Case Title: Commonwealth v. Tejeda

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12593

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-03-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12593 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ROBINSON TEJEDA. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 4, 2018. - March 29, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher,  
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Sentence.  Joint Enterprise. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 27, 2012. 
 
 
Following review by this court, 473 Mass. 269 (2015), a 
motion to revise and revoke the defendant's sentence was heard 
by Janet L. Sanders, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Dana Alan Curhan for the defendant. 
 
Helle Sachse, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  The issue before us is whether a judge may allow 
a defendant's motion to revise and revoke a sentence under Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 29 (a) (2), as appearing in 474 Mass. 1503 (2016), 
based upon the disparity between the defendant's sentence and a 
2 
 
 
coventurer's sentence subsequently imposed by a different judge.  
Although generally motions to revise and revoke sentences must 
be based on facts as they existed at the time of sentencing, 
today we recognize a limited exception that allows judges to 
consider a coventurer's sentence for the same crime even if 
imposed subsequent to the defendant's sentence where it is 
reasonably apparent that the defendant was less or equally 
culpable than his subsequently-sentenced coventurer.  Because we 
conclude that the circumstances of this case fit that narrow 
exception, we affirm the decision of the judge to grant the 
defendant's motion to revise and revoke his sentence to match 
that of his coventurer. 
  
Background.  After a jury trial, the defendant, Robinson 
Tejeda, was convicted of armed robbery and other charges.1  This 
court affirmed his convictions in Commonwealth v. Tejeda, 473 
Mass. 269, 281-282 (2015).  The defendant's convictions stem 
from his involvement in the robbery of a man from whom the 
defendant and two friends had arranged to buy marijuana.  Id. at 
270-271.  The defendant remained in the vehicle while his two 
coventurers, Christopher Pichardo and Stephane Etienne, entered 
                     
1 The defendant also was convicted of possession of a class 
D controlled substance with intent to distribute, home invasion, 
and murder in the second degree.  Commonwealth v. Tejeda, 473 
Mass. 269, 269-270 (2015).  His motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict was allowed as to the murder 
conviction and affirmed by this court.  Id. at 281-282. 
3 
 
 
a residence with the intention of obtaining the marijuana 
through a ruse, rather than through payment.  Id. at 270.  Their 
robbery led to a gun fight, during which Pichardo was shot and 
killed.  Id.  On May 8, 2014, the defendant received a State 
prison sentence of from six to eight years on the armed robbery 
count. 
 
After a separate trial before a different judge in April 
2015, Etienne received a State prison term of from five to seven 
years for armed robbery.  The defendant subsequently filed a 
motion to revise and revoke based on the disparity between those 
sentences.  The judge agreed with the defendant and reduced his 
sentence to match the sentence of Etienne.2  The Commonwealth 
appealed, and in an unpublished memorandum and order pursuant to 
its rule 1:28, the Appeals Court reversed, concluding insofar as 
relevant here that the judge's decision was improperly based on 
an event that occurred after the defendant had already been 
                     
 
2 In support of her decision, the judge stated: 
 
"I think it's a fairly straightforward issue.  You know, 
frankly I think there's a real value to treating like cases 
alike as much as possible.  It's hard sometimes to decide 
if cases are exactly alike.  There's differences in 
criminal records, there's different facts or different 
levels of involvement.  When it comes down to it, however, 
if I had Mr. Tejeda here and was sentencing him at the same 
time as Mr. Etienne, if they had been tried together, then 
I would have imposed the same sentence.  So I'm going to 
allow the motion and reduce the sentence to the sentence 
that Mr. Etienne received." 
4 
 
 
sentenced.  Commonwealth v. Tejeda, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 1116 
(2018).  We allowed the defendant's application for further 
appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  Rule 29 (a) (2) provides that "[t]he trial 
judge, upon the judge's own motion, or the written motion of a 
defendant, filed within sixty days after the imposition of a 
sentence or within sixty days after issuance of a rescript by an 
appellate court on direct review, may, upon such terms and 
conditions as the judge shall order, revise or revoke such 
sentence if it appears that justice may not have been done."  
Although a trial judge's power under rule 29 (a) "to revise or 
revoke a criminal disposition is severely limited," Commonwealth 
v. Goodwin, 458 Mass. 11, 16 (2010), the rule's purpose is to 
allow a judge to consider whether the sentence imposed was just 
"in light of the facts as they existed at the time of 
sentencing."  Commonwealth v. McCulloch, 450 Mass. 483, 487 
(2008), quoting Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 440 Mass. 147, 152 
(2003).  "In considering whether to allow a motion to revise or 
revoke, 'we have repeatedly and unequivocally held that a judge 
may not take into account conduct of the defendant that occurs 
subsequent to the original sentencing.'"  DeJesus, supra, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Barclay, 424 Mass. 377, 380 (1997).  
However, a judge may take into account a disparity among the 
5 
 
 
sentences of codefendants.  Commonwealth v. Derry, 26 Mass. App. 
Ct. 10, 13 (1988). 
 
The Commonwealth contends that the judge abused her 
discretion in allowing the defendant's motion for two reasons.  
First, the Commonwealth asserts that the defendant's motion was 
inadequate because it was not accompanied by an affidavit and 
therefore should have been denied on procedural grounds.  See 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 29 (b) (party who files "motion pursuant to 
this rule . . . shall file and serve" affidavit in support of 
his or her position).  In DeJesus, 440 Mass. at 152, we 
considered the affidavit requirement and concluded that "to be 
properly filed, a motion to revise or revoke must be accompanied 
by an affidavit, or otherwise indicate the grounds on which it 
is based."  However, where, as here, the factual basis for a 
motion is clear despite the lack of an affidavit, rule 29 (b) is 
not so stringent as to preclude a judge from considering the 
motion. 
 
 The Commonwealth further argues that the judge abused her 
discretion in considering Etienne's sentence because Etienne was 
tried separately and sentenced after the defendant.  Therefore, 
the Commonwealth asserts, the reduction of the defendant's 
sentence was erroneously based on facts other than those 
available at sentencing.  Using our superintendence power, we 
now recognize a limited exception to the requirement that 
6 
 
 
motions to revise and revoke be based solely on facts as they 
existed at the time of sentencing:  a judge may consider a 
disparate sentence of a coventurer, tried separately and 
subsequently, who was convicted of the same crime where, at the 
time of sentencing, it is reasonably apparent that the defendant 
was less culpable than or equally culpable to his or her yet 
untried coventurer. 
 
The underlying principles governing rule 29 motions are 
fairness and justice.  In keeping with these principles, our 
cases emphasizing that facts not in existence at the time of 
sentencing cannot serve as the basis for an altered sentence 
have focused on the conduct of the defendant or a denial of 
parole.  See, e.g., McCulloch, 450 Mass. at 487 (subsequent 
payment of restitution improper consideration in rule 29 
motion); Barclay, 424 Mass. at 380 (positive conduct by 
defendant while incarcerated cannot be considered in rule 29 
motion); Commonwealth v. Amirault, 415 Mass. 112, 115-117 (1993) 
(judge cannot revise and revoke sentence because parole board 
acted contrary to judge's expectations).  We do not depart from 
this well-settled law; a defendant's actions postsentencing are 
best considered by a parole board.3  See Commonwealth v. 
                     
 
3 It remains within a judge's discretion to consider a 
defendant's behavior while on probation in determining whether 
to modify probation conditions.  Goodwin, 458 Mass. at 15-23 
(judge has discretion to add, eliminate, or modify defendant's 
7 
 
 
McGuinness, 421 Mass. 472, 476 n.4 (1995) ("A judge may not 
interfere with the executive function of the parole board by 
using postconviction evidence in an order to revise and 
revoke"). 
 
However, in the circumstances of this case, it would be 
arbitrary to say the judge could have considered the 
coventurer's sentence if it had been imposed before the 
defendant's sentence, but find error in her consideration of the 
sentence solely because it was issued after the defendant's 
sentence.  See Derry, 26 Mass. App. Ct. at 13.  The facts that 
formed the grounds for each sentence were known at trial.  The 
defendant remained in the vehicle while his two coventurers 
entered a residence with the intention of stealing drugs while 
armed with a firearm.  One of the coventurers was killed in a 
shootout.  Certainly, the defendant was culpable; he was 
convicted and sentenced to State prison.  The defendant's 
culpability, however, was not commensurate with that of his 
surviving coventurer who entered the residence and engaged in a 
robbery that devolved into a shootout while the defendant waited 
outside in the vehicle.  The difference between the defendant's 
culpability and that of his coventurer, Etienne, was reasonably 
apparent at the time of the defendant's original sentencing. 
                     
probation conditions based on defendant's performance while on 
probation, be it positive or negative). 
8 
 
 
 
  In the circumstances of this case, the judge did not 
abuse her discretion in considering the coventurer's later-
imposed sentence where the coventurer was more culpable and 
received a more lenient sentence.  The allowance of the 
defendant's motion to revise and revoke his sentence is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.