Case Title: State v William J Matt

Citation: 2008 MT 444

Docket Number: 88717987-d0ee-4673-a5d0-dfed3297fa2c

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 2008-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
DA 06-0134
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

sooner as
STATBOF MONTANA, FILE}
Plaintiff and Appellee, BEC 3.9 08

Ed Smita,
WILLIAM JOHN NAT, sangha

Defendant and Appellant

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DC 2004-350
Honorable John W. Larson, Presiding Judge

 

‘COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant

Chad Weight, Hooks & Wright, Helena, Montana
For Appelle:

Hon, Mike McGrath, Montana Attorney General, Pamela P. Collins,
Assistant Atiomey General, Helena, Montana

Fred Van Valkenburg, Missoula County Attorney, Andrew Paul,
Deputy County Attorney, Missoula, Montana

‘Submitted on Briefs: June 6, 2007
Decided: December 30, 2008

File:

———
Justice James C, Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

1 William John Matt appeals from his conviction of deliberate homicide in the

Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County. We reverse and remand for a new tril.
ISSUES

{2 Matt raises three issues on appeal:

1. Did the District Court err in limiting Matt’s cross-examination of one of the

 

State's witnesses?

2. Did Matt’s tial counsel provide constitutionally ineffective assistance of
counsel?

3. Was Matt's constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of his trial
violated and, if so, was the violation harmless error?
$B Because we conclude that Matt's conviction must be Teversed under Issue 3, we do
not address Issues 1 and 2. Moreover, since this case is being remanded for a new trial,
‘we do not provide substantial details regarding the facts underlying the charged offense.

BACKGROUND

{4 The State of Montana filed an information, and subsequently an amended

information, charging Matt wit violation of

 

deliberate homicide, a felony,

 

§ 45-5-102(1(b), MCA (commonly known as “

 

ony murder"). As alleged in the
State's probable-cause affidavit, the body of Steven Rodriguez was found the morning of
June 22, 2004, submerged in an irrigation canal near the Clark Fork River in Missoula,

‘Montana, The medical examiner determined that the cause of death was drowning and

 

that Rodriguez had nonlethal injures consistent with having been in a fight. Following
‘an investigation, the State developed the theory that Matt, Rodriguez, Andrew Greybull,
and Kevin Oldhorn had been drinking together under the Madison Street Bridge and that

Matt, Greybull, and Oldhom had taken turns beating up Rodriguez, who was “too drunk

 

to defend himself." Allegedly, Matt, Greybull, and Oldhorn threw Rodriguez in the canal
several times, and Greybull and Oldhorn took tums holding Rodriguez’s head underwater
for ten to fifteen seconds at atime. “They eventually left Rodriguez's body floating in the
canal. According to the State, Greybull removed Rodrigue2’s boots during the course of
these events and later sold them at a local pawnshop, and Matt then used the money
‘obtained from selling the boots to purchase vodka,

{5 The State charged that Matt, with the purpose to promote or facilitate the offense
of robbery, aided, abetted, or attempted to aid Greybull and/or Oldhorn in the planning or
commission of the robbery of Rodriguez, and that in the course of said robbery, Matt or
other persons legally accountable for the robbery caused the death of Rodriguez, Matt
pleaded not guilty to this offense, and the ease proceeded to trial in April 2005,

46 _Atthe close of the State's case-in-chief, the trial judge, the prosecutor, and defense
‘counsel met in the judge’s chambers. Matt was not present. At the outset, the judge

inquired of defense counsel, “Do you have Mr. Matt coming?" to which defense counsel

 

responded, “I don't mind if he’s not here.” A discussion took place off the record, and
then, back on the record, defense counsel added, “I don’t need my client here. This is
legal. He doesn’t get any of this anyway.”

{7 Four matters were addressed during the in-chambers conference. First, defense

counsel renewed an objection to testimony by a police detective concerning Matt’s
interview with authorities, She noted that the court had reserved ruling on this objection,

 

‘and she argued that the detective's testimony was cumulative of the auditory recording
played to the jury and that the prejudicial effect of the testimony outweighed any
probative value it might have, The prosecutor responded that he had elicited the

testimony in question for the purpose of clarifying certain inconsistencies in Matt's

 

statements. The court overruled the objection,
{8 Second, defense counsel requested permission to call Dave McCarthy, a probation

officer, to testi

 

about the: reputation for truthfulness of Shaun Nimocks, one of the
State's witnesses. The court ruled that McCarthy could testify about Nimocks’s
reputation for truthfulness but that McCarthy could not testify about any underlying
offenses or underlying allegations concerning probation violations.

{9 Third, defense counsel requested permission to present the testimony of a police
officer who was in possession of a note which (according to coiinsel) Oldhorn had writen

to Matt while in j

 

and jail staff hed intercepted. The prosecutor objected, arguing that
the note constituted hearsay and that defense counsel could not lay a proper foundation

for it. The court ruled that the note was inadmissible.

  

{10 Fourth, defense counsel moved to dismiss the charge for insufficient evidence.

 

She argued that the prosecutor had failed to prove the elements of the underlying felony
of robbery beyond a reasonable doubt, as required to satisfy the felony-murder nule under
§ 45-5-102(1){b), MCA. Moreover, she argued that the prosecutor had failed to establish

‘a “causal connection” between the felonious act and Rodriguez’s death. Lastly, she

 
argued that the accomplice testimony presented by the prosecution during its case was
insufficient because it was uncorroborated. ‘The court denied the motion,
{11 The jury ultimately found Matt guilty of felony homicide, and the District Court
sentenced him to 100 years in the Montana State Prison without the possibility of parole.
Matt now appeals his conviction.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
$12. Whether a criminal defendant's right to be present at a critical stage of his trial has
‘been violated is a question of constitutional law. Price v. State, 2007 MT 307, § 10, 340
Mont. 109, $10, 172 P.3d 1236, $ 10; see also State v. Mizenko, 2006 MT 11, 4 8, 330
‘Mont. 299, 4 8, 127 P.3d 458, 48. This Courts review of a question of constitutional
lawis plenary. State v, LaFreniere, 2008 MT 99, §7, 342 Mont. 309, $7, 180 P.3d 1161,
'{7; mre AS, 2004 MT 62, § 9, 320 Mont. 268, § 9, 87 P.34 408, § 9.

DISCUSSION

{13 Was Matt's constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of his trial
violated and, if so, was the violation harmless error?

{14 Matt contends that his state and federal constitutional rights were violated because
he was not included at the conference held at the close of the State's case in the trial

judge's chambers. Specifically, Matt relies on his rights of confrontation and due process

 

under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and his
rights to appear and defend in person and to meet the witnesses against him face to face

‘under Article Il, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution. Matt argues that the in-

 

chambers conference was a “critical stage” of his trial and that he did not effectively
‘waive his right to be present at this conference. Matt further argues that the violation of
his constitutional right to be present cannot be deemed harmless, and he therefore
concludes that his conviction must be reversed.

15. In response, the State argues that the in-chambers conference was not @ “critical
stage” of Matt's tral because “[nJo witnesses were questioned” and “the issues discussed
‘were purely legal.” The State also contends that a violation of a defendants right to be
present ata critical stage of the trial is not necessarily a “structural” violation. ‘Thus, the
State asserts that we must affirm Matt’s conviction.

‘The Right to be Present

 

{16 The federal constitutional right to be present at all criminal proceedings is one of
the most basic rights contained in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. State v. Tapson, 2001 MT 292, § 14, 307 Mont. 428, 4 14,
41 P3d 305, $14 (citing Mlinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058
(1970)). Although rooted “to a large extent” in the Confrontation Clause, the right to be
present is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause “in some
situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against
him." United States v. Gagnon, 470 US. $22, 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 1484 (1985) (per
curiam). A defendant has “a due process right to be present in his own person whenever
his presence has @ relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to
defend against the charge.” Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2658,
2667 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted), The right to be present stems in part

from the fact that by his physical presence, the defendant can hear and see the
proceedings and can participate in the presentation and preservation of his rights.
‘Bustamante v. Eyman, 456 F.2d 269, 274 (9th Cir. 1972); State v. Kennedy, 2004 MT 53,
‘16, 320 Mont. 161, $16, 85 P.3d 1279, $16. The right is also designed to safeguard the
public's interest in a fair and orderly judicial system. Bustamante, 456 F.2d at 274.75;
‘accord Tapson, § 14. Thus, the right to personal presence at all critical stages of the trial
is a “fundamental right{ | of each criminal defendant.” Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114,
117, 104 S. Ct. 453, 455 (1983) (per curiam).

417 Separate and independent of this federal right, “the right to appear and defend in
person” is contained in the Declaration of Rights of Montana's 1972 Constitution. See

Mont. Const. art. Il, § 24, As such, itis a fundamental right. Tapson, 415. In State v,

 

Reed, 65 Mont. 51, 210 P. 756 (1922), we considered identical language in Article II,
Section 16 of Montana's 1889 Constitution and observed that a defendant “has the legal
right to be present when the jury are hearing his case, and at all times during the
proceeding of the trial, when anything is done which in any manner affects his right.”
Reed, 65 Mont. at $8, 210 P. at 758 (internal quotation marks omitted). ‘The fundamental
right to be present applies without exception to those stages of the proceedings that are
deemed “critical.” State v. Roedel, 2007 MT 291, 4 59, 339 Mont, 489, $59, 171 P.3d
(694, 459. This Court has defined “critical stage” as “any step of the proceeding where
there is potential for substantial prejudice to the defendant.” Ranta v, State, 1998 MT 95,
$17, 288 Mont. 391, 4 17, 958 P.2d 670, $17 (internal quotation marks omitted),

{18 With these principles in mind, we conclude below that (1) the in-chambers

‘conference was a critical stage of Matt's tril, (2) Matt did not waive his right to be
present at the conference, and (3) the violation of Matt’s right to be present is not
hharmless error.
Critical Stage

$19 This Court has not directly addressed whether an in-chambers conference where
evidentiary issues and a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence are argued by counsel
and ruled on by the trial judge constitutes a “eritical stage” of the trial. We observe,
however, that the District Court’s consideration of Matt's motion to dismiss for
insufficient evidence was clearly a'step in the proceedings where there was “potential for
substantial prejudice” to Matt. Ranta, 17. At that point, the charge of felony homicide
could have been dismissed and Mat set free. The fact that his motion was denied and his
tial on the charge accordingly resumed most certainly “affectfed] his right.” Reed, 65

Mont. at 58, 210 P, at 758, The denial of the motion established that, in the District

 

Court’s view, the State had presented sufficient evidence upon which a rational trier of
fact could find the essential elements of felony homicide beyond a reasonable doubt. See
State v. Rosling, 2008 MT 62, § 35, 342 Mont. 1,435, 180 P.3d 1102, 4 35. This, in turn,
‘moved Matt one step closer to conviction and, ultimately, imprisonment.

$20 Similarly, the District Court's consideration of and ruling on the evidentiary issues
raised by defense counsel constituted a critical stage of Matt's trial, See e.g, Talton v.
Warden, 310 A.24 965, 967-68 (Conn. 1976); People v. Thomas, 208 N.W.2d 51, $6-57
(Mich, App. 1973); People v. Tellier, 648 N.Y.S.2d 659, 660 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept.

1996); People v. Casiano, 743 N.Y.S.24 405, 405-06 (N.Y. App. Div. Ist Dept. 200:

 

State v. Addison, 496 S.E.24 412, 413-14 (N.C. App. 1998); LaPointe v. State, 166
S.W.3d 287, 296-98 (Tex. App. 3d Dist, 2005). ‘The evidentiary issues raised and argued
at the in-chambers conference included: (1) whether the District Court would sustain
defense counsel's objection to testimony by a police detective concerning inconsistencies
in Matt’s statements to authorities; (2) whether defense counsel could call a probation
officer in order to impeach witness Nimocks’s credibility, and what the parameters of
defense counsel's questioning of this witness would be; and (3) whether defense counsel
could introduce into evidence the note allegedly written by Oldhorn to Matt while in jail

Each of these issues, regardless of the District Court's ultimate rulings, had the potential
to prejudice Matt's defense substantially.

{21 Finally, we do not agree with the State's suggestion that the in-chambers
conference was not a critical stage of Matt’s tril because the issues discussed were
“purely legal.” Even assuming, forthe sake of argument, that Matt would not have fully
grasped the legal aspects of the issues being discussed, there are other reasons why the
conference constituted a critical stage of his trial. Perhaps most obvious is the fact that
every criminal defendant in this state has the constitutional right to appear and defend “in
person.” Mont. Const. art. Il, § 24, In this connection, Matt could have participated in
the preservation of his rights at the conference. See Kennedy, $16 (“{Bly his or her

defendant can hear and see the proceedings, and can participate in

 

physical presence,
the preservation of his or her rights.”). He could have observed whether his attomey was
advocating for him zealously and professionally. He could have observed the demeanor
of the trial judge and the prosecutor. He could have heard their arguments, statements,

and rulings regarding the evidentiary issues and his motion to dismiss for insufficient
evidence. He could have provided information bearing on the matters being discussed
Based on his observations, he could have decided to change his plea in the hope of a
more lenient sentence. His observations also could have informed his decision to pursue
fan ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Ukimately, it was Matt who bore the
consequences of the District Court's rulings on the matters raised by defense counsel—
matters which, as stated above, had the potential to prejudice Matt's defense
substantially.
$22. For these reasons, we hold that under Article 11, Section 24, the in-chambers
conference at which the District Court heard arguments on evidentiary issues and ruled
‘on Matt's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence constituted a critical stage of his
‘tial, for which Matt had a constitutional right to be present.

Waiver
$23 The State contends that even ifthe in-chambers conference was a critical stage of
‘Matt’s tral, defense counsel “validly waived her client's presence” when she told the tral
{judge on the record: “I don’t need my client here. This is legal. He doesn’t get any of
this anyway.” Matt, however, argues that any purported waiver of his right to be present
‘was not valid, We agree with Matt,
{24 “Waiver” is defined as “the voluntary abandonment of @ known right.” State v
Bird, 2001 (2002') MT 2, 35, 308 Mont. 75, $35, 43 P.3d 266, $35 (emphasis and

internal quotation marks omitted); State v. McCarthy, 2004 MT 312, 4 32, 324 Mont. 1,

 

" Bird was decided January 15, 2002, and, thus, should have been given a 2002
designation. Due to a typographical error, however, it was published with a 2001 “MT”
number.
32, 101 P.3d 288, $32. As noted, the right to appear and defend in person is @
fundamental right. Tapson, $15. Before a defendant can waive a fundamental right,

such waiver, to be recognized by the courts, must be informed and intelligent, for there

 

«ean be no waiver by one who does not know his rights or what he is waiving. McCarthy,
32; Bird, 436. Thus, if a defendant chooses to waive his right to be present ata critical
stage of the trial, the trial court must obtain an on-the-record personal waiver by the
defendant acknowledging that the defendant voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly
waives that right, McCarthy, 4 32; Bird, 438; see also Tapson, 4 28; Roedel, 4 59; State
¥. Aceto, 2004 MT 247, $9 45-46, 323 Mont. 24, 49 45-46, 100 P.3d 629, $4 45-46. This
Court will not engage in presumptions of waiver. McCarthy, 32; Bird, §35; Tapson,
125;

(We refuse to presume that a defendant waived a constitutional right.”)

 

e also State v. Walker, 2007 MT 34, § 14, 336 Mont. 56, § 14, 153 P.3d.614, $14 _

 

{25 Here, because the in-chambers conference constituted a critical stage of Matt’s

trial, any decision to waive his right to be present had to be voluntarily, intelligently, and

 

knowingly made by Matt himself. McCarthy, § 32; Bird, 438; Aceto, $9 45-46. There is
nothing in the record, however, amounting to an on-the-record personal waiver by Matt
Of his right to appear in person at the conference. For that matter, nothing in the record
establishes that Matt was fully apprised of this right. Cf Tapson, 427 (“While Tapson’s
counsel professed to waive these rights, there is nothing in the record to indicate that
‘Tapson himself was apprised of these rights, nor is there anything in the record indicating,

that he personally made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of these rights.")
{26 In this regard, and contrary to the State's argument, defense counsel’s remarks
regarding Matt's absence are not sufficient to establish a valid waiver. Defense counsel's
statements that “I don’t mind if he’s not here” and “I don’t need my client here” do not
suggest that Matt, himself, had made an informed and voluntary decision to waive his
right. Rather, they suggest that defense counsel personally did not see the need for
‘Matt's presence, Of course, that perspective misses the mark, since the right at issue here
is not defense counsel's to waive if she does not “need” her client present. Rather, the

right and the deci

 

1 to waive it are personal to the defendant. See State v: Martin, 695
'N.W.2d $78, $86 (Mina. 2005) (“While the defendant can waive his right to be present at
4 stage of trial, the decision to waive the right is not for counsel to make but a personal
decision for defendant to make after consultation with counsel.” (internal quotation marks
omitted), abrogated on other grounds, State v. Moua Her, 750 N,W.2d 258, 265 n.5
(Minn, 2008); see also Bradshaw v. State, 806 A.24 131, 137 (Del. 2002) (“The general
rule is thatthe right to be present is aright that is personal to a defendant, and may not be
‘waived by that defendant's counsel.”); People v. Lofton, 740 N.E.2d 782, 797 (Ill. 2000)
(“When the accused is not present in person, the error is not cured by the presence of his
counsel, as his attorney has no power to waive his right to be present."), The error here,
therefore, is that the record does not affirmatively show that Matt himself voluntarily,
intelligently, and knowingly waived his right to be present atthe conference. McCarthy,
432; Bird, $38; Tapson, $27.

$27 The premise underlying the State's argument is that defense counsel may, on the

defendant's behalf, effectively waive his fundamental right to be present. The State cites

12
‘no authority in support of this proposition. More importantly, because Article Il, Section
24 guarantees the defendant's fundamental right to appear and defend “in person,” we are
‘not persuaded that this right may, as ere, be summarily waived by counsel absent an on-
the-tecord personal acknowledgment by the defendant that he has been advised of the
right to be present and, after consultation with counsel, has voluntarily, intelligently, and

knowingly given counsel his proxy to waive that ri

 

t. MoCarthy, § 32; Bird, 438. Such
waiver by Matt is not established here.
{28 In sum, defense counsel’s statements do not constitute an effective waiver of
‘Matt's right to be present atthe in-chambers conference, and the record does not contain
‘Voluntary, intelligent, and knowing waiver of this right by Matt personally, For these
reasons, we reject the State’s contention that Matt waived his right of presence.

Harmless Error
{29 Having determined that Matt was not present at a critical stage of his tral and that
he did not waive his right to be present, we tum to the final inquiry: whether this
constitutional violation was harmless.
{80 The Supreme Court has said that “there may be some constitutional errors which
in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may,
consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic.
reversal of the conviction.” Chapman v, California, 386 US. 18, 22, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827
(1967). Before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless under Chapman, the
reviewing court “must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt,” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S. CL at 828. Critically, “the State

13
bears the burden of proving that an error passes muster under this standard.” Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1717 (1993); see also Chapman, 386
US. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828 (“{T]he original common-law harmless-error rule put the
burden on the beneficiary of the error either to prove that there was no injury or to suffer
a reversal of his erroneously obtained judgment.’

{31 At the same time, the Supreme Court has recognized that “[sJome constitutional
violations . .. by their very nature cast so much doubt on the faimess of the trial process
that, as a matter of law, they can never be considered harmless.” Satterwhite v. Texas,
486 U.S. 249, 256, 108 S. Ct. 1792, 1797 (1988); see also Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23, 87
S.Ct. at 827-28 (*{T}here are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their
infraction can never be treated as harmless error.”). However, the Supreme Court has

found a constitutional violation to be subject to “automatic reversal” only in “a very

 

limited class of cases.” Neder v. United States, $27 US. 1, 8, 119 8. Ct, 1827, 1833
(1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Examples of such violations include lack of
‘an impartial trial judge (Tumey v. Ohio, 273 US. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437 (1927)), total
deprivation of the right to counsel (Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792
(1963)), conflict of interest in representation throughout the entire proceeding (Holloway
v. Arkansas, 435 US. 475, 98 S. Ct. 1173 (1978)), the right to selfepresentation at trial
(MeKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 US. 168, 104 S. Ct. 944 (1984), the right to a public tial
(Waller v. Georgia, 467 US. 39, 104 S.Ct, 2210 (1984)), unlawful exclusion of grand
jurors of the defendant's race (Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 106 S. Ct. 617 (1986)),

and an erroneous reasonable-doubt instruction to the jury (Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.

14
275, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993). See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 n. 8, 87 S. Ct. at 828 n. &
Satterwhite, 486 USS. at 256, 108 S. Ct, at 1797; Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 US. 279,
309-10, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1264-65 (1991); Johnson v. United States, 520 US. 461,
468-69, 117 S, Ct. 1544, 1549-50 (1997)

{32 These sorts of constitutional violations (listed in the preceding paragraph) require
automatic reversal because they are “structural defects” in the constitution of the trial
mechanism, Fulminante, 499 US. at 309, 111 S, Ct. at 1265, because they “infect” and
“contaminate” the framework within which the trial procéeds, Brecht, 507 US. at
629-30, 113 §. Ct. at 1717; Satterwhite, 486 USS. at 257, 108 S. Ct. at 1798; Fulminante,
499 US. at 310, 111 S.Ct, at 1265, and because they “necessarily render a trial
fundamentally unfair,” Rose v. Clark, 478 US. 570, 577, 106 S. Ct. 3101, 3106 (1986).
Given the nature of a “structural defect” (as distinguished from ‘an error in the trial
process itself"), structural defects “defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards.”
Fulminante, 499 US. at 309, 310, 111 S. Ct. at 1265.

$33 For purposes of analyzing whether the violation of Matt's right of presence under
Article II, Section 24 constitutes harmless error, we will apply the Supreme Court's
harmless-error framework, with one modification, as summarized below. In so doing, we
acknowledge that we must “guarantee the minimum rights established by the United
‘States Constitution” but that we otherwise “are not compelled to march lock-step with
pronouncements of the United States Supreme Cour,” State v. Martinez, 2003 MT 65,
51, 314 Mont. 434, $51, 67 P.3d 207, $51, since the provisions of Article Il “each

constitute separate and enforceable constitutional rights insofar as the jurisdiction of the

1s
State of Montana extends,” Madison v. Yunker, 180 Mont. $4, 60, $89 P.2d 126, 129
(1978).

{B4 We have long recognized the proposition that not all constitutional violations
‘amount to reversible error. See e.g. State v. LaMere, 2000 MT 45, $22, 39, 298 Mont.
358, $22, 39, 2 P.3d 204, $9 22, 39; State v. Johnson, 233 Mont. 473, 476-77, 760 P.24
760, 761-62 (1988). We have also recognized that a constitutional violation requires
‘automatic reversal of a conviction if the violation contaminates the framework within
‘which the trial proceeds or if the constitutional right is s0 basic to a fair trial that its
infraction can never be treated as harmless. See LaMere, $923, 48-50, Conversely, a
constitutional violation that falls outside this limited class of “automatic reversal” cases
must be evaluated for harmlessness. See LaMere, $9 22, 39-45; see also e.g. State v.
Gladue, 208 Mont. 174, 182-83, 677 P.2d 1028, 1032 (1984).

{85 Thus, the first question is whether, under the circumstances of the particular case,

the violation of the right to be present constitutes a “structural defect"

 

» whether it
‘contaminated the framework within which the trial proceeded or casts so much doubt on
the fairness of the trial that it cannot be treated as harmless—thus requiring automatic
reversal. Ifthe violation does not fallin this eategory, the second question is whether the
violation is harmless. In this connection, the Supreme Court has made it clear that “(t]he
State bears the burden of proving that an error passes muster under [the harmless-error]
standard.” Brecht, 507 US. at 630, 113 S.Ct. at 17175 see also Chapman, 386 US. at
24, 87 S.Ct. at 828, In implementing this rule, however, we decline to employ the

“beyond a reasonable doubt” terminology articulated in Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87

16
S.Ct. at 828, and subsequent cases, “Beyond a reasonable doubt” is a standard
prescribed fora trier of fact. See Oberson v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 2007 MT
293, 4.34, 339 Mont. 519, 34, 171 P.3d 715, $34 (Leaphart, Nelson, & Cotter, J,
concurring) (citing Branson School Dist, RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F:3d 619, 636 n. 15 (10th
Cir, 1998)), In Chapman, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “[t]here is litle, ifany,
difference” between a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard and a “{no] reasonable
possibilty” standard. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S. Ct. at 828; see also United States
¥, Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 679 n. 9 105 S, Ct. 3375, 3382 n, 9 (1985). Notably, we apply
the latter standard when evaluating whether erroneously admitted evidence contributed to
the defendant's conviction. See State v. Van Kirk, 2001 MT 184, $46, 306 Mont. 215,
146, 32 P.3d 735, $46. Likewise, here, we conclude that the “no reasonable possibility”
standard is preferable, in terms of terminology, to the “beyond a reasonable doubt”

standard, given that there

 

tle, if any, difference between these two standards in terms
of the burden on the State, and given that this Court does not sit as a fact-finder when
‘evaluating a constitutional violation for harmlessness. Accordingly, the burden on the
State is to demonstrate that there is no reasonable possibility the violation of the
defendant's Anticle II, Section 24 right to be present prejudiced the defendant,

{86 We note that the foregoing analytical approach is similar to, but distinguishable
from, the framework set forth in Van Kirk. In Van Kirk, we articulated a two-step
analysis for determining whether an alleged error prejudiced a criminal defendant’ right

to a fair trial and, therefore, is reversible. As here, the first step is to determine whether

 

the claimed error is “structural,” ie., whether it affects the framework within which the

”
trial proceeds. See Van Kirk, 438. We noted that structural error “is presumptively
prejudicial and is not subject to harmless error review.” Van Kirk, § 38. At this juncture,

however, the Van Kirk analysis diverges from the approach set out above for analyzing,

 

right-of-presence violations. In Van Kirk, we explained that, in contrast to “structural”

error, “tial” error “typically occurs during the presentation of a case to the jury” and “is

 

amenable to qualitative assessment by a reviewing cour for prejudicial impact relative to
the other evidence introduced at trial.” Van Kirk, $40. We held that, “in order to prove

that trial error was harmless, the State must demonstrate that there is no reasonable

 

    

possibility that the inadmissible evidence might have contributed to the conviction.” Van

sd, “the State must demonstrate that the fact-finder

 

Kirk, 447. “To do this,” we explai
‘was presented with admissible evidence that proved the same facts as the tainted
evidence and, qualitatively, by comparison, the tainted evidence would not have
contributed to the conviction.” Van Kirk, § 47.

{37 Notably, this “trial error” test also places the burden on the State to demonstrate
that the error was harmless. But the substantive inquiries under the test, which focus on

admissible and ina

 

ible evidence (see Van Kirk, 40-47), are unsuitable for

 

determining whether a nonstructural, rightof-presence violation is harmless. For one
thing, the right to be present at a critical-stage proceeding serves a broader range of
interests than simply ensuring that inadmissible evidence is properly excluded at tial. As
explained above, the right more generally guarantees the defendant the ability to appear
‘and defend in person and to participate in the presentation and preservation of his or her

rights. Moreover, violation of the right to be present is not necessarily harmless just
because there is no reasonable possiblity inadmissible evidence contributed to the
conviction. If the trial judge communicates with a deliberating jury in the defendant's
absence (see e.g. State v. Tapson, discussed below), a qualitative assessment of the
evidence introduced at trial does not reveal whether this violation is harmless. For these
reasons, we conclude that Van Kirk's “trial error” testis inapt here and thatthe State must
demonstrate harmlessness in light of the interests the right of presence was designed to
protect

{38 To summarize, therefore, we hold that once it has been established that the
defendant's fundamental right to be present has been violated, prejudice is presumed. If
the violation constitutes a “structural defect,” then the presumption of prejudice is
conclusive, since the error is not amenable to harmless-error analysis. If the violation is
‘not structural, then the State has the burden to rebut the presumption by demonstrating,
there is no reasonable possibility the violation prejudiced the defendant in light of the
interests the right of presence was designed to protect.

{89 Although this approach has not been articulated in this manner in our recent right-

 

of-presence cases, the approach is nevertheless consistent with our resolutions of those
‘cases. In State v, Tapson, 2001 MT 292, 307 Mont. 428, 41 P.3d 305, we decided that
‘Tapson’s right to be present was violated when the trial judge entered the jury room to
deliver new verdict forms and to instruct the jury, without counsel or Tapson present and
without « waiver by Tapson of his right to be present. See Tapson, $¥]14-33. As to
whether this violation was harmless, we observed that “alithough the most important

factor here isthe actual intrusion of the Judge into the jury room during deliberations, the

19
lack of a record makes it impossible to say that, beyond a reasonable doubt, there was no
prejudice to the defendant, and therefore harmless error.”  Tapson, $31 (internal
‘quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we held that the district court had committed
reversible error by entering the jury room. Tapson, 433. Implicit in our reasoning are
the conclusions that the constitutional violation was amenable to harmless error review
and that, absent a showing of harmlessness in the record, the conviction had to be
reversed.

{40 Similarly, in State v. Bird, 2001 (2002) MT 2, 308 Mont, 75, 43 P.3d 266, we
determined that Bird's right to be present was violated due to his exclusion from a
number of individual voir dire sessions conducted in chambers, See Bird, $9 23-40. On
the question of whether this violation was harmless, we held that “jury selection errors
are ‘structural’ errors and as such, they are not amenable to harmless error review.” Bird,

$39 (iting LaMere, 9939-50). Accordingly, we reversed

 

's conviction and
sentence, Bird, $40.

$41 In State v. Kennedy, 2004 MT $3, 320 Mont. 161, 85 P.3d 1279, the tial judge
questioned one of the jurors in chambers concerning the juror’s telephone contact, on the
second day of trial, with a detective who was scheduled to testify. See Kennedy,
11,8, 10. We held that this meeting between the judge and the juror constituted &
critical stage of Kennedy's trial. Kennedy, $9 26-27. We further held that the court
violated Kennedy's right of presence when it excluded him from this meeting. Kennedy,
427. With regard to whether this violation was harmless, we first observed that, unlike

Tapson, the record was sufficient to assess whether Kennedy had been prejudiced.

20
Kennedy, 133. We ultimately concluded that the error was harmless, reasoning that
“such exclusion did not cause Kennedy prejudice because any opportunity Kennedy
missed to question {the juror} about his conversation with {the detective] was mooted
when {the juror] was removed from the jury panel and [the detective] was excluded as a
witness.” Kennedy, $34, Thus, we found the error in excluding Kennedy from the
‘meeting to be harmless based on the impact (or lack thereof) that this violation had on his
right to an impartial jury.

42. Lastly, in State v. Mann, 2006 MT 160, 332 Mont, 476, 139 P.3d 159, we
‘concluded thatthe district court violated Mann's constitutional right to be present when it
‘excluded him from a pretrial hearing, the purpose of which was to decide whether Mann
‘would represent himself or proceed with his current counsel. Mann, $917, 21. During
this hearing, defense counsel portrayed Mann in a negative light. See Mann, $9 20-21
On the question of whether this violation required reversal, we first noted that “we
consider the effect the violation has on the defendant to determine whether the defendant
suffered any conceivable prejudice.” Mann, 415. We then observed that Mann's
exclusion from the hearing prevented him from exercising in a meaningful way his

constitutional rights to receive effective assistance of counsel or to represent himself at

 

trial. Mann, $21. Accordingly, we reversed his convietion and remanded for a new trial.
Mann, $21.

$43. Tuming now to the case at hand, the frst question we must answer is whether,
under the circumstances of this ease, the violation of Matt’s right to be present atthe in-

chambers conference constituted a “structural defect.” Cf. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S.

2
114, 117 n, 2, 104 8. Ct. 453, 455 n.2 (1983) (per curiam) (observing that “violations of
the right to be present during all critical stages of the proceedings” are subject to
harmless error analysis, “unless the deprivation, by its very nature, cannot be harmless”).

__ Matt suggests thatthe violation constitutes a structural defect under Tapson and Bird.
‘The State, however, argues based on Kennedy and Mann that the violation is not
structural. We agree with the State, Nothing discussed at the conference and ruled on by
the District Court concemed or-affected the framework within which Matt’s trial
proceeded or necessarily rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. The court overruled
dofense counsel's objection to testimony by a police detective, granted defense counsel's

;, denied

 

request to call a probation officer to impeach witness Nimocks's ered
defense counsel's request to introduce into evidence the note allegedly written by
Oldhorn to Matt while in jail, and denied defense counsel's motion to dismiss for
insufficient evidence. None of these issues and rulings contaminated the trial mechanism
along the lines that a biased judge, lack of counsel, an erroneous reasonable-doubt
instruction, ora jury-selection error would.

{44 Having determined that the constitutional violation here was not structural, the
second question is whether the State has demonstrated that there is no reasonable
possibility the violation prejudiced Matt in light ofthe interests the right of presence was
designed to protect. In this regard, we note that the State does not provide a harmless-
crror analysis in its appellate brief. Rather, the State’s analysis under Issue 3 focuses on

two matters: whether the in-chambers conference was a critical-stage proceeding, and

 

whether defense counsel validly waived Matt’s right to be present at the conference. The

2
State does assert that Matt has failed to demonstrate how his absence “made the in-

 

chambers conference unfair” and how his presence “may have made a difference.” These
assertions, however, reflect an incorrect assumption that Matt has the burden to
demonstrate prejudice flowing from the violation of his right to be present. Apparently in
the State's view, if the right of presence is violated, then the violation is presumed
harmless and the defendant has to demonstrate the contrary in order to obtain relief. We
reject this approach, not only because itis directly contrary to Supreme Court precedent,
see Brécht, S07 US. at 630, 113 S, Ct, at 1717 ("The State bears the burden of proving
that an error passes muster under {the harmless-error] standard.”), but also because it is
not logically sound, see Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S. Ct. at 828 (*{T]he original
common-law harmiless-error rule put the burden on the beneficiary of the error either to
prove that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously obtained
judgment."), ‘That the burden to show harmlessness is on the State should come as no
surprise, given that we reversed the defendant's conviction in Tapson because it was

impossible to say that ... there was no prejudice to the defendant, and therefore

 

harmless error,” Tapson, 31 (internal quotation marks omitted), and given thatthe State
has the burden under our analogous test in Van Kirk “to demonstrate that the error at
issue was not prejudicial,” Van Kirk, $42.

{45 Accordingly, because the State has not met its burden of demonstrating that there
is no reasonable possibility Matt was prejudiced by the violation his right to be present at
the in-chambers conference, we hold that this constitutional error eannot be deemed

harmless.

2B
CONCLUSION

 

{46 The in-chambers hearing held in Matt's absence at the close of the State’s ease
chief was a critical stage of his trial, Matt did not validly waive his right to be present at
the hearing, and failing to include him at the hearing violated his right under Article I,
Section 24 of the Montana Constitution to appear and defend in person. The State has
rot met its burden of demonstrating that this error was harmless. Accordingly, we
reverse Matt’s conviction of deliberate homicide (felony murder), vacate the District
Court's judgment, and remand this case for a new trial,

{47 Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Justice

We Concur:

 

th uA (at

 

4
Justice John Wamer dissents.
448 I dissent. The Court invents a burden on the State to somehow show beyond a
reasonable doubt there is no reasonable possibility that Matt's absence from the hearing
at the close of the State's evidence prejudiced him. The Court then ignores the record as
well as § 46-20-701(1), MCA, and concludes the judgment must be reversed--not because
Matt was prejudiced, but because the State did not present a sufficient response to an
argument thet Matt did not make.

{49 Today, the Court sneaks up on the State by creating a new burden it must satisfy if
prejudice is alleged. The Court’s holding today contravenes our holding in State v.
Peters, 146 Mont. 188, 405 P.2d 642 (1965). In Peters, the defendant was not present on
‘motions to exclude evidence and dismiss the information. The Court held a defendant's

constitutional and statutory right to be present at trial does not encompass proceedings

 

before the court involving matters of law because he would have merely been a spectator.
Peters, 146 Mont. at 196, 405 P.2d at 646-47. At the hearing in question in this case,
only matters of law were discussed. As the record is complete, and Matt points to
nothing of substance where he could have been of assistance to his counsel, nor to any
error in the District Court's rulings, this Court should not reverse a conviction on appeal
because the State did not invent a prejudice argument for Matt and then proceed to
successfully refute it.

{50 No previous Montana precedent concerning the right to be present requires the
State to satisfy a “burden.” See Mann, $¥ 12-17; State v. Riggs, 2005 MT 124, 4 54, 327
Mont. 196, $ 54, 113 P.3d 281, 54; Kennedy, Tf 32-34; State v. Stroud, 210 Mont. 58,

28
67-68, 683 P.2d 459, 464 (1984); See also DuBray v. State, 2008 MT 121, $ 36-37, 342
Mont. 520, $f) 36-37, 182 P.3d 753, $¥) 36-37. If a defendant's right to be present at a

critical stage of his trial is denied, courts are to review for possible constitutional

 

violations “in light of the whole record.” U.S. v. Rosales-Rodriguez, 289 F.3d 1106,
1110 (9" Cir, 2002) (quoting U.S. v. Gagnon, 470 U.S, 522, 526-27, 105 S. Ct. 1482,
1484 (1985).

{51 In Tapson there is a reference to “reasonable doubt.” Tapson, { 31. But, the Court
‘imposes no burden on the prosecution to show the error was harmless. Rather than place
some sort of burden on the State at the appellate level, this Court should carefully
‘examine the record to determine if the denial of the right to be present could have
reasonably contributed to a conviction. If our examination of the record reveals a
defendant was prejudiced by his absence, or if the record is inadequate to determine the
defendant was not prejudiced by his absence, we have no choice but to reverse a
conviction.

{52 In Riggs, the Court determined the district court’s error was harmless because “the
defendant ... made no persuasive claim of prejudice arising” from his absence when the
court spoke to two jurors outside of his presence, Riggs, 4 54. The Court recently

reiterated the Riggs language in DuBray. DuBray, $9] 36-38. From

 

language in
Riggs and DuBray, it is obvious a defendant must make a persuasive claim to the
appellate court that he was prejudiced.

453. The Court today posits the State “incorrect[ly] assum{ed]" Matt has the burden to
demonstrate prejudice. Opinion, § 44. However, there is no indication the State assumed

26
anything, It responded in the only way it could to an unsupported assertion of prejudice
by pointing out that the record showed no prejudice. Riggs and DuBray stand for the
proposition that a defendant who wishes his conviction reversed on appeal because he
‘was absent from a hearing must point to something in the record indicating he might have
been prejudiced, Matt did not do so, His real argument is that his absence constitutes
structural error and reversal is automatic.
{54 At the appellate level, parties do not present evidence to carry a “burden” of
“persuading’a fact-finder to view the facts in a way that favors that party.” Black's Law
Dictionary 190 (Bryan A. Gamer ed., 7* ed., West 1999). They make arguments. This
Court's job is to consider the arguments, review the record, and then determine which
party's argument is more persuasive. By statute and applicable precedent, our appellate
review of the record is not to be conducted in terms of burdens of proof. Rather, the
decision is to be made by a review of the record to determine if the error resulted in
prejudice, as required by § 46-20-701(1), MCA:

‘Whenever the record on appeal contains any order, ruling, or proceeding of

the trial court against the convicted person affecting the convicted person’s

substantial rights on the appeal of the cause, together with any required

‘objection of the convicted person, the supreme court on that appeal shall

consider the orders, rulings, or proceedings and the objections thereto and

shall reverse or affirm the cause on the appeal according to the substantial

rights of the respective parties, as shown upon the record. A cause may not

be reversed by reason of any error committed by the trial court against the

convicted person unless the record shows that the error was prejudicial.
Section 46-20-701(1), MCA. This approach is consistent with our analysis in Mann and
Kennedy where, atthe prejudice phase of the analysis, there are no discussions of burdens

orstandards of proof. Mann, $$ 19-21; Kennedy, § 34.
27
{55 The Court quotes Mann, saying: “[o]n the question of whether this violation

 

required reversal, we first noted that, ‘we consider the effect the violation has on the
defendant to determine whether the defendant suffered any conceivable prejudice.""
Opinion, $ 42. Mann does not place a burden on the State. The language quoted by the
‘Court does not limit this Court’s ability to consider the entire record.

{56 The Court's statement in 14--that Matt argues the violation of his constitutional
Tight to be present at the hearing at the close of the State's evidence cannot be deemed
harmless~is misleading. In the issues Matt presents for appellate review, he first recites a
‘portion of what happened atthe hearing, and then states, asa fact, his constitutional right
to be present was violated. The thrust of Matt’s argument concerning this appeal issue is
simply that this Court, in Bird and in Tapson, concluded a structural error existed if @
defendant was not present at a critical stage of his trial, and had not waived his presence.
Matt then acknowledges the Court backed away from that rule in Kennedy, but goes on to
state that Kennedy is no longer good law as the United States District Court disagreed
with that decision. Thus, Matt's primary argument is that this Court should conclude his
absence at the hearing in question was structural error, and thus the judgment must
‘automatically be reversed,

{57 In an offhand assertion, without even attempting a harmless error analysis, Matt's

 

 

brief states in a conclusory fashion that itis “easy to conceive” how his absence created
prejudice. Matt does not make any argument supported by authorities that any of the

rulings ofthe District Court atthe hearing in question were erroneous, that things would

28
hhave been different had he been there, of that he was in any way led astray. He only
states in a conclusory fashion he was prejudiced.

¥58 In $15, the Court mentions that the State argued the in-chambers hearing was not
4 critical stage of the trial. The Court decides this was a critical stage of the trial. The
Court then notes the State argued that a violation of a defendant's right to be present is
not necessarily structural error. The Court agrees that Matt's absence was not @
structural error. The Court then reverses Matt's conviction by overlooking that the State
responded in the only way it could to Matt's offhand, unsupported claim he was
somehow prejudiced by his absence at a critical stage of his trial. As Matt did not say
how he was prejudiced, the State pointed out in its response brief that Matt failed to
demonstrate how his absence prejudiced him,

‘159 Matt made no attempt to point out any error in the District Court's rulings at the

in-chambers hearing. He did not make a cogent argument how his presence would have

 

made any substantial difference. Nor did he make any intelligible argument concemi
how he suffered prejudice because of his absence, The Court has ignored its oft repeated
rule that it will not consider unsupported arguments in support of positions taken on
appeal. State v. Humphrey, 2008 MT 358, {| 11, 346 Mont. 150, § 11, 194 P.3d 643,411
(declining to consider an issue because defendant’s argument consisted of an “offhand
assertion” supported only by one distinguishable case); State v. Ochadleus, 2005 MT 88,
132, 326 Mont. 441, $ 32, 110 P.3d 448, 4 32 (citing State v. Rodarte, 2002 MT 317,

115, 313 Mont, 131, $15, 60 P.3d 983, 415). Even under the Court’s incorrect analysis

29
of the law, itis improper to reverse the judgment because the State did not adequately
refute arguments Matt did not make.
{60 The record affirmatively shows that Matt's presence at the hearings would have

been useless, as the District Court’s rulings were all correct. The United States

 

 

Constitution and the Montana Constitution do not assure “the privilege of presence when
presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow." State v. Schenk, 1S1 Mont.
493, 499, 444 P.2d 861, 864 (1968) (quoting Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
291 US. 97, 54S. Ct. 330 (1934), overruled on other grounds, Malloy v. Hogan, 378
US.'1, 84 S. Ct. 1489 (1964)). The end result of this case is that a deliberate homicide

conviction is reversed, based on the shadow of a benefit--at best-to Matt

61 Matt and his

 

counsel will be thrilled that the Court has taken this opportunity to
reverse his conviction by creating a new appellate burden that he neither thought of nor
argued for, and that the State had no inkling that it was required to satisfy. However, I

dissent.

 

District Court Judge Laurie McKinnon, sitting in for Justice Morris, joins in the
foregoing dissent.

 

District Judge

30
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray, specially concurring.

{62 I concur in the Court’s Opinion. I write separately to address the foregoing
Dissent's reliance on State v. Riggs, 2005 MT 124, 327 Mont. 196, 113 P.3d 281, and
DuBray v, State, 2008 MT 121, 342 Mont. 520, 182 P.34 753. In my view, both cases are
readily distinguishable on their procedural facts and, therefore, also inapplicable on.the
law. I premise my concurrence, however, on @ much more fundamental—indeed, fatal—
flaw in relying on Riggs and DuBray.

{63 The United States Supreme Court has held that, “before a federal constitutional
error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Chapman v. California, 386 US. 18, 24, 87 8. Ct. 824,
828 (1967). Implicit in this standard is the premise that a constitutional error is harmful
on its face, unless shown to be otherwise. Indeed, the Supreme Court pointed out that
“the original common-law harmless-error rule put the burden on the beneficiary of the
error either to prove that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroncously
obtained judgment.” Chapman, 386 US. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at $28. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court has stated that “[tJhe State bears the burden of proving that an error
passes muster under [the Chapman] standard.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, $07 US. 619,
630, 113 8. Ct. 1710, 1717 (1993).

$64 This Court is not required to march lockstep with pronouncements of the United
States Supreme Court if Montana’s Constitution provides greater protection than is

‘guaranteed by the United States Constitution, We are required, however, to guarantee the

31
minimum rights established by the United States Constitution. See State v. Martinez,
2003 MT 65, $51, 314 Mont. 434, { S1, 67 P.3d 207, $51. As a result, we simply
cannot—in the face of a violation of the constitutional right to be present at critical
stages—ignore the Supreme Court's determination that the State bears the burden of
proving that a constitutional error passes muster under the Chapman standard.

{65 Finally, the Dissent’s concem over the burden placed on the State here is, in my
view, somewhat excessive. The “burden” being placed in this case is, first, on defense

counsel to stop purporting to waive the rights of the accused being represented and,

 

instead, to insist on the presence of the client. The burden is placed, secondarily, on the
trial court to stop allowing such nonchalant waivers. If counsel for the accused and for
the State work to ensure that criminal defendants are present at critical stages, the State

will not face any additional burden at al
chief Nstice

Justices Patricia O. Cotter, James C. Nelson and W. William Leaphart joi
foregoing special concurrence of Chief Justice Karla M. Gray.

Ahi Ci

 

 

Z Monto,

32
Justice Jim Rice, dissenting,

 

165 I cannot conclude there is reversible error when a trial judge, during a midctrial
‘conference, inquires of defense counsel concerning the presence of the defendant and
receives defense counsel’s assurance that the defendant’s presence is not necessary, and
then conducts the conference without the defendant. I agree with the State that we should
affirm on waiver grounds, as I believe defense counsel's actions constitute invited error
and that reversal on such grounds undermines our legal system.

167 Ofcourse, no objection was made with regard to Matt's presence in the conference,
at issue here, Just the opposite, in response to the District Court's inquiry, defense
‘counsel assured the court that the conference could continue without the Defendant. In
Williams v, Fla,, 687 So. 24 858 (Fla. Dist. App. 1997), the Florida court concluded that
such actions by defense counsel with regard to his client's presence during trial
constituted “invited error” which was not reversible. “It is well-established law that
where the trial judge has extended counsel an opportunity to cure any error, and counsel
fails to take advantage of the opportunity, such error, if any, was invited and will not
warrant reversal.” Williams, 687 So. 24 at 859 (citations omitted).

{68 Here, the District Court gave defense counsel the explicit opportunity to correct
the error, but counsel did not do so. Under these circumstances, defense counsel's waiver
of the defendant's right to appear should be affirmed to protect the integrity of the trial
process from invited error. A trial judge must be able to rely upon the assurances given

by defense counsel in response to issues raised by the judge during the course of the trial

33
if the legal system is to properly function. We should not burden the judge with the duty
of second-guessing defense counsel's trial decisions, as there is a process in place for
counsel's actions to be later challenged and reviewed. Indeed, a trial involves numerous
potential waivers of a defendant's constitutional rights, such as the decision to forego
cross-examination of a stale witness, the decision for a defendant to testify, and the
decision to pass a jury panel for cause.

$69. I would affirm on the basis of this invited error. The Defendant, ifhe chose, could
pursue the recourse of challenging his counse’s actions within a post-conviction

proceeding as ineffective,

Honorable Laurie McKinnon joins in the

 
 
     

innon, District Court
Judge, sitting in place of Justice Brian Morris

34