Case Title: Motley I v. Virginia State Bar

Citation: 

Docket Number: 000392

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2000-09-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, and Kinser, 
JJ., and Compton and Stephenson, Senior Justices 
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VICTOR ALAN MOTLEY 
 
                                  OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 000392        CHIEF JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO 
 
                              September 15, 2000 
VIRGINIA STATE BAR 
 
FROM THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD 
 
 
This appeal presents for review an order of the 
Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (the Disciplinary 
Board) involving Victor Alan Motley (Motley), a Richmond 
attorney.  Dated September 29, 1999, the order imposed upon 
Motley a public reprimand for failing to inform a client in 
a criminal case of the denial of his appeal by the Court of 
Appeals of Virginia in time for him to decide whether to 
seek an appeal to this Court.  Motley is here on an appeal 
of right.  Finding no error in the order of the 
Disciplinary Board, we will affirm. 
Background 
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Motley’s public reprimand resulted from his handling 
of a criminal case involving Brian Lee Rowe (Rowe) in the 
Circuit Court of the City of Richmond.  Motley was retained 
by Rowe’s parents and received from them a retainer fee of 
$1,000.  Originally, Rowe was charged with two counts of 
capital murder, one count of robbery, and three counts of 
use of a firearm.  However, at the time Motley was 
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retained, the capital murder charges had been reduced to 
first degree murder.  Motley was retained for the purpose 
of arranging for Rowe to plead guilty to “the lowest 
possible charges.”  
 
Motley was successful in arranging with the prosecutor 
for Rowe to plead guilty to two counts of second degree 
murder, one count of robbery, and three counts of use of a 
firearm.  Rowe and his parents expected that Rowe would 
receive a sentence of no more than thirteen years and two 
months, which, according to what Motley told them, was the 
maximum punishment under the sentencing guidelines.  Motley 
argued for application of the guidelines, but the court 
sentenced Rowe to serve a total of ninety-three years. 
 
Rowe’s parents then asked Motley “what could be done,” 
and Motley agreed to appeal the case for an additional fee 
of $2,000.  Motley filed a motion in circuit court to 
withdraw Rowe’s guilty pleas or, in the alternative, for 
reconsideration of the sentence.  The motion was denied, 
and Motley appealed the denial to the Court of Appeals.  
That court denied the petition for appeal by unpublished 
order.  (No. 2718-95-2, April 15, 1996).  The court noted, 
inter alia, that the circuit court had found the sentencing 
guidelines inapplicable to permit a sentence of thirteen 
years and two months because Rowe “faced a mandatory 
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thirteen years on the firearms charges alone, without the 
additional charges of robbery and murder.”  
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Id.
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Rowe had thirty days after entry of the order of April 
15, 1996, within which to file a notice of appeal with the 
clerk of the Court of Appeals (Rule 5:14(a)) and a petition 
for appeal with the clerk of this Court (Rule 5:17(a)(2)).  
Neither document was filed within the prescribed time.1
 
On June 24, 1996, Rowe’s mother, Claretha A. Rowe, 
filed with the Virginia State Bar a complaint against 
Motley alleging that he had failed to inform Rowe or his 
parents of the Court of Appeals’ denial of Rowe’s petition 
for appeal until it was too late to petition this Court for 
an appeal.  The Third District Committee, Section Two (the 
Committee), determined that Motley had failed timely to 
inform Rowe or his parents of the Court of Appeals’ action.  
The Committee decided it would offer Motley an opportunity 
to comply with certain terms and conditions as a predicate 
to the imposition of a private reprimand with terms but, 
failing such compliance, that it would impose a public 
 
1 This Court awarded Rowe a delayed appeal on March 6, 1997, 
following a finding by the Circuit Court of the City of 
Richmond in a habeas corpus proceeding that Motley had been 
ineffective for “[f]ailing to perfect an appeal to [this 
Court] following the Virginia Court of Appeal’s refusal to 
hear [Rowe’s] appeal.”  The petition for appeal filed 
pursuant to the award of the delayed appeal was refused by 
this Court. 
 
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reprimand.  Motley appealed the Committee’s determination 
to the Disciplinary Board. 
 
After a hearing, the Disciplinary Board affirmed the 
District Committee’s determination but imposed as a 
sanction an opportunity to comply with altered terms and 
conditions as part of a private reprimand, with the proviso 
that if Motley failed to comply with the terms and 
conditions, a public reprimand would be imposed.  On 
September 29, 1999, the Disciplinary Board entered an order 
stating that Motley had “willingly failed and refused to 
comply with the terms of [the] Private Reprimand” and, 
therefore, a public reprimand was imposed. 
 
Disciplinary Rule 6-101(C) of the Virginia Code of 
Professional Responsibility, which was in effect at all 
times pertinent to the present controversy, provided that 
“[a] lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about 
matters in which the lawyer’s services are being rendered.”2  
In imposing a public reprimand upon Motley, the 
Disciplinary Board found that he had “failed to timely 
inform either Rowe or his parents of the denial of the 
petition [for] appeal by the Court of Appeals in time to 
                     
2 Effective January 1, 2000, the Virginia Code of 
Professional Responsibility was replaced by the Virginia 
Rules of Professional Conduct.  The subject of reasonable 
 
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allow them to decide whether to appeal further to the 
Virginia Supreme Court” and, therefore, that Motley had 
“engaged in misconduct in violation of DR-6-101C of the 
Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility.” 
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Issues on Appeal
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1. Unconstitutional Vagueness 
 
Motley argues that DR 6-101(C) is unconstitutionally 
vague.  Citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 
108 (1972), Motley opines that the vagueness doctrine 
requires that a statute give a person of ordinary 
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct 
is commanded or prohibited.  He says the phrase “reasonably 
informed” in DR 6-101(C) is not defined and “gives no 
guidelines as to what is reasonable and leaves respondent 
at the [whim] of the personalities making up [the 
Disciplinary Board].” 
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We disagree with Motley.  Disciplinary Rule 6-101(C) 
is presumed to be constitutional, and we will resolve any 
doubt regarding its constitutionality in favor of its 
validity.  See Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs., Inc., 
257 Va. 1, 9, 509 S.E.2d 307, 311 (1999).  Furthermore, 
“[v]agueness challenges to statutes not threatening First 
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communication between lawyer and client is now contained in 
Rule 1.4(a),(b), and (c) of the new Rules.   
 
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Amendment interests are examined in light of the facts of 
the case at hand; the statute is judged on an as-applied 
basis.”  
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Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 (1988). 
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We find nothing vague about the language of DR 6-
101(C) with respect to the conduct commanded of Motley in 
light of the facts of this case.  Beyond any question, the 
conduct commanded was for Motley to inform Rowe of the 
denial of his appeal by the Court of Appeals in time for 
him to decide whether to appeal the denial and, if his 
decision was affirmative, to file the notice of appeal and 
petition for appeal within the thirty-day period prescribed 
by Rules 5:14(a) and 5:17(a)(2). 
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2. Sufficiency of Evidence
 
Motley argues that the finding of the Disciplinary 
Board that he failed timely to inform Rowe of the denial of 
his appeal is not justified by a reasonable view of the 
evidence.  On review of a disciplinary proceeding, “we will 
make an independent examination of the whole record, giving 
the factual findings of the Disciplinary Board substantial 
weight and viewing them as prima facie correct.  While not 
given the weight of a jury verdict, those conclusions will 
be sustained unless it appears they are not justified by a 
reasonable view of the evidence or are contrary to law.”  
Blue v. Seventh Dist. Comm., 220 Va. 1056, 1061-62, 265 
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S.E.2d 753, 757 (1980).  And we view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the side that prevailed below.  
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Rutledge v. Virginia State Bar, 214 Va. 312, 313, 200 
S.E.2d 573, 574 (1973). 
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Here, the evidence was in sharp conflict.  Motley 
testified that he informed both Rowe and his mother of the 
Court of Appeals’ denial of Rowe’s petition for appeal 
within the thirty-day period following the denial.  Both 
Rowe and his mother denied receiving knowledge of the Court 
of Appeals’ action within the thirty-day period. 
 
Motley introduced telephone bills which showed collect 
calls ostensibly placed by Rowe to Motley’s office from 
Southampton Reception Center on April 22, 1996, and from 
Brunswick Correctional Center on April 30, 1996.  Both 
these dates were within the thirty-day period after the 
Court of Appeals’ denial of Rowe’s petition for appeal, and 
Motley claimed that on both occasions he informed Rowe the 
appeal had been denied.  Rowe testified, however, that he 
was not confined at Southampton Reception Center on April 
22, 1996.  He also said that on the one occasion he reached 
Motley by telephone from Brunswick Correctional Center 
within the thirty-day period following April 15, 1996, 
Motley told him he “hadn’t heard anything” concerning the 
outcome of the appeal. 
 
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Rowe testified further that he received nothing from 
Motley in the mail within the thirty-day period following 
April 15, 1996, and that it was not until June that Motley 
told him in a telephone conversation that the appeal had 
been denied.  A “couple of days later,” on June 18, 1996, 
Rowe wrote Motley requesting a copy of the Court of 
Appeals’ decision and received a copy in the mail. 
 
Motley also claimed that, in the thirty-day period, he 
mailed Rowe’s mother a copy of the Court of Appeals’ order 
denying Rowe’s appeal, but he could not document the 
mailing with a copy of a cover letter or otherwise.  In 
addition, Motley introduced a memorandum prepared by his 
secretary stating that Ms. Rowe called the office on April 
5, 1996, and left a message that she would make a payment 
on Motley’s fee on April 15.  Motley also introduced a copy 
of a receipt dated May 10, 1996, for a payment of $100 
purportedly made on that date by Ms. Rowe on a visit to 
Motley’s office. 
 
However, Ms. Rowe testified that she received nothing 
in the mail from Motley within the thirty-day period 
following April 15, 1996, and that she only learned of the 
denial of the appeal when Rowe informed her in late May or 
June that Motley had just told him the appeal had been 
denied.  Ms. Rowe then contacted Motley, and he confirmed 
 
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that the appeal had been denied and told her that it was 
“too late” to appeal further. 
 
Ms. Rowe also denied that she “left a message” with 
Motley’s office promising to make a payment on his fee on 
April 15, 1996, and she said that she did not recall 
visiting Motley’s office on May 10, 1996, when Motley 
claimed she made a payment in the office.  She insisted, 
instead, that March 6, 1996, was the last date upon which 
she made a payment. 
 
Motley says Rowe and his mother were “not credible 
witnesses.”  We disagree.  Their testimony was not 
inherently incredible, and it was for the Committee, as 
trier of fact, to determine the credibility of the 
witnesses and to resolve the conflicts between Motley’s 
testimony and the testimony of Rowe and his mother. 
 
The burden was on the Bar to establish Motley’s 
violation by clear proof.  See Blue, 220 Va. at 1062, 265 
S.E.2d at 757.  With the conflicts resolved against Motley, 
the evidence constituted clear proof to support the finding 
by the Disciplinary Board that Motley violated DR 6-101(C). 
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3. Prior Disciplinary Record
 
Motley argues that the Disciplinary Board erred in 
considering his prior disciplinary record in determining to 
 
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impose a public reprimand upon him.3  While his argument is 
difficult to follow, he appears to seek a redetermination 
of the merits of the prior proceedings, an exercise in 
which we decline to indulge.  He also appears to argue the 
relevancy of the evidence of his prior conduct. 
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However, “[b]ecause a primary purpose of the 
Disciplinary Rules is the protection of the public, it is 
clearly the Board’s duty, in determining an appropriate 
penalty, to consider whether the attorney before it has 
demonstrated a history of professional conduct harmful to 
his clients or to the public generally.”  Tucker v. 
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Virginia State Bar, 233 Va. 526, 533, 357 S.E.2d 525, 529 
(1987).  Hence, the evidence of Motley’s disciplinary 
record was relevant and properly considered by the 
Disciplinary Board. 
 
For all these reasons, we will affirm the Disciplinary 
Board’s order of September 29, 1999. 
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Affirmed. 
                     
3 The record shows that Motley’s disciplinary history 
consisted of two dismissals of complaints with terms (VSB 
Docket Nos. 86-146 and 91-031-0795) and a private reprimand 
with terms (VSB Docket No. 89-031-0495). 
 
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