Case Title: State v. Buckner

Citation: 351 N.C. 401

Docket Number: 444A93-2

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2000-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 444A93-2
FILED: 7 APRIL 2000
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
GEORGE CALE BUCKNER
On writ of certiorari pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(b) to
review an order signed 3 November 1998 by Baker, J., in Superior
Court, Gaston County, granting the State’s motion for discovery
under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(e).  Heard in the Supreme Court
14 December 1999.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by John H. Watters,
Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.
E. Fitzgerald Parnell, III, and Joseph E. Zeszotarski, Jr.,
for defendant-appellant.
Center for Death Penalty Litigation, by Kenneth J. Rose, on
behalf of the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers and
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amici
curiae.
WAINWRIGHT, Justice.
In September 1993, defendant George Cale Buckner was tried
on charges of first-degree murder, robbery with a dangerous
weapon, conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon,
felonious larceny, and felonious possession of stolen goods.  On
20 September 1993, the jury returned verdicts of guilty as to all
counts.  The jury recommended the death penalty.
On 8 October 1993, the trial court sentenced defendant to
death for first-degree murder and to consecutive terms of
imprisonment of forty years for robbery with a dangerous weapon,
ten years for conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous
weapon, and ten years for felonious larceny.  On 8 December 1995,
this Court found no error as to the convictions of first-degree
murder, conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon, and
robbery with a dangerous weapon, but arrested judgment on the
conviction of felonious larceny.  See State v. Buckner, 342 N.C.
198, 464 S.E.2d 414 (1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 828, 136 L.
Ed. 2d 47 (1996).
On 5 August 1997, post-conviction counsel for defendant
filed a motion for appropriate relief alleging that trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel at both the guilt and
sentencing phases of defendant’s capital trial.  Defendant
alleged he received ineffective assistance by trial counsel’s:
1.
“failure to discover and present evidence tending to
prove another committed the murder”;
2.
“failure to adequately warn Defendant of the
consequences of his taking the witness stand and . . .
failure to object to the prosecutor’s alleged improper
closing argument and the trial court’s inadequate
curative instruction”;
3.
“failure to adequately inform Defendant about the
prosecution’s subjecting him to cross-examination about
his prior criminal record”;
4.
“failure to properly prepare Defendant for cross-
examination concerning the type of speedometer in the
get-away vehicle”;
5.
“ineffective[ness] by virtue of his failing to demand
Defendant be present at all stages of his trial”;
6.
“ineffective[ness] for stipulating to Defendant’s prior
common law robbery and for failing to present rebuttal
evidence”;
7.
“ineffective[ness] in developing sufficient evidence in
support of the mitigating circumstances presented to
the jury”;
8.
“ineffective[ness] for failing to sufficiently
investigate and present evidence of other mitigating
circumstances”;
9.
“ineffective[ness] in failing to present evidence upon
which a jury could find Defendant’s criminal history
was not significant”; and
10.
“ineffective[ness] in failing to request peremptory
instructions on non-statutory mitigating
circumstances.”
(Emphasis added.)
In response to defendant’s motion for appropriate relief,
the State requested, by way of a motion for discovery, “access to
and copies of all notes, documents, communications or work
product touching directly or indirectly on the issues enumerated
[in defendant’s motion for appropriate relief] and the
investigation, preparation for trial, tactical decisions, and
strategy relevant to Defendant’s allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel.”
Post-conviction counsel provided the State with copies of
written correspondence between trial counsel and defendant. 
Defendant’s trial counsel, however, refused to speak to the State
and filed an affidavit stating he was ineffective and was the
attorney primarily responsible for investigation, preparation,
and presentation of the mitigation evidence at sentencing.  No
summaries of any oral communications between trial counsel and
defendant were provided to the State.
After considering the oral arguments of the parties, the
evidence of record, and the parties’ submitted written arguments,
the superior court entered an order on 3 November 1998 granting
the State’s motion for discovery.  The superior court made, inter
alia, the following findings of fact:
5.
Counsel for the State made several inquiries
concerning discovery necessary to represent the
interest of the State in defending against the
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.
6.
Post-conviction counsel for [defendant], provided
copies of correspondence between the defense
attorneys at trial and the defendant.
7.
Access to any other material related to the issues
of ineffective assistance of counsel has been
denied the State’s attorney.
8.
The State, on September 28, 1998, formally filed
its Discovery Motion and requested access to and
copies of all notes, documents, communications, or
work product touching directly or indirectly on
the issues alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel.  The State also asks the right to
interview trial counsel to glean the substance of
any oral communications relevant to the
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The superior court then concluded as a matter of law:
1.
As to those issues alleging ineffective assistance
of counsel, [defendant] has waived the
attorney/client privilege and any privilege having
to do with work product related to those issues.
2.
The waiver of the attorney/client privilege was
automatic upon the filing of the allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel, as it related
to both oral and written communications between
[defendant] and his trial counsel.  N.C.G.S. §
15A-1415(e).  State v. Taylor, 327 N.C. 147, 393
S.E.2d 801 (1990)[,] provides the [court] with the
inherent power to determine that work product
related to the issues alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel be waived.
3.
Nothing in the passage of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(e)
limits the inherent authority of this court to
determine a waiver of attorney/client privilege or
that of work product privilege.
The superior court’s order stated the State’s attorney was
to be provided access to and copies of all notes, documents,
communications, or work product touching directly or indirectly
on the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel
enumerated in defendant’s motion for appropriate relief. 
Additionally, the superior court ordered that the State’s
attorney have the right to interview trial counsel to learn of
any oral communications relevant to the trial investigation and
preparation, tactical decisions, or strategy relevant to
defendant’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.
On 22 July 1999, this Court allowed defendant’s petition for
writ of certiorari to review the superior court’s order.
Defendant argues the superior court erred as a matter of law
in failing to recognize the effect of the legislature’s enactment
of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(e) by not applying the statutory language,
and in acting without authority in ordering trial counsel to
submit to an interview.
First, we address defendant’s argument that the superior
court’s order failed to recognize the effect of the legislature’s
enactment of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(e) by not applying the statutory
language.  In 1996, the legislature enacted “An Act to Expedite
the Postconviction Process in North Carolina,” ch. 719, 1995 N.C.
Sess. Laws 389, which added discovery provisions, including
subsection (e), to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415.  Subsection (e) provides:
Where a defendant alleges ineffective assistance of
prior trial or appellate counsel as a ground for the
illegality of his conviction or sentence, he shall be
deemed to waive the attorney-client privilege with
respect to both oral and written communications between
such counsel and the defendant to the extent the
defendant’s prior counsel reasonably believes such
communications are necessary to defend against the
allegations of ineffectiveness.  This waiver of the
attorney-client privilege shall be automatic upon the
filing of the motion for appropriate relief alleging
ineffective assistance of prior counsel, and the
superior court need not enter an order waiving the
privilege.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(e) (1999) (emphasis added).
Specifically, defendant contends (1) N.C.G.S. §
15A-1415(e) supersedes and effectively overrules State v. Taylor,
327 N.C. 147, 393 S.E.2d 801, and sets out a specific, concrete
set of discovery rules applicable to materials privileged between
defendant and his trial counsel; (2) the statute invokes a
stricter standard of permissible discovery than was previously
imposed under the “relevance” standard of Taylor by limiting
discovery to only “oral and written communications” between a
defendant and trial counsel relevant to any ineffective
assistance of counsel claims; (3) the superior court failed to
follow N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(e) when it ordered post-conviction
discovery in the instant case; and (4) the required disclosure is
further limited by the phrase “to the extent the defendant’s
prior counsel reasonably believes such communications are
necessary to defend against the allegations of ineffectiveness.” 
We disagree.
At the time Taylor was decided, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415
contained no discovery provisions.  Defendant’s contention that
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(e) supersedes Taylor is misplaced.  Except
where inconsistent with this opinion, Taylor remains good law. 
In Taylor, the defendant’s post-conviction counsel filed a motion
for appropriate relief contending, inter alia, that trial counsel
for the defendant rendered ineffective assistance in preparing
and presenting both the defense at trial and the direct appeal. 
Taylor, 327 N.C. at 150, 393 S.E.2d at 804.  The superior court
ordered the defendant to give the State “access to . . . all
files relating to these cases.”  Id. at 151, 393 S.E.2d at 804. 
This Court, however, held that a defendant waives the benefits of
both the attorney-client and the work-product privileges by
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, “but only with
respect to matters relevant to his allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel.”  Id. at 152, 393 S.E.2d at 805.  The
majority of this Court conceded that the defendant’s waiver of
privileges was broad, as pointed out in Justice Meyer’s dissent,
but nevertheless stated that “his waiver was not an unlimited
waiver.”  Id.  We concluded,
[a]s the order of the Superior Court directed
the defendant to provide the State access to
“all files relating to these cases” without
limiting the ordered disclosure to matters
relevant to issues raised by the defendant’s
allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the order of the Superior Court was
overbroad and exceeded its authority.
Id.  As a result, the State was permitted discovery of all
materials that were in any way relevant to the ineffectiveness
claims.  Id.
In reviewing N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(e), we recognize that
when interpreting a statute, courts must look to the intent of
the legislature.  State v. Tew, 326 N.C. 732, 738, 392 S.E.2d
603, 607 (1990).  If possible, a statute must be interpreted so
as to give meaning to all its provisions.  State v. Bates, 348
N.C. 29, 35, 497 S.E.2d 276, 279 (1998).  “Individual expressions
must be construed as a part of the composite whole and be
accorded only that meaning which other modifying provisions and
the clear intent and purpose of the act will permit.”  Tew, 326
N.C. at 739, 392 S.E.2d at 607.
The legislature enacted “An Act to Expedite the
Postconviction Process in North Carolina” “in response to
legislative concerns that the post-conviction process in capital
cases appeared endless.”  State v. Green, 350 N.C. 400, 406, 514
S.E.2d 724, 728, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 144 L. Ed. 2d 840
(1999) (citing Bates, 348 N.C. 29, 497 S.E.2d 276).  The
amendments to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415 evidence “an intent on the part
of the General Assembly to expedite the post-conviction process
in capital cases while ensuring thorough and complete review.” 
Bates, 348 N.C. at 37, 497 S.E.2d at 280-81 (emphasis added).
The superior court in the instant case followed
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(e) when it ordered discovery.  We find our
previous decision in Bates, which examined subsection (f),
instructive to our analysis here.  Id. at 29, 497 S.E.2d at 276. 
Subsection (e) mandates, in explicit language, that the defendant
is deemed to have waived the attorney-client privilege;
therefore, the clear language of this statute demands disclosure
in post-conviction proceedings.  See id. at 36, 497 S.E.2d at
280; N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(e).  In criminal cases, both the accused
and the State have an interest in obtaining a fair and accurate
resolution of the question of guilt or innocence.  Id. at 37, 497
S.E.2d at 280.  This interest “‘demand[s] that adequate
safeguards assure the thorough preparation and presentation of
each side of the case.’”  Id. (quoting United States v. Nobles,
422 U.S. 225, 238, 45 L. Ed. 2d 141, 153 (1975)).  In Bates, we
noted that the statute contains no express provision for
withholding work product.  Id. at 35, 497 S.E.2d at 279. 
Similarly, nothing in existing law prohibits disclosure to the
State of defendant’s oral and written communications, including
work-product materials, upon defendant alleging ineffectiveness
of counsel.  We also stated in Bates that the interest of the
State in protecting its work product once the case has reached
post-conviction review is diminished.  Id. at 37, 497 S.E.2d at
280.  Consistent with the legislature’s intent in N.C.G.S. §
15A-1415(e), this principle applies equally to a defendant.
Subsection (e), being expeditious in nature, makes
clear that a defendant shall be deemed to waive the attorney-
client privilege automatically without the need of the superior
court entering such an order.  Defendant argues that the phrase
“to the extent the defendant’s prior counsel reasonably believes
such communications are necessary to defend against the
allegations of ineffectiveness” must limit the required
disclosure.  We agree that this language is intended as some
limitation on the information which the defendant is required to
make available.  However, the clear intent and purpose of the Act
permit only a limitation of discovery to relevance, consistent
with Taylor.  See id.
The objective and subjective mental processes of trial
counsel and defendant are relevant, as they form the basis of
trial counsel’s choices, strategies, and approaches concerning
the case.  If something is reasonably necessary in defending
against an ineffectiveness allegation pursuant to N.C.G.S. §
15A-1415(e), it would also be relevant under Taylor.  If evidence
is relevant to ineffectiveness, it may be “necessary” to defend
against an ineffectiveness allegation.  See N.C.G.S. §
15A-1415(e).  Thus, Taylor is not superseded, as defendant
argues, and discovery is not per se limited to merely “oral and
written communications.”
In Taylor, post-conviction counsel described the extent
of the defendant’s waiver of the attorney-client and work-product
privileges by making specific allegations of trial counsel’s
ineffectiveness.  In particular, defendant alleged that his trial
counsel (1) failed to investigate the other crimes, (2) failed to
cross-examine witnesses to these crimes, and (3) offered no
rebuttal evidence concerning these witnesses and crimes.  Taylor,
327 N.C. at 158, 393 S.E.2d at 809.  Defendant additionally set
forth certain allegations of ineffective assistance with regard
to his prior counsel’s preparation of his appeal.  Id. at 155,
393 S.E.2d at 807.  The post-conviction counsel further
identified in detail specific parts of the files in which the
defendant had not waived limited privileges of confidentiality. 
Id.  Thus, this Court ordered disclosure to matters relevant to
the defendant’s allegations.  Id. at 152, 393 S.E.2d at 805.
In the instant case, however, defendant’s claims are
numerous, broad-based, and encompass almost every aspect of the
trial and sentencing proceeding.  Defendant’s allegations involve
each counsel’s thoughts and, therefore, include defendant’s and
trial counsel’s notes, documents, paperwork, work product,
communications (both oral and written), frame of mind, trial
decisions and strategy, along with defendant’s and trial
counsel’s responses to one another.  By attacking the competency
of his trial counsel, defendant has waived the attorney-client
and work-product privileges as to privileged communications and
work product relevant to the allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel.  See id.  Defendant has raised these
broad-based allegations and cannot be allowed to use them as a
sword and simultaneously use the attorney-client and work-product
privileges as a shield.
Moreover, when enacting subsection (e), it is clear the
legislature anticipated trial counsel would be cooperative and
willing to defend their work and reputation against allegations
of ineffectiveness.  However, as in the instant case, it is
reasonable to believe that, on occasion, trial counsel will
continue to defend his/her client regardless of personal attacks. 
As previously noted, defendant argues the phrase “to the extent
the defendant’s prior counsel reasonably believes such
communications are necessary to defend against the allegations of
ineffectiveness” limits the required disclosure.  The legislature
could not have intended that trial counsel should be the only one
to control discovery by determining the extent of discovery or
acting as the gatekeeper of discovery.  Such an intention would
be contrary to the purpose of the statute.  Determining the
extent of discovery is ultimately for the court to decide
pursuant to its inherent power.
This Court in Taylor affirmed the “inherent power” of
the superior court to order discovery in its discretion, to
assure justice in criminal cases.  Taylor, 327 N.C. at 153, 393
S.E.2d at 806 (citing State v. Hardy, 293 N.C. 105, 124, 235
S.E.2d 828, 840 (1977)).  In Taylor, we stated:
“At trial the major concern is the ‘search
for truth’ as it is revealed through the
presentation and development of all relevant
facts.  To ensure that truth is ascertained
and justice served, the judiciary must have
the power to compel the disclosure of
relevant facts, not otherwise privileged,
within the framework of the rules of
evidence.”
Id. at 154, 393 S.E.2d at 806 (quoting Hardy, 293 N.C. at 125,
235 S.E.2d at 840).  This reasoning led us to conclude that “our
judiciary also must and does have the inherent power to compel
disclosure of relevant facts regarding a post-trial motion and
may order such disclosure prior to a hearing on such motion.” 
Id. (emphasis added).
Inherent power is that which a court necessarily
possesses irrespective of constitutional provisions.  In re
Alamance County Ct. Facils., 329 N.C. 84, 93, 405 S.E.2d 125, 129
(1991).  Such power may not be abridged by the legislature and is
essential to the court’s existence and the orderly and efficient
administration of justice.  Id.  Through its inherent powers, a
court has the “‘authority to do all things that are reasonably
necessary for the proper administration of justice.’”  Id. at 94,
405 S.E.2d at 129 (quoting Beard v. N.C. State Bar, 320 N.C. 126,
129, 357 S.E.2d 694, 696 (1987)); see also Eash v. Riggins
Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 562-63 (3d. Cir. 1985) (holding
that the United States Supreme Court viewed inherent power as
fundamental to the administration of justice and the functioning
of the judiciary); Felix F. Stumpf, Inherent Powers of the Courts
37-38 (1994) (inherent power covers powers thought essential to
the existence, dignity, and functions of the court, or for an
orderly, efficient and effective administration of justice).  A
court uses its inherent power when constitutional provisions,
statutes, or court rules fail to supply answers to problems or
when courts find themselves compelled to provide solutions that
enable the litigative process to proceed smoothly.  Stumpf,
Inherent Powers of the Courts 37-38.  Our courts have the
“inherent power to order discovery in furtherance of criminal
investigation.”  In re Super. Ct. Order Dated April 8, 1983, 315
N.C. 378, 379, 338 S.E.2d 307, 308 (1986).
Because the State could have issued a subpoena to
compel disclosure by defendant’s trial counsel or the production
of documentary evidence, the superior court has the inherent
power to order disclosure by defendant’s trial counsel prior to a
hearing on defendant’s motion for appropriate relief.  See
Taylor, 327 N.C. at 154, 393 S.E.2d at 806.  Superior courts
should determine if ordering disclosure on the merits of a
defendant’s motion for appropriate relief will significantly
assist in the search for truth.  If the superior court orders
disclosure, and there is disagreement about whether the order
covers certain questionable documents or communications, the
superior court must conduct an in camera review to determine the
extent of the order as to those documents or communications.  See
id. at 155, 393 S.E.2d at 807.
To defend against ineffective assistance of counsel
allegations, the State must rely on information provided by
defendant to trial counsel, as well as defendant’s thoughts,
concerns, and demeanor.  See id. at 159, 393 S.E.2d at 809
(Meyer, J., dissenting).  “[O]nly when all aspects of the
relationship are explored can it be determined whether counsel
was reasonably likely to render effective assistance.”  Id. at
161, 393 S.E.2d at 810 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (citing Harris v.
Commonwealth, 688 S.W.2d 338 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 842, 88 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1985)).  Thus, superior courts
should assess the allegations in light of all the circumstances
known to counsel at the time of the representation.  Id. (noting
that the performance of trial counsel must be analyzed according
to the circumstances of each particular case); see also
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674,
697 (1984) (holding that “an act or omission that is
unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant [trial
strategy] in another”).  On remand of this case, the superior
court should take evidence, make findings of fact and conclusions
of law, and order review of all files and oral thought patterns
of trial counsel and client that are determined to be relevant to
defendant’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.
We now address defendant’s argument that the trial
court erred in ordering defendant’s trial counsel to submit to an
ex parte interview.  Defendant contends the superior court was
without authority to order such an interview.  We agree.  It was
improper for the superior court to order an ex parte interview. 
However, the superior court may order trial counsel to answer
questions to reveal relevant information concerning defendant’s
motion for appropriate relief, order that a deposition of trial
counsel be taken with both parties present, or order any other
formal discovery appropriate to reveal relevant information.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the superior court’s
order as to its authority to determine the extent of discovery;
to order relevant discovery based on the allegations; and to
conduct in camera review, if necessary, to resolve any
disagreements.  However, that part of the superior court’s order
requiring that the State’s attorney have the right to interview
defendant’s trial counsel ex parte is vacated.  On remand of the
instant case, the superior court shall take evidence and (1) make
appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning
which materials are relevant; (2) order disclosure of all
relevant materials; and (3) in addition, order any hearing,
deposition, or other formal discovery necessary to reveal trial
counsel’s tactical decisions and strategy, including but not
limited to their opinions, thoughts, and oral communications,
which are relevant to the allegations of ineffectiveness.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Chief Justice FRYE concurs in the result.