Case Title: The Florida Bar v. Mario A. Ruiz De La Torre A/K/A Mario Costa

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC07-1633

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2008-10-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-1633 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR,  
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
MARIO A. RUIZ DE LA TORRE a/k/a MARIO COSTA, 
Respondent. 
 
[October 16, 2008] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee's report recommending that Mario A. Ruiz De 
la Torre be found guilty of professional misconduct and suspended from the 
practice of law for ninety days.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  
We approve the referee’s findings, except for one aggravating factor, and his 
recommendations as to guilt.  Further, we disapprove the recommended discipline 
of a ninety-day suspension.  Instead, we impose an eighteen-month suspension, 
effective, nunc pro tunc, October 4, 2007, followed by three years of probation.   
BACKGROUND 
 
In September 2007, The Florida Bar filed a notice of determination of guilt 
with this Court after being informed that in March 2000, De la Torre had entered 
nolo contendere pleas in the circuit court for five criminal charges, including two 
felonies.  Upon the Bar’s filing of the notice of determination of guilt, De la Torre 
was suspended, effective October 4, 2007, pursuant to Rule Regulating the Florida 
Bar 3-7.2 (Procedures Upon Criminal or Professional Misconduct; Discipline 
Upon Determination or Judgment of Guilt of Criminal Misconduct) (hereinafter, 
“felony suspension rule”).  A referee was subsequently appointed to preside over 
the disciplinary case, pursuant to Bar rule 3-7.6.  After holding a hearing, the 
referee filed a report with this Court in which he made the following findings of 
fact.   
In March 2000, the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for 
Miami-Dade County, Florida withheld adjudication for De la Torre (in State v. 
Mario Costa, Case No. F99-38473) on a total of five criminal charges (the two 
felonies — possession of cocaine and battery on a law enforcement officer, and 
three misdemeanors — resisting an officer without violence, unlawful possession 
of cannabis, and possession of drug paraphernalia) and imposed eighteen months 
probation.  De la Torre completed all of the probation conditions early and the 
circuit court terminated his probation after ten months.  Most significantly, even 
 
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though he pled to the offenses in March 2000, De la Torre failed to notify the Bar 
about the determinations of guilt, 1 as required by Bar rule 3-7.2(c), until August 
2007. 
The referee recommends that De la Torre be found guilty of violating Rules 
Regulating the Florida Bar 4-8.4(a) (“A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to 
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do 
so, or do so through the acts of another.”) and 4-8.4(b) (“A lawyer shall not 
commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, 
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.”). 
The referee found six aggravating factors:  (1) dishonest or selfish motive; 
(2) pattern of misconduct; (3) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding; 
(4) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deception during the 
disciplinary process; (5) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of conduct; 
and (6) substantial experience as a practicing lawyer.2  The referee found five 
mitigating factors:  (1) no prior Bar disciplinary record; (2) personal or emotional 
                                          
 
 
1.  Pursuant to rule 3-7.2(b), a determination of guilt for any felony stands as 
“conclusive proof of guilt of the criminal offense(s) charged” for the disciplinary 
case.  Moreover, rule 3-7.2(h)(2) states in pertinent part that “[t]he respondent may 
not contest the findings of guilt in the criminal proceedings[;] [however, the 
respondent] may be allowed to explain the circumstances concerning the entry of 
the plea for purposes of mitigation.”   
 
2.  At the time of the hearing, the referee noted that De la Torre was fifty-
three years old and had been a member of the Bar since 1986. 
 
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problems; (3) character or reputation; (4) interim rehabilitation; and (5) imposition 
of other penalties or sanctions (during the 2000 criminal proceedings).   
Based on his findings, and Florida Standard for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
5.12,3 the referee recommends that De la Torre be suspended effective, nunc pro 
tunc, October 4, 2007, for ninety days followed by probation for three years.  The 
referee also recommends that De la Torre be evaluated, within thirty days, by 
Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc. (FLA, Inc.).  If the evaluation by FLA, Inc. 
indicates that De la Torre is in need of treatment for substance abuse, he would be 
required to execute a FLA, Inc. contract.  Finally, the referee recommends that the 
Bar be awarded costs incurred during the disciplinary process. 
The Bar petitioned for review, challenging the referee’s recommended 
sanction.  De la Torre filed a cross-petition challenging certain findings in 
aggravation.  The Bar filed an amended affidavit of costs totaling $ 2,957.80, 
which was not challenged. 
DISCUSSION 
Neither party challenges the referee’s findings of fact or recommendations 
as to guilt.  Therefore, we approve the referee’s findings of fact and 
recommendations as to guilt.  Based on the parties’ arguments, there are two issues 
                                          
 
 
3.  Standard 5.12 states:  “Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer 
knowingly engages in criminal conduct which is not included in Standard 5.11 and 
that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice.” 
 
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to address:  (1) whether there is competent, substantial evidence to support the 
referee’s findings in aggravation; and (2) whether the referee’s recommended 
ninety-day suspension is reasonably supported by the standards and caselaw.  We 
address these issues, in turn. 
With regard to the first issue, we examine whether there is competent, 
substantial evidence to support the referee’s findings in aggravation.  De la Torre 
asserts that the record does not support any of the referee’s findings in aggravation, 
except the finding that at the time of his arrest he had substantial experience in the 
practice of law, which we approve here.  The Bar argues that all of the referee’s 
findings in aggravation are supported.  The standard of review is whether the 
referee’s findings of aggravation are clearly erroneous or without support in the 
record.  See Fla. Bar v. Valentine-Miller, 974 So. 2d 333, 336 (Fla. 2008) (a 
referee’s findings of aggravation and mitigation are presumptively correct and will 
not be disturbed unless such findings are clearly erroneous or without record 
support); Fla. Bar v. Arcia, 848 So. 2d 296, 299 (Fla. 2003) (same).   
De la Torre raises arguments pertaining to three of the referee’s findings in 
aggravation (a pattern of misconduct, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary 
proceeding, and refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of conduct) that we 
find without merit and reject without discussion, except to note that our review of 
 
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the record shows the referee’s findings for these aggravating factors are supported.  
We therefore approve the findings of these factors.   
We briefly address De la Torre’s argument that the referee’s finding that he 
acted from a dishonest or selfish motive in failing to reporting his two felony pleas 
is erroneous.  De la Torre asserts that he relied on his trial counsel’s advice that he 
was not entering pleas to any felony offenses.  Therefore, De la Torre claims that 
he did not report what he thought were misdemeanor offenses to the Bar, because 
the Bar rules in effect at that time did not require reporting of misdemeanor pleas.  
We find De la Torre’s claim about relying on his trial counsel’s assurance that he 
was not entering pleas to any felony offenses to be utterly incredible.  There is no 
plausible excuse for a member of The Florida Bar, who had more than twelve years 
of experience at the time, not to be fully aware that he was entering nolo 
contendere pleas to two felonies.  The record shows that in his colloquy at the 
sentencing hearing, the trial judge specifically addressed that the charges of battery 
on a police officer and possession of cocaine each carried maximum sentences of 
five years’ imprisonment.  Further, the trial judge ensured that De la Torre both 
understood his rights and voluntarily entered nolo contendere pleas to these felony 
charges.  De la Torre clearly failed to fulfill his duty under the Bar rules to report 
his two felony pleas to the Bar.  Accordingly, we approve the referee’s finding that 
De la Torre demonstrated a dishonest or selfish motive.   
 
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De la Torre’s assertion that the referee erred in finding that he engaged in 
deceptive practices “during the disciplinary process”4 because he may have 
misidentified himself to the arresting officer in November 1999 also merits 
examination.  The referee’s finding of this aggravating factor is clearly erroneous 
for two reasons.  First, the referee’s observation that De la Torre may have 
misidentified himself to the arresting officer in November 1999 is not an actual 
finding of fact; the referee did not conclude that De la Torre made that 
misrepresentation.  Second, even if there had been a finding that De la Torre 
deliberately misidentified himself to the arresting officer, such a misleading 
statement in 1999 was not part of the “disciplinary process,” which did not 
commence until seven years later.  Accordingly, we disapprove the referee’s 
finding that De la Torre submitted false evidence, false statements, or engaged in 
other deceptive practices in the context of the “disciplinary process.”   
Next, we turn to the recommended sanction.  The Bar argues that the 
referee’s recommended ninety-day suspension is too lenient and, if approved by 
the Court, would embolden other lawyers to conceal their pleas to criminal 
offenses from the Bar.  The Bar asserts that De la Torre’s misconduct warrants a 
                                          
 
 
4.  Standard 9.22(f) states that one aggravating factor that may be found is 
“submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during 
the disciplinary process.”   
 
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one-year suspension.  De la Torre, in turn, argues that his substantial mitigation 
and caselaw supports the referee’s recommended sanction.   
In reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, this Court’s scope of 
review is broader than that afforded to the referee’s finding of fact because, 
ultimately, it is the Court’s responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  See 
Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. 
Const.  However, generally speaking, this Court will not second-guess the referee’s 
recommendation for disciplining a lawyer, as long as the referee’s recommended 
discipline has a reasonable basis in existing caselaw and the Florida Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  Fla. Bar v. Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999).   
In this case, the referee does not cite any caselaw in support of his 
recommended discipline.  Instead, he bases his recommended sanction solely on 
standard 5.12, which states that suspension is the appropriate discipline for certain 
criminal conduct.  However, standard 5.12 does not indicate the appropriate 
duration of a given suspension.  In this case, standard 5.12 alone fails to provide 
adequate support for the referee’s recommendation that a ninety-day suspension is 
the appropriate sanction for De la Torre’s violations of rules 4-8.4(a) and 4-8.4(b) 
and failure to notify the Bar of his nolo contendere pleas to two felonies.  
Moreover, the recommended sanction is inconsistent with the caselaw wherein we 
imposed lengthy suspensions for judgments or determinations of guilt involving 
 
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felonies.  See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Del Pino, 955 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 2007) (suspended for 
three years); Fla. Bar v. Hochman, 815 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 2002) (suspended for three 
years effective from date of felony suspension); Fla. Bar v. Wells, 602 So. 2d 1236 
(Fla. 1992) (suspended for eighteen months).  Based on the standards and caselaw, 
we find that the recommended ninety-day suspension is inappropriate, because it is 
too lenient. 
 
In Del Pino, the Bar initiated lawyer disciplinary proceedings after Del Pino 
pled guilty to two federal felonies (tax evasion and mail fraud) in a federal district 
court.  955 So. 2d at 558.  The federal court sentenced Del Pino to probation for 
three years.  Afterward, Del Pino was suspended under the felony suspension rule.  
The disciplinary case was referred to a referee, who recommended that Del Pino be 
found guilty of violating multiple Bar rules.  The referee found three aggravating 
factors and six mitigating factors.  The referee recommended that Del Pino be 
disbarred.  On review, after considering the substantial mitigation, the Court 
determined that Del Pino met her burden of demonstrating that a sanction less than 
disbarment was appropriate.  Therefore, we disapproved the referee’s 
recommended sanction and imposed a three-year suspension.   
 
In Hochman, the Bar and Hochman entered into a consent judgment after 
Hochman voluntarily came forward, in 1997, and admitted that he had a significant 
drug addiction.  Due to his drug addiction, Hochman had misappropriated client 
 
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trust funds.  815 So. 2d at 625.  Hochman was suspended for three years effective 
July 1997.  In 1999, Hochman was criminally charged, based on the same 
misappropriation of client trust funds, with two counts of felony grand theft.  In 
October 1999, Hochman pled no contest to both charges, and was sentenced to two 
years of community service.  In 2000, the Bar filed a notice of determination of 
guilt seeking an additional three-year suspension; a referee was appointed to 
conduct a hearing and make recommendations.   
Even though Hochman was already suspended, the referee recommended 
that he be suspended for three years effective, nunc pro tunc, on the date he entered 
his criminal pleas.  On review, this Court approved the recommended discipline of 
a three-year suspension, but modified the effective date to the date of his felony 
suspension. 
 
Finally, in Wells, the Bar initiated disciplinary proceedings against Wells, 
charging him with eight counts of abandoning the practice of law and a count of 
felony possession of cocaine and paraphernalia.  602 So. 2d at 1236.  With regard 
to the felony charge, Wells pled no contest to two counts of possession of cocaine.  
Adjudication was withheld and he was sentenced to probation for five years.  
Afterward, Wells was suspended under the felony suspension rule.  A referee was 
appointed to hold a hearing on the nine disciplinary charges.  The referee 
recommended that Wells be found guilty of violating multiple Bar rules.  However, 
 
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the referee also found substantial mitigation and, thus, recommended that Wells be 
suspended for eighteen months effective, nunc pro tunc, on the date of his felony 
suspension and be placed on probation for two years thereafter.  On review, this 
Court approved the duration of suspension, but, given the totality of circumstances, 
modified the referee’s recommendation regarding probation to require that Wells 
be placed on probation for three years.   
Del Pino, Hochman, and Wells provide guidance in this case regarding the 
role substantial mitigating factors play in determining the severity of the sanction 
to be imposed.  See generally Fla. Bar v. Cohen, 908 So. 2d 405, 410 (Fla. 2005) 
(the Court has permitted lawyers facing Bar discipline to introduce evidence about 
the circumstances of their convictions to demonstrate mitigation in favor of less 
severe sanctions).   
In the present case, the referee found substantial mitigation.  First, De la 
Torre had no prior disciplinary record.  Second, De la Torre was experiencing 
personal and emotional problems at or around the time of his misconduct, 
including:  (1) recovery from a serious injury; (2) a significant period of 
unemployment; and (3) dissolution of his long-term marriage.  Third, there was 
“considerable evidence” of De la Torre’s good character and reputation.  Fourth, 
De la Torre demonstrated interim rehabilitation by his “seemingly exemplary 
record” since his 1999 arrest.  Finally, De la Torre completed all of the terms of his 
 
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criminal sentencing.  We view De la Torre’s mitigation as significant in 
determining the severity of the sanction to impose.  Nevertheless, the fact that 
under Bar rule 3-7.2(a)(2), his nolo contendere pleas to two felony charges 
constitute determinations of guilt, coupled with the inexcusable fact that he 
concealed those pleas from the Bar for more than seven years, requires the 
imposition of a lengthy suspension. 
De la Torre’s misconduct, along with the aggravating and mitigating factors, 
warrants suspension for eighteen months effective, nunc pro tunc, the date of his 
felony suspension.  We do not take lightly the fact that De la Torre pled to felonies, 
did not inform the Bar, and continued to practice law.  We emphasize that the 
behavior that led to De la Torre’s nolo contendere pleas to two felonies, and his 
subsequent failure to report those pleas to the Bar for seven years, is egregious 
misconduct that is unbecoming of a member of The Florida Bar.  But for the 
mitigation found by the referee, we would impose a harsher sanction on De la 
Torre.   
 
Accordingly, Mario A. Ruiz De la Torre is hereby suspended for eighteen 
months effective, nunc pro tunc, October 4, 2007.  Because De la Torre is currently 
suspended it is unnecessary to provide him with thirty days to close out his practice 
of law to protect the interests of existing clients.  De la Torre shall accept no new 
business until he is reinstated to the practice of law in Florida.  Whenever De la 
 
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Torre is reinstated, he shall be on probation for three years thereafter.  Further, he 
is directed to comply with all other terms and conditions in the referee’s report, 
including the recommendations regarding FLA, Inc.   
 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Mario A. Ruiz De la 
Torre in the amount of $2,957.80, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., concur. 
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., did not participate. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION. 
 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, Kenneth Lawrence Marvin, Director of 
Lawyer Regulation, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, and Barnaby Lee Min, 
Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
Kevin P. Tynan of Richardson and Tynan, P.L.C., Tamarac, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent