Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Rocky L. Coe

Citation: 2003 WI 117

Docket Number: 2001AP002488-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 117 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-2488-D 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Rocky L. Coe, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
 
Complainant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Rocky L. Coe,  
 
Respondent-Appellant-Cross-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST COE 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 16, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
April 10, 2003   
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-cross respondent there were 
briefs by Rocky L. Coe, Milwaukee. 
 
For the complainant-respondent-cross appellant there were 
briefs by William J. Weigel, litigation counsel, Madison. 
 
 
2003 WI 117 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
01-2488-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Rocky L. Coe, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
 
          Complainant-Respondent-Cross- 
          Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Rocky L. Coe,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 16, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding.  Proceeding dismissed.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 
appeals from the report and recommendation of the referee that 
concluded that the OLR failed to establish that Attorney Rocky 
Coe violated SCR 20:3.10 in a letter he sent to opposing 
counsel.1  Attorney Coe cross-appeals from several aspects of the 
referee's report and recommendation.  He specifically objects to 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:3.10 provides: "[a] lawyer shall not present, 
participate in presenting or threaten to present criminal 
charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter." 
No. 
01-2488-D   
 
2 
 
the referee's recommendation that this court admonish Attorney 
Coe for disrespectful conduct toward the referee.   
¶2 
We adopt the recommendation of the referee and agree 
that the OLR has failed to establish, under the facts of this 
case, that Attorney Coe violated SCR 20:3.10.  Accordingly, we 
dismiss the complaint against Attorney Coe.  However, the record 
before 
us 
is 
replete 
with 
examples 
of 
Attorney 
Coe's 
disrespectful and cavalier attitude toward the referee, and the 
court in general.  We hereby admonish him pursuant to SCR 
62.02(1).2 
                                                 
2 SCR 62.02(1), which provides in relevant part: 
(1) Judges, court commissioners, lawyers, clerks 
and court personnel shall at all times do all of the 
following: 
(a) Maintain a cordial and respectful demeanor 
and be guided by a fundamental sense of integrity and 
fair play in all their professional activities. 
(b) Be civil in their dealings with one another 
and with the public and conduct all court and court-
related 
proceedings, 
whether 
written 
or 
oral, 
including discovery proceedings, with civility and 
respect for each of the participants. 
(c) Abstain from making disparaging, demeaning or 
sarcastic remarks or comments about one another. 
(d) Abstain 
from 
any 
conduct 
that 
may 
be 
characterized as uncivil, abrasive, abusive, hostile 
or obstructive. 
 . . . . 
(h) Conduct 
themselves 
in 
a 
manner 
which 
demonstrates 
sensitivity 
to 
the 
necessity 
of 
preserving decorum and the integrity of the judicial 
process. 
No. 
01-2488-D   
 
3 
 
¶3 
Attorney Coe was admitted to practice in Wisconsin in 
1977.  He has no disciplinary history.   
¶4 
In the fall of 2000 Attorney Coe began representing 
the Opportunities Industrialization Center of Greater Milwaukee, 
Inc. 
(OIC) 
in 
connection 
with 
an 
ongoing 
unemployment 
compensation case and related sexual harassment case in which 
the OIC was named as defendant. 
¶5 
The plaintiff in the underlying matter had resigned 
her employment with the OIC.  Several months later she filed a 
claim for unemployment compensation (the "UC case").  She also 
filed a claim with the State of Wisconsin Equal Rights Division, 
alleging that she resigned from the OIC because of sexual 
harassment by an OIC supervisor (the "ERD case").  
¶6 
The initial decision in the UC case was unfavorable to 
the plaintiff.  The plaintiff appealed and the Labor & Industry 
Review Commission (LIRC) reversed, declaring that she was 
eligible for unemployment benefits.  The OIC, represented by 
Attorney Coe, appealed the LIRC decision to the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court in OIC v. LIRC and Dates, Case No. 00-CV-07743. 
Meanwhile, in June 2000 the ERD issued a probable cause finding 
in favor of the plaintiff and against the OIC with regard to her 
sexual harassment claim.   
¶7 
While both of these matters were pending, Attorney Coe 
interviewed 
several 
potential 
witnesses. 
 
Some 
of 
these 
witnesses had unfavorable things to say about the plaintiff.  
                                                                                                                                                             
(Emphasis added.) 
No. 
01-2488-D   
 
4 
 
Without detailing the specific allegations, certain former co-
workers and a former boyfriend, who happens to be a married 
minister, essentially alleged that the plaintiff had concocted 
the sexual harassment allegations in order to obtain money and 
alleged further that she had behaved in a manner that did not 
support her claims of harassment by her former supervisor.  
Testimony 
introduced 
at 
the 
evidentiary 
hearing 
in 
the 
disciplinary matter further indicates that on or about December 
4, 2000, the plaintiff's former boyfriend contacted Attorney Coe 
because he had received a telephone call from one of the 
plaintiff's lawyers and was anxious about his involvement with 
the case and concerned that his extramarital relationship with 
the plaintiff would be publicized. 
¶8 
On December 5, 2000, Attorney Coe sent a letter to the 
lawyers who represented the plaintiff in the UC matter and the 
ERD matter.  That letter forms the basis for the disciplinary 
complaint subsequently filed against Attorney Coe by the OLR.  
The first paragraph of the letter states: ". . . I am expediting 
my proposed settlement to humanely put these cases out of their 
misery."  It continues:  
 
if you continue to proceed, thereby dragging 
more 
innocent 
people 
into 
this 
already 
sordid affair, I will have no choice but to 
recommend 
[plaintiff] 
to 
the 
District 
Attorney for prosecution for perjury and 
fraud.  Moreover, let this be official 
notice that I am now aware that all of you 
know or should know of what kind of scamming 
and lying character you proffer as honest.   
 
No. 
01-2488-D   
 
5 
 
Although my client has exerted a lot of 
energy and expenses defending this ruse, as 
a gesture of peace during the holidays, I 
will strongly recommend letting this matter 
drop, if this is ended now.  Otherwise, I am 
going to the DA. 
(Emphasis in original.)  Subsequently, a grievance was filed 
with the OLR regarding this letter.3   
¶9 
The OLR made a preliminary evaluation and determined 
that Attorney Coe's conduct potentially violated the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, namely, SCR 20:3.10, which prohibits a 
lawyer 
from 
presenting, 
participating 
in 
presenting 
or 
threatening to present criminal charges solely to obtain an 
advantage in a civil matter.  The OLR investigated the matter 
and offered Attorney Coe the opportunity to resolve the matter 
privately, which he declined.  The OLR Director then presented 
an investigative report to the Preliminary Review Committee, 
which found cause to proceed with the filing of a complaint 
against Attorney Coe, alleging a violation of SCR 20:3.10.   
¶10 A complaint was filed on September 18, 2001, alleging 
that Attorney Coe "presented, participated in presenting or 
threatened to present criminal charges solely to obtain an 
advantage in a civil matter, in violation of SCR 20:3.10."   
                                                 
3 Both matters involving the plaintiff have been resolved.  
The plaintiff withdrew her ERD complaint in January 2001.  The 
circuit court later upheld the LIRC decision, declaring the 
plaintiff eligible for unemployment compensation.  The OIC 
appealed, but the appeal was later dismissed. 
 
No. 
01-2488-D   
 
6 
 
¶11 The Honorable David Friedman was appointed referee on 
October 1, 2001.  Attorney Coe answered, moved to dismiss the 
complaint, and filed counterclaims against the OLR, alleging 
malicious prosecution, abuse of authority, failure to cooperate, 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  He demanded 
the OLR compensate him at a rate of $275/hour for the time he 
spent responding to the OLR complaint.  The OLR moved to dismiss 
the counterclaims.  Attorney Coe opposed the motion and moved 
for summary judgment on the claims. 
¶12 The referee found the complaint legally sufficient, 
dismissed Attorney Coe's counterclaims, and denied Attorney 
Coe's motion for summary judgment on December 27, 2001.4  The 
matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing.  After the hearing 
and following post-hearing supplemental briefing (to which 
                                                 
4 Attorney Coe prematurely attempted to appeal the referee's 
decision.  Subsequently, he filed a "motion to recuse referee" 
and asked this court to enjoin the OLR from prosecuting this 
matter.  He explained that an injunction was necessary "due to 
the brutal and unconscionable mental abuse that are being heaped 
upon [him] under the guise of official lawyer regulation, by a 
branch of the Supreme Court, the Office of Lawyer Regulation."  
This filing also contained a generalized complaint against the 
Supreme Court Rules.  The motions were denied. 
No. 
01-2488-D   
 
7 
 
Attorney Coe objected) the referee issued the report and 
recommendation on August 7, 2002.5 
¶13 The referee found that Attorney Coe had sent the 
letter of December 5, 2001, to gain an advantage, but ultimately 
concluded 
that 
Attorney 
Coe 
did 
not 
threaten 
criminal 
prosecution solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter, and 
consequently did not violate SCR 20:3.10.  Accordingly, the 
referee recommended this court dismiss the complaint against 
Attorney Coe.  However, the referee also suggested that this 
court consider admonishing Attorney Coe for his disrespectful 
conduct toward the office of the referee.  Both parties appeal. 
¶14 The parties agree that the referee's findings of fact 
will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous and that the 
referee's conclusions of law are to be reviewed de novo.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Swartwout, 116 Wis. 2d 380, 342 
N.W.2d 406 (1984). 
                                                 
5 On July 22, 2002, Attorney Coe filed a "motion for 
supervisory writ" in this court, complaining that the report and 
recommendation had not been filed within 30 days of the deadline 
established in SCR 22.16(6).  The report and recommendation 
issued while the motion was under advisement and the motion was 
dismissed as moot.  Attorney Coe now renews his complaint 
regarding 
the 
delay in 
the 
issuance 
of 
the 
report and 
recommendation.  We observe that the record clearly reflects 
that the delay was occasioned, at least in part, by the 
referee's request that the parties prepare post-hearing briefs, 
including a request that the parties discuss the significance of 
a supreme court case that actually favored Attorney Coe.  See 
letter of July 2, 2002, from Referee David Friedman.  There is 
no evidence that Attorney Coe suffered any prejudice from the 
brief delay in the issuance of the report and recommendation.  
Attorney Coe's renewal of this grievance is unwarranted. 
No. 
01-2488-D   
 
8 
 
¶15 We begin with the OLR's appeal, which asserts that 
certain of the referee's findings of fact were clearly erroneous 
and that the referee erred in concluding that Attorney Coe did 
not violate SCR 20:3.10.  The OLR is of the opinion that 
Attorney Coe's letter "represents one of the clearest violations 
of SCR 20:3.10 imaginable" and contends that the record evidence 
warrants the conclusion that Attorney Coe did, in fact, violate 
SCR 20:3.10. 
¶16 Attorney Coe defended his letter, variously asserting 
the following positions: (1) he would not gain an advantage from 
the letter; (2) his letter was facetious; (3) he was trying to 
"help" adverse counsel avoid ethical violations; (4) he was 
reminding LIRC to act properly; and, (5) he was protecting an 
"innocent witness."   
¶17 The referee found that the first four "justifications" 
were neither credible nor supported by the evidence.  However, 
the referee was persuaded that Attorney Coe was, at least in 
part, genuinely trying to protect the privacy of one of his 
witnesses, the former boyfriend of the plaintiff.  The man was 
married and had emphasized to Attorney Coe the day before the 
letter 
was 
sent, 
that 
disclosure 
of 
his 
extramarital 
relationship with the plaintiff would be undesirable. 
¶18 With respect to the UC case, the referee noted that it 
was unclear to what extent Attorney Radtke (one of the 
recipients of the December 5 letter) was involved with the case.  
In addition, the referee was not persuaded that counsel for the 
plaintiff could have influenced an advantageous dismissal of the 
No. 
01-2488-D   
 
9 
 
UC case, in that the OIC was appealing the matter. While the OLR 
objects to these findings as "simply wrong" we cannot, based on 
the record before us, agree that they are clearly erroneous.  
¶19 With respect to the ERD case, the referee found that 
Attorney Coe's purpose in sending the letter was not solely to 
gain advantage and that he was motivated, at least in part, by a 
desire to protect his witness. 
¶20 The OLR maintains this finding is clearly erroneous as 
well.  The OLR contends: "Coe presented no evidence that any 
witnesses . . . were in need of protection."  The OLR notes that 
prior to sending the letter Attorney Coe had never discussed 
protecting witnesses with opposing counsel.  The OLR sets forth 
in detail the sequence of events that preceded and succeeded the 
letter to demonstrate that Attorney Coe was not particularly 
interested in protecting this witness's privacy, including the 
fact that Attorney Coe had filed the witness's affidavit in the 
public record as part of the ERD case.  Ultimately, the OLR 
contends that the "record rebuts every purported motivation 
alleged by Attorney Coe."  According to the OLR, "there is no 
scenario in which Attorney Coe could have been found to be 
assisting [the witness] in that matter as of December 5, 2000." 
¶21 We observe that the witness in question testified that 
he believed that Attorney Coe sent the letter of December 5 in 
order to protect him.  The referee explicitly stated that it 
found this witness credible.  The referee's assessment of this 
witness and of Attorney Coe's intent in sending the letter 
required a credibility determination that we are extremely 
No. 
01-2488-D   
 
10 
 
reluctant to disturb on appeal.  We are mindful that Attorney 
Coe's zealous style of advocacy transcends that typically 
encountered, even in the most aggressive litigator; this may 
have influenced the referee's findings.  We emphasize that in 
another case a letter with identical wording might well be found 
to violate SCR 20:3.10.  Based on the record before us, however, 
we must conclude that the referee's finding that Attorney Coe 
did not send the letter "solely" to obtain an advantage is not 
clearly erroneous.  
¶22 As the parties have noted there is little precedent 
regarding SCR 20:3.10 and these matters are highly fact 
specific. See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Johann, 216 Wis. 2d 118, 574 N.W.2d 218 (1998).  Because the 
referee's factual findings on this record are not clearly 
erroneous we conclude that the referee correctly concluded, as a 
matter of law, that the OLR failed to establish that Attorney 
Coe violated SCR 20:3.10 in this matter.  We emphasize that our 
conclusion is limited to the facts of this case. 
¶23 We turn to Attorney Coe's cross-appeal which is 
somewhat diffuse in its rather sweeping accusations against the 
referee and the OLR.  On appeal, Attorney Coe claims that the 
OLR violated his constitutional and/or other substantive rights 
in prosecuting him, and that its prosecution of him was 
"malicious."  He is angry with the OLR for failing to prosecute 
the 
plaintiff's 
lawyers 
apparently 
for 
undertaking 
representation of an individual that Attorney Coe deems to be of 
poor character.  He claims that the referee was biased against 
No. 
01-2488-D   
 
11 
 
him 
and 
intentionally 
"covered-up" 
the 
OLR's 
malicious 
prosecution of him.  He complains that the referee's finding 
that he sent the December 5 letter to obtain an "advantage" was 
"clearly erroneous."  He suggests racial bias played a role in 
this matter.  Attorney Coe also challenges the referee's 
suggestion that he be admonished for his conduct.  We will 
address these issues as they are advanced in Attorney Coe's 
brief: 
1.  Did the OLR violate Rocky L. Coe's constitutional 
right to freedom of speech and a due process fair 
trial by finding that Coe sought an advantage and by 
not addressing the issue of perjury and fraud in his 
report? 
2.  Did the referee in his recommendation to admonish 
Coe 
despite 
finding 
Coe 
innocent, 
evidence 
his 
personal bias? 
3.  Did the OLR unethically 
prosecute 
Coe 
using 
perjury and fraud? 
4.  Did the OLR by not engaging in discovery or 
cooperating with Coe, violate his right to due 
process? 
5.  Did the OLR in using the perjury and fraud to 
prosecute Coe, and not Attorney Rotker violate Coe's 
constitutional right to equal protection under the 
laws? 
¶24 With respect to the first issue we note that it was 
the referee, not the OLR, who found that Attorney Coe sought an 
advantage in sending the letter of December 5 and who declined 
to address the issue of "perjury" and "fraud" in the report and 
recommendation. 
No. 
01-2488-D   
 
12 
 
¶25 In four of the five issues presented to the court, and 
throughout his briefs and motions, Attorney Coe makes reference 
to the facts of the underlying matter, including his repeated 
references to "perjury" and "fraud." Attorney Coe seems to 
believe that the fact that certain witnesses were prepared to 
make statements that reflect unfavorably upon the credibility of 
the plaintiff in the underlying matter is somehow relevant to, 
or justification for, his own conduct.   
¶26 We conclude that the referee's discretionary decision 
not to discuss Attorney Coe's extensive allegations of "perjury" 
and "fraud" by the plaintiff was entirely proper.  Even if true, 
these allegations would not justify an attempt by counsel to 
threaten criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a 
civil matter.  See SCR 20:3.10. 
¶27 In any event, Attorney Coe challenges the referee's 
finding that he sent the letter to "obtain an advantage."  He 
also claims it is "glaring evidence of the referee's zealous 
bias."  We are somewhat perplexed as to why Attorney Coe objects 
to this finding when the referee ultimately determined that it 
was inadequate to support a conclusion that Attorney Coe 
violated SCR 20:3.10.  In any event, the referee's finding of 
fact on this point is not clearly erroneous.  As the OLR 
observes in its brief, the letter was sent to the plaintiff's 
counsel by Attorney Coe, as defense counsel for the OIC, with 
the intent to induce the plaintiff's counsel to dismiss her 
case——in other words, to gain a benefit, or advantage, for 
Attorney Coe's client.  It is readily apparent that Attorney Coe 
No. 
01-2488-D   
 
13 
 
would have obtained a benefit or advantage if the letter had 
accomplished its objective of inducing the plaintiff to dismiss 
the ERD case.  
¶28 We turn to Attorney Coe's assertion that the referee 
in this matter was guilty of bias.  As a preliminary matter, the 
OLR correctly observes that Attorney Coe's claims regarding the 
referee's and OLR's handling of this disciplinary matter are not 
properly before the court on this appeal.  However, in the 
interests of judicial efficiency, we will dispose of them on the 
merits.   
¶29 A charge of bias is a serious allegation and should 
not be made lightly.  We have carefully reviewed the record and 
conclude that Attorney Coe's allegation with respect to Referee 
Friedman is utterly without support in the record.  Indeed, 
Referee Friedman appears to have conducted himself with the 
utmost self-control and patience in what must have been a very 
trying matter. 
¶30 We also reject Attorney Coe's claim that the OLR 
"unethically persecute[d]" him using "perjury and fraud" and 
that the OLR violated his constitutional rights to due process 
and equal protection.  Attorney Coe's allegations against the 
OLR are both conclusory and unsupported by the evidence in the 
record.   
¶31 There is simply no evidence before us that supports 
Attorney Coe's contention that the OLR engaged in malicious 
prosecution, that the referee was unfairly biased against him, 
or that Attorney Coe's fundamental rights were in any way 
No. 
01-2488-D   
 
14 
 
violated by this proceeding.  Therefore, the referee did not err 
in dismissing Attorney Coe's counterclaims.   
¶32 We appreciate that we may not have specifically 
addressed each and every one of Attorney Coe's claims on appeal.  
To the extent we have not addressed an argument raised on 
appeal, the argument is deemed rejected.  State v. Waste Mgmt. 
of Wis., Inc., 81 Wis. 2d 555, 564, 261 N.W.2d 147 (1978) ("An 
appellate court is not a performing bear, required to dance to 
each and every tune played on an appeal.").  
¶33 We now turn to the referee's suggestion that this 
court consider admonishing Attorney Coe for his disrespectful 
conduct toward the referee.  The referee emphasizes that he was 
not personally concerned 
about Attorney Coe's 
disparaging 
comments, but rather about his lack of respect for the position 
of referee. 
¶34 The OLR agrees that it is the court's prerogative to 
admonish Attorney Coe and opines that the recommendation "is 
well supported."  The OLR adds that the recommendation "would 
appear consistent with precedent interpreting SCR 20:8.2(a)."6   
¶35 The OLR cites a number of the many examples of 
Attorney Coe's disrespectful attitude toward the referee and/or 
                                                 
6 SCR 20:8.2(a) provides that: 
a. A lawyer shall not make a statement that the 
lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as 
to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications 
or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or 
public legal officer, or of a candidate for election 
or appointment to judicial or legal office. 
No. 
01-2488-D   
 
15 
 
the court system in general.  Only a few will be repeated here.  
Attorney Coe has stated on the record: 
This [referee's] patent and reprehensible masquerade 
of fairness to support Attorney Rotker and the OLR, is 
not 
only 
an 
embarrassment 
to 
the 
history 
of 
jurisprudence, 
but 
is 
a 
brutally 
unconscionable 
slight . . . . 
 . . . . 
Ostensibly, the referee was nothing but a cheerleader 
for the OLR. 
 . . . . 
Clearly, the referee, in an attempt to keep the gross 
injustice of this case in the dark, conveniently kept 
his intellectual light bulb turned off. 
 . . . . 
Without question, it would be easier for a snowman to 
put on a gasoline suit and stroll hand in hand with 
the devil through the flames of hell, than for me to 
get a fair report from this referee. 
¶36 Attorney Coe also referred to one of the referee's 
comments as: "a rare moment of intellectual activity."  In 
addition, in a motion filed with this court, Attorney Coe 
contended that it was "brutally unconscionable for this Court to 
allow an attorney with my over 25 years of accomplishments, to 
be subjected to this 'high tech lynching.'"  He calls the 
referee "mean spirited" for mentioning "his witness" by name in 
the report and recommendation.  He makes reference to the 
referee's "antebellum condescension."   
¶37 In a letter to the referee dated July 27, 2002, he 
stated:  
 
No. 
01-2488-D   
 
16 
 
And, I remind you that in your zealous bias 
for the OLR, you denied me the professional 
courtesy of a postponement of this April 12, 
2002 trumped up trial.  Well, you are now 
nearing almost three months overdue for 
rendering a decision in a simple one-count 
hearing.  What happened to "Justice delayed, 
is justice denied"?   
 
Is this more hypocrisy? 
¶38 Attorney Coe also describes the referee as "personally 
upset and whining."  He adds that the referee "had become 
intoxicated from his own whine and could not write a complete or 
clear decision."  This is only a sampling of Attorney Coe's 
rhetoric, which pervades the record, his briefs and motions.   
¶39 We direct Attorney Coe's attention to SCR 62.02(1), 
which provides in relevant part: 
 
(1) Judges, 
court 
commissioners, 
lawyers, clerks and court personnel shall at 
all times do all of the following: 
 
(a) Maintain a cordial and respectful 
demeanor and be guided by a fundamental 
sense of integrity and fair play in all 
their professional activities. 
 
(b) Be civil in their dealings with one 
another and with the public and conduct all 
court and court-related proceedings, whether 
written 
or 
oral, 
including 
discovery 
proceedings, with civility and respect for 
each of the participants. 
 
(c) Abstain 
from 
making 
disparaging, 
demeaning or sarcastic remarks or comments 
about one another. 
 
(d) Abstain from any conduct that may 
be 
characterized 
as 
uncivil, 
abrasive, 
abusive, hostile or obstructive. 
No. 
01-2488-D   
 
17 
 
 
 . . . . 
 
(h) Conduct 
themselves 
in 
a 
manner 
which 
demonstrates 
sensitivity 
to 
the 
necessity of preserving decorum and the 
integrity of the judicial process. 
SCR 62.01.  (Emphasis added.)  Violation of the Standards of 
Courtesy and Decorum "can . . . carry serious consequences to 
the merits of a given case."  See Geneva Nat'l Cmty. Ass'n v. 
Friedman, 228 Wis. 2d 572, 584, 598 N.W.2d 600 (Ct. App. 1999); 
Aspen Servs., Inc. v. IT Corp., 220 Wis. 2d 491, 498, 583 N.W.2d 
849, 852 (Ct. App. 1998) ("[Aspen] is mistaken in its belief 
that the Rules in SCR 62 and SCR 20 cannot be the basis for 
imposing a sanction for incivility during litigation."). 
¶40 In addition, we remind Attorney Coe that SCR 62.02(4) 
provides that "Adherence to standards of professionalism and 
courtesy, good manners and dignity is the responsibility of each 
judge, court commissioner, lawyer, clerk, and other personnel of 
the court who assist the public."  The Attorney's Oath also 
states that each attorney shall "maintain the respect due to 
courts of justice and judicial officers." SCR 40.15. 
¶41 Attorney Coe's comments rise to the level of a 
personal 
attack 
on 
the 
referee 
and 
are 
unwarranted 
and 
unprofessional.  Even in zealous advocacy attorneys are required 
to maintain respect to courts of justice.  See Preamble SCR 
Chapter 20; SCR 62.02(c); In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 407, 240 
N.W.2d 441 (1932).  His excessive sarcasm and hyperbolic 
rhetoric are unbecoming to a lawyer, and undermine the decorum 
and integrity of the judicial process.  See SCR 62.02(1).  
No. 
01-2488-D   
 
18 
 
Pursuant to SCR 62.02(1), we hereby formally admonish Attorney 
Coe for his disrespectful comments made during the course of 
this disciplinary proceeding.  Although this admonishment will 
not carry additional sanctions in this proceeding, Attorney Coe 
is strongly advised to curtail his rhetorical style in future 
court proceedings or risk sanctions pursuant to SCR 62.01. 
¶42 Finally, both parties seek costs in this case.  As the 
OLR complaint will be dismissed, the OLR is not entitled to 
recoup its costs in this matter.  Attorney Coe's request for 
costs is denied.   
¶43 IT 
IS 
ORDERED 
that 
the 
referee's 
report 
and 
recommendation of August 7, 2002, is adopted by this court and 
the complaint against Attorney Rocky Coe alleging a violation of 
SCR 62.02(1) is dismissed. 
¶44 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Attorney Rocky Coe is 
hereby admonished pursuant to SCR 62.02(1) for conduct in 
violation of the standards articulated therein. 
No. 
01-2488-D   
 
 
 
1