Case Title: Smethurst v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1988-06-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Smethurst v. State1988 WY 84756 P.2d 196Case Number: 87-148Decided: 06/15/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
GERALD SMETHURST, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Terrence L. 
O'Brien, J.

Wyoming Public 
Defender Program, Julie D. Naylor, Appellate Counsel, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Michele J. Neves, Student 
Intern, Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ., 
and KAIL, District Judge.

KAIL, District 
Judge.

[¶1.]     Gerald Smethurst was 
tried and found guilty of first degree sexual assault in violation of § 
6-2-302(a)(i), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement). Smethurst was sentenced to 
incarceration at the Wyoming State Penitentiary for a period of not less than 
twelve nor more than thirty years. Smethurst appeals his conviction and 
sentence.

[¶2.]     Smethurst raises the 
following issues on appeal:

1. Whether appellant's 
right to trial before an impartial jury was denied.

2. Whether it was error 
to admit a cumulative medical report into evidence over the objection of defense 
counsel.

[¶3.]     We will 
affirm.

FACTS

[¶4.]     In October of 1986, 
appellant and co-defendant, Jeff Doles, were incarcerated in the juvenile 
section of the CampbellCountyDetentionCenter. On October 30, 1986, the victim, 
fifteen year-old M.G., was placed in the same cell block. The three boys spent 
most of the afternoon watching television together.

[¶5.]     Sometime during the 
early evening or late afternoon of October 30, Smethurst and Doles went into 
Smethurst's cell to talk. Shortly thereafter, Smethurst and Doles returned to 
where the victim was watching television. Doles then jumped on the victim's back 
and made the victim carry him up the stairs. Doles grabbed the victim's arms and 
held him. Smethurst and Doles then proceeded to beat the 
victim.

[¶6.]     The beating lasted 
approximately one and one-half hours. During the course of the beating Doles 
forced the victim to his knees. Smethurst pulled his pants down and put his 
penis in the victim's mouth. Smethurst and Doles threatened to kill the victim 
if he reported the occurrence.

ISSUES

[¶7.]     During the voir dire 
process, a prospective juror realized that he was familiar with some of the 
facts of the case. The juror asked to approach the bench, where the following 
exchange occurred:

"[JUROR]: Judge, I've sat 
back there through this whole proceeding, and I - and I - and I have every 
intention of serving and fulfilling my responsibility 
here.

"However, I feel I would 
not be fulfilling if I didn't let you know that through the process I have 
remembered this case. I have remembered discussions, and I feel I am - well, I 
am prejudiced right now. In my judgment. And I - I don't feel I have as - I am 
as open because of information I know now.

"THE COURT: What - with 
whom did you discuss it?

"[JUROR]: Just with - 
just with different jailers and some of the - you know, I recognized the face as 
I was sitting there. I didn't recall things at first, but I remember seeing a 
face now in the facility.

"And I remember - things 
have been coming back to me as I - even as we were sitting and 
talking.

"THE COURT: 
Okay.

"Do you have any 
questions?

"MS. PATTON: Isn't the 
critical issue whether you could put aside your prior knowledge and sit as a 
juror only with what's presented in court? And, if you could do that, couldn't 
he be a juror?

"[JUROR]: Are you asking 
that of me, then?

"MS. PATTON: If His Honor 
is permitting me to.

"THE COURT: 
Sure.

"[JUROR]: It's - I guess 
that's why I came up here is because I felt that - that previous to that I 
wanted to make it known, you know, I sat there and did bring back - and did have 
the feeling of the judge of this witness - or of this 
defendant.

"I feel that same way I 
did - I would hope I could. However, there's a question in this particular case, 
and which, in my working closely with the jail and through its construction 
-

"MS. PATTON: If you were 
instructed by the Court only to consider evidence produced in court, could you 
base your decision on only that evidence?

"[JUROR]: Yeah, I feel I 
could make my decision only on that.

"MS. PATTON: Okay. Thank 
you.

"MR. SKAGGS: 
Okay.

"Now, the follow-up 
question to that is, seeing's how we're forced to look prospectively into the 
future and possibly sitting in the jury room, is there a possibility that, based 
upon your prior knowledge of this particular case, based upon your discussions, 
based upon your experience in the jail, is there a possibility that you could 
not be fair and unbiased and not follow the Judge's instructions? Is there that 
possibility?

"[JUROR]: Yeah, that's - 
that's why I came up here, questioning of myself, and I felt I'd better bring 
this - at least to my attention before - again, I - I feel that I could make a 
fair and impartial judgment of the - of what's presented if I really put aside 
everything that I do know prior to this point.

"MR. SKAGGS: Is there a 
possibility that you would not be able to put that aside?

"THE COURT: Well, let's - 
he's answered the question.

"[JUROR]: Yes, I would - 
I hope I've answered it as much as possible. I have knowledge. I am going to do 
my best to insulate that, to put that aside. However, I felt I needed to make it 
a - both of you aware. 

"THE COURT: I think 
that's appropriate. And let me ask the question a little more neutrally than 
perhaps it's been put to you.

"As I - the same thing 
applies with respect to the newspaper accounts. As I explained to the panel, we 
don't want jurors who don't read the newspapers, who don't listen to the radio 
because they're uninformed. And probably unintelligent.

"So that's not the test 
of jurors. If we have those kinds of jurors, we wouldn't get 
anywhere.

"[JUROR]: 
Uh-huh.

"THE COURT: The question 
is whether or not, having read or heard something, you can - you can disregard 
it. And there's no one that can look into your mind except for you. And the real 
question is - and I recognize that it's prospective and that makes it difficult 
- but the question is, are you able to listen to the testimony offered in court 
and decide on that basis or have you formed a judgment now which would prevent 
you from doing that?

"And it's okay if you 
have. But you're the only one who really can answer that 
question.

"[JUROR]: Okay. I feel 
that - and I came up here to say I felt I had a - was slanted. I did have a 
judgment, not a hard-core judgment but a leaning sort of decision. However, I 
feel I could put that aside. And hear the case.

"THE COURT: Are there 
other questions?

"MS. PATTON: No, Your 
Honor.

"MR. SKAGGS: I don't have 
any other questions. You may be seated. I'm going to put the objection on the 
record.

"THE COURT: Thank 
you."

[¶8.]     The court denied 
defendant's motion to challenge the juror for cause.

[¶9.]     The right to an 
impartial jury is guaranteed by the Wyoming and United States Constitutions. 
U.S. Constitution, Amendment 
VI; Wyo. 
Const. Art. 1, § 10. Appellant contends he was denied this constitutional right 
when the trial court denied his motion to challenge the juror for 
cause.

[¶10.]  The Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure 
and §§ 7-11-101 through 7-11-107, W.S. 1977, addressed the procedural and 
substantive aspects of the voir dire process.

[¶11.]  Appellant asserts that the prospective 
juror should have been dismissed for cause pursuant to § 7-11-105(a)(ii), W.S. 
1977, which provided:

"(a) The following is 
good cause for challenge to any person called as a juror in a criminal 
case:

"* * 
*

"(ii) That he has formed 
or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, or is 
biased or prejudiced for or against the accused;"

[¶12.]  Appellant contends that merely showing a 
juror has knowledge of some facts of the case constitutes prejudice. The 
contention is not correct.

[¶13.]  The defendant in a criminal prosecution 
is entitled to an impartial jury, not a sympathetic one. Jahnke v. State, 
Wyo., 682 P.2d 991, 999-1000 (1984). A corollary to that rule is that a defendant is not 
entitled to a jury ignorant of current events. See, e.g., Collins v. State, 
Wyo., 589 P.2d 1283, 1289 (1979).

[¶14.]  A fact of life in a rural state is that 
members of a community often discuss events occurring within the community. This 
court has held that mere knowledge of the facts of a case does not taint a jury 
or prospective juror. Id. The Wyoming legislature has likewise 
recognized that mere knowledge of the facts of a case, whether garnered through 
newspaper account or rumor, is not sufficient cause for challenge if the juror 
can "lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the 
evidence presented in court;" (7-11-106, W.S. 1977) and the trial judge is 
satisfied regarding the juror's ability to do just that.

[¶15.]  The foregoing is exactly the situation we 
have in the present case. The prospective juror had, prior to trial, discussed 
the case. The juror expressed concerns about his ability to be impartial. The 
juror explained that the bases for his concerns were his earlier 
discussions.

[¶16.]  The juror was then asked three times in 
three different ways by three different persons if he could lay aside his prior 
knowledge and render a verdict based solely upon evidence produced in court. 
Each time the juror answered affirmatively.

[¶17.]  We have recognized that "`courts put 
great, though not absolute faith, in the juror's statement that he will give the 
defendant a fair and impartial trial.'" Summers v. State, Wyo., 725 P.2d 1033, 1041 
(1986), affirmed on reh. 731 P.2d 558 (1987), (quoting 2 C. Wright, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, § 383 (2d ed. 1982)).

[¶18.]  The trial judge was satisfied that the 
prospective juror could lay aside his prior knowledge. The trial judge is vested 
with a "duty to determine if any of the prospective jurors were so biased and 
prejudiced that they could not have rendered a fair and impartial verdict." 
Gresham v. State, Wyo., 708 P.2d 49, 56 (1985). The trial judge 
is afforded a fair degree of discretion in the exercise of that duty. Id. It has not been 
shown, nor can it be said, that the trial judge acted unreasonably in this 
case.

[¶19.]  As the trial judge sagely 
observed:

"My experience from these 
kind of cases tell me that the - the voir dire process often causes people to be 
very, very circumspect into their affairs and doubt their own sense of judgment 
and fairness."

[¶20.]  Once the mandates of § 7-11-106 are 
satisfied, it becomes incumbent upon the defendant to demonstrate impartiality 
or bias. Lopez v. State, Wyo., 544 P.2d 855, 862 (1976). Appellant has 
failed to carry his burden.

[¶21.]  The second issue presented for review 
concerns the admittance into evidence of a medical report.

[¶22.]  During trial, an emergency room record 
was admitted into evidence over appellant's objection. The basis of the 
objection was:

"* * * on the ground and 
for the reasons that there are simply highlights of oral testimony and goes 
against the Supreme Court dictates - that doctor's case, and the name just slips 
me right offhand - but barring the admission of written evidence which simply 
highlights oral testimony and gives more - greater - weight to the reasoning of 
the case, gives greater weight to the testimony than would otherwise be given to 
the admission of the written."

The "doctor's 
case" referred to by appellant is Schmunk v. State, Wyo., 714 P.2d 724 
(1986). Appellant's reliance upon Schmunk is misplaced.

[¶23.]  In Schmunk, the issue presented on appeal 
was "whether several errors occurring during the course of trial, when 
considered together, created sufficient prejudice to deprive appellant of a fair 
trial." Id., 
at 726.

[¶24.]  One of the errors committed in Schmunk 
was allowing the jury, during deliberations, to view a highly prejudicial 
videotape. We noted in Schmunk that videotaped testimony is unique, and that videotaped testimony 
possesses the danger of unduly emphasizing testimony. Id., at 
732.

[¶25.]  The emergency room record does not carry 
with it the same potential for prejudice. There is no showing that the record 
would unduly emphasize the treating doctor's testimony. There is no showing that 
the record was filed or made by the treating doctor. The exhibit tended only to 
corroborate the testimony of the doctor.

[¶26.]  The trial court has broad discretion with 
respect to admissibility of evidence. The burden is upon the appellant to show 
that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence. See, e.g., 
Carey v. State, Wyo., 715 P.2d 244, 247-248, cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 107 S. Ct. 270, 93 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1986), and authorities cited therein. Additionally, 
the appellant must show a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have 
been more favorable to him if the evidence had been excluded. Ramirez v. State, 
Wyo., 739 P.2d 1214, 1220 (1987) (citing Bishop 
v. State, Wyo., 687 P.2d 242 (1984), cert. 
denied 469 U.S. 1219, 105 S. Ct. 1203, 84 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1985)). Appellant has failed to meet these 
requirements.

[¶27.]  Affirmed.

URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ., each filed a dissenting 
opinion.

URBIGKIT, Justice, dissenting. 

[¶28.]  It is axiomatic in trial standards that 
due process is not provided if eleven appropriate jurors and one prejudicially 
informed witness can be seated as the constitutional twelve provided to 
determine guilt. In this case where that could have occurred and, to a degree, 
did occur, I dissent.

[¶29.]  Juror Swanhorst was a deputy county 
engineer and, in that professional responsibility, was familiar with the county 
jail where this offense occurred. Additionally, because of the county's 
potential liability for the injuries sustained by the victim in this occurrence, 
he was, by employment, directly related to the county's monetary interest in 
conviction result. This case does not end there in the required search for the 
fair, disinterested and impartial juror. In voir dire, he admitted discussion of 
the case as then creating the requirement that to serve as a juror he would set 
aside knowledge that he had obtained from talking directly to jailers at the 
institution.

[¶30.]  To extrapolate what he said on voir dire 
about knowledge and opinion derived from discussion and involvement, we 
learn:

"In my capacity as deputy 
county engineer, I was in the jail several times during the past year. I was 
aware of several cases that went on. I did discuss in a - I mean, you know - you 
know, casual manner with some of the people that work 
there.

"I can't say that I know 
this case in particular at this time. However, I'm - I'm thinking that, as it 
progresses, I may recall some things.

"I guess I just wanted to 
make everybody aware of that now.

* * * * * 
*

"THE COURT: 
Okay.

"Do you feel that your 
knowledge about the - the jail and the operations in the jail would prevent you 
from being a fair and impartial juror, listening to the evidence presented, and 
deciding on that basis?

"MR. SWANHORST: Yes. I 
don't know what evidence might be presented, but I - again, working closely in 
the jail in my capacity, I did find out a lot of things about the operations of 
the jail, and I don't know if that information would be presented now or 
not.

* * * * * 
*

"THE COURT: Let me ask 
one other question.

"There may be some civil 
litigation against the County and the sheriff's office over this. And I assume 
that you're aware of that.

"Would that in any way 
affect your ability to sit on the jury in this case, the fact that there may be 
some civil litigation arising?"

[¶31.]  That potentiality for civil liability 
against the county was also explained to the jury by the 
prosecution:

"As you know, this is a 
criminal action to determine whether the proof is that the defendant is guilty 
or whether it fails to prove him guilty.

"There - in some cases 
where crimes occur in jails, there might be a companion civil action, for 
example, for money damages."

[¶32.]  Then, as outlined in majority opinion, 
the juror announced at bench conference:

"MR. SWANHORST: Judge, 
I've sat back there through this whole proceeding, and I - and I - and I have 
every intention of serving and fulfilling my responsibility 
here.

"However, I feel I would 
not be fulfilling if I didn't let you know that through the process I have 
remembered this case. I have remembered discussions, and I feel I am - well, I 
am prejudiced right now. In my judgment. And I - I don't feel I have as - I am 
as open because of information I know now.

"THE COURT: What - with 
whom did you discuss it?

"MR. SWANHORST: Just with 
- just with different jailers and some of the - you know, I recognized the face 
as I was sitting there. I didn't recall things at first, but I remember seeing a 
face now in the facility.

* * * * * 
*

"MR. SKAGGS: Okay. 

"Now, the follow-up 
question to that is, seeing's how we're forced to look prospectively into the 
future and possibly sitting in the jury room, is there a possibility that, based 
upon your prior knowledge of this particular case, based upon your discussions, 
based upon your experience in the jail, is there a possibility that you could 
not be fair and unbiased and not follow the Judge's instructions? Is there that 
possibility?

"MR. SWANHORST: Yeah, 
that's - that's why I came up here, questioning myself, and I felt I'd better 
bring this - at least to my attention before - again, I - I feel that I could 
make a fair and impartial judgment of the - of what's presented if I really put 
aside everything that I do know prior to this point.

"MR. SKAGGS: Is there a 
possibility that you would not be able to put that aside?

"THE COURT: Well, let's - 
he's answered the question.

"MR. SWANHORST: Yes, I 
would - I hope I've answered it as much as possible. I have knowledge. I am 
going to do my best to insulate that, to put that aside. However, I felt I 
needed to make it a - both of you aware.

"THE COURT: I think 
that's appropriate. And let me ask the question a little more neutrally than 
perhaps it's been put to you.

"As I - the same thing 
applies with respect to the newspaper accounts. As I explained to the panel, we 
don't want jurors who don't read the newspapers, who don't listen to the radio 
because they're uninformed. And probably unintelligent.

"So that's not the test 
of jurors. If we have those kind of jurors, we wouldn't get 
anywhere.

"MR. SWANHORST: 
Uh-huh.

* * * * * 
*

"MR. SWANHORST: Okay. I 
feel that - and I came up here to say I felt I had a - was slanted. I did have a 
judgment, not a hard-core judgment but a leaning sort of decision. However, I 
feel I could put that aside. And hear the case."

[¶33.]  Here is a county employee who is 
professionally familiar with the county jail, has discussed the case with 
participants, who as county employees could be witnesses, and is himself not 
without prejudicial opinion about the events from which the criminal charge 
arose.

[¶34.]  The justice-delivery system does not have 
to start with jurors who arrive with both personal and direct hearsay knowledge 
of the events, as then asserting in regard to initial prejudice as "not a 
hard-core judgment, but a leaning sort of decision," and that then, as the judge 
observes, it "could happen" that he would carry some prejudice into the jury 
box. The enormity of the sacrifice of constitutional rights in present 
justification of expediency is denied by a vast volume of well-reasoned cases in 
review of constitutional application of the fair and disinterested juror within 
which I might not number either Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 79 (1981), 
cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982), or Jahnke v. 
State, Wyo., 682 P.2d 991 (1984) as final authority.

[¶35.]  Judge Selya of the Court of Appeals, 
First Circuit in Neron v. Tierney, 841 F.2d 1197 (1st Cir. 1988), with 
comprehensive consideration and interesting language, recently considered the 
fairness and impartiality of a trial juror who was designated in discussion as 
the "ex-inamorata" or "erstwhile infatuate" of defendant's 
son.

[¶36.]  He first discerned:

"The Due Process Clause 
guarantees a criminal defendant that his trial will `comport with prevailing 
notions of fundamental fairness.' California v. 
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 2532, 
81 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1984). The right to trial by jury in a criminal case is an 
important feature of the justice system. In turn, the value of the right 
consists principally in the neutrality of the venire. All would agree that an 
impartial jury is an integral component of a fair trial. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 551, 
96 S. Ct. 2791, 2799, 49 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1976). To preserve the integrity of the 
process, trial courts must jealously safeguard jurors' impartiality. 

"The ways of due process, 
however, cannot be lifted intact from some handy manual. `(D)ue process is 
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation 
demands.' Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2600, 
33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972). Rather than being taken off the rack, the strictures 
which the Clause imposes must be tailored to fit each particular situation. See 
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S. Ct. 1743, 1748, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1230 (1961). And within a given situation, a broad range of 
alternatives, each different from the others, may suffice to alleviate due 
process concerns. Because of this fluidity, cross-typing the bloodlines of a 
particular case with the imperatives of due process is necessarily a sui generis 
exercise. * * *

"These precepts have 
clear pertinence to the matter at hand. We have no doubt that a court must 
satisfactorily probe nonfrivolous charges of jury spoilage. * * * But, though 
adequate inquiry must be made into allegations of this genre, see, e.g., United 
States v. Richman, 600 F.2d 286, 295 (1st Cir. 1979) (juror misconduct); United 
States v. Corbin, 590 F.2d 398, 400 (1st Cir. 1979) (juror bias), `adequacy' is 
itself a dynamic concept; the technique for achieving `adequacy' need not always 
be the same." Id. at 1200, 1201.

[¶37.]  In approving the state proceedings, the 
federal jurist observed:

"The judge sua sponte 
released from service each juror who indicated the remotest connection to the 
defendant or any witness, or who presented the tiniest reason for placing his or 
her neutrality in doubt. All in all, the rigor and thoroughness of the voir dire 
furnished a highly efficacious method of minimizing the risk of juror 
partiality.

* * * * * 
*

"The record, we think, 
reflects that the trier exhibited commendable solicitude for the accused's right 
to trial by an impartial jury." Id. at 1202.

[¶38.]  Differing from his evaluation of the 
juror in that case, I would find the situation here much more closely aligned 
to:

"There are at one extreme 
situations where the evidence shows the well to be so heavily poisoned that the 
inference of taint is inescapable; in such straitened circumstances, 
interrogating the juror would be an exercise in superfluity." Id. at 
1202-1203.

As compared 
with:

"On the other hand, there 
are situations where the evidence of impropriety may be so slight or conjectural 
as not to support any reasonable inference of prejudicial bias or misconduct." 
Id. at 
1203.

[¶39.]  The trespass on the constitutional rights 
of Smethurst in denied due process did not end here. With mandated last 
peremptory challenge used for the exclusion of Swanhorst, defendant was forced 
to retain among the final array as a group to be fair and impartial, a juror, 
whose realistic background for appropriateness to serve in this case of 
contended jail misconduct arising from hardcore adult instigation, was seven 
years experience as a correction officer in the military prison at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas. Cynically, this juror assisted in establishing his 
disinterest and fairness by stating, "I think some of my prior experience would 
be to an advantage." This "experience" included testimony and hearings involving 
internal investigations of inmate problems while working in the Kansas prison. Fair, unbiased and disinterested? This 
juror also became an expert witness as placed in the jury box no matter what his 
conscious intent to be fair might be.

[¶40.]  This status compares with the reasoning 
of the prosecution as explaining a peremptory challenge of a Hispanic 
venireperson that "the State always gets rid of people who have been acquittal 
jurors in criminal cases in the past." The relevance of this peremptory 
exclusion by the state while the defendant was required to retain an 
ex-Leavenworth, Kansas military prison guard hardly 
accommodates equal justice.

[¶41.]  The population of CampbellCounty, as the sixth or seventh largest in 
the state and the first richest in natural resources, can surely support twelve 
disinterested and unbiased jurors to serve on the criminal panel. To say 
otherwise is demeaning nonsense when applied to that industry-oriented, 
progressively-directed community. Nor does this meet the test of Irvin v. Dowd, 
366 U.S. 717, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 6 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1961). See King v. Lynaugh, 828 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 
1987).

[¶42.]  The constitutional parameters of both the 
United 
States and Wyoming Constitutions are to 
guarantee to every defendant a fair trial before an impartial jury. Taylor v. State, Wyo., 612 P.2d 851 (1980).1 The events of this case are 
revolting in cruelty of jail inmates and tragically unsatisfactory in 
institutional supervision. Those disturbances do not amend nor delete 
constitutional rights which encompass the essence of an enlightened society. 
Constitutional rights in the selection of the Smethurst jury were denied and I 
respectfully dissent.

MACY, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶43.]  I dissent. Mr. Swanhorst, one of the 
prospective jurors, advised the court three times that he was prejudiced, and 
the court talked him out of it. The test is not whether he will change his mind 
after hearing the evidence but whether he is biased and prejudiced before 
hearing the evidence. Although it is not clear whether the prospective juror was 
biased or prejudiced for or against the accused, neither the State nor an 
accused should have the burden of changing a juror's opinion as to whether the 
accused is guilty or innocent.

FOOTNOTES

1 As a confirmed 
psychological fact, casual exposure of the jury to community publicity and 
newspaper reports, cf. Collins v. State, Wyo., 589 P.2d 1283 (1979), cannot be 
compared in preeminence for potentialities to convict derived from juror 
personal knowledge and familiarity of the facts from acquaintanceship and 
discussion with the participants. The experienced trial attorney's paranoia 
about a key man or one member-controlled jury is significantly derived from the 
recognition that the processes of reasoning utilize all attained knowledge. It 
cannot be expected that the more informed member will be restrained from sharing 
his or her inside information as a particularized factor in jury discussion and 
ultimate conclusion. Leaving Swanhorst to serve, after denied challenge for 
cause, presented the dilemma to defendant of either trial by eleven jurors and a 
prejudiced witness or effectively having his number of statutorily available 
peremptory challenges reduced by one to then retain for the jail event charged 
crime, an ex-prison guard.