Case Title: Gordon Family v. GAR

Citation: 348 Md. 129

Docket Number: 69/96

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1997-11-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
NO. 69
SEPTEMBER TERM, 1996
     THE GORDON FAMILY PARTNERSHIP         
V.
 GAR ON JER et al.
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
         *Karwacki
Raker
  
Wilner,
               
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
Filed:  November 20, 1997
    *Karwacki, J., now retired, participated in the        
      hearing and conference of this case while an        
       active member of this Court; after being recalled 
       pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section  
       3A, he also participated in the decision and the   
        adoption of this opinion.
Unless otherwise indicated, all future statutory references will be to the Tax-
1
Property Article.
In addition to Prince George’s County, the complaint to foreclose rights of
2
redemption named each of the property owners whose property was purchased by the
appellant.   Only the County moved to dismiss and has participated in these proceedings;
accordingly, we shall refer only to it in this opinion.
 
The issue this case presents involves the interpretation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996
Repl. Vol.) §§ 14-820 and 14-833 of the Tax-Property Article.    Section 14-833(c) defines
1
the limitations period for filing an action to foreclose the right to redeem property sold at a
tax sale in terms of “the date of the certificate of sale” and § 14-820(a)(8) reiterates that
definition, albeit referring simply to “the date of the certificate,” in the context of prescribing
the contents of that certificate of sale.   The trial court, interpreting § 14-833(c), equated “the
date of the certificate of sale” with “the date of the sale,” and thus dismissed the action to
foreclose rights of redemption filed by the appellant, the Gordon Family Partnership.   We
granted certiorari on our own motion to review this important issue.
I
Each May, beginning on the second Monday and continuing over the course of three
to five days, Prince George’s County, Maryland, the appellee,  sells thousands of parcels of
2
real property situated in the County on which the payment of property taxes is delinquent. 
In 1993, the sale began on May 10 and continued for the next four and a half days.   Three
pamphlets or notices containing pertinent information concerning the tax sale, its procedures
and consequences, were provided or made available in connection with the sale.  Each
That section, in relevant part, provides:
3
(a) Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, at any
time after 6 months from the date of sale a holder of any
certificate of sale may file a complaint to foreclose all rights
of redemption of the property to which the certificate relates.
(b) The right to redeem shall continue until finally barred by
decree of the circuit court in which the foreclosure proceeding
is filed.
2
pamphlet and each notice advised, inter alia, that a successful bidder/purchaser needed to
initiate legal action to foreclose rights of redemption within two years of the date of the tax
sale, otherwise the certificate of sale would be void.
The appellant participated in the sale and purchased over its course, 10 separate parcels
of real property.    It paid for its purchases on May 17, 1993.   The purchases were evidenced
by 10 Certificates of Sale by the Director of Finance for Prince George’s County executed,
upon information and belief, in the presence of a Notary.   The certificates were not issued,
or delivered to the appellant, however, until November 1, 1993, the date they were signed and
notarized.   Copies of each certificate were filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s
County.   
When all of the properties had not been redeemed by the various property owners, the
appellant filed, on May 22, 1995, pursuant to § 14-833  in the Circuit Court for Prince
3
The appellant’s complaint sought foreclosure of the right of redemption of all ten
4
properties, notwithstanding that three of them had been redeemed prior to May 10, 1995.
3
George’s County, a Complaint to Foreclose Rights of Redemption.     The County moved to
4
dismiss the complaint, contending that it came too late, more than two years from the date of
the sale, the date it maintained was prescribed by § 14-833(c).    That motion was denied and
the County filed a Motion for Reconsideration.   Following a hearing on that motion, the court
issued its written opinion granting the appellee’s motion for reconsideration and, thus,
dismissing the appellant’s complaint.  The court rejected the appellant’s argument that the
date of the certificate and the date of the sale are different dates, accepting instead the
appellee’s submission that “the date of the sale is effectively synonymous with the date of the
certificate.”
      II
The appellant’s argument is simple and straightforward, premised on the plain and
ordinary meaning of § 14-833(c).   It is that the date of the sale is a different and separate date
from the date of the certificate.   Moreover, by using the  phrase, “date of the certificate of
sale,” a phrase that  is clear and unambiguous, and requiring no further construction, when
given its plain and ordinary meaning, the Legislature made a clear choice between those two
dates.    Thus, the appellant asserts that the starting date for the running of the limitations
period is the date of the certificate, i.e. November 1, 1993, rather than the date of the sale; to
construe the phrase otherwise is to disregard the language the General Assembly used and
avoid its clear meaning.
4
On the other hand, the appellee’s argument is more involved and complex.   It is also
multifaceted.    First, it maintains that:
Since at least 1978, the Court of Appeals and the Court of Special Appeals have
consistently interpreted the aforementioned limitation provisions for filing a tax
sale foreclosure suit [§§ 14-833(c) and 14-820(a)(8)] to mean two years from
the date of the tax sale, making the terms “date of the certificate” and “date of
the certificate of sale” effectively synonymous with “date of the sale.”
It cites, and discusses, as supportive of this proposition, Fish Market Nominee Corp. v.
G.A.A. Inc., et al., 337 Md. 1, 5, 650 A.2d 705, 707 (1994); Scheve v. Shudder, Inc., 328 Md.
363, 365, 614 A.2d 582, 583-84 (1992); Dawson v. Prince George’s County, 324 Md. 481,
482, 597 A.2d 952, 954 (1991); Prince George’s Home, Inc. v. Cahn, 283 Md. 76, 77, 389
A.2d 853, 854 (1978); Slattery v. Friedman, 99 Md. App. 106, 112, 636 A.2d 1, 4, cert.
denied 335 Md. 81, 642 A.2d 192 (1994); Scott v. Seek Lane Venture, Inc., 91 Md. App. 668,
679, 605 A.2d 942, 948 (1992).    The appellee also takes solace in the fact that the pamphlets
and notices all contained advice consistent with this interpretation.    This is, for appellee,
further evidence that its construction is correct and that the appellate courts have indeed so
construed the statutes.
Second, the appellee argues that the doctrine of legislative acquiescence, see, e.g.,
Workers' Compensation Com'n v. Driver, 336 Md. 105, 120-21, 647 A.2d 96, 104 (1994);
Macke Co. v. St. Dep't of Assess. & Tax., 264 Md. 121, 132-133, 285 A.2d 593 (1972);
Smolin v. First Fidelity Sav. and Loan Ass’n., 238 Md. 386, 392-393, 209 A.2d 546, 549-550
(1965), is applicable under the facts sub judice.    In support of this argument, it points out:
From the date of the Cahn decision in 1978 to the present, Subtitle 8 of the
5
Tax-Property Article and its predecessor, Article 81, Section 70, et seq.,
pertaining to tax sales has been addressed, modified, and amended by the
Legislature, under its various sections without fail at virtually each legislative
session.   In fact, the entire tax sale procedure was recodified from Article 81
to the Tax-Property Article in 1985.   In particular, Section 14-833 ..., and its
predecessor, Article 81, Section 100, have gone through at least two repeals and
reenactments, and Section 14-820 ... and its predecessor Article 81 Section 83,
have gone through numerous repeals and reenactments, without the Legislature
responding in opposition to, or in any way changing, the interpretation placed
on these sections by the Courts pertaining to the two year statute of limitations
period running from the date of the sale.(Footnotes omitted).
Continuing from the perspective of the legislative history of the legislation, the
appellee further asserts that such history reflects an intention on the part of the Legislature
“to accord a two year tax sale statute of limitations for post-1943 tax sales, running from the
date of the sale, as the Courts have so interpreted.”   That history indicates, it states, that the
Legislature intended that there be a uniform procedure applicable to the conduct of tax sales
and the commencement of tax sale foreclosure actions.    That intended uniformity would be
significantly undermined, the appellee suggests, if the date of the certificate were the
appropriate date.    According to the appellee,
[t]aken to it logical conclusion, if the date of the administrative signing of the
certificate or the notary’s acknowledgment were to govern the commencement
of the running of the statute of limitations under Section 14-833(c), the State
would have at least as many varying time periods for filing tax sale foreclosure
suits as there were political subdivisions conducting tax sales for delinquent
taxes.
Finally, the appellee maintains that adoption of the appellant’s argument would result
in an illegal delegation of authority in contravention of separation of powers, see Article 8 of
Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides:
5
That the Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers of Government ought to
be forever separate and distinct from each other; and no person exercising
the functions of one of said Departments shall assume or discharge the
duties of any other.
6
the Maryland Declaration of Rights  and the “Delegation Doctrine established by the Courts,”
5
citing  Christ v. Maryland Dept. of Natural Resources, 335 Md. 427, 644 A.2d 34 (1994);
Department of Transportation v. Armacost, 311 Md. 64, 74, 532 A.2d 1056, 1061 (1987);
Sullivan v. Bd. of License Comm'rs, 293 Md. 113, 123, 442 A.2d 558, 563 (1982).   It argues:
Such a limitations period as argued by the appellant Partnership would,
in effect, be no limitations period, at all.   Worse yet, such a local,
administratively driven limitations period, which subjects the statute of
limitations to the vagaries of each local tax collector’s administrative practice
for issuing tax sale certificates would, in effect, constitute an illegal delegation
of the General Assembly’s legislative authority in violation of Article 8 of the
Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution and the Delegation
Doctrine established by the Courts. 
By way of explaining its position, the appellee reasons:
If the signing of the tax sale certificate by the Collector of Taxes or the
notarizing of said signature is the trigger for starting the two-year limitations
period for filing a foreclosure action, as the Partnership contends, then the
discretion that is supposed to be vested solely within the province of the
legislature is in reality, placed in the hands of various local officials, without
any guidance or restrictions from the General Assembly.   This would shift the
fundamental decision making authority for the imposition of the statute of
limitations away from the Legislature ....
III
The statute whose meaning is at issue on this appeal is § 14-833(c).   It provides:
7
(c) The certificate is void unless a proceeding to foreclose the
right of redemption is filed:
(1) within 2 years of the date of the certificate of sale; or
(2) in Baltimore City, with respect to any property which was
cited as vacant and abandoned on a housing or building violation
notice outstanding on the date of the tax sale, within 1 year of the
date of the certificate of sale.
Section 14-820 pertaining to the contents of a certificate of sale is also instructive, particularly
subsection (a)(8), which provides:
(a) The collector shall deliver to the purchaser a certificate of sale under the
collector's hand and seal, or by the collector's authorized facsimile signature,
acknowledged by the collector as a conveyance of land, which certificate shall
set forth:
*   *   *
(8) that the certificate will be void unless foreclosure proceedings
are brought within 2 years from the date of the certificate or in
Baltimore City, with respect to any property which was cited as
vacant and abandoned on a housing or building violation notice
outstanding on the date of tax sale, within 1 year from the date
of the certificate.
In particular, the question to be answered is “what does ‘date of the certificate of sale’ mean?”
Determining the answer to that question is a matter of statutory construction. The principles
pursuant to which that task is performed are clear and well settled in this State.  Prince
George's County v. Vieira, 340 Md. 651, 658, 667 A.2d 898, 901 (1995).   The object of
statutory construction is to effectuate, after discerning, the real intention of the Legislature.
 Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Cassidy, 338 Md. 88, 93, 656 A.2d 757, 760 (1995);
Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 435, 639 A.2d 675, 678 (1994);  Motor Vehicle Admin. v.
Seidel Chevrolet, Inc., 326 Md. 237, 248, 604 A.2d 473, 479 (1992); Mustafa v. State, 323
8
Md. 65, 73, 591 A.2d 481, 485 (1991).    The search for legislative intent  begins, and
ordinarily ends, with the words of the statute under review.   Cassidy, 338 Md. at 93, 656
A.2d at 760;  Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 145, 626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993).   Where, giving
the words of the statute their ordinary and common meaning, see Dickerson v. State, 324 Md.
163, 171, 596 A.2d 648, 652 (1991);  Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 185, 567 A.2d 126,
127 (1989), the statute is clear and unambiguous, both in meaning and application, see C &
P Telephone v. Director of Finance, 343 Md. 567, 578, 683 A.2d 512, 517 (1996), it usually
is unnecessary to go further.  State v. Thompson, 332 Md. 1, 7, 629 A.2d 731, 734 (1993);
Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65, 73, 591 A.2d 481, 485 (1992).  Because it is part of the context,
related statutes or a statutory scheme that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative
purpose or goal must also be considered.  Popham v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company,
333 Md. 136, 148, 634 A.2d 28, 34 (1993);  GEICO v. Insurance Commissioner, 332 Md.
124, 131-32, 630 A.2d 713, 717 (1993).  Thus, not only are  we required to interpret the
statute as a whole, State v. Crescent Cities Jaycees Found., Inc., 330 Md. 460, 468, 624 A.2d
955, 959 (1993), but, if appropriate, in the context of the entire statutory scheme of which it
is a part.  Id.; Popham v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, 333 Md. 136, 148, 634 A.2d
28, 34 (1993);   GEICO v. Insurance Comm'r, 332 Md. 124, 131-32, 630 A.2d 713, 717
(1993);  Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 305 Md. 145, 157, 501
A.2d 1307, 1313 (1986).   Moreover, neither the words in the statute nor any  portion of the
statutory scheme should be read "so as to render the other, or any portion of it, meaningless,
surplusage, superfluous, or nugatory."  GEICO, 332 Md. at 132, 630 A.2d at 714.   Nor may
That section provides:
6
Any certificate of sale executed and delivered by the collector to the
purchaser is assignable and an assignment of the certificate of sale vests in
the assignee, or the legal representative of the assignee, all the right, title,
and interest of the original purchaser.   The assignment of certificate of sale
may be made in accordance with the provisions of law relating to the short
assignment of mortgages.
Pursuant to this section,
7
The purchaser may record the certificate of sale among the land records of
9
we read a statute in a way that is inconsistent with, or ignores, common sense or logic. Frost
v. State, 336 Md 125, 137, 647 A.2d 106,112(1994). 
The applicable statutes clearly and unambiguously refer to the “date of the certificate”
or the “date of the certificate of sale.”   Neither one mentions the “date of sale” in the context
of the limitation period for foreclosing the right of redemption.   This is significant because
there is a real and acknowledged difference between the two dates, both of which are
addressed in the legislation regulating tax sales.  Compare §14-820(a)(2), requiring that the
certificate of sale set forth the date of sale with §14-820(a)(8), defining the limitations period
as running from the date of the certificate.   Moreover, the certificate of sale has an existence
and significance apart from the date of sale.   Consistent with the requirement that it set forth
the date of sale, the certificate actually evidences the sale. See §14-820(a)(“The collector shall
deliver to the purchaser a certificate of sale under the collector’s hand and seal, or by the
collector’s facsimile signature, acknowledged by the collector as a conveyance of land....”).
  Additionally, the certificate is assignable, §14-821,  and may be recorded. Section 14-822.
6
7
the county in which the property is located, but failure to record does not
affect the right to institute foreclosure proceedings as provided in this
subtitle.
10
 The Legislature’s use of the phrase “date of the certificate of sale” takes on added importance
in view  of these attributes, particularly assignability, of the certificates.    Finally, §14-832,
concerned with the construction of the sections of the legislative scheme relating to the
foreclosure of the right of redemption by tax sale purchasers, which includes §14-833, is also
instructive.   Mandating liberal construction, it provides:
The provisions of §§ 14-832.1 through 14-854 of this subtitle shall be liberally
construed as remedial legislation to encourage the foreclosure of rights of
redemption by suits in the circuit courts and for the decreeing of marketable
titles to property sold by the collector.
We believe that the legislative intent in enacting § 14-833 is clear.    By using the
phrase, “date of the certificate of sale,” the General Assembly clearly and unequivocally
stated its intention that the two year period run from that date, rather than the date of sale. 
So clear is the statement that there simply is no room or occasion for interpretation.   But not
only did the General Assembly use clear and unambiguous language in defining the period
of limitations, to use any other date would render the phrase the Legislature used meaningless
and mere surplusage.    Thus, even were there some ambiguity, as we have already seen, it
may not be resolved in that way; effect still must be given to every phrase and word of the
statute if possible.   And, of course, in the case of the statutes under consideration,  that may
be done simply by treating the date of the sale and the date of the certificate as they have been
treated by the plain language of the statutes, as separate, one reflecting the other, and having
11
different consequences and significance.   
The appellee argues that this Court and the Court of Special Appeals have already
resolved this issue and, as we have seen, it has offered cases to support that assertion.   Those
cases do not, however, appreciably advance the appellee’s position.    To be sure, there is
language in those cases which seems to equate the date of sale and the date of the certificate
of sale.   But the issue in those cases was not the one presented in this case.  
 It is true, of course, that in Fish Market, this Court, summarizing the right of a
purchaser at a tax sale to foreclose the right of redemption with respect to the property
purchased, stated:
After waiting six months from the date of the sale, the holder can file a
complaint to foreclose the owner’s right of redemption. Section 14-833.   If the
certificate holder does not file such a complaint within two years of the tax
sale, the certificate becomes void, effectively placing a statute of limitations on
actions to foreclose the right of redemption.
337 Md. at 6, 650 A.2d at 707.    There were two issues in that case, “whether Maryland's
General Assembly may properly authorize Baltimore City to set the redemption interest rate
on a tax sale of real estate at a rate greater than the 6% rate provided in Article III, § 57 of the
Maryland Constitution [footnote omitted] and whether a circuit court, in a proceeding to
foreclose the rights of redemption in two properties, can substitute the assignee of only one
of the two tax sale certificates so that two plaintiffs, rather than one, are parties in the case,”
id. at 4, 650 at 706.   Neither issue involved the timeliness of the filing of the foreclosure
proceedings. Thus, resolution of the issues in that case did not turn on the quoted passage. 
Similarly, in Scheve, despite language suggesting that the two year period for filing the
A similar analysis applies to the other cases cited by the appellee: Prince George’s
8
Home, Inc., v. Cahn, 283 Md. 76, 77, 389 A.2d 853 (1978)(error to dismiss timely filed
action to foreclose rights of redemption even though not concluded for nine years);
Dawson v. Prince George’s County, 324 Md. 481, 482, 597 A.2d 952 (1991)(right of
redemption may not be foreclosed while dispute concerning the amount required for
redemption is pending); Slattery v. Friedman, 99 Md. App. 106,120, 636 A.2d 1,8, cert.
denied 335 Md. 81, 642 A.2d 192 (1994)(propriety of setting aside a final order
foreclosing the right of redemption);  Scott v. Seek Lane Venture, Inc., 91 Md. App. 668,
685, 605 A.2d 942, 950 (1992)(same).   
12
foreclosure action ran from the date of sale, the only issue in the case was “whether the court
may issue a final decree foreclosing a landowner's right of redemption and vesting title in a
tax sale purchaser ... where the tax sale purchaser has filed suit to foreclose the right of
redemption and taken all necessary steps to perfect the foreclosure ... but thereafter changed
his mind.” 328 Md. at 365-66, 614 A.2d at 583-84.   Consequently, to the extent that language
favorable to the appellee’s position may be interpreted to bear on the issue sub judice, it is
at best dicta.    
8
The appellee fares no better with its legislative acquiescence argument. We have
already concluded that the statutes at issue are not ambiguous, that, on the contrary, they are
quite clear and unambiguous.   Moreover, as we have also shown, the issue before the courts
when they made the pronouncements the appellee relies upon was not one which required the
courts to decide the point that is at the heart of this case.
To be sure, it may very well be the case that the legislative history of the tax sale
provisions as they pertain to when proceedings to terminate right of redemption must be
initiated reflects the Legislature’s desire to bring uniformity to the process.   Thus, assuming
13
that the appellee’s arguments in this regard are correct does not affect the result or, indeed,
the validity of the appellant’s argument.   By prescribing a two-year period, counting from
the date of the tax sale certificate, for bringing an action to foreclose the right of redemption
of  a property owner whose property has been sold at tax sale, the General Assembly achieved
the goal of uniformity and, in addition, the predictability that uniformity fosters.   That a
particular subdivision chooses, for whatever reason, to issue the certificate after the date of
sale does not disrupt the scheme contemplated by the Legislature since any foreclosure of the
right of redemption action must, and certainly could, comply with the legislative directive.
 In short, had it intended the two-year period to run from the date of the tax sale, surely the
General Assembly could, and would, have said so specifically.
And for the very same reason just stated, there is in this case no “illegal delegation of
the General Assembly’s legislative authority in violation of Article 8 of the Declaration of
Rights of the Maryland Constitution and the Delegation Doctrine established by the Courts.”
 As we have seen, the General Assembly itself prescribed the limitations period when it
selected the date of the certificate of sale, rather than, as it could have done, the date of sale,
as the trigger for starting the running of the period in which the foreclosure proceedings must
be commenced.   Determining when that date has occurred does not impact or, as the appellee
would have it, undermine, that exercise of discretion.   Whether the date of the certificate is
determined by when it is signed by the Collector of Taxes and/or when that official’s
signature is notarized or by some other event is beside the point because the Legislature has
already acted to designate the commencement date for the purpose of limitations.  Therefore,
14
whatever that determining factor or event, neither it nor the person performing it will have
made the critical decision - when to start the running of the period of limitations.    
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY REVERSED;
CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH
INSTRUCTIONS TO ENTER JUDGMENT FOR
THE APPELLANT; COSTS TO BE PAID BY
THE APPELLEE.