Case Title: State ex rel. Greene v. Martin Sprocket & Gear, Inc.

Citation: 2001-Ohio-12

Docket Number: 19990787

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-01-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Greene v. Martin Sprocket & Gear, Inc., 90 Ohio St.3d 531, 
2001-Ohio-12.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. GREENE, APPELLANT, v. MARTIN SPROCKET & GEAR, INC. 
ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Greene v. Martin Sprocket & Gear, Inc. (2001), 90 Ohio 
St.3d 531.] 
Workers’ compensation — Industrial Commission does not abuse its discretion 
when its decision denying a violation of a specific safety requirement 
claim is supported by “some evidence” — Finding of specific-safety-
requirement inapplicability upheld. 
(No. 99-787 — Submitted October 10, 2000 — Decided January 17, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 98AP03-271. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Appellant-claimant, Bruce L. Greene, worked for appellee 
Martin Sprocket and Gear, Inc. (“MSG”) in the Hobber Department.  On June 1, 
1994, claimant was working on a Gould and Ederhardt 48 H Hobbing Machine 
(“hobber”), which cuts gear or sprocket teeth into raw steel.  The change-gear 
compartment, which transmitted power to the machine, contained several power-
driven gears, and was located within the machine’s frame.  Access was controlled 
by a panel door that prevented contact with the gears. 
 
On the date of injury, claimant testified that, immediately upon arrival, he 
heard a hissing sound coming from the gearbox.  He stated: 
 
“From my own experience, I knew that this noise meant that the gears 
needed oiling, and I proceeded to the rear of the machine. 
 
“I opened the rear panel of this machine and saw that the gears were 
intermeshed very tightly and looked around for the oil can.  I did not see the can 
and I knew there had to be oil put onto these gears[,] so using my right rubber 
gloved hand, I reached into the  bottom of the machine, which housed a reservoir 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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of oil and dipped my right gloved hand into this oil.  I then proceeded to drip it 
over these gears, but in so doing, my right gloved hand became caught * * *.” 
 
Claimant lost three fingers as a result. 
 
After his workers’ compensation claim was allowed, claimant alleged that 
the gears were not adequately guarded, in violation of a specific safety 
requirement (“VSSR”).  Appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio denied his 
application, writing: 
 
“ ‘IC-5-03 applies to power-transmission machinery and facilities required 
to transmit power to operating equipment or machine tools.  IC-5-03 shall not be 
construed as being applicable to power transmission facilities located within the 
frame of the equipment and exposure is necessary to its operation or adjustment.’ 
 
“The exclusion contained in the second sentence requires both stated parts 
to be satisfied to take effect.  Here, the gears were within the frame of the 
equipment.  The next question is whether or not exposure was necessary to its 
operation or adjustment.  The claimant testified that the self-lubricating lines in the 
machine were not functioning properly.  He also indicated that he heard a hissing 
noise coming from the gear box and, knew, from experience, that the noise meant 
that the gears needed oiling.  He presented no evidence as to how often this noise 
occurred or how often he had to oil the gears.  Mr. Kurtz, the plant manager for the 
employer, testified that the only adjustment to the gears is made at the time of the 
setup and that the machine is shut down at that time.  He indicated that no further 
adjustment is made to the gears once production has begun. 
 
“Neither term, operation or adjustment, is contained in the definitional 
section of the code.  Webster’s Dictionary defines operation as a doing or 
performing of a practical work, a method or manner of functioning.  Webster’s 
Dictionary defines adjustment as a correction or modification to bring into proper, 
exact or conforming position or condition. 
January Term, 2001 
3 
 
“Although it certainly was not necessary to leave the doors open for the 
operation of the machine, it was necessary to open the doors to manually oil the 
gears.  The Staff Hearing Officer finds that the manual oiling is an adjustment 
pursuant to the code as it was a correction to bring (the machine) into proper 
condition whether it occurred automatically (self-lubricating lines) or manually (by 
the operator).  The Staff Hearing Officer finds that the statements of Mr. Kurtz are 
not accurate [or] persuasive as it appears that his concept of adjustment was 
restricted to one that pertained only to the changing or alteration of gears and did 
not include any additional process which corrected the machine to bring it into 
proper condition to perform its function.  Therefore, during the time it took to 
manually oil the machine, the exposure is found to be necessary to an adjustment 
and the exclusion is applicable in that no guard is required.” 
 
Reconsideration was denied. 
 
Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, alleging a commission abuse of discretion.  The court of appeals 
disagreed with the commission’s finding of specific-safety-requirement 
inapplicability, but agreed with the balance of the order and accordingly denied 
the writ. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
Issues of both the applicability of and compliance with IC-5-03.06 are 
presented.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, but do 
so for reasons different from those advanced by that body. 
 
The introductory paragraph to IC-5-03 is entitled “Power Transmission 
Machinery” and states: 
 
“IC-5-03 applies to power-transmission machinery and facilities required 
to transmit power to operating equipment or machine tools.  IC-5-03 shall not be 
construed as being applicable to power transmission facilities located within the 
frame of the equipment and exposure is necessary to its operation or adjustment.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Debate centers on the exclusionary language of the second sentence.  The 
parties agree that the gear-driven power transmission apparatus was located 
within the hobber’s frame.  They disagree on the necessity of exposure for 
operation or adjustment. 
 
The core difference between the two positions is one of perspective — 
theory or reality-based.  The court of appeals, through its magistrate, adopted the 
former, reasoning that exposure to the gears, as designed, was required during 
only “the initial setup of the machine, before a new job was begun and while the 
machine was not operating.”  The commission, on the other hand, stressed that the 
machine, at the time of injury, was not operating as designed.  The hobber was 
engineered to self-lubricate, but, in reality, it did not, forcing the operator to oil 
the gears.  This action, according to the commission, was a necessary adjustment 
for purposes of the exclusion.  We agree. 
 
We find two cases to be particularly instructive.  The first — which is 
actually the most recent in a series of cases — is State ex rel. Volker v. Indus. 
Comm. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 466, 663 N.E.2d 933.  The equipment at issue there 
was a ten-foot wooden stepladder. The claimant in that case was unable to open 
the ladder into its A-frame position because of a cramped workspace, and instead 
propped the folded ladder against the wall.  He was injured when the ladder 
skidded out from under him. 
 
Claimant alleged a violation of a specific safety requirement directing all 
portable ladders to be equipped with safety shoes, spikes, or spurs.  The specific 
safety requirement, however, also specifically exempted stepladders from the 
requirement. 
 
The code defined a “stepladder” as “a self-supporting portable ladder, 
non-adjustable in length, having flat steps or treads and a hinged back.”  Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121:1-5-01(B)(80)(k).  The commission found that the ladder’s 
construction was that of a stepladder, rendering the specific safety requirement 
January Term, 2001 
5 
inapplicable, and the court of appeals concurred.  Claimant appealed here, arguing 
that, despite its construction, the ladder was not self-supporting at the time of the 
accident, and could not, therefore, be considered a stepladder.  Unpersuaded, we 
held: 
 
“Claimant asserts that use, not construction, must control.  We disagree. 
 
“In some cases, equipment use has determined the applicability of a 
specific safety requirement.  In others, the commission has been guided by the 
equipment’s construction.  We cannot, therefore, state that a single standard 
governs all questions of specific safety requirement applicability.”  (Citations 
omitted.)  Id. at 468-469, 663 N.E.2d at 935. 
 
More recently, we touched on the theory versus reality debate.  In State ex 
rel. Dibble v. Presrite Corp. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 275, 707 N.E.2d 928, claimant 
was severely injured while checking cooling hoses on an energized high-voltage 
transformer.  He alleged violations of several specific safety requirements that 
required insulated personal protective gear when working “in proximity to 
energized lines.” 
 
The employer argued that claimant did not have to work near energized 
lines because the transformer was designed with an interlock that was to 
automatically disconnect the power when its doors were open.  The claimant 
asserted that the interlock was broken on the date of injury, forcing him to work 
next to live lines.  The commission adopted the employer’s position, as did the 
court of appeals. 
 
We reversed, writing: 
 
“Claimant testified that the reason he did not cut the transformer’s power 
was because he was unable to contemporaneously do so, due to a broken interlock 
knife switch.  Unfortunately, the commission never addressed this crucial 
allegation.  In examining only the interlock’s design and installation, it considered 
theory but not reality.  In addressing how the interlock was supposed to work, the 
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commission ignored how it did work on the date of injury.  The commission must 
address this key point.”  Id. at 279, 707 N.E.2d at 931. 
 
The interpretation of a specific safety requirement lies solely with the 
commission.  State ex rel. Allied Wheel Prod., Inc. v. Indus. Comm. (1956), 166 
Ohio St. 47, 50, 1 O.O.2d 190, 192, 139 N.E.2d 41, 44.  Moreover, because a 
specific safety requirement is a penalty, “it must be strictly construed, and all 
reasonable doubts concerning the interpretation of the safety standard are to be 
construed against its applicability to the employer.”  State ex rel. Burton v. Indus. 
Comm. (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 170, 172, 545 N.E.2d 1216, 1219. 
 
These principles, as well as the cases cited above, persuade us that it was 
within the commission’s prerogative to rely on the actual operation of the hobber 
at the time of injury in reaching a decision on the potential applicability of the 
cited safety regulation.  Here, the commission found that exposure to the gears 
was necessary for manual oiling, triggering the provision’s exclusionary 
provision.  Because the decision is supported by “some evidence,” it must remain 
intact, and its finding of specific-safety-requirement inapplicability is hereby 
upheld. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Spitler & Williams-Young Co., L.P.A., and William R. Menacher, for 
appellant. 
 
Gibson & Robbins-Penniman and J. Miles Gibson, for appellee Martin 
Sprocket & Gear, Inc. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and C. Bradley Howenstein, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
__________________