Case Title: Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Barker

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-10-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
ARKANSAS STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION v. 
Roland A. BARKER, Jr., and Barbara Barker,
and Union State Bank, Mortgagee

96-227                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered October 28, 1996


1.   Eminent domain -- recognized formulas for measuring just
     compensation -- measure of damages in partial-taking cases. --
     A landowner who has his land condemned is entitled to just
     compensation; however, this does not mean that a landowner is
     entitled to be unjustly enriched at the expense of the public
     purse; there are three recognized formulas for measuring just
     compensation in partial-taking cases:  (1) the value of the
     part taken; (2) the value of the part taken plus the damages
     to the remainder; and (3) the before- and after-value rule;
     the difference between the market value of the whole tract
     before the taking and the market value of that part which
     remains after the taking, less any enhancement peculiar to the
     lands, has long been the measure of damages in partial-taking
     cases.

2.   Eminent domain -- error to allow deduction for drive
     installation and maintenance in reaching after-taking value --
     case reversed and remanded for new trial. -- Where, in his
     appraisal report, a witness used three comparable sales to
     determine after-taking value, but from each of the three
     comparable sales he deducted $10,300 for installation and
     maintenance of a circular driveway in order to reach the
     after-taking value, the trial court erred in allowing evidence
     of the driveway cost to be introduced; the case was reversed
     and remanded for a new trial.  

3.   Eminent domain -- evidence of appraisal of nearby tract
     admitted at trial -- sale made by condemnor not considered a
     voluntary transaction -- admission was in error. -- Appellees'
     cross-examination concerning an appraisal of a nearby tract
     was erroneously allowed into evidence where the tract had not
     been used by either party as a comparable sale and thus was
     not relevant and where the appraisal was prepared for the
     condemnation offer on the other tract; offers to buy are not
     competent evidence of the market value; a sale made by a
     condemnor is not deemed a voluntary transaction; sales to one
     having the right of eminent domain do not ordinarily fall in
     the category of voluntary sales in the ordinary course of
     business and, consequently, are not fair criteria of value for
     purposes of comparable sales in determining the just
     compensation due in eminent-domain actions. 


4.   Eminent domain -- measure of damages in partial-taking cases -
     - order of remittitur inappropriate. -- The measure of damages
     in partial-taking cases is the difference between the market
     value of the whole tract before the taking and the market
     value of that part which remains after the taking, less any
     enhancements peculiar to the lands; appellant's request for
     instructions for remittitur in the amount of its appraisal and
     the amount of its deposit was declined, and, instead, the
     court ordered a new trial; the appropriate amount of damages
     was still of such question that an order of remittitur was not
     appropriate. 


     Appeal from Union Circuit Court; David F. Guthrie, Judge;
reversed and remanded.
     Robert L. Wilson, Chief Counsel and Barbara A. Griffin, Staff
Attorney, for appellant.
     Ronald L. Griggs, for appellees.

     Robert H. Dudley, Justice.  
     In January 1994, the Arkansas State Highway Commission
condemned .47 acre in fee, along with the access routes, belonging
to Roland and Barbara Barker and Union State Bank, mortgagee, in
order to widen Highway 167 to three lanes south of El Dorado.  The
condemned land was a part of a 10.16-acre tract purchased by the
Barkers in 1992 for $20,000.  A little over seven acres of the
tract were timberland and not suitable for industrial or commercial
use, and three acres were suitable for commercial or industrial
use.  The .47 acre condemned is in the three acres that are
suitable for commercial or industrial use.  Before the taking, the
Barkers constructed a metal building in the northeast corner of the
three acres.  The .47 acre is between the metal building and the
highway.  At the time of the taking, the Commission deposited with
the court the amount it estimated to be just compensation, $1,450. 
The Barkers denied that $1,450 was just compensation and asked for
adequate compensation.  Ultimately, a jury returned a verdict for
$15,100.  The Commission appeals.  We reverse and remand for a new
trial.
     The Commission timely filed a motion in limine asking the
court to prohibit, among other things, the introduction of evidence
proving the cost to cure damages to the residual property, if the
cost was in excess of the decrease in the market value of the
property taken and if the cost constituted a substantial betterment
to the property.  In its motion the Commission specifically alleged
that the Barkers' appraisal report contained two estimates, one for
$6,800 and one for $7,875, which when averaged was $7,300, for
installation of a circular drive on the residual tract.  An
additional $3,000 was added for maintenance of the circular
driveway, which brought the total betterments to $10,300.  The
Commission pointed out that, before the taking, the tract had
sixteen feet of unpaved driveways that provided access to the
highway and that the Commission's construction plans, filed with
the court, required it to replace the unpaved driveways with two
forty-foot asphalt driveways.  Finally, the Commission alleged that
if the utility of the residual property was diminished by the
taking, that loss constituted the element of damage, and not the
cost of a circular driveway, which was a betterment and which cost
far more than the loss to the remaining property, especially when
the Commission intended to replace sixteen-feet-wide unpaved
driveways with forty-feet paved driveways.  On appeal, the
Commission contends that the trial court erred in allowing evidence
of the $10,300 loss to be introduced.  The Barkers do not contend
that evidence of the cost to cure damages was admissible, but
rather they respond that the Commission is "simply mistaken that
testimony was offered as costs to cure damages which constitute a
betterment on the residual property."  We hold the trial court
erred in allowing the evidence.
     A landowner who has his land condemned is entitled to just
compensation.  City of El Dorado v. Scruggs, 113 Ark. 239, 168 S.W. 846 (1914).  However, this does not mean that a landowner is
entitled to be unjustly enriched at the expense of the public
purse.  See United States v. 158.24 Acres of Land, 696 F.2d 559,
564 (8th Cir. 1982).  There are three recognized formulas for
measuring just compensation in partial-taking cases:  (1) the value
of the part taken; (2) the value of the part taken plus the damages
to the remainder; (3) the before- and after-value rule.  Young v.
Arkansas State Highway Comm'n, 242 Ark. 812,