Case Title: State Personnel Bd. v. Dept. Personnel Admin.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S119498

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2005-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 12/1/05 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
STATE PERSONNEL BOARD, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
 
) 
 
DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL  
) 
 
ADMINISTRATION et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
 
Defendants and Appellants. 
) 
S119498 
___________________________________ ) 
 
) 
ASSOCIATION OF CALIFORNIA STATE) 
ATTORNEYS AND ADMINISTRATIVE ) 
LAW JUDGES et al., 
) 
 
)  Ct.App. 3 C032633, C034943, 
 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
)  
C040263  
 
 
) 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL  
) 
ADMINISTRATION et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 Sacramento County 
 
Defendants and Appellants. 
)  
Super. Ct. Nos. 01CS00109, 
___________________________________ )   
99CS00260, 98CS03314 
 
 
 
) 
STATE PERSONNEL BOARD, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL 
) 
ADMINISTRATION et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
2 
 
 
The memoranda of understanding (MOU’s) of four state employee 
bargaining units1 allow covered employees to challenge disciplinary actions either 
by seeking review before the State Personnel Board or by pursuing an alternative 
grievance/arbitration procedure that bypasses the State Personnel Board.  The 
Legislature ratified the grievance/arbitration procedures set forth in the four 
MOU’s by enacting implementing legislation.  (See Gov. Code, § 18670, subds. 
(c), (d) & (e); further undesignated statutory references are to the Government 
Code.)   
 
Does this bypass of the State Personnel Board violate article VII, section 3 
of the California Constitution, which provides that the State Personnel Board 
“shall . . . review disciplinary actions” taken against state civil service employees?  
(Cal. Const., art. VII, § 3, subd. (a).)  We conclude that it does.   
I. 
A.  MOU’s and Implementing Legislation 
 
1.  Unit 8 (Firefighters) 
 
In 1998, the Department of Personnel Administration, which represents the 
Governor of California in labor negations with state employee unions, entered into 
an MOU with the Department of Forestry Firefighters (Firefighters’ Union), the 
bargaining agent for Unit 8.  That MOU (hereafter also referred to as the original 
Unit 8 MOU) sets forth a procedure by which a firefighter can challenge a 
disciplinary action.  “Discipline” includes punitive dismissals, demotions, 
suspensions and pay reductions.  Discipline can be “major” or “minor.”  Major 
                                              
1  
The four bargaining units whose MOU’s are before us are Units 8, 11, 12 
and 13.  Unit 8 is comprised of firefighters, Unit 11 of engineering and scientific 
technicians, Unit 12 of craft and maintenance workers, and Unit 13 of stationary 
engineers.   
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discipline is a suspension of more than five days or a pay reduction of more than 5 
percent.  Anything less than that is minor discipline. 
 
The original Unit 8 MOU allows a firefighter to challenge a major 
disciplinary action in one of two ways:  either by seeking review before the State 
Personnel Board, or by filing a grievance with a “Board of Adjustment” comprised 
of four members (two selected by the union and two by the employer).  A minor 
disciplinary action can be challenged only through the Board of Adjustment 
grievance procedure; that board’s decision is final and binding, subject only to 
confirmation as an arbitration award.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1280 et seq.)  If the 
Board of Adjustment fails to reach a decision, the disciplinary action would be 
sustained unless the employee or the Firefighters’ Union sought arbitration.  The 
arbitrator’s decision would likewise be final and binding, and subject to judicial 
review only on the grounds set out in Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2.  
These include “corruption, fraud, or other undue means” in procuring the award, 
and corruption or prejudicial misconduct by an arbitrator.  (Id., subd. (a)(1).) 
 
To implement those provisions of the original Unit 8 MOU, the Legislature 
in 1998 added a new subdivision to section 18670.  That statute in subdivision (a) 
provides for the State Personnel Board to “hold hearings and make investigations 
concerning all [civil service] matters.”  (§ 18670, subd. (a), italics added.)  The 
1998 amendment added subdivision (d), which applies “only to state employees in 
State Bargaining Unit 8”; it exempts Unit 8 employees from either “investigation 
or hearing” by the State Personnel Board.  (§ 18670, subd. (d), as amended by 
Stats. 1998, ch. 1024, § 7; subsequently amended by Stats. 1999, ch. 446, § 6 and 
now designated subd. (c).)   
 
In 2000, as the result of a lawsuit brought by the Association of California 
Attorneys and Administrative Law Judges (State Attorneys and ALJ’s), the trial 
court issued a writ of mandate prohibiting the Unit 8 MOU’s alternative 
4 
grievance/arbitration procedure allowing disciplined firefighters to bypass review 
by the State Personnel Board in favor of review before a different agency.  In 
response, the Department of Personnel Administration and the Firefighters’ Union 
amended the original Unit 8 MOU.  The amended Unit 8 MOU, which we discuss 
below, states that the “modification shall be temporary” and that the MOU will 
revert to the original language “if the Court of Appeal reverses the Superior Court 
judgment.”   
 
The amended Unit 8 MOU gives firefighters subject to minor discipline the 
choice to seek review before the State Personnel Board or to bypass such review 
and instead pursue the grievance/arbitration process.  (Under the original MOU, a 
firefighter wishing to challenge a minor discipline could do so only through the 
grievance/arbitration procedure.)  In addition, the amended Unit 8 MOU requires 
an arbitrator’s decision to be submitted to the State Personnel Board to ensure that 
the decision does not conflict with “merit principles.”   
2.  Unit 11 (Engineering and Scientific Technicians) 
Effective July 1, 1999, the Department of Personnel Administration and the 
California State Employees Association (CSEA), as bargaining agent, entered into 
an MOU governing employees in Unit 11 (Unit 11 MOU), consisting of 
engineering and scientific technicians.  Relevant here are the MOU provisions 
pertaining to mandatory substance abuse testing for those employees operating 
commercial vehicles.  Employees disciplined or dismissed after receiving a positive 
test result during probation may challenge the action through a grievance and 
arbitration process, or if they choose, may seek review before the State Personnel 
Board.   
To implement the Unit 11 MOU, the Legislature in 1999 added subdivision 
(d) to section 18670.  (Stats. 1999, ch. 630, § 2.)  Then in 2000 the Legislature 
amended section 18670 by adding another new subdivision (d) (Stats. 2000, ch. 
5 
402, § 5.)  In relevant part, this new subdivision (d) states that covered employees 
who have been disciplined for “positive drug test results” and who have elected to 
challenge the discipline through the grievance and arbitration procedure “are not 
subject to either a[n] . . . investigation or a hearing” by the State Personnel Board.  
(See also § 19175, subds. (f) & (g); Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5, subd. (k).) 
 
 
3.  Unit 12 (Craft and Maintenance Workers) and Unit 13 
(Stationary Engineers) 
The MOU’s between the Department of Personnel Administration and the 
Operating Engineers (the bargaining agent for employees in Units 12 and 13) date 
from September 21, 1999.  As the exclusive means for resolving minor 
disciplinary actions, the MOU’s for Units 12 and 13 (Unit 12 MOU, Unit 13 
MOU) provide a grievance procedure before a four-member “Board of 
Adjustment,” consisting of two members chosen by the Department of Personnel 
Administration and two by the union.  For challenges to major disciplinary 
actions,2 employees can elect between review before the State Personnel Board or 
a grievance filed with the Board of Adjustment.  The latter’s decision is subject to 
arbitration, which, except for the grounds set out in Code of Civil Procedure 
section 1286.2 (see p. 3, ante), is final and binding.   
To implement the MOU’s for Units 12 and 13, the Legislature in 1999 
amended section 18670 by adding subdivision (e), providing that these MOU’s 
would control over conflicting provisions of section 18670 “without further 
legislative action.”   
                                              
2   
Major discipline under the Unit 12 MOU consists of a suspension for more 
than three working days, a temporary demotion, or a reduction in pay of five 
percent for more than three months.  The Unit 13 MOU defines major discipline as 
a “dismissal or suspension of more than three working days.”   
6 
B.  The Lawsuits  
The MOU’s discussed above and the statutory provisions implementing 
them were challenged in three separate lawsuits.  The first lawsuit was filed by the 
State Personnel Board on December 18, 1998, against the Department of 
Personnel Administration and the Firefighters’ Union; it sought a writ of mandate 
to prohibit enforcement of the disciplinary review provisions in the original Unit 8 
MOU pertaining to firefighters.  The trial court dismissed the case, ruling that the 
State Personnel Board lacked standing.  The State Personnel Board appealed.   
The second lawsuit was brought on February 8, 1999, by the State 
Attorneys and ALJ’s and a taxpayer against the Department of Personnel 
Administration and the Firefighters’ Union.  Like the earlier lawsuit brought by 
the State Personnel Board, this second suit challenged the original Unit 8 MOU 
covering firefighters and sought the same relief.   
The third lawsuit, by the State Personnel Board against the Department of 
Personnel Administration and two employee unions (the CSEA, as bargaining 
agent for Unit 11, and the Operating Engineers, as bargaining agent for Units 12 
and 13), was filed on January 25, 2001 and challenged the disciplinary review 
provisions in the MOU’s governing Units 11, 12, and 13.   
In the second and third lawsuits, the trial court issued a peremptory writ of 
mandate prohibiting enforcement of the disciplinary review provisions allowing 
bypass of review by the State Personnel Board in favor of filing a grievance with a 
four-member Board of Adjustment whose decision would be subject to arbitration.  
The Department of Personnel Administration and the employee unions appealed.   
The Court of Appeal consolidated the three appeals.  Disagreeing with the 
trial court in the first lawsuit, the Court of Appeal concluded the State Personnel 
Board had standing to challenge the MOU’s and the implementing legislation.  It 
also held that in allowing employees to challenge a disciplinary action through a 
7 
grievance/arbitration process instead of seeking review before the State Personnel 
Board, the MOU’s (including the amended Unit 8 MOU governing firefighters) 
and the implementing legislation violated article VII, section 3, subdivision (a) of 
the California Constitution by infringing upon the State Personnel Board’s 
authority to “review disciplinary actions” taken against state civil service 
employees.  We granted review of this constitutional issue, which was raised in 
petitions by the Department of Personnel Administration and two of the affected 
public employee unions (the Firefighters’ Union, which represents Unit 8; and the 
Operating Engineers, which represents Units 12 and 13).   
II. 
 
Before addressing the issue of whether the MOU’s for Units 8, 11, 12 and 
13 and the implementing legislation violate article VII of the state Constitution, 
we give a brief overview of the origins of the State Personnel Board and the state 
civil service system of which it is a part.   
 
A.  State Constitutional Provisions  
 
In tracing the history of the State Personnel Board, we find helpful our 
decision in Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown (1981) 29 Cal.3d 168 (Pacific 
Legal Foundation).  As we there explained, the California Legislature in 1913 
established this state’s first civil service system “to combat the ‘spoils system’ of 
political patronage in state employment.”  (Id. at pp. 181-182, citing Stats. 1913, 
ch. 590, p. 1035.)  By the early 1930’s, that system was “failing in its primary 
task” because of “numerous politically motivated appointments” and the 
exemption of most state employees from civil service.  (Pacific Legal Foundation, 
supra, at p. 182, citing King, Deliver Us from Evil:  A Public History of 
California’s Civil Service System (1979) p. 26.)  In 1934, the voters of California 
passed an initiative measure that added article XXIV to the state Constitution, 
revising the civil service system and creating the State Personnel Board to oversee 
8 
that system.  The ballot argument described the purpose of the initiative measure 
as promoting “efficiency and economy in State government,” to be achieved by 
prohibiting “appointments and promotion in State service except on the basis of 
merit, efficiency and fitness ascertained by competitive examination.”  (Pacific 
Legal Foundation, supra, at p. 183, fn. 6, quoting Ballot Pamp., Proposed 
Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 1934), 
argument in favor of Prop. 7, p. 12 (Ballot Pamphlet, 1934 General Election).)  
Thus, the 1934 amendment to the state Constitution established “the principle that 
appointments and promotions in state service be made solely on the basis of 
merit.”  (Pacific Legal Foundation, supra, at pp. 183-184.)  This merit system was 
to be administered by a “nonpartisan Personnel Board.”  (Id. at p. 184.)  
 
Thirty-six years later, at the 1970 general election, the voters of California 
revised article XXIV, based on changes that the California Constitution Revision 
Commission proposed.  (Pacific Legal Foundation, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 184, fn. 
8, citing Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 3, 
1970) pp. 23-24.)  The 1970 revision “made no substantive changes . . . and 
merely deleted obsolete and superfluous language . . . .”  (Ibid.)   
 
Thereafter, at the June 1976 election, “article XXIV was repealed but its 
provisions were adopted [by the voters] ‘verbatim’ as [present] article VII.”  
(Pacific Legal Foundation, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 184, fn. 8, citing Ballot Pamp., 
Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Prim. Elec. (June 8, 
1976) pp. 58-59.)  Article VII is pertinent to the issue we consider here.   
 
California Constitution article VII provides in section 1, subdivision (a), 
that “every officer and employee of the State” is in the state civil service system, 
unless otherwise exempted by the state Constitution.  Subdivision (b) of section 1 
states that civil service employees are appointed and promoted “based on merit,” 
which is to be “ascertained by competitive examination.”   
9 
 
Section 2 of California Constitution article VII provides for the state civil 
service system to be administered by the State Personnel Board, which consists of 
five members “appointed by the Governor and approved by the Senate.”  (Cal. 
Const., art. VII, § 2, subd. (a).)  Section 3, subdivision (a) of article VII describes 
the board’s duties in these words:  “The board shall enforce the civil service 
statutes and, by majority vote of all its members, shall prescribe probationary 
periods and classifications, adopt other rules authorized by statute, and review 
disciplinary actions.”  (Ibid., italics added.)   
B.  Disciplinary Review by the State Personnel Board 
 
The legislative scheme governing State Personnel Board review of 
disciplinary actions appears in the Government Code and is described in this 
court’s 1975 decision in Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194.  
Below we quote relevant portions of that decision.  (Bracketed material reflects 
statutory changes made after Skelly.)   
 
“Under section 19574 . . . the appointing power must serve upon the 
employee and file with the Board a written notice specifying:  (1) the nature of the 
punishment, (2) its effective date, (3) the causes therefor, (4) [a statement advising 
the employee of the right to answer the charges], and (5) the employee’s right to 
appeal.  (§ 19574.)  
 
“Except in cases involving minor disciplinary matters, the employee has a 
right to an evidentiary hearing to challenge the action taken against him.  To 
obtain such a hearing, the employee must file with the Board a written answer to 
the notice of punitive action . . . .  The answer is deemed to constitute a denial of 
all allegations contained in the notice which are not expressly admitted as well as a 
request for a hearing or investigation.  (§ 19575; [citation].)  Failure to file an 
answer within the specified time period results in the punitive action becoming 
final.  (§ 19575.) 
10 
 
“In cases where the affected employee files an answer within the prescribed 
period, the Board, or its authorized representative, must hold a hearing within a 
reasonable time.  (§ 19578; [citation].)  As a general rule, the case is referred to 
the Board’s hearing officer who conducts a hearing and prepares a proposed 
decision which may be adopted, modified or rejected by the Board.  (§ 19582.)  
. . .  If the Board determines that the cause or causes for which the employee was 
disciplined were insufficient or not sustained by the employee’s acts or omissions, 
or that the employee was justified in engaging in the conduct which formed the 
basis of the charges against him, it may modify or revoke the punitive action . . . .  
(§ 19583.)  . . .  
 
“In the case of an adverse decision by the Board, [either party] may petition 
. . . for a rehearing.  (§ 19586.)  As an alternative or in addition to the rehearing 
procedure, [either party] may seek review of the Board’s action by means of a 
petition for writ of administrative mandamus filed in the superior court.  (§ 19588; 
Boren v. State Personnel Board (1951) 37 Cal.2d 634, 637.)”  (Skelly, supra, 15 
Cal.3d at pp. 202-205, fns. omitted.)   
 
Because the State Personnel Board derives its adjudicatory authority from 
the state Constitution rather than from a legislative enactment, a superior court 
considering a petition for administrative mandate must defer to the Board’s factual 
findings if they are supported by substantial evidence.  (Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d at 
p. 217, fn. 31.)   
C.  Review of Employee Discipline Under the MOU’s 
 
As noted at the outset, the MOU’s at issue here allow the state employees 
in Units 8, 11, 12 and 13 to challenge disciplinary actions either before the State 
Personnel Board or by filing a grievance before a four-member Board of 
Adjustment.  Employees in Units 11, 12 and 13 who are dissatisfied with a Board 
of Adjustment decision can challenge that decision through arbitration.  (Unit 8 
11 
employees can pursue arbitration only if the Board of Adjustment fails to reach a 
decision.)  Have these MOU’s, as the trial courts and the Court of Appeal 
concluded, altered review of state civil service disciplinary actions in such a way 
as to violate section 3, subdivision (a) of article VII of the state Constitution 
providing that the State Personnel Board “shall . . . review disciplinary actions”?  
We address that question below.  For simplicity’s sake, we will refer to plaintiffs 
collectively as “the State Personnel Board,” and we will refer to the employee 
unions and the Department of Personnel Administration collectively as 
“defendants.” 
III. 
 
In deciding whether the MOU’s and their implementing legislation violate 
the state Constitution, we bear in mind the following:  “ ‘Unlike the federal 
Constitution, which is a grant of power to Congress, the California Constitution is 
a limitation or restriction on the powers of the Legislature.  [Citations.]  Two 
important consequences flow from this fact.  First, the entire law-making authority 
of the state, except the people’s right of initiative and referendum, is vested in the 
Legislature, and that body may exercise any and all legislative powers which are 
not expressly or by necessary implication denied to it by the Constitution.  
[Citations.]  In other words, “we do not look to the Constitution to determine 
whether the legislature is authorized to do an act, but only to see if it is 
prohibited.”  [Citation.]  [¶]  Secondly, all intendments favor the exercise of the 
Legislature’s plenary authority:  “If there is any doubt as to the Legislature’s 
power to act in any given case, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the 
Legislature’s action.  Such restrictions and limitations [imposed by the 
Constitution] are to be construed strictly, and are not to be extended to include 
matters not covered by the language used.” ’  (Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. 
Saylor (1971) 5 Cal.3d 685, 691; accord, Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown 
12 
[supra,] 29 Cal.3d 168, 180.)  On the other hand, ‘we also must enforce the 
provisions of our Constitution and “may not lightly disregard or blink at . . . a 
clear constitutional mandate.” ’ ”  (County of Riverside v. Superior Court (2003) 
30 Cal.4th 278, 284-285.)   
 
The constitutional provision at issue here says that the State Personnel 
Board “shall enforce the civil service statutes and, by majority vote of all its 
members, shall prescribe probationary periods and classifications, adopt other 
rules authorized by statute, and review disciplinary actions.”  (Cal. Const., art. 
VII, § 3, subd. (a), italics added.)  Does the italicized phrase preclude the 
Legislature from authorizing some entity other than the State Personnel Board (for 
instance, the Boards of Adjustment described in the four MOU’s) to review 
disciplinary actions taken against state civil service employees?  As we explain 
below, we conclude that it does. 
 
Defendants insist that the language of section 3, subdivision (a) of article 
VII of the state Constitution stating that the State Personnel Board “shall” review 
disciplinary actions is permissive, which according to defendants simply allows 
the Board to review disciplinary actions but does not require all disciplinary 
review to be before the Board.  Thus, defendants argue that, in permitting 
disciplined state employees to bypass review before the State Personnel Board in 
favor of pursuing a grievance/arbitration procedure outside that Board, the MOU’s 
and the implementing legislation do not conflict with the state constitutional 
provision at issue.  In support, defendants point to our decisions in Pacific Legal 
Foundation, supra, 29 Cal.3d 168, and in State Personnel Board v. Fair 
Employment and Housing Commission (1985) 39 Cal.3d 422 (Fair Employment 
and Housing).  Those cases are distinguishable, however.  In both, the 
administrative agency had a specialized function that supplemented rather than 
13 
supplanted the central adjudicative function of the State Personnel Board, as 
discussed below.   
 
In Pacific Legal Foundation, this court rejected a facial challenge to the 
State Employer-Employee Relations Act (SEERA), enacted by the Legislature to 
provide for collective bargaining to state civil service employees.  We also 
rejected a facial challenge to the SEERA’s statutory provisions allowing the 
Public Employee Relations Board (PERB) to investigate and devise remedies for 
unfair labor practices.  (Pacific Legal Foundation, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 197, fn. 
19.)  We saw no conflict with the language in section 3, subdivision (a) of article 
VII of the state Constitution vesting jurisdiction in the State Personnel Board to 
“review disciplinary actions.”  (Pacific Legal Foundation, supra, 29 Cal.3d at 
p. 196.)  We explained that the PERB’s authority over unfair labor practices did 
not overlap with the State Personnel Board’s jurisdiction over review of 
disciplinary actions because the State Personnel Board and the PERB were created 
to serve “different, but not inconsistent, public purpose[s].”  (Id. at p. 197.)  We 
noted that the State Personnel Board’s constitutional grant of authority was to 
review disciplinary actions against civil service employees whereas the PERB’s 
legislatively created function was “a somewhat more specialized and more focused 
task:  to protect both employees and the state employer from violations of the 
organizational and collective bargaining rights” secured under the SEERA.  (Id. at 
p. 198.)   
 
In Fair Employment and Housing, supra, 39 Cal.3d 422, three applicants 
rejected for state civil service employment asserted that their rejections constituted 
physical disability discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and 
Housing Act (§ 12900 et seq.) (FEHA).  At the request of the State Personnel 
Board, the trial court enjoined enforcement of the FEHA in matters involving the 
state civil service, concluding that it conflicted with the Board’s exclusive 
14 
jurisdiction over state civil service employment.  (Fair Employment and Housing, 
supra, at p. 427.)  This court disagreed, holding that the merit principle governing 
state civil service was actually reinforced, rather than hindered, by enforcing the 
FEHA, which “guarantees that non-merit factors such as race, sex, [and] physical 
handicap” would play no role in appointing state civil service employees.  (Fair 
Employment and Housing, supra, at p. 439.)   
 
In both Pacific Legal Foundation, supra, 29 Cal.3d 168, and Fair 
Employment and Housing, supra, 39 Cal.3d 422, the Legislature’s grant of certain 
functions to an administrative agency was consistent with advancing the merit 
principle embodied in article VII of our state Constitution, and in neither case did 
the statutory scheme undermine or compromise the State Personnel Board’s 
jurisdiction to “review disciplinary actions” (id., § 3, subd. (a)) against state civil 
service employees.   
 
We now turn to California Correctional Peace Officers Association v. State 
Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, another case relied on by defendants.  
There we considered section 18671.1, which requires the State Personnel Board to 
render a decision on a disciplinary matter either within six months of the 
employee’s filing of a petition for review or within 90 days after the Board takes 
the case under submission.  The statute also provides that, if the Board does not 
meet these statutory deadlines, the employee may seek de novo review in the 
superior court.  We held that in providing for de novo review in the superior court, 
the Legislature did not violate section 3, subdivision (a) of article VII in our state 
Constitution that the State Personnel Board “shall . . . review disciplinary actions.”  
(California Correctional Peace Officers Association, supra, at p. 1152.)  De novo 
review in the superior court would be allowed only after a failure of the State 
Personnel Board to comply with the statutory deadlines.  In contrast to the 
situation here, the State Personnel Board was not in any way deprived of the 
15 
constitutional authority to review disciplinary actions against state civil service 
employees.   
 
Defendants point to a comment in California Correctional Peace Officers 
Association v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 10 Cal.4th 1133, that section 3, 
subdivision (a) of article VII does not “limit the Legislature’s power to establish 
civil service procedures,” but rather merely ensures that employees can appeal 
disciplinary actions to the State Personnel Board.  (At p. 1152.)  This, they argue, 
acknowledges that the Legislature has broad powers to establish civil service 
procedures, including allowing employees to choose to challenge disciplinary 
actions before some entity other than the State Personnel Board.  Not so.  In 
California Correctional Peace Officers Association, we did not consider—much 
less resolve—the issue here, whether the Legislature could, consistent with section 
3, subdivision (a) of article VII, allow employees challenging disciplinary actions 
to bypass review before the State Personnel Board.   
 
Here, the State Personnel Board argues that allowing disciplined state civil 
service employees to bypass its review in favor of pursuing a grievance/arbitration 
procedure outside the Board would violate the “constitutional mandate” that state 
civil service appointments and promotions be based solely on merit.  The merit 
principle, as explained earlier, embodies “ ‘the concept “under which public 
employees are recruited, selected, and advanced under conditions of political 
neutrality, equal opportunity, and competition on the basis of merit and 
competence.” ’ ”  (Pacific Legal Foundation, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 184, fn. 7; see 
also California State Personnel Board et al. v. California State Employees 
Association (2005) 36 Cal. 4th 758 [invalidating post-and-bid programs that allow 
selection of state employees from a list of eligible candidates based on seniority 
rather than merit].)  As the Court of Appeal here pointed out, administering the 
state civil service based on the principle that appointments and promotions are 
16 
made solely on the basis of merit is the “central function” of the State Personnel 
Board.  In the court’s view, the board’s adjudicatory authority to review 
disciplinary actions, as set forth in section 3, subdivision (a) of article VII in our 
state Constitution, is a “necessary counterpart” to the board’s power under article 
VII, section 1, subdivision (b), to appoint and promote public employees based 
solely on merit.  The Court of Appeal reasoned that unless the board could 
exercise a veto of the discipline imposed on state civil service employees, state 
agencies “would be free to terminate an employee for spurious reasons in violation 
of the merit principle.”  We agree.   
 
Thus, when a state civil service employee is removed from employment, 
the interest of the State Personnel Board in ensuring that the disciplinary action 
does not violate the merit principle is just as great as when an employee is selected 
for state civil service employment.  And discipline other than removal from civil 
service also implicates the merit principle because disciplinary actions in general 
can have a profound effect on an employee’s chance of future advancement within 
the merit-based civil service. 
 
It would be inimical to California’s constitutionally mandated merit-based 
system of civil service, which is administered by the State Personnel Board, to 
wholly divest that board of authority to review employee disciplinary actions in 
favor of an MOU-created review board.  This is so because a state civil service 
based on the merit principle can be achieved only by developing and consistently 
applying uniform standards for employee hiring, promotion, and discipline.  By 
vesting in the nonpartisan State Personnel Board the sole authority to administer 
the state civil service system (Cal. Const., art. VII, § 2), our state Constitution 
recognizes that this task must be entrusted to single agency, the constitutionally 
created State Personnel Board.  Because employee discipline is an integral part of 
17 
the civil service system, the State Personnel Board’s exclusive authority to review 
disciplinary decisions is a critical component of the civil service system. 
 
Defendants insist that the MOU provisions at issue do not adversely affect 
the constitutionally mandated merit-based civil service system because a 
disciplined employee who opts for review by the Board of Adjustment instead of 
review by the State Personnel Board has done nothing more than waive the right to 
review before the latter.  Defendants’ argument rests on the incorrect assumption 
that the merit-based civil service system exists solely for the benefit of state civil 
service employees to the exclusion of the general public, and therefore a 
disciplined employee’s decision to forgo State Personnel Board review in favor of 
the grievance/arbitration procedure affects no one other than the disciplined 
employee.  As mentioned on pages 7 and 8, ante, the California electorate back in 
1934 had a different view of state civil service in mind when it passed an initiative 
measure that added former article XXIV (now article VII) to the state 
Constitution, revising the state civil service and creating the State Personnel Board 
to oversee that system.  The ballot argument explained the initiative’s goal as 
promoting “efficiency and economy in State government,” to be achieved by 
prohibiting “appointments and promotion in State service except on the basis of 
merit.”  (Ballot Pamp., 1934 Gen. Elec., supra, p. 12.)  Thus, the public in general 
has a strong interest in ensuring that partisanship plays no role in selection and 
advancement within the state civil service.  That public interest would be 
subverted if various ad hoc arbitral boards, operating beyond the control of the 
State Personnel Board and not bound to apply its merit-based standards, could 
review and reverse disciplinary actions taken against state civil service employees.  
As we have explained, the public interest in a merit-based civil service is best 
served by recognizing that the State Personnel Board’s authority to review 
employee discipline is exclusive. 
18 
 
One last point on defendants’ “waiver” argument.  Under our state 
Constitution, a disciplined employee has the right to have the State Personnel 
Board review the disciplinary action.  The employee can, of course, decide not to 
exercise that right at all.  If that occurs, the employee has waived that right.  But 
that is different from allowing a disciplined employee the option of bypassing 
review by the board in favor of an MOU-created agency that, unlike the board, 
lacks express authority under our state Constitution to oversee California’s merit-
based state civil service system, including review of disciplinary actions taken 
against employees. 
DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
AARON, J.∗ 
                                              
∗ 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, 
Division One, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 
California Constitution. 
19 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion State Personnel Board v. Department of Personnel Administration 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 111 Cal.App.4th 839 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S119498 
Date Filed: December 1, 2005 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Sacramento 
Judge: Lloyd Connelly, Gail D. Ohanesian and Ronald R. Robie 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys: 
 
 
Elise S. Rose, Dorothy Bacskai Egel; Kronick, Moskovitz, Tiedemann & Girard and Susan R. Denious for 
Plaintiff and Appellant and for Plaintiff and Respondent State Personnel Board. 
 
Howard L. Schwartz, K. William Curtis, Marguerite D. Seabourn and Linda Diane Buzzini for Defendant 
and Appellant and for Defendant and Respondent Department of Personnel Administration. 
 
Anne M. Giese and Mark DeBoer for Defendant and Appellant and for Defendant and Respondent 
California State Employees Association. 
 
Carroll, Burdick & McDonough, Ronald Yank, David M. Rice and Gregg McLean Adam for Defendant 
and Appellant and for Defendant and Respondent Department of Forestry Firefighters. 
 
VanBourg, Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld, Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld, William A. Sokol, Vincent A. 
Harrington, M. Suzanne Murphy and Matthew J. Gauger for Defendant and Appellant and for Defendant 
and Respondent International Union of Operating Engineers. 
 
Norman Hill and Wendy Breckon for Defendant and Appellant and for Defendant and Respondent 
Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David S. Chaney, Assistant Attorney General, Damon M. Connolly, 
Miguel A. Neri, Jacob Appelsmith, Alicia M. B. Fowler and Michelle Littlewood, Deputy Attorneys 
General, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant and Defendant and Respondent 
Department of Personnel Administration. 
 
Anne M. Giese; Katzenbach and Khtikian and Christopher W. Katzenbach for California State Employees 
Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants and  Defendants and Respondents 
Department of Personnel Administration, Department of Forestry Firefighters and International Union of 
Operating Engineers. 
20 
Attorneys (cont’d) 
 
Law Office of Steven B. Bassoff, Steven B. Bassoff; Eisen & Johnston Law Corporation, Jay-Allen Eisen 
Law Corporation, Jay-Allen Eisen, Marian M. Johnston and C. Athena Rousos for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents Association of California State Attorneys and Administrative Law Judges et al. 
 
Elise S. Rose, Dorothy Bacskai Egel; Kronick, Moskovitz, Tiedemann & Girard and Susan R. Denious for 
State Personnel Board as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents Association of California 
State Attorneys and Administrative Law Judges et al. 
21 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Dorothy Bacskai Egel 
State Personnel Board 
801 Capitol Mall 
Sacramento, CA  95814 
(916) 653-1403 
 
Linda Diane Buzzini 
Department of Personnel Administration 
1515 S Street, North Building, Suite 400 
Sacramento, CA  95814-7243 
(916) 324-0512 
 
Ronald Yank 
Carroll, Burdick & McDonough 
44 Montgomery Street, Suite 400 
San Francisco, CA  94104 
(415) 989-5900 
 
Matthew J. Gauger 
Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld 
428 J Street, Suite 520 
Sacramento, CA  95814-2341 
(916) 443-6600 
 
Steven B. Bassoff 
Law Office of Steven B. Bassoff 
2000 O Street, Suite 250 
Sacramento, CA  95814 
(916) 448-7317