Case Title: Jett v. Ford Motor Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S49787

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: JULY 3, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

TRUDY JETT
and RON JETT,
	Petitioners on Review,
	v.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,
	Respondent on Review,
	and
MILLIGAN MOTORS, INC.,
an Oregon corporation,
	Defendant.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,
and MILLIGAN MOTORS, INC.,
an Oregon corporation,
	Third-Party Plaintiffs,
	v.
TIM TESTERMAN,
dba Advanced Auto Detailing,
	Third-Party Defendant.
(CC 9801-00538; CA A111123; SC S49787)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted March 5, 2003.
	W. Eugene Hallman, Hallman & Dretke, Pendleton, argued the
cause and filed the briefs for petitioners on review.
	John McCauley, Venable LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, argued the
cause for respondent on review.  With him on the briefs were
Michael T. Garone, Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, PC, Portland, and
Jonathan M. Hoffman, Martin, Bischoff, Templeton, Langslet &
Hoffman, LLP, Portland.
	Before, Carson, Chief Justice, Gillette, Durham, Riggs, De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.
	DE MUNIZ, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
	*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Marshall L. Amiton, Judge. 183 Or App 260, 52 P3d 441 (2002).
		DE MUNIZ, J.
This is a civil case in which plaintiff filed an action 
against defendant Ford Motor Company (Ford), alleging that a
delivery truck that she operated as an employee of United Parcel
Service (UPS) was defective and injured her. (1)  At trial, Ford
denied that the truck was defective and also contended that
plaintiff had been negligent and had contributed to her injuries. 
The jury concluded that Ford was 85-percent liable and that
plaintiff was 15-percent liable.  Ford appealed from the judgment
entered on the jury's verdict.
		On appeal, Ford assigned error to the trial court's
refusal to admit into evidence portions of certain UPS safety
rules, the trial court's instruction on comparative fault, and
the denial of Ford's motion for mistrial based on plaintiff's
counsel's closing argument.  The Court of Appeals reasoned that
this court's decisions in Jones v. Mitchell Bros, 266 Or 513, 511
P2d 347 (1973), and Hansen v. Abrasive Engineering and
Manufacturing, 317 Or 378, 856 P2d 625 (1993), permit a trier of
fact to consider a company's internal safety rules when those
rules are relevant in determining the standard of care that a
party was required to exercise in the circumstances.  The Court
of Appeals concluded that "the safety [rules were] relevant to
the reasonableness of plaintiff's conduct" and that the exclusion
of the rules had at least some likelihood of affecting the jury's
assessment of comparative fault.  Jett v. Ford Motor Co., 183 Or
App 260, 266-69, 52 P3d 441 (2002).  The Court of Appeals,
therefore, reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the
case to that court.  Id.  The Court of Appeals did not address
Ford's other two assignments of error, concluding that Ford had
not preserved its assignment of error relating to the comparative
fault instruction and that, in light of the disposition of the
case, the court did not need to reach Ford's assignment of error
regarding the mistrial motion.  We allowed plaintiff's petition
for review and now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals
and remand to that court for further proceedings.
		On review, plaintiff argues that the UPS safety rules
were not relevant to prove the pertinent standard of care and
that, even if they were, they would have tended to confuse the
jury.  Ford's response is that the Court of Appeals correctly
concluded that, under this court's decisions, internal safety
rules can be admissible to prove the standard of care in specific
instances.  
		Plaintiff, however, makes an additional argument, one
that, if well taken, would obviate our need to determine whether
the particular safety rules in this case were admissible. 
Plaintiff maintains that rules governing our appellate standard
of review require us to affirm the trial court judgment because
any error in excluding the UPS safety rules did not substantially
affect Ford's rights.  We now address that argument and, in doing
so, we assume, for purposes of this opinion, that the UPS safety
rules were relevant and that the trial court erred in refusing to
admit them into evidence.
		Two related standards govern our consideration of
evidentiary questions on appellate review.  First, "[n]o judgment
shall be reversed or modified except for error substantially
affecting the rights of a party."  ORS 19.415(2).  See Mable Shoup v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 335 Or 164, 173, 61 P3d 928 (2003) ("The
possibility that an error might have resulted in a different jury
verdict is insufficient under [ORS 19.415(2)].  Instead, the
court must be able to conclude, from the record, that the error
'substantially affect[ed]' the right of the losing party."). 
Second, "[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits
or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected[.]"  OEC 103(1). 
		The Court of Appeals summarized the facts as follows:
	"Plaintiff was a professional package delivery truck
driver for UPS.  On April 22, 1996, she reported that
her regular truck was difficult to shift.  Two days
later, she again reported trouble with shifting.  On
April 29, the truck was taken in for servicing, and
plaintiff was given a replacement truck.  Plaintiff,
however, reported that the replacement vehicle also was
difficult to shift.  On April 30, the individual
responsible for truck maintenance and service spoke
with plaintiff about the shifting problem with the
replacement truck.  He told plaintiff that the
replacement truck was unsafe and that she should wait
until later that morning to do her rounds, when her
regular truck would be available.
		"Plaintiff declined to wait.  She loaded the
replacement truck with parcels, turned on the ignition,
and pulled the truck forward approximately 10 feet. 
Immediately, however, she encountered difficulty with
the gear shift.  She moved the transmission shift lever
to 'neutral.'  She believes that she set the parking
brake, because that was her usual practice.  With the
engine still running, she got out of the truck and
walked behind it to retrieve some additional packages. 
While she was standing between the rear of the truck
and the loading dock, the truck rolled back and pinned
her against the dock, causing severe injuries.
		"Before trial, plaintiffs moved to exclude
evidence of the UPS safety rules concerning the proper
procedure for the disposition of delivery trucks before
getting out of them.  Initially, the trial court ruled
that the rules are relevant to the issues of
comparative negligence and denied plaintiffs' motion. 
The following day, however, the trial court
reconsidered.  The court drew a distinction between
internal company safety rules and a safety-related law
or regulation.  Citing Jones v. Mitchell Bros, 266 Or
513, 511 P2d 347 (1973), and Jones v. Montgomery Ward,
49 Or App 231, 619 P2d 907 (1980), the court held that
the former are not relevant, while the latter are. 
Accordingly, the trial court decided to allow
plaintiffs' motion to exclude evidence of UPS safety
rules.
		"At trial, Ford offered the testimony of Isfeld, a
UPS driver trainer with 27 years of experience in the
package delivery business.  When Ford asked him about
the standards that he uses in training UPS drivers,
plaintiffs objected on the basis of the trial court's
earlier ruling about internal UPS safety rules.  An
offer of proof followed, during which Isfeld testified
about UPS rules concerning shifting the vehicle into
park, setting the parking brake, and turning off the
vehicle before getting out.  The trial court ruled that
Isfeld could not refer to any internal UPS safety rules
because they were not relevant."
183 Or App 263-64. 
		At trial, the issue for the jury was whether Ford had
manufactured a defective product and, if so, to what extent
plaintiff's negligence had caused her injuries.  If the jury
decided that Ford was liable, then the jury had to determine the
extent of plaintiff's responsibility for her injuries under
principles of comparative fault. 
		Ford sought to introduce the UPS safety rules to prove
that plaintiff had acted negligently, i.e., that plaintiff had
acted unreasonably in getting out of the delivery truck without
shifting into park, setting the parking brake, and turning the
motor off.  At trial, however, several experienced delivery
drivers offered testimony that was consistent with the substance
of the UPS rules.  Plaintiff's expert, a UPS Fleet Manager with
experience in training UPS drivers, testified on cross-examination:
		"Q  Sir, as someone with this background, it would
be fair to say, wouldn't it, that you consider it safe
practice to make sure your vehicle, especially if you
are driving a [delivery truck] such as the one that
Mrs. Jett was driving, if you were driving a [delivery
truck], you would want to make sure that vehicle was in
park before you got out of it; correct?
		"A  Correct.
		"Q  Sir, if you were in a [delivery truck] and * *
* couldn't get it into park after you had started the
engine and taken it out of park and driven it forward,
then you tried to put it into park and you couldn't do
that, with your background, it would be safe in your
view, a safe practice to make sure, at least to get
that engine turned off before you get out if you don't
know - if you don't know that you are in park; right?
		"A  Correct."
	Another UPS driver with sixteen years' experience
testified:
		"Q  Over the years you have learned that when you
exit a vehicle you set the parking brake, haven't you?
		"A  Yes, sir.
		"Q  And you learned that you shut the vehicle off
when you exit the vehicle, haven't you?
		"A  Yes."
	Another UPS driver with ten years' experience testified
on cross-examination by Ford's counsel:
		"Q  [W]henever you left your vehicle, you set that
parking brake, didn't you?
		"A  Are you asking if I did that consistently or
are you asking if I do that?
		"Q  Was that your practice to set the parking
brake?
		"A  Yes.
		"Q  And it was not your practice to leave the
engine running without setting the parking brake, was
it?
		"A  No.
		"Q  And, in fact, it was not your practice to
leave your engine running if you weren't in park;
right?
		"A  No, I wouldn't leave my engine running if I
was not in park in an automatic transmission vehicle.
		"Q  Right.  You understood it would not be a safe
practice to do that?
		"A  That's correct."
	Even plaintiff admitted under cross-examination that
she knew that she should turn the engine off and set the parking
brake:
		"Q  You knew that whenever you had stopped your
vehicle to get out of it that you needed to turn your
engine off, did you not?
		"A  Yes.  I knew that that's what they wanted you
to do and that's what you should do.
		"Q  And you also knew that you were to always put
the vehicle into park whenever you got out of the
vehicle as well, right?
		"A  Yes."
		As previously noted, to provide a basis for reversal or
modification of a judgment, any evidentiary error must
substantially affect a party's rights.  The record that we have
set out reflects an accumulation of testimony establishing that
the applicable standard of care for a delivery driver in
plaintiff's situation included putting the vehicle in park,
turning off the motor, and setting the brake before getting out
of the delivery vehicle.  Indeed, plaintiff's testimony appears
fairly to acknowledge the existence of rules to that effect and
the fact that she had violated those rules.  Therefore, even if
we assume that excluding the UPS safety rules from evidence was
an error, we cannot conclude that the error substantially
affected Ford's rights because ample evidence in the record made
the same point that Ford had sought to make by introducing the
UPS safety rules.  Thus, Ford has failed to demonstrate
prejudicial error sufficient to justify reversal of the trial
court judgment under ORS 19.415(2).  See Shoup, 335 Or at 174
(describing burden of party on appeal to obtain reversal of
judgment).
		We now address one of the remaining questions, viz.,
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Ford did not properly
preserve its objection to the trial court's comparative fault
instruction. The jury was instructed as follows:
	"A special rule of comparative negligence applies only
to a products liability case.
		"When considering the negligence, if any, of the
plaintiff, carelessness or negligent failure to
discover or guard against the product defect is not an
appropriate defense and may not be considered by the
jury.
		"Other forms of negligent conduct by plaintiff, if
any, such as unreasonableness, misuse of the product,
or unreasonable use despite knowledge of the dangerous
defect in the product and awareness of the risk posed
by that defect may be considered by the jury."
183 Or App at 264-65.  That instruction is known as a "Sandford"
instruction, after Sandford v. Chevrolet Division of General
Motors, 292 Or 590, 642 P2d 624 (1982), in which this court held
that a plaintiff's negligence may be considered in a products
liability action, "unless the user's alleged negligence consists
in the kind of unobservant, inattentive, ignorant, or awkward
failure to discover or guard against the defect that goes toward
making the product dangerously defective in the first place." 
Id. at 598.
		At trial, Ford objected to the comparative fault
instruction quoted above.  Specifically, Ford disagreed with the
paragraph in the instruction that stated, "When considering the
negligence, if any, of the plaintiff, carelessness or negligent
failure to discover or guard against the product defect is not an
appropriate defense and may not be considered by the jury."  Ford
protested that it had not alleged that plaintiff had been
careless or negligent regarding a product defect, but that
plaintiff had known that she was supposed to have acted in a
particular manner (i.e., in accordance with the UPS safety
rules), and had not.  Plaintiff, however, argued that the
instruction properly was given.  Her theory was that the design
of the truck's shifting mechanism was prone to defective
operation.  According to plaintiff, the instruction was proper,
because the defective design of the truck's shifting mechanism
could mislead a driver into believing that the truck was shifted
into neutral when it was actually between gears or in reverse,
and plaintiff should not be faulted for that kind of mistake. 
The Court of Appeals held that Ford had failed to
preserve its objection to the instructions because Ford had
failed to explain the basis of the exception as ORCP 59 H
requires. (2)  Jett, 183 Or App at 269.  However, as the foregoing
recitation demonstrates, that conclusion was incorrect.  Ford had
explained its objection to the trial court, thus giving the court
the opportunity to change the instruction, and Ford had renewed
its objection just before and after the court gave the
instruction to the jury.  See Davis v. O'Brien, 320 Or 729, 737,
891 P2d 1307 (1995) (rules pertaining to preservation of error
are intended to advance goals such as ensuring that parties
clearly present arguments to trial court and that parties are not
taken by surprise, misled, or denied opportunities to contest
opposing arguments); Delaney v. Taco Time Intern, Inc., 297 Or
10, 18, 681 P2d 114 (1984) (purpose of requiring exceptions to
jury instructions is to give trial court opportunity to correct
instruction).  We, therefore, conclude that the objection to the
instruction was preserved.  On remand, the Court of Appeals must
address the merits of Ford's assignment of error concerning the
"Sandford" instruction.  See State ex rel Carlisle v. Frost, 326
Or 607, 617, 956 P2d 202 (1998) ("When this court concludes that
the Court of Appeals has erred in not deciding an issue on the
merits, it usually remands the case to that court to consider the
issue in the first instance.").
	 	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.



1. 	Plaintiff's husband also filed a claim against Ford. 
He is not a party on review.

2. 	ORCP 59 H provides:
		"No statement of issues submitted to the jury
pursuant to subsection C(2) of this rule and no
instruction given to a jury shall be subject to review
upon appeal unless its error, if any, was pointed out
to the judge who gave it and unless a notation of an
exception is made immediately after the court instructs
the jury.  Any point of exception shall be particularly
stated and taken down by the reporter or delivered in
writing to the judge. It shall be unnecessary to note
an exception in court to any other ruling made.  All
adverse rulings, including failure to give a requested
instruction or a requested statement of issues, except
those contained in instructions and statements of
issues given, shall import an exception in favor of the
party against whom the ruling was made."