Case Title: MC Development Company, LLC, Appellant v. Central R-3 School District of St. Francois County, Respondent, Farmington R-7 School District of St. Francois County, Cross-Appellant, Damon Black, Assessor of St. Francois County, Respondent.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC90022

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2009-12-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
MC DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLC, 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
No. SC90022 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
CENTRAL R-3 SCHOOL DISTRICT OF  
) 
ST. FRANCOIS COUNTY, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
FARMINGTON R-7 SCHOOL DISTRICT OF ) 
ST. FRANCOIS COUNTY, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Cross-Appellant, 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
DAMON BLACK, ASSESSOR OF 
 
) 
ST. FRANCOIS COUNTY, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Respondent.  
) 
 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. FRANCOIS COUNTY 
The Honorable Scott E. Thomsen, Judge 
 
Opinion issued December 22, 2009. 
 
MC Development Company, LLC, appeals from the trial court's declaratory judgment 
finding that a portion of MC Development's land was part of the Central R-3 School 
District rather than the Farmington R-7 School District.  Farmington School District 
cross-appeals, also claiming that the property at issue was part of Farmington School 
District.  MC Development and Farmington School District argue that the trial court's 
decision was against the weight of the evidence.  Further, MC Development and 
Farmington School District argue that the trial court misapplied the law in deciding the 
property was part of Central School District because school districts were required 
statutorily and constitutionally to be composed of contiguous territory. Judgment 
affirmed. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
This case arises out of a dispute over the determination that a tract of property is 
located within the Central School District.  The property at issue is Parcel 13, which is 
surrounded by property taxed as part of the Farmington School District.   
 
Central School District was established in 1966 through the reorganization of 
several school districts.  In 1967, an annual election was held, and a proposal pursuant to 
section 162.431, RSMo Supp. 1965,1 to change the boundary line between Farmington 
School District and Central School District (then known as St. Francois County School 
District R-3) was on the ballot.  Farmington School District approved the boundary 
change, but Central School District rejected it.  The matter was appealed to a board of 
arbitration, which found that the boundary change was necessary and ruled in favor of 
Farmington School District. 
In 2004, MC Development purchased a tract of property that encompassed Parcel 
13 in St. Francois County.  At closing, the sellers of the property delivered an assessor's 
map to MC Development indicating that a portion of the property was in Central School 
                                             
 
1 The parties, in their briefs, refer to RSMo 1963; however, chapter 162 changed after 1963 but 
before 1966.  As such, the applicable statute is RSMo Supp. 1965.  All references are to RSMo 
Supp. 1965, unless otherwise indicated. 
 
District.  MC Development contacted the St. Francois County assessor, who informed 
MC Development that Parcel 13 had been continuously assessed as part of Central 
School District as far back as 1950.    
On April 7, 2005, MC Development filed an action for declaratory judgment 
against Farmington School District, Central School District and the assessor asking the 
court to determine that the property owned by MC Development lies wholly within 
Farmington School District and to direct the assessor to change the assessment records 
accordingly.  MC Development then filed an amended petition, and Farmington School 
District filed a cross-claim shortly thereafter.  A two-day bench trial was held.  The trial 
court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law deciding that the property in dispute 
was wholly within the territorial boundaries of Central School District.   
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A judgment in a court-tried case will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence to 
support it, it is not against the weight of the evidence, and it does not erroneously declare 
or apply the law.  Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). "Great 
deference must be given to the trial court's resolution of conflicts in evidence, and this 
Court gives due regard to the court's opportunity to have judged the credibility of the 
witnesses before it."  In re Competency of Parkus, 219 S.W.3d 250, 255 (Mo. banc 
2007). 
"In considering whether the judgment of the trial court is 'against the weight of the 
evidence,' this Court may exercise its power to set aside the judgment of the trial court 
only with caution and only if it possesses a firm belief that the judgment is wrong."  
 
3
Lewis v. Gibbons, 80 S.W.3d 461, 466 (Mo. banc 2002) (citing Murphy, 536 S.W.2d at 
32).  In reviewing a court-tried case, this Court accepts all evidence and inferences 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and disregards all contrary 
evidence.  Essex Contracting, Inc. v. Jefferson County, 277 S.W.3d 647, 652 (Mo. banc 
2009).    
III.  ANALYSIS 
A. The trial court's judgment was not against the weight of the evidence 
MC Development and Farmington School District argue that the trial court's 
decision was against the weight of the evidence because the trial court relied on the 
assessor's records rather than the records of Farmington School District.  Specifically, 
MC Development and Farmington School District contend that the trial court's reliance 
on the assessor's map was in error because section 162.841 required the district secretary 
to record and update a correct plat of the district, and they contend there is no legal basis 
for the assessor's records to be more determinative. This Court finds that the trial court's 
judgment was not against the weight of the evidence. 
The trial court relied on the assessor's records because they were more reliable 
under the facts and circumstances of this particular case, not because they were 
authoritative.  The trial court found that, at the time of the reorganization in 1967, the 
authority to establish school district boundaries was vested in the county school 
superintendent; this office no longer existed at the time of trial, and no official records 
remained from the St. Francois county school superintendent.  Moreover, the trial court 
found that there is no government office or agency with the authority to establish 
 
4
boundary lines or determine boundary lines when there is a dispute, including the county 
assessor.  Accordingly, the trial court had to determine the boundaries based on the 
conflicting evidence presented from different sources.  The trial court found that maps 
maintained by the school districts were evidence of what they believed to be their 
boundaries but were in conflict with other evidence.     
The trial court considered the assessor's maps and records to be more persuasive 
evidence as to which school district Parcel 13 belonged.  The trial court also considered 
the legal description of the land from the 1967 election, which it found to be a reliable 
source of information about the location of the school districts' boundary lines.  As such, 
the trial court had substantial evidence on which to base its finding that Parcel 13 was 
located within the boundaries of Central School District.     
MC Development further claims that the trial court erred in that it gave "no 
weight" to the testimony of Dr. Henry, who was superintendent of Farmington School 
District in 1967.  The trial court was presented with testimony from numerous witnesses, 
including Dr. Henry.  In keeping with well-settled Missouri law, this Court defers to the 
trial court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses before it.  Parkus, 219 S.W.3d 
at 255.  Further, the trial court is free to believe or disbelieve all, part or none of the 
testimony of any witness.  Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170, 192 (Mo. banc 2009).    
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court determined that Parcel 13 was part 
of Central School District prior to the 1967 election and that it continued to be within its 
boundary following the election.  Mindful of the opportunity the trial court had to assess 
the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh the conflicting evidence, this Court holds 
 
5
that the trial court's finding that Parcel 13 is in the Central School District was not against 
the weight of the evidence.   
B. The trial court did not misapply the law 
 
MC Development and Farmington School District argue that school districts were 
constitutionally and statutorily mandated to be contiguous.  Central School District 
responds that MC Development and Farmington School District failed to assert these 
claims in the petition, amended petition or cross-claim; therefore, they are waived.  
However, it is clear from a review of the record, which did not include any objection that 
any testimony or evidence was outside the pleadings, that the issue of whether a school 
district's boundaries are required by law to be contiguous was tried by implied consent of 
the parties.  See Rule 55.33(b). 
Additionally, MC Development filed a timely request for conclusions of law from 
the trial court pursuant to Rule 73.01(c), raising the issue of whether the statutes would 
have allowed for a noncontiguous school district.  Therefore, this issue was properly 
preserved for appeal.     
 
Turning now to the merits of MC Development's argument that the trial court 
misapplied the law, MC Development contends that the 1967 boundary change made 
pursuant to section 162.431 was impermissible because section 162.431 prohibited non-
contiguous school districts.  Section 162.431 set out the procedures for boundary changes 
to Missouri public schools, and this statute governed the last boundary change between 
Central School District and Farmington School District in 1967.  Section 162.431 
contained no requirement that school district boundaries be contiguous.  MC 
 
6
Development admits that section 162.431 did not itself require contiguity, but it argues 
that case law and statutes that should be read in pari materia with section 162.431 require 
a reading of contiguity into section 162.431.   
 
MC Development and Farmington School District specifically point to sections 
162.171 and 162.211 to support their view that section 162.431 required contiguity.  The 
fallacy with this argument is that courts have a duty to read statutes in their plain, 
ordinary and usual sense.  Bosworth v. Sewell, 918 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Mo. banc 1996).  
Where there is no ambiguity, this Court does not apply any other rule of construction.  
Parktown Imports, Inc. v. Audi of Am., Inc., 278 S.W.3d 670, 672 (Mo. banc 2009).  
There is no ambiguity in section 162.431.     
In 1966, at the time of the reorganization, and in 1967, at the time of the boundary 
change, sections 162.011 to 162.091 concerned school districts generally.  Sections 
162.101 to 162.451 controlled six-director districts.  MC Development and Farmington 
School District rely most heavily on section 162.171, which stated: 
In recommending proposed reorganization plans, the county board of education 
may divide existing unreorganized districts if division is in the best interests of the 
children, and place any portion in any proposed district but each proposed district 
shall be composed of contiguous territory.  (emphasis added). 
 
They argue that section 162.171 indicated a broader attempt by the legislature to require 
school districts to be comprised of contiguous territory.  Central School District responds 
that the requirement in section 162.171 for contiguous school districts is specific to 
reorganization plans and not generally applicable to all boundary changes, which were 
governed by section 162.431.  This Court agrees with Central School District.  The 
 
7
legislature explicitly included a requirement for contiguous territory in section 162.171 
regarding reorganization plans, but not in section 162.431 governing boundary change 
procedures.  To read a contiguous territory requirement into section 162.431 would be 
tantamount to rewriting the statute. 
MC Development and Farmington School District also point to section 162.211 to 
support their argument that school districts must be composed of contiguous territory.  
Section 162.211 states that a six-director school district "may be established by the voters 
of . . . [a]ny two or more adjacent six-director districts . . . or any two or more adjacent 
common school districts . . . ." (emphasis added).  MC Development and Farmington 
School District argue that the use of "adjacent" indicates that the General Assembly 
intended to require contiguous school districts. 2  "When different statutory terms are 
used in different subsections of a statute, appellate courts presume that the legislature 
intended the terms to have different meaning and effect."  Nelson v. Crane, 187 S.W.3d 
868, 870 (Mo. banc 2006).  The fact that the General Assembly used different terms in 
                                             
 
2 Farmington School District also points to section 162.222, which it erroneously states was 
enacted in 1963.  Section 162.222, RSMo Supp. 1977 (repealed 1997), which dealt with 
consolidation of school districts, stated in pertinent part, "Notwithstanding the provisions of any 
section in chapter 162, in proceedings limited to the consolidation of two or more adjoining 
districts . . . ." (emphasis added).  Finally, Farmington School District points to section 162.223, 
which was not enacted until 1969, two years after the boundary change in this case.  Section 
162.223 provides that voters in two or more "adjacent" six-director districts may petition for 
consolidation.  Farmington School District claims that use of the words "adjoining" and 
"adjacent" in these statutes indicates a history of the General Assembly requiring contiguous 
districts.  As noted, this argument is contrary to Missouri law governing statutory interpretation, 
which provided that if a statute is clear, there is no need to apply any rules of statutory 
construction.  See Parktown Imports, 278 S.W.3d at 672.       
 
8
different sections of chapter 162 further undercuts the argument that the statutory scheme 
required school districts to be comprised of contiguous territory.  Therefore, Central 
School District and Farmington School District, as altered by the 1967 boundary change, 
were not required by statute to be comprised of contiguous property.  
Lastly, MC Development and Farmington School District argue that Mo. Const. 
art. IX, sec. 1(b) requires school districts to be contiguous.  Article IX, sec. 1(b) states in 
pertinent part, "Specific schools for any contiguous territory may be established by law."  
The General Assembly has the power to enact any law not prohibited by the Missouri 
Constitution.  State ex inf. Danforth v. Merrell, 530 S.W.2d 209, 213 (Mo. banc 1975).  
Article IX, sec. 1(b) specifically contemplates the establishment of school districts, not 
boundary changes to existing school districts.  Section 162.431 governs boundary 
changes to already-established school districts.  Therefore, section 162.431 does not 
contravene the Missouri Constitution.3   
                                             
 
3 MC Development and Farmington School District argue, based on State, at Inf. of Taylor ex rel. 
Schwerdt v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-3, 257 S.W.2d 262, 267-68 (Mo. App. 1953), that Missouri 
law does not contemplate noncontiguous school districts.  This case dealt with annexation 
procedures pursuant to section 165.300, RSMo 1949, rather than a boundary change pursuant to 
section 162.431, RSMo Supp. 1965, which governs this case.  Moreover, the court in Schwerdt 
specifically limited its language to section 165.300 annexation proceedings, stating, "In 
proceedings to release parts of school districts for annexation to other districts, the law does not 
contemplate that two portions of a district should be left entirely segregated from each other."  
Id. at 268.  Notably, Schwerdt came out in 1953, and no other cases have expanded its language 
to apply to section 162.431 dealing with boundary change procedures between two six-director 
school districts such as in this case. 
 
 
9
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
 
All concur. 
 
10