Case Title: State v. Alan J. Ernst

Citation: 2005 WI 107

Docket Number: 2003AP001728-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2005-07-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
2005 WI 107 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP1728-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Alan J. Ernst,  
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 12, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Fond du Lac   
 
JUDGE: 
Dale L. English   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
WILCOX, J., concurs in part, dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by Jeffrey W. 
Jensen and Law Offices of Jeffrey W. Jensen, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Jeffrey W. Jensen. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Michael C. Sanders, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
briefs was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2005 WI 107 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP1728-CR  
(L.C. No. 
02 CF 304) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Alan J. Ernst,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Fond du Lac 
County, Dale L. English, Judge.    Reversed and cause remanded.     
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This case is before the court 
on certification from the court of appeals, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2001-02).1  The defendant, Alan J. 
Ernst (Ernst), who has been charged with his fifth offense of 
operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, asks 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise indicated all references to Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 2001-02 edition.   
Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 states, in relevant part:  
"The supreme court may take jurisdiction of an appeal or other 
proceeding in the court of appeals upon certification by the 
court of appeals or upon the supreme court's own motion." 
No. 
2003AP1728-CR   
 
2 
 
for review of a non-final order of the Fond du Lac County 
Circuit Court, which granted the State of Wisconsin's (State) 
request to hold an evidentiary hearing, during which it will 
have the chance to question Ernst in an attempt to prove that 
Ernst's waiver of the right to counsel was valid and that he was 
competent to represent himself.  The circuit court concluded 
that the record of Ernst's fourth conviction for operating under 
the influence of an intoxicant was deficient in two respects: 1) 
the difficulties and disadvantages of self-representation were 
not adequately explained; and 2) competency was not explicitly 
addressed.  Thus, the circuit court, in effect, held that Ernst 
had made a prima facie showing that his waiver of counsel was 
not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.       
¶2 
We conclude, first, based on our superintending and 
administrative authority, that the requirements this court 
imposed in State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 
(1997), regarding waiver of counsel, survive the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004).  
Second, we hold that an alleged violation of the requirements of 
Klessig can form the basis of a collateral attack, as long as 
the defendant makes a prima facie showing, pointing to facts 
that 
demonstrate 
that 
he 
or 
she 
did 
not 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waive his or her constitutional 
right to counsel.  Third, we conclude that when the defendant 
successfully makes a prima facie showing, the burden to prove 
that the defendant validly waived his or her right to counsel 
shifts to the State (State of Wisconsin).  Fourth, we hold that 
No. 
2003AP1728-CR   
 
3 
 
the State may call and elicit testimony from the defendant at an 
evidentiary hearing in an attempt to meet its burden and, in 
turn, the defendant may not raise his or her Fifth Amendment 
privilege against testifying.  Finally, we conclude that the 
defendant's refusal to testify under these circumstances allows 
a circuit court reasonably to infer that the State has satisfied 
its burden of showing a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
waiver of the right to counsel.        
I 
¶3 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  On August 10, 
2002, the Fond du Lac County police stopped Ernst on suspicion 
that he was operating his vehicle while under the influence of 
an intoxicant (OWI).  Ernst failed his field sobriety tests and 
was then placed under arrest.  His blood-alcohol content was 
measured at 0.02.2   
¶4 
A Fond du Lac County Assistant District Attorney filed 
a two-count complaint against Ernst.  He was charged with an 
OWI, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a), 
and 
having 
a 
prohibited alcohol concentration under § 346.63(1)(b).  Because 
Ernst had received four prior convictions for OWI, these crimes 
were charged as fifth offenses.       
¶5 
 Before trial, Ernst filed a motion collaterally 
attacking his fourth OWI conviction for the purpose of reducing 
                                                 
2 It should be noted that having at least three prior 
convictions for operating a vehicle under the influence of an 
intoxicant lowers the prohibited alcohol concentration of a 
driver 
from 
the 
usual 
0.08 
to 
0.02. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 340.01(46m)(c).   
No. 
2003AP1728-CR   
 
4 
 
the penalty enhancement in the pending case.  He alleged that 
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel3 had not been validly waived 
when he pled guilty to the previous OWI charge.  Specifically, 
he claimed he "was not represented by counsel and the court did 
not take a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel from the 
defendant or determine that the defendant was competent to 
represent himself."   
 
¶6 
Following a motion hearing, the Fond du Lac County 
Circuit Court, Dale L. English, Judge, concluded that the record 
in Ernst's fourth OWI conviction, in regard to his waiver of 
counsel, 
was 
deficient 
because 
Ernst 
was 
not 
adequately 
instructed on the difficulties and disadvantages of proceeding 
pro se, and that competency was not explicitly addressed.  The 
transcript from his plea and sentencing proceeding on February 
26, 2002, in relevant part, sets forth the following: 
THE COURT: 
Mr. Ernst, the Plea Questionnaire and 
Waiver of Rights form that I have received ——  is it 
your wish to proceed here today without counsel?  
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is, Your Honor.  
                                                 
3 The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides:  
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence.   
No. 
2003AP1728-CR   
 
5 
 
THE COURT:  
And do you feel that that's a decision 
that you have made of your own volition?              
THE DEFENDANT: It was a hard decision, yes, it was.  
But, yes.                                            
THE COURT:  
Okay.  You understand the document that 
I have received?  You've read through it?            
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I have.  
THE COURT: And this is your signature on the back 
side?  
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is, Your Honor. 
THE COURT:  
And it's dated today's date?  
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is. 
THE COURT:  
The form indicates that you would be 
entering a no contest plea; that you do have a high 
school diploma; that 
you 
understand the 
English 
language; that you understand the charge to which you 
are pleading; that you are not currently receiving 
treatment for a mental illness or disorder; nor have 
you had any alcohol, medications, or drugs within the 
last 24 hours.  Are all of those statements true and 
correct?  
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, they are.  
THE COURT:  
As it relates to your constitutional 
rights, you have put check marks in each of the boxes 
preceding each of the seven rights and concludes with 
a statement that you understand the rights that have 
been checked and that you are giving them up of your 
own free will.  Is that also true and correct?  
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is.    
. . . .                                                  
The COURT:  
You understand the penalties that the 
Court could impose in this matter?  
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do, Your Honor.   
No. 
2003AP1728-CR   
 
6 
 
 
¶7 
After the circuit court's ruling in regard to the 
fourth 
OWI 
conviction, 
the 
State 
promptly 
requested 
an 
evidentiary 
hearing 
to 
show 
that 
Ernst 
had 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel in 
that case.  The State also informed the court that it intended 
to call Ernst as a witness at this hearing.  Ernst responded by 
announcing that he would assert his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination and would not testify if called as a 
witness.   
 
¶8 
After ordering the parties to submit briefs, the 
circuit court entered an order on June 17, 2003, which granted 
the State's request for an evidentiary hearing and allowed the 
State to question Ernst with respect to his previous waiver of 
counsel.  The court reasoned that the State would never be able 
to meet its burden at such a hearing without being able to 
question the defendant and, that if unable to question him, the 
evidentiary hearing would become, in effect, meaningless.  With 
respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege, the court held, first, 
"that it's disingenuous for a defendant to be able to raise a 
right to counsel issue . . . and then be insulated from having 
to testify about the very issues the defendant raises."  The 
court also determined that Ernst could not incriminate himself 
with regard to the fourth OWI conviction, since he had been 
convicted on that charge previously. 
Subsequently, 
Ernst 
petitioned the court of appeals for interlocutory review of the 
circuit court's decision to grant an evidentiary hearing and to 
compel Ernst's testimony at the hearing.  The court of appeals 
No. 
2003AP1728-CR   
 
7 
 
granted the petition and then certified the case to this court.  
We granted review and heard oral arguments on November 12, 2004.   
¶9 
On December 1, 2004, we ordered the parties to file 
supplemental briefs.  We have considered all of the briefs, as 
well as the oral arguments, and now reverse the order of the 
circuit court, since we determine that a sufficient prima facie 
case has not been established. We remand the case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion, where Ernst would have 
the opportunity to file an affidavit and attempt to establish a 
prima facie case.   
II 
 
¶10 Whether a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires 
the application of constitutional principles to the facts.  See 
Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 204; see also State v. Woods, 117 
Wis. 2d 701, 715-16, 345 N.W.2d 457 (1984).  We review such a 
question de novo, independently of the reasoning of the circuit 
court.  Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 204.  We benefit, however, from 
that court's analysis.  Whether a party has met the burden of 
establishing a prima facie case presents a question of law which 
we review de novo.  See State v. Baker, 169 Wis. 2d 49, 78, 485 
N.W.2d 237 (1992).     
 
¶11 We 
also 
determine 
whether 
a 
defendant's 
Fifth 
Amendment privilege against compulsory incrimination may be 
violated.  Such an analysis presents a question of law and, 
thus, is subject to de novo review.  See State v. Eastman, 185 
Wis. 2d 405, 410, 518 N.W.2d 257 (1994).   
No. 
2003AP1728-CR   
 
8 
 
III 
¶12 The first issue we address is whether the requirements 
this court imposed in Klessig, regarding waiver of counsel, 
survive the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in 
Iowa v. Tovar.  Ernst and the State seem to agree that the 
Klessig requirements may be imposed as a procedural rule under 
the court's superintending and administrative authority over the 
Wisconsin court system and, thus, do not conflict with the 
Supreme Court's holding in Tovar.          
¶13 We first discussed the requirements necessary to 
effectuate a valid waiver of counsel in Pickens v. State, 96 
Wis. 2d 549, 292 N.W.2d 601 (1980).  In that case, the defendant 
attempted to have his conviction overturned because the circuit 
court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into his decision to 
proceed pro se.  Specifically, the defendant argued that his 
waiver was not knowing and voluntary.  The court concluded that 
the record made no showing of the defendant validly waiving his 
right to counsel:  
[I]n order for an accused's waiver of his right to 
counsel to be valid, the record must reflect not only 
his deliberate choice to proceed without counsel, but 
also 
his 
awareness 
of 
the 
difficulties 
and 
disadvantages of self-representation, the seriousness 
of the charge or charges he is facing and the general 
range of possible penalties that may be imposed if he 
is found guilty.  Unless the record reveals the 
defendant's deliberate choice and his awareness of 
these facts, a knowing and voluntary waiver will not 
be found. 
Id. at 563-64.  Although the court held that this colloquy was 
the best way to accomplish a thorough examination of the 
No. 
2003AP1728-CR   
 
9 
 
defendant's waiver, it did not require that such colloquy occur 
in every case.  Id.        
 
¶14 Next, in Klessig, we "overrule[d] Pickens to the 
extent that we mandate the use of a colloquy in every case where 
a defendant seeks to proceed pro se to prove knowing and 
voluntary waiver of the right to counsel."  Klessig, 211 
Wis. 2d at 206. 
 Although Klessig also involved a defendant 
claiming an invalid waiver of counsel, the court prescribed a 
higher 
standard 
than 
previously 
applied 
in 
this 
state.  
Specifically, the court held:  
To prove such a valid waiver of counsel, the 
circuit court must conduct a colloquy designed to 
ensure that the defendant: (1) made a deliberate 
choice to proceed without counsel, (2) was aware of 
the 
difficulties 
and 
disadvantages 
of 
self-
representation, (3) was aware of the seriousness of 
the charge or charges against him, and (4) was aware 
of the general range of penalties that could have been 
imposed on him.  If the circuit court fails to conduct 
such a colloquy, a reviewing court may not find, based 
on the record, that there was a valid waiver of 
counsel.  
Id. (citation omitted).  The court adopted such requirements in 
order to insure that the defendant validly waived his right to 
counsel and to preserve appellate resources by making the 
standard clear.  See id.   
 
¶15 Most recently, in Tovar, the United States Supreme 
Court reviewed warnings which the Iowa Supreme Court had held 
essential to a "knowing and intelligent" waiver of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.  The specific warnings that the 
state required were as follows:  
No. 
2003AP1728-CR   
 
10 
 
(1) advise the defendant that "waiving the assistance 
of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty 
[entails] the risk that a viable defense will be 
overlooked"; and (2) "admonis[h]" the defendant "that 
by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose the 
opportunity to obtain 
an 
independent 
opinion on 
whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is 
wise to plead guilty"? 
Tovar, 541 U.S. at 81.  In rejecting the argument that such 
warnings were required by the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court 
held that a valid waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
did not require the particular language used by the Iowa courts.  
Instead, the Supreme Court held that "[t]he constitutional 
requirement is satisfied when the trial court informs the 
accused of the nature of the charges against him, of his right 
to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of 
allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty 
plea."  Id.   
 
¶16 The Court emphasized that it has never "prescribed any 
formula or script to be read" when a defendant seeks to proceed 
pro se.  See id. at 88.  The central component for a valid 
waiver is simply that the defendant "'knows what he is doing and 
his choice is made with his eyes open.'"  Id. at 89 (quoting 
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 
(1942)).  Such information "will depend on a range of case-
specific 
factors, 
including 
the 
defendant's 
education 
or 
sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the 
charge, and the stage of the proceeding."  Id. at 88 (citing 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).   
No. 
2003AP1728-CR   
 
11 
 
 
¶17 With these above principles in mind, the United States 
Supreme Court rejected some of the admonitions that were 
required by the Iowa Supreme Court, which had justified such 
requirements on Sixth Amendment grounds.  The Supreme Court 
carefully framed its holding to allow states to continue 
adopting procedural rules to guide the waiver of counsel 
procedure.  Specifically, the court held: "We note, finally, 
that States are free to adopt by statute, rule, or decision any 
guides to the acceptance of an uncounseled plea they deem 
useful."  Id. at 94 (citations omitted). 
¶18 We recognize the Supreme Court's decision in Tovar.  
We conclude, however, that the Klessig requirements are not 
based on the Sixth Amendment and, thus, do not conflict with the 
Supreme Court's holding.  We do not conclude that the Klessig 
requirements are dictated by Article I, Section 7 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.4  In Klessig, we never suggested that the 
colloquy requirements were based on either the United States 
Constitution or Article I, Section 7 of our State Constitution.  
                                                 
4 Article 
I, 
Section 7 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
provides, in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions the 
accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and 
counsel. . . ." 
Article VII, 
Section 3 
of the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
states, in relevant part: "The supreme court shall have 
superintending and administrative authority over all courts."   
In State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 580 N.W.2d 171 (1998), 
we stated: "We recognize that the Wisconsin Constitution may 
afford greater protection than the United States Constitution."  
Id. at 242; see also Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 94 (2004).     
No. 
2003AP1728-CR   
 
12 
 
Instead, we made it clear that the requirements were a court-
made procedural rule.  Specifically, this court used its 
superintending and administrative authority to "mandate" the use 
of a colloquy in cases involving a defendant's waiver of the 
right to counsel, in order to serve "the dual purposes of 
ensuring that a defendant is not deprived of his constitutional 
rights 
and 
of 
efficiently 
guarding 
our 
scarce 
judicial 
resources."  Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 206.       
¶19 Superintending and administrative authority allows 
courts to formulate "procedural rules not specifically required 
by the Constitution or the [Legislature]."  United States v. 
Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983).  Such rules are designed to 
implement a remedy for a violation of recognized rights.  See 
id.  In Wisconsin, our authority to supervise the courts and 
issue procedural rules is found in Article VII of the Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
 
Article 
VII, 
Section 3 
provides 
us 
with 
"superintending and administrative authority over all courts."  
This clause constitutes a grant of power "that is indefinite in 
character, unsupplied with means and instrumentalities, and 
limited only by the necessities of justice."  Arneson v. 
Jezwinski, 
206 
Wis. 2d 217, 
225, 
556 
N.W.2d 721 
(1996) 
(citations omitted). 
¶20 The 
justification 
for 
the 
superintending 
and 
administrative authority this court utilized in Klessig is 
similar to that which we invoked in State v. Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986).  In that case, we held that a 
circuit court must follow prescribed methods for determining the 
No. 
2003AP1728-CR   
 
13 
 
defendant's understanding of the nature of a charge.  In so 
holding, 
we 
concluded 
that, 
under 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution, no particular procedure is mandated for a circuit 
court's acceptance of a no contest or guilty plea.  Instead, we 
made "mandatory" that, as a procedural requirement, in order to 
assist the circuit court in making the constitutionally required 
determination that a defendant's plea is voluntary, a circuit 
court must undertake a personal colloquy with the defendant.  
The purpose of the colloquy is to ascertain his or her 
understanding of the nature of the charge, prior to the court's 
acceptance of a guilty or no contest plea, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1). 
 
See 
State 
v. 
Livingston, 
159 
Wis. 2d 561, 572, 464 N.W.2d 839 (1991).  We based the sources 
of the required duties of the circuit court on the statute and 
on our "superintending and administrative authority over the 
circuit courts. . . ."  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 267 (footnote 
omitted).   
¶21 Similarly, in Klessig, we required a circuit court to 
undertake a colloquy, even though such an action was not 
constitutionally required.  We conclude that the Klessig 
colloquy requirement was and is a valid use of the court's 
superintending and administrative authority, just as it was in 
Bangert, and that such a rule does not conflict in any way with 
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Tovar, but rather 
receives endorsement from the Supreme Court's language in that 
decision.    
 
No. 
2003AP1728-CR   
 
14 
 
IV 
 
¶22 We next address whether the violation of the Klessig 
requirements can form the basis for a collateral attack.5  In 
State v. Hahn, 2000 WI 118, 238 Wis. 2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 528, we 
firmly established that "[i]n an enhanced sentence proceeding 
predicated on a prior conviction, the U.S. Constitution requires 
a trial court to consider an offender's allegations that the 
prior conviction is invalid only when the challenge to the prior 
conviction 
is 
based 
on 
the 
denial 
of 
the 
offender's 
constitutional right to a lawyer."  Id., ¶17.  Consequently, we 
must now determine whether, in a collateral attack, the 
violation of the Klessig requirements can be raised to the level 
of 
a 
constitutional 
violation 
and, 
if 
so, 
under 
what 
circumstances.   
 
¶23 Ernst argues that our decision in Hahn should not 
prohibit a collateral challenge based upon the failure to follow 
the Klessig requirements.  He contends that such a challenge 
based upon the failure to follow Klessig does not present a mere 
technical procedural violation, but rather that the required 
procedure is one by which the courts determine if a defendant 
validly 
waived 
his 
Sixth 
Amendment 
right 
to 
counsel.  
                                                 
5 We have held that a collateral attack in a prior 
conviction is "'an attempt to avoid, evade, or deny the force 
and effect of a judgment in an indirect manner and not in a 
direct proceeding prescribed by law and instituted for the 
purpose of vacating, reviewing, or annulling it.'"  State v. 
Sorenson, 2002 WI 78, ¶35, 254 Wis. 2d 54, 646 N.W.2d 354 
(quoting Zrimsek v. Am. Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 1, 3, 98 
N.W.2d 383 (1959)).   
No. 
2003AP1728-CR   
 
15 
 
Specifically, Ernst argues "the violation of the rule has 
constitutional 
implications . . . If 
the 
procedure 
is 
not 
followed the default adjudication is that the waiver of counsel 
was not freely and voluntarily made (i.e. the defendant was 
denied his constitutional right to counsel)."        
 
¶24 Conversely, the State contends that a violation of the 
Klessig requirements cannot comprise a constitutional violation 
and, thus, satisfy the test for a collateral attack.  The State 
argues that there is a difference between a constitutional 
standard and "the procedures which states must follow to achieve 
conformance with the constitutional standard."  Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 257.  The State relies on our decision in Bangert to 
argue that the violation of a circuit court's required duty, 
based on 
our 
superintending 
and 
administrative 
authority, 
cannot, by itself, be the basis for a constitutional violation.  
In Bangert, we held that a violation of a court-made procedural 
rule, "though itself not constitutionally significant, may have 
constitutional 
ramifications," 
because 
"[i]f 
a 
defendant's 
understanding of the nature of the charge is not evidenced in 
some manner, then the plea will not meet the constitutional 
standard of voluntariness."  Id. at 261 n.3.   
 
¶25 We agree that a defendant must do more than allege 
that "'the plea colloquy was defective'" or the "'court failed 
to conform to its mandatory duties during the plea colloquy'" to 
satisfy the standard for collateral attacks set forth in Hahn.  
See State v. Hampton, 2004 WI 107, ¶57, 274 Wis. 2d 379, 683 
N.W.2d 14.  Instead, the defendant must make a prima facie 
No. 
2003AP1728-CR   
 
16 
 
showing that his or her constitutional right to counsel in a 
prior proceeding was violated.  In order to avoid any question 
concerning a valid waiver, "[t]he record must show, or there 
must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused 
was offered counsel but 
intelligently 
and 
understandingly 
rejected the offer."  Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 
(1962).    For there to be a valid collateral attack, we require 
the defendant to point to facts that demonstrate that he or she 
"did not know or understand the information which should have 
been provided" in the previous proceeding and, thus, did not 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his or her right 
to counsel.  See Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶46 (citing Bangert, 
131 Wis. 2d at 274-75).  Any claim of a violation on a 
collateral attack that does not detail such facts will fail.        
 
¶26 Applying the above principles to the facts of this 
case, we hold that Ernst's attempt to initiate a collateral 
attack failed.  As noted earlier: "Whether a party has met its 
burden of establishing a prima facie case is a question of law 
that we decide de novo."  Baker, 169 Wis. 2d at 78 (citation 
omitted).  In his motion to avoid, for enhancement purposes, the 
effect of his prior conviction, Ernst asked the circuit court to 
set aside his fourth OWI conviction, because he was "not 
represented by counsel and the court did not take a knowing and 
voluntary waiver of counsel from the defendant. . . ."  Ernst 
made no mention of specific facts that show that his plea was 
not a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary one.  Instead, Ernst 
simply relied on the transcript and asserted that the court's 
No. 
2003AP1728-CR   
 
17 
 
colloquy was not sufficient to satisfy Klessig.  Specifically, 
he argued: "The Court did not take a valid waiver of counsel 
from the defendant in Case No. 02-CT-70 because the Court did 
not address each of the four Klessig factors with Alan Ernst in 
that case."   Since this was a collateral attack, the lack of 
specific facts resulted in a failure to establish a prima facie 
case 
that 
Ernst 
did 
not 
knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily waive his right to counsel.  Accordingly, the 
decision of the circuit court on this issue must be reversed.               
V 
¶27 We next determine the proper procedures for the court 
to apply when the defendant makes a sufficient prima facie 
showing on a collateral attack.  Both parties agree that if the 
defendant makes such a showing, then the burden shifts to the 
State to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant's waiver of counsel was knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily entered.  See Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 207.6  We agree 
with the parties as to the burden of proof, and conclude that 
the court should, at such a time, hold an evidentiary hearing to 
                                                 
6 In State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 
(1997), we agreed to "adopt an evidentiary hearing procedure for 
resolving invalid waiver of counsel claims that is similar to 
the procedure established by this court for the resolution of 
guilty plea waivers."  Id. at 207.  Accordingly, like our 
decision in State v. Baker, 169 Wis. 2d 49, 485 N.W.2d 237 
(1992), we require the State to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the waiver of counsel was "knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary."  Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 207.   
No. 
2003AP1728-CR   
 
18 
 
allow the State an opportunity to meet its burden.7  "If the 
State is unable to establish by clear and convincing evidence 
that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
waived his right to the assistance of counsel, the defendant 
will 
be 
entitled . . ." 
to 
attack, 
successfully 
and 
collaterally, his or her previous conviction.  Id.       
 
¶28 Ernst argues, however, the State should not be able to 
examine the defendant at the evidentiary hearing.  He contends 
that no case in Wisconsin involving a collateral attack has 
required the defendant to testify at an evidentiary hearing, and 
that this court should refrain from doing so.  Ernst also argues 
that the State's reliance on Klessig and Bangert is misplaced.  
Specifically, he asserts that because both cases involved a 
direct attack on a prior conviction, they should be treated 
differently than a collateral attack.  Finally, Ernst contends 
that any requirement to make the defendant testify impinges his 
Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.8        
                                                 
7 This is the same procedure that we have used when the 
appeal arises out of a postconviction motion challenging the 
validity of a defendant's waiver of counsel.  Id. (citing Keller 
v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 502, 511-12, 249 N.W.2d 773 (1977)).   
8 The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
states: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, 
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when 
in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
No. 
2003AP1728-CR   
 
19 
 
 
¶29 The State, on the other hand, agrees with the circuit 
court that Ernst should be required to testify as to his 
knowledge concerning the previous waiver of counsel, without 
protection from the Fifth Amendment privilege.  The State 
asserts that, under current Wisconsin law, it is acceptable to 
examine the defendant at a hearing to establish if the 
defendant's waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary.  Additionally, the State contends that the defendant 
cannot rely on Fifth Amendment protection, because a defendant 
such as Ernst has waived the privilege by putting into issue his 
or her lack of understanding regarding the waiver of counsel.   
 
¶30 We agree with the State that Wisconsin law allows a 
defendant to be questioned at an evidentiary hearing concerning 
a collateral attack on the waiver of right to counsel.  In 
Klessig, we held that at an evidentiary hearing "the State is 
required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that [the 
defendant's] waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent and 
voluntary."  Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 207.  In doing so, we 
adopted "an evidentiary hearing procedure for resolving invalid 
waiver of counsel claims that is similar to the procedure 
established by this court for the resolution of guilty plea 
waivers."  Id.             
                                                                                                                                                             
himself, 
nor 
be 
deprived 
of 
life, 
liberty, 
or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.    
No. 
2003AP1728-CR   
 
20 
 
 
¶31 In Bangert, this court established the procedure 
regarding guilty plea waivers.  There, we held that when the 
defendant makes a prima facie showing that he or she "did not 
know or understand the information which should have been 
provided at the plea hearing, the burden will then shift to the 
state to show by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant's plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 
entered. . . ."9  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274.  To do so, the 
State "may then utilize any evidence which substantiates that 
the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made."  Id. at 274-75. 
Specifically, the court held:  
In essence, the state will be required to show that 
the defendant in fact possessed the constitutionally 
required 
understanding 
and 
knowledge 
which 
the 
defendant alleges the inadequate plea colloquy failed 
to afford him.  The state may examine the defendant or 
defendant's counsel to shed light on the defendant's 
understanding or knowledge of information necessary 
for him to enter a voluntary and intelligent plea.  
Id. at 275 (citations omitted).  We adopt the same procedure as 
Bangert and Klessig outlined, for situations such as the one 
here involving a collateral attack, if a prima facie case has 
                                                 
9 We decline to apply a "presumption against waiver" when 
the 
burden 
shifts 
to 
the 
State 
in 
situations 
involving 
collateral attacks.  We agree with the State that there is no 
reason to presume the defendant did not properly waive his right 
to counsel in a collateral attack.  To do so, would "ignore 
another presumption deeply rooted in our jurisprudence: the 
'presumption of regularity' that attaches to final judgments."  
Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992) (citing Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).   
No. 
2003AP1728-CR   
 
21 
 
been shown.10  We find no reason to apply a different procedure 
in this circumstance than that which would apply on a direct 
attack against a prior conviction.11     
 
¶32  We next address a defendant's ability to raise his or 
her 
Fifth 
Amendment 
privilege 
against 
testifying 
in 
an 
evidentiary hearing.  Ernst alleges that if he were made to 
testify at an evidentiary hearing on a collateral attack, the 
                                                 
10 This procedure is also similar to that adopted for 
Goodchild hearings in Wisconsin.  In State ex rel. Goodchild v. 
Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965), this court adopted 
a procedure which provides for a separate hearing during which 
the circuit court judge is to determine whether a statement was 
voluntarily made and, thus, admissible at trial.  In such a 
proceeding: "The state shall have the burden of proving 
voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.  At this hearing the 
defendant may take the stand and testify for the limited purpose 
of making a record of his version of the facts and circumstances 
under which the confession was obtained."  Id. at 264-65 
(footnote omitted).   
 
If the State were not allowed to call the defendant in such 
a hearing, the court would have the impossible task of deciding 
the voluntariness of a confession without the defendant's 
recitation of his or her version of the circumstances behind the 
confession.  Similarly, in a situation involving a collateral 
attack, the State must be able to call the defendant to 
determine whether his or her waiver of counsel was a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary one.      
 
11 Although Ernst argues that we should apply different 
procedures on a direct attack than we do on a collateral attack, 
we find this argument to be unpersuasive.  Under a direct 
attack, like in Klessig, Ernst concedes that a defendant could 
be compelled to testify at an evidentiary hearing whether he or 
she knowingly waived the right to counsel.  However, Ernst then 
alleges that a collateral attack situation is entirely different 
than a direct attack and, thus, requires different procedures.  
We conclude that such a ruling would make the State's burden in 
a collateral attack more difficult than in a direct attack, and 
we find no reason for doing so.    
No. 
2003AP1728-CR   
 
22 
 
court would be impinging upon his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination.  The State contends that the 
defendant is precluded from asserting his or her Fifth Amendment 
privilege against testifying, because the privilege has been 
waived.     
 
¶33 We agree with the State that a defendant, by putting 
into issue his or her lack of knowledge regarding the waiver of 
counsel, has waived the privilege against testifying.  To make a 
prima facie showing a defendant is required to point to facts 
that 
demonstrate 
that 
he 
or 
she 
did 
not 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waive his or her constitutional 
right to counsel.  An affidavit from the defendant setting forth 
such facts would be necessary, in order to establish a prima 
facie case.  Accordingly, once a defendant successfully makes a 
prima facie showing, the defendant cannot avoid testifying about 
the circumstances concerning the waiver when the State decides 
to challenge the claim that the waiver was not valid.  No 
defendant can "testify voluntarily about a subject and then 
invoke the privilege against self-incrimination when questioned 
about the details."  Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 
321 (1999) (citation omitted).12   
                                                 
12 In Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999), the 
Supreme Court held that a defendant's guilty plea did not waive 
his or her right to remain silent at sentencing proceedings.  
Specifically, the court held: "[t]he Fifth Amendment by its 
terms prevents a person from being 'compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against herself.'  To maintain that 
sentencing proceedings are not part of 'any criminal case' is 
contrary to the law and to common sense."  Id. at 327 (citation 
omitted).   
No. 
2003AP1728-CR   
 
23 
 
¶34 Similar problems arise in regard to a defendant 
testifying at a criminal trial.  In Brown v. United States, 356 
U.S. 148 (1958), the United States Supreme Court held that a 
defendant has no right to set forth facts in his favor during a 
direct examination, without laying himself open to cross-
examination.  See id. at 155.  We find language here relevant to 
our case:    
Such a witness has the choice, after weighing the 
advantage of the privilege against self-incrimination 
against the advantage of putting forward his version 
of the facts and his reliability as a witness, not to 
testify at all.  He cannot reasonably claim that the 
Fifth Amendment gives him not only this choice but, if 
he 
elects 
to 
testify, 
an 
immunity 
from 
cross-
examination on the matters he has himself put in 
dispute.  It would make of the Fifth Amendment not 
only a humane safeguard against judicially coerced 
self-disclosure but a positive invitation to mutilate 
the truth a party offers to tell. 
Id. at 155-56.  A similar scenario arose before us in Neely v. 
State, 97 Wis. 2d 38, 292 N.W.2d 859 (1980).  In that case, the 
defendant took the stand in his own defense, but refused to 
                                                                                                                                                             
Certainly Mitchell should not be extended to situations 
involving collateral attacks.  The Supreme Court's holding was 
limited to the defendant's right to remain silent with respect 
to the specific facts of the offense in question.  In this case, 
the State wants to ask Ernst about whether his waiver of right 
to counsel, in a previous proceeding, was knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary.  The State would not make any inquiry regarding 
the specific facts involved in his previous OWI conviction.   
We also note that other courts have declined to extend 
Mitchell to situations involving sentence enhancements, where 
there is no inquiry about the factual details of the underlying 
crime.  See State v. Blunt, 71 P.3d 657, 662 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2003). 
No. 
2003AP1728-CR   
 
24 
 
answer questions on cross-examination on the grounds that his 
answers might be incriminating.  This court held, in denying the 
defendant's request to invoke the Fifth Amendment, "that a 
defendant who takes the stand in his own behalf cannot then 
claim 
the 
privilege 
against 
cross-examination 
on 
matters 
reasonably 
related 
to 
the 
subject 
matter 
of 
his 
direct 
examination.  See id. at 45 (citations omitted).  Therefore, 
just as we will not allow a defendant to take the stand in his 
or her own behalf and then claim his or her Fifth Amendment 
privilege on matters related to the subject matter of the direct 
examination, we will not allow a defendant to claim in an 
affidavit necessary to establish a prima facie case, in support 
of his or her motion, a lack of a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver of counsel, and then raise the privilege upon 
the State's attempt to refute that claim.                 
 
¶35 Finally, if the defendant refuses to testify under 
these circumstances, a circuit court would be free to draw the 
reasonable inference that the State has satisfied its burden, 
and that the waiver of counsel was a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary one.  The defendant may not "pick and choose what 
aspects of a particular subject to discuss without casting doubt 
on the trustworthiness of the statements and diminishing the 
integrity of the factual inquiry."  Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 322.   
¶36 While we recognize that courts in criminal proceedings 
have generally not inferred guilt from a defendant's silence, 
see Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), in this 
circumstance, where the state's ability to meet its burden 
No. 
2003AP1728-CR   
 
25 
 
relies on the defendant's testimony, we conclude that a refusal 
of the defendant to testify would allow the circuit court 
reasonably to infer that the state has met its burden of showing 
a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of counsel by the 
defendant.  Such a determination is very different than 
inferring guilt based on the silence of a defendant. 
VI 
¶37 In sum, we conclude, based on our superintending and 
administrative authority, that the requirements this court 
imposed in Klessig, regarding waiver of counsel, survive the 
United States Supreme Court's decision in Iowa v. Tovar.  
Second, we hold that an alleged violation of the requirements of 
Klessig can form the basis of a collateral attack, as long as 
the defendant makes a prima facie showing, pointing to facts 
that 
demonstrate 
that 
he 
or 
she 
did 
not 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waive his or her constitutional 
right to counsel.  Third, we conclude that when the defendant 
successfully makes a prima facie showing, the burden to prove 
that the defendant validly waived his or her right to counsel 
shifts to the State.  Fourth, we hold that the State may call 
and elicit testimony from the defendant at an evidentiary 
hearing in an attempt to meet its burden and, in turn, the 
defendant may not raise his or her Fifth Amendment privilege 
against testifying.  Finally, we conclude that the defendant's 
refusal to testify under these circumstances allows a circuit 
court reasonably to infer that the State has satisfied its 
No. 
2003AP1728-CR   
 
26 
 
burden of showing a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver 
of the right to counsel.        
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed, 
and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.   
 
 
   
No.  2003AP1728-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶38 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  For a 
discussion of the nature of the supreme court's superintending 
authority over all courts, see Part I of my concurrence in State 
v. Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, 
joined by Justices Bradley, Crooks, and Butler. 
 
 
No. 2003AP1728-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶39 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  In State v. 
Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997), this court was 
asked to determine whether defendant Klessig had knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel before he represented himself in a felony jury trial.  
The court noted that the trial court had not engaged the 
defendant in an on-the-record colloquy to assess his waiver, and 
it held that "the record is insufficient to determine whether 
Klessig's waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent and 
voluntary."  Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 197.  To remedy this 
deficiency, the court remanded the case to the circuit court for 
an evidentiary hearing at which the State would be required to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that Klessig's waiver of 
counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  Id. at 207. 
¶40 As part of the opinion, the court mandated "the use of 
a colloquy in every case where a defendant seeks to proceed pro 
se [in order] to prove knowing and voluntary waiver of the right 
to counsel."  Id. at 206.  It then set forth the following 
requirements: 
To prove such a valid waiver of counsel, the 
circuit court must conduct a colloquy designed to 
ensure that the defendant: (1) made a deliberate 
choice to proceed without counsel, (2) was aware of 
the 
difficulties 
and 
disadvantages 
of 
self-
representation, (3) was aware of the seriousness of 
the charge or charges against him, and (4) was aware 
of the general range of penalties that could have been 
imposed 
on 
him. 
 
See 
Pickens 
[v. 
State], 
96 
Wis. 2d [549,] 563-64[, 292 Wis. 2d 601 (1980)].  If 
the circuit court fails to conduct such a colloquy, a 
reviewing court may not find, based on the record, 
that there was a valid waiver of counsel. 
No. 2003AP1728-CR.dtp 
 
2 
 
When an adequate colloquy is not conducted, and 
the defendant makes a motion for a new trial or other 
postconviction 
relief 
from 
the 
circuit 
court's 
judgment, the circuit court must hold an evidentiary 
hearing on whether the waiver of the right to counsel 
was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 
Id. at 206-07 (emphasis added). 
¶41 The court did not identify the source of its authority 
to mandate the above-described colloquy.  It simply explained 
that 
[c]onducting such an examination of the defendant is 
the clearest and most efficient means of insuring that 
the defendant has validly waived his right to the 
assistance 
of 
counsel, 
and 
of 
preserving 
and 
documenting that valid waiver for purposes of appeal 
and postconviction motions.  [A] properly conducted 
colloquy serves the dual purposes of ensuring that a 
defendant is not deprived of his constitutional rights 
and 
of efficiently 
guarding 
our 
scarce 
judicial 
resources.  We hope that our reaffirmation of the 
importance of such a colloquy will encourage the 
circuit 
courts 
to 
continue 
their 
vigilance 
in 
employing such examinations. 
Id. at 206. 
¶42 The Klessig decision was understandable and rational, 
and I have no trouble affirming the substance of it in this 
case, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's ruling in Iowa v. 
Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004).  I do have trouble, however, with 
this 
court's 
utilization 
of 
its 
"superintending 
and 
administrative authority" in Article VII, Section 3 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution as a basis for its action. 
¶43 I expressed my concern about the misapplication of 
Article VII, Section 3 in State v. Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Prosser, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part).  The present case represents at least 
No. 2003AP1728-CR.dtp 
 
3 
 
the second time this term that the court has invoked this 
superintending authority.  See Jerrell.  
¶44 My concern about the court's new reliance on this 
provision is threefold.  First, the superintending authority of 
the supreme court over all courts is intended to give this court 
broad power to protect the legal rights of a litigant when the 
ordinary course of litigation, such as review, is inadequate.  
The authority was never intended as carte blanche power to 
mandate "rules" of general application for the bench and bar 
through the vehicle of individual cases.  This is the gist of my 
Jerrell dissent. 
¶45 Second, 
the 
use 
of 
the 
court's 
superintending 
authority in the manner it is now being used can become 
addictive and lead to abuse.  Over and over our opinions repeat 
the mantra that our superintending authority is "unlimited in 
extent" or "limited only by the necessities of justice," as 
though there were no bounds to the court's power to do 
"justice."  This sort of nonsense needs to be exposed before 
this court does something that will provoke a crisis.  By 
contrast, our court does have power to promulgate judicial rules 
through an orderly open process.  See Wis. Stat. § 751.12 and 
SCR Ch. 98.  This power is both inherent and delegated, but it 
is not unlimited.  Our invocation of the court's superintending 
authority as justification to make rules in opinions is an 
indication that we don't think we have traditional rulemaking 
power over a particular subject or we are unwilling to take the 
time to go through the proscribed rulemaking process.   
No. 2003AP1728-CR.dtp 
 
4 
 
¶46 Third, the court does not necessarily do a good job 
when it legislates from the bench.  We will see this, in time, 
in the Jerrell rule because the court failed to answer many 
important questions about its scope.  We see it in this case as 
we attempt to apply the "rule" from Klessig.   
¶47 Klessig involved a direct appeal.  The court said: 
"When an adequate colloquy is not conducted, and the defendant 
makes a motion for a new trial or other postconviction relief 
from the circuit court's judgment, the circuit court must hold 
an evidentiary hearing on whether the waiver of the right to 
counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary."  Klessig, 211 
Wis. 2d at 206-07 (emphasis added).  The Klessig admonition did 
not draw any distinction between a direct appeal and a 
collateral attack, but it would have been fine if the court had 
not portrayed it as a "rule" for everyone.  Today we are forced 
to "amend" that "rule" to avoid the result we dictated in the 
previous mandate.   
¶48 The court should confine itself to the adoption of 
real "rules" through proper procedures and the pronouncement of 
aspirational standards and guidelines that are persuasively 
explained, faithfully applied, and quickly included in the 
Benchbook for judges.  The latter course would avoid a 
separation of powers issue and allow judges some latitude in the 
way 
they 
manage 
the 
courts 
and 
protect 
statutory 
and 
constitutional rights.   
¶49 I therefore respectfully concur. 
 
No.  2003AP1728-CR.jpw 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶50 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (concurring in part, dissenting in 
part).  I agree with the majority opinion that this court should 
continue to require the waiver of counsel colloquy set forth in 
State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 206, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997).  
Majority op., ¶2.  As the court recognized in Klessig, such a 
colloquy serves to conserve judicial resources on appeal and 
ensures that a valid waiver of counsel is taken in a clear and 
efficient manner.  Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 206.   
¶51 I also agree with the majority's decision to do so 
utilizing 
this 
court's 
superintending 
and 
administrative 
authority in this instance for two reasons.  First, as the 
majority correctly indicates, majority op., ¶18, Klessig itself 
can be read as imposing the colloquy requirement as a court-made 
procedural rule.  Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 206.  Second, 
mandating the colloquy requirement as a matter of state 
constitutional law would be inconsistent with Klessig.  As we 
stated 
in 
Klessig, 
"[t]he 
scope, 
extent, 
and, 
thus, 
interpretation of the right to assistance of counsel is 
identical under the Wisconsin Constitution and the United States 
Constitution."  Id. at 202-03 (emphasis added).  See also Jones 
v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 97, 105, 216 N.W.2d 224 (1974)(accord).  In 
Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 91-92 (2004), the United States 
Supreme Court held that one of the colloquy requirements we set 
forth in Klessig is not mandated by the federal constitution.   
¶52 One of the requirements we set forth in Klessig was 
that the defendant be informed of the "difficulties and 
No.  2003AP1728-CR.jpw 
 
2 
 
disadvantages 
of 
self-representation[.]" 
 
Klessig, 
211 
Wis. 2d at 206.  In Tovar, the Supreme Court held that a 
strikingly similar requirement imposed by the Iowa Supreme Court 
was not compelled by the Sixth Amendment.  Tovar, 541 U.S. at 
91-92.  As such a requirement is not compelled by the federal 
constitution and because "[t]he scope, extent, and, thus, 
interpretation of the right to assistance of counsel is 
identical under the Wisconsin Constitution and the United States 
Constitution[,]" 
Klessig, 
211 
Wis. 2d at 
202-03, 
such 
a 
requirement cannot be mandated by the Wisconsin Constitution.  
While some of the requirements we set forth in Klessig may be 
constitutionally necessary before a defendant can validly waive 
his 
right 
to 
counsel,13 
clearly 
a 
defendant 
is 
not 
constitutionally entitled, as part of the right to counsel, to 
be 
warned 
about 
the 
dangers 
and 
disadvantages 
of 
self-
representation.   
¶53 As such, I disagree with the majority's conclusion 
that a violation of Klessig in this instance may form the basis 
of a collateral attack on Ernst's guilty plea.  Majority op., 
¶2.  Ernst argues he is entitled to a plea withdrawal because he 
"was 
not 
adequately 
instructed 
on 
the 
difficulties 
and 
disadvantages of proceeding pro se."  Majority op., ¶6.  As 
                                                 
13 Compare State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 206, 564 
N.W.2d 716 (1997)("the circuit court must conduct a colloquy 
designed to ensure that the defendant:  (1) made a deliberate 
choice to proceed without counsel[.]") with Iowa v. Tovar, 541 
U.S. 77, 88 (2004)("We have described a waiver of counsel as 
intelligent when the defendant 'knows what he is doing and his 
choice is made with eyes open.'")(quoting Adams v. United 
States, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)).   
No.  2003AP1728-CR.jpw 
 
3 
 
discussed, in light of Tovar, such an instruction is not 
required under either the federal or state constitution.   
¶54 In State v. Hahn, 2000 WI 118, ¶4, 238 Wis. 2d 889, 
618 N.W.2d 528, this court held that a defendant cannot 
collaterally challenge a prior state conviction unless the 
challenge is based on "a violation of the constitutional right 
to a lawyer" in the previous proceeding.  "In an enhanced 
sentence proceeding predicated on a prior conviction, the U.S. 
Constitution requires a trial court to consider an offender's 
allegations that the prior conviction is invalid only when the 
challenge to the prior conviction is based on the denial of the 
offender's constitutional right to a lawyer."  Id., ¶17.   
¶55 Thus, logically, if a defendant pleading guilty need 
not be informed of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation as part of the constitutional guarantee of the 
right to counsel, and if the only legitimate basis for 
collaterally attacking a prior conviction is the denial of the 
constitutional right to counsel, then the failure of the circuit 
court to warn the defendant as to the dangers and disadvantages 
of proceeding pro se cannot form the basis for a collateral 
attack on a prior conviction.   
¶56 As noted previously, some of the Klessig requirements 
may be constitutionally necessary, and to that extent, a 
violation of Klessig could, in some instances, form the basis of 
a collateral attack on a prior conviction.  As the majority 
opinion correctly indicates:  "Klessig can form the basis of a 
collateral attack, as long as the defendant makes a prima facie 
No.  2003AP1728-CR.jpw 
 
4 
 
showing, pointing to facts that demonstrate that he or she did 
not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his or her 
constitutional right to counsel."  Majority op., ¶2.  However, 
under Tovar, being informed of the dangers and disadvantages of 
self-representation is not part of the constitutional right to 
counsel.  While failure to provide this particular Klessig 
warning may form the basis for a reversal on direct appeal, see 
Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 206, it cannot, under Tovar and Hahn, 
form the basis of a collateral attack.  Thus, I dissent from 
Part IV of the majority opinion to the extent it suggests that 
the failure of the circuit court to inform a defendant of the 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation may form the 
basis of a collateral attack on his conviction or has any 
relevance in determining whether the defendant was denied the 
constitutional right to counsel.   
¶57 I do, however, fully join Part V of the majority 
opinion, addressing the proper procedures for a circuit court to 
follow once the defendant has made a proper prima facie showing 
of denial of the right to counsel.   
 
 
 
No.  2003AP1728-CR.jpw 
 
 
 
1