Case Title: Swindell v. Hellkamp

Citation: 242 So. 2d 708

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1970-11-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
242 So. 2d 708 (1970)
Linda Sue SWINDELL, a Minor, by and through Her Mother and Next Friend, Nadine Swindell, and Nadine Swindell, Individually, Petitioners,
v.
Donald G. HELLKAMP and Jesse Ramirez, a Minor, Respondents.
No. 39609.

Supreme Court of Florida.
November 25, 1970.
Rehearing Denied January 26, 1971.
John T. Carlon, Jr., of Coker & Carlon, Fort Lauderdale, for petitioners.
Dieter K. Gunther, of Carey, Dwyer, Austin, Cole & Selwood, Fort Lauderdale, for respondents.
ROBERTS, Justice.
This cause is before the court on writ of certiorari following certification under *709 Florida Appellate Rule 4.5, subd. c(6), 32 F.S.A. by the District Court of Appeal for the Fourth District as presenting a question of great public interest.
The minor plaintiff, Linda Sue Swindell, was struck and injured on September 30, 1966 by an automobile that was driven by the seventeen year old defendant, Jesse Colberto Ramirez. The evidence indicated that Linda ran across the street after having emerged from behind a row of shrubs and was struck by the front of the automobile. The case was tried before a jury on the issue of liability only and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants.
From the decision of the District Court reported as, Swindell v. Hellkamp, Fla. App., 232 So. 2d 186, we quote:
And from the dissenting opinion, inter alia:
We have been asked to clarify this area of law which has been in this and other jurisdictions one of difficulty and confusion. On one hand we are asked to follow the common law in criminal cases, i.e., a child under the age of seven is conclusively presumed to be incapable of committing a crime. The common law rule raises a presumption of incapacity of an infant between the ages of seven and fourteen, and the presumption is that the incapacity after seven years of age decreases with the progress of his years. Cf. Clay v. State, 143 Fla. 204, 196 So. 462 (1940). On the other hand, we are cited to the proposition that in cases where jurors could reasonably disagree, the issue of ultimate fact in a negligence case should be submitted to the jury with proper instruction. Here there is no complaint against the instruction given, which is taken from "Standard Jury Instruction 4.4, Negligence of a Child:"
In Florida, we have held, "A three year old child is incapable of committing contributory negligence." Winner v. Sharp, Fla., 43 So. 2d 634 (1949). But in Turner v. Seegar, (1942), 151 Fla. 643, 10 So. 2d 320, this court held that it was for the jury to determine whether a child within nineteen days of six years was guilty of contributory negligence but that decision was based on the reasoning, quoted in Dupuis v. Heider, 113 Fla. 679, 152 So. 659 (1934) which involved the alleged contributory negligence of a thirteen year old boy.
In the absence of a legislative declaration, it is our opinion and we so hold, that the child herein involved and any other child under six years of age is conclusively presumed to be incapable of committing contributory negligence. This holding is compatible with the common law rule that a child under seven is conclusively presumed to be incapable of committing a crime inasmuch as a child must learn individual safety at an early age but social consciousness comes at a somewhat later age. Compare the following cases in which the conclusive presumption of incapacity has been recognized: Beliak v. Plants, 84 Ariz. 211, 326 P.2d 36 (1958) (5 1/2 year old boy  struck by automobile while backing from driveway); Duffy v. Cortesi, 2 Ill. 2d 511, 119 N.E.2d 241 (1954) (5 year old girl  struck by car while crossing street); Lever Brothers Co. v. Stapleton, 313 Ky. 837, 233 S.W.2d 1002 (1950) (6 *711 year old boy  struck while running across street); Nagy v. Balogh, 337 Mich. 691, 61 N.W.2d 47 (1953) (4 years and 10 months  struck by car while in street); Cox v. Hugo, 52 Wash. 2d 815, 329 P.2d 467 (1958) (under six years of age); Shaske v. Hron, 266 Wis. 384, 63 N.W.2d 706 (1954) (five and a half years old); Romine v. City of Watseka, 341 Ill. App. 370, 91 N.E.2d 76 (1950) (five and a half year old boy); Gilligan v. City of Butte, 118 Mont. 350, 166 P.2d 797 (1946) (five years and 9 months).
In view of the foregoing the case sub judice must be considered on the negligence vel non of the defendant and finding none that would support a verdict against him, the trial court was correct in entering judgment for the defendant. In this posture the trial court's giving the instruction it did as to contributory negligence was harmless error.
The second question was properly answered in the decision under review.
No reversible error appearing, the decision is revised to conform to the views hereinabove expressed, and the
Writ of certiorari heretofore issued is discharged.
It is so ordered.
ERVIN, C.J., and DREW, CARLTON and BOYD, JJ., concur.