Case Title: Decker v. Libell

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88353

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-09-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 88353-Agenda 21-May 2000.
CHARLES SCOTT DECKER, Appellee, v. 
 JASON LIBELL, 								Appellant.
Opinion filed September 21, 2000.
	JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of St. Clair County,
the plaintiff, Charles Decker, was awarded $13,715 in damages for
injuries he sustained in a motor vehicle accident with the
defendant, Jason Libell. The defendant appealed, and, in an
unpublished order, the appellate court affirmed the circuit court
judgment. No. 5-98-0641 (unpublished order under Supreme
Court Rule 23). We allowed the defendant's petition for leave to
appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and we now affirm the judgment of
the appellate court.
	The facts in this case are uncomplicated and may be stated
briefly. The plaintiff was injured on September 4, 1994, in an
accident in Shiloh when his pickup truck was hit by a vehicle
being driven by the defendant. The plaintiff brought the present
action against the defendant in the circuit court of St. Clair County
in February 1995 to recover damages for his injuries. The
defendant conceded liability, and the only issue at trial, in April
1998, concerned the plaintiff's damages. At trial, the plaintiff
testified in his own behalf and also introduced the evidence
deposition of his chiropractor, Dr. Warren Stewart, Jr. Dr. Stewart
had treated the plaintiff for four months, from September 1994 to
January 1995, for the injuries the plaintiff sustained to his neck,
back, and shoulder as a result of the accident. Dr. Stewart's
deposition had been taken in March 1996, and his testimony
concerning the plaintiff's prognosis was admitted over the
defendant's objection that Dr. Stewart's treatment of the plaintiff
was too remote in time in relation both to the deposition and to the
eventual trial to be admissible.
	The defendant did not present any evidence. At the conclusion
of the trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff a total of $13,715 in
damages, which comprised itemized awards of $7,500 for the
plaintiff's past pain and suffering, $2,500 for future pain and
suffering, and $3,715 for past medical expenses; the jury did not
award the plaintiff any of the damages requested by him for loss
of a normal life. The defendant filed a post-trial motion seeking a
new trial. In the motion, the defendant renewed his argument that
the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Stewart's deposition
testimony about the plaintiff's prognosis. In addition to the points
raised previously, the defendant contended that Dr. Stewart's
testimony regarding the possible permanency of the plaintiff's
injuries was contradicted by the plaintiff's own statement, at trial,
that he no longer experienced any pain in his neck. The trial court
denied the post-trial motion, and the defendant appealed. The
appellate court affirmed the circuit court judgment. No.
5-98-0641 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We
allowed the defendant's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R.
315(a)), and we now affirm the judgment of the appellate court,
though for reasons different from those relied on by that court.
	The sole issue before this court concerns the admission of Dr.
Stewart's deposition testimony regarding his opinion about the
prognosis for the plaintiff's injuries. As noted earlier, the
plaintiff's accident occurred in September 1994, and the plaintiff
was treated by Dr. Stewart for four months, from September 7,
1994, until January 11, 1995. According to the evidence, Dr.
Stewart saw the plaintiff a total of 55 times during this period. Dr.
Stewart's evidence deposition was taken on March 15, 1996, a
little more than 14 months after the plaintiff ceased his course of
treatment with the chiropractor. Trial was conducted on April 20
and 21, 1998, 25 months after Dr. Stewart's deposition was taken,
and 39 months after the last treatment occurred. The defendant
contends that Dr. Stewart's deposition testimony regarding the
prognosis for the plaintiff's injuries was too old to represent an
opinion at the time of trial and therefore was inadmissible. See
Henricks v. Nyberg, Inc., 41 Ill. App. 3d 25, 28 (1976); see also
Wilson v. Chicago Transit Authority, 126 Ill. 2d 171, 176 (1988).
The defendant argues further that the plaintiff contradicted Dr.
Stewart's testimony when the plaintiff testified that he no longer
experiences pain in his neck; Dr. Stewart, in the evidence
deposition, had stated that the plaintiff's condition, especially in
the neck, could be permanent.
	In response, the plaintiff contends that the periods of time
between a patient's last examination or office visit, the time of the
expert's deposition, and the time of trial pertain only to the weight
to be given to the expert's testimony and do not affect its
admissibility. The appellate court below adopted this rationale in
affirming the circuit court judgment. The appellate court believed
that the intervals of time between the chiropractor's last
examination, his deposition, and the trial went only to the weight
to be accorded the evidence and did not determine whether it was
admissible.
	The plaintiff's argument assumes that evidence of this nature
is automatically admissible, regardless of its provenance, and that
the relative age or recency of the testimony will never affect its
admissibility. To be sure, language in some cases suggests that the
age or recency of an expert's opinion pertains only to the weight
to be given to the testimony. Housh v. Bowers, 271 Ill. App. 3d
1004, 1008 (1995); Molitor v. Jaimeyfield, 251 Ill. App. 3d 725,
729 (1993). We believe the better view, however, is represented by
the cases that first consider whether the testimony or evidence is
admissible and, if it is, then permit the trier of fact to determine
what weight to assign to it. See Soto v. Gaytan, 313 Ill. App. 3d
137, 145-48 (2000); Knight v. Lord, 271 Ill. App. 3d 581, 587
(1995); see also Marchese v. Vincelette, 261 Ill. App. 3d 520, 526-27 (1994) (after determining that doctor's testimony was
admissible, court explains that age of opinion will affect the
weight to be given to the testimony); Courtney v. Allied Filter
Engineering, Inc., 181 Ill. App. 3d 222, 231 (1989) (court
concludes that doctor's testimony was properly admitted). Even
the court in Housh, cited by the plaintiff, referred to the length and
nature of the doctors' treatment in finding no error in the
admission of their testimony. Trial courts routinely bar evidence
because it is irrelevant or unreliable, and we see no reason to apply
a different rule in this context. Under this approach, the trial judge
serves in a familiar role as "gatekeeper," barring testimony that is
not sufficiently relevant or reliable to be admitted into evidence.
	It remains for us to consider what circumstances are relevant
in determining the admissibility of opinion testimony about the
prognosis for a patient's injuries or condition. As a number of the
cases illustrate, the calendar alone does not determine whether the
evidence should be admitted or excluded. Courts will consider the
nature of the plaintiff's injury or condition, the type of treatment
administered to the plaintiff, the length of time the plaintiff was
receiving the treatment, the number and frequency of the
plaintiff's visits, the length of time between the plaintiff's last
treatment and the witness' formation of his or her opinion, the
length of time between the formation of the opinion and the trial,
and any other circumstances that bear on the relevance and
reliability of the proposed testimony. See Soto, 313 Ill. App. 3d at
147-48 (listing relevant circumstances; specifically discussing
nature of injury, length and nature of treatment, and interval
between treatment and time of trial); Housh, 271 Ill. App. 3d at
1008 (length and nature of treatment); Marchese, 261 Ill. App. 3d
at 526 (interval between examination and deposition; length of
treatment).
	Applying these considerations to the case at bar, we do not
believe that the trial judge abused his discretion in admitting into
evidence Dr. Stewart's testimony regarding the plaintiff's
prognosis. The plaintiff sustained injuries to his neck, back, and
shoulder in the collision with the defendant's vehicle. The
plaintiff's treatment with Dr. Stewart lasted a little over four
months, beginning September 7, 1994, three days after the
accident, and ending January 11, 1995. During that period, Dr.
Stewart treated the plaintiff 55 times, and he took two full sets of
X rays in the course of the treatment.
	The defendant argues, however, that Dr. Stewart's deposition
testimony regarding the permanency of the plaintiff's injuries was
fatally contradicted by the plaintiff's own testimony at trial. The
plaintiff stated that, although he still experienced pain in his back
from time to time, he no longer experienced any pain in his neck.
The defendant believes that this contradicts Dr. Stewart's
testimony. In the evidence deposition, Dr. Stewart stated that, with
respect to the plaintiff's neck injury, "there certainly could be a
permanency." Unlike the defendant, we do not believe that the two
are inconsistent. Dr. Stewart testified only that there could be a
permanent problem, not that there necessarily would be. The
balance of his testimony regarding the plaintiff's prognosis was
borne out by the plaintiff's testimony, for the plaintiff stated that
he still suffered from back pain. On this record, we are unable to
conclude that the trial judge abused his discretion in admitting the
challenged testimony.
	For the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court,
which affirmed the judgment of the circuit court of St. Clair
County, is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.