Case Title: Fraley v. Estate of Oeding

Citation: 2014-Ohio-452

Docket Number: 2012-1994

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2014-02-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Fraley v. Estate of Oeding, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-452.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-452 
FRALEY, D.B.A. FRALEY TRUCKING, APPELLEE, v. ESTATE OF OEDING ET AL., 
APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Fraley v. Estate of Oeding, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-452.] 
Civil Procedure—Long-arm jurisdiction—Ohio court may not exercise personal 
jurisdiction over nonresident based solely on conduct of nonresident’s 
insurance company—Judgment reversed. 
(No. 2012-1994—Submitted October 9, 2013—Decided February 12, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Butler County, 
No. CA2011-09-0180, 2012-Ohio-4770. 
______________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
An Ohio court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident based 
solely on the conduct of the nonresident’s insurance company. 
______________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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FRENCH, J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we address whether Ohio courts may exercise in-
personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant based solely on the conduct of 
the defendant’s insurer.  We hold that they may not. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} Appellee, David Fraley, d.b.a. Fraley Trucking, an Ohio resident, 
filed this negligence action against appellants, the Estate of Timothy J. Oeding, 
J&R Equipment and Storing (“J&R”), and Auto-Owners Insurance Company 
(“Auto-Owners”), in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas.  Fraley’s action 
arises out of a motor-vehicle accident that occurred in November 2008 in Indiana.  
Fraley’s complaint identifies an Indiana address for each appellant, and service of 
process was directed to the appellants in Indiana. 
{¶ 3} Fraley alleged that Timothy Oeding, while acting within the course 
of his employment with J&R, negligently caused a collision between the motor 
vehicle Oeding was operating and a truck owned by Fraley and operated by 
Fraley’s employee, Craig Farler, who was also acting within the course of his 
employment.  Oeding died as a result of injuries sustained in the collision.  Fraley 
alleged that Auto-Owners, which insured J&R and Oeding, conducted an 
independent investigation into the facts of the accident and, as part of its 
investigation, placed an investigative hold on Fraley’s truck for approximately 
five months.  Fraley claimed that Oeding’s negligence proximately caused 
tangible property damage to Fraley’s truck and personal injury to Farler.  Fraley 
also claimed that Auto-Owners’ investigatory hold caused Fraley intangible 
economic loss due to the loss of use of the truck.  The parties’ filings indicate that 
they settled Fraley’s claims for property damage and personal injury but were 
unable to resolve Fraley’s loss-of-use claim, the sole claim left to be resolved. 
{¶ 4} Appellants moved the trial court to dismiss Fraley’s complaint for 
lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(2).  They argued that 
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Fraley’s allegations do not fall within the scope of Ohio’s long-arm statute or 
Civ.R. 4.3(A) and that appellants do not have sufficient minimum contacts with 
Ohio to justify the exercise of jurisdiction.  Appellants also argued that Auto-
Owners’ provision of insurance coverage in several states, including Ohio, is 
insufficient to permit Ohio’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Auto-Owners 
or its insureds given the circumstances of this case. 
{¶ 5} In response to appellants’ motion, Fraley submitted an affidavit in 
which he restated relevant facts from the complaint and further stated that he 
suffered economic loss in Ohio due to Auto-Owners’ investigative hold.  Fraley’s 
affidavit additionally stated that Auto-Owners directed correspondence and calls 
to Fraley and his counsel in Ohio to resolve Fraley’s claims and that Auto-Owners 
is licensed to transact business in Ohio.  In his memorandum opposing dismissal, 
Fraley did not argue that Oeding or J&R had any personal contacts with Ohio, but 
argued that personal jurisdiction exists over all appellants because Auto-Owners 
transacted business in Ohio and caused tortious injury to Fraley in Ohio while 
acting as an agent of J&R and Oeding. 
{¶ 6} The trial court granted appellants’ motion to dismiss.  The court 
held that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Oeding and J&R solely 
because their insurer did business in Ohio and further held that Fraley was not 
entitled to maintain a direct action against Auto-Owners, because he had not 
obtained a judgment against Auto-Owners’ insureds. 
{¶ 7} On appeal, Fraley conceded that Ohio law precludes him from 
bringing a direct action against Auto-Owners, but he argued that the trial court 
erred in determining that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Oeding and J&R.  
The Twelfth District Court of Appeals agreed and reversed the trial court’s 
judgment.  2012-Ohio-4770, 981 N.E.2d 911 (12th Dist.). 
{¶ 8} The court of appeals recognized that the record contains no 
indication that Oeding or J&R had any contact with Ohio and that Fraley’s 
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jurisdictional argument could prevail only if Auto-Owners’ activities are imputed 
to J&R and Oeding.  Id. at ¶ 9.  The court of appeals acknowledged instances in 
which this court has imputed an insurer’s action or inaction to its insured, see, 
e.g., Griffey v. Rajan, 33 Ohio St.3d 75, 77-78, 514 N.E.2d 1122 (1987), but it 
recognized that the question whether an insurer’s actions can be imputed to a 
nonresident insured for purposes of obtaining personal jurisdiction over the 
insured is one of first impression in this state.  Id. at ¶ 9-13.  The court answered 
that question in the affirmative and held that Auto-Owners’ investigatory hold and 
its correspondence and calls to Fraley and his attorney brought Auto-Owners, and 
by extension J&R and Oeding, within Ohio’s long-arm statute.  Id. at ¶ 19.  The 
court also held that Ohio’s exercise of jurisdiction over appellants would not 
contravene principles of due process.  Id. at ¶ 23-24. 
{¶ 9} This court accepted appellants’ discretionary appeal.  134 Ohio 
St.3d 1484, 2013-Ohio-902, 984 N.E.2d 28. 
Question Presented 
{¶ 10} We are asked to determine whether an Ohio court may impute an 
insurance company’s conduct to its nonresident insured for purposes of 
establishing personal jurisdiction over the insured.  We hold that it may not.  An 
Ohio court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident based solely 
on the conduct of the nonresident’s insurance company. 
Analysis 
{¶ 11} Appellants’ motion to dismiss placed upon Fraley the burden to 
show that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over appellants.  Kauffman 
Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts, 126 Ohio St.3d 81, 2010-Ohio-2551, 930 
N.E.2d 784, ¶ 27, citing Fallang v. Hickey, 40 Ohio St.3d 106, 107, 532 N.E.2d 
117 (1988).  When, as here, a trial court determines a Civ.R. 12(B)(2) motion to 
dismiss without an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie 
showing of jurisdiction.  Id.  In resolving the motion, the trial court must view the 
January Term, 2014 
 
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allegations in the pleadings and the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff and make all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.  Id., citing 
Goldstein v. Christiansen, 70 Ohio St.3d 232, 236, 638 N.E.2d 541 (1994).  
Personal jurisdiction is a question of law that appellate courts review de novo.  Id. 
{¶ 12} The determination whether an Ohio court has personal jurisdiction 
over an out-of-state defendant requires a two-step inquiry.  First, the court must 
determine whether the defendant’s conduct falls within Ohio’s long-arm statute or 
the applicable civil rule.  Kentucky Oaks Mall Co. v. Mitchell’s Formal Wear, 
Inc., 53 Ohio St.3d 73, 75, 559 N.E.2d 477 (1990).  If it does, then the court must 
consider whether the assertion of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant 
would deprive the defendant of due process of law under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Id. 
{¶ 13} We begin with the question whether appellants’ conduct falls 
within Ohio’s long-arm statute or Civ.R. 4.3(A).  Ohio’s long-arm statute, R.C. 
2307.382, enumerates specific conduct that gives rise to personal jurisdiction.  It 
provides as follows: 
 
(A)  A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action 
arising from the person’s: 
(1)  Transacting any business in this state; 
* * * 
(4)  Causing tortious injury in this state by an act or 
omission outside this state if he regularly does or solicits business, 
or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives 
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services 
rendered in this state. 
 
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For purposes of R.C. 2307.382, “person” includes “an individual, his executor, 
administrator, or other personal representative, or a corporation, partnership, 
association, or any other legal or commercial entity, who is a nonresident of this 
state.”  R.C. 2307.381. 
{¶ 14} Civ.R. 4.3(A)(1) and (4) mirror R.C. 2307.382(A)(1) and (4) 
respectively, regarding service of process on persons outside the state of Ohio.  
Civ.R. 4.3(A) defines “person” in terms nearly identical to R.C. 2307.381.1 
{¶ 15} Because Fraley concedes that he is not entitled to maintain a direct 
action against Auto-Owners, we consider only whether the trial court had personal 
jurisdiction over J&R and Oeding.  The court of appeals characterized Auto-
Owners as J&R and Oeding’s agent, concluded that Auto-Owners’ actions fell 
within R.C. 2307.382(A)(4), and held that Auto-Owners’ actions may be imputed 
to Oeding and J&R.  2012-Ohio-4770, 981 N.E.2d 911, at ¶ 18-19.  The court of 
appeals expressly recognized that “there is no indication that J&R or Oeding 
themselves had any contact with Ohio” but nevertheless held that “by virtue of the 
actions of Auto-Owners, J&R and Oeding are also within the purview of Ohio’s 
long-arm statute.”  Id. at ¶ 9, 19.  The court of appeals’ determination is contrary 
to the plain language of the long-arm statute. 
{¶ 16} Our paramount concern in construing a statute is legislative intent.  
State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-Ohio-4960, 815 
N.E.2d 1107, ¶ 21.  To discern legislative intent, “we first consider the statutory 
language, reading words and phrases in context and construing them in 
accordance with rules of grammar and common usage.”  State ex rel. Choices for 
South-Western City Schools v. Anthony, 108 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-5362, 840 
N.E.2d 582, ¶ 40.  When statutory language is unambiguous, a court must apply it 
                                                          
 
1 “ ‘Person’ includes an individual, an individual’s executor, administrator, or other personal 
representative, or a corporation, partnership, association, or any other legal or commercial entity * 
* *.”  Civ.R. 4.3(A). 
January Term, 2014 
 
7
as written.  Zumwalde v. Madeira & Indian Hill Joint Fire Dist., 128 Ohio St.3d 
492, 2011-Ohio-1603, 946 N.E.2d 748, ¶ 23. 
{¶ 17} Under R.C. 2307.382(A)(4), an Ohio court “may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action 
arising from the person’s * * * [c]ausing tortious injury in this state by an act or 
omission outside this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in 
any other persistent course of conduct * * * in this state.”  (Emphasis added.)  The 
“persons” over whom Fraley asks the court to exercise jurisdiction are J&R and 
Oeding. 
{¶ 18} To be subject to personal jurisdiction under R.C. 2307.382(A)(4), a 
person must cause tortious injury in Ohio by an act or omission, either directly or 
by an agent, outside of Ohio.  The alleged injury here is Fraley’s loss of the use of 
his truck, and the act allegedly causing that injury is Auto-Owners’ investigative 
hold.  Fraley maintains that Auto-Owners acted as the agent of J&R and Oeding 
when it held Fraley’s truck in Indiana and that Auto-Owners’ act is therefore 
imputed to its insureds.  We will address Fraley’s agency argument in more detail 
below, but we first conclude that more is statutorily required before J&R and 
Oeding are subject to personal jurisdiction under R.C. 2307.382(A)(4). 
{¶ 19} R.C. 2307.382 requires that the person over whom jurisdiction is 
asserted regularly does or solicits business or engages in another persistent course 
of conduct in Ohio.  Although it is undisputed that neither J&R nor Oeding has 
engaged in any conduct in Ohio, Fraley nevertheless maintains that Auto-Owners’ 
business or activity in Ohio is imputed to its insureds and satisfies the remaining 
statutory requirement for jurisdiction over J&R and Oeding. 
{¶ 20} Under R.C. 2307.382(A)(4), a person may act, either directly or by 
an agent, to cause tortious injury, but use of the term “agent” does not indicate a 
legislative intent to incorporate an agent into the definition of “person.”  Indeed, 
were an agent incorporated within the definition of “person,” the General 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Assembly would not have needed to specify that a person may act, either directly 
or by an agent.  As a result of that specification, an agent is necessarily distinct 
from the person for whom the agent acts.  R.C. 2307.382(A)(4) defines the 
subject of jurisdiction as “a person who acts * * * as to a cause of action arising 
from the person’s * * * causing tortious injury * * * if he regularly does or 
solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct * * * in this 
state.”  (Emphasis added.)  Although a person may act via an agent to cause harm, 
the person (and not his or her agent) must have done or solicited business or 
engaged in a persistent course of conduct in Ohio before being subjected to the 
jurisdiction of Ohio’s courts.  The word “he” in R.C. 2307.382(A)(4) relates to 
the “person”—J&R and Oeding in this case—and not to the person’s agent.  As 
neither J&R nor Oeding conducted business in Ohio, R.C. 2307.382(A)(4) does 
not subject them to personal jurisdiction. 
{¶ 21} Fraley also argues that the R.C. 2307.381 definition of “person” 
includes a personal representative and that Auto-Owners qualifies as a personal 
representative of its insureds.  Fraley maintains that R.C. 2307.381 indicates a 
legislative intent for maximum reach over nonresident defendants.  R.C. 2307.381 
defines “person” to include an individual’s “executor, administrator, or other 
personal representative,” but R.C. Chapter 2307 does not define those terms.  
Although the definition in R.C. 2307.381 applies to R.C. 2307.382, Fraley’s 
suggestion that Auto-Owners acted as its insureds’ personal representative is 
misplaced. 
{¶ 22} We must accord undefined statutory terms their plain and ordinary 
meaning.  Am. Fiber Sys., Inc. v. Levin, 125 Ohio St.3d 374, 2010-Ohio-1468, 
928 N.E.2d 695, ¶ 24.  Black’s Law Dictionary 651 (9th Ed.2009) defines 
“executor” as follows:  “1. * * * One who performs or carries out some act.  2. * * 
* A person named by a testator to carry out the provisions in the testator’s will.  
Cf. ADMINISTRATOR (2).”  As relevant to one who acts in a representative 
January Term, 2014 
 
9
capacity, Black’s defines “administrator” as “2.  A person appointed by the court 
to manage the assets and liabilities of an intestate decedent. * * * Cf. 
EXECUTOR (2).”  Id. at 52.  Review of those definitions reveals that the terms 
executor and administrator are related. 
{¶ 23} When, as in R.C. 2307.381, a statute contains a list of specific 
terms followed by a catchall term linked to the specific terms by the word “other,” 
we consider the catchall term as embracing only things of a similar character as 
those comprehended by the preceding terms.  Moulton Gas Serv., Inc. v. Zaino, 97 
Ohio St.3d 48, 2002-Ohio-5309, 776 N.E.2d 72, ¶ 14; State v. Aspell, 10 Ohio 
St.2d 1, 225 N.E.2d 226 (1967), paragraph two of the syllabus.  Applying that rule 
here, “other personal representative” in R.C. 2307.381 embraces relationships of a 
similar character as that of an executor or administrator, but it does not extend to 
the mere contractual relationship between an insurer and its insured.  See 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marsh, 15 Ohio St.3d 107, 109, 472 N.E.2d 1061 
(1984) (noting the “long-standing principle of law” that the relationship between 
an insurer and its insured is purely contractual in nature).  This understanding of 
“personal representative” is consistent with the definition of that term in Black’s 
Law Dictionary as “[a] person who manages the legal affairs of another because 
of incapacity or death, such as the executor of an estate.”  Id. at 1416-1417.  Auto 
Owners did not act as J&R and Oeding’s personal representative. 
{¶ 24} Rather than focusing on the specific statutory language, the court 
of appeals looked to prior opinions in which this court has approved imputing an 
insurer’s conduct to its insured.  See Griffey, 33 Ohio St.3d at 78, 514 N.E.2d 
1122 (“for purposes of a Civ.R. 60(B)(1) motion for relief from a default 
judgment on the grounds of excusable neglect, the neglect of a defendant’s 
insurance company in failing to file an answer or other responsive pleading to a 
complaint against defendant is imputable to the defendant”); Peyko v. Frederick, 
25 Ohio St.3d 164, 166-167, 495 N.E.2d 918 (1986) (holding that a plaintiff may 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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access the unprivileged portions of the claim file of a defendant’s insurer for 
purposes of a motion for prejudgment interest because the “defendant’s insurer 
conducts the pretrial negotiations and litigation and approves any offers of 
settlement—all in the defendant’s name and for the defendant’s benefit” 
[emphasis sic]).  In Griffey, we noted a “wealth of authority from outside Ohio 
supporting the imputation of an insurance company’s neglect in defending a 
lawsuit to its insured.”  Id. at 78.  Importantly however, neither Griffey nor Peyko 
involved a question of personal jurisdiction, with its attendant due-process 
concerns.  In both of those cases, the Ohio courts unquestionably had personal 
jurisdiction over the insured defendants.  We are aware of no Ohio case, other 
than the court of appeals’ decision here, in which a court has imputed an insurer’s 
conduct to its insured for purposes of determining whether the insured was subject 
to personal jurisdiction in Ohio, and we do not view Griffey or Peyko as requiring 
or supporting that result. 
{¶ 25} Even if an agent’s doing business in Ohio could satisfy R.C. 
2307.382(A)(4), Auto-Owners did not act as its insureds’ agent when it instituted 
an investigatory hold on Fraley’s truck.  We agree with the reasoning of the court 
in Kirchen v. Orth, 390 F.Supp. 313 (E.D.Wis.1975), which addressed a 
jurisdictional argument similar to Fraley’s.  Kirchen involved the application of 
Wisconsin’s long-arm statute, which permitted the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction “ ‘[i]n any action whether arising within or without this state, against 
a defendant who when the action is commenced * * * [i]s engaged in substantial 
and not isolated activities within this state.’ ”  Id. at 316, quoting former 
Wis.Stat.Ann. 262.05(1)(d), now Wis.Stat.Ann. 801.05(1)(d). 
{¶ 26} The plaintiffs in Kirchen, who were Wisconsin residents, initiated 
suit in a Wisconsin federal district court.  They argued that the nonresident 
defendant-driver engaged in substantial activities in Wisconsin by way of 
settlement negotiations between his insurance company and the plaintiffs, that the 
January Term, 2014 
 
11
insurance company was acting as the driver’s agent, and that the insurance 
company’s activities were attributable to the driver for purposes of determining 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 315-316. 
{¶ 27} The Kirchen court rejected the plaintiffs’ agency theory.  It noted 
that an agency relationship requires the purported principal to have the right of 
control over the purported agent’s actions.  Id. at 317, citing 2A Corpus Juris 
Secundum, Agency, Section 6, at 561 (1972).  Accord Hanson v. Kynast, 24 Ohio 
St.3d 171, 494 N.E.2d 1091 (1986), paragraph one of the syllabus (“The 
relationship of principal and agent * * * exists only when one party exercises the 
right of control over the actions of another, and those actions are directed toward 
the attainment of an objective which the former seeks”).  The Kirchen court 
reasoned that liability-insurance policies reserve to the insurer the right to defend, 
investigate, negotiate, and settle any claim against the insured as the insurer 
deems expedient, and that the insured has no right to control the method, means, 
or place of settlement negotiations.  Id. at 317.  The court also noted that while an 
insurance company may act on its insured’s behalf in negotiating and settling 
claims, the insurer acts “in a dual capacity, the principal purpose of which is to 
protect its own contingent liability under the contract.”  Id.  Under these 
circumstances, the court refused to find an agency relationship between the 
insurer and the insured. 
{¶ 28} The insurance policy issued to J&R is not part of the record, but 
Fraley has never argued, and there is nothing in the record to suggest, that J&R 
and/or Oeding had any control over Auto-Owners’ actions, including its 
investigative hold on Fraley’s truck or its negotiations to settle Fraley’s claims.  
There is simply no prima facie showing that Auto-Owners acted as its insureds’ 
agent in this case for purposes of R.C. 2307.382(A)(4).  For these reasons, we 
conclude that Auto-Owners’ actions cannot suffice to subject J&R or Oeding to 
personal jurisdiction under Ohio’s long-arm statute. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 29} In addition to concluding that Ohio may not exercise personal 
jurisdiction over J&R and Oeding under its long-arm statute, we further conclude 
that exercise of personal jurisdiction in this case would violate established 
principles of due process.  Because Ohio’s long-arm statute is not coterminous 
with due process, Goldstein, 70 Ohio St.3d at 238, 638 N.E.3d 541, fn. 1, even 
satisfaction of the long-arm statute does not justify the exercise of jurisdiction 
unless that exercise also comports with the defendant’s constitutional right to due 
process.  Kauffman Racing Equip., 126 Ohio St.3d 81, 2010-Ohio-2551, 930 
N.E.2d 784, at ¶ 45.  Here, it would not. 
{¶ 30} We must evaluate all assertions of state-court jurisdiction 
according to the due-process standards set out in Internatl. Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), and its progeny.  
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977).  A 
state may exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant only if the defendant 
has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the 
suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ”  
Internatl. Shoe at 316, quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 
339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940).  The concept of minimum contacts protects the 
nonresident defendant from the burdens of litigating in distant or inconvenient 
forums and ensures that states do not encroach upon each other’s sovereign 
interests.  U.S. Sprint Communications Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Mr. K’s Foods, 
Inc., 68 Ohio St.3d 181, 186, 624 N.E.2d 1048 (1994), citing World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 
(1980). 
{¶ 31} To satisfy the minimum-contacts requirement, “it is essential in 
each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself 
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the 
benefits and protections of its laws.”  Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 
January Term, 2014 
 
13
S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958).  A determination whether a court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction is consistent with due process must focus on “the relationship among 
the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”  Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204, 97 S.Ct. 
2569, 53 L.Ed.2d. 683.  A court must assess each defendant’s contacts with the 
forum state individually.  Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 
L.Ed.2d 804 (1984), citing Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332, 100 S.Ct. 571, 62 
L.Ed.2d 516 (1980). 
{¶ 32} The only alleged connections in this case between appellants and 
the state of Ohio are Auto-Owners’ registration with the Ohio Department of 
Insurance and its telephone and written correspondence with Fraley and his 
attorney in Ohio.  Fraley maintains that those connections demonstrate sufficient 
minimum contacts for the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction over all three 
appellants.  Appellants, on the other hand, argue that the imputation of Auto-
Owners’ conduct to J&R and Oeding for purposes of determining their 
amenability to personal jurisdiction violates traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice. 
{¶ 33} Subjecting an insured to personal jurisdiction wherever its insurer 
chooses to conduct settlement negotiations is offensive to due process.  Kirchen, 
390 F.Supp. at 317.  When a defendant has engaged in no purposeful and willful 
conduct with the forum state and has no control over his insurer’s settlement 
activity in that state, the defendant “cannot be said to have willfully associated 
himself with the state nor purposefully invoked the benefit and protections of its 
laws.”  Id. 
{¶ 34} The United States Supreme Court addressed due-process concerns 
raised by the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant based 
on the conduct of the defendant’s insurer in Rush, 444 U.S. 320, 100 S.Ct. 571, 62 
L.Ed.2d 516.  Rush arose out of a single-vehicle accident in Indiana.  At the time 
of the accident, the driver, Randal Rush, and the injured passenger, Jeffrey 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Savchuk, were Indiana residents, and the vehicle driven by Rush was insured 
under a liability policy issued by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company in Indiana.  Savchuk subsequently moved to Minnesota, where he 
commenced an action against Rush and State Farm.  Although State Farm 
conducted business in Minnesota, Rush had no personal contacts with that state.  
Id. at 322. 
{¶ 35} Savchuk attempted to invoke the Minnesota court’s quasi-in-rem 
jurisdiction by garnishing State Farm’s policy-obligation to defend and indemnify 
Rush.  Id. at 323.  The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s denial of 
the defendants’ motions to dismiss and held that fairness supported the exercise of 
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction “because in accident litigation the insurer controls the 
defense of the case, State Farm does business in and is regulated by [Minnesota], 
and [Minnesota] has an interest in protecting its residents and providing them with 
a forum in which to litigate their claims.”  Id. at 324, citing Savchuk v. Rush, 311 
Minn. 480, 245 N.W.2d 624 (1976) (“Savchuk I”).  As summarized in the United 
States Supreme Court’s opinion, the Minnesota Supreme Court “recognized that 
Rush had engaged in no voluntary activity that would justify the exercise of in 
personam jurisdiction” but held that the assertion of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction 
through garnishment of State Farm’s obligation to Rush complied with due 
process.  Id. at 324-325; see Savchuk v. Rush, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn.1978) 
(“Savchuk II”). 
{¶ 36} The United States Supreme Court rejected Savchuk’s “ingenious 
jurisdictional theory,” holding that the fictitious presence in Minnesota of State 
Farm’s obligation to defend and indemnify Rush “does not, without more, provide 
a basis for concluding that there is any contact in the International Shoe sense” 
between Minnesota and Rush.  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 328-330.  “[I]t cannot be 
said that the defendant engaged in any purposeful activity related to the forum 
January Term, 2014 
 
15
that would make the exercise of jurisdiction fair, just, or reasonable * * * merely 
because his insurer does business there.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 329. 
{¶ 37} The Supreme Court also rejected as “plainly unconstitutional” the 
Minnesota court’s aggregation of State Farm’s and Rush’s forum contacts in a 
situation in which the resulting assertion of jurisdiction over Rush was based 
solely on State Farm’s activities:  “The requirements of International Shoe * * * 
must be met as to each defendant over whom a state court exercises jurisdiction.”  
Id. at 332.  Despite State Farm’s conducting of business in Minnesota and its 
attempts to settle Savchuk’s claims there, the court held that Rush “has no 
contacts with the forum, and the Due Process Clause ‘does not contemplate that a 
state may make binding a judgment * * * against an individual or corporate 
defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.’ ”  (Emphasis 
sic.)  Id. at 332-333, quoting Internatl. Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 
L.Ed 95.  See also Shoemaker v. McConnell, 556 F.Supp.2d 351, 355 
(D.Del.2008) (holding that the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant based 
solely on the actions of the defendant’s insurer in the forum state would not 
comport with due process). 
{¶ 38} The same rationale applies here.  The requirements of Internatl. 
Shoe, which must be met as to each defendant, have not been met with respect to 
J&R or Oeding.  It cannot be said that either J&R or Oeding engaged in any 
purposeful activity related to the state of Ohio that would make the exercise of 
jurisdiction fair, just, or reasonable merely because their insurer did business in 
Ohio.  Simply put, neither J&R nor Oeding have any contacts with the state of 
Ohio, and the exercise of jurisdiction over those appellants would violate due 
process. 
{¶ 39} The court of appeals here stated that “in some instances, minimum 
contacts can be established regarding the insured solely by the actions of the 
insurer negotiating on his behalf in the forum state.”  2012-Ohio-4770, 981 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
N.E.2d 911, at ¶ 22, citing Univ. of S. Alabama v. S. Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. Co., 
S.D.Ala. No. CA 05-00275-C, 2005 WL 1840238 (July 27, 2005).  Univ. of S. 
Alabama, however, is not only distinguishable but is also inconsistent with the 
reasoning of Rush, 444 U.S. 320, 100 S.Ct. 571, 62 L.Ed.2d 516, as pertinent to 
this case. 
{¶ 40} Univ. of S. Alabama involved a Mississippi automobile accident 
between Roosevelt Jackson and Virginia Hamilton, both of whom were 
Mississippi residents.  As a result of the accident, Jackson received medical care 
from an Alabama hospital, which filed a notice of hospital lien in Alabama.  
Despite knowledge of the hospital lien, Jackson, Hamilton, and Hamilton’s 
insurer, Mississippi Farm Bureau, settled Jackson’s claims without providing for 
payment of the lien, and Jackson executed a release of all claims against Hamilton 
and Mississippi Farm Bureau in exchange for $25,000, paid by Mississippi Farm 
Bureau.  2005 WL 1840238 at *1-2. 
{¶ 41} The hospital sued Mississippi Farm Bureau, Jackson, and Hamilton 
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama for 
impairment of its lien, and Mississippi Farm Bureau and Hamilton moved the 
court to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Id. at *3.  The district court held 
that Mississippi Farm Bureau was subject to the court’s specific jurisdiction 
because the plaintiff’s claim—a direct claim against Mississippi Farm Bureau—
arose from the insurer’s contacts with Alabama.  Id. at *8.  The court also 
concluded that in light of deposition testimony that Mississippi Farm Bureau 
acted as Hamilton’s agent during settlement negotiations, it could exercise 
specific personal jurisdiction over Hamilton.  Id., fn. 7. 
{¶ 42} In contrast to the plaintiff in Univ. of S. Alabama, Fraley has 
conceded that he does not have a direct claim against Auto-Owners.  Further, 
Fraley’s claim does not arise directly from Auto-Owners’ conduct in Ohio.  
Rather, Fraley relies upon Auto-Owners’ sporadic and nebulous contacts with 
January Term, 2014 
 
17
Ohio to establish jurisdiction over Auto-Owners’ insureds precisely because he 
cannot seek recovery directly against Auto-Owners itself.  We have additionally 
determined that Auto-Owners did not act as its insureds’ agent with respect to the 
conduct underlying Fraley’s claim.  This case, therefore, is factually 
distinguishable from Univ. of S. Alabama.  Moreover, in light of the United States 
Supreme Court’s holding in Rush, 444 U.S. at 332-333, 100 S.Ct. 571, 62 L.Ed.2d 
516—that due process does not permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant who has no contacts with the forum, despite the fact that 
the defendant’s insurance company conducts business in the forum—Univ. of S. 
Alabama does not persuade us that Fraley is entitled to maintain a claim against 
appellants in Ohio. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 43} An Ohio court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident based solely on the conduct of the nonresident’s insurance company.  
The assertion of personal jurisdiction over J&R and Oeding, based solely on the 
conduct of their insurer, is inconsistent with both Ohio’s long-arm statute and 
principles of due process.  Neither J&R nor Oeding has any contact with the state 
of Ohio, and fundamental fairness precludes Ohio from subjecting appellants to 
the burdens of litigating and the possibility of binding judgments in this state 
merely because their insurance company engages in business here.  Accordingly, 
we reverse the judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals and reinstate the 
judgment of the trial court. 
Judgment reversed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and KENNEDY, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 44} Does Ohio law shield an insurance company that transacts business 
in this state from having to be subject to suit in an Ohio court when it engages in 
tortious activity that does harm to Ohioans?  I would hold that Ohio’s long-arm 
statute is broad enough to confer jurisdiction over a defendant whose Ohio-
licensed insurer commits tortious acts against Ohio citizens and that exercising 
jurisdiction over the insured defendants in this case would not raise significant 
due-process concerns. 
{¶ 45} The only claim remaining in the lawsuit at issue concerns solely 
the activity of Auto-Owners Insurance Company (“Auto-Owners”), specifically 
its alleged retention of plaintiff-appellee David Fraley’s tractor-trailer for an 
unreasonable length of time.  The parties seem to agree that R.C. 3929.06 
prevents a direct action by Fraley against Auto-Owners; I am not sure that I share 
that view, but that issue is not alive in this case and is a matter for another day. 
{¶ 46} We are left with a case that revolves around the actions of Auto-
Owners only but that can be resolved only through a claim against the insureds.  I 
agree with the appellate court below that just as the actions of an insurer can be 
imputed to the insured for purposes of liability, personal jurisdiction may also be 
imputed from the insurer to the insured.  If direct actions against insurers are 
indeed forbidden by law, J&R Equipment and Storing and the Oeding estate are 
defendants here in name only.  That legal fiction should not obscure who the true, 
sole defendant is in this case. 
{¶ 47} If it were an available defendant through a direct action, Auto-
Owners would be subject to long-arm jurisdiction under R.C. 2307.382(A).  Auto-
Owners fits the definition of “person” under R.C. 2307.381 and meets the rest of 
the requirements of R.C. 2307.382: 
 
January Term, 2014 
 
19
(A) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action 
arising from the person’s: 
* * * 
(4) Causing tortious injury in this state by an act or 
omission outside this state if he regularly does or solicits business, 
or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives 
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services 
rendered in this state. 
 
{¶ 48} Auto-Owners allegedly caused injury to Fraley in Fraley’s home 
base of Ohio through wrongfully withholding the use of Fraley’s truck; the 
existence of Auto-Owners’ insurance license from the Ohio Department of 
Insurance authorizing it to transact business in this state satisfies the “regularly 
does or solicits business” portion of the long-arm statute. 
{¶ 49} To properly determine personal jurisdiction, we must also consider 
“whether the exercise of jurisdiction would deprive the nonresident defendant of 
the right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.”  Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts, 126 Ohio St.3d 
81, 2010-Ohio-2551, 930 N.E.2d 784, ¶ 28. 
 
[D]ue process is satisfied if the defendant has “minimum contacts” 
with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not 
offend “ ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ”  
[Internatl. Shoe Co. v. Washington] (1945), 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 
S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, quoting Milliken v. Meyer (1940), 311 U.S. 
457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
Kauffman Racing Equip. at ¶ 45. 
{¶ 50} I would hold that Auto-Owners’ license to do business in Ohio is 
sufficient to establish minimum contacts as to both Auto-Owners and its insureds.  
In Kentucky Oaks Mall Co. v. Mitchell's Formal Wear, Inc., 53 Ohio St.3d 73, 
559 N.E.2d 477 (1990), this court set forth factors to consider in determining 
whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial 
justice: 
 
“Once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully 
established minimum contacts within the forum State, these 
contacts may be considered in light of other factors to determine 
whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with 
‘fair play and substantial justice.’  * * * Thus courts in 
‘appropriate cases[s]’ may evaluate ‘the burden on the defendant,’ 
‘the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,’ ‘the 
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,’ 
‘the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most 
efficient resolution of controversies,’ and the ‘shared interest of the 
several States in furthering fundamental substantive social 
policies.’  * * * These considerations sometimes serve to establish 
the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of 
minimum contacts than would otherwise be required.  * * * On the 
other hand, where a defendant who purposefully has directed his 
activities at forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must 
present a compelling case that the presence of some other 
considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.”  (Citations 
omitted and emphasis added.) 
 
January Term, 2014 
 
21
Id. at 77, quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-477, 105 
S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). 
{¶ 51} I would find that the burden on Auto-Owners and its insureds in 
this particular case is minimal.  Auto-Owners would not rely on the testimony of 
anyone involved in the underlying accident; any witnesses would be people under 
its control, either employees or contractors.  This state has great interest in seeing 
one of its citizens obtain relief for the alleged tortious acts of an insurer licensed 
to do business in this state.  The plaintiff, already hampered by being without an 
important piece of business equipment for an inordinate period, has great interest 
in obtaining timely, convenient, and effective relief.  Because litigation of the 
plaintiff’s claim would not require the presence of the named Indiana-resident 
insureds, a lawsuit in Ohio against a corporation that does business in Ohio would 
efficiently resolve the controversy.  Allowing the case to be heard in Ohio would 
also be a nod to the practical realities of how insurance litigation is conducted in 
Ohio and adjoining states.  Exercising jurisdiction over the insureds in this case 
would not upset traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice in cases 
involving insurance companies—this is the rare case in which there is only a 
single extant claim, which happens to involve only the insurer’s wrongful activity. 
{¶ 52} Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
O’NEILL, J., concurs in the forgoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Repper, Pagan, Cook, Ltd., and Christopher J. Pagan, for appellee. 
 
Smith, Rolfes & Skavdahl Co., L.P.A., and James P. Nolan II, for 
appellants. 
 
Green & Green, Lawyers, and Erin B. Moore, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys. 
__________________