Case Title: State v. Morningstar

Citation: 

Docket Number: 103433

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2014-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 103,433 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
GARY LEE MORNINGSTAR, JR., 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
The jurisdictional bar in K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1) prohibiting review of presumptive 
sentences does not extend to appellate review of a district court's interpretation of its 
sentencing authority under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act or an appellate court 
mandate. 
 
2. 
Interpretation of an appellate court mandate and the determination whether the 
district court complied with it on remand are questions of law subject to de novo review. 
 
3. 
Interpretation of sentencing statutes is a question of law subject to de novo review. 
An appellate court will not read into a statute something not readily found in its text. 
 
2 
 
 
 
4. 
A district court simultaneously sentencing multiple convictions generally has 
discretion to order the sentences to be served consecutively. See K.S.A. 21-4608(a); 
K.S.A. 21-4720(b).  
 
5.  
When a term of imprisonment is vacated on appeal and remanded for 
resentencing, the district court's authority in setting the length of the new prison term 
includes determining on remand whether it will run consecutive to the defendant's other 
terms of imprisonment. 
 
6. 
The Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act permits a district court to order the 
sentence for the primary crime of conviction to run consecutive to a defendant's other 
sentences. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed May 6, 2011. 
Appeal from Sumner District Court; R. SCOTT MCQUIN, judge. Opinion filed July 18, 2014. Judgment of 
the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal is reversed. Judgment of the district court is affirmed on the 
issue subject to our review. 
 
Elaine M. Esparza, of Harper, argued the cause, and Kerwin L. Spencer, of Wellington, was on 
the briefs for appellant, and Gary Lee Morningstar, Jr., appellant pro se, was on a supplemental brief.  
 
Matthew B. Metcalf, acting county attorney, argued the cause, and Evan C. Watson, county 
attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee. 
 
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The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BILES, J.:  This appeal concerns a consecutive sentence ordered after an appellate 
remand in a multiple-conviction case. See State v. Morningstar, 289 Kan. 488, 495, 213 
P.3d 1045 (2009) (Morningstar I). The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal because it 
determined it was without jurisdiction because the new sentence was within the 
presumptive range under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA). See State v. 
Morningstar, No. 103,433, 2011 WL 1878003, at *2 (Kan. App. 2011) (unpublished 
opinion) (Morningstar II); see also K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1) (no direct appeal jurisdiction 
over presumptive sentences). We granted review to consider the panel's jurisdictional 
analysis, as well as its determination that the district court acted properly. 
 
We hold that the panel erred in dismissing the appeal because appellate 
jurisdiction exists to determine whether the district court had authority to impose the 
consecutive sentence, even if that sentence fell within the presumptive range. See State v. 
Warren, 297 Kan. 881, 882-85, 304 P.3d 1288 (2013) (appellate court may consider 
limited question whether district court properly interpreted sentencing statute). As to the 
merits, we affirm the district court because the KSGA permits a district court imposing a 
term of imprisonment upon resentencing to determine anew whether the prison term runs 
consecutive to a defendant's other sentences. We also hold that a district court may 
designate that the sentence for the primary crime of conviction runs consecutive to the 
defendant's other sentences under the KSGA's multiple-convictioin sentencing statute. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Gary L. Morningstar, Jr., was convicted of one count each of rape of a child under 
14, aggravated battery, abuse of a child, and child endangerment. At his sentencing 
hearing, the district court imposed an off-grid hard 25 life sentence for the rape 
4 
 
 
 
conviction as required by Jessica's Law. See K.S.A. 21-4643. The court also applied the 
statutory sentencing grid to impose term-of-years sentences for the remaining 
convictions. See K.S.A. 21-4704. In doing so, the court used Morningstar's full criminal 
history score to enhance the sentence for the aggravated battery conviction, which was 
the highest severity level grid crime. See K.S.A. 21-4720(b)(2)-(4). The district court 
then ordered the term-of-years sentences to run concurrent with each other and with the 
off-grid hard 25 life sentence for the rape conviction. See K.S.A. 21-4608(a); K.S.A. 21-
4720(b).  
 
In Morningstar I, this court affirmed Morningstar's convictions but vacated the 
off-grid rape sentence because the jury had not determined Morningstar's age, which was 
necessary to impose that sentence under K.S.A. 21-4643. In other words, Morningstar's 
off-grid sentence was not lawful. See 289 Kan. at 494-95. We remanded for resentencing 
on the rape conviction "as a felony on the KSGA nondrug sentencing grid." (Emphasis 
added.) 289 Kan. at 495.  
 
On remand, the parties recognized that imposing a grid sentence for rape also 
implicated Morningstar's aggravated battery sentence because the rape conviction became 
Morningstar's highest severity level grid offense. See K.S.A. 21-3502(c) (rape of child 
under 14 a severity level 1 felony). This meant the district court was required to apply 
Morningstar's full criminal history to the rape conviction, which in turn required 
resentencing for the aggravated battery conviction without applying a criminal history 
score. See K.S.A. 21-4720(b)(2), (3), (5); State v. Sims, 294 Kan. 821, 825, 280 P.3d 780 
(2012) (sentence illegal when, e.g., it differs in character or term from that authorized by 
statute). 
 
Given those KSGA requirements, the district court sentenced Morningstar to 186 
months' imprisonment for rape based on the appropriate grid box given his criminal 
5 
 
 
 
history score. It also sentenced Morningstar to 43 months' imprisonment for aggravated 
battery applying no criminal history score. It then ordered the rape sentence to run 
consecutive to the other sentences. As a practical matter, Morningstar is required to serve 
a total sentence of 229 months' imprisonment—the sum of the rape sentence and the 
aggravated battery sentence (which is the longest of Morningstar's concurrent sentences 
for aggravated battery, abuse of a child, and child endangerment).  
 
Morningstar challenged whether the district court on remand could order the rape 
sentence to run consecutive to his other sentences. In an unpublished opinion, the Court 
of Appeals held the district court did not violate the Morningstar I mandate because the 
original rape sentence was necessarily nullified as a consequence of our decision to 
vacate it. The panel reasoned this allowed the district court to start over when 
resentencing on that offense under the KSGA. But after engaging in this analysis and 
conclusion, the panel then determined that Morningstar's sentence was not reviewable on 
appeal under K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1) because it was within the presumptive sentence range. 
The panel held that Morningstar's new sentence was subject to K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1) 
(prohibition of direct appeal jurisdiction over presumptive sentences). Morningstar II, 
2011 WL 1878003, at *2. 
 
Morningstar timely petitioned this court for review, which we granted under 
K.S.A. 20-3018(b), obtaining jurisdiction under K.S.A. 60-2101(b). 
 
We must note Morningstar raised other issues in his petition for review and in a 
supplemental brief filed with this court that we do not reach because our review is limited 
to what Morningstar contends the panel wrongly decided. See Supreme Court Rule 
8.03(g)(1) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 77). At oral argument, Morningstar agreed the only 
questions properly presented are the panel's jurisdictional analysis and his consecutive 
sentence challenge. 
6 
 
 
 
 
DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION 
 
We address this issue first because without subject matter jurisdiction, a court 
cannot address a case's merits. See State v. Huerta, 291 Kan. 831, 840-41, 247 P.3d 1043 
(2011) ("If subject matter jurisdiction is in question, that issue needs to be resolved first. 
The merits come second."). 
 
Kansas appellate courts have jurisdiction to "correct, modify, vacate or reverse any 
act, order, or judgment of a district court to assure that any such act, order or judgment is 
just, legal and free of abuse." K.S.A. 60-2101(a), (b). Under the KSGA, appellate courts 
lack jurisdiction over presumptive sentences. K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1). But this prohibition 
does not extend to appellate review of a district court's interpretation of its sentencing 
authority under the KSGA. See Warren, 297 Kan. at 885 (Court of Appeals had 
jurisdiction, despite sentence within presumptive range, to review claim that district court 
erroneously believed it did not possess authority to impose downward departure). 
 
Morningstar's consecutive sentencing challenge concerns not merely the ultimate 
sentence imposed but the district court's authority to impose it. This is not a challenge to 
a presumptive sentence precluded by K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1). The panel erred when it 
dismissed Morningstar's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we consider the 
merits of the challenge to his newly imposed consecutive sentence. 
 
IMPOSITION OF CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE 
 
Morningstar asserts three reasons why the district court could not run the rape 
sentence consecutive to his other sentences:  (1) Morningstar I did not permit the district 
court to impose consecutive sentences on remand; (2) there was no statutory authority for 
7 
 
 
 
the district court to reconsider on remand its original decision to run Morningstar's 
sentences concurrent with one another; and (3) the sentence for a defendant's primary 
crime of conviction cannot run consecutive to a defendant's other sentences. We disagree 
with each argument. 
 
The Morningstar I mandate 
 
Interpretation of an appellate court mandate and the determination of whether the 
district court complied with it on remand are both questions of law subject to de novo 
review. See State v. Guder, 293 Kan. 763, 765, 267 P.3d 751 (2012). 
 
In State v. Heywood, 245 Kan. 615, 618, 783 P.2d 890 (1989), the court held in a 
pre-KSGA case that a mandate like the one at issue here did not prohibit a district court 
from changing concurrent sentences to sentences that run consecutive with one another. 
In that case, the convictions initially sentenced as class B felonies were remanded for 
resentencing as class C felonies. 245 Kan. at 618. The Heywood court held that the 
change from concurrent to consecutive sentences did not exceed the mandate because the 
sentences imposed on remand were within the district court's statutory authority under the 
then-existing sentencing scheme. The court explained that in remanding the convictions 
for resentencing as class C felonies, it intended that the district court be permitted to 
exercise that authority. 245 Kan. at 618. 
 
Similarly, our decision in Morningstar I concerned only whether Morningstar 
could be sentenced off-grid for rape under Jessica's Law due to the State's failure to prove 
the defendant's age to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. In ordering resentencing under 
the grid, our mandate did not restrict the district court's statutory sentencing authority on 
remand. It was intended only to permit the district court to exercise whatever authority it 
might have under the KSGA. We consider that question next.  
8 
 
 
 
 
Authority to modify rape sentence to run consecutive to other sentences under the KSGA  
 
Morningstar argues the district court lacked statutory authority to order the new 
rape sentence to run consecutive to his other sentences, citing language in K.S.A. 21-
4720(b)(5). He does not argue the district court's action was vindictive or violated due 
process or double jeopardy.   
 
The Court of Appeals held the district court had authority to change a sentence 
from concurrent to consecutive upon resentencing as long as there was no presumption of 
vindictiveness, citing Heywood, 245 Kan. at 618-20. Morningstar II, 2011 WL 1878003, 
at *2. And as discussed, the panel is correct that Heywood affirmed the district court's 
authority to resentence a defendant to consecutive terms when the sentence for the same 
crime of conviction was remanded for resentencing.  
 
But Heywood was decided before the KSGA's enactment, and the Heywood court 
relied on the district court's broader pre-KSGA discretion when imposing a sentence in 
supporting its outcome. 245 Kan. at 617-18. Subsequent decisions limiting a district 
court's jurisdiction to modify a sentence under the KSGA raise questions whether 
Heywood remains good law when the question concerns the district court's statutory 
authority. 
 
In State v. Miller, 260 Kan. 892, 897, 926 P.2d 652 (1996), the court held the 
legislature intentionally eliminated a sentencing court's authority to modify sentences by 
omitting provisions like the one that permitted pre-KSGA sentencing courts to modify 
already imposed sentences within 120 days of sentencing. 260 Kan. at 897. The court 
held:  "'When a lawful sentence has been imposed under KSGA, the sentencing court has 
9 
 
 
 
no jurisdiction to modify that sentence except to correct 'arithmetic or clerical errors' 
pursuant to K.S.A. 21-4721(i)." (Emphasis added.) 260 Kan. at 900. 
 
Admittedly, Miller is factually distinguishable because it did not involve 
modification of a sentence on remand for resentencing. But the same principle—that 
courts have limited jurisdiction to modify sentences—was also applied in Guder, 293 
Kan. 763, which did involve resentencing of an unlawful sentence. 
 
In Guder, which was decided after the panel issued its decision in this case, the 
question concerned a multiple-conviction case in which an appellate court remanded only 
the defendant's primary crime of conviction for resentencing, while leaving intact the 
other convictions and sentences on those convictions. On remand, the district court 
modified one of the defendant's lawful, non-vacated sentences to run consecutive to the 
other sentences. In a second appeal challenging the resentencing, the defendant argued 
the district court lacked authority to modify the previously imposed concurrent sentence 
when resentencing for a different conviction. On review, our court agreed with the 
defendant that the district court lacked authority to modify the previously imposed, non-
vacated sentence. 293 Kan. at 767. 
 
In doing so, the Guder court noted that prior to the KSGA district courts could 
resentence defendants on all counts in multiple-conviction cases, even if the sentence for 
only one count was disturbed on appeal, because the sentences collectively comprised a 
single, whole judgment. 293 Kan. at 765-66 (citing State v. Woodbury, 133 Kan. 1, 2, 298 
P. 794 [1931], and subsequent cases). But the Guder court held that the KSGA abrogated 
that earlier authority and further held that a previously imposed, lawful sentence that was 
not vacated on appeal could not be modified at resentencing absent specific statutory 
authority to do so. 293 Kan. at 765-66. The Guder court then examined K.S.A. 21-
10 
 
 
 
4720(b)(5) to determine whether there was statutory authority for the district court's 
action. That statute states: 
 
"Nonbase sentences will not have criminal history scores applied, as calculated in 
the criminal history I column of the grid, but base sentences will have the full criminal 
history score assigned. In the event a conviction designated as the primary crime in a 
multiple conviction case is reversed on appeal, the appellate court shall remand the 
multiple conviction case for resentencing. Upon resentencing, if the case remains a 
multiple conviction case the court shall follow all of the provisions of this section 
concerning the sentencing of multiple conviction cases." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 21-
4720(b)(5).  
 
The Guder court summarized this statute as providing that "in the event that a 
conviction of the primary crime is reversed on appeal, the sentencing court is to follow 
all of the KSGA provisions concerning sentencing in multiple conviction cases." 
(Emphasis added.) 293 Kan. at 766. The court then held that because the KSGA does not 
provide other grounds to modify, authority to modify does not exist in a multiple-
conviction case unless the conviction for the primary crime is reversed. Applying that 
rule, the Guder court held a district court lacks jurisdiction when resentencing in a 
multiple-conviction case to modify non-vacated sentences for the other crimes of 
conviction because only the sentence for the primary offense was vacated, the conviction 
itself was not reversed. 293 Kan. at 767. 
 
But the caveat to Guder is that the non-vacated sentences must be otherwise 
lawful when the case is returned to the district court on remand. See Miller, 260 Kan. at 
899 (recognizing the KSGA limits a court's powers to modify a lawful sentence). In 
Morningstar's case, the district court had to correct the aggravated battery sentence as 
well because it was no longer the primary offense after the off-grid rape sentence was 
vacated. In other words, Morningstar's criminal history score could no longer enhance the 
11 
 
 
 
aggravated battery sentence, so absent modification on remand Morningstar's aggravated 
battery sentence would have been an illegal sentence. See K.S.A. 21-4720(b)(2), (3), (5); 
Sims, 294 Kan. at 825 (sentence illegal when, e.g., it differs in character or term from that 
authorized by statute).   
 
Guder is distinguishable because the district court here did not modify the 
sentences for any convictions that were not affected by our decision in Morningstar I. 
The district court had to make changes on remand to both Morningstar's rape sentence 
and his original aggravated battery sentence so that the whole judgment conformed to the 
KSGA's requirements. For this reason, we reject Morningstar's argument that K.S.A. 21-
4720(b)(5) prohibited the district court from addressing the concurrent or consecutive 
nature of the rape sentence. But the question still remains whether that aspect of the rape 
sentence was within the district court's power to address when ensuring Morningstar's 
sentences conformed to the KSGA. We hold that it was. 
 
The sentence for each crime of conviction is multifaceted. In some cases, it 
encompasses confinement or other manners of durational punishment (such as probation), 
the place and duration of such punishments, monetary penalties (fines, fees, expenses, or 
restitution), and offender registration and postrelease supervision requirements. See 
K.S.A. 21-4603d; K.S.A. 21-4608; K.S.A. 21-4704; K.S.A. 21-4720. The panel 
concluded that the district court was "required to resentence Morningstar de novo, as if he 
had never been sentenced on the crime before." Morningstar, 2011 WL 1878003, at *1. 
In so stating, the panel's analysis seemingly implicates all aspects of a defendant's 
sentence. But this would far exceed what the district court actually did and what 
Morningstar challenges. We are solely concerned with the district court's decision to run 
the newly imposed rape sentence consecutive to Morningstar's other sentences.    
 
12 
 
 
 
The district court was tasked with imposing a grid sentence for the rape 
conviction. At minimum, it needed to exercise its discretion and select the appropriate 
term of months from the range supplied by the applicable grid block. See K.S.A. 21-
4704(e)(1). But selecting the term from the applicable grid box is not the only decision a 
district court must make in determining a grid sentence's length. See K.S.A. 21-4716 
(providing mechanism for departing from presumptive sentences supplied by KSGA 
grid); K.S.A. 21-4720(a) (providing discretion to run sentences consecutive in multiple-
conviction cases). 
 
In cases like Morningstar's involving multiple convictions, whether a sentence 
runs consecutive to the defendant's other sentence or sentences is related, if not 
intertwined, with the sentencing court's discretion to choose the appropriate term of 
months. See K.S.A. 21-4720(a), (b) (consecutive sentences yield prison term equal to 
sum of the consecutive terms); see also State v. Stafford, 255 Kan. 807, 816-20, 878 P.2d 
820 (1994) (upholding pre-KSGA consecutive sentences as within sentencing court's 
discretion when district court considered statutory factors for determining sentences' 
minimum terms in ordering sentences to run consecutively). The district court necessarily 
had to apply the KSGA provisions governing the terms of grid sentences to determine the 
sentence's length. In doing so, the district court had to exercise its independent 
judgment—within the limitations imposed by the KSGA—to determine the appropriate 
sentence. 
 
We hold that running the new rape sentence consecutive to the other sentences 
was a permissible mechanism available to the district court under the KSGA for 
regulating the sentence's length. The district court properly addressed the facets of 
Morningstar's vacated rape sentence that were before it on remand, which included 
whether the new sentence should run consecutive to the other sentences.   
 
13 
 
 
 
Authority to run sentence for primary crime of conviction consecutive to other sentences  
 
Finally, Morningstar argues K.S.A. 21-4720 prohibited the district court from 
ordering the sentence for his primary crime, rape, to run consecutive to his other 
sentences. Interpretation of the sentencing statutes is a question of law subject to 
unlimited review. See Guder, 293 Kan. at 765. 
 
Morningstar does little to develop this argument, which hinders the analysis. But 
essentially he contends the sentencing guidelines require the base sentence to be 
established first and only after that can a sentence for a nonbase crime be determined, 
including whether it runs consecutive to the base sentence. We do not find this 
requirement in the statutes.   
 
K.S.A. 21-4608 and K.S.A. 21-4720 both permit a district court to run two or 
more sentences consecutive with one another. In multiple-conviction cases, K.S.A. 21-
4720 does not dictate the order in which consecutive grid sentences must be imposed or 
served. More precisely, the statute does not say the sentence for a primary crime cannot 
be run consecutive to another sentence or sentences. 
 
In any event, it is inconsequential whether the sentence for a primary crime is 
consecutive to another grid sentence, or whether the converse is true. All consecutive grid 
sentences are aggregated into a single controlling sentence. See K.S.A. 21-4720(b)(1). 
What matters is only whether the sentences are consecutive with one another and, 
therefore, aggregated; or concurrent with one another and, therefore, not aggregated. And 
while authorizing the district court to impose consecutive sentences, K.S.A. 21-4720 
contains no express prohibition against running the sentence for a primary crime of 
conviction consecutive to a defendant's other sentences. We will not read into the statute 
a prohibition that does not exist in its text.  
14 
 
 
 
 
We hold the district court did not err when it ordered the rape sentence to run 
consecutive to Morningstar's other sentences. The net result, which is a controlling 229-
month prison term, is in harmony with the statute. The Court of Appeals decision 
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction is reversed. The sentence imposed by district 
court is affirmed. 
 
* * *  
 
JOHNSON, J., dissenting:  While I agree with the majority that the Court of Appeals 
erred in finding no jurisdiction to review the district court's application of the Kansas 
Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA), I disagree with the majority's determination that the 
sentencing court, on remand, had authority to order consecutive sentencing. I disagree 
with the majority's rationale on more than one level. 
 
First, I discern that our holding in State v. Guder, 293 Kan. 763, 267 P.3d 751 
(2012), affects our analysis in this case, although it does not completely resolve our 
current question. Guder involved a resentencing after the Court of Appeals had vacated 
the sentence on the primary crime because the original sentencing court had used an 
incorrect severity level for that crime. The mandate did not vacate any of the other 
nonbase sentences. On remand, the district court changed one of the nonbase sentences to 
run consecutive to, rather than concurrent with, the newly imposed base sentence. The 
district court relied on State v. Woodbury, 133 Kan. 1, 2, 298 P. 794 (1931), and its 
progeny, which stood for the proposition that "a sentence pronounced following 
conviction is a singular entity that cannot be subdivided into correct and erroneous 
counts, and the sentencing court therefore [has] the latitude on remand to modify its 
original sentence on all counts, including those for which no error [has] been found." 
Guder, 293 Kan. at 765.  
15 
 
 
 
 
The unanimous Guder court, which included all of the members of the majority in 
this case, found that the KSGA required the reversal of the district court's modification of 
the non-vacated, nonbase sentences, specifically noting that"[s]tatutory changes to the 
jurisdiction of district courts to modify sentences have superseded the Woodbury 
rationale." 293 Kan. at 766. In other words, where the appellate court vacates one of the 
sentences in a multiple-conviction case, the district court does not have the authority "to 
modify any of the sentences that were not vacated on appeal." 293 Kan. at 767. 
Moreover, changing a sentence from concurrent to consecutive is a sentence 
modification.  
 
The majority acknowledges Guder but curiously discusses the factual distinction 
in this case that required the resentencing court to change the primary offense from the 
aggravated battery conviction to the rape conviction. First, I would note that the 
resentencing court pronounced that the rape conviction would be imposed consecutively. 
See Abasolo v. State, 284 Kan. 299, 303-04, 160 P.3d 471 (2007) (A sentence is effective 
upon pronouncement from the bench, regardless of the court's intent at the time the 
sentence is pronounced.). The district court did not say that it was modifying the 
aggravated battery sentence from concurrent to consecutive. See State v. Spear, 297 Kan. 
780, 798, 304 P.3d 1246 (2013) (K.S.A. 21-4608 provides that sentences shall be served 
concurrently where judge fails to pronounce how they will be served); State v. Jackson, 
262 Kan. 119, 140, 936 P.2d 761 (1997) ("The sentence . . . was effective when 
pronounced. Because the record of the sentencing hearing is silent as to whether the 
sentence should run concurrently or consecutively, the sentence must be served 
concurrent with the other sentences."). Accordingly, I fail to see how the need to 
recalculate the prison term on the aggravated battery sentence affects whether the rape 
sentence could be imposed consecutively. 
 
16 
 
 
 
Likewise, I would not interpret the court's right to correct an illegal sentence under 
K.S.A. 22-3504 as providing the authority to modify the lawful portions of that sentence 
in violation of K.S.A. 21-4721(i). When the rape sentence was remanded for 
resentencing, the term of imprisonment on the aggravated battery became an illegal 
sentence because it did not conform to the applicable statutory provisions with regard to 
the term of authorized punishment. See Makthepharak v. State, 298 Kan. 573, 578, 314 
P.3d 876 (2013) (An illegal sentence is defined, in part, as a "'sentence that does not 
conform to the applicable statutory provision, either in the character or the term of 
authorized punishment.'"); State v. Trotter, 296 Kan. 898, 902, 295 P.3d 1039 (2013). To 
correct the illegality in the aggravated battery sentence, which was not vacated on appeal, 
the grid box prison term had to be recalculated. But the order to serve the aggravated 
battery sentence concurrently did not need to change to effect a legal sentence. 
Accordingly, changing the sentence to consecutive would be a prohibited modification 
rather than a permitted correction. Guder suggests that only the vacated or erroneous 
portions of a sentence may be modified on remand. 
 
The majority does mention the true distinction between our case and Guder, which 
is that the district court ostensibly modified the vacated sentence rather than modifying 
one of the non-vacated sentences. Perhaps one could debate whether a district court has 
the authority to do indirectly what it is prohibited from doing directly, e.g., whether a 
court can modify the vacated sentence to run consecutive to the non-vacated sentences 
when the non-vacated sentences are not amenable to being modified to run consecutive to 
the vacated sentence. But we need not decide that question today. Because the vacated 
sentence became the primary or base sentence, it was imposed first and, therefore, it 
could not have been imposed consecutive to itself. 
 
The majority finds authority to run a base sentence consecutive to the nonbase 
sentences from the fact that K.S.A. 21-4720 does not expressly prohibit it, i.e., the statute 
17 
 
 
 
is silent about which sentence is imposed first and which are then imposed consecutively. 
In other contexts, we have found that statutory silence is the equivalent of an ambiguity. 
See State v. Holman, 295 Kan. 116, 149-50, 284 P.3d 251 (2012) (If the legislature's 
intent is unclear as to the unit of prosecution defined by a statute, for the purposes of 
double jeopardy analysis, the rule of lenity applies, which provides that statutory silence 
and ambiguity regarding the unit of prosecution is construed in favor of the defendant.); 
State v. Thompson, 287 Kan. 238, 249, 200 P.3d 22 (2009) ("Under the rule of lenity, 
statutory silence and ambiguity regarding the unit of prosecution is construed in favor of 
the defendant."); Bradley v. Sudler, 172 Kan. 367, 371, 239 P.2d 921 (1952) (recognizing 
that statute was ambiguous based on silence).  
 
But we need not rely solely upon silence to find ambiguity in K.S.A. 21-4720, 
which is the statute addressing sentencing in multiple conviction cases. The provisions in 
subsection (b)(4) address limiting the total prison sentence to twice the base sentence and 
include the following statement:  "This limit shall apply only to the total sentence, and it 
shall not be necessary to reduce the duration of any of the nonbase sentences imposed to 
be served consecutively to the base sentence." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 21-4720(b)(4). 
Subsection (b)(4) is not linguistically or conceptually consistent with the notion that a 
base sentence can be imposed consecutive to the nonbase sentences. In that instance, the 
base sentence would be the one that need not be reduced to meet the twice-the-base limit. 
On the other hand, the language of the subsection supports the reasonable and sensible 
interpretation that the base sentence is imposed first and the nonbase sentences are then 
imposed either concurrent with or consecutive to the base sentence.  
 
At the very least, the provisions of K.S.A. 21-4720 are ambiguous about whether a 
base sentence for the primary crime is amenable to being designated as consecutive to the 
nonbase sentences for the remaining crimes. Where ambiguity exists, the rule of lenity 
dictates that a court strictly construe a criminal statute for the benefit of the defendant, 
18 
 
 
 
resolving any reasonable doubt as to the statute's meaning in favor of the accused. State v. 
LaGrange, 294 Kan. 623, Syl. ¶ 2, 279 P.3d 105 (2012). If there are two reasonable and 
sensible interpretations of a criminal statute, the rule of lenity requires the court to adopt 
the one that favors the accused. State v. Coman, 294 Kan. 84, 97, 273 P.3d 701 (2012).  
 
The other reason the majority gives for allowing the base sentence to be the one 
that is imposed consecutively is that "it is inconsequential." But, of course, the additional 
3 years and 7 months that Morningstar will be required to remain in prison under the 
majority's interpretation of the applicable statutes will likely be of some consequence to 
him. In other words, the interpretation favoring the accused in this instance is that the 
base sentence for the primary crime is imposed first and it is not amenable to being 
imposed consecutive to later imposed nonbase sentences. 
 
Consequently, I would find that the district court erred in resentencing, and I 
would vacate that portion of the rape sentence that unlawfully ordered it to be served 
consecutive to the nonbase offenses that were not before the court for resentencing. 
 
BEIER, J., joins in the foregoing dissent.