Case Title: Stitle v. Stitle

Citation: 197 N.E.2d 174, 245 Ind. 168

Docket Number: 30,285

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1964-03-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
245 Ind. 168 (1964)
197 N.E.2d 174
STITLE
v.
STITLE.
No. 30,285.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed March 24, 1964.
Stevenson, Kendall & Stevenson, of Danville, and Harry M. Stitle, Jr., pro se, for appellant.
Raber & Vandivier, John Carl Vandivier, Jr., of Danville, Raikos, Barton, Rochford & Thomas and John J. Rochford, of Indianapolis, for appellee.
JACKSON, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Hendricks Circuit Court finding appellant guilty of contempt for violation of a support order incident to a decree of divorce previously entered.
*169 The factual situation may be best summarized by reference to the Affidavit for Contempt Citation filed by appellee and appellant's Answer in Denial thereto. The above mentioned pleadings, omitting formal parts, verification and signatures follow chronologically.
Thereafter, prior to a hearing on the contempt citation, appellee filed a Petition to Modify Divorce Decree in which she asked that the previous support order be doubled and also thereafter and prior to the hearing on the contempt citation appellee's attorneys filed their Petition For Allowance of Partial Attorney's Fees.
We have taken appellant's condensed recital of the evidence from his brief, as the appellee in her brief paragraph six page two, "accepts the appellant's condensed recital of the evidence in narrative form" as follows:
March 20, 1962, the court entered its finding and judgment, which in pertinent part, reads as follows:
March 29th appellant filed his motion for a new trial on the following grounds:
On April 9, 1962, the court entered its order overruling the motion for a new trial and ordered the defendant (appellant) to purge himself forthwith for his contempt.
Appellant's assignment of error is the single ground that "[t]he court erred in overruling the appellant's motion for a new trial."
*182 Basically the proposition relied on by appellant for reversal of the judgment is:
1. That the son, Harry Stitle, III, was emancipated and consequently appellant was relieved from making further payments pursuant to the support order embodied in the decree.
Emancipation frees a child from the care, custody and control of its parents, what constitutes emancipation of a minor child is a question of law, but whether there has been an emancipation is a question of fact. The subject is discussed rather fully at 22 I.L.E. § 18, p. 366 with numerous cases cited and in the interest of brevity herein, reference is made to that work rather than exhaustively discussed here.
The record before us sustains the finding and judgment of the trial court that Harry Stitle III was not emancipated at the time in question.
We think it would follow as a matter of law that if the son, Harry Stitle III, was not emancipated then appellant was required to make the payments in the manner, amount and at the times required by the support order embodied in the divorce decree, at least until such order was modified or set aside.
The Appellate Court of Indiana in the case of Biedron v. Biedron (1958), 128 Ind. App. 299, 148 N.E.2d 209 said, "[i]n this state after support installments have accrued, the court is without power to reduce, annul or vacate such orders retrospectively, and therefore the court committed error in attempting to do so. Zirkle v. Zirkle (1930), 202 Ind. 129, 172 N.E. 192; Corbridge v. Corbridge (1952), 230 Ind. 201, 102 N.E.2d 764; Ginn v. Ginn (1941), 108 Ind. App. 553, 31 N.E.2d 65."
*183 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Arterburn and Myers, JJ., concur. Landis, C.J., and Achor, J., concur in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 197 N.E.2d 174.