Case Title: Troy Victorino v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC17-1285

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2018-03-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-1285 
____________ 
 
TROY VICTORINO, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[March 8, 2018] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Troy Victorino, a prisoner under sentences of death, appeals the portions of 
the postconviction court’s order denying in part his successive motion for 
postconviction relief, which was filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.851.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
On July 25, 2006, after a jury trial, Victorino was found guilty of the 
following crimes: one count of conspiracy to commit aggravated battery, murder, 
armed burglary of a dwelling, and tampering with physical evidence; six counts of 
first-degree murder of victims Erin Belanger, Francisco Ayo Roman, Jonathon W. 
 
 
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Gleason, Roberto Manuel Gonzalez, Michelle Ann Nathan, and Anthony Vega; 
one count of abuse of a dead human body with a weapon; one count of armed 
burglary of a dwelling; and one count of cruelty to animals.  After the penalty 
phase, the jury returned a recommendation that Victorino be sentenced to death for 
the murders of Erin Belanger (by a vote of ten to two), Francisco Ayo Roman (by a 
vote of ten to two), Jonathon W. Gleason (by a vote of seven to five), and Roberto 
Manuel Gonzalez (by a vote of nine to three), and to life imprisonment for the 
murders of Michelle Ann Nathan and Anthony Vega.  The trial court followed the 
jury’s recommendation and imposed four death sentences on Victorino. 
We affirmed Victorino’s convictions and death sentences on direct appeal.  
Victorino v. State, 23 So. 3d 87 (Fla. 2009).  We thereafter affirmed the denial of 
Victorino’s initial motion for postconviction relief and denied his petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus.  Victorino v. State, 127 So. 3d 478 (Fla. 2013).   
Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, 
136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and this Court’s decisions in Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 
(Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017), and Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 
1248 (Fla. 2016), Victorino filed a successive postconviction motion.  The 
postconviction court granted Victorino’s motion in part, ordering that Victorino’s 
death sentences be vacated and a new penalty phase be held in light of the Hurst 
and Mosley decisions.  But the postconviction court denied the portions of 
 
 
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Victorino’s motion in which he argued that he was entitled to be resentenced to life 
imprisonment based on section 775.082(2), Florida Statutes, the prohibition against 
double jeopardy, and the prohibition against ex post facto laws.  Victorino now 
appeals the portions of the postconviction court’s order denying in part his 
successive motion. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Section 775.082(2), Florida Statutes 
Victorino concedes we have already ruled in Hurst v. State and Franklin v. 
State, 209 So. 3d 1241 (Fla. 2016), that section 775.082(2)1 does not require death 
sentences imposed in violation of Hurst v. Florida to be commuted to life.  
Nonetheless, Victorino urges us to reconsider our interpretation of section 
775.082(2) in light of the fact that his case involves a mass murder and four death 
sentences.  Victorino asserts that under these circumstances a new penalty phase 
                                          
 
 
1.  Section 775.082(2) provides: 
In the event the death penalty in a capital felony is held to be 
unconstitutional by the Florida Supreme Court or the United States 
Supreme Court, the court having jurisdiction over a person previously 
sentenced to death for a capital felony shall cause such person to be 
brought before the court, and the court shall sentence such person to 
life imprisonment as provided in subsection (1).  No sentence of death 
shall be reduced as a result of a determination that a method of 
execution is held to be unconstitutional under the State Constitution or 
the Constitution of the United States. 
 
 
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would be especially time consuming and costly and therefore it would be 
reasonable for us to construe section 775.082(2) in a way that would require his 
death sentences to be commuted to life sentences.  We find Victorino’s suggestion 
that we reconsider our interpretation of section 755.082(2) based on the facts of his 
case unpersuasive and conclude that section 775.082(2) does not entitle Victorino 
to be resentenced to life imprisonment. 
B.  The Prohibition Against Double Jeopardy 
Victorino next argues that because none of the four jury recommendations 
for the death penalty in his case were unanimous, he was “acquitted” of the death 
penalty and therefore subjecting him to a new penalty phase, in which he will again 
be eligible for the death penalty, violates the prohibition against double jeopardy.  
This claim is meritless.  The Hurst decisions do not “acquit” Victorino of his four 
death sentences.  As the United States Supreme Court discussed in Sattazahn v. 
Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 114 (2003), a retrial of a capital defendant does not 
implicate double jeopardy, stating, “[n]or, in these circumstances, does the 
prospect of a second capital-sentencing proceeding implicate any of the ‘perils 
against which the Double Jeopardy Clause seeks to protect’ ” (citation omitted).  
Victorino has not been acquitted of the death penalty or deemed to be an 
inappropriate candidate for the death penalty.  The postconviction court correctly 
applied the law in determining that double jeopardy does not bar a new penalty 
 
 
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phase in which Victorino will again be eligible for the death penalty.  Victorino is 
not entitled to relief. 
C.  The Prohibition Against Ex Post Facto Laws 
Victorino argues that to “apply the recent, post-Hurst case law retroactively 
to make the Defendant death-eligible would violate the constitutional prohibitions 
against ex post facto laws.”  Initial Brief of Appellant at 18, Victorino v. State, No. 
SC17-1285 (Fla. Sept. 21, 2017).  For a criminal law to be ex post facto it must be 
retrospective, that is, it must apply to events that occurred before its enactment; 
and it must alter the definition of criminal conduct or increase the penalty by which 
a crime is punishable.  Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441 (1997).  Florida’s new 
capital sentencing scheme, which requires the jury to unanimously and expressly 
find all the aggravating factors that were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, 
unanimously find that sufficient aggravating factors exist to impose death, 
unanimously find that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances, and unanimously recommend a sentence of death before the trial 
judge may consider imposing a sentence of death, see § 921.141(2), Fla. Stat. 
(2017), neither alters the definition of criminal conduct nor increases the penalty 
by which the crime of first-degree murder is punishable.  Thus, it does not 
constitute an ex post facto law, and Victorino is therefore not entitled to relief. 
 
 
 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we affirm the portions of the postconviction court’s order 
denying Victorino’s claims that he is entitled to have his death sentences reduced 
to life sentences. 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, 
and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Volusia County,  
Randell H. Rowe, III, Judge - Case No. 642004CF001378XXXAWS 
 
Christopher J. Anderson of Law Office of Christopher J. Anderson, Neptune 
Beach, Florida, 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Doris Meacham, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
for Appellee