Case Title: Allgood v. Orason

Citation: 511 P.2d 746, 85 N.M. 260

Docket Number: 9573

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1973-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
511 P.2d 746 (1973) 85 N.M. 260 Eula Jean ALLGOOD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Roy O. ORASON, Defendant-Appellant. No. 9573. Supreme Court of New Mexico. July 6, 1973. Solomon, Roth & Kaufman, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellant. Jones, Gallegos, Snead & Wertheim, John Wentworth, Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee. STEPHENSON, Justice. This action was brought by Eula Jean Allgood ("plaintiff") against Roy Orason ("defendant") in the District Court of Santa Fe County for modification of their California child custody order regarding visitation rights. After trial to the court, the California decree was modified as to custody, visitation rights, and expenses, with a restraining order being placed on both parties. Defendant appeals. The developments of this case, particularly the California battles over visitation, are rather remarkable even in the field of domestic relations. An interlocutory judgment of dissolution of marriage was entered by the Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara in August 1970. Pursuant to stipulation, custody of the children was given to plaintiff subject to defendant's visitation rights. The judgment further provided that prior to permanent removal of either child from residence in California, the party so removing should secure the written consent of the other or a further order of the court. The same restrictions were carried forward into the final judgment of dissolution entered in October 1970. But even prior to the entry of the final judgment, problems were arising concerning visitation. A hearing was held in September 1970 on a petition of plaintiff to permanently remove the children to Texas, and defendant's request for modification of the custody provisions and a contempt order against plaintiff. All relief sought by either party was denied in November 1970. *747 By January, 1971, plaintiff was back in court with another petition, this time to define the visitation rights and to obtain permission to remove the children from the Bay area. An order was entered spelling out the visitation rights more fully, and permitting plaintiff to take the children out of California for vacations of up to one month. On February 20, 1971 plaintiff married Mr. Allgood and two days later left California. The Allgoods and the children have resided in Santa Fe since February 25th of that year. In April, 1971, we again find plaintiff in the Superior Court of California again seeking to loosen the restrictions on where she may keep the children and tighten the visitation rights. On May 28, 1971 the California court entered the order with which we are primarily concerned, and will call the "California order." Notable features of the order include: The California order was not appealed, nor has plaintiff sought to have it modified. Following entry of the California order, defendant commenced a continuous effort to exercise his visitation rights, but with indifferent success. He was able to see his daughters only twice, once in California and once in New Mexico, being met with a barrage of excuses by, and passive resistance on the part of, the plaintiff. Although the record is not entirely clear, apparently defendant initiated a contempt proceeding in California. He claims that plaintiff secured a continuance of it and then filed this proceeding on November 3, 1971. So far as we know, there have been no further hearings in California since the order. A good deal is said in the briefs about whether the California order was res judicata and should be given full faith and credit under U.S.Const. art. IV, § 1. The foundation of our law with respect to enforcement of foreign custody decrees was laid in Ex parte Mylius v. Cargill, 19 N.M. 278, 142 P. 918 (1914). Mylius was a habeas corpus proceeding by the father to enforce a Texas decree giving custody rights to both the mother and the father and prohibiting the removal of the children from the State of Texas without consent of the court. The mother had removed the children to New Mexico without consent of the court and had thereby deprived the father of his custody rights. In determining whether the Texas decree was entitled to full faith and credit, this court said: We have consistently followed the principles established in Mylius by holding that foreign custody decrees are entitled to full faith and credit; and this means such decrees are res judicata, but only as to the facts before the court rendering the decree; Smith v. South, 59 N.M. 312, 283 P.2d 1073 (1955); and that upon a showing of changed circumstances indicating the welfare of the child will best be served by a change of custody, the full faith and credit clause does not prohibit a modification of the foreign decree. Tuft v. Tuft, 82 N.M. 461, 483 P.2d 935 (1971) and the cases cited therein; Terry v. Terry, 82 N.M. 113, 476 P.2d 772 (1970). The controlling consideration is the welfare of the child. See e.g. Terry v. Terry, supra; Fox v. Doak, 78 N.M. 743, 438 P.2d 153 (1968); Smith v. South, supra; Albright v. Albright, 45 N.M. 302, 115 P.2d 59 (1941); Ex parte Mylius v. Cargill, supra. As to the degree and kind of change in circumstances, we said in Albright v. Albright, supra: The moving party has the burden of proving that a legally sufficient change of circumstances has occurred. We said in Merrill v. Merrill, 82 N.M. 458, 483 P.2d 932 (1971): Naturally, the trial court has considerable discretion in child custody awards. Merrill v. Merrill, supra; Kotrola v. Kotrola, 79 N.M. 258, 442 P.2d 570 (1968). But a generality concerning the breadth of the trial court's discretion cannot be permitted to serve as a device for circumventing the constitutional requirements of full faith and credit, the common law doctrine of res judicata and the requirements laid down in our precedents regarding the sufficiency of a supposed change in circumstances. With these principles in view, the legal issue presented here is limited in scope. Has there been a change of circumstances which is substantial, which materially effects the children's welfare and which occurred between May 28 and November 3, 1971? Only an affirmative answer to these questions will permit us to sustain the trial court's order. Quite a lot of the petition and evidence was taken up with assorted alleged delinquencies and shortcomings of defendant. Most of this had more or less evaporated by the time the proof was in and does not concern us. The petition, in summary, alleges that the California order is "burdensome and oppressive" in requiring plaintiff to share visitation expenses; that plaintiff cannot comply with it; that the traveling is bad for the children; that defendant is able to pay these expenses; and so on. Most of the proof, which could be material here consisted merely of inveighing against the California order that it was bad, unworkable and expensive. The trial *749 court in its findings said the California order was "burdensome for the children and for the plaintiff." It also found: The trial court then gave the visitation provisions of the California order a general overhaul. Our inquiry is not whether the New Mexico order is better than the California one. We are inclined to think it probably is. Rather the question is whether the finding as to a material change in circumstances is supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff has precisely stated in her brief a summary of the evidence she relies upon to show a change of circumstances, reiterated upon oral argument by specific reference to the brief. This summary (in plaintiff's words, but separated and numbered for convenience and with our comments interspersed) is as follows: In Merrill v. Merrill, supra, we were presented with an analogous situation. A divorce decree confirming a prior custody agreement giving custody of the children to the mother had previously been entered. The father, plaintiff in the action, subsequently remarried and sought to modify the custody agreement. In holding that the trial court abused its discretion in changing custody of the children to the plaintiff, we said: Similarly, the record in this case, if it reveals any change in circumstances, presents no evidence of a change of a substantial or material nature affecting the children's welfare or justifying the modification of the California order. Accordingly, we hold that the order appealed from must be reversed. Appellee relies on Hoefer v. Hoefer, 67 N.M. 180, 353 P.2d 1066 (1960), in which we held that the domicile in good faith in New Mexico of the mother is sufficient basis for jurisdiction in New Mexico to enter a decree confirming a prior Kansas custody decree granting custody to the mother, even though during the pendency of the New Mexico proceeding, the Kansas decree had been modified. In Hoefer, we held only that New Mexico had jurisdiction to confirm a foreign custody order existing at the time domicile was established in New Mexico, and we stated that there was no issue of changing a prior custody order of a sister state. Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in refusing to rule upon his request that the children be required to use the name "Orason," their legal name, rather than the name "Allgood," the name of their stepfather. He advanced no legal basis for this assertion, either at the trial court or here. Accordingly the decision of the trial court refusing the request is affirmed. The order from which this appeal is taken is reversed. The case is remanded to the district court with directions to dismiss plaintiff's petition. Plaintiff is allowed $500.00 for the services of her attorneys in this court. It is so ordered. MONTOYA and MARTINEZ, JJ., concur.