Case Title: Smith v. State

Citation: 463 So. 2d 1028

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1984-02-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
463 So. 2d 1028 (1984) Raymond SMITH v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 54089. Supreme Court of Mississippi. February 22, 1984. Rehearing Denied February 27, 1985. Charles R. Wilbanks, Corinth, for appellant. Bill Allain, Atty. Gen. by Frankie Walton White, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before PATTERSON, C.J., and PRATHER and ROBERTSON, JJ. PATTERSON, Chief Justice, for the Court: Raymond Smith was convicted of murder and sentenced by the Circuit Court of Alcorn County to life imprisonment. Although there are numerous assignments of error designated for reversal, we address only those concerning the granting of certain instructions. On June 8, 1980, Amos Ergle came from Alabama to the home of Raymond Smith, his cousin, in Alcorn County. Ergle stated to Smith that he was running from the law and was armed. He appeared agitated and wanted something to drink. Upon Ergle's insistence, Smith went with him to purchase some whiskey and vodka. They imbibed and returned to Smith's home where Ergle continued to drink. Afterward Ergle became belligerent and threatened to beat Smith. Smith attempted to get Ergle to use a bedroom and sleep it off, believing the rest would calm Ergle, but this effort was fruitless. Thereafter Smith, his wife and Ergle visited Smith's mother whose home was next door. After a few minutes Smith's wife returned to her home leaving the appellant; his mother, Mary Lou Smith; and Amos Ergle. Thereafter Ergle began to destroy the furnishings in the home of Mrs. Smith and when she attempted to stop him by entreaty and asked him to leave, he threatened her and refused to leave her house. In this state of affairs the appellant and his mother left the house to return to the appellant's home. While en route Mrs. Smith heard gunshots behind her, turned *1029 and observed Ergle lying on the ground and her son walking to his home. Smith testified he shot as Ergle ran toward him. Alluding to events earlier in the day, Smith stated that Ergle had accused him of calling him a "queer," and of complicity in the drowning of Ergle's brother. He also insisted that Smith drive him back to Alabama, threatened to kill him and the entire family, and refused to leave the premises after he had been asked to do so. Under these circumstances Smith stated he thought he had no alternative but to obtain his gun. He testified that when he and his mother left her house that Ergle followed them and his mother cried out that he was coming after them and told him to run but he could not do so because of his physical condition. He then shot Ergle as he could not escape him. On this testimony Smith was convicted of murder. Being of the opinion the evidence reveals no crime greater than manslaughter, and because the jury was improperly instructed, we reverse and remand for a new trial. Before addressing the instructions assigned as error and to place them in proper perspective, we think reference to homicide less than murder need be mentioned. The term "justifiable homicide" is commonly understood to mean the killing of another in necessary self-defense under extreme circumstances warranting an acquittal of the accused. Another homicide less than murder is the killing of another in the heat of passion, without malice aforethought and is generally referred to as "manslaughter." It does not justify a homicide as does self-defense but rather reduces the greater crime of murder to the lesser crime of manslaughter because "malice aforethought" is lacking. Manslaughter does not exonerate the homicide but requires a sentence less than that for murder. Mississippi Code Annotated, Section 97-3-35 (1972) provides: It will be noted that every homicide "without malice," and "not in necessary self-defense", and "in the heat of passion" shall be manslaughter. The distinction between murder and manslaughter is that the latter is without malice. The cogent issue presently before the court is whether instructions S-1 and S-2 properly instructed the jury on the issue of manslaughter. We are of the opinion they did not. Instruction S-1 provides: This instruction directs the jury to find the defendant guilty of murder if Amos Ergle was willfully and deliberately killed by Raymond Smith without authority of law. Of course, a homicide may result from a willful act or deliberate design without being murder if the killing occurs in necessary self-defense or results from an act committed in the heat of passion without malice aforethought. In this case there is no evidence of malice aforethought, but since the killing resulted from an intentional act and was without authority of law, the jury by the above quoted instruction was mandated to find the defendant guilty of murder. The instruction was peremptory to murder, in our opinion, necessitating the case to be reversed unless *1030 it can be said the instruction was cured by others. Instruction S-2 provides: On close scrutiny this instruction sets forth the distinction between murder and manslaughter as it refers to "with his malice aforethought" and, in the last sentence, "without malice aforethought and in the heat of passion," and the jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty of manslaughter if the homicide occurred without malice aforethought and in the heat of passion. The problem, as we view it, is that it is contradictory to Instruction S-1 which mandated the jury to find defendant guilty of murder if the homicide was intentional and without authority of law. Or stated differently, the jury first had to decide which of these two instructions correctly portrayed the law. This is a function of the court and not the jury. We therefore think the cause must be reversed for a new trial. See Cooley v. State, 346 So. 2d 912 (Miss. 1977), and Pittman v. State, 297 So. 2d 888 (Miss. 1974). In Patterson v. State, 289 So. 2d 685 (Miss. 1974), this Court held, "There appears to be some confusion as to this instruction but we point out at this time that any such instruction should make it clear to the jury that `malice aforethought' must pre-exist the infliction of a mortal wound in a murder case." 289 So. 2d at 686. In Bangren v. State, 196 Miss. 887, 17 So. 2d 599 (1944), it was held: Additionally, complaint is made of Instruction C-5, which follows: Although we do not reverse because of this instruction, we nevertheless call the court's attention to Robinson v. State, 434 So. 2d 206 (Miss. 1983), which was critical of a similar instruction. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL. WALKER and ROY NOBLE LEE, P.JJ., and BOWLING, HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON and SULLIVAN, JJ., concur.