Case Title: Marcus F. Sanders v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC09-1729

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2010-04-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC09-1729 
_____________ 
 
 
 
MARCUS F. SANDERS, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[April 22, 2010] 
 
 
CANADY, J. 
 
In this case we consider whether sentence points were properly scored on the 
Criminal Punishment Code (CPC) scoresheet used for sentences imposed upon the 
revocation of probation.  We have for review the decision of the Second District 
Court of Appeal in Sanders v. State, 16 So. 3d 232 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), in which 
the Second District certified a question to this Court to be of great public 
importance.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  We have 
revised the question as follows: 
 
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WHEN A DEFENDANT IS TO BE SENTENCED UPON 
REVOCATION OF PROBATION AND PRIOR TO THAT 
REVOCATION THE TRIAL COURT‟S JURISDICTION OVER 
ONE OR MORE OF THE ORIGINALLY SENTENCED OFFENSES 
HAS EXPIRED, MAY THE OFFENSES OVER WHICH THE 
TRIAL COURT NO LONGER HAS JURISDICTION BE SCORED 
AS ADDITIONAL OFFENSES? 
 
For the reasons that follow, we answer the rephrased certified question in the 
negative.  Offenses over which the trial court no longer has jurisdiction cannot be 
scored as additional offenses during a sentencing proceeding following a violation 
of probation because they do not fit the definition of “additional offense” set out in 
section 921.0021, Florida Statutes (1999).  Accordingly, we quash the decision 
under review and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
In January of 2003, Marcus Sanders pleaded no contest to five offenses in 
three separate cases.  The underlying criminal conduct occurred between February 
and August of 2000.  Sanders was sentenced to concurrent three-year prison terms 
on all of the offenses, to be followed by concurrent terms of probation.  He 
received two-year terms of probation for criminal mischief, attempted burglary, 
and aggravated assault.  Those convictions were all third-degree felonies.  Sanders 
received three-year terms of probation for the second-degree felony offenses of 
robbery and aggravated battery.  Sanders, 16 So. 3d at 233. 
 
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After Sanders completed the two-year probationary terms but before he had 
completed his remaining probation on the second-degree felonies, the State alleged 
that Sanders violated the conditions of his supervision by moving without the 
consent of his probation officer and by failing to complete a residential drug 
treatment program.  Sanders admitted violating the conditions of his probation.  He 
was not charged with any new substantive offense. 
In December of 2006, the trial court revoked Sanders‟ probation for all five 
offenses.  The trial court sentenced Sanders to concurrent 108-month prison terms 
on all five counts, which was a slight downward departure from the lowest 
permissible sentence of 111.6 months on the CPC scoresheet used by the trial 
court.  Id. 
 
Sanders appealed to the Second District Court of Appeal.  He raised two 
issues.  First, Sanders argued that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and 
sentencing him for the third-degree felony offenses because Sanders had 
completed his probation for those offenses.  The Second District agreed.  The 
Second District explained that pursuant to section 948.06, Florida Statutes (1999), 
the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the offenses for which Sanders had 
completed his probation.  Accordingly, the Second District reversed the orders 
revoking Sanders‟ probation as to those offenses.  Sanders, 16 So. 3d at 234. 
 
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Second, Sanders contended that his sentences for the second-degree felonies 
should be reversed because of an error in preparing the scoresheet used at the 
sentencing following the revocation of probation.  He asserted that because he 
could not be sentenced on the third-degree felonies, those crimes should not have 
been scored as additional offenses on a recalculated scoresheet.  Sanders originally 
raised this issue before the trial court in a motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.800(b), which was constructively denied.  Sanders, 16 So. 3d 
at 234 n.1. 
 
The Second District affirmed the trial court‟s denial of the motion.  The 
Second District explained that an additional offense is “any offense other than the 
primary offense for which an offender is convicted and which is pending before the 
court for sentencing at the time of the primary offense.”  Id. at 234 (quoting § 
921.0021(1), Fla. Stat. (1999)).  The Second District acknowledged that while the 
third-degree felonies were correctly listed as additional offenses when Sanders was 
originally sentenced in 2003, the offenses did not technically meet the definition of 
additional offenses in 2006 because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sentence 
Sanders on those counts.  The Second District rejected Sanders‟ claim on appeal, 
however, because it concluded that the trial court could not employ a recalculated 
scoresheet when sentencing Sanders following his violation of probation.  The 
Second District determined that “[t]he law is well-settled that following revocation 
 
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of probation the trial court must use the original scoresheet used at the time the 
defendant was placed on probation” and that the trial court shall “impose any 
sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the probationer on 
probation.”  Id. at 235 (quoting Adekunle v. State, 916 So. 2d 950, 952 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2005); § 948.06(1), Fla. Stat. (2000)).  The Second District then concluded 
that scoring the third-degree felonies as additional offenses “would be the only 
possible way to ensure that Sanders faced upon the revocation of his probation the 
same sentence for the second-degree offenses that he might have originally faced 
on those counts.”  Id. 
 
The Second District affirmed in part and reversed in part with instructions.  
In addition, the Second District certified the following question as one of great 
public importance: 
WHEN A DEFENDANT IS TO BE RESENTENCED AFTER THE 
TRIAL COURT REVOKES HIS OR HER PROBATION AND 
PRIOR TO THAT REVOCATION THE TRIAL COURT‟S 
JURISDICTION OVER ONE OR MORE OF THE ORIGINALLY 
SENTENCED OFFENSES HAS EXPIRED, SHOULD THESE 
OFFENSES OVER WHICH THE TRIAL COURT NO LONGER 
HAS JURISDICTION BE SCORED AS PRIOR RECORD ON A 
RECALCULATED SCORESHEET OR SHOULD THE TRIAL 
COURT EMPLOY THE ORIGINAL SCORESHEET ON WHICH 
THOSE OFFENSES WERE SCORED AS ADDITIONAL 
OFFENSES? 
 
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Id. at 235-36.  We accepted jurisdiction.1 
II.  ANALYSIS 
The issue before this Court is whether Sanders‟ third-degree felony offenses, 
for which he had completed his prison sentences and probation, should have been 
scored as additional offenses on the scoresheet used in the 2006 sentencing upon 
the revocation of his probation.  This issue presents a legal question, requiring 
interpretation of statutes and rules of criminal procedures.  Pure questions of law 
are subject to de novo review.  Sims v. State, 998 So. 2d 494, 504 (Fla. 2008).  In 
the analysis that follows, we begin by explaining why the third-degree felony 
offenses should not have been scored as additional offenses.  We then address 
whether the erroneous scoring of the third-degree felony offenses was harmful in 
this case, concluding that the error was harmful. 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.704(d)(28) provides that “[s]entences 
imposed after revocation of probation or community control must be imposed 
according to the sentencing law applicable at the time of the commission of the 
original offense.”  All of the offenses at issue in this case were committed in 2000 
and were subject to the 1998 CPC.  Therefore, rule 3.704(d)(28) required the trial 
court to use the sentencing scoresheet associated with the 1998 CPC when 
                                          
 
 
1.  In addition to the instant case, the Second District certified the same 
question in Hubard v. State, 17 So. 3d 1274 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).  Neither party 
sought review by this Court in Hubard. 
 
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sentencing Sanders following his violation of probation.  Further, pursuant to 
section 921.0024(3), Florida Statutes (1999), because the offenses were committed 
under the same version of the sentencing code, the trial court was required to use a 
single scoresheet, covering all of the defendant‟s offenses pending for sentencing.  
See also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.704(d)(2) (“One scoresheet must be prepared for all 
offenses committed under any single version or revision of the guidelines or 
Criminal Punishment Code pending before the court for sentencing.”). 
Section 921.0021, Florida Statutes (1999), defined the scoresheet categories 
of noncapital, felony offenses committed on or after October 1, 1998, as follows: 
(1) “Additional offense” means any offense other than the 
primary offense for which an offender is convicted and which is 
pending before the court for sentencing at the time of the primary 
offense. 
. . . . 
(4) “Primary offense” means the offense at conviction pending 
before the court for sentencing for which the total sentence points 
recommend a sanction that is as severe as, or more severe than, the 
sanction recommended for any other offense committed by the 
offender and pending before the court at sentencing.  Only one count 
of one offense before the court for sentencing shall be classified as the 
primary offense. 
(5) “Prior record” means a conviction for a crime committed by 
the offender, as an adult or a juvenile, prior to the time of the primary 
offense.  Convictions by federal, out-of-state, military, or foreign 
courts, and convictions for violations of county or municipal 
ordinances that incorporate by reference a penalty under state law, are 
included in the offender‟s prior record. . . .  
 
 
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§ 921.0021, Fla. Stat. (1999).  The version of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.704 in effect both at the time of Sanders‟ original sentencing and his sentencing 
proceeding following the revocation of his probation echoed these definitions. 
During the 2006 sentencing proceeding, the trial court scored Sanders‟ 
conviction on the charge of aggravated battery, a second-degree felony, as the 
primary offense and his third-degree felony convictions as additional offenses.  
The Second District accurately concluded that the third-degree felonies were not 
pending before the trial court for sentencing during the 2006 sentencing proceeding 
because Sanders had completed his probation for those offenses.  See § 948.04(2), 
Fla. Stat. (1999) (“Upon the termination of the period of probation, the probationer 
shall be released from probation and is not liable to sentence for the offense for 
which probation was allowed.”); State v. Hall, 641 So. 2d 403, 404 (Fla. 1994) 
(same). 
Section 921.0021 does not differentiate original sentencing proceedings, 
sentencing proceedings upon revocation of probation, and resentencing 
proceedings.  It does not include any exceptions to the statutory definitions for 
sentencing proceedings upon revocation of probation.  The statute plainly provides 
that an offense qualifies as an “additional offense” for purposes of the scoresheet if 
it “is pending before the court for sentencing at the time” of the sentencing 
proceeding then being conducted.  In this case, the third-degree felonies were not 
 
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pending for sentencing during the 2006 sentencing proceeding.  As a result, they 
were not properly scored as additional offenses. 
The reasons articulated by the Second District for treating the offenses for 
which the two-year probationary period had previously expired as additional 
offenses do not justify departing from the plain meaning of “additional offense” as 
set forth in section 921.0021(1).  The Second District determined that case law 
precluded the use of a recalculated scoresheet when sentencing Sanders following 
the violation of probation and required the trial court to use the original scoresheet 
filled in exactly as it was when Sanders was originally sentenced.  The Second 
District relied on the Fourth District Court of Appeal‟s statement that “[t]he law is 
well-settled that following revocation of probation the trial court must use the 
original scoresheet used at the time the defendant was placed on probation.”  
Sanders, 16 So. 3d at 235 (quoting Adekunle, 916 So. 2d at 952).  The Second 
District‟s conclusion that an original sentencing scoresheet cannot be revised or 
recalculated for purposes of sentencing a defendant after a violation of probation is 
inconsistent with section 921.0024, Florida Statutes (1999), and our holding in 
Roberts v. State, 644 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1994). 
Section 921.0024(1)(b) directs that where a defendant is being sentenced as 
a result of violating probation, “[c]ommunity sanction violation points” are to be 
assessed.  Each community sanction violation not involving a new felony offense 
 
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requires the addition of six sentence points to the defendant‟s scoresheet.  Each 
community sanction violation involving a new felony offense requires the addition 
of twelve sentence points.  As a result of these community sanction violation 
points, the scoresheet prepared for a sentencing upon revocation of probation 
necessarily will differ from the scoresheet prepared for the original sentencing.  
Recalculation is not only permitted but required by section 921.0024. 
In addition, we have determined that a scoresheet may be recalculated 
during a sentencing upon revocation of probation to correct an omission from the 
original scoresheet.  In Roberts, some of the defendant‟s prior convictions were 
erroneously omitted from the original scoresheet.  This Court concluded that the 
trial court should have used a revised, recalculated scoresheet during the 
sentencing. 
When Roberts was originally sentenced, he received the benefit 
of a mistake in his guidelines scoresheet.  Now that he has committed 
a new crime and violated his probation, we see no reason to 
perpetuate the error.  Justice is not served by awarding a defendant 
something to which he is not entitled.  We agree with the rationale of 
the opinion below in which the court said:  
The defendant cites to Graham v. State, 559 So. 2d 
343 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)[,] for the proposition that a trial 
court is without power to consider a new scoresheet, over 
objection, containing prior convictions completely 
omitted from the original.  The contention then is that the 
defendant be sentenced under a scoresheet that is simply 
not based upon the truth.  Consequently, we do not agree 
with Graham because to follow it literally, the defendant 
receives the benefit of being sentenced under a 
 
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scoresheet which mistakenly omits prior convictions.  
Neither the rules nor the substantive law justifies a 
defendant receiving the largesse of a judicial error.  Since 
only one guidelines scoresheet may be used for each 
defendant covering all offenses pending before the court 
at sentencing, Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.701(d)(1); accord 
Lambert v. State, 545 So. 2d 838, 841 (Fla. 1989), 
following the defendant‟s argument permits him to 
escape the punishment meted out by the law.  
Furthermore, since the defendant‟s violation of 
probation triggered the resentencing, the defendant is not 
being sentenced for “precisely the same conduct,” and 
double jeopardy concerns do not come into play.  
 
Roberts, 644 So. 2d at 82-83 (quoting Roberts v. State, 611 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 1992)).  In short, this Court concluded that a defendant is not entitled to 
perpetuate an error in scoring.  Our holding in Roberts is thus inconsistent with the 
reasoning employed by the Second District. 
Next, the Second District determined that the third-degree felonies should be 
scored exactly as they were at the original sentencing because section 948.06(1), 
Florida Statutes, provides that in a sentencing proceeding following a violation of 
probation, the trial court shall “impose any sentence which it might have originally 
imposed before placing the probationer on probation.”  Sanders, 16 So. 3d at 235 
(quoting 948.06(1), Fla. Stat. (1999)).  The Second District concluded that scoring 
the third-degree felonies as additional offenses “would be the only possible way to 
ensure” that Sanders faced the same sentencing possibilities upon the revocation of 
his probation.  Id. 
 
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We conclude, however, that this broad reading of the relevant provision of 
section 948.06(1) cannot be reconciled with the plain import of sections 
921.0021(1) and 921.0024(1)(b) or with our reasoning in Roberts.  In the context 
of the related statutory provisions, it is more reasonable to understand the provision 
of 948.06(1) as stating a rule that parallels the provision of rule 3.704(d)(28) that 
sentences imposed upon revocation of probation “must be imposed according to 
the sentencing law applicable at the time of the commission of the original 
offense.” 
Having concluded that the trial court erred in scoring the third-degree 
felonies as additional offenses, we now consider whether that error was harmless.  
When a scoresheet error is challenged on direct appeal, via a motion under Florida 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b) or via a motion under Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.850, the error “is harmless if the record conclusively shows 
that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence using a correct 
scoresheet.”  Brooks v. State, 969 So. 2d 238, 241 (Fla. 2007) (citing State v. 
Anderson, 905 So. 2d 111, 118 (Fla. 2005)).  Sanders raised the issue of how his 
third-degree felony convictions should be scored in a rule 3.800(b) motion and 
argued the point on direct appeal.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the 
record does not conclusively show that the trial court would have imposed the 
 
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same sentence had the third-degree felonies not been scored as additional offenses.  
Thus, Sanders is entitled to a new sentencing proceeding. 
Sanders contends that two of the three third-degree felony convictions 
should have been scored as prior record when he was sentenced following 
revocation of his probation.  We agree.  Section 921.0021(5) defines “prior record” 
as “a conviction for a crime committed by the offender, as an adult or a juvenile, 
prior to the time of the primary offense.”  To be scored as prior record the offense 
must have been committed prior to the commission of the primary offense.  The 
order of the convictions is irrelevant.  See Harris v. State, 685 So. 2d 1282, 1285 
(Fla. 1996) (concluding that a conviction for an offense committed after the 
primary offense but tried before the primary offense “[fell] between the cracks” 
and could not be scored as prior record); Halfacre v. State, 24 So. 3d 795, 796 (Fla. 
5th DCA 2009) (holding that prior record should be determined based on the order 
of the commission of the offenses, not the order of convictions). 
Sanders‟ conviction for aggravated battery was scored as the primary 
offense.  According to the information, the aggravated battery occurred on or 
around August 13, 2000.  Two of the third-degree felonies were committed before 
this aggravated battery.  Sanders committed the criminal mischief offense on or 
about February 16, 2000, and the attempted burglary offense on or about May 26, 
 
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2000.  The final third-degree felony, aggravated assault, was committed 
contemporaneously with the primary offense. 
When a word in a statute is not expressly defined, it is “„appropriate to refer 
to dictionary definitions . . .‟ in order to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning” 
of the word.  School Bd. of Palm Beach County v. Survivors Charter Schools, Inc., 
3 So. 3d 1220, 1233 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Barco v. School Bd. of Pinellas County, 
975 So. 2d 1116, 1122 (Fla. 2008)).  The dictionary definition of “prior” is 
“[p]receding in time, order, or importance; earlier, former, previous, antecedent.”  
2 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 2350 (6th ed. 2007).  A contemporaneously 
committed offense does not precede the commission of the primary offense in time 
and thus, based on the plain meaning of the statute, does not qualify as prior 
record. 
Accordingly, Sanders‟ third-degree felony convictions for the offenses of 
criminal mischief and attempted burglary—offenses committed prior to the 
primary offense—should have been scored as prior record when Sanders was 
sentenced following the revocation of his probation.  In contrast, Sanders‟ third-
degree felony conviction for the offense of aggravated assault, which was 
committed contemporaneously with the primary offense, should not have been 
scored as an additional offense or as prior record when he was sentenced following 
the revocation of his probation. 
 
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When the three third-degree felony convictions were scored by the 
sentencing court as additional offenses, they totaled 37.2 points.  Had the criminal 
mischief and the attempted burglary convictions been scored as prior record and 
the aggravated assault conviction not scored, they would have totaled 9.8 points.  
This 27.4-point difference would have reduced Sanders‟ total sentence points to 
149.4.  The resulting lowest permissible prison sentence would be 91.05 months 
rather than 111.6 months—a difference of nearly two years. 
From the record, we cannot rule out the possibility that this change in the 
lowest permissible sentence could have affected the trial court‟s sentencing 
decision.  The trial court gave Sanders a downward departure sentence of nine 
years of incarceration.  At the sentencing hearing, the trial court explained: 
Well, I‟d like to sentence him to the year in the county in the 
drug program but he‟s let me down too many times.  He‟s violated his 
probation.  We‟ve bent over backwards with him. 
. . . . 
This isn‟t as bad as it seems, at least in my figuring.  That‟s 
why I was figuring the time served.  (Inaudible).  I‟m going to roughly 
sentence him to the guidelines [sic].  I‟m a rounder-offer so this is 
slightly below.  I‟m going to sentence him to nine years in the 
Department of Corrections, which is a hundred and eight months.  I 
think that‟s enough to do it. 
As I figure that, though, if he‟s got nine years and he‟s served 
three, that drops him down to six, and he‟s got another four months 
[of time served].  And if he‟s a good prisoner, he gets a—he‟ll serve 
eighty-five percent of that, it‟ll be right around, a little less than four 
years.  So, totally, it‟s not nearly as bad as it seems. 
 
 
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Given the trial court‟s comments, particularly its express reliance on the lowest 
permissible sentence identified by the scoresheet, the record does not conclusively 
show that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had the third-
degree felonies not been scored as additional offenses. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We answer the rephrased certified question in the negative.  Where the trial 
court‟s jurisdiction over a criminal offense has expired, the trial court may not 
score that offense as an additional offense during a sentencing proceeding.  
Because the trial court‟s scoring of the third-degree felonies in this case did not 
comport with section 921.0021 and because the record does not demonstrate that 
the error was harmless, we quash the decision of Second District.  We remand this 
case to the Second District with instructions that the Second District remand for 
sentencing consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, 
JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D07-1741  
 
 
(Lee County) 
 
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James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Richard J. Sanders, Assistant 
Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Robert J. Krauss Bureau 
Chief, and Ronald Napolitano, Assistant Attorneys General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent