Case Title: Roth v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92338

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-12-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 92338-Agenda 16-March 2002.
BRENDA ROTH, Ind. Adm'r of the Estate of Angela Roth, 
Deceased, Appellee, v. ILLINOIS FARMERS INSURANCE
COMPANY, Appellant.
Opinion filed December 5, 2002.

	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Plaintiff, Brenda Roth, acting as the administrator of the estate
of her daughter, Angela, brought a declaratory judgment action in
the circuit court of St. Clair County against defendant, Illinois
Farmers Insurance Company. The circuit court found in plaintiff's
favor, and defendant appealed. The appellate court affirmed the
circuit court's judgment (324 Ill. App. 3d 293), and we
subsequently allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal (177
Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). For the reasons that follow, we hold that leave
to appeal in this matter was improvidently granted and dismiss the
appeal.

BACKGROUND
	Due to our disposition of the case, we will detail only those
facts necessary to an understanding of our holding. The appellate
court issued its opinion in this case on August 7, 2001. On August
24, 2001, defendant filed a document, in the appellate court,
entitled "Affidavit of Intent to File Petition For Leave to Appeal."
The document reads as follows:
			"Comes now Defendant/Appellant, Illinois Farmers
Insurance Company, and hereby states it intends to file a
Petition for Leave to Appeal with the Illinois Supreme
Court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315.
			Respectfully submitted,
			Law Offices of Morgan & Associates"
The document was signed by one of the law firm's attorneys and
was accompanied by a certificate of service. Defendant thereafter
filed in this court its petition for leave to appeal on September 11,
2001. Plaintiff filed a response, and we granted leave to appeal on
December 5, 2001.

ANALYSIS
	Plaintiff contends that this appeal must be dismissed because
defendant failed to comply with the requirements of Supreme
Court Rule 315(b). Plaintiff argues that the affidavit of intent filed
by defendant was a nullity and that, as a result, the petition for
leave to appeal was untimely. Defendant, on the other hand,
responds that, because the affidavit required under Rule 315(b) is
one designed to "serve as notice of an action," the deficiencies of
its affidavit of intent are inconsequential. Defendant also contends
this issue is moot given the fact that this court has granted leave to
appeal.
	We begin our analysis with Rule 315(b), which states that
			"[u]nless a timely petition for rehearing is filed in the
Appellate Court, a party seeking leave to appeal must file
the petition for leave in the Supreme Court within 21 days
after entry of the judgment of the Appellate Court, or
within the same 21 days file with the Appellate Court an
affidavit of intent to file a petition for leave, and file the
petition within 35 days after the entry of such judgment."
(Emphasis added.) 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(b).
We interpret a supreme court rule in the same manner in which we
interpret a statute, namely, by ascertaining and giving effect to the
intent of the drafter. In re Estate of Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d 395, 404
(1998). The most reliable indicator of intent is the language used,
which should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Rennick,
181 Ill. 2d  at 405. When the language is clear and unambiguous,
we will apply the language used without resort to further aids of
construction. Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d  at 405.
	In the case of Rule 315(b), the import of the language cannot
be clearer-the rule requires that an "affidavit" be filed in order to
secure a 35-day period in which to file a petition for leave to
appeal in this court. Therefore, we must determine whether
defendant filed an "affidavit" in the appellate court as is
contemplated by Rule 315(b).
	Although the term "affidavit" is not defined within Rule 315,
Illinois courts have defined the term in consistent fashion for over
100 years. For example, in Harris v. Lester, 80 Ill. 307, 311
(1875), this court noted that "[a]n affidavit is simply a declaration,
on oath, in writing, sworn to by a party before some person who
has authority under the law to administer oaths. It does not depend
on the fact whether it is entitled in any cause or in any particular
way. Without any caption whatever, it is nevertheless an
affidavit." See also Figge v. Rowlen, 185 Ill. 234, 238 (1900)
(citing Harris definition with approval); People ex rel. McCline v.
Meyering, 356 Ill. 210, 214 (1934) (defining affidavit as a
declaration on oath, in writing, sworn to by a party before some
person who has authority, under the law, to administer oaths).
More recently, our appellate court has noted that " '[a]n affidavit
is simply a declaration, on oath, in writing sworn to before some
person who has authority under the law to administer oaths. A
writing which does not appear to have been sworn to before any
officer does not constitute an affidavit.' " People v. Smith, 22 Ill.
App. 3d 377, 380 (1974), quoting 2 Ill. L. & Prac. Affidavits §2, at
648 (1953). Thus, an affidavit must be sworn to, and statements in
a writing not sworn to before an authorized person cannot be
considered affidavits. See Kehoe v. Rounds, 69 Ill. 351 (1873);
Kohls v. Maryland Casualty Co., 144 Ill. App. 3d 642 (1986); 1
Ill. L. & Prac. Affidavits §3, at 436 (1988). In light of this
precedent, we agree with plaintiff that defendant did not file an
"affidavit" in this case because the document filed with the
appellate court does not consist of a statement sworn to before a
person who has authority under the law to administer oaths.
Rather, the document takes the form of a simple pleading.
	Notwithstanding the above, defendant argues that the
signature of its attorney on its filing substantially complies with
the requirements of Rule 315(b) because the purpose of the
affidavit is merely to give "notice" of the party's intention to seek
leave to appeal. Defendant notes that an attorney is ethically bound
to sign legal papers that are truthful. In essence, defendant asks
this court to relax the affidavit requirement contained in Rule
315(b) in this case and allow for a general notice of intent to
suffice. However, "[t]he rules of court we have promulgated are
not aspirational. They are not suggestions. They have the force of
law, and the presumption must be that they will be obeyed and
enforced as written." Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 210 (1995).
To hold as defendant suggests would require that we ignore
completely the affidavit requirement contained in Rule 315(b). We
deem such a course of action imprudent for several reasons. As an
initial matter, were we to so hold, we would provide litigants with
little incentive to follow our rules. More importantly, our rules
would have little force if the legal community perceived that we,
as a court, do not enforce the rules or tailor them to fit the
exigencies of the moment. Accordingly, we must emphasize that
the supreme court rules are rules of procedure and that it is
incumbent upon litigants to follow them. Furthermore and contrary
to defendant's argument, the affidavit of intent does not serve only
to give notice to the opposing party of the intention to seek leave
to appeal. The affidavit of intent also serves to stay, automatically,
the mandate of the appellate court. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 368. Thus,
the filing of the sworn document prevents the prevailing party
from proceeding on the appellate court's judgment. Given this
dual purpose, we cannot agree with defendant's suggestion that the
affidavit-of-intent requirement is nothing more than a notice
provision to the opposing party.
	We note that our recent opinion in Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d 324 (2002), in which we addressed what is required for
compliance with the affidavit requirements of Supreme Court Rule
191(a), provides little assistance to us in the context of addressing
the affidavit of intent required under Rule 315. In Robidoux, we
held that an affidavit need not be notarized in order to comply with
the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 191(a). In so holding, we
looked at the specific requirements for affidavits as set forth in
Rule 191 and noted that, in contrast to traditional rule that
notarization accompany an affidavit, Rule191 contained no
express requirement that the affidavit be notarized. What was
required under Rule 191, we held, was that the affidavit must be
signed by the affiant or that his or her name must appear as the
person having taken an oath. Our analysis in Robidoux necessarily
applies only to affidavits filed pursuant to Rule 191(a), which
itself applies only to specified proceedings under the Code of Civil
Procedure, such as motions for summary judgment, involuntary
dismissal, and to special appearances to contest personal
jurisdiction. In this case, we are dealing with an affidavit required
under Rule 315, which is not a rule used to implement practice
under the Code of Civil Procedure. Even if it were, Rule 191(a) is
markedly different from Rule 315. Rule 191 expressly provides
what is required of the affidavit, stating that affidavits:
		"shall be made on the personal knowledge of the affiants;
shall set forth with particularity the facts upon which the
claim, counterclaim, or defense is based; shall have
attached thereto sworn or certified copies of all papers
upon which the affiant relies; shall not consist of
conclusions but of facts admissible in evidence; and shall
affirmatively show that the affiant, if sworn as a witness,
can testify competently thereto." 145 Ill. 2d R. 191(a).
In contrast, Rule 315, as we have noted previously, sets forth no
specific affidavit requirements, stating only that "an affidavit" of
intent is required if a petition is not filed in the Supreme Court
within 21 days after entry of the judgment of the appellate court.
177 Ill. 2d R. 315(b). Because Rule 191(a) sets out specific
requirements for an affidavit, but omits reference to notarization,
it was reasonable for this court to conclude in Robidoux that
notarization is not required. In this case, we cannot excuse the
noncompliance with the traditional requirements of an affidavit
because Rule 315(b), unlike Rule 191(a), gives absolutely no
guidance as to what is required of the party filing the affidavit. For
that reason, its requirements must be gleaned from our case law,
i.e., how this court has traditionally viewed the requirements of an
affidavit. Robidoux, therefore, is inapplicable our discussion here.
	Having decided that the document filed by defendant in this
matter was not an affidavit, we must next determine what effect,
if any, the improper filing had on this case. Defendant asserts that
the issue is moot because this court has already granted leave to
appeal. Just recently, however, this court, in a unanimous opinion,
reaffirmed that "[o]ur rules demand strict compliance in the timely
filing of appeals or affidavits of intent as a matter of jurisdiction."
A.J. Maggio Co. v. Willis, 197 Ill. 2d 397, 403 (2001). In that case,
although we granted the petition for leave to appeal, we
subsequently declined to exercise jurisdiction and dismissed the
appeal because of the untimeliness of the petition for leave to
appeal. Therefore, we will not consider the issue to be moot.
	An affidavit that is not sworn is a nullity. Hough v. Weber,
202 Ill. App. 3d 674, 692 (1990). The fact that defendant's
affidavit was a nullity calls into question the timeliness of the
filing of the petition for leave to appeal in this case. Under Rule
315(b), to bring a further appeal to this court, defendant was
required to do one of two things within 21 days of the filing of the
appellate court opinion: either file a petition for leave to appeal in
the supreme court or file, in the appellate court, an affidavit of
intent. A proper affidavit of intent would allow a litigant an
additional 14 days in which to file a petition for leave in this court.
We have already determined that the "affidavit of intent" filed in
this case was not proper. Because an improper affidavit has no
legal effect, the document filed in the appellate court was
insufficient to extend the time for filing the petition for leave to
appeal. For this reason, defendant's petition for leave to appeal
was untimely and should not have been considered. We, therefore,
conclude that leave to appeal in this matter was improvidently
granted and dismiss the cause.

CONCLUSION
	Leave to appeal in this matter was improvidently granted. The
appeal is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.


	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, concurring in part and dissenting in
part:


	I write separately to note my limited concurrence with the
majority's application of Supreme Court Rule 315(b), and to voice
my dissent concerning the majority's interpretation of the Rule
315(b) "affidavit" requirement. The majority concludes that since
the document filed by defendant was not, strictly speaking, an
"affidavit," it was a nullity and insufficient to extend the time for
filing the petition for leave to appeal. Slip op. at 3.
	I agree that the document filed by defendant is not an affidavit
within the meaning of Rule 315(b) because it contains no recital
that it was made under oath. This court, however, recently
approved as minimally sufficient under Rule 191(a) an affidavit
containing no notary attestation or other independent evidence that
an oath was administered to the person who signed it. Robidoux v.
Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d 324, 340 (2002). Accordingly, today's
decision conflicts with this court's holding in Robidoux. The
majority provides no sufficient rationale for its willingness to relax
the formal requirements of an affidavit in Robidoux and not in this
case. The majority attempts to distinguish Robidoux, reasoning
that Rule 191(a) sets out specific requirements for the form of an
affidavit, unlike Rule 315(b). That distinction does not, however,
resolve the conflict. The requirements of Rule 191(a) relate solely
to the factual assertions in support of, or in opposition to, a
summary judgment motion and not to oath, signature, or
attestation requirements. Neither Rule 191(a) nor Rule 315(b)
refers directly to notarization or oaths of averment or any other
attestation requirement necessary to render the subject document
an "affidavit." Nonetheless, the majority chooses to strictly
enforce these nonspecified attestation requirements with respect to
Rule 315(b) when we did not in Robidoux.
	The majority concludes that because the document was
insufficient, we lack jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Slip op. at 6.
Despite a defective affidavit, under Rule 315(b) this court has
exercised its discretion to extend the time for petitioning for leave
to appeal under "extreme and compelling" circumstances. See
Telegraph Savings & Loan Ass'n of Chicago v. Schilling, 105 Ill. 2d 166 (1984).
	The majority reasons that we have merely declined to exercise
jurisdiction under the facts in this case. Slip op. at 6. I reluctantly
concur with that portion of the decision because Rule 315(b), in its
present form, requires a minimally sufficient affidavit and the
defendant did not seek an extension of time for petitioning for
leave to appeal. Nonetheless, the majority applies Rule 315(b) as
a strict jurisdictional rule while acknowledging that this court
possesses the power to decline or accept jurisdiction under the
same rule. I find it difficult to reconcile the treatment of Rule
315(b) as jurisdictional when Rule 315(b) is frequently not applied
on a strict jurisdictional basis.