Case Title: Rental Property Management Services v. Hatcher

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12373

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-05-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-12373 
 
RENTAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT SERVICES & another1  vs.  
LORETTA HATCHER. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     January 8, 2018. - May 15, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Unauthorized Practice of Law.  Summary Process.  Practice, 
Civil, Summary process, Standing.  Jurisdiction, Summary 
process, Housing Court.  Housing Court, Jurisdiction.  
Consumer Protection Act, Unfair or deceptive act. 
 
 
 
 
Summary process.  Complaint filed in the Western Division 
of the Housing Court Department on March 24, 2016. 
 
 
A motion for partial summary judgment was heard by Dina E. 
Fein, J., and entry of final judgment was ordered by her. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Joel Feldman for the defendant. 
 
Stanley D. Komack (John B. Stewart & Jason R. Ferenc also 
present) for the plaintiffs. 
 
Patricia Whiting & Andrea Moon Park, for Harvard Legal Aid 
Bureau & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Joshua M. Daniels & Richard M.W. Bauer, for National 
Consumer Law Center & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
                                                          
 
 
1 Fred Basile. 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  In 2016, Fred Basile, a property manager, 
brought a summary process action in the Housing Court in the 
name of his sole proprietorship, seeking to evict a tenant from 
a property for which he was neither the owner nor the lessor.  
Basile claimed that he was the manager for the property, and was 
acting as the agent of the owner when he filed the summary 
process complaint. 
 
We hold that Basile had no standing to bring a summary 
process action in his name, where he was not the owner or lessor 
of the property.  We also hold that, to the extent that he was 
acting on behalf of the true owner of the property when he filed 
the complaint, his conduct constituted the unauthorized practice 
of law because he was not an attorney. 
 
We further declare that, where the plaintiff in a summary 
process action is neither the owner nor the lessor of the 
property, the court must dismiss the complaint with prejudice 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, regardless of whether a 
motion to dismiss has been presented by the defendant.  Where 
the plaintiff is the true owner or lessor, but the complaint has 
been signed and filed by another person who is not an attorney, 
the court may either immediately dismiss the complaint without 
prejudice based on the unauthorized practice of law, or order 
that the complaint shall be dismissed on a designated date 
3 
 
 
unless the plaintiff before that date retains counsel or 
proceeds pro se, and amends the complaint accordingly. 
 
Finally, we hold that such conduct is not enough, on its 
own, to constitute an unfair or deceptive practice in violation 
of G. L. c. 93A.  However, where a plaintiff seeks to evict a 
tenant without the standing to do so, or where a person who is 
not authorized to practice law signs and files a summary process 
complaint -- and where that conduct is not inadvertent but by 
design, or part of a pattern or practice -- we hold that a court 
has the inherent authority, in the exercise of its sound 
discretion, to impose appropriate sanctions, including 
attorney's fees and other costs, in order to ensure the fair 
administration of justice and to deter such conduct in the 
future.2 
 
Background.  In January, 2016, Basile issued a notice to 
quit to Loretta Hatcher, informing her that she must leave the 
premises she was renting in Springfield by March 31, 2016, "or 
we will go to court and seek permission to evict you."  In the 
notice to quit, Basile described himself as the "property 
manager" and "agent for Andrew Arvanitis," an owner of the 
property. 
                                                          
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the National 
Consumer Law Center and the Volunteer Lawyers Project, and by 
the Harvard Legal Aid Bureau and the Massachusetts Law Reform 
Institute. 
4 
 
 
 
On March 21, 2016, ten days before the deadline given in 
the notice to quit, Basile filed a summary process complaint in 
the Western Division of the Housing Court Department to evict 
Hatcher.  The complaint was written on a form provided by the 
Housing Court.  Where the form asked for the name of the 
"PLAINTIFF/LANDLORD/OWNER," Basile wrote the name of his sole 
proprietorship:  "Rental Property Management Services."  Where 
the complaint asked for the name and signature of the "Plaintiff 
or Attorney," Basile printed and signed his own name.  
Arvanitis's name was not included anywhere in the complaint. 
 
In her answer to Basile's complaint, Hatcher brought 
various affirmative defenses, including defenses asserting that 
Basile is not the owner or lessor of the property and therefore 
has no legal right to possession, and that Basile is engaged in 
the unauthorized practice of law by representing the property 
owner in this case.  She also brought various counterclaims, 
including a counterclaim that Basile, by "portraying himself as 
having the legal authority to initiate and prosecute an eviction 
proceeding against [Hatcher]," engaged in unfair and deceptive 
practices in violation of G. L. c. 93A. 
 
In answer to Hatcher's interrogatories and request for 
admissions, Basile admitted that he is neither the owner nor the 
lessor of the property, and is not an attorney.  He stated that 
he was orally directed by the owner to serve the tenant with the 
5 
 
 
notice to quit and the summary process summons and complaint.  
He identified the owners of the property as Andrew Arvanitis and 
"Kathleen Stevens-Arvanitis, as trustee."  In a separate summary 
process action Basile brought against another tenant, Shavonna 
Williams, Basile admitted in answer to a request for admissions 
that, since 2007, he has initiated over ninety summary process 
cases in his own name or in the name of Rental Property 
Management Services, in each case seeking to evict tenants from 
properties that he does not own.  He also admitted that he was 
aware that a property agent who is not an attorney may not 
represent a property owner in a lawsuit in the Housing Court, 
but stated that he and others had been allowed to do so "by the 
Western Division [of the] Housing Court, [m]ediators, 
[a]ssistant [c]lerks and also [l]egal [a]id." 
 
Hatcher moved for partial summary judgment on her c. 93A 
counterclaims, arguing that by commencing a summary process 
action against her when he was neither the owner nor the lessor 
of the property, and was not an attorney, he had committed an 
unfair and deceptive practice in violation of c. 93A.  Williams 
brought a similar motion, based on the same conduct by Basile, 
and both motions were argued in the same hearing.  Although the 
cases were not consolidated, the judge ruled on both motions in 
a single order. 
6 
 
 
 
The judge found that it was undisputed that Basile was not 
the owner or lessor of the properties at issue, and therefore 
both cases were subject to dismissal.  The judge enjoined Basile 
from "initiating summary process cases in his own name or the 
name of his company . . . with respect to tenancies in which he 
neither owns the rental property in question nor is identified 
as the 'landlord' or 'lessor' in the applicable rental 
agreement."  The judge ordered that any future cases Basile 
brought in violation of that order would be "subject to 
immediate dismissal." 
 
However, the judge denied the tenants' motions for partial 
summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of Basile on the 
tenants' c. 93A counterclaims.  The judge noted that a property 
manager may initiate and prosecute a case in his or her own name 
if he or she is the owner or lessor of the property, and that a 
substantial percentage of landlords in the Housing Court are 
self-represented.  The judge found that "it is not the 'policy' 
of this court" to permit property managers to act as plaintiffs 
where they are neither the owners nor the lessors of the 
property, but "[a]s a practical matter, . . . it is beyond the 
capacity of the court to ferret out" such violations "in cases 
where no one is raising them, even were it an appropriate role 
for the court to do so."  The judge added that it was not 
appropriate for the court to assume that those defendants who 
7 
 
 
could claim such a violation "would necessarily and invariably 
choose to make" such a claim.  Instead, the court "relies on the 
adversary process to manage [these] issues, responding when they 
are affirmatively raised for determination, typically by 
requiring counsel to appear for the property manager."  The 
judge found that there was nothing in the record to support the 
tenant's allegation that Basile was "'gaming' the system," that 
is, "initiating and prosecuting summary process cases unless he 
gets 'caught,' in which case he redresses his own unlawful 
behavior by obtaining representation."  "It is simply unfair," 
the judge concluded, "to sanction Basile for doing that which 
the court -- albeit passively -- and the adversary process 
permitted him to do in some, if not all, cases." 
 
Hatcher subsequently stipulated to the dismissal of all her 
counterclaims other than that part of her c. 93A counterclaim 
that alleged that Basile portrayed himself as having the legal 
authority to initiate and prosecute the eviction action.3  As to 
that part of her counterclaim, she stipulated to the entry of 
judgment so that she could "more expeditiously" appeal from the 
judge's ruling on that counterclaim.  The judge entered final 
judgment in accordance with the stipulation.  Hatcher now 
                                                          
 
 
3 Loretta Hatcher had earlier entered into an agreement with 
Andrew Arvanitis and Kathleen Stevens-Arvanitis that allowed her 
to retain possession of her apartment, and provided for 
reasonable attorney's fees to be paid to her attorney. 
8 
 
 
appeals from the denial of her motion for partial summary 
judgment and the entry of partial summary judgment in favor of 
Basile.4  We granted her application for direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standing to bring summary process action.  
A plaintiff may bring a summary process action to evict a tenant 
and recover possession of his or her property only if the 
plaintiff is the owner or lessor of the property.  See G. L. 
c. 239, § 1 ("the person entitled to the land or tenements may 
recover possession" through summary process action). 
 
Where, as here, the plaintiff is neither the owner nor the 
lessor of the property, the plaintiff has no standing to bring a 
summary process action.  See Ratner v. Hogan, 251 Mass. 163, 165 
(1925) ("To recover . . . possession [through summary process], 
it is essential that there should be proof of the relation of 
lessor and lessee, or of landlord and tenant, between the 
plaintiff and defendant . . .").  See also Cummings v. Wajda, 
325 Mass. 242, 243 (1950) ("Summary process is a purely 
statutory procedure and can be maintained only in the instances 
specifically provided for in the statute").  And where the 
                                                          
 
 
4 Basile argues that, by stipulating to the entry of 
judgment, Hatcher has waived her right to appeal from the 
judge's entry of partial summary judgment on the G. L. c. 93A 
counterclaim.  Where the stipulation expressly declares that it 
was entered into to permit Hatcher "more expeditiously" to 
appeal from the judge's ruling, we decline to find such a 
waiver. 
9 
 
 
plaintiff lacks standing to bring an action, the court lacks 
jurisdiction of the subject matter and must therefore dismiss 
the action.  HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Matt, 464 Mass. 193, 199 
(2013) (HSBC). 
 
In addition, whenever a problem of subject matter 
jurisdiction becomes apparent to a court, the court has "both 
the power and the obligation" to resolve it, "regardless [of] 
whether the issue is raised by the parties."  Id., quoting 
Nature Church v. Assessors of Belchertown, 384 Mass. 811, 812 
(1981).  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (h) (3), 365 Mass. 754 (1974) 
("Whenever it appears by suggestion of a party or otherwise that 
the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court 
shall dismiss the action" [emphasis added]).  "Subject matter 
jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, conduct or waiver."  
Litton Business Sys., Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 383 Mass. 
619, 622 (1981).5 
                                                          
 
 
5 The obligation to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction established in Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (h) (3) is not 
inconsistent with the Uniform Summary Process Rules and 
therefore applies to summary process actions.  See Rule 1 of the 
Uniform Summary Process Rules (1980) (summary process actions 
governed by Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure to extent 
they are "not inconsistent" with Uniform Summary Process Rules).  
Cf. ROPT Ltd. Partnership v. Katin, 431 Mass. 601, 607 (2000) 
(under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 [b] [1], 365 Mass. 754 [1974], party 
to summary process action "has the right to raise subject matter 
jurisdiction at any time"). 
10 
 
 
 
We therefore hold that, whenever it becomes apparent to a 
court in a summary process action that a plaintiff may not be 
the owner or lessor of the property at issue, the court is 
obligated to inquire into the plaintiff's standing and, if it 
determines that the plaintiff lacks standing, it must dismiss 
the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, regardless 
of whether any party raises an issue of standing.  See HSBC, 464 
Mass. at 199-200; Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (h) (3).  Although 
dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are 
ordinarily without prejudice because they typically do not 
involve an adjudication on the merits, in cases where a lack of 
standing is also fatal to the merits of the plaintiff's claim, 
as here, dismissal must be with prejudice.  See Abate v. Fremont 
Inv. & Loan, 470 Mass. 821, 828, 836 (2015) (dismissal with 
prejudice appropriate in try title action where determination of 
standing "effectively negate[d] the merits of [plaintiff's] 
claim").  Where the complaint is dismissed with prejudice for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff cannot file a 
new summary process complaint against the tenant unless he or 
she subsequently becomes the owner or lessor of the property.  
However, nothing would bar the true owner or lessor of the 
property from filing a new complaint. 
 
We recognize, as the judge did, that a plaintiff's lack of 
standing will not be apparent on the face of the complaint 
11 
 
 
where, as here, a property manager is identified as the 
"PLAINTIFF/LANDLORD/OWNER."  Unless it becomes apparent that a 
plaintiff may not be the owner or lessor of the property, we do 
not mandate that a judge or court staff take affirmative steps 
to "ferret out" whether the named plaintiff has standing to 
bring the summary process action.  However, we note that 
revisions to the summary process complaint form could be made 
that would help to prevent standing issues.  For example, the 
form could in some fashion require the person signing the 
complaint to certify that the plaintiff is the owner or lessor 
of the property and that the signatory is either the individual 
owner or lessor, or an attorney for the owner or lessor. 
 
2.  Unauthorized practice of law.  Where the named 
plaintiff is neither the owner nor the lessor of the property, 
it is legally irrelevant whether the plaintiff is the agent or 
attorney of the owner or lessor, or whether the plaintiff has 
obtained the express approval of the owner or lessor to bring 
the action in the plaintiff's name.  Only a person entitled to 
the property as owner or lessor may bring an action to recover 
possession of that property.  See G. L. c. 239, § 1.  A separate 
legal issue is raised where, unlike here, the named plaintiff is 
the owner or lessor of the property, but the person who signs 
the summary process summons and complaint is neither the 
individual owner or lessor nor his or her attorney. 
12 
 
 
 
This was the situation presented in LAS Collection Mgt. v. 
Pagan, 447 Mass. 847 (2006) (LAS).  In that case, a property 
management agent, LAS Collection Management (LAS), filed a 
complaint in the Housing Court on behalf of the property owner, 
High Rock Group, seeking injunctive relief against the defendant 
tenant.  Id. at 847.  The plaintiff was identified in the 
complaint as "High Rock Group c/o LAS Collection [Management]," 
and the complaint was signed by the owner of LAS, who added the 
word "agent" to her signature.  Id. at 848.  The agent was not 
an attorney.  Id.  The defendant filed an answer that included 
counterclaims for the unauthorized practice of law and violation 
of c. 93A, and separately moved to dismiss the complaint, 
arguing that, where LAS was not the owner of the property, the 
agent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by signing and 
filing the complaint on behalf of High Rock Group.  Id.  The 
judge denied the motion to dismiss, and we concluded that the 
judge erred in doing so, holding that "a property agent who is 
not an attorney may not represent a property owner in a lawsuit 
in the Housing Court."  Id. at 851. 
 
By ruling that the motion to dismiss should have been 
allowed, we essentially concluded that the property agent 
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by signing and 
13 
 
 
filing the complaint as an agent of the property owner.6  
Consequently, even if Basile had identified the true owner of 
the property in the summary process complaint, his act of 
signing the complaint as the "Plaintiff or Attorney" and then 
filing the complaint would have been sufficient to warrant 
dismissal based on the unauthorized practice of law. 
 
To be clear, nothing precludes an individual who is the 
owner or lessor of the property from signing and filing a 
summary process complaint himself or herself, regardless of 
whether he or she is an attorney.  See G. L. c. 221, § 48 
("Parties may manage, prosecute or defend their own suits 
personally . . ."); Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 614-
615 (1935), abrogated on other grounds by Real Estate Bar Ass'n 
for Mass., Inc. v. National Real Estate Info. Servs., 459 Mass. 
512 (2011) (Real Estate Bar Ass'n) ("Individuals have been 
                                                          
 
 
6 The agent in LAS Collection Mgt. v. Pagan, 447 Mass. 847, 
848, 850 (2006) (LAS), not only filed and signed the complaint 
as an agent of the property owner but also "managed the 
prosecution of the complaint[] and cross-examined witnesses" at 
an evidentiary hearing.  Basile contends that, because the agent 
in LAS did more than sign the complaint, our ruling in that case 
was not that an agent engages in the unauthorized practice of 
law by signing and filing the complaint alone, but that proof is 
required that the agent also managed the prosecution of the 
complaint and represented the property owner at a court 
proceeding.  We disagree; by concluding that the judge erred in 
denying the motion to dismiss, which was decided early in the 
litigation, we effectively ruled that the signing and filing of 
the complaint was enough to constitute the unauthorized practice 
of law. 
 
14 
 
 
permitted to manage, prosecute or defend their own actions, 
suits, and proceedings, . . . and this does not constitute the 
practice of law").7,8  But where an individual plaintiff asks 
                                                          
 
 
7 A corporation, however, may only be represented in court 
by an attorney, except in small claims court.  See Varney 
Enters., Inc. v. WMF, Inc., 402 Mass. 79, 82 (1988) (recognizing 
"the well-established common law principle that corporations 
must appear and be represented in court, if at all, by 
attorneys"). 
 
 
8 We also recognize that nonattorneys may assist litigants 
in various ways without engaging in the unauthorized practice of 
law.  Paralegals who are not attorneys may, with appropriate 
supervision, assist attorneys who themselves provide legal 
advice.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.5 comment 2, as appearing in 
471 Mass. 1452 (2015).  Nonattorneys may provide information to 
self-represented litigants to help them understand their legal 
rights.  They may also assist self-represented litigants in 
articulating the facts that are necessary to present the 
litigants' claims and defenses clearly, accurately, and 
comprehensively.  And they may help self-represented litigants 
navigate through a legal system the litigants may not adequately 
understand.  For instance, in the SAFEPLAN advocacy program 
established by the Massachusetts Office for Victim Assistance, 
nonattorneys help victims of domestic and sexual violence by 
informing them of their legal rights and options in civil and 
criminal court proceedings and assisting them in completing the 
requisite forms and applications.  See Massachusetts Office for 
Victim Assistance, Frequently Asked Questions About SAFEPLAN, 
http://www.mass.gov/mova/safeplan/faqs [https://perma.cc/8RN3-
3MAB].  They may not provide legal advice, but they may provide 
a referral to an attorney where one is needed.  Id. 
 
 
Moreover, the Massachusetts Trial Court, like the trial 
courts in some other States, provides walk-in court service 
centers at certain large court houses where nonattorneys "help 
people navigate the court system" by assisting with forms, 
providing information about court procedures, and answering 
questions about how the court works.  See Massachusetts Trial 
Court, Learn About Court Service Centers, https://www.mass.gov 
/service-details/learn-about-court-service-centers [https: 
//perma.cc/5X4Q-QCHK].  See also Colorado Judicial Branch, Self-
 
15 
 
 
another to sign and file his or her complaint, the person doing 
so must be an attorney; if a nonattorney were to sign and file 
the complaint on behalf of the plaintiff, the nonattorney would 
be engaging in the unauthorized practice of law and the 
complaint would be subject to dismissal on that ground.  See 
LAS, 447 Mass. at 851. 
 
Where a summary process complaint is signed and filed by an 
individual who is neither the plaintiff nor the attorney, the 
complaint is subject to dismissal, not for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, but because the filing of such a complaint 
is the unauthorized practice of law, and dismissal may be the 
sanction necessary to fulfil our constitutional obligation to 
regulate the practice of law.  See Opinion of the Justices, 289 
Mass. at 612 ("It is inherent in the judicial department of 
government under the Constitution to control the practice of the 
law . . .").  "Permission to practise law is within the 
exclusive cognizance of the judicial department."  Id. at 613.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Help, https://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/District/Custom 
.cfm?District_ID=14&Page_ID=471 [https://perma.cc/DC9G-2D53] 
("Self-Represented Litigant Coordinators" assist 
self-represented litigants, educating them about law and 
procedures and helping with forms and paperwork); New York State 
Unified Court System, Court Navigator Program, https:// 
www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/housing/rap.shtml [https://perma.cc 
/2YLU-6XJP] (nonattorney "Court Navigators" assist 
self-represented litigants in landlord-tenant and consumer debt 
cases, helping with forms and paperwork and explaining what to 
expect in court). 
16 
 
 
It is our responsibility both to determine what constitutes the 
practice of law and to determine the qualifications of those 
authorized to practice law.  Id. at 612.  See Lowell Bar Ass'n 
v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 180 (1943).  "The purpose in limiting 
the practice of law to authorized members of the bar is . . . to 
protect the public welfare."  Real Estate Bar Ass'n, 459 Mass. 
at 517; Matter of the Shoe Mfrs. Protective Ass'n, 295 Mass. 
369, 372 (1936).  And we can protect the public only if we can 
effectively prevent the unauthorized practice of law. 
 
Thus, where a court learns that a person is engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law, the court is obligated to take 
corrective action, regardless of whether the adverse party 
requests such action.  A court has no discretion to tolerate the 
unauthorized practice of law, and may not allow a person to 
engage in the unauthorized practice of law simply because the 
adverse party does not object.  A judge does have the 
discretion, however, to determine the appropriate remedy.  
Specifically, where a summary process complaint has been signed 
and filed by a person who is not an attorney, such as a property 
agent, the judge may order immediate dismissal of the complaint, 
or order that the complaint be dismissed on a designated date 
unless the plaintiff before that date retains counsel or 
proceeds pro se, and amends the complaint accordingly.  Compare 
LAS, 447 Mass. at 851 (ordering dismissal of complaint where 
17 
 
 
property agent signed complaint by property owner), with Varney 
Enters., Inc. v. WMF, Inc., 402 Mass. 79, 82-83 (1988) (where 
corporation employee engaged in unauthorized practice of law by 
representing corporation in court, case remanded with 
instruction that default judgment against corporation be vacated 
if, within thirty days, attorney should appear and file answer 
on corporation's behalf).  Any such dismissal would be without 
prejudice; the owner or lessor may file a new summary process 
complaint if the defect warranting dismissal is corrected. 
 
In exercising this discretion, the judge should consider 
whether the unauthorized practice of law occurred by 
inadvertence or by design.  We recognize that some small 
landlords may be unfamiliar with summary process procedures and 
may inadvertently cause a property agent to engage in the 
unauthorized practice of law because neither the landlord nor 
the agent knows any better.  We also recognize that other 
landlords and property agents do know better, but may seek to 
"game the system," as was alleged but unproven here, by having 
an agent sign the summary process complaint and prosecute the 
action in the hope that the unauthorized practice of law will 
not be detected or that, even if it is, the landlord will then 
be given time to retain an attorney before the complaint is 
dismissed.  For those in the latter category, only immediate 
dismissal will bring an end to this "game." 
18 
 
 
 
3.  G. L. c. 93A counterclaim.  In LAS, 447 Mass. at 851, 
we dismissed the property owner's complaint but remanded the 
case to the Housing Court to consider the tenant's counterclaims 
concerning the unauthorized practice of law, including the 
counterclaim alleging a violation of G. L. c. 93A.  We did not 
decide in that case whether a tenant may prevail on a 
counterclaim under c. 93A based solely on the property agent's 
unauthorized practice of law.  Here we must address that issue, 
and decide whether, based on the facts in this case, the judge 
erred in entering judgment in favor of Basile on Hatcher's 
c. 93A counterclaim. 
 
A complainant bringing a claim under G. L. c. 93A, § 9, 
must establish that the defendant committed an "unfair or 
deceptive act[] or practice[] in the conduct of . . . trade or 
commerce."  G. L. c. 93A, § 2 (a).  Generally, litigation 
conduct alone is not a sufficient basis for a c. 93A claim.  In 
Morrison v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., Mass., 441 Mass. 451, 458 (2004), 
we held that a defendant could not be held liable under c. 93A 
for bad faith settlement practices, emphasizing that, with few 
exceptions,9 c. 93A does not "establish an independent remedy for 
                                                          
 
 
9 By statute, litigation conduct can constitute a violation 
of G. L. c. 93A where the defendant is engaged in the business 
of insurance.  G. L. c. 176D, § 3 (9) (insurer's unfair claim 
settlement practice is unfair or deceptive act or practice).  
And under our common law, we have recognized that litigation 
 
19 
 
 
unfair or deceptive dealings in the context of litigation."  Id. 
at 457.  Here, the only alleged unfair or deceptive conduct was 
Basile's act of signing and filing the summary process complaint 
when he lacked standing and was not authorized to practice law.  
Although Basile has admitted in a separate case that he has 
filed numerous summary process complaints in his own name or in 
the name of his business, Hatcher's c. 93A claim is predicated 
only on Basile's conduct in this case. 
 
In the context of summary process, we decline to interpret 
c. 93A so broadly as to impose liability -- with the possibility 
of multiple damages and attorney's fees -- for such conduct 
alone.  To do so would invite a c. 93A counterclaim whenever 
there is a defect in a plaintiff's filing of a summary process 
complaint due to lack of standing or the unauthorized practice 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
conduct may be the basis for a c. 93A claim where the defendant 
who initiates a lawsuit "does not have probable cause to believe 
the suit will succeed, and is acting primarily for a purpose 
other than that of properly adjudicating his claims."  G.S. 
Enters., Inc. v. Falmouth Marine, Inc., 410 Mass. 262, 273, 277 
(1991) (litigation conduct that could support claim for tortious 
interference with contractual relations could also support 
c. 93A claim).  See, e.g., Refuse & Envtl. Sys., Inc. v. 
Industrial Servs. of Am., Inc., 932 F.2d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 1991) 
(litigation conduct that constituted abuse of process was also 
unfair and deceptive practice under c. 93A).  Hatcher's c. 93A 
counterclaim does not fall within those exceptions.  The judge 
did not make a factual finding as to whether Basile knew that he 
had no standing to bring the summary process complaint or knew 
that he was engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.  Nor 
does Hatcher allege that Basile filed the complaint for a 
purpose other than to seek her eviction. 
20 
 
 
of law, which, as we earlier noted, can arise in some cases from 
a landlord's mere inexperience with eviction cases rather than 
bad faith.  We also note that the Attorney General's regulations 
interpreting c. 93A, which specify various unfair and deceptive 
practices in the landlord-tenant relationship, make no mention 
of litigation conduct, with the exception of 940 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 3.17(5)(b) (2014), which prohibits owners from 
"commenc[ing] summary process . . . before the time period 
designated in the notice to quit . . . has expired."10  This 
omission is especially noteworthy given how comprehensive and 
detailed the regulations are in identifying unfair and deceptive 
practices in this context.  See, e.g., 940 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 3.17(1)(a) (2014) (renting premises that are "unfit for human 
habitation"); 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.17(2)(a) (2014) (sending 
notice to tenant that appears or purports to be official or 
judicial document); 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.17(4)(a) (2014) 
(requiring excessive security deposit).  We therefore agree with 
the judge that Basile's conduct in this case did not violate 
c. 93A. 
 
We do not agree, however, that it would be "unfair to 
sanction Basile for doing that which the court -- albeit 
passively -- and the adversary process permitted him to do in 
                                                          
 
 
10 Hatcher has not alleged that Basile committed a violation 
of G. L. c. 93A on this ground. 
21 
 
 
some, if not all, cases."  The fact that the court did not 
earlier put a stop to Basile's conduct, perhaps in the mistaken 
belief that the court could not or should not act sua sponte in 
the absence of a motion to dismiss, does not mean that it should 
continue to go unsanctioned.  As the judge recognized by 
enjoining the conduct, filing summary process complaints in a 
property manager's own name or in the name of his or her 
business seriously undermines the fairness of summary process 
and therefore threatens the administration of justice, 
especially where the vast majority of tenants in these cases are 
self-represented.11 
 
Where the named plaintiff in a summary process action is 
not the true landlord, a self-represented tenant with viable 
defenses or counterclaims based on the landlord's misconduct or 
the poor condition of the premises will be unable to assert them 
against the plaintiff -- who is, of course, not the landlord -- 
without impleading the true landlord.  In effect, such conduct 
confers an unfair advantage on landlords, shielding them from 
tenants' potential defenses and counterclaims even where, for 
                                                          
 
 
11 In the Housing Court in 2017, ninety-three per cent of 
tenants and thirty-three per cent of landlords in summary 
process cases were self-represented, as were sixty-nine per cent 
of litigants in all cases.  See Housing Court Department, Fiscal 
Year 2017 Statistics, http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/courts-
and-judges/courts/housing-court/2017-hc-self-represented-
represented-litigants-by-court-location.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T4R7-53J7]. 
22 
 
 
example, the landlord has provided inadequate heat or allowed 
the premises to fall into uninhabitable disrepair. 
 
Moreover, even where the tenant recognizes that the 
plaintiff is not the true landlord and successfully moves to 
dismiss the summary process action, the tenant suffers a 
distinct and identifiable harm by having to come to court to 
defend against a complaint that must be dismissed.  Regardless 
of the underlying merits of the eviction, a summary process 
complaint brought by a plaintiff without standing is a 
groundless claim, and we have long recognized the harms often 
associated with having to defend against groundless claims, 
including the time and expense of defending a suit, emotional 
distress, and harm to reputation.  See Millennium Equity 
Holdings, LLC v. Mahlowitz, 456 Mass. 627, 645 (2010) (abuse of 
process); Malone v. Belcher, 216 Mass. 209, 212 (1913) 
(malicious prosecution).  Such harms can be especially serious 
where the unjustified litigation is a summary process action, 
where the consequences of an adverse judgment -- eviction and 
the loss of one's home -- are especially distressing, and where 
the mere record of an eviction proceeding can serve as a long-
term barrier to a tenant when he or she seeks future housing, 
regardless of the legal outcome.  See Desmond & Bell, Housing, 
Poverty, and the Law, 11 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 15, 19 (2015) 
23 
 
 
(even dismissed eviction actions can result in rejection of 
housing applications by landlords). 
 
And in cases where the person who signs and files the 
summary process complaint is not an attorney, all parties are at 
risk of harm stemming from that unauthorized practice of law.  
As earlier stated, the purpose of our rule limiting the practice 
of law to attorneys is to protect the public.  See LAS, 447 
Mass. at 850.  Attorneys are officers of the legal system who 
are subject to judicial oversight and "held to a high standard 
of honor and of ethical conduct."  Lowell Bar Ass'n, 315 Mass. 
at 180.  See S.J.C. Rule 3:07, as amended, 471 Mass. 1304 (2015) 
(Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct).  Under the rules 
of professional conduct, attorneys must represent their clients 
with competence, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, as appearing in 471 
Mass. 1311 (2015), and diligence, Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, as 
appearing in 471 Mass. 1318 (2015).  They may not abuse the 
court process by bringing frivolous claims, Mass. R. Prof. 
C. 3.1, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1414 (2015), and they must 
deal with fairness to opposing parties and their counsel.  
Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1425 (2015).  
When dealing with unrepresented individuals, attorneys may not 
state or imply that they are disinterested and must not give 
legal advice, other than the advice to secure counsel, to those 
whose interests may be in conflict with their clients'.  
24 
 
 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 4.3, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1442 (2015).  
In contrast, a property manager engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law is not governed by the ethical rules of 
professional conduct, and may not be sanctioned by the Board of 
Bar Overseers for their violation.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 & 
comment, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1483 (2015); Mass. R. Prof. 
C. 8.5, as appearing in 454 Mass. 1301 (2009). 
 
The prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law 
also protects landlords who allow property managers to represent 
them in summary process actions.  See Lowell Bar Ass'n, 315 
Mass. at 180 (purpose of prohibition is to "protect[] . . . the 
public from being advised and represented in legal matters by 
incompetent and unreliable persons").  This case well 
illustrates the danger.  If Basile were an attorney, he would 
have been expected to know that a landlord cannot file a summary 
process complaint before the deadline stated in the notice to 
quit, see Rule 2(b) of the Uniform Summary Process Rules, and 
that it is an unfair and deceptive practice under the Attorney 
General's regulations to do so.  See 940 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 3.17(5)(b). 
 
Precisely because Basile is not an attorney, the sanctions 
that are typically available for frivolous claims are not 
available here.  Such sanctions can be imposed only on parties 
who are represented by attorneys or on attorneys themselves.  
25 
 
 
See G. L. c. 231, § 6F (attorney's fees and other costs may be 
assessed against parties who were "represented by counsel" for 
claims that are "insubstantial, frivolous[,] and not advanced in 
good faith"); Mass. R. Civ. P. 11 (a), as amended, 456 Mass. 
1401 (2010) (attorneys subject to "appropriate disciplinary 
action" for wilful violation of rule prohibiting them from 
signing groundless pleadings). 
 
That does not mean, however, that a judge is powerless to 
sanction conduct like that committed by Basile.  Even where 
sanctions are not authorized by any statute or court rule, and 
even where no court order or rule of procedure has been 
violated, a judge may exercise the court's inherent power to 
impose sanctions for misconduct where the misconduct threatens 
the fair administration of justice and where the sanction is 
necessary to preserve the judge's authority to administer 
justice.  See Wong v. Luu, 472 Mass. 208, 209 (2015).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Matranga, 455 Mass. 45, 49 (2009) (courts retain 
inherent authority to impose sanctions where necessary "to 
secure the full and effective administration of justice"); New 
England Novelty Co. v. Sandberg, 315 Mass. 739, 746, cert. 
denied, 323 U.S. 740 (1944) ("Every court of superior 
jurisdiction has the inherent power . . . to punish those who 
obstruct or degrade the administration of justice").  "[A] court 
should exercise restraint and discretion both in determining 
26 
 
 
whether the rule of necessity permits the imposition of 
sanctions under a court's inherent powers and, where it does, in 
determining whether to impose a sanction in a particular case 
and the severity of the sanction."   Wong, 472 Mass. at 218.  
See Sommer v. Maharaj, 451 Mass. 615, 621 (2008), cert. denied, 
556 U.S. 1235 (2009), quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 
32, 44 (1991) (inherent power of court to impose sanctions must 
"be exercised with restraint and discretion"). 
 
Where a plaintiff seeks to evict a tenant without the 
standing to do so, or where a person who is not authorized to 
practice law signs and files a summary process complaint -- and 
where that conduct is not inadvertent but by design, or part of 
a pattern or practice -- we hold that a court has the inherent 
authority, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to impose 
appropriate sanctions, including attorney's fees and other 
costs, in order to ensure the fair administration of justice in 
summary process actions, and to deter such conduct in the 
future. 
 
Conclusion.  The order denying Hatcher's motion for partial 
summary judgment and entering judgment in favor of Basile is 
affirmed.  The case is remanded to the Housing Court judge to 
determine whether sanctions are warranted against Basile 
pursuant to the court's inherent power to ensure the fair 
administration of justice and, if so, in what amount. 
27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.