Case Title: State v. Mitchell

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015AP000304-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2018-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
2018 WI 84 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP304-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Gerald P. Mitchell, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS  
 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 3, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 11, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan 
 
JUDGE: 
Terence T. Bourke 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
KELLY, J., concurs, joined by R.G. BRADLEY, J. 
(opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J., dissents, joined by 
ABRAHAMSON, J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs filed by 
Linda J. Schaefer and Schaefer Law Firm, S.C., Sturgeon Bay.  
There was an oral argument by Linda J. Schaefer. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Ryan J. Walsh, chief deputy solicitor general, with whom on the 
brief were Brad D. Schimel, attorney general, and David H. 
Perlman, assistant attorney general.  There was an oral argument 
by Ryan J. Walsh, chief deputy solicitor general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Mothers 
Against Drunk Driving by Kevin M. St. John and Bell Giftos St. 
 
 
2 
John, LLC, Madison, with whom on the brief was Theane D. 
Evangelis, Lauren M. Blas, and Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, Los 
Angeles, California.  There was an oral argument by Lauren M. 
Blas. 
 
 
 
2018 WI 84
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP304-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2013CF365) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Gerald P. Mitchell, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 3, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
C.J.   This 
appeal 
is 
before us on certification from the court of appeals.   
¶2 
Gerald Mitchell was convicted of operating while 
intoxicated and with a prohibited alcohol concentration, based 
on the test of blood drawn without a warrant while he was 
unconscious, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(b) (2013–14).1  
Mitchell contends that the blood draw was a search conducted in 
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.   
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
2 
 
¶3 
We conclude that Mitchell voluntarily consented to a 
blood draw by his conduct of driving on Wisconsin's roads and 
drinking to a point evidencing probable cause of intoxication.  
Further, through drinking to the point of unconsciousness, 
Mitchell forfeited all opportunity, including the statutory 
opportunity under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4), to withdraw his 
consent 
previously 
given; 
and 
therefore, 
§ 343.305(3)(b) 
applied, which under the totality of circumstances herein 
presented 
reasonably 
permitted 
drawing 
Mitchell's 
blood.  
Accordingly, we affirm Mitchell's convictions.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
On the afternoon of May 30, 2013, officers from the 
City of Sheboygan Police Department were dispatched in response 
to a report that the caller had seen Mitchell, who appeared 
intoxicated, get into a gray van and drive away.  Between 30 and 
45 minutes later, Officer Alex Jaeger made contact with 
Mitchell.  He found Mitchell walking near a beach.  Mitchell was 
wet, shirtless and covered in sand.  Mitchell's speech was 
slurred and he had difficulty maintaining his balance. 
¶5 
Mitchell admitted to Jaeger that he had been drinking 
prior to driving and that he continued drinking at the beach.  
He also stated that he had parked his vehicle "because he felt 
he was too drunk to drive."  Nearby, officers found the gray van 
Mitchell was reported to have been driving. 
¶6 
After observing Mitchell's physical condition, Jaeger 
believed that it would not be safe to conduct standard field 
sobriety tests.  Instead, he administered a preliminary breath 
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
3 
 
test, which indicated a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 
0.24.2  Jaeger then arrested Mitchell for operating while 
intoxicated. 
¶7 
Following his arrest, and during the drive to the 
police station, Mitchell's physical condition deteriorated and 
his demeanor became more "lethargic."  Upon arrival at the 
police station, it became apparent that an evidentiary breath 
test would not be feasible.  Instead, Jaeger opted to transport 
Mitchell to a nearby hospital for a blood draw. 
¶8 
During the approximately eight-minute drive to the 
hospital, Mitchell "appeared to be completely incapacitated, 
[and] would not wake up with any type of stimulation."  Upon 
arriving at the hospital, Mitchell needed to be transported in a 
wheelchair where he sat "slumped over" and unable to maintain an 
upright seating position. 
¶9 
After Mitchell entered the hospital emergency room, 
Jaeger read Mitchell the Informing the Accused form, thereby 
reading Mitchell the statutory opportunity to withdraw his 
consent 
to 
a 
blood 
draw. 
 
However, 
Mitchell 
was 
"so 
incapacitated [that] he could not answer."  Jaeger directed 
hospital staff to draw a sample of Mitchell's blood.3  They did 
so.  Mitchell did not awaken during the procedure.   
                                                 
2 Preliminary breath tests are not sufficient evidence to 
prove prohibited alcohol concentrations at trial.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.303.  
3 There was no warrant sought prior to drawing Mitchell's 
blood. 
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
4 
 
¶10 The 
blood 
draw 
occurred 
approximately 
one 
hour 
following Mitchell's arrest.  The analysis of his blood sample 
showed a BAC of 0.222. 
¶11 Mitchell was subsequently charged with driving with a 
prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC), as well as operating a 
motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), as a 7th offense.  Prior 
to trial, Mitchell moved to suppress the results of the blood 
test.  He alleged that the warrantless blood draw violated his 
rights 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
¶12 In response to Mitchell's motion, the State contended 
that he had consented to the blood draw when he drove his van on 
Wisconsin highways according to a subsection of Wisconsin's 
implied-consent law, Wis. Stat. § 343.305(2).  The State also 
contended that as an unconscious person, he is presumed not to 
have withdrawn his consent, pursuant to § 343.305(3)(b).  The 
State expressly stated that it was not relying on exigent 
circumstances to justify the blood draw. 
¶13 The circuit court4 denied Mitchell's suppression motion 
in reliance on Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(b).  The circuit court 
concluded that the officer had probable cause to believe that 
Mitchell was driving while intoxicated, and therefore, the blood 
                                                 
4 The Honorable Terence T. Bourke of Sheboygan County 
presided. 
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
5 
 
draw was lawful.  A jury convicted Mitchell of the OWI and PAC 
charges. 
¶14 Mitchell appealed his conviction based on the sole 
contention that the warrantless blood draw violated his Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from "unreasonable searches and 
seizures."   
¶15 The court of appeals, noting the opportunity to 
clarify the law in light of our recent decision in State v. 
Howes, 2017 WI 18, 373 Wis. 2d 468, 893 N.W.2d 812,5 certified 
the following questions:  (1) whether "implied-consent," the 
potential for which is described in Wis. Stat. §§ 343.305(2) & 
(3)(a), which arises through a driver's voluntary conduct in 
operating a vehicle on Wisconsin roadways after drinking to 
intoxication, 
is 
constitutionally 
sufficient 
consent, 
and 
(2) whether a warrantless blood draw from an unconscious person 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(b) violates the Fourth 
Amendment.   
                                                 
5 The court of appeals, noting that two of its prior cases 
had reached opposite conclusions, asked us to clarify whether 
implied consent is equivalent to constitutionally sufficient 
consent.  Compare State v. Padley, 2014 WI App 65, 354 
Wis. 2d 545, 849 N.W.2d 867 (holding that implied consent is not 
constitutionally sufficient consent), with State v. Wintlend, 
2002 WI App 314, 258 Wis. 2d 875, 655 N.W.2d 745 (holding that 
implied consent is constitutionally sufficient).  See also Cook 
v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 171, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (concluding 
that the court of appeals does not have the power to overrule or 
modify one of its published opinions). 
 
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
6 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶16 Whether a suppression motion was properly denied 
presents a question of constitutional fact.  Howes, 373 Wis. 2d 
468, ¶17 (citing State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶27, 359 
Wis. 2d 421, 857 N.W.2d 120).  We will not set aside a circuit 
court's findings of historical fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  State v. Brereton, 2013 WI 17, ¶17, 345 Wis. 2d 563, 
826 N.W.2d 369.  However, the application of those facts to 
Fourth Amendment principles presents a question of law that we 
review independently.  Id. 
B.  Fourth Amendment General Principles 
¶17 The 
Fourth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution, and its Wisconsin counterpart, Article I, Section 
11 of the Wisconsin Constitution,6 protect persons' rights to "be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures."  U.S. Const., amend. IV; 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 11.  "As the text makes clear, the 
ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness."  
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) 
(quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)).  As 
a result, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches 
undertaken by government actors, but "merely proscribes those 
                                                 
6 "Historically, we have interpreted Article I, Section 11 
of the Wisconsin Constitution in accord with the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment."  State v. Arias, 2008 
WI 84, ¶20, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748. 
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
7 
 
which are unreasonable."  Howes, 373 Wis. 2d 468, ¶21 (quoting 
Tullberg, 359 Wis. 2d 421, ¶29 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 
U.S. 248, 250 (1991))).   
¶18 Drawing blood is a search of the person.  Birchfield 
v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2173 (2016) 
(stating that "our cases establish that the taking of a blood 
sample or the administration of a breath test is a search"); 
Howes, 373 Wis. 2d 468, ¶20 (concluding that a blood draw is a 
search).  Furthermore, a warrantless search is "presumptively 
unreasonable."  State v. Brar, 2017 WI 73, ¶16, 376 Wis. 2d 685, 
898 N.W.2d 499 (quoting Tullberg, 359 Wis. 2d 421, ¶30).  
¶19 However, "there are certain 'specifically established 
and well-delineated' exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's 
warrant requirement."  Brar, 376 Wis. 2d 685, ¶16 (quoting State 
v. Williams, 2002 WI 94, ¶18, 255 Wis. 2d 1, 646 N.W.2d 834).  
One such exception is a search conducted pursuant to consent.  
Brar, 376 Wis. 2d 685, ¶16.  Warrantless consent searches are 
reasonable; and therefore, they are consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 
Fernandez 
v. 
California, 
571 
U.S. 292, 
134 
S. Ct. 1126, 1137 (2014); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 
218, 222 (1973).   
C.  Consent 
¶20 In determining whether consent was given, we employ a 
two-step process.  First, we examine whether relevant words, 
gestures or conduct supports a finding of consent.  State v. 
Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶30, 327 Wis. 2d 392, 786 N.W.2d 430.  
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
8 
 
Second, we examine whether the consent was voluntarily given.  
Id.   
1.  Implied Consent 
¶21 As we have explained, consent to search need not be 
given verbally.  State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 197, 577 
N.W.2d 794 (1998) (citing United States v. Griffin, 530 
F.2d 739, 741 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Donlon, 909 F.2d 
650, 652 (1st Cir. 1990) invalidated on other grounds by United 
States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519 (1st Cir. 1997)).  Consent given 
through conduct "provides a sufficient basis on which to find 
that the defendant consented to the search."  Phillips, 218 
Wis. 2d 
at 
197 
(concluding 
that 
defendant's 
affirmative 
assistance in the search of his bedroom demonstrated his consent 
to the search).  "Through conduct, an individual may impliedly 
consent to be searched."  Brar, 376 Wis. 2d 685, ¶17. 
¶22 In addition, the United States Supreme Court has 
recently explained that consent also may be shown by the context 
in which consent arises.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185.  In 
Birchfield, the Court said that "[i]t is well established that a 
search is reasonable when the subject consents, and that 
sometimes consent to a search need not be express but may be 
fairly 
inferred 
from 
context." 
 
Id. 
(internal 
citations 
omitted).  The Court's connection between context and consent 
was made in the course of Birchfield's review of searches 
incident to arrest for OWI in states that have implied-consent 
laws. 
 
Birchfield 
cited 
two 
cases 
that 
demonstrated 
constitutionally sufficient consent because of the context in 
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
9 
 
which consent was lawfully implied:  Florida v. Jardines, 569 
U.S. 1 (2013) and Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 
(1978).   
¶23 In Jardines, the Court, through Justice Scalia, 
recognized the sanctity of the home and that at the "very core" 
of the Fourth Amendment "stands 'the right of a man to retreat 
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable 
governmental intrusion,'" and that this right extended to the 
curtilage of the home, including the home's front porch.  
Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6–7 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 
365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). 
¶24 However, the Supreme Court also said that the sanctity 
of the curtilage of one's home is not absolute and certain 
permissions to enter may be implied.  Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8.  
In Jardines, the Court recognized that by putting a knocker on 
his door, the homeowner had given implicit consent for visitors 
to approach and said that the implicit granting of such 
permission "does not require fine-grained legal knowledge."  Id.  
Rather, law enforcement could approach a homeowner's front door 
"precisely because that is 'no more than any private citizen 
might do.'"  Id.  (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 
(2011)).  The Court recognized that a homeowner who places a 
knocker on his front door impliedly invites visitors to approach 
and enter upon the home's curtilage.  Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8.  
Stated otherwise, in the context established by the homeowner, 
consent to enter the curtilage and approach the front door was 
given.   
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
10 
 
¶25 The other decision referenced in Birchfield, Marshall 
v. Barlow's, Inc., noted that while generally the Fourth 
Amendment 
prohibits 
searches 
without 
a 
warrant, 
certain 
businesses and industries are subject to exception.  Marshall, 
436 U.S. at 313.  Indeed, "pervasively regulated business[es]" 
and "'closely regulated' industries 'long subject to close 
supervision and inspection,'" are subject to warrant exceptions 
for certain searches.  Id. (quoting Colonnade Catering Corp. v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 72, 73-75, 77 (1970) (wherein the Court 
held that the statutory right to enter and inspect a facility 
authorized to serve liquor required no warrant for the search).   
¶26 The Fourth Amendment exception upheld in Colonnade was 
grounded in "unique circumstances" in that "[c]ertain industries 
have such a history of government oversight that no reasonable 
expectation of privacy, could exist for a proprietor over the 
stock of such an enterprise."  Marshall, 436 U.S. at 313 
(internal citation omitted).  Referring to the liquor and 
firearms industries, the Court said that "when an entrepreneur 
embarks upon such a business, he has voluntarily chosen to 
subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation."  
Id.  According to the Court, businesses in these industries are 
part of "a long tradition of close government supervision, of 
which any person who chooses to enter such a business must 
already be aware."  Id.  By choosing to participate in certain 
businesses, 
the 
Court 
concluded 
that 
those 
persons 
had 
"accept[ed] the burdens as well as the benefits of their trade," 
in a manner different from other businesses and thus "in effect 
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
11 
 
consents to the restrictions placed upon him."  Id.  Once again, 
it was the context in which such businesses are operated that 
evidenced voluntary consent to be subjected to significant 
governmental regulation.  Stated otherwise, the context in which 
one operates a business involved in alcohol or firearms had a 
well-known history of significant governmental regulation such 
that an owner of such a business would have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy from governmental oversight of his 
business.  Id.   
¶27 Birchfield's discussion of the relationship between 
context and consent instructs that context is part of the 
totality of circumstances that courts should review when consent 
to search is at issue.  In regard to the context of highway 
regulation, we note that the statutes at issue here are the 
legislature's attempt to stop the injuries and deaths drunken 
drivers inflict year after year on others who use Wisconsin 
highways.7  That drunken driving has resulted in and necessarily 
increased state regulation of the privilege of driving on public 
roadways is well known.  Therefore, the context of well-
publicized 
regulations 
forms 
part 
of 
the 
totality 
of 
circumstances we examine to determine whether a driver who has 
been arrested for OWI consented to be searched.     
                                                 
7 The same is true across the nation.  For example, it has 
been reported that in 2016 drunken driving took one life  
every 
50 
minutes 
in 
the 
United 
States. 
 
See 
National  
Highway 
Traffic 
Safety 
Administration, 
Drunk 
Driving, 
https://www.nhtsa.gov/risky-driving/drunk-driving (last visited 
June 25, 2018).   
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
12 
 
¶28 Some of the regulations to which drivers consent have 
never been challenged.  For example, they agree to drive on the 
right side of the road, Wis. Stat. § 346.05; to yield the right-
of-way to emergency vehicles, Wis. Stat. § 346.19; to comply 
with posted speed limits, Wis. Stat. § 346.57(4); and not to 
drive with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration, Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(b). 
 
While 
these 
regulations 
do 
not 
have 
implications for constitutional rights, drivers do not sign a 
form acknowledging these obligations each time they get into 
their vehicle; yet, they are held accountable and required to 
abide by each of them because they chose to drive a vehicle upon 
public highways.   
¶29 Just as Wisconsin drivers consent to the above-listed 
obligations by their conduct of driving on Wisconsin's roads, in 
the context of significant, well-publicized laws designed to 
curb drunken driving, they also consent to an evidentiary 
drawing of blood upon a showing of probable cause to believe 
that they operated vehicles while intoxicated.8  This qualified 
consent to search is required in order to exercise the privilege 
of driving in Wisconsin.9  As Birchfield explained, implied 
consent laws condition "the privilege of driving on state roads 
                                                 
8 Of course, probable cause to believe that a driver is 
operating while intoxicated is sufficient to arrest the driver.  
9 Probable cause to believe that a driver operated a vehicle 
while intoxicated is required before the driver must provide 
samples of breath, blood or urine.  Wis. Stat. §§ 343.305(2) & 
(3)(a).   
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
13 
 
and [] the privilege would be rescinded if a suspected drunk 
driver refused to honor that condition."  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. 
at 2169.  Consent is complete at the moment the driver begins to 
operate a vehicle upon Wisconsin roadways if the driver 
evidences probable cause to believe that he or she is operating 
a vehicle while intoxicated.  Wis. Stat. §§ 343.305(2) & 
(3)(a).10   
¶30 As acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court, 
driving on state highways is a privilege; it is not a right.  
Id.  In Wisconsin, it is a statutory privilege that comes with 
                                                 
10 The point in time when a driver consents has been 
described in various ways based on the facts of the case and the 
arguments of counsel.  For example, in Wintlend, 258 Wis. 2d 
875, the court of appeals addressed Wintlend's argument that the 
officer's reading the Informing the Accused form to him coerced 
consent.  Id., ¶8.  The court rejected his argument and 
concluded that the statutory terms chosen by the legislature 
demonstrated that consent had been given before Wintlend was 
read the Informing the Accused form.  Id., ¶16.   
In State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 191, 289 N.W.2d 828 (1980), 
Neitzel's license was suspended for 60 days for his unreasonable 
refusal to permit chemical testing.  Id. at 192.  Neitzel argued 
that the refusal was not unreasonable because he had asked to 
consult his attorney before deciding and his request was denied.  
Id. at 193.  In dismissing Neitzel's argument, we said that 
under the circumstances no right to counsel was provided.  Id.  
We also explained that a driver must be arrested before he or 
she could be asked to submit to chemical testing, but custody at 
that point did not implicate a right to counsel.  Id. at 200.  
Because the focus in Neitzel was on an alleged right to counsel, 
our discussion addressed that concern.  However, our discussion 
herein explains why constitutionally sufficient consent occurs 
when a driver operates a vehicle on Wisconsin's highways and 
drinks or uses drugs to a point where the driver exhibits 
probable cause that he or she is intoxicated.   
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
14 
 
statutory obligations when that privilege is exercised.  Steeno 
v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 663, 671, 271 N.W.2d 396 (1978) ("The 
granting of an automobile license to operate a motor vehicle is 
a privilege and not an inherent right."). 
¶31 The United States Supreme Court recognized that 
implied consent laws are the context in which constitutionally 
sufficient consent for chemical testing may be given when it 
opined, "our prior opinions have referred approvingly to the 
general concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil 
penalties and evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse 
to comply. . . .  [N]othing we say here should be read to cast 
doubt on them."  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185.   
¶32 Birchfield also established a "categorical" rule that 
a breath test does not implicate "significant privacy concerns," 
and therefore, a warrant is not needed to administer a breath 
test.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2176-84.  This is an 
interesting 
conclusion 
because 
of 
the 
Court's 
previous 
statements that there are no bright-line rules for determining 
when a warrant is not required.  See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 
U.S. 141, 158 (2013).  It is also interesting because a driver's 
bodily alcohol concentration can be determined from evidentiary 
breath tests as well as from blood tests.   
¶33 Birchfield went on to explain, "It is another matter, 
however, for a State not only to insist upon an intrusive blood 
test, but also to impose criminal penalties on the refusal to 
submit to such a test.  There must be a limit to the 
consequences to which motorists may be deemed to have consented 
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
15 
 
by virtue of a decision to drive on public roads."  Birchfield, 
136 S. Ct. at 2185 (emphasis added).  The limit on the 
consequences of the decision to drive while intoxicated was the 
imposition of criminal penalties for refusing to permit a blood 
draw.  Id.   
¶34 Criminal penalties for withdrawing consent to a blood 
draw were beyond the scope of implied-consent laws because there 
was an insufficient nexus between the consequence of criminal 
penalties and choosing to drive on the highways in those states 
that imposed criminal penalties for withdrawing consent to 
provide a blood sample for testing.  Id. at 2186.  In Wisconsin, 
the consequences of refusing to permit a blood draw are civil 
and evidentiary, not criminal.  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4).   
¶35 Relevant to assessing future challenges to refusal to 
submit to a blood draw, the Supreme Court adopted the following 
standard:  motorists are "deemed to have consented to only those 
conditions that are 'reasonable' in that they have a 'nexus' to 
the 
privilege 
of 
driving 
and 
entail 
penalties 
that 
are 
proportional to severity of the violation."  Id.  When applying 
that standard, the Court concluded that "motorists cannot be 
deemed to have consented to submit to a blood test on pain of 
committing a criminal offense [for refusing to submit]."  Id.  
However, imposing "civil penalties and evidentiary consequences" 
on motorists who refuse to submit to a blood draw are 
permissible because civil penalties, such as license revocation, 
have a nexus to driving.  Id. at 2185 (citing McNeely, 569 U.S. 
at 160-61).   
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
16 
 
¶36 Wisconsin 
imposes 
no 
criminal 
penalties 
for 
withdrawing consent previously given.  The only criminal 
consequence imposed for drunken driving in Wisconsin arises from 
repeated OWI and PAC convictions and from convictions for 
causing injury or death by intoxicated use of a vehicle.  See 
generally Wis. Stat. § 346.65.  Criminal penalties do not arise 
from 
withdrawing 
consent 
to 
blood 
draws. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(4).  All penalties for refusal are administrative and 
evidentiary.  For example, a refusal that leads to a first OWI 
conviction subjects a defendant to a license suspension and a 
forfeiture but no jail time.  Wis. Stat. §§ 343.305(4) & 
346.65(1)(a).   
¶37 Accordingly, 
we 
confirm 
that 
because 
it 
is 
constitutionally permissible to impose civil penalties as a 
consequence for refusing to submit to a blood draw, as Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(4) 
provides, 
Wisconsin's 
implied-consent 
statutes, §§ 343.305(2) & (3)(a), describe a context consistent 
with Birchfield where constitutionally sufficient consent to 
search arises through conduct.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185.  
Stated otherwise, it is not statutes that grant consent to 
search, 
but 
rather, 
consent 
is 
granted 
by 
the 
driver's 
exercising the privilege of driving on Wisconsin highways when 
he or she has imbibed sufficient alcohol or drugs to become 
intoxicated.  Furthermore, if the consent that arises when a 
driver's conduct falls within §§ 343.305(2) & (3)(a) were not 
constitutionally sufficient consent for a blood draw, there 
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
17 
 
would be no reason to provide a statutory opportunity to 
withdraw consent under § 343.305(4).    
¶38 Furthermore, we presume that drivers know the laws 
applicable to the roadways on which they drive.  State v. Weber, 
2016 WI 96, ¶78, 372 Wis. 2d 202, 887 N.W.2d 554 (Kelly, J., 
concurring).  Likewise, we also recognize, as has the United 
States Supreme Court, that in a state with civil penalties for 
refusal to submit to a blood draw, "a person suspected of drunk 
driving has no constitutional right to refuse to take a blood-
alcohol test."  South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 560 n.10 
(1983). 
¶39 In 
Neville, 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
examined 
whether 
Neville's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test could be 
used as evidence of guilt for drunken driving at his trial.  The 
circuit court of South Dakota had suppressed Neville's refusal 
to submit to a blood-alcohol test based on the circuit court's 
conclusion that evidence of refusal violated Neville's federal 
constitutional rights.  Id. at 556.  The Supreme Court reversed 
the suppression because Neville's "right to refuse the blood-
alcohol test [] is simply a matter of grace bestowed by the 
South Dakota legislature," not a constitutional right.  Id. at 
565.  As the Court further explained, because a driver had no 
constitutional right to refuse a blood-draw when there was 
probable cause to arrest for OWI, the driver's refusal could be 
used against him at trial as evidence of guilt.  Id.; see also 
Howes, 373 Wis. 2d 468, ¶62 (Gableman, J., concurring) ("[A] 
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
18 
 
driver has no statutory or constitutional right to refuse [blood 
alcohol testing] without consequences.").11 
¶40 Of course, consent voluntarily-given before a blood 
draw may be withdrawn with or without a statutory reminder.  
United States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 2005).  
However, when consent is withdrawn, civil consequences may 
follow because the opportunity to withdraw voluntarily given 
consent is not of constitutional significance.  Neville, 459 
U.S. at 565; Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4). 
¶41 The legitimacy of implied-consent laws has been 
supported repeatedly by the United States Supreme Court.  In 
McNeely, the Court stated that "[n]o one can seriously dispute 
the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States' 
interest in eradicating it."  McNeely, 569 U.S. at 160 (quoting 
Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990)).  
The Court further recognized that "drunk driving continues to 
exact a terrible toll on our society," and that "all 50 States 
have adopted implied consent laws that require motorists, as a 
condition of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to 
                                                 
11 Justices Shirley Abrahamson, Ann Walsh Bradley, Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley and Daniel Kelly manufacture a constitutional 
right to refuse blood-draws to test for blood-alcohol content of 
drivers who operate vehicles while intoxicated, notwithstanding 
the United States Supreme Court's clearly stated explanation in 
South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 560 n.10, 565 (1983), 
that drunken drivers have no constitutional right to refuse 
blood-alcohol testing.  State v. Dalton, 2018 WI 85, ¶61, __ 
Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d (manufacturing a constitutional right for 
drunken drivers to refuse blood-alcohol testing).    
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
19 
 
consent to BAC testing if they are arrested or otherwise 
detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense."  McNeely, 569 
U.S. at 160–61.   
¶42 Other states are in accord with our conclusion that 
drivers give constitutionally sufficient consent through driving 
on state highways and drinking to a point evidencing probable 
cause of intoxication.  For example, the Supreme Court of 
Colorado held that warrants need not be obtained for unconscious 
drivers as the result of their previously-given consent under 
Colorado's "Expressed Consent Statute."  People v. Hyde, 393 
P.3d 962 (Colo. 2017).  The Colorado court recognized that 
"Hyde's statutory consent satisfied the consent exception to the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement."  Id., ¶3.  Similarly, the 
Supreme Court of Kentucky has said that drivers "consent[] to 
testing by operating a vehicle in Kentucky."  Helton v. 
Commonwealth, 299 S.W.3d 555, 559 (Ky. 2009). 
¶43 As judicial opinions of other states, as well as the 
United States Supreme Court's prior statements show, "[i]mplied 
consent is not a second-tier form of consent."  Brar, 376 
Wis. 2d 685, ¶23.  Rather, when a driver chooses to operate a 
vehicle upon Wisconsin's roads, he or she does so charged with 
knowing the laws of this state.  See Byrne v. State, 12 Wis. 577 
(*519), 580 (*521) (1860).   
¶44 Those laws include Wis. Stat. §§ 343.305(2) & (3)(a) 
that function together.  Section 343.305(2) provides that anyone 
who "drives or operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways 
of this state . . . is deemed to have given consent to one or 
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
20 
 
more tests of his or her breath, blood or urine, for the purpose 
of determining the presence or quantity in his or her blood or 
breath, of [alcohol or other prohibited substances], when 
requested 
to 
do 
so 
by 
a 
law 
enforcement 
officer."  
Section 343.305(3)(a) applies when a driver is arrested based on 
probable cause to believe that he or she is intoxicated, wherein 
a driver's conduct completes his or her obligation to give 
samples of breath, blood or urine.   
¶45 In the case before us, Mitchell chose to avail himself 
of the privilege of driving upon Wisconsin's roads.  Because he 
did so while intoxicated, by his conduct he consented to the 
effect of laws that are relevant to exercising that privilege.  
He did not need to read them off one-by-one, and then sign a 
piece of paper acknowledging his consent to be subject to those 
rules and penalties for failing to follow them.  By driving in 
Wisconsin, Mitchell consented to have samples of his breath, 
blood or urine taken upon the request of a law enforcement 
officer who had probable cause to believe he was intoxicated, 
unless he withdrew such consent.  Wis. Stat. §§ 343.305(2) and 
(3)(a).   
2.  Voluntary Consent 
¶46 A determination that consent has been given is not the 
end of our inquiry, we also must determine whether the consent 
was given "freely and voluntarily."  Artic, 327 Wis. 2d 392, 
¶32.  "However, the State need not demonstrate that consent was 
given knowingly or intelligently."  Brar, 376 Wis. 2d 685, ¶26 
(citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 241 ("Nothing, either in the 
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
21 
 
purposes behind requiring a 'knowing' and 'intelligent' waiver 
of trial rights, or in the practical application of such a 
requirement suggests that it ought to be extended to the 
constitutional 
guarantee 
against 
unreasonable 
searches 
and 
seizures.")).  The concept of "'voluntariness' reflects an 
accommodation of complex, somewhat conflicting values."  Artic, 
327 Wis. 2d 392, ¶32 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 224–25). 
¶47 "The test for voluntariness is whether consent to 
search was given in the absence of duress or coercion, either 
express or implied."  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 197.  In 
evaluating the voluntariness of consent, we evaluate "the 
totality of all the surrounding circumstances."  Artic, 327 
Wis. 2d 392, ¶32 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226).  No 
single criterion controls voluntariness.  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 
at 197. 
¶48 In making a determination of voluntariness, the State 
bears the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
consent was given voluntarily.  Id.  Our determination of the 
voluntariness of consent is a mixed question of fact and law.  
Id.  In addition, voluntariness is a determination that we 
consider relative to Wis. Stat. §§ 343.305(2) & (3)(a) when a 
driver commences operation of his or her vehicle on Wisconsin 
roadways and under § 343.305(3)(b) when an unconscious driver 
has not availed himself of an opportunity to withdraw consent 
previously given.    
¶49 Consent to search that arises in the context of 
Wisconsin's implied-consent laws is voluntary in one respect 
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
22 
 
that is similar to the voluntariness of consent in Colonnade 
because Wisconsin has a long history of close governmental 
regulation of its highways in regard to drunken drivers.  Stated 
otherwise, the privilege of driving on Wisconsin highways comes 
within the context of well-publicized requirements to provide 
samples of breath, blood or urine to law enforcement who have 
probable cause to believe that the driver is intoxicated.  
¶50 We now further consider voluntary consent under four 
subsections of Wisconsin's implied-consent law at issue in the 
case before us:  Wis. Stat. §§ 343.305(2), 343.305(3)(a), 
343.305(4) and 343.305(3)(b).12 
a.  Wisconsin Stat. §§ 343.305(2) & (3)(a) 
¶51 The voluntariness of consent by conduct that occurs 
when a driver commences operation of his vehicle on Wisconsin 
roadways is unequivocal and constitutionally sufficient when he 
or she evidences the indicia of intoxication such that there is 
probable cause to believe he or she is driving under the 
influence.  Stated otherwise, voluntary consent arises through 
the effect of a driver's conduct in the context of Wisconsin 
law, Wis. Stat. §§ 343.305(2) and 343.305(3)(a).  
                                                 
12 We 
note 
that 
other 
circumstances 
are 
impacted 
by 
Wisconsin implied consent law that we do not discuss here.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2., causing death or great bodily 
harm when there is reason to believe the driver violated state 
or local traffic law.  Here, we limit our discussion to those 
circumstances where there are no facts in addition to probable 
cause to believe the driver was intoxicated.   
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
23 
 
¶52 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(2) clearly provides, "[a]ny 
person who . . . drives or operates a motor vehicle upon the 
public highways of this state . . . is deemed to have given 
consent to one or more tests of his or her breath, blood or 
urine, for the purpose of determining the presence or quantity 
in his or her blood or breath, of alcohol, controlled 
substances . . . ."  A driver's consent is conditioned on 
probable cause to believe he or she is intoxicated or has caused 
serious injury or death.  As Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(a) 
provides, "Upon arrest of a person for violation of s. 346.63(1) 
[driving while intoxicated], (2m) [underage drinking], or 
(5) [commercial driver] or . . . (2) [causing injury] . . . a 
law enforcement officer may request the person to provide one or 
more samples of his or her breath, blood or urine."  Therefore, 
as an initial matter, one consents to search by driving on 
Wisconsin roadways when one has imbibed sufficient alcohol to 
support probable cause to arrest.  The choice to drive on 
Wisconsin roadways and the choice to drink or ingest drugs to 
the point of probable cause to arrest for OWI are voluntary 
choices.    
b.  Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(4) 
¶53 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(4) provides a statutory 
opportunity to withdraw consent given under §§ 343.305(2) and 
(3)(a), when an officer has probable cause to arrest the driver.  
However, civil penalties may follow when consent is withdrawn.  
Section 343.305(4) provides in relevant part: 
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
24 
 
You have either been arrested for an offense that 
involves driving or operating a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs . . . or you 
are the operator of a vehicle that was involved in an 
accident that caused the death of, great bodily harm 
to, or substantial bodily harm to a person . . . . 
This law enforcement agency now wants to test one 
or more samples of your breath, blood or urine to 
determine the concentration of alcohol or drugs in 
your system. . . .  If you refuse to take any test 
that this agency requests, your operating privilege 
will be revoked and you will be subject to other 
penalties.  The test results or the fact that you 
refused testing can be used against you in court.13   
It is helpful to keep subsection (4) in mind when discussing 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(b), which is central to this appeal.  
¶54 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(4) provides a statutory 
opportunity to withdraw consent, even though a driver has 
operated a vehicle on Wisconsin roads and has imbibed sufficient 
alcohol to be arrested for OWI.  Of course, one may withdraw 
consent previously given with or without a statutory reminder.  
See Sanders, 424 F.3d at 774.  Nevertheless, a driver may 
                                                 
13 Justices Shirley Abrahamson, Ann Walsh Bradley, Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley and Daniel Kelly strike down, sub silentio, Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(4)'s provision that the fact of refusal can be 
used against a drunken driver in court because they label 
refusal of chemical testing a constitutional right.  Dalton, 
__Wis. 2d __, ¶61.  However, the United States Supreme Court has 
concluded that refusing to take a blood test is not of 
constitutional 
significance 
and 
can 
be 
used 
against 
the 
defendant at trial.  Neville, 459 U.S. at 565.  The majority 
opinion in Dalton and the separate writings in this case will 
create confusion in Wisconsin courts on the admissibility of 
refusal evidence because Neville has not been overruled and 
remains authoritative on whether refusal is or is not a 
constitutional right.        
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
25 
 
forfeit the driver's opportunity to withdraw consent by failing 
to timely engage it.  State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶29, 315 
Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612.  Furthermore, a defendant may 
forfeit an opportunity he or she otherwise would have by his or 
her conduct.  State v. Anthony, 2015 WI 20, ¶59, 361 Wis. 2d 
116, 860 N.W.2d 10.   
¶55 Here, Mitchell drank sufficient alcohol to render 
himself unconscious.  He had a BAC of 0.222.  It is no wonder 
that he passed out.14  Through this conduct, he forfeited all 
opportunity to withdraw the consent to search that he had given.  
c.  Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(3)(b) 
¶56 Mitchell was unconscious when his blood was drawn.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(3)(b) addresses blood draws from 
unconscious persons who have not availed themselves of the 
statutory opportunity that is provided by § 343.305(4) or 
otherwise taken steps to withdraw consent.  Some who are 
unconscious have imbibed sufficient alcohol or drugs to render 
themselves unconscious; others may be unconscious due to an 
injury sustained in an accident.  Section 343.305(3)(b) provides 
in relevant part:  
A person who is unconscious or otherwise not capable 
of withdrawing consent is presumed not to have 
withdrawn consent under this subsection, and if a law 
enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that 
                                                 
14 See National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, 
Alcohol 
Overdose: 
 
The 
Dangers 
of 
Drinking 
Too 
Much, 
https://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/AlcoholOverdoseFactsheet
/Overdosefact.htm (Oct. 2015). 
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
26 
 
the person has violated s. 346.63(1) [driving while 
intoxicated], 
(2m) 
[underage 
drinking] 
or 
(5) [commercial driver] . . . [or caused injury] one 
or more samples specified in par. (a) or (am) may be 
administered to the person. 
¶57 The Fourth Amendment question is whether drawing 
Mitchell's blood while he was unconscious was unreasonable and 
therefore in violation of Fourth Amendment's prohibitions 
against unreasonable searches.  Mitchell claims the blood draw 
was unreasonable because he was unconscious when the Informing 
the Accused form was read to him.  The State claims that the 
blood draw was reasonable because Jaeger had arrested Mitchell 
for driving while intoxicated.15   
¶58 Mitchell's self-induced physical condition does not 
render Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(b)'s presumption unreasonable 
under the totality of circumstances applicable to our Fourth 
                                                 
15 The State's contention could be read to assert that the 
blood draw was a search incident to arrest within the 
traditional 
exception 
to 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment's 
warrant 
requirement.   
Mitchell's blood draw parallels the search incident to 
arrest doctrine, as probable cause to arrest Mitchell for 
driving while intoxicated is fully supported by the record.  
That a search incident to arrest is an exception to the warrant 
requirement is an important principle to keep in mind.  This is 
so because all unconscious drivers are not subjected to a blood 
draw under Wisconsin implied consent laws.  Only those drivers 
for whom "a law enforcement officer has probable cause to 
believe that the person has violated [laws regulating use of 
intoxicants]" can be searched.  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(b).  
This limitation also is consistent with the reasonableness 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.  For an unconscious driver, 
a blood draw is the only means by which to obtain evidence of 
the crime for which he or she has been charged. 
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
27 
 
Amendment discussion.  First, by exercising the privilege of 
driving on Wisconsin highways, Mitchell's conduct demonstrated 
consent to provide breath, blood or urine samples to be tested 
in accord with §§ 343.305(2) & (3)(a) if law enforcement had 
probable cause to believe that he had operated his vehicle while 
intoxicated.  Second, Jaeger had probable cause to arrest 
Mitchell for driving while intoxicated.  His speech was slurred; 
he smelled of alcohol; he had difficulty maintaining his 
balance; his preliminary breath test showed a BAC of 0.24, which 
indicates significant intoxication.  Third, Mitchell chose to 
drink sufficient alcohol to produce unconsciousness.  Fourth, by 
his conduct, Mitchell forfeited the statutory opportunity to 
assert that he had "withdrawn consent" he previously gave.  
Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶29; Anthony, 361 Wis. 2d 116, ¶59.   
¶59 Therefore, under the totality of circumstances as 
applied to Mitchell, Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(b)'s presumption is 
reasonable. 
 
Accordingly, 
drawing 
Mitchell's 
blood 
was 
reasonable, and no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. 
¶60 Because we conclude that consent given by drivers 
whose conduct falls within the parameters of Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305 is constitutionally sufficient consent to withstand 
Fourth 
Amendment 
scrutiny, 
and 
although 
consent 
must 
be 
voluntary, it need not be knowing, we overrule State v. Padley, 
2014 WI App 65, 354 Wis. 2d 545, 849 N.W.2d 867.  We do so for 
two reasons.  First, we clarify that Padley has no precedential 
effect because its holding is in direct conflict with an 
earlier, published court of appeals decision, State v. Wintlend, 
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
28 
 
2002 WI App 314, 258 Wis. 2d 875, 655 N.W.2d 745.  Cook v. Cook, 
208 Wis. 2d 166, 171, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (concluding that the 
court of appeals cannot overrule or modify one of its published 
opinions).  Second,  Padley is simply wrong as a matter of law.  
There, the court of appeals said that "implied consent" is 
different than "actual consent," and that actual consent is 
given only when a driver affirms his or her previously-given 
implied consent after being read the Informing the Accused form.  
See Padley, 354 Wis. 2d 545, ¶38.  The court also incorporated 
the concept of "knowingly" into consent law.  Id., ¶62.  Under 
the reasoning in Padley, driving on Wisconsin highways and 
drinking, using drugs or being involved in an accident causing 
death or serious bodily injury while violating a state or local 
traffic law does not provide constitutionally sufficient consent 
through conduct.  We conclude otherwise.      
¶61 The question that remains in regard to Mitchell is 
whether Wis. Stat. § 343.304(3)(b)'s presumption that consent 
has not been withdrawn is reasonable for a driver who has 
suffered an injury rendering him or her unconscious, but for 
whom there is probable cause to believe that he or she operated 
a 
vehicle 
in 
violation 
of 
laws 
regulating 
the 
use 
of 
intoxicants.   
¶62 We begin by noting that all drivers, by their conduct, 
consent to provide samples of their breath, blood or urine when 
requested by law enforcement personnel who have probable cause 
to 
arrest 
for 
driving 
while 
intoxicated. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 343.305(2) & (3)(a).  We also recognize that consent to 
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
29 
 
search once given may be withdrawn.  See Sanders, 424 F.3d at 
774.  Although no magic words are required to withdraw consent, 
the intent to withdraw must be unequivocal.  Id.  Withdrawal of 
consent given under implied-consent laws also may be withdrawn.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(4) reminds drivers of the opportunity 
to "withdraw" consent previously given.  See also State v. 
Arrotta, 339 P.3d 1177, 1178 (Idaho 2014) (concluding that under 
Idaho implied-consent laws, a suspected drunken driver can 
withdraw his or her consent to test for the presence of 
alcohol).  However, for many unconscious drivers, it may be that 
they have taken no steps to demonstrate unequivocal intent to 
withdraw consent previously given.    
¶63 Furthermore, the opportunity to refuse a blood test 
when there is probable cause to believe the driver is 
intoxicated is not of constitutional significance, as is shown 
by Supreme Court jurisprudence concluding that withdrawal of 
consent may be used as evidence of guilt at trial.  State v. 
Crandall, 133 Wis. 2d 251, 255, 394 N.W.2d 905 (1986) (citing 
Neville, 
459 
U.S. 
at 
565 
(concluding 
that 
it 
is 
not 
"fundamentally unfair for South Dakota to use the refusal to 
take the test as evidence of guilt, even though respondent was 
not specifically warned that his refusal could be used against 
him at trial")).   
¶64 In addition, Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(b)'s presumption 
affects only unconscious drivers for whom law enforcement has 
probable cause to believe that the driver has violated statutory 
proscriptions on use of intoxicants.  Therefore, those drivers 
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
30 
 
who are unconscious but for whom law enforcement does not have 
probable cause to believe they drove while intoxicated will not 
be subject to the presumption of § 343.305(3)(b).   
¶65 For drivers for whom the presumption applies, Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(3)(b) is consistent with United States Supreme 
Court precedent that a warrantless search at arrest does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment when there is consent given prior 
to the search.  United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 
(1973); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222.  Therefore, we conclude 
that under the totality of circumstances the presumption of 
§ 343.305(3)(b) is reasonable.  Accordingly, it does not violate 
Fourth Amendment rights of one for whom law enforcement has 
probable cause to believe he or she operated a vehicle after 
consuming alcohol or drugs to the point of intoxication.     
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶66 We conclude that Mitchell voluntarily consented to a 
blood draw by his conduct of driving on Wisconsin's roads and 
drinking to a point evidencing probable cause of intoxication.  
Further, through drinking to the point of unconsciousness, 
Mitchell forfeited all opportunity, including the statutory 
opportunity under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4), to withdraw his 
consent 
previously 
given; 
and 
therefore, 
§ 343.305(3)(b) 
applied, which under the totality of circumstances reasonably 
permitted drawing Mitchell's blood.  Accordingly, we affirm 
Mitchell's convictions.  
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
affirmed.   
No. 
2015AP304-CR   
 
31 
 
 
No.  2015AP304-CR.dk 
 
1 
 
¶67 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring).  I do not believe the 
state can waive the people's constitutional protections against 
the state.  I nonetheless concur because performing a blood draw 
on an unconscious individual who has been arrested for operating 
a motor vehicle while intoxicated in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.63 ("OWI") is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 
¶68 This is not the first time we have considered whether 
a law enforcement officer may perform a blood draw on an 
individual 
pursuant 
to 
"consent" 
granted 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305.  Last term we considered whether such "implied 
consent" can satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.  See State v. Brar, 2017 WI 73, 
¶¶15, 28-29, 376 Wis. 2d 685, 898 N.W.2d 99 (lead opinion).  No 
opinion attracted a majority of the court.  I concurred because 
Mr. Brar was conscious and had provided express consent to a 
blood draw, a point on which a majority of the court agreed.  
However, 
because 
the 
court 
nonetheless 
addressed 
the 
constitutionality of the implied consent statute, I also 
explained why I believe that "implied consent" is actually 
consent granted by the legislature, not the suspect, and why 
legislative consent cannot satisfy the mandates of our State and 
Federal 
Constitutions. 
 
See 
id., 
¶¶44, 
59 
(Kelly, 
J., 
concurring); see also id., ¶15 & n.6 (lead opinion) (discussing 
                                                 
1 I join paragraphs 1-2 and 4-28 of the lead opinion. 
No.  2015AP304-CR.dk 
 
2 
 
federal and state constitutional provisions).  I incorporate 
that analysis here in toto. 
¶69 The court today is even more ambitious than it was in 
Brar.  Legislatively-granted consent to perform a blood draw is 
justified, the court says, for the same reasons certain searches 
of pervasively-regulated businesses do not require warrants.  
Lead op., ¶¶25-28 (citing Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 
U.S. 307 (1978); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 
U.S. 72 (1970)).  But the court misunderstands the significance 
of that line of cases.  The searches considered there were not 
reasonable because a legislature said they were; they were 
reasonable because they did not intrude on the affected person's 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  In Colonnade Catering, for 
example, the United States Supreme Court surveyed the regulatory 
history of the liquor industry, reaching as far back as England 
of the eighteenth century.  Colonnade Catering, 397 U.S. at 75.  
The whole point of rehearsing that history was to demonstrate 
that a liquor retailer had no reasonable expectation his 
premises would be free from regular governmental inspection.  
See id.  Therefore, the congressionally-developed inspection 
regime at issue in Colonnade Catering was constitutional because 
it operated in an area in which the retailer had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  The United States Supreme Court has 
treated the firearm industry in a similar fashion.  In United 
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), the Court said "[i]t is 
also apparent that if the law is to be properly enforced and 
inspection made effective, inspections without warrant must be 
No.  2015AP304-CR.dk 
 
3 
 
deemed reasonable official conduct under the Fourth Amendment."  
Id. at 316.  Although the Court chose a stilted means of 
explaining itself, it is apparent the Court had concluded that 
the inspection regime in that case did not reach into an area in 
which the pawn dealer had a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
See id.  The "pervasive-regulation" doctrine, therefore, allows 
warrantless inspection regimes only when the nature of the 
business at issue is such that the proprietor does not have an 
expectation of privacy. 
¶70 The court should not venture into the "pervasive-
regulation" arm of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence without a 
great deal of fear and trepidation.  The rationale justifying 
this doctrine is too easy to abuse.  If increased regulation 
decreases the areas in which individuals have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, then the Fourth Amendment's protections 
are effectively contingent on the reach of the regulatory state.  
Through combined legislative and executive activity, oceans of 
regulations can wear away zones of privacy, allowing warrantless 
inspection regimes to follow in their wake. 
¶71 Today's decision is a good example of the doctrine's 
erosive power.  Driving, the court observes, is subject to many 
regulations, what with all the rules about staying on the right 
side of the road, speed limits, interactions with emergency 
vehicles, et cetera.  The court could have mined that vein even 
more deeply than it did——under any definition, driving truly is 
pervasively-regulated.  The temptation to reach for the doctrine 
under these circumstances is nearly irresistible.  And why 
No.  2015AP304-CR.dk 
 
4 
 
wouldn't it be?  It fairly demands to be heard here.  But this 
is a powerful and unruly force, and when the United States 
Supreme Court set it in motion, it impressed on the doctrine no 
internal logic capable of limiting its reach. 
¶72 The court thinks to wield this doctrine here with 
limited 
effect——after 
all, 
we 
are 
simply 
justifying 
a 
warrantless blood draw.  But the court misapprehends how the 
doctrine functions and, therefore, its consequences.  If we are 
of a mind that this doctrine justifies the implied consent law, 
we may do so only if we first conclude that regulatory 
pervasiveness has removed the subject of its operation from the 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  See Colonnade Catering, 397 
U.S. at 75; Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316.  That is to say, because 
driving 
is 
pervasively 
regulated, 
those 
who 
travel 
on 
Wisconsin's highways have no reasonable expectation of privacy 
as they engage in that activity.  And if that is true, it would 
sweep away a large body of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as it 
relates to traffic stops, searches of automobiles, searches of 
drivers and passengers, et cetera.  Wielding this doctrine as 
the court does today, if we are serious about its application, 
calves off a substantial piece of the Fourth Amendment. 
¶73 For these reasons, and the reasons I discussed in my 
Brar concurrence, I conclude that the consent implied by Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305 cannot justify the blood draw performed on Mr. 
Mitchell. 
No.  2015AP304-CR.dk 
 
5 
 
* 
¶74 But this case is not Brar, and different reasons 
justify the blood draw here.  The most important distinction 
between the two cases is this:  Mr. Mitchell was not conscious 
when the law enforcement officer determined that a blood draw 
was necessary.  No Supreme Court decision has yet opined 
directly on whether a warrant is necessary to perform a blood 
draw under these circumstances; I believe the interplay among 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), Missouri v. 
McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013), and Birchfield v. North Dakota, 
136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), leave that question open.  Their 
combined rationale, however, indicates that no warrant is 
necessary to perform a blood draw when an individual has been 
arrested for OWI, the suspect is unconscious, and there is a 
risk of losing critical evidence through the human body's 
natural metabolization of alcohol. 
¶75 For more than half a century now the United States 
Supreme Court has recognized that warrantless blood draws can be 
constitutional.  In Schmerber, the Supreme Court recognized that 
exigent circumstances can justify a warrantless blood draw from 
an individual arrested on OWI charges.  See Schmerber, 384 U.S. 
at 770-71.  It said the human body's natural metabolization of 
alcohol could, under the right circumstances, cause an officer 
to "reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an 
emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, 
under 
the 
circumstances, 
threatened 
'the 
destruction 
of 
evidence.'"  Id. at 770 (citation omitted). 
No.  2015AP304-CR.dk 
 
6 
 
¶76 More recently, the State of Missouri pressed the 
Supreme Court to adopt a rule that the natural metabolization of 
alcohol in the bloodstream presents a per se exigency.  McNeely, 
569 U.S. at 151-52.  The Court refused, but confirmed the 
continuing vitality of the rule that the proper circumstances 
will still justify a warrantless blood draw.  "We do not doubt," 
the Court said, "that some circumstances will make obtaining a 
warrant impractical such that the dissipation of alcohol from 
the bloodstream will support an exigency justifying a properly 
conducted warrantless blood test."  Id. at 153.  Therefore, 
"[w]hether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect 
is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the 
totality of the circumstances."  Id. at 156. 
¶77 The constitutionality of a warrantless blood draw 
returned to the Supreme Court in the context of the "search 
incident to arrest" doctrine in Birchfield.  136 S. Ct. at 2179, 
2185.  There, the Court said this doctrine justifies a 
warrantless breath test when the individual has been arrested 
for OWI; however, it does not justify a warrantless blood draw 
(at least when the suspect is conscious).  See id. at 2185.  In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court placed heavy emphasis on the 
differing levels of intrusiveness between the two tests.  Id. at 
2178.  Thus, for example, it said that "[b]ecause breath tests 
are significantly less intrusive than blood tests and in most 
cases amply serve law enforcement interests, we conclude that a 
breath test, but not a blood test, may be administered as a 
No.  2015AP304-CR.dk 
 
7 
 
search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk driving."  Id. at 
2185. 
¶78 Availability of the breath test, however, was the 
driving motivation for its ruling.  In the absence of such an 
option, 
the 
reasonableness 
of 
a 
warrantless 
blood 
test 
increases: 
We reach a different conclusion with respect to 
blood tests.  Blood tests are significantly more 
intrusive, and their reasonableness must be judged in 
light of the availability of the less invasive 
alternative of a breath test.  Respondents have 
offered no satisfactory justification for demanding 
the more intrusive alternative without a warrant. 
Id. at 2184. 
¶79 Combining the reasoning of Schmerber, McNeely, and 
Birchfield provides the necessary guidance for Mr. Mitchell's 
case.  Schmerber established the ground-rule principle that a 
warrantless blood draw can be constitutional.  See Schmerber, 
384 U.S. at 770-71.  McNeely refined the Schmerber holding when 
it 
explained 
that, 
under 
the 
right 
circumstances, 
"the 
dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream will support an 
exigency justifying a properly conducted warrantless blood 
test."  See McNeely, 569 U.S. at 153.  Birchfield added two 
important pieces to the analysis.  First, it established that an 
individual arrested for OWI may be searched incident to his 
arrest for evidence of intoxication without a warrant.  See 
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184.  And second, it determined that 
the method by which law enforcement conducts the search (by 
breath 
test 
as 
opposed 
to 
blood 
test) 
depends 
on 
the 
availability of the less-intrusive option.  See id. at 2185. 
No.  2015AP304-CR.dk 
 
8 
 
¶80 Here is how the Supreme Court's instructions apply in 
this case.  Mr. Mitchell, of course, was arrested for OWI, so 
Schmerber and McNeely recognize that critical evidence of his 
intoxication was continually metabolizing away.  They also 
explain that although metabolization alone would not support a 
warrantless blood draw, when combined with other elements it 
may.  Birchfield says his privacy interest in the evidence of 
intoxication within his body is no longer a factor because the 
"search incident to arrest" doctrine is a recognized exception 
to the warrant requirement.  So the only question remaining is 
whether the search should be conducted via a breath test or a 
blood test.  Birchfield tells us that we must consider the 
availability of the less intrusive test in making this decision.  
Mr. Mitchell, however, was unconscious, so the breath test was 
not an option.  A warrantless blood test was reasonable, 
therefore, because he had been arrested for OWI, evidence of the 
offense was continually dissipating, there was no telling how 
long he would be unconscious, his privacy interest in the 
evidence of intoxication within his body had been eviscerated by 
the arrest, and no less intrusive means were available to obtain 
the evanescent evidence. 
¶81 I recognize that Birchfield holds a cautionary note 
about blood tests performed on unconscious suspects, but it 
appears to be in the form of an explanation for why the Court 
devoted just two sentences to the subject: 
It is true that a blood test, unlike a breath 
test, 
may 
be 
administered 
to 
a 
person 
who 
is 
unconscious (perhaps as a result of a crash) or who is 
unable to do what is needed to take a breath test due 
No.  2015AP304-CR.dk 
 
9 
 
to profound intoxication or injuries.  But we have no 
reason to believe that such situations are common in 
drunk-driving arrests, and when they arise, the police 
may apply for a warrant if need be. 
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184-85.  Nothing in the opinion 
indicates the Supreme Court considered how its analytical 
structure would apply in the context of an unconscious suspect 
arrested for OWI, and it would be too much like reading tea 
leaves to give any substantive weight to a statement that simply 
gives the Court's reasons for not addressing the question we are 
deciding.2 
                                                 
2 The dissent believes Birchfield has already answered this 
question, and therefore concludes my "analytical exercise 
ultimately 
fails 
because 
it 
cannot 
be 
reconciled 
with 
Birchfield's central holding:  'a breath test, but not a blood 
test, may be administered as a search incident to a lawful 
arrest for drunk driving.'"  Dissent, ¶101 n.6 (quoting 
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016)) 
(emphasis omitted).  The Supreme Court stated that central 
holding, however, in the context of a suspect who, unlike Mr. 
Mitchell, was conscious.  This is a distinction that Birchfield 
itself advanced, so it's entirely justifiable to explore its 
significance, as I have done in this opinion. 
But there is an even more important reason the dissent 
should be chary of finding such a categorical prohibition in 
that precedent:  Birchfield is not comfortable in its own skin.  
Its central logic is actually self-contradictory, which explains 
why both the court and the dissent are able to call on it for 
support.  If the Supreme Court had endorsed implied-consent laws 
as sufficient to authorize a breath or blood test (as our court 
says), then it would have held that implied consent justified 
the breath test.  But it didn't.  It said the "search incident 
to 
arrest" 
exception 
to 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment's 
warrant 
requirement justified the breath test.  On the other hand, if 
Birchfield forbids blood draws pursuant to an implied-consent 
law, as the dissent claims, then such a law could not justify 
the breath test either, inasmuch as the law either provides 
constitutionally-sound consent for both, or for neither. 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP304-CR.dk 
 
10 
 
* 
¶82 Apropos of nothing relevant to this case, the lead 
opinion says a quartet of the court's members, including the 
author of this concurrence and the justice who joins it, "label 
refusal of chemical testing a constitutional right [in State v. 
Dalton, 2018 WI 85, ¶61, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __]."  See 
lead op., ¶53 n.13.  If the lead opinion means to say that we 
understand the people of Wisconsin have a constitutionally-
protected right to be free from warrantless, unreasonable 
searches, then it is spot-on.  And if the lead opinion further 
means to say that we recognize that the people of Wisconsin may 
operationalize that constitutionally-protected right by refusing 
warrantless, unreasonable searches, then it again hits the 
bulls-eye.  But none of that happened in Dalton.  It happened 
when the people of this nation ratified the Bill of Rights.  We 
have done nothing new here; we only recognize what is already 
the law. 
¶83 Ultimately, the lead opinion is of two minds on 
whether a suspect may refuse a blood test, and it expressed both 
of them.  On the one hand, it says that, "in a state with civil 
                                                                                                                                                             
So I disagree with the dissent that I cannot reconcile my 
analytical exercise to Birchfield's central holding.  When the 
Supreme Court speaks with two contradictory voices in one 
opinion, the best we can do is follow its logic until it starts 
contending with itself.  Here, that means Birchfield stands for 
the proposition that, with respect to conscious drunk-driving 
suspects, the "search incident to arrest" doctrine covers breath 
tests, but not blood draws.  Because Mr. Mitchell was not 
conscious, Birchfield does not control the disposition of this 
case. 
No.  2015AP304-CR.dk 
 
11 
 
penalties for refusal to submit to a blood draw, 'a person 
suspected of drunk driving has no constitutional right to refuse 
to take a blood-alcohol test.'"  Lead op., ¶38 (quoting South 
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 560 n.10 (1983)).  But almost 
immediately afterwards it also said:  "Of course, consent 
voluntarily-given before a blood draw may be withdrawn with or 
without a statutory reminder."  Lead op., ¶40 (citing United 
States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 2005)).  So which 
is it?  May a suspect refuse a blood test or not? 
¶84 Perhaps, however, the lead opinion means to say that 
when a blood test is conducted pursuant to consent——real 
consent, the kind that people provide, not legislatures——the 
consent can be withdrawn, but when conducted pursuant to 
legislatively-provided consent, it cannot.  That seems to be the 
import of the observation that the "right to refuse the blood-
alcohol test . . . is simply a matter of grace bestowed by 
the . . . legislature."  See lead op., ¶39 (quoting Neville, 459 
U.S. at 565).  But if that is so, what possible jurisprudential 
theory allows a statute to make permanent what the constitution 
makes revocable?3 
                                                 
3 The right to refuse a search, and to revoke consent once 
given, has been a part of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for a 
very long time.  See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 
227 (1973) (stating that consent may be refused); United States 
v. Carter, 985 F.2d 1095, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (stating that 
consent may be withdrawn); United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129, 
138 (7th Cir. 1982) (same); Mason v. Pulliam, 557 F.2d 426, 428 
(5th Cir. 1977) (stating that nothing in Schneckloth prevents 
consent from being withdrawn). 
No.  2015AP304-CR.dk 
 
12 
 
* 
¶85 For these reasons, I respectfully concur in our 
court's mandate. 
¶86 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  2015AP304-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶87 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  A blood draw is 
a particularly intrusive search.  It invades the interior of the 
human body and implicates interests in human dignity and 
privacy.  Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966).  
To allow a blood draw without a warrant runs counter to these 
significant interests, not to mention United States Supreme 
Court precedent. 
¶88 The police took Gerald Mitchell's blood without a 
warrant while he was unconscious.  According to the lead 
opinion1, this is perfectly fine because Mitchell by implication 
"voluntarily consented" to a blood draw and, while he was 
unconscious, did not revoke such consent. 
                                                 
1 I use the term "lead" opinion for two reasons.  First, I 
am concerned that without this cue, the reader may mistakenly 
believe that the lead opinion has any precedential value.  
Although five justices join in the mandate of the opinion to 
affirm the court of appeals (Roggensack, C.J., joined by 
Ziegler, J., Gableman, J., Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., and 
Kelly, J.,), it represents the reasoning of only three justices 
(Roggensack, C.J., joined by Ziegler, J., and Gableman, J.).  
Justices Rebecca Grassl Bradley and Kelly joined in the mandate, 
but they would rely on contrary reasoning.  Other paragraphs of 
the lead opinion that Justice Kelly indicates that he joins 
provide only uncontested factual and legal background that do 
not include the lead opinion's reasoning.  See Justice Kelly's 
concurrence, ¶67 n.1. 
Although set forth in two separate opinions, four justices 
disagree with the reasoning of the lead opinion.  Importantly, 
contrary to the lead opinion, four justices determine that the 
implied consent laws cannot justify the warrantless blood draw 
performed in this case (Abrahamson, J., Ann Walsh Bradley, J., 
Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., and Kelly, J.). 
The lead opinion fails to alert readers as to the non-
precedential status of its essential reasoning.  Lest the rule 
of law be unclear to courts and litigants:  BY THEMSELVES, THE 
IMPLIED CONSENT LAWS CANNOT JUSTIFY A WARRANTLESS BLOOD DRAW. 
No.  2015AP304-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
¶89 Contrary to the lead opinion, I determine that 
"implied consent" is not the same as "actual consent" for 
purposes of a Fourth Amendment search.  By relying on the 
implied consent laws, the lead opinion attempts to create a 
statutory per se exception to the constitutionally mandated 
warrant requirement.  Thus, it embraces a categorical exception 
over the constitutionally required consideration of the totality 
of the circumstances.  Consent provided solely by way of an 
implied consent statute is constitutionally untenable.2 
¶90 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶91 Mitchell was arrested for operating while intoxicated.  
En route to a nearby hospital, he lost consciousness.  Despite 
Mitchell's incapacitation, a police officer read him the 
Informing the Accused form.  Mitchell provided no response 
because he was unconscious.  The officer then directed hospital 
staff to draw a sample of Mitchell's blood, and they did so.  
Mitchell remained unconscious as his skin was pierced and his 
blood taken. 
¶92 Seeking to exclude the evidence obtained as a result 
of the blood draw, Mitchell filed a motion to suppress.  He 
premised his motion on the contention that the warrantless 
                                                 
2 I observe that the concurrence and this dissent are in 
accord on this point.  The concurrence "do[es] not believe that 
the state can waive the people's constitutional protections 
against the state."  Concurrence, ¶67.  Accordingly, it 
concludes that "the consent implied by § 343.305 cannot justify 
the blood draw performed on Mr. Mitchell."  Id., ¶73. 
No.  2015AP304-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
taking of his blood while he was unconscious violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
¶93 The 
lead 
opinion 
rejects 
Mitchell's 
argument, 
concluding that the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment's 
warrant requirement applies.  Lead op., ¶3.  According to the 
lead opinion, Mitchell "voluntarily consented to a blood draw by 
his conduct of driving on Wisconsin's roads and drinking to a 
point evidencing probable cause of intoxication."  Id.  Further, 
in the lead opinion's view, Mitchell "forfeited all opportunity, 
including 
the 
statutory 
opportunity 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(4), to withdraw his consent previously given . . . ."  
Id. 
II 
¶94 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution protect 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.  State v. Eason, 
2001 WI 98, ¶16, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625.  A warrantless 
search is presumptively unreasonable unless an exception to the 
warrant requirement applies.  State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, 
¶30, 359 Wis. 2d 421, 857 N.W.2d 120. 
¶95 One such exception to the warrant requirement is a 
search conducted pursuant to consent.  State v. Artic, 2010 WI 
83, ¶29, 327 Wis. 2d 392, 786 N.W.2d 430.  The lead opinion 
correctly states that relevant words, gestures or conduct may 
support a finding of consent.  Lead op., ¶20 (citing Artic, 327 
No.  2015AP304-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
Wis. 2d 392, ¶30).3  However, it errs by departing from 
Mitchell's "words, gestures or conduct" to determine that he 
impliedly consented for the state to draw his blood. 
¶96 The lead opinion's conclusion is based on Wisconsin's 
implied consent laws, one subsection of which provides that any 
person operating a motor vehicle in Wisconsin "is deemed to have 
given consent to one or more tests of his or her breath, blood 
or urine" when requested to do so by a law enforcement officer 
in certain circumstances.  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(2). 
¶97 Another 
subsection 
specifically 
addresses 
the 
situation where a driver is unconscious.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 343.305(3)(b) provides that "[a] person who is unconscious or 
otherwise not capable of withdrawing consent is presumed not to 
have withdrawn consent under this subsection."  It further 
states that a law enforcement officer may administer a breath, 
blood, or urine test if probable cause exists that the driver 
has committed any of a list of offenses.  Id. 
                                                 
3 The lead also cites State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 
197, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998), for the proposition that consent to 
search need not be given verbally.  Lead op., ¶21.  In Phillips, 
when asked by law enforcement whether they could search the 
defendant's bedroom, "the defendant did not respond verbally, 
but he opened the door to and walked into his bedroom, retrieved 
a small baggie of marijuana, handed the baggie to the agents, 
and pointed out a number of drug paraphernalia items."  218 
Wis. 2d at 197.  The court concluded that "[t]he defendant's 
conduct provides a sufficient basis on which to find that the 
defendant consented to the search of his bedroom."  Id.  The 
affirmative assistance provided by the defendant in response to 
a request to search in Phillips is a far cry from the complete 
lack of response from the defendant here. 
No.  2015AP304-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
¶98 In determining whether the warrantless taking of a 
blood draw from an unconscious person pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(3)(b) violates the Fourth Amendment, I begin my 
analysis with Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. 
Ct. 2160 (2016).  In Birchfield, the United States Supreme Court 
determined that "a breath test, but not a blood test, may be 
administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk 
driving."  Id. at 2185. 
¶99 Birchfield emphasized the invasive nature of a blood 
test, which is significant for Fourth Amendment purposes.  See 
id. at 2184.  In comparison to a breath test, a blood test is 
"significantly more intrusive[.]"  Id.  As an intrusion "beyond 
the 
body's 
surface," 
a 
blood 
test 
implicates 
paramount 
"interests in human dignity and privacy[.]"  Id. at 2183 (citing 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70).  Indeed, a blood test can 
provide a lot more information than just a person's blood 
alcohol content.4 
¶100 The Birchfield court further addressed the precise 
circumstances that have arisen in this case: 
It is true that a blood test, unlike a breath test, 
may be administered to a person who is unconscious 
(perhaps as a result of a crash) or who is unable to 
                                                 
4 "[A] blood test, unlike a breath test, places in the hands 
of law enforcement authorities a sample that can be preserved 
and from which it is possible to extract information beyond a 
simple BAC reading.  Even if the law enforcement agency is 
precluded from testing the blood for any purpose other than to 
measure BAC, the potential remains and may result in anxiety for 
the person tested."  Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. __, 
136 S. Ct. 2160, 2178 (2016). 
No.  2015AP304-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
do what is needed to take a breath test due to 
profound intoxication or injuries.  But we have no 
reason to believe that such situations are common in 
drunk-driving arrests, and when they arise, the police 
may apply for a warrant if need be. 
136 S. Ct. at 2184-85 (emphasis added). 
¶101 This language compels a single conclusion:  law 
enforcement needed a warrant here.  First, the State concedes 
that there were no exigent circumstances that would justify a 
departure from the warrant requirement.5  Second, the ultimate 
holding in 
Birchfield was that a blood test cannot be 
administered as a search incident to arrest for drunk driving.  
Id. at 2185.  The lead opinion's interpretation of the implied 
consent statutes attempts to accomplish exactly what the 
Birchfield court said violates the Fourth Amendment——a blood 
test as a search incident to the arrest of an unconscious person 
for drunk driving.6 
                                                 
5 See State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶30, 359 Wis. 2d 421, 
857 N.W.2d 120. 
6 The concurrence focuses on language in Birchfield stating 
a blood test's "reasonableness must be judged in light of the 
availability of the less intrusive alternative of a breath 
test."  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184; see concurrence, ¶¶77-
79.  It creatively interprets this language to indicate that, 
because a breath test was unavailable due to Mitchell's 
unconsciousness, a blood test was constitutionally reasonable.  
Id., ¶80.  The concurrence's analytical exercise ultimately 
fails because it cannot be reconciled with Birchfield's central 
holding:  "a breath test, but not a blood test, may be 
administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk 
driving."  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185 (emphasis added). 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP304-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
¶102 Unlike the lead opinion, I would follow, rather than 
attempt to overrule, the court of appeals in State v. Padley, 
2014 WI App 65, 354 Wis. 2d 545, 849 N.W.2d 867.  The Padley 
court emphasized that, when analyzing whether there was a 
consensual search, the determining factor was whether the driver 
gave actual consent to the blood draw: 
[T]he implied consent law is explicitly designed to 
allow the driver, and not the police officer, to make 
the choice as to whether the driver will give or 
decline to give actual consent to a blood draw when 
put to the choice between consent or automatic 
sanctions.  Framed in the terms of "implied consent," 
choosing the "yes" option affirms the driver's implied 
consent and constitutes actual consent for the blood 
draw.  Choosing the "no" option acts to withdraw the 
driver's implied consent and establishes that the 
driver does not give actual consent. 
354 Wis. 2d 545, ¶39.  As Justice Abrahamson has explained, 
"[t]he Padley court concluded that a driver's actual consent 
occurs after the driver has heard the Informing the Accused 
Form, weighed his or her options (including the refusal 
penalties), and decided whether to give or decline actual 
consent."  State v. Brar, 2017 WI 73, ¶116, 376 Wis. 2d 685, 898 
N.W.2d 499 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). 
                                                                                                                                                             
Federal and state courts around the country have cited the 
"but not a blood test" language a multitude of times.  See, 
e.g., Robertson v. Pichon, 849 F.3d 1173, 1184 n.7 (9th Cir. 
2017; Espinoza v. Shiomoto, 215 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807, 829 (Ct. App. 
2017); State v. Ryce, 396 P.3d 711, 717 (Kan. 2017); State v. 
Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d 283, 307 (Tenn. 2016).  The concurrence is 
unable to cite to any court that eschews the clear language of 
Birchfield's 
central 
holding 
in 
favor 
of 
the 
unique 
interpretation it now embraces. 
No.  2015AP304-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
¶103 That implied consent and actual consent are separate 
and distinct concepts is confirmed by an analysis of recent 
United States Supreme Court precedent in addition to Birchfield.7  
In Missouri v. McNeely, the Supreme Court determined that 
"[w]hether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect 
is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the 
totality of the circumstances."  569 U.S. 141, 156 (2013).  A 
case by case determination is the antithesis of a categorical 
exception.  Although McNeely was an exigent circumstances case, 
the court's emphasis on the totality of the circumstances 
suggests broad application of the case by case determinations it 
requires. 
 
Brar, 
376 
Wis. 2d 685, 
¶122 
(Abrahamson, 
J., 
dissenting). 
¶104 Indeed, the Supreme Court implied such a broad 
application of McNeely in Aviles v. Texas, 571 U.S. 1119 (2014).  
In Aviles, the Court vacated a Texas judgment upholding a 
warrantless blood draw based not on actual consent but on 
implied consent derived through the Texas implied consent law.  
571 U.S. 1119 (2014).  The Court further remanded the Aviles 
case to the Texas court of appeals for further consideration in 
light of McNeely.  Id. 
¶105 "Aviles suggests that McNeely should be read broadly 
to apply to all warrantless blood draws and that the Texas 
implied consent statute was not a per se exception to the Fourth 
                                                 
7 For further in-depth analysis of this assertion, see State 
v. Brar, 2017 WI 73, ¶¶119-126, 376 Wis. 2d 685, 898 N.W.2d 499 
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting). 
No.  2015AP304-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
Amendment justifying warrantless blood draws."  Brar, 376 
Wis. 2d 685, ¶123 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).  On remand the 
Texas court of appeals concluded that the Texas implied consent 
statute "flies in the face of McNeely's repeated mandate that 
courts must consider the totality of the circumstances of each 
case."  Aviles v. State, 443 S.W.3d 291, 294 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2014). 
¶106 The upshot of these United States Supreme Court cases 
is that reliance on an implied consent statute to provide actual 
consent 
to 
a 
Fourth 
Amendment 
search 
violates 
McNeely's 
requirement that each blood draw in a drunk driving case be 
analyzed on a case by case basis.  The implied consent statute 
attempts 
to 
create 
a 
per 
se 
exception 
to 
the 
warrant 
requirement.  Of course, categorical consent is by definition 
not individualized. 
¶107 The lead opinion employs the simple act of driving an 
automobile as justification for a search.  The untenability of 
the lead opinion's position is aptly illustrated by Justice 
Kelly's concurrence in Brar, 376 Wis. 2d 685, ¶¶59-66 (Kelly, 
J., concurring).  As Justice Kelly explains, a court's normal 
constitutional inquiry into whether consent is given involves an 
examination 
of 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances 
and 
a 
determination that the consent was voluntary and not mere 
acquiescence to authority.  Id., ¶¶59-62.  On the other hand, 
"[f]or 'consent' implied by law, we ask whether the driver drove 
his car."  Id., ¶64. 
No.  2015AP304-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
¶108 Further, the lead opinion errs by relying not on a 
constitutionally 
well-recognized 
exception 
to 
the 
warrant 
requirement, but instead on a Wisconsin statute, to curtail 
constitutional protections.  By seeking to create a statutory, 
per se consent exception to the warrant requirement, the lead 
opinion further steps into a minefield.  See lead op., ¶¶53-55 
(asserting that Mitchell "forfeited the statutory opportunity to 
withdraw the consent to search that he had given."). 
¶109 A blood draw is plainly a "search" for Fourth 
Amendment 
purposes. 
 
Birchfield, 
136 
S. 
Ct. 
at 
2185. 
Accordingly, one has a constitutional right, not merely a 
statutory right, to refuse such a search absent a warrant or an 
applicable exception.8  See State v. Dalton, 2018 WI 85, ¶61, __ 
Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __.  Under the lead opinion's analysis, 
however, the opportunity to refuse an unconstitutional search is 
merely a matter of legislative grace.  If the ability to 
withdraw consent is merely statutory, could the legislature 
remove the ability to withdraw consent entirely?  For the Fourth 
Amendment to have any meaning, such a result cannot stand. 
¶110 I 
therefore 
conclude 
that 
implied 
consent 
is 
insufficient for purposes of a Fourth Amendment search.  As the 
                                                 
8 The lead opinion's reliance on South Dakota v. Neville, 
459 U.S. 553, 560 n.10 (1983), is misplaced.  See lead op., 
¶¶38-39.  Neville was decided pre-McNeely and pre-Birchfield.  
Both McNeely and Birchfield have had a significant effect on 
drunk driving law, and highlight the constitutional nature of a 
blood draw.  Both cases analyze breath and blood tests as Fourth 
Amendment searches and appear to supersede the statement from 
the Fifth Amendment Neville case on which the lead opinion 
relies. 
No.  2015AP304-CR.awb 
 
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court of appeals explained in Padley, the implied consent law 
does not authorize searches.  Rather, it authorizes law 
enforcement to require a driver to make a choice:  provide 
actual consent and potentially give the state evidence that the 
driver committed a crime, or withdraw implied consent and 
thereby suffer the civil consequences of withdrawing consent.  
Padley, 354 Wis. 2d 545, ¶39. 
¶111 A person who is unconscious cannot make this choice.  
Because he was unconscious, Mitchell did not react to the 
Informing the Accused Form when law enforcement presented him 
with his options.  He exhibited no "words, gestures, or conduct" 
that would indicate his actual consent to a blood draw.  See 
Artic, 327 Wis. 2d 392, ¶30. 
¶112 Because consent provided solely by way of an implied 
consent statute is not constitutionally sufficient, I determine 
that the results of Mitchell's blood draw must be suppressed.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶113 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
 
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