Case Title: Cannon v. McDonald

Citation: 615 P.2d 1268

Docket Number: 

State: utah

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Date: 1980-08-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
615 P.2d 1268 (1980) Quayle CANNON, Jr., and Sheldon R. Brewster, on behalf of themselves and other parties similarly situated, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Leonard W. McDONALD, in his original capacity as Executive Director of the Utah State Retirement Board, and the Utah State Retirement Board, Defendants and Appellants. No. 16586. Supreme Court of Utah. August 5, 1980. *1269 Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., and Mark A. Madsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellants. David A. Westerby and Richard R. Neslen of Kirton & McConkie, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and respondents. MAUGHAN, Justice: The defendants bring this appeal from the district court's judgment and order granting the plaintiffs' retirement benefits under the Utah State Retirement Act. We reverse. All statutory references are to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. The plaintiffs, Quayle Cannon, Jr., and Sheldon R. Brewster, are both at least 65 years of age and have served at least four years in the Utah Legislature. Mr. Cannon served in the state legislature from 1941 through 1945 and Mr. Brewster served from 1937 through 1943, and 1957 through 1960. Their applications for retirement benefits pursuant to 49-10-36 were denied by the defendant, Leonard W. McDonald, acting in his capacity as Executive Director of the Utah State Retirement Board. Upon review of this administrative action, the district court reversed the ruling of the agency and ordered the approval of the plaintiffs' applications for legislative pensions. The district court's decision was grounded on its interpretation of the pertinent language of 49-10-36 and its conclusion the section grants a pension to all former legislators who had four years or more of legislative service and who were 65 years of age or older. Owing to the nature of the action, the case was tried on stipulated facts and the only issue presented on appeal is the *1270 legal question of the propriety of the district court's interpretation of the statutory provision. Specifically, 49-10-36 provides in part: Thus, the language of the statute grants a legislative pension to "... a member who has credit for four or more years service as a legislator." The district court interpreted this phrase broadly and concluded "credit" should be granted for all past legislative service. Therefore, the court reasoned each former legislator who has served four or more years in the Utah Legislature and has reached the age of 65 is entitled to receive the specific legislative pension. We cannot agree with this interpretation or its resultant conclusion. In interpreting the statutory language care must be taken to construe the words used in light of the total context of the legislation,[1] and when the construction of a section involves technical words and phrases which are defined by statute, the provision must be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.[2] The critical word in the above quoted phrase is "service" which is defined in 49-10-6(16): This definition is supplemented in 49-10-6(17) where the legislature has defined "current service" to mean covered service rendered on or after July 1, 1967, and 49-10-6(18) where "prior service," is defined as "service rendered prior to July 1, 1967, which is creditable in the system herein created." To determine what prior service is creditable under the Retirement Act we must look to 49-10-17 which explains: The original Utah Public Employees' Retirement Act[3] which was enacted in 1961 specified the requirements for prior service credit in section (18) by stating: Applying this specific definition to the language of 49-10-36 demands an interpretation contrary to that reached by the District Court. Before a past legislator can become eligible for retirement benefits under that section, he must have accumulated four or more years of prior service credit. Because "prior service credit" is defined in 49-10-17 with reference to the original retirement act, the plaintiffs' eligibility for benefits depends upon fulfillment of the requirements of those provisions. However, the plaintiffs have stipulated their prior service does not fulfill the requirements of section 18 of the 1961 Act. Therefore, they do not qualify for a legislative service pension under the present legislation and the District Court's judgment must be reversed. The plaintiffs ingenious argument that legislators cannot accumulate "service credit" because they cannot perform "service" or "covered service" is not persuasive. The argument falls in the face of the explicit language of 49-10-36(3) which explains: WILKINS, HALL and STEWART, JJ., concur. CROCKETT, C.J., being disqualified, does not participate herein. [1] See Crist v. Bishop, Utah, 520 P.2d 196, 198 (1974). [2] 68-3-11. [3] Chapter 100, Laws of Utah, 1961.