Case Title: BOSTON v. BUCHANAN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96470

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2003-12-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
BOSTON v. BUCHANAN  BOSTON v. BUCHANAN 2003 OK 114 89 P.3d 1034 Case Number: 96470 Decided: 12/23/2003 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA MELBA C. BOSTON and GLEN C. BOSTON, Plaintiffs/Appellants, ON CERTIORARI TO THE OKLAHOMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION I ¶0 Husband and wife brought a medical malpractice action in the District Court of Oklahoma County. Defendants answered, discovery occurred, and then nothing was filed in the matter for approximately twenty months. The District Court, Honorable Carolyn R. Ricks, District Judge, issued a notice of intent to dismiss for lack of prosecution, and thereafter dismissed the action for that reason. Husband and wife appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the dismissal. We hold that: 1. A trial court may not dismiss an action pursuant to CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS VACATED; AND THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT REVERSED Michael H. Brady and Ronald A. Schaulat, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs/Appellants. Michael J. Heron, Nathan A. Lockhart, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee, St. Anthony Hospital. J. Roger Hurt, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendants/Appellees, Robert T. Buchanan, M.D., Chester W. Beam, M.D., and Plastic and Reconstructive Institute. SUMMERS, J. ¶1 This case involves a trial court's dismissal of an action based upon its determination that the action was not diligently prosecuted by Plaintiffs. The primary issue on certiorari is the difference between dismissing an action pursuant to ¶2 A husband and wife brought a medical malpractice action in the District Court of Oklahoma County in 1995, and some discovery occurred. In November 1997 the action was dismissed because of Plaintiffs' failure to diligently prosecute the action. Plaintiffs re- filed their action in October 1998, and service of process occurred in April 1999. Defendants filed answers in April and May 1999. Interrogatories and requests for production of documents were sent to Plaintiffs in May 1999. Plaintiffs responded in July 1999. ¶3 Then on April 3, 2001 the trial court mailed to the parties a notice of intent to dismiss the case "pursuant to Rule 9 of the Rules for District Courts for failure to diligently prosecute this action, as the last action of record in this case occurred on the 15th day of July, 1999." The notice scheduled a hearing for the matter in May 2001. Plaintiffs' attorney filed a motion to enter the cause on a jury docket. Defendants objected to the motion to enter the cause on a jury docket, because there had been "almost two (2) years inactivity in this case", and because the last activity had been plaintiffs responses to Defendants' discovery requests in 1999. ¶4 The District Court's order states that the case came on for hearing on the court's Disposition Docket, and that notice was mailed to the parties. The Court then found that the case should be dismissed for failure to diligently prosecute pursuant to Rule 9(b), Rules of the District Courts and/or ¶5 Section 1083 states as follows: § 1083. Actions not at issue and in which no pleadings filed for 1 year-- Dismissal Any action which is not at issue and in which no pleading has been filed or other action taken for a year and in which no motion or demurrer has been pending during any part of said year shall be dismissed without prejudice by the court on its own motion after notice to the parties or their attorneys of record; providing, the court may upon written application and for good cause shown, by order in writing allow the action to remain upon its docket. 12 O.S.2001 § 1083, (emphasis added). Plaintiffs argue that the case was "at issue" and not subject to dismissal pursuant to § 1083. We agree. ¶6 In Davidson v. Gregory, It is true that in certain circumstances under our system of pleading, when the answer is filed no further pleadings are necessary, and clearly in such a case it would be at issue on the filing of an answer. In the case of Roush v. Chester it appears that the answer contains certain affirmative defenses or new matter to which the plaintiff has replied. When the parties to a suit have filed all their pleadings and pleading has ended, the case is at issue. Andrew Stephens on Pleading (2d Ed.) 147; 2 Cooley's Blackstone, 1091; Black's Law Dictionary, 657; Dickerson v. Stoll, 24 N.J.Law, 550. Roush v. District Court of Eighth Judicial Dist. for Cascade County ¶7 We hold that a case is at issue when issues are made up, or when the defendant has failed to plead within the time allowed by law or by an order of the court. Davidson v. Gregory, supra. This will most often occur when an answer is filed and no further pleadings are necessary. Section 1083 clearly limits the scope of its application to an action which is not at issue. In the matter before us today answers were filed and no further pleading occurred. The action was at issue, and § 1083 does not apply. ¶8 The District Court cited Rule 9(b) of the Rules for the District Courts as alternative authority for dismissing the action. Rule 9 states in pertinent part as follows: Diligence in prosecution b. Where an action is not diligently prosecuted, the court may require the plaintiff to show why the action should not be dismissed. If the plaintiff does not show good cause why the action should not be dismissed, the court shall dismiss the action without prejudice. A court shall dismiss actions in which no action has been taken for a year as provided in 12 O. S.2001 Ch. 2, App, Rules for District Courts, Rule 9. Rule 9(b) does not expressly limit its application to cases at issue, and Defendants argue that the dismissal can stand on the authority of Rule 9 alone. The legal issue presented by this argument is whether § 1083 limits the scope of Rule 9(b). ¶9 Rule 9(b) was created by an Order of this Court in 1961, and provided for dismissal of an action because of a plaintiff's lack of diligence in prosecuting the action. 12 O.S.1961 Ch. 2, App. ¶10 The first two sentences of Rule 9(b) state that a district court may dismiss an action, and they do not refer to cases not being at issue, nor a one-year period of inactivity. The last sentence of Rule 9(b) refers to a period of inactivity for one-year and dismissal of a case pursuant to § 1083. May a court dismiss a case the meets the criteria of the first two sentences of Rule 9(b), but does not satisfy the criteria of the last sentence applying § 1083? We have indicated at different times that Rule 9(b) was limited or was not limited by § 1083, and we now resolve this conflict. ¶11 After Rule 9 was amended in 1981 we were presented with the situation whether the first two sentences of Rule 9(b) acted as authority independent of § 1083. In Matter of Estate of Goyne, ¶12 Our analysis in Goyne included reasoning that Rule 9(b) was based upon § 1083, and that § 1083 would not support dismissing an action when a motion remained pending for adjudication. Id. ¶13 Then in B & M International Trading Co. v. Woodie Ayers Chevrolet, Inc., Section 1083 directs the court to dismiss without prejudice any action "which is not at issue and in which no pleading has been filed or other action taken for a year and in which no motion or demurrer has been pending during any part of said year ..." Since the record here reflects that all of defendant's demurrers, motions to make more definite and certain, and motions to compel more complete answers to interrogatories were pending at the time of the trial court's dismissal, section 1083 does not apply, and the court must exercise its discretion to dismiss under Rule 9(b). Dismissal under that Rule must be without prejudice. Finding no authority upon which the trial court could dismiss the present action with prejudice, we hold that dismissal under Rule 9(b) was proper, but that such dismissal is to be without prejudice. B & M International Trading Co., We conclude that B & M International Trading Co. is correct. ¶14 We have recognized a court's inherent power to dismiss an action because of a party's failure to prosecute an action. Winters By and Through Winters v. City of Oklahoma City, ¶15 The first two sentences of Rule 9(b) state: "Where an action is not diligently prosecuted, the court may require the plaintiff to show why the action should not be dismissed. If the plaintiff does not show good cause why the action should not be dismissed, the court shall dismiss the action without prejudice." The issue before us today is whether plaintiffs showed "good cause" why the action should not be dismissed. ¶16 A trial court adjudication of "good cause" is reviewed on appeal using an abuse of discretion standard. Fischer v. Baptist Health Care of Oklahoma, ¶17 One issue of law involves the often-stated public policy that legal controversies should be decided upon their merits. For example, when discussing default judgments we said the following: While it is true that diligence of litigants in attending to their matters pending in the courts is of importance, and while it is a significant function of the courts that the litigation before them be determined and disposed of as rapidly as possible, it is also important that all litigants be given a reasonable opportunity to have their day in court, and to have their rights and liberties tried upon the merits. The latter is and should be the primary right of the parties and duty of the courts. Beck v. Jarrett We have also emphasized the public policy that encourages actions being tried on their merits when reviewing a judgment dismissing an action for delay in service of process. Fischer v. Baptist Health Care of Oklahoma, ¶18 In Gorman v. City of Phoenix, 152 Ariz. 179, 731 P.2d 74 (1987), the court explained the purpose of its rule for dismissing cases when certain litigation procedures were not timely performed: Uniform Rule V should be used to dispose of abandoned cases and to encourage litigants to resolve their disputes quickly. It should not be used to trap the unwary or the momentarily negligent. The purpose of Uniform Rule V(e) is procedural, not substantive; the rule is merely "a convenient administrative practice" designed to rid court calendars of inactive or abandoned cases and to prod the judge and the attorneys involved to bring cases to trial as quickly as possible. Gorman In Vaughn v. Chung, 119 Wash. 2d 273 , ¶19 Beck states that a party should not be denied a reasonable opportunity to have his or her case decided on the merits. Courts must construe Rule 9(b) consistent with that opportunity. Campbell, Gorman, and Vaughn indicate that a dismissal for failure to prosecute should not be used against the momentarily negligent, but used to prod attorneys to bring cases to trial and dismiss the truly dormant cases. We agree that Rule 9(b) should not be used against the momentarily negligent. ¶20 Rule 9(b) places a burden upon the party resisting dismissal to show "good cause" for not dismissing a case. First, in an effort to show that the delay was "momentarily" and not perpetual, Plaintiffs point to a motion to enter the cause on the jury docket that was filed after the court's notice but prior to dismissal. Secondly, they point to illness on the part of both Plaintiffs, and they allege that this hampered discovery. Third, they state that they were not given notice of the standard of conduct required prior to a court exercising its inherent powers and issuing a notice of dismissal, and that because of this lack of notice the trial court was required to issue a warning prior to its notice, or allow them to cure the offense by modifying their litigation conduct after the notice was issued. Fourth, they argue that the dismissal will result in a dismissal with prejudice, although the face of the order states that it is without prejudice. Fifth, they point to the trial court's alleged improper use of a prior action in determining whether the present action was timely prosecuted. We reverse the trial court on its use of § 1083 and Rule 9(b), and need not address these grounds as framed by Plaintiffs, except as they relate to § 1083 and Rule 9(b) and as their resolution is necessary for appellate adjudication herein. ¶21 Plaintiffs filed a motion to enter the cause on the jury docket. The trial court declined to consider the motion. In Beck we said that: The courts should always be loath to deny a determination of a case upon its merits by reason of the actual or supposed fault of an attorney and one of the parties litigant. Especially is this true when issue of fact showing a cause of action of apparent merit on the part of the plaintiff and a defense of contended merit on the part of the defendants has been joined by appropriate pleadings. Beck v. Jarrett When the trial court stated that it would not consider the motion it was concluding, for the purpose of Rule 9(b), it simply did not matter if one or more of the parties was prepared to advance the action for trial on the merits. ¶22 The Rules for District Courts provide that a scheduling order should be issued "as soon as feasible after the case is at issue." 12 O.S.2001 Ch.2, App. 1, Rule 5(C). Local Rule 17 of the Seventh Judicial District states that the trial judge may enter a scheduling order on the date the motion to enter is heard. ¶23 Clearly, lawyers should not calendar litigation dates based upon a disposition docket or a court's sua sponte notice of dismissal. These two actions taken by a trial court are not alternatives to a lawyer's intra-office case-tracking system. On the other hand, a trial court should consider both the public policy of having cases tried on their merits and a party's intent to advance a case by a motion to enter when the trial court seeks to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute. We agree that merely filing a motion to enter would not ipso facto cure a lengthy lapse by party's failure to prosecute an action. ¶24 Plaintiffs state that the effect of the dismissal is a dismissal with prejudice, although the order stated that it was a dismissal without prejudice. They are correct. A party is allowed only one refiling if a case fails other than on its merits if the statute of limitations has run. ¶25 The dismissal herein was based upon Rule 9(b), consistent with a court's inherent power to dismiss a matter for a party's failure to timely prosecute. Public policy favors this inherent power of a court no less than a plaintiff's interest in having a matter tried on its merits. We decline to adopt Plaintiffs' argument that would necessarily give precedence to a party's dilatory conduct over a trial court's inherent powers. ¶26 The Arizona court in Gorman , however, stated that when "expiration of the statute of limitations turns a dismissal without prejudice into a dismissal with prejudice, the trial court must take an especially hard look at the actual circumstances of the case before it." Id. ¶27 Plaintiffs state on certiorari that the circumstances provided the trial court with good cause for not dismissing the action. They argued that their illnesses prevented a more active prosecution of the case. Defendants disputed this. However, we conclude that the appellate record is insufficient to review this ground. ¶28 The certified docket sheet for the trial court proceeding does not show any filed response by Plaintiffs to the notice to show cause other than the motion to enter. The appellate record does not contain a transcript of the hearing held on the court's dismissal. The appellate record contains a Narrative Statement by Plaintiffs, a Response to Plaintiffs' Narrative Statement authored by Defendants, and the trial court's order in response to these two filings. ¶29 This Court's rules provide for a narrative statement in lieu of a transcript (Okla.Sup.Ct.R. 1.30), and a statement in lieu of a record on appeal (Okla.Sup.Ct.R. 1.31.). Plaintiffs' statement states that it is submitted pursuant to Rule 1.30 and is in lieu of a transcript. Rule 1.30 is derived from former Rule 1.22 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases, 12 O.S.1991 Ch. 15, app. 2. We explained Rule 1.22 in Cox v. Smith, ¶30 In the case today, Plaintiffs' narrative makes statements of fact relating to particular medical problems of Plaintiffs. One of Plaintiffs' lawyers signed the attached affidavit stating that the statement was true and correct to the best of her knowledge and belief. Defendants' objected with statements that no admissible evidence was introduced at the hearing on the nature and extent of Plaintiffs' medical problems. Defendants further stated that Plaintiffs' counsel did make some statements regarding health problems of Plaintiffs at the hearing, but that no evidence was presented on the issue of whether the health problems were of such a nature to prevent either Plaintiffs or their counsel from proceeding with the case. ¶31 The judge filed a separate statement stating that "she could not recall exactly, but did not believe she had as much detail regarding Plaintiffs' medical conditions as what was contained in Plaintiffs' Narrative Statement." The judge-authored statement then states that therefore both Plaintiffs' and Defendants' statements are to be submitted on appeal. The judge-signed statement appears to incorporate therein both the proposed statement by Plaintiffs and the objections by Defendants. ¶32 What were the medical conditions of Plaintiffs? Did Plaintiffs' produce facts on their medical conditions to the trial court in a judicially cognizable form for that proceeding? Neither of these questions is "settled" or resolved by the trial court's signed statement. The narrative statement in lieu of transcript is for the purpose of making a record of what actually happened at a previous trial or proceeding. This Court is presented with conflicting statements of what was said at the hearing. These conflicting statements are insufficient to create a settled statement on facts relating to Plaintiffs' medical conditions. Further, because we reverse the trial court on other grounds we need not attempt to address from the inconsistent narrative statements whether the form of the proof before the trial court was proper. ¶33 Plaintiffs suggest that Rule 9(b), by reason of its lack of specificity, is too vague to constitutionally support a dismissal. Applying a statute, or rule, with a facially uncertain meaning to a specific case includes a review of the previous judicial construction of that statute or rule. This is so because "clarity at the requisite level may be supplied by judicial gloss on an otherwise uncertain statute . . . ." U.S. v. Lanier, ¶34 Judicial decisions construing a common law principle are appropriate for a court's analysis when a court also construes the meaning of a statute that codifies that common law principle. See, e.g., Schepp v. Hess, ¶35 In Baker v. Deichman, While time is not the sole issue in determining the question it nearly always happens, as it did in this case, that other factors arise, such as the loss of evidence, death of witnesses or parties, or other developments, rendering it inequitable to continue permission to prosecute. Both from an appraisal of the situation in this case and from comparison of it with other decisions in the books we are of the opinion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition. Baker v. Deichman Baker ¶36 In B & M International Trading Co. v. Woodie Ayers Chevrolet, Inc., "although a trial court has inherent power to dismiss a case for want of prosecution, such power is not unlimited, and should not be exercised where the record shows, as here that both parties nursed the case along with the court's approval." B & M International Trading Co., We thus focused upon a fact other than the mere passage of time. Indeed, the Cervi court discussed other factors for a court to consider when dismissing an action because of a delay in prosecution, e.g., settlement negotiations, plaintiffs' hiring new counsel, and the defendant being responsible for part of the delay. Id. ¶37 The narrative statement prepared by Plaintiffs purports to contain the reasons set forth by the trial judge explaining why the action was dismissed. That statement contains no reference to prejudice suffered by the Defendants because of the delay in prosecuting the action, nor does the narrative statement signed by the trial judge. The narrative statement provided by Defendants states that the trial judge "noted it was prejudicial for defendants to defend care in that 1993 surgery, and post-surgical care carrying over from 1994 to 2001." But the narrative statement prepared by Defendants provides no facts or reasons therein how Plaintiff's action, to the extent that it related to "post-surgical care carrying over from 1994 to 2001" caused Defendants prejudice in defending an action in 2001. We note the passage of eight years from the surgery in 1993 to the dismissal of the action in 2001, but the narrative statements do not provide any hint for identifying the nature of the prejudice suffered by Defendants in defending such allegations. The order of dismissal is silent on the issue of prejudice suffered by Defendants. ¶38 Defendants also state that the trial court said that the passage of time in this case was extremely prejudicial to Defendants. However, Plaintiffs' argue that no showing was made in the trial court that Defendants would suffer any prejudice. The narrative statements do not refer to any specific facts used for the trial court's determination of prejudice. Defendants state that the trial court's finding of prejudice is simply this: If the case is allowed to proceed and Plaintiffs are unable to make assurances that their future medical conditions would be sufficiently healthy to participate in further discovery and trial, then the matter would not be tried until some distant undetermined point in the future, and Defendants would be prejudiced by a potentially unresolved claim. ¶39 This argument is rejected for two reasons. First, in responding to a different argument Defendants state that no facts were before the trial court showing a lack of ability on the part of either Plaintiffs or their counsel in participating in discovery. If no facts are before the court to show that Plaintiffs cannot participate in discovery and trial, then no facts support Defendants' concept of prejudice that is based upon their view of an uncertain future trial date. Further, reversing the trial court's order does not necessarily allow Plaintiffs to delay trying the case until an indefinite time in the future. In this case, plaintiffs filed a motion to enter and, presumably, litigation deadlines will be set by the trial court upon remand. Rule 5(C) of the Rules for District Courts, supra. ¶40 When the trial court uses an incorrect legal standard we review that issue de novo. Christian v. Gray, ¶41 Neither the order of dismissal nor the various narrative statements make any distinction between the standards for dismissing a case pursuant to § 1083 and an exercise of a court's inherent powers pursuant to Rule 9(b). This Court, as an appellate tribunal, does not make first-instance rulings. ACCOSIF v. American States Insurance Co., ¶42 In sum, ¶43 The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals is vacated, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ¶44 WATT, C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, KAUGER, SUMMERS, BOUDREAU, JJ. - Concur ¶45 HARGRAVE, WINCHESTER, JJ. - Concur in Result ¶46 OPALA, V.C.J. - Dissents FOOT