Case Title: LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors

Citation: 381 Md. 288

Docket Number: 111/03

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2004-05-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
William LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., No. 111 September Term, 2003.
[Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act, held; the evidence was sufficient to support the trial
judge’s finding that an employee misappropriated company trade secrets.  The trial judge,
however, erred in issuing an injunction based on the theory that the company’s trade secrets
would be “inevitably disclosed.”] 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 111
September Term, 2003
__________________________________
WILLIAM LEJEUNE
v
 
COIN ACCEPTORS, INC.
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
__________________________________
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
__________________________________
Filed:   May 13, 2004
This case of first impression involves the provisions of the Maryland Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, codified under Maryland Code, Sections 11-1201 through 11-1209 of the
Commercial Law Article (1975, 2000 Repl. Vol.).  William LeJeune appeals from a
preliminary injunction issued by the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, enjoining him
from working for Mars Electronics, Inc. (hereinafter “Mars”) in a number of specified
industries.  The Circuit Court found that, if LeJeune were permitted to work in those
industries, his former employer and Mars’ principal competitor, Coin Acceptors, Inc.
(hereinafter “Coinco”), would suffer irreparable injury because LeJeune had misappropriated
trade secrets that would give Mars an unfair competitive advantage.  We conclude that the
evidence supports a finding of trade secret misappropriation.  We also conclude, however,
that the Circuit Court erred in relying on the theory of “inevitable disclosure” when  ruling
on the preliminary injunction.  Therefore, we vacate the injunction and remand this case to
the Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
I. Background
A. Facts
 Coinco is a Missouri corporation in the business of designing, manufacturing, and
servicing coin acceptors, coin changers, bill validators, and similar machines.  Coinco divides
its efforts to market and sell these machines into three separate “channels”: “Vending,”
which includes beverage bottlers such as Coke and Pepsi; “Amusement,” which includes
video game manufacturers and distributors; and “Specialty Markets,” which includes transit
or transportation companies or companies that offer “self-check-out” services.  
1
Service Center Managers manage the service of Coinco’s equipment for its customers,
and the Customer Service Representatives provide additional customer support to Coinco
customers.
-2-
LeJeune began his employment with Coinco in 1993 as a “Sales and Field Service
Representative.”  While in this position, he sold currency equipment, performed field service
on that equipment, and led seminars on the repair and maintenance of Coinco’s machines.
In 1997, LeJeune was promoted to the position of Branch Manager and became responsible
for managing every aspect of the Baltimore branch office, including the sales and field
service of Coinco vending equipment in Maryland, Virginia, Delaware and West Virginia.
LeJeune’s job title changed again to Area Account Manager in 2002, when Coinco
restructured its operations, eliminating the position of Branch Manager and creating three
new positions: Area Account Manager (hereinafter “AAM”), Service Center Manager, and
Customer Service Representative.  As an AAM, LeJeune continued to be responsible for
sales of Coinco’s vending products but in an expanded region.1
In January of 2003, Coinco introduced the MC2600 bill acceptor, a new product in
the Amusement Market.  Although LeJeune traditionally sold vending products, Coinco
assigned him the responsibility of marketing and selling the MC2600 because many of the
amusement customers were also Coinco’s vending customers.  LeJeune, however, never sold
a single MC2600 in the Amusement Market and, actually, approached only one amusement
industry customer to sell that product.
Coinco selected LeJeune in 2002 and 2003 to serve on a team of Coinco employees
-3-
charged with investigating ways the company could cultivate clients in the Specialty Markets
channel.  LeJeune, the only AAM selected, attended the team’s initial meeting, after which
he was told by Coinco leadership to focus his work on the Vending Market and not to let his
work on the Specialty Markets team interfere with that focus.  LeJeune did not attend any
subsequent meetings of the Specialty Markets team.  Ultimately, the team generated a
strategic plan, which analyzed the Specialty Markets and Coinco’s opportunities in those
markets.  LeJeune received a copy of the plan, but he never reviewed it in detail.
While employed with Coinco, LeJeune never entered into a non-compete or
confidentiality agreement with Coinco.  He worked in sales and was not involved in
manufacturing or research and development.  He did, however, develop an extensive
understanding of Coinco’s products through his service and sales experience.  He also
learned of Coinco’s pricing, pricing strategies, marketing and business initiatives, and selling
strategies  but was not privy to all information relating to Coinco’s contracts with customers.
LeJeune worked from his home in Annapolis, where he regularly received company
documents.
Considering new employment in May and June of 2003, LeJuene had several
interviews with Mars, Coinco’s primary competitor in the currency acceptor industry.  During
an introductory telephone interview in May 2003, LeJeune described his work experience
with Coinco and mentioned to the interviewer, Chris Mumford, that “Coinco [had] recently
added Money Controls products to [its] portfolio to call on retail/kiosk accounts east of the
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Mississippi.”  He also stated that Coinco was concerned that Conlux, a sister company of
Mars, was cutting into Coinco’s sales.  LeJeune later traveled to Lancaster, Pennsylvania,
where he interviewed with several other Mars personnel.  LeJeune discussed his experience
at Coinco and explained why he sought employment with Mars.  One of the interviewers,
Mary Rampe, twice explained to LeJeune that no confidential Coinco information should be
discussed during the interview.  On July 7, 2003, LeJeune signed a job-offer letter from Mars
and accepted a position as an Amusement OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer)
Manager.  The new position would require LeJeune to focus on selling to the amusement
industry, although he would have some contact with “full line distributors” that serve both
the amusement and vending markets.
On July 14, 2003, LeJeune informed his supervisor, William Morgan, that he was
leaving Coinco to work for Mars.  On July 16, 2003, Morgan and LeJeune met for several
hours to review the status of LeJeune’s accounts.  Morgan asked LeJeune to continue to work
for Coinco for two weeks so that LeJeune could introduce Coinco’s clients to LeJeune’s
successor.  During his conversations with Morgan, LeJeune stated that he would be in a
“unique” position at Mars because of his experience at Coinco.  Morgan understood this to
mean that LeJeune intended to use his knowledge of Coinco’s business strategies.  LeJeune
stated that the reference to his “unique” position described his situation as one with extensive
experience in the vending industry entering a job with a focus on the amusement market.
That same day, LeJeune returned his laptop computer to Morgan along with a box of Coinco
-5-
documents and materials.
Prior to this meeting with Morgan, LeJeune, on three separate occasions, had
transferred or “burned” digital copies of numerous documents from his Coinco laptop to a
compact disc (“CD”).  On July 8, LeJeune copied, among other documents, Coinco’s
Executable Budgeting Software, which includes Coinco’s manufacturing costs and profit
margins.  LeJeune conducted a second “burn”on July 8, transferring numerous personal files
that had been saved on the Coinco laptop.  On July 16, LeJeune again copied various files
from the laptop, one of which contained pricing information related to Coinco’s Specialty
Markets Strategic Plan.  Sometime after copying all of the files onto the CD, LeJeune created
a second copy of the disc.
LeJeune explained that he had done this because he wanted to retain personal files,
such as wedding photographs, that had been saved under the “My Documents” file on the
laptop.  He stated that, for the sake of simplicity and because he did not know how to save
individual files onto a CD, he had “burned” the entire “My Documents” folder and captured
some of Coinco’s business documents.  LeJeune stated that he had not saved any Coinco
documents with the intent to use those documents in his work with Mars.  An expert in
computer forensics testifying on behalf of Coinco, however, stated that, when LeJeune
copied the Executable Budgeting Software, that file was not part of the “My Documents”
folder.  The expert also discovered that LeJeune had erased information from the Coinco
laptop in an effort to hide the downloads.  The erased information was recovered by
-6-
computer forensic specialists.
In addition to the computer files, LeJeune also retained hard copies of a number of
other Coinco documents.  Included among those documents were Coinco’s price and cost
information, Coinco’s service pricing, a list of Coinco’s preferred distributors, and detailed
technical specifications relating to a Coinco’s amusement product, the MC2600, and a
Coinco vending product, the Bill Pro Validator.  The pricing and cost information is sensitive
because Coinco uses a tiered-pricing system.
Coinco’s efforts to maintain the confidentiality of company information included
limiting access to company documents to only personnel who needed to know the
information.  To this end, Coinco guarded the computer files on its mainframe computer with
a password system, which allowed Coinco to control the employees’ access to company
information.  Coinco also negotiates “non-disclosure” agreements with many of its clients
to ensure that those clients do not share pricing information with other Coinco customers or
Coinco competitors.  In addition, Coinco’s “Employee Handbook” states that its business
methods are “proprietary,” and employees should protect such information as confidential.
Many of Coinco’s pricing documents and other strategic information, including information
at issue in this case (i.e., the Specialty Markets Strategic Plan, pricing and cost documents,
and Bill Pro Validator specifications), were marked  “confidential.” 
LeJeune stated that he did not discuss proprietary Coinco information, such as
Coinco’s price list, customer list, or strategic plan, with anyone at Mars.  According to
2
Section 11-1202(a) of the Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act states: “Actual or
threatened misappropriation may be enjoined.”
-7-
LeJeune, he did not know that Coinco was concerned about his knowledge of confidential
information until he learned of Coinco’s suit against him, at which time he returned all of the
alleged confidential Coinco documents and files.
B. Procedural History
On July 24, 2003, in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Coinco filed a
Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief and a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order
against LeJeune.  Coinco claimed that it was entitled to injunctive relief under Section 11-
1202(a) of Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act2 because LeJeune had misappropriated
Coinco’s trade secrets.  On the next day, the Circuit Court granted the Temporary Restraining
Order, which, pending the outcome of Coinco’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction,
prohibited LeJeune from working for Mars in the “Vending Industry, Amusement Industry,
and/or the Specialty Markets Industries.”
Over a period of three non-consecutive days in August and September of 2003, the
Circuit Court held a hearing on Coinco’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, after which
the trial judge issued his ruling from the bench.  He concluded that Coinco had presented
sufficient evidence that it would succeed on the merits of its case against LeJeune.  In
particular, the judge found that it was likely that Coinco would be able to establish at trial
that LeJeune had possession of Coinco’s “technical information” and “overall strategy” that
-8-
qualified as trade secrets under the Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act.   He also found
that, for the purpose of a preliminary injunction, Coinco had presented sufficient evidence
that the trade secrets had been misappropriated when LeJeune downloaded Coinco’s business
documents.  The trial judge additionally found that, “with the knowledge [LeJeune] has, it
would be inconceivable . . . how he could do his job as [Mars’s] national accounts
representative for the amusement industry without considering or weighing . . . the
information that he acquired while he was employed with Coinco . . . .”
In balancing the injuries that would result from granting or denying the injunction, the
trial judge stated that Coinco would “suffer a greater harm” if the injunction were denied
because Mars could “basically . . . lock[] [Coinco] out of the market” and gain “an unfair
competitive advantage.”  As a result of Mars’s advantage, the trial judge found, Coinco
would be “irreparably harmed and there will be no . . . monetary value . . that will fairly
compensate” Coinco for its injuries.   Finding further that the public interest would not be
harmed by the proposed preliminary injunction, the Circuit Court, therefore, granted
Coinco’s motion and, in a written order dated September 5, 2003, stated:
William LeJeune . . .  is hereby enjoined from using or
disclosing any of Coinco’s confidential and trade secret
information; and it is further ordered that William LeJeune be
and is hereby  enjoined from competing against Coinco by
working for Mars in any area in which he would have to use or
disclose Coinco’s confidential and trade secret information –
including specifically the Vending Industry, Amusement
Industry, and/or the Specialty Markets Industries, and also
including, 
specifically, 
as 
Mars’s 
National 
Accounts
Representative for the Amusement Industry . . . . [T]his
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Preliminary Injunction shall remain in effect until the trial on the
merits in this proceeding, to be scheduled by the Court.
LeJeune appealed the Circuit Court’s order, and this Court, acting on its own
initiative, issued a writ of certiorari.   LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, 379 Md. 224, 841 A.2d 339
(2004).  LeJeune presents several questions for review, which we have rephrased for clarity:
1. Under the Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act, did LeJeune
misappropriate Coinco’s trade secrets when, after resigning, he
retained Coinco’s documents, including its price lists, customer
lists, budgeting software, and product specifications?
2.  Under the Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act, should
LeJeune be enjoined from working in the Vending, Amusement,
and Specialty Markets because he would inevitably disclose
knowledge of Coinco’s trade secrets to Mars?
3. Did the Circuit Court abuse its discretion in concluding that
Coinco would suffer irreparable harm unless LeJeune was
enjoined from working in the specified industries?
4. Was the Circuit Court’s preliminary injunction overbroad?
We hold that the evidence supports the Circuit Court’s finding that LeJuene
misappropriated Coinco’s trade secrets.  We further hold that the Circuit Court erred in
relying on the theory of “inevitable disclosure,” which does not apply in Maryland.
Moreover, because the decision to grant the preliminary injunction was based on this error
of law, we vacate the Circuit Court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings.
II. Standard of Review
Our review of a preliminary injunction is “limited” because “we do not now finally
determine the merits” of the parties’ arguments.  Dep’t of Transportation v. Armacost, 299
-10-
Md. 392, 404, 474 A.2d 191, 197 (1984).  Rather, we ordinarily determine whether the trial
judge exercised sound discretion in examining the four factors that must be found in order
to issue the preliminary injunction.  Lerner v. Lerner, 306 Md. 771, 776, 511 A.2d 501, 504
(1986) (quoting State Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Baltimore County, 281 Md.
548, 554, 383 A.2d 51, 55 (1977)).  We referred to those four factors in Fogle v. H & G
Restaurant, Inc., 337 Md. 441, 654 A.2d 449 (1995):
As a general rule, the appropriateness of granting an
interlocutory injunction is determined by examining four factors:
(1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits;
(2) the “balance of convenience” determined by whether greater
injury would be done to the defendant by granting the injunction
than would result from its refusal; (3) whether the plaintiff will
suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction is granted; and (4)
the public interest. 
Id. at 455-56, 654 A.2d at 456 (quoting Armacost, 299 Md. at 404-05, 474 A.2d at 197).  In
examining irreparable injury, the Circuit Court may consider “the necessity to maintain the
status quo” pending a final outcome. Lerner, 306 Md. at 776, 511 A.2d at 504 (quoting State
Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene, 281 Md. at 554, 383 A.2d at 55).  An appellate court
ordinarily will not disturb a preliminary injunction on appeal unless the trial court committed
an abuse of discretion.  See Maryland Comm’n on Human Relations v. Downey
Communications, Inc., 110 Md. App. 493, 521, 678 A.2d 55, 69 (1996).  Nonetheless, “even
with respect to a discretionary matter, a trial court must exercise its discretion in accordance
with correct legal standards.”  Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 504, 629 A.2d 70, 74 (1993).
III. Discussion
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A. Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act
Coinco brought its cause of action under the Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
which provides the statutory remedies for a business alleging misappropriation of a trade
secret. “Misappropriation” means the:
(1) Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who
knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired
by improper means; or 
(2) Disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express
or implied consent by a person who:
(i) Used improper means to acquire knowledge of the
trade secret; or 
(ii) At the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason
to know that the person’s knowledge of the trade secret
was:
1. Derived from or through a person who had
utilized improper means to acquire it; 
2. Acquired under circumstances giving rise to a
duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or 
3. Derived from or through a person who owed a
duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its
secrecy or limit its use; or 
(iii) Before a material change of the person’s position,
knew or had reason to know that it was a trade secret and
that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or
mistake.
Section 11-1201(c) of the Commercial Law Article.  Under the Maryland Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, the term “trade secret” means:
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process that:
(1) Derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and
not being readily ascertainable by proper means
by, other persons who can obtain economic value
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from its disclosure or use; and
(2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
Section 11-1201(e) of the Commercial Law Article.
Long before the enactment of the Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act in 1989,
Maryland and other jurisdictions within and outside the United States had regulated the
protection of trade secrets.  See MILTON E. BABIRAK, JR., The Maryland Uniform Trade
Secrets Act: A Critical Summary of the Act and Case Law, 31 U. BALT. L. REV. 181, 183
(2002) (hereinafter “Babirak”).  One scholar has submitted that, even under Roman law, a
businessperson had a cause of action against a competitor who enticed the businessperson’s
slave to divulge confidential business information.  Id. (citing A. ARTHUR SCHILLER, Trade
Secrets and the Roman Law: The Actio Servi Corrupti, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 837, 838 n.5
(1930)).  At least since 1837, when the court in Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523 (1837)
ordered the seller of a chocolate mill not to disclose his secret chocolate-making formula to
anyone other than the buyer of the mill, courts in the United States have taken action to
protect the secrecy of a type of confidential business information called “trade secrets.”   See
Babirak at 184.  
In 1922, this Court decided Fulton Grand Laundry Co. v. Johnson, 140 Md. 359, 117
A. 753 (1922), possibly the first published Maryland case involving alleged trade secrets.
In that case, the Court held that a former employee of a laundry company could use a list of
the company’s clients to start his own business.  Id. at 362, 117 A. at 754.  The customer list,
-13-
the court concluded, should not be “classed as a trade secret”  because it was “susceptible of
discovery by observation [and] open to the observation of any one who thinks it worth while
to observe.”  Id. at 361, 117 A. at 753.
The modern development of trade secret law took a significant step when, in 1939,
the drafters of the first Restatement of the Law of Torts included a definition of a trade
secret.  Comment b of Section 757(b) of the Restatement of the Law of Torts states:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or
compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and
which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know or use it.  It may be a formula for
a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or
preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or
a list of customers. 
The Restatement also proposed six factors for a court to consider in determining whether
information should be protected as a trade secret:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his
business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and
others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken
by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of
the information to him and his competitors; (5) the amount of
effort or money expended by him in developing the information;
(6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be
properly acquired or duplicated by others.
This definition of trade secret gained wide acceptance during the mid-twentieth century as
the number of trade secret cases grew and courts around the country began to adopt the
Restatement version.  Babirak at 187.  We embraced the Restatement’s definition of a trade
secret as well as its proposed factors in Space Aero Products Co., Inc. v. R.E. Darling Co.,
-14-
Inc., 238 Md. 93, 105, 208 A.2d 74, 79, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843, 86 S. Ct. 77, 15 L. Ed.
2d 83 (1965). 
In 1979, the United States National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (hereinafter the “Uniform Act”), which
proposed a definition of a trade secret based in large measure on the Restatement.  UNIF.
TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 437 commissioners’ prefatory note, 439 (1990).  The
Uniform Act also defined “misappropriation” and provided for damages and injunctive relief
in the event a trade secret had been misappropriated.  Id. at 438, 449, 455.  Soon after its
adoption, many states began to recognize the Uniform Act as the model for legislating trade
secret protection.  Babirak at 188.
When the Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act took effect on July 1, 1989, Maryland
became the twenty-ninth state to adopt some version of the Uniform Act.  Maryland Laws
ch. 598 (1989); NOTE, PETER B. SWANN, Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 49 MD. L.
REV. 1056 (1990)(hereinafter “Swann”).  Presently, forty-two of the fifty states and the
District of Columbia have enacted some form of the Uniform Act.  Babirak at 182 and 188
n.60.  The substantive provisions of the Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act depart only
slightly from the Uniform Act in that Maryland’s version “may [not] be applied or construed
to waive or limit any common law or statutory defense or immunity possessed by State
personnel as defined under [the Maryland Tort Claims Act].”  Section 11-1207(b)(2) of the
3
Section 11-1207(b)(2) states: “Nothing contained in this act may be applied or
construed to waive or limit any common law or statutory defense or immunity possessed by
State personnel as defined under  § 12-101 of the State Government Article.”  The Uniform
Act does not contain such a provision.
4
Section 11-1207(a) states: “Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, this
subtitle displaces conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law of this State providing civil
remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret.”  The exceptions provided in subsection (b)
include:
(i) Contractual remedies, whether or not based upon
misappropriation of a trade secret; 
(ii) 
Other 
civil 
remedies that are 
not 
based 
upon
misappropriation of a trade secret; or
(iii) Criminal 
remedies, whether or not based upon
misappropriation of a trade secret. 
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Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act3; see Swann at 1056 n.2.  With a few enumerated
exceptions not relevant here, the Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act currently provides the
exclusive civil remedy for misappropriation of a trade secret, “displac[ing] conflicting tort,
restitutionary, and other law of this State” that provides civil remedies for such conduct.
Section 11-1207(a) of the Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act.4
Section 11-1202(a) sets forth the operative language for injunctive relief under the
Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act.  It states plainly that the “[a]ctual or threatened
misappropriation” of a trade secret “may be enjoined.” A claim under the M aryland Uniform
Trade Secrets Act, therefore, raises two central inquiries: (1) whether the information at issue
qualifies as a trade secret; and (2) whether an individual has actually misappropriated that
information or has threatened to misappropriate it.
The Circuit Court in the case sub judice invoked its equity powers under Section 11-
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1202(a) of the Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act to enjoin LeJeune from working for
Mars in the Vending, Amusement, or Specialty Markets channels.  LeJeune contends that the
Circuit Court erred in issuing the injunction because the documents and files at issue were
not trade secrets under the Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act and because he did not
“misappropriate” any of that information. 
1. Coinco’s Trade Secrets 
We begin by examining whether the alleged trade secrets in this case qualify as such
under the Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act (hereinafter “MUTSA”).   LeJeune posits
that Coinco failed to make reasonable efforts to protect the secrecy of its information;
therefore, according to LeJeune, the documents and information that he retained do not
qualify as trade secrets.  On the other hand, Coinco alleges that numerous computer files and
documents that LeJeune had in his possession were confidential, proprietary items that meet
the definition of “trade secrets.” In particular, Coinco complains that, of the computer files
taken by LeJeune, the Executable Budgeting Software and Special Markets Strategic
Marketing Plan were trade secrets.  Coinco also claims that LeJeune retained trade secrets
in hard-copy form, including pricing and cost information, service pricing information, a list
of preferred distributors, and specifications of the MC2600 and Bill Pro Validator.
Section 11-1201(e) of MUTSA defines the term “trade secret” to mean:
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process that:
(1) Derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not
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being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use; and
(2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
Section 11-1201(e) of MUTSA.  
Although we have not had occasion to interpret this definition, the Court of Special
Appeals has done so in a case where a printing company alleged that its pricing information
and marketing strategies qualified for trade secret protection.  In Optic Graphics, Inc. v.
Agee, 87 Md. App. 770, 591 A.2d 578, cert. denied, 324 Md. 658, 598 A.2d 465 (1991), the
court held that the pricing information or market strategies did not meet the statutory
definition of a trade secrets.  The court observed that “[t]here are two types of trade secrets:
technological developments and internal operating information.”  Id. at 784, 591 A.2d at 585.
Obviously dealing with “internal operating information,” the court recognized that, under
some circumstances, pricing information and marketing strategies could be considered trade
secrets.  Id. at 787, 591 A.2d at 586.  Nevertheless, the court stressed, information is a trade
secret under MUTSA only if two requirements are met: “the information must (1) hold
‘independent economic value’ because it is not ‘generally known’ to or readily ascertainable
by others who stand to benefit economically if they use or disclose it, and (2) be the subject
of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.”  Id. at 787, 591 A.2d at 587.  The Court of
Special Appeals agreed with the trial court that the pricing information and marketing
strategies failed both requirements.  The pricing information had no “economic value” to the
5
On one other occasion, the Court of Special Appeals considered MUTSA’s definition
of a trade secret, but in a vastly different context.  In Bond v. PolyCycle, Inc., 127 Md. App.
365, 732 A.2d 970 (1999), the Court of Special Appeals held that a company’s chemical
engineering technology met the statutory definition.  PolyCycle’s former engineer, Bond,
who had improved the company’s machine that separated paint adherent from plastic, left the
company and took all of the technology with him.  He argued that the technology did not
qualify as a trade secret because “the components of the machine are all available on the
open market” and the general technology is “widely known in the plastics industry.”  Id. at
374, 732 A.2d at 974.  The court rejected these arguments and held that the improved
technology was a trade secret.  Id. at 372-73, 732 A.2d at 973-74.  As to Bond’s first
argument, the court stated that, no matter the availability of the component parts, it was the
“secret formula” of combining those parts that qualified as the trade secret.  Id. at 375, 732
A.2d at 975.  Regarding Bond’s second argument, the court held that the engineering process,
although similar to other technology, was still PolyCycle’s trade secret because Bond had
developed it while acting as the company’s agent and by using the company’s funds.  Id. at
376, 832 A.2d at 975-76.
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competitor because it was composed of so many variables, generally subject to change, and
specific to the printing company.  The printing company’s efforts to maintain the secrecy of
the pricing information also “fell short” of MUTSA’s requirement.  Id. at 787-88, 591 A.2d
at 587.  The marketing strategies also failed the “trade secret” definition because they, too,
were subject to change and, given that they were readily available from the marketplace, had
not been reasonably safeguarded.  Id. at 788, 591 A.2d at 587.5
In Diamond v. T. Rowe Price Assocs., 852 F.Supp. 372 (D. Md. 1994), Judge Benson
E. Legg of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland also determined that
certain internal operating information did not qualify for trade secret protection under
MUTSA.  T. Rowe Price, an investment management firm, sought relief under MUTSA
against a manager who had allegedly misappropriated files that she had acquired during her
time as an employee.  Judge Legg found that almost all of the documents at issue were
-19-
“either outdated (e.g., interoffice memoranda), innocuous (e.g., routine correspondence), or
publicly available (e.g., SEC filings such as Form K-1s).”  Id. at 412.  With respect to the
other documents, which contained general business matters, the tax withholding status and
investment structure of a mutual fund, and “an analyst’s cursory analysis of a sneaker
company,” the Judge determined that “there is no evidence that they have any independent
economic value for anyone” other than T. Rowe Price.  Id.
 In Motor City Bagels  v. American Bagel Co., 50 F.Supp.2d 460 (D. Md. 1999),
however, Judge Frederic N. Smalkin found that a company’s business plan was a trade secret.
Judge Smalkin summarized MUTSA’s definition: “Stated succinctly, ‘to be protected under
Maryland law, information must be secret, and its value must derive from the secrecy.  In
addition, the owner of the information must use reasonable efforts to safeguard the
confidentiality of the information.”  Id. at 478 (quoting Montgomery County Ass’n of
Realtors, Inc. v. Realty Photo Master Corp., 878 F.Supp. 804, 814 (D. Md. 1995), aff’d, 91
F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that a realtor association’s computer database was not a
“trade secret” because the information contained on it had been “distributed widely to its
realtor members and potential purchasers”)).  Although the business plan at issue contained
some public information, Judge Smalkin distinguished it from publicly available marketing
strategies in Optic Graphics because the business plan included “personal insights and
analysis brought to bear through diligent research and by marshaling a large volume of
information.”  Id. at 479.  
-20-
Judge Deborah K. Chasanow reached a similar conclusion with regard to the mutual
fund customer list at issue in Padco Advisors, Inc. v. Omdahl, 179 F.Supp.2d 600 (D. Md.
2002).  As a Regional Sales Manager for Padco Advisors, Omdahl was responsible for
marketing and selling mutual funds to customers in the western United States.  When
Omdahl left Padco to work for ProFund, one of Padco’s two competitors, Padco sought relief
under MUTSA to protect its customer database.  Padco’s customers were registered
individual investment advisors (“RIAs”), and the database contained information about each
RIA’s “investment strategy, total assets he manages, where the assets are invested, and the
type of portfolio management software used.”  Id. at 604.  In denying Omdahl’s motion for
summary judgment, Judge Chasanow  held that certain information on the database was not
ascertainable by competitors and that the information had economic value because it could
help ProFund develop new products.  Id. at 610.   Judge Chasanow also concluded that Padco
had taken reasonable steps to guard the secrecy of the database by making it available to only
15% of its employees and by protecting the database with passwords and “firewalls.”  Id.
Thus, for the purposes of surviving summary judgment, the database met the statutory
definition of trade secret.
The case before us resembles the situations in Motor City Bagels and Padco.  Similar
to the companies in those cases that sought to protect collections of valuable data, Coinco
had compiled in its Executable Budgeting Software, Specialty Markets Strategic Plan, and
hard-copy pricing documents a vast amount of information related to its manufacturing costs
6
The evidence does not support a finding that Coinco’s preferred distributor list had
any economic value to Mars.  That document only identifies twenty-one distributors of the
MC2600 that Coinco characterizes as “preferred.”  It does not contain price or cost
information or technical information.  It is not likely that Mars would have to make much of
an effort to learn from another source, such as the marketplace, the identity of these relatively
few distributors.   
-21-
and profit margins.  Moreover, like the mutual fund market in Padco in which only three
companies competed, the currency acceptor industry is highly competitive and dominated by
only two companies.  Therefore, Coinco’s cost and profit information, if available to Mars,
could allow Mars to undercut all of Coinco’s prices, giving Mars an easy economic
advantage.  Because of the unique, competitive nature of the currency acceptor industry, the
detailed specifications of the MC2600 and Bill Pro Validator also had economic value to
Mars.  Should Mars learn the technology used in those machines, it could apply that
technology to improve the commercial value of its own products.  
We have identified no evidence suggesting that Mars, without spending a great deal
of resources, could obtain all of this information from the marketplace.  Indeed, Coinco is
a privately held company and does not release its profit information in public filings with the
Securities and Exchange Commission.  The evidence supports a finding that the information
contained in the computer files and hard-copy documents (i.e., the budgeting software,
Specialty Markets Strategic Plan, pricing and cost documents, and M C2600 and Bill Pro
Validator specifications)6 had economic value to Mars and was not “readily ascertainable.”
Furthermore, it is apparent from the record that Coinco took reasonable measures to
maintain the secrecy of the pricing and cost information, Specialty Markets Strategic Plan,
-22-
and machine specifications.  Because of its tiered pricing scheme, Coinco negotiated non-
disclosure agreements with its customers to prevent them from discussing prices with other
customers.  In addition, Coinco marked “confidential” on the specifications for the Bill Pro
Validator as well as the Specialty Markets Strategic Plan and other pricing documents that
LeJeune either burned or kept in hard copy form.  In the company’s employee handbook,
Coinco communicated the secret nature of its manufacturing processes and business methods
by requiring employees to protect such information as confidential.  In light of these efforts,
we hold that the trial court appropriately determined that the specifications of the MC2600
and Bill Pro Validator as well as the pricing and cost data contained on the Specialty Markets
Strategic Plan, Executable Budgeting Software, and other hard-copy pricing documents
qualify as trade secrets under MUTSA.
2. Misappropriation
Coinco is not entitled to injunctive relief unless it has established that LeJeune
misappropriated its trade secrets, including Coinco’s Executable Budgeting Software,
Specialty Markets Strategic Plan, hard-copy pricing and cost lists, and specifications of the
MC2600 and Bill Pro Validator.  LeJeune contends that the only basis for granting an
injunction under MUTSA is a finding of “actual or threatened” misappropriation.  The
evidence admitted at the preliminary injunction hearing, LeJeune argues, does not establish
any “actual or threatened” misappropriation of a trade secret.  LeJeune maintains that he did
not acquire any information improperly because Coinco voluntarily provided him with all
-23-
retained documents and then did not ask for their return until the start of this litigation.
Additionally, LeJeune argues that Coinco did not present any evidence that he had used or
disclosed trade secrets or that he intended to do so.
In response, Coinco urges that the evidence does support a finding that LeJeune
misappropriated trade secrets.  Coinco also claims that the evidence demonstrates that
LeJeune misappropriated this information by copying selected confidential files from the
Coinco laptop onto a CD and by retaining hard-copy documents after allegedly telling Coinco
that he had returned everything.
As we stated above, because this Court has not before considered a claimed violation
of MUTSA, whether there has been a misappropriation is a question of first impression.
Section 11-1201(c) of MUTSA defines “misappropriation” as follows:
“Misappropriation” means the:
(1) Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person
who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret
was acquired by improper means; or 
(2) Disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without
express or implied consent by a person who:
(i) Used improper means to acquire knowledge of
the trade secret; or 
(ii) At the time of disclosure or use, knew or had
reason to know that the person’s knowledge of the
trade secret was:
1. Derived from or through a person who
had utilized improper means to acquire it;
2. Acquired under circumstances giving
rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or
limit its use; or 
3. Derived from or through a person who
owed a duty to the person seeking relief to
7
Coinco also argues that LeJeune threatened misappropriation of trade secrets under
the theory of “inevitable disclosure.”  As discussed in Part B, infra, we disagree that this type
of analysis should apply.
-24-
maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or 
(iii) Before a material change of the person’s
position, knew or had reason to know that it was
a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been
acquired by accident or mistake.
Section 12-1201(c) of MUTSA.  This section describes two general types of
misappropriation: (1) acquisition of a trade secret by improper means or (2) disclosure of a
trade secret.  We must consider this definition in conjunction with the terms of Section 11-
1202(a) of MUTSA, which provides an injunction for “actual” or “threatened”
misappropriation.  A court, therefore, can issue an injunction to prevent either of the
following: (1) the actual or threatened acquisition of a trade secret by improper means or (2)
the actual or threatened disclosure of a trade secret.7
a. Acquisition of a Trade Secret by Improper Means 
The Circuit Court was persuaded that the evidence was sufficient that LeJeune had
acquired trade secrets by improper means.  Both parties agree that LeJeune possessed
documents and files belonging to Coinco, and we determined that several of these documents
(i.e., the budgeting software, Specialty Markets Strategic Plan, pricing and cost documents,
and MC2600 and Bill Pro Validator specifications) qualified as trade secrets.  MUTSA states
that a trade secret is acquired by “improper means” when it has been acquired by “theft,
bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of duty to maintain secrecy, or
-25-
espionage through electronic or other means.”  Section 11-1201(b) of MUTSA.
The Court of Special Appeals’ opinion in Bond v. PolyCycle, 127 Md. App. 365, 732
A.2d 970 (1999) is instructive here.  Bond, the former engineer of a plastic recycling
company, on the evening prior to resigning, “took all of the work product that he had done
in the preceding two years on improving [the company’s technology], placed it on a floppy
disc, [and] then erased it from the company computers.”  Id. at 377, 732 A.2d at 976.
Because this technology was a trade secret belonging to the company, Bond did not have
authority to take it.  The court concluded, “Without authority from PolyCycle, [Bond’s]
taking of its computer files relating to the process constitutes theft, and therefore a
misappropriation under [MUTSA].” Id. at 379, 732 A.2d at 977.
The engineer’s acquisition of the technology in Bond occurred under circumstances
similar to those before us in the present case.  When Bond took the technology from
PolyCycle and erased it from the company’s computers, he took possession of trade secrets
without the company’s authorization.  Similarly, Coinco did not give LeJeune permission to
transfer trade secrets from the company laptop to a CD.  In an attempt to justify his actions,
LeJeune stated that he transferred the “My Documents” folder from the company laptop to
retain personal files, such as wedding photographs, and in the process, captured numerous
Coinco documents.  Coinco’s expert testified, however, that LeJeune did not download only
the “My Documents” folder, but he also transferred selected, specific Coinco files containing
trade secrets.  Considering this evidence, the trial judge apparently did not believe LeJeune’s
-26-
version of the events, and we see no reason here to upset the fact-finder’s credibility
determination. 
LeJeune argues that he did not acquire the trade secrets improperly because Coinco
provided the documents and had no procedure in place for collecting them after an employee
left the company.  In support of this contention, LeJeune relies on Diamond, 852 F.Supp. at
412, in which the defendant, after she left her employment, retained certain company files
and documents that the company had sent to her home.  The company, T. Rowe Price, argued
that this conduct amounted to misappropriation under MUTSA, but the court disagreed,
holding that the files did not constitute trade secrets.  Id. at 412.   Judge Legg noted that, even
if trade secrets were at issue, “T. Rowe Price allowed [the defendant] to work at home,
regularly sent documents to her home, and cannot now complain that her possession of these
documents violates [MUTSA].”  Id. at 412 n.193.
LeJeune’s argument misses the mark because the circumstances in Diamond differ
from those in the present case.  In this case, unlike in Diamond, the trial court found and we
agree that the information at issue is sensitive trade secret information.   Moreover, LeJeune
did not merely hold on to documents that had been sent to his home and then refuse to return
them, as was the case in Diamond.  Rather, on the last day of his employment, LeJeune
selected specific, confidential Coinco documents and actively transferred them from the
Coinco laptop to a CD that he intended to keep for his personal use.  After transferring the
files, LeJeune then erased over four hundred files from the laptop.  This suggests that
-27-
LeJeune was attempting to hide his conduct and was aware that transferring the files was
improper.  LeJeune again demonstrated an intent to hide his possession of trade secrets when
he told his supervisor that “everything” had been returned, although numerous hard-copy
trade secrets remained in LeJeune’s possession.  The evidence in this case is sufficient to
support the Circuit Court’s finding that LeJeune acquired Coinco’s trade secrets by improper
means.
b. Inevitable Disclosure / Threatened Disclosure
Concluding that LeJeune misappropriated trade secrets by acquiring them improperly
does not end our inquiry with respect to whether the Circuit Court’s injunction was
appropriate in this case.  Injunctive relief, by its nature, addresses only what could happen
in the future and cannot remedy misconduct, such as the improper acquisition of trade
secrets, that occurred in the past.  In fact, the injunctive remedies of Section 11-1202(a) of
MUTSA provide no remedy at all for the past misappropriations.  In other words, if LeJeune
already had misappropriated the trade secrets and returned them, the court cannot craft a
injunction to reverse time and erase whatever harm LeJeune caused by taking the trade
secrets without consent.
Nevertheless, MUTSA’s injunctive remedies could serve to protect Coinco if the
evidence demonstrates a likelihood of some future misappropriation.  As we stated
previously, MUTSA permits a court to enjoin either (1) actual or threatened acquisition of
a trade secret by improper means or (2) actual or threatened disclosure of trade secrets.  With
8
We have identified some evidence in the record suggesting that LeJeune has
threatened disclosure of Coinco’s trade secrets.  When LeJeune met with his supervisor after
announcing his resignation, he mentioned that he would be in a “unique” position at Mars,
suggesting that he might use confidential Coinco information in his new employment.  This
comment raises suspicion particularly because, as we determined above, LeJeune had
acquired trade secrets improperly by copying Coinco files onto his CD and by saving certain
hard-copy trade secrets after he informed his supervisor “everything” had been returned.   See
Ackerman v. Kimball International, Inc., 652 N.E.2d 507, 510-11 (Ind. 1995) (upholding the
trial court’s finding that the defendant’s “pre-departure harvesting” of the plaintiff’s
“proprietary information” suggested a threat of misappropriation).  Further evidence of
LeJeune’s threatened disclosure comes from the discovery that not only did he burn one CD,
but he also placed Coinco trade secrets on a second CD.  If there is a second CD filled with
trade secrets, it would come as no surprise that LeJeune had made a third or fourth CD to
maintain for future reference.  Even LeJeune’s interview with Mars indicates his willingness
to share trade secrets.  When interviewing face-to-face with Mars personnel, he was
reminded twice that confidential information should not be disclosed.  One could infer from
these reminders that LeJeune, in fact, had displayed some propensity to disclose trade secrets.
Based on this evidence, we hold that Coinco will likely succeed on the merits of its claim of
threatened misappropriation by disclosure of trade secrets. 
-28-
respect to the first category, the evidence clearly is insufficient to support a finding that
LeJeune continues to acquire trade secrets improperly or that he has threatened other
acquisition of Coinco’s trade secrets by improper means.  As to the second category, the
record does not reveal any evidence that LeJeune actually had disclosed Coinco’s trade
secrets and that an injunction is necessary to stop that conduct.  The sole question in the case
at bar, therefore, is whether any threatened future disclosure or use of a trade secret justifies
an injunction at this stage of the proceedings.8
The Circuit Court, however, did not make a finding of “threatened disclosure” of
Coinco’s trade secrets.  Rather, it decided to issue the preliminary injunction based on a
theory known as “inevitable disclosure.”  In making its ruling, the trial judge stated:
-29-
I know I don’t have to make a final ruling on whether the
inevitable disclosure doctrine applies or not, but it is the court’s
position that with the knowledge that [LeJeune] has, it would be
inconceivable to the court how he could do his job as the
national accounts representative for the amusement industry
without considering or weighing or taking into consideration the
information that he acquired while he was employed with
Coinco, and so for that reason, I do believe . . . that [Coinco]
will suffer irreparable injury.
The theory of “inevitable disclosure” has been applied in courts outside of Maryland to
enjoin a departing employee from working for a competitor when the court is persuaded that
it is inevitable that the departed employee will use or disclose trade secrets in his or her work
for the competitor.  Babirak at 198.  Put another way, “inevitable disclosure” cases
are so named because they are based on the original employer’s
claim that a former employee who is permitted to work for a
competitor will – even if acting in the utmost good faith –
inevitably be required to use or disclose the former employer’s
trade secrets in order to perform the new job.
LAWRENCE I. WEINSTEIN, Revisiting the Inevitability Doctrine: When Can a Former
Employee Who Had Never Signed a Non-compete Agreement nor Threatened to Use or
Disclose Trade Secrets Be Prohibited from Working for a Competitor?, 21 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 211, 212 (1997) (hereinafter “Weinstein”).  Another commentator explained that the
doctrine arises often when the former employee did not sign a non-compete agreement:
Significantly, the inevitable disclosure doctrine is utilized in
cases where the employee has not signed, or has even refused to
sign, a non-competition agreement or non-disclosure of
proprietary information agreement with his prior employer, and
where the employee has not threatened, directly or indirectly, to
use or disclose the trade secrets of his former employer to his
-30-
new employer.
Babirak at 198. 
LeJeune claims that, because this Court has not recognized the theory of “inevitable
disclosure,” the Circuit Court erred in using it as a ground for issuing the preliminary
injunction limiting his employment at Mars.  LeJeune argues, however, that, even if this
Court decides to adopt “inevitable disclosure,” it should not be applied to his case.
According to LeJeune, any trade secrets that LeJeune may have acquired while working in
the Vending Channel at Coinco would not be useful to him while working in the Amusement
Channel at Mars.  Disclosure of the vending trade secrets, therefore, is not inevitable in
LeJeune’s opinion. 
According to Coinco, however, “inevitable disclosure,” although not expressly
recognized in Maryland, was correctly applied in this case because it is a form of
“threatened” misappropriation under MUTSA.  Coinco claims that LeJeune inevitably would
disclose his extensive knowledge about Coinco’s business strategies while working for Mars,
giving his new employer an unfair competitive advantage.  This is so, in Coinco’s view,
because LeJeune has demonstrated a lack of candor and a willingness to use or disclose trade
secrets.  Coinco believes, therefore, that the theory of “inevitable disclosure” is appropriate
in this case because LeJeune understands Coinco’s strategic plan for the Amusement
Channel, the market on which he would focus at Mars as a National Accounts Representative
for the Amusement Industry.  We disagree with Coinco and decline to adopt the theory of
9
 In B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963), the court
affirmed an injunction prohibiting a former employee of B.F. Goodrich, the first space-suit
manufacturer, from working for a competitor on space-suit projects.  The court held that the
former employee’s intimate knowledge of trade secrets provided him the opportunity to use
and disclose those secrets in his work for the competitor, whose technology lagged behind
B.F. Goodrich’s.  Id. at 103-04.  Similarly,  E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. American
Potash & Chemical Corp., 200 A.2d 428 (Del. Ch. 1964), involved a scientist who had
worked extensively to develop the pigment manufacturing process for duPont, a leader in that
industry, and then left to join a competitor.  Despite a lack of evidence of threatened
disclosure or bad faith, the court held that there was sufficient evidence that the scientist
inevitably would use or disclose duPont’s trade secrets in his work with the competitor.  The
court in Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. Continental Aviation & Engineering Corp.,
255 F.Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1966) issued an injunction under almost the same
circumstances.  The defendant, in his work in the Allis-Chalmers fuel systems laboratory, had
been “intimately connected” with the development of technology that only a few companies
had commercialized.  Id. at 650.  A competitor that had not commercialized the technology
hired the defendant, and Allis-Chalmers sued for an injunction.   Holding  that it was
“virtual[ly] impossib[le]” that the defendant could work for the competitor without giving
it the “benefit” of Allis-Chalmers’ trade secrets, the court issued an injunction that prohibited
the defendant from working on fuel systems projects altogether.  Id. at 654.
-31-
“inevitable disclosure” under the present circumstances.
Long before the adoption of the Uniform Act, the first reported cases applying
“inevitable disclosure” involved extraordinary situations in which a company tried to guard
the secrecy of some technology that had propelled the company into industry leadership.  See
Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. Continental Aviation & Engineering Corp., 255
F.Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1966); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. American Potash &
Chemical Corp., 200 A.2d 428 (Del. Ch. 1964); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192
N.E.2d 99 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963);9 see also Weinstein at 223.  
Since the Uniform Act’s adoption and widespread recognition by the states, the most
notable case involving “inevitable disclosure” is Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7 th
-32-
Cir. 1995).  In that case, Pepsico sought to enjoin one of its former senior executives,
Redmond, from working for Quaker Oats Company, Pepsico’s rival in the sports beverage
market.  Id. at 1264.  While at Pepsico, Redmond had access to confidential marketing
strategies and “pricing architecture.”  Id. at 1265.  Redmond continued to work for Pepsico
while he secretly negotiated for employment with Quaker.  Redmond accepted a senior sales
position at Quaker and, when he informed Pepsico of that decision, misrepresented the nature
of his new position.  Id.  Pepsico sued and obtained a preliminary injunction, barring
Redmond from “assuming any duties with Quaker relating to beverage pricing, marketing,
and distribution.”  Id. at 1263.  
On appeal before the Seventh Circuit, Pepsico argued that Redmond would
“inevitably disclose” trade secrets acquired at Pepsico because, at Quaker, he would be
involved significantly in the marketing, pricing, and distribution of sports beverages.  Id. at
1266.  The court of appeals agreed, affirming the injunction and holding that “a plaintiff may
prove a claim of trade secret misappropriation by demonstrating that defendant’s new
employment will inevitably lead him to rely on the plaintiff’s trade secrets.”  Id. at 1269.  The
appellate court accepted the district court’s reasoning that “unless Redmond possessed an
uncanny ability to compartmentalize information, he would necessarily be making decisions
about [Quaker’s beverages] by relying on his knowledge of [Pepsico’s] trade secrets.”  Id.
No court interpreting the provisions of MUTSA has applied the theory of “inevitable
disclosure.”  See Padco Advisors, 179 F.Supp.2d at 611 (“The doctrine of inevitable
-33-
disclosure has not been expressly adopted by the Maryland state courts.”).  Among other
courts, including those interpreting other versions of the Uniform Act, the theory remains the
subject of considerable disagreement.  Compare Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App.
4th 1443 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (rejecting the “inevitable disclosure” doctrine after surveying
the cases that have considered the theory), Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co.,
148 F.Supp.2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (same), Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc.,
72 F.Supp.2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (same), and EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F.Supp.2d
299 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) with Strata Marketing, Inc. v. Murphy, 740 N.E.2d 1166 (Ill. App.
2000), Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7 th Cir. 1995), Merck & Co., Inc. v. Lyon,
941 F.Supp. 1443 (M.D.N.C. 1996), and Uncle B’s Bakery, Inc. v. O’Rourke, 920 F. Supp.
1405 (N.D. Iowa 1996); see also Comment, An Overview of Individual States’ Application
of Inevitable Disclosure: Concrete Doctrine or Equitable Tool?, 55 SMU L. REV. 621
(2002); Babirak at 198-99 (stating that courts do not agree about the application of
“inevitable disclosure”).
The court in  Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
recently presented a comprehensive discussion of the theory within the context of California
law.  Schlage Lock Company competed with Kwikset Corporation in the business of
manufacturing and selling locks and related products to retailers.  Id. at 1447.  The Home
Depot, one of the largest retailers of these products, accounted for a large percentage of
Schlage’s sales.  As Schlage’s vice-president of sales, Whyte was responsible for sales to
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several large retailers, including The Home Depot.  Id. Although Whyte had signed a
confidentiality agreement as to Schlage’s proprietary information, he had not signed a
covenant not to compete.  Whyte was lured to join Kwikset, and Schlage sued, seeking an
injunction based on the theory of inevitable disclosure.  Id. at 1448.  After surveying the
cases that have considered the doctrine, the court opted to join those jurisdictions that have
rejected it:
The decisions rejecting the inevitable disclosure doctrine
correctly balance competing public policies of employee
mobility and protection of trade secrets.  The inevitable
disclosure doctrine permits an employer to enjoin the former
employee without proof of the employee’s actual or threatened
use of trade secrets based upon an inference (based in turn upon
circumstantial evidence) that the employee will use his or her
knowledge of those trade secrets in the new employment.  The
result is not merely an injunction against the use of trade
secrets, but an injunction restricting employment.
Id. at 1461-62 (emphasis added).  The application of the doctrine, the court stated, “‘creates
a de facto covenant not to compete’ and ‘runs counter to the strong public policy in
California favoring employee mobility.’” Id. at 1462 (quoting Bayer Corp., 72 F.Supp.2d at
1120).  The court continued:
The chief ill in the covenant not to compete imposed by the
inevitable disclosure doctrine  is in its after-the-fact nature: The
covenant is imposed after the employment contract is made and
therefore alters the employment relationship without the
employee’s consent.  When, as here, a confidentiality agreement
is in place, the inevitable disclosure doctrine “in effect
convert[s] the confidentiality agreement into such a covenant
[not to compete].  Or, as another federal court put it, “a court
should not allow a plaintiff to use inevitable disclosure as an
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after-the-fact noncompete agreement to enjoin an employee
from working for the employer of his or her choice.”
Id. at 1462-63 (citations omitted); see also EarthWeb, 71 F.Supp.2d at 311 (“[S]uch
retroactive alterations [as a result of applying inevitable disclosure] distort the terms of the
employment relationship and upset the balance which courts have attempted to achieve in
construing non-compete agreements.”).  The court was disturbed that the inevitable
disclosure doctrine could “rewrite[] the employment agreement” by providing the employer
with “the benefit of a contractual provision it did not pay for, while the employee is bound
by a court-imposed contract provision with no opportunity to negotiate terms or
consideration.”  Id. at 1463. 
We find this reasoning persuasive, especially as applied to the circumstances in the
case before us.  Maryland has a policy in favor of employee mobility similar to that of
California.  See Becker v. Bailey, 268 Md. 93, 299 A.2d 835 (1973); Tawney v. Mutual
System of Maryland, Inc., 186 Md. 508, 47 A.2d 372 (1946).  Furthermore, Coinco decided
not to enter into a confidentiality agreement or a covenant not to compete with LeJeune.  To
recognize “inevitable disclosure” in this case would allow Coinco the benefit of influencing
LeJeune’s employment relationship with Mars even though Coinco chose not to negotiate
a restrictive covenant or confidentiality agreement with LeJeune.  See  International Business
Mach. Corp. v. Seagate Technology, Inc., 941 F.Supp. 98, 101 (D. Minn. 1992) (“A claim
of trade secret misappropriation should not act as an ex post facto covenant not to
compete.”).  Adopting the theory also would tend to permit a court to infer some inevitable
-36-
disclosure of trade secrets merely from an individual’s exposure to them.  See H & R Block
Eastern Tax Servs. Inc. v. Enchura, 122 F.Supp.2d 1067, 1076 (W.D. Mo. 2000) (stating that
no inference of inevitable disclosure can flow from exposure to trade secrets).  For these
reasons, we conclude that the theory of “inevitable disclosure” cannot serve as a basis for
granting a plaintiff injunctive relief under MUTSA.
B. Irreparable Harm and the Breadth of the Preliminary Injunction
LeJeune’s final arguments challenge the Circuit Court’s use of discretion in
determining irreparable harm to Coinco and by fashioning the preliminary injunction.  The
Circuit Court made its determination of irreparable harm based on the inapplicable theory of
“inevitable disclosure.”  The trial judge found that Coinco would suffer irreparable harm if
LeJeune were permitted to work as a national accounts representative at Mars because “it
would be inconceivable . . . how he could do [the job] without considering or weighing”
Coinco’s trade secrets.  Based on this reasoning, the Circuit Court issued its preliminary
injunction, barring LeJeune from “working for Mars in any area in which he would have to
use or disclose Coinco’s confidential and trade secret information – including specifically
the Vending Industry, Amusement Industry, and/or the Specialty Markets Industries, and also
including, specifically, as Mars’ National Accounts Representative for the Amusement
Industry.”
The analysis underlying the injunction relies on the assumption that LeJeune’s
exposure to trade secrets will cause those secrets to be “inevitably disclosed” by virtue of the
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new employment with a competitor.  As a result, the Circuit Court’s order “is not merely an
injunction against the use of trade secrets, but an injunction restricting employment.” Whyte,
101 Cal. App. 4th at 1462.  Because “inevitable disclosure” does not apply, the trial court was
wrong to issue the injunction limiting the scope of LeJeune’s employment with Mars.
Rather, the focus should be on precluding the disclosure of trade secrets.
PRE L IMINARY  
INJU NCTIO N
VACATED; CASE REMANDED TO
THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE
ARUNDEL COUNTY FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH
THIS OPINION; COSTS TO BE PAID
BY APPELLEE.