Case Title: Taylor v. Gill

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-12-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rick TAYLOR, Joyce Taylor and Kenny Willis v.
Jackie GILL

96-793                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered December 23, 1996


1.   Principal & agent -- agency relationship discussed -- two
     essential elements. -- The burden of proving an agency
     relationship lies with the party asserting its existence;
     every agency relationship includes the element of control by
     the principal; the two essential elements of an agency
     relationship are (1) that an agent have the authority to act
     for the principal and (2) that the agent act on the
     principal's behalf and be subject to the principal's control. 
     
2.   Principal & agent --  agency defined -- gratuitous undertaking
     may fall under umbrella of agency relationship. -- An agency
     may be defined as a contract, either express or implied, upon
     a consideration or a gratuitous undertaking by which one of
     the parties confides to the other the management of some
     business to be transacted in his name or on his account, and
     by which that other assumes to do the business and render an
     account of it.

3.   Principal & agent -- submission by one giving service to
     direction and control of one receiving it applies equally to
     master-servant and principal-agent relationships. --  The
     principle of law that it is only necessary that there be
     submission by the one giving the service to the direction and
     control of the one receiving it as to the manner of
     performance applies not only to a master-servant arrangement
     but to principal-agent relationships as well.

4.   Motions -- denial of directed verdict -- standard of review. -
     - The standard of review in determining whether the trial
     court erred in denying a motion for a directed verdict is
     whether the verdict of the jury is supported by substantial
     evidence; substantial evidence is that evidence which is
     beyond mere suspicion or conjecture and which is of sufficient
     force and character that it will, with reasonable and material
     certainty and precision, compel a conclusion of the matter one
     way or another; on review, the appellate court will only
     consider evidence favorable to the appellee together with all
     reasonable inferences. 

5.   Principal & agent -- independent contractor -- distinguished
     from agent. -- An independent contractor is one who,
     exercising an independent employment, contracts to do work
     according to his own methods and without being subject to the
     control of the employer, except as to the results of the work;
     the right to control and not the actual control determines
     whether one is a servant or an independent contractor.     

6.   Principal & agent -- no substantial evidence regarding
     existence of agency relationship -- judgment of trial court as
     to appellants reversed. -- Where the evidence presented did no
     more than relegate the neighbor who mowed appellant's lawn to
     a status akin to that of an independent contractor, the
     appellate court found a marked difference between the
     authority of appellant to stop the neighbor from doing the
     work altogether, which she most certainly could have done, and
     her authority to control the exact manner in which he went
     about his task; there was no proof that the appellant intended
     to micromanage, or could have micromanaged, how the neighbor
     actually accomplished his work; nor was there proof in the
     record that the he would have subjected himself to such
     control in performing this favor; because there was no
     substantial evidence regarding the existence of the agency
     relationship, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and
     remanded as to the landowners.


     Appeal from Arkansas Circuit Court; Russell Rogers, Judge;
reversed and remanded.
     Matthews, Sanders, & Sayes, by: Margaret M. Newton, for
appellants. 
     Green, Henry, & Green, by:  J.W. Green, Jr., for appellee.

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.
     Appellants Rick Taylor and Joyce Taylor appeal from a $40,000
judgment entered against them relating to a lawnmower injury
sustained by appellee Jackie Gill.  The Taylors raise several
arguments for reversal, one of which is the lack of an agency
relationship between them and the operator of the lawnmower, Kenny
Willis.  We agree with the Taylors that Willis was not acting as
their agent when the injury occurred, and we reverse the judgment
as it pertains to them.
     Kenny Willis and the Taylors lived in the same neighborhood in
Stuttgart and were friends who would, on occasion, assist each
other in meeting various needs.  For example, Rick Taylor would
help Willis with mechanical work on his truck, while Willis would
mow the Taylors' yard because the Taylors did not own a lawnmower. 
Other neighbors, including Jackie Gill, would do the same.  No
payment was made for these services, and Willis was not paid for
the mowing involved in this case.
     On April 16, 1994, a day when Rick Taylor was out of town,
Willis began mowing the Taylors' yard.  He was neither asked nor
told to do so but was merely mowing the yard as a favor to the
Taylors.  Both Rick and Joyce Taylor later testified at trial that
they did not know Willis would be mowing their yard on that day. 
Although neither of the Taylors was home when Willis commenced his
task, Joyce Taylor returned from work while he was cutting the
grass in her yard.  She noticed that Willis was doing this but did
not ask him to stop, although she acknowledged at trial that she
could have done so.  While Willis was mowing in a ditch on the
Taylors' property, the lawnmower hit a rock or piece of gravel
which shot out from the side of the lawnmower, soared some 20 feet,
and struck Jackie Gill, who was standing on the other side of a
pickup truck, in the eye.  Gill lost partial use of his eye.
     Gill filed a complaint against Kenny Willis and the Taylors
and sought damages for the personal injury he sustained as a result
of Willis's alleged negligence.  The complaint asserted that
Willis, acting as the Taylors' agent, operated the lawnmower
unsafely in an area where gravel and rocks were located without
first determining whether it could be done without causing injury
to Gill.
     At the ensuing trial, the Taylors moved for a directed verdict
at the close of Gill's evidence and urged, among other things, the
lack of substantial evidence to support an agency relationship. 
The directed-verdict motion was denied.  The Taylors put on no
proof, and the circuit court submitted the case to the jury on
interrogatories.  The jury found that Willis was 80% at fault,
while Gill was 20% at fault.  The jury assessed Gill's damages at
$50,000 and found that an agency relationship existed between
Willis and the Taylors.  The court, as a result of the verdict,
reduced the $50,000 award due to Gill's measure of fault and
entered a $40,000 joint and several judgment against the Taylors
and Willis.
     In Pledger v. Troll Book Clubs, Inc., 316 Ark. 195,