Case Title: White Hall Entertainment, et al. v. Alabama

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1210122, 1210064, 1200798

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2022-09-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: September 30, 2022 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
SPECIAL TERM, 2022 
 
_________________________ 
 
1200798 
_________________________ 
 
State of Alabama  
 
v.  
 
Epic Tech, LLC; K.C. Economic Development, LLC, d/b/a 
VictoryLand; and Sheriff Andre Brunson 
 
 
Appeal from Macon Circuit Court 
(CV-17-900150) 
_________________________ 
 
1210064 
_________________________ 
 
State of Alabama  
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
2 
 
 
v.  
 
White Hall Enrichment Advancement Team d/b/a Southern Star 
Entertainment; White Hall Town Council; and White Hall 
Entertainment 
 
Appeal from Lowndes Circuit Court 
(CV-17-900069.80) 
_________________________ 
 
1210122 
_________________________ 
 
White Hall Entertainment and White Hall Town Council  
 
v. 
 
State of Alabama 
 
 
Appeal from Lowndes Circuit Court 
(CV-17-900069.80) 
 
 
SHAW, Justice. 
 
In case nos. 1200798 and 1210064, the State of Alabama appeals 
from separate orders entered by the Macon Circuit Court and Lowndes 
Circuit Court, respectively, denying the State's requests for injunctive 
relief seeking to abate, as a public nuisance,1 illegal gambling operations 
 
1See generally §§ 6-5-120, 6-5-122, and 12-2-7, Ala. Code 1975. 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
3 
 
in Macon County and Lowndes County.  In case no. 1210122, 
defendants/counterclaim plaintiffs White Hall Entertainment and the 
White Hall Town Council (referred to collectively as "White Hall"), cross-
appeal from the Lowndes Circuit Court's order dismissing their 
counterclaims against the State.  This Court consolidated these appeals.  
In case no. 1200798, we reverse the order of the Macon Circuit Court 
denying, in effect, the State's request for preliminary injunctive relief and 
remand the matter for that court to enter, within 30 days, a preliminary 
injunction enjoining the defendants' gambling operations in Macon 
County; in case no. 1210064, we reverse the order of the Lowndes Circuit 
Court denying the State's request for permanent injunctive relief and 
remand the matter for that court to enter, within 30 days, a permanent 
injunction enjoining the defendants' gambling operations in Lowndes 
County; and in case no. 1210122, we affirm the Lowndes Circuit Court's 
order dismissing White Hall's counterclaims. 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
A full factual background of these matters is found in State v. Epic 
Tech, LLC, 323 So. 3d 572 (Ala. 2020) ("Epic Tech I"), and State v. Epic 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
4 
 
Tech, LLC, 342 So. 3d 200 (Ala. 2021) ("Epic Tech II").2  Essentially, in 
2017, the State sued in the Macon Circuit Court, among others, Epic 
Tech, LLC ("Epic Tech"); K.C. Economic Development, LLC, d/b/a 
VictoryLand ("KCED"); and Sheriff Andre Brunson,3 in his official 
capacity as sheriff of Macon County (referred to collectively as "the Macon 
County defendants").  At around that same time, the State sued, in the 
Lowndes Circuit Court, among others, White Hall Enrichment 
Advancement Team d/b/a Southern Star Entertainment ("Southern 
Star") and White Hall4 (referred to collectively as "the Lowndes County 
 
2See also, generally, State v. Epic Tech Inc., [Ms. 1210012, May 20, 
2022] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2022) (addressing similar operations in Greene 
County).   
 
3To satisfy the State's aim of obtaining "an injunction against all 
those participating, profiting and promoting the illegal gambling 
enterprise," it also named as defendants in the Macon County action 
Aurify Gaming, a Georgia-based corporation; Winter Sky, LLC, the 
purported manufacturer of the electronic gaming machines at issue; and 
Promotions Holding Company, LLC, the sole member of Epic Tech, all of 
which the complaint included among the parties responsible for 
"operat[ing], administer[ing], licens[ing] and/or provid[ing] gambling 
devices for … VictoryLand…."  As to Sheriff Brunson, the State alleged 
that he had both issued permits to illegal gambling facilities, from which 
he receives a monthly licensing fee, and that he had assisted and/or 
allowed illegal gambling facilities to operate in Macon County.   
 
4In the Lowndes County action, the State also included as a named 
defendant the Town of White Hall because, the State alleged, it and the 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
5 
 
defendants").5  In each action, the State sought an order declaring the 
illegal gambling operations conducted by the defendants to be a public 
nuisance and related injunctive relief.  See Epic Tech I, 323 So. 3d at 574.  
The State's complaint in each action was also accompanied by a motion 
seeking the entry of an order preliminarily enjoining the defendants from 
engaging in illegal gambling operations.6  The State alleged, as support 
 
White Hall Town Council "are the ones that have the sole right to license 
and issue licenses for operation of bingo, to pass ordinances or pass … 
regulations regarding the play of bingo in White Hall" and were "illegally 
and improperly doing so and providing assistance for the nuisance to 
occur."  The State explained that Epic Tech, also referred to as Epic Tech 
Inc., was also named as a defendant "because [it is] the vendor[] or … the 
supplier[] … with regard to the machines being brought into our state 
and being operational in Lowndes County."  However, as discussed below, 
Epic Tech was dismissed as a defendant in the Lowndes County action. 
 
5The records before us establish that the State also commenced 
identical actions with regard to similar illegal gambling operations in 
Morgan, Houston, and Greene Counties. 
 
6More particularly, the State sought to prohibit the defendants in 
each action from:  
 
"(a) offering 'electronic bingo' machines … at the[ir] 
facility in [each] County …; 
 
"(b) receiving any monies in relation to the electronic 
machines at the[ir] facility in [each] County …; 
 
"(c) transporting or providing any additional electronic 
machines to the[ir] facility in [each] County …; [and] 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
6 
 
for its requests for the issuance of the preliminary injunctions, that it had 
a reasonable chance of success on the merits; that it would be irreparably 
harmed in the absence of injunctive relief; that it lacked an adequate 
legal remedy; and that the "balance of equities" favored the issuance of 
the injunctions.  See Ormco Corp. v. Johns, 869 So. 2d 1109, 1113 (Ala. 
2003) ("A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction has the burden of 
demonstrating '(1) that without the injunction the plaintiff would suffer 
immediate and irreparable injury; (2) that the plaintiff has no adequate 
remedy at law; (3) that the plaintiff has at least a reasonable chance of 
success on the ultimate merits of his case; and (4) that the hardship 
imposed on the defendant by the injunction would not unreasonably 
outweigh the benefit accruing to the plaintiff.'" (quoting Perley v. 
Tapscan, Inc., 646 So. 2d 585, 587 (Ala. 1994))).  The State supported its 
motions with, among other evidentiary exhibits, video recordings of the 
gambling activities in each county and accompanying affidavit testimony 
attesting that special agents with the attorney general's office had, 
 
 
"(d) receiving, utilizing and/or providing bingo licenses 
or permits under [the pertinent local constitutional 
amendment permitting bingo activities in the county] for the 
play of 'electronic bingo' in [each] County …." 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
7 
 
during surveillance of the subject facilities, observed nothing to suggest 
that the activities witnessed amounted to playing the legally permissible 
game of bingo.  See generally Barber v. Cornerstone Cmty. Outreach, 
Inc., 42 So. 3d 65, 86 (Ala. 2009) ("Cornerstone") (outlining the six 
characteristics necessary for the legally permissible game commonly 
referred to as "bingo").     
 
In 2019, the trial courts dismissed, on motions of the defendants 
and before hearings on the merits of the State's requests for preliminary-
injunctive relief, each action in its entirety based on their conclusions 
that they lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the State's claims.  See 
Epic Tech I, 323 So. 3d at 606.   In Epic Tech I, this Court reversed those 
dismissal orders and remanded the matters for further proceedings.  See 
id.  In doing so, the Court specifically noted the following regarding the 
State's claims in each case:  "[I]t is clear that the State adequately alleged 
facts that would support a finding that the … defendants' conduct caused 
harm to the public and that the State lacked another adequate remedy."  
Id. at 600.  
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
8 
 
Following remand, the filing of the defendants' answers, and 
several continuances, the trial court in each case conducted a hearing on 
the State's pending request for preliminary injunctive relief. 
Macon County Proceedings 
At a hearing conducted on June 22, 2021, the State, referencing this 
Court's 2016 decision in State v. $223,405.86, 203 So. 3d 816, 844 (Ala. 
2016), argued that, despite this Court's "previous ruling,"7 the Macon 
 
7The Court's "ruling" in that case, which arose from forfeiture 
proceedings initiated in Macon County, included the following: 
 
"Today's decision is the latest, and hopefully the last, 
chapter in the more than six years' worth of attempts to defy 
the Alabama Constitution's ban on 'lotteries.'  It is the latest, 
and hopefully the last, chapter in the ongoing saga of attempts 
to defy the clear and repeated holdings of this Court beginning 
in 2009 that electronic machines like those at issue here are 
not the 'bingo' referenced in local bingo amendments.  It is the 
latest, and hopefully the last, chapter in the failure of some 
local law-enforcement officials in this State to enforce the 
anti-gambling laws of this State they are sworn to uphold, 
thereby necessitating the exercise and performance by the 
attorney general of the authority and duty vested in him by 
law, as the chief law-enforcement officer of this State, to 
enforce the criminal laws of this State.  And finally, it is the 
latest, and hopefully last, instance in which it is necessary to 
expend public funds to seek appellate review of the meaning 
of the simple term 'bingo,' which, as reviewed above, has been 
declared over and over and over again by this Court.  There is 
no longer any room for uncertainty, nor justification for 
continuing dispute, as to the meaning of that term.  And 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
9 
 
County defendants had, subsequent to that ruling declaring the 
electronic gaming machines at issue in that case, which the defendants 
had characterized as "electronic bingo" machines, illegal, reopened the 
same facility ("the Macon County facility"), using machines that were 
substantially similar.  It further explained that, based on failed attempts 
at obtaining the assistance of local law enforcement in shutting down the 
illegal gambling operations or the voluntary discontinuation of those 
operations, it had commenced the underlying action in an attempt to seek 
the court's help in abating the nuisance that, it alleged, the Macon 
County defendants' illegal gambling operations represent.    
In support of its request for injunctive relief, the State submitted 
video recordings of the use of electronic gaming machines in the Macon 
County facility during visits in September 2016, July 2017, and 
December 2019, and accompanying testimony from two of the agents 
responsible for obtaining the video recordings, who explained the 
 
certainly the need for any further expenditure of judicial 
resources, including the resources of this Court, to examine 
this issue is at an end. All that is left is for the law of this 
State to be enforced." 
 
203 So. 3d at 844-45 (footnotes omitted). 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
10 
 
recordings' contents in detail to the trial court.  Specifically, the agents 
confirmed, as the State had originally alleged in its submissions in 
support of its request for injunctive relief, that, while wearing plain 
clothes and concealed recording devices, they had entered the Macon 
County facility and had viewed the available electronic gaming machines 
on multiple occasions.   
As described by the agents, the Macon County facility contained, 
during the surveillance operations, several hundred machines that both 
"looked like a standard slot machine" and "played[] like[] a slot machine 
with a five by five grid and balls that dropped to simulate … what would 
be a person calling a number."  The agents estimated that the grid that 
recorded the numbers, i.e., the simulated "bingo" card, was 
approximately the size of a postage stamp while the spinning reels were 
the predominant display on the machines' screens.  The agents further 
testified that they detected no correlation between the grid and the reels 
and that they were not required either to record numbers on the grid -- 
or on a corresponding physical bingo card -- or determine that the 
numbers on the grid matched those in the ball drop.  Instead, they 
indicated that the machines could be played without the need for paying 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
11 
 
attention to any of the activity occurring on the screen and estimated that 
a single game lasted approximately five seconds.  The agents further 
denied that the machines required the use of any actual corresponding 
paper or printed bingo card, that any skill was required to win, or that 
the machines informed the player that he or she "was racing against 
anyone else to be the first to do anything."  In sum, the agents opined 
that the electronic gaming machines were illegal "games of chance."  The 
State's evidence further indicated that, despite urgings from the attorney 
general and the governor, local law enforcement had -- obviously, since 
the Macon County facility remained in operation -- taken no steps to shut 
down illegal gambling in Macon County.  Thus, as discussed in more 
detail below, the State argued that its evidence established both that the 
electronic gaming machines in Macon County were illegal gambling 
devices in defiance of "the repeated holdings of the Supreme Court of 
Alabama," see, e.g., State v. $223,405.86, and "the need for an 
injunction." 
In response to the State's evidentiary showing, the Macon County 
defendants did not dispute the nature of the electronic gaming machines 
in operation at the Macon County facility.  Instead, they elicited, on cross-
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
12 
 
examination, testimony from the agents acknowledging that the 
defendants operating the facility employed a security force responsible 
for limiting entry to persons aged 21 or older, that the electronic gaming 
machines bore appropriate "revenue stamps," that the agents were not 
frightened at any time during their visits to the facility, that they did not 
become addicted to gambling as a result of those visits, and that they 
were not coerced by the Macon County defendants into return visits.  The 
Macon County defendants also presented testimony from numerous other 
witnesses, each of whom testified that charitable contributions and 
taxation revenue stemming from the proceeds of the Macon County 
operations were essential to providing services necessary for the health, 
safety, and welfare of Macon County residents.8   
Relying on the foregoing, the Macon County defendants maintained 
that the State could not meet its burden of demonstrating that their 
operations caused irreparable harm.  Thus, according to the Macon 
County defendants, the State failed to satisfy the requirements for the 
 
8In particular, the testimony established that the Macon County 
sheriff's office had historically received "a half a million dollars a year" 
from other Macon County defendants, who made total charitable 
contributions exceeding $1 million in 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020. 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
13 
 
issuance of an injunction or to demonstrate that the activities of the 
Macon County defendants constituted a nuisance as defined by Alabama 
law.  The Macon County defendants further disputed that the State was 
entitled to essentially revoke the operating license for the Macon County 
facility because, they argued, it could not "obtain a greater penalty or 
forfeiture" than the maximum $6,000 fine that could be imposed had the 
State instead sought to prosecute the defendants for the misdemeanor 
crimes that, they maintain, apply to their activities if deemed illegal. 
Upon the conclusion of the proceedings, the State filed a 
posthearing brief incorporating all the evidence and testimony presented 
at the injunction hearing.  In its brief, it reiterated its claim that the 
Macon County defendants' "electronic bingo" operations were illegal and 
were prohibited by prior decisions of this Court; thus, according to the 
State, the requested injunction was necessary.  The State further argued 
that it had established all the elements necessary for the issuance of 
injunctive relief, including irreparable injury to the "public welfare, 
morals, and safety of the State"; the lack of an adequate legal remedy 
because "criminal prosecution has failed" to eliminate the illegal 
gambling operations; and the State's likelihood of success on the merits 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
14 
 
because, it argued, the balancing of the equities at issue weighed in favor 
of preserving the public safety and welfare.  Finally, it maintained that 
the Macon County defendants' only evidence in opposition to its request 
for a preliminary injunction consisted of "naked emotional appeals" 
aimed at "highlighting possible detriments to the local community [and 
its] citizens … who receive a portion of the profits …."   
The Macon County defendants, however, disputed that a 
preliminary injunction was necessary.  For example, in posthearing 
filings, KCED contended that the requested preliminary injunction 
would not preserve the status quo, i.e., that "[t]he preliminary injunction 
sought by the State … [was] intended to alter the status quo by 
preventing [the Macon County] Defendants from conducting certain 
games … prior to the trial on the merits."9  It further argued that there 
was nothing showing the requisite danger of irreparable harm in the 
 
9See Irwin v. Jefferson Cnty. Pers. Bd., 263 So. 3d 698, 702-03 (Ala. 
2018) ("T]he purpose of temporary and preliminary injunctive relief is to 
maintain the status quo pending the resolution of the action on its 
merits."), and Spinks v. Automation Pers. Servs., Inc., 49 So. 3d 186, 189 
(Ala. 2010) ("The status quo is the 'last uncontested status' of the parties 
preceding the commencement of the controversy."). 
 
 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
15 
 
absence of an injunction and that, under Alabama law, an injunction 
should not issue to prevent the commission of criminal activity.  More 
specifically, according to KCED, as to the irreparable-harm element, the 
State's evidence focused on the illegality of the Macon County defendants' 
activities without demonstrating an actual public injury -- or even injury 
to the State's investigating officers, who had participated in those 
activities as part of the State's undercover operation.  Contrary to the 
State's claims, KCED instead asserted that, as allegedly demonstrated 
by the testimony of its witnesses at the injunction hearing, the activities 
of the Macon County defendants actually benefit the residents of Macon 
County. 
Similarly, Epic Tech argued that any award of injunctive relief 
would be premature before the rendition of a verdict deeming the Macon 
County defendants' activities a nuisance and that the State's attempt at 
demonstrating injury resulting from those activities was insufficient 
when compared to the benefits to Macon County residents in the form of 
revenue and employment opportunities.  Epic Tech further argued that 
the authority cited by the State in support of its request for injunctive 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
16 
 
relief was distinguishable, and it disputed the likelihood of the State's 
success on the merits of its case. 
Subsequently, the trial court entered an order titled:  "Order 
Granting 'Status Quo' Relief to All Parties in the Absence of Evidence of 
Irreparable Harm or Injury."  In that order, the trial court concluded that 
the State's evidence "was deficient in at least three of four of [the] 
elements" required for issuance of a preliminary injunction.  In 
particular, citing testimony from defense witnesses "regarding the 
substantial economic benefits provided to the most impoverished citizens 
of Macon County," the trial court found that the Macon County 
defendants had "disproved any showing" by the State of the potential for 
immediate and irreparable injury in the absence of the requested 
injunction and, instead, concluded that issuing the requested injunction 
"would impose an unreasonable financial hardship for the citizens of 
Macon County."  More particularly, it concluded that the State had failed 
to show that the absence of injunctive relief would subject "anyone" to 
immediate and irreparable harm.  Thus, although requiring the 
immediate report of incidents involving minors or breaches of the peace 
at the Macon County facility, or of complaints by nonparties of 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
17 
 
"endangerment to [their] public health, morals, safety, or welfare" as a 
result of the activities of the Macon County defendants, the trial court, 
in effect, denied the State's request for a preliminary injunction.  In case 
no. 1200798, the State appeals that order. 
Lowndes County Proceedings 
Following our remand in Epic Tech I, but before a hearing on the 
State's pending request for injunctive relief in the Lowndes County 
Action, Epic Tech and the Lowndes County defendants, see note 4, supra, 
either separately answered the State's complaint or amended previous 
answers to assert counterclaims seeking, among other relief, a 
declaration of their legal rights and a judgment declaring that their 
activities were legal, as well as demanding a jury trial on those 
counterclaims.  In particular, White Hall filed an "Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim" seeking to enjoin the State "from acting in bad faith, 
beyond [its] authority or under mistaken interpretation of the law and to 
enjoin [it] from enforcing an unconstitutional application of Alabama's 
public nuisance law," adopting a separate counterclaim asserted by Epic 
Tech, and further alleging both purported civil-rights violations and that 
the State had "tortiously interfered with the [defendants'] business 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
18 
 
relationships" by bringing this action, thereby "causing potential 
irreparable harm and damages that could equal to [sic] millions of 
dollars."  The trial court ultimately consolidated the State's request for a 
preliminary injunction with a full trial on the merits of the pending 
claims.     
In its trial brief, Epic Tech argued that the State was "attempting 
… to effect a complete forfeiture of the … defendants' business 
enterprises, based on a contention that their bingo operations are 'illegal' 
under Alabama misdemeanor statutes" -- a characterization that Epic 
Tech disputed -- "without any convictions in criminal proceedings." Epic 
Tech further disputed that the State was able to establish the existence 
of a public nuisance under § 6-5-121, Ala. Code 1975.  In support of that 
assertion, Epic Tech attached a copy of and quoted from the status-quo 
order entered in the parallel proceeding in Macon County, i.e., the order 
at issue in case no. 1200798, arguing that it established that the State's 
showing "'was devoid of any testimony as to harm from the operation of 
that facility'" and described the charitable benefits the Macon County 
defendants' activities had conferred on Macon County.   
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
19 
 
Before the start of trial on September 1, 2021, the trial court denied 
the State's pending motion seeking to dismiss Epic Tech's and the 
Lowndes County defendants' counterclaims.  At the ensuing bench trial, 
the State first argued both that the Lowndes County defendants' 
operations are a nuisance to the extent that illegal gambling "damages 
all those that are in its sphere" and that the use and/or possession of 
illegal gambling devices constitutes a nuisance per se under prior rulings 
of this Court.  Thereafter, it presented testimony aimed at establishing 
that the electronic gaming devices located at the facilities operated by 
some of the defendants ("the Lowndes County facilities") are illegal.  See, 
e.g., Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 86. 
In particular, the State presented evidence from an agent who 
participated in the investigation of the Lowndes County facilities.  The 
agent testified that, as part of those investigations, between September 
2016 and July 2021, agents visited those facilities on five separate 
occasions "to see if they were actually playing what is considered bingo 
in the state of Alabama."   
Initially, during the agent's testimony, the State successfully 
admitted evidence of communications between the governor and the 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
20 
 
attorney general and the district Attorney and the sheriff of Lowndes 
County, which occurred in September 2016, and in which the Lowndes 
County defendants' gambling operations were brought to the attention of 
the sheriff, accompanied by a "call" for the sheriff to "enforce the laws in 
this state and take any action necessary to bring about compliance."  In 
reply, the sheriff noted the lack of any public complaint regarding the 
Lowndes County defendants' operations, his alleged inability -- due to a 
purported lack of both "manpower" and funding -- to undertake a related 
investigation, and a conflict of interest that "preclude[d] him from any 
further involvement with the investigation and/or prosecution of the 
alleged illegal bingo activity in Lowndes County."  The agent's testimony 
confirmed that, despite the above-described exchange and the State's 
demands, he was unaware that any type of investigative activity 
regarding illegal gambling operations had occurred in Lowndes County 
or that the Lowndes County facilities had been shut down as a result. 
The agent further indicated that during two of his four visits to the 
Lowndes County facilities in 2016 and 2017, agents had viewed the 
available electronic gaming machines, which he numbered at "several 
hundred" in each facility, and recorded activity using a "covert camera."  
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
21 
 
Recordings of the electronic gaming machines in operation in the 
Lowndes County facilities were admitted into evidence.  Despite differing 
visual appearances, the agent's testimony indicated that all the available 
electronic gaming machines located at the Lowndes County facilities 
were "almost identical" and that, at the very least, "[t]hey all played the 
same."  In particular, he noted that, on their initial visits to the facilities, 
each electronic gaming machine required the user to obtain in exchange 
for currency a pin number that could then be used to initiate play on the 
machine but that, during later visits, cash could be inserted directly into 
a machine to initiate play.  Once play was initiated, the user could select 
from among five and six individual games available on the machine or 
play the single offered game, determine a bet amount, and "just mash the 
['play'] button."  The agent described what occurred next as follows:  "The 
graphics would roll or the screen would roll like a traditional slot machine 
with the wheel spinning and, then, … it ma[d]e some noise, some flashing 
lights, and, then, it stopped and you either won or didn't win."  He 
estimated that the entire process took only "[a] matter of seconds."   
Although the agent testified that the screens of the electronic 
gaming machines also featured graphics including a "five by five 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
22 
 
representation of what a …  traditional bingo card looks like," he noted 
that the representative card was "[a] little bigger than a half dollar."  The 
agent clarified, however, that the machines did not require the use of a 
paper or printed bingo card; that a bingo card was not provided to him at 
any time while at the Lowndes County facilities; that he did not hear 
anyone calling out either numbers or a successful "bingo" win; and that 
he was not required to record, recognize, compare, or match numbers that 
appeared on the machine's screen with a number or pattern that 
appeared on the depicted bingo grid in order to win.  He further indicated 
that one could successfully play a machine "without paying attention to 
anything," including the numbers that appeared on the display screen or 
other players, and that skill was not required to win.  
 On cross-examination, counsel for the Lowndes County defendants 
attempted to demonstrate that the electronic gaming machines merely 
represented attempts "to adjust to the technological age to upgrade paper 
bingo as electronic bingo" and/or to accommodate the hearing impaired 
who, it was suggested, would be unable to hear numbers called aloud.  
They further attempted to undermine the agent's testimony by 
suggesting that he had neither actually played all the available electronic 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
23 
 
gaming machines in each facility nor individually observed each one to 
confirm how each one operated; however, they were unable to get him to 
concede that a "win" occurred by obtaining a winning pattern on the 
depicted bingo grid.  Instead, the agent consistently testified that any 
pattern established on the depicted bingo grid "has nothing to do with 
whether you won or not." 
The Lowndes County defendants further emphasized the sheriff's 
communications with the governor and the attorney general, as discussed 
above, in which he denied having received any public complaints related 
to the Lowndes County defendants' operations, the fact that the State's 
agents never encountered any underage patrons at the Lowndes County 
facilities during their visits, and the facts that those agents never 
detected criminal activity or excessive noise outside the facilities or in the 
parking lots or any disorderly conduct or offensive odors once inside.  In 
fact, the Lowndes County defendants noted, despite the lack of any 
arrests relating to the investigations, the only criminal activity the agent 
reported observing during the investigations was "illegal gambling."  The 
agent further stated during cross-examination that, although he had 
both played the electronic gaming machines and observed them being 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
24 
 
played, he had not become addicted to gambling and had not been forced 
to return to the facilities.  He also stated that, while present at the 
facilities, he had not heard anyone complaining about the Lowndes 
County defendants' dishonesty or deceit and had observed other available 
activities. 
Upon the conclusion of the State's case, Epic Tech filed a "Motion 
for Judgment in its Favor on … Partial Findings."  The trial court granted 
Epic Tech's motion on the basis that the only evidence the State had 
presented as to Epic Tech's connection to the case was that "there was an 
Epic Tech car in the parking lot."  The Lowndes County defendants also 
moved for a judgment as a matter of law in their favor, arguing that the 
State had failed to demonstrate that their activities constituted either 
illegal gambling or a public nuisance, as confirmed by the sheriff's 
communications with the governor and the attorney general.  At that 
time, the State also moved the trial court to dismiss the Lowndes' County 
defendants' counterclaims.   
Thereafter, White Hall requested the opportunity to present 
rebuttal testimony aimed at demonstrating that, contrary to the State's 
contentions, the electronic gaming machines offered the traditionally 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
25 
 
defined game of bingo.  To that end, and to avoid the need for the proposed 
witness to potentially incriminate herself, the State stipulated, regarding 
the electronic gaming machines located at the Lowndes County facilities, 
"that on the screen that there are numbers that appear from a random 
number generator"; that those numbers appear "under a bingo 
description card on the screen"; that "when … those randomly generated 
numbers appear, that card lights up if those numbers appear on the card 
and that … if that card matches a pattern, … that shows they won by 
showing a pattern on the card"; and "that those patterns can be accessible 
on the screen by touching a help button, or something like that, to see the 
different patterns that are possible in a game," i.e., "[a]cross, up and 
down, diagonal, or four corners."  
The general response of the Lowndes County defendants to the 
State's claims, as detailed in subsequent briefing, was that, contrary to 
the State's allegations, their operations actually benefited all "persons 
within the sphere," i.e., that their operations do not constitute a nuisance 
per se, and that there had been no criminal charges in connection with 
those ongoing operations.  Specifically, White Hall, in its filings below, 
disputed that the State had demonstrated that its activities were either 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
26 
 
illegal or a nuisance10; that the State lacked another remedy; or that the 
Lowndes County defendants' activities harmed the public.  
Thereafter, the trial court issued a final order in which it denied 
the State's request for permanent injunctive relief based on its conclusion 
that the State had failed to demonstrate that the Lowndes County 
defendants' activities constituted either a public nuisance or a nuisance 
per se.  In reaching that conclusion, the trial court cited the lack of 
"evidence of any harm resulting from the [defendants'] activities" and/or 
the lack of "evidence that adequate legal remedies were not available to 
[the State]," as well as the legislature's omission of illegal gambling from 
the enumeration of "public nuisances menacing public health" found in § 
22-10-1, Ala. Code 1975.   In that same order, however, the trial court 
granted the State's request for reconsideration of its earlier decision 
denying the State's request to dismiss White Hall's counterclaims and 
 
10 On the issue of legality, White Hall argued:   
 
"Contrary to the State's assertions, the Court does not have to 
decide whether or not Defendants' gaming activities are legal.  
That is not the ultimate issue. The issue is whether all 
electronic bingo gaming is a nuisance per se and therefore 
Defendants' activities constitute a nuisance per se." 
 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
27 
 
granted the State's request for their dismissal.  The State appeals (case 
no. 1210064) from the denial of its request for permanent injunctive 
relief; White Hall cross-appeals from the dismissal of its counterclaims 
(case no. 1210122). 
Discussion 
Case nos. 1200798 and 1210064 
On appeal, the State contends that, in each case, it successfully 
demonstrated that the gambling operations of the Macon County 
defendants and the Lowndes County defendants were illegal, a public 
nuisance, and a nuisance per se; thus, the State maintains that, as a 
matter of law, it demonstrated all the elements necessary to obtain 
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief.   
The Court's review of an order denying a preliminary injunction is 
well established: 
"'The decision to grant or to deny a preliminary 
injunction is within the trial court's sound discretion.  In 
reviewing an order granting [or denying] a preliminary 
injunction, the Court determines whether the trial court 
exceeded that discretion.'  SouthTrust Bank of Alabama, N.A. 
v. Webb-Stiles Co., 931 So. 2d 706, 709 (Ala. 2005).  As to 
questions of fact, the ore tenus rule is applicable in 
preliminary-injunction proceedings.  See Water Works & 
Sewer Bd. of Birmingham v. Inland Lake Invs., LLC, 31 So. 
3d 686, 689-90 (Ala. 2009).  As this Court recently noted in 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
28 
 
Holiday Isle, LLC v. Adkins, 12 So. 3d 1173, 1176 (Ala. 2008), 
however, 
 
"'[t]o the extent that the trial court's 
issuance of a preliminary injunction is grounded 
only in questions of law based on undisputed facts, 
our longstanding rule that we review an injunction 
solely to determine whether the trial court 
exceeded its discretion should not apply.  We find 
the rule applied by the United State Supreme 
Court in similar situations to be persuasive:  "We 
review the District Court's legal rulings de novo 
and its ultimate decision to issue the preliminary 
injunction for abuse of discretion."  Gonzales v. O 
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 
U.S. 418, 428, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1017 
(2006)....' 
 
"(Emphasis omitted.) 
"The plaintiff bears the burden of producing evidence 
sufficient to support the issuance of a preliminary injunction.  
Ormco Corp. v. Johns, 869 So. 2d 1109, 1113 (Ala. 2003).  The 
requirements for a preliminary injunction are well known: 
 
"'"Before entering a preliminary injunction, 
the trial court must be satisfied: (1) that without 
the injunction the plaintiff will suffer immediate 
and irreparable injury; (2) that the plaintiff has no 
adequate remedy at law; (3) that the plaintiff is 
likely to succeed on the merits of the case; and (4) 
that the hardship imposed upon the defendant by 
the injunction would not unreasonably outweigh 
the benefit to the plaintiff." ' 
 
"Blount Recycling, LLC v. City of Cullman, 884 So. 2d 850, 
853 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Blaylock v. Cary, 709 So. 2d 1128, 
1130 (Ala. 1997))." 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
29 
 
 
Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 77-78. 
 
The standard governing our review of the denial of permanent-
injunctive relief differs slightly: 
"'"The applicable standard of review [of 
injunctive relief] depends on whether the trial 
court entered a preliminary injunction or a 
permanent injunction.  A preliminary injunction is 
reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard, 
whereas a permanent injunction is reviewed de 
novo."  TFT, Inc. v. Warning Sys., Inc., 751 So. 2d 
1238, 1241-42 (Ala. 1999); see also Smith v. 
Madison County Comm'n, 658 So. 2d 422, 423 n. 1 
(Ala. 1995).' 
 
"Nevertheless, this Court has noted that a trial court's 
consideration of ore tenus testimony has a bearing upon the 
standard of review we apply to the entry of a permanent 
injunction.  Here, the trial court considered ore tenus 
testimony. … 
 
"'The trial court entered a permanent 
injunction, and we review de novo the entry of a 
permanent injunction.  TFT, Inc. v. Warning Sys., 
Inc., 751 So. 2d 1238, 1241 (Ala. 1999).  However, 
the trial court also conducted a bench trial at 
which evidence was presented ore tenus. 
 
"'"Where evidence is presented to the 
trial court ore tenus, a presumption of 
correctness exists as to the court's 
conclusions on issues of fact; its 
determination will not be disturbed 
unless it is clearly erroneous, without 
supporting 
evidence, 
manifestly 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
30 
 
unjust, or against the great weight of 
the evidence. However, when the trial 
court improperly applies the law to the 
facts, no presumption of correctness 
exists as to the court's judgment." 
 
"'American Petroleum Equip. & Constr., Inc. v. 
Fancher, 708 So. 2d 129, 132 (Ala.1997) (citations 
omitted).' 
 
"Collins v. Rodgers, 938 So. 2d 379, 384 (Ala. 2006)." 
Classroomdirect.com, LLC v. Draphix, LLC, 992 So. 2d 692, 700-01 (Ala. 
2008). 
"'"'To be entitled to a permanent 
injunction, 
a 
plaintiff 
must 
demonstrate success on the merits, a 
substantial threat of irreparable injury 
if the injunction is not granted, that the 
threatened injury to the plaintiff 
outweighs the harm the injunction may 
cause the defendant, and that granting 
the injunction will not disserve the 
public interest.'" 
 
"'[Grove Hill Homeowners' Ass'n v. Rice,] 43 So. 3d 
[609,] 613 [(Ala. Civ. App. 2010)] (quoting TFT, 
Inc. v. Warning Sys., Inc., 751 So. 2d 1238, 1242 
(Ala. 1999), overruled on other grounds, Holiday 
Isle, LLC v. Adkins, 12 So. 3d 1173 (Ala. 2008)).' 
 
"Grove Hill Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Rice, 90 So. 3d 731, 
734 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011)." 
 
Epic Tech I, 323 So. 3d at 585. 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
31 
 
The State first maintains that it is undisputed that, under Alabama 
law, gambling is illegal except as permitted in certain narrowly tailored 
constitutional amendments.  See Ala. Const. of 1901 (Off. Recomp.), Art. 
IV, § 65.  See also Cornerstone, supra, Barber v. Jefferson Cnty. Racing 
Ass'n, Inc., 960 So. 2d 599, 614 (Ala. 2006), and Opinion of the Justices 
No. 83, 249 Ala. 516, 31 So. 2d 753 (1947).  Also according to the State, it 
successfully demonstrated that the electronic gaming machines offered 
in the Macon County facility and the Lowndes County facilities are illegal 
gambling devices -- not devices used to play the legally permissible game 
commonly referred to as "bingo" as defined by this Court in Cornerstone, 
supra.  The State further argues that, under this Court's decision in Try-
Me Bottling Co. v. State, 235 Ala. 207, 178 So. 231 (1938), the "ongoing 
criminal activity at the [defendants'] facilities in [each] County is a per 
se nuisance under Alabama law."  We agree. 
Electronic bingo is illegal in Alabama.  See Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d 
at 86 (outlining the six characteristics necessary to "the game commonly 
or traditionally known as bingo" and concluding that the electronic 
gaming machines at issue in that case, which "operate[d] almost exactly 
like slot machines," did not comply); Riley v. Cornerstone Cmty. 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
32 
 
Outreach, Inc., 57 So. 3d 704, 734 (Ala. 2010) (agreeing with the 
governor's position "that the term 'bingo' … is a reference to the game 
traditionally known as bingo, i.e., a game that is not played by or within 
the electronic or computerized circuitry of a machine, but one that is 
played on physical cards (typically made of cardboard or paper) and that 
requires meaningful interaction between those who are playing and 
someone responsible for calling out the randomly drawn designations 
corresponding to designations on the players' cards"); Ex parte State, 121 
So. 3d 337, 358 (Ala. 2013) (noting that the electronic gaming machines 
"depicted in the surveillance video and described in the affidavit … do 
not reasonably resemble a game of 'bingo'" but are, instead, "slot 
machines or other gambling devices that are illegal under Alabama law"); 
State v. Greenetrack, Inc., 154 So. 3d 940, 960 & 962 (Ala. 2014) (noting 
that "the fact that an 'electronic marking machine' can be substituted for 
a paper card under the terms of [a local constitutional amendment] does 
not eliminate the requirement that, in all other respects, the game of 
bingo permitted by that amendment be the game traditionally known as 
'bingo'" and finding, based on the evidence, that electronic gaming 
machines in use in Greene County were "'not the game of bingo and, 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
33 
 
instead, [were] slot machines or other gambling devices that are illegal 
under Alabama law'" (quoting Ex parte State, 121 So. 3d at 
358));  Houston Cnty. Econ. Dev. Auth. v. State, 168 So. 3d 4, 14 (Ala. 
2014) ("HEDA") (holding that "[t]he game of bingo is in fact the game 
'commonly or traditionally known as bingo,' i.e., one that does involve 
meaningful human interaction in a group setting, not one that is played 
within the circuitry of electronic machinery," and further finding that the 
electronic gaming machines at issue in that case did not involve the play 
of the traditional game of bingo); State v. $223,405.86, 203 So. 3d at 834 
("Section 65 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 prohibits 'lotteries,' 'gift 
enterprises,' and 'any scheme in the nature of a lottery.'  …  It is this so-
called 'anti-lottery provision' that stands as the constitutional bar not 
just to what is known in contemporary parlance as a 'lottery,' but to slot 
machines and all other forms of gambling in Alabama."), State v. 825 
Elec. Gambling Devices, 226 So. 3d 660, 668 & 671 (Ala. 2016) 
(reaffirming that, "[i]n Cornerstone, HEDA, and other similar cases over 
the past seven years, this Court has held that the unadorned term 'bingo' 
means simply 'the game commonly or traditionally known as bingo'" and 
holding both that that definition applies even in cases of a local 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
34 
 
amendment "permit[ting] the use of an 'electronic marking machine' or 
an 'electronic card marking machine' in lieu of a paper card" and that the 
electronic gaming machines at issue did not satisfy those characteristics 
(quoting Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 86)).  Cf.  City of Piedmont v. Evans, 
642 So. 2d 435, 437 (Ala. 1994) (affirming the trial court's conclusion that 
"'instant bingo' constitutes an illegal lottery"); Barrett v. State, 705 So. 
2d 529, 532 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) ("[L]otteries, other than the common 
game of bingo, are illegal in Calhoun county regardless of their 
perpetrator's thinly veiled attempts to disguise them."); Barber v. 
Jefferson Cnty. Racing Ass'n, 960 So. 2d at 610 & 614 (both providing 
"the statutory definition of a slot machine" as prohibited by § 13A-12-
20(10), Ala. Code 1975, and explaining that "[i]t is '"the policy of the 
constitution and laws of Alabama [to prohibit] the vicious system of 
lottery schemes and the evil practice of gaming, in all their protean 
shapes"'" (quoting Opinion of the Justices No. 83, 249 Ala. at 517, 31 So. 
2d at 754, quoting in turn Johnson v. State, 83 Ala. 65, 67, 3 So. 790, 791 
(1887))); and Foster v. State, 705 So. 2d 534, 538 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) 
(upholding the defendant's convictions for promoting gambling and 
possession of a gambling device on, among other grounds, the basis that 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
35 
 
"'legal bingo was clearly defined'" and "'capable of a layperson's 
understanding as that game "commonly known as 'bingo'"'") (quoting 
Barrett, 705 So. 2d at 531)).  
In Cornerstone, the Court defined "the game commonly or 
traditionally known as bingo," which is legally permitted by local 
constitutional amendments in Macon County and Lowndes County, as 
necessarily including the following characteristics:  
"1. Each player uses one or more cards with spaces 
arranged in five columns and five rows, with an alphanumeric 
or similar designation assigned to each space. 
 
"2. Alphanumeric or similar designations are randomly 
drawn and announced one by one. 
 
"3. In order to play, each player must pay attention to 
the values announced; if one of the values matches a value on 
one or more of the player's cards, the player must physically 
act by marking his or her card accordingly. 
 
"4. A player can fail to pay proper attention or to 
properly mark his or her card, and thereby miss an 
opportunity to be declared a winner. 
 
"5. A player must recognize that his or her card has a 
'bingo,' i.e., a predetermined pattern of matching values, and 
in turn announce to the other players and the announcer that 
this is the case before any other player does so. 
 
"6. The game of bingo contemplates a group activity in 
which multiple players compete against each other to be the 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
36 
 
first to properly mark a card with the predetermined winning 
pattern and announce that fact." 
 
42 So. 3d at 86.  This definition applies to "bingo" in both Macon County 
and Lowndes County.  See State v. $223,405.86, supra (Macon County), 
and Cornerstone, supra (Lowndes County).  Thus, the electronic gaming 
machines in use in the Macon County facility and the Lowndes County 
facilities are illegal if they do not include all six of the foregoing 
characteristics identified in Cornerstone.  
The State asserted in support of its requests for injunctive relief 
below that neither the activities of the Macon County defendants nor  
those of the Lowndes County defendants meet the definition of "bingo" in 
Cornerstone.  Although it made the following argument in the Macon 
County proceedings, the State's logic is pertinent to both cases:   
"The only form of gambling made legal under Alabama's 
constitutional amendments is bingo in its traditional form:  a 
game of personal, human ability between players who are 
playing simultaneously on cards, paying attention to each 
number as it is drawn, personally identifying matches on a 
card, and racing against each other to be the first to recognize 
and claim a winning pattern using their own cognitive 
abilities. 
 
"[The defendants], however, operate[] machines that 
accept cash or cash-value credits to play games controlled 
exclusively by chance in exchange for the hope of winning cash 
prizes within a few seconds. These machines have digital 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
37 
 
bingo grids instead of a physical bingo card, video 
representations of rapid-fire ball draws instead of live 
announcers calling drawn numbers one-at-a-time, automated 
displays of matching patterns instead of human recognition of 
matches and winning patterns, and an unskilled opportunity 
for customers to place a bet on a computerized game of pure 
chance instead of any competition of skill between human 
beings.  In fact, every single element involved in the game 
commonly known as bingo is eliminated in the operation of 
these machines. 
 
"The machines are so automated that a player cannot, 
and is not required to, pay attention to and react to individual 
numbers drawn or personally decide which numbers on his 
video grid match drawn numbers or form winning patterns.  
Most of the machines do not even require a player to touch a 
machine more than one time. The [Macon County facility] 
offers the mindless, individual automated gambling of a slot 
machine -- the exact activity the laws as interpreted by the 
Alabama Supreme Court prevent -- not the competition of the 
game commonly known as bingo." 
 
(Emphasis in original.)   
In fact, in its brief in support of its request for injunctive relief in 
the Lowndes County action, the State made the following similar claim 
that, despite the clear illegality of their activities, 
"[t]he Defendants continue to administer, license, 
encourage, solicit, facilitate and/or promote gambling on 
electronic devices in [each] County in contradiction of the 
clear prohibitions under Alabama law. Attempts have been 
made by state officials to enforce the laws of this state and 
stop illegal gambling.  The State's efforts have been to no avail 
and the defiance of state law continues. 
 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
38 
 
"…. 
"This continued defiance of state law presents a 
textbook case for the issuance of injunctive relief for a public 
nuisance under … § 6-5-121[, Ala. Code 1975].  The 
Defendants' violations harm not just the local community but 
also all citizens who desire to exercise their clear right to live 
in a place where there is clear enforcement of the laws.  All 
individuals within the 'sphere of influence' are effected -- 
whether they want to admit it or not -- because the activity 
and possession of the devices is illegal; all who come into a 
facility, benefit from the facility, or run the facility are 
corrupted by the illegal activity.  Those who offer the games 
are violating the law, those playing the games as patrons -- 
either ignorantly or in outright defiance of the law are 
violating the law, and those profiting from the leasing of 
machines are violating the law.  None are immune to the 
application of the laws of the state. 
 
"The Supreme Court has recognized the 'harm' of illegal 
gambling in its plethora of opinions upholding the prohibition 
of  'the vicious  system of lottery schemes and the evil practice 
of gaming, in all their protean shapes, tending, as centuries of 
human experience now fully attest, to mendicancy and 
idleness on the one hand, and more profligacy and debauchery 
on the other.'  [Epic Tech I, 323 So. 3d at 582] (quoting 
Johnson v. State, 3 So. 790,791 (1888) and citing previous 
opinions issued by Supreme Court) (emphasis added).  In 
other words, the public policy of this State, as recorded in the 
Constitution, is that illegal gambling is harmful.  As a result, 
the inquiry for this Court is not whether it agrees with that 
policy, or whether it personally views illegal gambling as 
harmful to the community.  That determination has been 
made.  Instead, the inquiry for this Court is whether 
Defendants are engaged in activities that, according to 
Alabama law, are harmful.  The answer is yes.  Under 
Alabama law, the continued operation of a criminal gambling 
enterprise impacts the 'public health, welfare and morals' of a 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
39 
 
community and thus harms the community.  That is exactly 
why 'the State, under its police power, has the authority to 
abate nuisances offensive to the public health, welfare, and 
morals.'  College Art Theatres, Inc. v . State ex rel. DeCarlo, 
476 So. 2d 40, 44 (Ala. 1985)." 
 
Although this Court did not reach the actual merits of the State's 
injunctive claims in Epic Tech I, in reversing the trial courts' dismissal 
orders in that case, we specifically noted that the State's allegations, if 
actually demonstrated, would "support a finding that the … defendants' 
conduct caused harm to the public and that the State lacked another 
adequate remedy."  323 So. 3d at 600.  As shown below, the State 
successfully met that burden.  
The record in each case before us establishes that the State 
introduced evidence supporting the conclusion that it had a reasonable 
likelihood of success or should have prevailed on the merits of its claims 
that the electronic gaming machines in operation in the Macon County 
facility and the Lowndes County facilities do not constitute the legal 
game of bingo.  The State's evidence, including testimony and recordings 
from agents demonstrating the play of those gaming machines, 
established that the machines are substantially similar to slot machines 
and do not offer the game traditionally know as bingo, based on the short 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
40 
 
duration of play, the absence of numbered cards requiring player 
interaction, the automatic nature of the play and ultimate outcome, and 
the absence of an announcement of a winner upon the game's conclusion.  
Cf. Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 86-87.  The defendants failed to counter this 
showing.  Thus, the State's evidence established that the electronic 
gaming machines at issue were illegal; the State argues that the 
resulting harm to the public and the State by their continued existence 
is therefore presumed.  See § 6-5-120, Ala. Code 1975 ("A 'nuisance' is 
anything that works hurt, inconvenience, or damage to another.").  
In response to the State's arguments, as set out above, the Macon 
County defendants and the Lowndes County defendants argued that the 
State could not merely demonstrate that their activities in each county 
were illegal, but that the State also had to demonstrate that those 
activities constituted a nuisance under Alabama law.   On appeal, in 
response to the State's claims, the defendants, each of which incorporates 
the arguments of the other, collectively argue that a grant of injunctive 
relief would actually alter rather than preserve the status quo; that the 
law generally disfavors mandatory injunctions; that the State "seeks to 
enjoin [the defendants'] conduct only because it [is] allegedly unlawful -- 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
41 
 
and not because the conduct is a true public nuisance"; that equity 
prohibits the injunction of criminal offenses; that purported "public policy 
shifts favor[] electronic gambling" in Alabama; and that the balance of 
the hardships weighs in their favor in the absence of any evidence "of 
tangible and measurable harm" caused by the defendants' activities.11  In 
particular, the defendants, citing the purported "dearth of irreparable 
injury evidence" from the State, dispute that their activities constitute a 
public nuisance.  However, as the Court observed in Try-Me Bottling, 
"'[t]he Legislature has in effect [declared them] so.'"  235 Ala. at 212, 178 
So. at 235 (quoting with approval J.B. Mullen & Co. v. Mosley, 13 Idaho 
457, 90 P. 986, 990 (1907)).  The Court's holdings in that regard are clear:  
"'No 
state 
has 
more 
steadfastly 
emphasized 
its 
disapprobation of all these gambling devices of money-making 
by resort to schemes of chance than Alabama. For more than 
40 years past -- we may say, from the organization of the state, 
with some few years of experimental leniency -- the voice of 
the legislature has been loud and earnest in its condemnation 
of these immoral practices, now deemed so enervating to the 
public morals.'  [Quoting Johnson v. State, 83 Ala. 65, 67, 3 
So. 790, 791 (1888).]  
 
 
11We do not address the defendants' "de facto forfeiture" claim 
because this is not a property-forfeiture case, and Timbs v. Indiana, 586 
U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019), an opinion the defendants rely upon, is 
clearly distinguishable. 
 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
42 
 
"True, the lawmaking body has not in so many words 
declared the use of such devices a nuisance, but it is our view 
that in substance and effect this has been done. 
 
"…. 
 
"In Lee v. City of Birmingham, 223 Ala. 196, [197,] 135 
So. 314, 315 [(1931)], speaking to a like question, this court 
observed that 'it is held by respectable authority that, if a 
gambling device is prohibited by statute, its operation may be 
considered a nuisance, and abated upon proper proceedings.' 
 
"And in Mullen & Co. v. [Mosley], 13 Idaho 457, 90 P. 
986, 990, 12 L.R.A., N.S., 394, 121 Am. St. Rep. 277, 13 Ann. 
Cas. 450, (cited in the Lee Case, supra), the court said:  'It has 
been urged by counsel for appellants that, in order to 
authorize the destruction of these machines, it was necessary 
for the Legislature to declare them a nuisance.  The 
Legislature has in effect done so.  It has prohibited their use 
in any manner or form, and has also directed that, when any 
such instruments are found within this state, they shall be 
seized and destroyed.  Making their use a crime and rendering 
them incapable of any legitimate use reduces them to the 
condition and state of a public nuisance which they clearly 
are.  This amounts as effectually to declaring them a nuisance 
as if the word "nuisance" itself had been used in the Statute.'" 
 
235 Ala. at 212, 178 So. at 234-35.12  Accordingly, because "electronic 
bingo" machines are illegal under Alabama law, they -- and enterprises 
engaging in their use -- constitute a public nuisance per se.  
 
12Although the Court, in Try-Me Bottling, did reference in passing 
that "children often find [the bottle caps forming the basis of the subject 
defendant's 'lottery' enterprise] in trash piles," 235 Ala. at 211, 178 So. 
at 234, we see nothing in the language of that opinion either rendering 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
43 
 
Further, we disagree that the potential existence of another 
remedy, namely criminal prosecution, prevents the issuance of injunctive 
relief in these cases:   
"It is scarcely necessary to observe that whether the 
maintenance of a public nuisance is or is not punishable in the 
law courts as a crime is an immaterial incident so far as the 
preventive jurisdiction of equity is concerned; for equity 
ignores its criminality, and visits upon the offender no 
punishment as for a crime." 
   
State v. Ellis, 201 Ala. 295, 297, 78 So. 71, 73 (1918).  See also Try-Me 
Bottling, 235 Ala. at 210, 178 So. at 233 ("[I]f the facts presented disclose 
 
that particular circumstance as determinative or limiting the ultimate 
holding permitting the abatement of that enterprise as a public nuisance 
only to cases including that circumstance.  Further, as we explained in 
Epic Tech I, "even though [former] § 13-7-90[, Ala. Code 1975,] ha[s] been 
repealed, the principles set forth in Try-Me [Bottling are] still 
applicable."  323 So. 3d at 584.  Similarly, although § 22-10-1, Ala. Code 
1975, does include a list of things deemed to be public nuisances per se, 
nothing suggests that the included list is exhaustive or that it necessarily 
excludes illegal gambling operations.  Specifically included among the 
enumerated public-health nuisances in that Code section is the activity 
of "conducting … a business, trade, industry or occupation or the doing of 
a thing, not inherently insanitary or a menace to public health, in such a 
manner as to make it a menace, or likely to become a menace, to public 
health." § 22-10-1(7). Try-Me Bottling indicates that gambling 
enterprises are a menace to "'[t]he maintenance of the public health, 
morals, safety and welfare ….'"  235 Ala. at 211, 178 So. at 234 (quoting 
Stead v. Fortner, 255 Ill. 468, 478, 99 N.E. 680, 684 (1912)). 
 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
44 
 
the need of equity intervention for the protection of rights cognizable by 
equity, then injunctive relief may be granted, though as an incident 
thereto the writ may also restrain the commission of a crime.").  The State 
presented evidence establishing that no action had been taken in Macon 
and Lowndes Counties to enforce Alabama's ban on illegal gambling, 
despite our caselaw clearly identifying "electronic bingo" as illegal both 
generally and in these counties specifically.  Thus, the State also 
successfully demonstrated its lack of success in applying that purported 
alternate remedy to shut down the defendants' illegal gambling 
operations, which constitute a public nuisance per se.   
In addition, Alabama law suggests that criminal prosecution is not 
the State's sole legal remedy.   
"It is held by respectable authority that, if a gambling 
device is prohibited by statute, its operation may be 
considered a nuisance, and abated upon proper proceedings. 
46 Corpus Juris, 707; Stanley-Thompson Liquor Co. v. People, 
63 Colo. 456, 168 P. 750 [(1917)]; Mullen & Co. v. [Mosley], 13 
Idaho 457, 90 P. 986, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 394, 121 Am. St. Rep. 
277, 13 Ann. Cas. 450 [(1907)]; Lang v. Merwin, 99 Me. 486, 
59 A. 1021, 105 Am. St. Rep. 293 [(1905)]. 
 
"It is our opinion that the statutes and principles to 
which we have referred clearly intend to authorize a 
proceeding in equity to abate and condemn as contraband 
machines whose nature is such that they were intended to be 
and are used as gambling devices or gift enterprises." 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
45 
 
 
Lee v. City of Birmingham, 223 Ala. 196, 197, 135 So. 314, 315 (1931). 
In Try-Me Bottling, the Court later also observed: 
"The mere prosecution for a misdemeanor here involved 
will not give complete relief.  The State is interested in the 
welfare of the people within her domain, and, of consequence, 
in the enforcement of the declared public policy against 
lotteries or gift schemes in the nature thereof.  And, as said 
by the Illinois court, Stead v. Fortner, 255 Ill. 468, 99 N.E. 680 
[(1912)], here approvingly quoted in State v. Ellis, [201 Ala. 
295, 78 So. 71 (1918)]:  'As we have noted above, this court has 
never regarded a criminal prosecution, which can only dispose 
of an existing nuisance and cannot prevent a renewal of the 
nuisance, for which a new prosecution must be brought, as a 
complete and adequate remedy for a wrong inflicted upon the 
public. The public authorities have a right to institute the suit 
where the general public welfare demands it and damages to 
the public are not susceptible of computation.  The 
maintenance of the public health, morals, safety, and welfare 
is on a plane above mere pecuniary damage, although not 
susceptible of measurement in money ….'" 
 
235 Ala. at 212, 178 So. at 235 (emphasis added).  As a final matter, in 
Epic Tech I, we specifically observed that "this Court's myriad decisions 
dealing with the legality of electronic bingo machines supports the State's 
assertion that it does not have any other adequate remedy to abate the 
public nuisances alleged here."  323 So. 3d at 588. 
 
In sum, because the State established the existence of ongoing 
illegal gambling operations and a corresponding inability to compel the 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
46 
 
defendants' compliance with the law in the absence of injunctive relief, 
we find that the State did, contrary to the arguments of the defendants 
in each case and the findings of the trial courts, demonstrate that it 
would be irreparably harmed in the absence of the relief requested in 
each case.  The defendants have no right to engage in, and, thus, cannot 
be harmed by being enjoined from continuing in, an illegal enterprise.  
Cf. State v. $223,405.86, 203 So. 3d at 827 ("Gambling is not a 
fundamental right.  'There is no constitutional right to gamble.'" (quoting 
Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419, 423 (1955))).  The defendants fail 
to identify any legal principle suggesting that illegal activity cannot 
constitute a nuisance if a portion of the fruits of that illegal activity are 
charitably distributed.  Additionally, although, as the defendants note, 
recent developments in Alabama law have made certain forms of 
gambling, in general, more permissible, those developments have not 
legalized electronic gaming machines like those at issue in these cases, 
nor has the legislature acted to alter the Court's conclusions in Try-Me 
Bottling, supra, that illegal gambling constitutes a public nuisance and 
in Cornerstone, supra, as to what constitutes legal "bingo" in Alabama.   
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
47 
 
Further, the Court remains unpersuaded that either forensic 
examination of the electronic gaming machines at issue or a more in-
depth investigation of the defendants' operations was required to 
establish that they do not meet the elements of legally permissible bingo 
as established by the Court.  See Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 86.  See also 
Epic Tech I, 323 So. 3d at 593 ("'"[T]he game traditionally known as 
bingo" is a game that "is not played by or within the electronic or 
computerized circuitry of a machine, but one that is played on physical 
cards (typically made of cardboard or paper) and that requires 
meaningful interaction between those who are playing and someone 
responsible 
for calling 
out the 
randomly 
drawn 
designations 
corresponding to designations on the players' cards."'" (citations 
omitted)).  Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that a forensic 
examination would, contrary to the State's evidence below, demonstrate 
that the electronic gaming machines at issue met the six-part test 
established in Cornerstone.   
Based on the foregoing, we hold that, in each case, the State's 
evidence, as a matter of law, demonstrated the State's success on the 
merits, a substantial threat of irreparable injury to the public at large in 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
48 
 
the absence of an injunction, that the threatened injury to the State 
outweighed any benefit in allowing criminal operations to continue, and 
that the requested injunctions were specifically aimed at serving the 
public interest.  See Epic Tech I, 323 So. 3d at 585.  Accordingly, contrary 
to the findings of the trial courts in each case below, the State 
successfully demonstrated that the operations of the Macon County 
defendants and the Lowndes County defendants are a public nuisance 
under Try-Me Bottling.  Because the Macon Circuit Court exceeded its 
discretion in failing to grant, in full, the State's request for preliminary 
injunctive relief, and because the Lowndes Circuit Court exceeded its 
discretion in denying the State permanent injunctive relief, the orders of 
those courts are hereby reversed and the matters are remanded. 
Case no. 1210122 
In its cross-appeal, White Hall argues, in pertinent part: 
"Th[e] Lowndes County Circuit Judge dismissed [White 
Hall's] counterclaims in his final Order … but did [not] 
provide an opinion or explanation for dismissal.  The State 
never responded [to] White Hall['s] …  counterclaims.  [White 
Hall] preserved all counterclaims for the record. [White Hall] 
subsequently appealed.  These counterclaims have yet to be 
addressed by the State." 
 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
49 
 
Despite arguing that the State should address its counterclaims on 
appeal, White Hall's one paragraph addressing this issue, as the State 
notes, entirely omits either argument or authority establishing that the 
trial court's dismissal of those counterclaims was erroneous.  See Rule 
28(a), Ala. R. App. P.   Accordingly, White Hall has waived any arguments 
concerning the dismissal of its counterclaims, and we hereby affirm the 
Lowndes Circuit Court's order insofar as it relates to those claims.  See, 
e.g., Tucker v. Cullman-Jefferson Counties Gas Dist., 864 So. 2d 317, 319 
(Ala. 2003) (stating that issues not raised and argued in brief are waived), 
and City of Birmingham v. Business Realty Inv. Co., 722 So. 2d 747, 752 
(Ala. 1998) ("When an appellant fails to cite any authority for an 
argument on a particular issue, this Court may affirm the judgment as 
to that issue, for it is neither this Court's duty nor its function to perform 
an appellant's legal research."). 
Conclusion 
 
Based on the foregoing, the Macon Circuit Court and the Lowndes 
Circuit Court erroneously denied or exceeded their discretion in denying 
the State's request in each case for injunctive relief prohibiting the Macon 
County defendants and Lowndes County defendants from continuing to 
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
50 
 
engage in the illegal gambling activities at issue.  Accordingly, we reverse 
their orders and remand these cases for the Macon Circuit Court to enter 
an order, within thirty days of this Court's issuance of the certificate of 
judgment, preliminarily enjoining the Macon County defendants, and for 
the Lowndes Circuit Court to enter an order, within thirty days of this 
Court's issuance of the certificate of judgment, permanently enjoining the 
Lowndes County defendants, from offering "electronic bingo" machines 
at any facility in their respective county, from receiving any moneys in 
relation to "electronic bingo" machines in operation in their respective 
county, from transporting or providing any additional "electronic bingo" 
machines to any facility in their respective county, and from receiving, 
utilizing, or providing bingo licenses or permits to play "electronic bingo" 
in their respective county.  Further proceedings in the Macon Circuit 
Court on the State's request for a permanent injunction shall be 
consistent with this opinion.  Finally, because White Hall has waived all 
arguments at issue in its cross-appeal relating to the dismissal of its 
counterclaims, that portion of the Lowndes Circuit Court's order is 
hereby affirmed. 
  
1200798 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.  
1200798; 1210064; 1210122  
51 
 
  
1210064 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
 
1210122 -- AFFIRMED. 
 
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, Stewart, 
and Mitchell, JJ., concur.