Case Title: Smith v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 32, 2001

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2001-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
1The Court has not considered the appellant’s response to the motion to affirm that
was filed on June 5, 2001.  The response was not requested by the Court and, therefore,
shall be stricken as a nonconforming document.  See Supr.  Ct.  R.  25, 34.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
MARTIN H.  SMITH,
§
§
No.  32, 2001
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
§
Court Below—Superior Court
§
of the State of Delaware, in
v.
§
and for Sussex County in PS99-
§
10-0255.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§
§
Plaintiff Below,
§
Appellee.
§
Def.  ID No.  9910007159
Submitted: May 25, 2001
Decided:
June 26, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and HOLLAND, Justices.
O R D E R
This 26th day of June 2001, upon consideration of the appellant’s
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm1 pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that:
(1)
In November 1999, Martin H. Smith was indicted for Possession
with Intent to Deliver Cocaine, Conspiracy in the Second Degree, Possession
of Drug Paraphernalia and Resisting Arrest.  On February 25, 2000, Smith
pleaded guilty, pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 11(e)(1)(c), to two
2See Guilty Plea Hr’g Tr., Feb. 25, 2000.
3See 16 Del.  C. § 4763(a) (providing for additional penalties when a defendant has
previously been convicted of a drug offense).
2
charges:  Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine and Conspiracy in the
Second Degree.  The remaining charges were nolle prossed.  The Superior
Court ordered a presentence investigation, as provided in the plea agreement.
At the time the presentence investigation was ordered, it was the
understanding of the parties and the Superior Court that Smith was not subject
to mandatory jail time.2  
(2)
During the course of its investigation, the presentence office
discovered that Smith had a prior drug conviction in Maryland for
Distribution of Cocaine.  As a result of the prior drug conviction, Smith faced
an enhanced sentence on the drug offense to which he pleaded guilty in this
case.3  In view of the substantial mandatory jail time that Smith faced in this
case as a result of the prior Maryland drug conviction, the Superior Court, on
March 17, 2000, allowed Smith to withdraw his guilty plea.  
(3)
On June 22, 2000, Smith entered into a second plea agreement.
Smith pleaded guilty, pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 11(e)(1)(c),
to Possession of Cocaine (a lesser-included offense of Possession with Intent
4It appears that the first plea agreement provided for an agreed-upon sentence of
six years at Level V, or, in the alternative, a presentence investigation.  It is clear from the
plea hearing transcript that Smith opted for a presentence investigation.
3
to Deliver Cocaine) and to the other three charges in the original indictment.
Smith was immediately sentenced, in accordance with the plea agreement, to
seven years at Level V.  
(4)
On August 31, 2000, Smith filed his first motion for
postconviction relief.  Smith alleged that the prior Maryland drug charge had,
in fact, been dropped, and that he did not have a Maryland drug conviction.
Smith requested that the Superior Court allow him to accept “the first plea
that was offered,”4 i.e., the February 2000 guilty plea that was withdrawn in
March 2000.  By order dated October 11, 2000, the Superior Court denied
relief.  
(5)
On December 7, 2000, Smith filed a second motion for
postconviction relief.  Smith again alleged that his sentence was “predicated
on a second nonexistent drug conviction.”  Again, Smith argued that he
should be resentenced in accordance with his first plea agreement.  By order
dated December 19, 2000, the Superior Court denied relief as factually
5Somerville v.  State, Del.  Supr.,  703 A.2d 629, 631 (1997).
6Supr.  Ct.  R.  8; Trump v.  State, Del.  Supr., 753 A.2d .  963, 971 (2000)
(citing Wainwright v.  State, Del.  Supr., 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (1986)).
4
incorrect and as procedurally defaulted under Superior Court Criminal Rule
61(i)(3) and (4).  This appeal followed.
(6)
In his opening brief on appeal, Smith does not argue, as he did
in his first and second postconviction motions, that he does not have a prior
Maryland drug conviction.  Instead, Smith argues that his second guilty plea
was involuntary and that his counsel was ineffective.
(7)
Because Smith has chosen not to brief his Maryland drug
conviction claim, that claim is deemed waived and abandoned and will not be
considered on appeal.5  Smith’s claims of involuntary guilty plea and
ineffective assistance of counsel, on the other hand, were not raised in the
Superior Court.  We review them now only for plain error.6
(8)
Smith has failed to demonstrate any plain error in the entry and
acceptance of his second guilty plea.  Smith’s  claim that his guilty plea was
involuntary is contradicted by the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form.
Smith’s claim that his counsel promised him that he would receive a sentence
only of probation is contradicted by the plea agreement, which states that
7Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d at 632.
5
Smith would be sentenced to a total of seven years at Level V.  In the absence
of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Smith is bound by the terms
of the written plea agreement and his answers on the Truth-in-Sentencing
Guilty Plea Form.7
(9)
It is manifest on the face of Smith’s opening brief that this appeal
is without merit.  The issues presented on appeal are controlled by settled
Delaware law, and to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, clearly
there was no abuse of discretion.
NOW, THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
s/Joseph T. Walsh
Justice