Case Title: State v. Billiter

Citation: 2012-Ohio-5144

Docket Number: 2011-1501

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-11-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Billiter, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5144.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5144 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BILLITER, A.K.A. BILLETER, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. Billiter, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5144.] 
Criminal law—Postrelease control—Res judicata—When a criminal defendant is 
improperly sentenced to postrelease control, res judicata does not bar the 
defendant from collaterally attacking his conviction for escape due to an 
earlier postrelease-control sentencing error. 
(No. 2011-1501—Submitted May 22, 2012—Decided November 7, 2012.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Stark County,  
No. 2010C400292, 2011-Ohio-2230. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
When a criminal defendant is improperly sentenced to postrelease control, res 
judicata does not bar the defendant from collaterally attacking his 
conviction for escape due to an earlier postrelease-control sentencing 
error. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
 
MCGEE BROWN, J. 
{¶ 1} We are asked to resolve a certified conflict between the Fifth and 
Second District Courts of Appeals on whether res judicata bars a criminal 
defendant from arguing that his plea is void due to an earlier postrelease-control 
sentencing error when the defendant has entered a plea of guilty to escape.  We 
hold that if a trial court improperly sentences a defendant to a term of postrelease 
control and the defendant subsequently pleads guilty to violating the terms of that 
postrelease control, the defendant is not barred by principles of res judicata from 
collaterally attacking his conviction as void.   
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} In 1998, appellant, Donald Jack Billiter III, also known as Billeter 
III, pled guilty to charges of aggravated burglary and domestic violence, felonies 
of the first and fifth degrees respectively, and was sentenced to three years in 
prison. The trial court’s sentencing entry imposed a mandatory term of postrelease 
control of “up to a maximum of three (3) years.”  In fact, however, R.C. 
2967.28(B) requires five years of postrelease control for a first-degree felony, not 
up to three years.  Billiter did not appeal his conviction and sentence. 
{¶ 3} On May 20, 2001, Billiter was released from prison and was put 
under the supervision of the Adult Parole Authority for his postrelease control.  
Billiter complied with the terms of post-release control until March 2004, less 
than three years after his release.  Billiter was indicted on a charge of escape, in 
violation of R.C. 2921.34, a second-degree felony, and pled guilty the next month.  
In June 2004, the trial court sentenced Billiter to three years of community 
control.  Billiter did not appeal. 
{¶ 4} Almost immediately, Billiter violated the terms and conditions of 
his community-control sanctions.  On August 26, 2004, the trial court revoked his 
probation and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment for escape.  Billiter did 
not appeal this judgment. 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
{¶ 5} In July 2008, Billiter filed a pro se motion from prison asking the 
court to vacate his conviction and order his release.  Citing our recent precedent, 
he alleged that because the postrelease-control portion of his 1998 sentence was 
contrary to law—up to three years instead of the mandatory five—it was void.  
Because this part of the sentence was void, he continued, he is innocent of the 
charge of escaping it.  The trial court denied his motion, and Billiter appealed.  
The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the denial and held that based on a 
habeas corpus case, Watkins v. Collins, 111 Ohio St.3d 425, 2006-Ohio-5082, 857 
N.E.2d 78, the trial court’s incorrect sentence had nevertheless given Billiter 
proper notice that he was subject to postrelease control, and so the sentence was 
not void. Consequently, res judicata applies to his conviction for escape.  State v. 
Billiter, 5th Dist. No. 2008 CA 00198, 2009-Ohio-2709, ¶ 13, 21.  Billiter did not 
appeal to this court for discretionary jurisdiction.  Shortly thereafter, we issued 
State v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-Ohio-2462, 909 N.E.2d 1254, which 
held, “[I]n the absence of a proper sentencing entry imposing postrelease control, 
the parole board's imposition of postrelease control cannot be enforced.”  Id. at 
¶ 70.  Billiter did not file a motion for reconsideration of the Fifth District’s 
decision. 
{¶ 6} In 2010, 12 years after his original sentence was imposed, Billiter, 
through counsel, moved to withdraw his 2004 guilty plea to escape, on the theory 
that he had never been legally placed on postrelease control.  Therefore, he 
claimed, “he is actually innocent” of the crime of escape and is serving a sentence 
that is a legal nullity.  The trial court denied his motion, and the Fifth District 
affirmed.  State v. Billiter, 5th Dist. No. 2010CA00292, 2011-Ohio-2230, ¶ 21.  
Subsequently, the Fifth District certified a conflict to this court regarding its 
decision and three cases from the Second District Court of Appeals: State v. 
Pointer, 193 Ohio App.3d 674, 2011-Ohio-1419, 953 N.E.2d 853 (2d Dist.2011); 
State v. Robinson, 2d Dist. No. 20120 CA 30, 2011-Ohio-1737; and State v. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Renner, 2d Dist. No. 24019, 2011-Ohio-502.  Upon review of that order, we 
determined that a conflict exists on the following question of law: “Where a 
criminal defendant enters a plea of guilty to escape, does res judicata bar the 
defendant from arguing his plea is void due to a post release control sentencing 
violation?”  State v. Billiter, 130 Ohio St.3d 1436, 2011-Ohio-5883, 957 N.E.2d 
298.  We answer the certified-conflict question in the negative. 
II. Analysis 
{¶ 7} “A sentence that does not include the statutorily mandated term of 
postrelease control is void, is not precluded from appellate review by principles of 
res judicata, and may be reviewed at any time, on direct appeal or by collateral 
attack.” State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, 
paragraph one of the syllabus; See also State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-
Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961, ¶ 16; State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-
6085, 817 N.E.2d 864 (where postrelease notification is absent from the 
sentencing hearing, the sentence is void and must be vacated and remanded to the 
trial court for de novo sentencing); State v. Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d 74, 75, 471 
N.E.2d 774 (1984); Colegrove v. Burns, 175 Ohio St. 437, 195 N.E.2d 811 
(1964). 
{¶ 8} In the instant case, the trial court sentenced Billiter in 1998 to a 
mandatory term of postrelease control of up to a maximum of three years.  
However, the court should have sentenced Billiter to a mandatory term of five 
years of postrelease control.  If this matter related only to Billiter’s 1998 sentence, 
without difficulty we would apply Fischer.  But Billiter does not directly 
challenge his 1998 sentence.  Rather, this case involves a certified conflict about 
whether Billiter can challenge his 2004 guilty plea to the offense of escape on the 
basis that his 1998 postrelease control order was void or whether res judicata bars 
his argument.  Thus, this matter requires the court to consider the effect of Fischer 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
on a subsequent conviction that is based on an erroneous postrelease-control 
sentence. 
{¶ 9} The state argues that the procedural history of Billiter’s case—that 
is, his guilty plea to escape after failing to challenge any of his convictions and 
sentences—should compel this court to apply res judicata.  The state contends that 
because Billiter did not attack his 1998 sentence and because trial and appellate 
courts have already rejected Billiter’s challenge to his escape conviction and 
sentence, under res judicata, he should not be able to raise the issue once more.  
The state claims that Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 
332, addressed issues on direct appeal only and does not require a different result.  
Billiter, on the other hand, relies on our case law to argue that the Adult Parole 
Authority had no authority to supervise him from 2001 to 2004 because the 
court’s 1998 postrelease control order was void.  Billiter contends, therefore, that 
he is factually innocent, his escape conviction is a legal nullity, and res judicata, 
which is founded on principles of fairness and justice, cannot apply. 
{¶ 10} As we have consistently stated, if a trial court imposes a sentence 
that is unauthorized by law, the sentence is void.  “ ‘The effect of determining that 
a judgment is void is well established.  It is as though such proceedings had never 
occurred; the judgment is a mere nullity and the parties are in the same position as 
if there had been no judgment.’ ”  Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 
868 N.E.2d 961, ¶ 12, quoting Romito v. Maxwell, 10 Ohio St.2d 266, 267-268, 
227 N.E.2d 223 (1967).  (Bezak was later modified by State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio 
St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, paragraph two of the syllabus.)  We 
said in Fischer that a void postrelease-control sentence “is not precluded from 
appellate review by principles of res judicata, and may be reviewed at any time, 
on direct appeal or collateral attack.”  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 11} Fischer applies to every criminal conviction, including a collateral 
attack on a void sentence that later results in a guilty plea to the crime of escape.  
R.C. 2921.34(A)(1) provides:  
 
 
No person, knowing the person is under detention, other 
than supervised release detention, or being reckless in that regard, 
shall purposely break or attempt to break the detention, or 
purposely fail to return to detention, either following temporary 
leave granted for a specific purpose or limited period, or at the 
time required when serving a sentence in intermittent confinement. 
 
According to R.C. 2921.01(E), “detention” includes “supervision by an employee 
of the department of rehabilitation and correction of a person on any type of 
release from a state correctional institution.”  See Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 
504, 511-512, 733 N.E.2d 1103 (2000).  Therefore, Fischer necessarily applies, 
and we therefore follow it in holding that res judicata does not control the law 
regarding an escape charge to which a defendant pleads guilty after violating the 
terms of an improperly imposed postrelease control. See Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 
92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, ¶ 30-36; see also State v. Simpkins, 117 
Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, syllabus (expressly 
disfavoring applying res judicata to sentences that do not conform to statutory 
postrelease-control mandates).  Therefore, we hold that if a trial court sentences a 
defendant to an improper term of postrelease control and the defendant 
subsequently pleads guilty to violating postrelease control, the defendant is not 
barred by the principles of res judicata from challenging his conviction. 
{¶ 12} Here, the trial court failed to sentence Billiter to a correct term of 
postrelease control.  Accordingly, his sentence was void. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 
92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, paragraph one of the syllabus.  The trial 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
court’s incorrect sentence for postrelease control in 1998 was insufficient to 
confer authority upon the Adult Parole Authority to impose up to three years of 
postrelease control on Billiter.  Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 
N.E.2d 864, ¶ 17.  Although the Adult Parole Authority actually did place Billiter 
under supervision, see R.C. 2921.01(E), and Billiter did violate the terms of that 
postrelease control in violation of R.C. 2921.34(A)(1), Billiter’s escape 
conviction was based on an invalid sentence.  Accordingly, the trial court was 
without jurisdiction to convict him on the escape charge. 
{¶ 13} Billiter’s conviction and sentence for escape based on a 
postrelease-control error do not fall outside of the scope of our decision in 
Fischer.  Therefore, Billiter is not barred by res judicata from arguing that his plea 
is void due to the trial court’s incorrect imposition of postrelease control. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 14} When a criminal defendant is improperly sentenced to postrelease 
control, res judicata does not bar the defendant from collaterally attacking his 
conviction for escape due to an earlier postrelease-control sentencing error. 
Judgment reversed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 15} Not so long ago, res judicata would have barred this action.  Now, 
because of the quagmire created in the void/voidable line of cases, Billiter can 
arguably claim that he was not under detention because the postrelease portion of 
his sentence was “void.”  See State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-
6238, 942 N.E.2d 332.  We can easily avoid the judicial obstacle course arising 
from the void-sentence doctrine by simply clarifying that mistakes in imposing 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
sentences make the sentence merely voidable—that is, subject to being reversed 
on direct appeal. 
I.  The Majority’s Decision Undermines Res Judicata 
{¶ 16} This should be a simple case.  In 1998, Billiter erroneously 
received a discretionary three years, instead of the mandatory five years, of 
postrelease control as part of his sentence.  Although the sentence was in error, it 
was voidable, not void, and both Billiter and the state had the right to appeal for 
30 days after the sentence was announced.  App.R. 4.  Of course, Billiter had no 
motive to appeal, since the shorter monitored period after prison was to his 
advantage.  But the sentence was res judicata.  Billiter’s later escape charge was 
based upon his breaking detention within the three-year period of postrelease 
control to which he had been sentenced, and his later violation of community 
control led to a new prison term.  Finis.  See, e.g., State v. Boswell, 121 Ohio St.3d 
575, 2009-Ohio-1577, 906 N.E.2d 422, ¶ 17-18 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 17} Now, however, Billiter claims that he is innocent of the crime of 
escape, reasoning that the postrelease portion of his 1998 sentence was “void” by 
virtue of a line of cases that weaken res judicata by allowing collateral attacks on 
sentences that fail to correctly follow a statutory mandate.  See Fischer, 128 Ohio 
St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332 (latest case redefining the term “void” 
for purposes of postrelease control).  Thus, the argument continues, until he was 
resentenced, he was not properly under detention.  And if he was not under 
detention, he could not have committed escape, a violation of R.C. 2921.34, 
which requires that the person be under detention and “purposely break or attempt 
to break the detention, or purposely fail to return to detention.”  Billiter now 
claims that he is serving an unjust sentence so that his guilty plea should be 
withdrawn. 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
{¶ 18} The majority accepts this argument and holds that Billiter may 
challenge his 1998 postrelease-control order 14 years later, even though he never 
filed a direct appeal challenging his original 1998 conviction, his June 2004 
conviction for escape, or his August 2004 sentence following the revocation of his 
probation.  Rather than encouraging finality in judgments, the court has 
encouraged collateral attacks of this type.  “A sentence that does not include the 
statutorily mandated term of postrelease control is void, is not precluded from 
appellate review by principles of res judicata, and may be reviewed at any time, 
on direct appeal or by collateral attack.”  Fischer, paragraph one of the syllabus.  
To allow collateral attack in addition to appeal undermines the principles of res 
judicata.  See State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006–Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 
824, ¶ 16-18. 
II.  Problems Continue to Arise After Fischer 
{¶ 19} The majority opinion in this case highlights the shortcomings of 
the court’s decision in Fischer.  The opinion in Fischer explicitly limited its 
holding to “a discrete vein of cases:  those in which a court does not properly 
impose a statutorily mandated period of postrelease control.”  Fischer at ¶ 31.  
Today, however, the majority has ignored the court’s own limitation of Fischer by 
extending the expansion of collateral attack to other sentences.  This is not the 
first time the court has disregarded the limitation of Fischer.  See State v. Harris, 
132 Ohio St.3d 318, 2012-Ohio-1908, 972 N.E.2d 509, paragraph one of the 
syllabus (expanding the Fischer analysis in concluding that “[w]hen a trial court 
fails to include a mandatory driver’s license suspension as part of an offender’s 
sentence, that part of the sentence is void”). 
{¶ 20} The fact that we are persistently called upon to address issues 
arising from the application of Fischer demonstrates the problems inherent in the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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decision.1  While the majority has not acknowledged that its handling of certain 
sentencing errors continues to create convoluted consequences, commentators 
have begun questioning this court’s jurisprudence in the area.2  And despite the 
majority’s statement that its decision is consistent with previous cases, recent 
history has shown that the court has been anything but clear and consistent in its 
postrelease-control cases, in which it has followed various lines of reasoning only 
to change or reverse course when the consequences of this reasoning become 
unworkable.3 
                                                          
 
1 See, e.g., State v. Lynch, Supreme Court case No. 2012-1361, notice of appeal of Lorain App. 
No. 11CA010031, 2012-Ohio-2975 (asking this court to accept jurisdiction over the issue of 
whether a trial court has jurisdiction to terminate postrelease-control supervision if the defendant 
has completed his prison term and postrelease control is not properly imposed in a judgment entry, 
even if the defendant has notice that postrelease control should be a part of his sentence).   
 
2 See Falvo, Survey of Ohio Law: Ohio Supreme Court Decisions: II. Cases Concerning Criminal 
Procedure: C. Post-Release Control: State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St. 3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 
Decided March 20, 2008, 35 Ohio N.U.L.Rev. 1182 (2009); McGraw, “Oh By the Way…”: Why 
the Supreme Court of Ohio Lost Its Way in State of Ohio v. Fisher, 128 Ohio St. 3d 92 (2010), 80 
U.Cin.L.Rev. 567 (2011); Lau, Survey of Ohio Law: Ohio Supreme Court Decisions: I. Cases 
Concerning State and Federal Constitutional Law: E. Sixth Amendment: Criminal Resentencing: 
State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St. 3d 94, 2007 Ohio 3250, 868 N.E.2d 718 Decided July 11, 2007, 34 
Ohio N.U.L.Rev. 945 (2008); Medelius, Survey of Ohio Law: Ohio Supreme Court Decisions: V. 
Other Criminal Law: A. Appellate Review of Sentencing Errors: State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St. 3d 
92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942N.E.2d 332 decided December 23, 2010, 37 Ohio N.U.L.Rev. 949 
(2011). 
 
3 Compare State v. Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d 74, 75, 471 N.E.2d 774 (1984) (“Any attempt by a 
court to disregard statutory requirements when imposing a sentence renders the attempted sentence 
a nullity or void”), with State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, 
¶ 27 (“When a trial court fails to notify an offender about postrelease control at the sentencing 
hearing but incorporates that notice into its journal entry imposing sentence, it fails to comply with 
the mandatory provisions of R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(c) and (d), and, therefore, the sentence must be 
vacated and the matter remanded to the trial court for resentencing”). Compare Hernandez v. 
Kelly, 108 Ohio St.3d 395, 2006-Ohio-126, 844 N.E.2d 301, ¶ 32 (in the absence of appropriate 
notification of postrelease control by a trial court and incorporation of postrelease control in its 
sentencing entry, the Adult Parole Authority is not authorized to put an offender on postrelease 
control, and if the offender’s sentence has expired, the offender is entitled to a writ of habeas 
corpus) with Watkins v. Collins, 111 Ohio St.3d 425, 2006-Ohio-5082, 857 N.E.2d 78, ¶ 51-53 
(habeas corpus is not available to contest sentencing entries that erroneously refer to discretionary 
rather than mandatory postrelease control).  Compare State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-
Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961, syllabus (when postrelease control is not properly included in a 
sentence, that sentence is void, and the offender is entitled to a new sentencing hearing) with State 
January Term, 2012 
11 
 
{¶ 21} An additional concern raised by this opinion is its apparent 
resurrection of State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 
961, a case that was partially overruled by Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-
Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, paragraph two of the syllabus.  The majority cites 
with approval Bezak’s formulation of what “void” means in the postrelease 
control context: 
 
As we have consistently stated, if a trial court imposes a 
sentence that is unauthorized by law, the sentence is void.  “ ‘The 
effect of determining that a judgment is void is well established.  It 
is as though such proceedings had never occurred; the judgment is 
a mere nullity and the parties are in the same position as if there 
had been no judgment.’ ”  Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-
                                                                                                                                                               
v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E2d 306, ¶ 29 (sentences imposed after 
improper judicial fact-finding are not void, but voidable).  See also State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio 
St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, syllabus (the state is entitled to a new sentencing 
hearing to have postrelease control imposed when mandatory postrelease control was not properly 
included in a sentence); State v. Boswell, 121 Ohio St.3d 575, 2009-Ohio-1577, 906 N.E.2d 422, 
¶ 1 (when a defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea to a crime that required postrelease control 
but the trial court failed to impose it, the motion to withdraw the guilty plea must be treated as a 
presentence motion under Crim.R. 32.1); State v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-Ohio-2462, 
909 N.E.2d 1254, ¶ 69-72 (discharging a defendant who had received improper notification of 
postrelease control and had already completed his prison term); State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 
173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus (for sentences 
imposed prior to July 11, 2006, in which the trial court failed to properly impose postrelease 
control, the trial court shall hold a de novo sentencing hearing to correct the sentence, but for 
sentences imposed on or after July 11, 2006, in which the trial court failed to properly impose 
postrelease control, the trial court shall follow R.C. 2929.191 to correct the sentence); State v. 
Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, ¶ 26-29, 40 (when a judge fails to 
impose statutorily mandated postrelease control as part of a defendant’s sentence, only part of the 
sentence is void and must be set aside, and res judicata applies to all other non-postrelease-control 
portions of the sentence.  Bezak and its progeny are overruled to the extent that those cases 
required a de novo sentencing hearing to correct sentences in which postrelease control was not 
properly imposed); State v. Qualls, 131 Ohio St.3d 499, 2012-Ohio-1111, 947 N.E.2d 718, 
syllabus (omission of postrelease control from a sentencing entry can be corrected with a nunc pro 
tunc entry when a defendant is notified about postrelease control at the sentencing hearing.). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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3250, 868 N.E.2d 961, ¶ 12, quoting Romito v. Maxwell, 10 Ohio 
St.2d 266, 267-268, 227 N.E.2d 223 (1967). 
 
Majority opinion at ¶ 10.  The majority’s move to reaffirm this portion of Bezak 
directly contradicts the principle set forth in Fischer that the court claimed it 
“overlooked in Bezak”:  “when an appellate court concludes that a sentence 
imposed by a trial court is in part void, only the portion that is void may be 
vacated or otherwise amended.”  Fischer at ¶ 28.  As the saying goes, the majority 
cannot have its cake and eat it, too.  Either a sentence is “void” as demanded by 
Bezak or “in part void” as reconstituted in Fischer.  Far from being consistent, the 
majority is completely baffling in its approach to what “void” means in the 
postrelease-control context. 
{¶ 22} Furthermore, the court’s decision today raises serious doubts as to 
the continued vitality of State v. Jordan, 124 Ohio St. 3d 397, 2010-Ohio-281, 
922 N.E.2d 951.  Jordan held, “To obtain a conviction for escape under R.C. 
2921.34(A)(1), the state may prove that the defendant was subject to postrelease 
control without proving that during a sentencing hearing the trial court orally 
notified the defendant that he would be subject to postrelease control.”  Id. at 
syllabus.  In Jordan, the trial court’s sentencing entry properly imposed a three-
year term of postrelease control, but no record existed as to whether the court 
orally advised him during sentencing that he would be subject to postrelease 
control.  Id. at ¶ 3-4.  Like Billiter, Jordan failed to comply with the terms of 
postrelease control and was found guilty of escape in violation of R.C. 2921.34.  
Id.  Because the case did not arise as a direct challenge to Jordan’s postrelease 
control via an appeal of his sentence, this court held that the case did not fall 
under the control of Bezak and other postrelease-control cases.  Id. at ¶ 12.  
January Term, 2012 
13 
 
Instead, the majority held that ordinary standards regarding the sufficiency of 
evidence applied.  Id. 
{¶ 23} The Jordan court noted that its holding rested upon the fact that 
there was no evidence that postrelease control was improperly imposed, and it 
stated that its holding “does not reach the question whether a defendant can be 
convicted of escape when the evidence affirmatively demonstrates that the 
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction lacked the authority to supervise the 
accused.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at ¶ 14-15.  However, given the majority’s silence 
today regarding Jordan and its expansion of Fischer to this line of cases, it 
remains unclear whether Jordan survives or whether it too has been swallowed by 
the whale that is Fischer. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 24} The implications of the majority’s decision are troubling for the 
doctrine of res judicata.  Fourteen years after Billiter’s original sentence was 
announced, this court has now declared it to be void.  While in this case, the 
court’s holding works in Billiter’s favor, the possibility exists that it could be 
applied in favor of the state, meaning that if some portion of a defendant’s 
postrelease control is found to be improper, he or she could be hauled into court 
14, 20, or even 50 years after the original sentence had been “finalized.” 
{¶ 25} The application of Fischer in this case is even more problematic 
than it has been in this court’s other postrelease-control cases.  Before this case, 
res judicata ruled the day: once Billiter was released from prison and placed on 
postrelease control, both he and the state knew that he would be subject to the 
supervision of the APA for three years.  If Billiter failed to comply with the terms 
of his postrelease control, he would face certain consequences, but if he met his 
requirements for three years, he would no longer be subject to supervision.  For 
his failure to comply, Billiter was indicted on a charge of escape, he pled guilty, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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and he was sentenced.  Today, the majority explodes a settled process, and no one 
can be certain when a sentence is truly final. 
{¶ 26} The Fischer majority stated, “[I]t is likely that our work in this 
regard is drawing to a close, at least for purposes of void sentences.”  Id. at ¶ 31.  
But two years after that decision was announced, there is no end in sight to the 
void/voidable conundrum.  I agree with the majority opinion to the extent that 
under current precedent, defendants should be allowed to ignore res judicata to 
the same extent as the state by collaterally attacking a sentence.  However, I 
continue to dissent fundamentally from this line of cases and would hold that 
without an appeal by either party, this sentence took effect.  Any sentencing error 
made the sentence voidable, not void, and should have been appealed within 30 
days.  Otherwise, res judicata demands that the sentence stand. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 27} I respectfully dissent. 
{¶ 28} We accepted this case as a certified conflict from decisions of the 
Second and Fifth District Courts of Appeals in order to resolve the following 
question of law: “Where a criminal defendant enters a plea of guilty to escape, 
does res judicata bar the defendant from arguing his plea is void due to a post 
release control sentencing violation?” 
{¶ 29} In my view, our decision in State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 
2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, controls the outcome of this case.  In Fischer, 
we recognized that “when a judge fails to impose statutorily mandated postrelease 
control as part of a defendant's sentence, that part of the sentence is void and must 
be set aside.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at ¶ 26.  The court further explained, “Although 
the doctrine of res judicata does not preclude review of a void sentence, res 
January Term, 2012 
15 
 
judicata still applies to other aspects of the merits of a conviction, including the 
determination of guilt and the lawful elements of the ensuing sentence.”  Id. at 
paragraph three of the syllabus.  The lesson from Fischer is that a sentence is void 
only to the extent it fails to impose a statutorily mandated term on an offender. 
{¶ 30} Here, the error in the sentence is that the trial court imposed an 
insufficient term of postrelease control—“up to a maximum of three years”—for 
the 1998 conviction for aggravated burglary when R.C. 2967.28(B) required a 
five-year mandatory term of postrelease control for a first-degree felony.  
Nonetheless, the court did impose postrelease control to the extent that the 
sentence complied with the statute—that is, to the extent that it imposed three 
years of the mandatory five-year term of postrelease control.  This is so because 
the trial court lacked the power to exempt Billiter from postrelease control.  As we 
observed in Fischer, “The failure to impose a statutorily mandated period of 
postrelease control is more than administrative or clerical error. It is an act that 
lacks both statutory and constitutional authority.”  Fischer at ¶ 22. 
{¶ 31} I therefore cannot agree that imposing a term of postrelease control 
of insufficient length renders that part of the sentence a “mere nullity,” relieving 
Billiter from supervision required by statute, imposed by the court, and executed 
by the Adult Parole Authority. 
{¶ 32} In Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 733 N.E.2d 1103 (2000), we 
addressed the constitutional significance of including postrelease control in the 
sentence, explaining that the Adult Parole Authority may impose postrelease-
control sanctions only if a trial court incorporates postrelease control into its 
original sentence. Id. at 512-513. 
{¶ 33} But this case does not involve a situation in which the trial court 
failed to impose any term of postrelease control, thereby depriving the Adult 
Parole Authority of the power to execute the sentence and supervise the offender 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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on release.  Nor is this a case in which the term of postrelease control expired 
before the escape occurred or in which the trial court imposed a period of 
supervision longer than permitted by law. 
{¶ 34} In contrast to those circumstances, here it is undisputed that Billiter 
received notice, both at the sentencing hearing and in the sentencing entry, that he 
would be supervised by the Adult Parole Authority for up to three years after his 
release from prison.  And it is undisputed that he complied with that supervision 
for almost three years, believing himself to be under detention.  Although the 
sanction is insufficient as a matter of law and subject to correction before 
completion of the sentence, the trial court nonetheless actually imposed a three-
year term of postrelease control, the Adult Parole Authority had the authority to 
execute it, and Billiter therefore committed the crime of escape when he broke his 
detention. 
{¶ 35} Accordingly, because Billiter’s conviction for escape is not void, 
his belated challenge to it is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and I would 
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
John D. Ferrero, Stark County Prosecuting Attorney, and Richard Mark 
Caldwell, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 
______________________