Case Title: AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK, TRUSTEE OF THE LOUISE J. SARA IRREVOCABLE TRUST DATED MARCH 14, 2003 v. JOSEPH D. SARA

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0104

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-01-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK, TRUSTEE OF THE LOUISE J. SARA IRREVOCABLE TRUST DATED MARCH 14, 2003 v. JOSEPH D. SARA2011 WY 9Case Number: S-10-0104Decided: 01/21/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
AMERICAN NATIONAL 
BANK, TRUSTEE OF THE LOUISE J. SARA IRREVOCABLE TRUST DATED MARCH 14, 
2003,

 
 
Appellant 
(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
JOSEPH D. 
SARA,

 
 
Appellee 
(Respondent).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Thomas T.C. Campbell, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Harriet 
M. Hageman and Kara Brighton of Hageman & Brighton, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Hageman.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Scott 
W. Meier and Lucas E. Buckley of Hathaway & Kunz, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Buckley.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      American National 
Bank (ANB), acting as Trustee of the Louise J. Sara Irrevocable Trust, appeals 
the district court's denial of ANB's motion to enforce a settlement agreement 
between Louise J. Sara and Joseph D. Sara (Joseph).  ANB is also appealing the district 
court's denial of attorneys' fees and costs associated with filing the motion to 
enforce.  Finding that the district 
court erred in denying ANB's motion to enforce, we will reverse that portion of 
the district court's order with further instructions as detailed below, but we 
will uphold the district court's denial of an award of attorneys' fees and 
costs.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      1.   Did the district court err in 
finding that the current action was a quiet title action and therefore the 
district court did not retain jurisdiction to decide the 
matter?

 
 
2.   Did the district court err in 
finding that the Release, Waiver and Satisfaction of All Claims did not 
discharge the mortgage and note at issue in this case?

 
 
3.   Did the district court abuse its 
discretion by ordering the parties to pay their own attorneys' fees and costs? 

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The history of 
this case and the development of the current conflict dates back to 2000.  A series of lawsuits, countersuits, and 
motions were filed in late 2000 and beyond, between members of the Sara family, 
against each other, personally, and in their capacity as personal 
representatives and trustees of various family trusts.  The actions involved numerous issues 
arising out of squabbles over ownership and control of various real and personal 
property owned by the Sara family and trusts controlled by members of the Sara 
family.  The disputes ultimately led 
to a Release, Waiver and Satisfaction of all Claims (Release), which Release was 
signed in October 2001, by all of the parties, both personally and in their 
capacity as personal representatives or trustees.  As a result of the Release, the parties 
filed a Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice of all the actions previously 
filed by the parties.  The district 
court then entered an Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, signed by all of the 
parties, dismissing with prejudice all of the parties' lawsuits.  In addition to dismissing all of the 
lawsuits, and at the request of the parties, the district court also ordered 
that it would retain jurisdiction over the action in order to enforce the 
Release in the future.

 
 
[¶4]      In May 2009, ANB, 
acting as Trustee of the Louise J. Sara Irrevocable Trust, filed a Motion to 
Enforce Release, Waiver and Satisfaction of All Claims.1  ANB's motion was in response to a demand 
by Joseph for payment on a note secured by a mortgage on property belonging to 
the Louise J. Sara Irrevocable Trust.  
The property, located at 422 West 3rd Avenue in Cheyenne, was transferred 
to the Louise J. Sara Irrevocable Trust pursuant to the Release.  Prior to the property being transferred, 
it was part of the Restated Dominic Sara Living Trust Agreement, controlled by 
Joseph as the Trustee.  ANB's motion 
to enforce argued that the note and mortgage were discharged pursuant to the 
Release and Joseph's attempts to collect on the note violated the Release.  The motion requested that the district 
court enforce the Release and find that the note and mortgage had been 
discharged by the Release.  ANB also 
sought attorneys' fees and expenses associated with ANB's motion.  The district court denied ANB's motion 
to enforce, holding that ANB's motion to enforce was actually a quiet title 
action and that the district court did not retain jurisdiction over such an 
action.  The district court further 
ruled that to the extent it retained jurisdiction over any portion of ANB's 
motion to enforce, the Release did not discharge the note and mortgage.  The district court also denied ANB's 
request for attorneys' fees and expenses.  
This appeal by ANB followed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Did 
the district court err in finding that the current action was a quiet title 
action and therefore the district court did not retain jurisdiction to decide 
the matter?

 
 
[¶5]      This question of 
whether a district court lacks jurisdiction to decide a matter is reviewed de novo.  See William F. West Ranch, LLC v. 
Tyrrell, 2009 WY 62, ¶ 9, 206 P.3d 722, 726 (Wyo. 2009); Douglass v. Wyo. Dep't of Transp., 2008 
WY 77, ¶ 9, 187 P.3d 850, 853 (Wyo. 2008).  
The law in Wyoming relating to retained jurisdiction is clear: a court 
may retain jurisdiction over a stipulation or settlement agreement for the 
purpose of enforcing the terms of the stipulation or settlement agreement, if 
the order of dismissal so provides and the parties agree.  Rawlinson v. Wallerich, 2006 WY 52, ¶ 
12, 132 P.3d 204, 208-09 (Wyo. 2006) (citing 8 [James Wm. Moore et al.,] Moore's Federal Practice [§] 
41.34[[6][a], at 41-122, [h], at 41-125 (3d ed. (2010)]). 

 
 
[¶6]      In response to 
ANB's Motion to Enforce Release, Waiver and Satisfaction of All Claims, the 
district court determined that ANB's motion was a quiet title action and, based 
on the Release, the district court did not retain jurisdiction over such an 
action.  We disagree with the 
district court and hold that ANB's motion was not a quiet title action but, 
rather, was a motion to enforce the Release, which is exactly the kind of action 
over which the district court retained jurisdiction.  The Release provides that "[t]he parties 
agree that the Court will retain jurisdiction in this matter for the purpose of 
enforcing the terms and conditions of this Release."  Additionally, the subsequent Stipulation 
for Dismissal with Prejudice entered by the parties provides that "[t]he parties 
also request that this Court retain jurisdiction in this matter for the purpose 
of enforcing the RELEASE, WAIVER AND SATISFACTION OF ALL CLAIMS agreed to by the 
parties."

 
 
[¶7]      In part, ANB's 
motion to enforce provides as follows:

 
 
American 
National Bank (ANB), Trustee of the Louise J. Sara Irrevocable Trust Dated March 
14, 2003 (Louise Sara Trust) . . . pursuant to the Order of Dismissal with 
Prejudice filed in the above-captioned matter, hereby moves this Honorable Court 
for an Order enforcing the "Release, Waiver and Satisfaction of all Claims" 
("the Release") in its favor.  In 
support of this Motion, ANB states the following:

 
 

1.    
The 
Release was executed by all Plaintiffs, Defendants, Counter-Plaintiffs and 
Counter-Defendants on October 31, 2001, including Joseph D. Sara and Sharon L. 
Sara.

 
 

2.    
The 
Release fully and finally settled all claims originating out of lawsuits 
surrounding the property of Louise J. Sara and the Estate of Dominic Sara and 
the Dominic Sara Living Trust, including mortgages.

 
 

3.    
Joseph 
D. and Sharon L. Sara have attempted to collect on a certain "mortgage" which 
allegedly encumbered real property that was in dispute as part of the 
above-captioned lawsuits.  
Specifically, Mr. and Mrs. Sara claim to have a "mortgage" that allegedly 
encumbers the home where Louise J. Sara (Joseph D. Sara's mother) lived prior to 
her passing, which property is located at 422 West 3rd Avenue, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
                        
5.   The "mortgage" was 
fully and finally released, waived and satisfied under the terms of the 
Release.

 
 
                        
6.   The real property 
allegedly encumbered by the "mortgage," referred to in the "mortgage" as "Tract 
Two,"was released from the "mortgage," and as of October 31, 2001, the 
"mortgage" had no further legal effect as to the property.

 
 
                        
. . . . 

 
 
                              
WHEREFORE, ANB respectfully requests that this Court enter an Order 
enforcing the Release in its favor . . . .

 
 
[¶8]      It is clear that 
the parties requested, and the district court ordered, that the district court 
retain jurisdiction in order to enforce the Release.  ANB's motion was in response to Joseph's 
attempts to collect on the note and mortgage, which note and mortgage existed 
prior to the Release.  Furthermore, 
the note and mortgage related to property and parties subject to the 
Release.  Consequently, Joseph's 
attempts to collect on the note and mortgage relating to this particular 
property, against a party to the Release, directly implicated the terms and 
conditions of the Release.  ANB's 
motion sought to enforce the Release, which was the purpose of the district 
court's retained jurisdiction.  The 
question was whether the note and mortgage were released in the settlement.  This was not a quiet title 
action.

 
 
Did 
the district court err in finding that the Release, Waiver and Satisfaction of 
All Claims did not discharge the mortgage and note at 
issue?

 
 
[¶9]      Although the 
district court determined that ANB's motion was really a quiet title action and 
therefore the district court did not retain jurisdiction, the district court 
went on to hold that to the extent the district court did retain jurisdiction 
over the matter that the Release did not discharge the mortgage and note.  We find that conclusion to be in 
error.  The determination of this 
issue requires this Court to interpret the Release entered into by the 
parties.  

 
 
[¶10]   "A settlement agreement is a 
contract and, therefore, subject to the same legal principles that apply to any 
contract."  Dobson v. Portrait Homes, Inc., 2005 WY 
95, ¶ 9, 117 P.3d 1200, 1204 (Wyo. 2005); see also Dorr v. Wyo. Bd. of Certified Pub. 
Accountants, 2006 WY 144, ¶ 16, 146 P.3d 943, 953 (Wyo. 2006).  In that regard, we have said the 
following relating to the interpretation of contracts:

 
 
The 
primary focus is on determining the intent of the parties to the contract.  The initial question is whether the 
language of the contract is clear and 
unambiguous.  If it is, then the 
trial court determines the parties' intent from the contract 
language alone.  It does not 
consider extrinsic evidence, although it may consider the context in which the 
contract was 
written, including the subject matter, the purpose of the contract, and 
the circumstances surrounding its making, all to help ascertain what the parties 
intended when they made the contract.  The trial court then enforces the contract in 
accordance with the plain meaning its language would be given by a reasonable 
person.  All of these 
issues--deciding whether a contract is unambiguous, determining 
the parties' intent from the unambiguous language, 
and enforcing the contract in accordance with its plain 
meaning--involve questions of law for the trial court.  When we undertake de novo review of the trial court's 
conclusions of law, we follow the same familiar path.  See Double Eagle Petroleum & 
Mining Corp. v. Questar Exploration & Production Co., 2003 WY 139, ¶¶ 7-8, 78 P.3d 679, 
681-82 (Wyo. 2003), and cases cited therein.

 
 

Terris 
v. Kimmel, 2010 
WY 110, ¶ 7, 236 P.3d 1022, 1025 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting Horse Creek 
Conservation Dist. v. State ex rel. Wyo. Attorney Gen., 2009 WY 143, ¶ 25, 221 P.3d 306, 
315 (Wyo. 2009)).

 
 
[¶11]   Regarding the property in question, 
the Release provides as follows: 

 
 
At 
Closing, Louise J. Sara shall be deeded the property located at 422 West 3rd 
Avenue, Cheyenne, Wyoming, by Warranty Deed in the form attached hereto as 
Exhibit B.  Such Warranty Deed 
transfers to Louise J. Sara the Trust's ownership in the following described 
real estate:

 
 
The 
property located at 422 West 3rd Avenue, Cheyenne, Wyoming, more particularly 
described as:

 
 
Lot 
12, Block 25, Moore Haven Heights Addition, Second Filing, City of Cheyenne, 
Laramie County, Wyoming, including improvements thereon.

 
 
Louise 
J. Sara assumes all existing liabilities and expenses associated with the 
foregoing property.  

 
 
The 
district court and Joseph rely on the final provision of this section of the 
Release, which states that Louise J. Sara would assume all liabilities and 
expenses associated with the property, in order to argue that the Release did 
not discharge the mortgage and note associated with the property.  However, that provision is just one of 
many in the Release.  When 
interpreting a contract, "the contract as a whole should be considered, with 
each part being read in light of all other parts."  Dorr, 2006 WY 144, ¶ 16, 146 P.3d  at 
953.  To that end, when the Release 
is considered as a whole, the purpose and intent of the Release become 
clear.  The intent of the Release 
was to satisfy and release all existing claims that all the parties had against 
each other, which included the mortgage and note.  Two such provisions in the Release 
support this interpretation.  The 
first of those provisions provides as follows:  

 
 
21.  This Release, Waiver and Satisfaction of 
All Claims (Release) is entered into as a full, complete, and total settlement 
of any and all claims held by plaintiffs, defendants, counter-plaintiffs, or 
counter-defendants, their heirs, assigns, and/or beneficiaries, direct or 
indirect, economic or non-economic, and any claims that may or may not be known 
and/or contemplated as of the date of this Release.  The 
parties further agree to execute any and all documents necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of this Release, whether such documents are specifically referenced 
herein or are otherwise necessary.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶12]   The second provision in the Release 
that provides insight into the intent of the Release provides as 
follows:

 
 
22.  The terms of this Release as set forth 
above are more than a mere recital, and act as an acknowledgment of the full, 
complete, and total settlement of any claims alleged or asserted for purposes of 
these lawsuits, or that could have been alleged or asserted and which may 
originate from the factual matters that form the basis for the lawsuits that 
were filed by the parties.

 
 
These 
provisions underscore the obvious intent behind the parties entering into the 
Release.  Clearly the parties 
intended to settle once and for all any claims that they had against one 
another.  The Release is clear and 
the language is unambiguous.  Any 
claims that Joseph had based on the note and mortgage as they related to the 
property that Louise J. Sara took pursuant to the Release were extinguished when 
Joseph signed the Release, and he was obligated to execute a release of the 
mortgage. 

 
 
[¶13]   Joseph argues that such an 
interpretation is erroneous because it would render the clause in the Release 
requiring Louise J. Sara to assume all existing liabilities and expenses 
associated with the property meaningless.  
It is true that when we construe a contract, we endeavor to avoid 
interpreting it in a way that would render any provision meaningless.  Scherer v. Laramie Reg'l Airport Bd., 
2010 WY 105, ¶ 11, 236 P.3d 996, 1003 (Wyo. 2010).  The Release is unambiguous and, contrary 
to Joseph's position, we have interpreted the Release consistent with the 
parties' intent and in a manner that gives effect to each provision.  Our conclusion that the intent of the 
Release was to discharge any and all claims the parties had against each other 
does not render meaningless the provision regarding Louise J. Sara taking the 
property subject to existing liabilities and expenses.  Instead, that provision remains entirely 
effective against third parties who were not parties to the Release.  The mortgage and note existed prior to 
the execution of the Release and affected property and parties that were part of 
and subject to the Release.  To 
conclude that the Release did not discharge the mortgage and note would 
undermine the purpose and intent of the Release, that the parties release all 
claims and liabilities against each other.  
Consequently, we find that the district court erred in concluding that 
the Release did not discharge the mortgage and note.  We will remand to the district court for 
entry of an order enforcing the Release and discharging the note and mortgage in 
question.

 
 
Did 
the district court abuse its discretion by ordering the parties to pay their own 
attorneys' fees and costs?

 
 
[¶14]   ANB argues that the district court 
abused its discretion when it ordered each party to pay its own attorneys' fees 
and costs associated with filing and defending the motion to enforce.  Regarding denials of an award of 
attorneys' fees and costs, we have said the following:

 
 
We 
review the denial of an award for attorney fees for an abuse of discretion.  Mueller v. Zimmer, 2007 WY 195, ¶ 11, 173 P.3d 361, 364 (Wyo. 2007) (citing Cline v. Rocky Mountain, Inc., 998 P.2d 946, 951 (Wyo. 
2000)).

 
 

A 
court abuses its discretion only when it acts in a manner which exceeds the 
bounds of reason under the circumstances.  
The burden is placed upon the party who is attacking the trial court's 
ruling to establish an abuse of discretion, and the ultimate issue is whether 
the court could reasonably conclude as it did.

 
 

Cline, 
998 P.2d  at 951 (quoting Johnston v. Stephenson, 938 P.2d 861, 862 (Wyo. 
1997)).

 
 

We 
have said that "[j]udicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which 
are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment 
exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing 
so arbitrarily or capriciously."  
Mueller, ¶ 11, 
173 P.3d  at 364 (quoting Ekberg v. Sharp, 2003 WY 123, ¶ 9, 76 P.3d 1250, 
1253 (Wyo. 2003)).  If the record 
includes sufficient evidence to support the district court's exercise of 
discretion, we uphold its decision.  
MTM v. LD (In re KJD), 2002 WY 26, ¶ 21, 41 P.3d 522, 527 
(Wyo. 2002).

 
 

Stafford 
v. JHL, Inc., 2008 
WY 128, ¶¶ 14-15, 194 P.3d 315, 318 (Wyo. 2008).  Furthermore, 

 
 
Wyoming 
follows the American rule that each party is normally responsible for his or her 
own attorney fees.  There are two 
exceptions to this rule: when there is an express statutory authorization or a 
contractual provision that allows for an award of attorney fees to a party.  We have denied attorney fees where 
neither exception is applicable.

 
 

Snodgrass 
v. Rissler & McMurry Co., 903 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Wyo. 1995) (internal citations omitted). 

 
 
[¶15]   The Release provides the following 
regarding attorneys' fees and costs:

 
 
26.  As part of this Release, Louise J. Sara, 
Richard P. Sara, Joseph D. Sara, and Sharon L. Sara acknowledge that they have 
had the opportunity to consult with and be represented by independent legal 
counsel of their own choosing, and that each of the parties shall be responsible 
for their own attorneys' fees, costs, and associated expenses pertaining to the 
prosecution and defense of these lawsuits. 

 
 
This 
provision does not pertain to the current issue of attorneys' fees and costs 
associated with ANB's later motion to enforce; rather, it pertains to fees and 
costs that occurred prior to the Release.  
There is no contract between the parties that would alter the American 
rule as it applies to the attorneys' fees and costs relating to ANB's motion to 
enforce.  

 
 
[¶16]   
ANB acknowledges that Wyoming follows the American rule; 
nevertheless, ANB argues that Joseph should be required to pay ANB's attorneys' 
fees and costs because Joseph acted in bad faith in concealing the existence of 
the mortgage and note until long after the Release was executed, and then 
attempted to collect on the note and mortgage.  ANB relies on Snodgrass, 903 P.2d  at 1017, for the proposition that in the absence 
of a contractual provision or statutory authority a party may be awarded 
attorneys' fees and costs if he or she can show that "fraud, malice, oppression 
or willful wrong has occurred."  In 
Snodgrass, we did note an exception 
to the American rule, stating that "[i]n a replevin action, a party may be 
awarded attorney fees when they can show that fraud, malice, oppression or 
willful wrong' has occurred."  903 P.2d  at 1017 (quoting Olds v. 
Hosford, 354 P.2d 947, 950 (Wyo. 1960)).  As indicated by the text of that quote, 
the exception has been limited to replevin actions.  Snodgrass did not expand the holding in 
Hosford beyond replevin actions, but 
was determined instead on our conclusion that bad faith had not been 
proven.  Snodgrass, 903 P.2d  at 1019; see also McNeill Family Trust v. Centura Bank, 
2003 WY 2, ¶ 32, 60 P.3d 1277, 1289 (Wyo. 2003) (noting the fraud exception in 
replevin actions).  We are not 
convinced that the facts of this case are such that we should broaden the 
exception to the American rule mentioned in Snodgrass. 

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶17]   The district court erred in holding 
that ANB's motion to enforce was a quiet title action and that the district 
court lacked jurisdiction to determine such an action.  ANB's motion clearly sought to enforce 
the terms of the Release.  
Furthermore, the district court erred in determining that the note and 
mortgage at issue in this case were not discharged by the Release.  The clear intent of the parties entering 
into the Release was to discharge and release any and all claims that the 
parties had against each other, either individually or in their capacity as 
personal representatives or trustees.  
The note and mortgage were claims held by Joseph prior to entering into 
the Release and were subsequently discharged upon signing the Release.  Accordingly, we reverse that portion of 
the district court's order and remand this matter to the district court for 
entry of an order discharging the note and mortgage at issue.  Finally, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in applying the American rule and requiring the parties to 
pay their own attorneys' fees and costs.

 
 
[¶18]   Reversed and remanded. 

FOOTNOTES

1Louise J. Sara is the mother of Joseph, both of whom were parties to the 
Release.  Louise J. Sara was the 
Trustee of the trust bearing her name until her death in 2007, at which time ANB 
became the Trustee.