Case Title: AEI v. JDM

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-87-3

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1988-07-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
AEI v. JDM1988 WY 95758 P.2d 22Case Number: C-87-3Decided: 07/22/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
AEI, Appellant 
(Respondent)

 
 
v.

 
 
JDM, Appellee 
(Petitioner)

 
 
Mary B. Guthrie and Richard E. 
Dixon, Cheyenne, for Appellant.

 
 
Oscar A. Hall, Rawlins, for 
Appellee. 

 
 
Before Cardine, C.J., and Thomas, 
Urbigkit, and Macy, JJ., and Grant, D.J. 

 
 
Cardine, 
Chief Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This is a child custody 
dispute between a child's natural mother and his putative father. The district 
court determined that the putative father was the presumptive father of the 
child and that he was a fit and proper "parent" who should be awarded custody of 
the child. The court further found that the natural mother was a fit and proper 
parent who should be awarded liberal visitation rights. Appellant, the child's 
mother, seeks a reversal of the district court's custody order. Although she 
raises several issues on appeal, we find it necessary to address only the 
question of whether the district court erred in determining custody without 
first determining the issue of paternity in conformance with the formal 
procedures set out in the Wyoming version of the Uniform Parentage 
Act.

 
 

[¶2.]     Appellant and appellee 
have known each other for at least seven years. They lived together 
intermittently from 1980 until May of 1983. One month after they broke up, 
appellant visited appellee at his mother's home and told him that she was 
pregnant and he was the father. When the child was born, appellant was living 
with her aunt in Rawlins, 
Wyoming. Appellee also lived in 
Rawlins, and he periodically visited the child. In April 1984, appellee and the 
child moved to Albuquerque, 
New Mexico. There was considerable 
conflict in the evidence concerning whether appellant or appellee's mother had 
primary custody of the child between 1984 and 1986. The trial court found that 
the evidence "seem[ed] to preponderate in favor of" the child being in the home 
of appellee's mother during this period of time.

 
 

[¶3.]     In May 1986, appellant 
and appellee tried to renew their relationship. They lived together in Albuquerque until August 
of 1986, when appellee returned to Rawlins. The next month, appellant returned 
to Rawlins to retrieve her son and took him back to Albuquerque with her. On 
October 26, 1986, appellee went to Albuquerque, and the couple decided to resume 
their relationship once again. They agreed that appellee would take the child to 
Rawlins where appellant would meet them in two weeks. Before the two weeks had 
passed, appellant and appellee, by telephone, broke up again. In late November 
1986, appellant returned to Rawlins to pick up her son, and she was served with 
appellee's petition for custody.

 
 

[¶4.]     The petition for 
custody was predicated upon the allegation that appellee was the child's father. 
In response, appellant filed an affidavit in which she stated that appellee was 
not the natural father of the child and that he had never acknowledged 
paternity. In her amended response to the petition, appellant asserted, as an 
affirmative defense, that appellee lacked standing to seek custody of the child 
because the paternity issue had not been adjudicated.

 
 

[¶5.]     At a two-day hearing 
before the district court, the parties litigated the paternity issue as well as 
the issue of custody. The child was never made a party to the proceedings, and a 
guardian ad litem was not appointed to represent the child's interests. After 
the hearing, the court found that appellee was presumed to be the father of the 
child under § 14-2-102(a)(iv), W.S.1977, which provides:

 
 
"(a) A man is presumed to be the 
natural father of a child if:

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
"(iv) While the child is under the 
age of majority, he receives the child into his home and openly holds out the 
child as his natural child."

 
 
The court further found that 
appellee was a fit and proper "parent" who should be awarded the care and 
custody of the child. Appellant contends that the custody order must be reversed 
because the proceedings did not conform to the requirements of the Wyoming parentage act, § 
14-2-101, et seq. We agree.

 
 

[¶6.]     The exclusive means of 
establishing the parent-child relationship between a child and his natural 
father is provided in the Wyoming parentage act. Section 
14-2-101(b)(ii), W.S.1977. Section 14-2-106(a) of the act 
provides:

 
 
"The district court has jurisdiction 
of an action brought under W.S. 14-2-101 through 14-2-120. The action may be 
joined with an action for divorce, annulment, separate maintenance, support or 
any action affecting the parent and child relationship."

 
 
Section 14-2-113(a) 
provides:

 
 
"The judgment or order of the court 
determining the existence or nonexistence of the parent and child relationship 
is determinative for all purposes."

 
 
Subsection (c) 
states:

 
 
"The judgment or order may contain 
any other provision directed against the appropriate party to the proceeding 
concerning the duty of support, the custody and guardianship of the child, 
visitation privileges with the child, the furnishing of bond or other security 
for the payment of the judgment or any other matter in the best interest of the 
child."

 
 

[¶7.]     The parentage act 
contains strict procedural requirements. Among these requirements are a 
mandatory informal hearing before trial, § 14-2-108(a), W.S.1977; mandatory 
blood tests upon request of a party, § 14-2-109(a), W.S.1977; and mandatory 
recommendations for settlement, § 14-2-111, W.S.1977. Perhaps most importantly, 
the act also requires that

 
 
"the child shall be made a party to 
the action. If he is a minor he shall be represented by his guardian or a 
guardian ad litem appointed by the court." Section 14-2-107, 
W.S.1977.

 
 
These formal procedural requirements 
were not followed in the present case. Appellee contends that they were 
unnecessary for two reasons. First, he argues that neither he nor appellant 
brought an action under the act. Second, he contends that a formal paternity 
action with its attendant procedural requirements was unnecessary because he was 
the child's presumptive father. We reject both arguments.

 
 

[¶8.]     First, we conclude that 
the action was necessarily subject to the parentage act because it determined 
the existence of the parent and child relationship. In his petition, appellee 
alleged that he was the child's father. The paternity issue was contested. At 
the conclusion of the proceedings, the court found that appellee was the child's 
"parent." Although the parties did not expressly refer to the parentage act in 
their pleadings, the action was one which determined that appellee was the 
child's father. Because the parentage act is the exclusive means of establishing 
this relationship, the action necessarily came within its 
purview.

 
 

[¶9.]     Next, we cannot agree 
that the existence of a presumption of paternity obviates the procedural 
requirements of the act. The effect of the presumptions contained in § 14-2-102 
is illustrated in various provisions of the act. One function is evidentiary. If 
a presumption is established, it may be rebutted only by clear and convincing 
evidence. Section 14-2-102(b), W.S.1977. Another function is to determine 
standing to bring an action under the act. Section 14-2-104(a) allows a 
presumptive father to bring an action to declare the existence or nonexistence 
of the father and child relationship. Yet another function of the presumptions 
is to determine who is entitled to notice of an action brought under the act. 
Section 14-2-107, W.S.1977. Nothing in the act, however, suggests that custody 
may be awarded on the basis of a presumption or that the act's extensive 
procedural requirements somehow disappear when a party alleges that he is a 
child's presumed father.

 
 

[¶10.]  We hold that in a child custody case in 
which paternity is contested, a putative father cannot be awarded custody unless 
he establishes paternity in accordance with the Wyoming parentage act.

 
 

[¶11.]  Reversed.