Case Title: State v. Miller

Citation: 

Docket Number: 100247

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2011-09-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 100,247 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
XAVIER MILLER, 
Appellee. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
 
When the appellant fails to object at trial to the inclusion of a jury instruction, the 
appellate court applies a clearly erroneous standard of review. To find an instruction 
clearly erroneous, the appellate court must be convinced there is a real possibility the jury 
would have rendered a different verdict had the jury been properly instructed. 
 
2. 
 
 
When a defendant is charged with voluntary manslaughter, the jury should be 
instructed pursuant to PIK Crim. 3d 56.05, Alternative A, which sets forth the elements 
of voluntary manslaughter. 
 
3. 
 
 
When the crime of voluntary manslaughter is submitted to the jury as a lesser 
included offense of the crime charged, the jury should be instructed pursuant to PIK 
Crim. 3d 56.05, Alternative B, which instructs the jury to simultaneously consider the 
offenses of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. 
 
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4. 
 
 
The district court erred in this case when it properly instructed the jury pursuant to 
PIK Crim. 3d 56.05, Alternative B to simultaneously consider the lesser included 
offenses of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, but then also erroneously 
instructed the jury to sequentially consider the lesser offenses of second-degree murder 
and voluntary manslaughter, using a modified form of PIK Crim. 3d 56.05, Alternative 
A. 
 
5. 
 
 
Under the facts of this case, when the jury was given contradictory instructions to 
consider the lesser included offenses of second-degree murder and voluntary 
manslaughter sequentially under a modified form of PIK Crim. 3d 56.05, Alternative A, 
and simultaneously under PIK Crim. 3d 56.05, Alternative B, and the remaining 
instructions, closing argument, and verdict form also led the jury to consider the lesser 
included offenses sequentially rather than simultaneously, a real possibility exists that the 
jury would have rendered a different verdict had it been properly instructed. 
  
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed June 5, 2009. 
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; THOMAS L. BOEDING, judge. Opinion filed September 2, 2011. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is 
reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court. 
 
Lydia Krebs, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellant.  
 
Sheryl L. Lidtke, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and John Bryant, assistant district 
attorney, Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were on the brief for 
appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
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MORITZ, J.:  In this appeal, we granted review of the Court of Appeals' decision 
affirming Xavier Miller's conviction of intentional second-degree murder. State v. Miller, 
No. 100,247, 2009 WL 1591572 (Kan. App. 2009) (unpublished opinion). The issue 
presented on review is whether the district court clearly erred when it appropriately 
instructed the jury that it should simultaneously consider the lesser included offenses of 
second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, but then erroneously gave a 
contradictory instruction directing the jury to consider the offense of voluntary 
manslaughter only if it could not agree on the offense of second-degree murder. Because 
we find there is a real possibility the jury would have rendered a different verdict had it 
not received the inappropriate and contradictory instruction advising it to consider the 
lesser included offenses sequentially, we reverse the Court of Appeals' decision affirming 
Miller's conviction, reverse Miller's conviction and remand for a new trial. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On June 12, 2007, Xavier Miller, Shawnte Holliday, Andre Chapman, and August 
Peeler gathered at Peeler's apartment in Kansas City, Kansas, to celebrate Holliday's 
birthday. Peeler's son, who was also Miller's child, and Peeler's daughter were also 
present in the apartment. At some point in the evening, Chapman, Miller, and Peeler left 
the apartment, and Holliday's boyfriend, Brandon Estis, arrived. Miller, Peeler, Chapman, 
and Articulus Watson, Miller's cousin, returned to the apartment to find Estis choking 
Holliday, who was on the floor. Estis told everyone to leave and lifted up his shirt, 
revealing a revolver. Miller, Chapman, and Watson eventually left. Estis left shortly 
thereafter, followed by Holliday. Approximately 30 minutes to an hour later, Miller and 
Watson returned so Miller could check on Peeler and the couple's son. 
 
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Miller testified in his own defense at trial, and the following summary of the 
events of the evening is derived from Miller's testimony. 
 
As Miller and Watson drove into the apartment complex parking lot, Miller saw 
Estis' car. From the parking lot, Miller telephoned Estis and asked why he was still there. 
Estis responded, "[B]itch ass nigga, what you mean what I still doing out here? Where 
you at?" Miller asked Estis where he was, and Estis said, "I'm right here." Estis then got 
out of his car in the parking lot and started walking toward Miller. Miller was scared 
because he knew Estis had a gun. 
 
Miller borrowed a semiautomatic handgun from someone he knew only as "JJ," 
who was standing nearby. As Miller started walking toward Estis, Estis pointed his gun at 
Miller, and Miller began firing his gun. According to Miller, he shot Estis twice. One of 
his shots made Estis' arm flinch and caused Estis to fling his gun to the ground. 
 
Estis then started stumbling toward the gun, attempting to retrieve it. Miller 
realized his gun was out of bullets so he ran to Estis' gun, picked it up, and shot Estis 
twice in the head. 
 
The State charged Miller with premeditated first-degree murder. Although the 
record contains no discussion of the basis for giving lesser included offense instructions, 
the district court instructed the jury on the lesser included offenses of second-degree 
murder and voluntary manslaughter in addition to premeditated first-degree murder. 
Those instructions provided: 
 
 
"Number eight. If you do not agree that the defendant is guilty of Murder in the 
First Degree, you should then consider the lesser offense of Murder in the Second 
Degree. 
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"To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved: 
 
1. That the defendant intentionally killed Brandon Estis; and 
 
2. That this act occurred on or about the 13th day of June, 2007, in Wyandotte 
County, Kansas. 
 
"Instruction number nine. In determining whether the defendant is guilty of 
Murder in the Second Degree, you should also consider the lesser offense of Voluntary 
Manslaughter. Voluntary Manslaughter is an intentional killing done upon a sudden 
quarrel or in the heat of passion or upon—or upon an unreasonable but honest belief that 
circumstances existed that justified deadly force in defense of a person. 
 
"If you decide the defendant intentionally killed Brandon Estis, but that it was 
done upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion or upon an unreasonable but honest 
belief that circumstances existed that justified deadly force in defense of a person, the 
defendant may be convicted of Voluntary Manslaughter only. 
 
"Number 10. If you do not agree the defendant is guilty of Murder in the Second 
Degree, you should then consider the lesser included offense of Voluntary Manslaughter. 
 
"To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved: 
 
1. That the defendant intentionally killed Brandon Estis; 
 
2. That it was done: 
 
 
a) Upon a sudden quarrel; or 
 
 
b) In the heat of passion; or 
 
c) Upon an unreasonable but honest belief that circumstances 
existed that justified deadly force in defense of a person; and 
 
3. That this act occurred on or about the 13th day of June, 2007, in Wyandotte 
County, Kansas." 
 
The jury convicted Miller of second-degree murder. Miller appealed his 
conviction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and dismissed in part. Miller, 2009 
WL 1591572, at *7. We granted Miller's petition for review. 
 
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ANALYSIS 
 
In his appeal to the Court of Appeals and in his petition for review to this court, 
Miller challenges the instructions given to the jury regarding lesser included offenses. In 
particular, Miller claims that Instructions Nos. 9 and 10 inconsistently advised the jury 
regarding the order in which it was to consider the lesser included offenses. 
Consequently, Miller argues the jury may not have considered whether he was guilty of 
voluntary manslaughter instead of the offense of which he was convicted, second-degree 
murder. 
 
Miller concedes that Instruction No. 9, which mirrored PIK Crim. 3d 56.05, 
Alternative B, properly directed the jury to simultaneously consider the lesser included 
offenses of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. That instruction stated in 
relevant part:  "In determining whether the defendant is guilty of murder in the second 
degree, you should also consider the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter." But 
Miller argues the jury was then incorrectly advised in Instruction No. 10 to consider the 
lesser offenses sequentially. That instruction, which was based in part on PIK Crim. 3d 
56.05, Alternative A, stated:  "If you do not agree that the defendant is guilty of murder 
in the second degree, you should then consider the lesser included offense of voluntary 
manslaughter." (Emphasis added.) 
 
Because Miller did not object below to the inclusion of Instruction No. 10, we 
apply a clearly erroneous standard on review. See K.S.A. 22-3414(3). To find an 
instruction clearly erroneous, we must be convinced there is a real possibility the jury 
would have rendered a different verdict had the jury been properly instructed. State v. 
Graham, 275 Kan. 831, Syl. ¶ 2, 69 P.3d 563 (2003). 
 
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As Miller points out, the alternative PIK instructions are designated as 
"alternative" instructions for a reason—they were not intended to be given together. 
Rather, as the "Notes on Use" accompanying PIK Crim. 3d 56.05 clarifies, Alternative A 
should be used if the information charges voluntary manslaughter, while Alternative B 
should be used when voluntary manslaughter is submitted to the jury as a lesser included 
offense of the crime charged. Here, the crime of voluntary manslaughter was submitted to 
the jury as a lesser included offense of the charged crime of first-degree murder. Thus, 
only Instruction No. 9, which was based on Alternative B, should have been given to the 
jury in this case, and the district court erred in also giving Instruction No. 10. 
 
Before considering whether this was clearly erroneous, we note that the State 
urges us to affirm the Court of Appeals' decision based upon our holding in State v. Abu-
Fakher, 274 Kan. 584, 609, 56 P.3d 166 (2002). There, as here, voluntary manslaughter 
was submitted as a lesser offense of the crime charged; thus, PIK Crim. 3d 56.05, 
Alternative B, was the appropriate instruction. But in Abu-Fakher, instead of giving both 
instructions, the district court fashioned its own instruction using Alternative B but 
appended it to a portion of Alternative A. 
 
However, the improvised instruction at issue in Abu-Fakher did not contain any 
language instructing the jury to consider voluntary manslaughter only if it could not agree 
as to the defendant's guilt on the second-degree murder charge. In fact, the court 
specifically noted that the instruction did not preclude the jury from simultaneously 
considering the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Rather, the issue in 
Abu-Fakher was whether the improvised instruction improperly shifted the burden to the 
defendant to prove mitigating circumstances, which the court held it did not. 274 Kan. at 
609. Thus, Abu-Fakher has no significance in our analysis of this case. 
 
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In considering whether the instructional error requires reversal in this case, Miller 
urges us to rely on Graham, 275 Kan. 831. There, although the defendant was not 
charged with attempted voluntary manslaughter, the district court instructed the jury 
using Alternative A instead of Alternative B. This court found this "reordering" of the 
jury's decision-making process deprived the jury of the opportunity to consider the 
mitigating circumstances of heat of passion or sudden quarrel that reduce an intentional 
homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter. 275 Kan. at 837. The court reasoned: 
 
"Both second degree-murder [sic] and voluntary manslaughter are intentional killings. An 
intentional homicide is reduced from murder to voluntary manslaughter if it is committed 
upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion under K.S.A. 21-3403(a). Where the 
homicide is intentional and there is some evidence the homicide was committed under the 
mitigating circumstances contained in K.S.A. 21-3403(a), the appropriate voluntary 
manslaughter instruction should be considered by the jury during its consideration of 
second-degree intentional murder. Thus, where there is evidence of mitigating 
circumstances justifying an instruction on voluntary manslaughter in a case where 
voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense, a failure to instruct the jury to 
consider such circumstances in its determination of whether the defendant is guilty of 
second-degree murder, is always error—and in most cases—presents a case of clear 
error." 275 Kan. at 837. 
 
The Graham court found this error was compounded when the district court 
instructed the jury that "'when there is a reasonable doubt as to which of two or more 
offenses the defendant is guilty, he may be convicted of the lesser offense only.'" 275 
Kan. at 840. The court concluded this instruction sent a message to the jury that if it 
found the defendant guilty of attempted second-degree murder it need not consider 
attempted voluntary manslaughter. 275 Kan. at 840. 
 
Graham relied upon a factually similar case, State v. Cribbs, 29 Kan. App. 2d 919, 
34 P.3d 76 (2001), in which the district court erroneously instructed the jury using PIK 
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Crim. 3d 56.05, Alternative A, rather than Alternative B, although the defendant was not 
charged with attempted voluntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeals panel in Cribbs 
found that the instruction told the jury, in essence, it "need not bother" to consider 
attempted voluntary manslaughter unless and until it failed to agree on defendant's guilt 
of attempted second-degree murder. 29 Kan. App. 2d at 924. Thus, the panel recognized 
that the jury "may never have fully analyzed whether the shooting was the product of heat 
of passion or a sudden quarrel, the factors that distinguish the greater and the lesser 
crimes and the reasons they require simultaneous deliberation when the evidence could 
support either." 29 Kan. App. 2d at 924. 
 
The Cribbs panel concluded the error was clearly erroneous and, like this court in 
Graham, was not swayed by the "reasonable doubt" instruction given the jury. As the 
panel observed:  "[T]his instruction was insufficient to cure the error, because it still 
made any consideration of attempted voluntary manslaughter contingent on the jury's 
prior inability to convict on attempted second-degree murder." 29 Kan. App. 2d at 924. 
 
The State argues, as it did before the Court of Appeals, that Graham and Cribbs 
are distinguishable because the jury in this case received both the applicable PIK Crim. 
3d 56.05, Alternative B instruction and the inapplicable PIK Crim. 3d 56.05, Alternative 
A instruction. The Court of Appeals agreed and concluded that the instructions "as a 
whole" properly stated the law. Miller, 2009 WL 1591572, at *5. However, the panel's 
conclusion is problematic: 
 
"The jury was instructed to consider second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter 
simultaneously, to convict of the lesser offense only if there was a reasonable doubt as to 
which of one or more offenses the defendant was guilty, and to refrain from singling out 
one or more instructions and disregarding others. Based on these facts, we find no real 
possibility the jury would have rendered a different verdict in the absence of Instruction 
No. 10 and thus no clear error in the district court's decision to instruct the jury on 
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voluntary manslaughter using both alternative A and alternative B of PIK Crim. 3d 
56.05." (Emphasis added.) Miller, 2009 WL 1591572, at *5. 
 
Ironically, in concluding that the instructions "as a whole" properly and fairly 
stated the law, the Court of Appeals panel did not mention the instruction at issue in this 
case—i.e., the instruction that required the jury to sequentially consider the lesser 
offenses of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. Yet that instruction was 
entirely contradictory to the instruction advising the jury to consider the crimes 
simultaneously. Thus, in order to properly and fairly apply the instructions, the jury 
would have been required to do exactly what it had been instructed not to do—to 
disregard the instruction advising it to consider the crimes sequentially and single out the 
instruction directing it to consider the crimes simultaneously. 
 
The same faulty analysis underlies the State's suggestion at oral argument that we 
should presume the jury followed the correct instruction and disregarded the improper 
instruction directing it to sequentially consider the two offenses. 
 
Further, as both Graham and Cribbs recognized, the reasonable doubt instruction 
relied upon here by the Court of Appeals as support for its conclusion that the jury 
properly applied the instructions actually may have enhanced the error. If the jury chose 
to consider the crimes sequentially rather than simultaneously (that is, to follow 
Instruction No. 10 instead of Instruction No. 9), it may have found the defendant guilty of 
the lesser included offense of second-degree murder without ever considering voluntary 
manslaughter. The "reasonable doubt" instruction did not indicate to the jury that it was 
to consider the lesser offenses simultaneously—rather, it instructed the jury that if 
reasonable doubt existed as to "which of one or more offense[s] the defendant is guilty, 
he may be convicted of the lesser offense only." (Emphasis added.) 
 
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Although not discussed by either party, our review of the entirety of the record 
leads us to conclude that if any presumption is to be made, it would be more logical to 
presume the jury followed the instruction to sequentially consider the offenses. 
Significantly, neither attorney explained to the jury in closing argument that it should 
consider the lesser included offenses simultaneously. Instead, both the prosecutor and 
defense counsel separately discussed first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and 
voluntary manslaughter in that order, implying that the crimes should be considered 
sequentially. 
 
Moreover, the verdict form, which sequentially listed first-degree murder, second-
degree murder, and then voluntary manslaughter, did nothing to clarify the contradictory 
instructions and more likely led the jury to consider the offenses sequentially. 
 
We conclude under the facts of this case, that when the jury was given 
contradictory instructions to consider the lesser included offenses of second-degree 
murder and voluntary manslaughter both sequentially under a modified form of PIK 
Crim. 3d 56.05, Alternative A, and simultaneously under PIK Crim. 3d 56.05, Alternative 
B, and the remaining instructions, closing argument, and verdict form also led the jury to 
consider the lesser offenses sequentially rather than simultaneously, a real possibility 
exists that the jury would have rendered a different verdict had it been properly 
instructed. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals' decision affirming Miller's 
conviction of second-degree murder, reverse Miller's conviction, and remand for a new 
trial. 
 
Finally, we note that Miller raised two sentencing issues in his petition for review. 
In light of our decision remanding this case for a new trial, those remaining arguments 
are moot. 
 
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Reversed and remanded.