Case Title: Casper Iron & Metal, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Com'n of Dept. of Employment of State of Wyo.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92-39

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-01-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Casper Iron & Metal, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Com'n of Dept. of Employment of State of Wyo.1993 WY 6845 P.2d 387Case Number: 92-39Decided: 01/11/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
 
CASPER IRON & METAL, 
INC.,

Appellant (Appellant 
below),

v.

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
COMMISSION OF the DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT OF THE STATE OF 
WYOMING; and Mark A. 
O'Brien,

Appellees (Appellees 
below).

 
 

Appeal from District 
Court, Natrona 
County, Dan Spangler, J. 

Peter J. Young 
and Harry B. Durham, III, of Brown & Drew, Casper, for appellant.

William G. 
Hibbler, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee Unemployment Ins. Comm'n.

Before MACY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, CARDINE, and GOLDEN, JJ., and URBIGKIT, J. Ret.*

* Chief Justice at time of 
conference; retired January 1, 
1993.

CARDINE, Justice.

[¶1.]     Casper Iron and Metal, 
Incorporated (CIM) brings this appeal of an administrative decision affirming 
payment of unemployment benefits to a former employee. Finding that the decision 
of the Unemployment Insurance Commission of the Department of Employment of the 
State of Wyoming (Commission) correctly 
determined the ultimate fact question, we affirm.

[¶2.]     Two issues are 
presented by CIM:

I. Whether the Special 
Hearing Examiner for the Department of Employment, Division of Unemployment 
Insurance, improperly placed the burden of proving the voluntariness of Mark 
O'Brien's separation of employment on the employer, Casper Iron & Metal, 
Inc.

II. Whether the Special 
Hearing Examiner for the Department of Employment, Division of Unemployment 
Insurance, improperly used the wrong statutory standard to determine whether the 
employee, Mark O'Brien, was entitled to unemployment benefits.

[¶3.]     The Commission restates 
the issues:

I. Whether the appeals 
examiner of appellee, Wyoming Department of Employment, Division of Unemployment 
Insurance, Unemployment Insurance Commission, properly allocated burdens of 
proof to the parties at the evidentiary hearing held in this matter?

II. Whether the appellee, 
Wyoming Department of Employment, Division of Unemployment Insurance, 
Unemployment Insurance Commission, properly held that Mark A. O'Brien is 
eligible for unemployment insurance benefits because he did not voluntarily quit 
his work but was discharged, however not for misconduct connected with that 
work?

FACTS

[¶4.]     Claiming he was fired 
from his position as a crane operator and recyclable materials processor at CIM, 
Mark A. O'Brien (O'Brien) sought unemployment insurance. A commission deputy 
(Deputy) determined that O'Brien's claim was "not disqualified" and the cost of 
benefits would be charged against CIM's account. CIM appealed the determination 
arguing that O'Brien had voluntarily quit on April 
24, 1991. CIM and O'Brien 
participated in an appeal hearing held to determine the "reason for claimant's 
separation from employment."

[¶5.]     At the hearing, CIM 
pointed to a series of events to prove O'Brien quit his job voluntarily. After 
learning that CIM fired a temporary employee, O'Brien announced, on 
April 22, 
1991, he was quitting and 
wanted his paycheck immediately. CIM President Sidney Tolin successfully talked 
O'Brien out of quitting. Sidney Tolin assured O'Brien that his job was not 
threatened. Two days later, on Wednesday, April 24, 
1991, O'Brien reported to 
work for a short time and then left the job site at 8:45 
a.m. Two co-workers reported 
to CIM management that O'Brien had quit. O'Brien, however, never stated such an 
intention to management. Sidney Tolin discussed O'Brien's absence with 
Vice-President, General Manager and Corporate Counsel Don Tolin. CIM management 
concluded O'Brien had quit and removed his time card from the office 
area.

[¶6.]     O'Brien maintained at 
the hearing that he did not quit but was fired. Before leaving work on 
April 24, 
1991, O'Brien completed a CIM 
"Employee Time-Off" form. The form indicated O'Brien's absence from work to meet 
with the "Laber Bord" (sic). Lorna Wilkes (Wilkes), of the Wyoming Department of 
Labor, testified she met with O'Brien on the morning of April 24, 
1991. Wilkes said O'Brien 
expressed concern about hazardous materials at CIM, including asbestos and lead, 
and possible retaliation for reporting the problems.

[¶7.]     On his return to CIM, 
O'Brien completed another "Employee Time-Off" form showing he was absent from 
8:46 
a.m. to 12:00 noon to meet with the Labor 
Board. After completing the form, O'Brien asked where his time card was located. 
Sidney Tolin told O'Brien he had quit and his time card had been "pulled." 
According to Sidney Tolin, O'Brien erupted, screaming, "Fuck you, Mr. Tolin," 
several times and threatening, "If you were twenty years younger I'll [sic] take 
you on." O'Brien admitted losing his temper, but claimed it was after Sidney 
Tolin called O'Brien a "lying son-of-a-bitch" and ordered O'Brien to "get the 
fuck off my property." Sidney Tolin testified he did not "cuss and swear" at 
anybody and called O'Brien's accusation "a damned lie."1 The shouting match ended when a 
Casper police officer escorted 
O'Brien off the premises.

[¶8.]     Oh that word, spoken in 
the transience of the moment, its effect decays quietly. Written, it assumes the 
importance of time as if harkening back to the cuneiform wedges. But fortunately 
our tablets of stone and their permanence have been replaced by a recyclable 
medium, paper. With that simple change, intransigence can be replaced by 
decision. The language used by the participants is "crude"; it is also the 
language of exasperation, language which one less restrained might invoke in a 
shocking situation such as job loss. We are not here to excuse its use at the 
time. Our task is simply considering whether its recitation should be included 
in this opinion in light of a concern expressed by one member of the 
court.

[¶9.]     The express language 
used by the parties is included as necessary to understanding the decision of 
the hearing officer awarding benefits. The most important words were those not 
spoken. The management never said, "you're fired," to the employee. The employee 
never said, "I quit," to management. So the hearing examiner was left to examine 
the available testimony to determine, first, the intent of the employee in 
leaving the jobsite; second, at what point a termination did occur, if one 
occurred; and third, what evidence supported such a finding.

[¶10.]  Management presented two affidavits 
signed by co-employees indicating the employee told them he quit. Refuting this 
testimony, the employee presented the two "time-out" forms he completed in 
accord with company policy to establish his intent to leave the jobsite 
temporarily. The action of "pulling" the employee's time card amounted to 
termination according to the hearing examiner. The virulence of the employee's 
reaction to learning his time card was missing and the reported statements of 
management offered persuasive support of the employee's position. The fact the 
employee had to be escorted by police off the jobsite after the management 
ordered him to leave also argues in favor of termination. Weighing all this 
evidence, the examiner determined a termination had occurred.

[¶11.]  The language used is quoted. It was 
transcribed as stated in the administrative hearing. The language, therefore, 
comes from an official proceeding. The district court, undoubtedly, heard this 
language in its consideration of this action. It was also stated in briefing to 
this court as a relevant characterization of intent. Absent this important 
evidence of the language used, the reader of the opinion might have difficulty 
understanding the decision awarding benefits. Despite my brother's belief, the 
courts of Wyoming are already familiar 
with the profane words. See F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 98 S. Ct. 3026, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1073 (1978).

[¶12.]  Based on the evidence, the Commission's 
"Appeals Examiner" (Examiner) affirmed the Deputy's initial decision that 
O'Brien was entitled to unemployment insurance. The Examiner determined O'Brien 
intended his absence from work to be only temporary. "The employer's action in 
`pulling his time card' is an action which is commonly construed as a 
discharge."

[¶13.]  The Commission adopted the Examiner's 
findings and conclusions and affirmed the decision. After administrative 
remedies were exhausted, CIM appealed to the district court. The district judge 
noted, in his decision letter, that there was evidence indicating O'Brien was 
fired and contrary evidence indicating he quit. Deferring to the agency's role 
as fact finder, the district court affirmed the Commission's 
decision.

DISCUSSION

[¶14.]  The issues of this case are really about 
language, some legal and some coarse. Initially, the language of the judicial 
function is overlaid with the language of administrative procedure to ask 
whether a contested case proceeding should be analogized to a trial or an appeal 
and, depending on the result, which party assumes the burden of proof, also 
defined by the separate burdens of production and persuasion. See, Bernard 
Schwartz, Administrative Law, § 7.8 (2nd ed. 1984). Ultimately, the language of 
the bureaucracy is pitted against the language of the laborer. One translation 
inquires whether a claimant is "not disqualified" for unemployment insurance 
discharge benefits. The second translation asks whether a worker quits by 
leaving the premises or gets fired when a time card is pulled and the worker is 
told to get off the property. In this mix of language, the Examiner applied the 
basic facts found from the evidence presented at the hearing to the law, 
producing the ultimate fact determination that O'Brien was entitled to 
benefits.

[¶15.]  Our standard of review for administrative 
actions requires proper notice of jurisdiction. "The right to judicial review of 
administrative decisions is entirely statutory, and agency actions are not 
reviewable absent statutory authority." Sellers v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 760 P.2d 394, 395 (Wyo. 1988). Jurisdiction for 
judicial review of Commission decisions is granted by the Wyoming Employment 
Security Law, W.S. 27-3-101 through -704 (1991) (hereinafter WESL), which 
provides:

(a) Any person aggrieved 
or adversely affected by a final decision under this act may obtain judicial 
review by filing a petition for review with the district court of jurisdiction. 
Review by the court shall be as provided by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure 
Act [§§ 16-3-101 through 16-3-115] and shall be given precedence over all other 
civil cases except those under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Act.

(b) A decision of the 
district court may be appealed to the supreme court. The appeal shall be taken 
in the same manner as other civil cases.

W.S. 27-3-407 
(1991); see also W.R.A.P. 12.11.

[¶16.]  Under the statutory jurisdiction grant, 
the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, W.S. 16-3-101 through -115 (1990) 
(hereinafter WAPA), directs the scope of review:

(c) To the extent 
necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall 
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory 
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole 
record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of 
the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

(i) Compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and

(ii) Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:

(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

(B) Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

(C) In excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory right; 

(D) Without observance of 
procedure required by law; or

(E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

W.S. 16-3-114(c) 
(1990).

[¶17.]  We review the agency decision without 
according any special deference to the district court decision. Union Pacific 
R.R. Co. v. Wyoming 
State Bd. of Equalization, 802 P.2d 856, 859 (Wyo. 1990). Using the same 
evidence and same review standards as the district court, the review conducted 
by the Wyoming Supreme Court proceeds as if the matter had come directly to us 
from the agency. Southwest 
Wyoming 
Rehabilitation 
Center v. Employment Sec. 
Comm'n, 781 P.2d 918, 920 (Wyo. 1989); 
Atchison v. Career Serv. Council, 
664 P.2d 18, 20 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 982, 104 S. Ct. 424, 78 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1983).

[¶18.]  Our review of contested case orders 
focuses on the evidence and considers the reasonableness of the agency's 
exercise of judgment while determining if errors of law were committed or 
whether any constitutional rights were violated. We take the record as a whole 
and review whether substantial evidence supports the agency's findings of fact. 
Amax Coal Co. v. Wyoming 
State Bd. of Equalization, 819 P.2d 825, 828 (Wyo. 1991). The burden of 
establishing the absence of substantial evidence belongs to the challenging 
party. Union Tel. Co., Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n, 821 P.2d 550, 557 
(Wyo. 1991). The court relies 
upon and affords deference to agency expertise in weighing the evidence, and 
determinations are not disturbed unless "`clearly contrary to the overwhelming 
weight of the evidence on record.'" Mekss v. Wyoming Girls' School, 813 P.2d 185, 201 (Wyo. 1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 872, 116 L. Ed. 2d 777 
(1992) (quoting State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Brown, 805 P.2d 830, 833 (Wyo. 1991)). Substantial evidence is "`such relevant evidence as 
reasonable minds would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Employment 
Sec. Comm'n v. Western Gas Processors, Ltd., 786 P.2d 866, 870, 86 A.L.R.4th 295 
(Wyo. 1990) (quoting Southwest Wyoming Rehabilitation Center v. Employment Sec. 
Comm'n, 781 P.2d at 921).

[¶19.]  We determine whether the agency 
conclusions of law, including those stated as ultimate facts, are "in accordance 
with law." Amax Coal, 819 P.2d  at 829. Agency decisions are reversed only for 
errors of law. Union Tel., 821 P.2d  at 557. We summarized the three 
possibilities that exist when we review agency conclusions of law in Western 
Gas, 786 P.2d at 871:

The agency may correctly 
apply their findings of fact to the correct rule of law. In such case, the 
agency's conclusions are affirmed. But the agency could apply their findings of 
fact to the wrong rule of law or they could incorrectly apply their findings of 
fact to a correct rule of law. In either case, we correct an agency conclusion 
to ensure accordance with law. [citations omitted]

If the agency 
misapplies the correct rule of law, we do not defer to the agency's finding. 
Wyoming Dep't of Employment, 
Div. of Unemployment Ins. v. Secrest, 811 P.2d 733, 735 
(Wyo. 1991); Union Pacific, 
802 P.2d  at 860-61. The issues presented by CIM require that we first consider 
whether the Commission properly applied the law.

[¶20.]  CIM contends the Examiner erred in 
placing the burden of proof on CIM to establish O'Brien left voluntarily without 
good cause. CIM believes that the correct application of substantive law would 
have placed the burden of proof on O'Brien to establish he left employment 
involuntarily. At that point, CIM admits the burden would then shift to the 
employer to establish a discharge for misconduct.

[¶21.]  CIM's position proceeds from a faulty 
premise. CIM argues that after O'Brien filed his claim for unemployment benefits 
and the Deputy initially approved it, the appeal CIM filed created an 
administrative proceeding exercising "original rather than appellate 
jurisdiction." CIM's premise creates an analogy comparing O'Brien's claim to a 
"complaint" which CIM protested with an "answer" creating the need for a "trial" 
at which the burden of proof would be placed on the "plaintiff," 
O'Brien.

[¶22.]  Despite the de novo nature of the appeal 
hearing, Yellow Front Stores, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 694 P.2d 882, 884 (Colo. 
App. 1985), the plain language of the WESL defeats CIM's premise. When a claim 
for unemployment insurance is filed, an initial eligibility determination is 
made by a deputy. W.S. 27-3-402(a) (1991). The determination is "final unless a 
party entitled to notice applies for redetermination or appeals." 
Id. (emphasis added). The 
"Notice to Employer of Initial Determination" was prepared on May 10, 
1991. CIM exercised its right 
and appealed the Deputy's action. W.S. 27-3-402(e) (1991).

[¶23.]  Under the WESL, disputed claims are heard 
by an "appeal tribunal" which can be an examiner or a three-member body. W.S. 
27-3-403 (1991). The "appeal tribunal" must provide "notice of and a reasonable 
opportunity for hearing." Id. Under the WESL, appeals 
are conducted in accordance with WAPA. W.S. 27-3-405(a) (1991). WAPA requires a 
"reasonable notice" for contested case hearings. W.S. 16-3-107(a) (1990). The 
notice must include, "[a] short and plain statement of the matters asserted." 
W.S. 16-3-107(b)(iv) (1990).

[¶24.]  CIM and O'Brien received a "Notice of 
Hearing" for an "appeal filed by employer." (emphasis added) The stated issue 
was: "Reason for claimant's separation from employment with Casper Iron & 
Metal, Inc." The parties, each represented by counsel at the hearing, were also 
informed: "Any other issues which may affect claimant's rights to benefits will 
be considered." While both the WESL and WAPA are silent on the proper allocation 
of the burden of proof, the "Notice of Hearing" contained sufficient information 
to inform CIM of its burden as the party seeking an appeal. The specific nature 
of the burden CIM acquired by filing the administrative appeal requires further 
definition.

[¶25.]  Burden of proof, as part of the 
substantive law of evidence, is complex and often confusing. See 1 D. Louisell 
& C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 65 (1977). The general term, burden of 
proof, identifies two separate legal doctrines: the burden of persuasion; and 
the burden of production, also termed the burden of producing evidence or the 
burden of going forward with the evidence. Louisell & Mueller, supra, § 66. 
The burden of persuasion is attached to the party who "runs the risk of 
nonpersuasion." Id. During a trial, this 
means if the "party with the burden of persuasion has not sustained it by a fair 
preponderance of the evidence - if the evidence is in equipoise or the opposing 
party's preponderates - the party with the burden must fail." 
Id. The burden of producing 
evidence is "the obligation of the party to present at the appropriate time * * 
* evidence on the issue involved of sufficient substance to permit the fact 
finder to act upon it." Id. The burden of producing 
evidence shifts during the presentation of evidence. 
Id. The burden of 
persuasion, which generally does not shift unless by the operation of a legal 
presumption, becomes operative only after all the evidence is submitted. 
Id.

[¶26.]  This court previously ruled that burden 
of proof is recognized in contested case proceedings under WAPA. Pan Am. 
Petroleum Corp. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation 
Comm'n, 446 P.2d 550, 556 (Wyo. 1968). The Pan Am. court 
noted the dual use of the term as a "burden of establishing the case as a 
whole," for the burden of persuasion; and the "burden on a party to make out a 
prima facie case in his favor at a certain stage during the hearing," which is 
the burden of producing evidence. Pan Am., 446 P.2d  at 556; 4 Jacob A. Stein et 
al., Administrative Law § 24.01 (rev. ed. 1991).

[¶27.]  The proper application of burden of 
persuasion and burden of producing evidence doctrines requires consideration of 
the purpose of unemployment insurance. The purpose of the WESL, and similar 
statutes in other states, is to lighten the economic load created by involuntary 
unemployment. California Dep't of Human Resources 
Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 131-32, 91 S. Ct. 1347, 1354, 28 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1971); Colorado Div. of Employment and 
Training v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704, 706 (Colo. 1989). Using state 
police powers, the legislature acted to protect the general welfare creating 
unemployment reserve accounts to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed 
through no fault of their own. Nat'l Gypsum Co. v. State Employment Sec. Bd. of 
Review, 244 Kan. 678, 772 P.2d 786, 789 (1989). The WESL should be liberally 
construed in favor of the claimant, and disqualifications from benefits should 
be narrowly construed. Department of Indus. Relations v. Jaco, 337 So. 2d 374, 
376 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976); Matter of Johnson, 337 N.W.2d 442, 446 (S.D. 
1983).

[¶28.]  The legislature specifically directed the 
circumstances which shall disqualify an individual from unemployment benefits. 
W.S. 27-3-311 (1991). Two provisions are relevant to this case. The first is 
disqualification from benefits for discharge "from his most recent work for 
misconduct connected with his work." W.S. 27-3-311(c) (1991). The second is 
disqualification for quitting or leaving work "voluntarily without good cause 
attributable directly to his employment." W.S. 27-3-311(a)(i) (1991). Whether 
unemployment results from a discharge or a voluntary quit is often "a close 
question." Valley Vendors, Inc. v. Jamieson, 129 
Ariz. 238, 240, 630 P.2d 61, 
63, 18 A.L.R.4th 298 (App. 1981). However, to be eligible for benefits, the 
reason for unemployment must be external and apart from the claimant, regardless 
of whether the employment ended by discharge or a voluntary quit. Read v. 
Employment Sec. Dep't, 62 Wn. App. 227, 813 P.2d 1262, 1266 (1991).

[¶29.]  In administrative law, the "central 
concern" is on the burden of producing evidence. Environmental Defense Fund, 
Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 548 F.2d 998, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1976), 
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 925, 97 S. Ct. 2199, 53 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1977); see 3 K. 
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 16:9 (1980). In the context of unemployment 
insurance, the initial evidentiary burden of a claimant is satisfied when a 
prima facie showing is made and benefits are allowed. Java, 402 U.S.  at 134, 91 S. Ct.  at 
1355. The Commission's acceptance of a claimant's statement supporting a 
benefits application means the claimant has met the burden and established a 
prima facie showing. Lucero v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 812 P.2d 1191, 1193 
(Colo. App. 1991); 
Denver Symphony Ass'n v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 526 P.2d 685, 687 (Colo. App. 1974). The initial 
determination in favor of eligibility means that benefits are due the claimant. 
W.S. 27-3-409(a) (1991); see Java, 402 U.S.  at 134, 91 S. Ct.  at 
1355.

[¶30.]  If the employer seeks to challenge the 
benefits determination, the burden is on the employer to present contrary 
evidence. Arizona Dep't of Economic Sec. 
v. Magma Copper Co., 125 Ariz. 23, 26, 607 P.2d 6, 9 
(1980); Denver Symphony, 526 P.2d  at 
687; Norland v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 412 N.W.2d 904, 910 (Iowa 1987). The employer's 
evidence must disclose a statutory ground for benefits disqualification. 
Hewlett, 777 P.2d  at 707.

[¶31.]  Sound policy supports placing the burden 
of producing evidence on the employer when an appeal is filed. The reason is 
apparent from a consideration of why an employer would challenge the benefits 
payment. Since unemployment benefits are chargeable against an employer's 
account, the appeal may protect the balance in the employer's unemployment 
compensation fund. See W.S. 27-3-201 (1991). The employer should, therefore, 
possess the burden of producing evidence proving disqualification. Lozano v. 
California Unemployment Ins. 
Appeals Bd., 130 Cal. App. 3d 749, 182 Cal. Rptr. 6, 10 (1982).

[¶32.]  CIM's misperception of its obligation is 
apparent from the transcript of the hearing. At the beginning of proceedings, 
CIM's counsel attempted to defer calling any witnesses except in rebuttal. The 
Examiner informed CIM that, as appellant, "It's your responsibility to provide 
sufficient testimony and evidence to persuade me to change the decision that's 
been made by the Deputy." CIM's counsel then attempted to dismiss CIM's appeal, 
apparently in a belief that O'Brien would then have the burden of producing 
evidence: "At this time I move that, ah, the appellants, ah, being as they do 
have the burden, that the appellant's objection be dismissed, you know * * *." 
The Examiner interrupted and stated she saw no reason to deviate from the normal 
hearing procedure.

[¶33.]  The issue before the Examiner was not 
whether O'Brien was initially eligible for benefits. When the Deputy allowed the 
claim, it constituted a determination that benefits were due O'Brien, and he was 
"not disqualified." Java, 402 U.S.  at 134, 91 S. Ct.  at 
1355. The Examiner took "official notice" of the records in O'Brien's file, 
including the Deputy's determination, at the beginning of the appeal hearing. 
Therefore, the legal issue to be resolved by the hearing was whether O'Brien's 
benefit determination should be modified or reversed based upon proof of a 
statutory disqualification. CIM possessed the burden to produce evidence of 
disqualification at the hearing. If CIM had made a sufficient showing, the 
burden of producing evidence would have shifted to O'Brien to refute CIM's 
proof. See Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Bryant, 704 P.2d 1311, 1317 (Wyo. 1985) 
(holding claimant who failed to appear before hearing examiner or Commission to 
give testimony or ask that matters in files be noticed did not meet his "burden 
of proof").

[¶34.]  CIM steadfastly maintains that the 
Examiner erred when she required CIM to meet the "artificial and unannounced 
burden to prove misconduct." CIM misconstrues the Examiner's findings. Implicit 
in the Deputy's determination of benefits eligibility is a finding that O'Brien 
was discharged from employment with CIM and, therefore, eligible for 
unemployment benefits. On appeal, CIM had to show the existence of a statutory 
disqualification. In this case, disqualification would have occurred if it was 
established either that O'Brien was discharged for misconduct or that O'Brien 
left work voluntarily without good cause. W.S. 27-3-311 (1991). CIM failed to 
convincingly rebut O'Brien's prima facie case.

[¶35.]  This court accepted the Commission's 
definition of misconduct in Safety Medical Serv., Inc. v. Employment Sec. 
Comm'n, 724 P.2d 468, 472 (Wyo. 1986):

Misconduct under the 
Wyoming Employment Security Law means generally an act of an employee which 
indicates a disregard of (1) the employer's interests or (2) the commonly 
accepted duties, obligations and responsibilities of an employee. This would 
include carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to reveal 
willful intent or an intentional disregard of the employer's interests or of the 
employee's duties and obligations to his employer. Inefficiency or failure in 
good performance as the result of inability or incapacity; ordinary negligence 
in isolated instances or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not 
deemed to be misconduct within the meaning of the Law.

In determining 
if misconduct was present, the question is whether the employee intentionally 
acted contrary to his or her responsibility to perform assigned duties or 
willfully and intentionally disregarded known employer interests. 
Id. at 473 (emphasis in 
original); see also Western Gas, 786 P.2d  at 873.

[¶36.]  CIM's misconduct evidence was minimal and 
constituted primarily vague recitations of undocumented past incidents of 
alleged disobedience which would be insufficient to support termination. 
O'Brien's absence on his final day of work could only be considered misconduct 
if CIM had documented an intentional action in disregard of known company 
policy. CIM maintains in its brief that the "Employee Time-Off" form O'Brien 
completed was improperly submitted because it was not provided to management at 
least a day prior to the absence. The company president's testimony does not 
support CIM's contention. Sidney Tolin testified that the employee requesting 
leave "usually" completes the form a "day or so" before the absence so that 
another employee can be substituted. The back of the "Employee Time-Off" form 
contains a lengthy description of CIM's absenteeism and tardiness policy which 
makes no mention of requiring completion of a request form one day prior to the 
absence. CIM submitted no documentary evidence establishing the existence of an 
advance notice rule. No evidence was introduced showing that O'Brien had notice 
of requirements for advance notification. Evidence of the past enforcement 
practices when employees violated the rule was also not presented. Without 
reducing the rule to writing and making the requisite showing of employee 
knowledge and consistent enforcement, CIM failed, as a matter of law, to 
establish a misconduct violation. Blackwell v. Review Bd. of 
Indiana Dep't of Employment and 
Training Serv., 560 N.E.2d 674, 678-79 (Ind. App. 1990). O'Brien's 
action in completing the form actually reflects an effort to preserve his 
employment.

[¶37.]  Defining the meaning of the word 
"voluntarily" when that term is applied to an employee who leaves work, W.S. 
27-3-311(a)(i) (1991) is a matter of law. Southwest 
Wyoming 
Rehabilitation 
Center v. Employment Sec. 
Comm'n, 781 P.2d 918, 921 (Wyo. 1989). As used in the 
WESL, voluntary connotes "`[u]nconstrained by interference; unimpelled by 
another's influence; spontaneous; acting of oneself * * * [r]esulting from free 
choice.'" Shuler v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 9 
Va. App. 147, 384 S.E.2d 122, 124 (1989) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1413 (5th ed. 1979)). Similar 
language in other jurisdictions' statutes has been interpreted to require "some 
manifestation of intent to quit" to show a claimant voluntarily left employment. 
Blackwell, 560 N.E.2d  at 677; Monaco v. Unemployment 
Compensation Bd. of Review, 523 Pa. 41, 565 A.2d 127, 129 
(1989); Johnson, 337 N.W.2d  at 447. Merely leaving the premises of employment is 
not enough to determine intent, Johnson, 337 N.W.2d  at 447; the totality of the 
circumstances must be considered. Monaco, 565 A.2d  at 
129.

[¶38.]  The bulk of CIM's evidentiary 
presentation attempted to contradict the discharge claim. CIM tried to establish 
O'Brien had left work voluntarily using Sidney Tolin's testimony that O'Brien 
had previously been talked out of quitting and the affidavits of two CIM 
employees that O'Brien told them on the day he left he was quitting. CIM 
counsel, Don Tolin, also vigorously cross-examined O'Brien and those testifying 
at the hearing in his behalf.

[¶39.]  O'Brien refuted CIM's contention that he 
quit voluntarily with his own testimony that he did not intend to quit when he 
left work. O'Brien also denied telling co-workers on April 24, 
1991, that he was quitting. 
O'Brien's version was persuasively supported by the introduction of the CIM 
"Employee Time-Off" forms accounting for O'Brien's absence from work. A 
co-worker at CIM, Barry Texas, testified that O'Brien had no intention of 
quitting when he went to the Labor Board.

[¶40.]  The critical finding was that CIM's 
action in "pulling" O'Brien's time card terminated his employment. The examiner 
noted this action "is commonly construed as a discharge." Even though the 
Examiner allowed CIM a broad range of flexibility during its evidentiary 
presentation, including numerous leading or irrelevant questions from counsel, 
CIM's contention that O'Brien left voluntarily was not supported with sufficient 
evidence. If O'Brien had intended to leave voluntarily, he would not have 
completed the "Employee Time-Off" forms. It is also unlikely he would have 
engaged in such an obscene attack on his employer after being told he "quit." 
With deference to the Commission's expertise in employment matters, we hold 
substantial evidence supports the finding that O'Brien's employment terminated 
at the hands of CIM, the employer.

CONCLUSION

[¶41.]  The Commission's application of law was 
proper; and its determination, supported by substantial evidence, was 
reasonable. The decision of the district court, therefore, is 
affirmed.

Footnotes

Footnotes

1 Justice Thomas has 
objected to the quoted language and may file a specially concurring 
opinion.

THOMAS, Justice, concurring 
specially.

[¶42.]  The Moving Finger writes; and, having 
writ,

Moves on: nor 
all your Piety nor Wit Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line, Nor all your 
Tears wash out a Word of it.

 

The Rubaiyat of 
Omar Khayyam, Stanza 71, AN ANTHOLOGY OF WORLD POETRY 126 (translated by Edward 
FitzGerald) (Van Doren ed. 1936).

The immortal 
words of the poet maintain their verity.

FAMILIARITY BREEDS 
CONTEMPT.

[¶43.]  AESOP'S FABLES, The Fox and the Lion 24 
(The Harvard Classics 1909).

While the courts 
of Wyoming well may know all the 
profane words, Aesop graphically articulates the difference between knowing 
something and familiarity with it.

[¶44.]  I concur in the result of this opinion, 
but I am unable to join in the opinion. Vulgarity for the sake of vulgarity has 
no real place, but it is particularly inappropriate in an opinion of a supreme 
court. "If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it 
must be a duck." City of Laramie v. Facer, 814 P.2d 268, 
273 (Wyo. 1991). It is unfortunate 
that the court is compelled, for whatever reason, to emulate a naughty schoolboy 
attempting to shock the teacher. The result of our decisions is often 
sufficiently shocking that it is specious to attempt to do it with vulgar 
language.

[¶45.]  In the course of this court's work, 
occasions may arise when coarse language is necessary and, for that reason, 
appropriate. It is indeed probable that situations may arise when such 
statements are a necessary part of the material facts. Despite the attempt in 
this instance to justify the inclusion of the vulgarities, this language is not 
necessary to understand the decision of the hearing officer. In his Findings and 
Conclusions, the Appeals Examiner found it sufficient to report:

The claimant protested 
that he had not intended to quit and entered into an exchange of verbal obscenities with his 
employer. (Emphasis added.)

In explaining 
his decision, the Appeals Examiner afforded no significance to this exchange, 
saying:

The claimant's actions in 
contacting the Labor Board, or any other regulatory agency, were within his 
rights. The claimant intended his absence to be temporary and completed the 
appropriate paperwork for the employer indicating that his absence was intended 
to be temporary. The employer's action in "pulling his time card" is an action 
which is commonly construed as a discharge. The claimant took no action to end 
his employment. The end of the employment was determined by the employer. The 
claimant was discharged but there is insufficient evidence to support a finding 
that the discharge was for misconduct connected with his work. The claimant is, 
therefore, not subject to disqualification.

The material 
facts had ended before the argument occurred out of which the gutter language is 
quoted, and that language is not relevant to any of the issues in this appeal. 
The inclusion of those vulgarities serves only to denigrate both the work place 
and the Supreme Court of Wyoming. It is interesting to note that to the extent 
the parties found it necessary to address this exchange in materials furnished 
through counsel to the Unemployment Insurance Commission, they described the 
event as "screamed obscenities," "yelling obscenities," "yell obscenities in a 
loud and abusive manner," "use obscenities," and "scream 
obscenities."

[¶46.]  The statement of the issues and the able 
resolution of those issues in the court's opinion belie the claimed 
justification for using this language. It appears in the Brief of Appellee, but 
its use should not be condoned by repetition. I am firmly of the conviction that 
the citizens of Wyoming deserve the portrayal of 
a better image by their highest court than this opinion presents. How can we 
expect to enjoy a shining image in the eyes of our constituency if we go to such 
lengths to tarnish it ourselves. It is truly unfortunate that this opinion will 
be remembered, not for the able treatment of the legal issues, but because of 
the unnecessary invocation of such vulgarity. I am disappointed.