Case Title: State v. Dye

Citation: 1998-Ohio-234

Docket Number: 19970851

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1998-07-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. DYE, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Dye (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Criminal law — Rape — Degree of force and violence necessary to commit crime 
of rape of a child varies, when — Under totality of circumstances, person 
who stands in same position over a child as a parent may be convicted of 
rape of a child under thirteen with force pursuant to R.C. 2907.02A)(1)(b) 
and (B) without evidence of express threat of harm or evidence of 
significant physical restraint. 
A person in a position of authority over a child under thirteen may be convicted of 
rape of that child with force pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and (B) 
without evidence of express threat of harm or evidence of significant 
physical restraint. 
(No. 97-851 — Submitted March 25, 1998 — Decided July 8, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 17763. 
 
Michael Dye, defendant-appellee, was friends with Joyce W. Dockus for 
approximately seven years.  Joyce trusted the defendant with her three sons and 
would allow them to go over to his apartment.  Beginning in December 1994, 
Joyce’s son, David, age nine, went over to the defendant’s apartment about every 
week and spent the night. 
 
On July 22, 1995, David was at home, where he resided with his mother, 
Joyce, his mother’s live-in boyfriend, Gene Scritchfield, and his other two 
brothers, Tommy and Terry.  The defendant called the house and asked David to 
come over for a few hours, but David told the defendant he would have to ask 
Gene.  When David handed the telephone to Gene, Gene overheard the defendant 
say, “David, are you going to come over and suck my dick?”  Gene told the 
defendant that was no way to talk to a child, and he hung up on the defendant. 
 
2
 
When Joyce returned home later that evening, Gene repeated the incident to 
her.  When Joyce questioned David, he started to cry and told his mother that the 
defendant had made him “suck his thing with his mouth.”  Upset, Joyce took 
Gene, her two brothers, her older daughter, and her three sons and went over to the 
defendant’s residence to confront him.  At the defendant’s residence, a fight 
erupted between the parties.  The details are unclear, but apparently Joyce struck 
the defendant during the confrontation.  Police were called to the scene, and Joyce 
reported the allegations against the defendant. 
 
Upon the advice of police, Joyce took David to the hospital.  Dr. Narges 
Daliri, the attending physician in the emergency room, examined David that same 
evening, July 22, 1995.  David told Dr. Daliri that the defendant “had been putting 
his weenie in [David’s] butt,” and “[had been] playing with his weenie and making 
[David] play with his weenie.”  David told Dr. Daliri that this had been happening 
since December 1994.  Dr. Daliri’s physical examination revealed a healed fissure 
in David’s anal region, as well as decreased sphincter tone for a child David’s age.  
Further, a rape protocol was performed and samples were taken.  However, the kit 
was later inadvertently destroyed by the police department. 
 
A social worker, Elizabeth Morstatter, also interviewed David on July 22, 
1995.  David told her that the first time the sexual contact occurred was the day 
after Christmas.  David told her that he was in the defendant’s bedroom when the 
defendant started “rubbing on his weenie,” pulled David’s pants down, and then 
pulled his own pants down.  David also told Morstatter that the defendant had “put 
David’s weenie in his mouth,” that defendant once gave him $5, and that the 
defendant would sometimes give him red wine that he kept in a locked cabinet by 
his bed.  In addition, David told Morstatter that the defendant had been his friend. 
 
3
 
A few days after the examination at the hospital, Detective Edward L. 
Mathews, a juvenile detective from the Akron Police Department, interviewed 
David, Joyce, and Gene.  David told the detective that, in addition to the above 
allegations, the defendant had also digitally penetrated him.  Based on the 
interviews, Detective Mathews obtained warrants for the defendant and arrested 
him. 
 
The defendant was indicted on August 18, 1995, on five counts of rape and 
five counts of felonious sexual penetration, each with the specification that the 
defendant had used or threatened force.  At trial, Detective Mathews testified that 
the defendant denied any sexual involvement with David, but did not dispute that 
David spent the night with him frequently.  Detective Mathews testified that the 
defendant told him that he and David slept together on the couch and that the 
“front parts” of their bodies would touch.  The defendant told Detective Mathews 
that when he woke up in the morning he would sometimes find his fly unzipped 
and he had “no idea what David might have done to him.” 
 
At trial, David testified that the first time the defendant touched him, he was 
lying in the defendant’s bed and the defendant started pulling down his pants and 
touching him on his “weenie.”  David testified that the defendant turned him over 
and David asked him twice what he was doing, but the defendant did not say 
anything.  David testified that the defendant told him that this was to be a secret 
and then he turned David over and “put his weenie up [his] butt.”  Then, David 
testified that the defendant turned him back around and start[ed] “sucking on my 
thing, my weenie, and then he started making me suck on his weenie.”  When 
asked why he kept going back to the defendant’s apartment, David replied, 
“because I let him do it to me long enough where I know he is going to go to jail 
for a long time if he becomes guilty.” 
 
4
 
David’s mother, Joyce, testified that she trusted the defendant with her 
children and would allow them to go over to his residence.  She testified that the 
defendant was a friend of hers.  When she dropped David off at the defendant’s 
residence, Joyce testified that she told David to be good and mind the defendant, 
and if he did not that she would come and pick him up. 
 
During trial, the defendant moved for dismissal of the felonious sexual 
penetration charges and the force specifications.  The court dismissed two counts 
of felonious sexual penetration, based on David’s testimony during trial that the 
defendant had inserted his finger into David’s anus “about three” times.  The court 
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the force specifications. 
 
The jury returned guilty verdicts on all five counts of rape and the three 
remaining counts of felonious sexual penetration, with a force specification on 
each count.  The trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment on each 
count.  The court of appeals affirmed the defendant’s convictions, but reversed his 
life sentences, finding insufficient evidence of force. 
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Maureen O’Connor, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip D. 
Bogdanoff, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
C. Michael Walsh, for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
Lundberg Stratton, J.  The issue presented in this case is whether a person 
in a position of authority over a child under thirteen may be convicted of rape of 
that child with force pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and (B) without evidence 
 
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of express threat of harm or evidence of significant physical restraint.  For the 
reasons stated below, we answer in the affirmative. 
 
R.C. 2907.02 provides: 
 
“(A)(1)  No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another who is not 
the spouse of the offender or who is the spouse of the offender but is living 
separate and apart from the offender, when any of the following applies: 
 
“ * * * 
 
“(b)  The other person is less than thirteen years of age, whether or not the 
offender knows the age of the other person. 
 
“ * * * 
 
“(2)  No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another when the 
offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force or threat of force.” 
 
“(B)  Whoever violates this section is guilty of rape, an aggravated felony of 
the first degree. * * *  If the offender under division (A)(1)(b) of this section 
purposely compels the victim to submit by force or threat of force, whoever 
violates division (A)(1)(b) of this section shall be imprisoned for life.” 
 
R.C. 2901.01(A) defines the element of force as “any violence, compulsion, 
or constraint physically exerted by any means upon or against a person or thing.” 
 
This court considered the issue of force in State v. Eskridge (1988), 38 Ohio 
St.3d 56, 526 N.E.2d 304.  In Eskridge, the defendant was convicted of raping his 
four-year-old daughter by force.  This court reinstated the defendant’s conviction 
and held that “[t]he force and violence necessary to commit the crime of rape 
depends upon the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to each 
other.  With the filial obligation of obedience to a parent, the same degree of force 
and violence may not be required upon a person of tender years, as would be 
required were the parties more nearly equal in age, size and strength.  (State v. 
 
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Labus [1921], 102 Ohio St. 26, 38-39, 130 N.E. 161, 164.)”  Id., paragraph one of 
the syllabus. 
 
In Eskridge, the victim testified that the defendant removed her panties, and 
there was testimony that he laid her on the bed, both acts of compulsion and 
constraint that we found were independent of the act of rape.  Id., 38 Ohio St.3d at 
58, 526 N.E.2d at 306.  Further, we emphasized the age difference and disparity in 
size between the defendant, a twenty-eight-year-old man, and the victim, a four-
year-old child.  We held that “[a] four-year-old child cannot consent to sexual 
conduct” and “[t]he victim * * * did not and could not have participated in the 
sexual conduct on her own free will.” Id. 
 
Eskridge involved a father-child relationship, and we noted that the “ ‘youth 
and vulnerability of children, coupled with the power inherent in a parent’s 
position of authority, creates a unique situation of dominance and control in which 
explicit threats and displays of force are not necessary to effect the abuser’s 
purpose.’ ”  Id., 38 Ohio St.3d at 59, 526 N.E.2d at 307, quoting State v. Etheridge 
(1987), 319 N.C. 34, 47, 352 S.E.2d 673, 681.  We concluded that the defendant 
father held a position of authority over the victim daughter which did not require 
any explicit threats or displays of force.  Id. 
 
Later, in State v. Schaim (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 51, 600 N.E.2d 661, we 
considered force in the context of a pattern of incest between a father and his 
twenty-year-old daughter.  In finding that the state did not prove the elements of 
forcible rape, we held that “[a] defendant purposely compels another to submit to 
sexual conduct by force or threat of force if the defendant uses physical force 
against that person, or creates the belief that physical force will be used if the 
victim does not submit.  A threat of force can be inferred from the circumstances 
surrounding sexual conduct, but a pattern of incest will not substitute for the 
 
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element of force where the state introduces no evidence that an adult victim 
believed that the defendant might use physical force against her.  (State v. 
Eskridge [1988], 38 Ohio St.3d 56, 526 N.E.2d 304, distinguished.)”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Id., at paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
Although we found insufficient evidence of force in Schaim, we recognized 
Eskridge’s continuing application in cases involving young children: “State v. 
Eskridge is based solely on the recognition of the amount of control that parents 
have over their children, particularly young children.”  Id., 65 Ohio St.3d at 55, 
600 N.E.2d at 665.  We concluded that “[b]ecause of the child’s dependence on his 
or her parents, a child of tender years has no real power to resist his or her parent’s 
command, and every command contains an implicit threat of punishment for 
failure to obey.”  Id. 
 
We recognize that it is nearly impossible to imagine the rape of a child 
without force involved.  Clearly, a child cannot be found to have consented to 
rape.  However, in order to prove the element of force necessary to sentence the 
defendant to life imprisonment, the statute requires that some amount of force 
must be proven beyond that force inherent in the crime itself.  Yet “ ‘[f]orce need 
not be overt and physically brutal, but can be subtle and psychological.  As long as 
it can be shown that the rape victim’s will was overcome by fear or duress, the 
forcible element of rape can be established.’ ”  Eskridge, 38 Ohio St.3d at 58-59, 
526 N.E.2d at 306, citing State v. Fowler (1985), 27 Ohio App.3d 149, 154, 27 
OBR 182, 187, 500 N.E.2d 390, 395.  In fact, R.C. 2907.02(B) requires only that 
minimal force or threat of force be used in the commission of the rape.  Id., 38 
Ohio St.3d at 58, 526 N.E.2d at 306. 
 
In examining the age, size, and strength of the parties and their relation to 
each other, we clearly find sufficient evidence of force.  We found insufficient 
 
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evidence of force in Schaim, but that case involved a twenty-year-old adult who 
was no longer completely dependent on her parents and was more nearly her 
father’s equal in size, strength, and mental resources.  In the present case, at the 
time of the rapes, the defendant was forty-four years old, while David was nine.  
Further, there was a clear disparity in the relative size and strength of the 
defendant and David.  The defendant was a five-foot, nine-inch, one-hundred-
thirty-five-pound man, while David was an approximately seventy-seven-pound 
child.  In addition, David told Morstatter that the defendant said to him “he 
wouldn’t be [his] friend” if David told (someone about the abuse) and that David 
thought the defendant might hit him. 
 
Aside from the evidence of physical force, the evidence of psychological 
force is substantial.  The defendant contends that Eskridge may be distinguished 
due to the absence of a parent-child relationship between the defendant and David.  
We disagree.  In Eskridge there was “ ‘a child being told to do something by an 
important figure of authority, and commanded not to tell anyone about it.’ ”  Id., 
38 Ohio St.3d at 59, 526 N.E.2d at 306, quoting Fowler, 27 Ohio App.3d at 154, 
27 OBR at 187, 500 N.E.2d at 395.  Consequently, we found nothing unreasonable 
about a finding that the child’s will was overcome and the forcible element of rape 
was properly established.  Id. 
 
In the present case, nine-year-old David was forced to submit to the 
authority of a forty-four-year-old man who was not his parent, but who stood in a 
position of authority over him.  David’s mother had known the defendant for 
seven years and David had maintained a close relationship with the defendant over 
that time, visiting and staying at the defendant’s residence approximately once a 
week.  David considered the defendant to be his friend until these events occurred.  
Clearly, the defendant was an important figure of authority in David’s life.  In 
 
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addition, just as in Fowler, the defendant told David to keep the sexual abuse a 
secret. 
 
Most important, when David’s mother dropped David off at the defendant’s 
residence or when the defendant picked David up and took him to his home, 
David’s mother told him to mind the defendant, and not to aggravate him, or she 
would come and pick him up or the defendant would bring him home.  The 
defendant claims that because this punishment or threat of punishment came from 
David’s mother and not the defendant himself, this somehow lessens the position 
of authority the defendant had over David.  We find no rationale for this 
distinction.  The defendant was clearly the authority figure to David when David 
was at the defendant’s home, which is where the sexual conduct took place. 
 
Further, the defendant urges this court to make a distinction between 
biological parents (or other family members) who sexually abuse their children, 
and all other sexual abusers.  Again, we see no reason for such a distinction.  
Unfortunately, due to divorce and custody arrangements, some children may see 
their biological parent(s) only once every few months or not at all, yet may spend 
eight to ten hours a day with a nonparental caregiver.  Further, parents often leave 
their children in the care of others for a variety of reasons.  When parents tell their 
children that the caregiver is in charge and that the children should mind the 
caregiver, that caregiver occupies the same position of authority as the parent 
traditionally would.  Thus, to make a distinction on the basis of biology is wholly 
inappropriate and ignores the realities of our society. 
 
The evidence showed that David’s mother told him that the defendant was 
in charge and David should mind him.  Further, the evidence showed that while 
David was at the defendant’s house, the defendant would fondle David’s genitalia, 
turn David around and pull his pants down, sit on a bed and make David sit on his 
 
10
lap, or tell David to crouch before engaging in sex with him, make David engage 
in oral sex with him, and tell David to keep the sex a secret.  Nonetheless, the 
court of appeals found this evidence was insufficient for a finding of force since a 
parent was not involved.  We disagree. 
 
We hold that a person in a position of authority over a child under thirteen 
may be convicted of rape of that child with force pursuant to R.C. 
2907.02(A)(1)(b) and (B) without evidence of express threat of harm or evidence 
of significant physical restraint. 
 
Weighing the credibility of the witnesses was the job of the trier of fact.  
State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 39 O.O.2d 366, 227 N.E.2d 212.  
David’s testimony, if believed, demonstrated a threat of force by the defendant 
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and (B).  Viewing 
the evidence presented by the state at trial in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found all of the elements of rape of 
a child under thirteen proven beyond a reasonable doubt, including the use of 
force or threat of force.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and reinstate the defendant’s convictions and life sentences. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS and COOK, JJ., concur separately. 
__________________ 
 
Cook, J., concurring.  I concur in the judgment of the majority.  I would 
not modify State v. Eskridge (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 56, 526 N.E.2d 304, but would 
reconcile this case with Eskridge, using the following syllabus language: 
 
Assessment of whether the defendant has compelled the victim to submit by 
an implicit threat of force under R.C. 2907.02(B) and State v. Eskridge requires a 
 
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comparison of the age, size, and strength of the parties and their relation to each 
other.  Even where the relationship between the defendant and the child victim is 
not one of parent and child, in assessing the totality of the circumstances, the 
factfinder may consider whether the defendant was an important figure of 
authority to the child victim.  (State v. Eskridge [1988], 38 Ohio St.3d 56, 526 
N.E.2d 304, construed.) 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in the foregoing concurring opinion.