Case Title: Joseph C. Bonner and C.O.W., Inc. v. Lyons, Pipes & Cook, P.C. and Marion A. Quina, Jr.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1070187

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2009-04-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel 04/03/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
_________________________
1070187 
_________________________
Joseph C. Bonner and C.O.W., Inc.
v.
Lyons, Pipes & Cook, P.C., and Marion A. Quina, Jr.
_________________________
1070272
__________________________
Lyons, Pipes & Cook, P.C., and Marion A. Quina, Jr.
v.
Joseph C. Bonner and C.O.W., Inc.
Appeals from Mobile Circuit Court
(CV-04-4702)
1070187 & 1070272 
2
PER CURIAM.
C.O.W., Inc., and its owner, Joseph C. Bonner, appeal
from a judgment as a matter of law entered in favor of
attorney Marion A. Quina, Jr., and the law firm in which he is
a partner, Lyons, Pipes & Cook, P.C.  (Quina and Lyons, Pipes
& Cook are hereinafter referred to collectively as "the legal-
service providers"), in the underlying legal-malpractice
action.  The legal-service providers cross-appeal.  We affirm
the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the legal-service
providers' cross-appeal as moot.
Facts
C.O.W. entered into a franchise agreement with Keelboat
Concepts, Inc., pursuant to which C.O.W. purchased the right
to operate a "Cock of the Walk" catfish restaurant in Mobile.
The franchise agreement contained a choice-of-law provision,
which 
stated 
that 
Mississippi 
law 
would 
govern 
the
construction of the agreement in the case of a dispute.  Under
the terms of the franchise agreement, C.O.W. had the option to
renew the franchise agreement at the end of the initial
contract period, provided, among other things, (1) that C.O.W.
1070187 & 1070272 
3
gave Keelboat written notice of renewal no earlier than July
3, 2002, and no later than January 3, 2003, and (2) that, at
the time of renewal, C.O.W. paid Keelboat 50% of the then
current initial franchise fee established by Keelboat. The
undisputed evidence presented at the trial of this case
establishes that C.O.W. did not provide a written notice of
renewal during the period prescribed in the franchise
agreement and did not pay Keelboat 50% of the then current
initial franchise fee "at the time of renewal." 
C.O.W. alleges that its attorney, Quina, a partner in the
firm of Lyons, Pipes & Cook, negligently failed to timely
renew the franchise agreement.  It is undisputed that Quina
sent the notice of renewal to Keelboat after the expiration of
the January 3, 2003, deadline for the renewal notice.
After receiving C.O.W.'s late notice of renewal, Keelboat
informed C.O.W. that it was terminating the franchise
agreement because it had not been timely renewed;  C.O.W.,
however, continued to operate the restaurant.  Consequently,
Keelboat filed an action against C.O.W. requesting a judgment
declaring that the franchise agreement had terminated ("the
Keelboat declaratory-judgment action").  In its complaint for
1070187 & 1070272 
4
a declaratory judgment, Keelboat alleged a number grounds for
the issuance of such an order, any of which, standing alone,
if proven, would have been sufficient grounds for the issuance
of a judgment declaring that the franchise agreement had
terminated.  Among those grounds were the following:
1.  That the notice of renewal was invalid because
it was untimely under the renewal-option provision
of the franchise agreement; and
2.  that  C.O.W.'s notice of renewal was ineffective
because C.O.W. did not submit payment of 50% of the
franchise renewal fee allegedly due simultaneously
with its notice of renewal.
In addition, C.O.W. filed a cross-claim for a declaratory
judgment seeking, among other things, a judgment declaring
that C.O.W.'s untimely exercise of its option to renew was
effective to renew the franchise agreement.  All the above
claims and issues were tried in the Keelboat declaratory-
judgment action.
After a bench trial, the trial court
entered judgment rejecting all Keelboat's arguments and
declaring that C.O.W.'s right to operate the Cock of the Walk
restaurant in Mobile had not terminated.
Keelboat appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which
affirmed the trial court's judgment without an opinion.
Keelboat Concepts, Inc. v. C.O.W., Inc. (No. 2030174, Oct. 8,
1070187 & 1070272 
5
2004), 921 So. 2d 477 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) (table).  Keelboat
then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari.  We
granted the writ only as to the issue "whether the affirmance
by the Court of Civil Appeals conflicts with the general rule
that time is of the essence in an option contract unless
otherwise specified."  Ex parte Keelboat Concepts, Inc., 938
So. 2d 922, 927 n.4 (Ala. 2005). We concluded "that ...
C.O.W., Inc., did not effectively renew the franchise
agreement because time was of the essence of the option
contract and the renewal notice was not timely"; thus, we
reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and
remanded the case.  938 So. 2d at 932.  The Court of Civil
Appeals subsequently entered an order directing that, "[i]n
compliance with the Supreme Court's opinion, the judgment of
the trial court is reversed, and the cause remanded for
further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's
opinion."  Keelboat Concepts, Inc. v. C.O.W., Inc., 938 So. 2d
932 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006).
Procedural History
On December 29, 2004, C.O.W. and Bonner filed the
underlying legal-malpractice action against the legal-service
1070187 & 1070272 
6
providers pursuant to Alabama's Legal Services Liability Act,
§ 6-5-570 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the ALSLA"), in the Mobile
Circuit Court.
The case was eventually tried before a jury.  On the
seventh day of trial, C.O.W. and Bonner rested their case.
The legal-service providers then moved for a judgment as a
matter of law.  The trial court held a hearing on the motion.
In that hearing, the legal-service providers argued, among
other things, that Bonner had no standing to bring the action
against the legal-service providers because, in rendering the
legal services that allegedly fell below the standard of care,
Quina was representing C.O.W., not Bonner.  The trial court
granted the motion for a judgment as a matter of law on this
issue and dismissed Bonner's claims. 
The legal-service providers further argued that they were
entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to C.O.W.'s claims
against them, because, they said, C.O.W. had not presented
evidence that, but for the fact that the renewal was untimely,
C.O.W. would have succeeded in renewing the franchise
agreement.  Specifically, just as Keelboat had argued in the
Keelboat 
declaratory-judgment 
action, 
the 
legal-service
1070187 & 1070272 
7
providers argued that, even if the notice of renewal had been
timely, C.O.W. did not pay 50% of the franchise fee allegedly
due at the time of renewal.  After listening at length to the
parties' arguments with regard to the "but for" causation
issue, the trial court entered a judgment as a matter of law
for the legal-service providers on the claims against C.O.W.
On October 24, 2007, C.O.W. and Bonner filed a notice of
appeal from the judgment of the trial court.
On November 5, 2007, the legal-service providers filed a
notice of appeal, arguing that they were entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law regardless of the merits of C.O.W.
and Bonner's appeal.  According to the legal-service
providers, C.O.W. and Bonner did not present valid expert
testimony to prove that the legal-service providers had
breached the applicable standard of care.
Standard of Review
"When reviewing a ruling on a motion for a JML
[judgment as a matter of law], this Court uses the
same standard the trial court used initially in
deciding whether to grant or deny the motion for a
JML.  Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v. Crawford, 689 So.
2d 3 (Ala. 1997).  Regarding questions of fact, the
ultimate question is whether the nonmovant has
presented sufficient evidence to allow the case to
be submitted to the jury for a factual resolution.
Carter v. Henderson, 598 So. 2d 1350 (Ala. 1992).
1070187 & 1070272 
8
The 
nonmovant 
must have presented substantial
evidence in order to withstand a motion for a JML.
See § 12-21-12, Ala. Code 1975; West v. Founders
Life Assurance Co. of Fla., 547 So. 2d 870, 871
(Ala. 1989).  A reviewing court must determine
whether the party who bears the burden of proof has
produced substantial evidence creating a factual
dispute requiring resolution by the jury.  Carter,
598 So. 2d at 1353.  In reviewing a ruling on a
motion for a JML, this Court views the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmovant and
entertains such reasonable inferences as the jury
would have been free to draw.  Id.  Regarding a
question of law, however, this Court indulges no
presumption of correctness as to the trial court's
ruling.  Ricwil, Inc. v. S.L. Pappas & Co., 599 So.
2d 1126 (Ala. 1992)."
Waddell & Reed, Inc. v. United Investors Life Ins. Co., 875
So. 2d 1143, 1152 (Ala. 2003).
Analysis
Appeal (case no. 1070187)
A.
Whether the trial court erred in determining that
Bonner lacked standing.
Bonner 
has 
submitted 
no 
argument 
to 
this 
Court
challenging the dismissal of his claims against the legal-
service providers based on a lack of standing.  Therefore, we
affirm the judgment as a matter of law for the legal-service
providers as to Bonner's claims against them.  Stover v.
Alabama Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 467 So. 2d 251, 253 (Ala. 1985)
("While we attempt to avoid dismissing appeals or affirming
1070187 & 1070272 
9
judgments on what may be seen as technicalities, we are
sometimes unable to address the merits of an appellant's claim
when the appellant fails to articulate that claim and presents
no authorities in support of that claim.").
B.
Whether the trial court erred in entering a judgment as
a matter of law on C.O.W.'s claims against the legal-
service providers.
1.
The Keelboat declaratory-judgment action and the
doctrine of collateral estoppel.
To prevail in a legal-malpractice action, the plaintiff
must prove that, but for the attorney's negligence, the legal
matter concerning which the attorney is alleged to have been
negligent would have been resolved more favorably to the
plaintiff.  Pickard v. Turner, 592 So. 2d 1016, 1019 (Ala.
1992).  To meet this burden, the plaintiff must prove (1)
that, in the absence of the alleged malpractice, the plaintiff
would have been entitled to a more favorable result in the
legal matter concerning which the attorney is alleged to have
been negligent, and (2) that the attorney's negligence in fact
caused the outcome of the legal matter to be less favorable to
the plaintiff than the outcome would have been in the absence
of the alleged malpractice.  Pickard, 592 So. 2d at 1020
("'Generally, 
actionable 
[legal] 
malpractice 
cannot 
be
1070187 & 1070272 
10
established in the absence of a showing that the attorney's
wrongful conduct has deprived the client of something to which
he would otherwise have been entitled.' [7A C.J.S. Attorney
and Client § 255 at 462 (1980).]  A lawyer cannot be expected
to achieve impossible results for a client."); Hall v. Thomas,
456 So. 2d 67, 68 (Ala. 1984) ("A claim for malpractice
requires a showing that in the absence of the alleged
negligence the outcome of the case would have been different."
(citing Mylar v. Wilkinson, 435 So. 2d 1237 (Ala. 1983))).  
Thus, in this case, to withstand the legal-service
providers' motion for a judgment as a matter of law, not only
did C.O.W. bear the burden of proving that its attempt to
renew the franchise would have in fact had a more favorable
result but for the legal-service providers' negligence in
failing to timely renew the franchise, but also that, but for
the fact that the renewal notice was untimely, it was legally
entitled to renew the franchise.  See Pickard, 592 So. at
1020.  C.O.W. argues that, because C.O.W. obtained a favorable
judgment on those issues in the Keelboat declaratory-judgment
action, C.O.W. would have been legally entitled to renew the
franchise agreement despite C.O.W.'s failure to pay the
1070187 & 1070272 
11
franchise fee.  C.O.W. points out that the only basis for the
reversal of the trial court's judgment in favor of C.O.W. in
the Keelboat declaratory-judgment action was this Court's
opinion holding that the notice of renewal was ineffective
because it was untimely.
C.O.W. argues that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
bars the legal-service providers from challenging the legal
authority it contends was established in Ex parte Keelboat
Concepts.  Collateral estoppel is an equitable defense that
bars a party from relitigating an issue that has been resolved
in an earlier case.  Ex parte Flexible Prods. Co., 915 So. 2d
34, 45 (Ala. 2005). Collateral estoppel applies when the
following elements are shown:
"(1) an issue identical to the one litigated in the
prior suit; (2) that the issue was actually
litigated in the prior suit; (3) that resolution of
the issue was necessary to the prior judgment; and
(4) the same parties."
Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 566 So. 2d 723, 726 (Ala.
1990).
When this Court decided Ex parte Keelboat Concepts, it
reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and
remanded the case in its entirety.  Although this Court had
1070187 & 1070272 
12
granted certiorari review only as to one of the issues the
Court of Civil Appeals had decided in favor of C.O.W. and
Bonner, and although it was only on the basis of that issue
that this Court reversed the judgment of the  Court of Civil
Appeals, that reversal necessarily reversed the entire
judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals.  When, in compliance
with this Court's remand order, the Court of Civil Appeals in
turn reversed the trial court's judgment, it necessarily
reversed the trial court's judgment in its entirety.
In Van Schaack v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 586 So. 2d 192
(Ala. 1991), a lower court's judgment had been reversed, and
this Court rejected a subsequent attempt by a party to rely
upon a holding in the lower court's judgment that was not the
reason 
for 
the 
reversal. 
 
As 
this 
Court 
explained,
"well-settled in the law of Alabama is the principle that a
judgment is a legal entity -- a single unit -- the reversal of
which annuls it in its entirety and vacates all rulings that
are contained within it."  586 So. 2d at 195 (quoting Ex parte
Riley, 464 So. 2d 92, 93-94 (Ala. 1985)) (emphasis omitted).
Thus, C.O.W. has not met its burden, as the party seeking
the benefit of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, to
1070187 & 1070272 
13
demonstrate the existence of a final judgment adjudicating any
issue other than that the notice of renewal was invalid
because it was untimely.  Thus, the doctrine of collateral
estoppel does not prevent the legal-service providers from
relitigating issues decided by the trial court in the Keelboat
declaratory-judgment action before its original judgment was
reversed on another issue.
2. The effect of C.O.W.'s failure to pay the initial
franchise fee.
A plaintiff in a legal-malpractice case must prove "the
same basic elements as in a negligence action: duty, breach,
proximate cause, and damages."  Pickard, 592 So. 2d at 1019
(citing Moseley v. Lewis & Brackin, 533 So. 2d 513, 515 (Ala.
1988)).  Bonner testified that he telephoned Quina on December
13, 2003, and told him to send the letter of renewal.  Bonner
testified that, at that time of the telephone call, although
he could not recall the precise day in early January 2003 when
the renewal deadline would expire, he told Quina that "the
letter of renewal needed to be sent by the first of the
year.... [T]he dates that were talked about were January the
3rd and January the 4th."  It is undisputed that Quina did not
send Keelboat a letter of renewal until January  20, 2003.  It
1070187 & 1070272 
Quina denies that Bonner informed him of the renewal
1
deadline or requested that the notice of renewal be completed
by any particular date.  However, because we are reviewing the
propriety of a judgment as a matter of law, we must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to C.O.W., the nonmoving
party.  See Waddell & Reed, 875 So. 2d at 1152.
14
is further undisputed that, if Bonner indeed informed Quina of
the deadline for renewal and instructed Quina to draft the
renewal notice in anticipation of that deadline,  Quina would
1
have breached a duty to timely prepare the notice of renewal.
It is undisputed that Keelboat did not accept C.O.W.'s notice
of renewal, citing as its reason for not accepting it the
untimeliness of C.O.W.'s attempt to renew.  It is undisputed
that this Court held in Ex parte Keelboat that C.O.W.'s notice
of renewal was ineffective because it was untimely.  Finally,
it is undisputed that, because C.O.W. was unable to prevail in
its attempt to renew the franchise, C.O.W. lost the right to
the franchise and the ability to profit from it.
However, because this is a legal-malpractice action, in
addition to duty, breach, proximate cause, and damages, C.O.W.
bore the burden at trial of proving that, had the notice of
renewal been timely, C.O.W. would have had a legal right to a
renewal of the franchise.  Pickard, 592 So. 2d at 1020
("'Generally, 
actionable 
[legal] 
malpractice 
cannot 
be
1070187 & 1070272 
We note that C.O.W. makes no argument that the legal-
2
service providers had or breached a duty to inform C.O.W. that
15
established in the absence of a showing that the attorney's
wrongful conduct has deprived the client of something to which
he would otherwise have been entitled.' [7A C.J.S. Attorney
and Client § 255 at 462 (1980).]  A lawyer cannot be expected
to achieve impossible results for a client."). The legal-
service  providers argue that the untimeliness of the renewal
notice was not the only reason C.O.W. had no legal right under
the franchise agreement to renew. According to the legal-
service providers, C.O.W. failed to comply with a number of
other requirements in the renewal-option provision that were
necessary for C.O.W. to exercise the option.
According to the legal-service providers, one of the
requirements set forth in the renewal-option provision was
that, to renew, C.O.W. was required to have paid, at the time
of renewal, 50% of the then current initial franchise fee.
The uncontradicted evidence presented in C.O.W.'s case-in-
chief demonstrated that C.O.W. did not pay 50% of the initial
franchise fee at the time of renewal.  Therefore, the legal-
service providers argue, Keelboat would have been justified in
rejecting C.O.W.'s attempt to renew even had it been timely.2
1070187 & 1070272 
paying 50% of the initial franchise fee at the time of renewal
was a requirement of exercising the renewal option.
The phrase "time of renewal" is not defined in the
3
franchise agreement, but C.O.W. does not dispute the legal-
service providers' contention that the "time of renewal" was
the latest date notice of renewal could have been timely
given, i.e., January 3, 2003.
16
The original renewal-option provision, contained in
Paragraph IV.B. of the franchise agreement, stated:
"B.
[C.O.W.] 
may, 
at 
its 
option, 
renew 
this
Franchise agreement for one additional period
of twenty (20) years, provided that, at the
time of renewal:[ ]
3
"1.
[C.O.W.] gives [Keelboat] written notice of
such election to renew not less than twelve
(12) months nor more than eighteen (18)
months prior to the end of the primary
term.
"2.
[C.O.W.] executes and is obligated to
perform under [Keelboat]'s then current
standard form of Franchise agreement ....
"....
"6.
[C.O.W.] shall have paid to [Keelboat]
fifty percent (50%) of the then current
initial Franchise fee."
(Emphasis added.)
A 1993 amendment to the renewal-option provision in the
franchise agreement states:
"Paragraph IV(B)1-2 is amended to read as follows:
1070187 & 1070272 
17
"B.
[C.O.W.] and/or its successors and assigns may,
at their option, renew this Franchise agreement
for one additional period of twenty (20) years,
provided that at the time of the renewal:
"1.
[C.O.W.] gives [Keelboat] written notice of
such election to renew not less than twelve
(12) months nor more then eighteen (18)
months prior to the end of the primary
term.
"2.
[C.O.W.] executes and is obligated to
perform under a Franchise agreement in the
form of the current Franchise agreement.
At the time that the option is exercised,
the monthly gross sales royalty shall be
set at one percent, and there shall be no
monthly advertising or royalty on gross
sales."
(First emphasis added; remaining emphasis original to indicate
additions.)
In its argument on appeal, C.O.W. does not discuss the
construction of Paragraph IV.B.6. of the franchise agreement,
which conditioned C.O.W.'s right to renew on C.O.W.'s having
paid 50% of the initial franchise fee at the time of renewal.
However, C.O.W.'s brief does quote the order of the trial
court in the Keelboat declaratory-judgment action, which
judgment was later reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals on
other grounds. Keelboat Concepts, Inc. v. C.O.W., Inc., 938
So. 2d 932; see also Ex parte Keelboat, 938 So. 2d 922.  The
1070187 & 1070272 
18
trial court in the Keelboat declaratory-judgment action
stated:
"The Court finds that the 1993 amendment of the
Franchise agreement set forth all of the payments
[C.O.W.] was required to make to [Keelboat] on the
renewal of the term of the Franchise Agreement.
Under that amendment, [C.O.W.] would owe a one
percent (1%) royalty fee to [Keelboat] during the
new term of the franchise, which the Court finds
would be due only on sales made by [C.O.W.] after
the beginning of the new term on January 4, 2004.
[C.O.W.] 
would 
not 
be 
required 
to 
pay 
any
advertising royalty. And [C.O.W.] would be entitled
to renew 'in the form of the current Franchise
agreement.'  Nowhere in the amendment is [C.O.W.]
required to pay any other kind of 'franchise fee' to
[Keelboat]. Therefore, the Court finds that [C.O.W.]
is not required to pay [Keelboat] any 'franchise
fee' on renewal of the term of the Agreement, other
than the one percent (1%) royalty fee."
This analysis is inconsistent with the express language
of the renewal-option provision in the franchise agreement.
See Ex parte Keelboat, 938 So. 2d at 925 ("'Option contracts
are to be strictly construed ....'" (quoting Haddox v. Walker,
522 So. 2d 266, 269 (Ala. 1988), citing in turn Colonial
Baking Co. of Alabama v. Pine Dale, Inc., 436 So. 2d 856, 858
(Ala. 1983))).  As we observed in Ex parte Keelboat:
"[I]n Robinson v. Martel Enters., Inc., 337 So. 2d
698, 702-04 (Miss. 1976), the Mississippi Supreme
Court held:
1070187 & 1070272 
19
"'"It 
is 
incumbent 
upon 
the
optionee to exercise the option
in the manner provided in the
contract 
and, 
unless 
such
requirements 
are 
waived, 
his
failure to do so, or his attempt
to exercise it in another manner,
is inoperative to form a binding
contract ...." [quoting Reynolds
v. Maples, 214 F.2d 395, 398 (5th
Cir. 1954)].
"'....
"'...[W]e 
have 
decreed 
strict
compliance with the terms and provisions of
option contracts. See Poole v. McCarty, 229
Miss. 170, 90 So. 2d 190 (1956).'"
938 So. 2d at 930-31 (emphasis added).
The terms of Paragraph IV.B.6 of the renewal-option
provision are clear and unambiguous: the provision gave C.O.W.
the option to renew the franchise agreement "provided that, at
the time of renewal: ... [C.O.W.] shall have paid to
[Keelboat] fifty percent (50%) of the then current initial
Franchise fee."  The 1993 amendment to the franchise agreement
clearly and unambiguously provided that, with regard to the
renewal- option provision, it was amending only "Paragraph
IV(B)(1)-(2)." 
 
It 
did 
not 
purport 
to 
amend 
other
subparagraphs in the renewal-option provision, including
Paragraph IV.B.6, the provision requiring payment by C.O.W. of
1070187 & 1070272 
20
50% of the initial franchise fee at the time of renewal.  The
trial court's conclusion in the Keelboat declaratory-judgment
action to the effect that the amendment modified the
requirements of Paragraph IV.B.6 is inconsistent with the
express terms of the renewal-option provision.  We therefore
reject C.O.W.'s reliance on the trial court's construction in
the Keelboat declaratory-judgment action of the terms of the
renewal-option provision as persuasive authority in this
legal-malpractice action in construing the portion of the
renewal-option provision regarding payment of 50% of the
initial franchise fee.  Instead, we hold that the express
terms of renewal-option provision required payment by C.O.W.
of 50% of the initial franchise fee at the time of renewal as
a condition precedent to the renewal of the franchise
agreement.
Accordingly, pursuant to the plain terms of the renewal-
option provision, C.O.W.'s attempt to renew the franchise
agreement without paying 50% of the initial franchise fee at
the time of renewal as specified in the renewal-option
provision would have been ineffective to form a binding
renewal contract, even had the notice of renewal been timely.
1070187 & 1070272 
21
See Ex parte Keelboat, 938 So. 2d at 930-31 (quoting Robinson
v. Martel Enters., Inc., 337 So. 2d 698, 702-04 (Miss. 1976)).
C.O.W. argues that Keelboat waived this requirement of renewal
because Keelboat did not object to C.O.W.'s failure to pay a
portion of the initial franchise fee in its letter informing
C.O.W. that the franchise renewal notice was untimely and
therefore 
ineffective.  However, 
as 
the legal-service
providers point out, the franchise agreement states:
"No failure of [Keelboat] to exercise any power
reserved to it in this Franchise agreement or to
insist upon compliance by Franchisee with any
obligation or condition in this Franchise agreement
... shall constitute a waiver of [Keelboat's] right
to demand exact compliance with the terms of the
Franchise agreement." 
Franchise agreement, paragraph XVII.  On its face, this
language precludes any argument that Keelboat could not refuse
to renew the franchise agreement because it did not initially
advise C.O.W. that it had failed to meet a condition precedent
to renewal by not paying 50% of the initial franchise fee upon
renewal.  Cf. Fletcher v. U.S. Rest. Props., Inc., 881 So. 2d
333, 339 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (holding, in a case of
recurring violations of provisions in a lease, that, under a
similar nonwaiver provision, "failure of [a] lessor to insist
1070187 & 1070272 
22
upon strict compliance would not cause waiver of its right to
later insist upon strict compliance");  Kirkland v. Chinita
Land Dev., Inc., 798 So. 2d 620, 623-24 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001)
(same).
C.O.W. makes no argument that the nonwaiver provision
should be construed otherwise.  Instead, C.O.W. cites several
cases for the proposition that a nonwaiver provision itself
may be waived: Exxon Corp. v. Crosby-Mississippi Res., Ltd.,
40 F.3d 1474 (5th Cir. 1995) (decided under Mississippi law),
Siciliano v. Hudson, (Ms. 2:92CV061-D-A, April 3, 1996) (N.D.
Miss. 1996) (not reported in F. Supp:); and Charles Stores,
Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 428 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1970). C.O.W.
does not, however, cite any evidence or give any explanation
as to why, in light of Exxon, Siciliano, and Charles Stores,
the record in this case demonstrates that Keelboat waived
application of the nonwaiver provision.  Taranto Amusement Co.
v. Mitchell Assocs., Inc., 820 So. 2d 726, 730 (Miss. Ct. App.
2002) ("To establish a waiver, there must be shown an act or
omission on the part of the one charged with the waiver fairly
evidencing an intention to permanently surrender the right
alleged to have been waived.").  Moreover, although we view
1070187 & 1070272 
23
the evidence in the light most favorable to C.O.W., see
Waddell & Reed, Inc., supra, we find no evidence in this
record that Keelboat intended to surrender its rights under
the nonwaiver provision.
"'Where a contract is clear and unambiguous, its meaning
and effect are matters of law which must be determined by the
court.'"  Fradella v. Seaberry, 952 So. 2d 165, 171 (Miss.
2007) (quoting IP Timberlands Operating Co. v. Denmiss Corp.,
726 So. 2d 96, 106 (Miss. 1998) (citing in turn Pfisterer v.
Noble, 320 So. 2d 383, 384 (Miss. 1975))).  Because the terms
of the renewal option required payment of 50% of the initial
franchise fee at the time of renewal as a condition precedent
to renewal, because Keelboat did not waive its right to insist
upon such a payment as a condition of renewal, and because the
evidence is undisputed that C.O.W. did not pay 50% of the
initial franchise fee at the time of renewal, C.O.W. would not
have been entitled to renew the franchise agreement even if
its notice of renewal had been timely.  Therefore, C.O.W.
cannot prevail on its malpractice claim against the legal-
service providers for failing to timely provide notice of
1070187 & 1070272 
24
renewal, and the legal-service providers were entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
Cross-Appeal (case no. 1070272)
As grounds for their cross-appeal, the legal-service
providers argue that they were entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law regardless of the merits of C.O.W.'s appeal.
According to the legal-service providers, C.O.W. did not
present valid expert testimony to prove that the legal-service
providers breached the standard of care.  See Wilson v.
Athens-Limestone Hosp., 894 So. 2d 630, 634 (Ala. 2004)
(noting that "this Court can affirm a trial court's judgment
for any reason, even one not specifically given by the trial
court." (citing Taylor v. Stevenson, 820 So. 2d 810, 814 (Ala.
2001))).  However, because we hold that the legal-service
providers were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because
C.O.W. did not have a legal right to renew the franchise even
if the franchise-renewal notice had been timely, we dismiss
the legal-service providers' cross-appeal as moot.
1070187--AFFIRMED.
1070272--DISMISSED AS MOOT.
1070187 & 1070272 
25
Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker, Murdock, and Shaw, JJ.,
concur.
Lyons, J., concurs specially.
Cobb, C.J., concurs in part and concurs in the result.
1070187 & 1070272 
26
LYONS, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur fully in the main opinion.  I write specially to
offer an alternative basis on which to reject the availability
of the doctrine of collateral estoppel even if, contrary to
the holding in the main opinion, our grant of certiorari
review and reversal on the sole issue of timeliness of the
notice in Ex parte Keelboat Concepts, Inc., 938 So. 2d 922,
932 (Ala. 2005), had not vacated all aspects of the judgment
below, including the trial court's separate holding as to the
effect of the nonpayment of the renewal fee.  
The trial court in Keelboat's declaratory-judgment action
rejected Keelboat's contention that C.O.W.'s notice of renewal
was ineffective because C.O.W. did not pay 50% of a franchise-
renewal fee allegedly due simultaneously with its notice of
renewal.  In the subsequent legal-malpractice action, the
legal-service providers assert the defense that the default of
the franchisee in payment of the renewal fee precludes
renewal.  C.O.W. asserts the doctrine of collateral estoppel
on that issue based on the trial court's rejection of that
contention in the declaratory-judgment action.  
1070187 & 1070272 
27
In Ex parte Keelboat Concepts, Inc., 938 So. 2d at 932,
this Court concluded:
"Bonner and C.O.W., Inc., did not effectively renew
the franchise agreement because time was of the
essence of the option contract and the renewal notice
was not timely; thus, the trial court erred in ruling
that Bonner's late notice of renewal was effective to
renew the franchise agreement for an additional 20
years.  We therefore reverse the judgment of the
Court of Civil Appeals affirming the trial court's
ruling, and we remand this case for proceedings
consistent with this opinion."  
(Emphasis added.) 
Once this Court found the notice of renewal untimely in
Ex parte Keelboat, the trial court's rejection of Keelboat's
separate contention that C.O.W.'s notice of renewal was
ineffective because C.O.W. did not pay 50% of a franchise-
renewal fee  became immaterial because untimeliness serves as
an independent and sufficient basis to reject the renewal.  In
other words, C.O.W.'s notice of renewal could have been
accompanied by a check for 10 times the amount of the
franchise fee, and it would have been too late under Ex parte
Keelboat.   
In 
Lloyd 
Noland 
Foundation, 
Inc. 
v. 
HealthSouth 
Corp., 979
So. 2d 784, 795-96 (Ala. 2007), this Court stated:
1070187 & 1070272 
28
"Collateral estoppel applies when (1) the issue in a
prior case was identical to the issue being litigated
in the present action, (2) the issue was actually
litigated in the prior action by a court of competent
jurisdiction, (3) resolution of that issue was
necessary to the prior judgment, and (4) the same
parties are involved in the two actions."  
(Emphasis added.)  Therefore, even assuming that our
disposition in Ex parte Keelboat did not have the effect of
vacating all aspects of the judgment below, when this Court in
Ex parte Keelboat held that the renewal notice was too late,
the trial court's holding as to the lack of consequence of
failure to make the tender became unnecessary to the prior
judgment, rendering the doctrine of collateral estoppel
unavailable. 
1070187 & 1070272 
29
COBB, Chief Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the
result).
I concur in the result as to the majority's determination
that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is inapplicable in
this case; as to the remainder of the majority's opinion, I
concur.  In my opinion, the express language of the Alabama
Legal Services Liability Act, § 6-5-570 et seq., Ala. Code
1975 ("the ALSLA"), is dispositive of whether the doctrine of
collateral estoppel is available in this case. The ALSLA
provides: "In defense of the underlying action, the legal-
services provider may assert any and all substantive and
procedural defense, restriction, limitation, or immunity which
could have the effect of limiting, mitigating, reducing, or
avoiding liability or damages."  § 6-5-579(b), Ala. Code 1975.
In this case, the "underlying action," i.e., the legal
matter concerning which the legal-service providers are
alleged to have been negligent, is the legal transaction of
renewing the franchise agreement.  See the majority's opinion,
___ So. 3d at ___ (noting C.O.W.'s reliance on the doctrine of
collateral estoppel to satisfy its burden to prove "that, in
the absence of the alleged malpractice, the plaintiff would
1070187 & 1070272 
30
have been entitled to a more favorable result in the legal
matter concerning which the attorney is alleged to have been
negligent"); see also Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-572(5) (defining
"underlying action" as "the legal matter concerning the
handling of which it is alleged that the legal-services
provider 
breached 
the 
applicable 
standard 
of 
care");
Cunningham v. Langston, Frazer, Sweet, & Freese, P.A., 727 So.
2d 800, 803 (Ala. 1999) ("[I]f this standard of care
[applicable to a legal-services  provider] is to be breached,
it will be breached in the handling of a 'case,' (i.e., a
legal matter) by a 'legal-services  provider.'  That the ALSLA
refers to a lawyer's handling of legal matters is also made
apparent by the definition of 'underlying action': 'The term
underlying action refers to the legal matter concerning the
handling of which it is alleged that the legal-services
provider breached the applicable standard of care.'").
Accordingly I believe the plain language of § 6-5-579
renders 
unnecessary 
this 
Court's 
consideration 
of 
the
judicially created doctrine of collateral estoppel as a bar to
the legal-service providers' ability to relitigate issues or
defenses that were previously adjudicated in the course of
C.O.W.'s attempt to renew the franchise.