Case Title: Montgomery County v. Anchor Inn

Citation: 374 Md. 327

Docket Number: 91/00

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2003-05-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 91, September Term, 2000 
Montgomery County, Maryland, et al. v. Anchor Inn Seafood Restaurant, et al.
[Involves The Validity Of A Montgomery County Regulation That Prohibits Smoking In Eating
and Drinking Establishments]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 91
September Term, 2000
_________________________________________
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND, et al.
v.
ANCHOR INN SEAFOOD RESTAURANT, et al.
__________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
        
Eldridge
       
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
 
                                
         JJ.
__________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
________________________________________
Filed:    May 2, 2003
We issued a writ of certiorari in this case to determine the validity of a Montgomery
County regulation that prohibits smoking in eating and drinking establishments other than
private clubs.  We shall hold that the regulation is invalid.
I.
On January 19, 1999, Bill No. 2-99, banning smoking in licensed bars and restaurants
in Montgomery County, was introduced in the Montgomery County Council.  Following a
hearing, the bill passed by a five to four vote and was delivered to the County Executive, who
vetoed it.  On the same date that the bill was passed, the County Council purported to convene
as the Board of Health and considered adopting, by resolution, a regulation that mirrored Bill
No. 2-99.  Resolution 14-70 was adopted on March 9, 1999, to take effect on January 1, 2002.
It provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
“Smoking in eating and drinking establishments
(a)
Smoking Prohibited.  A person must not smoke any
tobacco product in any eating and drinking establishment
licensed under Chapter 15 of the County Code.  The owner
or person in control of the establishment must refuse to
serve or seat any person who smokes, and must direct the
person to leave if the person continues to smoke after
proper warning.
* * *
“(b)
Exception.  This regulation does not apply in the bar or
dining area of any eating and drinking establishment that:
(1)
is a club as defined in the state alcoholic
beverages law,
(2) 
has an alcoholic beverages license issued to
private clubs under the state alcoholic
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beverages law, and
(3) 
allows consumption of alcoholic beverages
on its premises.”
The purported legal basis for Resolution 14-70 was set forth in the Resolution, and states in
pertinent part as follows:
“Maryland Code Health-General Article § 3-202(d) authorizes the
County Council, sitting as the County Board of Health, to adopt rules and
regulations regarding any nuisance or cause of disease in the County.”
Following the adoption of the Resolution, the respondents, Anchor Inn Seafood
Restaurant, numerous other restaurants located in Montgomery County, restaurant owners and
employers (collectively referred to as “Anchor Inn”) and the City of Gaithersburg, filed in the
Circuit Court for Montgomery County these declaratory judgment actions challenging the
validity of the Resolution.  After cross-motions for summary judgment, the Circuit Court
entered a judgment declaring the Resolution invalid.  In a separate opinion accompanying the
declaration that the Resolution was invalid, the Circuit Court delineated five alternative
grounds for its decision.  First, the court held that, under state law, the County Council did not
have the authority to sit as the Board of Health without the participation of the County
Executive.  Second, the Circuit Court held that the Resolution was preempted by Maryland
Code (1992, 1998 Repl. Vol.), § 2-105(d) of the Business Regulation Article.  Third, the court
concluded that the County Council, purporting to sit as an administrative agency, failed to
comply with the Montgomery County Administrative Procedure Act.  Fourth, the court took
the position that the Resolution violated the separation of powers provisions in the
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1
 Article XI-A, § 3, provides in part as follows:
(continued...)
Montgomery County Charter.  Fifth, the Circuit Court held that the Resolution violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
the equal protection principle embodied in Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
Montgomery County filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, and then
petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari prior to any proceedings in the Court of Special
Appeals.  We granted the certiorari petition, Montgomery County Council v. Anchor Inn, 361
Md. 433, 761 A.2d 932 (2000), and we shall affirm.
II.
We fully agree with the first ground relied upon by the Circuit Court for holding the
Resolution invalid, namely that, under state law, the Montgomery County Council did not have
the authority to act as the Board of Health without the participation of the County Executive.
Consequently, we need not and shall not express any opinion with respect to the other
alternative grounds relied upon in the Circuit Court’s opinion.
Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution authorizes counties to adopt home rule
charters which, as we have often pointed out, function as “constitutions” for the counties
adopting them.  Save Our Streets v. Mitchell, 357 Md. 237, 248, 743 A.2d 748, 754 (2000),
and cases there cited.  Section 3 of Article XI-A mandates that a county adopting a home rule
charter must select one of two types of government:  (1) an elective legislative body known
as the County Council without an elected County Executive or (2) an elective County Council
plus an elective County Executive.1
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1
(...continued)
“Every charter so formed shall provide for an elective legislative body in which
shall be vested the law-making power of said City or County.  Such legislative body in the
City of Baltimore shall be known as the City Council of the City of Baltimore, and in any
county shall be known as the County Council of the County.  The chief executive officer,
if any such charter shall provide for the election of such executive officer, or the presiding
officer of said legislative body, if such charter shall not provide for the election of a chief
executive officer, shall be known in the City of Baltimore as Mayor of Baltimore, and in
any County as the President or Chairman of the County Council of the County, and all
references in the Constitution and laws of this State to the Mayor of Baltimore and
City Council of the City of Baltimore or to the County Commissioners of the Counties,
shall be construed to refer to the Mayor of Baltimore and City Council of the City of
Baltimore and to the President or Chairman and County Council herein provided for
whenever such construction would be reasonable. * * * ” (Emphasis supplied).
In accordance with Article XI-A of the Constitution, Montgomery County adopted in
1948 a home rule charter.  In this original charter, Montgomery County opted for the system
having no county executive and where the elected County Council comprised the governing
body, having both legislative and executive powers.  The original Charter, in Art. III, §§ 2 and
3, declared that the Council was the “chief executive authority” and vested the Council with “all
powers of the Board of County Commissioners, or any of them, as a local board of health.”
In 1965, the County Council by ordinance again designated itself as the local Board of Health.
In 1968, however, Montgomery County adopted a new charter, effective in 1970, which
provided for the other type of government authorized by Article XI-A of the Maryland
Constitution, with a county executive and a separation of the county government into
legislative and executive branches.  See Eggert v. Montgomery County Council, 263 Md. 243,
256-260, 282 A.2d 474, 480-482 (1971), where this Court discussed the new charter and the
Montgomery County Council’s invalid efforts to exercise executive powers under the new
charter.
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2
There was a limited exception for Montgomery County in the second paragraph of the statute, but the
exception concerned only chartered municipalities within the County.
The Maryland General Assembly, as early as 1886, has authorized the governing bodies
of counties, which were then county commissioners in all counties, to constitute the county
boards of health.  Ch. 22, § 2, of the Acts of 1886 stated that
“the Board of County Commissioners of the several counties in this
State shall, ex-officio, constitute a Local Board of Health for their
respective counties, and shall have and exercise all the duties of a Board
of Health, as provided in this act . . . .”
In December 1970 and thereafter, when Montgomery County’s new charter went into effect,
the state statute was virtually the same as when it was enacted in 1886.  Maryland Code (1957,
1971 Repl. Vol.), Art. 43, § 45, provided in relevant part as follows:
“The board of county commissioners of the several counties in this
State shall, ex officio, constitute a local board of health for their
respective counties and shall have and exercise all the duties of a board
of health as provided in this article except in cases where the charter of
any city or town in the State contains provisions inconsistent therewith.”2
As reenacted and recodified by Ch. 21, § 2, of the Acts of 1982, Maryland Code (1982, 2000
Repl. Vol.), § 3-201 of the Health-General Article, the provision now reads as follows:
“§ 3-201. County governing body or designated board.
(a) In general. – Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section,
the governing body of a county is ex officio the board of health for the
county.
(b) Code or charter county. – In a code county or charter county, the
governing body is ex officio the board of health for the county, unless
the governing body establishes a board of health.”
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Montgomery County has not by ordinance established a separate entity as a Board of
Health.  Accordingly, the critical issue in this case is whether the “governing body” of
Montgomery County, for purposes of § 3-201 of the Health-General Article, is the County
Council alone, or is the County Council and County Executive together.
It is clear that, after 1948 and until the latter part of 1970, the County Council of
Montgomery County constituted the local Board of Health.  The 1948 Charter provision and
the 1965 ordinance, designating the County Council alone as the Board of Health, were
consistent with former Art. 43, § 45, providing that the County Commissioners constituted the
local Board of Health.  Under the explicit language of Article XI-A, § 3, of the Maryland
Constitution, the reference to the Board of County Commissioners in the state statute should
“be construed to refer to the . . . County Council herein provided for . . . .”  From 1948 until
December 1970, the County Council of Montgomery County was the “governing body” of
Montgomery County.
From and after December 1970, however, when the new Montgomery County Charter
went into effect, the County Council alone was clearly no longer the local Board of Health.
The adoption of the County Executive - County Council form of local government was a major
change with obvious consequences for future enactments.  Under Article XI-A, § 3, of the
Maryland Constitution, the language in Art. 43, § 45, of the Maryland Code, referring to the
“Board of County Commissioners,” meant the County Council and County Executive together.
In County Council v. Supervisor, 274 Md. 116, 117, 332 A.2d 897, 898 (1975), this
Court held that “the County Council of Montgomery County is not synonymous with the term
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‘county commissioners’.”  In reviewing the provisions of Art. XI-A of the Maryland
Constitution, in a charter county, we held that the corporate body of Montgomery County
comprises the Executive and the Council together, as the successor to the former county
commissioners.  Judge Smith explained for the Court (274 Md. at 123, 332 A.2d at 900-901):
“When one considers the fact that at the time of the adoption of Art.
XI-A the corporate name of the City of Baltimore was ‘Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore,’ that by the provisions of Art. 25, § 1 county
commissioners of each county are ‘declared to be a corporation,’ that
one would hardly expect to call the chief executive officer of a county
‘mayor,’ and the words ‘President and County Council’ are an
approximation of ‘Mayor of Baltimore and City Council of the City of
Baltimore,’ it becomes obvious to us that the intent of the framers of the
amendment was to refer to the county in its corporate capacity, by
whatever name it might ultimately be known upon the adoption of a
charter.  Accordingly, we conclude that it is the corporate entity of
Montgomery County, Maryland, so known in its charter, which is vested
with the right of appeal . . . in lieu of the prior corporate entity, the
County Commissioners of Montgomery County.”
Earlier, in Barranca v. Prince George’s County, 264 Md. 562, 287 A.2d 286 (1972),
we held that the County Executive and the County Council together comprised the corporate
governing body of Prince George’s County.  In that case, the County Executive claimed to have
the authority to act alone to remove a Prince George’s County member of the Washington
Suburban Sanitary Commission from office.  We held that the “power of removal . . . lies in
the hands of both the County Executive and the County Council,” when the relevant statute
vested the authority in the corporate body.  Barranca v. Prince George’s County, supra, 264
Md. at 571, 287 A.2d at 291.
Moreover, this Court has consistently taken the position that, with respect to home rule
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counties with both an executive and a council, the reference to “governing body” of a county,
without further definition, means the executive and council together.  Thus, in County Council
of Harford County v. Maryland Reclamation Associates, 328 Md. 229, 614 A.2d. 78 (1992),
we held that the Harford County Council acting by itself was not the “governing body” of the
county.   The County Council in that case, as in the instant case, purported to adopt a  regulation
without the participation of the County Executive.   The Harford County Council argued  that
“the provisions of Maryland Code (1982, 1987 Repl. Vol., 1992 Cum. Supp.), §§ 9-501
through 9-521 of the Environment Article, authorize[d] the ‘County Council’ itself to adopt,
review, revise and amend Harford County’s Solid Waste Management Plan.”  County Council
of Harford County v. Maryland Reclamation Associates, supra, 328 Md. at 234, 614 A.2d.
at 81.  But the state statute granted the authority to the “county governing body,” not the
Council.  As we pointed out, 328 Md. at 236 n.3, 614 A.2d at 82 n.3, even though the
Environment Article did not define the term “county governing body,” the 
“Legislature elsewhere has defined the term to mean, in a charter county,
the council and executive together.  See, e.g., Code (1974, 1990 Repl.
Vol.), § 8-701(d) of the Natural Resources Article (‘“Governing body”
means the county commissioners, county executive and county council
of any county . . .’); Code (1978, 1989 Repl. Vol.), § 5-102(c)(1) of the
Education Article (‘county governing body . . . consists of a county
executive and county council’).”  
Accordingly, we held that the Council, acting alone, without the participation of the County
Executive, lacked the authority to adopt or amend the County’s Solid Waste Management Plan.
No ordinance passed by the Montgomery County Council and signed by the
Montgomery County Executive has created a separate Board of Health for Montgomery
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County.  Consequently, under § 3-201 of the Health-General Article of the Maryland Code,
the “governing body” of Montgomery County is the local Board of Health.  After 1970, the
governing body has consisted of the County Council and County Executive together, and not
the Council acting alone.  Since the challenged Resolution was passed by the Council acting
alone, it is invalid.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.