Case Title: Roy Lee Tolston v. State of Arkansas

Citation: 

Docket Number: CR04-480

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT No. CR 04-480 NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION ROY LEE TOLSTON Appellant v. STATE OF ARKANSAS Appellee Opinion Delivered June 16, 2005 APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PULASKI COUNTY, NO. CR. 2001-1063, HONORABLE BARRY SIMS, JUDGE AFFIRMED PER CURIAM Appellant was convicted of rape and sentenced as a habitual offender to 480 months' imprisonment. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed. Tolston v. State, CA CR 02-447 (Ark. App. Feb. 5, 2003). Appellant subsequently filed a timely petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37, which was denied following a hearing. From that order comes this appeal. The Supreme Court enunciated the standard for assessing the effectiveness of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires a showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Id. at 687. Thus, a defendant must first show that counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," id. at 688, and second, that the errors "actually had an adverse effect on the defense." Id. at 693. In reviewing a denial of relief under Rule 37, we must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the range of reasonable professional assistance. Noel v. State, 342 Ark. 35, 38, 26 S.W.3d 123, 125 (2000). To rebut this presumption, appellant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt in that the decision reached would have been different absent the errors. Id. A reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. Ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be established by a mere showing of error by counsel or by revealing that counsel's failure to object prevented an issue from being addressed on appeal. Thomas v. State, 330 Ark. 442, 448, 954 S.W.2d 255, 258 (1997) (citing Huls v. State, 301 Ark. 572, 785 S.W.2d 467 (1990) (per curiam)). We must consider the totality of the evidence before the factfinder, and we will not reverse the denial of postconviction relief unless the lower court's findings are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Noel, supra. Appellant makes the following claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) counsel failed to preserve the issue of whether the trial court applied the correct code provision in finding him guilty of rape, (2) counsel failed to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence by making a general motion for directed verdict and not renewing the motion at the close of all evidence, and (3) counsel was incompetent in advising appellant not to testify. On direct appeal, appellant's sole argument was that the trial court erred in failing to apply the code provision that was in effect at the time of the offense. According to the court of appeals: The felony information alleged that on January 14, 2001, Tolston violated Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-103 (Repl.1997) by unlawfully engaging in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity with J.S., who was incapable of consent because she was physically helpless. The definition of "physically helpless" in effect at the time of Tolston's offense is found in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-101(5) (Repl.1997), which states that a person is physically helpless when that person is unconscious or physically unable to communicate lack of consent.1 This definition was amended by the General Assembly in April 2001, to add that a person is also physically helpless when they are "rendered unaware the sexual act is occurring." See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14- 101(5)(B) (Supp.2001); 2001 Ark. Acts 1724. Tolston, slip op. at 2. There, appellant argued that the acts for which he was tried did not constitute rape under the law in effect on January 14, 2001; accordingly, he claimed that the trial court must have applied the law in effect on September 24, 2001, the date of his bench trial. Id. at 2-3. Specifically, appellant argued that J.S. could not have been "physically helpless" under the definition in effect at the time of his offense because she testified that she was merely asleep and not unconscious. The court of appeals found that there was nothing in the record to support appellant's contention that the trial court did not apply the statute in effect at the time of his offense. Id. at 3. According to the court, "Absent a contradictory showing, there is a presumption that the defendant received a fair trial and that the trial court followed the applicable statutory law." Id. The court of appeals held that appellant's argument was not preserved for appellate review as he did not raise this argument to the trial court until his closing argument, and the record did not reflect that the court ever ruled on the issue. Tolston, slip op. at 3. Appellant's failure to obtain a ruling on the issue precluded review on appeal. Id. The court went on to state the following: Also, even if Tolston's argument is considered as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, the issue is not preserved for appellate review because Tolston made only a general motion for dismissal and did not renew it at the close of all the evidence. See Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1 (stating that in order to preserve an argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal from a bench trial, a defendant must make a motion for dismissal at the close of all the evidence, and in the motion, the defendant must state the specific grounds on which he alleges that the proof is insufficient). Therefore, we affirm. Tolston, slip op. at 3. During her closing argument, counsel mentioned the amendment to the code provision, arguing that the State did not prove that the victim was "physically helpless." As noted, the trial court found appellant guilty of rape without ruling on counsel's argument regarding which definition of "physically helpless" was applicable. In denying postconviction relief, the trial court referenced Tolston, supra, ruling that appellant failed to show actual prejudice. Ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be established by revealing that counsel's failure to object prevented an issue from being addressed on appeal. Thomas, supra. Moreover, appellant fails to show that the issue would have been resolved in his favor on appeal, had it been preserved. Conclusory allegations unsupported by facts and which lack allegation or showing of prejudice are insufficient to warrant Rule 37 relief. See Nelson v. State, 344 Ark. 407, 413, 39 S.W.3d 791, 795 (2001) (per curiam). We therefore affirm the denial of relief. Appellant goes on to argue that counsel failed to preserve the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence. At trial, counsel made a very general motion for directed verdict. The motion was denied, and it was not renewed at the close of all evidence. In its order, the trial court ruled that ineffective assistance of counsel could not be demonstrated by simply showing that counsel's failure to object prevented an issue from being heard on appeal. Moreover, the court found that upon review of the record, it found substantial evidence to support the verdict and that a renewed motion for directed verdict would not have led to a different outcome. Without a showing of prejudice, the trial court ruled that there was no basis for relief. The following excerpt from the opinion affirming appellant's conviction sets out the evidence presented at trial: At trial, the victim, J.S., testified that she lived in an apartment with another female. On the evening of January 14, 2001, J.S. stated that her roommate's boyfriend and Tolston visited the apartment. Soon after the two men arrived, J.S. testified that she was tired and had a headache, so she went to her bedroom to go to sleep. J.S. stated that Tolston then came into her bedroom, and after asking her if he could get comfortable, Tolston took his shoes off, leaned over her, and began "rubbing on her." J.S. testified that she did not feel comfortable, so she got up and told Tolston that she did not want to do that. J.S. stated that she then went into the living room and went to sleep on the couch, while Tolston stayed in her bedroom. Later, Tolston came into the living room, apologized to J.S. for his actions, and told her that she could have her bed back. J.S. stated that she went back to her room and fell asleep. She testified that she woke up later to find that Tolston was naked and lying next to her. According to J.S.'s testimony, her nightgown was pulled up to her chest, Tolston's hand was in her panties, and his fingers were inside her vagina. J.S. testified that she jumped up and told Tolston that he was going to have to leave. She stated that she left the apartment shortly after the incident and reported what happened to the police. J.S. testified that she did not have any alcoholic beverages to drink that night, but she stated that she did take two Excedrin P.M. pills for her headache before she went to sleep. Tolston, slip op. at 1-2. Based upon the above evidence, we believe that there was sufficient evidence presented to support appellant's conviction for rape and even if the issue had been preserved for appeal, that the outcome would not have been different. Under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-103(a)(3), the statute in existence at the time of the rape, a person committed rape if he or she engaged in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity with another person who was incapable of consent because he or she was physically helpless. "Deviate sexual activity" meant any act of sexual gratification involving the penetration, however slight, of the labia majora of one person by any body member or foreign instrument manipulated by another person. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-101(1)(B). At that time, "physically helpless" meant that a person was unconscious or physically unable to communicate lack of consent. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-101(5). Moreover, we have held that the uncorroborated testimony of a rape victim is substantial evidence to support a rape conviction if the testimony satisfies the statutory elements. Butler v. State, 349 Ark. 252, 256, 82 S.W.3d 152, 154 (2002). J.S. testified that appellant penetrated her vagina with his fingers while she was asleep. Her testimony satisfied the elements of rape; accordingly, that was enough to support appellant's conviction. Again, appellant has not shown that had the issue of sufficiency of the evidence been preserved, that he would have been successful on appeal. Without a showing of prejudice, we cannot grant postconviction relief. Finally, appellant claims that counsel was ineffective for advising him not to testify, as he took such advice to mean that he could not testify. According to counsel's testimony at the hearing, she advised appellant against testifying because of his prior convictions. The trial court ruled that counsel's decision to advise appellant against testifying was a matter of trial strategy and not grounds for relief under Rule 37. Rule 1.2. of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that "[i]n a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify." See also State v. Franklin, 351 Ark. 131, 137, 89 S.W.3d 865, 867 (2002). Case law has confirmed this tenet of the scope of representation. Id. The accused has the right to choose whether to testify in his own behalf. Chenowith v. State, 341 Ark. 722, 734, 19 S.W.3d 612, 618 (2000) (per curiam). Counsel may only advise the accused in making the decision, and that decision to testify is purely one of strategy. Id Because counsel's decision to advise appellant not to testify based upon his prior criminal record was a matter of trial strategy, we find no merit and affirm. Affirmed. 1 We note that the commentary to section 5-14-101(5) states that the term "unconscious" means "any condition from a deep sleep to complete insensibility as a result of illness or the excessive use of an intoxicating substance," and refers to Harvey v. State, 53 Ark. 425, 14 S.W. 645 (1890), in which the supreme court stated that a person who is asleep is incapable of resisting a rape.