Case Title: State ex rel. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas

Citation: 2000-Ohio-379

Docket Number: 19991979

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2000-05-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 88 
Ohio St.3d 447, 2000-Ohio-379.] 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY, v. CUYAHOGA 
COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of 
Common Pleas (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 447.] 
Prohibition — Writ sought to prohibit Cuyahoga County common pleas court 
judge from asserting further jurisdiction with respect to an amended 
complaint against relator concerning relator’s electric rates and charges 
in common pleas court case No. 367179 — Writ granted, when. 
(No. 99-1979 — Submitted February 22, 2000 — Decided May 17, 2000.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
 
On August 8, 1997, Mark R. Weiss, d.b.a. several commercial real estate 
companies (“Weiss”), filed with the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio 
(“commission”) a complaint against the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company 
(“CEI”), in which he asserted that the rates CEI charged to Weiss outside the 
geographic boundaries applicable to its “competitive pilot program” were 
discriminatory and prejudicial, in violation of R.C. 4905.31, 4905.33, and 4905.35.  
On November 6, 1997, the commission dismissed Weiss’s complaint.  However, 
pursuant to a timely application for rehearing, the commission issued an Entry on 
Rehearing, dated December 23, 1997, granting a limited rehearing.  From time to 
 
 
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time during 1998, hearings were scheduled and briefs were submitted by the 
parties.  On January 14, 1999, the commission issued its Opinion and Order, 
dismissing the complaint for failure of proof by Weiss that CEI’s rates were 
discriminatory and prejudicial in violation of statute. 
 
While the commission complaint case was pending, Weiss filed a complaint 
against CEI in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, case No. 
367179.  The case was assigned to Judge Peggy Foley Jones.  Weiss sought to 
bring his common pleas court case as a class action, asserting that CEI violated the 
antitrust provisions of Ohio’s Valentine Act (R.C. 1331.01 et seq.) and that CEI 
acted as a monopoly to Weiss’s detriment.  Weiss’s complaint set forth three 
causes of action.  On December 1, 1998, CEI moved for dismissal of Weiss’s 
complaint.  Before the common pleas court ruled on the motion, Weiss filed a first 
amended complaint (“amended complaint”).  CEI filed a motion to dismiss the 
amended complaint, primarily on the ground that the commission has exclusive 
jurisdiction over a public utility’s rates and charges and that the common pleas 
court, therefore, does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Weiss’s complaint. 
 
On June 11, 1999, Judge Jones issued her opinion dismissing “Count Two.”  
Judge Jones ruled that the first and third causes of action contained in Weiss’s 
complaint remained properly before her court. 
 
 
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On March 8, 1999, Weiss filed with this court his notice of appeal of the 
commission’s Opinion and Order in his complaint case.  Weiss’s appeal was 
assigned case No. 99-444, and it is currently pending before this court. 
 
On November 4, 1999, CEI, as relator, filed with this court its original action 
in prohibition, naming Judge Jones, as respondent, seeking a writ of prohibition 
against the further assertion of jurisdiction by the common pleas court over 
Weiss’s amended complaint.  The prohibition action was assigned case No. 99-
1979 and is the subject of this opinion. 
 
Weiss filed a motion for leave to intervene as a party appearing in support of 
respondent Judge Jones.  We hereby grant Weiss’s motion, effective retroactively 
to the date of his motion. 
 
On December 20, 1999, Judge Jones and Weiss filed motions to dismiss 
CEI’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief in the form of 
prohibition could be granted. 
 
The cause is before the court upon Judge Jones’s and Weiss’s motions to 
dismiss CEI’s complaint in prohibition. 
__________________ 
 
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, David A. Kutik and Mark A. Whitt; and James 
W. Burk, for relator Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company. 
 
 
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William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Carol 
Shockley, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent Judge Peggy Foley Jones. 
 
Timothy A. Shimko & Associates, and Frank E. Piscitelli, Jr.; Spangenberg, 
Shibley & Liber, Dennis R. Lansdowne and Mary A. Cavanaugh, for intervenor 
Mark R. Weiss. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5) provides that “[a]fter the time for filing an 
answer to the complaint or a motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court will either 
dismiss the case or issue an alternative or a peremptory writ, if a writ has not 
already been issued.” 
 
“To obtain a writ of prohibition, a relator must show  (1) that the court 
against whom the writ is sought is exercising or about to exercise judicial power, 
(2) that the exercise of power is unauthorized by law, and (3) that denying the writ 
will result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary 
course of law.  * * *  However, where there is a patent and unambiguous lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction in the court exercising judicial authority, it is not 
necessary to establish that the relator has no adequate remedy at law in order for a 
writ to issue.* * *” (Citations omitted.)  State ex rel. Ohio Edison Co. v. Parrott 
(1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 705, 707, 654 N.E.2d 106, 108. 
 
 
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CEI has met the first requirement for grant of a writ of prohibition: it has 
shown that Judge Jones has exercised and continues to exercise jurisdiction over 
the amended complaint in the underlying legal proceeding before the common 
pleas court.  We now turn to consideration of the second and third requirements for 
issuance of a writ of prohibition as enumerated in Parrott. 
 
Judge Jones claims that her exercise of jurisdiction over the amended 
complaint is grounded in R.C. 2305.01, which confers general subject matter 
jurisdiction to common pleas courts in civil actions.  She argues that “[a]bsent a 
patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter 
jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging the court’s 
jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by way of appeal.”  State ex rel. Lipinski v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Probate Div. (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 19, 
22, 655 N.E.2d 1303, 1306.  Based on that proposition of law, Judge Jones 
determined that the common pleas court has jurisdiction over two of the three 
counts of the amended complaint.  However, Judge Jones ignores the introductory 
qualifying language of her proffered proposition of law relating to the absence of 
patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction over the amended complaint. 
 
The commission has exclusive jurisdiction over various matters involving 
public utilities, such as rates and charges, classifications, and service, effectively 
denying to all Ohio courts (except this court) any jurisdiction over such matters.  
 
 
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R.C. 4905.26 specifically establishes the commission’s exclusive jurisdiction over 
such matters, which “in any respect” are alleged to be “unjust, unreasonable, 
unjustly discriminatory, unjustly preferential, or in violation of law * * *.”  In 
addition, “[n]o court other than the supreme court shall have power to review, 
suspend, or delay any order made by the public utilities commission * * *.”  R.C. 
4903.12. 
 
We have held that when the General Assembly has enacted a comprehensive 
scheme of public utility rate regulation and has specifically conferred regulatory 
jurisdiction upon the commission, such jurisdiction is exclusive.  As we said in 
Kazmaier Supermarket, Inc. v. Toledo Edison Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 147, 150-
153, 573 N.E.2d 655, 658-660: 
 
“The General Assembly has by statute pronounced the public policy of the 
state that the broad and complete control of public utilities shall be within the 
administrative agency, the Public Utilities Commission.  This court has recognized 
this legislative mandate. 
 
“ ‘There is perhaps no field of business subject to greater statutory and 
governmental control than that of the public utility.  This is particularly true of the 
rates of a public utility. Such rates are set and regulated by a general statutory plan 
in which the Public Utilities Commission is vested with the authority to determine 
rates in the first instance, and in which the authority to review such rates is vested 
 
 
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exclusively in the Supreme Court by Section 4903.12, Revised Code * * *.’ Keco 
Industries, Inc. v. Cincinnati & Suburban Bell Tel. Co. (1957), 166 Ohio St. 254, 
256, 2 O.O.2d 85, 86, 141 N.E.2d 465, 467; see, also, Inland Steel Dev. Corp. v. 
Pub. Util. Comm. (1977), 49 Ohio St.2d 284, 288-289, 3 O.O.3d 435, 437-438, 361 
N.E.2d 240, 243-244; Akron v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1948), 149 Ohio St. 347, 359, 37 
O.O. 39, 44, 78 N.E.2d 890, 897. 
 
“ * * * 
 
“ ‘ * * * The General Assembly has enacted an entire chapter of the Revised 
Code dealing with public utilities, requiring, inter alia, adequate service, and 
providing for permissible rates and review procedure.  E.g., R.C. 4905.04, 4905.06, 
4905.22, 4905.231 and 4905.381.  Further, R.C. 4905.26 provides a detailed 
procedure for filing service complaints. This comprehensive scheme expresses the 
intention of the General Assembly that such powers were to be vested solely in the 
Commission.  As this court said in State ex rel. Ohio Bell Telephone Co., v. Court 
of Common Pleas (1934), 128 Ohio St. 553 at 557 [1 O.O. 99 at 100-101, 192 N.E. 
787 at 788-789]: 
 
“ ‘ “The jurisdiction specifically conferred by statute upon the Public 
Utilities Commission over public utilities of the state, including the regulation of 
rates and the enforcement of repayment of money collected * * * during the 
pendency of the proceeding * * * is so complete, comprehensive and adequate as 
 
 
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to warrant the conclusion that it is likewise exclusive.”  See, also, Ohio Transport, 
Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1955), 164 Ohio St. 98, 107 [57 O.O. 108, 113, 128 
N.E.2d 22, 28].’  (Emphasis added.) 
 
“ * * * 
 
“In regard to administrative agency exclusivity, generally, this court has 
recognized that where the General Assembly has enacted a complete and 
comprehensive statutory scheme governing review by an administrative agency, 
exclusive jurisdiction is vested within such agency.  State ex rel. Geauga Cty. 
Budget Comm. v. Geauga Cty. Court of Appeals (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 110, 113, 1 
OBR 143, 146, 438 N.E.2d 428, 431; see, also, State ex rel. Northern Ohio Tel. Co. 
v. Winter, supra, 23 Ohio St.2d [6] at 9-10, 52 O.O.2d [29] at 31, 260 N.E.2d [827] 
at 829-830.  State, ex rel. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common 
Pleas (1934), 128 Ohio St. 553, 1 O.O. 99, 192 N.E. 787.” 
 
As we observed in Parrott, 73 Ohio St.3d at 708, 654 N.E.2d at 109: 
 
“Admittedly, however, our jurisdiction over matters involving utilities is not 
entirely exclusive.  Other courts retain limited subject matter jurisdiction over tort 
and some contract claims involving utilities regulated by the commission.  See, 
e.g., Kazmaier Supermarket, Inc. v. Toledo Edison Co., supra, 61 Ohio St.3d at 
154, 573 N.E.2d at 660 (pure common-law tort claims may be brought in common 
pleas court); Kohli v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 12, 18 OBR 10, 479 
 
 
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N.E.2d 840 (failure to warn landowners of dangers regarding voltage actionable in 
common pleas court); Milligan v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 191, 10 
O.O.3d 352, 383 N.E.2d 575, paragraph three of the syllabus (invasion of privacy 
actionable in common pleas court); Marketing Research Serv., Inc. v. Pub. Util. 
Comm. (1987), 34 Ohio St.3d 52, 517 N.E.2d 540 (commission has no jurisdiction 
to resolve breach of contract dispute concerning provision of interstate 
telecommunications service).  But, see, Gallo Displays, Inc. v. Cleveland Pub. 
Power (1992), 84 Ohio App.3d 688, 618 N.E.2d 190 (common-law nuisance claim 
against utility not actionable in common pleas court).” 
 
Weiss’s amended complaint disregards the commission’s exclusive 
jurisdiction to determine the matters complained of by asking the common pleas 
court to rule on those matters.  Weiss argues that the common pleas court has 
jurisdiction over the amended complaint not only under R.C. 2305.01, but also by 
virtue of the jurisdictional provisions of Ohio’s Valentine Act. 
 
Weiss characterizes the amended complaint’s allegations as based in 
antitrust violations under the Valentine Act.  However, the express basis of his 
amended complaint is that CEI’s rates under its commission-approved 
“competitive pilot program” unfairly and illegally discriminate against customers 
such as Weiss. 
 
 
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The comprehensive public utility regulatory scheme set forth in R.C. 
4905.22, 4905.26, 4905.31, 4905.33, and 4905.35 expressly governs the matters set 
forth in the amended complaint.  It follows that the claims in the amended 
complaint are claims which may be properly raised by way of a complaint before 
the commission.1 Kazmaier, 61 Ohio St.3d at 153, 573 N.E.2d at 660.  There is no 
indication that issues of discrimination under R.C. 4905.33 and 4905.35 are 
different from issues of discrimination under the Valentine Act, and Weiss has 
failed to cite any legal authority to support the proposition that there is a 
difference.  We find that there is none and conclude that the commission has 
exclusive jurisdiction over the matters of discrimination asserted by Weiss in his 
amended complaint before the common pleas court. 
 
We find that the commission and this court have exclusive jurisdiction over 
the matters addressed in Weiss’s amended complaint and that respondent’s lack of 
jurisdiction over those matters is patent and unambiguous.  Therefore, relator need 
not establish that it has no adequate remedy at law in order to obtain a writ of 
prohibition in this case.  Thus, the second and third requirements for issuance of a 
writ of prohibition, as enumerated in Parrott, have been met or avoided.  See 73 
Ohio St.3d at 709, 654 N.E.2d at 109. 
 
Moreover, we find that it is beyond doubt that CEI is entitled to issuance of 
a writ of prohibition, and where “it appears beyond doubt that relator is entitled to 
 
 
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the requested extraordinary relief, a peremptory writ should issue.”  State ex rel. 
DeBrosse v. Cool (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 716 N.E.2d 1114, 1116, and State ex 
rel. Stern v. Mascio (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 297, 298, 691 N.E.2d 253, 254. 
 
We hereby grant a peremptory writ of prohibition against the respondent, 
prohibiting the respondent from asserting further jurisdiction with respect to 
Weiss’s amended complaint in common pleas court case No. 367179.  Further, by 
reason of the issuance of such writ, we hereby deny Judge Jones’s and Weiss’s 
motions to dismiss CEI’s complaint in prohibition in this case. 
Writ granted and 
dismissal motions denied. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents and would dismiss the cause. 
 
COOK, J., not participating. 
FOOTNOTE: 
 
1. 
Weiss, in fact, challenged CEI’s “competitive pilot program” in his 
R.C. 4905.26 complaint proceeding before the commission, which is on appeal 
before this court in our case No. 99-444.