Case Title: Randall v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 970789

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1998-01-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
WILLIAM N. RANDALL, ET AL. 
 
v.    Record No. 970789 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
                                   January 9, 1998 
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
 
William F. Rutherford, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we decide whether, for purposes of 
qualifying as an insured under Code § 38.2-2206, a highway worker 
was "using" his employer's vehicle while placing lane closure 
signs along the side of a highway. 
 
Early in the morning of July 28, 1994, James L. Downey and 
Lawrence Eichler, employees of Archer-Western Contractors, Ltd., 
were placing lane closure signs along the shoulders of a one-mile 
section of Interstate 64 in Norfolk when Downey was struck and 
killed by a car driven by Thomas Glen Pasterczyk.  Downey had 
driven himself and the closure signs to the highway section in a 
pickup truck owned by his employer and insured by Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Company (Liberty). 
 
In placing the closure signs, Downey and Eichler employed 
the following procedure.  At several points in the one-mile 
stretch leading to a merge zone, Downey pulled over to the side 
of the shoulder and exited his vehicle, leaving the engine 
running and the flashing yellow bubble light on top of the cab 
turned on.  Downey then removed a stand from the pickup truck and 
placed it on the side of the road, five to six feet behind the 
back of the truck.  Next, Downey removed two flags and a sign 
from the truck and placed those on the stand.  Eichler, 
 
 
 
 
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meanwhile, followed the same procedure on the opposite side of 
the road.  Downey and Eichler then would re-enter their trucks 
and would drive simultaneously to the next designated point. 
 
Downey was struck and killed while placing the fourth and 
final sign in the one-mile stretch.  Eichler testified that 
Downey had already placed the final stand and retrieved the sign 
from the back of the truck.  Eichler last saw Downey walking away 
from the truck, toward the stand, carrying the sign.  Eichler did 
not see the actual collision, nor could he say whether Downey had 
completed placing the final sign on its stand before being 
struck.  Pasterczyk's vehicle drifted off the road, first 
striking Downey and then striking the truck.  According to 
Eichler, Downey was out of his truck for "two minutes, three 
minutes, maybe longer" at the fourth spot before the accident 
occurred, and he was six to ten feet behind the truck on the 
shoulder of the road at the moment he was hit. 
 
William N. Randall and Sharon S. Downey, Administrators of 
Downey's estate (collectively "Randall"), filed a motion for 
judgment against Pasterczyk.  Prior to trial, an order was 
entered by agreement providing, in relevant part, for the entry 
of a judgment against Pasterczyk in the amount of $105,000, 
$60,000 of which was to be paid jointly by Pasterczyk's liability 
insurance carrier and Downey's uninsured/underinsured motorist 
(UM/UIM) insurance carrier.  The order also allowed an amendment 
to the motion for judgment to seek a determination of whether 
 
 
 
 
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Downey was an insured under § 38.2-2206 and entitled to 
underinsured motorist coverage under the Liberty policy. 
 
Following an ore tenus hearing and subsequent argument of 
counsel, the trial court determined that Randall was not entitled 
to recover under the UM/UIM endorsement of the Liberty policy 
because, at the time of his death, Downey was not a named insured 
under the policy and was neither "using" nor "occupying" the 
truck.  We granted Randall an appeal limited to an assignment of 
error addressing the issue whether Downey was "operating or 
using" the truck for purposes of UM/UIM insurance coverage. 
 
I. 
 
Section 38.2-2206 mandates that automobile liability 
insurance policies provide UM/UIM coverage to persons insured 
under the policies.  The statute defines "insured," in relevant 
part, as "any person who uses the motor vehicle to which the 
policy applies" with the consent of the named insured.  This 
mandated coverage is not extended to the entire period of 
permissive use, but is limited to injuries sustained while the 
permissive user is actually using the insured vehicle.  Insurance 
Company of North America v. Perry, 204 Va. 833, 837-38, 134 
S.E.2d 418, 421 (1964). 
 
Two of our prior cases, Great American Insurance Co. v. 
Cassell, 239 Va. 421, 389 S.E.2d 476 (1990), and United States 
Fire Insurance Co. v. Parker, 250 Va. 374, 463 S.E.2d 464 (1995), 
provide the analytical framework for determining whether a 
 
 
 
 
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permissive user of an insured vehicle who is injured while away 
from the vehicle qualifies as an insured and, therefore, is 
entitled to UM/UIM coverage under § 38.2-2206.  In Cassell, a 
fire fighter was struck by a car while standing 20 to 25 feet 
from his fire truck.  The truck was parked in a manner which 
restricted traffic flow and provided a protective barrier for the 
fire fighters, and its red lights were flashing at the time of 
the accident.  The truck was used to transport to the scene 
water, hoses, tools, and other equipment used in combating the 
fire.  Id. at 422-23, 389 S.E.2d at 476-77.  In Cassell, we held 
that the fire fighter was using his truck at the time of the 
accident, entitling him to uninsured motorist coverage from the 
policy insuring the truck.  We concluded that "[u]se of the fire 
truck . . . was an integral part of the fire fighters' mission," 
and that the fire fighter was "engaged in a transaction essential 
to the use of the fire truck" when he was struck.  Id. at 424, 
389 S.E.2d at 477. 
 
In Parker, a landscape gardener drove herself, two other 
workers, some ornamental cabbage plants, and tools to the 
entrance of a residential development in a pickup truck.  The 
gardeners parked the truck so as to provide a safety barrier from 
passing traffic, and began digging holes and planting the 
cabbages.  A door of the truck was left open to allow the 
gardeners to hear a two-way radio inside the truck.  While Parker 
was digging a hole 12 to 15 feet from the truck, an underinsured 
 
 
 
 
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motorist hit the truck and then hit Parker, injuring her.  We 
described the relevant inquiry as whether there was a causal 
relationship between the accident and the use of the insured 
vehicle as a vehicle, and concluded that Parker was not using the 
truck at the time of the accident, since she was not "engaged in 
a transaction essential to the use of the pickup truck . . . ."  
250 Va. at 376-78, 463 S.E.2d at 465-66. 
 
As established by these cases, actual use of the vehicle for 
purposes of UM/UIM coverage mandated by § 38.2-2206 is not 
restricted to the transportation function of a vehicle.  If the 
injured person is using the insured vehicle as a vehicle and as 
an integral part of his mission when he is injured, he is 
entitled to UM/UIM coverage under § 38.2-2206.  Parker, 250 Va. 
at 377-78, 463 S.E.2d at 466; Cassell, 239 Va. at 424, 389 S.E.2d 
at 477.  In this context, the use of a vehicle "as a vehicle" 
requires that at the time of the injury, the vehicle is being 
used in a manner for which it was specifically designed or 
equipped.
1  For example, the fire truck in Cassell had special 
equipment for use in completing the user's fire fighting mission 
which was in use at the time of the accident. 
 
II. 
                     
 
1  Compare with Lexie v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
251 Va. 390, 469 S.E.2d 61 (1996), and Travelers Ins. Co. v. 
LaClair, 250 Va. 368, 463 S.E.2d 461 (1995)(interpreting 
insurance policies to determine whether parties' injuries 
resulted from tortfeasors' use of uninsured/underinsured 
vehicles "as a vehicle"). 
 
 
 
 
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Liberty argues that applying these principles to this case 
requires the conclusion that Downey was not using his employer's 
truck when he was struck and killed.  Liberty notes that Downey, 
like the gardener in Parker, was using an ordinary pickup truck 
to transport items to be deposited at the work site.  The truck 
in Parker was parked in a manner which created a safety zone, but 
neither that truck nor Downey's impeded or altered the flow of 
traffic.  Finally, Liberty argues, the purpose and use of the 
yellow warning light on Downey's truck was only to protect the 
truck by showing the truck's location.
2  Liberty concludes that 
Downey did not need to use either the truck or its warning light 
to place the lane closure signs; therefore, as in Parker, when 
Downey was struck and killed he "was not engaged in a transaction 
essential to the use of the pickup truck . . . ."  250 Va. at 
378, 463 S.E.2d at 466. 
 
We disagree with Liberty.  In Parker, we specifically noted 
that the pickup truck used by the gardeners "had no special, 
emergency warning lights," and that the positioning of the truck 
for safety purposes was done "independently and not because of 
any requirement" of the gardener's employer.  250 Va. at 378, 463 
S.E.2d at 466.  The lack of these elements contributed to the 
conclusion that the truck in Parker "merely was used as a means 
                     
 
2 Liberty's counsel stated at oral argument that the 
location of the truck either in front of Downey or between 
Downey and the oncoming traffic did not affect whether the 
purpose and use of the truck was to create a safety zone. 
 
 
 
 
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of transportation so that Parker could complete her landscaping 
duties."  Id.  However, these elements do exist in this case.  
Here, the specialized warning equipment and its relationship to 
Downey's work made the use of the truck more than merely a means 
of transportation. 
 
Archer-Western Contractors, Ltd., Downey's employer, was 
doing road work for the Virginia Department of Transportation 
which required the closing of highway lanes.  Closing highway 
lanes occurs in close proximity to highway traffic, and the need 
for procedures to insure the safety of workers is inherent in the 
work.  As Downey's co-worker Eichler testified, company procedure 
for lane closing required Downey to stay close to the truck 
because when motorists see the lights on the truck, they will 
think "that . . . people are right back behind the truck."  The 
truck's warning equipment, and the procedures prescribed for 
putting out the lane closure signs which incorporated the use of 
the warning equipment, made Downey's truck, like the fire truck 
in Cassell, a specialized vehicle, one designed to be used for 
more than simply transportation. 
 
The evidence shows that Downey was following the prescribed 
safety procedures.  When he alighted from the truck, he kept the 
yellow warning light burning and he remained at a distance from 
the truck which allowed him enough space to remove the sign from 
the truck while retaining the protection of the warning light.  
At the time he was struck, Downey was using the truck's 
 
 
 
 
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specialized equipment to perform his mission. 
 
Thus, we conclude that Downey qualified as an insured under 
§ 38.2-2206 because he was using his employer's vehicle when he 
was struck and killed.  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment 
of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. 
 
Reversed and remanded.