Case Title: DANE JACOBSON V. KENNETH F.B. COBBS, M.D.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
DANE JACOBSON V. KENNETH F.B. COBBS, M.D.2007 WY 99160 P.3d 654Case Number: 06-83Decided: 06/19/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
DANE 
JACOBSON,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.KENNETH F.B. COBBS, 
M.D.,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofLincolnCounty

The Honorable Dennis L. 
Sanderson, Judge

 
 
Representing Appellant:

William R. 
Fix and Jenna V. Mandraccia, William R. Fix, PC, Jackson, Wyoming.  
Argument by Ms. Mandraccia.

 
 
Representing Appellee:

Jeffrey C. 
Brinkerhoff, Brown, Drew & Massey, LLP, Casper, Wyoming; Nick A. 
Swartzendruber, Poulson, Odell & Peterson, LLC, Denver, Colorado.  Argument by Mr. 
Brinkerhoff.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Dane Jacobson 
filed a medical malpractice action against Kenneth F.B. Cobbs, M.D.  In the course of litigation, Dr. Cobbs 
filed a motion for summary judgment supported by his affidavit in which he 
opined that his treatment of Mr. Jacobson met the applicable standard of 
care.  Mr. Jacobson failed to 
substantively oppose the motion and, instead, filed motions to extend the time 
to respond.  The district court 
denied Mr. Jacobson's motions and granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. 
Cobbs.  On appeal, Mr. Jacobson 
contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motions 
for additional time to respond to the summary judgment.  Mr. Jacobson also contends that the 
affidavit filed by Dr. Cobbs was deficient and improperly relied upon by the 
district court as a basis for the summary judgment.  We affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Jacobson 
presents the following issues for review:

 
 

I.                    
Whether the lower court's 
Order Denying Motion for Enlargement of Time, Denying Rule 56(f) Motion, and 
Granting Summary Judgment, was proper and in accordance with established 
law.

 
 

II.                  
Whether the lower court 
erred in relying on the Affidavit of Kenneth F.B. Cobbs, M.D., as the basis for 
granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On January 28, 
2005, Dane Jacobson filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, that Dr. Cobbs negligently 
performed surgery on his left hand.  
At the time of filing his complaint, Mr. Jacobson was not represented by 
counsel, although attorney William R. Fix assisted him with the drafting of the 
complaint.  On May 5, 2005, Dr. 
Cobbs served discovery requests on Mr. Jacobson.  Responses to the discovery were due June 
8, 2005.  Mr. Jacobson requested, 
and received, a three week extension to respond to the discovery from Dr. 
Cobbs.  Subsequently, Mr. Jacobson 
requested another extension and was given two additional weeks to respond.  On September 8, 2005, Dr. Cobbs sent 
correspondence to Mr. Jacobson requesting a response to the discovery within ten 
days.  Mr. Jacobson did not respond 
to the request.1 

 
 
[¶4]      Recognizing that 
"no substantial or bona fide action" had taken place, on October 25, 2005, the 
district court entered an order requiring the parties to "show cause in writing 
on or before the 10th day of November, 2005, 
why this matter should not be dismissed."  
Mr. Jacobson did not respond to the district court's order.  Dr. Cobbs also did not file a direct 
response.  However, Dr. Cobbs filed 
a motion for summary judgment and a brief in support of the motion.  Additionally, Dr. Cobbs submitted his 
affidavit stating, among other things, that he met the standard of care in his 
treatment of Mr. Jacobson. 

 
 
[¶5]      On December 7, 
2005, Mr. Fix entered his appearance on behalf of Mr. Jacobson and filed a 
motion requesting a telephone scheduling conference.  The next day, Mr. Jacobson filed the 
following motions:  (1) Plaintiff's 
Motion for Enlargement of Time to Respond to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment; (2) Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) Motion to Supplement the Record; and (3) 
Plaintiff's Designation of Record in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment.  Mr. Jacobson did 
not file any expert affidavits countering Dr. Cobbs' 
affidavit.

 
 
[¶6]      A hearing was 
held on January 19, 2006, to address the pending motions.  The district court denied Mr. Jacobson's 
motions and granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Cobbs.  In finding that summary judgment was 
appropriate, the district court explained its decision as follows: 

 
 
a.         
The Defendant, as a board certified orthopedic surgeon since 1997, is 
competent and qualified to set forth the applicable standard of care, to recite 
the facts pertinent to Plaintiff's treatment in this case, and to render an 
opinion based on his review of the relevant medical records as to whether his 
conduct in treating the Plaintiff departed from the standard of care in any 
respect;

 
 
b.         
Defendant has met his burden of proof for summary judgment, through his 
affidavit and other supporting materials, in showing that his conduct did not 
depart from the applicable standard of care in treating the 
Plaintiff;

 
 
c.         
The effect of the Defendant having met his burden of proof is to 
establish a prima facie case showing 
the absence of negligence, thereby shifting the burden to the Plaintiff to 
marshal specific facts and evidence, by way of expert testimony, refuting the 
evidence submitted by the Defendant; 

 
 
d.         
Despite ample opportunity since the commencement of the suit, including 
the time after Plaintiff's counsel's formal entry of appearance, Plaintiff has 
failed to submit memoranda, expert opinion or other substantive evidence to 
refute Defendant's affidavit.

 
 
This appeal 
followed.

 
 

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      A motion for 
summary judgment is properly granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  W.R.C.P. 56(c).  "A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a disputed fact, if proven, would establish or refute an essential element 
of a cause of action or a defense that a party has asserted."  Linton v. E.C. Cates Agency, Inc., 2005 
WY 63, ¶ 6, 113 P.3d 26, 28 (Wyo. 2005).  
The propriety of a summary judgment is evaluated 

 
 
by employing the same 
standards and by examining the same material as the district court. We examine 
de novo the record, in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion, affording to that party the benefit 
of all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the record. If upon review of 
the record, doubt exists about the presence of issues of material fact, that 
doubt must be resolved against the party seeking summary judgment. We accord no 
deference to the district court's decisions on issues of 
law.

Id., ¶ 7, 113 P.3d  at 28 (citations omitted).  
"Summary judgment is not favored in a negligence action and is, 
therefore, subject to more exacting scrutiny. We have, however, affirmed summary 
judgment in negligence cases where the record failed to establish the existence 
of a genuine issue of material fact."  
Jones v. Schabron, 2005 WY 65, 
¶ 9, 113 P.3d 34, 37 (Wyo. 2005) (citations omitted).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]      Mr. Jacobson 
challenges the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of 
Dr. Cobbs.  First, he claims that it 
was error for the district court to deny his motions for additional time to 
respond to the summary judgment motion.  
Second, he claims that the district court should not have considered the 
affidavit submitted by Dr. Cobbs in support of his motion for summary 
judgment.  We begin our review with 
the denial of Mr. Jacobson's motions.  
  

 
 

I.                    
Motion for Enlargement of 
Time and W.R.C.P. 56(f) Motion

 
 
[¶9]      Mr. Jacobson 
contends that his Motion for Enlargement of Time and W.R.C.P. 56(f) Motion to 
Supplement the Record were improperly denied.  He argues that he did not have adequate 
time to obtain an affidavit by a medical expert to oppose Dr. Cobbs' motion for 
summary judgment because his attorney entered his appearance one month prior to 
the hearing.  Mr. Jacobson also 
points out that discovery was not yet complete and, as a result, contends that 
summary judgment was premature.  

 
 
[¶10]   Rule 6(b), of the Wyoming Rules of 
Civil Procedure, governs extensions of time and provides that "the court. . . 
for cause shown may at any time in its discretionorder the period enlarged if 
[the] request . . . is made before the expiration of the period originally 
prescribed."  W.R.C.P. 56(f) 
provides an alternative way to obtain additional time to respond to a motion for 
summary judgment.  The rule 
states:

 
 
Should it appear from the 
affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons 
stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, 
the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to 
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just.

 
 

Id.  We apply an abuse of discretion standard 
in reviewing the district court's decision denying Mr. Jacobson's motions for 
additional time.  The district court 

 
 
has broad discretion in 
granting or denying a motion for continuance, and absent a manifest abuse of 
discretion, the reviewing court will not disturb such ruling. To find an 
abuse of discretion, the refusal must be so arbitrary as to deny appellant due 
process, and the burden rests upon appellant to prove actual prejudice and a 
violation of his rights. Upon review we look at the peculiar circumstances of 
the case and the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time of the 
request.

Abraham v. Great Western Energy, LLC, 
2004 WY 145, ¶ 16, 101 P.3d 446, 454 (Wyo. 2004) (citing Byrd v. Mahaffey, 2003 WY 137, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 671, 673 (Wyo. 2003)).

 
 
[¶11]   The district court explained its 
reasons for denying the request for additional time:

 
 
All of the delays and 
lack of bona fide action in this case  including the failure to answer or 
respond to discovery served by Defendant (even after multiple extensions), the 
failure to seek a scheduling order, the failure to serve discovery on the 
Defendant, the failure to respond to this Court's Order to Show Cause, and the 
failure [to] respond substantively to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
within the time prescribed under the Rules of Civil Procedure  are due to the 
Plaintiff's own choice not to prosecute this action.

            

We cannot disagree with 
the district court's assessment.  

 

[¶12]   Mr. Jacobson acknowledges that he 
failed to conduct discovery or consult an expert at any time during the course 
of the litigation.  Regardless, he 
contends that summary judgment cannot be granted, in any case, if the discovery 
process has not been completed.  He 
relies on Abraham v. Great Western 
Energy, LLC, 2004 WY 145, 101 P.3d 446 (Wyo. 2004), as support for his 
position.  His reliance is 
misplaced.    

 
 
[¶13]   In Abraham, discovery was ongoing and the 
parties were in the process of deposing key witnesses when the district court 
granted summary judgment.  We 
reversed the district court's decision explaining that "W.R.C.P. 56(c) 
presupposes that discovery is complete and, ordinarily, discovery on the issues 
which are the subject of the summary judgment motion should be allowed to be completed before 
a motion for summary judgment is scheduled, heard, and decided."  Abraham, ¶ 19, 101 P.3d  at 455 (emphasis 
added).  We concluded that "[b]y 
scheduling the hearing on the motions for summary judgment before the deadline 
for discovery had passed and, thus, not allowing the Abrahams adequate time to 
prepare and file any other pertinent materials prior to that hearing, they were 
deprived of the protections to due process afforded by the applicable rules of 
civil procedure."  Id.  

 
 
[¶14]   The permissive language used in Abraham does not lead to the conclusion 
that the court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Jacobson's motions in the 
present case.  Rule 56 does not 
require that discovery be completed prior to entry of summary judgment.  Rather, there must have been adequate 
time allowed for discovery to be conducted.  See, e.g., Keller v. Anderson, 
Wyo., 554 P.2d 1253, 1262 (1976) (motion for enlargement of time denied because plaintiff had 
adequate time to prepare and file necessary papers to respond to motion for 
summary judgment).  See also Hatton v. Energy Elec. Co., 
2006 WY 151, ¶ 20, 148 P.3d 8, 16 (Wyo. 2006) (clarifying that "we did not 
rule a district court may never grant summary judgment before discovery has been 
completed, only that ordinarily, if doing so would unfairly prevent the opposing 
party from discovering contradictory evidence, it would be an abuse of 
discretion not to grant a request for a continuance to allow adequate time for 
such discovery").  Unlike the 
situation in Abraham, Mr. Jacobson 
was not relying on any deadlines set by a scheduling order and had over ten 
months in which to commence discovery.  
Mr. Jacobson simply failed to take any action during the pendency of this 
matter to commence or complete discovery.  
We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of the 
Motion for Enlargement of Time.  

 
 
[¶15]   We also do not find that the 
district court erred by denying Mr. Jacobson's W.R.C.P. 56(f) motion.  Mr. Jacobson offered no legitimate 
justification for his failure to obtain expert medical testimony in support of 
his malpractice claim.  The sole 
basis of his request for additional time was his assertion that "[a]s discovery 
progresses, it is believed that defendant Kenneth F.B. Cobbs' position will be 
controverted by expert medical testimony and evidence."  Where a party filing a Rule 56(f) motion 
has been dilatory, an extension of time is not required.  Jensen v. Redevelopment Agency, 998 F.2d 1550, 1554 (10th Cir. 1993).  See also United States v. Bob Stofer 
Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc., 766 F.2d 1147, 1153 (7th Cir. 1985) ("A party who 
has been dilatory in discovery may not use Rule 56(f) to gain a continuance 
where he has made only vague assertions that further discovery would develop 
genuine issues of material fact."); Abiodun v. Martin Oil Service, Inc., 475 F.2d 142 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
414 U.S. 866, 94 S. Ct. 57, 38 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1973); Waldron v. Cities Service Co., 361 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd sub nom. First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 
391 U.S. 253, 88 S. Ct. 1575, 
20 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1968), reh'g denied, 
393 U.S. 901, 89 S. Ct. 63, 21 L. Ed. 2d 188 
(1968).

 
 
[¶16]   Although we have recognized that 
"certain leniency is accorded to pro se 
litigants," we have also reiterated that "the proper administration of 
justice requires reasonable adherence to the same rules of evidence, procedure 
and requirements of the court as expected of those qualified to practice 
law."  Stoneking v. Wheatland Rural Elec. Ass'n, 
2003 WY 81, ¶ 12, 72 P.3d 272, 276 (Wyo. 2003).  Under the circumstances presented, we do 
not find that the district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Jacobson's 
requests for additional time.

 
 
II.         
Affidavit of Dr. Cobbs

 
 
[¶17]   In his second issue, Mr. Jacobson 
contends that the district court "erred when it relied exclusively" upon the 
affidavit of Dr. Cobbs.  Mr. 
Jacobson terms the affidavit as "entirely self-serving and conclusory" and 
contends that the district court "should not have considered it."  Mr. Jacobson offers no support for his 
position and fails to direct our attention to any specific portion of Dr. Cobbs' 
affidavit that he finds problematic.  

 
 
[¶18]   W.R.C.P. 56(e) governs the 
submission of supporting affidavits for summary judgment purposes and provides 
that:

 
 
Supporting 
and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that 
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit 
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits 
to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or 
further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not 
so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the 
adverse party.

 
 
Upon our review, we find 
that the affidavit of Dr. Cobbs is sufficient under these standards.  The affidavit is based upon Dr. Cobbs' 
personal knowledge.  It sets forth 
his qualifications and background.  
It describes his treatment of Mr. Jacobson.  The medical records upon which Dr. Cobbs 
relied are attached and Dr. Cobbs sets forth his opinion that his treatment did 
not fall below the appropriate standard of care.  

 
 
[¶19]   Mr. Jacobson also asserts that 
summary judgment was not proper because Dr. Cobbs "failed to provide an 
affidavit from an independent medical doctor who has no interest in the pending 
case."  He contends that an 
affidavit of a defendant doctor in a medical malpractice action is inadequate as 
a matter of law to provide an opinion regarding whether the doctor failed to 
meet the required standard of care.  
Again, Mr. Jacobson offers no legal authority to support that position 
and we would be justified in refusing to consider that argument.  See, e.g., Odegard v. Odegard, 2003 WY 
67, ¶ 29, 69 P.3d 917, 925 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶20]   We would note, however, that a 
defendant doctor in a medical malpractice action may supply an affidavit 
expressing opinions regarding the standard of care and whether that standard was 
met in the instant case. For example, in Keller, we found affidavits submitted by 
the defendant doctors in support of their motions for summary judgment 
adequate.  We 
stated:

 
 
In 
support of their motions for summary judgment, the doctors filed factual and 
detailed affidavits describing the participation of each affiant in the 
plaintiff's case, delineating the details of the medical procedure, care, 
treatment and ministration.  Each 
doctor expressed his opinion that the practices undertaken met and complied with 
the medical-care and treatment standards for like care and service at the time 
and place administered.  The 
affidavit of the hospital was likewise factual and in all ways adequate for 
summary judgment purposes.

 
 

Id., 554 P.2d  at 1256.2  Accordingly, Dr. Cobbs' affidavit was 
sufficient to support his motion for summary judgment.  The district court did not err by 
considering it for purposes of summary judgment.

 
 
[¶21]   Because Dr. Cobbs' affidavit 
adequately supported his motion, the burden shifted to Mr. Jacobson to establish 
a genuine issue of material fact.  
W.R.C.P. 56(e).  See also Mize v. North Big Horn Hosp. 
Dist., 931 P.2d 229, 232 (Wyo. 1997).  Mr. Jacobson could no longer rely only 
upon the allegations in his pleadings.  
He was required to "affirmatively set forth material, specific facts in 
opposition to [the] motion for summary judgment."  Jones, ¶ 10, 113 P.3d  at 37.  Mr. Jacobson failed to meet his 
burden.    

 
 
[¶22]   Mr. Jacobson had adequate time to 
obtain expert testimony or other evidence to refute Dr. Cobbs' position, but he 
made no such effort.  "[W]here there 
are no material facts in dispute a summary judgment should be entered.  This is the law  even in a negligence 
case."  Keller, 554 P.2d  at 1258.  We find no error in the district court's 
decision to grant summary judgment. 

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶23]   Because Mr. Jacobson was dilatory 
in prosecuting his case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by 
denying the motion for enlargement of time and the W.R.C.P. 56(f) motion.  Furthermore, as the party opposing the 
summary judgment motion, Mr. Jacobson was required to show that evidence was 
"available which would justify a trial [on the] issue" of negligence.  Harris v. Grizzle, Wyo., 625 P.2d 747, 754 
(1981).  He failed to come forward 
with any such evidence.  Therefore, 
summary judgment was properly granted.

 
 
[¶24]   Affirmed.

 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Mr. Jacobson 
submitted his discovery responses on January 13, 
2006.

 
 

2See also Rohe v. 
Shivde, 
560 N.E.2d 1113, 1121 (Ill. App. 1990) (explaining that "where a defendant 
doctor submits his own affidavit in support of a summary judgment motion, and in 
his affidavit asserts that he was familiar with the standard of care in the 
geographic location and that the treatment and care rendered by him was in 
compliance with that standard, and where the plaintiff has failed to bring 
forth evidence to the contrary even though afforded ample time to so do, then 
such an affidavit is sufficient for entry of summary judgment in favor of the 
physician'").