Case Title: McClure v. Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 86118

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1999-10-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket Nos. 86118, 86192 cons.-Agenda 17-May 1999.
DELORES McCLURE, Indiv. and as Special Adm'r of the Estate of Robert McClure, Deceased, et al., Appellees, v.
OWENS CORNING FIBERGLAS CORPORATION et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed October 21, 1999.
JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
This case involves three actions by three different plaintiffs, Lois Bicknell (Bicknell), Vernadine Thacker (Thacker), and
Delores McClure (McClure), against defendant Owens Corning Fiberglas Corporation (Owens Corning). McClure also
named Owens-Illinois, Inc. (Owens-Illinois), as a defendant in her suit. All three plaintiffs' complaints were based on
injuries allegedly resulting from their husbands' exposure to asbestos while employed by the Union Asbestos and Rubber
Company (Unarco) at its Bloomington, Illinois, plant. Neither Unarco nor Johns-Manville Corporation (Johns-Manville), a
supplier of asbestos used in the Bloomington plant, is named as a defendant in plaintiffs' complaints. In addition, plaintiffs
alleged no exposure to Owens Corning or Owens-Illinois products and no employment relationship between defendants and
their husbands. Nevertheless, plaintiffs claimed that defendants were responsible for the injuries alleged in their complaints
because defendants engaged in a civil conspiracy with Unarco, Johns-Manville, and other companies to suppress
information concerning the harmful health effects of asbestos exposure and to falsely represent that it was safe for people to
work in close proximity to asbestos-containing materials.
At plaintiffs' request, these three cases were consolidated for trial before the circuit court of McLean County. After trial, the
jury returned verdicts in favor of Bicknell and Thacker against Owens Corning. The jury also found in favor of McClure
against both Owens Corning and Owens-Illinois. The appellate court affirmed the judgments entered on these verdicts. 298
Ill. App. 3d 591. Owens-Illinois then filed a petition for leave to appeal the judgment in the McClure case, and Owens
Corning filed a petition for leave to appeal the judgments in all three cases. This court granted defendants' petitions (177 Ill.
2d R. 315) and allowed plaintiffs' motion to consolidate defendants' appeals. In addition, we have permitted amicus curiae
briefs to be filed by the Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel, the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., and the
Illinois Manufacturers' Association. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345. We reverse on the basis that the evidence was insufficient to show
that either defendant engaged in the alleged civil conspiracy with Unarco or Johns-Manville.
BACKGROUND
In her complaint against Owens Corning and Owens-Illinois,(1) Delores McClure, individually and as special
administrator of the estate of Robert McClure, alleged that her husband, Robert McClure, worked in Unarco's Bloomington
plant during the period 1959-61. She asserted that, while her husband worked at the Bloomington plant, he was exposed to
asbestos, including asbestos that Johns-Manville supplied to Unarco. According to McClure, as a result of this exposure, her
husband contracted asbestosis and lung cancer, which caused his death.
McClure asserted that defendants, Unarco, and Johns-Manville knew of the health hazards associated with asbestos
exposure and had a duty to warn their employees of these hazards and to provide a safe workplace. She further alleged that
defendants conspired with Unarco, Johns-Manville, and other companies to "positively assert in a manner not warranted by
the information possessed by the conspirators, that *** it was safe for people to work with and in close proximity to
asbestos and asbestos containing materials" and to "suppress information about the harmful effects of asbestos *** causing
asbestos workers to be and to remain ignorant of that information." In furtherance of this alleged conspiracy, the
conspirators, inter alia, sold asbestos without warning of its adverse health effects, refused to warn their own employees
and Robert McClure about these hazards, and altered and suppressed published reports concerning these hazards. According
to McClure, these acts were proximate causes of Robert McClure's injuries and death.
Lois Bicknell's complaint against Owens Corning (Owens-Illinois was a defendant only in McClure's complaint)(2)
contained essentially the same conspiracy allegations stated by McClure. Bicknell alleged that, like Robert McClure, her
husband, Hugh Bicknell, worked in Unarco's Bloomington plant, although his period of employment was 1954 to 1955.
According to Bicknell, as a result of her husband's exposure to asbestos while working in the plant, he developed
pulmonary fibrosis and lung cancer, which resulted in his death. Also like McClure, Bicknell alleged that her husband's
injuries and death were proximately caused by the acts taken in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.
Vernadine Thacker's complaint against Owens Corning(3) also contained the same allegations of conspiracy as
McClure's complaint. Unlike McClure's and Bicknell's complaints, however, Thacker's complaint was based on her own
exposure to asbestos. Thacker alleged that her husband, Charles Thacker, was employed at Unarco's Bloomington plant
between 1952 and 1965. Thacker asserted that she was exposed to asbestos fibers carried home from the plant on her
husband's person and clothing. According to Thacker, as a result of her exposure to these fibers, she developed pulmonary
fibrosis and lung cancer. Thacker claimed that the acts taken in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy were a proximate
cause of her injuries.
Prior to trial, the circuit court granted plaintiffs' motions to consolidate these three cases. It denied Owens-Illinois' motion
requesting that it be tried separately from Owens Corning, although when evidence was admitted against only one of these
parties during trial, the circuit court gave the jury a limiting instruction.
The trial was divided into two phases. All issues except for punitive damages were determined at the first phase. Defendants
argue that the verdicts against them at the first phase must be overturned because there was insufficient evidence to support
plaintiffs' conspiracy claims and because certain trial errors require reversal. We agree with defendants that the verdicts
finding them liable for conspiracy cannot stand because the evidence does not permit a conclusion that they agreed with
Unarco or Johns-Manville to conceal the health hazards of asbestos from employees. The following is a description of the
evidence relevant to our disposition.
I. Medical and Scientific Literature
As circumstantial evidence of defendants' alleged knowledge of the health hazards of asbestos, plaintiffs presented
evidence of the information about these hazards contained in medical and scientific publications during the relevant time
periods. Prior to 1930, there were approximately 12 case reports linking asbestos and disease in Britain, the United States,
and Europe. In 1930, the first epidemiological study relating asbestos exposure to disease was published. This study, which
was published in Britain and the United States, showed that approximately 25% of the asbestos industry workers studied
had lung scarring and that the scarring was more severe in individuals who worked in dustier areas and had been exposed to
asbestos for longer amounts of time. To prevent such lung damage, the author recommended dust control, respiratory
protection, periodic health examinations of the workers, and education of workers concerning the risks of asbestos.
In 1938, a bulletin issued by the United States Public Health Service reported the results of a study on asbestos textile
manufacturing employees. The study connected asbestosis, which is irreversible lung scarring caused by asbestos fibers, to
exposure to asbestos dust in concentrations greater than five million particles per cubic foot. The bulletin contained a
recommendation that dust levels be kept below this threshold in order to prevent asbestosis.
In the 1940s and 1950s, the five million particles per cubic foot threshold limit value for asbestos was adopted by the
American Conference of Governmental and Industrial Hygienists and by many states, including Ohio and New Jersey. In
the 1950s, however, the five million particles per cubic foot asbestos dust limit was criticized in the medical and scientific
literature because it was designed only to prevent asbestosis and did not account for the cancer risk associated with asbestos
exposure. Nevertheless, the threshold limit value for asbestos remained the same until 1969, when it was lowered.
Beginning in the 1930s, case reports linking asbestos to lung cancer were published in the medical and scientific literature.
In 1955, an epidemiological study involving asbestos and lung cancer was published in the British Journal of Industrial
Medicine. This study found that asbestos manufacturing workers with asbestosis had 10 times the rate of lung cancer as the
general population. In 1960, an epidemiological study linking asbestos exposure to mesothelioma, a cancer of the
membrane surrounding the lungs, was published in the British Journal of Industrial Medicine.
In the 1960s, Dr. Irving Selikoff began a large scale epidemiological study of asbestos and disease. Selikoff became one of
the leading authorities on asbestos and disease. Throughout the 1960s , 1970s, and 1980s, Selikoff published the results of
an ongoing health survey of members of the International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers
Union. In a 1964 article published in the Journal of the American Medical Association, Selikoff stated that, although many
researchers had questioned the link between lung cancer and asbestosis, the results of his study proved that there was a
connection. He found that asbestos exposure put insulation workers at greater risk for diseases such as asbestosis, lung
cancer, and mesothelioma. These diseases were most apparent in workers with more than 20 years since the date of their
first exposure.
II. Efforts by Asbestos Product Manufacturers Other Than Owens Corning and Owens-Illinois to Suppress Information
Concerning the Health Hazards of Asbestos
As other circumstantial evidence of defendants' involvement in the alleged conspiracy, plaintiffs presented evidence
intended to demonstrate that defendants' actions paralleled those of the other alleged conspirators. Plaintiffs' theory at trial
was that parallel conduct by the alleged conspirators demonstrated an agreement among them to suppress and misrepresent
the health hazards of asbestos. The majority of the evidence at trial related to similarities and differences in the activities of
the alleged conspirators.
For example, plaintiffs presented evidence that, at the same time that information about the health hazards associated with
asbestos exposure was appearing in medical and scientific publications, asbestos product manufacturers other than
defendants were causing published reports of such information to be suppressed or altered. There was no evidence that
defendants participated in these particular activities. Instead, evidence of the actions of these other companies was part of
plaintiffs' evidence of alleged parallel conduct.
A. The Lanza Study
There was evidence that attorneys for Johns-Manville and Raybestos-Manhattan, another asbestos product manufacturer,
edited an article published in 1935 by Dr. Anthony Lanza, a physician employed by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.
Prior to publishing this article, which discussed the results of a study of workers at plants where asbestos-containing
products were manufactured, Lanza permitted these attorneys to review the article and incorporated the changes they
suggested. These were changes that were favorable to the asbestos-containing products industry or consistent with its legal
positions. According to plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Barry Castleman, the substance of these changes was inconsistent with
information contained in medical and governmental literature at the time.
B. Asbestos Magazine
Plaintiffs also presented evidence that, around the same time, Raybestos-Manhattan and Johns-Manville prevented the
publication of information concerning the health hazards of asbestos in Asbestos magazine, a monthly trade publication. In
September 1935, the editor of Asbestos magazine wrote Sumner Simpson, the president of Raybestos-Manhattan, to ask
whether Simpson had any objections to the magazine publishing information about asbestosis and efforts to control it. The
editor observed: "Always you have requested that for certain obvious reasons we publish nothing, and, naturally your
wishes have been respected." Simpson consulted with Vandiver Brown, an attorney for Johns-Manville, about the editor's
request, and the two men agreed that it would be better if nothing were said about asbestosis.
C. Results of the Saranac Laboratory Research
Similarly, plaintiffs presented evidence that, due to the actions of certain asbestos product manufacturers other than
defendants, information concerning the health hazards of asbestos exposure was omitted from a 1951 article discussing the
results of a study conducted by the Saranac Laboratory. In 1936, a group of asbestos product manufacturers agreed to
sponsor research on the health effects of asbestos dust. Members of this group included Johns-Manville and Unarco but not
defendants. In their agreement with Saranac, the sponsoring companies required that the results of the research remain their
property, that they maintain control over the disclosure of the results, and that any manuscript discussing the results be
submitted to them for approval prior to publication.
Consistent with this agreement, Saranac submitted a manuscript to the sponsoring companies. At a meeting, these
companies agreed that certain changes should be made to the manuscript, and Saranac incorporated these changes. For
example, at the request of the sponsoring companies, references to cancer and tumors were removed from the manuscript
before publication. The published article nevertheless stated that it is a "complete survey" of the research and did not
acknowledge the input of the sponsoring companies.
III. Unarco's and Johns-Manville's Plant Operations
Additional evidence relating to plaintiffs' parallel-conduct theory included testimony that Unarco and Johns-Manville failed
to warn their employees of the health hazards of asbestos exposure and failed to protect their employees from these hazards.
Employees who worked in Unarco's Bloomington plant during the fifties and sixties testified that Unarco never told them
or other employees that breathing asbestos dust posed any health risks. These employees also described conditions in the
Bloomington plant before Owens Corning purchased it from Unarco in 1970. According to these employees, the plant used
raw asbestos supplied by Johns-Manville to make insulation and other products. Dust from the plant operations was
released into the air of the plant. The dust in the air was visible and covered surfaces in the plant. Ron Thacker, plaintiff
Vernadine Thacker's son, testified that he worked with his father in the plant and, when they left the plant, there was dust
on their clothing and hair.
These employees further testified that Bloomington plant employees were not required to wear respirators. One employee
stated that he had a respirator, but employees did not use them frequently because they had difficulty obtaining filters for
the respirators, and the filters needed to be changed every day. There was some dust-collection equipment in the plant, but it
did not collect all of the dust because there was always dust in the air. Unarco had no ventilation equipment and no
industrial hygienist. Unarco also did not require employees to get annual chest X rays. According to the industrial hygiene
survey Owens Corning conducted during the summer after it purchased the Unarco plant, atmospheric conditions in the
Bloomington plant were "unbelievably bad," and exposures to asbestos were "excessive."
A Johns-Manville employee testified that, during the period 1946 to 1961, Johns-Manville did not give its employees
warnings about the health hazards of asbestos. Johns-Manville did require employees to undergo periodic physical
examinations, which included a chest X ray. These X rays were read, however, by Johns-Manville's own doctors and
treated as the property of the company. It was Johns-Manville's policy not to inform an employee that his X ray showed
asbestosis or another lung disease unless the disease became disabling. This policy did not change until the early 1970s.
IV. Evidence of Owens-Illinois' Activities
In an attempt to connect Owens-Illinois and Owens Corning to Unarco and Johns-Manville, plaintiffs presented evidence
intended to show that defendants' actions with respect to their own production and distribution of asbestos-containing
products were similar to Unarco's and Johns-Manville's. The evidence relating to defendants focused on their manufacture
of "Kaylo," a high-temperature hydrous calcium silicate insulation.
In 1948, Owens-Illinois began commercial production and distribution of Kaylo. Kaylo included 15% to 22% asbestos. In
1953, Owens-Illinois and Owens Corning entered into an agreement under which Owens-Illinois continued to manufacture
Kaylo, but Owens Corning assumed the responsibility for distribution. In 1958, Owens-Illinois sold the Kaylo division to
Owens Corning. Owens Corning also purchased plants where Owens-Illinois had manufactured Kaylo, including its plant in
Berlin, New Jersey. Although Owens Corning manufactured other asbestos-containing products, Kaylo was the only
asbestos-containing product manufactured by Owens-Illinois. Beginning in the late sixties, Owens Corning performed
research to find a substitute for the asbestos in Kaylo. A substitute was found in 1972, after which Owens Corning also did
not manufacture asbestos-containing Kaylo.
A. Knowledge and Communication of Health Hazards
With respect to Owens-Illinois' knowledge of the health hazards associated with exposure to Kaylo, there was evidence
that, in 1943, Owens-Illinois hired Saranac Laboratory to determine whether Kaylo presented an air hazard when mixed,
sawed, or applied. In its initial correspondence with Owens-Illinois, Saranac expressed the desire to publish any results of
this research, but stated that "nothing [would] be published without [Owens-Illinois'] authorization."
In 1946, Saranac reported to Owens-Illinois that, with respect to the Kaylo experiments, "no serious results [had] developed
***. The dust alone [was] not causing anything suggestive of either silicosis or asbestosis." According to the preliminary
report Saranac provided in 1947, Kaylo dust was biologically inactive, did not cause silicosis or asbestosis, and would
probably be harmless if inhaled in moderate amounts by humans over a long period of time. Just one year later, however, in
November 1948, Saranac informed Owens-Illinois that further research had revealed that Kaylo dust did in fact cause
asbestosis. Saranac reported: "Kaylo *** is capable of producing asbestosis and should be handled as a hazardous industrial
dust."
Saranac submitted the final report on the Kaylo research to Owens-Illinois in February 1952. According to this final report,
Kaylo was capable of causing a "peribronchiolar fibrosis typical of asbestosis," as a result of which, "every precaution
should be taken to protect workers against inhaling the dust." Saranac indicated that it hoped to publish the results of the
Kaylo research but that it would omit references to Kaylo and Owens-Illinois from any publication to protect the interests of
the company. In addition, Saranac told Owens-Illinois that it would submit a manuscript to Owens-Illinois prior to
publication and would welcome comments by Owens-Illinois.
Subsequent correspondence, however, indicates that, because of management changes at Saranac, Owens-Illinois was never
given the opportunity to review the article discussing the results of the Saranac research before this article was published.
The article contained no references to Kaylo or Owens-Illinois.
In an effort to show that Owens-Illinois failed to share the information it had about the health hazards of Kaylo with its
employees or consumers, plaintiffs presented evidence that Owens-Illinois failed to place warning labels on Kaylo during
the time it manufactured this product. Plaintiffs also showed that, in 1952, Owens-Illinois issued an advertising brochure in
which it represented that Kaylo was nontoxic. There was conflicting evidence at trial as to the meaning of "toxic" and the
applicability of this term to asbestos.
In addition, plaintiffs presented the testimony of Jerry Helser, who had worked for Owens Corning since 1961. Helser
testified that, during the first few years of his employment at Owens Corning, he worked with individuals who had
previously worked for Owens-Illinois at its Berlin plant and other locations. According to Helser, none of these former
Owens-Illinois employees told him that the asbestos used in Kaylo caused lung scarring and cancer or gave him any
indication that Owens-Illinois had informed them of these risks.
Contrary to Helser's testimony, a former Owens-Illinois employee, Richard Grimmie, testified that Owens-Illinois
employees at the Berlin plant did receive warnings about the health hazards associated with exposure to the asbestos in
Kaylo dust. Grimmie testified that he began working for Owens-Illinois in 1945. Grimmie stated that, before beginning
work at the Berlin plant, he received a physical examination. At the time of this examination, he was told about asbestos
and asbestosis and was informed that respirators were required in certain areas of the plant because of the silica and
asbestos content of Kaylo.
Grimmie testified that he informed job applicants about the hazards of asbestos when he worked as personnel manager for
Owens-Illinois. He testified that he told applicants that respirators were required in certain areas of the plant and that the
plant manufactured a product containing silica, which causes silicosis, and asbestos, which causes asbestosis.
B. Plant Conditions
In addition to evidence of Owens-Illinois' communications concerning the health hazards of exposure to Kaylo dust, there
was evidence relating to the conditions of the plants where Kaylo was manufactured. Grimmie testified that the Berlin plant
employed a very large, powerful, and well-maintained dust collector with inlets near certain dusty plant operations, such as
the saws used to shape the finished Kaylo product. In addition to the dust collector, Owens-Illinois had mechanical
sweepers to vacuum dust from the floors and, before the end of each shift, workers were given time to clean their work
areas.
According to Grimmie, Owens-Illinois also had a respirator program, under which employees were required to wear
respirators in areas where dust could not be controlled. The plant nurse administered the program. Respirators with clean
filters were given to workers by their supervisors at the beginning of each shift. At the end of the shift, the respirators were
returned to the nurse, who would clean the filters. Workers often refused to wear their respirators and were disciplined for
these refusals. Grimmie testified that Owens-Illinois also employed an industrial hygienist, Willis Hazard, who would
frequently take dust samples throughout the plants.
Grimmie further testified that Owens-Illinois required every Owens-Illinois employee at the Berlin plant to have a
preemployment X ray and annual X rays thereafter. Grimmie was aware of no asbestos-related disease showing on any
employee's X ray during the time Owens-Illinois owned the Berlin plant. Grimmie was also unaware of any asbestos-related workers' compensation claim made during this time.
In addition to Grimmie's testimony, there was evidence of an industrial hygiene survey taken at the Berlin plant a few days
before and a few days after ownership of the Berlin plant was transferred from Owens-Illinois to Owens Corning in 1958.
Consistent with Grimmie's testimony, the report noted that employees working at certain operations were wearing
respirators and that exhaust systems were available at certain locations. Nevertheless, the report stated that several air
samples exceeded or closely approached acceptable limits for asbestos dust. One sample taken near a saw showed 91.8
million particles per cubic foot of air. The report also suggested improvements to the plant's exhaust systems and respirator
program.
V. Evidence of Owens Corning's Activities
Extensive evidence of Owens Corning's activities with respect to its own products and own employees was presented.
Again, this evidence was intended to support plaintiffs' theory that similarities in the activities of Owens Corning and the
other alleged conspirators demonstrated the alleged conspiracy.
A. Knowledge and Communication of Health Hazards
To show that, like the other alleged conspirators, Owens Corning was aware of the health hazards of asbestos and failed to
communicate information about these hazards to its employees, plaintiffs relied on a 1942 internal memorandum. This
memorandum indicated that Owens Corning planned to gather medical and scientific literature concerning asbestosis and
use this information as a "weapon-in-reserve" during negotiations with the Asbestos Workers Union. The memorandum
proposed that the information on asbestosis be disclosed to union locals only if the union leadership rejected the company's
offer. Other evidence showed that, in 1956, Owens Corning received information from Saranac Laboratory that asbestos
had been "fairly well incriminated as a carcinogen."
Plaintiffs presented other evidence intended to show that Owens Corning made efforts to conceal the information it had
about the health risks related to asbestos. For example, according to a sales brochure published by Owens Corning in 1956,
Kaylo was "[n]on-irritating to the skin and non-toxic." In 1966, Owens Corning placed a label on Kaylo cartons concerning
its asbestos content, but the label did not identify specific health hazards. The label provided: "This product contains
asbestos fiber. If dust is created when this product is handled, avoid breathing the dust. If adequate ventilation control is not
possible, wear respirator approved by U.S. Bureau of Mines." In 1970, Owens Corning changed the label on cartons of
Kaylo. The new label read: "Caution-Product contains asbestos fiber. Inhalation of dust in excessive quantities over long
periods of time may be harmful. Avoid breathing dust. If adequate ventilation is not possible wear respirators approved by
the U.S. Bureau of Mines for pneumoconiosis producing dust."
In addition to this evidence, plaintiffs relied on numerous internal Owens Corning memoranda as evidence that Owens
Corning endeavored to conceal the health risks of asbestos. A 1966 internal memorandum contained a reminder regarding
Owens Corning's "long-standing" policy that inquiries and complaints concerning the health hazards of Owens Corning
products should be referred to certain corporate officers or the company's legal department. A 1967 internal memorandum
indicated that an Owens Corning employee had questioned plans to expand Kaylo manufacturing given that "the
Government will probably blow the whistle relative to the use of asbestos in the not too distant future."
In a 1968 internal memorandum, the author recognized the association between asbestos exposure and asbestosis, lung
cancer, and mesothelioma, but observed that Owens Corning's position had been to indicate that "all medical research to
date indicates no hazard to health." Another internal memorandum from that same year concerned the company's
participation in the Insulation Industry Hygiene Council. According to this memorandum, "much care and consideration
went into developing the proposed draft for the constitution by-laws of this organization *** [in order to] limit the influence
of Dr. Selikoff." Selikoff was an authority on asbestos and disease who had worked to publicize and protect workers from
the health hazards of asbestos. Similarly, internal correspondence from 1970 indicates that Owens Corning was reluctant to
participate in an industrial hygiene course organized by Selikoff. Owens Corning believed it would be unwise to attend the
course because, inter alia, it would give "tacit approval to Selikoff."
The evidence presented at trial indicates that Owens Corning first began notifying employees of the health hazards
associated with asbestos exposure in the 1970s. Some employees received this information in the early seventies. For
example, internal Owens Corning memoranda show that, at meetings in 1971, Berlin employees were informed by their
plant manager about the adverse health effects of asbestos exposure. In addition, an employee in the Bloomington plant
testified that she first learned of these health risks when Owens Corning sent her and certain other employees to a meeting
at Illinois State University in 1971.
The evidence showed that Owens Corning did not inform other employees of these health hazards until 1978. In April of
that year, United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Secretary Joseph Califano issued a "broadly
publicized statement bringing attention to the possible increased risk of death from an asbestos related disease many years
after exposure had terminated." Califano suggested that exposed workers should stop smoking cigarettes and receive a
physical examination from a physician. Around the time of the Califano announcement, the Surgeon General issued a
"Physicians Advisory" concerning the health effects of asbestos.
Following the Califano announcement, Owens Corning communicated these health hazards to all Bloomington plant
employees. Before that time, "no formal education programs regarding asbestos hazards" had occurred at the Bloomington
plant. After the Califano announcement, Owens Corning also notified former Bloomington plant employees of the diseases
that could be caused by asbestos exposure.
There was also testimony, however, that not all Owens Corning employees received information from their employer about
the health risks related to asbestos. According to Jerry Helser, Owens Corning never informed him of these risks. Helser
testified that Owens Corning never told him that asbestos could cause asbestosis, lung cancer, or mesothelioma. He was
never informed that Kaylo dust was a hazardous industrial dust or that he should wear a respirator to avoid inhaling Kaylo
dust because the dust was harmful.
B. Plant Conditions
In addition to this evidence of Owens-Corning's knowledge of and failure to communicate the health hazards of asbestos,
the parties presented evidence of conditions at plants where Owens Corning produced asbestos-containing products. In
1951, the Saranac Laboratory conducted an industrial hygiene survey at Owens-Illinois' Sayreville, New Jersey, plant, at
which Kaylo was manufactured. The report concluded that "considerable attention had been given in the plant to the control
of dust." Given that some of the dust samples approached the "maximum allowable limits," however, the report
recommended certain improvements to the plant's dust control measures.
In 1961, only two of the dust samples taken during an industrial hygiene survey of the Berlin plant exceeded the threshold
limit value of five million particles per cubic foot. Of these two samples, one only slightly exceeded the limit and, with
respect to the other, "exposure was intermittent." The survey report made no recommendations for improvements.
Helser testified that, when he worked at the Berlin plant in the sixties, the plant had a ventilation and dust-collection
system, which had intake vents at all the saws and sanders used to shape the final product. Some dust, however, escaped the
system. In addition to the dust-collection system, the Berlin plant had a respirator program under which respirators were
required in certain areas of the plant and a program under which employees received annual physical examinations and X
rays. Throughout his career at Owens Corning, Helser received annual chest X rays.
One Bloomington plant employee testified that, after the sale of the Bloomington plant to Owens Corning in 1970, the plant
continued to operate. Owens Corning installed dust-collection equipment in the plant, which helped control the dust, but it
took approximately a year for this equipment to be installed. Owens Corning asked employees to wear respirators, but did
not make this a requirement. It also held safety meetings with employees.
According to a 1978 internal Owens Corning memorandum, the Berlin plant was cleaned after asbestos production stopped
there in 1972, and air samples showed that the concentrations of asbestos there were extremely low. Insulation containing
asbestos was produced at the Bloomington plant only 1½ years after Owens Corning purchased the plant. Nevertheless, the
memorandum acknowledged that "there were significant exposures" at both of these plants and that cases of asbestosis had
arisen in workers from both plants.
VI. Evidence of Contacts Among Defendants and Other Asbestos Product Manufacturers
Although the majority of the evidence presented at trial concerned the separate, but allegedly parallel, activities of
defendants and other asbestos-containing product manufacturers, plaintiffs did present some evidence of contacts among
these companies. The evidence of contacts among the alleged conspirators was also circumstantial.
A. Owens Corning's Contacts With Owens-Illinois
Plaintiffs presented the following evidence of a relationship between Owens Corning and Owens-Illinois. Owens Corning
was formed in 1938 by Owens-Illinois and Corning Glass. In addition, William Boeschenstein, Owens Corning's chief
executive officer, testified that Owens-Illinois "owned a large part of Owens-Corning," although he did not indicate the
time period of this ownership.
With respect to contacts between these companies, there was evidence that, in 1941, an Owens Corning attorney returned
two published articles he had borrowed from Owens-Illinois' industrial hygienist. These articles concerned the health
effects of asbestos and dust-control methods in asbestos manufacturing plants.
Evidence of other contacts between these companies included Owens Corning's agreement to distribute Kaylo in 1953 and
to later purchase the Kaylo division from Owens-Illinois in 1958. In addition, the 1956 Owens Corning brochure
advertising Kaylo as nontoxic contained the information that Kaylo was manufactured by Owens-Illinois and was a
trademark of this company. Under the distribution agreement, Owens Corning was required to use Owens-Illinois'
trademark and trade name.
B. Labeling
Plaintiffs' evidence of contacts between Owens Corning and Johns-Manville included a 1964 internal Owens Corning
memorandum. This memorandum indicated that Johns-Manville's medical director had informed Owens Corning that, in
October of that year, Johns-Manville planned to label shipping cartons of asbestos-containing products with warnings of the
"alleged hazards of asbestos." The author of the Owens Corning memorandum observed:
A 1965 internal Owens Corning memorandum indicated that, several months after receiving this information from Johns-Manville, Owens Corning was still deciding whether to place warning labels on its own asbestos-containing products. The
author of the 1965 memorandum recommended that Owens Corning "continue to give serious consideration to the labeling
of *** Kaylo products in a manner similar to that currently being used by Johns-Manville*** [because] the fact that Johns-Manville is labeling their preformed products is in itself a pressure on the whole industry to consider labeling."
C. NIMA Pamphlet
Plaintiffs also presented evidence that Owens Corning and Johns-Manville employees were involved in the National
Insulation Manufacturers Association, Inc. (NIMA), a trade organization. In 1968, Owens Corning's medical director joined
this organization as a representative for his company. There was also evidence that another Owens Corning employee and a
Johns-Manville employee participated in drafting a pamphlet published by NIMA in 1969 or 1970.
This pamphlet, entitled "Recommended Health Safety Practices For Handling and Applying Thermal Insulation Products
Containing Asbestos," did not identify the specific health hazards involved with asbestos exposure, such as asbestosis, lung
cancer, or mesothelioma. Instead, the pamphlet stated generally that there were certain health risks associated with asbestos
insulation. For example, the introduction provided:
The recommendations contained in the pamphlet included taking precautions to minimize dust, wearing United States
Bureau of Mines respirators, observing good housekeeping practices, and using water to clean material.
D. Owens Corning's Purchase of the Bloomington Plant
Other evidence pertained to contacts between Owens Corning and Unarco. As evidence of the alleged conspiracy between
Owens Corning and Unarco, plaintiffs rely on the indemnity clause in Owens Corning's 1970 agreement to purchase the
Bloomington plant from Unarco. Under this clause, Unarco agreed, inter alia, to indemnify Owens Corning for claims
based on asbestosis or other respiratory ailments resulting from employees' exposure to Unarco products prior to Owens
Corning's purchase of the plant. No indemnification was to be provided for pending litigation.
E. 1978 Konzen Memorandum
Other contacts between Owens Corning and the alleged conspirators were evidenced by a 1978 internal memorandum
written by Dr. Jon Konzen, Owens Corning's medical director. In this memorandum, Konzen noted that the Califano
announcement had caused Owens Corning to review its handling of former employees from the Berlin and Bloomington
plants. He stated that, as part of this review, Owens Corning had contacted other companies who had similar operations,
including "Johns-Manville, CSG, GAF, Armstrong, Keene, Eagle-Picher, Pabco and O-I."
Konzen described the information obtained from these companies with respect to their handling of asbestos-exposed
workers. Johns-Manville employees exposed to asbestos were given educational material and presentations concerning the
health risks. At retirement, Johns-Manville informally offered employees the opportunity to return for periodic physical
examinations. Owens-Illinois indicated that it did not plan to take any action with respect to former Owens-Illinois
employees who worked at the Berlin plant. Other companies did not plan to offer examinations to employees or to educate
them concerning the health risks of asbestos.
Konzen recommended in the memorandum that retirees and former employees of Owens Corning be offered periodic
physical examinations. In addition, he suggested that this group of individuals be notified by letter that they had been
exposed to asbestos, that the exposure might place them at a higher risk of contracting an asbestos-related disease, that they
should stop smoking, and that they should schedule physical examinations by their personal physicians.
F. 1979 Meeting
In addition, plaintiffs presented evidence of defendants' involvement in two meetings with other asbestos-containing
product manufacturing companies. One of these meetings was held in 1979 following the Califano announcement. The
chief officers of asbestos-containing product manufacturers were invited to a meeting at Johns-Manville offices to discuss
the "Congressional, media and regulatory forces being brought to bear [which] raise serious questions as to the vi[a]bility of
the industry." Owens-Corning and Unarco attended this meeting, but Owens-Illinois did not.
G. 1983 Asbestos Claims Conference
The other meeting was held in 1983 and was entitled the "Asbestos Claims Conference." Attendees included both
defendants, Johns-Manville, other former asbestos-containing product manufacturers, and insurance companies. The agenda
from the meeting indicated that among the topics discussed at the meeting were bankruptcy proceedings, legislation, and
strategies for resolving asbestos litigation. Written material from the meeting also listed common goals of asbestos product
manufacturers as establishing a "better, more equitable and efficient system to resolve the asbestos litigation"; developing a
consortium to provide an umbrella of insurance; passing legislation to accomplish the companies' goals; and establishing a
"representative industry group" consisting of executives.
H. Castleman's Opinion
In addition to this evidence of contacts between defendants and the other alleged conspirators, plaintiffs presented the
opinion of their expert witness, Dr. Barry Castleman, that defendants were involved in a conspiracy with Johns-Manville,
Unarco, and other companies to suppress information about the adverse health effects of asbestos exposure. Castleman
testified that he holds a doctorate in occupational and environmental health policy and has researched and written
extensively on the historical response of corporations to the asbestos health hazard. Castleman opined that Owens-Illinois'
and Owens Corning's failure to educate workers and users of the health hazards of asbestos was part of an "implicit
understanding among the companies that nobody would blow the whistle on asbestos and they would avoid the problems of
labor unrest, strikes, other kinds of things." He explained that there was no formal agreement but that, based on the failure
to disclose the health risks of asbestos, he was "assuming" that there was an understanding that "[n]obody would raise the
health issue and everybody would benefit thereby, at least in the short term financially who were selling asbestos-containing products, like Kaylo." According to Castleman, the companies involved in the alleged conspiracy included
Johns-Manville, Raybestos-Manhattan, Unarco, Owens Corning, and Owens-Illinois.
Following the presentation of this evidence at trial, the jury found in favor of Bicknell and Thacker against Owens Corning.
The jury awarded Bicknell $225,000 and awarded Thacker $220,000 in damages. The jury also returned a verdict in favor
of McClure against both Owens Corning and Owens-Illinois. It awarded McClure $400,000 in damages and determined that
each defendant was responsible for one half of these damages. At the second phase of the trial, the jury rejected Thacker's
claim for punitive damages. The second phase was limited to Thacker's claim against Owens Corning for punitive damages.
The other two plaintiffs did not make requests for punitive damages.
The appellate court affirmed the judgments entered on these verdicts. The appellate court rejected defendants' argument that
the evidence was insufficient to prove them liable for civil conspiracy. The appellate court held: "If evidence of parallel
conduct is sufficiently persuasive we see no reason why a jury could not rely upon it alone to find that a conspiracy
existed." 298 Ill. App. 3d at 598. Further, the appellate court found that, in addition to parallel conduct, plaintiffs had shown
"contacts" between Owens Corning and other companies in the industry, as well as "ties" between Owens Corning and
Owens-Illinois. 298 Ill. App. 3d at 598. According to the appellate court, this evidence was sufficient to support the jury's
verdicts against defendants. With respect to the trial errors asserted by defendants, the appellate court held that there was no
error or that any error was harmless. 298 Ill. App. 3d at 599-604. Both defendants filed petitions for leave to appeal the
appellate court's decision. We granted each petition and consolidated their appeals for review.
ANALYSIS
In this court, both defendants argue that the circuit court erred in denying their post-trial motions for judgments
notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, new trials. According to defendants, the jury verdicts against them must be
overturned because the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's determination that they participated in the alleged
conspiracy. In addition, defendants assert numerous trial errors, including (1) the admission of extensive evidence under the
co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, (2) the admission of Castleman's opinion that defendants were involved in a
conspiracy, (3) the circuit court's exclusion of the deposition testimony of Willis Hazard, (4) the inclusion of facts not in
the record and inflammatory statements in plaintiffs' closing argument; (5) error and bias in the instructions the circuit court
gave to the jury, and (6) the circuit court's refusal of instructions and special interrogatories submitted by defendants.
According to defendants, these errors, individually and collectively, denied them a fair trial.
We begin our review by addressing defendants' argument that the insufficiency of the evidence required that the circuit
court enter judgments notwithstanding the verdict in their favor or, in the alternative, grant them new trials. The standards
for granting each of these two forms of relief differ. "Judgment notwithstanding the verdict should not be entered unless the
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary
verdict based on that evidence could ever stand." Holton v. Memorial Hospital, 176 Ill. 2d 95, 109 (1997); Pedrick v.
Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510 (1967). Judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not appropriate if
"reasonable minds might differ as to inferences or conclusions to be drawn from the facts presented." Pasquale v. Speed
Products Engineering, 166 Ill. 2d 337, 351 (1995). As this court stated in Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 453 (1992):
We apply a de novo standard to our review of decisions on motions for judgments notwithstanding the verdict. See, e.g.,
Gaffney v. City of Chicago, 302 Ill. App. 3d 41, 48 (1998).
By contrast, a circuit court will order a new trial if, after weighing the evidence, the court determines that the verdict is
contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d  at 454. " 'A verdict is against the manifest weight of the
evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the findings of the jury are unreasonable, arbitrary and
not based upon any of the evidence.' " Maple, 151 Ill. 2d  at 454, quoting Villa v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 202 Ill. App. 3d
1082, 1089 (1990). A reviewing court will not reverse a circuit court's decision with respect to a motion for a new trial
unless it finds that the circuit court abused its discretion. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d  at 455.
In addition to these principles, our review of the circuit court's decision is governed by the elements of the cause of action
alleged by plaintiffs in their complaints. Plaintiffs allege no employment relationship between their husbands and
defendants, nor do they allege that they or their husbands were exposed to defendants' products. Plaintiffs base their claims
against defendants exclusively on a theory of civil conspiracy. According to plaintiffs, defendants are liable for the injuries
alleged in their complaints because defendants conspired with Unarco and Johns-Manville to suppress information about
the harmful effects of asbestos and to falsely represent that it was safe to work with asbestos-containing materials.
Civil conspiracy is defined as "a combination of two or more persons for the purpose of accomplishing by concerted action
either an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means." Buckner v. Atlantic Plant Maintenance, Inc., 182 Ill. 2d 12, 23 (1998). In order to state a claim for civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must allege an agreement and a tortious act
committed in furtherance of that agreement. Adcock v. Brakegate, Ltd., 164 Ill. 2d 54, 62-64 (1994). The agreement is "a
necessary and important" element of this cause of action. Adcock, 164 Ill. 2d  at 62. The civil conspiracy theory has the
effect of extending liability for a tortious act beyond the active tortfeasor to individuals who have not acted but have only
planned, assisted, or encouraged the act. Adcock, 164 Ill. 2d  at 62-63.
Civil conspiracy is an intentional tort and requires proof that a defendant "knowingly and voluntarily participates in a
common scheme to commit an unlawful act or a lawful act in an unlawful manner." Adcock, 164 Ill. 2d  at 64. Accidental,
inadvertent, or negligent participation in a common scheme does not amount to conspiracy. Adcock, 164 Ill. 2d  at 64. Mere
knowledge of the fraudulent or illegal actions of another is also not enough to show a conspiracy. Tribune Co. v. Thompson,
342 Ill. 503, 530 (1930). Similarly, "[a] defendant who innocently performs an act which happens to fortuitously further the
tortious purpose of another is not liable under the theory of civil conspiracy." Adcock, 164 Ill. 2d  at 64. However, "[a]
defendant who understands the general objectives of the conspiratorial scheme, accepts them, and agrees, either explicitly or
implicitly to do its part to further those objectives *** is liable as a conspirator." Adcock, 164 Ill. 2d  at 54.
A conspiracy is almost never susceptible to direct proof. Walsh v. Fanslow, 123 Ill. App. 3d 417, 422 (1984). Usually, it
must be established "from circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from evidence, coupled with common-sense
knowledge of the behavior of persons in similar circumstances." Adcock, 164 Ill. 2d  at 66. If a civil conspiracy is shown by
circumstantial evidence, however, that evidence must be clear and convincing. E.g., Majewski v. Gallina, 17 Ill. 2d 92, 99
(1959); Tribune Co., 342 Ill.  at 529; Bosak v. McDonough, 192 Ill. App. 3d 799, 804 (1989).
In this case, defendants argue that the jury verdicts finding them liable for civil conspiracy must be overturned because the
evidence showed no agreement between either of them and Unarco or Johns-Manville to conceal or misrepresent
information concerning the health hazards of asbestos. They challenge the appellate court's ruling that evidence of
similarities between defendants' conduct and the conduct of Unarco and Johns-Manville was sufficient to establish the
required agreement for civil conspiracy. According to defendants, the evidence showed that they acted unilaterally, and
mere parallel conduct is never enough to establish that there was an agreement for purposes of civil conspiracy.
In addition, defendants argue that the appellate court erred in concluding that there was any evidence other than parallel
conduct that demonstrated an agreement between defendants and the alleged conspirators. Defendants assert that any
contacts they may have had with each other failed to show their involvement in the alleged conspiracy with Unarco or
Johns-Manville. In addition, defendants argue, the few contacts Owens Corning had with others in the industry were for
legitimate business reasons and not due to the alleged conspiracy. Based on the lack of evidence of an agreement,
defendants contend that the jury verdicts cannot stand.
Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence in this case, therefore, involves a threshold legal question: whether parallel
conduct alone can suffice as proof of agreement for civil conspiracy. Prior to the appellate court decision in this case, no
Illinois court had addressed this question. But see Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 173 Ill. App. 3d 1, 28-30 (1988) (holding that
parallel activity by drug manufacturers in producing and marketing DES does not establish civil conspiracy or concerted
action), rev'd on other grounds, 137 Ill. 2d 222 (1990). This case, therefore, presents us with an issue of first impression.
After reviewing decisions on point from other jurisdictions, as well as related precedent in Illinois, we hold that parallel
conduct may serve as circumstantial evidence of a civil conspiracy among manufacturers of the same or similar products
but is insufficient proof, by itself, of the agreement element of this tort.
Our review of case law from other jurisdictions convinces us that the overwhelming weight of authority has refused to
accept mere parallel action as proof of conspiracy. In the context of federal antitrust litigation, it is well-settled that mere
consciously parallel behavior is insufficient to establish a conspiracy under the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §1 (1994)). See,
e.g., Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993); Reserve Supply
Corp. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 971 F.2d 37, 50-51 (7th Cir. 1992); Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 252
(2d Cir. 1987). According to these courts, conscious parallelism is circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy, but additional
evidence is required before the inference of an agreement is permitted. Some federal courts have held that "substantial
additional evidence" is required. See Coleman v. Cannon Oil Co., 849 F. Supp. 1458, 1466 (M.D. Ala. 1993). Other courts
have required only additional evidence that reasonably tends to exclude the possibility that the defendants were acting
independently. See, e.g., Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Authority, 921 F.2d 1438, 1456 (11th Cir. 1991). Such additional
evidence includes evidence of "(1) actions contrary to the defendants' economic interests, and (2) a motivation to enter into
such an agreement." Petruzzi's IGA, 998 F.2d  at 1242. The reason federal courts require evidence in addition to mere
parallel conduct before imposing liability for conspiracy is to avoid inadvertent condemnation of nonconspiratorial conduct.
See Coleman, 849 F. Supp.  at 1466. As the Coleman court explained, "The requirement is intended to help assure that there
is a reasonable basis to conclude that persons exchanged assurances of common action or otherwise adopted a common
plan, albeit not necessarily through meetings, conversations, or exchanged documents." Coleman, 849 F. Supp.  at 1466.
The federal court rule with respect to evidence of parallel conduct has been adopted in one Illinois case involving a claim
under the Illinois Antitrust Act (740 ILCS 10/1 et seq. (West 1994)), which is based on the Sherman Act. See Trowbridge
Farm Supply Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 82 Ill. App. 3d 1140 (1980) (finding the plaintiff's evidence of parallel conduct
insufficient to establish a conspiracy to restrain trade).
Similarly, in cases involving the tort of conspiracy, courts in other jurisdictions have held that proof of mere parallel
conduct is insufficient. See, e.g., In re Asbestos School Litigation, 46 F.3d 1284, 1292 (3d Cir. 1994); Burnside v. Abbott
Laboratories, 351 Pa. Super. 264, 280, 505 A.2d 973, 982 (1985); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 188, 342 N.W.2d 37, 47-48 (1984). For example, in Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's
proof of parallel conduct was insufficient to establish the defendants' liability under a civil conspiracy theory. The plaintiff
had sued the defendants, who were manufacturers of the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES), for injuries she allegedly suffered as
a result of her mother's ingestion of this drug while pregnant. According to the plaintiff, the defendant drug companies
engaged in a conspiracy to obtain FDA approval in 1941 and 1947, to market DES as a treatment for pregnancy problems,
and to misrepresent that it was safe to use the drug for this purpose. Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 187, 342 N.W.2d  at 47.
The Collins court rejected the plaintiff's conspiracy claim. According to the court:
The Collins court, therefore, held that the summary judgment entered in favor of the defendants was appropriate.
Proof of parallel conduct was held insufficient in another DES case involving a civil conspiracy claim. In Burnside v.
Abbott Laboratories, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs' proof of parallel conduct was insufficient to
hold the defendant drug manufacturers liable for civil conspiracy. The plaintiffs alleged that each of the defendants
marketed DES in a generic form as a miscarriage preventative; that they knew or should have known that it was potentially
carcinogenic; that they failed to test the drug for carcinogenic or teratogenic effects; and that they marketed it without
warnings. Burnside, 351 Pa. Super. at 280, 505 A.2d  at 981-82.
The Burnside court held that these allegations of parallel conduct were insufficient to withstand the defendants' motion for
summary judgment. The court explained:
For these reasons, the court found that the trial court had properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on
this claim.
Similarly, In re Asbestos School Litigation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a former
manufacturer of asbestos-containing products could not be held liable under a civil conspiracy theory based on conscious
parallel activity with other asbestos manufacturers. The evidence of parallel conduct presented in that case was as follows:
(1) the defendant began to sell Kilnoise, an asbestos-containing product, in 1964 without warnings; (2) in 1965, the
defendant learned of the connection Dr. Selikoff had made between asbestos and cancer; (3) thereafter the defendant
continued to sell Kilnoise; (4) the defendant and other asbestos-containing product manufacturers sold their products
without warning despite knowledge of the dangers of these products; and (5) the defendant and other asbestos-containing
product manufacturers were aware that each was selling these products without warnings. In re Asbestos School Litigation,
46 F.3d  at 1291. Although the court found that these actions indicated that the defendant and the other manufacturers
engaged in parallel courses of conduct, it held that "conscious parallelism is not sufficient to establish *** a civil
conspiracy." In re Asbestos School Litigation, 46 F.3d  at 1292.
In cases involving claims of concerted action, a tort very similar to civil conspiracy,(4) evidence of parallel conduct has
also been deemed insufficient by courts in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 512 F. Supp. 1031, 1037 (D.
Mass. 1981); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1016 (D.S.C. 1981); Ford Motor Co. v. Wood, 119 Md. App. 1,
36, 703 A.2d 1315, 1332 (1998); Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 79 N.Y.2d 289, 296, 591 N.E.2d 222, 224-25,
582 N.Y.S.2d 373, 375-76 (1992); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 599, 689 P.2d 368, 379 (1984). In one
of these cases, Rastelli, the Court of Appeals of New York held that the manufacturer of a multipiece tire rim could not be
held liable under a concert of action theory for injuries caused by a rim manufactured by another company. The plaintiff had
alleged that the defendant and other manufacturers had lobbied OSHA to make employers rather than manufacturers
responsible for safe truck maintenance; had chosen not to issue warnings; had prevented a ban of the multipiece rims; and
had refused to voluntarily recall the rim that injured the plaintiff's decedent. Rastelli, 79 N.Y.2d  at 296, 591 N.E.2d  at 224,
582 N.Y.S.2d  at 375.
According to the Rastelli court, these allegations were insufficient to support the plaintiff's claim of concerted action. The
court stated that the plaintiff had showed parallel activity by the manufacturers, but parallel activity by companies
developing and marketing the same product is insufficient, in itself, to show an agreement under a concerted action theory.
Rastelli, 79 N.Y.2d  at 296, 591 N.E.2d  at 224-25, 582 N.Y.S.2d  at 375-76. The Rastelli court noted that it had refused to
accept mere parallel activity as proof of concerted action because, to do so, would "expand the concept of concerted action
beyond a rational or fair limit." The Rastelli court explained that "because application of concerted action renders each
manufacturer jointly liable for all damages stemming from any defective product of an entire industry, parallel activity by
manufacturers is not sufficient justification for making one manufacturer responsible for the liability caused by the product
of another manufacturer." Rastelli, 79 N.Y.2d  at 295-96, 591 N.E.2d  at 224, 582 N.Y.S.2d  at 375.
Like these other courts, we find that requiring more than proof of mere parallel conduct in civil conspiracy cases involving
manufacturers of the same or similar products is necessary to make certain that there is a reasonable basis for inferring an
agreement and to minimize the risk that liability will be imposed based on nonconspiratorial conduct. Our conclusion that
parallel conduct alone is insufficient to establish civil conspiracy in such cases finds support in the clear and convincing
standard of proof that applies to the elements of that tort when the evidence is circumstantial, as it is in the case before us.
See, e.g., Bosak, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 804 (noting the standard of proof for civil conspiracy). Under this clear and convincing
standard, "if the facts and circumstances relied upon are as consistent with innocence as with guilt it is the duty of the court
to find that the conspiracy has not been proved." Tribune Co., 342 Ill.  at 529; see also Regan v. Garfield Ridge Trust &
Savings Bank, 220 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 1091-92 (1991); ABC Trans National Transport, Inc. v. Aeronautics Forwarders, Inc.,
90 Ill. App. 3d 817, 830 (1980). As defendants and the amici argue, there are many potential innocent explanations for
parallel conduct by competitors. These include encountering the same business problems, the same consumer demands, and
the same competitive pressures. As defendants observe, "[b]asic economic principles dictate that competitive companies
will often act in a highly similar manner." See also, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 606, 607 P.2d 924,
933, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 141 (1980) (it is a common practice in the industry for manufacturers to use the experience and
methods of others making the same or similar products). Parallel conduct alone by manufacturers of the same or similar
products is, therefore, as consistent with innocence as with guilt and cannot be considered, in itself, clear and convincing
evidence of a conspiracy.
Not only does our rejection of mere parallel conduct as proof of civil conspiracy comport with the clear and convincing
standard of proof Illinois courts have applied to this tort, it is consistent with this court's previous descriptions of the scope
of a manufacturer's liability. In rejecting the market share theory of product liability in Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 Ill. 2d 222 (1990), this court reasoned that imposing liability under this theory violated the principles that manufacturers are not
"insurers of their industry" and that " 'a logical limit must be placed on the scope of a manufacturer's liability.' " Smith,
137 Ill. 2d  at 266-67, quoting Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 37 (1980) (requiring plaintiffs to prove that a
defendant knew of or should have known of the danger in order to establish strict product liability for failure to warn).
Requiring proof of more than parallel action to establish civil conspiracy liability is necessary to protect manufacturers from
becoming insurers of their industry. This case illustrates the potential for industrywide liability under the civil conspiracy
theory. Plaintiffs were allegedly injured as a result of the actions and products of defendants' competitors. Defendants have
been found liable for the injuries plaintiffs allege in their complaints even though it is undisputed that neither plaintiffs nor
their husbands were employed by defendants, worked at the Unarco plant after Owens Corning purchased it, or used
defendants' products. To permit conspiracy liability based on proof of parallel action alone, when competitors engage in
similar conduct for many nonconspiratorial reasons, would expand the civil conspiracy theory "beyond a rational or fair
limit" (Rastelli, 79 N.Y.2d  at 295, 591 N.E.2d  at 224, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 375). Requiring evidence in addition to parallel
conduct ensures that a manufacturer's responsibility for the actions of a competitor is based on more than speculation and
conjecture. Accordingly, we hold that, while mere parallel conduct may serve as circumstantial evidence of an agreement
under the civil conspiracy theory, it cannot, in itself, be considered clear and convincing evidence of such an agreement
among manufacturers of the same or similar products.
Having decided that parallel action alone will not support liability under the civil conspiracy theory in cases such as the one
before us, our review of the evidence becomes a two-step process. First, we must examine whether there is evidence to
support a finding by the jury that defendants and the alleged conspirators engaged in parallel conduct. Next, we must
determine whether any evidence, other than evidence of parallel conduct, was presented at trial and whether this evidence,
considered with any evidence of parallel conduct, was sufficient to establish the existence of an agreement between
defendants and Unarco or Johns-Manville to suppress or misrepresent information regarding the health hazards of asbestos.
Plaintiffs presented no direct evidence of an agreement. Instead, they relied entirely on circumstantial evidence to prove the
alleged agreement. The majority of this evidence related to plaintiffs' theory that parallel conduct by these companies
demonstrated such an agreement. The evidence showed that, in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, there were numerous reports
in the medical and scientific literature linking asbestos exposure to asbestosis and cancer. Despite this information,
defendants, Unarco, and Johns-Manville produced and sold asbestos-containing products during this time period. Before
1964, none of these companies placed warnings on their asbestos-containing products. Johns-Manville was the first to place
a warning label on its products in 1964. In 1966, Owens Corning also added warning labels to its asbestos-containing
products. These warnings did not, however, identify the specific diseases caused by asbestos exposure.
There was evidence that Unarco and Johns-Manville prevented information about the health hazards of asbestos from being
published. At their request, Asbestos magazine refrained from publishing articles on this topic. In addition, these companies
required Saranac Laboratory to omit references to cancer and tumors from the 1951 article it published concerning the
results of asbestos research sponsored by Unarco, Johns-Manville, and other asbestos product manufacturers.
While Owens-Illinois did not interfere with Saranac's publication of the results of the asbestos research Owens-Illinois
sponsored, there was evidence that, like Unarco and Johns-Manville, Owens-Illinois caused inaccurate information about
the health hazards of its asbestos-containing product to be published. Despite knowledge that Kaylo dust caused asbestosis,
in 1952 Owens-Illinois published a brochure stating that Kaylo was "non-toxic."
Other evidence indicated that, like Unarco and Johns-Manville, Owens Corning failed to share information about the health
hazards of asbestos with the public. In the 1950s, Owens Corning also published a brochure representing Kaylo as "non-toxic." Internal company memoranda showed that (1) Owens Corning chose to use information on the health hazards of
asbestos as a "weapon-in-reserve" during union negotiations rather than freely disclose this information; (2) the company
had a policy that required complaints about health hazards of its products to be referred to certain corporate officers or its
legal department; (3) the company was concerned that the government would "blow the whistle" on asbestos; (4) despite
knowledge of the health hazards of asbestos, the company maintained a position that the medical research indicated no such
hazards; and (5) the company tried to limit the influence of Dr. Selikoff, who had publicized and attempted to protect
workers from the hazards of asbestos exposure.
There was also evidence that defendants, Unarco, and Johns-Manville failed to warn their employees of, and adequately
protect them from, the health hazards of asbestos. Former Unarco employees who worked in the Bloomington plant testified
that Unarco failed to warn them of these hazards, did not have a respirator program, had almost no dust-collection
equipment, permitted plant conditions that were "unbelievably bad," employed no industrial hygienist, and had no annual
X-ray program for employees. Likewise, a former Johns-Manville employee testified that this company also did not tell
employees of the adverse health effects of asbestos exposure and, although periodic X rays were required, Johns-Manville
did not tell employees of disease that appeared on the X rays unless the disease became disabling.
Owens Corning employees testified that, like Unarco and Johns-Manville, Owens Corning failed to warn its employees of
the health hazards of asbestos. Some employees testified that Owens Corning did not warn them of these hazards until the
1970s. Another employee, Jerry Helser, testified that he was never warned of the hazards.
There was conflicting testimony with respect to Owens-Illinois' efforts to warn its employees of the dangers of asbestos.
Helser testified that former Owens-Illinois employees with whom he had contact did not communicate any such warnings to
him. By contrast, Richard Grimmie testified that Owens-Illinois did warn its employees that asbestos exposure could cause
asbestosis.
While there was evidence that the conditions and dust-control measures in Owens Corning's and Owens-Illinois' plants
were better than those in Unarco's Bloomington plant, there was also evidence that, like Unarco, these companies did not
adequately control the dust in their plants. Some dust samples taken in these plants exceeded the threshold limit value for
asbestos. After purchasing the Bloomington plant, Owens Corning did not install dust collection equipment immediately
and did not require employees to wear respirators. In addition, by 1972, many employees from the Berlin plant had been
diagnosed with asbestosis.
Defendants dispute that the evidence showed that their conduct paralleled that of Unarco or Johns-Manville. For example,
they assert, there was evidence that the warnings they gave their employees, the conditions in their plants, and their
industrial hygiene programs were better than those of Unarco and Johns-Manville. In reviewing a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, however, a court may not resolve conflicts in the evidence, and the evidence must be
considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Maple, 151 Ill. 2d  at 452-53. Accordingly, we find that
the jury could have found parallel action based on the evidence that, like Unarco or Johns-Manville, defendants (1) knew
that asbestos could cause disease at the time they sold asbestos-containing products; (2) sold these products without
warning of these diseases; (3) failed to warn employees and consumers of these diseases; and (4) failed to adequately
protect their employees from exposure to asbestos dust.
As stated previously, however, evidence of parallel conduct alone is insufficient to establish a civil conspiracy by clear and
convincing evidence. Thus, we move to the second step of our review of the evidence. Under this step, we determine
whether there was any evidence of agreement other than parallel conduct and whether this additional evidence, when
considered along with the evidence of parallel conduct, permitted the jury to conclude that there was clear and convincing
evidence of an agreement.
In addition to parallel conduct, plaintiffs rely on the following evidence as proof of an agreement between defendants and
Unarco or Johns-Manville to suppress or misrepresent information concerning the health hazards of asbestos: (1) evidence
of the relationship between Owens Corning and Owens-Illinois; (2) the fact that Owens Corning received information from
Johns-Manville about its plan to place warning labels on its products; (3) Owens Corning's participation in the drafting of
the NIMA pamphlet; (4) the indemnity clause contained in Owens Corning's agreement to purchase the Bloomington plant
from Unarco; (5) the fact that Owens Corning contacted other asbestos product manufacturers about their responses to the
Califano announcement; (6) the 1979 meeting among asbestos-containing product manufacturers; (7) the 1983 meeting
among asbestos-containing product manufacturers; and (8) Castleman's opinion that defendants were involved in the
alleged conspiracy with Unarco and Johns-Manville.
Even reviewing this evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, we find that it does not permit a reasonable inference
of the alleged agreement between defendants and Unarco or Johns-Manville. At most, these facts are as consistent with
innocent as with guilty conduct. Thus, they do not support a finding by the jury that there was clear and convincing
evidence of an agreement. See Tribune Co., 342 Ill.  at 529; Regan, 220 Ill. App. 3d at 1091-92.  Much of plaintiffs'
additional evidence of the alleged agreement between defendants and Unarco or Johns-Manville demonstrated only a
sharing of information among these companies. Plaintiff showed that Owens-Illinois lent Owens Corning two published
articles about the health effects of asbestos, that Owens Corning received information from Johns-Manville about its
labeling decision, that Owens Corning sought information from other asbestos product manufacturers about their responses
to the Califano announcement, and that asbestos product manufacturers held meetings in 1979 and 1983 to discuss litigation
strategy, bankruptcy, insurance, and the impact of the Califano announcement. The mere exchange of information by
manufacturers of the same or similar products is a common practice, however, and does not support an inference of an
agreement. See Payton, 512 F. Supp.  at 1038 (membership in industrywide trade organizations and participation in
scientific conferences are common in most industries and do not support an inference of agreement); Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d  at
606, 607 P.2d  at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr.  at 141 (it is a common practice in industry for manufacturers of the same or similar
products to use the experience and methods of others).
Indeed, an inference of agreement based on these exchanges of information is undermined by the circumstances
surrounding this conduct. For example, plaintiffs assert that the existence of the alleged agreement is the reason Johns-Manville would have shared information about its labeling decision with Owens Corning. The evidence that Johns-Manville
was among the first to place a warning label on its product, however, suggests an innocent explanation for its
communication of this decision to its competitors. If Johns-Manville were alone in placing warning labels on its products,
consumers might perceive that its products were more dangerous than its competitors' and choose to buy a competitor's
product. If it persuaded its competitors, such as Owens-Corning, to also place warning labels on their products, Johns-Manville could avoid this problem. Given this nonconspiratorial explanation for Johns-Manville's communication of its
labeling decision, this fact fails to support a finding of conspiracy.
In addition, evidence that asbestos product manufacturers acted differently with respect to the shared information also
prohibits an inference of agreement. Despite the fact that Owens Corning learned that Johns-Manville was placing warning
labels on its products in 1964, Owens Corning did not add warning labels to its products until 1966, and internal
memoranda indicated that the company decided to add these labels only after considering whether to do so would be in its
own best interest. Likewise, the evidence that Owens Corning contacted other asbestos product manufacturers about their
responses to the Califano announcement also showed that Owens Corning acted independently. The actions it decided to
take differed from those of Johns-Manville and the other companies it consulted.
The circumstances of the 1979 and 1983 meetings also prohibit a reasonable inference of the alleged agreement. As a
preliminary matter, we note that Owens-Illinois did not attend the 1979 meeting. In addition, both meetings occurred after
the Califano announcement, which publicized the health hazards of asbestos, and after Owens Corning itself had warned a
large number of its employees and former employees about these hazards. Given that these disclosures had already occurred
at the time of the meetings, it is highly unlikely that the purpose of the meetings was to suppress information about the
health hazards of asbestos. Suppression of such information at that point would have been futile, as well as contrary to
Owens Corning's efforts to inform employees about the health risks of asbestos. Evidence that Owens Corning and Owens-Illinois met with other asbestos product manufacturers in 1979 and 1983 cannot, therefore, support a reasonable inference
of the alleged agreement.
Evidence of Owens Corning's participation in the drafting of the NIMA pamphlet and the indemnity clause in its agreement
to purchase the Unarco plant also does not support an inference of agreement. According to plaintiffs, the fact that an
Owens Corning and a Johns-Manville employee were involved in drafting the NIMA pamphlet shows an agreement by
these companies to conceal the health hazards of asbestos because, even though the pamphlet did state that asbestos was
potentially injurious and had been associated with certain health hazards, it did not specifically identify the diseases
associated with asbestos. The evidence does not support this inference. In other cases involving allegations of a civil
conspiracy among manufacturers, courts have been unwilling to infer an agreement based on membership in industry trade
organizations. See, e.g., In re Asbestos School Litigation, 46 F.3d at 1287-90; Payton, 512 F. Supp.  at 1038. In this case,
inference of an agreement is improper because, even though Owens Corning and Johns-Manville employees may have
participated in drafting the pamphlet, there is no evidence indicating to what extent these companies controlled the content
of the pamphlet. To conclude that the content of the pamphlet demonstrates an agreement between these companies,
therefore, is unreasonable.
Likewise, no rational inference of agreement can be made based on the indemnity clause contained in Owens Corning's
agreement with Unarco to purchase the Bloomington plant. Plaintiff asserts that the fact that this indemnity clause discussed
asbestos claims by employees is proof of an agreement by Owens Corning and Unarco to suppress or misrepresent
information about the harmful effects of asbestos. To the contrary, the language of the clause itself demonstrates a
legitimate reason for the discussion of asbestos claims: litigation concerning asbestos exposure of the Bloomington plant
employees had already begun at the time of Owens Corning's purchase of the plant. The clause does nothing more than
identify each parties' responsibilities with respect to that litigation, such as their obligations to pay judgments and to share
relevant documents. There is no evidence that Owens Corning's purchase of the Bloomington plant was anything other than
an arm's-length transaction between competitors (see Payton, 512 F. Supp.  at 1038 (such transactions do not permit an
inference of conspiracy)).
As proof of the alleged agreement, plaintiffs also presented evidence pertaining to the relationship between Owens Corning
and Owens-Illinois. This evidence is only tangentially related to the essential question in this case, which is whether
plaintiffs proved the existence of an agreement between defendants and Unarco or Johns-Manville. Proof of a relationship
between defendants themselves does not establish the required agreement with Unarco or Johns-Manville.
Castleman's opinion that defendants were involved in the alleged conspiracy with Unarco and Johns-Manville to suppress
information regarding the health hazards of asbestos also did not permit the jury to conclude that an agreement existed.
Castleman testified that he "assumed" that there was an agreement among these companies because none of them disclosed
the health risks of asbestos. An expert's opinion is only as valid as the bases and reasons for that opinion. State Bank v. City
of Chicago, 287 Ill. App. 3d 904, 918 (1997). Castleman's "assumption," therefore, cannot be considered proof of
conspiracy, especially when this assumption is based on mere parallel conduct, which we have explained is insufficient to
establish a conspiracy. Even assuming the jury found Castleman credible and accepted his opinion, his testimony that
defendants participated in the alleged conspiracy does not support the jury's verdict. See, e.g., Kleiss v. Cassida, 297 Ill.
App. 3d 165, 174 (1998) (affirming judgment notwithstanding the verdict after concluding that the plaintiff's expert's
opinions were conclusory and unsupported); Aguilera v. Mount Sinai Hospital Medical Center, 293 Ill. App. 3d 967, 975-76 (1997) (same).
Although the scope of our review of jury verdicts is limited, we find that the evidence in this case so overwhelmingly favors
defendants that judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted. Plaintiffs' evidence of parallel conduct is
insufficient to establish the agreement required by the civil conspiracy theory. When plaintiffs' evidence of contacts
between defendants and Unarco or Johns-Manville is added to this parallel conduct, the evidence still cannot support the
jury's determination that plaintiffs proved agreement by clear and convincing evidence. The contacts between defendants,
Unarco, and Johns-Manville were isolated, particularly with respect to Owens-Illinois, and an inference of agreement based
on these contacts is not reasonable. Even when considered in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, evidence of these
contacts was as consistent with innocence as with guilt. See Tribune Co., 342 Ill.  at 529; Bosak, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 804.
Plaintiffs showed separate acts by the alleged conspirators, but the evidence failed to show that these acts were connected
by an agreement. See Bergeson v. Mullinix, 399 Ill. 470, 475 (1948) (finding that evidence of the separate acts of the
alleged conspirators was insufficient to establish a conspiracy when the evidence showed no "connection or confederation"
between them). To conclude, based on the evidence of record, that defendants engaged in a conspiracy requires speculation.
Liability based on such speculation is contrary to tort principles in Illinois (see Smith, 137 Ill. 2d  at 254, 259) and to the
clear and convincing standard of proof applicable in civil conspiracy cases. Given the lack of evidence supporting this
agreement element of plaintiffs' conspiracy claims, the jury verdicts cannot stand, and judgment must be granted in favor of
defendants.
In defense of the jury verdicts in this case, plaintiffs rely on our recent decision in Adcock v. Brakegate, Ltd., 164 Ill. 2d 54
(1994). While the facts involved in that case are similar to those before us, our holding in Adcock does not support a
conclusion that the evidence of conspiracy is sufficient in this case. In Adcock, the executor of the estate of a deceased
Unarco Bloomington plant employee filed suit against Owens Corning and other asbestos-containing product
manufacturers. The plaintiff alleged that the decedent worked in the Bloomington plant from 1954 until the end of 1970.
According to the plaintiff, the decedent was exposed to asbestos in the plant, as a result of which he developed asbestosis
and mesothelioma, which resulted in his death. As in the cases before us, the Adcock plaintiff alleged that Owens Corning
was liable for the decedent's injuries based on a civil conspiracy theory. The plaintiff claimed that Owens Corning
conspired with other asbestos manufacturers to suppress information about the hazards of asbestos and to falsely assert that
it was safe to work with asbestos. Adcock, 164 Ill. 2d  at 57.
After the circuit court denied Owens Corning's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, Owens
Corning answered the complaint. As a sanction for Owens Corning's failure to produce certain witnesses, the circuit court
entered judgment against Owens Corning as to liability. There was a trial on damages only. Adcock, 164 Ill. 2d  at 58-60.
On appeal before this court, Owens Corning argued only that the circuit court erred in denying its motion to dismiss. Owens
Corning contended that civil conspiracy is not actionable without underlying, intentional conduct. Adcock, 164 Ill. 2d  at 60.
In rejecting this argument, we explained that Owens Corning's answer to the complaint waived any objection to the
sufficiency of the allegations, provided that the complaint stated a recognized cause of action. After finding that civil
conspiracy, based on either intentional or negligent tortious conduct, is a recognized cause of action, we held that Owens
Corning was precluded from challenging the factual sufficiency of the complaint. We refused to express any opinion on the
factual sufficiency of the complaint. Adcock, 164 Ill. 2d  at 65-66.
Our holding in Adcock, therefore, does not support plaintiffs' position that the evidence was sufficient in this case.
Although the facts involved in Adcock were similar to those at issue in this case, Adcock was decided on the pleadings.
There was no trial with respect to Owens Corning's liability, and this court did not address the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the plaintiff's conspiracy allegations in that case. By contrast, the sufficiency of the evidence is the
determinative issue in this case.
Given our decision in this case that judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted based on the
insufficiency of the evidence, we need not consider defendants' request for a new trial based on the insufficiency of the
evidence or the remaining arguments defendants raise in their briefs. In connection with their argument that the circuit court
erred in excluding the testimony of Willis Hazard, Owens-Illinois filed a motion in this court to supplement the record with
a transcript of that testimony. We took that motion with the case. We now deny Owens-Illinois' motion to supplement the
record because it involves an issue that is not relevant to our disposition of defendants' appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the judgment of the circuit court against Owens Corning and Owens-Illinois must
be reversed and order that judgment be entered in defendants' favor in each plaintiff's case.
Judgments reversed.
JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
In nullifying the jury's verdict and entering judgment for defendants, the majority refers to "the lack of evidence supporting
th[e] agreement element of plaintiffs' conspiracy claims" (slip op. at 39) and opines that "the evidence *** cannot support
the jury's determination that plaintiffs proved agreement by clear and convincing evidence" (slip op. at 39). These
statements reflect two basic flaws in my colleagues' analysis. First, the majority fails to adhere to the applicable standards
for entry of judgment n.o.v. Under established law, which the majority correctly cites, then forgets, judgment n.o.v. may not
be granted merely because a verdict is not supported by the evidence. If the verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence, the proper remedy is to order a new trial. A judgment n.o.v. should be entered only in those limited cases where
all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors movant that no
contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand. Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 453 (1992).
The second problem with the majority's analysis is that it places undue emphasis on the existence of an agreement between
the conspirators. Under Illinois law,
The existence of a conspiracy can rarely be established through direct evidence. Instead, it must be proven through
circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from evidence, coupled with commonsense knowledge of the behavior of
persons in similar circumstances. Adcock, 164 Ill. 2d  at 66. Sometimes evidence of parallel conduct will suffice. As the
appellate court correctly noted in this case, if evidence of parallel conduct is sufficiently persuasive, there is no reason why
a jury could not rely upon it to find that a conspiracy existed. 298 Ill. App. 3d at 598.
In rejecting this view, the majority argues that there can be "many potential innocent explanations for parallel conduct by
competitors" and that "[p]arallel conduct alone by manufacturers of the same or similar products is *** as consistent with
innocence as with guilt." Slip op. at 30. While this assertion may be valid in the context of antitrust litigation, it makes no
sense at all in cases such as this. The reason it makes no sense is that there is no possible innocent justification for what the
defendants and the other manufacturers were shown to have done. See Burgess v. Abex Corp., 305 Ill. App. 3d 859 (1999).
In the words of the appellate court, "[c]oncealing the dangers of asbestos does not carry with it any beneficial aspects." 298
Ill. App. 3d at 597.
Further confusing the majority's analysis is its contention that rejection of parallel conduct as proof of civil conspiracy
comports with the clear and convincing standard of proof required in Illinois for civil conspiracy. It is true that proof of
civil conspiracy must be clear and convincing. As I have previously noted, however, and as our court has long recognized
(see, e.g., Tribune Co. v. Thompson, 342 Ill. 503, 529 (1930)), the clear and convincing standard can be met solely through
the use of circumstantial evidence. Because proof of conspiracy can be totally circumstantial, and because parallel conduct
can be circumstantial evidence of a civil conspiracy, as even the majority itself acknowledges, there is no reason why a civil
conspiracy cannot be established, in an appropriate case, based on the parallel conduct of the defendants, coupled with the
jurors' "commonsense knowledge of the behavior of persons in similar circumstances" (Adcock, 164 Ill. 2d  at 66, citing
Majewski v. Gallina, 17 Ill. 2d 92, 99 (1959)).
Even if I could look beyond these problems, I still would not agree with the majority's decision. A defendant is liable as a
conspirator where he understands the general objectives of the conspiratorial scheme, accepts them, and agrees, either
explicitly or implicitly, to do his part to further those objectives. Adcock, 164 Ill. 2d  at 64. Based on the same evidence
reviewed by the majority in its disposition, a different jury might possibly have found that Owens Corning and Owens-Illinois did not meet these criteria. What some other jury might have done, however, is irrelevant. What matters is what this
jury did. This jury assessed the evidence, rejected defendants' rationalizations for their behavior, and decided that
defendants should be held liable as conspirators. It is not the province of our court to now reweigh the evidence and
substitute its judgment for the jury's, even if it would have reached a contrary conclusion. If there is any evidence, together
with reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, demonstrating a substantial factual dispute, or where the assessment of
credibility of the witnesses or the determination regarding conflicting evidence is decisive to the outcome, the court has no
right to enter judgment n.o.v. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d  at 453. The circuit and appellate courts applied this principle correctly, and
their judgments should not be disturbed.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
1.      1McClure also named the Illinois Central Railroad Company and the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company as
defendants in her complaint, but these companies are not parties to this appeal.

2. 2Grefco, Inc., Great Lakes Carbon Corporation, General Refractories Company, Abex Corporation, Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company, Cape Industries, PLC, and Illinois Central Railroad Company were also named as defendants in
Bicknell's complaint, but none of these companies were parties to this appeal.

3. 3Cape Industries, PLC, Abex Corporation, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, and Illinois Central Railroad
Company were also named as defendants in Thacker's complaint, but none of these companies were parties to this appeal.

4.      4See Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 Ill. 2d 222, 235 (1990) ("Concert of action applies when a tortious act is done
in concert with another or pursuant to a common design, or a party gives substantial assistance to another knowing that the
other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty").