Case Title: State v. Richard T. Yeoman Failure to register as a sex offender

Citation: 

Docket Number: 35689-2008

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Date: 2010-07-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 35689-2008 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
RICHARD T. YEOMAN, 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
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Boise, June 2010 Term 
 
2010 Opinion No.  88 
 
Filed: July 26, 2010 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for Kootenai County.  The Hon. Lansing L. Haynes, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.  Eric 
Fredericksen argued. 
 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.  Kenneth Jorgensen 
argued. 
 
 
 
EISMANN, Chief Justice. 
 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for failing to register as a sex offender.  
Appellant contends that he was not required to register upon moving into this State or, if he was, 
the registration requirement violated his constitutional right to travel.  We affirm the judgment of 
the district court.  
 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
In 1984, Richard T. Yeoman (Defendant) was convicted of rape in Washington and was 
required to register in that State as a sex offender.  In 2007, he moved to Idaho, but did not 
register as required by Idaho Code § 18-8304(1)(c).  On February 22, 2008, the State charged 
him with the crime of failing to register as a sex offender, a felony.  After the district court 
 
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denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss, he pled guilty, reserving his right to appeal the 
applicability and constitutionality of the statute. 
 
II.  ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1.  Does Idaho Code § 18-8304(1)(c) apply to persons whose conviction for a sex crime occurred 
before July 1, 1993? 
2.  Does Idaho Code § 18-8304(1)(c) violate Defendant’s constitutional right to travel? 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Does Idaho Code § 18-8304(1)(c) Apply to Persons Whose Conviction for a Sex Crime 
Occurred before July 1, 1993? 
 
In 1998, Idaho enacted the “Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community 
Right-to-Know Act,” Idaho Code §§ 18-8301 to 18-8326.  Ch. 411, § 2, 1998 Idaho Sess. Laws 
1275, 1276-90.  When adopted, the Act applied to three categories of sex offenders, including 
any person convicted in Idaho on or after July 1, 1993, of any of the crimes listed in Idaho Code 
§ 18-8304(1)(a).  Those crimes consisted of a list of crimes designated by code section and an 
attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit any of those crimes. 
 
In 2005, the legislature added another category of sex offender who was required to 
register under the Act.  Ch. 233, § 1, 2005 Idaho Sess. Laws 710, 711.  Section 18-8304 was 
amended to apply to any person who was convicted of a crime that was substantially equivalent 
to the crimes set forth in subsection (1)(a) and who was required to register as a sex offender in 
another jurisdiction when the person entered Idaho to establish permanent or temporary 
residence.  Idaho Code § 18-8304(1)(c).  Defendant pled guilty to violating this subsection of the 
statute.  He contends that it should be read as applying only to convictions that occurred on or 
after July 1, 1993. 
 
Idaho Code § 18-8304(1)(c) applies to any person who: 
 
Has been convicted of any crime, an attempt, a solicitation or a conspiracy 
to commit a crime in another state, territory, commonwealth, or other jurisdiction 
of the United States, including tribal courts and military courts, that is 
substantially equivalent to the offenses listed in subsection (1)(a) of this section 
and was required to register as a sex offender in any other state or jurisdiction 
when he established permanent or temporary residency in Idaho. 
 
 
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This provision only applies if the conviction was “substantially equivalent to the offenses 
listed in subsection (1)(a) of this section.”  That subsection applies to any person who: 
 
On or after July 1, 1993, is convicted of the crime, or an attempt, a 
solicitation, or a conspiracy to commit a crime provided for in section 18-909 
(assault with attempt to commit rape, infamous crime against nature, or lewd and 
lascivious conduct with a minor, but excluding mayhem, murder or robbery), 18-
911 (battery with attempt to commit rape, infamous crime against nature, or lewd 
and lascivious conduct with a minor, but excluding mayhem, murder or robbery), 
18-919 (sexual exploitation by a medical care provider), 18-1505B (sexual abuse 
and exploitation of a vulnerable adult), 18-1506 (sexual abuse of a child under 
sixteen years of age), 18-1506A (ritualized abuse of a child), 18-1507 (sexual 
exploitation of a child), 18-1507A (possession of sexually exploitative material 
for other than a commercial purpose), 18-1508 (lewd conduct with a minor child), 
18-1508A (sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age), 18-
1509A (enticing a child over the internet), 18-4003(d) (murder committed in 
perpetration of rape), 18-4116 (indecent exposure, but excluding a misdemeanor 
conviction), 18-4502 (first degree kidnapping committed for the purpose of rape, 
committing the infamous crime against nature or for committing any lewd and 
lascivious act upon any child under the age of sixteen, or for purposes of sexual 
gratification or arousal), 18-4503 (second degree kidnapping where the victim is 
an unrelated minor child), 18-5609 (inducing person under eighteen years of age 
into prostitution), 18-6101 (rape, but excluding 18-6101(1) where the defendant is 
eighteen years of age or where the defendant is exempted under subsection (4) of 
this section), 18-6108 (male rape, but excluding 18-6108(1) where the defendant 
is eighteen years of age or where the defendant is exempted under subsection (4) 
of this section), 18-6110 (sexual contact with a prisoner), 18-6602 (incest), 18-
6605 (crime against nature), 18-6608 (forcible sexual penetration by use of a 
foreign object), upon a second or subsequent conviction under 18-6609 (video 
voyeurism) or 18-8602(1), Idaho Code, (sex trafficking). 
 
 
One of the crimes listed in subsection (1)(a) is rape in violation of Idaho Code § 18-6101.  
Defendant does not contend that the definition of the crime of rape for which he was convicted in 
Washington in 1984 was not substantially equivalent to rape as defined in Idaho Code § 18-6101.  
Rather, he argues that the words “[o]n or after July 1, 1993,” should be read as part of the 
definition of “the offenses listed in subsection (1)(a) of this section” so that subsection (1)(c) 
would only apply if the conviction of a substantially equivalent offense occurred on or after July 
1, 1993.  Because his conviction occurred before that date, he contends that the statute does not 
apply to him. 
 
The interpretation of a statute “must begin with the literal words of the statute; those 
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed 
 
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as a whole.  If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows 
the law as written.”  McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 
759 (2006) (citations omitted). 
 
When construing Idaho Code § 18-8304 as a whole, subsection (1)(c) is not limited to 
crimes for which the person was convicted on or after July 1, 1993.  Subsection (1)(c) 
incorporates by reference “the offenses listed in subsection (1)(a) of this section.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Subsection (1)(a) applies to any person who “[o]n or after July 1, 1993, is convicted of 
the crime, or an attempt, a solicitation, or a conspiracy to commit a crime provided for in section 
. . . 18-6101 (rape, but excluding 18-6101(1) . . .) . . . .”  (Emphasis added.)  Subsection (1)(c) 
does not incorporate by reference the convictions listed in subsection (1)(a); it incorporates by 
reference the offenses listed.  The offenses are listed by reference to their respective code 
sections.  The date of conviction for one of those offenses is not part of the definition of the 
crime as set forth in the code section.  The date a person was convicted of a crime does not 
become part of the definition of the offense for which he or she was convicted.  Therefore, 
subsection (1)(c) applies to Defendant. 
 
B.  Does Idaho Code § 18-8304(1)(c) Violate Defendant’s Constitutional Right to Travel? 
 
Defendant contends that Idaho Code § 18-8304(1)(c) violates his constitutional right to 
travel.  In Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999), the United States Supreme Court wrote: 
 
The “right to travel” discussed in our cases embraces at least three 
different components.  It protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to 
leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an 
unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State, and, for those 
travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like 
other citizens of that State. 
 
 
Defendant asserts that the statute violates the third aspect of his right to travel, which is 
“the right of the newly arrived citizen to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other 
citizens of the same State.”  Id. at 502.  This aspect of the right to travel is based upon the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 503.  Thus, the Supreme 
Court has held that the right to travel can be violated when a new resident of a state is denied 
rights or benefits available to longer-term residents.  See, Attorney General of New York v. Soto-
Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986) (civil service employment preference given to certain veterans if 
 
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they were residents of the state when they entered the military, but not if they became residents 
later); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (amount of payments from oil revenues based upon 
length of residency); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (one-year 
residency requirement to receive nonemergency medical care at county expense); Dunn v. 
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (one-year state residency and three-month county residency 
required to vote); and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (one-year residency 
requirement to receive welfare benefits).  Defendant has not identified any privilege or immunity 
enjoyed by other citizens of Idaho that he has been denied.  Likewise, he does not contend that 
he is being treated differently because he is a new or temporary resident of Idaho. 
 
Rather, Defendant contends that an Idaho resident would not be required to register as a 
sex offender based upon a conviction for rape in Idaho that occurred prior to July 1, 1993, but he 
was required to register as a sex offender upon moving to Idaho based upon his rape conviction 
in Washington that occurred prior to July 1, 1993.  Thus, he argues that “the statute in question 
clearly treats an in-state sex offender differently than it would a similarly situated out-of-state 
sex offender” and that such difference in treatment violates his right to travel and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
Defendant’s claim that he is treated differently from a similarly situated Idaho sex 
offender is faulty.  He was not required to register in Idaho as a sex offender simply because he 
had a prior conviction for the crime of rape when he moved here.1  He was required to register 
because, in addition to the rape conviction, he “was required to register as a sex offender in 
[Washington] when he established permanent or temporary residency in Idaho.”  Idaho Code § 
18-8304(1)(c).  Had he not been required to register in Washington, he would not have been 
required to register once he moved here. 
 
Because he was required to register while residing in Washington, it is difficult to see 
how the requirement that he register in this State in any way infringed upon his right to travel to 
                                                 
1 When Idaho Code § 18-8304 was enacted, it treated persons entering the state with sex offense convictions 
predating July 1, 1993, differently from residents with sex offense convictions predating that date.  Subsection (1)(b) 
of the original statute required a sex offender, who had been convicted of a crime in another jurisdiction that was 
substantially equivalent to a crime listed in subsection (1)(a), to register if he or she “[e]nters the state on or after 
July 1, 1993.”  Ch. 411, § 2, 1998 Idaho Sess. Laws 1275, 1278.  An Idaho resident convicted prior to July 1, 1993, 
of a crime listed in subsection (1)(a) would not have been required to register if he or she had remained in Idaho.  In 
2005, subsection (1)(b) of the statute was amended to eliminate that difference in treatment.  Ch. 233, § 1, 2005 
Idaho Sess. Laws 710, 711. 
 
 
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or become a resident of this State.  “[M]oving from one jurisdiction to another entails many 
registration requirements required by law which may cause some inconvenience, but which do 
not unduly infringe upon anyone’s right to travel.”  United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151, 
162-63 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
Nevertheless, even assuming that the registration requirement of Idaho Code § 18-
8304(1)(c) has the effect of imposing a penalty on Defendant’s right to change his residence to 
Idaho, it will be upheld if it is shown necessary to promote a compelling state interest.  Saenz v. 
Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 499 (1999).  “The state has a strong interest in preventing future sexual 
offenses and alerting local law enforcement and citizens to the whereabouts of those that could 
reoffend.”  Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1348-49 (11th Cir. 2005).  This is “a compelling and 
strong interest” that “outweighs any burden imposed.”  Shenandoah, 595 F.3d at 163.  The 
requirement that Defendant register as a sex offender upon relocating to Idaho did not violate his 
right to travel. 
 
Defendant also contends on appeal that the registration requirement denied him the equal 
protection of the law.  As stated above, he has not pointed to any similarly situated category of 
sex offenders who are not required to register. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
We affirm the judgment of the district court. 
 
 
Justices BURDICK, J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.