Case Title: Battlefield, Inc. v. Neely

Citation: 

Docket Number: 5718

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-01-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Battlefield, Inc. v. Neely1983 WY 3656 P.2d 1154Case Number: 5718Case Number: 5718Decided: 01/07/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
BATTLEFIELD, INC., A 
WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

ELLEN L. NEELY, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF). No. 5718

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofSubletteCounty, John D. Troughton, 
J.

Don W. Riske, of 
Riske & Edmonds, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant.

Gerald R. Mason 
and William H. Twichell, of Mason & Twichell, P.C., Pinedale, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J.*, RAPER, THOMAS and ROSE[fn**], JJ., and 
GUTHRIE, J., retired.

* Became Chief Justice on 
January 1, 1983.

[fn**] Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     On July 30, 1980 
appellee Ellen L. Neely filed a complaint against appellant Battlefield, Inc., a 
Wyoming 
corporation, alleging breach of an oral employment agreement and claiming unpaid 
real estate commission damages in the sum of $22,600.86. Battlefield denied the 
material allegations of the complaint and proffered affirmative defenses, 
including the allegation that the appellee's conduct violated the Wyoming Real 
Estate License Act, and the interpretative rules promulgated by the Wyoming Real 
Estate Commission, and that she was not exempt from its licensing provisions by 
§ 33-28-101, et seq., W.S. 1977.1 It was urged that appellee's action 
was therefore barred by Wyoming law.

[¶2.]     When the issues were 
joined, the appellant Battlefield, Inc. filed a motion for summary judgment 
which was denied. The case then went to trial and the jury returned a verdict 
for the plaintiff-appellee for $18,588.34. A judgment was entered on the verdict 
and Battlefield appeals. We will affirm.

FACTS

[¶3.]     In the early part of 
July, 1979 Mr. Jack Richardson, president of Battlefield, Inc., approached Ms. 
Neely and offered to employ her to market real estate which appellant 
Battlefield owned. The appellee accepted the offer in August of 1979. At that 
time, Ms. Neely had been making preparation to obtain a real estate license but 
Jack Richardson, who had undisputed authority to speak for the appellant 
corporation in all matters with which we are in this appeal concerned, advised 
her to terminate these efforts explaining that her work for the corporation 
would be such that she would not need a license. Richardson represented to Ms. Neely that the 
real estate law exempted "regular employees" of owners of real estate, and that 
this would be the relationship that she and Battlefield would enjoy during their 
association. To be certain that Ms. Neely would be comfortable with the 
exemption and would be positive that it applied to her, Richardson examined with 
Ms. Neely the section of the Wyoming statute which spoke to this issue, namely, 
§ 33-28-103, W.S. 1977, supra n. 1. Therefore, Mr. Richardson, when he employed 
Ms. Neely, not only knew that she was not licensed, but he had also represented 
to her that she was exempt from the licensing requirement of the Wyoming 
statutes. Whether Ms. Neely was possessed of a license or not was in no way a 
factor in either her employment or the subsequent termination of her 
services.

[¶4.]     The terms of the 
employment proposal were that Ms. Neely was to show properties to prospective 
purchasers and would be paid 25% of the gross amount of any sales which she 
brought to fruition. On occasion she was directed to show the property to 
purchasers referred to her by Mr. Richardson. She was to use only the forms 
provided by appellant and was told how those forms must be filled out. The 
corporation provided Ms. Neely with the maps, price lists, disclosures and all 
other documents that were necessary for selling the property. While she could 
solicit potential purchasers on her own, and from time to time was directed to 
show the property to purchasers referred to her by Mr. Richardson, she did not 
have the authority to bind appellant to contracts without Richardson's approval. 
The record discloses that the corporation retained the exclusive authority to 
either accept or reject any sale prospect which Ms. Neely presented. Appellant 
also reserved the right to fire appellee at any time for any 
reason.

[¶5.]     Richardson exercised 
control over appellee's advertising - he introduced Ms. Neely to potential 
purchasers, he accompanied her on various occasions where he instructed her and 
controlled her selling procedures so that appellee was obliged to sell in 
absolute conformance with Mr. Richardson's instructions and could not make any 
sales except in the authorized manner.

[¶6.]     Mr. Richardson was 
highly sophisticated in the handling of real estate transactions and was 
knowledgeable in the law with respect to such matters, while appellee was not 
possessed of this kind of knowledge or experience. It is noteworthy that 
appellant had hired and paid compensation for doing the same or similar work to 
at least one other person who was not licensed. Richardson admits Ms. Neely 
would have been paid if she had not broken her agreement, regardless of whether 
or not she had a real estate license. Of course, whether the appellee did or did 
not breach her contract is not in any way at issue in this appeal. Ms. Neely 
sold for the appellant only and it is conceded that Battlefield was the 
recipient of substantial benefits from her efforts and 
services.

[¶7.]     Ms. Neely commenced 
working under those conditions and, after accompanying Mr. Richardson to the 
property and being introduced to several prospective purchasers, she was 
directed to write up certain contracts that were then entered into by the 
parties. When this was accomplished, Richardson ordered the bank to deduct 25% 
of the payments received on those contracts and to deposit these monies to the 
credit of appellee, which the bank did.

[¶8.]     Ms. Neely continued 
working under this arrangement until approximately November 15, 1979, when, 
because of some personal differences that she had with Mr. Richardson, her 
employment was terminated and, on or about March 28, 1980, the bank was 
instructed to discontinue paying Ms. Neely her portion of payments received on 
such contracts as she had previously caused to be executed and upon which 
payments were being made.

[¶9.]     The record tells us 
that, at the time of her termination, appellee had sold $90,250 worth of 
property, having a deferred-payment price of $119,598.75. At that time she had 
done all things necessary to complete the sales and there remained nothing 
further for her to do but collect the monies earned. The evidence is that 
appellee had earned but was unpaid compensation in the amount of $26,042.44, in 
spite of which fact the jury returned a verdict of only $18,588.34. Ms. Neely 
has not, however, cross appealed.

[¶10.]  Such other facts as we consider relevant 
will be referred to later in this opinion.

[¶11.]  Before addressing the issues, we should 
perhaps observe that we perceive the appellant to be urging some rather shocking 
positions in this appeal. Particularly, we see the appellant coming to this 
court asking it to reach some blatantly inequitable decisions in order to help 
the corporation avoid its honest obligations. Courts do not like to aid 
litigants in avoiding their contractual obligations by joining in their games of 
hide-and-seek behind statutory technicalities - especially is this so where the 
other party has performed and the party looking to avoid the contract has reaped 
all the benefits of the performance. We will not aid and abet such efforts if we 
can possibly avoid it.

ISSUES

[¶12.]  The appellant defines the two issues for 
our consideration as follows:

(1) "WHETHER THE 
APPELLEE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, WAS A `REGULAR EMPLOYEE' OF THE APPELLANT AS 
CONTEMPLATED BY THE EXEMPTION FROM THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE WYOMING REAL ESTATE 
LICENSE ACT AS SET OUT IN W.S. 33-28-103."

(2) "WHETHER THE 
APPELLANT, WHOSE SOLE ACTIVITY WAS THE SALE OF ITS OWN REAL PROPERTY, IS THE 
TYPE OF `OWNER OF REAL ESTATE' CONTEMPLATED BY THE WYOMING LEGISLATURE IN ITS 
ADOPTION OF W.S. 33-28-103."

[¶13.]  Another way of describing the issues 
identified by this appeal is to say that we are concerned with whether or not 
Ms. Neely is exempt from the Wyoming real estate licensing provision of the 
statute and whether the appellant is the type of owner contemplated by the 
exemption provision.

ARGUMENT 
I

Was Ms. Neely Exempt From 
the Licensing Act?

A. Was the appellee a subdivider and thus NOT 
exempt from licensing under § 33-28-103, W.S. 1977?

[¶14.]  One of the tenuous grounds urged by 
appellant is that it should not have to pay Ellen Neely her commissions (even 
though she earned them) for the reason that she is not exempt from the mandatory 
licensing provisions of the Act since she was a subdivider - and § 33-28-103, 
supra, denies licensing exemption from those persons who

"as subdividers, sell or 
offer for sale subdivisions."

[¶15.]  We hold that Ms. Neely was not a 
subdivider under the statute and therefore is not, by the subdivider language, 
denied her real estate license exemption.

[¶16.]  Appellant's contention in this respect 
vividly points to its paper-thin underpinning in this appeal because, if Ms. 
Neely is precluded from licensing exemption because she is a "subdivider," then 
Battlefield is also a "subdivider" without a real estate license. If 
Battlefield's position were to be upheld, the result would be for us to take the 
money that Ms. Neely has earned and give it to Battlefield although, under 
Battlefield's theory, both are guilty of the same infraction of the law. The 
appellant asks a lot of the justice system when it proposes that we accept this 
sort of an offer, and we respectfully decline to do it for the reason that neither Ms. Neely nor Battlefield is 
denied the privileges of the licensing exemption statute by reason of the 
subdivider exception contained therein.

[¶17.]  The class excluded from licensing 
exemption under § 33-28-103, W.S. 1977 is "subdividers" who sell or offer for 
sale "subdivisions." Fortunately, the term "subdivision" is defined in § 
33-28-102(a)(vi), W.S. 1977 as follows:

"The term `subdivision' 
means any land or tract of land in 
another state which is divided or proposed to be divided into five (5) or 
more lots, parcels, units or interest, for the purpose of disposition as a part 
of a common promotional plan and where any subdivision is offered by a single 
developer, or a group of developers acting in concert, and such land is 
contiguous or is known, designated or advertised as a common unit or by a common 
name such land shall be presumed, without regard to the number of lots covered 
by each individual offering, to be a part of a common promotional plan;" 
(Emphasis added.)

[¶18.]  The appellee satisfactorily disposes of 
the contention that appellant and appellee were "subdividers" and thus not 
exempt from licensing under § 33-28-103, W.S. 1977, when she says in her 
brief:

"The land which appellee 
offered for sale on behalf of appellant was not located in another state, hence 
appellant is not a subdivider nor was the land involved a subdivision for the 
purposes of the Wyoming Real Estate Licensing Act. The exemption from the 
licensing requirements is, therefore, available to both appellant and 
appellee.

"Furthermore, the 
exclusion of Wyoming land from definition of a subdivision for licensing 
requirements becomes very strong evidence that the legislature must have 
intended that owners of Wyoming subdivisions could enjoy the same benefits in 
regard to the sale of their land that the owners of unsubdivided Wyoming land 
enjoyed * * *."

[¶19.]  For the reasons given, the appellee was 
not offering "subdivisions" for sale and therefore was not affected by this 
exception to the licensing exemption provision.

B. Was the appellee a "regular employee" as 
contemplated by the licensing exemption statute § 33-28-103, W.S. 
1977?

[¶20.]  The trial court did not err in submitting 
to the jury the question which asks whether Ellen Neely was a "regular employee" 
within the contemplation of the exemption statute.

[¶21.]  It seems appropriate here to call 
attention to the fact that no member of the public has been adversely affected 
by anything that Ms. Neely did. The only one complaining is the corporation who 
hired her knowing she was not a licensed real estate agent, and now, after she 
has performed for her employer, it seeks to play little statutory interpretation 
games in an effort to avoid paying her the commissions it promised and the 
commissions she has earned. We are supportive of the trial judge's comments 
when, denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict, he 
said:

"* * * The evidence 
further indicates that there were sales and there was benefit that accrued to 
Battlefield, Inc. and to the Defendants in this action. The Court does not 
believe that it is or ought to be the policy of Wyoming law that under those 
types of facts and circumstances, an owner of land, of Wyoming land, which is to 
be subdivided, can take advantage of a person not holding a real estate sales 
license, obtain the benefits when he doesn't care whether they are licensed or 
not, obtain the benefits of such a transaction and then utilize and manipulate 
the Wyoming law to his own advantage to avoid that for which he 
bargained.

"We will give it to the 
Jury."

[¶22.]  Since a third party has not been damaged 
by the actions of Ms. Neely, and since the statute is designed to protect the 
public - not someone standing in the shoes of Battlefield, Inc.2 - and since the party who seeks the 
aid of the law has conducted itself with such good purpose as can only be 
described as questionable at best - we will eye the Wyoming real estate 
licensing exemption statute with a view that looks to see and do that which is 
equitable - instead of that which is inequitable.

1. Agency 
Interpretation

[¶23.]  It is the contention of the appellant 
that, given the condition of the record, it must be concluded - as a matter of 
law - the appellee was not a "regular employee" as conceived by § 33-28-103, 
W.S. 1977, and that reasonable minds could not differ on the issue. Thus, goes 
the argument, the court erred in presenting the question as one of fact for the 
jury. One of the assertions made in support of this position is that the Wyoming 
Real Estate Commission, in § 2, subparagraph (d) of its rules and regulations, 
has interpreted the term as follows: 

"The term `regular 
employee,' for the purposes of this act, means one who is employed on a regular, 
salaried basis by the owner of real estate whose duties are performed in the 
ordinary course of the business or management and/or operation thereof and the 
investment therein, and whose acts with reference to the sale of the employer's 
property are incidental to his ordinary duties."

[¶24.]  Appellant alleges that § 2, subparagraph 
(d) is a substantive rule of the Wyoming Real Estate Commission that must be 
given the force and effect of law by this court. In other words, Battlefield 
contends that the definition of "regular employee" as set out in the regulation, 
which obviously excludes appellee Neely, is a binding legislative rule by which 
we must abide. Appellee Neely asserts, in the alternative, that the definition 
of "regular employee" in the regulation is merely the agency's interpretation of 
what the term is intended to mean, and such interpretative rules are not binding 
on this court. Of course, if we were bound by the commission's interpretation of 
the words "regular employee" the appellant's position would have merit - but we 
are not.

[¶25.]  Whether the appellee qualifies as a 
"regular employee" under the commission's interpretation of the statute is not 
the initial question that must be answered. Attention must first be given to 
this query:

Assuming this court were 
to disagree with the commission's interpretation of the term "regular employee," 
is that interpretation nevertheless binding upon us?

In order to 
answer this, we turn to some general administrative law concepts having to do 
with administrative agencies' legislative and interpretative rule-making 
powers.

[¶26.]  It is said in 1 Am.Jur.2d Administrative 
Law § 95, "Legislative and Interpretative," pp. 892-893:

"From the standpoint of 
breadth of discretion in rulemaking which is recognized by the courts, that is, 
the extent to which the courts will restrict themselves in overturning 
administrative rules or regulations, and the legal effect given to such rules or 
regulations, rules or regulations are often classified as `legislative' and 
`interpretative.'

"`Legislative' rules or 
regulations are accorded by the courts or by express provision of statute the 
force and effect of law immediately upon going into effect. In such instances 
the administrative agency is acting in a legislative capacity, supplementing the 
statute, filling in the details, or `making the law,' and usually acting 
pursuant to a specific delegation of legislative power. `Interpretative' regulations are those which 
purport to do no more than interpret the statute being administered, to say what 
it means. They constitute the administrator's construction of a statute. In such 
instances the administrative agency is merely anticipating what ultimately must 
be done by the courts; they are performing a judicial function rather than a 
legislative function, and interpretative regulations (in the absence of 
ratification by the legislature) have validity in judicial proceedings only to 
the extent that they correctly construe the statute and then, strictly speaking, 
it is the statute and not the regulation to which the individual must 
conform." (Emphasis added and footnotes omitted.)

[¶27.]  In Schwartz, Administrative Law, § 58, p. 
154, the author says:

"* * * A substantive rule 
is the administrative equivalent of a statute, compelling compliance with its 
terms on the part of those within the agency ambit. Substantive rules are issued 
pursuant to statutory authority and implement the statute; they create law just 
as the statute itself does, by changing existing rights and obligations. An 
interpretative rule is a clarification or explanation of existing laws or 
regulations, rather than a substantive modification of them. Interpretative rules are statements as to 
what the agency thinks a statute or regulation means; they are statements 
issued to advise the public of the agency's construction of the law it 
administers." (Emphasis added and footnotes omitted.)

See also, 2 
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 7:8, pp. 36-37, 42, and § 7:11, pp. 
54-57.

[¶28.]  The Real Estate Commission's rule was an 
interpretative rule. We conclude this, because, even though the commission is 
granted the authority by § 33-28-105(a) and (c)(vii) to adopt rules and 
regulations to assist in implementing the laws, § 33-28-103 does not delegate, 
in any manner, the power of the commission to determine the meaning of the term 
"regular employee" as used therein. Finding no specific delegation of authority, 
we conclude that the commission's rule must be characterized as an 
interpretative rule, which under the above authorities is not necessarily 
binding on this court. Even so, we must still decide whether it was proper - 
under the law - for the court to give the jury the question as a fact issue that 
asks whether Ms. Neely was a "regular employee" of 
Battlefield.

2. Legal 
Interpretation

[¶29.]  Appellant admits that the issue of 
whether one is an employee or an independent contractor is a question of fact, 
unless the record contains insufficient facts to support an employer-employee 
relationship conclusion or unless the only inference that can be drawn from the 
facts is that the individual was not, under the applicable law, an employee. The 
appellant says in its brief:

"When confronted with a 
vicarious liability question in an auto accident involving an insurance 
salesman, this Court in Combined Insurance Co. of America v. Sinclair, [Wyo., 
584 P.2d 1034 (1978)], noted initially that the overriding consideration in 
making a determination whether one is an `employee' or an `independent 
contractor' lies in whether or not the employer has retained the right to 
control the details of the work. This Court noted that this issue is ordinarily 
one of a question of fact for the jury but that it becomes a question of law 
when only one reasonable inference can be drawn from the facts, citing Barnes v. 
Fernandez, 526 P.2d 983 (Wyo. 1974), Tyler v. Jensen, [75 Wyo. 249] 295 P.2d 742 
(1956), and Holly Sugar Corp. v. Perez, 508 P.2d 595 (Wyo. 1973)." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶30.]  The appellant would have us hold that, 
under the facts of this case, there are either insufficient facts for us to 
determine that Ms. Neely is an employee under the statute (§ 33-28-101, supra) 
or that, given the facts bearing upon the employee question, the only reasonable 
inference that can be drawn is that she was not.

[¶31.]  The appellant correctly identifies the 
test that must be satisfied in order to establish the employer-employee 
relationship, which is whether or not the employer retained the right to control 
the details of the work - and, to be sure, this is ordinarily a jury 
question.

[¶32.]  We said in Combined Insurance Company of 
America v. Sinclair, Wyo., 584 P.2d 1034, 1042 (1978):

"* * * The overriding 
consideration in determining whether one is an employee or an independent 
contractor lies in ascertaining whether or not the employer has the right to 
control the details of the work whereby liability is sought to be established. 
Stockwell v. Morris, 46 Wyo. 1, 22 P.2d 189. This issue is ordinarily a question 
of fact for the jury and becomes a question of law only when but one reasonable 
inference can be drawn. Barnes v. Fernandez, [Wyo., 526 P.2d 983]; and Tyler v. 
Jensen, 75 Wyo. 249, 295 P.2d 742, 749. More particularly, the extent to which 
an employee has the `right to control' is primarily a jury question. Holly Sugar 
Corporation v. Perez, Wyo., 508 P.2d 595, 598."

[¶33.]  We went on to say that when we are 
undertaking to decide whether a jury's finding of employer-employee relationship 
may be successfully attacked,

"* * * we must look to 
the evidence most advantageous to the appellee and give it every favorable 
inference.",

citing Rissler 
and McMurry Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., Wyo., 559 P.2d 25 (1977) and Kahler 
v. Martin, Wyo., 570 P.2d 720 (1977).

[¶34.]  In Combined Insurance, supra, we 
emphasized that the important fact to be remembered in making a determination 
with respect to whether one is an employee or an independent contractor is to 
look to whether the "right to 
control" was retained by the alleged employer and not whether the employer 
in fact exercised the right. We said:

"* * * The base 
determining factor is whether Combined retained the right of control [emphasis in text] 
* * * and not whether such control was in 
fact exercised [emphasis added]. Stockwell v. Morris, [46 Wyo. 1, 22 P.2d 189] supra; Brubaker v. Glenrock Lodge Intern. Order of Odd Fellows, Wyo., 526 P.2d 52 (1974); Tyler v. Jensen (1956), [75 Wyo. 249, 295 P.2d 742] supra; Fox 
Park Timber Co. v. Baker, 53 Wyo. 467, 84 P.2d 736, 120 A.L.R. 1020 (1938); 
Chatelain v. Thackery, 98 Utah 525, 100 P.2d 191, and Ludlow v. Industrial 
Commission, 65 Utah 168, 235 P. 884. See, also, 41 Am.Jur.2d, Independent 
Contractors, §§ 5 and 7." 584 P.2d  at 1042.

[¶35.]  We pointed out in Combined Insurance that another indicia 
of the retention of the right to control and the exercise of control is whether 
the purported employer had the authority to fire the alleged employee without 
incurring liability. Combined 
Insurance, 584 P.2d  at 1043, quoting from Lichty v. Model Homes, 66 Wyo. 
347, 211 P.2d 958, 967 (1949). On the other hand, we said in Combined Insurance that an independent 
contractor

"`"* * * is one who, 
exercising an independent employment, contracts to do a piece of work according 
to his own methods and without being subject to the control of his employer 
except as to the result of the work." . . .' Lichty v. Model Homes, 66 Wyo. 347, 
211 P.2d 958, 967."

[¶36.]  In this case, not only did the appellant 
through Richardson retain right of control over the details of Ms. Neely's work, 
but he actually exercised meticulous control over the particulars relating to 
her sales activities and thus Ms. Neely was never left to her own devices with 
respect to the details of the work which she was employed to do. Evidence of 
this can be seen in that:

(1) Ms. Neely was in fact 
employed;

(2) She accepted the 
employment;

(3) She was to show the 
appellant's property for sale; but

(4) She could not close a 
sale without Richardson's approval;

(5) Richardson could 
reject all offers brought by Ms. Neely to the company;

(6) Ms. Neely was to use 
the forms provided by appellant and was told how the forms must be filled 
out;

(7) The appellant 
provided Ms. Neely with maps, price lists, and all documents which were to be 
utilized in selling the property;

(8) Richardson exercised 
control over the details of appellee's advertising;

(9) Richardson, in order 
to show Ms. Neely how to conduct her sales presentations, accompanied her on 
various occasions where he instructed her and controlled her manner of 
sale;

(10) The appellant 
reserved the right to fire and did fire the appellee.

[¶37.]  From a review of these facts, there can 
be no doubt whatever that Battlefield not only retained the right to control the 
day-to-day detailed activity of Ms. Neely's employment obligations but, in fact, 
did control the details of Ms. Neely's work. Therefore the issue of whether or 
not Ms. Neely was an employee of Battlefield is at least a jury question - if 
indeed it was not so clear and unequivocal that it became a question of law 
which could have only been resolved in favor of the appellee's contention that 
she was a "regular employee" of Battlefield.

ARGUMENT 
II

[¶38.]  The appellant asks:

"WHETHER THE APPELLANT 
WHOSE SOLE ACTIVITY WAS THE SALE OF ITS OWN REAL PROPERTY IS THE TYPE OF `OWNER 
OF REAL ESTATE' CONTEMPLATED BY THE WYOMING LEGISLATURE IN ITS ADOPTION OF W.S. 
33-28-103."

In its brief, 
the appellant spells out its contention as follows: 

"It is undisputed that 
the sole activity of Appellant Battlefield, Inc., was the sale of real property 
owned by it as subdivided parcels of that area within Lincoln County, Wyoming, 
known as Commissary Ranch. * * * It is the Appellant's contention that an owner 
of real property who is wholly engaged in the business of selling its own real 
estate is not within the contemplation of the exemption statute to the Real 
Estate License Act and therefore it cannot have any `regular employees' who 
could qualify to sell such real estate without having an active Wyoming real 
estate license."

[¶39.]  The only authority cited for this 
position is MacPhee v. Kinder, Tex.Civ.App., 523 S.W.2d 509 (1975), Elrod v. 
Becker, Tex.Civ. App., 537 S.W.2d 84 (1976) and Brown v. Haverfield, 276 Or. 
911, 557 P.2d 233 (1976). These cases are distinguishable because they do not 
interpret a statute which is the same or in material respects nearly the same as 
our § 33-28-101, W.S. 1977, supra. The Texas statute specifically excluded from 
its exemption statute "`owners * * * engaged wholly or in part in the business 
of selling real estate.'" MacPhee v. Kinder, 523 S.W.2d  at 512, quoting Vernons 
Ann.Civ.St. art. 6573a, § 6(4). Our statute carries with it no such exception. 
In Brown v. Haverfield, supra, the Oregon statute with which the court was there 
concerned limits the availability of the exemption to regular employees of 
owners who perform acts in relation to a sale

"`* * * incidental to 
other principal activities or business of a nonreal estate nature of the 
employer.'" 557 P.2d  at 234, n. 2, quoting ORS 696.030(1).

With this 
language in the statute, the court concluded that the Oregon licensing exemption 
statute would not apply if the employer's primary business were the sale of 
land. But Wyoming's statute contains no such language.

[¶40.]  The only exception to be found in the 
exemption provision of the Wyoming real estate licensing law is the one we have 
previously discussed, i.e., the provision with respect to subdividers. There is 
no reason for us to interpret § 33-28-101 to say that Battlefield, Inc. is not 
the kind of owner contemplated by the statute and appellants have not pointed us 
to any cogent authority to indicate that we should so 
hold.

[¶41.]  We find that Battlefield, Inc. was the 
type of landowner envisioned by § 33-28-101 with the attendant capability of 
entering into an employer-employee relationship with Ms. Neely - which it 
did.

[¶42.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 33-28-103, W.S. 
1977 provides:

"The provisions of this 
act [§§ 33-28-101 to 33-28-117] shall not apply to an owner of real estate or to 
a member of his or her immediate family or to his regular employees with respect to property owned 
by him, or to an attorney in fact under a duly executed power of attorney 
authorizing the consummation of a real estate transaction or to an 
attorney-at-law in the performance of his duties as an attorney or to a public 
official in the conduct of his official duties, or to a person acting as 
receiver, trustee, administrator, executor, or guardian, or while acting under 
court order or under the authority of a will or of a trust instrument, provided, however, this section shall not 
exclude those persons, who as subdividers, sell or offer for sale 
subdivisions." (Emphasis added.)

2 In Hagar v. Mobley, Wyo., 638 P.2d 127, 136 (1981), speaking of 
the Wyoming Real Estate Licensing Act, we said:

"* * * An act licensing 
real estate agents must be construed in the light of an obvious purpose of 
protecting the public in the handling of important and valuable transactions 
relating to real property. Toavs v. State, Wyo., 635 P.2d 1172 
(1981)."

RAPER, Justice, 
concurring.

[¶43.]  I concur in the majority opinion even 
though there is an unsatisfactory result which points up a weakness in the real 
estate licensing act. The legislature, through oversight or otherwise, has 
authorized the outcome we reach. If intentional, it is not for this court to 
question legislative wisdom when the statutory language is clear. Courts will 
not usurp the power of the legislature by deciding what should have been said. 
Barber v. State 
Highway Commission, 80 Wyo. 340, 342 P.2d 723 
(1959).

GUTHRIE, Justice, retired, 
concurring.

[¶44.]  I concur in the majority opinion but feel 
that the following comment should be made. An examination of the case of 
Dixon v. Ringsby, 
Wyo., 405 P.2d 271 (1965) and Owens v. Capri, 
65 Wyo. 325, 202 P.2d 174 (1949), reveals that 
Dixon v. Ringsby 
was decided under a dissimilar statute and prior to the adoption of § 33-28-103, 
W.S. 1977, in 1971. The Owens v. Capri case did 
not involve the then exemption statute and in my view has no applicability 
herein. The statute under which the Dixon case was decided was quite different and 
much more restrictive than the present statutory exemption. In my view, it must 
be presumed that the legislature intended to adopt a less restrictive definition 
of the words "regular employee" by repeal of the earlier statute and adoption of 
the present one. Jordan v. 
Delta Drilling Company, Wyo., 541 P.2d 39, 43 (1975). 

ROONEY, Chief Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶45.]  I agree with the majority opinion in its 
conclusion that appellant did not act within the spirit or letter of the law in 
connection with this incident. I do not agree that appellee was within the 
exemptions of § 33-28-103, W.S. 1977 (see fn. 1, majority opinion). She should 
have been licensed under the Real Estate License Act of 1971 (§§ 33-28-101 
through 33-28-117, W.S. 1977) before carrying on her activities in connection 
with this incident. Both parties were, or should have been, aware of this 
requirement. Inasmuch as each of them came into court with dirty hands, I would 
leave them as the court first found them.

"The frequently stated 
maxim that `he who comes into equity must come with clean hands' is an ancient 
and favorite precept of the equity court." 27 Am.Jur.2d Equity, § 
136.

[¶46.]  In Owens v. Capri, 65 Wyo. 325, 202 P.2d 174 (1949), a person who submitted purchaser's offers to vendor of a ranch in a 
single real estate transaction was held to be acting as a broker without a 
license, wherefore he could not enforce an oral agreement with the purchaser for 
a fee to be paid in assisting the purchaser in acquisition of a ranch. We there 
said at of 202 P.2d:

"Although we recognize 
the apparent hardships sometimes resulting, this court has held that courts will 
not aid the party to enforce an agreement made in furtherance of acts expressly 
made illegal by statute. Kennedy v. 
Lonabaugh, 19 Wyo. 352, 117 P. 1079, Ann.Cas. 1913E, 133; 
Seamonds v. School Dist. No. 14, 51 Wyo. 477, 68 P.2d 149.

"`The law refuses to 
enforce illegal contracts as a rule, not out of regard for the party objecting, 
nor from any wish to protect his interest, but from reasons of public policy.' 
Camp v. Bruce, 96 Va. 521, 524, 31 S.E. 901, 43 L.R.A. 146, 70 Am.St.Rep. 873; 2 Elliott on Contracts, Section 
1064."

[¶47.]  The sales were not within the exceptions 
contained in § 33-28-103, W.S. 1977. The legislative intent in this respect was 
there adequately expressed when considered together with other provisions of the 
act of which it is a part. Licensing is required for those who participate in 
the activity:

"* * * for another and 
for a fee, commission or other valuable consideration, or with the intent or 
expectation of receiving same, negotiates or attempts to negotiate the listing, 
sale, purchase, rental, auctioneering, exchange or lease of any real estate or 
the improvements thereon, or collects rents or attempts to collect rents, or who 
advertises or holds himself out as engaged in any of the foregoing activities. * 
* *" Section 33-28-102(a)(ii), W.S. 1977.

Appellee, with 
assistance from and knowledge of appellant, was certainly doing that. And the 
exceptions contained in § 33-28-103, W.S. 1977 (see fn. 1 in majority opinion) 
do not apply to this situation. The exceptions are designed to exclude from the 
licensing requirement those who have occasion to sell real property for others 
but who are not doing so as a part of their regular business, i.e. 
attorneys-in-fact operating under a power of attorney, attorneys at law, public 
officials performing official duties, receivers, trustees, administrators, 
executors, guardians, those acting under a court order or authority of a will or 
trust instrument; and "an owner of real estate or to a member of his or her 
immediate family or to his regular employees with respect to property owned by 
him." The only exception having possible application to this incident is the 
last quoted one.

[¶48.]  And it is inapplicable inasmuch as 
appellee was not a regular employee 
of appellant. Her status may have been that of an "employee" as distinguished 
from an "independent contractor," but she was not a "regular" employee within 
the intent of the statute. The use of the word "regular" by the legislature 
cannot be said to be a useless gesture.

"* * * We must give 
meaning to every word, clause and sentence of the statute and the statute should 
be construed so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous. * * *" State Board of Equalization v. Cheyenne 
Newspapers, Inc., Wyo., 611 P.2d 805, 809 (1980). See: Belco Petroleum Corporation v. State Board 
of Equalization, Wyo., 587 P.2d 204 
(1978).

During the 
period which is subject of this action, appellee was the elected Clerk of the 
DistrictCourtofSubletteCounty. Her employment by 
the county was on a full-time basis.

"Each * * * clerk of the 
district court, * * * shall devote full time to the duties of their respective 
offices during the term for which they were elected or appointed." Section 
18-3-106, W.S. 1977.

Appellee may 
have been a part-time or irregular employee of appellant, but she was not a 
regular employee of it within the intent of the statute.

[¶49.]  Additionally, the exception in the 
statute was intended to allow one other 
than a licensed real estate broker or salesman to sell his own property and 
to utilize the members of his immediate family or those regularly working for 
him in such role. To go beyond the scope of this intention and to allow a 
licensed real estate broker to use unlicensed people to sell real property for 
him simply because he has taken title thereto in his own name would be contrary 
to the entire purpose of the Real Estate License Act of 1971. And many brokers 
do buy real property or take it in trade in the course of their real estate 
business, which property they subsequently sell. Under the holding of the 
majority opinion, unlicensed individuals could be employed to do so. The very 
intent and purpose of the act will be thwarted by judicially legislating such a 
loophole.

[¶50.]  A temptation exists to weigh the relative 
dereliction of the parties and to make an award to the one whose hands are least 
dirty, but such is not a function of the court.

[¶51.]  I would remand the case with instructions 
to vacate the judgment and to dismiss the case.

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶52.]  I agree with the conclusion of Justice 
Rooney that this case should be reversed. Because I have identified a different 
rationale for that reversal I cannot simply join in his dissenting opinion. In 
my view the majority of the court strays in that portion of its opinion which 
interprets § 33-28-103(a)(vi), W.S. 1977.

[¶53.]  The majority of the court adopts the 
claim of the appellee that this section must be construed to the end that a 
"subdivision" can only be found in some state other than Wyoming. Upon reflection 
it indeed seems to be a strange and wonderful result for our legislature, in 
adopting a comprehensive regulatory scheme for real estate licensing to decide 
that it would only attempt to regulate transactions involving subdivisions lying 
outside the State of Wyoming. My scrutiny of the statutory language 
leads me to the conclusion that the word "subdivision" includes subdivisions in 
the State of Wyoming, and if that is true the statutory 
scheme leads to the opposite result from that suggested by the 
majority.

[¶54.]  The critical language in § 
33-28-102(a)(vi) is "The term `subdivision' means any land or tract of land in 
another state which is divided or proposed to be divided into five (5) or more 
lots, parcels, units or interests * * *." The effect of the construction placed 
upon the statute by the majority is that the modifying phrase "in another state" 
relates to the words "any land" as well as the words "tract of land." This 
construction is contrary to the rule previously espoused by this court which 
requires every part of a statute to be given effect if possible. State Board of Equalization v. Cheyenne 
Newspapers, Inc., Wyo., 611 P.2d 805 (1980); Belco Petroleum Corporation v. State Board 
of Equalization, Wyo., 587 P.2d 204 (1978); and Wheatland Irrigation District v. Short, 
80 Wyo. 136, 339 P.2d 403 (1959). Instead the construction given by the majority 
leads to a statutory redundancy in the phrase "any land or tract of land," 
treating the two phrases as meaning the same thing. More significantly, we 
previously have held that the use of the term "or" in a statute denotes 
alternatives. Basin Electric Power 
Cooperative v. State Board of Control, Wyo., 578 P.2d 557 (1978); Voss v. Ralston, Wyo., 550 P.2d 481 
(1976). In this statute it also denotes alternatives.

[¶55.]  In addition the language used in the 
statute by the legislature makes it appropriate to apply the following intrinsic 
aid to statutory construction as suggested by Professor Sands in 2A Sutherland 
Statutory Construction § 47.33, p. 159 (1973), as supplemented by Professor 
Singer in the 1982 Cumulative Supplement:

"Referential and 
qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely 
to the last antecedent, which consists of `the last word, phrase, or clause that 
can be made an antecedent without impairing the meaning of the sentence.' Thus a 
proviso usually is construed to apply to the provision or clause immediately 
preceding it. The rule is but another aid to discovery of intent or meaning, 
however, and not an inflexible and uniformly binding rule. Where the sense of 
the entire act requires that a qualifying word or phrase apply to several 
preceding or even succeeding sections, the word or phrase will not be restricted 
to its immediate antecedent. Evidence that a qualifying phrase is supposed to 
apply to all antecedents instead of only to the immediately preceding one may be 
found in the fact that it is separated from the antecedents by a comma." 
(Footnotes omitted.)

[¶56.]  It is particularly noted that the 
qualifying phrase "in another state" is not set off by commas. That coupled with 
the use of the disjunctive "or" leads to the conclusion that the legislature 
intended to describe both "any land" and a "tract of land in another state." The 
words "any land" include lands in the State of Wyoming. This is a sensible 
construction of legislative intent in a situation in which the legislature was 
dealing with a licensing scheme designed to provide protection to citizens of 
this state with respect to purchases of real estate. We previously have noted 
that our act is designed for the protection of the public and must be construed 
in light of its beneficent purpose so as to effectuate the intention of the 
legislature. Hagar v. Mobley, Wyo., 
638 P.2d 127 (1981); Toavs v. State, 
Wyo., 635 P.2d 1172 (1981). A construction of the statute which excludes 
subdivisions in the State of Wyoming is contrary to the previously articulated 
legislative purpose.

[¶57.]  Conceding that the appellant comes before 
the court in a posture which in most instances would justify depriving it of any 
equitable considerations, I suppose we must recognize that the legislature can 
adopt statutes which do not afford equity in all situations. On the premise that 
in this instance we were dealing with a "subdivider," i.e. Battlefield, Inc., 
which was offering subdivided land for disposition, it is clear to me that the 
exemption statute, § 33-28-103, W.S. 1977, by virtue of its proviso is not 
applicable because the statute says:

"* * * provided, however, 
this section shall not exclude those persons, who as subdividers, sell or offer 
for sale subdivisions."

If Battlefield, 
Inc., as the owner, is not within the exemption of that section by virtue of the 
quoted language, then there is no possibility that the appellee can be within 
the exemption, and her status as a "regular employee" is not important for 
purposes of disposition.

[¶58.]  Absent the benefit of the exemption 
statute, the appellee is a broker under one of the definitions found in § 
33-28-102(a)(ii), which provides in pertinent part:

"* * * The term `broker' 
also includes any person employed by or on behalf of the owner or owners of real 
estate to conduct the sale, leasing, or other disposition thereof at a salary or 
for a fee, commission or any other consideration. * * *"

It is obvious 
from the description of the facts found in the majority opinion that the 
appellee was doing some of these things.

[¶59.]  The next step in sequence is the 
invocation of § 33-28-115, W.S. 1977, which provides as 
follows:

"No person shall maintain 
an action in any court of this state for the recovery of a commission, fee, or 
compensation for any act done, the doing of which is prohibited under this act 
[§§ 33-28-101 to 33-28-117] to other than licensed brokers, unless such person 
was licensed hereunder as a broker at the time of the doing of the 
act."

The actions of 
the appellee are made unlawful by § 33-28-101, W.S. 1977. The appellee was not 
licensed as a broker.

[¶60.]  In Dixon v. Ringsby, Wyo., 405 P.2d 271 
(1965), this court held that the predecessor of § 33-28-115, W.S. 1977 (§ 
33-350, W.S. 1957) precluded an action to recover compensation alleged to be due 
a ranch manager for locating a buyer for the ranch real property. The court 
cited Owens v. Capri, 65 Wyo. 325, 202 P.2d 174 (1949), and in effect held that 
one who is in the regular business of being a ranch manager obviously became a 
broker even for purposes of a single transaction. Justice Rooney already has 
pointed out that the appellee here had a regular business of being clerk of the 
district court. Courts in other states have reached similar conclusions. Ness v. 
Greater Arizona Realty, Inc., 117 Ariz. 357, 572 P.2d 1195 (1977); Marcotte 
Realty & Auction, Inc. v. Schumacher, 225 Kan. 193, 589 P.2d 570 (1979); 
Islandia, Inc. v. Marechek, 82 Nev. 424, 420 P.2d 5 (1966); Ratcliff v. Cobb, 
Okla., 439 P.2d 194 (1968); and Brown v. Haverfield, 276 Or. 911, 557 P.2d 233 
(1976).

[¶61.]  Since I am persuaded that the exemption 
provision is not available because our legislature intended to regulate 
subdivisions in the State of Wyoming as well as subdivisions out of the State of 
Wyoming, I am satisfied that the district court should be reversed as a matter 
of law. The marketing of the subdivision in this instance forecloses the 
application of the exemption statute, leaving the appellee in the situation of a 
broker without a license. Conceding that it is difficult to bear witness to a 
situation in which one who has accomplished the required tasks is denied the 
agreed-upon compensation for doing that work that is what the legislature 
clearly intended, as this court previously has recognized. Dixon v. Ringsby, 
supra; Doran v. Imeson Aviation, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 586 (D.Wyo. 
1976).