Case Title: Pizza di Joey v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore

Citation: 

Docket Number: 41/19

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2020-08-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Pizza di Joey, LLC and Madame BBQ, LLC v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,   
No. 41, September Term, 2019. Opinion by Biran, J. 
 
 
JUDICIAL REVIEW – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT – JUSTICIABILITY 
– RIPENESS – STANDING – Court of Appeals held that mobile vendors’ substantive 
due process and equal protection claims were justiciable in a declaratory judgment action 
brought under Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-409(a)(1) (1973, 2013 Repl. Vol.). Mobile 
vendors’ challenge to Baltimore City Code, Article 15, § 17-33, which prohibits them from 
parking their food trucks within 300 feet of a competing retail establishment (“300-foot 
rule”), was ripe. Enforcement of the 300-foot rule restricts where mobile vendors may 
operate and affects their potential profitability, resulting in concrete, specific claims of 
constitutional violations. The Court also held that the mobile vendors in this case had 
standing to challenge the 300-foot rule. They established at trial that they were directly 
affected by the 300-foot rule.  
 
MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS – ARTICLE 24 – EQUAL 
PROTECTION – SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS – BALTIMORE CITY CODE, 
ARTICLE 15, § 17-33 – RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW – Court of Appeals held that the 
proper level of judicial scrutiny for the 300-foot rule is rational basis review. The Court 
held that the 300-foot rule is rationally related to Baltimore City’s legitimate interest in 
ensuring the economic vibrancy of its commercial districts. The 300-foot rule furthers this 
interest by addressing the “free rider” problem that exists when food trucks are able to park 
too close to restaurants that primarily sell the same type of food products. Thus, the Court 
held that the 300-foot rule does not violate mobile vendors’ rights to substantive due 
process and equal protection under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Even 
reviewed under the less deferential heightened rational basis test, the 300-foot rule is 
constitutional because it bears a real and substantial relation to Baltimore’s legitimate 
interest in ensuring the vibrancy of its commercial districts. 
 
COURTS – WAIVER – APPELLATE REVIEW – Court of Appeals held that, where 
mobile vendors affirmatively waived vagueness challenge, circuit court erred in holding 
the 300-foot rule void for vagueness on its own initiative. An appellate court has discretion 
to give effect to a party’s affirmative waiver of a claim for relief in the trial court, despite 
the trial court having decided the question on its own initiative. 
 
MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS – ARTICLE 24 – VOID-FOR- 
VAGUENESS DOCTRINE – FACIAL CHALLENGE – The Court of Appeals held 
that a facial vagueness challenge to the 300-foot rule is permissible. On the merits of that 
claim, the Court held that the 300-foot rule is not void for vagueness. Mobile vendors failed 
to show that there is no set of circumstances under which the 300-rule is valid. In addition, 
the language of the 300-foot rule is not so broad as to be susceptible to irrational and 
selective enforcement. 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 41 
 
                    September Term, 2019  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   PIZZA DI JOEY, LLC AND  
    MADAME BBQ, LLC 
 
   v. 
 
     MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL 
     OF BALTIMORE 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
McDonald 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty 
Booth 
Biran 
Raker, Irma S. 
       (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), 
 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by Biran, J. 
Raker, J., dissents. 
 
 
Filed: August 17, 2020
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No. 24-C-16-002852 
Argued: February 6, 2020 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2021-02-11 
14:47-05:00
“There ain’t no such thing as a free lunch.” 
 
– adage popularized as the acronym “TANSTAAFL” in 
The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress by Robert A. Heinlein (1966)   
 
 
According to one scholar, in nineteenth-century America, “cities were regarded 
almost purely as economic entities.” Dennis R. Judd, The Politics of American Cities: 
Private Power and Public Policy 2 (1979). Thus, in that era, “[l]ocal politics could be 
defined as the enterprise of protecting and promoting economic vitality.” Id. In modern 
America, Baltimore City and other local governments have had more on their plates when 
promoting the general welfare than just ensuring economic vitality. In 2020, the 
coronavirus pandemic and concerns about racism in policing have dominated civic 
discourse in Maryland and throughout the nation. In Baltimore City, policymakers and 
concerned citizens have confronted issues relating to equality and policing (and other social 
issues) for many years prior to this one. Nevertheless, promoting and maintaining 
economic strength remains an important governmental interest in Baltimore and other 
cities. Without economic strength, cities struggle to remain vibrant, as tax bases shrink and 
public safety challenges increase. Promoting a city’s general welfare requires that local 
lawmakers balance competing interests and make sometimes difficult choices. This case 
concerns Baltimore City’s efforts to balance the interests of brick-and-mortar restaurants 
and food trucks.  
Joseph Salek-Nejad, known professionally as Joey Vanoni, and Nicole McGowan 
are the respective owners of Pizza di Joey, LLC (“Pizza di Joey”) and Madame BBQ, LLC 
2 
 
(“Madame BBQ”). Since 2014, both Pizza di Joey and Madame BBQ have been part of 
Maryland’s food truck industry, with Pizza di Joey primarily operating in Anne Arundel 
County and Madame BBQ (rebranded in 2016 as MindGrub Café) in Howard County. 
Pizza di Joey and Madame BBQ (collectively, the “Food Trucks”) seek to operate in 
Baltimore City, but contend that they are unable to do so due to a provision in Baltimore’s 
street vending ordinance that restricts a food truck from parking within 300 feet of a brick-
and-mortar restaurant that primarily sells the same type of food (the “300-foot rule” or the 
“Rule”).  
The Food Trucks filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against the Mayor 
and City Council of Baltimore (the “City”), claiming that the 300-foot rule violates Article 
24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights by restricting the Food Trucks’ ability to practice 
their trade. Specifically, the Food Trucks alleged that the 300-foot rule’s restraint on their 
ability to operate their businesses in Baltimore deprives them of equal protection and 
substantive due process of law under Article 24. At a bench trial, the City introduced expert 
testimony from an economist, who testified that the 300-foot rule addresses a “free rider” 
problem posed by food trucks siphoning business from brick-and-mortar restaurants after 
those restaurants have invested their resources and become semi-permanent members of 
the neighborhoods in which they are based. The City’s expert testified that, while food 
trucks provide an important service, they threaten the vibrancy and viability of the City’s 
commercial districts if allowed to operate too closely to brick-and-mortar establishments 
that sell primarily the same type of food.  
3 
 
 
After receiving evidence from both sides, the circuit court held that the 300-foot 
rule does not violate Article 24’s requirements of equal protection and substantive due 
process. However, despite the Food Trucks’ explicit disavowal of a claim based on the 
procedural due process doctrine of vagueness, the court enjoined the City from enforcing 
the 300-foot rule, concluding on its own initiative that the Rule is impermissibly vague. 
 
The parties cross-appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which ruled in favor of 
the City. The intermediate appellate court agreed with the circuit court that the 300-foot 
rule does not deprive the Food Trucks of substantive due process or equal protection under 
Article 24. However, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court’s grant of 
injunctive relief, holding that the Food Trucks had not preserved a vagueness claim for 
appellate review, and that such a claim failed on the merits in any event.  
The Food Trucks appealed to this Court. For the reasons discussed below, we agree 
with the Court of Special Appeals that the 300-foot rule is constitutional.     
I 
 
Background 
A. Food Trucks 
Not every city has had the same experience with food trucks over the past decade. 
In some cities, the emergence of food trucks has been viewed as a wholly positive 
development. In other cities, the relationship between food trucks and established 
businesses and the local citizenry has been more complicated. But there is no doubt that 
food trucks have become increasingly popular and prevalent in Baltimore and many other 
American cities over the past decade.  
4 
 
However, the idea behind a kitchen on wheels is not novel. In 1866, Charles 
Goodnight repurposed a military wagon into a mobile kitchen for cattle farmers traveling 
along Western trails. See Clay Coppedge, Good Eats on the Range, available at 
http://www.americanchuckwagon.org/images/CWarticle.pdf (accessed on July 15, 2020), 
archived at https://perma.cc/YLU6-6L66. Known as the chuck wagon, its popularity and 
uses expanded over the following century. After enjoying a steak at an event in Colorado, 
former President Theodore Roosevelt mounted a chuck wagon and spoke of the “great 
comfort” they provided on the frontier. At the “Chuck Wagon Lunch”, Baltimore Sun (Aug. 
30, 1910). In the 1930s, a “restaurant on wheels” could travel to different destinations at a 
moment’s notice. “Old Hutch” Feeds Famous Folk: Restaurant on Wheels is Site of Many 
Quick Repasts in Wilds, Washington Post (Aug. 9, 1936). In 1949, a restaurant in Little 
Rock, Arkansas styled a Jeep after a chuck wagon and used it to cater parties and events. 
Chuck Wagons Roll Again, Wall Street Journal (Mar. 14, 1949).  
The mobile food industry took a different form in cities. Vendors have sold food 
from pushcarts in New York City for hundreds of years. See The Complete History of 
American Food Trucks, available at http://www.mobile-cuisine.com/business/history-of-
american-food-trucks (accessed on July 13, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/FWR3-
RARW. In 1872, Walter Scott cut windows into a wagon parked outside an office in 
Providence, Rhode Island, from which he sold sandwiches and coffee. Similar “lunch 
wagons” began to appear in other cities. Devin Gannon, From oysters to falafel: The 
complete history of street vending in NYC, available at http://www.6sqft.com/from-oysters-
to-falafel-the-complete-history-of-street-vending-in-nyc (accessed on July 13, 2020), 
5 
 
archived at https://perma.cc/P468-FQGG. Near the end of the nineteenth century, 
nighttime food wagons, known as “Owls,” appeared in New York City, serving hot food 
and drinks after restaurants closed. Id. After the advent of the automobile, food wagons 
eventually became motorized. Id. 
The person widely credited with creating the first of today’s modern “food trucks” 
was Raul Martinez, who, in 1974 in Los Angeles, converted an old ice cream truck into a 
mobile lunch wagon serving tacos. See Lynn Brown, The Rise of the Taco Truck, available 
at https://daily.jstor.org/rise-of-the-taco-truck (accessed on July 13, 2020), archived at 
https://perma.cc/D6JW-ZGWX. Six months later, thanks to the popularity of his truck, Mr. 
Martinez was able to open a brick-and-mortar restaurant called King Taco in Los Angeles, 
which became a successful chain of restaurants. Mr. Martinez’s success led others to try to 
follow in his footsteps, and “taco trucks” became common in California and the Southwest. 
Id. 
One of the first gourmet food trucks to receive national attention was Kogi BBQ in 
Los Angeles, which used Twitter to develop a fan base for its “Korean Short Rib Taco” 
and other Korean-Mexican fare. Id.; see also David Farley, The taco that’s taking the US 
by storm, available at http://www.bbc.com/travel/story/20150130-the-taco-thats-taking-
the-us-by-storm (accessed on July 13, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/JZX3-F8TU. 
Others on the west coast, and soon after on the east coast, took note of Kogi BBQ’s success, 
leading chefs to “scour[] used car lots to find trucks to convert into mobile restaurants.” 
The Rise of the Food Truck, available at http://www.restaurantengine.com/rise-food-truck 
(accessed on July 13, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/GC6Y-F4MR.  
6 
 
Food trucks have grown exponentially in popularity since the 2008 economic 
downturn. That recession forced many talented chefs out of traditional restaurants. See id. 
In addition, given the low cost of creating a food truck relative to a brick-and-mortar 
restaurant, many aspiring chefs have opted to begin their careers with food trucks. See Lorri 
Mealey, A History of the Food Truck, available at www.thebalancesmb.com/a-history-of-
food-trucks-2888314 (accessed on July 13, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/VDW5-
8BFE; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Urban Reform at 3-4 (noting the “relatively low 
startup costs [of food trucks] in comparison to the high capital requirements and 
complicated, ever-expanding government regulations that accompany starting traditional 
businesses” and observing that, for many food truck operators, “[s]treet vending is the first 
rung on these entrepreneurs’ climb up the ladder of economic success”) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). The ascendance of food trucks has been reflected in popular 
culture, including the 2014 film “Chef,” starring Jon Favreau, Robert Downey, Jr., and 
Scarlett Johansson, and in the television programs “The Great Food Truck Race” and 
“Food Truck Nation.”  
Baltimore City is no exception to an increasing number of food trucks in U.S. cities. 
As of May 2017, there were 65-70 food trucks operating in the City, compared with 
approximately 25 licensed food trucks in 2011-12. 
B. The City’s Regulation of Food Trucks 
In 2014, responding to the increasing popularity of food trucks, the City established 
a series of regulations that apply to the operation of food trucks within its boundaries. The 
stated goal of the legislation was to promote “entrepreneurship and a vibrant business 
7 
 
climate for food truck vendors and local restaurants,” taking into account “pedestrian, 
traffic and parking concerns” while also promoting “public safety and health.” Recitals, 
Council Bill 14-0305 (First Reader, introduced Jan. 13, 2014).1 The resulting Ordinance 
14-237 (the “Ordinance”), which is codified as Subtitle 17 of Article 15 of the Baltimore 
City Code, substantially revised the regulations governing street vending in the City. See 
Baltimore City Code, Art. 15, Subtitle 17, Editor’s Note.  
The Ordinance, which became effective on February 28, 2015, established “special 
regulatory provisions for mobile vendors.” Id. As relevant here, a “mobile vendor” is 
defined as “any person that sells, distributes, or offers to sell or distribute food products … 
from a motor vehicle on City streets or private property within the City of Baltimore.” 
Baltimore City Code, Art. 15, § 17-1(e)(1). Among other things, the Ordinance sets forth 
the procedure and requirements to obtain a mobile vending license and creates an 
administrative appeals process. Id. §§ 17-18 & 17-45.2  
The Ordinance also regulates when and where mobile vendors may park their 
vendor trucks. Street vendors may not operate between the hours of midnight and 6 a.m. in 
the absence of receipt of a special event permit that explicitly grants permission to operate 
 
1 The City’s overhaul of its laws regarding street vendors was introduced as 
Ordinance 14-0305. Upon enactment, it was renumbered Ordinance 14-237. 
 
2 If approved for a license, a street vendor receives a license for a one-year term that 
can be renewed for an unlimited number of subsequent one-year terms. See id. § 17-19. 
Alternatively, a person may apply for a temporary street vending license that carries a term 
of four days and can be renewed for at least one additional four-day period. See id. § 17-
20. 
 
8 
 
during those hours. Id. § 17-36. In addition, the Ordinance provides parking benefits to, 
and imposes parking restrictions on, mobile vendors. The primary parking benefit that the 
City provides to licensed mobile vendors is the right to park free of charge in a “mobile 
vending zone.” Id. § 17-5. These zones are comprised of designated spaces on City streets 
or other public property “for the exclusive use of mobile vendors during designated hours.” 
Id. § 17-5(a)(1). According to evidence submitted at the trial in this case, without such 
zones, mobile vendors would have to pay more for parking, and would have to comply 
with parking time restrictions, which prohibit “meter feeding.”3 A City official explained 
that mobile vendors had asked the City to provide such vending zones, which 
“accommodate [their] need for setup time, breakdown time, and [do not] require [them to] 
pay a disproportionate amount of money for the parking resource on the street.” 
On the other hand, the Ordinance restricts mobile vendors from parking their vendor 
trucks in certain places within the City. These restrictions comprise the majority of the 
prohibitions set forth in Part III of the Ordinance. See id. §§ 17-30 through 17-39.4 The 
300-foot rule is one of these restrictions. It provides: 
 
3 The City’s Department of Transportation has published regulations which provide, 
among other things, that “[a] licensed mobile vendor, not assigned to a designated mobile 
vending location may vend from any legal parking place, … where the following 
conditions are met: … No mobile vendor may park at a meter without providing the 
appropriate meter fees; [and] [n]o mobile vendor may ‘meter feed’ or park in a metered 
space for longer than the time limit designated as the parking time limit.” Street Vendor 
Program Rules and Regulations §§ 1100(g) & (h); see also Baltimore City Code, Art. 31, 
§ 7-17(b) (prohibiting parking in a metered space “for a duration longer than that 
designated”). 
 
4 In addition to imposing parking restrictions, the Ordinance prohibits street vendors 
of food products from: (1) operating without sufficient trash receptacles, id. § 17-30(a); (2) 
9 
 
A mobile vendor may not park a vendor truck within 300 feet of any retail 
business establishment that is primarily engaged in selling the same type of 
food product … as that offered by the mobile vendor. 
 
Id. § 17-33.5 Three hundred feet is approximately the length of a typical City block. The 
term “food product” means “any item used as food, drink, confectionary, or condiment for 
human consumption, whether simple or compound.” Id. § 17-1(c). The phrases “primarily 
engaged in” and “same type” are not defined in the Ordinance.  
The Ordinance provides for enforcement of its provisions by civil citation. Id. § 17-
41. The Ordinance also provides a misdemeanor criminal penalty for any “person who 
violates any provision” of the Ordinance. Id. § 17-42. Upon conviction, the violating person 
“is subject to a penalty of $500 for each offense.” Id. In addition, the Department of General 
Services (“DGS”) may suspend or revoke a mobile vending license if the licensee violates 
any provision of the Ordinance. Id. § 17-44(a)(1). If a mobile vendor commits three 
violations of any of the prohibitions set forth in Part III of the Ordinance (including the 
 
failing to remove all trash within a 10-foot radius of the place where the vendor truck has 
been parked, id. § 17-30(b); and (3) operating without keeping a detailed logbook noting 
the vendor’s daily use of its supporting commissary, id. § 17-34(a).  
 
5 The Ordinance also prohibits mobile vendors from parking their vendor trucks: (1) 
in a residential spot for more than 15 minutes at a time every 48 hours, id. § 17-35; (2) 
within two blocks of a mobile vending zone, id. § 17-32; (3) within two blocks of a City 
market, id. § 17-37; (4) within two blocks of the perimeter of any City-authorized farmers’ 
market when the farmers’ market is in operation, without the written permission of the 
farmers’ market organizer and holder of the farmers’ market permit, id. § 17-39; and (5) 
from 7 a.m. to 8 p.m., within two blocks of any building used as a public or private 
kindergarten, elementary school, or secondary school, or any public transit stop serving a 
kindergarten, elementary school, or secondary school, id. § 17-38. In addition, no mobile 
vending zone may be designated within two blocks of a public or private kindergarten, 
elementary school, or secondary school. Id. § 17-5(a)(3). 
10 
 
300-foot rule), DGS must revoke that vendor’s license. Id. § 17-44(b). If a license is 
revoked, the former licensee may not apply for a new license until at least one year 
following the date of revocation. Id. § 17-44(c).  
The City has confirmed that it enforces the 300-foot rule. It does so by asking 
vendors to relocate or to alter their menus based on the menus of the nearby brick-and-
mortar establishments. Enforcement authorities take such action only in response to a 
complaint that a food truck is parked too close to a brick-and-mortar restaurant. No mobile 
vendor has received a citation or has had its license suspended or revoked for violating the 
300-foot rule.  
C. Pizza di Joey and Madame BBQ 
Pizza di Joey and Madame BBQ and their owners, Mr. Vanoni and Ms. McGowan, 
exemplify many of the greatest benefits of the food truck industry. Mr. Vanoni created 
Pizza di Joey after his return from a tour of duty in the United States Marine Corps. His 
fellow servicemembers enjoyed his cooking and encouraged him to get into the food 
business. Mr. Vanoni tested a variety of pizza recipes before opening his food truck for 
business in 2014. At the time, he lacked the capital to open a brick-and-mortar restaurant. 
A resident of the Federal Hill neighborhood in Baltimore City, Mr. Vanoni obtained a 
mobile vendor license from the City, but, as discussed below, he primarily traveled to Anne 
Arundel County to operate his food truck, due to the 300-foot rule. There, his business 
thrived, as Pizza di Joey became known for its New-York style pizza and Italian pastas and 
salads. In 2019, Mr. Vanoni opened a brick-and-mortar Pizza di Joey restaurant in Federal 
11 
 
Hill,6 but food trucks are still part of his business. He wishes to focus his mobile-vending 
operation in Baltimore.    
Ms. McGowan, owner of Madame BBQ, has worked in the food service industry 
since she was 15 years old. Barbeque remains a staple offering of her food truck, but since 
rebranding her business as MindGrub Café in 2016, Ms. McGowan has added a diverse 
array of healthy food options. Targeting workers in professional occupations, she aims to 
provide “brain food for knowledge workers.” Ms. McGowan originally focused her 
operation in Howard County but took her truck to Baltimore City through one-day permits 
for block parties and special events. Like Pizza di Joey, Madame BBQ is currently licensed 
as a mobile vendor in the City. Ms. McGowan also wishes to focus her food truck business 
in the City. 
Despite having proper licensing and a desire to operate in the City, both Mr. Vanoni 
and Ms. McGowan have limited their food truck operations in the City due to the 300-foot 
rule. Mr. Vanoni came to this decision after a University of Maryland police officer 
approached the Pizza di Joey truck while it was parked in the 800 block of West Baltimore 
Street. The officer explained to Mr. Vanoni that he had received a complaint from a nearby 
restaurant that Pizza di Joey was parked too close to the restaurant, and told Mr. Vanoni 
that he would need to move his truck from that location. After Mr. Vanoni accessed the 
 
6 Thus, Mr. Vanoni appears to be an example of a food entrepreneur for whom 
mobile vending indeed was “the first rung on [the] climb up the ladder of economic 
success.” Brief of Amicus Curiae Urban Reform at 4; see also Nicholas Alvarez, 
Regulating the Food Truck Industry: An Illustration of Proximity and Sanitation 
Regulations, 12 J. Food L. & Pol’y 1, 5 (2016) (“Some food truck owners have been so 
successful that they are looking into permanent brick-and-mortar spots.”). 
12 
 
text of the 300-foot rule on his laptop, he was able to convince the officer that he was not 
selling the same type of food product as the complaining restaurant (which did not sell 
pizza). Mr. Vanoni continued to operate at that location that day; indeed, the officer 
returned during the lunch hour and bought a slice of pizza from Mr. Vanoni. Nevertheless, 
this incident caused Mr. Vanoni substantial concern because it showed that police officers 
in the City do enforce the 300-foot rule. Although Mr. Vanoni had never been cited or 
charged for violating the 300-foot rule, Mr. Vanoni worried that he might face a criminal 
charge and/or put his license at risk if he mistakenly operated within 300 feet of a restaurant 
that primarily sells the same type of food products. In addition, just engaging in a 
discussion with police to attempt to avoid enforcement means losing precious operating 
time. After analyzing the menus of the brick-and-mortar restaurants in two Baltimore 
neighborhoods where he wants to operate – Hampden and Federal Hill – Mr. Vanoni 
determined that the prevalence of restaurants that sell Italian sandwiches and pizza in those 
areas effectively makes it impossible for him to operate there. These factors led Mr. Vanoni 
to severely cut back the operation of his food truck in the City and instead operate 80-90 
percent of the time in Anne Arundel County. 
As for Ms. McGowan, Madame BBQ’s menu after the rebranding to MindGrub 
Café became quite varied, as it came to include various salads, soups, and sandwiches, as 
well as retaining some barbecue items. Ms. McGowan became concerned that the 
diversification of her menu greatly increased the number of brick-and-mortar restaurants 
which would be considered as selling primarily the same type of food products as 
MindGrub Café. Similar to Mr. Vanoni, Ms. McGowan analyzed how the 300-foot rule 
13 
 
affected her food truck’s ability to operate in certain desirable areas. She concluded that 31 
restaurants in Hampden, 50 restaurants in Federal Hill, and 113 restaurants in the 
downtown area implicated the 300-foot rule with respect to MindGrub Café. Ms. 
McGowan also would like to operate in Waverly Brewing Company’s parking lot on 
private property, but has concluded that she cannot do so, because Blue Pit BBQ is located 
within 300 feet, and sells pulled pork sandwiches, as does MindGrub Café. In addition, 
Ms. McGowan concluded that she cannot legally operate her vendor truck in the parking 
lot of a commissary she owns in the Locust Point neighborhood because of a nearby 
restaurant called Barracuda’s.  
Like Pizza di Joey, Madame BBQ has never been cited for violating the 300-foot 
rule, nor has Ms. McGowan had any encounter with enforcement agencies with respect to 
the Rule. But Ms. McGowan became sufficiently concerned about the wide sweep of the 
Rule and the possibility that she might lose her license, or that she might receive a $500 
citation for a violation of the Rule, that she decided not to operate her food truck in the 
City.   
D. The Litigation 
On May 13, 2016, the Food Trucks filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore City, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief based on their claim 
that the 300-foot rule violates their rights under Article 24. The City moved to dismiss the 
Complaint; the circuit court denied the motion to dismiss.  
On October 18, 2016, the Food Trucks filed an Amended Complaint, which alleged 
that, by interfering unreasonably with their right to earn a living, the 300-foot rule: (1) 
14 
 
violates the Food Trucks’ right to equal protection under Article 24, both on its face and as 
applied to the Food Trucks (Count I); and (2) violates the Food Trucks’ right to substantive 
due process under Article 24, both on its face and as applied to the Food Trucks (Count II). 
The Food Trucks sought declaratory and injunctive relief, a nominal one-dollar award of 
damages, as well as costs and attorneys’ fees. The Food Trucks did not include a claim that 
the 300-foot rule is unconstitutionally vague in either the original Complaint or the 
Amended Complaint. 
The parties engaged in discovery and then filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment. In its motion for summary judgment, the City argued, among other things, that 
the Food Trucks’ claims were not ripe because neither Pizza di Joey nor Madame BBQ had 
suffered any cognizable injury from the 300-foot rule. During oral argument at the hearing 
on the motions for summary judgment, counsel for the Food Trucks stated that the Food 
Trucks had “not brought a vagueness argument.”  
The circuit court denied both summary judgment motions. As to the City’s argument 
regarding ripeness, the court found that at least one of the plaintiffs had “demonstrated 
sufficient facts” to show a “credible threat of prosecution.”   
On September 28-29, 2017, another judge of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
presided over a nonjury trial of the Food Trucks’ claims. Both Mr. Vanoni and Ms. 
McGowan testified in the Food Trucks’ case-in-chief, explaining how they wanted to 
operate their trucks in the City but had altered their business plans based on their conclusion 
that they were not able to operate effectively in the City without risking sanctions for 
violating the 300-foot rule. They introduced into evidence maps showing how the 300-foot 
15 
 
rule prevents them from parking anywhere in certain neighborhoods of the City in which, 
but for the Rule, they would sell their food products. Mr. Vanoni also testified about his 
encounter with the University of Maryland police officer who was attempting to enforce 
the 300-foot rule.  
Notwithstanding their determinations that the 300-foot rule prevented them from 
operating in certain areas, both Mr. Vanoni and Ms. McGowan also testified that one of 
the reasons they find the Rule problematic is that they do not know what it covers and what 
it does not. For example, when asked what “the same type of food product” means to him, 
Mr. Vanoni answered: “[I]t’s really pretty broad. Is it pizza? Is it flatbread? Specifically 
with Pizza di Joey, … is it cuisine? Italian? American? Italian-American? Sandwiches? I 
mean, are we talking like the form of the cuisine? The style of it?” While Ms. McGowan 
offered that at least one comparison was “easy” for her to make – both her truck and a 
restaurant called Harbor Que sell barbecue – she was not “totally sure” if she would be 
permitted to park within 300 feet of Blue Hill Tavern, which (like her truck) has chicken 
sandwiches, salads, and soup on its menu.  
The Food Trucks introduced transcripts of depositions given by two City officials 
with knowledge of, and responsibility for, enforcement of the 300-foot rule. Among other 
things, those officials testified that the City has not created a document that provides 
guidance to the departments with enforcement authority concerning standards to apply in 
enforcing the Rule. However, the officials testified that they applied “commonsense” 
definitions to the phrases “primarily engaged in selling” and “same type” of food product. 
Thus, when asked whether pizza is the same type of food product as flat bread, one of the 
16 
 
City officials answered that he was unaware of the City having “established a formal 
position on whether or not those two things are similar or equal,” but stated that he would 
“argue that flat bread is flat bread and pizza is pizza.” The officials acknowledged that the 
300-foot rule is “not an easy rule to enforce” and requires those with enforcement authority 
to conduct a “subjective analysis” on a “case-by-case basis” whether a restaurant is 
“primarily engaged in selling” the “same type” of food product as a mobile vendor. The 
officials explained that there were several factors that could be considered when 
conducting this analysis, including: (1) the specific items on the respective menus of the 
food truck and the brick-and-mortar restaurant; and (2) whether the food truck and nearby 
restaurant offered the same kind of cuisine.    
The City called one witness in its defense case: Anirban Basu, who testified as an 
expert in applied economics. Mr. Basu, who has advised multiple Maryland municipalities 
regarding economic development strategies, explained that “[a] city has to deliver[] a value 
proposition that attracts people. Without people[,] cities cannot be financially or 
economically valuable.” Mr. Basu testified that Baltimore City’s commercial districts are 
vital in delivering that value proposition to people because they are sources of tax base and 
jobs. He further opined that commercial vacancies detract from the vibrancy of the City’s 
commercial districts by negatively affecting the perception of public safety:  
[P]eople are taking cues from their environment. If they see a lot of vacant 
space they see a lot of hopelessness. Often vacant space associated with 
deteriorating physical conditions of buildings. That also sends out signals to 
people. And people often respond with their behaviors to those signals. So 
what you want is very vibrant commercial districts ... low vacancy rate.... 
 
Mr. Basu further explained that vacancies in the City’s commercial districts make 
17 
 
it more difficult to attract new businesses to those areas 
because again it sends a signal to potential tenants that this may not be the 
place for them.... [O]ne of the things you tend to see in commercial real estate 
is that an area that has suffered high vacancy often continues to suffer high 
vacancy.... So vacancy breeds vacancy. And it’s very difficult once a 
commercial area stops being vibrant to bring that vibrancy back. And we see 
that throughout Baltimore. 
  
In Mr. Basu’s opinion, brick-and-mortar restaurants are a very important part of 
maintaining the vibrancy of the City’s commercial districts because they are major 
employers, and also “energize the street-scape,” thereby encouraging visitation of the City.  
While Mr. Basu recognized that food trucks provide the same important service as 
brick-and-mortar restaurants and also contribute to the vibrancy of a commercial district, 
he explained that food trucks invest less in the City than their stationary competitors and 
provide fewer financial benefits for the City:   
Restaurants are semi-permanent members of their community.... Food trucks 
by definition are mobile. They’re not affixed to a particular community. 
They’re not necessarily pillars of their community. And of course, they’re 
not in [the] brick and mortar context. And so they’re not generating property 
taxes, directly or indirectly, the way that a restaurant would…. [T]he typical 
restaurant employs far more people than the typical food truck…. 
 
Mr. Basu explained that a typical restaurant entrepreneur invests approximately four times 
as much money as a food truck entrepreneur to open for business. Thus, while “[b]oth are 
taking risks [and] are to be respected for taking those risks, … the restaurateur on average 
is making a much larger gamble financially than is a typical food truck entrepreneur.” And 
brick-and-mortar entrepreneurs do not just gamble on their ability to attract and retain 
customers through the quality of the food offerings; they also gamble on the vibrancy of 
the City neighborhood in which they choose to set up shop. In this regard, Mr. Basu 
18 
 
compared the different courses of action available to food trucks and the City’s brick-and-
mortar restaurants after the Baltimore riots of April 2015. Putting himself in the shoes of 
both a restaurateur with a brick-and-mortar location on Monroe Street in West Baltimore 
and the operator of a food truck that frequents the same neighborhood, Mr. Basu explained 
that, as a result of the unrest in the neighborhood, the brick-and-mortar restaurateur has  
a problem because I am committed to that location. But if I’m a food truck 
operator, I get to move…. Maybe I’ll move to the area around Loyola 
University, which happens to be home to a food truck zone, or maybe I’ll 
move to the University of Maryland, or maybe I’ll move to the University of 
Baltimore, or Wabash Avenue…. I’ve got choices. I’m not committing to a 
particular part of the City. And so if public safety deteriorates in one part of 
the city, I move to another. In fact, … there’s nothing stopping me from 
leaving Baltimore City. Why don’t I go to Towson or some other place? I’m 
not committed to the City. My business is on wheels. But that restaurant 
entrepreneur on Monroe Street or Greenmount, they’re committed to the 
City. They’re committed to the space. They have a lease. They may actually 
own the building in which they operate. That’s not uncommon. And so that 
is an enormous source of risk. So not only are they risking more capital, 
they’re making a bigger bet on the City of Baltimore. 
 
For these reasons, Mr. Basu testified, it is sensible for the City to take steps to try to 
ensure the viability of brick-and-mortar restaurants. One such step, according to Mr. Basu, 
is the 300-foot rule, which addresses a “free rider” problem that exists when food trucks 
park near a competing brick-and-mortar restaurant. Using a brick-and-mortar pizzeria in 
the Fells Point neighborhood as an example,7 Mr. Basu explained the problem and what 
might happen if the City did not address it: 
 
7 We glean from Mr. Basu’s testimony that he was referring here to BOP, a Fells 
Point restaurant that stands for “Brick Oven Pizza.” The transcript refers to “Bob Pizza.” 
We are aware of no pizza restaurant in Fells Point called “Bob Pizza” or “Bob’s Pizza.” 
Thus, we have changed “Bob” to “BOP” in quoting from this portion of Mr. Basu’s 
testimony.  
19 
 
[L]et’s say a pizzeria creates a reputation. People say I want to go to BOP 
Pizza…. [T]hat restaurant is essentially paying property taxes all day and 
night, but … a food truck can come during an advantageous part of the day 
just when the market is hottest, just when BOP Pizza could generate the most 
revenues on a per hour basis and I’m going to sit in front of BOP Pizza at 
that time. Is that fair? I have created the market as BOP Pizza… I’ve made a 
commitment over the long term. I’ve bought equipment. I’ve hired [staff] 
and now I’ve got patrons coming in my direction and they can be siphoned 
off by a food truck that’s going to be gone in two hours. To me, that is not a 
satisfying outcome. And it doesn’t strike me as fair competition and it very 
much strikes me as a free rider problem. That food truck is free riding upon 
the efforts of that pizzeria and in my mind policy makers shouldn’t support 
that. 
 
…. 
 
[O]ne economic actor is engaging in a certain level of investment or 
expenditure and I am able to free ride on those efforts without having to 
expend my own resources. And in that sense it’s unfair because I’m being 
subsidized involuntarily by this other economic actor.… 
 
If I were a restauranteur or would[-]be restauranteur, … and I know that … 
a food truck … selling primarily the same item can locate right in front of 
my restaurant I may not open up the restaurant in the first place. Why would 
I spend … hundreds of thousands of dollars, take on all kinds of liability…. 
Why … spend that money just so a food truck that moves right in front of me 
can be successful for a few hours of the day before they move on to Baltimore 
County [or] wherever they’re going to go? It doesn’t make sense to me. 
That’s the kind of thing … that produces commercial vacancies. That’s the 
kind of thing that produces unemployment and we have enough of that in this 
City. 
 
Mr. Basu opined that the 300-foot rule addresses this free rider problem, i.e., unfair 
competition between food trucks and brick-and-mortar restaurants, “very strongly”: 
My conclusion is very firmly that [the 300-foot rule] inures to the benefit of 
the people of Baltimore and to the benefit of the level of commercial 
transactions that will take place in this city over the long term[,] that it 
supports entrepreneurship[,] and that it supports street-level vitality. 
 
The Food Trucks did not call an expert witness of their own in their case-in-chief or in 
20 
 
rebuttal following Mr. Basu’s testimony. 
 
During the Food Trucks’ closing argument, the circuit court asked if the Food 
Trucks, in addition to arguing that the 300-foot rule violates substantive due process and 
equal protection, were also contending that the regulation was impermissibly vague 
because of “the ability to interpret [it] in different ways.” The attorney for the Food Trucks 
at first seemed to suggest that the Food Trucks were advancing a vagueness challenge. 
However, as he went on in his answer, he did not assert that the 300-foot rule is void for 
vagueness. Rather, he restated the Food Trucks’ claims regarding substantive due process 
and equal protection. After the City’s counsel argued during his closing argument that the 
Food Trucks lacked standing to present an as-applied vagueness challenge and that a facial 
challenge on vagueness grounds would not have merit, the Food Trucks’ attorney clarified 
during his rebuttal argument that “we didn’t raise a void for vagueness challenge.”  
After the trial concluded, the circuit court took the case under advisement. On 
December 20, 2017, the court issued a Memorandum and Order. Applying “heightened 
rational basis” scrutiny, the court found that the 300-foot rule 
(1) protects the contributions brick-and-mortar retail establishments make to 
the City’s commercial districts; (2) promotes entrepreneurial investments 
and opportunity by eliminating the potential risk of food trucks; and (3) 
diversifies the marketplace to maximize positive economic effect by creating 
meaningful choices for the consumer. The 300-foot rule promotes brick-and-
mortar establishments throughout the City by eliminating the threat of mobile 
vendors, and ensuring brick-and-mortar establishments become a permanent 
fixture in the City. Promoting brick-and-mortar restaurants provides jobs, 
property tax revenue, and prevents a growing number of vacant properties. 
The commercial district of this City is dependent on these brick-and-mortar 
establishments’ long-term real estate investments. The City’s economic 
vitality is dependent upon the flourishment of its commercial district. 
 
21 
 
The court concluded that, because the 300-foot rule is substantially related to achievement 
of the City’s legitimate purpose of ensuring the vibrancy of its commercial districts, the 
300-foot rule does not infringe on the Food Trucks’ substantive due process and equal 
protection rights. 
However, despite the Food Trucks having disclaimed a vagueness challenge to the 
300-foot rule, the circuit court held that the Rule is unconstitutionally vague in two ways. 
First, the court concluded that the phrases “primarily engaged in” and “same type of food 
product” deprive mobile vendors of fair notice of the rule’s scope and how the City would 
enforce it. Second, the court found that “the entities enforcing this ordinance do not have 
guidance as to how to measure the 300-foot distance between brick-and-mortar 
establishments and food trucks.” With respect to the latter problem, the circuit court 
construed § 17-33 to require that the 300-foot distance be measured “from the closest point 
of the space in the building that is occupied by the restaurant – or by the food court in 
which the restaurant is located (rather than at the closest point of the building in which the 
restaurant is located) to the closest point of the food truck.” As to the former, the circuit 
court proffered no saving construction, and held that the lack of fair notice “prevents 
enforcement officials, brick-and-mortar restaurants, and food trucks from understanding 
what constitutes a violation of the rule.” For that reason, the circuit court enjoined the City 
from enforcing the 300-foot rule. The circuit court’s injunction went into effect on 
February 19, 2018. 
Resolving the parties’ cross-appeals, the Court of Special Appeals first held that the 
Food Trucks’ substantive due process and equal protections claims were ripe. Pizza di Joey, 
22 
 
LLC v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 241 Md. App. 139, 160-63 (2019). While the 
circuit court had found that at least one of the plaintiffs had “demonstrated sufficient facts” 
to show a “credible threat of prosecution,” the intermediate appellate court rejected the 
City’s ripeness challenge for a different reason. The Court of Special Appeals observed 
that “[a]lthough designated a misdemeanor, the 300-foot rule is, in substance and 
application, a local economic regulation. The primary injury the Food Trucks allege is not 
the possibility of prosecution, … but the loss of their right to pursue a business opportunity 
in their chosen profession, an interest that qualifies readily as a basis for a declaratory 
judgment.” Id. at 162.  
On the merits, the intermediate appellate court applied rational basis review to the 
300-foot rule, and held that the Rule is rationally related to the legitimate government 
purpose of protecting brick-and-mortar establishments from free-riding mobile vendors. 
Thus, the Court of Special Appeals agreed with the circuit court’s determination that the 
300-foot rule does not violate the Food Trucks’ rights to substantive due process and equal 
protection under Article 24. Id. at 163-78. However, the court reversed the circuit court’s 
grant of injunctive relief, concluding that the Food Trucks did not preserve a vagueness 
challenge for appellate review and, even if they did, the 300-foot Rule is not impermissibly 
vague. Id. at 178-82. 
The Food Trucks sought certiorari in this Court. On September 9, 2019, we granted 
the Food Trucks’ petition. 466 Md. 192 (2019). 
 
 
23 
 
II 
 
Standard of Review 
Where, as here, “an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate court will 
review the case on both the law and the evidence. It will not set aside the judgment of the 
trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due regard to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Md. Rule 8-131(c); 
see Sapero v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 398 Md. 317, 333-34 (2007). We review 
the trial court’s legal conclusions without any deference. Id. at 334. The proper scope of a 
constitutional right, and its application to a particular set of facts, are issues of law. See 
State v. Cates, 417 Md. 678, 691 (2011); Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211, 220-21 (2002). 
Therefore, we review such questions de novo. Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 535 (2006).  
III 
Discussion 
A. The Food Trucks’ Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection Claims Are 
Justiciable. 
 
Before we address the constitutionality of the 300-foot rule, we consider the City’s 
argument that the Food Trucks’ substantive due process and equal protection claims are 
not justiciable under the declaratory judgment act. In the courts below, the City argued that 
those claims were not sufficiently ripe to present an actual controversy. The circuit court 
and the Court of Special Appeals rejected the City’s ripeness challenge, although for 
different reasons. We, too, shall hold that the Food Trucks’ substantive due process and 
equal protection claims are justiciable. 
24 
 
The declaratory judgment act provides that “a court may grant a declaratory 
judgment or decree in a civil case, if it will serve to terminate the uncertainty or controversy 
giving rise to the proceedings, and if … [a]n actual controversy exists between contending 
parties.” Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-409(a)(1) (1973, 2013 Repl. Vol.). A court cannot 
consider a declaratory judgment action unless the underlying controversy is justiciable. 
State Center, LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship, 438 Md. 451, 591 (2014); Hatt v. 
Anderson, 297 Md. 42, 45 (1983) (“[T]he existence of a justiciable controversy is an 
absolute prerequisite to the maintenance of a declaratory judgment action.”). A case is not 
justiciable if it is not “ripe” for review. See State Center, 438 Md. at 591. A claim for 
declaratory relief “lacks ripeness if it involves a request that the court declare the rights of 
parties upon a state of facts which has not yet arisen, or upon a matter which is future, 
contingent and uncertain.” Id. The purpose of the declaratory judgment act is not to “decide 
theoretical questions or questions that may never arise, or questions which have become 
moot, or merely abstract questions…. To address issues which are non-justiciable because 
they are not ripe would place courts in the position of rendering purely advisory opinions, 
a long forbidden practice in this State.” Hickory Point P’ship v. Anne Arundel Cty., 316 
Md. 118, 129-30 (1989); see also State v. G & C Gulf, Inc., 442 Md. 716, 718-19 (2015). 
In its motion for summary judgment and before the Court of Special Appeals, the 
City argued that, because neither Pizza di Joey nor Madame BBQ has been prosecuted or 
cited (or threatened with such prosecution or citation) for violating the 300-foot rule, the 
Food Trucks’ challenge to the Rule only “exists in the abstract” and therefore is not ripe. 
Thus, the City argued, the circuit court should have dismissed this case. 
25 
 
The Court of Special Appeals recognized that neither Pizza di Joey nor Madame 
BBQ faced imminent prosecution when they filed their action for a declaration that the 
300-foot rule is unconstitutional. However, the Court of Special Appeals observed: 
[I]f the Food Trucks’ only opportunity to challenge the 300-foot rule’s 
constitutionality arises when they are issued a citation, that opportunity is 
unlikely ever to arise because the City and its enforcement agencies do not 
enforce the 300-foot rule by pursuing any of the penal consequences 
authorized by the Baltimore City Code. Violations of the 300-foot rule are 
misdemeanors, but the rule doesn’t operate like a typical penal statute. 
 
…. 
 
Although designated a misdemeanor, the 300-foot rule is, in substance and 
application, a local economic regulation. The primary injury the Food Trucks 
allege is not the possibility of prosecution, … but the loss of their right to 
pursue a business opportunity in their chosen profession, an interest that 
qualifies readily as a basis for a declaratory judgment. 
 
Pizza di Joey, 242 Md. App. at 162; see also Oyarzo v. Maryland Dep’t of Health & Mental 
Hygiene, 187 Md. App. 264, 275 (2009) (“[T]he right [the plaintiff] seeks to protect is the 
right to pursue a business opportunity. He asserts that the challenged regulation restricts 
his right to pursue his chosen profession…. This is not a case in which the event triggering 
the controversy is remote and contingent. There is no need for [the plaintiff] to violate the 
challenged regulation in order for us to consider whether it was within the scope of the 
Department’s authority to adopt [the regulation].”).  
The intermediate appellate court further explained that the Food Trucks are 
“indisputably limited in their business” because the 300-foot rule “restricts where they can 
sell and affects their potential profitability.” Pizza di Joey, 241 Md. App. at 162-63. 
Rejecting the City’s description of the Food Trucks’ claims as purely abstract and 
26 
 
theoretical, the Court of Special Appeals observed that the controversy’s “contours are 
visible: the 300-foot rule requires mobile vendors to keep their distance from direct brick-
and-mortar competitors, in ways we can measure and draw on maps (as the parties have).” 
Id. at 163. Thus, the court held that the Food Trucks’ claims are “sufficiently ‘concrete and 
specific’ to generate a controversy that is ripe for review.” Id. (quoting Hatt, 297 Md. at 
46). We agree with the Court of Special Appeals’ analysis concerning ripeness in this case.8  
Implicitly recognizing the soundness of the Court of Special Appeals’ holding on 
ripeness, the City has shifted the focus of its justiciability argument in this Court. The City 
now contends that the Food Trucks have not made a sufficient showing that they have 
suffered a specific, quantifiable, negative financial impact as a result of the Rule, such that 
they may challenge its constitutionality. Indeed, the City observes that “business apparently 
has been quite good for Pizza di Joey,” given that, in 2019, Mr. Vanoni was able to open a 
brick-and-mortar location in the City’s newly renovated Cross Street Market in Federal 
Hill.9 
 
8 Contrary to the Dissent’s concern, we continue to require that courts decide actual 
cases and controversies, not abstract or hypothetical cases. However, the mere presence of 
a criminal penalty for violations of the Ordinance does not render the Food Trucks’ 
substantive due process and equal protection claims abstract. The record reflects that the 
City actively enforces the 300-foot rule, but not by charging any mobile vendors under the 
Rule’s criminal penalty provision, or even by citing them civilly or seeking license 
suspension or revocation. Rather, the City enforces compliance with the Rule by asking 
mobile vendors to move after a nearby restaurant complains. The City may not insulate the 
300-foot rule from constitutional challenge by pointing to a criminal penalty that it chooses 
not to use, while simultaneously enforcing compliance with the Rule through other means. 
 
9 The record does not tell us how the Madame BBQ food truck fared in Howard 
County while Ms. McGowan operated it there. 
27 
 
The City’s current argument is less about ripeness and more about the standing of 
these particular plaintiffs to seek relief. While the doctrines of standing and ripeness both 
“fall under the umbrella of justiciability,” G & C Gulf, 442 Md. at 696 n.2 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted), they are distinct. See id.; State Center, 438 Md. at 
498. Standing “refers to whether the plaintiff has shown that he or she is entitled to invoke 
the judicial process in a particular instance,” id. at 502 (cleaned up); whereas a question of 
ripeness “arises if parties, entitled to invoke the judicial process, ask the court to declare 
their rights upon a state of facts which has not yet arisen, or upon a matter which is future, 
contingent and uncertain.” G & C Gulf, 442 Md. at 696 n.2 (cleaned up). The requirement 
of standing “is designed to ensure that a party seeking relief has a sufficiently cognizable 
stake in the outcome so as to present a court with a dispute that is capable of judicial 
resolution.” Kendall v. Howard Cty., 431 Md. 590, 603 (2013) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted). “Under Maryland common law, standing to bring a judicial action 
generally depends on whether one is aggrieved, which means whether a plaintiff has an 
interest such that he or she is personally and specifically affected in a way different from 
the public generally.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Evans v. State, 396 Md. 256, 328 (2006) 
(“[A]n individual or an organization has no standing in court unless he has also suffered 
some kind of special damage from such wrong differing in character and kind from that 
suffered by the general public.”) (cleaned up); Davis v. State, 183 Md. 385, 389 (1944) 
(allowing pre-enforcement declaratory judgment challenge to Maryland statute prohibiting 
medical doctors from advertising their services, where plaintiff doctor was “directly 
affected” by the statute; doctor was “entitled to apply for a declaratory judgment … rather 
28 
 
than run the risk of being subjected to criminal prosecution, and possibly having his license 
revoked”); cf. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures 
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973) (explaining that the purpose of the analogous 
federal law standing requirement of “injury-in-fact” is “to distinguish a person with a direct 
stake in the outcome of a litigation – even though small – from a person with a mere interest 
in the problem”). 
We disagree with the City’s contention that the Food Trucks lack standing to 
challenge the 300-foot rule. The Food Trucks sufficiently established that they are 
aggrieved by the 300-foot rule. Unlike members of the general public, who might be 
disappointed that the 300-foot rule results in their having fewer food options in Federal 
Hill, Hampden, and other City neighborhoods, the Food Trucks are personally and 
specifically affected by the Rule in a way that the general public is not. The Food Trucks 
both applied for and received mobile vendor licenses. Thus, they both paid fees for the 
privilege to operate in the City. Mr. Vanoni and Ms. McGowan both testified without 
contradiction that, but for the 300-foot rule, they would have focused their mobile vending 
businesses in various specific commercial districts in the City, including Federal Hill and 
Hampden.10 In other words, the Food Trucks specifically altered their business plans as a 
result of the 300-foot rule. We are also satisfied by our review of the record that, but for 
the Rule, Pizza di Joey and Madame BBQ both would have received substantial revenues 
 
10 Notably, both Mr. Vanoni and Ms. McGowan operate other food-related ventures 
in Baltimore City. As discussed above, Mr. Vanoni now operates a brick-and-mortar Pizza 
di Joey restaurant in Federal Hill. And Ms. McGowan owns a commissary in Locust Point. 
29 
 
from operating in Hampden and Federal Hill. In addition, we can infer from the record that 
Mr. Vanoni, a resident of the City, incurred greater fuel expenses by driving to and from 
Anne Arundel County to operate his truck than he would have if he had been able to operate 
his truck closer to home in the Federal Hill or Hampden neighborhoods of the City. Given 
these concrete and particularized effects of the 300-foot rule on the Food Trucks, we 
conclude that the Food Trucks have standing to challenge the Rule’s constitutionality.11  
In sum, we are satisfied that the Food Trucks have stated justiciable substantive due 
process and equal protection claims. Thus, we will consider those claims on their merits. 
B. The 300-foot Rule Does Not Violate the Food Trucks’ Rights to Substantive 
Due Process and Equal Protection Under Article 24. 
 
The Food Trucks argue that the Court of Special Appeals erred in applying rational 
basis review to their substantive due process and equal protection claims under Article 24. 
According to the Food Trucks, the proper test when determining the constitutionality of 
 
11 As the City points out, in some cases in which this Court has found that plaintiffs 
had standing to bring pre-enforcement challenges of statutes covering their conduct, those 
plaintiffs alleged, or it was undisputed, that their compliance with the statutes had reduced 
their income significantly. See Bruce v. Director, Dep’t of Chesapeake Bay Affairs, 261 
Md. 585, 588, 591, 595 (1971) (undisputed that territorial restrictions on crabbing and 
oystering had a severe economic impact on plaintiff watermen); Davis, 183 Md. at 387-89 
(doctor alleged that, after he complied with statute prohibiting advertising, his revenues 
fell more than 50 percent from previous years when he did advertise). But causing a loss 
of net income is not the only way that an economic regulation can concretely affect a 
business to its detriment. A regulation can, as here, cause a business to change its business 
plan out of fear that compliance may result in prosecution or the loss of a license. Moreover, 
loss of net income is not the only financial harm that can satisfy the requirement of 
standing. If, as here, a business alleges the loss of a particular source of revenue as a result 
of an economic regulation, the fact that the business may be able to partially or even 
completely replace that revenue by operating in a different jurisdiction is immaterial to the 
standing analysis. 
30 
 
legislation that burdens a person’s ability to practice a lawful trade is heightened rational 
basis review. The Food Trucks contend that, if we apply that more rigorous test to the 300-
foot rule, we must find that it violates their rights to substantive due process and equal 
protection under Article 24. Alternatively, the Food Trucks argue that the 300-foot rule is 
unconstitutional even under the more deferential rational basis test.  
The City asserts that we should review the 300-foot rule under the more deferential 
rational basis standard, and that the Court of Special Appeals correctly held that the Rule 
passes constitutional muster under that test. The City alternatively argues that, if we apply 
heightened rational basis review (as did the circuit court), the result remains that the 300-
foot rule does not violate the Food Trucks’ rights to substantive due process and equal 
protection under Article 24. We agree with the City in all respects. 
1. Rational Basis Review Is Appropriate for This Case. 
 
Article 24 provides “[t]hat no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of 
his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or 
deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of 
the Land.” This provision of the Declaration of Rights guarantees due process and equal 
protection of the laws to the people of Maryland.12 
 
When a statute creates a distinction based upon “clearly suspect” criteria (such as 
race, gender, religion, or national origin), or when it infringes on a “fundamental” right, 
 
12 Although Article 24 is titled “Due process” and does not expressly address equal 
protection of the laws, it is well settled that “the concept of equal protection nevertheless 
is embodied in the Article.” Renko v. McLean, 346 Md. 464, 482 (1997); see also Dan 
Friedman, The Maryland State Constitution 59-60 (2011). 
31 
 
we apply strict scrutiny when considering a substantive due process or equal protection 
challenge to it. See, e.g., Powell v. Maryland Dep’t of Health, 455 Md. 520, 548 (2017); 
State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 315 Md. 254, 296 (1989); Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 
342, 356 (1992). We will invalidate a statute that is subject to strict scrutiny unless it “is 
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.” Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 
219, 272-73 (2007), abrogated on other grounds by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(2015). Because such statutes must be the least restrictive means available to accomplish 
the compelling governmental interest, they “rarely survive the legal glare.” Id. at 273.  
 
On the other end of the spectrum are statutes that do not discriminate on the basis 
of an inherently suspect classification and do not burden any fundamental constitutional 
right. We assess whether such a statute is “rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
interest.” Id. at 274 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Rational basis review 
is “the least exacting and most deferential standard of constitutional review.” Id. at 273-
74. Under this standard, we presume that the challenged statute is constitutional, and will 
uphold it “unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the 
achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that [we] can only conclude that 
the [State’s] actions were irrational.” Murphy, 325 Md. at 355 (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted). Put another way, we will uphold a statute under this form of review 
if there is “any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for 
the classification.” Washington v. State, 450 Md. 319, 344 (2016) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  
32 
 
 
Between these poles are statutes that burden “important personal rights, not yet held 
to merit strict scrutiny but deserving of more protection than a perfunctory review would 
accord.” Murphy, 325 Md. at 382 (quoting Attorney Gen. of Md. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 
713 (1981)). Our prior cases suggest that these statutes in the middle can, themselves, be 
divided into two groups that receive different levels of review. First, when a statute makes 
a distinction based on a “quasi-suspect” classification, such as illegitimacy, a court reviews 
the statute under what the Supreme Court and this Court have referred to as “intermediate 
scrutiny.” See Conaway, 401 Md. at 275-76. To withstand this level of review, a statute 
must “serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the 
achievement of those objectives.” Id. at 276 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  
Second, an economic regulation that prohibits an individual from practicing his or 
her chosen trade, or that, on its face, discriminates based on a factor that is unrelated to the 
stated purpose of the regulation, is reviewed under a “heightened rational basis” test. See 
Waldron, 289 Md. at 728; Verzi v. Baltimore County, 333 Md. 411, 419 (1994). When such 
an economic regulation is reviewed under Article 24, courts will not accept “any 
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis” for the challenged 
legislation, Washington, 450 Md. at 344, but rather will consider only “those purposes that 
are obvious from the text or legislative history of the enactment, those plausibly identified 
by the litigants, or those provided by some other authoritative source.” Waldron, 289 Md. 
at 722. To survive heightened rational basis review, the statute in question must bear “a 
real and substantial relation to the problem addressed by the statute.” Id. at 728.  
33 
 
 
As the Court of Special Appeals explained, see Pizza di Joey, 241 Md. App. at 168, 
the “real and substantial relation” language also appeared in some of this Court’s decisions 
in the early years of the twentieth century concerning substantive due process. During this 
period, sometimes referred to as the “Lochner era,” after Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 
45 (1905), the Supreme Court invalidated a number of federal and state statutes that sought 
to regulate economic conditions. The Supreme Court was skeptical during that era of 
legislative enactments that interfered with the right to contract. So was this Court, which 
stated that “[t]he legislative authority to abridge [freedom of contract] can be justified only 
by exceptional circumstances. The guarantee of due process simply demands that the law 
shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a 
real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.” Daniel Loughran Co. v. 
Lord Baltimore Candy & Tobacco Co., 178 Md. 38, 44 (1940) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted). As the Court of Special Appeals observed, Pizza di Joey, 241 Md. 
App. at 170-71, we abandoned this line of “real and substantial relation” cases in 1977, 
when we decided Governor of Md. v. Exxon, 279 Md. 410 (1977), and applied the more 
deferential form of rational basis review to an economic regulation. In that case, we 
explained that we had  
returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute 
their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who 
are elected to pass laws…. Legislative bodies have broad scope to 
experiment with economic problems…. We refuse to sit as a superlegislature 
to weigh the wisdom of legislation…. [I]t is enough that there is an evil at 
hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative 
measure was a rational way to correct it.  
 
Id. at 425-26 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
34 
 
We disagree with the Food Trucks’ contention that Exxon is a “constitutional 
outlier.” We reaffirm that, under Article 24, an economic regulation that does not affect an 
important personal right at all is reviewed under the rational basis test. In contrast, a statute 
that entirely prohibits a person from practicing a trade receives heightened rational basis 
scrutiny under the “real and substantial relation” test. A statute that places some constraints 
on the time and place where a person can practice a trade, but does not entirely prevent the 
person from pursuing that trade (and does not discriminate based on geography or another 
suspect classification that suggests the proffered legitimate governmental interest is 
pretextual), is reviewed under the rational basis test.13    
The parties disagree about whether the 300-foot rule is properly reviewed under the 
rational basis test or under the heightened rational basis test. Although it is a close question, 
we conclude that the appropriate level of scrutiny here is review under the rational basis 
test. 
 
13 We are unpersuaded by the Food Trucks’ attempt to read Article 24’s “Law of the 
land” language as compelling heightened rational basis scrutiny for every alleged 
substantive due process violation involving the practice of a trade or business. In this 
regard, the Food Trucks distinguish Article 24 from the due process clauses of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, which do not contain references to 
the “Law of the land.” But, as we have previously recognized, “[t]he term ‘Law of the 
land,’ derived from the Magna Carta, is generally considered to be synonymous with the 
term ‘due process of the law’ as used in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Sapero, 
398 Md. at 344. To the extent our jurisprudence is in keeping with that of the federal courts 
and has diverged from that of a few states which seemingly still adhere to decisions from 
the Lochner era, see, e.g., Ladd v. Real Estate Comm’n, 230 A.3d 1096, 2020 WL 2532285 
(Pa. May 19, 2020); see also id. at *15-*16 (Wecht, J., dissenting) (criticizing Ladd 
Majority for hewing to Lochner, which “jumpstarted an era of judicial overreach”), we 
reaffirm our belief that rational basis review furthers the democratic process by 
appropriately requiring judicial restraint when reviewing most economic regulations. 
35 
 
The Food Trucks argue that we must subject the 300-foot rule to heightened rational 
basis review, citing Waldron and Verzi. But the legislative enactments at issue in those 
cases differed significantly from the 300-foot rule.  
In Waldron, the Attorney General sought a declaration upholding the 
constitutionality of a statute that prohibited retired judges from practicing law for profit if 
they accepted State-provided pensions. See Waldron, 289 Md. at 686-87. Because the 
statute was not “an economic regulation of lawyers,” but rather “flatly denie[d] [a retired 
judge] the right to engage in the practice of the profession for which he [or she was] 
otherwise qualified,” id. at 717, this Court applied heightened rational basis review. See id.  
Here, the 300-foot rule does not effectively deny Pizza di Joey, Madame BBQ, and 
other City-licensed mobile vendors from pursuing their chosen vocation. Rather, it 
regulates the places where they may do so within the City. It is undisputed that the 
Ordinance provides other locations in the City where mobile vendors may operate. And, if 
mobile vendors are not satisfied with those locations and the other locations where they are 
permitted to park in the City, they may pursue their chosen vocation across the City line, 
as Pizza di Joey and Madame BBQ did. The statute at issue in Waldron provided retired 
judges with no such opportunity; it was a blanket prohibition on their ability to practice 
law in the State for profit.   
In Verzi, this Court invalidated a Baltimore County regulation that required a 
licensed towing operator to have a place of business within the county before police could 
call the operator to tow a vehicle that had been disabled by an accident. 333 Md. at 413. 
We explained that, when we assess the constitutionality of a “legislative classification[] 
36 
 
which impinge[s] on privileges cherished by our citizens, … [we] require[] that [such] a 
legislative classification rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial 
relation to the object of the legislation.” Id. at 419 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). But the factor that animated the level of scrutiny we chose to apply to Baltimore 
County’s towing regulation was not that it affected a business at all, but rather that it did 
so based on a geographical distinction. See id. at 423 (observing that the Court “has been 
particularly distrustful of classifications which are based solely on geography, i.e., treating 
residents of one county or city differently from residents of the remainder of the State”). 
That is because the distinction based on geography, on its face, gave rise to concern that 
the intent of the regulation was to discriminate between in-county and out-of-county 
businesses, rather than regulate how towing companies operated. See id. at 427.  
Here, there is no similar geographical classification at work in the City’s 300-foot 
rule. As the Court of Special Appeals aptly observed, Verzi would be analogous to this case 
if the City conditioned mobile vendor licenses on City residence. Pizza di Joey, 241 Md. 
App. at 174. But it does not. Rather, the 300-foot rule “regulates the places all City-licensed 
mobile vendors can operate in Baltimore City, wherever those food trucks are parked at 
idle.” Id.  
We conclude from our examination of Waldron and Verzi that the 300-foot rule is 
properly reviewed under the more deferential rational basis standard. Contrary to the Food 
Trucks’ contention, these cases do not stand for the proposition that Article 24 requires 
heightened rational basis scrutiny for all statutes that impose any kind of regulation on a 
business. The regulation must either effectively deny a class of business operators the 
37 
 
ability to practice their trade entirely, or it must discriminate against a class of business 
operators based on a factor (such as geography) that has nothing to do with the nature of 
the business, in order to trigger heightened rational basis scrutiny. The 300-foot rule does 
neither. Accordingly, we apply rational basis review to the 300-foot rule. 
2. The 300-foot Rule Is Rationally Related to a Legitimate Government Interest. 
As explained above, the rational basis test requires us to consider whether the 300-
foot rule is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Conaway, 401 Md. at 
274. We agree with the Court of Special Appeals that “the 300-foot rule rationally furthers 
the City’s legitimate interest in addressing the free-rider problem that arises when mobile 
vendors set up within a block of direct brick-and-mortar competitors.” Pizza di Joey, 241 
Md. App. at 176. 
When we review a legislative enactment under the rational basis test, we do not 
substitute our judgment for that of the legislative body. See, e.g., Exxon, 279 Md. at 425-
26; Tyler v. City of College Park, 415 Md. 475, 500-01 (2010); Salisbury Beauty Schools 
v. State Bd. of Cosmetologists, 268 Md. 32, 48 (1973). Rather, we recognize that the 
“Legislature exercises a large discretion in determining what the public welfare requires, 
in what may be injurious to the general welfare of the public and also what measures are 
either necessary or appropriate for the protection and promotion of these interests.” Id. This 
is particularly the case when the legislative body is “dealing with a serious problem in a 
new and untried fashion”; in such cases, “courts are under a special duty to respect the 
legislative judgment as to the proper means of solving the problem.” Exxon, 279 Md. at 
428; see also Tyler, 415 Md. at 500 (noting that “courts are under a special duty to respect 
38 
 
the legislative judgment where the legislature is attempting to solve a serious problem in a 
manner which has not had an opportunity to prove its worth”). 
For these reasons, legislative decisions like the 300-foot rule carry a strong 
presumption of constitutionality, “despite the fact that, in practice, [its] laws result in some 
inequality.” Supermarkets Gen. Corp. v. State, 286 Md. 611, 617 (1979) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). Therefore, we will not invalidate the 300-foot rule unless the 
City misused or abused its legislative authority, or acted arbitrarily, oppressively or 
unreasonably in enacting the Rule. See Salisbury Beauty Schools, 268 Md. at 48-49. 
The Food Trucks argue that the City misused and abused its legislative authority by 
infringing on the practice of their trade in order to enrich existing brick-and-mortar 
restaurants. According to the Food Trucks, the City’s protectionist goals in enacting the 
300-foot rule, by definition, do not constitute a legitimate government interest. We 
disagree.  
The City established at trial that protecting brick-and-mortar restaurants through the 
300-foot rule is not an end in itself, but rather is a means to an end: maintaining vibrant 
commercial districts. The creation and retention of vibrant commercial neighborhoods 
surely is a legitimate interest that the City may seek to achieve through the enactment of 
ordinances. That the means it has chosen to do so in this instance reduces the competition 
brick-and-mortar restaurants face from mobile vendors does not render the 300-foot rule 
unconstitutional. To the contrary, our cases demonstrate that, in furtherance of the general 
welfare, legislative bodies may limit competition as long they do not impermissibly 
discriminate based on a suspect classification or otherwise make arbitrary and capricious 
39 
 
distinctions that do not further the general welfare of the community. See Salisbury Beauty 
Schools, 268 Md. at 56 (“That [a] statute may undertake indirectly to control prices and 
affect competition does not per se render it invidious or unconstitutional; such a form of 
regulation is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant 
to the policy the Legislature is free to adopt.”); see also Blum v. Engelman, 190 Md. 109, 
115 (1948) (lawmakers are “free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be 
deemed to promote public welfare, whether by promoting free competition by statutes 
aimed at monopolies or by curbing harmful competition by fixing minimum prices”).  
The Food Trucks’ reliance on Verzi in this regard again is misplaced. In that case, 
the Court discerned that the proffered justifications for the County regulation – such as 
decreasing traffic congestion and delays in the roadways – were pretextual. 333 Md. at 
425-27. In reality, we concluded, the regulation sought to discriminate against non-
Baltimore County towing companies to the benefit of in-county towing companies. Id. at 
427. Here, based on Mr. Basu’s testimony, the circuit court found that the City’s goal in 
enacting the 300-foot rule is to promote the general welfare by ensuring the vibrancy of 
the City’s commercial districts. The Food Trucks point to no evidence in the record that 
contradicts this finding, and the circuit court did not clearly err in reaching this conclusion. 
Nor do the Food Trucks seriously dispute that the 300-foot rule rationally furthers 
this legislative goal. The circuit court found that the Rule helps maintain the vitality of the 
City’s commercial districts by eliminating the threat that mobile vendors pose to brick-
and-mortar restaurants and, therefore, helping to ensure that restaurants become permanent 
fixtures in their neighborhoods. This, in turn, “provides jobs, property tax revenue, and 
40 
 
prevents a growing number of vacant properties.” The court also determined that the 300-
foot rule “protects the contributions brick-and-mortar establishments make to the City’s 
commercial districts,” “promotes entrepreneurial investments and opportunity,” and 
“diversifies the marketplace to maximize positive economic effect by creating meaningful 
choices for the consumer.” The Food Trucks do not challenge these factual findings, and 
even if they did, such a challenge would fail. The circuit court’s findings are amply 
supported by Mr. Basu’s testimony. 
As noted at the outset, local governments routinely must balance competing 
interests to promote the general welfare. This requires that cities such as Baltimore 
sometimes make difficult choices that help some businesses and hurt others. While the 
Food Trucks discern no cost to the City in allowing the free market to decide, without any 
interference, how mobile vendors would affect nearby restaurants, the City’s lawmakers 
reasonably could have seen it otherwise. They reasonably could have concluded that, just 
as a “free lunch” often turns out not actually to be free,14 there would be a cost to the 
 
14 The adage “there ain’t no such thing as a free lunch” has been traced back to the 
Depression era, but the concept’s roots apparently lie in the practice of nineteenth-century 
saloons to provide a “free lunch” to customers who purchased alcoholic beverages. See 
Alexandra Twin, There Ain’t No Such Thing As a Free Lunch (TANSTAAFL), available at 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tanstaafl.asp (accessed on July 13, 2020), archived 
at https://perma.cc/L3GE-CLWM. The idea was that the high salt content in the food would 
cause the customers to purchase more drinks, thereby offsetting the cost of the food to the 
saloon. Id. In economics, TANSTAAFL describes the concept of opportunity cost, which 
recognizes that “for every choice made, there is an alternative not chosen.” Id. In other 
words, “[d]ecision-making requires trade-offs and assumes that there are no real free 
offerings in society.” Id.; see also N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics 4 (8th ed. 
2015) (“To get something that we like, we usually have to give up something else that we 
also like.”). Or, as Robert Heinlein had a character explain in his 1966 classic science 
fiction novel, TANSTAAFL means that “anything free costs twice as much in [the] long 
41 
 
purported “free lunch” of unregulated competition that the Food Trucks offer here: mobile 
vendors would siphon business from brick-and-mortar restaurants and harm the economic 
vitality and, ultimately, the general welfare of the City. It was within the City’s authority 
to enact an economic regulation designed to address the “free rider” problem Mr. Basu 
described. And the City did so in the context of a robust regulatory regime that also allows 
mobile vendors to operate in specific dedicated zones, as well as in other locations that are 
not within 300 feet of directly competing brick-and-mortar restaurants. While the Food 
Trucks claim this balancing of interests infringes on their rights to substantive due process 
and equal protection, we see it simply as democracy in action.  
Our conclusion is in keeping with the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in 
LMP Services, Inc. v. City of Chicago, __ N.E.3d __, 2019 IL 123123, ¶ 20 (Ill. May 23, 
2019), upholding Chicago’s analogous ordinance that prohibits food trucks from parking 
within 200 feet of the entrance of a ground-floor restaurant. The LMP Court held: 
[Chicago] has a legitimate governmental interest in encouraging the long-
term stability and economic growth of its neighborhoods. The 200-foot rule, 
which helps promote brick-and-mortar restaurants and, thus, neighborhood 
stability, is rationally related to this legitimate interest. Importantly, too, in 
2012, when the City passed Ordinance 2012-4489, section 7-38-117 was 
added to the Code. This section created a number of food truck stands, i.e., 
designated areas along the public way where food trucks are permitted to 
park without being subject to the 200-foot rule. Thus, the City has not entirely 
banned food trucks. Rather, it has created a regulatory scheme that attempts 
to balance the interests of food trucks with the need to promote neighborhood 
stability that is furthered by brick-and-mortar restaurants.  
 
Id. So too here. 
 
 
run or turns out worthless.” Robert A. Heinlein, The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress 162 (Tom 
Doherty Associates 1997 ed.). 
42 
 
In sum, the 300-foot rule’s restriction on the locations where the Food Trucks may 
operate are not arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable. To the contrary, the Rule directly 
furthers the City’s conception of what is necessary for its general welfare.    
As was the case with the Court of Special Appeals, “[w]e offer no views on the 
wisdom or the economic efficacy of the 300-foot rule. Our role is not to screen for bad 
policy, but for unconstitutional legislation.” Pizza di Joey, 241 Md. App. at 178.15 Because 
the 300-foot rule is rationally related to the City’s legitimate interest in maintaining the 
vibrancy of its commercial districts, the Rule passes muster under the substantive due 
process and equal protection components of Article 24. 
3. The 300-foot Rule Also Survives Heightened Rational Basis Review. 
 
Even if we assume that the right to operate as a mobile vendor without any 
restriction based on the location of competing brick-and-mortar restaurants is an important 
personal right that warrants heightened rational basis review, we conclude that the 300-
foot rule is constitutional under that standard as well. For the same reasons as discussed 
above, we conclude that the reason proffered by the City for the Rule – the need to address 
 
15 At oral argument, the Food Trucks several times referred to the amicus curiae 
brief filed by three economics professors in arguing that Mr. Basu’s free rider analysis is 
flawed. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Economics Professors in Support of Petitioners 11-16 
(arguing, among other things, that food trucks respond to demand, not to restaurants, and 
that they create new customers, rather than siphon existing customers from brick-and-
mortar establishments). But the amicus professors did not testify at the trial in this case. 
The only expert testimony the circuit court had to consider was Mr. Basu’s. Moreover, the 
professors’ analysis is better directed to the City in its legislative capacity than to us. It is 
for the City to decide whether its current balance of interests furthers its legitimate interests 
in the best way possible. The City is free to change course and repeal or amend the 300-
foot rule if it concludes that the Rule is not producing the benefits the City expected, or if 
the City perceives that the Rule’s costs outweigh the benefits it provides. 
43 
 
the free rider problem posed by mobile vendors – bears a “real and substantial relation” to 
the legitimate interest the City has in ensuring the vibrancy of its commercial districts and, 
thereby, promoting the general welfare.  
C. The 300-foot Rule Is Not Impermissibly Vague. 
 
Although the Food Trucks expressly told the circuit court that they had not made a 
void-for-vagueness claim, the court concluded on its own initiative that the 300-foot rule 
is impermissibly vague and therefore enjoined the City from enforcing it. The court 
reasoned that the phrases “primarily engaged in” and “same type” (of food product), which 
are not defined in the Ordinance, deprive mobile vendors of fair notice of the Rule’s scope 
and how the City would enforce it.16 The Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that 
the Food Trucks had not preserved a vagueness challenge for appellate review. 
Alternatively, the intermediate appellate court held that the Food Trucks could not assert 
either an as-applied or facial vagueness claim, but even if they could bring either such 
claim, the 300-foot rule is not impermissibly vague.  
The Food Trucks affirmatively waived a void-for-vagueness challenge in the circuit 
court. We therefore hold the circuit court erred when it raised a vagueness challenge to the 
300-foot rule on its own initiative, determined that the Rule is void for vagueness, and 
 
16 As discussed above, the circuit court construed the Rule’s 300-foot distance to be 
measured “from the closest point of the space in the building that is occupied by the 
restaurant – or by the food court in which the restaurant is located (rather than at the closest 
point of the building in which the restaurant is located) to the closest point of the food 
truck.” Neither side challenged this construction of the Rule in the Court of Special 
Appeals, nor has any party asked us to review it. Thus, the circuit court’s measurement 
construction is not before us.   
44 
 
enjoined the City from enforcing the Rule on that basis. Reviewing the merits of the circuit 
court’s grant of injunctive relief, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals that the 300-
foot rule is not impermissibly vague on its face. 
1. The Circuit Court Erred by Raising and Deciding a Vagueness Challenge to the 
300-foot Rule on Its Own Initiative. 
 
The City contends that we should not address the merits of the Food Trucks’ 
vagueness argument on appeal because the Food Trucks waived a vagueness claim in the 
circuit court. The record indeed reflects that the Food Trucks affirmatively waived a void-
for-vagueness challenge to the 300-foot rule when, during the summary judgment hearing 
and again during closing arguments, they expressly stated that they had not made a 
vagueness claim.  
It was error for the circuit court to invalidate the 300-foot rule based on a claim that 
the Food Trucks affirmatively waived. Just as a trial court generally lacks authority sua 
sponte to assert an affirmative defense on behalf of a party that has affirmatively waived 
it, see, e.g., Kapar v. Kuwait Airways Corp., 845 F.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(reversing sua sponte dismissal of case for lack of personal jurisdiction, where defendant 
had voluntarily withdrawn its motion for dismissal on that ground), a trial court should not, 
on its own initiative, decide a claim for relief that a party has not raised, let alone 
affirmatively waived. See Commonwealth v. Morales, 622 Pa. 352, 355-56 (2013) (holding 
that trial court erred when it sua sponte struck down Pennsylvania’s Drug-Free School 
Zones as unconstitutional after criminal defendant had waived a potential claim on that 
ground); cf. Steiner v. Markel, 600 Pa. 515, 522 (2009) (issue whether Complaint contained 
45 
 
a claim for breach of contract was waived, and intermediate appellate court therefore 
should not have raised it sua sponte). This is especially the case where the trial court, on 
its own initiative, determines that a statute is unconstitutional based on a claim that a party 
in the case has affirmatively waived.  
Because the circuit court ruled on its own initiative that the 300-foot rule is void for 
vagueness, we may reach the merits of this question. See Md. Rule 8-131(a) (providing 
that, except as to jurisdictional questions, “[o]rdinarily, the appellate court will 
not decide [an] issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in 
or decided by the trial court”) (emphasis added). However, where, as here, a party 
affirmatively waived relief based on a claim that the trial court subsequently adopted on its 
own initiative, we also have discretion not to consider the party’s appellate defense of the 
trial court’s sua sponte ruling. That is, the decision by a trial court to raise and adopt a 
claim (or an affirmative defense) in favor of a party sua sponte, despite the waiver of that 
claim or defense by the party, does not compel an appellate court to ignore the party’s 
waiver. Our adversarial system of justice relies on the parties themselves to decide which 
claims and defenses they wish to raise. When a trial court on its own initiative ignores a 
party’s affirmative waiver, the court puts its thumb on the scale in a way that, ordinarily, 
is improper. Thus, we have discretion to give effect to the Food Trucks’ affirmative waiver 
of a void-for-vagueness claim and not review the circuit court’s sua sponte vagueness 
ruling. However, because the question of the 300-foot rule’s vagueness is one of substantial 
importance, and because the Court of Special Appeals chose to decide that question, we 
will also reach the merits of the circuit court’s vagueness ruling. 
46 
 
 
2. The 300-foot Rule Is Not Void for Vagueness. 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine “is rooted in the fourteenth amendment’s 
guarantee of procedural due process.” Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 611 n.7 (2001) 
(quoting Williams v. State, 329 Md. 1, 8 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see 
also Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 459 (1990) (discussing how vagueness standards are 
“based on fourteenth amendment due process or fairness concerns”). “A law is not vague 
simply because it requires conformity to an imprecise normative standard.” Id. Because 
“[t]he root of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea of fairness,” the “touchstone” of a 
vagueness analysis is “whether persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at 
[the law’s] meaning and differ as to its application.” Id. (cleaned up). This applies to both 
those who are subject to the statute and those who are charged with its enforcement. Thus, 
a statute must be “sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct 
on their part will render them liable to its penalties.” Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 120 
(1978) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This “fair notice principle … is 
grounded on the assumption that one should be free to choose between lawful and unlawful 
conduct.” Id. at 121. And we will find a statute void for vagueness “if it lacks fixed 
enforcement standards or guidelines and thus impermissibly delegates basic policy matters 
to police[], judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the 
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” Eanes, 318 Md. at 459 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
47 
 
A person who is aggrieved by a statute may challenge it as void for vagueness either 
as applied to that person or on its face. See Galloway, 365 Md. at 616-17 & n.12. When a 
person complains that a statute is impermissibly vague as applied, the court reviews the 
application to the “facts at hand.” Id. at 616. That is, the court considers whether the statute 
provided fair prior notice to the person that the specific conduct he or she committed 
violated the law. When a person asserts a facial vagueness challenge to a statute, the person 
“must establish that there is no set of circumstances under which the [statute] would be 
constitutional.” Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Seenath, 448 Md. 145, 181 (2016) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982) (challenger to statute must show that the 
law is “impermissibly vague in all of its applications”).  
a. A Facial Vagueness Challenge to the 300-foot Rule Is Permissible. 
The circuit court invalidated the 300-foot rule as vague on its face. On appeal, the 
Food Trucks defend this ruling.17 In response, the City first argues that a facial vagueness 
challenge to the 300-foot rule is improper because the Rule does not implicate the First 
Amendment or another fundamental right. In essence, the City contends that, if the Food 
 
17 At oral argument, the Food Trucks confirmed that they are not asking this Court 
to find the 300-foot rule vague, as applied. This concession is sensible, given that neither 
Pizza di Joey nor Madame BBQ has ever been cited for violating the 300-foot rule. Thus, 
there is no set of facts “at hand” against which we could assess whether the Food Trucks 
received sufficient prior notice that their conduct violated the Rule. In other words, a pre-
enforcement challenge to the 300-foot rule is, by definition, a facial challenge. See Act Now 
to Stop War and End Racism Coalition and Muslim Am. Soc’y Freedom Found. v. District 
of Columbia, 846 F.3d 391, 410 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (noting that a pre-enforcement vagueness 
challenge is “by its nature facial”). 
 
48 
 
Trucks had raised a pre-enforcement facial vagueness challenge to the 300-foot rule, the 
circuit court would have been foreclosed from considering its merits. We disagree with the 
City on this point.  
The City is correct that a person may assert a facial vagueness challenge if the 
challenged statute implicates the First Amendment or another fundamental right. See 
Seenath, 448 Md. at 181-83; Galloway, 365 Md. at 616 n.11. However, the City overlooks 
that this is not the only basis for proceeding on a pre-enforcement void-for-vagueness 
claim. Rather, “facial challenges are appropriate in two circumstances: (1) when a statute 
threatens to chill constitutionally protected conduct (particularly conduct protected by the 
First Amendment); or (2) when a plaintiff seeks pre-enforcement review of a statute 
because it is incapable of valid application.” Dias v. City & Cty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 
1179-80 (2009); see also Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494-95. Thus, this Court, 
the Supreme Court, and other state and federal courts have entertained pre-enforcement 
facial vagueness challenges where there was no “fundamental” right alleged to be at stake. 
See, e.g., Tidewater/Havre de Grace, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Havre de Grace, 337 
Md. 338, 350 (1995) (deciding pre-enforcement facial vagueness claim as part of 
declaratory judgment action filed by marinas challenging Havre de Grace’s ordinance 
requiring marinas to collect and remit docking and storage fees); Village of Hoffman 
Estates, 455 U.S. at 489, 497 (explaining that “[a] law that does not reach constitutionally 
protected conduct and therefore satisfies the overbreadth test may nevertheless be 
challenged on its face as unduly vague, in violation of due process” and reaching merits of 
pre-enforcement facial vagueness challenge to town ordinance that required a business to 
49 
 
obtain a license to sell any items that were “designed or marketed for use with illegal 
cannabis or drugs”); Lexington Fayette Cty. Food & Beverage Ass’n v. Lexington-Fayette 
Urban Cty. Gov’t, 131 S.W.3d 745, 756 (Ky. 2004) (considering pre-enforcement 
vagueness challenge and invalidating a portion of local government’s anti-smoking law as 
void for vagueness).   
The Food Trucks’ defense of the circuit court’s vagueness ruling implicates the 
second of the two scenarios for a facial vagueness challenge, i.e., when a plaintiff 
seeks pre-enforcement review of a statute because it is incapable of valid application.18 
Indeed, the Food Trucks expressly argue that “[i]n no instance does a vendor receive fair 
 
18 In Seenath, we stated that the plaintiff (on judicial review of an adverse 
administrative ruling) could proceed on a facial vagueness challenge to the language of the 
Motor Vehicle Administration’s DR-15 Advice of Rights form, where the challenge 
implicated the continued possession of a driver’s license. Seenath, 448 Md. at 182-83. 
Although we observed that, “[t]ypically, a facial challenge in which a party contends that 
a statute is void-for-vagueness arises out of a right under the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution,” we found significant that other types of facial challenges “have arisen 
out of fundamental constitutional rights other than those that the First Amendment 
protects,” including the rights to substantive due process and equal protection under Article 
24. Id. at 182 (citing Tyler v. City of College Park, 415 Md. at 502, and Griffin v. 
Bierman, 403 Md. 186, 195-96 (2008) (where this Court considered “a facial challenge to 
the Maryland foreclosure notice scheme that arose out of the rights under the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 24 of 
the Maryland Declaration of Rights”) (internal quotation marks omitted)). We recognized 
that “the continued possession of a driver’s license may become essential to earning a 
livelihood,” thereby requiring due process before this “entitlement” may be taken away. 
Id. at 183 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For this reason, “[a]s did the 
parties who raised facial challenges that arose out of the right to due process in Tyler … 
and Griffin,” we stated that the plaintiff in Seenath could assert a facial vagueness challenge 
“that arises out of the right to due process.” Id. Because we conclude that a void-for-
vagueness challenge to the 300-foot rule is permissible under the second rationale for a 
facial vagueness challenge, we need not decide whether the Food Trucks have established 
that a vagueness challenge here also “arise[s] out of [a] fundamental constitutional right[].” 
Id. at 182. 
50 
 
notice of what the ban prohibits. And in every instance, officials enforce the ban based on 
their own subjective belief of what it prohibits.”  
A facial vagueness challenge is appropriate where, due to a lack of guiding 
standards, there is a high risk that authorities necessarily will enforce the law arbitrarily. 
See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983) (“Where the legislature fails to 
provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit a standardless sweep” that 
allows enforcement authorities “to pursue their personal predilections.”) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). Although we ultimately conclude that the 300-foot rule is not 
impermissibly vague, the acknowledgment by City officials that it enforces the Rule on a 
case-by-case basis, through the use of common sense, is sufficient to justify a pre-
enforcement facial vagueness challenge. This is especially appropriate because the City’s 
stated policy is to enforce the Rule, not by filing a criminal charge, issuing a civil citation, 
or suspending/revoking a mobile vendor’s license, but rather by asking mobile vendors to 
move when nearby restaurants complain. Indeed, as discussed above, no mobile vendor 
has had its license suspended or revoked, received a civil citation, or been charged 
criminally for allegedly violating the 300-foot rule. If we accepted the City’s argument that 
a facial vagueness challenge could not be brought in these circumstances, it appears that 
the alleged facial vagueness of the Rule would never be subject to challenge, at least so 
long as the City continued to enforce the Rule through means that do not permit an as-
applied vagueness challenge in the first instance. We decline to make the reviewability of 
the 300-foot rule’s alleged vagueness contingent on the City’s chosen means of 
enforcement. Thus, we will address the merits of the circuit court’s vagueness ruling. 
51 
 
b. The 300-foot Rule Is Not Impermissibly Vague. 
The City argues that the circuit court erred in finding the 300-foot rule void for 
vagueness because: (1) the Food Trucks have not shown that there is no set of 
circumstances under which the Rule is valid; and (2) even if the Food Trucks need not 
show that the Rule is vague in all its applications, it is not so broad as to be susceptible to 
irrational and selective patterns of enforcement. We agree. 
As stated above, in order to prevail on a facial vagueness claim, the person 
challenging the statute must show that there is no set of circumstances under which the 
statute would be constitutional. Seenath, 448 Md. at 181; Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 
U.S. at 494 (challenged statute will be upheld unless it is “impermissibly vague in all of its 
applications”). Although the Food Trucks contend that they meet this test, it is plain that 
they do not. Ms. McGowan herself testified that an “easy” scenario for application of the 
Rule would be if she parked her truck within 300 feet of Harbor Que, a brick-and-mortar 
barbecue restaurant. Similarly, it seems beyond dispute that Pizza di Joey would violate 
the Rule if Mr. Vanoni parked his truck within 300 feet of BOP or another brick-and-mortar 
pizzeria. Indeed, it is useful to recall that both Mr. Vanoni and Ms. McGowan walked 
through and surveyed specific neighborhoods in the City, and were able to identify so many 
specific competing restaurants in those neighborhoods that “triggered the 300-foot ban,” 
Brief for the Petitioners at 13, 15, that they became convinced the Rule effectively 
prevented them from operating in those neighborhoods entirely. 
The Food Trucks alternatively argue that the Supreme Court abandoned the no-set-
of-circumstances test with respect to facial vagueness challenges in Johnson v. United 
52 
 
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Johnson concerned a vagueness challenge to the “residual 
clause” of the federal Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which 
established a mandatory minimum sentence for offenders who have at least three prior 
convictions for a felony offense involving conduct “that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another.” To determine whether ACCA’s greater sentence applied to a 
particular defendant, a federal district court had to imagine an “ordinary” version of each 
of the defendant’s potential qualifying prior offenses and assess whether that “abstraction 
presents a serious risk of physical injury.” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557. Because the statute 
“tie[d] the judicial assessment of risk to a judicially imagined ‘ordinary case’ of a crime, 
not to real-world facts or statutory elements,” id., it was not surprising that the Supreme 
Court and the lower federal courts struggled for many years – and failed – to apply ACCA 
consistently. See id. at 2558-60. In the course of holding ACCA’s residual clause void for 
vagueness, the Court stated: 
[A]lthough statements in some of our opinions could be read to suggest 
otherwise, our holdings squarely contradict the theory that a vague provision 
is constitutional merely because there is some conduct that clearly falls 
within the provision’s grasp. For instance, we have deemed a law prohibiting 
grocers from charging an “unjust or unreasonable rate” void for vagueness – 
even though charging someone a thousand dollars for a pound of sugar would 
surely be unjust and unreasonable. We have similarly deemed void for 
vagueness a law prohibiting people on sidewalks from “conduct[ing] 
themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by” – even though 
spitting in someone's face would surely be annoying. These decisions refute 
any suggestion that the existence of some obviously risky crimes establishes 
the residual clause's constitutionality. 
 
Id. at 2561 (citations omitted). However, the Court went on also to observe: 
 
As a general matter, we do not doubt the constitutionality of laws that call 
for the application of a qualitative standard such as “substantial risk” to real-
53 
 
world conduct; “the law is full of instances where a man’s fate depends on 
his estimating rightly ... some matter of degree” ….  The residual clause, 
however, requires application of the “serious potential risk” standard to an 
idealized ordinary case of the crime. Because “the elements necessary to 
determine the imaginary ideal are uncertain both in nature and degree of 
effect,” this abstract inquiry offers significantly less predictability than one 
“[t]hat deals with the actual, not with an imaginary condition other than the 
facts.” 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 
We do not read Johnson as doing away with the no-set-of-circumstances test for all 
facial vagueness challenges. Rather, we agree with the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit that Johnson is best understood as an exception to the general no-set-
of-circumstances rule, rather than an abrogation of the rule. Copeland v. Vance, 893 F.3d 
101, 110-11 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2018) (reiterating the no-set-of-circumstances test, but noting 
that “in certain exceptional circumstances not present here, a criminal statute may be struck 
down as facially vague even where it has some valid applications”), cert. denied, 139 S. 
Ct. 2714 (2019). 
As noted above, in Seenath, a post-Johnson facial vagueness case, we reiterated the 
applicability of the no-set-of-circumstances test to facial vagueness challenges brought 
under Maryland law. Seenath, 448 Md. at 181. We discern no reason to deviate from that 
standard in a case like this one, which does not involve an abstract, judge-created 
conception of a crime as Johnson did, but rather concerns a statute that “call[s] for the 
application of a qualitative standard … to real-world conduct.” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2561. 
Because there are many instances in which it is clear both to mobile vendors and 
enforcement authorities whether or not the 300-foot rule applies to a particular food truck 
54 
 
parked within 300 feet of a particular restaurant, the Food Trucks cannot show that the 300-
foot rule is void for vagueness. 
Even if we were prepared to abandon the no-set-of-circumstances test for facial 
vagueness challenges in Maryland, we would hold that the 300-foot rule is not 
impermissibly vague. The words that make up the phrases the circuit court found vague – 
“primarily engaged in” and “same type” – are common and have generally accepted 
meanings. For example, “primarily” means “for the most part,” Merriam Webster Online 
Dictionary, available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/primarily (accessed 
on July 14, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/36Z8-XMCV, and “same” means 
“resembling in every relevant respect,” id., available at https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/same 
(accessed 
on 
July 
14, 
2020), 
archived 
at 
https://perma.cc/7TU4-3GEY. Just as Mr. Vanoni and Ms. McGowan were able to 
compare their trucks’ menus to the menus of various brick-and-mortar establishments and 
thereby determine the number of such restaurants that “triggered” the 300-foot rule, we 
believe enforcement authorities can make fair and reasoned judgments when applying the 
Rule. See Bowers, 283 Md. at 125 (a law “is not vague when the meaning of the words in 
controversy can be fairly ascertained by reference to judicial determinations, the common 
law, dictionaries, treatises or even the words themselves”). Indeed, when a University of 
Maryland police officer approached Mr. Vanoni with a complaint that the Pizza di Joey 
truck was parked too close to a nearby restaurant, Mr. Vanoni made his case to the officer 
as to why the brick-and-mortar establishment was not one that primarily engaged in selling 
the same type of food as Pizza di Joey. The result of that encounter was that, rather than 
55 
 
forcing Pizza di Joey to move or citing Mr. Vanoni for violating the 300-foot rule, the 
officer allowed Pizza di Joey to continue to vend from that location and even bought a slice 
of pizza himself. We believe this episode demonstrates that enforcement authorities are 
able to make practical judgments about the applicability of the 300-foot rule based on the 
particular facts of each situation. 
The fact that different enforcement authorities might come to different conclusions 
about a particular scenario does not trouble us. The Court of Special Appeals undoubtedly 
was correct that “[t]here may well be close questions about the scope of the 300-foot rule 
as food trucks grow and spread in Baltimore.” Pizza di Joey, 241 Md. App. at 181. 
Regardless, “City enforcement authorities are allowed to exercise reasonable discretion in 
applying the 300-foot rule.” Id. at 182; Bowers, 283 Md. at 122 (a criminal statute will not 
be found “void merely because it allows for the exercise of some discretion on the part of 
law enforcement and judicial officials. It is only where a statute is so broad as to be 
susceptible to irrational and selective patterns of enforcement” that it will be invalidated as 
impermissibly vague.). 
For these reasons, the 300-foot rule is not impermissibly vague on its face. If the 
City ever does cite a mobile vendor for violating the 300-foot rule, that vendor will be free 
to assert an as-applied vagueness challenge if the vendor believes the Rule did not provide 
fair notice. 
 
 
56 
 
IV 
Conclusion 
Nobody disputes that mobile vendors add value to Baltimore City. However, the 
City acted rationally when it balanced the competing interests of mobile vendors and brick-
and-mortar restaurants and enacted the 300-foot rule to further its legitimate interest in 
promoting the vibrancy of its commercial districts. It follows that the Rule does not deprive 
mobile vendors of their substantive due process and equal protection rights under Article 
24. The Food Trucks affirmatively waived a vagueness challenge to the 300-foot rule, and 
the circuit court erred in sua sponte enjoining the City from enforcing the Rule as 
impermissibly vague. In any event, the 300-foot rule is not void for vagueness. 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. 
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
COURT 
OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED; COSTS 
TO BE PAID BY PETITIONERS. 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 41 
 
                    September Term, 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   PIZZA DI JOEY, LLC AND  
    MADAME BBQ, LLC 
 
   v. 
 
     MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL 
     OF BALTIMORE 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
McDonald 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty 
Booth 
Biran 
Raker, Irma S. 
       (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), 
 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Raker, J. 
 
 
Filed: August 17, 2020 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No. 24-C-16-002852 
Argued: February 6, 2020 
Raker, J., dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent.  I would hold that this case is not justiciable because it is not 
ripe for review.1  There does not exist an actual controversy to satisfy the ripeness 
requirement for a declaratory judgment,2 nor should this Court entertain injunctive relief 
                                              
1 We noted in State v. G & C Gulf, Inc., 442 Md. 716, 720 n.2, 114 A.3d 694, 696–97 n.2 
(2015) as follows: 
 
“In some of our earlier cases we conflated the concept of 
‘standing’ with ripeness.  See Hitchcock v. Kloman, 196 Md. 
351, 356, 76 A.2d 582, 584 (1950); Hammond v. Lancaster, 
194 Md. 462, 471–72, 71 A.2d 474, 477–78 (1950).  In State 
Center, LLC, 438 Md. at 498, 92 A.3d at 428, we distinguished 
the two doctrines, which fall under the ‘umbrella of 
justiciability.’  Standing refers to whether ‘the plaintiff [has] 
show[n] that he or she is entitled to invoke the judicial process 
in a particular instance.’  Id. at 502, 92 A.3d at 430, 
quoting Kendall v. Howard Cnty., 431 Md. 590, 593, 66 A.3d 
684, 685 (2013).  The issue of ripeness, meanwhile, arises if 
parties, entitled to invoke the judicial process, ask the court to 
declare their rights ‘upon a state of facts which has not yet 
arisen, [or] upon a matter which is future, contingent and 
uncertain.’  Id. at 591, 92 A.3d at 484, quoting Boyds Civic 
Ass’n v. Montgomery Cnty. Council, 309 Md. 683, 690, 526 
A.2d 598, 602 (1987).” 
 
2 The Court of Special Appeals explained in Pizza di Joey, LLC v. Mayor and City Council 
of Baltimore, 241 Md. App. 139, 160–61, 209 A.3d 184, 196 (2019) as follows: 
 
“The declaratory judgment act provides that ‘a court may grant 
a declaratory judgment or decree in a civil case, if it will serve 
to terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the 
proceedings, and if an actual controversy exists between 
contending parties.’  Md. Code (1974, 2013 Repl. Vol.) § 3-
409(a)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (‘CJ’).  
But a court cannot consider a declaratory judgment action 
unless the underlying controversy is justiciable.  State Center, 
(footnote continued . . .) 
 
2 
 
with respect to a criminal or penal ordinance where there is no prosecution or threat of 
prosecution.  The threshold question for this Court, as presented by respondent the Mayor 
and City Council of Baltimore (“the City”) is justiciability or, more specifically, ripeness 
of the issue and reads as follows: 
“Did the Food Trucks fail to present an action that was ripe 
under the meaning of the Declaratory Judgments Act when 
neither Pizza di Joey nor Madame BBQ was cited for violating 
the 300-foot rule, neither Food Truck established a negative 
financial impact from the rule, and the only enforcement 
officer to consider the rule’s application to either of the Food 
Trucks agreed that Pizza di Joey was not in violation of the 
ordinance?” 
 
 
The majority holds that “the Food Trucks’ substantive due process and equal 
protection claims are justiciable.”  Maj. Op. at 23.  The majority finds justiciability because 
it agrees with the Court of Special Appeals that although “neither Pizza di Joey nor 
Madame BBQ faced imminent prosecution when they filed their action for a declaration 
that the 300-foot rule is unconstitutional,” they are “indisputably limited in their business.”  
Maj. Op. at 25 (quoting Pizza di Joey, LLC v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 241 
Md. App. 139, 162–63, 209 A.3d 184, 197 (2019)).  The majority explains as follows: 
                                              
LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship, 438 Md. 451, 591, 92 
A.3d 400 (2014); Hatt v. Anderson, 297 Md. 42, 45, 464 A.2d 
1076 (1983) (‘the existence of a justiciable controversy is an 
absolute prerequisite to the maintenance of a declaratory 
judgment action’).”  
 
An “actual controversy” is effectively synonymous with a justiciable controversy.  Neither 
the majority nor the court below has suggested a construction of this language from the 
declaratory judgment act that would indicate any legislative intent to expand the doctrine 
of justiciability.   
   
3 
 
“The intermediate appellate court further explained that the 
Food Trucks are ‘indisputably limited in their business’ 
because the 300-foot rule ‘restricts where they can sell and 
affects their potential profitability.’  Rejecting the City’s 
description of the Food Trucks’ claims as purely abstract and 
theoretical, the Court of Special Appeals observed that the 
controversy’s ‘contours are visible: the 300-foot rule requires 
mobile vendors to keep their distance from direct brick-and-
mortar competitors, in ways we can measure and draw on maps 
(as the parties have).’  Thus, the court held that the Food 
Trucks’ claims are ‘sufficiently concrete and specific to 
generate a controversy that is ripe for review.’  We agree with 
the Court of Special Appeals’ analysis concerning ripeness in 
this case.”3 
 
Maj. Op. at 25–26 (internal citations omitted). 
As the majority notes, ripeness is a jurisdictional requirement to create a justiciable 
claim in court.  “It is well settled that, ‘before addressing any issue raised by the parties, 
we must be satisfied that there is a justiciable controversy that is ripe for our 
consideration[.]’”  Tunnell v. State, 466 Md. 565, 598, 223 A.3d 122, 142 (2020) (Watts, 
J., dissenting).  Therefore, if the claim is not ripe, it is not justiciable.  A plaintiff’s 
subjective feeling of inhibition or fear arising from prospective enforcement of a law is not 
sufficient to establish ripeness.  See Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971).  Because I do not 
agree with the majority that the claim in the present case is ripe and justiciable, I am 
compelled to dissent. 
                                              
3 Concreteness and specificity are more commonly discussed in analysis of standing than 
of ripeness because the Supreme Court of the United States analyzes the injury-in-fact 
requirement of standing using the terms of concreteness and particularity.  Concreteness is 
relevant to standing and ripeness; concreteness requires more than a hypothetical harm.  
Absent concrete injury and concrete legal stakes for all litigants, a case is less likely to be 
fully developed, less likely to be well-litigated, and a court becomes more likely to make 
imprudent decisions.  
4 
 
 “A controversy is justiciable when there are interested parties asserting adverse 
claims upon a state of facts which must have accrued wherein a legal decision is sought or 
demanded.”  Reyes v. Prince George’s Cty., 281 Md. 279, 288, 380 A.2d 12, 17 (1977).  
Addressing non-justiciable issues places courts in the position of rendering purely advisory 
opinions, a long forbidden practice in this State.  See, e.g., Planning Comm’n v. Randall, 
209 Md. 18, 120 A.2d 195 (1956); Tanner v. McKeldin, 202 Md. 569, 97 A.2d 449 (1953); 
Hammond v. Lancaster, 194 Md. 462, 71 A.2d 474 (1950), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 908 
(1950).  That is exactly what this Court is doing—offering an advisory opinion on a 
misdemeanor action which may never occur.   
Judge Battaglia, writing for this Court in State v. G & C Gulf, Inc., 442 Md. 716, 
718, 114 A.3d 694, 695–96 (2015), explained the justiciability requirement as follows: 
“We are called upon in this case, seminally, to address 
justiciability, which has been defined as, ‘[t]he quality, state, 
or condition of being appropriate or suitable for adjudication 
by a court.’  Black’s Law Dictionary 997 (10th ed. 2014).  The 
doctrine has been ‘developed to identify appropriate occasions 
for judicial action.’  State Center, LLC v. Lexington Charles 
Ltd. Partnership, 438 Md. 451, 498, 92 A.3d 400, 427 (2014), 
quoting 13 Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 3529, at 611 (3d ed. 2008).  Issues of justiciability 
may encompass unripe and moot controversies, abstract or 
hypothetical disputes, collusive lawsuits and claims by 
disinterested plaintiffs.  John A. Lynch, Jr. & Richard W. 
Bourne, Modern Maryland Civil Procedure 2–8 (2d ed. 2004, 
2014 supp.).  ‘When a court believes a litigant’s claim is 
somehow unfit for judicial determination, it dismisses the 
claim under the rubric of justiciability.’  Id. at 2–3.  The 
rationale for the doctrine is that ‘addressing non-justiciable 
issues would place courts in the position of rendering purely 
advisory opinions, a long forbidden practice in this State.’  
State Center, LLC, 438 Md. at 591, 92 A.3d at 483–84 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).” 
5 
 
 
In cases seeking to adjudicate constitutional rights, justiciability is especially important, 
and ordinarily we require concrete and specific issues to be raised in actual cases, rather 
than as theoretical or abstract propositions.  See, e.g., Salisbury Beauty Schools v. St. Bd. 
of Cosmetologists, 268 Md. 32, 300 A.2d 367 (1973); Thomas v. Solis, 263 Md. 536, 283 
A.2d 777 (1971); Liberto v. State’s Attorney, 223 Md. 356, 164 A.2d 719 (1960); Givner 
v. Cohen, 208 Md. 23, 116 A.2d 357 (1955).   
The existence of a justiciable controversy is an absolute prerequisite to the 
maintenance of a declaratory judgment action in Maryland.  Hatt v. Anderson, 297 Md. 42, 
45, 464 A.2d 1076, 1078 (1983); Kronovet v. Lipchin, 288 Md. 30, 58, 415 A.2d 1096, 
1112 (1980); Reyes, 281 Md. at 287, 380 A.2d at 17; Haminton v. McAuliffe, 277 Md. 336, 
339, 353 A.2d 634, 637 (1976).  In Maryland, “[a]n action for declaratory judgment is not 
treated differently than any other suit for purposes of ripeness.”  G & C Gulf, 442 Md. at 
720, 114 A.3d at 697; see also State Center, LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. Partnership, 
438 Md. 451, 591, 92 A.3d 400, 484 (2014); Hatt, 297 Md. at 45, 464 A.2d at 1078.  It has 
long been the law in Maryland that the declaratory judgment process is not available to 
decide purely theoretical questions or questions that may never arise.  Prince George’s Co. 
v. Chillum-Adelphi, 275 Md. 374, 340 A.2d 265 (1975); Liss v. Goodman, 224 Md. 173, 
167 A.2d 123 (1961); Davis v. State, 183 Md. 385, 37 A.2d 880 (1944). 
Simply reading our jurisprudence on the subject leads to the conclusion that we do 
not dispense with the ripeness requirement merely because the criminal ordinance 
6 
 
addresses economic regulation.  In G & C Gulf, which concerned a criminal statute4 
addressing an economic issue related to regulating towing companies, this Court held that 
there was not a justiciable controversy because “G & C Gulf has not alleged nor proven 
that it has been prosecuted under the statute nor, in actuality, threatened with prosecution.”  
442 Md. at 734, 114 A.3d at 705.  The plaintiff in that case did not aver that it had violated 
or intended to violate the statute in question but alleged that its “rights, duties, status and 
legal relations are affected by” the statute and that it was “in jeopardy of being charged 
with criminal offenses” under the statute.  Id. at 722, 735, 114 A.3d at 698, 705.  We 
explained that “the mere existence of a criminal statute,” even if unconstitutional, and a 
“hypothetical threat” of prosecution is not sufficient for ripeness requirements.  Id. 731–
32, 114 A.3d at 703–04 (citing Hammond, 194 Md. at 473–74, 71 A.2d at 478–79 (holding 
that the suit challenging the constitutionality of a penal statute was not justiciable “as, none 
of the complainants had been threatened with prosecution, nor did they allege any facts to 
indicate that they had violated, or were about to violate, any of the criminal provisions of 
the Act”)); see also WAAM, Inc. v. Ober, 199 Md. 203, 208, 86 A.2d 399, 402 (1952) 
(affirming dismissal of declaratory judgment action alleging unconstitutionality of a 
criminal ordinance prohibiting advertising on Sundays, because plaintiff had not been 
prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution). 
                                              
4 “A violation of [the statute at issue] is a criminal offense and subjects the violator ‘to a 
fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for not more than 2 months or both.’  Md. 
Code Ann., Transp. § 27-101(c)(25).”  G & C Gulf, 442 Md. at 720, 114 A.3d at 696. 
7 
 
Also, in G & C Gulf, a county representative, whose police force was charged with 
enforcing the statute, testified at trial that the county was “enforcing [the statute] now 
because it is the law” and answered in the affirmative the trial judge’s question as to 
whether she was “ready to charge and prosecute or at least take to the Commissioner’s 
Office the Plaintiff.”  442 Md. at 727, 114 A.3d at 701.  The plaintiff later filed a post-
hearing memorandum related to ripeness, in which it posited that this affirmative answer 
by the county representative was a judicial admission5 of a credible threat of prosecution.  
But we held that these statements could not “constitute a credible threat of enforcement, 
because, for the purported threat to constitute a threat of prosecution for purposes of 
ripeness, it must be specific to the litigant.”  Id. at 735, 114 A.3d at 705.  The county 
representative had not “specifically utter[ed] a threat of enforcement towards the litigant” 
but had “merely affirmed that the County would enforce the statute because it is the law.”  
Id. 
The same is true in the instant case.  The Food Trucks’ claims are not ripe for review 
because no credible threat of prosecution for the acts proscribed by the statute have been 
alleged or established.  Neither Pizza di Joey nor Madame BBQ has been cited under the 
300-foot rule (“Ordinance”), nor can either party point to a credible threat of prosecution.  
                                              
5 “A judicial admission is an express waiver made in court or before trial by the party or 
his attorney conceding for the purposes of the trial the truth of some alleged fact.  The party 
with the burden of proof is, therefore, relieved of that burden and the fact is deemed 
proved.”  Bellamy v. State, 403 Md. 308, 327 n.19, 941 A.2d 1107, 1118 n.19 (2008) 
(quoting 2 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 6:16 (15th ed. 2001)). 
 
 
8 
 
Madame BBQ was not even licensed to operate in the City until a few weeks before trial.6  
Pizza di Joey’s sole encounter with the enforcement of the Ordinance in the City consisted 
of a statement by a University of Maryland Police Officer, who did not have the authority 
to enforce the Ordinance,7 that there was a complaint that he was violating the Ordinance.  
This incident resolved on the spot with the officer agreeing that Pizza di Joey was not in 
violation of the Ordinance and that he could continue selling there; and incredibly, the 
officer returned later and bought some pizza.  Pizza di Joey was not threatened with 
prosecution for violating the Ordinance.  That Pizza di Joey decided subsequently not to 
operate in the City for fear of further encounters with police with power to enforce the 
Ordinance does not establish prosecution or a credible threat of prosecution. 
The majority states that the City, “[i]mplicitly recognizing the soundness of the 
Court of Special Appeals’ holding on ripeness,” “shifted the focus of its justiciability 
argument in this Court” to standing—another element of justiciability.  Maj. Op. at 26.  But 
the City made no such implicit concession.  The City has continued to argue that the Food 
Trucks’ claims are not ripe because they failed to allege and prove prosecution or a credible 
threat of prosecution.  Respondent’s Brief at 15–16.  In response to the Food Trucks’ 
argument seemingly that “infringement of their interest in pursuing a business opportunity” 
                                              
6 Before receiving this license, Madame BBQ’s only experience operating in the City was 
limited to parties and festivals in which enforcement of the Ordinance was not an issue. 
 
7 The City designee Gia M. Montgomery stated this fact in her deposition. 
 
9 
 
is an alternative, independent basis of justiciability for their declaratory judgment action,8 
the City has added merely that the Food Trucks also fail to meet that standard by failing to 
show the requisite “direct effect” or “quantifiable financial impact” needed under that 
standard.  Respondent’s Brief at 16–17 (citing Bruce v. Dir., Dep’t of Chesapeake Bay 
Affairs, 261 Md. 585, 276 A.2d 200 (1971); Davis v. State, 183 Md. 385, 37 A.2d 880 
(1944)). 
The Court of Special Appeals had explained this seemingly alternative, independent 
basis of justiciability applicable in this case as follows: 
“When considering a statute’s constitutionality, we are more 
concerned with its substance than its label, and so too when we 
assess the ripeness of the Food Trucks’ challenge here.  
Although designated a misdemeanor, the 300-foot rule is, in 
substance and application, a local economic regulation.  The 
primary injury the Food Trucks allege is not the possibility of 
prosecution, which the Court of Appeals has rejected as non-
justiciable, see, e.g., G & C Gulf, Inc., 442 Md. at 732, but the 
loss of their right to pursue a business opportunity in their 
chosen profession, an interest that qualifies readily as a basis 
for a declaratory judgment.  See, e.g., Bruce v. Dir., Dep’t. of 
Chesapeake Bay Affairs, 261 Md. 585, 595 (1971), quoting 
Davis, 183 Md. at 389 (‘[I]n this case complainant is affected 
by the [statute] and he is entitled to apply for declaratory 
judgment under the uniform act, rather than run the risk of 
being subjected to criminal prosecution.’); Oyarzo v. Md. 
Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene, 187 Md. App. 264, 275 
(2009) (‘[T]he right [the challenger] seeks to protect is the right 
to pursue a business opportunity. . . . There is no need for [him] 
to violate the challenged regulation in order for us to consider 
                                              
8 The Maryland Declaratory Judgments Act expressly provides that “any person . . . whose 
rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute . . . may have determined any 
question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute . . . and obtain a declaration 
of rights, status, or other legal relations under it.”  Md. Code, Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings, § 3-406. 
10 
 
whether it was within the scope of the Department’s authority 
to adopt [the regulation at issue].’). 
 
Pizza di Joey, 241 Md. App. at 162, 209 A.3d 184 at 197 (emphasis added).  The majority 
seems to agree with the intermediate court that the loss of the Food Trucks’ right to pursue 
a business opportunity in their chosen profession constitutes an alternative, independent 
basis for their declaratory judgment action and that the basis has been met.  Because the 
Food Trucks are “indisputably limited in their business” as the Ordinance “restricts where 
they can sell and affects their potential profitability,” the majority agrees with the 
intermediate court that their claims are “sufficiently ‘concrete and specific’ to generate a 
controversy that is ripe for review.”  Maj. Op. at 25–26. 
Ordinarily, the loss of one’s right to pursue a business opportunity (changing a 
business plan) in one’s chosen profession is not an alternative, independent basis for 
ripeness and justiciability of a declaratory judgment action challenging a criminal statute.  
In Davis v. State, 183 Md. 385, 389, 37 A.2d 880, 883 (1944), in considering a declaratory 
judgment action involving a criminal statute, we adopted the following rule: 
“[A] person may obtain a judgment under the Uniform 
Declaratory Judgments Act declaring whether or not a statute 
is constitutional, and that a proper case for rendition of such a 
declaratory judgment is presented when the plaintiff alleges 
that he will be directly damaged in person or in property if the 
statute is enforced, and such enforcement will result in the 
infringement of his constitutional rights, and the defendant is 
charged with the duty of enforcing the statute and is enforcing 
it or is about to enforce it.” 
 
183 Md. at 389, 37 A. 2d at 883 (emphasis added).  The Ordinance (a/k/a 300-foot rule) is 
a criminal statute regardless of any economic aspect.  As the trial judge cogently stated, “It 
11 
 
is important to note that a violation of the 300-foot rule is a crime.  Art. 15, Section 17-42, 
labeled ‘Criminal Penalties,’ states, ‘[a] person who violates [this Ordinance] is guilty of a 
misdemeanor and, on conviction, is subject to a penalty of $500 for each offense.’”  
(Emphasis added).  Hence, in the present case, the alternative, independent basis does not 
apply.  Even under Davis, the Food Trucks, to establish the ripeness of their claim, must 
prove more than the mere loss of their right to pursue a business opportunity—e.g., a direct 
damage and an actual threat of enforcement or prosecution against them. 
Even assuming, without conceding, that actual threat of enforcement is unnecessary, 
there is no evidence in this record that either Pizza di Joey or Madame BBQ ever suffered 
any direct effect or quantifiable financial loss because of the Ordinance.  The majority 
holds as follows: 
“The Food Trucks sufficiently established that they are 
aggrieved by the 300-foot rule. . . . [T]he Food Trucks 
specifically altered their business plans as a result of the 300-
foot rule.  We are also satisfied by our review of the record 
that, but for the Rule, Pizza di Joey and Madame BBQ both 
would have received substantial revenues from operating in 
Hampden and Federal Hill.” 
 
Maj. Op. at 28–29.  I do not believe that altering a business plan is a cognizable injury for 
the justiciability of a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a 
criminal statute or ordinance or to enjoin the enforcement of a penal ordinance.  Moreover, 
the Food Trucks did not offer any evidence “that, but for the Rule, [they] both would have 
received substantial revenues from operating in Hampden and Federal Hill.”  They seem 
to have taken as given, without offering any evidence, that their revenue and profitability 
will increase substantially by operating in any areas they wish in Hampden and Federal 
12 
 
Hill.9  But this is a sheer speculation that does not account for any of the numerous variables 
involved, e.g., increased competition and preferences of different customer segments.  The 
Food Trucks’ unsupported speculation is not sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional 
justiciability requirement. 
I conclude with a question: What has become of this Court’s long standing mantra 
that “this Court has ‘long forbidden’ the practice of issuing an advisory opinion concerning 
an issue that is not ‘ripe’”?  Twigg v. State, 447 Md. 1, 19 n.11, 133 A.3d 1125 (2016) 
(citing Hickory Point P’ship v. Anne Arundel Cty., 316 Md. 118, 129, 557 A.2d 626, 631 
(1989) (quoting Boyds Civic Association v. Montgomery Cty. Council, 309 Md. 683, 690, 
526 A.2d 598, 601 (1987) and Hatt, 297 Md. at 46, 464 A.2d at 1078)).   Justiciability, or 
ripeness, is a jurisdictional component.  This Court lacks jurisdiction to address this appeal. 
                                              
9 The City notes that “neither Pizza di Joey nor Madame BBQ ever sought clarification 
from the City, nor did they ever receive any official determination that any given spot 
where they desired to vend was prohibited by the 300-foot rule.  They made their own 
assumptions about certain spots being off-limits[.]”  Respondent’s Brief at 18.