Case Title: State v. Summers

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2012-02-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 101,902 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
JAMAAL SUMMERS, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
1. 
 
When reviewing a district court ruling on a motion to suppress a confession, an 
appellate court reviews the factual underpinnings of the decision under a substantial 
competent evidence standard. The ultimate legal conclusion drawn from those facts is 
reviewed de novo. The appellate court does not reweigh the evidence, assess the 
credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicting evidence. 
 
2. 
 
A two-part inquiry is used to determine whether an interrogation is custodial for 
purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). 
The first prong is:  What were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation? The 
appellate court reviews that determination under a substantial competent evidence 
standard. The second prong of the inquiry is:  Under the totality of those circumstances, 
would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the 
interrogation? The appellate court applies a de novo standard of review to that 
determination. 
 
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3. 
Several nonexclusive factors may be considered when reviewing the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding a defendant's statements to determine admissibility, including:  
(1) when and where the interrogation occurred; (2) how long it lasted; (3) how many 
police officers were present; (4) what the officers and defendant said and did; (5) the 
presence of actual physical restraint of the defendant or things equivalent to actual 
restraint such as drawn weapons or a guard stationed at the door; (6) whether the 
defendant is being questioned as a suspect or a witness; (7) how the defendant got to the 
place of questioning, that is, whether he or she came completely on his or her own in 
response to a police request or was escorted by police officers; and (8) what happened 
after the interrogation—whether the defendant left freely, was detained, or was arrested. 
 
4. 
 
The K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 60-460(d)(3) hearsay exception is held to apply to 
statements made by a deceased victim to his wife regarding his plans for the evening, 
when those statements were made shortly after the victim made his plans. 
 
5. 
 
Prosecutorial misconduct may occur when a prosecutor asks a question for which 
the prosecutor has no reason to believe there is a foundation of law or fact. But under the 
facts presented in this case, a single improper question was harmless. 
 
6. 
 
A sentencing court has no authority to order a term of postrelease supervision in 
conjunction with an off-grid, indeterminate life sentence. 
 
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; JOHN J. MCNALLY, judge. Opinion filed February 3, 
2012. Conviction affirmed, sentence affirmed in part and vacated in part. 
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Michelle A. Davis, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief 
for appellant.  
 
Sheryl L. Lidtke, deputy district attorney, argued the cause, and Jerome A. Gorman, district 
attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
ROSEN, J.:  Jamaal Summers was charged with first-degree murder. His first jury 
trial resulted in a mistrial because the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict. At a 
second trial, the jury convicted Summers of first-degree murder. The trial court imposed 
a life sentence without the possibility of parole for 25 years, and lifetime postrelease 
supervision. 
 
Summers challenges his conviction on three grounds. We hold that (1) the trial 
court did not err in admitting statements Summers made to police during an interview at 
his father's house, (2) the trial court did not err in allowing the victim's wife and neighbor 
to testify that the victim told them his friend, "Homie," was coming over that evening, 
and (3) the trial court did not err in handling the prosecutor's inappropriate question 
during cross-examination of a defense witness. We affirm his conviction. 
 
Summers also challenges the trial court's imposition of lifetime postrelease 
supervision as part of his sentence. We hold that the trial court does not have the 
authority to order a term of postrelease supervision in conjunction with an off-grid, 
indeterminate life sentence. Therefore, the portion of Summers' sentence imposing 
lifetime postrelease supervision is vacated. 
 
 
 
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
On New Year's Eve leading into 2007, Teresa Putman heard gunshots from her 
neighbor's backyard. She told her husband about the gunshots, but ultimately concluded 
that the gunshots were part of a New Year's Eve tradition for her neighbors, Leslie and 
Jamaal Summers. During the summer of 2007, Teresa's 12-year-old son, Thomas Ross, 
found a bullet casing in the yard while he was mowing. Teresa threw the shell casing 
toward the woods behind their home and told her son to leave it alone. Ross retrieved the 
casing for his collection, which he kept in a glasses case in his bedroom.  
 
At 8:22 on the morning of June 18, 2007, Summers called the police to report that 
his .40 caliber semiautomatic handgun had been stolen. Eight minutes later, at 8:30 a.m., 
Summers made the first of numerous calls to the victim, Salvador Velasquez. A total of 
12 calls, ranging in length from 1 to 2 minutes, were made on June 18 between Salvador's 
cell phone and phones associated with Summers. Summers' phone numbers were listed in 
Salvador's cell phone as "Homi" and "Homi2." Summers explained that these calls were 
made to arrange for him to purchase marijuana from Salvador.  
 
Adriana Lopez, Salvador's wife, worked until 3 p.m. on June 18, 2007. She ran 
several errands before arriving home around 4 p.m. Salvador was outside the house with 
their dog, Scooby. Scooby was a stray Labrador-Rottweiler mix that tended to get overly 
excited around people, so the couple always shut Scooby in their bedroom when 
company came to their house.  
 
After Adriana and Salvador had eaten some nachos she had brought home from 
work, Adriana went inside to cook dinner. When Adriana went outside to tell Salvador 
dinner was ready, she saw he was talking on his cell phone. They went inside to eat 
together. After dinner, Adriana got dressed to go to the gym. Salvador told Adriana he 
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was expecting company that evening, specifically, that Homie was coming over. Adriana 
left the house at about 5 p.m.  
 
At around 4:30 p.m., Salvador's neighbor, Sandra Aguirre, got home with her 
daughter. She saw Salvador outside talking to her husband and nephew, Luis Valdez. She 
went inside to cook dinner, but the men stayed outside talking to Salvador for about half 
an hour. Salvador told Valdez and his uncle that he had to return home because his friend 
Homie was coming over.  
 
Also around 4:30 p.m., Summers was visiting his wife, Leslie Summers, at her 
office at the Midwest United Credit Union at Blue Ridge and Longview in South Kansas 
City. Summers was driving the Jaguar that day, which had a good car seat, while Leslie 
had taken the minivan with the "kind of ragged" car seat. Leslie printed some paperwork 
for Summers' music business. Summers testified that he went out to his car, reviewed the 
paperwork, called Salvador to cancel the marijuana purchase, and switched the car seats 
between his vehicle and his wife's vehicle, before walking back into the credit union. 
Summers claimed he went back into the credit union so that Leslie could make copies for 
him, before driving to his Aunt Alice's apartment.  
 
Summers testified that he drove to his Aunt Alice's apartment, located about 10 
minutes from the credit union, because he had been checking on his aunt since her recent 
discharge from the hospital. Aunt Alice testified somewhat vaguely that she thought she 
had seen Summers outside with the Summers' minivan that day, but she had been unable 
to answer the door in time to talk with him. Leslie testified that she drove the minivan to 
Aunt Alice's after work, where she waved at Summers to get going because they were 
running late to pick up their son from day care, which was located about 20 minutes from 
Alice's apartment. Leslie signed their son out of day care at 5:30 p.m. Summers and 
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Leslie testified that they returned home, ate dinner, and stayed home for the remainder of 
the evening.  
 
Sandra Simental passed by Adriana and Salvador's house as she walked from her 
house to her mother's house, a distance of about 1 block. She left her house at about 4:45 
p.m. She returned to her house at 5:02 p.m., noting the time because she was babysitting 
a friend's children and the children were to be picked up at 5 p.m. She saw Salvador 
talking to a black man, whom Salvador invited into his front yard. She identified 
Summers as the black man she had seen with Salvador, both in a photographic lineup 
presented by officers the next day and in court.  
 
Michael Rios testified that he drove past Salvador's house between 5:30 and 5:45 
that afternoon, taking a group of kids to Sonic for ice cream after a day spent cutting 
grass for the city. He saw Salvador sitting on the porch with his dog, talking on his 
phone. When detectives first talked to Rios, he thought he had gone to Sonic around 6:45 
p.m. When the detectives took a second statement, Rios suggested the time might have 
been 30 to 45 minutes earlier. Rios testified that they spent 30 to 45 minutes at Sonic, 
returning around 6:15 p.m. Upon his return, he was unable to drive down the block 
because an ambulance, fire trucks, and police cars at Salvador and Adriana's house had 
blocked the street.  
 
Adriana checked into Gold's Gym at 5:23 p.m. She left the gym at 6:18 p.m. 
Driving to Walmart, she called Salvador's cell phone twice but he did not answer his 
phone. She called her neighbor, Simental, to ask if Salvador's truck was still parked 
outside the house. Simental confirmed that Salvador's truck was parked in its usual 
location. Adriana purchased several things at Walmart, paying for her items at 7 p.m.  
 
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Adriana returned home to find her front door unlocked, which was unusual 
because she and Salvador always locked the door. She found her husband lying on the 
floor between the hallway and the living room. She dropped her purse and Walmart bags 
and knelt down by Salvador. She found Scooby shut in the bedroom. Otherwise, the 
house appeared just as it had been when she left.  
 
Adriana ran to Sandra Aguirre's house for help. Valdez went into Adriana's house 
with her and touched Salvador to see if there was anything he could do. Valdez caught 
Scooby outside, because he was one of the few people who would touch the dog, and put 
him into Salvador's truck. Another neighbor called the police, reporting a dead body. The 
deputy coroner determined the cause of Salvador's death was multiple gunshot wounds to 
the head, chest, and neck.  
 
Three PMC brand .40 caliber Smith and Wesson cartridge cases were found near 
Salvador's body. The Kansas Bureau of Investigation forensic laboratory compared those 
shell casings to the Independence brand .40 caliber Smith and Wesson caliber cartridge 
case turned in by Ross. The firearm and tool mark examiner concluded that all four 
cartridge cases had been fired from the same firearm.  
 
After a trial, the jury convicted Summers of first-degree murder. Additional facts 
will be added as necessary. 
 
SUMMERS' STATEMENTS 
 
On June 23, 2007, 5 days after Salvador's death but nearly a month before 
Summers' arrest, two officers met with Summers at his father's house. Summers' wife, his 
father, his mother, and his grandfather were also present. They sat down at a kitchen or 
dining room table to talk. The officers came dressed in business casual apparel, 
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displaying their badges on their belts, and carrying their service weapons. The officers 
said that they were there to talk to Summers about someone who they believed to be 
Summers' friend, who had been killed in Armourdale. The officers explained to Summers 
that he was not in custody and that they did not feel the need to Mirandize him.  
 
After talking for 30 to 45 minutes, the police recorded a 2- to 3-minute statement 
from Summers. The officers collected an oral swab of Summers' DNA as well as 
Summers' fingerprints. Summers told the officers he did not know Salvador, did not 
recognize his picture, and had never been to his house. The officers told Summers they 
did not believe he was being truthful. At that point, Summers asked the officers to leave 
and they left.  
 
Although Summers did not make a confession or directly incriminating statements 
during the interview, he did make statements that were inconsistent with the evidence. 
Summers later testified that he lied to the officers because he had called Salvador to buy 
some marijuana. Knowing that Salvador had been murdered and not knowing what else 
Salvador was into other than marijuana, Summers was reluctant to admit knowing 
Salvador in front of his wife and father.  
 
Summers filed a motion to suppress evidence on January 15, 2008. After hearing 
evidence and arguments at a pretrial hearing, the trial court ruled Summers' statements 
were admissible. Defense counsel timely objected to the admission of this evidence at 
trial. On appeal, Summers argues that the interrogation was custodial because he was 
being questioned as a suspect, not a witness. Summers claims he felt he was being 
questioned as a suspect because the officers were investigating a murder, he had spoken 
to Salvador several times on the day of the murder, and his ties to Salvador were 
complicated by their illegal drug connection. Summers claims that the statements should 
have been suppressed because Miranda warnings were not given. 
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Standard of Review 
 
 
When reviewing a district court ruling on a motion to suppress a 
confession, an appellate court reviews the factual underpinnings of the decision 
under a substantial competent evidence standard. The ultimate legal conclusion 
drawn from those facts is reviewed de novo. The appellate court does not reweigh 
the evidence, assess the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicting 
evidence. State v. Edwards, 291 Kan. 532, 545, 243 P.3d 683 (2010). 
 
 
"A two-part inquiry is used to determine whether an interrogation is custodial for 
purposes of Miranda. The first prong is:  What were the circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation? We review that determination under a substantial competent evidence 
standard. The second prong of the inquiry is:  Under the totality of those circumstances, 
would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the 
interrogation and leave? We apply a de novo standard of review to that determination. 
[Citation omitted.]" State v. Morton, 286 Kan. 632, 640, 186 P.3d 785 (2008). 
 
Analysis 
 
We begin by reviewing the circumstances surrounding the interrogation under a 
substantial competent evidence standard to determine whether Miranda warnings were 
required. Several nonexclusive factors may be considered when reviewing the totality of 
the circumstances surrounding the statements, including  
 
"'"(1) when and where the interrogation occurred; (2) how long it lasted; (3) how many 
police officers were present; (4) what the officers and defendant said and did; (5) the 
presence of actual physical restraint on the defendant or things equivalent to actual 
restraint such as drawn weapons or a guard stationed at the door; (6) whether the 
defendant is being questioned as a suspect or a witness; (7) how the defendant got to the 
place of questioning, that is, whether he came completely on his own in response to a 
police request or was escorted by police officers; and (8) what happened after the 
10 
 
 
 
interrogation—whether the defendant left freely, was detained, or was arrested."' 
[Citation omitted.]" Morton, 286 Kan. at 640. 
 
The trial court found the following circumstances existed at the time of Summers' 
interrogation. Summers arranged the meeting with the officers at his parents' house. He 
was interviewed in the presence of his family. The interview lasted less than an hour. His 
wife testified that the officers were cordial to her and Summers. When the officers 
became confrontational, Summers asked them to leave and they left the house. The 
interview was conducted 5 days after Salvador's death, but Summers was not arrested for 
nearly a month after the interview. Substantial competent evidence supports the existence 
of the circumstances found by the trial court. Our review of the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the statements leads us to agree with the trial court's ruling. 
 
We then use an objective standard to determine whether the interrogation was 
custodial, i.e., whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would 
have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interview. Morton, 286 Kan. at 642. 
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we hold that a reasonable person would 
have felt that he or she was at liberty to terminate the interview. In fact, Summers told the 
officers to leave, and the officers did leave. "'It is well settled then, that a police officer's 
subjective view that the individual under questioning is a suspect, if undisclosed, does not 
bear upon the question whether the individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda.'" 
Morton, 286 Kan. at 643 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324-25, 114 S. 
Ct. 1526, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293 [1994]). Summers' statements were made before the officers 
became confrontational about the truth of Summers' claims that he did not know the 
victim. A reasonable person in these circumstances would have felt that he or she was 
free to terminate the interview; therefore, Miranda warnings were not necessary. 
 
 
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VICTIM'S STATEMENTS THAT HE EXPECTED "HOMIE" TO VISIT 
 
Before the first jury trial, Summers filed a motion in limine to exclude Salvador's 
statements to his wife, Adriana, that he was expecting his friend, Homie, to visit the 
evening of his murder. Adriana identified Summers as the friend Salvador referred to as 
"Homie." Phone records showed that the phone numbers in Salvador's cell phone under 
"Homi" and "Homi2" belonged to Summers. Before the second jury trial, Summers again 
raised this issue, extending the motion to cover similar statements made to a neighbor as 
well as those made to Adriana. Defense counsel made a timely objection when Adriana 
testified that Salvador was expecting Homie to come over, and also when the neighbor, 
Valdez, testified that Salvador said he had to go back to his house because Homie was 
coming over.  
 
Standard of Review 
 
This court reviews a trial court's determination that hearsay is admissible under a 
statutory exception, such as K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 60-460(d)(3) here, for an abuse of 
discretion. "'"The abuse-of-discretion standard includes review to determine that the 
discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions."' [Citation omitted.]" State v. 
Davis, 283 Kan. 569, 573, 158 P.3d 317 (2006). 
 
Analysis 
 
The State argued, and the trial court agreed, that the following exception to the 
hearsay rule applied to Salvador's statements: 
 
 
"A statement which the judge finds was made . . . if the declarant is unavailable 
as a witness, by the declarant at a time when the matter had been recently perceived by 
12 
 
 
 
the declarant and while the declarant's recollection was clear and was made in good faith 
prior to the commencement of the action and with no incentive to falsify or to distort." 
K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 60-460(d)(3). 
 
The declarant, Salvador, was obviously unavailable because his death resulted in 
the charges in this case. Similarly, the challenged statements were made prior to the 
commencement of this action. Additionally, the trial court heard testimony concerning 
several phone calls that took place between Summers and Salvador during the time 
Adriana was at home with Salvador. Summers argued that the autopsy report showed 
cocaine and marijuana in Salvador's body, which suggests that his recollection and 
judgment might have been impaired. The trial judge rejected this argument by 
referencing the first trial, where he ruled: 
 
 
"THE COURT:  Well, certainly it's hard to imagine that his memory wasn't sharp 
enough to remember it from the end of the conversation until he immediately told the 
witness. I think it's a stretch to say that there's a question as to his perception to the extent 
that he wouldn't—wouldn't have understood the conversation that he had just heard and 
related to the witness here. 
 
 
"So I do believe it—I agree with both counsel that it is an exception to the 
hearsay. There's no–no indication there's any incentive to falsify or distort or there would 
have been at the time that he made the statement."  
 
On appeal, Summers complains that the trial court did not make any finding 
regarding the good faith of Salvador in making these statements to his wife and that the 
trial court did not make any specific findings regarding the statutory requirements with 
regard to the statements Salvador made to his neighbor.  
 
Summers testified that his plan was to meet Salvador that day to purchase 
marijuana. He explained that the nature of their transactions required several phone calls 
13 
 
 
 
because Salvador had to arrange to get the marijuana from a third party and then arrange 
to meet him. Summers testified that while he was at the credit union speaking to his wife, 
he missed a call from Salvador. He returned this call from the parking lot and canceled 
the arrangement to meet Salvador because it had taken too long for Salvador to get the 
marijuana and Summers' wife had made plans for their evening.  
 
The statement made by the victim to his wife during or shortly after the phone call 
fits easily within the K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 60-460(d)(3) hearsay exception. The statement 
was made shortly after or while Salvador spoke to Summers and made the plans. Adriana 
testified that she and Salvador had just eaten and that he seemed coherent and normal, 
which supports the trial court's finding that Salvador's recollection was clear. The trial 
court found that the statement was made simply to tell his wife the plan for the evening, 
which suggests the statement was made in good faith and with no incentive to falsify or 
distort. 
 
The statement Salvador made to his neighbor, Valdez, is a closer question because 
this statement was further removed in time from the phone call in which Salvador made 
plans to meet with Summers that evening. However, these two instances are not the only 
time this information was put before the jury. Defense counsel made no objection when 
Officer Sunderman testified that Adriana told him at the scene that Salvador had received 
a call from Homie, who said he was on his way to their house. Nor did defense counsel 
object when Detectives Michael Lucas and Michael Vivian testified that Adriana told 
each of them that Salvador was expecting Homie to visit that evening. The statement 
Salvador made to Valdez is cumulative evidence that Salvador expected Homie to visit 
that evening. As such, we need not reach the question of whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in admitting the statement to Valdez. 
 
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The statement Salvador made to his wife was admissible under K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 
60-460(d)(3). The trial court did not err in admitting this statement. 
 
PROSECUTOR'S IMPROPER CROSS-EXAMINATION 
 
Summers was on video at the Midwest United Credit Union, 21 miles from 
Salvador's house, from 4:24 p.m. to 4:26 p.m. Due to technical problems with the credit 
union's video surveillance system, this time may be off by as much as 9 minutes. 
Simental testified that she saw Summers talking to Salvador outside Salvador's house at 
about 4:45 p.m. Summers sought to prove that the distance between the credit union and 
Salvador's house discredited Simental's identification.  
 
On another business day around 4:30 p.m., Detectives Vivian and Lucas drove 
from the credit union to Salvador's house. Detective Vivian testified that the drive took 
about 20 to 21 minutes. Detective Lucas testified that the drive took 21 minutes. Defense 
counsel cross-examined both officers regarding the route they took and their method of 
calculating time.  
 
Brian Underwood, an investigator hired by the defense, drove from the credit 
union to Salvador's house on Monday, October 27, 2008, leaving the credit union at 4:26 
p.m. Underwood testified that the drive took 29 minutes. The prosecutor began cross-
examination of Underwood by asking, "Did [the defense attorney] tell you what route his 
client took back on June 18th of 2007?" Defense counsel objected, saying it was 
improper to suggest that his client took any route because he was presenting an alibi 
defense. Although the court sustained the objection, did the question prejudice Summers' 
right to a fair trial? 
 
Standard of Review 
 
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"[W]e begin by determining whether the prosecutor's questions were proper. Within the 
scope of a prosecutorial misconduct analysis, this inquiry would answer whether the 
questions were within the latitude allowed the prosecutor. Then, in an analytical step 
unique to prosecutorial misconduct analysis, an appellate court, in determining if the 
prosecutor's conduct requires reversal, reviews (1) whether the misconduct was gross and 
flagrant, (2) whether the misconduct showed ill will on the prosecutor's part, and (3) 
whether the evidence was of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct 
would likely have had little weight in the minds of jurors." State v. Inkelaar, 293 Kan. 
414, 428, 264 P.3d 81 (2011). 
 
Analysis 
 
Defense counsel made a timely objection to the prosecutor's question, which the 
trial court sustained. No further inquiry was made on this subject. In his motion for a new 
trial, Summers stated that the clear purpose of Underwood's testimony that it took 29 
minutes to drive from the credit union where Summers was seen on tape at 4:26 p.m. to 
the scene of the crime where Simental testified that she saw Summers at 4:45 p.m. was to 
demonstrate that Summers could not have been where Simental claimed to have seen 
him. This testimony was presented as part of Summers' alibi defense that he went from 
the credit union to his aunt's apartment and then to the day care location before going 
home, which was the same alibi outlined in the alibi notice and presented at the first trial. 
Summers argued that the clear implication of the prosecutor's question was that Summers 
and his counsel were lying to the jury and that the State knew that he had gone to 
Salvador's home and told his attorney the route he took between the credit union and 
Salvador's house. 
 
Summers argues on appeal that the question assumed Summers had driven to 
Salvador's house from the credit union. He again argues that the question was improper 
because it suggested that he and his attorney were being dishonest with the jury. The 
State claims the question was a poorly worded attempt to determine whether the witness 
16 
 
 
 
drove the route the State was alleging Summers had driven to get to Salvador's house—
the same route driven by Detectives Vivian and Lucus—or some other route. 
 
"Prosecutorial misconduct . . . may occur when a prosecutor asks a question for 
which the prosecutor has no reason to believe there is a foundation of fact or law." 
Inkelaar, 293 Kan. at 428. The trial court ruled that the prosecutor had no reason to 
believe there was a foundation of fact for this question and sustained the objection. The 
witness had described how he came up with the route after consulting several sources. 
The trial court noted that this was the same route used by the detectives. There was 
nothing to suggest that defense counsel had told the witness what route Summers had 
taken from the credit union to Salvador's house, in large part because Summers 
maintained that he had not driven from the credit union to Salvador's house. 
 
Although the question was improper, the trial court appropriately sustained 
defense counsel's objection. The question was not answered, and the subject was not 
brought up again. The State presented a compelling circumstantial case against Summers. 
Summers reported his gun stolen the morning before the murder, just before he called 
Salvador. He made plans to meet with Salvador to purchase marijuana later that day. His 
gun was used to fire the shots that killed Salvador. He made frequent phone calls to 
Salvador up to the time of his death, but no calls after Salvador's death despite his claim 
that he did not know Salvador was dead. The question, while inappropriate, was objected 
to, and the objection was sustained, which cured any possible prejudice in this strong 
circumstantial case. 
 
LIFETIME POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION 
 
Summers was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, an off-grid offense. 
See K.S.A. 21-3401. The trial court imposed a life sentence without the possibility of 
17 
 
 
 
parole for 25 years (hard 25). The trial court also imposed lifetime postrelease 
supervision. The State concedes that the trial court erred and that Summers should be 
subject to lifetime parole rather than postrelease supervision. 
This court recently considered this issue and concluded that "[a]n inmate who has 
received an off-grid indeterminate life sentence can leave prison only if the successor to 
the Kansas Parole Board grants the inmate parole. Therefore, a sentencing court has no 
authority to order a term of postrelease supervision in conjunction with an off-grid 
indeterminate life sentence." State v. Cash, 293 Kan. 326, Syl. ¶ 2, 263 P.3d 786 (2011). 
Because the trial court erred in imposing lifetime postrelease supervision, that portion of 
Summers's sentence is hereby vacated. 
 
The conviction is affirmed, and the sentence is affirmed in part and vacated in 
part.