Case Title: Commonwealth v. Bower

Citation: 

Docket Number: 012220

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
v.  Record No. 012220 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
June 7, 2002 
WILLIAM PATRICK BOWER 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
The Court of Appeals reversed William Patrick Bower's 
conviction under Code § 18.2-67.2 of animate object sexual 
penetration of his thirteen-year-old daughter, holding that 
there was insufficient evidence that Bower perpetrated the crime 
through intimidation.  We will reverse the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals and reinstate his conviction because we conclude that 
the testimonial evidence along with the familial relationship 
between the defendant and victim, their relative ages and sizes, 
and the improper touching that preceded the penetration 
constitute sufficient proof that the conduct of the defendant 
intimidated the victim in such a way that her will was overcome. 
I.  FACTS 
 
"Where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged after 
conviction, it is our duty to consider it in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth and give it all reasonable 
inferences fairly deducible therefrom."  Higginbotham v. 
Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). 
 
In April 1995 around 8:00 a.m., Bower entered the bedroom 
of his thirteen-year old daughter, Buffy Brooks Bower.  She was 
lying on her stomach, facing away from the door, and appeared to 
be asleep.  Without saying anything, he lay down next to her.  
He put his hand underneath her pajamas and fondled her breasts 
for a period of five minutes.  He then placed his hand inside 
her panties; first resting his hand on her bare bottom and then 
putting his finger into her vagina for a twenty-minute period.  
During this episode, Buffy kept facing away and pretending to be 
asleep until, after a total of about thirty minutes, Bower 
finally got up and left the room.  Buffy went back to sleep. 
 
Buffy testified that after the incident she was "too scared 
to even [tell her] own mother" what had occurred.  She also 
testified that she had had a good relationship with her father 
prior to the assault but from that time forward refused to be 
alone with him. 
 
The Bowers divorced in 1997 after Buffy's mother learned 
about the assault.  Bower remarried and fathered a second 
daughter.  Ultimately, it was concern for her half-sister that 
induced Buffy to report the incident to the police in 1999. 
 
At trial, Bower waived his right to a jury and was 
convicted by the trial court of animate object sexual 
penetration under Code § 18.2-67.2 and taking indecent liberties 
with a child by a person in custodial or supervisory 
 
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relationship under Code § 18.2-370.1.  The trial court sentenced 
Bower to ten-years' imprisonment for the animate object sexual 
penetration conviction, with five years suspended, and to a 
five-year sentence for the indecent liberties conviction, 
suspended in its entirety. 
 
The Court of Appeals granted Bower's appeal of his animate 
object sexual penetration conviction and reversed that 
conviction.  The court, referring to this Court's discussion of 
"intimidation" in Sutton v. Commonwealth,  228 Va. 654, 324 
S.E.2d 665 (1985), concluded that "intimidation in the context 
of the criminal sexual assault statutes, including Code § 18.2-
67.2, means putting the victim in fear of bodily harm."  Bower 
v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 382, 389, 551 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2001).  
The court held that, in this case, nothing in Bower's conduct 
"would place his daughter in fear of bodily harm" and that the 
evidence would not even support a finding under a "lower 
standard" that the victim's will was overborne by psychological 
domination and control.  Id. at 389-90, 551 S.E.2d at 4.  
Rejecting the proposition that the parent-child relationship and 
differential in age and size could constitute "cognizable 
intimidation of the daughter causing her to submit to Bower," 
the court concluded that Bower "probably accomplished" the 
offending act by surprise.  Id. at 390, 551 S.E.2d at 5.  We 
awarded the Commonwealth an appeal. 
 
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In Sutton, we considered the meaning of "intimidation" in 
the context of the rape statute, Code § 18.2-61.  Since the term 
"intimidation" is consistently used throughout the various 
statutes dealing with crimes of sexual assault, the Sutton 
discussion is relevant to our decision in this case.  We 
described intimidation as 
putting a victim in fear of bodily harm by exercising 
such domination and control of her as to overcome her 
mind and overbear her will.  Intimidation may be caused 
by the imposition of psychological pressure on one who, 
under the circumstances, is vulnerable and susceptible 
to such pressure. 
 
228 Va. at 663, 324 S.E.2d at 670. 
 
The Court of Appeals' decision that the Commonwealth failed 
to meet its burden of proving intimidation was based on two 
factors:  (1) the absence of evidence other than the parent-
child relationship to show emotional domination; and (2) the 
absence of any conduct by the defendant that would put the 
victim in fear of bodily harm such that the intimidation element 
of the crime was met. 
 
The Court of Appeals, while acknowledging that the parent-
child relationship can be a "highly relevant" factor when 
considering intimidation, discounted such evidence as proof of 
intimidation in this case because there was no other evidence 
supporting the conclusion that the defendant exercised 
"emotional domination" over his daughter.  The lack of such 
 
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emotional domination by Bower was reflected, according to the 
Court of Appeals, in the daughter's testimony that she had a 
"good relationship" with her father prior to the assault. 
 
In discussing the psychological pressure that can cause 
submission through fear in Sutton, we referred to an earlier 
case, Bailey v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 107 (1886), "where the 
intercourse was induced through fear of a person whom the victim 
was accustomed to obey, such as a person standing in loco 
parentis."  228 Va. at 663, 324 S.E.2d at 670.  In that case, 
the defendant's conviction for the rape of his fourteen-year old 
stepdaughter was affirmed.  Bailey, 82 Va. at 114.  As in 
Bailey, the "good relationship" between Bower and his daughter 
in this case could lead the child to submit to the overtures of 
the parent because a "good relationship" between parent and 
child can include the child's general obedience to the parent's 
direction.  Therefore, the parent-child relationship was 
relevant to a determination of intimidation and supported the 
finding that Bower exercised emotional dominance over his 
daughter in this case. 
 
The Court of Appeals' holding that the Commonwealth failed 
to produce sufficient evidence supporting a finding of fear of 
bodily harm apparently was based on two rationales; however, 
neither rationale can support the Court of Appeals' result in 
this case.  The first rationale the court apparently applied was 
 
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a requirement that the requisite fear be a fear of bodily harm 
separate and apart from the harm experienced in the sexual 
assault.  However, nothing in Sutton or any other case we have 
decided requires this conclusion. 
 
Sexual assaults are assaults against the body of the 
victim; they are violent acts which common knowledge tells us 
inflict bodily hurt on the victim.  It defies human experience 
to conclude that fear of the possibility of bodily injury caused 
by sexual assault is insufficient "fear of bodily harm" for 
purposes of establishing sexual assault by intimidation. 
 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred to the extent that 
it required proof that the victim feared some type of bodily 
harm other than the harm inherent in the sexual assault. 
 
A second rationale which the Court of Appeals appears to 
have utilized in finding that there was no evidence of fear of 
bodily harm was the use of an objective standard for measuring 
the reasonableness of a victim's fear.  Citing its prior cases, 
the Court of Appeals stated that fear of bodily harm must come 
from the actions of the defendant, not from the victim's 
"temperamental timidity."  Because nothing in Bower's conduct 
"would place his daughter in fear of bodily harm," and the 
victim made no reaction indicating that she was emotionally 
dominated or fearful, the Court of Appeals concluded that the 
 
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crime was not perpetrated through intimidation.  Bower, 36 Va. 
App. at 389-90, 551 S.E.2d at 4-5. 
 
In Sutton, we specifically did not decide whether an 
objective or subjective standard should be applied in these 
cases.  We have not done so in subsequent cases, and we need not 
resolve that issue in this case.  Matters such as the victim's 
age, the relative size of the defendant and victim, the familial 
relationship between the defendant and victim, and the 
vulnerable position of the victim are not matters of the 
"temperamental timidity" of the victim and are relevant matters 
to be considered with other testimony when determining whether 
the victim was put in fear of bodily harm. 
 
Applying the above principles, we conclude that the record 
is sufficient to support a finding that Bower committed animate 
sexual penetration by intimidation.  The victim testified that 
she was "frightened" and "scared" and that the assault hurt.  
She also testified that her father had never approached her in 
this manner before, that she pretended to be asleep during the 
assault, and that, after the assault, she avoided being alone 
with her father.  This testimony, along with evidence of the 
parent-child relationship, the age of the victim and the 
relative sizes of the parties, was sufficient to sustain a 
finding that the act of sexual abuse occurred through 
intimidation. 
 
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Finally, the Court of Appeals concluded that the act of 
sexual penetration was accomplished by surprise.  This 
conclusion is not supported by the record.  This assault did not 
occur in a matter of seconds or even a few minutes.  The crime 
charged was preceded by at least five minutes of fondling and 
continued for almost thirty minutes.  The continuation of the 
defendant's conduct over that period of time is inconsistent 
with surprise. 
 
For the above reasons, we conclude that the Court of 
Appeals erred in setting aside the conviction.  Accordingly, we 
will reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate 
the conviction.  
Reversed and final judgment.
 
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