Case Title: City of Phoenix v. Industrial Commission

Citation: 104 Ariz. 120, 449 P.2d 291

Docket Number: 9440-PR

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1969-01-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
104 Ariz. 120 (1969) 449 P.2d 291 CITY OF PHOENIX, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona and John N. Adams, Respondents. No. 9440-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona. In Banc. January 16, 1969. Rehearing Denied February 18, 1969. *121 O'Connor, Cavanagh, Anderson, Westover, Killingsworth & Beshears by Ralph E. Mahowald, Jr., Phoenix, for petitioner. Robert D. Steckner, Phoenix, Chief Counsel, for respondent The Industrial Commission of Arizona. McFARLAND, Justice: This case is before us on a petition by the City of Phoenix for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, 8 Ariz. App. 193, 444 P.2d 750, which affirmed an award of the Industrial Commission of Arizona denying compensation to the employee and the petitioner. Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed. It should be noted that the claimant, named as respondent here, one John Adams, vigorously opposes any reimbursement under our Workmens' Compensation Act. The facts are as follows: On June 16, 1966, John N. Adams, an employee of the City of Phoenix, was injured in a fall in an elevator located in the Municipal Building of the City of Phoenix at 251 West Washington Street. He was employed by the City of Phoenix as a civil engineer. His offices were located on the 7th floor of the Municipal Building. Adams had been afflicted with an arthritic condition for approximately twenty years prior to his injury, and for approximately five years prior to his injury he had been so badly crippled that he required the assistance of crutches to ambulate. Because of this it was his custom to go to the office at 7:30 a.m., prior to the 8:00 o'clock rush, and to leave the building at approximately 4:30 p.m., prior to the 5:00 o'clock rush. Co-employees of Adams assisted him in numerous ways, such as helping him out of his chair, and going with him when he left work for the day to bring his car around to the office building basement so that he would not have to walk to the parking lot. On the day of the accident Adams left work at approximately 4:30 p.m. He rode down the elevator from the 7th floor to the first floor where the other passenger got off, then rode the elevator alone to the basement. As he was leaving the elevator, something occurred in the closing of the doors to knock him off balance and he fell backwards into the elevator and broke his leg. The elevator went up to the 5th floor where Adams was discovered by another employee of the City of Phoenix. Adams was unable to say exactly what caused him to fall, although he did state that on other occasions he had had the doors of another of the numbered elevators close on him suddenly. He testified that he had never before had difficulty with the particular elevator on which he was riding that night, but it seemed to him then that the doors closed suddenly. Adams testified that at the time the accident occurred he had completed his work for the day and was on his way home. *122 An employee is covered by our Workmens' Compensation Act if he is injured by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. A.R.S. § 23-1021. We have defined these elements in McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, No. 536, 71 Ariz. 244, 226 P.2d 147. A corollary to these elements is the well-established rule that "Our workmen's compensation act, like those of most jurisdictions, was not intended to give protection to workers going to and from work." Malinski v. Industrial Commission, 103 Ariz. 213, 439 P.2d 485. There are exceptions, such as where the employee's actual services commence when he leaves home and continue until his return home, Strauss v. Industrial Commission, 73 Ariz. 285, 240 P.2d 550; where the employee is performing a special mission for his employer, Cavness v. Industrial Commission, 74 Ariz. 27, 243 P.2d 459; and where the employer furnishes transportation or compensates the employee for his travel time to and from work, Serrano v. Industrial Commission, 75 Ariz. 326, 256 P.2d 709. The petitioner here however urges upon this Court the so-called "on premises" rule in that it seeks compensation coverage based on the bare fact of Adams's physical presence in his employer's building, even though he was admittedly going home. Such rule is actually an exception to and an incursion into the "going and coming" rule, and has been adopted in varying degrees, and in many cases greatly extended, in a number of jurisdictions. See Schneider, Workmen's Compensation Text, §§ 1712 et seq. (Permanent Ed.). While this Court has never rejected the "on premises" exception in so many words, in Cavness v. Industrial Commission, supra, we stated: See also Strauss v. Industrial Commission, supra. *123 Each case must be decided on its individual facts, and within the framework of the definitions set forth in the McCampbell case, supra. There is no "rule of thumb" that an injury is compensable merely because it was incurred between the hours of eight to five or occurred within the linear measurements of the employer's premises. The circumstances must be such that the activity engaged in, at the time of the accident, is an incident of the employment. This was well stated in a Michigan case, a jurisdiction which rejected the categorical doctrine of the "on premise" exception and reaffirmed the early Massachusetts reasoning of In re McNicol, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697, L.R.A. 1916A, 306: This principle of relationship between the particular activities being engaged in and the duties of employment is the thread which runs through the exceptions to the "going and coming" rule. This was also *124 the basis for the decision in Nicholson v. Industrial Commission, 76 Ariz. 105, 259 P.2d 547, not a "coming and going" case, but one which the petitioner cites as approving the "on premises" exception. The petitioner interprets certain language contained in that opinion, such as "Generally injuries incurred by the employee while leaving the premises * * * are normally incidents of the employment relation" and "The employee is deemed to be within the course of employment for a reasonable period while he winds up his affairs and leaves the premises," as an adoption of the "on premise" exception. This is not so, as is explained in the subsequent language of the Court: When the employee actually embarks on his homeward journey is not limited by time and place, but is a question of fact dependent upon the circumstances of each individual case and is to be determined by the trier of the facts. Here, Adams finished his day's work, left his office and descended on the elevator to the basement in order to obtain his car for the drive home. He was going home, and the Industrial Commission so found as a matter of fact. He was not performing any duties for his employer nor engaging in any activity incidental to his employment, and the injuries sustained are not compensable as arising out of and in the course of his employment. The petitioner has also urged that the use of an elevator together with Mr. Adams's unfortunate arthritic condition comprised a "special risk" and cites 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law 226-227 as authority that Arizona has "narrowed the going-and-coming premises rule judicially" requiring a showing of a "special risk" in order to obtain coverage under our workmen's compensation laws. We need not comment on this view because, in today's age of high-rise office buildings and apartments, *125 the use of an elevator, per se, is hardly a special risk or hazard of office employment. Further, the risk referred to in the Arizona Constitution is a necessary risk of, or inherent in, the nature of the employment, Ariz.Const. Art. 18, § 8, A.R.S., not in the physical condition of the employee. For these reasons the award of The Industrial Commission denying compensation is affirmed. UDALL, C.J., LOCKWOOD, V.C.J., and STRUCKMEYER and HAYS, JJ., concur.