Case Title: The People v. Tran

Citation: 

Docket Number: S176923

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed 6/13/11  reposted to correct file date and signature spelling (no change to opn. text) 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S176923 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/3 G036560 
QUANG MINH TRAN, 
) 
 
) 
Orange County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 01WF0544 
 
____________________________________) 
 
The California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (the 
STEP Act; Pen. Code, § 186.20 et seq.)1 criminalizes active participation in a 
criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)).  A criminal street gang is any ongoing 
association that has as one of its primary activities the commission of certain 
criminal offenses and engages through its members in a “pattern of criminal gang 
activity.”  (§ 186.22, subd. (f); see People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 4.)  A 
pattern of criminal gang activity is “the commission of, attempted commission of, 
conspiracy to commit, or solicitation of, sustained juvenile petition for, or 
conviction of two or more” specified criminal offenses within a certain time 
frame, “on separate occasions, or by two or more persons” (the “predicate 
offenses”).  (§ 186.22, subd. (e); see Loeun, at p. 4.)  We hold that a predicate 
offense may be established by evidence of an offense the defendant committed on 
                                              
1  
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2 
a separate occasion.  Further, that the prosecution may have the ability to develop 
evidence of predicate offenses committed by other gang members does not require 
exclusion of evidence of a defendant‟s own separate offense to show a pattern of 
criminal gang activity.  
I. 
On May 6, 1997, Duc Vuong, a member of OPB (Oriental Play Boys), a 
criminal street gang, was accosted at a gas station by members of the rival 
criminal street gang VFL (Vietnamese for Life).  The VFL members fled when 
Vuong fired a warning shot at their car.  Later that day, three armed and masked 
men chased Vuong through his apartment complex, shooting at him and wounding 
him in the shoulder.  A short time later, two masked men fired shots at 18-year-old 
Lon Bui as he was crossing the street to the apartment complex, killing him.  Bui 
was not a member of any gang.  
Qui Ly, a member of V (Vietnamese Boys), a gang affiliated with VFL, 
testified about the attacks.  He stated defendant Quang Minh Tran was a “shot-
caller” for VFL.  Defendant called Ly a few hours after Vuong fired the warning 
shot, telling Ly he needed guns to retaliate against OPB for the disrespect Vuong 
had shown VFL.  Ly brought two guns to a meeting with defendant and several 
other V and VFL members.  Defendant armed himself with a TEC-9 automatic 
weapon, choosing it for himself because it tended to jam after a round was fired 
and he knew how to clear it.  They drove to Vuong‟s apartment complex, where 
Ly, defendant and “Uncle Dave,” another VFL member, donned masks and went 
to look for Vuong.  They found him attempting to retrieve something from the 
trunk of his car.  All three men began shooting at Vuong, who ran to his 
apartment, chased by defendant and his companions.  Someone inside the 
apartment opened the door, kicking it closed after Vuong ran inside.  One of the 
men chasing Vuong kicked the door open, fired several shots into the apartment, 
3 
and ran off.  Vuong‟s only injury was a bullet graze to his shoulder.  Defendant 
and Ly ran to the front gate of the apartment complex where they saw Bui.  
Defendant said, “That‟s him, that‟s him, that‟s Play Boy,” apparently believing 
Bui was a member of OPB.  Defendant then crouched, took aim, and shot Bui in 
the back as Bui attempted to run away.  When defendant later learned the man he 
killed was not an OPB member, he responded, “Fuck it, like oh well.” 
Other evidence also linked defendant to the attacks on Vuong and Bui.  
Hanh Dam, a V member, testified that a few days after Bui‟s murder, defendant 
warned him to be careful if he saw any OBP members, telling Dam about the 
incident at the gas station, explaining that defendant had learned where Vuong 
lived, and telling Dam “they” had shot at Vuong and killed Vuong‟s friend.  The 
bullet that killed Bui was consistent with a bullet fired from a TEC-9, and was of 
the same make as several live rounds recovered from the apartment complex that 
could have been ejected from a TEC-9 if the weapon had jammed or misfired.  
A witness who heard shooting saw several men run out of the complex and jump 
into cars.  One of the cars, a burgundy four-door Acura with tinted windows and 
shiny chrome wheels, met the description of the car defendant drove at that time.  
Officer Ronnie Echevarria, a police expert on criminal street gangs, was 
familiar with VFL, V and OBP, and with the members of each gang.  Echevarria 
testified he knew defendant and knew that on May 6, 1997, defendant was an 
active participant in VFL, a gang that engaged in extortion, prostitution, robberies, 
and burglaries as its primary activities.  Echevarria was also familiar with gang 
culture.  He stated that respect is of paramount importance to gangs, and that gang 
members will shoot members of a rival gang to enhance the reputation of their 
own gang, to benefit their gang‟s recruitment processes, and to send the message 
that gang members will react violently to acts of disrespect committed against the 
gang. 
4 
To establish the predicate offenses required to show a pattern of criminal 
gang activity, Echevarria testified about Noel Jesse Mata, a VFL member who in 
1996 shot three men he believed to be members of OPB to retaliate for the 1992 
death of another VFL member.  Over defendant‟s objection, Echevarria also 
testified about a series of extortions defendant and several other VFL members 
had undertaken in 1993 and 1994 against Vietnamese businesses.  Echevarria 
stated that VFL members had fired shots into some businesses and had made 
threats against others.  Defendant, defendant‟s brother, and another VFL member 
had been arrested and prosecuted as the result of a “sting” in which a cooperating 
business owner paid protection money to defendant.  The prosecution also 
provided the jury with certified copies of court records establishing that Mata had 
been convicted of offenses arising from the 1996 shootings, and that defendant, on 
a plea of guilty, had suffered a conviction resulting from a 1994 extortion.2 
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of first degree murder 
(§ 187, subd. (a)), attempted premeditated murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664), and 
active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)).  The jury also 
found defendant had personally used a firearm in the commission of a felony or 
attempted felony (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and had committed the murder and the 
attempted murder for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a 
criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)).  The trial court sentenced defendant to a 
term of 25 years to life for murder and a consecutive term of life for attempted 
murder, adding a 10-year enhancement to each term for the use of a gun and a 
three-year enhancement to each term for the gang enhancement.  It imposed an 
                                              
2  
Felony extortion is one of the offenses enumerated in section 186.22, 
subdivision (e). 
5 
additional consecutive term of three years for active participation in a criminal 
street gang.  The Court of Appeal modified the judgment to stay the three-year 
term imposed for active gang participation and affirmed the judgment as modified.  
II. 
We have not directly considered whether a defendant‟s offense on a 
separate occasion might qualify as a predicate offense to establish a “pattern of 
criminal gang activity” under the STEP Act.  In People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 
Cal.4th 605, 625, however, we held a predicate offense may be established by 
evidence of the charged offense (see People v. Loeun, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 9).  
We thus found a predicate offense can be established by proof of an offense 
committed by the defendant.  That the STEP Act allows a predicate offense to be 
established by proof of an offense the defendant committed on a separate occasion 
is implicit in that finding.  We explicitly so hold here. 
III. 
Defendant contends that even if the STEP Act allows a predicate offense to 
be established by evidence of a defendant‟s offense on a separate occasion, the 
inherent prejudice in such evidence generally requires its exclusion under 
Evidence Code section 352, which provides:  “The court in its discretion may 
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
probability that its admission will . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice, 
of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”  
Without doubt, evidence a defendant committed an offense on a separate 
occasion is inherently prejudicial.  (See People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 
404; People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 318.)  But Evidence Code section 
352 requires the exclusion of evidence only when its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  “Evidence is substantially more 
prejudicial than probative . . . [only] if, broadly stated, it poses an intolerable „risk 
6 
to the fairness of the proceedings or the reliability of the outcome‟ [citation].”  
(People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724.) 
In Ewoldt, for example, a prosecution for lewd acts committed against a 
child under the age of 14 years, we concluded that the trial court had not abused its 
discretion by admitting evidence the defendant had committed other, uncharged 
lewd acts against the victim and her sister.  Although the evidence was prejudicial 
to the defendant, it was also probative, strongly suggesting a common design or 
plan.  (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b); People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 404.)  
We identified several factors that might serve to increase or decrease the probative 
value or the prejudicial effect of evidence of uncharged misconduct and thus are 
relevant to the weighing process required by Evidence Code section 352. 
The probative value of the evidence is enhanced if it emanates from a 
source independent of evidence of the charged offense because the risk that the 
witness‟s account was influenced by knowledge of the charged offense is thereby 
eliminated.  (People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 404.)  On the other hand, the 
prejudicial effect of the evidence is increased if the uncharged acts did not result in 
a criminal conviction.  This is because the jury might be inclined to punish the 
defendant for the uncharged acts regardless of whether it considers the defendant 
guilty of the charged offense and because the absence of a conviction increases the 
likelihood of confusing the issues, in that the jury will have to determine whether 
the uncharged acts occurred.  (Id. at p. 405.)  The potential for prejudice is 
decreased, however, when testimony describing the defendant‟s uncharged acts is 
no stronger or more inflammatory than the testimony concerning the charged 
offense.  (Ibid.) 
In Ewoldt, we concluded that the totality of the circumstances supported the 
trial court‟s decision to admit the evidence of the defendant‟s uncharged criminal 
acts.  And we so concluded even though not all of the listed factors weighed in 
7 
favor of admitting the evidence.  Thus, we found the evidence admissible although 
the source of the testimony relevant to the uncharged acts was not wholly 
independent of the evidence of the charged offense, and the uncharged acts had 
not resulted in a criminal conviction.  (People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at 
p. 405.) 
In cases such as Ewoldt, where evidence is admitted under Evidence Code 
section 1101, subdivision (b), the evidence is probative because of its tendency to 
establish an intermediary fact from which the ultimate fact of guilt of a charged 
crime may be inferred.  (People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 393; People v. 
Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 315-316 & fns. 14, 15.)  In prosecutions for 
active participation in a criminal street gang, the probative value of evidence of a 
defendant‟s gang-related separate offense generally is greater because it provides 
direct proof of several ultimate facts necessary to a conviction.  Thus, that the 
defendant committed a gang-related offense on a separate occasion provides direct 
evidence of a predicate offense, that the defendant actively participated in the 
criminal street gang, and that the defendant knew the gang engaged in a pattern of 
criminal gang activity.  
At the same time, the inherent prejudice from a defendant‟s separate gang-
related offense typically will be less when the evidence is admitted to establish a 
predicate offense in a prosecution for active participation in a criminal street gang, 
than when it is admitted to establish an intermediary fact from which guilt may be 
inferred.  “Prejudice for purposes of Evidence Code section 352 means evidence 
that tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant with very little effect 
on issues, not evidence that is probative of a defendant‟s guilt.”  (People v. Crew 
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 842.)  As we explained in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 
Cal.4th 390:  “ „The prejudice that section 352 “ „is designed to avoid is not the 
prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly 
8 
probative evidence.‟  [Citations.]  „Rather, the statute uses the word in its 
etymological sense of “prejudging” a person or cause on the basis of extraneous 
factors.‟ ” ‟ ”  (Id. at p. 439.)  That the evidence provided direct evidence of some 
of the elements of the prosecution‟s case thus does not weigh against its 
admission.  In addition, because the prosecution is required to establish the 
defendant was an active participant in a criminal street gang and had knowledge of 
the gang‟s criminal activities, the jury inevitably and necessarily will in any event 
receive evidence tending to show the defendant actively supported the street 
gang‟s criminal activities.  That the defendant was personally involved in some of 
those activities typically will not so increase the prejudicial nature of the evidence 
as to unfairly bias the jury against the defendant.  In short, the use of evidence of a 
defendant‟s separate offense to prove a predicate offense should not generally 
create “an intolerable „risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the reliability of 
the outcome.‟ ”  (People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 724.) 
Defendant argues that evidence of a defendant‟s separate offense on 
another occasion should not be admitted when it is “cumulative.”  By this he 
seems to mean that the evidence should not be admitted when the prosecution has 
the ability to develop evidence of offenses committed on separate occasions by 
other gang members.  But defendant cites no authority for the argument that the 
prosecution must forgo the use of relevant, persuasive evidence to prove an 
element of a crime because the element might also be established through other 
evidence.  The prejudicial effect of evidence defendant committed a separate 
offense may, of course, outweigh its probative value if it is merely cumulative 
regarding an issue not reasonably subject to dispute.  (People v. Ewoldt, supra, 
7 Cal.4th at pp. 405-406; People v. Williams (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 587, 610-
611.)  But the prosecution cannot be compelled to “ „present its case in the 
sanitized fashion suggested by the defense.‟ ”  (People v. Salcido (2008) 44 
9 
Cal.4th 93, 147.)  When the evidence has probative value, and the potential for 
prejudice resulting from its admission is within tolerable limits, it is not unduly 
prejudicial and its admission is not an abuse of discretion.  Further, a rule 
requiring exclusion of evidence of a defendant‟s separate offense on the theory the 
prosecution might be able to produce evidence of offenses committed by other 
gang members would unreasonably favor defendants belonging to large gangs 
with a substantial history of criminality.  That the prosecution might be able to 
develop evidence of predicate offenses committed by other gang members 
therefore does not require exclusion of evidence of a defendant‟s own separate 
offense to show a pattern of criminal gang activity.3  
That evidence of a defendant‟s separate offense may be admissible to prove 
a predicate offense does not mean trial courts must in all cases admit such 
evidence when offered by the prosecution.  Considerations such as those described 
in People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pages 404-405, will still inform the trial 
court‟s discretion and in an individual case may require exclusion of the evidence.  
Further, although the court need not limit the prosecution‟s evidence to one or two 
separate offenses lest the jury find a failure of proof as to at least one of them, the 
probative value of the evidence inevitably decreases with each additional offense, 
                                              
3 
People v. Leon (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 149, relied on by defendant, is 
distinguishable because the court in that case considered only if the evidence was 
admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), governing 
admission of “other crimes” evidence to prove an intermediary fact.  (Leon, at pp. 
168-169.)  Here, evidence of defendant‟s offense was admitted to prove an 
ultimate fact necessary for conviction.  Further, the court in Leon found the 
evidence unduly prejudicial because it was cumulative to other evidence that had 
already been admitted.  (Id. at p. 169.)  Leon therefore provides no authority for 
the argument that evidence of a defendant‟s separate offense must be excluded if 
the prosecution has the ability to develop evidence of predicate offenses 
committed by other gang members.  
10 
while its prejudicial effect increases, tilting the balance towards exclusion.  And 
the trial court of course retains discretion to exclude details of offenses or related 
conduct that might tend to inflame without furthering the purpose for admitting the 
evidence. 
IV. 
Turning to the present case, we find the admission of evidence of 
defendant‟s conviction of extortion and related activities in 1993 and 1994 to have 
been a proper exercise of the trial court‟s discretion under Evidence Code section 
352.  The evidence was highly probative on several issues relevant to the charge of 
active participation in a criminal street gang, providing direct evidence of a 
predicate offense, that defendant actively participated in VFL, and that defendant 
knew VFL engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.  Defendant‟s conviction 
of extortion occurred several years before his arrest on the current charges.  The 
probative value of the evidence accordingly was enhanced because the evidence 
emanated from independent sources that could not have been influenced by 
knowledge of the charged offenses.  (People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 
404-405.)  Further, as the prosecution‟s evidence of predicate offenses consisted 
only of evidence of the charged offenses, evidence Noel Jesse Mata shot three men 
in 1996, and evidence of defendant‟s extortion activities and conviction in 1993-
1994, the evidence of defendant‟s extortion activities and conviction was not 
particularly cumulative and certainly not so cumulative as to lack probative value. 
Nor was the evidence unduly prejudicial.  As we have explained, that the 
evidence tended to establish elements of the prosecution‟s case did not render it 
prejudicial for purposes of Evidence Code section 352.  (People v. Doolin, supra, 
45 Cal.4th at p. 439; People v. Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 842; People v. Karis 
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638.)  Looking again to the factors identified in Ewoldt, 
because defendant stood convicted of the extortion, there was little danger of 
11 
confusing the issues by requiring the jury to determine if defendant was guilty of 
both the charged offenses and the extortion, and no risk the jury might convict 
defendant to prevent him from escaping punishment for the extortion.  The 
evidence of defendant‟s extortion activities was less inflammatory than the 
testimony about the charged offenses (see People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at 
p. 405):  although Officer Echevarria stated that shots were fired during the 1993-
1994 extortions, there was no evidence anyone was killed or injured or that 
defendant personally shot at or threatened anyone.  And finally, the court gave a 
limiting instruction, telling the jury evidence of separate criminal acts by gang 
members could not be considered to prove defendant was a person of bad 
character or had a disposition to commit crimes. 
The probative value of the evidence thus far outweighed its prejudicial 
effect, justifying the trial court‟s decision to admit it. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
BLEASE, J.* 
                                              
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, assigned 
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Tran 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 177 Cal.App.4th 138 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S176923 
Date Filed: June 13, 2011 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Orange 
Judge: Robert R. Fitzgerald* 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Marleigh A. Kopas, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting, Lise S. Jacobson and 
Collette C. Cavalier, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
*Retired judge of the Orange Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 
of the California Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Marleigh A. Kopas 
Post Office Box 528 
Ponderay, ID  83852 
(310) 455-3651 
 
Collette C. Cavalier 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2654