Case Title: MALINDA JANET MARTIN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2006-SC-000370-MR

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENTAND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION . ,suprmt d1outi of 2006-SC-000370-MR nA7 MALINDA JANET MARTIN APPELLANT APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT V. HONORABLE CRAIG Z . CLYMER, JUDGE NO . 05-CR-00284 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING RENDERED : MAY 24, 2007 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED Malinda Janet Martin appeals from her McCracken Circuit Court conviction for prostitution, first degree possession of a controlled substance (cocaine, first offense), possession of drug paraphernalia (second or subsequent offense) and first degree persistent felony offender . The jury recommended a total sentence of 20 years' imprisonment . The single issue on appeal concerns the sufficiency of the evidence for the conviction of first degree possession of a controlled substance . Because the Commonwealth presented evidence that Martin possessed a crack pipe containing cocaine residue -- even though the residue was unmeasurable -- the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for first degree possession of a controlled substance. Thus, we affirm . I. Background While driving down a street in Paducah, Kentucky, one May night, two undercover male law enforcement officers observed Martin, who was walking, and stopped next to her. Martin approached the vehicle and asked the men what they were looking for . The officers responded that they were "looking to party." Martin got in the backseat of the car. The undercover officers spoke to Martin about drugs, and Martin said that she smoked "rock." Eventually, the officers discussed paying for sexual intercourse with Martin . After haggling over the cost, Martin agreed to have sexual intercourse with both men and to perform oral sex on both men for $22 . Martin directed the officer who was driving to an alley. When they reached the alley, one officer gave Martin $20. However, Martin told him that she needed more money than that . So the officer gave her another $5 . Upon receiving the additional $5, Martin immediately began undressing . The officers informed Martin that she was under arrest for prostitution . According to the officers, Martin threw the money down and resisted arrest . The officers struggled with Martin . During the struggle, Martin reached for one of her shoes . When she grabbed the shoe, a small tin fell out . The officers recovered the tin and found a crack pipe inside it . A field test and subsequent laboratory testing confirmed that the pipe contained cocaine residue, although the exact amount was unmeasurable . In addition to the charges for which she was convicted, the McCracken County grand jury also charged Martin with resisting arrest . However, the Commonwealth later dismissed that charge . At trial during jury deliberation, the jury sent a question to the trial court . The question read : "The jury would like clarification regarding what constitutes a `quantity' of cocaine? (per State Law)." Over defense counsel's objection, the trial court brought the jury in and gave them the following answer in response to their question : "Any amount of cocaine constitutes a `quantity."' The single issue on appeal is whether Martin was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal on the possession of a controlled substance charge when two witnesses testified at trial that the amount of cocaine contained in the crack pipe was unmeasurable . I1. Discussion of the issue: Was Martin entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal on the possession of a controlled substance charge when two witnesses testified at trial that the amount of cocaine contained in the crack pipe was unmeasurable? On a motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth, reserving to the jury all questions of credibility and weight of the evidence . See Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W .2d 186, 187 (Ky . 1991) ; Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3, 4 (Ky . 1983). "On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal." Benham , 816 S.W .2d at 187 . A conviction for first degree possession of a controlled substance, as it relates to this case, required the jury to find that Martin knowingly and unlawfully possessed any quantity of cocaine (a Schedule II controlled substance) . See KRS 218A.1415(1) and KRS 218A.070(1)(d) (listing cocaine as a Schedule II controlled substance) . Under KRS 218A.1415 and the case law interpreting the statute, the existence of cocaine residue on a crack pipe -- even if the residue cannot be accurately weighed or measured -- is sufficient to support a conviction for possession of a controlled substance . See Commonwealth v . Shivlev , 814 S.W .2d 572, 574 (Ky . 1991) (holding that cocaine residue supports a charge of cocaine possession when there is other evidence or the inference that a defendant knowingly possessed the controlled substance) ; Bolen v . Commonwealth , 31 S.W .3d 907, 909-10 (Ky . 2000) (following Shivle ). Turning to the testimony at trial relating to the first degree possession of a controlled substance charge, there was evidence from which a jury could infer that Martin knowingly possessed in her shoe a crack pipe containing cocaine residue . Thus, Martin was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal on that charge. Cognizant of the language of the applicable statutes and this Court's holdings in Shivlev and Bolen , Martin attempts to distinguish this case based on the facts that (1) one witness testified in this case that "it was hard to say" what amount of cocaine was actually in the crack pipe and (2) another witness said that the amount of cocaine in the crack pipe was more like a film and was not weighable. This argument is no different from the argument that the quantity recovered must be measurable to support a conviction, which argument was expressly rejected by Shivlev and Bolen. To the extent that Martin cannot distinguish the facts of her case from Shivlev and Bolen , she argues that this Court should reexamine the holdings in those cases . We decline to do so. And we further decline to address Martin's additional arguments discussing (1) the language of KRS 218A.500 and KRS 218A.510 and (2) the fact that most Americans have daily contact with cocaine residue on cash in circulation as those arguments were not raised before the trial court . We affirm the judgment of the McCracken Circuit Court . All sitting . All concur. COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT : Julia K . Pearson Department of Public Advocacy 100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 301 Frankfort, Kentucky 40601 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE : Gregory D . Stumbo Attorney General of Kentucky Room 118, Capitol Building Frankfort, Kentucky 40601 David W . Barr Assistant Attorney General Office of Attorney General 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, Kentucky 40601