Case Title: Singleton v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 082270

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2009-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Lacy, S.J.  
 
KENNETH L. SINGLETON 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 082270 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
     November 5, 2009 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
GORDON ANDREW ZEDD 
 
v.  Record No. 090012 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In these appeals, we consider whether the evidence was 
sufficient to convict two attorneys for contempt of court in 
violation of Code § 18.2-456.  In Singleton v. Commonwealth, 
Kenneth L. Singleton was found guilty of criminal contempt for 
failing to appear for a scheduled trial of his client and for 
excusing his client from appearing at the trial without the 
court’s approval.  In Zedd v. Commonwealth, Gordon Andrew Zedd 
was found guilty of criminal contempt for excusing his client 
from appearing for a scheduled trial without the court’s 
approval. 
BACKGROUND 
I. Singleton v. Commonwealth 
 
Darrell P. Simpson retained attorney Kenneth L. Singleton 
to represent him in an appeal of a misdemeanor conviction for 
driving under the influence.  The matter was originally set 
for trial on August 30, 2007 in the Circuit Court of the City 
of Norfolk. 
 
Prior to trial, Singleton contacted the prosecutor 
assigned to the case regarding a continuance.  The prosecutor 
and Singleton agreed to a continuance of the case to September 
27, 2007.  The prosecutor then prepared a continuance order 
and “called off” his witness in the case.  On August 28, 2007, 
the prosecutor and Singleton met and signed the continuance 
order.  Thereafter at Singleton’s direction, his office 
informed Simpson that he did not need to appear in court for 
his original trial date. 
 
On August 30, 2007, the prosecutor appeared in the 
circuit court and requested entry of the continuance order.  
The court rejected the order in light of the fact that neither 
Singleton nor his client was present. 
 
Singleton, Simpson, and the prosecutor subsequently 
appeared before the circuit court on September 12, 2007 for a 
bond hearing.1  At that time, the court asked Singleton:  “What 
authority do you have to excuse a person from court?”  
Singleton answered by indicating that the parties had agreed 
                     
1 While the record is not clear, apparently Simpson was 
arrested for failing to appear on August 30, 2007, and was 
subsequently released on bond by a magistrate prior to the 
bond hearing set for September 12, 2007. 
 
2
on a date to continue the case.  The court asked again:  “What 
authority do you have to excuse someone from court without a 
judge entering an order?”  Singleton answered:  “None, Your 
Honor.”  The court then found Singleton in contempt of court, 
fining him $250. 
 
In his defense, Singleton explained:  “I know I have no 
authority as a judge to excuse anyone from court, but as an 
officer of the court, I did believe, in good faith, that after 
speaking with the Commonwealth[’s] Attorney, we had agreed on 
a date.”  The circuit court replied:  “You do understand that 
nothing you talk about between counsel is an order until a 
judge says it’s an order, right?”  Singleton responded that he 
had signed the continuance order and that he was unaware the 
continuance order was not entered.  The court concluded the 
hearing with an admonition that Singleton should never excuse 
a client from appearing on a scheduled trial date without 
knowing that a judge has in fact given approval for a 
continuance. 
 
The circuit court entered a final order on September 13, 
2007, finding Singleton guilty of contempt of court pursuant 
to Code § 18.2-456.  In the final order, the court handwrote the 
following after the contempt charge:  “[i]ntentional 
[i]nterference with [the] administration of justice by willfully 
& knowingly failing to appear for a court appearance without 
 
3
prior court approval and further, advising his client not to 
appear resulting in an arrest warrant being issued for the 
client’s arrest.” 
 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Singleton argued the 
evidence was insufficient to find him guilty of contempt 
because there was no evidence of contemptuous intent.  
Singleton also argued that the trial court denied him due 
process by erroneously employing summary, rather than plenary, 
contempt procedures. 
 
In a published opinion, a three-judge panel of the Court 
of Appeals affirmed Singleton’s conviction, holding that by 
not appearing on the original trial date and advising his 
client not to appear on that date, Singleton undermined the 
trial court’s authority to control the court’s docket and 
schedule criminal cases for trial.  Singleton v. Commonwealth, 
52 Va. App. 665, 671, 667 S.E.2d 23, 26 (2008).  The Court of 
Appeals also held that Singleton was precluded from raising 
for the first time on appeal the argument that he should have 
received the procedural protections associated with plenary 
contempt.  Id. at 672-73, 667 S.E.2d at 26.  We awarded 
Singleton an appeal. 
II. Zedd v. Commonwealth 
 
Kiwani Scott retained attorney Gordon Andrew Zedd to 
represent her in an appeal of a misdemeanor conviction for 
 
4
reckless driving.  The matter was originally set for trial on 
October 2, 2007 in the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk. 
 
The day before the trial, Zedd contacted the prosecutor 
assigned to the case in order to request a continuance because 
of a scheduling conflict.  The prosecutor agreed to continue 
the case to November 6, 2007 because its key witness, the 
state trooper who had charged Scott, was unavailable to attend 
the trial.  Subsequently, Zedd contacted Scott and told her 
that she did not need to appear in court the next day. 
 
Zedd and the prosecutor appeared in the circuit court the 
following day and submitted a joint continuance order to the 
court.  The court questioned Zedd about the whereabouts of his 
client.  Zedd stated that he had excused his client.  In 
response to the court’s questions for why he had excused his 
client, Zedd noted the unavailability of the state trooper and 
the Commonwealth’s inability to proceed.  Additionally, the 
prosecutor highlighted to the court that this was a joint 
continuance motion due to a mutual inability to proceed.2  
 
At the conclusion of the proceedings on October 2, 2007, 
the circuit court issued a bench warrant charging Zedd with 
contempt of court.  Pursuant to that warrant, Zedd was 
arrested and processed.  On February 28, 2008, the court 
                     
2 It is unclear from the limited record before us what 
action the circuit court took with regard to the requested 
continuance. 
 
5
entered a final order finding Zedd guilty of contempt of court 
pursuant to Code § 18.2-456 and imposing a fine of $50. 
 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Zedd argued the 
evidence was insufficient to find him guilty of contempt 
because there was no evidence of contemptuous intent.  Zedd 
also argued that the trial court denied him due process by 
erroneously employing summary, rather than plenary, contempt 
procedures.  In addition, Zedd attempted to distinguish his 
case from Singleton’s case, noting that unlike Singleton, he 
had appeared on the scheduled trial date. 
 
The Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion held that 
Zedd’s appearance in court on the scheduled trial date was 
insufficient to distinguish his case from Singleton’s case.  
Accordingly, for the reasons stated in Singleton, 52 Va. App. 
at 672-73, 667 S.E.2d at 26, the Court of Appeals affirmed 
Zedd’s conviction.  Zedd v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2621-07-1 
(December 2, 2008).  We awarded Zedd an appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
 
The dispositive issue in these appeals is whether there 
was sufficient evidence to convict Singleton and Zedd of 
contempt of court.  The applicable standard of appellate 
review is well established.  Where the sufficiency of the 
evidence is challenged after conviction, we review the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
 
6
according it the benefit of all reasonable inferences fairly 
deducible therefrom.  Dowden v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 459, 
461, 536 S.E.2d 437, 438 (2000).  As a result, we will reverse 
a judgment of the circuit court only upon a showing that it is 
plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.  Viney v. 
Commonwealth, 269 Va. 296, 299, 609 S.E.2d 26, 28 (2005). 
Both Singleton and Zedd were convicted of contempt of 
court in violation of Code § 18.2-456, which states in 
relevant part: 
The courts and judges may issue attachments for 
contempt, and punish them summarily, only in the 
cases following: 
 
(1) Misbehavior in the presence of the court, or  
so near thereto as to obstruct or interrupt the 
administration of justice; 
 
. . . . 
 
(4) Misbehavior of an officer of the court in his  
official character; 
 
(5) Disobedience or resistance of an officer of the  
court, . . . to any lawful process, judgment, decree 
or order of the court. 
 
 
We have long recognized that “[a]ll courts in this 
Commonwealth have the power to impose penalties for 
contemptuous conduct.”  Gilman v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 222, 
227, 657 S.E.2d 474, 476 (2008).  Moreover, “[a] court’s 
authority to punish contemptuous conduct is exercised to 
preserve the power of the court and to vindicate the court’s 
 
7
dignity.”  Id.  Thus, in criminal contempt proceedings, it is 
essential to consider whether the accused intended to 
undermine this authority.  See Potts v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 
855, 859, 36 S.E.2d 529, 530 (1946) (“any act which is 
calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct the court in the 
administration of justice is contempt”) (emphasis added).  In 
the present appeals, it is not contended that the conduct of 
these attorneys invoked the application of Code § 18.2-456(4) 
or (5).  Therefore, we must decide whether the evidence was 
sufficient to establish that Singleton and Zedd intended “to 
obstruct or interrupt the administration of justice.”  Code 
§ 18.2-456(1). 
 
For more than a century, Virginia courts have required 
the element of intent in order to sustain a criminal contempt 
conviction.  See Carter v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 791, 802-03, 
32 S.E. 780, 780 (1899); Wise v. Commonwealth, 97 Va. 779, 
781-82, 34 S.E. 453, 453-54 (1899); Wells v. Commonwealth, 62 
Va. (21 Gratt.) 500, 509 (1871); accord Robinson v. 
Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 137, 143, 583 S.E.2d 60, 63 (2003) 
(finding intent a necessary element of criminal contempt); 
Carter v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 392, 397, 345 S.E.2d 5, 8 
(1986) (same).  For purposes of resolving the present appeals, 
we find a review of our prior precedents instructive. 
 
8
 
In Wells, an attorney erroneously advised his client to 
seek an injunction from a federal district court, sitting as a 
court in bankruptcy, to enjoin state circuit court 
proceedings.  62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 505.  When the attorney 
was cited for contempt of court for interfering with a state 
court proceeding, he filed an affidavit indicating it was his 
good faith belief that his client did have such a right under 
the law, and he intended no disrespect to the state court.  
Id. at 506.  This Court held that, although he may have erred 
in judgment, the attorney could not be held in contempt 
because “he was acting in good faith, for what he believed to 
be the interest of his client, and not from disrespect to the 
court.”  Id. at 509.  
 
In Wise, an attorney had scheduled a case for trial in a 
court in the City of Richmond at 10:00 a.m. with the 
reasonable expectation that he would finish the case in time 
to begin a second case scheduled at 11:00 a.m. in Henrico 
County.  97 Va. at 780, 34 S.E. at 453.  When it became 
apparent that he would be late for his second case, the 
attorney telephoned the Commonwealth’s Attorney of Henrico 
County and asked him to inform the judge that he was 
unavoidably detained in the trial of the case in the Richmond 
court.  Id.  The attorney then returned to the courtroom in 
the Richmond court and requested a continuance of the trial.  
 
9
Id.  The judge refused to interrupt the trial to permit the 
attorney to go immediately to the court in Henrico County.  
Id.  Upon his late arrival, the court in Henrico County 
imposed a fine upon the attorney for contempt of court.  Id. 
at 780-81, 34 S.E. at 453.  We reversed the contempt 
conviction, holding there could be no contempt when “[t]here 
is nothing in the facts stated to give color to the suspicion 
that, in what he did, [the attorney] intended the slightest 
contempt of, or disrespect to, the lawful authority of the 
[court in Henrico County].”  Id. at 781, 34 S.E. at 453 
(emphasis added).  We further stated that the court in Henrico 
County could have continued the case or proceeded without the 
attorney “but it could not punish for a contempt of court when 
it is manifest that no contempt of its authority was 
intended.”  Id. at 782, 34 S.E. at 454 (emphasis added). 
 
Finally, in Carter, we considered whether the defendant 
had the requisite intent for criminal contempt because he sent 
a telegram to his attorney for use in court falsely stating 
that he was ill and could not appear for a scheduled trial.3  
96 Va. at 802, 32 S.E. at 780.  Carter contended that he did 
not make the statement for the purpose of obtaining a 
continuance and that no disrespect to the court was intended.  
                     
3 Carter was convicted under a criminal contempt statute 
identical to modern-day Code § 18.2-456.  See Carter, 96 Va. 
at 803, 32 S.E. at 780. 
 
10
Id.  We affirmed Carter’s conviction, however, holding that 
“[t]he effort to obtain a continuance . . . by means of a 
statement as to health which he knew to be false tended 
directly to impede and obstruct the administration of 
justice.”  Id.  We went on to note that lack of intent is a 
defense to criminal contempt: 
It is true that with respect to conduct or language 
where the intent with which a thing is said or done 
gives color and character to the act or words, a 
disclaimer of any purpose to be guilty of a contempt 
or to destroy or impair the authority due to the 
court, is a good defence; but this is true only of 
language or acts of doubtful import, and which may 
reasonably bear two constructions.  In the case 
before us there could have been but one motive, and 
that to influence the action of the court with 
respect to a case before it by means of a statement 
known and admitted to be false. 
 
Id. at 802-03, 32 S.E. at 781 (internal citation omitted). 
 
In the appeals presently before us, nothing in either 
record suggests an intent on the part of the two attorneys “to 
obstruct or interrupt the administration of justice” as 
required by Code § 18.2-456(1).  In Singleton’s case, the 
prosecutor agreed to a continuance of the case and released 
his witness, making it impossible for the Commonwealth to 
proceed to trial on the original trial date.  Similarly, in 
Zedd’s case, the prosecutor agreed to a continuance because 
the Commonwealth’s key witness was unavailable to appear and 
testify on the original trial date.  Unquestionably, 
 
11
Singleton’s absence on the scheduled trial date and his 
release of his client is entirely consistent with his asserted 
good faith belief that the circuit court would grant the 
mutually requested continuance because of the Commonwealth’s 
inability to proceed to trial on the scheduled trial date.  
Likewise, the evidence is entirely consistent with Zedd’s 
assertion that he excused his client from appearing on the 
scheduled trial date on the reasonable expectation that the 
court would grant the mutually requested continuance because 
of the Commonwealth’s inability to proceed to trial without 
its necessary witness.  Accordingly, we hold that the evidence 
was insufficient to establish that Singleton or Zedd intended 
“to obstruct or interrupt the administration of justice.”  In 
the absence of such intent, we further hold that the evidence 
is insufficient to sustain their convictions for criminal 
contempt under Code § 18.2-456(1).  Accordingly, the Court of 
Appeals erred in finding the evidence sufficient to convict 
Singleton and Zedd of contempt of court. 
 
In reaching our resolutions of these appeals, we are not 
unmindful of the trial court’s “inherent authority to 
administer cases on its docket.”  Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 
258 Va. 347, 361, 519 S.E.2d 602, 608 (1999).  Certainly, 
whether a continuance should be granted rests within the sound 
discretion of the trial court.  Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 248 
 
12
Va. 501, 508, 450 S.E.2d 146, 151 (1994).  In that regard, we 
take this opportunity to stress that criminal defense 
attorneys and as well attorneys for the Commonwealth, in the 
absence of an established contrary policy by a particular 
trial court, should not follow a practice of agreeing to a 
continuance of a pending case under circumstances that 
essentially limit, as a practical matter, the trial court’s 
ability to exercise its discretion whether to grant a 
continuance.  When critical witnesses are excused prior to the 
granting of a continuance by the trial court, the discretion 
of the trial court to grant a continuance under such 
circumstances is severely limited.  Experience teaches that 
when continuances are requested in a timely fashion and for 
the reasons typified by the circumstances in the present 
cases, the trial courts will routinely ensure that by granting 
a continuance both parties will be afforded a trial on the 
merits of a particular case.  Undoubtedly, the better practice 
would dictate that until the trial court enters a continuance 
order, the defense attorney should appear in court on the date 
scheduled for trial with his or her client and request the 
continuance.  Similarly, the attorney for the Commonwealth 
should appear in court and not excuse its witnesses in 
anticipation that the trial court will grant a mutual request 
for a continuance.  In short, in the absence of the entry of a 
 
13
continuance order prior to the scheduled trial date, attorneys 
should not presume that a continuance will be granted. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals sustaining Singleton’s conviction of contempt 
of court in violation of Code § 18.2-456, and will vacate that 
conviction.  We will also reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals sustaining Zedd’s conviction of contempt of court in 
violation of Code § 18.2-456, and will vacate that conviction.4 
 
Record No. 082270 - Reversed and vacated. 
Record No. 090012 - Reversed and vacated. 
                     
4 In light of our resolution of these appeals on the 
sufficiency of the evidence issue, we need not address the 
remaining issue raised. 
 
14