Case Title: State v. Sauve

Citation: 164 Vt 134, 666 A.2d 1164

Docket Number: 94-670

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1995-08-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE_V_SAUVE.94-670; 164 Vt 134; 666 A.2d 1164

[Filed 11-Aug-1995]

  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                     No. 94-670


State of Vermont                                       Supreme Court

                                                      On Appeal from
   v.                                                 District Court of Vermont,
                                                      Unit No. 3, Essex Circuit

Larry Sauve                                            June Term, 1995



Mary Miles Teachout, J.

       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellant

       Charles S. Martin of Martin & Paolini, Barre, for defendant-appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       JOHNSON, J.   In this appeal, we consider the scope of V.R.Cr.P.
  48(b)(2), which authorizes the trial court, in furtherance of justice, to
  dismiss a criminal prosecution with prejudice to the refiling of charges. 
  In this case, the trial court dismissed sexual assault charges against
  defendant over the prosecutor's objection after the jury failed to reach a
  verdict following a five-day trial.  We conclude that the court abused its
  discretion in dismissing the case.

                                   I.

       In May 1993, defendant was charged with sexual assault of a minor,
  Opal W., who was five or six years old at the time the assaults allegedly
  occurred, between September 1985 and December 1986.  According to the
  amended complaint, defendant was living with the victim's mother when he
  sexually assaulted Opal on two occasions, once with the aid of another
  woman named Janice.  At trial, the State presented the testimony of Opal,
  her mother, her foster mother, and a state police investigator who was
  present during an interview of Opal in 1992.  Opal had great difficulty
  testifying, and the trial court limited or excluded much of the proposed
  testimony

 

  of the other witnesses regarding what Opal had told them about the
  alleged assaults.  The defense presented the testimony of Janice, a police
  investigator, and a friend of Opal's in an attempt to show inconsistencies
  between Opal's trial testimony and her statements at a prior deposition.
  Closing arguments centered almost exclusively on Opal's credibility.

       After approximately eight hours of deliberation, the jury reported
  that there was no reasonable probability of reaching a unanimous verdict,
  and the court declared a mistrial.  During the eight hours of deliberation,
  portions of the trial testimony were read back to the jury at its request. 
  Following the mistrial, the State amended the information to charge
  penile/vaginal contact rather than insertion, and to allege Janice's
  presence rather than assistance at the second assault.  Defendant then
  filed a motion to dismiss in furtherance of justice under Rule 48(b)(2). A
  hearing was held, after which the court granted defendant's motion, ruling
  as follows:

         The trial in this matter was conducted completely and correctly.
         The jury had a full opportunity to reach a verdict and was unable
         to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
         
         The rulings on the admissibility of evidence  have been reviewed
         and would not be changed during a second trial.

         The court is concerned about the effect on Opal [], a very
         troubled young lady, about participating in such a trial for a second
         time.  The research on the effect on children of participating in
         court processes with respect to sexual abuse prosecutions indicates
         that the process alone on recounting stories multiple times has an
         effect whether or not the alleged incidents took place.  The Court
         is mindful of the effect on Opal of recounting the incidents
         involving this difficult period in her life yet again.

         The Court is also mindful of the age of the evidence in this case.

         The State reminded the Court that it has a responsibility to
         balance the interests of the defendant against the rights of society,
         but the State has not made a strong showing in this case of why it
         is in the interest of society to try this case a second time when the
         jury was unable to reach a verdict after the first trial.

         The impact on Opal [] is significant here and the State has not
         been able to persuade the Court that it is in the interest of Opal
         individually as a member of society or society at large to try this
         case at this time, several years after the alleged incident.  Opal has
         had the benefit during the intervening time of significant help.  The
         court is concerned about the possible impact of having to have her
         testify again.

 

         In addition to balancing the interests, the court is also responsible
         for the integrity of the process as a whole.  And for the reasons
         just stated, after taking all of these factors into consideration, the
         Court does conclude that this case is in fact one of the rare cases
         in which, to serve the ends of justice, it is appropriate to dismiss
         the case with prejudice.  Therefore, the case is dismissed.

       On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in dismissing
  the charges because (1) abuse of discretion is an inappropriate standard
  for reviewing dismissals with prejudice in furtherance of justice, and (2)
  the factors relied on by the court do not support dismissal of the charges.

                                  II.

       The State first argues that an abuse-of-discretion standard is
  appropriate only when the trial court dismisses cases for want of
  prosecution.  According to the State, dismissal of prosecutions with
  prejudice in the interest of justice implicates the separation-of-powers
  doctrine, and this Court rather than the trial court is better suited to
  weigh the competing interests of the judicial and executive branches.

       Rule 48(b) provides that the "trial court may dismiss an indictment or
  information (1) If the prosecution does not bring the defendant to trial
  within such time as the Supreme Court may provide by Administrative Order;
  or (2) If the court concludes that such dismissal will serve the ends of
  justice and effective administration of the court's business."  Subsection
  (b)(2) is based on the January 1970 proposed, but unadopted, amendments to
  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48.  Reporter's Notes, V.R.Cr.P. 48.  In
  1989, the following sentence was added to V.R.Cr.P. 48(b): "Unless the
  court directs that the dismissal is with prejudice, the dismissal shall be
  without prejudice."

       The State reasons as follows in arguing that we should not apply an
  abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing trial court decisions to dismiss
  criminal prosecutions in furtherance of justice: (1) we have applied an
  abuse-of-discretion standard in the past when reviewing Rule 48 dismissals,
  see State v. Snide, 144 Vt. 436, 440,