Case Title: Simms v. Oedekoven

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92-97

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-09-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Simms v. Oedekoven1992 WY 124839 P.2d 381Case Number: 92-97Decided: 09/28/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Robert J. 
SIMMS, Petitioner,

v.

Byron 
OEDEKOVEN, Sheriff of CampbellCounty, Respondent.

 [¶1.]     In an original 
proceeding on accused's petition for writ of habeas corpus, accused challenged 
denial of pretrial bail on grounds that he presented serious flight risk. The 
Supreme Court, Thomas, J., held that rule providing that bail may be denied in 
such circumstances violated State Constitution.

 [¶2.]     Order on writ 
confirmed.

Wyoming Public Defender 
Program: Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Stephen R. Johnson, Sr. Asst. 
Public Defender, for 
petitioner.

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Mary Beth Wolff, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
respondent.

 Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, 
URBIGKIT*, and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

THOMAS, Justice.

 [¶3.]     The constitutional 
question presented in this matter is whether a finding by a judicial officer, 
pursuant to Wyo.R.Crim.P. 46.1, that no condition or combination of conditions 
will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant justifies a refusal to 
set bail. The county court for Campbell County, Wyoming concluded that, in this 
instance, the only sufficient surety to assure the appearance of the defendant, 
Robert J. Simms (Simms), was detention and, therefore, the court refused to set 
bail despite the language of Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution of the 
State of Wyoming which provides, "[a]ll persons shall be bailable by sufficient 
sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the 
presumption great." We hold that the provisions of Wyo.R.Crim.P. 46.1 contravene 
Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution, and there was no justification for 
the court's refusal to set bail. The Constitution of the State of Wyoming must control over 
the provisions of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Order on Writ of 
Habeas Corpus entered June 12, 1992 in this matter is confirmed in every 
respect.

 [¶4.]     We have a limited 
record in this matter and, consequently, we rely primarily upon the allegations 
of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus together with the documents attached 
to that Petition. The underlying facts are not disputed by the State of 
Wyoming. From 
these documents, it appears that about 9:00 P.M. on January 22, 1992 Simms 
accompanied a woman whom he had just met to her motel room in Gillette, Wyoming. After they entered the room, she left 
Simms alone for a few minutes while she used the bathroom. Sometime that 
evening, or early the next morning, Simms left. After he left, the victim 
realized that she was missing some valuable jewelry and a substantial sum of 
money.

 [¶5.]     On January 25, 1992, 
Simms was arrested in South Dakota on the charge of grand larceny filed in 
Wyoming pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 6-3-402(a), (c)(i) (1988).1 Simms did not consent to 
extradition from South 
Dakota and, after a contested extradition hearing, he 
was ordered extradited about April 24, 1992. At his initial court appearance, 
the prosecution requested, and received, a continuance pursuant to Wyo. 
R.Crim.P. 46.1(f).2 Simms' initial appearance then was 
pursued on April 28, 1992, and the judge of the county court found that Simms 
was "a serious flight risk" who would not likely appear voluntarily at his 
trial. The county court judge ruled, consistently with this finding, that Simms 
should be held without bond pending adjudication of his case, in accordance with 
the provisions of Wyo.R.Crim.P. 46.1(e).

 [¶6.]     Following that ruling, 
Simms petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus which was filed with this court on 
April 29, 1992. Simms' contention in his petition was that he was illegally 
detained because he was denied his right to bail by the ruling of the county 
court.

 [¶7.]     This issue is one of 
first impression in Wyoming, and we have not found a precedent for 
the circumstances presented in any other jurisdiction. The issue posed is 
whether Wyo.R.Crim.P. 46.1(e), which permits detention without bail for an 
accused who is found to be a flight risk, is compatible with the provisions of 
Article 1, Section 14 of the Wyoming Constitution.

 [¶8.]     In resisting the 
petition for writ of habeas corpus, the State argues that it was appropriate to 
hold Simms without bail because Wyo.R.Crim.P. 46.1(e) allows detention if "[t]he 
judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will 
reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required and the safety of 
any other person and the community." This rule provision was modeled after 18 
U.S.C. § 3142 (1984), a provision of the Bail Reform Act of 1984. The federal 
courts have upheld the federal statute against a variety of constitutional 
attacks. U.S. v. Parker, 848 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1988) (Fifth Amendment); U.S. v. 
Walker, 808 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1986) (due process); U.S. v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1985) (Fifth and Eighth Amendments); U.S. v. Savides, 658 F. Supp. 1399 (N.D.Ill. 1987), aff'd 898 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied ___ U.S. 
___, 110 S. Ct. 3286, 111 L. Ed. 2d 795 (1990), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 210, 112 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1990), on remand 758 F. Supp. 466 (N.D.Ill. 1991) 
(due process). We can see no reason why the federal courts could not also find 
it compatible with the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United 
States which provides only that "excessive bail 
shall not be required." In our view, Wyo.R.Crim.P. 46.1(e) would not be 
invalidated by the provisions of the Constitution of the United States. 
That Constitution, however, does not encompass language articulating a right to 
bail as does Article 1, Section 14 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.

 [¶9.]     This court previously 
has interpreted the language in our state constitution in this 
way:

The 
right to furnish bail with sufficient sureties, then, arises in favor of any 
person accused of crime, and before conviction, absolutely and without exception 
in cases of all crimes not punishable with death * * *.

     State v. Crocker, 5 
Wyo. 385, 40 P. 681, 685 (1895).

Decisions 
in other states bearing on the same or similar constitutional language are 
afforded persuasive effect. Matter of Johnson, 568 P.2d 855 (Wyo. 1977). We have 
considered similar constitutional provisions from other states and have sought 
guidance from their courts with respect to the interpretation of this provision. 
See Petition of Humphrey, 601 P.2d 103 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979) (listing 
comparatively the constitutional provisions of the several states). We have 
found no other state that has held that an accused can be held without bail 
solely because he is perceived to be a flight risk, however serious.3 Some courts have recognized the 
possibility of such a rule. State v. Johnson, 61 N.J. 351, 294 A.2d 245 (1972); 
Commonwealth v. Truesdale, 449 Pa. 325, 296 A.2d 829 (1972). New Jersey, however, has 
cited Crocker in support of two propositions:

The 
purpose [of denying bail in capital cases] is, of course, to deny bail where the 
prisoner's assumed apprehension of being put to death if found guilty creates 
the hazard that he will forfeit the bail rather than forfeit his life. Where 
there is no such hazard bail attends even capital cases.

     Application of Corbo, 
54 N.J. Super. 575, 149 A.2d 828, 834 (1959).

[I]t 
was said that an attempt by the lawmakers to forbid bail after indictment 
whether or not proof to the required degree appeared, could not 
survive.

     State v. Konigsberg, 33 N.J. 367, 164 A.2d 740, 744 
(1960).

 [¶10.]  We also have held that the constitutional 
standards promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States are minimal, and 
those rights may be enlarged pursuant to state constitutional provisions if that 
approach is justifiable. Richmond v. State, 554 P.2d 1217 (Wyo. 1976). See also Washakie County School 
District Number One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980), cert. denied sub 
nom., Hot Springs County School District Number 1 v. Washakie County School 
District Number 1, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1980). Our holding 
is consistent with general law to this effect:

Nevertheless, 
* * * the state courts may exceed the federal courts in the granting of rights 
under the state's own laws or the state's own constitution, as long as they do 
not violate a restriction of federal law.

     JOHN E. NOWAK & 
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1.6, at 21 (4th ed. 
1991).

 [¶11.]  Our primary judicial obligation is to 
uphold the constitution.

By the 
constitution which [the people] establish, they not only tie up the hands of 
their official agencies, but their own hands as well; and neither the officers 
of the State, nor the whole people as an aggregate body, are at liberty to take 
action in opposition to this fundamental law.

     1 THOMAS M. COOLEY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 81 (8th ed. 1927).

In the 
first decade after statehood, this court quoted from an earlier work of Cooley 
saying:

In 
American constitutional law the word "constitution" is used in a restricted 
sense, as implying the written instrument agreed upon by the people of the 
Union, or any one of the states, as the absolute rule of action and decision for 
all departments and officers of the government, in respect to all the points 
covered by it, which must control until it shall be changed by the authority 
which established it.

     Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 
Wyo. 117, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897) (citation omitted).

 [¶12.]  The language of Article 1, Section 14 of 
the Constitution of the State of Wyoming provides without equivocation that 
"all persons shall be bailable," and it must control the right to bail over Wyo. 
R.Crim.P. 46.1(e). Similarly, it affords a greater right than is specified in 
the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
Our constitution does not permit denial of bail on the ground that the accused 
is considered to be a serious flight risk.

 [¶13.]  Another argument advanced by the State is 
that the language of the constitution is sufficiently expansive to provide for 
pretrial detention when the accused is a flight risk. The State looks to the 
language that focuses upon "sufficient sureties." The argument is that the 
sufficiency of potential sureties is to be considered in connection with a bail 
hearing and, if no surety is perceived to be adequate to compel the accused to 
reappear for trial, then he may be detained to provide the "sufficient 
sureties." According to the State's argument, "petitioner was a significant 
flight risk, since he had no ties to the community, no job, no family in the 
area, and had given the police three different social security numbers and may 
be using different names." There is no reason to disagree with the position of 
the State that Simms, indeed, is a serious flight risk.

 [¶14.]  In presenting this contention, the State 
appears to invert the applicable concepts relative to constitutional 
application. The State, in effect, is seeking to invoke an exception to what is 
a clear extension of a right to bail. The general rule is that constitutional 
provisions should be broadly and liberally construed in order to provide the 
flexibility to meet changing conditions without departing from the basic 
principles that are articulated. See cases cited in 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 18, nn. 67-70 (1984). Conversely, if an exception is articulated or perceived 
with respect to a constitutional provision, it is to be narrowly and strictly 
construed. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 313 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1975); Commonwealth v. Yee, 361 Mass. 533, 281 N.E.2d 248 
(1972). The language of Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution of the State 
of Wyoming is 
not vague or ambiguous. There is a clear exception for capital offenses only 
when the proof is evident or the presumption great, and there is no indication 
that there is an exception to be found with respect to the right to bail if the 
only sufficient surety is detention. The application of the concept of narrow 
construction of such a perceived exception leads us to the conclusion that it is 
not available to avoid the setting of bail for Simms.

 [¶15.]  In structuring yet a third reason to 
justify pretrial detention in the case of someone found to be a significant 
flight risk, the State of Wyoming points to the language in the rules to 
the effect that "the judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that 
results in the pretrial detention of the person." Wyo.R.Crim.R. 46.1(c)(2). The 
State's argument is that the judge was foreclosed from imposing a financial 
condition for release that results in pretrial detention. Therefore, the State 
contends, the judge must turn to other means of assuring appearance for trial 
and, under the federal standard, that may encompass continued detention. The 
State, in effect, argues that the judge must choose between imposing a financial 
condition that results in pretrial detention or pretrial detention because of 
the risk of flight. This argument fails to acknowledge that either course would 
violate the provisions of Article 1, Section 14 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.

 [¶16.]  We are unable to accept this argument by 
the State of Wyoming. Wyo. R.Crim.P. 46.1(c)(2) is not pertinent to 
whether the individual who is charged will be admitted to bail. Rather, that 
provision inhibits setting the amount of bail at an amount so high that it would 
substantively and actually deny bail to the accused. Carlisle v. Landon, 73 S. Ct. 1179, 97 L. Ed. 1642 (1953) 
(Opinion of Justice Douglas Sitting in Chambers). In this case, the question of 
excessive bail is not before us since no bail was set. In this regard, however, 
the purpose of the required surety is to assure the appearance of the accused at 
his trial. "The word `appearance' means a voluntary submission to the 
jurisdiction in whatever form manifested." Ex parte Forbell, 82 N YS.2d 109, 110 
(N.Y.S.Ct., Special Term, Richmond County 1948) (quoting Citizens' Trust Co. of 
Utica v. R. Prescott & Son, Inc., 221 A.D. 426, 223 N.Y.S. 191, 197 (4th 

Dept. 
1927)). See generally the cases cited in 6 C.J.S. Appearances § 18 
(1975). We are in accord that bail may not be set so as to inhibit the release 
of the accused, but it may be set higher than the amount perceived to be 
necessary to forcibly return the accused to trial.

 [¶17.]  The amount of bail, like any other 
condition of probation, is designed to assure the appearance of the accused when 
he is ordered to appear. In setting bail, the court may consider the sum 
reasonably necessary to cause one to appear, rather than flee the court's 
jurisdiction. In this regard, we note our holding that violations of other 
conditions of bail, including a requirement of good behavior, can cause 
forfeiture of the bond, reaffirming our decision in Application of Allied 
Fidelity Insurance Co., 664 P.2d 1322 (Wyo. 1983). We recognize that determining 
the amount of surety which is sufficient to cause the accused to appear, 
together with other appropriate conditions for the admission of an accused to 
bail, is a demanding judicial task, but it is a decision the law 
requires.

 [¶18.]  The Order on Writ of Habeas Court of this 
court entered June 12, 1992 is confirmed in every respect.

FOOTNOTES

 1 Wyo. Stat. § 6-3-402(a), 
(c)(i) (1988) provides:

     (a) A person who 
steals, takes and carries, leads or drives away property of another with intent 
to deprive the owner or lawful possessor is guilty of 
larceny.

     * * 
*.

     (c) Except as provided 
by subsection (e) of this section, larceny is:

     (i) A felony 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more 
than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the value of the property is 
five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more * * *.

2 Wyo.R.Crim.P. 46.1(f) provides, in 
pertinent part:

The 
hearing shall be held immediately upon the defendant's first appearance before 
the judicial officer unless that person, or the attorney for the state, seeks a 
continuance.

3 Both Illinois and Pennsylvania have suggested that bail may be 
denied if the accused is a serious flight risk, but their cases are 
distinguishable because the accused in each was charged with murder. People ex 
rel. Hemingway v. Elrod, 60 Ill. 2d 74, 322 N.E.2d 837 (1975); Commonwealth v. 
Segers, 460 Pa. 149, 331 A.2d 462 
(1975).