Case Title: Smith v. First State Animal Center & SPCA, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 559, 2018

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2019-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JOHN SMITH, 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 559, 2018 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
C.A. No. S15C-12-025 ESB 
FIRST STATE ANIMAL CENTER § 
AND SPCA, KATELYN PEPPER, 
§ 
SANDRA GALLOWAY, DAVID 
§ 
HULSE, KEVIN USILTON, MARY § 
PALACIO, and SHERRI  
 
§ 
WARBURTON,  
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Defendants Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellees.  
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted: June 12, 2019 
Decided: 
June 13, 2019 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and SEITZ, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
(1) 
The appellant and plaintiff below, John Smith, appeals from the 
Superior Court’s entry of summary judgment for the defendants, the First State 
Animal Center and SPCA and various individuals employed by the SPCA.1  On 
appeal, Smith challenges the trial court’s rulings on his claims against the defendants 
                                                          
 
1 Smith v. First State Animal Ctr. and SPCA, Inc., 2018 WL 4829991, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 
4, 2018). 
2 
 
for false arrest or imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and violation of his 
constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 
(2) 
These claims arise out of an incident in which Smith’s dog, Millie, 
attacked both a neighbor’s dog and the neighbor, causing serious injury to the 
neighbor’s dog.  After an investigation, the SPCA sought to quarantine Millie for a 
limited time and, due in part to a previous biting incident involving Millie, label her 
a dangerous dog.  Accordingly, the SPCA seized Millie under the authority of a 
warrant and kept her in its kennel for about a month pending the dangerous dog 
hearing. 
(3) 
After Smith took certain actions that the SPCA claims obstructed its 
investigative and enforcement efforts, the SPCA obtained an arrest warrant against 
Smith for one count of maintaining a dangerous animal that causes death or physical 
injury to another animal and one count of hindering prosecution.  Smith turned 
himself in and was promptly released pending trial after being processed. 
(4) 
Ultimately, a dangerous dog hearing panel determined that Millie was 
potentially dangerous and let Smith and his wife take her back home after agreeing 
to additional safety precautions.  The Delaware Department of Justice also dropped 
the criminal charges against Smith. 
                                                          
 
2 Smith does not challenge the trial court’s ruling on his intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claim. 
3 
 
(4) 
Each of Smith’s claims below and on appeal relate to the SPCA’s 
decision to obtain either the arrest warrant (as to Smith) or seizure warrant (as to 
Millie).  There are essentially two premises underlying his claims.  First, Smith 
argues that the SPCA and its officers did him wrong because the officers who swore 
out the warrants lacked the authority to do so.  That is, Smith argues, the law in effect 
at the time required that to be done by a certified police officer.  Second, Smith 
argues that the SPCA lacked probable cause to arrest him because he had not done 
anything that comes close to hindering prosecution. 
(5) 
As to Smith’s false arrest or imprisonment claim, we agree with the 
Superior Court that the SPCA officer who swore out the arrest warrant had (i) the 
necessary authority to arrest Smith for maintaining a dangerous animal; and (ii) 
probable cause to do so.3 
                                                          
 
3 As a result, we need not and therefore do not address whether we would find probable cause for 
the hindering prosecution charge in this case.  A defendant is not liable for false arrest unless the 
arrest was “unlawful,” Hunt ex rel. DeSombre v. State, 69 A.3d 360, 368 (Del. 2013) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), and an arrest made under a valid warrant issued by the Justice of the 
Peace Court defeats any such claim except under rare circumstances, such as when the defendant 
has misled the magistrate as to the facts supporting the warrant, see Boulden v. Turner, 2007 WL 
3378662, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 12, 2007).  Here, Smith concedes on appeal that he “affirmed 
the factual substance of the affidavit” supporting the warrant for his arrest, which describes the 
serious injuries that his dog inflicted on two other animals.  Opening Br. at 17 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  That is, Smith affirmed that the SPCA officer gave a truthful account in seeking 
the warrant.  Not only that, but the Justice of the Peace Court found the warrant established 
probable cause, and the Superior Court also did so in this case.  Therefore, without needing to 
determine the probable cause issue ourselves, it is plain that the SPCA officer did not engage in 
deceptive or improper conduct in obtaining a warrant for hindering prosecution from the relevant 
court with jurisdiction.  Accordingly, any restraint of Smith was not “unlawful,” and there is no 
liability for false arrest or imprisonment. 
4 
 
(6) 
As to Smith’s malicious prosecution claim, we affirm on the basis that 
Smith failed to introduce evidence that would support a jury finding that the SPCA 
officer who swore out the arrest warrant acted with actual malice in doing so. 
(7) 
As to Smith’s § 1983 claims, we affirm on three grounds.  First, we 
agree with the Superior Court that the individual defendants are protected by 
qualified immunity to the extent that Smith’s claims are premised on a purported 
lack of authority to swear out warrants.  Second, to the extent that Smith’s § 1983 
claims against the individual defendants are premised on a purported lack of 
probable cause to arrest him, these claims fail because the undisputed facts establish 
as a matter of law that the SPCA had probable cause to arrest him for maintaining a 
dangerous animal.4  Finally, Smith’s claims against the SPCA fail under the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services of the 
City of New York.5 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is hereby AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice  
 
                                                          
 
4 As with the false arrest claim, we need not and do not address Smith’s argument that the SPCA 
officer lacked probable cause to arrest him for hindering prosecution. 
5 436 U.S. 658 (1978).