Case Title: MATTER OF REDCROW

Citation: 

Docket Number: 13589

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1977-05-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13589 I N THE S U P R E M E COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1977 I N THE MATTER O F THE ADOPTION O F DARLENE RAE REDCROW Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable E. Gardner Brownlee, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: C h r i s t i a n , McCurdy, Ingraham & Wold, Polson, Montana Donald Peterson argued, Polson, Montana For Respondent : Richard P. Heinz argued, County Attorney, Polson, Montana French and Grainey, Ronan, Montana P h i l i p Grainey argued, Ronan, Montana Hood and Bradshaw, Missoula, Montana Randi M. Hood argued, Missoula, Montana Thomas Mahan, Helena, Montana Submitted: A p r i l 13, 1977 M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Two couples f i l e d competing p e t i t i o n s t o adopt Darlene Rae Redcrow, about four yeard o l d , and an e n r o l l e d member of t h e Confederated S a l i s h and Kootenai Tribe. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Lake County, Hon. E. Gardner Brownlee, d i s t r i c t judge, granted an adoption decree t o t h e Meyer couple and t h e Rhodes couple appeal. The c h i l d involved had previously been removed from t h e home of her n a t u r a l p a r e n t s because of neglect. She was placed i n t h e home of a p p e l l a n t s Rhodes f o r 2 3 months u n t i l November, 1975, when she was returned t o t h e home of her n a t u r a l parents. Six weeks later S t a t e and T r i b a l a u t h o r i t i e s again found it necessary t o remove t h e c h i l d from her p a r e n t a l home because of neglect. She was then placed i n t h e home of respondents Meyer. O n December 29, 1975, t h e Department of Social and Re- h a b i l i t a t i o n Services of t h e S t a t e of Montana (SRS) p e t i t i o n e d t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Lake County t o have t h e c h i l d declared dependent and neglected and f o r temporary custody. O n February 27, 1976, a p p e l l a n t s f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r adoption with t h e w r i t t e n consent of t h e n a t u r a l parents. O n April 8 , 1976, re- spondents Meyer f i l e d t h i s p e t i t i o n f o r adoption without t h e consent of t h e n a t u r a l parents. O n A p r i l 1 4 , 1976, SRS amended its p e t i t i o n t o cover permanent custody with r i g h t of adoption r a t h e r than temporary custody. The t h r e e p e t i t i o n s were consolidated and set f o r hearing on May 12. The SRS and Meyer p e t i t i o n s were continued f o r hearing t o a l a t e r d a t e t o allow c l e a r i n g up of p o t e n t i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n a l d e f e c t s . The Rhodes p e t i t i o n was heard and taken under advise- ment pending hearings on t h e SRS and Meyer p e t i t i o n s and c l e a r i n g up any question of consent by t h e T r i b a l c o u r t . O n June 9 t h e SRS p e t i t i o n w a s heard a t t h e conclusion of which the district court declared the child dependent and neglected and placed adoptive custody in SRS. The Meyer petition was heard on July 12 and taken under advisement. On August 11 the district court found both the appel- lants Rhodes and respondents Meyer suitable parents for the adoption and granted the Meyer petition for adoption. Appel- lants Rhodes have appealed from this order. The single issue on appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion in delaying determination of the Rhodes petition until after the hearing on the SRS and Meyer petitions. Appellants argue that since their adoption petition was jurisdictionally perfected, ready for hearing and heard prior to the other petitions it should have been decided first and granted, citing In re Koger, 206 Ore. 307, 292 P.2d 791. We hold the entire matter was properly treated as before the court from beginning to end. See State ex rel. Habeck v. Dist. Ct., 157 Mont. 231, 484 P.2d 272. The district court was entirely correct in hearing all aspects of the case before making any decision on the competing petitions. The court cannot be compelled to fragment the case because of different filing dates and readiness for hearing of the competing petitions. The court cannot be forced to don blinders to other aspects of the case on the theory that the early bird should catch the worm or its legal equivalent "Between rights otherwise equal, the earliest is preferred." Section 49-117, R.C.M. 1947. The paramount consideration in deciding between the competing parties is what is in the best interests of the child. Adoption of Biery, 164 Mont. 353, 522 P.2d 1377. The district court's finding that both competing couples are suitable adoptive parents is not equivalent to a finding that each would equally promote the best interests of the child. We find no abuse of discretion of the district court's determination. The order of the district court is affirmed. Justice Justices