Case Title: McLean v. Buck Medical Services, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S46151

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2002-04-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  April 25, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

GARY McLEAN,
	Petitioner on Review,
	v.
BUCK MEDICAL SERVICES, INC.,
dba American Medical 
Response Northwest, Inc.,
and A. A. AMBULANCE SERVICE OF PORTLAND, INC.,
dba American Medical Response Northwest, Inc.,
	Respondents on Review,
	and
MULTNOMAH COUNTY,
	Respondent on Review.
(CC 9601-00413; CA A96826; SC S46151)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted March 7, 2000.
	W. Eugene Hallman, Pendleton, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for petitioner on review.  With him on the briefs was Mark
D. Griffin, of Griffin McCandlish, Portland.
	Stephen F. Crew, of Ramis Crew Corrigan & Bachrach LLP,
Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondents
on review Buck Medical Services, Inc., and A. A. Ambulance
Service of Portland.  With him on the briefs was T. Chad Plaster,
Portland.
	No appearance for respondent on review Multnomah County.
	Margaret S. Olney, of Smith, Gamson, Diamond & Olney,
Portland, filed a brief for amicus curiae AFSCME Council 75.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
and Riggs, Justices.**
	GILLETTE, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.
	Durham, J., concurred and filed an opinion in which Riggs,
J., joined.
	*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Ward Greene, Judge pro tempore. 157 Or App 563, 971 P2d 462 (1998).
    **Van Hoomissen, J., retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate in the decision of this case; Kulongoski, J.,
resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the decision
of this case; De Muniz and Balmer, JJ., did not participate in
the consideration or decision of this case.
		GILLETTE, J.
This is a class action by employees of Buck Medical
Services, Inc. (Buck), the exclusive provider of ambulance
services within certain parts of Clackamas and Multnomah
counties, seeking overtime pay from their employer under two
provisions of the public contract laws.  Plaintiff, the class
representative, brought the action on the theory that Buck's
contracts with Multnomah and Clackamas counties are "public
contracts," and that public contracting laws -- specifically, ORS
279.316 (1997) and ORS 279.334 (1997) (set out below) (1) -- require
Buck, as a public contractor, to pay overtime wages for any hours
that its employees work on weekends, holidays, or in excess of
eight hours in a given day.  The trial court rejected that theory
and granted summary judgment for Buck.  The Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that, regardless of whether the contracts at
issue are public contracts, they are exempt from the statutory
overtime pay provisions in ORS 279.316 (1997) and ORS 279.334
(1997) because they are "personal service contracts" within the
meaning of those statutes.  McLean v. Buck Medical Services, Inc.,
157 Or App 563, 569-79, 971 P2d 462 (1998).  For the reasons that
follow, we affirm. 
	  	Because the trial court granted Buck's motion for
summary judgment, we view the record in the light most favorable
to plaintiff -- the party opposing summary judgment -- and draw
all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.  See Jones v.
General Motors Corp., 325 Or 404, 408, 939 P2d 608 (1997)
(stating rule).  In July 1991, Clackamas County adopted an
Ambulance Service Plan to ensure efficient provision of ambulance
service.  The plan provided for four "ambulance service areas"
(ASAs) within the county and further provided that, for each ASA,
all emergency ("9-1-1") requests for ambulance transportation
calls would be referred to a single ambulance service provider,
which would respond to the calls and charge the users (rather
than the county) for its services.  The exclusive provider for
each ASA would be selected through a competitive request-for-proposal (RFP) process.  
		 In September 1993, Clackamas County issued an RFP for
its largest ASA.  The RFP set certain minimum credential and
performance standards, and indicated that the successful bidder
would be selected on the basis of its credentials, response-time
commitments, level of clinical sophistication, fiscal strength,
equipment management and maintenance, key personnel, employee
wage and benefit structure, proposed costs and charges to users,
and other factors.  Buck responded to the RFP, submitting a
proposal that included, along with other materials pertaining to
wages and benefits, a copy of Buck's collective bargaining
agreement with its employees.  The collective bargaining
agreement provides for overtime pay for holidays and all hours
worked in excess of 40 hours in any week, but not for weekend
work or hours in excess of eight hours on a particular day.  
The county ultimately selected Buck as the sole
ambulance provider within the ASA and entered into an agreement
to that effect.  The agreement provided, among other things,
that, "at a minimum," Buck would adhere to the wage and benefit
package described in its proposal.  It further provided, in a
section labeled "Standard Provisions," that "[t]he provisions of
Oregon public contracting law, ORS 279.310 through ORS 279.320
are incorporated herein by this reference." (2)     
		In 1994, Multnomah County adopted an Ambulance Service
Plan that was similar to the Clackamas County plan.  Like
Clackamas County, Multnomah County decided to select an exclusive
ambulance service provider for its single ASA through an RFP
process, and to base its selection on a variety of factors
including credentials, performance commitments, employee wage and
benefit structure, and cost of the service to users.  Buck
responded to Multnomah County's RFP with a proposal that was
similar to its Clackamas County proposal and that incorporated a
similar wage and benefit proposal.  Buck was selected as the
exclusive provider for the Multnomah County ASA and entered into
an agreement with the county that required it to adhere to the
wages and benefits described in its proposal.  Unlike the
Clackamas County agreement, the Multnomah County agreement does
not include a provision incorporating ORS 279.310 to ORS 279.320
by reference.         
Plaintiff, a paramedic who works for Buck under both
the Clackamas and Multnomah county agreements, filed this action
against Buck in 1996, alleging violations of ORS 279.316(1)(a)
(1997) and ORS 279.334(1)(a) (1997), and of provisions of the
contracts between Buck and Clackamas and Multnomah counties. 
Later, the court certified the case as a class action and
designated plaintiff as class representative. (3)  Buck moved for
summary judgment, arguing that the contracts were not subject to
the public contracting statutes and that, in any event, they were
"contracts for personal services" and exempt from the overtime
pay requirements in ORS 279.316(1)(a) (1997) and ORS
279.334(1)(a) and (6) (1997). (4)  The trial court accepted those
arguments and granted the motion.
		On plaintiff's appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. 
McLean v. Buck Medical Services, Inc., 157 Or App at 565.  The
court held that, regardless of the general applicability of the
public contracting statutes, the contracts in question are
"contracts for personal services" and exempt from the overtime
pay requirements of ORS 279.316 and ORS 279.334.  Id. at 574.  
In so holding, the Court of Appeals concluded that both ambulance
service contracts fell within categories of contracts that had
been designated as personal services contracts by the relevant
county contract review board.  Id. at 572-73.  It also opined
that, in making those designations, those county boards had not
exceeded the authority delegated to them by a related public
contracting statute, ORS 279.051(2), to designate classes of
contracts as personal services contracts.  McLean, 157 Or App at
576-77.
		Plaintiff challenges the decision of the Court of
Appeals on a number of grounds.  Plaintiff argues, first, that
the Court of Appeals misinterpreted ORS 279.051, construing it to
allow local contract review boards virtually unfettered
discretion in designating contracts as personal services
contracts when, in fact, that discretion is quite limited. 
Plaintiff contends that local boards may designate contracts as
personal services contracts only if those contracts fit into the
category of contracts that are for the services of a particular
individual who possesses a high degree of expertise or
professional, artistic, or management discretion that is
necessary for the task.  Plaintiff contends that the Buck
contracts are not in that category, because they pertain to the
work of a large number of employees, none of whom perform work
that requires a professional level of expertise or discretion.
		Plaintiff's argument presents a question of statutory
construction, which we carry out under the analytical framework
set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 859
P2d 1143 (1993).  In accordance with PGE's instruction, we begin
by examining the text and context of the relevant statutes to
ascertain the legislature's intent.  Id. at 610-11.  
As noted, both ORS 279.316(1)(a) (1997) and ORS
279.334(6) (1997) exempt from the overtime pay requirements
"contracts for personal services as defined in ORS 279.051."
(Emphasis added.) (5)  It follows that the first place to look in
analyzing the statutes' meaning is ORS 279.051 (1997).  ORS
279.051 (1997) provides, in part:
     "(1) Except as provided in ORS 279.712, public
agencies may enter into contracts for personal
services. * * * Each public agency authorized to enter
into personal service contracts shall create procedures
for the screening and selection of persons to perform
personal services.
     "(2) The Director of the Oregon Department of
Administrative Services [DAS] or a local contract
review board by ordinance, resolution, administrative
rule or other regulation may designate certain service
contracts or classes of service contracts as personal
service contracts."	 
		Although ORS 279.051 actually does not fulfill the
expectation created in ORS 279.316(1)(a) (1997) and ORS
279.334(6) (1997) that it will define "contracts for personal
services," the statute does authorize the director of DAS or
local public contract review boards to "designate" certain
contracts and classes of contracts as personal services
contracts.  One way -- indeed, we think the most plausible way --
to construe the phrase "as defined in ORS 279.051" in ORS
279.316(1)(a) (1997) and ORS 279.334(6) (1997) would be to read
it as referring to those contracts that the director of DAS or
local contract review agencies, under the authority granted to
them by ORS 279.051(2) (1997), have designated as personal
service contracts.  That interpretation assumes that ORS
279.051(2) (1997) delegates authority to the director of DAS or
local contract review boards to define "contract for personal
services" for purposes of the public contracts within their
respective purviews.    
It also is arguable, however, that, regardless of
contrary suggestion in ORS 279.316(1)(a) (1997) and ORS
279.334(6) (1997), ORS 279.051(2) (1997) does not confer
authority on DAS or local contract review boards to define
"contract for personal services."  That, essentially, is the
position that plaintiff takes. (6)  Plaintiff contends the term
"contract for personal service" has a fixed meaning in ORS
279.051(2) (1997), and that the only choice that the statute
delegates to local contract review boards is whether to designate
a particular service contract or class of service contracts that
fall within that legislatively intended meaning as "personal," so
that the exceptions at ORS 279.316(a)(1) (1997) and ORS
279.334(6) (1997) will apply.    
		Inherent in plaintiff's argument is the assumption that
the statutes either express or assume a particular, limited
definition of the concept of a "personal services contract."  As
previously noted, plaintiff contends that the statutes do express
such a choice, which plaintiff characterizes as a choice to make
the "personal services contract" exception from the overtime
provisions in ORS 279.316(1)(a) (1997) and ORS 279.334(6) (1997)
only applicable to contracts with a single individual for
services that require a high degree of expertise or professional,
artistic, or management discretion.  Plaintiff argues that that
intention is evident from the legislature's use of the phrase
"contract for personal services" itself and from the statutory
context in which that phrase is used.  
  		Plaintiff first points to the term "personal" in the
phrase "contract for personal service" and to the fact that ORS
279.051(1) (1997) requires public agencies to "create procedures
for the screening and selection of persons to perform personal
services."  (Emphasis added.)  Relying on the common usage of the
terms "person" and "personal," plaintiff contends that term
"contract for personal service" clearly pertains to contracts for
the services of a particular individual.
We are not convinced that the use of those terms is
dispositive.  At least in legal parlance, the term "person" may
include business and other nonhuman entities, often made up of a
large number of persons, that are recognized as having certain of
the rights and duties of a human being. (7)  Moreover, other
provisions in ORS chapter 279 appear to contemplate that at least
some personal services contracts will require services by
companies or other business entities. (8)  Ultimately, we are
unpersuaded that those words in the statute, read in context,
demonstrate that the legislature expressed the choice that
plaintiff asserts.  
Plaintiff also relies on the fact that, in a related
statute, ORS 279.712(1), the term "personal services" is used in
connection with two typically professional services --
architectural and engineering services. (9)  Plaintiff reasons from
that connection that the phrase "personal services" in ORS
279.316(1)(a) (1997) and ORS 279.334(6) (1997) also must refer to
the same professional services, or services like them, that
require a high degree of professional, managerial, or artistic
discretion.
		Again, we are unpersuaded.  Plaintiff is relying on the
principle of "ejusdem generis," see, e.g., King Estate Winery,
Inc. v. Dept. of Rev., 329 Or 414, 424, 988 P2d 369 (1999)
(stating and using principle), but this is not a case in which
the reference to "architectural [and] engineering * * * services"
in ORS 279.712(1) is sufficient to define fully the scope of the
term "personal services contract."  The phrase in which those
terms appear is too open-ended to aid our construction of the
distinct terminology of ORS 279.051.
		In addition to considering plaintiff's arguments, we
have examined independently the text and context of ORS 279.051
(1997), ORS 279.316 (1997), and ORS 279.334 (1997), including the
textual history of each statute.  We have found nothing in any of
those sources that sheds light on the issue that we confront
here.  Both readings of the cross-references to ORS 279.051
(1997) in ORS 279.316(1)(a) (1997) and ORS 279.334(6) (1997)
remain plausible.  We turn to legislative history -- the second
level of analysis -- in our attempt to determine whether the
legislature intended to place the primary responsibility for
defining "personal services" with the director of DAS and local
contract review boards.  See PGE, 317 Or at 611-12 (demonstrating
methodology).
Before 1979, the only references to "personal services
contracts" in the public contracting statutes appeared in the
section that pertained to bidding and purchasing.  ORS 279.051
(1977) authorized public agencies to enter into "personal
services contracts" and provided that the state public
contracting board could impose screening and selection procedures
on any state agency.  ORS 279.011(1) (1977) defined "public
contract" to include purchases, leases, or sales by a public
agency "other than agreements which are exclusively for personal
service."  (Emphasis added.) (10) 
In 1979, the legislature adopted a second section of
ORS 279.051, authorizing the director of DAS and local contract
review boards to "designate certain contracts and classes of
contracts as personal services contracts."  Or Laws 1979, ch 196,
§ 2.  The provision was adopted in the context of concerns about
the requirements of the bidding and purchasing sections of the
public contracting statutes and, in particular, about the
implications of a then-recent Court of Appeals decision, Photo-Art v. Hunter, 42 Or App 207, 600 P2d 471 (1979).  Photo-Art held
that a state agency contract with a film-making company for the
production and ultimate purchase of three films was a "public
contract" within the meaning of ORS 279.011(1) as it then
appeared (11) and that the agency should have awarded it to the
lowest qualified bidder.  Id. at 211-13.  The Court of Appeals
read the statutory exemption for agreements, which are
"exclusively" for personal services literally, and concluded that
the film contract was outside that exemption, because the
contract covered the purchase of the films as well as personal
services required to create them.  Id.
Shortly thereafter, the Attorney General sponsored
Senate Bill 232 (1979), which sought to delete the term
"exclusively" from ORS 272.011(1) and to add a provision that
would allow the state Public Contract Review Board or local
contract review boards to designate contracts and classes of
contracts as personal service contracts. (12)  During legislative
discussions, a committee administrator described the bill as
"allow[ing] more flexibility in determining what is a services
contract and what is a personal services contract." (13)  One
witness, Jack Sollis of the Oregon Department of Transportation,
stated that the bill "grant[s] * * * authority to the Public
Contract Review Board to make a very definitive distinction of
what contracts are or are not personal service contracts." (14) 
Although it is clear from those discussions that some of the
bill's proponents thought of the "personal service contract"
bidding exemption primarily in terms of professional services, (15)
others spoke of personal services contracts in more flexible
terms -- i.e., as contracts in which the particular capabilities
of the party performing the contract are a more important
consideration than the overall contract cost.  See, e.g.,
Testimony of Noel Klein, on behalf of the League of Oregon
Cities, House Committee on Intergovernmental Affairs, SB 232,
April 25, 1979, Tape 14, Side 1 (illustrating proposition).  It
also is clear that, as we have explained, the common purpose was
to avoid the Photo-Art problem.
		The committees that considered the bill understood that
it contained a very broad delegation and that it relied heavily
on the discretion of the state or local public contract review
boards.  One discussion in the Senate Local Government Committee
is illustrative.  When asked whether the state Public Contract
Review Board could draft a meaningful rule distinguishing
personal services contracts, Assistant Attorney General Don
Seymour, counsel for the Board, answered:  
A:  "I think that a meaningful rule could be adopted
[but] it's not going to be too easy.  I would suggest
an amendment to the law and we wouldn't have to worry
about an administrative rule.   One possible way of
going about it would be to put in a provision that
would restrict this personal service contract that
would involve more than just personal service to one
where the end product would be unique.  I think this
would solve a lot of the problems and I think one of
the worries that this committee might have is that the
Board might adopt a rule where it would open the
floodgates [to] everything being a personal services
contract and not be subject to competitive bids and a
restriction like that might ease some of the minds of
the committee.  The example that is bothering me * * *
is a contract to paint this room.  I think it's a
services contract but its not a personal services
contract but you could adopt a rule that would make
this a personal service contract and that would not be
subject to competitive bid.  However, in the ordinary
sense, the painting of this room, the end product would
not be unique."
Q:  "In your opinion though, some kind of defensible
rule could be drawn?"
A:  "Yes, I believe that a rule could be drawn that
would allow this kind of contract to be a personal
services contract not out for competitive bid and still
protect the public in cases where the public would
expect the matter to be put out for competitive bid."
Tape Recording, Senate Committee on Local Government, SB 232,
January 22, 1979, Tape 2, Side 1.  Shortly thereafter, an
unidentified committee member commented:
"It appears to me that the rulemaking authority that we
would be giving is of massive significance to the state
of Oregon and we should probably carefully consider
whether we want to remove the people's attorney general
from the [Public Contracting Review] Board?"
Id.  The committee chairman, Senator Frank Roberts, answered: 
"Yes, we've increased its responsibilities tremendously."  Id.
		We think that the foregoing history shows that, in
enacting ORS 279.051(2) (1997), the legislature understood that
it was conferring broad authority on contract review agencies to
designate contracts as "personal services contracts."  The
history indicates, for example, that the legislature contemplated
that contract review boards would be able to designate entire
contracts as "personal services contracts" for purposes of ORS
chapter 279, even if only part of the work that the contract
covered traditionally would be considered "personal services." 
The history also shows that the legislators did not choose to
attempt to limit the delegation in the statute, even when it was
suggested that the boards might use that delegation to make
designations that were counterintuitive.  In sum, the history
reinforces what we had concluded was the most plausible way to
read the statutory text:  The legislature intended to authorize
the boards to define for themselves which contracts or classes of
contracts were "personal service contracts" and exempted from the
competitive bidding process.  
Plaintiff suggests, however, that, in this inquiry, the
proper focus is on the history of ORS 279.316 and ORS 279.334,
the two wage and hour statutes that are at issue.  Plaintiff
notes that the people enacted the wage and hour protections
contained in those provisions by initiative in 1912, (16) and that
the initiative sought to protect laborers from long hours and low
wages that were, in the view of the initiative sponsors,
detrimental both to labor and to the public welfare.  Plaintiff
argues that the court must read ORS 279.316 and ORS 279.334
broadly to effectuate that purpose and that the Court of Appeals'
reading, which expands the authority of local contract review
boards to declare exceptions to those statutes, does just the
opposite.
		In so arguing, plaintiff chooses to ignore the fact
that we are dealing here with amendments to ORS 279.316 and ORS
279.334.  However expansive the voters' intent may have been when
the people adopted those wage and hour protections in 1912, the
fact remains that the 1989 Legislature exempted certain
contracts, i.e., "contracts for personal services as defined in
ORS 279.051," from those protections.  If the meaning and scope
of that exemption is not clear from its text and context, then
the next step is to examine the legislative history of the
amendment.  Accordingly, we turn to the legislative history of
the 1989 amendments to ORS 279.316 and ORS 279.334.
At the time of the 1989 amendments, as now, ORS chapter
279 contained two definitions of the term "public contract."  The
first, by its express terms, applies to the term "public
contract" "as used in ORS 279.011 to 279.063."  It provides: 
"'Public contract' means any purchase, lease or sale by a public
agency of personal property, public improvements or services
other than agreements which are for personal services."  ORS
279.011(4) (1987) (emphasis added).  The other definition, which
appeared at ORS 279.310(1), applied to the term "[w]hen used in
ORS 279.310 to 279.320."  Under that definition,"'public
contract' means a contract made with the state, county, school
district, municipality, municipal corporation or subdivision
thereof." (17) 
		It appears that the amendments at issue were conceived
after the state Attorney General issued an opinion that suggested
that the latter definition applied to ORS 279.316 and ORS
279.334.  See Minutes, Senate Committee on Labor, SB 40, April 3,
1989, pp 2-4.  According to discussions of the proposed
amendments in the Senate Committee on Labor, the Department of
General Services had been conducting its affairs as if only the
first definition, which excludes personal services contracts,
applied.  The amendments were needed to "clarify" that "personal
contracts" that the department and local governments had been
treating as exempt from the wages and hours limitations of ORS
279.316 and ORS 279.334 were, in fact, exempt.  See also
Testimony of Jon Yunker, Administrator, Budget and Management
Division, Executive Department, Senate Committee on Labor, SB 40,
April 3, 1989, Exhibit A (to same effect).  Some legislators
objected to exempting personal services contracts from wage and
hour protections altogether, and proposed amendments that would
provide some wage and hour protections to persons working under
personal services contracts.  See Minutes, Senate Committee on
Labor, SB 40, April 28, 1989, p 4 (comments of Annette Talbott,
Committee Administrator).  The amendments at issue resulted from
those discussions:  They exempt "personal services contracts as
defined in ORS 279.051" from the requirements in ORS 279.316 and
ORS 279.334 that workers be paid time-and-a-half for weekend
hours and hours in excess of eight hours in a day, but require
overtime pay for hours in excess of 40 in any week.  Or Laws
1989, ch 572, §§ 1-2.  
		Interestingly, much of the testimony and discussion
respecting the amendments centered around avoiding the high cost
of extending the overtime pay requirement for weekends and in
excess of an eight hour day to human services and "purchase of
care" contracts.  Witness Colleen Hoss, speaking to the Senate
Committee on Labor on behalf of local governments, emphasized
that many community service projects require providers to be
present seven days a week and 24 hours a day.  Minutes, Senator
Committee on Labor, SB 40, April 3, 1989, p 3.  Witness Jon
Yunker of the Executive Department, focused on "purchase of care"
contracts in his testimony.  He noted that extending the wage and
hour protections of ORS 279.316 and ORS 279.334 to personal
services contracts would increase the cost of business
significantly for governments.  Testimony of Jon Yunker, Senate
Committee on Labor, SB 40, April 3, 1989, Exhibit A.  He
particularly noted that
"the Department of Human Resources will have the
greatest impact because it has over 90 percent of all
personal services contracts.  
	"* * * * *
	"Most of the additional expenses in applying the
definition will be for labor costs for purchase of
care, e.g., nursing homes, foster care, health
services, residential group homes, emergency and
shelter care facilities, residential psychiatric care
facilities.  Overtime must be paid to persons working
split shifts or flexible time.  It adds 104 days per
year which must be compensated at time and a half
(Saturdays and Sundays).  Purchase of care operates on
a seven-day workweek, 24-hours per day schedule, not a
five-day workweek, eight-hours per day schedule.  The
employes of the purchase of care contractors are
presently paid for any overtime or holidays worked. 
However, if a worker's five-day workweek begins on
Saturday and ends on Wednesday, the worker is not paid
overtime for working eight hours on a Saturday or a
Sunday, unless the day is a holiday -- like Christmas." 

Id.
		The significance of that history is twofold.  First, it
shows that the 1989 Legislature understood the amendment as
codifying the then-current understanding and practice of state
and local public contracting agencies, which all along had
treated the contracts that they classified as personal services
contracts as exempt from the wage and hour guarantees at ORS
279.316 and ORS 279.334.  Second, it shows that the legislature
understood that, by excepting "contracts for personal services as
defined in ORS 279.051" from those wage and hour guarantees, it
was excepting a broad array of human services contracts that
required around-the-clock labor, including "purchase of care"
contracts for nursing homes, foster care, health services, and
residential group homes.  Such contracts clearly do not fall
within the narrow definition of "personal service" contract that
plaintiff proposes; however, they are very much like the
ambulance service contracts at issue in this case, which require
24-hour availability and involve administering emergency health
care.  
Ultimately, the foregoing legislative history, combined
with the legislative history of ORS 279.051(2), satisfies us that
(1) the 1979 Legislature did not attach a particular meaning to
the term "contracts for personal services" when it adopted ORS
279.051(2), but, instead, invested public contracting agencies
with broad discretion to designate contracts and classes of
contracts as personal services contracts when cost is secondary
to other considerations; (2) in excepting "contracts for personal
services as defined in ORS 279.051," the 1989 Legislature
extended that same broad discretion to the wage and hour arena;
and (3) the 1989 Legislature endorsed the notion that a wide
range of human services contracts that do not necessarily involve
professional, artistic, or managerial discretion still might be
exempted, under the rubric of personal services contracts, from
the wage and hour guarantees in ORS 279.316(1)(a) and ORS
279.334(1)(a). (18)



		Neither do we find any basis for concluding that a
local contract review board abuses the discretion that ORS
279.051(2) extends to it by designating ambulance service
contracts like those that are at issue here as personal services
contracts.  A board reasonably could conclude, in choosing an
exclusive ambulance service provider, that obtaining the services
of the most capable provider is more important than cost and that
a competitive bidding process would be inappropriate.  Plaintiff
may think it inappropriate that that decision also should place
the contract at issue within an exemption to the wages and hours
laws, but that is the choice that the legislature made.  
		Plaintiff's second objection to the decision of the
Court of Appeals is a corollary to his first:  He argues that it
is impermissible to eliminate the wage and hour protections of
individual employees who do not perform personal services in any
sense of the word by "bundling" those employees together with
others under "personal services" contracts.  However, it appears
from the wording of ORS 279.316 (1997) and ORS 279.334 (1997)
that that is what the legislature intended.  On their faces, ORS
279.316(1)(a) (1997) and ORS 279.334(6) (1997) exempt "contracts
for personal services as defined in ORS 279.051" from the
overtime pay provisions on which plaintiff relies.  (Emphasis
added.)  There is nothing in either statute that suggests that
individual employees working under personal services contracts
might be treated differently, depending on whether they
themselves performed services that might be deemed personal
services. 
In plaintiff's third challenge to the decision of the
Court of Appeals, he argues that the trial court erred in
granting Buck's motion for summary judgment, because issues of
material fact remained as to whether Clackamas and Multnomah
counties intended to designate the contracts at issue as personal
services contracts.  We understand this argument to have two
components. (19)  First, plaintiff appears to argue that the
contracts at issue do not fall within the classes of contracts
that have been designated as personal services contracts by the
relevant local contract review board.  In that regard, plaintiff
suggests that only a rule that designates "ambulance services" as
a category of personal services contract would suffice.  Second,
plaintiff appears to argue that, regardless of the sweep of the
definition in the local public contracting rules, there is a
question of fact whether the counties intended that these
specific contracts be personal services contracts and exempt from
the overtime pay requirements that are at issue.  Plaintiff
contends that the absence of any express reference to personal
services in the contracts, the fact that an unsuccessful bidder
on the Multnomah County RFP did not understand that the RFP was
about a contract for personal services, and other evidence all
raise a question of fact in that regard.
		We deal first with the latter of those two arguments,
because we do not believe that it actually is presented by this
case.  Buck never has argued that the counties intended to or did
designate these specific contracts as personal services
contracts.  Instead, Buck has argued that the contracts are
within classes of contracts that have been designated as personal
services contracts by the relevant county authorities.  Buck's
case thus stands or falls on a legal question, viz., the scope
and applicability of the county rules.  If the contracts fall
within the scope of the definitions that the relevant county
boards adopted, then the contracts are personal services
contracts for purposes of ORS chapter 279.
		The foregoing leaves us with plaintiff's arguments that
pertain to the scope of the Multnomah and Clackamas county rules. 
We begin by setting out the relevant rules.  The Clackamas County
rule, which was adopted in January 1994, provides, in part:
"The following are personal service contracts:
"(a) Contracts for services performed as an independent
contractor in a professional capacity, including but
not limited to the services of an accountant; attorney;
architectural or land use planning consultant;
physician or dentist; registered professional engineer;
appraiser or surveyor; passenger aircraft pilot; aerial
photographer; timber cruiser; data processing
consultant or broadcaster.
"* * * * * 
"(f) Contracts for human services provided by
independent contractors in the areas of aging and
senior services, mental health services, health
services, social and emergency services, child care
services, and temporary shelter services."
Clackamas County Local Contract Review Board Rule 110-092.
		The Multnomah County rule does not use the term
"personal services contract."  Instead, it provides for a
category of contracts that it denominates as "professional
services contracts," which the county may enter into using an RFP
(rather than competitive bidding) process.  The rule provides:
"The following are professional services contracts:
"(1) Contracts for services performed as an independent
contractor in a professional capacity, including but
not limited to, the services of an accountant;
attorney; architect; architectural or land use planning
consultant; physician or dentist; registered
professional engineer; appraiser or surveyor; passenger
aircraft pilot; aerial photographer; timber cruiser;
data processing consultant or broadcaster.
"* * * * * 
"(5) Contracts for educational, human custodial care
services and other human services."
Multnomah County Public Contract Review Board Administrative Rule
10.092. 
		As noted, plaintiff contends that the absence of
specific reference to "ambulance services" in the two rules is
significant.  Plaintiff notes, first, that both counties adopted
ordinances defining "personal services contract" within a few
months before the execution of the relevant contract with Buck. 
Plaintiff contends that, "[g]iven the contemporaneous timing of
these contracts and ordinances, it is inconceivable that the
[c]ounties would not have designated 'ambulance services' within
[the two ordinances] if they intended ambulance services to be
included within the designation of personal services contracts."
		Plaintiff's argument assumes that the county boards
would choose to designate categories of contracts with some level
of specificity and would not rely on the broad categories that
appear at Clackamas County Rule 110-092(f) ("health services" and
"social and emergency services") and Multnomah County Rule
10.092(f) ("educational services, human custodial care services
and other human services").  Plaintiff argues that, in fact,
"[t]hese generalized terms do not identify emergency ambulance
service contracts as personal service contracts," because
"[n]early every contract with a county in which services are
provided fit within [those loose classifications]."  However, we
are satisfied that the counties could have relied on those broad
categories in the circumstances that plaintiff has described.  We
equally are satisfied that, regardless of how contemporaneous the
executions of the Buck contracts were with the promulgation of
the rules, neither law nor logic dictated that the counties
necessarily would have added a specific reference to ambulance
services, had they meant to include them in the broad sweep of
those rules. 
		Plaintiff also argues that the terms "health services"
and "emergency services" in the Clackamas County rule and
"educational, human custodial care services and other human
services" in the Multnomah County rule do not encompass these
contracts.  Plaintiff notes, in that regard, that ambulance
services are not classified as health, emergency, or human
services in the United States Census Bureau's 1987 Standard
Industrial Classification Manual (SICM) but, instead, are
classified as transportation services.  Id. at §§ 4119, pp 267-68
(classifying "ambulance service, road" under category 4119,
"Local Passenger Transportation, Not Elsewhere Classified"). 
Plaintiff also relies on the fact that the counties that drafted
the contracts labeled them contracts for "ambulance service," not
"personal services."
We do not agree with plaintiff's suggestions that the
counties are bound by the classification choices used in the SICM
or any other classification system, or that the counties must
label their contracts with the same terminology that they use in
their rules. (20)  We are persuaded, instead, that the classes
described in the rules must be construed in the ordinary way,
using the same method that we use in construing a statute.  See
Abu-Adas v. Employment Dept., 325 Or 480, 485, 940 P2d 518 (1997)
(court uses same method in interpreting agency rules that it does
in interpreting statute).  We begin with text and context of the
rules, and assign to the terms of common usage used in the rules
their "plain, natural and ordinary" meaning.  Id.; see also PGE
v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d
1143 (1993) (prescribing same methodology for statutory
constructions).
		Employing that method, we have no difficulty in
concluding that the ambulance service provided under the
contracts falls within two of the categories named in the
Clackamas County rule, viz., "emergency" and "health" services. 
Ambulance service commonly responds to emergencies; ambulance
crews commonly provide health care to sick or injured persons. 
		The applicability of the Multnomah County rule is less
obvious, but we believe that the ultimate conclusion is the same. 
With respect to that rule, Buck argues, and the Court of Appeals
held, that the contracts at issue fall within the broad category
of "educational, human custodial care services and other human
services."  The Court of Appeals held, specifically, that
ambulance service is a type of custodial care and that, in any
event, it falls under the catchall phrase "other human services."
		We agree with the Court of Appeals' assessment that
ambulance service qualifies as an "other human service[]."  The
term "human services" is somewhat vague and, if it stood alone,
might be read to encompass only social welfare services or the
like.  However, the fact that Multnomah County associated it with
more specific but also very disparate terms in this context
("educational services" and "custodial care services") persuades
us that the term was intended in a more comprehensive sense,
i.e., as one encompassing any service that operates directly on
human beings.  Ambulance service falls into that category.  
		Moreover, and even if ambulance service did not fit
into that particular section of the ordinance, there is still
another section of the Multnomah County ordinance that is
relevant, viz., the section that identifies and describes
"professional" services.  Plaintiff always has argued that the
services provided under the contracts at issue are not
"professional" services.  Citing Quirk v. Baltimore County, MD.,
895 F Supp 773 (D Md 1995), plaintiff argues that the services
provided by emergency medical technicians (EMTs) such as those on
Buck's ambulances are not professional services, because EMTs do
not have a sufficiently high level of education, or exercise
enough discretion in their work, to be considered professionals.  
		The Quirk case interpreted federal Department of Labor
regulations that pertained to the enforcement of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.  The regulations expressly designated as the
touchstones of a profession a high level of formal education and
a high degree of discretion.  Here, however, we are interpreting
the term "professional service" as it is used in Multnomah
County's rule.  The fact that the Multnomah County rule does not
require the same level of formal education and discretion as the
Department of Labor rule in Quirk is shown by the express
inclusion of appraisers, passenger aircraft pilots, aerial
photographers, timber cruisers, and the like in the category of
services that are deemed to be "performed * * * in a professional
capacity."  The inclusion of those and other occupations in the
definition of "profession" makes clear that the Multnomah County
rule uses the term "professional service" in the sense of the
broad definition found in Marx v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity
Company, 183 Neb 12, 157 NW2d 870 (1968).  That definition, which
this court utilized in Multnomah Co. v. Oregon Auto Ins. Co., 256
Or 24, 28, 470 P2d 147 (1970), provides:
"The act or service must be such as exacts the use or
application of special learning or attainment of some
kind.  The term 'professional' * * * means something
more than mere proficiency in the performance of a task
and implies intellectual skill as contrasted with that
used in an occupation for production or sale of
commodities.  A 'professional' act or service is one
arising out of a vocation, calling, occupation, or
employment involving specialized knowledge, labor or
skill and the labor or skill involved is predominantly
mental or intellectual rather than physical or manual." 

Marx, 157 NW 2d at 871-72.
Emergency medical technicians (EMTs), and ambulance
service in general, fall within the foregoing meaning of
"professional."  The record on summary judgment establishes that
EMTs are required to have special learning -- two years of
training -- that provides them not only with the physical skills
to perform medical procedures but also with the intellectual
skill to recognize symptoms and to make split-second decisions. 
Other courts have concluded that those factors bring ambulance
services into the broad meaning of professional service described
in Marx, (21) and we agree with their assessments. 
		Ultimately, we are persuaded that both contracts are
within categories of contracts that have been designated by the
appropriate authority as personal services contracts. 
Consequently, they also are personal services contracts for the
purposes of ORS chapter 279 and, specifically, for the purposes
of the exemptions from the overtime pay requirements in ORS
279.316(1)(a) (1997) and ORS 279.334(1)(a) (1997).  
		With respect to those exemptions, plaintiff asserts one
more argument that only pertains to the Clackamas County
contract.  Plaintiff argues that, even if the Clackamas County
contract otherwise would be exempt under those statutes, it is
subject to the overtime pay provisions contained therein because
the contract expressly incorporates those provisions by
reference.  The Clackamas County contract provides, in part:
"The provisions of the Oregon public contracting law,
ORS 279.310 through 279.320 are incorporated herein by
this reference."    
		Buck responds, and we agree, that the foregoing
contractual provision is not helpful to plaintiff.  Although it
is true that one of the statutory provisions upon which plaintiff
relies, ORS 279.316(1)(a), is a statute that is cross-referenced
in the contract, it also is true that the same cross-referenced
provision contains the exemption for personal services contracts
that we have determined to be applicable to this contract.  
		Plaintiff suggests that it is nonsensical to read the
noted provision as incorporating both the cross-referenced wage
and hour requirements and the statutory exemptions to those
requirements.  However, the exemption does not extend to all the
cross-referenced wage and hour requirements, and parties to the
contract reasonably could intend to adopt some of the referenced
statutory requirements (for example, that they pay overtime for
over 40 hours in one week, ORS 279.316(2), timely pay for labor,
ORS 279.312(1), and make appropriate payments to the Industrial
Accident Fund, ORS 279.312(2), but not the ones from which the
contract statutorily is exempt. 
		For the reasons discussed, we hold that the responsible
counties were entitled to treat the contracts at issue as
personal services contracts within the meaning of ORS chapter
279.  The contracts are exempt from the overtime pay provisions
upon which plaintiff relies.  Because we have so concluded, we do
not consider Buck's alternative argument that the contracts are
not "public contracts" and that ORS chapter 279 generally is
inapplicable in this case.  
		The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed. 
	DURHAM, J., concurring.
	The majority concludes that the legislature intended to
authorize parties to a public contract to avoid responsibility
for compliance with Oregon's wage and hour laws by obtaining,
from the Multnomah County and Clackamas County contract review
boards, designations that the ambulance service contracts in
question are "personal service contracts" under ORS 279.051. 
That is a correct answer to the issue that plaintiff poses.  I
write separately to make it clear that the majority opinion, in
addressing the legislature's intended scope of the delegated
authority of local contract review boards, does not decide any
issue regarding the validity of that delegation.
	Statutory competitive bidding requirements regarding
public contracts generally foster the public's interest in
obtaining goods and services from qualified suppliers at the
lowest available cost.  The legislature allows local governments
to subordinate that public interest by contracting pursuant to an
exemption from competitive bidding requirements (for example,
when a local government entity pays extraordinary lawyer fees to
protect it against a risk of liability).  One exemption,
discussed below, concerns contracts for "personal services."
	ORS 279.316(1)(a) and ORS 279.334, which the majority
sets out in its footnote 3 of its opinion, state certain wage and
hour requirements that pertain to public contracts.  However,
each statute expressly provides that it is inapplicable to
"contracts for personal services as defined in ORS 279.051      
* * *."  ORS 279.316(1)(a); ORS 279.334 (6).
	As the majority correctly observes, ORS 279.051 fails
to define "contracts for personal services," thus contradicting
the terms of ORS 279.316(1)(a) and ORS 279.334.  Instead, ORS
279.051(2) expressly authorizes a local contract review board to
"designate certain service contracts or classes of service
contracts as personal service contracts."  The majority concludes
that the legislature intended that that delegation would
authorize the local contract review boards in Multnomah and
Clackamas Counties to designate the particular ambulance service
contracts involved here as "personal service contracts."  That
conclusion about the legislature's intention involves no inquiry
into the question whether the delegation satisfies legal
requirements for a lawful delegation.
	In Warren v. Marion County, 222 Or 307, 313, 353 P2d
257 (1960), this court addressed a claim by a building contractor
that a building code ordinance in Marion County and the statutory
enabling act that authorized the ordinance were unconstitutional
and void.  The plaintiff argued, among other things, that the
statute purported to delegate authority to promulgate building
regulations, but lacked any definite standards for the
regulations.  According to the plaintiff, the enabling statute
attempted to delegate legislative power in violation of the
legislature's constitutional lawmaking authority set out in the
Oregon Constitution, Article IV, section 1.  222 Or at 311.
	The court agreed that the legislature had stated the
statutory standards for the regulation of building construction
in general terms, but concluded that the generality of the
standards that accompanied the legislative delegation did not
create a constitutional defect.  The court stated:
		"There is no constitutional requirement that all
delegation of legislative power must be accompanied by
a statement of standards circumscribing its exercise. 
It is true that a contrary view has frequently been
expressed in the adjudicated cases, particularly the
earlier ones, but the position taken in such cases is
not defensible.  It is now apparent that the
requirement of expressed standards has, in most
instances, been little more than a judicial fetish for
legislative language, the recitation of which provides
no additional safeguards to persons affected by the
exercise of the delegated authority.  1 Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise, §§ 2.04, 2.05; Forkosch,
Administrative Law, § 84.  Thus, we have learned that
it is of little or no significance in the
administration of a delegated power that the statute
which generated it stated the permissible limits of its
exercise in terms of such abstractions as 'public
convenience, interest or necessity' or 'unjust or
unreasonable,' or 'for the public health, safety, and
morals' and similar phrases accepted as satisfying the
standards requirement.  1 Davis, Administrative Law
Treatise, §§ 2.03-2.05; Forkosch, Administrative Law,
§§ 83, 84.
		"As pointed out in Davis on Administrative Law,
the important consideration is not whether the statute
delegating the power expresses standards, but whether
the procedure established for the exercise of the power
furnishes adequate safeguards to those who are affected
by the administrative action.  1 Davis, Administrative
Law Treatise, §§ 2.10, 2.15, 7.20.  See also: Peninsula
Corporation v. United States, 60 F Supp 174 (D.C. Cir
1945); Heath v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,
187 Md 296, 49 A2d 799 (1946).
		"In testing the statute for the adequacy of such
safeguards it is important to consider the character of
administrative action which the statute authorizes. 
The statute here authorizes the establishment of
building codes, including the adoption by reference of
published codes such as the Uniform Building Code which
the defendant adopted in modified form.  Such codes are
in themselves a statement of specific standards for the
construction of buildings.  The administrative official
charged with the duty of enforcing a building code
ordinance is called upon to decide whether the
specifications set out in the code have been met in the
construction of a particular building.  His action can,
therefore, be tested against the specific description
of adequate construction set out in the building code. 
The statute then requires that the county set up appeal
procedures so that persons dissatisfied with the
building inspector's action in ruling upon the
suitability of materials or construction may have that
action reviewed by a separate administrative body. 
What further safeguards are needed to protect persons
subjected to regulation under such a code?
		 "We believe that the appeals procedure required
by ORS 215.108(2) provided a sufficient safeguard to
persons wishing to contest administrative action in the
enforcement of the code.  Plaintiff has not mentioned
the standards which he thinks would satisfy the
requirement for an adequate statute.  We doubt that any
standards which he could suggest for inclusion in the
statute would make any clearer the scope of the
delegated power or contribute materially to the
protection of a citizen against unwarranted
administrative action.  We hold that ORS 215.108
constitutes a valid delegation of legislative power."
222 Or at 313-15 (emphasis in original).	
	Under Warren, the key to determining whether a statute
-- here, ORS 279.051(2) -- establishes a permissible delegation
of legislative authority is to examine whether the legislative
scheme furnishes adequate safeguards to protect those who are
affected by the resulting administrative action, such as
plaintiff.  When examined in that light, ORS 279.051(2) appears
problemmatic.
	The lack of any statutory definition or standard by
which the public or a court might identify a "personal service
contract" is no small oversight.  Because no statute supplies any
limitation to that term, the legislature's scheme appears to
approve the designation of any public contract as a personal
service contract.  No statute requires that a contract designated
under ORS 279.051(2) actually be a personal service contract.
	ORS 279.051(1) requires pertinent public agencies to
"create procedures for the screening and selection of persons to
perform personal services."  Multnomah County and Clackamas
County may or may not have promulgated the procedures that that
statute requires.  In examining those or other procedures, if
they exist, under Warren, the question is not simply whether
locally adopted procedures guide the public entity in selecting
those persons who shall perform personal services.  Rather, the
question is whether the pertinent statutes furnish adequate
safeguards to adversely affected persons, such as plaintiff, to
protect against "unwarranted administrative action."  222 Or at
315.
	Warren decided that the enabling statute considered in
that case did incorporate adequate safeguards and, therefore,
that the statute was a "valid delegation of legislative power." 
Id.  The majority does not address or decide that question in
regard to the legislative delegation involved here.  In view of
the scope of the legal issues that this case raises, I agree with
that approach.
	I concur. 
	Riggs, J., joins in this concurrence.



1. 	Throughout this opinion, we refer to the statutes as
they appeared at the time that the present case came before this
court.  As we shall explain later, the pertinent wording of one
of the statutes, ORS 279.316, recently has been amended.  The
other statutes have not changed in any way that is relevant.

2. 	The statutes have been amended several times since, but
no amendment affects our analysis in this case.

3. 	The class is composed of 
	"any person who worked at any time during the period
July 18, 1994 to the present for defendants and
performed services pursuant to the contract between
defendants and Clackamas County dated July 14, 1994  * * * and any persons who worked at any time during the
period September 1, 1995, to the present for defendants
and performed services pursuant to the contract between
defendants and Multnomah County dated July 20, 1995." 

4. 	ORS 279.316(1)(a) (1997) provides, in part:
	"(1)(a) Every public contract shall also contain a
condition that no person shall be employed for more
than 10 hours in any one day, or 40 hours in any one
week, except in cases of necessity, emergency, or where
the public policy absolutely requires it, and in such
cases, except in cases of contracts for personal
services as defined in ORS 279.051, the employee shall
be paid at least time and a half pay: 
	"(A) For all overtime in excess of eight hours a
day or 40 hours in any one week when the work week is
five consecutive days, Monday through Friday; or
	"(B) For all overtime in excess of 10 hours a day
or 40 hours in any one week when the work week is four
consecutive days, Monday through Friday; and
	"(C) For all work performed on Saturday and on any
legal holiday specified in ORS 279.334.
	"* * * * *
	"(2) In the case of contracts for personal
services as defined in ORS 279.051, the contract shall
contain a provision that the employee shall be paid at
least time and a half for all overtime worked in excess
of 40 hours * * *."     
(Emphasis added.)  ORS 279.334 (1997) provides, in part:
	"(1)(a) In all cases where labor is employed by
the state, county, school district, municipality, 
municipal contractor, or subdivision, through a
contractor, no person shall be required or permitted to
labor more than 10 hours in any one day, or 40 hours in
any one week, except in cases of necessity, emergency,
or where the public policy absolutely requires it, in
which event, the person or persons so employed for
excessive hours shall receive at least time and a half
pay:  
	"(A) For all overtime in excess of eight hours a
day or 40 hours in any one week when the work week is
five consecutive days, Monday through Friday; or
	"(B) For all overtime in excess of 10 hours a day
or 40 hours in any one week when the work week is four
consecutive days, Monday through Friday; and
	"(C) For all work performed on Saturday and on 
* * * legal holidays:"
	"* * * * *
	"(6) This section shall not apply to contracts for
personal services as defined in ORS 279.051, provided
that persons employed under such contracts shall
receive at least time and a half pay for work performed
on the legal holidays specified in subsection
(1)(a)(c)(ii) to (vii) of this section and for all
overtime worked in excess of 40 hours in any one week,
except for individuals under these contracts who are
excluded under ORS 653.010 to 653.261 or under 29 U.S.C
sections 201 to 209 from receiving overtime."
(Emphasis added.)   

5. 	We construe ORS 279.316(1)(a), ORS 279.334(6), and ORS
279.051, as they appeared at the time that this case first came
to this court.  We note, however, that the 2001 Legislature
altered the wording that is at the focus of our analysis in one
of the statutes at issue.  Specifically, in a general statute
that purported to "correct * * * erroneous material," the 2001
Legislature replaced the phrase "as defined in ORS 279.051" in
ORS 279.316(1)(a) with "as described in ORS 279.051."  Or Laws
2001, ch 104, § 91.  The legislature did not, at that time, alter
the parallel wording in ORS 279.334(6).  The change in ORS
279.316(1)(a) is not relevant to the present case, and we express
no opinion as to its import or effect.

6. 	Plaintiff does not argue that, if the statute does
confer such authority on the direction of DAS or local contract
review boards, the grant is without standards and, thus,
impermissible.

7. 	Black's Law Dictionary, 1162 (7th ed 1999) defines
"person" as, among other things, "[a]n entity (such as a
corporation) that is recognized by law as having the rights and
duties of a human being." 

8. 	For example, ORS 279.057(3)(d) provides that certain
contracts for consulting services are personal service contracts
and further provides that screening and selection procedures for
such consulting services may include consideration of "each
candidate's * * * [o]wnership status and employment practices
regarding women, minorities and emerging small businesses or
historically underutilized businesses." 

9. 	ORS 279.712(1) provides:
		"The Oregon Department of Administrative Services
shall purchase or otherwise provide for the acquisition
or furnishing of all supplies, materials, equipment and
services, including architectural, engineering and
other personal services, required by state agencies 
	* * *."  
(Emphasis added.)

10. 	We note that this court considers earlier versions of
the statute at issue as context, not legislative history. 
Krieger v. Just, 319 Or 328, 336, 876 P2d 754 (1994).  In this
case, however, we provide the earlier statutory information as
background to our discussion of the contents of the legislative
record.

11. 	At that time, ORS 279.011(1) defined "public contract"
to mean
		"* * * any purchase, lease or sale by a public
agency of personal property, public improvements or
services other than agreements which are exclusively
for personal services."
(Emphasis added.)

12. 	The 1979 bill and enactment granted that authority to a
state Public Contract Review Board or local contract review
boards.  See Or Laws 1979, ch 196, § 2 (granting authority to
"board"), § (1) (defining "board" to include "the Public Contract
Review Board or local contract review board of a city or county
as provided for in ORS 279.055").  A later amendment to ORS
279.051(2) extended the same authority to the Director of the
Department of Administrative Services (then the Department of
General Services). Or Laws 1983, ch 690, § 13.  Finally, in 1997,
the legislature amended ORS 279.051(2) to refer only to "the
Director of the Oregon Department of Administrative Services or a
local contract review board."  Or Laws 1997, ch 802, § 1. 

13. 	Testimony of Isaac Regenstreif, Committee
Administrator, Senate Committee on Local Government, SB 232,
January 22, 1979, Tape 2, Side 1.

14. 	Testimony of Jack Sollis, Senate Committee on Local
Government, SB 232, January 22, 1979, Exhibit B, p 3.

15. 	For example, one proponent stated: 
		"In dealing with this problem, we feel that the
Public Contract Review Board can, by administrative
rule, provide what types of personal service contracts
are to be let [through] the competitive [bidding]
process and which personal service contracts will be
let by the process of advertising for proposals,
interviewing the parties that have submitted proposals
and determining from the interviews which proposed
contractor can do the best job even though the price
they have proposed may not be the lowest price offered. 
The reasoning behind this is that [in] securing the
service of professionals such as attorneys, physicians,
architects, engineers, surveyors, accountants,
auditors, real estate appraisers and other
professionals, it is the duty of the state to secure
the individual who will perform the best job and not
necessarily the individual or company who will work for
the cheapest price." 
Testimony of Jack Sollis, Senate Committee on Local Government,
SB 232, January 22, 1979, Exhibit B, p 1-2.  

16. 	Or Laws 1913, ch 1, note.

17. 	As above, see ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 13, n 10), we
provide this material as background to our discussion of the
contents of the legislative record.

18. 	Plaintiff also suggests that the definition of
"personal services contract" that DAS adopted after the passage
of ORS 279.051(2) is controlling.  See OAR 125-20-130 (limiting
personal services contracts to those that call for "specialized
skills, knowledge and resources in the application of highly
technical or scientific expertise, or the exercise of
professional, artistic or management discretion or judgment"). 
It is not.  ORS 279.051(2) provides separate authority to local
boards to designate personal services contracts.  Those boards
are not bound in that endeavor by a DAS choice to limit personal
services contracts to contracts involving professional, artistic,
or other similar skills.   
19. 	Because plaintiff's arguments to this court on this
point are brief and somewhat general, we read them in light of
the more expansive treatment in plaintiff's brief to the Court of
Appeals.     

20. 	ORS 279.051(2) does not impose any requirements of that
sort.  It provides only that local boards shall make their
designations "by ordinance, resolution, administrative rule, or
other regulation."  

21. 	See, e.g., Curtis Ambulance v. Shawnee Cty. Bd. of Cty.
Comr's, 811 F2d 1371 (10th Cir 1987) (for purposes of county
public contract bidding requirements, contract for ambulance
service was personal services contract exempt from bidding
requirement).