Case Title: People v. Grimes

Citation: 

Docket Number: S076339

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2015-01-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed 1/5/15 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S076339 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
GARY LEE GRIMES, 
) 
 
 
) 
Shasta County  
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 95F7785 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Defendant Gary Lee Grimes was convicted by a jury of one count of 
murder with burglary and robbery special circumstances and one count each of 
robbery, burglary, conspiracy to commit robbery, conspiracy to commit burglary, 
and unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle.  (Pen. Code, §§ 182, subd. (a), 187, 
subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(17), 211, 459; Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).)1  In 
connection with the murder, robbery, burglary, and conspiracy counts, the jury 
found true allegations that defendant inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim, 
an elderly person (§ 1203.09, subd. (a)), and that the offenses were committed 
while defendant was on parole (§ 1203.085, subd. (b)).  In a bifurcated proceeding, 
the trial court found true allegations that defendant had served four prior prison 
terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and had been convicted of a serious or violent felony 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise 
indicated.   
 
2 
within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§ 1170.12).  The jury returned a 
verdict of death.  The trial court sentenced defendant to death for the murder and 
imposed a term of six years for the driving or taking of a motor vehicle and four 
one-year terms for the four prior prison term allegations; sentences on the 
remaining counts were imposed and stayed.  
The judgment is modified to vacate the true finding on one of the four prior 
prison term allegations, and is otherwise affirmed.   
I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt phase 
1.  The offenses 
In October of 1995, defendant, then 33 years old, was staying with a friend, 
Sheila Abbott (Sheila), in her trailer.  Also staying in the trailer were Sheila‘s son, 
Shane Fernalld, her daughter, Misty Abbott (Misty), and Misty‘s boyfriend, 
Patrick James Wilson, then 19 years old.  On the morning of October 18, John 
Morris, a 20-year-old friend of the family, arrived at Sheila‘s trailer.  At 
approximately noon, Morris, Wilson, and defendant obtained some medical gloves 
and bandanas from the trailer.  They tried on the bandanas, placing them over their 
mouths, before putting them in their pockets.  The three left in Morris‘s red sports 
car.  They drove to the house shared by Betty Bone, who was then 98 years old, 
and her daughter.  They ransacked the house and took property, including a .38-
caliber handgun, a ―boom box,‖ some jewelry, a rifle, a telephone in a Styrofoam 
box, and a brown truck.   
Bone was killed.  Her body showed evidence of blunt force trauma to the 
head, ligature strangulation, and stab wounds.  There was a telephone cord and a 
bandana around her neck.  There was bruising on her tongue and lip that was 
likely caused by a gag.  Her injuries were consistent with her having been knocked 
 
3 
unconscious, strangled, and then stabbed repeatedly.  Bleeding due to the stabbing 
was the cause of death, with strangulation as a contributory cause.   
Defendant, Wilson, and Morris returned to Sheila‘s trailer, with Morris and 
Wilson in Morris‘s car and defendant driving the brown truck that had been taken 
from Bone‘s residence.  They unloaded items from the truck.  Defendant showed a 
bag of jewelry to Sheila, and asked her whether it was real; she told him it was 
costume jewelry.  Defendant drove the truck to Shasta Lake, with Morris and 
Misty following in Morris‘s car.  Defendant drove the truck into the lake.  The 
three left the lake in Morris‘s car to go back to Sheila‘s trailer.  
Later that afternoon defendant, Morris, and Misty were driving in 
defendant‘s brown Camaro when they approached a roadblock that had been set 
up by the sheriff‘s department.  Before reaching the roadblock, defendant and 
Morris threw their guns out of the car and into the bushes.  The weapons, which 
included the handgun taken from Bone‘s residence along with another handgun, 
were later recovered by law enforcement.  When they went through the roadblock, 
defendant identified himself to an officer as ―Gary Woods‖ and gave the officer a 
false Social Security number.  He was wearing a pair of white fingerless gloves, 
similar to the type of gloves that Bone‘s daughter kept in the brown truck.   
They returned to Sheila‘s trailer and then left for Sacramento.  Misty and 
her baby went in Morris‘s car and defendant drove in his car with Misty‘s brother, 
Shane Fernalld.  They spent the night in Sacramento with Morris‘s aunt.  In her 
apartment, they left a bag of jewelry and the box containing a telephone that had 
been taken from Bone‘s house.  The next day, Fernalld left defendant at the 
Sheraton apartment complex.   
 
4 
2.  Defendant’s arrest and statements to police 
Morris was arrested on October 21, 1995, three days after the crime, and 
killed himself in his jail cell the next afternoon.  Wilson was arrested the following 
day.  Also that day, a deputy sheriff recovered two knives that had been buried 
near Sheila Abbott‘s property.  One was a long kitchen knife and the other was a 
pocket knife.  DNA from both knives was consistent with a mixture of Bone‘s 
DNA and Wilson‘s DNA; none of the DNA on the knives could have come from 
defendant.  Defendant was arrested on the following day, as he pulled his car into 
the parking area of the Sheraton apartment complex.  As he got out of the car, a 
loaded .22-caliber handgun fell out of the driver‘s side door.  Defendant called 
Sheila Abbott from jail, and she told him that Morris had killed himself.   
Defendant was interviewed by detectives, and a tape recording of the 
interview was played for the jury.  Defendant admitted that he was involved in the 
burglary and robbery, but denied any involvement in the murder, claiming that 
Morris had killed Bone while defendant was in the back of the house.  Defendant 
stated that it had been Morris‘s idea to break into a house because he needed 
money to pay for his automobile insurance.  Defendant said that he, Morris, and 
Wilson each had a bandana that Sheila had given them, and they had latex gloves 
that were obtained from her first-aid kit.  Morris drove defendant and Wilson to 
Bone‘s neighborhood, an area in which defendant had formerly lived.  In the car, 
defendant handed Morris a gun, which was wrapped in a bandana, and Morris put 
it in his pants.  According to defendant, they were watching a house in the 
neighborhood and saw a woman outside; Morris said they could kill her and take 
their time going through the house, but defendant told Morris that he was ―not into 
killin‘ people.‖   
Defendant told the detectives that when they arrived at the Bone house, 
Morris and Wilson knocked on the door of the house and initially no one 
 
5 
answered; Morris commented that no one was there and defendant concluded they 
would just be committing a burglary.  Then Morris stated there was someone in 
the house.  Defendant walked back to the car and saw Bone answer the door.  
Wilson asked for a girl named Debbie and Bone replied ―no, my daughter‘s name 
is Barbara.‖  Wilson pushed the door open, hitting Bone and knocking her to the 
ground.  Defendant walked through the open door.  At some point he saw Bone 
lying on the floor with Morris on top of her; Bone pleaded with him to let her go.  
Defendant told the detectives that he said to Morris, ―don‘t hurt no women, don‘t 
hurt nobody.‖  He said he went into the back of the house because he ―couldn‘t 
deal with it.‖  When he came back out of the bedroom he saw Morris strangling 
Bone, who was tied up with a phone cord.  According to defendant, Morris said, ―I 
can‘t leave no witnesses.‖  Morris also said, ―that fucking bitch won‘t die.‖  
Defendant saw Morris rummaging through the kitchen looking for a knife.  He 
saw or heard Morris stabbing Bone forcefully and repeatedly.  Morris gave Wilson 
a paper sack containing the knives that were later recovered, and told him to get 
rid of them.   
According to defendant, Morris ordered him to take Bone‘s truck.  They 
loaded the items from the house into the truck and took them back to Sheila‘s 
trailer.  Wilson and Morris siphoned the gas out of the truck.  Defendant drove the 
truck to Shasta Lake, following Morris and Misty.  Morris instructed defendant to 
break out the windows of the truck and drive it into the lake.  Defendant told the 
detectives that the gun he had when he was arrested in Sacramento did not come 
from the house and that he had obtained it that same day.  He stated that Wilson 
had found a gun in the house and Morris had found a rifle.  Defendant denied 
knowing the location of the guns taken from the house and asserted that Morris 
was supposed to dispose of them.   
 
6 
3.  Testimony regarding out-of-court statements 
At trial, Misty Abbott testified that during the ride to Shasta Lake, Morris 
told her that he had killed a woman; specifically, he had tried to strangle her but 
because she did not die he took a knife from the kitchen and stabbed her.  She 
testified that during the ride back to her mother‘s trailer, after they dumped the 
truck into the lake, defendant and Morris fired their guns out the windows of the 
car.  When she was interviewed by Wilson‘s private investigator, she also said that 
Morris and defendant were laughing about the murder and calling each other 
―down white boys.‖  Misty‘s brother, Shane Fernalld, testified that while he and 
defendant were driving to Sacramento, defendant told Fernalld either ―she 
deserved it‖ or ―she didn‘t deserve it‖; he was not sure which.  Before trial, 
however, he told several law enforcement officers that defendant‘s statement was 
―she deserved it‖ or ―the old bitch deserved it.‖  Morris‘s grandfather testified that 
Morris called him from jail, sounding very upset, and told him that his friends had 
turned against him and were going to testify that he had killed Bone, but that he 
had not done it.2  This call occurred an hour or two before Morris committed 
suicide by hanging himself in his jail cell.   
Jonathan Howe, a prisoner who had been housed with defendant in the 
county jail, testified that defendant told him defendant had ordered Wilson and 
Morris to tie up Bone and kill her.  According to Howe, defendant also told him 
that he could not be linked to the murder with DNA evidence because he had 
never touched the body.  Defendant told him either that he had enjoyed watching 
                                              
2  
The trial court admonished the jury that it could not consider for its truth 
Morris‘s statement to his grandfather that he did not kill Bone; the court explained 
that testimony was relevant only in evaluating Misty‘s testimony regarding 
Morris‘s confession to him.   
 
7 
Bone be killed or he enjoyed the fact that she died.  Howe testified under an 
agreement that permitted him to plead guilty to pending charges for a sentence of, 
at most, 24 months, consecutive to a term he was already serving.  Prior to coming 
forward he had been offered a plea bargain with a 24-month consecutive sentence.  
Under the new plea agreement, he could receive a sentence of less than 24 months; 
his sentencing was postponed until after trial in the present case, at which time the 
judge presiding over defendant‘s trial would decide his sentence.   
4.  Defense evidence 
Defense counsel conceded that defendant was guilty of burglary, robbery, 
and murder, but contested the special circumstance allegations on the grounds that 
defendant was not the actual killer and did not act with an intent to kill or a 
reckless indifference for life.   
The defense put into evidence admissions made by Wilson to law 
enforcement officers that were consistent with defendant‘s statements to the police 
regarding Wilson‘s role:  Wilson admitted that he was involved with the burglary 
and that he had pushed Bone inside the house; when she fell back she was 
knocked out and he watched her for several minutes; he found a .38-caliber 
revolver in a toolbox in a closet in Bone‘s house; he cleaned the knives used to kill 
Bone by spitting on them and wiping them off with a cloth; he siphoned gas out of 
the truck before defendant drove it to the lake.   
Evidence was also presented that the day after Morris was arrested, he 
called Sheila Abbott‘s trailer and asked her daughter, Ginger Abbott, if she could 
provide him with an alibi.  Ginger refused.   
The jury convicted defendant on all counts.   
 
8 
B.  Penalty phase 
1.  Aggravation 
The prosecution introduced evidence that after driving the truck into the 
lake, defendant, Morris, and Misty Abbott bought some methamphetamine and 
injected it.  Defendant had 10 prior felony convictions.  The prosecution presented 
evidence regarding four incidents involving violent criminal conduct.  In 1985, 
defendant, along with accomplice Anna Cline, tied up victim James Leonard and 
stole $300 from him.  Defendant brandished a pipe that was wrapped in a towel to 
simulate a gun.  Afterward, defendant and Cline used the money to purchase 
drugs.  A day after that robbery, defendant was observed by a police officer 
shooting a sawed-off shotgun in an orchard.  In 1991, a police officer encountered 
defendant in a restaurant with a loaded .25-caliber semiautomatic handgun in his 
waistband.  In 1993, during a fight with his girlfriend, defendant held her down in 
his car by her throat, threatening to choke her if she left him.  When he stopped the 
car in a parking lot, she escaped, he ran after her, and they struggled until police 
arrived.   
2. Mitigation 
The defense case in mitigation focused on two themes:  defendant‘s 
cognitive impairments and his positive contributions to his friends and family 
members.  A neuropsychologist, John Wick, testified about the results of 
psychological testing.  Defendant‘s mental functioning was tested in 12 areas; his 
scores were in the mentally retarded range in seven areas, low dull-normal in two 
areas, and normal in three areas.  Defendant‘s overall IQ score was 73, which is 
borderline retarded, and he generally tested in the range of third to fourth grade in 
reading, spelling, and arithmetic.  Wick concluded that defendant had organic 
brain damage and that his low intellect could impair his judgment, cause 
 
9 
impulsivity, make decisionmaking difficult, and make it difficult to learn both 
academic subjects and acceptable social behaviors.   
Psychiatrist Albert Globus, who interviewed defendant and reviewed the 
test results, agreed that defendant was mentally retarded.  Dr. Globus thought that 
defendant suffered from organic brain damage at birth (possibly due to beatings 
his mother suffered while pregnant), based on the test results and on his low birth 
weight, trouble breast feeding, loss of weight during his first week of life, 
incontinence up to the age of eight, and a speech impediment.  At age 12, he 
suffered a serious head injury which may have exacerbated his brain disorder.  
Although defendant could determine right from wrong, Dr. Globus concluded that 
he would have difficulty applying that knowledge to his decisionmaking and 
would likely rely on others to make decisions for him.  People like defendant will 
often function better in a structured setting like prison because most decisions are 
made for them.   
At age nine, defendant was referred to a psychiatrist, who prescribed Ritalin 
and Librium.  At age 11, he was placed in special education classes for 
emotionally disturbed children.  Defendant‘s special education teacher, a teacher‘s 
aide, and a resource specialist for the special education program described 
defendant, at that time, as nonaggressive, well behaved, a follower, and someone 
in need of love and attention.  At age 15, he began running away from home and 
was placed in foster care and then juvenile hall.  He was committed to Napa State 
Hospital at age 17 for nine months.  His records from the hospital indicate he was 
mildly mentally retarded and had latent schizophrenia.   
Defendant‘s sister, Darlene, testified that when defendant was a young boy 
he was incontinent and their mother would make him wear a dress and stand out in 
the yard as punishment.  Defendant lacked self-esteem and confidence; she 
described him as a follower who would do what others told him to do.   
 
10 
Defendant‘s mother, Patricia Grimes, testified that she loved her son.  
Defendant‘s father beat her while she was pregnant and left her before defendant 
was born.  After the birth, she was in the hospital for more than three months with 
postpartum depression and defendant lived with her parents.  She recalled that at a 
young age, he told her he heard voices and he would wake in the night screaming.  
Defendant‘s mother also testified that the day before he was arrested, he was 
crying and remorseful, and said he was very sorry that the victim had died.   
Defendant‘s ex-wife, Cindy Grimes, who was married to defendant in 1990 
for a brief period, testified that she loved him and he had treated her and her 
teenage son well.  Defendant also helped take care of her father, who was 
disabled.  Her son, Michael, testified that defendant treated both of them very 
well, and had influenced him to get his GED and stay out of trouble with the law.  
Cindy‘s mother and the manager of their apartment complex confirmed that 
defendant was helpful and kind to Cindy‘s family and to others who lived in their 
apartment complex.  A fellow prison inmate, Michael Huntsman, testified that 
defendant came to his aid when he was assaulted by a group of inmates.   
In 1995, defendant attempted to assist the mother of his fiancée, Shannon 
Yarnell, in a domestic violence incident involving Shannon‘s stepfather.  The 
incident ended in tragedy, however, when Shannon‘s stepfather rammed his truck 
into the car in which Shannon was riding, killing Shannon.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Excusal for cause of Prospective Juror A.J. 
Defendant contends that the death sentence must be reversed because the 
trial court erred in excusing for cause Prospective Juror A.J.  The trial court 
concluded that A.J. would have difficulty following the law on felony murder in a 
case in which the defendant did not actually kill or intend to kill.  As explained in 
 
11 
more detail below, Prospective Juror A.J. indicated in his questionnaire that if his 
conscience conflicted with the law, he would follow his conscience.  Although he 
stated during voir dire that if he were sworn as a juror he would follow the law, he 
also made clear that the law making a defendant liable for felony murder and a 
special circumstance would present an extreme conflict for him if the defendant 
did not intend to kill, and that he would prefer not to be in that situation.  We 
conclude that the trial court did not err in granting the prosecution‘s challenge for 
cause.   
On his questionnaire, Prospective Juror A.J. responded to a query about 
how he would deal with a situation in which the law differed from his beliefs or 
opinions by stating, ―If it were a moral issue I would opt for my conscience.  
Otherwise I would do my duty in accordance with the law.‖  In response to 
another question, he affirmed that he could set aside his personal feelings 
regarding what the law should be and follow the law as explained by the court.   
The court began voir dire by noting these responses and explaining that, as 
a juror, A.J. would have to agree to put aside his views and follow the law.  Asked 
if he could make that agreement, A.J. responded, ―I think so.‖  Asked if he had 
some particular concern about a moral belief that might conflict with the law, he 
responded that he did not know what might occur.  The court noted that when 
asked on the questionnaire whether, concerning the issue of penalty, he would 
limit himself to considering only those factors enumerated by the court, he had 
written, ―If I must, yes.‖  A.J. explained that when answering that question he had 
been thinking that there might be a conflict between the law and his moral 
judgment.   
The court explained that no one knew exactly what the evidence at trial 
might be, and that jurors are asked to take an oath that if a conflict arises between 
their personal views and the law, they would set aside their views and follow the 
 
12 
law.  The court stated it needed to know whether, if there was a conflict, A.J. 
would follow his conscience and not follow the law.  A.J. responded, ―At this 
time, I don‘t know whether that situation would arise; therefore I would say, 
having to answer your question, I would say that I would set aside in order to 
follow my duty as a juror.‖  A.J. affirmed that he could ―be an impartial juror who 
will faithfully apply the law in this case.‖   
When defense counsel questioned him, counsel commented that A.J. had 
hesitated every time that he answered a question about his ability to follow the 
law.  Counsel asked what personal feelings he might have that might interfere with 
his ability to follow the law.  A.J. responded that he had never been a juror before.  
When defense counsel asked whether A.J.‘s hesitation had anything to do with this 
being a capital case, A.J. responded, ―No doubt that has something to do with it, 
also.‖  He added, ―I‘m a person who is directed by my conscience.  Now, if I 
promise, through an oath, to set that aside, I will certainly do my duty . . . I don‘t 
know if the situation — the specific situation will . . . arise where I will be in 
conflict.  But as I said, . . . if I make an oath, say I will set that aside, that will be 
my primary responsibility.‖   
During a break, the court expressed its ―ongoing concern about this juror‘s 
potential conflict . . . whether or not he can honestly make the commitment to 
follow the law regardless of a possible conflict.‖  The court encouraged the 
prosecutor to question the prospective juror on this issue.  The prosecutor asked 
A.J. about his views on the death penalty and A.J. stated that he ―could apply it as 
a juror‖ and affirmed that he had no concerns about it in relation to his conscience 
or his moral beliefs.   
The prosecutor later explained the felony-murder rule and provided a 
hypothetical in which two former employees of a grocery store burned the store 
down at night, hoping that no one would be working at that time.  One supplied 
 
13 
the gasoline and drove the two to the store, and the other lit the fire.  The 
prosecutor asked whether A.J. could follow the law that both would be liable for 
murder.  A.J. responded that he could not, because in the hypothetical there was 
―no intention to kill.‖  A.J. promptly clarified, however, that if he had been sworn 
in as a juror to follow the law, he would do so ―regardless of what my conscience 
says.‖  He explained that he did not agree with the law in the hypothetical 
described by the prosecutor, but if sworn in as a juror he would ―follow the law as 
explained to me by the court.‖  When further pressed by the prosecutor about 
whether he could follow the law that the man who drove the car in the scenario 
would be liable for murder ―even though he had no intention to kill and he was not 
the actual killer,‖ A.J. stated that he would follow the law but ―I prefer not to be in 
that situation. . . .  But if I place myself in that situation and I said to the court, yes, 
you swear me in, I will follow the law.‖   
The prosecutor then explained that the person in the hypothetical who 
drove the car could be liable for a special circumstance ―if the jury finds that he 
acted as a major participant and with a reckless indifference to human life.‖  The 
prosecutor asked whether A.J. could follow the law making that person guilty of 
the special circumstance.  His initial answer was ―no.‖  The trial court interrupted 
and explained that although the facts of the hypothetical were not those of the 
present case, he should assume that they might equally put him in a situation in 
which the law was in conflict with his conscience.  The court asked whether he 
could take the oath.  A.J. responded, ―I am telling you that if I was sworn to 
uphold the law as stated to me, I would do so.‖  In response to another question, he 
reiterated that if he was a juror and ―I had taken an oath to uphold the law as stated 
to me, I would do so.‖  He added, however, referring to the discussion about the 
prosecutor‘s hypothetical, ―I would very much prefer not to be in that situation 
because of the extreme conflict that would occur.‖   
 
14 
The prosecutor challenged A.J. for cause.  Defense counsel disagreed, and 
opined that the prosecutor‘s hypothetical was misleading.  The trial court excused 
Prospective Juror A.J. for cause.  The court stated that it had ―more than a definite 
impression‖ that the juror would be unable to apply the law if his views conflicted 
with it.  The court noted that although the prosecutor‘s hypothetical did not reflect 
the circumstances of the present case, ―a key circumstance which could 
conceivably be before this juror is somebody who is being considered for 
punishment by the jury who did not preplan and did not intend to murder and who 
was convicted under the felony-murder rule, and I think this juror has an extreme 
conflict in that area, and I also have a definite impression that in spite of what he 
said, this juror would have difficulty and probably be unable in any case of a 
serious conflict between his personal views and the law to faithfully follow the 
law.‖   
A capital defendant‘s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to an 
impartial jury prohibits the exclusion of prospective jurors ―simply because they 
voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or 
religious scruples against its infliction.‖  (Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 
510, 522.)  A prospective juror may be excused from serving in a capital case, 
however, if his views on the death penalty would ― ‗prevent or substantially 
impair‘ ‖ the performance of his duties as a juror.  (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 
U.S. 412, 424 (Witt).)  ―A prospective juror who would invariably vote either for 
or against the death penalty because of one or more circumstances likely to be 
present in the case being tried, without regard to the strength of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, is . . . subject to challenge for cause, whether or not the 
circumstance that would be determinative for that juror has been alleged in the 
charging document.‖  (People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1005; see 
People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 772 [juror who was unwilling to impose 
 
15 
the death penalty on a defendant who was young and had not previously killed was 
properly excused]; People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 916-918 [trial court 
properly excused prospective jurors who could not consider the death penalty in a 
case involving an unplanned killing during a burglary but could consider it in 
other situations, including if the murder were premeditated]; see People v. Fields 
(1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 357-358 [court may exclude jurors who would 
automatically vote against the death penalty in the case before them, even if they 
were willing to consider the death penalty in other cases].)  ― ‗ ―[O]n appeal, we 
will uphold the trial court‘s ruling if it is fairly supported by the record, accepting 
as binding the trial court‘s determination as to the prospective juror‘s true state of 
mind when the prospective juror has made statements that are conflicting or 
ambiguous.‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 987.)3 
We have held that a prospective juror‘s statements that he or she would 
have a ― ‗hard time‘ ‖ voting for death or would find it ― ‗very difficult‘ ‖ to do so 
―indicate a degree of equivocation on the juror‘s part which, taken into account 
with the juror‘s hesitancy, vocal inflection, and demeanor, can justify a trial 
court‘s‖ excusal of the juror under the Witt standard.  (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 
Cal.4th 646, 697.)  Here, substantial evidence supports the trial court‘s conclusion 
that A.J. would have difficulty following the law if faced with deciding the 
punishment for a defendant convicted of felony murder who did not intend to kill.  
Beginning with the questionnaire, A.J. consistently expressed concern about his 
ability to follow the law if it conflicted with his moral views.  Voir dire revealed 
                                              
3  
We have previously rejected defendant‘s argument, based on Greene v. 
Georgia (1996) 519 U.S. 145, that we need not give deference to the trial court‘s 
findings related to juror bias, concluding that California law on this point is 
settled.  (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 132.)   
 
16 
that his personal views were in ―extreme conflict‖ with the law making a felony 
murderer guilty of first degree murder and eligible for the death penalty even if he 
did not intend to kill.  Although A.J. insisted that he would follow his oath as a 
juror if sworn, he stated that he preferred not being placed in the position of 
having to do so.  The trial court noted that it had the ―definite impression‖ that 
A.J. would be conflicted despite his promise to follow the law.  Under these 
circumstances, we defer to the trial court‘s conclusion that he would be unable to 
follow the law if it seriously conflicted with his views.   
B.  Excusal for cause of Prospective Juror J.W. 
Defendant similarly argues that his death sentence must be reversed 
because Prospective Juror J.W. was erroneously excused for cause.  The trial court 
excused J.W., over objection by defense counsel, because it concluded he would 
not be able to fairly consider the death penalty in a case in which the defendant did 
not intend to kill.  Defendant contends the trial court erred because the juror‘s 
answers indicated that his views were consistent with the law.  We disagree.   
In his questionnaire, J.W. responded to the question about what he would 
do if the law differed from his beliefs or opinions by writing, ―The law has to be.‖  
Although he indicated he did not always agree with the law, he wrote:  ―The law is 
not always right.  But it is the law.‖  He did not have strong feelings about the 
death penalty; he did not like it, ―[b]ut it has[] to be.‖  He wrote that he could 
follow the court‘s instructions regarding the factors to be considered in deciding 
between a sentence of death and life without the possibility of parole, and that he 
could set aside his personal feelings about what the law should be and follow the 
law as the court explained it.   
The trial court began voir dire by questioning J.W. about his attitudes 
regarding the death penalty and life without the possibility of parole.  J.W. 
 
17 
affirmed that if the law and facts justified it, he would be capable of voting for 
either punishment.  He felt that life imprisonment was the more severe 
punishment, but could accept that the law regarded death as the more severe 
punishment.  He affirmed that if his personal views conflicted with the law, he 
could follow the law.   
In response to questioning from the prosecutor, J.W. stated that he would 
favor life in prison over death for most people but he would apply the law.  He 
was sure that he could ―make . . . a proper decision.‖  The prosecutor explained the 
felony-murder rule, including the same hypothetical she had used previously with 
Prospective Juror A.J. regarding two accomplices who commit arson of a store at 
night (―thinking, hoping, praying nobody‘s there‖), resulting in the death of a clerk 
who was working late.  J.W. agreed that both people in the hypothetical — the one 
who drove the car and the one who set the fire — were equally responsible for the 
death even though they did not intend the person to die, but stated that in that 
scenario, ―I would go for life in prison without parole.‖  He explained that had 
they known the clerk was there, however, ―that would be a different circumstance 
and that might be a death sentence.‖  He affirmed that he could follow the law that 
makes a person guilty of murder ―even though they didn‘t have any intention to 
kill and they were not the actual killer.‖   
The prosecutor then explained that a person could be eligible for the death 
penalty ―even though they‘re not the actual killer and they had no intention to 
kill,‖ if they ―act as a major participant in an underlying felony and they act with a 
reckless indifference to human life.‖  When asked whether his personal beliefs 
would prevent him from being able to ―seriously consider the death penalty in that 
situation,‖ J.W. responded ―I‘m sure I could follow the law.‖  The prosecutor then 
asked whether J.W. would have a ―hard time giving serious consideration to the 
death penalty in that situation.‖  J.W. stated that ―if a person accidentally killed 
 
18 
somebody, it would be hard to give them the death penalty.  If a person 
deliberately killed somebody, then it‘s a different scenario.‖  When the prosecutor 
asked again whether J.W. could really set aside his moral principles, he responded, 
―I would do it. . . .  I know, that‘s a hard one.  I would do it.‖   
The prosecutor continued to pursue the point, asking, ―In the situation 
where someone doesn‘t have any intention to kill, do you feel that you could 
seriously consider the death penalty?‖  J.W. responded, ―If a person flat had no 
intention to kill . . . it would be hard to give them the death penalty.  I don‘t know 
that I would, but I don‘t know that I wouldn‘t.‖  J.W. then attempted to explain his 
position with a hypothetical.  ―[I]f someone was robbing a bank and they had a 
gun and a guard pulled his gun out and he shot the guard, that‘s intentionally 
killing him.  If somebody was robbing a bank and somebody had a heart attack — 
and I believe under the law, he‘s in for murder there.  No, that — that wasn‘t an 
intentional killing. . . .  That would be the life in prison instead of the death 
penalty.‖  The prosecutor then asked whether J.W. felt it necessary to have an 
intent to kill in order to receive the death penalty.  J.W. responded, ―Yes, I do.  I 
may not have noticed that when I came in here, but now that we‘ve talked.‖  He 
affirmed that it would be hard for him to personally vote for the death penalty if 
there was no intention to kill, and then clarified, ―If there was no intention [to] kill, 
then I don‘t think that a person should have the death penalty.‖   
The prosecutor rephrased the question, asking whether J.W. could not 
impose the death penalty unless the defendant intentionally killed the victim, even 
if the defendant had been convicted of first degree murder and a special 
circumstance.  J.W. then questioned whether a person could be convicted of first 
degree murder if the person had not intentionally killed, stating that he did not 
know the law.  The trial court interjected, explaining that ―somebody can be 
convicted of first degree special circumstance murder even though that person did 
 
19 
not personally kill the victim and even though that person did not have an intent to 
kill.‖  The court stated that it could not go into the specifics of this case, but 
―[w]e‘re talking in a hypothetical case [the prosecutor] gave you.‖  ―But the law 
says that persons can be convicted of a first degree special circumstance murder 
such that the jury would be called upon to decide which of those two punishments, 
death or life without parole, was appropriate in a case where the defendant did not 
have the intent to kill anybody.  If a person was killed, for example, in the course 
of one of the special — specified felonies, it was a felony-murder rule, and all the 
other criteria that the attorneys have mentioned.  That‘s the law.‖  The court then 
asked whether J.W. could follow the law and whether he could honestly consider 
all the circumstances in aggravation and mitigation before he decided the penalty.  
J.W. responded, ―no, my mind would not be made up that I would not vote for the 
death penalty.‖   
The court then rephrased the question, asking whether there was ―some 
absolute requirement, factually, regarding an intent to kill before you would ever 
vote for the death penalty, no matter what the other evidence was?‖  J.W. 
responded, ―Let me put it this way?  If I — I thought that a person never 
intentionally killed somebody, I would have trouble voting for the death penalty, 
yes.‖  The court again rephrased the question, asking whether he would ―have 
trouble giving any serious consideration‖ to the penalty phase evidence, ―you kind 
of have your mind made up already?‖  J.W. responded, ―If he didn‘t deliberately 
kill somebody or she, then I would have trouble giving the death sentence.  If they 
killed somebody, breaking the law or whatever, you know, and it was an accident 
or whatnot, no, then they go to jail for the rest of their life or whatever.‖   
The prosecutor challenged J.W. for cause.  Defense counsel responded that 
the questioning did not explain the requirement of major participation in the felony 
and an indifference to human life, and the juror did not really understand that law.  
 
20 
Defense counsel observed that the prospective juror‘s hypothetical demonstrated 
that he was thinking about an accident, someone who had a heart attack during a 
bank robbery.  Accordingly, defense counsel argued, the juror was confused and 
did not have the whole picture 
The court stated it was ready to rule, and granted the challenge to exclude 
for cause.  The court stated that J.W. had ―a predisposition to favor life without 
possibility of parole and to reject the death penalty such that . . . he would 
basically be precluded or, at the very least, appreciably impeded from engaging in 
the weighing process that the law requires in the second phase.‖  The court 
thought that ―this juror, ultimately, after all examination, understood that under the 
law, somebody could be convicted of first degree murder and eligible for 
consideration for the death penalty without an intent to kill, felony-murder rule 
was explained, both sides had the opportunity to do that.  And I think this juror 
made it as clear as he could that if there was not an intent to kill, or a deliberate 
killing, he wouldn‘t be able to vote for the death penalty or there was no 
reasonable possibility of that.‖   
As noted above, even if a prospective juror could fairly consider imposing 
the death penalty in some types of cases, one ―who would invariably vote either 
for or against the death penalty because of one or more circumstances likely to be 
present in the case being tried, without regard to the strength of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, is . . . subject to challenge for cause.‖  (People v. 
Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1005.)  ― ‗ ―[O]n appeal, we will uphold the trial 
court‘s ruling if it is fairly supported by the record, accepting as binding the trial 
court‘s determination as to the prospective juror‘s true state of mind when the 
prospective juror has made statements that are conflicting or ambiguous.‖ ‘ ‖  
(People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 987.)  ―If there is no inconsistency . . . 
we will not set aside the court‘s determination if it is supported by substantial 
 
21 
evidence and hence is not clearly erroneous.‖  (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 
771, 809.) 
J.W.‘s statements regarding his ability to consider a death sentence for 
someone who did not intend to kill were conflicting.  J.W. stated that he would 
have trouble voting for the death penalty if the person did not intend to kill.  After 
the prosecutor explained the law that makes a person eligible for the death penalty 
―even though they‘re not the actual killer and they had no intention to kill,‖ so 
long as the person acted ―as a major participant in an underlying felony and . . . 
with a reckless indifference to human life,‖ J.W. stated clearly that he would be 
able to follow the law.  However, he then indicated that ―If a person flat had no 
intention to kill . . . it would be hard to give them the death penalty.‖  J.W. 
affirmed that he felt it was necessary to have an intent to kill in order to receive 
the death penalty.  When the judge rephrased the question, he stated that his mind 
would not be made up against the death penalty.  Yet when the judge asked him 
whether there was ―some absolute requirement‖ of an intent to kill before he could 
impose the death penalty, J.W. repeated, ―If he didn‘t deliberately kill somebody 
or she, then I would have trouble giving the death sentence.‖  Because Prospective 
Juror J.W.‘s statements were conflicting and ambiguous, we must accept the trial 
court‘s determination regarding his true state of mind.  (See People v. Jenkins, 
supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 987.) 
Defendant contends that J.W.‘s answers were not conflicting and his views 
were consistent with the law.  Only one of the questions he was asked specifically 
mentioned a defendant who did not intend to kill but who also exhibited a reckless 
disregard for life.  In response to that question, he stated that he could follow the 
law.  The other questions he was asked referred to a defendant who did not intend 
to kill, but said nothing about a reckless disregard for life.  Thus, defendant argues, 
J.W.‘s statements that he would have difficulty imposing a death sentence on a 
 
22 
defendant who did not intend to kill do not indicate he would have the same 
difficulty with a defendant who acted with reckless disregard for life.  This 
conclusion is further supported, defendant contends, by the circumstance that J.W. 
consistently explained that his difficulty was with imposing the death penalty for 
an ―accidental‖ killing, demonstrating that he did not understand the questions 
concerning an unintentional killing to include a killing committed with ―reckless 
disregard for life.‖ 
Defendant‘s interpretation of J.W.‘s remarks is one reasonable 
interpretation of the record.  It is not, however, the only reasonable interpretation 
of the record, and ―the question is not whether a reviewing court might disagree 
with the trial court‘s findings, but whether those findings are fairly supported by 
the record.‖  (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 434.) The trial court could fairly 
conclude, taking into account not only J.W.‘s words but also his demeanor, that 
his references to accidental killings were just one example of the circumstances in 
which he would have difficulty imposing the death penalty.  And because J.W. had 
been informed about the ―reckless indifference to life‖ requirement, the trial court 
could fairly conclude that he understood the law and could interpret his continued 
statements that he would have a problem imposing the death penalty for an 
unintentional killing to encompass killings that were committed with a reckless 
disregard for life.   
C.  Trial court’s refusal to impanel separate juries for the guilt and 
penalty phases 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to impanel separate 
juries for the guilt and penalty phases.  In support of his motion for separate juries, 
defendant presented a transcript of the testimony of Professor Edward Bronson, of 
Chico State University, in another case.  Professor Bronson testified that the 
process of death qualification is prejudicial to a defendant in two ways.  First, the 
 
23 
remaining jurors who are not eliminated tend to be less supportive of due process 
values than those who were eliminated.  Second, the process of death 
qualification, by focusing on the death penalty and asking jurors to put themselves 
in the position of having found defendant to be guilty, suggests to jurors that the 
defendant is guilty and that their duty is to find him guilty, and it may also 
desensitize them to their task.  According to Professor Bronson, sequestered voir 
dire would ―to some extent, minimize or mitigate those effects,‖ but would not 
eliminate them.  The trial court denied defendant‘s motion, concluding that much 
of the potential prejudice resulting from death qualification could be avoided if the 
court used individual, sequestered voir dire and if the court and counsel were 
careful to impress upon the potential jurors that defendant‘s guilt was not a 
foregone conclusion.   
Section 190.4, subdivision (c), requires the same jury to decide guilt and 
penalty absent good cause.  We review the trial court‘s decision for abuse of 
discretion.  (People v. Bivert (2011) 52 Cal.4th 96, 108.)  Dr. Bronson‘s testimony 
supported only the conclusion that death-qualified juries in general tend to be 
more likely to convict.  ―This court and the United States Supreme Court have 
repeatedly rejected the claim that separate juries are required because jurors who 
survive the jury selection process in death penalty cases are more likely to convict 
a defendant.‖  (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 626; see Lockhart v. 
McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162; Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 68-
69.)  Nothing in Dr. Bronson‘s testimony or the studies he cited provided any 
information significantly different from that which was considered in our previous 
decisions.  Indeed, Dr. Bronson testified that studies undertaken after Lockhart and 
Hovey reached conclusions similar to those of the studies addressed in those cases 
and he was not able to cite any significant new developments in the research.  
Thus, Dr. Bronson‘s testimony provided no basis for the trial court to depart from 
 
24 
the holdings in these prior cases.  Defendant offered no evidence to establish good 
cause for a separate penalty jury based on the particular circumstances of this case.  
The trial court took steps to reduce any prejudice to defendant that might result 
from the jury selection process, including conducting individual, sequestered voir 
dire.  We find no abuse of discretion.   
D.  Exclusion of Morris’s alleged statements against interest 
As noted above, witness Misty Abbott testified that Morris told her he 
killed the victim, first attempting to strangle her and then, because she did not die, 
taking a knife from the kitchen and stabbing her.  This statement was admitted as a 
declaration against Morris‘s penal interest.  (Evid. Code, § 1230.)  The defense 
also sought to admit additional statements by Morris as declarations against 
interest:  (1) testimony by Misty Abbott that Morris told her defendant did not take 
part in the killing and that after he ―did the lady‖ defendant and Wilson ―looked at 
[Morris] as if they were saying, what in the hell are you doing, dude‖; and (2) 
testimony by Albert Lawson that while he was incarcerated in the county jail, 
Morris told him that defendant and Wilson were ―in the house but took no part in 
the actual killing.‖  The trial court ruled that these statements were inadmissible 
hearsay because they did not qualify as declarations against interest under 
Evidence Code section 1230.  Defendant contends that the trial court erred in 
excluding these statements and that the trial court‘s ruling violated his Fifth 
Amendment right to a fair trial, his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense, 
and the Eighth Amendment‘s requirement of reliable procedures in death penalty 
cases.  (Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683; Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 
410 U.S. 284, 302.) 
 
25 
 
1.  Applicable legal principles 
There is an exception to the rule excluding hearsay for a statement against 
interest — that is, one that ―when made, was so far contrary to the declarant‘s 
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to the risk of civil or 
criminal liability, or so far tended to render invalid a claim by him against another, 
or created such a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule, or social 
disgrace in the community, that a reasonable man in his position would not have 
made the statement unless he believed it to be true.‖  (Evid. Code, § 1230.)  This 
exception to the hearsay rule is ―founded on the assumption that a person is 
unlikely to fabricate a statement against his own interest at the time it is made.‖  
(Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, 410 U.S. at p. 299.)  ―The proponent of such 
evidence must show that the declarant is unavailable, that the declaration was 
against the declarant‘s penal interest when made and that the declaration was 
sufficiently reliable to warrant admission despite its hearsay character.‖  (People v. 
Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 610-611 (Duarte).)   
We review a trial court‘s ruling as to whether a statement is admissible as 
against a declarant‘s penal interest for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Lawley 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 153 (Lawley).)  ―In determining whether a statement is 
truly against interest within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1230, and 
hence is sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible, the court may take into account 
not just the words but the circumstances under which they were uttered, the 
possible motivation of the declarant, and the declarant‘s relationship to the 
defendant.‖  (People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 745 [trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in excluding statement of third party that he had killed the 
victim, where the statement was made 14 years after the murder and before 
defendant‘s retrial on special circumstances and penalty, the declarant knew there 
had been a prior verdict finding that defendant was the killer, and the trial ―court 
 
26 
could reasonably find [the declarant] wanted to aid his friend at little risk to 
himself‖].)   
Evidence Code section 1230‘s exception to the hearsay rule is ―inapplicable 
to evidence of any statement or portion of a statement not itself specifically 
disserving to the interests of the declarant.‖  (People v. Leach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 
419, 441.)  Even when the declarant admits culpability for a crime, those portions 
of the declarant‘s statements that do not incriminate the declarant are inadmissible.  
For example, in Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at page 154, we concluded that portions 
of a declarant‘s hearsay statement that did not specifically incriminate the 
declarant were inadmissible.  In that case, the defendant was convicted of murder 
based on evidence that he hired one Seaborn to kill the victim.  We held that the 
trial court did not err in admitting Seaborn‘s hearsay statement that he was hired to 
and did kill the victim, while excluding his hearsay statements that he had been 
hired by the Aryan Brotherhood and that an innocent man was in jail for the crime.  
The latter two statements, we observed, did not specifically disserve Seaborn‘s 
interests.   
Whether or not a statement is against penal interest can be determined only 
by considering the statement in context.  (Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 153.)  
There are some circumstances in which a declarant‘s statement that fully or 
partially exculpates the defendant while placing the greater part of the blame on 
the declarant have been held to be sufficiently against the declarant‘s interests to 
be admissible.  In United States v. Paguio (9th Cir. 1997) 114 F.3d 928 (Paguio), 
the defendants were a husband and wife who were charged with making false 
statements on a loan application.  (Id. at p. 929.)  The defendants‘ lawyer and his 
paralegal offered to testify concerning statements made by the husband‘s father, 
who was a fugitive at the time of trial.  (Id. at p. 931.)  They would have testified 
that the husband‘s father stated that ― ‗he was the one who was involved with 
 
27 
creating the false W-2‘s.  He said his son had nothing to do with that.‘ ‖  (Id. at 
p. 931, fn. 1.)  The appellate court held that the trial court erred in excluding the 
evidence as not sufficiently against interest:  ―In context, the father‘s statement 
that his son had nothing to do with it was inculpatory of the father as well as 
exculpatory of the son.  The father admitted not only participation but leadership, 
leading his son and daughter-in-law into the abyss.  Because leading others into 
wrongdoing has always been seen as especially bad, there is a sentencing 
enhancement for it.  [Citation.]  Also, in context, the inculpating and exculpating 
statements were not practically separable.‖  (Id. at pp. 933-934; see United States 
v. Lopez (10th Cir. 1985) 777 F.2d 543, 554 [trial court erred in excluding hearsay 
statements of a passenger in a vehicle that he alone had placed cocaine into the 
vehicle and that the defendant was not aware of the drugs prior to transporting 
them].)   
In Lawley, we distinguished Paguio in a footnote, noting that in Lawley, 
―the reference to some unidentified ‗innocent man‘ being in jail for the murder did 
not further incriminate [the declarant].‖  (Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 155, fn. 
21.)  The question, then, is whether portions of a declarant‘s statements 
exonerating the defendant further incriminate the declarant; that is, whether they 
are ―specifically disserving to the interests of the declarant.‖  (People v. Leach, 
supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 441.)   
In excluding the proffered hearsay, the trial court reasoned that ―if 
somebody is confessing to a murder and to personally being the one who stabbed 
someone, that it does not in any way significantly enhance the personal detriment 
to the confessor if he says nobody else had any part in it. . . .  [T]he fact that the 
others did or did not assist him isn‘t going to diminish his exposure, his public 
ridicule, et cetera.‖  The trial court found People v. Gatlin (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 
31 (Gatlin) to be controlling.   
 
28 
The trial court may have been incorrect in its categorical statement that a 
declarant who has admitted to murder does not enhance his personal culpability by 
claiming that he acted alone.  It is plausible that under some circumstances, as 
defendant contends, such statements may subject the declarant to a risk of 
increased criminal liability by establishing aggravating circumstances of the crime 
under section 190.3, factor (a), which would make the declarant more deserving of 
the death penalty.  (See People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 414-415 [that 
defendant acted alone could be considered by jury as a circumstance of the crime 
in determining penalty]; People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1195 
[defendant‘s role as the actual killer and motivating force behind the crime was a 
factor aggravating his culpability].)   
Although the trial court relied on Gatlin, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d 31, that 
case is not on point.  In Gatlin, the defendant was charged with burglary and 
sought to offer recordings of statements made by three codefendants.  The 
codefendants claimed the defendant ―had nothing to do with [it].‖  (Id. at p. 44.)  
However, the codefendants made these statements while disclaiming their own 
involvement.  (Ibid.)  The Court of Appeal held that the exculpation of the 
defendant was ―not specifically disserving‖ (ibid.) and that the defendant‘s 
argument ignored the declarants‘ ―self-serving‖ (id. at p. 43) denials of culpability.  
Thus, in Gatlin, the declarants‘ exoneration of the defendant clearly did not 
suggest that the declarants were more culpable.  Here, in contrast, Morris‘s 
statements were made during a conversation in which he admitted that he 
personally murdered the victim by choking and stabbing her.   
Nevertheless, ―we review the ruling, not the court‘s reasoning and, if the 
ruling was correct on any ground, we affirm.‖  (People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 
555, 582.)  Below, we apply these principles separately to the portion of the 
 
29 
proffered statements by Morris describing defendant‘s reaction to the killing and 
those portions asserting that defendant did not take part in the killing.   
 
2.  Statement regarding defendant’s reaction to the killing 
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the 
portion of Misty Abbott‘s proposed testimony that Morris told her that after he 
killed Bone, defendant and Wilson looked at him ―as if they were saying, what in 
the hell are you doing, dude.‖  It was defendant‘s burden to establish that Morris‘s 
statement describing defendant‘s reaction to the killing ―when made, . . . so far 
subjected [Morris] to the risk of civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable 
man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be 
true.‖  (Evid. Code, § 1230; see Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 610-611.)   
Defendant contends this portion of Morris‘s statement qualifies as a 
statement against interest because it meant that defendant was surprised that 
Morris killed the victim and thus that Morris alone made the decision to kill, a 
circumstance of the crime that could have aggravated Morris‘s potential sentence.  
The statement, however, was not necessarily against Morris‘s interest when made 
because its significance was unclear.  Morris‘s description of defendant‘s look as 
signifying ―what in the hell are you doing‖ suggests that Morris thought defendant 
was surprised or alarmed, but not why he was surprised or alarmed.  Defendant 
might have reacted as described by Morris for any number of reasons — for 
example, because of the manner in which Morris killed the victim or because of 
the extreme efforts (both strangling and stabbing) he had taken to kill the victim.  
If defendant‘s reaction was due to the circumstances, and not the fact, of the 
killing, the statement did not imply that defendant was unaware that Morris was 
going to kill the victim or that defendant was not involved in the decision to kill.  
If so, it did not further incriminate Morris, who had described the circumstances of 
 
30 
the crime to Misty, telling her that he had personally choked and stabbed the 
victim.   
In light of defendant‘s own statements to police, defendant‘s theory that the 
reaction described by Morris meant that defendant was surprised at the fact that 
Morris had killed the victim is an unlikely interpretation.  Defendant told the 
police that he had observed Morris strangling Bone and heard Morris say that she 
―won‘t die.‖  Later he saw Morris looking for a knife in the kitchen and then saw 
or heard him stabbing Bone.  Under these circumstances, he could not have been 
surprised at the fact that Morris had killed Bone.  Because Morris‘s proffered 
statement was vague and subject to reasonable interpretations that did not further 
incriminate Morris, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 
defendant failed to establish that the statement was one that ―a reasonable man in 
[Morris‘s] position would not have made . . . unless he believed it to be true.‖  
(Evid. Code, § 1230.) 
3.  Statements that defendant did not participate in the killing 
Whether the proffered testimony that defendant did not participate in the 
actual killing should have been admitted presents a closer question.  On the one 
hand, as defendant contends, we have recognized that a defendant‘s role as the 
actual killer and motivating force behind a murder can be an aggravating factor.  
(People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1195.)  Statements indicating that the 
declarant was the sole killer could subject the declarant to a risk of increased 
criminal liability by establishing aggravating circumstances of the crime.  On the 
other hand, given that Morris had admitted that he was the actual killer, and had 
personally choked and stabbed the victim to death, it is not clear that his 
statements that defendant was in another part of the house and ―took no part in the 
actual killing‖ further incriminated Morris to such an extent that a reasonable 
person in his position would not have made the statements unless they were true.  
 
31 
However, we need not decide whether the trial court erred, or whether any such 
error violated defendant‘s constitutional rights, because, as explained below, we 
conclude that the exclusion of Morris‘s statements regarding defendant‘s lack of 
participation in the killing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
4.  Attorney General’s failure to timely brief the harmless error issue 
The Attorney General did not argue, in her answer brief, that any error in 
the exclusion of Morris‘s hearsay statements was harmless.  The issue was 
discussed at oral argument, after which we gave both parties the opportunity to 
brief the issue of harmless error.  In addition, although defendant did not argue in 
his reply brief that the Attorney General had forfeited the harmless error issue by 
failing to brief it, we also gave both parties the opportunity to address the question 
of forfeiture.  We conclude that the Attorney General‘s failure to respond to 
defendant‘s harmless error argument does not relieve this court of its 
responsibility to determine whether any error was harmless.   
A forfeiture is the loss of a right by the failure to make a timely assertion of 
it.  (Cowan v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 367, 371.)  When an appellant 
fails to raise an issue in the opening brief, raising it for the first time in a reply 
brief or at oral argument, we generally decline to address the issue or address it in 
a summary manner.  (See People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 550, fn. 9 [claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel raised by defendant for the first time in reply 
brief is forfeited]; People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1290 [defendant‘s 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to prosecutor‘s 
argument, made for the first time in his reply brief in response to the Attorney 
General‘s waiver argument, ―is as meritless as it is belated‖]; People v. Alvarez 
(1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 241, fn. 38 [― ‗perfunctorily‘ ‖ rejecting defendant‘s claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, made for the first time in his reply brief and in 
a single paragraph]; People v. Crow (1993) 6 Cal.4th 952, 960, fn. 7 [declining to 
 
32 
address issue raised by defendant for the first time at oral argument]; Varjabedian 
v. City of Madera (1977) 20 Cal.3d 285, 295, fn. 11 [for reasons of fairness, court 
would not consider issue raised by defendant for the first time in its reply brief]; 
see also People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 254, fn. 5 [declining to 
address an argument that the People, as petitioners in this court, raised for the first 
time in their reply brief].)  To allow an appellant to raise a new issue in its reply 
brief or at oral argument, ―would be unfair to the respondent, and would increase 
the labors of the court.‖  (Webber v. Clarke (1887) 74 Cal. 11, 13.)   
A respondent‘s failure to address an argument raised by an appellant may, 
under some circumstances, be interpreted as a concession.  (See People v. Bouzas 
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 480, [stating that the People ―apparently concede‖ a point 
made by the defendant to which they did not respond, either in briefing or in oral 
argument].)  We do not, however, invariably interpret the failure to respond to an 
argument as a concession or a forfeiture.  In People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 
―[w]e decline[d] to find a [forfeiture] based on nothing more than respondent‘s 
failure to respond to defendant‘s . . . argument, which was itself raised for the first 
time on appeal.  Such a rule would require a party to respond to his opponent‘s 
every argument, subargument, and allegation, no matter how meritless or briefly 
made.‖  (Id. at p. 995, fn. 3; see Canaan v. Abdelnour (1985) 40 Cal.3d 703, 722, 
fn. 17 [court exercised discretion to address point that respondent raised for the 
first time at oral argument, because ―the point is but one aspect of the larger 
constitutional question‖], overruled on other grounds in Edelstein v. City and 
County of San Francisco (2002) 29 Cal.4th 164, 168.)   
Regardless, we have long recognized that, provided the parties have had a 
fair opportunity to address the issues, ―[t]his court . . . is undoubtedly at liberty to 
decide a case upon any points that its proper disposition may seem to require, 
whether taken by counsel or not . . . .‖  (Hibernia Sav. and Loan Soc. v. Farnham 
 
33 
(1908) 153 Cal. 578, 584.)  A reviewing court‘s authority to decide issues not 
initially raised or briefed by the parties is recognized in Government Code section 
68081, which requires that, before doing so, ―the court shall afford the parties an 
opportunity to present their views on the matter through supplemental briefing.‖  
(Gov. Code, § 68081.)  ―An appellate court is generally not prohibited from 
reaching a question that has not been preserved for review by a party.‖  (People v. 
Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6.)  In most instances, ―[w]hether or not 
it should do so is entrusted to its discretion.‖  (Ibid.) 
In this instance, however, we do not have discretion to decline to address 
whether any error was harmless based on the Attorney General‘s failure to brief 
the issue in a timely manner.  We are prohibited by the state Constitution from 
reversing a judgment unless, ―after an examination of the entire cause, including 
the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has 
resulted in a miscarriage of justice.‖  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)  The Attorney 
General‘s failure does not relieve this court of its constitutional responsibility to 
determine whether any error resulted in a miscarriage of justice.   
Defendant agrees that, regarding state law error, the state Constitution 
requires us to conduct harmless error analysis, and argues in this respect only that 
he should be given adequate notice of the Attorney General‘s position and an 
opportunity to respond to it.  Ample notice and opportunity to respond were 
provided in the present case, through both supplemental briefing and oral 
argument.   
Regarding errors of federal constitutional dimension, however, defendant 
argues that because the beneficiary of federal constitutional error has the burden of 
showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (Chapman v. 
California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24), we should adopt the approach that federal 
courts use when the government fails to argue that an error is harmless:  the issue 
 
34 
is generally considered forfeited, but the court may exercise its discretion to 
overlook the forfeiture, considering (1) the length and complexity of the record, 
(2) whether harmlessness is certain or debatable, and (3) the futility and costliness 
of further proceedings in the trial court.  (United States v. Giovanetti (1991) 928 
F.2d 225, 226-227.)   
Although we must apply the federal standard of harmless error in 
determining whether such a miscarriage has occurred (Chapman v. California, 
supra, 386 U.S. at p. 21), the forfeiture rules employed in the federal courts are not 
binding on this court.  None of the federal cases cited by defendant suggest that 
the forfeiture rules they apply are mandated by the federal Constitution.  (See 
United States v. Gonzalez-Flores (9th Cir. 2005) 418 F.3d 1093, 1100 
[government‘s failure to argue nonconstitutional error was harmless usually 
waives the issue, unless harmlessness is clear beyond any serious debate]; United 
States v. Davis (3d Cir. 2013) 726 F.3d 434, 445, fn. 8 [applying same rule]; 
United States v. Cacho-Bonilla (1st Cir. 2005) 404 F.3d 84, 90 [noting that 
because the government made no harmless error argument, defendants had no 
chance to respond to any harmless error claim]; Hargrave v. McKee (6th Cir. 
2007) 248 Fed.Appx. 718, 729 [concluding that even if the state did not forfeit the 
harmless error argument by failing to raise it until oral argument, the court would 
find the constitutional error not harmless]; United States v. Montgomery (8th Cir. 
1996) 100 F.3d 1404, 1407 [stating the government‘s failure to raise harmless 
error in its brief waived the argument on appeal but, exercising its discretion to 
overlook the waiver and review the record on its own motion, court concluded the 
error was not harmless]; United States v. Varela-Rivera (9th Cir. 2002) 279 F.3d 
1174, 1180 [stating the government did not argue that the error was harmless and 
this failure waived the argument]; United States v. Vallejo (9th Cir. 2001) 237 
F.3d 1008, 1026 [same, adding that nevertheless, under the circumstances of the 
 
35 
case the error was not harmless].)  Furthermore, most of these courts explicitly 
recognize that they retain discretion to review the record and decide whether any 
error was harmless even when the government fails to make the argument.  This 
recognition undermines any contention that the forfeiture rule applied by federal 
courts is constitutionally mandated.   
The state cases cited by defendant in support of his position are similarly 
based on those states‘ own procedural rules and policies, not on federal 
constitutional principles.  (See State v. Almaraz (Idaho 2013) 301 P.3d 242, 256-
257 [relying on state case law holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal 
at oral argument are not properly before the court]; Polk v. State (Nev. 2010) 233 
P.3d 357, 359-361 [citing state rule of appellate procedure providing that if a 
respondent fails to adequately respond to an appeal, the court may consider the 
failure to respond as a confession of error].)  These cases do not specifically 
discuss a failure to address harmless error.  In any event, they are not persuasive 
because, as noted above, under the California Constitution, this court may not 
reverse a judgment unless it is convinced that a miscarriage of justice has 
occurred, and we clearly have the authority to address matters not initially raised 
by the parties.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Gov. Code, § 68081.) 
Justice Liu‘s concurring and dissenting opinion argues that we should adopt 
the forfeiture rule used by the federal appellate courts, regardless of whether the 
error is one of state law only or is of federal constitutional dimension.  Even if 
such a rule could be reconciled with our constitutional obligation to address 
harmless error ―after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence‖ 
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13), we are not persuaded that we should adopt it.  If the 
harmless error issue is a debatable one or the record is complex, we may exercise 
our discretion to seek supplemental briefing and decide the issue with the benefit 
of full briefing from the parties.  This approach is fair to the parties and gives the 
 
36 
court the benefit of the parties‘ perspectives on an issue that we are obliged to 
address.  The federal approach might avoid delay and save some effort on a 
reviewing court‘s part, but at the potential cost of an incorrect decision, resulting 
in unnecessary relitigation.   
Defendant suggests that if we do not attach some negative consequence to 
the Attorney General‘s failure to brief harmless error, we are unfairly treating the 
state, as a party, more leniently than we treat criminal defendants.  We disagree.  
We have occasionally exercised our discretion to permit defendants to file 
supplemental briefs raising new issues in capital appeals.  (See, e.g., People v. 
Howard (2010) 51 Cal.4th 15, 26, 30, fn. 6, 33 [addressing on the merits three 
different contentions raised for the first time in a supplemental brief]; People v. 
Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 187, and docket entries, case No. S043628 
[reversing two burglary convictions based on an argument made in defendant‘s 
supplemental brief, which was filed after her reply brief].)  Furthermore, because 
our Constitution prohibits reversal of a judgment absent a finding that a 
miscarriage of justice has occurred, a respondent and an appellant are not similarly 
situated.  Our obligation to address harmless error despite a respondent‘s default is 
a result of the constitutional mandate and is not based on the party‘s status as 
criminal defendant or the state.   
5.  Harmless error analysis 
Turning to the merits of the harmless error argument, we conclude that the 
exclusion of Morris‘s statements to Lawson and to Misty Abbott that defendant 
did not participate in the killing does not require reversal of the special 
circumstance finding and the death sentence.  The most reasonable interpretation 
of the proffered evidence that defendant did not participate in the killing, and that 
he was in another part of the house and did not participate in the actual killing, 
was that he did not participate in the act of killing.  The prosecutor, however, 
 
37 
never argued that defendant participated in the act of killing.  In order to find the 
special circumstance to be true, the jury needed to find that defendant acted either 
with reckless disregard for life or with the intent to kill.  The prosecutor reminded 
the jury, ―There‘s no requirement that he be the actual killer,‖ and she did not 
suggest that he was.  As the prosecutor argued, ―The fact the defendant may not 
have killed Betty Bone himself is not of any significance in this case.‖   
Indeed, the prosecution presented no evidence that defendant had actually 
participated in the homicidal act.  Defendant‘s statement to the police indicated 
that he was present in the house while Morris killed Bone but that he did not 
participate in the killing.  Misty Abbott‘s testimony concerning Morris‘s 
description of how he killed the victim did not include the involvement of any 
other person.  Likewise, defendant‘s out-of-court statement to jailhouse informant 
Howe was that he never personally touched the victim and his DNA would not be 
found on the body.  No DNA or other evidence linked defendant to the actual 
killing.  Although Morris‘s grandfather testified that Morris had told him that 
others were wrongly blaming him for the murder, that statement was admitted 
only for purposes of impeachment and, in any event, nothing in it suggested that 
defendant assisted Morris in killing Bone.   
The prosecution did present testimony from jailhouse informant Howe that 
defendant admitted he had ordered Morris and Wilson to kill the victim, and 
argued that Howe‘s testimony supported a true finding on the special circumstance 
allegation on the theory that defendant acted with the intent to kill.  Defendant 
argues that the excluded evidence would have caused the jury to doubt Howe‘s 
otherwise uncontradicted testimony that defendant ordered the killing.  We find no 
reasonable possibility that the excluded evidence would have caused the jury to 
doubt Howe‘s testimony.  Statements that defendant did not participate in the 
actual killing were not inconsistent with Howe‘s testimony that defendant 
 
38 
admitted he ordered Morris to kill Bone, and they were consistent with Howe‘s 
testimony that defendant said he had never touched Bone.   
Likewise, at the penalty phase, the prosecution did not suggest that 
defendant participated in the actual killing; it instead suggested only that he 
ordered Morris and Wilson to do it and stood by while it was done.  As observed 
above, there is no reasonable possibility that the jury would have interpreted 
Morris‘s statements as inconsistent with Howe‘s testimony that defendant 
admitted he ordered the killing.   
Defendant argues that Morris‘s statement to Lawson that defendant was ―in 
another part of the house‖ during the killing would have contradicted Howe‘s prior 
statement to Detective O‘Connor that defendant told him he watched the killing 
and enjoyed watching it, thereby negating these potential aggravating 
circumstances of the crime as well as tending to impeach Howe‘s testimony 
generally.  We find no reasonable possibility that the admission of Morris‘s 
statements would have changed the jury‘s view of Howe‘s testimony, for several 
reasons.  First, defendant in his own statement to the police admitted that he had 
observed at least some of Morris‘s actions.  He conceded that he saw Morris 
strangling the victim and he specifically described Morris‘s action in stabbing the 
victim as well as the sounds of the stabbing.  Second, there is no real conflict 
between Howe‘s statement to the detective that defendant told him he watched the 
murder and Morris‘s statement that defendant was in another part of the house 
during the killing.  Morris‘s killing of Bone was a protracted effort.  As defendant 
himself described it, he was moving about the house looking for items to steal; he 
was in another part of the house some of the time but he also returned to Morris‘s 
location, or at least close enough to observe his actions, at other times.  Third, 
Howe himself, in his testimony, disavowed his statement to the detective that 
defendant told him he had watched the killing.  Howe testified that he did not 
 
39 
know where defendant was during the killing; he may have assumed defendant 
watched the killing but could not be certain that defendant admitted to doing so.  
He was uncertain whether defendant told him he enjoyed watching the killing or 
that he enjoyed the fact that the victim died.  Under these circumstances, it is 
highly improbable that the jury would have viewed Morris‘s statement that 
defendant was in another part of the house during the killing as grounds for 
disbelieving any part of Howe‘s testimony.  We find no reasonable possibility that 
the exclusion of Morris‘s statements that defendant did not participate in the 
killing and was in another part of the house made a difference in the outcome at 
either the guilt or penalty phase.   
E.  Instructions on circumstantial evidence 
The trial court read to the jury a standard instruction regarding 
circumstantial evidence, CALJIC No. 8.83, which informed the jury that (1) each 
fact that is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to establish the 
truth of a special circumstance must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) 
if there are two reasonable interpretations of the circumstantial evidence, the jury 
must accept the one that favors defendant.  Defendant argues that instructing the 
jury regarding these principles only in connection with circumstantial evidence 
could cause the jury to believe that the principles did not apply when direct 
evidence is used.  (See People v. Vann (1974) 12 Cal.3d 220, 226-227 [instruction 
on circumstantial evidence, in the absence of a general instruction requiring proof 
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, might have been interpreted by jurors as 
requiring a lesser degree of proof if the evidence is direct].)  He contends the 
instruction undermined the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as 
applied to direct evidence.  He further argues that this instructional error requires 
reversal of the special circumstance finding because it could have affected the 
 
40 
jury‘s consideration of Howe‘s testimony, which was direct evidence that 
defendant intended to kill.   
The Attorney General contends that defendant forfeited this claim by 
failing to request that the trial court modify the standard instruction.  We agree.  
―A party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and 
responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has 
requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language.‖  (People v. Lang (1989) 
49 Cal.3d 991, 1024; see People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1165 
[defendant forfeited claim that instruction discussing proof by direct evidence 
should have included additional principles related to the burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that were contained in the instruction on circumstantial 
evidence]; People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 328 [defendant forfeited claim 
that instruction directing jury to find special circumstance not true if it had a 
reasonable doubt as to its truth was incomplete because it did not define 
reasonable doubt or direct the jury to find the special circumstance ―beyond a 
reasonable doubt‖].)  The instructions regarding circumstantial evidence were not 
incorrect or inapplicable and defendant did not request any modification of the 
instructions to address the concerns he now presents.   
Were we to address the merits, we would have to reject the claim.  An 
instruction ―[d]ifferentiating between direct and circumstantial evidence does not 
undermine the reasonable doubt standard or presumption of innocence.‖  (People 
v. Livingston, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1166.)  We addressed and rejected claims 
nearly identical to defendant‘s in People v. Livingston and in People v. Soloman 
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 825- 827.  In People v. Soloman, the defendant argued that 
because the instruction on circumstantial evidence did not refer to direct evidence, 
―jurors would have believed that a fact essential to guilt that was based on direct, 
rather than circumstantial, evidence need not be proved beyond a reasonable 
 
41 
doubt.‖  (Id. at p. 826.)  We noted that the trial court had instructed the jury that 
both direct and circumstantial evidence were acceptable means of proof, that the 
defendant was to be presumed innocent, and that ― ‗in case of a reasonable doubt 
whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty.‘ ‖  
(Ibid., quoting CALJIC No. 2.90.)  ―These instructions, coupled with the directive 
to ‗consider the instructions as a whole and each in light of the others,‘ fully 
apprised the jury that the reasonable doubt standard applied to both forms of 
proof.‖  (People v. Soloman, supra, at p. 826.) 
As in People v. Soloman, the trial court in the present case fully instructed 
the jury on the presumption of innocence, the requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and to consider the instructions as a whole.  We see no 
reasonable likelihood that because the jury was given some additional, more 
detailed, direction about how to apply the reasonable doubt standard to 
circumstantial evidence, but was not given such direction regarding direct 
evidence, the jury would have concluded that the reasonable doubt standard did 
not fully apply to proof by direct evidence.   
Furthermore, the jury received additional relevant instructions applicable to 
the direct evidence with which defendant is here concerned — Howe‘s testimony 
that defendant told him he ordered the killing, which was evidence of defendant‘s 
intent.  The jury was instructed that ―if the evidence as to any specific intent or 
mental state is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which points 
to the existence of the specific intent or mental state and the other to the absence 
of the specific intent or mental state, you must adopt that interpretation which 
points to the absence of the specific intent or mental state.‖ 
 
42 
F.  Failure to instruct that the jury must unanimously agree on any 
overt acts required for conspiracy to commit robbery 
Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery.  Conspiracy to 
commit a crime requires proof of an overt act committed in pursuance of the 
conspiracy.  (§ 184.)  The information alleged five different overt acts in 
furtherance of the conspiracy.  Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing 
to instruct the jury that it could not convict defendant of conspiracy unless the 
jurors unanimously agreed regarding the required overt act.  Defendant concedes 
that this court has previously rejected the argument that jury unanimity regarding 
the overt act is required under state law.  (People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 
1135 (Russo).)  He contends, however, that Russo did not consider whether the 
federal Constitution requires the agreement of at least a majority of jurors on the 
overt act.  Defendant cites cases holding that the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the federal Constitution require a jury trial and proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt on all elements of the offense (Sandstrom v. Montana (1979) 442 
U.S. 510, 512-514; Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975) 421 U.S. 684, 697-698; In re 
Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 363-364; Morissette v. United States (1952) 342 
U.S. 246, 274-275) and the agreement of some minimum number of jurors (Burch 
v. Louisiana (1979) 441 U.S. 130 [conviction by a nonunanimous six-person jury 
violated defendant‘s right to a jury trial]; Johnson v. Louisiana (1972) 406 U.S. 
356 [agreement of nine out of 12 jurors is sufficient]).   
None of the cases cited by defendant calls into question our prior 
conclusion that the jurors need not agree unanimously on which ―overt act‖ of a 
conspiracy was proved.  Russo reasoned that the jury must agree on what crime 
was committed, not how that crime was committed.  ―Although the jury had to 
find at least one overt act, whether it was one or another of several possible acts 
only concerns the way in which the crime was committed, i.e., the theory of the 
 
43 
case, not whether discrete crimes were committed.  Thus, if the jurors disagreed as 
to what overt act was committed, and agreed only that an overt act was committed, 
they would still have unanimously found defendant guilty of a particular 
conspiracy.‖  (Russo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1135.)  Consistently with our 
reasoning in Russo, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that when the 
defendant‘s alleged conduct constitutes a single offense that may be committed in 
different ways, the federal Constitution does not require unanimity regarding how 
the crime was committed.  (Schad v. Arizona (1991) 501 U.S. 624, 629-645 [due 
process clause does not require a jury to agree unanimously whether a charge of 
first degree murder was committed by an intentional, premeditated killing or by 
felony murder]; id. at p. 649 (conc. opn. of Scalia, J.) [―it has long been the 
general rule that when a single crime can be committed in various ways, jurors 
need not agree upon the mode of commission‖]; see also United States v. Kozeny 
(2d Cir. 2011) 667 F.3d 122, 132 [jury need not agree on a single overt act to 
sustain a conspiracy conviction]; United States v. Griggs (7th Cir. 2009) 569 F.3d 
341, 343 [same]; United States v. Sutherland (5th Cir. 1981) 656 F.2d 1181 
[same].) 
G.  Discovery order 
Defendant contends that discovery ordered against the defense under 
section 1054.5 is unconstitutional and violates the federal and state privileges 
against self-incrimination and rights to effective assistance of counsel.  Defendant 
recognizes that we rejected the same arguments in Izazaga v. Superior Court 
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, but, in order to preserve the issue for federal review, 
contends that case was wrongly decided and should be reconsidered.  We decline 
to do so.   
 
44 
H.  Refusal of request to instruct that the jury must unanimously agree 
on the theory supporting the special circumstance verdict 
The robbery and burglary special circumstance allegations required that 
defendant either intended to kill or was a major participant in the felony and 
exhibited a reckless disregard for life.  (§ 190.2, subds. (c) & (d).)  The trial court 
refused to instruct the jury that it must agree unanimously on the theory that 
supported the special circumstance allegation.  Defendant acknowledges that when 
a charge is prosecuted under different legal theories, the jury need not agree 
unanimously on which legal theory applies.  (See, e.g., People v. Jenkins, supra, 
22 Cal.4th at p. 1024 [jury need not agree whether defendant is guilty of murder 
based on a theory of direct culpability or a theory of accomplice liability]; People 
v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 824 [jury need not agree unanimously which 
acts constitute lying in wait]; People v. Failla (1966) 64 Cal.2d 560, 567 [in 
burglary case, jurors need not agree unanimously regarding which felony the 
defendant intended at the time of entry].)  Defendant contends this is a case in 
which he was prosecuted under a single legal theory, with alternative factual 
theories that (1) defendant ordered Morris to kill the victim, in which case he acted 
with intent to kill, or (2) he did not order the killing but was a major participant in 
the robbery and his conduct evidenced a conscious disregard for life.  Under these 
circumstances, defendant contends, the jury must agree unanimously on the acts 
constituting the offense.  He contends that the omission of the unanimity 
instruction violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and his Eighth 
Amendment right to heightened reliability in a capital case.   
A unanimity instruction is required if there is evidence that more than one 
crime occurred, either of which could provide the basis for conviction under a 
single count.  (See People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 281 [when evidence 
suggested more than one act of bribery, jury must agree unanimously which act 
 
45 
was the basis for conviction]; see People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 92 [―A 
requirement of jury unanimity typically applies to acts that could have been 
charged as separate offenses‖].)  On the other hand, the unanimity instruction is 
not required ― ‗where multiple theories or acts may form the basis of a guilty 
verdict on one discrete criminal event.‘  ‖  (Russo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1135, 
italics added.)  ―[W]here the evidence shows only a single discrete crime but 
leaves room for disagreement as to exactly how that crime was committed or what 
the defendant‘s precise role was, the jury need not unanimously agree on the basis 
or, as the cases often put it, the ‗theory‘ whereby the defendant is guilty.‖  (Id. at 
p. 1132.)  This is true even if the two theories are based on different facts.  (People 
v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1025 [unanimity instruction not required even 
where ―different facts would support aiding and abetting liability and liability as a 
direct perpetrator‖].)   
In the present case, there was no evidence that more than one crime of 
murder was committed.  Rather, the evidence left ―room for disagreement as to 
exactly how that crime was committed or what the defendant‘s precise role was.‖  
(Russo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1132.)  When the defendant‘s alleged conduct 
constitutes a single offense that may be committed in different ways, the federal 
Constitution does not require unanimity on how the crime was committed.  (Schad 
v. Arizona, supra, 501 U.S. 624 [due process clause of U.S. Const. does not 
require jury to agree unanimously whether charge of first degree murder was 
committed by an intentional, premeditated killing or by felony murder].)   
Defendant analogizes this case to People v. Dellinger (1985) 163 
Cal.App.3d 284, 300-302, in which the Court of Appeal held that the defendant 
was entitled to a unanimity instruction because evidence suggested that the 
defendant could have killed the victim either by blunt force trauma or by cocaine 
poisoning.  Dellinger recognized that in most of the cases that have addressed the 
 
46 
need for a unanimity instruction, there were not only multiple criminal acts that 
could have constituted the charged offense but also potentially multiple offenses.  
(Id. at p. 301.)  In contrast, in Dellinger, ―there was only one offense and one 
victim but there were several hypotheses as to which act or acts caused [the 
victim‘s] death.‖  Nevertheless, the appellate court concluded that a unanimity 
instruction was required.  ―As long as there are multiple acts presented to the jury 
which could constitute the charged offense, a defendant is entitled to an instruction 
on unanimity.‖  (Ibid.)   
Even assuming that Dellinger was correctly decided, it is factually 
distinguishable from the present case.  Here, there was no dispute as to what acts 
caused the victim‘s death.  We have previously concluded the holding of Dellinger 
does not extend to the situation in which the defendant could have been convicted 
as an aider and abettor to a murder or as the actual killer based on a single course 
of conduct.  (People v. Beardslee, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 93.)  Much less should it 
apply in the present case, in which there was no dispute that defendant was guilty 
of murder even though he was not the actual killer, and the only issue was whether 
he acted with the intent to kill or as a major participant in the felony with a 
reckless disregard for life.  No unanimity instruction was required.   
I.  Misreading of the instruction on the mental state element of the 
felony-murder special circumstance 
To prove the felony-murder special circumstance, the prosecution was 
required to prove either that defendant aided the murder with the intent to kill, or 
acted as a major participant in the felony and exhibited a reckless indifference to 
human life.  (§ 190.2, subds. (c) & (d).)  The written instructions, which were 
provided to the jury, correctly explained that ―[a] defendant acts with reckless 
indifference to life when that defendant knows or is aware that his acts involve a 
grave risk of death to an innocent human being.‖  (Italics added.)  However, when 
 
47 
reading the instruction, the trial court told the jury that ―[a] defendant acts with 
reckless indifference to life whether [he] knows or is aware that his acts involve a 
grave risk of death to an innocent human being.‖  (Italics added.)  Defendant 
contends this instruction was erroneous, because the trial court apparently 
substituted the word ―whether‖ for ―when,‖ thereby indicating that reckless 
indifference could exist whether or not defendant knew or was aware that his acts 
caused a grave risk of death.  He contends this instruction misstated the law and 
violated his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the federal 
Constitution.   
―The risk of a discrepancy between the orally delivered and the written 
instructions exists in every trial, and verdicts are not undermined by the mere fact 
the trial court misspoke.‖  (People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 200.)  ―[W]e 
often have held that when erroneous oral instructions are supplemented by correct 
written ones, we assume the jury followed the written instructions, particularly 
when, as here, the jury is instructed that the written version is controlling.‖  
(People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1132; see People v. Osband (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 622, 687 [noting that the jury was instructed to be ― ‗governed only by 
[each] instruction in its final wording, whether printed, typed or handwritten‘ ‖].)  
Here, the jury was instructed just before the beginning of deliberations that it 
would be provided with the instruction in written form and that ―the instructions 
may be typed, printed or handwritten.  Portions may have been added or 
deleted. . . .  Every part of the text of an instruction, whether typed, printed, or 
handwritten is of equal importance.  You are to be governed only by the 
instruction in its final wording.‖   
Even if we do not assume that the jury understood that the written 
instructions were controlling, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury 
misunderstood the requirements for proof of the felony-murder special 
 
48 
circumstance.  ―When an appellate court addresses a claim of jury misinstruction, 
it must assess the instructions as a whole, viewing the challenged instruction in 
context with other instructions, in order to determine if there was a reasonable 
likelihood the jury applied the challenged instruction in an impermissible 
manner.‖  (People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 803.)  Here, the instruction as 
read to the jury was, at most, ambiguous.  Both the prosecution and the defense 
focused on the ―reckless indifference‖ element of the special circumstance in their 
arguments, and correctly stated that it required that defendant knew his act created 
a grave risk of death.  The prosecutor stated, ―The definition of a reckless 
indifference to human life as taken from the jury instruction itself is that the 
defendant knows or is aware that his acts involve a grave risk of death to an 
innocent human being.‖  ―Mr. Grimes knew there was a grave risk by going into 
this house with these people that Betty Bone was gonna be killed . . . .  So when 
we talk about reckless indifference, knowing or being aware that your acts involve 
a grave risk . . . it‘s his knowledge and his awareness at the time that he goes into 
this residence as to what could potentially happen to this woman.‖  Defense 
counsel correctly read the instruction to the jury:  ―I know I have read it, but I‘ll 
read it to you again. . . .  A defendant acts with reckless indifference to human life 
when that defendant knows or is aware that his acts involve a grave risk of death 
to an innocent human being.‖  ―The law on the special circumstance above and 
beyond the first degree murder, is that Mr. Grimes must know or be aware that his 
acts, his conduct, what he does, involves a grave risk of death to an innocent 
human being.‖  ―That‘s how reckless indifference is defined, when that defendant 
knows or is aware that his acts involve a grave risk of death to an innocent human 
being.‖  In light of counsel‘s repeated statements and the correct written 
instructions, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury was misled by the trial 
court‘s misstatement.   
 
49 
J.  Instructions on the robbery element of the felony-murder special 
circumstance 
The jury was instructed that the felony-murder special circumstance could 
not be found true unless, among other things, the prosecution proved ―the murder 
was committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of the crime of 
robbery or to facilitate the escape therefrom or to avoid detection.‖  The jury was 
correctly instructed on the elements of robbery.  Defendant nevertheless contends 
the robbery special-circumstance finding must be reversed because the trial court 
erred in instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 2.15, which told the jurors that if 
they found defendant had been in possession of stolen property, that was not 
enough to support a conviction of robbery and that corroborating evidence tending 
to prove defendant‘s guilt also is required, but ―this corroborating evidence need 
only be slight, and need not by itself be sufficient to warrant an inference of guilt.‖  
Defendant contends that CALJIC No. 2.15 provided the jury an option of 
convicting defendant of robbery based on his possession of stolen goods plus some 
corroborating evidence, without finding all the elements of robbery.  He also 
contends that it unconstitutionally lightened the state‘s burden of persuasion by 
permitting a conviction based on ―slight evidence.‖   
We have previously rejected the same arguments, concluding that CALJIC 
No. 2.15 appropriately permits — but does not require — jurors to infer guilt of 
burglary, robbery, or theft from the possession of stolen property plus some 
corroborating evidence, and that it does not violate due process or reduce the 
burden of proof.  (See People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 375; People v. 
Parson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332, 355-356; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 
975-977.)   
Defendant relies upon federal conspiracy cases that have found a violation 
of due process because the jury was instructed, over the defendant‘s objection, that 
 
50 
― ‗[o]nce the existence of the agreement or common scheme of conspiracy is 
shown, . . . slight evidence is all that is required to connect a particular defendant 
to the conspiracy.‘ ‖  (United States v. Partin (5th Cir. 1977) 552 F.2d 621, 628; 
see United States v. Durrive (7th Cir. 1990) 902 F.2d 1221, 1228 [concluding that 
on appellate review, reviewing court must find ―substantial evidence,‖ rather than 
―slight evidence,‖ connecting defendant to the conspiracy]; United States v. Dunn 
(9th Cir. 1977) 564 F.2d 348, 356-357 [clarifying that defendant‘s connection to 
the conspiracy need only be slight, but the connection must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt].)  According to these cases, the ―slight evidence‖ instruction 
― ‗reduced the level of proof necessary for the government to carry its burden by 
possibly confusing the jury about the proper standard or even convincing jury 
members that a defendant‘s participation in the conspiracy need not be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.‘ ‖  (United States v. Partin, supra, at p. 629, quoting 
United States v. Hall (5th Cir. 1976) 525 F.2d 1254, 1256.)   
The problem with the instruction addressed in these federal cases is that it 
permitted the jury to conclude that defendant was a participant in the conspiracy 
based only on ―slight evidence.‖  By contrast, the CALJIC No. 2.15 permits 
conviction of theft-related offenses based upon evidence that the defendant was 
recently found in possession of stolen property plus additional, ―slight,‖ 
corroborating evidence.  We have recognized that ―[p]ossession of recently stolen 
property is so incriminating that to warrant conviction there need only be, in 
addition to possession, slight corroboration in the form of statements or conduct of 
the defendant tending to show his guilt.‖  (People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 
748, 754.)  Defendant‘s reliance on the federal conspiracy cases is, therefore, 
inapt. 
 
51 
K.  Admission of testimony from a jailhouse informant 
Jonathan Howe, an inmate in the county jail where defendant was 
incarcerated before trial, testified at trial regarding admissions that defendant 
made to him.  Before trial, defense counsel unsuccessfully moved to exclude 
Howe‘s testimony on several grounds, but he did not contend that the testimony 
should be excluded on the ground that Howe‘s plea agreement with the 
prosecution placed him under a strong compulsion to testify in accordance with his 
pretrial statements.  Defendant contends his counsel rendered constitutionally 
deficient assistance in failing to move to exclude or strike Howe‘s testimony on 
this latter ground.   
It is proper for the prosecution to present the testimony of a witness 
pursuant to a plea bargain if the witness believes that the agreement merely 
requires him to testify truthfully.  (People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 768; 
People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1229.)  A defendant is denied a fair 
trial, however, if a plea agreement places the witness under ―a strong compulsion 
to testify in a particular fashion.‖  (Garrison, supra, at p. 768.)  Here, there is no 
evidence that Howe was under any compulsion to testify in accordance with his 
previous statements.  Howe pleaded guilty to certain pending charges and agreed 
to a sentence of up to 24 months in exchange for the dismissal of other charges.  
He had been offered this same agreement before he came forward with 
information regarding defendant, except that the sentence would have been an 
agreed-upon term of 24 months.  The actual length of his sentence would be 
decided by the same judge who was presiding in the present case, depending upon 
his determination as to whether Howe testified truthfully.  The written plea 
agreement stated that Howe had ―an obligation to do nothing other than to tell the 
truth, fully and accurately.‖   
 
52 
Defendant argues that because the prosecution put Howe through a voice 
stress test and two polygraphs before his testimony, it was clear to Howe that the 
prosecution believed his pretrial statements were truthful and he therefore would 
have understood the agreement to testify truthfully to mean he was required to 
testify in accordance with his pretrial statements.  The record demonstrates that 
any such notion was dispelled by the trial court‘s very clear direction that Howe 
was to tell the truth in court regardless of what he may have said previously.  At 
his plea hearing, Howe told the judge that it was his understanding that he would 
have to testify truthfully and ―consistent with any report I‘ve — I‘ve made so far 
in this case.‖  The judge clearly explained to him that he was to ―testify truthfully 
whether or not it‘s consistent with any other statement. . . .  [I]f telling the truth 
here, the actual truth, would be inconsistent with something you‘ve previously 
said, that fact that it‘s inconsistent will not cause me to conclude that you‘re not 
being truthful. . . .  In other words, I don‘t want you to think in any way, 
Mr. Howe, that for me to believe you‘re telling the truth that what you say here in 
this courtroom has to be consistent with something you‘ve said before. . . .  In 
other words, do not say something that isn‘t true because it‘s consistent with what 
you said previously to law enforcement, in hopes that I will therefore conclude 
you‘re telling the truth here.‖  Howe repeatedly affirmed that he understood.  
Given these facts, any challenge to Howe‘s testimony on the grounds that he was 
under pressure to testify consistently with his former statements would have been 
unsuccessful.  There being nothing in the record to demonstrate defense counsel 
performed deficiently by failing to challenge Howe‘s testimony on these grounds, 
relief on direct appeal is unwarranted.  (See People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 
Cal.4th 264, 266-267; People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426.)   
 
53 
L.  Alleged deficient performance by counsel in advising defendant to 
reject plea bargain 
Defendant contends that his trial counsel performed deficiently in advising 
him to reject a plea bargain that would have avoided the death penalty before 
counsel was sufficiently familiar with the case to render such advice.  Because the 
record does not establish what counsel knew about the case at the time the plea 
bargain was refused or what advice counsel gave to defendant, defendant has not 
shown that his counsel‘s actions fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. 
Defendant was charged with murder and special circumstances in October 
of 1995 and pled not guilty.  Fifteen months later, in January of 1997, the District 
Attorney of Shasta County, Dennis Sheehy, notified defendant‘s counsel that he 
had decided not to seek the death penalty.  Because defendant was not the actual 
killer, District Attorney Sheehy did not believe that a jury would impose the death 
penalty.  Shortly thereafter, Mr. Sheehy resigned as the district attorney and 
McGregor Scott replaced him.  On May 23, 1997, in response to defendant‘s 
Marsden motion (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118), the court appointed 
new counsel, Richard Maxion, for defendant.  Two weeks after Maxion was 
appointed, on June 6, District Attorney Scott informed the court that he would be 
seeking the death penalty as of June 27 unless, prior to that date, defendant 
decided to plead guilty to special circumstances murder.  In court on June 27, 
defense counsel stated that his client would not be pleading guilty and the 
prosecutor announced that he would be seeking the death penalty.   
Prior to trial, defendant moved to prohibit the prosecution from seeking the 
death penalty on a number of grounds, including claims that the decision to seek 
the death penalty constituted vindictive prosecution and that defendant was denied 
effective assistance of counsel because counsel Richard Maxion had not been 
 
54 
given enough time to attempt to persuade the district attorney not to seek death.  
At the hearing on defendant‘s motion the trial court rejected the claim that the 
prosecution‘s offer to allow the defendant a three-week period to decide whether 
to plead guilty in exchange for a life sentence denied defendant effective 
assistance of counsel because it was made only two weeks after new counsel was 
appointed.  Testimony established that defense counsel had agreed to the deadline, 
and that the prosecutor would have given him more time if he had asked for it. 
Here, defendant contends that his counsel rendered constitutionally 
deficient assistance in advising him not to accept the plea before he had 
adequately familiarized himself with the case.  A defendant has the right to 
effective assistance of counsel in deciding whether to accept or reject a proposed 
plea agreement.  (See In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 937.)  In order to 
establish a claim of constitutionally deficient performance by counsel, defendant 
must establish that (1) counsel‘s representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and (2) there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel‘s failings, the result would have been more 
favorable to defendant.  (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-696.)  
―[A] defense attorney‘s simple misjudgment as to the strength of the prosecution‘s 
case, the chances of acquittal, or the sentence a defendant is likely to receive upon 
conviction, among other matters involving the exercise of counsel‘s judgment, will 
not, without more, give rise to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.‖  (In re 
Alvernaz, supra, at p. 937.)  ―When a claim of ineffective assistance is made on 
direct appeal, and the record does not show the reason for counsel‘s challenged 
actions or omissions, the conviction must be affirmed unless there could be no 
satisfactory explanation.‖  (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 569; see 
People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 266-267.).)   
 
55 
The record does not show how much counsel knew about the case, how 
counsel advised defendant, or what defendant‘s response was.  There is no 
evidence that he did not advise defendant to accept the offer.  Defendant contends 
that the record demonstrates that counsel could not have had a sufficient 
understanding of the case to adequately advise defendant at the time that defendant 
declined the plea offer and that, if properly advised, defendant would have 
accepted the plea.  He bases this conclusion on the fact that during jury selection 
(was more than a year after defendant declined the offer), when counsel was fully 
prepared for trial, counsel told the court that defendant was willing to plead guilty 
and accept a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.  But the record does 
not establish that defendant‘s decision to plead guilty was based on counsel‘s 
additional knowledge about the case.  Any number of circumstances, unrelated to 
counsel‘s representation, may have occurred during the time between defendant‘s 
rejection of the plea offer and the start of trial, that could have led defendant to 
change his mind.4  Consequently, defendant has failed to show that counsel‘s 
conduct fell below professional norms or that defendant would have pled guilty if 
properly advised.   
M.  Prosecution’s decision to seek death unless defendant pled guilty to 
murder and the special circumstance 
Defendant contends he was denied due process when the district attorney 
decided to reverse the decision of the prior district attorney and to seek the death 
penalty unless defendant pleaded guilty to the charge of murder with special 
circumstances.  As explained above, after the district attorney‘s office notified 
                                              
4  
For example, during this time period witness Howe came forward to offer 
evidence that defendant admitted he directed Morris to kill Bone, and trial counsel 
became aware that Howe might be called as a witness.   
 
56 
defendant that it would not seek the death penalty, a new district attorney was 
appointed.  He reconsidered that decision and decided to seek the death penalty, 
but gave defendant the opportunity to plead guilty to the charges of murder with 
special circumstances and serve a sentence of life without possibility of parole.  
Defendant argues his right to due process was violated because the district 
attorney sought the death penalty after defendant refused to plead guilty, thereby 
punishing him for exercising his right to a jury trial.   
Under the due process clause, prosecutors may not ―tak[e] certain actions 
against a criminal defendant, such as increasing the charges, in retaliation for the 
defendant‘s exercise of constitutional rights.  [Citations.]  It is not a constitutional 
violation, however, for a prosecutor to offer benefits, in the form of reduced 
charges, in exchange for a defendant‘s guilty pleas, or to threaten to increase the 
charges if the defendant does not plead guilty.  [Citations.]  In the pretrial setting, 
there is no presumption of vindictiveness when the prosecution increases the 
charges or, as here, the potential penalty.  [Citations.]  Rather, the defendant must 
‗prove objectively that the prosecutor‘s charging decision was motivated by a 
desire to punish him for doing something the law plainly allowed him to do.‘ ‖  
(People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 98.)   
Absent proof of vindictiveness or other improper motive, increasing the 
charges or punishment when a plea bargain is refused does not constitute 
unconstitutional punishment or retaliation for the exercise of a defendant‘s legal 
rights.  ―[I]n the ‗give-and-take‘ of plea bargaining, there is no such element of 
punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the 
prosecution‘s offer.‖  (Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978) 434 U.S. 357, 363.)  The 
district attorney was free to change the decision made by his predecessor not to 
seek the death penalty, and that decision does not raise a presumption of 
vindictiveness.  (See United States v. Goodwin (1982) 457 U.S. 368, 381-385.)  
 
57 
―A prosecutor should remain free before trial to exercise the broad discretion 
entrusted to him to determine the extent of the societal interest in prosecution.  An 
initial decision should not freeze future conduct.‖  (Id. at p. 382.)   
In the present case, the record establishes nothing more than that a plea 
bargain was offered and refused.  The trial court conducted a hearing at which the 
district attorney explained why he disagreed with the decision of his predecessor, 
who had considered the decision a close call but believed that a jury was not likely 
to return a death verdict.  The new district attorney reconsidered that decision after 
a thorough review of the case.  Following a hearing at which both the former and 
current district attorneys testified, the trial court concluded that the decision was 
not arbitrary or capricious and that there was no element of retaliation in the 
decision.  Nothing in the record supports defendant‘s argument to the contrary.   
N.  Trial court’s refusal to instruct that the jury could return a life 
sentence even in the absence of any mitigating circumstances 
The trial court refused to instruct the jury, as defense counsel requested, 
that it could impose a life sentence ―even in the absence of mitigating evidence,‖ if 
it concluded that ―the aggravating evidence is not comparatively substantial 
enough to warrant death.‖  Instead, the court instructed the jury as follows:  ―In 
weighing the various circumstances you determine under the relevant evidence 
which penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the totality of the 
aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances.  To 
return a judgment of death each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating 
circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances 
that it warrants death instead of life without parole.‖  (See CALJIC No. 8.88.)  
Defendant contends that the court‘s failure to instruct the jury that it could return a 
life sentence even in the absence of mitigating factors violated both the due 
process clause and the Eighth Amendment of the federal Constitution.   
 
58 
We have rejected similar claims, concluding that, under instructions like 
those given here, ―[t]he jury may decide, even in the absence of mitigating 
evidence, that the aggravating evidence is not comparatively substantial enough to 
warrant death.‖  (People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 979.)  ―By stating that 
death can be imposed in only one circumstance — where aggravation substantially 
outweighs mitigation — the instruction clearly implies that a sentence less than 
death may be imposed in all other circumstances.  ‗No reasonable juror would 
assume he or she was required to impose death despite insubstantial aggravating 
circumstances, merely because no mitigating circumstances were found to exist.‘ ‖  
(People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 356.) 
Even assuming that the proposed instruction would have clarified how the 
instructions given would apply if there were no mitigating evidence at all, such 
clarification was not required in the present case.  Defendant did present 
mitigating evidence, including evidence of his mental impairments, his positive 
relationships with friends and family, and the circumstance of the crime that 
defendant was not the actual killer.  Although the jurors may have given little 
weight to this evidence, there is no reasonable possibility that they viewed this as a 
case in which there was no mitigating evidence at all. 
O.  Failure to instruct that accomplice Cline’s statements to police 
should not be relied upon unless corroborated, or that they should 
be viewed with caution 
Anna Cline, defendant‘s accomplice in a prior robbery to which he pleaded 
guilty, testified at the penalty phase regarding the circumstances of that robbery.  
She testified that the robbery was her idea and that she and defendant had agreed 
that no one would be hurt.  The prosecution also introduced testimony regarding 
her statements to police officers about this crime.  She told one officer that 
 
59 
defendant had forced her to help him with the robbery.  She told another that 
defendant had wanted to hurt the victim, but she stopped him.   
The jury was instructed that Cline was an accomplice as a matter of law, 
and that an accomplice‘s testimony incriminating the defendant should be viewed 
with caution.  Defendant contends the instructions were insufficient in two ways.  
First, they did not require that Cline‘s testimony be corroborated.  Second, they 
did not inform the jury that the accomplice‘s testimony included her out-of-court 
statements.  (See CALJIC No. 3.11.)   
1.  Corroboration 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing his request to instruct 
the jury that the testimony of an accomplice must be corroborated.  Section 1111 
provides that a conviction cannot be based upon the testimony of an accomplice 
unless that testimony is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the 
defendant with the commission of the crime.  This corroboration requirement 
applies not only to the accomplice‘s testimony but also to an accomplice‘s out-of-
court statements when they are used as substantive evidence.  (People v. Andrews 
(1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 214.)  Corroboration is also required at the penalty phase 
when the prosecution introduces accomplice testimony as evidence of 
unadjudicated prior criminal conduct.  (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 
461; People v. Varnum (1967) 66 Cal.2d 808.)  The jury need not be instructed, 
however, that an accomplice‘s testimony about the defendant‘s prior criminal 
conduct requires corroboration if the crime was previously adjudicated.  (People v. 
Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1104, 1143; see People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 
153, 276 [jury need not be instructed that accomplice‘s testimony regarding the 
circumstances of a crime of which defendant had previously been convicted must 
be viewed with caution].)   
 
60 
Defendant contends that corroboration was nonetheless required here 
because Cline‘s prior statements were not admitted to prove that defendant 
committed the prior robbery — facts that had previously been adjudicated — but 
to establish the extent and nature of defendant‘s involvement in that crime — facts 
that had not previously been adjudicated.  The same was true, however, in People 
v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pages 184, 276, in which we rejected the 
argument that corroboration of an accomplice‘s testimony was required.  The 
corroboration requirement applies only when accomplice testimony is used to 
prove that defendant committed a crime.  (See § 1111 [―A conviction cannot be 
had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other 
evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the 
offense . . . .‖].)   
2.  Cautionary instruction on accomplice’s out-of-court statements 
Defendant contends trial counsel rendered constitutionally deficient 
assistance in failing to prepare and submit to the trial court an instruction 
clarifying that not only must an accomplice‘s in-court testimony be viewed with 
caution, but also that the accomplice‘s out-of-court statements should be viewed 
with caution.  Defendant states that the trial court agreed to instruct the jury on this 
concept, but that counsel inexplicably failed to prepare an appropriate instruction.  
The record is not so clear.  The trial court refused counsel‘s request to give the 
standard instruction on corroboration, CALJIC No. 3.11, which included a 
statement that ―testimony‖ includes an out-of-court statement by the accomplice.  
It agreed to give the instruction requiring that the testimony of an accomplice that 
incriminates the defendant be viewed with caution, CALJIC No. 3.18.  The 
standard cautionary instruction, however, did not refer to an accomplice‘s out-of-
court statement.  (CALJIC No. 3.18.)  Although the trial court‘s comments suggest 
 
61 
that it believed the accomplice‘s out-of-court statements should be viewed with 
caution, it never explicitly ruled that the jury should be so instructed or directed 
defense counsel to modify the cautionary instruction to include this concept.  It 
simply directed counsel to replace the version of CALJIC No. 3.18 that had 
previously been submitted with the more recent version.   
In any event, we may treat defendant‘s claim as one that his counsel 
rendered constitutionally deficient assistance in failing to request that the trial 
court give a modified version of the cautionary instruction to explain that 
―testimony‖ of an accomplice includes the accomplice‘s out-of-court statements.  
To establish such a claim, defendant must show, among other things, that ―but for 
counsel‘s unprofessional errors and/or omissions, the trial would have resulted in a 
more favorable outcome.‖  (In re Visciotti (1996) 14 Cal.4th 325, 352.)   
Defendant does not convince us that there is a reasonable probability that 
the penalty jury would have reached a different result had it been instructed that 
Cline‘s out-of-court statements should be viewed with caution.  Because of the 
inconsistencies between Cline‘s in-court testimony and her out-of-court 
statements, the jury would have been well aware that it needed to carefully 
consider the credibility of those statements.  In addition, one of the officers 
testified that she admitted to him that her statements to law enforcement were 
―payback,‖ for defendant ―rolling over on her,‖ testimony that provided the jury 
with further reason to be cautious in relying on those statements.   
P.  Trial court’s failure to rule on admissibility of aggravating evidence 
before voir dire 
Defendant claims the trial court erred and deprived him of his rights to an 
impartial jury and effective assistance of counsel when it refused to rule on the 
admissibility of aggravating evidence prior to voir dire.  The trial court did not err.   
 
62 
In the prosecution‘s notice of its aggravating evidence against defendant, 
the prosecution alleged five incidents of unadjudicated criminal activity involving 
―the use or attempted use of force or violence.‖  Two months prior to voir dire, 
defense counsel requested a hearing to determine whether the prosecution had 
sufficient evidence to prove these incidents at the penalty phase.  The trial court 
declined to conduct a hearing at that time and indicated that it would hear an offer 
of proof before the penalty phase trial and then determine whether a hearing was 
required.  After the guilt phase verdict, the trial court ruled that three of the five 
incidents were admissible.  Ultimately, the prosecution introduced evidence of 
only one of these unadjudicated matters — a 1993 incident in which defendant 
argued with his girlfriend, choked her, grabbed the keys to their car, and drove for 
20 minutes while holding her down by the neck.   
Defendant contends that because of the trial court‘s failure to rule on the 
admissibility of these incidents before voir dire, he did not question any of the 
jurors who sat on the case about how they would treat evidence of such violent 
acts.  He argues that the trial court thereby deprived him of the opportunity to 
ensure, through voir dire and the appropriate use of peremptory challenges and 
challenges for cause, that jurors hearing this type of aggravating evidence could be 
impartial.   
The trial court has discretion to decide whether a hearing should be 
conducted to determine whether the prosecution has sufficient evidence to prove a 
defendant‘s alleged unadjudicated criminal activity beyond a reasonable doubt.  
(People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 477, fn. 51; People v. Fauber (1992) 2 
Cal.4th 792, 849; People v. Philips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 72, fn. 25.)  But we have 
never suggested that such a hearing, if conducted, must be conducted prior to voir 
dire.  Defendant has not cited any circumstance of the present case that established 
a particular need for a pretrial determination of the admissibility of the 
 
63 
prosecution‘s evidence in aggravation so as to render the trial court‘s failure to 
resolve this issue before trial an abuse of discretion.   
Defendant argues that because evidence of prior violence is critical at the 
penalty phase, he was entitled to question prospective jurors about their response 
to such evidence — to ask them for example, whether they could consider 
mitigation in a case in which the defendant had committed prior acts of violence.  
He cites in support of this argument People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 879, 
in which we held that the state must provide the defense with notice of the 
aggravating evidence it will rely on in seeking the death penalty prior to voir dire, 
so that, among other things, a defendant will have ―the ability to conduct voir dire 
with adequate knowledge of the facts that will be presented on the issue of penalty 
as well as the issue of guilt.‖  Consistent with Daniels, however, defendant was on 
notice before voir dire that the prosecution would present evidence regarding 
defendant‘s prior criminal activities, both adjudicated and unadjudicated.  The 
prosecution‘s notice of aggravation included not only the five incidents of 
unadjudicated violent criminal activity whose admissibility defendant contends 
should have been resolved before voir dire, but also five prior felony convictions, 
including the circumstances surrounding defendant‘s conviction for a robbery and 
possession of a sawed-off shotgun.  Defendant thus had every opportunity and 
motive to question the prospective jurors to determine whether evidence of 
defendant‘s prior violent activity might affect their ability to impartially decide the 
issue of penalty.  Defendant does not explain how having additional information 
about which of the aggravating incidents of prior violence would actually be 
presented to the jury would have changed the manner in which defense counsel 
conducted voir dire.   
 
64 
Q.  Prosecutor’s argument that defendant had provided the jury with 
no reason to doubt Howe’s testimony 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct in arguing that 
the defense had ―never given [the jury] a reason to doubt [Howe‘s] testimony.‖  
He argues that the prosecutor knew that such evidence existed because she had 
successfully objected to the defense‘s attempt to introduce evidence that might 
have cast doubt on Howe‘s testimony that defendant had ordered Morris to kill 
Bone — specifically, Morris‘s hearsay statements that defendant was not involved 
in the actual killing and that he was surprised when Morris killed the victim.  (See 
part II.D., ante.)  Defendant claims that the prosecutor‘s misconduct violated due 
process and requires reversal of the death judgment, citing cases holding that due 
process precludes a prosecutor from asking a jury to convict a defendant because 
the defendant has failed to introduce evidence that the court has excluded on the 
prosecution‘s own motion.  (See, e.g., Paxton v. Ward (10th Cir. 1999) 199 F.3d 
1197, 1217-1218; United States v. Ebens (6th Cir. 1986) 800 F.2d 1422, 1440-
1444.) 
Defendant, however, has forfeited this claim because defense counsel did 
not object to the prosecutor‘s argument at trial.  Generally, a defendant forfeits a 
claim of prosecutorial misconduct in argument unless the defendant makes a 
specific objection to the argument in the trial court and requests that the jury be 
admonished to disregard it.  (People v. Jackson (2014) 58 Cal.4th 724.)  The 
failure to do so will be excused if an objection would have been futile or if an 
admonition would not have cured the harm caused by the misconduct.  (Ibid.)  
Defendant claims that an admonition would not have cured the harm and that, if it 
would have, defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to 
it.  We disagree.   
 
65 
There is no reason to believe that, if an objection had been sustained and 
the court had admonished the jury to ignore the prosecutor‘s remark, the jury 
could not have done so.  We generally presume that a jury will follow an 
admonition to disregard questions or arguments to which the trial court has 
sustained an objection.  (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 173.)   
Counsel did not provide constitutionally deficient assistance in failing to 
object because there was no misconduct by the prosecutor that would have 
provided grounds for a successful objection.  ―Ineffective assistance of counsel 
under the Sixth Amendment entails deficient performance under an objective 
standard of professional reasonableness and prejudice under a similarly objective 
standard of a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome in the absence of 
the deficient performance.‖  (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1202, fn. 11; 
see Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 687-696.)   
A prosecutor‘s argument constitutes misconduct under California law if it 
involves ―the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade 
either the court or the jury.‖  (People v. Strickland (1974) 11 Cal.3d 946, 955.)  ―A 
prosecutor is given wide latitude to vigorously argue his or her case and to make 
fair comment upon the evidence . . . .‖  (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 
726.)  Here, the prosecutor‘s comment was a response to defense counsel‘s 
argument that the jury should not believe Howe‘s testimony because of his use of 
numerous aliases, his criminal history, and the inconsistency between his 
testimony that defendant ordered the killing and other evidence indicating that 
defendant was a follower, not a leader.  Furthermore, her comment that the jury 
had no reason to doubt Howe‘s testimony was based on her argument that the 
defense had ―never been able to give you a reason that Mr. Howe would lie. . . .  In 
fact, the evidence was Mr. Howe had been friends with defendant.‖  The excluded 
 
66 
evidence of Morris‘s statements would not have supplied the jury with a motive 
for Howe to lie.   
Nor did the prosecutor‘s comments violate defendant‘s right to due process 
under the federal constitution.  Defendant relies on the principle that due process 
precludes a prosecutor from asking the jury to convict or execute a defendant 
because he failed to present certain evidence when the defendant has not been 
given a full opportunity to present that evidence.  (Simmons v. South Carolina 
(1994) 512 U.S. 154 [due process violated when prosecution argued defendant 
would pose a future danger to society if he were not executed, but court refused to 
inform jury that he would not be eligible for parole]; Skipper v. South Carolina 
(1986) 476 U.S. 1, 5, fn. 1 [due process violated when defendant was not 
permitted to introduce evidence of his good behavior in prison in response to 
prosecution‘s argument that he posed a future danger if not executed].)  In the 
present case, defendant was not denied the opportunity to challenge Howe‘s 
credibility.  The trial court merely ruled, under California laws of evidence 
regarding hearsay, that some of the evidence he offered — Morris‘s hearsay 
statements — was not sufficiently reliable to be considered by the jury.  Defendant 
was permitted to cross-examine Howe and to make the jury aware not only of his 
numerous prior convictions but also his frequent use of aliases, as well as his 
potential bias because he stood a chance of benefitting personally from his 
testimony.  Howe‘s sentencing on certain pending offenses to which he had 
pleaded guilty was postponed until after defendant‘s trial.  At that time, the 
sentencing judge — who would be the same judge who was presiding over 
defendant‘s trial — could, in his discretion, sentence Howe to something less than 
the two-year maximum consecutive sentence to which he had agreed in a plea 
bargain.  Under these circumstances, the prosecutor‘s argument was not improper 
 
67 
and did not violate defendant‘s due process rights.  Consequently, counsel did not 
perform deficiently in failing to object to it. 
R.  Trial court’s dismissal of Juror No. 27417 for misconduct, failure to 
grant a mistrial, and refusal to grant a new trial based on Juror 
No. 24777’s alleged misconduct 
1.  Dismissal of Juror No. 27417 and refusal to grant a mistrial 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in discharging Juror No. 27417 
during penalty phase deliberations but alternatively, if discharging the juror was 
proper, he argues the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial after the juror 
was dismissed. 
Shortly after penalty phase deliberations began, Juror No. 27417 requested 
to speak to the judge.  The juror gave the court a letter explaining that, during the 
guilt phase, he had reluctantly agreed that the special circumstance was true based 
on defendant‘s acting with a reckless indifference to life.  After hearing the 
opening statements at the penalty phase, the juror realized that defendant faced a 
minimum term of life without parole.  He was concerned about the available 
sentencing choices because ―I do not believe the crime he committed is deserving 
of such a severe punishment.‖  Upon questioning, he assured the court that he 
could follow the instructions, deliberate, and make a decision.  He was permitted 
to resume deliberations.   
Subsequently, the district attorney reported to the court that his office had 
discovered that the juror had talked to people at his workplace about his 
―unwillingness to impose certain penalties and that he was having trouble 
deliberating with members of the jury.‖  The court conducted a hearing, at which 
two of the juror‘s coworkers testified.  One testified that the juror had spoken to 
him about the case two or three times.  The first conversation occurred at an early 
stage of the trial and was very general.  A few weeks later, they had another 
 
68 
conversation.  The case was nearing the conclusion of the guilt phase and there 
was some discussion about two options that the jury was going to address, one of 
which involved ―reckless indifference to human life.‖  The juror mentioned that he 
wanted to educate himself more about what those words meant.  The coworker 
testified that the juror mentioned that ―he was one of the last people to come 
around to those terms,‖ that is, that he had not decided yet.  Within the previous 
week, the two had another conversation.  The juror told him the jury was 
deliberating between the death penalty and life in prison and he was undecided.   
A second coworker testified that the juror had also talked to him about the 
case.  The juror told him the case was in a second phase, and he was concerned 
that he did not fully understand the consequences of the first phase and how they 
related to the second phase.  He mentioned the phrase ―reckless indifference to 
life‖ and that it was a ―key component.‖  The coworker recounted that the juror 
was not familiar with the term and may have asked for clarification from the 
judge.  The juror was concerned that the decision was a difficult one and he was 
conscientiously reviewing the case.   
When questioned, the juror admitted he had had conversations with these 
two coworkers about the case.  Whenever he talked to someone about what was 
going on, he tried to warn them not to make any comment that might influence 
him.  He acknowledged that he had been instructed not to discuss the case, ―[a]nd 
I tried to do that.  To not discuss it.  And I guess it depends on how — how we 
define what discussing the case means.‖  The juror remembered mentioning to 
someone that the phrase ―reckless indifference to human life‖ was pivotal and that 
he wished he understood it better.  He questioned whether the court would define 
that conversation as ―discussing it.‖  When the trial court told him it definitely 
would, he replied, ―Oh, you would?  Okay.‖  He remembered expressing that he 
felt some jurors were not giving defendant the benefit of the doubt.  He also shared 
 
69 
with his wife his frustrations that some jurors seemed to have made up their mind 
and were not willing to look at the whole picture.  None of the people he talked to 
made any substantive response that could have influenced his thinking.   
Over defense counsel‘s objection, the court discharged the juror, 
concluding that he had committed serious and willful misconduct by repeatedly 
discussing the case with outsiders.  The court also concluded that it could not rely 
on the juror‘s ability to follow the court‘s instructions or to reasonably interpret 
them, because, even if the juror had been acting in good faith, his interpretation of 
the admonition not to discuss the case was unreasonable.  The court denied 
defendant‘s motion for a mistrial, concluding that none of the other jurors had 
been affected by the discharged juror‘s misconduct.   
The trial court subsequently denied defendant‘s motion for a new trial of 
the penalty phase based on the trial court‘s discharge of the juror.  The court 
rejected defendant‘s argument that the juror‘s misconduct was not serious, noting 
that the juror had expressed to outsiders his state of mind on issues that were 
before him as a juror and that he had commented on the deliberative process.  The 
court also denied defendant‘s motion for a new trial of the guilt phase based on the 
juror‘s misconduct, concluding there was no substantial likelihood that the juror‘s 
conduct resulted in prejudice at the guilt phase.  The court found no evidence that 
the juror received any information from or was influenced by any of the people he 
discussed the case with, and there was no evidence that he was biased against 
defendant.   
―If at any time, whether before or after the final submission of the case to 
the jury, a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is 
found to be unable to perform his or her duty, . . . the court may order the juror to 
be discharged and draw the name of an alternate . . . .‖  (§ 1089.)  ―While a trial 
court has broad discretion to remove a juror for cause, it should exercise that 
 
70 
discretion with care.‖  (People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052, 
fn. omitted.)  The trial court‘s decision to dismiss a sitting juror will be upheld on 
review if the juror‘s inability to serve appears in the record ―as a ‗demonstrable 
reality.‘ ‖  (People v. Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 821.)  This standard of review 
is more stringent than the deferential ― ‗substantial evidence‘ ‖ test.  (Ibid.)  
―Under the demonstrable reality standard . . . the reviewing court must be 
confident that the trial court‘s conclusion is manifestly supported by evidence on 
which the court actually relied.‖  (People v. Barnwell, supra, at p. 1053.)   
In People v. Daniels, supra, 52 Cal.3d 815, the trial court excused a juror 
who had read a newspaper account of the case, discussed the case with outsiders, 
and expressed an opinion on the issue of guilt prior to deliberations.  (Id. at 
p. 863.)  We held that a court may remove a juror for ―serious and willful 
misconduct,‖ even if that misconduct does not suggest a bias toward either side.  
(Id. at p. 864.)  We concluded that the juror‘s misconduct in violating the court‘s 
instructions not to talk or read about the case rendered her ―unable to perform his 
duty,‖ which ―includes the obligation to follow the instructions of the court, and a 
judge may reasonably conclude that a juror who has violated instructions to refrain 
from discussing the case . . . cannot be counted on to follow instructions in the 
future.‖  (Id. at p. 865.)  
Similarly, in People v. Ledesma, supra. 39 Cal.4th at pages 742-743, the 
trial court discharged a juror who ―admitted that he had discussed the case with his 
wife in violation of the court‘s admonition — an act that constitutes deliberate 
misconduct.‖  (Id. at p. 743.)  The juror had recounted the story of the case to his 
wife in order to help himself sort it out.  His wife told him that he had a difficult 
decision to make and gave him an opinion which, in the juror‘s view, ― ‗left me 
with the same decision that I had before.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 742.)  We upheld the trial 
court‘s decision to remove the juror, citing our statement in People v. Daniels that 
 
71 
the trial court could reasonably conclude the juror would be unable to follow the 
court‘s instructions in the future.  (People v. Ledesma, supra, at p. 743.)   
In the present case, after the jurors were sworn, they were instructed ―not to 
discuss this case with anyone . . . not even with a fellow sworn trial juror.‖  Before 
the presentation of evidence, the jury was instructed, in the language of CALJIC 
No. 0.50, that ―[y]ou must not converse among yourselves or with anyone else on 
any subject connected with this trial‖ except when deliberating.  The jurors were 
frequently reminded of this admonition during the course of the trial.  
Nevertheless, the evidence was undisputed that the juror had discussed the case 
with outsiders during the trial.  The juror was aware of the instruction not to 
discuss the case but apparently thought that the discussions he had with coworkers 
did not violate the instruction.  The trial court decided that the juror‘s 
misinterpretation of the instruction not to discuss the case, even if made in good 
faith, was not reasonable.  The trial court‘s conclusion that the juror‘s failure to 
understand and follow this simple instruction constituted grounds to doubt his 
ability to follow the court‘s instructions in the future was manifestly supported by 
the evidence upon which the trial court relied.   
Defendant argues, in the alternative, that if the trial court did not err in 
dismissing the juror, it should have granted defendant‘s motions for a mistrial and 
for a new trial on the guilt phase based on the prejudicial effect of the juror‘s 
misconduct.  The record shows that Juror No. 27417 spoke about the case during 
both the guilt and penalty phases.  Defendant argues that if the juror was unfit to 
serve during the penalty phase, then he was also unfit to serve during the guilt 
phase.  We disagree.   
The removal of a juror for misconduct does not necessarily mean that a 
mistrial is warranted.  A juror may be removed if, as here, his misconduct 
establishes that he is unlikely to be able to follow the court‘s instructions in the 
 
72 
future.  No finding of prejudice is required before the juror may be removed, and 
misconduct that justifies removal does not necessarily taint the rest of the jury or a 
previous verdict.  Juror misconduct does raise a presumption of prejudice, but that 
presumption ―is rebutted, and the verdict will not be disturbed, if the entire record 
in the particular case, including the nature of the misconduct or other event, and 
the surrounding circumstances, indicates there is no reasonable probability of 
prejudice, i.e., no substantial likelihood that one or more jurors were actually 
biased . . . .‖  (In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 296.)  We independently 
determine whether such a reasonable probability of prejudice exists, but accept the 
trial court‘s findings of fact and credibility determinations if supported by 
substantial evidence.  (People v. Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1303; People v. 
Danks (2004) 32 Cal.4th 269, 304.)   
In the present case, although the trial court concluded that there was 
sufficient doubt about the juror‘s ability to follow the court‘s instructions to justify 
his removal, it also concluded that the juror had not been influenced by any of the 
people he talked to about the case.  That conclusion is well supported by the 
evidence.  The juror‘s coworkers never testified that they said anything to him 
about the case that could possibly have influenced him.  The juror himself, who 
was forthcoming in his testimony, testified that when he talked to others about 
what was going on with the case he cautioned them not to say anything that might 
influence him, and none of them did so.  The record demonstrates that there is no 
reasonable probability that the juror was biased against defendant or that his 
discussion of the case with his wife or coworkers in any way affected the jury‘s 
deliberations at the guilt phase.   
 
73 
2.  Alleged misconduct of Juror No. 24777 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial 
based on the misconduct of another juror, Juror No. 24777, whose discussions of 
the case with outsiders, he contends, was comparable to the misconduct of Juror 
No. 27417.  In a motion for new trial, defendant presented affidavits from three 
persons who stated that Juror No. 24777 had discussed the case during trial and 
that she had stated the opinion that defendant would receive the death penalty.  
The court conducted a hearing, at which the three witnesses and Juror No. 24777 
testified.   
The three witnesses had been present at the juror‘s place of employment, a 
childcare classroom at an alcohol and drug rehabilitation program.  Kathleen Hash 
testified that she overheard the juror talking about the case with another woman in 
the childcare classroom.  The juror ―was talking about being on a jury, of three 
men and an elderly lady, and she was on the trial for the one gentleman, and that 
the jury had not made a decision yet on what was going to happen, but more than 
likely he was going — he was looking at life or death, and more likely he was 
going to get the death penalty.‖  Hash testified that she and witnesses Tina Ferreria 
and Susan Mayberry then starting discussing the case with the juror.  The juror 
told them that the case involved three men, and the one that had killed the elderly 
lady killed himself in jail.‖  She also mentioned that a ―guy had driven the truck 
into the lake.‖   
Ferreria similarly testified that she recalled a conversation with Juror 
No. 24777 in the classroom at which Hash and Mayberry were present, during 
which the juror said the case involved ―the old lady that they stole her car and left 
it in the lake.  Mayberry recalled a conversation with the juror at which Ferreria 
was present, but she did not recall Hash being there.  Mayberry testified that the 
juror told them that she was on the Gary Grimes case.  When the conversation 
 
74 
turned to the death penalty, Mayberry said, ―you don‘t want my views on the death 
penalty‖ because ―that usually causes a lot of conflict.‖  The juror, however, said 
nothing about the death penalty.   
Juror No. 24777 denied that any of these conversations had ever taken 
place.  She did recall someone asking if she would have a difficult time deciding a 
death penalty case.  She testified that she responded that she would ―have to listen 
to what the judge told me, what the law said, and what the facts were.‖  The trial 
court found Hash to be ―less than credible‖ but that Juror No. 24777‘s testimony 
was entirely credible and that she had not discussed the case with the witnesses.  It 
further concluded that even if the conversations reported by Ferreria and Mayberry 
took place, there was no evidence of ―any misconduct which could result in 
prejudice‖; Juror No. 24777 had merely identified herself as a juror on a particular 
case.   
When a trial court denies a motion for new trial based on juror misconduct, 
―the reviewing court should accept the trial court‘s factual findings and credibility 
determinations if they are supported by substantial evidence, but must exercise its 
independent judgment to determine whether any misconduct was prejudicial.‖  
(People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 809; see also People v. Gamache, supra, 
48 Cal.4th at p. 386.)  Here, the trial court‘s conclusions that the juror was 
credible, and Hash was not, are supported by substantial evidence.  The trial court 
had observed the juror not only while she testified but also throughout the trial.  
Hash, on the other hand, appeared less than credible, not only based on her 
demeanor but also on the fact that she had two felony convictions and that she had 
a friendship with two of defendant‘s friends.  Neither of the other two witnesses, 
Ferreria and Mayberry, corroborated Hash‘s most damaging allegation — that the 
juror stated that defendant was likely to get the death penalty.  The trial court did 
 
75 
not err in concluding that the juror had not discussed the case with the witnesses 
and consequently that defendant failed to establish any prejudicial misconduct.   
S.  Cumulative error 
Defendant contends that the guilt, special circumstances, and penalty 
verdicts should be reversed based on the cumulative effect of the prejudice 
resulting from all alleged errors, even if each is not prejudicial in itself.  We have 
found no error and have presumed error only as to the trial court‘s exclusion of 
certain hearsay statements of Wilson, which we found not to be prejudicial.  
Consequently, there is nothing to cumulate and hence there can be no cumulative 
prejudice. 
T.  Waiver of jury trial on prior conviction allegations 
Defendant contends that the trial court‘s true findings on certain noncapital 
sentencing allegations must be vacated because his waiver of jury trial was 
involuntary.  The information charged defendant with a number of noncapital 
sentencing allegations, including allegations that he was on parole (§ 1203.085, 
subd. (b)) and that he had served four prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).  Prior 
to trial, defense counsel moved to bifurcate proceedings on these allegations and 
offered to waive jury trial.  The trial court received defendant‘s waiver of jury trial 
on these allegations.  Subsequently, during guilt phase deliberations, the court and 
defense counsel reviewed the transcript of defendant‘s waiver and agreed that the 
waiver was sufficient and no further advisements need be given.  The allegations 
were tried to the court, which found that defendant had been convicted of one 
serious or violent felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law and had 
served four prior prison terms.  Based on these findings, the trial court doubled 
defendant‘s sentence under the Three Strikes law for the offense of unlawful 
 
76 
driving or taking of a vehicle, and imposed four one-year terms for the four prior 
prison term enhancements.   
Defendant contends that his waiver of jury trial on the allegations was 
invalid because the court and counsel informed him that he was required to waive 
his right to a jury trial in order to avoid having the jury be exposed to evidence of 
his criminal history at the guilt phase.  This advisement was misleading, defendant 
contends, because defendant could have retained his right to a jury trial and the 
trial court could have bifurcated trial on the sentencing allegations, so that the 
jurors would not hear evidence of his history until after they had decided his guilt 
on the substantive charges.  (See People v. Calderon (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69, 72.)   
Defendant has forfeited this claim based on his failure to object in the trial 
court.  ―[T]he deprivation of the statutory right to jury trial on the prior prison term 
allegations does not implicate the state or federal constitutional right to jury trial.  
Absent an objection to the discharge of the jury or commencement of court trial, 
defendant is precluded from asserting on appeal a claim of ineffectual waiver of 
the statutory right to jury trial of prior prison term allegations.‖  (People v. Vera 
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 269, 278; see People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63, 74-79 
[federal constitutional right to a jury trial does not extend to allegations that a 
defendant has suffered a prior conviction or served a prior prison term].)  Here, 
after reviewing the transcript of defendant‘s waiver, defense counsel expressly 
agreed with the trial court that defendant‘s waiver was sufficient.   
Furthermore, the claim fails on the merits.  There is no evidence in the 
record that defense counsel advised defendant that trial on the sentencing 
allegations could not be bifurcated unless defendant waived his right to a jury trial.  
The record does not show what advice counsel gave to defendant.  There was a 
brief pause in the proceedings while defendant consulted with counsel before 
hearing the trial court‘s advisements and waiving jury trial on the allegations.  The 
 
77 
trial court explained to defendant that ―your attorneys have indicated they want 
this jury, when this jury is deciding the issue of whether or not the People have 
proven the charges against you beyond a reasonable doubt, to be influenced in any 
way by also considering the allegations of these prior felony convictions and 
related matters. . . .  In order to avoid having the jury deal with that issue, your 
attorneys are recommending to you, apparently, that you waive your right to have 
the jury decide that issue, and that you have those issues, as to each one of these 
prior special allegations, be decided solely by the court.‖  Contrary to defendant‘s 
contention, the court never stated that waiving jury trial was the only way that 
defendant could avoid exposing the jury to his criminal history during the guilt 
phase.  Rather, the court stated only that waiving jury trial was the means that 
defendant‘s attorneys were recommending to avoid such exposure.  That statement 
was not incorrect or misleading, and does not render defendant‘s waiver 
involuntary.   
U.  Sufficiency of evidence to prove four prior prison term allegations 
Defendant claims the trial court improperly imposed four one-year 
enhancements for service of prior prison terms when the evidence showed that he 
had served only three separate prison terms.  Section 667.5, subdivision (b), 
provides an additional penalty of one year ―for each prior separate prison term . . . 
imposed . . . for any felony.‖  A prior separate prison term is ―a continuous 
completed period of prison incarceration imposed for the particular offense alone 
or in combination with concurrent or consecutive sentences for other crimes . . . .‖  
(§ 667.5, subd. (g).)  ―[T]his statutory language means that only one enhancement 
is proper where concurrent sentences have been imposed in two or more prior 
felony cases.‖  (People v. Jones (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 744, 747.) 
 
78 
As respondent concedes, the evidence shows that defendant served 
consecutive terms on two of the four felony convictions alleged — his convictions 
for being a felon in possession of a firearm and escape (Stanislaus County case 
Nos. 265702 & 265697).  Accordingly, the terms served for these offenses were 
not ―separate‖ terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).  
Therefore, the trial court‘s true finding on one of the section 667.5, subdivision 
(b), allegations must be vacated and defendant‘s determinate sentenced modified 
by striking the additional one-year sentence. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The judgment is modified to vacate the trial court‘s true finding on one of 
the section 667.5, subdivision (b), allegations and to strike the additional one-year 
sentence for that allegation.  In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
BAXTER, J.
                                              
  
Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, assigned by the Chief 
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
I agree with the majority that (1) despite omissions in the Attorney 
General‘s briefing, section 13 of article VI of the California Constitution requires 
we address the prejudice, if any, flowing from the trial court‘s decision to exclude 
hearsay statements John Morris made to Misty Abbott and Albert Lawson (maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 33); and (2) any error in excluding that evidence was harmless at 
the guilt phase.  Unlike the majority, however, I find the trial court abused its 
discretion by excluding the aforesaid evidence, and that the error prejudiced 
defendant at the penalty phase of his trial.  Consequently, I dissent from that part 
of the majority opinion. 
I. 
As the majority explains, a hearsay statement—that is, a statement made 
outside of court that is offered in evidence for its truth—may be admitted into 
evidence despite the rule against hearsay if it satisfies the requirements in 
Evidence Code section 1230.  That section permits the admission of hearsay if the 
declarant is unavailable and ―the statement, when made, . . . so far subjected him 
to the risk of civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable man in his position 
would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.‖  Although as 
a general rule a trial court‘s ruling on a hearsay question will be affirmed on 
appeal absent an abuse of discretion, in this case I conclude the trial court erred 
under Evidence Code section 1230 in excluding Morris‘s statements to Abbott and 
 
2 
to Lawson.  Regarding Morris‘s statement to Misty Abbott that defendant did not 
take part in the actual killing of Betty Bone, and that upon seeing Morris killing 
her, he (defendant) looked at Morris as if to say ― ‗what in hell are you doing, 
dude‘ ‖ (maj. opn., ante, at p. 24), the clear implication is that killing Bone was 
not part of the group‘s plan, and that Morris acted on his own.  This statement 
tends to exculpate defendant (because it suggests he did not intend the victim to be 
killed), and clearly inculpates the declarant Morris (because he admits he 
personally killed Bone).  As Justice Liu opines in part I of his separate opinion:  
―Had Morris been tried for capital murder, evidence that his conduct was so 
egregious as to surprise even his confederates would be relevant to the jury‘s 
determination of what penalty to impose on him.‖  (Conc. & dis. opn. of Liu, J., 
post, at p. 5.)  More to the point, a reasonable man would not have rendered 
himself vulnerable to the death penalty by making such a statement unless it were 
true.  (Evid. Code, § 1230.)   
The same reasoning applies to the second excluded statement.  Albert 
Lawson would have testified that, while jointly incarcerated with Morris in county 
jail, Morris told him that defendant and Wilson had joined him in Bone‘s house 
― ‗but took no part in the actual killing.‘ ‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 24.)  By 
assuming sole responsibility for Bone‘s murder, Morris inculpated himself and 
tended to exculpate his codefendants.  The majority agrees, reasoning that 
―[s]tatements indicating that [Morris] was the sole killer could [have] subject[ed] 
[him] to a risk of increased criminal liability by establishing aggravating 
circumstances of the crime.‖  (Id., p. 30; see conc. & dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at 
p. 6.)  Again, a reasonable man would not have made such a statement unless it 
were true.  (Evid. Code, § 1230.) 
I agree with Justice Liu the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the 
statements because ―[u]nder any reasonable reading, the excluded statements 
 
3 
tended to inculpate Morris, and their reliability is buttressed by their consistency 
and the absence of any discernible reason for Morris to lie.‖  (Conc. & dis. opn. of 
Liu, J., post, at pp. 6–7.)  The evidence of defendant‘s guilt of felony murder being 
overwhelming, however, I agree with the majority this error did not result in a 
miscarriage of justice at the guilt phase of trial.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; People 
v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836–837.)  I reach a different conclusion 
concerning the effect of the error at the penalty phase of defendant‘s trial. 
II. 
This court first set forth the applicable standard of review for penalty phase 
errors in a capital trial in People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432.  In that case, we 
explained ―that state law error occurring at the penalty phase must be assessed on 
appeal by asking whether it is reasonably possible the error affected the verdict.‖  
(People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 525–526, italics added; see Brown, supra, 
at p. 448.)  We have since explained the Brown standard is the same in substance 
and effect as that set forth for federal constitutional error in Chapman v. California 
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; ―that is, that reversal is required unless it is shown the 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.‖  (Abilez, supra, at p. 526.)  ― ‗The 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman ―requir[es] the beneficiary of a 
[federal] constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.‖  (Chapman, supra, 386 
U.S. at p. 24.)  ―To say that an error did not contribute to the ensuing verdict is . . . 
to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on 
the issue in question, as revealed in the record.‖  (Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 
391, 403.)  Thus, the focus is what the jury actually decided and whether the error 
might have tainted its decision.  That is to say, the issue is ―whether the . . . verdict 
actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.‖  (Sullivan v. 
 
4 
Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 279.)‘ ‖  (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 
393, 463.) 
Applying this rigorous standard of review, I agree with Justice Liu that ―it 
is reasonable to think that the jury‘s determination of whether Grimes deserved the 
death penalty turned significantly on whether he played a leadership role in the 
killing and what his attitude or reaction to the killing was.‖  (Conc. & dis. opn. by 
Liu, J., post, at p. 27.)  Although the prosecution presented defendant‘s prior 
criminal behavior as aggravating evidence, the defense met that evidence with 
mitigating evidence detailing defendant‘s dysfunctional childhood, mental 
problems, possible intellectual disability, brain damage and schizophrenia.  Victim 
impact evidence from the surviving family was met with evidence from 
defendant‘s sister, mother, ex-wife and others proclaiming their love for 
defendant.  Evidence suggesting defendant lacked remorse over Bone‘s murder 
was counterbalanced with defense evidence that defendant was the only one to 
have come to the aid of a prisoner being assaulted by others, and evidence 
describing a traumatic incident in which defendant‘s fiancée was killed in a traffic 
accident when defendant went to the aid of her mother, who was being harassed 
by the mother‘s ex-husband.   
Given this relative equipoise of evidence at the penalty phase and the 
undisputed fact that defendant did not personally kill Betty Bone, defendant‘s 
actual role in the events leading to her death was likely a critical factor in the 
jury‘s penalty phase calculus.  Accordingly, we must ask:  what evidence before 
the jury was relevant to determining defendant‘s role in the murder?  Deputy 
O‘Connor testified that inmate Jonathon Howe told him that while incarcerated 
together in the Shasta County Jail in 1998, defendant told Howe that because Bone 
had seen them, defendant ordered Morris and Wilson to kill her.  (Howe himself 
was more equivocal, testifying that his memory of his interview with Deputy 
 
5 
O‘Connor had faded.)  The prosecutor drew a line under this point in closing 
argument, saying the defense has ―never given you a reason to doubt [Howe‘s] 
testimony.‖ 
As we now know, however, evidence casting doubt on Howe‘s account 
existed in the form of John Morris‘s out-of-court statements to Misty Abbott and 
to Albert Lawson, evidence excluded by the trial court.  Had the jury heard 
evidence suggesting that Morris decided on his own to kill the victim, and that 
defendant and Wilson expressed surprise at his actions, the jury may well have 
questioned Howe‘s assertion that defendant had taken a leadership role among the 
criminal trio.  And as Justice Liu further explains (conc. & dis. opn. by Liu, J., 
post, at pp. 27–28), had the jury heard Morris‘s statements that defendant was in 
another part of Bone‘s house during her murder and that he appeared shocked 
upon seeing the murder, the jury may also have questioned Howe‘s further 
assertion that defendant enjoyed watching Morris strangle and then stab the 
victim, and that defendant ―enjoyed the fact she died.‖  Given Howe‘s professed 
lack of memory and his many pending felony and misdemeanor charges, as well as 
the suggestion in the record of the benefits he received for his testimony (in the 
form of dismissed enhancements and the like), admission of Morris‘s out-of-court 
statements would likely have been decisive in convincing the jury to disregard 
Howe‘s rather equivocal evidence. 
 
6 
On this record, I find ―there is a reasonable (i.e., realistic) possibility that 
the jury would have rendered a different verdict‖ on penalty had the trial court 
admitted the out-of-court statements Morris made to Abbott and Lawson.  (People 
v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 448.)  In other words, I find the error was not 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at 
pp. 525–526.)  Although I concur in the affirmance of the guilt phase judgment, I 
dissent from the majority‘s affirmance of defendant‘s penalty phase judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY LIU, J. 
 
Ninety-eight-year-old Betty Bone was killed during a home invasion 
robbery committed by defendant Gary Lee Grimes and two confederates, Patrick 
James Wilson and John Morris.  Morris committed suicide shortly after his arrest; 
he was never tried.  According to witness Misty Abbott, Morris told her on the day 
of the crime that he (Morris) killed Bone by strangling and then stabbing her.  This 
statement was admitted at trial.  But the trial court refused to admit other 
statements by Morris.  The trial court excluded Morris‘s statements to Abbott that 
Grimes ―did not take part in the killing,‖ that Grimes had not ―participated in the 
killing,‖ and that after he (Morris) killed Bone, Grimes and Wilson ―looked at him 
as if they were saying, what in the hell are you doing, dude.‖  The trial court also 
excluded Morris‘s statement to his cellmate, Albert Lawson, that Grimes was ―in 
the house but took no part in the actual killing and [was] in some other place in the 
house.‖ 
In this appeal, Grimes devoted 18 pages of his opening brief to arguing that 
the trial court erred in excluding these statements because they were admissible as 
declarations against Morris‘s interest under Evidence Code section 1230.  Four of 
those pages explain that the errors were prejudicial and require reversal of the guilt 
and penalty verdicts.  The subheading of this latter discussion reads, ―Because The 
State Will Be Unable To Prove The Exclusion Of Morris‘s Statements Harmless, 
Reversal Is Required.‖ 
 
2 
In her briefing, the Attorney General responded with nine pages arguing 
that ―[t]he trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate appellant‘s federal 
constitutional rights by excluding evidence of Morris‘s out-of-court statements 
that allegedly exculpated appellant of being Bone‘s actual killer.‖  Nowhere in this 
discussion did the Attorney General argue that the exclusion of Morris‘s 
statements, if erroneous, was not prejudicial.  By contrast, there are many 
instances elsewhere in her briefing where the Attorney General, after refuting a 
claim of error, raised harmless error as an additional and alternative argument. 
In his reply brief, Grimes again addressed the exclusion of Morris‘s 
statements and said:  ―Respondent does not dispute that if error occurred, reversal 
of both the special circumstance and penalty phase verdicts is required.‖  In 
advance of oral argument, Grimes submitted a focus letter to this court, with 
notice to the Attorney General, indicating that counsel would address the 
exclusion of Morris‘s statements at oral argument. 
At oral argument, upon questioning by the court, the deputy attorney 
general acknowledged that ―the harmless error was omitted from our briefing‖ but 
then proceeded to argue, for the first time, that any error in excluding Morris‘s 
statements was harmless.  Three weeks later, this court on its own motion invited 
the parties to file supplemental briefs on the merits of the harmless error issue and 
on the effect, if any, of the Attorney General‘s failure to address the issue.  The 
case was reargued, during which the court asked the deputy attorney general 
whether she should now be permitted to argue harmless error in light of her failure 
to do so earlier.  The deputy attorney general conceded that if the issue was not 
properly addressed in her initial briefing — a matter on which there is no real 
dispute (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B)) — then ―[y]ou shouldn‘t be 
hearing from me‖ on the issue. 
 
3 
In the face of these irregularities, today‘s opinion finds no legal or practical 
significance in the Attorney General‘s failure to address harmless error.  Not only 
does the court assign no consequence to the Attorney General‘s omission, but the 
court, acting on its own initiative, invited the Attorney General to rectify her 
omission through supplemental briefing.  This approach cannot be squared with 
elemental notions of fair play and this court‘s role as a neutral arbiter in the 
adversarial process.  With today‘s opinion, we are saying to the Office of the 
Attorney General, the most experienced litigant in California‘s appellate courts:  
―Don‘t worry if you fail to argue harmless error because we will give you a second 
bite at the apple.‖ 
Because article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution prohibits 
reviewing courts from reversing a judgment without undertaking harmless error 
analysis, I agree that ―the Attorney General‘s failure to respond to defendant‘s 
harmless error argument does not relieve this court of its responsibility to 
determine whether any error was harmless.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 31.)  In making 
this determination, however, I would take into account the Attorney General‘s 
forfeiture by adapting a well-developed body of federal case law on this issue.  As 
explained below, no authority supports this court‘s approach of inviting and 
considering belated arguments on harmless error when the government, in 
response to a defendant‘s clearly stated claim of prejudice, does not address the 
issue.  Instead, harmless error analysis must be based on the record and arguments 
that are properly before the reviewing court.  (See Carducci v. Regan (D.C. Cir. 
1983) 714 F.2d 171, 177 (Scalia, J.) [―The premise of our adversarial system is 
that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, 
but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties 
before them.‖].)  Ultimately, where the harmlessness of an error under the 
 
4 
applicable legal standard is seriously debatable, a court should not find the error 
harmless on its own initiative. 
In this case, the trial court erred in excluding Morris‘s statements to Abbott 
and Lawson because they were clearly admissible as statements against Morris‘s 
penal interests.  Applying the proper legal standards for harmless error in a capital 
trial, I find the error unquestionably harmless as to Grimes‘s guilt of special 
circumstance murder.  But I do not believe the error can be deemed harmless as to 
the penalty verdict because the excluded statements were crucial to rebutting the 
principal evidence of Grimes‘s leadership and depravity with respect to the killing.  
I therefore dissent from the affirmance of the death judgment. 
I. 
I begin by explaining why it was error for the trial court to exclude Morris‘s 
statements to Abbott and Lawson.  Evidence Code section 1230 allows for the 
admission of hearsay that ―so far subjected [the declarant] to the risk of civil or 
criminal liability‖ that ―a reasonable man in his position would not have made the 
statement unless he believed it to be true.‖  A party seeking to introduce an out-of-
court statement pursuant to this exception must show that ―the declarant is 
unavailable, that the declaration was against the declarant‘s penal interest, and that 
the declaration was sufficiently reliable to warrant admission despite its hearsay 
character.‖  (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 607.)  We review a trial court‘s 
ruling on the admissibility of evidence pursuant to section 1230 for abuse of 
discretion.  (People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 143.)  
Evidence Code section 1230 does not apply to ― ‗ ―any statement or portion 
of a statement not itself specifically disserving to the interests of the declarant.‖ ‘  
[Citation.]‖  (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 153 (Lawley).)  In certain 
circumstances, a statement may specifically disserve the declarant‘s interest by 
exculpating an accomplice.  (See Chia v. Cambra (9th Cir. 2004) 360 F.3d 997, 
 
5 
1005 [statement that ―simultaneously‖ inculpated declarant and exculpated 
defendant was admissible as a statement against interest]; U.S. v. Paguio (9th Cir. 
1997) 114 F.3d 928, 933 [―In context, the father‘s statement that his son had 
nothing to do with [the crime] was inculpatory of the father as well as exculpatory 
of the son.‖].)  Whether a statement that exculpates a defendant is admissible as a 
statement against the declarant‘s interest depends on the context in which the 
statement was made.  (Paguio, at pp. 933–934.)  ― ‗Thus a statement admitting 
guilt and implicating another person, made while in custody, may well be 
motivated by a desire to curry favor with the authorities and hence fail to qualify 
as against interest. . . .  On the other hand, the same words spoken under different 
circumstances, e.g., to an acquaintance, would have no difficulty in qualifying.‘ ‖  
(Williamson v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 594, 601–602, quoting Advisory 
Com. Notes, Fed. Rules Evid., rule 804(b)(3), (28 U.S.C.); see Lawley, at p. 153 
[―Whether a statement is self-inculpatory or not can only be determined by 
viewing the statement in context.‖].) 
Morris‘s statement to Abbott indicates at the least that Grimes and Wilson 
were ―surprised or alarmed‖ by Morris‘s actions.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 29.)  
Although Morris‘s statement did not specify the reason for their surprise, any 
reasonable interpretation of such a reaction inculpates Morris.  Surprise at the fact 
of the killing would undermine the inference that Grimes ordered or otherwise 
participated in the decision to kill Bone; it would instead support an inference that 
Morris made the decision to do so on his own.  Surprise at the circumstances of 
the killing would suggest that Morris acted on his own initiative in choosing a 
gruesome way of killing Bone.  Had Morris been tried for capital murder, 
evidence that his conduct was so egregious as to surprise even his confederates 
would be relevant to the jury‘s determination of what penalty to impose.  (See Pen. 
Code, § 190.3, subd. (a); People v. Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 836, 859 [―section 
 
6 
190.3, factor (a) is concerned with those circumstances that make a murder 
especially aggravated, and therefore make a defendant more culpable and 
deserving of the ultimate penalty‖].) 
Morris‘s statement to Lawson also stressed Morris‘s personal responsibility 
for the killing, undermining any inference that he drew tacit support or approval 
from Grimes‘s presence, oversight, or counsel.  Had Morris faced trial, this 
evidence would have impaired his ability to argue that he was simply following 
orders or acting according to someone else‘s plan, or to later deny that he alone 
committed the act of killing.  Like his statement to Abbott, Morris‘s statement to 
Lawson would have undermined his ability to distribute blame across the group. 
Although today‘s opinion acknowledges as much (see maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 30 [―Statements indicating that the declarant was the sole killer could subject 
the declarant to a risk of increased criminal liability by establishing aggravating 
circumstances of the crime.‖]), the court reasons that because Morris had already 
told Abbott that he choked and stabbed Bone to death, his statements to Abbott 
and Lawson that Grimes took no part in the killing were not sufficiently self-
inculpatory to guarantee its reliability.  But there is no indication in the record that 
Morris said he acted alone or without assistance in his earlier admission to Abbott.  
Nor is there any reason to think Morris was speaking with such analytical 
precision that, having realized he had already implicated himself as the sole killer 
in an earlier conversation with Abbott, he felt he had nothing to lose by later 
saying, falsely, that he killed Bone without the presence, participation, or support 
of his confederates.  If anything, the consistency between the excluded statements 
and Morris‘s earlier confession to Abbott renders the excluded statements more 
reliable, not less. 
Under any reasonable reading, the excluded statements tended to inculpate 
Morris, and their reliability is buttressed by their consistency and the absence of 
 
7 
any discernible reason for Morris to lie.  Accordingly, I would hold that the trial 
court abused its discretion in excluding these statements. 
II. 
Today‘s opinion declines to decide whether the trial court improperly 
excluded Morris‘s statement to Lawson and instead concludes that any error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to the guilt and penalty verdicts, even 
though ―[t]he Attorney General did not argue, in her answer brief, that any error in 
the exclusion of Morris‘s hearsay statements was harmless.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 31.)  I agree that article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution obligates 
us to address harmless error despite the government‘s forfeiture.  But having 
found that the Attorney General did not argue harmless error, we should not have 
invited supplemental briefing on the issue.  In so doing, the court gave the 
government an unwarranted second bite at the apple. 
―In our adversary system, in both civil and criminal cases, in the first 
instance and on appeal, we follow the principle of party presentation.  That is, we 
rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of 
neutral arbiter of matters the parties present. . . .  [A]s a general rule, ‗[o]ur 
adversary system is designed around the premise that the parties know what is best 
for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments entitling them 
to relief.‘ ‖  (Greenlaw v. United States (2008) 554 U.S. 237, 243–244 
(Greenlaw).)  The court‘s neutrality, in appearance and reality, is crucial to its 
legitimacy and to the overall functioning of the judicial system.  (See Broadman v. 
Commission on Judicial Performance (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1079, 1100 [―Judges . . . 
cannot be advocates for the interests of any parties; they must be, and be perceived 
to be, neutral arbiters of both fact and law [citation] who apply the law uniformly 
and consistently.‖].) 
 
8 
These adversarial principles are evident in the procedural rules that govern 
day-to-day practice before our court.  For example, if an appellant fails to file an 
opening brief, the appeal is subject to dismissal.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
8.360(c)(5)(A).)  If a respondent fails to file a response, the court ―will decide the 
appeal on the record, the opening brief, and any oral argument by appellant.‖  (Id., 
rule 8.360(c)(5)(B).)  The same is true if a party does not show up for oral 
argument.  (Pen. Code, § 1253.)  A party forfeits an argument by failing to raise it 
in the opening brief.  (See People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1075 [―It is 
axiomatic that arguments made for the first time in a reply brief will not be 
entertained because of the unfairness to the other party.‖].)  Even a claim that a 
party explicitly asserts may be disregarded if it is briefed in a perfunctory or 
conclusory manner.  (See People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1182 [claim 
presented without ―adequate‖ supporting legal argument was ―not properly 
raised‖]; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 206 [―Points ‗perfunctorily 
asserted without argument in support‘ are not properly raised.‖]; People v. 
Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 196 [―Defendant‘s constitutional claims largely are 
asserted perfunctorily and without argument in support.  Therefore we do not 
consider them.‖].)  These forfeiture rules apply to a criminal defendant whose 
opening brief does not explain how an asserted error resulted in prejudice.  (See 
People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 996 (Hill); Adams v. MHC Colony Park 
Limited Partnership (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 601, 614.) 
Procedural rules of this sort are designed to promote the fair and orderly 
administration of justice.  They serve this function when applied evenhandedly to 
all parties, regardless of whether compliance is more difficult for some parties or 
whether compliance is strictly necessary to the court‘s resolution of a particular 
claim.  Thus, forfeiture rules generally apply to the government in the same 
manner and to the same extent that they apply to criminal defendants.  (See Wilson 
 
9 
v. O’Leary (7th Cir. 1990) 895 F.2d 378, 384 (O’Leary) [―Procedural rules apply 
to the government as well as to defendants.‖]; Calvert v. Wilson (6th Cir. 2002) 
288 F.3d 823, 835–836 (conc. opn. of Cole, J.) [―While a petitioner has the 
responsibility of ensuring that all claims in support of a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus are timely raised, so too does the warden bear the responsibility of ensuring 
all defenses, including harmless error, are timely raised.‖]; Rose v. United States 
(D.C. 1993) 629 A.2d 526, 537 (Rose) [―[A]lthough the public is entitled to have 
valid judgments of conviction sustained, the public ordinarily must be bound by 
the actions of its counsel, just as a criminal defendant normally is.  That is how the 
adversary system works.‖].) 
In the criminal context, there is an additional reason why courts must hew 
carefully to their role as neutral arbiters.  Within our system of divided 
government, the ―prosecution of criminal offenses on behalf of the People is the 
sole responsibility of the public prosecutor.‖  (Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 
Cal.3d 442, 451; see Pen. Code, § 684; Gov. Code, §§ 100, subd. (b), 26500.)  The 
judiciary, by contrast, has no constitutional or statutory authority to represent the 
people in criminal prosecutions.  (Steen v. Appellate Division, Superior Court of 
Los Angeles County (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1045, 1052, 1053–1054.)  Prosecutorial 
discretion includes deciding ―whom to charge, what charges to file and pursue, 
and what punishment to seek,‖ as well as ―the conduct of a criminal action once 
commenced.‖  (Dix, at pp. 451–452.)  Defending or not defending a conviction on 
the basis of harmless error is an exercise of prosecutorial ―responsibility to decide 
in the public interest whether to seek, oppose, accept, or challenge judicial actions 
and rulings.‖  (Id. at p. 452.)  Such a decision reflects a prosecutorial judgment as 
to whether, without the benefit of the error, the case should have gone forward, 
would have satisfied the burden of proof, or would have served the interests of 
justice.  If the government ―has . . . assumed its traditional role of advocate‖ by 
 
10 
―vigorously argu[ing] for affirmance‖ and ―has selected the arguments it believes 
are best suited to achieve that end,‖ then ―the adversary system should be allowed 
to function as such,‖ and courts should not ―automatically . . . act as an 
institutional failsafe to make sure that the government has not compromised its 
prosecutorial responsibility.‖  (Rose, supra, 629 A.2d at p. 534.) 
In this case, the Attorney General ―has vigorously argued for affirmance‖ 
and ―has selected the arguments it believes are best suited to achieve that end.‖  
(Rose, supra, 629 A.2d at p. 534.)  Her answer brief argues harmless error in 
response to several issues raised by Grimes, but not in response to the claim that 
the trial court improperly excluded Morris‘s statements.  Thus, the Attorney 
General has forfeited the opportunity to make that argument.  Her forfeiture 
cannot turn on whether the failure to make the argument was intentional or 
inadvertent, for we do not engage in such inquiry when applying forfeiture rules to 
criminal defendants on direct appeal.  How could we make such a factual 
determination in the course of an appellate proceeding, anyway?  Would we have 
to appoint a referee to consider a sworn declaration from the Attorney General or 
her delegates?  Or hear live testimony?  In this case, the names of five attorneys 
appear on the government‘s brief:  the Attorney General, a chief assistant attorney 
general, a senior assistant attorney general, a supervising deputy attorney general, 
and a deputy attorney general.  Would we have to inquire of one of them?  Some 
of them?  Or all of them? 
Moreover, it does not matter whether an omitted claim happens to surface 
later on.  In this case, the Attorney General did not respond in her briefing to 
Grimes‘s argument that the error was prejudicial, did not indicate that she would 
focus on this issue at oral argument, and did not raise the issue at oral argument.  
The deputy attorney general addressed harmless error only in response to a 
question from the bench.  At that point, the deputy attorney general insisted that 
 
11 
the failure to brief the issue ―wasn‘t an act of forfeiting such a claim‖ and 
proceeded to argue, for the first time, that any error was harmless.  But the fact 
that the deputy attorney general said the omission was unintended — along with 
the fact that her harmless error argument is now before us in supplemental briefing 
— is sheer happenstance.  Had the court not inquired, or had Grimes not focused 
his oral argument on this particular issue, we would have had no basis to believe 
the omission was inadvertent.  Such fortuities should not guide our approach. 
Today‘s opinion says, ―We have occasionally exercised our discretion to 
permit defendants to file supplemental briefs raising new issues in capital 
appeals.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 36, citing People v. Howard (2010) 51 Cal.4th 15, 
26, 30, fn. 6, 33, and People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 187 and docket 
entries, case No. S043628.)  But the two cited instances involved unusual 
circumstances that have no analog here.  In Howard, we allowed the defendant to 
raise new issues in supplemental briefing because a new lawyer had taken over 
and reexamined the defendant‘s appeal after the completion of briefing.  (See Mot. 
for Permission to File Supp. Br. (Feb. 6, 2008) People v. Howard (S050583), p. 3.)  
In Carrington, the new issue addressed by the defendant was not really new; it had 
been raised in the government‘s brief as a meritorious noncapital issue warranting 
relief.  (See Mot. for Leave to File Supp. Br. (Oct. 7, 2005) People v. Carrington 
(S043628), p. 2.)  And our published opinion in Carrington does not mention, 
much less approve, the belated presentation of new arguments.  If anything, the 
atypical situations in Howard and Carrington suggest they were exceptions to our 
general rule.  Moreover, in both cases we allowed supplemental briefing in 
response to the defendant‘s request; we did not invite the defendant to address a 
previously neglected issue on our own initiative, as we have done with the 
Attorney General in this case. 
 
12 
The principles above readily establish that the Attorney General forfeited 
the issue of harmless error in this case.  Having failed to address Grimes‘s claim of 
prejudice in her answer brief, she had no further entitlement to argue the issue.  As 
the deputy attorney general conceded at reargument, ―You shouldn‘t be hearing 
from me‖ on harmless error.  In light of the government‘s forfeiture, our ordinary 
posture of impartiality should have restrained us from soliciting and considering 
supplemental briefing on our own initiative. 
III. 
I now consider how the government‘s failure to argue harmless error affects 
the treatment of that issue by an appellate court.  A substantial body of federal 
case law has addressed this question and provides helpful guidance for how we 
should approach this case.  Although I agree with today‘s opinion that the 
California Constitution requires us to address harmless error, the government‘s 
omission is not, as the court suggests, without consequence to the analysis or 
outcome. 
A. 
The government‘s failure to argue harmless error has occurred with some 
frequency in the federal courts of appeals.  Two provisions of law codify a 
harmless error rule binding on federal courts.  Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure says:  ―Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does 
not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.‖  And section 2111 of title 28 of 
the United States Code says:  ―On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in 
any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without 
regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.‖  
The mandatory language of these provisions directs federal courts to disregard 
errors that do not affect substantial rights.  But no federal court has read these 
provisions to require consideration of harmless error when the government has not 
 
13 
raised it.  That is because, as one leading case explains, mandatory language ―is a 
general feature of legal rules, and does not make their provisions nonwaivable.  
Specific rules of conduct or procedure are promulgated against a backdrop of 
understandings concerning the procedure for invoking the benefits of rules, or for 
waiving those benefits.‖  (U.S. v. Giovannetti (7th Cir. 1991) 928 F.2d 225, 226 
(Giovannetti).) 
Some cases have held that when the government fails to argue harmless 
error, a finding of error simply results in reversal without inquiry into prejudice.  
(See U.S. v. Cacho-Bonilla (1st Cir. 2005) 404 F.3d 84, 90; U.S. v. Varela-Rivera 
(9th Cir. 2002) 279 F.3d 1174, 1180; O’Leary, supra, 895 F.2d at p. 384; see also 
United States v. Pryce (D.C. Cir. 1991) 938 F.2d 1343, 1352–1353 (Pryce) (conc. 
& dis. opn. of Silberman, J.).)  The dominant view in federal case law, however, is 
that courts have discretion to determine whether an error is harmless despite the 
government‘s failure to raise the issue.  In deciding whether to exercise that 
discretion, many courts have followed the Seventh Circuit‘s guidance in 
Giovannetti that ―the controlling considerations are the length and complexity of 
the record, whether the harmlessness of the error or errors found is certain or 
debatable, and whether a reversal will result in protracted, costly, and ultimately 
futile proceedings in the district court.‖  (Giovannetti, supra, 928 F.2d at p. 227; 
see U.S. v. Hunter (D.C. Cir. 2014) 554 Fed.Appx 5, 11–12 [following Pryce, 
supra, 938 F.2d at p. 1348 (lead opn. of Williams, J.)]; Gover v. Perry (6th Cir. 
2012) 698 F.3d 295, 300–301 (Gover); U.S. v. Gonzalez-Flores (9th Cir. 2005) 
418 F.3d 1093, 1100 (Gonzalez-Flores); U.S. v. Torrez-Ortega (10th Cir. 1999) 
184 F.3d 1128, 1136 (Torrez-Ortega); U.S. v. McLaughlin (3d Cir. 1997) 126 F.3d 
130, 135; Lufkins v. Leapley (8th Cir.1992) 965 F.2d 1477, 1481; see also U.S. v. 
Rose (1st Cir. 1997) 104 F.3d 1408, 1415 [finding Giovannetti factors relevant but 
not exhaustive].) 
 
14 
As these cases have explained, ―the dangers of allowing sua sponte 
consideration of harmlessness . . . include the potential burden on reviewing courts 
of searching the record without guidance from the parties and encouragement of 
sloppy practice by lawyers.‖  (Gover, supra, 698 F.3d at p. 300; see Giovannetti, 
supra, 928 F.2d at p. 226.)  ―[T]he practice may unfairly tilt the scales of justice 
by authorizing courts to construct the government‘s best arguments for it without 
providing the defendant with a chance to respond.‖  (Gonzalez-Flores, supra, 418 
F.3d at p. 1101.)  ― ‗[W]here the case is at all close, defense counsel‘s lack of 
opportunity to answer potential harmless error arguments may lead the court to 
miss an angle that would have shown the error to have been prejudicial.‘ ‖  (Ibid., 
quoting Pryce, supra, 938 F.2d at p. 1347 (lead opn. of Williams, J.).)  At the 
same time, courts must also consider ―the potential costs to third parties and to the 
system brought about by needless relitigation of cases in which the error did not 
make any difference.‖  (Gonzalez-Flores, at p. 1100; see Gover, at p. 301.)  To 
avoid burdening ―other users of the court system, whose access to that system is 
impaired by additional litigation‖ and ―unnecessary court delay,‖ courts may 
―disregard a harmless error even though through some regrettable oversight 
harmlessness is not argued‖ by the government.  (Giovannetti, at p. 226.) 
A review of the case law shows that courts, in determining whether to 
address harmless error when the government forfeits the issue, focus primarily on 
how certain or debatable the harmlessness of the error is in light of the record.  
(See Gonzalez-Flores, supra, 418 F.3d at p. 1101 [―the court‘s certainty as to the 
harmlessness of the error . . . is of particular importance‖].)  In Giovannetti, the 
Seventh Circuit concluded that ―[t]he certainty of harmlessness does not appear 
with such clarity from an unguided search of the record that we should raise the 
issue on our own motion.‖  (Giovannetti, supra, 928 F.2d at p. 227.)  In Torrez-
Ortega, the Tenth Circuit similarly declined to conduct harmless error review ―in 
 
15 
the complete absence of guidance from the government‖ where ―[t]he 
harmlessness of the constitutional error is at best debatable‖ in light of an 
―extensive and complex‖ record.  (Torrez-Ortega, supra, 184 F.3d at p. 1136.)  
Other courts have refused to address harmless error for similar reasons.  (See U.S. 
v. Davis (3d Cir. 2013) 726 F.3d 434, 445, fn. 8 (Davis); U.S. v. Kloehn (9th Cir. 
2010) 620 F.3d 1122, 1130–1131; U.S. v. Davis (D.C. Cir. 2010) 596 F.3d 852, 
861; U.S. v. Silva (7th Cir. 2004) 380 F.3d 1018, 1021; U.S. v. Samaniego (10th 
Cir. 1999) 187 F.3d 1222, 1225–1226.) 
Where courts have decided to address harmless error on their own 
initiative, some have found the error prejudicial.  (See U.S. v. Hatfield (7th Cir. 
2010) 591 F.3d 945, 951; U.S. v. Montgomery (8th Cir. 1996) 100 F.3d 1404, 
1407; U.S. v. Rodriguez Cortes (1st Cir. 1991) 949 F.2d 532, 543.)  Others have 
found the error harmless.  (See U.S. v. Brooks (9th Cir., Nov. 24, 2014, No. 13-
10146) __ F.3d __, __ [2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 22217, at p. *23] (Brooks) [finding 
error harmless with respect to two convictions but not a third]; Gover, supra, 698 
F.3d at pp. 301–302; U.S. v. Shavers (3d Cir. 2012) 693 F.3d 363, 389 (Shavers); 
U.S. v. Ford (7th Cir. 2012) 683 F.3d 761, 768–769 (Ford); Gonzalez-Flores, 
supra, 418 F.3d at p. 1102; U.S. v. Rose, supra, 104 F.3d at pp. 1414–1415; Pryce, 
supra, 938 F.2d at pp. 1348–1350 [finding error harmless with respect to three 
defendants but not with respect to a fourth].) 
As to the latter cases, it is important to note the caution expressed by those 
courts.  The Sixth Circuit in Gover said that finding harmless error sua sponte is 
appropriate ―when there is no doubt as to the ultimate result‖ under the applicable 
standard or ―when the error is harmless upon review of a clear record.‖  (Gover, 
supra, 698 F.3d at p. 301.)  The Ninth Circuit in Gonzalez-Flores similarly 
observed that a sua sponte finding of harmless error is proper only when ―the 
harmlessness of any error is clear beyond serious debate and further proceedings 
 
16 
are certain to replicate the original result.‖  (Gonzalez-Flores, supra, 418 F.3d at 
p. 1100; see Brooks, supra, __ F.3d at p. __ [2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 22217, at 
p. *24] [―Certainty as to harmlessness is a prerequisite‖].)  The First Circuit in 
United States v. Rose warned that ―[t]he government‘s case is, of course, put at 
risk by its failure to argue that admission of the evidence was harmless.‖  (U.S. v. 
Rose, supra, 104 F.3d at p. 1415.)  And Judge Williams‘s opinion in Pryce, which 
the D.C. Circuit has subsequently followed, said that ―a court should normally 
conduct the harmless error inquiry on its own initiative only where the relevant 
portions of the record are reasonably short and straightforward.  Moreover, where 
a court does conduct the inquiry on its own, it should err on the side of the 
criminal defendant.‖  (Pryce, supra, 938 F.2d at p. 1348.) 
This narrow approach is evident in the analysis of the record in those cases 
that have found harmless error sua sponte.  (See Brooks, supra, __ F.3d at p. __ 
[2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 22217, at p. *22] [―overwhelming evidence‖ of guilt in ―a 
four-day trial‖ where ―the complexity of the record is modest‖]; Gover, supra, 698 
F.3d at p. 303 [erroneously admitted testimony ―was cumulative of the testimony 
of others, and was of extremely little weight when compared to the weight of the 
totality of the evidence admitted against Gover‖]; Shavers, supra, 693 F.3d at 
p. 389 [―overwhelming evidence‖ of guilt]; Ford, supra, 683 F.3d at pp. 767–768 
[DNA evidence showed 1 in 29 trillion chance that defendant was not the robber]; 
Gonzalez-Flores, supra, 418 F.3d at p. 1102 [finding error ―undeniably harmless‖ 
where ―[t]he record . . . is small and simple,‖ ―trial lasted less than two days,‖ ―the 
evidence against [defendant] was overwhelming,‖ ―[t]he elements of the crime 
were easily established,‖ and ―Gonzalez put on no defense‖]; U.S. v. Rose, supra, 
104 F.3d at p. 1414 [finding error ―plainly harmless‖ where improperly admitted 
―photograph was cumulative, [and] the weight of the additional evidence 
overwhelming‖].)  In Pryce, Judge Williams observed that ―the record is neither 
 
17 
long nor complicated‖ and concluded that ―the error was indisputably harmless‖ as 
to three defendants because ―[i]t obviously did not harm‖ one of them and raised 
no ―serious argument for reversing the convictions of‖ two others.  (Pryce, supra, 
938 F.2d at p. 1348.)  As to a fourth defendant, Judge Williams found ―the matter 
. . . open to serious debate‖ and, on that basis, concluded that reversal was 
required.  (Id. at p. 1349.) 
In sum, a significant body of case law holds that courts may find harmless 
error on their own initiative ―only where the harmlessness of the error is not 
reasonably debatable.‖  (Gonzalez-Flores, supra, 418 F.3d at p. 1101; see Pryce, 
supra, 938 F.2d at p. 1348 (lead opn. of Williams, J.) [―Where the government 
does not raise the harmless error issue, I would deem errors ‗harmless‘ only where 
satisfaction of that standard is beyond serious debate.‖]; Giovannetti, supra, 928 
F.2d at p. 227 [sua sponte finding of harmless error is appropriate ―if the 
harmlessness of the error is readily discernible without an elaborate search of the 
record‖].)  Courts have endorsed this approach as striking a proper balance among 
multiple values:  ensuring accurate outcomes, encouraging timely presentation and 
efficient resolution of harmless error claims, avoiding undue delay and needless 
relitigation, and maintaining judicial neutrality and fairness in the adversarial 
process. 
B. 
While acknowledging some of this case law, today‘s opinion ultimately 
deems it irrelevant because ―the forfeiture rules employed in the federal courts are 
not binding on this court.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 34.)  What is binding is article 
VI, section 13 of the California Constitution, which says:  ―No judgment shall be 
set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground of misdirection of the 
jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to 
any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after 
 
18 
an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the 
opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.‖ 
The plain meaning of this provision is that a reviewing court may not 
reverse a judgment without addressing harmless error.  It is true that federal 
courts, despite the mandatory language of the federal harmless error provisions, 
have held that they have discretion not to address the issue when the government 
does not raise it.  (Ante, at p. 15.)  But the text of article VI, section 13 differs from 
the analogous federal provisions in two respects.  First, it is phrased as a 
prohibition:  ―No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, . . . unless . . . .‖  
Second, it sets forth not only a substantive standard for reversal but also a 
procedural requirement:  a reviewing court must conduct ―an examination of the 
entire cause, including the evidence,‖ before setting aside a judgment.  Thus, I 
agree that ―[t]he Attorney General‘s failure does not relieve this court of its 
constitutional responsibility to determine whether any error resulted in a 
miscarriage of justice.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 33.) 
I do not agree, however, that the Attorney General‘s forfeiture makes no 
difference to our resolution of the harmless error issue.  As an initial matter, the 
fact that article VI, section 13 requires us to address harmless error does not justify 
our invitation or consideration of the Attorney General‘s belated views on the 
subject.  Nothing in article VI, section 13 or its enactment history suggests that it 
was intended to displace the ordinary norms of the adversarial process or the 
ordinary expectation that the parties will argue the merits of the issue.  (See 
People v. O’Bryan (1913) 165 Cal. 55, 63–64 (O’Bryan) [discussing history of the 
provision].)  Although article VI, section 13 obligates us to decide the issue, we 
must decide it without giving special treatment to either party. 
It may be argued that having the benefit of the Attorney General‘s views, 
even though untimely, is likely to enhance the accuracy of our harmless error 
 
19 
inquiry.  That is, we are more apt to reach the ―correct‖ result with full 
information and guidance from an interested party.  But the legally correct 
outcome in any case is necessarily shaped by the circumstances of that case, 
including the evidence presented, the objections made at trial, and the claims 
raised on appeal, and adherence or lack of adherence to established procedure is a 
circumstance that properly informs the outcome.  When a defendant omits a 
particular argument in the opening brief and attempts to raise it in the reply brief 
or at oral argument, we do not typically pardon the oversight for the sake of 
greater accuracy in determining whether the trial reached the correct result.  (See 
maj. opn., ante, at pp. 31–32.)  Moreover, the situation here is not unique insofar 
as harmless error directly concerns the issue of reversal or affirmance, for the 
import of any procedural rule — the reason procedure matters — is that it may 
affect the outcome. 
Few if any cases are litigated perfectly, and we must decide each case as it 
comes to us, warts and all.  (See Greenlaw, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 244 [― ‗[Courts] 
do not, or should not, sally forth each day looking for wrongs to right.  We wait 
for cases to come to us, and when they do we normally decide only questions 
presented by the parties.‘ ‖].)  Tellingly, today‘s opinion is unable to cite a single 
instance in which a court has addressed harmless error in the face of a government 
forfeiture while also giving the government a second chance to brief the issue.  
Courts have rejected such an approach because of its obvious unfairness and the 
dubious incentive it would provide for careless or manipulative lawyering.  (See 
Giovannetti, supra, 928 F.2d at pp. 226–227; Holland v. McGinnis (7th Cir. 1992) 
963 F.2d 1044, 1057–1058.) 
What difference, then, does the government‘s forfeiture make to the merits 
of the issue?  One might argue that it should not make any difference since we can 
and, under our state Constitution, we must examine the entire record ourselves, 
 
20 
even if the task is more burdensome without guidance from the Attorney General.  
This view, however, overlooks several important considerations. 
First, although this court can and does independently canvass the record 
when assessing prejudice, our reading of the record without guidance from the 
government provides a necessarily limited window into the dynamics of the case.  
The record on appellate review often does not illuminate matters of credibility, 
demeanor, intonation, or emphasis — all of which may affect what evidence the 
jury found convincing or not.  (See, e.g., Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 1337, 1358; People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 359; Meiner v. Ford 
Motor Co. (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 127, 140–141.)  It is already imperative, when 
the issue of harmless error is fully litigated by the parties, that reviewing courts 
exercise caution in reweighing the evidence.  (See O’Bryan, supra, 165 Cal. at 
p. 66 [―We are not substituted for the jury.  We are not to determine, as an original 
inquiry, the question of the defendant‘s guilt or innocence.‖].)  This imperative is 
even greater when the government does not address the issue.  A reviewing court‘s 
counterfactually constructed understanding of the evidence in support of the jury‘s 
verdict may not correspond to how the evidence actually came across to the jury at 
trial.  Aspects of the record that a court finds significant may not have been 
significant at all; conversely, aspects that a court overlooks or discounts may have 
been important in real time.  Because ― ‗[c]ounsel almost always know a great deal 
more about their cases than we do‘ ‖ (Greenlaw, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 244), a 
reviewing court must be especially cautious in rejecting a defendant‘s explanation 
of prejudice in favor of the court‘s own narration of the record. 
 Second, when a reviewing court finds harmless error on its own initiative, 
it is in effect ―construct[ing] the government‘s best arguments for it without 
providing the defendant with a chance to respond.‖  (Gonzalez-Flores, supra, 418 
F.3d at p. 1101.)  Such an approach ― ‗may lead the court to miss an angle that 
 
21 
would have shown the error to have been prejudicial.‘ ‖  (Ibid., quoting Pryce, 
supra, 938 F.2d at p. 1347 (lead opn. of Williams, J.).)  In this case, the court 
notes that Grimes was ―given adequate notice of the Attorney General‘s position 
and an opportunity to respond to it.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 33.)  But that is only 
because the court improperly invited supplemental briefing from the Attorney 
General on harmless error.  Properly understood, the posture of Grimes‘s 
challenge to the exclusion of Morris‘s statements is that Grimes has claimed 
prejudicial error and the Attorney General, while disputing the error, has forfeited 
the issue of harmlessness.  It is in that posture that we must address harmless error, 
thus implicating the concerns above. 
Third, the significance of the Attorney General‘s forfeiture must be 
considered in light of the usual inference that a party‘s failure to assert a particular 
claim signals its acquiescence.  (See People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 480; 
People v. Isaac (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 143, 147, fn. 4; People v. Carson (1970) 4 
Cal.App.3d 782, 784–785; Giovannetti, supra, 928 F.2d at p. 226 [―the defendant 
goes out of his way to argue that the error of which he complains was prejudicial, 
and the government by not responding signals its acquiescence that if there was 
error, it indeed was prejudicial‖]; Davis, supra, 726 F.3d at p. 445, fn. 8 [―Such 
silence usually means that harmless error is waived . . . .‖]; Gonzalez-Flores, 
supra, 418 F.3d at p. 1100 [―Usually when the government fails to argue 
harmlessness, we deem the issue waived . . . .‖].)  The court cites Hill for the 
proposition that ―[w]e do not . . . invariably interpret the failure to respond to an 
argument as a concession or a forfeiture.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 32, citing Hill, 
supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 995, fn. 3.)  But Hill was a case where the claim of error to 
which the government failed to respond was ―itself raised for the first time on 
appeal‖ (Hill, at p. 995, fn. 3; see id. at p. 995 [defendant waived the claim at 
 
22 
trial]) and lacked any explanation of why the error was prejudicial (id. at p. 996).  
The same is not true here. 
In this case, the Attorney General belatedly contends that her failure to raise 
harmless error was due to an oversight, not acquiescence.  As noted (ante, at 
p. 10), we have no practical way to assess this factual contention on direct appeal.  
Nor should it matter, unless we are prepared to dispense with the usual inference 
from silence in favor of now allowing all litigants, not just the Attorney General, 
to clarify their ―actual‖ position whenever their briefing does not address a 
particular issue. 
Fourth, we must be mindful of the separation of executive and judicial 
functions in criminal cases.  When the government ―seeks affirmance based on 
reasonable appellate strategy‖ but does not advance a particular argument, the 
court should hesitate to second-guess the government by advancing that argument 
in its stead.  (Rose, supra, 629 A.2d at p. 535.)  It is true that the government‘s 
forfeiture is not binding on this court in light of article VI, section 13.  But 
affirming a judgment on grounds not advocated by the government carries the risk 
of a ―confusion of roles‖ that is ―inconsistent with the neutrality expected of the 
judiciary in our adversary system of justice.‖  (Rose, at p. 535.) 
In my view, the considerations above counsel the same approach that 
federal courts have adopted in this context:  When the government fails to argue 
harmless error, we may find harmless error on our own initiative only when the 
harmlessness of the error is clear ―beyond serious debate.‖  (Pryce, supra, 938 
F.2d at p. 1348 (lead opn. of Williams, J.).)  The length and complexity of the 
record are relevant considerations.  But the harmlessness of an error may be 
readily apparent even on a lengthy record, especially if, for example, the length of 
the record is due to the volume of evidence against the defendant.  At the same 
time, a close case may come packaged in a clear and simple record.  Importantly, 
 
23 
neither the intent nor the effect of the rule I propose is to impose a technical 
penalty on the government.  Rather, the rule is a means of allocating the risks we 
face in discharging our obligation to consider harmless error — both the risk of 
finding an error prejudicial that is actually harmless and the risk of finding an error 
harmless that is actually prejudicial.  Where harmlessness is clear, the latter risk is 
negligible; hence the government‘s forfeiture does not affect the outcome.  But, 
like Judge Williams in Pryce, I would hold that where the harmlessness of an error 
is seriously debatable, the risk of an inaccurate determination must be borne by the 
party who forfeited the issue. 
Further, whether the harmlessness of an error is certain or seriously 
debatable will depend not only on the record in each case but also on the 
applicable legal standard for harmlessness.  As to a judgment of guilt, we evaluate 
the harmlessness of state law error under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 
836–837, which requires the defendant to demonstrate a reasonable probability 
that the outcome would have been different absent the error.  (See People v. Lucas 
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 263.)  Because the burden of persuasion falls on the 
defendant, and because the reasonable probability standard requires a substantial 
showing of prejudice, we may expect that courts not infrequently can find 
harmlessness under this standard to be clear beyond serious debate, despite the 
government‘s failure to address the issue. 
By contrast, we have long held that the standard for assessing the effect of 
state law error in the penalty phase of a capital trial is ― ‗the same, in substance 
and effect,‘ ‖ as the standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S 18 
(Chapman) for assessing the effect of federal constitutional error.  (People v. 
Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, fn. 15; see People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 
491; People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 786; People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 
Cal.4th 353, 479; People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 448 (Brown).)  The 
 
24 
Chapman standard requires the beneficiary of the error — the government — to 
show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Chapman, supra, 
386 U.S. at pp. 23–24.)  In adopting this standard for assessing prejudice from 
state law error in capital sentencing, we suggested it was constitutionally required:  
―When the ‗result‘ under review is such a normative conclusion based on guided, 
individualized discretion, the Watson standard of review is simply insufficient to 
ensure ‗reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in 
a specific case.‘  (Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280, 305 (plur. 
opn.); accord, Satterwhite v. Texas (1988) 486 U.S. 249, [263]; Caldwell v. 
Mississippi [(1985)] 472 U.S. 320, 329–330; Zant v. Stephens [(1983)] 462 U.S. 
862, 884–885.)‖  (Brown, at p. 448.) 
The government‘s burden under Chapman is perhaps best understood not as 
a burden of proof but as a burden of persuasion.  (See O’Neal v. McAninch (1995) 
513 U.S. 432, 436–437.)  In that sense, a forfeiture does not mean that the 
government automatically loses under Chapman.  But the reasonable doubt 
standard, along with the allocation of the burden of persuasion to the government, 
suggests that only in limited circumstances can a reviewing court find an error 
harmless under Chapman when the government forfeits the issue.  Such a finding 
―requires a double level of certainty:  we must be convinced that the error was 
‗harmless beyond a reasonable doubt‘ and that ‗satisfaction of that standard is 
beyond serious debate.‘ ‖  (Brooks, supra, __ F.3d at p. __ [2014 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 22217, at p. *2], quoting Pryce, supra, 938 F.2d at p. 1348 (lead opn. of 
Williams, J.).) 
C. 
The approach I have proposed is supported by substantial authority and 
sensibly accommodates concerns of accuracy, efficiency, and fairness.  It also has 
another virtue that counsel for Grimes observed at reargument.  When a criminal 
 
25 
defendant has forfeited a claim, the defendant is permitted to argue, typically in a 
habeas corpus petition, that the forfeiture resulted from deficient performance of 
counsel and that counsel‘s deficient performance was prejudicial.  Thus, our 
adversarial system of justice does not entirely foreclose relief in the event of a 
forfeiture.  But a defendant‘s forfeiture unquestionably raises the bar for obtaining 
relief, as neither deficient performance nor prejudice is easily demonstrated in the 
context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  (See Strickland v. 
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 689 [―a court must indulge a strong presumption 
that counsel‘s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance‖]; In re Champion (2014) 58 Cal.4th 965, 1007 [defendant must show 
― ‗ ― ‗a reasonable probability . . . that, but for counsel‘s failings, the result would 
have been more favorable‘ ‖ ‘ ‖].)  The proper approach to the government‘s 
forfeiture of harmless error is similar.  It does not foreclose affirmance on the 
basis of harmless error, but it does require the reviewing court to find 
harmlessness under the applicable standard to be clear beyond serious debate.  The 
rough symmetry with claims of ineffective assistance of counsel underscores the 
fairness and prudence of this approach. 
IV. 
I now apply the principles above to the case before us.  As to whether the 
exclusion of Morris‘s statements was prejudicial at the guilt phase, I begin by 
noting that at trial Grimes did not dispute his liability for felony murder.  The only 
contested issue was his eligibility under Penal Code section 190.2 for the death 
penalty or life in prison without parole.  Because Grimes was not the actual killer 
(cf. id., § 190.2, subd. (b)), he was eligible for these penalties only if the jury 
found that he participated in the underlying felony with the intent to kill (id., 
§ 190.2, subd. (c)) or with reckless indifference to human life (id., § 190.2, 
subd. (d)).  The prosecutor presented both theories to the jury.  But because a true 
 
26 
finding was needed only as to one theory, and because the evidence was much 
stronger with respect to reckless indifference, the latter theory was, as defense 
counsel said in closing argument, the ―real issue‖ in the case.  Moreover, a finding 
of Grimes‘s intent to kill Bone would necessarily subsume a finding of his 
reckless indifference to her life. 
Grimes argues that the excluded statements were necessary to rebut 
Jonathan Howe‘s testimony that Grimes said he (Grimes) had ordered Morris to 
kill Bone.  But the prosecutor did not rely on Howe‘s testimony in arguing that 
Grimes acted without regard for Bone‘s life.  Instead, she relied on the 
overwhelming and uncontradicted evidence that Grimes knowingly helped break 
into an occupied house in the middle of the day, that he was accompanied by two 
people he knew to be armed, that he had to step over Bone‘s unconscious body in 
order to enter the house, and that he proceeded to search her house for things to 
steal while overhearing her brutal murder.  This evidence of reckless indifference 
is not undermined by the excluded statements, which concern Grimes‘s physical 
location during the murder, his lack of participation in the killing, and his reaction 
immediately following the murder.  Indeed, Grimes does not argue that the 
excluded statements counter the reckless indifference theory.  Even if the 
erroneous exclusion of Morris‘s statements under Evidence Code section 1230 
amounted to federal constitutional error, it is clear beyond serious debate that the 
error was harmless as to Grimes‘s guilt of special circumstance murder. 
As to the penalty phase, however, I reach a different conclusion.  In 
deciding between death and life without parole, a jury must take into account the 
totality of the circumstances of the crime as well as the defendant‘s ―character, 
background, history, mental condition and physical condition.‖  (Pen. Code, 
§ 190.3.)  ―[D]etermining the balance of evidence of aggravation and mitigation 
and the appropriate penalty do not entail the finding of facts but rather ‗a single 
 
27 
fundamentally normative assessment . . . .‘ ‖  (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 
Cal.4th 1, 106.) 
In this case, all sides agree that Grimes did not personally kill Bone.  
Although the high court has held that the federal Constitution does not prohibit 
capital punishment for a defendant who did not actually kill (see Tison v. Arizona 
(1987) 481 U.S. 137; Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782), such death 
sentences are not common.  Among the nearly 1,400 executions in the United 
States since 1976, only 20 involved a capital defendant who did not actually kill, 
and that number includes persons who acted with an intent to kill.  (See Death 
Penalty Information Center (Nov. 19, 2014) Executions by Year Since 1976  
 [as of Jan. 5, 2015]; id., Those 
Executed Who Did Not Directly Kill the Victim, 
 [as of Jan. 5, 2015].)  This low rate is not a recent development.  (See 
Enmund, at pp. 794–795 [among the 362 executions since 1954, 339 involved a 
defendant who ―personally committed a homicidal assault,” two involved a 
defendant who “had another person commit the homicide for him,” six involved “a 
nontriggerman felony murderer,” and 16 involved facts “not reported in sufficient 
detail to determine whether the person executed committed the homicide”].)  
Whether due to determinations of culpability made by legislatures, by prosecutors, 
or by juries, the death penalty has rarely been applied to persons who did not 
actually kill, even if they had an intent to kill. 
Given this context, it is reasonable to think that the jury‘s determination of 
whether Grimes deserved the death penalty turned significantly on whether he 
played a leadership role in the killing and what his attitude or reaction to the 
killing was.  And much of that depends on the credibility of a single witness, 
Jonathan Howe.  Although today‘s opinion says that Morris‘s statements did not 
 
28 
directly contradict Howe‘s testimony (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 36–38), that is not the 
same as saying that Morris‘s statements could not reasonably have led the jury to 
doubt Howe‘s credibility or to reject the most damning inferences from his 
testimony. 
For example, Howe testified that Grimes said that he had ―enjoyed 
watching‖ the killing or that he ―enjoyed the fact she died.‖  Evidence that Grimes 
expressed alarm or surprise at the killing (―what in the hell are you doing?‖) is not 
inconsistent with Howe‘s account; Grimes could have enjoyed the killing even 
though he was surprised by its brutality.  But it would have been perfectly 
reasonable for a juror to draw the opposite inference, i.e., that Grimes‘s look of 
surprise cast doubt on Howe‘s account and, in turn, Howe‘s overall credibility.  
Morris‘s statements tended to shift culpability away from Grimes, and a 
reasonable juror could have inferred that Grimes, instead of enjoying the killing, 
retained enough humanity to be shocked by its brutality.  Although Howe‘s 
testimony that Grimes ―enjoyed‖ the killing evokes Grimes‘s depravity, the 
excluded statement that Morris made to Abbott could reasonably have led one or 
more jurors to doubt this testimony. 
Similarly, although the jury could have reasonably believed Howe‘s 
testimony that Grimes said he (Grimes) ordered Morris to kill Bone, the jury also 
could have reasonably doubted this aspect of Howe‘s testimony in light of 
Morris‘s statements to Abbott and Lawson that Grimes took no part in the killing 
as well as Morris‘s statement to Lawson that Grimes was ―in some other place in 
the house‖ during the killing.  Notably, Morris made these statements without ever 
mentioning that he was following Grimes‘s lead, that Grimes took an interest in 
the killing, or that the killing was in any way a joint undertaking.  Moreover, 
evidence that Grimes did not supervise the actual killing and was not in the same 
room when it occurred could have led one or more jurors to infer that even if 
 
29 
Grimes did order the killing, he was not resolutely murderous but somewhat 
indifferent to whether the killing was actually carried out (consistent with the 
reckless indifference theory of his guilt).  Because Grimes did not himself kill the 
victim, it is reasonable that the jury would have paid especially close attention to 
the precise details of his involvement.  The excluded statements would have 
provided additional nuance for the jury to consider. 
Today‘s opinion does not suggest that Abbott or Lawson would not have 
been credible witnesses, that Howe‘s testimony was unimportant to the penalty 
determination, or that the aggravating evidence was so overwhelming that the jury 
would have voted for death whether or not it believed Howe‘s testimony.  The 
penalty phase of this trial consumed 11 days and involved some 25 witnesses, 
resulting in thousands of pages of record material on top of the voluminous record 
of the four-week guilt phase.  The prosecution introduced evidence of Grimes‘s 
criminal history and the impact of Bone‘s murder on her family.  The penalty 
phase also included a mass of contested evidence concerning childhood abuse 
suffered by Grimes and its ongoing psychological and neurological effects, 
Grimes‘s tendency to be a follower in social situations, his limited mental 
capacity, and various acts of kindness Grimes showed toward vulnerable people in 
his life.  In addition, the defense and prosecution vigorously disputed whether 
Grimes expressed genuine remorse after the killing.  In closing argument, the 
defense argued that Howe‘s testimony lacked credibility, to which the prosecutor 
responded by saying, ―They‘ve never given you a reason to doubt his testimony.‖  
The excluded statements by Morris would have enabled the defense to fill this gap. 
Having reviewed this lengthy and complex record, I cannot say with 
confidence that the jury would have voted against death if the trial court had 
admitted Morris‘s statements.  But more importantly, I cannot say with confidence 
that the jury would have voted for death if the trial court had admitted Morris‘s 
 
30 
statements.  In this case, where the jury had to assess the culpability of a defendant 
who did not personally kill, the penalty issue was hardly clear-cut.  Grimes‘s 
briefing discussed at length why the erroneous exclusion of Morris‘s statements 
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Attorney General offered no 
response.  Because the harmlessness of the error is seriously debatable — indeed, 
it is open to reasonable doubt (see conc. & dis. opn. of Werdegar, J., ante, at 
pp. 4–5) — I would not find the error harmless at the penalty phase.  To the extent 
the issue is close, the risk of an inaccurate determination must fall not on the party 
who properly and carefully litigated the issue, but on the party who bears the 
burden of persuasion yet did not address the issue. 
* 
* 
* 
In sum, the trial court erred in excluding Morris‘s self-inculpatory 
statements to Abbott and Lawson.  Although I would affirm Grimes‘s conviction 
of special circumstance murder despite the error, I respectfully dissent from the 
court‘s affirmance of the penalty verdict.  In all other respects, I join the court‘s 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
I CONCUR: 
 
ZELON, J.* 
 
                                              
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, 
Division Seven, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 
the California Constitution. 
 
1 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Grimes 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S076339 
Date Filed: January 5, 2015 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Shasta 
Judge: Bradley L. Boeckman 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
James M. Fahey and Cliff Gardner, under appointments by the Supreme Court, Catherine White and Lazuli 
Whitt for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. 
Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Ward A. Campbell, Stephanie A. Mitchell and Sean M. McCoy, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, Barry P. Helft, Chief Deputy State Public Defender, and Nina 
Rivkind, Deputy State Public Defender, for the Office of the State Public Defender as Amicus Curiae. 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Cliff Gardner 
1448 San Pablo Avenue 
Berkeley, CA  94702 
(510) 524-1093 
 
Stephanie A. Mitchell 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 323-8044