Case Title: CAMPBELL COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, STATE OF WYOMING, et al., LARAMIE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. ONE, et al.; WYOMING EDUCATION ASSOCIATION; WYOMING SCHOOL BOARD ASSOCIATION, BIG HORN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. ONE, et al. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING; THE STATE OF WYOMING V. CAMPBELL COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, STATE OF WYOMING, et al., LARAMIE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. ONE, et al.; WYOMING EDUCATION ASSOCIATION; WYOMING SCHOOL BOARD ASSOCIATION, BIG HORN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. ONE, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-74

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-01-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
CAMPBELL COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, STATE OF WYOMING, et al., LARAMIE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. ONE, et al.; WYOMING EDUCATION ASSOCIATION; WYOMING SCHOOL BOARD ASSOCIATION, BIG HORN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. ONE, et al. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING; THE STATE OF WYOMING V. CAMPBELL COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, STATE OF WYOMING, et al., LARAMIE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. ONE, et al.; WYOMING EDUCATION ASSOCIATION; WYOMING SCHOOL BOARD ASSOCIATION, BIG HORN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. ONE, et al.2008 WY 2181 P.3d 43Case Number: 06-74, 06-75Decided: 01/08/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
CAMPBELL 
COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, STATE OF WYOMING, et 
al.,Appellants(Plaintiffs),LARAMIE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
NO. ONE, et al.; WYOMING EDUCATION ASSOCIATION; WYOMINGSCHOOL BOARD 
ASSOCIATIONAppellants(Intervening Plaintiffs),BIG HORN 
COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. ONE, et 
al.,Appellants(Plaintiffs),v.THE STATE OF WYOMING,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
 
 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,Appellant(Defendant),v.CAMPBELL 
COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, STATE OF WYOMING, et 
al.,Appellees(Plaintiffs),LARAMIE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 
ONE, et al.; WYOMING EDUCATION ASSOCIATION; 
WYOMINGSCHOOL BOARD 
ASSOCIATION,Appellees(Intervening Plaintiffs),BIG HORNCOUNTYSCHOOL 
DISTRICT NO. ONE, et al., 
Appellees(Plaintiffs).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 
 
Representing 
CampbellCountySchool 
District, State of Wyoming, et al.:

Ford T. 
Bussart and Marvin L. Tyler of Bussart, West, Tyler, P.C., Rock Springs, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
LaramieCountySchool 
District No. One, et 
al.:

Paul J. 
Hickey and Richard D. Bush of Hickey & Evans, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Big HornCountySchool 
District No. One, et al.

Timothy 
J. Kirven and Benjamin S. Kirven of Kirven and Kirven, P.C., Buffalo, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
the Wyoming 
Education Association:

Patrick 
E. Hacker, Gregory P. Hacker and Erin M. Kendall of Patrick E. Hacker, P.C., 
Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
the WyomingSchool Board 
Association:

Tracy J. 
Copenhaver, Powell, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Teton County School District No. 1:

Sara E. 
Van Genderen of Mullikin, Larson & Swift LLC, Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
NatronaCountySchool 
District Number One:

Kathleen 
B. Dixon and Stefanie L. Boster of Murane & Bostwick, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
the State of Wyoming:

Michael 
R. O'Donnell, State School Finance Counsel; Rhonda Sigrist Woodard, Special 
Assistant Attorney General, Woodard & White, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, JJ; DONNELL and YOUNG, 
DJJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Since 1971, 
Wyoming courts, legislators, educators, and 
parents have acted to eliminate wealth-based and educational opportunity 
disparities in Wyoming's school finance and capital 
construction systems.  This enormous 
undertaking was necessitated by the unique provisions of Wyoming's state constitution, which directs the 
legislature to provide a thorough and efficient education to every Wyoming student beginning 
at age six.  The boundaries and 
breadth of a fundamental right to a thorough and efficient education without 
disparities had not previously been charted.  However, by the 1990s, the severe 
negative impact of inadequate resources and wealth-based disparities on a school 
system not built upon the constitutional principles of equality, efficiency and 
thoroughness was apparent across the state and the cooperation and full 
commitment of all branches of Wyoming's government was required to rectify 
those disparities.  

 
 
[¶2]      The Wyoming constitution entrusts the Wyoming legislature with 
defining, developing, and implementing a thorough and efficient education 
system.  The legislature, in 
reliance upon research and information from its agencies, consultants, local 
school districts, educators and parents, enacted statutes to correct the 
deficiencies in the state school system.  
Some of those statutes produced legitimate legal challenges. We issued 
significant decisions in 1995 and 2001 clarifying the constitutional mandate to 
be met by legislation.  Since then, 
and continuing today, the legislature has generously responded to our decisions 
and its constituency by developing and refining a comprehensive, sophisticated 
system that meets the complex demands of delivering a thorough and efficient 
education to the individualized needs of Wyoming students in the 21st 
century.

 
 
[¶3]      Having fulfilled 
its constitutional duty to define what constitutes a "thorough and efficient 
education," the legislature entrusted local school districts with the task of 
delivering it by developing appropriate educational programs, hiring quality 
teachers, reducing class size, and designing appropriate facilities.  The legislature passed laws to fund 
education from state wealth and then delivered that funding to local school 
districts in a block grant.  The 
level of trust the legislature has placed in the people of Wyoming is admirable and 
certainly one important reason that it has achieved so much since 2001.  

 
 
[¶4]      This case 
presents the issue of whether the legislature's efforts meet the constitutional 
mandate.  We hold that the system is 
constitutional.  Some deficiencies 
exist, some changes are required and new issues will arise; however, this Court 
is satisfied that the legislature has in place a thorough and efficient 
educational structure funded from state wealth as required by our state 
constitution.  This Court's 
jurisdiction, retained since 2001, is ended. 

 
 
PROCEDURAL  HISTORY

 
 
[¶5]      In State v. Campbell County School District, 
2001 WY 19, 19 P.3d 518 (Wyo. 2001) (Campbell II), we ordered the district 
court to retain jurisdiction of the issues until the state could demonstrate 
compliance with the decision's mandate on or before July 1, 2002.  In State v. Campbell County 
School District,2001WY 90, 32 P.3d 325 (Wyo. 2001) (Campbell III), at the request of all 
parties we agreed to retain jurisdiction.   On March 10, 2004, the state 
filed a Petition for Resolution of Constitutional Interpretation Questions with 
this Court.  We were unable to 
resolve the issues presented without factual development and denied the state's 
petition.  Thirty school districts, 
the Wyoming Education Association and the Wyoming School Board Association 
(challengers) filed a Petition for Resolution of Constitutional Questions in the 
district court.  The challengers 
claimed that the state had failed to comply with the mandate of Campbell II for both operations and 
capital construction funding.

 
 
[¶6]      Specifically, the 
challengers claimed that the operations funding formula was not yet cost-based 
for utilities, vocational education, small schools and small districts, and 
at-risk students; failed to properly account for inflation and the regional cost 
adjustment; and contained computational errors that had harmed school districts 
and resulted in money damages.  The 
challengers also claimed that the latest capital construction funding formula 
produced inadequate facilities incapable of delivering all educational programs 
and improperly shifted costs to school districts under the guise of local 
enhancements to be funded by local bonding.  The challengers claimed, and the state 
conceded, that it had failed to either repair or replace immediate need 
facilities by the deadline imposed in Campbell II.  

 
 

[¶7]      Following a trial 
on the merits in 2005, the district court issued a lengthy decision holding that 
the state met the Campbell II mandate 
for:  at-risk students, with some 
adjustments required; cost of living differences, with some adjustments; 
administrative 
and classified salaries, small schools and small districts; teacher beginning 
and average salaries; and funding of health insurance costs.  The district court also found that the 
recalibration of the MAP model in 2001 was cost-based and reasonably and 
accurately captured the cost of education.  

 
 

[¶8]      The district 
court rejected the challengers' claim for 
money damages for computational errors and found that the state violated the Campbell II mandate by imposing a 20 
year experience cap on teacher salaries, capping 
funding for routine and major maintenance when space exceeds state standards, 
failing to provide for funding in cases of extreme hardship during great price 
volatility for utilities, failing to properly fund vocational education and 
failing to use a specific index for the inflation cost adjustment.  

 
 
[¶9]      On capital 
construction, the district court found that in 2002 the legislature had created 
a comprehensive system to provide safe, efficient, adequate and equitable school 
facilities in Wyoming by enacting statutes and creating the 
School Facilities Commission (SFC) which promulgated rules and regulations.  Nevertheless, the district court found 
that the state had failed to meet the Campbell II and III 
deadlines for immediate need facilities and technology readiness.  The district court held that the SFC 
rules and regulations were constitutional except those related to adequate space 
for cocurricular activities, dedicated long distance learning rooms, adequate 
computer rooms and utility installation and road costs.  The district court also ruled that the 
state was not constitutionally required to build facilities for athletic 
activities.  All parties appealed 
the ruling and the cases were consolidated.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶10]   We review findings of fact made by 
the district court after a bench trial using a clearly erroneous standard.  A finding is clearly erroneous when, 
even though substantial evidence supports it, the reviewing court is left with 
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made.  We review legal conclusions de novo.  Mullinnix LLC v. HKB Royalty Trust, 2006 
WY 14, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 909, 916 (Wyo. 2006).  This standard is central to our 
jurisprudence generally and to every case we have decided involving the 
Wyoming public 
school financing statutes.   Some of those cases did not involve 
review of a district court decision after a trial.  Although we did not specifically address 
the standard of review in the cases involving purely legal issues, our review 
was clearly de novo.  Washakie County School District No. One v. 
Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980); Campbell County School Dist. v. State, 
907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995) (Campbell I); Campbell 
II, 2001 WY 19, 19 P.3d 513; 
Campbell III, 
2001 WY 90, 32 P.3d 325.

 
 
[¶11]   The parties' briefs in this case 
indicate some confusion about the difference between the standard of review 
guiding this Court's consideration of the decision being appealed and the 
constitutional test applicable to matters related to public education.  It is important to differentiate between 
the two.  Our school finance cases 
have unequivocally held that the Wyoming constitution establishes education as 
a fundamental right. Accordingly, Art. 1, § 34, which guarantees equal 
protection under the law, prohibits wealth-based disparities in education 
funding.  Sweetwater County Planning Committee for Organization of School 
Districts v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234, 1236-37 (Wyo. 1971); 
Washakie, 606 P.2d  at 332; Campbell 
I, 907 P.2d  at 1245; and Campbell II, ¶ 5, 19 P.3d  at 528.  
However, we have consistently recognized that "exact or absolute equality 
is not required."  Therefore, 
differences may exist in funding between school districts if those differences 
result from differences in the cost of providing education.  Washakie, 606 P.2d  at 336.  
Any state action resulting in a wealth-based disparity in public 
education funding will be subject to "strict scrutiny to determine if it is 
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest."  Id. at 333.  In addition, this test requires "the 
state [to] establish that there is no less onerous alternative by which its 
objective may be achieved."  
Id. (citing Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 
(Conn. 
1977)).

  

[¶12]   In Campbell II, this Court held that the 
cost of education model the legislature adopted to allocate funds for public 
school operations was constitutional.  
Properly implemented, the model would assure that differences in per 
student funding between school districts would be based not upon local wealth 
but upon differences in the cost of providing education in the various school 
districts.  In addition, we held 
that so long as the specified modifications were made by the state, the funding 
was adequate to provide the education that the state deemed appropriate.  Because the model is so critical, this 
Court examined each component and found that some had to be revised to more 
accurately reflect true costs.  In 
addition, so long as the state chose to rely upon a cost of education model to 
distribute state funds for school operation, the model needed to be recalibrated 
beginning in 2001, and every five years thereafter, to assure that it continued 
to reflect the true cost of education over time as accurately as possible.  If the state complied with that mandate 
by revising those components to better reflect true costs and conducting the 
recalibration appropriately, the system of funding school operations would be 
considered devoid of wealth-based disparities, to adequately provide the 
education the state required, and thus, be constitutional.

 
 
[¶13]   In this most recent round of 
litigation, the issues before the district court regarding compliance with the 
Campbell II mandates for operation 
funding were factual and the state had the burden of proving those facts by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Montoy v. State, 112 P.3d 923, 929 
(Kan. 2005); Derolph v. State, 699 N.E.2d 518, 519 
(Ohio 
1998).  The issue presented to the 
district court was whether or not the state's revisions and the recalibration 
reflected costs as closely as could reasonably be expected.   If they did, then any differences 
in funding between school districts were not wealth-based and, therefore, did 
not invoke the equal protection provisions of our constitution.  In this context, the strict scrutiny 
test, discussed above, is not in play.  
We simply review the district court's factual findings using the clearly 
erroneous standard.  Some of the 
challengers seem to contend that strict scrutiny (used to determine if a 
classification denies equal protection of the law) should be applied to 
determine whether the modifications adopted by the state resulted in what the 
challengers deem to be inadequate funding for public education.  This argument is not supported by any 
authority and misconstrues the strict scrutiny test. 

 
 
[¶14]   Further, the challengers contend 
the education provisions of the constitution, as interpreted by this Court, 
require the state to provide funding for more than what the state has determined 
education should cost.  Art.7, § 1 
provides:

 
 
The 
legislature shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a complete and uniform system of public 
instruction, embracing free elementary schools of every needed kind and grade, a 
university with such technical and professional departments as the public good 
may require and the means of the state allow, and such other institutions as may 
be necessary.  (emphasis 
added.)

 
 
Art. 7, 
§ 9 provides:

 
 
The 
legislature shall make such further provision by taxation or otherwise, as with 
the income arising from the general school fund will create and maintain a thorough and efficient system of public 
schools, adequate to the proper 
instruction of all youth of the state, between the ages of six and 
twenty-one years, free of charge; and in view of such provision so made, the 
legislature shall require that every child of sufficient physical and mental 
ability shall attend public school during the period between six and eighteen 
years for a time equivalent to three years, unless educated by other means.  (emphasis added).

 
 
This 
Court has interpreted those provisions to require the legislature 
to:

 
 
"provide 
an education system of a character which provides Wyoming students with a 
uniform opportunity to become equipped for their future roles as citizens, 
participants in the political system, and competitors both economically and 
intellectually[.]" 

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
"define 
and specify what a proper education' is for a Wyoming child."

 
 

Campbell 
I, 907 P.2d  at 1259.

 
 
"do the 
best that we can do."

 
 

Id. 
 at 1279.

 
 
"provide 
a thorough and uniform education of a quality that is both visionary and 
unsurpassed." 

 
 

Campbell 
II, ¶ 51, 
19 P.3d  at 538.

 
 
[¶15]   The challengers rely upon these 
statements to argue that our constitution requires the state to provide funding 
and facilities for whatever programs each district chooses to offer.  They argue that if the state sets the 
funding based upon what it contends a proper education for Wyoming's children should 
cost then the state somehow fails to fulfill its obligation under the education 
provisions of the constitution.  
While we are certain the school districts are motivated by a true desire 
to serve our state's children as well as they possibly can, we disagree with 
this constitutional theory for two important reasons.  First, we have consistently held that 
the constitution imposes on the legislature the obligation to determine 
the kind of education Wyoming's children will be afforded.  Second, the challengers seem to be saying 
the courts should determine the proper level of educational funding and in doing 
so the will of the school districts must prevail.  Courts can, and should, protect against 
a failure of the state to fund a system capable of meeting state standards.  However, the determination of whether to 
require funding in excess of the level deemed adequate to meet state standards 
must be left to the legislature.  For the most part, the district court 
found that the adjustments provided adequate funding to achieve the state's 
educational requirements and those factual findings are subject to review under 
the "clearly erroneous" standard. 

            

[¶16]   With regard to Campbell II's mandate on capital 
construction, this Court required the state to use state funds to remodel or 
replace those school facilities identified by the state as inadequate, under its 
process in place at the time, within a prescribed time frame. In response, the 
state adopted a process that used state funds, but identified the capital 
construction needs in a completely different manner.  Whether that system is constitutional 
involves factual findings concerning whether the funding is adequate to allow 
school districts to provide the education deemed appropriate by the legislature, 
and whether the system as designed provides capital facilities without reliance 
on local wealth.  Those factual 
findings are also reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. 

 
 
DISCUSSON

 
 
I.          
OPERATIONS

 
 
            
1.         
Recalibration

 
 
[¶17]   The state performed its first 
recalibration as directed by this Court in 2001, and the legislature adopted the 
employee compensation and benefits recommended by that effort in the 2002 
legislative session.  The district 
court held that the recalibration "provided public school funding which 
reasonably and accurately captures the cost of education in Wyoming."  In addition, the district court 
concluded the legislature had acted "responsibly and diligently in making these 
adjustments."  After a careful 
review of the trial record, we hold the district court's findings were not 
clearly erroneous and, in fact, were supported by substantial evidence.  In addition, the legislature adopted 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-309(t) (LexisNexis 2007) requiring the recalibration to 
occur every five years, and we take judicial notice of the fact that the 
legislature performed another such recalibration in 2006.1  Although the substance of that 
recalibration is not before us, the fact that it was performed is evidence of 
the legislature's continuing commitment to follow the Court's direction and 
assure the model is up to date and as accurate as 
possible.

 
 
[¶18]   To comply with the recalibration 
requirement of Campbell II, the 
legislature contracted with Management Analysis & Planning Assoc., Inc. 
(MAP) to conduct the 2001 recalibration.  
We noted in Campbell II that 
MAP was "a well recognized and credentialed consulting firm with expertise in 
public school finance ." Campbell II, ¶ 11, 19 P.3d  at 529.  In the course of conducting its review 
of the model, MAP visited over 100 schools and 41 districts, met with advisory 
committees of teachers and administrators, evaluated data submitted by the 
school districts and available in the public domain, and relied upon its 
professional judgment.  Because 80% 
of the cost of operating the public schools is personnel, the primary issue 
regarding the adequacy of the recalibration efforts was the number of employees 
and their compensation.  Obviously, 
the key category of employees is teachers.  
The challengers criticize the recalibration because it did not follow the 
same process utilized when the model was first created, i.e. obtaining input 
from panels of Wyoming educators and developing the parameters from the ground 
up, such as the number of teachers required, class size, etc.  We agree with the district court that Campbell II did not dictate any 
particular recalibration process, but only that the individual components should 
be reviewed so that the model remained current.  To start from scratch every five years 
would seem impracticable and unnecessarily costly.  We think it fair to assume that if major 
changes occur in the field of public education that would affect the assumptions 
in the model, and the state and the school districts believe such changes should 
be implemented in Wyoming, the model will be adjusted 
accordingly in the recalibration process.

 
 
[¶19]   MAP concluded the class size 
originally adopted in the 1997 model, 16 students for K-5 and 21 students for 
6-12, remained appropriate and the personnel in the model was sufficient to 
achieve these class sizes.  Based 
upon MAP's research, Wyoming's teacher/pupil ratio is lower than 
most other states and available research does not justify smaller class sizes 
than are in the model.  The 
challengers did not seem to contend a specific smaller class size, with an 
accompanying increase in the number of teachers, should have been included in 
the model.  Instead, they contended 
that many school districts hired more teachers than provided for in the 
model.  With regard to other 
personnel issues, MAP reported that it received mixed signals from its 
investigation and some schools thought more substitute teacher time should have 
been considered as well as security personnel and other administrative 
support.  It noted that there are 
always some who believe more teachers are necessary; however, most principals 
said they had adequate staff to deliver the educational services required.  While the challengers criticized the 
thoroughness of MAP's efforts, they did not offer any specific change in the 
class size numbers.

 
 
[¶20]   The challengers' primary focus, 
instead, was on teacher salaries, claiming the salaries provided for in the 
recalibration and the adjustments to those salaries in the period between 
recalibrations were inadequate.  The 
district court found the average salary, considering education and experience, 
had increased from $32,014 in the 1997 model to $36,871 in 2001, representing a 
15% increase during a time when the Wyoming Cost of Living Index (WCLI) had 
increased 13.2875%.  In addition, 
the actual salaries being paid for 2001-02 were used in the recalibrated 
model.  However, at trial, all of 
the experts agreed that the salaries actually being paid by Wyoming schools exceeded 
the salaries provided for in the model, thus requiring schools to move funds 
from other needs to pay salaries.  
This problem is somewhat unavoidable and results from salary increases 
that occur between recalibrations.  
The challengers claim that because salaries in the model are not 
escalated annually, they must "rob Peter to pay Paul" when competitive pressures 
and inflation force them to increase salaries to remain competitive in the 
interim.  The state contends that 
local control over how funds are allocated is contemplated by the block 
grant/model approach, many schools do not spend the full allotment for every 
line item in the model and, consequently, sufficient funds are available to 
accommodate those increases.  In 
addition, Campbell II also required 
an external cost adjustment to assist in addressing the problem of inflation 
between recalibrations.  In fact, as 
the state points out, the model is not intended to be a "real time" picture of 
the various cost categories and there will always be some differences between 
the costs included in the model and the school districts' real 
expenditures.  In addition to 
showing that actual salaries exceeded those in the model, the challengers 
presented evidence that some school districts continue to have difficulty 
filling positions, an indication that salaries are too low.   

 
 
 [¶21]  Having heard the competing opinions, the 
district court concluded, on balance, the state's experts' opinion that the 
salaries and benefits were adequate to attract and retain teachers was sound and 
credible.  As support for its 
conclusions, the district court noted Wyoming's average teacher salary upheld in 
Campbell II caused it to rank 
42nd nationally and, in 2002-03, that rank had improved to 
36th; Wyoming's beginning and average salaries exceeded other states 
in the region except Colorado; salaries had increased 24.6% from 2001-02 to 
2004-05; and beginning teacher salaries ranked 29th in the nation, higher than Arizona and Nevada, 
states often cited by the challengers as offering more competitive 
salaries.  

 
 
[¶22]   As additional proof that salaries 
were inadequate, the challengers contended Wyoming had too many uncertified 
teachers.  The evidence demonstrated 
that 95% of Wyoming teachers were fully certified although 
some rural districts had a higher percentage.  This rate compared favorably to other 
states and had improved since the time the model was instituted.  MAP concluded that provisional 
certification of teachers was not a pervasive problem and was limited to certain 
districts and specific specialties.  
Having weighed all of the evidence, the district court found, 
"Notwithstanding those deficiencies noted above, the weight of the evidence 
indicates that Wyoming's teacher salaries are 
not lagging behind other states in the region; Wyoming has improved its average salaries and beginning 
salaries and Wyoming teacher salaries are adequate to 
maintain a qualified work force."2  

 
 
[¶23]   Upon review of all of the 
testimony, we cannot conclude the district court's findings were clearly 
erroneous.  We discern from the 
district court's order that the findings were influenced by both the district 
court's conclusion that the state's experts had done a thorough and adequate job 
analyzing the issue as well as the state's actions to increase salaries after 
the 2001 recalibration.  Those 
actions resulted in the average salary increasing to $40,618 in 2004, and a 
special appropriation in 2005 of $22,736,000 for employee bonuses.  We take judicial notice that the 
legislature adopted additional increases after the trial pursuant to the 2006 
recalibration, resulting in a salary of $45,126 with a corresponding increase in 
benefits to 19.66% and a health insurance benefit of $8,169.  2006 Sess. Laws, Ch. 37.  

 
 
[¶24]   The cost of health insurance is an 
obvious concern to all.  MAP used 
the average of the actual district expenditures for 2001 in the recalibration. 
We take judicial notice that an additional $33,321,418 was appropriated in 2005 
to assist districts with increasing health insurance costs in the interim 
between recalibrations.  2005 Sess. 
Laws, Ch. 21, § 2.  It appears clear to us that the current 
legislature is committed to assuring teacher salaries and benefits in Wyoming remain adequate 
to deliver a constitutionally sound public education system.  We trust it will continue to do so in 
the future.

 
 
[¶25]   With regard to administrative and 
classified salaries, MAP evaluated the salaries and, pursuant to Campbell II, adjusted them for 
responsibility, measured by number of students, education, including advanced 
degrees, and experience.  The 
district court was satisfied that these adjustments demonstrated compliance with 
this Court's mandate and we agree.

 
 
[¶26]   The challengers raise a global 
issue regarding the models and their recalibration.  Suffice it to say, the model used by the 
state to allocate funding to the state's schools has evolved over time in 
response to newly available data, mandates from this Court, and legislative 
changes.  Integration of the law 
into a computer model presents an obvious challenge and understanding how the 
various modifications apply and interact is difficult for all concerned.  The districts report new information 
each year regarding their expenditures and the demographics of their students 
and school personnel, and the legislature makes various adjustments to address 
inflation and other issues.  Each 
year, after the legislative session, adjustments are made and the revised model, 
in Microsoft Excel format, is filed in the Secretary of State's office.  The state has chosen to provide only the 
most general information in the statutes concerning the model and to refer to 
the version filed with that office as reflecting the most current funding 
allocation.   http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2007/interim/schoolfinance/modelversions.htm.

 
 
[¶27]   The original MAP model was 
delineated as Model 3.2.  Following 
Campbell II, changes were made in the 
model and errors were corrected.  
From 2001 through 2004, versions 3.2b, 4.1a, 4.2, and 4.2a were adopted 
by the state pursuant to its consultants' recommendations.  At various points in time, there were 
differences between what the models indicated should be paid to the school 
districts and what the legislature actually paid.  The district court attributed those 
differences to the legislature's attempt to comply with the time deadlines of Campbell II and the availability of the 
data necessary to do so. In addition, the district court found that these 
differences did "not violate the cost-based principle" and could be explained by 
changes made to reflect revised data submitted by the Wyoming Department of 
Education (WDE). 

 
 
[¶28]   To complicate things further, these 
models, adopted by the legislature by reference, are not the models used by the 
state to allocate appropriated funds.  
Instead the WDE developed a funding model which changes from year to year 
based again upon information provided to the districts such as teacher seniority 
data, transportation and special education's actual costs, and data related to 
at-risk students.  The challengers 
provided evidence that the results of the funding model differed from the 
results achieved by the model on file with the Secretary of State that had been 
adopted by the legislature.   
In response, the state's expert, Richard Seder, undertook a study during 
the trial to determine for the district court whether the funding model captured 
the substance of Model 4.2a, the then-current version filed in the Secretary of 
State's office.  He concluded that 
the funding model delivered the same level of funding as model 4.2a and, in 
fact, found an overpayment of $2.4 million had occurred over a three-year 
period, reflecting about 1% of the funds distributed in that time.  The district court clearly found Mr. 
Seder credible, stating, "No other witnesses who presented testimony in the 
trial ha[ve] displayed Seder's over-arching ability in this field."3  

 
 
[¶29]   In support of their claim that the 
models are flawed, the challengers point to the fact that they do not use the 
per student allotment set out in the statutes.  Section 21-13-309.  The state explained, and the district 
court concurred, that this fact resulted from the change in approach required to 
reflect the line-item adjustments made to comply with Campbell II.  Originally, the MAP model developed 
prototype schools, calculated what the costs were in those prototypes and then 
multiplied those costs by each district's student population, i.e. the average 
daily membership (ADM).  That cost 
per ADM was then incorporated into the statutes.  The modified model disaggregated the 
prototypical costs into the various components in order to more precisely 
capture the cost of education, an approach the state believed was required by Campbell II.  Although the revised model did not 
contain the statutory ADM figures, a re-aggregation of the modeled numbers 
resulted in a very close comparison to the statutory figures.  In addition, the district court found, 
as a factual matter, that the state and its consultants acted in good faith in 
their efforts to ensure that the model on file with the Secretary of State 
reflected legislative intent, even though minor errors were later discovered, 
and the end result was that the amount actually received by the districts was 
substantially consistent with legislative intent.  The district court was satisfied that 
these deviations did not result in a failure to provide cost-based education 
funding.  

[¶30]   We hold the district court's 
findings regarding the efficacy and accuracy of the models were not clearly 
erroneous.  Further, we conclude the 
state's effort to respond to the requirement that the models be updated and 
recalibrated met the requirements of this Court's mandate.  We also note that individual districts 
are given the opportunity to certify to the WDE that the amount of funding they 
receive is improperly calculated and, if a district believes the actual block 
grant it receives is not consistent with requirements of the law, it has the 
opportunity to appeal that action in accordance with the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-2-201 and 202(d) 
(LexisNexis 2007).

 
 
[¶31]   At this point, we make the 
observation that Campbell II required 
the state to revise certain specified inputs in the model so that actual costs 
would be reflected, as accurately as possible, in the method of funding chosen 
by the state, a cost of education model.  
Further, because the model approach was a proxy for actual costs and was 
largely based on historic costs, we required that the state take appropriate 
steps to assure the inputs to the model were updated to reflect reality as much 
as possible.  Not an unreasonable 
requirement, from our point of view.  
This Court did not and should not dictate the method the state must use 
to determine the cost of education.  
We caution all of the stakeholders in this process to avoid reading into 
our legal rulings a desire or intent to direct and control the inner workings of 
the computer models selected by the state.  
It seems that in the debate at trial over intricacies of the various 
models, the parties somewhat lost perspective on the primary constitutional 
issue  does the state's chosen method of funding represent, as close as 
reasonably possible, the cost of education.  Surely, one must question whether errors 
of the magnitude of those demonstrated at trial have any measurable impact on 
the state-wide quality of education.

 
 

2.         
Maintenance and 
Operations      

                                                                                                                                        
                                                    

[¶32]   
Prior to Campbell II, the 
districts received funding for the cost of maintenance of school buildings based 
upon 1996-97 state-wide averages on a per pupil basis.  We held that approach was not based upon 
actual costs and the state must develop a formula which considered ADM, building 
square footage and the number of buildings to more closely approximate actual 
costs, or reimburse actual costs subject to state oversight.  Campbell II ¶ 31, 19 P.3d  at 544.  In response to this Court's mandate, the 
state and its consultants undertook a study of operation and maintenance costs 
and concluded full reimbursement would fail to provide incentives for districts 
to manage buildings cost-effectively. They recommended 5% of operations and 
maintenance funding should be classified as major maintenance and funded as 
capital construction, 70% of the remaining adjustment should be based on square 
footage, and 30% on ADM.  The 
resulting adjustment was inflated using the WCLI.  The number of buildings was not included 
in the formula.

 
 
[¶33]   After the creation of the SFC, and 
its adoption of allowable square footage for new school buildings, a new formula 
was developed that limited the square footage for which districts could receive 
funding for operations and maintenance to encourage districts to eliminate 
excess building space.  That formula 
provided funding for 135% of the allowable square footage for 2004-06, 125% for 
2006-08, and 115% for 2009 and thereafter.  
Utilities were funded on the average of actual costs and escalated in the 
recalibration process. 

 
 
[¶34]   The district court found the method 
of funding operation and maintenance did not comply with the mandate of Campbell II because it did not reflect 
the actual costs and, although the state had a compelling interest in minimizing 
excess square footage, it did not provide the districts with the necessary 
support to reduce any excessive square footage they may have because of 
buildings constructed before the SFC guidelines were adopted.  Thus it did not meet the constitutional 
test of using the least restrictive means of achieving the state's 
interests.  In addition, the 
district court held the method of adjusting for utilities did not provide for 
the extreme price volatility that the districts had 
experienced.

 
 
[¶35]   The state contends the district 
court erred in concluding it had not used the least restrictive alternative to 
accomplish its legitimate state interest.  
It argues that the formula is aimed at ultimately funding operation and 
maintenance on a cost basis by reducing allowable square footage over time, and 
this Court approved of such transitional approaches in Lincoln County School District No. One v. 
State, 985 P.2d 964, 967 (Wyo. 1999).  In addition, the state points out that 
the challengers provided no testimony that major maintenance payments were 
insufficient or that routine maintenance amounts had not been so inadequate as 
to prevent districts from delivering the required educational programs.  The only other alternative, the state 
contends, is for it to require closure or consolidation of schools  a route the 
districts obviously would not want to take.  With regard to utilities, the state 
reports that the 2006 legislature adjusted funding for utilities by using 
actual, rather than average, 2004-05 costs for each district and provided for 
escalation of those numbers by "appropriate inflation factors in subsequent 
years." Enrolled Act 23, 2006 Sess. Orig. H.B. 0139, 58. The state noted the 
district court's finding that a less onerous method existed to address excess 
space, i.e. to first determine if removing excess square footage was feasible 
and then funding districts' efforts to do so, was never discussed at trial and 
was first mentioned in the district court's order.

 
 
[¶36]   As we approach this issue, we note 
first that the state did respond to the mandate of Campbell II and adopted an operation and 
maintenance formula that more closely reflected actual costs because it was more 
heavily weighted to actual square footage and was escalated for inflation.4  We also conclude that the 2006 
legislature appears to have properly addressed the issue of utilities by using 
each district's actual 2004-05 costs and escalating them.  Whether the State's new approach of 
limiting the square footage for which it will provide operation and maintenance 
funding is constitutional is the question we must resolve. 

 
 
[¶37]   The district court found that 
excess square footage existed because buildings were built before the SFC 
standards were adopted or because of declines in enrollment, both causes beyond 
the districts' control.  Those 
findings are supported by the evidence and are not clearly erroneous.  The district court then applied the 
strict scrutiny test and concluded that reducing excess square footage did 
represent a compelling state interest, but could have been accomplished in a 
less onerous manner.  Those 
conclusions involve a question of law which we review de novo.  

 
 
[¶38]   It should be remembered that the 
strict scrutiny test applies when differences in funding are wealth-based.  If the difference in funding between 
districts is based upon what the state has determined a particular component 
should cost, and not on wealth, then an equal protection issue is not 
raised.  We observe that no one has 
suggested the differences in operation and maintenance funding between districts 
are not based upon the state's determination of what that component should 
cost.  Consequently, applying the 
proper constitutional measure, one must conclude the differences in funding do 
not result in a denial of equal protection.  Even if the equal protection standard is 
applied to the differences in operation and maintenance funding between 
districts, we agree with the district court's conclusion of law that the state 
has a compelling interest in regulating the size of public school buildings, not 
only to assure public funds are wisely spent, but also to assure each student 
ultimately has the benefit of approximately similar facilities.5

 
 
[¶39]   The district court's conclusion 
that the operation and maintenance formula was not constitutional rested upon 
its belief that less restrictive means of accomplishing the state's interests 
existed.  It suggested the state 
must provide "technical and financial assistance" to reduce the excess square 
footage and that failure to do so would require the districts "to take money 
from other educational needs to make up the difference, which adversely impacts 
the ability of districts to provide the constitutionally mandated 
education."  Although that is, of 
course, theoretically possible given the state's modeled approach to determining 
costs, the district court's compliance order does not make any findings 
regarding any additional costs that would be incurred to conduct that 
effort.  In fact, the state points 
out that this alternative approach was raised for the first time in the district 
court's order and, consequently, none of the parties presented evidence on what 
those possible additional costs might be.  
On the other hand, the state presented evidence that while numerous 
districts have square footage in excess of the standards, the total statewide 
square footage exceeds the standards by 29%.  Given the fact that the formula allows 
funding for 135% of the standards until the school year 2005-06, 125% until 
2008-09, and 15% thereafter, the impact statewide of the limitations does not 
appear severe and it is unlikely these limitations would prevent the districts 
from providing adequate educational programs.

 
 
[¶40]   In their briefs on appeal, the 
challengers suggest less onerous alternatives might be for the state to: (1) 
provide technical assistance to help the districts come into compliance; (2) 
plan temporary mothballing of portions of the excess square footage; (3) develop 
programs to allow use of the excess space by others (i.e. rent) to reduce the 
costs; and/or 4) evaluate each building on an individual basis to determine 
whether practical alternatives exist.  
They also suggest the state should provide funds to support these 
efforts.  While all of these efforts 
make sense and we presume the districts and the state are undertaking some 
combination of those efforts, no evidence was presented that these efforts would 
require more funding.  We simply 
cannot conclude on the record extant that the state's approach results in 
differences in funding between districts not based upon the costs as deemed 
appropriate by the legislature.  
While we may agree that the state could be more generous, it is not our 
role to determine the ultimate square footage it must utilize for the operation 
and maintenance factor in the model.6  We recognize that this approach presents 
administrative challenges for the districts and we urge the state to provide the 
assistance the district court envisioned possible to reduce the impact where 
excess capacity results through no fault of the districts.

 
 
[¶41]   Utilizing the de novo standard of review on this 
question of law, we hold the state's approach to funding operation and 
maintenance does not violate the equal protection clause of the Wyoming 
constitution.

 
 
            
3.         
At Risk 
Students

 
 
[¶42]   All parties recognize that it is 
more expensive to educate students considered to be "at risk," a term defined by 
the state regulations as school age individuals who exhibit behaviors that place 
the students at risk of experiencing educational failure.  In Campbell II, we concluded the manner in 
which the state had calculated those additional costs in the original MAP model 
was flawed because it was not supported by the evidence, and resulted in 
arbitrary allocations of funds not based upon actual costs of the necessary 
programs or even an estimate of what those costs should be.  Campbell II, ¶¶ 73-84, 19 P.3d  at 545-48.  That approach provided additional 
funding for economically disadvantaged youth (EDY) and for students for whom 
English is a second language (ESL).7  For EDY students, that funding was an 
arbitrary $500 (based on one reading intervention program) for each student 
enrolled in the free and reduced cost lunch program if the number of these 
students exceeded 150% of the statewide average.  If a district had 149% or less than that 
number of such students or if the students were at-risk for other reasons, no 
additional funding was provided.  
With regard to ESL students, the model provided approximately $900 per 
student (based upon one state's experience) if such students exceeded 20% per 
grade level or 25% of the school-wide ADM.  
Again, schools with fewer such students received nothing.  We recognized that reliance upon the 
number of students signing up for the lunch program may be a partial proxy for 
the number of EDY students and, clearly, ESL students could be identified.  However, no evidence supported the 
amount of funding actually provided by those measures. Other measures were 
discussed such as identifying low performing students, but MAP had rejected such 
measures as rewarding failing schools.  
Recognizing the difficulty in developing a reliable formula to determine 
what additional funding was actually required, Campbell II directed the state to either fund the actual costs of 
additional services needed to educate such students or develop "an accurate formula with 
which to distribute adequate funds in lieu of direct reimbursement ."  Campbell II, ¶ 81, 19 P.3d  at 547.  We specifically did "not prohibit the 
use of those formulas (EDY and ESL) for partial funding" of those needs.  Id.

 
 
[¶43]   In response to Campbell II's mandate, the state, 
through its consultants, conducted an extensive survey of the programs in 
Wyoming schools for at-risk students, and undertook a comprehensive review of 
the literature on such programs and the approaches taken for funding such 
programs in other states.  It 
conducted site visits in 30 schools, large and small, and closely examined 
schools that had qualified for at-risk funding under the original MAP model and 
those that had not.  The study 
included examining how such students were identified and what types of programs 
were offered to assist them, paying special attention to the Velma Linford 
elementary school in Albany County because 70% of its students were identified 
as at-risk.  On the basis of this 
study, examination of the literature and the experience of other states, MAP 
recommended the at-risk funding supplement be based upon the concentration of 
at-risk students because research has shown the obvious  the costs associated 
with addressing at-risk students increase as their numbers increase in a 
particular school.  

 
 
[¶44]   MAP specifically recommended 
against reimbursing actual costs because of the difficulty of defining at-risk 
students, the variability in programs that could be offered and the fact that 
many of the programs focused on activities in the regular classroom rather than 
creating special classes.  MAP noted 
that many students may be at risk for a variety of reasons and for differing 
lengths of time, and the preference was to defer to local control over such 
programs and against enhancing a state bureaucracy to oversee a program of 
actual cost reimbursement.  Although 
the district court did not make any specific finding on this issue, we are 
convinced MAP and the state gave careful consideration to the reimbursement 
option as suggested by Campbell II, 
and rejected that option on the basis of sound reasoning. 

 
 
[¶45]   Relying on the literature and 
formulas used by schools in other states, MAP concluded additional funding in 
the amount of .25 times the per pupil funding should accommodate the additional 
costs required in the schools with the highest proportion of at-risk 
students.  A reduced adjustment was 
provided for schools with a lesser proportion of such students.  To identify at-risk students, the new 
formula continues to use actual ESL numbers and the lunch program as a proxy for 
EDY.  However, it considers 
eligibility for the lunch program, not actual enrollment.  That change was intended to more 
accurately capture students at risk because of poverty levels, but who might not 
sign up for the lunch program.  On 
an on-going basis, the state compares the number of at-risk students being 
served as reported by the districts with the number predicted by the model.  In 2002, the state reported that the 
proxies were accurately reflecting the number of students receiving at-risk 
services in the elementary grades, but some discrepancy was noted in the middle 
and high school grades.  In 2003, 
while conducting its continuing review of the at-risk funding at the direction 
of the legislature, MAP concluded the ESL and EDY numbers were not accurately 
capturing at-risk students at the middle and high school levels and that a 
strong correlation existed between low test scores and the mobility of students, 
i.e. their moving from one school to another.  Upon further examination, MAP concluded 
that students who changed schools were often at-risk because of unstable homes 
or problems in other schools, and that student mobility should also be 
considered in determining the at-risk population.  Inclusion of mobility in the 
identification of at-risk students increased the supplemental funds provided to 
the districts for at-risk programs and improved the model's 
accuracy.

 
 
[¶46]   The district court expressed some 
concern about whether the EDY and ESL proxies were the appropriate tools to 
measure the number of at-risk students and suggested that test scores, or some 
other unidentified measure, may more appropriately identify whether students 
were at risk of failure.  
Apparently, it interpreted Campbell II as somehow limiting both the 
state's discretion and the district court's exercise of continuing jurisdiction 
over this litigation.  We are 
perplexed by that interpretation since we explicitly stated, "we do not 
foreclose the possibility of the state in the future developing an accurate 
formula with which to distribute adequate funds in lieu of direct 
reimbursement."  Campbell II, ¶ 81, 19 P.3d  at 547.  It is not for this Court to undertake 
that function and we encourage the state to continue its efforts to improve the 
accuracy of this component, as well as the other components in the model, to 
assure they are as accurate as possible in estimating the actual 
costs.

 
 
[¶47]   The district court's findings 
indicate the proxies used by the state did not capture all of the possible 
at-risk students or all of the possible costs necessary to address their 
particular problems and those findings are supported by the record.  However, ultimately, the district court 
was "not inclined to condemn the at risk adjustment for this reason."   Neither are we.  There are too many variables involved in 
the at-risk issue to expect precision in estimating the costs of educating these 
students. State witnesses testified there is no one appropriate program because 
it varies by district, by student and by curricular area.  In fact, for some students, regular 
classroom instruction can assist in preventing them from becoming at risk.  We are persuaded that the state has 
continually refined its formula resulting in greater accuracy and more funds 
being available to the districts in this area, that it does consider student 
performance as one of the characteristics used in identifying at-risk students, 
and that no viable alternative has been suggested by the challengers other than 
funding any program that could be interpreted to serve at risk students.  There is little question that the state 
exerted significant effort to develop a fair and accurate method of estimating 
the additional cost of addressing at-risk students and that is a much different 
situation than we addressed in Campbell 
II.  The district court's 
finding that the state responded appropriately to the Campbell II mandate in this regard was 
not clearly erroneous. 

 
 
            
4.         
Vocational 
Education

 
 
[¶48]   Prior to Campbell II, no provision was made in 
the MAP models for vocational education even though all parties agreed that it 
was more costly to provide than other academic courses.  Because vocational education and 
technical training was included by the legislature in its determination of an 
appropriate education, the Court required that the state determine what those 
additional costs were and to include them in the funding model.  Campbell II, ¶ 86, 19 P.3d  at 
548.

 
 
[¶49]   In response, the state visited a 
representative variety of schools and collected data concerning their vocational 
education costs.  The state examined 
the type of programs provided, the condition of the available equipment, class 
size, teacher salaries and necessary supplies.  No differences in teacher salaries were 
found in the course of this study.  
Not surprisingly, the state discovered a wide variety in per student 
costs with the smaller schools spending more per student to provide vocational 
education.  Because there were no 
state standards regarding this educational component and data was lacking on 
student participation in vocational classes, MAP recommended equipment and 
supply needs be met and that the legislature provide funds for equipment grants 
in the interim until more accurate data could be developed upon which to base a 
funding factor for this category of costs.  
In 2002-03, the legislature provided $750,000 in grant funds for 
equipment and tuition for students to attend vocational programs as well as an 
annual grant fund of $250,000.  2002 
Sess. Laws, Ch. 76, §§ 5, 18.  Because the average class size for 
vocational classes is 13 students, compared with 16.7 students for other 
classes, MAP recommended a funding factor of .29 per Full Time Equivalent (EQV) 
student attending vocational classes.  
The district court found, based upon the testimony of the parties' 
experts, that the increased operational funding, together with the grant monies, 
allowed the districts to provide an "abundant offering of vocational education 
programs."  However, the challengers 
point out that grant applications far exceed the funds available and wide 
disparities exist between districts in the variety of vocational programs 
offered.  The state does not dispute 
those claims, but contends that vocational education funding continues to evolve 
and, in 2006, the legislature enhanced funding and included vocational education 
as an interim study topic.  Enrolled 
Act No. 23, 2006 Sess., Orig. H.B. 0139, 18-19, 42-43, 56.  The district court found that vocational 
education funding was a "work in progress" and that it could not find that the 
state had met its burden of proving compliance with the Campbell II 
mandate.

 
 
[¶50]   It is important to remember that 
prior to Campbell II, no effort had 
been made by the state to determine the actual cost of providing vocational 
education in Wyoming.  
As a consequence, this Court required that those costs be "examined, 
included as a line item in the MAP model and funded accordingly."  Campbell II, ¶ 86, 19 P.3d  at 548.  In response, the state undertook a 
serious effort to determine those costs, provided operational funding which 
recognized the smaller class size needed for these students, and provided funds 
for equipment.  To that extent, the 
state complied.  We recognize that 
vocational education differs somewhat from other educational funding because of 
the lack of specific state standards regarding what must be provided, and the 
expense and wide variety of equipment and facilities needed depending on local 
preferences.  The challengers argue 
that because the legislature failed to provide sufficient grant money to fund 
all of their grant applications for equipment, it failed to develop a cost-based 
method of allocating funds for vocational education.  However, supplies and equipment 
represent only 10% of the amount schools spend on vocational education.  Further, no one has suggested that every 
school must have exactly the same vocational opportunities.  If a wider discrepancy between schools 
in the type of vocational education offered is inherent, that discrepancy alone 
cannot be found to violate our constitution.  We hold the state appropriately 
responded to our Campbell II mandate 
regarding vocational education.  We 
encourage the legislature to continue its study of this important aspect of 
education funding and to exercise leadership and guidance for the districts in 
determining what vocational education opportunities are appropriate for 
Wyoming 
schools.

 
 
            
5.         
Small School Adjustment

 
 
[¶51]   In the first MAP model at issue 
in Campbell II, certain adjustments 
were made in funding for small schools based upon the assumption that such 
schools experienced a diseconomy of scale because of their smaller enrollment 
and unavoidable fixed costs.  
However, those adjustments were not based on any reliable data and were 
subject to arbitrary cutoffs.  
Campbell II, ¶ 99, 19 P.3d  at 552.  The Court mandated that these 
adjustments be revised to reflect actual differences in costs not experienced by 
larger schools.

 
 
[¶52]   The state responded by conducting 
two studies of small schools, the first completed for the 2002 legislative 
session and the second in 2003.  The 
studies consisted of visits to many schools throughout the state, interviews 
with educators and administrators, consultation with an advisory committee of 
the same, review of small school funding formulas that other states utilize, and 
a statistical analysis of Wyoming school staffing and expenditure patterns.  The adjustment was revised on the basis 
of this data and applied in a consistent manner without arbitrary cutoffs that 
existed in the original model.  The 
district court found the small school adjustment satisfied the Campbell II mandate and that there was 
no competent evidence to the contrary.  
We hold that finding was supported by the evidence and was not clearly 
erroneous.    

 
 
            
6.         
Small 
Districts

 
 
[¶53]   Like the small school adjustment, 
Campbell II held the original small 
district adjustment was unsupported by any data and thus, not cost based.  Campbell II, ¶ 99, 19 P.3d  at 552.  The state was directed to assure that 
any small district adjustment was justified by actual data demonstrating the 
differences in funding based on smaller ADM and was cost based.  Again, the state undertook an extensive 
study of district expenditures, developed prototype districts and conducted 
regression analyses to determine how the per student costs changed with 
size.  The district court found the 
state's approach was "sophisticated and adequate" resulting in an adjustment 
that was cost based and complied with Campbell II, and that there was no 
competent evidence to the contrary.  
We hold that decision was supported by the evidence and was not clearly 
erroneous. 

 
 
            
7.         
Regional Cost of Living 
Adjustment

 
 
[¶54]   
From the beginning of the use of the MAP model, the state has 
recognized that because the model utilizes state-wide average salaries 
(representing 80% of the total funding), some adjustment must be made to allow 
for areas in the state where the cost of living is higher and those average 
salaries do not accurately reflect the compensation schools in those areas must 
pay to hire personnel.  In the model 
at issue in Campbell II, MAP 
recommended and the legislature adopted the WCLI exclusive of the medical 
component and the rental of shelter subcomponent.  Section 21-13-309 (o)(ii) (LexisNexis 
2005), repealed by 2006 Sess. Laws, Ch. 37, § 2.  Both the district court and this Court 
concluded that removal of those components undermined the validity of the 
index.  The state had argued removal 
of the rental of shelter component was justified because in higher cost of 
living areas that higher cost was the result of "amenity value" and the state 
should not have to fund higher salaries that resulted from the attractiveness of 
a particular location.  Finding that 
argument unsupported by the record, the district court found the adjustment 
resulted in differences in funding not based upon costs, and thus, 
unconstitutional.  This Court 
affirmed the district court and mandated that the adjustment be modified using 
all of the components of the WCLI "or another reasonable formula."  Campbell II, ¶ 105, 19 P.3d  at 
555.

 
 
[¶55]   In response to Campbell II, the legislature eliminated 
the exclusion of medical costs and the price of rental for shelter and amended § 
21-13-309(o)(ii) to read:  

 
 
            
The amount . . . shall be further adjusted for regional cost of living 
differences.  The adjustment for 
regional cost of living differences shall be based upon the Wyoming cost-of-living 
index, as computed by the division of economic analysis, department of 
administration and information.  The 
version of the index used shall be the average of the six (6) consecutive 
semi-annual index reports completed by January 1 prior to the school year for 
which it is to be used.

 
 
The 
legislature chose not to authorize "another reasonable formula" as allowed by 
this Court.

 
 
[¶56]   The problems identified by the 
challengers and the district court regarding the cost of living adjustment 
involve not the legislative action, but the state's implementation of the 
adjustment.  The WCLI actually 
involves two indexes  a comparative index to measure the relative price 
differences between regions of Wyoming and an inflation index.  The comparative index measures how much 
a particular area's measured cost of living (using 140 different items) differs 
from the state wide average.  
Apparently, the state used only the comparative index and simply 
multiplied the salaries times the percentage by which the area's cost of living 
differed from the state wide average.  
Some districts had higher than the average and some had lower  not a 
surprising result given that the base value was the state wide average.  If a district's cost of living was 10% 
higher than the average, it received 10% more of an allocation than the model 
produced.  If it was 10% lower, it 
received 10% less than the model produced.  
The result is that 37 districts received fewer funds than the model 
represented as the cost of providing education in this state.  Even the state's expert agreed this 
approach did not properly account for the differences in cost of living from 
district to district and tended to under- fund remote, rural districts. 

 
 
[¶57]   The district court agreed with both 
the state and the challengers and found that the methodology utilized by the 
state did not fairly adjust the funding allocation for cost of living 
differences.  Districts whose 
salaries were adjusted downward did not pay actual salaries less than the 
state-wide average; in fact they often paid higher salaries.  Those districts were primarily rural 
ones.  In addition, the adjustment 
was applied to 85% of the allocation even though it was intended to address only 
salaries and salaries constituted 80%.  
The district court concluded the cost of living adjustment as implemented 
by the state under-funded many rural districts.  Interestingly, even though the district 
court concluded the adjustment under-funded many districts, it concluded that it 
did "not have the authority to overrule the Supreme Court's mandate."  Apparently, the district court accepted 
the state's position that somehow Campbell II required the application of 
the WCLI in the manner chosen by the 
state.  The plain meaning of Campbell II contradicts that 
position.

 
 
[¶58]   In order to dispel any perception 
that this Court mandated that funds allocated to districts where the cost of 
living was less than the statewide average be reduced, we must revisit the 
context of the discussion in Campbell 
II and the record upon which it was based.  In that case, the state, for the first 
time, proposed allocating funds for operations of schools on the basis of a 
model it claimed was cost-based.  
The largest component in the model was, and remains, teacher 
salaries.  Campbell II, ¶ 57, 19 P.3d  at 540.  The state determined the teacher salary 
component by using the 1996-97 state-wide mean or average starting salary.8  The effect of relying on a state-wide 
average was noted by this Court:

 
 
Extensive 
evidence in the record indicates recruiting and retaining teachers is becoming 
more difficult not just in Wyoming but also 
nationally, and certain communities in Wyoming may have more difficulty given the 
economic reality in their area.  The use of a statewide average salary 
equalizes the previous disparity by supplementing the salary component for those 
districts that had lower than average salaries. The districts with higher 
than average salaries would presumably have paid higher salaries because of a 
higher cost of living, and, while the model would initially reduce their salary 
component to the average, it would ultimately adjust it upward based upon the 
regional cost-of-living adjustment.

 
 

Id., ¶ 58, 
19 P.3d  at 541 (emphasis added).9

 
 
[¶59]   As the issues were joined in Campbell II, no one addressed the 
possibility that pursuant to the state's implementation of the model and its 
cost of living adjustment, districts in lower cost of living areas would be 
penalized and have their allocations reduced below the state wide average.  In fact, the entire approach of the 
model assumed that figure, the state wide average salary, represented the true 
cost of hiring teachers. The state's consultants represented in their report to 
the legislature explaining the proposed model, that the use of the statewide 
average "encompasses both high spending and low spending school districts and 
true costs' may emerge from the mix" and that "it is possible that the model 
allows districts to continue to pay more than a theoretically true' cost for 
these resources, but it is not possible 
that the model expects districts to provide an adequate education for less than 
this cost."  Cost Based Block 
Grant Model for Wyoming School 
Finance, Management by Analysis, and 
Planning Associates, L.L.C., submitted to Joint Appropriations Committee of the 
Wyoming Legislature, April, 1997, 29 (emphasis added).  

 
 
[¶60]   The only issue regarding the cost 
of living adjustment in Campbell II 
was whether the state's exclusions of medical costs and the rental of shelter 
were appropriate.  The district 
court found those exclusions undermined the validity of the index and the state 
had not proved that exclusion of the housing component accurately reflected the 
"amenity" value of a particular location.  
It also "recognized that whatever method was chosen by the legislature to 
reflect regional differences need not be perfect, but must be a reasonably 
comprehensive measure of those differences.'"  Campbell II, ¶ 105, 19 P.3d  at 555.  This Court affirmed that finding and 
held that the state must adjust salaries using the full cost of living 
differences (an obvious reference to the housing and medical costs which had 
been excluded) using either the WCLI 
or "another reasonable formula ."  
Id.  Nowhere in our consideration of the 
issue, or in the issues as presented by the parties, can it be found that the 
state proposed to reduce the 
statewide average salary figures used to estimate the true cost of hiring 
teachers in those counties where the comparative cost of living was lower than 
the statewide average.

 
 
[¶61]   The state did argue that the cost 
of living adjustment was an effort to make the model more precise and we 
understand that some symmetry is achieved by both increasing the funds allotted 
to districts with higher costs of living and decreasing those with lower 
costs.  However, that ignores what 
the figure being adjusted represents, i.e. appropriate cost of providing 
teachers.  We see no effort to 
compare that average figure with actual salaries being paid in those low cost 
districts.  To do so may suggest an 
expenditure-based system rather than a cost-based one.  We simply must assume that the salary 
figures in the model are the minimum.  
To do otherwise undermines the entire cost-based model approach to school 
finance funding adopted by the state.  

 
 
[¶62]   On the flip side, all parties 
appear to agree that in higher than average cost of living areas, the statewide 
average salaries will not represent true costs and those districts will need 
some kind of adjustment to keep pace with their markets.  The question of whether that adjustment 
is based upon the WCLI, the only index ever proposed by the state, or, as we 
said, "some other reasonable formula," is a decision for the 
legislature.

 
 
[¶63]   In response to Campbell II's mandate, the legislature 
acted appropriately and amended the statute to apply all components of the 
WCLI.  The state, on the other hand, 
implemented that adjustment in a fashion deemed unfair by all and apparently 
claimed its hands were tied by this Court.  
To all parties concerned, we repeat, if the state chooses to use the WCLI 
to adjust the statewide average salaries to address situations where the cost of 
living exceeds the statewide average, there is not now, and never has been, a 
constitutional requirement that those salaries in lower than average cost areas 
must be reduced below what the model assumes is the actual cost.  This is not a zero sum game.  Campbell I, 907 P.2d  at 
1278.

 
 
[¶64]   The state's position that its hands 
were tied by this Court is further belied by the action taken by the legislature 
in 2006 when it provided that salaries are to be adjusted by the "greater of a 
hedonic wage index" or the WCLI.   
Enrolled Act No. 23, 2006 Sess., H.B. 139, 18.  A hedonic wage index was described by 
the state's expert as a "sophisticated econometric approach which attempts to 
specifically price out those aspects of the teacher and the teacher's 
environment, and the work environment, and the community's environment that 
might lead to higher or lower payments on the part of the employer."  At the time of trial, that expert 
testified the data was not available to develop such an index in Wyoming and MAP had been 
concerned that the complexity of such an approach would be difficult for the 
public to understand and that transparency was important.  We understand that other methods of 
adjusting for cost of living differences, more sophisticated than the WCLI, may 
be available now or in the future.  
That is precisely why we specifically stated in Campbell II that the state could utilize 
other reasonable formulas.  

 
 
[¶65]   However, a word of caution is 
appropriate.  It may be true that 
use of a cost of living index such as the WCLI will result in salary adjustments 
in areas of extremely high cost housing that do not represent "true cost" of 
hiring teachers.  However, it seems 
to this Court that those instances are few in number.  In addition, in some areas, the high 
housing cost may be temporary, such as when it is caused by energy booms.  Consequently, it would seem possible to 
accommodate those anomalies with specifically tailored adjustments rather than 
attempting to capture all of the "hedonic" differences between all of the 
districts in this state econometrically.  
We also note that the implementation of the WCLI as described by the 
districts' expert, Dr. George Rhodes, appears reasonable.  However, it is not the role of this 
Court to dictate to the state or the experts what approach must be taken in the 
implementation of the index.  
Instead, it is our role to judge whether the result achieved accurately 
reflects the cost of education.  
Apparently, all involved, the state, the districts, the district court 
and this Court, agree that the result obtained by the implementation of WCLI has 
not accomplished that result.

 
 
[¶66]   We hold that, so long as the state 
relies upon a cost of education model, regional cost of living adjustments 
cannot reduce salaries below those which the state's model establishes as the 
statewide cost of hiring personnel. Any adjustment pursuant to other indexes 
selected by the state must result in salaries which allow districts in areas 
with a high cost of living to attract and retain teachers, and recognize that 
housing costs are a significant component of the cost of living.  Campbell II, ¶ 105, 19 P.3d  at 
555.

 
 
            
8.         
External Cost 
Adjustment

 
 
[¶67]   All parties recognize that because 
the cost-based model adopted by the state is based upon historic costs, those 
costs must be regularly adjusted for inflation in order to remain accurate 
representations of actual, current costs. To assure that adjustment occurred on 
a regular, timely basis, Campbell II 
mandated that the model must be re-evaluated and recalibrated every five years 
(as discussed above) and every two years at a minimum, beginning July 1, 2002, 
to account for inflation that will occur in the interim between recalibrations. 
Campbell II, ¶ 90, 19 P.3d  at 549-50.  Because all parties had accepted the 
WCLI as credible, we also noted that adjustments pursuant to that index would be 
found adequate and that if other methods of adjustment were adopted, they should 
be "structured to assure the quality of education remains adequate." Id., ¶ 90, 19 P.3d  at 550.  The amount of the 
adjustments required would, obviously, depend on timing and economic 
conditions.

 
 
[¶68]   In 2001, the legislature adopted a 
9.44% increase for 2001-02.  Thereafter, in response to Campbell II, the state and its 
consultants began the process of conducting the study necessary for the first 
recalibration of the model which occurred in 2002.  While no specific inflation adjustment 
occurred in 2002, the legislature increased teacher salaries by 14.6% and 
overall spending by 13.2875% which exceeded the increase in the WCLI for the 
period 1997-01.  The legislature 
adopted inflation adjustments thereafter in the amounts of 2% for 2003-04, 2003 
Sess. Laws, Ch. 131, 2.3% for 2004-05 and 2.3% for 2005-06, 2005 Sess. Laws, Ch. 
131, § 205.  The total funding per 
ADM from 1998-99 to 2004-05 increased 90% which the expert witness for the 
challengers agreed caused the funding to remain relatively constant over that 
period of time.  That result is 
precisely what this Court intended by requiring the modeled funding to be 
adjusted at least biannually for inflation.

 
 
[¶69]   The challengers complained because 
the WCLI was not applied to determine the inflation factors and the adjustments 
were not made based upon estimates for the upcoming year, but instead were based 
on data accumulated for the previous year.  
This Court did not mandate any particular index, but did note that if the 
WCLI was utilized, because all parties accepted that index, this Court would do 
the same. Campbell II, ¶ 90, 19 P.3d  at 550.  However, whether the WCLI was used or 
not is not determinative of whether the state complied with the mandate of Campbell II.  The state's experts contended the WCLI 
overstated inflation and the district court seemed to agree that there were some 
problems using that index.  It also 
found the adjustments were reasonable even though not based on a particular 
index.  That finding was supported 
by the evidence and was not clearly erroneous.  While the adoption of one index may make 
the adjustments easier to track, the legislature has the discretion to determine 
how to make the necessary adjustments.  
The only constitutional requirement is, so long as a model based upon 
historic costs is used, those costs must be escalated for inflation in order to 
assure education funding continues to adequately support the actual cost of 
education.  

 
 
[¶70]   We take judicial notice of the 
legislature's continued commitment to adjusting for inflation on an ongoing 
basis.  In 2006, the legislature 
statutorily required that the education block grant model be recalibrated not 
less than once every five years to "ensure it remains cost-based in light of 
changing conditions and modifications to law" and that, between recalibrations, 
the amount computed for each district "shall be adjusted to provide for the 
effects of inflation."  Section 
21-13-309(o) and (t).  That is 
precisely what Campbell II 
required.

 
 
[¶71]   The challengers complain that 
leaving the decision regarding inflation adjustments in the hands of the 
legislature each year is somehow objectionable.  While we understand their trepidation, 
the expenditure of state funds is the legislature's responsibility and whether 
it adopts a particular index, which it, of course, could change at any time it 
chose, or whether it makes a judgment biannually in the budgetary process, does 
not control the determination of whether school funding is constitutional.  That is governed by whether the 
legislature does, in fact, make the adjustments necessary to assure that the 
historic costs continue to represent the actual cost of education.  The legislature should be commended for 
taking appropriate action on a regular, on-going basis and for demonstrating it 
is committed to the long term efficacy of the funding approach it has 
chosen.

 
 
            
9.         
Challengers' Miscellaneous 
Objections

 
 
[¶72]   In addition to challenging each of 
the district court's findings on issues addressed by Campbell II, the challengers present 
other arguments as to why the state's response is 
inadequate.

 
 
                        
a.         
Cost as "Minimalist" 
Approach

 
 
[¶73]   The district court described the 
cost-based approach required by Campbell 
I and II as resulting in a 
"minimalist concept" because the experts defined "cost" as the lowest price at 
which one can purchase something.  
In reviewing the adequacy of the funding model, the district court 
differentiated between what the districts were choosing to spend and what the 
state contended a particular element should cost.  While recognizing some districts would 
always want more funds available, the district court concluded that funding for 
any component in excess of what the state had demonstrated that component should 
cost is the province of the legislature.  

 
 
[¶74]   The challengers contend the 
district court got it wrong and applied the incorrect standard to the question 
of whether the funding was adequate.  
They point to language from the constitution and the Campbell cases 
which they contend requires this state to exceed what is deemed adequate in 
other states and fully fund whatever programs the individual districts have 
adopted to deliver education services.  
Noting that § 21-2-304(a)(iii) prohibits the state from establishing the 
curriculum for the districts to follow, they argue the state is indirectly doing 
just that by limiting the funds it will provide.  The challengers do not criticize the 
proficiency standards adopted by the legislature and note they are among the 
highest of those states evaluated by the Northwest Evaluation Association.  Instead, they contend the funds received 
by the state's cost-based model are inadequate for them to support the programs 
they have chosen to accomplish those standards.  Apparently, the challengers believe the 
recalibration process should have involved an in-depth evaluation of the 
programs actually being provided by districts and the costs then determined 
based upon what the districts are spending to support those programs.  

 
 
[¶75]   The problem noted by the district 
court is that such an approach would essentially constitute an expenditure-based 
system in which the legislature must fund whatever the districts request.  Since Campbell I, we have always recognized 
that the legislature must set the educational standards and provide an amount of 
funding equal to what it determines is necessary to meet those standards.  Whether that funding is adequate has 
been measured by what other states have done in terms of salaries and other 
expenditures, and by other measures such as levels of teacher accreditation, 
class size, student test scores, and opinions of experts in the field.  By those measurements, the legislature's 
actions have resulted in educational funding found adequate by the district 
court.

 
 
[¶76]   The tension between what the 
districts believe is needed and what the state contends education should cost 
will always exist, particularly in a system such as ours that values and 
protects local control.  The 
districts rightfully and jealously guard their right to determine educational 
programs for their communities; at the same time state control of funding is 
necessary to assure all communities have an equal share of the state's wealth to 
devote to education.  It is likely 
these competing forces will assure some level of continuing conflict concerning 
the adequacy of educational funding.  
The language of the Campbell opinions 
characterizing our constitutional standard as requiring "visionary and 
unsurpassed" education, and "the best that we can do" did not invest the 
districts with the sole authority to determine what level of funding was 
required.  Certainly, each of those 
opinions recognized it was the legislature's role to determine what a "proper" 
education would be for the children of Wyoming.  
So long as the process seeks to provide a quality education in a uniform 
and equal fashion, the constitutional standard has been met.  In Campbell I, we defined a quality 
education as including:

 
 
1. Small 
schools, small class size, low student/teacher ratios, textbooks, low 
student/personal computer ratios.

 
 
2. 
Integrated, substantially uniform substantive curriculum decided by the 
legislature through the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and the State 
Board of Education with input from local school boards.  

 
 
3. 
Ample, appropriate provision for at-risk students, special problem students, 
talented students.  

 
 
4. 
Setting of meaningful standards for course content and knowledge attainment 
intended to achieve the legislative goal of equipping all students for entry to 
the University of Wyoming and WyomingCommunity 
Colleges or which will achieve the other purposes of 
education.  

 
 
5. 
Timely and meaningful assessment of all students' progress in core curriculum 
and core skills regardless of whether those students intend to pursue college or 
vocational training.

 
 

Campbell 
I, 907 P.2d  at 1279.

            

[¶77]   The record demonstrates the 
legislature has achieved each of these measures of a quality education.  The funding models assumed a high school 
class size of 21 students and districts have actually provided non-vocational 
class sizes of 16.7 students and vocational classes of 13 students.  These class sizes are smaller than the 
standard proposed in educational research.  
Likewise, student/teacher ratios are among the lowest in the nation and 
public revenue per student is sixth in the nation.10  The proficiency standards, adopted by the 
legislature and the WDE, which guide curriculum, are among the most stringent in 
the nation.   Each school is 
accredited by the WDE to assure these standards are being implemented and that 
students are assessed on a regular basis to ascertain their proficiency.  The challengers did not contend the 
standards were lacking or that the students were failing to achieve them.  Neither was any claim made that 
Wyoming 
students were not performing adequately.  
In fact, the evidence at the time of trial was that Wyoming ranked as one of 
the highest states in the nation for schools making adequate yearly progress 
under the federal No Child Left Behind program.  While additional funds could always be 
spent, appropriate adjustments were provided for at-risk students.  

 
 
[¶78]   Recognizing that good faith 
differences of opinions existed among experts, district personnel, and WDE 
officials concerning the adequacy of the state's public school funding, we agree 
with the district court that the state properly responded to each of the 
components identified as lacking in Campbell II.  While the challengers argue passionately 
that the state has not done the "best we can do," it is instructive to keep in 
mind the various measures of adequacy utilized by this Court over the years 
including:

 
 
            
Exact or absolute equality is not required, some variance is allowed and 
financial parity is the goal.  

 
 

Washakie, 
606 P.2d  
at 336.

 
 
[A] 
"thorough and efficient education system" required by Art. 7, § 9 of the 
Wyoming 
constitution is one that is "productive without waste and reasonably sufficient 
for the appropriate or suitable teaching/education/learning of the state's 
school age children." 

 
 

Campbell 
I, 907 P.2d  at 1258-59.

 
 
"[A] 
complete and uniform system of public instruction" and a "thorough and efficient 
system of public schools, adequate to the proper instruction of all youth of the 
state."

 
 

Id. at 
1263-1264.

 
 
[¶79]   In every school finance case, this 
Court has consistently recognized the constitutional directive that it is the 
legislature's duty and prerogative to determine the appropriate standards for 
our public schools and to assure sufficient funding is provided to allow the 
districts to achieve those standards.  
While perfection is not required or expected, a good faith effort to 
preserve and protect our constitution's commitment to a sound public education 
system is.  We are convinced, as was 
the district court, that the state has met that standard and will continue to do 
so in the future.  

 
 
                        
b.         
Timeliness of State 
Action

 
 
[¶80]   The challengers also contend the 
legislature ignored the deadlines imposed by Campbell II on a variety of issues.  With regard to operations funding 
components found deficient, the deadline suggested by this Court was July 1, 
2002, over one year after issuance of the opinion.  However, we note that the opinion was 
issued in the middle of the 2001 legislative session leaving only one year to 
undertake the study necessary to determine how to accomplish the modifications 
and one legislative session in which to consider the necessary legislative 
changes.  In hindsight, that 
deadline was too short.  The record 
demonstrates the legislative and executive branches of government acted 
immediately to begin the process required, including the data gathering 
necessary to recalibrate the model and to refine its inputs.  In recognition of the magnitude of the 
effort required, we recognized in Campbell III that extensions of time may 
be necessary and, had one been requested, it would have likely been 
granted.  We do not fault the state 
for simply undertaking the effort as expeditiously as possible instead of 
spending valuable time and resources further complicating this litigation by 
seeking such extensions.  Action was 
taken in every year since Campbell II 
was issued, including in the years after the trial in this matter.  In 2006, the legislature continued its 
efforts, accomplished the second recalibration of the model, increased salaries, 
continued to adjust for inflation and undertook additional study of many school 
funding issues including at-risk resources, alternative schools, summer school 
and extended day support, school activities and distance learning.  H.B. 139, 2006 Sess. Laws, Joint Interim 
Education Committee Budget.  We hold 
that the state acted in good faith on issues of operations funding and heeded 
the urgency expressed in our opinions.

 
 

            
            
c.         
"Cost Plus" Funding

 
 
[¶81]   The district court found school 
districts received funds that are, in essence, in addition to the cost of 
education as determined by the model.  
The primary sources of those funds are:  1) additional funding the legislature 
provides over and above allocations based upon the model, and 2) federal funding 
of specific educational functions. The latter has increased from $33 million in 
2000-01 to $71 million in 2004-05 and is dedicated to low income students, 
teacher quality and development, special education and vocational 
education.   

 
 
[¶82]   Over the period since issuance of 
Campbell II, the legislature provided 
substantial additional funding outside of the model, characterized by the 
district court as a matter of "legislative grace."  A review of the activities of the Joint 
Education Committee over those years discloses a constant effort to evaluate 
educational programs and needs and to seek funding beyond the model where it 
deemed necessary. http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2007/interim/schoolfinance/schoolfinance.htm; 
See also, interim committee meeting minutes for the education committee on the 
legislature's website since 2003.  
That effort is represented by the following 
appropriations:

 
 

a.         
Reading assessment and intervention with a biennium appropriation of 
$7,550,640.   2004 Sess. Laws, Ch. 95, 
§205; 2004 Sess. Laws, Ch. 108, §101.  

 
 
b.         
Full-day kindergarten with an appropriation of $6,000,000 in 2004 and 
$6,200,000 for SY 2005-06.  2004 
Sess. Laws, Ch. 108, §801 and 
§1101(c); 2005 Sess. Laws, Ch. 121, §3.

 
 
c.         
Summer school with an appropriation of $4,500,000 for 2004 and $4,500,000 
for 2005-06.  2004 Sess. Laws, 
Ch. 108, §1001 and §1101(d); 
2005 Sess. Laws, Ch. 121, §1 and §3. 

 
 
d.         
Additional assistance with health insurance in the amount of $33,321,419 
to provide.  2005 Sess. Laws, 
Ch. 121, §§2 and 3.  

 
 

e.         
Employee bonuses in the amount of $22,736,000.  2005 Sess. 
Laws, Ch. 191, §342.

 
 
f.          
Funds to assist school districts with recruiting teachers in special 
education, math, science and multiple endorsements in the amount of $400,000. 
2005 Sess. Laws, Ch. 191, § 333.

 
 
[¶83]   The challengers claim the funding 
is not cost-based and is simply evidence that the model under-funded the 
districts in those areas. The state contends funding above the model is a 
legislative prerogative and every district has the same opportunity to benefit 
from this funding.  In some cases, 
cost studies were obtained by the legislature to guide its determination of the 
amount and manner of allocation of those additional funds.11   In other cases, funds were 
allocated on an ADM or FTE (full time equivalent) type of formula.  Further, the funding either met a 
temporary need or, once adequate data became available, the legislature folded 
these new costs into the model.  
Thus, the state attempted to allocate the funds outside of the model in a 
manner that represented actual costs as much as reasonably possible.  

 
 
[¶84]   We are puzzled by the challengers' 
complaints about funding outside of the model.  Obviously, schools are benefited by this 
legislative action.  Recalibration 
of the model cannot feasibly be accomplished on an ongoing basis.  During the time between recalibrations, 
the legislature certainly has both the prerogative and the responsibility to 
provide funds in areas where needs are demonstrated and the model does not 
provide adequate funds.  To some 
extent, both the state and the challengers are correct.  Funding outside the model is the 
legislature's role and also demonstrates that the model is not perfectly 
accurate at all times in estimating what the cost of education should be.  However, we fail to see how the system 
could operate in any other way.  So 
long as the legislature continues to act in a responsive and responsible manner 
and the model is not allowed to become out-dated, we can see no constitutional 
infirmity with so-called "cost plus" funding.

 
 

                        
d.         
Pre-school Funding

 
 
[¶85]   
Prior to trial, the state moved for partial summary judgment on the 
issue of whether the Wyoming constitution required the state to 
fund voluntary pre-schools throughout the state.12   The district court granted that 
motion concluding:

 
 
            
My ruling is very simple on this issue.  I'm going to go along with the State. I 
think the constitution says 6 to 21. And that precludes preschool students.  It is a matter of legislative grace if 
they wish to fund these programs, but I don't believe the constitution compels 
it.  

 
 
Art. 7 § 
9 of the Wyoming constitution 
provides:

            

            
The legislature shall make such further provision by taxation or 
otherwise as  will create and maintain a thorough and efficient system of 
public schools, adequate to the proper instruction of all youth of the state, 
between the ages of six and twenty-one years.

 
 
[¶86]   The state contended the 
constitutional language was plain and unambiguous and limited the state's 
constitutional obligation to the education of Wyoming's children in the age bracket 
described.  Management Council of the Wyoming Legislature v. Geringer, 953 P.2d 839, 843 
(Wyo. 
1998).  We have held that the 
constitutional age bracket established the upper limit of the state's 
constitutional obligation to provide for the education of students who were 
disabled.  Natrona County School Dist. No. 1 v. 
Ryan, 764 P.2d 1019, 1024-25 (Wyo. 1988); NatronaCountySchool 
Dis. No. 1 v. McKnight, 764 P.2d 1039, 1048 (Wyo. 1988). 

 
 
[¶87]   The records of our constitutional 
convention indicate the framers discussed what grades of school must be 
established.  The records 
indicate  the framers did not intend 
to require the state to provide for grades other than those in existence at the 
time.  The proponent of Art. 7 §1 is 
recorded as having said:

            

            
I suppose the legislature will make such provisions as will lead to the 
establishment of grades.  It is not 
supposed that the legislature will interfere with the grades as they are at 
present, but it has been thought possible that there might be other classes of 
schools.  Schools for manual 
training have been opened in many places in connection with the public 
schools.  Then there is the 
kindergarten, for very little children before they are prepared to enter the 
eight grades which are established almost universally throughout the 
country.

 
 
Journal 
and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Wyoming (1889), 
729-730.

 
 
[¶88]   The challengers offered impressive, 
and essentially unrefuted, evidence concerning the positive impact of pre-school 
on the ultimate educational success of students.  While we may agree with the challengers 
that offering pre-school services to our state's children, particularly for low 
income students and those deemed at-risk for failure in the school system, is a 
good public policy decision, it is not ours to make.  The challengers contend that because 
Art. 7 § 1 requires the state to provide a "complete and uniform" education 
embracing "free elementary schools of every needed kind and grade  and such 
other institutions as may be necessary,"  
the reference to youths ages 6 to 21 is not a ceiling on that obligation, 
but only a minimum.   They go 
so far as to suggest that the "ceiling" on the state's obligation concerning the 
age of students is "infinitely high."  
We do not believe the constitution can reasonably be interpreted in that 
fashion.  We agree with the district 
court's legal conclusion that the constitution does not require the state to 
provide the necessary funds for each district to offer voluntary pre-schools and 
affirm the grant of partial summary judgment on that 
issue.

 
 

                        
e.         
"Remedy" for Alleged Funding Shortfalls and Attorneys 
Fees

 
 
[¶89]   
The challengers ask this Court to order the state to pay the 
attorneys fees they incurred, as they contend, to correct obvious errors and 
enforcing Campbell II mandates.  However, they provide no authority for 
such request and to grant it would be counter to our consistent adherence to the 
American rule.  Wells Fargo Bank Wyoming, NA v. Hodder, 
2006 WY 128, ¶ 59, 144 P.3d 401, 420 (Wyo. 2006) (holding the American rule 
will be applied when punitive damages were not awarded and no contract or 
statute provides for such fees).  We 
decline their invitation to enter into such an effort.

 
 
[¶90]   
The challengers also seek the "remedy" of reimbursement of costs 
where they contend the state failed to fund the actual costs the districts 
incurred to provide the required educational programs.  In Campbell II, the district court found, 
and all parties agreed, that an error had been made in the MAP model for the 
years 1998-99 that failed to account for kindergarten students as one half of an 
ADM.  Campbell II, ¶ 106, 19 P.3d  at 555.  That error caused the total amount of 
school funding to be short $13,930,000 from the amount the state's model 
determined was the cost of providing the education required of the state.  We ordered that one-time amount to be 
added to the school operating budget.  
However, we clearly stated the kindergarten error is not like the other 
claims based on model adjustment deficiencies.  We held, "it is not based on a 
theoretical or legal dispute.  It is 
an admitted mistake in calculation and recordation at a legislative level.  The claim is more in the nature of a 
request for determination of correlative rights between state entities.  Campbell CountySchool 
District 
v. Catchpole, 6 P.3d 1275, 1287 (Wyo. 2000)."  Id.

 
 
[¶91]   The costs for which the districts 
seek reimbursement fall into three categories:  those components that were deemed 
constitutional by the district court and affirmed herein; those components that 
the state ultimately included in its funding model, such as seniority salary 
adjustments, utilities and health insurance; and the regional cost adjustment 
that the challengers contend was erroneously implemented and the district court 
and this Court found problematic.  The challengers' claims in this round are 
not in the nature of the "kindergarten error", but instead are based upon their 
theories about school funding and their legal claims based on the 
constitution.  

 
 
[¶92]   With regard to the first category, 
i.e. those components that were upheld by the district court and affirmed 
herein, their claims obviously fail.  
The second category, including the seniority cap, utilities and health 
insurance, involved legal issues.  
In addition, the legislature acted to remove the seniority cap, funded 
the actual cost of utilities, and adjusted the health insurance component to 
keep up with increasing costs.  2006 
Sess. Laws, Ch. 37 (eliminated cap); 2006 Sess. Laws, Ch. 37, Attach. 
A funded actual SY 2004-05 utility expenditures and provided for inflation 
adjustments.  The final category, 
implementation of the regional cost adjustment, raises greater concern for this 
Court.  We have stated clearly that 
the manner in which that adjustment was made was not required by Campbell II.  For whatever reason, those responsible 
for implementation of the model chose not to apply the adjustment in a fashion 
that assured the districts would receive at least the minimum cost of education 
determined by the model.  No one 
defended that adjustment as truly reflecting actual differences in costs between 
the districts.  However, that choice 
was deliberate and apparently based upon the state's erroneous reading of this 
Court's opinion.  Thus, it is more 
in the nature of a legal or theoretical dispute and not a mistake.  We view judicial involvement in the 
legislature's appropriation decisions as an absolute last resort limited to 
instances where the state itself admits it failed to fund a specific cost of 
education by mistake, such as it did in the "kindergarten error."   In addition, the issue of how to 
properly account for regional cost adjustments is one of the most complicated 
issues in the state's model and we believe judicial restraint must be exercised 
and the details of the solution should be worked out by the experts, subject to 
the guidelines established in the above discussion on the issue.  

 
 
[¶93]   Our approach to other "errors" 
discovered in the model during this litigation is similar.  Given the complexity of the model 
approach adopted by the state, we are quite certain that such errors will 
continue to be unavoidable, resulting in minor over-funding or 
under-funding.  We are also quite 
certain that both the state and the districts will be vigilant in preventing 
errors and correcting them, if they occur.  
Having this Court function as an accounting overseer serves no purpose 
and inappropriately injects the judiciary into executive and legislative branch 
functions.

 
 
II.         
CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION

 
 
            
1.         
Procedural 
Background

 
 
[¶94]   The constitutional concerns caused 
by inadequate resources and wealth-based disparities have dramatically impacted 
school construction and maintenance since the early 1970s.  Historically, school construction was 
financed entirely through property taxes and the funds available varied widely 
from county to county as a result of the differing assessed values of property 
in each county.  In 1980, we held 
that system violated the state's constitution and mandated "statewide 
availability from total state resources for building construction or 
contribution to school buildings on a parity for all school districts."  Washakie, 606 P.2d 337.  Campbell I reviewed the 
legislative changes made in response to the Washakie opinion and found 
that the combination of loans and grants had not adequately addressed the 
deficient public school facilities which the state itself had identified.  We declared that system 
unconstitutional.  Campbell 
I, 907 P.2d  at 1275.  In 
response to that opinion, the WDE financed a study to score all buildings in 
each school district based on various categories of capital construction 
needs.  This report, generally 
identified as the Wyoming Department of Education Statewide Schools Facilities 
Assessment, identified certain schools in immediate need of capital 
construction.  In 1999, the 
legislature acted to address the constitutional infirmities of the school 
capital construction statutes and enacted Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-15-111 (Lexis 
1999), which established a process whereby school districts could receive state 
funding for capital construction of school facilities.  However, that statute required the 
districts to certify they had used 90% of their bonding capacity authorized by 
Art. 16, § 5 of the Wyoming constitution before they would be 
eligible to receive state funding.  
In Campbell II, we concluded that § 21-15-111 was unconstitutional 
because it again resulted in wealth-based disparities in school construction 
financing.  Campbell II, ¶ 11, 19 P.3d  at 556.  As a result of that decision, in 2002, 
the legislature completely overhauled the statutory scheme for capital 
construction of public schools and created a statewide program for funding 
construction of facilities necessary to meet state-determined adequacy 
standards.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
21-15-101 to 21-15-121 (LexisNexis 2002).  
Snell v. Johnson County School 
Dist. #1, 2004 WY 19, ¶ 5, 86 P.3d 248, 251 (Wyo. 
2004).

 
 
[¶95]   The Campbell II and III decisions determined that a proper 
education could not be adequately delivered to children who attended schools 
that had long been denied adequate maintenance and construction funding.  Legislative studies, experts and 
consultants, as well as school district reports, identified and proved what was 
known anecdotally by parents, teachers and students that, throughout the state, 
seriously deficient buildings were negatively impacting the quality of 
education.   Neither funding 
nor planning existed to timely remedy the situation and this constitutional 
inadequacy resulted in this Court's 2001 Campbell decisions requiring the legislature to 
adopt a plan to remedy capital construction deficiencies and resolve immediate 
needs within two years and other critical areas within four years.  The ultimate test of success would be 
whether educational facilities were replaced or repaired sufficiently to require 
only routine maintenance, a term easily defined by industry and building 
standards.  

 
 
[¶96]   In 2005, that overhauled system was 
reviewed by the district court, which made findings of facts and conclusions of 
law.  The district court had been 
notified by the state that it had not met the mandate to remedy immediate need 
facilities within two years.  The 
state informed the district court that the overall condition of facilities 
throughout the state required considerable effort to meet this Court's mandate 
and the mandate had not been achieved.

 
 
[¶97]   Since the legislature began using 
MGT as its primary consultants to study and quantify needs, the evidence and our 
past decisions have quantified and tracked the inadequacies of capital 
construction funding by relying upon its efforts.  In 1992, MGT identified capital 
construction needs at $275 million.  
At the time only $5 million was designated as capital funding.  In 1992, LCSD#1 needed a new high school 
estimated to cost $30 million; however, no funding was available.  No funding at all was appropriated 
between 1995 and 1998 for capital construction across the state.  Maintenance funding needs went 
unmeasured.  By 1999, however, all 
needs had been measured in 1998 dollars and the state had determined that 
decades of previous non-funding of school capital construction now required $868 
million to correct deficiencies.  
Nevertheless, the legislative process had generated very few dollars at 
the state level and only $30 million was actually appropriated by the 
legislature between 1998 and 2001.  
After the 2001 Campbell decisions, the state learned that the 
building conditions were even more dire and contends that the legislature 
appropriately responded by developing a constitutional school system driven by 
well-founded educational standards, not arbitrary fiscal policies.  The state claims that the legislature 
enacted a separate statutory structure dedicated solely to capital construction 
funding, building and maintenance and, then, appropriated almost a billion 
dollars from state wealth.  The 
state contends that this system is adequate, thorough and equal.  

 
 
[¶98]   The legislature did act and was 
fortunately enabled by large surpluses made available for state spending due to 
the national energy boom in which Wyoming has participated.  Since 2002, the legislature has 
earmarked approximately $990 million for school capital construction funding and 
placed large sums in the projected capital school construction account.  By the time the trial was held, however, 
very little had been spent.  In 
fact, so little was spent that the school construction account balance grew 
sufficiently large that the legislature transferred funds out of that account 
and into a budget reserve account.  

 
 
[¶99]   The legislature not only 
appropriated funds but also created the SFC, with the specific function and 
responsibility of implementing capital construction.  The legislature directed school 
districts to produce a five-year-plan for prioritizing and addressing all 
capital construction needs.  The SFC 
was instructed to focus and streamline school district planning into a 
comprehensive statewide strategy; to adopt rules and regulations to oversee 
school construction and maintenance; to spend the large amounts of funding 
specifically earmarked for building new schools; and to coordinate major 
maintenance projects costing over $200,000 each, as well as minor maintenance 
projects.  Although a substantial 
portion of the funds have not been spent and were at one time transferred back 
out of school construction funding, the SFC believes that sufficient funds are 
obligated to school maintenance and construction.13  

 
 
[¶100] Despite all this activity by the legislature, 
the state concedes that the Campbell II 
mandate of fixing facilities in immediate need has not been met.  The challengers claim that the state 
made no effort to comply with the mandate and has stopped tracking work on 
immediate need and inadequate facilities and supplied only a partial list of 
buildings identified as remaining in the immediate need category.  The challengers provided an assessment 
of the overall lack of progress by the state in the categories of immediate 
need, inadequate technology readiness, educational suitability and building 
accessibility for student-related buildings and non-educational buildings by 
estimating the total number of buildings that probably remain in each 
category.  What neither party 
showed, however, was how the five-year-plan prioritized those projects and 
proposed meeting the mandate for immediate need facilities.  The district court resolved this lack of 
evidence by holding that the state had not met the mandate but determined the 
remedy required was a case-by-case resolution.  The district court also concluded the 
SFC guidelines failed to provide for adequate space for student activities, long 
distance learning, and computer space, and failed to pay for utility lines and 
roadways to school sites where future schools were to be built.  In addition, it concluded vocational 
education requirements should be based on a case-by-case determination of 
need.  

 
 
[¶101] We agree with the district court that the 
state's failure to comply with the mandate and the remaining demonstrated 
inadequacies require a new approach. We regret that so many children have passed 
through facilities requiring major repairs or replacement; however, our review 
of the evidence discussed below persuades us, as it did the district court, that 
the state has acted in good faith in trying to meet the mandate through 
research-based policy making, statutory enactment and appropriations of large 
sums.  We have carefully examined 
the constitutionality of the statutory and regulatory schemes enacted since the 
mandate was imposed and find that these deficiencies and failures are not the 
result of an unconstitutional system.   Instead, they result primarily 
from the administrative and logistic challenge created by the size of the 
problem created by years of neglect.  
We believe the appropriate remedy is that directed by the district court, 
a case-by-case review.

 
 
[¶102] The state responded to the deadlines in Campbell II with urgency and expended 
Herculean efforts to create a new agency, determine construction guidelines and 
implement a massive funding process.  
For some, the state moved too slowly and failed to make adequate funds 
available soon enough.  Certainly 
that is true for those students who have passed through the state's schools over 
the last six years.  However, the 
only rational reaction to the state's efforts is to applaud the state and 
encourage its continued progress.    We hold that the state's 
failure to meet the precise deadlines of Campbell II and III should not result in any action by 
this Court.  At this point in time, 
we are convinced the state is moving forward as quickly as can be 
expected.

 
 

            
2.         
Constitutionality of Current 
Statutory Scheme

 
 
[¶103] Campbell 
II and III ruled that a capital 
construction funding formula would be constitutional when it complied with 
specific mandates.  Those mandates 
are listed below and from them we must test the legislature's statutory and 
regulatory structure.   The 
state has complied when:

 
 

1.      
The 
legislature has funded the facilities deemed required by the state for the 
delivery of the required educational programs to Wyoming students in all locations throughout 
the state. 

 
 

2.      
The 
legislature has enacted a comprehensive plan, separate from operations, to 
provide adequate funding for adequate facilities from state wealth; 

 
 

3.      
The 
legislature measures an adequate facility as one requiring only routine 
maintenance, although it may utilize different methodologies to measure 
adequacy. 

 
 
[¶104] A review of the legislation adopted in response 
to Campbell II and III demonstrates compliance with these 
mandates.  In its statutes, the 
legislature defined school buildings and facilities as the physical structures 
and the land upon which the structures are situated, which are primarily used in 
connection with or for the purpose of providing the educational programs offered 
by a school district in compliance with law, including both student-related and 
non-student-related buildings and facilities.  Section 21-15-111 (vi).14  In addition, the statute directing 
the SFC to develop standards for the adequacy of school facilities refers to 
"buildings and facilities necessary for providing educational programs 
prescribed by law."  Section 
21-15-115(a).  No statute specifically describes 
those educational programs that will be "in compliance with law" or "prescribed 
by law."  The minimum uniform 
performance standards for this state's educational program are set forth at Wyo. 
Stat. Ann.  § 21-9-101 (LexisNexis 
2007), and that statute requires school districts to design, develop and deliver 
the educational programs required to meet those standards.  We find that "educational programs in 
compliance with law" or "prescribed by law" logically also means programs 
contemplated by WDE rules and regulations and authorized by the operation 
funding model, which is incorporated by reference into the statutes.  Section 21-9-10115; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-2-203(a)16 (LexisNexis 2007); § 21-13-30917, as well as those programs for 
which federal funding is accepted.  
Clearly, the legislature has authorized or "prescribed" programs beyond 
those necessary to achieve the minimum proficiency standards under § 
21-9-101.  By including expenditures 
in the model for specific educational programs, it is presumed the legislature 
intended to authorize delivery of those programs.  We conclude that the legislature 
intended the school districts to provide educational programs whether required 
by § 21-9-101, or authorized by the model, or funded by federal funds, and these 
educational programs would then be "in compliance with" or "prescribed by" the 
law.  School facilities providing 
these educational programs are entitled to capital construction and maintenance 
funding from state wealth.

 
 
[¶105] To ensure adequacy and equity of school 
facilities, the legislature enacted a statute requiring the SFC to "by rule and 
regulation establish and maintain uniform statewide standards for the adequacy 
of school buildings and facilities necessary for providing educational programs 
prescribed by law for the public schools."  
Section 21-15-115(a).18  The SFC and school districts were 
directed to evaluate and prioritize all needs, first through a five-year-plan 
and then through annual assessments based on this legislative 
mandate:

 
 
            
(a) Through the identification of school building and facility conditions 
and needs provided by the assessment conducted and maintained under  W.S. 21-15-115, and a comparison of the 
identified conditions and needs with the established statewide building adequacy 
standards and the district facility plans submitted under W.S. 21-15-116, the 
commission shall annually in coordination and cooperation with the districts, 
evaluate the adequacy of school buildings and facilities within local school 
districts, and based upon this evaluation, establish a schedule for building and 
facility remediation.  Remediation 
shall bring all buildings and facilities to conditions such that over time, only 
routine maintenance is required to maintain building adequacy.  

 
 
Section 
21-15-117(a).  Annually, the SFC is 
to report to the legislature's Select Committee on Education (SCE) on all 
aspects of school facilities needs including buildings deemed inadequate, 
expenditures, progress and upcoming budgetary needs.  Section 21-15-121.  
As we noted in the first paragraph of this opinion, under the state 
constitution, the legislature is ultimately responsible for education.  The inclusion of legislative oversight 
and involvement is crucial to a constitutional statutory scheme.  Although the legislature may involve 
school districts and agencies such as the SFC for parts of the system, that does 
not lessen legislative responsibility for the entire system.  The legislature must be actively 
involved, as it has been, and aggressively monitor the SFC to ensure the capital 
construction system does not fail.  
Since Campbell II, this 
particular committee has acted responsibly and positively on MAP recommendations 
on the school operations side as well as on MGT recommendations on capital 
construction towards compliance with the Campbell 
decisions.  We, therefore, believe 
this method of legislative oversight reliably serves the delivery of a 
constitutional education.

 
 
[¶106] Testing this statutory scheme against the Campbell II mandate, we do not find nor 
does any challenger contend that this legislative statutory plan contains the 
previous infirmities that defeated constitutionality.  It provides for capital construction 
funding from state wealth without reliance upon local wealth as a source of 
capital; mandates facilities be remedied to a point requiring only routine 
maintenance; and most importantly, makes adequacy of facilities a function of 
delivering adequate educational programs.  
No challenger contends that the appropriated funding in total19 is inadequate or is improperly 
diverted to other school operations needs.  

 
 
[¶107] The legislature has enacted a comprehensive, 
constitutional statutory plan for school capital construction.  The challengers identify two 
deficiencies related to implementation: few immediate need facilities have been 
remedied and very little of the funding appropriated has actually been 
spent.  We agree with the 
challengers that these deficiencies are disturbing but our review does not show 
that they result from inactivity.  
With regard to addressing facilities in immediate need, the legislature 
chose to rely upon its methodology of a five-year-plan to prioritize needs and 
an annual evaluation to assess progress.20  Our review shows that the legislature 
always prioritized needs and emphasized progress in these areas.  It instructed the SFC that, in 
implementing this plan, immediate needs were to be addressed first, particularly 
for those buildings used as classrooms for students.21  Since the trial, the state has informed 
the Court that the legislature has acted to increase the speed of repair or 
replacement and continues to appropriate large sums. 2006 Sess. Laws, 
Ch. 35, § 27.  This continued aggressive legislative 
oversight over capital construction is obtaining results as part of a 
constitutional statutory scheme.     

 
 
            
3.         
Constitutionality of Current 
Regulatory Scheme 

 
 
[¶108] The legislature's constitutional statutory 
scheme directed the SFC to adopt rules and regulations to accomplish statutory 
directives for major and minor maintenance as well as building remodels, 
additions and construction.  The SFC 
deliberately chose to call its rules and regulations "guidelines" to avoid 
inflexibility.  Those guidelines 
govern the maintenance funding discussed earlier and major capital renovations 
and building replacements through a school district's five-year-plan developed 
pursuant to § 21-15-116.  

 
 
[¶109] The guidelines provide for project approval and 
state funding as well as regular maintenance payments based upon total square 
footage within a school district.  
For construction of a new school, however, the heart of the guidelines is 
the prototypical models included for elementary, middle and high schools at 
specified student populations.  Each 
model lists the types of spaces the SFC deems most likely required in a school 
setting and sets a square footage allotment.  The school districts must look to the 
particular model to determine the square footage allotment and a cost per square 
foot that the building project may not exceed without SFC permission.  The school districts, not the SFC, 
design the classrooms, laboratories, physical education areas, etc., required 
for delivery of their educational programs.  Designs that exceed either the square 
footage allotment or cost allowed by the SFC must be approved by the SFC through 
the grant of an exception.  

 
 
[¶110] The statute provides for administrative review 
when the SFC rejects or modifies a school's five-year-plan but does not 
specifically provide for administrative review of any other kind of SFC decision 
such as denials of exceptions.  The 
evidence at trial showed that school districts were primarily concerned that 
none could obtain swift, reasoned decisions for denials of exception requests 
for square footage allotment increases or for rejection of contractor bids for a 
project.  Bid rejections were 
particularly frustrating because they often came at the end of a three to five 
year process of designing, planning and gaining approval of a project with which 
the community had become deeply involved.  
The bid rejections were most often caused by the SFC's failure to 
adequately provide for inflation of project costs during the long review 
process. The district court ruled that any inadequacies specific to a certain 
project were properly resolved by exhaustion of administrative remedies for 
which there would then be judicial review.  
It is unclear from its ruling whether the district court determined that 
the school districts were entitled to contested case proceedings or simply the 
judicial review provided to a person aggrieved by agency action set forth in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2007).  As the district court found, a school 
district22 can seek judicial review under § 
16-3-114(c).  However, neither 
statute nor rule provide for an administrative process that will develop a 
factual record on the many issues that may arise in the complex, time-consuming 
task of each building or major maintenance project.  Nevertheless, the state contends that 
such a process exists for review of denials of exception requests and other 
issues not concerning constitutionality of a statute or rule and that the SFC is 
not permitted to simply deny an exception or increased project funding 
request.  The state also contends 
that the SFC provides, through an informal process, the development of a factual 
record, and issues a swift, reasoned decision that can be reviewed in court 
pursuant to § 16-3-114.  We accept 
the state's contentions as true.23

 
 
[¶111] The district court held that the SFC guidelines 
are facially constitutional.  This 
decision is apparently based upon acceptance of the state's evidence that the 
guidelines are not standards or "rules that cannot be changed."  The author of the guidelines, Dodds 
Cromwell of MGT, testified that the term "guidelines" was intentionally used to 
avoid an invariable or mindless application of the models without regard to 
adequacy and equity requirements.  
He testified that both adequacy and equity requirements were best met by 
viewing the guidelines as flexible for each construction project.  Several stages for individualizing 
construction projects, one of which he described as a value engineering process, 
were in place including allowing a school district to request that the SFC grant 
an exception as needs were identified during each stage.  Mr. Cromwell explained that the 
guidelines were developed to recognize and accommodate both state and federal 
law changes that might impose educational program requirements such as the 
federally required Title I reading rooms that may not be part of the 
prototypical model, but yet a new school construction would have to 
include.  He testified the 
guidelines anticipated yearly changes and intended to incorporate them through 
the exception process.    

 
 
[¶112] Mr. Cromwell described a regulatory scheme 
designed to adequately and equitably provide for constructing and maintaining 
facilities throughout the state.  
Applied flexibly to accommodate the changing educational programs 
authorized by state law, or for which federal funding was accepted, the 
provisions are capable of serving this intended purpose at state expense without 
causing wealth-based disparities.  
We agree with the district court that this regulatory scheme as explained 
by Mr. Cromwell is facially constitutional.

 
 
[¶113] However, the evidence was overwhelming that the 
SFC has not implemented its guidelines in this fashion.  The challengers presented evidence that 
the SFC has rigidly applied the guidelines and has routinely denied requests for 
exceptions telling school districts that the guidelines do not allow for any 
deviation through an exception.24  We can find no explanation for this 
approach in the record and it creates the possibility that the implementation of 
the guidelines is contrary to the statutory scheme adopted by the legislature 
which we have just held is constitutional.  
                     

 
 
                        
a.         
Adequacy of Guidelines 

 
 

                                    
i.          
Educational Facilities

 
 
[¶114] The state provided testimony concerning the 
process followed to draft the guidelines.  
The testimony showed that MGT reviewed guidelines prepared by the WDE and 
a steering committee which recommended a much more generous square footage 
allotment than that ultimately used; however, the district court determined that 
the square footage number was arrived at by study and comparison to facilities 
in other states.  The challengers 
claimed MGT ignored input from educators and experts from across the state and, 
as a result, the square footage allotments were inadequate to, in many cases, 
provide the programs they had historically provided to their students, and 
hence, the guidelines were inadequate.  
The district court found the guidelines adequate with a few 
exceptions.  Although it does appear 
from the evidence that the SFC was very conservative in its determination of the 
appropriate square footage allotments, we conclude the district court's findings 
were not clearly erroneous and any specific shortcomings can best be addressed 
on a case-by-case basis.  

 
 
[¶115] The district court found that the SFC must pay 
for off site development of utilities and streets to connect to new school 
construction.  When local 
governments require construction of such infrastructure, schools cannot be built 
without them, and we agree with the district court's conclusion and hold that 
the state must fund the school district's fair share of the infrastructure 
necessary for the school to operate from state wealth.  We recognize that such funding may be 
affected by the design, location, and timing of school 
construction.

 
 
[¶116] The district court also found that the SFC 
guidelines did not provide space for long distance learning and computer 
education although these two programs were specifically required by the state 
for all schools.  The district court 
ruled that space must be included as part of the guidelines, and we again find 
the court's findings are not clearly erroneous.25

 
 
[¶117]  Other space shortages identified by the 
challengers included insufficient science laboratories, auditoriums, vocational 
education rooms and other educational programs in existence that might be 
eliminated under the SFC guidelines.  
This dispute arises from the SFC's limitation of allotments to subject 
areas listed in § 21-9-101.  As we 
discussed earlier, the legislature intended for schools to provide educational 
programs prescribed by or in compliance with the law whether required by § 
21-9-101, or authorized by the model, or funded by accepted federal funds. 
School facilities necessary to provide those educational programs are then 
entitled to capital construction and maintenance funding from state wealth.  Accordingly, the SFC cannot fail to 
provide such necessary facilities or it is acting contrary to law.  All of the various laws that require and 
authorize the school districts to develop educational programs must be 
considered in determining what capital facilities are required.  Because the legislature, by statute, has 
left it to the school districts to design those educational programs, the SFC 
will be reviewing school designs that vary from district to district, 
necessitating it to decide the appropriate square footage needed on a 
case-by-case basis.  Ultimately, the 
test of whether the SFC acted properly in approving or rejecting proposed school 
facilities will be whether adequate space is provided to allow the school to 
provide authorized programs.  To do 
so, the SFC necessarily must determine, based on the evidentiary record and the 
guidelines, how much and what type of space is required for those 
programs.

 
 
                                    
ii.         
Student Activities

 
 
[¶118] The district court concluded, without much 
explanation, that the SFC did not provide adequate facilities for school 
activities.  There is no dispute 
that facilities must be provided for some level of student 
activities.

 
 
[¶119] In 2005, MAP justified its long time inclusion 
of student activities in the operation funding model based on research and 
evidence and reported that:

 
 
Elementary, 
middle and high schools typically provide an array of after school programs, 
from clubs, bands, and other activities to sports.  Teachers supervising or coaching in 
these activities usually receive small stipends for these extra duties.  Further, research shows, particularly at 
the secondary level, that students engaged in these activities tend to perform 
better academically than students not so engaged, though too much extra 
curricular activity can be a detriment to academic learning.  

 
 
2005 
Recalibration Report, 101 (emphasis added).  Student activities including sports are 
important not just for the general student population but also for special needs 
and at-risk students.  In the same 
report, MAP determined from its research and evidence that an important 
component of an effective strategy for properly educating at-risk students 
includes two hours per day of non-academic activities during summer school 
programs.  Supra at 64.  This Court has previously determined that 
co-curricular activities are part of the free appropriate public education which 
is guaranteed by the IDEA, a federal law.  
Koopman By and Through Koopman v. 
Fremont County School Dist. No. 1, 911 P.2d 1049, 1053, (Wyo. 1996).  See Crocker v. Tennessee Secondary School 
Athletic Association, 873 F.2d 933 (6th Cir. 1989); Rettig v. Kent City School District, 788 F.2d 328 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 
478 U.S. 1005, 106 S. Ct. 3297, 92 L. Ed. 2d 711 (1986); Hollenbeck 
v. Board of Education of RochelleTownship, 699 F. Supp. 658 (N.D.Ill. 
1988).   The state has determined that student 
activities are part of a proper education for all children under both federal 
and state law, and, as the challengers contend, Campbell II and III mandate that 
appropriate school facilities accommodate those student 
activities.

            

[¶120] The district court found that the guidelines 
were deficient for not accommodating "cocurricular activities", a term found in 
§ 21-9-101, but not defined.  That 
statute specifically encourages districts to implement cocurricular programs 
that provide "educational experiences."  
Section 21-9-101(e).  The 
district court found that the guidelines provided space only for assembly and 
physical education and no evidence explained how the guidelines provided space 
for cocurricular activities.  
However, the specific deficiencies that concerned the district court were 
not explained.

            

[¶121] The district court also concluded that school 
sports were "extracurricular," and not "cocurricular" activities, and were not 
expressly provided for by statute.  
However, the legislature did not exclude athletics from "cocurricular" 
activities and authorized funding for them in the assumptions underlying the MAP 
model block grant.  In 1997, the 
legislature directed the state superintendent of education to identify and 
determine student activities, without excluding athletics, to be included in the 
model.  1997 Spec. Sess. Laws, 
Ch. 3, § 202(e).  The record shows that the superintendent 
advised that, for high schools, local and national activities had been 
identified and among those were activities governed by the Wyoming High School 
Activities Association (WHSAA).26  The model provides funding for student 
activities in all schools in general as a line item and provides funding for 
athletic directors and activities directors where necessary.  The WDE rules regulate student 
activities and have categorized them as elementary, junior high or high school. 

            

[¶122] The districts testified that since 1997 they 
have offered cocurricular activities in high school sanctioned by the WHSAA but 
will also look to other sources on both a local and national level if not 
provided for by the WHSAA.  The 
record shows that athletic programs are included in those sanctioned by the 
WHSAA.  We did not see that athletic 
programs outside of WHSAA are offered in Wyoming schools.  According to the challengers, WHSAA 
sanctions activities such as Future Farmers of America, Future Business Leaders 
of America, student council, band, cheerleading, football, volleyball, 
basketball, tennis, swimming, and other traditional competitive sports.  

 
 
[¶123] Interestingly, SFC guidelines seem to be 
consistent with this approach of including athletics in the category of 
cocurricular activities, and accommodate some types of sports in the square 
footage allotments.  They allow 
funding for a gym for certain types of schools but not all, although the SFC 
recently decided that it would make sure one gym was provided per community. 
 SFC Guidelines, Ch. 4.  Funds are allowed for track and soccer 
fields, but not for lighting, seating, or restrooms for those fields.  No swimming pools are allowed for any 
new construction.

 
 
[¶124] The state contends that the SFC may exclude or 
restrict student activity facilities or amenities because students can access 
those facilities with full amenities either through recreational centers or at 
other schools in the community.  The 
state contends that student access to activities and their facilities is 
adequate and equitable.  We agree 
with the state that this would be so if the SFC had been making those 
determinations; however, the evidence supports the challengers' contention that 
the SFC has not been reviewing particular projects to ensure adequate and 
equitable access.  It appears to 
have denied state facility funding for student activities without regard for 
access and availability.   

 
 
[¶125] We note that neither the constitution nor the 
legislature requires specific athletic programs or activities be provided to all 
students.  Instead, the legislature 
has left to the school districts the decision of what cocurricular activities 
should be offered.  Section 
21-9-101.  Since 2003, the model has 
funded student activities at $250 per ADM, meaning the state is funding the 
average activities, including athletics.  
Accordingly, the SFC is required to provide facilities to house an 
average number and variety of activities, including athletics.  To avoid educational opportunity 
disparities, the SFC is required to ensure that substantially similar activities 
will be provided to similarly situated students across the state.  The constitution does not require all 
facilities for student activities be exactly the same, especially considering 
the wide variety of possible activities and local preferences, or funding of 
facilities desired by a community to allow the public to be involved in such 
activities.  We agree that 
reasonable access to substantially similar activities and their facilities 
determines the equity and adequacy of student activity facilities.  That determination must be made on a 
case-by-case determination.   
The SFC must develop a factual record on the issue for a school's 
particular project and make a reasoned decision that students will receive 
access to substantially similar activities and facilities received by similarly 
situated students.

 
 
                                    
iii.        
Local 
Enhancements

 
 
[¶126] The SFC guidelines define local enhancements as 
anything exceeding SFC guidelines and require that local enhancements must be 
paid for by a school district through local bonding.  As just discussed, if the SFC improperly 
limits the educational programs requiring space, it shifts costs of facilities 
to deliver those programs to local school districts which then have to rely upon 
local bonding.  The natural result 
is wealth-based disparities created within a constitutional regulatory scheme 
enabled by a constitutional statutory scheme.  This approach of unconstitutional cost 
shifting is new to this Court; however, the term "local enhancement" is a 
concept first examined in Campbell 
I.  

 
 
[¶127] Campbell 
I recognized that local enhancements had an important role to play in 
improving and maintaining educational quality.  It found that local school districts 
have a constitutional right to have a role at the local level whether in the 
form of optional mill levies or bonding.  
Campbell I, 907 P.2d  at 
1274.  Campbell II discussed 
this concept after deciding the term "local control" could only mean a "local 
role" in implementing a legislatively defined proper education.  Because school districts felt strongly 
that state control might result in "dumbing down" the education provided to 
students, Campbell I defined the state's standard as the "best we 
can do" and then provided for "local enhancements" to ensure that deciding what 
a "proper" education was would remain dynamic and continue to evolve.27  Campbell I, 907 P.2d  at 
1274.

[¶128] Regarding capital construction, Campbell 
II clearly allows a school district to build facilities considered 
innovative or world-class with money raised locally or by property taxes not 
subject to recapture under the constitutional provision and then leaves 
it to the legislature to ensure that type of local enhancement does not 
ultimately create a disparity in equal educational opportunity.  Campbell II's 
discussion about a "local role" contemplated that, by requiring the 
legislature to define and fund the "proper education," the role of a local 
school district would necessarily change from primarily deciding how to pay for 
the "proper education" with inadequate funds to the new and necessary role of 
raising funding for "local enhancement" in order to assure innovation.  

[¶129] As our decisions show, we have concluded that 
the constitution contemplates each school district will have an equal opportunity to innovate for the purpose 
of exceeding the state educational system.  
Unlike the approach of not permitting any variance in the educational 
program because it would necessarily cause actual educational experience 
differences across the state, this Court determined that so long as every school 
district had the same opportunity for innovation, local enhancement represented 
a compelling state interest that would survive strict scrutiny.  Our concern was plainly on protecting 
the opportunity for "innovation" which means new, modern, improved, advanced and 
original.  In the past, we have seen 
many "innovations" by local schools such as advanced placement classes, 
international baccalaureate classes, and full day kindergarten, all of which are 
now part of a proper statewide education.  

[¶130] The SFC definition of local enhancement 
states:  

"Local 
Enhancements to School Buildings and Facilities" or Local Enhancements" means 
any renovation, construction, replacement, repair or other improvement of or to 
any school building or facility initiated by a school district which is designed 
to bring the building or facility to a condition exceeding the statewide 
building adequacy standards contained in the commission guidelines. 

 
 
SFC 
Rules and Regs., Ch.1, General Provisions, § 2(ff) (12/8/04).  Plainly, the SFC definition focuses on 
whether the local enhancement would exceed the state system as presented in the 
SFC guidelines.  This definition is 
permissible if the SFC guidelines are building an adequate facility at state 
expense.  As the district court 
found, this may not be the result on a case-by-case basis. 

 
 
[¶131] The legislature has empowered and commanded the 
SFC to build adequate and equitable facilities capable of delivering the 
educational programs prescribed by laws and state standards.  Anything desired by the school districts 
over and above that is a local enhancement for which local bonding will be 
required.

            

[¶132] We are aware that the legislature is concerned 
with where to draw the line and believes examples of excess might include 
wealthy districts potentially creating new standards for the entire state in 
areas such as sports by building golf courses for their golf programs or lavish 
domed arenas with local wealth.  
Gratuitous luxuries are conceivable, but are not an educational 
innovation that will raise the bar for the rest of the school districts.  Nowhere in the record does it show that 
these types of facilities are called for to deliver a thorough and efficient 
education.  The state's own experts 
at MAP stated that too many extracurricular activities are harmful and it can 
reasonably be inferred that such inappropriate expenditures to accommodate or 
house activities is just as harmful.  
No facts, laws, or adequacy tests require these types of 
facilities.

            

            
 4.        
Case-By-Case Review

 
 
[¶133] In the future, the SFC must properly implement 
its guidelines in accordance with the statutes and consider exception requests 
in light of this opinion.  Judicial 
review of administrative decisions is well-established and the SFC can easily 
learn that courts will uphold those decisions that are not conclusory but are 
well-reasoned based upon consideration of proper basic and ultimate facts.  This opinion defines the facts that 
should be gathered, the laws that should be applied, the tests that should be 
administered, and the reasoning necessary to reach a written decision that can 
be upheld upon judicial review.

 
 
[¶134] Now that we have found this capital 
construction statutory and regulatory scheme constitutional, we believe that a 
new approach for fixing or replacing immediate need facilities is now available 
to school districts that should swiftly resolve SFC delays.  The state has shown that adequate funds 
were appropriated for these facilities and the challengers have shown that the 
funds were not spent.  On a 
case-by-case basis, a school district can seek review of any decision denying 
funding if it concludes it cannot build facilities necessary to deliver the 
educational programs required by law.  
The SFC may want to preempt more court battles throughout the state and 
provide for its own expedited process for immediate need facilities.  

 
 
[¶135] The challengers correctly state that an agency 
may not decide the constitutionality of a statute.  Riedel v. Anderson (In re Conflicting Lease Applications), 972 P.2d 586, 587 (Wyo. 1999).  However, we agree with the district 
court that administrative review is appropriate when the issue is limited to 
whether the agency action such as denying an exception request or rejecting a 
reasonable bid for construction is denying a school district the facility 
required by law.  The agency may 
decide this issue without impermissibly judging the constitutionality of a 
statute.  The school district is 
then entitled to judicial review.  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶136] We hold the state has demonstrated compliance 
with the mandates of Campbell II as 
described in detail herein.  Certain 
action has been identified in the area of capital construction which needs to be 
taken to fairly and constitutionally implement the system chosen by the state to 
fund construction of school facilities.  
Additionally, we have addressed problems with application of the WCLI 
that must be corrected.

 
 
[¶137] One issue remains.  We retained jurisdiction over this 
litigation, as set forth in Campbell II 
and III, because all parties requested us to do so and 
there was substantial action that needed to be taken and much disagreement 
among the parties about how to correct the deficiencies identified in those 
opinions.  At this point, the 
challengers seek continued jurisdiction and the state argues strongly that it 
has complied and this litigation should end.   It is interesting to note that 
this issue is not arising in school finance for the first time.  Over thirty-six years ago, in  Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234, this Court 
held portions of the school finance statutes in place at that time 
unconstitutional and retained jurisdiction for a final decision after the next 
legislative session.  In 1972, the 
Court relinquished jurisdiction to allow the parties to settle their differences 
or until some future taxpayer pursued the "invidious discrimination" of that 
system.  Washakie, 606 P.2d  at 319-20.  The legislature did take action, but 
failed to achieve equality in funding.  
The problems were not solved by the many legislatures convening between 
that time and 1980 when the Washakie 
opinion was issued.  That 
opinion gave the legislature two years, or until 1982, to solve the problems of 
inequality, and directed the district court to retain jurisdiction until 
legislative action was taken consistent with the opinion.  Id. 
at 336.  Again, the problems were 
not solved and Campbell I issued in 
1995.  Yet again, the court held the 
school funding statutes unconstitutional and the same course was taken, remand 
to the district court with the instruction to retain jurisdiction.  Each time jurisdiction was retained, 
legislative action was finally forthcoming.  In this case, as stated in Campbell III, ¶ 28, 32 P.3d  at 331,  we retained jurisdiction reluctantly and 
at the request of both parties, and 
went to great lengths to provide flexibility to the parties in hopes of a final 
resolution.

 
 
[¶138] Over the long course of Wyoming's school 
finance litigation, the parties and the courts have steadfastly and in good 
faith worked toward the challenging constitutional goal of funding primary and 
secondary public education to assure each child the opportunity to receive a 
quality education regardless of where that child resides or the location of the 
school which that child attends so that every child may enter a structurally 
safe building, which is staffed with competent and sufficient teachers and which 
contains  appropriate and sufficient teaching material and equipment, and 
upon graduation from high school be "equipped for a role as a citizen, 
participant in the political system and competitor both intellectually and 
economically."  Campbell I, 907 P.2d  at 1278.  As our opinion today reveals, that challenging 
constitutional goal has been reached and only a few adjustments to the statutory 
system remain to be made.  Because this Court is confident of the 
legislature's good faith and genuine commitment to address the adjustments which 
remain, we conclude there is no reason to retain, and therefore we herewith 
release, continuing jurisdiction of the matter before us.

 
 
[¶139] One matter remains that deserves 
attention.  A review of the record 
of the district court trials in Campbell 
I, Campbell II, and the present 
action reveals that the same district court judge served as the trial judge in 
all three trials.  It is hard to 
imagine the hours and days that this public servant has devoted to the school 
children of this state.  For the 
most part, this Court has agreed with his careful rulings and has been 
consistently impressed with his mastery of massive volumes of evidence, his 
understanding of the issues, and his patience with parties passionately devoted 
to their positions.  All involved in 
this process and in public education owe him a great debt.

 

[¶140] Affirmed in part and reversed in 
part.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1"It is 
within this Court's prerogative to take judicial notice of the official reports 
of state agencies."  Campbell II, ¶ 67, 19 P.3d 518, 563 fn. 56; Dellapenta, 838 P.2d  at 1159 
(citing Washakie, 606 P.2d  at 322, n.16; Hinkle, 491 P.2d at 
1237).

 
 

2The 
recalibrated model did not provide for additional funding for teachers with more 
than 20 years of seniority and the district court found that 20-year "cap" to be 
unconstitutional.  However, in 2006 
that cap was removed and, consequently, this issue is moot.  2006 Sess. Laws, Ch. 
37.

 
 

3The 
challengers' evidence showed $5,060,103 less was distributed by the state 
funding model than would have been under Model 4.2a.  While they admit that amount might be 
considered de minimus in light of the 
total education funding, they point out two school districts where the impacts 
were significant.  Park County 
School Dist. 16 (Meeteetse) received 20% less and Sweetwater County School Dist. 
No. 1 (Rock 
Springs) received $1,279,699 less pursuant to the 
challengers' calculations.  The 
state did not provide any explanation for those particular results and this 
Court is not in a position to determine whether they were caused by appropriate 
adjustments or whether they represent mistakes causing funding differences not 
based upon cost.  However, as we 
note below, individual districts have the opportunity to appeal their funding 
allocation if they believe errors were made and their block grant does not 
comply with the law.

 
 

4The 
challengers note that the formula does not consider the number of buildings as 
mentioned in Campbell II.  The record reflects that while MAP 
recommended including that factor, the school districts urged the legislature 
not to do so and the legislature followed that recommendation.  While we recognize that the number of 
buildings could affect the cost of operation and maintenance, the challengers 
provided no evidence to that effect and we are not convinced it is a significant 
factor in the equation.  It was 
mentioned in Campbell II, however, in 
the context of requiring a formula that more accurately reflected actual costs 
than that used in the 1997 model, not as a mandatory inclusion in such a 
formula.

 
 

5The 
challengers contend that the district court may have erroneously assumed that 
"saving money" is a "compelling" state interest.  The challengers are correct to state 
that while reducing square footage and saving money from the reduction is a 
legitimate governmental interest, it is not a compelling state interest.  See e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 
507, 119 S. Ct. 1518, 143 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1999) (holding that saving money, the 
state rationale for providing different benefits based on durational residency, 
is not a compelling interest); Memorial 
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 263, 94 S. Ct. 1076, 39 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1974) ("a state may not protect the public fisc by drawing an invidious 
distinction between classes of the citizens.")  The state must do more than show the 
challenged action "saves money."

 
 

6See the 
discussion on the adequacy of the SFC guidelines for school 
facilities.

 
 

7The 
designation of students with language limitations has changed and, most likely 
will continue to change.  We 
understand the current designation is English language limited or 
ELL.

 
 

8The model 
added to that salary figure additional compensation for advanced education and 
experience. 

 
 

9We note that 
a rehearing was granted in Campbell 
II and it was never suggested in that process that the Court's understanding 
of how the cost of living adjustment would operate, as reflected in this 
quotation, was flawed.

 
 

10We realize 
that comparing Wyoming's educational statistics with other 
states can be misleading because of the rural nature of our population and the 
need to provide small schools in remote locations to serve that population. As a 
consequence, we would expect to see small classrooms and student/teacher ratios, 
as well as high per student spending to support the number of small schools that 
do not have favorable per student cost efficiencies.  However, these comparisons are some 
measure of the adequacy of Wyoming's public education 
funding.

 
 

11Richard C. 
Seder and James R. Smith, MAP, A 
Cost-Based Analysis of the Reading Assessment and Intervention Program, June 
3, 2003, and A Grant Proposal to Fund 
Summer School Programs for the State of Wyoming, Oct. 1, 2003, are examples 
of cost studies which accompanied the legislative action in two 
areas.

 
 

12It is 
unclear how this issue arose since it was not included in the Campbell II mandates.  However, we assume it became an issue in 
the course of the recalibration process.

 
 

13The district 
court made no finding otherwise.  
The challengers claim that the school capital construction account had 
more than sufficient funds to provide for a much more extensive capital 
construction program but poor planning and budgeting by the SFC during the 3-5 
years prior precluded project completions.

 
 

14School 
buildings and facilities" mean the physical structures and the land upon which 
the structures are situated, which are primarily used in connection with or for 
the purpose of providing the educational programs offered by a school district 
in compliance with law, including both student-related and non student-related 
buildings and facilities[.]

 
 

15Educational 
programs for schools; standards; core of knowledge and skills; special needs 
programs;  class size 
requirements;  co-curricular 
activities.

 
 
            
 (a) The board of trustees of 
each school district within the state shall cause the schools under its 
jurisdiction to provide an educational program in accordance with uniform 
standards defined under this section and rules and regulations promulgated by 
the state board of education pursuant to W.S. 
21-2-304(a).

            
(b) Each school district within the state shall provide educational 
programs sufficient to meet uniform student content and performance standards at 
the level established by the state board of education in the following areas of 
knowledge and skills:

    (i) Common core of 
knowledge:

         
(A) Reading/language arts;

         
(B) Social studies;

         
(C) Mathematics;

         
(D) Science;

         
(E) Fine arts and performing arts;

         
(F) Physical education;

         
(G) Health and safety;

         
(H) Humanities;

         
(J) Career/vocational education;

         
(K) Foreign cultures and languages;

         
(M) Applied technology;

         
(N) Government and civics including state and federal constitutions 
pursuant to W.S. 21-9-102.

     (ii) For grades one 
(1) through eight (8), reading, writing and mathematics shall be emphasized 
under the common core of knowledge specified under paragraph (b)(i) of this 
section;

    (iii) Common core of 
skills:

         
(A) Problem solving;

         
(B) Interpersonal communications;

         
(C) Keyboarding and computer applications;

         
(D) Critical thinking;

         
(E) Creativity;

(F) Life 
skills, including personal financial management 
skills.

            
(c) In addition to subsection (b) of this section, each school district 
within this state shall provide programs designed for the special needs of those 
student populations specified within this subsection.  Programs under this subsection shall be 
provided and shall identify special student populations in accordance with rules 
and regulations of the state board of education.  The state board shall monitor the 
proportion of students in each special needs category, compared to available 
regional averages.  Special needs 
student populations include:

            
     (i) 
Children with disabilities evaluated in accordance with rules and regulations of 
the state board as having mental retardation, hearing impairments including 
deafness, speech or language impairments, visual impairments including 
blindness, serious emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, 
traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, specific learning 
disabilities, deafness and blindness or other multiple disabilities, and who, 
because of the impairments, need special education and related services;  and

            
     (ii) 
Gifted and talented students identified by professionals and other qualified 
individuals as having outstanding abilities, who are capable of high performance 
and whose abilities, talents and potential require qualitatively differentiated 
educational programs and services beyond those normally provided by the regular 
school program in order to realize their contribution to self and 
society.

            
(d) In addition to subsections (b) and (c) of this section, each school 
district within this state shall endeavor to maintain when practicable, in 
kindergarten through grade three (3) within the district, an average class size 
of no more than twenty (20) students per teacher, excluding children with 
disabilities who spend more than fifty percent (50%) of their time outside of 
regular classroom instruction.

            
(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit school 
districts from establishing co-curricular activity programs which have as their 
purpose to provide educational experiences not otherwise provided by the local 
district.  The legislature 
specifically encourages school districts to establish programs of this 
type.

            
(f) It is the intent of the legislature that the funding mechanism 
established by law for schools encourage school districts to achieve the goal of 
reduced class sizes.

            
(g) Not later than the 2002-2003 school years, all school districts shall 
provide instruction in foreign languages to students in kindergarten through 
grade 2 in accordance with standards promulgated by the state 
board.

 
 

16School 
district data collection and funding model administration;  duties and responsibilities 
specified;  data advisory 
committee;  school district 
compliance.   

            
(a) The department shall collect data for the state's school finance 
system and in accordance with rule and regulation of the state superintendent, 
administer the Wyoming education resource block 
grant model adopted by the Wyoming legislature pursuant to W.S. 
21-13-309. 

 
 

17Section 
21-13-309 lists the computations under the model and the actual cost funding to 
be delivered through the foundation program for each 
district.

 
 

18The 
commission shall by rule and regulation establish and maintain uniform statewide 
standards for the adequacy of school buildings and facilities necessary for 
providing educational programs prescribed by law for the public schools.  

 
 

19The 
challengers' contention that insufficient funding has been spent for immediate 
need facilities is addressed in a later part of the 
opinion.

 
 

20In its 
brief, the state shows that effective July 1, 2006, amendments to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 21-15-116, eliminated the five year provision and required redevelopment 
of the district facility plan every two years or on a schedule otherwise 
established for the district by the commission.  2006 Sess. Laws, Ch. 42, § 
1.  

 
 

21This process 
appears to be underway.  In rules 
adopted in 2006, the SFC identifies and prioritizes needs as either critical or 
necessary.  SFC Rules&Regs., 
Ch. 6, §§ 3-5. 
 On January 20, 2006, the SFC 
reported to the legislature's joint appropriations committee that over $200 
million was required to resolve critical needs. SFC 2007/2008 Budget 
Presentation, http://sfc.state.wy.us/pdf/JAC%20Presentation%202006.pdf. Critical needs are those the Commission deemed most important and to be 
accomplished as soon as feasible.  

 
 
Section 
4. Priority Group 1 - Critical Projects.

 
 
            
(a) This priority group includes those projects that the Commission 
determines to be most

important 
and to be accomplished as soon as feasible. Per W.S. 21-15-117(a)(iv) priority 
will be given to educational buildings. The following are the types of projects 
that are included in priority group 1:

            
     (i) 
Health and safety projects. Those that include improvements to protect the 
health and safety of its occupants include those involving structures serviced 
by a water supply that is contaminated or failing, structures having egress that 
endangers student safety, structures having significant potential for structural 
failure, and structures requiring installation of emergency systems.  

 
 
                                                
****

The details 
were provided earlier to the legislature's select committee on school facilities 
on January 11, 2006 where the minutes state in relevant 
part:

 
 
Director Shivler reviewed 
the School Facilities Commission 2007-2008 biennial budget request, a copy of 
which was distributed and is attached as Appendix D.  Director Shivler reported the total 
bonding capacity of the state is around $300 million compared to a total 
biennial budget request by school districts of $673,055,123.  With this in mind, the Commission 
prioritized the capital construction projects in accordance with its rules and 
regulation and is forwarding priority 1 projects for a total capital 
construction request of $220,652,041 plus an additional $14,000,000 in 
contingency and value engineering funding.  
All minor capital construction projects were brought forward in a total 
funding request of $36,194,644.  
Also included in the 2007-2008 biennial request is the Commission's 
operating budget of $7,350,256, review and analysis funds totaling $60,000,000, 
emergency funding at $1,000,000, major maintenance program funding of 
$68,200,000 and a proposed project opportunities fund of $134,000,000, all 
resulting in a total budget request of $541,396,941.   
 Select School Facilities 
Committee Minutes, Jan. 11, 2006, http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2005/interim/schoolfac/MINUTES/min0111.htm.

22A school 
district is a governmental subdivision and therefore a person.  Pritchard v. State, Division of Vocational 
Rehabilitation, Dept. of Health and Social Services, 540 P.2d 523, 530 (Wyo. 
1975).

23Section 
21-15-118, in relevant part, directs that the SFC "[w]ith the 
assistance of the involved school district, develop and approve the necessary 
schematic design documents" as well as cooperate on several other aspects of the 
construction process.  

24In a May 24, 
2004, letter to LCSD #1, the chairman of the SFC, Jeff Marsh, stated that the 
Commission did not have authority to add facilities beyond approved guidelines 
and any changes required would be treated as an enhancement for which the 
districts would have to pay.  In his 
testimony, the state's expert, Mr. Cromwell, stated that he was not aware of a 
single example where the SFC had deviated from its guidelines in terms of 
allowing excess square footage that was not considered an enhancement.  Schools have used local bonding to pay 
for science rooms, vocational education programs, physical education rooms, 
multi-purpose rooms, special education rooms, and Title I reading rooms.    

25We were 
unable to determine the status for correcting this deficiency although we found 
this reference in the minutes of a legislature select committee meeting held on 
Sept. 26, 2005. Off Site 
Developments.  Director Shivler brought to the attention of the 
Select Committee the fact that the Commission is not currently providing funds 
to school districts for off-site developments such as sidewalks, curb and 
gutter, street lights, traffic lights, intersection improvements and water and 
sewer lines.  These expenditures are 
becoming substantial to impacted communities.  Recently Cheyenne was quoted $6.2 million for sewer and 
water lines and street infrastructure necessary for the completion of a new 
school.  The Commission recommends 
the establishment of a state level funding mechanism for this purpose which is 
outside of the Commission's jurisdiction. 

26WHSAA, a 
nonprofit regulatory group, has been in existence since the 1920s.  Membership is voluntary.  Because it sponsors fine arts, 
leadership, vocational education, and athletics, WHSAA calls its programs 
"cocurricular activities."

27The 
Constitutional Local Level Role

            
As the district court found, the evil of the optional mill levy was its 
impact upon "basic" equal educational opportunity. In view of the constitutional 
requirement that the state provide a uniform, "proper" education program, the 
question arises whether the legislature can permit optional mill levies so the 
local school district can raise funds outside of the state foundation program in 
order to enrich its students' educational opportunities beyond those offered 
elsewhere in the state.

            
The constitution requires the legislature to create and maintain a system 
providing an equal opportunity to a quality education. That system must be a 
function of state wealth. Once the legislature achieves the constitutional 
mandate of a cost-based, state-financed proper education, then assuming the 
legislature has a compelling reason for providing a mechanism by which local 
districts may tax themselves in order to enhance their programs in an equitable 
manner, that appears to be constitutionally permissible. However, we inject two 
notes of caution. First, in Skeen, 
the two dissenting state supreme court justices did not believe strict scrutiny 
permits a local enhancement mechanism. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d  at 322 (Page, 
Gardebring, JJ, dissenting). Second, local enhancement may also result in 
substantive innovations which should be available to all school districts as 
part of a proper education. The definition of a proper education is not static 
and necessarily will change. Should that change occur as a result of local 
innovation, all students are entitled to the benefit of that change as part of a 
cost-based, state-financed proper education.