Case Title: Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, Ltd.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019 ME 45

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2019-03-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
 2019 ME 45 
Docket: 
 Was-17-142 
Argued: 
 November 14, 2017 
Decided: 
March 28, 2019 
Revised: 
July 11, 2019 
 
Panel: 
 SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
Majority: 
ALEXANDER, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
Concurrence: SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD and GORMAN, JJ. 
 
 
KENNETH W. ROSS et al. 
 
v. 
 
ACADIAN SEAPLANTS, LTD. 
 
 
HJELM, J. 
 
[¶1]  This case draws us again into the confluence of public and private 
property rights within the intertidal zone—this time, to address the ownership 
of rockweed, a species of seaweed that grows in Maine’s intertidal zone and is 
often found on the rocky ledges that accent the State’s coastline.  Specifically, 
we are asked to determine whether rockweed is private property that belongs 
to the adjoining upland landowner who owns the intertidal soil in fee simple, 
or property that is held in trust by the State through the jus publicum for the 
public to harvest.   
[¶2]  Acadian Seaplants, Ltd., appeals from a summary judgment entered 
by the Superior Court (Washington County, Stewart, J.) in favor of Kenneth W. 
 
 
2 
Ross, Carl E. Ross, and Roque Island Gardner Homestead Corporation 
(collectively, Ross), who are owners of upland property where—without the 
landowners’ permission—Acadian has harvested rockweed that is attached to 
the intertidal land.1  In its judgment, the court declared that rockweed growing 
in the intertidal zone is the private property of the upland property owners.  We 
agree that rockweed in the intertidal zone belongs to the upland property 
owner and therefore is not public property, is not held in trust by the State for 
public use, and cannot be harvested by members of the public as a matter of 
right.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶3]  The following facts are taken from the parties’ stipulated joint 
statement of material facts, submitted to the court on cross-motions for 
summary judgment.  See BCN Telecom, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor, 2016 ME 165, 
¶ 3, 151 A.3d 497.  
                                         
1  On this appeal, amici briefs have been filed by the Cobscook Bay Fishermen’s Association; 
Conservation Law Foundation; Downeast Coastal Conservancy; Downeast Lobstermen’s Association; 
Hale Miller; Jonesport and Beals Commercial Fishermen and Lobstermen; Maine Clammers 
Association, Independent Maine Marine Worm Harvesters Association, North American Kelp, and 
Gulf of Maine, Inc.; Maine Coast Fishermen’s Association; Maine Coast Heritage Trust; Maine 
Department of Marine Resources; Maine Seaweed Council; Pacific Legal Foundation and Property 
and Environment Research Center; and Pleasant River Wildlife Foundation.  See M.R. App. P. 9(e) 
(Tower 2016).  
 
 
3 
[¶4]  Rockweed is the common name for several species of brown 
seaweed, or macroalga.  The most abundant of the species is known by the 
scientific name Ascophyllum nodosum and is often found on rocks and ledges in 
the intertidal portions of Maine’s seacoast.  Rockweed is a plant.  It does not 
grow in intertidal sand but obtains its nutrients from the surrounding seawater 
and air.  Rockweed attaches to hard, stable objects such as ledges and rocks 
using a disc-like structure called a holdfast.  The sole function of the holdfast is 
to secure the rockweed in place by penetrating the surface of substrate by up 
to four millimeters.  A rockweed’s holdfast typically remains intact and 
attached to a substrate for decades, allowing rockweed to generate new growth.  
If the rockweed becomes detached from a substrate, it cannot reattach its 
holdfast to a different substrate and will float freely in the water or be cast onto 
the land.  Rockweed, which is typically two to four feet in length but can grow 
to be more than six feet, is important to Maine’s coastline ecology because it 
moderates temperatures and provides a habitat for marine organisms.   
[¶5]  Acadian is a commercial entity that operates in Maine and Nova 
Scotia and harvests rockweed from the Maine intertidal zone for use in various 
commercial products, such as fertilizer and animal feed.  Acadian harvests 
rockweed during mid-tide, using three-to-four-ton-capacity skiffs and specially 
 
 
4 
designed cutting rakes.  During the harvesting operation, Acadian operates the 
watercraft in intertidal waters without walking or traveling on the intertidal 
land itself.  The Department of Marine Resources regulates the harvest of 
rockweed in Cobscook Bay.  See 12 M.R.S. § 6803-C (2018); see also id. 
§ 6001(7), (13).2  Acadian annually harvests the statutory maximum 17 percent 
of eligible harvestable rockweed biomass in Cobscook Bay.  See id. § 6803-C(9).   
 
[¶6]  Ross owns coastal intertidal property on Cobscook Bay, and Acadian 
has harvested rockweed from Ross’s intertidal property without his consent.  
In December of 2015, Ross commenced this action by filing a two-count 
complaint against Acadian, seeking, in Count 1, a declaratory judgment that he 
exclusively owns the rockweed growing on and affixed to his intertidal 
property, and, in Count 2, injunctive relief that would prohibit Acadian from 
harvesting rockweed from his intertidal land without his permission.  Acadian’s 
answer to the complaint included a counterclaim for a judgment declaring that 
                                         
2  The Department of Marine Resources, as amicus curiae, argues that 1 M.R.S. § 2(2-A) (2018), 
which governs State regulation of harvesting of marine resources, establishes the public’s right to 
harvest rockweed from the intertidal zone because the statute vests ownership of that seaweed with 
the State and therefore not with the upland property owners.  In a one-sentence footnote in its reply 
brief, Acadian states that it adopts the Department’s arguments.  This contention, however, was not 
meaningfully developed in the trial court and is therefore not preserved for appellate consideration.  
See Penkul v. Matarazzo, 2009 ME 113, ¶ 11, 983 A.2d 375 (stating that an issue “not presented to the 
trial court . . . is not properly before this Court on appeal”); see also Jacobs v. Jacobs, 507 A.2d 596, 
597 n.1 (Me. 1986) (stating that we will consider an argument raised in an amicus brief “only to the 
extent[] that it addresses issues raised before the trial court and pursued here by the parties 
themselves”).    
 
 
5 
harvesting rockweed from the intertidal water is a form of “fishing” and 
“navigation” within the meaning of the Colonial Ordinance and is therefore a 
public right.3  The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment 
predicated on a joint statement of material facts.  See M.R. Civ. P. 56.  In March 
of 2017, after holding a hearing, the court (Stewart, J.) granted Ross’s motion in 
part by entering summary judgment for Ross on his request for declaratory 
judgment in Count 1 of his complaint.  The court also entered judgment for Ross 
on Acadian’s counterclaim and denied Acadian’s motion.  Ross then moved to 
dismiss Count 2 of the complaint, and the court granted the motion without 
objection from Acadian, resulting in the entry of a final judgment.  Acadian filed 
a timely notice of appeal.  See 14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2018); M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3) 
(Tower 2016).4  
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶7]  Because the facts presented are not in dispute, we review the 
summary judgment de novo for errors of law in the court’s interpretation of the 
                                         
3  Acadian also filed a motion to dismiss Ross’s complaint for failure to join the State as a necessary 
party.  See M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7), 19.  The court (Stokes, J.) denied the motion after concluding that the 
State was not exposed to any current or future litigation as a result of the private claims asserted in 
this action.  No party challenges that determination on appeal.   
4  Because this appeal was filed before September 1, 2017, the restyled Maine Rules of Appellate 
Procedure do not apply.  See M.R. App. P. 1 (restyled Rules). 
 
 
6 
relevant legal concepts.  See Beane v. Me. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 2007 ME 40, ¶ 9, 916 
A.2d 204; see also Remmes v. Mark Travel Corp., 2015 ME 63, ¶ 19, 116 A.3d 466 
(“Cross motions for summary judgment neither alter the basic Rule 56 
standard, nor warrant the grant of summary judgment per se.” (quotation 
marks omitted)).  
 
[¶8]  The limited issue before us is whether living rockweed, growing on 
and attached to intertidal land, is—as Ross asserts—the private property of the 
adjoining upland landowner who owns the intertidal zone in fee, or—as 
Acadian counters—a public resource held in trust by the State.   
A. 
Intertidal Property Rights 
[¶9]  Our consideration of this dispute takes us back to the analytical 
foundations of the law governing rights to the intertidal zone: the interrelated 
common law public trust doctrine and the rights embodied in the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony’s Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47.  In past opinions, 
we have described the legal principles emanating from these laws.  See, e.g., 
McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, ¶¶ 8-41, 28 A.3d 620; Bell v. Town of Wells 
(Bell II), 557 A.2d 168, 170-79, 180-89 (Me. 1989); Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell I), 
510 A.2d 509, 511-17 (Me. 1986).  Given the extensive discussion in those 
 
 
7 
opinions, we need not describe the historical origins and developments in 
detail here.   
[¶10]  In short, the English common law tradition vested both “title” to 
and “dominion” over the intertidal zone in the crown.  Shively v. Bowlby, 
152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894).  Title—the jus privatum—belonged to the crown “as the 
sovereign” but was held subject to the public’s rights of “navigation,” 
“commerce,” and “fishing”—the jus publicum—which the crown held in trust 
for the public.  Id.  After the American colonies gained independence, the 
ownership of intertidal land devolved to the particular state where the 
intertidal area was located.  Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 
476 (1988); Shively, 152 U.S. at 14-15; State v. Leavitt, 105 Me. 76, 78-79, 72 
A. 875 (1909).  Each state nonetheless remained free to modify its laws 
governing ownership of the intertidal zone.  Shively, 152 U.S. at 18.  In a decision 
issued in 1810, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ratified the vitality of 
the Colonial Ordinance.  Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435, 438 (1810).  The 
Colonial Ordinance had conveyed fee title to the intertidal zone—described as 
the area from the mean high-water mark to the mean low-water mark but not 
more than 100 rods—to the upland landowner subject to the public’s right to 
use the wet sand for “navigation,” “fishing,” and “fowling”—the latter being an 
 
 
8 
additional use allowed by the Ordinance that augmented the uses already 
allowed by the English public trust doctrine.  See Bell I, 510 A.2d at 512-15.  
Thus, the upland owners obtained fee title to the wet sand to allow them to 
“wharf out,” see Conservation Law Found. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2003 ME 62, 
¶ 36, 823 A.2d 551, and the public retained an easement interest in that 
intertidal zone, see Norton v. Town of Long Island, 2005 ME 109, ¶ 32, 883 A.2d 
889; Bell I, 510 A.2d at 516. 
[¶11]  When Maine attained statehood in 1820, by force of the Maine 
Constitution the arrangement of private ownership by the upland owners and 
the right of the public—the jus publicum—was engrafted into Maine common 
law.  See Me. Const. art. X, §§ 3,5 5;6 see also Bell I, 510 A.2d at 513-14; State v. 
Wilson, 42 Me. 9, 28 (1856) (acknowledging that “[s]o far as the public had 
authority to use the shore under the common law of the State, as declared in 
the proviso of the Colonial [O]rdinance of 1641 . . . [s]ubject to this public right, 
[the property owner’s] title to the shore was as ample as to the upland”); Lapish 
                                         
5  Article X, section 3 of the Maine Constitution provides in full, “All laws now in force in this State, 
and not repugnant to this Constitution, shall remain, and be in force, until altered or repealed by the 
Legislature, or shall expire by their own limitation.”   
6  Article X, section 5 of the Maine Constitution provides and adopts the Massachusetts Act of 
Separation.  That provision is omitted from printed copies of the Constitution but remains in full 
force.  See Me. Const. art. X, § 7; 1 Laws of Maine 1821 at 45-50 (text of article X, section 5).   
 
 
9 
v. Bangor Bank, 8 Me. 85, 93 (1831) (stating that “[e]ver since [Storer v. 
Freeman, 6 Mass. 435 (1810)], as well as long before, the law on this point has 
been considered as perfectly at rest”). 
[¶12]  The result is that, in Maine, there are three separate shoreland 
areas subject to distinct public and private rights.  See Britton v. Donnell 
(Britton II), 2011 ME 16, ¶ 6, 12 A.3d 39.  First, the land below the mean 
low-water mark is owned by the State.  See id. ¶ 7.  Second, the dry sand, above 
the mean high-water mark, belongs exclusively to the upland property owner.  
See id. ¶¶ 6-7.  Finally, there is the area that is the subject of the present dispute: 
the intertidal zone—the land between the mean high-water mark and the mean 
low-water mark up to 100 rods, 12 M.R.S. § 572 (2018) (defining “intertidal 
land” as “all land of this State affected by the tides between the mean high 
watermark and either 100 rods seaward from the high watermark or the mean 
low watermark, whichever is closer to the mean high watermark”); see also 
Britton II, 2011 ME 16, ¶ 6, 12 A.3d 39; Bell I, 510 A.2d at 515.  The intertidal 
zone belongs to the owner of the adjacent upland property, or some other 
person to whom that part of the land has been transferred by the upland owner, 
“subject to certain public rights.”  Britton II, 2011 ME 16, ¶ 7, 12 A.3d 39. 
 
 
10 
[¶13]  The nature and extent of the public’s interest in the intertidal zone 
has been a subject of much debate, litigation, and judicial writing.  Our 
jurisprudence has not clearly established, for all purposes, the delineation 
between the public and private rights in and to the intertidal area.  Differing 
views within this Court regarding the nature and scope of the public’s right to 
use the intertidal zone became evident in our 1989 decision in Bell II.  Those 
differences were most recently brought into sharp focus in McGarvey v. 
Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, 28 A.3d 620.  There, the question presented was 
“whether, as a matter of Maine common law, the public has the right to walk 
across intertidal lands to reach the ocean for purposes of scuba diving.”  Id. ¶ 1.  
All six justices who participated in that case agreed that that use was within the 
scope of the public trust doctrine.  Id.  The Court was evenly divided, however, 
on the rationale supporting that conclusion.  Compare id. ¶¶ 48-58, with 
¶¶ 59-78. 
[¶14]  Despite these divergent views concerning the scope of the public’s 
intertidal property rights, only one conclusion obtains in this case: the public 
may not harvest living rockweed growing in and attached to the 
privately-owned intertidal zone.  We explain this outcome with reference to the 
two analytical frameworks articulated in McGarvey. 
 
 
11 
B. 
McGarvey v. Whittredge  
[¶15]  In the first of the two doctrinal views discussed in McGarvey 
regarding the nature of the public trust rights, Chief Justice Saufley wrote that 
“[r]ather than stretching the definitions of these three terms [fishing, fowling, 
and navigation] beyond their reasonable limits . . . , we return to the roots of the 
common law.”  Id. ¶ 53.  Pursuant to that approach, the terms “‘fishing,’ 
‘fowling,’ and ‘navigation’” must be “broad[ly] underst[ood]” and, over time, 
have been “adapted to reflect the realities of use in each era.”  Id. ¶¶ 37, 39.  This 
approach is consistent with the analysis articulated in Justice Wathen’s 
dissenting opinion in Bell II, 557 A.2d at 188, which “rejected a rigid application 
of the terms of the Ordinance and resorted to contemporary notions of usage 
and public acceptance in order to strike a rational and fair balance between 
private ownership and public rights.”   
[¶16]  This broad and adaptive approach reflects “judicial unease with a 
rigid interpretation” of the terms “fishing,” “fowling,” and “navigation”—terms 
that were referenced in the Colonial Ordinance and that may, pursuant to the 
broader interpretations urged originally by Chief Justice Wathen and more 
recently by Chief Justice Saufley, too narrowly describe the public trust 
doctrine.  McGarvey, 2011 ME 97, ¶ 56, 28 A.3d 620.   
 
 
12 
[¶17]  Therefore, even if an activity carried out by a member of the public 
does not “fall readily” within the notions of “fishing,” “fowling,” or “navigation,” 
the activity may nonetheless be protected by the public trust doctrine so long 
as, pursuant to the common law, the activity constitutes “a reasonable balance 
between private ownership of the intertidal lands and the public’s use of those 
lands.”  Id. ¶¶ 49, 57.  On the particular facts presented in McGarvey, 
Chief Justice Saufley’s opinion concluded that even though passing over the wet 
sand in order to scuba dive could not “readily” be seen as a type of “navigation,” 
the public was nonetheless entitled to engage in that activity as a matter of 
general common law because it represents “a reasonable balance” between the 
private and public rights to the intertidal zone.  Id. ¶¶ 49-50, 56-58.   
[¶18]  In a separate opinion, Justice Levy, writing for the other half of the 
Court’s panel in the case, analyzed the question based on the limiting principle 
that the enumerated rights of “fishing,” “fowling,” and “navigation” were “never 
understood . . . to merely establish a context for some broader right or rights.”  
Id. ¶ 62.  Pursuant to this approach, while those terms delimit the public’s 
rights, they must be interpreted in a way that is “sympathetically generous and 
broad.”  Id. ¶ 71; see also Bell II, 557 A.2d at 173 (summarizing prior case law 
as allowing for “a sympathetically generous interpretation to what is 
 
 
13 
encompassed within the terms ‘fishing,’ ‘fowling,’ and ‘navigation,’ or 
reasonably incidental or related thereto”).  Construing “navigation” in that 
expansive way—but not looking beyond it—Justice Levy’s concurring opinion 
concluded that scuba diving fell within the ambit of “navigation” because it is 
an activity that involves equipment and methods that are similar to those used 
in traditional forms of navigation.  McGarvey, 2011 ME 97, ¶¶ 75-76, 28 A.3d 
620. 
C. 
Application of the Two Doctrinal Views 
[¶19]  We now turn to the narrow issue presented here: is harvesting 
living rockweed, growing in and attached to the intertidal zone, an activity that 
is authorized and protected by the public trust doctrine?   
[¶20]  In addressing the harvesting activity, we first consider whether 
harvesting living rockweed from the intertidal zone is a form of “fishing” or 
“navigation” as those activities are understood in Justice Levy’s concurrence in 
McGarvey.  We conclude that, contrary to Acadian’s contention, harvesting 
living rockweed secured to the intertidal bed cannot be seen as either “fishing” 
or “navigation,” even when those terms are interpreted in a “sympathetically 
broad and generous” way.  Id. ¶ 71.  Then we apply the more expansive 
“common law” approach urged by the Chief Justices and the concurrence to this 
 
 
14 
opinion and address whether the common law permits the public to harvest 
rockweed as an activity that constitutes a “reasonable balance” between the 
public’s rights within the intertidal zone and the private property interests held 
by the upland property owner.  Id. ¶¶ 49, 57.  Ultimately, we also answer this 
question in the negative. 
1. 
Application of the Trilogy 
[¶21]  We first address the two relevant constituents of the trilogy: 
“navigation” and “fishing.”7 
 
a. 
Navigation 
[¶22]  “Navigation” has been interpreted to involve some mode of 
transportation, whether traveling over frozen intertidal water, see French v. 
Camp, 18 Me. 433, 434-35 (1841), passing on intertidal land to get to and from 
land or houses, see Deering v. Proprietors of Long Wharf, 25 Me. 51, 65 (1845), 
or mooring vessels and loading or unloading cargo, see id.; Wilson, 42 Me. at 24.8  
In each of these instances, the primary activity is crossing the intertidal water 
or land itself.  See, e.g., French, 18 Me. at 434 (stating that State-owned waters 
                                         
7  Acadian does not argue—nor could it—that harvesting rockweed is a type of “fowling,” which is 
the third part of the trilogy.   
8  As is discussed above, some members of this Court also concluded that scuba diving is a type of 
navigation.  McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, ¶¶ 75-77, 28 A.3d 620 (Levy, J., concurring).  This 
was not the majority view, however, because the Court was evenly divided on that question.  Id. ¶ 1. 
 
 
15 
are “of common right, a public highway, [available] for the use of all the 
citizens”).  Although there is a navigational component to harvesting rockweed, 
it is secondary to what Acadian seeks to do.  Rather, the harvesters operate the 
skiffs in intertidal waters for the principal purpose of engaging in a different, 
nonnavigation activity, namely, cutting and taking significant portions of 
rockweed plants.  The harvesting of rockweed, even by boat, involves the use of 
the intertidal land itself because living rockweed is attached to the intertidal 
substrate even if it does not draw nutrients from the land.  Therefore, Acadian 
uses the intertidal waters not for “navigation” in its own right, but merely to 
gain access to the attached rockweed.  See Gerrish v. Brown, 51 Me. 256, 262 
(1863) (“The term navigation, as applied to waters which are used as highways, 
imports something different; it denotes the transportation of ships or 
materials[] from place to place . . . .”).   
[¶23]  Therefore, no matter how broadly “navigation” is viewed, it does 
not encompass harvesting living rockweed from the intertidal zone. 
 
b. 
Fishing 
[¶24]  Harvesting rockweed—which the parties stipulated is a plant—is 
not a form of “fishing.”  See Small v. Wallace, 124 Me. 365, 367, 129 A. 444 
(1925) (stating that a landowner’s right to fish “arises not out of their 
 
 
16 
ownership of the soil but from [the landowner’s] right to share in the common 
right of fishery reserved to the public”).  The two types of ventures are 
qualitatively different from each other.     
[¶25]  In cases involving the public’s rights within the intertidal zone, we 
have viewed the concept of “fishing” broadly.  We have not imposed limitations 
based on the fishery or the method used for fishing, see Moulton v. Libbey, 
37 Me. 472, 489-90 (1854), and we have recognized the public’s right to use the 
intertidal zone to dig for shellfish, see Leavitt, 105 Me. at 79-81, 72 A. 875; 
Moulton, 37 Me. at 493-94, and bloodworms, see State v. Lemar, 147 Me. 405, 
409, 87 A.2d 886 (1952).  See also State v. Norton, 335 A.2d 607, 610 (Me. 1975) 
(recognizing the State’s authority to regulate the harvest of shellfish by the 
public). 
[¶26]  Nonetheless, even a “sympathetically generous and broad 
interpretation of the public’s rights”—something that “is not . . . without limits,” 
McGarvey, 2011 ME 97, ¶ 69, 28 A.3d 620 (Levy, J., concurring)—cannot 
transform the harvesting of a marine plant into “fishing.”  Cf. Moore v. Griffin, 
22 Me. 350, 356 (1843) (holding that the taking of mussel-bed manure does not 
 
 
17 
fall within the public trust rights);9 Marshall v. Walker, 93 Me. 532, 537, 
45 A. 497 (1900) (stating that the public “may not take shells or mussel manure 
or deposit scrapings of snow upon the ice over [the intertidal land]”).   
[¶27]  Rockweed is biologically dissimilar from fish, lobster, clams, 
oysters, and bloodworms—it draws nutrients from the air and seawater using 
a photosynthetic process and, once attached to the intertidal substrate, does 
not move.  See Moulton, 37 Me. at 489-90 (stating that “the general term 
‘piscaria,’ or its equivalent, is used as including all fisheries, without any regard 
to their distinctive character, or to the method of taking the fish” and giving 
examples of regulated “fisheries” to include oyster, lobster, salmon, herring, 
and pilchard (second emphasis added)).  After arguing in its brief that “seaweed 
is a marine organism, not a terrestrial plant,” at oral argument Acadian 
acknowledged that there is no legal distinction between plants growing in the 
soil in the intertidal zone and those growing on the rocks in that same area.  The 
                                         
9  Mussel-bed manure comprises shells mixed with the soil.  See Opinion of Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 
567 (Mass. 1974) (stating that mussel mud consists of “living and dead shell fish . . . and the soil or 
clay in which they were found” (alteration in original) (quoting Porter v. Shehan, 73 Mass. 435, 436 
(1856)); E.H. Jenkins & John Phillips Street, Manure from the Sea, 194 Conn. Agric. Experiment Station 
1, 11 (1917) (referring to “marine mud” as “mud taken from flats at low tide or cast up on the shore 
of an inlet . . . [and i]n some places vast quantities of small shells, ground fine by the waves, are cast 
up with the mud”).  
 
 
18 
fundamental dissimilarities between the harvesting of fish and of rockweed as 
a marine plant demonstrate that Acadian is not in the business of “fishing.”10 
                                         
10  The parties have addressed two of our opinions that make reference to intertidal seaweed.  For 
differing reasons, we find neither to be dispositive.   
The earlier of the two opinions, which was issued more than 150 years ago, states that “seaweed 
belongs to the owner of the soil upon which it grows, or is deposited, unless some other person has 
acquired the right to take it.”  Hill v. Lord, 48 Me. 83, 99 (1861) (emphasis omitted).  The analysis, 
however, contains several statements about the nature of seaweed that do not fully square with the 
stipulated record here.  For example, Hill states that seaweed grows partially “on the beach.” Id. at 
96.  This was significant to the conclusion that seaweed is a profit “in the soil” and not subject to the 
public’s easement rights to use the intertidal waters.  Id. at 99-100.  Here, in their joint statement of 
material facts, the parties stipulated that rockweed is an intertidal seaweed—meaning that it “does 
not grow on intertidal sandy beach except [attached to] hard . . . objects.”   
We do not entirely reject Hill, however.  As Acadian acknowledged at oral argument, there is no 
principled legal distinction between plants growing in the soil in the intertidal zone and those 
growing on the rocks in that same area, which supports the application of the doctrine of profit a 
prendre that underlies the analysis in Hill.  Further, Hill has been invoked as authority in more recent 
case law.  See, e.g., Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell II), 557 A.2d 168, 187 (Me. 1989) (Wathen, J., dissenting).  
To the extent that Hill has persuasive effect, the case favors Ross, but we do not place dispositive 
weight on it.  See Appeal of Robinson, 88 Me. 17, 23, 33 A. 652 (1895) (“The common law would ill 
deserve its familiar panegyric as the ‘perfection of human reason,’ if it did not expand with the 
progress of society and develop with new ideas of right and justice.”); Woodman v. Pitman, 
79 Me. 456, 458, 10 A. 321 (1887) (“The inexhaustible and ever-changing complications in human 
affairs are constantly presenting new questions and new conditions which the law must provide for 
as they arise . . . .”); see also Mitchell W. Feeney, Comment, Regulating Seaweed Harvesting in Maine: 
The Public and Private Interests in an Emerging Marine Resource Industry, 7 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 329, 
343 (2002) (discussing the erroneous scientific principles upon which the Court in Hill v. Lord 
appears to rely, and noting that it “is now known that seaweeds do not receive their nutrients from 
the soil, but from the surrounding water column [and t]heir only reliance on the soil is for anchorage 
purposes”).   
The second case is Marshall v. Walker, 93 Me. 532, 45 A. 497 (1900), which Acadian cites favorably.  
That opinion states that the public is entitled to “take sea manure” (which includes seaweed and is 
given that description because of its use as a fertilizer, see generally Jenkins & Street, supra; see also 
1 F.H. Storer, Agriculture in Some of Its Relations with Chemistry 462 (4th ed. 1892)) from the 
intertidal zone.  Marshall, 93 Me. at 536-37, 45 A. 497.  No authority, however, is offered for that 
assertion.  Further, Marshall was a quiet title action and did not determine the nature of the public’s 
rights to the land or implicate questions of public ownership.  Therefore, the opinion’s general 
discussion of the nature of the public’s rights is dictum on which we do not place weight.  See Legault 
v. Levesque, 150 Me. 192, 195, 107 A.2d 493 (1954) (stating that obiter dictum is “an assertion of law 
not necessary to the decision of the case” (quotation marks omitted)). 
 
 
19 
2. 
Application of the Common Law and “Reasonable Balance” 
Approach 
 
[¶28]  Having concluded that harvesting rockweed is neither “navigation” 
nor “fishing” pursuant to the “sympathetically generous and broad” approach 
described in Justice Levy’s McGarvey concurrence, see 2011 ME 97, ¶ 71, 
28 A.3d 620, we further conclude that, likewise, the activity does not “fall 
readily” within either category of “navigation” or “fishing,” as discussed in Chief 
Justice Saufley’s concurring opinion in McGarvey, see id. ¶ 49.  Thus, we turn to 
the additional inquiry explained by both Chief Justice Saufley in McGarvey and 
by the Bell II dissent, which calls for an assessment of whether the removal of 
rockweed by members of the public from privately owned land is within the 
common law principle that looks to achieve a “reasonable balance” between the 
private landowner’s interests and the rights held by the State in trust for the 
public’s use of that land.  See id. ¶¶ 41, 49, 57.  
[¶29]  In answering this question, we draw further guidance from Chief 
Justice Wathen’s dissenting opinion in Bell II, 557 A.2d at 188-89, which 
espouses the same broader view of the public trust rights described in Chief 
Justice Saufley’s discussion of the extent of those rights in McGarvey, 2011 ME 
97, ¶¶ 47, 49, 28 A.3d 620.  We conclude that even pursuant to that school of 
 
 
20 
thought, the harvesting of seaweed attached to the intertidal land falls outside 
the scope of activities that can be carried out as a matter of public right.   
[¶30]  The criterion used in the Bell II dissenting opinion calls for 
consideration of “contemporary notions of usage and public acceptance in 
order to strike a rational and fair balance between private ownership and 
public rights.”  557 A.2d at 188.  In finding the appropriate balance, “we must 
avoid placing any additional burden upon the shoreowner”—a burden that can 
result when something is taken from the intertidal lands.  Id. at 188-89.  In 
formulating that standard, the dissent drew on a collection of our cases, 
including Hill v. Lord, 48 Me. 83, 96 (1861), which prohibited the removal of 
seaweed from intertidal lands belonging to another.  Bell II, 557 A.2d at 185-89.  
It is significant here that even a broad view of the public trust rights explained 
in the Bell II dissent does not encompass the harvesting of seaweed.11   
                                         
11  We are careful not to push the limits of the dissenting analysis in Bell II too far.  While the 
dissent concluded that, in his view, the public’s rights included “such recreational activities as 
bathing, sunbathing and walking,” he specifically did “not attempt to provide a comprehensive 
definition of the recreational activities” that are within the scope of the public’s common law rights.  
Bell II, 557 A.2d at 189.  Setting aside the question of whether, for purposes of determining the scope 
of intertidal rights, commercial activities can be equated with recreational activities, the core 
principle urged by the dissent was drawn from the lessons of our case law, including Hill.  Id. at 
181-89.  Thus, although—given the explicit limitation noted above—the dissent in Bell II cannot be 
read to state directly that removing seaweed is outside the scope of the public’s right to use the 
intertidal waters, the dissent’s use of Hill to derive the baseline principle of a “rational and fair 
balance” of public and private rights, id. at 188, is significant here. 
 
 
21 
[¶31]  This is a reasonable and proper demarcation between the 
competing interests at stake here.  The “additional burden” imposed on the 
owner of the intertidal zone, id. at 188, is not reasonable when the nature of the 
interference consists of cutting and removing marine plants from the intertidal 
zone, proximate to the dry sand on which the public has no independent rights, 
with the use of specialized equipment and skiffs that have a multi-ton capacity.  
Furthermore, Acadian’s activity is qualitatively similar to other uses of the 
intertidal zone that we have held are outside of the public trust doctrine.  See, 
e.g., McFadden v. Haynes & DeWitt Ice Co., 86 Me. 319, 325, 29 A. 1068 (1894) 
(holding that although a person may pass over intertidal land to fish, that 
person may not enter that land for the purpose of cutting ice); King v. Young, 
76 Me. 76, 80 (1884) (holding that the Colonial Ordinance does not permit 
taking mussel-bed manure from another’s intertidal land); Moore, 22 Me. at 356 
(same); see also Mitchell W. Feeney, Comment, Regulating Seaweed Harvesting 
in Maine: The Public and Private Interests in an Emerging Marine Resource 
Industry, 7 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 329, 340-41 (2002) (“[N]owhere in the body of 
Maine case law has fishing been held to include the collection of vegetable 
matter.  Migratory resources (like fish, and presumably shellfish and worms) 
 
 
22 
have traditionally been less protected by private property rights than 
stationary resources such as attached seaweed.”). 
[¶32]  Therefore, the harvesting of rockweed is not encompassed within 
the rights held by the public even when those rights are viewed from the 
broader of the perspectives explained in our case law. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
[¶33]  For these reasons, we conclude that, pursuant to both of the 
differing legal constructs our opinions have articulated to define the scope of 
the public’s intertidal property rights, rockweed attached to and growing in the 
intertidal zone is the private property of the adjacent upland landowner.  
Harvesting rockweed from the intertidal land is therefore not within the 
collection of rights held in trust by the State, and members of the public are not 
entitled to engage in that activity as a matter of right.  And because neither view 
of the public’s right to use the intertidal zone accommodates the activity at 
issue here, we determine—contrary to the position of the concurring justices—
that this case does not present us with the occasion to consider the vitality of 
the holding in Bell II. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
23 
 
 
 
 
  
 
SAUFLEY, C.J., with whom MEAD and GORMAN, JJ., join, concurring in part. 
[¶34]  In 1989, the Law Court, in a sharply divided opinion, made a 
regrettable error, limiting public access to the intertidal zones on Maine’s 
beaches in Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell II), 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989).  Since that 
time, a member of the public has been allowed to stroll along the wet sands of 
Maine’s intertidal zone holding a gun or a fishing rod, but not holding the hand 
of a child.   
[¶35]  Recognizing, as the majority concludes, that the pronouncement of 
that four-justice majority in Bell II is not ultimately dispositive in the matter 
before us, we would, nonetheless, clarify the applicable law and set aside the 
holding in Bell II.  Accordingly, we concur in the result of the Court’s opinion, 
but we do not join the analysis because we would take this opportunity to 
explicitly overrule Bell II.   
[¶36]  Bell II, which addressed the intertidal zone at Moody Beach in 
Wells, was decided thirty years ago.  Id. at 170.  Prior to that decision, as a 
matter of common law, the public had long enjoyed reasonable access to the 
intertidal zone.  Id. at 180, 184-85 (Wathen, J., dissenting).  The extent of and 
 
 
24 
limitations on that access had evolved over centuries to adapt to the differing 
and reasonable uses of the public.12  See id. at 185-89. 
[¶37]  As predicted in the Bell II dissent, id. at 192, and in another 
separate opinion issued in its wake, Eaton v. Town of Wells, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 52, 
760 A.2d 232 (Saufley, J., concurring), Bell II has generated significant and 
expensive litigation resulting from the Court’s limitation of the public’s 
allowable activities to those that can be forced into the definitions of “fishing, 
fowling, and navigation,” Bell II, 557 A.2d at 169.  The constrictive trilogy of that 
holding has bedeviled the State of Maine since that opinion was issued, and we 
                                         
12  Permissible activities that had been held to fall within the public trust rights before the 
imposition of the constrictive trilogy in Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell II), 557 A.2d 168, 173 (Me. 1989), 
included the following: digging for worms, State v. Lemar, 147 Me. 405, 408-09, 87 A.2d 886 (1952); 
landing on, receiving and discharging passengers from, and walking across intertidal land to access 
a power boat for hire, Andrews v. King, 124 Me. 361, 362-64, 129 A. 298 (1925); clamming, State v. 
Leavitt, 105 Me. 76, 77-80, 72 A. 875 (1909); transporting merchandise, rafting, driving logs, and 
floating or propelling boats across intertidal land, whether for commercial or recreational purposes, 
Smart v. Aroostook Lumber Co., 103 Me. 37, 47-48, 68 A. 527 (1907); sailing over, mooring a vessel 
on, walking across, riding or skating on ice over, digging shellfish in, and taking sea manure from 
intertidal land, Marshall v. Walker, 93 Me. 532, 536-37, 45 A. 497 (1900); mooring a vessel, 
discharging passengers, and taking on cargo, State v. Wilson, 42 Me. 9, 24-25 (1856); fishing for 
shellfish, Moulton v. Libbey, 37 Me. 472, 489-90 (1854); passing to other property after landing a boat, 
Deering v. Proprietors of Long Wharf, 25 Me. 51, 64-65 (1845); and traveling over frozen waters, 
French v. Camp, 18 Me. 433, 434-35 (1841). 
Activities of the public prohibited in the intertidal zone before Bell II included taking shells or 
mussel manure, or depositing snow or ice, Marshall, 93 Me. at 536-37; cutting ice or depositing snow, 
McFadden v. Haynes & DeWitt Ice Co., 86 Me. 319, 325, 29 A. 1068 (1894); harvesting seaweed, Hill v. 
Lord, 48 Me. 83, 100 (1861); and removing mussel-bed manure, ballast, or sand, Moore v. Griffin, 
22 Me. 350, 355-56 (1843).  With the issuance of the Bell II decision, the prohibited activities have 
thus far been expanded to include general recreation, such as walking along the wet sand, entry and 
exit for swimming, sunbathing, frisbee-throwing, and picnicking.  Bell II, 557 A.2d at 175-76. 
 
 
25 
fear that the Court’s holding will become enshrined in increasingly 
uncorrectable law. 
[¶38]  As Justice Wathen wrote eloquently in his dissent to Bell II: “This 
Court’s opinion does nothing to dispel the obvious conclusion that from this 
moment on, at Moody Beach and every other private shore in Maine, the 
public’s right even to stroll upon the intertidal lands hangs by the slender 
thread of the shore owners’ consent.  I will not hazard a guess whether that 
consent will be forthcoming.  In my judgment, the public rights should not be 
so quickly and completely extinguished.”  Id. at 192 (Wathen, J., dissenting).   
[¶39]  Although judicial efforts to loosen the strings of Bell II have been 
undertaken—for example, in the strained interpretation of “navigation” in 
McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, ¶¶ 72-77, 28 A.3d 620 (Levy, J., 
concurring)—these anemic efforts have failed to do what must be done.  
Although three of the six sitting Justices sought to avoid further enshrining the 
constrictive trilogy in Maine law, no majority holding to that effect occurred, id. 
¶¶ 1, 53 (Saufley, C.J., concurring), thus leaving in place the jurisprudence that 
led to the tortuous shoehorning of various activities into the constrictive trilogy 
by declaring the simple walk of a scuba diver across the intertidal zone to the 
 
 
26 
ocean as fitting into the definition of “navigation.”  Id. ¶¶ 72-77 (Levy, J., 
concurring). 
[¶40]  As time marches on, concepts of stare decisis may begin to take 
root in this critical aspect of Maine law, and Maine landowners, understandably, 
may begin to rely on the restrictions placed on the public’s access to the 
intertidal zone.13  The Bell II decision was built in great part on a literal reading 
of the Colonial Ordinance, 557 A.2d at 175 (“The Massachusetts court noted 
that the Colonial Ordinance mentioned no public rights except for fishing, 
fowling, and navigation.”), which was actually no longer extant at the time of 
                                         
13  The doctrine of stare decisis preserves the reliance interests of the public by counseling 
adherence to the previously established rule of law created by precedent:  
Litigants have a right to transact business with reference to the law enunciated 
by the court.  Most valuable property rights may be predicated upon the law, as thus 
declared.  These rights should not be impaired nor sacrificed by a reversal or 
modification of the law except upon cogent and necessary reasons.  Stability of the 
law should be the one great outstanding feature of jurisprudence upon which the 
profession as well as the people should have a right to rely. . . . 
Jordan v. McKenzie, 113 Me. 57, 59, 92 A. 995 (1915); see Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A.2d 932, 
935 (Me. 1982) (“Courts properly seek to create a framework of continuity amidst a universe of 
continuous change in order that those citizens and litigants who rely upon the legal doctrines and 
principles they announce may conduct their day-to-day affairs without fear that their reasonable 
expectations will be torn asunder by an unforeseen and radical departure from precedent.”). 
If we do not stem the tide of Bell II’s influence now, therefore, we fear that stare decisis will 
impose rigid results “restrained by the bonds of the past” that perpetuate a “cultural lag of unfairness 
and injustice”—exactly the consequence we must take care to avoid.  Moulton v. Moulton, 309 A.2d 
224, 228 (Me. 1973); see Adams, 443 A.2d at 935 (discussing that the court’s discretion in 
determining whether to apply stare decisis in a given matter “must be exercised with a view to 
whether adherence to past error or departure from precedent constitutes the greater evil to be 
suffered”). 
 
 
27 
Maine’s statehood, see McGarvey, 2011 ME 97, ¶¶ 29-30, 28 A.3d 620 (Saufley, 
C.J., concurring).  That decision—Bell II—has been questioned, see Eaton, 2000 
ME 176, ¶¶ 50-55, 760 A.2d 232 (Saufley, J., concurring); pretzeled, see 
McGarvey, 2011 ME 97, ¶¶ 72-77, 28 A.3d 620 (Levy, J., concurring); and 
avoided, see id. ¶¶ 48-49 (Saufley, C.J., concurring).  Accordingly, because of the 
passage of time, which will eventually diminish the ability of the Court to 
correct the wrong created by the Bell II decision, we would take this 
opportunity to correct the judicial error that restricted the rights of the public 
to engage in reasonable ocean-related activities that do not interfere with the 
upland owners’ peaceful enjoyment of their own property or their right to 
wharf out. 
[¶41]  The 1989 decision in Bell II erroneously limited the public’s 
reasonable and nonabusive use of the intertidal zone.  That use should include 
the right to walk unfettered upon the wet sand of Maine beaches to peacefully 
enjoy one of the greatest gifts the State of Maine offers the world.   
[¶42]  Simply put, we would overrule Bell II once and for all.  We would 
adopt the original Wathen analysis, Bell II, 557 A.2d at 180-92 (Wathen, J., 
dissenting), and allow the common law of public access and use of the intertidal 
 
 
28 
zone to continue to develop as it has over the centuries.  The public deserves 
our correction. 
[¶43]  We would then, as the Court has done today, conclude that, even 
according to the public’s common law access rights to the intertidal zone, the 
public does not have the right to take attached plant life from that property in 
contradiction to the fee owner’s wishes—not because such activity falls outside 
of the constrictive trilogy, but because the taking of attached flora from fee 
owners was not within the reasonable access contemplated when the jus 
publicum was established.14  See id. at 180-81, 189. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Benjamin M. Leoni, Esq. (orally), Curtis Thaxter LLC, Portland, for appellant 
Acadian Seaplants Limited 
 
Gordon R. Smith, Esq. (orally), Verrill Dana, LLP, Portland, for appellees Kenneth 
W. Ross, Carl E. Ross, and Roque Island Gardner Homestead Corporation 
 
Catherine R. Connors, Esq. (orally), Pierce Atwood LLP, Portland, for amicus curiae 
Maine Department of Marine Resources 
 
                                         
14  Of note, the people of Rhode Island have amended their state constitution to allow the public 
to take seaweed, even when attached to the land: “The people shall continue to enjoy and freely 
exercise all of the rights of fishery, and the privileges of the shore, to which they have been heretofore 
entitled under the charter and usages of this state, including but not limited to fishing from the shore, 
the gathering of seaweed, leaving the shore to swim in the sea and passage along the shore; and they 
shall be secure in their rights to the use and enjoyment of the natural resources of the state with due 
regard for the preservation of their values . . . .”  R.I Const. art. I, § 17 (LEXIS through ch. 2 of the 
Jan. 2019 Session). 
 
 
29 
Brian W. Thomas, Esq., Stocking & Thomas, LLC, Lamoine, for amicus curiae 
Downeast Coastal Conservancy 
 
Karin Marchetti-Ponte, Esq., Maine Coast Heritage Trust, Mount Desert, for amicus 
curiae Maine Coast Heritage Trust 
 
John A. Churchill, Esq., Calais, for amicus curiae Cobscook Bay Fishermen’s 
Association 
 
Mary A. Denison, Esq., Lake and Denison, Winthrop, for amici curiae Maine 
Clammers Association, Independent Maine Marine Worm Harvesters Association, 
North American Kelp, and Gulf of Maine, Inc.  
 
Robert Miller, Dean W. Alley, Wendell Alley, Shawn L. Alley, Nathan Fagonde, 
and Ordman Alley Jr., amici curiae, jointly as “Jonesport and Beals Commercial 
Fishermen and Lobstermen” 
 
Severin M. Beliveau, Esq., Jonathan G. Mermin, Esq., and Matthew S. Warner, Esq., 
Preti Flaherty Beliveau & Pachios, LLP, Portland, for amicus curiae Maine Seaweed 
Council 
 
Leah B. Rachin, Esq., and Benjamin T. McCall, Esq., Bergen & Parkinson, LLC, 
Kennebunk, for amicus curiae Hale Miller 
 
Gerard P. Conley., Jr. Esq., Cloutier, Conley & Duffett, P.A., Portland, for amicus 
curiae Downeast Lobstermen’s Association 
 
Kurt E. Olafsen, Esq., Olafsen & Butterfield, LLC, Portland, for amicus curiae 
Maine Coast Fishermen’s Association 
 
Mariah D. Mitchell, Esq., Eaton Peabody, Brunswick, for amicus curiae Pleasant 
River Wildlife Foundation 
 
Sean Mahoney, Esq., Conservation Law Foundation, Portland, for amicus curiae 
Conservation Law Foundation 
 
Ryan P. Dumais, Esq., Eaton Peabody, Brunswick, for amici curiae Pacific Legal 
Foundation and Property and Environment Research Center 
 
 
 
30 
Washington County Superior Court docket number CV-2015-22 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY