Case Title: Trappman v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC2021-1479

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2024-02-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC2021-1479 
____________ 
 
DAVID WILLIAM TRAPPMAN, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
February 8, 2024 
 
CANADY, J. 
 
 
Petitioner David William Trappman was not cooperative when 
law enforcement officers came to his home to arrest his wife.  As the 
officers were attempting to make the arrest, Trappman shoved an 
officer.  After the officer shoved back, Trappman responded by 
siccing a pit bull on the officer.  For shoving the officer, Trappman 
was convicted of battery of a law enforcement officer.  For siccing 
the dog on the officer, with the resulting bite and scarring of the 
officer’s leg, Trappman was convicted of aggravated battery of a law 
enforcement officer. 
 
- 2 - 
 
In Trappman’s appeal, the First District Court of Appeal 
rejected an argument that the protection against double jeopardy 
precluded his dual convictions and sentences.  Trappman v. State, 
325 So. 3d 944, 945 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021).  The court concluded that 
although the two offenses occurred in one criminal episode, they 
were based on distinct acts for which multiple punishments could 
be imposed without a double jeopardy violation.  Id. at 946.  
Recognizing that the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal 
in Olivard v. State, 831 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), involved a 
similar fact pattern but reached a different result on the double 
jeopardy issue, the First District certified that its decision was in 
direct conflict with Olivard.  Trappman, 325 So. 3d at 947.  Based 
on the certified conflict, we decided to exercise jurisdiction.  See art. 
V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
Because we agree with the First District that the shoving of the 
officer and the subsequent siccing of the dog on the officer were 
distinct criminal acts for which separate punishments were 
properly imposed, we approve the conclusion in Trappman that no 
double jeopardy violation occurred.  And we disapprove Olivard as 
inconsistent with our reasoning here.  
 
- 3 - 
In explaining our decision, we first review the facts of the 
incident that resulted in the charges against Trappman and the 
First District’s disposition of Trappman’s appeal and compare that 
decision with the conflict decision.  We then examine double 
jeopardy principles, focusing particularly on the multiple-
punishment analytical framework set forth in the United States 
Supreme Court’s landmark decision of Blockburger v. United States, 
284 U.S. 299 (1932).  Next we turn to the Blockburger-inspired rule 
of construction regarding multiple punishments contained in 
section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (2017).  Finally, we consider 
the arguments of the parties on the conflict issue and then analyze 
Trappman’s conduct, concluding that separate impulses resulting 
in distinct criminal acts justify Trappman’s dual convictions and 
sentences. 
I. 
As explained by the First District, officers arrived at 
Trappman’s home “to execute an arrest warrant for his wife.”  
Trappman, 325 So. 3d at 945. 
Once officers entered the home, [Trappman] was 
instructed to proceed back outside with his two dogs 
while the warrant on his wife was executed.  At trial, 
 
- 4 - 
officers testified that [Trappman] initially complied; 
however, once outside, he began to rile up the dogs by 
banging their heads together and yelling at them.  He 
eventually reappeared in the doorway of the home 
holding both dogs by the collars and refused the officers’ 
orders to go back outside.  Sergeant Bird—the victim of 
both batteries—testified that when he approached, 
[Trappman] reached out and shoved him with one hand.  
Sergeant Bird responded by driving [Trappman] towards 
the front door with both hands.  [Trappman] then let go 
of a dog while exclaiming “dog up, dog up.”  The dog, a 
pit bull, leapt at Sergeant Bird and latched onto his leg, 
causing injury and subsequent scarring. 
 
Id.  Trappman was charged with battery of a law enforcement officer 
and aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer.1   
“The theory of the State’s case was that [Trappman] had 
initially committed battery by shoving Sergeant Bird, and that he 
separately committed aggravated battery by subsequently ‘siccing’ 
the dog on Bird.”  Id.  Agreeing with the State, the First District held 
that Trappman’s acts of shoving a police officer and then siccing a 
dog on the officer were “distinct acts” rendering double jeopardy 
inapplicable, notwithstanding that the two acts “occurred over the 
 
 
1.  Trappman was also charged with resisting arrest.  That 
charge is not at issue. 
 
- 5 - 
course of approximately one minute” and “were part of a single 
criminal episode.”  Id. at 946. 
The First District certified conflict with the decision of the 
Fourth District in Olivard.  There, the defendant was convicted of 
battery (for hitting the victim) and aggravated battery (for biting off 
the victim’s ear).  831 So. 2d at 824.  The Fourth District reversed 
the lesser conviction, reasoning that the defendant’s “actions were 
within the course of one continuous episode attacking [the victim].”  
Id.  The Fourth District, which did not discuss the notion of 
“distinct acts,” viewed the defendant’s conduct as “a single act,” and 
concluded that dual punishments for the greater offense of 
aggravated battery and the lesser included offense of battery could 
not be imposed for such a “single act.”  Id.   
II. 
 
The Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause provides that 
no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb.”  Amend. V, U.S. Const.  The protections of 
this federal constitutional provision are applicable to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 
784, 787 (1969).  In any event, the Florida Constitution contains a 
 
- 6 - 
similar provision, which states that no person shall “be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense.”  Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const.  We have said 
“that our own double jeopardy clause in article I, section 9, Florida 
Constitution, which has endured in this state with only minor 
changes since the constitution of 1845, was intended to mirror [the] 
intention of those who framed the double jeopardy clause of the 
fifth amendment.”  Carawan v. State, 515 So. 2d 161, 164 (Fla. 
1987); see also Trotter v. State, 825 So. 2d 362, 365 (Fla. 2002) 
(“The scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause is the same in both the 
federal and Florida Constitutions.”). 
 
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court “have 
recognized three separate guarantees embodied in the Double 
Jeopardy Clause: It protects against a second prosecution for the 
same offense after acquittal, against a second prosecution for the 
same offense after conviction, and against multiple punishments for 
the same offense.”  Justs. of Bos. Mun. Ct. v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 
306-07 (1984) (citing Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415 (1980)).2  
 
 
2.  Mistrials can also trigger application of the double jeopardy 
clause in some circumstances.  See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 
82 (1978). 
 
- 7 - 
In applying each of the three guarantees, the essential 
determination is whether one charge against a defendant is for the 
“same offense” as another charge against that defendant.  And for 
double jeopardy protection to apply, most succinctly put, the 
offenses must be “the same in law and in fact.”  Burton v. United 
States, 202 U.S. 344, 380 (1906) (quoting Commonwealth v. Roby, 
12 Pick. 496, 502 (Mass. 1832)); see also Boswell v. State, 20 Fla. 
869, 875 (1884) (“In considering the identity of the offence, it must 
appear . . . that the offence charged in both cases was the same in 
law and in fact.” (quoting Roby, 12 Pick. at 509)). 
A. 
 
Here, the third guarantee—“against multiple punishments for 
the same offense”—is at issue.  A framework for analyzing such 
multiple-punishment double jeopardy questions is laid out in 
Blockburger, which addresses the distinct questions of how to 
determine both whether offenses are the same “in fact” and whether 
they are the same “in law.”  The first inquiry addresses whether 
conduct transgressing a single prohibition is subject to multiple 
punishments, and the second is aimed at determining whether a 
single act transgressing more than one prohibition may be 
 
- 8 - 
punished separately based on the violation of the separate 
prohibitions.   
Under Blockburger’s reasoning, multiple punishments for 
violations of a single criminal prohibition are permissible if the 
prohibition is aimed at singular acts—as opposed to a continuous 
offense or course of criminal conduct—and the defendant’s conduct 
involves separate acts stemming from “successive impulses.”  See 
Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 302 (quoting Wharton’s Criminal Law 
(11th Ed.) § 34).3  And multiple punishments for a single act that 
violates separate criminal prohibitions are permissible if the 
separate prohibitions each require proof of a fact not required to 
establish a violation of the other prohibition.  See id. at 304. 
 
In Blockburger, the defendant was convicted of three counts 
related to the illegal sale of morphine hydrochloride to the same 
purchaser.  Id. at 301.  One “count charged a sale on a specified 
day of ten grains of the drug not in or from the original stamped 
package,” while another “count charged a sale on the following day 
 
 
3.  Blockburger does not address when multiple punishments 
may be imposed for a singular act that violates a single prohibition 
but affects multiple victims. 
 
- 9 - 
of eight grains of the drug not in or from the original stamped 
package.”  Id.  The final “count charged the latter sale also as 
having been made not in pursuance of a written order of the 
purchaser as required by the statute.”  Id.  On review, the 
defendant first contended that the conduct on which the first two 
counts were predicated “constitute[d] a single offense” based on the 
facts.  Id.  Second, the defendant also argued that the final count—
for violating the separate statutory prohibition concerning the 
absence of a written order—as a matter of law “constitute[d] but one 
offense” with the later of the other counts, since the two counts 
were based on the same conduct.  Id.  The Court rejected both 
arguments.  
 
Concerning the first argument, the Court concluded that the 
two sales “were distinct and separate sales made at different times.”  
Id.  This was so even though payment for the drug in the second 
transaction—to be delivered the day after the drug in the first 
transaction was delivered—was made “shortly after delivery of the 
drug” in the first transaction.  Id.  The Court reasoned that “the first 
sale had been consummated, and the payment for the additional 
 
- 10 - 
drug, however closely following, was the initiation of a separate and 
distinct sale completed by its delivery.”  Id.   
The Court pointed to the well-established distinction between 
offenses that are continuous in character and offenses that can be 
committed by a singular act—that is, “uno ictu” or with one blow—
concluding that the statute under examination could be 
transgressed by an “isolated act.”  Id. at 302 (quoting Ex parte 
Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 281, 286 (1887)).  “Each of several successive 
sales constitutes a distinct offense, however closely they may follow 
each other.”  Id.  The Court elaborated by highlighting the 
significance of “successive impulses” discussed in Wharton’s 
Criminal Law: “[W]hen the impulse is single, but one indictment 
lies, no matter how long the action may continue.  If successive 
impulses are separately given, even though all unite in swelling a 
common stream of action, separate indictments lie.”  Id. (quoting 
Wharton’s Criminal Law (11th Ed.) § 34). 
On the defendant’s second contention, comparing the offense 
of sale “not in or from the original stamped package” with the 
offense of sale “not in pursuance of a written order,” the Court 
observed that “[e]ach of the offenses created requires proof of a 
 
- 11 - 
different element.”  Id. at 304.  The Court stated this as the 
governing rule: “[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a 
violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied 
to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether 
each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.”  
Id.  Under that test, the defendant’s argument was unavailing 
because “although both sections were violated by the one sale, two 
offenses were committed.”  Id. 
 
We have recognized the importance of the two different lines of 
analysis in Blockburger and that conflating those distinct lines of 
analysis is erroneous.  Rejecting case law that suggested such a 
conflated analysis, in Graham v. State, 207 So. 3d 135 (Fla. 2016), 
we clarified 
that Blockburger ultimately provides courts with two tests 
to apply: (1) where the defendant is convicted multiple 
times under the same statute for acts that occurred 
during the course of a single criminal episode, a “distinct 
acts” test is used, but (2) where a defendant is convicted 
under multiple statutes for one act, the “different 
elements” test applies. 
 
Id. at 141.  Regarding “the Blockburger ‘distinct acts’ analysis,” we 
recognized that acts are distinct when they “indicate[] a different 
impulse to violate the statute.”  Id. at 139.  We also accordingly 
 
- 12 - 
acknowledged “that under Blockburger, a defendant can also 
commit a number of sequential acts within a single criminal 
episode, and each distinct act may be punished under the same 
statute.”  Id. at 140. 
B. 
 
“With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single 
trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the 
sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the 
legislature intended.”  Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983).  
The protection against multiple punishments for the same offense 
thus  
is designed to ensure that the sentencing discretion of 
courts is confined to the limits established by the 
legislature.  Because the substantive power to prescribe 
crimes and determine punishments is vested with the 
legislature, the question under the Double Jeopardy 
Clause whether punishments are “multiple” is essentially 
one of legislative intent. 
 
Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984) (citations omitted).  In 
line with our law deciding that the state and federal double jeopardy 
protections have the same scope, we have echoed and applied this 
understanding of the limitations on multiple punishments as 
focused on legislative authorization.  See, e.g., Valdes v. State, 3 So. 
 
- 13 - 
3d 1067, 1069 (Fla. 2009) (discussing relevant Supreme Court case 
law and stating that “there is no constitutional prohibition against 
multiple punishments for different offenses arising out of the same 
criminal transaction as long as the Legislature intends to authorize 
separate punishments”). 
 
The decision in Blockburger—which notably makes no mention 
of the constitutional protection against double jeopardy—addresses 
how to properly interpret and apply federal criminal laws to insure 
that multiple punishments are not imposed when unauthorized by 
Congress.  “In the federal courts the [Blockburger] test . . . ordinarily 
determines whether the crimes are indeed separate and whether 
cumulative punishments may be imposed.”  Johnson, 467 U.S. at 
499 n.8.  But “the Blockburger test does not necessarily control the 
inquiry into the intent of a state legislature.  Even if the crimes are 
the same under Blockburger, if it is evident that a state legislature 
intended to authorize cumulative punishments, a court’s inquiry is 
at an end.”  Id.  
III. 
In Florida, the legislature has acted to provide very specific 
guidance concerning the general rules for determining when 
 
- 14 - 
separate punishments are properly applied for separate offenses 
that are committed during one criminal transaction or episode.  The 
legislative rules were adopted against the backdrop of Blockburger 
and Florida’s prior adherence to the “single transaction rule,” under 
which, as we held in Simmons v. State, 10 So. 2d 436, 439 (Fla. 
1942), “there should be one punishment where . . . the various 
counts of the information presented different aspects of the same 
criminal transaction and . . . the court should impose a sentence on 
the count which charges the higher grade or degree of the offense.”  
From its inception in 1976, section 775.021(4) “abrogated the single 
transaction rule.”  Borges v. State, 415 So. 2d 1265, 1266 (Fla. 
1982).  The statutory rules thus embody a broad purpose “to 
convict and sentence for each criminal offense committed”—even 
when committed in the course of a single transaction or episode—
and a departure from principles of lenity as previously understood.  
 
These “rules of construction” are set forth in section 
775.021(4): 
(4)(a) Whoever, in the course of one criminal 
transaction or episode, commits an act or acts which 
constitute one or more separate criminal offenses, upon 
conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall be sentenced 
separately for each criminal offense; and the sentencing 
 
- 15 - 
judge may order the sentences to be served concurrently 
or consecutively.  For the purposes of this subsection, 
offenses are separate if each offense requires proof of an 
element that the other does not, without regard to the 
accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial. 
(b) The intent of the Legislature is to convict and 
sentence for each criminal offense committed in the 
course of one criminal episode or transaction and not to 
allow the principle of lenity as set forth in subsection (1) 
to determine legislative intent.  Exceptions to this rule of 
construction are: 
1. Offenses which require identical elements of 
proof. 
2. Offenses which are degrees of the same offense 
as provided by statute. 
3. Offenses which are lesser offenses the statutory 
elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense. 
 
§ 775.021(4), Fla. Stat. 
 
The “principle of lenity” in subsection (1) requires that the 
provisions of the Florida Criminal Code “and offenses defined by 
other statutes shall be strictly construed,” so that “when the 
language is susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be 
construed most favorably to the accused.”  § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat.  
But subsection (4) makes clear that this rule of lenity has no 
application to matters within the scope of subsection (4), subject 
only to the specific exceptions set forth in subsection (4)(b)1.-3.   
We have acknowledged that “the Blockburger same-elements 
test”—which is sometimes characterized as a different elements 
 
- 16 - 
test—is “codified” in subsection (4).  State v. Marsh, 308 So. 3d 59, 
61 (Fla. 2020); see also State v. Maxwell, 682 So. 2d 83, 84 (Fla. 
1996) (“Section 775.021(4) is a codification of the Blockburger test, 
sometimes referred to as the same-elements test, which inquires 
whether each offense contains an element not contained in the 
other; if not, they are the same offense and double jeopardy bars 
subsequent punishment or prosecution.”).  The Blockburger same-
elements test is reflected in the text of the last sentence of 
subsection (4)(a), which provides that “offenses are separate if each 
offense requires proof of an element that the other does not, without 
regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial.”  It 
is also reflected and refined in the exceptions of subsection (4)(b) 
from the general rule that the intent of the legislature is “to convict 
and sentence for each criminal offense committed in the course of 
one criminal episode or transaction.”   
Under the statute—understood against the backdrop of 
Blockburger—multiple punishments for a criminal act that violates 
multiple criminal provisions are precluded if the provisions fall 
outside the ambit of the last sentence of subsection (4)(a) or within 
 
- 17 - 
the exceptions of subsection (4)(b).  And nothing in the statute is 
inconsistent with Blockburger’s distinct acts test. 
IV. 
Trappman’s core argument is that the two offenses of which he 
was convicted were “committed during one continuous criminal 
episode with one criminal intent” and multiple punishments were 
precluded under the exception in section 775.021(4)(b)3. because 
the statutory elements of the lesser offense (battery of a law 
enforcement officer) were subsumed by the greater offense 
(aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer).4  In support of his 
position, Trappman cites Olivard—the conflict case—and various 
other cases, relying principally on our decision in Hayes v. State, 
803 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 2001), in which we said that in determining 
whether criminal conduct involves distinct acts rather than “one 
continuous criminal act with a single criminal intent,” “courts 
 
 
4.  At oral argument, counsel for Trappman argued that this 
Court need not reach the issue of distinct acts and can instead 
resolve this case based on certain alleged deficiencies in the 
charging document.  But Trappman never raised this charging-
document issue below or in his initial brief to this Court.  We do not 
now consider this issue that was not properly preserved or 
presented.  
 
- 18 - 
should look to whether there was a separation of time, place, or 
circumstances.”  Id. at 704. 
The State counters that “[b]ecause Petitioner’s convictions 
were based on two separate distinct acts which were based upon 
separate impulses or intents, a Blockburger [different elements] 
analysis is not triggered.”  The State also points us to Graham, 
where—as previously mentioned—this Court “clarifie[d]” its reading 
of Blockburger and distinguished between the “distinct acts” test 
and the “different elements” test and—following Blockburger—
determined that acts are distinct when they are based on separate 
impulses.  Graham, 207 So. 3d at 139, 141.  According to the State, 
Trappman’s conduct in shoving the officer and subsequently siccing 
the dog on the officer involved two distinct acts flowing from two 
separate impulses.   
V. 
The State concedes that the two offenses for which Trappman 
was convicted occurred in the course of a single criminal 
transaction or episode.  The material facts related to the 
commission of the two offenses similarly are not disputed.  Nor is it 
disputed that the statutory elements of the lesser offense (battery of 
 
- 19 - 
a law enforcement officer) were subsumed by the greater offense 
(aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer) and that only one 
punishment would be applicable if the offenses were predicated on 
a singular act. 
Accordingly, the sole question presented for us to decide is 
whether the relevant conduct of Trappman constituted one criminal 
act of battery of a law enforcement officer, subject to only one 
punishment, or two successive criminal acts of battery of a law 
enforcement officer (the latter of which was in an aggravated form), 
subject to two punishments.  We review this question de novo.  See 
Pizzo v. State, 945 So. 2d 1203, 1206 (Fla. 2006) (“A double 
jeopardy claim based upon undisputed facts presents a pure 
question of law and is reviewed de novo.”).  Concerning whether 
there were multiple acts of battery, there is no suggestion that 
battery is a continuing offense that cannot be committed by an 
isolated act.  Nor is there any suggestion that the question here is 
resolved by the manner in which the statutory offenses are defined.5  
 
 
5.  This stands in contrast to cases such as State v. Johnson, 
343 So. 3d 46, 47 (Fla. 2022), in which we upheld multiple 
punishments for a single act of leaving the scene of an accident 
involving multiple victims.  Relying on the text of the statutory 
 
- 20 - 
Ultimately, we agree with the State that Blockburger’s distinct acts 
analysis provides the appropriate basis for deciding the issue in this 
case.  That test serves to implement the statutory directive to 
“convict and sentence for each criminal offense committed.” 
A. 
We begin our analysis by examining our decision in Hayes, in 
which the defendant, who was convicted and sentenced for both 
armed robbery and grand theft of an automobile for conduct in the 
course of a single criminal episode, challenged the district court 
decision upholding the dual punishments against a double jeopardy 
claim.  803 So. 2d at 697-98.  Specifically, we considered  
the issue . . . whether a defendant may be separately 
convicted of both armed robbery and grand theft of a 
motor vehicle where the defendant steals various items 
from inside a victim’s residence, including the victim’s 
car keys, and then proceeds outside the residence to 
steal the victim’s motor vehicle utilizing these keys. 
 
 
prohibition as understood in the context of the statutory scheme, 
we concluded that the “permissible unit of prosecution” under the 
statute authorized “prosecution on a per-crash-victim basis, rather 
than on a per-crash basis.”  Id.  The arguments presented here do 
not turn on a unit-of-prosecution analysis.  
 
- 21 - 
Id. at 697.  Based on the circumstances described, we decided that 
the two offenses were based on “distinct and independent criminal 
acts” and therefore that the imposition of two punishments was 
appropriate.  Id. at 704-05. 
The foundation for our analysis in Hayes was our recognition 
that “the prohibition against double jeopardy does not prohibit 
multiple convictions and punishments [when] a defendant commits 
two or more distinct criminal acts,” id. at 700—that is, when the 
offenses are not the same “in fact.”  We also recognized that in 
deciding whether criminal conduct constitutes a single criminal act 
as opposed to multiple distinct acts, “it is difficult to formulate a 
bright-line rule because the determination is often fact-specific.”  Id. 
at 705. 
Nonetheless, after surveying Florida case law and case law 
from certain other jurisdictions, we articulated a standard for 
making such a determination “in a case involving a single victim’s 
property.”  Id. at 704.  We said that  
courts should look to whether there was a separation of 
time, place, or circumstances between the initial armed 
robbery and the subsequent grand theft, as those factors 
are objective criteria utilized to determine whether there 
are distinct and independent criminal acts or whether 
 
- 22 - 
there is one continuous criminal act with a single 
criminal intent. 
 
Id. (emphasis added).  We elaborated that in deciding whether 
multiple criminal acts occurred, “the courts should consider the 
location of the items taken, the lapse of time between takings, the 
number of owners of the items taken, and whether intervening 
events occurred between the takings.”  Id.   
Based on this analytical framework, we held that even though 
“there was only a single victim . . . and there were no intervening 
acts, . . . the robbery of various items from inside the residence was 
sufficiently separate in time, place and circumstances from Hayes’ 
theft of the motor vehicle parked outside the victim’s residence to 
constitute distinct and independent criminal acts.”  Id.  Our 
analysis did not consider whether the conduct of Hayes involved 
“successive impulses,” the touchstone articulated in Blockburger for 
determining whether separate violations of a particular statutory 
provision have occurred.6 
 
 
6.  In our discussion of case law from other jurisdictions, we 
did mention authorities that employed the concept of “impulses” in 
determining whether multiple instances of a particular offense had 
 
- 23 - 
B. 
In contrast to Hayes, our more recent decision in Graham 
relied directly on Blockburger’s “distinct acts” analysis.  We find that 
Graham—in tracking Blockburger—provides a more helpful line of 
analysis for deciding the issue presented by Trappman. 
The question in Graham, in which the First District had 
affirmed the defendant’s convictions and sentences, was “whether 
double jeopardy prohibits dual convictions under the same statute 
[when] the acts upon which the charges are based occur within a 
single criminal episode.”  207 So. 3d at 137.  The dual convictions 
and sentences were for lewd and lascivious molestation based on 
the successive touchings of different parts of the victim’s body.  Id. 
at 136.  The victim’s testimony established that the defendant went 
to her as she slept and “touch[ed] [her] breasts under her shirt.”  Id. 
at 141.  Then, when the “victim turned over” she felt the defendant 
 
occurred.  See Hayes, 803 So. 2d at 702-03.  But we incorporated 
nothing regarding the concept of “impulses” in our own analysis. 
 
- 24 - 
“touching her buttocks.”  Id.7  We concluded that “these touches 
were each individual acts, committed sequentially” and that 
“[u]nder a ‘distinct acts’ analysis, it is clear that punishment was 
warranted for each individual touch.”  Id.  We analogized the case to 
Blockburger: 
Similar to Blockburger—in which the Court held that “the 
payment for the additional drug, however closely 
following, was the initiation of a separate and distinct 
sale completed by its delivery”—in this case, a new act 
began each time one touch ended and another was 
initiated, no matter how closely each one followed the 
other. 
 
Id. (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301).   
We thus approved the First District’s decision to affirm the 
dual convictions and sentences.  Id.  But we disagreed with its 
reasoning—reasoning that we concluded confused the proper 
analysis concerning multiple punishments for the violation of a 
particular criminal prohibition.  Id.  We recognized that the First 
District’s reasoning found its genesis in the reasoning of one of our 
 
 
7.  Although we did not focus on the circumstance, it appears 
that the victim’s act of turning over could be seen as an act of 
resisting the illicit contact. 
 
- 25 - 
own decisions—State v. Meshell, 2 So. 3d 132 (Fla. 2009).  Graham, 
207 So. 3d at 136. 
 
In Meshell, we considered whether “Meshell’s convictions for 
lewd and lascivious battery . . . for vaginal penetration or union . . . 
and for oral sex . . . violated double jeopardy.”  2 So. 3d at 133.  We 
upheld the dual convictions and sentences, concluding that 
“[b]ecause the oral sex . . . is a criminal act distinctively different 
from the vaginal penetration or union . . . , there is not a double 
jeopardy violation.”  Id. at 136.  We reasoned that “sexual acts of a 
separate character and type requiring different elements of 
proof . . . are distinct criminal acts that the Florida Legislature has 
decided warrant multiple punishments.”  Id. at 135.  
Notwithstanding the focus of our reasoning in Meshell, we did quote 
a district court decision stating that “the fact that the same victim 
is sexually battered in the same manner more than once in a 
criminal episode by the same defendant does not conclusively 
prohibit multiple punishments” and that “[s]patial and temporal 
aspects are equally . . . important as distinctions in character and 
type in determining whether multiple punishments are 
 
- 26 - 
appropriate.”  Id. (quoting Saavedra v. State, 576 So. 2d 953, 957 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1991), approved, 622 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 1993)). 
 
In Graham, we criticized the reasoning of Meshell as follows: 
Meshell had violated the lewd or lascivious molestation 
statute twice: First, when he penetrated the victim’s 
vagina, and second, when he penetrated the victim’s 
mouth.  Under the Blockburger “distinct acts” analysis, 
each act was distinct because each act indicated a 
different impulse to violate the statute.  Therefore, 
multiple punishments under the same statute would not 
violate double jeopardy.  However, this Court held that 
the two acts were “distinct” because they were “sexual 
acts of a separate character and type requiring different 
elements of proof, such as those proscribed in the sexual 
battery statute.”  Meshell, 2 So. 3d at 135 (emphasis 
added).  By including the “different elements” language in 
its analysis of “distinct acts,” it appears this Court may 
have conflated the two tests set forth in Blockburger. 
 
Graham, 207 So. 3d at 139-40. 
C. 
 
We reiterate Graham’s emphasis on the importance of 
distinguishing between the two tests set forth in Blockburger.  The 
analysis employed in determining whether offenses are the same “in 
fact” is very different from the analysis employed in determining 
whether offenses are the same “in law.”  Multiple punishments are 
precluded only when the charged offenses are both the same in fact 
and the same in law.  So it is essential that the distinct acts test not 
 
- 27 - 
be conflated or confused with—or displaced by—the same-elements 
test.  Acts are distinct when they result from “successive impulses” 
even when the character of the acts is the same.  But we also 
recognize that in applying the distinct acts test, it is significant that 
the conduct of a defendant has violated a single prohibition in 
multiple ways.  Although a variation in the manner in which the 
prohibition is violated is not necessary to establish the existence of 
distinct acts, such variation may signal that the defendant’s 
wrongdoing involves “successive impulses” to violate the same 
prohibition and thus results in distinct acts warranting separate 
punishment for each act. 
Likewise, we acknowledge that Hayes’s teaching that “courts 
should look to whether there was a separation of time, place, or 
circumstances” in the conduct of a defendant points to factors that 
may evidence that the defendant was guilty of conduct involving 
successive impulses to violate the same prohibition.  See Hayes, 
803 So. 2d at 704.  But the touchstone of the analysis—as 
Blockburger held—must be whether there were such successive 
impulses.  As in Graham, we adhere to Blockburger’s distinct acts 
test, which recognized that “[e]ach of several successive” violations 
 
- 28 - 
“constitutes a distinct offense, however closely they may follow each 
other” and placed the focus of the analysis squarely on whether 
there were “successive impulses.”  Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 302.  
Under the Blockburger test, separate instances of an offense—
arising from successive impulses—may be committed at the same 
place, in the same manner, and in close temporal connection. 
D. 
Applying the Blockburger distinct acts test, we conclude that 
Trappman’s conduct involved successive impulses to commit a 
battery and that his dual convictions and sentences were properly 
affirmed by the First District.  After Trappman first battered the 
officer by shoving him and the officer shoved back, Trappman 
responded to the officer’s resistance not by continuing the shoving 
match but by using the pit bull to escalate his violence against the 
officer.  Trappman’s conduct unquestionably “unite[d] in swelling a 
common stream of action.”  Id. (quoting Wharton’s Criminal Law 
(11th Ed.) § 34).  But that does not mean that the conduct involved 
only one criminal act.  On the contrary, there was a disjuncture in 
Trappman’s conduct when he moved from shoving to deploying the 
dog.  Successive criminal impulses to batter the officer are evident 
 
- 29 - 
in the sequence of events.  Those successive impulses resulted in 
distinct acts that are subject to separate punishments.8   
In this respect, Trappman’s course of conduct is akin to the 
defendant’s course of conduct in Graham.  In both cases, although 
there was a close temporal connection between the successive 
instances of forbidden physical contact, distinct criminal acts 
nonetheless resulted from successive impulses.  Cf. Brown v. State, 
430 So. 2d 446, 446-47 (Fla. 1983) (upholding convictions for two 
counts of robbery of a retail establishment in which the taking of 
property was from two different cash registers controlled by two 
different employees, and reasoning that “[w]hat is dispositive is 
whether there have been successive and distinct forceful takings 
with a separate and independent intent for each transaction”). 
Recently, the Supreme Court of Connecticut applied a similar 
distinct acts analysis in State v. Cody M., 259 A.3d 576 (Conn. 
 
 
8.  We need not and do not hold that when an offense, such as 
battery, may be committed by a single blow, that each additional 
blow laid on results in an additional offense.  The test is not 
whether there are successive blows but whether there are 
successive impulses.  We do not suggest that multiple blows may 
not spring from a single impulse. 
 
- 30 - 
2020), when it considered “whether multiple convictions for 
violation of a standing criminal protective order, arising from a 
series of statements made during a court hearing by the defendant, 
Cody M., to the person protected by the order, violate the 
constitutional protection from double jeopardy.”  Id. at 580.  The 
basic facts were as follows: 
When the hearing began, the defendant [who was 
under incarceration] tried to engage in “small talk” with 
the victim, but she ignored him and did not make eye 
contact.  The victim testified that the defendant had 
“whispered to me that he still loved me and had asked 
me why I had a block on the phone and that I said I 
would never do this to him . . . .  [W]hen I wasn’t 
responding to him, his tone changed and he told me that 
‘you’re going to have problems when I get home, bitch,’ 
and . . . I looked at him, and he told me that he was 
going to fucking kill me.” 
 
Id. at 581 (omissions and second alteration in original). 
After rejecting an argument that criminal violations of a 
protective order were in the nature of a continuing offense, id. at 
584, the court considered “whether the defendant’s statements in 
th[e] case constituted a single act or multiple acts,” id. at 588.  The 
court stated that “distinct repetitions of a prohibited act, however 
closely they may follow each other . . . may be punished as separate 
crimes without offending the double jeopardy clause.”  Id. (omission 
 
- 31 - 
in original) (quoting State v. Miranda, 794 A.2d 506, 524 (Conn. 
2002)).  The court concluded “that the defendant’s statements 
constitute two distinct acts because the victim’s resistance, 
effectuated by her silence, was an intervening event causing the 
defendant to escalate his behavior.”  Id.  The court further reasoned 
that “[w]hat separates the defendant’s statements into two criminal 
acts is the defendant’s clear escalation, showing a ‘fresh impulse’ to 
move from nonthreatening conversation to threatening 
conversation.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
Although the contexts are somewhat different, we find the line 
of analysis in Cody M.—with its focus on successive impulses—to 
be consistent with our reasoning here.9 
We thus approve the First District’s conclusion that 
Trappman’s conduct involved distinct acts.  We disapprove the 
conflict case, Olivard, to the extent that it failed to apply 
Blockburger’s distinct acts test, with that test’s focus on successive 
 
 
9.  Although we recognize—as does Cody M.—that an 
escalation of criminal conduct may provide evidence of successive 
impulses, we do not suggest that such an escalation is necessary to 
a finding of successive impulses. 
 
- 32 - 
impulses.  We also disapprove the decision of the Fifth District 
Court of Appeal in Rivera v. State, 286 So. 3d 930 (Fla. 5th DCA 
2019), for the same reason.  In failing to consider the distinct acts 
test, the Fifth District erroneously applied a categorical rule that, 
under section 775.021(4), “multiple convictions and sentences” may 
not be imposed “for aggravated battery and battery committed 
against one victim within the same criminal transaction or episode.”  
Id. at 932 (footnotes omitted). 
VI. 
Based on the holding in Blockburger—as well as our holding in 
Graham—that multiple punishments may be imposed for distinct 
acts springing from successive impulses to violate a single criminal 
prohibition in the course of a single criminal episode, we approve 
the First District’s decision to affirm Trappman’s dual convictions 
and sentences.  And we disapprove Olivard and Rivera as 
inconsistent with our reasoning here. 
 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, and 
FRANCIS, JJ., concur. 
SASSO, J., did not participate. 
 
 
- 33 - 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal 
Certified Direct Conflict of Decisions/Direct Conflict of 
Decisions 
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D19-1883 
 
 
(Santa Rosa County) 
 
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, Tallahassee, Florida, Michael L. 
MacNamara, General Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida, and Maria Ines 
Suber, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and David 
Welch, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent