Case Title: Presley v. State

Citation: 474 So. 2d 612

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1985-08-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
474 So. 2d 612 (1985) Eddie PRESLEY v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 54858. Supreme Court of Mississippi. August 7, 1985. *613 Donald J. Steighner, Columbus, for appellant. Bill Allain, Atty. Gen. by Billy L. Gore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and DAN M. LEE and ROBERTSON, JJ. ROY NOBLE LEE, Presiding Justice, for the court: Eddie Presley was indicted in the Circuit Court of Lowndes County at the February 1982 Term, for armed robbery and as an habitual offender. He was tried on May 26, 1982, and found guilty, but the jury declined to impose life imprisonment. Thereupon, the court, Honorable Joe O. Sams, Sr., presiding, heard evidence relating to the previous convictions of Presley, and, at the conclusion of that hearing, found Presley to be an habitual criminal and sentenced him to serve a term of forty (40) years with the Mississippi Department of Corrections. The sentence was the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by such felony and less than the defendant's reasonable life expectancy, the sentence not to be reduced or suspended, nor would Presley be eligible for parole or probation. Presley has appealed here and assigns two errors in the trial below. The instruction referred to in the first assignment of error is, for all purposes, the request for a peremptory instruction of not guilty. We will address the assignment on that question. On January 30, 1982, appellant was seen by employees of the Kroger Store in Columbus, Mississippi, attempting to place two packages of ribeye steaks in his trousers and under his shirt. He was able to conceal only one package of the steaks under his clothes and put the second package on a nearby shelf and began to walk quickly toward the entrance of the store. A Kroger employee called Charles Allen McCollum, manager of the Kroger store, over the intercom system and reported that a man in the cereal aisle was stuffing meat under his clothes. McCollum stepped out of his office, and Tom Lynn, head meat cutter, went with him to stop appellant, who was approaching the front doors. McCollum hollered at appellant and tried to *614 get him to halt, whereupon, appellant reached in his pocket and pulled out a pocketknife, opened the blade, and put the knife in his palm. McCollum pursued appellant at a safe distance, but was afraid of the knife, which appellant exhibited, and remained a safe distance from him for fear of getting cut. McCollum called upon appellant several times to drop the merchandise. Finally appellant pulled the steaks out of his trousers and threw them on the ground. The police department had been notified of the incident and officers arrived in the area where McCollum and Lynn had followed appellant. McCollum pointed out the direction in which appellant had gone, and shortly thereafter, the police apprehended him. Appellant testified in his own behalf. He stated that on the morning of January 30, he and a companion had been inside the Kroger store and had stolen three packages of meat, concealing them in their trousers. That afternoon, they returned to the Kroger store and appellant went directly to the meat box, picked up two packages of meat, walked up the aisle, got close to the shelf, and turned sideways to look in both directions so no one could notice what he did; that he was unable to put both packages inside his pants but was able to conceal one such package inside his pants and under his shirt; he opened the pocketknife in order to cut the Kroger label off the package of meat and not with the intention of threatening or harming McCollum; and that he put his knife down when the police arrested him. There is no dispute in the facts except as to whether or not appellant took the knife out of his pocket and opened the blade for the purpose of threatening McCollum and Lynn in detaining and apprehending him, or whether he had the knife for the purpose of cutting the Kroger label from the package of meat. Appellant simply contends that, as a matter of law and fact, the evidence supports only a conviction for shoplifting, not armed robbery. Excerpts from the testimony of the Kroger manager Charles McCollum follow: The indictment in this case was drawn under Mississippi Code Annotated § 97-3-79 (1972), which follows: In Hermann v. State, 239 Miss. 523, 123 So. 2d 846 (1960), a gas station attendant filled up Hermann's gasoline tank with 16.8 gallons of gasoline. Then he hung up the gasoline hose, walked over to Hermann and informed him that the cost of the 16.8 gallons of gasoline was $6.38.[1] According to the attendant, Hermann opened the car door, obtained a rifle from the car, and pointed it at the attendant's stomach. Hermann instructed him not to try anything and told the attendant "if you try to follow me, I will hurt you." Hermann drove the vehicle away leaving the attendant standing with his arms raised in the air. Hermann contended that the violence or intimidation (putting in fear) occurred after the taking of the gasoline. This Court said: 123 So. 2d at 849. In the case sub judice, employees of the store saw the appellant take two packages of steak from the meat counter, one of which he was able to conceal in his trousers, and start walking hurriedly toward the front exit. The manager was immediately notified of the theft, and he and the meat cutter converged upon appellant, attempted to stop him from leaving the store, then followed him outside through a parking lot where appellant finally discarded the stolen meat and the pursuit was discontinued. The record overwhelmingly reflects that the store manager did not touch or restrain appellant from leaving the store and the area by physical force because he was afraid of the knife, which appellant exhibited to him, apparently for the purpose of instilling fear to stop the apprehension and pursuit. Even a pocketknife in the hands of a thief could produce serious *617 bodily harm, viz, throat and jugular, eyes and head. In Harper v. State, 434 So. 2d 1367, 1368 (Miss. 1983), the Court held that fear expressed in the statute simply amounts to an expectation that personal injury may result from the weapon possessed by the accused. The Court said: We are of the opinion that the crime, which began as petty larceny or shoplifting, escalated into armed robbery, that the issues were properly submitted to the jury, and that the conviction must stand. Resolution of this question presents a more difficult problem when considering our penalty statutes and Mississippi decisions interpreting them. The jury verdict found the appellant guilty as charged, but the jury was unable to fix his sentence. In addition to the crime of robbery, the indictment charged appellant with being an habitual offender in that (1) he had been previously convicted of the crime of robbery, a felony, on November 25, 1974, in Cause No. 4940 in the Circuit Court of Lowndes County, Mississippi, and sentenced to serve a term of twelve (12) years in the Mississippi State Penitentiary; (2) and further, that he was convicted of the crime of escape, a felony, on May 27, 1975, in Cause No. 5322 in the Circuit Court of Lowndes County, Mississippi, and sentenced to serve a term of two (2) years in the Mississippi State Penitentiary. Subsequent to the jury verdict of guilty, the trial judge conducted a pre-sentence hearing which follows, except for copies of the conviction judgments: Appellant relies upon Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983), for the proposition that the sentence in the case sub judice is disproportionate to the crime, since there are a large number of serious crimes for which the sentence imposed here would not be as severe. In Helm, the Court stated that no question was raised as to the general validity of sentences without possibility of parole; and that the only issue before the court was whether, in the circumstances of the case and in light of the constitutional principle of proportionality, the sentence imposed violates the Eighth Amendment. Helm was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole after having been convicted as a recidivist. *619 The evidence showed that he had committed seven passive crimes previously. In Whitmore v. Maggio, 742 F.2d 230 (5th Cir.1984), a state prisoner, who was convicted of two counts of armed robbery and sentenced to a term of 125 years in prison without benefit of parole, sought habeas corpus relief. The Fifth Circuit held failure of the district court to conduct a proportionality review of petitioner's claim that his consecutive sentences of seventy-five (75) years and fifty (50) years without possibility of parole constituted cruel and unusual treatment. The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for a proportionality review.[1a] The record reflects that appellant's criminal record shows the following convictions: The State argues that Helm differs from the case sub judice in the following respects: (1) The felonies in Solem were all non-violent, while appellant was convicted of robbery and armed robbery which necessarily involved violence. (2) Appellant's record also contained a conviction for simple assault. (3) Appellant was a professional criminal beginning at age 18 up to the time of the armed robbery in the case at bar, as shown above. (4) Incarceration of appellant will promote the goals of the criminal justice system since appellant was unable to abide by the rules of probation and parole in the past. (5) Helm was sentenced to life without parole; Presley was sentenced to 40 years without parole. (6) Helm presented evidence of alcoholism as an excuse for his behavior, Presley presented no mitigating evidence during the sentencing portion of the trial. However, the record does not indicate anything relating to the facts of the charges (1) resisting arrest, (2) robbery, (3) escape, as to whether there were mitigating circumstances. All other offenses were relatively minor and constituted misdemeanors. There was no previous conviction for shoplifting. The penalty for the first offense of shoplifting, when the value of the goods taken is less than one hundred dollars ($100.00), is a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) nor more than three hundred dollars ($300.00), and by imprisonment in the county jail for a term of not less than five (5) days nor more than six (6) months or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court. The recidivist statute applicable to this case is contained in Mississippi Code Annotated § 99-19-81 (Supp. 1984), which follows: We have held that, when sentences are within the limits of the statute, the imposition of such sentences is within the sound discretion of the trial court and this Court will not reverse them. Boyington v. State, 389 So. 2d 485 (Miss. 1980). Likewise, we have held that providing punishment for crime is a function of the legislature, and, unless the punishment specified by statute constitutes cruel and unusual treatment, it will not be disturbed by the judiciary. Allen v. State, 440 So. 2d 544 (Miss. 1983); Adams v. State, 410 So. 2d 1332 (Miss. 1982); Baker v. State, 394 So. 2d 1376 (Miss. 1981); Horton v. State, 374 So. 2d 764 (Miss. 1979). We have carefully examined the record in this case. A pre-sentence hearing was conducted pursuant to Rules 6.02-6.04, Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice, and it was conceded that appellant is an habitual offender as defined by the statute. However, we are of the opinion that an adequate pre-sentencing hearing was not held, although the trial judge is not to be faulted in the matter, since he afforded every opportunity to appellant and his counsel to present mitigating evidence at that hearing. We do not retreat from the holding of our decisions in the cases cited above, but we recognize that there are cases, even when the appellant and his attorney fail to prepare and complete a sentencing record, where the trial court must consider all facets, background and record in a sentencing hearing in order that a just and proper sentence may be imposed. This is such a case. We are of the opinion that this cause should be remanded in order that the lower court may consider and pass upon, all matters relevant to the sentence of appellant. It should require counsel for appellant to present any mitigating circumstances at the resentencing hearing (surely, there must be some). The sentence of the lower court is vacated and the cause is remanded for an additional sentence hearing and resentencing. JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AFFIRMED. SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE REMANDED TO THE LOWER COURT FOR RESENTENCING HEARING. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER, P.J., and HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN and ANDERSON, JJ., concur. ROBERTSON and ANDERSON, JJ., specially concur. ROBERTSON, Justice, specially concurring: We have a longstanding and normally salutary rule in this state that imposition of a sentence of a term of years in a criminal proceeding is within the discretion of the trial judge and that such sentence will not be disturbed on appeal if it is within the limits authorized by a duly promulgated enactment of the legislature. See, e.g., Bracy v. State, 396 So. 2d 632, 636 (Miss. 1981); Boyington v. State, 389 So. 2d 485, 491 (Miss. 1980); Yazzie v. State, 366 So. 2d 240, 244 (Miss. 1979); Boone v. State, 291 So. 2d 182, 187 (Miss. 1974); Bond v. State, 249 Miss. 352, 358, 162 So. 2d 510, 512 (1964); Harris v. State, 142 Miss. 342, 344-45, 107 So. 372, 373 (1926). Put another way, the limits thought imposed upon the sentencing judge's discretion are those found in the statute and those only. This rule which is a creature of this Court's making and has no base in legislative directive has many virtues. Most prominent of these are the superior institutional and de facto opportunity of the trial judge to get well in mind all of the relevant facts and circumstances regarding the offense committed and the offender to be sentenced. Beyond that, the trial judge has the opportunity and the responsibility *621 to see and observe the offender, eyeball to eyeball, to engage him in colloquy. Where a trial has been had, the offender's demeanor becomes a matter within the actual knowledge of the sentencing judge. By way of contrast, we are ill equipped to impose sentences in criminal cases because we have only a cold record to review, because we have not seen the defendant eyeball to eyeball, because we do not have access to a presentence report which if done properly goes far beyond the scope of evidence admissible at trial. On a more practical level, as all know we simply do not have the time and resources to get into the sentence imposition and review business. The rule stated in the cases cited above and many others too numerous to cite has, I am confident, the full support of every member of this Court. There can be little doubt that on the whole it works better than any other approach to sentencing review. No one here wants to change the rule. Indeed the rule is such a wise and workable rule that I think it fair to say that the only thing that will ever cause us to deviate from it is the imposition by trial judges of sentences as shockingly excessive as that we have here, forty years without parole for what in essence is a petty criminal's stealing a steak. ANDERSON, J., joins in this opinion. [1] In 1960, gasoline was 38¢ a gallon. If the package of ribeye steaks contained two steaks, at the prices today, the value would have exceeded $8.00 for the package. [1a] A thorough discussion of Solem v. Helm and Whitmore v. Maggio is not necessary to our decision in this case. However, the Bench and Bar should acquaint themselves with the principle involved in those cases.