Case Title: State ex rel. Carr v. London Corr. Inst.

Citation: 2015-Ohio-2363

Docket Number: 2014-0596

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2015-06-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Carr v. London Corr. Inst., Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-2363.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-2363 
THE STATE EX REL. CARR, APPELLANT, v. LONDON CORRECTIONAL 
INSTITUTION, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Carr v. London Corr. Inst., Slip Opinion  
No. 2015-Ohio-2363.] 
Public records—R.C. 149.43—Request for single memorandum was not 
ambiguous where request identified the author and recipient and specified 
a two-month time frame during which the memorandum was sent—
Request for all e-mails and correspondence from a named individual to a 
specified department over a two-month period was not overbroad—Writ of 
mandamus granted—Statutory damages granted—Court costs awarded. 
(No. 2014-0596—Submitted February 3, 2015—Decided June 18, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Madison County, No. CA2012-10-023, 
2014-Ohio-1325. 
_____________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} We reverse the Twelfth District Court of Appeals’ denial of a writ of 
mandamus in this public-records case.  The case was brought by relator-appellant, 
James M. Carr Sr., an inmate at London Correctional Institution (“LCI”).  Carr 
made several public-records requests of LCI that were denied; his last request was 
granted.  He filed an action in mandamus in the Twelfth District to obtain the 
documents that he had not received.  He also sought statutory damages under R.C. 
149.43, the Public Records Act (“PRA”).  The court of appeals granted LCI’s 
motion for summary judgment and denied Carr a writ. It also denied his claim for 
statutory damages. 
{¶ 2} Because LCI has not shown that Carr’s requests were ambiguous, 
overbroad, or unduly burdensome, and because Carr complied with the 
requirements of R.C.149.43(C)(1), we reverse, grant a writ of mandamus, and 
award Carr statutory damages and court costs. 
Facts 
{¶ 3} In January 2012, the staff in LCI’s mailroom was replaced with a 
group of new, contract employees.  As a result, one of the prison chaplains, 
Chaplain Cahill, drafted a memorandum listing ministries that regularly send 
religious material to inmates and sent it to the mailroom supervisors to assist the 
mailroom staff in screening religious materials for unauthorized material and 
contraband. 
{¶ 4} In late February 2012, Carr became aware of the memorandum.  He 
went to the mailroom window and asked to see a copy.  The employee working at 
the mailroom window verified that the memorandum existed but refused to let 
Carr see the copy in the mailroom’s possession and suggested that Carr see Cahill 
to obtain a copy.  Carr immediately went to see Cahill and requested a copy of the 
memorandum.  Cahill refused to allow Carr to see a copy of the memorandum and 
January Term, 2015 
 
3
refused to provide a copy.  Carr told Cahill that he would request a copy from 
Vickey Justus, the warden’s administrative assistant, whose duties included 
responding to public-records requests from inmates. 
{¶ 5} On March 5, 2012, Carr hand-delivered a public-records request to 
DeCarlo Blackwell, the inspector of institutional services, to be delivered to 
Justus.  The request stated:  
 
Dear Mrs. Justus, 
This is a public records request pursuant to section 149.43 
of the Ohio Revised Code, and DRC policy 07-ORD-02. 
I went to see Chaplain Cahill on 2/28/2012, and requested 
that Chaplain Cahill provide me with a copy of an interoffice 
memo sent from his office to the mail room.  You can contact 
Chaplain Cahill to find out exactly the memo I am speaking of.  I 
request a copy of the following record: 
I request a copy of the inter-office memo between the 
Chaplains office and the mail room.  This memo was sent during 
January or February of 2012.  This memo contains information 
related to the religious ministries regularly dealt with by the 
Chaplains office.  This memo was sent to the mail room to assist 
the mail room with the religious material received by the 
institution. 
This public records request was hand delivered to the 
Institutional Inspector, Mr. Blackwell on 3/5/2012  
James M. Carr Sr., #459-931 
 
On March 8, Justus denied this request, stating that it was “ambiguous, overbroad, 
and unduly burdensome to produce.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 6} On March 15, 2012, Carr hand-delivered another public-records 
request to Blackwell for Justus.  That request stated: 
 
I request copies of all e-mails and interoffice memo’s sent 
from Chaplain Cahill, to the mailroom (including it’s supervisor’s), 
during the months of January and February for 2012.  To be clear, 
my request is only for e-mails and interoffice memo’s sent from 
Chaplain Cahill to the mailroom (including its supervisor’s) for the 
months of January and February of 2012. 
 
On April 4, 2012, Justus denied the March 15 request, again stating that it was 
“ambiguous, overbroad, and unduly burdensome to produce.” 
{¶ 7} On March 21, Carr sent a written request to Cahill for the date on 
which the memorandum had been sent.  On March 26, Cahill responded that he 
could not tell Carr the date of the original memorandum but that the most recent 
version had been sent on March 5, 2012. 
{¶ 8} On April 10, 2012, Carr hand-delivered another public-records 
request to Blackwell for Justus.  That request was for all e-mails and interoffice 
memos sent by Cahill to the mailroom during the month of February 2012.  On 
April 19, Justus denied this request, once again stating that it was “ambiguous, 
overbroad, and unduly burdensome to produce.” 
{¶ 9} Also on April 10, 2012, Carr delivered a second request to 
Blackwell that sought a copy of “all interoffice memos and e-mails sent by 
Chaplain Cahill to the mail room or it’s supervisors on 3/5/2012” as well as a 
current copy of LCI’s records-retention schedule.  On April 19, Justus responded 
that Carr needed to submit a cash slip to pay for the copies.  Once issues with the 
cash amount were resolved, Justus provided the records requested in Carr’s 
second April 10, 2012 request. 
January Term, 2015 
 
5
{¶ 10} Carr filed various internal forms and appeals within the prison in an 
effort to get the additional documents he had requested, but the records requested 
in the March 5, March 15, and first April 10, 2012 requests were still not 
provided. 
{¶ 11} On October 18, 2012, Carr filed an action in mandamus in the 
Twelfth District Court of Appeals seeking a writ of mandamus ordering LCI to 
provide the documents requested in Carr’s March 5, March 15, and first April 10, 
2012 requests. 
{¶ 12} In the court of appeals, both sides filed motions for summary 
judgment.  As an exhibit to its motion, which was docketed on March 5, 2013, 
LCI finally provided to Carr a copy of the original memorandum, dated January 
30, 2012, from Chaplain Cahill to the mailroom.  The court granted summary 
judgment to LCI as to the March 5, 2012 request, finding that it was properly 
denied as being ambiguous, but denied summary judgment as to the other requests 
and directed the parties to file briefs.  Both parties filed briefs, and on March 31, 
2014, the court of appeals issued a decision ruling that Carr’s March 15, 2012 
request and first April 10, 2012 request were properly denied as being overbroad.  
The court denied a writ and denied statutory damages.  Carr filed a notice of 
appeal. 
Analysis 
{¶ 13} We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and grant a writ of 
mandamus because Carr’s requests were not ambiguous or overbroad under the 
PRA.  Because Carr complied with the requirements of R.C.149.43(C)(1) and 
because withholding the document requested in his March 5, 2012 request was 
not reasonable, we also award statutory damages.  Because we issue a writ and 
because Carr complied with R.C. 149.43(C)(1), we also award Carr court costs 
under R.C. 149.43(C)(2) and remand to the court of appeals for a determination of 
the amount to be awarded as costs. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Affidavit required by R.C. 2969.25(A)  
{¶ 14} When an inmate files a civil action, he must comply with several 
statutes, including R.C. 2969.25(A), which requires that he file an affidavit 
containing a description of each civil action or appeal that he has filed in the 
previous five years.  LCI claimed below that Carr’s affidavit is deficient.  The 
court of appeals ignored this argument and proceeded to the merits; LCI asserts it 
again here. 
{¶ 15} While Carr’s affidavit might not be a model, it satisfies the statute.  
LCI first argues that Carr’s affidavit states only that the listed cases are those he 
has filed against government agencies, yet the statute requires him to list all of the 
civil cases he has filed, not just those against the government.  But LCI points to 
no evidence that Carr has filed any civil actions other than the ones he listed. 
{¶ 16} LCI next asserts that Carr did not name each party in the listed 
cases.  But the captions of the cases list the parties.  A separate listing might be 
preferable, but the information appears in the affidavit, and therefore the 
requirements of the statute are met. 
{¶ 17} Finally, LCI claims that Carr does not include the case name for his 
last-listed case.  However, that case is described as an earlier version of this 
mandamus action.  Again, while not ideal, the court can infer that the case name 
and parties are the same as those in the current case. 
{¶ 18} Carr’s affidavit is sufficient under the statute. 
Mandamus and public records 
{¶ 19} “Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel compliance with 
R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public Records Act.”  State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for 
Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 
2006-Ohio-903, 843 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 6; R.C. 149.43(C)(1).  Although “[w]e 
construe the Public Records Act liberally in favor of broad access and resolve any 
doubt in favor of disclosure of public records,” State ex rel. Rocker v. Guernsey 
January Term, 2015 
 
7
Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 126 Ohio St.3d 224, 2010-Ohio-3288, 932 N.E.2d 327, ¶ 6, 
the relator must still establish entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief by 
clear and convincing evidence, State ex rel. Doner v. Zody, 130 Ohio St.3d 446, 
2011-Ohio-6117, 958 N.E.2d 1235, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 20} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Carr must establish a clear 
legal right to the requested relief and a clear legal duty on the part of LCI to 
provide it.  State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 
N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6. 
The March 5, 2012 request 
{¶ 21} The court below found that Carr’s March 5, 2012 request was 
properly denied as being ambiguous.  LCI argues that the request was ambiguous 
in that Justus would have been required to do research to determine what record 
Carr was requesting. 
{¶ 22} However, Carr’s request identified a particular record authored by 
a named individual, specifying to whom it was sent and a time frame during 
which it was sent.  He provided unrefuted evidence by way of his affidavit that 
both Chaplain Cahill and an employee of the mailroom were able to verify the 
existence of the record.  Expecting Justus to simply track down the chaplain or 
someone in the mailroom to get the document is not “research” within the 
meaning of the PRA.  Rather, to constitute improper research, a record request 
must require the government agency to either search through voluminous 
documents for those that contain certain information or to create a new document 
by searching for and compiling information from existing records.  State ex rel. 
Morgan v. New Lexington, 112 Ohio St.3d 33, 2006-Ohio-6365, 857 N.E.2d 
1208, ¶ 30-31, 35; State ex rel. Kerner v. State Teachers Retirement Bd., 82 Ohio 
St.3d 273, 274, 695 N.E.2d 256 (1998). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
{¶ 23} While Carr did not provide a precise date on which the requested 
memo had been sent, we have never required that level of specificity when a 
document is otherwise reasonably identifiable: 
   
[W]e have never held that in order to constitute a viable request, 
the request must specify the author and date of the records 
requested. Although this may be helpful in identifying the 
requested records, the failure to do so does not automatically result 
in an improper request for public records, particularly where, as 
here, it is evident that the public office was aware of the specific 
records requested.  We do not require perfection in public-records 
requests. 
 
Morgan at ¶ 37, citing State ex rel. Cater v. N. Olmsted, 69 Ohio St.3d 315, 320, 
631 N.E.2d 1048 (1994). 
{¶ 24} The court of appeals erred in holding that the March 5, 2012 
request was ambiguous. 
The March 15, 2012 request 
{¶ 25} The court of appeals found that Carr’s March 15, 2012 public-
records request was properly denied as being overbroad.  Although the March 15 
request is broader than the March 5 request in that it asks for more than one 
document, it asks only for communications from one individual to an identified 
department in the prison over a two-month period. 
{¶ 26} The cases cited by LCI to support its argument that the request was 
overbroad are distinguishable.  Unlike in State ex rel. Zauderer v. Joseph, 62 
Ohio App.3d 752, 755, 577 N.E.2d 444 (1989), there is no indication that the 
request is not readily amenable to the method of retrieval used by the government 
agency. 
January Term, 2015 
 
9
{¶ 27} Unlike in State ex rel. Zidonis v. Columbus State Community 
College, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-961, 2011-Ohio-6817, ¶ 59, Carr did not 
make a request for extremely broad categories of records, such as “litigation files” 
or “complaint files,” but rather made a request for communications between a 
specific individual and a specific office within a reasonably defined time frame. 
{¶ 28} Carr’s request is not for anything approaching the scope of the 
request in State ex rel. Glasgow v. Jones, 119 Ohio St.3d 391, 2008-Ohio-4788, 
894 N.E.2d 686, ¶ 19, which was for the entire body of e-mails, texts, and written 
correspondence sent and received by a state representative during her entire term 
in office.  Carr’s request, unlike Glasgow’s, is not a “complete duplication” of 
anyone’s files.  See id.  Nor does Carr’s request approach the overbroad request in 
State ex rel. Dillery v. Icsman, 92 Ohio St.3d 312, 314, 750 N.E.2d 156 (2001), 
which sought “ ‘any and all records generated * * * containing any reference 
whatsoever to’ ” the requestor.  (Ellipses sic.)  LCI has not shown that the 
chaplain’s office sent vast numbers of memos and e-mails to the prison mailroom 
during January and February 2012. 
{¶ 29} The court of appeals erred in holding that the March 15, 2012 
request was overbroad. 
The April 10, 2012 request  
{¶ 30} The court of appeals also found that Carr’s first April 10, 2012 
request was properly denied as being overbroad.  That request was similar to 
Carr’s March 15 request except that it requested all interoffice memos and e-mails 
sent by Chaplain Cahill to the mailroom during only one month—February 
2012—instead of two.  Thus, the first April 10, 2012 request covers a narrower 
time frame than the March 15, 2012 request. 
{¶ 31} The court of appeals erred in holding that the first April 10, 2012 
request was overbroad. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Damages and costs 
{¶ 32} R.C. 149.43(C)(1) allows, under certain circumstances, awards of 
damages for requestors whose public-records requests have been denied in 
violation of the PRA:   
 
If a requestor transmits a written request by hand delivery 
or certified mail to inspect or receive copies of any public record in 
a manner that fairly describes the public record or class of public 
records to the public office or person responsible for the requested 
public records, except as otherwise provided in this section, the 
requestor shall be entitled to recover the amount of statutory 
damages set forth in this division if a court determines that the 
public office or the person responsible for public records failed to 
comply with an obligation in accordance with division (B) of this 
section. 
 
{¶ 33} Thus, for a public-records requestor to be entitled to damages, the 
requestor must have made the request in writing by hand delivery or certified 
mail, the request must have fairly described the public record or records, and the 
public office must have failed to comply with an obligation in the public-records 
law. 
{¶ 34} A reviewing court examining the denial of an award of damages 
under the PRA must determine whether the court below abused its discretion.  
State ex rel. Patton v. Rhodes, 129 Ohio St.3d 182, 2011-Ohio-3093, 950 N.E.2d 
965, ¶ 12, citing State ex rel. Doe v. Smith, 123 Ohio St.3d 44, 2009-Ohio-4149, 
914 N.E.2d 159, ¶ 1, 47. 
{¶ 35} The court of appeals denied damages in this case because, it 
reasoned, once Carr received the memo sent on March 5, 2012 from the 
January Term, 2015 
 
11
chaplain’s office to the mailroom, Carr’s request had been fulfilled, and therefore 
no violation of the PRA occurred. 
{¶ 36} In support of the court of appeals’ decision, LCI cites State ex rel. 
Doe v. Register, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2008-08-081, 2009-Ohio-2448, in 
which the Twelfth District held that the provision of official meeting minutes 
satisfied a request for draft meeting minutes where the two sets of minutes were 
identical, but that case is distinguishable. 
{¶ 37} First, the March 5 memo differs from the prior version of the memo 
in that the name of the sender and the date are different.  Second, unlike in 
Register, the earlier version of the memo is not a “draft” that was later finalized.  
Here, the earlier version was sent by the chaplain to the mailroom and apparently 
acted on by the mailroom personnel; it was, and is, a finalized public record.  
Moreover, a draft is not necessarily excluded from the definition of a public 
record.  State ex rel. Calvary v. Upper Arlington, 89 Ohio St.3d 229, 232-234, 
729 N.E.2d 1182 (2000) (requestor entitled to attorney fees when city delayed in 
providing her with draft of collective-bargaining agreement).  The differences 
between the various versions of the memo may be slight, but they are differences, 
and Carr is entitled to copies of all the public records he properly requested. 
{¶ 38} Nor should damages be denied because the purported reason for 
Carr’s request was to use the memo in a lawsuit alleging discrimination by the 
prison against his religion.  The purpose for which a public record is requested is 
irrelevant. Gilbert v. Summit Cty., 104 Ohio St.3d 660, 2004-Ohio-7108, 821 
N.E.2d 564, ¶ 10, citing State ex rel. Fant v. Enright, 66 Ohio St.3d 186, 610 
N.E.2d 997 (1993), syllabus (“A person may inspect and copy a ‘public record,’ 
as defined in R.C. 149.43(A), irrespective of his or her purpose for doing so”), 
and State ex rel. Consumer News Serv., Inc. v. Worthington City Bd. of Edn., 97 
Ohio St.3d 58, 2002-Ohio-5311, 776 N.E.2d 82, ¶ 45 (purpose behind request to 
“inspect and copy public records is irrelevant”).  Carr’s supposed purpose for 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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requesting the record cannot be used to deny his request for a prior version of the 
record.  LCI improperly withheld public records that were fairly described by 
Carr. 
{¶ 39} The next consideration is whether Carr’s delivery of his requests to 
Inspector Blackwell rather than to Justus means that the request was not 
transmitted by “hand delivery” within the meaning of R.C. 149.43(C)(1). 
{¶ 40} Neither the statute nor case law indicates exactly what “hand 
delivery” means.  LCI argues that Carr did not hand-deliver the requests because 
he gave them to Inspector Blackwell rather than to Justus, whom he knew was 
responsible for responding to such requests.  Carr responds that he is not allowed 
into the restricted area where Justus works and therefore could not have hand-
delivered the requests to her.  We find that Carr’s hand delivery of the requests to 
a prison official fulfilled the delivery requirement of the statute. 
{¶ 41} That does not end the analysis, however.  Under the PRA, a court 
may reduce or not award statutory damages if the court determines both of the 
following:  
 
(a) That, based on the ordinary application of statutory law 
and case law as it existed at the time of the conduct or threatened 
conduct of the public office or person responsible for the requested 
public records that allegedly constitutes a failure to comply with an 
obligation in accordance with division (B) of this section and that 
was the basis of the mandamus action, a well-informed public 
office or person responsible for the requested public records 
reasonably would believe that the conduct or threatened conduct of 
the public office or person responsible for the requested public 
records did not constitute a failure to comply with an obligation in 
accordance with division (B) of this section; [and] 
January Term, 2015 
 
13
(b) That a well-informed public office or person 
responsible for the requested public records reasonably would 
believe that the conduct or threatened conduct of the public office 
or person responsible for the requested public records would serve 
the public policy that underlies the authority that is asserted as 
permitting that conduct or threatened conduct. 
 
R.C. 149.43(C)(1).  Thus, if we find that LCI’s refusal to turn over the requested 
records was reasonable under previous case law and upheld an important public 
policy, we could decide not to award damages. 
{¶ 42} As to the March 5, 2012 request, no reasonable public employee 
responsible for public records could have thought that a request for a single 
document was overbroad or burdensome.  And because Carr’s request identified 
the author and recipient of the document within the prison and the approximate 
time the document was transmitted, no reasonable public employee responsible 
for public records could have thought that the request was ambiguous. 
{¶ 43} LCI asserts that a prison’s denial of an overbroad public-records 
request is consistent with public-policy concerns and therefore justifies a 
reduction of damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(1)(b).  The case it cites for this 
proposition is inapposite here.  State ex rel. Dehler v. Kelly, 11th Dist. Trumbull 
No. 2009-T-0084, 2010-Ohio-3053, ¶ 47, is concerned with overbroad requests 
interfering with “the integrity of the recordkeeping process.”  See also State ex 
rel. Dehler v. Kelly, 127 Ohio St.3d 309, 2010-Ohio-5724, 939 N.E.2d 828, ¶ 3 
(“the prison officials established that permitting Dehler to inspect the requested 
records might have unreasonably interfered with the discharge of their duties”).  
LCI has provided no evidence that the production of the documents at issue here 
would have interfered with the integrity of its recordkeeping process or with the 
discharge of its employees’ duties. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 44} But even if LCI had provided evidence to support its public-policy 
argument regarding overbroad requests, Carr would be entitled to damages.  LCI 
did not fulfill Carr’s March 5, 2012 request for a single memorandum sent in 
January 2012 until March 5, 2013, when LCI provided the memorandum as an 
exhibit to its motion for summary judgment in the court of appeals in this case.  
R.C.149.43(C)(1) fixes the amount of statutory damages at “one hundred dollars 
for each business day during which the public office * * * failed to comply,” up to 
a maximum award of $1,000.  As LCI failed to produce the document for a year’s 
worth of business days, we hold that the court of appeals abused its discretion in 
denying statutory damages, and we order LCI to pay Carr $1,000 in damages. 
{¶ 45} R.C.149.43(C)(2)(a) provides that if a court issues a writ of 
mandamus ordering a public office to comply with the PRA and determines that 
the circumstances set forth in R.C. 149.43(C)(1) exist, the court “shall determine 
and award the relator all court costs.”  As we are issuing a writ of mandamus 
ordering LCI to comply with the PRA, and as Carr complied with the 
requirements in R.C. 149.43(C)(1), we award Carr court costs.  We remand and 
order the court of appeals to determine the amount to be awarded as costs. 
Miscellaneous motions 
{¶ 46} Carr also appeals the court of appeals’ rulings on a number of 
procedural motions.  However, because we reverse on the merits, the issues 
relating to those motions are moot. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 47} We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and issue 
a writ of mandamus ordering LCI to produce any records requested by Carr on 
March 5, 2012, March 15, 2012, and April 10, 2012, that have not yet been 
produced.  We also reverse the court of appeals’ denial of statutory damages and 
award damages to Carr under R.C. 149.43(C)(1) in the amount of $1,000.  
January Term, 2015 
 
15
Finally, we award court costs to Carr under R.C.149.43(C)(2)(a) and remand the 
case to the court of appeals to determine the amount to be awarded as costs. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and 
O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
LANZINGER, J., dissents and would adopt the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
_____________________ 
 
James M. Carr Sr., pro se. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Caitlyn A. Nestleroth, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
______________________