Case Title: People v. Fair

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84731

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-09-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 84731-Agenda 27-May 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								ROBERT L. FAIR, Appellant.
Opinion filed September 28, 2000.
	JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court:
	The petitioner, Robert Fair, appeals from a Cook County
circuit court order dismissing his post-conviction petition without
an evidentiary hearing. Because petitioner was sentenced to death,
this court has jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 651(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a)). For the
following reasons, we now affirm in part and reverse in part.
BACKGROUND
	A Cook County jury convicted petitioner of the murders of
Candace Augustus and her 11-year-old son, Gregory. The same
jury sentenced petitioner to death. This court affirmed petitioner's
conviction and death sentence on direct appeal. People v. Fair,
159 Ill. 2d 51 (1994). The United States Supreme Court
subsequently denied petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari.
Fair v. Illinois, 513 U.S. 1020, 130 L. Ed. 2d 500, 115 S. Ct. 586
(1994).
	Following petitioner's conviction, it was discovered that Cook
County circuit court Judge Paul Foxgrover, who presided over
petitioner's trial and sentencing, had engaged in extensive criminal
conduct while on the bench between April 13, 1989, and July 9,
1991, both before and after petitioner's trial and sentencing. Judge
Foxgrover sentenced criminal defendants to probation with a fine
and/or restitution as a condition of probation and then converted
fine or restitution checks to his own personal use on at least 50
separate occasions during this time period. Judge Foxgrover
ultimately pleaded guilty to multiple counts of theft, official
misconduct, forgery, obstruction of justice for attempting to cover
up his criminal conduct and perjury for making false statements on
official forms. All told, Judge Foxgrover pleaded guilty to 159
separate crimes.
	Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition alleging that Judge
Foxgrover's massive corruption violated petitioner's right to a fair
trial guaranteed by the due process clauses of the United States
and Illinois Constitutions. The circuit court granted the State's
motion to dismiss the post-conviction petition without an
evidentiary hearing, holding petitioner failed to establish any
nexus between Judge Foxgrover's criminal conduct and
petitioner's murder trial. Petitioner now appeals to this court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
	At the motion to dismiss stage in post-conviction proceedings,
all well-pleaded facts that are not positively rebutted by the trial
record are to be taken as true. The inquiry into whether a post-conviction petition sufficiently alleges a substantial violation of
petitioner's constitutional rights does not require the trial court to
engage in any fact-finding or credibility determinations. People v.
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 385 (1998). As a result, there is little
justification for giving deference to the trial court's conclusions as
to the sufficiency of the allegations in the post-conviction petition.
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 388-89. The standard of review for a trial
court's decision to dismiss post-conviction claims without
conducting an evidentiary hearing, therefore, is de novo. Coleman,
183 Ill. 2d  at 389.
ANALYSIS
I. Petitioner's Due Process Claim
	Petitioner first argues that he does not have to establish a
nexus between Judge Foxgrover's criminal conduct and his
murder trial. According to petitioner, Judge Foxgrover's
corruption was so pervasive that there is no basis for presuming
that he was impartial at petitioner's trial. We disagree. In People
v. Titone, 151 Ill. 2d 19 (1992), the petitioner filed a post-conviction petition alleging he was denied a fair trial before an
impartial tribunal. Petitioner alleged that the judge at his murder
trial, Cook County circuit court Judge Thomas J. Maloney agreed
to accept a $10,000 bribe to acquit petitioner. Petitioner alleged
that he was convicted either because his trial attorney failed to pay
Judge Maloney the $10,000 bribe or because Judge Maloney
accepted the bribe but convicted petitioner anyway in order to
convince federal authorities investigating judicial corruption in
Chicago that he did not accept a bribe. This court affirmed the
dismissal of the post-conviction petition, holding that petitioner
presented no evidence that Judge Maloney accepted or agreed to
accept a bribe in petitioner's case. We also held that the fact that
Judge Maloney was then under investigation in nonrelated cases
arising out of his tenure as a Cook County circuit judge was not
germane to the facts of that case. Titone, 151 Ill. 2d  at 30. The
mere fact that Judge Maloney was implicated in accepting bribes
in other nonrelated cases, we concluded, could not serve to taint
all other decisions with which Judge Maloney was involved.
Titone, 151 Ill. 2d  at 29. Instead, we held that a petitioner who
alleges that his trial judge's corruption violated his right to a fair
trial must establish (1) a "nexus" between the judge's corruption
or criminal conduct in other cases and the judge's conduct at
petitioner's trial; and (2) actual bias resulting from the judge's
extrajudicial conduct. Titone, 151 Ill. 2d  at 30-31.
	Petitioner argues that we dispensed with the nexus
requirement in People v. Hawkins, 181 Ill. 2d 41 (1998). Petitioner
fundamentally misreads our opinion in Hawkins. Hawkins, like
Titone, involved a post-conviction claim alleging Judge Maloney's
corruption violated petitioners' right to a fair trial and required the
reversal of the petitioners' murder convictions. Unlike this case,
however, the petitioners presented evidence that Judge Maloney
accepted a bribe at their murder trial and then returned the bribe
when he suspected the FBI was investigating his conduct.
We stated in Hawkins:
			"A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of
due process. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 905, 138 L. Ed. 2d 97, 104, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 1797 (1997); In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 99 L. Ed. 942, 946, 75 S. Ct. 623, 625 (1955). Fairness at trial requires not only the
absence of actual bias but also the absence of the
probability of bias. In re Murchison, 349 U.S.  at 136, 99 L. Ed.  at 946, 75 S. Ct.  at 625. To this end, no person is
permitted to judge cases in which he or she has an interest
in the outcome. Bracy, 520 U.S.  at 905, 138 L. Ed. 2d  at
104, 117 S. Ct.  at 1797; In re Murchison, 349 U.S.  at 136,
99 L. Ed.  at 946, 75 S. Ct.  at 625. 'Every procedure which
would offer a possible temptation to the average man as
a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict
the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true between the state and the
accused denies the latter due process of law.' Tumey v.
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532, 71 L. Ed. 749, 758, 47 S. Ct. 437, 444 (1927); see also Aetna Life Insurance Co. v.
Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 822, 89 L. Ed. 2d 823, 833, 106 S. Ct. 1580, 1585 (1986); Ward v. Village of Monroeville,
409 U.S. 57, 60, 34 L. Ed. 2d 267, 270-71, 93 S. Ct. 80,
83 (1972).
			Because our inquiry is limited to whether Maloney
could have been tempted not to hold the balance between
the parties ' " 'nice, clear and true' " ' (Aetna Life
Insurance Co., 475 U.S.  at 822, 89 L. Ed. 2d  at 833, 106 S. Ct.  at 1585; Ward, 409 U.S.  at 60, 34 L. Ed. 2d  at 271,
93 S. Ct.  at 83; Tumey, 273 U.S.  at 532, 71 L. Ed.  at 758,
47 S. Ct. at 444), defendants need not show actual bias by
the trier of fact in order to be granted a new trial. As the
United States Supreme Court stated in In re Murchison,
349 U.S.  at 136, 99 L. Ed.  at 946, 75 S. Ct.  at 625, due
process will sometimes 'bar trial by judges who have no
actual bias and would do their very best to weigh the
scales of justice equally between the contending parties.
But to perform its high function in the best way, "justice
must satisfy the appearance of justice." ' " Hawkins, 181 Ill. 2d  at 50-51.
	This "appearance of justice" language in Hawkins did not, as
petitioner suggests, eliminate the first prong of the test established
in Titone. Hawkins simply clarified the second prong of the test by
adding that a post-conviction petitioner need not prove actual bias
if he can prove that the trial judge had a personal interest in the
outcome of the trial. In such cases, we concluded, the appearance
of justice requires reversal of petitioner's conviction and a new
trial. Nothing in Hawkins, however, supports petitioner's argument
that the "appearance of justice" requires the reversal of a criminal
conviction where the post-conviction petitioner alleging judicial
bias has failed to establish any connection whatsoever between the
judge's corruption or criminal conduct in other cases and the
petitioner's trial. We therefore reaffirm our holding in Titone that
in order to secure relief on a claim of judicial bias, a post-conviction petitioner must establish a nexus between a judge's
corruption and the judge's conduct at petitioner's trial.(1)
	Petitioner argues in the alternative that he has established a
nexus between Judge Foxgrover's criminal conduct and his trial.
Because we have determined to grant petitioner relief on a
subsidiary claim related to this argument, however, we express no
opinion on the merits of the argument itself. Petitioner asserts that,
if he must prove a nexus between Judge Foxgrover's corruption
and petitioner's trial, the circuit court erred when it denied
petitioner's request for discovery to uncover the full extent of
Judge Foxgrover's corruption. We agree.
	The circuit court denied petitioner's discovery motion which
sought production of the following evidence obtained by the Cook
County State's Attorney's office during its investigation into
Foxgrover's misconduct: "a lengthy confession by Judge
Foxgrover, the interviews of numerous witnesses and the
collection of substantial other material." Our review of the circuit
court's ruling on petitioner's discovery request is complicated by
the fact that petitioner has failed to include a copy of his discovery
request in the record on appeal. An appellant has the burden to
present a sufficiently complete record of the proceedings below to
support a claim of error. Foutch v. O'Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391
(1984). In the absence of a complete record on appeal, it will be
presumed that the order entered by the circuit court was in
conformity with law and had a sufficient factual basis. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d  at 392. Therefore, any doubts which may arise from the
incompleteness of the record regarding the precise scope of
petitioner's discovery request will be resolved against petitioner.
Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d  at 392. Since a complete review of the circuit
court's ruling on petitioner's discovery request is impossible in
this case, we limit our review of the discovery request to the
evidence specifically identified in petitioner's appellant's brief:
Judge Foxgrover's confession and any interviews of witnesses
conducted during the course of the investigation into Judge
Foxgrover's criminal conduct.
	The discovery rules for neither civil nor criminal cases apply
to proceedings under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. People ex
rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill. 2d 175, 181-83 (1988).
Nonetheless, the circuit court has inherent discretionary authority
to order discovery in post-conviction proceedings. Daley, 123 Ill. 2d  at 183. Circuit courts, however, must exercise this authority
with caution because post-conviction proceedings afford only
limited review of constitutional claims not presented at trial, and
there is a potential for abuse of the discovery process in post-conviction proceedings. Daley, 123 Ill. 2d  at 183. As a result, the
circuit court should allow discovery only after the moving party
demonstrates "good cause" for a discovery request. Daley, 123 Ill. 2d  at 183. We will not disturb a circuit court's denial of a request
for discovery in post-conviction proceedings absent an abuse of
discretion. See People v. Henderson, 171 Ill. 2d 124, 156 (1996).
	In Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 138 L. Ed. 2d 97, 117 S. Ct. 1793 (1997), the petitioner was tried, convicted and sentenced
to death by Judge Maloney. After a federal investigation into
judicial corruption in Chicago, Maloney was convicted of taking
bribes from defendants in criminal cases around the time of the
petitioner's trial. See United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645 (7th
Cir. 1995). Although Maloney did not take a bribe in the
petitioner's case, petitioner alleged in a federal habeas corpus
petition that Maloney had a personal interest in his conviction
which violated petitioner's right to a fair trial guaranteed by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. According to
petitioner, his conviction would deflect suspicion that Maloney
was taking bribes in other murder cases. In support of a discovery
request for the sealed transcript of Maloney's trial, access to the
prosecution's materials in Maloney's criminal case, and the
opportunity to depose persons associated with Maloney, petitioner
presented evidence that his murder trial was sandwiched tightly
between other murder trials in which Maloney accepted bribes.
Petitioner also presented evidence that Maloney offered bribes to
judges in cases while he was a practicing criminal defense attorney
and that at least one of his colleagues in private practice actively
assisted in these bribes. Petitioner's trial attorney was another
former associate of Maloney from private practice whom Maloney
appointed to represent petitioner. This attorney announced that he
was ready for trial only a few weeks after he was appointed, and
the attorney did not request additional time to prepare penalty
phase evidence after the State announced its intention to seek the
death penalty. These procedural irregularities, petitioner argued,
raised the possibility that Maloney appointed his former colleague
from private practice to represent petitioner in order to quickly
secure a conviction, which would deflect attention away from the
other murder trials fixed by Maloney. The United States Supreme
Court held that petitioner's allegations established "good cause"
for his discovery request to support his claim that Maloney was
actually biased in his case. Bracy, 520 U.S.  at 908, 138 L. Ed. 2d 
at 106, 117 S. Ct.  at 1799.
	The allegations in the post-conviction petition in this case lack
the specificity of the allegations in Bracy. The petitioner in Bracy,
however, had access to public sources of information regarding
Judge Maloney's corruption, while public sources of information
regarding Judge Foxgrover's corruption are unavailable to the
petitioner in this case. Judge Maloney was convicted after a trial
in federal court. Thus, the petitioner in Bracy had a wealth of
information from the record of Judge Maloney's trial upon which
to base his habeas corpus claim. Judge Foxgrover, however,
pleaded guilty, thus depriving the petitioner in this case of a
valuable public source of information regarding Judge Foxgrover's
corruption. All of the evidence regarding Judge Foxgrover's
criminal conduct remains in the exclusive control of the State. It
would be virtually impossible for the petitioner in this case to
establish a nexus between Judge Foxgrover's criminal conduct and
petitioner's murder trial without access to the evidence possessed
by the State.
	The State argues that petitioner has not established good cause
for his discovery request because nothing in the post-conviction
petition suggests that a nexus exists. The State's argument,
however, puts petitioner in an impossible dilemma. According to
the State, petitioner is entitled to seek out evidence that there is a
nexus between Judge Foxgrover's criminal conduct and
petitioner's trial only if he already possesses such evidence. The
State also argues that allowing petitioner to conduct discovery will
further delay the adjudication of this case. The State undoubtedly
has an interest in the finality of criminal convictions, but there are
other equally compelling interests at stake in this case. Judge
Foxgrover's extensive criminal conduct while on the bench and
utter disregard for his oath has tainted the judicial system of this
state. The finality of criminal convictions is a hollow achievement
if the integrity of the judicial system which produces these
convictions is open to question. Petitioner is entitled to an
opportunity to find and present whatever evidence there may be
which connects Judge Foxgrover's criminal conduct to his ability
to be an impartial judge at petitioner's murder trial.
II. Petitioner's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
	Petitioner next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to prevent Cameron Forbes, a supervisor at the Department
of Corrections records office, from testifying at petitioner's
sentencing hearing regarding petitioner's prison record. According
to petitioner, the record of petitioner's rules violations in prison is
unreliable and Forbes was not qualified to testify regarding
conclusions about petitioner's character contained in prison
reports.
	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act cannot be used to obtain
another hearing on a constitutional claim which has already been
given full review by this court on direct appeal. People v.
Emerson, 153 Ill. 2d 100, 106 (1992), quoting People v. Cox, 34 Ill. 2d 66, 67-68 (1966). Rulings on issues raised on direct appeal,
therefore, are res judicata. Emerson, 153 Ill. 2d  at 106, quoting
People v. Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1989). A post-conviction petitioner
cannot avoid the bar of res judicata simply by rephrasing claims
raised on direct appeal. Emerson, 153 Ill. 2d  at 106.
	On direct appeal, petitioner argued that Forbes' testimony
gleaned from petitioner's prison records was unreliable and
inadmissible. This court rejected petitioner's argument and held
that petitioner's prison records were properly admitted at his
sentencing hearing. Fair, 159 Ill. 2d  at 89-90. Petitioner's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding Forbes'
testimony is simply a rephrasing of his argument on direct appeal.
Petitioner's claim, therefore, is barred by res judicata.
	Petitioner also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to correct the false impression created by the State at
petitioner's sentencing hearing that petitioner is an older
individual who manipulates youths to commit crimes. According
to petitioner, the State argued at the sentencing hearing that
petitioner was with "two juveniles" when he committed an armed
robbery in 1966. Petitioner argues that his trial counsel should
have pointed out that petitioner was only 18 years old at the time
of the armed robbery and that the "two juveniles" were 17 years
old, only one year younger than petitioner. The State responds that
petitioner waived this claim because he could have raised it on
direct appeal but failed to do so. We disagree. Petitioner did not
waive this claim because he asserts in his post-conviction petition
that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the
claim on direct appeal. This ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel argument is a well-recognized exception to the waiver
doctrine in post-conviction proceedings. See People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406, 413 (1999).
	Petitioner's claim, however, fails on the merits. In order to
show that his trial counsel was ineffective at his death sentence
hearing, petitioner must prove that his counsel's representation
was deficient and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's deficient conduct, the sentencer would have concluded
that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did
not warrant death. People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 109 (1992),
citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674,
104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Even if we assume that petitioner has
shown that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to correct this
false impression, we hold that petitioner has failed to demonstrate
that he suffered any prejudice from this deficiency. As this court
noted on direct appeal, the aggravating and mitigating evidence at
petitioner's sentencing hearing was not closely balanced. Fair, 159 Ill. 2d  at 88. Petitioner brutally murdered Candace Augustus and
her 11-year-old son, Gregory, by bludgeoning them to death with
a baseball bat. Petitioner has an extensive history of criminal
behavior, and petitioner has failed dismally at adjusting to
incarceration. In light of this compelling aggravating evidence,
trial counsel's failure to correct a false impression regarding one
of petitioner's prior convictions had no demonstrable effect on the
outcome of petitioner's sentencing hearing. Petitioner has failed to
prove that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his
counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of his sentencing
hearing would have been different.
	Petitioner next argues that the "other instances of ineffective
assistance of counsel as asserted in the post-conviction petition are
sufficient to require an evidentiary hearing." Petitioner, however,
provides no argument in support of this contention, nor does he
provide any citations to relevant legal authority in support of these
claims. As a result, these remaining ineffective assistance of
counsel claims fail to satisfy the requirements of Supreme Court
Rule 341(e)(7) (134 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7)) and are waived.(2)
III. Petitioner's Challenge to the Constitutionality of the
Death Penalty Statute
	Petitioner next argues that section 9-1(b)(7) of the death
penalty statute, which provides that a defendant is eligible for the
death penalty if "the murdered individual was under 12 years of
age and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior indicative of wanton cruelty" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38,
par. 9-1(b)(7)), is unconstitutionally vague. Petitioner's argument
is barred by res judicata because this argument was raised, and
rejected by this court, on direct appeal. Fair, 159 Ill. 2d  at 80
(holding that section 9-1(b)(7) is not unconstitutional on its face
because it "specifically describes the conduct which qualifies an
accused for the death penalty and is not susceptible to arbitrary
application").
CONCLUSION
	For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the circuit court
of Cook County dismissing petitioner's post-conviction petition
without an evidentiary hearing is affirmed in part and reversed in
part. The circuit court's denial of petitioner's discovery request
with respect to Judge Foxgrover's confession and any interviews
of witnesses conducted during the course of the investigation into
Judge Foxgrover's criminal conduct is reversed, and the circuit
court is directed to enter an order that these materials be made
available to petitioner. After petitioner has been provided with
these items and has had an opportunity to use them in support of
his claim of a nexus between Judge Foxgrover's criminal conduct
and petitioner's case, the circuit court is directed to reconsider and
enter a new ruling on petitioner's allegation that Judge
Foxgrover's criminal conduct violated his due process right to a
fair trial.
	The remainder of the circuit court's judgment is affirmed, and
the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Judgment affirmed in part
and reversed in part;
cause remanded.
1.      1This reading of Hawkins also comports with the United States
Supreme Court's understanding of the elements of a judicial bias claim.
See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904-05 138 L. Ed. 2d 97, 104, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 1797 (1997) (holding due process clause requires a "fair
trial in a fair tribunal" before "a judge with no actual bias against the
defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case").

2.      2Petitioner argues in summary fashion later in his appellant's brief
that there are other issues in the post-conviction petition which merit an
evidentiary hearing, but these claims are waived for the same reason.