Case Title: McLaughlin v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 401, 2014

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2015-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
EDWARD McLAUGHLIN,1 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 401, 2014 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below–Superior Court of         
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware, in and  
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 1104021773 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted: January 23, 2015 
Decided: 
March 23, 2015 
 
Before HOLLAND, VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 23rd day of March 2015, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Edward McLaughlin, has appealed the Superior 
Court’s denial of postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 
(“Rule 61”).  After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs on appeal and the 
Superior Court record, the Court has concluded that the Superior Court judgment 
should be affirmed. 
(2) 
The record reflects that McLaughlin was tried in 2011 and retried in 
2012 on five counts of Rape in the Second Degree.  The alleged victim was 
                                
1 The Court notes that the appellant’s last name is spelled “McLaughlin” in some court 
documents and “McLaughlan” in others. 
2 
 
McLaughlin’s ten-year old step-daughter.  McLaughlin’s first trial ended in a 
mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict.  At the second 
trial, the jury found McLaughlin guilty on four of the five counts.  On July 6, 2012, 
the Superior Court sentenced McLaughlin to one hundred years of Level V 
incarceration – twenty-five years for each count – followed by ten years of 
probation.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior 
Court.2 
(3) 
On July 23, 2013, McLaughlin moved for the appointment of counsel 
to assist him in filing his first motion for postconviction relief under Rule 61.  
McLaughlin’s motion identified one “substantial ground for relief,” namely that his 
trial counsel was ineffective when cross-examining the alleged victim.  According 
to McLaughlin, trial counsel “failed to proffer any questions to the witness 
concerning the allegations, and, in so doing, did not challenge the veracity and 
integrity of the witness’ testimony.” 
(4) 
By order dated July 25, 2013, the Superior Court appointed counsel 
(hereinafter “Counsel”) to represent McLaughlin.  Under the Rule, Counsel was 
required to assist McLaughlin in presenting “any substantial ground for relief.”3  If 
Counsel determined that McLaughlin’s claim was “lacking in merit” and if 
                                
2 McLaughlan v. State, 2012 WL 6645727 (Del. Dec. 19, 2012). 
3 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(1), now renumbered (e)(5). 
3 
 
Counsel was “not aware of any other substantial ground for relief,” Counsel could 
file a motion to withdraw explaining “the factual and legal basis for [C]ounsel’s 
opinion.”4 
(5) 
On March 14, 2014, Counsel filed a motion to withdraw averring that 
he had carefully reviewed the record and determined that McLaughlin’s ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim was without merit and that the record did not suggest 
any other grounds for relief.  In an answer opposing Counsel’s motion, 
McLaughlin argued the merit of his “sole complaint . . . that trial counsel failed to 
effectively cross-examine the alleged victim.”  McLaughlin explained that his 
“defense was that the events did not happen and that ulterior motive was the reason 
the [alleged victim] was making the statements,” and that “[t]he key to the entire 
defense” was effective cross-examination of the alleged victim. 
(6) 
By memorandum opinion dated July 2, 2014, the Superior Court 
granted Counsel’s motion to withdraw and denied postconviction relief on the 
basis that McLaughlin’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was without merit.5  
In response to the memorandum opinion, McLaughlin filed a letter on July 29, 
2014, advising the court that he had not yet filed a motion for postconviction relief, 
and that the court’s denial of “the Rule 61 where none had been filed [was] an 
                                
4 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(2), now renumbered (e)(6). 
5 State v. McLaughlin, 2014 WL 2964945 (Del. Super. July 2, 2014).  
4 
 
error.”  The court considered McLaughlin’s letter as a motion for reargument and, 
by order dated July 29, 2014, denied reargument. 6  This appeal followed.7 
(7) 
On appeal, McLaughlin claims that the Superior Court “abrogated his 
constitutional right to challenge the validity of his conviction by way of collateral 
review.”  The claim is without merit.  McLaughlin sought postconviction relief on 
the basis of one claim, that his trial counsel was ineffective when cross-examining 
the alleged victim.  McLaughlin thoroughly addressed the ineffective counsel 
claim in his motion for appointment of counsel and answer to Counsel’s motion to 
withdraw (hereinafter “submission”).8 
(8) 
McLaughlin asserts that he advised Counsel “of a plethora of 
violations he wanted to pursue” in addition to the ineffective counsel claim.9  The 
record does not support that assertion.  When answering Counsel’s averment that 
                                
6 The Court notes that McLaughlin’s letter was not filed within five days of the filing of the 
memorandum opinion.  Consequently, the Superior Court was without authority to rule on the 
letter as a motion for reargument. Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 57(d); Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 59(e).  
Boyer v. State, 2007 WL 452300, at *1 (Del. Feb. 13, 2007) (citing Preform Bldg. Components, 
Inc. v. Edwards, 280 A.2d 697, 698 (Del. 1971)).      
7 Although an untimely motion for reargument does not toll the time for filing an appeal, Samuel 
v. State, 2010 WL 3245109 (Del. Aug. 17, 2010) (citing McDaniel v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 
860 A.2d 321, 323 (Del. 2004)), the Court notes that the notice of appeal in this case was timely 
filed on July 29, 2014 within thirty days of the docketing of the Superior Court’s July 2, 2014 
memorandum opinion.  Del. Supr. Ct. R. 6(a)(iii).   
8 All total, McLaughlin’s submission presented nine handwritten pages – the equivalent of 
twelve double-spaced typed pages – of well-developed argument. 
9 McLaughlin lists the violations as follows: “e.g., state’s failure to prove indictment beyond a 
reasonable doubt, double jeopardy, ineffective assistance of trial counsel, failure to call 
witnesses, violation of confrontation clause, sufficiency of indictment, vindictive prosecution, 
prosecutorial misconduct in grand jury proceedings, etc.”   
5 
 
“there are no other potential meritorious issues to raise in a motion for post-
conviction relief,” McLaughlin made no mention of any claims other than his “sole 
complaint . . . that trial counsel failed to effectively cross-examine the alleged 
victim.” 
(9) 
McLaughlin asserts, under Castro v. United States, that the Superior 
Court erred when it failed to notify him that it intended to consider his submission 
as a motion for postconviction relief.10  The claim is without merit.  The United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Castro v. United States governs federal courts 
and first federal habeas corpus petitions,11 and the rationale for the Castro decision 
does not apply under the circumstances in this case. 
(10) In this case, McLaughlin sought postconviction relief making it clear, 
not once but twice, that he had but one claim for relief.  McLaughlin fully 
addressed the claim in his submission.  When responding to Counsel’s position that 
the claim was without merit and that “there [were] no other potential meritorious 
issues to raise in a motion for post-conviction relief,” McLaughlin did not present 
additional claims for relief.  Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that 
                                
10 Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375 (2003).   
11 In Castro, the United States Supreme Court held that a federal court cannot convert a pro se 
litigant’s motion into a first habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 unless the court first 
informs the litigant of its intent to do so, warns the litigant that any subsequent petition under § 
2255 will be subject to the restrictions on “second or successive” petitions, and provides the 
litigant an opportunity to amend the motion so that it contains all the § 2255 claims the litigant 
believes he has.  Id. at 383. 
6 
 
the Superior Court did not err when it considered and decided McLaughlin’s claim 
for postconviction relief as presented in McLaughlin’s submission.  Furthermore, 
the Court concludes that, under these circumstances, the Superior Court was not 
required to notify McLaughlin of its intent to do so or to give him an opportunity 
to present additional claims for relief. 
(11) Having carefully considered the parties’ briefs and the record, we 
agree with the Superior Court’s analysis of McLaughlin’s ineffective counsel claim 
and conclude that the claim is without merit for the reasons stated in the court’s 
memorandum opinion.  It appears to the Court that the Superior Court properly 
analyzed McLaughlin’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland v. 
Washington.12  The Superior Court denied the claim after concluding that trial 
counsel’s cross-examination of the alleged victim did not fall below an objective 
standard of reasonableness as follows:   
Trial Counsel made a strategic decision in this case not to 
directly challenge the ten-year old alleged victim’s story 
on cross-examination.  His professional experience with 
juries, as well as basic common sense, likely led him to 
conclude that aggressively questioning a child witness 
posed a serious risk of prejudicing the jury against 
McLaughlin.  Trial [C]ounsel instead relied on 
McLaughlin’s own testimony to refute the story given by 
the victim, providing an alternative to conviction if the 
                                
12 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 692 (1984) (holding that a defendant 
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show that counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and was prejudicial).   
7 
 
jury found McLaughlin to be a more credible witness 
than the child victim. Furthermore, Trial Counsel had 
reason to believe that such a strategy could be effective 
because the first trial resulted in a hung jury:   a result 
that was achieved using a similar line of questioning 
during cross-examination.  Because this was a reasonable 
strategic decision in line with professional norms, Trial 
Counsel did not make an unprofessional error.13 
 
The Superior Court also determined that McLaughlin was not prejudiced by trial 
counsel’s conduct because it was “unlikely that aggressive cross-examination of 
the child victim would have had the effect [desired by McLaughlin] on the 
outcome of the trial”14 given “the extremely sympathetic nature of the child victim 
and the impact that her testimony had on the jury.”15 
(12) Lastly, to the extent McLaughlin relies on an error in the 
memorandum opinion to support a claim that the Superior Court did not review the 
record, his claim is without merit.  Although McLaughlin is correct that the 
memorandum opinion contains the misstatement “McLaughlin filed a Motion for 
                                
13 State v. McLaughlin, 2014 WL 2964945, at *2 (Del. Super. July 2, 2014) (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).   
14 State v. McLaughlin, 2014 WL 2964945, at *3 (Del. Super. July 2, 2014). 
15 Id., at *2.  The Court notes that McLaughlin argued in his submission that trial counsel’s 
cross-examination of the alleged victim was so inadequate that it constituted a complete failure 
“to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.”  See United States v. 
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) (holding that prejudice is presumed “if counsel entirely fails to 
subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing”).  McLaughlin has not raised 
that argument in his opening brief, and on that basis the Court concludes that the argument is 
waived.  Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993).  Were we to consider the claim, 
however, we would conclude it is without merit.   
8 
 
Postconviction Relief on March 14, 2013,”16 we conclude that the error is 
harmless. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice  
 
                                
16 State v. McLaughlin, 2014 WL 2964945, at *1 (Del. Super. July 2, 2014).  Neither the docket 
nor the record reflects such a filing.