Case Title: Pete Smith Co., Inc. v. City of El Dorado

Citation: 529 S.W.2d 147

Docket Number: 75-137

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1975-11-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
529 S.W.2d 147 (1975) PETE SMITH COMPANY, INC., Appellant, v. CITY OF EL DORADO, Arkansas, Appellee. No. 75-137. Supreme Court of Arkansas. November 10, 1975. Rehearing Denied December 15, 1976. Plegge, Lowe & Whitmore, Little Rock, for appellant. J. V. Spencer, III, City Atty., El Dorado, for appellee. *148 BYRD, Justice. The appellant Pete Smith Company, Inc., contracted with the appellee, City of El Dorado, Arkansas, to construct an 18-hole golf course for $230,329.88. After appellant had performed all of the clearing and dirt work in accordance with the contract specification, a torrential rainfall of 12.47 inches occurred in a 10 hour period. Substantial erosion resulted from this rainfall. The undisputed testimony is that it will cost in excess of $60,000 to restore the golf course to its condition prior to the rain. Appellant, by way of a declaratory judgment, sought relief under the doctrine of "Commercial Frustration." The trial court denied relief. Appellant appeals raising only the issue of Commercial Frustration. The commercial frustration doctrine is set forth in Restatement of Contracts § 288 (1932), as follows: The Restatement wording of the doctrine is criticized by Corbin, see 6 Corbin on Contracts § 1323 N. 19 (1962). Judge Riddick stated the doctrine, in Pacific Trading Co. v. Mouton Rice Milling Co., 184 F.2d 141 (8th Cir. 1950), as follows: Also, the doctrine is recognized between buyers and sellers of goods under the Uniform Commercial Code, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 85-2-615 (Add'n 1961). 6 Corbin on Contracts § 1361 points out that a partial frustration by subsequent events is less likely to be held to discharge a contractor from duty than is total frustration. In the cases upon which appellant reliesi. e. Butterworth v. Tellier, 185 Ark. 357, 47 S.W.2d 593 (1932)there was a total frustration. The contract before us here provides: Thus, from the foregoing it follows that the chancellor did not err in denying appellant relief under the commercial frustration doctrine whether such denial be placed upon the theory that the contract expressed a contrary intent or the theory that the doctrine is not applicable in the event of only a partial frustration that only increases the cost of performance. Affirmed.