Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V ERIC STEVEN CARLSON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 118915

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2002-05-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 29, 2002  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 118915  
ERIC STEVEN CARLSON,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
PER CURIAM  
The defendant was charged with third-degree criminal  
sexual conduct (CSC III), but the district court refused to  
bind the defendant over to stand trial.  The circuit court  
affirmed.
 The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for  
clarification of the district court judgment.  Because the  
district court’s decision in this matter, perhaps based on  
dicta in People v Patterson, 428 Mich 502; 410 NW2d 733  
(1987), may have been improperly influenced by a view that the  
prosecution had to present evidence that defendant “overcame”  
the victim, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and  
 
remand this case to the district court for reconsideration  
consistent with this opinion.  
I  
This 
case 
concerns a January 23, 2000, incident involving  
two students of the same high school, about six months apart  
in age.  Charged with third-degree criminal sexual conduct  
"using 
force 
or 
coercion 
to 
accomplish 
the 
sexual  
penetration," in violation of MCL 750.520d(1)(b)1, the  
defendant was brought before the district court for a  
preliminary examination.  The factual record in this case  
consists of the transcript of that proceeding.  
The complainant was a sixteen-year-old tenth grader when  
these events occurred.2  She had known the defendant between  
eighteen and twenty-four months. About two weeks before the  
January 23, 2000, incident, defendant had driven the  
1 MCL 750.520d(1) provides:  
A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct 
in the third degree if the person engages in sexual 
penetration with another person and if any of the 
following circumstances exist:  
* * *  
(b) Force or coercion is used to accomplish 
the sexual penetration.  Force or coercion includes  
but is not limited to any of the circumstances 
listed in [MCL 750.520b(1)(f)(i) to (v)].  
2 
 The factual account set forth in this opinion comes 
from the testimony of the complainant on direct examination at 
the defendant’s preliminary examination.  This case has not  
been tried, and we treat these facts as true only for the 
purpose of our present analysis.  
2  
 
complainant to the parking lot of a Meijer store where  
consensually he digitally penetrated her and she manually  
masturbated him.  
On January 23, the defendant telephoned the complainant  
after school to ask if she wanted to "hang out."  She agreed.  
He picked her up in an automobile and drove her to the parking  
lot of a YMCA.  The complainant allowed the defendant to  
unbutton her blue jeans and to digitally penetrate her. 
The  
complainant testified, “He started making out again, the same  
stuff, and then wanted to have sex with me and I said no. He  
asked me why.  I just said because I don't want to.”  After an  
interval, the defendant repeated his request that they have  
sexual intercourse. 
The complainant again said “no,”  
explaining that she “didn’t want to.” “He [next] asked me if  
he could just stick [it] in once and I said no.” 
He  
essentially 
repeated 
the question several times, and she would  
not answer him “[bec]ause I didn’t want to answer him any  
more.”  She acknowledged that she did not physically restrain  
or push him away and then said, “He stuck it in anyways and  
kept moving and asked me if I was enjoying it and I said I  
didn’t want to do it.”  When asked how he got it in, she said,  
“He got on top of me and put it in.”  
II  
The assistant prosecutor moved that the defendant be  
bound over for trial.  In response, defense counsel argued  
3  
 
that lack of consent by a complainant is not the same thing as  
force or coercion by a defendant.  The assistant prosecutor  
disagreed:  
There doesn't have to be bruises.  There has  
to be [sic] against the will.  This was not a  
willing partner at this time and that's all the 
force that is necessary plus you look at all the 
circumstances.  This is your classic example of  
date rape.  When an individual is a situation [sic] 
where I'm not going to take no for an answer, and 
he wanted what he wanted, and he took it from her 
without her permission when she said no.  That's  
force or coercion and that means he should be bound  
over, Your Honor.  
The district court denied the prosecution’s motion to  
bind over defendant on the CSC III charge on the ground that  
there was “[in]sufficient evidence of overcoming the victim  
through the use of physical force that rises to the level  
required by this statute.”  The district court also stated  
that there was “no evidence of any threats or coercion here.”  
Of particular importance, the district court elaborated:  
It is the argument of the prosecutor, that it 
is enough that she said no and that they don’t have 
to establish that she resisted.  It is true that  
resistance need not be shown. But there still has  
to be, in my opinion, enough-
-
-
-some evidence that  
Defendant used physical force to overcome her.  
Again, it is the prosecution’s argument that the 
fact that she said no yet he continued, got on top 
of her and they had these relations; that that 
satisfies the definition, or that the facts in that 
scenario satisfies [sic] the definition of physical 
force intended by the statute.  
. . . [T]here has been no evidence presented that  
he overcame her in any physical way other than her  
testimony that he got on top of her.  And while  
it’s not necessary to show lack of resistance, I  
believe that the legislature intended and logic  
requires that there be some evidence of actual  
4  
    
    
 
physical force to overcome her.
 There’s no  
indication, and we’re getting really kind of  
detailed here, but there’s no indication he pushed, 
or held her down, or forced her legs apart, there’s 
no indication he did anything to force her other 
than to get on top of her.  There’s no indication  
of any fear or physical resistance on her part and 
even though it’s not necessary that the prosecution 
show resistance, there is no indication of any, and 
that enters into my judgment as a factor as to 
whether or not there was force. [Emphasis added.]  
The prosecuting attorney appealed, but the circuit court  
affirmed the judgment of the district court.  The circuit  
court explained:  
Both parties were apparently in such a state 
of undress from their admittedly mutually agreeable 
sexual activity that no further undressing was 
necessary.  The Defendant then got on top of her 
and inserted his penis into her vagina.  
* 
* 
*  
In this case there is no evidence that by 
getting on top of her the Complainant was rendered 
helpless or that Defendant used superior strength 
to overcome her.  Although the Prosecuting Attorney 
would like the Court to draw that inference it is  
just as fair an inference that in doing this 
Defendant did nothing more than assume a normal 
sexual position. 
There is no evidence that  
Defendant forced Complainant’s legs apart or placed 
her body in a position to receive him.  This may 
have happened but there is no evidence of it in the 
record leaving only speculation for the Court to 
draw such a conclusion.  The inference from the  
record is just as probable that in addition to no 
longer 
answering 
Defendant’s 
questions 
about  
engaging in sex she also cooperated by placing her 
body in a position to receive Defendant just as she 
had cooperated in the prior sexual activity.  
The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that two of  
5  
 
 
its earlier decisions3 “clearly establish that when a victim  
refuses to engage in sexual activities and the defendant  
ignores the refusal and penetrates the victim anyway,  
sufficient evidence exists to satisfy the force or coercion  
requirement.”  As an alternative ground for reversal, the  
Court cited the “surprise” circumstance described in MCL  
750.520b(1)(f)(v), saying that the complainant “may have been  
surprised 
that 
an 
acquaintance, 
defendant, 
would 
disregard 
her  
failure to consent and proceed against her wishes.”  
The Court of Appeals held that “the examining magistrate  
erroneously concluded that the element of force or coercion  
had not been established.”  Rather than reverse outright,  
however, the Court remanded the case for clarification of the  
district court’s opinion, stating that the district court may  
have relied in part on its assessment of the complainant’s  
credibility.  
In dissent, Judge CAVANAGH distinguished the earlier  
decisions cited by the majority, and said that the district  
court had not erred in its conclusion that there was  
insufficient evidence of force or coercion to bind the  
defendant over for trial.  
The defendant has applied to this Court for leave to  
appeal.  
3 People v Kline, 197 Mich App 165, 166-167; 494 NW2d 756  
(1992); People v Brown, 197 Mich App 448, 450-451; 495 NW2d 
812 (1992).  
6  
 
III  
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s  
decision whether to bind a defendant over for trial. People  
v Justice, 454 Mich 334, 344; 562 NW2d 652 (1997). 
To the  
extent that this inquiry requires examination of the meaning  
of the underlying criminal statute, we face a question of law  
that we review de novo.  People v Mass, 464 Mich 615, 622; 628 
NW2d 540 (2001). 
IV
 Central to resolution of this case is the meaning of the  
phrase “force or coercion” as used in MCL 750.520d(1)(b), the  
statutory 
provision 
that defendant was accused of violating by  
using force or coercion to accomplish a sexual penetration of  
the complainant.4  
4 This provision states that “[f]orce or coercion 
includes but is not limited to any of the circumstances listed 
in [MCL 750.520b(1)(f)(i) to (v)].”  Emphasis added. In turn, 
MCL 750.520b(1)(f)(i) to (v) enumerates the following 
circumstances as involving force or coercion:  
(i)  When the actor overcomes the victim  
through the actual application of physical force or 
physical violence.  
(ii)  When the actor coerces the victim to  
submit by threatening to use force or violence on 
the victim, and the victim believes that the actor 
has the present ability to execute these threats.  
(iii)  When the actor coerces the victim to  
submit by threatening to retaliate in the future 
against the victim, or any other person, and the 
victim believes that the actor has the ability to 
execute this threat. As used in this subdivision, 
“to 
retaliate” 
includes 
threats 
of 
physical 
punishment, kidnapping, or extortion.  
7  
 
As set forth above, the district court indicated that, to  
support the charge of CSC III, there had to be evidence that  
defendant “used physical force to overcome” the complainant  
and that the prosecution failed to present such evidence in  
this case.  This view may have derived from dicta in our  
opinion in Patterson, supra.  In this regard, we note that the  
circuit court, in affirming the district court’s refusal to  
bind over defendant, quoted out of context from Patterson,  
supra at 523 as follows:  
The force to which reference is made is not  
the force inherent in the act of penetration but 
the force used or threatened to overcome or prevent 
resistance by the female. [Emphasis omitted.]5  
An understanding of Patterson should begin with the  
highly peculiar circumstances of that case.  The defendant in  
Patterson 
was 
accused 
of 
inappropriately 
touching 
the 
victim’s  
private area through her underwear while she was asleep.  See  
Patterson, supra at 505-506. The prosecution charged him with  
fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC IV) on the basis of  
(iv)  When the actor engages in the medical 
treatment or examination of the victim in a manner  
or for purposes which are medically recognized as 
unethical or unacceptable.  
(v)  When the actor, through concealment or by 
the element of surprise, is able to overcome the 
victim.  
5 This sentence was set forth in Patterson as a quotation 
from the decision of the California Court of Appeal in People  
v Kusumoto, 169 Cal App 3d 487, 493; 215 Cal Rptr 347 (1985), 
which was in turn quoting 3 Wharton, Criminal Law (14th ed), 
§§ 287-288, pp 30-34.  
8  
MCL 750.520e(1)(a), as then in effect, which prohibited  
accomplishing sexual contact by “[f]orce or coercion,”6 and  
the defendant was convicted of that charge.  Patterson, supra  
at 506, 509. Puzzlingly, the prosecution did not charge the  
defendant under a different subsection of the CSC IV statute,  
MCL 750.520e(1)(b) as then in effect, which expressly  
prohibited having sexual contact with a person “[t]he actor  
knows or has reason to know . . . is . . .physically  
helpless.”7  This is particularly difficult to understand  
because “physically helpless” was specifically defined in the  
criminal sexual conduct statute, MCL 750.520a(i) as then in  
effect, to include a person who is “asleep.”  Thus, as the  
Patterson Court indicated, the alleged conduct in that case  
would squarely have fallen under the subsection of the CSC IV  
statute that, among other things, prohibited sexual contact  
with a “physically helpless” person, but the prosecution did  
not rely on that subsection. Patterson, supra at 510, n 8.  
In a quite expansive opinion, this Court rejected the  
prosecution’s attempt to fit the facts of Patterson into the  
“force or coercion” subsection of the CSC IV statute.  The  
actual basis for this holding was set forth as follows:  
[T]he Legislature intended to treat sexual 
assaults 
accomplished 
by 
force 
or 
coercion  
6 
 A substantially similar provision is codified in the 
present CSC IV statute as MCL 750.520e(1)(b).  
7 
 A substantially similar provision is codified in the 
present CSC IV statute as MCL 750.520e(1)(c).  
9  
 
 
 
separately from assaults on physically or mentally 
incapacitated victims.  
Our holding is supported by the rules of  
statutory construction. Criminal statutes must be  
strictly construed. 
If this Court were to  
interpret defendant’s conduct in this case to be 
included within the provisions of subsection 1(a) 
of the fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct  
statute [prohibiting the use of “force or coercion” 
to accomplish sexual contact], this would render 
the language of subsection (1)(b) of the statute 
[prohibiting, in pertinent part, sexual contact 
with a “physically helpless” person] a nullity. 
[Patterson, supra at 526-527.]  
Simply put, the actual rationale for the holding in Patterson  
was that, because the Legislature included a separate  
subsection in the CSC IV statute prohibiting sexual contact  
with a “physically helpless” person (including a sleeping  
person), it did not view such conduct standing alone as coming  
within the “force or coercion” subsection of the statute.8  
This language in Patterson, quoting the California  
decision in Kusumoto to the effect that the prohibited “force”  
with regard to sexual penetration “is not the force inherent  
in the act of penetration but the force used or threatened to  
overcome or prevent resistance by the female” was mere dicta.  
The language from Kusumoto was set forth in connection with  
the argument of the defendant in Patterson that this Court  
“adopt the approach used in” Kusumoto. Patterson, supra at  
8 
 Of course, this actual holding of Patterson is  
inapposite to the present case in which the complainant was 
not sleeping when the sexual penetration at issue occurred, 
but rather was awake and conscious of being sexually  
penetrated.  
10  
 
521.  However, nowhere in Patterson did this Court state that  
it was actually adopting any rule of law derived from  
Kusumoto.  Rather, as set forth above, this Court’s holding in  
Patterson was based on an analysis of the structure of the CSC  
IV statute without any mention of Kusumoto.9  
Having established that the pertinent language from  
Patterson was mere dicta, we now consider whether the  
statutory provision at issue, MCL 750.520d(1)(b), prohibiting  
the accomplishment of a sexual penetration by “force or  
coercion” 
includes 
any 
requirement 
of 
“overcoming” 
the 
victim.  
As we will explain, we conclude that it does not because  
imposing such a requirement would amount to the improper  
insertion of an additional element beyond that required by the  
statutory language.  In other words, if “force or coercion” is  
used to accomplish a sexual penetration, the statute has been  
violated.  
To 
be 
sure, 
the 
“force” 
contemplated 
in 
MCL  
750.520d(1)(b) does not mean “force” as a matter of mere  
physics, 
i.e., 
the 
physical interaction that would be inherent  
in an act of sexual penetration, nor, as we have observed,  
does it follow that the force must be so great as to overcome  
the complainant.  It must be force to allow the accomplishment  
9 
 Some confusion might have resulted from this Court’s  
use of italics to emphasize the pertinent language in  
Kusumoto.  See Patterson, supra at 523.  This might lead a 
hurried 
reader 
to 
incorrectly treat the emphasized language as 
a holding of this Court.  
11  
 
of sexual penetration when absent that force the penetration  
would not have occurred.  In other words, the requisite  
“force” for a violation of MCL 750.520d(1)(b) does not  
encompass nonviolent physical interaction in a mechanical  
sense that is merely incidental to an act of sexual  
penetration. Rather, the prohibited “force” encompasses the  
use of force against a victim to either induce the victim to  
submit to sexual penetration or to seize control of the victim  
in a manner to facilitate the accomplishment of sexual  
penetration without regard to the victim’s wishes.  
Given this understanding of the CSC III statute, we  
conclude that the district court erred in viewing it as  
necessary for there to be “some evidence of actual physical  
force to overcome” the complainant to support a charge of CSC  
III. While we are uncertain from the record before us, this  
error may have affected the district court’s analysis in  
declining to bind over defendant for trial. Accordingly, we  
conclude that this case should be remanded to the district  
court 
for 
reconsideration of whether the evidence presented at  
the preliminary examination provided a showing of probable  
cause that there was force or coercion used to accomplish  
sexual penetration in light of the clarification provided by  
this opinion.10  
10 In light of our resolution, it is unnecessary to 
address the legal conclusions in the Court of Appeals opinion.  
12  
 
 
 
V  
The district court’s indication that a violation of MCL  
750.520d(1)(b) requires a showing that a defendant “overcame”  
a victim, possibly influenced by dicta in Patterson is  
incorrect.  Because this error may have affected the district  
court’s analysis in this case, we vacate the Court of Appeals  
opinion and remand this case to the district court for  
reconsideration, consistent with this opinion, of the  
prosecution’s request that defendant be bound over for trial  
on a charge of CSC III.  We direct the district court to issue  
a written decision addressing the present issue within forty­
five days of the release of this opinion. 
We retain  
jurisdiction to review this matter following the district  
court’s reconsideration.  
CORRIGAN, 
C.J., 
and CAVANAGH, KELLY, TAYLOR, 
YOUNG, 
and MARKMAN,  
JJ., concurred.  
13  
 
 
____________________________________ 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 118915  
ERIC STEVEN CARLSON,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
WEAVER, J. (dissenting).  
I dissent because I do not believe that a per curiam  
opinion is the appropriate means for deciding this case.  
Rather, if the Court is going to decide what is meant by the  
words “force or coercion,” as used in MCL 750.520d(1)(b), it  
should do so after the benefit of briefing and oral argument.