Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Blum

Citation: 373 Md. 275

Docket Number: 11ag/02

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2003-03-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Blum,  No. 11, September Term, 2002
[Violations of the following Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct: 1.15(a)(Safekeeping
Property), 1.16(d)(Declining or Terminating Representation), 3.3(a)(1) and (a)(4)(Candor
Toward the Tribunal), 3.4(a) and (b)(Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel), 8.1(a) and
(b)(Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters),  8.4(c) and (d)(Misconduct).  Violations of
Maryland Rules 16-606 (Name and Designation of Account), 16-609 (Prohibited
Transactions), and Maryland Code, Sections 10-304 (Deposit of Trust Money) and 10-306
(Misuse of Trust Money) of the Business Occupations and Professions Article (1989, 2000
Repl. Vol.)  Blum’s conduct, which violated all of the above listed rules and warranted
disbarment, involved placing clients’ funds into his personal or operating accounts before
earning them, the alteration of a check and eventual misrepresentations to his client, opposing
counsel, Bar Counsel, and the Court regarding the alteration.]  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 11
September Term, 2002
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION
v.
BRUCE DAVID BLUM
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
               
R odowsky, Lawrence F.
(retired, specially assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed: March 10, 2003
1
Maryland Rule 16-709(a) states that “[c]harges against an attorney shall be filed by
the Bar Counsel acting at the direction of the Review Board.”  This case arose and was
processed under the attorney grievance rules in effect prior to July 1, 2001.  Thus, we refer
to the rules as they existed prior to that date.  See Md. Rules Orders, p. 56, Maryland Rules,
vol. 1 (2002) (ordering that “any matter pending before an Inquiry Panel, the Review Board,
or the Court of Appeals pursuant to charges, a petition, or an application pending as of June
30, 2001 shall continue to be governed by the Rules in effect on June 30, 2001”). 
2
MRPC 1.15(a) provides:
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that
is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation
separate from the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in
a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600
of the Maryland Rules. Other property shall be identified as such
and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such
account funds and of other property shall be kept by the lawyer
and shall be preserved for a period of five years after
termination of the representation.
3
MRPC 1.16(d) provides:
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps
to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests,
such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property
to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance
payment of fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain
papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law.
Respondent Bruce David Blum (hereinafter “Blum”) was admitted to the Bar of this
Court on December 15, 1988, and thereafter, to the Bar of the District of Columbia.  On
March 21, 2002, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (hereinafter “Bar
Counsel”), acting pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-709(a),1 filed a petition for disciplinary
action against Blum charging him with violating the following Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct (hereinafter “MRPC”): MRPC 1.15(a)(Safekeeping property),2  MRPC
1.16(d)(Declining or Terminating Representation),3 MRPC 3.3(a)(1) and (4)(Candor Toward
4
MRPC 3.3(a)(1) and (4) state:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer
has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity,
the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures. 
5
MRPC 3.4(a) and (b) state:
A lawyer shall not:
(a) unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or
unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material
having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or
assist another person to do any such act; 
(b) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely,
or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law.
6
MRPC 8.1(a) and (b) state:
An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a
lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in
connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not: 
(a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or 
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension
known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly
fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an
admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does
not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by
Rule 1.6. 
7
MRPC 8.4(c) and (d) state:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation; 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.
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the Tribunal),4 MRPC 3.4(a) and (b)(Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel),5 MRPC 8.1(a)
and (b)(Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters),6 MRPC 8.4(c) and (d)(Misconduct).7  The
petition also charged Blum with violating Maryland Rules 16-606 (Name and Designation
8
Maryland Rule 16-606 states:
An attorney or law firm shall maintain each attorney trust account with
a title that includes the name of the attorney or law firm and that clearly
designates the account as “Attorney Trust Account”, “Attorney Escrow
Account”, or “Clients' Funds Account” on all checks and deposit slips.  The
title shall distinguish the account from any other fiduciary account that the
attorney or law firm may maintain and from any personal or business account
of the attorney or law firm. 
9
Maryland Rule 16-607 states:
a. General prohibition. An attorney or law firm may deposit in
an attorney trust account only those funds required to be
deposited in that account by Rule 16-604 or permitted to be so
deposited by section b. of this Rule. 
b. Exceptions. 1. An attorney or law firm shall either (A)
deposit into an attorney trust account funds to pay any fees,
service charges, or minimum balance required by the financial
institution to open or maintain the account, including those fees
that cannot be charged against interest due to the Maryland
Legal Services Corporation Fund pursuant to Rule 16-610 b 1
(D), or (B) enter into an agreement with the financial institution
to have any fees or charges deducted from an operating account
maintained by the attorney or law firm. The attorney or law firm
may deposit into an attorney trust account any funds expected to
be advanced on behalf of a client and expected to be reimbursed
to the attorney by the client.
2. An attorney or law firm may deposit into an attorney trust
account funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently
or potentially to the attorney or law firm. The portion belonging
to the attorney or law firm shall be withdrawn promptly when
the attorney or law firm becomes entitled to the funds, but any
portion disputed by the client shall remain in the account until
the dispute is resolved. 
3. Funds of a client or beneficial owner may be pooled and
commingled in an attorney trust account with the funds held for
other clients or beneficial owners.
-3-
of Account),8 16-607 (Commingling of Funds),9 16-609(Prohibited Transactions),10 and
10
Maryland Rule 16-609 states:
An attorney or law firm may not borrow or pledge any funds
required by these Rules to be deposited in an attorney trust
account, obtain any remuneration from the financial institution
for depositing any funds in the account, or use any funds for any
unauthorized purpose. An instrument drawn on an attorney trust
account may not be drawn payable to cash or to bearer. 
11
Section 10-304 states:
(a) General requirement. -- Except as provided in subsection (b)
of this section, a lawyer expeditiously shall deposit trust money
into an attorney trust account. 
(b) Exceptions –  Direction of court. –  Subsection (a) of this
section does not apply if there is a court order to the contrary. 
(c) Same – Real estate transaction. –  Notwithstanding
subsection (a) of this section or any other law, a lawyer may
disburse, at settlement in a real estate transaction, trust money
that the lawyer receives in the transaction. 
12
Section 10-306 states:
A lawyer may not use trust money for any purpose other than the
purpose for which the trust money is entrusted to the lawyer. 
13
The hearing judge concluded that there was not clear and convincing evidence to find
that Blum committed the violations alleged by Bar Counsel with respect to Chris
Kourkoulakos, John Watson, Paul Leopold, Jacqueline Boucher, Steven Bullock, and
Deborah Sidall.  Additionally, the allegations as to Charnese Fletcher-Grimes were
withdrawn.
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Maryland Code, Sections 10-304 (Deposit of Trust Money)11 and 10-306 (Misuse of Trust
Money)12 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article (1989, 2000 Repl. Vol.).  The
charges involved Blum’s representation of  Zahra Dianat, Latania Hubbard, Chris
Kourkoulakos, John Watson, Paul Leopold, Christine  Bernstein, Corlis Lesley Sellers,
Sharon Clinton, Cathy Walter, Jacqueline Boucher, Steven Bullock, Deborah Sidall, Lindsey
Asay, Vasilios Pappas, and Charnese Fletcher-Grimes.13  
-5-
On March 27, 2002,  pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-709(b), we referred the petition
to Judge Joseph A. Dugan, Jr., of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to conduct an
evidentiary hearing and make findings of fact and conclusions of law.  We also ordered that
the evidentiary hearing was to commence “not later than thirty (30) days from the filing of
the response and that no extension shall be granted except by Order of this Court.” 
On April 24, 2002, Blum filed his response, and on May 6, 2002, he filed a
counterclaim in which he alleged malicious use of process and/or abuse of process.  Bar
Counsel responded by filing a motion to strike Blum’s counterclaim, which was in fact, later
granted.
While conducting discovery, it became apparent that discovery problems were going
to derail the hearing that was supposed to occur within the thirty day limit set in our March
27, 2002 Order.  On May 9, 2002, as a result, Bar Counsel filed a motion for extension of
time in which it was  represented that Blum, Bar Counsel, and the lower court had agreed that
July 8, 2002 was an appropriate date to commence the proceedings because it would enable
the parties to complete discovery. On May 15, 2002, we granted that motion. On May 24,
2002, however, Blum sought an additional extension in his motion to “continue disciplinary
hearing for appropriate time to obtain counsel and adequately prepare.”  This Court granted
Blum’s motion and set the hearing dates for September 4 and 5, 2002.  In August of 2002,
Blum sought, yet again, an extension of the hearing date in his supplemental motion to
continue disciplinary proceeding.  We denied that motion.  
-6-
Also, as aforementioned, the discovery process was replete with problems.  On June
6, 2002,  Bar Counsel filed a motion for sanctions alleging Blum failed to respond to
interrogatories and requests for documents and a motion for protective order claiming that
Blum’s notice of intention to take deposition and request for production of documents were
oppressive, overly broad, and not calculated to lead to discoverable facts.  On June 18, 2002,
Judge Dugan conducted a hearing on these discovery motions, as well as on Bar Counsel’s
motion to strike Blum’s counterclaim.  During that hearing, the judge granted Bar Counsel’s
motion to strike Blum’s counterclaim; Bar Counsel withdrew his motion for sanctions, and
his motion for protective order was denied.  On July 16, 2002, Bar Counsel filed his second
motion for sanctions against Blum, again alleging that Blum had failed to respond to
interrogatories.  On August 16, 2002, less than three weeks before his disciplinary hearing,
Blum filed a motion for sanctions claiming that the disciplinary action should be dismissed
because Bar Counsel had willfully violated the rules of discovery.  On that same day, Blum
also filed a motion to recuse Judge Dugan, alleging that the judge’s handling of the
disciplinary matter had “been with such ineptitude as to prevent him from fairly presiding
over a Disciplinary Hearing.” Both of Blum’s motions were denied. 
Judge Dugan conducted evidentiary hearings on September 4 and 5, 2002.  At the
beginning of the September 4 hearing, Blum, during his opening argument, asserted that he
was willing to admit to most of the allegations against him.  Thus, Blum, pursuant to his
suggestion and the agreement of Bar Counsel,  took the stand and, in response to questions
-7-
from Bar Counsel, admitted many of the allegations contained in the petition for disciplinary
action not disposed of as mentioned in n.13, supra. 
After Blum’s testimony, Bar Counsel presented testimony from six additional
witnesses and introduced over forty evidentiary exhibits.  Blum presented no documentary
evidence and no testimony, other than his own, which was related to his assertion that he had
not deposited any unearned fees into his personal or operating accounts.
On September 5, 2002, the judge continued the proceedings to Friday, September 6,
2002.  Blum protested this extension and declared that he would not appear because he had
a brief due in the Court of Special Appeals on that day and because his family celebrated
Rosh Hashanah early, although that holiday did not begin until sundown on the 6th.   When
the Court of Special Appeals was contacted by the hearing judge to determine if an extension
could be granted for the filing of Blum’s brief, Judge Dugan learned that on August 28, 2002,
Blum’s case had been dismissed by the court for failure to file a brief upon an earlier
deadline.
After Judge Dugan ordered the September 6, 2002 hearing to proceed, Blum did, in
fact, fail to appear.  At the conclusion of the proceeding, Judge Dugan, based on Blum’s
admissions and upon testimonial and documentary evidence admitted during the evidentiary
hearings, made oral findings of fact and conclusions of law, which were transcribed later for
the record.  We have summarized and reorganized those findings and conclusions below in
order to better suit the needs of this opinion.
-8-
Zahra Dianat’s Complaint and the Investigation Thereof
With respect to the complaint of Zahra Dianat, Judge Dugan found that on December
9, 1997, Ms. Dianat hired Blum to represent her in a December 10, 1997 protective order
hearing.  Blum charged her $500 for that representation, which she paid for by credit card.
Because Blum did not have a credit card machine, he used a colleague’s, Jeffrey T.
Sheehan’s.  Blum charged to Ms. Dianat’s credit card $1500: a $500 fee for the protective
order hearing, and a $1000 retainer fee to represent her in a divorce.  Blum did not provide
Ms. Dianat with a receipt for the charge.  Mr. Sheehan provided Blum with a check for the
amount that was charged on Ms. Dianat’s credit card, minus a transaction fee, and Blum
deposited that check into his personal checking account.  Thereafter, Ms. Dianat contested
the amount of the charge that was placed on her credit card, but the hearing judge did not
find that she did not authorize the $1000 retainer charge for the divorce.
By letter dated January 9, 1998, which was mailed and faxed to Blum, Ms. Dianat
terminated his representation and requested a refund of unused retainer funds.  Blum did not
respond to Ms. Dianat’s letter.  By letter dated April 6,1998, Blum acknowledged receipt of
a complaint that Ms. Dianat filed with Bar Counsel and admitted that he owed her $720.  He
also represented that he was prepared to refund her that amount.  Despite the representation,
Blum did not return the money to Ms. Dianat.  By letter dated November 25, 1998, Blum
advised Ms. Dianat’s new attorney, Floyd Willis, III, Esquire, that he had refunded the
money to Ms. Diana, and attached a copy of check number 317 drawn on Blum’s operating
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account at NationsBank.  Blum altered the front of that check to appear as though it was
made payable to Ms. Dianat when, in fact, it was made payable to a company named CMI
for Blum’s rent.  Blum also included a copy of what he claimed was the back of Check 317
in order to show that the check had been negotiated.  What he really included, however, was
the copy of the back of a different negotiated check. 
In a July 1, 1999 letter to Bar Counsel, Blum stated that the operating account upon
which check 317 was written did not provide original negotiated checks.  In addition, in a
September 2, 1999 interview with Bar Counsel investigator John W. Reburn, Blum stated
that he moved the unearned portion of Ms. Dianat’s retainer fee from his escrow account to
his operating account.  Blum also told Mr. Reburn that he returned the money owed to Ms.
Dianat by check number 317.  All of these statements, the hearing judge found, were false.
In addition, Blum consistently failed to provide information about check number 317 to Bar
Counsel, despite repeated requests.
On November 18, 1999, Bar Counsel served Blum with a subpoena requiring him to
produce the check register for operating account No. 003-3389-6922 for the period of
December 1, 1997 through December 30, 1999, as well as the original Check 317.  On or
about November 19, 1999, Blum filed a motion to quash the subpoena in the Circuit Court
for Montgomery County.  In that motion, Blum falsely stated that he did not receive
negotiated checks from the account upon which Check 317 was drawn when Check 317 was
negotiated, but that because of Bar Counsel’s request, he had specifically ordered Check 317.
14
Blum asserted that he had earned all of the funds that were charged to Ms. Dianat’s
credit card, but that she was owed $720 because of “some kind of credit.”  The hearing judge
rejected Blum’s assertion, finding that a “credit did not appear on any of the statements that
this court reviewed . . . nor did [Blum] explain any basis for any credit that may have been
given to her.”  Thus, the hearing judge found that Blum had not earned all of the money
charged to Ms. Dianat’s credit card when he deposited it in his personal account and that his
testimony was false.
-10-
On January 24, 2000, in a hearing on Blum’s motion to quash Bar Counsel’s subpoena
before the Honorable Martha G. Kavanaugh of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County,
Blum falsely testified that when Check 317 was negotiated, he did not receive the original
check, and that he did not begin receiving negotiated checks on his operating account until
the end of 1998 or the beginning of 1999.  Blum also falsely testified that the Bank told him
it could not find the original Check 317, that Mr. Willis had requested the check, and that
pursuant to that request, it had given the original to Mr. Willis.  Thus the Bank, Blum
prevaricated, was only able to provide him with a photocopy of Check 317, the photocopy
that, in reality, he himself had manufactured and sent to Mr. Willis. In addition, Blum was
found by the Circuit Court to have falsely testified during the January 24, 2000 hearing that
by the time he deposited the check representing the charge to Ms. Dianat’s credit card into
his operating account, he had earned all of the funds.14  In addition, Blum was found to have
falsely testified that the $720 owed Ms. Dianat was not an unearned fee.  A further
misrepresentation made during the January 24, 2000 hearing by Blum was that he did not
know into which account he had deposited the check representing the charge placed on Ms.
Dianat’s credit card.  Finally, at the end of the January 24, 2000 hearing, Judge Kavanaugh
15
Blum claimed that his client notes were altered by Bar Counsel or someone else other
than himself during the course of the disciplinary proceedings. The hearing judge found in
“light of the document itself” that Blum’s claim was “utterly outrageous” and false.  
-11-
denied Blum’s motion to quash and ordered that he produce the check register for Account
No. 0039-3389-6922, titled “Law Offices, Bruce David Blum,” his operating account for the
period of December 1, 1997, through September 30, 1999, and the original cancelled check
317.  Blum failed to produce those documents because, the hearing judge found, he had
disposed of them “at some point in time . . . in the hopes that it would prevent [the] Court
[and] the Attorney Grievance Commi[ssion]” from obtaining them.  
Blum repeated these misrepresentations with respect to check 317 during an inquiry
panel hearing.  He also presented false evidence to the inquiry panel by producing notes from
his client file concerning Ms. Dianat that he had altered.15 Additionally, in a letter to Bar
Counsel dated February 3, 2000, Blum would not advise into which account he had deposited
the check representing the charge made on Ms. Dianat’s credit card.  
Finally, in a letter to Blum dated June 20, 2000, Bar Counsel requested retainer
agreements, billing statements, and billable hour worksheets for approximately 30 clients.
Rather than providing those documents, Blum stated in a letter to Bar Counsel that he wanted
an explanation for why they wanted the items.  That letter, the hearing judge found, did not
constitute a response to Bar Counsel’s request and exemplified the “typical, evasive, and
obstructive response that Mr. Blum continued to persevere in with Bar Counsel right up until
the time and throughout the course of these proceedings.” 
16
We note that the hearing judge found that Bar Counsel was denied the benefit of
cross- examining Blum’s September 5, 2002 testimony regarding his representation of Ms.
Hubbard and all of the other clients discussed herein because Blum failed to appear for the
hearing on September 6, 2002.
-12-
Based upon these findings of fact with respect to Ms. Dianat, the hearing judge
concluded that Blum violated MRPC 1.15(a)(Safekeeping Property),  MRPC 3.3(a)(1) and
(a)(4)(Candor Toward the Tribunal), MRPC 3.4(a) and (b)(Fairness to Opposing Party and
Counsel), MRPC 8.1(a) and (b)(Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), MRPC 8.4(c) and
(d)(Misconduct), Maryland Rule 16-609(Prohibited Transactions), and Maryland Code,
Section 10-306 (Misuse of Trust Money) of the Business Occupations and Professions
Article.
2. 
Latania Hubbard:16  
With respect to Ms. Hubbard, the hearing judge found that Blum deposited checks
from her totaling $5000 into his personal and operating bank accounts, not into an attorney
trust account, and that Blum had not earned those funds.  Blum’s testimony that he had
performed between $11,000 and $12,000 worth of work for Ms. Hubbard at the time he
received the funds, was found “not . . . to be credible, along with most of what Mr. Blum
testifies to.”  
In addition, the hearing judge found that the documentary evidence did not support
Blum’s claim.  A January 12, 1998 letter of engagement between Ms. Hubbard and Blum
indicated that an “advance fee” of $5000 was due, that $4000 of that had been received, and
17
The date on the statement of account for Ms. Hubbard, and on the statements of
account for the other clients discussed herein, is January 8, 2001.  Blum indicated that this
was so because a computer program he was using automatically printed the date as the day
on which he had printed the statements. 
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that the remaining $1000 was due no later than January 31, 1998.  The checks from Ms.
Hubbard to Blum were dated January 18, 1998 and February 8, 1998, and a deposit slip
indicated Blum deposited the former check into his operating account several days after
receiving it.  A statement of account,17 however, predated the letter of engagement.  It
purported to cover the period from “January 1, 1998 through April 20, 1999.”  Nevertheless,
itemizations listed in that statement, according to the hearing judge, did not support Blum’s
testimony regarding the amount of work he had done for Ms. Hubbard prior to the January
12 letter of engagement.  Thus, according to the hearing judge, the $5000 represented, as was
characterized in the letter of engagement, an “advance fee.”  Blum had not yet earned all of
the money when he deposited it into his operating and personal accounts. 
Based on these findings of fact, the hearing judge concluded that Blum violated
MRPC 1.15(a)(Safekeeping Property), Maryland Rule 16-609(Prohibited Transactions), and
Maryland Code, Sections 10-304 (Deposit of Trust Money) and 10-306 (Misuse of Trust
Money) of the Business Occupations and Professions Article.
3.
Corlus Leslie Sellers  
The hearing judge found that Blum was retained by Ms. Sellers on June 24, 1998, by
virtue of a letter of engagement and a $2500 check representing the retainer fee called for in
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the letter, both dated June 24, 1998.  On June 27, 1998, Blum deposited the $2500 check into
his personal account at First National Bank of Maryland, but at that time, the hearing judge
found, Blum had not earned all of the money although Blum had produced a statement of
account running from June 21, 1998 to September 20, 1998, “to show that . . . the work had
started prior to the letter of engagement.”  The statement of account, however, had “no
specific dates or times in terms of hours” and did not support Blum’s testimony regarding
work he had done for Ms. Sellers prior to his depositing the check.
Based on these findings of fact, the hearing judge concluded that Blum violated
MRPC 1.15(a)(Safekeeping Property), Maryland Rule 16-609(Prohibited Transactions), and
Maryland Code, Sections 10-304 (Deposit of Trust Money) and 10-306 (Misuse of Trust
Money) of the Business Occupations and Professions Article.
4. 
Lindsey B. Asay
According to Judge Dugan’s findings of fact, Blum accepted a check for $1500 on
April 17, 1998 from Lindsey B Asay, and on April 22, 1998, he deposited that check into his
personal checking account at First National Bank of Maryland.  That check, as found by the
hearing judge, had not yet been completely earned by Blum when he made the deposit into
his personal account.  A statement of account indicated a beginning date of March 21, 1998
and stated in part, “Review domestic violence pleadings for initial client appointment  4/17,”
the same date that Blum received Mr. Asay’s check.  There was nothing in the statement of
account or other documentary evidence, according to the hearing judge, to support Blum’s
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testimony with respect to work he had done prior to depositing Mr. Asay’s check.  The funds
represented by that check, therefore, were unearned when deposited into Blum’s personal
account on April 22, 1998.
Based on these findings of fact, the hearing judge concluded that Blum violated
MRPC 1.15(a)(Safekeeping Property), Maryland Rule 16-609(Prohibited Transactions), and
Maryland Code, Sections 10-304 (Deposit of Trust Money) and 10-306 (Misuse of Trust
Money) of the Business Occupations and Professions Article.
5.
Vasilious Pappas 
The hearing judge found that on June 22, 1999, Blum deposited a $5000 check dated
June 21, 1999 from Vasilious Pappas into his personal account, but that Blum had not earned
that check in full by the time he deposited it.  Blum produced a statement of account with a
beginning date of June 21, 1999, indicating that he had appeared at a protective order
hearing, prepared a complaint for limited divorce, and attended a conference regarding
strategy for custody and divorce.  Blum testified, however, that he had done additional work
constituting $5000 worth of services.  The hearing judge found that Blum’s testimony lacked
credence and was not supported by the statement of account, with the result that Blum had
not fully earned the $5000 check when he deposited it into his personal checking account.
Based on these findings of fact, the hearing judge concluded that Blum violated
MRPC 1.15(a)(Safekeeping Property), Maryland Rule 16-609(Prohibited Transactions), and
Maryland Code, Sections 10-304 (Deposit of Trust Money) and 10-306 (Misuse of Trust
-16-
Money) of the Business Occupations and Professions Article.
6.
Christine Bernstein
According to Judge Dugan’s findings of fact, a February 24, 1998 letter of
engagement executed by Ms. Bernstein and Blum indicated that Ms. Bernstein was
advancing a fee of $1000 to Blum.  Blum’s statement of account running from February 21,
1998 through May 20, 1999, according to the hearing judge, did not indicate how much work
was done prior to the February 24, 1998 letter of engagement and did not support Blum’s
testimony regarding the amount of the work which he purportedly had completed prior to
receiving Ms. Bernstein’s payment.  The hearing judge found that Blum did not deposit the
$1000 into his escrow account and that the funds were not earned when Blum received them.
 Based on these findings of fact, the hearing judge concluded that Blum violated
MRPC 1.15(a)(Safekeeping Property), Maryland Rule 16-609(Prohibited Transactions), and
Maryland Code, Sections 10-304 (Deposit of Trust Money) and 10-306 (Misuse of Trust
Money) of the Business Occupations and Professions Article.
7.
Cathy Walter  
Judge Dugan found that on or about July 9, 1998, Blum entered into a letter of
engagement with Ms. Walter, and that on or about that same date, Blum accepted a $5000
payment from Ms. Walter that, as indicated in the letter of engagement, was a retainer fee.
Those funds were not deposited into an escrow account, although it was unclear exactly
where Ms. Walter’s funds went.  Blum did not earn, however, the $5000 before receiving it,
-17-
according to the hearing judge.  The hearing judge found Blum’s testimony to the contrary
to be incredible.
Based on these findings of fact, the hearing judge concluded that Blum violated
MRPC 1.15(a)(Safekeeping Property), Maryland Rule 16-609(Prohibited Transactions), and
Maryland Code, Sections 10-304 (Deposit of Trust Money) and 10-306 (Misuse of Trust
Money) of the Business Occupations and Professions Article.
8.
Attorney Trust Account  
The hearing judge found that Blum “wrote checks made payable to cash on his
attorney trust account at Provident Bank,” and that he had named his attorney trust account
“Bruce David Blum Law Firm ‘IOLTA.’”  Based on those findings, the hearing judge
concluded that Blum violated Maryland Rules 16-606 (Name and Designation of Account)
and 16-609 (Prohibited Transactions).
Bar Counsel presents no exceptions to Judge Dugan’s findings and conclusions and,
as a sanction for Blum’s conduct, recommends disbarment.  Blum argued before this Court
that his admissions at the evidentiary hearing, which formed much of the bases for Judge
Dugan’s findings of fact, should be stricken because he was without counsel.  Blum also
excepts to the manner in which the disciplinary hearings were scheduled and to the hearing
judge’s denial of his motion for sanctions and motion for recusal.  Based upon those
exceptions, Blum urges us to remand the case for de novo proceedings.  Because Blum’s
exceptions are without merit, and because his conduct clearly demonstrates that he is unfit
-18-
to practice law in this State, we shall disbar him.
I.
Standard of Review
This Court exercises “original and complete jurisdiction for attorney disciplinary
proceedings in Maryland,” and conducts “an independent review of the record.” Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. McLaughlin, 372 Md. 467, 492, 813 A.2d 1145, 1160 (2002)(citing
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garfield, 369 Md. 85, 97, 797 A.2d 757, 763 (2002) (citing
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garland, 345 Md. 383, 392, 692 A.2d 465, 469 (1997))).  In
conducting that review, we accept the hearing judge's findings of fact as prima facie correct
unless shown to be “clearly erroneous,” and we give due regard to the hearing judge’s
opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Wallace,
368 Md. 277, 793 A.2d 535 (2002).  “As to the hearing judge's conclusions of law,” however,
“our consideration is essentially de novo.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dunietz, 368 Md.
419, 428, 795 A.2d 706, 710-711 (2002) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Thompson,
367 Md. 315, 322, 786 A.2d 763, 768 (2001) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Briscoe, 357 Md. 554, 562, 745 A.2d 1037, 1041 (2000))).
II.
Discussion
A.
Blum’s Exceptions
Blum claims that because the evidentiary hearings were “unfair[ly] schedul[ed]” in
the Circuit Court, he was prevented from “fully presenting his case” and from retaining
counsel.  Consequently, he claims that his admissions should be stricken and that he is
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entitled to an entirely new hearing.  In support of that claim, Blum presents no arguments
other than those contained in his Supplemental Motion to Continue Disciplinary Hearing,
which was previously filed in and denied by this Court.  Blum also claims that he did not
receive a full and fair trial because the Circuit Court, after realizing that the proceedings
would take longer than expected, continued them through September 6, 2002, despite Blum’s
claim that he could not appear on that date.
We have considered previously the arguments contained in Blum’s Supplemental
Motion to Continue Disciplinary Hearing and found them to be without merit.  The
disciplinary hearings in this case, pursuant to our March 27, 2002 Order remanding the
matter to the hearing judge for findings of fact and conclusions of law, was to occur “not
later than thirty (30) days from the filing of the response.”  Nonetheless, we already had
continued the hearing twice before Blum’s third motion for a continuance.  In the first
motion, which was filed by Bar Counsel, Blum agreed with Bar Counsel that, because of
discovery difficulties, the hearing should occur on July 8, 2002.  We granted that motion on
May 22, 2002.  Two days later, however, despite agreeing to the date of July 8, 2002,  Blum
filed a motion seeking to continue the proceedings further in order  “to obtain counsel and
to adequately prepare.”  In a July 8, 2002 Order, we granted Blum’s motion, setting the
hearing date for September 4 and 5, 2002.  Thus, we afforded Blum almost two more months
to retain counsel and prepare for the hearings, even after he had already agreed that July 8,
2002 was an appropriate date.  Moreover, Blum concedes that by July 8, 2002, he was aware
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of our Order.  Thus, despite any prior communications he claims that he had with the Circuit
Court or Judge Dugan’s chambers with respect to the hearing dates, he knew, as of July 8,
2002, when the hearings were to occur.
Blum’s claim with respect to the continuance of the hearing on September 6, 2002,
is also wholly meritless.  Blum represented to the hearing judge that he was unavailable on
September 6, 2002 for two reasons:  first, because his family celebrates Rosh Hashanah early,
and second, because he had a brief due in the Court of Special Appeals on September 6,
2002.  With respect to the brief, the Court of Special Appeals was contacted to determine if
the due date could be extended, and Judge Dugan discovered that Blum’s case in fact had
been dismissed by the Court of Special Appeals in an August 28, 2002 order because a brief
due on August 14, 2002 had not been timely filed.  When confronted with this, Blum’s
response was that the Court of Special Appeals had miscalculated the due date and that he
had not received notice of the dismissal.  Judge Dugan, however, found that Blum was being
“less than candid with the Court.”  We have no difficulty in accepting Judge Dugan’s finding,
especially in light of Blum’s continued lack of candor, which occurred when he appeared
before this Court.  In oral argument, Blum was asked whether he had told Judge Dugan that
he could not appear on September 6 because he had a brief due in the Court of Special
Appeals.  Blum claimed that he had not said that, but had stated that he “would be filing a
brief.”  Before Judge Dugan on September 5, 2002, however, Blum asserted on at least two
separate occasions, “I have a brief due by tomorrow.”  
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Nor was he unavailable for the September 6, 2000 hearing because of Rosh Hashanah,
for, as Judge Dugan pointed out, that holy day did not begin until sundown on September 6,
2002.  Thus, Blum was not prevented from attending the September 6, 2002 hearing.  On the
contrary, he chose not to attend.    
Blum’s final two exceptions are based on Judge Dugan’s denial of his motion for
sanctions and his motion for recusal.  They carry no more weight than the exceptions already
discussed.  On May 23, 2002, Blum served petitioner with a notice to take the deposition of
Petitioner.  In response, Bar Counsel filed a motion for protective order alleging that Blum’s
notice was oppressive, overly broad, and inappropriate because it would not lead to
discoverable facts.  During a hearing on Bar Counsel’s motion, after negotiating other issues,
Bar Counsel offered to make available for the deposition Mr. Reburn, the primary
investigator in the matter, or Mr. Hirshman, Bar Counsel.  Blum would not identify whom
he would prefer for the deposition, and the Circuit Court advised petitioner that it need only
produce Mr. Reburn.  When Bar Counsel produced Mr. Reburn for the deposition, Blum
inquired as to whether Mr. Reburn was produced pursuant to the notice of deposition and was
there to testify on behalf of petitioner.  Blum also claimed that Bar Counsel’s response was
that “Mr. Reburn, who was the investigator, was present to testify.”  Dissatisfied with Bar
Counsel’s answer,  Blum filed a motion for sanctions, alleging that the disciplinary action
against him should be dismissed for willful discovery violations.  
The Circuit Court denied Blum’s motion, and was correct in doing so.  We have said
18
“Chapter 400 of Title 2" of the Maryland Rules, “governs the taking of depositions
and discovery in the hearing of [disciplinary] charges.”  Md. Rule 16-710(a).  See also
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Powell, 369 Md. 462,471 n.5, 800 A.2d 782, 787 n.5
(2002)(After a petition for disciplinary action has been filed, discovery is governed by Title
2, Chapter 400.”)(citing Md. Rule 16-756, the successor to Md. Rule 16-710).
-22-
in the context of interpreting the discovery rules18 that
[t]he dismissal of a claim . . . is among the gravest of sanctions,
and as such, is warranted only in cases of egregious misconduct
such as ‘willful or contemptuous’ behavior, ‘a deliberate attempt
to hinder or prevent effective presentation of defenses or
counterclaims,’ or ‘stalling in revealing one's own weak claim
or defense.’ 
Manzano v. Southern Maryland Hosp., 347 Md. 17, 29, 698 A.2d 531, 537 (1997)(quoting
Rubin v. Gray, 35 Md. App. 399, 400-01, 370 A.2d 600, 601 (1977))(citations omitted).
There is absolutely no indication that Bar Counsel committed any discovery violations,
willful or otherwise.  Indeed, the Circuit Court found during the June 18, 2002 hearing “that
Ms. Kessler [Assistant Bar Counsel who prosecuted this case] is not acting in bad faith [but]
is doing everything she can to provide you with what you want.”
Blum’s final exception is based on his motion to recuse Judge Dugan.  In that motion,
Blum asserted that Judge Dugan, by his ruling on the discovery issue, “showed a
predisposition and bias in favor of petitioner.”  Blum’s argument has no merit.  In ruling on
the motion for recusal, Judge Dugan declared that he had “no reason or basis” to recuse
himself.  Contrary to what Blum asserts, the record in this case reflects behavior of the
Circuit Court Judge that was both patient and fair.  Respondent bears the “heavy burden to
-23-
overcome the presumption of impartiality and must prove that the judge has a personal bias
and prejudice against him or her or has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shaw, 363 Md. 1, 11, 766 A.2d
1028, 1033 (2001).  Blum has not demonstrated that Judge Dugan was biased or prejudiced
against him, only that Judge Dugan did not rule in his favor.  
None of Blum’s exceptions have merit and all, therefore, are overruled.
B.
Blum’s Mishandling of Client Funds and Pattern of Deceit
1.
MRPC 1.15 and 1.16, Maryland Rules 16-606 and 16-609, and Maryland
Code, Sections 10-304 and 10-306 of the Business Occupations and
Professions Article.
The hearing judge concluded that Blum’s mishandling of funds with respect to Ms.
Dianat, Ms. Hubbard, Ms. Bernstein, Ms. Sellers, Ms. Walter, Mr. Asay, and Mr. Pappas
violated MRPC 1.15(a), Maryland Rule 16-609, and Maryland Code, Sections 10-304 and
10-306 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article.
With respect to Ms. Dianat, Ms. Hubbard, Ms. Bernstein, Ms. Sellers, Ms. Walter, Mr.
Asay, and Mr. Pappas, Blum deposited funds from them into his personal or operating
accounts, rather than into an attorney trust account.  The hearing judge found that Blum had
not yet earned these funds at the time he deposited them into his personal and operating
accounts and that Blum did not use the funds for their intended and authorized purposes.
Indeed, judging from the quantity of violations, it appears as though it was Blum’s practice
to take a client’s money entrusted to him for future services and to then use that money as if
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it were his own, prior to earning it.  It also appeared to be his practice to maintain ambiguous
and disorganized financial records.  Blum’s  statements of accounts relating to the clients at
issue, for instance, contained itemizations of activities, but consistently failed to provide
dates or times spent on the itemizations, thus, perhaps not entirely without purpose, often
rendering the time, nature and extent of his services unclear.  The lack of clear
documentation in this case adds further discredit to Blum’s already incredible assertions that
he would perform substantial amounts of services for clients without charging them, and then
later bill those clients for less than what he purportedly was owed.  
A hearing judge’s factual findings are prima facie correct unless shown to be clearly
erroneous.  McLaughlin, 372 Md. at 493, 813 A.2d at 1160.  Judge Dugan’s findings, that
the funds at issue were not earned when Blum deposited them into his personal and operating
accounts, were not clearly erroneous.  The funds were given to Blum in anticipation of future
services, and as such, “qualified as ‘trust money’ under Section 10-301 of the Business
Occupations and Professions Article.”  Id. at 504, 813 A.2d at 1167.  Section 10-301(d)
defines “trust money” as “a deposit, payment or other money that a person entrusts to a
lawyer to hold for the benefit of a client or a beneficial owner.”  According to Section 10-304
of the Business Professions and Occupations Article, an attorney, except in certain
circumstances not relevant here, “expeditiously shall deposit trust money into an attorney
trust account.”  Along the same lines, Section 10-306 of the Business Occupations and
Professions Article provides that “[a ]lawyer may not use trust money for any purpose other
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than the purpose for which the trust money is entrusted to the lawyer.”  
Provisions of the MRPC and the Maryland Rules mirror these concepts.  MRPC
1.15(a) provides in part that when a client entrusts a lawyer with the client’s funds, the
“[f]unds shall be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600 of
the Maryland Rules” and that the lawyer must keep “complete records of such account
funds.”  Maryland Rule 16-609 provides, in part, that an attorney may not use any funds
“required by these Rules to be deposited in an attorney trust account . . . for any unauthorized
purpose.”  
Ms. Dianat, Ms. Hubbard, Ms. Bernstein, Ms. Sellers, Ms. Walter, Mr. Asay, and Mr.
Pappas gave the funds at issue to Blum for the purpose of retaining his future services, not
to pay for services that already had been rendered.  Blum, however, deposited the funds into
his personal and operating accounts as if he had already earned them.  Consequently, he used
those funds for a “purpose other than the purpose for which” they were entrusted to him.
Thus, we agree with the hearing judge’s conclusions that with respect to the above listed
clients, Blum violated MRPC 1.15(a), Maryland Rule 16-609, and Maryland Code, Sections
10-304 and 10-306 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article.  
We also agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that with respect to Ms. Dianat,
Blum violated MRPC 1.16(d).  The hearing judge found that Ms. Dianat mailed and faxed
a letter to Blum in which she terminated his representation and requested a refund of unused
retainer funds.  Blum did not respond to Ms. Dianat’s request for a refund, which prompted
-26-
her to file a complaint with Bar Counsel.  Upon receiving notice of that complaint, Blum
acknowledged that he owed Ms. Dianat $720 and that he would pay her those funds.  Blum,
however, did not refund the money, and then misrepresented to Ms. Dianat’s counsel, Bar
Counsel, and the Court, that he had.  Thus, upon Ms. Dianat’s termination of Blum’s
representation, Blum did not “take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a
client's interests, such as . . . refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.”
MRPC 1.16(d); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n. v. Milliken, 348 Md. 486, 517, 704
A.2d 1225, 1240 (1998)(stating that under Md. Rule 1.16(d), an attorney is “obligated to
return any unearned portion” of an “advance fee payment”)  On the contrary, the only
person’s interests Blum was concerned with protecting were his own, and in doing so, he was
willing to lie and deceive time and again.
Finally, the hearing judge was correct when he concluded that Blum violated
Maryland Rules 16-606 and 16-609 when he named his attorney trust account  “Bruce David
Blum Law Firm ‘IOLTA.’”, and wrote checks made payable to cash on his attorney trust
account.  Maryland Rule 16-606 states:
An attorney or law firm shall maintain each attorney trust
account with a title that includes the name of the attorney or law
firm and that clearly designates the account as ‘Attorney Trust
Account’, ‘Attorney Escrow Account’, or ‘Clients' Funds
Account’ on all checks and deposit slips.  The title shall
distinguish the account from any other fiduciary account that the
attorney or law firm may maintain and from any personal or
business account of the attorney or law firm.
Blum failed to title his attorney trust account in compliance with this rule.  See Attorney
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Grievance Comm’n v. Bernstein, 363 Md. 208, 221-22, 768 A.2d 607, 614
(2001)(concluding that an attorney trust account entitled “Maryland Legal Services, Jack A.
Bernstein, Esquire, IOLTA” violated “the Maryland Rules regarding Attorney Trust
Accounts”).  In addition, Blum wrote checks to cash from his attorney trust account in
violation of Maryland Rule 16-609, which provides in part that “[a]n instrument drawn on
an attorney trust account may not be drawn payable to cash or to bearer.”
2.
MRPC 3.3, 3.4, 8.1 and 8.4
The hearing judge concluded that Blum’s myriad misrepresentations to Ms. Dianat’s
counsel, Bar Counsel, the inquiry panel, and the court, regarding Blum’s admitted forgery
of Check 317, violated MRPC 3.3(a)(1) and (a)(4), 3.4(a) and (b), 8.1 (a) and (b) and 8.4 (c)
and (d).  We agree.
Blum misrepresented to Ms. Dianat’s new attorney that he had refunded Ms. Dianat’s
money to her.  He then altered Check 317 and manufactured a photocopy purporting to be
the back of that check in order to create the illusion that he had paid Ms. Dianat with a check
that had been negotiated.  By this conduct, the hearing judge found that Blum violated MRPC
3.4(a) and (b) and MRPC 8.4(c) and (d).  We agree.  Blum had received Ms. Dianat’s
complaint to Bar Counsel and knew that her attorney was attempting to collect her money
when he altered the check and concocted the deceptive photocopy.  Consequently, Blum
“unlawfully obstruct[ed] another party's access to evidence, . . . unlawfully alter[ed] . . . a
document . . . having potential evidentiary value, [and] falsif[ied] evidence.”  MRPC 3.4(a)
-28-
and (b).  His alteration of the check and his misrepresentations to Ms. Dianat’s attorney were
also fraught with “dishonesty, fraud, [and] deceit,”  MRPC 8.4(c), and were “prejudicial to
the administration of justice.”  MRPC 8.4(d).  See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Koven, 361 Md. 337, 342-343, 761 A.2d 881, 883-884 (2000)(concluding that an attorney
“violated Rule 8.4(c) and (d)” when he “intentionally altered Department of Labor letters and
alien certification receipts, [] created letters and faxes to mislead [a company] and its
employees, and [] submitted a false billing statement”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
White, 354 Md. 346, 350-54, 731 A.2d 447, 450-52 (1999)(concluding that destroying
evidence and giving false testimony in federal district court violate MRPC 3.4(a)).
Blum’s disingenuous and obstructive conduct continued as Bar Counsel attempted to
investigate Ms. Dianat’s complaint.  In response to Bar Counsel’s inquiry, Blum falsely
claimed that the bank account upon which Check 317 was drawn did not provide negotiated
checks when Check 317 was negotiated and that he would contact the bank for the check.
In addition, Blum lied to Bar Counsel investigator John Reburn about the movement of Ms.
Dianat’s money between his accounts and failed to respond to repeated requests for financial
records related to Ms. Dianat’s complaint.  This conduct, the hearing judge correctly
determined, violated MRPC 8.1(a)(“[A] lawyer in connection with . . .  a disciplinary matter,
shall not . . . knowingly make a false statement of material fact.”) and MRPC 8.4(c)( “It is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation.”); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Angst, 369 Md. 404,
-29-
410, 800 A.2d 747, 751 (2002)(concluding that misrepresentations to Bar Counsel and Bar
Counsel investigator constituted violations of MRPC 8.1(a) and 8.4(c))
Blum’s motion to quash a Bar Counsel subpoena and his conduct at the hearing on
that motion also violated several Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.  Judge Dugan
concluded, and we agree, that during the hearing before the Honorable Martha G. Kavanaugh
of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Blum violated MRPC 3.3 (a)(1) and (a)(4), and
MRPC 8.4(c) and (d), when he knowingly made repeated and blatant “false statements of
material fact” to Judge Kavanaugh and offered evidence he knew to be false.  Blum repeated,
this time under oath, his previous lies with respect Check 317 and the account upon which
it was drawn.  In addition, he falsely claimed, among other things, that the bank told him it
could not find the original Check 317, that Mr. Willis (Ms. Dianat’s counsel), had requested
that check, and that according to its records, it provided the check to Mr. Willis.  See White,
354 Md. at 363-64, 731 A.2d at 457 (1999)(concluding that attorney’s false testimony under
oath during a deposition violated MRPC 3.3(a)(1) and (a)(4) and 8.4(c) and (d)).  When
Blum made similar misrepresentations to the inquiry panel, the hearing judge correctly
concluded that the same rules were violated, in addition to MRPC 8.1(a)(“[A] lawyer in
connection with . . . a disciplinary matter, shall not . . . knowingly make a false statement of
material fact.”) and MRPC 3.4(a) and (b)(prohibiting a lawyer from “unlawfully
obstruct[ing] another party's access to evidence[,] . . . unlawfully alter[ing] . . . a document
. . . having potential evidentiary value[,] [and] falsifying evidence”).  Finally, the hearing
-30-
judge correctly concluded that as Bar Counsel continued to request information from Blum,
and as he continued to fail to provide that information, he violated MRPC 8.1(b)(“[A] lawyer
in connection with . . . a disciplinary matter, shall not . . . knowingly fail to respond to a
lawful demand for information from [a] . . . disciplinary authority . . . .”)  See also Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Powell, 369 Md. 462, 473 n.8, 800 A.2d 782,789 (2002)(“An attorney
is required to cooperate with Bar Counsel during the investigative process.  Once a petition
for disciplinary action is filed, an attorney is obligated to provide requested discovery in
accordance with the Maryland Rules of Procedure.”).
C.
Sanction
Bar Council recommends that the appropriate sanction in this case is disbarment.  We
agree.  Recently, in McLaughlin, we recognized that, 
the purpose of the sanctions is to protect the public, to deter
other lawyers from engaging in violations of the Maryland Rules
of Professional Conduct, and to maintain the integrity of the
legal profession. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland
v. Hess, 352 Md. 438, 453, 722 A.2d 905, 913 (1999) (quoting
Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Webster, 348 Md.
662, 678, 705 A.2d 1135, 1143 (1998)). We have stated that
“[t]he public is protected when sanctions are imposed that are
commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and
the intent with which they were committed." Attorney Grievance
Comm’n of Maryland v. Awuah, 346 Md. 420, 435, 697 A.2d
446, 454 (1997). Therefore, the appropriate sanction depends
upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case,
including consideration of any mitigating factors. See Attorney
Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Atkinson, 357 Md. 646, 656,
745 A.2d 1086, 1092 (2000); Attorney Grievance Comm’n of
Maryland v. Gavin, 350 Md. 176, 197-98, 711 A.2d 193, 204
(1998).
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372 Md. at 510, 813 A.2d at 1170.  
Blum refused to return Ms. Dianat’s money to her when she terminated his
representation, and then altered a check, which he provided to her new attorney, in order to
create the illusion that he had paid her.  Blum also took funds that clients had given to him
in anticipation of future services and deposited such funds into his personal and operating
accounts for his own benefit, before he had earned those funds.  Behavior such as this, in and
of itself, “in the absence of mitigating circumstances, ordinarily warrants disbarment.”
Milliken, 348 Md. at 520, 704 A.2d at 1241-42 (concluding that “numerous trust account
violations” and “conversion of client monies in failing to return unearned fees,” among other
things, mandated disbarment); Powell, 369 Md. at 475, 800 A.2d at 789-90 (recognizing that
“[i]t has long been the position of this Court that disbarment is the appropriate sanction for
intentional dishonest conduct” and stating that in cases involving “intentional dishonesty,
fraud, misappropriation and the like, we will not accept as compelling extenuating
circumstances ‘anything less than the most serious and utterly debilitating mental or physical
health conditions . . .’”)(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376,
413-14, 773 A.2d 463, 485 (2001)); Bernstein, 363 Md. at 226, 768 A.2d at 617 (recognizing
that “[w]e have held consistently that ‘[m]isappropriation of funds by an attorney is an act
infested with deceit and dishonesty and ordinarily will result in disbarment in the absence of
compelling extenuating circumstances justifying a lesser sanction”)(citations omitted).  
Blum has presented no mitigating factors, and we find none.  In fact, rather than any
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mitigating factors, the egregiousness of Blum’s conduct was compounded and aggravated
by his persistent lies, deceit, and obstructionist behavior during the course of the disciplinary
process.  Judge Dugan found that “Mr. Blum, in the course of these proceedings, would say
anything or do anything to try and prevent Bar Counsel from investigating and finding out
the violation[s] he [has committed] and the fraud that he has perpetrated upon the Court and
his client.”  Indeed, Blum was willing to make multiple, blatant misrepresentations to Ms.
Dianat’s counsel, Bar Counsel, and the inquiry panel in an attempt to obfuscate the truth and
save his own skin.  In addition, he ignored several, legitimate requests by Bar Counsel for
financial documents pertinent to the disciplinary hearing, he altered and destroyed evidence,
and on numerous occasions, he lied under oath to Judge Kavanagh.  Such conduct is
intolerable.  
Honesty is of paramount importance in the practice of law.  
Unlike matters relating to competency, diligence, and the like,
intentional dishonest conduct is closely entwined with the most
important matters of basic character to such a degree as to make
intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer almost beyond excuse.
Honesty and dishonesty are, or are not, present in an attorney’s
character.
Angst, 369 Md. at 420, 800 A.2d at 757 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lane, 367
Md. 633, 646, 790 A.2d 621, 628 (2002)(quotation omitted)).  Moreover, “the practice of law
carries with it special responsibilities of self-regulation, and attorney cooperation with
disciplinary authorities is of the utmost importance to the success of the process and the
integrity of the profession.” Powell, 369 Md. at 474 n.8, 800 A.2d at 789 n.8 (quoting
-33-
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Fezell, 361 Md. 234, 255, 760 A.2d 1108, 1119 (2000)).
Blum has repeatedly betrayed the public trust that he was endowed with when admitted to
the Bar of this Court.  In order to protect the public, deter other lawyers from engaging in
violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct and to maintain the integrity of the
legal profession, he must be disbarred.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL
PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE
CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING
THE COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS,
PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-
715(C), FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY
GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION 
AGAINST
BRUCE DAVID BLUM.