Case Title: State ex rel. N. Main St. Coalition v. Webb

Citation: 2005-Ohio-5009

Docket Number: 20051616

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2005-09-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. N. Main St. Coalition v. Webb, 2005-Ohio-5009.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. NORTH MAIN STREET COALITION ET AL. v. WEBB, 
VILLAGE CLERK. 
[Cite as State ex rel. N. Main St. Coalition v. Webb,  
106 Ohio St.3d 437, 2005-Ohio-5009.] 
Village clerk abused discretion in failing to certify the sufficiency and validity of 
initiative petition to the board of elections — Village clerk does not have 
authority to refuse to certify a petition based on substantive issues not 
evident on the face of petition — Writ of mandamus granted to compel 
clerk to certify the petition to the board of elections for placement on 
November 8, 2005 ballot. 
(No. 2005-1616 ─ Submitted September 15, 2005 ─ Decided  
September 26, 2005.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an expedited election case in which initiative petitioners 
seek a writ of mandamus to compel a village clerk to certify the sufficiency and 
validity of the petition to the board of elections for placement of a proposed 
ordinance on the November 8, 2005 election ballot. 
{¶ 2} In 2000, the Ohio Department of Transportation (“ODOT”) 
announced a $200 million, ten-year rail-crossing-safety initiative to “provide 
railroad grade separations to communities most affected by increased train traffic 
as a result of the recent acquisition of Conrail by the Norfolk Southern 
Corporation and CSX Transportation.”  The Council of the village of Wellington, 
Ohio, enacted Resolution 2000-02, which requested that the Ohio Rail 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
Development Commission fund a feasibility study to determine the possibility and 
plausibility of a grade separation within the village. 
{¶ 3} In 2001, ODOT retained an engineering company to design a 
railroad underpass to be constructed along State Route 58 in Wellington. 
{¶ 4} On December 17, 2001, the Wellington Village Council passed 
Resolution No. 2001-62, an emergency measure for the village to “contribute up 
to 5% of the project cost for a grade separation to be constructed on SR-58.”  The 
resolution specified that the village is located on a CSX Transportation railroad 
line, that the line bisects the village on a diagonal that contains at-grade crossings 
on state highways S.R. 18 and S.R. 58, that a grade separation would enhance the 
safety of the crossings and the health, safety, and welfare of the community, and 
that ODOT had conducted a study to determine the feasibility of a grade 
separation at S.R. 58.  At present, ODOT is considering only the S.R. 58 site for 
the construction of a new railroad grade separation in Wellington.  ODOT has not, 
however, made a final decision. 
{¶ 5} Relator North Main Street Coalition (“North Main”) is a 
committee designated to circulate initiative petitions.  North Main is composed of 
relators Helen Dronsfield, James Farago, Helen Wiggs, and Mary Lou Rapp, who 
are Wellington taxpayers and residents. 
{¶ 6} North Main circulated an initiative petition proposing an ordinance 
to repeal Resolution No. 2001-62, which it refers to as the “Rt. 58 Underpass 
Project.”  According to North Main, the Rt. 58 Underpass Project “would cause 
destruction and damage to the historical nature of downtown Wellington and 
would result in the loss of and damage to residential properties.”  Election 
officials certified the proposed ordinance for placement on the November 8, 2005 
election ballot. 
{¶ 7} In conjunction with its initiative petition to repeal Resolution No. 
2001-62, North Main also circulated a separate initiative petition.  The petition 
January Term, 2005 
3 
proposes an ordinance to approve a different location for the grade-separation 
project.  It proposes an overpass bridge in the Maple Street Industrial Park area 
and a village contribution of up to five percent of the project cost: 
{¶ 8} “Section 1:  That based upon the facts that the grade separation 
project, known as the overpass bridge at the Maple St. Industrial Park area, would 
not cause destruction and damage to the historical nature of downtown 
Wellington, would not result in the loss of and damage to residential properties, 
would have cost savings, and would provide an alternative eastern traffic bypass 
for downtown traffic, the location for the grade separation project to be 
constructed, known as the overpass bridge at the Maple St. Industrial Park area, 
and the contribution of up to 5% of the project cost for the grade separation 
project is hereby approved.” 
{¶ 9} Although the petition did not specify North Main as the committee 
filing or circulating the petition, it listed the North Main members, relators 
Farago, Dronsfield, Wiggs, and Rapp, as the committee.  On July 8, 2005, before 
circulating the petition, North Main filed a certified copy of the proposed 
ordinance with respondent, Village Clerk Karen Webb.  In correspondence 
accompanying the proposed ordinance, North Main referred to itself as the 
“Committee for the Overpass Bridge Maple St. Industrial Park Project.” 
{¶ 10} On July 28, 2005, North Main filed in Webb’s office the initiative 
petition for the proposed ordinance on the Maple Street Overpass Bridge Project.  
The petition contained 179 signatures.  North Main again referred to itself as the 
Committee for the Overpass Bridge Maple St. Industrial Park Project.  North 
Main further advised Webb of her duties under R.C. 731.28, including that she 
certify the sufficiency and validity of the petition to the Lorain County Board of 
Elections by August 25, 2005 to assure placement of the initiative on the 
November 8, 2005 election ballot. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
{¶ 11} On August 8, 2005, Webb submitted the petition to the board to 
determine the number of valid signatures.  On August 9, the board determined 
that the petition contained 170 valid signatures, which was sufficient to place the 
initiative on the November 8 election ballot.  The board advised Webb: 
{¶ 12} “It has been found that there are enough valid signatures for you to 
certify the sufficiency and validity of said petitions and return them to us before 
the August 25th filing deadline in order for this issue to be placed on the ballot for 
the November 8th, 2005 general election.” 
{¶ 13} On August 16, 2005, Webb asked Kenneth Wright, the ODOT 
Planning Administrator for District 3, to verify that ODOT did not have a pending 
or approved grade-separation project involving an overpass bridge in the Maple 
Street Industrial Park area.  Wright responded that ODOT had no Maple Street 
project and that the Maple Street location had been “eliminated early in the 
process.”  Nevertheless, Wright and another ODOT official have also stated that 
ODOT would consider and investigate alternatives to a S.R. 58 underpass, 
including a Maple Street overpass bridge.  In Wright’s words, “If there is support 
for another location, ODOT will look at it.” 
{¶ 14} After her correspondence with Wright, Webb questioned whether 
the ordinance proposed by relators was legally sufficient or valid.  On August 19, 
2005, Village Solicitor Stephen Bond filed suit on behalf of Webb in the Lorain 
County Court of Common Pleas.  In the complaint, Webb requested a declaratory 
judgment that (1) the ordinance proposed by relators’ initiative petition to approve 
a grade-separation project in the Maple Street Industrial Park area is not legally 
sufficient and is not valid and (2) Webb has the discretion to determine that the 
proposed ordinance is not sufficient and is invalid, and therefore she is not 
required to certify the petition to the board of elections.  Webb did not specify in 
the complaint that she promised to abide by the common pleas court’s ruling. 
January Term, 2005 
5 
{¶ 15} Webb’s declaratory-judgment complaint named relator Farago, the 
board of elections, and ODOT as defendants, but did not name North Main1 or 
any of its members besides Farago as parties.  Farago did not receive service of 
summons and a copy of the complaint.  On the same date that the complaint was 
filed, however, Bond notified North Main’s counsel of the filing and mailed a 
courtesy copy of the complaint. 
{¶ 16} On August 23, 2005, Webb advised North Main that she would not 
certify the initiative petition to the board of elections.  On that date, North Main 
and its members demanded that Bond immediately bring an action to compel 
Webb to certify the petition to the board of elections by August 25.  Bond rejected 
the demand, explaining that he had already commenced the declaratory-judgment 
action on behalf of Webb, Webb had discretion to determine the sufficiency and 
validity of the petition, and the common pleas court could determine that the 
petition was insufficient or invalid. 
{¶ 17} On August 30, relators, North Main and its members, filed this 
expedited election action for a writ of mandamus to compel Webb to certify the 
sufficiency and validity of the initiative petition and to place the proposed 
ordinance regarding the Maple Street Overpass Bridge Project on the November 
8, 2005 election ballot.  Webb responded by filing an answer and a motion to 
dismiss, and the parties submitted evidence and briefs pursuant to the accelerated 
schedule in S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9). 
{¶ 18} This cause is now before the court for a consideration of the 
merits. 
Motion to Dismiss 
                                                 
1. 
Webb did not name as a defendant either North Main or the name of the committee 
specified by North Main in its correspondence to Webb, i.e., Committee for the Overpass Bridge 
Maple St. Industrial Park Project. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
{¶ 19} We deny Webb’s motion to dismiss.  Because Webb’s motion was 
filed at the same time as her answer, her belated Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion is 
actually a motion for judgment on the pleadings.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Holloman 
v. Phillips, 100 Ohio St.3d 70, 2003-Ohio-5063, 796 N.E.2d 524, fn. 3; Carcorp, 
Inc. v. Chesrown Oldsmobile-GMC Truck, Inc., 159 Ohio App.3d 87, 2004-Ohio-
5946, 823 N.E.2d 34, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 20} Motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings are 
inappropriate in expedited election cases because “[u]nder S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9), the 
presentation of evidence and briefs on the merits  * * * is provided in lieu of a 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5) dismissal determination, making procedural motions normally 
inapplicable.”  See State ex rel. Ryant Commt. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections 
(1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 107, 111, 712 N.E.2d 696; State ex rel. Hackworth v. 
Hughes, 97 Ohio St.3d 110, 2002-Ohio-5334, 776 N.E.2d 1050, ¶ 20. 
{¶ 21} Therefore, we deny Webb’s motion to dismiss.  Nevertheless, we 
will consider her arguments in our consideration of the merits. 
Mandamus 
{¶ 22} North Main and its members request a writ of mandamus to 
compel Webb to certify the sufficiency and validity of the initiative petition to the 
board of elections for placement on the November 8 election ballot. 
{¶ 23} In order to be entitled to the writ of mandamus, relators must 
establish a clear legal right to certification of the initiative petition, a 
corresponding clear legal duty on the part of Webb to certify the petition, and the 
lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to provide the 
certification.  State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-Ohio-
4960, 815 N.E.2d 1107, ¶ 16. 
Sufficiency and Validity of Initiative Petition 
{¶ 24} Relators claim that Webb abused her discretion in refusing to 
certify the sufficiency and validity of the initiative petition. 
January Term, 2005 
7 
{¶ 25} “R.C. 731.28 provides the following procedure for municipal 
initiative petitions:  (1) when a petition for an initiated ordinance or other measure 
is signed by the required number of electors, the city auditor or village clerk has a 
mandatory, ministerial duty, after ten days from the date the petition was filed, to 
transmit the petition and a certified copy of the text of the proposed ordinance or 
other measure to the board of elections; (2) within ten days of receiving the 
petition, the board of elections is required to determine the number of electors of 
the municipal corporation who signed the petition and return the petition to the 
auditor or clerk together with a statement attesting to the number; (3) the auditor 
or clerk then exercises limited, discretionary authority to determine the 
sufficiency and validity of the petition; and (4) if the auditor or clerk certifies the 
sufficiency and validity of the initiative petition to the board of elections, the 
board must submit the proposed ordinance or other measure at the next 
succeeding general election occurring after seventy-five days from the 
certification to the board of elections, but only if the board determines under R.C. 
3501.11(K) and 3501.39  that the petition is sufficient and valid.”  State ex rel. 
Ditmars v. McSweeney (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 472, 477, 764 N.E.2d 971. 
{¶ 26} North Main presented the petition to Webb on July 28.  Webb 
followed R.C. 731.28 by transmitting the petition and a certified text of the 
proposed ordinance regarding the Maple Street Overpass Bridge Project to the 
board of elections on August 8.  The board determined that the petition contained 
sufficient valid signatures and returned it to Webb on August 9 for her sufficiency 
and validity determination.  As both North Main and the board of elections 
advised her, Webb had until August 25 to certify the petition to the board for 
placement of the proposed ordinance on the November 8 ballot. 
{¶ 27} But Webb did not certify the petition to the board by August 25.  
Webb, in her capacity as the village clerk, exercises a limited, discretionary 
authority to determine the sufficiency and validity of the petition.  State ex rel. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
Sinay v. Sodders (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 224, 231, 685 N.E.2d 754, citing 1 
Gotherman & Babbit, Ohio Municipal Law (1992) 119, Section T 7.37(B).  
Although a writ of mandamus will not control Webb’s exercise of her discretion, 
it will correct an abuse of that discretion.  Id. at 232, 685 N.E.2d 754 (“a writ of 
mandamus will issue to correct an abuse of such discretion by a nonjudicial public 
body or official”  [emphasis sic]). 
{¶ 28} Relators contend that Webb abused her limited discretion by 
refusing to certify the sufficiency and validity of relators’ initiative petition to the 
board of elections.  Webb claims that she had no duty to certify the petition, 
because the proposed ordinance concerns an administrative, instead of a 
legislative, subject, and its enactment would amount to a vain act because the 
ordinance proposes to take an action that the village cannot legally perform, i.e., 
approve the location of a grade separation that is not under consideration by 
ODOT. 
{¶ 29} For the following reasons, we hold that Webb abused her 
discretion by refusing to certify the sufficiency and validity of relators’ initiative 
petition to the board of elections. 
{¶ 30} Webb exceeded her limited, discretionary authority by attempting 
to resolve substantive questions not evident on the face of the petition.  The 
village clerk “does not inquire into questions not evident on the face of the 
petition or conduct a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding.”  Sinay, 80 Ohio St.3d 
at 231, 685 N.E.2d 754.  In Sinay, we observed that the discretion of city auditors 
and village clerks in determining the sufficiency and validity of initiative petitions 
is similar to the limited discretion of municipal legislative authorities in deciding 
the sufficiency of petitions to amend a city charter.  Id., citing Morris v. 
Macedonia City Council (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 52, 55, 641 N.E.2d 1075.  A 
municipal legislative authority’s discretion in these cases is “limited to matters of 
form, not substance,” is “more restricted than that of a board of elections,” does 
January Term, 2005 
9 
not involve “judicial or quasi-judicial determinations, e.g., analyzing if the 
requirements of R.C. 3501.38(F) have been satisfied,” and does not permit 
“inquir[ing] into questions not apparent on the face of the petitions themselves or 
which require the aid of witnesses to determine.”  Morris, 71 Ohio St.3d at 55, 
641 N.E.2d 1075. 
{¶ 31} Webb improperly engaged in a judicial or quasi-judicial 
determination to decide the manifestly substantive issues of whether the ordinance 
proposed by relators’ initiative petition involved a subject that the village was 
authorized to control by legislative action and whether enactment of the proposed 
ordinance would constitute a vain act.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Barberis v. Bay 
Village (1971), 31 Ohio Misc. 203, 204, 59 O.O.2d 366, 281 N.E.2d 209 
(“Whether any given action of a municipal council is legislative or administrative 
is a judicial question”); State ex rel. Citizens for a Better Portsmouth v. Sydnor 
(1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 49, 53, 572 N.E.2d 649 (“council’s authority is limited to 
approving the form of the petition, not its content”). 
{¶ 32} In fact, Webb refused to certify the sufficiency and validity of the 
initiative petition only after she sought information from an ODOT official about 
the status of the Main Street project mentioned in the proposed ordinance.  This 
Webb could not do.  See Morris, 71 Ohio St.3d at 55, 641 N.E.2d 1075 (“council 
cannot inquire into questions * * * which require the aid of witnesses to 
determine”). 
{¶ 33} Moreover, even assuming that Webb had the broader authority she 
claims to have in determining the sufficiency and validity of the initiative petition, 
she erred in determining that the petition was insufficient and invalid. 
{¶ 34} “Mandamus will not lie to compel a board of elections to submit an 
ordinance proposed by initiative petition to the electorate if the ordinance does not 
involve a subject which a municipality is authorized by law to control by 
legislative action.”  State ex rel. Hazel v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1997), 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
80 Ohio St.3d 165, 168, 685 N.E.2d 224; State ex rel. Rhodes v. Lake Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1967), 12 Ohio St.2d 4, 41 O.O.2d 2, 230 N.E.2d 347; Section 1f, 
Article II, the Ohio Constitution.  Administrative actions are not subject to 
initiative.  Hazel, 80 Ohio St.3d at 169, 685 N.E.2d 224.  “The test for 
determining whether the action of a legislative body is legislative or 
administrative is whether the action taken is one enacting a law, ordinance or 
regulation, or executing or administering a law, ordinance or regulation already in 
existence.”  Donnelly v. Fairview Park (1968), 13 Ohio St.2d 1, 42 O.O.2d 1, 233 
N.E.2d 500, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 35} The proposed ordinance here is legislative and thus subject to 
initiative because it would enact a law rather than simply execute or administer 
preexisting laws.  It specifies the location for the grade-separation project as well 
as the village’s financial contribution for that project.  This is not like the 
ordinance proposed in Rhodes, a case that Webb relies on to claim that the 
proposed ordinance is not subject to initiative.  Rhodes involved a proposed 
village resolution that the “President of the United States should bring all 
American troops home from Vietnam.”  Id.  See, also, State ex rel. Bevington v. 
Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections (May 2, 1979), Summit App. No. 9087, 1979 WL 
207624 (no right to place on ballot municipal initiative proposing an ordinance 
requesting a congressional investigation of an Ohio company).  Unlike the 
proposed ordinances in Rhodes and Bevington, the proposed ordinance here is not 
merely precatory and without legal effect.  The initiative does not expressly 
request a third party to do something – it sets a location for the project and the 
village’s contribution for the project.  If ODOT decides to construct a Maple 
Street overpass bridge, the proposed ordinance will bind the village to contribute 
five percent to its cost.  By contrast, the proposed ordinances in Rhodes and 
Bevington would not have bound the municipalities involved therein in any way. 
January Term, 2005 
11 
{¶ 36} In effect, relators’ proposed ordinance on the Maple Street 
Overpass Bridge Project is no more precatory or indefinite than Resolution No. 
2001-62, which the Wellington Village Council passed in 2001 to have the village 
contribute up to five percent of the cost for a grade separation to be constructed 
on S.R. 58. ODOT had not committed to construct the grade separation on S.R. 58 
at the time that Resolution No. 2001-62 was enacted, and in fact, has not done so 
at this time. 
{¶ 37} Moreover, Webb’s contention that passing the proposed ordinance 
would constitute a vain act based on State ex rel. Beckstedt v. Eyrich (1963), 120 
Ohio App. 338, 29 O.O.2d 170, 195 N.E.2d 371, also lacks merit.  See State ex 
rel. Moore v. Malone, 96 Ohio St.3d 417, 2002-Ohio-4821, 775 N.E.2d 812, ¶ 38 
(“Mandamus will not issue to compel a vain act”).  Beckstedt involved a proposed 
ordinance on whether a city council should “undertake an Urban Renewal 
program which includes federal financial assistance.”  Id. at 340, 29 O.O.2d 170, 
195 N.E.2d 371.  The initiative petition was deemed ineffective because it 
“propose[d] no enactment, provide[d] no detail or direction as to how the program 
should be undertaken, and provide[d] no form which could be construed as 
legislation whether effected by the people themselves or by the council.”  Id. at 
345, 29 O.O.2d 170, 195 N.E.2d 371.  The proposed ordinance here is 
considerably more detailed than the one at issue in Beckstedt and is at least as 
detailed as the one passed by the village in 2001.  And relators introduced 
evidence that ODOT would consider their proposed Maple Street location for the 
grade-separation project; thus, passing the ordinance would not necessarily be a 
vain act. 
{¶ 38} In effect, Webb’s claim that the proposed ordinance might, if 
enacted, violate R.C. 5501.31 by unilaterally changing the location of ODOT’s 
grade-separation project without ODOT’s approval is an attack on the legality or 
effectiveness of the ordinance instead of a challenge to the propriety of its 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
submission to the voters.  These claims are premature before the ordinance is 
passed by the electorate.  See State ex rel. DeBrosse v. Cool (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 
1, 6, 716 N.E.2d 1114 (“Any claims alleging the unconstitutionality or illegality 
of the substance of the proposed ordinance, or actions to be taken pursuant to the 
ordinance when enacted are premature before its approval by the electorate”). 
{¶ 39} Therefore, Webb abused her limited discretion in failing to certify 
the sufficiency and validity of the initiative petition to the board of elections by 
August 25. 
Lack of Adequate Remedy in the Ordinary Course of Law 
{¶ 40} Webb asserts that even if she had a clear legal duty under R.C. 
731.28 to certify the sufficiency and validity of the initiative petition to the board 
of elections, relators have an adequate remedy at law by way of Webb’s pending 
declaratory-judgment action to raise their claims. 
{¶ 41} A writ of mandamus will not be issued when there is a plain and 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  R.C. 2731.05.  In order for an 
alternative remedy to constitute an adequate remedy at law, it must be complete, 
beneficial, and speedy.  State ex rel. Smith v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common 
Pleas, 106 Ohio St.3d 151, 2005-Ohio-4103, 832 N.E.2d 1206, ¶ 19. 
{¶ 42} A declaratory judgment is not an adequate remedy here, because it 
is not sufficiently complete.  A declaratory judgment would not be a complete 
remedy unless coupled with extraordinary ancillary relief in the nature of a 
mandatory injunction to compel Webb to comply with R.C. 731.28 by certifying 
the sufficiency and validity of the initiative petition.  State ex rel. Webb v. Bliss, 
99 Ohio St.3d 166, 2003-Ohio-3049, 789 N.E.2d 1102, ¶ 23. 
{¶ 43} Nor is the pending declaratory-judgment action sufficiently 
speedy.  Given the proximity of the November 8 election, any appellate process 
would last well past the election.  State ex rel. Thurn v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 289, 292, 649 N.E.2d 1205.  In expedited election 
January Term, 2005 
13 
cases, “[t]he ‘ordinary course of law’ doctrine does not comprehend that a relator 
in a mandamus action be obliged to follow the suicidal course of filing a cross-
complaint in his opponent’s different action in another court which would 
foreclose his own suit in mandamus.”  State ex rel. Tulley v. Brown (1972), 29 
Ohio St.2d 235, 237, 58 O.O.2d 489, 281 N.E.2d 187.  Time was of the essence 
here once Webb received the petition back from the board of elections on August 
9.  She had until August 25 to certify the petition to the board for placement on 
the November 8 election ballot. 
{¶ 44} Webb erroneously relies on State ex rel. Citizens for Fair Taxation 
v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 749, 591 N.E.2d 691, to 
claim that her pending declaratory-judgment action was an adequate remedy.  In 
that case, the court held that a pending declaratory-judgment action constituted an 
adequate remedy barring an action for an extraordinary writ because the action 
had been filed against the relators bringing the mandamus action, and the 
complaint for declaratory relief “reflect[ed] the principal respondent’s promise to 
abide by the common pleas court’s declaration.”  Id. at 752, 591 N.E.2d 691. 
{¶ 45} Neither of these things is true of the pending declaratory-judgment 
case here.  Webb did not name all of the relators as parties to the declaratory-
judgment action, and the one relator she did name ─ Farago ─ was not served 
with the complaint.  See R.C. 2721.12(A) (“when declaratory relief is sought * * 
* all persons who have or claim any interest that would be affected by the 
declaration shall be made parties to the action or proceeding”).  In her common 
pleas court complaint, Webb does not promise to comply with any court order, 
and she seeks a declaration that because the petition is defective, she has no duty 
to certify its sufficiency and validity to the board of elections.  Even in her 
evidence submitted in this expedited election case, Webb has not promised to 
abide by any declaration of the common pleas court.  Instead, she states only that 
it is her “intention” to abide. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
{¶ 46} More important, in Citizens, the requested relief was to certify a 
referendum petition at either the upcoming primary or the next general election.  
Id. at 750, 591 N.E.2d 691.  Thus, a prompt resolution was not as necessary in 
that case as it is here, where the relators seek placement of the initiative on the 
November 8 ballot. 
{¶ 47} Based on the foregoing, relators have established their entitlement 
to a writ of mandamus to compel Webb to certify the sufficiency and validity of 
the initiative petition to the board of elections for placement on the November 8 
election ballot.  Webb received a copy of the petition as early as July 8, but did 
not make her erroneous objection to the substantive nature of the proposed 
ordinance until late August.  Because Webb’s unjustified delay in certifying the 
petition to the board of elections caused the August 25 deadline to pass, relators 
are entitled to the writ to compel certification of the petition for placement of the 
proposed ordinance on the November 8 election ballot.  Cf. Morris, 71 Ohio St.3d 
52, 641 N.E.2d 1075 (city council’s unjustified failure to promptly determine 
sufficiency of petition for city-charter amendment warranted writ of mandamus 
compelling inclusion of charter-amendment initiative on next election ballot even 
though constitutional deadline had passed).  Our holding is consistent with our 
duty to liberally construe municipal initiative provisions to permit the exercise of 
the power of initiative.  DeBrosse, 87 Ohio St.3d at 7, 716 N.E.2d 1114. 
Attorney Fees 
{¶ 48} Relators seek attorney fees pursuant to R.C. 733.61.  “The decision 
to award attorney fees to successful relators in an R.C. Chapter 733 taxpayer suit 
is within the court’s discretion.”  DeBrosse at 7, 716 N.E.2d 1114.  “In exercising 
this discretion, courts consider whether the case resulted in a public benefit and if 
respondents had a reasonable basis to support their position.”  State ex rel. Miles 
v. McSweeney, 96 Ohio St.3d 352, 2002-Ohio-4455, 775 N.E.2d 468, ¶ 29. 
January Term, 2005 
15 
{¶ 49} We deny relators’ request for attorney fees.  Although Webb’s 
position was ultimately erroneous, she had a reasonable basis for believing that 
she was acting properly by seeking the common pleas court’s guidance on 
whether to certify the initiative petition. 
{¶ 50} Based on the foregoing, we grant a writ of mandamus to compel 
respondent to certify the sufficiency and validity of relators’ initiative petition to 
the Lorain County Board of Elections for placement on the November 8, 2005 
election ballot. 
Writ granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and 
LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
Phillips & Co., L.P.A., and Gerald W. Phillips, for relators. 
 
Baumgartner & O’Toole and Stephen P. Bond, Wellington Village 
Solicitor, for respondent. 
______________________