Case Title: In re A.P.W.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 418A20

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2021-08-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-93 
No. 418A20-1 
Filed 27 August 2021 
 
IN THE MATTER OF: A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) and on writ of certiorari  
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(b) from orders entered on 4 March 2019 by Judge David 
V. Byrd and on 30 June 2020 by Judge Jeanie R. Houston in District Court, Wilkes 
County.  This matter was calendared in the Supreme Court on 21 June 2021 but 
determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of 
the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
Vannoy, Colvard, Triplett & Vannoy, P.L.L.C., by Daniel S. Johnson, for 
petitioner-appellee Wilkes County Department of Social Services. 
 
Michelle FormyDuval Lynch for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Parent Defender Wendy C. Sotolongo and Assistant Parent Defender J. Lee 
Gilliam for respondent-appellant father. 
 
Anné C. Wright for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
 
BERGER, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Respondent-mother and respondent-father appeal from the trial court’s orders 
terminating their parental rights in the minor children “Ava,” born on January 16, 
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
2014, “Aiden,” born on June 16, 2012, and “Hunter,” born on February 14, 2011. 1   In 
an order entered on December 18, 2020, this Court also allowed respondents’ joint 
petition for writ of certiorari to review the trial court’s March 4, 2019 permanency 
planning order eliminating reunification from the children’s permanent plan.  See 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(2), (a2) (2019); see also N.C.R. App. P. 21(a)(1) (authorizing 
certiorari review “when the right to prosecute an appeal has been lost by failure to 
take timely action[.]”).  We now affirm the trial court’s orders with regard to 
respondent-mother and respondent-father. 
I. 
Procedural History 
¶ 2 
 
On January 2, 2017, the Wilkes County Department of Social Services (DSS) 
received a child protective services (CPS) report stating that Ava, Aiden, and 
Hunter’s home lacked heat and running water and had holes in the floor.  The same 
day, law enforcement came to the residence to investigate a reported robbery in which 
a man wearing a ski mask brandished a toy gun while attempting to steal medication 
belonging to a friend of respondent-mother.  Officers found drug paraphernalia in the 
home, and two of the children identified respondent-father as the robber.  Law 
enforcement reported finding used hypodermic needles in the home, raising “concerns 
about improper supervision and ongoing substance abuse.”  DSS was notified that 
day that “mom and the children resided in a home with no running water or heat and 
                                            
1 We use these pseudonyms to protect the juveniles’ identities and for ease of reading.  
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
holes in the f1oor.”  In subsequent drug screens, respondent-mother tested positive 
for 
THC 
and 
benzodiazepine.2 
Respondent-father 
tested 
positive 
for 
methamphetamine and benzodiazepine.   
¶ 3 
 
On January 3, 2017, DSS obtained nonsecure custody of the children and filed 
petitions alleging they were neglected juveniles under N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2019).  
Specifically, the petitions alleged that the children were neglected because they did 
not receive proper supervision from their parents and lived in an environment 
injurious to their welfare.  Because of this, respondent-mother was asked to find 
appropriate housing for the family, and she subsequently moved in with the 
children’s paternal grandmother.  Respondent-father “was asked to move out of the 
home due to inappropriate housing arrangements.”  
¶ 4 
 
After a hearing on February 6, 2017, the trial court entered an order 
adjudicating the children neglected.  In lieu of written findings, the trial court found 
that respondents had stipulated to the facts stated in the court summary prepared 
by DSS and incorporated the document into the order by reference.  According to the 
court summary, respondents’ CPS history began in 2013 when one child fell and hit 
his head while under respondent-mother’s care, though the case was closed because 
neglect was not substantiated. Then, in 2016, there were concerns of “substance 
                                            
2 Respondent-mother has a valid prescription for Xanax, a brand-name 
benzodiazepine.  
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
abuse by the parents and improper care of the children.”  Later that year, all three 
children underwent medical exams which showed medical or remedial neglect.  Due 
to this, the family went into case management, and “[b]oth parents were 
substantiated on for improper medical/remedial care.”  
¶ 5 
 
Per a separate disposition order, legal and physical custody of the juveniles 
was to remain with DSS.  The trial court granted respondents semi-monthly, one-
hour periods of supervised visitation, “contingent upon clean drug screens.”  The court 
ordered DSS to conduct a home study of the paternal grandmother.  
¶ 6 
 
Respondents each entered into a DSS case plan requiring them to provide DSS 
with a written statement of the reasons their children were placed in foster care. 
Further, both respondents had to obtain substance abuse assessments; complete 
parenting classes; obtain and maintain stable employment and appropriate housing; 
sign a voluntary support agreement requiring payment of timely child support; and 
attend regular visitation with the children, conditioned upon negative drug screens.  
Respondent-father was also required to complete anger management classes.  
¶ 7 
 
At the initial review hearing on June 5, 2017, the trial court found respondent-
mother had “completed most of the requirements of her family service case plan[,]” 
including substance abuse treatment and parenting classes.  Respondent-mother had 
signed a voluntary support agreement and had a “small child support arrearage.”  
She had submitted to random drug screens and regularly attended visitation with 
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
the children.  However, while DSS was unable to inspect the interior of respondent-
mother’s home at that time, the exterior was found to be in poor condition.  
Respondent-father had “made practically no progress” on his case plan, and he was 
not attending visitations or maintaining regular contact with the social worker.  
¶ 8 
 
On December 4, 2017, the trial court held a permanency planning hearing and 
established a primary permanent plan of reunification with a concurrent plan of 
custody with a court-approved caretaker.  At the time of the hearing, respondent-
father was incarcerated for a probation violation and had made no child support 
payments despite entering into a voluntary support agreement.  The trial court found 
that respondent-mother was unemployed and “behind in her child support[.]” 
Additionally, an inspection of respondent-mother’s home revealed that the condition 
of her residence was unclean, “very cluttered[,]” and “not appropriate at this time.”  
Respondent-mother was living with her boyfriend Thomas and their infant child.  The 
trial court further found that Ava, Aiden, and Hunter had “indicated that they are 
afraid of [Thomas,]” and that respondent-mother had “advised the social worker that 
she will separate herself from [Thomas] if necessary to regain custody of her 
children.”   
¶ 9 
 
Following a review hearing on September 18, 2018, the trial court entered a 
permanency planning order on March 4, 2019.  This order eliminated reunification 
and changed the primary plan to adoption with the secondary plan being custody with 
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
an approved caretaker.  The court relieved DSS of further reunification efforts while 
noting that “[e]ach parent, through counsel, preserves their right to appeal the 
Court’s decision to cease reunification efforts.” However, respondents failed to file 
written notice preserving their right to appeal the order eliminating reunification 
from the permanent plan, as required by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(2) which states 
(a1) In a juvenile matter . . . only the following final orders 
may be appealed directly to the Supreme Court:  
 
. . . . 
 
(2) An order eliminating reunification as a permanent plan 
under G.S. 7B-906.2(b), if all of the following conditions are 
satisfied:  
 
a. The right to appeal the order eliminating 
reunification has been preserved in writing within 
30 days of entry and service of the order.  
 
b. A motion or petition to terminate the parent’s 
rights is filed with 65 days of entry and service of the 
order eliminating reunification and both of the 
following occur: 
 
(1) The motion or petition to terminate rights 
is heard and granted. 
 
(2) The order terminating parental rights is 
appealed in a proper and timely manner.  
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(2) (2019).  
¶ 10 
 
DSS later filed petitions to terminate respondents’ parental rights in Ava, 
Aiden, and Hunter.  On June 9, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on the petitions, 
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
and on June 30, 2020, the trial court entered orders terminating respondents’ 
parental rights.   
¶ 11 
 
In adjudicating grounds for termination, the trial court concluded respondents 
had: (1) neglected the children under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1); (2) willfully left the 
children in a placement outside the home for more than twelve months without 
making reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to their removal under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2); and (3) willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of the 
children’s cost of care in DSS custody under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3).  With regard 
to respondent-mother, the trial court further concluded the children were dependent 
juveniles under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6), because she was incapable of providing 
proper care and supervision for the children and lacked an appropriate alternative 
childcare arrangement.  The trial court then considered the dispositional factors in 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) and determined it was in the children’s best interests that 
respondents’ parental rights be terminated.   
¶ 12 
 
Respondents filed notice of appeal from the termination orders.  By an order 
entered on December 18, 2020, this Court allowed respondents’ joint petition for writ 
of certiorari to review the March 4, 2019, permanency planning order eliminating 
reunification from the permanent plan as part of their appeal.  
II. 
Order Eliminating Reunification from the Permanent Plan 
¶ 13 
 
Respondents contend the trial court erred when it eliminated reunification 
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
from the children’s permanent plan in the March 4, 2019, permanency planning 
order.  We disagree. 
A. Standard of review 
¶ 14 
This Court’s review of a permanency planning review order 
“is limited to whether there is competent evidence in the 
record to support the findings [of fact] and whether the 
findings support the conclusions of law.”  The trial court’s 
findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by any 
competent evidence.”   
 
In re H.A.J., 377 N.C. 43, 2021-NCSC-26, ¶ 14 (quoting In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. 165, 
168, 752 S.E.2d 453, 455 (2013)).  Uncontested findings are binding on appeal.  Id. 
¶ 15.  
¶ 15 
 
The trial court’s dispositional choices—including the decision to eliminate 
reunification from the permanent plan—are reviewed for abuse of discretion.  In re 
J.H., 373 N.C. 264, 267–68, 837 S.E.2d 847, 850 (2020).  “An abuse of discretion occurs 
when the trial court’s ruling is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a 
reasoned decision.”  Id. at 268, 837 S.E.2d at 850. 
¶ 16 
 
When this Court reviews an order eliminating reunification from the 
permanent plan with an order terminating parental rights, “we consider both orders 
together” as provided in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a2).  In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. 165, 170, 752 
S.E.2d 453, 457 (2013).  Therefore, “incomplete findings of fact in the cease 
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
reunification order may be cured by findings of fact in the termination order.”3  Id. 
¶ 17 
 
As an initial matter, we note the record on appeal does not include a transcript 
of the September 18, 2018, permanency planning hearing or a narrative of the 
hearing testimony.  See N.C R. App. P. 9(a)(1)(e) (stating that the record on appeal 
shall contain information “necessary for an understanding of all issues presented on 
appeal.”)  Because respondents have failed to include a narration of the evidence, or 
a transcript of the trial court proceedings with the record, we presume the findings 
made by the trial court are supported by competent evidence.  See Summerlin v. 
Carolina & N.W. Ry. Co., 133 N.C. 550,  557, 45 S.E. 898, 901 (1903) (deciding that it 
is the responsibility of the appellant to assemble the record in such a way as to show 
error, otherwise the Court cannot presume error.);  see also In re A.R.H.B., 186 N.C. 
App. 211, 219, 651 S.E.2d 247, 253 (2007), appeal dismissed, 362 N.C. 235, 659 S.E.2d 
433 (2008) (finding that in the absence of a transcript “[t]he longstanding rule is that 
there is a presumption in favor of regularity and correctness in proceedings in the 
trial court, with the burden on the appellant to show error.” (citation and quotation 
                                            
3 At the time of our decision in In re L.M.T., the parent’s right to appeal from a 
permanency planning order was triggered by the trial court’s ceasing of reunification efforts, 
rather than its elimination of reunification from the permanent plan as in current N.C.G.S. 
§§ 7B-1001(a)(5) and (a1)(2) (2019). In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. at 167–70, 752 S.E.2d at 455–57 
(discussing former N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-507(b)(1) and 7B-1001(a)(5) (2011)). Section 7B-906.2 now 
directs the trial court to “order the county department of social services to make efforts 
toward finalizing the primary and secondary permanent plans” until permanence is achieved. 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(b). The elimination of reunification from the permanent plan thus 
implicitly relieves the department of its duty to undertake reunification efforts pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(b). 
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
marks omitted)).  To the extent respondents challenge any of the findings in the 
March 4, 2019, permanency planning order on evidentiary grounds, those challenges 
cannot succeed. 
B. Sufficiency of findings 
¶ 18 
 
Respondent-mother contends the permanency planning order lacks the 
findings required by N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.1(d)(3) (2019) and N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(b) 
(2019) to eliminate reunification from the children’s permanent plan.   
¶ 19 
 
Subdivision 7B-906.1(d)(3) applies at all review and permanency planning 
hearings following an adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency.  This statute 
requires the trial court to “make written findings regarding . . . [w]hether efforts to 
reunite the juvenile with either parent clearly would be unsuccessful or inconsistent 
with the juvenile’s health or safety and need for a safe, permanent home within a 
reasonable period of time.”4  N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.1(d)(3).  
¶ 20 
 
Subsection 7B-906.2(b) provides, in pertinent part, that reunification shall 
remain a part of the juvenile’s permanent plan unless the trial court “made findings 
under . . . G.S. 7B-906.1(d)(3) . . . or the court makes written findings that 
                                            
4 Subsection 7B-906.1(d) includes seven subdivisions and provides that, “the court 
shall consider the following criteria and make written findings regarding those that are 
relevant[.]” N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.1(d).  This Court has construed virtually identical language in 
N.C.G.S. 7B-1110(a) (2019)—which governs the dispositional stage of a termination of 
parental rights proceeding—“to require written findings only as to those factors for which 
there is conflicting evidence.” In re E.F., 375 N.C. 88, 91, 846 S.E.2d 630, 633 (2020) (citing 
In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190, 199, 835 S.E.2d 417, 424 (2019)). 
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
reunification efforts clearly would be unsuccessful or would be inconsistent with the 
juvenile’s health or safety.”5  N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(b).  “The trial court’s written 
findings must address the statute’s concerns but need not quote its exact language.”  
In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. at 168, 752 S.E.2d at 455 (interpreting former N.C.G.S. § 7B-
507(b)(1) (2011)). 
¶ 21 
 
The trial court made the following findings with regard to respondent-mother’s 
progress and prospects for reunification: 
5. 
The mother signed her case plan on February 27, 
2017.  She completed some of the items of her case plan.  
She completed substance abuse classes, parenting classes, 
and signed a voluntary support agreement.  The mother 
has made a few child support payments.  She has a child 
support arrearage in excess of $2,000.00.  The mother’s 
employment status is unclear.  She has reported work at 
Lydall, Van Heusen, the Candle Company, and Tyson. 
6. 
The condition of the mother’s home has been a 
concern throughout the pendency of these cases.  Each time 
the mother has moved she has failed to keep a suitable and 
clean residence. 
7. 
The mother has lived with her boyfriend, Thomas       
. . ., throughout the pendency of these cases.  The children 
have consistently indicated that they are afraid of 
[Thomas] and they have described, in detail, incidents of 
domestic violence perpetrated by [Thomas] against their 
mother.  [Thomas] signed a case plan; however, he did not 
complete the plan with the exception of taking a few 
random drug screens.  
                                            
5 Subsection 7B-906.2(b) also allows the trial court to exclude reunification from the 
permanent plan if “the court made findings under G.S. 7B-901(c) or G.S. 7B-906.1(d)(3), [or] 
the permanent plan is or has been achieved . . . .” N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(b). 
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
. . . . 
9 
Both parents have been allowed supervised 
visitation, twice monthly for one hour, contingent on 
passing drug screens.  The mother missed visits from April 
through July 2018. The mother’s visits have been 
appropriate and she has done well with the children during 
her visits. . . .  
10. 
The mother was ordered to undergo a psychological 
evaluation with Nancy Sizemore, MA, LPA.  Ms. Sizemore 
submitted her report in August 2018.  She diagnosed the 
mother with the following conditions: 
 Borderline intelligence 
 Attention 
deficit 
hyperactivity 
disorder 
(“ADHD”) 
 Generalized anxiety disorder 
 Paranoid personality disorder 
 Mild neurocognitive disorder 
11. 
Ms. Sizemore opined that and the court finds the 
mother does not appear able to make appropriate decisions 
in the best interests of the children and reunification is not 
likely to be in the best interest of the children.  The mother 
does not appear to learn from past mistakes and blames 
others for her situation.  She does not appear capable to 
make the necessary changes in her life to provide a safe 
and secure environment for the children. 
12. 
There are no appropriate relative placements for the 
children. . . .  
13. 
It is not possible for the children to be returned to 
the home of a parent immediately or within the next six 
months and it would be contrary to the children’s health 
and safety and their general welfare to be returned to the 
home of a parent.  The parents have not completed their 
case plans.  The mother is unable to appropriately parent 
the children.  The mother has not separated herself from 
Thomas. . . .  Neither parent has demonstrated such 
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
stability which would warrant the children being returned 
to their care.  As a result, the Court finds that the 
permanent plan should be changed from reunification to a 
primary permanent plan of adoption and a secondary plan 
of custody with an approved caretaker.  DSS should be 
relieved of any further obligation to attempt to reunify the 
children with a parent. 
¶ 22 
 
We find no merit to respondent-mother’s argument.  Although the trial court 
did not use the precise language of N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-906.1(d)(3) and -906.2(b) in its 
findings, the court addressed the substance of both statutes’ concerns.  See In re 
L.M.T., 367 N.C. at 168, 752 S.E.2d at 455 (“The trial court's written findings must 
address the statute's concerns, but need not quote its exact language.”).  The trial 
court also found sufficient evidentiary facts that demonstrate the basis for its findings 
of fact: “[i]t is not possible for the children to be returned to the home of a parent 
immediately or within the next six months and it would be contrary to the children’s 
health and safety and their general welfare to be returned to the home of a parent.” 
(emphasis added).  Specifically, the trial court cited respondent-mother’s failure to 
obtain stable and appropriate housing or employment, her continued cohabitation 
with Thomas despite the children’s detailed accounts of his domestic violence against 
her, the unfavorable results of her psychological evaluation, and her apparent 
inability “to learn from past mistakes and . . . make the necessary changes in her life 
to provide a safe and secure environment for the children.”  
¶ 23 
 
Respondent-mother insists the evidence and the trial court’s findings show 
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
that “[r]eunification efforts between Ava, Aiden, Hunter and their mother would not 
have been clearly unsuccessful,” given her progress in completing some components 
of her case plan.  As explained above, however, the trial court’s findings of fact support 
its conclusion of law that reunification with either parent would be “contrary to the 
children’s health and safety[.]”  Accordingly, we affirm the order eliminating 
reunification from the permanent plan as to respondent-mother.  
¶ 24 
 
Respondent-father claims the trial court failed to make sufficient findings to 
comply with N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d)(1)–(4) (2019) in eliminating reunification from 
the children’s permanent plan.  Subsection 7B-906.2(d) requires the trial court to 
make written findings as to each of the following, which 
shall demonstrate the [parent’s] degree of success or failure 
toward reunification: 
(1) Whether the parent is making adequate progress 
within a reasonable period of time under the plan. 
(2) Whether the parent is actively participating in or 
cooperating with the plan, the department, and the 
guardian ad litem for the juvenile. 
(3) Whether the parent remains available to the court, 
the department, and the guardian ad litem for the 
juvenile. 
(4) Whether the parent is acting in a manner 
inconsistent with the health or safety of the juvenile. 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d)(1)–(4).  While the findings need not track the statutory 
language, they “must make clear that the trial court considered the evidence in light 
of whether reunification would be futile or would be inconsistent with the juvenile’s 
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of 
time.”  In re L.E.W., 375 N.C. 124, 129–30, 846 S.E.2d 460, 465 (2020).  Moreover, as 
previously noted, “incomplete findings of fact in the cease reunification order may be 
cured by findings of fact in the termination order.”  In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. at 170, 752 
S.E.2d at 457. 
¶ 25 
 
Here, the permanency planning order includes the following findings 
regarding respondent-father’s progress and prospects for reunification: 
8. 
The father signed a case plan on April 6, 2017.  He 
has been in and out of prison and treatment for substance 
abuse.  As a result of his incarceration and treatment the 
father has only had three visits with the children since they 
have been in DSS custody.  He signed a voluntary support 
agreement and has a child support arrearage in excess of 
$5,000.00 
9. 
Both parents have been allowed supervised 
visitation, twice monthly for one hour, contingent on 
passing drug screens.  . . . As noted above, the father has 
only had three visits with the children during the time that 
they have been in DSS custody. 
. . . . 
12. 
There are no appropriate relative placements for the 
children. . . .  
13. 
It is not possible for the children to be returned to 
the home of a parent immediately or within the next six 
months and it would be contrary to the children’s health 
and safety and their general welfare to be returned to the 
home of a parent.  The parents have not completed their 
case plans. . . .  Neither parent has demonstrated such 
stability which would warrant the children being returned 
to their care.  As a result, the Court finds that the 
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
permanent plan should be changed from reunification to a 
primary permanent plan of adoption and a secondary plan 
of custody with an approved caretaker.  DSS should be 
relieved of any further obligation to attempt to reunify the 
children with a parent. 
¶ 26 
 
In its three orders terminating respondents’ parental rights, the trial court 
listed the requirements of respondent-father’s case plan and made the following 
additional findings regarding the N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d) criteria:6 
25. 
The Respondent-Father was incarcerated from 
November 2017 until January 2018. 
26. 
The Respondent-Father failed to complete his anger 
management assessment. 
27. 
The Respondent-Father signed a voluntary support 
agreement in 2017 to pay child support in the amount of 
$295.00 per month.  . . . At the time of the termination 
hearing, 
[he] 
had 
a 
child 
support 
arrearage 
of 
approximately $10,000.00.  
. . . . 
29. 
The Respondent-Father participated in a substance 
abuse assessment and went through an inpatient 
treatment program in the DART program. 
30. 
The Respondent-Father suffered a substance abuse 
relapse in September 2019.  On September 23, 2019, the 
Respondent-Father was ordered to submit a drug screen by 
the 
Court. 
 
This 
drug 
screen 
was 
positive 
for 
methamphetamine. 
31. 
The 
Respondent-Father 
has 
not 
consistently 
                                            
6 The trial court entered a separate termination order for Ava, Aiden, and Hunter. 
The three orders contain virtually identical findings of fact and conclusions of law, altered 
only to account for the name, age, and sex of the child at issue.  
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
submitted himself for drug screening requested by DSS.  
He was asked to submit to forty-one (41) drug screens but 
only took twelve (12) during the pendency of the underlying 
juvenile action. 
32. 
The Respondent-Father also refused to take some 
drug screens. . . .  
33. 
The 
Respondent-Father 
has 
not 
consistently 
participated in visitation with the minor child[ren].  
During the pendency of the underlying juvenile action, the 
Respondent-Father could have participated in forty (40) 
supervised visits with the child[ren] but only had five (5) 
visits. 
34. 
The Respondent-Father did not complete parenting 
classes.  
. . . . 
45. 
. . . Neither parent made any appreciable progress in 
their case plan.  Neither Respondent has shown that they 
could serve as a responsible custodian for the child.  
Neither parent has maintained stable and appropriate 
housing. 
As respondent-father does not contest any of these findings, they are binding on 
appeal.   
¶ 27 
 
Respondent-father first contends that the trial court’s bare finding that he 
“ha[d] not completed” his case plan at the time of the permanency planning hearing 
is insufficient to address the criteria required by N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d)(1).  However, 
the trial court made additional findings that satisfy N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d)(1).  
Specifically, the trial court found that respondent-father: had been “in and out of 
prison and treatment for substance abuse” since signing his case plan on April 6, 
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
2017; had visited the children just three times in the twenty months since they 
entered DSS custody; had accumulated “a child support arrearage in excess of 
$5,000.00”; and had not “demonstrated such stability which would warrant the 
children being returned to [his] care.” Additional findings in the termination orders 
include that, although he obtained a substance abuse assessment and attended 
inpatient treatment through the DART program, respondent-father: failed to 
complete an anger management assessment or parenting classes; failed to secure 
stable housing; attended fewer than one-third of the drug screens requested by DSS 
and refused to submit to other screens; and made no “appreciable progress” on his 
case plan even at the time of the termination hearing in June 2020.  See generally In 
re L.M.T., 367 N.C. at 170, 752 S.E.2d at 457 (concluding that “incomplete findings 
of fact in the cease reunification order may be cured by findings of fact in the 
termination order”).  Accordingly, these findings more than satisfy the requirements 
of N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.1(d)(1).  
¶ 28 
 
Respondent-father further asserts the trial court made “no findings” 
addressing the remaining criteria in N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d)(2)–(4).  We disagree.  
¶ 29 
 
While not utilizing the statutory language, the trial court’s findings “address 
the necessary statutory factors by showing that the trial court considered the 
evidence in light of whether reunification would be futile or would be inconsistent 
with the juvenile’s health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a 
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
reasonable period of time[.]”  In re H.A.J., 377 N.C. 43, 2021-NCSC-26, ¶ 16 (cleaned 
up).  The findings depict respondent-father’s minimal degree of engagement with his 
case plan and cooperation with DSS, specifically with DSS’s requests for drug screens. 
In addition to noting respondent-father’s attendance at the hearing, the trial court 
found respondent-father had been “in and out of prison,” undergone “treatment for 
substance abuse,” and “ha[d] not consistently submitted himself for drug screening 
requested by DSS[.]”  These findings reflected respondent-father’s less-than-
consistent availability to the court and DSS.   
¶ 30 
 
With regard to N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d)(4), the trial court found that respondent-
father was incarcerated from November 2017 to January 2018; that he failed to 
address the anger management and parenting skills components of his case plan; that 
he either failed to attend or refused to participate in most of the requested drug 
screens requested by DSS; that he failed to obtain stable housing; and that “it would 
be contrary to the children’s health and safety and their general welfare to be 
returned to” his care.  Therefore, the trial court addressed the purpose of N.C.G.S. 
§7B-906.2(d)(4).  
¶ 31 
 
Respondent-father next argues the trial court failed to make the conclusions of 
law required by N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(b)—i.e., “that reunification efforts clearly would 
be unsuccessful or would be inconsistent with the juvenile[s’] health or safety.”  
However, the trial court satisfied the substance of N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(b) by finding 
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
that “[i]t is not possible for the children to be returned to the home of a parent or 
within the next six months and it would be contrary to the children’s health and safety 
and their general welfare to be returned to the home of a parent.” (emphasis added).  
See In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. at 169, 752 S.E.2d at 456 (holding that “[w]hile [the] 
findings of fact do not quote the precise language [the statute], the order embraces 
the substance of the statutory provisions requiring findings of fact that further 
reunification efforts “would be futile” or “would be inconsistent with the juvenile's 
health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of 
time.”).  
¶ 32 
 
To the extent respondent-father separately contends the trial court’s 
evidentiary findings focus solely on his “completion of a case plan” and, therefore, do 
not support its findings of fact under N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(b), we conclude the court’s 
findings adequately explain the basis for its determination that there were no 
realistic prospects for reunification.  At the time of the permanency planning hearing, 
the children had been in DSS custody for more than twenty months, and respondent-
father had been afforded more than nineteen months to remedy the conditions 
leading to their adjudication as neglected in February 2017.  Respondent-father 
continued to engage in activities resulting in his incarceration,7 repeatedly refused to 
                                            
7 Although respondents have not provided this Court with a transcript of the 
permanency planning hearing, the record suggests respondent-father had been incarcerated 
for violating his probation.  
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
submit to drugs screens, and had made no meaningful effort to engage with his case 
plan by attaining personal stability or providing support for the children. These facts 
fully support a determination that returning the children to respondent-father at any 
time in the foreseeable future would be contrary to their health, safety, and general 
welfare. See In re L.R.L.B., 377 N.C. 311, 2021-NCSC-49 ¶ 25 (stating that the “trial 
court thus made the finding required by N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(b) to eliminate 
reunification from the permanent plan” by finding “[t]hat further reasonable efforts 
to prevent or eliminate the need for placement of the juvenile are clearly futile or 
inconsistent with the juvenile’s need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable 
period of time.”).  
¶ 33 
 
Finally, respondent-father claims the trial court failed to make the findings 
required by N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(c) (2019), which provides: 
(c) Unless reunification efforts were previously ceased, at 
each permanency planning hearing the court shall make a 
finding about whether the reunification efforts of the 
county department of social services were reasonable. In 
every subsequent permanency planning hearing held 
pursuant to G.S. 7B-906.1, the court shall make written 
findings about the efforts the county department of social 
services has made toward the primary permanent plan and 
any secondary permanent plans in effect prior to the 
hearing. The court shall make a conclusion about whether 
efforts to finalize the permanent plan were reasonable to 
timely achieve permanence for the juvenile. 
¶ 34 
 
The trial court’s orders refer to DSS’s efforts with respondent-father, DSS’s 
consideration of relative placements for the children, visitations by respondent-
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
father, and the voluntary support agreement entered with DSS.  The termination 
order includes additional findings of fact detailing DSS’s efforts, including efforts 
relating to the development and implementation of a case plan tailored to assist 
respondent-father and respondent-mother in correcting the conditions that led to 
Ava, Aiden, and Hunter’s removal in order to facilitate reunification; home 
inspections of respondent-mother’s residence; offering respondent-mother’s boyfriend 
the opportunity to participate in a case plan; requests for drug screens offering forty 
supervised visitations for respondent-father; providing transportation for supervised 
visitations for respondent-father; and attempts to and verification of respondent-
father’s reported residences.  The orders which detail the efforts made by DSS to 
reunify the children with respondent-father, in addition to other findings related to 
efforts with respondent-mother, include “written findings about the efforts the county 
department of social services has made toward the primary permanent plan and any 
secondary permanent plans in effect prior to the hearing,” N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(c).8  
                                            
8 The trial court’s findings also state that a written report submitted by the DSS social 
worker is “incorporated herein as Findings of Fact.”  However, that report is not included in 
the record on appeal.  Although the document’s absence does not affect our ruling here as the 
trial court made the necessary findings of fact as to DSS’s efforts, we reiterate the appellant’s 
burden of assembling a record on appeal that affirmatively demonstrates the errors asserted 
in the appeal.   
As the trial court may consider such materials as the written report submitted by a 
DSS social worker at a permanency planning hearing, this report likely set forth additional 
details concerning DSS’s efforts that the trial court found relevant. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.1(c) 
(2019) (“The court may consider any evidence, including hearsay evidence as defined in G.S. 
8C-1, Rule 801, or testimony or evidence from any person that is not a party, that the court 
finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the needs of the juvenile and the 
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
While the trial court’s orders lack an express finding using the term “reasonable” or 
“reasonableness” regarding DSS’s efforts, this Court has recognized that in regard to 
other statutory requirements for findings in a trial court order, “[t]he trial court’s 
written findings must address the statute’s concerns, but need not quote its exact 
language.” In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. at 168, 752 S.E.2d at 455 (addressing sufficiency of 
findings to satisfy former N.C.G.S. § 7B-507(b)(1) (2011)); see also In re H.A.J., 377 
N.C. 43, 2021-NCSC-26, ¶ 16 (addressing sufficiency of findings to satisfy N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-906.2(d)). We conclude that the trial court’s findings of fact address the statutory 
concern of N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(c).  
¶ 35 
 
Our conclusion is further supported by the failure of respondent-father to 
identify how DSS’s efforts for reunification were not reasonable. Respondent-father 
claims that “the efforts of DSS toward reunification were not reasonable, particularly 
with unreasonable limits on the children’s time with respondent-father,” but we find 
no merit to his complaint.  Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-905.1, it is the trial court’s duty 
to “provide for visitation that is in the best interests of the juvenile consistent with 
the juvenile’s health and safety, including no visitation.”  N.C.G.S. § 7B-905.1(a) 
(2019).  It was not DSS, but the trial court that made respondents’ visitation with the 
children “contingent upon clean drug screens” as part of its initial “Juvenile 
                                            
most appropriate disposition.”). To the extent the report was submitted to the trial court and 
is germane to his appeal, it was incumbent upon respondent-father to make it a part of the 
appellate record.   
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
Disposition Order” entered on February 14, 2017. The trial court maintained this 
condition in each subsequent order.  Whatever actions DSS must undertake to meet 
the “reasonable efforts” standard, it is not obliged to defy the trial court’s orders.  It 
was also the trial court that established that DSS was not “required to provide visits 
to any incarcerated parent[,]” and significantly, there is no indication that 
respondent-father requested visitation with the children while incarcerated and only 
exercised five out of forty supervised visitations offered by DSS.  Accordingly, we 
reject respondent-father’s assignment of error by the trial court or DSS. 
III. 
Orders Terminating Respondents’ Parental Rights 
¶ 36 
 
Respondent-mother contends the trial court erred in adjudicating the existence 
of grounds for the termination of her parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a).  
Respondent-father does not raise any claims of error with regard to the termination 
orders.  
A. Standard of Review 
¶ 37 
 
Under this Court’s well-established standard of review,  
we review a trial court’s adjudication of grounds to 
terminate parental rights to determine whether the 
findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing 
evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law. 
Findings of fact not challenged by respondent are deemed 
supported by competent evidence and are binding on 
appeal. The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewable 
de novo on appeal. 
In re B.T.J., 377 N.C. 18, 2021-NCSC-23, ¶9 (cleaned up).  This Court has also held 
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
that “an adjudication of any single ground for terminating a parent’s rights under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) will suffice to support a termination order.  Therefore, if this 
Court upholds the trial court’s order in which it concludes that a particular ground 
for termination exists, then we need not review any remaining grounds.”  In re S.R.F., 
376 N.C. 647, 2021-NCSC-5 ¶ 9 (quoting In re J.S., 374 N.C. 811, 815, 845 S.E.2d 66, 
71 (2020)).  
¶ 38 
 
We will address the trial court’s adjudication that respondent-mother willfully 
failed to pay a reasonable portion of the children’s cost of care under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(3).   Under this provision, the trial court may terminate the rights of a parent 
whose child is in DSS custody if “the parent has for a continuous period of six months 
immediately preceding the filing of the petition or motion willfully failed to pay a 
reasonable portion of the cost of care for the juvenile although physically and 
financially able to do so.”  N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3).  The determinative six-month 
period in this case is October 23, 2018, to April 23, 2019, the day DSS filed its 
petitions to terminate respondents’ parental rights.   
¶ 39 
 
The trial court made the following findings of fact pertinent to its adjudication 
under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3) and to respondent-mother’s arguments on appeal: 
3. 
From the preliminary hearing held before the trial 
of this action, the petitioner presents the following issues 
for adjudication: 
. . . . 
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
c. 
The minor children have been in the care and 
custody of DSS for a continuous period of six (6) 
months or more next preceding the filing of these 
petitions. During this period, the Respondents have 
willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of the 
costs of care for the minor children, although each of 
the parents has been physically and financially able 
to do so N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3); 
. . . . 
. . . . 
6. 
The minor children have been in the legal and 
physical custody of DSS at all times since January 10, 
2017. 
. . . . 
21. 
The Respondent-Mother does not have a valid 
driver’s license and relies on her mother and Thomas . . . 
for transportation.  
. . . .  
23. 
The Respondent-Mother has not maintained stable 
employment. At the time of the termination hearing, she 
was unemployed. The Respondent-Mother has reported 
past work at Sonic restaurant and Lydall Manufacturing. 
She has also reported work as a babysitter. 
24. 
The Respondent-Mother signed a voluntary support 
agreement to pay child support for all of her children in the 
amount of $112.00 per month. The Respondent-Mother has 
failed to consistently pay child support and currently has a 
child support arrearage of $3,953.00. The Respondent-
Mother’s last child support payment was made on October 
15, 2018.  
. . . . 
38. 
DSS has expended significant funds providing for 
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
the cost of care for the minor children since they have been 
in care. DSS has expended the sum of $1,564.00 per month 
per child since the children have been in custody beginning 
in January 2017. 
39. 
The Respondents have failed to pay a reasonable 
portion of the cost of care for the minor children. Each of 
the Respondents has had the physical ability to engage in 
employment and to provide support for the minor child.  
. . . . 
46. 
Each Respondent has willfully failed to pay a 
reasonable portion of the cost of care for the minor children 
while they have been in the care and custody of DSS. 
¶ 40 
 
Based on these findings, the trial court concluded as follows: 
2. 
The Petitioner has proven the following statutory 
grounds for terminating the Respondent-Mother’s parental 
rights by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence: 
. . . . 
c. 
The Respondent-Mother has willfully failed to 
pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the 
juveniles, although she has had the ability to do so, 
while the children have been in the custody of DSS 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3). 
¶ 41 
 
Respondent-mother challenges the trial court’s finding that her nonpayment 
of support was willful in Finding of Fact 46 and Conclusion of Law 2(c). “The 
willfulness of a parent’s actions is a question of fact for the trial court.”  In re K.N.K., 
374 N.C. 50, 53, 839 S.E.2d 735, 738 (2020). 
¶ 42 
 
Respondent-mother acknowledges having paid nothing toward the children’s 
cost of care during the six months at issue. However, she contends the trial court’s 
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
order fails to support a finding of willfulness because “there are no findings that 
address [her] income, employment, or capacity for the same during the six-month 
period relevant to [N.C.G.S. §] 7B-1111(a)(3).”  We disagree. 
¶ 43 
 
“A parent is required to pay that portion of the cost of foster care for the child 
that is fair, just and equitable based upon the parent’s ability or means to pay.”  In re 
S.E., 373 N.C. 360, 366, 838 S.E.2d 328, 332 (2020) (quoting In re Clark, 303 N.C. 
592, 604, 281 S.E.2d 47, 55 (1981)).  Here, the parents signed a voluntary support 
agreement.  A voluntary support agreement has “the same force and effect as an order 
of support entered by that court, and shall be enforceable and subject to modification 
in the same manner as is provided by law for orders of the court in such cases.”  
N.C.G.S. § 110-132(a3) (2019).  
¶ 44 
 
The evidence and the trial court’s findings show respondent-mother paid 
nothing toward the children’s cost of care during the six-month period immediately 
preceding DSS’s filing of the petitions to terminate her parental rights, despite 
having agreed to pay $112.00 per month in support and having demonstrated an 
ability to work by multiple reported periods of employment.  Respondent-mother 
never moved to modify or nullify the voluntary agreement, and she was thus subject 
to a valid order “that established her ability to financially support for her children.” 
In re J.M., 373 N.C. 352, 359, 838 S.E.2d 173, 178 (2020). 
¶ 45 
 
Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err in finding respondent-mother’s 
IN RE A.P.W., A.J.W., H.K.W. 
2021-NCSC-93 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
nonpayment to be willful and in concluding that grounds existed to terminate her 
parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3). Therefore, we need not review the 
court’s additional grounds for termination under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and 
(6).  
¶ 46 
 
Respondent-mother does not separately challenge the trial court’s conclusion 
at the dispositional stage of the termination proceeding that terminating her parental 
rights is in the children’s best interests. Accordingly, we affirm the termination 
orders as to respondent-mother. 
IV. 
Conclusion 
¶ 47 
 
In both respondent-mother’s and respondent-father’s appeal, we affirm the 
trial court’s order eliminating reunification from the permanent plan and the orders 
terminating their parental rights in Ava, Aiden, and Hunter.   
AFFIRMED.