Case Title: State v. Federico

Citation: 104 Ariz. 49, 448 P.2d 399

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1968-12-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
104 Ariz. 49 (1968) 448 P.2d 399 The STATE of Arizona, Appellant, v. Ruben FEDERICO, Appellee. No. 1825. Supreme Court of Arizona. In Banc. December 11, 1968. Rehearing Denied January 7, 1969. Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., Darrell F. Smith, then Atty. Gen., Phoenix, William J. Schafer, III, Pima County Atty., by Horton C. Weiss, Deputy County Atty., Pima County, Tucson, for appellant. Royal & Carlson, by H. Wesley Carlson, Tucson, for appellee. McFARLAND, Chief Justice: After a trial in superior court, a jury found defendant-appellee guilty of rape, and he was given a sentence of eight to ten years in prison. We affirmed the conviction, and our mandate was received by the superior court on September 23, 1966. Defendant unsuccessfully applied to the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari, and remained free on bond until July 14, 1967, at which time the superior court held a hearing and ordered that the "imposition of sentence be suspended for a period of five years, and the defendant be placed on probation * * *" Defendant's bond was exonerated, and he is still at large. From the above order the State has appealed. The question before us is not whether defendant is deserving of probation, but rather whether the superior court had jurisdiction to modify its judgment of imprisonment by granting probation after an affirmance by this Court. Defendant contends that the federal rule is a trial court may grant probation to a defendant even after affirmance of his conviction on appeal. To support this proposition, he cites United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 48 S. Ct. 146, 72 L. Ed. 309. That case, however, is based upon a federal statute which specifically permits *50 a trial court to suspend either the imposition or the execution of a sentence, while in Arizona our statute allows the suspension of only the imposition of a sentence. A.R.S. § 13-1657, subsec. A, par. 1. Even in the absence of the distinction, defendant is in error, for the federal rule was clearly stated as early as 1895 in Re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S. 247, 16 S. Ct. 291, 40 L. Ed. 414, where the court said: That case was cited with approval in United States v. Howe, 280 F. 815, 23 A.L.R. 531 (2d Cir.1922), where the following appears: Howe, supra, was cited with approval in United States v. Tuffanelli, 138 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.1943), in which the court said: Defendant cites several California cases, including People v. Causey, 230 Cal. App. 2d 576, 41 Cal. Rptr. 116. While Causey lends authority to defendant's proposition, it must be noted that there is a lack of uniformity in the California decisions, and there have been legislative changes which have caused the California courts to alter their approach to the problem. See Beggs v. Superior Court, etc., 179 Cal. 130, 175 P. 642; People v. Maggio, 96 Cal. App. 409, 274 P. 611; Lloyd v. Superior Court etc., 208 Cal. 622, 283 P. 931; and People v. Rittger, 55 Cal. 2d 849, 13 Cal. Rptr. 406, 362 P.2d 38. However, we need not look outside our own cases to confirm the fact that we have, from the earliest days, followed an unbroken resolve that our mandates shall terminate the cases in which they are issued. We are reviewing them at this time so that all doubts about the law on the question will be completely resolved. This Court spoke on this principle even before California. As early as 1921, in State v. Superior Court etc., 22 Ariz. 452, 197 P. 537, we held that a trial court could not issue a writ of habeas corpus to review a judgment of this Court, saying: *51 In Sam v. State, 33 Ariz. 421, 265 P. 622, we considered the problem in detail and said: We then went on to say, in that opinion, that not only the expiration of six months, but also the perfection of an appeal, cut off the trial court's right to vacate or modify its judgments, stating: In Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. Allen, 38 Ariz. 173, 298 P. 406, we said: In State v. Griffith, 54 Ariz. 436, 96 P.2d 752, we said: In 1956, in Gusick v. Eyman, 81 Ariz. 182, 302 P.2d 944, we quoted with approval from both Griffith, supra, and Standard Accident, supra, and went on to announce our agreement with decisions of both Idaho and Montana to the effect that: The same general principles were followed in State v. Superior Court etc., 86 Ariz. 231, 344 P.2d 736; Spector v. McFate, 95 Ariz. 88, 387 P.2d 234; State ex rel. Ronan v. Superior Court, etc., 94 Ariz. 414, 385 P.2d 707; and Eyman v. Cumbo, 99 Ariz. 8, 405 P.2d 889. In Rogers v. Ogg, 101 Ariz. 161, 416 P.2d 594, we had occasion again to consider our holdings on the subject and reaffirmed our previous statement that the mandate of this Court is conclusive and binding upon the trial court which then becomes powerless to render a judgment differing "in one jot or tittle" from the mandate. We also construed R.C.P. 60(c), 16 A.R.S., as meaning that after a mandate has issued from this Court, any one who seeks to vacate or modify the judgment in the trial court must first apply to this Court for permission to so move. We said: The last case decided in this Court on the subject is State v. Superior Court, etc., 103 Ariz. 208, 439 P.2d 294, in which we quoted with favor from the Supreme Court of Illinois in People ex rel. Kerner v. Circuit Court of Will County, 369 Ill. 438, 440, 441, 17 N.E.2d 46, 47, as follows: It would be difficult to find a case more nearly like the instant case, in its facts, than State v. Kowalczyk, 3 N.J. 231, 69 A.2d 718. There, after receiving the appellate court's mandate, the trial judge entered an order suspending the original sentence and putting the defendant on probation for one year. On appeal by the state, the New Jersey Supreme Court said: In State v. Carlson, 178 Minn. 626, 228 N.W. 173, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that a trial court cannot change a sentence, even during the same term of court, after it has been affirmed on appeal. As that court put it: If there are mitigating circumstances that have arisen after the appeal has been perfected, they may be called to the attention of the appellate court at any time before the mandate has gone down, and the sentence may be modified by the appellate court. The Order of the Superior Court dated July 14, 1967, suspending the sentence and granting probation to the defendant is hereby vacated, and the Superior Court is directed to order defendant delivered into the custody of the warden of the State Prison, there to commence serving the sentence imposed upon him on September 30, 1964. UDALL, V.C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, BERNSTEIN and LOCKWOOD, JJ., concur.