Case Title: State ex rel. Sherry v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 2006-Ohio-249

Docket Number: 20050100

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-02-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Sherry v. Indus. Comm., 108 Ohio St.3d 122, 2006-Ohio-249.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. SHERRY, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL  
COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Sherry v. Indus. Comm.,  
108 Ohio St.3d 122, 2006-Ohio-249.] 
Workers’ compensation — Temporary total disability compensation — Payment 
for services precludes temporary total disability compensation regardless 
of whether the recipient’s enterprise earns a profit — Judgment affirmed. 
(No. 2005-0100 — Submitted October 11, 2005 — Decided February 8, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 04AP-78, 2004-Ohio-7050. 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} A claimant may not work while receiving temporary total 
disability compensation.  State ex rel. Ramirez v. Indus. Comm. (1982), 69 Ohio 
St.2d 630, 632, 23 O.O.3d 518, 433 N.E.2d 586.  Appellant, John Sherry, was 
receiving temporary total disability compensation.  He was simultaneously 
involved in a home-repair business.  Although Sherry was paid for the services 
performed, a staff hearing officer for appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio 
found that because there was no proof that Sherry’s business earned a profit, 
Sherry was not “earning” and hence was not “working.”  Today, we consider 
whether that conclusion was a clear mistake of law sufficient to merit the 
commission’s continuing jurisdiction to correct it. 
{¶ 2} In 2001, Sherry held two jobs.  One was as a warehouseman with 
Clark Products, Inc. (“Clark”).  The other was in connection with his business, 
Affordable Home Repairs. 
{¶ 3} On March 16, 2001, Sherry was injured at Clark, and a workers’ 
compensation claim was allowed that generated temporary total disability 
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compensation.  In 2002, the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation started an 
investigation after being informed that Sherry was continuing to do home repairs.  
Based on the results of its inquiry, the bureau moved the commission to (1) 
terminate temporary total disability compensation, (2) declare an overpayment of 
all temporary total disability compensation paid after June 23, 2001, and (3) make 
a declaration of fraud. 
{¶ 4} A district hearing officer granted that motion on January 23, 2003, 
but a staff hearing officer reversed.  The staff hearing officer found that Sherry 
did not engage in activities medically inconsistent with his claim that he could not 
return to his former position of employment.  The staff hearing officer also found: 
{¶ 5} “The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation has also failed to prove 
that the claimant was paid for any work performed from 06/23/2001 through 
12/01/2002.  The claimant testified that he made no profit from any of the home 
repairs and that all payments from customers went to cover the cost of materials 
and payments to workmen.  The staff hearing officer finds that the financial 
records on file fail to establish that the claimant had any earnings from home 
repairs completed during the period in question.” 
{¶ 6} The commission refused the bureau’s appeal.  The bureau moved 
for reconsideration of that decision, reasserting its belief that the staff hearing 
officer’s analysis constituted a clear error of law.  On June 16, 2003, the 
commission vacated the staff hearing officer’s decision and issued an 
interlocutory order setting the matter for hearing to evaluate whether the staff 
hearing officer had made a mistake of law that would warrant the exercise of 
continuing jurisdiction over the underlying merit issue. 
{¶ 7} On September 4, 2003, the commission, in a lengthy order, 
determined that the staff hearing officer had committed a clear error of law in 
equating a lack of business profit with a lack of payment for services.  The 
commission, therefore, found sufficient justification for reopening the issue of 
January Term, 2006 
3 
 
entitlement to temporary total disability compensation.  Upon review, the 
commission determined that Sherry had received temporary total disability 
compensation improperly and granted the bureau’s motion in full. 
{¶ 8} Sherry initiated a mandamus action in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, challenging the order of the Industrial Commission and 
requesting findings that he was entitled to temporary total disability compensation 
for the applicable period.  The court of appeals denied the writ after upholding the 
commission’s exercise of continuing jurisdiction.  This cause is now before this 
court on an appeal as of right. 
{¶ 9} Continuing jurisdiction under R.C. 4123.52 is justified by the 
presence of specific criteria, one of which is a clear mistake of law.  State ex rel. 
B & C Machine Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 538, 541, 605 N.E.2d 
372.  The commission relied on this element, stating that the staff hearing 
officer’s analysis regarding remuneration was legally flawed.  Sherry accuses the 
commission of misreading the staff hearing officer’s order and argues that the 
staff hearing officer’s analysis comported with the directives of this court.  We 
disagree. 
{¶ 10} The staff hearing officer discussed both prongs of the bifurcated 
analysis required when extraneous activities potentially compromise eligibility for 
temporary total disability compensation:  (1) whether the claimant was paid for 
the disputed activities and (2) if not, whether the activities were nevertheless 
medically inconsistent with the claimant’s assertion that he could not return to his 
former job.  State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. Indus. Comm., 98 Ohio St.3d 20, 
2002-Ohio-7038, 780 N.E.2d 1016, ¶ 19; State ex rel. Parma Comm. Gen. Hosp. 
v. Jankowski, 95 Ohio St.3d 340, 2002-Ohio-2336, 767 N.E.2d 1143, ¶ 7.  In 
response to the first question, the staff hearing officer acknowledged that Sherry 
had received money for his services.  The staff hearing officer nevertheless 
concluded that Sherry had not been paid, because his business allegedly returned 
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no profit.  This reasoning is legally unsound.  That Sherry’s home-repair business 
may not have been profitable does not eliminate the fact that Sherry received 
money for his labor, and under temporary total disability compensation law, he 
cannot be compensated for labor. 
{¶ 11} The commission’s exercise of continuing jurisdiction was, 
therefore, proper.  The staff hearing officer committed a clear error of law in 
requiring a temporary total disability compensation recipient’s enterprise to be 
profitable before the recipient’s compensation could be terminated.  Accordingly, 
the commission’s September 4, 2003 order was not an abuse of discretion. 
{¶ 12} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
___________________ 
Heinzerling & Goodman, L.L.C., and Jonathan H. Goodman, for 
appellant. 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and William J. McDonald, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
_______________________