Case Title: Geauga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Snavely

Citation: 2016-Ohio-7829

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2016-11-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Geauga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Snavely, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-7829.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-7829 
GEAUGA COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. SNAVELY. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Geauga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Snavely, Slip Opinion No.  
2016-Ohio-7829.] 
(No. 2016-0854—Submitted July 13, 2016—Decided November 22, 2016.) 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Two-
year suspension with final 18 months stayed on conditions. 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2015-034. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Carly L. Snavely of Chagrin Falls, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0081569, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2007.  
Relator, Geauga County Bar Association, charged her with violating the Rules of 
Professional Conduct based on her actions in two client matters and for her own 
illegal activity.  The parties entered into a consent-to-discipline agreement, in which 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
they stipulate that Snavely engaged in the charged misconduct and recommend that 
we suspend her for two years, with 18 months stayed.  The Board of Professional 
Conduct determined that the agreement conforms to the requirements of Gov.Bar 
R. V(16) and recommends that we adopt it in its entirety. 
{¶ 2} Upon review of the record, we accept the board’s recommendation 
and adopt the parties’ consent-to-discipline agreement. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 3} The parties stipulate that after graduating from law school, Snavely 
worked as a public defender in Florida from 2007 to 2008 and then as an assistant 
prosecuting attorney in the Geauga County prosecutor’s office from 2008 to 2011.  
Since then, she has worked as a solo practitioner. 
{¶ 4} In February 2013, William Russell hired Snavely to defend him in a 
criminal case and later paid her a retainer pursuant to a written fee agreement.  At 
that time, however, Snavely did not maintain a client trust account or know how to 
properly use one.  Nor did she have professional liability insurance or obtain written 
notification from Russell acknowledging that he was aware that she lacked 
malpractice insurance.  In March 2013, Alex Fisher retained her to defend him in a 
criminal case, but Snavely also failed to notify him that she lacked malpractice 
insurance.  Fisher’s mother paid Snavely a portion of an agreed-upon flat fee, but 
Snavely failed to deposit the money into a client trust account or inform her client 
that he might be entitled to a refund of all or a part of the flat fee if she did not 
complete the representation. 
{¶ 5} In June 2013, Snavely was involved in an incident that led to the filing 
of criminal drug charges against her.  In July 2013, she was admitted to an inpatient 
treatment program for a heroin addiction, and after completing the inpatient 
program, she underwent several weeks of intensive outpatient treatment.  In 
November 2013, she pled guilty to a fifth-degree felony for heroin possession 
relating to the June incident.  The trial judge granted intervention in lieu of 
January Term, 2016 
 
3
conviction and placed her on community-control sanctions for two years.  Nearly 
one year early, in December 2014, the judge found that she had complied with the 
conditions of her community control and dismissed the case. 
{¶ 6} In the meantime, Russell filed a grievance against Snavely, claiming 
that because of her drug addiction and treatment, he had been forced to retain other 
counsel to represent him.  Snavely later acknowledged that although both Russell 
and Fisher ultimately obtained substitute counsel, she was unaware of—and 
therefore failed to comply with—the appropriate procedures for withdrawing from 
representation of a client. 
{¶ 7} The parties stipulate that Snavely has not used illegal drugs since 
January 11, 2014, that she is in full compliance with her contract with the Ohio 
Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”), and that she has actively participated in 
recovery programs.  Additionally, after becoming clean, she made restitution to 
Russell in the amount of $3,500 and to Fisher’s mother in the amount of $2,650. 
{¶ 8} The parties also stipulate that although Snavely has no memory of 
doing so, she forged Russell’s signature on a legal-malpractice-waiver form.  As a 
result, Snavely was charged with forgery in May 2015.  She ultimately pled guilty 
to a first-degree misdemeanor for attempted forgery and served three days in jail. 
{¶ 9} Based on this conduct, the parties stipulate that Snavely violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(c) (requiring a lawyer to inform the client on a separate written 
form that the lawyer does not maintain professional liability insurance and requiring 
the client to sign the form), 1.5(d)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from charging a flat fee 
without simultaneously advising the client in writing that the client may be entitled 
to a refund of all or part of the fee if the lawyer does not complete the 
representation), 1.15(a) (requiring a lawyer to hold property of clients in an interest-
bearing client trust account, separate from the lawyer’s own property), 1.15(c) 
(requiring a lawyer to deposit advance legal fees and expenses into a client trust 
account, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or expenses 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
incurred), 1.15(e) (requiring a lawyer to promptly distribute all portions of client 
funds that are held in trust), 1.16(a) (requiring a lawyer to withdraw from 
representation when the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materially impairs 
the lawyer’s ability to represent the client), 8.4(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
committing an illegal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty or 
trustworthiness), and 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that 
adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law). 
{¶ 10} We agree that Snavely engaged in this misconduct. 
Sanction 
{¶ 11} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
several relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 
aggravating and mitigating factors, and the sanctions imposed in similar cases.  See 
Gov.Bar R. V(13)(A). 
Aggravating and mitigating factors 
{¶ 12} As an aggravating factor, the parties stipulate that Snavely acted with 
a selfish or dishonest motive in falsifying Russell’s name on a legal document.  See 
Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2). 
{¶ 13} In mitigation, the parties agree that Snavely has no prior discipline, 
made timely and good-faith restitution, and is well respected in the local legal and 
drug-recovery communities.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (3), and (5).  In addition, 
the parties agree that Snavely has served other penalties for her misconduct—
namely, community control for the drug-possession charge and the jail sentence for 
her attempted-forgery conviction—and that she has made other attempts at interim 
rehabilitation, including hiring a legal-ethics expert to provide her one-on-one 
training in the areas of fee agreements, client trust accounts, and withdrawing from 
client matters.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(6) and (8).  Indeed, the parties stipulate 
that with the assistance of her counsel, she is compliant with the dictates of 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(c), 1.5, 1.15, and 1.16. 
January Term, 2016 
 
5
{¶ 14} Finally, the parties stipulate that Snavely’s addiction qualifies as a 
mitigating factor under Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7).  A chemical-dependency 
counselor diagnosed Snavely with a severe substance-abuse disorder; the disorder 
contributed to her professional misconduct; she has successfully completed 
inpatient, outpatient, and aftercare treatment and continues to be monitored by 
OLAP; and her counselor concludes that she is currently capable of engaging in the 
competent and ethical practice of law. 
Applicable precedent 
{¶ 15} To support their recommended sanction, the parties cite a series of 
cases in which we imposed two-year suspensions with 18 months conditionally 
stayed on attorneys who engaged in misconduct while impaired by an addiction but 
who ultimately demonstrated a sustained period of sobriety after treatment. 
{¶ 16} For example, in Toledo Bar Assn. v. Shousher, 112 Ohio St.3d 533, 
2007-Ohio-611, 861 N.E.2d 536, the attorney accepted retainers and then failed to 
perform the work in numerous cases, failed to deposit the retainers into his client 
trust account, and failed to notify his clients that he lacked malpractice insurance.  
In addition, he pled guilty to forgery and identity theft for completing credit-card 
applications in his ex-wife’s name without her authorization, and he admitted to 
writing a series of dishonored checks.  In mitigation, he had no prior discipline, 
made full restitution to each former client, and cooperated in the disciplinary 
process.  In addition, he participated in various treatment and recovery programs 
for addictions to alcohol and prescription drugs and had remained sober for over 
two years.  We suspended him for two years but stayed 18 months on conditions, 
including that he maintain compliance with his OLAP contract.  Id. at ¶ 36.  See 
also Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoppel, 129 Ohio St.3d 53, 2011-Ohio-2672, 950 
N.E.2d 171 (attorney suspended for two years with 18 months stayed for, among 
other things, accepting over $14,000 from clients to represent them but failing to 
perform the work and instead spending their money on his cocaine addiction; 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
mitigating factors included full restitution to each client, a cooperative attitude in 
the disciplinary process, successful completion of inpatient and outpatient 
treatment programs for his chemical dependency, and a one-and-a-half-year period 
of sobriety); Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Washington, 109 Ohio St.3d 308, 2006-Ohio-
2423, 847 N.E.2d 435 (attorney suspended for two years with 18 months stayed on 
conditions for similar misconduct emanating from a diagnosed cocaine and alcohol 
dependency; mitigating factors included successful completion of treatment 
programs and a sustained period of sobriety). 
{¶ 17} The board reviewed the cases cited by the parties and agreed with 
their recommended sanction.  We also agree that Shousher, Hoppel, and 
Washington are relevant precedents and that a similar sanction is therefore 
warranted in this case. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 18} For the reasons explained above, we accept the parties’ consent-to-
discipline agreement.  Carly L. Snavely is hereby suspended from the practice of 
law for two years, with the final 18 months stayed on the conditions that she 
continue to comply with her OLAP contract and refrain from engaging in any 
further misconduct.  If Snavely fails to comply with these conditions, the stay will 
be lifted and she will serve the entire two-year suspension.  It is further ordered that 
as a condition of reinstatement, she must demonstrate compliance with her OLAP 
contract.  Costs are taxed to Snavely.  
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LANZINGER, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., 
concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by KENNEDY, J. 
_________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 19} Respectfully, I dissent. 
January Term, 2016 
 
7
{¶ 20} When imposing discipline on members of the bar, our responsibility 
is to protect the public from attorneys who are unable to demonstrate the ability to 
engage in the practice of law with the highest moral and ethical standards and to 
display the highest degree of professionalism in their personal life and professional 
engagements. 
{¶ 21} Here, the parties stipulated that Snavely’s heroin addiction 
contributed to her misconduct, including forging her client’s signature on a notice 
that she lacked malpractice insurance, and that she has not used drugs since January 
11, 2014. 
{¶ 22} But when a Geauga County Grand Jury indicted her for two counts 
of forgery, it alleged that those offenses occurred between June 1, 2014, and July 
31, 2014—after she had attained sobriety.  And when the trial court accepted her 
guilty plea to attempted forgery (as the lesser included offense of the forgery 
charged in the indictment), it granted the state’s motion to amend that count to 
reflect that the offense occurred “on or between February 25, 2013 – July 31, 2014 
instead of June 1, 2014 – July 31, 2014.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
{¶ 23} Based on Snavely’s admission of guilt and the dates referenced in 
the amended indictment, it is possible that she committed this offense after she last 
used drugs in January 2014; if so, her addiction did not contribute to or mitigate her 
misconduct, and therefore, a more severe sanction may be appropriate. 
{¶ 24} The stipulations do not address whether Snavely cooperated with the 
disciplinary counsel’s investigation.  But when relator filed the complaint against 
her, it alleged that Snavely had “stated that, on February 25, 2013, [she] provided 
Mr. Russell with a written notice stating that [she] does not carry professional 
liability insurance,” that she had “stated that Mr. Russell signed the written notice 
in [Snavely’s] presence,” and that she had “provided relator a photocopy of the 
written notice.” These statements are inconsistent with her current claim to have 
“no active, working memory of the forgery.”  And in her answer, Snavely only 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
denied the allegations against her for want of knowledge, similarly claiming, for 
example, that she “cannot recall stating that Mr. Russell signed the written notice 
in [her] presence.” 
{¶ 25} Thus, the scant facts in the record before us—including the 
allegations in the indictment and in the complaint—suggest that the attempted 
forgery occurred after Snavely had stopped using heroin in January 2014 and after 
the investigation into her misconduct commenced.  Relator received Russell’s 
grievance in April 2014, and it was during the investigation that followed that 
Snavely apparently presented the forged document to relator as authentic. 
{¶ 26} In each of the cases cited by the parties as supporting the 
recommended suspension of two years with 18 months stayed—Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Hoppel, 129 Ohio St.3d 53, 2011-Ohio-2672, 950 N.E.2d 171; Toledo 
Bar Assn. v. Shousher, 112 Ohio St.3d 533, 2007-Ohio-611, 861 N.E.2d 536; and 
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Washington, 109 Ohio St.3d 308, 2006-Ohio-2423, 847 
N.E.2d 435—the respective attorneys committed the misconduct before attaining 
sobriety.  Hoppel at ¶ 11; Shousher at ¶ 30-31; Washington at ¶ 3, 7.  As we 
explained in Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Toohig, 133 Ohio St.3d 548, 2012-
Ohio-5202, 979 N.E.2d 332, an addiction is not a contributing cause to misconduct 
or a significant mitigating factor when “much of the charged misconduct occurred 
after [the] period of sobriety commenced.”  Id. at ¶ 50, 53-54.  Further, in Hoppel, 
Shouster, and Washington, the attorneys had taken responsibility for their 
misconduct and fully cooperated in the disciplinary proceedings.  Hoppel at ¶ 10; 
Shousher at ¶ 32; Washington at ¶ 6.  None claimed to lack memory of committing 
the misconduct. 
{¶ 27} In contrast, the stipulations here do not establish that Snavely’s 
misconduct occurred before she attained sobriety or that there was a causal 
connection between her addiction and the attempted forgery offense, nor do the 
stipulations reflect that Snavely gave full and free disclosure to the Board of 
January Term, 2016 
 
9
Professional Conduct or had a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary 
proceedings, which is significant because she has claimed not to remember 
committing the attempted forgery offense and appears to have made untrue 
statements to relator during the investigation. 
{¶ 28} Accordingly, I would remand this matter to the board to determine 
whether Snavely committed the attempted forgery offense before attaining sobriety 
and whether she cooperated with the disciplinary investigation and to consider 
whether a more severe sanction is warranted. 
 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Michael T. Judy Co., L.P.A., and Michael T. Judy, for relator. 
Dunson Law, L.L.C., and Joseph P. Dunson, for respondent. 
_________________