Case Title: Pheasant Bridge Corporation v. Township of Warren

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-138-99

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2001-08-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). LaVecchia, J., writing for a Unanimous Court. There are two issues in this appeal. First, whether a zoning ordinance increasing the minimum lot size for permitted residential development is valid as applied to plaintiff's property. Second, whether a taking of plaintiff's property has occurred irrespective of whether the ordinance is valid as applied. In 1986, plaintiff, Pheasant Bridge Corporation, purchased approximately 29 acres of land in the northern section of Warren Township ( Township ). The particular zone in which this land was situated had as a permitted use single-family homes on a minimum lot size of one-and-one-half acres, allowing plaintiff to enjoy a yield of eight to fifteen subdivided lots on its land. In December 1993, however, before plaintiff could perfect its subdivision application, the Township adopted an ordinance establishing the EP-250 zone, created to protect certain environmentally constrained lands. Section 16-9 of the ordinance increased the minimum lot size to six acres. Consequently, plaintiff could develop no more than four lots on its land, rendering the project economically unfeasible in plaintiff's view. As a result, plaintiff sued the Township. Upon initial review, the trial court held that the EP-250 zone was facially valid, but deferred the as applied issue to the Township's Zoning Board of Adjustment. On appeal, the Appellate Division remanded the matter to the trial court for consideration of the ordinance as applied to plaintiff and for a determination of whether there was an uncompensated taking of plaintiff's property. On remand, the trial court concluded that the zoning ordinance was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable as applied to plaintiff, and that a taking of property without compensation had occurred. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court on both issues, holding that the ordinance was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable as applied and that application of the ordinance to plaintiff's property did not result in an uncompensated taking. The Supreme Court granted the petition for certification. HELD: The zoning ordinance is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable as applied to plaintiff's property. Plaintiff has no cognizable taking claim. 1. Municipalities possess broad police power to zone for the public good insofar as the Legislature delegates that authority. A municipality's zoning ordinance carries a strong presumption of validity that may be overcome through an affirmative showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable in whole or as applied to any particular property, or that the ordinance is plainly contrary to fundamental zoning principles or the zoning statute. A court must not pass on the wisdom of such an ordinance, but may engage in a review of the relationship between the means and ends of the ordinance. The fundamental question is whether the requirements of the ordinance are reasonable under the circumstances. (Pp.7-10) 2. Legitimate zoning purposes may be challenged as they apply to particular parcels of land. Plaintiff's property is unique in that it does not satisfy most of the environmental purposes sought to be advanced by creation of the EP- 250 zone. Therefore, the purposes of the ordinance creating the EP-250 zone are not served by applying the ordinance to plaintiff's property and the ordinance is invalid as applied. (Pp. 10-17) 3. The Takings Clauses of the United States and New Jersey constitutions do not prohibit governmental interference with property rights, but, rather, are designed to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking. A temporary taking, however, does not occur merely because plaintiff is subjected to an invalid ordinance during the time it takes to challenge successfully the ordinance's application, and monetary damages are not justified during that interim period. (Pp. 17-25) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED in part, AFFIRMED in part, and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for restoration of the zoning that pertained to plaintiff's property prior to its inclusion in the EP- 250 zone. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA'S opinion. PHEASANT BRIDGE CORPORATION, a corporation of the State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOWNSHIP OF WARREN, in Somerset County, a municipal corporation of the State of New Jersey, Defendant-Respondent. ______________________________ Argued January 17, 2001 -- Decided August 2, 2001 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Joseph E. Murray argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Murray & Associates, attorneys; Mr. Murray and Jay B. Bohn, on the briefs). Timothy P. Beck argued the cause for respondent (DiFrancesco, Kunzman, Coley, Yospin, Bernstein & Bateman, attorneys). The opinion of the Court was delivered by which could resolve any concerns about all environmental issues. The trial court, therefore, made detailed findings based on substantial, credible evidence concerning the nature and extent of environmental constraints affecting plaintiff's property. The limited scope of appellate review requires deference to the trial court's findings when supported by adequate, substantial, and credible evidence. Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales, Inc., 110 N.J. 464, 475 (1988); Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974). That adequate, substantial, and credible evidence supported the trial court's findings in this matter was confirmed by the Appellate Division. Although it reversed the trial court's judgment, the Appellate Division did not disturb the determination that plaintiff's property was not subject to the specific environmental constraints affecting the rest of the EP- 250 zone. Nevertheless, the Appellate Division sustained the ordinance's application to plaintiff's property primarily on the basis that it perceived the ordinance as including among its intentions, besides environmental protection, the preservation of farmland because farmland is one of the listed uses of the EP-250 zone From its base of factual findings, the trial court concluded that the zoning ordinance was arbitrary and capricious as applied to plaintiff's property. Although a trial court's legal interpretations are not entitled to special deference, Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Township Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995), we agree with the trial court's legal conclusion in this matter. The dearth of environmental limitations on plaintiff's property leads us to conclude, as did the trial court, that the ordinance is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable as applied to plaintiff. We rely on enduring principles governing municipal exercise of the zoning power in reaching that conclusion. As this Court stated in Home Builders, supra, 81 N.J. at 138, [t]he purposes sought to be accomplished [by a zoning ordinance] must justify the restrictions placed on the use of one's land[,] and [t]he means used to attain the ends must be reasonably related to those ends. Those well-established criteria are not met here because defendant's zoning ordinance fails to accomplish its purposes when applied to plaintiff's property. The means-ends relationship is illusory. Plaintiff convincingly points to the lot immediately south and contiguous to its property as having essentially identical physical characteristics, yet that contiguous property is zoned to allow development at the one-and- one-half acre density that previously applied to plaintiff's property. The Township offers no justification for distinguishing between the two parcels. Indeed, at argument before this Court, the Township took the position that it encouraged plaintiff to apply for a variance. We find no justification for requiring plaintiff to seek variance relief. In Riggs v. Township of Long Beach, supra, 109 N.J. at 617, this Court upheld the trial court's conclusion that the zoning ordinance at issue was invalid as arbitrary and unreasonable, and that after years of litigation, [t]he time ha[d] come to bring [the] matter to a close. Ibid. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the Law Division for entry of an order declaring the challenged ordinance invalid and for regulation of the plaintiff's property under the prior zoning ordinance to permit subdivision of the property in line with its requirements. Ibid. Here, plaintiff has met its burden by affirmatively demonstrating that the means chosen do not bear any real and substantial relationship to the ostensible purposes of the zoning provision. It is time to bring this litigation to an end also. Finally, we note for completeness that the Appellate Division was persuaded, in part, by the Township's argument that the EP-250 zone's purpose also was to preserve farmland and open space consistent with the Township's Master Plan. The trial court disposed of that explanation as follows: There is no dispute about the purpose of the EP-250 zone. In fact, the designation EP stands for 'Environmental Protection'. The Master Plan described the purpose: 'It is meant to guarantee the protection of environmentally sensitive features which are predominant in the area, to insure the continuation of this area as open space and recreation, promote agricultural retention where appropriate, and maintain the predominantly rural character.' In the original decision in this matter, the Court noted that the environmental concerns which, in part, justified the passage of the ordinance did not apply to the property of Pheasant Bridge. . . . The only purposes for establishing the EP-250 zone which have application to the property of Pheasant Bridge are the goals of 'continuation of this area as open space and recreation . . . and maintain the rural character.' The presence of those references in the Master Plan has not been the subject of argument in this matter. Such language suggests the goal of the ordinance is maintenance of the status quo. Since the property is now vacant, one apparent goal of the EP-250 requirements was the maintenance of the property in its vacant state. . . . [But] authority is generally seen as lacking for the establishment of lot sizes which are not supported by the requirement necessary to accommodate septic and water systems. Warren has submitted additional arguments which are founded on recent amendments to the Master Plan. For example, Warren has recently added the argument that the offending provisions of Ordinance 93-24 are justified by a desire to preserve farm land and six acres is the appropriate size under the Farmland Assessment Act. On its face that argument seems contrived because of its late arrival and its omission from the very substantial Master Plan adopted by the Planning Board. Furthermore, the soils map for the EP-250 zone shows the soil is ill suited for farming. Since it was not advanced at trial nor mentioned at the time the ordinance was enacted, it will not be further considered. NO. A-138 PHEASANT BRIDGE CORPORATION, a corporation of the State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOWNSHIP OF WARREN, in Somerset County, a municipal corporation of the State of New Jersey, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED August 2, 2001 Chief Justice Poritz