Case Title: H.P.White v. Blackburn

Citation: 372 Md. 160

Docket Number: 34/02

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2002-12-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 34, September Term, 2002
H. P. WHITE LABORATORY, INC. v. JAMES BLACKBURN
[Holds That A Harford County Ordinance, Creating A New Judicial Cause Of Action In The
Circuit Court, Violates Art. 11-A Of the Maryland Constitution] 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 34
September Term, 2002
_________________________________________
H. P. WHITE LABORATORY, INC.
v.
JAMES L. BLACKBURN
__________________________________________
Bell, C.J.,
        Eldridge
       
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
 
                                
         JJ.
__________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
__________________________________________
Filed:   December 11, 2002
1
Section 95-13 states as follows:
“§ 95-13.  Nonexclusiveness of remedies.
“The provisions of this chapter shall be construed as vesting in all persons the
right to be free of any practices within the county which are prohibited herein.  Any
person who is aggrieved by an act prohibited herein may bring an appropriate action
in law or in equity in the Circuit Court for the county to seek damages, including
counsel fees, redress of injury or injunctive relief arising out of any act prohibited
herein, in addition to pursuing the procedures and seeking the remedies established
herein.”
Chapter 95 of the Harford County Code, enacted by the Harford County Council,
makes unlawful various “Discriminatory Practices,” including in § 95-5 certain
discriminatory employment practices.  Chapter 95, in § 95-11, also makes it unlawful
“for any person to retaliate . . . against any person because” the latter has, inter alia,
filed a complaint alleging a discriminatory practice under Chapter 95.  Section 95-7
creates an administrative remedy for “[a]ny person claiming to be aggrieved by an
alleged violation of this chapter.”   In addition, Chapter 95 authorizes civil and criminal
penalties for certain violations of the chapter.  Finally, § 95-13 provides that the
administrative and penal remedies set forth in Chapter 95 are not exclusive and that a
party aggrieved by a violation of Chapter 95 may file an action “in law or in equity” in
the Circuit Court for Harford County for money damages, including counsel fees, or
for injunctive relief.1
-2-
2
The language in brackets represents our modifications and additions to the Court of Special
Appeals’ statement of the facts.
The respondent, James L. Blackburn, is a former employee of the petitioner,
H. P. White Laboratory, Inc.  Blackburn brought an action against H. P. White under
§ 95-13 of the Harford County Code and recovered monetary damages plus attorney’s
fees based on the jury’s determination that H. P. White had retaliated against Blackburn
because Blackburn had earlier filed an age discrimination complaint against H. P.
White.  The sole issue before us in this case is whether § 95-13 is valid under Article
XI-A of the Maryland Constitution and, therefore, whether it could validly confer
jurisdiction upon the Circuit Court.  The Court of Special Appeals held that § 95-13
was valid, and the intermediate appellate court affirmed the money judgment in favor
of Blackburn based on retaliation in violation of § 95-11.  We shall disagree.  
I.
The basic facts of the case were set forth in the unreported opinion of the Court
of Special Appeals as follows:2
“H. P. White is a testing and research facility located in Harford
County, for [which] Blackburn worked as an employee at will until
22 January 1996.  Blackburn had not only a history of violating
company policy, but had abused in particular H. P. White*s paid
leave of absence procedures, applicable to all employees.  After
having been warned of the potential disciplinary actions which
would be taken by H. P. White if such conduct continued,
Blackburn violated company policy once more.  Rather than accept
the disciplinary action posed by H. P. White, Blackburn chose not
to return to work.  At the time of his separation from H. P. White,
Blackburn was earning $20.00 per hour, and elected to continue
health insurance coverage with H. P. White*s insurer, and H. P
-3-
White continued to finance . . . that coverage.  Claiming to have
been a victim of age discrimination, Blackburn filed a complaint
form with the Harford County Human Relations Commission on 22
March 1996, and in March, 1996 began receiving unemployment
benefits.  On 5 April 1996, Blackburn filed a claim with the
Division of Labor and Industry, attempting to collect 84.5 hours of
unpaid and accrued vacation pay, but that claim was abandoned. 
“On 6 May 1996, Blackburn filed a Complaint in the . . .
District Court [of Maryland], c1aiming constructive discharge, and
84.5 hours of unpaid and accrued vacation pay.  This claim was
voluntarily dismissed.  In September, 1996, Blackburn obtained a
job with Tero-Tek.
“On 10 October 1996, Blackburn filed a Complaint in the
Circuit Court for Harford County charging H. P. White with age
discrimination based on a violation of Chapter 95 of the Harford
County Code, constructive discharge, and violations of the
Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Act.
“On 25 November 1996, Blackburn amended his Complaint
alleging age discrimination based on a violation of Chapter 95 of
the Harford County Code, breach of the Maryland Wage Payment
and Collection Act, breach of contract and wrongful discharge. By
this time, the Harford County Human Relations Commission
(HCHR C), had completed its investigation and on 27 December
1996 issued its written report finding no age discrimination by
H. P. White. [Blackburn did not seek judicial review of this
decision].
“In January of 1997, while still employed with Tero-Tek, as was
evident from his pay stubs, Blackburn sought employment with
Alcore, listing H. P. White as a reference.  On 13 January 1997,
Alcore conducted a telephone interview with H. P. White.  During
that interview, the Alcore employee described H. P. White’s
President as very aggressive and very eager to tell Alcore that
Blackburn currently had a lawsuit for age discrimination pending
against H. P. White.  Overall, H. P. White was a negative
reference, as it related to Blackburn*s absenteeism.
“On 1 December 1997, Blackburn amended his Complaint,
maintaining the same four counts listed, but adding language to the
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3
See Maryland Code (1991, 1999 Repl. Vol.), §§ 3-501 through 3-509 of the Labor and
Employment Article.
age discrimination count that H. P. White had retaliated against
Blackburn in violation of Chapter 95 of the Harford County Code,
specifically citing a violation of Chapter 95-11 . . . .  Similar
language was added to the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection
Act count.  Prior to 1 December 1997, Blackburn had filed no
discrimination complaint with any administrative agency charging
H. P. White with retaliation.  Unknown to H. P. White, the HCHRC
had earlier suggested that Blackburn file his discrimination claim
at the State or Federal level.  Not only did Blackburn not do so, he
replied in writing to the HCHRC that he could not wait for the
State or Federal agencies to act.
“In response to Blackburn’s claims, H. P. White took the
position that a suit for damages claiming it had violated the
Harford County Code was not appropriate [because of lack of
jurisdiction], and that there had been no wrongful discharge and
that there was a bona fide dispute whether Blackburn was entitled
to 84.5 hours of accrued vacation pay.  Of course, Blackburn
disagreed, and the case proceeded to trial.”
The case went to trial before a jury on four counts.  Count one charged age
discrimination and retaliation in violation of Chapter 95 of the Harford County Code,
and the asserted right to damages was premised entirely on § 95-13 of the Code.  Count
two alleged a breach of the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law,3 and count
three alleged that H. P. White had breached the employment contract with respect to
accrued vacation pay.  Count four asserted a common law wrongful discharge cause of
action.
At the close of the plaintiff’s case, the trial judge dismissed the count four
wrongful discharge claim, and, after the close of all of the evidence, the judge
-5-
dismissed count two alleging a violation of the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection
Law.  Count one, charging age discrimination and retaliation in violation of Chapter
95 of the Harford County Code, and count three concerning vacation pay, were allowed
to be submitted to the jury.  Prior to the jury instructions, the parties stipulated that the
jury should determine liability upon the claims submitted to it and that the trial judge
should thereafter determine damages upon each claim under which liability was found.
The jury found that H. P. White had not engaged in age discrimination.  The jury
did find, however, that H. P. White retaliated against Blackburn, in violation of § 95-11
of the Harford County Code, because Blackburn had “filed this case of age
discrimination.”  The jury also found that H. P. White “breached its contractual promise
to pay . . . Blackburn the value of vacation leave due him of 42 hours at $20 per hour.”
The trial judge determined that Blackburn was entitled to $101,257.42 on the retaliation
claim, $136.74 on the vacation pay claim, and $3,800.00 in attorney fees.  The total
judgment entered against H. P. White was $105,194.16.
H. P. White took an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, raising numerous
issues, including the contention that § 95-13 of the Harford County Code was
unconstitutional and, therefore, could not confer on the Circuit Court jurisdiction to
entertain the action for retaliation in violation of § 95-11 of the Code.  H. P. White
relied extensively upon this Court’s opinions in McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, 319 Md. 12,
570 A.2d 834 (1990), and Sweeney v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 319 Md. 440, 573 A.2d
32 (1990), in which this Court ruled on the validity of charter county ordinances
-6-
creating new judicial causes of action in the circuit courts based on claims of
discrimination.  (Appellant’s brief in the Court of Special Appeals at 7, 8, 9).
Blackburn filed a cross-appeal with regard to the calculation of breach of contract
damages and the attorney fee award.  Blackburn did not, however, challenge the
adverse determinations on his age discrimination claim, his Maryland Wage Payment
and Collection Law claim, and his common law wrongful discharge claim.
Consequently, those determinations became final.
The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, affirmed the award of
$101,257.42 in retaliation damages, stating: “We hold that the Circuit Court for
Harford County has subject matter jurisdiction over civil actions claiming damages
based on a violation of Chapter 95 of the Harford County Code . . . .”   The
intermediate appellate court indicated that, if § 95-13 did not validly authorize a
judicial remedy, there might not be a satisfactory remedy.  The Court of Special
Appeals continued: “When an employer retaliates against a former employee for
protesting age discrimination in good faith, that retaliation cries out for a remedy.” 
The Court of Special Appeals did reverse the award for vacation pay under the
breach of contract count, holding that the trial court’s resolution of the Maryland Wage
Payment and Collection Law count rendered the vacation pay award “inappropriate.”
The Court of Special Appeals also vacated the $3,800.00 attorney fee award and
remanded the “matter” to the Circuit Court for further proceedings, indicating that the
award was inadequate because the trial court did not sufficiently “consider [] appellee’s
-7-
counsel’s efforts over a period of at least five years, including a lengthy trial . . . .”
H. P. White filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, challenging the
retaliation judgment and the award of counsel fees under § 95-13 of the Harford County
Code.  H. P. White’s petition presented a single question, namely whether § 95-13 is
constitutional under the holdings in McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, supra, 319 Md. 12, 570
A.2d 834, and Sweeney v. Hartz Mountain Corp., supra, 319 Md. 440, 573 A.2d 32.
Blackburn did not file a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari, and, consequently, the
Court of Special Appeals’ decision in favor of H. P. White on the breach of contract
count became final.  This Court granted H. P. White’s certiorari petition, White Labs.
v. Blackburn, 369 Md. 571, 801 A.2d 1031 (2002).
II.
Harford County is a chartered home rule county under Article XI-A of the
Maryland Constitution.  Save Our Streets v. Mitchell, 357 Md. 237, 743 A.2d 748
(2000).  Article XI-A, or the Home Rule Amendment as it is sometimes called, “enables
those counties adopting a home rule charter to enjoy a significant amount of self-
governance by transferring the General Assembly’s power to enact many types of
public local laws to the home rule counties themselves.”  Montrose Christian School
v. Walsh, 363 Md. 565, 579, 770 A.2d 111, 119 (2001) (emphasis supplied).
As made clear by the language of Article XI-A, § 3, of the Constitution,
however, the law-making authority of a home rule county is limited to the “power to
enact local laws of said . . . County” (emphasis supplied).  See Montgomery County v.
-8-
Broadcast Equities, 360 Md. 438, 441 n.1, 758 A.2d 995, 996 n.1 (2000), in which we
recently stated:
“Article XI-A, § 3, of the Maryland Constitution, inter alia,
grants to the county council of a charter county ‘full power to enact
local laws of said . . . County . . . upon all matters covered by the
express powers granted’ to charter counties.  If, however, an
ordinance enacted by a charter county does not constitute a ‘local
law’ within the meaning of Article XI-A, it is beyond the authority
of a charter county and, therefore, is unconstitutional.  See
McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, 319 Md. 12, 17-24, 570 A.2d 834, 836-
840 (1990), and cases there cited.” 
In McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, supra, this Court held that § 27-20(a) of the
Montgom ery County Code, which had been enacted by the Montgom ery County
Council, was not a “local law” within the meaning of Article XI-A of the Maryland
Constitution and that, therefore, the ordinance was unconstitutional.  Section 27-20(a),
involved in McCrory, 319 Md. at 15, 570 A.2d at 835, provided:
“‘Any person who has been subjected to any act of
discrimination prohibited under this division shall be deemed to
have been denied a civil right and shall be entitled to sue for
damages, injunction or other civil relief, including reasonable
attorney’s fees; provided, however, that no suit shall be
commenced until forty-five (45) days after a complaint alleging
such an act of discrimination has been filed with the commission
. . . .’”
In holding that the above-quoted provision was not a “local law,” we reasoned in
McCrory as follows (319 Md. at 19-21, 570 A.2d at 837-838):
-9-
“Section 27-20(a) of the Montgom ery County Code authorizes
a private citizen to seek redress for another private citizen’s
violation of a county anti-employment discrimination ordinance by
instituting a judicial action in the courts of the State for, inter alia,
unlimited money damages.  Fowler, for example, is seeking over
$1.8 million.  While a plaintiff must first file a complaint with an
administrative agen cy, he is free to institute a civil action after
forty-five days have elapsed.  In the present case, the
administrative agency followed its standard policy and closed
Fowler*s complaint when he ‘decided to pursue his claim in a
judicial forum.’  Thus, the judicial action is effectively
independent of any county administrative proceeding.
“In creating a new judicial cause of action between private
individuals, § 27-20(a) encroaches upon an area which heretofore
had been the province of state agencies.  In Maryland, the creation
of new causes of action in the courts has traditionally been done
either by the General Assemb ly or by this Court under its authority
to modify the common law of this State.  See, e.g., Adler v.
American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981)
(recognizing tort actions for abusive discharge).  Furthermore, the
creation of new judicial remedies has traditionally been done on a
statewide basis.
“Abusive employment practices constitute a statewide problem
which has been addressed by the General Assemb ly in Article 49B
of the Maryland Code and by this Court in Adler v. American
Standard Corp., supra.  It is true that the field has not been
preempted by the State, and that home rule counties have
concurrent authority to provide administrative remedies not in
conflict with state law.  Nevertheless, creating a remedy which has
traditionally been the sole province of the General Assemb ly and
the Court of Appeals, to combat a statewide problem such as
employment discrimination, goes beyond a ‘matter[] of purely local
concern.’   State v. Stewart, supra, 152 Md. at 422, 137 A. at 4l.
. . . [Section] 27-20(a) of the Montgom ery County Code affects
‘matters of significant interest to the entire state’ and cannot
qualify as a ‘local law’ under Article XI-A.
“A contrary holding would open the door for counties to enact
a variety of laws in areas which have heretofore been viewed as the
exclusive province of the General Assemb ly and the Court of
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Appeals.  For example, could a county ordinance authorize in the
circuit court and the District Court negligence actions in which
contributory negligence would not be a bar?  Could a county
ordinance provide for breach of contract suits upon ‘contracts’ not
supported by consideration, or where the parol evidence rule is
inapplicable?  We believe that the answer is ‘no.’  These, and many
other legal doctrines, are matters of significant interest to the entire
State, calling for uniform application in state courts.  They are not
proper subject matters for ‘local laws.’”
Later, in Sweeney v. Hartz Mountain Corp., supra, we held that the following
provision of the Howard County Code, enacted by the County Council, was not a local
law and thus violated Article XI-A of the Constitution (319 Md. at 442, 573 A.2d at
33):
“Section 12.217.  Nonexclusive remedy.
“I. Rights: The provisions of this subtitle vest in all persons in
Howard County the right to be free of any practices prohibited by
this subtitle.
“II.  Action at Law: Any person who is aggrieved by an act
prohibited by this subtitle may bring an action in law or in equity
in the Circuit Court for Howard County to seek damages, including
counsel fees, redress of injury or injunctive relief arising out of any
such prohibited act.
“III.  Action at Law Plus Remedies of This Subtitle: The action
in the Circuit Court for Howard County shall be in addition to
pursuing the procedures and seeking the remedies set forth in this
subtitle.”
Except for the provision in the Montgom ery County Code for a 45-day waiting
period, the Montgom ery County provision invalidated in McCrory is the same as § 95-
13 of the Harford County Code.  In substance, the Howard County provision
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4
Subsequent to the McCrory and Sweeney decisions, the General Assembly enacted Maryland
Code (1957, 1998 Repl. Vol.), Art. 49B, §§ 42 and 43, which authorize civil actions based on
discrimination in violation of the Montgomery County, Prince George’s County, Howard County,
and Baltimore County Codes.  The General Assembly has not authorized such an action in Harford
County.
invalidated in the Sweeney case is the same as § 95-13 of the Harford County Code.
The opinions in McCrory and Sweeney compel us to hold that § 95-13 of the Harford
County Code is not a local law and is, therefore, unconstitutional under Article XI-A
of the Maryland Constitution.4
The retaliation damages and the attorney fees awarded to Blackburn, claimed in
count one of the complaint, were based entirely on an asserted right of action under
§ 95-13 of the Harford County Code.  Since § 95-13 is invalid, the Circuit Court had
no jurisdiction over count one and no authority to award damages and attorney fees for
violations of Chapter 95 of the Harford County Code.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIA L
APPEALS REVERSED IN PART AND
AFFIRMED IN PART. CASE REMANDED
TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO
REVERSE IN PART AND AFFIRM IN PART
THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR 
HARFORD 
COUNTY, 
AND 
TO
REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCU IT
COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO DISMISS
COUNT ONE AND TO ENTER JUDGMENT
F O R 
T H E 
D E F E N D A N T 
O N  
T H E
REMAINING COUNTS.  COSTS IN THIS
COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS 
TO 
BE 
P AID 
BY 
THE
RESPONDENT JAMES L. BLACKBURN.