Case Title: State v. Neill

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018AP000075-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2020-02-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
2020 WI 15 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP75-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Charles L. Neill, IV, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2019 WI App 4, 385 Wis. 2d 471,922 N.W.2d 861 - 
Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 14, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 14, 2019   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis R. Cimpl   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a 
unanimous Court. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Michael C. Sanders, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul attorney general there was an oral 
argument by Michael C. Sanders.  
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Pamela Moorshead, assistant state public defender. There 
was an oral argument by Pamela Moorshead. 
 
 
 
 
2020 WI 15
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP75-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2016CR2997) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Charles L. Neill, IV, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 14, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a 
unanimous Court. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   Charles L. Neill, IV seeks 
review of the court of appeals decision1 affirming the judgment 
and order upholding his sentence for third-offense OWI.2  This 
                                                 
1 State v. Neill, 2019 WI App 4, 385 Wis. 2d 471, 922 
N.W.2d 861. 
2 The Honorable Dennis R. Cimpl of the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court presided. 
No. 
2018AP75-CR   
 
2 
 
appeal involves only the $4,800 fine Neill was ordered to pay.  
The issue presented requires the interpretation of the penalty 
enhancers in Wisconsin's OWI statutes.  Specifically, we consider 
how the penalty enhancers' provisions requiring "doubling" and 
"quadrupling" of the fine for a third-offense OWI should be 
determined when multiple penalty enhancers apply.  Neill faced two 
penalty enhancers:  (1) having a minor passenger in his car, which 
requires doubling of the fine, and (2) driving with a high blood 
alcohol concentration, which requires quadrupling of his fine. 
¶2 
The court of appeals decided that the first penalty 
enhancer changes the "applicable minimum" fine Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am)3 sets for third-offense OWI, and as a result, when 
applying the second penalty enhancer, a court must use this 
already-enhanced applicable minimum instead of the specific 
applicable 
minimum 
for 
third-offense 
OWI 
contained 
in 
§ 346.65(2)(am)3. 
¶3 
We reject this interpretation.  The statute's text 
requires that each penalty enhancer use the specific "applicable 
minimum" contained in Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)3, which for 
third-offense OWI is $600.  Accordingly, the court of appeals erred 
when it affirmed the $4,800 fine imposed by the circuit court.  
Because the text of § 346.65(2)(am)3 sets the minimum applicable 
fine at $600, both penalty enhancers must be calculated using $600 
as the applicable minimum. 
                                                 
"OWI" is the commonly-used acronym for operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant or other drug. 
No. 
2018AP75-CR   
 
3 
 
¶4 
Neill's first penalty enhancer for OWI with a minor 
passenger, Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(f)2, requires "the applicable 
fine" be doubled.  Accordingly, the circuit court should have 
started with $600 and multiplied it by two for an enhanced fine of 
$1,200.  Neill's second penalty enhancer for OWI with a high BAC, 
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(g)3, requires "the applicable fine" in 
§ 346.65(2)(am)3 be quadrupled.  Consequently, the circuit court 
should have started with $600 and multiplied it by four for an 
enhanced fine of $2,400.  These two fines total $3,600, not $4,800.  
We reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand with 
directions to amend the judgment to require Neill to pay a fine of 
$3,600. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
In July 2016, Neill was arrested for OWI.  At the time, 
he had his one-year-old child in the car and had a blood alcohol 
concentration of .353 percent.  The State charged Neill with third-
offense OWI, based on his prior convictions from 2005 and 2008.  
The Complaint and the Information listed the charge as:  third-
offense OWI "with a minor child in the vehicle."  These documents 
then listed the .353 percent blood alcohol concentration under 
"penalty enhancer." 
¶6 
Neill pled guilty to third-offense OWI and the circuit 
court imposed and stayed a sentence of 15 months initial 
confinement followed by 9 months of extended supervision.  The 
circuit court placed Neill on probation for 3 years with 6 months 
jail time as a condition of probation.  The circuit court imposed 
a fine of $4,800. 
No. 
2018AP75-CR   
 
4 
 
¶7 
During sentencing, defense counsel objected to the 
$4,800 fine: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor . . . our position 
is that the minimum fine would be four times the regular 
minimum fine of $600. 
I know the State is of the position it should be 
multiplied by eight because of the two possible 
enhancers.  I don't see anything in the statutes or case 
law that direct us whether those multipliers -- the one 
for having the child in the car and one for the high BAC 
-- should be multiplied together, if the Court's 
following me, so because --  
THE COURT:  The minimum fine is $1,200.  It must be 
multiplied by four because of his BAC. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  What is the Court citing? 
THE COURT:  I'm looking at the complaint.  
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  And the-- 
THE COURT:  The complaint says that the minimum 
fine for a third offense under 343.307(1) since January 
1st, 1989 be fined not less than $1,200, nor more than 
$4,000. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I'm-- 
THE COURT: . . . [B]ecause the BAC -- the penalty 
enhancer for the BAC, he had an alcohol concentration of 
.25 or above, the applicable minimum and maximum fines 
are quadrupled, so that's why it's $4,800. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . .  Where I'm getting my 
information from is 346.65, which is the penalty section 
for OWIs -- 
THE COURT:  Yep. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: -- (2)(3), which is penalties 
for third offense.  The minimum fine is $600. 
THE COURT: . . .  It's not a third offense.  It's 
this offense. 
No. 
2018AP75-CR   
 
5 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  And-- 
THE COURT: And the minimum fine for this offense, 
operating while intoxicated third offense with a minor 
child . . . in the vehicle is $1,200.  And by law 
. . . because of his BAC, it has to be quadrupled.  I 
don't have any choice.  I don't like it, but that's what 
the law says. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  And I-- 
THE COURT:  So his fine is $4,800. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Judge, I just want to make a 
record. 
THE COURT:  Go ahead. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Make my objection in case Mr. 
Neill wants to appeal what the minimum fine is.  What we 
have is -- is two penalty enhancers, and we don't have 
any direction from the statutes or case law from what I 
can tell that tell us whether they should both be applied 
together, you know, minimum fine of six hundred times 
two and the times four because it's -- there's no statute 
covering that situation. 
The way we get to [$]1,200 is because of (f)(2) of 
that same section that doubles the minimum fine if 
there's a child in the car.  And then we have the section 
on the BAC, which is (g)(3), which says that if the BAC 
is .25 or above the minimum fines are quadrupled.  But 
there's nothing to say they should be multiplied 
together four and the times two.  So our position is 
that since it's ambiguous, the rule of leniency means 
that only one of those should apply, and it should be 
the quadrupled. 
THE COURT:  I don't see any ambiguity at all.  The 
minimum fine is $1,200 for this crime, and by law, this 
crime's minimum has to be quadrupled to [$]4,800.  I 
don't like it.  That's what the statute says, so the 
fine is $4,800. 
¶8 
The circuit court entered judgment imposing a fine of 
$4,800.  In October 2017, Neill filed a postconviction motion 
asking the circuit court to decrease the $4,800 fine.  The motion 
No. 
2018AP75-CR   
 
6 
 
alleged the circuit court failed to use the $600 applicable minimum 
from the statute in assessing the fine and instead incorrectly 
used the $1,200 applicable minimum alleged in the Complaint.  As 
noted, the Complaint listed the crime as "Operating a motor vehicle 
while intoxicated – Third Offense, with a minor child in the 
vehicle" and listed a single penalty enhancer for high BAC.  The 
Complaint listed the minimum fine as $1,200.  Neill's motion 
asserted that having a minor child in the car is a penalty 
enhancer——that the offense itself is OWI-third, and as a result of 
the misstatement in the Complaint, the circuit court incorrectly 
used $1,200 as the minimum fine instead of $600.  Neill's 
postconviction motion argued that only the greater penalty 
enhancer should apply because the lesser penalty enhancer should 
be subsumed within the greater.  In other words, because the 
doubled penalty enhancer resulted in a $1,200 fine and the 
quadrupled penalty enhancer resulted in a $2,400 fine, Neill argued 
he should have to pay only the greater of the two——$2,400. 
¶9 
The circuit court acknowledged that it incorrectly 
relied on the Complaint instead of the OWI statutes in computing 
the fine: 
Viewing the complaint in isolation, it appears that 
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated – third 
offense, with minor child in vehicle is a criminal 
offense in and of itself, but upon a review of the 
statutes, it becomes clear that the crime is operating 
a motor vehicle [while] intoxicated (3rd offense) and 
that "with minor in vehicle" is a penalty enhancer, which 
not only doubles the minimum and maximum penalties but 
also converts the offense from a misdemeanor to a felony.  
Although the State did not charge the "with minor child 
in vehicle" provision as a penalty enhancer, presumably 
No. 
2018AP75-CR   
 
7 
 
for purposes of prosecuting this case in felony court, 
that is essentially what it is, and therefore, the 
complaint does not control the outcome of [the fine in] 
this case. 
¶10 Nonetheless, the circuit court disagreed with Neill's 
position that the lesser fine is simply subsumed within the greater 
fine.  The circuit court said both penalty enhancers should be 
applied under State v. Beasley, 2004 WI App 42, ¶14, 271 
Wis. 2d 469, 
678 
N.W.2d 600 
(recognizing 
multiple 
penalty 
enhancers may be applied), and refused to adopt Neill's position 
because doing so would give effect to only one of the penalty 
enhancers.  Without further explanation, the circuit court found 
the proper fine to be $4,800. 
¶11 Neill appealed the circuit court's decision to the court 
of appeals, which affirmed in a 2-1 decision.  State v. Neill, 
2019 WI App 4, 385 Wis. 2d 471, 922 N.W.2d 861.  The majority of 
the court of appeals held that application of the first penalty 
enhancer "altered" the applicable minimum fine starting point.  
Id., ¶23.  In other words, once the first penalty enhancer has 
been applied, a court uses the enhanced number instead of the $600 
when it applies the second penalty enhancer.  Because the first 
penalty enhancer doubled the $600 to $1,200, the court of appeals 
concluded the $1,200 must be used as the starting number when 
applying the second penalty enhancer.  Quadrupling the $1,200 
resulted in an aggregate enhanced fine of $4,800. 
No. 
2018AP75-CR   
 
8 
 
¶12 Presiding Judge Joan F. Kessler, dissented.3  Judge 
Kessler "disagree[d] that the application of multiple penalty 
enhancers changes the minimum base fine."  Id., ¶25.  The dissent 
asserted that the plain text of the statute does not allow the 
calculation described by the court of appeals majority: 
The statute does not state that penalty enhancers 
are to be multiplied by each other, which is what the 
trial court did here.  The Majority states that the 
statute does not preclude a trial court from changing a 
base fine by multiplying penalty enhancers together, but 
the statute does not specifically instruct a court to 
apply the second or subsequent multiplier to an already 
multiplied fine.  We may not add words to the statute's 
text.  Words excluded from a statutory text must be 
presumed to have been excluded for a purpose. 
The statute plainly states that the "base fine" for 
a third OWI offense is $600.  Nothing in the statute 
instructs us to apply sequential enhancers to any figure 
other than the base fine set out in the statute. 
Each penalty enhancer must be separately applied.  
See Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2).  Applying the enhancer for 
having a minor in the car ($1200) and the enhancer for 
a prohibited BAC ($2400) results in a total fine of $3600 
when the plain language the legislature chose is 
applied. 
Neill, 385 Wis. 2d 471, ¶¶27-29 (citations omitted). 
¶13 Neill petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Judge Joan F. Kessler presided over District I Court of 
Appeals at the time of Neill's decision. 
No. 
2018AP75-CR   
 
9 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶14 This case involves the interpretation of statutes, which 
presents "a question of law we review independently[.]"  State v. 
Hinkle, 2019 WI 96, ¶14, 389 Wis. 2d 1, 935 N.W.2d 271. 
III.  STATUTES 
¶15 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.63(1) prohibits any person from 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence.4  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 346.65 sets forth the penalties for violating § 346.63(1).  
Three of the OWI penalty statutes are at issue in this case. 
¶16 The first is the general penalty statute for third- 
offense OWI, Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)3, which provides: 
Any person violating s. 346.63 (1): 
Except as provided in pars. (cm), (f), and (g), shall be 
fined not less than $600 nor more than $2,000 and 
imprisoned for not less than 45 days nor more than one 
year in the county jail if the number of convictions 
under ss. 940.09 (1) and 940.25 in the person's lifetime, 
plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.63(1) provides as pertinent: 
No person may drive or operate a motor vehicle while: 
(a) Under the influence of an intoxicant, a controlled 
substance, a controlled substance analog or any 
combination of an intoxicant, a controlled substance and 
a controlled substance analog, under the influence of 
any other drug to a degree which renders him or her 
incapable of safely driving, or under the combined 
influence of an intoxicant and any other drug to a degree 
which renders him or her incapable of safely driving; or 
 . . . . 
(b) The person has a prohibited alcohol concentration. 
 
No. 
2018AP75-CR   
 
10 
 
other convictions counted under s. 343.307 (1), equals 
3, except that suspensions, revocations, or convictions 
arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be 
counted as one. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶17 The second is the penalty enhancer for third-offense OWI 
with a minor in the car, Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(f)2, which 
provides: 
If there was a minor passenger under 16 years of age in 
the motor vehicle at the time of the violation that gave 
rise to the conviction under s. 346.63 (1), the 
applicable minimum and maximum fines and imprisonment 
under par. (am) 2. to 7. for the conviction are doubled.  
An offense under s. 346.63 (1) that subjects a person to 
a penalty under par. (am) 3., 4., 5., 6., or 7. when 
there is a minor passenger under 16 years of age in the 
motor vehicle is a felony and the place of imprisonment 
shall be determined under s. 973.02. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶18 The third is the penalty enhancer for having a high BAC 
in an OWI-third, Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(g)3, which provides: 
If a person convicted had an alcohol concentration of 
0.25 or above, the applicable minimum and maximum fines 
under par. (am) 3. to 5. are quadrupled.  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶19 Resolving the issue presented in this case depends on 
construing 
the 
emphasized 
text 
in 
these 
three 
statutes 
collectively. 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
¶20 The parties proffer three interpretations of the 
statutory text: 
(1) Neill proposes that quadrupling the applicable 
minimum fine pursuant to one penalty enhancer subsumes the 
No. 
2018AP75-CR   
 
11 
 
doubling of the fine under the other penalty enhancer; because 
the quadrupled fine of $2,400 is higher than $1,200, Neill 
argues he should be required to pay only the $2,400;  
(2) The circuit court, the majority of the court of 
appeals, and the State would start with the minimum fine of 
$600, then double it to $1,200 to get a new applicable fine, 
and then use $1,200 as the new minimum to be quadrupled under 
the other penalty enhancer, resulting in a fine of $4,800; 
and  
(3) In the alternative, Neill advances Judge Kessler's 
interpretation, which would double and quadruple the $600 and 
then add those amounts. 
We hold the text of these statutes supports only Judge Kessler's 
interpretation. 
A.  Rules of Statutory Interpretation 
¶21 When interpreting statutes, we start with the language 
of the statutes, and if the meaning of the text is plain, we go no 
further.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  "Statutory language is given its 
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning."  Id.  In determining the meaning of 
the text, context and the statute's structure are important so 
that the words are not viewed in isolation, but are considered 
together with "closely-related" statutes.  Id., ¶46.  The goal is 
to interpret the statute in a reasonable way, which avoids "absurd 
or unreasonable results."  Id. 
No. 
2018AP75-CR   
 
12 
 
¶22 We also attempt "to give reasonable effect to every word, 
in order to avoid surplusage," id., and apply the fundamental canon 
of statutory construction that "[n]othing is to be added to what 
the text states or reasonably implies[.]"  Id.; Antonin Scalia & 
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 93 
(2012).  "A matter not covered is to be treated as not covered."  
Lopez-Quintero v. Dittmann, 2019 WI 58, ¶18, 387 Wis. 2d 50, 928 
N.W.2d 480 (quoting Scalia & Garner, Reading Law 93). 
¶23 "One of the maxims of statutory construction is that 
courts should not add words to a statute to give it a certain 
meaning."  Fond Du Lac Cty. v. Town of Rosendale, 149 Wis. 2d 326, 
334, 440 N.W.2d 818 (Ct. App. 1989) (citation omitted); see also 
Dawson v. Town of Jackson, 2011 WI 77, ¶42, 336 Wis. 2d 318, 801 
N.W.2d 316 ("We decline to read into the statute words the 
legislature did not see fit to write." (citation omitted)); State 
v. Wiedmeyer, 2016 WI App 46, ¶13, 370 Wis. 2d 187, 881 N.W.2d 805 
("It is not up to the courts to rewrite the plain words of 
statutes[.]").  "[R]ather, we interpret the words the legislature 
actually enacted into law."  State v. Fitzgerald, 2019 WI 69, ¶30, 
387 Wis. 2d 384, 929 N.W.2d 165. 
B.  Application 
¶24 We start, then, with the language of the pertinent 
statutes to see whether the meaning of the text is plain.  We 
conclude that it is and that Judge Kessler's interpretation of 
these statutes is correct. 
¶25 The text of the statute setting the fine for third- 
offense OWI plainly says that anyone who violates the OWI statute 
No. 
2018AP75-CR   
 
13 
 
a third time "shall be fined not less than $600."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am)3.  This language establishes a minimum fine for a 
third-offense OWI of $600.  Section 346.65(2)(am)3 does have an 
"except" clause that refers to "pars. (cm), (f), and (g)."  None 
of the referenced paragraphs changes the $600 starting point.  
Paragraph (cm) applies only when a county "opts to offer a reduced 
minimum period of imprisonment for the successful completion of a 
probation period that includes alcohol and other drug treatment" 
and is not applicable here.  Paragraphs (f) and (g) contain the 
penalty enhancers applicable in this case. 
¶26 Paragraph (f) is the penalty enhancer for OWIs when minor 
passengers are in the car.  See Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(f).  
Paragraph (g) is the penalty enhancer for high BACs.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 346.65(2)(g).  The text of each penalty enhancer refers us 
to the "applicable minimum" in § 346.65(2)(am)3, which is $600.  
See 
§ 346.65(2)(f)2 
(referencing 
"the 
applicable 
minimum . . . under [Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)] par. (am) 2. to 7."); 
§ 346.65(2)(g) (referencing "the applicable minimum . . . under 
[Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)] par. (am) 3. to 5."). 
¶27 The term "applicable" is used because of the overall 
structure of the OWI statute——the applicable minimum (and also the 
maximum fine and imprisonment time)——varies depending upon which 
number OWI is involved.  Paragraph (f) covers second offense OWIs 
through tenth (or more) OWIs.  See Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(f)2 ("the 
applicable minimum and maximum fines and imprisonment under par. 
(am) 2. to 7. [referencing statutes for second through tenth or 
more OWIs] for the conviction are doubled").  Paragraph (g) covers 
No. 
2018AP75-CR   
 
14 
 
only third, fourth, and fifth or sixth OWIs.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(g)3 ("the applicable minimum and maximum fines under 
par. (am) 3. to 5. [referencing statutes for third, fourth, and 
fifth or sixth OWIs] are quadrupled").  The minimum fine for each 
OWI varies depending on which number offense it is.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am). 
¶28 For a third-OWI conviction, the "applicable minimum" is 
$600.  Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)3.  The text of paragraph (f) 
instructs a court to "double" the $600.  The text of paragraph (g) 
instructs a court to "quadruple" the $600.  There is nothing in 
the text suggesting that application of the first penalty enhancer 
"alters" or "increases" or sets a higher minimum fine for third-
OWI when the second penalty enhancer also applies.  The text does 
not direct a court to start with the already "doubled" fine or the 
already "quadrupled" fine when applying a second penalty enhancer.  
Rather, it plainly instructs a court to use the "applicable 
minimum" for third-OWI contained in § 346.65(2)(am)3.  Adopting 
the construction espoused in the majority opinion of the court of 
appeals would require rewriting the statute or adding words to 
make the "applicable minimum" vary based not on the number of OWIs 
of which an offender has been convicted, but on what penalty 
enhancers apply.  A court's job is not to rewrite a statute.  See 
Segregated Account v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2017 WI 71, 
¶15, 376 Wis. 2d 528, 898 N.W.2d 70.  Alteration of the minimum 
applicable fine when multiple penalty enhancers apply lies with 
the legislature, not this court. 
No. 
2018AP75-CR   
 
15 
 
¶29 Similarly, the text of the statute does not support 
Neill's position that when both penalty enhancers apply, the lesser 
penalty enhancer is subsumed by the greater enhancer.  Nothing in 
the text of the statute suggests giving effect to the greater 
enhancer alone when multiple penalty enhancers apply.  We must 
apply the text as written, which requires a fine for both driving 
drunk with a minor passenger and a fine for driving with a high 
BAC.  "Penalty enhancers . . . authorize specified increases to 
separate specified penalties for underlying crimes.  Thus, the 
underlying crime has a penalty, and the enhancer adds an additional 
penalty."  Beasley, 271 Wis. 2d 469, ¶14.  In order to give effect 
to both penalty enhancers, the fine associated with each must be 
paid. 
¶30 We interpret the text of the OWI statutes to mean what 
it says.  The text of these statutes is plain.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am)3 says the minimum fine for third-OWI is $600.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 346.65(2)(f)2 requires doubling the $600 fine.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 346.65(2)(g)3 requires quadrupling the $600 
fine.  The statute requires Neill be fined $1,200 as a result of 
the first penalty enhancer and $2,400 for the second penalty 
No. 
2018AP75-CR   
 
16 
 
enhancer for a total fine of $3,600.  This interpretation applies 
both penalty enhancers and follows the text as it is written.5 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶31 We conclude the plain text of the statute requires a 
court sentencing a defendant convicted of a third-offense OWI with 
penalty enhancers for having a minor in the car and a high BAC to 
impose a fine reflecting both penalty enhancers.  The minimum fine 
for third-offense OWI is $600 under Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)3. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 346.65(2)(f)2 requires the "applicable minimum" 
in paragraph (am)3 to be doubled for having a minor in the car, 
resulting in a minimum fine of $1,200 for that penalty enhancer.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 346.65(2)(g)3 requires the "applicable minimum" 
in paragraph (am)3 to be quadrupled for having a high BAC, 
resulting in a minimum fine of $2,400 for that penalty enhancer.  
Applying the enhanced fines in Neill's case requires him to pay 
$1,200 for having a minor passenger plus $2,400 for having a high 
BAC.  These two fines total $3,600, not $4,800.  The court of 
appeals erred when it affirmed the $4,800 fine imposed by the 
circuit court.  We reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
                                                 
5 Although ambiguity was raised in the lower court, no one 
asserts ambiguity before this court.  We see no ambiguity in these 
statutes.  "A statute is not ambiguous simply because the parties 
disagree as to its meaning.  Rather, a statute is ambiguous if 
reasonable people can understand it in more than one way."  Preston 
v. Meriter Hosp., Inc., 2005 WI 122, ¶20, 284 Wis. 2d 264, 700 
N.W.2d 158.  That is not the case here. 
No. 
2018AP75-CR   
 
17 
 
and remand with directions to amend the judgment to require Neill 
pay a fine of $3,600.6 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 The court ordered supplemental briefs in this case after 
the State informed the court that it thought a recently decided 
unpublished court of appeals case, State v. Culver, No. 2018AP799-
CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 25, 2019), would 
impact our decision in Neill's case.  The State interprets Culver 
to say that when the application of a penalty enhancer makes the 
OWI a felony instead of a misdemeanor, the penalty enhancer is no 
longer a penalty enhancer; instead, third-offense OWI with a minor 
in the car is its own crime carrying a minimum fine of $1,200.  
This, the State contends, means that Neill's minimum fine is $1,200 
and when the high-BAC penalty enhancer requiring quadrupling of 
the minimum fine is applied, the resulting fine is $4,800.  We 
reject the State's contention. 
Culver involved a dispute over how to calculate the extended 
supervision portion of a sentence and whether a fifth- offense OWI 
with a minor passenger was a classified or unclassified offense.  
Culver, No. 2018AP799-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶1-3, 13.  The 
court of appeals in Culver did not conduct a statutory analysis to 
resolve this issue.  Instead, it relied entirely on a footnote in 
State v. Jackson, 2004 WI 29, ¶37 n.8, 270 Wis. 2d 113, 676 
N.W.2d 872, referencing 2004 OWI law, which has since been amended 
by the legislature.  See Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)4m (2011-12).  
Neither party to the Culver case petitioned this court for review 
and this court is not bound by Culver, an unpublished court of 
appeals decision. 
Regardless, it is not necessary for us to analyze the Culver 
case because, as we have already explained, the plain text of the 
statutes controls the disposition of the issue presented in Neill's 
petition for review. 
No. 
2018AP75-CR   
 
2 
 
 
 
No. 
2018AP75-CR   
 
 
 
1