Case Title: Young v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 289, 2005

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2005-10-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DARUS E. YOUNG, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 289, 2005 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr.A. Nos. S01-02-0384 thru  
§                                  0386 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: August 24, 2005 
 
 
 
 
Decided:    October 18, 2005 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 18th day of October 2005, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Darus E. Young, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s June 24, 2005 order denying his motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The 
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the judgment 
of the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the face of 
Young’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit.  We agree and 
affirm.   
 
2
 
(2) 
In 2001, Young was found guilty by a Superior Court jury of 
Possession With Intent to Deliver Cocaine, Conspiracy in the Second Degree 
and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.  He was sentenced to 15 years 
incarceration at Level V, to be followed by decreasing levels of probation.  
This Court affirmed Young’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal.1 
 
(3) 
In this latest appeal, Young claims that the trial judge abused 
his discretion: a) by denying his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, in 
that his counsel refused to allow him to testify at trial; and b) by deciding his 
postconviction motion without scheduling an evidentiary hearing.  To the 
extent Young has not argued other grounds that previously were raised, 
those grounds are deemed waived and will not be addressed by this Court.2   
 
(4) 
After the filing of Young’s postconviction motion, the Superior 
Court ordered Young’s trial counsel to file an affidavit responding to 
Young’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, including his 
allegation that he refused to allow Young to testify at trial.3  Although not 
requested by the Superior Court, Young filed a response to his counsel’s 
affidavit.  The Superior Court judge reviewed all of these materials and 
                                                 
1 Young v. State, Del. Supr., No. 60, 2002, Walsh, J. (Nov. 19, 2002). 
2 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993).  In his motion for postconviction 
relief filed in the Superior Court, Young also claimed that his counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by: failing to consult with him about the appeal; failing to move for 
judgment of acquittal; failing to object to inadmissible evidence; and failing to object to 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
3 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(g) (1) and (2). 
 
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determined, as a matter of discretion, that an evidentiary hearing was not 
necessary and that Young’s claim that his counsel had refused to allow him 
to testify at trial was without merit.4   
 
(5) 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
defendant must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
the proceedings would have been different.5  Although not insurmountable, 
the Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a “strong 
presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable.”6  A 
defendant asserting a claim of ineffective assistance is required to make 
concrete allegations of cause and actual prejudice or risk summary 
dismissal.7 
 
(6) 
While Young claims that he was convicted because his attorney 
prevented him from testifying at trial, he does not state specifically what his 
testimony would have been or how that testimony would have changed the 
outcome of the case, which is essential to his claim of ineffective assistance 
                                                 
4 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(h). 
5 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
6 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
7 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
 
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of counsel.  In the absence of such a showing, we find no error or abuse of 
discretion by the Superior Court in denying Young’s postconviction motion.   
 
(7) 
It is within the discretion of the Superior Court to determine 
whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary to decide a postconviction 
motion.  The record in this case reflects no error or abuse of discretion by 
the Superior Court in deciding Young’s postconviction motion without such 
a hearing.  
 
(8) 
It is manifest on the face of Young’s opening brief that this 
appeal is without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled 
by settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is 
implicated, there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule 25(a), the State of Delaware’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Justice