Case Title: Bennett v. Farmers Ins. Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S45229

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2001-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  June 1, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

DARRELL A. BENNETT,
					Petitioner/Respondent on Review,
	v.
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF OREGON,
an Oregon corporation;
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE;
TRUCK INSURANCE  EXCHANGE;
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE;
MID-CENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY;
FARMERS NEW WORLD LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY;
and FARMERS GROUP, INC.,
aka FARMERS UNDERWRITERS ASSOCIATION,
					Respondents/Petitioners on Review.
(CC 9308-05432; CA A89477; SC S45229 (Control), S45240)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted October 13, 1999.
	Marc Zwerling, Portland, argued the cause for
petitioner/respondent on review.  With him on the briefs
were Gary J. Lekas, P.C., and Jacqueline L. Koch, Portland.
	James N. Westwood, of Miller, Nash, Wiener, Hager & Carlsen,
LLP, Portland, argued the cause for respondents/petitioners
on review.  With him on the briefs were William H. Walters
(Miller, Nash) and Craig D. Bachman, of Lane Powell Spears
Lubersky, Portland.
	Phil Goldsmith, John Paul Graff, and Richard S. Yugler,
Portland, filed a brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers
Association.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, and
Kulongoski, Justices.**
	KULONGOSKI, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and
reversed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed
in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the
circuit court with instructions to reinstate the jury's verdict
on the contract claim.
* 	Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Frank L. Bearden, Judge. 150 Or App 63, 945 P2d 595 (1997).
** 	Van Hoomissen, J., retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.  Leeson, Riggs,
and De Muniz, JJ., did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this case.
		KULONGOSKI, J.
	Plaintiff brought this action against Farmers Insurance
Companies (Farmers) (1) and Farmers's management company, Farmers
Group, Inc. (FGI) (collectively, "defendants"), after Farmers
terminated plaintiff's district manager appointment agreement. 
Plaintiff alleged tort claims for breach of fiduciary duty and
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing against Farmers
and FGI, and a claim for breach of contract against Farmers. (2) 
The jury found for plaintiff on each of those claims.  After
entering judgment in favor of plaintiff in accordance with the
jury's verdict, the trial court entered judgment notwithstanding
the verdict (JNOV) for defendants on all claims. (3)  Alternatively,
the trial court granted defendants' motion for a new trial on all
claims.  The Court of Appeals reversed the JNOV on plaintiff's
contract claim and remanded that claim for a new trial, but
affirmed the trial court's JNOV on plaintiff's tort claims. 
Bennett v. Farmers Ins. Co., 150 Or App 63, 945 P2d 595 (1997). 
Plaintiff and defendants (4) petitioned for review, and we allowed
both petitions.
		On review, we are asked to resolve three issues:  
(1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support plaintiff's
claim that his termination without good cause constituted a
breach of contract (based on plaintiff's theory that the parties
had modified the at-will provision of the contract, or that
Farmers had waived that provision, or that Farmers was estopped
from relying on it); (2) if the evidence supports the breach of
contract claim, then whether this court must remand the case for
a new trial; and (3) whether a "special relationship" existed
between plaintiff and defendants such that defendants could be
liable to plaintiff in tort for breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing or for breach of fiduciary duty.  For the
reasons set out below, we affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals reversing the trial court's JNOV on the contract claim
and affirming the trial court's JNOV on the tort claims. 
However, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals
remanding the case for a new trial on the contract claim, and we
remand with instructions to the trial court to reinstate the
judgment in accordance with the jury verdict on that claim.  
I.  FACTS

		On appeal after a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the party
who prevailed before the jury.  Jacobs v. Tidewater Barge Lines,
Inc., 277 Or 809, 811, 562 P2d 545 (1977).  We therefore review
the record in this case in the light most favorable to plaintiff. 
		The agreement described the district manager's duties
and compensation, and provided:
	"This Agreement * * * may be canceled without cause by
either the District Manager or [Farmers] on 30 days
[sic] written notice." 
The agreement also provided: 
	"Nothing contained [in the agreement] is intended or
shall be construed to create the relationship of
employer and employee. * * * No control is to be
exercised by [Farmers] over the time when, the place
where, or the manner in which the District Manager
shall operate in carrying out the objectives of this
Agreement provided only that they conform to normal
good business practice * * *."  
Finally, the agreement stated that the parties could make "no
change, alteration or modification" of the agreement, "except as
* * * evidenced by an agreement in writing signed by the District
Manager and an authorized representative of [Farmers]."
		Defendants regularly evaluated district managers'
performance.  Some of the factors affecting those evaluations
were the number of new agents that the district manager had
recruited and the number and types of policies that agents within
the district had sold.  		
		In 1985, Winter, plaintiff's regional sales manager, (6)
and other FGI managers criticized plaintiff's performance as a
district sales manager.  That criticism centered around what
Winter referred to as plaintiff's "poor performance in agency
development."  According to Winter, plaintiff had failed to
recruit and train a sufficient number of new agents.  Winter
informed plaintiff that he was expected to meet specific
recruitment goals by the end of August 1985 and additional goals
by the end of that year.  In a letter describing those goals,
Winter wrote:
	"Failure to attain any one of these goals will * * *
result in us requesting your resignation or terminating
your appointment agreement."	
Winter also requested that plaintiff submit a detailed
description of how he intended to meet his goals.  Winter went on
to list the additional expectations, including that plaintiff
would provide a "weekly recruiting report" and that plaintiff
would contact his prospective recruits every two weeks.  The
parties referred to that agreement as plaintiff's "performance
plan."  Winter closed the letter about the performance plan by
saying:
	"At this point, you will either make the goals that we
established together and develop the habits necessary
to be a successful district manager over the long haul,
or we will have to replace you as a district manager. 
If you approach this in a positive manner and take
advantage of the assistance that we can and will
provide, you can attain the established goals.  If you
are unwilling or unable to put forth the effort
necessary to attain these goals, you probably should
not be a district manager.  Your future is in your
hands.  We can help, but we can't do the job for you. 
Your own abilities and efforts will be the determinant
factor as to whether you remain as a district manager * * *."   
At Winter's request, plaintiff signed, dated, and returned the
letter.  According to plaintiff, after that performance plan was
developed, defendants began to exercise increasing control over
the manner in which he conducted his business.
		Plaintiff nearly reached the goals that had been set
for him in the 1985 performance plan.  Farmers acknowledged
plaintiff's success by giving him various awards.  However, in
1992, a new group of regional managers placed plaintiff on
another performance plan with new goals.  That performance plan
also was accompanied by exhortatory letters from defendants'
managers, including statements such as, "you are responsible for
your own destiny" and "as always, your ultimate destiny lies in
your own hands."  One year later, Farmers terminated its
agreement with plaintiff, citing plaintiff's failure to meet
stated goals and his management decisions on several specified
occasions.
		In August 1993, plaintiff filed the present action
against defendants.  Plaintiff alleged that defendants had
encouraged him to give up his insurance agency to become a
district manager and that, after he had built a successful
business, defendants had established unreasonable performance
goals and used other deceitful strategies to force him out of
business and to reap the profits of the business that he had
created. 
		Plaintiff introduced evidence at trial in support of 
those allegations.  Colvard, the regional agency manager who
worked under Winter and who attended the meetings to evaluate
plaintiff, testified that plaintiff's 1985 performance plan was
part of defendants' strategy to force plaintiff to resign. 
Colvard explained that his own success was evaluated based on the
number of district managers that he could replace.  According to
Colvard, defendants benefitted from replacing district managers
because the commission paid to new agents typically was lower
than that paid to seasoned ones, and defendants would profit from
the difference.  Colvard further testified that he had been told
that Farmers had to have good cause to terminate a district
manager.  Accordingly, to support plaintiff's termination,
Colvard had had to document a "severe performance deficiency." 
Colvard also admitted that he had set out to obtain plaintiff's
resignation or to document his performance deficiency by setting
unreachable performance quotas.
		Additional testimony from Meals, the manager under
Colvard who worked directly with district managers, corroborated
Colvard's testimony.  Meals testified that he directly was
responsible for executing defendants' plan to push plaintiff into
resignation or to document plaintiff's performance failure. 
Meals testified that he had set out to demonstrate that plaintiff
had failed to perform and that he had asked for plaintiff's
resignation at least eight times in 1985.  Meals also admitted
that he had told plaintiff that, if plaintiff met the production
goals, then plaintiff would remain a district manager. 
Additionally, Meals acknowledged that he had told plaintiff in
writing that plaintiff's future as district manager was in
plaintiff's own hands.  Meals, like Colvard, understood that
Farmers's agreement with plaintiff could not be terminated
without good cause. 
		In addition to the testimony of those who worked
directly with plaintiff, plaintiff offered the testimony of
Bigley, Farmers's zone vice president at the time that Farmers
terminated its agreement with plaintiff.  Bigley was responsible
for reviewing any employee's termination and ensuring that it was
fair.  Bigley testified that he had reviewed the reasons for
plaintiff's termination and then had approved it.  Bigley also
testified that he believed that it was "impossible" for Farmers
to terminate a district manager without good cause. 
		Plaintiff testified that, throughout the time that he
had served as a district manager, various representatives of
Farmers had made clear to him that Farmers would terminate the
agreement only if he "lied, cheated, or stole." 
		As noted above, the jury returned a verdict in
plaintiff's favor on each of plaintiff's claims.  After entering
judgment on that verdict, the trial court granted defendants'
motion for JNOV and, alternatively, for a new trial.
		On plaintiff's appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's JNOV on the tort claims, but reversed the JNOV
on the contract claim, holding that there was sufficient evidence
that the parties had modified the agreement.  Bennett, 150 Or App
at 70.  The Court of Appeals then affirmed the trial court's
alternative order of a new trial because of error in the jury
instructions.  Id. at 73.  A majority of the Court of Appeals
also held that, in a new trial, plaintiff could not use estoppel
as one of his legal theories in support of his contention that
Farmers was not entitled to rely on the at-will provision of the
agreement.  Id. at 78.  Four judges dissented in part.  According
to the dissenting judges, plaintiff was entitled to pursue his
theory that Farmers was estopped from relying on the at-will
provision.  Id. at 86. 
		Plaintiff seeks reinstatement of the judgment in his
favor.  Farmers seeks review of the Court of Appeals' reversal of
the JNOV on the contract claim.   
II.  DISCUSSION

A.  Contract Claim
		Plaintiff alleged that Farmers had breached its
contract with him in three ways:  (1) by exercising greater
control over the time, place, and manner of his performance than 
the terms of the agreement permitted; (2) by imposing
unreasonable performance criteria; and (3) by terminating his
employment without good cause.  However, plaintiff alleged that
he incurred damages only as a result of the termination. 
Accordingly, the only allegation of breach that we consider is
breach by termination without good cause.
		Farmers does not argue on review that it had good cause
to terminate its agreement with plaintiff.  Rather, Farmers
relies on the fact that the agreement expressly provided that
plaintiff's employment was "at will."  However, plaintiff
contends that the at-will provision is not determinative of his
breach-of-contract claim and that good cause was required to
terminate his employment.  He offered three alternative legal
theories in support of that contention:  (1) the parties had
modified the agreement, both in writing and orally; (2) Farmers
had waived the at-will provision; and (3) Farmers was estopped
from asserting that it had the right to terminate the agreement
without cause.  
		The trial court instructed the jury under each of
plaintiff's three theories and, as noted, the jury decided that
Farmers had breached its contract with plaintiff.  The jury's
verdict in favor of plaintiff on that claim did not specify the
theory under which the jury had found that the at-will provision
was inapplicable.
		Farmers moved for JNOV, arguing that there was
insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. (7)  Farmers
alternatively moved for a new trial on the grounds that:  (1) the
trial court erred in instructing the jury about contract
modification; and (2) the trial court "instructed the jury on one
or more theories [modification, waiver, or estoppel] which were
not supported by the evidence."  As noted, the trial court
granted Farmers's motion for JNOV and the alternative motion for
a new trial.
	1.  Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV)
		On appeal after a JNOV, we must reinstate the jury
verdict unless we can say affirmatively that there was no
evidence to support it.  Jacobs, 277 Or at 811.  As noted above,
the parties do not dispute that Farmers terminated the agreement
without good cause; they dispute only whether the agreement
required good cause for a termination.  Accordingly, we begin our
review by focusing on the evidence concerning the parties'
alleged modification of the at-will provision of the agreement.
		It is axiomatic that parties to a contract may modify 
that contract by mutual assent.  Florey v. Meeker, 194 Or 257,
282, 240 P2d 1177 (1952).  Such a modification must be supported
by consideration.  Marnon v. Vaughan Motor Co., Inc., 184 Or 103,
156-57, 194 P2d 992 (1948).  
		Mutual assent, or what historically was considered as
the "meeting of the minds" requirement, may be expressed in words
or inferred from the actions of the parties.  Gordon v. Curtis
Brothers, 119 Or 55, 62-63, 248 P 158 (1926).  Whether a
statement or act is a manifestation of assent to a modification
is a question of fact for the jury.  See Yartzoff v. Democrat-Herald Publishing Co., 281 Or 651, 657, 576 P2d 356 (1978) (jury
decides if statements in employee handbook modify original
employment contract). 
		The foregoing general rule notwithstanding, Farmers
urges this court now to announce that, as a matter of law, a jury
may not consider certain types of business communications as
evidence in determining whether the parties to a written contract
assented to a modification.  Farmers would have this court
include within that category of business communications a "shape
up or ship out" letter, as it characterizes the letter that
Winter sent to plaintiff in 1985, and unwritten company policies
like its own stated policy not to terminate employment agreements
without good cause.  Farmers does not cite authority in support
of that argument.  Rather, it seems to argue in favor of a public
policy exception to the rule established in this court's case
law, set out ante, that any words or actions that tend to
manifest assent are appropriate evidence of assent.  According to
Farmers, the proposed business communications exception would
reinforce the importance of written contracts and would promote
predictability in commerce.  If those business communications
cannot be considered evidence of a modification in this case,
Farmers argues, then the jury's verdict that Farmers assented to
the modification of the agreement was not supported by sufficient
evidence.   
		The holding that Farmers seeks would require us, 
despite the lack of any superseding statute, to reconsider this
court's case law.  We decline to do so because, ordinarily, the
creation of law for reasons of public policy such as those
advanced by Farmers in this case is a task assigned to the
legislature, not to the courts.   
		In this case, the jury heard evidence not only of
Winter's representations to plaintiff during the 1985 performance
plan and of Farmers's stated company policy, but also of
repeated, direct and indirect assurances to plaintiff that
Farmers would not terminate the agreement absent good cause.  In
addition, the jury heard evidence that Farmers's managers falsely
documented "good cause" grounds for plaintiff's termination, a
fact that tended to establish that Farmers itself did not believe
that it continued to have the right to rely on the at-will
provision of the agreement.  A reasonable juror could have
concluded that the evidence was clear and convincing that Farmers
had assented to the modification of the at-will agreement.  See
Craswell v. Biggs, 160 Or 547, 560, 86 P2d 71 (1939) (oral
modification of written contract must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence).  There is no issue whether plaintiff
assented to the modification.  Therefore, we hold that the trial
court erred in granting a JNOV for Farmers on the contract
claim. (8)
		We turn now to the question whether the case must be
remanded for a new trial.
	2.  New Trial		
		In the alternative to the JNOV, the trial court granted
Farmers's motion for a new trial on plaintiff's contract claim
under ORCP 64 B(6), (9) citing errors in the jury instructions
concerning contract modification.  The trial court had instructed
the jury as follows in regard to plaintiff's contract claim:
		"A contract is a legally enforceable promise or
set of promises.  
		"Plaintiff contends that the provisions of the
appointment agreement concerning the parties' rights to
terminate the agreement without cause was [sic]
modified by the parties orally or in writing or by
conduct of the parties during the term of the
agreement.  Plaintiff must prove any modification by
clear and convincing evidence.  
		"Clear and convincing evidence is that which
enables you to find the truth of the facts asserted is
highly probable.
		"Consideration is a necessary element for a valid
modification.  To form a valid modification, both
parties must give consideration for the performance by
the other party.  Consideration consists of the accrual
to one party of some right, interest, profit or
benefit, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or
responsibility given, suffered, or undertaken by the
other party.
		"* * * * *
		"In determining the intent of the parties to a contract, you may consider conduct relating to disputed
terms of the contract before any controversy arose."
The trial court ruled that it had erred:  (1) in failing to
instruct the jury "on the core requirement of 'mutual assent'"; 
(2) in failing to instruct the jury concerning the provision in
the agreement that any modification be in writing; and (3) in
failing to provide the jury a special verdict form containing
"interrogatories appropriate to the [modification] instructions." The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order of a new
trial on the contract claim on the basis of the trial court's
failure to instruct the jury on the requirement of mutual assent
for a valid modification of the agreement.  Bennett, 150 Or App 
at 73.
		At the outset of this discussion, we note that the
parties disagree about the appropriate standard of appellate
review of a new trial order based on jury instruction error. 
Farmers contends that we should follow the standard of review set
out in Goggan v. Consolidated Millinery Co., 242 Or 328, 332, 409
P2d 174 (1965), and affirm the order of a new trial "if the
instructions are susceptible of any reasonable interpretation
which would make them erroneous."  Plaintiff argues that the
appropriate standard of review of the trial court's order
granting Farmers's motion for a new trial is for errors of law.
		We agree with plaintiff.  The standard of review
described in this court's opinion in Goggan is appropriate when
the instructional error at issue relates to misstatements of fact
included in the jury instructions.  The instructions at issue in
Goggan advised the jury of the alternative ways in which it could
find the defendant liable for negligence.  Id. at 330.  The
phrasing of one instruction misstated the evidence that had been
introduced at trial.  Id.  After trial, upon realizing its error,
the trial court ruled that the erroneous assumption of fact that
it had included in the jury instruction might have misled the
jury.  Id. at 330-31.  The trial court accordingly ordered a new
trial.  Id.  This court held that affirmance was appropriate
"under [those] circumstances."  Id. at 332 (emphasis added).  
		Unlike the error at issue in Goggan, in this case, the
error in the jury instructions identified by the trial court is
one strictly of law.  When the trial court's order of a new trial
is based on an interpretation of the law, we review that order
for errors of law.  See Hightower v. Paulson, 277 Or 65, 69, 559
P2d 872 (1977) (if order of new trial based on erroneous
conception of law, appellate court's duty is to reverse).  
		We turn, then, to the merits of plaintiff's argument
that the trial court erred in granting a new trial, reviewing for
errors of law.  Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in
granting a new trial because:  (1) Farmers did not preserve the
asserted errors in the jury instructions on which the trial court
based its ruling; and (2) the trial court's omission of a
specific instruction concerning "mutual assent" was not an error
of law because that requirement adequately was conveyed by the
jury instructions given.  We address the preservation argument
first.			
		As noted above, an order for a new trial under ORCP 64
B(6) must be based on an "error of law * * * objected to or
excepted to by the party making the application" that 
"materially" affects "the substantial rights" of that party. 
Plaintiff's first argument requires us to determine what
constitutes a sufficient objection or exception under ORCP 64
B(6) when the asserted error of law is an error in the jury
instructions, then to review the record to determine if Farmers
complied with that requirement.  
		The parties in this case assume that the objection or
exception required under ORCP 64 B(6) is the same as the
objection or exception that would be required to preserve the
asserted error for appellate review.  As a result, the parties
adopt the requirements set out in ORCP 59 H, (10) the rule
concerning the steps that a party must take to preserve errors in
jury instructions for review upon appeal, as the requirements for
a proper objection to jury instructions for the purposes of
moving for a new trial under ORCP 64 B(6).  Under ORCP 59 H, to
preserve an error in instructions given to a jury for appellate
review, the aggrieved party must point out the error to the trial
court, and a notation of that exception must be made after the
court instructs the jury.  By contrast, to preserve an error in
failing to give a requested instruction, the aggrieved party need
not make any further objection; under ORCP 59 H, the trial
court's adverse ruling concerning the requested instruction
"imports an exception."  However, the failure to give a requested
instruction is not error if the requested instruction was not
correct in all respects.  Hernandez v. Barbo Machinery Co., 327
Or 99, 106, 957 P2d 147 (1998).  
		We agree with the parties that, to make a proper
"objection or exception" under ORCP 64 B(6) to an error of law in
instructing the jury, the aggrieved party must take steps that at
least would be sufficient to preserve that error for review on
appeal under ORCP 59 H, should the trial court overrule the
objection or exception.  With that in mind, we turn to the jury-instruction error alleged in this case.
		The first alleged error in the jury instructions is an
error of omission:  the trial court failed to instruct the jury
concerning "mutual assent" to a contract modification.  Because
Farmers requested a jury instruction on modification that
mentioned the requirement of mutual assent, the error of omission
in this case may be characterized either as:  (1) the failure to
give Farmers's requested instruction; or (2) an error in the jury
instructions given, because they did not include an instruction
on mutual assent.  Because the parties do not agree on the
characterization of the error at issue, we address each type of
error in turn.  
		Farmers requested the following instruction on contract
modification:
		"* * * In order to be valid, a modification of a
contract must meet all of the requirements for
formation of a contract.  To find that there was a
modification, you must find that there was an offer and
acceptance, that the parties mutually assented to the
modification and the terms of the modification, and
that there was an exchange of consideration for the
modification."
Plaintiff argues that Farmers's requested instruction properly
was refused by the trial court because it was not correct in all
respects.  The instruction implied that the jury, to find a valid
modification of the agreement, had to find both "mutual assent"
and "an offer and acceptance."  According to plaintiff, the law
requires only evidence of "mutual assent," whether that assent is
expressed through an offer and an acceptance or is manifested by
conduct.  We agree.  See Gordon, 119 Or at 63 (mutual assent may
be expressed in words or inferred from actions).  Accordingly, it
was not error for the trial court to refuse to give Farmers's
modification instruction because that instruction misstated the
law.  See Hernandez, 327 Or at 106 (failure to give requested
instruction not error unless requested instruction is correct in
all respects).     
		By contrast, if we characterize the error at issue as
an error in the jury instructions given, the fact that the
requested instruction was not correct in all respects is not
determinative.  To have preserved an error of omission in the
jury instructions given, Farmers must have pointed out that error
of omission to the trial court, and an exception must have been
made immediately after the court instructed the jury.  As
discussed below, however, Farmers did not adequately point out
the error of omission to the trial court.
		Farmers argues that its comments during the discussion
with the court about the proposed modification instruction (set
out ante) were sufficient to preserve the alleged error.  After
plaintiff had objected to Farmers's proposed modification
instruction, counsel for Farmers suggested to the trial court
that it was error to omit a reference to the requirement of
mutual assent:
	"Your honor, I would point out to the Court, for
example, that in [Marnon, 184 Or at 158-59], which we
cite, it is of course well established that the minds
of the parties must have met upon the asserted
modification."
However, counsel for Farmers made that comment as part of his
argument in support of the proposed modification instruction. 
Neither by its text nor its context was it an objection to the
modification instruction that the court chose to give to the
jury.  As to that instruction, Farmers did not except separately,
either before or after the court instructed the jury. 
Accordingly, if we characterize the error at issue as an error in
the jury instructions given, then that error was not preserved. 
		We hold that, because Farmers neither offered an
alternative jury instruction concerning mutual assent that was
correct in all respects nor separately excepted to the trial
court's omission of an instruction on that subject, Farmers did
not "object or except to" the jury instruction error for the
purposes of a motion for new trial under ORCP 64 B(6). 
Accordingly, the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting
Farmers's motion for a new trial on that basis.
		In regard to the other errors in the jury instructions
cited by the trial court -- the failure to instruct the jury
concerning the integration clause and the failure to provide a
verdict form with interrogatories -- we agree with plaintiff that
they, too, were not preserved.  Moreover, Farmers does not argue
in support of those rulings on review.  Accordingly, we do not 
address them further except to note that they do not support the
trial court's order granting a new trial.
		However, our review of the trial court's order of a new
trial does not end there.  Farmers contends that, even if a new
trial is not warranted because of the reasons cited by the trial
court, a new trial nevertheless is warranted under the "we can't
tell rule" described by this court in Whinston v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospital, 309 Or 350, 788 P2d 428 (1990).  In
Whinston, this court held that a new trial is required when:  (1)
the jury considered more than one allegation in support of
plaintiff's claim; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support one
allegation but not one or more of the others; and (3) it cannot
be determined on which allegation the jury based its verdict. 
Whinston, 309 Or at 357.    
		Farmers argues that plaintiff's three theories in
support of his assertion that the at-will provision of the
agreement was not determinative of the dispute (viz., that the
provision was modified or waived, or that Farmers was estopped
from relying on it) are multiple "allegations" or
"specifications" for purposes of the Whinston rule and that at
least one of those three theories was not supported by the
evidence.  Therefore, Farmers argues, because the jury's verdict
in this case did not specify on which theory it had based its
determination that the at-will provision did not apply, Farmers
is entitled to a new trial on the contract claim.  Plaintiff
responds that sufficient evidence supported each one of his
theories concerning the at-will provision.  Alternatively, he
points out that the Whinston rule applies only to cases involving
multiple claims or multiple specifications in support of one
claim, and not to cases like this one involving multiple legal
theories.  
		We do not reach plaintiff's second argument because we
agree with his first:  The evidence in this case was sufficient
to support the jury's verdict under any one of the three theories
concerning why the at-will provision of the agreement was not
determinative of the dispute between the parties.  First, we
address the evidence that Farmers waived the at-will provision of
the agreement.
		Waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known
right.  Alderman v. Davidson, 326 Or 508, 513, 954 P2d 779
(1998).  A party to a written contract may waive a provision of
that contract by conduct or by oral representation.  Moore v.
Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 317 Or 235, 241, 855 P2d 626 (1993). 
Unlike a modification of a contract, waiver can be accomplished
unilaterally, and it need not be supported by consideration.     
		Farmers argues that a party may not waive a material
term of a contract and that the written at-will provision in this
case was a material term.  Farmers offers no law directly in
support of that argument.  Indeed, it recognizes that this court
has described the doctrine of waiver as applying broadly to any
contract term.  See, e.g., Cross v. Campbell, 173 Or 477, 493,
146 P2d 83 (1944) ("It is axiomatic that a party to a contract
may waive performance of any of its provisions if he so
chooses.").  Although Farmers acknowledges those descriptions, it
argues that they never have been the formal holding of an opinion
of this court.  Farmers urges this court to disavow those
opinions and to hold otherwise, because such a holding would
reinforce the importance of written agreements.  We decline to do
so.
		Farmers also contends that the evidence was
insufficient to prove that Farmers had waived the at-will
provision because its company policy requiring good cause for
termination does not contradict the written at-will provision of
the agreement and thus cannot, as a matter of law, "unequivocally
manifest" an intent to waive that provision.  
		We agree with Farmers that the waiver must be 
unequivocal.  See Waterway Terminals Co. v. P.S. Lord, 242 Or 1,
26, 406 P2d 556 (1965) (clear, unequivocal, decisive act required
to show waiver by conduct).  However, we disagree that Farmers's
policy requiring good cause for termination, as a matter of law,
could not be considered evidence of Farmers's unequivocal waiver
of an earlier at-will provision in the appointment agreement with
plaintiff.  As noted previously, a company policy may manifest an
intent to change an inconsistent, written contract provision. 
See Yartzoff, 281 Or at 656 (employee handbook evidence of
modification of written term in employment contract).  Whether a
stated policy is evidence of an intent to waive a pre-existing,
written contract provision is a question of fact, and the jury
evaluates that evidence in the context of all the other
communications between the parties.  See, e.g., Kabil
Developments Corp. v. Mignot, 279 Or 151, 158, 566 P2d 505 (1977)
(evidence of parties' mutual assent to modification inferred from
evidence of negotiations or other past conduct).  
		In this case, the same evidence discussed above that
permitted a reasonable juror to find by clear and convincing
evidence that the agreement had been modified also would have
permitted a reasonable juror to find that Farmers unequivocally
had waived its right to terminate plaintiff at will.  Thus, we
cannot say that there was insufficient evidence to support the
jury's verdict whether that verdict was based on a theory that
the at-will provision had been modified or on a theory that it
had been waived.
		Finally, we address plaintiff's theory that Farmers was
estopped from relying on the at-will provision.  A majority of
the Court of Appeals held that, as a matter of law, estoppel was
not available to plaintiff as a legal theory to prevent Farmers
from relying on the written at-will provision of the agreement. 
Bennett, 150 Or App at 78.  As discussed below, we disagree.
		This court has described the doctrine of estoppel by
comparing it to the doctrine of waiver.  The two doctrines are
closely related, and sometimes it is difficult to distinguish
between the two.  Smith v. Martin, 94 Or 132, 141, 185 P 236
(1919).  If there is no evidence of an intent to waive a contract
provision, a party nevertheless may be estopped from relying on
that provision if that party led the other party to believe that
the provision had been waived, and the other party relied on that
perceived waiver.  Id.; see also Waterway Terminals Co., 242 Or
at 26-27 (waiver not presumed if not intended unless other party
was misled, to that party's prejudice, into honest belief that
waiver was intended). 
		Despite those precedents, a majority of the Court of
Appeals reasoned that, "where there is an express contract,
courts cannot create a new contract for the parties by estoppel,"
citing this court's opinion in DeJonge v. Mutual of Enumclaw, 315
Or 237, 843 P2d 914 (1992).  Bennett, 150 Or App at 77.  In
DeJonge, this court held that estoppel could not be used to
negate an unambiguous exclusion in a written policy of insurance
when the insurer did not dissuade the insured from reading or
understanding the exclusion.  315 Or at 245-46.  However, this
court's holding in DeJonge specifically concerned disputes in the
interpretation of express insurance policies.  This court's
rationale for that holding, in addition to other policy
considerations concerning insurance coverage, was the legislative
rule established in ORS 742.016(1), the statutory parol evidence
rule applying to written contracts of insurance.  Id. at 241-42. 
In the absence of a superseding statute, however, estoppel is
available to a party to a contract that was led to rely upon a
perceived waiver of a contract provision.  See Moore, 317 Or at
241 (in context of fire insurance policies, common-law rule that
written contract may be orally modified did not apply because
superseded by statute).
		In this case, the estoppel theory was available to
plaintiff and was supported by the evidence.  From plaintiff's
testimony, from evidence of Winter's representations to plaintiff
during the 1985 performance plan, and from evidence of the other
repeated assurances to plaintiff that the agreement would not be
terminated without good cause, a reasonable juror could have
found that plaintiff honestly and reasonably believed that
Farmers had waived its right to rely on the at-will provision of
the agreement.  Evidence that plaintiff, understanding that his
agreement could be terminated only for cause, continued to invest
in his district manager business, acquiesced in Farmers's
heightened involvement in that business, and worked to achieve
the goals set for him in the performance plans also established
that plaintiff relied on that perceived waiver to his detriment. 
See Schafer v. Fraser, 206 Or 446, 477, 290 P2d 190 (1955) ("A
substantial change of position in justifiable reliance upon a
promise * * * renders the latter obligatory.").  
		Thus, we conclude that the jury's verdict was supported
by sufficient evidence under any one of plaintiff's alternative
legal theories.  Accordingly, Farmers is not entitled to a new
trial under the Whinston rule.
B.  Tort Claims
		Plaintiff brought two claims in tort against both
Farmers and FGI.  The first was a claim for breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing.  The other was a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty.  Plaintiff pleaded identical facts in support of
each claim, including:  that defendants had induced plaintiff to
work hard and to invest in his insurance business, knowing all
along that they intended to terminate his agreement without good
cause; that defendants had distorted the truth about plaintiff's
performance in order to appear to document a good-cause
termination; that defendants had exercised greater control over
plaintiff's business than that specified in the agreement; that
defendants had "browbeaten" and "demoralized" plaintiff; and,
finally, that defendants had terminated plaintiff's agreement
without good cause.  As noted above, the jury returned a verdict
for plaintiff on each of those claims. 
		On defendants' motion, the trial court granted a JNOV
on both of plaintiff's tort claims.  In support of that ruling,
the trial court noted that there was no "special relationship"
between plaintiff and defendants that existed independent of the
contract and, thus, that defendants could not be liable in tort
for having breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing or
for having breached any fiduciary duty.  As noted above, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the JNOV on the tort claims.
		The issue on review respecting plaintiff's tort claims
is whether defendants owed plaintiff either a duty of good faith
and fair dealing or any fiduciary duty.  The parties agree that
no such duties are implied unless the parties are in a "special
relationship," as this court has used that expression in its case
law.  See Conway v. Pacific University, 324 Or 231, 237, 924 P2d
818 (1996) (duty to avoid making negligent misrepresentations
arises only in "special relationship" in which one party has
obligation to pursue interests of other party).  Accordingly,
unless plaintiff's relationship with either defendant qualifies
as the type of "special relationship" that gives rise to either
duty alleged, no breach of duty can have occurred. (11)
		Plaintiff contends that he was in a "special
relationship" with defendants because defendants controlled his
financial interests. (12)  He argues that this court's decision in
Georgetown Realty v. Home Ins. Co., 313 Or 97, 831 P2d 7 (1992),
provides authority for the notion that, when one party's
financial interests are dependent on the other's control, a
"special relationship" exists.  As discussed below, plaintiff
misconstrues Georgetown Realty.
		In Georgetown Realty, the court held that an insurer
that had assumed its contractual obligation to defend an insured
was in a "special relationship" with the insured and, therefore,
the law imposed tort duties on the insurer in carrying out the
defense:
		"When a liability insurer undertakes to 'defend,'
it agrees to provide legal representation and to stand
in the shoes of the party that has been sued.  The
insured relinquishes control over the defense of the
claim asserted.  Its potential monetary liability is in
the hands of the insurer.  That kind of relationship
carries with it a standard of care that exists
independent of the contract and without reference to
the specific terms of the contract."
Id. at 110-11 (citation and footnote omitted).  As that excerpt
makes clear, in determining whether the insurer in Georgetown
Realty owed the insured a duty of care, the court focused on the
type of relationship that exists between an insured and an
insurer that has assumed the obligation to defend the insured. 
That relationship, by its nature, allowed the insurer to step
into the shoes of the insured and to control the subject matter
of the relationship, namely, the insured's own financial
liability.  In Conway, the court explained that the
characteristic that made the relationship in Georgetown Realty
"special" was the same characteristic found in "situations in
which one party has hired the other in a professional capacity,
as well as in principal-agent and other similar relationships":
		"* * * In all those relationships, one party has
authorized the other to exercise independent judgment
in his or her behalf and, consequently, the party who
owes the duty has a special responsibility to
administer, oversee, or otherwise take care of certain
affairs belonging to the other party." 
Conway, 324 Or at 241. 
		By concentrating on the fact that Farmers, over time,
exerted more and more control over his financial interests,
plaintiff misunderstands the fundamental focus of our inquiry in
Georgetown Realty and other "special relationship" cases.  The
focus is not on the subject matter of the relationship, such as
one party's financial future; nor is it on whether one party, in
fact, relinquished control to the other.  The focus instead is on
whether the nature of the parties' relationship itself allowed
one party to exercise control in the first party's best
interests.  In other words, the law does not imply a tort duty
simply because one party to a business relationship begins to
dominate and to control the other party's financial future. 
Rather, the law implies a tort duty only when that relationship
is of the type that, by its nature, allows one party to exercise
judgment on the other party's behalf.  Conway, 324 Or at 241. 
With the foregoing in mind, we turn now to consider the nature of
plaintiff's relationship with defendants.
		We begin by examining all aspects of the relationship
between the parties to determine whether one had a special
responsibility toward the other.  Id.  If a contract exists, then
we may examine that contract to determine the type of
relationship between the parties.  Id.   
		For purposes of arguing that a "special relationship"
existed, plaintiff does not distinguish between the relationship
that he had with Farmers and the relationship that he had with 
FGI.  Because FGI controlled Farmers's operations and employed
the managers with whom plaintiff worked, the two entities were,
from plaintiff's perspective, indistinguishable.  Of the two,
plaintiff had a more direct relationship with Farmers because it
was Farmers, not FGI, with whom he had entered into a contract. 
We look first at that contract -- the 1981 appointment agreement
-- to determine whether its terms created the type of
relationship that gave rise to a duty in tort.  
		As noted, the agreement between plaintiff and Farmers
required Farmers not to interfere in plaintiff's business: 
		"No control is to be exercised by [Farmers] over
the time when, the place where, or the manner in which
the District Manager shall operate in carrying out the
objectives of this Agreement provided only that they
conform to normal good business practice. * * *" 
Nothing about the relationship as defined in the agreement
suggested that plaintiff would relinquish control over his
business or that Farmers would exercise independent judgment on
plaintiff's behalf.  Indeed, the agreement specifically provided
that Farmers would do the opposite.  As defined by the agreement,
the nature of their relationship was not one in which Farmers was
to step into plaintiff's shoes and to manage his business
affairs.  Accordingly, the parties were not in a "special
relationship," and Farmers did not owe plaintiff a duty in tort. 
Therefore, when Farmers began to interfere in plaintiff's
business in contravention of a contract term, plaintiff's remedy
was in contract only.  See Georgetown Realty, 313 Or at 106 (if
plaintiff's claim is based solely on breach of provision in
contract which itself spells out obligation, remedy normally is
in contract; if gravamen of complaint is party negligently
performed under contract, remedy is in tort). 
		As noted above, plaintiff does not distinguish between
his relationship with Farmers and his relationship with FGI.
Because Farmers did not owe plaintiff a duty, and because FGI's
only relationship with plaintiff was by virtue of its control
over Farmers's operations, it follows that FGI also was not in a
"special relationship" with plaintiff.  
		Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err
in entering a JNOV in defendants' favor on the tort claims.
III.  CONCLUSION  

		In regard to plaintiff's contract claim, the evidence
in this case supported plaintiff's theories that the parties had
modified the at-will provision of their agreement.  Accordingly,
the jury's verdict in plaintiff's favor was supported by the
evidence, and we reverse the JNOV on plaintiff's contract claim. 
We also hold that the trial court erred as a matter of law in
ordering a new trial because Farmers failed to object or except
to the jury instruction error as required under ORCP 64 B(6). 
Finally in regard to plaintiff's contract claim, because the
evidence in this case supported all three of plaintiff's legal
theories concerning why the at-will provision was not
determinative of the dispute between the parties, Farmers is not
entitled to a new trial under the Whinston rule.
		In regard to plaintiff's tort claims, the evidence did
not establish that a "special relationship" existed between
plaintiff and either defendant.  Thus, the jury's verdict as to
the tort claims was not supported by the evidence.  We affirm the
JNOV on the tort claims.   
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in
part and reversed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded
to the circuit court with instructions to reinstate the jury's
verdict on the contract claim.  	

1. 	Farmers Insurance Companies in this case are: 
Farmers Insurance Exchange; Truck Insurance Exchange; Fire
Insurance Exchange; Mid-Century Insurance Company; Farmers New
World Life Insurance Company; and Farmers Insurance Company of
Oregon.  Those companies contracted with plaintiff for his
services.  We refer to the contracting defendants collectively as
"Farmers."

2. 	Plaintiff also brought a claim under the Oregon
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, ORS 166.720
et seq., alleging that defendants' conduct constituted unlawful
racketeering.  The trial court directed a verdict for defendants
on that claim.  That ruling was not at issue on appeal or on
review.

3. 	The jury awarded plaintiff $750,000 in damages on each
tort claim.  The jury also returned a verdict in plaintiff's
favor on the contract claim, awarding $3.5 million in damages. 
Finally, after a subsequent trial, the jury awarded punitive
damages against all defendants totaling $35 million. 

4. 	Because FGI prevailed on all its claims in the Court of
Appeals, only defendant Farmers had an interest in petitioning
for review.  However, defendants have the same counsel and,
according to the wording of the petition, the petition was filed
on behalf of both Farmers and FGI.  

5. 	The district manager's responsibilities included
recruiting, training, and supervising insurance agents who sold
Farmers's insurance policies. 

6. 	According to Farmers's organizational structure,
several districts make up a "division," several divisions make up
a "region," and several regions make up a "zone."

7. 	Farmers argued on appeal, but does not pursue on
review, that the trial court appropriately granted the JNOV
because, among other reasons, the agreement required that
modifications be in writing and there was insufficient evidence
of a written modification.    
		Our case law has recognized that the parties may modify
a written contract orally even if the writing contains an express
provision against nonwritten modifications.  See Moore v. Mutual
of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 317 Or 235, 241, 855 P2d 626 (1993)
(common-law rule that written contract may be modified orally
despite express provision to the contrary is valid except when
superseded by statute).  Accordingly, in this case, the jury
could have found that the parties had modified the agreement
orally despite the existence of the express provision requiring
written modifications. 

8. 	On appeal, although not on review, Farmers also argued
that there was no consideration for the asserted modification. 
The Court of Appeals held that the jury could have found that
plaintiff's acceptance of heightened supervision and other
involvement by Farmers was a sufficient quid pro quo for
Farmers's agreement not to terminate the agreement without cause. 
Bennett, 150 Or App at 70.  
		On review, Farmers argues that plaintiff's acceptance
of heightened supervision during the 1985 performance plan cannot
constitute consideration for a permanent modification of the
agreement.  Farmers contends that the performance plan was
temporary in nature and that, at the end of that performance
plan, the parties were restored to their respective positions as
defined in the original appointment agreement.  
		Farmers did not make that argument in the trial court. 
Therefore, it is not preserved, and we do not address it further
here.   

9. 	ORCP 64 B provides, in part:
		"A former judgment may be set aside and a new
trial granted * * * on the motion of the party
aggrieved for any of the following causes materially
affecting the substantial rights of such party: 
		"* * * * *
		"B(6) Error in law occurring at the trial and
objected to or excepted to by the party making the
application."

10. 	ORCP 59 H provides, in part:
		"* * * [N]o instruction given to a jury shall be
subject to review upon appeal unless its error, if any,
was pointed out to the judge who gave it and unless a
notation of an exception is made immediately after the
court instructs the jury.  Any point of exception shall
be particularly stated and taken down by the reporter
or delivered in writing to the judge.  It shall be
unnecessary to note an exception in court to any other
ruling made.  All adverse rulings, including failure to
give a requested instruction * * * shall import an
exception in favor of the party against whom the ruling
was made." 

11. 	We note that plaintiff contends that the two torts
alleged -- breach of good faith and breach of fiduciary duty --
are distinct.  He concedes, however, that each requires proof of
a "special relationship" between the parties.  Because, as
discussed infra, ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 34), we hold that
plaintiff's relationship with defendants was not a "special
relationship," we do not need to address the differences, if any,
that may exist between the two torts as alleged by plaintiff.

12. 	Plaintiff also argues that he was in a "special
relationship" with defendants because they acted as his agents in
jointly marketing defendants' insurance products.  For that
argument, plaintiff relies on Hampton Tree Farms, Inc. v. Jewett,
320 Or 599, 892 P2d 683 (1995).  In Hampton, this court held that
a jury could find that a creditor who agreed to represent a log
seller, for the purpose of selling the log seller's business,
acted as the log seller's agent and thus owed the log seller
fiduciary duties.  However, as noted in Hampton, to find a
principal-agent relationship, there must be evidence that both
parties consented to their respective roles.  Id. at 617.  In
this case, plaintiff does not identify any evidence of his
consent to an agency relationship.  Indeed, the theory of his
case was that defendants' takeover of his business was against
his will and in breach of their agreement.  Because plaintiff
offers little to support his argument in favor of finding that
defendants acted as his agents, we decline to address it further.