Case Title: Brunsvold v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 93-15

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-11-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Brunsvold v. State1993 WY 146864 P.2d 34Case Number: 93-15Decided: 11/23/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Steven BRUNSVOLD,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal 
from The District Court of Laramie County, Edward L. Grant, 
J.

Wyoming 
Public Defender Program, Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Gerald M. 
Gallivan, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid Program, Thomas A. Thompson, Student 
Director, and Aaron Phillips, Student Intern, for 
appellant.

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Barbara Boyer, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., and Mary Beth Wolff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      In this case, we 
address and resolve the question whether a district court in a criminal case has 
jurisdiction to order repayment to the defendant of payments made into the Crime 
Victims Compensation Fund or to adjust the terms of probation after the 
defendant has been discharged. The appellant, Steven Brunsvold (Brunsvold), 
during his probation, filed a motion seeking return of money improperly paid to 
the Crime Victims Compensation Fund, relying upon the decisions of this court in 
Dreiman v. State, 825 P.2d 758 (Wyo. 1992), and Seaton v. State, 811 P.2d 276 
(Wyo. 1991). After presenting his motion for refund of the money paid, Brunsvold 
succeeded in obtaining a discharge from his probation from another district 
judge. Subsequent to Brunsvold's discharge, the original judge ordered refund of 
the moneys paid and, when the administrator of the Crime Victims Compensation 
Fund did not refund the money, Brunsvold sought a contempt citation. The 
district court then rescinded its earlier order requiring repayment of the 
funds, and Brunsvold appeals from that determination. We hold the trial court 
was without jurisdiction to afford the relief sought by 
Brunsvold.

[¶2]      In his Brief of 
Appellant, Brunsvold states this to be the issue:

1. 
Whether the District Court erred by failing to order the refund of payments to 
the Victim's Compensation Fund in excess of those permitted under Wyoming 
statutes and this Court's decisions in Seaton and Dreiman.

In 
its brief, the State of Wyoming sets forth the issue in this 
way:

A. 
Whether the district court properly denied appellant's motion for return of 
monies paid into the crime victim's compensation fund.

While 
the parties have presented cogent arguments in their briefs with respect to 
these issues, we conclude that the issue upon which the case must be resolved is 
that of jurisdiction, i.e.:

     Whether a trial court 
in Wyoming has jurisdiction in a criminal proceeding after the defendant has 
been discharged from probation.

[¶3]      In March, 1990, 
Brunsvold was convicted in the district court on two counts of aiding and 
abetting delivery of a controlled substance pursuant to his pleas of guilty. 
Following a pre-sentence investigation and the appropriate report to the court, 
Brunsvold was sentenced to a term of not less than one and one-half, nor more 
than two and one-half, years on each count with the proviso that the sentences 
be served concurrently. The district court then suspended the execution of the 
sentence and placed Brunsvold on probation for two years. The trial court 
ordered Brunsvold to pay restitution to the Department of Criminal Investigation 
in the amount of $140; to reimburse the Wyoming Public Defender's office in the 
amount of $164.25 for the services of his state-appointed attorney; and to pay 
$136.88 to the district attorney's office for the costs of prosecution. In 
addition, Brunsvold was ordered to pay $5,000 in restitution to the Crime 
Victims Compensation Fund, with $50 of that amount to be paid within ten days. 
The remaining balance of the restitution was to be paid during the term of 
Brunsvold's probation according to a payment plan to be promulgated by the 
Department of Probation and Parole.

[¶4]      On July 12, 1990, 
Brunsvold petitioned the district court to extend the term of his probation to 
five years in order to reduce the amount of his monthly restitution payments. 
The court granted this motion on July 20, 1990. On April 22, 1991, a petition 
was filed by the district attorney for revocation of Brunsvold's probation. At 
the hearing on that petition, Brunsvold admitted he had consumed alcohol during 
the holidays, and he had smoked a joint of marijuana during December, 1990. 
After the hearing, the district court signed an order, entered on May 21, 1991, 
revoking Brunsvold's probation and then reinstating him on probation for a 
period of five years beginning May 15, 1990. On April 17, 1992, a second 
petition for revocation of Brunsvold's probation was filed. The district court, 
as it had before, revoked probation and reinstated Brunsvold on probation 
commencing May 1, 1992. On this occasion, the district court required Brunsvold 
be admitted to the resident treatment program of Community Alternatives of 
Cheyenne for a term of six months.

[¶5]      Brunsvold then 
took the initiative by filing a motion for return of money paid improperly to 
the Crime Victims Compensation Fund on the obligation for restitution in the 
amount of $5,000. Brunsvold based this contention on the court's decision in 
Dreiman. He asserted periodic payments he had made into the Crime Victims 
Compensation Fund were made pursuant to an order that had failed to require 
payment within ten days as the statute requires and, consequently, those 
payments were ordered without authority in the law. Subsequently, on August 24, 
1992, Brunsvold filed a motion seeking discharge from probation on the ground 
his probation had been extended to five years only because he was not able to 
pay the restitution imposed within the original two-year probationary 
term.

[¶6]      The response from 
the district attorney's office was another petition for revocation of 
Brunsvold's probation, filed on September 25, 1992. Prior to any further 
proceeding with respect to revocation, another district judge discharged 
Brunsvold from probation by an order entered on September 28, 1992. Only two 
days later, the district judge who had been handling the Brunsvold case entered 
an order requiring refund to Brunsvold of the payments he previously had made to 
the Crime Victims Compensation Fund. That refund was not made, and Brunsvold 
sought relief on October 15, 1992 by a motion for a contempt hearing urging the 
court to issue an order to show cause why the State had failed to make the 
ordered reimbursement. On the same day, Brunsvold filed a petition for a writ of 
mandamus to require refund of the moneys paid from the administrator of the 
Crime Victims Compensation Fund. The court did enter an order to show cause and, 
after a hearing on October 23, 1992, the district judge rescinded the earlier 
order for refund from the Crime Victims Compensation Fund. Brunsvold appealed 
from this latter order.

[¶7]      The question of 
the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court may be raised by this 
court on its own motion. We have done that because, in our judgment, the 
resolution of this case depends upon the jurisdiction of the court. The absence 
of subject matter jurisdiction in a trial court or an administrative agency 
cannot be waived, and any party, or the court itself, can challenge that 
jurisdiction at any time. See, e.g., Matter of Various Water Rights in Lake 
DeSmet Reservoir, 623 P.2d 764 (Wyo. 1981); Merritt v. Merritt, 586 P.2d 550 
(Wyo. 1978); Gardner v. Walker, 373 P.2d 598 (Wyo. 1962).

[¶8]      We do not find 
any prior case in Wyoming that matches the rather convoluted procedural facts of 
this case. We hold, as of the time the district court dealt with Brunsvold's 
motion, it had no further jurisdiction in the criminal case. Lackey v. State, 
731 P.2d 565 (Wyo. 1987). In this regard, we also rely upon persuasive authority 
from sister jurisdictions defining the jurisdictional limitations of a trial 
court in dealing with probationers. See, e.g., Keller v. Superior Court in and 
for Maricopa County, 22 Ariz. App. 122, 524 P.2d 956 (1974); Burney v. State, 
577 So. 2d 722 (Fla.Ct.App. 1991); Robinson v. State, 474 So. 2d 1274 (Fla.Ct.App. 
1985); Kiser v. Commonwealth, 829 S.W.2d 432 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992); State ex rel. 
Peach v. Tillman, 615 S.W.2d 514 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Miller v. Haskins, 12 Ohio 
Misc. 164, 230 N.E.2d 694 (1967). While the resolution of these several cases 
depended upon a determination of when the probation ended as a matter of law, at 
least equivalent, if not superior, significance must be afforded to the 
volitional act of the district court in discharging the 
probationer.

[¶9]      In Lackey, we 
addressed a situation in which the State attempted to revoke probation pursuant 
to a petition filed after the probationary sentence had ended. This court held 
the order revoking Lackey's probation must be vacated, and the trial court was 
directed to enter an order discharging him. The rationale for the decision was 
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke probation since the second 
petition for revocation upon which the court acted was not filed prior to the 
expiration of the period of probation.

[¶10]   The question presented in Keller, 
under a different statutory requirement, was whether the court had jurisdiction 
to continue probation revocation proceedings in a situation in which the 
defendant's probationary term expired after the filing of the petition to 
revoke, but before the date set for the initial revocation hearing. The Arizona 
Court of Appeals stated:

The 
trial court does not have jurisdiction over a probationer where probation 
revocation procedures and the imposition of a sentence have not been 
accomplished prior to the expiration of his term of 
probation.

Keller, 
524 P.2d  at 958.

The 
court, therefore, held the petitioner's habeas corpus petition should be granted 
and ordered his discharge based upon the lack of jurisdiction in the trial 
court. Keller.

[¶11]   The Missouri Court of Appeals in 
Tillman held that, whenever a recipient of a suspended imposition of sentence 
has complied with his probation terms, the court may discharge him from its 
jurisdiction. The result was that, after the discharge, a judgment of conviction 
could not be entered upon the verdict in the case. See Tillman, 615 S.W.2d 514.

[¶12]   The Florida Courts of Appeals in 
both Burney and Robinson found a trial court has no power to conduct a hearing 
for violation of probation after the defendant's original probationary term has 
expired. In Robinson, the court expressed it in this way:

Filing 
of new substantive charges on the affidavit of probation after the expiration of 
the probationary period is untimely and * * * the trial court has no 
jurisdiction to consider the new charges.

Robinson, 
474 So. 2d  at 1275; see also Kiser, 829 S.W.2d 432; Miller, 230 N.E.2d 694.

[¶13]   Considered collectively, all of 
these cases acknowledge that, when the term of probation has expired, a trial 
court no longer has any authority to act in the case. As in Keller, this can be 
true even if a timely petition to revoke has been filed prior to the end of the 
probationer's term, if the sentencing is not accomplished during that same time 
frame. That is, if the petitioner has been discharged, nothing further can be 
done. Of course, this rule inures to the benefit of the probationer because any 
recourse against him for criminal violations, if the revocation of probation has 
not been accomplished during his probationary term, must take the form of 
newly-filed charges.

[¶14]   The rule is that the trial court 
has no jurisdiction after the petitioner has been discharged, whether that be by 
operation of law or by an order entered by the court. Lackey. This rule also 
must inure to the benefit of the Crime Victims Compensation Fund. The court no 
longer had jurisdiction in Brunsvold's case. Brunsvold's sentence was completed 
when the district judge entered the order discharging him from probation and the 
criminal case was over. It may well now stand as res judicata. In any 
event, both of the orders of the district court entered after the discharge, the 
one requiring refund and the other rescinding that earlier order relating to the 
repayment to Brunsvold of the moneys paid to the Crime Victims Compensation 
Fund, are null and void. The district court had no 
jurisdiction.

[¶15]   We affirm this case on 
jurisdictional grounds. It follows, since the trial court had no jurisdiction, 
this appeal should be dismissed, and we so hold.

[¶16]   Appeal dismissed.