Case Title: STATE v SWAZIO

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1977-07-26T00:00:00Z

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No. 1 3 4 4 9 I N THE S U P R E M E COURT O F THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 THE STATE OF MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs- ANTHONY MARTIN SWAZIO, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert H. Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Moses, Kampfe, T o l l i v e r and Wright, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Dennis Moreen, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, Helena, Montana Arthur W. Ayers, Jr. County Attorney, argued, Red Lodge, Montana Submitted: A p r i l 1 4 , 1977 Decided : 2 6 1977 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. O n June 27, 1974, an Information was f i l e d i n the d i s t r i c t court, Carbon County, charging Anthony Martin Swazio with aggravated assault. The victim of the alleged assault was Deputy Sheriff Robert Peters. O n April 21, 1976, defendant was found g u i l t y by a jury verdict. Defendant was sentenced t o the s t a t e prison a t Deer Lodge, Montana, f o r a period of one year. From t h i s verdict and f i n a l judgment defendant appeals. O n June 22, 1974, a t approximately 10:45 p.m., Swazio was informed by h i s wife t h a t Deputy Sheriff Robert Peters had been t o t h e i r home during the day looking for a Steve Hull, a friend of Swazio. This upset defendant a s there existed bad blood between he and Deputy Sheriff Peters. Swazio drove t o the Peters' residence with a Bruce Brush. Brush accompanied defendant t o show him where Deputy Sheriff Peters lived. Swazio parked h i s car i n front of the Peters' residence, then walked through a gate i n the fence enclosing the house and yard, and to the door of the house, Brush remained inside defendant's vehicle the e n t i r e time. The wife of Deputy Sheriff Peters, Phyllis Peters, answered the door. Swazio reques tEd t h a t Peters come out of the house and speak with him. Deputy Sheriff Peters came outside and went through the gate of the fence and there met defendant. A t t h i s time an argument ensued between them regarding the of c o n d u c t / ~ e p u t ~ Sheriff Peters e a r l i e r t h a t day and both were yelling a t each other. Phyllis Peters, seeing the discussion had escalated into a violent argument, came from the house with a gun and f i r e d it into the a i r , apparently i n an attempt t o stop t h e argument. The f i r i n g of the shot had no e f f e c t on defendant o~ 3eputy Peters. A t t h i s time Depucy bheriff Peters took the gun from h i s wife and informed defendant he was going t o place him under a r r e s t f o r disturbing the peace. A t t h i s point there i s con- f l i c t i n the f a c t s . Peters and h i s wife t e s t i f i e d t h a t a s Peters was about t o f r i s k defendant, defendant made a sudden move turning toward Peters. The gun discharged and defendant was shot i n the back. Prior t o the shooting Deputy Peters and h i s wife claim defendant assaulted Deputy Sheriff Peters by s t r i k i n g him with h i s f i s t . Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t when Peters said he was arresting him, he threw up h i s arms, turned, and walked away from Peters toward h i s vehicle. After taking a few steps he was shot i n the back. Defendant claimed he never he struck Deputy Peters, u n t i l after/ Nas shot i n the back. As a r e s u l t of t h e shooting defendant f i l e d a c i v i l claim against the s t a t e of Montana. Defendant's attorney moved t o have any evidence of the c i v i l claim excluded from t r i a l . The motion i n limine was denied. Brush, defendant's companion, gave a statement t o Deputy Sheriff Peters soon a f t e r the incident. Brush could not be found t o be served with a subpoena t o appear a t t r i a l so defendant's attorney attempted t o introduce the statement given t o the deputy s h e r i f f i n t o evidence. The t r i a l court disanmed the introduction of the statement a t t r i a l . O n appeal defendant presents three issues f o r review by t h i s Court; 1. Whether the d i s t r i c t court erred i n denying defendant's motion i n limine, thereby allowing evidence t o be presented t o the jury regarding defendant's c i v i l claim against the s t a t e of .<on tana ? 2. 'dhether the d i s t r i c t court erred i n refusing t o allow into evidence signed statements by an impartial eyewitness t o the alleged crime, Bruce Brush, i n absence of Brush's testimony? 3. Whether there was s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o support a verdict of g u i l t y ? Issue 1 concerns the t r i a l c o u r t ' s denial of the motion i n Limine. This issue cannot be reviewed due t o the voluntary actions taken by defendant's attorney. After the defendant's motion i n limine was denied h i s attorney brought the matter of the c i v i l s u i t before the jury while questioning defendant on d i r e c t examination. The rule concerning preservation of exceptions and objections a t t r i a l i s s e t f o r t h i n 5 Am J u r 2d, Appeal and Error 5562. It s t a t e s : I I Even where exceptions have been duly taken t o a matter the appellate court may refuse review where the exception i s deemed waived by subsequent inconsistent conduct of the party complaining.;k * *" I n t h i s case defendant waived h i s r i g h t t o object t o the evidence by the introduction into the t r i a l of the subject matter t h a t the motion i n limine was meant t o suppress. Defendant cannot object t o the consequences of h i s own voluntary actions. Croteau v. Allbee, 117 V t . 332, 9 1 A.2d 803; Frederick v. Gay's Express Inc., 1 1 1 V t . 411, 17 A.2d 248. Defendant i n h i s Issue 2 contends the court erred i n not allowing the statement taken from Bruce Brush t o be admitted i n t o evidence. He r e l i e s on the doctrine of r e s gestae and the b e s t and secondary evidence rule. Res gestae i s recognized a s an exception t o the hearsay rule. The statement Brush gave t o Deputy Peters was a narrative statement followed by questions and answers. This Court i n Sullivan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 96 Mont. 254, 268, 29 P.2d 1046, stated: ''9; * ; ? N o precise rule has been, nor can be, formulated for determining what statements a r e a p a r t of the r e s - gestae; consequently, each case i n i n a sense a law unto i t s e l f and must be decided on i t s p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s , so t h a t precedents a r e valuable more £or the purpose of i l l u s t r a t i o n than f o r establishment of a rule which may be generally followed." 96 Mont. 268. The amount of time between the incident and the time the statement was taken by the deputy sheriff i s not c l e a r from the record, however it does appear the statement was completed within an hour o r two a f t e r the incident occurred. This Court in Sullivan said: "The element of time elapsing a f t e r the accident and before the utterance sought t o be proved i s not decisive, but important.'' 96 Mont. 268. Therefore a lapse of time does not automatically exclude hearsay statements from the res gestae rule. However, the lapse of time taken i n combination with other factors may well indicate the rule i s not applicable t o the statement. This Court i n State v. Newman, 162 Mont. 450, 457, 513 P.2d 258, divided the r e s gestae r u l e into four categories: " g c * * I n modem usage the Ires gestae' exception actually involves four d i s t i n c t types of cases (1) excited utterances, (2) declarations of present sense impressions, (3) declarations as t o s t a t e of mind, and (4) declarations a s t o body condition. I n each of these instances the basic rationale underlying the ' r e s gestae' exception t o the hearsay rule i s t h a t the statements a r e spontaneous and contemporaneous, lending a p a r t i c u l a r r e l i a b i l i t y of trustworthiness t o the statement. 162 Mont. 457. The only category i n t o which Brush's statement could f a l l is the second: declaration of present sense impressions. Brush' s statement may have been describing an event, but there was no showing the statement was made while the speaker was laboring under excitement and before he.had time t o r e f l e c t o r otherwise come within the rule enunciated by t h i s Court. Therefore, the statement was not a declaration t h a t formed p a r t of the transaction and there was no abuse on the p a r t of the d i s t r i c t court i n denying rhe admission of hearsay evidence. Counsel f o r defendant also argues i n support of the admiss- i b i l i t y of Brush's statement under the best and secondary evidence rule. Counsel argues since Brush was outside of the s t a t e of Montana, t h a t h i s statement t o the deputy s h e r i f f was admissible as the best-evidence available. 2 Jones on Evidence, 6th Ed., § 7:2, s t a t e s : "The best evidence r u l e is generally, i f not almost exclusively, invoked where proof i s t o be made of a record i n writing o r where there i s an attempt t o substitute o r a l for documentary evidence of the content of .a writing. I n f a c t it has been said t h a t the term 'best evidence' i s a convenient short description of the rule governing proof of the contents of a writing." The question of the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the best evidence r u l e , other than t o documents, has not been reached d i r e c t l y i n Montana and has not been extended t o a s i t u a t i o n of t h i s kind. Issue 3 i s whether there was s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o support a verdict of g u i l t y ? The t e s t i s whether there i s s u f f i c i e n t credible evidence, i f believed by the jury, t o support i t s verdict. I f there i s s u f f i c i e n t credible evidence the verdict w i l l stand. State v. Farnes, M o n t . , 558 P.2d 472, 33 St.Rep. 1270, 1274. The evidence here i s i n conflict. Deputy Sheriff Peters and h i s wife claim Peters was struck by defendant before defendant was shot, yet neither one could agree on how many times he was struck nor exactly when. Defendant, on the other hand, claims he did not h i t Peters u n t i l a f t e r he was shot. This was the base l i n e testimony of a l l witnesses t o the incident. I n S t a t e v. Fitzpatrick, 163 Mont. 220, 226, 516 P.2d 605, t h i s Court s e t f o r t h i t s position i n determining questions of sufficiency of the evidence : "As t h i s Court has held many times over, the jury i s the f a c t finding body i n our system of jurisprudence, and i t s decision i s controlling. The jury i s f r e e t o consider a l l evidence presented and t o pick and choose which of the witnesses it wishes to believe. I f s u f f i c i e n t testimony was introduced, a s well a s exhibits t o j u s t i f y the j u r y ' s findings, then i t s conclusions w i l l not be disturbed unless i t i s apparent there was a c l e a r misunder- standing by the jury o r t h a t there was a misrepre- sentation made t o the jury.!' 163 Mont. 226. Defendant contends the uncontradicted physical evidence in t h i s case was ignored by the jury. The general law i n Montana i s t h a t uncontradicted credible evidence cannot be disregarded by a court o r by a jury. Holenstein v. Andrews, 166 Mont. 60, 530 P.2d 476. I n reviewing the d i s t r i c t court record there i s considerable physical evidence which supports defendant's conten- tions, but t h i s evidence was not uncontroverted evidence. Both b a l l i s t i c s witnesses t e s t i f i e d defendant was probably shot from a t l e a s t 36 inches away, yet neither expert could rule out the p o s s i b i l i t y of a contact shot. The jury i s not bound by expert opinion evidence. In short, the jury is the t r i e r of f a c t . In S t a t e v. Glidden, 165 Mont. 470, 473, 529 P.2d 1384, t h i s Court stated: "In a criminal prosecution the weight of evidence and c r e d i b i l i t y of the witness is a matter exclusively within the province of the jury and should not be disturbed by a court of appeal." While defendant's story, i f believed, would lead t o the conclusion he was not g u i l t y of aggravated a s s a u l t , the jury was not required t o believe the testimony of the defendant o r the testimony of the expert witnesses. Viewing the evidence i n the l i g h t most favorable t o the s t a t e , these factors support the j u r y ' s conclusion: (1) Deferlclant went t o the Deputy s h e r i f f ' s home a t approximately 1 1 : O O p.m. because he was extremely upset with Deputy Peters' conduct; (2) they proceeded t o have a heated argument; (3) the o f f i c e r was placing defendant under a r r e s t , and (4) Peters and h i s wife t e s t i f i e d defendant struck Deputy Sheriff Peters p r i o r t o the time defendant was shot. There being no reversible t r i a l e r r o r and the record does reveal s u f f i c i e n t substantial and credible evidence t o support the verdict of the jury, the judgment of the t r i a l court is affirmed. W e Concur: chief J u s t i c e , J u s t i c e s .