Case Title: Murphy v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015-SC-000487-MR

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 2017-02-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
RENDERED: FEBRUARY 16, 2017
TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2015-SC-000487-MR
REX ALLEN MURPHY APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE DAVID A. TAPP, JUDGE.
NO. 14-CR-00407

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE HUGHES

AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING

‘a matter of right from a judgment

 

Appellant, Rex Allen Murphy, appeals
of the Pulaski Circuit Court sentencing him to thirty years’ imprisonment for
first-degree sodomy, first-degree sexual abuse, and use of a minor in a sexual
performance. Murphy raises seven issues on appeal: 1) the trial court erred by
failing to direct a verdict of acquittal for first-degree sodomy and first-degree
‘sexual abuse; 2) the trial court violated double jeopardy when it failed to
differentiate between first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse in the
jury instructions; 3) the trial court erred by failing to include an instruction for
the lesser included offense of sexual misconduct; 4) the trial court erred by
6)

 

permitting the Commonwealth to ask lay witnesses for legal conclusion:

the Commonwealth’s statements during closing argument constituted palpable

 

 

error; 6) the trial court erred by excluding mitigation evidence; and 7)
cumulative error supports reversal. For the following reasons, we affirm
Murphy's conviction for use of a minor in a sexual performance, reverse his
convictions for first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse, and remand
this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2013, when Paul was fifteen-years-old, Murphy, who was almost
thirty-years old, became a member of the church Paul attended.! In April
2014, Murphy began to teach the church's Sunday school class. There were
only seventeen members of the congregation and the Sunday school class only
hhad two to three pupils, including Paul and his brother. These classes, which
initially focused on bible study and discussion, over time became focused on
personal and sexual topics.

During the course of Paul and Murphy's discussions, Murphy claimed to
have “dark magic powers” and that he had the ability to erase a person’s mind,
Murphy also asserted that he was able to see a person's sins and sexuality by
touching their hands. Murphy convinced Paul that his sin was bisexuality and
offered to help Paul fight this “sin” by tempting him sexually, so that he would
become stronger and not give into his urges.

‘Several weeks into teaching Paul’s Sunday school class, Murphy asked
Paul to help him with work on his residence. With Paul's parents’ approval,

‘Murphy would pick up Paul and drive him to Murphy's residence, where the

' The name of the minor victim in this opinion has been replaced with a
pseudonym to preserve his privacy.

2
‘two would work together every other week. While driving to the residence, the
pair would not only discuss Paul's day, but also sexual topics. On more than
‘one occasion, Murphy would bring up a sexual topic as a “test” and then
during the resulting discussion check to see whether Murphy had an erection.
Other examples of Murphy's conduct during their time in the truck included: 1)
touching Paul's genitals over his clothing; 2) discussing oral sex with Paul; and
3) requesting to see Paul's genitals,

(One evening after a cross-country race, in which Paul participated, Paul
and Murphy were alone in Murphy's truck. After Murphy discussed
homosexuality and sexual temptation, he played a pornographic video on hi
phone and watched it with Paul. Afterwards, Murphy had Paul expose his
penis so that Murphy could sexually stimulate him. Later in the evening, Paul
‘and Murphy exited the vehicle and entered the woods, where Murphy asked
Paul to anally sodomize him. Despite Paul's efforts, he was unable to complete
the sexual act. Subsequently, Paul informed Murphy that he did not want to
‘engage in sodomy, which made Murphy upset. After this incident, Paul
stopped going to Murphy's residence.

In September 2014, Murphy contacted Paul to inform him that he had
completed the work on the residence and wanted to celebrate. Paul agreed to
let Murphy pick him up, due to his belief that Murphy's wife would be home
uring his visit, Unbeknownst to Paul, Murphy's wife was at church, and
consequently he would be alone with Murphy. Once at the residence, Murphy

began to discuss sexual topics with Paul. Afterwards, he asked Paul to

3
‘masturbate in front of him and provided him with lubricant to do so. Paul
agreed and Murphy watched him perform the sex act. Subsequently, Murphy
‘and Paul went into the bedroom where Paul removed his clothes. Murphy then
began to kiss Paul’s torso and groin area and put his mouth and hands on
Paul's penis, When Murphy's wife returned home, Paul and Murphy
discontinued the sexual acts. Before driving Paul home that evening, Murphy
threatened to kill him if he were to reveal what had happened.?

In October 2014, Paul admitted to a co-worker at the hospital where he
volunteered that Murphy had inappropriately touched him and threatened him
with witchcraft, The co-worker reported the abuse to the police who began an
investigation. As part of that investigation, Eubank Police Chief Colin Hatfield
‘and social service worker Brittany Penick spoke with Murphy at his residence.
‘Murphy told Chief Hatfield and Penick that he had been cursed with witchcraft,
and that the Lord revealed things to him when he touched a person’s hand.
Murphy went on to say that the Lord had informed him that Paul was dealing
with homosexuality. Additionally, Murphy admitted to touching and engaging
in sexual acts with Paul. Murphy's admission was only partially recorded, as
the tape recorder that Chief Hatfield and Penick used stopped working during
the recording.

‘Murphy was indicted by the Pulaski County grand jury in November

2014, for first-degree sodomy, first-degree sexual abuse, and use of a minor in

2 Pau also testified that Murphy threatened to use his black magic powers
‘against him, if he were to reveal to others what had happened that evening.

4
f sexual performance. In Murphy's February 2015 trial, the Commonwealth
called three witnesses: Paul, Chief Hatfield, and Penick. In his testimony, Paul
explained that he went along with Murphy’s sexual requests because of his fear
of Murphy’s black magic powers. Specifically, Paul was worried that Murphy
‘would use those powers to erase his mind. Additionally, Paul testified that
‘Murphy had previously threatened him with the use of black magic.

Murphy declined to testify or call any witnesses in the guilt phase of his,
trial. His defense was that the sexual acts with Paul were legal and

consensual, as Paul was sixteen years old when the sexual offenses alleged at

 

tial occurred. Additionally, Murphy claimed that the Commonwealth provided
insufficient evidence to establish forcible compulsion and that his providing
lubricant to Paul did not constitute inducement so as to convict him of use of a
minor in a sexual performance.

Murphy was convicted of all charges and the jury recommended fifteen
years’ imprisonment for first-degree sodomy, five years imprisonment for first-
degree sexual abuse, and ten years’ imprisonment for use of a minor in a
sexual performance. The jury recommended that those sentences be served
consecutively for a total sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment, After denying
Murphy's motion for a new trial and for a judgment of acquittal, the trial court
sentenced Murphy in conformance with the jury's recommendation. Murphy
brings this appeal

 

matter of right.
ANALYSIS

1. The Trial Court Erred by Failing to Direct a Verdict of Acquittal for
First-Degree Sodomy and First-Degree Sexual Abuse,

Murphy argues that the Commonwealth failed to produce sufficient
evidence of the element of “forcible compulsion” to convict him of first-degree
sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse. As such, he contends that the trial
court committed reversible error in denying his motion for directed verdict.

[At the close of the Commonwealth's case, Murphy made a motion for a
directed verdict on both the first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse
charges. Murphy first argued that there was insufficient evidence presented to
prove the forcible compulsion element of first-degree sodomy. In denying
Murphy's motion, the trial court found that Murphy had engaged in a pattern
of behavior that groomed Paul to be receptive of further sexual advances by
using Paul's fear of Murphy's alleged black magic powers. Additionally, the
trial court concluded that Murphy's behavior rose to the level of an implicit
threat of force. Subsequently, Murphy made a motion for directed verdict for
first-degree sexual abuse, arguing that that this offense was part of the same
continuous act as first-degree sodomy. The trial court also denied this motion.
After declining to present any proof, Murphy made a renewed motion for a

directed verdict which was also denied.

 

° Murphy has four separate arguments regarding the denial of the motion for
directed verdict and the trial court's instructions for first-degree sodomy and first-
degree sexual abuse. As these arguments are intertwined we choose to address them
together.

6
(On appeal, Murphy alleges that the trial court erred by denying his

‘motion for directed verdict for first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual
abuse due to insufficient evidence of forcible compulsion. While Murphy's
directed verdict argument for first-degree sodomy was properly preserved for
appellate review, his directed verdict argument for first-degree sexual abuse is
unpreserved.

Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 50.01 states, in pertinent part “[a]
motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor.” CR
50.01 has previously been applied to criminal cases and “its requirement of
‘specific grounds’ must be followed to preserve for appellate review a denial of a
motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.” Potts v. Commonwealth, 172 $.W.34
345, 348 (Ky. 2005). The failure to identify a particular ground in a motion for
directed verdict forecloses appellate review of the trial court's denial of the
‘motion except to the extent that palpable error is shown. McCleery v.
Commonweatth, 410 8.W.3d 597, 601-602 (Ky. 2013) (citing Pate v,
Commonwealth, 134 8,W.3d 593, 597-98 (Ky. 2004)) Kentucky Rule of Criminal
Procedure (RCr) 10.26.*

‘As Murphy failed to raise his forcible compulsion argument in his motion
for directed verdict for first-degree sexual abuse that argument was not

«The palpable error rule mandates reversal when “manifest injustice has
resulted from the error.” Elery v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.34 78, 98 (Ky. 2012)
(quoting RCr 10.26). To determine whether there has been manifest injustice, the
Court focuses “on what happened and whether the defect is so manifest, fundamental

and unambiguous that it threatens the integrity of the judicial process.” Martin v.
(Commonwealth, 207 8.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. 2006}.
properly preserved for appellate review. We reject Murphy's argument that his
discussion of forcible compulsion in his motion for directed verdict for first-
degree sodomy, preserved the forcible compulsion argument as to first-degree
sexual abuse. We further note that Murphy failed to request palpable error
review of this issue pursuant to RCr 10.26. “Absent extreme circumstances
amounting to a substantial miscarriage of justice, an appellate court will not
‘engage in palpable error review pursuant to RCr 10.26 unless such a request is
‘made and briefed by the appellant.” Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 251 S.W.34
309 (Ky. 2008) (citing Thomas v. Commonwealth, 153 8.W.34 772, 782 (Ky.
2004); Bray v. Commonwealth, 177 8.W.3d 741, 752 (Ky. 2005)). Because,
under the facts presented, a decision not to review Murphy's conviction for
first-degree sexual abuse would cause a substantial miscarriage of justice, this
Court will review for palpable error.

“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution requires that a conviction be supported by proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Gribbins v. Commonwealth, 483 8.W.3d 370, 377
(Ky. 2016} (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309, 99 S. Ct. 2781
(1979)). In considering a motion for directed verdict, the trial court is required
to “draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth." Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 8.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991)
A directed verdict should not be granted if a reasonable juror could find that

the elements of the offense were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. “On

 

appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the

8
whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the
defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.” Id. (citing
Commonwealth v. Sawhil, 660 8.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1983)).

Under Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 510.070 a person is guilty of first-
degree sodomy when “[hje engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another
person by forcible compulsion|.|* Similarly, under KRS 510.110 a person is,
guilty of first-degree sexual abuse when “{hje or she subjects another person to
sexual contact by forcible compulsion|.|" KRS 510.010(2} defines “forcible

 

compulsion” as “physical force or threat of physical force, express or implied,
which places a person in fear of immediate death, physical injury to self or
another person, fear of the immediate kidnap of self or another person, or fear
of any offense under this [KRS Chapter 510]. Physical resistance on the part of
the victim shall not be necessary to meet this definition.”

In the case at bar, Paul explained that over an extended period, Murphy
convinced him that he, Murphy, was imbued with special powers. Paul
believed that Murphy could touch a person’s hand and that God would inform
him of that person’s sins. Significantly, Paul became convinced that Murphy
could practice witchcraft or dark magic and use this power to erase minds.

During his testimony, Paul admitted to fearing Murphy due to Murphy's
self-professed witchcraft powers. Specifically, Paul feared that if he did not do
what Murphy wanted that Murphy would respond by “erasing” Paul’s mind.
Paul testified on more than one occasion Murphy had threatened the use of

black magic. While the men discussed black magic on the day in which the

9
sodomy and sexual abuse were alleged to have occurred, Paul did not identify
any threats made by Murphy during that conversation.

As is clear from its definition, forcible compulsion may be shown in two
broad ways: an act of physical force or a threat of physical force. Here, there
‘was no evidence presented that Murphy employed physical force to compel
Paul to submit to sodomy or sexual abuse. Indeed, the Commonwealth does
not argue that Murphy used physical force in his interactions with Paul. Cf:
Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 496 S.W.3d 435, 446 (Ky. 2016) (reasonable jury
could have believed that the defendant by forcibly rolling the victim over,
removing her pajama pants, and physically pushing aside attempts to block the
assault, defendant forcibly compelled sexual acts.); Gibbs v. Commonwealth,
208 S.W.3d 848, 856 (Ky. 2006) overruled on other grounds by Padgett v.
Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 336 (Ky. 2010) (defendant's act of taking the
victim’s hand and placing on his penis met the requisite physical force
requirement of the sexual abuse statute.)

Despite the lack of physical force, the Commonwealth argues that
Murphy's threats were nonetheless sufficient to meet the statutory element of
forcible compulsion. Murphy responds to this argument by contending that
the Commonwealth failed to produce sufficient evidence that the sex acts.
resulted from “a threat of physical force, express or implied” which placed Paul
in fear of “immediate death [or] physical injury." Specifically, Murphy argues
that: 1) a threat to use black magic to erase a person’s mind does not

constitute a threat of immediate death or physical injury under KRS

10
500.080(13); 2) that the Commonwealth failed to produce evidence that
Murphy threatened Paul with black magic in order to get him to engage in the
acts; and 3) that even if threat were made it was not sufficiently immediate to
the sexual acts.

In evaluating whether a threat satisfies the element of forcible
compulsion, the Court does not employ an objective test. Rather, “[ijn
determining whether the victim felt threatened to engage in sex or feared harm
from the attacker, a subjective test is applied.” Newcomb v. Commonwealth,
410 S.W.3d 63 (Ky. 2013) (citing James v. Commonwealth, 360 8.W.34 189,
195 (Ky. 2012}; Salsman v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 638, 641 (Ky. App.
1978)). In Yarnell v. Commonwealth, 833 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Ky. 1992), this
Court noted that the conclusion that the victim's fear is to be judged by a
subjective standard was supported by the commentary accompanying the final
draft of the Kentucky Penal Code, published in November 1971, Although the
definition of forcible compulsion has been modified from its 1971 wording, that
modification has no bearing on the portion of the accompanying commentary
that we find pertinent. In discussing the definition of “forcible compulsion,”
the commentary states that ‘[t}he definition does not require that the victim's
fear be ‘reasonable.’ One who takes advantage of a victim’s unreasonable fears

of violence should not escape punishment any more than the swindler who

5 KRS 500.100 provides: “The commentary accompanying this code may be
‘used as an aid in construing the provisions of this code.”

re
cheats gullible people by false statements which they should have found
incredible.”

While the victim’s fear is judged by a subjective standard, forcible
compulsion requires the use of physical force or the threat of physical force
and the fear must be of “immediate death, physical injury to self... ., fear of the
immediate kidnap of self. . . or fear of any offense under |KRS Chapter 510.”
‘The threat to erase a person's mind by invoking black magic does not qualify as
4 threat of physical force. This conclusion derives from the meaning of the

” BLack's Law DicrionaRy contains several definitions for

 

word “physical,

“physical,” but the one most pertinent to this discussion is *[olf, relating to, or

 

involving someone's body as opposed to mind.” BLAcK's Law Dicrionary (10th
ed. 2014). Under this definition, a threat to erase Paul’s mind through black
magic would not qualify as a threat of physical force because no physical act
would be threatened. Moreover, the feared end result of the black magic (an

erased mind) would be a mental injury, not a physical injury. Therefore, while

 

Paul may have sincerely believed that Murphy could erase his, Paul’s, mind
through the use of black magic, this type of conduct and his subjective fear of
the end result do not constitute forcible compulsion.

Further, even if the Court were to agree with the Commonwealth that a
threat of black magic could satisfy the “physical” elements of forcible
‘compulsion as to both the threat and the feared injury, the Commonwealth
failed to produce sufficient evidence of the existence of such a threat in

temporal proximity to the charged offenses. The Commonwealth fails to point

12
to an explicit threat made by Murphy to Paul on the day in which the sodomy
and sexual abuse were alleged to have occurred. Rather, the Commonwealth
argues that Paul was in constant fear of physical injury and that the perceived
threat was immediate and ongoing. In support of this argument, the
Commonwealth relies on Yarnell, a case that is significantly different from the
one before us.

‘Yamell was convicted of a myriad of sexual offenses for abuse
perpetrated on his two step-children. 833 $.W.2d at 835. On appeal, Yarnell
argued that he was entitled to a directed verdict, as the prosecution failed to
rove the element of forcible compulsion. Id. at 836. The evidence at trial,
established that Yamell created a climate of fear, through constant emotional,
verbal, and physical abuse of his step-children. Id. at 837. Specifically, both
children testified that they were afraid of Yarnell, due to his yelling, screaming,

and use of obscenities. Id. at 836. Yarnell’s step-son attempted to avoid

 

Yarnell, by staying in his bedroom and not coming out until he had left. Id.
Additionally, Yarnell physically abused his step-daughter by hitting her,
throwing her against a wall, and ripping her clothes. Id. The step-daughter
testified to unsuccessfully fighting back on at least one occasion, after which
Yarnell threw her on a bed and raped her. Id. Both children testified that
‘Yarnell would punish them by forcing them to perform oral sex with him. Id.
During the trial, the children explained that they submitted to this sexual
abuse due to fear of what Yarnell might do to them or their mother if they

refused to comply. Id. at 837. In reviewing the evidence, the Court concluded

13.
that “it was not clearly unreasonable for the jury to find that Yarnell engaged in
sexual intercourse with the children by means of forcible compulsion.” Id.

‘The Commonwealth's reliance on Yamelt is misplaced. In Yamell it was
clear that there was a climate of fear created by the continuing physical and
emotional abuse of the children during the nine years they lived with Yarnell,
‘Yarnell’s regular practice of screaming at and physically abusing his step-
children raised reasonable concerns about what he might do if his sexual
demands were refused. In the case at bar, itis clear that Paul was able to
refuse Murphy's sexual advances without violent reprisal.

‘As noted above, one evening, Paul and Murphy exited Murphy's vehicle
land entered the woods where Murphy requested that Paul sodomize him. Paul
was unable to complete the sexual act and informed Murphy that he did not
want to engage in sodomy, which upset Murphy. However, Paul failed to
identify any threats made or force displayed by Murphy in the aftermath of the
incident.© Further, on a different occasion, Murphy attempted to touch Paul
‘sexually, who rebuffed his advances, and there were no repercussions. The
absence of either physical force or repeated threats of physical force renders
this case substantially dissimilar from Yarnell where the victims lived in a

constant climate of fear in their own home.

© Murphy and Paul saw each other the next day at church. During their
‘meeting, Murphy showed Paul a list of people whom he wanted to kill. It was not
suggested during his testimony that Paul's name was on this list or what if any threat
this conveyed to Paul.

4
While Yamelt is not on point, our recent decisions in Neweomb and
James v. Commonwealth, 360 $.W.3d 189 (Ky. 2012), offer insight to the
forcible compulsion issue raised in this case. In James, the defendant and the
victim were engaged in a long-term relationship that became so contentious
that a series of emergency protective orders and domestic violence orders were
entered. Id. at 192. However, in direct violation of these orders the couple
continued to cohabitate. Id. One evening, James began to savagely beat the
victim, 1d. Over a five-hour period, James grabbed the victim’s hair, dragged

her across the room, kicked her, spit on her, punched her in the face and head,

 

kicked her in the ribs and back, put his hands around her throat, and
threatened to kill her. id. at 192-193. During a lull in the beatings, the victim
noticed that James had an erection. Id. Seeing this, the victim decided that if
she were to have sexual intercourse with James that the beatings would stop
and so she engaged in various sexual acts with him. Id. Subsequently, the
victim contacted the police about the abuse and James was eventually
convicted, among other charges, of first-degree rape and first-degree unlawful
imprisonment. Id.

On appeal, James argued that the Commonwealth failed to prove the
forcible compulsion element of first-degree rape, Id. at 194, James contended
that there was a lack of proof that he initiated the sexual acts or threatened the
victim to induce the victim to engage in sexual activity. Id. In concluding that
@ reasonable jury could find forcible compulsion from the evidence presented at

trial, the Court relied on the fact that the victim had been beaten for several

15,
hours before engaging in sexual activity and that the victim believed that
sexual submission was necessary to prevent future beatings. Id. at 195.
Additionally, James repeatedly refused the victim's requests to be permitted to
leave or for him to leave the apartment. Id. The Court concluded that this
evidence “established [the victim's] subjective view that she had been
threatened to engage in sex, which is sufficient to prove forcible compulsion.”
Jd, The Court also determined that a jury could have concluded that James's
kissing the victim with a visible erection, “presented a choice between engaging
in sexual conduct or suffering further violence.” Id. Accordingly, the Court
determined that the Commonwealth provided sufficient proof to satisfy the
element of forcible compulsion. id. at 197. Cf. Yates v. Commonwealth, 430
S.W.3d 883 (Ky. 2014) (threatened revelation of young victim’s secret
relationship with older boy, which if reported by the victim’s mother could
result in criminal charges and harm to victim's boyfriend, did not constitute a
threat of immediate death or physical injury to another person.).

Similarly, in Newcomb the Court addressed whether there was sufficient
evidence to meet the element of forcible compulsion in the offense of first-
degree rape. 410 S.W.3d at 78-79, The evidence presented by the
Commonwealth at trial established that the victim was in her home preparing
to do laundry when she realized that Newcomb was standing in her living
room. Id. at 71. The door to the victim's home had not been completely closed
and Newcomb had entered without invitation or announcing himself. Id.

Subsequently, Newcomb forced the victim to him and began to kiss her neck,

16
saying “[yjou know you want me.” Id. The victim resisted these advances and
asked Newcomb to leave, but despite the victim's protests Newcomb continued
to kiss her. id. Newcomb then began unfastening the victim’s belt, but she re-
fastened it. Id. When Newcomb began to loosen her belt a second time, the
victim froze in fear. Id. Afterward Newcomb had intercourse with the victim on
her couch, against her will. id. The victim later explained that she did not
scream or fight, due to her fear and shock. Id.

In rejecting Newcomb's argument that there was insufficient evidence of
forcible compulsion, the Court noted that Newcomb employed physical force in
‘committing the rape, specifically by drawing the victim close to him, kissing her
neck, unfastening her belt, and pulling her pants down. Jd. at 80. While
physical resistance by the victim is unnecessary, the Court noted that the
victim resisted Newcomb by struggling with him to keep her belt fastened and
her pants pulled up. Id. Additionally, the victim testified that her submission
to Newcomb's sexual advances was made out of fear. Id. Accordingly, the
Court determined that, “[s}ufficient evidence existed for the jury to determine
that [the victim] subjectively felt threatened to engage in sex or feared harm

from Newcomb if she did not submit to his sexual advances.” Id.

 

Unlike James and Newcomb, there was insufficient evidence in the case
at bar to establish that the sexual activity in question was compelled by an
implicit threat of physical force. Paul's testimony is clear that he was fearful of
Murphy's self professed powers and that Murphy had threatened the use of

those powers in the past. Yet, while the pair discussed black magic on the day

7
 

in question, Paul did not classify that discussion as a threat. Further, Paul’
testimony does not specify any physical act or statement by Murphy that would
suggest an implicit threat of physical force at the time of the sexual acts.
Rather, Paul's testimony established that after he initially declined to
participate in sexual acts he was convinced to do so by Murphy. Paul did not
elaborate on how he was convinced to participate in sexual acts with Murphy,
but there clearly was no testimony about a contemporaneous threat of physical
force or use of physical force. Cf. State v. Goupil, 908 A.2d 1256, 1270 (N.H.
2006) (“We conclude, therefore, that the initial repeated verbal threats, along
with the actual physical assaults and threats with the knife, constituted an
implicit threat throughout the entire ordeal.”). As such, there is insufficient
evidence of an express or implied threat of physical force.”

Murphy's predatory conduct, while certainly reprehensible, does not
‘satisfy the element of forcible compulsion to sustain a conviction for first-
degree sodomy. As Murphy could not have been convicted of first-degree
sodomy by forcible compulsion, the trial court abused its discretion in denying,

the motion for a directed verdict.

 

7 Paul testified that after the commission of the sexual acts Murphy threatened
the use of his black magic powers and threatened to kill Paul if he were to reveal what
had occurred. These explicit threats after the sexual acts were also insufficient to
meet the element of forcible compulsion. See generally, Miller v. Commonwealth, 77
S.W.3d 566, 575-576 (Ky. 2002) ("The only threat she described was that, on one
‘unspecified occasion, Appellant told her they would both get in trouble if she told
‘anyone what they were doing. While that might explain delayed reporting, it does not
prove that {the victim] was compelled by force or threat to submit to sexual intercourse
(oF oral sodomy."),

18
While Murphy's claim of error as to the denial of his motion for directed
verdict for first-degree sexual abuse on the same ground was not preserved, we
are constrained to conclude that that conviction, based on conduct that
‘occurred close in time to the alleged sodomy and also involving no forcible
compulsion under KRS 510.010(2) must be reversed. In the absence of proof of
this critical element of the criminal offense, manifest injustice would result
from allowing the conviction to stand.

Il, Two of Murphy’s Remaining Arguments Concerning His First-Degree
Sodomy and First-Degree Sexual Abuse Convictions are Moot.

Murphy alleges three additional errors concerning his convictions for
first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse. First, Murphy contends
that the trial court failed to differentiate the first-degree sodomy and first-
degree sexual abuse charges in the jury instructions. Second, Murphy alleges
that the Commonwealth was permitted to ask two witnesses for legal
conclusions. Specifically, two witnesses who interviewed Murphy were asked

whether he admitted to sodomy as to Paul. Third, Murphy argues that the trial

 

court erred by failing to include a jury instruction for sexual misconduct as
lesser included offense to first-degree sodomy. However, in light of our decision
that the trial court should have granted the motion for directed verdict as to
first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse, the first two of these
remaining arguments are moot.

‘As noted, the trial court erred by failing to grant a directed verdict for
first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse due to the Commonwealth's

failure to prove the element of forcible compulsion. “A reversal of a judgment of
19
conviction on appeal on the ground that no reasonable trier of fact could have
found guilt on the basis of the evidence at trial precludes a retrial of the case
because of prior jeopardy.” Nichols v. Commonwealth, 657 S.W.2d 932, 933
(ky. 1983) (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 8, Ct. 2141 (1978));
Commonwealth v. Burris, 590 8.W.2d 878 (Ky. 1979}). Consequently, the
Commonwealth is barred from retrying Murphy for either of those offenses.
Accordingly, the Court does not need to examine whether the trial court erred

in its instructions for first-degree sodomy or first-degree sexual abuse, nor does

 

the Court need to consider whether the Commonwealth impermissibly asked
witnesses for a legal conclusion as to the sodomy charge.

Ill, The Trial Court Did Not Err By Denying Murphy's Request For a Sexual
Misconduct Jury Instruction.

Additionally, Murphy contends that the trial court erred by failing to
instruct on the lesser included offense of sexual misconduct Specifically,
Murphy argues that this instruction was appropriate as the jury could have
believed that Murphy engaged in deviate sexual intercourse without Paul’s
consent, as opposed to by forcible compulsion or through a position of special

trust or authority.

8 While the Court's determination precludes Murphy from being retried for first-
degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse, the Commonwealth is permitted to retry
‘Murphy for the lesser included offense of third-degree sodomy. See Combs v.
Commonwealth, 198 S.W.34 574, 579 (Ky. 2006); McGinnis v. Wine, 959 S.W.2d 438-
39 (Ky. 1998).

° KRS 510.140 provides as follows: (1) A person is guilty of sexual misconduct
when he engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with another
Person without the latter's consent. (2) Sexual misconduct is a Class A misdemeanor.

20
‘The trial court is required to instruct the jury on the “whole law of the
case, and this rule requires instructions applicable to every state of the case
deducible or supported to any extent by the testimony.” Taylor v.
Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 355, 360 (Ky. 1999) (citing Kentucky Rule of
Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.54(1); Kelly v. Commonwealth, 267 S.W.2d 536, 539
(ky. 1954). Further, the trial court is mandated to “instruct the jury on all
lesser-included offenses which are supported by the evidence.” Yarnell, 833
‘S.W.2d at 837 (citing Cannon v. Commonwealth, 777 8.W.2d 591 (1989)};
McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464 (Ky. 1986)

‘The trial court properly denied Murphy's request for a sexual misconduct
jury instruction as it was not supported by the evidence. In Cooper v.
Commonwealth, 550 S,W.2d 478, 479 (Ky. 1977), the Court held that the
sexual misconduct statute was intended to apply only in cases where the
‘victim's non-consent was premised on his age and where the perpetrator’s
young age could likewise be considered a mitigating factor. Id.!° This
longstanding interpretation of the sexual misconduct statute was recently

reaffirmed in Jenkins.

10 The commentary to KRS 510, 140 reflects the prevailing construction of the
statute.

When read in conjunction with the rape and sodomy statutes, KRS

510.140 is designed primarily to prohibit nonconsensual sexual

intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse under two circumstances: when

the victim is 14 or 15 and the defendant is less than 21; or when the

victim is 12, 13, 14, or 15 and the defendant is less than 18 years of age.

 

21
‘As in Cooper, Jenkins argued that he was entitled to a jury instruction
‘on sexual misconduct as a lesser offense included within the more serious
charges of rape and/or sodomy. Jenkins, 496 S.W.3d at 452. Relying on the
Cooper Court's construction of KRE 510.140, this Court determined that the
requested instruction was not appropriate, as neither the victim nor
perpetrator was within the statute's intended age limits. Id. In the case at bar,
both Murphy and Paul were over the pertinent ages at the time of the alleged
offenses. Accordingly, KRS 514.140 was inapplicable and the trial court
properly denied Murphy's requested jury instruction.

IV. Prosecutorial Misconduct Did Not Rise to the Level of Palpable Error.

Murphy alleges multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct in the
‘Commonwealth's closing argument. Specifically, Murphy argues that the
Commonwealth engaged in a pattern of misconduct by: 1) ripping pages out of
‘ criminal statute book; 2) raising his voice to Murphy and trial counsel; 3)
improperly making reference to the trial court's use of initials in place of the
victim's name in the jury instructions; 4) commenting on Murphy's silence; 5)
referring to Murphy as a “monster”; and 6) introducing facts not admitted into
evidence.

“Prosecutorial misconduct is ‘a prosecutor's improper or illegal act
involving an attempt to persuade the jury to wrongly convict a defendant or
assess an unjustified punishment.” Commonwealth v. McGorman, 489 8.W.34
731, 741-742 (Ky. 2016) (quoting Noakes v. Commonwealth, 354 8.W.3d 116,

121 (Ky. 2011). The misconduct can occur in a variety of forms, including

22
improper closing argument. Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 485 8.W.3d 310, 329
(Ky. 2016) (citing Duncan v. Commonwealth, 322 S.W.3d 81, 87 (Ky. 2010)). In
considering an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct, the Court must view
that allegation in the context of the overall fairness of the trial. McGorman, 489
S.W.3d at 742, To justify reversal, the Commonwealth’s misconduct must be
“so serious as to render the entire trial fundamentally unfair.” Soto v.
Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 873 (Ky. 2004) (quoting Stopher v.
Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 787, 805 (Ky. 2001)).

“If the misconduct is objected to, we will reverse on that ground if proof
of the defendant's guilt was not such as to render the misconduct harmless,
and if the trial court failed to cure the misconduct with a sufficient admonition
to the jury.” Duncan v, Commonwealth, 322 S.W.3d 81, 87 (Ky. 2010) (citing
Barnes v. Commonwealth, 91 S,W.3d 564 (Ky. 2002); Partin v. Commonwealth,
918 S.W.2d 219 (Ky.1996). If the defendant failed to object, however, the
Court “will reverse only where the misconduct was flagrant and was such as to
render the trial fundamentally unfair.” Ordway v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d
762, 789 (Ky. 2013) (quoting Duncan, 322 S.W.3d at 87).

In considering an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct in closing,
argument, the Court considers the arguments “as a whole” while remembering,
that counsel is granted wide latitude during closing argument. Brewer v.
‘Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 350 (Ky. 2006) (quoting Young v.
Commonwealth, 25 S.W.3d 66, 74-75 (Ky. 2000)). “The longstanding rule is

that counsel may comment on the evidence and make all legitimate inferences

23
that can be reasonably drawn therefrom.” Padgett v. Commonwealth, 312
S.W.3d 336, 350 (Ky. 2010) (citing East v. Commonwealth, 60 S.W.2d 137, 139
(Ky. 1933).

In his brief, Murphy condemns the actions of the prosecutor in the
strongest possible terms, stating that his closing argument was “shockingly
awful” and “beneath the dignity of Commonwealth Attorneys.” Yet, no
objection was made at trial to any of the alleged instances of prosecutorial
misconduct and, curiously, no explanation is offered on appeal for trial
counsel's failure to object. In any event, as the alleged misconduct was not
objected to, Murphy is unable to meet the requirements of Bames. However,
Murphy has requested and the Court will review the alleged instances of
prosecutorial misconduct for palpable error under RCr 10.26.

First, Murphy asserts that the Commonwealth “desecrated the law,” by
dramatically ripping pages out of a copy of the Criminal Law of Kentucky."!
During Murphy's closing argument, he claimed that the acts alleged in the
indictment were willfully performed by Paul as part of a consensual sexual
relationship. In response, the prosecutor argued that Murphy had preyed on
Paul. To emphasize the non-consensual nature of the sexual acts, the
prosecutor began to tear out the sections of the Criminal Law of Kentucky,
which dealt with the crimes charged against Murphy. Murphy contends that

the Commonwealth's actions implied to the jury that he was asking them to

3 The Criminal Law of Kentucky is a compilation of substantive and procedural
Kentucky criminal laws.

24
nullify the law in this case. While we do not approve of the prosecutor's overly
theatrical approach, especially when viewed in the context of other closing
argument behavior, we conclude the prosecutor was trying to respond
forcefully to Murphy’s contention that the sexual acts with Paul were of a
consensual nature. The Commonwealth never asked the jury to disregard the
Jaw nor suggested that Murphy was asking the jury to ignore the law. Under
these circumstances, the behavior cannot be labeled an error.

Next, Murphy argues that the Commonwealth repeatedly raised his voice
to him and trial counsel, In this portion of his argument, Murphy includes

number of other allegations against the prosecutor: a threat of violence against

 

Murphy, personal attacks against Murphy and counsel, criticism of Murphy for

 

his decision to exercise his constitutional rights, and comments on Murphy's
right to remain silent.

A review of the record clearly demonstrates that the prosecutor raised his
voice during closing argument on multiple occasions. The act of simply raising
‘one’s voice, however, does not in and of itself constitute improper argument.
“Great leeway is allowed to both counsel in a closing argument. It is just that -
an argument. A prosecutor may comment on tactics, may comment on
evidence, and may comment as to the falsity of a defense position.” Slaughter
v. Commonwealth, 744 8.W.2d 407, 412 (Ky. 1987). The use of different
oratory techniques such as raising or lowering the volume of speech to

emphasize an argument is within the scope of acceptable conduct for closing,

25
argument. However, we will examine the content of the comments identified by
Murphy to discern whether there was any prosecutorial misconduct.
Principally, Murphy takes issue with the prosecutor's use of rhetorical

questions, contending that “[t]here is something monstrously unfair about

 

allowing the person with the last word to shout allegations knowing neither the
defendant nor his counsel may answer.” BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY defines @

rhetorical question as “{a] question that one poses as a way of making a

 

statement, with no real expectation of an answer; a question used not to eli
an answer but instead for rhetorical effect. BLACK's Law DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014). Contrary to Murphy's argument, there is nothing intrinsically wrong
with the Commonwealth's use of rhetorical questions in closing argument.
Rather, rhetorical questions have long been a persuasive tool in American
jurisprudence.!? Further, a review of the statements challenged by Murphy
demonstrates that the Commonwealth remained within the bounds of proper

argument.

1 In his argument for the defense in the 1770 Boston Massacre trial, John
‘Adams repeatedly employed rhetorical questions saying:
[What had the soldiers to expect, when twelve persons armed with clubs
-- were daring enough, even at the time when they were loading their
guns, to come up with their clubs, and smite on their guns; what had
eight soldiers to expect from such a set of people? Would it have been a
prudent resolution in them, or in any body in their situation, to have
‘stood stil, to see if the sailors would knock their brains out, or not? Had
they not all the reason in the world to think, that as they had done so
much, they would proceed farther?
John Adams, Argument for the Defense, in 3 Legal Papers of John Adams

242, 262 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965) as cited in
Gabriel H. Teninbaum, Who Cares? 3 Drexel L. Rev. 485 (2011)

26
‘The first challenged statement, “{ajnd where does the predatory prey?

 

Where he can find the weak,” is an innocuous truism.! The second and third
challenged statements were criticisms of Murphy's counsel and his explanation
for Murphy's actions. In arguing that the relationship between Paul and
Murphy was not consensual as Murphy's counsel had portrayed it the
prosecutor said, “[djoes that sound like the ‘Love Boat’ to you, counsel? Have a
little shame.” While a prosecutor is not permitted to vilfy the accused or his
counsel, he is permitted to comment in a reasonable manner on how counsel
conducts himself during the course of the trial. See Johnson v. Commonwealth,
302 8.W.2d $85, 587 (Ky. 1957) (no error in the prosecutor calling defense

counsel arrogant in closing argument). While the prosecutor's argument,

 

should not have been directed to counsel personally, it was designed to
underscore the falsity of Murphy's defense, namely that he and Paul were
‘engaged in a consensual sexual relationship. While the glib phrasing of this
argument was unbecoming of the office of Commonwealth's Attorney, we
cannot conclude that this statement vilified Murphy or his counsel, or that it
rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.

Similarly, the prosecutor criticized Murphy's counsel for his questioning

of Chief Hatfield and Penick saying, “[ajnd another thing, while we're at it. If

 

°8 After asking this rhetorical question, the prosecutor moved towards the
defense table and shouted at Murphy to “get a grown man.” Later in his closing the
prosecutor repeated this conduct. These comments served no useful purpose in
arguing for Murphy's guilt of the offenses contained in the indictment. While these
outbursts do not make us question the overall faimess of Murphy's trial, we caution
‘the Commonwealth against the repetition of such conduct.

a7
it’s @ consensual act why did you crawl all over [Chief Hatfield and Penick] for
not taping it? Because apparently they'd said the truth. Why counsel? Why'd
you craw! all over them? Because you were going to say it was consensual
conduct? Why?" Again, the prosecutor should not have directed personal
comments to defense counsel, but we cannot agree with Murphy that the

constitutional right to confront

 

Prosecutor was criticizing the exercise of hi
witnesses against him. This was a permissible comment on the tactics
employed by the defense, albeit with language that was not well chosen.

‘The fourth challenged statement, “[lf they were in a consensual relation
where everything was great and lovey dovey, why did he go for help?” was a
permissible comment on the defense’s position that it was a consensual
relationship. The fifth challenged statement concerned the offense of the use of
‘a minor in a sexual performance, in which the prosecutor said, “[nJow I guess
having him perform a sex show for him wasn't enough people. Maybe that’s it.
Maybe if [Murphy] had had some of his friends over he talked about, five, six,
and ten. How many people does he have to masturbate in front of for it to be a
felony? That we care?” A prosecutor is permitted “reasonable latitude in
‘argument to persuade the jurors the matter should not be dealt with lightly.”
Lynem v. Commonwealth, 565 8.W.2d 141, 145 (Ky. 1978) (citing Hames v.
Commonwealth, 475 8.W.2d 485 (1972); Richards v. Commonwealth, 517
‘S.W.2d 237 (Ky. 1974)). It is clear that the prosecutor was trying to implore

the jury to follow the law, which does not mandate that more than one person

28
witness a minor's sexual performance in order to obtain a conviction. There

was no error.!4
Third, Murphy contends that the Commonwealth erred by making

reference to the trial court's use of initials in place of the minor victim’s name

 

in the jury instructions. During his closing argument, the prosecutor alleged

that Murphy's counsel did not want the state to criminalize conduct against
minors if it was “inconvenient” to Murphy. The Commonwealth noted that the
state protects minors, by using their initials rather than their name in a public
document like the jury instructions. Murphy now contends that by doing #0
the prosecutor was telling jurors that the use of the victim’s initials in the trial
court's instructions was evidence of his guilt. We disagree. The prosecutor's
statement, contrary to Murphy's assertion, did not align the power and prestige
of the trial court with the Commonwealth's narrative. Nor, did this statement
suggest to the jury that there was knowledge known to the trial court and the
‘Commonwealth that had not been shared with them. Rather, the

Commonwealth noted the common court practice of using initials rather than

4 Murphy also raises other instances of unbecoming conduct by the
prosecution. These instances included the prosecutor saying that he “vomited into his
‘mouth,” after hearing Murphy's counsel's alleged mischaracterization of the evidence,
‘an apparent reference to Murphy's counsel lacking shame, and a suggestion that he
would have physically assaulted Murphy if Murphy had tried to convince him that he
hhad magic powers. We recognize that in cases involving allegations of sexual crimes
‘against children, that the Commonwealth will be motivated to mount a vigorous:
Prosecution and that our precedents afford counsel a great deal of latitude in closing
‘argument. Yet, this latitude is not endless. While the conduct of the prosecutor did
not deprive Murphy of a fair trial, the prosecutor's conduct in several instances was
beneath the dignity of his office. ‘Zealous advocacy can be achieved without insulting
or disrespecting opposing counsel. We admonish the Commonwealth to not repeat
this conduct in the future.

29
the names of minors to protect their privacy. While there was no error in the
‘Commonwealth's statement, all counsel should tread carefully on the
4iscussion of matters of trial court procedure to avoid inappropriate
implications, including any suggestion the prosecutor and trial court are acting
in concert.

Fourth, Murphy argues that the Commonwealth improperly commented
on his silence. In his closing argument, the prosecutor emphasized that the
Commonwealth's evidence was uncontradicted. The relevant portion of the
‘Commonwealth's argument was as follows, *[Paul] said it happened. [Chief
Hatfield and social worker Penick] testified. He admitted he sodomized him;
put his mouth on his penis. That's all the proof. If we're to limit ourselves to
‘what you hear, not much of a case against our case.” Murphy contends that
this statement was a comment on his decision not to testify.

‘The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution “forbids either

 

comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the
court that such silence is evidence of guilt.” Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,
615, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 1233 (1965). This protection is codified in KRS 421.225,
which mandates that “[iJn any criminal or penal prosecution the defendant, on
his own request, shall be allowed to testify in his own behalf, but his failure to
do so shail not be commented upon or create any presumption against him.”
‘The prosecutor's statement did not directly refer to Murphy's failure to
testify, rather it noted that Murphy failed to put on any witnesses at all.

“Argument that a defendant had failed to contradict the prosecutor's evidence

30
has been upheld as a proper form of argument.” Haynes v. Commonwealth,
657 S.W.2d 948, 953 (Ky. 1983) (citations omitted). As the Commonwealth’s
statement did not refer to Murphy individually or his decision not to testify, the
comments were not improper.

Fifth, Murphy contends that it was improper for the prosecutor to refer to
him as a monster. Murphy contends that this statement was designed to viify
hhim and that the Court has previously condemned similar language in the
plurality opinion of Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1988).
Sanborn was sentenced to death after being convicted of intentional murder,
first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, and first-degree kidnapping. id. at 537.
On review, the Court identified three specific errors, each of which mandated
reversal. Id. at 539. The Court also discussed a series of errors in the trial,
which cumulatively had the effect of qualifying as reversible error. Id. at 542.
One of the errors identified by the Court, was the prosecutor's vilification of
Sanborn during closing argument, by calling him a “black dog of a night,” a
“monster,” a “coyote that roamed the road at night hunting women to use this
knife on,” and a ‘wolf? Id. at 544.

While the prosecutor is not permitted to vilify the accused, *[t]he
legitimate scope of an argument to the jury is affected to some extent by the
nature of the evidence.” Timmons v. Commonwealth, 555 8.W.2d 234, 241 (Ky.
1977). ‘Outrageous conduct warrants stronger words than might otherwise be
justified.” Id. As such, the Court has tolerated severe characterizations of

defendants. See, e.g., Dean v. Commonwealth, 844 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Ky. 1992)

31
Ferguson v. Commonwealth,

 

(referring to the defendants as ‘crazed animals’
401 S.W2d 225, 228 (Ky. 1965) (calling the defendant a “beast"); Grigsby v.
Commonwealth, 194 S,W.2d 363, 364 (Ky. 1946) (calling the defendant a “vile
brute”); Holbrook v. Commonwealth, 61 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Ky. 1933) (calling the
defendant a *desperado”}; Slaughter, 744 S.W.2d at 412 (referring to the
defendant as a ‘bit of evil"). In this context, we cannot conclude that a single
reference to the defendant being a “monster,” rises to the level of palpable

error.

Sixth, Murphy contends that the Commonwealth introduced facts not in
evidence during closing argument. In responding to Murphy's argument that
his relationship with Paul was consensual, the prosecutor argued that this was
not the case or else Paul would not have gone to his parents for help. ‘There
‘was never any evidence presented during the trial that Paul went to his parents
to inform them of Murphy's actions. A second instance of the Commonwealth
introducing facts not in evidence concerned the prosecutor's statement that
Murphy told Paul “Ill cut your throat [if] you tell anybody.” While Paul testified
that Murphy threatened to kill him, the means by which Murphy planned to
carry out that threat was not identified in Paul’s testimony,

‘The Commonwealth claims that these comments were reasonable
inferences from the evidence. We disagree and conclude that this portion of
‘the Commonwealth's closing argument was improper. “In his closing remarks,
prosecutor may draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence and

propound his explanation of the evidence and why it supports a finding of

32
guilt” Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 8.W.24 13, 39 (Ky. 1998) (citing Bills v.
Commonwealth, 851 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1993)). While counsel is granted
substantial latitude in making argument, the fundamental issue is whether the

‘statement is reasonably supported by the evidence.” Padgett v.
Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d at 353. In the case at bar, it is clear that the
prosecutor's remarks were not reasonable inferences, but rather misstatements
of Paul's testimony.

While the prosecutor's remarks were improper, reversal is only required if
the misconduct was “flagrant” and, as such, rendered the trial fundamentally
unfair. We employ a four-part test to determine whether a prosecutor's
improper comments amount to flagrant misconduct. The four factors to be
considered are: “(1) whether the remarks tended to mislead the jury or to
prejudice the accused; (2) whether they were isolated or extensive; (9) whether
they were deliberately or accidentally placed before the jury; and (4) the
strength of the evidence against the accused.” Hannah v. Commonwealth, 306
S.W.3d 509, 518 (Ky. 2010) (citing United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1385
(6th Cir. 1994), superseded by statute KRS 503.055 and 503.050).

‘As to the first factor, Murphy was prejudiced by the Commonwealth’s
remark that misstated the evidence of Murphy's threat, ie., the alleged graphic
threat to cut Paul's throat as opposed to the more generalized “I will kill you if
‘you tell anyone” supported by the record. As for how Paul came forward about
Murphy's abuse, itis difficult to see how the incorrect statement that Paul told

his parents as opposed to the correct statement that he told a co-worker was

33
prejudicial, although clearly it was improper since not supported by the record.
In any event, the Commonwealth mislead the jury about the evidence regarding
Murphy's threat, so this factor weighs in Murphy's favor. As to the second
factor, the Commonwealth’s remarks comprised only a small portion of the
prosecutor's closing argument. This factor weighs in the Commonwealth's
favor.

As to the third factor, we are unable to conclude that the Commonwealth
deliberately placed misleading statements before the jury. In summarizing the
evidence it is just as possible that the Commonwealth inadvertently misstated
the facts in the record regarding Pauls disclosure of the abuse, as it is that he

 

purposely misstated the facts of the case. The remark regarding Murphy
threatening to cut Paul’s throat seems likely intended as a forceful
representation of the threat to kill rather than a purposeful intent to mislead.
‘This factor weighs in neither Murphy's nor the Commonwealth’s favor. The
fourth and final factor is the weight of the evidence against Murphy. There was
significant evidence of Murphy's guilt. In particular, the Commonwealth
offered testimony from a police officer and a social worker about Murphy
admitting to engaging in sexual relations with Paul. Further, Paul provided
detailed testimony about his interactions with Murphy. This factor weighs in
the Commonwealth's favor.

Accordingly, the results of the four-factor test to determine whether the
‘Commonwealth’s argument was flagrant are one factor weighing in Murphy's

favor, while two weigh in the Commonwealth's. As such, we cannot conclude

34
that the Commonwealth's misstatements in closing argument were so
egregious that they constitute flagrant misconduct and thereby undermine the
essential fairness of Murphy's trial,

V. Murphy's Offer of Proof About Gabbard’s Excluded Testimony was
Insufficient to Preserve Appellate Review Under KRE 103(a)(2).

Murphy also contends that the trial court erred by excluding mitigation
want, Naomi Gabbard,

 

evidence. During the penalty phase Murphy called hi
to testify. After establishing that Gabbard had known Murphy his entire life,
Murphy asked her to “e}xplain to the jury how he has been as a person.” The
Commonwealth objected to this question based on its opened ended nature
and lack of relevance. Subsequently, the trial court asked Murphy to explain
the relevance of the question of how Murphy was raised. In response, Murphy
said, ‘t]he relevance in how he was raised, | think it is going to go in mitigation

life, there was testimony in the guilt phase about

 

of sentencing about how hit

him being a victim when he was younger . . . things like that.” While the trial

 

court permitted Gabbard to answer Murphy's question, it was clear that the
trial court wanted to avoid a swearing contest between the defense and the
‘Commonwealth about Murphy’s good or bad character respectively. The trial
court acknowledged that it would give Murphy some leeway to put on
mitigation evidence through Gabbard, but that the questions would have to be
narrowly tailored.

Gabbard’s ensuing testimony was brief and disjointed. Repeatedly
Gabbard attempted to offer speculation and hearsay about how Murphy had

been impacted by the trial. The Commonwealth objected to these statements
35
and the trial court directed Murphy to provide a basis for Gabbard’s
knowledge. However, Murphy's attempts to do so were unsuccessful and he
discontinued Gabbard’s questioning after approximately eight minutes of
testimony.

To preserve a trial court’s evidentiary ruling excluding evidence for
appeal, a substantial right of a party must be affected and the substance of the
evidence must be provided to the trial court. Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE)
103, The substance of the evidence can be made in an offer of proof, which
has been defined as “adducing what that lawyer expects to be able to prove
through a witness's testimony.” Henderson v. Commonwealth, 438 S.W.3d 335
(Ky. 2014) (citing Bryan A. Garner, GarweR’s DICTONARY OF LBGAL USAGE, p. 630
(Gd ed. 2011).

“Generally speaking, an offer of proof must not be ‘too vague, general, or
conclusory.” Id. at 342 (quoting 21 Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 5040.1 (2d ed.).

While KRE 103(a)(2) does not mandate a formal offer of proof, it does require an
indication of “the facts sought to be elicited or the specific facts the witness
would establish.” Id. The purpose of this is twofold. First, a detailed offer of
proof provides the trial court with the necessary information to evaluate the
objection based upon the actual substance of the evidence. Id. at 340.
Second, by way of a detailed offer of proof, an appellate court can determine
whether a party's substantial rights were affected by the trial court’s ruling. id.
In the case at bar, Murphy failed to make a sufficient offer of proof. In

responding to the Commonwealth's first objection to Gabbard’s testimony,

36
Murphy stated his belief that Gabbard’s testimony would be useful for the
purpose of mitigation by discussing his life prior to the trial. Murphy also
referenced testimony from the guilt phase that suggested Murphy might have
been a victim of sexual abuse. These vague references, however, were
insufficient to identify the substance of Gabbard’s anticipated testimony to the
trial court. Nor is the Court able to discern, from reviewing Murphy's
examination of Gabbard, what specific evidence he sought to establish during
her testimony. Cf. Stansbury v. Commonwealth, 454 8.W.34 293, 298 (ky.
2015) (defense counsel's questions to the witness and responses to the
Commonwealth's objections were sufficient to establish what testimony he
sought to elicit from the witness.). As Murphy only established the general
subject matter of Gabbard’s expected testimony we are unable to determine
how this testimony would have affected his trial. Accordingly this claim is
denied for not being adequately preserved for review.

Vi. There is no Cumulative Effect of Multiple Errors That Would Justify
Reversal.

Finally, Murphy requests that this Court overturn his convictions on the
grounds of cumulative error. See Funk v. Commonwealth, 842 8.W.2d 476,
483 (Ky. 1992) (stating that “the cumulative effect of the prejudice” from
multiple errors can require reversal). This doctrine acknowledges that,
“multiple errors, although harmless individually, may be deemed reversible if

their cumulative effect is to render the trial fundamentally unfair.” Brown v.

 

Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577, 631 (Ky. 2010). As we have explained, the

Commonwealth failed to prove the element of forcible compulsion for first-
37
degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse, and the trial court erred in
failing to grant Murphy a directed verdict for those offenses. However, the
necessity of reversing Murphy's conviction for those offenses does not lead us
the trial was

 

to conclude that his trial was fundamentally unfair. Whil
certainly not error free, our review of the record demonstrates that the errors
‘we have identified did not raise any questions as to Murphy's conviction for use
of a minor in a sexual performance. As such, we reject Murphy's cumulative
error argument.
CONCLUSION

In sum, we affirm the portion of the trial court's judgment convicting
Murphy of use of a minor in a sexual performance and sentencing him to ten
years’ imprisonment. We reverse the convictions for first-degree sodomy and
first-degree sexual abuse for insufficient evidence of forcible compulsion. We
hereby remand the matter, accordingly, to the Pulaski Circuit Court for entry of
‘an amended judgment, and any additional proceedings consistent with this

Opinion,

  

; Cunningham, Keller, VanMeter, and Venters,

All sitting. Minton, C.
JJ., concur. Cunningham, J., concurs by separate opinion. Wright, J.,
concurs in result only by separate opinion.

CUNNINGHAM, J., CONCURRING: | concur with Justice Hughes's well
written opinion. I agree that the closing argument was not prejudicial enough
to warrant a reversal on those grounds.

38
However, as a former Commonwealth's Attorney, I cannot let this case
pass without expressing more strongly my disapproval of the prosecutor's
closing argument in this case. Some of his theatrics go up to the line, but are
within ethical and legal bounds. However, the questions he posed directly to
the defense lawyer were neither rhetorical nor argumentative. Rhetorical
questions in closing arguments are to be posed to the jury with full knowledge
that they are to be answered only in their deliberations and verdict. It is highly
unprofessional, unfair, and inappropriate to pose such questions as were used
in this case to a defense lawyer. There were at least two of these questions
which required answers that the defense lawyer was procedurally muzzled to
answer. In some instances, if not here, it could rise to the level of reversible
error. Jurors are not fully aware of trial procedures. Such questions not only
put the defendant's lawyer in an embarrassing situation, but the refusal to
answer might be interpreted by the jury in a way which would be incriminating
to the defendant.

Prosecution of all felony cases in this state is the responsibility of the
elected Commonwealth’s Attorney. The conduct of any assistants assigned by
that office holder is imputed to that public servant.

Former Kentucky Supreme Court Chief Justice John Palmore—a former
Commonwealth's Attorney himself—spoke eloquently to this. “One of the finest
offices the public can give to a member of the legal profession in this state is
that of Commonwealth's Attorney. Its very status becomes a mantle of power

land respect to the wearer. Though few are apt to wear it lightly, some forget, or

39
apparently never learn, to wear it humbly." Niemeyer v. Commonwealth, 533
S.W.2d 218, 222 (Ky. 1976}.

Although written over forty-one years ago, it is a banner still pristine with
meaning and is worth repeating.

WRIGHT, J., CONCURRING IN RESULT ONLY: While I agree with the
‘majority in all other respects, I disagree as to its holding that a threat to erase
one’s mind through the use of black magic can never rise to the level of forcible
compulsion. Paul's belief that Murphy could actually erase his mind is central
to this analysis. Our brains are our most protected organs. The fact that one
cannot visibly see a memory does not mean it is not physically present.
Individuals do not create a memory each time they recall it—rather, it has to be
physically inside our minds. Therefore, a threat to erase the mind would be a
threat to remove a physical part of one’s brain. This would amount to a “threat

force” pursuant to the statute. That being said, I agree with the

 

of physi
majority that Murphy's threats of force in the case at bar were not temporally
connected so as to create an “immediate fear .. . of physical force.” KRS

510.010(2) (emphasis added).

40
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
John Gerhart Landon

Assistant Public Advocate

Department of Public Advocacy

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Andy Beshear, Attorney General of Kentucky
Jefirey Ray Prather

Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General

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