Case Title: Shropshire v. State

Citation: 279 N.E.2d 219

Docket Number: 671S156

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1972-02-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
279 N.E.2d 219 (1972)
Jerry Michael SHROPSHIRE, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 671S156.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
February 29, 1972.
Rehearing Denied April 12, 1972.
*220 David F. McNamar, Steers, Klee, Sullivan & LeMay, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Stephen D. Clase, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
DeBRULER, Judge.
Appellant was charged by affidavit with first degree burglary, i.e., breaking and entering the dwelling house of Lemon Morris with intent to commit theft, in violation of I.C. 1971, XX-XX-X-X, being Burns' § 10-704. In a trial without jury in the Marion County Criminal Court Division No. 2, appellant was convicted of the lesser included offense, entering to commit a felony, and sentenced to one to ten years in prison.
Appellant's first contention is that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the trial court finding. In reviewing the allegation of insufficient evidence this Court will not weigh the evidence nor resolve questions of credibility of witnesses, but will look to that evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom which support the finding of the trial court. Asher v. State (1969), Ind., 244 N.E.2d 89. The conviction will be affirmed if from that viewpoint there is evidence of probative value from which the trier of fact could reasonably infer that the appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Smith v. State (1970), Ind., 260 N.E.2d 558. Viewed in that way the evidence was as follows:
Lemon Morris testified that between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. on July 30, 1970, he returned to his home at 2044 N. Martindale in Indianapolis and found appellant with two other young men ransacking his house which had been locked earlier in the day. Morris testified that when the men fled appellant took from the house a tape recorder which belonged to Morris' grandson. Morris then called the police. He identified a tape recorder marked for identification as Exhibit 2 as the tape recorder taken from his house by appellant. He also identified a bayonet marked for identification as Exhibit 1 as the bayonet one of the men had with him in the house that day. Neither exhibit was offered in evidence.
Officer Meyer, Indianapolis Police Department, who responded to the call testified without objection that Morris told him that Morris' house had been broken into by three men, that he knew where they were, and that they still had the tape recorder in their possession. Meyer took Morris to a park two and one-half blocks away and Morris pointed out three men sitting on a park bench as the three who broke into his house. Meyer found appellant in possession of the tape recorder marked as Exhibit 2, and one of the others in possession of the bayonet, Exhibit 1. Appellant testified *221 that he did not have any tape recorder in his possession when arrested but he did have the bayonet.
Appellant's first argument is that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the trial court finding because the appellee failed to offer in evidence Exhibits 1 and 2. Appellant relies on Keiton v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 294, 235 N.E.2d 695, where this Court said:
Since appellant did not make such a motion to strike in the trial court the Keiton decision does not apply in his case.
We think the evidence that was introduced is more than ample to sustain the trial court finding of guilty of entering with the intent to commit a felony. Morris testified that appellant was one of three men ransacking Morris' previously locked house, that the three ran away when Morris returned, that appellant had Morris' grandson's tape recorder when he fled the house. Minutes later appellant was found with the tape record.
Appellant's second argument is that the evidence was insufficient because there was no proof of value of the items stolen. Appellant was being tried for burglary and the appellee did not have to plead or prove the kind or value of the property intended to be stolen. Smithhart v. State (1971), Ind., 270 N.E.2d 740. No actual theft need have occurred at all for one to be guilty of burglary or entering to commit a felony. Farley v. State (1890), 127 Ind. 419, 26 N.E. 898. Appellant relies on Burrows v. State (1894), 137 Ind. 474, 37 N.E. 271, where the Court said:
However, the Court went on to say:
That case involved larceny of a check and the Court was dealing with the distinction between grand and petit larceny which distinction rested on the value of the property stolen. That issue has no relevance whatsoever to a burglary case such as the one before us on appeal, where the element to be established is not that goods of a certain value were stolen, but rather, that appellant entered with the intent to commit a felony namely, theft.
Appellant's third argument is set out in appellant's brief as follows:
Appellant did not submit any evidence whatsoever as part of the record concerning the witness' prior statements. At the close of the appellant's evidence, appellant's attorney said:
During cross examination of appellee's witness, Mr. Morris, appellant asked Morris if he had previously been unable to identify appellant in Municipal Court and Morris denied that several times. If appellant had had evidence that Morris had so failed it would have been inconsistent with Morris' testimony at trial and would properly have been admissible as impeaching evidence. Antrobus v. State (1970), Ind., 254 N.E.2d 873. More importantly it might have had a bearing on the legality of the pre-trial identification procedures discussed in U.S. v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149; Gilbert v. California (1967), 388 U.S. 263, 87 S. Ct. 1951, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178. But appellant did not have in his possession any such evidence. Neither can appellant's statement be viewed as a motion for discovery of such prior statements because they were admittedly not in the possession of the appellee. Antrobus v. State, supra. Appellant's statement could be viewed as an inept request for a continuance to permit appellant to obtain the transcript of the witness' testimony in Municipal Court. Indiana Code 1971, XX-X-XX-X, being Burns' § 9-1401 provides:
Appellant's motion did not comply with this statute in that it was not under oath and there was no representation that due diligence had been exercised. Since appellant's motion was on statutory grounds and did not comply with the statute the trial court did not commit error in denying the appellant's motion. Finton v. State (1963), 244 Ind. 396, 193 N.E.2d 132; Tait v. State (1963), 244 Ind. 35, 188 N.E.2d 537; Blume v. State (1963), 244 Ind. 121, 189 N.E.2d 568.
Judgment affirmed.
ARTERBURN, C.J., and GIVAN, HUNTER and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.