Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Mba-Jonas

Citation: 402 Md. 334

Docket Number: 55ag/06

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2007-12-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket (Subtitle AG)
No. 55
September Term, 2006
_________________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
VICTOR MBA-JONAS
_________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Eldridge, John C. (Retired, Specially 
                  Assigned),
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, Specially   
                 Assigned),
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired, Specially   
                 Assigned),
                  JJ.
_________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
 Harrell, Battaglia and Wilner, JJ.,    
Dissent.
_________________________________________
Filed: December 4, 2007
1
Rule 1.1 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct provides as follows:
“Rule 1.1. Competence.
“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.”
2
Rule 1.15 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct states:
“Rule 1.15.  Safekeeping Property.
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that
is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation
separate from the lawyer’s own property.  Funds shall be kept in  a
separate account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the
Maryland Rules.  Other property shall be identified as such and
appropriately safeguarded.  Complete records of such account funds
and of other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be
(continued...)
  
The respondent, Victor Mba-Jonas, was admitted to the Bar of this Court on
April 6, 1995.   On March 20, 2007, this Court indefinitely suspended Mba-Jonas, with
the right to apply for readmission after 90 days, because of misconduct in the
management of his escrow account.   Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v.
Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. 690, 919 A.2d 669 (2007).  In the present matter, the Attorney
Grievance Commission, by Bar Counsel, filed a petition for disciplinary action against
Victor Mba-Jonas based upon allegations of substantially the same type of conduct
involved in Mba-Jonas’s previous case.   Specifically, Bar Counsel alleged violations
of Rules 1.1,1 1.15,2 8.1 3 and 8.4 4 of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of
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2
(...continued)
preserved for a period of five years after termination of the
representation.
(b) A lawyer may deposit the lawyer’s own funds in a client
trust account for the sole purpose of paying bank service charges on
that account, but only in an amount necessary for the purpose.
(c) Unless the client gives informed consent, confirmed in
writing, to a different arrangement, a lawyer shall deposit into a client
trust account legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance,
to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or expenses
incurred.
(d) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client
or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the
client or third person.  Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise
permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall
promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other
property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon
request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full
accounting regarding such property.
(e) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in the
possession of property in which two or more persons (one of whom
may be the lawyer) claim interests, the property shall be kept separate
by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved.  The lawyer shall promptly
distribute all portions of the property as to which the interests are not
in dispute.”
3
Rule 8.1 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct provides:
“Rule 8.1. Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters.
“An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a
lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in
connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:
(a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a
misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or
knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from
an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does not
require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.”
4
The relevant portions of Rule 8.4 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct provide as
follows:
“Rule 8.4 Misconduct.
(continued...)
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4
(...continued)
“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules
of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so,
or do so through the acts of another;
* * *
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration
of justice.” 
5
Maryland Rule 16-607 provides in relevant part:
“Rule 16-607.  Commingling of funds.
“a.  General prohibition.  An attorney or law firm may
deposit in an attorney trust account only those funds required to be
deposited in that account by Rule 16-604 or permitted to be so
deposited by section b. of this Rule.”
* * *
Maryland Rule 16-609 states as follows:
“Rule 16-609.  Prohibited transactions.
“An attorney or law firm may not borrow or pledge any funds
required by these Rules to be deposited in an attorney trust account,
obtain any remuneration from the financial institution for depositing
any funds in the account, or use any funds for any unauthorized
purpose.  An instrument drawn on an attorney trust account may not
be drawn payable to cash or to bearer.”
6
Sections 10-306 and 10-307 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article provide as
follows:
“§ 10-306.  Misuse of trust money.
(continued...)
Professional Conduct; Maryland Rules 16-607 and 16-609;5 and Maryland Code (2000,
2004 Repl. Vol.), §§ 10-306 and 10-307 of the Business Occupations and Professions
Article.6  The matter was referred to Judge Maureen M. Lamasney of the Circuit Court
-4-
6
(...continued)
“A lawyer may not use trust money for any purpose other than
the purpose for which the trust money is entrusted to the lawyer.”
“§ 10-307.  Disciplinary action.
“A lawyer who willfully violates any provision of this Part I
of this subtitle, except for the requirement that a lawyer deposit trust
moneys in an attorney trust account for charitable purposes under §
10-303 of this subtitle, is subject to disciplinary proceedings as the
Maryland Rules provide.”
7
Maryland Rules 16-752 and 16-757 state in relevant part as follows:
“Rule 16-752.  Order designating judge.
“(a) Order.  Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or
Remedial Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order
designating a judge of any circuit court to hear the action and the
clerk responsible for maintaining the record.  The order of
designation shall require the judge, after consultation with Bar
Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the
extent of discover and setting dates for the completion of discover,
filing of motions and hearing.”
“Rule 16-757.  Judicial hearing.
* * *
“(c) Findings and conclusions.  The judge shall prepare and
file or dictate into the record a statement of the judge’s findings of
fact, including findings as to any evidence regarding remedial action,
and conclusions of law.”
for Prince George’s County for a hearing and factual findings pursuant to Maryland
Rules 16-752(a) and 16-757(c). 7
The facts, as found by Judge Lamasney, are essentially as follows.  On April 26,
2005, Bar Counsel received a letter from the Bank of America stating that there was an
overdraft on Mba-Jonas’s attorney escrow account in the amount of $39.79.  Bar
Counsel sent three letters to Mba-Jonas requesting an explanation for the overdraft but
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received no response.  After a fourth letter was sent to Mba-Jonas’s attorney, Bar
Counsel received a letter, forwarded by Mba-Jonas’s attorney, from McDonald C.
Okechukwo of the Bank of America.  The letter was in reference to the overdraft, but,
as Judge Lamasney found, it was “totally non-responsive.”  Thereafter the Attorney
Grievance Commission performed a “bank record analysis,” sometimes referred to as
a “trust account analyzer,” for the period of January 1, 2005 to October 15, 2005, on
Victor Mba-Jonas’s escrow account at the Bank of America. 
The central feature of the allegations against Mba-Jonas in this case concerns the
maintenance of his escrow account, and those facts were not in dispute.  Regarding the
allegations, Judge Lamasney found as follows: 
“The trust analyzer revealed that the trust account had a
negative balance on January 10, [2005].  The respondent had only
$47.88 in the bank when he wrote a $60.00 check payable to
Agyeiwah Adwua.  A negative balance of $12.12 ensued.  
“On 2-2-05 a $3,000 deposit was immediately reduced to
$2958.74.  The second negative balance occurred on April 20, 2005
and resulted in the letter from the bank to the Attorney Grievance
Commission.
“On April 27, 2005, a deposit of $9,000 attributable to Terri
Belt was immediately reduced to $8,930 and brought the account
to a positive level.
“During this period of time, the following clients of Mr. Mba-
Jonas had amounts left over in their accounts that were not
disbursed:
April Langley
$105.00
Terri Belt
$100.00
Solange Tang
$100.00
Nathan Drakeford
$  30.00
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Joseph Ebotarrey
$100.00
Christian Njoku
$  15.00
Agnes Mongare
$100.00
Kufre Akpaidem
$  68.80
Chinyere Uduhiri
$  25.00
Joselyne Edmond
$  66.00
Abel Getachew
$  25.00
S. Olorungbohunmi
$400.00
“The undisbursed money totaled $1,732.80.  Bank fees for the
account were $370.05, approxim ately 25% of the total.  Mr. Mba-
Jonas testified that the money was his, not the clients.
“In two cases, more money was given out than taken in.  In the
matter of Hilaria Navarro, $15.00 more was expended.  In the case
of Dora Lima, the amount was $966.85.
“There were four occasions during this time period when money
directed to one client was used for another.  The respondent wrote
a partial settlement check for $60.00 to Agyewash Adwua, when
only $47.88 in funds remained.  Secondly, on February 1, 2005 a
deposit of $3000 was made from Progressive Insurance for Ekaette
Essien.  Because of the negative balance, the amount was
immediately reduced to $2,958.74.  On April 11, 2005, a check was
written to Godwin Ihionu for $79.41 with only $39.62 in the
account.
“[Fourth ], a deposit made for the benefit of Terri Belt in the
amount of $9,000 became $8,930.21 because of the negative
balance.  Additionally, the respondent admitted to writing check
number 3017 to cash.”
Judge Lamasney made the following conclusions of law regarding Mba-Jonas’s
management of the escrow account:
“Rule 1.15 Safekeeping Property
The respondent failed to safeguard the property of his clients.
He failed to keep his clients’ property separate from his own.  He
maintained his own funds far in excess of the amount needed to
cover expenses.  He failed to generate complete records in the first
place; whatever records he did produce he has not maintained for
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five years.
“Rule 8.4 Misconduct
“The manner in which the escrow account was maintained is
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.  The Court
does not believe–nor has it been suggested–that the state of his
escrow account is the result of dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation.
“Maryland Rule 16-607–Commingling Funds
“The respondent did not withdraw his own [money] from the
account money with any degree of promptness on multiple
occasions.
“Maryland Rule 16-609 Prohibited Transactions
“The respondent acknowledges a check made out to cash.
“Business Occupations & Professions Article, 10-306 Misuse of
Trust Money
“All of the above violations constitute a misuse of trust money
under this section.”
The remaining issue in this case concerns Mba-Jonas’s interactions with Bar
Counsel investigator Marc Fiedler and the letter from McDonald Okechukwu of the
Bank of America.  Marc Fiedler testified that he asked Mba-Jonas to produce certain
documents so that he could review them, and Mba-Jonas failed to produce the
documents.  According to Mba-Jonas’s testim ony, “the files were not immediately
accessible; . . . he had difficulty obtaining them; . . . the cost of photocopying was
expensive, and . . . he was dealing with the consequences of the suspension mandated
by the Court of Appeals.”  In addition, Fiedler testified that he gave Mba-Jonas
information on how to balance his account and reviewed with him the requirements of
an escrow account.  Judge Lamasney stated that the “situation with his escrow account
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8
The letter read in full as follows:
“To Whom It May Concern:
“On August 2nd, 2005, a deposit of $15,800.00 was made into the
above referenced customer’s account, which funds were delayed until
August 11, 2005.
“Our customer issued a check which cleared his account on
August 11, 2005 with the assumption that the funds would be
available on the same business day.  However, according to our
deposit agreement the funds are available the next business day after
the expiration of hold.  In this case, the funds were made available on
August 12th, 2005 causing our customer’s account to become
overdrawn.”
Judge Lamasney noted that the record did not reflect that the deposit referenced in the letter was
actually made.
has not improved since that time.”
As previously indicated, Bar Counsel received a letter signed by McDonald C.
Okechukwu of the Bank of America concerning the overdraft. 8  Marc Fiedler testified
that he inquired if Mba-Jonas knew the author of the letter because the letter was non-
responsive and was from a branch of the Bank of America located some distance from
Mba-Jonas’s office.  Fiedler further testified that  Mba-Jonas said that he did not know
McDonald Okechukwu and that Mba-Jonas repeated the same answer after Fiedler
“said he hoped he would not find out that the respondent had represented the banker.”
According to Judge Lamasney’s findings, Mba-Jonas “did in fact represent the banker
in a divorce in 1999.”  Mba-Jonas testified that Fiedler did not ask whether Mba-Jonas
knew the author of the letter, but whether the author was a friend.  Mba-Jonas testified
that, to this question, he answered “no.”  He also stated that he went to that particular
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branch of the Bank of America because he was shopping with his family in the area.
Regarding the letter from McDonald Okechukwu and the interactions with Marc
Fiedler, Judge Lamasney found that Mba-Jonas violated Rule 8.1.  Judge Lamasney
stated as follows:
“Rule 8.1 Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters
“The Court finds that the letter obtained from the Bank of
America is another example of the extreme carelessness exhibited
by the respondent and not an attempt at deliberate deception.  Since
the letter was so clearly non-responsive, there was no question that
it would be accepted as a resolution of the overdraft by the
Attorney Grievance Commission.
“However, the conversation with Mr. Fiedler is a different
matter.  The Court finds the testimony of Mr. Fiedler to be credible
and finds that the respondent deliberately tried to conceal his
connection to the banker. At the very least, he failed to volunteer
the information since it was clear Mr. Fiedler’s questions were
directed to ascertain the relationship between the banker and
respondent.
“The Court finds that he failed to provide information to the
Attorney Grievance Commission despite their lawful demand.
While the respondent was going through a difficult time in his life,
at the time this case was instigated he was in the midst of the prior
proceeding.  He produced some documents in that matter, but
almost none in this.  His cooperation decreased, even with the prior
grievance and the suspension by the Court of Appeals.  That
process should have induced more cooperation rather than less.”
Finally, Judge Lamasney also found in mitigation that Mba-Jonas “had family
problems that required a substantial amount of attention during this period of time.”
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II. 
Bar Counsel filed no substantive exceptions to Judge Lamasney’s findings of
fact or conclusions of law.  Bar Counsel filed a few technical exceptions to correct
minor typographical errors in dates set forth in Judge Lamasney’s findings and
conclusions, and we sustain those exceptions.  
Victor Mba-Jonas filed a single exception objecting to Judge Lamasney’s finding
of fact and conclusion that he violated Rule 8.1 with respect to his discussions with
Marc Feidler.  Mba-Jonas argues that “a fair reading of the record would indicate that
Bar Counsel failed to prove . . . by clear and convincing evidence” that he made a false
statement regarding his relationship with Okechukwu.  Furthermore, Mba-Jonas asserts
that “he had no motive to hide any association with Mr. Okechukwu . . . or to be
disingenuous.”
We overrule this exception.  We accept Judge Lamasney’s finding and legal
conclusion as she had the opportunity to weigh the credibility of the witnesses.  In our
review of such disciplinary hearings, we accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact as
prima facie correct unless shown to be clearly erroneous.  Attorney Grievance
Commission of Maryland v. Siskind, 401 Md. 41, 54, 930 A.2d 328, 335 (2007);
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Ward, 394 Md. 1, 16, 904 A.2d 477,
486 (2006).  In addition,  ‘“[w]eighing the credibility of witnesses and resolving any
conflict in the evidence are tasks proper for the fact finder.”’  Attorney Grievance
Commission of Maryland v. Robertson, 400 Md. 618, 630, 929 A.2d 576, 583 (2007),
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quoting State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733, 750, 720 A.2d 323, 331 (1998).  Judge
Lamasney found the testimony of Marc Fiedler to be credible, and there is nothing in
the record to indicate that such a finding is clearly erroneous.  Because the factual
finding is not clearly erroneous, and the conclusion of law is supported by the factual
finding, we overrule Mba-Jonas’s exception relating to his violation of Rule 8.1.
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Robertson, supra, 400 Md. at 629, 929
A.2d at 583 (“When the factual findings are not clearly erroneous and the conclusions
drawn from them are supported by the facts found, exceptions to conclusions of law
will be overruled”); Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Mba-Jonas, supra,
400 Md. at 629, 929 A.2d at 583, Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v.
Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50, 891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (2006). 
III.
Bar Counsel recommends that Victor Mba-Jonas be disbarred.  In support of this
recommendation, Bar Counsel cites Mba-Jonas’s failure to improve his management
of his escrow account even after Marc Fiedler provided him with information on how
to do so.  In addition, Bar Counsel cites Mba-Jonas’s failure to disclose the full extent
of his relationship with Okechukwu as reason for disbarment.  Bar Counsel also
maintains that the present matter is distinguishable from a series of cases applying
suspensions of varying lengths for violations involving the mismanagement of escrow
accounts.  In particular, Bar Counsel cites Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland
v. Obi, 393 Md. 643, 904 A.2d 422 (2006); Attorney Grievance Commission of
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Maryland v. Rose, 383 Md. 385, 859 A.2d 659 (2004); Attorney Grievance Commission
of Maryland v. Awuah, 374 Md. 505, 823 A.2d 651 (2003); Attorney Grievance
Commission of Maryland v. McClain, 373 Md. 196, 817 A.2d 218 (2003); Attorney
Grievance Commission of Maryland v. DiCicco, 369 Md. 662, 802 A.2d 1014 (2002).
Victor Mba-Jonas argues that the appropriate sanction is a ninety day suspension
to run concurrently with his indefinite suspension ordered by this Court in Attorney
Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Mba-Jonas, supra, 397 Md. 690, 919 A.2d 669.
Noting that this matter “arose in an almost contemporaneous framework as [his
previous] disciplinary violations,” Mba-Jonas argues the problems in the instant case
are similar to those in his prior case.  Furthermore, he reasons that the
misrepresentation to Marc Fiedler “never created a cloud over Bar Counsel’s
investigation.”  Mba-Jonas also argues that Judge Lamasney essentially made
alternative findings regarding his violation of Rule 8.1.  He points to the language from
Judge Lamasney’s findings and conclusions stating that he “deliberately tried to
conceal” information and that he “[a]t the very least, failed to volunteer the
information.”  Mba-Jonas argues that this Court should consider only the latter finding.
 Finally, he asserts that to impose greater sanctions than those imposed in his previous
case “would needlessly punish him for essentially the same conduct that could have
been dealt with in one case, rather than two.”
As discussed, Victor Mba-Jonas has previously been the subject of disciplinary
proceedings.  In Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Mba-Jonas, supra,
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397 Md. 690, 919 A.2d 669, this Court addressed violations occurring in 2003 and
2004.  In large part, the violations found in Mba-Jonas’s first case are similar to those
in the present matter.  As here, his previous violations involved mismanagement of his
escrow account including three instances where the escrow account was overdrawn,
poorly maintained settlement sheets and records, failure to keep a ledger, and post
dated checks.  This Court held in the previous case that Mba-Jonas violated Rules 1.15,
8.4(a) and (d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Maryland Rules 16-604, 16-607,
and 16-609, and Maryland Code (2000, 2004 Repl. Vol., 2006 Supp.), § 10-306, of the
Business Occupations and Professions Article.
An attorney’s disciplinary history is among the factors this Court considers in
determining the appropriate sanction for misconduct.  Attorney Grievance Commission
of Maryland v. Sapero, 400 Md. 461, 490, 929 A.2d 483, 501 (2007); Attorney
Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Hill, 398 Md. 95, 103, 919 A.2d 1194, 1198
(2007).  In the present matter, we note that the disciplinary violations are substantially
similar to those in Mba-Jonas’s previous case and to a certain extent the time periods
involved in the two actions overlap.  This Court filed its opinion in the first case on
March 20, 2007.  The proceedings in the instant matter were initiated on December 19,
2005, when the Attorney Grievance Commission filed in this Court a Petition for
Disciplinary or Remedial Action.  Given the overlap in time period and the
substantially similar violations involved, we believe it is appropriate to consider
Mr. Mba-Jonas’s present violations as a continuation of his previous improper conduct.
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In considering a sanction, we therefore consider Mba-Jonas’s conduct, including his
prior violations, as a whole.
 
Moreover, this Court also considers “the nature and gravity of the violations and
the intent with which they were committed.”  Attorney Grievance Commission of
Maryland v. Robertson, supra, 400 Md. at 642, 929 A.2d at 590 (internal quotations
omitted); Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Awuah, 346 Md. 420, 435,
697 A.2d 446, 454 (1997).  Neither of the actions against Mba-Jonas involves an intent
to defraud, deceive, or steal from his clients.  Judge Lamasney found in the previous
case that “[c]learly, he had no intent to defraud or steal from his clients.  In fact, many
of his problems resulted from his desire to accomm odate his clients and to keep them
satisfied with his representation.”  See Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland
v. Mba-Jonas, supra, 397 Md. at 698, 919 A.2d at 674.  Likewise, in the present matter,
Judge Lamasney found that the “Court does not believe – nor has it been suggested –
that the state of [Mba-Jonas’s] escrow account is the result of dishonesty, fraud, deceit
or misrepresentation.” 
We disagree that the cases involving suspensions, cited by Bar Counsel, are
distinguishable.  Bar Counsel relied on most of the same cases to recommend an
indefinite suspension in Mba-Jonas’s prior disciplinary proceeding.  We believe that
the cases again support an indefinite suspension.  The only case not relied on by Bar
Counsel in the first matter, but cited here, is Attorney Grievance Commission of
Maryland v. Awuah, supra, 374 Md. 505, 823 A.2d 651.  See also Attorney Grievance
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Commission v. Awuah, supra, 346 Md. 420, 697 A.2d 446.  In Awuah, an attorney who
previously had been indefinitely suspended with a right to reapply after 60 days, was
disbarred after he continued to practice law in spite of his suspension.  The initial
suspension involved similar offenses to the present matter.  Specifically, Awuah failed
to maintain proper trust accounts, commingled client funds with his own, and failed to
keep proper records.  Awuah, 374 Md. at 508, 823 A.2d at 653.  In the subsequent case,
however, Awuah was disbarred because he continued to practice law in violation of
Rule 5.5(a).  Awuah, 374 Md. at 525-526, 823 A.2d at 663-664.  In the present matter,
Mba-Jonas did not behave similarly.  He did not continue to practice law subsequent
to his suspension.  Also, as Judge Lamasney found, Mba-Jonas did not deceive his
clients.
Bar Counsel also points to Mba-Jonas’s violation of Rule 8.1 to support the
disbarment recommendation. According to Judge Lamasney, however, Mba-Jonas, “at
the very least, failed to volunteer the information [about his representation of
Okechukwu] since it was clear that Fiedler’s questions were directed to ascertain the
relationship between the banker and the respondent.”  Under the circumstances, this
does not warrant disbarment.
In determining the appropriate sanction to apply, we do not seek to punish the
erring attorney but to protect the public.  Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland
v. Robertson, supra, 400 Md. at 642, 929 A.2d at 590; Attorney Grievance Commission
of Maryland. v. Mba-Jonas, supra, 397 Md. at 702, 919 A.2d at 677; Attorney
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Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Rees, 396 Md. 248, 254, 913 A.2d 68, 72
(2006).  We disagree, however, with Mba-Jonas, that a 90 day suspension, concurrent
with his indefinite suspension, is the appropriate sanction.  Rather, viewing Mba-
Jonas’s two cases in conjunction, we believe the appropriate sanction is a continuation
of the indefinite suspension with the right to reapply for readmission after six months
from the date this opinion is filed.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL
PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE
CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING
C O S T S  
O F  
A L L  
T R A N S C R I P T S ,
PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761,
FOR 
WHICH 
SUM 
JUDGMENT 
IS
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY
GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION 
AGAINST
VICTOR MBA-JONAS.
   
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket (Subtitle AG)
No. 55
September Term, 2006
                                                                             
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
VICTOR MBA-JONAS
                                                                             
 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Eldridge, John C. (Retired,
Specially Assigned)
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired,
Specially Assigned)
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired,
Specially Assigned)
JJ.
                                                                             
Dissenting Opinion by Harrell, J.
Which Battaglia and Wilner, JJ. join
Filed: December 4, 2007
Although I agree with the Majority opinion Parts I and II, I disagree with the
sanctions analysis and result in Part III.  The Majority opinion concludes that the time
periods involved in the present case and Respondent’s prior disciplinary action, Atty.
Griev. Comm’n v. Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. 690, 919 A.2d 669 (2007) (“Mba-Jonas I”),
overlap “to a certain extent.”  Maj. slip op at 13.  It reaches this conclusion on the basis
that the Court filed its opinion in Mba-Jonas I on 20 March 2007 and the proceedings
in the present case were initiated on 19 December 2005.  Id.  On the basis of this
observation in gross, the Majority opinion penultimately expresses the view that it is
“appropriate to consider [Respondent’s] present violations as a continuation of his
previous improper [and substantially similar] miscon duct.”  Id.  Therefore, for
sanctions purposes, the Majority opinion considers the misconduct in both cases as
constituting a “whole.”  The focus of the Majority opinion is wrong.
The actual misconduct in Mba-Jonas I occurred over the period June 2003 - June
2004.  Mba-Jonas I, 397 Md. at 695-97, 919 A.2d at 672-74.  The misconduct upon
which the present case relies occurred during December 2004 - October 2005.
Respondent had been given the benefit of advice from Petitioner’s investigator, Mr.
Fiedler, as early as 23 January 2004, about the specific record-keeping requirements
of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as having a monitor of his
bookkeeping practices from March 2004 to at least June 2004 (Mba-Jonas I, 397 Md.
at 695, 919 A.2d at 672) under a failed conditional Diversion Agreem ent.
Notwithstanding these affirmative efforts by others to get him to straighten out his
record-keeping, Respondent persisted in the present case to ignore what was expected
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of him, after he no longer could claim ignorance of the requirements, over a
substantially longer period of time than was embraced by the misconduct in Mba-Jonas
I. 
To my thinking, it is not the overlap of the prosecution and pendency of these cases
that should be the focus of the sanctions analysis, but rather the actual dates of the
misconduct.  There was a clear separation of the misconduct of Mba-Jonas I, and that
in the present case.  The separation becomes even more meaningful in light of the
external efforts made to get Respondent to conform to the ethical norms and his
continued refusal and failure to do so.  Simply put, there is no “whole” or single unit
of prosecution (to borrow a phrase from another legal context) here.
Moreover, I am troubled by Respondent’s effort, clumsy though it was, to explain
away his misconduct through the disingenuous solicitation and tender of Mr.
Okechukw u’s letter.  Respondent was found by the hearing judge to have “deliberately
tried to conceal his connection to [Mr. Okechukwu],” a former client of Respondent.
This record convinces me that Respondent remains resolutely oblivious to the
ethical expectations and requirements for the safekeeping and accounting of trust
monies and seems prepared to be devious and unforthcoming when sought to be held
accountable for his actions.  In order to protect the public from the probable continuing
perpetration of Respondent’s misconduct and to set a proper example for the Bar as to
the tolerance limits for this sort of ongoing pattern of misconduc t, I would disbar
Respondent.
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Judge Battaglia and Judge Wilner authorized me to state that they join the views
expressed in this dissent.