Case Title: Curtis Leon Heggs v. State of Florida Rehearing Opinion Revised

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2000-05-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida
   
____________
No. SC93851
____________
CURTIS LEON HEGGS,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[February 17, 2000]
REVISED OPINION
PER CURIAM
We have for review a circuit court judgment certified as having a great  effect
on the proper administration of justice throughout Florida and as requiring
immediate resolution by this Court.  See Heggs v. State, 718 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1998).  Specifically, the Second District has requested that this Court
determine whether chapter 95-184, Laws of Florida, is unconstitutional as violative
of the single subject rule contained in article III, section 6 of the Florida
Constitution.  We have jurisdiction.  See Art. V, § 3(b)(5), Fla. Const.  As we
-2-
explain more fully, based on our analysis in State v. Thompson, 25 Fla. L. Weekly
S1 (Fla. Dec. 22, 1999), we hold that chapter 95-184 violates the single subject rule
and invalidate the law in its entirety.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND IN THE PRESENT CASE
In December 1995, the State of Florida (the State) filed an information
against Curtis Leon Heggs (Heggs), charging him with committing an armed robbery
on November 2, 1995, in violation of section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995). 
Later that December, the State filed a second information, charging Heggs with
committing an additional armed robbery with the offense occurring on October 24,
1995, in violation of the same statute.  On September 4, 1996, a jury found Heggs
guilty of the armed robbery offense charged in the second information, and later that
same day, Heggs entered a written plea of guilty to the armed robbery charged in the
first information.
Subsequently, on November 1, 1996, the trial court sentenced Heggs on each
armed robbery offense to 132 months (11 years) in prison, with such sentences to
run concurrently.  The trial court calculated Heggs' sentences based on the 1995
sentencing guidelines--which were the 1994 sentencing guidelines as amended by
chapter 95-184, Laws of Florida--because he committed his offenses on or after
October 1, 1995.  See Ch. 95-184, §§ 2-6, at 1678-98, Laws of Fla.; §
1 This 1994 guidelines calculation is taken directly from the opinion below, in which the
Second District stated, "It is not disputed that Heggs's sentencing range under the 1994 guidelines
would be 55.8 months to 93.5 months."  Heggs, 718 So. 2d at 264.  Indeed, this statement is
consistent with the calculation contained in Heggs' initial brief to the Second District.  Heggs'
initial brief to this Court, however, asserts that the "guidelines range under the 1994 guidelines
would be 44.8 to 93.5 months."  Initial Brief at 4.  Accepting either calculation as true, the
maximum sentence under the 1994 guidelines would have been 93.5 months, which clearly is less
than the 132-month sentences Heggs received.
2 Although the trial court did not specify the year of the statute under which it imposed the
three-year minimum mandatory prison terms, it is clear that the 1995 version of the statute, as
amended by chapter 95-184, Laws of Florida, would apply to Heggs because he committed his
offenses on or after October 1, 1995.  See Ch. 95-184, § 19, at 1708-10, Laws of Fla. (amending
section 775.087, applicable to offenses committed on or after October 1, 1995).  Thus,
theoretically, Heggs' three-year minimum mandatory prison terms would be impacted by this
Court's ruling as to the constitutionality of chapter 95-184.  Practically, however, this Court's
ruling on chapter 95-184 will not entitle Heggs to relief from his minimum mandatory prison
terms because he would have received such terms under the 1993 version of section 775.087(2). 
See § 775.087(2), Fla. Stat. (1993).
-3-
921.001(4)(b)2., Fla. Stat. (1995); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.702; Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.991.  Under the 1995 guidelines, the permitted sentencing range for Heggs'
offenses was 83.2 to 138.7 months, while under the 1994 guidelines, the permitted
sentencing range for these offenses would have been 55.8 to 93.5 months.1  Further,
because Heggs carried a firearm during the commission of the armed robberies, each
of his sentences included a three-year minimum prison term in accordance with
section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (1995).2  After imposition of these sentences,
Heggs filed a consolidated appeal from both his trial and plea cases on November
18, 1996.
On appeal before the Second District, Heggs asserted in his initial brief that
-4-
both of his sentences were either "illegal" or "unlawful" because chapter 95-184
violates the single subject rule contained in article III, section 6 of the Florida
Constitution, which provides, in pertinent part, that "[e]very law shall embrace but
one subject and matter properly connected therewith, and the subject shall be briefly
expressed in the title."  Even though Heggs had not raised the single subject rule
challenge in the trial court, he claimed in his brief that the challenge should be
considered for the first time on appeal under the doctrine of fundamental error.  The
Second District agreed with Heggs and stated:
Heggs did not challenge the constitutionality of the
sentencing guidelines in the circuit court.  Even so, his
increased sentence[s] under the 1995 guidelines
implicate[] a fundamental due process liberty interest. 
See State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1993). 
Consequently, we may review this issue of fundamental
error on appeal.  See Id. at 4; see also § 924.051(3), Fla.
Stat. (Supp. 1996).
Heggs, 718 So. 2d at 264.  On the merits, the Second District declined to rule on the
single subject rule challenge, but instead certified the issue as having a great effect
on the proper administration of justice throughout Florida, requiring immediate
resolution by this Court.  See id.  Before making this certification, however, the
Second District observed:
Heggs'[] challenge to chapter 95-184 presents an
issue very similar to that raised in Thompson v. State, 708
-5-
So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), review granted, 717 So.
2d 538 (Fla. 1998).  In Thompson, we held that chapter
95-182, which addressed violent career criminal
sentencing, was unconstitutional because the enactment
embraced civil and criminal provisions that had no
"natural or logical connection."  That chapter's
objectionable civil provisions addressing domestic
violence injunctions also appear in chapter 95-184, at
issue here.  As we pointed out in Thompson, these three
provisions began as bills in the Florida House of
Representatives, failed to pass, and later were engrafted
onto several Senate Bills: SB 168, which became chapter
95-182 (the subject of Thompson); SB 172, which became
chapter 95-184 (the subject of this case); and SB 2216,
which became chapter 95-195.
Following our own precedent in Thompson, we
believe that chapter 95-184 violates the single subject rule
because it, too, embraces civil and criminal provisions that
are not logically connected.  The two subjects "are
designed to accomplish separate and dissociated objects
of legislative effort."  708 So. 2d at 317 (quoting State ex
rel. Landis v. Thompson, 120 Fla. 860, 892-893, 163 So.
270, 283 (1935)).  Likewise, as in Thompson, here there
is no legislative statement of intent to implement
comprehensive legislation to solve a crisis.  See
Thompson, 708 So. 2d at 315.
Heggs, 718 So. 2d at 264.  Heggs is now before this Court for determination of the
issue certified.
II. STANDING TO CHALLENGE CHAPTER 95-184 ON
SINGLE SUBJECT RULE GROUNDS
In the decision below, the Second District determined that the window period
for challenging chapter 95-184 on single subject rule grounds opened on October 1,
3 We must clarify the Second District's determination, however, as applied to persons
affected by other changes made by chapter 95-184.  Specifically, while some sections of chapter
95-184 became effective on October 1, 1995, e.g., chapter 95-184, section 6, at 1693, Laws of
Florida, other sections became effective on June 8, 1995, when the Governor approved the law. 
See Ch. 95-184, § 40, at 1724 ("Except as otherwise provided herein, this act shall take effect
upon becoming a law."); Parker v. Evening News Pub. Co., 54 Fla. 482, 483-84, 44 So. 718, 718
(1907); Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 91-63 (1991).  Thus, depending on which section of chapter 95-184
impacts the person challenging that chapter law on single subject rule grounds, the applicable
window period could open on June 8, 1995, or on October 1, 1995.
-6-
1995.  See Heggs, 718 So. 2d at 264 n.1.  We agree with this determination as
applied to persons such as Heggs who claim that their guidelines sentences are
invalid due to the changes in the guidelines within chapter 95-184.3   Thus, the
applicable window period in this case opened on October 1, 1995, and Heggs
clearly committed his offenses after that date.
The Second District also determined that the window period for challenging
chapter 95-184 on single subject rule grounds closed on May 24, 1997, the date on
which chapter 97-97, Laws of Florida, reenacted the provisions contained in chapter
95-184 as part of the Legislature's biennial adoption of the Florida Statutes.  See
Heggs, 718 So. 2d at 264 n.1 (relying on State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla.
1993)).  However, in Bortel v. State, 743 So. 2d 595, 597 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), the
Fourth District certified conflict with the Second District's determination in Heggs
regarding the close of the window period.  Specifically, the Bortel Court held that
the defendant in that case, who committed his offenses between October 26, 1996,
-7-
and November 24, 1996, did not have standing to challenge his guidelines sentences
because "the sentencing guidelines at issue here were reenacted in 1996 pursuant to
Chapter 96-388, Laws of Florida, with an effective date of October 1, 1996, thereby
curing the constitutional defect raised in this case."  Bortel, 743 So. 2d at 596
(relying on Salters v. State, 731 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), and Scott v. State,
721 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)).  We note that whether the window period
closed on October 1, 1996, or on May 24, 1997, in the present case Heggs would
still have standing to raise his single subject rule challenge because he committed
the offenses at issue on October 24 and November 2, 1995.  In light of this fact, we
decline to rule in this case as to when the window period closed for persons
claiming that their guidelines sentences are invalid due to the amendments affected
by chapter 95-184.
III. HEGGS' FAILURE TO RAISE HIS SINGLE SUBJECT
RULE CHALLENGE IN THE TRIAL COURT
Even though Heggs did not assert a single subject rule challenge against
chapter 95-184 in the trial court, the Second District determined that it could review
such a challenge for the first time on appeal in this case because "his increased
sentence[s] under the 1995 guidelines implicate[] a fundamental due process liberty
interest."  Heggs, 718 So. 2d at 264.  Upon review, it is clear that the sentences
4 We requested supplemental briefing from the parties regarding whether sections
924.051(3) and 921.051(4), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996), which are portions of the Criminal
Appeal Reform Act (the Act), and this Court's rules implementing the Act (Implementing Rules),
apply in this case, and if so, what effect the Act and Implementing Rules would have.  At oral
argument, the Assistant Attorney General representing the State conceded that even if the Act and
Implementing Rules apply to this case, Heggs would still be able to assert his single subject rule
challenge against chapter 95-184 for the first time on appeal.  Based on the facts of this case, we
agree with the State's concession and thus do not determine whether the Act and Implementing
Rules apply to persons who committed their offenses before those laws became effective.  Cf.
Nelson v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly S250, S251 (Fla. May 27, 1999) (declining to determine
whether a portion of the Act applied where offense was committed before the Act became
effective but trial occurred after, finding that even if the Act applied, the result would be the
same), cert. denied, 68 U.S.L.W. 3459 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2000) (No. 99-7076).
-8-
imposed on Heggs under the 1995 guidelines are longer (by over three years each)
than they would have been had he been sentenced pursuant to the 1994 guidelines. 
Accordingly, we agree with the Second District that, under this Court's reasoning in
Johnson, see 616 So. 2d at 2, Heggs' single subject rule challenge against chapter
95-184 is reviewable for the first time on appeal.4  Therefore, we now turn to the
merits of Heggs' challenge.
IV. SINGLE SUBJECT RULE ANALYSIS
The single subject rule challenge against chapter 95-184 in this case is almost
identical to the challenge presented in State v. Thompson, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S1, in
which the defendant raised a single subject rule challenge to chapter 95-182, Laws
of Florida.   Specifically, as noted by the Second District below, see Heggs, 718 So.
2d at 264, the same three provisions dealing with domestic violence are located in
-9-
chapter 95-182, the chapter law considered in Thompson, and chapter 95-184, the
chapter law at issue here.  Compare Ch. 95-182, §§ 8- 10, at 1673-75 (amending
section 741.31, creating section 768.35, and amending section 784.046,
respectively), with Ch. 95-184, §§ 36-38, at 1722-24 (same).  Further, the domestic
violence provisions contained in chapters 95-182 and 95-184 were added on the
same day, May 4, 1995, on the floor of the House of Representatives.  See Fla. H.R.
Jour. 1207-12 (Reg. Sess. 1995) (adding the domestic violence provisions, among
other things, to Senate Bill 168); Fla. H.R. Jour. 1230-31 (Reg. Sess. 1995) (adding
the domestic violence provisions, among other things, to Committee Substitute for
Senate Bill 172).  The Second District has expressed that the reasoning in
Thompson should apply in the present case, and thus chapter 95-184, like chapter
95-182, should be found unconstitutional as violative of the single subject rule.  See
Heggs, 718 So. 2d at 264.  After considering the various provisions of chapter 95-
184, the chapter law's legislative history, prior case law in the single subject rule
context, as well as the similarities between this case and Thompson, we agree with
the Second District and hold that chapter 95-184 violates the single subject rule.
Chapter 95-184 is characterized as "[a]n act relating to the justice system." 
Ch. 95-184, at 1676, Laws of Fla.  The chapter law is comprised of 40 sections. 
See id.  Section 1 provides that "[s]ections 2 through 36 of this act may be cited as
-10-
the 'Crime Control Act of 1995'"; section 39 is a severability clause; and section 40
provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided herein, this Act shall take effect upon
becoming law."  See id. at 1724.  Therefore, there are 36 substantive sections
contained in chapter 95-184.  These substantive sections may be summarized as
follows:
Sections 2-7.  These sections amend various
portions of chapter 921, Florida Statutes, relating to
criminal sentencing guidelines.  See Ch. 95-184, §§ 2-7,
at 1678-99.  These are the sections of chapter 95-184 that
primarily affect Heggs.
Sections 8-13.  These sections amend various
substantive criminal statutes.  See id. §§ 8-13, at 1699-
1703.  Specifically, section 8 amends the burglary statute
(section 810.02) to create new penalty levels for the
offense; section 9 amends the theft statute (section
812.014) to differentiate between levels of the offense;
section 10 amends subsection (2) of 538.23 (dealing with
secondary metals recyclers) to correspond with the
changes to the theft statute; section 11 amends the retail
and farm theft statute (section 812.015) to reflect the
changes in the theft statute; section 12 amends the
criminal justice information statutes (section 943.051) to
reflect the changes in the theft statute; and section 13
amends the accessory after the fact statute (section
773.03) by establishing new penalty degrees of the
offense.
Sections 14-25.  These sections amend various
statutes addressing substantive crimes and sentencing
enhancement, in part to reflect changes in the sentencing
guidelines established in sections 2 through 7.  See Ch.
-11-
95-184, §§ 14-25, at 1703-16.  In theory, section 19
impacts Heggs’ three-year minimum sentence terms, see
supra note 2, while section 25 amends another portion of
chapter 921 relating to sentencing alternatives (section
921.187).
Sections 26-27.  These sections amend the gain-
time and control release statutes, respectively, in part to
reflect changes in the sentencing guidelines.  See Ch. 95-
184, §§ 26-27, at 1716-18.
Sections 28-35.  These sections amend various
statutes relating to monetary compensation for crime
victims.  See Ch. 95-184, §§ 28-35, at 1718-22.  For
example, section 28 amends section 960.293, Florida
Statutes, to reflect that a crime victim should be
compensated in a civil suit for damages for actual losses
suffered as a result of the crime.  See id., Ch. 95-184, §
28, at 1718.  The concept of a civil restitution lien is also
present throughout the amendments adopted by sections
29 through 35.  See id., §§ 29-35, at 1718-22.
Sections 36-38.  These three sections amend
various statutes relating to domestic violence, and they are
the exact provisions that were included in chapter 95-182,
the chapter law at issue in Thompson.   Compare Ch. 95-
182, §§ 8-10, at 1673-75 (amending section 741.31,
creating section 768.35, and amending section 784.046,
respectively), with Ch. 95-184, §§ 36-38, at 1722-24
(same).  Section 36 of chapter 95-184 amends section
741.31, Florida Statutes, to create a civil cause of action
for damages (including costs and attorney's fees) for
injuries inflicted in violation of a domestic violence
injunction, to be enforced by the court that issued the
5 Interestingly, section 36 is the only section in chapter 95-184 dealing with domestic
violence that is included as part of the "Crime Control Act of 1995."  See Ch. 95-184, § 1, at
1678.  This anomaly appears to be the result of an oversight.  Specifically, on May 4, 1995, the
House of Representatives considered Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 172, the bill version of
chapter 95-184.  See Fla. H.R. Jour. 1214-1232 (Reg. Sess. 1995).  At that time, the House
substantially overhauled the version of Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 172 that had been
referred from the Senate.  See id.  The result of this overhaul was a 41 section bill, with current
section 36 then found at section 37.  See id.  After this 41-section bill was presented, however,
Representative Martinez proposed an additional amendment to eliminate section 28 from the 41-
section bill.  See id. at 1232.  The House approved the amendment proposed by Representative
Martinez, and the text and title of the bill were corrected to reflect the elimination of section 28. 
See id.  However, section 1 of the bill declaring that "sections 2 through 36 of this act may be
cited as the 'Crime Control Act of 1995'" was not edited to reflect the change.  See id.  As a
result, according to the text of chapter 95-184, section 36 is part of the "Crime Control Act of
1995."
-12-
injunction.5  Section 37 creates section 768.35, Florida
Statutes, to provide a cause of action for victims of
continued domestic violence.  Finally, section 38 amends
several portions of section 784.046, Florida Statutes, by
imposing certain procedural duties on clerks of court and
law enforcement officers regarding the filing and
enforcement of domestic violence injunctions.
In his briefs to this Court, Heggs argues that the sections of chapter 95-184
summarized above address four different subjects: criminal sentencing; defining
substantive crimes; monetary compensation for crime victims; and civil remedies for
victims of domestic violence.  During oral argument, Heggs asserted that those
sections address at least three different subjects: criminal sentencing, monetary
compensation for crime victims, and civil remedies for victims of domestic violence. 
Conversely, the State claims the various sections comprising chapter 95-184 "are
cogent and interrelated and directed to one primary object: the definition,
-13-
punishment, and prevention of crime and the concomitant protection of the rights of
crime victims."  State's Answer Brief at 7-8.  After reviewing the various sections
contained in chapter 95-184, we conclude that our analysis in Thompson concerning
chapter 95-182 must be applied here--the domestic violence provisions contained in
chapters 95-182 and 95-184 are not naturally or logically connected to the
remaining criminal subject matters contained in those chapter laws.  We agree with
the reasoning of the Second District that:
Following our own precedent in Thompson, we
believe that chapter 95-184 violates the single subject rule
because it, too, embraces civil and criminal provisions that
are not logically connected.  The two subjects "are
designed to accomplish separate and dissociated objects
of legislative effort."  708 So.2d at 317 (quoting State ex
rel. Landis v. Thompson, 120 Fla. 860, 892-893, 163 So.
270, 283 (1935)).  Likewise, as in Thompson, here there
is no legislative statement of intent to implement
comprehensive legislation to solve a crisis.  See
Thompson, 708 So.2d at 315.
Heggs, 718 So. 2d at 264.
The State asserts that this case differs from Thompson because chapter 95-
184, to a greater degree than chapter 95-182, is a comprehensive law similar to
those upheld by this Court in Burch v. State, 558 So. 2d 1, 2-3 (Fla. 1990); Smith v.
Department of Insurance, 507 So. 2d 1080, 1085-87 (Fla. 1987); Chenoweth v.
Kemp, 396 So. 2d 1122, 1124 (Fla. 1981); and State v. Lee, 356 So. 2d 276, 282-83
6 Heggs notes that these decisions were subject to vigorous dissent on the single subject
rule issue.  See Burch, 558 So. 2d at 4 (Shaw, J., dissenting, joined by Barkett and Kogan, JJ.);
Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1096 (Erhlich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Barkett
and Adkins, JJ.); Chenoweth, 396 So. 2d at 1126 (Sundberg, C.J., joined by England, J.); Lee,
356 So. 2d at 286 (Sundberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by England and
Hatchett, JJ.).  Further, Heggs notes that Justice Adkins, who joined in the four person majority in
Lee, subsequently stated that his concurrence in Lee was a "mistake."  See Smith, 507 So. 2d at
1099 (Adkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
-14-
(Fla. 1978).6  In doing so, the State attempts to distinguish chapter 95-184 from the
chapter laws analyzed in State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1993), and Bunnell v.
State, 453 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1984), in which this Court struck down the chapter laws
at issue as being violative of the single subject rule.  See Johnson, 616 So. 2d at 4
(involving chapter 89-280, Laws of Florida, which addressed both habitual felony
offender sentencing and the licensing of private investigators and their authority to
repossess personal property); Bunnell, 453 So. 2d at 809 (involving chapter 82-150,
Laws of Florida, which created the crime of obstruction of justice and made
amendments regarding the Florida Council on Criminal Justice).  We disagree with
the State’s position that the decisions of this Court in Burch, Smith, Chenoweth, and
Lee are controlling here.  In each of those cases, the Legislature specifically
identified a broad crisis that it was attempting to address through the passage of the
comprehensive chapter laws at issue.  See Burch, 558 So. 2d at 2-3 (involving
challenge to chapter 87-243, Laws of Florida, in which the Legislature identified
crisis in increasing crime rate); Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1085-87 (involving challenge to
-15-
chapter 86-160, Laws of Florida, in which the Legislature identified crisis in the
availability of commercial liability insurance); Chenoweth, 396 So. 2d at 1124
(involving challenge to chapter 76-260, Laws of Florida, in which the Legislature
identified crisis in the tort law/medical malpractice liability insurance system); Lee,
356 So. 2d at 282-83 (involving challenge to chapter 77-468, Laws of Florida, in
which the Legislature identified crisis in tort law/automobile insurance system).  In
relation to chapter 95-184, however, the Legislature has not identified a crisis that
would require combining the criminal provisions with the three sections dealing with
civil remedies for victims of domestic violence.  Instead, based on the text and
legislative history of chapter 95-184, it seems clear that the chapter law constitutes a
classic act of logrolling, which is the evil sought to be prevented by the single
subject rule and an intellectually honest analysis requires application of Thompson. 
Accordingly, we hold that chapter 95-184, Laws of Florida, violates article III,
section 6 of the Florida Constitution.
We realize that our decision here will require, among other things, the
resentencing of a number of persons who were sentenced under the 1995 guidelines,
as amended by chapter 95-184.  However, only those persons adversely affected by
the amendments made by chapter 95-184 may rely on our decision here to obtain
relief.  Stated another way, in the sentencing guidelines context, we determine that if
-16-
a person’s sentence imposed under the 1995 guidelines could have been imposed
under the 1994 guidelines (without a departure), then that person shall not be
entitled to relief under our decision here.  See, e.g., Freeman v. State, 616 So. 2d
155, 156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (affirming denial of the defendant’s motion to correct
sentence, even in light of this Court’s decision in State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1
(Fla. 1993), because the defendant failed to allege that “he could not have been
habitualized without the amendments effected by chapter 89-280”); cf. State v.
Mackey, 719 So. 2d 284, 284-85 (Fla. 1998), (affirming fifteen-year sentence that
departed from 1991 guidelines–even though the trial court should have calculated
the sentence using the 1994 guidelines–because the fifteen-year sentence would
have been within the 1994 guidelines range).
V. SEVERABILITY
The final issue to be addressed in this case is whether the sections contained
in chapter 95-184 that address civil remedies for victims of domestic violence  may
be severed from the chapter law so that the remaining sections may remain valid. 
The State argues that this Court's decision in Moreau v. Lewis, 648 So. 2d 124, 128
(Fla. 1995), along with the severability clause set forth in section 39 of chapter 95-
184, supports the application of severability in this case.  Contrastingly, Heggs
argues that severability is never appropriate in the single subject rule context and
-17-
that chapter 95-184 should be declared unconstitutional in its entirety.  After careful
consideration, we find that severability is not appropriate in this case.
In Colonial Investment Co. v. Nolan, 100 Fla. 1349, 131 So. 178 (1930), this
Court considered whether chapter 14571 of the Laws of Florida of 1929, violated
the single subject rule contained in article 3, section 16 of the Florida Constitution
of 1885, the predecessor of the same substantive rule now contained in article III,
section 6 of the Florida Constitution.  The party challenging the chapter law in that
case primarily alleged that the title of the law was invalid because it contained more
than one subject.  See Nolan, 100 Fla. at 1350-51, 131 So. at 178-79.  This Court
declined to determine the case on that isolated basis, however, because it found that
both the title and body of the chapter law contained two distinct and improperly
connected subjects.  See id. at 1353, 131 So. at 180.  This Court recognized that if
the title of a chapter law contains more than one subject but the body does not, then
such a law may remain valid.  See id.  However, as to chapter laws in which both
the title and body contain more than one subject, this Court quoted with approval a
legal text which stated: "If an act embraces two or more subjects, and two or more
of the same are expressed in the title, the whole act is void."  Id. at 1354, 131 So. at
180 (quoting 1 John Lewis, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 144 (2d ed.
1904)).  After finding that both the title and body of chapter 14571 contained more
-18-
than one subject, this Court invalidated the law in its entirety.  See Nolan, 100 Fla.
at 1358, 131 So. at 181.  This Court has reached a similar conclusion in several
other decisions.  See Sawyer v. State, 100 Fla. 1603, 1611, 132 So. 188, 192 (1931)
(relying on Nolan to invalidate entire chapter law because the law's title and body
contained more than one subject); Ex parte Winn, 100 Fla. 1050, 1053, 130 So.
621, 621 (1930) (stating that "both the act and the title dealt with more than one
subject, and that the several subjects dealt with were not so properly connected as
to conform with [the single subject rule], and for this reason the entire act must
fall").
Since issuing these vintage opinions, this Court has not discussed the concept
of severability as it relates to whether a chapter law violated article III, section 6 of
the Florida Constitution, other than in Moreau.  In that case, the petitioner
challenged the constitutionality of Specific Appropriation 63 of the 1994-95 General
Appropriations Act (the Act), as well as section 2, subsection 18 of the Act's
Implementing Bill.  See 648 So. 2d at 125-26.  The petitioner claimed that both the
Act and the Implementing Bill violated article III, sections 6 and 12 of the Florida
Constitution because they improperly changed or amended substantive law on
7 Article III, section 12 of the Florida Constitution provides: "Laws making appropriations
for salaries of public officers and other current expenses of the state shall contain provisions on no
other subject."
-19-
subjects other than appropriations.7  See id. at 126-27.  This Court found that while
the Act itself did not amend substantive law, the Implementing Bill did amend
existing law on subjects other than appropriations and therefore violated article III,
section 6 of the Florida Constitution.  See id. at 127.  This Court then found that the
offending section of the Implementing Bill was properly severable from the
remaining portions of the bill, see id. at 127-28, noting the severability clause
contained in the Implementing Bill and applying the following test set forth by this
Court in Presbyterian Homes v. Wood, 297 So. 2d 556, 559 (Fla. 1974):
An unconstitutional portion of a general law may be
deleted and the remainder allowed to stand if the
unconstitutional provision can be logically separated from
the remaining valid provisions, that is, if the legislative
purpose expressed in the valid provisions can be
accomplished independently of those which are void;  and
the good and bad features are not inseparable and the
Legislature would have passed one without the other;  and
an act complete in itself remains after the invalid
provisions are stricken.
Moreau, 648 So. 2d at 128.
After reviewing Moreau, we find that the severability analysis set forth
therein must be limited to the appropriations context.  Our reasoning is four-fold. 
-20-
First, pursuant to article III, section 12 of the Florida Constitution, laws on
appropriations must address only that subject and not amend substantive law.
Second, as is clear from Moreau, when the Legislature enacts a law to implement a
general appropriations act, such implementing bill must relate only to appropriations
as well.  Third, any expansive application of severability would emasculate the "one
subject " constitutional provision and thrust the judiciary into the legislative arena. 
Finally, the Implementing Bill at issue in Moreau provided that it was "'[a]n act
relating to implementing the fiscal year 1994-95 General Appropriations Act.'"
Moreau, 648 So. 2d at 128.  Thus, in that case, the title of the Implementing Bill
contained only one subject, while the body contained two.  Under such
circumstances involving appropriations, it is proper to sever the superfluous subject
contained in the body of the chapter law if such severance does not violate the rules
governing severance set forth in Presbyterian Homes v. Wood, 297 So. 2d 556 (Fla.
1974).  Cf. State v. Physical Therapy Rehab. Center of Coral Springs, Inc., 665 So.
2d 1127, 1131-32 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (finding title of chapter law
unconstitutionally defective for failing to give adequate notice of contents, and
severing section in body of the chapter law that was not adequately noticed in the
title); Millard H. Ruud, "No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject", 42 Minn.
L. Rev. 389, 397 (1958) ("[I]f the title [of a bill] gives adequate notice of a portion
-21-
of the contents of the bill, then only that portion of the act of which the title fails to
give adequate notice is invalid.").
In summary, we find that the doctrine of severability is applicable in the
single subject rule context only in certain situations.  First, as set forth in Moreau, a
court may sever portions of a law implementing a general appropriations law if
severing such portion or portions of the implementing bill would not run afoul of the
principles set forth in Wood.  Second, a court may sever a portion or portions of the
body of a chapter law that are properly a single subject but have not been
adequately noticed in the title, if severing such portion or portions would not run
afoul of the principles set forth in Wood.  See Physical Therapy Rehab., 665 So. 2d
at 1132.  Finally, in accordance with the rule set forth by this Court in Nolan, a
chapter law that violates the single subject rule contained in article III, section 6 of
the Florida Constitution must be voided in its entirety should the body of such law
contain more than one subject.  See also Litchfield Elementary School Dist. No. 79
v. Babbitt, 608 P.2d 792, 808-09 (Ariz. 1980) (adopting rule that entire act must fail
where it violates single subject rule).  In reaffirming the rule set forth in Nolan, we
note the cogent analysis of this issue set forth years ago by Millard H. Ruud:
It is very doubtful that the doctrine of severability is
applicable to an act containing two or more subjects
adequately expressed by its title.  Where a portion of an
8 We recognize that courts in other jurisdictions have severed portions of single subject
rule violative chapter laws in a variety of circumstances.  See, e.g., Western Int'l v. Kirkpatrick,
396 N.W. 2d 359, 364-65 (Iowa 1986); State v. Prince Georgians for Glendening, 617 A.2d 586,
589-90 (Md. 1993); Hammerschmidt v. Boone County, 877 S.W. 2d 98, 103 (Mo. 1994)
("[W]hen the Court concludes that a bill contains more than one subject, the entire bill is
unconstitutional unless the Court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that one of the bill's
multiple subjects is its original, controlling purpose and the other subject is not."); State ex rel.
Hinkle v. Franklin County Board of Elections, 580 N.E. 2d 767, 770 (Ohio 1991).  However, we
find persuasive Justice Douglas's observation in Hinkle: "[H]ow does the majority know which
part of the Act is defective?  The Act is a promulgation of the General Assembly in package form. 
Can we break into the package and excise what we perceive (or want to be) the offending part?" 
580 N.E. 2d at 773 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial
Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E. 2d 1062, 1101-02 (Ohio 1999) (acknowledging that there likely is
adequate support to overrule Hinkle on the issue of severability).
-22-
act is unconstitutional, the doctrine of severability saves
the constitutional portions and gives them effect, where to
do so will carry out the legislative purpose. 
Unconstitutionality, generally flows from lack of
legislative power.  The one subject rule is not concerned
with substantive legislative power.    It is aimed at
log-rolling.  It is assumed, without inquiring into the
particular facts, that the unrelated subjects were combined
in one bill in order to convert several minorities into a
majority.  The one-subject rule declares that this
perversion of majority rule will not be tolerated.  The
entire act is suspect and so it must all fall.  If this is the
rationale for the constitutional rule and it certainly is the
principal one stated by the courts, then it is manifestly
unsound to employ severability to save the provisions
dealing with one of the subjects.  The necessary
assumption that this will carry out the legislative purpose,
assented to by a majority of the legislators, cannot be
made.
Ruud, 42 Minn. L. Rev. at 399.8  If we were to adopt the severability approach, this
Court would be thrusting itself into the legislative arena, a venture we care not to
9 Curiously, the title of chapter 95-184 also provides the following:
[A]mending s. 741.29, F.S.; providing legislative intent with respect
to services for victims of domestic violence; amending s. 741.30,
F.S.; requiring the clerk of court to furnish the sheriff with specified
information on respondents; revising guidelines for transmission of
specified information by the sheriff; restricting the authority to
serve or executive [sic] injunctions for protection against domestic
violence to specified municipal or county law enforcement officers .
. . .
Ch. 95-184, at 1677-78.  However, nowhere in chapter 95-184 did the Legislature amend either
section 741.29 or section 741.30, Florida Statutes.  Heggs has not challenged this surplusage.
-23-
undertake in connection with this single subject analysis.  We now apply these
above-stated principles to the present case.
The title of chapter 95-184, in its entirety, spans almost two pages of text. 
See Ch. 95-184, at 1676-78.  Clearly located within the lengthy title is a reference to
amending sections 741.31, 768.35, and 784.06, Florida Statutes,9 see id. at 1677-78,
which are the domestic violence provisions addressed in sections 36 through 38 of
the chapter law.  See id. §§ 36-38, at 1722-24.  Therefore, as it is clear that both the
title and the body of chapter 95-184 contain more than one subject, the domestic
violence provisions may not be severed from the Act to save its remaining sections. 
Accordingly, we hold chapter 95-184, Laws of Florida, void in its entirety, reverse
the sentences imposed in this case, and remand this cause for resentencing in
accordance with the valid laws in effect on October 24 and November 2, 1995, the
-24-
dates on which Heggs committed his respective offenses.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ.,
concur.
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, J., dissenting.
For the reasons stated in my dissent in State v. Thompson, 25 Fla. L. Weekly
S1 (Fla. Dec. 22, 1999), I dissent from the majority decision in this case.  Rather, I
would approve the decision of the three district courts who have decided on this
issue contrary to the majority and the Second District.
Appeal of Judgment of Circuit Court, in and for Polk County,  Oliver L. Green, Jr.,
Judge, Case No. CF95-6007A1-XX - Certified by the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, Case No. 2D96-05252
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Richard J. Sanders, Assistant Public
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida,
for Appellant
-25-
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; James W. Rogers and Edward C. Hill, Jr.,
Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Dale E. Tarpley, Assistant
Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee