Case Title: Wilkes v. Wilkes

Citation: 488 S.W.2d 398

Docket Number: B-3217

State: texas

Court: Texas Supreme Court

Date: 1972-11-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
488 S.W.2d 398 (1972) Robert Leslie WILKES et al., Petitioners, v. Margaret Alice WILKES, Respondent. No. B-3217. Supreme Court of Texas. November 22, 1972. Rehearing Denied December 27, 1972. *399 Marks & Black, James K. Peden, III and Don Black, Strasburger, Price, Kelton, Martin & Unis, Royal H. Brin, Jr., Dallas, for petitioners. Hultgren, Jewell & Kolb, James J. Hultgren, Dallas, for respondent. GREENHILL, Chief Justice. This case involves the construction of the will of Belle Shumard. Her will created a trust which still exists. The questions are the intention of the testatrix as to the ultimate distribution of the property and of the trust income in the meantime. These questions, in turn, depend upon whether Belle intended to make a gift to a class or group which was capable of future change in number. Her will provides for a devise to "the lineal descendants, if any," of various beneficiaries including those of her adopted daughter, Virginia Wilkes. At the time of Virginia's death, she had only one lineal descendant, her son, Robert S. Wilkes. Subsequently, Robert S. Wilkes had two sons, both living, Robert L. Wilkes and Gerald Wilkes. The plaintiff herein is Margaret Wilkes, wife of Robert S. Wilkes and the stepmother of Robert L. and Gerald Wilkes. The trial court held that the sons of Robert S. Wilkes are lineal descendants of Virginia Wilkes and that Belle intended a gift to the class of "lineal descendants" which includes them. The court of civil appeals disagreed. It held that when Virginia, the mother of Robert S., died, an estate vested in Robert S. Wilkes; and hence he could convey an interest in the estate to his wife Margaret (not a lineal descendant) and could cut off, or limit, the interests of his own sons, the grandchildren of Virginia Wilkes. 474 S.W.2d 777. We agree with the construction made by the trial court; and accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of civil appeals. Our holding is that Belle Shumard intended a gift to the class of "lineal descendants," a group capable of future changes in number, rather than a bequest to specific individuals. The will of Belle Shumard is quite long. Its general scheme was to divide her trust property and its income into three lines. To assist in the understanding of the will, we set out a diagram of the relevant people involved. This litigation involves only the third line. *400 As relevant here, Belle Shumard's will had the following provisions. Matters in brackets and all emphasis are added by us. The will was probated, and the bank continues to serve as trustee. The trust has not terminated. Salina and Carrie, two of the five named life tenants, are alive and are parties to this suit. Virginia Wilkes, the adopted daughter, died intestate in 1960. She had one son, Robert S. Wilkes. After the death of Virginia in 1960, Robert had two sons, Robert L. and Gerald. As stated, Margaret A. Wilkes, the plaintiff herein, was married to Robert S. Wilkes and is the stepmother of Robert L. and Gerald Wilkes. *401 The controversy arose because Virginia's son, Robert S. Wilkes, left a will in which he attempted to name his wife a beneficiary of an interest in the corpus of the trust created by Belle Shumard's will and in the income of the trust. The wife of Robert S. Wilkes (Margaret), of course, is not a "lineal descendant" of Virginia Wilkes. If the gift under the will is to the class of "lineal descendants," then it was not within the power of Robert S. Wilkes to devise the property of the Belle Shumard trust, or the income from it, to his wife; and the property would go to "the lineal descendants," the sons of Robert S. Wilkes. The suit was brought by Margaret Wilkes for a construction of the will. She seeks to sustain the one-sixth interest willed to her by her husband. Her contention is that since Robert S. Wilkes was the sole "lineal descendant" when his mother Virginia died, this portion of the property and its trust income vested in him; and hence he could dispose of it by his will. The court of civil appeals, in agreeing with that construction, applied the rule favoring early vesting of estates. That rule is recognized, particularly where the alternative is to void the trust or grant. Rekdahl v. Long, 417 S.W.2d 387 (Tex.1967); Pickering v. Miles, 477 S.W.2d 267 (Tex.1972). The rule, however, is not applicable where, as here, there are other expressed indicia of intent. We do not regard the will as being ambiguous. We must seek the intent of the testatrix; and having done so, we must give effect to it. As Chief Justice Marshall observed in Smith v. Bell, 6 Pet. (31 U.S.) 68 L. Ed. 322 (1832), such intent is the polar star to be used by the courts in the construction of a will. The testamentary scheme is this: 1. Belle devised a large part of her realty in trust for the lives of Malnor, Isabel, Salina, Carrie and Virginia, describing their several relationships to her. 2. Then she provided for distribution of the net revenues (income) among "the beneficiaries," giving (a) Malnor one-third for life, (b) Isabel, Salina, and Carrie one-third to be divided equally between them during their respective lives, and (c) Virginia one-third for life. In each instance at the death of the life beneficiary, the net revenues (income) were directed to be paid to the beneficiaries of a valid will of the life beneficiary, in legal effect a testamentary power to appoint persons to receive the trust revenues. If no valid will was probated, the trust revenues were to be distributed to the beneficiary's "lineal descendants, if any." In the absence of lineal descendants, the trust revenues were to be paid to the other "beneficiaries" under the will. 3. The trust was to last "until the death of the last survivor" of the five named life tenants. "At the termination of the trust * * * the trust property shall be divided among the then surviving beneficiaries of this my will as follows,"one-third to the beneficiaries of Malnor's will, one-third divided between the beneficiaries of the wills of Isabel, Salina, and Carrie, and one-third to the will beneficiaries of Virginia. If Virginia left no will, the last one-third was to go "to her lineal descendants, if any." The testatrix used the same sort of language as the above in disposing of the income from the trust. If Virginia died intestate and without lineal descendants (which did not happen), the share would be distributed "among the surviving beneficiaries of this my will." It is significant that distribution at the trust termination is to be among the "then surviving beneficiaries of this my will," and that distribution in the absence of a valid will or lineal descendants is also "among the surviving beneficiaries of this my will." This repeats similar language covering distribution of net revenues at the earlier deaths of the respective life tenants during the term of the trust. The testatrix looked constantly at a group, a class of surviving persons unidentifiable *402 at the time of the execution of her will and at her death but to be chosen from, and to become identifiable at, the dates of interim and final distribution. Her use of language is completely consistent in this respect. Belle's will did not name Robert S. Wilkes as a beneficiary. His rights under the will depended upon his qualification as a "lineal descendant" of Virginia surviving at her death. He did so qualify and began receiving distributions of "net revenues." At the time, he was the only lineal descendant of Virginia; so he received the net revenues from her entire one-third. His right to receive that income would have continued so long as he occupied that status. It was not subject to division with any other person because his mother, Virginia, had made no different provision by will; and there were no other lineal descendants to share in any division. Upon the birth of a son to Robert S., another legal descendant entered the picture, but that descendant's rights to a distribution of net revenues was subordinate to that of his living father upon principles of per stirpes distribution. In this limited sense, Robert S. Wilkes' right to this income was vested. But his interest as a lineal descendant in the income was subject to failure at the date of any distribution of net revenues if he was not there to receive it; for if there was no other person who could then qualify as a lineal descendant of Virginia, the will of Belle provided that the income would be distributed "among the surviving beneficiaries of this my will." In the facts before us, the sons of Robert S. Wilkes, Gerald and Robert L., at their father's death, could qualify as lineal descendants of Virginia; but his wife, Margaret, could not possibly do so because she did not fall within the class of "lineal descendants" of Virginia. Nothing that Robert could do by will could alter this fact. The will is unequivocal: "said net revenues shall be paid to * * * her [my adopted daughter Virginia's] lineal descendants." It does not say "to those persons whom Virginia's lineal descendants shall appoint by will." Robert S., a lineal descendant of Virginia, tried to appoint his wife. Belle's will gave him no authority to do so. It is equally clear that those persons who are to share in Virginia's one-third of the trust principal at the death of the last surviving life tenant are, or will be, Virginia's "then surviving lineal descendants, if any." Though there are now living persons (Robert S.'s sons) who are potential beneficiaries of this segment of the corpus of the trust, it cannot now (the last surviving life tenant not having died) be known whether either of them will ultimately receive any portion of that principal. One thing is sure. Margaret is not Virginia's lineal descendant; and hence, no matter when the trust termination occurs, she cannot qualify to share in it. The factors that lead to the foregoing conclusions as to the meaning of the language employed by Belle Shumard are these: 1. The particular use of the word "beneficiaries" to refer to the five named life tenants. 2. The requirement that the "net revenues shall be paid * * * to her lineal descendants," language which in this context can only mean that a separate determination must be made as each revenue payment is about to be disbursed. 3. The precise termination date of the trust as drawn from the combined reading of paragraph "Fifth: I will my property in trust until the death of the last survivor of them" and Paragraph "Seventh: At the termination of the trust here created * * * the trust property * * * and * * * any then existing lease * * * shall be partitioned and divided among the then surviving beneficiaries of this my will, as follows * * *" 4. Who those "then surviving beneficiaries" will be is immediately defined. Virginia's one-third goes (she having *403 failed to appoint by will) "to her lineal descendants, if any." Preoccupation with the characterization of the nature of the interest which Robert S. Wilkes had during his lifetime under Belle Shumard's will as "vested" or "contingent" seems to have confused the issue in the court of civil appeals. He had the right to receive income as long as he met the qualifications of the bequest. He was alive and, for a time, the sole lineal descendant of Virginia and entitled to her one-third. The gift to "lineal descendants" is a gift to a class within the rule of Hagood v. Hagood, 186 S.W. 220 (Tex.Civ.App.1916, writ refused), where it was correctly said, Accord, Farrell v. Cogley, 146 S.W. 315 (Tex.Civ.App.1912, writ refused); Welch v. Trustees of Robert A. Welch Foundation, 465 S.W.2d 195 at 200 (Tex.Civ.App.1971, writ refused, n. r. e.); Johnston v. Johnston, 276 S.W. 776 (Tex.Civ.App.1925, no writ). The Restatement of Property, Volume 3, is helpful. The introduction to its chapter on class gifts states at page 1445, Comment: Another definition of class gifts is found in Evans v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 190 Md. 332, 58 A.2d 649 (1948): Referring to Rule 279 of the Restatement of Property set out above, the court continued, In Sanderson v. First National Bank in Dallas, 446 S.W.2d 720 (Tex.Civ.App.1969, writ ref., n. r. e.), the testatrix had four sisters and a brother when she executed her will. She provided, as relevant here, that her property should "be equally divided between my sisters." At the time of the death of the testatrix, her brother and three of her sisters had died. One sister survived. If the bequest was to four individuals, then the bequest of the three of the sisters lapsed; and other members of the family favored this construction. If the gift was to the class, then the property went to the surviving sister. Citing Section 279 of the Restatement, supra, the court held that there was a gift to the class: Here, by describing the alternate takers of the net revenues as "lineal descendants," Belle looked to a future group of persons she did not know and could not name. As stated, she did not name Robert S. Wilkes and thus restrict the gift over in default of Virginia's appointment to him. Instead, she designated a class of "lineal descendants" into which Robert happened to fit at Virginia's death. He, therefore, received the income as long as he qualified for it. But he was given no power to dispose of that income interest. He could only dispose of the payments as he received them. Before Virginia died, it could not be known that he himself would be the lineal descendant who would be entitled to her income interest and also be the only one. His contingency ripened into a "vested" interest *405 so long as he lived and continued to qualify. But that income interest would disappear if he failed to qualify at any distribution. Pending the ultimate termination of the trust, his interest in the income was similar to that involved in Morrison v. Morrison's Executor, 14 N.J.Eq. 330 (1862) in which the will in question left income to grandsons until they respectively reached 21. The court wrote, The situation was similarly described in Ford v. Jones, 223 Ky. 327, 3 S.W.2d 781 (1928): The current income pie here, like remainder pie, must be divided as each distribution is made. In In re Anderson's Estate, 165 Pa.Super. 353, 67 A.2d 783 (1949), the will provided a trust until the death of the children and until the youngest grandson became 21. It then provided, One of the children died without descendants but leaving a wife to whom he had delivered an inter vivos assignment of his share of the trust income. The trust, as here, was still in operation since the time for termination had not yet arrived. The court held, *406 A case having facts rather close to those before us is Burlington County Trust Co. v. Di Castelcicala, 2 N.J. 214, 66 A.2d 164 (1949). In that case, the class was "grandchildren" rather than "lineal descendants." The New Jersey Supreme Court reached a result which we reach here and with similar reasoning. There, as here, one of the life tenants attempted to devise an interest in the income of a testamentary trust to his wife. The court concluded that, The holding was that the devise to the wife was ineffective because it came from her husband "whose interest terminated at his death." This result also finds support in the Restatement of Property, where it says in Volume 3 at page 1588 and following: What has been said with respect to the income interest under Belle Shumard's will likewise disposes of Margaret Wilkes' claim to share in the distribution of the trust principal at the death of the last survivor of the life tenants, Carrie Maxwell and Salina Hulings, and for the same reasons set out above. Margaret is not a lineal descendant of Virginia Wilkes and hence can never be a member of the class designated by Belle to take if Virginia did not exercise her testamentary power of appointment. Belle gave Robert S. Wilkes no such power, and his will can give no trust principal to Margaret. We do not decide, indeed we cannot now decide, who will be entitled to Virginia Wilkes' share of the trust principal at the termination of the trust upon the death of the last surviving life tenant. All that can now be said is that the group can not include Margaret Wilkes because Belle's *407 will leaves out a person in Margaret's position. The court of civil appeals, therefore, erred in construing Belle's will to create a vested remainder and hence a transmittable interest in Robert S. Wilkes. His interest was contingent upon his continued survival both as to income and as to a share of the principal. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of civil appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.