Case Title: Kesner v. Superior Court

Citation: 

Docket Number: S219534

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2016-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 12/1/16 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
CECELIA KESNER, 
) 
 
 
) 
S219534 
 
Petitioner, 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/3 A136378 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
 
) 
Alameda County 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF  
) 
Super. Ct. No. RG11578906 
ALAMEDA COUNTY, 
) 
  
 
) 
 
 
Respondent; 
) 
 
 
) 
PNEUMO ABEX, LLC, 
) 
 
 
 
) 
 
Real Party in Interest. 
) 
 
 
) 
CECELIA KESNER, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/3 A136416 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
 
) 
Alameda County 
PNEUMO ABEX, LLC, 
) 
Super. Ct. No. RG11578906  
 
) 
 
 
Defendant and Respondent; 
) 
 
 
) 
JOSHUA HAVER, et al. 
) 
 
 
)  
S219919 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/5 B246527 
 
v. 
)  
 
 
 
) 
 
BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, 
)  
Los Angeles County 
 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BC435551 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
These two cases ask whether employers or landowners owe a duty of care 
to prevent secondary exposure to asbestos.  Such exposure, sometimes called 
domestic or take-home exposure, occurs when a worker who is directly exposed to 
a toxin carries it home on his or her person or clothing, and a household member is 
in turn exposed through physical proximity or contact with that worker or the 
worker‘s clothing.  Plaintiffs in these actions for personal injury and wrongful 
death allege that take-home exposure to asbestos was a contributing cause to the 
deaths of Lynne Haver and Johnny Kesner, and that the employers of Lynne‘s 
former husband and Johnny‘s uncle had a duty to prevent this exposure.  
Defendants argue that users of asbestos have no duty, either as employers or as 
premises owners, to prevent nonemployees who have never visited their facilities 
from being exposed to asbestos used in defendants‘ business enterprises.   
 
After the trial and appellate courts in these two cases reached varying 
conclusions as to the existence of this duty, we granted review and consolidated 
both cases for oral argument and decision to address the following questions:  
Does an employer that uses asbestos in the workplace have a duty of care to 
protect employees‘ household members from exposure to asbestos through off-site 
contact with employees who carry asbestos fibers on their work clothing, tools, 
vehicles, or persons?  How, if at all, does this duty differ when the plaintiff states a 
claim for premises liability rather than general negligence?  If an employer or 
premises owner has such a duty, is that duty limited to immediate family members 
or to members of the employee‘s household?  Or does the duty extend to visitors, 
guests, or other persons with whom the employee may come into contact? 
 
We hold that the duty of employers and premises owners to exercise 
ordinary care in their use of asbestos includes preventing exposure to asbestos 
 
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carried by the bodies and clothing of on-site workers.  Where it is reasonably 
foreseeable that workers, their clothing, or personal effects will act as vectors 
carrying asbestos from the premises to household members, employers have a duty 
to take reasonable care to prevent this means of transmission.  This duty also 
applies to premises owners who use asbestos on their property, subject to any 
exceptions and affirmative defenses generally applicable to premises owners, such 
as the rules of contractor liability.  Importantly, we hold that this duty extends only 
to members of a worker‘s household.  Because the duty is premised on the 
foreseeability of both the regularity and intensity of contact that occurs in a 
worker‘s home, it does not extend beyond this circumscribed category of potential 
plaintiffs.   
I. 
Johnny Blaine Kesner, Jr., was diagnosed with perotineal mesothelioma in 
February 2011.  (Because this case involves family members with the same last 
name, we use individuals‘ first names for clarity.)  Johnny filed suit against a 
number of defendants he believed were responsible for exposing him to asbestos 
and causing his mesothelioma. These defendants included Pneumo Abex, LLC 
(Abex).  Johnny‘s uncle, George Kesner, worked at the Abex plant in Winchester, 
Virginia, for much of George‘s life, where George was exposed to asbestos fibers 
released in the manufacture of brake shoes.  According to George, Johnny spent an 
average of three nights per week at his uncle‘s home from 1973 to 1979.  When 
Johnny was at his uncle‘s home, he would sometimes sleep near George or 
roughhouse with George while George was wearing his work clothes.  Johnny 
alleged that his exposure to asbestos dust from the Abex plant, carried home on his 
uncle‘s clothes, contributed to his contracting mesothelioma.  Johnny died in 
December 2014, after the Court of Appeal issued its judgment in this matter.  
Cecelia Kesner is his successor in interest. 
 
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Lynne Haver was diagnosed with mesothelioma in March 2008 and died in 
April 2009.  Her children, Joshua Haver, Christopher Haver, Kyle Haver, and 
Jennifer Morris (the Havers), filed a wrongful death and survival action alleging 
negligence, premises owner and contractor liability, and loss of consortium.  They 
allege that Lynne‘s exposure to asbestos by way of her former husband, Mike 
Haver, caused her cancer and death.  Mike was employed by the Atchison, 
Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway, a predecessor of BNSF Railway Company 
(BNSF), from July 1972 through 1974.  In his position as fireman and hostler for 
BNSF, Mike was exposed to asbestos from pipe insulation and other products.  
The Havers allege that Mike carried home these asbestos fibers on his body and 
clothing, and that Lynne was exposed through contact with him and his clothing, 
tools, and vehicle after she began living with him in 1973. 
Mesothelioma is a cancer of the chest and abdomen closely associated with 
asbestos exposure.  Asbestos can cause disease when an individual inhales or 
ingests microscopic asbestos fibers that have been released into the air.  Some 
forms of asbestos, termed friable, release such fibers upon slight contact; 
nonfriable asbestos may release fibers if cut, sawed, or broken.  (29 C.F.R. 
§ 1926.1101, appen. H (2016).)  The Havers and Kesner allege that BNSF and 
Abex, through the use or manufacture of asbestos-containing products, created a 
risk of harm to the household members of their employees by failing to exercise 
reasonable care in their use of asbestos-containing materials.   
Neither the Havers‘ nor Kesner‘s suit reached a jury.  Abex moved for 
nonsuit at the beginning of trial in light of Campbell v. Ford Motor Co. (2012) 206 
Cal.App.4th 15, 34 (Campbell), which held that ―a property owner has no duty to 
protect family members of workers on its premises from secondary exposure to 
asbestos used during the course of the property owner‘s business.‖  The trial court 
granted this motion and entered a final judgment in Abex‘s favor on the ground 
 
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that Abex did not owe a duty to Kesner to prevent his exposure to asbestos.  
Kesner both appealed and petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate.  
The Court of Appeal consolidated the appeal and writ proceeding, and reversed 
the trial court‘s grant of a nonsuit. 
After the Havers filed suit, BNSF demurred to the complaint, also relying 
on Campbell.  The trial court sustained the demurrer; the Havers appealed.  The 
Court of Appeal held that Campbell correctly rejected the claim that premises 
owners owe a duty of care to household members who suffer take-home exposure 
to asbestos, and distinguished the Court of Appeal‘s decision in Kesner on the 
ground that Kesner‘s claim alleged negligence in the manufacture of brake pads, 
whereas the Havers‘ claim rested on a theory of premises liability.   
We granted review in both cases and consolidated them for argument and 
decision in order to determine whether an employer has a duty to members of an 
employee‘s household to prevent take-home asbestos exposure on a premises 
liability or negligence theory. 
II. 
 
A plaintiff in any negligence suit must demonstrate ― ‗a legal duty to use 
due care, a breach of such legal duty, and [that] the breach [is] the proximate or 
legal cause of the resulting injury.‘ ‖  (Beacon Residential Community Assn. v. 
Skidmore, Owings & Merrill LLP (2014) 59 Cal.4th 568, 573 (Beacon), quoting 
United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 586, 594.)  
Here we are tasked solely with deciding whether Abex or BNSF had a legal duty 
to prevent the injuries alleged by Kesner and the Havers.   
 
―Duty is a question of law for the court, to be reviewed de novo on appeal.‖  
(Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 770 (Cabral).)  ―California 
law establishes the general duty of each person to exercise, in his or her activities, 
reasonable care for the safety of others.  (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).)‖  (Id. at 
 
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p. 768.)  Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part:  
―Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also 
for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in 
the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, 
willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.‖  
(All subsequent statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise 
indicated.)  ― ‗Courts . . . invoke[] the concept of duty to limit generally ―the 
otherwise potentially infinite liability which would follow from every negligent 
act . . . .‖ ‘ ‖  (Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 370, 397 (Bily), 
quoting Thompson v. County of Alameda (1980) 27 Cal.3d 741, 750.)  The 
conclusion that a defendant did not have a duty constitutes a determination by the 
court that public policy concerns outweigh, for a particular category of cases, the 
broad principle enacted by the Legislature that one‘s failure to exercise ordinary 
care incurs liability for all the harms that result.  ―The history of the concept of 
duty in itself discloses that it is not an old and deep-rooted doctrine but a legal 
device of the latter half of the nineteenth century designed to curtail the feared 
propensities of juries toward liberal awards.‖  (Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 
728, 734.)  As a result, ―in the absence of a statutory provision establishing an 
exception to the general rule of Civil Code section 1714, courts should create one 
only where ― ‗clearly supported by public policy.‘ ‖  (Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at 
p. 771, quoting Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112 (Rowland).)   
 
In determining whether policy considerations weigh in favor of such an 
exception, we have said the most important factors are ―the foreseeability of harm 
to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the 
closeness of the connection between the defendant‘s conduct and the injury 
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant‘s conduct, the policy of 
preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and 
 
7 
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting 
liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the 
risk involved.‖  (Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 113.)  Because Civil Code 
section 1714 establishes a general duty to exercise ordinary care in one‘s 
activities, which includes the use of asbestos in one‘s business or on one‘s 
premises, we rely on these factors not to determine ―whether a new duty should be 
created, but whether an exception to Civil Code section 1714 . . . should be 
created.‖  (Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 783.)  
 
Because a judicial decision on the issue of duty entails line-drawing based 
on policy considerations, ―the Rowland factors are evaluated at a relatively broad 
level of factual generality. . . .  [¶] In applying the . . . Rowland factors, . . . we 
have asked not whether they support an exception to the general duty of 
reasonable care on the facts of the particular case before us, but whether carving 
out an entire category of cases from that general duty rule is justified by clear 
considerations of policy. . . .  [¶] By making exceptions to Civil Code section 
1714‘s general duty of ordinary care only when foreseeability and policy 
considerations justify a categorical no-duty rule, we preserve the crucial 
distinction between a determination that the defendant owed the plaintiff no duty 
of ordinary care, which is for the court to make, and a determination that the 
defendant did not breach the duty of ordinary care, which in a jury trial is for the 
jury to make.‖  (Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 772; see Rest.3d Torts, Liability 
for Physical and Emotional Harm, § 7, com. a, p. 78 [―No-duty rules are 
appropriate only when a court can promulgate relatively clear, categorical, bright-
line rules of law applicable to a general class of cases.‖].) 
 
In this respect, duty differs from the other elements of a tort.  Breach, 
injury, and causation must be demonstrated on the basis of facts adduced at trial, 
and a jury‘s determination of each must take into account the particular context in 
 
8 
which any act or injury occurred.  Analysis of duty occurs at a higher level of 
generality.  In Cabral, we held it was irrelevant to the question of duty whether the 
defendant had ―parked 16 feet from the outermost traffic lane, rather than six feet 
or 26 feet; that parking for emergencies was permitted in the dirt area he chose; 
that [plaintiff] likely left the highway because he fell asleep or because of some 
unknown adverse health event, rather than from distraction or even intoxication.‖  
(Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 774.)  Each of these factual circumstances went to 
elements other than duty, such as breach or proximate causation.   
 
Here, because ―the general duty to take ordinary care in the conduct of 
one‘s activities‖ applies to the use of asbestos on an owner‘s premises or in an 
employer‘s manufacturing processes, ―the issue is also properly stated as whether 
a categorical exception to that general rule should be made‖ exempting property 
owners and employers from potential liability to individuals who were exposed to 
asbestos by way of employees carrying it on their clothes or person.  (Cabral, 
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 774, citing § 1714, subd. (a).)  In answering this question, 
our task is not to decide whether Kesner or the Havers have proven that asbestos 
from Abex or BNSF actually and foreseeably reached Johnny Kesner or Lynne 
Haver, or whether Abex‘s or BNSF‘s asbestos contributed to the disease that 
Johnny or Lynne suffered, or whether Abex or BNSF had adequate procedures in 
place to prevent take-home exposure.  Our task is to determine whether household 
exposure is categorically unforeseeable and, if not, whether allowing the 
possibility of liability would result in such significant social burdens that the law 
should not recognize such claims.  As noted, we will not ―carv[e] out an entire 
category of cases from th[e] general duty rule‖ of section 1714, subdivision (a), 
unless doing so ―is justified by clear considerations of policy.‖  (Cabral, at 
p. 772.) 
 
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III. 
The Rowland factors fall into two categories.  Three factors — 
foreseeability, certainty, and the connection between plaintiff and defendant — 
address the foreseeability of the relevant injury, while the other four — moral 
blame, preventing future harm, burden, and availability of insurance — take into 
account public policy concerns that might support excluding certain kinds of 
plaintiffs or injuries from relief.  As explained below, we conclude that the 
exposure of household members to take-home asbestos is generally foreseeable 
and that BNSF and Abex have not shown that categorically barring take-home 
claims is justified by clear considerations of policy.  Accordingly, Abex and BNSF 
owed plaintiffs a duty of ordinary care to prevent take-home exposure. 
A. 
 
The most important factor to consider in determining whether to create an 
exception to the general duty to exercise ordinary care articulated by section 1714 
is whether the injury in question was foreseeable.  (Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of 
California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 434 (Tarasoff).)  With respect to this factor, we 
conclude that it was foreseeable that people who work with or around asbestos 
may carry asbestos fibers home with them and expose members of their 
household.  This factor weighs in favor of the existence of a duty. 
―[A]s to foreseeability, . . . the court‘s task in determining duty ‗is not to 
decide whether a particular plaintiff‘s injury was reasonably foreseeable in light 
of a particular defendant‘s conduct, but rather to evaluate more generally whether 
the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind 
of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed . . . .‘ ‖  (Cabral, 
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 772; accord, Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co. (1997) 15 
Cal.4th 456, 476 (Parsons); Jackson v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. (1993) 16 
Cal.App.4th 1830, 1839.)  For purposes of duty analysis, ― ‗foreseeability is not to 
 
10 
be measured by what is more probable than not, but includes whatever is likely 
enough in the setting of modern life that a reasonably thoughtful [person] would 
take account of it in guiding practical conduct.‘. . .  [I]t is settled that what is 
required to be foreseeable is the general character of the event or harm — e.g., 
being struck by a car while standing in a phone booth — not its precise nature or 
manner of occurrence.‖  (Bigbee v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 49, 57–
58 (Bigbee).) 
A reasonably thoughtful person making industrial use of asbestos during 
the time periods at issue in this case (i.e., the mid-1970s) would take into account 
the possibility that asbestos fibers could become attached to an employee‘s 
clothing or person, travel to that employee‘s home, and thereby reach other 
persons who lived in the home.  (See Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (N.J. 2006) 895 
A.2d 1143, 1149 (Olivo) [―It requires no leap of imagination to presume that . . . 
[the worker‘s] spouse would be handling [the worker‘s] clothes in the normal and 
expected process of laundering them so that the garments could be worn to work 
again.‖].)  It is a matter of common experience and knowledge that dust or other 
substances may be carried from place to place on one‘s clothing or person, as 
anyone who has cleaned an attic or spent time in a smoky room can attest.  
Defendants would not need to know ―the precise . . . manner‖ that exposure 
occurred (i.e., that Lynne laundered Mike‘s clothing or that George roughhoused 
with his nephew Johnny) in order to recognize the general risk posed by workers 
leaving an area with airborne dust-based toxins and then coming into contact with 
members of their households.  (Bigbee, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 58.) 
 
Moreover, at the time George Kesner and Mike Haver worked for 
defendants, broadly applicable regulations identified the potential health risks of 
asbestos traveling outside a worksite.  In June 1972, the federal Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) published its first permanent 
 
11 
regulations for employers using asbestos.  (OSHA, Standard for Exposure to 
Asbestos Dust, 37 Fed. Reg. 11320 (June 7, 1972) (OSHA Standard), amending 
29 C.F.R. § 1910 et seq.; for current regulation, see 29 CFR § 1910.0001 et seq. 
(2016); see also Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson (D.C.Cir. 
1974) 499 F.2d 467, 471–472 (Industrial Union).)  In addition to setting a ceiling 
for employee exposure to airborne asbestos, the OSHA Standard required 
employers to take precautions for employees and others who may be exposed to 
concentrations of airborne asbestos above that ceiling.  (OSHA Standard, supra, 
37 Fed. Reg. 11320, adding 29 C.F.R. former § 1910.93a.)  Some precautions 
contemplated asbestos traveling within a worksite.  For example, the regulations 
required employers to post signs in all areas of high airborne asbestos 
concentrations ―at such a distance from such a location so that an employee may 
read the signs and take necessary protective steps before entering the area marked 
by the signs.‖  (Id., 37 Fed. Reg. 11321.)  Others protected nonemployees from 
asbestos traveling outside of a worksite on employees‘ clothing.  Under the 
regulations, employers were required to provide their asbestos-exposed employees 
with special clothing and changing rooms.  (Ibid.)  Employers were required to 
inform launderers of asbestos-exposed clothing of the asbestos contamination and 
to transport asbestos-exposed clothing ―in sealed impermeable bags, or other 
closed, impermeable containers‖ that were appropriately labeled as containing 
asbestos.  (Ibid.)  Moreover, employers were required to provide ―two separate 
lockers or containers for each employee, so separated or isolated as to prevent 
contamination of the employee‘s street clothes from his work clothes.‖  (Ibid.) 
 
Well before OSHA issued the 1972 standard, the federal government and 
industrial hygienists recommended that employers take measures to prevent 
employees who worked with toxins from contaminating their families by changing 
and showering before leaving the workplace.  In 1952, the United States 
 
12 
Department of Labor‘s standards for federal contractors provided that ―[w]orkers 
who handle or are exposed to harmful materials in such a manner that contact of 
work clothes with street clothes will communicate to the latter the harmful 
substances . . . should be provided with facilities which will prevent this contact.‖  
(U.S. Dept. of Labor, Safety and Health Standards For Contractors performing 
Federal Supply Contracts under the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act (1952) pt. 
III. B. 5 (d), 25.)  The International Labour Office‘s Standard Code of Industrial 
Hygiene (Geneva 1934) recommended washing accommodation and cloakrooms 
for workers ―[i]n dusty trades.‖  (Id., art. 4, std. 40, at p. 15.)  It was also known 
that take-home exposure to asbestos could cause serious injury; as early as 1965, 
scholarly journals documented fatal cases of mesothelioma where patients‘ only 
exposure was through living with an asbestos worker.  (See Newhouse & 
Thompson, Mesothelioma of Pleura and Peritoneum Following Exposure to 
Asbestos in the London Area (1965) vol. 22, No. 4 Brit. J. Indus. Med. 261, 264.) 
 
Defendants argue that there was no scientific consensus regarding the risks 
of take-home asbestos during the relevant time periods here.  But defendants cite 
no authority requiring a scientific consensus to establish foreseeability in the 
context of duty analysis.  (Cf. Tarasoff, supra, 17 Cal.3d at pp. 437–438 [rejecting 
the argument that because the state of scientific evidence did not enable therapists 
to accurately predict whether patients will act violently, therapists have no duty to 
third parties for their patients‘ violent conduct, and instead holding that therapists 
must ―exercise ‗that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily 
possessed and exercised by members of [that professional specialty] under similar 
circumstances‘ ‖].)  The OSHA Standard — informed by a four-day public 
hearing ―at which various representatives and experts appeared on behalf of 
interested parties,‖ and by recommendations from the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health and from an Advisory Committee on Asbestos 
 
13 
Standards composed of two employer and two labor representatives, plus a 
representative of the public (Industrial Union, supra, 499 F.2d at p. 470; see id. at 
p. 470, fn. 4) — observed that ―[n]o one has disputed that exposure to asbestos of 
high enough intensity and long enough duration is causally related to asbestosis 
and cancers.  The dispute is as to the determination of a specific level below which 
exposure is safe.‖  (OSHA Standard, supra, 37 Fed. Reg. 11318.)  After 
acknowledging conflicting evidence, the OSHA Standard said:  ―In view of the 
undisputed grave consequences from exposure to asbestos fibers, it is essential that 
the exposure be regulated now, on the basis of the best evidence available now, 
even though it may not be as good as scientifically desirable.‖  (Ibid.)  The risks of 
exposure that prompted OSHA to require precautions against take-home exposure 
were sufficient to provide notice of the reasonable foreseeability of such harm.  
Indeed, our research reveals no reported case in which an employer or industry 
group challenged the 1972 OSHA Standard for lack of substantial evidence. 
 
The second Rowland factor, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff 
suffered injury, ―has been noted primarily, if not exclusively, when the only 
claimed injury is an intangible harm such as emotional distress. ‖  (Bily, supra, 3 
Cal.4th at p. 421.)  Courts have occasionally included under this factor concerns 
about the existence of a remedy.  (See Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 781, fn. 9.)  
Cecelia Kesner and the Havers allege that Johnny Kesner and Lynne Haver died as 
a result of mesothelioma; their injuries are certain and compensable under the law. 
The third Rowland factor, ― ‗the closeness of the connection between the 
defendant‘s conduct and the injury suffered[,]‘ [citation] is strongly related to the 
question of foreseeability itself.‖  (Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 779.)  BNSF 
argues that the connection between defendants‘ conduct and plaintiffs‘ illness is 
―indirect and attenuated‖ because it ―relies on the intervening acts of a defendant‘s 
 
14 
employee to transmit the alleged asbestos risk to the plaintiff.‖  The ―closeness‖ 
factor, BNSF argues, ―weighs strongly against the imposition of a legal duty.‖   
―It is well established . . . that one‘s general duty to exercise due care 
includes the duty not to place another person in a situation in which the other 
person is exposed to an unreasonable risk of harm through the reasonably 
foreseeable conduct (including the reasonably foreseeable negligent conduct) of a 
third person.‖  (Lugtu v. California Highway Patrol (2001) 26 Cal.4th 703, 716.)  
In determining whether one has a duty to prevent injury that is the result of third 
party conduct, the touchstone of the analysis is the foreseeability of that 
intervening conduct.  (See Bigbee, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 58, quoting Rest.2d 
Torts, § 449.)  The relevant intervening conduct here — that workers returned 
home at the end of the day and, without adequate precautions, would bring 
asbestos dust home — is entirely foreseeable.  An intervening third party‘s actions 
that are ―themselves derivative of defendants‘ allegedly negligent conduct . . . do 
not diminish the closeness of the connection between defendant‘s conduct and 
plaintiff‘s injury for purposes of determining the existence of a duty of care.‖  
(Beacon, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 583.)  An employee‘s role as a vector in bringing 
asbestos fibers into his or her home is derived from the employer‘s or property 
owner‘s failure to control or limit exposure in the workplace. 
In support of its claim that Lynne Haver‘s injury had only an attenuated 
connection to defendants‘ use of asbestos, BNSF cites cases involving car 
accidents in which the plaintiffs attempted to hold the defendants liable for 
creating the situation in which they were hit by a third party driver.  But each of 
those cases turned on either the lack of foreseeability of the intervening negligent 
conduct or the lack of relationship between the intervening conduct and the 
defendant‘s negligence.  (See Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School District (1998) 19 
Cal.4th 925, 936 [―school personnel who neither know nor reasonably should 
 
15 
know that a particular student has a tendency to drive recklessly owe no duty to 
off-campus nonstudents‖]; Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60, 65 [where 
―the defendant has no reason to believe that the third person is incompetent to 
manage‖ property, the defendant has no duty to prevent negligent use of lent or 
stolen property]; Bryant v. Glastetter (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 770, 782 [―there is no 
logical cause and effect relationship between that negligence and the harm 
suffered by decedent except for the fact that it placed decedent in a position to be 
acted upon by the negligent third party‖].)  Where there is a logical causal 
connection between the defendant‘s negligent conduct and the intervening 
negligence of a third party driver, making the intervening negligence foreseeable, 
we have found both a duty and liability.  (See Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. 
(1975) 15 Cal.3d 40 [affirming a wrongful death judgment against a radio 
broadcaster where radio contest that awarded teen drivers for being the first to 
reach a disc jockey driving around the area induced reckless driving that killed 
decedent].) 
In sum, BNSF‘s reliance on our cases involving third party drivers is 
unavailing.  The gravamen of plaintiffs‘ claims is that defendants failed to mitigate 
known risks associated with the use of asbestos.  Increased risk of mesothelioma is 
a characteristic harm that makes the use of asbestos-containing materials 
unreasonably dangerous in the absence of protective measures.  An employee‘s 
return home at the end of the workday is not an unusual occurrence, but rather a 
baseline assumption that can be made about employees‘ behavior.  The risk of 
take-home exposure to asbestos ― ‗is likely enough in the setting of modern life 
that a reasonably thoughtful [employer or property owner] would take account of 
it in guiding practical conduct‘ ‖ in the workplace.  (Bigbee, supra, 34 Cal.3d at 
p. 57.)  Moreover, the intervening conduct leading to this exposure is predictable 
 
16 
and derivative of the alleged misconduct, namely, failure to control the movement 
of asbestos fibers.  The foreseeability factors weigh in favor of finding a duty here. 
B. 
―[F]oreseeability alone is not sufficient to create an independent tort duty.  
‗ ― . . . [The] existence [of a duty] depends upon the foreseeability of the risk and a 
weighing of policy considerations for and against imposition of liability.‖ ‘ ‖  
(Erlich v. Menezes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 543, 552.)  These policy considerations 
include ― ‗the moral blame attached to the defendant‘s conduct, the policy of 
preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and 
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting 
liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the 
risk involved‘ (Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 113).‖  (Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th 
at p. 781.)  ―A duty of care will not be held to exist even as to foreseeable injuries 
. . . where the social utility of the activity concerned is so great, and avoidance of 
the injuries so burdensome to society, as to outweigh the compensatory and cost-
internalization values of negligence liability.  [Citations.]‖  (Merrill v. Navegar, 
Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 502.)  We first address prevention of future harm, 
moral blame, and availability of insurance, and then discuss the burden that a 
finding of duty here would impose on both defendants. 
―The overall policy of preventing future harm is ordinarily served, in tort 
law, by imposing the costs of negligent conduct upon those responsible.‖  (Cabral, 
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 781.)  In general, internalizing the cost of injuries caused by 
a particular behavior will induce changes in that behavior to make it safer.  That 
consideration may be ―outweighed, for a category of negligent conduct, by laws or 
mores indicating approval of the conduct or by the undesirable consequences of 
allowing potential liability.‖  (Id. at p. 782.) 
 
17 
Defendants contend that the future risk of the particular injury at issue — 
mesothelioma resulting from exposure to airborne asbestos fibers — has largely 
been eliminated through extensive regulation and reduced asbestos usage.  In light 
of state and federal regulations that currently mandate extensive precautions (see, 
e.g., Lab. Code, §§ 9000–9052; 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001 (2016) [federal regulations 
setting forth detailed protective measures and limits for occupational exposure to 
asbestos]; 40 C.F.R. § 763.165 (2015) [banning the import and manufacture of 
certain asbestos-containing products]), imposing a duty to prevent secondary 
exposure is unlikely to alter the behavior of current asbestos-using businesses.  
Defendants thus argue there is little prospective benefit to finding a duty here. 
But whether or how the imposition of liability would affect the conduct of 
current asbestos users, our duty analysis looks to the time when the duty was 
assertedly owed.  Just as we look to the availability of scientific studies to assess 
the foreseeability of injury due to take-home asbestos exposure at the time Lynne 
and Johnny were exposed, the relevant question for this factor is whether imposing 
tort liability in the 1970s would have prevented future harm from that point.  The 
numerous regulations cited by BNSF suggest that legislatures and agencies readily 
adopted the premise that imposing liability would prevent future harm.  And 
BNSF points to no countervailing state policy promoting the use of asbestos to 
outweigh our general presumption in favor of incentivizing reasonable 
preventative measures.  (See Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 782.)  Rather, as the 
regulations cited above make clear, there is a strong public policy limiting or 
forbidding the use of asbestos.   
As for moral blame, this factor can be difficult to assess in the absence of a 
factual record.  (See Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 
1066, 1078.)  We have previously assigned moral blame, and we have relied in 
part on that blame in finding a duty, in instances where the plaintiffs are 
 
18 
particularly powerless or unsophisticated compared to the defendants or where the 
defendants exercised greater control over the risks at issue.  (See Beacon, supra, 
59 Cal.4th at p. 586 [―Because of defendants‘ unique and well-compensated role 
in the Project as well as their awareness that future homeowners would rely on 
their specialized expertise in designing safe and habitable homes, significant moral 
blame attaches to defendants‘ conduct.‖]; Peterson v. San Francisco Community 
College Dist. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 799, 814 [failure to take intervening action to 
improve safety of facilities ―if established, also indicate[s] that there is moral 
blame attached to the defendants‘ failure to take steps to avert the foreseeable 
harm‖].)  Similar considerations apply here, as commercial users of asbestos 
benefitted financially from their use of asbestos and had greater information and 
control over the hazard than employees‘ households.  Negligence in their use of 
asbestos is morally blameworthy, and this factor weighs in favor of finding a duty. 
As for the availability of insurance, Abex contends that insurance for 
asbestos-related injuries is no longer widely available, as the insurance industry 
has revised its standard commercial general liability policies to exclude asbestos. 
But the relevant insurance policies are those that were available to defendants at 
the time of exposure, even if the availability of such policies declined along with 
the dramatic drop in the use of asbestos.  
Among those defendants that had purchased suitable coverage, BNSF and 
Abex contend, the scope of potential liability for take-home exposure would 
exceed policy limits.  We do not speculate on, and defendants do not offer, the 
precise policy terms or estimates of the number of take-home claims to support 
such an empirical conclusion.  At the level of generality appropriate to duty 
analysis, it is not obvious that secondary asbestos exposure poses greater 
uncertainty in terms of potential claimants and total liability than, say, the 
negligent release of chemicals into the air or negligent contamination of 
 
19 
groundwater.  More to the point, BNSF argues that even if defendants could limit 
the size of judgments against them by defeating plaintiffs‘ claims of causation or 
injury, ―the burdens of participating in discovery and defending a case up to and 
through a jury trial‖ would overwhelm insurers and defendants alike.  Whatever 
the ultimate liability of defendants for take-home asbestos exposure, their concern 
is that the magnitude and uncertainty of potential liability make insuring against it 
impossible. 
At its core, this argument regarding the availability and cost of insurance 
merges with the main policy consideration urged by Abex and BNSF:  Allowing 
tort liability for take-home asbestos exposure would dramatically increase the 
volume of asbestos litigation, undermine its integrity, and create enormous costs 
for the courts and community.  The already ―elephantine mass of asbestos cases‖ 
would further expand.  (Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp. (1999) 527 U.S. 815, 821; see 
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor (1997) 521 U.S. 591, 598.)  Bringing such 
cases to trial would entail ―inherently tricky fact-finding,‖ Abex contends, against 
a backdrop of fading memories, reorganized and successor corporations, lost 
records, and evolving regulatory standards informing the particular duty in any 
given case.  Moreover, defendants argue, recognizing a duty would permit 
sufferers of mesothelioma or asbestosis who may have also been exposed in their 
own workplaces to sue their family members‘ employers as well as their own.  
Such suits would target contributors to a plaintiff‘s total asbestos exposure on the 
basis of relative solvency instead of relative fault, with joint and several liability 
resulting in significant judgments against relatively small contributors.  
In evaluating defendants‘ concerns, we begin by observing that the relevant 
burden in the analysis of duty is not the cost to the defendants of compensating 
individuals for past negligence.  To the extent defendants argue that the costs of 
paying compensation for injuries that a jury finds they have actually caused would 
 
20 
be so great that we should find no duty to prevent those injuries, the answer is that 
shielding tortfeasors from the full magnitude of their liability for past wrongs is 
not a proper consideration in determining the existence of a duty.  Rather, our duty 
analysis is forward-looking, and the most relevant burden is the cost to the 
defendants of upholding, not violating, the duty of ordinary care.  (See, e.g., 
Parsons, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 473 [assessing the behavior changes that 
machinery operators and local landowners would have to make to prevent 
spooking horses with loud noises as the relevant ―burden to the defendant and 
consequences to the community‖ under Rowland]; Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial 
Hospital (1985) 38 Cal.3d 112, 131 [―The foreseeability of an assault was high in 
comparison to the minimal burden on the hospital to take security measures 
. . . .‖].)  Neither the Court of Appeal in Haver nor defendants suggest that 
preventing Lynne‘s or Johnny‘s exposure to asbestos was unreasonably expensive 
to defendants or that the costs would have impeded defendants‘ ability to carry out 
an activity with significant social utility.  In general, preventing injuries to 
workers‘ household members due to asbestos exposure does not impose a greater 
burden than preventing exposure and injury to the workers themselves.  
Defendants do not claim that precautions to prevent transmission via employees to 
off-site individuals — such as changing rooms, showers, separate lockers, and on-
site laundry — would unreasonably interfere with business operations. 
Defendants further argue that a finding of duty here will result in increased 
insurance costs and tort damages, and ultimately impose a burden on consumers 
and the community.  But the tort system contemplates that the cost of an injury, 
instead of amounting to a ―needless‖ and ―overwhelming misfortune to the person 
injured,‖ will instead ―be insured by the [defendant] and distributed among the 
public as a cost of doing business.‖  (Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. (1944) 24 
Cal.2d 453, 462 (conc. opn. of Traynor, J.).)  Such allocation of costs serves to 
 
21 
ensure that those ―best situated‖ to prevent such injuries are incentivized to do so.  
(Ibid.; see generally Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents:  A Legal and Economic 
Analysis (1970).)  Employers and premises owners are generally better positioned 
than their employees or members of their employees‘ households to know of the 
dangers of asbestos and its transmission pathways, and to take reasonable 
precautions to avoid injuries that may result from on-site and take-home exposure.  
BNSF observes that because the market for asbestos products has contracted 
significantly in the decades between Johnny‘s and Lynne‘s exposure and the 
current suits, the costs of these suits will be borne by entities other than the 
companies that directly benefitted from the past use of asbestos.  But this is a 
concern that applies to all asbestos injuries.  It does not provide a basis for 
discriminating between those plaintiffs who experienced on-site exposure to 
asbestos and those plaintiffs who experienced take-home exposures. 
Defendants‘ most forceful contention is that a finding of duty in these cases 
would open the door to an ―enormous pool of potential plaintiffs.‖  BNSF argues 
there is no logical way of distinguishing between Lynne and anyone else who may 
have been exposed to asbestos carried by their on-site employees.  Once we accept 
the principle of liability for asbestos exposure by means of employees carrying 
fibers outside the workplace, they argue, we invite claims from anyone who may 
have had contact with an asbestos worker, including ―innumerable relatives, 
friends, acquaintances, [and] service providers,‖ as well as ―babysitters, neighbors, 
. . . carpool partners, fellow commuters on public transportation, and laundry 
workers.‖  According to defendants, such an unlimited duty imposes great costs 
and uncertainty, and invites voluminous and frequently meritless claims that will 
overwhelm the courts. 
 
 
22 
Like the Court of Appeal in Haver, defendants rely on Campbell, supra, 
206 Cal.App.4th 15, to argue that the uncertainty and size of potential liability for 
defendants weighed against a finding of duty.  Campbell, in turn, relied on Oddone 
v. Superior Court (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 813.  In Oddone, the plaintiff alleged 
that her husband‘s employer negligently exposed him to toxic chemicals, which 
the husband then brought home to the plaintiff, injuring her.  (Id. at p. 816.)  
Oddone said:  ―The gist of the matter is that imposing a duty toward nonemployee 
persons saddles the defendant employer with a burden of uncertain but potentially 
very large scope.  One of the consequences to the community of such an extension 
is the cost of insuring against liability of unknown but potentially massive 
dimension.  Ultimately, such costs are borne by the consumer.  In short, the burden 
on the defendant is substantial and the costs to the community may be 
considerable.‖  (Id. at p. 822; accord, Campbell, at p. 33.) 
Defendants are correct that a finding of  ― ‗ ―[n]o duty‖ ‘ ‖ is in effect ― ‗a 
global determination that, for some overriding policy reason, courts should not 
entertain causes of action for cases that fall into certain categories,‘ ‖ even if some 
defendants in such cases did actually cause the harm of which the plaintiffs 
complained.  (Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1228 (conc. opn. of 
Kennard, J.), quoting Sugarman, Assumption of Risk (1997) 31 Valparaiso U. 
L.Rev. 833, 843.)  ― ‗[N]ot every loss can be made compensable in money 
damages, and legal causation must terminate somewhere.‖  (Borer v. American 
Airlines, Inc. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 441, 446.)  Even if recognizing a duty would 
enable some plaintiffs to obtain legitimate compensation for their injuries, the 
argument goes, this interest is outweighed by the costs — to the defendants, the 
judicial system, and society as a whole — of unremitting litigation by other 
plaintiffs whose claims are tenuous at best. 
 
23 
But recognizing a duty with respect to one set of potential plaintiffs does 
not imply that any plaintiff may make a similar claim.  ―If the actor‘s conduct 
creates such a recognizable risk of harm only to a particular class of persons, the 
fact that it in fact causes harm to a person of a different class, to whom the actor 
could not reasonably have anticipated injury, does not make the actor liable to the 
persons so injured.‖  (Rest.2d Torts § 281, com. (c), p. 5.)  Although defendants 
raise legitimate concerns regarding the unmanageability of claims premised upon 
incidental exposure, as in a restaurant or city bus, these concerns do not clearly 
justify a categorical rule against liability for foreseeable take-home exposure.  
(Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 772.)  Instead, the concerns point to the need for a 
limitation on the scope of the duty here. 
We hold that an employer‘s or property owner‘s duty to prevent take-home 
exposure extends only to members of a worker‘s household, i.e., persons who live 
with the worker and are thus foreseeably in close and sustained contact with the 
worker over a significant period of time.  To be sure, there are other persons who 
may have reason to believe they were exposed to significant quantities of asbestos 
by repeatedly spending time in an enclosed space with an asbestos worker — for 
example, a regular carpool companion.  But any duty rule will necessarily exclude 
some individuals who, as a causal matter, were harmed by the conduct of potential 
defendants.  By drawing the line at members of a household, we limit potential 
plaintiffs to an identifiable category of persons who, as a class, are most likely to 
have suffered a legitimate, compensable harm. 
This limitation comports with our duty analysis under Rowland.  Our 
finding of foreseeability turned on the fact that a worker can be expected to return 
home each work day and to have close contact with household members on a 
regular basis over many years.  Persons whose contact with the worker is more 
incidental, sporadic, or transitory do not, as a class, share the same characteristics 
 
24 
as household members and are therefore not within the scope of the duty we 
identify here.  This rule strikes a workable balance between ensuring that 
reasonably foreseeable injuries are compensated and protecting courts and 
defendants from the costs associated with litigation of disproportionately meritless 
claims. 
Abex contends that if we find a duty to prevent take-home exposure, the 
duty should be limited to immediate family members.  But extending the duty to 
household members, not just immediate family members, more closely tracks the 
rationale for the existence of the duty.  ―Being a household member refers not only 
to the relationships among members of a family, but also to the bonds which may 
be found among unrelated persons adopting nontraditional and quasi-familial 
living arrangements.‖  (People v. Jeffers (1987) 43 Cal.3d 984, 992.)  As used in 
other legal contexts, the term ―household‖ refers to persons who share ― ‗physical 
presence under a common roof‘ ‖ (People v. Wutzke (2002) 28 Cal.4th 923, 939) 
or relationships aimed at common subsistence (Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. 
Parks (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 779, 792).  The cause of asbestos-related diseases is 
the inhalation of asbestos fibers; the general foreseeability of harm turns on the 
regularity and intimacy of physical proximity, not the legal or biological 
relationship, between the asbestos worker and a potential plaintiff. 
As an instructive point of contrast, we have limited the scope of a duty to 
immediate family members where the alleged injury is negligent infliction of 
emotional distress (Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644; Christensen v. 
Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868) or loss of consortium (Elden v. Sheldon 
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 267; Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., supra, 19 Cal.3d 441; 
Baxter v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 461).  In each of these cases, the 
emotional injury grew out of the loss of a relationship to a third party or the 
vicarious suffering of the plaintiff with respect to that third party.  Here, the 
 
25 
significance of a plaintiff‘s relationship to a third party (an asbestos worker) lies in 
the degree of exposure the plaintiff had to asbestos dust as a result of his or her 
physical contact and cohabitation with the third party in an enclosed space.  Such 
contact and cohabitation within a household does not depend on a legal or 
biological relationship between the plaintiff and the worker.  
C. 
In sum, proper application of the Rowland factors supports the conclusion 
that defendants had a duty of ordinary care to prevent take-home asbestos 
exposure.  Such exposure and its resulting harms to human health were reasonably 
foreseeable to large-scale users of asbestos by the 1970s, and the OSHA Standard 
affirmed the commonsense reality that asbestos fibers could be carried on the 
person or clothing of employees to their homes and could be inhaled there by 
household members.  Businesses making use of asbestos were well positioned, 
relative to their workers, to undertake preventive measures, and Abex and BNSF 
cite no evidence to suggest such measures would have been unreasonably costly.  
Although the lawful use of asbestos is not inherently reprehensible, no state policy 
promotes or specially protects it.  We are mindful that recognizing a duty to all 
persons who experienced secondary exposure could invite a mass of litigation that 
imposes uncertain and potentially massive and uninsurable burdens on defendants, 
the courts, and society.  But this concern does not clearly justify a categorical 
exemption from liability for take-home exposure.  ―The law is not indifferent to 
considerations of degree‖ (A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935) 295 U.S. 
495, 554 (conc. opn. of Cardozo, J.)), and the foreseeability of take-home 
exposure and associated risk of injury are at their maximum when it comes to 
members of an employee‘s household.  Accordingly, we hold that defendants 
owed the members of their employees‘ households a duty of ordinary care to 
prevent take-home exposure and that this duty extends no further.  We disapprove 
 
26 
Campbell v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 206 Cal.App.4th 15, and Oddone v. Superior 
Court, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th 813, to the extent they are inconsistent with this 
opinion. 
Defendants analogize the present cases to Bily, supra, 3 Cal.4th 370, but the 
comparison actually reinforces why relevant policy considerations weigh in favor 
of a duty here.  The court in Bily was concerned that ―[a]n award of damages for 
pure economic loss suffered by third parties raises the spectre of vast numbers of 
suits and limitless financial exposure‖ for auditors, a concern similar to those 
raised by defendants here.  (Id. at p. 400.)  We held that accountants do not have a 
duty to prevent investors‘ losses as a result of negligent auditing because (1) ―the 
complexity of the professional opinions rendered in audit reports, and the difficult 
and potentially tenuous causal relationships between audit reports and economic 
losses from investment and credit decisions‖ make it challenging to determine the 
causal relationship between auditor mistakes and investor losses; (2) ―the 
generally more sophisticated class of plaintiffs‖ makes contract rather than tort 
law an effective means of allocating risk; and (3) the added risk of secondary 
liability is unlikely to alter accountants‘ behavior because they already have a 
significant business interest in accuracy.  (Id. at p. 398.) 
None of these countervailing considerations applies to take-home asbestos 
exposure:  (1) Unlike the causal relationship between auditor mistakes and 
investor losses, the causal relationship between preventable asbestos exposure of 
sufficient intensity and duration and the type of injuries plaintiffs allege here is 
clear and scientifically well established, and was so at the time of Lynne‘s and 
Johnny‘s alleged exposure.  (See OSHA Standard, supra, 37 Fed. Reg. 11318 
[―No one has disputed that exposure to asbestos of high enough intensity and long 
enough duration is causally related to asbestosis and cancers.‖].)  (2) Plaintiffs 
such as Lynne and Johnny are not sophisticated with respect to the dangers of 
 
27 
asbestos, much less able to contract with the relevant employers or premises 
owners regarding safety procedures.  (3) Nor do asbestos-using companies have a 
business interest, apart from potential liability, in taking precautions to prevent 
take-home exposure.  Moreover, we have limited the duty to prevent take-home 
asbestos exposure to a discrete category, namely, members of a worker‘s 
household.  This limitation means that not all persons who foreseeably 
experienced secondary exposure may sue for damages; as a result, defendants are 
unlikely to ―face[] potential liability far out of proportion to [their] fault.‖  (Bily, 
supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 398.) 
Finally, Abex argues that even if we find it had a duty to prevent take-home 
asbestos exposure, we must find as a matter of law that Kesner cannot meet the 
burden of demonstrating proximate causation.  Whatever merit this argument may 
have, we do not address it here.  The only issue on which we granted review was 
whether a duty exists to prevent take-home exposure.  We have no occasion to 
address other arguments defendants might make to defeat liability.  It must be 
remembered that a finding of duty is not a finding of liability.  To obtain a 
judgment, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant breached its duty of ordinary 
care and that the breach proximately caused the plaintiff‘s injury, and the 
defendant may assert defenses and submit contrary evidence on each of these 
elements.  Here, Abex may argue that in light of other sources of asbestos to 
which Johnny may have been exposed, one cannot say with sufficient certainty 
that fibers carried home by his uncle were a ―substantial factor‖ (Rutherford v. 
Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 968) in bringing about Johnny‘s 
mesothelioma.  BNSF similarly argues (with respect to the ―closeness of 
connection‖ between its conduct and Lynne‘s injuries) that the Havers‘ own 
complaint, by alleging that Mike was exposed to asbestos in a variety of other 
contexts, casts doubt on the causal relationship between BNSF‘s use of asbestos 
 
28 
and Lynne‘s mesothelioma.  The possibility of other sources of exposure is a fact-
specific inquiry; it does not bear on the question of duty, which must be addressed 
at a higher level of generality.  (Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 772.) 
IV. 
 
The Havers and Kesner allege different primary theories of liability:  
premises liability (the Havers) and negligence (Kesner).  BNSF argues that even if 
employers have a duty to prevent employees from exposing members of their 
household to asbestos by carrying fibers home on their clothing, property owners 
do not have a similar obligation with respect to workers on their premises.  
According to BNSF, to hold that property owners owe a duty of ordinary care to 
persons who have never set foot on the premises ―would take the ‗premises‘ out of 
premises liability and unsettle the tort law that applies to all property owners in 
this state.‖  We disagree. 
 
The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the 
same:  a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in 
injury.  (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998; see Ladd v. 
County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917 [negligence cause of action]; 
Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205 [cause of action for premises 
liability].)  Premises liability ― ‗is grounded in the possession of the premises and 
the attendant right to control and manage the premises‘ ‖; accordingly, ― ‗mere 
possession with its attendant right to control conditions on the premises is a 
sufficient basis for the imposition of an affirmative duty to act.‘ ‖  (Preston v. 
Goldman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 108, 118, italics omitted, quoting Sprecher v. Adamson 
Companies (1981) 30 Cal.3d 358, 368, 370.)  But the duty arising from possession 
and control of property is adherence to the same standard of care that applies in 
negligence cases.  (Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 119 [―The proper test to be 
applied to the liability of the possessor of land . . . is whether in the management 
 
29 
of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of 
injury to others . . . .‖]; accord, Alcaraz v. Vece (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1149, 1156.)  In 
determining whether a premises owner owes a duty to persons on its property, we 
apply the Rowland factors.  (See, e.g., Thai v. Stang (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1264, 
1271 [Rowland analysis applies to premises liability cases].)  Indeed, Rowland 
itself involved premises liability.  (Rowland, at p. 110.) 
 
We have never held that the physical or spatial boundaries of a property 
define the scope of a landowner‘s liability.  The Courts of Appeal have repeatedly 
concluded that ― ‗[a] landowner‘s duty of care to avoid exposing others to a risk of 
injury is not limited to injuries that occur on premises owned or controlled by the 
landowner.‘ ‖  (Garcia v. Paramount Citrus Association (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 
1448, 1453; see Barnes v. Black (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1478 (Barnes); 
McDaniel v. Sunset Manor Co. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1, 7–8 (McDaniel).)  
―Rather, the duty of care encompasses a duty to avoid exposing persons to risks of 
injury that occur off site if the landowner‘s property is maintained in such a 
manner as to expose persons to an unreasonable risk of injury off-site.‖  (Barnes, 
supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1478; see Davert v. Larson (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 
407, 410 [―A landowner or possessor owes a duty of care to persons who come on 
his property as well as to persons off the property for injuries due to the 
landowner‘s lack of due care in the management of his property.‖].) 
 
BNSF argues that those cases are distinguishable on the ground that the 
relevant off-site injuries were due in part to the plaintiff‘s proximity to the 
defendant‘s property, a fact that implicitly establishes a self-limiting principle for 
finding such liability.  Noting that Garcia, Barnes, and McDaniel addressed 
liability for accidents occurring adjacent to the defendant‘s property, BNSF says 
this court has ―never expanded premises liability to permit lawsuits by plaintiffs 
 
30 
whose only connection to the property at issue is an encounter with someone who 
visited the site.‖ 
 
Although this last statement is superficially correct, it misconstrues the 
Havers‘ theory of negligence.  It is not Lynne‘s contact with Mike that allegedly 
caused her mesothelioma, but rather Lynne‘s contact with asbestos fibers that 
BNSF used on its property.  Mike and his clothing acted as a vector to carry the 
fibers into Mike and Lynne‘s home, where she was exposed.  The Havers‘ claim 
of negligence focuses on an allegedly hazardous condition created and maintained 
on BNSF‘s property and BNSF‘s alleged failure to contain that hazard as a 
reasonable property owner would have done in the mid-1970s.  This claim is 
readily attributable ―to [a] specific condition, natural or artificial,‖ on BNSF‘s 
property.  (A. Teichert & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 657, 
663.)  
 
Indeed, liability for harm caused by substances that escape an owner‘s 
property is well established in California law.  ―The Rowland factors determine 
the scope of a duty of care whether the risk of harm is situated on site or off site.‖  
(Barnes, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1479, quoting McDaniel, supra, 220 
Cal.App.3d at pp. 7–8.)  We have found that landowners have a duty to prevent 
hazardous natural conditions arising on their property from escaping and causing 
injury to adjacent property.  (See Sprecher v. Adamson Companies (1981) 30 
Cal.3d 358 [applying Rowland factors to find that an uphill landowner had a duty 
to correct or control a landslide condition on their land that eventually pushed a 
downhill landowner‘s home into a third house, resulting in damages].)  A similar 
rule applies to escaping animals.  (See Davert, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d 407 [finding 
landowner had a duty to prevent injuries due to a horse‘s escape from the property 
and subsequent collision with an automobile]; Curtis v. State of California ex rel. 
Dept. of Transportation (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 668 [upholding verdict finding the 
 
31 
state negligent in constructing defective fences that permitted a cow to escape and 
create a dangerous condition by entering a public highway].)  And the Courts of 
Appeal ―have consistently held private persons liable for negligently setting fires 
and for negligently allowing fires to escape to others‘ properties.‖  (Anderson v. 
United States (9th Cir. 1995) 55 F.3d 1379, 1381, citing People v. Southern 
Pacific Co. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 627, 633–634, and Gould v. Madonna (1970) 5 
Cal.App.3d 404, 406.)  
 
The cases above do not suggest that the duties of employers and the duties 
of premises owners are necessarily coextensive.  The law of premises liability 
includes a number of affirmative defenses and exceptions flowing from the 
general principle that ― ‗[t]he duties owed in connection with the condition of land 
are not invariably placed on the person [holding title] but, rather, are owed by the 
person in possession of the land [citations] because [of the possessor‘s] 
supervisory control over the activities conducted upon, and the condition of, the 
land.‘ ‖  (Alcaraz v. Vece, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1161.)  For example, a 
landowner ―who hired an independent contractor generally [is] not liable to third 
parties for injuries caused by the contractor‘s negligence in performing the work.‖ 
(Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, 693; cf. Van Fossen v. 
MidAmerican Energy Co. (Iowa 2009) 777 N.W.2d 689, 698.)  At the same time, 
the rule is subject to exceptions:  ―[T]he hirer as landowner may be independently 
liable to the contractor‘s employee, even if it does not retain control over the work, 
if (1) it knows or reasonably should know of a concealed, preexisting hazardous 
condition on its premises; (2) the contractor does not know and could not 
reasonably ascertain the condition; and (3) the landowner fails to warn the 
contractor.‖  (Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 675.)  
 
 
32 
 
We express no view on whether BNSF can assert one or more of these fact-
specific defenses or whether the exceptions under the Privette doctrine, which 
applies to a contractor‘s employees, also apply to injuries to those employees‘ 
family members.  No such defense has been alleged.  The facts as pleaded, which 
we must accept as true at this stage (see Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 
31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081), are that BNSF‘s predecessor was not a passive consumer 
of asbestos but instead had ― ‗supervisory control‘ ‖ (Alcaraz v. Vece, supra, 14 
Cal.4th at p. 1158) over the sources of asbestos to which Lynne was exposed.  
Mike, who carried the asbestos home, was an employee of that predecessor.  
Under these circumstances, in which BNSF‘s predecessors are alleged to have 
engaged in active supervisory control and management of asbestos sources, the 
Havers‘ premises liability claim is subject to the same requirements and same duty 
analysis that apply to a claim of general negligence.   
V.  
 
Looking beyond California law, Abex and BNSF urge us to follow what 
Abex characterizes as ―a growing majority of courts‖ that have rejected a duty of 
ordinary care to prevent take-home exposure to asbestos.  This argument rests on a 
mischaracterization of out-of-state precedent.  The only courts that have squarely 
addressed cases of take-home exposure factually comparable to the cases before 
us, and that have applied general tort law principles commensurate with our own, 
have reached the same conclusion we do here.  All of the cases cited by defendants 
as failing to find a duty are readily distinguishable. 
 
First, a number of the cases defendants cite address facts different from 
those presented here.  In Martin v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. (6th Cir. 2009) 561 
F.3d 439, the Sixth Circuit found ―no evidence that either defendant had actual 
knowledge of the danger of bystander exposure‖ during a period of alleged 
exposure spanning the years 1951 through 1963.  (Id. at pp. 444–445.)  But the 
 
33 
exposure at issue here occurred in the 1970s, after OSHA had promulgated a 
standard to address the acknowledged danger of take-home exposure.  (OSHA 
Standard, supra, 37 Fed. Reg. 11320.)  Decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court 
and Texas Courts of Appeal are similarly distinguishable.  (See Simpkins v. CSX 
Transportation, Inc. (Ill. 2012) 965 N.E.2d 1092 [remanding to allow plaintiffs 
leave to amend the complaint to state enough well-pleaded facts to establish 
foreseeability]; Alcoa, Inc. v. Behringer (Tex.App. 2007) 235 S.W.3d 456, 462 
[plaintiff failed to show that ―the danger of non-occupational exposure to asbestos 
dust on workers‘ clothes was  . . . known [or] reasonably foreseeable to Alcoa in 
the 1950s‖ and thus Alcoa did not owe a duty to a plaintiff alleging take-home 
exposure ―under the facts of this case‖]; but cf. Dube v. Pittsburgh Corning (1st 
Cir. 1989) 870 F.2d 790, 793 [the Navy was ―charged with knowledge of the risk 
[of asbestos] to domestic bystanders as of October 1964‖ and was negligent in its 
failure to ―consider[] whether those risks justified a warning‖], abrogated on other 
grounds by Shansky v. U.S. (1st Cir. 1999) 164 F.3d 688.) 
 
Second, defendants cite a number of product liability suits.  The Maryland 
high court determined that a products manufacturer could not foresee and had no 
means of preventing take-home exposure as the result of use of its asbestos-
containing product in 1969.  (See Georgia Pacific, LLC v. Farrar (Md. 2013) 69 
A.3d 1028, 1039.)  But that same court, on the same day, upheld a judgment 
awarding damages on a product liability and take-home exposure claim and noted 
that, although the defendants had not challenged the foreseeability of the alleged 
injury and therefore the court did not address that issue, the fact that exposure 
―extended well beyond 1972‖ might alter the foreseeability determination.  (Dixon 
v. Ford Motor Co. (Md. 2013) 70 A.3d 328, 330, fn. 1.)  More to the point, take-
home asbestos cases against employers or premises owners allege that the 
defendants had direct knowledge as to how fibers were being released and 
 
34 
circulated within their facilities and failed to prevent those employees from 
leaving workplaces owned or controlled by the defendants with asbestos on their 
clothing or persons.  Product liability defendants, by contrast, have no control over 
the movement of asbestos fibers once the products containing those fibers are sold.  
Because the Rowland analyses for these two theories of liability differ 
significantly, product liability cases are inapposite. 
 
Third, defendants cite cases where the court, in concluding that the 
defendants did not have a duty to prevent take-home exposure, asserted as a 
foundational principle of tort liability that a plaintiff and a defendant must have a 
prior relationship for a duty to exist from the latter to the former.  This category 
includes the New York high court‘s opinion in Matter of New York City Asbestos 
Litigation (N.Y. 2005) 840 N.E.2d 115, 119.  An Illinois appellate court has 
similarly predicated its finding of no duty on the absence of a relationship between 
plaintiff and defendant.  (Nelson v. Aurora Equipment Co. (Ill.App.Ct. 2009) 909 
N.E.2d 931, 934.)  Other courts have downplayed the significance of 
foreseeability while embracing a preexisting relationship between plaintiff and 
defendant as a prerequisite to the establishment of a duty.  (See Gillen v. Boeing 
Co. (E.D. Pa. 2014) 40 F.Supp.3d 534, 538–540 [applying Pennsylvania tort law 
where foreseeability ― ‗is not necessarily a dominant factor‘ ‖ and where the fact 
that parties were ― ‗legal strangers‘ ‖ is a significant consideration to hold that 
plaintiff‘s husband‘s employer had no duty to protect plaintiff from asbestos]; In 
re Certified Question from Fourteenth District Court of Appeals of Texas (Mich. 
2007) 740 N.W.2d 206, 211 [― ‗Duty . . . ―concerns the problem of the relation 
between individuals which imposes upon one a legal obligation for the benefit of 
the other,‖ ‘ ‖]; id. at p. 212 [―Although foreseeability is a factor to be considered, 
‗[all] other considerations may be, and usually are, more important.‘ ‖].) 
 
35 
 
In California, both legislative policy (section 1714) and this court‘s long-
standing precedent have treated foreseeability as the predominant factor in duty 
analysis.  Although we have held that the existence of a relationship between the 
plaintiff and defendant is one basis for finding liability premised on the conduct of 
a third party (see Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 203–205; 
Tarasoff, supra, 17 Cal.3d at pp. 435–436), we have never held that such a 
relationship is a prerequisite to finding that a defendant had a duty to prevent 
injuries due to its own conduct or possessory control.  Indeed, the irrelevance of 
the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant is the central holding of 
Rowland:  We squarely rejected the notion that duty analysis should turn on 
whether the person injured on the owner‘s or occupier‘s premises was a trespasser, 
licensee, or invitee.  (Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 116–119.)  Although ―in 
general‖ there may be a correlation between the factors relevant to duty analysis 
and the plaintiff‘s relationship to a property owner, ―there are many cases in which 
no such relationship may exist‖ yet proper analysis of the Rowland factors would 
support the existence of a duty.  (Id. at pp. 117–118.)  The New York, Illinois, 
Pennsylvania, and Michigan authorities are therefore inapplicable to our present 
analysis, as each begins from a principle of tort law this court has long rejected. 
 
Finally, defendants cite two decisions rejecting take-home asbestos claims 
by the Delaware Supreme Court.  In both cases, the court relied heavily on a 
distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance to conclude that an employer‘s 
failure to prevent take-home exposure is nonfeasance and thus, in the absence of a 
―legally significant relationship‖ between the plaintiff and their spouse‘s 
employer, no legal duty existed.  (Riedel v. ICI Americas Inc. (Del. 2009) 968 
A.2d 17, 25–27; see Price v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. (Del. 2011) 26 A.3d 
162, 170 [applying same reasoning to a ―failure to warn‖ claim].)  The Delaware 
Supreme Court ―decline[d] to adopt . . . the principle that absent a countervailing 
 
36 
principle or policy‖ all actors have a ―duty to exercise reasonable care when the 
actor‘s conduct creates a risk of physical harm,‖ as stated by section 7 of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts, Physical and Emotional Harm.  (Riedel, supra, 968 
A.2d at pp. 20–21.)  But we have endorsed precisely this principle — and section 
7 of the Restatement Third of Torts — as an articulation of California law.  
(Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 771 fn. 2).  Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court‘s 
approach is not informative here because it begins from a plainly different general 
principle of tort liability.   
 
Against this body of distinguishable precedent stand decisions from two 
state high courts and one intermediate appellate court that begin with the premise 
that foreseeability of injury is a significant factor in duty analysis, find that take-
home exposure is reasonably foreseeable to employers using asbestos-containing 
materials, weigh this foreseeability against public policy considerations, and 
conclude that possessors or employers owe members of a worker‘s household a 
duty to prevent take-home exposure.  (See Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co. 
(Tenn. 2008) 266 S.W.3d 347 (Satterfield); Olivo, supra, 895 A.2d at pp. 1148–
1149 [weighing ―foreseeability of the risk of harm to that individual or identifiable 
class of individuals‖ and considerations of fairness, and concluding that ―to the 
extent [defendant] owed a duty to workers on its premises for the foreseeable risk 
of exposure to friable asbestos and asbestos dust, similarly, [defendant] owed a 
duty to spouses handling the workers‘ unprotected work clothing‖]; Chaisson v. 
Avondale Industries, Inc. (La.Ct.App. 2006) 947 So.2d 171, 182, 184 [following 
Olivo on the ground that Louisiana jurisprudence ―relie[s] more heavily upon 
foreseeability,‖ and finding public policy weighs in favor of finding a ―duty of a 
company with knowledge of the presence of asbestos and OSHA‘s 1972 standards 
. . . to guard against [plaintiff‘s] household exposure to asbestos from laundering 
her husband‘s work clothes‖]; Zimko v. American Cyanamid (La.Ct.App. 2005) 
 
37 
905 So.2d 465, 483 [finding a ―duty to act reasonably in view of the foreseeable 
risks of danger to household members of its employees resulting from exposure to 
asbestos fibers carried home on its employee‘s clothing, person, or personal 
effects‖ because inference of this danger was not particularly difficult and was 
―definable as including the employee‘s household members‖].) 
 
The reasoning of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Satterfield is particularly 
instructive.  There the plaintiff had ―filed a negligence action against her father‘s 
employer, alleging that the employer had negligently permitted her father to wear 
his asbestos-contaminated work clothes home from work.‖  (Satterfield, supra, 
266 S.W.3d at p. 351.)  After finding that the ―paramount‖ factor, foreseeability, 
weighed in favor of finding a duty (id. at p. 366), the court addressed objections by 
the defendant similar to those raised by Abex and BNSF, i.e., that manufacturers 
―could face bankruptcy‖ (id. at p. 369), thereby costing jobs, and that finding a 
duty would invite claims by other plaintiffs against all premise owners (id. at 
pp. 370–371).  The court reasoned that failing to assign liability to manufacturers 
will not eliminate the burden these injuries have caused, but merely leave them on 
the shoulders of the injured persons and fellow purchasers of health insurance, and 
―no particular public policy reason[s]‖ favor allocating costs in this way.  (Id. at 
p. 371.)  The court concluded that an ―employer owed a duty to those who 
regularly and for extended periods of time came into close contact with the 
asbestos-contaminated work clothes of its employees to prevent them from being 
exposed to a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm.‖  (Id. at p. 352.)  The 
court went on to emphasize that a verdict against a premises owner will always 
require proof that an injury due to take-home exposure was ―reasonably 
foreseeable‖ in the particular circumstances of the case, a determination that 
depends on fact-specific questions of asbestos quantity and the particularized 
knowledge and sophistication of an individual defendant.  (Id. at p. 371.)   
 
38 
 
In sum, the holding in this case is consistent with the conclusions of courts 
that have adopted a general principle of tort liability analogous to section 1714 or 
that allow recovery, as we did in Rowland, for foreseeable categories of injury 
regardless of the relationship of the parties.  Other courts and scholars, surveying 
precedent on the issue of take-home exposure, have reached the same conclusion:  
The different outcomes among state courts reflect underlying differences in the 
duty doctrine in the respective states, not a split between a majority and a minority 
position on the ultimate policy issues.  (See Satterfield, supra, 266 S.W.3d at 
p. 373; Levine, Clearing the Air: Ordinary Negligence in Take-Home Asbestos 
Exposure Litigation (2011) 86 Wash. L.Rev. 359, 360.)  By holding that section 
1714 and Rowland analysis establish a duty to prevent take-home exposure that 
extends to members of a worker‘s household, we stand in harmony with other 
courts that have applied similar law to similar facts. 
 
39 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal in 
Haver and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.  We 
vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Kesner and remand for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion, including, if appropriate, a remand 
to the trial court for the parties to submit additional evidence on whether Johnny 
Kesner was a member of George Kesner‘s household for purposes of the duty we 
recognize here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
 
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Kesner v. Superior Court and Haver v. BNSF Railway Company 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 226 Cal.App.4th 251 and 226 Cal.App.4th 1104 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S219534 and S299919 
Date Filed: December 1, 2016 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Alameda and Los Angeles 
Judge: John M. True and Richard E. Rico 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Weitz & Luxenberg, Benno Ashrafi, Cindy Saxey, Josiah W. Parker; Kazan, McClain, Satterley & 
Greenwood and Ted W. Pelletier for Petitioner and for Plaintiff and Appellant Cecelia Kesner. 
 
Brayton Purcell, Alan R. Brayton, Gilbert L. Purcell and Gary L. Brayton as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Petitioner and Plaintiff and Appellant Cecelia Kesner. 
 
The Arkin Law Firm and Sharon J. Arkin for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Petitioner and Plaintiff and Appellant Cecelia Kesner. 
 
Walters Kraus & Paul, Paul C. Cook and Michael B. Gurien for Plaintiffs and Appellants Joshua Haver, et 
al. 
 
The Arkin Law Firm and Sharon J. Arkin for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants Joshua Haver, et al. 
 
No appearance for Respondent Superior Court. 
 
Horvitz & Levy, Lisa Perrochet, Robert H. Wright, Curt Cutting; Brydon Hugo & Parker, Hugo Parker, 
Edward R. Hugo, James C. Parker and Jeffrey Kaufman for Real Party in Interest and for Defendant and 
Respondent Pneumo Abex, LLC. 
 
McKenna Long & Aldridge, Lisa L. Oberg; McDermott Will & Emery and Colleen E. Baime for 
CertainTeed Corporation and Honeywell International Inc., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real  
Party in Interest and Defendant and Respondent Pneumo Abex, LLC. 
 
Snell & Wilmer, Mary-Christine Sungaila and Jenny Hua for International Association of Defense Counsel 
and Federation of Defense & Corporate Counsel as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest and 
Defendant and Respondent Pneumo Abex, LLC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 2 – S219534 & S219919 counsel continued 
 
Counsel: 
 
Fred J. Hiestand for The Civil Justice Association of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real  
Party in Interest and Defendant and Respondent Pneumo Abex, LLC. 
 
Deborah J. La Fetra for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest and 
Defendant and Respondent Pneumo Abex, LLC. 
 
Armstrong & Associates and William H. Armstrong for Resolute Management as Amicus Curiae on behalf 
of Real Party in Interest and Defendant and Respondent Pneumo Abex, LLC. 
 
Schiff Hardin and Eliot S. Jubelirer for Owens-Illinois, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in 
Interest and Defendant and Respondent Pneumo Abex, LLC. 
 
Shook, Hardy & Bacon, Mark A. Behrens and Patrick Gregory for Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc., 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, National Association of Manufacturers, American 
Tort Reform Association and NFIB Small Business Legal Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party 
in Interest and Defendant and Respondent Pneumo Abex, LLC. 
 
Gordon & Rees and Don Willenburg for Association of Defense Counsel of Northern California and 
Nevada as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest and Defendant and Respondent Pneumo Abex, 
LLC. 
 
Horvitz & Levy, Curt Cutting and Steven Fleischman for Association of Southern California Defense 
Counsel as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest and Defendant and Respondent Pneumo 
Abex, LLC. 
 
Sims Law Firm, Selim Mounedji; Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Veronica Lewis, Theodore J. Boutrous Jr., 
Joshua S. Lipshutz and Alexander M. Fenner for Defendant and Respondent BNSF Railway Company. 
 
Fred J. Hiestand; Erika C. Frank and Heather L. Wallace for The California Chamber of Commerce and 
The Civil Justice Association of California as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent BNSF 
Railway Company. 
 
Shook, Hardy & Bacon, Mark A. Behrens and Patrick Gregory for Litigation Justice, Inc., Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States of America, National Association of Manufacturers, American Tort Reform 
Association and NFIB Small Business Legal Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Respondent BNSF Railway Company. 
 
Snell & Wilmer, Mary-Christine Sungaila and Jenny Hua for International Association of Defense Counsel 
and Federation of Defense & Corporate Counsel as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent 
BNSF Railway Company. 
 
Deborah J. La Fetra for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Respondent BNSF Railway Company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 3 – S219534 & S219919 counsel continued 
 
Counsel: 
 
Louis P. Warchot, Daniel Saphire; Murphy, Campbell, Alliston & Quinn and Stephanie L. Quinn for 
Association of American Railroads as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent BNSF 
Railway Company. 
 
King & Spalding, Peter A. Strotz, Steven D. Park and Ethan P. Davis for Western States Petroleum 
Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent BNSF Railway Company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Ted W. Pelletier 
Kazan, McClain, Satterley & Greenwood 
Jack London Market 
55 Harrison Street, Suite 400 
Oakland, CA  94607 
(510) 302-1000 
 
Lisa Perrochet 
Horvitz & Levy 
Business Arts Plaza 
3601 West Olive Avenue, 8th Floor 
Burbank, CA  91505-4681 
(818) 995-0800 
 
Michael B. Gurien 
Walters Kraus & Paul 
222 North Sepulveda Boulevard, Suite 1900 
El Segundo. CA  90245 
(310) 414-8146 
 
Theodore J. Boutrous Jr. 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher 
333 South Grand Avenue 
Los Angeles, CA  90071-3197 
(213) 229-7000