Case Title: Trustees of Cambridge Point Condominium Trust v. Cambridge Point, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12327

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-01-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12327 
 
TRUSTEES OF THE CAMBRIDGE POINT CONDOMINIUM TRUST  vs.  
CAMBRIDGE POINT, LLC, & others.1 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     October 5, 2017. - January 19, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Condominiums, By-laws, Management, Common area.  Real Property, 
Condominium.  Public Policy. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
April 3, 2014. 
 
 
A motion for partial summary judgment was heard by Rosalind 
H. Miller, J.; a motion for reconsideration was considered by 
her; and motions to dismiss were heard by Peter B. Krupp, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Edmund A. Allcock for the plaintiffs. 
 
John F. Gleavy for CDI Commercial Development, Inc., & 
another. 
 
David Aleksic, for Frank Fodera & another, was present but 
did not argue. 
                                                          
 
 
1 Northern Development, LLC; CDI Commercial Development, 
Inc.; Giuseppe Fodera; Frank Fodera; Frank Fodera, Jr.; and 
Anahid Mardiros. 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
David T. Keenan, for Anahid Mardiros, was present but did 
not argue. 
 
Henry A. Goodman & Ellen A. Shapiro, for Community 
Associations Institute, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Cailin M. Burke, Julie B. Heinzelman, Diane R. Rubin, 
Thomas O. Moriarty, & Kimberly A. Bielan, for Real Estate Bar 
Association for Massachusetts, Inc., & another, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  In this action, a condominium trust's board of 
trustees has filed suit against the developers of the 
condominium for damages arising from various design and 
construction defects in the condominium's common areas and 
facilities.  The condominium bylaws, however, provide that the 
trustees cannot bring any litigation involving the common areas 
and facilities against anyone other than a unit owner unless 
they first obtain the consent of at least eighty per cent of the 
unit owners.  The issue on appeal is whether this bylaw 
provision is void, either because it violates the Condominium 
Act (act), G. L. c. 183A, or because it contravenes public 
policy.  We conclude that it is void because it contravenes 
public policy.2 
 
Background.  In 2007, Cambridge Point, LLC, as the 
declarant of a predominantly residential forty-two-unit 
condominium in Cambridge, filed in the Middlesex South District 
registry of deeds a master deed, a declaration of trust, and the 
                                                          
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Community Associations Institute and by the Real Estate Bar 
Association for Massachusetts, Inc., and the Abstract Club. 
3 
 
 
 
bylaws of the Cambridge Point Condominium Trust (trust).  The 
trust's board of trustees (trustees) is responsible for 
administering the affairs of the trust.  Among the powers and 
duties committed to the trustees is the authority under § 1(o) 
of the bylaws to "conduct[] litigation as to any course of 
action involving the common areas and facilities."  However, 
this authority is limited by a condition precedent that requires 
the trustees, before initiating any litigation against anyone 
who is not a unit owner, (1) to deliver a copy of the proposed 
complaint to all unit owners; (2) to specify a monetary limit of 
the amount to be paid as legal fees and costs in the proposed 
litigation; (3) to inform all unit owners that, if they consent 
to the initiation of the litigation, they will forthwith be 
separately assessed this amount of legal fees and costs as a 
special assessment; and (4) within sixty days after a copy of 
the proposed complaint has been delivered to the unit owners, to 
receive the written consent of not less than eighty per cent3 of 
all unit owners to bring the litigation.4 
                                                          
 
 
3 Section 32 of the condominium's bylaws defines 
"[p]ercentage of [u]nit [o]wners" as "the owners of the 
specified percentage in the aggregate in interest of the 
undivided ownership in the common areas and facilities of the 
[c]ondominium." 
 
 
4 Section 1(o) of the condominium's bylaws provides in 
relevant part: 
 
"The [b]oard of [t]rustees shall have all powers necessary 
4 
 
 
 
 
In 2012, the trust began receiving complaints from unit 
owners about pervasive water leaks, which were infiltrating and 
damaging the building envelope, eventually causing a mold 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
for administering the affairs of the [c]ondominium as set 
forth in [G. L. c. 183A] . . . .  Such powers and duties of 
the [t]rustees shall include, but shall not be limited to, 
. . . 
 
(o) conducting litigation as to any course of action 
involving the common areas and facilities . . . . 
 
"Notwithstanding any provision of the [m]aster [d]eed, or 
the [d]eclaration of [t]rust of the [c]ondominium [t]rust, 
or of these [b]ylaws or the [r]ules and [r]egulations to 
the contrary, neither the [t]rustees acting in their 
capacity as such [t]rustees or acting as representatives of 
the [u]nit [o]wners, nor any class of the [u]nit [o]wners 
shall bring any litigation whatsoever unless a copy of the 
proposed complaint in such litigation has been delivered to 
all of the [u]nit [o]wners, and not less than eighty [per 
cent] (80%) of all [u]nit [o]wners consent in writing to 
the bringing of such litigation within sixty (60) days 
after a copy of such complaint had been delivered to the 
[u]nit [o]wners and specifying as part of the written 
consent a specific monetary limitation to be paid as legal 
fees and costs and expenses to be incurred in connection 
therewith, which amount shall be separately assessed as a 
special assessment effective forthwith at the time of said 
affirmative consent.  Notwithstanding any provisions of the 
[m]aster [d]eed, or of the [d]eclaration of [t]rust of the 
[c]ondominium [t]rust . . . or these [b]ylaws or the 
[r]ules and [r]egulations, the provisions of this 
[p]aragraph . . . shall not be amended except by vote of at 
least eighty [per cent] (80%) of [u]nit [o]wners.  The 
provisions of this [p]aragraph (o) shall not apply to 
litigation by the [c]ondominium [t]rust against [u]nit 
[o]wners with respect to the recovery of overdue [c]ommon 
[e]xpenses or [s]pecial [a]ssessments or to foreclose the 
lien provided by [G. L. c. 183A, § 6], and [G. L. 
c. 254, §§ 5 and 5A], . . . or to enforce any of the 
provisions of the [m]aster [d]eed, or the [d]eclaration of 
[t]rust of the [c]ondominium [t]rust, or these [b]ylaws 
. . . , or the unit deed, against [u]nit [o]wners . . . ." 
 
5 
 
 
 
infestation both on the exterior sheathing of the building 
envelope and within individual units.  An investigation 
conducted by an engineering firm in 2013 identified myriad 
design and construction defects with the condominium.  When the 
trust's demands that the developers repair the defective 
construction proved futile, the trust sought out a contractor to 
repair the building, who estimated the costs of repair as 
exceeding $2 million. 
 
On April 3, 2014, after having delivered to the unit owners 
the proposed complaint and a statement of the estimated legal 
fees and costs of the litigation, but without having received 
the written consent of at least eighty per cent of the unit 
owners, the trustees filed a verified complaint in the Superior 
Court against the developers of the condominium5 alleging 
negligence, breach of the implied warranty of habitability, 
negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation and 
concealment, and breach of fiduciary duty.  In their complaint, 
                                                          
 
 
5 We refer to all of the defendants as "developers of the 
condominium" but recognize that the defendant Anahid Mardiros 
does not appear to have participated in the drafting of the 
condominium documents or the development and maintenance of the 
condominium.  She has filed a separate brief, claiming that her 
only affiliation with the other defendants is as a trustee of 
the Cambridge Point Nominee Trust, which is not a defendant 
here.  To resolve this appeal, we need not (and do not) address 
whether Mardiros is properly a defendant in this action.  We 
also note that, pursuant to a stipulation by the parties, the 
claims against the defendant Frank Fodera, Jr., were dismissed 
prior to the judgment of dismissal at issue in this appeal. 
6 
 
 
 
the trustees also sought a judgment declaring that § 1(o) of the 
bylaws is void.  They alleged that, because the developers and 
their affiliates had "reserved for themselves, and continue to 
own, enough units to prevent an [eighty per cent] supermajority 
of [u]nit [o]wners to authorize the [t]rust to institute a 
lawsuit," § 1(o) effectively prevented them from obtaining legal 
redress.6 
 
The trustees moved for partial summary judgment on their 
claim seeking a judgment declaring that § 1(o) of the bylaws is 
void.  The first motion judge denied the motion.7  The developers 
then moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the 
trustees had not obtained the minimum level of consent required 
under § 1(o).  The second motion judge allowed the motions to 
dismiss, concluding that the act "does not prohibit adoption of 
a bylaw that requires a percentage of unit owners to consent to 
litigation before litigation is filed by the trustees of a 
condominium," and that the requirements of § 1(o) did not 
                                                          
 
 
6 The trustees also sought a judgment declaring that 
§ III(i) of the declaration of trust, which provides for the 
indemnification of the trustees "against any liability incurred 
by them," is void, but neither motion judge addressed this claim 
and it is not before us on appeal. 
 
 
7 The first motion judge initially ruled that the trustees 
could proceed with the litigation if they obtained the consent 
of eighty per cent of the "disinterested unit owners," defined 
as those who had neither business, financial, nor familial ties 
to the developers, but, on reconsideration, she determined that 
under § 1(o), the litigation required the consent of at least 
eighty per cent of all unit owners. 
7 
 
 
 
constitute "overreaching" in contravention of public policy 
where the unit owners knew or should have known of these 
requirements prior to purchasing a unit.  The trustees appealed, 
and we granted their application for direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  The trustees argue that the provisions in 
§ 1(o) of the bylaws requiring them to obtain the consent of at 
least eighty per cent of the unit owners before initiating 
litigation against the developers are void for two reasons:  (1) 
they circumscribe the power of the trustees to conduct 
litigation, in violation of the act; and (2) they effectively 
shield the developers from any litigation brought on behalf of  
the unit owners for defects in the construction and design of 
the condominium, in contravention of public policy.  We address 
each argument in turn. 
 
1.  Does the act prohibit any requirement of unit owner 
consent before the trustees may initiate litigation?  Under 
§ 10 (b) (4) of the act, a condominium trust, as the entity 
granted the authority to manage the common areas and facilities 
of the condominium, "shall have, among its other powers, the 
. . . rights and powers . . . [t]o conduct litigation . . . as 
to any course of action involving the common areas and 
facilities."  We have recognized that, where there are defects 
or other problems in the common areas and facilities, the 
authority of a condominium trust to seek a remedy through 
8 
 
 
 
litigation is "exclusive."  Berish v. Bornstein, 437 Mass. 252, 
265 (2002).  "[C]ondominium unit owners cede the management and 
control of the common areas to the organization of unit owners, 
which is the only party that may bring litigation relating to 
the common areas of the condominium development on their 
behalf."  Id. at 263.  See Strauss v. Oyster River Condominium 
Trust, 417 Mass. 442, 445 (1994) ("Only the trustees have the 
right to conduct litigation concerning 'common areas and 
facilities'" [citation omitted]).  The trustees contend, in 
essence, that, because the act provides that they are the only 
party that may commence litigation to obtain compensation for 
damages arising from construction and design defects in the 
common areas, the act implicitly prohibits any bylaw provision 
that requires the trustees to obtain the consent of the unit 
owners before filing suit. 
 
We are not persuaded that every bylaw that requires unit 
owner consent before the trustees may initiate litigation is in 
violation of the act.  The act is "essentially an enabling 
statute, setting out a framework for the development of 
condominiums in the Commonwealth, while providing developers and 
unit owners with planning flexibility."  Scully v. Tillery, 456 
Mass. 758, 769 (2010), quoting Queler v. Skowron, 438 Mass. 304, 
312 (2002).  It "sets forth certain minimum requirements for the 
establishment of condominiums, but 'those matters that are not 
9 
 
 
 
specifically addressed in the statute are to be worked out by 
the involved parties.'"  Scully, supra, quoting Queler, supra at 
312-313.  Matters not specifically addressed by the act may be 
undertaken through the condominium bylaws, provided they are not 
"inconsistent" with the act or the master deed.  See G. L. 
c. 183A, § 12 (d) ("The [bylaws] may also provide . . . [s]uch 
other provisions as may be deemed necessary for the management 
and regulation of the organization of unit owners or the 
condominium not inconsistent with [G. L. c. 183A] and the master 
deed"). 
 
The act declares that the "organization of unit owners," as 
defined in G. L. c. 183A, § 1 -- here, the trust -- has the 
power to "manage, and otherwise deal with" common areas and 
facilities of the condominium.  G. L. c. 183A, § 10 (b) (1).  
However, the act does not grant unbridled authority to the trust 
with respect to every management decision that affects common 
areas and facilities.  For example, it requires the agreement of 
at least seventy-five per cent of the unit owners to repair or 
restore a condominium in the event it suffers a casualty loss 
that exceeds ten per cent of the value of the condominium.  
G. L. c. 183A, § 17 (b) (1).  It also provides that improvements 
to the common areas and facilities may not be treated as a 
"common expense" borne collectively by the unit owners unless at 
least seventy-five per cent of the unit owners agree to make the 
10 
 
 
 
improvements.  G. L. c. 183A, § 18 (b).  The existence of these 
provisions in the act suggests that the Legislature did not 
believe that a condominium trust's power to manage the common 
areas and facilities is necessarily inconsistent with a 
requirement of unit owner consent for certain management 
decisions. 
 
The trustees contend that, because the Legislature included 
provisions in the act requiring unit owner consent under some 
circumstances, but failed to include any comparable provision 
governing the initiation of litigation, we can therefore infer 
that the Legislature intended to prohibit any bylaw requiring 
unit owner consent for litigation.  "However, the maxim of 
negative implication -- that the express inclusion of one thing 
implies the exclusion of another -- 'requires great caution in 
its application.'"  Halebian v. Berv, 457 Mass. 620, 628 (2010), 
quoting 2A N.J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland 
Statutory Construction § 47.25, at 429 (7th ed. 2007).  Such 
caution is especially appropriate here, given the enabling 
nature of the act and the wide latitude and flexibility it 
provides developers and unit owners to craft arrangements not 
specifically addressed by the act.  See Scully, 456 Mass. at 
769.  We cannot reasonably infer that, because the act requires 
unit owner consent for some management decisions, the 
Legislature intended to prohibit any bylaw requiring unit owner 
11 
 
 
 
consent for other management decisions, including the decision 
to commence litigation concerning common areas or facilities.  
See Halebian, supra, quoting 2A N.J. Singer & J.D. Shambie 
Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, supra at § 47.25, at 
433-435 (maxim of negative implication "will be disregarded 
. . . where its application would thwart the legislative intent 
made apparent by the entire act").  See also Bank of Am., N.A. 
v. Rosa, 466 Mass. 613, 619-620 (2013).  Such an inference would 
require a clearer indication of legislative intent than mere 
negative implication.  See generally Globe Newspaper Co., 
petitioner, 461 Mass. 113, 119 (2011) (applying maxim of 
negative implication would yield result not intended by 
Legislature).  Therefore, we conclude that a bylaw provision 
requiring unit owner consent to initiate litigation is not per 
se void because it is "inconsistent" with the act under 
§ 12 (d). 
 
2.  Is this particular bylaw void because it contravenes 
public policy?  Having determined that the act does not 
bar every bylaw provision requiring unit owner consent prior to 
litigation, we now consider whether this bylaw provision is void 
because it contravenes public policy.  We begin by recognizing 
that the bylaw provision's requirement of the consent of at 
least eighty per cent of all unit owners makes it effectively 
impossible for the trustees to sue the developers of a 
12 
 
 
 
condominium for damages arising from the defective construction 
and design of common areas or facilities where, as here, the 
developers or their affiliates retain an ownership interest in 
at least twenty per cent of the units.8  The developers are not 
likely to agree to sue themselves.  And if the trustees cannot 
file suit against the developers, no one can, because their 
authority to bring such a suit is "exclusive" as to the common 
areas and facilities of the condominium.  See Berish, 437 Mass. 
at 265.  Moreover, if the developers or their affiliates were to 
retain at least a twenty per cent ownership interest in the 
units for more than six years, they could effectively prevent 
any suit from being brought against them for design or 
construction defects in the common areas or facilities because 
the statute of repose would bar any subsequent suit.  See G. L. 
                                                          
 
 
8 Giuseppe Fodera, Frank Fodera, and Frank Fodera, Jr., 
formed, and currently manage, the defendant Cambridge Point, 
LLC.  These three individuals contemporaneously formed, and 
currently manage, defendant Northern Development, LLC, the 
general contractor of the condominium.  These three individuals 
and their affiliates owned at least 20.36 per cent of the 
beneficial interest in the condominium units:  Giuseppe owned a 
5.58 per cent beneficial interest; Ciross, LLC, owned by 
Giuseppe's wife, owned a 6.54 per cent beneficial interest; a 
limited liability corporation owned by Giuseppe's relative owned 
a 3.49 per cent beneficial interest; and a trust formed by Frank 
Fodera, who appointed his lawyer as the trustee, owned a 4.75 
per cent beneficial interest.  Consequently, even without 
considering Mardiros's 14.87 per cent beneficial interest, see 
note 5, supra, the developers and their affiliates alone could 
have thwarted any attempt by the trustees to initiate litigation 
against the developers for defects in construction in the common 
areas and facilities. 
13 
 
 
 
c. 260, § 2B (six-year statute of repose for tort actions for 
damages arising out of deficiency or neglect in design, 
planning, construction, or general administration of improvement 
to real property).9 
 
Even if the developers or their affiliates did not retain a 
twenty per cent ownership interest, the provisions of § 1(o), in 
their entirety, make it extraordinarily difficult for the 
trustees to sue the developer for defective construction and 
design of common areas or facilities.  First, the bylaw 
provisions require the consent of at least eighty per cent 
of all unit owners, so if the developers retain any ownership 
interest in the units, the trustees would need to obtain the 
consent of more than eighty per cent of the unit owners who are 
not affiliated with the developers -- and perhaps all of them, 
if the developers have retained nearly twenty per cent of the 
units.  Second, because the trustees must obtain the affirmative 
consent of at least eighty per cent of all unit owners, any unit 
owner who fails to respond to the request for written consent is 
treated as if he or she refused such consent, regardless of 
whether the unit owner is ill, has rented out the unit and is 
                                                          
 
 
9 Even if the developers or their affiliates were to retain 
at least a twenty per cent ownership interest in the units for 
just three years, any such suit might also be barred by the 
statute of limitations, depending upon the date the cause of 
action accrued.  See G. L. c. 260, § 2B (actions in tort for 
negligent design or construction "shall be commenced only within 
three years after the cause of action accrues"). 
14 
 
 
 
presently unavailable, or is simply unwilling to make a 
decision.  Contrast Fla. Stat. § 720.303(1) (homeowners 
association required to "obtain the affirmative approval of a 
majority of the voting interests [present] at a meeting of the 
membership at which a quorum has been attained" prior to 
litigating any matter in which amount in controversy exceeds 
$100,000).  Third, the bylaw provides that the entirety of the 
legal fees and costs to be incurred from litigation must be 
"separately assessed as a special assessment effective 
forthwith" upon consent, even though the legal fees and costs 
would be incurred and billed during the life of the litigation.  
See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (b) (3), as appearing in 471 Mass. 
1380 (2015) (even where retainer paid in advance, lawyer may not 
withdraw funds until fees earned or expenses incurred).  Fourth, 
the trustees have only a brief time frame of sixty days to 
obtain the required written consent from the unit owners.  
Cumulatively, these requirements function as a formidable hurdle 
that the trustees are required to surmount before commencing 
litigation against the developers. 
 
We have long recognized that "the public interest in 
freedom of contract is sometimes outweighed by public policy, 
and in such cases [a] contract will not be enforced."  Beacon 
Hill Civic Ass'n v. Ristorante Toscano, Inc., 422 Mass. 318, 321 
(1996).  "The grounds for a public policy exception must be 
15 
 
 
 
clear in the acts of the Legislature or the decisions of this 
court."  Miller v. Cotter, 448 Mass. 671, 683 (2007).  
See Beacon Hill Civic Ass'n, supra at 321 ("'Public policy' in 
this context refers to a court's conviction, grounded in 
legislation and precedent, that denying enforcement of a 
contractual term is necessary to protect some aspect of the 
public welfare").  Consequently, we must consider whether a 
bylaw that makes it extraordinarily difficult -- and in this 
case, effectively impossible -- to obtain redress for a 
developer's defective construction and design of common areas 
and facilities is void because it is contrary to public policy. 
 
Massachusetts has a well-established public policy in favor 
of the safety and habitability of homes, as reflected in our 
implied warranty of habitability under common law and in the 
legislative enactment of building codes.  In Albrecht 
v. Clifford, 436 Mass. 706, 710-711 (2002), we expanded our 
implied warranty of habitability under common law, holding that 
it attaches not only to residential leases but also to "the sale 
of new homes by builder-vendors in the Commonwealth."  The 
purpose of this implied warranty is "to protect a purchaser of a 
new home from latent defects that create substantial questions 
of safety and habitability."  Id. at 711.  Cf. Boston Hous. 
Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 199 (1973) ("[I]n a rental of 
any premises for dwelling purposes, under a written or oral 
16 
 
 
 
lease, for a specified time or at will, there is an implied 
warranty that the premises are fit for human occupation").  
Although the precise scope of the warranty depends on the 
circumstances of the case, "a home that is unsafe because it 
deviates from fundamental aspects of the applicable building 
codes, or is structurally unsound, or fails to keep out the 
elements because of defects of construction, would breach the 
implied warranty."  Albrecht, supra.  We have emphasized that 
"[the implied warranty] cannot be waived or disclaimed, because 
to permit the disclaimer of a warranty protecting a purchaser 
from the consequences of latent defects would defeat the very 
purpose of the warranty."  Id.  Cf. Boston Hous. Auth., supra 
("This warranty [insofar as it is based on the State [s]anitary 
[c]ode and local health regulations] cannot be waived by any 
provision in the lease or rental agreement"). 
 
"The policy reasons that led us to adopt an implied 
warranty of habitability in the purchase of a new home apply 
equally to the purchase of a new condominium unit."  Berish, 437 
Mass. at 263.  In Berish, supra, we therefore held that an 
implied warranty of habitability attaches to the sale of new 
residential condominium units by builder-vendors.10  At the same 
                                                          
 
 
10 "A claim for breach of this implied warranty may be 
brought by an individual unit owner who can establish that (1) 
he purchased a new residential condominium unit from the 
builder-vendor; (2) the condominium unit contained a latent 
17 
 
 
 
time, we recognized that "the protections afforded [to] 
purchasers of newly constructed condominium units by this 
implied warranty against latent defects in their own units may 
not be adequate to ensure the habitability of those units" 
because improper design, material, or workmanship that causes a 
defect in a common area might cause units to be uninhabitable or 
unsafe.  Id. at 264-265.  "To ensure that there is a complete 
remedy for a breach of habitability in the sale of condominium 
units, we conclude[d] that an organization of unit owners" -- 
such as a condominium trust -- "may bring a claim for breach of 
the implied warranty of habitability when there are latent 
defects in the common areas that implicate the habitability of 
individual units."  Id. at 265.11 
A developer of a condominium not only is subject to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
defect; (3) the defect manifested itself to the purchaser only 
after its purchase; (4) the defect was caused by the builder's 
improper design, material, or workmanship; and (5) the defect 
created a substantial question of safety or made the condominium 
unit unfit for human habitation."  Berish v. Bornstein, 437 
Mass. 252, 264 (2002). 
 
 
11 To establish a claim for the breach of the implied 
warranty of habitability, the condominium trust must demonstrate 
that:  "(1) it is an organization of unit owners as defined by 
G. L. c. 183A, § 1; (2) the common area of the condominium 
development contains a latent defect; (3) the latent defect 
manifested itself after construction of the common areas was 
substantially completed; (4) the defect was caused by the 
builder's improper design, material, or workmanship; and (5) the 
defect created a substantial question of safety as to one or 
more individual units, or made such units unfit for human 
habitation."  Berish, 437 Mass. at 265-266. 
18 
 
 
 
implied warranty of habitability but also must comply with the 
minimum standards prescribed by the building code.  See 780 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 114.1 (2017) ("It shall be unlawful for any 
person, firm[,] or corporation to erect [or] construct . . . any 
building, structure[,] or equipment regulated by [the building 
code] . . . in violation of any of [its] provisions . . .").  
The purpose of the building code "is to establish the minimum 
requirements to safeguard the public health, safety[,] and 
general welfare . . . ."  780 Code Mass. Regs. § 101.3 (2017).  
The importance of adherence to the building code is evident from 
the fact that, in certain circumstances, a building code 
violation may also result in liability under G. L. c. 93A, 
pursuant to the Attorney General's regulation, 940 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 3.16(3) (1993), which provides, among other things, that 
an act or practice may constitute unfair or deceptive conduct 
within the scope of G. L. c. 93A if it "fails to comply with 
existing statutes, rules, regulations[,] or laws, meant for the 
protection of the public's health, safety, or welfare."  
See Klairmont v. Gainsboro Rest., Inc., 465 Mass. 165, 170 
(2013) (building code violation may constitute violation of 
G. L. c. 93A, § 2 [a], if underlying conduct is unfair or 
deceptive, and occurs in trade or commerce).  Importantly, where 
a claim under G. L. c. 93A, § 2 (a), arises from a building code 
violation, that claim cannot be waived because such a waiver 
19 
 
 
 
could "do violence to the public policy underlying the 
legislative enactment."  Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 406 Mass. 369, 378 (1990), quoting Spence v. Reeder, 382 
Mass. 398, 413 (1981).  See Downey v. Chutehall Constr. Co., 88 
Mass. App. Ct. 795, 800-801 (2016) (waiver of building code 
requirements by homeowner does not preclude contractor's 
liability for G. L. c. 93A violation arising from building code 
violation "where there are possible consequences for the safety 
of the homeowner and others"). 
In sum, it is "clear [from] the acts of the Legislature 
[and] the decisions of this court," Miller, 448 Mass. at 683, 
that the public policy of Massachusetts strongly favors the 
safety and habitability of homes.  In order to effectuate this 
public policy, we have consistently recognized the rights of 
individuals to obtain legal redress when their homes fail to 
meet minimum standards.  These rights -- whether grounded in the 
implied warranty of habitability or in the building code as 
enforced through G. L. c. 93A -- are so vital that we have 
consistently held that they cannot be waived. 
This clear expression of public policy leads us to conclude 
that a condominium bylaw provision that effectively limits the 
ability of unit owners to obtain legal redress for violations of 
these rights must be carefully scrutinized to determine whether 
it contravenes that public policy.  For example, if a bylaw were 
20 
 
 
 
to provide that the unit owners waive all claims against the 
developers for any defects in construction, we would surely 
declare such a bylaw void as contravening public policy to the 
extent that it sought to waive the unwaivable claims based on 
the implied warranty of habitability and G. L. c. 93A, § 2 (a).  
And we surely would not enforce such a sweeping waiver to the 
extent that it would shield the developers from claims of gross 
negligence.  See Maryland Cas. Co. v. NSTAR Elec. Co., 471 Mass. 
416, 422 (2015), quoting Zavras v. Capeway Rovers Motorcycle 
Club, Inc., 44 Mass. App. Ct. 17, 19 (1997) ("[It is a] well-
established principle of contract law . . . that, 'while a party 
may contract against liability for harm caused by its 
negligence, it may not do so with respect to its gross 
negligence'").  See also CSX Transp., Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay 
Transp. Auth., 697 F. Supp. 2d 213, 226 (D. Mass. 2010) ("[T]he 
[Supreme Judicial Court] would not enforce agreements purporting 
to require indemnification against gross negligence"). 
But the bylaw provision here, in practical effect, is even 
more sweeping and more unfair than this hypothetical bylaw 
provision.  It is more sweeping because, as here, where the 
developers and their affiliates control more than twenty per 
cent of the units, this provision effectively prevents the 
trustees from bringing any claim in litigation against the 
developers for defects in construction or design, regardless of 
21 
 
 
 
whether the claim is for a breach of the implied warranty of 
habitability, a violation of G. L. c. 93A, or any other claim 
(including gross negligence, fraud, or intentional misconduct). 
 
And it is more unfair than the hypothetical bylaw provision 
because its practical effect would likely not be immediately 
apparent to a reasonable prospective purchaser.  If, under our 
hypothetical bylaw provision, unit owners were required to waive 
all claims against the developers for defects in construction or 
design, a prospective purchaser -- if he or she had reviewed the 
bylaws in the registry of deeds -- would know that he or she 
would have no legal recourse against the developers for any 
defects in construction or design of the common areas and 
facilities of the condominium.  A reasonable prospective 
purchaser, however, would not necessarily understand from the 
terms of § 1(o) the absence of legal recourse (or the severity 
of the impediments to legal recourse), because the prospective 
purchaser would not know how many condominium units the 
developers intended to retain, and for how long.  Without this 
information, a prospective purchaser could not know whether 
§ 1(o) is simply a provision that requires consent from eighty 
per cent of the unit owners before initiating litigation, or a 
provision that, in effect, will shield the developers from any 
and all legal claims by the trustees. 
 
In Barclay v. DeVeau, 384 Mass. 676, 682 (1981), we 
22 
 
 
 
declared that "[a]bsent overreaching or fraud by a developer, we 
find no strong public policy against interpreting c. 183A, 
§ 10 (a), to permit the developer and unit owners to agree on 
the details of administration and management of the condominium 
unit" (footnote omitted).  We conclude that it is overreaching 
for a developer to impose a condition precedent that, for all 
practical purposes, makes it extraordinarily difficult or even 
impossible for the trustees to initiate any litigation against 
the developers regarding the common areas and facilities of a 
condominium.  Such a provision has all the same flaws as a 
waiver of liability provision -- which we would find void as 
contravening public policy -- but without the transparency of 
such a provision.  We therefore conclude that § 1(o) of the 
bylaws, viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances, is 
void because it contravenes public policy.12 
 
Conclusion.  We vacate the judgment of dismissal of the 
verified complaint, order the grant of partial summary judgment 
on so much of the trustees' declaratory judgment claim as seeks 
a declaration that § 1(o) of the bylaws is void as contravening 
                                                          
 
 
12 Because we reach this conclusion, we need not (and do 
not) address the trustees' other arguments that § 1(o) of the 
bylaws denies access to the courts in violation of art. 11 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, or that the provision 
invades the attorney-client relationship and privilege by 
requiring the trustees to provide unit owners with a draft of 
the complaint and an estimate of the legal fees and costs to be 
incurred in the proposed litigation. 
23 
 
 
 
public policy, and remand the matter to the Superior Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.