Case Title: State ex rel. Pickett v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 1996-Ohio-322

Docket Number: 19940874

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
The State ex rel. Pickett, Appellee, v. Industrial Commission of Ohio et al., 
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Appellees; Scott Industries, Appellant. 
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[Cite as State ex rel. Pickett v. Indus. Comm. (1996), ______ Ohio St. 
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3d _____.] 
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Workers’ compensation -- Industrial Commission’s denial of wage 
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loss compensation not an abuse of discretion, when. 
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(No. 94-874--Submitted January 9, 1996--Decided March 1, 1996.) 
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Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 92AP-
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1710. 
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Appellee-claimant, Katharine A. Pickett, was injured on February 13 
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and on April 20, 1987, while in the course of and arising from her 
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employment with appellant Scott Laboratories.  A district hearing officer for 
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appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio initially allowed the claim for “low 
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back.”  A regional board of review vacated the order, substituting 
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“aggravation of pre-existing bilateral spondylolysis at L5 level with 
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spondylolisthesis of L5 and S1.”  The board also ordered temporary total 
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disability compensation from May 6, 1987 through March 14, 1988, and to 
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continue upon submission of medical proof.  These findings were based on 
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the reports of Dr. Dennison Stewart. 
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Staff hearing officers affirmed the board in part, but terminated 
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temporary total disability compensation as of August 3, 1989 based on Dr. I. 
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Vidu’s report of the same date.  In that report, Dr. Vidu concluded the 
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claimant could return to her former position of employment. 
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On September 4, 1990, claimant moved for wage loss compensation 
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pursuant to R.C. 4123.56(B).  Wage loss compensation was denied on 
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February 20, 1991: 
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“This District Hearing Officer denies claimant’s request for wage loss 
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since 8/3/89.  Found persuasive in making such a determination was the 
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10/11/89 Staff Hearing Officer’s order which terminated Temporary Total 
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compensation as of 8/3/89 because claimant was able to return to her former 
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job.  Specifically, this District Hearing Officer notes that such a 
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determination precludes payment of wage loss.  Furthermore, this District 
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Hearing Officer notes that claimant has shown no changed circumstances 
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since the 10/11/89 hearing to consider wage loss since that date.” 
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Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
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Franklin County, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion in 
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denying wage loss compensation.  That court found a violation of State ex 
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rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 57 Ohio St. 3d 203, 567 N.E.2d 245, 
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because “the district hearing officer failed completely to set forth any 
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evidence upon which was predicated the determination that there had been 
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no changed circumstances” since the earlier termination of compensation 
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for temporary total disability. 
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This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
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Rademaker, Matty, McClelland & Greve, Robert C. McClelland and 
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Kirk R. Henrikson, for appellant. 
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Per Curiam.  We are asked to evaluate the February 20, 1991 order 
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for Noll compliance.  For the reasons to follow, we find that Noll has been 
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met. 
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The commission explicitly stated why wage loss compensation was 
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denied--claimant could return to her former job.  This conclusion alone, 
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supported by “some evidence,” can sustain a denial of wage loss 
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compensation.  State ex rel. Chora v. Indus. Comm. (1996), 74 Ohio St. 3d 
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238, 658 N.E.2d 276.  Full medical release implies an ability to return at a 
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preinjury capacity.  This in turn implies a return to the preinjury rate of pay.  
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Thus, a full medical release equates to an ability to earn at the preinjury 
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level.  Consequently, one who can return but who does not cannot attribute 
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diminished earnings to injury. 
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In this case, the October 30, 1989 staff hearing officer’s finding that 
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the claimant could return to her former position of employment constituted 
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“some evidence.”  We, of course, recognize the limited effect a prior 
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determination on extent of disability has.  See State ex rel. B.O.C. Group, 
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Gen. Motors Corp. v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 199, 569 N.E.2d 
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496.  We, however, find no new and changed circumstance that would 
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detract from the validity of the earlier finding.  We disagree with the 
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suggestion that Dr. Stewart’s January 10, 1990 and August 14, 1990 
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reports--which postdated the October 30, 1989 order--showed a change in 
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claimant’s condition by declaring claimant unable to return to her former 
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job.  These reports were almost identical to five earlier C84 supplemental 
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physician reports.  The January 1990 and August 1990 reports contain the 
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same diagnosis and complaints as the earlier documents.  Most importantly, 
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all of these reports were premised on a disability continuous since the 
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original injury.  This demonstrates that Stewart was not reporting that the 
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claimant was experiencing a new period of disability subsequent to the staff 
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hearing officer’s determination that she could work. 
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We also disagree with the conclusion that the commission’s order is 
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deficient for failing to adequately explain how it determined that no new 
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and changed circumstances existed.  It is not the commission’s 
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responsibility to disprove new and changed circumstances.  It was the 
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claimant’s burden to prove new and changed circumstances, and the 
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commission found that she did not.  No more is required. 
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Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. 
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Judgment reversed. 
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MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER 
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and COOK, JJ., concur. 
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