Case Title: Bolton v. Town of Scarborough

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019 ME 172

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2019-12-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 172 
Docket: 
Cum-19-73 
Argued: 
September 24, 2019 
Decided: 
December 23, 2019 
Revised: 
April 9, 2020 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN,* JABAR, and HJELM, JJ. 
 
 
KENYON C. BOLTON III et al.  
 
v. 
 
TOWN OF SCARBOROUGH 
 
 
ALEXANDER, J. 
[¶1]  Three years ago, we concluded that the Town of Scarborough had 
engaged in an unlawful and discriminatory assessment practice that violated 
the equal protection rights of Kenyon C. Bolton III and other plaintiffs 
(collectively, the Taxpayers); based on this conclusion, we remanded the 
matter to the Scarborough Board of Assessment Review “for a determination of 
the appropriate abatements” to address the inequality in tax treatment 
affecting the Taxpayers as a result of the discriminatory practice.  Angell Family 
2012 Prouts Neck Tr. v. Town of Scarborough, 2016 ME 152, ¶¶ 1-2, 15-21, 36, 
                                         
*  Although not available at oral argument, Justice Gorman participated in the development of this 
opinion.  See M.R. App. P. 12(a)(2) (“A qualified Justice may participate in a decision even though not 
present at oral argument.”). 
 
 
2 
149 A.3d 271 [hereinafter Angell]; Petrin v. Town of Scarborough, 2016 ME 136, 
¶¶ 2, 8-9, 18, 23-32, 45, 147 A.3d 842.  
[¶2]  In this consolidated appeal, we now consider whether the 
abatements formulated by the Board and reviewed by the Superior Court after 
our remand pass constitutional muster.  Because we conclude that the Board’s 
decision granting the Taxpayers eight percent abatements to their land values, 
as recommended to the Board by the Town, satisfies constitutional 
requirements, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court (Cumberland 
County, Horton, J.) and remand with the direction to affirm the Board’s original 
decision after remand. 
I.  CASE HISTORY 
[¶3]  The issues before us stem from the Town’s former practice of 
allowing any owner of two separate but abutting parcels, one of which was 
undeveloped, to request that those parcels be valued as if they were a single lot 
to attain a lower overall assessment than if the parcels were valued separately.  
See Angell, 2016 ME 152, ¶¶ 15-16, 149 A.3d 271; Petrin, 2016 ME 136, ¶ 8, 
147 A.3d 842.   
[¶4]  In our previous opinions, we concluded that the Board had erred in 
denying the Taxpayers’ abatement requests because the abutting lot program 
 
 
3 
violated the statutory requirement that each parcel of real estate be assessed 
separately, see 36 M.R.S. § 708 (2018), and the constitutional requirement that 
real estate be assessed at its just value, see Me. Const. art. IX, § 8.  See Angell, 
2016 ME 152, ¶ 19, 149 A.3d 271; Petrin, 2016 ME 136, ¶¶ 26-29, 147 A.3d 842.  
We further held that because the abutting lot program violated Maine law and 
imposed property taxes on the Taxpayers at rates that were not imposed on 
similarly situated owners of lots that happened to be abutting other lots of 
those owners, it contravened the Taxpayers’ rights to equal protection.  See 
Angell, 2016 ME 152, ¶¶ 20, 36, 149 A.3d 271; Petrin, 2016 ME 136, ¶¶ 29-31, 
45, 147 A.3d 842.   
[¶5]  Respecting our direction on remand that it provide the Taxpayers 
with appropriate abatements to address this inequality, the Board conducted 
hearings on the issue in early 2017.  Because the Town had continued to 
implement the program, and most of the Taxpayers had continued to file yearly 
abatement requests during the intervening years between their initial requests 
and our decisions in 2016, the parties agreed to expand the scope of the 
proceedings to allow the Board to determine the appropriate abatements for 
 
 
4 
the four tax years in question—which was labeled the “abatement period.”1  
The Board received exhibits from both sides and heard extensive testimony 
from the Town’s Special Deputy Assessor regarding the impact of the abutting 
lot program on both the Town in general and each of the Taxpayers who were 
parties to the proceeding.   
[¶6]  At the conclusion of the hearings, the Town urged the Board to grant 
the Taxpayers eight percent abatements to their land values because the total 
dollar amount of such abatements would be approximately equal to the total 
dollar amount of taxes avoided by the owners participating in the abutting lot 
program over the abatement period.  The Taxpayers contended that they were 
entitled to 31.48 percent abatements to their land values, which, by their 
calculations, was the average discount that the abutting lot program 
participants received to their combined land values.   
                                         
1  Those tax years were 2012-13, 2013-14, 2014-15, and 2015-16.  In our 2016 decisions, we said 
only that the Taxpayers were “entitled to an abatement for the 2012 tax year.”  Angell Family 2012 
Prouts Neck Tr. v. Town of Scarborough, 2016 ME 152, ¶ 21, 149 A.3d 271; Petrin v. Town of 
Scarborough, 2016 ME 136, ¶ 32, 147 A.3d 842.  The Board’s decision to consider abatements for the 
other years in which the discriminatory program affected the Taxpayers is a reasonable 
extrapolation of our directions.  Complicating matters slightly, not all of the Taxpayers filed 
abatement requests for each of the years at issue.  In their brief, the Taxpayers assert that “the parties 
have agreed that those variances present only a ministerial issue, [and] are not material to the 
remedy here.” 
 
 
5 
[¶7]  In May 2017, after deliberating, the Board voted unanimously to 
adopt a written decision granting the Taxpayers eight percent abatements to 
their land values—exclusive of any improvements—for each year during the 
abatement period in which they filed abatement requests.  The Board explained 
that because the combined value of these abatements was equal to the total 
amount of taxes avoided by the abutting lot program participants during the 
abatement period, the eight percent figure provided each Taxpayer with a 
proportionate share of the total benefit of the program. 
[¶8]  The Taxpayers appealed to the Superior Court, see 36 M.R.S. § 843 
(2018); M.R. Civ. P. 80B, which entered a judgment vacating the Board’s 
decision based on its conclusion that the Board’s abatement formula was 
unreasonable because it made the percentage discount a function of the 
number of appealing Taxpayers.  The court remanded the matter to the Board 
with instructions to provide the Taxpayers with abatements that would place 
them “in a position roughly equal to the favored abutting lot owners.” 
[¶9]  On remand from the Superior Court, the Board held an additional 
hearing where the parties mostly relied on the evidence introduced in the prior 
proceedings.  The Taxpayers continued to assert that their proposal of 31.48 
percent abatements was the most appropriate way to remedy the inequality.  
 
 
6 
The Town maintained that the Board’s decision to grant eight percent 
abatements was legally sufficient, but alternatively suggested a different 
method for calculating abatements to comply with the Superior Court’s 
directions. 
[¶10]  Following deliberations, the Board unanimously voted to adopt a 
written decision in June 2018.  In its decision, the Board accepted “the Superior 
Court’s conclusion that . . . [its] May 10, 2017 decision was unreasonable, and 
not in conformity with Maine law” and determined that the Taxpayers were 
entitled to 14.74 percent abatements to their land values.  To reach that 
percentage, the Board made the following calculations for each year of the 
abatement period:   
1. 
It divided the aggregate tax savings for abutting lot program 
participants by the number of program participants to calculate the 
average tax dollar savings per abutting lot program participant. 
 
2. 
It multiplied the average tax dollar savings per abutting lot program 
participant by the number of appealing Taxpayers to calculate the 
average abutting lot program benefit.2   
 
3. 
It divided the average abutting lot program benefit by the total value 
of the appealing Taxpayers’ land multiplied by the applicable mil rate 
to calculate the percentage reduction.   
 
                                         
2  As the Taxpayers point out, it is a misnomer to call this figure the average abutting lot program 
benefit because its formula includes the number of Taxpayers who filed abatement requests.  The 
Town more aptly calls the figure the “Total Abatement Principal.” 
 
 
7 
The Board then averaged the yearly percentage reductions, which resulted in 
the 14.74 percent figure.   
[¶11]  Once again, the Taxpayers appealed to the Superior Court.  The 
Town also appealed to preserve its argument that the original eight percent 
abatements were sufficient.  In January 2019, the Superior Court entered a 
judgment affirming the Board’s decision granting the Taxpayers 14.74 percent 
abatements after finding that the Board’s formula was rational and reasonable.3  
The Superior Court’s judgment being final, see M.R. Civ. P. 80B(n), the 
Taxpayers appealed to us, and the Town cross-appealed seeking reinstatement 
of the eight percent abatements, see M.R. App. 2B(c)(1), 2C(a)(2).4  
II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
 
[¶12]  The Taxpayers contend that the Equal Protection Clause mandates 
that they be extended the same discounts that were provided to participants in 
the abutting lot program.  They assert that neither of the Board’s abatement 
                                         
3  The court modified the interest rate calculation in the Board’s second decision, but that issue is 
moot in light of our conclusion that the Board’s original decision provided adequate relief.  See infra 
n.9. 
4  M.R. Civ. P. 80B(m) provides that when, as here, “the Superior Court remands the case for 
further action or proceedings by the governmental agency, the Superior Court’s decision is not a final 
judgment, and all issues raised on the Superior Court’s review of the governmental action shall be 
preserved in a subsequent appeal taken from a final judgment entered on review of such 
governmental action.” 
 
 
8 
formulas accomplishes this, and that the most appropriate abatements would 
provide them with a 31.48 percent discount to their land assessments, which 
they maintain is the average percentage discount received by the abutting lot 
program participants. 
A. 
Standard of Review and Statutory Requirements 
 
[¶13]  When a party appeals a decision of the Superior Court in an action 
seeking review of decisions by a municipal Board of Assessment Review, “we 
review the Board’s decision[s] directly for abuse of discretion, errors of law, 
and sufficient evidence.”  Petrin, 2016 ME 136, ¶ 13, 147 A.3d 842.  “That the 
record contains evidence inconsistent with the result, or that inconsistent 
conclusions could be drawn from the evidence, does not render the Board’s 
findings invalid if a reasonable mind might accept the relevant evidence as 
adequate to support the Board’s conclusion.”  Terfloth v. Town of Scarborough, 
2014 ME 57, ¶ 10, 90 A.3d 1131 (alterations omitted). 
[¶14]  Although the Superior Court and the Board gave significant weight 
to the requirement of 36 M.R.S. § 843(1) that any abatement provided by the 
Board be “reasonable,” our case law suggests that an abatement is reasonable 
if it does not represent an abuse of discretion or error of law.  See City of 
 
 
9 
Biddeford v. Adams, 1999 ME 49, ¶¶ 24-25, 727 A.2d 346.  Thus, our standard 
of review encompasses the reasonableness requirement.    
[¶15]  The more significant effect of section 843 on our review is that it 
limits our ability to substitute our own judgment for that of the Board.  See 
So. Portland Assocs. v. City of South Portland, 550 A.2d 363, 369 (Me. 1988) 
(stating that we will not intrude on the authority that 36 M.R.S. § 843(1) grants 
to Boards of Assessment Review by substituting our own value estimates or 
acting “as final-offer arbitrators” to resolve opposing figures); see also Weekley 
v. Town of Scarborough, 676 A.2d 932, 934 (Me. 1996) (holding that courts lack 
the authority to determine the just value of properties or “grant relief in the 
nature of an abatement”).   
[¶16]  We find no merit in the Taxpayers’ argument that we should depart 
from this deferential standard because the Board is “hopelessly biased” against 
them.  The aspects of the record that the Taxpayers allege demonstrate “bias” 
merely show the Board members—who are not lawyers—grappling with a 
complicated area of the law and an equally complex set of facts.  
B. 
Constitutional Considerations 
 
[¶17]  As discussed above, we previously determined that the abutting 
lot program was unlawfully discriminatory and violated the Taxpayers’ equal 
 
 
10 
protection rights.5  While our instruction on remand was for the Board to 
provide the Taxpayers with appropriate abatements to remedy this inequality, 
we recognize that this was a challenging directive given the complicated and 
unsettled nature of this area of the law.  See Adams, 727 A.2d at 351 (noting that 
neither “Maine case law nor the tax abatement statute provide guidance on the 
appropriate remedy for unjust discrimination”).  The somewhat tortured 
progression of this matter after our remand demonstrates a need for further 
guidance regarding the range of proper remedies in circumstances like these.   
[¶18]  The United States Supreme Court has explained that “when 
unlawful discrimination infects tax classifications or other legislative 
prescriptions, the Constitution simply calls for equal treatment.  How equality 
is accomplished . . . is a matter on which the Constitution is silent.”  Levin v. 
Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413, 426-27 (2010).  A state “found to have 
                                         
5  Although we reiterate our previous conclusion that the abutting lot program violated the Equal 
Protection Clause, not every tax classification that violates state law violates the Federal Constitution.  
See Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 566 U.S. 673, 687-88 (2012) (cautioning against the risk of 
“transforming ordinary violations of ordinary state tax law into violations of the Federal 
Constitution”).  Generally, a tax classification involving neither a fundamental right nor a suspect 
class “cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the 
disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.”  Id. at 680 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 
509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993)).  The case at hand presents a rare situation, like in Allegheny Pittsburgh 
Coal Co. v. Cty. Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 344-46 (1989), where the facts, when evaluated pursuant to the 
law, preclude any plausible rational basis for the Town’s policy of valuing properties significantly 
below just value on the basis that the properties happen to be abutting other property of the same 
owners.  See Armour, 566 U.S. at 686-88 (discussing the limited applicability of Allegheny); Nordlinger 
v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 14-16 & nn. 6-8 (1992) (same). 
 
 
11 
imposed an impermissibly discriminatory tax retains flexibility in responding 
to this determination,” McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Bevs. & Tobacco, 
496 U.S. 18, 39-40 (1990), because how a state “eliminates unconstitutional 
discrimination ‘plainly is an issue of state law,’” Levin, 560 U.S. at 427 (quoting 
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17-18 (1975)).  Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
explicitly indicated that its practice is “to abstain from deciding the remedial 
effects” of finding “a tax measure constitutionally infirm” to maintain 
“federal-state comity.”  Id. 
 
[¶19]  The Supreme Court has said, however, that the Due Process Clause 
requires states “to provide meaningful backward-looking relief to rectify any 
unconstitutional deprivation.”  McKesson, 496 U.S. at 31.  It has also provided 
guideposts for determining the appropriate remedy for a discriminatory tax.  In 
seeking to effectuate equal tax treatment, a state may (1) invalidate and 
withdraw the benefits from the favored class, (2) extend the benefits to the 
excluded class, or (3) use some other measure.  See Levin, 560 U.S. at 426-27; 
Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 740 (1984).  In considering these options, it 
is important to remember that the Equal Protection Clause imposes no “iron 
rule of equal taxation” and encompasses an area of the law where it is often 
“impracticable and unwise to attempt to lay down any general rule or 
 
 
12 
definition.”  Bell’s Gap R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237 (1890).  
Accordingly, a remedy that is appropriate in one discriminatory tax case may 
not be appropriate in another; each case requires a fact-specific analysis.  
 
[¶20]  As for the first option, the Board in this case could not withdraw 
the abutting lot benefit to achieve equal tax treatment because it lacked the 
authority to retroactively raise the values of the underassessed properties.  See 
Adams, 1999 ME 49, ¶ 26, 727 A.2d 346 (“The Board only has power to grant 
abatements and does not have the authority to remand the case to the assessor 
to recompute the tax.”).   
 
[¶21]  That brings us to the second option—the one favored by the 
Taxpayers—which is to extend the benefit to them.  We need not delve into 
whether either of the abatement amounts decided on by the Board adequately 
extends the benefit of the abutting lot program, because we reject the 
Taxpayers’ contentions that such a remedy is necessary or even appropriate in 
the circumstances of this case.   
[¶22]  The Taxpayers suffered no greater harm from the abutting lot 
program than every other taxpayer in the Town.  Except for the few participants 
in the abutting lot program, all of the approximately 8,500 property taxpayers 
in the Town paid slightly higher taxes as a result of the improper discounts 
 
 
13 
provided by the abutting lot program.  Additionally, the number of Taxpayers 
who sought abatements exceeded the number of property owners who 
received the benefit of the abutting lot program for each of the four years at 
issue.  Thus, to extend the benefit in the manner that the Taxpayers suggest 
would increase by several magnitudes the negative effect of the abutting lot 
program on the nonappealing taxpayers, who bore the same burden of the 
original program as the Taxpayers.6  See Williams v. Griffes, 686 A.2d 964, 967 
(Vt. 1996) (Morse, J. concurring) (a state “need not blindly sacrifice the interest 
of the taxpaying public to the desires of a relative few aggrieved taxpayers” 
when determining the appropriate remedy for a discriminatory tax scheme).  
To magnify rather than rectify the discriminatory effect of the program would 
be an inappropriate mandate under the guise of equality.  Cf. Haman v. Cty. of 
Humboldt, 506 P.2d 993, 997 (Cal. 1973) (the proper remedy for 
discriminatory tax treatment should not increase “discrimination among other 
taxpayers”).  
                                         
6  The Board supportably found that the Town lost $395,397.90 in tax revenue over the abatement 
period as a result of the discounts provided by the abutting lot program.  By comparison, the parties 
agree that providing the Taxpayers with 31.48 percent abatements to their land values would cost 
the Town around $1,600,000. 
 
 
14 
 
[¶23]  Of course, providing any abatements will have some effect on 
nonappealing taxpayers—that is unavoidable—but for us to hold that 
municipalities are required to provide the full extent of the improper benefit in 
cases like this could establish a dangerous precedent.  Consider if instead of 
approximately fifty appealing taxpayers there were 500?  It is not an 
unthinkable scenario given that the Taxpayers here have no better claims of 
discrimination than do the thousands of nonappealing taxpayers who were also 
negatively affected by the abutting lot program.   
[¶24]  Consider also if instead of having a total assessed value of several 
billion dollars, the Town had a total assessed value of $100 million?7  With its 
substantial tax base, the Town here might be able to absorb the cost of 
extending the benefit of the program to the Taxpayers without cutting funding 
for critical services or raising taxes significantly, but the same would not be true 
for municipalities with less substantial tax bases.  In the hypothetical case 
involving 500 plaintiff taxpayers, challenging a similar program, in a town with 
a $100 million tax base, giving unjust benefits to rectify giving unjust benefits 
                                         
7  When we issued our decisions in 2016, we noted that the Town of Scarborough’s total valuation 
was approximately $3.5 billion.  See Petrin v. Town of Scarborough, 2016 ME 136, ¶ 32, 147 A.3d 842.  
According to Maine Revenue Services, the Town’s total valuation as of 2019 is $4.3 billion, which is 
the third highest of any municipality in the State.  See Me. Revenue Svcs., 2019 State Valuation (2019), 
https://www.maine.gov/revenue/propertytax/sidebar/2019_state_valuation.pdf 
(last 
visited 
Dec. 20, 2019).  
 
 
15 
could substantially compromise the municipality’s capacity to provide essential 
services.   
 
[¶25]  What then is the proper remedy?  The Supreme Court has 
suggested a third option: not withdrawing or extending benefits to achieve 
equal tax treatment, but rather using “some other measure.”  Levin, 560 U.S. at 
426.  The best measure of the actual disproportionality borne by the Taxpayers 
here is not the discounts provided by the abutting lot program but rather the 
effect that those discounts had on the Taxpayers.  We alluded to this in our 
previous decisions when we said that we were remanding “for the Board to 
address the unlawfully discriminatory effect of the Town’s abutting property 
program” and described that effect as the “unequal apportionment” of the 
municipal tax burden.  Petrin, 2016 ME 136, ¶¶ 32-33, 45, 147 A.3d 842.  We 
suggested then and hold now that the injury to the Taxpayers was not that their 
properties were over-assessed in comparison to the properties in the abutting 
lot program, but that they paid more than their fair share of taxes as a result of 
the discounts that were unlawfully provided by that program.   
 
[¶26]  The Taxpayers may be made whole by abatements that refund the 
difference between what they paid in taxes and what they would have paid had 
the properties in the abutting lot program been assessed at just value.  Such a 
 
 
16 
remedy corrects the equal protection violation by putting the Taxpayers in the 
position they would have occupied had all taxpayers been treated equally.8  See 
MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline v. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 
494 N.W.2d 535, 537-38 (Neb. 1993), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 960 (1993) 
(approving such a remedy in a similar case of tax discrimination); Keniston v. 
Bd. of Assessors, 407 N.E.2d 1275, 1279-80 (Mass. 1980) (holding that 
abatements limited to the difference between the amount a taxpayer actually 
paid and what he or she “should have paid had a municipality followed lawful 
assessment practices,” do not “offend the equal protection clause” even if the 
abatements do not provide the same treatment that was provided to “the most 
favored class”).   
[¶27]  This approach also satisfies the requirement of due process that 
Taxpayers be provided with meaningful backward-looking relief by refunding 
the portion of their taxes resulting from the unconstitutional discrimination.  
See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 31.  And it accomplishes the purpose of article IX, 
                                         
8  To the extent that the Supreme Court’s decision in McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Bevs. & 
Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 22-23, 36-43 (1990), might be read to suggest that this remedy is insufficient, 
that case is distinguishable from the one at hand because it involved a state excise tax that 
discriminated against out-of-state commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause.  See Tucson Elec. 
Power Co. v. Apache Cty., 912 P.2d 9, 26, 29-31 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (distinguishing the remedies 
discussed in McKesson from the remedies appropriate in cases involving discriminatory property 
taxes).   
 
 
17 
section 8 of the Maine Constitution, which “is to equalize public burdens so that 
a taxpayer contributes to the entire tax burden in proportion to his [or her] 
share of the total value of all property subject to the tax.”  Eastler v. State Tax 
Assessor, 499 A.2d 921, 924 (Me. 1985).    
 
[¶28]  Practically speaking, we recognize that there may be times when 
the amount of such abatements may be too insignificant to justify any individual 
taxpayer taking action against discriminatory tax schemes, but any remedy 
must also avoid unduly burdening other nonappealing taxpayers.  
[¶29]  The record here reflects that as a result of the Board’s original 
decision granting eight percent abatements, a decision recommended by the 
Town, the Taxpayers were collectively refunded approximately $380,000 
before any interest.9  This amount is more than enough to make the Taxpayers 
                                         
9  In its first decision, the Board granted the Taxpayers interest on the abatements at a rate of 
seven percent from the date of overpayment pursuant to 36 M.R.S. § 506-A (2018), based upon the 
Town’s contention that that was the proper interest rate for overpayments.  Seven percent is the 
interest rate that the Town used when it paid the eight percent abatements, which brought the 
collective amount paid to the Taxpayers to approximately $461,000.  After the Superior Court’s 
remand, however, the Town introduced budget orders for the years at issue showing that the correct 
interest rate for overpayments was actually three percent.  Thus, the Taxpayers received an extra 
four percent in interest, which the Town acknowledges must stand if the Board’s original decision is 
reinstated. 
There was also some dispute after the Superior Court’s remand about when the interest should 
begin to run.  If the Town made any error in calculating when the interest began to run when it made 
the eight percent abatement payments, the error was rendered harmless by the extra four percent 
interest and the fact that the Taxpayers received more money than was necessary to make them 
whole.   
 
 
18 
whole and satisfy all of the above-described constitutional requirements.  The 
Town has already paid the eight percent abatements and is advocating for the 
Board’s first decision.  Accordingly, we need not review in detail whether the 
Board’s original decision meets the criteria for deciding the appropriate 
amount of an abatement in another hypothetical case.  Here, where the Board’s 
original decision is supported by the Town, it is not outside the reasonable 
range of discretion allowed the Board under our precedents.  
[¶30]  Based on our analysis and in recognition of our deferential 
standard of review of the Board’s decision-making, we vacate the Superior 
Court’s judgment affirming the Board’s second decision granting 14.74 percent 
abatements and remand with the direction to affirm the Board’s first decision.   
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated.  Remanded to the Superior 
Court 
with 
instructions 
to 
affirm 
the 
Scarborough Board of Assessment Review’s 
decision granting eight percent abatements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
We find no merit in the Taxpayers’ suggestion that they were somehow entitled to twenty-five 
percent interest pursuant to 36 M.R.S. § 504 (2018).  The twenty-five percent interest rate provided 
in section 504 only applies to the recovery of taxes “not raised for a legal object,” and there has been 
no suggestion that the Town collected taxes for an illegal purpose.   
 
 
19 
Jonathan A. Block, Esq., Pierce Atwood LLP, Portland; John B. Shumadine, Esq., 
and Sage M. Friedman, Esq., Murray Plumb & Murray, Portland; and William H. 
Dale, Esq. (orally), Jensen Baird Gardner & Henry, Portland, for appellants 
Kenyon C. Bolton III et al.  
 
Michael A. Hodgins, Esq. (orally), Eaton Peabody, Bangor, and Zachary B. 
Brandwein, Esq., Bernstein Shur, Portland, for cross-appellant Town of 
Scarborough 
 
 
Cumberland County Superior Court docket numbers AP-2018-24, AP-2018-26, AP-2018-30, and  
AP-2018-31 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY