Case Title: Drake v. Winkler

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-10-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Drake v. Winkler1992 WY 126838 P.2d 1177Case Number: 91-242Decided: 10/08/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Roy DRAKE, 
Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

Brenda 
D. WINKLER, Personal Representative of the Estate of Gayle Frances Stagner, 
Deceased; and Pilot Butte, Inc., a Wyoming Corporation, Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal 
from District Court, FremontCounty, Elizabeth A. Kail, 
J.

F.M. 
Andrews, Jr. of Andrews and Anderson, P.C., Riverton, for appellant.

Joel 
Vincent of Vincent and Vincent, Riverton, for appellee Brenda 
Winkler.

Norman 
Young of Hill, Young and Barton, P.C., Riverton, for appellee Pilot Butte, 
Inc.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, 
URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
appeal.

GOLDEN, Justice.

 [¶1.]     Appellant Roy Drake 
appeals a grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees Brenda D. Winkler 
(personal representative of the estate of Gayle Frances Stagner, deceased) and 
Pilot Butte, Inc., a Wyoming corporation. This dispute concerns 
moneys transferred to both Stagner and Pilot Butte by Drake before Stagner's 
death. Drake claims the moneys were a loan and meant to be 
repaid.

 [¶2.]     We reverse the grant of 
summary judgment for both appellees and remand this case for trial on the 
issues.

ISSUES

 [¶3.]     Appellant Roy Drake 
frames the issues on appeal as follows:

1. Did 
the court err in granting the summary judgment motion of defendant Brenda 
Winkler, Personal Representative of the estate of Gayle Frances Stagner, 
deceased?

2. Did 
the court err in denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment against Pilot 
Butte, Inc.?

 [¶4.]     Appellees Brenda 
Winkler and Pilot Butte, outline the arguments on appeal as 
follows:

1. The 
dead man's statute requires corroboration both of the fact that money was 
transferred to the decedent and her corporation and also the reason why the 
money was transferred.

2. The 
decedent's mere receipt of checks does not sufficiently corroborate the reasons 
for the transfer of money.

3. The 
provisions of the Wyoming dead man's statute apply equally to 
the decedent's closely held corporation.

FACTS

 [¶5.]     Appellant Roy Drake and 
Gayle Frances Stagner were engaged to be married at the time of her death on May 
20, 1990. Before her death, Drake claims to have made various "loans" to Stagner 
from September 20, 1989 to May 2, 1990, with the understanding, through a verbal 
prenuptial agreement, that these moneys would become mutual assets at the time 
of marriage or, in the alternative, be repaid to Drake. Stagner did not sign any 
promissory notes as assurance to repay the funds, nor was there any written 
evidence that the moneys paid were to be considered 
"loans."

 [¶6.]     Sometime before the 
loans began, Drake gave Bruce McMillan approximately $23,000, Drake's share of 
insurance proceeds from a fire at Logan Packing Company. McMillan would then 
disperse money to Drake through drafts on McMillan's account. A total of $23,023 
was transferred to Stagner or her closely held corporation, Pilot Butte. Drake 
claims that various amounts were loaned to the decedent or her corporation on 
the following dates: 

          
September 
20, 1989, $500 cash loaned to Stagner

          
October 9, 
1989, $750 cash loaned to Stagner

          
December 
18, 1989, $1,500 check made to "cash" from the account of Bruce McMillan, 
endorsed by Stagner

          
February 5, 
1990, $5,000 check made to "cash" from the account of Bruce McMillan, endorsed 
by Stagner

          
February 5, 
1990, $2,000 check made to "cash" from the account of Bruce McMillan, endorsed 
by Drake and loaned to Stagner

          
February 
27, 1990, $1,000 check made to "cash" from the account of Bruce McMillan, 
endorsed by Drake and loaned to Stagner

          
February 
27, 1990, $6,000 check made to "cash" from the account of Bruce McMillan, 
deposited into the account of Pilot Butte

          
May 2, 
1990, $3,273 check made to "cash" from the account of Bruce McMillan, endorsed 
by Drake and deposited into the account of Pilot Butte

          
May 2, 
1990, $3,000 check made to "cash" from the account of Bruce McMillan, endorsed 
by Drake and deposited into the account of Pilot Butte

 [¶7.]     At the time the moneys 
were deposited with Pilot Butte, Drake was an officer, though not a shareholder, 
in the corporation. Duane C. Winkler, Secretary/Treasurer of Pilot Butte, 
testified that to his knowledge, no evidence exists to show that there was any 
obligation owed to Pilot Butte by Drake as motivation for the sums 
deposited.

 [¶8.]     On August 1, 1990, 
Drake filed a creditor's claim against the Estate of Gayle Frances Stagner for 
the amount of $23,023 with interest, which was rejected by the personal 
representative of the estate, Brenda D. Winkler, on August 31, 1990. Drake then 
filed a complaint for "money loaned" and "money had and received" against the 
Stagner estate which was answered by denial from appellee Winkler. An amended 
complaint was filed on December 17, 1990 bringing suit also against Pilot Butte, 
claiming $12,273 was paid to the corporation at the request of Stagner. These 
suits were consolidated on February 3, 1990.

 [¶9.]     Winkler and Pilot Butte 
filed motions for summary judgment on May 22, 1991 and July 3, 1991, 
respectively. Appellees contend that no written documentation exists evidencing 
Stagner's promise to repay money to Drake and that Wyo. Stat. § 1-12-102 (1988), 
requires a claim made against a party incapable of testifying to be 
corroborated. On August 26, 1991, Drake also filed a motion for summary 
judgment. The court granted appellees' motions on September 30, 1991. Drake 
appeals this order.

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 [¶10.]  Our standard of review for summary 
judgment is well known. As we have often stated:

     On appeal from a grant 
of summary judgment, we review the judgment in the same light as the district 
court, using the same materials and following the same standards. The party 
moving for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine 
issues of material fact exist and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. We have defined a material fact as 
one which, if proved, would have the effect of establishing or refuting an 
essential element of the claim of defense asserted by the parties. We review 
the record from the vantage point most favorable to the nonmoving party, giving 
that party the benefit of every favorable inference which may be drawn from the 
facts in the materials submitted in the record.

Home 
Ins. Co. v. Elston Equip. Co., 810 P.2d 992, 993 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting Stephenson 
v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 779 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Wyo. 1989)) (emphasis 
added).

DISCUSSION

 [¶11.]  Appellees contend that Wyoming's "Dead Man's 
Statute" is controlling at this stage of litigation. It 
provides:

     In an action or suit 
by or against a person who from any cause is incapable of testifying, or by or 
against a trustee, executor, administrator, heir or other representative of the 
person incapable of testifying, no 
judgment or decree founded on uncorroborated testimony shall be rendered in 
favor of a party whose interests are adverse to the person incapable of 
testifying or his trustee, executor, administrator, heir or other 
representative. In any such action or suit, if the adverse party testifies, 
all entries, memorandum and declarations by the party incapable of testifying 
made while he was capable, relevant to the matter in issue, may be received in 
evidence.

Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-12-102 (1988) (emphasis added).

 [¶12.]  Though the parties address the 
application of this statute to the evidence or lack of evidence at issue in this 
case, the real question is not the statute's application, but the propriety of 
the summary judgment order. In other words, the question is whether the movants 
are able to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to the reason for the disposition of Drake's 
money to appellees. As acknowledged previously by this 
court,

[t]he 
motion for summary judgment is a drastic remedy and one which is designed to 
pierce the formal allegations and reach the merits of the controversy - but only 
when no material issue of fact is present. Although both parties are obligated 
to come forward with their evidence, the burden is on the moving party to 
demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material 
fact.

Cordova 
v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625, 639 (Wyo. 1986) 
(quoting Weaver v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 609 P.2d 984, 986-87 (Wyo. 1980)) (citations 
omitted). See also, Hozian v. Weathermon, 821 P.2d 1297, 1299 (Wyo. 
1991).

 [¶13.]  As appellant states, appellees do not 
dispute that the moneys were received by Stagner and Pilot Butte, nor do they 
provide any evidence that tends to support that the moneys were anything other than a loan. 
Appellees' entire argument relies on appellant's inability to produce corroborated evidence that the moneys 
were intended as a loan. We perceive that the burden here has been misplaced. It 
is the movant's obligation to show that no genuine issue of material fact 
exists, not to rely on the evidence or lack of evidence of the nonmovant. This 
court has stated repeatedly:

[U]ntil 
the moving party has established with its supporting evidence that there are no 
genuine issues of material fact requiring a trial, the nonmoving party has no 
obligation to support his pleadings with any evidence.

Home 
Ins. Co., 810 P.2d  at 993 (quoting Matthews v. Wyoming Dep't of Agric., 719 P.2d 216, 220 (Wyo. 
1986)).

If the 
moving party does not refute the averment of the nonmoving party, the nonmoving 
party may rely on its averment and has no obligation to present any factual 
support.

Alewine 
v. State Dep't of Health and Social Serv., 803 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Wyo. 1991) (citing Jung-Leonczynska v. Steup, 782 P.2d 578, 582 (Wyo. 
1989)).

 [¶14.]  The requirement of corroboration of 
evidence against a party incapable of testifying under the statute should not 
come into play at the summary judgment stage. At this point we debate only the 
existence or nonexistence of material facts surrounding the 
controversy.

 [¶15.]  Offering no evidence to dispute Drake's 
claim or show that the moneys were anything other than loans, appellees Winkler 
and Pilot Butte allege only that Drake cannot corroborate his claim. All 
appellees have done at this stage is to "arm [themselves] with ordnance to 
attack him at trial." Home Ins. Co., 810 P.2d  at 995. Whether Drake's evidence 
to support his claims is admissible under the Dead Man's statute remains for the 
trial court to determine.

 [¶16.]  In reversing appellees' grant of summary 
judgment, we cannot hold that Drake's motion for summary judgment should have 
been granted. Drake has not offered evidence to support his theory of a loan to 
the exclusion of any other possible theory. We hold that appellees' grant of 
summary judgment is reversed and the case remanded to 
trial.

CARDINE, J., files a partially 
dissenting and specially concurring opinion.

CARDINE, Justice, partially dissenting 
and specially concurring.

 [¶17.]  The rationale of the court in its opinion 
reversing summary judgment in this case, is that the prohibition of the dead 
man's statute preventing entry of judgment upon uncorroborated testimony is 
available to the appellee at trial but not at the summary judgment stage of the 
proceeding. Thus, the court states in its opinion that:

     The requirement of 
corroboration of evidence against a party incapable of testifying under the 
statute should not come into play at the summary judgment 
stage.

Maj. 
op. at 1180. Why should something which is purely a matter of law, W.S. 
1-12-102, the dead man's statute, not be available at the summary judgment 
stage? The court makes this astonishing statement without citation of supporting 
authority. The statement is squarely contrary to W.R.C.P. 56, which provides in 
paragraph (c) as follows:

The 
judgment * * * shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law. [emphasis added]

 [¶18.]  I would hold that the parties are 
entitled to have their case decided at the summary judgment stage on all of the 
law then existing.

 [¶19.]  The court then continues as 
follows:

     Offering no evidence 
to dispute Drake's claim or show that the moneys were anything other than loans, 
appellees Winkler and Pilot Butte allege only that Drake cannot corroborate his 
claim.

Maj. 
op. at 1180. First, appellee is not required to offer evidence that the monies 
were "other than loans." Appellee is only required to set forth the facts, which 
are that money was transferred with nothing to show the transfer was either a 
loan or a gift. Second, we know that Drake cannot defeat summary judgment by 
claiming that the monies transferred were loans. A claim made in pleading will 
not defeat summary judgment. Simply stated, a claim is not enough. Referring 
again to W.R.C.P. 56(e), we find that

[s]upporting 
and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence * * *. [emphasis added]

 [¶20.]  Neither party can allege, nor did they 
allege, facts that would be admissible in evidence to corroborate Drake's claim. 
Nevertheless, the court proposes to reverse summary judgment and force the 
parties to trial. At trial what surely would happen is that Drake would begin to 
testify about an oral prenuptial agreement and an oral loan repayment agreement 
with deceased appellee Stagner. Appellees would object to the testimony as 
inadmissible under the dead man's statute. The dead man's statute, W.S. 
1-12-102, provides:

In an 
action or suit by or against a person who from any cause is incapable of 
testifying, or by or against a trustee, executor, administrator, heir or other 
representative of the person incapable of testifying, no judgment or decree 
founded on uncorroborated testimony shall be rendered in favor of a party whose 
interests are adverse to the person incapable of testifying or his trustee, 
executor, administrator, heir or other representative. In any such action or 
suit, if the adverse party testifies, all entries, memorandum and declarations 
by the party incapable of testifying made while he was capable, relevant to the 
matter in issue, may be received in evidence.

The 
objection should be sustained; but if the testimony were allowed, the case would 
still be over, for it would be uncorroborated testimony against a person 
incapable of testifying (in this case, Stagner who is deceased). It would be 
over at trial, but it should be over now at summary stage, for the parties do 
not even contend that there is a dispute in the material facts or in the 
law.

 [¶21.]  The undisputed facts are that monies of 
appellant were transferred to appellee Stagner and appellee Pilot Butte, a 
corporation. There was $10,750 transferred to appellee Stagner and $12,273 
transferred to Pilot Butte. There is no other writing than the transfers 
themselves of the money. The money transfers could be a gift, or they could be a 
loan. Drake and Stagner were living together and planning to be married at the 
time. Stagner died May 20, 1990. Appellant proposes to establish, by testimony, 
that there was an oral prenuptial agreement and an oral agreement that the 
monies transferred were loans to be repaid. The dead man's statute prohibits 
corroboration in this fashion. Summary judgment should be 
affirmed.

 [¶22.]  Pilot Butte, a corporation finds itself in a 
different posture. It is not a "person" incapable of testifying under the dead 
man's statute. At this stage of the proceeding, it is not entitled to the 
prohibition of the dead man's statute. Whether it may later appear that the dead 
man's statute comes into play because the corporate entity may be ignored or 
that the corporation is or is not a validly organized, existing and viable 
corporate entity, we cannot say. At this stage, we cannot say as a matter of 
fact or of law that summary judgment in favor of Pilot Butte should have been 
entered.

 [¶23.]  Therefore, I would affirm the summary 
judgment in favor of appellee Stagner and reverse the summary judgment in favor 
of Pilot Butte.