Case Title: People v. Lucas

Citation: 

Docket Number: S012279

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2014-08-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed 8/21/14 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S012279 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
DAVID ALLEN LUCAS, 
) 
 
 
) 
San Diego County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. Nos. CR 73093 & 
 
 
) 
CR 75195 
 
____________________________________) 
 
A jury found defendant David Allen Lucas guilty of the first degree 
murders of Suzanne Jacobs, Colin Jacobs, and Anne Swanke (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 
subd. (a), 189),1 the attempted murder of Jodie Santiago Robertson (§§ 187, 664), 
and the kidnappings of Swanke and Robertson (§ 207, subd. (a)).  The jury also 
found that he personally used a knife during each crime (§ 12022, subd. (b)) and 
inflicted great bodily injury upon Swanke and Robertson (§ 12022.7).  The jury 
further found true the special circumstance allegation of multiple murder (§ 190.2, 
subd. (a)(3)).  The jury acquitted defendant of the murder of Gayle Garcia and was 
unable to reach verdicts on the murders of Rhonda Strang and Amber Fisher.2  On 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
2  
Eleven jurors voted to convict defendant of these murders.  After 
defendant’s sentencing, the trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss 
the Rhonda Strang and Amber Fisher murder counts.  
 
2 
the allegation that he had a prior serious felony conviction for rape, the jury found 
the allegation true (§§ 667, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(1)).  Following the penalty 
phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of death.  The trial court denied 
defendant’s motions for new trial (§ 1181) and for modification of the penalty to 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and 
sentenced him to death.  The court also sentenced defendant to a 17-year term for 
the attempted murder of Robertson.3   
This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm the judgment.   
I.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
From May 1979 to November 1984, there were six unsolved throat-slashing 
killings in the San Diego area.  A seventh victim, Jodie Santiago Robertson, 
survived her throat-slashing injuries, and, in December 1984, she identified 
defendant as her attacker.  Following defendant’s arrest, police investigated 
defendant’s possible involvement in the other killings, which eventually resulted 
in these consolidated proceedings charging defendant with six murders and 
Robertson’s attempted murder.  Because defendant makes extensive arguments 
contesting the consolidation and joint trial of these crimes and their cross-
admissibility, we also include a factual summary of the crimes for which 
defendant was acquitted or that ended in mistrial. 
                                              
3  
This 17-year term is comprised of the upper term of nine years on the 
attempted murder conviction with an additional three years for the great bodily 
injury finding plus a term of five years for defendant’s prior serious felony 
conviction.  Pursuant to section 654, the court stayed the one-year enhancements 
for use of a knife regarding each murder conviction and the 10-year term for each 
kidnapping conviction.  
 
3 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  The Homicides of Suzanne and Colin Jacobs 
The 1979 killings of Suzanne and Colin Jacobs were unsolved for 
approximately five years until the investigation focused on a suspect, John 
Massingale, who had purportedly confessed to the crimes.  At the time of 
defendant’s arrest in late 1984, Massingale was in custody in San Diego awaiting 
trial for the Jacobs killings.  Investigators reevaluated the evidence in the Jacobs 
killings and linked defendant to those killings, largely because of a handwritten 
note found at the crime scene that matched defendant’s handwriting.  After further 
investigation, detectives developed a case against defendant based on boot print 
evidence, hair evidence, a vehicle linked to defendant, and his lack of an alibi.  
Authorities later dropped all charges against Massingale, released him, and instead 
charged defendant with the Jacobs killings.  Eventually, defendant’s presentation 
at trial focused heavily on the evidence that had purportedly linked Massingale to 
the killings of Suzanne and Colin Jacobs. 
a)  Prosecution Evidence  
(i)  The Events Leading to the Homicides 
On May 4, 1979, Michael and Suzanne Jacobs lived in a small white wood-
frame house in the eastern end of San Diego, California, with their three-year-old 
son, Colin, and their two dogs.  That day, Michael and Suzanne were expecting the 
delivery of a new dinette set.   
Michael awoke that morning and started his normal workday routine by 
getting ready for work.  He left the house at 6:00 a.m. and drove away in the 
family vehicle.  Michael also kept in his driveway a blue off-road Volkswagen 
Beetle with the top cut off and outfitted with a roll bar.   
Margaret Harris, a neighbor and friend who lived across the street from the 
Jacobs house, testified that she did not see Suzanne outside her house as she 
 
4 
usually did every morning.  Instead, she had seen a maroon or wine-colored sports 
car with a black top parked in the Jacobses’ driveway between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m.  
Harris believed the car was an MGB and described it as having sun-damaged 
paint.4   
Later that morning, around 11:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m., Harris telephoned 
Suzanne, but no one answered.  She assumed that Suzanne had been picked up by 
whoever had arrived in the sports car.  About this same time, Michael also 
telephoned Suzanne but got no answer.   
At approximately 12:30 p.m., deliveryman Louis Hoeniger arrived at the 
Jacobs residence to deliver the shipment of dinette furniture.  For approximately 
10 minutes waiting for someone to answer the door, Hoeniger heard no response, 
except for the barking of the Jacobses’ dogs in their backyard.  Harris observed the 
delivery truck arrive at the Jacobs residence and saw the deliveryman leave the 
dinette furniture on the front porch.  This surprised Harris because she knew 
Suzanne was expecting the delivery.  
Around 5:00 p.m., Michael returned home and was puzzled by the 
discovery of their new dinette furniture on the front porch because Suzanne was 
supposed to receive the shipment.  Michael entered the house and discovered 
blood all over the bathroom.  As he backed out of the bathroom, he saw Colin 
lying dead on the bedroom floor.  
                                              
4  
Harris did not immediately identify the car as an MGB.  She explained she 
came to this conclusion two days later when she and her husband drove around 
town to see if she could identify the make and model of the car she had seen in the 
Jacobs’s driveway.  When they saw an MGB, Harris believed it was the same 
make and model as the car she had seen two days earlier.  
 
5 
Michael walked out of the house and called out across the street to 
Margaret and Ed Harris, who were outside.  Michael appeared to be in shock and 
collapsed on the ground.  Michael was unable to talk, so the Harrises went into the 
Jacobs home to investigate.  They discovered Colin’s body just inside the entrance 
of the master bedroom and Suzanne’s body further inside the master bedroom.  
Mrs. Harris called the police.  
(ii)  The Scene of the Crime 
Emergency units and San Diego police officers arrived at the Jacobs 
residence and secured the crime scene to examine and collect evidence.  There was 
a significant amount of blood on the bathroom floor and on the floor of the 
hallway leading to it.  There was blood on the front and inside of the bathtub.  On 
the bathroom rug was a folded, torn scrap of paper with handwritten printing that 
read “Love Insurance” and “280-1700.”5  The note had a bloodstain on it.  Child-
sized bloody footprints, consistent with Colin’s, led from the bathroom to inside 
the master bedroom where his body was found.   
Colin’s throat had been severely slashed.  Because of the amount of blood 
found in the bathroom, the child-sized bloody footprints leading from it, and the 
amount of blood on the front of Colin’s clothing, Detective Gary Gleason believed 
Colin’s throat had been cut in the bathroom but that he had survived long enough 
to walk down the hallway where he collapsed inside the master bedroom.   
The master bedroom showed signs of a violent struggle.  A padded railing 
had been dislodged from the edge of the waterbed and was lying on the floor.  The 
bedsheets were out of place and had bloodstains.  There was a smear of blood on 
                                              
5 
Love Insurance was the name of an insurance brokerage firm in San Diego, 
and 280-1700 was the firm’s telephone number.   
 
6 
the top of a chest of drawers, and items on it had toppled over or fallen to the 
floor.  Next to the entrance to the master bedroom, there was a smear of blood on 
the light switch and the adjacent door and frame.   
Suzanne’s fully clothed body lay sprawled on the floor between the 
waterbed and the chest of drawers.  In both of her clenched hands were several 
strands of blond hair.  She had bruising across her back near her bra strap and her 
shirt had been torn in that area.  Suzanne’s throat had been slashed from ear to ear.   
Because of the sheer volume of blood on the floor of the master bedroom, 
no one could have walked around the bodies without leaving footprints.  Adult-
sized bloody footprints with a distinctive Vibram-sole pattern were visible in the 
master bedroom, leading out of the bedroom, through the hallway and toward the 
kitchen.  All the adult-sized footprints appeared to be made by one person because 
they were all the same size and had a consistent right-left pattern.   
In the living room, the television had been left on; on top of it was a wine 
glass with some wine in it and an ashtray containing a cigarette butt.  Around the 
television were more bloody footprints with the same Vibram-sole pattern.  The 
footprints led toward the dining room and then into the kitchen.   
In front of the kitchen sink, the footprints overlapped as if someone had 
stood over them repeatedly.  Blood was on the kitchen sink, faucets, and the drain 
trap.  Blood was on a washcloth in the sink, the soap holder, and a green paper 
towel left on the kitchen counter — all consistent with a bloodied assailant having 
used the sink to wash.   
(iii)  The Forensic Evidence 
(1)  The victims’ injuries 
According to forensic pathologist David Katsuyama, Colin’s throat had 
been slashed by at least two distinct cuts — one that extended from the left side of 
 
7 
his neck across the throat, and the other that extended to the right side behind his 
ear — leaving a gaping wound that nearly extended to the backbone.  Because the 
cuts had severed his jugular vein and carotid artery, he bled to death.  Colin also 
had severe cuts on the tips of two fingers, his right thumb, and the palm of his left 
hand below the base of the thumb.   
According to Dr. Katsuyama, Suzanne’s throat had been slashed by at least 
six distinct cuts that transected the skin, fatty tissue, cartilage, and muscles of the 
neck leaving a gaping wound that exposed the backbone.  Her right jugular vein 
and right carotid artery were severed.  Suzanne also had three stab wounds:  a 
small wound above her left collarbone, a larger wound that severed her pulmonary 
artery, and a wound to her abdomen that deeply penetrated her liver.  Like Colin, 
Suzanne died of blood loss caused by all of her wounds.  Unlike Colin, Suzanne 
had evidence of petechial hemorrhaging — tiny specks of blood caused by the 
rupture of capillary blood vessels on her left eyelid.  Dr. Katsuyama explained that 
Suzanne’s petechial hemorrhaging could have been caused by the loss of blood 
flow to that area caused either by strangulation or by her rapidly bleeding wounds.  
Suzanne, however, died with her tongue clenched between her teeth, which is 
consistent with strangulation.  Her body bore no signs of a sexual assault.  
Suzanne’s blood-alcohol level at her death was .04 percent, which would have 
been consistent with her having consumed two eight-ounce glasses of wine within 
the hour before she died.6   
In Dr. Katsuyama’s opinion, Colin’s and Suzanne’s wounds were inflicted 
by a medium-length sharp-edged knife with a relatively stiff blade.   
                                              
6  
Michael and Mrs. Harris both testified that Suzanne did not ordinarily drink 
in the morning.   
 
8 
(2)  The “Love Insurance” note 
On May 11, 1979, lab technician Pat Stewart took several photographs of 
the “Love Insurance” note found in the Jacobses’ bathroom, unfolding it to reveal 
the handwritten printing on it.  He then applied ninhydrin, a chemical that detects 
fingerprints by staining them a color ranging from a light pink to a dark purple.  
After he applied the ninhydrin, a partial fingerprint appeared.  At the time, Stewart 
was unaware that fingerprints that appear after ninhydrin is used fade over time, 
and he did not take a photograph of the fingerprint, believing that the latent print 
examiners would do so.   
Three days later, San Diego Police Department latent print examiner Leigh 
Emmerson examined the partial fingerprint on the Love Insurance note and found 
five to six identifiable points, which he believed were not sufficient to determine 
to whom the print belonged but which could be used to eliminate potential 
suspects.  Emmerson informed the lead detectives that the fingerprint should be 
preserved.  But he did not take a photograph of it himself because it was 
department policy for the investigating officer to photograph such prints.  
Emmerson returned the note to a locked file in the department’s latent print 
section.   
(iv)  The Arrest of John Massingale for the Homicides 
John Massingale, a drifter and native of Harlan County, Kentucky, 
eventually became a suspect in the Jacobs murders.  On March 18, 1984, San 
Diego police detectives located Massingale in Kentucky and interrogated him.  
During the initial interrogation, he admitted he was a drifter in Southern California 
in 1979 through 1980, but denied that he regularly carried a sheathed fixed-blade 
knife.  He also initially denied any knowledge of the Jacobs murders or that he had 
later bragged about killing them while hitchhiking with two men.  The following 
 
9 
day, however, in tape-recorded interviews, Massingale admitted he used to carry a 
fixed-blade knife and confessed to the murders, providing details matching the 
crime scene.  These details included that the Jacobs home was white and had a 
blue dune buggy parked outside, the approximate ages of Colin and Suzanne, the 
location of the living room couch, that Colin had been killed in the bathroom, and 
that Massingale exited the back door while hearing the sounds of barking dogs.  
Massingale was arrested and transported to San Diego where he remained in jail 
through December 1984.   
At defendant’s trial, Massingale testified that he had made a “phony” 
confession because the officers, before his tape-recorded confessions, advised him 
not to speak with an attorney, claimed they had evidence and witnesses against 
him, and warned that he faced a death sentence unless he cooperated with the 
police.  Massingale alleged that a detective had shown him numerous photographs 
of the crime scene.  Massingale said he later used details from those photographs 
in his recorded confessions.  He also admitted that he mostly smoked Marlboro 
brand cigarettes.7 
Massingale, who grew up in the Appalachian Mountains of Kentucky, 
testified that he could read and spell small words but was basically illiterate.  In 
Kentucky, he worked primarily as a painter and coal miner, but spent many years 
as a drifter and day laborer while staying at various Salvation Army missions.   
                                              
7  
The cigarette butt found in the ashtray at the Jacobs residence was not 
preserved, but the defense, during closing statements, argued that the butt was 
consistent with a Marlboro brand cigarette based on crime scene photographs.  At 
the time of her death, Suzanne Jacobs had matchbooks and a Winston brand 
cigarette in her pants pockets. 
 
10 
(v)  The Arrest of Defendant in December 1984 and 
Reexamination of the Evidence  
Approximately five years after the Jacobs murders on December 16, 1984, 
following the throat-slashing murder of Anne Swanke (see post, at pp. 41-49) and 
after Jodie Santiago Robertson identified him as the assailant who slashed her 
throat (see post, at pp. 30-36), defendant was arrested.  Therefore, because of the 
similarity of these cases to the throat-slashing murders of Suzanne and Colin 
Jacobs, local authorities reexamined the evidence collected at the Jacobs 
residence. 
(1)   Comparison of defendant’s handwriting to the Love 
Insurance note 
In December 1980, after the police identified Massingale as a possible 
suspect in the Jacobs murders, police lab technician Pat Stewart reexamined the 
Love Insurance note but discovered that the partial fingerprint, raised by his 
previous application of ninhydrin, had faded away completely, and he was unable 
to find any photographs of the partial fingerprint.  Stewart applied another 
application of ninhydrin, but nothing appeared.  His lab sought the assistance of 
the FBI in re-raising the fingerprint and sent the note to the FBI.  But when the 
note came back from the FBI, the fingerprint still was not visible, the paper had 
turned black and dark-purple, and the handwriting had become unreadable.  
Consequently, the investigation had to rely on photographs Stewart had taken of 
the note before he first applied ninhydrin to it in May 1979.  
A few weeks after his arrest, defendant, while in jail, cooperated with 
police and gave investigators several specimens of his handwriting.  John J. 
Harris, a handwriting expert and former president of two national associations for 
document examiners, examined these specimens, as well as other writings 
defendant had made in the past.  Harris enlarged these specimens and compared 
them with enlarged photographs of the handwriting on the Love Insurance note.  
 
11 
Harris believed, with “reasonable certainty” that defendant wrote the Love 
Insurance note.  Frank Clark, defendant’s business partner in their carpet cleaning 
company, was familiar with defendant’s handwriting and also believed defendant 
wrote the Love Insurance note.   
Love Insurance was the name of an insurance brokerage in San Diego, and 
the numbers on the note matched its business telephone number.  According to the 
brokerage’s business records, two months after the Jacobs killings, defendant 
bought auto insurance for his 1972 Audi through the Love Insurance agency.   
(2)  Defendant’s prior employment and the boot print evidence 
Roy Nilson, a retired deputy sheriff who specialized in shoe print 
examinations, examined a photograph of a single bloody footprint found in the 
Jacobses’ living room and concluded the sole pattern matched that of a size 12 
Vibram style No. 100 sole.  A Vibram sole was typically fitted to work or hiking 
boots.   
In the spring of 1979 defendant worked at Precision Metal, a metal forging 
company, which had provided defendant with a new pair of Lehigh work boots, 
size 10 1/2 D, about one month before the Jacobs murders.  Nilson researched this 
brand and size and learned that the manufacturer often used a size 12 Vibram sole, 
trimmed to fit a size 10 shoe.  He compared an inked footprint from an exemplar 
pair of size 10 1/2 Lehigh boots with a photograph of a bloody footprint on the 
Jacobses’ living room floor.  Although the front portion of the boot sole matched 
the photograph well, the heel was out of alignment by three-eighths inch.  Nilson 
believed this discrepancy could have been the result of minor inconsistencies in 
the manufacturing process, and that it was possible that the bloody prints could 
have been left by the same brand and size of boot as the exemplar.   
 
12 
(3)  Blood and fingerprint evidence 
Bloodstain samples taken from the kitchen floor, kitchen sink, the living 
room floor, the bedroom, Suzanne’s nail clippings, the bathroom, and from the 
Love Insurance note all tested as type O blood, which was consistent with 
Suzanne’s and Colin’s blood type, but not with Michael Jacobs, John Massingale, 
or defendant, who all have type A blood.   
John Torres, a latent print examiner for the San Diego Police Department, 
found only five prints at the crime scene with clear enough ridge detail to be of 
value for purposes of attempting a possible identification.  Of these, Torres 
believed two prints lifted from a doorjamb leading from the dining room to the 
kitchen matched Michael Jacobs.  Torres could not identify the three remaining 
prints, two recovered from the doorjamb between the dining room and the kitchen 
and a palm print from the bathroom doorjamb, as originating from defendant, 
Suzanne, Colin, or Michael.  Torres, however, did not examine these three prints 
to ascertain whether Massingale could be excluded as the donor of these prints.   
(4)  Hair comparison evidence 
John Simms, a criminalist at the San Diego Police Department forensic 
science laboratory, and James Bailey, a criminalist at the Los Angeles County 
Sheriff’s Department criminalistics laboratory, each microscopically examined the 
hairs collected at the crime scene from Suzanne Jacobs’s clenched right hand.  
They compared them with hair samples from defendant and John Massingale.  
Simms excluded Massingale as the source of those hairs calling them “very 
different from Massingale’s.”  Simms, however, was unable to either include or 
exclude defendant as the source of the hair found in Suzanne’s right hand but 
described some of the hairs as being very close to defendant’s.   
Bailey, in contrast, believed most of the hairs from Suzanne’s right hand 
were similar physically and microscopically to defendant’s hair and that they may 
 
13 
have come from him.  According to Bailey, some of the hairs had characteristics 
closer to that of Colin Jacobs, but he could not eliminate defendant as the source 
of those hairs.   
Bailey also examined additional hairs collected at the morgue from 
Suzanne’s right hand and from her left elbow.  Bailey believed many of the hairs 
collected from Suzanne’s right hand at the morgue were consistent with Suzanne 
or Colin.  Four of the hairs, however, were consistent with defendant and another 
two hairs were consistent with either defendant or Colin.  He also believed the hair 
collected from Suzanne’s elbow was similar to defendant’s but not to either 
Suzanne’s or Colin’s.  Finally, Bailey also believed a hair found on a rug 
underneath Suzanne’s body was similar to defendant’s hair.8   
(5)  Defendant’s mother’s MG Midget  
Because the Jacobses’ neighbor, Margaret Harris, reported seeing what she 
believed was a maroon or wine-colored MGB sports car parked outside the Jacobs 
residence on the morning of the crimes, the investigation focused on whether 
defendant ever had access to such a vehicle.   
On December 20, 1974, defendant’s mother had bought a 1974 MG Midget 
roadster.  On November 11, 1976, defendant was stopped for speeding while 
driving his mother’s MG, and he was involved in an accident in the same vehicle 
eight days later.  An MG Midget and MGB are very similar, with the MGB being 
slightly larger.  The rear of the MG Midget and the MGB were identical during 
their respective production years.   
                                              
8 
Simms, however, examined the same hair and was unable to include or 
exclude defendant as the source.   
 
14 
(6)  Defendant’s whereabouts on the day of the murders 
At the time of the Jacobs murders, defendant lived in a residence hall 
associated with the Salvation Army.  When he lived there, defendant’s presence 
was monitored and, due to his employment schedule at Precision Metal, he was 
not permitted to leave the facility earlier than 9:00 a.m. and had to return by 
1:00 a.m.  But according to Precision Metal’s employee attendance records, 
defendant was not at work on either Thursday, May 3, or Friday, May 4, 1979.   
b)  Defense evidence  
(i)  The Impeachment of John Massingale 
The defense called several witnesses to impeach Massingale’s trial 
testimony that he was not involved in the killing of Suzanne and Colin Jacobs, his 
habit of carrying a fixed-blade knife, his purported admission to the killings to 
fellow hitchhikers, and his claim that the police had coerced his confession.   
On August 15, 1980, California Highway Patrol Officer Robert McLean 
stopped and cited John Massingale for hitchhiking near a freeway in San Diego 
County.  Massingale was wearing a sheathed knife with a six- to eight-inch fixed 
blade.  Officer McLean recalled the incident because Massingale had “crazy eyes” 
and appeared to be “a very scary individual.”   
In late August 1980, John “Shorty” Smith, also a native of Harlan County, 
Kentucky, met Massingale at an Arizona gas station.  According to Smith, 
Massingale “looked like he was from my part of the country,” and he offered 
Massingale a ride to a mine in California for work.  But Massingale claimed he 
was wanted for murder in California.  Smith did not take Massingale seriously, 
and convinced Massingale to go to California, offering to eventually take him 
back to Harlan County.  According to Smith, Massingale wore a four-and-one-
half-inch Buck knife.  Because the California mine was closed when Smith and 
 
15 
Massingale arrived, they drove to Los Angeles, and along the way picked up a 
second hitchhiker, Jimmy Joe Nelson.9   
According to Smith, during the drive to Los Angeles, Massingale talked a 
lot and bragged to him and Nelson about having cut someone’s head off.   
Nelson testified that, during the trip in Smith’s van, they discussed failed 
marriages and Massingale replied that if a woman treated you badly “you just cut 
their head off and get it over with.”  Nelson described Massingale as having a dual 
personality that could shift unpredictably from being a nice person to being “one 
of the most violent people in the world.”   
Nelson saw Massingale carrying a knife with an 11- or 12-inch blade that 
he had strapped around his waist in a leather holster.  When riding in Smith’s van, 
Massingale constantly practiced and played with the knife “like a kid with a toy.”  
Massingale repeatedly showed off how he could unholster the knife quickly, flip it 
through the air with his wrist, and get it to stick in a wood board at the back of the 
van.  Because of Massingale’s personality and knife skills, Nelson was afraid of 
making Massingale mad while he played with his knife.   
After arriving in Los Angeles, Massingale took Smith and Nelson to a gay 
bar in Hollywood.  According to Smith and Nelson, although Massingale was a 
handsome, “flashy dresser” and portrayed himself as “a ladies’ man,” he appeared 
to prostitute himself with various male patrons of the bar — leaving with each of 
them briefly and then returning with cash he shared with Smith and Nelson.   
                                              
9  
Smith explained that, because Nelson suffered from seizures during the trip, 
Massingale did not like Nelson and tried to convince Smith to leave Nelson 
behind.  At the time of his testimony, Nelson was incarcerated in Texas for the 
manslaughter of William Calvin Toups and had been previously convicted of 
numerous theft and forgery crimes.   
 
16 
At the bar, according to Nelson, Massingale later ingested “windowpane” 
LSD.  After that point, Nelson described Massingale as talking nonstop with the 
“floodgates open” as he bragged about the things he had done.  One of the things 
Massingale bragged about, according to Smith and Nelson, was killing a mother 
and her little boy, over a year earlier, in the spring of 1979.  According to Smith 
and Nelson, Massingale claimed he had met a woman named “Sue Ann,” “Anne,” 
or “Suzanne” in San Diego and went to her home in East San Diego.10  
Massingale explained to Nelson that they had consumed a couple of drinks at her 
home and were sitting on the living room couch “making out,” but her little boy 
interrupted them, saying he needed to go to the bathroom.11  When the boy refused 
to go to the bathroom by himself, the mother got up to help the boy, which “pissed 
off” Massingale.  Massingale said he grabbed “that bitch by the hair,” “worked 
on” slicing her throat, and then “worked on” the little boy so “he would never have 
to go to the bathroom again.”  According to Nelson, Massingale claimed he killed 
the boy in the bathroom.   
The next day, Massingale decided to stay behind in Los Angeles and did 
not leave town with Smith and Nelson.  Before they parted, however, Massingale 
gave Nelson some of his clothes, a pair of boots, and some other items.  This 
included a striped brown-and-white silk shirt that appeared to have blood on it and 
                                              
10  
Smith testified that he remembered Massingale mentioning the name 
“Anne.”  In his 1981 interviews with police, Nelson said Massingale had referred 
to the victim by her full name “Suzanne Jacobs.”  At trial, Nelson testified that 
Massingale referred to the victim as “Sue Ann.”  Massingale did not describe the 
circumstances of how he met the woman.   
11  
Smith testified that Massingale told him that the boy was “pestering” him 
and his mother about going to the bathroom and that he “shut the kid up” and cut 
the mother’s head off.   
 
17 
runs consistent with a woman’s fingernails having raked down the left sleeve.  
Massingale also gave him a set of his work boots.  Nelson told police that 
Massingale wore engineer-type boots “all the time.”   
Soon after Nelson left Los Angeles and parted ways with Smith, Nelson 
became a suspect in a Texas killing.  Chickasaw Police Detective Sergeant Harold 
Phillips arrested Nelson for that death in Alabama on December 6, 1980.  Nelson 
assisted Alabama and Texas authorities in locating the other suspects in that 
killing,12 and also told them about the Jacobs killings.13  According to Detective 
Sergeant Phillips, Nelson told him that a man named “Johnny” had confessed to 
knife-slashing the throats of a woman and her child in San Diego in the bedroom 
of her white wood-frame home.  Nelson mentioned a blue vehicle at the home.  
Nelson said Johnny and the woman had been drinking.  At the time, Detective 
Sergeant Phillips knew nothing about the Jacobs murders.  Detective Sergeant 
Phillips contacted San Diego Police Detective David Ayers and told him of 
Nelson’s statements.14   
                                              
12  
These other suspects were Rochelle Coleman and David Ray Woods.   
13  
At the time of the Jacobs murders, Nelson was in custody for various theft-
related crimes.   
14  
The San Diego Police Department’s homicide unit had a policy of 
withholding details concerning the circumstances of murders the unit is 
investigating so as to be able to identify suspects that would have information that 
only the actual perpetrator would know.  According to Detective Gleason, in the 
present case, the unit did not publicly disclose the discovery of the bloody 
footprints in the home, the blood in and around the kitchen sink, or the theory that 
Colin was killed in the bathroom.   
 
18 
The authorities transported Nelson to Texas where Detective Ayers 
interviewed him in January 1981.15  Nelson described his encounter with 
Massingale and described his barroom confession.  Nelson stated that he still had 
the items Massingale had given him, including the bloody shirt and the work 
boots.  Nelson gave the officers permission to retrieve those items from his 
mother’s Alabama residence.16   
After locating Massingale in Harlan County, Kentucky, in mid-March 
1984, Detective Ayers and San Diego County District Attorney Investigator 
William Green traveled there to interview him.  Ayers and Green met with 
Kentucky State Police Detective Denny Pace, who was familiar with Massingale, 
and they interrogated him the next day.  According to Detective Pace, Massingale 
had a reputation for dishonesty in Harlan County.17   
                                              
15  
In their first interview, Nelson told Detective Ayers that David Ray Woods 
was responsible for the Jacobs murders, but later claimed he said so only because 
he was angry that Woods had tried to blame him for the Texas killing.  In his 
January 27, 1981, interview of Nelson, Detective Ayers seems to suggest that 
Woods had a solid alibi at the time of the Jacobs murders.  But Woods and his 
girlfriend were investigated as possible suspects in the Jacobs killings.  (See post, 
at p. 135.)   
16 
Detective Sergeant Phillips later retrieved the bloody silk shirt from 
Nelson’s mother’s Alabama residence.  It was as Nelson described, with runs and 
what appeared to be bloodstains.  Phillips believed he had boxed the shirt and 
other items collected from the residence and Nelson and had sent the box to 
Detective Ayers in San Diego.  But upon inspecting the same box before his 
testimony, he found it contained the other items but not the bloody silk shirt.   
17  
The defense also offered Sidney Douglass, a Harlan County attorney and 
former judge advocate general, former county circuit judge, and former 
prosecutor, who testified that he had worked with Detective Pace in several cases 
over the years.  He regarded Detective Pace as having a good reputation for 
honesty in the community.   
 
19 
Over the next five hours, Massingale admitted he had been in San Diego in 
the early summer of 1979 and that he had met Smith hitchhiking a year later.  But 
he denied any involvement in the Jacobs murders, confessing to the murders, or 
ever carrying anything other than a small pocket knife.  He also denied knowing or 
ever having met Nelson.   
During this first interview, Detective Ayers and Inspector Green showed 
Massingale four photographs related to the Jacobs murders.  Two photographs, 
full-body shots of each victim as they appeared facedown in the bedroom, did not 
show their neck wounds.  The other two photographs showed the Jacobs residence 
from the front and the side.  Detective Ayers, Inspector Green, and Detective Pace 
each denied ever showing Massingale any additional photographs related to the 
Jacobs murders.   
The officers also intentionally withheld from Massingale various details 
surrounding the murders during this first interview, including the fact that the 
victims had nearly been decapitated.  In fact, Detective Pace did not know details 
of the Jacobs murders, except that Colin had been killed in the bathroom.  At one 
point, Massingale asked Detective Pace if he should get an attorney, but Detective 
Pace replied, “Johnny if you didn’t do anything wrong, I don’t feel like you need 
an attorney.”  Massingale then voluntarily continued with the interrogation.  But 
he later ended it by indicating that he wanted a lawyer.   
After the end of the first interview, Massingale said he wanted to speak 
with Detective Pace alone.  In that discussion, Massingale asked Detective Pace 
what kind of sentence he faced and what he should do.  Detective Pace told 
Massingale that death was the maximum penalty and that he should not admit to 
anything he did not do.  Detective Pace explained that Detective Ayers and 
Inspector Green knew details about the crime that they had not disclosed during 
their five-hour interrogation.  Massingale asked Detective Pace what those details 
 
20 
were, but Pace said he could not disclose the details without Ayers’s and Green’s 
permission.  Massingale asked Detective Pace to get their permission to tell him 
those details.   
Detective Pace later spoke with Inspector Ayers, who gave him permission 
to tell Massingale that Colin had been killed in the bathroom and gave Pace a 
picture of the Jacobses’ bathroom to show Massingale.  Detective Pace returned to 
Massingale and confronted him with this evidence and explained that they also 
knew he was lying about carrying a knife.  Detective Pace said that Nelson had 
been in prison at the time of the murders, that Nelson told Pace that Colin had 
been killed in the bathroom, that the location of Colin’s murder had not been made 
public, and that, therefore, Massingale must have been present at the scene of the 
crime.  According to Detective Pace, Massingale replied, “I am guilty.”  
According to Detective Pace, Massingale appeared relieved by his admission and 
became more talkative.   
Massingale then admitted to Detective Pace that he had been lying during 
the earlier interrogation.  Massingale explained that he met “Sue Ann” in a bar, 
could not remember how he got to her residence, but recalled that she did not have 
a car.  He had recognized the pictures of the Jacobses’ white house that the 
officers had shown him and remembered that a blue dune buggy was parked 
beside the home.  Massingale told Detective Pace that he recalled sitting on the 
living room couch of Sue Ann’s home and pinching her leg, but that she smacked 
him in the face.  Massingale said he then “went crazy” because he was high on 
LSD.  He got up off the couch, and she told him to get out.  The little boy told 
Massingale, “don’t hit my mommy,” and he remembered cutting both of them 
with a knife that he had holstered on his belt.  He remembered cutting the little 
boy in the bathroom, washing up in either the bathroom or kitchen sink, and then 
leaving through the back door with the sound of dogs barking.   
 
21 
Massingale told Detective Pace he believed Sue Ann was about 27 years 
old and the boy was around five years of age.  He said he went to the Salvation 
Army and got new clothes and then later buried the knife in the Mexican desert.  
He said he remembered Nelson because he was bothered by Nelson’s seizures.  He 
also admitted giving Nelson one of his shirts.   
The following day, Massingale gave a tape-recorded confession to 
Detective Pace in which Massingale agreed with Detective Pace’s description of 
the circumstances of Massingale’s confession the night before.  Massingale then 
largely repeated the same details about the murder that he had given Detective 
Pace the night before.  Massingale explained that he was sorry, that he had never 
killed anyone before and that he would never hurt a child, but that the LSD made 
him nervous and “plum out of [his] mind.”   
Later that same day, Massingale gave a second tape-recorded confession 
with Detective Ayers and Inspector Green also present.  In this confession, 
Massingale repeatedly said he was sorry for what he did.  He explained that it was 
hard for him to remember the details of the crimes because he was high or drunk 
most of the time and because he suffered from memory problems.  In addition to 
some of the details he had provided in the prior interrogations, he also correctly 
identified the Jacobses’ couch as being on the right side as one entered the front 
door.  He remembered the mother had run from him and believed that he may have 
cut her in the kitchen.  At the end of the interrogation, Inspector Ayers asked 
Massingale if he had anything else to say, and he replied, “I’m guilty.”   
Inspector Green and Detectives Ayers and Pace each testified that they did 
not ever threaten or yell at Massingale at any time during the interrogations.   
 
22 
(ii)  The Temporary Residences of Massingale and Defendant in 
1979 
The defense presented evidence in support of its theory that Massingale had 
left the Love Insurance note at the crime scene because it must have been in 
clothing that defendant had left for donation to the Salvation Army.   
According to a chaplain of the San Diego Salvation Army rescue mission in 
downtown San Diego, Massingale stayed at the mission a few times in 1979.  
Massingale seemed out of place because he was more well-dressed than the typical 
transient.  In addition to shelter, the mission provided free clothing to its residents.   
The residence hall in which defendant stayed in May 1979 was also 
associated with the Salvation Army.  The hall was also in the same building as the 
Salvation Army rescue mission.18   
(iii)  The MG 
The defense presented evidence to rebut the state’s theory that defendant’s 
mother’s MG was at the Jacobs house on the morning of the killings.   
One of the Jacobses’ neighbors, Jeanette Robertson, drove by the Jacobs 
residence around 9:00 a.m. on May 4, 1979 and two more times later that same 
morning.19  She did not see any car parked in the driveway on any of those 
occasions.   
                                              
18  
In closing statements, the defense theorized that the Love Insurance note 
could have come from a piece of clothing that defendant had donated while he 
lived at the Salvation Army and that this clothing eventually could have been 
given to Massingale who dropped the note at the crime scene.  In contrast, the 
prosecution theorized that defendant had met Massingale at the Salvation Army, 
and defendant had bragged about the killings to Massingale, providing him details 
that Massingale later repeated to Nelson and Smith.  
19  
According to Robertson, Suzanne and her son Colin typically were early 
risers and they would spend their weekday mornings outside with Suzanne 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
23 
Margaret Harris, who had seen a wine-colored or faded maroon sports car 
in the Jacobses’ driveway on the morning of the murders, did not tell police her 
belief that the car was an MGB until sometime in 1988.20  She also admitted that 
she could not distinguish amongst the various different models of MG — an 
MGA, MGB, or a Midget.   
In 1974, defendant’s mother, Patricia Katzenmaier, bought a used 1974 
purple MG Midget that was only a few months old at the time.  According to 
Katzenmaier, from March 1979 until she sold the car in 1981, the Midget was 
parked in her garage and was not driveable.  In late 1979 or early 1980, Curt 
Andrewson, a family friend of the Lucas family, saw the MG Midget in 
Katzenmaier’s garage.  According to Andrewson, the car was purple and was 
inoperable because the engine was in pieces.  Dennis Smith bought the MG 
Midget from Katzenmaier in 1981.  According to Smith, the car was purple and 
did not run.  He fixed the car, painted it red, and sold it in 1986.21  
(iv)  Boot Print Evidence 
The defense presented evidence challenging the state’s theory that 
defendant had left the bloody boot prints found at the crime scene. 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
gardening while Colin rode his tricycle nearby.  But on the weekday morning of 
the murders, she never saw them outside.  
20  
According to Inspector Green, Harris claimed the car was an MG, but she 
later identified a photograph of a 1974 maroon MGB as being the same make and 
model of the car she had seen on May 4, 1979.   
21 
The prosecution provided no evidence of what color the vehicle was in May 
1979, but it provided evidence of a December 1986 traffic stop, after Smith had 
sold the vehicle, in which the detaining officer described the vehicle as “black 
over maroon.”   
 
24 
Fire Captain Edward Fairhurst, who was the first emergency responder to 
walk inside the Jacobs residence on the day of the murders, testified during the 
prosecution’s case-in-chief that he was not wearing Vibram-soled boots that day 
and denied ever owning any such shoes.  He also claimed that the bloody boot 
prints did not match the soles he was wearing that day.  
But Captain Fairhurst’s shoemaker, David Daywood, remembered resoling 
Fairhurst’s boots the month before the murders with Vibram soles and heels.  
Daywood recalled that Captain Fairhurst wore size 10 or 10 1/2 boots and that he 
applied new size 12 Vibram soles to his boots, which he trimmed down to fit the 
smaller boot size.  
In addition, defense investigator William Pon Cavege spoke with Captain 
Fairhurst in 1985, and showed him a photograph of a bloody boot print at the 
crime scene.  According to Cavege, Captain Fairhurst admitted that the pattern 
looked similar to the soles he had been wearing that day and admitted that his 
shoemaker had put new soles on his boots shortly before the murders.  A second 
defense investigator, Thomas Caldwell, testified that he contacted Captain 
Fairhurst in 1986, and Fairhurst admitted he was wearing Vibram-soled boots 
when he entered the Jacobs home.  Captain Fairhurst testified that he was unaware 
of anyone ever checking or comparing his boots with the prints found at the crime 
scene.  Captain Fairhurst had thrown away the boots in question by the time the 
defense investigators had first approached him about the boots.  
George Jackson, who worked alongside defendant in 1979 as a furnace 
operator at Precision Metal, described the floor conditions at the plant.  He said the 
plant floor was covered in lubricants, steel grit, and steel shot used in the forging 
process.  These materials would heavily soil the operators’ clothes and boots, with 
the materials getting stuck in crevices of the boot soles.  Because of these 
conditions, the furnace operators had a changing room and lockers where they 
 
25 
stored their overalls and boots.  According to Jackson, if someone tried to wear 
their boots outside the plant, they would ruin the carpets in their vehicle or at 
home.   
(v)  Hair Evidence 
The defendant re-called hair comparison expert John Simms, who had 
testified for the prosecution but was unable to reach any strong conclusions as to 
whether the hairs recovered from the crime scene were consistent with defendant’s 
hairs or excluded him.  According to Simms, because blond hairs typically exhibit 
a limited range of characteristics, they are more likely to appear similar from one 
blond person to another.  Also, defendant’s hair could have changed in the five 
years between the homicides and when the samples were obtained from him.  
(vi)  The Love Insurance Note 
The defense called David Oleksow, a handwriting expert for the San Diego 
County Sheriff’s Department crime laboratory.  Oleksow examined the 
handwriting on the Love Insurance note on several occasions, both before and 
after the note had been rendered unreadable, as part of his normal casework for the 
laboratory.  After defendant’s arrest, Oleksow compared defendant’s known 
handwriting samples with photographs of the Love Insurance note.  He observed 
“numerous unexplained variations,” but also no “significant differences” between 
those samples and the note.  Accordingly, Oleksow could not positively identify 
defendant as the author of the Love Insurance note, nor exclude him.  Oleksow 
explained that the handwriting on the Love Insurance note had a limited amount of 
writing from which to make useful comparisons.  Because he was dealing with a 
photograph of the note, he was unable to conduct a microscopic examination of 
the original or examine the fluctuations in embossing created by handwriting 
pressure.  Oleksow, however, acknowledged that in a report dated late March 
 
26 
1985, he wrote that defendant was “probably responsible” for the handwriting on 
the Love Insurance note.  
c)  Prosecution Rebuttal 
According to two close friends of Suzanne Jacobs, Bunnice Jacobs 
and Deborah Watts-Gaydos, Suzanne was not known to frequent bars alone and 
meet men.  
Inspector William Green, who was assigned to the Jacobs murders, wrote a 
report explaining that he had examined the boots of Fire Captain Fairhurst and his 
crew and determined they were different from the pattern on the footprints in the 
Jacobs house.  
2.  The Homicide of Gayle Garcia 
The jury acquitted defendant of the December 8, 1981 homicide of real 
estate agent Gayle Garcia, who was killed inside the home she had advertised for 
sale or lease.  We briefly summarize the evidence presented concerning this 
incident for purposes of evaluating defendant’s challenges to the consolidation of 
the crimes for trial and their cross-admissibility. 
a)  Prosecution Evidence  
(i)  Defendant’s Activities Before the Homicide   
 
In December of 1981, defendant worked as a manager at M & A Carpet 
Care, along with Frank Clark, his good friend and business partner.  On the 
afternoon of December 8, 1981, defendant was not at work and Clark filled in for 
him.   
(ii)  The Events Leading to the Homicide   
In 1981, Annette Goff owned a house in Spring Valley, San Diego County, 
with William Greene.  The relationship between Goff and Greene had 
 
27 
deteriorated, creating animosity between them.  Goff had obtained a restraining 
order against Greene that kept him out of the house and had filed a civil suit 
against him in a property dispute.  Due to their estrangement, Goff decided to sell 
the house and hired her friend, Gayle Garcia, as her real estate agent. 
On December 8, 1981, the day she was killed, Garcia was at the house from 
4:00 to 6:00 p.m. to show it to prospective clients, having placed a newspaper ad 
listing the property as “rent to own.”   
Greene, who still had a key to the house, wanted to show the property to his 
friends that evening, but Goff refused.  Over several telephone calls, Goff and 
Greene argued about allowing Greene’s friends to see the property.  Goff 
eventually hung up on Greene and called Garcia at 5:35 p.m. to let Garcia know 
that she would be at the house in 20 minutes, and that Greene may be coming.   
Goff arrived at the house at approximately 6:05 p.m., with her brother Chris 
and one of her business employees.  The front door was open and the phone was 
ringing as they entered the house.  When Chris answered the phone, Greene was 
on the line asking him if Garcia was still there.  Goff took the phone, and Chris 
began walking around the house looking for Garcia.  He discovered Garcia’s body 
lying on the floor of the dark, unlit bedroom.   
(iii)  The Scene of the Crime  
Homicide Detective Thomas Streed, called to investigate Garcia’s death, 
found Garcia’s body lying on the floor atop vacuum cleaner tubing.  A broken 
fingernail of Garcia’s was found in the hallway just outside the bedroom.  All the 
blood at the scene was under Garcia’s body or in the immediate vicinity.  Her 
pants had two parallel smears running down them that appeared consistent with 
wipe marks from a bloody knife blade.   
 
28 
(iv)  The Forensic Evidence  
 
Dr. Howard S. Robin performed Garcia’s autopsy on December 9, 1981, at 
the San Diego coroner’s office.  The body had a large, gaping neck wound, 
extending from the angle of the jaw on the left side all the way across the neck to 
the angle of the jaw on the right side.  The wound went through her carotid arteries 
and jugular veins on both sides, cut through the neck muscles and the membrane 
between the hyoid bone and the top of the thyroid cartilage, and nicked the second 
cervical vertebrae on her right side.  Garcia ultimately bled to death due to 
laceration of the carotid arteries.  
In addition to the neck wound, there were superficial abrasions on the left 
side of Garcia’s forehead, a one-inch abrasion in the mid-forehead region, and one 
on her nose.  There was an abrasion near her left ear and scratches or lacerations 
under her chin.  Small, fine petechial hemorrhages were found over the 
conjunctiva of her eyes.  These hemorrhages could have been caused by choking.  
When a 1985 search of defendant’s residence resulted in the seizure of a 
sheath from a model 112 Buck knife, Detective Streed compared photographs of 
the blood smears from Garcia’s pants with an exemplar model 112 Buck knife and 
concluded that the stains were consistent with that model.  Streed did not compare 
the smears with any other type of knife and admitted that the model 112 was a 
relatively common knife.  
Criminalist Ron Barry examined the 12 usable latent fingerprints lifted 
from the crime scene, but none matched defendant.  He did not examine Garcia’s 
broken fingernail for skin, blood, or other trace evidence.  
b)  Defense Evidence  
 
On the night of the homicide, while she was standing outside her home as 
the police investigated, Goff saw a motorcyclist go down her street who looked 
like William Greene’s brother, Richard, who lived with Greene nearby.  Sergeant 
 
29 
Steven Blackwood of the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department noted that the 
motorcyclist seemed very interested in the scene and almost stopped in front of the 
house.  As Blackwood wrote down the license plate number, the motorcyclist sped 
off.  Blackwood followed, stopped the motorcyclist, and identified him as Richard 
Greene.  
 
Richard Greene gave Sergeant Blackwood his address, and at 1:00 a.m. 
Detective Streed picked William Greene up for questioning at the police station.  
William Greene owned a Buck knife, but police never seized it for testing.  
 
Later that day, in the afternoon, Greene called Goff, and they discussed the 
events from the night before.  During this call, Greene denied having ever said he 
was going to their residence while Garcia was there.   
 
Parker Bell, a forensic expert, used eight different kinds of knife blades to 
wipe human blood on pants, and compared those smears with the smears found on 
Garcia’s pants.  He believed that none of the eight knife blades could be 
eliminated from having made the stains and that any similar type of knife could 
have left the smears.  
 
Defendant presented the testimony of several relatives and family friends, 
including his mother, his former stepfather, brother, sister, and brother-in-law, 
who said that defendant was at a family birthday party on the evening of 
December 8, 1981.  They testified that defendant arrived around dusk with his 
girlfriend and future wife, Shannon, and their children.  They stayed two to three 
hours, leaving after dark.  Defendant’s departure from the party was memorable 
because it was sparked by a derogatory comment made by his brother.  The trial 
court took judicial notice that December 8, 1981, was a Tuesday and the sun had 
set at 4:43 p.m.  
 
Officer Thomas Caldwell drove the route from the house where the family 
birthday party was held to the house where Garcia was killed.  The houses were 11 
 
30 
miles apart.  Caldwell made the trip between 4:30 and 4:45 p.m.  It took him 42 
minutes because the route was congested with traffic.   
3.  The Attempted Homicide of Jodie Santiago Robertson 
a) Prosecution Evidence  
(i)  Defendant’s Residence and Vehicle at the Time of the 
Crimes   
 
In early 1983, defendant moved to the Spring Valley area and bought a 
house on Casa de Oro Boulevard.  The home had a semicircular driveway with 
concrete steps leading to a porch.  That same year, defendant bought a black 1983 
Datsun 280ZX with a manual transmission.  He attached to it a customized license 
plate that read “CMC INC 2,” which referred to the name of his company, Carpet 
Maintenance Company, Inc.  At the beginning of June 1984, one of defendant’s 
employees, Richard Adler, moved into a spare bedroom in defendant’s house, 
living out of boxes he kept there.  
(ii)  The Abduction 
 
On the evening of June 8, 1984, 34-year-old Jodie Santiago Robertson, who 
was in the San Diego area visiting her brother, left a restaurant in El Cajon 
sometime between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m. to walk back to her brother’s apartment.  
As Robertson passed the apartment complex’s parking lot, a man, whom she 
eventually identified as defendant, came up behind her, placed a knife at her 
throat, and told her that if she ran or screamed he would cut her throat.  Defendant 
led Robertson to a dark-brown sports car, similar to a Datsun 280ZX, with louvers 
on the back window.  The car was already running and the driver’s side door was 
ajar.  Robertson noticed the license plate, but could remember only that it was 
comprised of three numbers and three letters.  
 
31 
 
Defendant forced Robertson through the driver’s side door, and she became 
seated partially in the center console area and partially in the passenger seat.  The 
seats had sheepskin seat covers.  Defendant placed the knife in front of him on the 
dashboard, behind the steering wheel.  Defendant drove the vehicle with his left 
hand on the steering wheel while keeping his right hand wrapped around 
Robertson’s right shoulder and neck.  During the drive, Robertson was also able to 
note that defendant had a mustache, blond hair, and “bulging” blue eyes.  She did 
not remember if the car had a stick shift and she did not notice defendant shifting 
gears as he drove.   
 
Defendant drove up to a house with a semicircular driveway.  He led 
Robertson out of the car and up some stairs to the front door.  Defendant led her to 
a bedroom with boxes where he tied her hands behind her.  He took Robertson into 
another bedroom and placed her on a bed.  When Robertson tried to lift up her 
head to cough, defendant began choking her until she lost consciousness.  
Robertson did not remember anything after that point.  
(iii)  The Rescue of Robertson 
 
The following morning at approximately 6:40 a.m., two women on a 
morning walk discovered Robertson lying in the brush and weeds on the side of 
the road at a residential intersection about a mile from defendant’s home.  She was 
naked below the waist and had blood all over her face and down her shirt.  
Robertson was moaning and making gurgling sounds.  She had a severe cut across 
the front of her neck and deep cuts to her fingers.  There was a significant amount 
of blood on the paved portion of the roadway and on the weeds in the overgrowth 
at the side of the road, suggesting that her injuries had been inflicted at the scene.  
 
At the hospital, a vascular and trauma surgeon examined the extent of 
Robertson’s neck wounds.  The wound was above her Adam’s apple and extended 
 
32 
into the larynx above the vocal cords.  The wound reached back to the bones of 
her neck vertebrae.  Robertson’s left external jugular vein was severed but the 
carotid artery, the right external jugular vein, and both internal jugular veins 
remained intact.  The wound was consistent with a cutting instrument having been 
used with a sawing or carving type motion.  Below the wound, Robertson’s neck 
had bruising consistent with a smooth ligature having been applied with enough 
force to constrict her neck.   
 
Robertson’s head had a severe skull fracture extending from behind her 
head nearly across to each of her ears.  Along the fracture, just behind each ear, 
portions of the skin on her scalp had split open.  The cuts to Robertson’s fingers 
on her right hand went through the tendons to the bone.  
 
Surgeons successfully reconstructed Robertson’s neck, and she was 
released from the hospital 18 days later.  
(iv)  Defendant’s Sale of His 280ZX 
 
Three days after Robertson’s abduction, the local newspaper ran an article 
about Robertson’s abduction and her survival.  Two days later, defendant traded 
his Datsun 280ZX for a Toyota pickup truck.  Defendant told his friend and 
employee, Richard Adler, that he could no longer afford the insurance and 
payments on the car.  Adler helped defendant remove the personalized license 
plate and sheepskin covers from the 280ZX’s seats and transferred them to the 
pickup.  
(v)  Robertson’s Identification of Defendant, His Residence, 
and His Vehicle’s Make and Model 
 
Following the murder of Anne Swanke (see post, at pp. 41-49), in mid-
December 1984, Robertson returned to San Diego at the request of the San Diego 
Police Department to view a photo lineup.  After examining the photo spread, 
Robertson identified a picture of defendant as that of her attacker.  
 
33 
 
Robertson had previously told detectives that she would recognize “on 
sight” the house to which she had been abducted.  From memory, she also drew a 
small diagram of the interior of the house and the circular driveway.  Following 
her identification of defendant’s photograph, detectives drove Robertson to the 
location of her brother’s apartment complex, but she was unable to retrace the 
route of her abduction.  The detectives also purposefully drove by defendant’s 
residence, but Robertson did not alert them to the house.  Later that morning, the 
detectives asked Robertson to draw a larger sketch of the house from her memory, 
and she again drew a circular driveway with additional detail of the interior of the 
house.  
 
In the afternoon, the detectives again took Robertson to defendant’s 
neighborhood.  Detective Robert Fullmer slowed the car as they drove by 
defendant’s house.  Robertson turned her head and looked at the house while 
turning slightly in her seat.  She asked Detective Fullmer to do a U-turn and drive 
past the house again.  On this last pass, Detective Fullmer again slowed the 
vehicle, and Robertson turned in her seat again while staring at the house.  
Detective Gary Fisher asked her if she saw something that she recognized, and 
Robertson identified defendant’s house as the one to which she had been taken.  
 
Robertson identified several photos of a Datsun 280ZX as being the same 
make and model vehicle in which she was abducted.  She also identified several 
photos of defendant’s actual 280ZX as being consistent with the vehicle used on 
the night of her assault, except that the rear window louvers were missing.  She 
also identified a sheepskin cover taken from defendant’s pickup truck as being 
consistent with the covers used in the vehicle in which she had been abducted.  
When taken to see the 280ZX actually owned by defendant at the time of her 
abduction, however, Robertson could not positively identify it as the vehicle used 
in her abduction.  
 
34 
(vi)  The Datsun 280ZX’s Louvers and Manual Transmission 
 
Two of defendant’s neighbors testified that they had often seen defendant’s 
280ZX parked outside and that it had rear window louvers.  After defendant traded 
in the 280ZX, it was subsequently sold to Michael George.  According to George, 
the 280ZX had no rear window louvers when he took possession of it, but he had 
to clean off a rubbery, glue-like substance adhering to the four corners of the rear 
window.  One type of aftermarket rear window louver for a 280ZX could be 
installed with a clip and adhesive on the glass.  It could be removed without 
leaving any permanent damage to the car.  
In order to explain why Robertson did not recall defendant making any gear 
changes during her abduction, San Diego County district attorney investigator 
William Green drove the same 280ZX owned by George, and previously by 
defendant, from the site of Robertson’s abduction to defendant’s home.  Green 
drove the entire route in second gear without use of the gear shifter.  He was able 
to follow the posted speed limits and traffic signals and signs without stalling the 
vehicle.  
b)  Defense Evidence  
(i)  The Effects of Trauma on Robertson’s Memory 
 
When paramedics brought Robertson to the hospital, her blood pressure 
was 70 over 0, suggesting that the heart was unable to pump a normal volume of 
blood and oxygen to the brain.  According to Dr. Sheldon Zigelbaum, a physician 
and psychiatrist, this loss of oxygen, if significant in duration, can cause damage 
to brain cells and result in memory impairment.  During her recovery in the 
hospital, Robertson displayed significant signs of psychomotor retardation, 
meaning that she spoke and moved slowly.  
 
After Robertson’s release from the hospital, both a social worker and a 
physician-psychiatrist diagnosed Robertson as suffering from posttraumatic stress 
 
35 
disorder.  According to Dr. Zigelbaum, closed-head injuries and diagnoses of 
posttraumatic stress disorder are related and can increase the possibility of 
memory loss.  Closed-head injuries can impair a person’s ability to perceive, 
remember, and contemplate events and surroundings and to use that information 
effectively later.  
 
According to her treating physician-psychiatrist, Dr. Wendy Freed, 
Robertson had expressed depression and suicidal thoughts, but later expressed 
happiness and relief after she believed that her assailant had been found and 
arrested.   
(ii)  Defendant’s Datsun “280ZX” 
 
Four of defendant’s former employees, William Johnson, Mitchell Hoehn, 
Dennis Adair, and Loren Linker, testified they worked for Carpet Maintenance 
Company, Inc., in 1984 and were familiar with defendant’s “280ZX.”  They all 
agreed that the car did not have louvers on the back window.  Adair, in particular, 
testified that he had washed defendant’s car a number of times at work and there 
was nothing on the rear that blocked him from directly washing the rear window.  
 
According to Hoehn, he had been a passenger in defendant’s 280ZX on 
several occasions.  The car had a computerized female voice that alerted when the 
door was opened.  Robertson heard no such sounds when the doors opened during 
her abduction.  
According to loan records, after defendant traded the 280ZX for the Toyota 
pickup truck, his monthly car payment was reduced from $412.23 to $287.11.  
(iii)  Defendant’s Alibi 
Loren Linker and his wife testified that defendant visited them on the night 
of Robertson’s abduction on June 8, 1984.  Loren Linker testified that he and 
defendant arrived at the Linker residence about 9:00 p.m., and defendant left 
 
36 
around 11:00 p.m. to midnight.22  The visit was memorable because the Linkers 
had a new chair delivered that same day, and defendant had commented on how 
nice it was.  
(iv)  Other Defense Evidence 
According to Detective Fullmer, in the final drive-by of defendant’s house, 
just before Robertson identified it as the place to where she had been abducted, he 
heard someone in the vehicle say “this house” or “what about this house?”  
Detective Fisher had previously stated that it was possible that he had made such 
statements before Robertson made a positive identification of the house.  
 
At the hospital, a rape kit was performed on Robertson.  Vaginal swabs 
taken from that examination tested presumptively positive for the presence of 
sperm cells, and criminalist Randall Robinson visually detected the presence of 
sperm cells.  The ABO blood type test results from the vaginal swabs neither 
included nor excluded defendant as the donor of the sperm cells.  In the opinion of 
Dr. Phillip Miller, an emergency room physician familiar with rape kits, the 
detection of sperm cells in the vaginal swabs indicated that sexual intercourse 
could have occurred as early as within minutes or as late as one to two days prior.  
c) Prosecution Rebuttal 
Defendant could not be ruled out as contributing the seminal fluid and 
sperm found on the two deep vaginal swabs from Jodie Robertson because both 
defendant and the swabs tested as nonsecretor — that is, one whose blood-type 
antigens are not secreted into bodily fluids.  
Deputy Nancy Zuniga was present when Robertson identified defendant’s 
house from a police vehicle.  She testified that, as Detective Fullmer drove past 
                                              
22 
Robertson was abducted between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m. that night.  
 
37 
defendant’s house, Robertson looked at it intently.  Detective Fullmer made a U-
turn and drove past the house again, and slowed down upon Robertson’s request.  
Robertson then identified defendant’s home as the house she had been taken to, 
and she listed the things about the house that she recognized, including its color, 
its concrete steps, and its circular driveway with a tree.  According to Deputy 
Zuniga, no one in the vehicle had guided Robertson’s attention to the house prior 
to her identifying it.  
4.  The Homicides of Rhonda Strang and Amber Fisher 
With 11 of 12 jurors voting in favor of conviction, the jury was unable to 
reach a verdict concerning whether defendant murdered Rhonda Strang and 
Amber Fisher on October 23, 1984.  The trial court declared a mistrial as to those 
counts, and the court later granted the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss these 
charges.  Again, we briefly summarize the evidence presented regarding this 
incident for purposes of evaluating defendant’s challenges to the consolidation of 
the crimes for trial and their cross-admissibility. 
a) Prosecution Evidence  
(i)  Defendant’s Relationship to the Strang Family’s Narcotics 
Dealing   
At the time of her death, 24-year-old Rhonda Strang was married to Robert 
Strang, and they had a baby named Jessica.  Robert used marijuana, cocaine, and 
methamphetamine.  To Rhonda’s dismay, Robert began selling drugs out of their 
house.  Defendant’s friend and employee, Richard Adler, was Rhonda’s brother 
and he introduced defendant to the Strang family.  Occasionally, defendant would 
visit the Strang home to purchase drugs.   
Rhonda was afraid of Robert’s drug activity and of one of his suppliers.  
Rhonda became very conscious about security at home and would compulsively 
 
38 
keep the doors and windows locked, and would check to see who was at the door 
before opening it.  Rhonda considered divorcing Robert and kept a diary of the 
drug transactions.  She believed that the house was being watched.  
(ii)  The Events Leading to the Killings 
Because of a 48-hour jail commitment stemming from a drunk driving 
conviction, defendant was supposed to report to the San Diego County detention 
facility at Descanso for work credit on October 23, 1984.  But defendant asked to 
reschedule for a later date, claiming that he had a large carpet job on October 23.  
According to the carpet company’s dispatch logs, however, the large carpet 
cleaning job scheduled for October 23 had been completed three days earlier.  On 
the morning of October 23, 1984, defendant called in sick at his carpet company.  
On the morning of October 23, 1984, Robert Strang arrived for work 
around 8:00 to 8:30 a.m., and remained there until 3:30 p.m.  Robert’s foreman, 
William Ralls, regularly took special note of Robert’s presence at work because 
Robert had a reputation for sneaking off the job site without permission.  
Between 9:00 and 9:30 a.m. that morning, Gregory Fisher, a long-time 
friend of Rhonda’s, left his three-year-old daughter Amber with Rhonda for her to 
babysit while he was at work.  In the early afternoon, Rhonda’s five-year-old 
daughter, April, came home from school and discovered the bodies of her mother 
and Amber Fisher.  April ran to a neighbor’s home.  Emergency responders 
arrived around 1:30 p.m.   
(iii)  The Scene of the Crime 
Arriving firefighters found the bodies of Rhonda and Amber.  They also 
found Rhonda’s baby daughter, Jessica, inside a playpen in the living room, 
lethargic, but unharmed.  
 
39 
Detective Robert Fullmer examined the crime scene.  He found no signs of 
forced entry.  All of the doors to the house were locked — except the door 
between the kitchen and the locked garage.  Inside the house, Rhonda Strang was 
lying on her back on the living room floor with her throat cut from ear to ear and 
with some abrasions on her neck.  Amber Fisher was lying on her side next to the 
doorway leading out the other side of the house.  Her throat also had been cut.  
(iv)  The Forensic Evidence 
Dr. Robert Bucklin performed the autopsies on both Rhonda and Amber.  
Rhonda’s gaping neck wound extended across the front part of her neck, 
and it transected through the structures of the neck, including both carotid arteries, 
all the jugular veins, and the larynx.  There were cutting marks penetrating the 
cervical vertebrae.  Based on the borders of the wound, the cuts appeared to have 
been made from her right to her left.  Dr. Bucklin believed that the skin wounds 
and marks on the cervical vertebrae revealed at least five distinct cutting strokes.  
Rhonda’s neck had prewound abrasions consistent with her gold necklace 
having been used to strangle her.  The skin on her face and the whites of her eyes 
had a number of small, superficial hemorrhages consistent with strangulation.  
Rhonda’s head showed suffusion, a dusky color that is consistent with choking.  In 
addition, she had a bruise on her right shoulder.  
Amber’s gaping neck wound also appeared to have been cut from her right 
to her left.  The wound severed the larynx, the carotid arteries, and the jugular 
veins.  Some of her cervical vertebrae had cutting injuries.  The skin on Amber’s 
neck indicated that the wound was cut using more than one stroke.   
Amber had a cut through the tip of her finger.  Like Rhonda, Amber also 
had a bruise on her right shoulder.  
 
40 
b)  Defense Evidence  
(i)  Domestic Violence in the Strang Household 
Several witnesses testified concerning incidents of violence against Rhonda 
by her husband Robert.  
At a party, a family friend saw Robert grab Rhonda by the throat and say, 
“I am going to kill you, bitch.”  Later, the friend saw Rhonda with bruises on her 
shoulder and scratches on her neck, which Rhonda claimed were caused by Robert 
beating her up.23  
On July 8, 1984, a neighbor heard a loud argument from the Strang house 
and eventually heard a woman screaming, “Help me.  Help me.  He’s trying to kill 
me,” followed by the sounds of pounding and breaking glass.  
Friends of the Strangs reported seeing Rhonda on occasions with a black 
eye and bruises on her face and arms.  They testified that Robert had an explosive 
temper and would often threaten her with a gun.  On one occasion in August 1984, 
a roommate saw Robert threaten Rhonda with a gun.  The roommate called the 
police, resulting in Robert’s arrest.  
According to Rhonda’s daughter, April, on the night before her mother’s 
murder, Rhonda and Robert had an argument.  
(ii)  Rhonda’s Fear and her Documentation of Robert’s 
Narcotics Activities 
In the summer of 1984, Rhonda began cooperating with San Diego Police 
Detective Dale Kitts concerning her husband’s drug activities, offering 
information regarding Robert’s supplier.  Rhonda told several of her friends that 
she was covertly tracking Robert’s activities by keeping a diary, tapes of phone 
                                              
23 
Rhonda’s statement was not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, 
but instead to show her state of mind and to explain her conduct.  
 
41 
conversations, and a list of drug dealers and drug deals.  Rhonda expressed her 
fear of Robert and his supplier to several friends and family members.  In the 
weeks before her murder, she repeatedly expressed her belief that she was being 
followed and was going to be killed because she knew too much about the 
narcotics activities.   
Following the murders, Detective Fullmer searched the Strang house but 
did not locate Rhonda’s diary, cassette tapes, nor any list of names of people 
involved with Robert’s drug activities.  
(iii)  Other Evidence 
Robert collected knives, would frequently sharpen them, would often carry 
a Buck knife on his belt, and sometimes concealed knives in his boot.  
Dr. Cyril Wecht, a specialist in anatomic, clinical and forensic pathology, 
testified that the direction of the neck wounds on Rhonda and Amber suggested 
that the assailant was left-handed.  
5.  The Homicide of Anne Swanke 
a) Prosecution Evidence  
(i)  Defendant’s Activities Before the Homicide 
On the evening of November 19, 1984, defendant and his business partner, 
Frank Clark, left work in defendant’s truck and went to a bar, where they drank 
several beers and consumed crystal methamphetamine.  They then drove to 
Clark’s home around 10:00 to 10:30 p.m. where they drank more beer.  The night 
was memorable to Clark and his wife, Cecilia, because she was watching the 
concluding part of the television miniseries “Fatal Vision.”  Defendant stayed 
through the end of the program at 10:58 p.m. and left the Clark residence at 
approximately midnight or thereafter.  
 
42 
(ii)  The Abduction of Anne Swanke 
On the evening of November 19, 1984, 22-year-old Anne Swanke was 
visiting her boyfriend, Gregory Oberle, near the San Diego State University 
campus.  Before Swanke left Oberle’s apartment between 12:30 a.m. and 
1:00 a.m. on November 20, she mentioned to him that her Dodge Colt was low on 
gasoline.  
On that night, Gale Graham was an employee of a gas station on Jackson 
Drive, near the intersection with Fletcher Parkway, in La Mesa.  Sometime after 
midnight, Graham encountered Swanke, who walked in with a gas can and 
purchased gasoline.  Swanke then left on foot.  
Soon thereafter, Richard Leyva, while driving home, was stopped at a 
traffic light at the intersection of Jackson Drive and Fletcher Parkway.  Leyva saw 
a car parked at a nearby curb and saw someone bent over at the rear of the car as if 
pouring gasoline into the filler.  Leyva looked away momentarily and when he 
looked back, he saw another vehicle had parked behind the first one, and it had a 
license plate with an unusual combination of letters, “TNCCNC,” “CNCTNC,” or 
possibly “CNCINC,” plus a number.  As Leyva made his turn and passed the 
vehicles, he noticed the silhouette of two people who appeared to be in an 
embrace, although he briefly considered that it might be a kidnapping.  
In the early morning hours of November 20, 1984, Officer Charles Drake of 
the La Mesa Police Department learned from the California Highway Patrol that a 
Dodge Colt had been abandoned at the intersection of Jackson Drive and Fletcher 
Parkway.  When he arrived at the car, Officer Drake opened the car door and 
retrieved Anne Swanke’s wallet from the passenger seat.  On the driver’s side rear 
corner of the trunk lid were Swanke’s car keys, a flashlight, and the gas tank cap.  
The gas tank flap was open, and a gas can was on the ground.  
 
43 
(iii)  Defendant’s Facial Scratches and the Discovery of Anne 
 
Swanke’s Body 
On the morning of November 20, 1984, defendant called Frank Clark and 
said that he needed to take a week off work because he had gone to a bar after 
leaving Clark’s home and someone there had hit him with a beer mug.  
Defendant’s roommate, Richard Adler, saw defendant that morning and observed 
fresh scratches on his forehead and both sides of his face and cheeks.  The 
scratches were still bleeding, and Adler commented to defendant that he looked 
like he had been run over by a truck.  Defendant told Adler that he had been in a 
bar fight the night before and was hit in the face by a beer mug or pitcher.  
Another roommate, Vicky Johnson, also noticed the scratches on defendant that 
morning.  
Defendant appeared at work on Friday, November 23, 1984, and Frank 
Clark noticed that defendant had deep scratches on the left side of his face that had 
begun to heal.  They were about four inches long and started from his eyelid and 
went down his cheek and off his chin.  Two advertising representatives who 
visited the carpet cleaning business that day also noticed the scratches, and 
defendant told them that he received them during a bar fight.  
The following day, on the morning of November 24, 1984, James McNelly 
was walking in the hills near his Spring Valley home and discovered Swanke’s 
body in a rough, rocky, steep, remote area about two miles away from defendant’s 
home.  McNelly returned home and called the police.  
(iv)  The Scene of the Crime 
San Diego County Sheriff’s Detectives Robert Fullmer and Craig 
Henderson arrived at the scene.  Swanke’s body was lying facedown in the mud 
near the bottom of a steep, rocky hill.  Except for socks, Swanke’s body was nude 
from the waist down.  Around her neck was a silver choke chain, like one used to 
 
44 
leash a dog.  After rolling the body over, Detective Henderson observed a severe 
cut to Swanke’s throat.  
Swanke’s shirt, bra, and sweater vest had been sliced through the middle, 
exposing her upper torso.  Her pants were a few feet away and were still zipped 
and buttoned but had been sliced through along the zipper to the crotch area.  Her 
shoes were scattered further up the hill.  Her underpants were also found further 
up the hill.  Based on Detective Henderson’s experience, it appeared the body had 
been there several days.   
(v)  The Forensic Evidence 
Dr. Katsuyama performed the Swanke autopsy.  Swanke’s neck wound was 
large and gaping, extending from behind the right ear downward to the upper 
portion of the neck and to the left side.  The wound cut through the neck muscles 
around the larynx, the larynx itself, the esophagus, the wind pipe, and the carotid 
vessels and jugular veins on both sides of the neck.  Cutting marks penetrated the 
cervical vertebrae and the connective tissue holding the backbone together.  Based 
on the status of the skin around the wound, there appeared to be at least seven 
distinct and separate sawing-type cuts on the left side, and at least four separate 
cuts on the right side of Swanke’s neck.   
Discolorations and marks on Swanke’s neck were consistent with the dog 
chain having been pulled tightly in an upward direction around her neck.  Swanke 
had an injury to her tongue suggesting that she had bitten it while being choked 
with the dog chain before her death.  Her body also had scrapes, primarily on her 
buttocks and thighs, as if she had been dragged across the ground or had fallen 
over rough terrain.  Dr. Katsuyama believed that the scratch injuries occurred 
shortly before or after her death.  
 
45 
Based on the presence of small insect larvae on the trachea, the partial 
dehydration of the eyes, and the cool weather of the preceding days, 
Dr. Katsuyama estimated that Swanke had been dead for at least 48 hours and 
probably longer.  However, Dr. Katsuyama could not determine the exact date and 
time of Swanke’s death.  
Dr. Katsuyama also took genital swabs for analysis, but tests were unable to 
confirm the presence of semen.  
According to Deputy Frederick Freiberg, Swanke’s fingernails had foreign 
debris consistent with blood and possibly skin, so he clipped the nails and 
collected them for further analysis.  The fingernails were sent to Serological 
Research Institute (SERI) for testing.  Brian Wraxall, a forensic serologist with 
SERI, analyzed the fingernails, as well as blood samples taken from defendant, his 
wife, Shannon, Jodie Robertson, and Swanke.   
Upon examination, Wraxall noticed blood present on most of the nails 
clipped from Swanke’s left hand.  One fingernail, labeled L2, held tissue-like 
material that stretched out like an accordion from a half-inch to three-quarters of 
an inch.  Blood from that fingernail clipping, and from another labeled L4, tested 
as type A blood with enzyme protein PGM subtype 2+1+, which was inconsistent 
with Swanke but consistent with the blood type of defendant.  
Wraxall also tested for two genetic markers found in blood — GM and KM 
(gamma marker and kappa marker) antibodies.  Two other fingernail clippings 
from Anne Swanke, one from each hand, labeled L1 and R4, tested positive for 
GM allotype genetic markers that were consistent with a mix of Swanke’s and 
defendant’s blood.  KM analysis of the fingernails was inconclusive.  
Based on the blood characteristics in the fingernail clippings R4, L1, L2, 
and L4, which matched defendant, Wraxall stated that blood from only 
 
46 
approximately 1 in 69 Caucasians, 1 in 547 Blacks, and 1 in 197 Hispanic/Native 
Americans would share the same characteristics.  
After a search and seizure of items from defendant’s truck, criminalist 
Charles Merritt tested a bloodstain found on the passenger side of a sheepskin seat 
cover.  The stain tested as type O blood, which was the same blood type as 
Swanke, but different from defendant and his wife, who were both type A.  
Marilyn Fink of the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department ran further 
tests on the sheepskin bloodstain searching for certain blood proteins.  Tests done 
at SERI verified Fink’s results and tested for additional proteins and genetic 
markers.  The blood proteins and genetic markers in Swanke’s blood were 
consistent with the tests of the sheepskin bloodstain.  Those results were 
inconsistent with the blood of defendant, his wife, and Jodie Robertson.  
According to Wraxall, the blood characteristics derived from the bloodstained 
sheepskin occur in only approximately 1 in 4,794 Caucasians, 1 in 5,875 Blacks, 
and 1 in 444 Hispanic/Native Americans.  
(vi)  Other Evidence 
Pursuant to a search warrant, sheriffs searched defendant’s house and 
recovered several items related to hunting knives.  One of the items was a sheath 
for a model 112 Buck folding knife with a 4 1/4-inch blade, and the sheath had 
significant signs of wear.  Sheriffs also located a box labeled “Buck Knife, Special 
Model 119.”  In addition, they recovered a Buck fixed-blade knife and sheath.  
From a tool box found in defendant’s truck bed, they also recovered a fillet knife 
used to skin fish.  None of those items had evidence of blood. 
In December 1984, San Diego County Sheriff’s Detective Craig Henderson 
interviewed defendant’s wife, Shannon Lucas.  Deputy Henderson showed 
Shannon Lucas the dog choke chain that had been around Swanke’s neck.  Upon 
 
47 
seeing the dog collar, Shannon Lucas appeared visibly shaken and said that it 
belonged to the couple’s recently deceased dog.24  
At the time of defendant’s arrest on December 16, 1984, nearly a month 
after Swanke’s abduction, Detective Henderson noticed healed scratches on 
defendant’s face.  He had a photograph taken of defendant’s face to document the 
injuries.   
b)  Defense Evidence  
(i)  The Forensic Evidence 
Hermann Schmitter, an expert in forensic serology from the 
Bundeskriminalamt (the German equivalent of the FBI), challenged the state’s 
serological evidence concerning the sheepskin bloodstain and the victim’s 
fingernails.  According to Schmitter, criminalist Charles Merritt’s and SERI’s 
ABO testing of the sheepskin stain was unreliable.  He criticized Merritt for failing 
to document what technical procedures, if any, Merritt used to test the stain.  In 
Schmitter’s opinion, Merritt and SERI should have tested the sample twice and 
reported only consistent results.  
Schmitter challenged SERI’s ABO testing of the fingernails, also believing 
that duplicate testing was required to verify the results.  Schmitter reviewed the 
photos of the gel slabs SERI used to identify the presence of various blood 
proteins and genetic markers in this case.  He believed there were no reportable 
results in the GM and KM genetic marker tests.  He disagreed with some of 
SERI’s interpretations of the blood protein results for the samples taken from 
Swanke, Shannon Lucas, and defendant.  
                                              
24  
Shannon Lucas died unexpectedly before defendant’s trial.  The jury heard 
this small portion of Shannon’s taped interview with Detective Henderson.   
 
48 
The parties stipulated that FBI Special Agent William Eubanks would 
testify that all FBI serology examiners must have at a minimum a bachelor’s 
degree from a four-year college with a major in chemistry or biochemistry.  
Eubanks would testify that the FBI required the use of controls and duplicate 
testing for the kind of serology testing employed in this case.  In addition, the 
results must be interpreted by a second examiner, and, if there is disagreement, the 
result is deemed inconclusive.  
Two criminal defense attorneys who had worked with Brian Wraxall (the 
head of SERI) in another capital case testified that they believed Wraxall was not 
honest.  
Criminalist Charles Merritt found two foreign pubic hairs on Swanke’s 
body, one from a pubic combing and one from her left hip.  They did not match 
her hair or defendant’s hair.  John Simms, the San Diego Police 
Department criminalist and hair comparison expert, reached similar conclusions, 
and he further concluded that the hairs did not match samples from Swanke’s 
boyfriend.  
None of the latent fingerprints found on the windows of Swanke’s vehicle, 
the gas tank flap, or the gas can matched defendant’s.  The identifiable latent 
prints were made by Swanke or Michael Quinn of the La Mesa Police Department.  
(ii)  The Dog Chain 
James Boyd, general manager for Hartz Mountain pet supplies, examined 
the dog chain found around Swanke’s neck.  He recognized it as a chain Hartz 
would distribute to pet stores and supermarkets.  According to his company’s 
business records, in 1982, 34,468 chains of similar type were sold in California in 
three lengths.  In 1983, 36,870 were sold and in 1984, another 33,833 were sold.  
Boyd also testified that several other companies sold similar types of dog chains.  
 
49 
Kevin Chess, a private investigator, went to various stores and 
supermarkets in San Diego County.  He found several chains similar to the one 
found around Swanke’s neck.   
(iii)  Other Evidence 
Vicky and William Johnson lived at defendant’s residence in November 
1984.  On the morning following Swanke’s disappearance, neither noticed any 
scratches on defendant’s face, but the following day, which was the day before 
Thanksgiving, they noticed scratches on his face, which defendant claimed were 
caused by a fight in a bar.  
To contest the prosecution’s evidence regarding Swanke’s time of death, 
the defense presented the testimony of Robert Martin, a security guard for the U.S. 
Elevator Company plant, which was located at the bottom of the hill near where 
Swanke’s body was discovered.  On November 22, 1984, three nights after 
Swanke’s disappearance, Martin was working his midnight shift at the company.  
As he made his rounds, he heard dogs in the neighborhood barking and howling 
louder than usual.  He also noticed the lights of an automobile at the top of the hill.  
B.  Penalty Phase 
1.  Prosecution Case  
The prosecution presented the record of defendant’s August 16, 1973 
conviction for the crime of forcible rape, in violation of section 261, including the 
finding that defendant was armed with a knife in the commission of the offense.  
This prior conviction was offered under aggravating factors (b) (prior violent 
criminal conduct) and (c) (prior felony conviction) of section 190.3. 
 
50 
2.  Defense Case 
a)  Defendant’s Family and Friends 
Defendant was born in the Philippines, where his father, Clarence Lucas, 
was stationed in the Navy at the time.  Defendant had problems with bedwetting 
and suffered from asthma from an early age.  Defendant’s father was described as 
a cold man who used to pick on defendant and his siblings when they were young.  
Defendant’s father had a temper, which he exhibited in front of defendant and the 
other children, at times putting holes in the walls out of anger.  Defendant’s father 
would hit them not only with his fists, but also sometimes with a belt or telephone 
cord.  One time, defendant’s father forced his sister Cathy to re-eat the salad she 
had just vomited onto her plate.  The father was especially hard on defendant, who 
often received the worst treatment.  The abuse continued until defendant’s parents 
separated when he was about 15 years old.  Despite the prior abuse, defendant 
asked his mother to give his father another chance.  The mother agreed but later 
divorced him.   
Defendant’s younger brother, Don, thought of defendant as a good friend 
and a father figure.  When Don was unemployed, there were a number of times 
when defendant bought groceries for his family.  Defendant once took Don and his 
family into his home.  Defendant often advised Don about preparing for his future.  
Don explained that defendant had the most “civil head” of anyone he knew.  Don 
recounted an incident in which his father was cleaning the garage with gasoline 
and the hot water heater ignited the gas.  Defendant pulled Don out of the garage 
as it was engulfed in flames.  Don trusted defendant with his children and asked 
that defendant be sentenced to life imprisonment.   
Cathy Lucas McEvoy, defendant’s sister, was one year older than him.  
Cathy testified that she talked to defendant about everything and that he took care 
of her when she was younger.  When neighborhood bullies picked on Cathy, he 
 
51 
defended her.  When defendant was arrested in 1984, Cathy visited him in jail, 
wrote to him, and talked to him by phone every day.  Cathy asked the jury to spare 
her brother and testified that his execution would hurt her children and family.   
Cathy’s ex-husband, Jim Graves, testified that when he and Cathy got into 
arguments, defendant helped Graves “sort out” his feelings.  Defendant was a 
good friend to Graves and maintained a good relationship with him and his 
children even after Graves remarried.   
Cathy’s current spouse, Mark McEvoy, first met defendant in about 1981.  
Sometimes defendant helped McEvoy with projects, such as working on 
McEvoy’s truck.  They also went to baseball games together.  McEvoy considered 
defendant someone with initiative for business.  McEvoy felt defendant was a 
human being worth saving, that his death would only compound tragedy upon 
tragedy, and that defendant’s family would be devastated if he were sentenced to 
death.   
Defendant’s niece, Trisha McEvoy, and nephew, Timmy Graves, testified 
on defendant’s behalf.  Trisha told the jury she got along well with defendant, she 
listened to his advice, and he was a good influence on her.  Defendant paid for her 
modeling school and was always available to talk to her about her problems.  
Trisha testified that defendant bought food for her and her little brother when her 
parents were going through a divorce.  Trisha wished her uncle to live.  Timmy 
testified that defendant is a good uncle who did nice things for him, like taking 
him fishing, going on car rides, and playing games and watching television with 
him.  Timmy thought the appropriate punishment for his uncle would be life in 
prison.   
Many of defendant’s friends and family testified that defendant was kind, 
caring, helpful and generous, and good with children.  All of defendant’s friends 
and family asked that defendant be given a life imprisonment sentence.  
 
52 
b)  1973 Rape Case 
Attorney George Anthony Gilham represented defendant in the 1973 rape 
case.  Gilham believed that defendant was not guilty of the rape charge.  Gilham 
also believed that defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment.  In 
Gilham’s opinion, defendant is a hard-working individual who could be a benefit 
to society if he were to receive such a sentence.   
c)  Expert Testimony 
Clinical and forensic psychologist Alvin Marks diagnosed appellant as 
having “personality disorder.”  Dr. Marks indicated defendant’s early life 
problems included a severely dysfunctional family.  Dr. Marks testified that 
defendant picked up his father’s hatred of women.  But Dr. Marks believed 
defendant also loved women and was in pursuit of the perfect woman.  Defendant 
had a great fear of men and distrust of authority because of his father, but 
defendant was able to get along with men in an institutional setting.  Defendant 
had difficulty expressing his feelings, but expressed sadness over the death of his 
wife, felt bad about the fact that he had difficulty in seeing his family, and 
expressed remorse for the family of the victims (without admitting to his guilt).   
Craig Haney, professor of psychology at the University of California at 
Santa Cruz testified regarding his studies of the prison environment concerning the 
sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole (LWOP).  Haney 
described security conditions in California prisons that held LWOP prisoners as 
being the highest level of security in the state.  He explained that living conditions 
for LWOP prisoners were heavily monitored, but that prison society was such that 
inmates could find meaningful ways of making contributions to the institution and 
people around them.  Haney described prison rules and punishment, as well as 
factors important to an inmate’s prison adjustment.   
 
53 
Louis Nelson, a retired San Quentin Prison warden, testified that wardens 
prefer life prisoners because they settle down, help mentor new and younger 
inmates, and perform valuable work assignments.  Nelson described the security at 
San Quentin, the cells occupied by inmates, the “lifer’s club,” and the inmate 
council — a group that facilitates communication between the inmates and the 
administration.  He maintained that the best indicator of how an inmate will 
perform is past prison conduct.  
3.  Prosecution Rebuttal 
a)  Spousal Abuse 
Laura Stewart lived next door to defendant and his wife for more than a 
year.  In Stewart’s opinion, defendant and his wife, Shannon, had a violent, 
tumultuous relationship.  She observed them constantly fighting outside in the 
yard and saw defendant hit Shannon numerous times.   
Stewart recalled one instance in which she was awakened by yelling and 
screeching tires.  Stewart heard defendant say, “Go get the chain.”  She heard 
defendant and Shannon arguing, with defendant using much profanity.  
Eventually, Stewart saw Shannon drive defendant’s truck into a pole, and saw 
defendant open the truck door and drag Shannon out by her hair.   
b)  Conduct in Jail 
When in custody in this matter, deputy sheriffs repeatedly found “pruno,” a 
homemade alcoholic beverage, in defendant’s jail cell.  Deputy Sheriff Barletta 
testified defendant’s possession of pruno was a major jail rule violation.  
On February 23, 1989, Deputy Sheriff Mark Profeta searched defendant’s 
jail cell.  When Profeta entered, he found a broomstick with a tapered end leaning 
against the bars and the wall.  Inmates were not allowed to have sharpened 
broomsticks because they posed a security risk for other inmates and the staff.  
 
54 
4.  Defense Surrebuttal 
In January 1989, Sonny Lee was housed with defendant in tank 5F in the 
central jail.  Lee testified that the item Deputy Profeta referred to as a broomstick 
was actually an attachment for a scrub brush.  Lee also testified that the stick was 
used to reach the television from the cell in order to change channels or adjust the 
volume because that was the only way the television could be adjusted.  
II.  PRETRIAL ISSUES 
A. Consolidation and Cross-admissibility Issues 
Defendant makes numerous arguments related to the consolidation of his 
cases.  He claims that each incident was not admissible to prove identity for each 
of the other killings because they were not so unusual and distinctive, nor so 
similar, so as to reflect the “signature” of a single perpetrator.  He argues that 
because the crimes were not cross-admissible, a joint trial of all the charges 
prejudiced his guilt and penalty phase verdicts.   
1.  Background and Procedural History 
Following his arrest in December 1984, defendant was arraigned for the 
crimes against Robertson, Strang, Fisher, and Swanke in case No. CR 73093.  
Investigators, however, believed defendant was also linked to the Jacobs and 
Garcia murders, and, in March 1985, defendant was arraigned for those murders in 
case No. CR 75195.  In December 1986, the prosecution filed a motion to 
consolidate the cases.  In the course of pretrial proceedings, the trial court heard 
evidence concerning the nature of the homicides, the victims, and the 
characteristics of the inflicted wounds.  The court also considered evidence of all 
known homicide cases in San Diego County from the prior 20 years that involved 
cutting injuries to the victim’s throat.  For the purpose of its determination of 
whether evidence would be cross-admissible for each incident, the court ruled that 
 
55 
the evidence would be limited to that put forth by the prosecution and denied the 
defense request to present its own witnesses to oppose the motion to consolidate.  
In June 1988, the trial court granted the motion to consolidate and made 
detailed findings in support of consolidation.  The court noted that all of the 
victims were vulnerable, that the women were all in their 20s or early 30s, pretty, 
and had brown hair, that all but one incident involved the victim being attacked 
while secluded in a house, that there was no apparent motive for the murders, no 
evidence of sex assault or items stolen, and that each victim had an ear-to-ear 
throat slashing wound that extended to the backbone — with this injury being the 
only major wound in all of the cases, except for Suzanne Jacobs.  The court also 
noted that the coroner’s office had seen relatively few throat-slashing homicides 
and that records for the prior 20 years identified only about three dozen murder 
cases involving cuts to the throat.  The court further explained that it had reviewed 
the coroner’s reports for these other throat-wound homicides and they were all 
distinguishable largely because of other wounds to the bodies that did not involve 
the neck.  The court did note that two other prior cases were similar to the charged 
cases in that the neck was the only part wounded, but it noted that both cases 
involved slashes to only the right side of the victim’s neck, and not ear to ear, and 
that both involved neck injuries that were lower on the neck than in the charged 
cases.  Finally, the court rejected the defense claim that the probative value of 
cross-admissibility was outweighed by any prejudicial effects.  
2.  Cross-admissibility to Prove Identity 
According to section 954:  “An accusatory pleading may charge . . . two or 
more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, under separate 
counts . . . provided, that the court in which a case is triable, in the interests of 
 
56 
justice and for good cause shown, may in its discretion order that the different 
offenses or counts set forth in the accusatory pleading be tried separately . . . .” 
“Because consolidation ordinarily promotes efficiency, the law prefers it.”  
(People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 409; accord, People v. Soper (2009) 45 
Cal.4th 759, 772.)  Accordingly, if the charged offenses are of the same class, such 
as the murders charged here, joinder is proper under section 954.  (People v. Kraft 
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1030.)  Under such circumstances, it is defendant’s burden 
to show error in allowing a joint trial of the charged offenses and relief will obtain 
only on a clear showing of prejudice to establish the trial court’s abuse of 
discretion.  (Alcala v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1220.)  
An abuse of discretion can occur “ ‘ “where:  (1) evidence on the crimes to 
be jointly tried would not be cross-admissible in separate trials; (2) certain of the 
charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) a ‘weak’ 
case has been joined with a ‘strong’ case, or with another ‘weak’ case, so that the 
‘spillover’ effect of aggregate evidence on several charges might well alter the 
outcome of some or all of the charges; and (4) any one of the charges carries the 
death penalty or joinder of them turns the matter into a capital case.” ’ ”  (People 
v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1030, quoting People v. Bradford (1997) 15 
Cal.4th 1229, 1315.) 
First, we examine whether defendant was prejudiced because of joinder by 
determining if each of the joined charges would have been admissible in separate 
trials on the others.25  “If so, any inference of prejudice is dispelled.”  (People v. 
Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1030.) 
                                              
25 
Section 954.1 states that “where two or more accusatory pleadings charging 
offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses have been consolidated, evidence 
concerning one offense or offenses need not be admissible as to the other offense 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
57 
Whether the other crimes would have been admissible in separate trials on 
the others is governed by Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), which 
permits admission of other uncharged acts when offered as evidence of a 
defendant’s motive, common scheme or plan, preparation, intent, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident in the charged crimes.  In this case, the 
prosecutor argued, and the trial court found, that evidence of each incident would 
have been cross-admissible in a separate trial of the charge relating to the other 
incidents because the incidents disclosed a distinctive modus operandi tending to 
establish the killer’s identity.  We have held that to prove identity through other 
uncharged acts, the similarities between the charged and uncharged offenses must 
be so unusual and distinctive as to be akin to a signature.  (People v. Ewoldt 
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 403.) 
In this matter, there were five incidents all involving slim, attractive 
Caucasian women with brown hair in their 20s or 30s.  To the extent that two of 
these incidents also involved the killing of young children, it appears that the 
children were not the primary targets, but were instead killed to eliminate potential 
witnesses to the adult killings.  None of the incidents disclosed any motive for the 
killings, with no conclusive evidence of sexual assault, larceny, or obvious motive 
for retribution. 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
or offenses before the jointly charged offenses may be tried together before the 
same trier of fact.”  But because defendant was tried prior to the effective date of 
this statute, as adopted by the California voters through Proposition 115 in June 
1990 (see Cal. Const., art. I, § 30, subd. (a)), we apply the law predating its 
enactment.  (People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 437, fn. 6.)  
 
58 
But the most important similarity in all the incidents was the characteristics 
of the inflicted throat wounds.  All of the victims in this case had severe slashing 
throat wounds that spanned nearly ear to ear and cut deeply through the tissues of 
the throat either at or above the thyroid cartilage.  The wounds themselves were 
distinctive based on how they invaded each victim’s throat in terms of depth, 
height, and length.  The extent and nature of all of these injuries indicated that 
they were not the result of stab wounds, but rather a slashing and sawing type of 
action that required multiple sawing motions to accomplish the extent of the 
injuries.  The throat wounds also were the primary cause of death for each victim. 
The uniqueness of the throat wounds in the present case becomes starkly 
evident when compared to the more than three dozen San Diego County homicide 
cases involving throat wounds in the prior two decades before defendant’s trial.  
Virtually all of the other cases involved stabbing, not slashing, wounds to the neck 
and involved significant slashing or stabbing wounds to other parts of the victim’s 
body.  As the trial court pointed out, only two of the other killings were similar to 
those in the present matter in that each of those female victims had a slashing 
throat wound as the sole major wound, but in those cases the wounds did not 
extend across the entire neck and involved only the right side.  Moreover, one of 
those two victims had been strangled to death before her neck was wounded and 
items had been stolen from her home.  The other victim’s throat wound extended 
well below the thyroid cartilage and into the lower neck vertebrae.  
Thus, in addition to the targeted victims’ gender, race, age, and appearance 
and the lack of apparent motive for the killings, all of the victims’ wounds shared 
characteristics that were unlike anything the San Diego coroner had observed in 
the more than 20 years preceding defendant’s trial.  Several doctors from the 
coroner’s office testified concerning the general rarity of throat-slashing 
 
59 
homicides.  And the neck wounds here were unique in that they were virtually the 
only offensive wounds present on each victim.26  
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
when it ruled that each incident displayed a pattern so unusual and distinctive as to 
support an inference that the same person committed all of the killings and that 
such evidence, therefore, was relevant on the issue of identity.27  In separate trials, 
evidence of the other four incidents would have been admissible in each trial.  Any 
inference of prejudice is dispelled.  (People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 
p. 1316.) 
Moreover, none of the other factors relevant to assessing prejudice from 
joinder support defendant’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion in 
allowing consolidation. 
As to whether some of the charges were likely to unusually inflame the jury 
against defendant, all of the charges were certainly aggravated by the brutal nature 
of the inflicted neck wounds, especially given that two of the incidents involved 
                                              
26 
Although Suzanne Jacobs had three stab wounds that were not associated 
with her neck, of the five charged incidents, her crime scene was the only scene 
that showed evidence of a prolonged struggle between the victim and her killer.  
Moreover, nearly all of the other more than three dozen San Diego County throat-
wound murder cases involved victims who suffered numerous stabbing and/or 
slashing wounds on other parts of the body as well as multiple sites of blunt force 
trauma.  In this respect, the injuries to Suzanne Jacobs were much more similar to 
the other four charged incidents than to the other throat-wound murders that had 
occurred in the county prior to defendant’s trial. 
27  
Defendant also claims the trial court abused its discretion by considering 
the offenses as a whole rather than determining cross-admissibility on a case-by-
case basis.  But nothing in the record suggests that the court blurred together the 
facts of each case.  Instead, the court’s ruling clearly focused on not only the 
factual circumstances of the five charged incidents but also on dozens of other 
homicides involving throat injuries.  
 
60 
three-year-old children.  But considered as a whole, the circumstances of each of 
the five incidents were “ ‘similar in nature and equally gruesome.’ ”  (People v. 
Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1155.) 
Regarding whether a weak case had been joined with a strong case or with 
another weak case so that the total evidence unfairly may have altered the outcome 
of some or all of the charges, the jury’s verdicts contradict such a contention.  The 
fact that the jury acquitted defendant of Garcia’s murder and could not reach a 
verdict as to the murders of Strang and Fisher strongly suggests that the jury was 
capable of weighing the evidence and differentiating among defendant’s various 
charges.  Concerning the Jacobs murders, there was compelling independent 
evidence connecting defendant to those murders.  Defendant had no alibi for that 
day, a bloodied note with his handwriting was found at the scene, a vehicle 
matching his mother’s car was in the Jacobses’ driveway that morning, and bloody 
footprints at the scene were consistent with the sole pattern of the boots defendant 
wore at work.  Defendant has not shown that there was a “ ‘spillover’ ” effect 
where evidentiary gaps in an allegedly weak case were filled by joinder with a 
stronger case.28  (People v. Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 606.)   
Finally, we consider whether any one of the charged crimes carries the 
death penalty or whether joinder of the charged crimes turns the matter into a 
capital case.  (People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1030.)  Although joinder did 
not convert the Jacobs murders or the Strang and Fisher murders into capital cases 
                                              
28 
Defendant also argues that the trial court assumed defendant was guilty of 
each murder in deciding cross-admissibility, thereby improperly “bootstrapping” 
the cross-admissibility rulings by interdependently relying on the validity of the 
other cases without that validity having been independently established.  But we 
note that the court specifically concluded that “there are independent factors about 
each of the crimes which link [defendant] to each crime.”   
 
61 
because both alone satisfied the multiple-murder special-circumstance statute, 
joinder did have the effect of converting the Garcia and Swanke murders into 
capital cases.  This raises a concern that joinder could produce a conviction that 
would not otherwise be obtainable on the evidence at separate trials because 
“joinder should never be a vehicle for bolstering either one or two weak cases 
against one defendant, particularly where conviction in both will give rise to a 
possible death sentence.”  (Williams v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 441, 454.)  
The jury, however, acquitted defendant of the Garcia murder and hung on the 
Strang and Fisher murders, and the evidence of defendant’s role in the Swanke 
murder was particularly strong.  Therefore, even if the Jacobs murders and 
Swanke murder had been tried separately, defendant still would have been subject 
to the multiple-murder special-circumstance statute. 
We conclude that defendant has failed in carrying his burden of making a 
clear showing of prejudice to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in 
granting the prosecution’s motion to consolidate the five charged incidents. 
3.  Defense Evidence on Cross-admissibility and Consolidation 
Defendant claims the trial court violated his constitutional rights to due 
process, to present a defense, and against cruel and unusual punishment by 
rejecting his offer to present 136 defense witnesses at the hearing on the 
prosecution’s motion to consolidate defendant’s cases in order to contest the issue 
of cross-admissibility and consolidation of the crimes for trial.  Specifically, 
defendant argues that he should have been allowed to present evidence 
challenging the accuracy and reliability of the state’s forensic evidence, evidence 
of Massingale’s confession, evidence of foreign pubic hair found on Swanke, his 
alibis for the Robertson and Garcia cases, evidence of third party guilt in the 
Strang and Fisher killings, and expert evidence about the ability of jurors to follow 
 
62 
limiting instructions concerning evidence of other crimes.  Defendant claims that, 
without consideration of this defense evidence, the court abused its discretion in 
ruling on cross-admissibility and joinder.  The court allowed the defense to fully 
cross-examine any prosecution witnesses in rebutting the state’s evidence or 
raising the question of a defense, but it noted that it would be burdensome for the 
court to hear all of the same evidence the jury would hear during trial for purposes 
of deciding the motion to consolidate.  We conclude there was no error. 
Preliminarily, we note that defendant cites no authority for the proposition 
that the trial court must essentially preview the defense’s anticipated trial evidence 
in order to adequately rule on matters of cross-admissibility and joinder or that the 
presentation of such evidence is constitutionally required.  Moreover, we conclude 
defendant’s claim fails for several reasons.  
First, under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), our courts have 
recognized that the existence of defendant’s other criminal conduct “and 
defendant’s connection to it are preliminary factual issues which must be decided 
before the prior misconduct can be deemed admissible” and that the proponent of 
such evidence must establish, by a preponderance, the existence of the prior crime 
and the defendant’s connection to it.  (People v. Garelick (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 
1107, 1115, citing People v. Simon (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 125, 129-130; Evid. 
Code, § 403, subd. (a) [“The proponent of the proffered evidence has the burden 
of producing evidence as to the existence of the preliminary fact”].)  Accordingly, 
in arguing in favor of consolidation, it was the prosecution’s burden to make a 
showing of cross-admissibility, including establishing preliminary facts linking 
defendant to the killings.  
The prosecution met its burden.  As discussed above, the prosecution’s 
evidence concerning the throat wounds supported the preliminary factual 
determination that the wounds were sufficiently similar such that the same person 
 
63 
likely inflicted them.  This determination alone satisfied the prosecution’s burden.  
Defendant’s proffered evidence did not challenge this preliminary factual 
determination, but instead challenged some of the other forensic evidence or 
offered evidence of alibi or third party culpability.  
Second, concerning the admissibility of other crimes evidence under 
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), “[o]rdinarily, determining the 
relevance of proffered ‘other act’ evidence presents solely a question of law for 
the court because the defendant does not dispute the fact of the prior act but 
merely argues its legal inadmissibility.”  (People v. Simon, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d 
at p. 129.)  But if a defendant claims he did not commit the other acts at issue, this 
ultimately presents a question of fact “which must be resolved by the jury before it 
can draw any inference regarding defendant’s commission of the charged 
offense.”  (Id. at p. 130.)  Here, the trial court properly determined the cross-
admissibility of the murders as a question of law, based on the evidence regarding 
the similarity of the killings.  As to defendant’s arguments that he did not commit 
the other murders, the court properly left those factual questions for the jury to 
decide. 
Third, although some of defendant’s proffered evidence may have been 
relevant to a pretrial determination of whether the prosecution sought to join 
relatively weak cases with strong ones, any presumed error at this pretrial stage 
could not have harmed defendant.  Defendant had the opportunity to renew his 
motion to sever after the presentation of evidence at trial, including after the 
defense phase.  (People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 68 [“If further 
developments occur during trial that a defendant believes justify severance, he 
must renew his motion to sever”].)  Defendant renewed his motion to sever after 
the prosecution presented its case-in-chief to the jury, and the trial court denied the 
motion.  He did not renew this motion after the defense presented its case.  Thus, 
 
64 
to the extent defendant argues that the court’s pretrial consideration of defense 
evidence was relevant to show that a weak case was being joined with a strong one 
to his prejudice, that claim is forfeited because defendant passed on the 
opportunity to renew such a claim after presenting his evidence at trial. 
We also reject defendant’s further claim that the trial court deprived him of 
a full and fair hearing on the issue of consolidation because the court excluded 
expert evidence about the ability of jurors to follow limiting instructions 
concerning evidence of other crimes.  The court heard the defense’s extensive 
offer of proof on this subject by considering the testimony of defense expert 
Dr. Stephen Penrod, an associate professor of psychology at the University of 
Wisconsin.  Although Dr. Penrod had used mock trials to study the effect of 
joinder of unrelated charges on jury decisionmaking, the court properly found his 
studies to be irrelevant.  None of Dr. Penrod’s studies involved cases in which the 
crimes were cross-admissible and none of them involved full trials with 12-
member juries.  In particular, the very nature of cross-admissibility dictates that 
consolidation is proper because the other crimes are relevant to ascertain guilt in 
the charged crime.  The studies were, therefore, irrelevant regarding whether 
joinder was proper in the present case.   
In any event, cross-admissibility ordinarily dispels any inference of 
prejudice.  (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 126.)  Moreover, our review of 
the record of trial, including the defense evidence, reveals no “ ‘ “gross 
unfairness” ’ ” that deprived defendant of a fair trial.  (People v. Ervin, supra, 22 
Cal.4th at p. 69.) 
4.  Denial of a Hearing Regarding a Claim of Vindictive Prosecution  
Defendant claims the trial court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing to 
explore whether the prosecutor had vindictively moved to consolidate his two 
 
65 
cases after defendant had successfully obtained an appellate order for a speedy 
trial in the Jacobs and Garcia matters.  He argues that the denial of such a hearing 
violated his due process rights and his right to present evidence under the state and 
federal Constitutions.  But the trial court correctly concluded that both sides had 
engaged in “very technical use of the law” to assert their respective preferences for 
the order in which defendant’s cases would be tried, and that the prosecution’s 
motions were not “legally improper” and did not impair any of defendant’s rights.  
“Where the defendant shows that the prosecution has increased the charges 
in apparent response to the defendant’s exercise of a procedural right, the 
defendant has made an initial showing of an appearance of vindictiveness.”  
(Twiggs v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 360, 371, italics added.)  Here, the 
prosecution sought to consolidate two preexisting cases, and the proposed 
consolidation did not expose defendant to additional charges or an increased 
sentence.  Consequently, defendant failed to make an initial showing of 
vindictiveness.  The trial court correctly denied defendant’s request for a hearing 
and his motion to dismiss based on prosecutorial vindictiveness.  
 
66 
B.  Pretrial Evidentiary Rulings29 
1.  Failure to Preserve Fingerprint Evidence on the Love Insurance 
Note 
Defendant contends the destruction of a partial fingerprint on the Love 
Insurance note rendered the note inadmissible by violating his due process rights 
under California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479 (Trombetta) and Arizona v. 
Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51 (Youngblood).  We disagree. 
The constitutional due process rights of a defendant may be implicated 
when he or she is denied access to favorable evidence in the prosecution’s 
possession.  (Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83.)  Trombetta outlines how the 
state’s failure to preserve evidence may violate those rights.  In Trombetta, the 
high court limited the state’s affirmative duty to preserve evidence to that which 
“might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense.”  
(Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 488.)  This standard of “constitutional 
materiality” imposes two requirements that a defendant must meet in order to 
show a due process violation.  As an initial matter, the evidence must “possess an 
exculpatory value that was apparent before [it] was destroyed.”  (Id. at p. 489.)  
                                              
29 
The following claims were the subject of lengthy, heavily litigated pretrial 
hearings.  Many of the pretrial hearings involved the admissibility of specific 
types of evidence.  Because the court’s rulings and defendant’s objections were 
sufficiently clear and express, we conclude, unless otherwise noted, that 
defendant’s in limine motions were sufficient to preserve his objections on appeal.  
(People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 190 [a contemporaneous objection at trial 
is not required if an in limine motion sufficiently preserved an objection for appeal 
when “(1) a specific legal ground for exclusion is advanced and subsequently 
raised on appeal; (2) the motion is directed to a particular, identifiable body of 
evidence; and (3) the motion is made at a time before or during trial when the trial 
judge can determine the evidentiary question in its appropriate context”].) 
 
67 
Additionally, it must “be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to 
obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.”  (Ibid.)   
Contrary to defendant’s claim here, the fingerprint on the Love Insurance 
note does not meet the “constitutional materiality” standard outlined in Trombetta.  
Although the fingerprint in this case was partial, it could have been used to 
exclude potential suspects.  But there is no indication that the print would have 
exculpated defendant, who was not even a suspect when law enforcement 
inadvertently failed to preserve the print.  Indeed, our conclusion here is consistent 
with previous cases, in which we have rejected Trombetta claims based on the 
destruction of fingerprints when the state had no reason to know that the prints 
might exculpate a particular defendant.  (People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 
509; People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 893.)   
Destroyed evidence with only potential, rather than apparent, exculpatory 
value is without remedy under Trombetta, but Youngblood provides a limited 
remedy when the state has acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the evidence.  In 
Youngblood, police obtained semen samples from a rape kit and several items of 
clothing, but could not definitively establish the identity of the assailant through 
their initial tests.  (Youngblood, supra, 488 U.S. at pp. 52-54.)  The police 
subsequently failed to take measures necessary to preserve those samples, such as 
refrigerating the clothing.  (Id. at p. 54.)  Although properly preserved samples 
could have exculpated the defendant in that case, that evidence was only 
“potentially useful” (id. at p. 58) to the defense and not “ ‘potentially 
exculpatory’ ” at the time it was allowed to deteriorate.  (Id. at pp. 57-58.)  The 
court held that “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the 
police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial 
of due process of law.”  (Id. at p. 58.)  Although Youngblood was decided after the 
commencement of defendant’s initial trial here, its rule applies retroactively.  
 
68 
(People v. Huston (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 192, 212-213.)  As we have explained, 
the partial fingerprint was only potentially useful to defendant’s case and not 
apparently exculpatory.  But defendant has neither alleged nor shown any bad 
faith in law enforcement’s handling of the partial fingerprint on the Love 
Insurance note.  Consequently, his claim also fails under Youngblood.   
Defendant alternatively argues that even if the note was admissible, the jury 
should have been given one of several instructions requested by the defense.  In 
effect, the instructions would have informed the jurors that they could find the 
note to be insufficiently authenticated if they found its potentially exculpatory 
value was lost and that they were allowed to assume that the lost evidence would 
have exonerated defendant.  Although a jury instruction may be a viable response 
to a due process violation, the trial court is under no obligation to so instruct the 
jury when there is no violation.  (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 811.)  
We have found no error here and the trial court’s refusal to give defendant’s 
proffered instructions was not an abuse of discretion. 
Last, we reject defendant’s claim that the requirements of Trombetta and 
Youngblood should be relaxed in light of the asserted heightened capital-case 
reliability requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal 
Constitution.  (People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 877-879 [discussing 
evidence challenged by a capital defendant under Trombetta without performing a 
heightened reliability analysis]; People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 664 
[denying capital defendant’s request that materials otherwise admissible under 
Trombetta and Youngblood be excluded and noting that “the fact that a particular 
 
69 
procedure might enhance reliability does not make it one that is constitutionally 
mandated”].)30 
2.  Challenges to Handwriting Comparison Evidence 
a)  Failure to Hold a Kelly Hearing 
Defendant argues the trial court erred and violated his state and federal 
rights to due process, right to present a defense, and his right of confrontation in 
denying his request for a Kelly hearing concerning the admissibility of the 
prosecution’s comparative handwriting analysis.  This claim relies on the premise 
that handwriting comparison is a new or novel scientific method or process that 
requires an analysis under the test established in People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 
24 (Kelly).  Defendant states that handwriting comparison should be treated as a 
scientific method because an analyst’s conclusions carry an aura of certainty that a 
jury is unable to critically question.  Defendant also claims that recent legal and 
                                              
30 
We also reject defendant’s similar claims regarding the failure to fully 
preserve hair evidence found in Suzanne Jacobs’s hand.  Defendant claims that the 
state impermissibly failed to refrigerate the hairs after collection to preserve their 
roots for later serological testing.  But at the time of their collection at the crime 
scene, electrophoretic analysis of serological evidence was a nascent field and 
refrigeration of hair samples was not standard practice.  The exculpatory value of 
the hairs was not immediately apparent at the time of their collection because 
defendant was not yet a suspect, and defendant cannot otherwise show bad faith in 
the state’s failure to preserve the hair roots.  Moreover, it is questionable whether 
the evidence has been “destroyed” for purposes of Trombetta and Youngblood.  
Defendant fails to recognize that modern forensic techniques are now available to 
determine whether the hairs have exculpatory value despite the absence of 
preserved roots.  (See Wagner v. State (Md.Ct.Spec. App. 2005) 864 A.2d 1037, 
1045, fn. 5 [“mtDNA analysis can be used on material without a nucleus, such as a 
bone sample or a piece of hair without a root segment”]; People v. Stevey (2012) 
209 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1412 [“Y-STR testing and its female counterpart, mtDNA 
(mitochondrial DNA) testing, have been generally accepted by the scientific 
community”].) 
 
70 
scientific challenges to the accuracy of the method underlying this analysis dictate 
that we treat it as we would a novel or unfamiliar theory.  Finally, he suggests that 
we consider recent studies that express doubts about the reliability of handwriting 
comparison.  We disagree with defendant’s contention that the handwriting 
comparison in this case is sufficiently “scientific” to qualify for a Kelly hearing. 
The Kelly standard provides a framework within which courts can analyze 
the reliability of expert testimony based on new or novel scientific methods or 
techniques.31  As we have acknowledged, there is no clear definition of science 
under this test.  (People v. Stoll (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1136, 1155.)  Accordingly, the 
application of that term is guided by resort to the “narrow ‘common sense’ 
purpose” behind the rule:  “to protect the jury from techniques which . . . convey a 
‘ “misleading aura of certainty.” ’ ”  (Id. at pp. 1155-1156, quoting Kelly, supra, 
17 Cal.3d at pp. 30-32.)  The danger of a false aura of certainty is acute where the 
“technique or procedure appears in both name and description to provide some 
definitive truth which the expert need only accurately recognize and relay to the 
jury,” such that a lay jury might treat the procedure as “objective and infallible.”  
(Stoll, supra, at p. 1156.)  The analysis is designed to address “scientific evidence 
or technology that is so foreign to everyday experience as to be unusually difficult 
for laypersons to evaluate.”  (People v. Venegas (1998) 18 Cal.4th 47, 80.) 
                                              
31 
In Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d 24, we adopted a three-pronged test to establish 
the reliability of scientific testing and its scientific basis to determine its 
admissibility in pretrial hearings.  “The first prong requires proof that the 
technique is generally accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific community.  
[Citation.]  The second prong requires proof that the witness testifying about the 
technique and its application is a properly qualified expert on the subject.  
[Citation.]  The third prong requires proof that the person performing the test in 
the particular case used correct scientific procedures.”  (People v. Bolden (2002) 
29 Cal.4th 515, 544-545, citing Kelly, supra, at p. 30.) 
 
71 
In contrast, when an expert’s methods are based on everyday processes of 
observation and analysis, we trust jurors to “rely on their own common sense and 
good judgment in evaluating the weight of the evidence presented to them.”  
(People v. Venegas, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 80; see People v. McDonald (1984) 37 
Cal.3d 351, 372 (McDonald) [“[w]hen a witness gives his personal opinion on the 
stand — even if he qualifies as an expert — the jurors may temper their 
acceptance of his testimony with a healthy skepticism born of their knowledge that 
all human beings are fallible”].) 
For more than 100 years, we have recognized that expert handwriting 
comparisons have evidentiary value and that juries should “form their own 
conclusion in reference to such similarity or resemblance.”  (People v. Storke 
(1900) 128 Cal. 486, 488.)  In addition, the Legislature has affirmed the value of 
handwriting comparisons to authenticate a writing.  (Evid. Code, §§ 1415, 1418.)  
The Evidence Code endorses the use of expert testimony in handwriting 
comparison and further allows jurors to make their own comparisons of 
handwriting.  (Evid. Code, §§ 1417, 1418.)   
Although our courts, to date, have not directly ruled on the applicability of 
Kelly to expert handwriting comparison, they have frequently held that the Kelly 
framework does not apply to comparisons that focus on physical evidence “whose 
existence, appearance, nature, and meaning are obvious to the senses of a 
layperson.”  (People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 524.)  Under these 
circumstances, “the reliability of the process in producing that result is equally 
apparent and need not be debated under the standards of Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d 
24.”  (Ibid.) 
In People v. Webb, we held that the use of a laser to generate a more 
accurate photographic image of a latent fingerprint did not implicate the concerns 
addressed by Kelly.  We explained that, because the technology merely 
 
72 
illuminated existing latent fingerprints, it was “unreasonable for defendant to 
suggest that the process might somehow have captured a fingerprint which did not 
exist, transformed some other image into a fingerprint, or changed the fingerprint 
of another person into one which matched defendant’s.”  (People v. Webb, supra, 
6 Cal.4th at p. 524.)  Therefore, no hearing pursuant to Kelly was required. 
Similarly, in People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, we held that an 
expert’s method of comparing readily apparent features of physical evidence was 
not sufficiently “scientific” to require a hearing under Kelly.  In that case, a 
radiologist taped bullets to the victim’s skin and then used an X-ray machine to 
compare those bullets to a bullet lodged inside him.  (Id. at p. 281.)  Quoting our 
decision in People v. Webb, supra, 6 Cal.4th 494, 524, we noted that this evidence 
could be meaningfully evaluated by the jury because it “ ‘isolate[d] physical 
evidence whose existence, appearance, nature and meaning are obvious to the 
senses of a layperson.’ ”  (People v. Ayala, supra, at p. 281.) 
In this case, the trial court held that the method of handwriting comparison 
offered by the prosecution was not sufficiently “scientific” to require a hearing 
under Kelly.  We agree with the trial court’s determination.  The handwriting 
comparison utilized here merely isolated, and carefully compared, readily 
observable aspects of physical evidence through simple magnification.  The 
simple visual magnification employed here was less sophisticated than the laser 
fingerprint imaging in Webb and the X-ray bullet analysis in Ayala.  Jurors could 
compare the handwriting on the Love Insurance note directly with the exemplars 
provided by defendant and were provided enlarged versions of both that were over 
three times their original size.  Jurors are equipped to make those evaluations and 
draw their own conclusions based on their independent observations of the 
evidence.  Indeed, as previously explained, a jury’s competence in performing this 
very analysis is recognized in Evidence Code section 1417.  The magnification 
 
73 
employed here was not a highly technical test that would hold undue sway over 
jurors. 
Additionally, the expert in this case stated that it was his “opinion with 
reasonable certainty” that the author of defendant’s exemplars was also the author 
of the handwriting on the Love Insurance note, even though he admitted that he 
employed no standardized number of similarities or differences in the comparison 
before reaching that opinion.  The expert further admitted that “there is a lot of 
handwriting similarity in the general population” and that “some people write 
alike” such that he may “not have the ability to distinguish between them.”  This 
testimony, therefore, was not presented as a “definitive truth,” but rather as an 
informed opinion based on the witness’s transparently subjective techniques.  
Because this method of analysis is not sufficiently “scientific” under Kelly, we 
need not reach the other Kelly issues raised by defendant. 
b)  Failure to Consider Pretrial Defense Evidence Regarding the 
Reliability of Handwriting Comparison Evidence 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his 
state and federal rights to due process, right to present a defense, right of 
confrontation, and compulsory process by refusing (1) to allow proffered defense 
expert testimony about handwriting comparison; (2) to take judicial notice of 
handwriting comparison proficiency studies; or (3) to allow an in-court test of the 
prosecution’s handwriting analysis expert, Dr. Harris.  He also challenges these 
rulings as erroneous under Evidence Code sections 352 and 1418.32  All of this 
                                              
32 
“The genuiness of writing, or the lack thereof, may be proved by a 
comparison made by an expert witness with writing (a) which the court finds was 
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered 
or (b) otherwise proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the court.”  (Evid. 
Code, § 1418.) 
 
74 
evidence was proffered by defendant during pretrial proceedings in an attempt to 
cast doubt upon the accuracy — and, by implication, the probity and relevance — 
of the handwriting analysis that linked him to the handwriting on the Love 
Insurance note.  We find no error in excluding this evidence from the pretrial 
proceedings. 
“In determining the admissibility of evidence, the trial court has broad 
discretion.”  (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 196.)  In particular, a trial 
court’s decision on the admissibility of expert testimony is reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion.  (People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 627.)  
It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to exclude the expert 
testimony and the proficiency studies offered by defendant.  Dr. Saks was offered 
by the defense as an expert witness in social science, research, and research 
methodology.  The trial court refused to hear Dr. Saks’s testimony because he was 
neither a practitioner nor a researcher of handwriting comparison.  Instead, 
Dr. Saks was merely prepared to discuss several proficiency studies that he had 
read concerning handwriting comparison.  The court expressed its concern that, 
because Dr. Saks was not a handwriting expert, the studies were inadmissible 
hearsay without a showing that they were the kind of studies that handwriting 
experts would reasonably rely upon.  The court also observed that Dr. Saks had 
not personally performed the studies on which he was relying, and, consequently, 
he could not adequately account for the base of information underlying his 
opinion.  Defendant misinterprets this ruling to state that only the direct 
practitioner of a technique can testify regarding the reliability of that technique.  
On the contrary, the trial court merely held that Dr. Saks’s lack of personal 
experience with both handwriting comparison and studies measuring the reliability 
of that analysis precluded him from having a sufficient basis for him to opine on 
the accuracy or reliability of that analysis generally.  (See People v. Watson (2008) 
 
75 
43 Cal.4th 652, 692 [although the offered witness had educational background in 
criminal justice and was experienced in noncapital sentencing alternatives, the trial 
court properly concluded he was not qualified to testify about the psychological 
impact of defendant’s upbringing on his ability to adjust to life in prison].)   
Because the trial court reasonably determined that Dr. Saks’s testimony 
lacked the necessary foundation to be relevant regarding the reliability of the 
prosecution’s handwriting comparison, defendant’s related claim that the court 
abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 also fails.  (People v. 
Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1070 [Evid. Code, § 352 rulings are reversible on 
appeal only on a clear showing of abuse of discretion].)  A trial court may exclude 
an expert’s opinion testimony if that expert lacks an adequate basis in formulating 
it.  (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 
Cal.4th 747, 770; People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1174-1176.)  
Additionally, there is no due process right to present factually unfounded 
evidence.  (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 442.)  Consequently, 
defendant’s due process claim is equally unavailing.  Finally, the trial court also 
reasonably exercised its discretion by refusing to take judicial notice because such 
studies are not matters subject to judicial notice under Evidence Code section 452. 
Defendant further argues that the trial court committed prejudicial error by 
refusing to allow the defense to “test” Dr. Harris’s handwriting identification 
abilities in court during the pretrial hearings concerning the admissibility of the 
state’s handwriting comparison evidence.  When cross-examining Dr. Harris, 
defendant sought to introduce additional writing samples from another individual 
and have Dr. Harris analyze them for purposes of undermining the admissibility of 
the state’s handwriting comparison evidence.  He avers that the court prevented 
him from fully confronting and cross-examining a key prosecution witness in 
violation of his state and federal constitutional rights.  The court held that the 
 
76 
proposed experiment lacked foundation and was outside the scope of cross-
examination.  
Proposing to cross-examine an expert through an in-court experiment 
implicates several considerations.  Generally, the scope of cross-examination of 
expert witnesses can be broad and may include additional facts bearing on the 
grounds and reliability of the expert’s opinion.  (Evid. Code, § 721; People v. 
Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 691, 739.)  This contemplates significant latitude to test 
the accuracy and credibility of tests relied on by an expert.  (People v. Smithey 
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 967.)  The trial court has wide discretion in determining the 
appropriate scope of cross-examination.  (People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 
50, 102.)  On the other hand, experimental evidence is admissible only when the 
party offering it proves (1) that it is relevant; (2) that it was conducted under 
conditions substantially similar to the original occurrence tested; (3) that 
presenting the evidence of the experiment will not consume undue time, confuse 
the issues, or mislead the trier of fact; and (4) that the expert testifying about the 
experiment is qualified to do so.  (People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 198.)   
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting an in-court “test” 
of Dr. Harris because, even if it was within the proper scope of cross-examination, 
the proposed test did not meet the minimum standards for admitting experimental 
evidence.  Defendant failed to show that the proposed test was substantially 
similar to the prior handwriting comparison performed by Dr. Harris.  Harris’s 
analysis of defendant’s handwriting involved numerous samples, including both 
those created in controlled conditions and his past writings.  These samples were 
observed under an illuminated magnifier.  Defendant’s proposed experiment 
would have asked Dr. Harris to identify whether one particular piece of writing 
“matched” the handwriting on the Love Insurance note, without the benefit of a 
large sample or any magnifying technology.  These major differences undermined 
 
77 
the proposed test’s relevance in terms of challenging the accuracy, credibility, and 
admissibility of Harris’s original analysis.  Also, the court reasonably determined 
that an in-court performance of the testing methods would consume undue time for 
purposes of the pretrial hearings.  The court correctly noted that these in-court 
experiments lacked foundation and that defendant would need to independently 
conduct a test with Dr. Harris and then establish a foundation for its relevance at 
the pretrial hearings.  Defendant did not take these further steps.  On this record, 
we see no basis for reversing the court’s reasonable resolution of this issue. 
c)  Admissibility of the Prosecution’s Expert Testimony on 
Handwriting 
Defendant asserts two additional non-Kelly challenges to the admission of 
testimony from the prosecution’s handwriting analysis expert, Dr. Harris. 
First, he contends that the trial court impermissibly shifted the burden to the 
defense on its Evidence Code section 352 objection to this testimony at the pretrial 
hearings to determine the admissibility of the state’s handwriting comparison 
evidence.  Defendant quotes the trial judge’s statement that handwriting 
comparison is generally considered reliable and the defense would “bear the 
burden of showing the court otherwise.”33  Defendant argues that this alleged 
                                              
33 
The trial judge’s exact statement was as follows:  “Then you’re attacking 
the — probably the most well-received, most oft-received piece of expert 
testimony that’s ever, ever been in a courthouse.  So it seems to me the burden is 
going to be on you to bring your expert in and convince the court otherwise, that 
handwriting experts are not the case.  I would suggest that you bring your expert 
down because you’re going to bear the burden.  The reality is — I’ve read the 
Points and Authorit[ies], and you’re just attacking something so often received and 
so generally accepted that I think the defense is ultimately going to bear the 
burden of showing the court otherwise . . . .  [¶]  I can look back at just case law in 
this area on the use of expert witnesses on handwriting.  And without even having 
an expert testify as to its reliability, it seems to me that it is so well known and so 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
78 
burden shifting prevented the court from properly exercising its discretion when 
considering whether — and to what extent — the handwriting comparison 
testimony was relevant and admissible.  There was no erroneous burden shifting.   
Relevant evidence is that which has “any tendency in reason to prove or 
disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action.”  (Evid. Code, § 210.)  Relevance is established when the evidence tends 
“ ‘ “ ‘logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference’ ” ’ ” to establish material 
facts, such as motive, intent, or identity.  (People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 
973.)  When the relevance of proffered evidence depends on the existence of a 
disputed material fact or facts, the proponent of that evidence bears the burden of 
establishing all preliminary facts pertinent to the question of relevance.  (Evid. 
Code, § 403, subd. (a)(1); People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 693.)  The 
disputed evidence is inadmissible unless the court finds evidence sufficient to 
sustain a finding that those pertinent preliminary facts exist.  (Evid. Code, § 403.)  
The trial court is accorded broad discretion in determining the relevance of 
evidence.  (People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th 346, 373.)   
Here, the handwriting comparison testimony was relevant to prove that 
defendant wrote the note found at the crime scene.  This evidence relied on the 
preliminary fact that, in the absence of new or novel scientific techniques, 
handwriting comparison in general is a reliable method of identifying or excluding 
the author of a writing.  (See Evid. Code, §§ 1417, 1418.)  The trial judge’s 
statement that defendant cites in support of his challenge merely recognized that 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
often received that it is one of those areas that simply passes to the defense 
immediately, without going through these machinations that we all know about.”   
 
79 
the case law on the issue of handwriting comparison, and its pervasive use in 
courts, was sufficient to sustain a finding that it was reliable.  This was the judge’s 
manner of expressing that the court found the prosecution’s burden was met with 
respect to the handwriting comparison offered.  This did not relieve the 
prosecution of the burden of proving Dr. Harris’s specific credentials and 
establishing that he practiced reliable methods, both of which would go to the 
question of whether his particular comparison was sufficiently reliable and 
relevant to the case.  The burden, therefore, was not impermissibly shifted to the 
defense on this issue.   
Second, defendant claims that the trial court erred by allowing Dr. Harris to 
testify at the pretrial hearings that in his opinion, defendant was the author of the 
handwriting on the Love Insurance note.  He claims this expert opinion improperly 
influenced the trial court’s decision to admit the Love Insurance note and the 
state’s handwriting comparison evidence.  According to defendant, the probative 
value of this opinion was low because lay persons could compare the similarities 
between handwritings.  He also argues that the probity of this opinion testimony 
was further undermined by the small sample of handwritten letters on the original 
note, the possibility that he may have been handcuffed when providing 
handwriting exemplars, the fact that the handwritten letters were not written in 
cursive, which is purportedly more distinctive, and the unavailability of the 
original document for comparison.  Defendant alleges that these factors combine 
to make the handwriting evidence so unreliable that it was an abuse of discretion 
not to exclude it under sections 352 and 1418 of the Evidence Code and the 
federal and state constitutional due process clauses.  We conclude that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting and considering Dr. Harris’s opinion 
about the note’s authorship.   
 
80 
An expert witness may offer an opinion relating to a subject sufficiently 
beyond common experience when that opinion would assist the trier of fact.  
(Evid. Code, § 801.)  Moreover, the Evidence Code specifically codifies the use of 
expert testimony in handwriting comparison.  (Evid. Code, § 1418.)  We have 
stated that a fact finder “ ‘need not be wholly ignorant of the subject matter’ ” 
(People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1299) covered in an expert’s opinion 
and that the opinion should be excluded only “ ‘when it would add nothing at all 
to’ ” the fact finder’s common knowledge.  (Id. at p. 1300.)   
Dr. Harris’s opinion in this case was well within the bounds of acceptable 
expert testimony.  Dr. Harris described himself as a full-time examiner of 
“questioned documents” for 38 years.  He was certified by the American Board of 
Forensic Document Examiners, which he cofounded and served as its president for 
three years.  Dr. Harris had qualified as a handwriting expert more than 1,000 
times in his career.  Clearly, Dr. Harris’s expertise, experience, and opinion in 
examining questioned documents was useful to the trial court in assessing the 
authorship of the handwriting on the Love Insurance note and the note’s 
admissibility. 
Defendant also fails to show sufficient prejudice under Evidence Code 
section 352 to require the exclusion of Dr. Harris’s opinion.  Broadly speaking, 
evidence tends to be more prejudicial than probative when it poses an intolerable 
risk to the fairness of the proceedings or reliability of the outcome.  (People v. 
Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 36.)  Additionally, an expert should not be permitted 
to provide an opinion based on assumptions of fact without evidentiary support or 
based on mere speculation or conjecture.  (Brown v. Ransweiler (2009) 171 
Cal.App.4th 516, 530.)  Although defendant cites legitimate factors that could 
undermine the reliability of the handwriting comparison, such as the small sample 
size, those concerns attach to the weight of the evidence, and do not require its 
 
81 
exclusion.  We find no abuse of discretion in the admission of the expert’s 
opinion. 
d)  The Reliability of Handwriting Comparison from a Photograph 
Defendant argues that our decision in Spottiswood v. Weir (1885) 66 Cal. 
525 forecloses a handwriting comparison based on a photograph of the original 
writing.  In Spottiswood, decided more than a century ago, we held that a 
handwriting expert could not testify to the genuineness of a disputed writing based 
on a “press copy” of that writing.34  (Spottiswood, at p. 529.)  In that case, no 
excuse was provided for the missing original writing and the genuineness of the 
“press copy” was disputed.  (Ibid.)  This court opined that it would be 
“ ‘dangerous’ ” to compare genuine samples with a press copy if its authenticity 
was in doubt.  (Ibid.)   
The present case is distinguishable.  First, unlike in Spottiswood, there is no 
dispute about the genuineness of the copy in this case.  Defendant does not contest 
that the photograph depicts the original Love Insurance note.  Second, the 
handwriting comparison in this case was based on a photograph, not a “press 
copy.”  
We have previously held a photographic negative to be admissible for the 
purpose of a handwriting comparison.  (People v. McKenna (1938) 11 Cal.2d 
                                              
34 
The United States Supreme Court described a press copy as a copy of the 
original made on “ ‘tissue paper’ ”:  “after a letter has been written on ordinary 
paper, it is placed between the leaves of a book filled with this kind of paper, the 
pages upon which the copy is desired being usually dampened somewhat for that 
purpose, after which such book is subject to great pressure by means of a hand or 
other press.  One or more impressions may thus be made of the written matter 
upon the leaves of this tissue paper.”  (Lawrence v. Merritt (1888) 127 U.S. 113, 
114-115.)   
 
82 
327.)  In McKenna, we reasoned that the jury could properly weigh the resulting 
handwriting comparison testimony because the expert readily admitted that certain 
details could have been lost from the original.  (Id. at pp. 337-338.)  Similarly, in 
this case defendant was free to elicit — through cross-examination or otherwise — 
evidence of any inaccuracy or uncertainty generated by comparing a photographic 
copy rather than the original note.  Under these circumstances, the photograph was 
properly admitted as the basis of the handwriting comparison, and Spottiswood 
does not apply. 
e)  Exclusion at Trial of Defense Evidence Concerning the 
Unreliability of Handwriting Comparison Evidence  
Defendant argues that the trial court’s assertedly erroneous pretrial rulings 
also had the effect of foreclosing his ability to present at trial the testimony of his 
defense witnesses, Dr. Saks or another purported handwriting expert, law 
professor Dr. Mark Denbeaux, or to allow in-court testing of Dr. Harris during 
cross-examination at trial.  As discussed, ante, at pages 73-77, the court excluded 
Dr. Saks and any in-court handwriting testing in connection with defendant’s 
challenge to the admissibility of the prosecution’s handwriting evidence during in 
limine proceedings.  Defendant claims that the in limine rulings precluded him 
from effectively contesting the reliability of the state’s handwriting expert at trial, 
thereby violating his state and federal constitutional rights to due process, 
compulsory process, confrontation, trial by jury and to present a defense.  But 
defendant has forfeited this claim because he did not offer the contemplated 
witnesses or evidence for purposes of challenging the credibility of the state’s 
handwriting expert at trial.  (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 108.)  
Accordingly, at trial the trial court was not presented with these issues and never 
made any ruling prohibiting the presentation of this evidence.   
 
83 
An erroneous exclusion of evidence will constitute grounds for setting aside 
a finding or a verdict only when it has resulted in a miscarriage of justice and it 
appears on the record that the “substance, purpose, and relevance of the excluded 
evidence was made known to the court by the questions asked, an offer of proof, 
or by any other means.”  (Evid. Code, § 354, subd. (a).)  Defendant argues that the 
trial court’s prior in limine rulings and comments regarding the admissibility of his 
experts and in-court handwriting testing rendered futile any attempt to reraise the 
same evidence for trial.  (See Evid. Code, § 354, subd. (b) [failure to object is 
excused when “[t]he rulings of the court made compliance with subdivision (a) 
futile”].) 
But, as explained, ante, at pages 73-81, the trial court ruled under Evidence 
Code section 352 that the proffered defense evidence did not render inadmissible 
the testimony of the state’s handwriting expert.  The court’s comment that the 
admissibility of expert testimony concerning a handwriting match was 
“unassailable” did not address whether the defense evidence could be used to 
weaken the strength of such an expert’s conclusion later at trial.  Instead, the court 
merely concluded that the proffered defense evidence was not useful in 
determining whether the state’s expert should be precluded from presenting his 
opinion of a match.  In fact, the court remarked that it would be “open” to consider 
admitting some of the defense’s handwriting evidence at trial if defendant made a 
sufficient offer of proof.  But defendant never made such an offer.  (People v. 
Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 108 [to preserve on appeal a claim concerning the 
improper exclusion of evidence, the defense must make an offer of proof to inform 
the judge’s ruling].) 
In any event, the trial court permitted defendant to present David Oleksow, 
a handwriting expert for the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department crime 
laboratory, who questioned the state expert’s methodology in reaching his 
 
84 
conclusion of a match.  Unlike Dr. Saks and Dr. Denbeaux, Oleksow was a 
qualified handwriting expert.  Under these circumstances, defendant cannot 
complain of error. 
3.  Opportunity to Challenge Robertson’s Identifications 
Defendant claims various deficiencies in the state’s evidence and errors in 
the trial court’s pretrial rulings conspired to deny him a fair opportunity to prove 
that Jodie Santiago Robertson’s identifications of him and his house were 
constitutionally tainted.  He claims these errors and deficiencies violated his state 
and federal constitutional rights to due process, to a fair trial by jury, to 
compulsory process, to present a defense, to effective assistance of counsel and 
equal protection, and to fair and reliable capital guilt and sentencing 
determinations.  These claims are forfeited, and, in any event, they are meritless. 
Specifically, defendant contends that Robertson’s memory was affected by 
posttrauma mental impairments; law enforcement failed to adequately document 
various contacts with her concerning her identification of defendant and his 
residence; and the officers failed to preserve the original pool of photos from 
which they created the six-pack photo lineup.  Defendant also complains that the 
trial court refused to permit him to solicit the testimony of the prosecutor, who had 
witnessed some of the identification procedures, and refused to consider the 
testimony of an identification expert.   
With the exception of calling the prosecutor as a witness, defendant 
complained of none of these alleged circumstances during pretrial proceedings 
litigating the admissibility of Robertson’s identifications.  Accordingly, nearly all 
of his claims are forfeited.  (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 989.)  
On their merits, his claims also fail. 
 
85 
Defendant faults law enforcement for inadequate documentation concerning 
Robertson’s interviews and identifications.  Defendant argues that the record of 
Robertson’s first two communicative interviews while she was in the hospital was 
inadequate because the officers did not write their reports of these interviews until 
six months later.  But defendant ignores the fact that, because Robertson could not 
talk during these first two interviews, they were conducted on paper — and those 
written original questions and answers had been preserved for trial.  Defendant 
also complains that Robertson’s first composite sketch session with a detective 
was not properly documented, but he fails to note how this alleged deficiency is 
relevant given that Robertson was dissatisfied with the final version of the sketch.  
Defendant further claims that Robertson’s identification of defendant’s house was 
not adequately documented, and notes that officers who were in the patrol vehicle 
gave conflicting accounts of her identification.  But defendant cites no authority 
supporting the duty of law enforcement to document such an identification 
procedure with greater precision. 
To the extent defendant appears to further argue that law enforcement’s 
alleged inadequate documentation of Robertson’s identifications violated his due 
process rights by the alleged failure to preserve favorable defense evidence under  
Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. 479, defendant fails to make an adequate showing of 
materiality.  Even assuming without deciding that Trombetta applies in the context 
of a photo lineup identification or a driveby identification of a residence, as 
explained above, defendant has not shown how any alleged deficiency deprived 
him of material evidence.  “The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed 
information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of 
the trial, does not establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense.”  (United 
States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 109-110.) 
 
86 
Defendant contends evidence conflicts concerning how quickly Robertson 
selected defendant’s photo in the six-pack lineup, whether she was told that she 
had identified defendant, and whether she and the detectives had a drink at the 
hotel bar after her identification.  Defendant references articles concerning 
eyewitness recollection in support of the proposition that an accurate recording of 
these circumstances would permit the assessment of any undue postidentification 
reinforcement placed on Robertson.  But because none of these articles were 
presented, or even available, at the time of trial and are not part of this record, this 
proposition is without foundation. 
Additionally, defendant assigns as error the trial court’s refusal to allow 
him to call at a pretrial hearing the prosecutor as a witness regarding the 
admissibility of Robertson’s identifications.  Two years earlier, the prosecutor had 
given testimony on these exact issues, and the court reviewed that testimony in 
assessing admissibility.  Under these circumstances, the court properly denied 
defendant’s request to question the prosecutor again, especially when the 
prosecutor admitted that his recollection of Robertson’s identifications was worse 
than when he testified two years prior.  
Finally, defendant claims that the trial court refused to consider the 
testimony of his expert witness at the pretrial hearing.  However, the court 
permitted the defense expert to testify over the prosecutor’s objection, and there is 
nothing in the record suggesting that the court refused to consider that testimony 
in determining the admissibility of Robertson’s identifications.  
Defendant was not denied a fair opportunity to challenge the admissibility 
of Robertson’s identifications. 
 
87 
4.  Robertson’s Identification of Defendant in a Photo Lineup 
Defendant contends that Robertson’s pretrial and trial identifications of 
defendant were based on a photo lineup that originated from suggestive and 
unreliable identification procedures.  He argues that the trial court erred by failing 
to suppress Robertson’s identification of him and that the error violated his 
constitutional rights to due process and the reliability of his sentence 
determination under the Eighth Amendment.  The court did not err. 
“In order to determine whether the admission of identification evidence 
violates a defendant’s right to due process of law, we consider (1) whether the 
identification procedure was unduly suggestive and unnecessary, and, if so, (2) 
whether the identification itself was nevertheless reliable under the totality of the 
circumstances, taking into account such factors as the opportunity of the witness to 
view the suspect at the time of the offense, the witness’s degree of attention at the 
time of the offense, the accuracy of his or her prior description of the suspect, the 
level of certainty demonstrated at the time of the identification, and the lapse of 
time between the offense and the identification.”  (People v. Cunningham, supra, 
25 Cal.4th at p. 989.)  It is defendant’s burden to demonstrate the existence of an 
unreliable identification procedure.  (Ibid.)  “We review deferentially the trial 
court’s findings of historical fact, especially those that turn on credibility 
determinations, but we independently review the trial court’s ruling regarding 
whether, under those facts, a pretrial identification procedure was unduly 
suggestive.”  (People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 943.) 
Defendant claims that, prior to Robertson being shown the photo lineup, 
several circumstances unduly influenced her and predisposed her to identify him 
in the six-photo lineup.  He claims that Robertson’s memory was affected because 
of her injuries; she had an emotional need to have her attacker be brought to 
justice; her participation in making the composite sketches may have tainted her 
 
88 
memory; and that the process of questioning her was suggestive.  He also argues 
that law enforcement may have strongly suggested to her that the suspect would be 
in the lineup by informing her that they had a suspect, flying her down 
immediately from Seattle, and being present as she viewed the lineup.  But these 
assertions are speculative, and defendant fails to reveal that the identification 
procedures were in fact actually unduly suggestive.   
We note that at the time of the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress 
Robertson’s identification there was evidence that Robertson’s memory had 
ceased at the point when she was being choked — but she retained the memory of 
her abduction and subsequent drive to the residence where she was assaulted.  
During that earlier period, she had a lengthy opportunity to view her kidnapper.  
Accordingly, defendant has not shown that the aforementioned circumstances 
were unduly suggestive causing Robertson’s identification of defendant’s photo to 
be unreliable. 
Defendant articulates a number of specific criticisms about the photo lineup 
itself.  He claims that none of the other five photos featured a person with bulging 
eyes; none of the other photos featured a person with unparted “feathered” hair; 
the mustaches among the six photos were inconsistent in that two photos showed 
mustaches extending below the lip (inconsistent with Robertson’s description); the 
man in the third photo was muscular and tanned (also inconsistent with 
Robertson’s description); defendant was the only person wearing the same shirt 
color as described by Robertson; and defendant’s photo was slightly larger than 
the others and centrally placed in the top row of the lineup.  
In denying defendant’s motion, the trial court aptly stated:  “On the issue of 
the photo lineup, the law does not require a perfect lineup, only that it be a lineup 
that is a fair one, and that it not be impermissibly suggestive. . . .  The lineup here 
is a good one.  All the young men that were in the photos were of the same general 
 
89 
type.  They were all blondish, they all had moustaches, they were the same type of 
individual, approximately the same age.  To the extent that defendant has focused 
on certain aspects of differences in treatment between Mr. Lucas’s photo and the 
others, such as the fact that Mr. Lucas’s photo was larger, or his face was 
larger within the photo, that it occupied the top center position. . . .  I find that 
these [were] small factors of difference between them — and they did 
not constitute impermissibly suggestive factors within the lineup.”  
The trial court’s observations are fully supported upon examination of the 
actual photo lineup.  Although law enforcement should make efforts to minimize 
such discrepancies, defendant’s face is only slightly larger than the faces shown in 
the other photos.  Moreover, the six photos also all bear a fair resemblance to the 
second composite sketch prepared by the police sketch artist.  In this light, any 
differences concerning the clothing, mustaches, and build of the persons in the 
lineup are minor.  In any event, we have recognized that “ ‘[b]ecause human 
beings do not look exactly alike, differences are inevitable’ ” and the primary 
concern “ ‘is whether anything caused defendant to “stand out” from the others in 
a way that would suggest the witness should select him.’ ”  (People v. Gonzalez, 
supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 943, quoting People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 
367.)  Although defendant’s photo does display eyes that are somewhat more 
“bulging” than the men in the other photos, “ ‘it would be virtually impossible to 
find five others who had’ . . . similar eye[s] ‘and who also sufficiently resembled 
defendant in other respects.’ ”  (People v. Gonzalez, supra, at p. 943.)   
Defendant argues that certain protective measures were necessary to 
minimize the possibility of suggestiveness, but, as we explain, his claims are 
forfeited and not required by due process.  (People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 
1210, 1256 [if “the challenged procedure was not unduly suggestive, our inquiry 
into the due process claim ends”].) 
 
90 
Defendant claims the admonition that police gave to Robertson before she 
looked at the photo lineup — that she “should not infer anything from the fact that 
the photographs are being shown to you or that we have a suspect in custody at 
this time” — was insufficient.  Defendant argues that Robertson should also have 
been told that the suspect may not be in the lineup, that the suspect’s head and 
facial hair could have changed since the crimes, and that an equally important 
purpose of a lineup is to clear innocent persons and not just identify guilty ones.  
Defendant further claims that the police should have shown Robertson the 
photographic lineup using a “double blind” procedure in which the administrator 
of the lineup procedure is also unaware of which photo depicts the suspect. 
Defendant made no such arguments in challenging the admissibility of 
Robertson’s identification.  Forfeiture aside, we have never required that certain 
pre-lineup admonitions be given before a victim views a photographic lineup or 
that it be administered in a double blind procedure.  The due process inquiry 
focuses on circumstances that are unduly suggestive.  (People v. Virgil, supra, 51 
Cal.4th at p. 1256.)  As discussed above, there was no undue suggestiveness in the 
procedures actually employed in Robertson’s identification. 
5.  Robertson’s Identification of Defendant’s Residence and Seat 
Covers 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by refusing to determine whether 
Robertson’s identifications of defendant’s residence and seat covers were the 
result of undue suggestiveness and that these identifications should have been 
suppressed.  He claims the errors violated his state and federal constitutional rights 
to a fair jury trial and to due process and his Eighth Amendment right to a reliable 
determination of both his guilt and penalty.  The trial court did not err. 
Defendant theorizes that Robertson’s identifications of defendant’s 
residence and seat covers should have been subjected to the same due process 
 
91 
scrutiny applicable to photographic and live lineups in determining admissibility.  
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor this court has addressed whether the 
due process protections necessary for identification of a suspect is equally 
applicable to the identification of inanimate objects.  Nearly every jurisdiction that 
has addressed the issue, however, has concluded that “any suggestiveness in the 
identification of inanimate objects is relevant to the weight, not the admissibility, 
of the evidence.”  (People v. Miller (Mich. 1995) 535 N.W.2d 518, 523; see 
Johnson v. Sublett (9th Cir. 1995) 63 F.3d 926, 932 [“There is no authority 
holding that a defendant’s due process right to reliable identification procedures 
extends beyond normal authenticity and identification procedures for physical 
evidence offered by the prosecution”]; United States v. Zenone (4th Cir. 1998) 153 
F.3d 725; Johnson v. Ross (2d Cir. 1992) 955 F.2d 178; Commonwealth v. Cole 
(Pa. 2005) 889 A.2d 501; State v. Crannell (Vt. 2000) 750 A.2d 1002; Hughes v. 
State (Miss. 1999) 735 So.2d 238; Brooks v. State (Ind. 1990) 560 N.E.2d 49, 57-
58; State v. Roscoe (Ariz. 1984) 700 P.2d 1312; State v. Cyr (N.H. 1982) 453 A.2d 
1315, 1317-1318; State v. King (Wash. 1982) 639 P.2d 809, 811-812; State v. 
Bruns (Iowa 1981) 304 N.W.2d 217; Commonwealth v. Simmons (Mass. 1981) 
417 N.E.2d 1193; People v. Coston (Colo. 1977) 576 P.2d 182, 185; Inge v. 
Commonwealth (Va. 1976) 228 S.E.2d 563, 567; but see Dennis v. State (Fla. 
2002) 817 So.2d 741, 760 [“The factors to be considered in the determination of 
whether the identification of the vehicle was reliable are all comparable to factors 
considered in a witness’s identification of a suspect”].) 
But we need not decide this issue.  Even assuming that identification 
procedures of inanimate objects should be subject to the same due process scrutiny 
applicable to photographic and live lineups in determining admissibility, that 
circumstance would bear no significance here.  Robertson never identified the seat 
covers as being the same covers used in the vehicle she was abducted in.  Instead, 
 
92 
she only identified them as being similar.  As to her identification of defendant’s 
residence, there was some conflicting evidence as to whether one of the officers 
may have pointed out the house after the police vehicle had made a U-turn and 
before Robertson had identified it.  But Robertson testified that she had already 
recognized the house before asking the officers to make the U-turn.  Thus, any 
suggestiveness did not affect her identification.  The evidence was properly 
admitted. 
6.  Exclusion of Impeachment Evidence Against Detectives Involved in 
the Robertson Case 
Defendant claims the trial court committed prejudicial error in excluding 
evidence, during pretrial hearings, that two detectives involved in the Robertson 
investigation gave false and/or misleading testimony and violated a criminal 
suspect’s Miranda rights in an unrelated matter, People v. Cavanaugh, San Diego 
County Superior Court No. CRN 10868 (Cavanaugh).  Defendant argues that this 
evidence of perjury and other professional misconduct was admissible as proof of 
specific instances of the detectives’ dishonesty and willingness to lie under oath in 
order to secure a criminal conviction.  He contends this evidence was relevant for 
purposes of both defendant’s in limine rulings concerning the Robertson case and 
for impeachment use at trial.  He claims the court’s refusal to admit evidence from 
the Cavanaugh matter violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due 
process, a fair jury trial and compulsory process under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  We disagree. 
The defendant sought to present various impeachment evidence against 
Detectives Henderson and Fullmer from the Cavanaugh matter:  (1) The 
detectives allegedly violated the murder suspect’s Miranda rights in Cavanaugh; 
(2) Henderson allegedly gave misleading testimony about the Miranda violation; 
(3) Fullmer allegedly provided false testimony about seeing a tape recorder in the 
 
93 
suspect’s purse at the crime scene; and (4) Fullmer allegedly gave false testimony 
about seeing a red light on the tape recorder, indicating that it was recording, when 
he moved the purse. 
In assessing the relevance of this evidence, the trial court noted that it was 
familiar with the materials associated with the Cavanaugh investigation and had 
considered that evidence when it took testimony from Detectives Henderson and 
Fullmer during in limine hearings.  Concerning the admissibility of this evidence 
at trial, the court found that here, the detectives were “not the prime prosecution 
witnesses,” but merely “tangential witnesses,” and that evidence corroborated 
Robertson’s description of her attacker prior to defendant’s becoming a suspect.  
The court, therefore, concluded that the minimal probative value of the evidence 
was substantially outweighed by the undue consumption of time required to 
present it.  
At the outset, we reject the contention that the trial court failed to consider 
the Cavanaugh evidence in assessing defendant’s various in limine motions 
concerning the reliability of Robertson’s description of her attacker and her 
identification of defendant and his residence.  The court previously had reviewed 
the materials from the Cavanaugh case and clearly stated it had that evidence in 
mind when Detectives Henderson and Fullmer testified during the in limine 
proceedings.  The court further emphasized that it had scrutinized their testimony 
in light of the Cavanaugh evidence.  Therefore, we reject defendant’s claim that 
the court did not consider this impeachment evidence in deciding in limine rulings 
concerning the Robertson case. 
Furthermore, we also reject defendant’s contention that the Cavanaugh 
matter contained vital impeachment evidence that should have been presented to 
the jury. 
 
94 
We previously have noted that “impeachment evidence other than felony 
convictions entails problems of proof, unfair surprise, and moral turpitude 
evaluation which felony convictions do not present.”  (People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 
Cal.4th 284, 296.)  Courts should, under Evidence Code section 352, “consider 
with particular care whether the admission of such evidence might involve undue 
time, confusion, or prejudice which outweighs its probative value.”  (People v. 
Wheeler, supra, at pp. 296-297.)  “A trial court’s ruling to admit or exclude 
evidence offered for impeachment is reviewed for abuse of discretion and will be 
upheld unless the trial court ‘exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or 
patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ”  
(People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 705, quoting People v. Rodriguez 
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9-10.)  Applying this standard, we conclude there was no 
abuse of discretion.   
Defendant argues that the detectives were key trial witnesses whose 
credibility was “crucial” in resolving discrepancies in the evidence regarding 
Robertson’s identification of defendant and his home.  But Detective Henderson 
was not present in the car during the drive-by when Robertson identified the 
house, undercutting defendant’s contention that Henderson was a “crucial” 
witness.  Moreover, Detective Fullmer testified as a defense witness that someone 
in the car said “this house” or “what about this house” as Fullmer drove Robertson 
past defendant’s home.  To support the defense theory that the procedure was 
suggestive, it would have been in the defendant’s interest that Fullmer be believed 
and not be impeached by the Cavanaugh evidence. 
Additionally, any doubt concerning Robertson’s identification of 
defendant’s home was convincingly negated by her sketch of the exterior and 
interior layout of his home.  Robertson made this sketch before she positively 
identified defendant’s home, and she correctly identified it as having a circular 
 
95 
driveway with stepping stones leading to a porch.  Furthermore, her drawing of the 
interior layout of the home was a near-perfect match of the actual layout of 
defendant’s home.  Defendant provides no explanation of how the detectives could 
have improperly influenced Robertson’s sketch when the detectives themselves 
could not have known the interior layout of defendant’s home at that point in the 
investigation. 
Regarding Robertson’s identification of defendant as her assailant, 
evidence corroborated her description of him before defendant became a suspect, 
which tends to negate defendant’s claim that the detectives conspired to 
improperly influence her to identify him as the attacker.  A week after her 
abduction, Robertson described the assailant’s car as “brown, two-door, possibly a 
280Z.”  She described her attacker as blond haired and blue eyed.  On December 
4, 1984, when Henderson and Fullmer visited Robertson in Seattle and before 
seeing any photo lineup, she described the attacker’s eyes as distinctively “bugged 
out” and his hair as “feathered.”  Concerning the attacker’s car, she stated that the 
seat covers were sheepskin.  All of these details could be corroborated 
independently of any testimony that Detectives Henderson and Fullmer could 
provide.  Defendant claims the truthfulness of Fullmer and Henderson’s testimony 
about their visit to Seattle and the subsequent photo lineup was “crucial,” but he 
fails to note any contradictory evidence regarding these aspects of the 
investigation. 
Defendant further argues that the detectives’ credibility was “crucial” in 
evaluating contradictory evidence concerning when the defendant became a 
suspect in the case, a hospital nurse’s statement about Robertson identifying the 
defendant’s car as a brown Colt, and how quickly Robertson identified defendant 
from the photo lineup.  Although the detectives’ credibility may have been 
probative on these issues, because much of this contradictory evidence was 
 
96 
explored in pretrial hearings and was never offered by defendant at trial, defendant 
fails to show how any additional impeachment evidence would have helped the 
jury assess these issues at trial.   
Defendant also contends that the evidence of perjury and misconduct would 
have been highly probative concerning whether the detectives intentionally 
constructed the photo lineup in a suggestive manner.  However, the admissibility 
of the lineup had been determined before trial.  And, in any event, the trial court 
found it possible for the jury to objectively evaluate the suggestiveness of the 
lineup independent of considerations about the detectives’ intent, noting that “[i]f 
it wasn’t fair and if it suggested to her the wrong person, then it wasn’t fair, and it 
doesn’t matter what [the detectives] did.”  
Finally, in light of the amount of evidence defendant had proposed to 
present on this collateral matter, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
ruling that the Cavanaugh materials would “take weeks” to put on and that the 
probative value of such evidence did not substantially outweigh the contemplated 
undue consumption of time.  The Cavanaugh materials consisted of at least “two 
volumes of files” from the “long, lengthy [Sheriff’s] investigation,” as well as 
“several hundred pages” of transcripts from the case hearing.  In addition, 
defendant indicated his intent to present interrogation tapes, photos, and 
investigation reports from the Cavanaugh case to prove Fullmer and Henderson’s 
specific acts.  The court could have reasonably foreseen that the admission of this 
evidence would lead to “nitpicking wars of attrition over collateral credibility 
issues.”  (People v. Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 296.)  The amount of evidence 
was also likely to lead to jury confusion.  Evidence Code section 352 gives the 
trial court wide latitude in preventing such occurrences.  (People v. Quartermain 
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 624.)  Thus, we find no error. 
 
97 
Even assuming there was error, it would be harmless under any standard. 
(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman) [constitutional error 
must be assessed for prejudice under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson) [error is harmless 
under state law unless it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to 
defendant would have occurred absent error].)  It is highly unlikely that the 
absence of the Cavanaugh evidence caused the jury to find that the defendant was 
guilty of attempting to kill Robertson.  Although the evidence could have 
discounted the credibility of the detectives, the record contains ample uncontested 
evidence to support the jury’s conclusion concerning defendant’s guilt, including 
Robertson’s descriptions of her attacker, which was fully corroborated before the 
detectives focused on defendant as a suspect. 
7.  Robertson’s Prior Sexual Conduct 
Defendant assigns error to the trial court’s decision to exclude evidence of 
Robertson’s prior sexual conduct — specifically that she had met a man at a bar 
and spent the night with him on the night before her assault.  Defendant argues 
that this excluded evidence was relevant to impeach Robertson’s memory of 
leaving the bar alone on the night of the crimes.  Defendant claims the court’s 
ruling violated his state and federal rights to present a defense, due process, 
compulsory process, confrontation, and effective representation of counsel.  The 
court properly excluded the evidence as irrelevant. 
During pretrial proceedings, Robertson testified that she had gone to a 
restaurant with her brother on the night before her abduction.  At that restaurant 
she met a man, Neil Reynolds, and went dancing with him.  Robertson spent that 
night with Reynolds at his apartment.  Seizing on Robertson’s alleged memory 
problems, the defense argued that Robertson may have had gaps in her memory 
 
98 
about the attack and that she had filled in that gap with the story of being abducted 
by someone who drove a sports car.  The defense argued that her prior sexual 
encounter was relevant to show that Robertson was the kind of person who met 
men at bars and that she may have done the same with her assailant on the night of 
the crimes.  
The trial court acknowledged that Robertson’s prior sexual encounter might 
be relevant to explain the presence of semen found on Robertson’s vaginal swab 
because Reynolds also could have been a contributor to the ABO factor on the 
swab.  The court, however, further explained that the prior sexual encounter was 
not relevant to prove that Robertson left the bar with someone on the night of her 
attack.  Moreover, it stated that, even if the evidence had some minor probative 
value, under Evidence Code section 352, it would be substantially outweighed by 
its prejudicial effects.  The court, nevertheless, made clear that the defense could 
present evidence of Robertson’s sexual encounter with Reynolds in challenging 
whether there was evidence she had been raped.  
On appeal, defendant appears to make an argument different from what he 
advanced below.  Before the trial court, the defense essentially argued that the 
prior sexual encounter reflected evidence of Robertson’s character and that she 
may have acted consistent with that character on the night of her attack.35  On 
appeal, however, defendant now confusingly argues that the prior sexual encounter 
was evidence of Robertson’s character and relevant to impeach Robertson’s 
memory on the night of the crimes, but that it was not relevant to prove her 
conduct on the night in question.  Regardless, defendant’s claim is forfeited 
because he did not argue this reasoning before the trial court.  (People v. Benson 
                                              
35 
The defense cited no authority in support of this argument. 
 
99 
(1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 786, fn. 7.)  Furthermore, the claim is without merit.  As 
previously discussed, a trial court’s decision to exclude impeachment evidence 
under Evidence Code section 352 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  (People 
v. Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 705.)  Evidence of Robertson’s single sexual 
encounter prior to the murder did little to establish her character and added 
nothing to impeach the reliability of her memory.  To the contrary, her recollection 
of defendant, his sports car, and his home established that her memory was quite 
accurate.  Accordingly, the trial court did not act “in an arbitrary, capricious, or 
patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice” by 
excluding this evidence.  (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 9-10.) 
8.  Admissibility of the Swanke Blood Evidence  
In People v. Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d 24, we adopted a three-pronged test to 
establish the reliability of scientific testing and its scientific basis to determine its 
admissibility.  “The first prong requires proof that the technique is generally 
accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific community.  [Citation.]  The second 
prong requires proof that the witness testifying about the technique and its 
application is a properly qualified expert on the subject.  [Citation.]  The third 
prong requires proof that the person performing the test in the particular case used 
correct scientific procedures.”  (People v. Bolden, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 544-
545, citing Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 30.) 
Defendant argues the trial court erred in rulings during in limine 
proceedings regarding the admissibility of the blood-testing evidence derived from 
Anne Swanke’s fingernails, which tested consistent with defendant’s blood type, 
and the blood evidence tested from defendant’s sheepskin seat cover, which tested 
consistent with Swanke’s blood type.  Specifically, defendant argues that both the 
GM and KM antibody blood testing failed prongs one and three, and that the ABO 
 
100 
and electrophoretic blood testing failed prong three.  He claims the erroneous 
admission of the Swanke blood analysis evidence deprived him of a fair and 
reliable trial proceeding and violated his rights under the Sixth, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  The trial court properly rejected these challenges. 
a)  First-prong and Third-prong Kelly Challenges to GM and KM 
Antibody Testing 
Defendant’s first-prong Kelly challenge concerning the admissibility of the 
GM and KM antibody genetic testing fails because proof of a scientific 
technique’s general acceptance in the relevant scientific community is no longer 
required once a published appellate decision affirms a trial court’s ruling admitting 
evidence obtained by that scientific technique.  (People v. Bolden, supra, 29 
Cal.4th at p. 545.)  Subsequent to defendant’s trial, this court and several Courts of 
Appeal have upheld the admissibility of GM and KM testing using the same 
techniques employed here.  (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1192 
[concluding that the agglutination inhibition technique used to test for GM and 
KM genetic markers is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community]; 
see People v. Yorba (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1017; People v. Morganti (1996) 43 
Cal.App.4th 643.)  Although this published case law postdates defendant’s trial, 
“that circumstance does not cause us to doubt the scientific reliability of the 
testing.”36  (People v. Riel, supra, at p. 1192.) 
                                              
36 
Defendant also attacks the first prong of Kelly itself, claiming that this 
aspect of our analysis violates federal due process by undermining the trial court’s 
gatekeeping function and barring relevant evidence at the pretrial stage.  
Essentially, defendant argues that the first prong of Kelly improperly relies upon 
what the scientific community accepts as to the reliability of a technique, thereby 
supplanting the trial court’s independent determination of reliability as required by 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) 509 U.S. 579.  But we have 
previously rejected such claims, and defendant offers no persuasive reason for 
reconsideration of our conclusion.  (People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 593-
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
101 
Defendant’s third-prong Kelly challenge to the admissibility of the GM and 
KM antibody genetic testing also fails.  He claims that the SERI laboratory’s GM 
and KM testing of the material recovered from Swanke’s fingernails was improper 
because the lab did not use procedural controls and did not photograph the test 
results.  But defendant fails to point to any evidence showing that the failure to use 
controls or to photograph the results violated generally accepted procedural 
practices or that their omissions rendered the test results unreliable.  (People v. 
Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 215.) 
b)  Third-prong Kelly Challenge to ABO Blood Testing 
Defendant further argues that the third prong of Kelly was not satisfied 
because the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department laboratory notes did not state 
its protocols for ABO testing, because SERI’s ABO results were not confirmed by 
other tests, and because SERI used a different procedure for the ABO control test.  
Defendant calls this different procedure a “mixed standard,” but his terminology is 
confusing.  More precisely, defendant refers to control testing in which the analyst 
confirms the presence of antiserum for each of the main blood types — A, B, AB, 
and O.  In one standard form of such testing, there are separate controls for each of 
the main blood types.  In an alternative standard, to which defendant objects, the 
analyst can use just two controls, AB and O, to determine the type of antiserum 
present in the control sample.  
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
604 [holding that the Kelly prongs survived Daubert in this state].)  In addition, 
our opinion in Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California 
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 747 did not, by using the term “gatekeeper,” indicate any move 
away from the Kelly test toward the federal Daubert standard.  (Sargon 
Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California, supra, 55 Cal.4th 747, 772, 
fn. 9.)  
 
102 
The lack of written documentation in the San Diego County Sheriff’s 
Department crime laboratory does not prove that incorrect procedures governed 
that facility’s ABO testing of the evidence.  To the contrary, criminalist Charles 
Merritt testified at the Kelly hearing, explaining his ABO testing of the evidence.  
During his testimony, defendant cross-examined Merritt extensively about the 
procedures he employed, but defendant raised no specific faults relevant to a third-
prong challenge concerning Merritt’s described procedures at trial nor does he do 
so here on appeal. 
Defendant complains that SERI’s ABO testing did not comply with 
generally accepted testing procedures in the scientific community because the lab 
conducted no other testing to confirm the results.  But none of the testifying 
experts stated that there was a consensus in the scientific community regarding 
whether a second, confirming test is required concerning forensic blood work.  
One expert testified that confirming tests are general practice for blood donations 
made at blood banks, but offered no opinion concerning forensic work.  The other 
experts testified merely that confirming testing is used at some laboratories, and 
each acknowledged that the use of confirmatory tests was an evolving trend in 
ABO testing.  None of the experts, however, established that confirmatory testing 
was an established procedure that reflected the consensus of the scientific 
community.  
Finally, defendant also complains that SERI’s ABO testing did not comply 
with generally accepted testing procedures because the lab used an alternative 
procedure for the ABO control tests by using two controls instead of three.  His 
claim is contradicted by the record.  Mark Stolorow, a forensic scientist from the 
Division of Forenic Sciences of the Illinois State Police, testified repeatedly that 
SERI’s alternative procedure for its ABO control testing was merely a matter of 
preference for the analyst and that the method produces valid results.  
 
103 
c)  Third-prong Kelly Challenge to Electrophoretic Testing 
Defendant additionally argues that the third prong of Kelly was not satisfied 
because SERI’s electrophoretic blood testing was not verified by a second reader.  
He also alleges that a photograph of the electrophoretic results was not an 
adequate substitute for “double-reader concurrence,” in which a second analyst 
must independently review the test results and agree with the first analyst’s 
conclusions.  Defendant further claims that the test result was unreliable because it 
was based on the subjective interpretation of the reader and not objectively 
verifiable scientific standards.  We have previously rejected similar claims, 
recognizing that “these matters were appropriately presented to the trier of fact to 
consider in weighing the accuracy of” of the test results and did not affect their 
admissibility.  (People v. Cook (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334, 1347.)  Defense counsel 
presented these criticisms at the appropriate stage — at trial in front of the jury.  
Defendant additionally argues that test results requiring any level of 
subjective interpretation violates the constitutional guarantees of due process, and 
a jury trial, as well as the need for heightened reliability in a capital case.  Again, 
however, defense counsel at trial vigorously cross-examined the state’s expert 
witness regarding the tests, and the jury was allowed to assess for itself whether 
the test results were reliable.  Defendant’s rights concerning this evidence were 
fully protected by those circumstances.  (People v. Stoll, supra, 49 Cal.3d at 
p. 1159 [“issues of test reliability and validity may be thoroughly explored on 
cross-examination at trial”].) 
d)  The Right to Counsel During the Electrophoretic Testing 
Defendant next argues, as he did below, that he had a constitutional right, 
under the Sixth Amendment and the state Constitution, to be notified of the 
 
104 
electrophoretic testing and to have his counsel present during the testing in order 
to help ensure the test’s reliability.37  Neither we nor the high court has ever 
imposed a duty on the prosecution to invite a defendant, through counsel, to 
participate in investigatory forensic testing.   
Forensic testing is not recognized as a critical stage of the proceedings at 
which an accused has the right to counsel.  “ ‘[S]ystematized or scientific 
analyzing of the accused’s fingerprints, blood sample, clothing, hair, and the like 
. . . [involve] differences which preclude such stages being characterized as critical 
stages at which the accused has the right to the presence of his counsel.  
Knowledge of the techniques of science and technology is sufficiently available, 
and the variables in techniques few enough, that the accused has the opportunity 
for a meaningful confrontation of the Government’s case at trial through the 
ordinary processes of cross-examination of the Government’s expert witnesses and 
the presentation of the evidence of his own experts.  The denial of a right to have 
his counsel present at such analyses does not therefore violate the Sixth 
Amendment; they are not critical stages since there is minimal risk that his 
counsel’s absence at such stages might derogate from his right to a fair trial.’ ”  
(Ent v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 936, 939-940, 
quoting United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 227-228; see People v. 
Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 816 [“The prosecution and court allowed the 
defense to participate in the [blood] testing on condition that the prosecution learn 
the results,” and “[t]he defense could choose to accept the condition or not 
                                              
37  
“Electrophoresis allows typing of individual blood proteins and enzymes 
found in a blood sample by a method that separates electrically charged 
molecules.”  (People v. Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 206.)  
 
105 
participate in the testing,” but “[f]orcing such a choice does not violate the 
Constitution or any other provision of law”].) 
Consequently, there was no violation of defendant’s right to counsel or his 
right of confrontation concerning the electrophoretic blood testing. 
9.  Shannon Lucas’s Statements Concerning the Dog Collar 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by ruling on an in limine motion to 
admit at trial his deceased wife’s statement that the dog choke-chain found around 
Anne Swanke’s neck was that of the couple’s dog, Duke.  He claims the admission 
of this statement violated several provisions of the Evidence Code because it did 
not qualify as a spontaneous statement under the hearsay rule, constituted 
inadmissible opinion evidence, violated the marital privilege, and should not have 
been admitted under Evidence Code section 352.  Defendant further contends the 
asserted error violated his rights to confrontation and due process and deprived 
him of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to fair and reliable guilt, 
death eligibility and sentencing determinations.  We agree that the admission of 
the statement violated defendant’s confrontation rights, but the error was harmless. 
The trial court explored the admissibility of this evidence in pretrial 
hearings.  On the day of defendant’s arrest, Detective Craig Henderson 
interviewed defendant’s wife, Shannon Lucas, at the sheriff’s office, where their 
conversation was tape-recorded.  In the course of the interview, Shannon 
described the couple’s pets and Detective Henderson opened a bag that contained 
the choke chain found around Swanke’s neck and showed it to her.  Shannon 
audibly gasped, and, according to Detective Henderson, she sat back, opened her 
eyes wider, and appeared stunned.  Shannon then stated, “That’s, um, one of 
Duke’s.  We had — the kids used to — my son and my sister’s daughter used to 
play with that and they half choked Duke to death.” 
 
106 
Shannon refused to testify against defendant at the preliminary hearing by 
asserting the marital privilege under Evidence Code section 970.  After she died 
unexpectedly before trial, the prosecution argued that her interview statement was 
admissible as a spontaneous utterance.  Over the defense’s numerous objections, 
including on confrontation grounds, the trial court concluded that this statement 
qualified as a spontaneous utterance, finding that it was a “response to something 
that shocked her.”  This was the only portion of Shannon’s statement admitted at 
trial. 
Defendant claims that the admission of Shannon’s statement violated his 
right to confront the witnesses against him because she was unavailable for cross-
examination at trial.  The admission of testimonial statements offered against a 
defendant violates the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause unless the witness 
who made the statement is unavailable at trial and the defendant had a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.  (Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 
(Crawford).)  After her husband’s arrest, Shannon made her statement to a law 
enforcement officer while being questioned at a police station.  Testimonial 
statements can comprise those “ ‘statements that were made under circumstances 
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement 
would be available for use at a later trial.’ ”  (Id. at p. 52.) 
It seems apparent that Shannon’s statement was testimonial for 
confrontation purposes.  More importantly, her unavailability at trial rendered her 
statement inadmissible because defendant had no prior opportunity to cross-
examine her at the preliminary hearing as a result of her assertion of the marital 
privilege.  In Crawford itself, statements to the police by the defendant’s wife 
were held to be inadmissible, because the defendant was unable to cross-examine 
 
107 
her due to the marital privilege.38  (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 40, 68.)  We 
conclude that the admission of Shannon’s statement violated defendant’s right of 
confrontation.  Accordingly, we need not decide defendant’s other contentions 
concerning the admissibility of this statement. 
But the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Chapman, supra, 
386 U.S. at p. 24; People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 608.)  Shannon’s 
recognition of the dog collar found around Swanke’s neck was just one small part 
of the confluence of circumstantial evidence linking defendant to Swanke’s 
abduction.  The evidence established that defendant left his friend’s home around 
the same time Swanke had become stranded on the side of the road.  An 
eyewitness actually saw the abduction and remembered an unusual personalized 
license plate at the scene that was remarkably close to the license plate on 
defendant’s vehicle.  Blood evidence found in that vehicle was consistent with 
Swanke.  Tissue and blood recovered from under Swanke’s fingernails were 
consistent with defendant’s blood characteristics.  Lastly, several witnesses 
testified that defendant had severe and long facial scratches the day after Swanke’s 
abduction, and a significant length of skin tissue was found crumpled under one of 
Swanke’s fingernails.  Given that the defense also presented significant evidence 
                                              
38  
In Crawford, Washington state law forbid the defendant’s spouse from 
testifying without the defendant-husband’s consent, which he refused to give.  
(Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 40.)  The high court expressly stated that it was 
not addressing whether the defendant had waived his confrontation rights by 
invoking the marital privilege.  (Id. at p. 42, fn. 1.)  Here, however, our state’s 
marital privilege does not afford the other spouse a “veto” over the spouse’s 
decision to testify.  (Evid. Code, § 970.)  Thus, it was solely Shannon Lucas’s 
decision not to testify against defendant at the preliminary hearing, and her right to 
assert that privilege is distinct from defendant’s right of confrontation even though 
the assertion benefitted defendant. 
 
108 
concerning the commonality of the type of dog chain recovered from Swanke’s 
neck, Shannon’s statement was not a decisive part of the evidence against 
defendant. 
C.  Motion to Recuse the Prosecutor’s Office  
Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in denying his motion 
to recuse the office of the San Diego County District Attorney because of an 
alleged conflict of interest arising from the prior abandoned prosecution of John 
Massingale for the Jacobs killings.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
After the district attorney dropped charges against Massingale for the 
Jacobs homicides and charged defendant with those crimes instead, Massingale 
obtained a finding of factual innocence under section 851.8.  Massingale then filed 
a civil lawsuit in federal court against the City and County of San Diego and those 
responsible for his police interrogations regarding the Jacobs murders.  In 
defendant’s motion to recuse the entire district attorney’s office, defendant alleged 
a conflict of interest because the office argued inconsistently in the civil suit that 
law enforcement had not improperly obtained Massingale’s confession, but argued 
in defendant’s criminal case that Massingale’s confession was involuntary.  
According to section 1424, which governs motions to disqualify the 
prosecutor:  “The motion may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a 
conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would 
receive a fair trial.”  We have explained that a conflict “ ‘ “exists whenever the 
circumstances of a case evidence a reasonable possibility that the DA’s office may 
not exercise its discretionary function in an evenhanded manner,” ’ ” and that such 
conflict may disqualify the office “ ‘only if it is “so grave as to render it unlikely 
that defendant will receive fair treatment.” ’ ”  (Hambarian v. Superior Court 
 
109 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 826, 833, quoting People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580, 
592, 594.) 
Assuming the prosecutor took conflicting positions in different forums on 
the voluntariness of Massingale’s confessions, defendant fails to show how such a 
conflict was “so grave” that it rendered his trial unfair.  He does not explain how 
the conflict may have altered any trial testimony to his detriment.  If anything, the 
prosecutor’s assertion in the civil case that Massingale’s confession was voluntary 
would have encouraged those who interrogated him to describe Massingale’s 
confession as uncoerced, and this circumstance would have assisted defendant in 
his third-party culpability defense.  The trial court properly denied the motion. 
D.  Asserted Errors During Jury Selection 
1.  Challenge to Jury Venire 
Defendant claims he made a preliminary showing that the panels from 
which the trial court selected his jurors underrepresented Hispanics and young 
persons.  Therefore, according to defendant, the court erred in denying his motion 
for discovery of jury composition information, which in turn denied him a fair 
opportunity to challenge the composition of his jury panels.  He asserts the errors 
denied him a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community in violation 
of his rights to due process and equal protection under the United States 
Constitution.  We conclude that the court properly denied defendant’s discovery 
request and that defendant failed to show that his jury was selected from an unfair 
cross-section of the community. 
a) The Requests for Discovery 
Before the prosecutions of the Robertson, Strang, Fisher, and Swanke 
homicides and the Jacobs and Garcia homicides were consolidated into a single 
case, defendant successfully obtained discovery orders from each trial court 
 
110 
directing the San Diego County jury commissioner to provide him access to the 
commissioner’s qualified jurors list, summons collected from prospective jurors 
on the list, written excuses received from prospective jurors on the list, the names 
and addresses of jurors who provided written excuses, and the names and 
addresses of jurors who did not appear.  These orders also permitted defendant to 
distribute questionnaires to prospective jurors who did appear, asking them about 
their age, residence, ethnicity, income, prior jury experience, gender, and whether 
they would receive their regular salary during jury service.  As a result of these 
orders, defendant was able to survey a total of nine panels of prospective jurors 
who appeared on three dates in August 1985, three dates in December 1985, and 
three dates in January 1986.  In total, defendant surveyed 1,734 prospective jurors 
who appeared for service.  
In June 1986, defendant successfully obtained a third discovery order, from 
the trial court assigned to the Jacobs and Garcia murders, for the commissioner to 
provide defendant with a qualified jurors list, certified jurors lists, and juror pay 
cards for the preceding 12 months.  
In September 1986, defendant filed a fourth and fifth discovery motion (one 
for each of defendant’s cases), which initially requested 33 items.  It was later 
modified at a subsequent hearing, to request the following five items from the jury 
commissioner for the preceding year:  1) the qualified jury lists or the weekly or 
monthly list of persons to whom jury summons are sent; 2) the list of those 
persons who reported for service for each period described above; 3) the list of 
those persons excused or excluded on the basis of those who responded to the 
written summons and the reasons for each such exclusion; 4) the commissioner’s 
procedures or policies for the preparation of the master jury list; and 5) the name 
and designation of the computer program used to implement jury selection in San 
Diego County.  In this motion, defendant’s counsel alleged that the 1980 census 
 
111 
revealed that approximately 14.8 percent of residents in San Diego County were 
Hispanic, but the approximate representation of Hispanics who sat on juries in the 
county was 8 percent.  Counsel also declared that he consulted with an expert in 
the field of jury composition research, Dr. Edgar Butler of the University of 
California at Riverside, and that Dr. Butler described the requested information as 
relevant in ascertaining any bias in how prospective jurors are impanelled.  The 
prosecution opposed the motion as duplicative of the prior motions, burdensome to 
the jury commissioner, and based upon an insufficient showing of disparity 
concerning the representation of Hispanics.  
Argument concerning the fourth discovery motion took place before Judge 
Franklin Orfield, who then was presiding over the Robertson, Strang, Fisher, and 
Swanke murders.  At that hearing, the jury coordinator, Geraldine Stevens, 
testified, as did defense expert witnesses, Dr. Butler and Dr. Oscar Kaplan, a 
professor at San Diego State University.  Based on her analysis of the prior two 
defense surveys, Stevens calculated that 9 percent of the surveyed prospective 
jurors who appeared for service were Hispanic.  According to Dr. Butler, the 1980 
census showed that Hispanics constituted 14.74 percent of the San Diego County 
population, and he estimated that the 1985 Hispanic population had risen to 17.25 
percent.  Similarly, Dr. Kaplan estimated that the Hispanic population for San 
Diego County was nearing 15 percent.  But neither defense expert had any data 
revealing the 1985 jury-eligible Hispanic population, and both conceded that the 
1980 census figure would be higher than the population actually eligible for jury 
service at that time.  
On cross-examination, Dr. Butler conceded that he had participated in an 
Orange County case in which he was able to calculate the jury-eligible Hispanic 
population.  According to Dr. Butler, based on 1980 census data, Orange County 
had a 14.8 percent Hispanic population, nearly identical to San Diego County’s 
 
112 
1980 census data.  Based on 1980 data compiled by the Center for Continuing 
Study of the California Economy, the percentage of Hispanic persons in Orange 
County who were 18 years of age or older, citizens, and English speaking was 8.4 
percent.  Relying on 1985 projections of the Hispanic population being between 
15.77 and 19.3 percent, Dr. Butler projected that between 9.07 and 11.16 percent 
of Hispanic persons in Orange County were jury eligible in 1985.  Dr. Butler 
admitted that similar 1980 jury-eligible data for San Diego County existed 
(presumably from the Center for Continuing Study of the California Economy) 
and could be obtained with “some effort,” but he did not have such data at the 
time.  
Judge Orfield denied defendant’s discovery motion, noting that despite the 
three prior orders of discovery, “nothing has been shown in any of the studies 
which would indicate that [a] further and deeper study should be made.”  The 
court noted that the jury commissioner’s office had expended “a very substantial 
amount of work” to comply with the previously ordered discovery and that the 
new request was even more burdensome.  The court concluded that “[i]t’s been 
made to appear that the representation of Hispanics is proper in San Diego County 
with respect to the Hispanic population.”  The court observed that Dr. Butler could 
not state with any certainty the reasons for his recommendations and stated that 
Dr. Kaplan’s statistical estimates appeared unreliable.  
A few weeks later, Judge William Kennedy, who was presiding over the 
Jacobs and Garcia murders, denied defendant’s fifth discovery motion, refusing to 
reconsider the matter in light of Judge Orfield’s ruling on the similar fourth 
discovery motion.  Defendant, however, argued that the results of his prior surveys 
were out of date, and Judge Kennedy granted defendant’s additional request to 
submit questionnaires to prospective jurors who appeared for jury duty on five 
 
113 
dates in November and December 1986.  Of the 817 prospective jurors surveyed, 
9.5 percent identified themselves as Hispanic.  
b) The Motion to Quash the Venire 
In December 1986, defendant filed a motion to challenge the composition 
of San Diego County juries and to quash all of its available jury panels.  The 
motion provided no statistical data to support its allegation that the county’s jury 
selection process was defective but the defense stated it would provide such 
evidence at the hearing on this motion.  The prosecution opposed the motion.  
In March 1987, after both cases were consolidated and assigned to Judge 
Laura Palmer Hammes, defendant, for the sixth time, moved for discovery of jury 
composition information and to distribute questionnaires for surveying additional 
prospective jurors.  Judge Hammes denied discovery of additional prospective 
juror information, relying on the prior rulings of Judges Orfield and Kennedy, but 
permitted questionnaires to be given to prospective jurors on seven dates in March 
through April 1987.  In addition to race and ethnicity, these questionnaires also 
probed the prospective jurors’ age and income.  Judge Hammes told defense 
counsel that if they found something that could persuade the court to order more 
discovery, defendant could renew his request for prospective juror information.  
As a result of this round of surveys, defendant collected data from 1,213 
prospective jurors.  In this group, 8.1 percent identified themselves as Hispanic.  
Later that year, defendant filed another motion to compel the jury 
commissioner to distribute questionnaires to prospective jurors who arrived for 
jury service on seven dates in September 1987.  The trial court denied the motion, 
noting that the defendant had the opportunity to survey 1,200 prospective jurors 
recently and hundreds prior to that.  The court denied defendant’s motion without 
prejudice to renewal if a new jury pool was created the following year.  
 
114 
Eventually, the court allowed defendant to survey additional prospective jurors in 
January and February of 1988.  In those surveys, 10.7 percent of the prospective 
jurors who arrived for jury service identified themselves as Hispanic.   
In June 1988, the court held a hearing on defendant’s renewed motion to 
challenge the composition of San Diego County juries and to quash all of its 
available jury panels.  In support of having a full hearing on the motion to 
challenge the composition of the jury, defendant made offers of proof regarding 
the alleged underrepresentation of Hispanics and young adults aged between 18 
and 24. 
Concerning the representation of Hispanics, defendant made the following 
offer of proof:  (1) Using a computer program that identifies Hispanic surnames, 
16.4 percent of the San Diego County master jury list contained individuals with 
Spanish surnames, which was probably consistent with the then-existing Hispanic 
population in the county over the age of 18; (2) after written and call-in excuses in 
response to the initial juror summons were taken into account, the percentage of 
Hispanics dropped to 14 percent; and (3) only 10.7 percent of individuals who 
appeared for jury service self-identified as Hispanic.  
Regarding the representation of young adults aged between 18 and 24, 
defendant made the following offer of proof:  (1) Based on data gathered in 
another, unrelated case, young adults in San Diego County comprise 
approximately 22 percent of the total eligible jurors; (2) only 9.1 percent of young 
adults appeared for jury service; (3) this disparity could not be fully accounted for 
based on young adults relocating due to military or college commitments; and (4) 
young adults are a cognizable group for purposes of jury selection representation 
because they have attitudes and beliefs unique from other groups.  
The trial court denied the requested evidentiary hearing and the related 
motion.  The court concluded that the statistics presented by defendant constituted 
 
115 
an insufficient offer of proof and did not suggest that Hispanics were being 
underrepresented because “the court cannot tell what caused the difference” 
between the 14 percent who responded to the initial juror summonses and the 10.7 
percent who actually appeared for jury service.  The court stated that “a good 
inference could be drawn that at least a certain percentage of that [difference] 
would be based on others who did not speak English or are aliens and who did not 
call, but who did not show up for those reasons.”  Concerning young adults, the 
court admitted that there was a large disparity between their prevalence in the 
population and their prevalence in the appearing jury pools, but concluded that 
defendant’s survey of this age group did not demonstrate any homogeneity as to 
whether “young people are less apt to convict than older people,” and, therefore, 
young adults were not a cognizable group.  
c) Analysis 
Under the federal and state Constitutions, a defendant is entitled to a jury 
drawn from a representative cross-section of the community.  (U.S. Const., Sixth 
Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357, 358-367; 
People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1159.)  This guarantee mandates that 
courts select juries from pools that do not systematically exclude distinctive 
groups in the community.  (People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 225.) 
In order to investigate whether the court has failed to draw a jury from a 
representative cross-section of the community, we have recognized that a 
defendant has certain rights to discovery.  In such a circumstance, “we consider 
not whether defendant has made a prima facie case [of underrepresentation], but 
the prior question of whether defendant was wrongly denied the discovery of 
information necessary to make such a case.”  (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 
1164, 1194.)  Accordingly, instead of making a prima facie case of 
 
116 
underrepresentation, a defendant need only make “a particularized showing 
supporting a reasonable belief that underrepresentation in the jury pool or the 
venire exists as the result of practices of systematic exclusion.”  (Ibid., italics 
added.)  Upon such a showing, “the court must make a reasonable effort to 
accommodate the defendant’s relevant requests for information designed to verify 
the existence of such underrepresentation and document its nature and extent.”  
(Ibid.)  As explained below, defendant failed to make a particularized showing 
supporting a reasonable belief that his jury was selected from an unfair cross-
section of the community.  The trial court, therefore, properly denied defendant’s 
discovery request. 
At the outset, we have held that young persons are not a cognizable group 
for purposes of an equal protection challenge to a jury’s composition.  (People v. 
Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 482; see People v. Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th at 
p. 256.)  Hispanics, however, are a cognizable group for purposes of such 
challenges.  (See Castaneda v. Partida (1977) 430 U.S. 482, 495.) 
In assessing defendant’s fourth discovery motion to probe the composition 
of the venire, Judge Orfield correctly concluded that defendant had failed to make 
a particularized showing supporting a reasonable belief concerning 
underrepresentation of Hispanics in the jury pool to justify further discovery.39  
Even though his own expert asserted it was available, defendant failed to provide 
the most relevant statistic to support his discovery request — demographic data 
showing the percentage of Hispanics who are presumptively eligible for jury 
service.  Instead, defendant presented general population data concerning 
                                              
39 
Accordingly, Judge Hammes did not err in relying on this prior ruling to 
deny defendant’s additional discovery requests.  
 
117 
Hispanics in San Diego County and compared that percentage with the number of 
Hispanic persons who appeared for jury service.  In People v. Harris (1984) 36 
Cal.3d 36, 54 (Harris), we recognized that such a comparison is problematic 
because general population data do not identify how many in the class are actually 
qualified for jury service; therefore, “a showing that that class’ representation in 
the jury pool is less than the group’s percentage of the general population does not 
necessarily show that the group is underrepresented.”  Although we recognized 
that it might be difficult for a defendant to obtain precise data concerning the 
number of persons qualified to serve, we noted that “more refined statistics would 
be preferable if available, [but] when they are not, it is sufficient for the defendant 
to show a significant disparity based on the use of total population figures.”40  
(Harris, supra, at p. 54.)   
Here, the more relevant and precise statistic was available with “some 
effort” according to the defense expert.  Indeed, the same defense expert had 
previously obtained similar data for Orange County.  Yet, the defense relied on the 
general population statistic, which would obviously portray a greater statistical 
disparity when compared with the percentage of Hispanics who appeared for jury 
service.  Given the amount of effort the jury commissioner expended in complying 
                                              
40 
This portion of the opinion in Harris was endorsed by only a three-justice 
plurality of this court.  We later recognized that census data regarding adult 
populations were readily available, and we subsequently clarified that, for 
purposes of making a prima facie showing of underrepresentation, henceforward 
“a defendant who has access to census or other demographic data that reflect adult 
population figures must base his challenge on that data.”  (People v. Bell (1989) 49 
Cal.3d 502, 526, fn. 12.)  At the time of defendant’s trial, Harris was the 
controlling case, but Harris did not address the threshold showing required for a 
discovery request and did not concern a scenario in which the defense expert 
admitted that a more relevant statistic, the percentage of adult Hispanics who 
could speak English, was available but not obtained. 
 
118 
with defendant’s three prior requests for discovery and given that defendant had 
access to the key statistical data relevant to the existence or nonexistence of any 
disparity, it was not unreasonable to expect defendant to make a more precise 
showing before granting his additional, and largely repetitive, discovery requests. 
Moreover, we note that the defense expert’s testimony concerning the 
adjoining jurisdiction, Orange County, strongly suggested that the percentage of 
Hispanic persons who appeared for jury service in San Diego County was 
consistent with the jury eligibility of Hispanics in the San Diego County 
population.  According to Dr. Butler, Orange and San Diego Counties had nearly 
identical 1980 census data concerning the percentage of its Hispanic population, 
and the percentage of Hispanic persons in Orange County who were 18 years of 
age or older, citizens, and English speaking was 8.4 percent.  Dr. Butler projected 
that the 1985 population in Orange County contained between 9.07 and 11.16 
percent who were jury eligible and Hispanic.  This projection was roughly 
consistent with the 9 percent calculation made by the jury coordinator in San 
Diego County after defendant surveyed more than 1,700 prospective jurors.  
Absent any showing by defendant that the demographics of Orange and San Diego 
Counties were not comparable, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to 
conclude that defendant failed to show that a “further and deeper study should be 
made.”  Defendant made no particularized showing supporting a reasonable belief 
of underrepresentation in the San Diego County jury pool that would justify 
further discovery. 
Defendant also failed to make a prima facie showing of underrepresentation 
of Hispanics for purposes of challenging the San Diego County venire.  To 
establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, defendant 
must show (1) that the group excluded was “distinctive”; (2) representation of the 
group in venires is not fair and reasonable in relation to community; and (3) this 
 
119 
underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion.  (People v. Ayala, supra, 23 
Cal.4th at p. 256.)  By the time the trial court heard defendant’s motion to quash 
the venire, defendant had surveyed literally thousands of prospective jurors over a 
period of less than three years.  The surveys showed that between 8.1 and 10.7 
percent of prospective jurors who appeared for service identified themselves as 
Hispanic.  As previously explained, defendant had access to statistics that could 
have more precisely described the percentage of the county population who were 
Hispanic and jury eligible, but he failed to present them during the nearly three 
years he litigated his fair cross-section claim.  Additionally, the statistics that 
defendant did present appeared consistent with the defense expert’s projections in 
adjoining Orange County, which had a comparable proportion of Hispanic 
residents. 
But even assuming, for the sake of argument, that defendant’s statistics did 
reveal an underrepresentation of Hispanics, defendant’s claim still fails because he 
made no showing that any alleged underrepresentation was the result of systematic 
exclusion.  In fact, defendant’s own offer of proof revealed that the county’s 
master jury list contained a fair cross-section of the Hispanic community, 16.4 
percent, which he admitted was probably consistent with the then existing 
Hispanic population in the county over the age of 18.  Therefore, any disparity 
arose only after summoned prospective jurors mailed or telephoned excuses or 
simply did not respond to the summons.  Defendant failed to explain how this 
apparently neutral excusal system was “an improper feature of the jury-selection 
process.”  (People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1160.)  Indeed, it appears that 
“[t]he foregoing method does not discriminate on the basis of ethnicity or national 
origin.”  (People v. Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 256.)  Accordingly, the trial 
court was correct in noting that defendant had not explained “what caused the 
difference” between the 14 percent who remained in the venire after responses to 
 
120 
the juror summonses and the 10.7 percent who actually appeared for jury service.  
The additional data defendant collected as the result of his later discovery motions 
were roughly consistent with the previous data defendant collected, but that data 
also failed to show any systematic exclusion.   
2.  Voir Dire Concerning Defendant’s Prior Rape Conviction 
Defendant claims the trial court erred by precluding his counsel from 
asking prospective jurors during voir dire about the effect of defendant’s prior rape 
conviction on their ability to fairly judge defendant’s penalty.  He contends this 
violated his state and federal rights to due process and trial by a fair jury and 
violated his Eighth Amendment right to a reliable, fair, and impartial sentencing 
trial.  We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting fact-
specific questions concerning defendant’s 1973 rape conviction. 
“ ‘[D]eath-qualification voir dire must avoid two extremes.  On the one 
hand, it must not be so abstract that it fails to identify those jurors whose death 
penalty views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their 
duties as jurors in the case being tried.  On the other hand, it must not be so 
specific that it requires prospective jurors to prejudge the penalty issue based on a 
summary of the mitigating and aggravating evidence likely to be presented.  
[Citation.]  In deciding where to strike the balance in a particular case, trial courts 
have considerable discretion.’ ”  (People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 
1120-1121, quoting People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 721-722.)  Regarding 
the limits of this discretion, “the court’s refusal to allow inquiry into such facts is 
improper only if it is ‘categorical’ [citation] and denies all ‘opportunity’ to 
ascertain juror views about these facts.”  (People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 
1263, 1286, quoting People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 286-287.) 
 
121 
As defendant concedes, the trial court told defense counsel that he could 
“certainly explore how strongly they [prospective jurors] feel about rape and 
whether that’s ever touched their lives and whether they would be very, very, very 
prejudiced against somebody who did such a thing.”  The court observed that such 
inquiry would “give you an indication that that’s the person who will take that one 
aggravating factor and vote death . . . .”  The trial court repeatedly clarified that 
such open-ended questions about rape were permissible.  Therefore, although the 
trial court prohibited specific questions about defendant’s 1973 rape conviction, 
the court did not abuse its discretion because it did not categorically bar questions 
concerning rape as an aggravating factor. 
3.  Challenge for Cause 
Defendant contends the trial court erred and violated his constitutional right 
to an impartial jury by denying a defense challenge for cause against Prospective 
Juror S.B., who eventually sat on defendant’s jury.  Defendant concedes that he 
had 11 available peremptory challenges when his jury panel was sworn in but did 
not challenge S.B. 
By failing to use one of his remaining 11 peremptory challenges to remove 
Prospective Juror S.B., defendant forfeited his claim.  (People v. Davis (2009) 46 
Cal.4th 539, 582.)  Defendant suggests several reasons why we should reconsider 
the application of forfeiture under these circumstances, but none of them address 
the obvious, long-recognized maxim that “ ‘ “errors committed in overruling 
challenges for cause are not grounds of reversal, unless it be shown an 
objectionable juror was forced upon the challenging party after he had exhausted 
his peremptory challenges; if his peremptory challenges remain unexhausted, so 
that he might have excluded the objectionable juror by that means he has no 
ground of complaint.” ’ ”  (People v. Schafer (1911) 161 Cal. 573, 577, quoting 
 
122 
People v. Durrant (1897) 116 Cal. 179, 196-197.)  Defendant further argues that, 
in capital trials, forfeiture should not apply in this circumstance unless the 
defendant personally waives his right to an impartial jury.  But even in capital 
cases the scope of counsel’s authority “extends to matters such as deciding what 
witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to 
accept or reject, what motions to make, and most other strategic and tactical 
determinations.”  (People v. McKenzie (1983) 34 Cal.3d 616, 631.) 
Moreover, defendant’s argument assumes he was tried by an unfair juror.  
He was not.  Although Prospective Juror S.B. acknowledged during questioning 
that she categorized the murder of a child as a heinous crime that would cause her 
to lean substantially in favor of a death sentence and that she would require proof 
that a sentence of life should be imposed instead, she also clarified that she would 
“listen to the mitigating circumstances and things of that nature before [she] could 
make a definite judgment.”  When presented with a hypothetical child-murder in 
which the defendant presents no mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, S.B. 
stated she would be willing to openly discuss alternative penalties because a 
fellow juror may have interpreted something from the guilt phase as mitigating.  
Finally, when asked why she could consider a life sentence instead of a death 
sentence for someone guilty of murdering six persons, including two children, 
S.B. responded:  “I think I have compassion.”  
Because these statements indicated that Prospective Juror S.B. had not 
prejudged defendant’s penalty but remained open to considering the evidence and 
consulting her compassion in deciding the appropriate penalty, the trial court 
properly denied the challenge for cause.  (People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 
953-954 [challenge for cause properly denied when prospective juror stated she 
would always vote for death for murder of a fellow inmate, but later clarified that 
 
123 
she would consider the evidence and could see herself realistically voting for a life 
sentence].) 
4.  Publication of Juror Information 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his request, made 
before jury selection, to withhold from the press the names of the jurors or 
prospective jurors, and he claims this error violated his state and federal 
constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial by jury, and reliable guilt and 
penalty verdicts.  We disagree. 
Defendant filed a motion to prohibit the media from photographing jurors, 
contacting jurors prior to the completion of the trial, and from publishing the 
names of jurors.  Various local media outlets opposed the motion.  Defendant 
offered no evidence, other than the nature of the case itself, explaining why a 
protective order was needed to ensure the fairness of defendant’s trial.  The trial 
court ordered the media not to videotape or photograph any of the jurors or 
prospective jurors and prohibited any interviews inside the courtroom.  The court 
denied defendant’s motion to prohibit the media from publishing the names of 
jurors.  
Our courts have noted that “[p]rior restraints are ‘one of the most 
extraordinary remedies known to our jurisprudence’ [citation] and carry a heavy 
burden against constitutional validity.”  (South Coast Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior 
Court (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 866, 870, quoting Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart 
(1976) 427 U.S. 539, 562.)  Most are invalid, but “prior restraints may be imposed 
under some extraordinary circumstances.”  (Wilson v. Superior Court (1975) 13 
Cal.3d 652, 661.)  According to the high court, the trial court must examine the 
evidence before it to determine “(a) the nature and extent of pretrial news 
coverage; (b) whether other measures would be likely to mitigate the effects of 
 
124 
unrestrained pre-trial publicity; and (c) how effectively a restraining order would 
operate to prevent the threatened danger.”  (Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, supra, 
at p. 562.)  In NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 
Cal.4th 1178, 1217-1218, we stated that, before a prior restraint can be upheld, “a 
trial court must hold a hearing and expressly find that (i) there exists an overriding 
interest supporting closure and/or sealing; (ii) there is a substantial probability that 
the interest will be prejudiced absent closure and/or sealing; (iii) the proposed 
closure and/or sealing is narrowly tailored to serve the overriding interest; and (iv) 
there is no less restrictive means of achieving the overriding interest.”  (Fns. 
omitted.) 
Although defendant asserted generally that public disclosure of jurors’ 
names would interfere with his right to a fair trial, he offered no evidence 
supporting the proposition that prejudice to that interest was substantially probable 
without the prior restraint.  There was no evidence that the media sought to 
identify the jurors publicly either before or during trial or that there was a clear 
danger that jurors would be pressured if publicly identified.  As evidence of 
prejudice, defendant refers to a juror who, in an abundance of caution, reported to 
the court that she had received a threat on her answering machine during the trial, 
but the juror herself believed that it “surely had nothing to do with this trial.”  
Because defendant advanced only an abstract argument concerning the danger of 
infringement on his right to a fair trial, the trial court properly exercised its 
discretion and concluded that it had no choice but to deny his motion.  (See South 
Coast Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 873-874.) 
 
125 
III.  GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Evidentiary Issues — Asserted Errors 
1.  Admissibility of the Love Insurance Note 
a)  Failure to Authenticate the Love Insurance Note 
Defendant argues that the trial judge erred and violated his state and federal 
rights to due process by failing to subject the photographs of the front and back of 
the handwriting on the Love Insurance note to an authentication process under 
Evidence Code sections 1400 and 1401.  Under defendant’s theory, the judge was 
obligated to make a preliminary finding that these photographs were authentic 
“writings.”  He also claims that the trial court committed prejudicial error by not 
instructing the jury to determine the note’s authenticity.  These contentions are not 
persuasive.   
A writing must be authenticated before being admitted into evidence or 
before secondary evidence of its contents is received.  (Evid. Code, § 1401.)  A 
writing is admissible if a finding of authentication is supported by a preponderance 
of the evidence.  (Jazayeri v. Mao (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 301, 321.)  The 
proponent of a writing satisfies the requirement of authentication when he or she 
introduces evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that the writing is what it is 
purports to be.  (Evid. Code, § 1400.)  Even if conflicting inferences can be drawn 
from the evidence supporting authentication, that consideration goes to the weight 
of the evidence and not to its admissibility.  (Jazayeri v. Mao, supra, at p. 321.)   
The record indicates that the trial court did consider and rule on the issue of 
authentication.  In a portion of a pretrial motion, the defense raised the 
authentication issue in detail.  When the prosecution sought admission of various 
Polaroid photos of the Love Insurance note at trial, the court asked whether 
defendant had any objection, and defendant requested leave to cross-examine the 
 
126 
witness first, which the court granted.  The next day, after cross-examination, the 
prosecution once again moved to admit the same three photographs of the note.  
Defense counsel stated that there were “existing objections on the record” and that 
he was renewing them.  The court replied:  “[The objections] are noted.  [The 
photographs] are admitted at this time.”  When the prosecutor asked if he was 
permitted to show the photos to the jury, the court responded that he was.  The 
trial judge was briefed on the authentication issue and, by admitting them into 
evidence, impliedly found the photographs to be authentic. 
We reject defendant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support a 
finding that the photographs were authentically what the prosecution claimed them 
to be — accurate depictions of the note found on the Jacobses’ bathroom rug.  
Detective Gleason testified that the photographs accurately depicted how the note 
was found folded and how it appeared on both sides after being unfolded.  Stewart, 
the police lab technician, also testified that he took the photographs and that they 
represented the note.  This testimony provides sufficient evidence that the 
photographs accurately depicted the two sides of the note.41   
                                              
41  
Defendant, for the first time on appeal, also advances a certification 
challenge, arguing that the note’s admission did not comply with Evidence Code 
sections 1531 and 1551, which, together, allow a photographic copy of a destroyed 
original writing to be admitted as if it were the original writing so long as the 
person who created the photographic copy attaches a certification attesting that the 
photo is a correct copy of the original.  Defendant forfeited any challenge under 
Evidence Code sections 1531 and 1551 by failing to object on these grounds 
below.  (Quality Wash Group V Ltd. v. Hallak (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1687, 1698.)  
In any event, the testimony of Stewart precludes any possible prejudice in failing 
to strictly comply with the provisions of Evidence Code sections 1531 and 1551.  
(People v. Skiles (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1178, 1186 [certification establishes only “a 
presumption of authenticity and is not the sine qua non of admissibility”].) 
 
127 
Defendant also contends that the court erred in failing to instruct on 
contested authentication, as required by Evidence Code section 403, subdivision 
(c)(1).  The Attorney General does not dispute this claim.  Under that section, 
when a court accepts evidence of a document’s authenticity but that authenticity 
remains contested, it “[m]ay, and on request shall, instruct the jury to determine 
whether the preliminary fact exists and to disregard the proffered evidence unless 
the jury finds that the preliminary fact does exist.”  (Evid. Code, § 403, subd. 
(c)(1).)  Because defendant contested the authenticity of the photographs and 
requested such an instruction, the trial court erred by failing to give the instruction.   
Still, the error was harmless.  First, defendant contends that this error 
violated his federal constitutional rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments by preventing the jury from deciding all relevant issues of fact and 
weighing the credibility of the evidence.  We examine “the nature of the evidence 
presented to determine whether it was likely the omitted instructions affected the 
jury’s evaluation of the evidence.”  (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 38.)  The 
instructions in this case did not advise the jurors to assume the photographs were 
authentic, but rather failed to advise them to consider the authenticity of the photos 
before relying on them.  This did not rise to the level of a federal constitutional 
violation, and state law error in admitting evidence is subject to harmless error 
analysis under Watson.  (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439.)  Under 
Watson, defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that a result more 
favorable to defendant would have been reached absent the error.  (Watson, supra, 
46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)  Here there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury would 
have found the photographs to be inaccurate representations of the note while 
simultaneously relying on those photographs to place defendant at the crime scene.  
(See Assem. Com. on Judiciary com., reprinted at 29B pt. 1B West’s Ann. Evid. 
Code (2011 ed.) foll. § 403, p. 21 (West’s Annotated Evidence Code) [stating that 
 
128 
an instruction on conditional relevancy is often not necessary, giving the example 
of a contested deed — “[n]o rational jury could find the deed to be spurious and, 
yet, to be still effective to transfer title from the purported grantor”].) 
b)  Failure to Comply with the Best Evidence Rule 
Defendant argues that the photograph of the Love Insurance note should 
not have been admitted in light of the “best evidence rule.”42  Defendant contends 
that the note was admitted to prove its contents because the prosecution relied on 
the name of the insurance company and its contact information as circumstantial 
evidence linking defendant to the crime scene.  Additionally, defendant avers that 
the prosecution’s comparative handwriting analysis relied on the contents of the 
note by examining the “shape, formation and style of each letter and numeral.”  
According to defendant, the original note should have been offered to prove its 
contents and the photograph was not an admissible substitute.  We disagree. 
We will consider a claim of erroneously admitted evidence only when the 
original objection to the evidence was both timely and specific.  (Evid. Code, 
§ 353, subd. (a); People v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal.4th 891, 924.)  Further, the 
objection must be specific enough as to “fairly inform the trial court, as well as the 
party offering the evidence, of the specific reason or reasons the objecting party 
believes the evidence should be excluded, so the party offering the evidence can 
respond appropriately and the court can make a fully informed ruling.”  (People v. 
Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 435.) 
                                              
42 
The so-called best evidence rule was codified as Evidence Code former 
section 1500 et seq.  Effective January 1, 1999, it was renumbered and retitled, 
and is now called the secondary evidence rule.  (See Evid. Code, § 1520 et seq.)  
We apply the rule as it existed at the time of defendant’s trial. 
 
129 
In this case, defendant never made a specific best evidence rule objection at 
the time the photographs of the Love Insurance note were introduced into 
evidence.  He objected to the photographs, citing merely “existing objections on 
the record,” but we have found no “best evidence” objection in the record.  In 
pretrial briefing, defendant claimed that folds in the original paper affected the 
handwritten letters, causing the potential loss of writing material for purposes of 
handwriting comparison, but he did not make reference to the best evidence rule.43  
Instead, the specific best evidence rule objection to the note was raised, and 
rejected, nearly five months later in connection with arguments concerning jury 
instructions.  Defendant forfeited this claim by failing to make a specific best 
evidence rule objection at the time the photographs were introduced into evidence.  
(See People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 423-424 [defendant’s objection to 
admission of photographs was not preserved on appeal when he failed to object 
when they were used in questioning witnesses but then objected at a later stage 
when the prosecution entered them into evidence].)   
In any event, the claim lacks merit.  The former best evidence rule (see 
ante, fn. 42) codified in Evidence Code section 1500, provided, in pertinent part, 
that “no evidence other than the writing itself is admissible to prove the content of 
a writing.”  (Stats. 1965, ch. 299, § 2, pp. 1297, 1350.)  But under this former 
provision, a copy of a writing was not made inadmissible when “ ‘the writing is 
lost or has been destroyed without fraudulent intent on the part of the proponent of 
                                              
43 
We also reject defendant’s contention that there may have been some 
relevant differences between the original note and the photographs because of 
content possibly lost within the folds of the paper.  The prosecution presented 
large, blown-up copies of the photograph of the note in which any creasing in the 
note can be readily examined.  Any missing detail is not so severe as to render any 
significant portion of it hidden or illegible.   
 
130 
the evidence.’ ”  (People v. Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 205, italics omitted; see 
Guardianship of Levy (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 237, 249-250 [admitting secondary 
evidence of a writing when the original was intentionally destroyed in good 
faith].)  Defendant has failed to show fraudulent intent in the destruction of the 
original Love Insurance note.  Consequently, the photographs were admissible 
even if they otherwise qualified for exclusion under the former version of the best 
evidence rule. 
2.  Admission of Lay Opinion Evidence Concerning the Handwriting on 
the Love Insurance Note 
Defendant asserts several challenges to the admission of a lay opinion that 
the handwriting on the Love Insurance note looked like defendant’s handwriting.  
Specifically, Frank Clark, defendant’s long-time work colleague, testified that he 
believed defendant wrote the letters and numbers on the paper.  In overruling 
defendant’s various objections to this evidence, the trial court found adequate 
foundation to allow Clark’s opinion on this subject because he had seen a number 
of numerals and letters written by defendant over the course of their working 
relationship.  According to the trial court, that extensive exposure to defendant’s 
writing allowed Clark to provide an opinion “as to whether or not the writing on 
the Love Insurance note appears to be consistent with Mr. Lucas’s writing.”   
Defendant now challenges the admission of this testimony on three bases.  
First, he argues that Clark’s statement that defendant authored the note did not 
meet the requirements for lay opinion testimony.  Second, he contends that the 
prosecution failed to establish, as a foundational matter, that handwriting is 
sufficiently unique to enable identification of a particular person’s writing.  
Finally, he states that Clark’s opinion about the note should have been excluded 
under Evidence Code section 352.  Defendant’s contentions fail. 
 
131 
Opinion evidence given by a lay witness is admissible “as is permitted by 
law,” including, but not limited to, an opinion that is:  “(a) [r]ationally based on 
the perception of the witness; and [¶] (b) [h]elpful to a clear understanding of his 
[or her] testimony.”  (Evid. Code, § 800.)  The California Law Revision 
Commission’s comment to Evidence Code section 800 clarifies that it “does not 
make inadmissible an opinion that is admissible under existing law,” even if that 
opinion does not meet the two factors in section 800.  (Cal. Law Revision Com. 
com., reprinted at 29B pt. 3A West’s Ann. Evid. Code (2009 ed.) foll. § 800, p. 3.)  
In other words, Evidence Code section 800 does not render a lay opinion 
inadmissible that would have otherwise been admissible under another section. 
Evidence Code section 1416 provides a specific statutory basis under which 
a lay opinion is admissible regarding handwriting.  Under section 1416, a lay 
witness may state his or her opinion concerning whether a document reflects the 
handwriting of a particular person if the court finds that he or she has “personal 
knowledge of the handwriting of the supposed writer.”44  If Clark’s opinion 
                                              
44  
Evidence Code section 1416 provides in full:  “A witness who is not 
otherwise qualified to testify as an expert may state his opinion whether a writing 
is in the handwriting of a supposed writer if the court finds that he has personal 
knowledge of the handwriting of the supposed writer.  Such personal knowledge 
may be acquired from:  [¶]  (a) Having seen the supposed writer write;  [¶]  (b) 
Having seen a writing purporting to be in the handwriting of the supposed writer 
and upon which the supposed writer has acted or been charged;  [¶]  (c) Having 
received letters in the due course of mail purporting to be from the supposed writer 
in response to letters duly addressed and mailed by him to the supposed writer; or  
[¶]  (d) Any other means of obtaining personal knowledge of the handwriting of 
the supposed writer.”  
 
This kind of opinion testimony was already permitted under Code of Civil 
Procedure former section 1943 when the Evidence Code was enacted in 1965.  
(Stats. 1901, ch. 102, § 481, p. 247, repealed by Stats. 1965, ch. 299, § 100, 
p. 1362, on enactment of the Evid. Code.) 
 
132 
testimony properly qualified under section 1416, it need not be analyzed under 
section 800.   
Clark’s opinion did qualify under Evidence Code section 1416.  He had 
sufficient personal knowledge of defendant’s writing, having known and worked 
with defendant for several years.  In that capacity, he saw various documents 
containing letters and numerals written by defendant, including a number of 
documents that he identified in court.  The court reasonably held that this gave 
Clark sufficient personal knowledge to opine about whether defendant authored 
the note.   
Defendant advances several unpersuasive arguments to the contrary.  He 
asserts that Evidence Code section 1416 should not apply to the handwriting on 
the Love Insurance note because the note contains “handprinting” rather than 
“handwriting.”  He quotes the comment to Evidence Code section 1418, the statute 
providing for the admissibility of expert testimony about handwriting, stating that 
it applies “to any form of writing, not just handwriting.”  (Cal. Law Revision Com. 
com., reprinted at 29B pt. 4 West’s Ann. Evid. Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 1418, at 
p. 469.)  He reasons that because “writing” means something beyond 
“handwriting” in section 1418, section 1416 must be intended to apply to cursive 
handwriting only.  We disagree.   
First, the comment quoted by defendant is intended to clarify that expert 
witnesses may provide opinions comparing typewriting under that section.  (Cal. 
Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at 29B pt. 4 West’s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, 
foll. § 1418 at p. 469 [explaining that the section “applies to any form of writing, 
not just handwriting” because “experts can now compare typewriting 
specimens”].)  Second, defendant points to no court or other authority that has 
applied different standards to cursive and printed letters.  (See Evid. Code, § 250 
[making no distinction between printing and cursive styles in definition of a 
 
133 
“writing”]; Black’s Law Dict. (9th ed. 2009) p. 783, col. 1 [defining handwriting 
as “the cast or form of writing peculiar to a person, including the size, shape, and 
style of letters, and whatever gives individuality to one’s writing” and 
“[something] written by hand” and making no distinction between cursive writing 
and printing].)  Moreover, the extent to which a distinction between cursive 
handwriting and handprinting might affect the relevance of an opinion concerning 
authorship can properly be elicited through cross-examination.  Defendant’s 
further contention that the opinion here was not “helpful” under Evidence Code 
section 800 seems dubious, but in any event, as noted above it was admissible 
under another existing law, Evidence Code section 1416.   
Defendant also challenges the foundation of Clark’s opinion testimony.  
First, he argues that the prosecution was required to establish that a unique 
identification could be made based on the small sample of letters and numerals 
present in the Love Insurance note.  Evidence Code section 1416 imposes no such 
restriction.  Second, defendant asserts that the prosecution failed to make a 
foundational showing that Clark could specifically make this identification for the 
following reasons:  Clark had never seen defendant write the exact content of the 
note; the content of the note was limited; Clark did not compare exemplars; and 
Clark’s comparison was not based on defendant’s contemporaneous writings.  As 
stated above, the court did not abuse its discretion by finding an adequate 
foundation for Clark’s opinion regarding the authorship of the writing under 
Evidence Code section 1416.  All of the factors that defendant mentions could be 
explored on cross-examination and considered by the jury in weighing the 
evidence, but they do not go to the opinion’s admissibility. 
Defendant insists that the court, nevertheless, committed prejudicial error 
by not providing a requested jury instruction requiring the jury to determine, as a 
foundational matter, whether the handwriting on the note was sufficiently unique.  
 
134 
Contrary to defendant’s claim, this jury instruction was not required under 
Evidence Code section 403, because Clark’s qualification to state his opinion 
under 1416 was a determination for the judge, not the jury.  (Legis. Com. com., 
29B pt. 1B West’s Ann. Evid. Code (2011 ed.) foll. § 403 at p. 20 [the 
qualifications of a lay witness to give an opinion under Evid. Code, § 1416 is 
decided by the judge under Evid. Code, § 405]; Legis. Com. com., reprinted at 
29B pt. 1B West’s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. § 405 at p. 42 [a “witness’ 
qualifications to express such an opinion [under Evid. Code, § 1416] . . . are to be 
determined by the judge under Section 405 just as the qualifications of other 
experts are decided by the judge”].)  The trial court rightly rejected this erroneous 
instruction on the required foundational showing.   
Alternatively, defendant contends the trial court should have excluded 
Clark’s testimony under Evidence Code section 352 because its probative value 
was substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice.  As we have 
already noted, an Evidence Code section 352 determination is reviewed by 
applying an abuse of discretion standard.  (People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 
195.)  For purposes of a section 352 analysis, evidence is unduly prejudicial if it 
tends to create an emotional bias against a defendant that could inflame the jury, 
while also having a negligible bearing on the issues.  (People v. Mendoza (2011) 
52 Cal.4th 1056, 1091-1092.)  The authorship of the handwriting on the Love 
Insurance note was far from a negligible issue.  It was a crucial element of the 
case.  Clark had personal experience with defendant’s handwriting and was 
qualified, under Evidence Code section 1416, to express his opinion that the note 
was consistent with that handwriting.  His testimony assisted the jury in 
determining whether defendant wrote the note, and this in turn was directly 
relevant to the jury’s determination whether defendant was present at the Jacobs 
crime scene.  Nor did Clark’s opinion tend to create any emotional bias against 
 
135 
defendant.  There was no abuse of discretion in admitting Clark’s testimony on 
this basis. 
3.  Exclusion of Lay Opinion Evidence Concerning the Love Insurance 
Note 
David Ray Woods was briefly considered a suspect in the Jacobs murders.  
(See ante, fn. 12, p. 17.)  The trial court excluded a statement by Rochelle 
Coleman, Woods’s girlfriend, in which she stated her belief that Woods authored 
the Love Insurance note.  During a police interview, Coleman was shown a 
photograph of the Love Insurance note and asked if she recognized the 
handwriting on the note.  She stated, “that’s David’s handwriting.”  Coleman died 
prior to trial.  Defendant sought admission of the statement for its truth under the 
spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule.  He also sought to admit the 
statement for a variety of nonhearsay purposes.  The court rejected these theories 
and excluded the statement.   
Defendant raises several related claims.  He first challenges the exclusion 
of this statement by claiming that it should have been allowed under the 
spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule.  He next contends the 
statement could also have been admissible for the nonhearsay purpose of 
undermining the expert handwriting evidence presented by the prosecution.  
Finally, he posits that even if the statement were not otherwise admissible, its 
exclusion precluded his right to present a defense.  We hold that none of these 
claims discloses an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to exclude 
Coleman’s statement.  
As previously described, evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible 
by the hearsay rule if the statement “(a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an 
act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶]  (b) Was made 
spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by 
 
136 
such perception.”  (Evid. Code, § 1240.)  To apply the exception the trial court 
must determine that “ ‘(1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to 
produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and 
unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been before there has been time to 
contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still 
to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance 
must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.’ ”  (People v. Poggi 
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 318, quoting Showalter v. Western Pacific R. R. Co. (1940) 
16 Cal.2d 460, 468.)  This rule mirrors a common law exception based upon the 
notion that such statements, although not necessarily more reliable or accurate, are 
more likely to represent “ ‘the unreflecting and sincere expression of one’s actual 
impressions and belief.’ ”  (Showalter v. Western Pacific R. R. Co., supra, at 
p. 468.)  Consequently, the mental state of the declarant — that is, the question of 
whether he or she was sufficiently under stress so as to dramatically reduce the 
possibility of deliberation and prevarication — is crucial to determining whether 
the exception applies.  A trial court’s decision to exclude a statement as not 
qualifying as a spontaneous utterance can be reversed only if it amounted to an 
abuse of the court’s discretion.  (People v. Gallegos (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 175.)   
The trial court did not abuse its discretion.  The court heard testimony from 
a police officer, Lieutenant Dolores Messick, who was present at the interview, 
and then the court heard a tape-recording of the interview.  In rendering its 
decision to exclude the statement, the court noted that “[Coleman’s] voice was 
very calm, cool, and modulated throughout” the recording.  This tone did not 
change when she was presented with the photograph.  Indeed, Messick also 
testified that Coleman was calm throughout the interview and did not show any 
emotion or change in demeanor when presented with the photograph.  It was 
appropriate for the trial court to consider the level of stress or excitement evident 
 
137 
in Coleman’s voice and through her demeanor.  (See People v. Brown (2003) 31 
Cal.4th 518, 541 [trial court properly considered that the declarant was “crying, 
shaking, and visibly upset” when allowing his statement as a spontaneous 
utterance].)  Because all of the evidence presented at trial suggests that Coleman 
seemed calm and reflective when giving her statement, we conclude that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting its admission as a spontaneous 
utterance.   
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in concluding that Coleman’s 
statement was inadmissible to undermine or impeach the prosecution’s expert 
testimony about handwriting comparison.  Defendant argues that the statement 
should have been admitted as nonhearsay evidence that the handwriting on the 
note was not unique and to impeach the prosecution’s expert witness by showing 
improper bias.  But to provide any such relevancy, one would have to accept as 
truthful that Coleman actually believed that the handwriting matched David 
Woods’s handwriting.  Therefore, it is difficult to understand how Coleman’s 
statements could constitute evidence of how the handwriting on the Love 
Insurance note was not unique without it also being offered to prove the truth of 
Coleman’s belief. 
Finally, the exclusion of Coleman’s statement did not preclude defendant’s 
constitutional right to present a defense or his constitutional rights to due process, 
and trial by jury, nor did it violate any principle requiring heightened reliability in 
capital cases.  “ ‘As a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not 
impermissibly infringe on the accused’s right to present a defense.’ ”  (People v. 
Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 821, quoting People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 
826, 834.)  Citing no authority, defendant fails to convince us that the application 
of these evidentiary rules, designed to exclude unreliable evidence, prejudiced the 
ability to defend his case or affected his constitutional rights. 
 
138 
4.  Restriction on the Cross-examination of John Massingale 
Defendant contends the trial court violated his statutory and constitutional 
rights to confront John Massingale by improperly restricting defense counsel’s 
cross-examination of him regarding a federal civil suit Massingale had filed 
against San Diego authorities, claiming he had been wrongfully arrested and held 
for the Jacobs murders.  Defendant argues that Massingale had a strong financial 
interest in testifying against defendant, and the trial court’s ruling unfairly 
precluded defense counsel from using this impeachment evidence.  We agree that 
the court erred, but disagree concerning the effect of this error. 
“ ‘[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by 
showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-
examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the 
witness, and thereby, “to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could 
appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.” ’  
[Citation.]  However, not every restriction on a defendant’s desired method of 
cross-examination is a constitutional violation.  Within the confines of the 
confrontation clause, the trial court retains wide latitude in restricting cross-
examination that is repetitive, prejudicial, confusing of the issues, or of marginal 
relevance.  [Citations.]  California law is in accord.  [Citation.]  Thus, unless the 
defendant can show that the prohibited cross-examination would have produced ‘a 
significantly different impression of [the witnesses’] credibility’  [citation], the 
trial court’s exercise of its discretion in this regard does not violate the Sixth 
Amendment.”  (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 946, disapproved on 
another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390.) 
The trial court prevented defense counsel from introducing evidence that 
Massingale had a significant financial interest in helping to convict defendant.  At 
the time of his testimony, Massingale was prosecuting a civil suit against San 
 
139 
Diego authorities claiming approximately $3 million in damages stemming from 
the circumstances surrounding his earlier arrest and prosecution.  The court noted 
that Massingale already had obtained a finding of factual innocence pursuant to 
section 851.8 regarding the Jacobs murders.  That finding, the court reasoned, was 
determinative of the civil action because “[o]nce the court has made that 
determination that he is innocent, then he goes before a civil action [as an] 
innocent [person].”  Therefore, the court concluded, the outcome of defendant’s 
case would not affect Massingale’s civil action, and any threat of bias stemming 
from the civil trial to Massingale’s current testimony was nonexistent, because 
Massingale already had obtained the benefit that defendant purported that he was 
seeking to gain.  
The trial court’s ruling rests on the false assumption that Massingale’s 
finding of factual innocence could be admitted into evidence in his civil trial.  
Section 851.8, subdivision (i)(1), states:  “Any finding that an arrestee is factually 
innocent . . . shall not be admissible as evidence in any action.”  Contrary to the 
trial court’s ruling, Massingale had not yet obtained the benefit he was purportedly 
seeking, and consequently, he may have retained a strong incentive to testify 
against defendant, because defendant’s conviction would likely carry a great deal 
of weight with Massingale’s civil jury.   
We previously have noted that there may be no stronger witness bias than 
“a financial interest in the outcome of the litigation contingent upon its terminating 
favorably for the party for whom [the witness] testified.”  (Staley v. State Bar 
(1941) 17 Cal.2d 119, 143.)  Because the trial court erred in concluding that his 
section 851.8 determination had preclusive effect in his civil action, Massingale’s 
litigation of his civil suit was relevant to his alleged bias in that he had a financial 
interest in facilitating defendant’s conviction. 
 
140 
Nevertheless, the trial court’s erroneous ruling did not rise to the level of 
constitutional error.  As previously stated, in order to prove that the error was in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause, defendant must 
demonstrate that the prohibited cross-examination would have produced “a 
significantly different impression of [the witness’s] credibility.”  (Delaware v. Van 
Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 680.)  The jurors here already knew that Massingale 
(1) had been arrested for the Jacobs murders, (2) had been held in custody for 
several years, and (3) had confessed in detail to the Jacobs homicides.  The jurors 
witnessed a very detailed cross-examination and recross-examination of 
Massingale that spanned approximately 118 transcript pages.  His claims of false 
and coerced confessions, which were central issues in his civil trial, were disputed 
in this trial by a number of defense witnesses, including the law enforcement 
officers who heard the confessions.  Finally, and most importantly, jurors were 
fully aware that Massingale had a significant incentive, albeit not necessarily 
financial, to testify against defendant — an interest in avoiding prosecution and 
the death penalty.  Given the jurors’ knowledge that Massingale already was 
actively trying to avoid prosecution for two murders and a potential sentence of 
death, evidence of his financial interest in defendant’s conviction would not have 
produced a “significantly different impression” of Massingale’s credibility.  
Therefore, the trial court’s erroneous ruling did not have the effect of violating 
defendant’s rights under the Sixth Amendment.  (People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th 
at p. 947.) 
5.  Untimely Disclosure of Impeachment Evidence 
Defendant contends the prosecution failed to timely disclose impeachment 
evidence favorable to him in violation of the due process clause of both the state 
and federal Constitutions.  The evidence at issue was:  (1) a police report 
 
141 
describing an incident in which prosecution witness John Massingale struck his 
wife; and (2) four crime scene photographs shown to Massingale during his 
interrogation by Detectives Ayers and Green.  Although the evidence had 
impeachment value, we conclude that any erroneous untimely disclosure did not 
prejudice defendant. 
a) The Police Report 
During defendant’s cross-examination of John Massingale at trial, 
Massingale admitted that he sometimes had a bad temper, but denied that he 
would ever hit a woman.  Approximately two days after his testimony, the 
prosecution provided the defense with a police report indicating that Massingale 
had struck his wife and another woman at a party in late December 1989.  Using 
this report, defense investigators located three witnesses concerning this incident, 
and defendant subsequently presented these witnesses during his case-in-chief.   
Approximately five months after receiving the police report, defendant filed 
a motion alleging a discovery violation.  During the hearing on that motion, it was 
revealed that sometime during or immediately after Massingale’s cross-
examination, the prosecution first received the police report from a deputy city 
attorney who was handling aspects of Massingale’s civil suit.  The prosecution 
stated that, upon receiving the report, it was immediately turned over to the 
defense.  The trial court found no misconduct on the part of the prosecution and no 
prejudice to defendant.   
In Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady), the United States 
Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence 
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is 
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith 
of the prosecution.”  (Id. at p. 87.)  Moreover, “[t]he high court has since held that 
 
142 
the duty to disclose such evidence exists even though there has been no request by 
the accused [citation], that the duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well as 
exculpatory evidence [citation], and that the duty extends even to evidence known 
only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor [citation].”  (People v. 
Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 1042.)  
Thus, a true Brady violation occurs only when three conditions are met: 
“The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is 
exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed 
by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.”  
(Strickler v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263, 281-282.)  Under this standard prejudice 
focuses on “the materiality of the evidence to the issue of guilt or innocence.”  
(United States v. Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at p. 112, fn. 20.)  In the case of 
impeachment evidence, materiality requires more than a showing that “using the 
suppressed evidence to discredit a witness’s testimony ‘might have changed the 
outcome of the trial.’  [Citation.]”  (People v. Salazar, supra, 35 Cal.4th at 
p. 1043, italics added.)  Rather, the evidence will be held to be material “only if 
there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  (United States v. 
Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 682.) 
With respect to the first prong in the Brady analysis, it is evident that the 
police report was favorable impeachment evidence for the accused.   
The record, however, does not support the assertion that the police report 
was suppressed by the prosecution.  It is true that the San Diego Police 
Department forms part of the “prosecution team,” and therefore, the prosecution 
had constructive possession of the report.  Even so, the prosecution’s eventual 
disclosure upon gaining actual possession cured any Brady violation.  “[E]vidence 
that is presented at trial is not considered suppressed, regardless of whether or not 
 
143 
it had previously been disclosed during discovery.”  (People v. Morrison (2004) 
34 Cal.4th 698, 715.)  Therefore, we find that the second prong of the Brady 
analysis is unsatisfied. 
Defendant nevertheless argues the occurrence of a Brady violation because 
the late disclosure meant that defense counsel was unable to catch Massingale in a 
lie during his cross-examination.  But defendant fails to explain how any delay in 
the disclosure of this police report resulted in prejudice.  (See People v. Carter, 
supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1161; People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 590.)  To the 
contrary, after having received the police report from the prosecution, defense 
counsel located and called three witnesses, including a police officer, to provide 
testimony regarding the evening on which Massingale struck two women.  The 
trial court determined that the three witnesses “thoroughly impeached and 
discredited” Massingale’s testimony.  Defense counsel further retained the ability 
to recall or subpoena Massingale and impeach him directly with the report.  That 
counsel failed to do so suggests a tactical assessment on the part of defense 
counsel that they had sufficiently impeached Massingale.  We find that defendant 
was able to make effective use of the police report at trial, and therefore, there was 
no prejudice stemming from its allegedly untimely disclosure.  
b) The Four Photographs 
Defendant contends that the prosecution failed to timely disclose the four 
photographs used by Detectives Ayers and Inspector Green during their initial 
interrogation of John Massingale.  The photographs, which were first introduced 
during the prosecution’s cross-examination of Detective Ayers, were unavailable 
for defendant’s earlier cross-examination of Massingale.  The record indicates that 
both the defense and the prosecution knew of the existence of the photographs 
throughout the course of the trial, though at the time of their introduction, only the 
 
144 
prosecution knew their exact location.  Defendant argues that Massingale’s cross-
examination is the “only time” the evidence could have been used to attack his 
credibility, and the prosecution’s failure to timely disclose the photographs 
violated his rights to due process.  We disagree. 
Defendant again fails to explain how any delay in the disclosure of these 
photographs resulted in prejudice.  Defendant argues his intended use of the 
evidence was to review the photographs with Massingale during cross-
examination in order to impeach his testimony that he confessed key details of the 
Jacobs murders only after seeing them in crime scene photos.  Because defendant 
had the ability to re-call or subpoena Massingale after the introduction of the 
photographs, we fail to see how the stated purpose was frustrated, even minimally.  
At the time of disclosure, the evidence could still be put to effective use by the 
defense, and we find no Brady violation on the part of the prosecution. 
Furthermore, even were we to find untimely disclosure or actual 
suppression of the photographs, we would nevertheless conclude that there was no 
Brady violation because the photographs were immaterial.  (United States v. 
Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at p. 112.)  Presumably, defense counsel sought to use the 
photographs to impeach Massingale by demonstrating that he could not have 
obtained all the confessed details of the Jacobs murders by only viewing those 
four photographs.  Massingale himself stated, however, that he was shown 
numerous crime scene photographs by Detective Pace when Detectives Ayers and 
Green had stepped out of the interrogation room.  Therefore, the four photographs 
would not have impeached Massingale, and thus, we cannot find it reasonably 
probable that a more favorable outcome would have resulted from their 
introduction. 
 
145 
Because we find no prejudice arising from these alleged discovery 
violations, we further reject defendant’s claim that the asserted errors were 
cumulatively prejudicial.  
6.  Exclusion of Expert Testimony Concerning Eyewitness 
Identification 
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the 
testimony of his proffered experts on eyewitness identification.  Defendant argues 
that the exclusion of this evidence caused the jury to make false assumptions 
concerning the reliability and strength of Robertson’s identification of defendant 
as her attacker.  He claims the error violated his state and federal constitutional 
rights to present a defense, confrontation, due process, and his Eighth Amendment 
right to verdict reliability.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
During pretrial proceedings, the trial court heard the testimony of proposed 
defense expert Dr. Robert Buckout.  Dr. Buckout testified that stress and the 
presence of a weapon are factors that reduce the accuracy of an eyewitness’s 
identification.  He also explained that an eyewitness’s confidence in the 
correctness of his or her identification does not necessarily correlate with the 
accuracy of that identification.  The court excluded Dr. Buckout’s testimony, 
concluding that McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d 351, requires the admission of expert 
testimony on eyewitness identification only if there is no other evidence that 
substantially corroborates the identification and gives it independent reliability.  
The court explained that Robertson’s identification of defendant was corroborated 
by the other charged crimes and her testimony describing defendant’s home and 
his vehicle.  
At trial, the defense again raised the issue and proffered another defense 
witness, Dr. Elizabeth Loftus, to testify about the reliability of eyewitness 
identification.  After a brief hearing without the jury present, Dr. Loftus gave 
 
146 
testimony similar to what Dr. Buckout presented in the pretrial hearings.  After 
screening this testimony, the court concluded that Dr. Loftus’s testimony was 
inadmissible because factors affecting eyewitness identification were a matter of 
common knowledge; Dr. Loftus had no reliable basis for her opinions, which were 
based on simulations and not actual crime victims; and the testimony raised the 
prospect of a “battle of experts” — a battle that the jury would be ill equipped to 
assess.  
In McDonald, we described the circumstances in which expert testimony 
may be useful concerning the reliability of eyewitness identification.  We stated 
that “the decision to admit or exclude expert testimony on psychological factors 
affecting eyewitness identification remains primarily a matter within the trial 
court’s discretion; . . . ‘we do not intend to “open the gates” to a flood of expert 
evidence on the subject.’  [Citation.]  We expect that such evidence will not often 
be needed, and in the usual case the appellate court will continue to defer to the 
trial court’s discretion in this matter.  Yet deference is not abdication.  When an 
eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key element of the prosecution’s 
case but is not substantially corroborated by evidence giving it independent 
reliability, . . . it will ordinarily be error to exclude that testimony.”  (McDonald, 
supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 377, fn. omitted.)  More recently, we stated that the 
exclusion of expert testimony on eyewitness identification “is justified only if 
there is other evidence that substantially corroborates the eyewitness identification 
and gives it independent reliability.”  (People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 
1112.) 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proposed expert 
testimony.  As the court noted, Robertson’s identification of defendant’s house 
and the make and model of his car independently corroborated her identification of 
defendant.  As we explained above (see ante, p. 94), her description and sketch of 
 
147 
the interior and exterior of defendant’s house were especially compelling.  Under 
these circumstances, the corroborative effect of this evidence was sufficient to 
give independent reliability to her identification of defendant in the photo lineup 
and later in court.  No expert testimony on the subject of eyewitness identification 
was required. 
7.  Issues Concerning Robertson’s Memory 
Defendant claims the trial court erred by refusing to allow his defense 
experts to testify about the reliability of Robertson’s memory.  He also argues that 
the defense was improperly precluded from explaining why its expert had not 
tested or evaluated Robertson.  He contends these errors violated his state and 
federal rights to present a defense, due process, compulsory process, 
confrontation, effective representation of counsel, and his Eighth Amendment 
right to verdict reliability.  We disagree. 
In pretrial hearings, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to subject 
Robertson to psychological testing.45  Later at trial, Dr. Wendy Freed, a 
psychiatrist who treated Robertson, testified that she believed Robertson’s 
memory was intact until the point she was choked to unconsciousness.  Defendant 
                                              
45 
Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in refusing to subject 
Robertson to defense neuropsychological testing, under Ballard v. Superior Court 
(1966) 64 Cal.2d 159 (Ballard), to determine her competency to testify.  But even 
assuming Robertson would have consented to such testing and the court was 
mistaken about this circumstance, defendant had no right to subject the victim to 
such an examination.  In 1980, the Legislature enacted section 1112, which 
overruled Ballard and abolished any discretion a trial court had to order a sex 
crime victim to submit to defense psychological testing.  (People v. Haskett (1982) 
30 Cal.3d 841.)  Moreover, whether or not the subject was the victim of a sex 
crime, “[t]he use of psychiatric testimony to impeach a witness is generally 
disfavored.”  (People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 835.) 
 
148 
objected, and the court agreed and struck that testimony.  Later, in a conference 
with only the parties present, the court expressed concern about getting into a 
“battle of experts” concerning Robertson’s memory.  The court asked the parties 
whether they intended to present witnesses concerning Robertson’s memory and 
stated that either “[b]oth sides do it or neither side does it.”  Defense counsel 
informed the court that they planned to call an expert on posttraumatic stress 
disorder to educate the jurors about that condition and its effect on memory.  
Defense counsel made clear that, because the court had denied the defense motion 
to subject Robertson to psychological testing, he believed the expert had no basis 
to give an opinion about whether Robertson suffered from memory problems.  The 
defense expert, Dr. Sheldon Zigelbaum, then testified in front of the jury 
concerning the effects of posttraumatic stress disorder on memory.  
Ultimately, defendant offered no testimony regarding whether Robertson’s 
memory was reliable or why the defense expert did not examine her, and the trial 
court made no specific ruling precluding defendant from presenting such evidence.  
Indeed, the court made clear that such evidence could be offered if “[b]oth sides 
do it.”  More important, defense counsel explained on the record their reasons for 
not having their expert speculate about whether Robertson did in fact have 
memory problems.  Instead of having the expert engage in speculation, defense 
counsel chose instead to have the expert testify about the effects of a medical 
condition that Robertson indisputably suffered — posttraumatic stress disorder.  
On appeal, we do not second-guess trial counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions.  
(People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1185.)  
8.  Evidence Concerning the Composition of the Photo Lineup 
Defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial error by excluding 
evidence that other less suggestive photographs of defendant were available for 
 
149 
use in the photo lineup.  He also argues that the court erred by precluding 
questioning of Robertson about whether the other photographs in the photo lineup 
matched her description of her attacker.  Defendant asserts that the court’s 
decision to exclude this evidence as irrelevant under Evidence Code section 352 
precluded him from showing that the detectives intentionally created a suggestive 
lineup and that Robertson’s identification of defendant was unreliable.  He claims 
these rulings violated defendant’s state and federal constitutional rights to present 
a defense, due process, confrontation and compulsory process, and his Eighth 
Amendment right to a reliable verdict.  The trial court did not err in either ruling. 
During trial, defendant sought to introduce photographs of him taken by 
one of the sheriff’s deputies who arrested him.  He argued that these photographs 
were relevant to show that the photograph ultimately used in Robertson’s photo 
lineup was suggestive by comparison.  Defendant also argued that these other 
photographs were relevant to show that the photo lineup was designed to be 
suggestive.46  The trial court excluded the evidence on the grounds of irrelevance 
under Evidence Code section 352.  The court emphasized that the relevant issue 
before the jury was whether the photographs actually used in the lineup were 
suggestive and if so how that impacted the credibility of Robertson’s identification 
of defendant.  In excluding the proposed evidence, the court refused to allow the 
defense to put Detective Fullmer “on trial separately when it [didn’t] affect that 
lineup as far as [Robertson] is concerned.”  The court explained that whether the 
detectives could have used better or less suggestive photos had no bearing on the 
                                              
46  
The Attorney General argues that defendant did not raise this particular 
issue before the trial court and, therefore, forfeited this claim on appeal.  But 
because it appears from the record that defendant articulated this theory, we 
conclude that he did not forfeit this issue on appeal. 
 
150 
suggestiveness of the photos used in the final photo lineup.  It concluded that the 
lineup’s suggestiveness could be evaluated objectively by the jury, independent of 
considerations about the availability of other photos or the detectives’ motivations.   
“ ‘Although completely excluding evidence of an accused’s defense 
theoretically could rise to [the level of a constitutional violation], excluding 
defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does not impair an accused’s due 
process right to present a defense.’ ”  (People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 
p. 428.)  The trial court correctly applied this precept concerning the availability of 
other photos of defendant. 
Concerning Robertson’s opinion about the other persons in the photo 
lineup, the trial court sustained the prosecution’s objection when the defense 
attempted to ask Robertson whether one of the other persons in the lineup 
resembled the description she had given to law enforcement after her attack.  The 
court explained that the answer was irrelevant because the jurors could themselves 
compare Robertson’s previous descriptions with any particular photo in the lineup.  
Yet, the court further explained, defendant could ask Robertson why she had 
excluded the other photos and why she picked defendant’s photo.  
Given that the trial court fully allowed defendant to ask Robertson why she 
had excluded five other photos and selected defendant’s photo, the court’s 
limitation of cross-examination was “ ‘on a minor or subsidiary point’ ” and did 
not impair defendant’s rights.  (People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 428.)   
9.  Evidence of Third Party Culpability in the Swanke Case 
Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred and violated his state 
and federal constitutional rights to due process and to present a defense by 
excluding evidence of third party culpability in the killing of Anne Swanke.  This 
contention fails. 
 
151 
During trial, defense counsel sought to ask Swanke’s father about an ex-
boyfriend and crank phone calls Anne Swanke had been receiving before her 
disappearance.  The defense made an offer of proof concerning the ex-boyfriend. 
According to the defense, the former boyfriend had made repeated attempts to 
contact Swanke, and that made her afraid of him.  In the morning after her 
disappearance, the ex-boyfriend visited the Swanke household wearing dark 
sunglasses, and he appeared nervous and fidgety.  The ex-boyfriend returned to the 
household later that evening, and his demeanor was unusual as he refused to look 
anyone in the eye.  In addition, before her disappearance, Anne Swanke had 
complained of receiving phone calls from unknown females in which caller would 
laugh and then hang up.  The trial court ruled that the evidence did not make the 
former boyfriend a third party suspect and was, therefore, irrelevant, misleading 
and confusing.  
The trial court was correct.  In People v. Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d 826, 833, 
we explained the applicable standard to determine the admissibility of third party 
culpability evidence:  “To be admissible, the third-party evidence need not show 
‘substantial proof of a probability’ that the third person committed the act; it need 
only be capable of raising a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt.  At the same 
time, we do not require that any evidence, however remote, must be admitted to 
show a third party’s possible culpability.  As this court observed in [People v.] 
Mendez [(1924) 193 Cal. 39, 51], evidence of mere motive or opportunity to 
commit the crime in another person, without more, will not suffice to raise a 
reasonable doubt about a defendant’s guilt:  there must be direct or circumstantial 
evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime.”   
Here, the connection between the former boyfriend and the victim’s 
abduction and killing was speculative with no evidence, either direct or 
circumstantial, in support.  Anne Swanke’s alleged fear of her ex-boyfriend and 
 
152 
his attempts to contact her were based on her statements, which are hearsay.  Even 
assuming the offer of proof suggested that the former boyfriend had a motive to 
hurt Swanke, there was nothing about his conduct that tended to raise a reasonable 
doubt about defendant’s guilt and nothing that connected the former boyfriend to 
her disappearance.  Defendant’s offer of proof also failed to connect the harassing 
phone calls to any conduct by the ex-boyfriend.  Under these circumstances, the 
trial court properly excluded the proffered evidence under Evidence Code section 
352. 
B.  Jury Instructions — Asserted Errors47 
1.  Preliminary Instructions  
Defendant contends the trial court erred and violated his state and federal 
constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial because the preliminary jury 
instructions at the start of trial allegedly did not properly describe the jury’s duty, 
and failed to include instruction on the presumption of innocence and the 
prosecution’s burden of proof.  He asserts that these alleged errors influenced the 
jury in favor of the prosecution.  We disagree. 
Defendant claims the trial court misstated the jury’s duty in ascertaining the 
facts of the case by preinstructing the jury that:  “you will, in essence, be judges 
because you will be the judges of the facts and I will be the judge of the law.  And 
                                              
47 
Defendant raises numerous claims of instructional error for both the guilt 
and penalty phases.  For many of these claims, defendant argues certain 
instructions required further amplification or clarification.  If defendant did not 
seek such amplification or clarification at trial, we conclude that the claim is 
forfeited.  (People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th 1, 29 [the “failure to seek 
‘amplification or explanation’ of the instruction precludes relief on appeal”].)  For 
those claims of instructional error that challenge a given instruction more 
generally or as a whole, we review his claim of error “to the extent his substantial 
rights were affected.”  (People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151, citing § 1259.) 
 
153 
at the conclusion of this case I will instruct you as to the law that is to be applied 
in this case.”  Defendant claims that this instruction misstated the jurors’ duty by 
encouraging them to ascertain which version of the facts comports with the truth, 
instead of determining whether the prosecution had proved defendant’s guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  He also argues that the jury pamphlet given to 
prospective jurors further mischaracterized the jury’s duty by stating that its 
function was to “find, from the evidence and stipulations, what actually 
happened.”  
But nothing in the complained-of instruction nor in the juror pamphlet 
misleadingly described the role of the jury.  To the contrary, “where the trial is by 
jury:  [¶]  (a) All questions of fact are to be decided by the jury.  [¶]  (b) Subject to 
the control of the court, the jury is to determine the effect and value of the 
evidence addressed to it, including the credibility of witnesses and hearsay 
declarants.”  (Evid. Code, § 312.)  The trial court’s preliminary instruction 
concerning the jury’s duty was proper. 
Regarding his claims concerning the trial court’s asserted failure to 
preinstruct the jury on the presumption of innocence and the prosecution’s burden 
of proof, defendant points to no binding authority requiring such preinstruction at 
the beginning of trial.  By statute, a trial court must give the jury certain 
preinstructions involving “its basic functions, duties, and conduct,” and “[t]he 
instructions shall include, among other matters,” admonitions that the jurors shall 
not discuss the case, conduct their own research, read media reports about the 
case, investigate the locations involved, or receive any payment in exchange for 
information regarding the trial.  (§ 1122, subd. (a).)  Nothing in this statute 
specifically requires preinstruction concerning the presumption of innocence or 
the prosecution’s burden of proof.  Furthermore, the statute that governs the order 
of trial proceedings, section 1093, allows the trial court to instruct the jury about 
 
154 
the applicable law after the conclusion of the evidence and closing arguments, but 
it also allows the court to give such instructions “[a]t the beginning of the trial or 
from time to time during the trial.”  (§ 1093, subd. (f).)  Nothing in section 1093 
requires the jury to be preinstructed regarding the presumption of innocence or the 
prosecution’s burden of proof.  (See People v. Smith (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 7, 
15-16.) 
Therefore, there was no error in the court’s preinstructions to the jury. 
In any event, claims of instructional error are examined based on a review 
of the instructions as a whole in light of the entire record.  (Estelle v. McGuire 
(1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72; People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1016.)  
Throughout the jury selection process, the trial court informed the venire about the 
presumption of innocence and the state’s burden of proving defendant’s guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Moreover, during voir dire the parties actively 
questioned prospective jurors about their ability to be guided by both.  Under these 
circumstances, the jury had already been well aware of the presumption of 
innocence and the prosecution’s burden of proof at the start of trial.   
2.  Cross-admissibility Instructions  
Defendant claims the trial court erred by refusing his request to clarify the 
instructions concerning other crimes evidence and that the alleged error allowed 
the jury to use the evidence of other crimes without first making a threshold 
finding concerning whether defendant had committed those other crimes.  He also 
argues that the jury should have been instructed to find that defendant committed 
the other crimes beyond a reasonable doubt before it was allowed to utilize 
evidence of those other crimes.  He contends the asserted errors violated his rights 
to a fair trial, due process, and to a reliable determination of penalty under the 
federal Constitution.  We disagree. 
 
155 
We have recognized that “evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible to 
prove, among other things, the identity of the perpetrator of the charged crimes, 
the existence of a common design or plan, or the intent with which the perpetrator 
acted in the commission of the charged crimes.”  (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 
Cal.4th 349, 369.)  “Evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible to prove identity, 
common design or plan, or intent only if the charged and uncharged crimes are 
sufficiently similar to support a rational inference of identity, common design or 
plan, or intent.”  (Ibid., italics added.) 
In the present case, the trial court instructed the jury with a modified 
version of CALJIC No. 2.50.48  By this instruction, the court advised the jury that 
                                              
48 
The full instruction read as follows: 
“Evidence has been introduced in this case of more than one count of homicide.  
As you have been instructed, each count charged must be decided separately.  
However, you may, if you so choose, use evidence from other counts together with 
any count under consideration for certain limited purposes. 
“Other counts evidence may be used by you, if you so choose, for the purpose of 
determining whether such evidence tends to show the identity of the person 
committing the crime charged in the count under consideration.  You may also 
consider whether such evidence tends to negate the inference of identity of the 
person committing the crime charged. 
“You may consider whether or not the evidence as to other counts tends to show a 
characteristic method, plan, or scheme in the commission of criminal acts similar 
to any method, plan, or scheme used in the commission of the offense in the count 
then under consideration.  Whether or not the evidence shows such a characteristic 
method, plan, or scheme is a matter solely for your determination. 
“If you should find a characteristic method, plan, or scheme, you may also 
consider whether or not such clear connection exists between the one offense 
under consideration and the other offense or offenses of which the defendant is 
accused, that it may be logically concluded that if the defendant committed the 
other offense or offenses, he also committed the crime under consideration. 
“You may also consider other counts evidence together with the count under 
consideration to determine whether there existed in the mind of the perpetrator an 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
156 
it must decide each count of homicide separately, but that it may consider the 
other counts for the limited purposes of inferring whether:  (1) “such evidence 
tends to show the identity of the person committing the crime charged in the count 
under consideration”; (2) such evidence shows “a characteristic method, plan, or 
scheme in the commission of criminal acts similar to any method, plan, or scheme 
used in the commission of the offense in the count then under consideration”; (3) 
“there existed in the mind of the perpetrator an intent which is a necessary element 
of the count under consideration or whether such intent may have been absent in 
some or all of the offenses charged”; and (4) “whether there existed any common 
motive for the crime or crimes charged or whether the evidence established 
different motives.” 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
intent which is a necessary element of the count under consideration or whether 
such intent may have been absent in some or all of the offenses charged. 
“You may also consider other counts evidence together under the count under 
consideration to determine whether there existed any common motive for the 
crime or crimes charged or whether the evidence established different motives. 
“Other counts evidence is a form of circumstantial evidence.  Therefore, you must 
weigh such evidence in the same manner and subject to the same rules as I 
previously provided to you regarding circumstantial evidence.  You must decide 
the weight, if any, to which other crimes evidence is entitled. 
“It is a matter solely for your determination as to whether or not any common 
scheme, plan, or method applies to some, all, or none of the counts.  You may find 
that the other crimes evidence may apply to some of the offenses, but not to 
others. 
“You are cautioned that evidence of other counts cannot be used to prove that the 
defendant is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition to commit 
crimes.” 
 
157 
Most important, the court further explained that “[o]ther counts evidence is 
a form of circumstantial evidence” and that the jury “must weigh such evidence in 
the same manner and subject to the same rules as I previously provided to you 
regarding circumstantial evidence.”  The court’s earlier instruction on 
circumstantial evidence explained that “each fact which is essential to complete a 
set of circumstances necessary to establish the defendant’s guilt must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt” and that “before an inference essential to establish 
guilt may be found to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, each fact or 
circumstance upon which such inference necessarily rests must be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt.”  (Italics added.)  The court also gave the standard instruction 
defining reasonable doubt.   
 
Taking these instructions together, the jury was directed that any inferences 
generated by the circumstantial evidence of other crimes should be treated the 
same as circumstantial evidence concerning the count under consideration. Those 
inferences could be drawn in support of a finding of guilt only if the jury made the 
threshold finding that the facts or circumstances of the other crimes had been 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, this was the express understanding of 
the trial court in discussing the instructions with the parties.   
Consequently, defendant’s claims fail because the instructions did require 
the jury to determine whether the facts or circumstances of the other crimes had 
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt before it could use that evidence to 
convict defendant. 
3.  Instructing the Jury to Make Various Preliminary Findings  
Defendant alleges the trial court erred by refusing various instructions that 
would have essentially directed the jury to make preliminary findings on various 
evidentiary issues.  We disagree. 
 
158 
Defendant complains that the trial court improperly refused his requested 
instruction directing the jury to disregard expert opinion that was based on 
speculative or conjectural data.  He also complains that the court improperly 
refused his proffered instruction requiring the jury, before considering opinion 
testimony based on a “comparative identification technique,” to find “that the 
items compared are reasonably comparable.”  A court may refuse a proposed 
instruction if it is duplicative of other instructions.  (People v. Sanders (1995) 11 
Cal.4th 475, 560.)  Here, the court instructed the jury with a modified version of 
CALJIC No. 2.80, which advised the jury that it is “not bound to accept an expert 
opinion as conclusive, but should give to it the weight to which you find it to be 
entitled” and that it “may disregard any such opinion, if you find it to be 
unreasonable.”  The court also instructed the jury with a modified version of 
CALJIC No. 2.83, which cautioned the jury to “consider the qualifications and 
believability of the expert witnesses, as well as the reasons for each opinion and 
the facts and other matters upon which it is based.”  Finally, the court further 
instructed the jury that opinion must be rationally based on perception.  Together, 
these instructions sufficiently conveyed the concepts of defendant’s proposed 
instructions. 
Defendant claims the trial court erroneously rejected his requested 
instruction that would have allowed the jury to reject physical evidence, and any 
expert opinion associated with it, if the proponent of the physical evidence failed 
to establish that “it is reasonably certain that there was no break in the chain of 
custody, alteration or tampering.”  Chain of custody is indeed a necessary showing 
for physical evidence to be admitted.  But the trial court decides the admissibility 
of physical evidence based on challenges to the chain of custody, and, once 
admitted, any minor defects in the chain of custody go to its weight.  (People v. 
 
159 
Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 559.)  Thus, there was no error in refusing the 
instruction. 
Defendant finally claims the trial court improperly refused his proffered 
instruction advising the jury to reject any opinion testimony based on 
electrophoretic testing if no photograph depicted the diagnostic bands or if the 
photograph was inadequate to observe separate and distinct banding patterns.  But, 
as explained, ante, at page 101, the failure to photograph the results of the 
electrophoretic testing did not render the expert’s opinion of the results 
inadmissible and any difficulty in interpreting photographed electrophoretic 
testing went to its weight not to its admissibility.  (People v. Cooper, supra, 53 
Cal.3d at pp. 812-813.) 
4.  Third Party Culpability Instructions  
Defendant alleges that the trial court erred in its jury instructions 
concerning evidence of third party culpability.  He claims the errors deprived him 
of his state law right to present a defense and his federal constitutional rights to 
due process, trial by jury, confrontation, compulsory process, representation of 
counsel, and the reliability of his death verdict under the Eighth Amendment.  
There was no error. 
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by refusing his modified 
version of CALJIC No. 2.03, which would have instructed the jury that 
Massingale’s false and misleading statements could be used as evidence of his 
consciousness of guilt.49  The court properly refused this instruction because it 
                                              
49 
Part of the proposed instruction read as follows:  
“If you find that a suspect of a crime made a willfully false or deliberately 
misleading statement concerning the crime or crimes for which he was suspected, 
for the purpose of misleading or warding off suspicion, you may consider such 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
160 
directed the jury to decide a third party’s guilt when, instead, the jury’s duty was 
to decide whether defendant’s guilt had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  
The jury did not need to ascertain Massingale’s guilt in the Jacobs homicides, but 
needed only to ascertain whether evidence of Massingale’s involvement in the 
homicides generated reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt — a point on which 
the jury was instructed just as the defense requested.  Thus, the proposed version 
of CALJIC No. 2.03 was not relevant to the jury’s determination of defendant’s 
guilt. 
Defendant’s second complaint is aimed at the very instruction he requested 
— that evidence of a third party’s involvement in each of the killings could 
generate a reasonable doubt regarding defendant’s guilt for each homicide.  He 
complains that the trial court’s instruction on this same point improperly assigned 
the burden to the defendant to prove that a third party’s possible involvement in 
the homicides raised a reasonable doubt concerning defendant’s guilt. 
Defense counsel submitted a proposed instruction on this issue, which read:  
“Evidence has been produced in this trial for the purpose of showing that a person 
other than the defendant committed the crime(s) charged.  [¶]  The burden is on 
the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was the defendant and 
not another person who committed the charged offenses.  [¶]  If, after a 
consideration of all of the circumstances of the case you have a reasonable 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
statement as a circumstance tending to prove a consciousness of guilt.  However, 
such conduct is not sufficient by itself to prove guilt, but may strengthen 
inferences of guilt arising from other facts.” 
 
The remainder of the proposed instruction emphasized that the weight of 
such false and misleading statements was for the jurors to decide and that such 
evidence was a form of circumstantial evidence.   
 
161 
doubt whether the defendant or some other person committed the crime(s) 
charged, you must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and find him not 
guilty.” 
Over the defense’s clear objection, the trial court stated that it would not 
give the second sentence of the proposed instruction.  The parties and the court 
then debated the precise language of the remaining portions of the proposed 
instruction.  The court ultimately crafted the following instruction, which was 
partially patterned on the standard alibi instruction also given in this case, CALJIC 
4.50: 
“The defendant has presented evidence in this trial for the purpose of 
showing that a person or persons other than the defendant may have committed a 
crime or crime charged.  [¶]  If, after a consideration of the entire case, such third 
party evidence alone or together with other evidence raises a reasonable 
doubt whether the defendant committed a crime or crimes charged, you must give 
the defendant the benefit of that doubt and find him not guilty.”  
Defendant claims the wording of this instruction imposed a burden on the 
defense to raise a reasonable doubt regarding his guilt based on third party 
evidence because the instruction stated that the defense presented such evidence 
“for the purpose of showing” someone else committed the crime and that 
defendant was entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt “raise[d]” by such 
evidence.  Defendant contends this language improperly imposed a burden of 
proof on him. 
But defendant did not object to this language.  He suggested the “for the 
purpose of showing” language and did not object when the court added the word 
“raises.”  Defendant argues that the trial court’s reaction to the second sentence of 
his proposed instruction showed that any further objection or proposed 
modifications would have been futile.  (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820.)  
 
162 
However, the court entertained and granted the defense’s subsequent request to 
modify the proposed instruction by replacing “evidence being produced” with 
“evidence being presented” to achieve clarity and neutrality, according to defense 
counsel.  Consequently, it does not appear that the court would have greeted any 
further defense objections with hostility.  In any event, the failure of the defense to 
object to asserted instructional error does not preclude appellate review of that 
error if the substantial rights of the defendant are affected.  (§ 1259; People v. 
Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1199.) 
On its merits, the claim fails.  “In reviewing the purportedly erroneous 
instructions, ‘we inquire “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has 
applied the challenged instruction in a way” that violates the Constitution.’ ” 
(People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th 894, 957, quoting Estelle v. McGuire, supra, 
502 U.S. at p. 72.)  A single instruction is not viewed in isolation, and the ultimate 
decision on whether a specific jury instruction is correct and adequate is 
determined by consideration of the entire instructions given to the jury.  (People v. 
Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 677.) 
There is no reasonable likelihood the jury misapplied the instruction as it 
relates to the state’s burden of proof.  Nothing in this instruction specifically 
assigned an evidentiary burden to defendant, but, instead, asked the jury to 
neutrally consider “the entire case” and “together with other evidence.”  More 
importantly, nothing in this instruction conflicted with the standard instruction 
given to this jury informing it that prosecution had “the burden of proving 
[defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  The jury received a similar 
instruction concerning the state’s burden in proving the truth of the special 
circumstance.  Additionally, yet another instruction made clear that “the burden is 
on the People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person 
who committed the crimes which he is charged.”  (Italics added.)  The jury was 
 
163 
also instructed to “consider the instructions as a whole and each in light of all the 
others” and not to “single out any particular sentence or any individual point or 
instruction and ignore the others.”  Under these circumstances, the complained-of 
instruction could not have misled the jury in the manner defendant contends. 
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to include the 
second sentence of defendant’s proffered instruction about third party culpability:  
“The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was 
the defendant and not another person who committed the charged offenses.”  
Defendant claims that the offered language more clearly defined the prosecution’s 
burden of proof concerning third party culpability.  But again, the court instructed 
the jury on defendant’s presumed innocence, the prosecution’s burden of proving 
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that third party culpability evidence can 
generate reasonable doubt.  In rejecting a similar claim that instructions failed to 
clearly assign the burden of proof as to third party culpability, we have stated that 
further instruction would be “repetitious of instructions already given.”  (People v. 
Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1134.)  In this same capacity, we have also stated:  
“It is hardly a difficult concept for the jury to grasp that acquittal is required if 
there is reasonable doubt as to whether someone else committed the charged 
crimes.”  (People v. Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472, 504.) 
Had the jury entertained a reasonable doubt that someone else committed 
any homicide it would have acquitted defendant, and, in fact, it did do so in the 
Garcia murder.  Consequently “no special instruction on third party culpability 
was necessary to apprise the jury of the pertinent legal principles and, contrary to 
defendant’s argument, the instructions given do not suggest he had the burden to 
prove [a third party] was guilty before he could reap the benefit of the jury’s doubt 
about his own guilt.”  (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 517.) 
 
164 
5.  Miscellaneous Claims of Instructional Error  
It is not error for the prosecution to refer itself as “ ‘the People’ ” or to try 
defendant in the name of “ ‘the People.’ ”  (People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 
771, 816.)  
Defendant contends the trial court erred and violated his constitutional 
rights by failing, on its own motion, to instruct the jury to view the testimony of 
Massingale with distrust because he was assertedly an accomplice to the Jacobs 
murders.  But defendant fails to point to any evidence in the record showing that 
Massingale knew defendant or was his accomplice in the Jacobs murders.  
Because there was no known “relationship between the defendant and 
[Massingale], either by virtue of a conspiracy or by acts aiding and abetting the 
crime,” the standard instruction regarding witness credibility was sufficient for the 
jury to evaluate Massingale’s testimony.  (People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 
212.) 
Defendant claims the trial court violated his state and federal constitutional 
rights by refusing to give his requested instruction advising the jury that a 
witness’s “immunity agreement may constitute a motive for bias” and “may be 
considered in assessing the witness’s believability.”  He argues the instruction was 
necessary for the jury to evaluate the testimony of Frank Clark, who testified for 
the prosecution under a grant of immunity related to narcotics possession and use.  
But the court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.20, which explained that, in 
determining the believability of a witness, jurors could “consider anything that has 
a tendency reasonably to prove or disprove the truthfulness of the testimony of the 
witness,” including “[t]he existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other 
motive.”  (CALJIC No. 2.20.)  The jury was aware of Clark’s immunity 
agreement, and nothing in the language of CALJIC No. 2.20 precluded the jury’s 
consideration of Clark’s immunity as a type of “bias, interest, or other motive” in 
 
165 
judging his credibility.  Even assuming the court erred by not giving the requested 
instruction or by modifying CALJIC No. 2.20 to list a grant of immunity as a 
factor in judging a witness’s credibility (see People v. Harvey (1984) 163 
Cal.App.3d 90, 112), a more favorable result was not reasonably probable.  
(Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836; People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 
p. 393 [“Mere instructional error under state law regarding how the jury should 
consider evidence does not violate the United States Constitution”].)  In closing 
statements, defense counsel argued that Clark’s credibility should be doubted 
because of his immunity agreement.  In light of the instructions given and closing 
arguments, any error had no effect. 
Defendant complains that it was error for the trial court to allow certain 
witnesses to be referred to as “experts,” because it improperly gave expert 
witnesses undue importance and weight before the jury.  But defendant has 
forfeited this claim by failing to raise it before the trial court, and, in any event, the 
court defined who qualified as an expert using CALJIC No. 2.80 and also accepted 
defendant’s proffered instruction that allowed the jury to consider an expert’s 
opinion as no more persuasive than a lay opinion.  That defense-requested 
instruction told the jury that “if you conclude that a witness testifying as an expert 
is not in fact an expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to lay 
opinion that is (1) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (2) helpful 
to a clear understanding of his testimony.”  In addition to the other instructions 
cautioning the jury not to accept an expert’s opinions as conclusive and to 
disregard such opinion if not believable or reasonable (see ante, at p. 158), there 
was no danger that the jury would improperly assign greater weight or credibility 
 
166 
to a witness merely if he or she was referred to as an “expert witness” during the 
proceedings.50 
Defendant claims the trial court erred by refusing his instruction that would 
have expanded the definition of “inference” found in CALJIC No. 2.00, which 
explains that “[a]n inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and 
reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts established by the 
evidence.”  His requested instruction would have further added that an inference 
“must be based on a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact to be 
inferred,” that, to make such a rational connection, “there must be a finding with 
substantial assurance that the fact proved gives rise to the fact to be inferred,” and 
that an inference “cannot be based on suspicion, imagination, speculation, 
conjecture or guess work” and, if it is, it “must be disregarded.”  Defendant cites 
no authority for why the standard definition of “inference” in CALJIC No. 2.00, 
which itself is derived from Evidence Code section 600, is insufficient or why his 
proposed expanded definition was necessary to preserve his rights to due process 
and a fair trial. 
Defendant complains that the trial court gave numerous jury instructions 
that used the permissive terms “should consider” or “may consider,” and he 
alleges this terminology erroneously permitted the jury not to consider crucial 
portions of the evidence.  Defendant has forfeited this claim because he failed to 
request the court to modify the instructions except as to the 1988 version of 
CALJIC No. 2.83.  The court denied defendant’s request to modify CALJIC 
No. 2.83 to state that in weighing the opinion of one expert against that of another 
                                              
50  
Because similar instructions were given at the penalty phase, we also reject 
defendant’s forfeited claim that the term “expert” should not have been used at the 
penalty phase.  
 
167 
“you should must consider the relative qualifications and credibility of the expert 
witnesses, as well as the reasons for each opinion and the facts and other matters 
upon which it is based.”  But even assuming that “should” is a more permissive 
term than the word “must,” the purpose of CALJIC No. 2.83 is to inform the jury 
how to resolve conflicting expert opinions and it strongly suggests using their 
respective qualifications, credibility, reasoning, and facts emphasized by witnesses 
to assess any divergent opinions.  The instruction does not inform the jury as to 
what evidence it may not consider in resolving conflicting opinions.  Defendant 
does not explain why or how, in light of this instruction, the jury would disregard 
the qualifications, credibility, reasoning, and facts emphasized by conflicting 
experts in assessing their opinions.  Nor does defendant explain why these factors 
“must” be the only ones to be used to assess such conflicts.  As to defendant’s 
other forfeited claims concerning permissive language used in various standard 
instructions,51 those contentions lack merit for the same reasons.52  All of these 
                                              
51 
Defendant cites no applicable authority addressing why the use of 
permissive language in these various instructions constituted error and the 
instructions appear otherwise to be correct.  Therefore, his failure to object to 
alleged instructional error or to request clarification of the instructions generally 
forfeits the issue on appeal.  (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 149.)  
Defendant also fails to show that any request to modify the instructions would 
have been futile, given that the trial court accepted many of his proposed 
instructions.  
52 
Defendant complains that the standard instructions improperly used 
“should” or “may” to permissively allow the jury to consider factors impacting 
eyewitness testimony; cognitive impairment regarding a witness’s prior 
statements; prior inconsistent statements as evidence of credibility and the truth; 
evidence of honesty, truthfulness, and prior convictions in assessing a witness’s 
credibility; the reasons, qualifications, and credibility of an expert for assessing his 
or her opinion; the credibility, perception, and reasons of lay opinion witnesses in 
offering their opinions; and factors of similarity or dissimilarity of other offenses 
in determining a common method, plan, or scheme; and evidence of motive.  
 
168 
instructions list the factors the jury may consider, but they do not direct the jury to 
reject certain evidence or to limit the factors to those enumerated in the 
instructions.  It is pure speculation to believe the jury ignored certain evidence 
simply because an instruction advised the jury that it “should” or “may” consider 
that evidence, instead of commanding the jury to consider that evidence. 
Defendant argues that, because expert and lay opinion testimony are a form 
of circumstantial evidence, the trial court erred by refusing his requested 
instruction to inform the jury that expert testimony and lay opinion were a form of 
circumstantial evidence.  But the court instructed the jury on circumstantial 
evidence, which it defined as “evidence that, if found to be true, proves a fact from 
which an inference of the existence of another fact may be drawn.”  Because some 
of the expert testimony and much of the lay opinion testimony in this case fit this 
description, this instruction was sufficient.  Defendant fails to cite any case 
requiring an instruction expressly stating that expert opinion and lay opinion are a 
form of circumstantial evidence. 
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously denied his motion to delete 
the titles from the written jury instructions given to it during its deliberations, but 
we have previously rejected such an argument.  (People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 
333, 355-356.)  
Defendant argues that the trial court improperly coerced the jury to reach a 
unanimous verdict by instructing it with a version of CALJIC No. 1.00, which 
states that the parties “have a right to expect that you will conscientiously consider 
and weigh the evidence, apply the law, and reach a just verdict regardless of the 
consequences.”  Defendant claims this instruction forced the jury to believe that it 
must reach a verdict because the parties and the court expected it to do so.  But as 
defendant points out, another standard instruction, CALJIC No. 17.40, told the 
jurors that  “the People and the defendant are entitled to the individual opinion of 
 
169 
each juror,” that “[e]ach of you must consider the evidence for the purpose of 
reaching a verdict, if you can do so,” and that “each of you must decide the case 
for yourself . . . .”  (Italics added.)  That same instruction also informed the jurors 
not to “decide any question any particular way because a majority of the jurors or 
any of them favor such a decision.”  Considering the instructions as a whole 
(Estelle v. McGuire, supra, 502 U.S. at p. 72; People v. Castillo, supra, 16 Cal.4th 
at p. 1016), the jury could not have been improperly coerced in the manner 
defendant contends.  Moreover, the circumstances of the jury’s having hung on 
defendant’s guilt concerning the killings of Rhonda Strang and Amber Fisher belie 
defendant’s claim of coercion. 
6.  Other Asserted Deficiencies in the Jury Instructions 
Defendant identifies a number of alleged instructional error claims, 
primarily concerning witness credibility instructions, and further argues that the 
cumulative effect of these asserted errors requires reversal of his judgment.  We 
reject all of these claims.  
Defendant first argues that those instructions suggesting that the jury must 
decide between the defendant’s “guilt” or “innocence” lessened the prosecution’s 
burden of proof by implying that the issue was one of guilt or innocence instead of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  We have previously rejected identical 
arguments.  (People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 847-848.) 
Defendant also complains that the trial court failed to define, on its own 
motion, the word “material,” as used in CALJIC No. 2.21.2, which allows the jury 
to reject a witness’s entire testimony if the witness was willfully false on a 
“material part” or a “material point” during his or her testimony.  But commonly 
used words that have no technical meaning peculiar to the law impose no 
obligation on the court to provide definition in the absence of a request.  (People v. 
 
170 
Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 270-271.)  Because the word “material,” as used in 
CALJIC No. 2.21.2, is within its ordinary meaning of “ ‘substantial, essential, 
relevant or pertinent,’ ” the court did not err by failing to define it.  (People v. 
Wade (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1496.) 
Also in connection with CALJIC No. 2.21.2, defendant contends the 
instruction diluted the reasonable doubt standard because it allowed jurors to 
accept the testimony of witnesses, including prosecution witnesses, after finding a 
mere “probability of truth.”  The court instructed the jury that it may reject a 
witness’s entire testimony if he or she willfully testified falsely on a material point 
unless it “believe[s] the probability of truth favors his or her testimony in other 
particulars.”  (CALJIC No. 2.21.2.)  We have repeatedly rejected similar 
challenges to this instruction.  (People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 827; 
People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 714.) 
Defendant argues the trial court erred by not modifying the standard 
instruction on the credibility of witness testimony, CALJIC No. 2.20, to inform the 
jury that the same principles apply to ascertaining the credibility of out-of-court 
statements of persons who did not testify.  He claims that this alleged error caused 
the jury to accept the credibility of out-of-court statements at face value and 
without assessing their credibility or reliability.  We have previously held, under 
similar circumstances, that no reasonable jurors would interpret these instructions 
so “as to preclude their applying the relevant portions of CALJIC No. 2.20 to their 
evaluation of all the evidence, including the out-of-court statements.”  (People v. 
Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1168.) 
Defendant contends that several standard instructions also relevant to 
witness credibility, including CALJIC Nos. 2.21.1, 2.21.2, 2.22, 2.23, and 2.27, 
were deficient because they too refer only to testimony and not out-of-court 
 
171 
statements.  We reject this claim for the same reasons described above.  (People v. 
Livingston, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1167-1168.) 
We likewise reject defendant’s additional claim that the trial court erred by 
refusing his proffered instruction that the testimony presented in transcripts from 
other proceedings that were read into the record should be considered “as if it had 
been given before you in this trial.”  Because defendant identifies no prior 
testimony read into the record of a person who did not testify at trial, there was no 
danger that the jury would fail to evaluate any prior testimony the same way as 
instructed under the standard witness credibility instructions. 
Finally, defendant claims the cumulative effect of the asserted errors 
described in this claim requires reversal of his conviction.  Defendant has failed to 
identify any error, hence there is no prejudice, individually or cumulatively. 
7.  Understandability of the Instructions 
Defendant claims the instructions were not “sufficiently understandable” to 
meet the heightened Eighth Amendment reliability required for a capital trial.  To 
support his argument, defendant observes that the Judicial Council established a 
commission that recommended a redrafting of the standard CALJIC instructions 
used at defendant’s trial.  (Blue Ribbon Com. on Jury System Improvement, Final 
Rep. (May 6, 1996) p. 93.)  He claims that this reevaluation of the instructions 
indicates that the CALJIC instructions were seriously defective in conveying 
necessary legal principles to the jury. 
The fact that the commission ultimately drafted the newer CALCRIM 
instructions, which the Judicial Council subsequently adopted (Cal. Rules of 
Court, rule 2.1050(e)), does not establish that the prior CALJIC instructions were 
constitutionally defective.  “Nor did their wording become inadequate to inform 
the jury of the relevant legal principles or too confusing to be understood by 
 
172 
jurors.  The Judicial Council’s adoption of the CALCRIM instructions simply 
meant they are now endorsed and viewed as superior.”  (People v. Thomas (2007) 
150 Cal.App.4th 461, 465-466.) 
8.  Adequacy of the Burden-of-proof Instruction 
Defendant lodges a series of complaints against the jury instructions, 
claiming they failed to adequately explain the burden of proof.  We find each of 
defendant’s complaints to be meritless because CALJIC No. 2.90 sufficiently 
defined the prosecution’s burden.53  
First, defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to affirmatively 
instruct that defendant had no obligation to present or refute evidence.  He argues 
that such an instruction is necessary to prevent any misconception amongst jurors 
that the defendant must produce evidence in order to raise a reasonable doubt.  
Defendant further argues that the court was obligated to inform the jury that the 
presentation of defense evidence does not shift the burden of proof to the 
defendant to prove a reasonable doubt.  With the exception of the first claim 
discussed below, defendant has forfeited these claims by failing in the trial court to 
seek amplification or further explanation of the standard instruction given.  
                                              
53  
The version of CALJIC No. 2.90 (5th ed. 1988) given at trial provided:  “A 
defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is 
proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether [his] [her] guilt is satisfactorily 
shown, [he] [she] is entitled to a verdict of not guilty.  This presumption places 
upon the People the burden of proving [him] [her] guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  [¶]  Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: it is not a mere possible doubt; 
because everything relating to human affairs, and depending upon moral evidence 
is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.  It is that state of the case which, 
after the entire comparison and consideration of all of the evidence, leaves the 
minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding 
conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.”  
 
173 
(People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 29.)  Moreover, on their merits, we 
disagree with defendant’s contentions. 
In People v. Wright, supra, 45 Cal.3d at page 1134, footnote 3, the 
defendant requested that the court instruct the jury that “ ‘[i]t is not necessary for 
the defendant to prove that another person may have committed the crime, nor is it 
the burden of the defendant to prove his innocence.’ ”  We held that “the [trial] 
court stated this rule in CALJIC No. 2.90, which defines the presumption of 
innocence and the prosecutor’s general burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Defendant’s special instructions . . . [were] thus repetitious of instructions 
already given, and the trial court correctly refused them on this ground.”  (Id. at 
p. 1134.)  In this case, CALJIC No. 2.90 adequately informed the jury that the 
prosecution had the burden of proof and never suggested that any presentation of 
evidence would shift this burden.  Thus, the trial court did not err in omitting the 
instructions defendant now proffers on appeal. 
Defendant next claims that CALJIC No. 2.90 was faulty because it failed to 
inform the jury that the presumption of innocence continues throughout the entire 
trial.  Defense counsel sought such an instruction, but the trial court denied the 
request.  However, the other instructions provided by the trial court adequately 
imparted this information to the jury.  The court instructed the jury that it should 
consider the evidence only for the purpose of reaching a verdict “after discussing 
the evidence and instruction [during deliberations] with the other jurors.”  The 
court also instructed the jury that it should not form or express any opinion on the 
case until the cause was finally submitted to the jury.  Thus, the trial court did not 
err in refusing defendant’s instruction because these other instructions adequately 
apprised the jury of the need to presume innocence throughout the entirety of the 
trial. 
 
174 
In a forfeited claim, defendant finds fault in the use of the term “until” in a 
portion of CALJIC No. 2.90.  That relevant portion of CALJIC No. 2.90 provided, 
“[a] defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is 
proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his or her guilt is satisfactorily 
shown, he or she is entitled to an acquittal, but the effect of this presumption is 
only to place upon the state the burden of proving him or her guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  He suggests that CALJIC No. 2.90 undermines the 
presumption of innocence because the use of the term “until” instead of “unless” 
implies that proof will necessarily be forthcoming.  We dismissed this precise 
argument in People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610 (Lewis).  In Lewis, we found 
that the instruction does not suggest that such evidence will inevitably be produced 
because it expressly dictates what should occur in the event the jury finds a 
reasonable doubt.  (Id. at p. 651.)  Thus, the use of the word “until” does not create 
misconceptions regarding the burden of proof.  
In another forfeited claim, defendant argues that the word “burden” is a 
technical term that the court was required to define for the jury as “a line” that the 
prosecution must successfully “cross.”  The claim is meritless.  “If a statutory 
word or phrase is commonly understood and is not used in a technical sense, the 
court need not give any sua sponte instruction as to its meaning.”  (People v. 
Rodriguez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 543, 546-547.)  The word “burden,” as used in 
CALJIC No. 2.90, utilizes the term’s common definition as a duty or 
responsibility.  (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 298.)  To the extent 
that the term “burden” acquires a technical definition when used in the phrase 
“burden of proof,” the term is wholly defined in CALJIC No. 2.90 as that 
establishing proof beyond a reasonable doubt.   
In a final forfeited claim, defendant argues that CALJIC No. 2.90 was 
incomplete and misleading because it did not adequately define how a jury could 
 
175 
find a reasonable doubt.  He asserts the court should have instructed the jurors that 
conflicting evidence or a lack of evidence could leave them with a reasonable 
doubt.  However, the court instructed the jury that the prosecution had the burden 
to prove defendant’s identity as the perpetrator and each element of the charged 
crime.  Thus, the jury was informed that the prosecution would not meet its burden 
of proof if the evidence was lacking on any of these points.  Additionally, the 
court provided the standard jury instruction for the treatment of circumstantial 
evidence, which instructed the jurors that if the evidence is capable of two 
conflicting, reasonable interpretations, then they must adopt the one that points to 
the defendant’s innocence.  These instructions provided at trial sufficiently 
explained the manner in which the jurors could find the existence of a reasonable 
doubt. 
Therefore, the court adequately instructed the jury regarding the 
prosecution’s burden of proof. 
9.  Other Challenges to the Burden of Proof Instructions 
Defendant claims the trial court erred by refusing to give his requested 
instructions defining both the clear and convincing evidence standard and his 
version of the reasonable doubt standard54 and making clear that proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is a higher standard than that for clear and convincing evidence 
and is, indeed, the “heaviest burden imposed in law.”  But nothing in his case 
required the application of the clear and convincing standard, and we have 
                                              
54 
Defendant’s rejected definition of “reasonable doubt” stated: 
“Proof beyond a reasonable doubt requires evidence that is clear, explicit, and 
unequivocal, so clear as to be unmistakable, which persuades to a near certainty of 
the truth of the facts for which it is offered as proof, so as to leave no reasonable 
doubt as to its truth, and is sufficiently strong to command the assent of every 
reasonable and impartial mind to a moral certainty and an abiding conviction.”  
 
176 
repeatedly held that the standard CALJIC jury instruction defining reasonable 
doubt is correct and adequate.  (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 392; 
Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 652.) 
Defendant complains that the 1988 version of CALJIC No. 2.90’s 
definition of “reasonable doubt,” unlike his own proffered definition (see ante, 
fn. 54), improperly suggested to the jurors that the reason and logic for their doubt 
should be measured against “mere possible” or “imaginary doubt.”55  That portion 
of the standard instruction cautions jurors that reasonable doubt is “not a mere 
possible doubt, because everything relating to human affairs and depending on 
moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt” and that reasonable 
doubt is, “state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of 
all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot 
say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.”  
(CALJIC No. 2.90 (5th ed. 1988).)  Defendant argues that this language 
improperly obligated jurors to have a reason for any doubt about defendant’s guilt.  
But defendant cites no applicable authority to support his argument, and, as stated 
previously, we repeatedly have held that the standard CALJIC jury instruction 
defining reasonable doubt is correct and adequate.  (People v. Brown, supra, 33 
Cal.4th at p. 392; Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 652.) 
Defendant claims that a portion of the standard definition of reasonable 
doubt given to the jury improperly excluded “mere possible doubt” as a basis for 
                                              
55 
Defendant further argues that this asserted error was exacerbated by the 
prosecutor’s closing argument that, if the jury could “attach reason and logic” to 
doubt, then it should acquit defendant but that “possible doubt or an imaginary 
doubt” should not result in acquittal.  Defendant forfeited such a claim by failing 
to object to this argument.  (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 504.) 
 
177 
finding reasonable doubt.  But the high court has already rejected a “challenge to 
this portion of the instruction,” noting that “[a] fanciful doubt is not a reasonable 
doubt.”  (Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 17.)  
Defendant complains of certain portions of the standard reasonable doubt 
instruction referring to morality — specifically, the references to some modicum 
of doubt as “depending upon moral evidence” and that reasonable doubt exists if 
jurors “cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth 
of the charge.”  He claims the references to “moral evidence” and “moral 
certainty” improperly allowed the jurors to consider moral factors in ascertaining 
guilt.  We note that defendant has at least partially forfeited this claim because his 
own proffered instruction defining reasonable doubt made a similar reference to 
“moral certainty” (see ante, fn. 54), and defendant voiced no objection to its use in 
the standard instruction (see ante, fn. 53) that the court ultimately gave to the jury.  
In any event, we have previously rejected similar claims, noting that the high court 
has ruled that such language, although unnecessary, does not render the instruction 
unconstitutional.  (People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 392, citing Victor v. 
Nebraska, supra, 511 U.S. at pp. 14-15; People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 
503-504.) 
Defendant contends the trial court’s circumstantial evidence instructions, 
derived from CALJIC Nos. 2.01 and 2.02 (5th ed. 1988), lightened the 
prosecution’s burden of proof by informing the jury that, if one interpretation of 
the evidence appeared reasonable and another unreasonable, it would be the jury’s 
duty to accept the reasonable interpretation — allegedly undermining the 
requirement that guilt be proved with the higher beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard.  We have repeatedly rejected similar claims, noting that “the disputed 
language does not undermine the instructions on the presumption of innocence and 
the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt” because other instructions make 
 
178 
clear the applicable standard of proof.  (People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 
943; accord, People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th 349, 375; People v. Crittenden 
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 144.) 
Defendant also complains that the trial court erred by refusing his requested 
instruction that, similar to the standard instruction concerning circumstantial 
evidence, stated:  “if direct evidence is susceptible of two reasonable 
interpretations, one of which points to the defendant’s guilt and the other to his 
innocence, you must adopt that interpretation which points to the defendant’s 
innocence, and reject that interpretation which points to his guilt.”  He claims that 
the conflicting interpretation rule applicable to circumstantial evidence applies 
equally to direct evidence.  We have previously rejected this claim because direct 
evidence, unlike circumstantial evidence, does not generate conflicting inferences.  
“ ‘Circumstantial evidence involves a two-step process — first, the parties present 
evidence and, second, the jury decides which reasonable inference or inferences, if 
any, to draw from the evidence — but direct evidence stands on its own.  So as to 
direct evidence no need ever arises to decide if an opposing inference suggests 
innocence.’ ”  (People v. Livingston, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1166, quoting People 
v. Ibarra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1187.) 
10.  Duties of the Jury Foreperson 
Finally, defendant complains that the trial court erred by failing to instruct 
the jury on the duties of its foreperson at the guilt and penalty phase deliberations.  
He claims the lack of instruction concerning the role of the foreperson gave that 
person undue influence during deliberations and that the jury should have been 
instructed that the foreperson’s vote carried no greater weight than the vote of any 
other juror.  Because defendant requested no such instructions, the claim is 
forfeited. 
 
179 
The trial court told the jury that each juror must “decide the case for 
yourself” and not “decide any question any particular way because a majority of 
the jurors or any of them favor such a decision.”  These instructions negated the 
concerns.  
C.  Providing the Jury with Trial Transcripts During Deliberations  
For the first time on appeal, defendant claims the trial court committed 
prejudicial error in allowing the jury to read requested trial transcripts in the jury 
room rather than having the testimony read to the jury.  Specifically, defendant 
complains that the rereading proceedings were conducted without “special 
directions or cautionary instructions” to the jury regarding the use of the 
transcripts.  He argues that the error violated his state and federal constitutional 
rights to be personally present, to counsel, and to the presence of a judge, as well 
as section 1138.  We disagree.  
1.  Right to Personal Presence 
First, defendant argues that he did not waive his right to personal presence 
at trial and was therefore entitled to be present at the rereading of testimony to 
oversee the fairness of the proceeding.  But regardless of whether defendant 
waived his right to be present, the rereading of testimony is not considered a 
critical stage of trial in which the defendant has a constitutional right to personal 
presence.  (People v. Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 288-289, fn. 8.)  A criminal 
defendant’s right to be personally present at trial is guaranteed by the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, as well as article I, section 15 
of the California Constitution.  (People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 530.)  
“ ‘ “A defendant, however, ‘does not have a right to be present at every hearing 
held in the course of a trial.’ ” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  A “ ‘defendant is not entitled to be 
personally present during proceedings which bear no reasonable, substantial 
 
180 
relation to his or her opportunity to defend the charges against him, and the burden 
is on defendant to demonstrate that his absence prejudiced his case or denied him a 
fair and impartial trial.’ ”  (People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1120-1121.)  
We have held that “[t]he reading back of testimony ordinarily is not an event that 
bears a substantial relation to the defendant’s opportunity to defend . . . .”  (Id. at 
p. 1121.)  Therefore, the contested trial court proceedings did not violate 
defendant’s right to be present. 
In any event, defendant’s contentions are without merit.  Absent a showing 
of prejudice, a defendant’s “absence from a rereading of testimony does not raise 
due process concerns.”  (People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 837.)  The 
defendant fails to explain how his presence would have assisted the defense in any 
way or altered the outcome of his trial.  His suggestion that the proceedings could 
have involved “an inadvertent omission of a part of the testimony, a mistake in the 
reading . . . or an inappropriate emphasis of voice” is entirely speculative.  Thus, 
we find no error. 
2.  Right to Presence of Counsel 
Defendant forfeited his claim when he did not object to the plan proposed 
by the trial court in handling jury requests for testimony.  It has long been the rule 
“that communications from the jury should be entertained in open court, with 
notification of counsel.”  (People v. Bloyd, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 361.)  However, 
when, as here, defense counsel is notified and does not disagree with the court’s 
handling of jury requests, we reject defendant’s claim that he was denied his 
constitutional right to counsel during jury deliberation.  (Ibid.)  Defendant further 
argues that the rereading proceedings violated his constitutional right to counsel.  
The right to counsel “is required at every stage of a criminal proceeding where 
substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected.”  (Mempa v. Rhay (1967) 
 
181 
389 U.S. 128, 134.)  But as discussed above, we have established that a readback 
proceeding is not a critical stage of trial.  Further, counsel has discretion to consent 
to a reading of testimony outside the presence of the court, counsel, and defendant.  
(See People v. Medina, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 904; People v. Lang (1989) 49 
Cal.3d 991, 1028; Bloyd, supra, at p. 361.)   
3.  Right to Presence of Trial Judge 
Finally, defendant claims that the rereading proceedings violated his 
statutory and constitutional right to the presence of a trial judge.  He relies on 
section 1138, which provides that “[a]fter the jury have retired for deliberation, if 
there be any disagreement between them as to the testimony, if they desire to be 
informed on any point of law arising in the case, they must require the officer to 
conduct them into court.”  The requested information “must be given in the 
presence of, or after notice to, the prosecuting attorney, and the defendant or his 
counsel, or after they have been called.”  (§ 1138.)  Defendant argues, for the first 
time on appeal, that this statute “obliges the trial court to supervise and control a 
readback of testimony . . . .” 
Section 1138.5, however, allows for the absence of the trial judge, 
providing:  “Except for good cause shown, the judge in his or her discretion need 
not be present in the court while testimony previously received in evidence is read 
to the jury.”  Thus, the rereading proceedings did not violate defendant’s statutory 
right to the presence of the trial judge. 
Defendant’s constitutional claim also fails.  We have interpreted section 
1138 to provide that “ ‘ “the trial court must satisfy requests by the jury for 
rereading of testimony.” ’ ”  (People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 968.)  But 
“[t]his statutory right is not of constitutional dimension,” because, as discussed 
above, “ ‘[t]he rereading of testimony is not a critical stage of the proceedings.’ ”  
 
182 
(Ibid.)  “When a trial judge exercises control over whether and what testimony 
previously introduced in evidence should be read to the jurors at their request after 
deliberation has begun, and the judge remains available to address any questions 
from the jurors to the court that might arise during the readback of the testimony, 
nothing in logic, reason, due process of law, or the right to a trial before an 
impartial jury compels the judge to be present while the testimony is read to the 
jurors.”  (People v. Rhoades (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1127.)   
4.  Right to a Public Trial 
Defendant contends that the rereading proceedings, conducted in the jury 
room and not in open court, violated his right to a public trial in both the guilt and 
penalty phases.  We disagree. 
“Every person charged with a criminal offense has a constitutional right to 
a public trial, that is, a trial which is open to the general public at all times.”  
(People v. Woodward (1992) 4 Cal.4th 376, 382.)  However, the scope of that 
right is not absolute.  “The right to public trial may be waived [citation], the 
waiver may be implied from failure to object [citations], and the waiver may be 
made by defense counsel on defendant’s behalf.”  (People v. Lang, supra, 49 
Cal.3d at p. 1028.)  Although defense counsel initially expressed concerns about 
how counsel would be notified of jury requests and the form in which testimony 
would be read back to the jury, defense counsel understood that the readback of 
testimony would be conducted in the jury deliberation room and not in open court 
when it discussed the rereading proceedings with the trial judge and the 
prosecution.  Therefore, “[a]ssuming the right to public trial extends to the reading 
of testimony during jury deliberations,” the defendant effectively waived the right 
by failing to object below.  (Ibid.) 
 
183 
5.  Proper Use of Transcripts 
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the 
jury on the proper use of transcripts during its guilt and penalty phase 
deliberations.  He claims that the jury’s request for certain transcripts created the 
danger that it might unduly emphasize those portions of the trial and that the court 
should have admonished the jury to weigh all of the evidence and not give undue 
focus to any particular portion of the trial.  This claim is forfeited because the 
defense made no request for such an instruction. 
In any event, defendant cites no binding authority that compels our courts 
to give additional instructions concerning the use of transcripts.  Moreover, the 
trial court had already instructed the jurors with the standard instructions 
admonishing them to consider “all the evidence,” that witness testimony was only 
one form of evidence, and that both direct and circumstantial evidence are both 
acceptable means of proof with neither being entitled to weight greater than the 
other.  Under these circumstances, the jury was fully informed of its duty to weigh 
all of the evidence and not to rely solely on witness testimony. 
D.  Asserted Cumulative Error 
Defendant argues that the cumulative effect of his asserted errors require 
reversal of his convictions.  The sole errors we have identified that are relevant to 
the guilt phase of defendant’s trial were the admission of Shannon Lucas’s 
statement concerning the dog collar (see ante, at pp. 105-108), the trial court’s 
ruling on the cross-examination of John Massingale for financial bias (see ante, at 
pp. 138-140) and failing to give a jury instruction on contested authentication 
concerning the photographs of the Love Insurance note (see ante, at pp. 127-128).  
We also assumed, without deciding, the trial court erred by not permitting the 
defense to introduce evidence to evaluate the joining of a weak case with a strong 
case for purposes of joinder and cross-admissibility (see ante, at p. 63), by 
 
184 
refusing to allow the impeachment of two detectives in the Jodie Santiago 
Robertson case using evidence from an unrelated matter (see ante, at p. 97), and 
by not instructing the jury that a grant of immunity may be a factor in judging a 
witness’s credibility (see ante, at p. 165).  But we explained that these errors could 
not have prejudiced defendant.  Any cumulative effect of these errors does not rise 
to a level requiring the reversal of defendant’s convictions.  (People v. Panah 
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 479-480.) 
IV.  PENALTY PHASE 
A.  Disqualification of the Trial Judge in Determining the Admissibility 
of Defendant’s Prior Rape Conviction 
Defendant contends Judge Hammes was biased in determining the 
admissibility of his prior 1973 rape conviction and that she should have 
disqualified herself from deciding the issue.  He claims the judge’s refusal to grant 
his motion to disqualify herself violated his state statutory rights and his state and 
federal due process rights to an impartial judge.  Defendant’s claim is not 
cognizable on appeal, and, in any event, the judge was not biased.  
In pretrial proceedings, defendant filed a motion to preclude admission of 
his 1973 rape conviction on the ground that the conviction was the result of 
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.  The trial court questioned 
whether defendant could attack his prior conviction in such a manner or whether it 
was more appropriate for him to challenge the validity of his prior conviction by 
filing a separate petition for writ of habeas corpus.  After further briefing and 
argument, the court ruled that defendant could not attack his conviction by his 
motion but should instead proceed by habeas corpus.  Judge Hammes also made 
clear that she believed that defendant’s motion, if construed as a petition for writ 
of habeas corpus, did not establish  a prima facie showing that would entitle him to 
an evidentiary hearing based on his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
 
185 
Defendant successfully sought writ relief for the trial court’s ruling, and the Court 
of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the court to consider 
defendant’s motion to strike the prior rape conviction.  (Lucas v. Superior Court 
(1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 149, overruled by Garcia v. Superior Court (1997) 14 
Cal.4th 953.)56 
One month after that decision became final, defendant filed a statement to 
disqualify Judge Hammes from hearing his motion to strike the prior rape 
conviction, alleging under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a), 
that the judge had prejudged the admissibility of the prior conviction.  Defendant’s 
statement referenced comments Judge Hammes had made months earlier 
concerning her belief that defendant had not made a prima facie showing.  It also 
cited a brief comment from the judge made one week before defendant filed his 
disqualification motion in which she stated her belief that defendant needed to 
make an offer of proof and argument before the motion to strike could proceed.  
Judge Hammes struck defendant’s disqualification statement in a written 
order on dual grounds — untimeliness and an insufficient basis for 
disqualification.  In the order, Judge Hammes noted that defense counsel had 
known the basis for defendant’s alleged claim of bias for at least the prior three 
                                              
56 
We disapproved Lucas v. Superior Court, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d 149, 
based on the high court’s decision in Custis v. United States (1994) 511 U.S. 485, 
which, in a noncapital context, generally held that “a defendant has no right under 
the federal Constitution to challenge the constitutional validity of a prior 
conviction in proceedings involving a subsequent offense . . . .”  (Garcia v. 
Superior Court, supra, 14 Cal.4th 953, 963.)  But we declined to impose this bar 
in a capital case when the prior conviction was a special circumstance making the 
defendant eligible for the death penalty.  (People v. Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th at 
p. 1134.)  We have not decided whether the bar applies to a case such as this one 
where a prior conviction is being used as an aggravating factor in a capital case.  
We express no opinion on this matter here. 
 
186 
months.  She also concluded that defendant’s statement was legally insufficient 
because the complained-of comments merely reflected her then-tentative legal 
opinion of the merits of defendant’s motion to strike based on the evidence 
defendant had provided at that point and such opinions cannot be grounds for 
disqualification.  She further noted that nothing defendant referenced in his 
statement suggested that she had prejudged the matter without regard to whatever 
additional evidence might be presented or arguments made.  
Defendant then made an offer of proof to augment his original motion to 
strike the prior conviction, and the trial court subsequently held an evidentiary 
hearing.  After considering defendant’s evidence, the court denied defendant’s 
motion to strike.  
Defendant’s claim that he was statutorily entitled to the disqualification of 
Judge Hammes is not cognizable on appeal because a “determination of the 
question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be 
reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate court of appeal sought 
only by the parties to the proceeding” within 10 days of notice to the parties of the 
decision.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (d).)  Because defendant failed to seek 
writ review, his statutory claim is not cognizable here.  For this same reason, 
defendant’s due process claim is forfeited as well.  (People v. Brown (1993) 6 
Cal.4th 322, 335-336.) 
In any event, even if defendant had preserved these issues on appeal, his 
claims are without merit.  As the trial court correctly recognized, “[i]t is well 
settled . . . that the expressions of opinion uttered by a judge, in what he conceives 
to be a discharge of his official duties, are not evidence of bias or prejudice.”  
(Kreling v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1944) 25 Cal.2d 305, 310-311.)  
 
187 
B.  Challenges to the Admissibility of Defendant’s Prior Rape 
Conviction 
Defendant lodges several challenges to the admissibility of his prior 1973 
rape conviction.  We reject all of them. 
1.  Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel  
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to 
strike his prior rape conviction on the grounds that he had received constitutionally 
inadequate assistance of counsel during that prior trial.  Defendant claims his trial 
counsel failed to discover that a friend of the victim had called the victim and that 
the timing of this call was inconsistent with the prosecution’s theory of when 
defendant had abducted and raped the victim.  According to defendant, had trial 
counsel presented evidence of this telephone call at trial, it would have severely 
undermined the prosecution’s case against him.   
To meet his burden, defendant must demonstrate both that counsel’s 
performance was deficient when measured against the standard of a reasonably 
competent attorney, and that counsel’s deficient performance resulted in prejudice, 
in that it “ ‘so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that 
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.’ ”  (People v. Kipp, 
supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 366, quoting Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 
668, 686.)  If petitioner fails to show prejudice, a reviewing court may reject the 
claim without determining whether counsel’s performance was adequate.  (People 
v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 164.) 
Defendant claims the evidence the prosecution presented at trial showed 
that the conduct involving the victim’s abduction and rape occurred between 
9:30 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. on May 27, 1973.  Because the telephone call between 
the victim and her friend, Alejandrina Casas, occurred at 10:00 p.m., while the 
victim was still at her residence, and the victim made no indication that she had 
 
188 
been abducted and raped, defendant contends that this call constituted exonerating 
evidence that his counsel should have discovered and presented at trial.57  The 
record does not reveal why trial counsel did not interview Casas before trial and 
discover the 10:00 p.m. call.  But even assuming counsel was deficient in this 
regard, defendant fails to show prejudice. 
First, the exact time of the victim’s abduction and rape and the duration of 
the crimes were far from certain based on the testimony presented at defendant’s 
rape trial.  The victim testified that she was unsure of the exact time of her 
abduction, placing it as early as 9:30 p.m. or as late as 10:30 p.m.  The victim’s 
estimate about the duration of the abduction and rape was 30 to 35 minutes.  A 
neighbor testified that she saw defendant return home at 10:30 p.m., although she 
had told an officer two days after the crimes that defendant returned between 
10:30 and 11:00 p.m.  Therefore, even if the defense had presented evidence of 
Casas’s 10:00 p.m. telephone call, it would not have exonerated defendant nor 
contradicted the prosecution’s theory of when defendant had abducted and raped 
the victim. 
More important, Casas’s testimony fortified the victim’s identification of 
defendant as her attacker.  After the original rape trial, defendant’s counsel learned 
of the 10:00 p.m. telephone call and filed a petition for coram nobis after which 
the trial court held a hearing and heard testimony from Casas concerning the 
telephone call.  At this hearing, Casas testified that she saw defendant with his 
friends having a party at the victim’s residence earlier on the night in question, and 
that, around 9:00 p.m., the victim asked her to tell him and his friends to leave.  
                                              
57 
Defendant also alleges that the victim told her friend not to tell 
investigators about this telephone call, but there is no such evidence in the record.  
 
189 
Casas testified that she told defendant to leave, and he responded, “Yes, ma’am, 
I’ll leave the house.”  After Casas left, she returned home and called the victim at 
10:00 p.m. to determine whether defendant and his friends had left, and the victim 
reported that they were gone.  According to Casas, the next day, she received a 
telephone call from the victim in which she hysterically explained that the same 
person that Casas had told to leave had later returned to rape her at knifepoint.  
Consequently, Casas’s testimony would not have impeached the 
prosecution’s version of events and would have only solidified the victim’s 
identification of defendant as her assailant.  Defendant has failed to demonstrate 
constitutionally inadequate assistance of his counsel in his prior rape case, and the 
trial court correctly rejected his motion to strike that conviction.58 
2.  Conflict of Interest of Appellate Counsel and the Failure to Seek 
Rehearing  
Defendant asserts the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to strike 
his prior conviction based on his claim that his appellate counsel performed under 
a conflict of interest.  Defendant contends a conflict existed because defendant’s 
mother paid for appellate counsel’s representation of him and controlled the issues 
he raised on appeal, including preventing him from raising a claim critical of trial 
counsel.  He further contends that the failure to pay appellate counsel to file a 
petition for rehearing, after his rape conviction was affirmed on appeal, also 
required the court to strike his prior conviction.  The trial court held a hearing in 
which appellate counsel testified concerning his work on appealing defendant’s 
                                              
58 
For these same reasons, appellate counsel in defendant’s rape case did not 
render constitutionally inadequate representation by failing to raise this issue on 
appeal, and, therefore, this circumstance also did not constitute a basis for the trial 
court to strike the prior conviction.  
 
190 
rape conviction.  We conclude the court properly rejected a claim that appellate 
counsel labored under a conflict that rendered his rape conviction invalid. 
Defendant claims that, without his consultation, his mother convinced 
appellate counsel not to raise on appeal a claim that trial counsel rendered 
constitutionally inadequate representation because of his alleged failure to seek a 
psychiatric examination of the rape victim under Ballard, supra, 64 Cal.2d 159.  
But the record demonstrates that defendant was 19 years old at the time, 
unsophisticated, and had intentionally delegated supervision of appellate counsel’s 
representation to his mother.  Defendant provides no evidence that he wanted to 
make decisions concerning his case or was otherwise excluded from the 
decisionmaking process concerning his appeal.  Although appellate counsel 
characterized the mother’s decision to delete the ineffective assistance claim as 
“stupid,” the proper way to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
generally by writ of habeas corpus, not appeal (People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 
412, 426), and defendant fails to explain why the appellate record was sufficient to 
raise such a claim successfully on appeal.59 
Defendant also alleges that his mother’s inability to pay appellate counsel 
for additional services resulted in a lack of investigation, the failure to transcribe 
the opening and closing statements at trial, and the failure to file a petition for 
rehearing or seek review before this court.  But “[t]he right of a nonindigent 
criminal defendant to discharge his retained attorney, with or without cause, has 
                                              
59  
Defendant also claims his appellate counsel should have raised several 
other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, but defendant raises these claims 
under the theory that his mother’s supervision of appellate counsel created a 
conflict of interest that prevented appellate counsel from raising claims critical of 
trial counsel.  According to appellate counsel, the Ballard claim is the only issue 
that defendant’s mother had precluded appellate counsel from raising. 
 
191 
long been recognized in this state” (People v. Ortiz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 975, 983), 
and defendant clearly had the right to appointed counsel if he became indigent 
(Douglas v. California (1963) 372 U.S. 353, 355; People v. Jones (1991) 53 
Cal.3d 1115, 1137).  Consequently, defendant has forfeited these issues by failing 
to seek appointment of counsel.  By choosing to proceed as he did, there was no 
conflict that adversely affected the appeal — rather, defendant and his mother 
simply chose to limit the scope and cost of the appeal.  For this same reason, 
appellate counsel did not render constitutionally inadequate assistance by failing to 
file a petition for rehearing because counsel “must always respect and defer to 
those decisions properly reserved to his client.”60  (Davis v. State Bar (1983) 33 
Cal.3d 231, 238.)  
3.  Admissibility of Evidence Attacking the Reliability of Defendant’s 
Prior Conviction  
Defendant claims the trial court erred by refusing to admit certain evidence 
that defendant argues was relevant to whether he actually committed the prior 
1973 rape.  We reject these claims. 
Defendant asserts the trial court erred by refusing to admit evidence 
showing he had passed a polygraph test concerning his alleged innocence 
regarding his prior rape conviction.  Despite acknowledging the existence of a 
statutory bar to the admission of such evidence (see Evid. Code, § 351.1), he 
claims the asserted error violated his Eighth Amendment right to present 
                                              
60  
The only issue defendant identifies that should have been included in a 
petition for rehearing is the appellate court’s alleged misunderstanding of the 
importance of Casas’s telephone call insofar as it related to the prosecution’s 
theory of when the abduction and rape occurred.  But, as explained above, Casas’s 
testimony would not have assisted the defense.  (See ante, at pp. 187-189.) 
 
192 
mitigating evidence, his right to due process, and his state right to present relevant 
evidence. 
We have recognized that “ ‘there is simply no consensus that polygraph 
evidence is reliable,’ ” — and indeed, “this lack of consensus is ‘reflected in the 
disagreement among state and federal courts concerning both the admissibility and 
the reliability of polygraph evidence’ ”; in this setting, “the per se exclusion of 
polygraph evidence ‘is a rational and proportional means of advancing the 
legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence’ . . . .”  (People v. Wilkinson 
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 849, quoting United States v. Scheffer (1998) 523 U.S. 303, 
309-311, 312 (lead opn. of Thomas, J.).)  Nor are we persuaded that a different 
rule should apply in the penalty phase of a capital trial.  The right to present 
mitigating evidence in the penalty phase “does not trump or override the ordinary 
rules of evidence.”  (People v. Thornton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 454.)  The trial 
court correctly applied the statutory bar to the admission of defendant’s polygraph 
testing. 
Defendant further argues that the trial court should have admitted evidence 
concerning Casas’s telephone call and evidence of his trial counsel’s alleged 
inadequate representation.  He claims the failure to admit such evidence violated 
his Eighth Amendment rights to challenge aggravating evidence and to present 
evidence in mitigation and his right to heightened reliability in a capital trial, as 
well as his federal due process rights. 
Because the record shows no request by trial counsel to admit evidence of 
Casas’s telephone call, this claim is forfeited.  The trial court did allow trial 
counsel to testify about his knowledge and opinion of defendant and his belief that 
defendant was innocent of the rape, but refused to admit testimony that would, in 
effect, relitigate the prior conviction.  The court also allowed defendant to present 
the testimony of Curt Andrewson, who had been a witness in the rape trial, and 
 
193 
allowed him to testify as an alibi witness and to his belief that defendant was 
innocent of the 1973 rape.  
The trial court properly exercised its discretion to exclude evidence of any 
alleged deficient representation because its probative value was substantially 
outweighed by the probability that exploring trial counsel’s alleged deficiencies 
would have created a substantial danger of confusing the issues or misleading the 
jury.  (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1145.)  As previously explained, 
defendant’s claim primarily concerns counsel’s failure to discover evidence of 
Casas’s telephone call before trial, but that call did little to thwart the 
prosecution’s theory of the case or to establish defendant’s innocence.  (See ante, 
at pp. 187-189.)  Moreover, as explained earlier, it appears that Casas’s testimony, 
if probed, would have identified defendant as the rape victim’s attacker.  Because, 
viewed as a whole, Casas’s telephone call carried little probative value in 
defendant’s favor, a lengthy exploration concerning why trial counsel failed to 
learn of the telephone call earlier would have been confusing to the jury, and its 
omission could not have affected the verdict.   
C.  Prosecutorial Misconduct  
 
Defendant asserts several claims of prosecutorial misconduct.  At the 
outset, we reject the Attorney General’s argument that defendant forfeited these 
claims by failing to object at trial.  The trial court stated its preference for the 
parties not to interrupt and make objections during closing statements, and instead 
asked that objections be made at the end of argument or before breaks.  Defense 
counsel did make objections for all of the claimed misconduct, typically after the 
prosecution was done speaking. 
 
194 
1.  References to the Bible and “Good versus Evil”  
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct in his penalty 
phase argument by (1) referring to a biblical verse at the beginning and end of his 
closing statement in which he quoted, without citing, Proverbs 24:20 — “The 
candle of the wicked shall be put out”; and (2) invoking “good versus evil” as a 
central theme, and expressly telling jurors it was their role to be involved in the 
“battle between good versus evil” in choosing a penalty of death or a penalty of 
life without the possibility of parole.  Defendant argues the prosecutor’s conduct 
was improper and prejudicial because his closing argument invoked higher 
religious law, erroneously implied jurors could justify a death verdict based on 
that law, and misstated the jurors’ role and their sense of penalty responsibility in 
violation of his Eighth Amendment right to a reliable penalty determination.  
In the prosecutor’s lengthy penalty argument, after the opening reference to 
the biblical verse, he stated, “Ladies and gentlemen by your verdicts of guilty you 
have determined that these vile, cold-blooded, savage, and brutal murders 
committed by Mr. Lucas indeed make him a wicked person.  Your decision will be 
to decide whether or not the candle of life within Mr. Lucas shall be put out.  And 
I submit to you and I suggest to you that the evidence in aggravation is 
astonishing.  It is overwhelming in support of a finding of death in your verdict.”  
The prosecutor then explained how the jurors were to decide what penalty 
to impose on Mr. Lucas.  He said, “ Your duty is one that requires that you both 
impose a penalty that is mandated by law that will be given to you and, secondly, a 
penalty that is just.”  Next, the prosecutor explained how to identify and weigh 
aggravating factors.  He advised the jury that only two of the applicable factors in 
aggravation had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that the jurors need 
not be unanimous in determining whether an aggravating factor existed.  He then 
explained that, because defendant had stipulated to the two factors (both 
 
195 
concerning the 1973 rape), those two factors had effectively already been proved 
to exist beyond a reasonable doubt.  Then the prosecutor said:  “The ultimate test 
— the ultimate test for you to concern yourself with is this; in the event, after full 
and complete consideration of the penalty evidence and the guilt evidence, you 
feel that the circumstances in aggravation are so substantial in comparison to the 
mitigating circumstances, only in that event are you capable of rendering a verdict 
of death.  And I submit to you, again, indeed this evidence is overwhelming in 
support of a verdict of death.  I am going to begin, first of all, by discussing these 
factors which support the legal mandate of your decision, and then I will move to 
the second half  of your responsibility, and that is to make a determination as to 
what is the just penalty.”  
The prosecutor then described the 10 factors in aggravation and explained 
that the jurors had to consider all the factors independently and accord each of 
them appropriate weight.  The prosecutor explained that the defense would plead 
for sympathy and mercy and further stated, “His lawyers will beg for mercy from 
you, but we all know that mercy is not an earthly gift.  It is a divine gift, and only 
God can grant mercy.  Your duty, ladies and gentlemen, is to dispense justice, and 
after you have done so, then Mr. Lucas will seek his mercy from God, and God 
will consider whether mercy is appropriate.”   
Finally, in concluding, the prosecutor theorized that “[w]ithin the story of 
life, ladies and gentlemen, is the battle between good and evil.  There are times 
when we have to enter into the battle of good and evil.  Sometime it’s not pleasant, 
but sometimes we have to do that.  And as sworn jurors, you have agreed to do 
that.  And one of those times is now for you to enter into this battle between good 
and evil.  Capital punishment has been with us for thousands of years, as Moses 
laid it down, as the punishment for premeditated murder, and we have had it ever 
since because it is a just penalty when someone commits the ultimate act of evil.  
 
196 
We know now by your verdicts that Mr. Lucas has indeed committed the ultimate 
acts of evil in murders.  You are going to hear, I am sure, that the death penalty is 
inhumane; it is immoral.  I say to you, ladies and gentlemen, it is — that notion is 
historical and logical nonsense.  For in that battle between good and evil there are 
times when we must, when we must get into that battle and do what is right and 
what is just and sometimes that requires that we impose the death penalty, and it is 
proper and just in this case.  However, it can never be just for the purpose or the 
reason that someone fails to get into that battle, because if you fail to get into that 
battle and deal with it and do what is just, if you fail, then justice is not done.  You 
may be told that the battle will be won by giving Mr. Lucas life without the 
possibility of parole, and I say no, no, ladies and gentlemen, no.  The appropriate 
penalty is death, because his lawyers will ask you for life . . . .  No one is going to 
try to tell you that your task is a pleasant one; no one.  But you must get into the 
battle between good and evil and take care of that problem.  This case cries for the 
penalty of death, and the candle of the wicked shall be put out.”  
Defense counsel then objected to the prosecutor’s “good versus evil” 
argument, to the reference to Moses as an improper invocation of “religious 
passion,” and to the reference that only God could grant mercy.  The court agreed 
to give a curative instruction to address the prosecutor’s comments about mercy,61 
but stated it was not concerned about the other comments.  
                                              
61 
Before the defense began its closing statements, the court admonished the 
jury:  “I want to advise you that the law does specifically provide that the jury may 
consider mercy for the defendant in considering his sentence.”  
 
197 
“It is well settled that biblical law has no proper role in the sentencing 
process.”62  (People v. Roybal, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 520.)  And we have said 
repeatedly that “[a] prosecutor may not cite the Bible or religion as a basis to 
impose the death penalty.”  (People v. Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1169; see 
People v. Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 100; People v. Roybal, supra, at pp. 519-
521.)  Yet, we have suggested that some biblical reference may be permissible “to 
argue, for the benefit of religious jurors who might fear otherwise, that application 
of the death penalty according to secular law does not contravene biblical doctrine 
[citations], or that the Bible shows society’s historical acceptance of capital 
punishment.”  (Zambrano, supra, at p. 1169.)  The prosecutor’s biblical reference 
to Moses merely emphasized the historical existence and acceptance of capital 
punishment.   (People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1325 [no prosecutorial 
misconduct for stating that “ ‘you will find that Moses laid down capital 
punishment as the punishment for premeditated murder’ ”].) 
The one obviously improper reference to higher authority — that only God 
may grant mercy — was cured by the court’s admonition and the court’s standard 
instructions listing mercy as a factor to consider.   
Defendant argues that the prosecutor’s theme of good versus evil has 
biblical roots and that the reference to the candle of the wicked “was unmistakably 
biblical in style and readily recognizable by persons schooled in the Christian 
                                              
62 
We note, however, that our holdings clearly condemning prosecutorial 
references to biblical authority in penalty phase closing argument were filed in 
1992 and thereafter, whereas the argument here occurred in 1989.  (See People v. 
Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 260-261; People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 
193-194; People v. Wrest (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1088, 1107.)  Accordingly, we make no 
finding concerning whether the prosecutor committed misconduct, but instead 
focus on whether any improper references unduly prejudiced defendant. 
 
198 
religion.”  (People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 193.)  Even so, these 
statements were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This court has held that, in similar contexts, when improper biblical 
references “ ‘were part of a longer argument that properly focused upon the factors 
in aggravation and mitigation’ ” such improper statements are harmless because 
“there is no likelihood his biblical references diminished the jury’s sense of 
responsibility or displaced the court’s standard penalty instructions.  [Citations.]”  
(Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1170.)  The record shows the asserted biblical 
references were but a fraction of the prosecutor’s overall argument when 
compared to his focus on the factors in aggravation and mitigation. 
Defendant argues that the references may have made a difference because 
the deliberations were closely balanced based on the jury’s repeated 
announcements of deadlock, the length of deliberations, and its requests for 
transcripts and for reinstruction.  But in a case as long and complex as this one, 
lasting nearly one year, with nearly 800 exhibits and more than 13,000 pages of 
reporter’s transcript for the trial alone, the requests for transcripts and reinstruction 
and the length of deliberations is unsurprising.  Consequently, “the length of the 
deliberations demonstrates nothing more than that the jury was conscientious in its 
performance of high civic duty.”  (People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 837.) 
2.  Implying That a Death Sentence Was Preordained  
Defendant assigns as prejudicial error the prosecutor’s statement during 
closing argument:  “If Mr. Lucas does not deserve the death penalty in this case, 
we should abolish it as a measure of punishment in the state of California.”  He 
claims the trial court’s refusal to address or correct this statement had the effect of 
suggesting that the authors of the death penalty law had preordained a death 
sentence in a case like this, implied a duty that jurors must decide on a sentence of 
 
199 
death, and minimized the significance of any mitigating evidence.  He argues the 
error violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  We 
disagree. 
The complained-of statement cannot be viewed in isolation.  Throughout 
the prosecutor’s argument, he repeatedly emphasized the jury’s role in following 
the law by weighing the applicable factors in order to determine whether a death 
sentence was appropriate.  The prosecutor’s statement was merely an attempt to 
emphasize the weight of the aggravating factors, and argue that this is the kind of 
case in which a death sentence should be imposed.  Under these circumstances, the 
prosecutor’s comments were within the bounds of proper argument.  (See People 
v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 185 [prosecutor’s argument that not imposing 
death would make death penalty meaningless is not misconduct because “the 
import of this comment is that the present case is precisely the type in which the 
death penalty should be imposed” and “[t]his is within the bounds of proper 
argument”].) 
3.  Arguments Minimizing Mitigating Evidence  
Defendant takes issue with the following remark made by the prosecutor 
during closing statements:  “[Defendant’s] friends came in and said he was a good 
guy. . . .  Ted Bundy was a good guy when he wasn’t murdering people.”  
Defendant claims the trial court should have addressed his objection to this 
reference because it improperly encouraged the jury to disregard and discount his 
mitigating evidence and was improperly based on facts outside the trial record. 
But the remark was anchored to a matter of common knowledge concerning 
a well-publicized serial killer and constituted fair comment on the evidence.  The 
general rule against referring to matters outside the record does not apply to 
matters of common knowledge or illustrations drawn from experience, history, or 
 
200 
literature.  (People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 463.)  In People v. Ervin, 
supra, 22 Cal.4th 48, 99, the prosecutor addressed the testimony of defendant’s 
mother, who claimed her son was “ ‘a nice person’ ” by stating, “ ‘To say Curtis 
Ervin is a nice person is like saying Charles Manson is the Messiah.’ ”  We 
concluded that this comment, which used an infamous killer to make a point, “was 
within the scope of fair comment on the evidence” regarding the defendant’s 
crimes of kidnapping and killing his victim.  (Ibid.)  The challenged comment here 
is no different. 
4.  Cumulative Effect of Misconduct  
Defendant claims that, if not individually prejudicial, his claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct cumulatively require reversal.  But we have found only 
one error in the prosecutor’s argument (see ante, at p. 197), and the trial court 
corrected that error with an admonition and again with an instruction.  This 
rendered the error harmless.  We also assumed, without deciding, various other 
errors in the prosecutor’s argument that the court did not correct, but we concluded 
all were harmless in light of the prosecutor’s whole argument.  The combined 
effect of the error and asserted errors did not prejudice defendant.  (People v. 
Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 479-480.) 
D.  Instructional Error  
1.  Use of Guilt-phase Convictions in Determining Defendant’s Guilt in 
the 1973 Rape  
Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct 
the jury on its own motion that the jury could not consider the guilt-phase 
convictions in determining whether the 1973 prior rape had been proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  He claims this instruction was necessary because the jury may 
have applied the cross-admissibility instructions from the guilt phase during its 
penalty phase deliberations.  He argues the error violated his state and federal 
 
201 
rights to due process and the Eighth Amendment in determining the reliability of 
his death sentence.  There was no error. 
As defendant acknowledges, we have previously rejected the claim that a 
guilt phase jury cannot hear evidence of other crimes at the penalty phase.  
(People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 239.)  More important, defendant 
merely speculates that the jurors applied cross-admissibility instructions to the 
penalty phase in determining defendant’s guilt for the 1973 rape, even though such 
instructions were not given at the penalty phase.  If defendant nonetheless believed 
the circumstances required additional attention, he should have requested a 
limiting instruction, because, even in the penalty phase trial of a capital case, “a 
trial court is under no duty to instruct on the limited admissibility of evidence of 
past criminal conduct in the absence of a request.”  (People v. McLain (1988) 46 
Cal.3d 97, 113.)  The trial court did not err. 
2.  Instructions Concerning Defendant’s Guilt and Conviction in the 
1973 Rape  
Defendant contends the trial court’s instructions concerning defendant’s 
1973 rape case caused the jury to avoid determining whether he had committed 
that crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  As explained below, one instruction 
concerned defendant’s conviction for that offense whereas the other concerned his 
guilt for that offense.  There was no error. 
In order to prove the aggravating factor of a prior conviction under section 
190.3, factor (c), the prosecution introduced evidence of defendant’s conviction 
for the 1973 rape, and the trial court gave the following instruction:  “Evidence 
has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant has been 
convicted of the crime of forcible rape while armed with a deadly weapon prior to 
the offenses of murder in the first degree of which he has been found guilty in this 
case.  [¶]  Before you may consider such alleged crime as an aggravating 
 
202 
circumstance in this case, you must first be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant was in fact convicted of such prior crime.”  
Defendant claims this instruction allowed the jury to accept defendant’s 
guilt as having been proved by this conviction without determining whether 
defendant had in fact committed the rape beyond a reasonable doubt for purposes 
of establishing prior violent conduct under section 190.3, factor (b).  But 
defendant ignores the fact that the jury was given an instruction specific to the 
factor (b) evidence:  “Evidence has been introduced showing that the defendant 
has committed a criminal act which involved the express or implied use of force or 
violence or the threat of force or violence.  The act is as follows:  [¶]  Forcible 
rape while armed with a deadly weapon; to wit, a knife.  [¶]  Before you may 
consider such criminal act as an aggravating circumstance in this case, you must 
first be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did in fact commit 
such criminal act.”  
Taken together, these instructions required the jury to determine beyond a 
reasonable doubt whether defendant had been convicted of the 1973 rape and 
whether he had actually committed the rape.  These instructions did not conflict; 
the jury was permitted to accept the truth of defendant’s rape conviction, made by 
way of a stipulation, but nonetheless entertain and act on any lingering doubts 
concerning whether defendant had actually committed the 1973 rape.  
Consequently, the jury received adequate instruction. 
3.  Lingering Doubt Instruction  
Defendant contends the trial court’s lingering doubt instruction was 
insufficient in several ways.  He asserts the court should have given his requested 
instruction that both identified lingering doubt as a factor in mitigation and 
required the jury to consider such doubts, instead of merely allowing it to consider 
 
203 
any doubts.  Although he made no such requests at trial, he also claims the court 
failed to define “lingering doubt” and failed to make clear that the concept could 
be applied to each of his convictions.  He argues the errors violated his state and 
federal rights to due process and his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to 
have relevant mitigating evidence considered by his jury.  We disagree. 
“Although a defendant may assert his or her possible innocence in 
mitigation, and the jury may consider lingering doubt in determining the 
appropriate penalty, there is no requirement that the court specifically instruct the 
jury to consider lingering doubt.”  (People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1314.)  
We have also rejected claims, which defendant has forfeited here, that lingering 
doubt must be defined, or that it must be identified as a mitigating factor.  (People 
v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 42; People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 
166.)  In any event, the standard instructions that compel jurors to consider the 
circumstances of the crime and any other circumstance extenuating the gravity of 
the crime, in addition to the defense arguments highlighting the question of 
lingering doubt, “suffice to properly put the question before the penalty jury.”  
(People v. Demetrulias, supra, at p. 42.)  Because no lingering doubt instruction is 
required, defense counsel argued the issue to the jury, and the instruction given 
here was not otherwise misleading, the court did not err. 
4.  Consideration of All Mitigating Evidence Presented 
Defendant contends the trial court gave the jury an instruction on mitigating 
evidence that improperly limited its consideration of such evidence to only 
defense evidence and not any mitigating evidence introduced by the prosecution.  
Although he made no request of the trial court to modify the relevant instruction, 
he claims the error violated his state and federal rights to due process and his 
 
204 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to have relevant mitigating evidence 
considered by his jury.  There was no error. 
The trial court gave a modified version of CALJIC No. 8.85, which stated, 
in relevant part:  “In determining which penalty is to be imposed on the defendant, 
you shall consider all of the evidence which has been received during the guilt 
phase of this trial insofar as such evidence is relevant to factors in aggravation or 
mitigation. . . .  [¶]  You shall consider, take into account, and be guided by the 
following factors, if applicable: . . .  [¶]  Any other circumstance which extenuates 
the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime; and any 
sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character, background or record 
that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not 
related to the offense for which he is on trial.”  (Italics added.)  
Defendant argues use of the phrase “that the defendant offers” precluded 
the jury from considering any guilt phase evidence introduced by the prosecution 
that the jury might have considered mitigating.  Defendant has forfeited this claim 
by failing to make any attempt at trial to modify this instruction. 
In any event, the disputed language is consistent with the high court’s 
construction of the federal Constitution.  In Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 
604, the high court held that a capital sentencer cannot be precluded from 
considering “as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record 
and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis 
for a sentence less than death.”  (Second italics added.)  Based on Lockett, our 
state adopted the disputed language now found in CALJIC No. 8.85.  (People v. 
Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878, fn. 10.) 
Furthermore, defense counsel, in closing statements, offered numerous 
points in mitigation and did not limit his argument to evidence presented only in 
the defense phases of the trial.  In addition, nothing in the instructions given to the 
 
205 
jury stated that it should ignore mitigation evidence offered by the prosecution.  In 
fact, the challenged instruction began by informing the jury that it should 
“consider all of the evidence which has been received during the guilt phase of this 
trial” that was relevant to mitigation.  Finally, in response to a jury question during 
deliberations, the trial court stated that “[e]vidence of the circumstances of the 
crimes of which defendant was convicted, and the finding of the special 
circumstances in the guilt phase may be considered in the penalty phase insofar as 
such evidence is relevant to factors in aggravation or mitigation.”  (Italics added.)  
Under these circumstances, the jury could not have interpreted the instruction in 
the manner defendant argues. 
In a related claim, defendant contends the trial court’s response to the jury, 
which asked whether it could consider evidence from the whole trial during the 
penalty phase, improperly limited its consideration of mitigating circumstances.  
Defendant has forfeited this claim by failing to seek clarification at trial of this 
additional instruction.  Regardless, the claim is without merit. 
Although the court’s imprecise response stated that the jury “may view 
factors, (a), (b), and (c) as aggravating and/or mitigating” and that “[a]ll other 
specifically enumerated factors listed on pages 17 and 18 must be considered as 
possible mitigating factors,” the court also stated that the final listed factor, the 
equivalent of factor (k), “is a ‘catch-all’ mitigating section” and that “[i]n addition 
to the specifically enumerated mitigating factors and the catch-all mitigating 
[factor], you may for the defendant consider pity, sympathy and mercy and 
lingering doubt.”  By referring to section 190.3, factor (k)’s catchall provision, the 
court clearly reminded the jury that it could consider as mitigation “[a]ny other 
circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crimes” or “any sympathetic or 
 
206 
other aspect of the defendant’s character.”  The additional instruction, therefore, 
did not improperly narrow the jury’s consideration of mitigating circumstances.63 
5.  Defendant’s Good Behavior During Trial  
Defendant claims the trial court erred and violated his Eighth Amendment 
right to have the jury consider mitigating evidence by instructing the jury, during 
the guilt phase, to ignore reactions to the evidence by the parties, including 
defendant.  He claims the jury improperly imported this instruction into the 
penalty phase, thereby ignoring defendant’s good demeanor as a circumstance in 
mitigation.  We disagree. 
The complained-of guilt phase instruction stated:  “The reactions to 
evidence introduced during the trial, if any, by the judge, court personnel, 
attorneys, defendant, or any spectator do not constitute evidence and cannot be 
considered.  If you have observed any such courtroom reactions, it is your duty to 
disregard the observations.”  
                                              
63 
Defendant also argues, for the first time on appeal, that this additional 
instruction and other supplemental instructions the court gave in response to the 
jury’s inquiries during deliberations should have been orally read to the jury 
instead of being submitted to the jury only in writing.  We have previously 
rejected a related claim that the trial court erred by supplying the jury with written 
transcripts instead of reading back the testimony in open court.  This is because 
“[s]ection 1138 requires the testimony to be furnished” but the statute does not 
specify the form in which it should be furnished, and the form “i.e., written or oral, 
is apparently in the trial court’s discretion.”  (People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 
1153, 1214.)  Because section 1138 also applies to the jury’s “ ‘desire to be 
informed on any point of law arising in the case’ ” (id. at p. 1213), it also was 
within the court’s discretion whether to orally instruct the jury in addition to 
providing written clarification.  Defendant fails to explain how the absence of oral 
supplemental instructions prejudiced his case and denied his rights to due process 
and a fair trial.  Thus, in addition to being forfeited, defendant’s claim fails on its 
merits. 
 
207 
Defendant forfeited this claim by failing to raise it in the trial court.  
Forfeiture aside, even assuming the jury applied this instruction at the penalty 
phase, nothing in the instruction precluded the jury from considering defendant’s 
good demeanor during the nearly year-long trial.  Instead, the instruction merely 
told the jury to ignore any “reactions to evidence.”  Moreover, defense counsel 
was specifically permitted to argue to the jury that defendant’s respect for 
authority supported a life sentence as demonstrated by “his behavior day in and 
day out in this courtroom for many months” which was “what you have seen.”  
Accordingly, there was no error. 
6.  Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances and the Weighing of 
“Good and Bad”  
Defendant claims the trial court erred and violated his state and federal 
rights and his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by refusing to 
give his proffered instruction elaborating on the weighing of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances.  He claims that, without this instruction, the jury may 
have imposed a death sentence because it improperly determined that there is more 
bad than good about the defendant and his crimes.  The trial court properly refused 
the instruction. 
The defense requested the following instruction:  “The weighing of 
mitigating and aggravating factors is not a weighing or balancing between good 
and bad, but between life and death.”  The trial court correctly rejected this 
instruction as being vague and taken out of context from our decision in People v. 
Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512 (Brown).  
In Brown, we rejected the claim that the death penalty statute impermissibly 
limits “the jury to a mechanical balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors.”  
(Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 538.)  In upholding the death penalty statute as not 
requiring “a death verdict on the basis of some arithmetical formula” (id. at p. 540) 
 
208 
we noted that the terms “ ‘[a]ggravating’ and ‘mitigating’ are not defined by the 
statute” but explained that “we see no statutory intent to require death if the jury 
merely finds more bad than good about the defendant and to permit life without 
parole only if it finds more good than bad.”  (Id. at p. 541, fn. 13.)  We further 
explained, “the statute requires at a minimum that he suffer the penalty of life 
imprisonment without parole.  It permits the jury to decide only whether he should 
instead incur the law’s single most severe penalty — extinction of life itself.  
[Citation.]  It follows that the weighing of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances must occur within the context of those two punishments; the 
balance is not between good and bad but between life and death.  Therefore, to 
return a death judgment, the jury must be persuaded that the ‘bad’ evidence is so 
substantial in comparison with the ‘good’ that it warrants death instead of life 
without parole.”  (Ibid., citing § 190.3.) 
We did not intend the above explanation to serve as necessary instruction in 
capital cases; rather, we were rejecting the argument that the death penalty statute 
requires a mechanical balancing to determine whether a verdict of death should be 
imposed.  More important, defendant’s proffered instruction did not include the 
last sentence quoted above.  Without that last sentence, defendant’s proposed 
instruction was vague. 
In any event, Brown rejected essentially the same claim defendant raises 
here.  The wording of the death penalty statute makes it sufficiently clear that a 
jury does not  perform “a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of the 
imaginary ‘scale,’ or the arbitrary assignment of ‘weights’ to any of them.”  
(Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 541.)  No further definition of “ ‘aggravating’ ” or 
“ ‘mitigating’ ” was required.  (People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 267 
[“ ‘aggravating’ and ‘mitigating’ are commonly understood terms that need not be 
defined for the jury”].) 
 
209 
7.  Instruction on the Consequences of Deadlocked Jury  
Defendant contends the trial court erred by answering the jury’s question 
about the effect of a deadlocked jury and instructing the jurors with this part of the 
statutory language of section 190.4, subdivision (b):  “[I]f the trier of fact is a jury 
and has been unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to what the penalty shall be, 
the court shall dismiss the jury and shall order a new jury impaneled to try the 
issue as to what the penalty shall be.”  
We have previously found no error when the trial court refuses the defense 
request to instruct the jury about the effect of a deadlock.64  (People v. Gurule 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 648; People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 882; People 
v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1193.)  In People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 
Cal.3d 744, 814 (Belmontes), we rejected a claim that the trial court should have 
answered the jury’s question by instructing it consistent with language from 
section 190.4, explaining that it “would have the potential for unduly confusing 
and misguiding the jury in their proper role and function in the penalty 
determination process” and that “[a]ny further instruction along the lines 
suggested herein could well serve to lessen or diminish that obligation in the 
jurors’ eyes.”  Defendant claims that Belmontes establishes that the trial court 
erred by instructing the jury in the language of section 190.4, even though 
defendant did not object to the trial court’s using that language. 
                                              
64  
In a related claim, defendant argues that the jury committed misconduct in 
discussing the consequences of a deadlock and that the trial court erred by failing 
to inquire into this alleged misconduct.  But jurors having difficulty during 
deliberations would naturally be curious about the consequences of their deadlock, 
and this circumstance, by itself, cannot be considered misconduct.  More 
important, instead of relying on speculation or extrinsic information, the jury 
dutifully expressed its concern by asking the court about this scenario.  In this 
situation, the court addressed the jury’s question and had no obligation to inquire 
further. 
 
210 
The Attorney General, however, argues that there was no error and cites 
People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 746 (Waidla), in which we “agree[d] that, 
as a general matter, the superior court may instruct a deliberating jury in response 
to a request going to the consequences of its inability to reach a unanimous verdict 
as to penalty.”  We explained, however, that “we cannot agree that, in this cause, 
the superior court had to do so” under the federal Constitution.  (Waidla, at 
p. 746.)  Thus, Waidla would seem to suggest that instruction based on section 
190.4, subdivision (b) is permissible, but not required. 
We excuse defendant’s failure to object to the instruction quoting section 
190.4 because the instruction affected his substantial rights.  (§ 1259; People v. 
Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1346, fn. 20.)  Moreover, given the tension 
between Belmontes and Waidla, we assume, without deciding, that it was error for 
the court to instruct the jury with section 190.4, subdivision (b).  We note, 
however, that the complained-of instruction did not improperly make “reference to 
the expense and inconvenience of a retrial.”  (People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 
835, 852, fn. 16.) 
But any error was not prejudicial.  After quoting the relevant part of section 
190.4, subdivision (b), the court explained, “The issue of what happens next in the 
event of a deadlock is a matter that should not concern you nor should it enter into 
your deliberations in any way.”  In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we 
assume the jury followed this instruction.  (People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 
93, 139.) 
8.  Other Claims of Instructional Error  
Defendant raises a number of claims of penalty phase instructional error 
that we have previously rejected. 
 
211 
The trial court is not required to instruct the jury that there is no burden of 
proof.  (People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 899.)  The trial court did not err in 
refusing to instruct the jury to consider sympathy for defendant’s family as a 
mitigating factor.  (People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 454-456.) 
The trial court properly refused defendant’s instruction that possible belief 
or predictions about a defendant’s future dangerousness are not to be considered 
for any purpose because the standard jury instructions do not permit “the jury to 
believe defendant’s future dangerousness could be an aggravating factor”  (People 
v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 993), and the prosecution presented no otherwise 
inadmissible expert opinion evidence on this subject (People v. Murtishaw (1981) 
29 Cal.3d 733, 767).  
E.  Other Claims 
1.  Defendant’s Absence During an In Camera Hearing  
Defendant argues the trial court erred by excluding him from a hearing to 
discuss the testimony of a defense psychologist.  Defendant claims the error 
violated his federal due process and his state statutory rights to be present at the 
proceedings against him, and he also claims the error created a conflict of interest 
with his defense counsel that deprived him of his state and federal rights to due 
process and effective representation of counsel.  He further claims his absence 
resulted in unreliable capital proceedings in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  
There was no error because defendant clearly and knowingly waived his presence 
at the hearing in question, and his absence did not create a conflict of interest. 
a) Background 
Defense witness Dr. Alvin Marks, a clinical and forensic psychologist, 
testified at the penalty phase, giving his diagnosis of defendant as having 
inadequate personality, mixed personality disorder, and personality disorder not 
 
212 
otherwise specified.  During the prosecution’s cross-examination of him, 
Dr. Marks revealed that he learned about defendant’s history from a chronological 
report prepared by a defense investigator.  Later, the prosecution noted that it had 
not received this report during discovery and asked the defense to provide a copy 
of it.  Defense counsel claimed the report was attorney work product and 
implicated the attorney-client privilege.  Counsel later explained that the report, 
containing attorney “editorial comments,” had been inadvertently provided to 
Dr. Marks.  Dr. Marks, however, had made his diagnoses of defendant before 
receiving that report and had not otherwise relied on it.  
The trial court noted that the prosecution’s discovery request had created a 
“large problem” and asked the prosecution if discovery was really necessary.  
When the prosecution questioned the nature of the problem, the court stated it 
would like to address the matter in chambers without defendant and asked whether 
he would waive his presence.  After defendant consulted with his attorneys, 
appellant waived his right to be present.  The court also had on file defendant’s 
earlier executed written waiver that covered any absences defendant agreed to 
during trial.  
At the in camera hearing, the trial court expressed concern that Dr. Marks’s 
receipt of the chronological report could later be raised as a claim of 
constitutionally inadequate assistance of counsel.  In order to prevent the jury from 
hearing damaging evidence as a result of defense counsel’s mistake, the court 
ruled that the chronological report could not be used.  At this same hearing, the 
court also resolved a scheduling problem concerning the prosecution’s expert 
witness, Dr. R.M. Schumann, who had diagnosed defendant while he was 
incarcerated at Atascadero State Hospital for his prior rape conviction.  Because 
Dr. Schumann would not be available for another week, the court asked the parties 
if they could agree whether the substance of his testimony could be captured by a 
 
213 
stipulation.  After the in camera hearing, the parties and defendant reappeared in 
open court, and defense counsel announced that the parties had agreed to a 
stipulation to substitute for Dr. Schumann’s testimony.  That stipulation stated that 
Dr. Schumann, a psychiatrist, had diagnosed defendant, in 1974 at Atascadero 
State Hospital, as having “an antisocial personality — severe, alcoholism, habitual 
excessive drinking, and a sexual deviation, aggressive sexuality, and the prognosis 
was very guarded.”65  
b) Analysis 
Defendant clearly and knowingly waived his right to be present at this in 
camera hearing.  Despite the court’s characterization of the discovery issue as a 
“large problem,” defendant elected not to participate in the hearing after 
consultation with his counsel.  Defendant, on the record, voiced his agreement to 
be absent, as he did on several other occasions during trial, and his written waiver 
was on file.  This complied with the statutory requirements to waive personal 
presence during trial (§ 977, subd. (b)(1)), and we reject, as we have before, 
                                              
65 
In another claim, defendant challenges the trial court’s instruction 
following the reading of this stipulation in which the court told the jury, “that’s a 
stipulated matter . . . it’s not a matter that you have to decide.  It’s given to you as 
a fact.”  Defendant claims this admonition failed to distinguish between a matter 
of evidence (i.e., that Dr. Schumann would testify that he examined defendant and 
diagnosed him) and a matter of fact (i.e., that defendant does have antisocial 
personality with sexual aggressions and deviances).  He claims the admonition 
allowed the jury to believe that defendant did in fact suffer from these mental 
disorders in violation of his state and federal rights to due process, trial by jury, 
confrontation and counsel and the reliability of the capital proceedings under the 
Eighth Amendment and the14th Amendment’s due process clause.  But defendant 
forfeited this issue by failing to request clarification of the admonition.  (People v. 
Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 149.) 
 
214 
defendant’s claim that waivers of personal presence should not be allowed in 
capital cases (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 405). 
In addition, defendant’s absence did not create or exacerbate a conflict of 
interest with his defense counsel or require that defendant be advised by other 
counsel.  Defendant argues that his counsel’s mistake in giving Dr. Marks the 
chronological report created grounds for a claim of constitutionally deficient 
assistance and that he should have been present and/or advised by nonconflicted 
counsel about whether he should challenge the performance of his attorneys.  But 
the in camera hearing itself resolved any mistake made by defense counsel by 
precluding the admission and discovery of the chronological report.  Thus, the 
court eliminated the potential prejudicial effect of any mistake by defense counsel.  
Nor did defense counsel’s mistake, or the subsequent in camera hearing, result in 
the jury hearing evidence of Dr. Schumann’s prior 1974 diagnosis of defendant.  
Independent of the discovery issue concerning the chronological report, the court 
had earlier ruled in defendant’s presence that Dr. Schumann’s prior diagnosis was 
admissible because defendant had placed his mental state at issue.  At the in 
camera hearing, from which defendant was absent, the court merely discussed 
logistical issues concerning Dr. Schumann’s testimony. 
Consequently, defendant fails to show how his absence affected his ability 
to defend himself or otherwise prejudiced his case. 
2.  Failure to Repeat Admonition for Jurors Not to Form or Express 
Any Opinion Until the Case Is Submitted to Them   
Defendant argues the trial court erred by failing to repeat, in the 19-day 
period between the end of the guilt phase and before the start of the penalty phase, 
the admonition required by section 1122, subdivision (b), which requires the court 
to admonish the jurors not to form or express any opinion concerning the case 
until the matter is submitted to them.  He claims the error violated his state and 
 
215 
federal rights to due process, fair trial by jury, and verdict reliability.  There was 
no error because the court gave the admonition on the first day of the penalty 
phase trial. 
Defendant’s argument rests on the premise that, because jurors were given 
the relevant admonition during the guilt phase, the failure to repeat that 
admonition after the filing of the guilt phase verdict, by implication, allowed 
jurors to speculate about the case during the 19-day period before the penalty 
phase began.  But defendant has forfeited this issue by failing to request such an 
instruction as part of the postverdict instructions.  (People v. Catlin, supra, 26 
Cal.4th at p. 149.)  In any event, defendant points to no evidence in the record 
showing that jurors improperly formed or expressed opinions about the matter 
during the 19-day break.  In addition, defendant acknowledges that the court 
complied with the relevant part of section 1122 on the first day of the penalty 
phase trial by again admonishing the jurors “not to form or express any opinion” 
about the matter and to “avoid this temptation at all cost” despite having been 
previously able to discuss the case amongst themselves during the guilt phase 
deliberations.  
Under these circumstances, there was no error. 
3.  Requestioning the Jury Before the Penalty Phase  
Defendant asserts the trial court erred by failing to grant his request to 
impanel a new jury for the penalty phase or, alternatively, to requestion the 
existing jurors concerning whether they could judge defendant’s penalty fairly 
despite knowing evidence of the Strang and Fisher murders on which the jury had 
hung.  He claims this alleged error violated his state and federal constitutional 
rights to explore potential bias, due process, and to an impartial jury and a reliable 
penalty determination under state statutory law and the Sixth, Eighth, and 
 
216 
Fourteenth Amendments.  The court properly denied defendant’s motions, and, 
instead, instructed the jury not to consider these other murders. 
We have previously recognized that section 190.4, subdivision (c), states 
the Legislature’s clear intent to have the same jury adjudicate both guilt and 
penalty in capital cases, “ ‘unless for good cause shown the court discharges that 
jury in which case a new jury shall be drawn.’ ”  (People v. Rowland, supra, 4 
Cal.4th at p. 267, quoting § 190.4, subd. (c).)  We have also previously held that 
“good cause” does not exist to impanel a new jury or to re-voir dire the jury if 
based solely on speculation (People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1029), and 
that acquittal of a charge at the guilt trial does not constitute “good cause” to 
impanel a new jury (People v. Bonillas (1989) 48 Cal.3d 757, 786).  To hold 
otherwise would thwart the statutory preference for having the same jury in both 
trials because “[i]t is commonplace for a defendant in a capital case to be tried on 
multiple charges.”  (Ibid.) 
Defendant contends he showed good cause because of the unique 
circumstance of the jury deadlocking on the counts for the Strang and Fisher 
murders by a vote of 11 to one in favor of convicting defendant.  He argues that 
these 11 jurors were unlikely to be able to disregard the grisly evidence 
surrounding those murders, especially because many of the exhibits brought to the 
jury deliberations room contained photos and other evidence from all of the 
charged crimes.  But defendant cites no authority for the proposition that the 
penalty phase jury cannot consider evidence of crimes for which it could not reach 
a verdict at the guilt phase.  (Cf. People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 563 
[“Section 190.3 expressly permits proof of any violent criminal activity, whether 
or not it led to prosecution and conviction, except as to any offense resulting in an 
acquittal”].) 
 
217 
In any event, the trial court specifically instructed the jury not to “consider 
any evidence produced at the guilt phase with respect to the victims Gayle Garcia, 
Rhonda Strang, and Amber Fisher” as being relevant “factors in aggravation or 
mitigation.”  When the issue was later raised by a jury question during the penalty 
phase deliberations, the court stated that “no evidence relating to the Garcia and 
Strang-Fisher cases may be considered by you in the penalty phase.”  Defendant 
argues that these admonitions were insufficient because they did not direct the 
jurors to set aside their impressions of defendant’s overall guilt or moral 
culpability or their desire to seek retribution for the murders of Strang or Fisher.  
But defendant has forfeited this issue by failing to request such additional 
clarification (People v. Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 149), and, in any event, the 
instructions given were clear and could not have allowed the jurors to think that 
they could nonetheless consider evidence of the Strang and Fisher murders for 
some emotional or moral purpose. 
Finally, although defendant speculates otherwise, we presume the jury 
followed the court’s repeated instructions not to consider evidence of the Strang 
and Fisher murders in its penalty phase deliberations.66  (People v. Yeoman, supra, 
31 Cal.4th at p. 139.) 
                                              
66 
For this same reason, we reject defendant’s claim that the jury improperly 
received extrinsic evidence during deliberations because the exhibits for the 
Garcia, Strang, and Fisher murders were not redacted or separated from the 
combined exhibits for all of the charged crimes.  In any event, defendant forfeited 
this issue because defense counsel agreed that the exhibits could not be separated 
and agreed that court’s admonitions were sufficient to direct the jury not to 
consider those portions of the exhibits.  
 
218 
F.  Jury Deliberations  
1.  Asserted Coercion of the Jury  
Defendant takes issue with how the trial court handled the jury’s 
announcements that it was deadlocked on the second and third days of its penalty 
phase deliberations.  He argues that the court failed to properly inquire concerning 
the nature of the deadlock, made an improper reference to the length of the trial in 
directing the jury to resume deliberations, and failed to inform jurors to follow 
their individual consciences in reaching a verdict.  He claims these asserted errors 
coerced the jury in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair 
and impartial jury, due process, and his Eighth Amendment right to a reliable 
penalty determination.  There was no coercion of the jury. 
a) Background 
On its second day of deliberations, after nearly four hours of deliberation, 
the jury sent the trial court a note, signed by the foreperson, stating that “it is the 
feeling of the jury that a unanimous decision is not possible.”  The court rejected 
defendant’s motion for a mistrial and his request that the court inquire about 
whether further deliberations could be helpful.  The court then addressed the jury, 
stating: 
“The length and complexity of this case, the complexity of the facts and the 
instructions are such that I would ask that you attempt to deliberate a little further 
and that each of you examine your opinions in view of the other jurors’ opinions.  
That each of you examine the instructions in light of all the instructions together, 
and attempt to make sure that you do understand each other’s opinions fully and 
completely, and we will resume this afternoon.  [¶]  I will ask that you attempt 
once again, if it is possible, and we will certainly respect if you have another note 
that says you can’t do it.  And if you can’t do it, you can’t, and certainly no juror 
 
219 
should feel pressure.  No group of jurors should feel pressure, but we do wish that 
you would make every attempt, if you can.”  
The jury resumed deliberations for just over another two hours.  On the 
following morning, after an additional half-hour of deliberation, the trial court 
received a note, signed by the foreperson, asking for help from the court.  The note 
indicated that some jurors believed that, if the jury could not reach a verdict, 
defendant would automatically receive a life sentence, and it inquired what would 
actually occur if the jury deadlocked.  The note also stated that “[s]ome jurors 
have made their decisions and feel that we should go home because no further 
progress is possible” but also that “[s]ome jurors feel that further progress is 
possible with direction from the Court.”  The court again denied defendant’s 
motions for a mistrial and to make an inquiry to determine which jurors felt further 
deliberations would not be useful.  In denying the defense requests, the court 
observed that the time the jury had spent deliberating had not been proportional to 
the length of the trial.  
The court then answered the jury’s question concerning the effect of 
deadlock (see ante, at p. 209) and, later on, additional questions concerning what 
evidence the jury could consider in determining the appropriate penalty (see ante, 
at p. 205). 
b) Analysis 
The trial court may ask jurors to continue deliberating when there is a 
“reasonable probability” of agreement, and that determination rests in the 
discretion of the court.  (§ 1140; see People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 319.)  
“The court must exercise its power, however, without coercion of the jury, so as to 
avoid displacing the jury’s independent judgment ‘in favor of considerations of 
compromise and expediency.’ ”  (People v. Breaux, supra, at p. 319, quoting 
 
220 
People v. Carter (1968) 68 Cal.2d 810, 817.)  “Any claim that the jury was 
pressured into reaching a verdict depends on the particular circumstances of the 
case.”  (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 265.)  
Defendant first complains that the trial court failed to inquire into the nature 
of the deadlock.  Given that the jury had deliberated less than four hours before 
sending its first note and less than seven hours before its second note, the court did 
not abuse its discretion by declining to inquire into the jury’s numerical division.  
Although the court may make such an inquiry (People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 
499, 538), it is not required to do so. 
Defendant next asserts that the court improperly coerced the jury by stating 
that “[t]he length and complexity of this case . . . are such that I would ask you to 
deliberate a little further.”  But the court’s comments contained no suggestion of 
coercion, and, instead, principally conveyed “that the jury had not deliberated for a 
sufficient time relative to the complexity of the case.”  (People v. Breaux, supra, 1 
Cal.4th at p. 320.)  The comments contained no impermissible “reference to the 
expense and inconvenience of a retrial.”  (People v. Gainer, supra, 19 Cal.3d at 
p. 852, fn. 16.) 
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing his request to 
remind the jurors that they were required to reach an individual opinion and not 
take any cue from the court, and he claims the court improperly directed the 
minority jurors to reexamine their views.  We have never required that jurors be 
readvised after they have already been instructed to reach individual opinions and 
not take cues from the court.  Moreover, nothing in the court’s comments called on 
minority jurors to reexamine their views, and defendant fails to identify language 
that allegedly did so.  Instead, the court asked the jurors to examine their opinions 
in light of other jurors’ opinions and to understand each other’s opinions.  The 
 
221 
court further urged the jurors not to be pressured.  The court’s comments were 
proper. 
2.  Asserted Jury Tampering  
Defendant contends the trial court tampered with the jury by investigating 
whether it was viewing guilt phase exhibits during the penalty phase deliberations 
and then giving the jury a biased supplemental instruction.  He claims the errors 
violated his state and federal rights to due process and fair trial by jury, his Eighth 
Amendment and due process right to a reliable determination of penalty, and his 
federal rights of confrontation, compulsory process, and representation of counsel.  
There was no error. 
a) Background 
After the court addressed the jury’s first two notes, the jury sent a third 
note, which it revised when the court asked for clarification of one of its questions.  
As relevant, the revised question asked, “Does evidence from the whole trial 
pertain to juror decisions during penalty phase or just evidence from penalty phase 
may be used?”  The court responded: 
“Evidence of the circumstances of the crimes of which defendant was 
convicted, and the finding of the special circumstances in the guilt phase may be 
considered in the penalty phase insofar as such evidence is relevant to factors in 
aggravation or mitigation.  Such evidence may be considered in the penalty phase 
just as if it had been presented in the penalty phase.  [¶]  The exception is that no 
evidence relating to the Garcia and Strang-Fisher cases may be considered by you 
in the penalty phase.”67  
                                              
67 
In another claim of instructional error, defendant asserts, for the first time 
on appeal, that this instruction impermissibly limited the jury’s consideration of 
mitigating evidence to “circumstances of the crime” instead of evidence of 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
222 
After sending the jury back for further deliberations, that same day the 
court called the parties into court and the judge explained that she had asked her 
bailiff about the condition of the deliberations room.  According to the judge, the 
bailiff reported that the guilt phase exhibits all remained in the file drawers, where 
they had been put after the guilt phase trial, suggesting that the jurors had not 
examined the exhibits during their penalty phase deliberations.  The judge 
expressed concern to the parties about whether her prior response to the jury had 
been adequate and proposed giving further instruction.  Defense counsel objected 
to the bailiff’s observations as constituting an invasion of the jury’s province and 
objected to any further instruction.  According to the judge, by the end of the day, 
it still appeared that none of the guilt phase exhibits had been accessed.  The court 
also rejected defense counsel’s request to allow the parties to inspect the 
deliberations room.  
The next day, the court informed the parties that the bailiff had noted that 
perhaps one guilt phase exhibit had been moved in the file drawers.  Defendant 
made numerous objections to the court’s proposed further instruction, arguing, 
among other things, that it would communicate the court’s belief that the exhibits 
were relevant, would emphasize exhibits concerning the Garcia, Strang, and Fisher 
murders, and that the jury had a right not to consider exhibits it had already 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
lingering doubt and aspects of defendant’s character otherwise unrelated to the 
crimes.  But this supplemental instruction was given along with the other 
supplemental instruction reminding the jurors of the factor (k) “catch-all” 
mitigating section that allowed the jury to consider any other extenuating 
circumstances and defendant’s character.  (§ 190.3, factor (k); see ante, at p. 205.)  
Viewed in context with the catchall instruction, this complained-of instruction 
could not have had the effect that defendant contends. 
 
223 
considered in the guilt phase.  The court overruled the objections and instructed as 
follows:  “A matter of clarification.  In case there is any question, the jury should 
understand it has access to the following during deliberations at the Penalty Phase:  
[¶]  Jury Instructions, Jurors’ Notes, Exhibits, and Verdict Forms from the Penalty 
Phase.  [¶]  Jury Instructions, Jurors’ Notes, and Exhibits from the Guilt Phase.  
(Except: The Jury must exclude from consideration those Guilt Phase Instructions, 
Notes and Exhibits relating to the Garcia and Strang-Fisher cases.)  [¶]  The jury 
may also request from the court:  (1) answers to legal questions, and (2) transcripts 
of testimony as needed.”  
b) Analysis 
Defendant claims the trial court improperly invaded the province of the jury 
by examining the deliberations room.  But the court merely asked the bailiff his 
observations of the deliberations room made during his regular duties of cleaning 
it.  The bailiff made no communications to the jury about the case or the law, nor 
did the bailiff or the court intrude on the jurors’ mental processes.  The 
observation that the guilt phase exhibits had not been moved merely generated the 
inference that the jury was not using those exhibits — an inference made more 
reasonable given the jury’s apparent confusion about whether it could consider 
guilt phase evidence in the penalty phase. 
Defendant also contends that the trial court’s supplemental instruction 
improperly emphasized the guilt phase exhibits and improperly communicated the 
trial court’s opinion that the guilt phase exhibits were important.  Yet the court’s 
supplemental instruction did not emphasize the exhibits in particular, but instead 
reminded the jurors that they could consider not only the exhibits, but also the 
instructions, their notes, verdict forms, transcripts, and the court’s responses to 
their questions.  Nothing in the language of the complained-of instruction had the 
 
224 
effect of emphasizing the exhibits or communicating that the court believed the 
exhibits were of unique importance. 
Finally, defendant argues the trial court violated his constitutional rights to 
confrontation and due process in relying on the court’s and the bailiff’s 
observations of the jury room without allowing defense counsel the opportunity 
for cross-examination or to inspect the deliberations room.  Defendant has 
forfeited this issue by failing to object based on the confrontation clause.  In any 
event, that provision of the “Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of an accused 
in a criminal prosecution ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’ ”  
(Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 678.)  The judge and the bailiff 
were not witnesses against defendant.  Instead, they merely communicated their 
observations of the deliberations room as part of their supervisory role over jury 
deliberations. 
3.  Death of a Juror’s Father  
Defendant asserts two claims associated with Juror P.W.’s request during 
deliberations to be excused from the proceedings to attend her father’s funeral.  
First, defendant claims the court erred by failing to notify his counsel about the 
juror’s request, which he claims violated his state and federal constitutional rights 
to counsel, due process, and his Eighth Amendment right to a fair and reliable 
sentencing proceeding.  Second, defendant contends the court erred and abused its 
discretion by failing to inquire whether the juror was capable of continuing 
deliberations, which he claims violated his state and federal constitutional rights to 
a fair and impartial trial, due process, and his Eighth Amendment right to a fair 
and reliable sentencing proceeding.  These contentions have no merit. 
Defendant’s asserted lack of notice concerning Juror P.W.’s request is not 
supported by the record.  On Monday, Juror P.W. sent a note to the court 
 
225 
explaining that her father had died over the weekend and advising that his funeral 
would be sometime that week and that she would let the court know once the date 
was set.  The clerk’s minutes state that the note was incorporated as part of court 
exhibit No. 32, but that “[c]ounsel are not notified at this time.”  The following 
Tuesday morning, the court received notes from two other jurors asking to be 
excused early on Thursday and to have Friday off.  One of the notes was from the 
foreperson, who also remarked that Friday “may be good for the other jurors to 
have an extra day off.”  The clerk’s minutes indicate that the notes were 
incorporated into court exhibit No. 32 and that “counsel are notified of the notes 
and agree that the jury need not deliberate on Friday.”  That same morning, the 
court received a note from the foreperson informing the court that the funeral for 
Juror P.W.’s father was on Friday and that she asked to be excused that day.  
Under these circumstances, it appears from the record that defense counsel 
were informed of Juror P.W.’s note and her father’s death.  The clerk’s minutes 
show that counsel were informed of “notes” the court had received, and there is no 
reason to believe that this reference was limited to the notes received Tuesday 
morning and excluded Juror P.W.’s note dated on Monday.  In any event, in the 
absence of any contrary indication in the record, we “assume the court followed 
established law by contacting trial counsel and affording them an opportunity to 
respond before communicating with the jury.”  (People v. Carter, supra, 30 
Cal.4th at p. 1215.)  Defendant bore the burden of developing a record sufficient 
to ensure review of his claim, and he could have sought a settled statement to 
clarify whether he received notice.  (Ibid., citing People v. Osband (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 622, 663.)  He did not. 
Defendant further claims that the death of a juror’s parent during 
deliberations may be good cause to discharge the juror and that the court abused 
its discretion in failing to inquire whether Juror P.W. could continue to deliberate.  
 
226 
As defendant observes, we have acknowledged that “[t]he death of a juror’s parent 
constitutes good cause to discharge the juror if it affects the juror’s ability to 
perform his or her duties” and that such good cause invokes the court’s duty to 
inquire whether the juror should be discharged.  (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 
Cal.4th at p. 1029.)  But we have also recognized that “[a]lthough such inquiry is 
preferred, it is not required.”  (People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 989.)  To be 
sure, it is wrong to assume that “a more detailed inquiry by the court would have 
served no purpose,” because such an inquiry could have provided insight into 
Juror P.W.’s state of mind and whether the court abused its discretion by allowing 
her to continue to deliberate.  (Ibid.)  But in Beeler, we rejected the assumption 
that “as a matter of law that the death of a juror’s parent is so debilitating that the 
juror is presumptively unable to deliberate.”  (Id. at p. 990.) 
In the circumstances here, an inquiry was not mandatory.  Juror P.W. gave 
no indication that she sought to be discharged or that she felt coerced to reach a 
speedy verdict.  Nothing suggests the remainder of the jury felt compelled to reach 
a speedy verdict to accommodate Juror P.W.  The jury deliberated for two weeks 
following the penalty phase closing arguments.  In fact, the jury deliberated for 
more than two full days following the Friday recess.  There is no indication that 
the court abused its discretion or that defendant was prejudiced by the lack of 
further inquiry.   
G.  Asserted Unconstitutionality of the Death Penalty Statute 
Defendant raises numerous constitutional challenges to California’s death 
penalty law, all of which we have repeatedly rejected for lack of merit.  
California’s death penalty law “adequately narrows the class of murderers 
subject to the death penalty” and does not violate the Eighth Amendment.  (People 
v. Loker, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 755.) 
 
227 
Section 190.3, factor (a), in allowing the jury to consider the circumstances 
of the crime, does not result in the arbitrary or capricious application of the death 
penalty.  (People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 211.) 
The federal Constitution does not require the jury to achieve unanimity as 
to the aggravating circumstances or that it be given a burden of proof or standard 
of proof instructions for finding the existence of aggravating factors, finding that 
aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors, or finding that death is the 
appropriate penalty.  (People v. Loker, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 755.)  The United 
States Supreme Court decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 
Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, and Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 
296, do not compel a different result.  (Loker, at p. 755.) 
A jury in a capital case is not required to make written findings in support 
of its verdict.  (People v. Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 212.) 
Intercase proportionality review is not required under either the state or 
federal Constitution.  (People v. Loker, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 755; People v. 
Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 156-157.) 
A penalty phase jury properly may consider a defendant’s unadjudicated 
criminal activity, and it need not instruct the jury that it could consider the 
unadjudicated criminal activity only if it unanimously found such crimes had been 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  (People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 
1059; People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 927.)   
The use of restrictive adjectives, such as “extreme” and “substantial,” in 
section 190.3’s list of potential mitigating factors does not render it 
unconstitutional.  (People v. Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 213.) 
A penalty phase jury need not be instructed regarding which factors are 
aggravating and which are mitigating or to restrict its consideration of the 
 
228 
evidence to such factors.  (People v. Barnwell, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1059; 
People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 402.)   
Capital defendants and noncapital defendants are not similarly situated, 
therefore, the death penalty law does not violate equal protection or the Eighth 
Amendment by denying capital defendants various procedural rights given to 
noncapital defendants.  (People v. Loker, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 756.)  
Finally, we again reject the contention that the death penalty violates 
international law or is contrary to international norms or that these norms require 
the application of the penalty to only the most extraordinary crimes.  (People v. 
Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 968.) 
H.  Asserted Cumulative Error Affecting the Reliability of Defendant’s 
Sentencing Determination 
Defendant finally contends that the collective impact of errors during all 
phases of the proceedings deprived him of his rights to due process, to a fair trial, 
to compulsory process and to confront the evidence against him, to a fair and 
impartial jury, to the right to present a defense, to the right to representation of 
counsel, and to fair and reliable guilt and penalty determinations in violation of the 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  We have concluded that any 
errors or assumed errors were not prejudicial.  Viewing them cumulatively, we 
conclude defendant is not entitled to reversal of his judgment. 
 
229 
 
V.  DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
THOMPSON, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*   Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division 
Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 
California Constitution.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Lucas 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S012279 
Date Filed: August 21, 2014 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Laura Palmer Hammes, Franklin B. Orfield and William H. Kennedy 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Thomas Lundy, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Bill Lockyer and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Holly D. Wilkens and William M. Wood, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Thomas Lundy 
2777 Yulupa Avenue, PMB 179 
Santa Rosa, CA  95405 
(707) 538-0175 
 
William M. Wood 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2202