Case Title: McInnis v. Southeastern Automatic Sprinkler Co.

Citation: 233 So. 2d 219

Docket Number: 45671

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1970-03-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
233 So. 2d 219 (1970) A.K. McINNIS, Jr., Inc. v. SOUTHEASTERN AUTOMATIC SPRINKLER CO., Inc., a Corp. No. 45671. Supreme Court of Mississippi. March 16, 1970. Rehearing Denied April 13, 1970. *220 Zachary, Weldy & Ingram, Hattiesburg, for appellant. Riddell & Dabbs, Quitman, for appellee. SMITH, Justice. Southeastern Automatic Sprinkler Co., Inc., recovered a judgment in the Circuit Court of Clarke County against A.K. McInnis, Jr., Inc., in the sum of $33,155.89, and the latter appeals. Southeastern's declaration alleged that McInnis was the general contractor in the construction of a factory building, that Southeastern had subcontracted from McInnis, and had performed, that part of the general contract providing for the installation of a sprinkler system, and that McInnis had failed to pay therefor. Also made defendant was Southern Household Products Co., Inc., the prospective occupant of the building, upon the alternative theories that it was either liable primarily or had orally guaranteed that McInnis would pay Southeastern. Separate answers were filed by McInnis and Southern Household. In its answer, McInnis admitted that it had been the "overall contractor on the job" and that it had supervised the installation of the sprinkler system by Southeastern. It admitted that it had not paid Southeastern because, it said, Southeastern had "not finished its job," and that, McInnis, therefore, as general contractor, had not been paid for the job by the owner. Further answering, McInnis said that it had "been trying to get (Southeastern) to complete its sprinkler system job for the past three or four months." Nevertheless, it denied that it had contracted to sublet the sprinkler job to Southeastern, and denied that it was liable to Southeastern "on any written or verbal contract." Upon the trial, Southern Household went out of the case on a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by the plaintiff. The case then was submitted to a jury as to the liability of McInnis to Southeastern and as to this, the jury returned a verdict for Southeastern. On appeal, McInnis assigns a number of grounds for reversal, the chief of which appears to be that the written proposal, embodying the contract for the installation of the sprinkler system, which had been submitted and carried out by Southeastern, was never manually or otherwise signed by anyone for McInnis and, therefore, was not binding upon McInnis. The evidence tended to show that McInnis, as general contractor, was seeking proposals for the installation of the sprinkler system, as shown on the plans and specifications of the building, and that Southeastern's written bid was $9,000.00 less than the next low bidder. It appears that the proposal, by mistake, was first addressed to Southern Household, and that the manager of that concern called attention to the error and suggested to Southeastern *221 that the bid be sent on to McInnis, the general contractor. This was done by deleting the name Southern Household and substituting that of McInnis. As so amended it was transmitted to McInnis. McInnis admitted receiving the proposal, that it had sent a purchase order to Southeastern, had requested from Southeastern a laborers' and materialmen's payment bond and a certificate of workmen's compensation and public liability insurance. It admitted supervising the work of installing the sprinkler system and that Southeastern had not been paid. It averred, however, that Southeastern's work in installing the system had not been completed but admitted that Southeastern would have been entitled to the bid amount of $28,449.00, if the job had been completed. The proposal in question contained a provision for an additional sum of 10% as attorneys' fees, if legal proceedings should become necessary to enforce payment. This document never was actually signed by anyone for McInnis, but the evidence, including a considerable volume of correspondence between Southeastern and McInnis, about the matter, was sufficient to support a finding that it was treated and acted upon by both parties as if, in fact, it had been formally executed. McInnis charged that the installation was not complete because sprinklers had not been installed in two small rooms. Southeastern countered that the plans and specifications did not call for such installation. Also, it was shown that no bond had ever been supplied by Southeastern, but it is not suggested that there are any outstanding claims for labor or materials in connection with the job. McInnis claims that it was entitled to have the jury instructed peremptorily to find in its favor, or if mistaken in that position, that the jury's verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. A careful review of the evidence in the record, of which there was a great deal, both oral and documentary, reflects that it was ample to withstand appellant's motion for a directed verdict, as well as its request for a peremptory instruction, and to require submission of the issues to a jury for determination. Moreover, the jury's verdict for Southeastern was not against the great weight of the evidence. The jury was warranted in concluding from the evidence that, although no actual signature was ever affixed by appellant to the contract, it had the binding force of an agreement through a mutuality of consent of both parties, notwithstanding this omission, particularly in the light of the correspondence and of the admissions in the pleadings. We think the evidence is clear and convincing that both parties acted upon it exactly as if it had been executed with all formality. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 62 (1963) contains this statement: *222 In 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 58 (1963) it is said: In Fanning v. C.I.T. Corporation, 187 Miss. 45, 52, 192 So. 41, 43 (1939) this Court said: The rule in Fanning recently was cited with approval and discussed in some detail by this Court in Old Equity Life Insurance Company v. Jones, 217 So. 2d 648 (Miss. 1969). The evidence was sufficient here to support a finding by the jury that, in all respects, both parties acted upon the contract as if, in fact, it had been duly signed. Also, there can be little question that Southeastern substantially performed the work in accordance with the plans and specifications, and that, in so doing, they worked under the direct supervision of McInnis, the general contractor. The fact that Household Products may not have paid McInnis for this item does not constitute a defense, as far as McInnis is concerned as against its subcontractor's claim for payment. The failure of Southeastern to provide the bond obviously was waived, and, in any event, since there has been no suggestion that there are any outstanding workmen's or materialmen's claims the omission of Southeastern to supply the bond has proved of no consequence. We have examined the instructions to the jury of which appellant makes complaint and have reached the conclusion that the jury was properly instructed, in the light of the factual circumstances in evidence, and that the instructions were not misleading when read together. The contract contained a provision for attorneys' fees and it was not error to permit the recovery of such fees by Southeastern. We find no reversible error in the record and the judgment appealed from will be affirmed. Affirmed. ETHRIDGE, C.J., and RODGERS, BRADY and PATTERSON, JJ., concur.