Case Title: Martinez v. People

Citation: 480 P.2d 843

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1971-02-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
480 P.2d 843 (1971) Leroy MARTINEZ, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error. No. 23643. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. February 16, 1971. *844 Allan R. Cooter, Eugene T. Halaas, Jr., Pueblo, for plaintiff in error. Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., John P. Moore, Deputy Atty. Gen., Robert L. Hoecker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant in error. DAY, Justice. Defendant Martinez was convicted of burglary in the Pueblo district court. He seeks reversal and a new trial, contending that the trial court committed error in refusing to allow appointed counsel to withdraw, and that the counsel thus compelled by the court to remain in the case proved to be ineffective, resulting in his being denied a fair trial. The difficulties between Martinez and his lawyer were called to the attention of the court six days prior to trial. Counsel informed the court that he had advised the defendant that his defense to the burglary charge was weak and that it was his considered advice that the defendant enter a guilty plea to a lesser charge. When defendant refused to follow the advice of counsel and stated that he wished to have his case tried, the lawyer told Martinez "I am glad it is not me that is facing the court with the case that you have." Counsel further advised the court that defendant had made "some rather strong statements to me which I believe will certainly handicap me in representing him." At the hearing on the motion by counsel to withdraw, the defendant stated to the court that his attorney had refused to subpoena some thirteen additional witnesses that could help establish the defendant's whereabouts at the time of the alleged crime, and that he believed counsel's attitude toward him deprived him of due process. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that appointed counsel was adequately trained and experienced and ruled that the indigent defendant did not have the right to pick and choose counsel to represent him. We point out that counsel representing the defendant in this court is not the one who represented him in the trial. We take up the first pointthe argument that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the withdrawal of appointed counsel. The standard of "effective assistance of counsel" (Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158) does not guarantee a defendant the right to choose his appointed counsel. Valarde v. People, 156 Colo. 375, 399 P.2d 245. Nor does it guarantee defendant an attorney with whose advice he can agree. Arellanes v. United States, 9 Cir., 326 F.2d 560. There are, however, three areas in which the will of the defendant must be allowed to prevail: In State v. Hines, 6 Utah 2d 126, 307 P.2d 887, cited by the defendant in his brief, the court said: *845 There is nothing to be found in the record in the instant case from which we are able to conclude that appointed counsel was unable to, or did not, render effective assistance. The people presented three eye witnesses who positively identified defendant and placed him at the scene of the crime. During the course of the trial, appointed counsel put three "alibi" witnesses on the stand, including the defendant's wife and employer. Each of these witnesses testified as to the defendant's whereabouts at the time of the crime. At a supplementary hearing going into what testimony the additional witnesses would have offeredhad they been calledthe offer of proof revealed that much, if not all, of this additional testimony would have been in conflict with that presented at trial, thus weakening the credibility of the defendant's contentions as to his whereabouts at the time of the crime. See also Baca v. People, 139 Colo. 111, 336 P.2d 712. Following the refusal of the court below to allow counsel to withdraw, counsel presented himself at the time scheduled for trial and ably and competently conducted the defense. The attorney appointed for the defendant had some seventeen years experience, and there is no evidence that he failed in any way to adequately represent the defendant during the course and conduct of the trial, nor does the defendant point out any such failure in his brief. The defendant's second contention, that of denial of due process of law, is equally unfounded. As we have previously held: The record does not disclose any flagrant shortcomings of the trial attorney from which we could conclude he was guilty of palpable malfeasance, or that the representation received at trial was so inadequate as to constitute a farce, mockery or sham. See Johnson v. United States, 10 Cir., 380 F.2d 810; Hampton v. People, Colo., 465 P.2d 112. The judgment of the court below is affirmed.