Case Title: Collins v. State

Citation: 383 Md. 684

Docket Number: 24/04

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
In the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County
Case No. 17-K-03-005418 IF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 24
September Term, 2004
CLIFTON COLLINS
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Raker, J. 
Filed:    November 16, 2004
1  Unless indicated otherwise, all future statutory references will be to Md. Code
(1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Cum. Supp.), Art. 27.  Article 27, § 293 was repealed and
recodified without substantive change as Md. Code (2002), § 5-905 of the Criminal Law
Article.  Article 27, § 291A was repealed and recodified without substantive change as Md.
Code (2002), § 5-622 of the Criminal Law Article.  Throughout this opinion, we shall refer
to the statutes as they were designated at the time of Appellant’s conviction.
2 Article 27, § 291A applies specifically to persons previously convicted of Controlled
Dangerous Substances offenses, as distinguished from the general felon in possession of a
firearm statute, found at Md. Code (2003, 2004 Cum. Supp.), § 5-133 of the Public Safety
Article.
This is another case addressing sentence enhancement based on prior offenses.  In this
appeal, we must interpret Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Cum. Supp.), Art. 27,
§ 293, second or subsequent offenses, and Art. 27, § 291A, possession, ownership,
transportation, etc., of a firearm,1 and decide whether a sentence enhancement for repeat drug
offenders may be imposed when a defendant is sentenced for a firearms offense that, by
definition, can only be committed by prior drug offenders.2  We shall hold that the
Legislature could not have intended to treat a first offense under § 291A as a “second or
subsequent offense” under the circumstances presented in this case and, accordingly, we shall
vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.
I.
Appellant Clifton Collins was convicted in the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s
County of possession of a firearm pursuant to § 291A, and of illegally carrying a handgun
on his person pursuant to § 36B(b).  On August 5, 2003, on the drug-felon in possession of
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a firearm count, the court imposed a sentence of ten years.  The court imposed a concurrent
three year sentence for carrying a handgun.  The court enhanced Collins’s § 291A sentence
pursuant to § 293, which permits the imposition of a sentence twice that otherwise
authorized.  The maximum sentence set out in § 291A is a term of incarceration up to five
years; nonetheless, the court determined that Collins’s prior conviction rendered his current
crime a “second or subsequent offense” under the enhancement provision of § 293, and
therefore subject to twice the stated penalty.  Collins noted a timely appeal to the Court of
Special Appeals.  Before that court considered the case, we granted certiorari on our own
initiative.  Collins v. State, 381 Md. 673, 851 A.2d 593 (2004).
II.
Before this Court, Collins argues that when a defendant has been convicted for the
first time of the offense of possession of a firearm under Art. 27, § 291A, it is error to
enhance a sentence under Art. 27, § 293 by classifying the possession of a firearm offense
as a second or subsequent offense.  He reasons that if § 293 were applicable to § 291A under
those circumstances, then persons convicted under § 291A would always face enhanced
penalties.  This reading, he suggests, would fail to effectuate the intent expressed by the
Legislature when it set the maximum sentence under § 291A at five years.  Alternatively, he
suggests that if the Legislature’s intent is ambiguous as to whether § 293 applies to § 291A,
then the rule of lenity bars its application.
3 Section 293 was enacted in 1970.  See 1970 Md. Laws, ch. 403.  Section 291A was
enacted in 1991.  See 1991 Md. Laws, ch. 613.
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The State does not dispute Collins’s premise that, if § 293 applies to § 291A, then all
persons convicted under the latter statute are subject to an enhanced penalty, and potentially
a ten year sentence.  The State argues that this is precisely the intent of the Legislature.  The
State relies on the plain language of both statutes and concludes that their language makes
clear that § 293 applies to § 291A.  It also contends that, because § 291A was enacted after
§ 293,3 the General Assembly is presumed to have known and intended that § 293 would
apply to § 291A.  Because the legislative intent is unambiguous, the State contends, the rule
of lenity is inapplicable.
III.
We review a trial court’s imposition of sentence on three recognized grounds: “(1)
whether the sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or violates other
constitutional requirements; (2) whether the sentencing judge was motivated by ill will,
prejudice or other impermissible considerations; and (3) whether the sentence is within
statutory limits.”  Khalifa v. State, 382 Md. 400, 416-17, 855 A.2d 1175, 1184 (2004)
(quoting Triggs v. State, 382 Md. 27, 40, 852 A.2d 114, 122 (2004)).  In the instant case, only
the third ground is at issue.  Because the interpretation of a statute is a pure question of law,
we review the Circuit Court’s decision de novo.
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The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of
the Legislature.  See Melton v. State, 379 Md. 471, 476, 842 A.2d 743, 746 (2004).  We begin
with the plain language of the statutes.  As we have frequently stated, if the statutory
language is unambiguous when construed according to its ordinary and everyday meaning,
then we give effect to the statute as it is written.  Id. at 477, 842 A.2d at 746.  We have also
noted, however, that “[s]tatutes that are clear when viewed separately may well be ambiguous
where their application in a given situation, or when they operate together, is not clear.”
Gardner v. State, 344 Md. 642, 648, 689 A.2d 610, 613 (1997).  See also Sullins v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 340 Md. 503, 508, 667 A.2d 617, 619 (1995) (noting similar result when construing
contract terms); Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 74, 517 A.2d 730, 732
(1986) (same).
IV.
As we have indicated, appellant was convicted of violating Article 27, § 291A,
possession, ownership, transportation of a firearm.  Article 27, § 291A provides, in pertinent
part, as follows:
“(b) Prohibited Acts.— A person may not possess, own, carry,
or transport a firearm if the person has been convicted of:
(1) 
A 
felony 
under 
this 
subheading
[Health—Controlled Dangerous Substances];
(2) An offense under the laws of the United
States, another state, or the District of Columbia
that would be a felony under this subheading if
committed in this State; or
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(3) Conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the
offenses listed in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this
subsection.”
The statutory penalty for a violation of Art. 27, § 291A is a fine of not more than $10,000 or
imprisonment for not more than five years or both.  Art. 27, § 291A(d).  Appellant had been
convicted previously of a drug felony under the requisite subheading, and as a result he was
not allowed by law to be in possession of a firearm.  
Appellant was sentenced to ten years on the possession of a firearm count.  He was
sentenced as a second or subsequent offender under Art. 27, § 293.  That section provides
as follows:
“(a) More severe sentence.—Any person convicted of any
offense under this subheading is, if the offense is a second or
subsequent offense, punishable by a term of imprisonment twice
that otherwise authorized, by twice the fine otherwise
authorized, or by both.
(b) Second or subsequent offense defined.—For purposes of this
section, an offense shall be considered a second or subsequent
offense, if, prior to the conviction of the offense, the offender
has at anytime been convicted of any offense or offenses under
this subheading or under any prior law of this State or any law
of the United States or of any other state relating to the other
controlled dangerous substances as defined in this subheading.”
Collins has correctly identified the logical conundrum into which we are placed when
interpreting §§ 293 and 291A.  By its terms, § 293 applies to “any offense under this
subheading . . . , if the offense is a second or subsequent offense.”  Section 291A falls within
the Controlled Dangerous Substances subheading.  Thus, when construed in isolation, § 293
would appear to apply to § 291A.
4 Article 27, § 290 states:
“Except as provided elsewhere under this subheading, any
person who attempts, endeavors or conspires to commit any
offense defined in this subheading is punishable by
imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the
maximum punishment prescribed by the offense, the
commission of which was the object of the attempt, endeavor,
or conspiracy.”
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By its terms, § 291A carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment “for not more than
5 years.”  Yet if § 293 applies to § 291A, every person convicted under § 291A would be
subject to an enhanced sentence and the maximum term would be ten years.  Any person
convicted of “a felony under this subheading” has been convicted of an “offense or offenses
under this subheading.”  Any person convicted under “the laws of the United States, another
state, or the District of Columbia that would be a felony under this subheading if committed
in this State” has been convicted under a “law of the United States or of any other state
relating to the other controlled dangerous substances as defined in this subheading.”  Any
person convicted of “[c]onspiracy or attempt to commit any of the offenses listed in
paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection” has been convicted of an “offense . . . under this
subheading or . . . any law of the United States or of any other state relating to the other
controlled dangerous substances as defined in this subheading” because attempts and
conspiracies to commit Controlled Dangerous Substances offenses are proscribed explicitly
by Art. 27, § 290.4  In other words, by definition, every offense under § 291A would be a
“second or subsequent offense” within the meaning of § 293.
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While language such as “imprisonment for not more than 5 years” in a criminal statute
impliedly is subject to exceptions created by free-standing enhancement provisions, § 293
cannot be considered an “exception” to § 291A under the State’s reading.  It would be
universally applicable, and “imprisonment for not more than 5 years” would never be the
maximum penalty for a violation of § 291A.  When construing a statute, we recognize that
it “should be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or
nugatory.”  James v. Butler, 378 Md. 683, 696, 838 A.2d 1180, 1187 (2003); Benedict v.
State, 377 Md. 1, 7, 831 A.2d 1060, 1063 (2002); Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 491, 632
A.2d 753, 758 (1993).  Interpreting the statutes as the State urges would render the words
“five years” nugatory, because those words would never describe the maximum penalty for
a violation of § 291A.
Our textual analysis has left us with two possible interpretations of the statutes.  When
two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of a statute exist, that statute is by
definition ambiguous.  Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223, 858 A.2d 484, 487 (2004).  Where
the language of a statute is ambiguous, we examine its statutory purpose, considering not
only the ordinary meaning of words, but also how that language relates to the overall
meaning, setting, and purpose of the act.  Deville at 223, 858 A.2d at 487; Melgar v. State,
355 Md. 339, 347, 734 A.2d 712, 716 (1999)).  Therefore, when interpreting unclear
language within a statute, we consider both the particular and broad objectives of the
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legislation, in addition to the overall purpose of the statutory scheme.  See Gargliano v. State,
334 Md. 428, 436, 639 A.2d 675, 678-79 (1994).
The purpose of any repeat-offender penalty enhancement is to create a differential in
the potential punishments imposed upon first-time and repeat offenders.  This differential can
serve a number of ends.  Individuals with prior convictions have demonstrated a higher
propensity toward criminality than the population at large.  As such, deterring them from
future offences may necessitate the threat of more severe penalties than would be required
for the average citizen.  Persons who in fact commit a second or subsequent offense may
pose greater dangers to the community than first-time offenders, and hence may justify
longer periods of incapacitation to protect the public safety.  Finally, repeat offenders may
be more morally blameworthy than first-time offenders, and hence deserve a stronger
measure of retribution.
However enhanced penalty statutes may be justified, it is axiomatic that they serve
their ends only when they are enhancements, i.e., only when they actually differentiate among
classes of offenders.  Applying § 293 to § 291A does not effectuate these ends, because by
its terms § 293 would group all persons convicted under § 291A into a single class.
Doubling Collins’s sentence does not “enhance” it relative to any other offender’s sentence,
and makes no sense when viewed in this context.  In our view, the only reasonable
construction of the two statutes is that the Legislature did not intend defendants such as
Collins to be considered “second or subsequent” offenders subject to penalty enhancement.
5 See 1951 Md. Laws, ch. 24, § 466; 1963 Md. Laws, ch. 772; 1964 Md. Laws, ch. 55.
6 See 1991 Md. Laws, ch. 613.
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The State argues that, because § 291A was enacted after § 293, the Legislature is
presumed to have known and intended that § 293 would apply to § 291A.  We generally
presume that the Legislature “‘had, and acted with respect to, full knowledge and information
as to prior and existing law and legislation on the subject of the statute and the policy of the
prior law.’”  Division of Labor v. Triangle, 366 Md. 407, 422, 784 A.2d 534, 542 (2001)
(quoting In re Special Investigation No. 236, 295 Md. 573, 576, 458 A.2d 75, 76 (1983)).
The State is correct that enhanced penalties for second or subsequent drug offenders have a
long history in Maryland.  Section 293 dates to 1970, see 1970 Md. Laws, ch. 403, and the
provision it replaced dates to 1935.  See 1935 Md. Laws, ch. 59, § 285V, which states:
“Any person violating any provision of this subtitle [Health –
Narcotic Drugs] shall, upon conviction, be punished for the first
offense by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000.00)
or by imprisonment for not exceeding three years, or both; and
for any subsequent offense by a fine not exceeding three
thousand dollars ($3,000.00) or by imprisonment for not
exceeding five years, or both.”
Section § 285V was codified as Md. Code (1939), Art. 27, § 352, and recodified, with
amendments,5 over the years as Md. Code (1951), Art. 27, § 369 and Md. Code (1951, 1967
Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 300.
The State’s argument—that when the Legislature enacted § 291A in 1991,6 it must
have recognized and intended that the penalty would be subject to enhancement under § 293
7Among those so prohibited are persons convicted of crimes of violence, of any
felony, of misdemeanors punishable by more than two years imprisonment, and of common
law offenses for which the person received more than two years imprisonment.  § 445(d)(1).
Persons under thirty who were adjudged delinquent as juveniles for such offenses are
similarly prohibited from possessing firearms.  § 445(d)(3).  Also banned from firearm
possession are fugitives from justice, habitual drunkards, persons addicted to or habitually
using controlled dangerous substances, persons suffering from certain mental disorders, and
persons subject to certain civil protective orders.  § 445(d)(2).  Section 445(d) has since been
recodified without substantive change at Md. Code (2003), § 5-133 of the Public Safety
Article.
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—is superficially appealing.  But complicating matters is the incongruous codification of an
essentially “pure” firearms regulation under a subheading of the Code otherwise given to the
classification and regulation of controlled substances.  Unlike § 281A(b), proscribing the
possession of a firearm “[d]uring and in relation to any drug trafficking crime . . . under
sufficient circumstances to constitute a nexus to the drug trafficking crime,” § 291A requires
no nexus between the act of possession and any drug activity whatsoever.  As such, the
prohibition contained in § 291A may more logically fit within § 445 of the Regulated
Firearms heading, which proscribes possession of a firearm by certain enumerated classes
of persons.7  The Legislature is, of course, free to arrange the Code in any manner it sees fit,
but doing so inconsistently can give rise to interpretive difficulties such as the one sub judice.
As it happens, a more limited prohibition against possession of firearms by certain
drug felons was once contained within § 445.  From 1989 to 1991, § 445(c) provided, in
pertinent part, as follows:
“A person may not possess a pistol or revolver if the person:
(1) Has been convicted of:
(i) A crime of violence;
8 “Unlawful manufacture, distribution, etc.; counterfeiting, etc.; manufacture,
possession, etc. of certain equipment for illegal use; keeping common nuisance.”
9 “Bringing into State in excess of certain amounts.”
10 “Using minors for manufacture, delivery or distribution of controlled dangerous
substances.”
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(ii) Any provisions of this subtitle
[Regulated Firearms]; or
(iii) Any of the provisions of
§ 286[8], § 286A[9], or § 286C[10] of
this article or any conspiracy to
commit any crimes established by
those sections.”
Md. Code (1957, 1987 Repl. Vol., 1989 Cum. Supp.), Art. 27, § 445(c).  Violation of
§ 445(c)(iii) was a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of $5000 or three years imprisonment.
Md. Code (1957, 1987 Repl. Vol., 1989 Cum. Supp.), Art. 27, § 448.  This prohibition was
introduced into Section 445 by 1989 Md. Laws, ch. 428.  In the Floor Report to House Bill
654, subsequently enacted as 1989 Md. Laws, ch. 428, the Senate Judicial Proceedings
Committee stated as follows: 
“Testimony indicated that the inclusion of convicted drug sellers
and dealers in the list of persons specifically prohibited from
purchasing and possessing handguns is necessary and overdue,
especially since drug wars involving guns have grown more
commonplace.” 
In 1991, the General Assembly enacted 1991 Md. Laws, ch. 613.  This statute created
§ 291A and repealed § 445(c)(1)(iii).  This action had several effects.  All drug-felons, not
only those convicted under § 286, § 286A, or § 286C, were subject to the prohibition.  The
11 Section 445 proscribed only pistols and revolvers until it was amended by the
Maryland Gun Violence Act of 1996, 1996 Md. Laws, ch. 561, § 2.
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statute now applied to all firearms, not just pistols and revolvers.11  The offense was now
classified as a felony, rather than a misdemeanor.  The codification of the prohibition was
moved from the Regulated Firearms subtitle to the Health – Controlled Dangerous
Substances subheading of Article 27.  Finally, the penalty was increased from the original
$5000 or three years imprisonment.  The level to which the penalty was increased is the
subject of our present inquiry.
If Collins’s reading is correct, the Legislature intended to increase the maximum
penalty to $10,000 or five years imprisonment.  In moving the prohibition to the Controlled
Dangerous Substances subheading, then, the Legislature either failed to notice that § 293
apparently applied to every violator of § 291A, or else affirmatively believed that § 293 did
not apply in that fashion.
If the State’s reading is correct, the Legislature intended to increase the maximum
penalty to $20,000 or ten years imprisonment for all offenders.  It went about doing so in the
rather unusual manner of wording a statute so that every offender would be subject to a
separate penalty-doubling statute, and then specifying a penalty one-half the amount actually
intended.
A review of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee’s bill file on House Bill 978,
subsequently enacted as 1991 Md. Laws, ch. 613, reveals no indication of a legislative intent
to set the penalty at ten years imprisonment.  Rather, the “Summary of Bill” which appears
12 See Arthur Conan Doyle, The Adventure of the Silver Blaze, 4 The Strand Mag. 645,
656 (1892).
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in both the Bill Analysis and the Floor Report indicates merely that “[t]he bill imposes a
penalty of a fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment for up to 5 years or both.”  It strains
credibility to imagine that the Legislature would have chosen to enact a ten year penalty
using the words “five years,” without some official discussion of this anomalous drafting
technique.  To paraphrase Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, this is a dog that would have barked,12
were the State’s theory correct.  Its silence suggests otherwise.
Accordingly, we hold that the maximum penalty which can be imposed on Collins for
his violation of § 291A is five years imprisonment.  
SENTENCE 
VACATED. 
 
CASE
REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT
COURT 
FOR 
QUEEN 
ANNE’S
COUNTY 
FOR 
RESENTENCING
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY QUEEN
ANNE’S COUNTY.