Case Title: State v. Prater

Citation: 463 P.2d 640, 77 Wash. 2d 526

Docket Number: 40283, 40300

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1970-01-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
77 Wn.2d 526 (1970) 463 P.2d 640 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. HARRY LEE PRATER, Appellant. In the Matter of the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus of HARRY LEE PRATER, Petitioner, v. JACK D. PORTER, as Sheriff of King County, Respondent.[*] Nos. 40283, 40300. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. January 8, 1970. *527 Gustav G. Kostakos, for appellant (appointed counsel for appeal). Charles O. Carroll and Steve Paul Moen, for respondent. ROSELLINI, J. Appellant Harry Lee Prater appeals from the judgment and sentence entered on his conviction by jury of the crime of taking and riding in a motor vehicle without permission of the owner. He was sentenced to a maximum term of 10 years in a state penal institution. About 8:15 p.m. on October 30, 1967, officers William J. Noon and Carl E. Ahl of the Seattle Police Department observed a 1956 Chevrolet automobile traveling at an excessive rate of speed in the 2200 block of East Terrace Street. In order to estimate the speed of the vehicle, the officers commenced following it. While pacing the vehicle, the officers checked their list of stolen vehicles and found that the license number of the vehicle was on it. Shortly thereafter, confirmation was received via the radio from police headquarters that this vehicle was still on the list. About this time, the officers stopped the vehicle and placed the occupants, the appellant and one Ron S., under arrest. They noticed that the ignition wires had been torn loose from the dashboard and were dangling. After their arrest, the appellant, aged 17 years, and his passenger, were placed in the police car and taken to the Youth Service Center, which is the juvenile reception and detention facility for King County. This center is located about four blocks from the scene of the arrest. A declination hearing was conducted by the Juvenile Department of the King County Superior Court in connection with a petition filed in that court, pursuant to RCW 13.04. November 22, 1967, the order declining jurisdiction was signed by the juvenile court commissioner and the appellant was then bound over to be tried as an adult by the superior court. Before the trial, a hearing was held, under Criminal Rule for Superior Court 101.20W, RCW vol. 0, to determine the admissibility of certain statements made by the appellant *528 to officers Noon and Ahl shortly after his arrest and before his admittance to the Youth Service Center. While taking the appellant and his companion to the Youth Service Center, the officers questioned the youths regarding the ownership of the car which the appellant was driving. The appellant, in response to these questions, at first stated that his father was doing some work on the car, but later said he didn't know whose car it was and that he had just taken it from a parking lot. At the pretrial hearing, the appellant contended that he was merely advised of his right to remain silent and that anything he said could be held against him. He denied that he was advised of the remaining rights enumerated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). The state, however, disputed the appellant's contentions. Officer Noon testified that he had advised both appellant and Ron S. of all their rights pursuant to Miranda prior to any questioning. Officer Ahl stated he did not recall specifically the rights concerning which he advised the appellant, but stated it was his practice to advise all suspects of their Miranda rights. After reviewing all the testimony at the pretrial hearing, the trial court entered the following findings and conclusions under CrR 101.20W (c): The conclusion of the court was based upon the testimony of the defendant: The trial court chose not to believe the defendant when he responded to questions of his counsel as follows: The appellant has never asserted that he did not know that the juvenile court might waive jurisdiction or that he might be prosecuted in superior court. The appellant assigns error to the admission in evidence of the oral statement made by the appellant to the police that the car he had been driving was loaned to him by his father, and the later statement that he had seen the car parked and had simply driven it away. The appellant cites the case of Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161, 163-64 (D.C. Cir.1961), as requiring the exclusion of any damaging statement made by a juvenile to police officers prior to the time that the juvenile court waived jurisdiction. In the Harling case, the juvenile had been detained approximately 12 hours before he made the incriminating statement that he had taken part in a robbery for which he was later prosecuted as a adult, the juvenile court having waived jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia said: Noting that the evidence was in sharp conflict as to whether the juvenile had actually participated in the robbery or had been merely an innocent bystander, the court held that the evidence of his incriminating statement was highly prejudicial and required that the case be remanded for a new trial. The Harling case was decided before In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967). At the time, juvenile proceedings were considered a civil matter and constitutional rights of juveniles were not considered important in the protective, rehabilitative, and "non-adversary" procedure. There was no requirement that juveniles be advised of such rights, and thus any statement given was presumably given without an intelligent waiver of such rights. In In re Gault, supra, the United States Supreme Court granted to juveniles their constitutional rights, including the right to be warned that any statement made while in custody could be used against him in a court of law. See Miranda v. Arizona, supra. [1] The Oregon court announced in State v. Gullings, 244 Ore. 173, 416 P.2d 311 (1966), a rule which we think is more appropriate than that in the Harling case. Although Gault had not yet established the precedent, a perceptive court recognized the applicability of constitutional safeguards. At pp. 178-79, speaking of admissions made at the time of arrest and before the juvenile had been placed in the custody of the juvenile court, the Oregon court said: (Footnotes omitted.) After considering the question whether a rule permitting the admission of statements given to arresting officers would adversely affect the relationship between the juvenile court and the children with whom it deals, the court concluded, at 180: (Footnote omitted.) We are of the opinion that such a rule affords the safeguards prescribed by Gault, does not threaten the integrity and proper functioning of the juvenile courts, and at the same time permits a legitimate use of evidence which is given under conditions importing trustworthiness. The trial court found that the appellant's constitutional rights were protected and that the statements of the appellant were made freely and voluntarily after proper warning. The record abundantly supports the trial court. The *533 boy was 17 years old, had been given the "Miranda warnings" many times before, and did not assert that he was unaware of the possibility of superior court prosecution. The evidence supports the trial court's findings that he understood all that was said to him and that he freely waived his rights. The appellant's conviction does not rest alone upon his admission but upon other independent and convincing evidence. The car which he was driving when he was apprehended had been reported stolen. The side window of the car had been broken. The officers noticed that the ignition wires were torn and hanging loose, indicating the car had been "hot wired." The owner of the car testified that it had been stolen. The passenger who was arrested in the car testified that he was present when the car was stolen; that the appellant came to his house with the stolen car and that he decided to go for a ride in the car. [2] The officers were taking the appellant to the juvenile center in accordance with the mandates of RCW 13.04.120[1] and 13.04.140, when the appellant gave the questioned admission. This statute does not forbid police to question a child who is suspected of committing a crime, provided the questioning does not delay the process of taking the child directly to the juvenile authorities. The constitution requires that a juvenile be advised of his rights and that he be warned of the possible consequences of an admission, but neither the constitution nor the statute forbids police to ask any questions of a child who is arrested. [3] It is urged that the new Juvenile Court Rules adopted December 31, 1968, would prohibit the gathering of information from the juvenile. These rules apply to all proceedings conducted in the juvenile court, but they do not apply to police officers making inquiries which are reasonably indicated in making an arrest. This is not to imply that the police may engage in a full custodial interrogation. But it would be unrealistic to assume that an officer can properly perform his duties without asking questions. Assuming the questioning is reasonably related to the performance of the officer's duties, he may inquire; but he must make sure that a juvenile understands the Miranda warning. If there is not an intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights, the juvenile's answers should not be used against him. Whether there is such a waiver depends on a number of factors such as the age, intelligence and experience of the juvenile. Whether a proper warning is given and whether there is an intelligent waiver is a factual matter for the court to decide in each case. The questioning of the appellant in this case was brief and properly incident to the arrest. The appellant voluntarily gave the questioned statement after the proper warning and advice as to his rights, and it was not error to admit it into evidence. Appellant has also submitted a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus which we have thoroughly reviewed. We find no merit in the contentions argued therein. The judgment is affirmed. HUNTER, C.J., FINLEY, WEAVER, HAMILTON, HALE, NEILL, and McGOVERN, JJ., concur. [*] Reported in 463 P.2d 640. [1] "When, in any county where a juvenile court is held, a child under the age of eighteen years is taken into custody by a parole, peace, police or probation officer, such child shall be taken directly before such court, or placed in the detention home or place under the jurisdiction of such court, or into the custody of the court probation officer: ..."