Case Title: Kingsbur v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 031016

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2004-03-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
LAFATE KINGSBUR, III 
 
v.  Record No. 031016 
 OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
March 5, 2004 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
Lafate Kingsbur, III, appeals the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals affirming his conviction for possession of a 
firearm by a convicted felon in violation of Code § 18.2-
308.2.  Kingsbur contends that the Commonwealth failed to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the handgun he possessed 
qualified as a firearm under the statute.  Because we conclude 
that the trial court's factual determination that the handgun 
was a firearm was not plainly wrong or without evidence to 
support it, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
FACTS 
 
On the evening of October 1, 2001, two officers of the 
Portsmouth Police Department saw Kingsbur outside Swanson 
Homes, a Portsmouth housing project.  One of the officers saw 
a white grocery bag "wrapped up" in Kingsbur's hand.  When the 
officers approached, Kingsbur put the bag down next to a trash 
can.  The officers told Kingsbur that he was under arrest for 
trespassing. 
 
Suspecting that Kingsbur had a weapon or drugs, the 
officers retrieved the white bag and found a handgun inside.  
Kingsbur told the officers he had found the gun in a park 
earlier and was "trying to find somewhere to throw it down."  
Kingsbur testified that he wanted to dispose of the handgun 
because he did not want it to fall into a child's hands and 
that he knew the gun did not work because the "chambers . . . 
fell off" when he picked up the gun.  He also testified that 
he put the gun down by the trash can because he did not want 
to get caught with it.  There were no bullets in the gun.  
Kingsbur was charged with a violation of Code § 18.2-308.2. 
 
The certificate of analysis admitted as an exhibit at 
Kingsbur’s bench trial stated that the gun was a Davis 
Industries, Model P-32, .32 caliber automatic pistol.  The 
certificate also stated that the pistol "does not function and 
could not be test fired" because there were ten missing parts.  
Kingsbur argued that the handgun’s state of disrepair rendered 
it inoperable and, therefore, that the Commonwealth failed to 
show that the handgun he possessed was a firearm within the 
meaning of Code § 18.2-308.2. 
The trial court applied the Court of Appeals' opinion in 
Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 312, 549 S.E.2d 641 
(2001) (en banc).  In that opinion, the Court of Appeals held 
that for purposes of Code § 18.2-308.2 a "firearm" was an 
 
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instrument "made with the purpose to expel a projectile by 
gunpowder or other explosion" and that proof of present 
operability was not required.  Id. at 321-22, 549 S.E.2d at 
645-46.  Accordingly, the trial court rejected Kingsbur's 
motion to strike the Commonwealth's evidence based on the 
inoperability of the handgun.  Kingsbur was convicted of 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and sentenced to 
five years in prison. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed Kingsbur's conviction based 
on this Court's opinion in Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 
573, 584, 562 S.E.2d 139, 145 (2002).  Kingsbur v. 
Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 307, 311, 579 S.E.2d 357, 359 
(2003). 
DISCUSSION 
 
Kingsbur argues here, as he did in the Court of Appeals, 
that the trial court should have granted his motion to strike 
the Commonwealth's evidence because the evidence failed to 
show that Kingsbur possessed a firearm within the meaning of 
Code § 18.2-308.2.  Kingsbur asserts that, under this Court’s 
opinion in Armstrong, a firearm that has lost the 
characteristic of firing a projectile by means of an explosion 
is no longer a firearm for purposes of the statute.  Here the 
evidence showed that the handgun at issue could not be test 
fired, did not function, was missing parts, and "came apart" 
 
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in Kingsbur's hands when he first picked it up.  These facts, 
Kingsbur asserts, show that the handgun was in such a state of 
disrepair that it ceased to function as a firearm within the 
meaning of Code § 18.2-308.2.  Kingsbur also asserted that it 
was the burden of the Commonwealth to prove that the handgun 
had not lost its characteristics as a firearm. 
In Armstrong, we approved the holding of the Court of 
Appeals that a firearm is an instrument which was "designed, 
made, and intended to expel a projectile by means of an 
explosion."  263 Va. at 585, 562 S.E.2d at 146.  In a footnote 
we stated:  
Common sense and experience leave no room for 
doubt that an instrument originally designed, 
made, and intended to expel a projectile by force 
of an explosion can lose this characteristic in 
many ways such that it would no longer be fairly 
considered a firearm. 
 
Id. at 584 n.6, 562 S.E.2d at 145 n.6.  This statement, upon 
which Kingsbur relies, refers to exceptional circumstances and 
not simply a showing of disrepair that might preclude 
expelling a projectile by explosion at a particular point in 
time.  Id. at 584, 562 S.E.2d at 146. 
 
Contrary to Kingsbur’s assertions, the Commonwealth did 
not have the burden of disproving that the handgun lost its 
characteristics as a firearm.  The Commonwealth had the burden 
of presenting prima facie evidence on all elements of the 
 
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crime charged and, once the Commonwealth met that burden, 
Kingsbur had the option of presenting evidence raising a 
reasonable doubt regarding one or more of those elements.  
However, the ultimate burden of persuasion always remained on 
the Commonwealth and if, considering the evidence as a whole, 
both for the Commonwealth and Kingsbur, there existed a 
reasonable doubt of his guilt, he was entitled to be acquitted 
of the offense.  See Dobson v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 71, 74-
75, 531 S.E.2d 569, 571 (2000); Hodge v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 
338, 342, 228 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1976). 
 
We therefore turn to Kingsbur's challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence.  Applying well-known principles 
of appellate review, we view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth and will not set aside the 
verdict unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to 
support it.  Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 281-82, 427 
S.E.2d 411, 421 (1993). 
 
Here, the Commonwealth was required to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the handgun in Kingsbur's possession was 
designed, made, and intended to fire or expel a projectile by 
means of an explosion.  It was not obligated to prove that the 
handgun was operable.  Armstrong, 263 Va. at 584, 562 S.E.2d 
at 145.  The certificate of analysis identified the specific 
model of the handgun.  Kingsbur considered it a handgun 
 
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because he did not want a child to "[get] ahold of it" and, as 
a convicted felon, he knew he should not get caught with it.  
This evidence supports a finding that the handgun Kingsbur 
possessed was designed, made, and intended to expel a 
projectile by means of an explosion. 
The evidence Kingsbur cites to support his position falls 
far short of the exceptional circumstance identified in 
Armstrong.  The evidence of inoperability because of the 
missing parts indicates in this case, as it did in Armstrong, 
that the handgun could have been repaired.  Id. at 584, 562 
S.E.2d at 146.  Kingsbur's testimony that the chambers of the 
handgun "just fell off of it" is insufficient to support a 
finding that the handgun in question lost its characteristic 
as a firearm.  Furthermore, the arresting officer testified 
that the handgun appeared to be "intact," and the certificate 
of analysis did not reflect that the handgun was in more than 
one piece. 
 
For the above reasons, we hold that the trial court did 
not err in concluding that the handgun in issue was a firearm 
for purposes of Code § 18.2-308.2 and in refusing to grant 
Kingsbur's motion to strike. 
 
Accordingly the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
affirmed. 
Affirmed.