Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. McClain

Citation: 406 Md. 1

Docket Number: 23ag/07

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2008-09-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Charles E. McClain, Sr., AG No. 23,
September Term, 2007 
HEADNOTE: Disbarment is the appropriate sanction for an attorney who knowingly made
false statements to the Circuit Court, and relied on those false and misleading statements in
a brief submitted to the Court of Special Appeals.
 
In the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County 
Case No.: CAE07-20768
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 23
September Term, 2007 
____________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF
MARYLAND
v.
CHARLES E. MCCLAIN, SR.
_______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Eldridge, John C. (Retired, Specially
Assigned)
Raker, Irma S. (Retired, Specially
Assigned)
   JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Greene, J.
__________________________________
Filed: September 8, 2008
1 Maryland Rule 16-751(a) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action.  (1) Upon approval of [the Attorney
Grievance] Commission.  Upon approval or direction of the [Attorney Grievance]
Commission, Bar Counsel shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the
Court of Appeals.
2 MRPC 1.1 provides:
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.  Competent representation
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for
the representation.
The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, acting through Bar Counsel and
pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751(a),1 filed a Petition For Disciplinary or Remedial Action
against Respondent Charles E. McClain, Sr. on August 10, 2007.  The Petition alleged that
Respondent, who was admitted to the Bar of this Court on September 30, 1993, violated
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”) 1.1 (Competence),2 1.7(b) (Conflict of
3MRPC 1.7(b) provides:
(b)  Notwithstanding the existence of a conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may
represent a client if:    
 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and
diligent representation to each affected client;   
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;  
  
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another
client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal;
and  
   
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
 
4 MRPC 3.1 provides:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein,
unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes, for example, a good
faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.  A lawyer may
nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the moving party's
case be established.
5 MRPC 3.2 provides:
A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of
the client.
6 MRPC 3.3(a) provides:
(a)  A lawyer shall not knowingly:     
 
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of
material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;  
  
(continued...)
-2-
Interest),3 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions), 4 3.2 (Expediting Litigation),5 3.3(a)
(Candor Toward the Tribunal),6 4.4(a) (Respect for Rights of Third Persons), 7 8.2(a) (Judicial
(...continued)
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting
a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;  
  
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the
lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing
counsel; or  
  
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.  If a lawyer has offered material
evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial
measures. 
7 MRPC 4.4(a) provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other
than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that
the lawyer knows violate the legal rights of such a person. 
8 MRPC 8.2(a) provides:
A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless
disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge,
adjudicatory officer or public legal officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to
judicial or legal office.
9 MRPC 8.4(c) & (d) provide:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;  
  
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
10 Maryland Rule 16-752(a) states:
(a) Order.  Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, the Court of
(continued...)
-3-
and Legal Officials),8 and 8.4(c) & (d) (Misconduct)9 in his representation of Gustav
Hamilton.  Pursuant to Maryland Rules 16-752(a)10 and 16-757(c), 11 we referred the matter
(...continued)
Appeals may enter an order designating a judge of any circuit court to hear the action and the
clerk responsible for maintaining the record.  The order of designation shall require the
judge, after consultation with Bar Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order
defining the extent of discovery and setting dates for the completion of discovery, filing of
motions, and hearing.
11 Maryland Rule 16-757(c) states in pertinent part:
(c) Findings and conclusions.  The judge shall prepare and file or dictate into the record a
statement of the judge’s findings of fact, including findings as to any evidence regarding
remedial action, and conclusions of law.
-4-
to the Honorable Cathy H. Serrette of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County to
conduct an evidentiary hearing and to submit to this Court proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law.  
On March 10, 2008, Judge Serrette issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, in
which she found that Respondent violated MRPC 1.1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3(a), 4.4, 8.2(a) and 8.4(c)
and (d), but not MRPC 1.7(b).  Judge Serrette’s findings of fact and conclusions of law read
in pertinent part:
Background
On July 13, 2003, Barbara Johnson, through her attorney, Todd Kelting,
Esquire, filed a partition action against Gustav Hamilton in the Circuit Court
for Prince George’s County seeking the sale of jointly owned real property.
The court entered an Order of Default on November 18, 2003 and
subsequently entered judgment against Mr. Hamilton.  On May 21, 2004, the
court ordered that the real property be sold, that the first $25,580.62 of
proceeds be distributed to Ms. Johnson, and that any remaining proceeds be
divided equally between the parties.  In an Order dated June 7, 2004, the court
appointed Ade Awojobi as Trustee to sell the property pursuant to Maryland
Rule 14-303.  Mr. Hamilton’s prior counsel filed an unsuccessful Motion to
Vacate.  
-5-
*  *  *
Findings of Fact
The facts underlying the alleged violations are, for the most part,
undisputed.  Respondent admitted all of the facts set forth in Petitioner’s
Request for Admission of Facts and Genuineness of Documents, and the Court
of Special Appeals issued an unreported decision following Respondent’s
appeal in the underlying case.
Respondent was admitted to the Bar of Maryland on September 30,
1993 and maintains a law office in Prince George’s County.  Respondent was
also admitted to the Bar of the District of Columbia.  Additionally, he has been
a licensed real estate broker and developer in Maryland since 1968, and the
broker for his own company, Geoplex Realty, since 1999.
On September 13, 2004, Respondent entered his appearance as Mr.
Hamilton’s counsel.  Respondent thereafter entered into an agreement with his
client to act as the broker for the purchase of the real property that was the
subject of the partition action in which Respondent was counsel for Mr.
Hamilton.  The agreement provided that Respondent, through Geoplex Realty,
would receive half of the commission resulting from the sale.  The commission
was to be paid in lieu of attorney’s fees.
Upon entering the case, Respondent filed a Motion to Set Aside and/or
Vacate Default Judgment knowing that a previous Motion to Vacate Default
Judgment had been denied.  Opposing counsel, Todd Kelting, notified
Respondent, via letter, that he did not deem the Motion to Set Aside and/or
Vacate Default Judgment to be legally justified.  On September 20, 2004, Ms.
Johnson filed her first Request for Sanctions pursuant to Maryland Rule 1-341.
On September 24, 2004, the Trustee filed a Motion to Compel Sale of the
Property.  These matters came before the trial court on Oct. 22, 2004.  During
the hearing, Respondent requested that his Motion to Set Aside and/or Vacate
Default Judgment be considered a request for reconsideration.  He further
asked that Judge Dawson recuse himself from the case if sanctions were to be
imposed, insofar as Judge Dawson had sanctioned Respondent “in just the
recent past.”  Judge Dawson denied the recusation request, the Motion to Set
Aside Default Judgment, and the oral motion to consider the Motion to Set
Aside as a motion for reconsideration.  He deemed the Motion to Set Aside
and/or Vacate Judgment to be without basis and found that Respondent had
12 Respondent cited Dorsey v. Dorsey, 30 Md. 522 (1869) and Kelly v. Gilbert, 78 Md.
431 (1894) in support of his argument that a joint tenant should be given a prioritized
opportunity to purchase the real property.  The Court of Special Appeals ruled that the
cases were not applicable.
-6-
filed the motion as a tactic to stall the proceedings.  Respondent and Mr.
Hamilton were jointly and severally sanctioned.
On November 1, 2004, Respondent filed a Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment and asked the court to compel the Trustee to sell the property in
question to Mr. Hamilton.  Respondent argued that the case law was unclear
as to Mr. Hamilton’s rights as a joint tenant, but proffered that, “Hamilton is
entitled by right, as joint tenant, to settlement with Johnson if able to do so,
prior to any third party purchase.” [12]  On November 5, 2004, Respondent filed
a Motion to Stay Proceedings Below in the Court of Special Appeals.  On
November 8, 2004, Ms. Johnson filed a second Request for Sanctions Pursuant
to Maryland Rule 1-341 asserting that Respondent’s tactics were dilatory,
meritless and designed to impede Ms. Johnson’s statutory right to sell the
property.  Ms. Johnson opposed the Motion to Alter and Amend Judgment and
requested reasonable attorneys’ fees.  In response, Respondent filed a Request
for Sanctions Pursuant to Maryland Rule 1-341, asserting that Mr. Hamilton
could purchase the property at the appraised value if given the opportunity to
refinance and that he should not have to match a higher third party offer.
In the meantime, Respondent continued to engage in negotiations with
the Trustee.  He entered into a contract to close on the property by November
24, 2004.  The Trustee granted two extensions, but ultimately cancelled the
contract because Mr. Hamilton failed to obtain financing.  Ms. Johnson filed
an Emergency Motion for Appropriate and Expedited Relief asserting that
Respondent’s delay tactics had prevented the Trustee from closing with third
party purchasers.  On December 17, 2004, Respondent filed an Emergency
Motion to Allow Respondent Priority to Settle with Trustee or to Stay Transfer
Title to Third Party Purchaser.  The property had been appraised at
$228,000.00, but the Trustee received offers as high as $259,000.00.  Mr.
Hamilton could not match the higher offers.
On January 2, 2005, in response to charges that Respondent was
preventing the sale of the property, Respondent filed a Motion for Trustee to
Provide Appraisal.  Respondent asserted that the delay in selling the property
was due to the Trustee’s failure to post a bond and provide an appraisal per
Maryland Rule 14-303.  In a motion filed days earlier, Ms. Johnson had
-7-
requested that Mr. Hamilton be held in contempt for preventing an appraiser
from a third-party’s prospective mortgagee from entering the property.
On January 25, 2005, after the Trustee had canceled Mr. Hamilton’s
contract, Respondent unilaterally scheduled a “sham” settlement on the
property with a mortgage company.  Respondent knew that the Trustee was out
of the country on the date of “settlement” and that the Trustee had not
approved the settlement.  Respondent thereafter wrote to the Trustee and filed
a Line with the court indicating that Mr. Hamilton had settled.
Judge Dawson heard argument on all outstanding motions on March 17,
2005.  The court determined that Respondent’s motions had been pursued in
bad faith and without substantial justification and suggested that Respondent
had become “too close” to Mr. Hamilton’s proceedings.  Sanctions were
imposed against Respondent and Mr. Hamilton in the amount of $12,230.00
to cover Ms. Johnson’s counsel fees.
On March 25, 2007, Respondent sent a letter to Judge Missouri,
Administrative Judge for the Circuit Court of Prince George’s County, without
notice to opposing counsel or the Trustee, asserting that Respondent was
precluded from filing appropriate motions regarding the property out of fear
of being sanctioned.  He concluded: “Please lead me in the proper direction
within the confines of your Court so that justice may be done considering the
status of this case.”  
On March 29, 2005, Respondent was notified that the Trustee had sold
the property for $259,000.00.  On May 3, 2005, the court ratified the sale.  The
Auditor’s Report was entered on July 13, 2005.
Respondent noted an appeal.  On September 19, 2005, he filed a brief
with the Court of Special Appeals in which he challenged the sale and the
sanctions.  Respondent’s brief misrepresented remarks made by Judge Dawson
during the March 17, 2005 hearing, claiming that Judge Dawson had said that
the judge was too close to the matter, when to the contrary, Judge Dawson had
told Respondent that Respondent might be too close to be objective.  The
Court of Special Appeals found that Respondent “misconstrued and twisted”
Judge Dawson’s words.  It further held that the Trustee acted in accordance
with his statutory duties, and noted that Respondent’s “legal arguments [were]
not presented in the context of the facts of this case, nor [did] he make an
effort to apply the law, or invoke precedent to bolster his argument.”  The
-8-
Court ruled that the Circuit Court had not erred in finding that Respondent
violated Maryland Rule 1-341 and did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning
Respondent, noting that “the evidence and inferences that can be reasonably
drawn from the filing of these motions demonstrate appellant’s bad faith and
lack of substantial justification.”  The Court declined to address Respondent’s
argument that Mr. Hamilton should not have had to pay more than fifty percent
(50%) of the equity in the real property insofar as Respondent had relied upon
inapplicable law and had failed to present a lucid and substantial argument.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration on October 25, 2006
and a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on December 26, 2006.  Both were
denied.
Conclusions of Law
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1 – Competence
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.  Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.
Whether a lawyer has employed the requisite knowledge and skill in a
particular matter is determined by considering “relevant factors including the
relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer’s general
experience, the lawyer’s training and experience in the field in question.”
Respondent’s trial performance in the underlying case, though less than
cogent or well supported, did not rise to the level of incompetence.  Neither
lack of preparation nor lack of thoroughness was to blame for the loss of Mr.
Hamilton’s home.  Mr. Hamilton appears not to have had a defense to the sale
of the property when Respondent was retained.  Mr. Hamilton was nonetheless
entitled to representation to ensure his rights were protected.  In vigorously
attempting to save his client’s home, Respondent proffered a theory that a joint
tenant is entitled to priority in purchasing the property and entitled to purchase
the property for fifty (50%) percent of the appraised value.  In pursuing this
theory, Respondent relied upon inapplicable, though tangentially related, case
law, while attempting to afford Mr. Hamilton an opportunity to purchase the
property.  Ultimately, Mr. Hamilton could not afford to purchase Ms.
Johnson’s interest in the property.
-9-
While Respondent’s trial performance skirted the bounds of competent
representation, his representation in the Court of Special Appeals cannot be
deemed to have been competent.  In the unreported decision in Hamilton v.
Johnson, Court of Special Appeals, No. 468, September Term, 2005, Judge
Davis wrote: “Preliminarily, we will discuss three of appellant’s eight
arguments based on his failure to present cogent and comprehensive arguments
to support his position…It is clear from the ‘arguments’ set forth above by
appellant that he presents nothing more than legal references and conclusions
to support his position.  His arguments above are not presented in the context
of facts of this case, nor does he make an effort to apply the law, or invoke
precedent to bolster his argument…We decline to address issues three, four,
and five of appellant’s brief for failure to provide support.”  In declining to
consider Respondent’s contention that Mr. Hamilton was entitled to purchase
the property for fifty percent (50%) of the appraised value, Judge Davis wrote,
“In light of our finding that appellant’s reliance on Dorsey and Kelly is
misplaced and the cases inapplicable, see III. B. supra, and appellant’s failure
once again to present a lucid and substantial argument, we decline to address
this issue on the merits.”
Considering Respondent’s performance as a whole, this Court finds that
Respondent violated MRPC 1.1.
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7(b) – Conflict
Rule 1.7(b) provides in pertinent part that except as otherwise provided,
a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent
conflict of interest.  A concurrent conflict of interest exists if there is a
significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially
limited by a personal interest of the lawyer.  Notwithstanding the existence of
a concurrent conflict of interest under the Rule, a lawyer may represent a
client if: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be
able to provide competent and diligent representation to each
affected client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a
claim by one client against another client represented by the
lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a
tribunal; and 
-10-
(4) each affected client gives informed consent,
confirmed in writing.
Petitioner contended that Respondent’s dual role as Mr. Hamilton’s real
estate broker and attorney for the disputed sale of the property constituted a
conflict of interest.  Respondent countered that Mr. Hamilton entered into the
agreement with Geoplex Realty as a convenience, insofar as any broker’s fees
earned from the sale of the property were to be applied to Mr. Hamilton’s
attorney’s fees.
Respondent reasonably believed that he could provide competent and
diligent representation while also serving as his client’s real estate broker.
There was no evidence that Respondent’s performance was colored by the fact
that his fees, which would presumably be owed regardless of whether
Respondent served as the real estate broker, would be paid in part from the
proceeds from the property.  Petitioner did not contend that Respondent
violated any law by employing his firm as the intended broker for the sale of
the property.  There was no showing that Respondent’s role as broker posed
a significant risk of materially limiting his ability to consider, recommend or
carry out an appropriate course of action for his client, nor that it prohibited his
ability to give detached legal advice.
Petitioner did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that
Respondent violated MRPC 1.7(b).
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 3.1 – Meritorious Claim
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert
an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not
frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification
or reversal of existing law.
Respondent was sanctioned at both the October 22, 2004 and March 17,
2005 hearings for violating Maryland Rule 1-341.  The Court of Special
Appeals sustained the sanctions.  While not dispositive, sanctions imposed by
other tribunals may be considered in deciding whether MRPC 3.1 has been
violated.
Respondent was advised at the October 22, 2004 hearing that his
-11-
arguments had no merit.  Despite this, he continued to file motions relying on
the same facts, same argument and same legal theory.  Respondent had no
basis for filing the Motion to Set Aside and/or Vacate Default Judgment, the
Motion to Compel Sale of the Property, Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment,
Request for Sanctions Pursuant to Maryland Rule 1-341, or the Emergency
Motion to Allow Respondent Priority to Settle with Trustee or to Stay Transfer
Title to Third Party Purchaser.  Accordingly, it was established by clear and
convincing evidence that Respondent violated MRPC 3.1.
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 3.2 – Expediting Litigation
A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent
with the interests of the client.
Respondent employed dilatory tactics, including unwarranted motions
and false representations that settlement had occurred, to prevent the sale of
the property, thereby frustrating the opposing party’s attempt to obtain rightful
redress.  Petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence that
Respondent violated MRPC 3.2.
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3(a) – Candor Towards the Tribunal
A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct
a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the
lawyer;
(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or
(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.  If a lawyer, the
lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material
evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take
reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the
tribunal.  A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a
defendant in a criminal matter that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.
A lawyer must avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the
adjudicative process and must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false
statements of law or fact that he knows to be false.
-12-
Respondent knowingly made false statements when representing that
settlement had occurred.  As well, Respondent relied on misleading statements
of fact regarding Judge Dawson when appealing the sanctions imposed by the
trial judge.  Respondent knew or should have known that these representations
were false.
Petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent
violated MRPC 3.3(a).
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 4.4(a) – Respect for Rights of Third
Persons
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no
substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person,
or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a
person.
A lawyer’s responsibility to his client does not imply that he may
disregard the rights of third persons.  While there was no suggestion that
Respondent’s tactics were intended to injure Ms. Johnson nor that he or his
client bore any ill-will towards Ms. Johnson, his actions were pursued in total
disregard for their substantial cost to Ms. Johnson, were intentionally dilatory
and were without legal basis.  While Respondent’s goal was to enable his
client to purchase the jointly held property, his tactics clearly and convincingly
constituted a violation of MRPC 4.4(a).
Maryland  Rules of Professional Conduct 8.2(a) – Judicial and Legal Officials
A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false
or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the
qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal
officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal office.
Petitioner pointed to Respondent’s March 25, 2005 letter to Judge
Missouri and Appellant’s Brief in support of its contention that Respondent
violated MRPC 8.2(a).
The letter to Judge Missouri, while an inappropriate appeal, did not
impugn Judge Dawson’s qualifications or integrity.
-13-
On the other hand, Respondent’s brief included statements regarding
Judge Dawson’s integrity which were known to be false or were made with
reckless disregard for the truth.  As the Court of Special Appeals opined after
evaluating Respondent’s contention that Judge Dawson had “admitted in open
court that he ‘was too close to the case’,” Respondent “adroitly misconstrue[d]
and twist[ed] the words of the court to create an argument or statement that
was not initially iterated.”  Respondent’s brief further asserted that Judge
Dawson had admitted in open court that he disliked Respondent and then
improperly refused to recuse himself.  Judge Dawson made no such comments.
While Respondent may have had a good faith belief that Judge Dawson
did not like him, the use of misleading statements to support the assertion that
Judge Dawson was motivated by personal bias improperly called the judge’s
integrity into question.  Accordingly, it was established by clear and
convincing evidence that Respondent violated MRPC 8.2(a).
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4(c) – Misconduct
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
Respondent advised the Court that his client had settled on the disputed
property when he had not.  He further misrepresented Judge Dawson’s words
in the appellate brief.  Accordingly, it has been established by clear and
convincing evidence that Respondent violated MRPC 8.4(c).
Maryland Rules of Professional conduct 8.4(d) – Misconduct
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Conduct that reflects negatively on the legal profession and sets a bad
example for the public at large is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Behavior that may seriously impair public confidence in the entire profession,
without extenuating circumstances, may be conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice.
Respondent’s frivolous motions, intentionally dilatory tactics, and
misrepresentations were prejudicial to the administration of justice.  While
Respondent no doubt was motivated by commitment to his client, rather than
13 Md. Rule 16-759(b) provides:
(continued...)
-14-
enmity for Ms. Johnson or antipathy for the legal system, the result was
prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of MRPC 8.4(d).
*  *  *
Mitigation
Respondent did not act with dishonest or selfish motives, nor with
intent to hurt Ms. Johnson.  He apparently thought he could achieve his client’s
ends, acquisition of the jointly titled property in which his client resided,
without depriving Ms. Johnson of fair compensation.  Respondent’s legal
arguments, while not supported by the case law, cited or otherwise, were
proffered with the intent of convincing the court that a party with an existing
interest in property should be afforded the right to purchase the property as
long as the party offers a purchase price consistent with the appraised value,
even if a higher offer has otherwise been submitted.  Unfortunately,
Responded pursued this theory inappropriately, with the consequences cited
above.
(Emphasis in original).
Neither Respondent nor Bar Counsel filed exceptions to the hearing court’s findings
of fact or conclusions of law.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In attorney discipline proceedings, this Court has original and complete jurisdiction
and conducts an independent review of the record.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Zuckerman, 403 Md. 695, 709, 944 A.2d 525, 534 (2008); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Nussbaum, 401 Md. 612, 632, 934 A.2d 1, 12 (2007); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Lawson, 401 Md. 536, 571-72, 933 A.2d 842, 863 (2007).  We review the hearing judge’s
conclusions of law de novo.  Md. Rule 16-759(b);13 Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kreamer,
(...continued)
(b) Review by Court of Appeals.
(1) Conclusions of Law.  The Court of Appeals shall review de novo the circuit court
judge's conclusions of law.
(2) Findings of Fact.
(A) If no exceptions are filed.  If no exceptions are filed, the Court may treat the findings
of fact as established for the purpose of determining appropriate sanctions, if any.
(B) If exceptions are filed.  If exceptions are filed, the Court of Appeals shall determine
whether the findings of fact have been proven by the requisite standard of proof set out in
Rule 16-757(b).  The Court may confine its review to the findings of fact challenged by
the exceptions.  The Court shall give due regard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to
assess the credibility of witnesses.
-15-
404 Md. 282, 292, 946 A.2d 500, 506 (2008); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Parsons, 404
Md. 175, 184, 946 A.2d 437, 443 (2008).  As neither party has filed exceptions, we treat the
findings of fact as established for the purpose of determining the appropriate sanction, if any.
Md. Rule 16-759(b); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Elmendorf, 404 Md. 353, 360, 946 A.2d
542, 546 (2008).   
DISCUSSION
Upon reviewing the record, we determine that the hearing judge’s conclusions of law
are supported by clear and convincing evidence.  We therefore turn to the task of determining
the appropriate sanction for Respondent’s violations of the MRPC.  Bar Counsel
recommends that Respondent be disbarred.  Respondent recommends a ninety day suspension
as the appropriate sanction, because he was not motivated by personal gain, but rather an
overzealous desire to protect his client’s interests.
-16-
Bar Counsel points to Respondent’s false and misleading statements to the Circuit
Court and the Court of Special Appeals, and our decision in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Siskind, 401 Md. 41, 75, 930 A.2d 328, 348 (2007), where we noted that the ultimate
sanction of disbarment was appropriate for violations involving dishonesty, fraud, or deceit.
In addition to the violations currently before this Court, Bar Counsel points to Respondent’s
prior sanctions imposed by this Court.  On February 24, 2003, Respondent was suspended
from the practice of law for thirty days for his failure to properly hold client funds in trust,
and failing to appropriately designate his attorney trust account.  On October 30, 2005,
Respondent was suspended for ninety days, by consent, for violations of MRPC 3.1
(Meritorious Claims and Contentions), 3.2 (Expediting Litigation), 3.3 (Candor Toward the
Tribunal), and 8.4(d) (Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice).
We have said that the purpose of attorney discipline proceedings is to maintain the
integrity of the legal profession, protect the public, and deter further violations of the MRPC
by other attorneys.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zuckerman, 386 Md. 341, 375, 872 A.2d
693, 713 (2005).  We determine the appropriate sanction for violations of the MRPC based
on the individual facts and circumstances of each case.  Id.  With regard to the sanction for
violations involving dishonesty, this Court has said:
[u]nlike matters relating to competency, diligence and the like,
intentional dishonest conduct is closely entwined with the most
important matters of basic character to such a degree as to make
intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer almost beyond excuse.
Honesty and dishonesty are, or are not, present in any attorney's
-17-
character. Disbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for
intentional dishonest conduct.
Siskind, 401 Md. at 75, 930 A.2d at 348.  
Furthermore, “[o]nly in the case of compelling extenuating circumstances ‘will we
even consider imposing less than the most severe sanction of disbarment’ in cases involving
dishonesty and fraudulent conduct.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Goodman, 381 Md. 480,
499, 850 A.2d 1157, 1168 (2004) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364
Md. 376, 414, 773 A.2d 463, 485 (2001)).  In Vanderlinde, we went on to say that, in such
cases, 
we will not accept, as “compelling extenuating circumstances,”
anything less than the most serious and utterly debilitating
mental or physical health conditions, arising from any source
that is the “root cause” of the misconduct and that also result in
an attorney’s utter inability to conform his or her conduct in
accordance with the law and with the MRPC.  
364 Md. at 413-14, 773 A.2d at 485.  Vanderlinde 
is a seminal case, in that it sought to return some measure of
consistency to the analysis of sanctions in intentional dishonesty
cases.  After documenting the tortured and sometimes
inexplicable “all-over-the-ballpark” array of sanctions in cases
of attorney dishonesty that preceded it, Vanderlinde endeavored
to restore a principal, guiding star for the sanctions in such
cases.  
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 597, 876 A.2d 642, 661 (2005);
see also In re Pennington, 921 A.2d 135, 140 (D.C. 2007) (noting that Pennington’s
disbarment in Maryland “was dictated by what amounts to a presumption under Maryland
-18-
law that an attorney who engages in intentional dishonesty will be disbarred”).
In Goodman, we imposed the sanction of disbarment because an attorney filed
pleadings and signed the name of a different attorney without that attorney’s knowledge or
permission.  381 Md. at 483, 499, 850 A.2d at 1159, 1168.  In addition, Mr. Goodman
negotiated a settlement with opposing counsel, while pretending to be this other attorney, and
also attempted to mislead the trial judge about his (Mr. Goodman’s) identity.  Goodman, 381
Md. at 483, 850 A.2d at 1159.  We reasoned that disbarment was the appropriate sanction,
in part, because “a lawyer’s act of dishonesty, fraud, or deceit might cause the public to lose
confidence in other lawyers and the judicial system as a whole.”  Goodman, 381 Md. at 498,
850 A.2d at 1168 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. White, 354 Md. 346, 364, 731
A.2d 447, 457 (1999)).  
While, in this case, the hearing judge found that Respondent was motivated by a desire
to further his client’s interests, and not a desire to harm Ms. Johnson, we cannot say that his
intent, without more, is compelling enough for us to impose less of a sanction than
disbarment in this case.  Respondent was intentionally dishonest with both the Circuit Court
and the Court of Special Appeals, and, as we have noted previously, “intentional dishonest
conduct is closely entwined with the most important matters of basic character to such a
degree as to make intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer almost beyond excuse.”
Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 418, 773 A.2d at 488.  Furthermore, Respondent went so far as to
create a “sham” settlement, at a time he knew the Trustee was out of the country, and
-19-
indicated to the court that his client had settled.  This shows a systematic effort by the
Respondent to mislead the court.  Given Respondent’s history of sanctions before this Court
for violating the MRPC, it appears that Respondent has shown an ongoing disregard for the
MRPC.   
In light of these facts, therefore, we impose the sanction of disbarment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.  RESPONDENT
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED
BY THIS COURT, INCLUDING THE
C O S T  
O F  
T R A N S C R I P T S ,
PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE
1 6 - 7 6 1  
F O R  
W H I C H  
S U M
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR
OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION AGAINST CHARLES
E. MCCLAIN, SR.
Chief Judge Bell and Judge Eldridge would impose an indefinite suspension rather than
disbarment as the appropriate sanction.