6); see also ORS 
469.040(1)(b) (requiring the director of ODOE to “[s]uper­
vise and facilitate the work and research on energy facility 
siting applications at the direction of the [council]”).1 The 
legislature has also created an extensive statutory frame­
work governing the site certificate application process. See 
ORS 469.330-370 (setting out the numerous steps in the cer­
tificate application process).
	
1  Throughout the opinion, we use the term “staff” to refer to the ODOE-
provided staff that supports the council. 
374	
Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Energy Fac. Siting Coun.
	
This case involves the process for amending a site 
certificate after a certificate holder already has completed 
that extensive application process and received a site certif­
icate. In contrast to the detailed statutory framework gov­
erning the site certificate application process, the statutory 
provisions for amending a site certificate are brief. We dis­
cuss those provisions below. Because of the limited statu­
tory direction, the council created the process for amending 
a site certificate through its administrative rules. See ORS 
469.470(2) (authorizing the council to “adopt standards and 
rules to perform the functions vested by law in the coun­
cil”). Those rules appear in Chapter 345, Division 27, of the 
Oregon Administrative Rules.
	
In January 2017, after years of considering changes, 
the council began the formal process to modify its rules that 
govern amending a site certificate and proposed what the 
council called a “wholesale re-write” of Division 27. The 
council continued its rulemaking activities until October 
2017, when the council adopted new rules. Over the course 
of that time, the council issued six public notices about the 
rulemaking process, extended the comment period four 
times, held three public hearings, circulated three draft ver­
sions of the proposed rules, and considered more than 150 
written comments.
	
We detail below the procedural steps in the rulemak­
ing process and the changes to the rules over the three draft 
versions, as relevant. A brief overview of those changes is 
helpful as background. Before the revisions, the rules pro­
vided for two procedural paths for reviewing requests for 
amendment (RFAs): a standard process and an expedited 
process.2 OAR 345-027-0060, 00070, 0080 (2017). The stan­
dard process could also be extended, which was frequently 
necessary because of the complexity and public interest in 
site certificate applications. See OAR 345-027-0070(2) (2017) 
(standards for extended standard process). In the years 
leading up the rule changes, about 70 percent of RFAs were 
reviewed under the extended standard process.
	
2  The rules also provided for a process limited to amending a site certificate 
when transferring the ownership of a facility. The council did not make material 
changes to that process, so the specifics of it are not relevant to this case.
Cite as 365 Or 371 (2019)	
375
	
The first draft of the proposed rules eliminated 
the expedited review process and added steps to make the 
standard process longer (more like the extended standard 
process) and to allow greater public participation. Among 
other additions, the proposed rules required staff to pre­
pare a draft proposed order (DPO) recommending that the 
council grant, deny, or modify the RFA and required a pub­
lic hearing and comment period on the DPO. Additionally, 
under the standard process in the proposed new rule, peo­
ple could request contested case proceedings as they could 
under the existing rules. The council would evaluate those 
requests and allow them only if the requests raised a sig­
nificant issue of law or fact, which was the same standard 
that the council applied under the then-existing rules.3 OAR 
345-027-0070(7) (2017).
	
The second draft retained the new standard pro­
cess and re-inserted an expedited review process, which a 
certificate holder could request. Staff would initially rule 
on such a request, based on a nonexclusive list of factors 
set out in the rules. If staff denied the request, the certifi­
cate holder could ask the council to reconsider that decision. 
Cases reviewed under the expedited process would follow 
many of the same steps as the proposed new standard pro­
cess. Notably, however, the expedited process allowed only 
written comments on the DPO, so no public hearing was 
required. And the expedited process did not allow interested 
persons to request a contested case proceeding.
	
The third draft retained the new standard and new 
expedited processes and added an even more expedited pro­
cess. That draft also applied a new naming convention: The 
standard process was called type A review; the expedited 
process was called type B review; and the new “truly expe­
dited” process was called type C review. The type C review 
was intended for a narrow range of amendments. It had 
fewer steps and much shorter deadlines for decision than 
the other types of review. ODOE would initially determine 
whether to process an RFA under type C review. But, before 
	
3  According to the record, “there has never been a contested case in the 
review process for a request for amendment,” because, when such a request 
has been made, the council has determined that the request failed to “meet the 
threshold criteria.” 
376	
Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Energy Fac. Siting Coun.
making a final decision on the RFA, the council would have 
the opportunity to direct an RFA to proceed under type A or 
type B review.
	
The council approved the third draft of the pro­
posed rules at its October 2017 meeting. The rules became 
effective October 24, 2017.
II.  DISCUSSION
	
Petitioners challenge the rules directly in this court 
under ORS 469.490. Petitioners contend that the rules are 
invalid because the council adopted them without following 
the procedures in the Oregon Administrative Procedures 
Act (APA), ORS 183.310-183.750, and because the rules 
exceed the council’s statutory authority. We begin with the 
procedural objections.
A.  Procedural Objections
	
Petitioners raise three procedural objections. First, 
petitioners argue that the council violated ORS 183.335
(3)(e)(C) by failing to respond to petitioners’ comments rec­
ommending other options for achieving the substantive 
goals of the rulemaking. Second, petitioners argue that 
the council violated ORS 183.335(2)(d) by failing to provide 
copies of the rules that they proposed to adopt, amend, or 
repeal that show all proposed changes to the existing rules. 
And third, petitioners argue that the council violated ORS 
183.335(3)(d) by failing to provide a statement identifying 
how the council will subsequently determine whether the 
rules are in fact accomplishing the stated objectives of the 
rulemaking.
1.  Standard of review
	
The parties dispute what standard this court 
applies when deciding whether to invalidate rules based on 
a petitioner’s procedural objections. The council argues for 
a substantial-compliance standard. Under ORS 469.490, 
“rules adopted by the Energy Facility Siting Council * 
* 
* 
shall be adopted in the manner required by ORS chapter 
183.” And chapter 183 requires only “substantial compli­
ance” with the notice procedures contained in ORS 183.335. 
Specifically, ORS 183.335(11)(a) provides that “a rule is not 
Cite as 365 Or 371 (2019)	
377
valid unless adopted in substantial compliance with the pro­
visions of [ORS 183.335].” Because each of petitioners’ proce­
dural objections arises under ORS 183.335, the council urges 
this court to assess its compliance under that substantial-
compliance standard.
	
Petitioners argue for a strict-compliance standard 
that, according to petitioners, also stems from ORS 469.490. 
Under that statute, “[t]he review by the Supreme Court of 
the validity of any rule adopted by the council shall other­
wise be according to ORS 183.400.” A subsection of ORS 
183.400 governs judicial review of agency rulemaking, 
directing courts to declare a rule invalid if the rule “[w]as 
adopted without compliance with applicable rulemaking 
procedures.” ORS 183.400(4)(c). Petitioners characterize 
that provision as implicitly setting out a strict-compliance 
standard, which they ask the court to apply instead of the 
substantial-compliance standard set out in ORS 183.335
(11)(a).
	
Petitioners’ reliance on ORS 183.400(4)(c) begs the 
question of what an agency must do to comply with applica­
ble rulemaking procedures. At least with regard to the pro­
cedures in ORS 183.335, an agency satisfies those statutory 
requirements by substantially complying with the proce­
dures set out in the statute. In that sense, a rule adopted in 
substantial compliance with ORS 183.335 is a rule adopted 
in “compliance with applicable rulemaking procedures.”
	
Consistent with the council’s position, this court 
has previously applied the substantial-compliance stan­
dard in reviewing challenges arising under ORS 183.335. 
In Don’t Waste Oregon Com. v. Energy Facility Siting, 320 
Or 132, 881 P2d 119 (1994), the petitioners argued that 
the council violated a provision of ORS 183.335 requiring 
that an agency “ 
‘consider fully any written or oral submis­
sion’ in a rulemaking.” Id. at 146 (quoting ORS 183.335
(3)(a)). The petitioners argued that the council failed to com­
ply with that provision because, rather than considering the 
petitioners’ written submissions, the council had considered 
summaries of the submissions that the hearing officer had 

prepared.
378	
Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Energy Fac. Siting Coun.
	
This court rejected the petitioners’ interpretation of 
that provision and then concluded that, even if that inter­
pretation were correct, the petitioners would lose because 
ORS 183.335 “requires only ‘substantial compliance’ with 
its provisions.” Id. (quoting former ORS 183.335(10)(a) 
(1993), renumbered as ORS 183.335(11)(a) (2003)). The court 
noted that “[n]either during the rulemaking hearing nor in 
their post-hearing brief in the contested case proceeding did 
[the] petitioners assert that the hearing officer failed to con­
sider fully their testimony or that the hearing officer failed 
to summarize their testimony accurately in his written and 
oral reports to [the council].” Id. at 147. Under those facts, 
the court held that the petitioners could not “establish that 
the procedure employed by [the council] failed to comply 
substantially with the requirement that the agency fully 
consider petitioners’ submissions.” Id.
	
We agree with the council and assess petitioners’ 
procedural objections for the council’s substantial compli­
ance with ORS 183.335.
2.  Responding to comments recommending options
	
Petitioners first argue that the amended rules are 
invalid because the council failed to respond to petitioners’ 
comments recommending other options for achieving the 
substantive goals of the rulemaking. Under ORS 183.335
(2)(b)(G), an agency’s notice of intended action must include a 
“request for public comment on whether other options should 
be considered for achieving the rule’s substantive goals 
while reducing the negative economic impact of the rule on 
business.” And under ORS 183.335(3)(e)(C), an agency must 
“maintain a record of the data or views submitted” during 
the rulemaking process, including “[a]ny public comment 
received in response to the request made under subsection 
(2)(b)(G) of this section and the agency’s response to that 
comment.” Petitioners maintain that they submitted com­
ments in response to the request made under subparagraph 
(2)(b)(G) and that the council failed to respond to those com­
ments, thus invalidating the resulting rules.
	
Petitioners, however, misunderstand the obligation 
that subparagraph (3)(e)(C) imposes on an agency. For the 
reasons we discuss below, we conclude that the terms of that 
Cite as 365 Or 371 (2019)	
379
statutory provision impose a recordkeeping obligation only. 
Thus, if an agency has provided a response to a public com­
ment submitted under subparagraph (2)(b)(G), then the stat­
ute requires the agency to “maintain” a record that includes 
“the agency’s response to that comment.” But if the agency 
has not provided a response to such a public comment, the 
statute does not require the agency to create one.
	
The fact that the statute imposes only a recordkeep­
ing obligation is clear from both the text of the statute and 
its context. The provisions on which petitioners rely, para­
graph (3)(e), expressly address only recordkeeping:
	
“(e)  An agency that receives data or views concerning 
proposed rules from interested persons shall maintain a 
record of the data or views submitted. The record shall 
contain:
	
“(A)  All written materials submitted to an agency in 
response to a notice of intent to adopt, amend or repeal a 
rule.
	
“(B)  A recording or summary of oral submissions 
received at hearings held for the purpose of receiving those 
submissions.
	
“(C)  Any public comment received in response to the 
request made under subsection (2)(b)(G) of this section and 
the agency’s response to that comment.
	
“(D)  Any statements provided by the agency under 
paragraph (d) of this subsection.”
ORS 183.335(3)(e).
	
Nothing in that text directs an agency to create an 
agency response to a comment to be included in the required 
record. Petitioners’ argument, instead, rests on the premise 
that a recordkeeping statute necessarily entails an obliga­
tion to create an agency response in the first place. Context, 
however, precludes that argument in this case. In addition to 
the requirement on which petitioners rely, paragraph (3)(e) 

also directs agencies to maintain a record of “[a]ny state­
ments provided by the agency under paragraph (d) of this 
subsection.” ORS 183.335(3)(e)(D). And paragraph (d), which 
we discuss further below, requires an agency, under certain 
circumstances, to provide a statement identifying a rule’s 
380	
Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Energy Fac. Siting Coun.
purpose and how the agency will measure its success. ORS 
183.335(3)(d). So the document-creation and recordkeeping 
requirements appear in separate provisions. If the record­
keeping requirement also entailed a document-creation 
requirement, then we would not expect the legislature to 
place them in separate provisions.
	
The absence of statutory text directing an agency to 
create a response to public comments made under subpara­
graph (2)(b)(G) is additional evidence that the legislature 
did not intend to impose such an obligation. We therefore 
interpret subparagraph (3)(e)(C) as imposing a recordkeep­
ing requirement only. Because petitioners do not allege that 
the council failed to comply with that recordkeeping require­
ment, we conclude that petitioners have not established that 
the council violated subparagraph (3)(e)(C).
3.  Providing copies of proposed rules
	
Petitioners next argue that the rules are invalid 
because the council did not timely provide copies of the rules 
that adequately showed the proposed changes. ORS 183.335 
sets out numerous notice requirements related to agency 
rulemaking. Subsection (1) requires an agency to notify 
certain people before adopting, amending, or repealing any 
rules:
	
“Prior to the adoption, amendment or repeal of any rule, 
the agency shall give notice of its intended action:
	
“(a)  In the manner established by rule adopted by the 
agency under ORS 183.341(4), which provides a reason­
able opportunity for interested persons to be notified of the 
agency’s proposed action;
	
“(b)  In the bulletin referred to in ORS 183.360 at least 
21 days prior to the effective date;
	
“(c)  At least 28 days before the effective date, to per­
sons who have requested notice pursuant to subsection (8) 
of this section; and
	
“(d)  Delivered only by electronic mail, at least 49 days 
before the effective date, to the persons specified in subsec­
tion (15) of this section.”
ORS 183.335(1).
Cite as 365 Or 371 (2019)	
381
	
Pursuant to that statute, petitioners had requested 
that the council provide them notice of its “intended action” 
“prior to the adoption, amendment or repeal” of any coun­
cil rule. See ORS 183.335(8)(a) (“Any person may request in 
writing that an agency send to the person copies of the agen­
cy’s notices of intended action issued under subsection (1) of 
this section.”). Therefore, under paragraph (1)(c), petitioners 
were entitled to receive a notice at least 28 days before the 
effective date of any proposed rule changes.
	
Subsection (2) describes the content that the agency 
must include in or with such a notice of intended rulemak­
ing. In addition to the general notice requirements, one 
requirement is specific to the notice that an agency must 
provide to a person who requested notice under subsection 
(8): the agency must provide a copy of the proposed rules to 
that person or tell the person how to acquire a copy, and, if 
the agency is proposing a rule amendment, then the copy of 
the proposed rule must show all new or deleted material:
	
“When providing notice of an intended action under 
subsection (1)(c) of this section, the agency shall provide a 
copy of the rule that the agency proposes to adopt, amend 
or repeal, or an explanation of how the person may acquire 
a copy of the rule. The copy of an amended rule shall show 
all changes to the rule by striking through material to be 
deleted and underlining all new material, or by any other 
method that clearly shows all new and deleted material.”
ORS 183.335(2)(d).
	
In this case, the council was proposing a rule 
amendment. For that reason, when providing notice under 
paragraph (1)(c) to persons who had requested it, the council 
was required to comply with paragraph (2)(d) by showing all 
new and deleted material with a redlined document or some 
other method of comparing the proposed amendments to the 
existing rules. The question that the parties raise is how 
many times the council was required to comply with that 
requirement. The council maintains that, because there 
was only one rule change, it was required to comply with the 
notice requirements only one time. Petitioners argue that, 
because the council issued multiple notices, the council was 
required to comply with the notice requirements each time.
382	
Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Energy Fac. Siting Coun.
	
According to the council, it was required to provide 
a copy of the proposed rules showing all changes when it 
was required to provide notice of its intended action under 
paragraph (1)(c). And, the council argues, it was required 
to provide notice of intended action only once, at some point 
28 days before the effective date of the rules. The council 
contends that it satisfied that requirement when it sent 
petitioners a notice in January 2017, well in advance of the 
rules becoming effective in October 2017. That January 
2017 notice summarized the changes in the first draft of the 
proposed rules, including the elimination of the expedited 
review process; opened a comment period on the proposed 
rules; scheduled a rulemaking hearing for February 2017; 
and stated that copies of those rules could be obtained from 
the council’s website and at its office. The notice also indi­
cated that council staff anticipated receiving “comments 
that raise questions and ideas about how the proposed rules 
could possibly be revised to allow EFSC to review, under 
special circumstances, an RFA in an expedited and/or emer­
gency manner rather than the standard review process 
being proposed.” The notice further provided that, because 
the staff considered expedited and emergency reviews “to 
be within the scope of this rulemaking notice, EFSC could 
revise the proposed rules and/or adopt new rules to address 
these issues as part of this rulemaking.”
	
According to the council, that notice satisfied the 
requirement under paragraph (1)(c), because it was a notice 
of intended action that it provided to petitioners more than 
28 days before the rules became effective. And the council 
maintains that it also satisfied paragraph (2)(d) because, not 
long after circulating the January 2017 notice, the council 
also made available a redlined document comparing the 
existing rules to the proposed rules. That document showed 
proposed deletions in strikethrough and showed proposed 
additions in underline.
	
Petitioners do not contend that that January 2017 
notice failed to satisfy paragraph (1)(c) or that that redlined 
document failed to show all new and deleted material that 
the council was proposing, as needed for that notice to sat­
isfy paragraph (2)(d). Instead, petitioners contend that the 
Cite as 365 Or 371 (2019)	
383
council issued five more notices, each of which was, accord­
ing to petitioners, a new paragraph “(1)(c) notice” that trig­
gered a new obligation under paragraph (2)(d) to show all 
new and deleted material that the council was proposing 
compared to the material in the existing rules.
	
Specifically, petitioners point out that, after holding 
its February 2017 rulemaking hearing, the council issued a 
second public notice in March 2017. That notice stated that 
the council intended to hold another rulemaking hearing 
and public comment period on a second draft of the proposed 
rules. At that point, however, the council had not completed 
the second draft of the rules and had not yet scheduled the 
second hearing and public comment period.
	
In April 2017, the council issued a third notice, which 
summarized the second draft of the proposed rules, includ­
ing the addition of an expedited review process; scheduled a 
second rulemaking hearing to take place in May 2017; and 
extended the public comment period until that date. Not 
long after circulating the third public notice, the council 
made available a redlined document comparing the second 
draft of the proposed rules to the first draft. The council did 
not, however, provide a redlined document comparing the 
second draft to the existing rules.
	
In May 2017, before it held the second rulemaking 
hearing, the council issued its fourth public notice, which 
added an additional day to the rulemaking hearing and cor­
respondingly extended the comment period.
	
In June 2017, the council issued its fifth public 
notice, which scheduled a third rulemaking hearing for July 
2017, and extended the comment period until the close of 
that hearing. The purpose of that hearing and comment 
period was to further consider the second draft of the pro­
posed rules.
	
In August 2017, after the third hearing, the council 
issued its sixth public notice, which stated that the council 
intended to create a third draft of the proposed rules to add 
another review process for “truly expedited situations.” At 
that time, the council had not completed the third version 
of the proposed rules, but the notice stated that the rules 
384	
Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Energy Fac. Siting Coun.
would be complete and available on the council’s website on 
September 8, 2017. The council further extended the written 
comment period until September 29, 2017, though the coun­
cil did not hold another rulemaking hearing. Consistent 
with that notice, on September 8, the council made avail­
able a copy of the third draft of the proposed rules, including 
a redlined document comparing the third draft to the sec­
ond draft. The council did not, however, provide a redlined 
document comparing the third draft to the existing rules. 
The council later made available a redlined document com­
paring the third draft to the existing rules on October 9, 
2017, which was 10 days before the council meeting approv­
ing the amended rules and 15 days before the rules became 
effective.
	
Each of those notices, like the first one in January 
2017, stated that a copy of the proposed amended rules 
could be obtained from the council’s website and at its office. 
Petitioners complain, however, that the council was required 
to satisfy paragraph (2)(d) by showing all new or deleted 
material (compared to the existing rules) each time that 
it issued the subsequent notices because each of the sub­
sequent notices was a paragraph “(1)(c) notice.” Petitioners 
argue that “the duty to provide a legally sufficient redline 
draft is triggered * 
* 
* whenever the agency provides notice 
under ORS 183.335(1)(c).” And, according to petitioners, 
the council “provided (1)(c) notices to the public on six dif­
ferent occasions.” Petitioners contend that the council did 
not satisfy paragraph (2)(d) with respect to at least some of 
the six notices, because some of the notices failed to show 
all new and deleted material through a redlined document. 
Specifically, petitioners point out that the redlined docu­
ments that the council issued after the first draft of the pro­
posed rules were comparisons between the first and second 
drafts and then the second and third drafts, rather than 
comparisons between each draft to the existing rules. And 
petitioners argue that, by the time the council provided a 
redlined document comparing the third draft to the existing 
rules, less than 28 days remained before the effective date of 
the new rules.
	
Petitioners’ argument rests on the premise that each 
of the notices subsequent to the initial January 2017 notice 
Cite as 365 Or 371 (2019)	
385
was a paragraph “(1)(c) notice.” That premise, however, is 
incorrect because paragraph (1)(c) does not define, or even 
identify, a particular type of notice. Instead, ORS 183.335(1), 
quoted above, requires that the agency, “prior to the adop­
tion, amendment, or repeal” of any rule, “shall give notice of 
its intended action.” The text of the statute makes clear that 
the referent for “intended action” is the “adoption, amend­
ment, of repeal” of a rule. Paragraph (1)(c) simply describes 
one group of persons who may request that the council give 
them the notice that is required by ORS 183.335(1). It also 
specifies when that notice must be given and, in paragraph 
(2)(d), describes the redlined version of any rules changes 
that must be provided, as discussed above.
	
Petitioners do not argue that the notice that the 
council provided in January 2017 was inadequate to provide 
notice of the rule amendments that the council eventually 
adopted in October 2017. That notice informed petitioners 
(and the public generally) that the council was proposing to 
“reorganize” and “rewrite” the “rules governing requests 
for site certificate amendments.” It described the rulemak­
ing process, summarized proposed changes to the rules, set 
a public hearing, and solicited comments on the proposed 
rules. It also included a redlined document comparing the 
draft of the proposed rules with the existing rule. Nor do 
petitioners contend that the council’s January 2017 notice 
was inadequate simply because the council’s final October 
2017 rule amendments were different from the amendments 
proposed in the January 2017 notice.4 Petitioners also do 
	
4  In 1976, the Court of Appeals held that an agency is not required to provide 
additional notice every time it considers adopting changes to the text proposed in 
a notice of intended rulemaking:
“The purpose of the notice requirement for rulemaking is twofold. It serves 
to inform the interested public about intended agency action. It triggers the 
opportunity for an agency to receive the benefit of the thinking of the public 
on the matters being considered. The notice requirement contemplates that 
an agency may often desire to alter a proposed rule after receiving public 
comment. To require, as petitioner would apparently have us do, that any 
modification of a proposed rule after hearing necessitates still another notice 
and another hearing would produce an unwieldy procedure and also might 
well result in either hearing after hearing or an agency reluctant to change a 
single word of its original proposals no matter how persuasive the arguments 
for change offered at the hearing.”
Bassett v. Fish and Wildlife Comm., 27 Or App 639, 642, 556 P2d 1382 (1976). 
Petitioners emphasize that they do not challenge that decision.
386	
Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Energy Fac. Siting Coun.
not argue that the council’s October 2017 rule amendments 
were outside the scope of the rulemaking as described in the 
January 2017 notice. Without such an argument, we pre­
sume that the council’s January 2017 notice provided suffi­
cient notice of the council’s October 2017 rule amendments.
	
Instead of arguing that the council was required 
to provide additional notices after the January 2017 notice, 
petitioners argue only that the council did provide addi­
tional notices and that those additional notices failed to 
comply with the comparison document requirement in 
paragraph (2)(d). But without some argument as to why the 
January 2017 notice failed to provide sufficient notice of the 
council’s October 2017 rule amendments, the fact that later 
notices might not have complied with paragraph (2)(d) is 
not grounds for concluding that the council failed to comply 
with the notice requirement.5 In other words, to invalidate 
the rules based on the argument that the later notices failed 
to comply with paragraph (2)(d), petitioners must establish 
that those later notices were subject to the requirements of 
paragraph (2)(d). To establish that those later notices were 
subject to the requirements of paragraph (2)(d), petitioners 
would have to establish that those notices were required 
by subsection (1). By not challenging the sufficiency of the 
January 2017 notice, petitioners have failed to establish 
that the later notices were required by subsection (1) and, 
as a result, failed to establish that the later notices were 
subject to paragraph (2)(d).
	
It may well have been appropriate for the council to 
have provided a redlined document that compared each sub­
sequent version of the proposed rules to the then-existing 
rules, as well as a redlined document comparing the new 
version to the previous version. But that is not required by 
	
5  We also note that the proposed rule amendments went through several iter­
ations and that it was not unreasonable for the council to assist the public and 
staff in tracking those changes by providing redlined documents that compared 
each subsequent revision of the proposed rules to the version that preceded it. 
Additionally, persons who closely followed this rulemaking process would have 
been able to compare the successive versions of the proposed rules and to have 
reviewed the changes from the then-existing rules to each subsequent version of 
the proposed rules, although we agree with petitioners that that task may have 
been difficult. 
Cite as 365 Or 371 (2019)	
387
the statute in this case. We therefore conclude that the coun­
cil did not violate ORS 183.335(2)(d).
4.  Statement of how to monitor the success of the rules
	
Petitioners finally argue that the amended rules 
are invalid because the council failed to comply with ORS 
183.335(3)(d), which requires agencies, under certain cir­
cumstances, to provide a statement that identifies the objec­
tive of the proposed rules and how the agency intends to 
determine whether the rules accomplish that objective. 
Specifically, paragraph (3)(d) provides:
	
“If requested by at least five persons before the earliest 
date that the rule could become effective after the agency 
gives notice pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the 
agency shall provide a statement that identifies the objec­
tive of the rule and a statement of how the agency will sub­
sequently determine whether the rule is in fact accomplish­
ing that objective.”
ORS 183.335(3)(d).
	
The council does not dispute that at least five peo­
ple requested the statement, thus triggering that statutory 
obligation.6 And petitioners do not dispute that the council 
provided a statement that identifies the objective of the pro­
posed rules—namely, to enhance efficiency and public par­
ticipation. The only point of dispute is whether the council 
provided “a statement of how the agency will subsequently 
determine whether the rule is in fact accomplishing that 
objective.” Id.
	
The council maintains that it met that standard 
because, at council hearings, individual members of the 
council and staff noted the importance of tracking the rules’ 
success and discussed how they might do that. In response 
to questions from individual council members about track­
ing the rules’ success, staff responded that the council would 
be able to observe how staff is handling RFAs as they are 
	
6  An agency must respond to requests made under paragraph (3)(d) only if 
the request is timely, which the statute defines as a request made “before the 
earliest date that the rule could become effective after the agency gives notice 
pursuant to subsection (1).” ORS 183.335(3)(d). The council does not challenge the 
timeliness of petitioners’ request. We therefore do not consider that issue.
388	
Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Energy Fac. Siting Coun.
processed and that, after some period of time, staff could 
gather input from those affected by the rules and report 
that input to the council.
	
Petitioners, however, argue that those discussions 
are inadequate to satisfy the statute. As an initial mat­
ter, petitioners note that, although there were discussions 
among council members and staff about tracking the suc­
cess of the rules, no decisions were made and no action taken 
regarding how the council would determine whether the 
rules were accomplishing their objective. For example, staff 
indicated that, if the council wanted staff to gather input 
from those affected by the rules, then the council should 
determine when it wanted that to be done and direct the 
staff to do so. But the council never took action on the issue 
after those discussions. Further, petitioners contend that, to 
satisfy the statute, the statement by the council must have 
been in writing. According to petitioners, oral statements 
are always insufficient.
	
One difficulty in evaluating those arguments is 
that, although the statute directs an agency to provide a 
statement regarding the objective of the rules and the mea­
surement of their success, the statute does not expressly say 
to whom the agency must provide that statement, when, or 
in what manner.7 Nevertheless, we agree with petitioners 
that the council never decided how it would track the suc­
cess of the rules. And we further agree that the statement 
must be in some storable and retrievable form, whether 
	
7  The Department of Justice’s uniform and model administrative rules add 
that the agency must provide the statement to those who requested it, within 

10 days of receiving the request, and in writing:
“(1)  A request for a statement of the agency’s objective in proposing a rule 
must be submitted in writing and must identify the persons on whose behalf 
the request is made.
“(2)  Within ten days of receiving a request or requests for a statement of 
objective from at least five persons, the agency shall provide the statement, 
in writing, to the person or persons who submitted written requests. Failure 
to meet this deadline shall not affect the validity of any rule.
“(3)  The agency’s written statement of the objective of the rule must include 
an explanation of how the agency will determine whether the rule accom­
plishes its objective.”
OAR 137-001-0095. The council has adopted that model rule. See OAR 345-001-
0005(1) (noting that, among other model rules, the council adopted “OAR 137-
001-0005 through 137-001-0100”).
Cite as 365 Or 371 (2019)	
389
the statement is in a tangible written document or in some 
stored version of a writing. As noted above, subparagraph 
(3)(e)(D) requires an agency to “maintain a record” of “[a]ny 
statements provided by the agency under” paragraph (3)(d), 
the provision at issue here. Because the legislature directed 
agencies to maintain a record of those statements, we can 
deduce that the legislature intended those statements to be 
in a form suitable for such a record—namely, in some writ­
ten form that can be stored and retrieved.8
	
Petitioners are correct that the council failed to pro­
vide a statement as to how it intended to determine whether 
the rules were accomplishing their directives. Under our 
standard of review discussed above, however, the legal ques­
tion regarding the validity of the council’s rules depends on 
whether the council substantially complied with the statu­
tory requirement to provide such a statement. We conclude 
that the council failed to do so.
	
As this court has previously observed, “The doc­
trine of substantial compliance has previously been used 
* 
* 
* to avoid the harsh results of insisting on literal compli­
ance with statutory notice provisions where the purpose of 
these requirements has been met.” Brown v. Portland School 
Dist. #1, 291 Or 77, 81, 628 P2d 1183 (1981) (internal citation 
omitted). In this case, the purpose of the statutory require­
ment was not met because the council never decided how it 
intended track the success of the new rules and, therefore, 
did not communicate that decision to petitioners. Statements 
about the importance of tracking the success of the rules 
and statements discussing possible means for doing so are 
not sufficient to substantially comply with a requirement 
that the council actually decide how it intends to track the 
success of the rules. The council, whether defined as just the 
council members or as including council staff, adopted no 
policy and made no decision as to how it would evaluate the 
success of its new rules and, thus, did not provide a state­
ment reflecting that decision.
	
8  The Uniform Commercial Code helpfully defines “record” as “informa­
tion that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or 
other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.” UCC § 1-201(b)(31); ORS 
71.2010(2)(ee). 
390	
Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Energy Fac. Siting Coun.
	
Because the council failed to substantially comply 
with ORS 183.335(3)(d), we conclude that the council’s new 
rules are invalid.
B.  Substantive Objections
	
Although we conclude that the rules are invalid for 
failing to comply with one of the procedural requirements 
of the APA, we nevertheless address petitioners’ substan­
tive objections so that we may provide appropriate direction 
to the parties for any future rulemaking regarding the site 
certificate amendment process.
	
Under ORS 183.400(4)(b), a rule that “[e]xceeds the 
statutory authority of the agency” is “invalid.” Petitioners 
contend that the council’s new rules exceed its statutory 
authority in two ways. First, petitioners argue that the 
rules delegate nondelegable authority to staff to determine 
whether a site certificate amendment should receive a public 
hearing and whether any member of the public may request 
a contested case proceeding. Second, petitioners maintain 
that the rules improperly limit judicial review of the coun­
cil’s decisions.9
1.  Delegating authority to staff
	
Under the amended rules, a site certificate holder 
may submit an RFA and ask that it be reviewed under the 
expedited type B review, rather than the standard type A 
review. And under those rules, staff decides whether the 
certificate holder can proceed under type B review. If staff 
concludes that type A review is required, then the certificate 
holder can ask the council to reverse staff’s decision and 
allow the RFA to be processed under type B review. If staff 
instead agrees with the certificate holder and concludes that 
the RFA should be processed under type B review, then the 
RFA proceeds under type B review.
	
By rule, the council has provided a nonexclusive list 
of factors that both the council and staff may consider when 
deciding whether an RFA should be processed under type A 
or type B review:
	
9  The council does not contend that it is entitled to deference in the interpre­
tation of the relevant authorizing statute. 
Cite as 365 Or 371 (2019)	
391
“(a)  The complexity of the proposed change;
“(b)  The anticipated level of public interest in the pro­
posed change;
“(c)  The anticipated level of interest by reviewing agencies;
“(d)  The likelihood of significant adverse impact; and
“(e)  The type and amount of mitigation, if any.”
OAR 345-027-0057(8) (2018).
	
Petitioners complain that, by giving staff the unre­
viewable discretion to determine that an RFA should get 
type B review, the new rules give discretion to staff to deter­
mine that there will be no contested case proceeding or pub­
lic hearing. As petitioners point out, under type A review, 
there is a public hearing and the public can request a con­
tested case proceeding. But under type B review, there is 
no public hearing and the public cannot request a contested 
case proceeding. So, when staff determines that an RFA 
request should get type B review, staff is determining that 
there will be no public hearing and that the public cannot 
request a contested case proceeding.
	
Petitioners contend that affording such discretion 
to staff is improper because only the council itself can deter­
mine whether there will be a public hearing and whether 
the public may request a contested case proceeding on an 
RFA. The problem for petitioners is that no statute requires 
the council to determine whether there will be a public hear­
ing or whether the public may request a contested case pro­
ceeding in the certificate amendment process. Petitioners 
attempt to get around that by citing the numerous statutes 
governing the site certificate application process. According 
to petitioners, those statutes structuring the initial applica­
tion process demonstrate that the legislature intended staff 
to have a merely advisory or ministerial role.
	
Petitioners, however, never explain why statutes 
governing the certificate application process should gov­
ern the certificate amendment process. The legislature has 
taken very different approaches to those processes, pro­
viding extensive statutes structuring and directing the 
392	
Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Energy Fac. Siting Coun.
application process, while providing only limited statutory 
direction regarding the amendment process.
	
A closer look at the statutory regimes highlights 
that contrast. The certificate application process begins with 
an applicant filing a notice of intent to apply for a site cer­
tificate. ORS 469.330(1). Staff issues a project order based 
on the notice of intent and comments received in response 
to that notice. ORS 469.330(3). An applicant uses that proj­
ect order to prepare the site certificate application, which 
it submits to the council. ORS 469.350(1). Staff reviews 
the application and feedback from state agencies and local 
governments and then issues a draft proposed order rec­
ommending approval or rejection of the application. ORS 
469.370(1). After the council holds a public hearing on the 
application, staff issues its final proposed order recommend­
ing approval or rejection of the application. ORS 469.370(4).
	
Staff then issues a public notice of the proposed 
order, which includes a notice of a contested case hearing 
and the deadline for persons to request to participate as a 
party in the contested case hearing. Id. Although the coun­
cil is required to conduct a contested case hearing on site 
certificate applications, ORS 469.370(5), the council con­
cludes the hearing if no party challenges staff’s proposed 
order, ORS 469.370(6). If a party challenges staff’s proposed 
order, then the council conducts the contested case hearing 
in accordance with the applicable provisions of the APA. 
ORS 469.370(5).
	
Regardless whether a party challenges staff’s final 
proposed order, the council must evaluate each site certifi­
cate application according to regulatory standards. See ORS 
469.360(1) (requiring council evaluation of applications); 
ORS 469.501(1) (requiring council to “adopt standards for the 
siting, construction, operation and retirement of facilities” 
and identifying subjects that the standards must address). 
After completing that evaluation, the council issues a final 
order either rejecting or approving the site certificate appli­
cation. ORS 469.370(7). Parties dissatisfied with the coun­
cil’s final order may apply for rehearing, ORS 469.403(1), or 
seek judicial review, ORS 469.370(8). Standards for judicial 
review are contained in ORS 469.403.
Cite as 365 Or 371 (2019)	
393
	
For some proposed facilities, the applicant may 
request expedited processing of a site certificate application. 
ORS 469.370(10); ORS 469.373. The council must evaluate 
each request for expedited review. ORS 469.360(1). Like the 
normal process for assessing a site certificate application, 
expedited processing results in a final order by the council 
either approving or rejecting an application.
	
In contrast to the detailed statutory framework 
governing the site certificate application process, the stat­
utory provision regarding the process for amending a site 
certificate provides:
	
“A site certificate may be amended with the approval of 
the Energy Facility Siting Council. The council may estab­
lish by rule the type of amendment that must be consid­
ered in a contested case proceeding. Judicial review of an 
amendment to a site certificate shall be as provided in ORS 
469.403.”
ORS 469.405(1); see also ORS 469.405(2) (addressing land 
use approval of proposed amendments); ORS 469.405(3) (dis­
pensing with the requirement of a site certificate amend­
ment for certain pipelines).
	
By imposing virtually no statutory procedural 
requirements on the RFA process, the legislature has 
allowed the council to develop that process largely as it sees 
fit. The statutes governing the RFA process require the 
council itself to approve an amendment, thus precluding the 
council from delegating that final decision-making author­
ity to staff. ORS 469.405(1). But, unlike the certificate appli­
cation process, the statutes do not otherwise dictate the allo­
cation of authority between the council and staff.
	
And, whereas the statutes governing the certificate 
application process require a public hearing and an oppor­
tunity to request a contested case proceeding, the statutes 
governing the RFA process do not. The most those statutes 
say on those topics is that the council “may establish by 
rule the type of amendment” that will require a contested 
case proceeding. ORS 469.405(1) (emphasis added). At 
this point, the council has not adopted rules requiring any 
types of RFAs to be subject to contested case proceedings. 
394	
Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Energy Fac. Siting Coun.
Ultimately, because the council is not required to provide 
a public hearing and opportunity to request contested case 
proceedings in the first place, petitioners cannot complain 
when the council makes those steps available on limited 
terms—namely, when staff determines that an RFA should 
get a type A review rather than a type B review. We there­
fore conclude that the council did not exceed its authority 
when it permitted its staff to determine whether an RFA 
gets type A or type B review.
2.  Judicial review
	
Petitioners finally contend that the council has 
adopted rules that improperly limit judicial review of RFAs 
that received type B review, none of which would have gone 
through contested case proceedings. The rules state that, 
when an RFA receives type B review, then the right to seek 
judicial review is limited to those who provided comments 
during the council’s consideration of an application and only 
as to issues on which they provided comment:
“[O]nly those persons, including the site certificate holder, 
who provided written comment by the written comment 
deadline may seek judicial review as provided in ORS 
469.403 and issues eligible for judicial review are limited 
to the issues raised in that person’s written comments.”
OAR 345-027-0068(3)(e)(E), OAR 345-027-0072(3)(d), and 
OAR 345-027-0072(5) (2018).
	
Petitioners contend that those rules are invalid 
because, when an RFA does not go through a contested case 
proceeding, then judicial review should be allowed for any 
“person adversely affected or aggrieved by the agency order,” 
without limitation. ORS 183.482(2). We agree.
	
The statute governing RFAs provides, “Judicial 
review of an amendment to a site certificate shall be as 
provided in ORS 469.403.” ORS 469.405(1). That stat­
ute, ORS 469.403, has a subsection expressly addressing 
judicial review of RFAs that went through contested case 
proceedings:
	
“Any party to a contested case proceeding on a site cer­
tificate or amended site certificate application may appeal 
the council’s approval or rejection of the site certificate or 
Cite as 365 Or 371 (2019)	
395
amended site certificate application. Issues on appeal shall 
be limited to those raised by the parties to the contested 
case proceeding before the council.”
ORS 469.403(2) (emphasis added).
	
The statute, however, does not have a provision 
addressing RFAs that did not go through contested case pro­
ceedings. The statute instead notes that, “[e]xcept as other­
wise provided in ORS 469.320 and this section, the review 
by the Supreme Court shall be the same as the review by the 
Court of Appeals described in ORS 183.482.” ORS 469.403(6). 
And ORS 183.482 allows a petition for review to be filed by, 
among others, “a person adversely affected or aggrieved by 
the agency order.” ORS 183.482(2). The challenged rules 
are improperly narrow, petitioners assert, because someone 
might be affected or aggrieved by an amended site certifi­
cate, and thus have standing to seek judicial review, even if 
the person did not provide comments to the council.
	
The council argues in response that it would not 
make sense for the legislature to provide for limited judi­
cial review in contested cases and broader judicial review 
in noncontested cases. Thus, the council argues, the more 
restricted review provided for noncontested cases is suffi­
cient. The council might be correct in its view of the kinds 
of cases where judicial review is less likely to be sought, and 
perhaps the legislature failed to notice the different paths for 
judicial review that it set out. But without some grounding 
in the statutory text, context, or legislative history, the coun­
cil’s argument must fail. We therefore conclude that OAR 
345-027-0068(3)(e)(E), OAR 345-027-0072(3)(d), and OAR 
345-027-0072(5) exceed the council’s statutory authority.
III.  CONCLUSION
	
In sum, we conclude that, as a procedural matter, 
the council failed to comply in ORS 183.335(3)(d), because 
it did not issue a statement identifying how it would later 
determine whether the proposed rules were accomplishing 
their objective. We further conclude that, as a substantive 
matter, OAR 345-027-0068(3)(e)(E), OAR 345-027-0072
(3)(d), and OAR 345-027-0072(5) exceed the council’s statu­
tory authority regarding the scope of judicial review.
396	
Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Energy Fac. Siting Coun.
	
The rules approved by the Energy Facility Siting 
Council through Permanent Administrative Orders EFSC 
4-2017 and EFSC 5-2017 are invalid.