Case Title: Watson v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 222, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2002-08-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ARTHUR T. WATSON, JR., 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 222, 2002 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr.A. No. IN96-10-1623 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 12, 2002 
 
 
 
 
  Decided:   August 7, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, BERGER and STEELE, Justices 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 7th day of August 2002, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening 
brief and the State’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it 
appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Arthur T. Watson, Jr., claims error in the 
Superior Court’s denial of his motion for postconviction relief.  The State has 
moved to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that it is 
manifest on the face of Watson’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit.1  
We agree and AFFIRM. 
                                                          
 
1SUPR. CT. R. 25(a). 
 
2
 
(2) 
In this appeal, Watson claims that the Superior Court abused its 
discretion by denying his motion for postconviction relief because: a) his 
identification by a witness at trial violated his due process rights; and b) his 
sentence as an habitual offender was illegal.  Watson states that, in pursuing these 
claims, he is not asserting that his counsel provided ineffective assistance. 
 
(3) 
In May 1997, Watson was convicted by a Superior Court jury of 
Robbery in the First Degree.  He was declared an habitual offender2 and was 
sentenced to 25 years in prison.  Watson’s conviction and sentence were affirmed 
by this Court on direct appeal.3 
 
(4) 
Watson’s first claim of abuse of discretion on the part of the Superior 
Court is without merit.  The Superior Court properly ruled that Watson’s claim of 
improper identification by a witness at trial was procedurally barred as formerly 
adjudicated4 and there was no showing that reconsideration of the claim was 
warranted in the interest of justice.5   
 
(5) 
The Superior Court also properly ruled that Watson’s second claim 
was procedurally barred because it had not been asserted in the proceedings 
                                                          
 
2DEL. CODE ANN. tit 11, § 4214(a) (2001). 
3Watson v. State, Del. Supr., No. 387, 1997, Hartnett, J. (Oct. 8, 1998). 
4SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (4). 
5ID. 
 
3
leading to the judgment of conviction6 and there was no showing of any basis upon 
which to excuse the procedural default.7  The Superior Court correctly rejected 
Watson’s argument that he did not assert the claim in his direct appeal because he 
was unable to communicate directly with the Court while represented by counsel8 
and correctly concluded that, in the absence of an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, Watson was precluded from raising the issue in a postconviction motion. 
 
(6) 
It is manifest on the face of Watson’s opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by settled 
Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, clearly there 
was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), the State ‘s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele___________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                          
 
6SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (3). 
7SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (3) (A) and (B); SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (5). 
8SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 47; SUPR. CT. R. 8.