Case Title: Woods v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 567, 2009

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2010-04-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
BERNARD WOODS, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 567, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 0708031045 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: February 26, 2010 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: April 26, 2010 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER, and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 26th day of April 2010, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the 
record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Bernard Woods, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s denial of his first motion for postconviction relief.  Woods raises three 
issues in his opening brief on appeal.  We find no merit to any of his arguments.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. 
(2) 
The record reflects that Woods pled guilty in February 2008 to one 
count each of trafficking, delivery of cocaine, possession of a deadly weapon 
during the commission of a felony, possession of a deadly weapon by a person 
prohibited, and second degree conspiracy.  In exchange for his guilty plea, the 
 
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State agreed to dismiss other charges against him, to recommend a sentence of no  
more than 15 years incarceration, and not to seek habitual offender sentencing.  
Following his plea, the Superior Court immediately sentenced Woods, in 
accordance with his plea agreement, to a total period of 29 years at Level V 
incarceration, to be suspended after serving a mandatory sentence of 15 years for a 
period of drug treatment and probation.  
(3) 
Woods did not file a direct appeal with this Court.  Instead, in April 
2008, Woods filed a motion for sentence reduction, which the Superior Court 
denied.  Again, Woods did not appeal.  In July 2008, he filed a motion for 
postconviction relief, which he was permitted to amend.  After receiving responses 
from defense counsel and counsel for the State, a Superior Court Commissioner 
issued a report recommending that Woods’ motion be denied.  On September 10, 
2009, the Superior Court denied Woods’ motion.  This appeal followed. 
(4) 
In his opening brief on appeal, Woods contends that: (i) the prosecutor 
engaged in misconduct by presenting false information to the grand jury; (ii) the 
prosecutor engaged in misconduct by coercing Woods to plead guilty; and (iii) his 
trial counsel was ineffective.1  The Superior Court found that Woods’ claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct were procedurally barred because he had raised similar 
                                                 
1 To the extent Woods’ postconviction motion and amendments raised additional issues 
that were not included in his opening brief on appeal, those claims are deemed waived.  Murphy 
v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993).  We do not address them here. 
 
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claims, which were rejected, when the Superior Court denied Woods’ motion for 
sentence reduction.2  The Superior Court rejected Woods’ ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim on its merits. 
(5) 
On appeal from the denial of postconviction relief, this Court first 
must consider the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before addressing any 
substantive issues.3  Rule 61(i)(4) bars litigation of any claim that previously was 
adjudicated unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of 
justice.  In this case, Woods argued in his motion for sentence reduction, which the 
Superior Court denied, that the prosecutor had engaged in misconduct and 
maliciously prosecuted him based on “fraudulent” weapon evidence.  We find no 
error in the Superior Court’s refusal to reconsider this previously adjudicated issue, 
even though Woods had restated his claim.4 Accordingly, we reject Woods’ first 
two arguments on appeal. 
(6) 
To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Woods 
was required to establish that (i) his trial counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness; and (ii) but for counsel’s unprofessional 
                                                 
2  See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4) (2010) (holding that any postconviction claim that 
was previously adjudicated is thereafter barred unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted 
in the interests of justice).  
3Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
4 Skinner v. State, 607 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Del. 1992) (court is not required to reconsider a 
previously adjudicated postconviction claim that has been “refined or restated”). 
 
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errors, he would not have pled guilty but would have insisted on going to trial.5  
Woods was required to set forth and substantiate concrete allegations of actual 
prejudice6 in order to overcome the “strong presumption” that counsel’s 
representation was professionally reasonable.7 
 (7) 
In this case, Woods contended that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to pursue a motion to suppress and for coercing Woods into pleading guilty 
to “fraudulent” weapon offenses, which were the result of an illegal search and 
seizure.  The record, however, does not support Woods’ argument.  Defense 
counsel did, in fact, file a pretrial motion to suppress, along with other pretrial 
motions.  In the course of the plea bargaining process, the prosecutor informed 
defense counsel that if Woods pursued a hearing on his pretrial motions, then the 
State would not offer a plea avoiding habitual offender sentencing.  After defense 
counsel discussed the matter with him, Woods chose to accept the plea in lieu of 
pursuing his pretrial motions.  
(8) 
During the course of the plea colloquy, Woods expressed satisfaction 
with the representation provided by his counsel.  He also acknowledged that he 
was pleading guilty because he, in fact, was guilty.  He acknowledged his 
                                                 
5 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 58-59 (Del. 1988) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 
(1985)).  See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). 
6 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 556. 
7 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689. 
 
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understanding that he was waiving certain rights by pleading guilty, including his 
right to pursue the pretrial suppression motion.  The Superior Court specifically 
found that Woods was competent to enter a plea and that his plea was entered 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  The trial court reviewed the sentence 
with Woods, and Woods acknowledged it was the sentence he agreed to in his plea 
form.  Woods also stated under oath that no one had coerced him into entering a 
plea. 
(9) 
Under these circumstances, we find no error in the Superior Court’s 
denial of Woods’ claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  In the absence of clear 
and convincing evidence to the contrary, Woods is bound by the answers on his 
guilty plea form and his sworn statements to the judge during the plea colloquy.8    
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
8 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997).