Case Title: People v. Johnson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84146

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-05-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Opinion filed May 18, 2000.
JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, Mark 
Johnson, was convicted of murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault. The 
same jury determined that defendant was eligible for the death penalty and that 
there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude a sentence of death. 
Accordingly, the circuit court sentenced defendant to death. On direct appeal, 
we affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence. People v. Johnson, 
146 Ill. 2d 109 (1991). The United States Supreme Court denied defendant's 
petition for a writ of certiorari. Johnson v. Illinois, 506 U.S. 834, 121 L. Ed. 2d 65, 113 S. Ct. 106 (1992).
Defendant, through appointed counsel, subsequently filed a petition for 
post-conviction relief, as well as two supplemental petitions, arguing, 
inter alia, that he was denied the effective assistance of trial 
counsel, that he was suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of 
the offenses, and that he was unfit to stand trial. The State filed a motion to 
dismiss and a supplemental motion to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that 
defendant's claims are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and 
waiver. During argument on the State's motions, the issue of defendant's fitness 
to participate in post-conviction proceedings was raised. The circuit court 
found no bona fide doubt of defendant's fitness to proceed with 
post-conviction proceedings, but nonetheless conducted a hearing on that issue. 
At the same time, the circuit court conducted a retrospective fitness hearing to 
determine whether defendant was fit to stand trial.
The circuit court found that defendant is fit to proceed with post-conviction 
proceedings and that he was fit at the time of his trial. The circuit court also 
granted the State's motions to dismiss and dismissed defendant's post-conviction 
petition and supplemental petitions without a further evidentiary hearing. 
Because defendant was sentenced to death for the underlying murder conviction, 
defendant's appeal from the dismissal of his post-conviction petition and 
supplemental petitions lies directly to this court. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 
651(a).
For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the judgment of the circuit court, 
and remand for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
A. Criminal Trial
Defendant's trial and a discussion of the evidence presented against him are 
discussed in this court's opinion on direct appeal. See People v. 
Johnson, 146 Ill. 2d 109 (1991). We provide a brief summary here.
On the afternoon of November 26, 1985, C.L., defendant, and C.L.'s uncle, 
Willie Robinson, went to an apartment, from which C.L. had been evicted, to pack 
and remove her belongings. Robinson left the apartment twice to purchase 
alcohol. During his second absence, defendant, who had a knife, forced C.L. to 
disrobe, and tied her hands and feet. When Robinson returned, defendant grabbed 
him from behind and cut his throat. The two struggled, and defendant repeatedly 
stabbed Robinson.
During the next several hours, defendant forced C.L. to perform repeated acts 
of oral sex on him, between which he continued to cut Robinson's throat. 
Defendant also raped C.L., urinated on her, forced her to lick the blood from 
the knife used on Robinson, and forced her to perform oral sex on Robinson, who 
was lying on the floor. Defendant left the apartment at 10 or 11 p.m., but 
returned a half-hour later for a few minutes and then left again. C.L. 
eventually freed herself and fled to a neighbor's apartment where she called 
police.
On December 5, 1985, police arrested defendant on an unrelated rape charge. 
During a search of defendant in connection with this arrest, police recovered a 
knife that was consistent with the type of knife used to stab Robinson. While 
defendant was under arrest, police questioned him about the murder of Robinson 
and took a written statement, which was introduced at trial. Defendant's 
statement generally corroborated C.L.'s testimony.
At trial, defendant argued that he was insane at the time of the offenses, 
focusing on the sadistic, brutal and bizarre nature of the crimes.
The jury was instructed on the defense of insanity and the verdict of guilty 
but mentally ill. The jury found that defendant was guilty of murder and 
aggravated criminal sexual assault. The same jury later found that defendant was 
eligible for the death penalty, and that there were no mitigating factors 
sufficient to preclude imposition of that sentence. The circuit court, 
therefore, sentenced defendant to death.
B. Post-Conviction Proceedings
On April 5, 1993, defendant, through appointed counsel, filed a petition for 
post-conviction relief. Defendant later filed two supplemental petitions for 
post-conviction relief. (For ease of discussion, we refer to defendant's initial 
post-conviction petition, together with his supplemental petitions, simply as 
defendant's post-conviction petition, in the singular.) In his post-conviction 
petition, defendant claimed that he was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel prior to trial, at trial, and at sentencing. Defendant also claimed 
constitutional deprivations based on improper jury instructions, improper 
psychiatric testimony as to defendant's sanity, defendant's unfitness at trial 
due to the ingestion of certain medication, and the trial court's improper 
denial of defendant's pretrial motions. Defendant further claimed that he was 
suffering from a mental disease or defect, or was insane, at the time of the 
offenses, and that he was unfit to stand trial. Lastly, defendant challenged the 
constitutionality of the death penalty statute.
In support of his post-conviction petition, defendant submitted copies of his 
records from the Psychiatric Institute of the Circuit Court of Cook County 
(Psychiatric Institute) and Cermak Health Services. Defendant also submitted his 
own affidavit, as well as affidavits from Dr. Michael Gelbort, a 
neuropsychologist; Dr. James R. Merikangas, a psychiatrist; Assistant Public 
Defender Shelton O. Green, who represented defendant at trial; and three family 
members.
During oral argument on the State's motions to dismiss defendant's 
post-conviction petition, the State argued that defendant's claim that he had 
been suffering from a long-term mental illness was undermined by the absence of 
any claim by his post-conviction counsel that defendant was not fit to proceed 
with post-conviction proceedings. Upon subsequent questioning by the circuit 
court, defendant's counsel indicated that there had been communication problems 
with defendant. The circuit court determined that a fitness hearing may be 
appropriate, and subsequently ordered that defendant be examined by the 
Psychiatric Institute. The circuit court also allowed defendant to be examined 
by Dr. Gelbort for the same purpose.
Dr. Gelbort later filed a supplemental affidavit with the circuit court in 
which he concludes that defendant is not fit to proceed with his post-conviction 
petition, but that with appropriate treatment, defendant might be competent 
within a 6- to 12-month period. Dr. Albert Stipes, a staff psychiatrist with the 
Circuit Court of Cook County Forensic Clinical Services (formerly the 
Psychiatric Institute), who examined defendant pursuant to the circuit court's 
order, also submitted his written findings to the court. Dr. Stipes found that 
defendant is unfit to proceed with the post-conviction process, but that with 
treatment and medication, there is a reasonable probability that he will be fit 
to proceed within one year.
At the State's request, the circuit court ordered a second evaluation of 
defendant to be performed by qualified personnel, other than those employed by 
the Psychiatric Institute. That evaluation was performed by Dr. Edward Mahoney, 
a clinical psychiatrist. Dr. Mahoney submitted two detailed forensic reports to 
the court, in which he ultimately concludes that defendant had the capacity in 
1993 to assist his attorneys with his post-conviction petition, had he chosen to 
do so, and that defendant is competent to continue with post-conviction 
proceedings, provided defendant remains on psychotropic medication.
Beginning June 11, 1997, the circuit court commenced an evidentiary hearing 
as to defendant's fitness to proceed with his post-conviction petition and 
defendant's fitness at the time of his trial. At present, we consider only that 
evidence relating to defendant's fitness to proceed with his post-conviction 
petition.
At the hearing, defendant called Dr. Stipes. Dr. Stipes testified that he 
examined defendant on January 10, 1996. Prior to the examination, he reviewed 
psychological reports from the Psychiatric Institute, as well as from outside 
agencies. One such report from 1978 indicates that defendant was diagnosed as 
paranoid schizophrenic and unfit to stand trial at that time. Dr. Stipes noted a 
lack of cooperation and negativism by defendant during the examination, but 
deferred diagnosis until he reviewed additional records.
These additional records indicated that in late December 1993, defendant 
suffered a psychotic breakdown and was placed on Prolixin Decanoate, an 
antipsychotic drug. He continued to receive Prolixin until November 22, 1995. 
These records also indicated that defendant reported experiencing auditory 
hallucinations in October 1995. During the course of his treatment, defendant 
was also prescribed Ativan, a tranquilizer; Elavil and Imipramine, 
antidepressants; and Cogentin, to reduce the side effects of the Prolixin. 
Earlier records indicated that in 1987 and 1988, defendant was prescribed 
Mellaril, another antipsychotic drug, and Sinequan, an antidepressant.
Dr. Stipes examined defendant again on March 1, 1996. In his opinion, 
defendant was suffering from schizoaffective disorder, a chronic mental disease 
that affects both thought and mood similar to schizophrenia, and which is 
characterized by confusion, paranoia, mood swings, delusions, and 
hallucinations. Dr. Stipes testified that defendant had marginal contact with 
reality, and that defendant's paranoia and negativism, due to his mental 
illness, rendered him unable to cooperate with post-conviction counsel. Dr. 
Stipes based this conclusion on defendant's history and his inability to 
cooperate with the examiner.
Defendant also called Dr. Gelbort. Dr. Gelbort testified that he evaluated 
defendant in mid-1993, in January 1996, and on June 10, 1997, the day before the 
hearing. The 1993 evaluation included the administration of a comprehensive 
battery of neuropsychological tests that revealed, among other things, an 
overall IQ of 75, falling within the borderline mentally deficient range of 
functioning, or the mildly mentally retarded range. In December 1994, Dr. 
Gelbort diagnosed defendant as suffering from paranoid schizophrenic disorder, a 
psychotic disorder characterized by delusional thinking, which is exacerbated by 
defendant's neuropsychological deficits. Dr. Gelbort stated that defendant has 
exhibited a longstanding pattern of psychotic and bizarre behavior that predates 
1993, and that defendant does not have the cognitive or emotional wherewithal to 
assist counsel in a meaningful manner with his post-conviction petition.
Finally, defendant called Dr. Merikangas, who testified regarding his May 21, 
1993, examination of defendant. Based on this exam, and a review of the relevant 
medical records, Dr. Merikangas diagnosed defendant as suffering from paranoid 
schizophrenia and migraine headaches, with a history of traumatic brain injury, 
as well as borderline mental retardation. Dr. Merikangas described schizophrenia 
as a major mental illness and a lifelong disease, characterized by delusions, 
hallucinations, thought processes that are inconsistent with reality, and 
deterioration in self-care and ability to perform in society. Dr. Merikangas 
testified that he met with defendant in July 1997, just prior to testifying at 
defendant's evidentiary hearing, and that his diagnosis remains unchanged. In 
his opinion, defendant is not able to proceed with his post-conviction petition 
because he is hostile, paranoid, uncooperative, unreliable and not thinking 
rationally. He also noted that at the time of the hearing, defendant was taking 
Haldol, a powerful antipsychotic drug in the same category as Prolixin, which he 
described as a "chemical straightjacket."
Following the denial of the State's motion for a finding of fitness, the 
State called Dr. Mahoney. Dr. Mahoney testified that he met with defendant on 
four occasions from June 1996 through May 1997. Two of the meetings were very 
brief, as defendant refused to cooperate. Based on the other two interviews and 
his review of defendant's psychiatric records, Dr. Mahoney was of the opinion 
that, as of May 1997, defendant was able to proceed with his post-conviction 
petition, and that he was fit to proceed in 1993, when he first filed his 
petition. Dr. Mahoney testified that there was no evidence in the medical 
records of psychiatric decompensation at that time. Dr. Mahoney further 
testified that although defendant was being treated with psychotropic medication 
in January 1994, the time at which defendant signed his affidavit in support of 
his petition, defendant's condition was "stabilized."
Dr. Mahoney described defendant as lucid and congenial during their May 1997 
interview. Defendant displayed a clear understanding of the basic framework of 
post-conviction proceedings, and how the current proceedings differed from his 
trial. Defendant also said that he understood the particular constitutional 
issues explained to him by his attorneys, and that he was aware of the issues 
being raised regarding his mental status. Although defendant initially said that 
he had made changes to his post-conviction petition, he later indicated that he 
chose instead to rely on the expertise of his attorneys in formulating his 
petition. Defendant also apologized for not being cooperative in the past, 
indicating that he was frustrated with the post-conviction proceedings and the 
number of evaluations, and that he had been advised by his attorneys to discuss 
his case only with them.
Dr. Mahoney agreed that defendant was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, 
but stated that any lack of cooperation with counsel was defendant's choice and 
was not the result of defendant's mental illness. Dr. Mahoney also testified 
that an overall IQ score of 75 is considered borderline intellectual 
functioning, not borderline mental retardation, and that errors in the scoring 
of the IQ test administered to defendant through Dr. Gelbort's office resulted 
in a score that underestimated defendant's true intellectual functioning. Dr. 
Mahoney further testified that studies show that inmates who are housed in 
segregation units, such as defendant, need to stimulate themselves, often 
engaging in behaviors that others would regard as bizarre, and that segregation 
adversely affects cognitive functions, such as concentration and attention span, 
which are reflected in IQ test scores.
After considering the evidence, the circuit court found that defendant is fit 
to proceed with his post-conviction petition and that defendant was fit at the 
time of his trial. The circuit court ultimately dismissed defendant's petition 
for post-conviction relief without a further evidentiary hearing, and denied 
defendant's motion to reconsider.
ANALYSIS
A. Post-Conviction Hearing Act
The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. 
(West 1998)) provides a remedy to criminal defendants who claim that a 
substantial violation of their federal or state constitutional rights occurred 
at the proceedings which resulted in their convictions, when such a claim has 
not been, and could not have been, adjudicated previously. People v. 
Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 72-73 (1997); People v. Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d 236, 242 (1995). A proceeding under the Act is not an appeal; it is a 
collateral attack on the prior judgment. Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d  at 242. 
Issues that were decided on direct appeal are barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata, and issues that could have been raised on direct appeal, but were 
not, are deemed waived. People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 502-03 
(1998); Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d  at 73.
A petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding is not entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on a petition as of right. Rather, a hearing will be held 
only where the allegations of the petition, supported by the trial court record 
and accompanying affidavits, make a substantial showing of a violation of a 
constitutional right. People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 427-28 (1998); 
Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d  at 73. In determining whether to grant an 
evidentiary hearing, all well-pleaded facts in the petition and affidavits are 
taken as true. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 503. A trial court's determination 
following such an evidentiary hearing will not be disturbed on review unless 
manifestly erroneous. The sufficiency of the allegations contained in a 
post-conviction petition, however, are reviewed de novo. People v. 
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388-89 (1998).
B. Fitness to Proceed with Post-Conviction Petition
We consider first defendant's argument that the evidence demonstrated that he 
was not fit to proceed with his post-conviction petition, and that the circuit 
court improperly allocated to him the burden of proof on this issue.
A defendant is presumed to be fit to stand trial, to plead, and to be 
sentenced. 725 ILCS 5/104-10 (West 1998). A defendant is also presumed to be fit 
at the time of post-conviction proceedings. People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351, 362 (1990). However, when a bona fide doubt of a defendant's 
fitness to proceed with post-conviction proceedings is raised, the court may 
order a psychological evaluation of the defendant and consider the matter at an 
evidentiary hearing. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d  at 365. Because the trial court 
is in the best position to observe a defendant's conduct, whether a bona 
fide doubt of fitness to proceed exists is a matter that lies within the 
discretion of that court. Moreover, because a presumption of fitness attaches at 
the outset of post-conviction proceedings, the court may require a substantial 
threshold showing of incompetence to establish a bona fide doubt as to 
a defendant's ability to consult with counsel. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d  at 
362-63.
The level of competency required during post-conviction proceedings is less 
than that required at trial. A defendant is considered unfit to stand trial 
when, "because of his mental or physical condition, he is unable to understand 
the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him or to assist in his 
defense." 725 ILCS 5/104-10 (West 1998). In contrast, a defendant is considered 
unfit to proceed with the post-conviction process when, because of a mental 
condition, he cannot communicate his allegations of constitutional deprivations 
to counsel, thus frustrating his entitlement, under the Act, to a reasonable 
level of assistance. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d  at 359-65.
The lower level of competency required at post-conviction proceedings, as 
opposed to trial, reflects a fundamental difference between the two proceedings. 
A post-conviction proceeding is not part of the criminal process. Rather, it is 
a collateral attack on the judgment of conviction and is civil in nature. 
Owens, 139 Ill. 2d  at 363. Further, in proceedings under the Act, 
counsel is appointed not to shield a defendant from the "prosecutorial forces" 
of the State, but to shape a defendant's claims into the appropriate legal form 
for presentation to the court. Accordingly, if a defendant is competent to 
communicate allegations of constitutional violations to counsel, that defendant 
is competent to participate in post-conviction proceedings. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d  at 365.
In People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351 (1990), this court held that an 
evidentiary hearing to determine a defendant's fitness to proceed with a 
post-conviction petition should be conducted in accordance with the procedures 
set forth in section 5-2-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (Ill. Rev. 
Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005-2-3, later codified at 730 ILCS 5/5-2-3 (West 
1992)). At that time, section 5-2-3 governed hearings on a defendant's fitness 
to be executed and provided, in relevant part, that the burden of proving a 
defendant unfit to be executed is on the defendant. Accordingly, under 
Owens, the burden of proving a defendant unfit to proceed with a 
post-conviction petition is likewise on the defendant. Our legislature, however, 
has since repealed section 5-2-3 (see Pub. Act 88-350, eff. January 1, 1994), 
and has not adopted a statutory provision delineating procedures for raising and 
determining fitness for execution, or for determining fitness for 
post-conviction proceedings. Thus, before we consider whether the circuit court 
improperly allocated the burden of proof at the hearing to determine defendant's 
fitness to proceed with his post-conviction petition, we must first determine 
where the burden of proof lies.
The State argued before the circuit court that defendant had the burden of 
proof at the fitness hearing. Before this court, however, the State maintains 
that it bore the ultimate burden of proving defendant fit to proceed with his 
post-conviction petition by a preponderance of the evidence, just as it does in 
cases where a defendant's fitness for trial is raised (see 725 ILCS 5/104-11 
(West 1998)). Defendant likewise maintains that the State had the ultimate 
burden of proof.
We agree with the parties' positions on appeal that, once a bona 
fide doubt of a defendant's fitness to proceed with a post-conviction 
petition is raised, the burden is on the State to prove that defendant is fit. 
In reaching this conclusion, we are guided by this court's decisions in 
People v. Bender, 20 Ill. 2d 45 (1960), and People v. 
McCullum, 66 Ill. 2d 306 (1977).
In Bender, we held that, in a pretrial sanity hearing, once there is 
evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of a defendant's sanity, the 
burden is upon the State to prove defendant is sane. We explained:
We applied the same reasoning in the McCullum case, when we 
considered the constitutionality of section 5-2-1 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 
1973, ch. 38, par. 1005-2-1(i)). At the time, section 5-2-1 placed upon the 
defendant the ultimate burden of proving unfitness to stand trial when the 
defendant had raised the issue. Relying on the same analysis employed in 
Bender, we found section 5-2-1 unconstitutional. We also rejected the 
argument that a defendant who has raised a bona fide doubt of fitness 
to stand trial is presumptively capable of assisting counsel in marshaling the 
information and presenting the facts necessary to prove unfitness. 
McCullum, 66 Ill. 2d  at 313-14.
Although Bender and McCullum involved hearings to determine 
the defendants' fitness at the time of their criminal trials, we believe the 
same rationale applies to a hearing to determine a defendant's fitness to 
proceed with a post-conviction petition. We are not unmindful that 
post-conviction proceedings are initiated by the defendant and are fundamentally 
different from criminal proceedings initiated by the State. Nonetheless, we 
conclude, as we did in Bender and McCullum, that it would be a 
"strange rule," indeed, to impose upon a defendant the burden of proving 
unfitness to proceed with a post-conviction petition where the very disability 
the defendant seeks to prove may very well render the defendant incapable of 
sustaining the burden of proof. Accordingly, we hold that, once a bona 
fide doubt of a defendant's fitness to proceed with a post-conviction 
petition is raised, the burden is upon the State to prove that the defendant is 
fit.
Here, the circuit court found no bona fide doubt of defendant's 
fitness, but determined that, given the gravity of the case, it would proceed to 
an evidentiary hearing. In the absence of a bona fide doubt, further 
proceedings were neither necessary nor proper. See People v. Eddmonds, 
143 Ill. 2d 501, 513 (1991) (holding that the circuit court's finding of "some" 
doubt as to defendant's fitness for trial is not a proper ground for granting 
post-conviction relief and ordering a fitness hearing). In any event, we find 
that a bona fide doubt of defendant's fitness was raised.
From the time the issue of defendant's fitness to proceed with his 
post-conviction petition was first raised, to the time the circuit court first 
set the matter for an evidentiary hearing, over 18 months had passed. During 
this time, the circuit court consistently maintained the view that no bona 
fide doubt of defendant's fitness had been raised. However, the circuit 
court had before it Dr. Gelbort's supplemental affidavit, as well as Dr. Stipes' 
written evaluation, in which each doctor concludes that defendant is not fit. 
Dr. Gelbort states in his supplemental affidavit that defendant suffers from 
paranoid schizophrenia, and that defendant is unable to communicate rationally 
with his attorneys. Dr. Gelbort further states that defendant "still 
demonstrates the presence of paranoia, instances of poor contact with reality, 
misperceptions of questions and verbal information presented [to] him, 
intellectual and information processing difficulties/impairments, and delusions 
surrounding his personal history." Dr. Stipes states in his evaluation that 
defendant is unable to cooperate with or assist counsel due to a severe disorder 
of thought and mood, and that "defendant shows evidence of marginal contact with 
reality." The record reveals that the circuit court had not fully reviewed the 
findings of Drs. Gelbort and Stipes prior to setting the matter for a hearing. 
Thus, although the circuit court is in the best position to determine whether a 
bona fide doubt of a defendant's fitness to proceed with a 
post-conviction petition has been raised (Owens, 139 Ill. 2d at 362), 
the circuit court here failed to consider the entirety of the record before 
it.
We now consider whether, as defendant claims, the circuit court misallocated 
the burden of proof. The record reveals a substantial amount of confusion on 
this issue. The circuit court initially expressed its agreement with the State 
that defendant bore the burden of proof, but later expressed its belief to the 
contrary. On the day the hearing commenced, both parties advised the 
court that the burden was on defendant to prove his unfitness to proceed with 
the post-conviction process. The circuit court expressed no disagreement. The 
State also argued that, in light of defendant's burden, and in order to preserve 
its ability to move the court for a "directed finding" of fitness, defendant's 
evidence must be presented first. This is, in fact, the order in which the 
hearing proceeded-defendant presented his witnesses first, following which the 
State moved for a finding of fitness, again arguing that the burden was on 
defendant. Only after the circuit court denied the State's motion did the State 
present any evidence. After the State rested, defendant presented his closing 
argument. Immediately thereafter, and without hearing argument from the State, 
the circuit court ruled. During its brief oral ruling, the circuit court made no 
reference to the burden of proof. Based on this record, we conclude that the 
parties and the court erroneously proceeded at the fitness hearing with the 
understanding that the burden of proof was on defendant. See People v. 
Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 234 (1996) (considering the circuit court's 
comments as a whole in determining whether the court properly allocated, to the 
State, the burden of proving defendant's fitness for trial).
The State argues, however, that a trial judge is presumed to have followed 
the fitness statute in effect at the time of the hearing. See People v. 
Bilyew, 73 Ill. 2d 294, 300 (1978). Although this is true as a general 
proposition of law, it is not applicable here. At the time of the fitness 
hearing in this case, the statute to which Owens refers (Ill. Rev. 
Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005-2-3) had been repealed, and no reviewing court had 
yet to address the burden-of-proof issue. Thus, there was no statute or other 
statement of the law which we may presume the trial judge followed. Furthermore, 
the record affirmatively shows that the trial judge misallocated the burden of 
proof to defendant.
Finally, the State contends that defendant waived review of this issue by 
failing to raise the matter before the circuit court. We decline, however, to 
find waiver where, as here, both parties before the court, as well as the trial 
judge, all proceeded under an erroneous view of the law. See People v. 
Bedford, 31 Ill. 2d 227, 229 (1964) (holding that defendant's acquiescence 
in the misallocation of the burden of proof at pretrial fitness hearing was not 
a bar from asserting error as grounds for reversal on appeal). Our conclusion 
that the circuit court erred in its allocation of the burden of proof does not 
end our inquiry. We must determine whether such error may be deemed harmless. 
See People v. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d 489, 511-12 (1992) (applying 
harmless-error analysis to claimed error in allocation of proof at pretrial 
fitness hearing); Johnson, 146 Ill. 2d  at 137-38 (applying 
harmless-error analysis to jury instruction that improperly modified burden of 
proof).
Based on our review of the evidence, we cannot conclude that the circuit 
court's error in misallocating the burden of proof was harmless. All four 
experts who examined defendant agreed that he was suffering from schizophrenia 
or a schizoaffective disorder. Three of the experts, Drs. Gelbort, Merikangas, 
and Stipes, concluded that defendant was not able to communicate rationally or 
effectively with post-conviction counsel. This conclusion was based on results 
obtained from the administration of various psychological, neurologic and 
psychiatric tests; a review of defendant's psychiatric records, which 
demonstrated a long history of mental disturbances and treatment with a variety 
of medications, including antidepressants and antipsychotic drugs; and a 
combined total of eight examinations of defendant, spanning the period from May 
1993 through July 1997.
Dr. Mahoney was alone in his opinion that, notwithstanding defendant's mental 
illness, defendant was fit to proceed with his post-conviction petition. Dr. 
Mahoney based this conclusion on interviews with defendant in June 1996 and in 
May 1997, a review of defendant's psychiatric records, and a review of his 
colleagues' impressions. Although Dr. Mahoney probed defendant most extensively 
as to those factors bearing directly on defendant's competence-his understanding 
of the post-conviction process, his understanding of the constitutional issues 
raised by his attorneys, and his participation in the formulation of his 
post-conviction petition-his testimony contains deficiencies. Unlike Dr. 
Merikangas, who met with defendant shortly before trial, Dr. Mahoney last 
examined defendant in early May 1997, and could not say whether defendant's 
mental status had changed in the interim. Dr. Mahoney was also unaware of what 
medication defendant was taking at the time of the fitness hearing. Further, Dr. 
Mahoney admitted that schizophrenia can cause a lack of cooperation in a person 
suffering from this disorder. Indeed, although Dr. Mahoney attempted four 
examinations of defendant, defendant cooperated on only two occasions, and 
refused any testing by Dr. Mahoney.
We note, however, that the opinions of defendant's expert witnesses likewise 
contain deficiencies. Dr. Gelbort testified in relevant part that defendant did 
not possess the "cognitive wherewithal" to proceed with his post-conviction 
petition. He explained that "cognitive wherewithal" refers to the defendant's 
ability to understand how people get along with one another, what motivates 
interpersonal behavior, and what is common or appropriate behavior. A 
defendant's fitness to proceed with the post-conviction process, however, is 
judged by the ability to communicate allegations of constitutional deprivations 
to counsel (see Owens, 139 Ill. 2d at 365), not by a defendant's 
understanding of interpersonal behavior. In addition, Dr. Gelbort was not able 
to describe with particularity the longstanding pattern of "bizarre" behavior on 
which he also based his opinion of defendant's unfitness.
Dr. Merikangas' opinion as to defendant's unfitness is undermined, to some 
extent, by his testimony that it is impossible to know how much defendant 
understands, and that defendant can, in fact, proceed with "simple things" 
related to his post-conviction petition that do not require his active 
participation. Dr. Merikangas further testified that, while being medicated with 
Haldol, which defendant was taking at the time of the fitness hearing, defendant 
is capable of some rational thought regarding courtroom proceedings.
Similarly, Dr. Stipes' opinion is called into doubt by his testimony that 
defendant was able to convey information that indicated he understood the 
original charges against him and that he had been to trial on those charges. Dr. 
Stipes' opinion is further compromised by admissions on cross-examination that 
he had not reviewed defendant's post-conviction petition, had never asked 
defendant whether he had assisted his counsel in the preparation of his 
post-conviction petition, and had not inquired further when defendant had 
indicated he would only speak to his attorneys about the post-conviction 
process.
In light of the foregoing evidence and the trial judge's conduct, we cannot 
conclude that the misallocation in the burden of proof was harmless error. 
Although the State maintains that the circuit court simply chose to believe the 
testimony of Dr. Mahoney over the testimony of defendant's experts, we cannot 
accept this conclusion, as it is equally plausible that the circuit court found 
that the evidence was closely balanced. In such a case, the court's decision 
would be adverse to the party who bore the burden. As already determined, the 
circuit court misallocated this burden to defendant.
Because we find that the error in the allocation of the burden of proof at 
the hearing to determine defendant's fitness to proceed with his post-conviction 
petition was not harmless, we vacate the circuit court's judgment dismissing 
defendant's post-conviction petition and remand this cause to the circuit court 
for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein. See 
generally Owens, 139 Ill. 2d  at 366-67. We need not, therefore, 
consider the remaining issues raised on appeal, and express no opinion as to the 
merits of the claims raised in defendant's post-conviction petition.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court is vacated and this 
cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings.
Circuit court judgment vacated;
cause remanded.