Case Title: DANIEL L. SNOW V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0222

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-09-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
DANIEL L. SNOW V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 117216 P.3d 505Case Number: No. S-08-0222Decided: 09/23/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
DANIEL 
L. SNOW,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina Kerin Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Kerin.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Pojman.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, 
C.J., delivers 
the opinion of the Court; BURKE, 
J., 
files a dissenting opinion.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from a felony stalking conviction.  
That conviction is just one part of the complicated factual and 
procedural posture of this case.  
Finding plain error in the district court's response to questions from 
the jury, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]     1.   Did the district court commit plain 
error in failing to dismiss the stalking charge based upon the appellant's 
constitutional double jeopardy right?

 
 
           
2.   Did the district 
court commit plain error in declining to instruct the jury on the appellant's 
proposed lesser-included offense instruction?

 
 
           
3.   Did the district 
court commit plain error in responding to questions submitted by the 
jury?

 
 
           
4.   Did the district 
court commit plain error by failing to allow the appellant to allocute before 
being sentenced?

 
 
           
5.   Did the district 
court abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law in ordering the appellant 
to pay restitution?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The word 
"tortured" might be an inadequate adjective to describe the factual and 
procedural history of this case.  It 
all started soon after the appellant and the victim began dating in 2005.  Their rather tumultuous and intermittent 
relationship led to an incident on May 26, 2006, during which the victim's 
vehicle and her date's vehicle were both "keyed," with the damages estimated at 
$3,000.00 per vehicle.  This damage 
was discovered soon after the appellant had accosted the couple and treated them 
to a torrent of insults, obscenities, and general verbal 
abuse.

 
 
[¶4]      On June 6, 2006, 
the victim obtained a protection order against the appellant.  One month later, the appellant was 
charged with two counts of felony property destruction based upon the "keying" 
incident.  One of the conditions of 
bond in that case was that the appellant have no contact with the victim.  As frequently happens in situations such 
as this one, the existence of the protection order and the bond conditions had 
little effect upon the conduct of the victim and the appellant, who continued 
their less-than-peaceful coexistence.  
Over the ensuing months, several incidents of emotional conflict, verbal 
combat, and physical confrontation took place, some of which incidents required 
law enforcement intervention.

 
 
[¶5]      On November 24, 
2006, the appellant was charged with one count of felony stalking, in violation 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506(e)(iii) (LexisNexis 2009).1  The gravamen of the allegation is found 
in the fourth paragraph of the Information:

 
 
4.  [On or between the 1st day of November, 
2006 and the 24th day of November, 2006] [d]id unlawfully with intent to harass 
another person, engage in a course of conduct reasonably likely to harass that 
person and did so in violation of any condition of probation, parole or bail, to 
wit:  did unlawfully with intent to 
harass [the victim], engage in a course of conduct reasonably likely to harass 
[the victim] and did so in violation of any condition of probation, parole, or 
bail, in violation of W.S. § 6-2-506(e)(iii), 2003 Lexis[Nexis], and against the 
peace and dignity of the State of Wyoming.

 
 
[¶6]      On February 2, 
2007, the stalking Information was amended to add as a second count violation of 
the protection order, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-404 (LexisNexis 
2003).2  This amendment took place in district 
court, rather than in circuit court.  
There is no probable cause affidavit attached to the Amended Information, 
there is in the record no motion to amend, there is no order allowing amendment, 
there is no indication of a hearing on the matter, there is no indication 
whether the appellant consented or objected to the amendment, and the Amended 
Information, itself, contains almost no facts to identify the crime 
alleged.  The only hint is that the 
crime allegedly occurred on August 23, 2006.  At arraignment, defense counsel waived 
reading of the charges and the appellant pled not guilty to both counts, so we 
must assume that, at the time, the appellant and his attorney knew what the 
alleged crime was.3

 
 
[¶7]      The Amended 
Information was then amended on July 6, 2007, this time to change the dates of 
the allegation in the stalking count to encompass the period from October 26, 
2006 through November 24, 2006.  As 
with the first amendment, there is no motion to amend, no order allowing 
amendment, no probable cause affidavit, no indication of a hearing, and no 
indication of the appellant's consent, even though this amendment took place 
after the appellant was bound over to district court and after he was 
arraigned.

 
 
[¶8]      The stalking 
charge and the protection order violation charge, but not the separately alleged 
property destruction charges, were presented to a jury on July 9-10, 2007.  The appellant was found guilty of 
violating the protection order, based upon the victim's testimony that, on 
August 23, 2006, the appellant had grabbed the steering wheel of her truck and 
had attempted to put his foot on the gas pedal while the victim was driving, all 
in the midst of a heated argument during which her thumb and the truck's 
carpeting were burned by his cigarette, "[h]e sent pop flying everywhere," and 
he took and destroyed her cell phone.4  The jury was unable to reach a verdict 
on the stalking charge, and a mistrial was declared as to that count.  On some date not reflected in the record, 
the appellant was sentenced to 90 days in jail for the protection order 
violation, and he served that sentence.

 
 
[¶9]      On October 9, 
2007, the State filed a motion to join the retrial of the stalking charge with 
the trial on the two counts of felony property destruction that had been 
separately filed back on July 17, 2006.  We will quote the reasoning set forth in 
the State's motion because it is relevant to some of the issues presented in 
this appeal:

 
 
The 
charge of stalking requires the State to show an ongoing course of conduct by 
the Defendant intended to harass another person.  In the cases at bar the Defendant 
allegedly vandalized the victim's vehicle as well as the vehicle of her friend 
in May of 2006, which resulted in two counts of felony property destruction 
being filed against the Defendant.  
During the following months the Defendant continued with this course of 
conduct by violating an order of protection, an offense for which he was 
convicted at trial, followed the victim, text messaged members of her family, 
and came into her house through the doggy-door at approximately 2:00 a.m.  As a result the charge of stalking was 
filed against the Defendant.

 
 
[¶10]   Although there is no order in the 
record, we presume the motion for joinder was granted because the cases 
proceeded jointly thereafter.  On 
December 4, 2007, the State filed yet another amended information, this time 
alleging that the appellant had committed the crime of stalking between the 
dates of May 27, 2006 through November 24, 2006.  On December 7, 2007, a "4th Amended 
Information" changed the alleged dates to July 14, 2006 through November 24, 
2006.5  These datesJuly 14 through November 
24were the dates set forth in the elements instruction when the case went to 
jury trial on December 10-12, 2007.

 
 
[¶11]   In its case-in-chief during the 
second trial, the State presented evidence generally of a course of conduct over 
many months where the appellant threatened, verbally abused, accosted, followed, 
surveilled, and intimidated the victim.  
Most such events were not identified by date, time, or place.  Specific identified incidents included 
the following:  (1) the May 26, 2006 
property damage incident; (2) an August 13, 2006 harassing telephone call; (3) 
the August 23, 2006 driving incident for which the appellant had been convicted 
of violating the protection order; (4) a November 12, 2006 harassing telephone 
call; and (5) the November 24, 2006 incident where the appellant broke into the 
victim's house through the doggy door.

 
 
[¶12]   The jury returned its verdict on 
December 12, 2007, finding the appellant guilty of stalking, but not guilty of 
the two property destruction charges.  A presentence investigation was ordered, 
and on April 18, 2008, the appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for a period 
of six to ten years, with credit for time served.  This appeal 
followed.

DISCUSSION

 
 
Did 
the district court commit plain error in failing to dismiss the stalking charge 
based upon the appellant's constitutional double jeopardy 
right?

 
 
[¶13]   There was no double jeopardy motion 
or objection below.  We do not 
generally consider issues not raised below.  Belden v. State, 2003 WY 89, ¶ 55, 73 P.3d 1041, 1090 (Wyo. 2003).  We 
have previously held, however, that the issue of double jeopardy is 
jurisdictional because it involves the power of the State to bring the appellant 
into court, and it may, therefore, be raised at any time.  Taylor v. State, 2003 WY 97, ¶ 11, 74 P.3d 1236, 1239 (Wyo. 2003); Kitzke v. 
State, 2002 WY 147, ¶ 8, 55 P.3d 696, 699 (Wyo. 2002).  In these circumstances, we apply the 
plain error standard of review.  Lafond v. State, 2004 WY 51, ¶ 56, 89 P.3d 324, 340-41 (Wyo. 2004).  "Even 
when constitutional error is alleged, each criterion must be satisfied or a 
claim for review under the plain-error doctrine will fail."  Miller v. State, 904 P.2d 344, 348 (Wyo. 
1995).  To establish plain error, 
the appellant must prove (1) the record clearly reflects the alleged error; (2) 
the existence of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; (3) a clear and obvious 
transgression of that rule of law; and (4) the error adversely affected a 
substantial right resulting in material prejudice to him.  Sanchez v. State, 2006 WY 12, ¶ 19, 126 P.3d 897, 904 (Wyo. 2006).6

 
 
[¶14]   The appellant contends that his 
right to protection against double jeopardy was violated when he was convicted 
and punished for the August 23, 2006 protection order violation, and then was 
convicted and punished for stalking based on a course of conduct that included 
the same incident.  For plain error 
purposes, the record leaves little doubt that the factual part of this analysis 
is correct.  As set forth above, the 
State clearly relied upon the August 23, 2006 incident as evidence to support 
the stalking charge.  See supra ¶¶ 6-12.

 
 
[¶15]   The appellant's legal arguments are 
not, however, as simply stated as the above synopsis.  First, quoting Daniel v. State, 2008 WY 87, ¶ 8, 189 P.3d 859, 862 (Wyo. 2008), he contends that the double jeopardy clause prohibits 
the prosecution of a person for a greater offense after he has been convicted of 
a lesser-included offense.  See Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 501, 
104 S. Ct. 2536, 2542, 81 L. Ed. 2d 425 (1984); and Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 53 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1977).  Next, 
relying upon Edge v. Commonwealth, 
883 N.E.2d 928, 930-32 (Mass. 2008), he argues that violation of a protection 
order is a lesser-included offense of felony stalking.  Finally, while nominally paying homage 
to the statutory elements test found in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182, 76 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1932), he asks this Court to go 
beyond that test in analyzing both the lesser-included offense issue and the 
double jeopardy issue, and to consider the underlying facts and evidence used to 
prove the separate offenses.  In 
this regard, he cites Bilderback v. 
State, 13 P.3d 249, 254-55 (Wyo. 2000), where this Court held that the 
separate crimes of attempted second-degree murder and using a firearm to commit 
a felony merged for sentencing purposes where the appellant "did not commit any 
other act which could have constituted attempted second-degree murder other than 
using the firearm."  Finally, he 
argues that only one prosecution is permissible for a continuing offense, and 
that acquittal or conviction for an offense that consists of a series of acts 
extending over a period of time bars prosecution for other acts during that 
period of time.  See In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 285, 7 S. Ct. 556, 561, 30 L. Ed. 658 (1887); and Commonwealth v. Robinson, 126 Mass. 259, 
261-62 (1878).

 
 
[¶16]   The State begins its analysis of 
this issue by noting our holding in Meyers v. State, 2005 WY 163, ¶ 8, 124 P.3d 710, 714 (Wyo. 2005), that the double jeopardy protections of the U.S. 
Constitution and the Wyoming Constitution "have the same meaning and are 
coextensive in application."  Next, 
the State agrees with the appellant that Daniel v. State, 2008 WY 87, ¶ 8, 189 P.3d 859, 862 (Wyo. 2008), holds that the double jeopardy clause prohibits the 
prosecution of a defendant for a greater offense after that defendant has been 
convicted of a lesser-included offense.  
Applying the statutory elements test of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182, 76 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1932), however, the State concludes 
that the crime of violating a protection order is clearly not a lesser-included 
offense of the crime of felony stalking.  
Finally, the State contends that the double jeopardy doctrine is not 
violated in this case because the two charges were originally tried together, 
and the retrial of the stalking charge was only necessitated by the jury 
deadlock on that issue.  See Meyers, 2005 WY 163, ¶ 10, 124 P.3d  
at 714.

 
 
[¶17]   We note first that the State is 
correct in its assertion that the December 2007 felony stalking retrial was not 
a "subsequent proceeding," but was a continuation of the earlier 
proceeding.  As just recently 
restated by the United States Supreme Court, "the failure of the jury to reach a 
verdict . . . is not an event which terminates jeopardy."  Yeager v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 
___, 129 S. Ct. 2360, 2369, 174 L. Ed. 2d 78 (2009) (quoting Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325, 104 S. Ct. 3081, 3086, 82 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1984)).  The second trial does not put the 
defendant in jeopardy twice; instead, it simply follows the declaration of a 
mistrial and continuation of the initial jeopardy.  Yeager, ___ U.S. at ___, 129 S. Ct.  at 
2366; see also Meyers, 2005 WY 163, 
¶ 10, 124 P.3d  at 714 (retrial after hung jury does not violate double 
jeopardy).  What that leaves us with 
is the question of whether there is any reason the appellant could not initially 
have been charged with both violation of the protection order and felony 
stalking, and the question of whether, once the appellant was convicted of both, 
the crimes merged for purposes of sentencing.  If double jeopardy was violated in this 
case, it had to have been in the sense of multiple punishments, rather than in 
the sense of subsequent prosecutions.

 
 
[¶18]   The State is also correct that the 
crime of violation of a protection order as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-404 
is not a lesser-included offense of the crime of stalking as defined by Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506(b).7  The elements of the former simply are 
not a subset of the elements of the latter.  See Javorina v. State, 2008 WY 35, ¶ 5, 
180 P.3d 205, 207 (Wyo. 2008); and Heywood v. State, 2007 WY 149, ¶ 10, 170 P.3d 1227, 1230 (Wyo. 2007).  The 
state was entitled to charge both crimes and to have both presented to a 
jury.  Meyers, 2005 WY 163, ¶ 10, 124 P.3d  at 
714.  Furthermore, "the fact that a 
continuing course of conduct engendered several charges creates no impediment to 
multiple convictions and sentences."  Rouse v. State, 966 P.2d 967, 970 (Wyo. 
1998).  Stalking is a 
course-of-conduct crime based on harassment, the definition of which includes 
several criminal acts, such as vandalism and battery.  Surely, the legislature did not intend 
for a stalker to be immune from punishment for his or her criminal course of 
conduct on the ground that he or she has been or was also being punished for an 
underlying criminal act that is not, under the statutory elements test, a 
lesser-included offense.

 
 
            
If we were to accept Daker's argument, then it would be impossible for 
the State to prosecute repeat offenders of the stalking statute as, having once 
used the evidence to demonstrate a course of conduct, the State would be forever 
barred from using that evidence again in establishing a subsequent stalking 
violation.  As stalking is, by its 
very nature, a cumulative crime, Daker's interpretation of double jeopardy would 
eviscerate the purpose of the stalking statute, leaving would-be stalkers free 
to begin stalking their victim with a clean slate following a stalking 
conviction.  We cannot believe the 
legislature intended such result.

 
 

Daker 
v. State, 
548 S.E.2d 354, 356-57 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).  It would seem that this rationale would 
apply whether the conviction for the first incident of stalking-type conduct was 
for stalking, itself, or was for another crime, such as assault or violation of 
a protection order.

 
 
[¶19]   We conclude that the fact that the 
appellant was punished for violating a protection order did not prohibit his 
also being punished for felony stalking, despite the fact that the conduct upon 
which the protection order violation was based became part of the conduct upon 
which the felony stalking conviction was based.  The thesis underlying Bilderback and similar cases does not 
prohibit multiple punishments where the first offense being punished is only one 
of a series of acts that constitute the second offense.8

 
 
Did 
the district court commit plain error in declining to instruct the jury on the 
appellant's proposed lesser-included offense 
instruction?

 
 
[¶20]   Near the end of the second trial, 
the district court asked counsel if either of them objected to the proposed jury 
instructions.  Both replied in the 
negative.  Defense counsel then 
asked the court to instruct the jury that criminal entry is a lesser-included 
offense of stalking, based on the doggy door incident.9  The State objected, relying on Blockburger.  The district court agreed with the 
State, commenting that "[i]t's simply an offense that may have been committed in 
the course of this course of conduct.  
That's separate and uncharged, so . . . ."

 
 
[¶21]   The record contains no copy of a 
written instruction, and no indication that a written instruction was 
offered.  Furthermore, defense 
counsel did not object when the district court declined to give the instruction. 
Thus, the issue has not been preserved for appeal except insofar as plain error 
can be shown.  Landsiedel v. Buffalo Props., LLC, 2005 
WY 61, ¶ 12, 112 P.3d 610, 614 (Wyo. 2005); Muniz v. State, 783 P.2d 141, 142 (Wyo. 
1989); Sybert v. State, 724 P.2d 463, 
466 (Wyo. 1986).10  The test for plain error was set out 
earlier herein and will not be repeated.  
See supra ¶ 13.  Suffice it to say that the district 
court did not violate any rule of law in declining to give a lesser-included 
offense instruction.  The elements 
of the crime of criminal entry simply are not a subset of the elements of felony 
stalking.  We continue to follow the 
statutory elements test of Blockburger, and so long as we do so, we 
need not dive into the rougher waters where conduct and evidence become issues 
in evaluating what is, and what is not, a lesser-included 
offense.

 
 
Did 
the district court commit plain error in responding to questions submitted by 
the jury?

 
 
[¶22]   During deliberations, the jury sent 
a note to the judge asking the following questions:

 
 
Question:

 
 
            
Whether or not you can tell us  does the stalking charge stem from the 
violations of the protection orders or from actions of following her, 
etc.

 
 
            
When was Daniel Snow actually cited for the stalking 
charge?

 
 
[¶23]   With the agreement of counsel, the 
court responded to the questions as follows:

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. ___

 
 
            
The charge of stalking, as the instructions indicate, alleges a "course 
of conduct" over the time stated, July 14 to November 24, 2006.  The following:  violation of protection order, telephone 
calls and other incidentsthe state alleges, all together amount to the "course 
of conduct" that constitutes, if you believe they did occur, the offense 
charge of stalking.  Keep in mind 
that the violation of the protective order is not a charge in this case and you 
should consider it only to the extent, if any, that you decide that the conduct 
which may have violated the protective order together with all of the other 
incidents combine to constitute the required course of conduct.  Remember that the state carries the 
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that these incidents did occur and 
that they do amount to the required course of conduct to constitute stalking 
under the definitions given in the instructions.  When Mr. Snow was cited for the stalking 
is not material to your deliberations. 

 
 
(Emphasis 
in original).

 
 
[¶24]   In support of its contention that 
the district court committed reversible error by the way in which it responded 
to the jury's questions, the appellant cites United States v. Duran, 133 F.3d 1324, 
1334 (10th Cir. 1998) and Proffit v. 
State, 2008 WY 114, ¶ 44, 193 P.3d 228, 244 (Wyo. 2008), for the proposition 
that it is the court's duty to clear up jury confusion about the instructions or 
applicable law.  The appellant then 
concedes that, given his failure to object below, this Court's review should be 
for plain error.  Substantively, the 
appellant argues that the response to the jury's questions constituted 
prejudicial error because the judge itemized for the jury those portions of the 
evidence that the judge believed could support the stalking 
charge.

 
 
[¶25]   In response, the State presents 
three separate standards of review.  
First, the State cites Luedtke v. 
State, 2005 WY 98, ¶ 28, 117 P.3d 1227, 1232 (Wyo. 2005), for its holding 
that this Court reviews jury instructions under an abuse of discretion 
standard.  Next, the State cites Leyva v. State, 2005 WY 22, ¶ 9, 106 P.3d 873, 876 (Wyo. 2005), as requiring plain error analysis due to the lack of 
an objection below.  Finally, the 
State quotes Martin v. State, 2007 WY 
76, ¶ 34, 157 P.3d 923, 930-31 (Wyo. 2007), where, in a case involving the 
failure to object to a limiting instruction, we said:  "Furthermore, the doctrine of invited 
error prohibits a party from raising error on appeal that was induced by the 
party's own actions."  Then, without 
citation to any authority, the State contends that it was appropriate for the 
district court to clarify for the jury what facts were alleged to have 
constituted stalking.  The State's 
interesting conclusion is that "[b]ecause Appellant has failed to meet his 
burden under the plain error standard, the district court cannot be said to have 
abused its discretion when responding to the jury's 
questions."

 
 

[¶26]   We agree that Martin says what the State says it 
says.  But Martin goes on, in the same paragraph, 
to say that "there will be no grounds for reversal unless 
the instruction was prejudicial."  Id. (emphasis added).  Similarly, in Leyva, 2005 WY 22, ¶ 9, 106 P.3d  at 876, 
we held that, where a defendant fails to object to an instruction, our review is 
for plain error, which, of course, involves a search for prejudice.  Even where a defendant has not only not 
objected, but has actually offered the offending instruction, the invited error 
doctrine allows for review where the instruction is "necessarily 
prejudicial."  Bromley v. State, 2007 WY 20, ¶ 35, 150 P.3d 1202, 1213 (Wyo. 2007).  These 
cases reflect the confluence of W.R.Cr.P. 30(a), which states in part that "[n]o 
party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless 
that party objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the 
matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection[,]" and 
W.R.Cr.P. 52(b), which states that "[p]lain errors or defects affecting 
substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the 
attention of the court."  We have 
followed this rule for a long time.  
See, e.g., Justice v. State, 775 P.2d 1002, 1009 
(Wyo. 1989); Cutbirth v. State, 663 P.2d 888, 891 (Wyo. 1983); and Britton v. 
State, 643 P.2d 935, 937 (Wyo. 1982).

 
 
[¶27]   Plain error analysis begins with 
the question of whether the record clearly reflects the alleged error.  Somewhat hesitantly, we answer that 
question in the affirmative.  We 
hesitate because, while there is a piece of paper in the exhibits folder that 
appears to be the jury question, it bears no identification other than "Snow 
trial 12-12-07."  It bears no 
signature and no indication of having been received from the jury by the 
judge.  But it looks like a jury 
question, and the parties have treated it as such, so we will, too.  There is also in the record a transcript 
of a brief discussion in chambers where the court and counsel discussed the 
court's receipt of a question from the jury, and its proposed response.  Neither the substance of the question 
nor the substance of the response are mentioned.  Finally, although the original response 
appears nowhere in the record, the parties agree that a copy attached to the 
appellant's brief as an exhibit is a copy of the response.11

 
 
[¶28]   The second question is whether a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law exists in relation to the issue at hand.  Here, that rule of law is, indeed, clear 
and unequivocal:  criminal 
defendants are entitled to a jury trial with the jury as the sole 
fact-finder.  U.S. Const. amend. VI; 
Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 9 ("The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate in 
criminal cases"); W.R.Cr.P. 23(a) ("Cases required to be tried by jury shall be 
so tried . . ."); Garay v. State, 
2007 WY 130, ¶ 2, 165 P.3d 99, 100 (Wyo. 2007) (jury as fact-finder resolves 
conflicts in the evidence); Leyo v. 
State, 2005 WY 92, ¶ 11, 116 P.3d 1113, 1116-17 (Wyo. 2005) (Supreme Court 
must preserve the jury's role as fact-finder); Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 21, 34 P.3d 271, 276 (Wyo. 2001) (jury's function to resolve factual issues); Walston v. State, 954 P.2d 987, 988 
(Wyo. 1998) (role of jury as fact-finder to evaluate evidence); 47 Am. Jur. 2d 
Jury §§ 15-16 (2006) (province of 
jury to determine controverted issues of fact).

 
 
[¶29]   The sanctity of the jury's role as 
fact-finder has always been honored in this State.  In Taylor v. State, 612 P.2d 851, 854-55 
(Wyo. 1980), we recognized the significance of the right by quoting 3 W. 
Blackstone, Commentaries, 379 as follows:

 
 
            
"Upon these accounts the trial by jury ever has been, and I trust ever 
will be, looked upon as the glory of the English law . . .  [I]t is the most transcendent privilege 
which any subject can enjoy, or wish for, that he cannot be affected either in 
his property, his liberty, or his person, but by the unanimous consent of 
twelve of his neighbours and equals. . . ."

 
 
[¶30]   In a case published just a month 
after Taylor, we reiterated our view 
of the significance of the jury trial:

 
 
            
The aim of the guarantee of the right to trial by jury is to preserve the 
substance of the right of trial by jury as distinguished from mere matters of 
form or procedure, particularly to retain the concept that issues of law are to 
be resolved by the court and issues of fact are to be determined by the jury 
under appropriate instructions by the court. . . .  The essential elements of a trial by 
jury are that there be impartial jurors, who unanimously decide the facts in 
controversy under the direction of a judge.

 
 

Lapp 
v. City of Worland, 
612 P.2d 868, 873 (Wyo. 1980) (internal citations 
omitted).

 
 
[¶31]   It is within this context that we 
must decide whether the district court in the case sub judice usurped the fact-finding role 
of the jury by identifying for it the evidence that the State contended amounted 
to the course of conduct underlying the stalking charge.  The parties have not directed us to any 
cases specifically on point, but we believe the following excerpts from the 
concurring opinion of Circuit Judge Tatel in United States v. Ayeni, 374 F.3d 1313, 
1317, 1319-21 (D.C. Cir. 2004), provide useful guidance:

 
 
            
"It goes without saying that few institutions are as venerable as that of 
trial by jury, enshrined at the Founding in the Bill of Rights and hallowed by 
an enormous body of English and American law that commands judges . . . not to 
invade the province of judgment by the people."  Stacey v. Allied Stores Corp., 768 F.2d 402, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1985). . . .

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
            
Two bedrock characteristics of our system of trial by jury, a system the 
Supreme Court has labeled "fundamental to the American scheme of justice," Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 
88 S. Ct. 1444, 1447, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1968), are that jury deliberations occur in 
seclusion and that the jury serves as the sole finder of fact.  Regarding the first characteristic, not 
only is "the sanctity of jury deliberations. . . a basic tenet of our system 
of criminal justice," United States v. 
Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 97 (2d Cir. 2002), but courts go to great lengths to 
protect that sanctity. . . .

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
            
No less fundamental than jury seclusion is the principle that the 
jurynot the trial judge and not the attorneysserves as the trier of fact.  As the Supreme Court has 
said:

 
 
Of 
course, . . . in a jury trial the primary finders of fact are the jurors.  Their overriding responsibility is to 
stand between the accused and a potentially arbitrary or abusive Government that 
is in command of the criminal sanction.  
For this reason, a trial judge is prohibited from entering a judgment of 
conviction or directing the jury to come forward with such a verdict, regardless 
of how overwhelmingly the evidence may point in that direction.  The trial judge is thereby barred from 
attempting to override or interfere with the jurors' independent judgment in a 
manner contrary to the interests of the accused.

 
 

United 
States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 
430 U.S. 564, 572-73, 97 S. Ct. 1349, 1355, 51 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1977) (citations 
omitted).  This court has also 
emphasized the importance of the jury as fact-finder.  Indeed, "our opinions have repeatedly 
emphasized our conviction that the jury's role as fact-finder is . . . central 
to our jurisprudence."  United States v. Comer, 421 F.2d 1149, 
1154 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see also Belton v. 
United States, 382 F.2d 150, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("[T]he principle that the 
jury should be permitted to find the facts is a cornerstone of our 
jurisprudence. . . .").  
Underscoring the importance of that role, this court, sitting en banc, 
has declared that "[a]ny undue intrusion by the trial judge into this exclusive 
province of the jury is error of the first magnitude."  United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 
1181 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc).

 
 
            
. . . Of course, no one told the jury which facts to find, but the jury's 
role as factfinder can be invaded without being completely usurped. . . 
.

 
 
            
. . . Juries' legal questions, which are what usually prompt supplemental 
instructions, differ fundamentally from their factual questions for an obvious 
reason:  juries do not serve as the 
"triers of law."  They are not 
expected to divine the law for themselves the way they are expected to find the 
facts.  Rather, the trial judge, 
aided by counsel, provides the jury with the proper legal standard.  See, e.g., Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 
256, 122 S. Ct. 726, 733, 151 L. Ed. 2d 670 (2002) ("A trial judge's duty is to 
give instructions sufficient to explain the law. . . .").  Indeed, "[w]hen a jury makes explicit 
its [legal] difficulties a trial judge should clear them away with concrete 
accuracy."  Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612-13, 66 S. Ct. 402, 405, 90 L. Ed. 350 (1946).

 
 
            
By contrast, where a jury's questions relate to a factual matter, a 
substantive reply (whether by the judge or the attorneys) risks interfering with 
the jury's exclusive responsibility for resolving factual questions.  For this reason, several circuits have 
upheld district courts that refused to answer juries' factual questions.  In one case, for example, the district 
court told jurors who submitted factual questions, "[m]embers of the jury:  The Court cannot answer your 
questions.  It is for you as fact 
finders to interpret the evidence, weigh it and evaluate it without further 
directions from the Court.  Please 
proceed with your deliberations."  
United States v. Aubin, 961 F.2d 980, 983 (1st Cir. 1992) (quoting the district court) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Sustaining the 
district court's actions, the First Circuit explained that "[t]he jury questions 
sought to resolve a conflict among the jurors as to what the testimony had been; 
such a conflict must be resolved by the trier of fact."  Id.; see also United States v. Blumberg, 961 F.2d 787, 790 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding no abuse of discretion where the district 
court, having received a factual question from the jury and "[b]elieving further 
instruction would invade the province of the jury as the ultimate fact finder, . 
. . told the jurors they should answer the question for themselves by examining 
the evidence").  Courts have also 
warned trial judges against usurping the jury's fact-finding role even as they 
carry out their obligation to clear up the jury's legal difficulties.  For instance, after explaining the 
importance of answering a jury's legal questions, the Fourth Circuit cautioned 
that "the court must be careful not to invade the jury's province as fact 
finder.'  Such a distinction is 
consistent with our fundamental belief that it is the court that provides the 
legal yardstick and the jury that measures the evidence."  United States v. Ellis, 121 F.3d 908, 
925 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Blumberg, 961 F.2d at 790) (citation 
omitted); see also United States v. 
Nunez, 889 F.2d 1564, 1569 (6th Cir. 1989) ("Questions from a deliberating 
jury present a dilemma for a trial court.  
The court must be careful not to invade the jury's province as 
fact-finder.  Nevertheless, the 
court must respond to questions concerning important legal issues."); United States v. Walker, 575 F.2d 209, 
214 (9th Cir. 1978) (Kennedy, J.) ("Because the jury may not enlist the court as 
its partner in the fact-finding process, the trial judge must proceed 
circumspectly in responding to inquiries from the jury."). 

 
 
[¶32]   Because we so revere the 
fact-finding role of the jury in America's and Wyoming's legal system, we are 
anxious to defend and protect that right with utmost care and attention.  In the instant case, the principles just 
enunciated require us to recognize that the district court's response to the 
first jury question was not a response to a question of law.  Rather, the response directed the jury 
to particular evidence that the jury should, or at least could, consider.  The response went too far because, using 
the oft-repeated phrase, it "invaded the province of the jury."  Once a jury begins to deliberate, its 
deliberations are guided by the evidence presented in open court, the arguments 
of counsel, and the legal instructions presented by the court.  If the State has presented the evidence 
in such a fashion, or has argued in such a fashion, as to leave doubt as to what 
evidence is meant to prove what crime, it is not appropriate for the court to 
correct that deficiency.

 
 
[¶33]   This case is nothing like Heywood v. State, 2007 WY 149, ¶ 30, 170 P.3d 1227, 1235 (Wyo. 2007), where we reversed because the district court failed 
to provide a substantive answer to a jury question.  The jury there did not ask what evidence 
should be considered in regard to each crime charged, but asked which crime it 
was to deliberate upon under each count.  
Id. at ¶ 25, 170 P.3d  at 
1234.  The failure in Heywood was a legal one; the verdict 
form was inadequate.  In the instant 
case, the given instructions and the verdict form were appropriate.  It should have been left at that.12

 
 
[¶34]   The final prong of the plain error 
test is the determination of whether the appellant was prejudiced by the 
error.  "To establish prejudice, the 
appellant must show a reasonable probability that she would have received a more 
favorable verdict in the absence of the error."  Pendleton v. State, 2008 WY 36, ¶ 11, 
180 P.3d 212, 216 (Wyo. 2008).  We 
have also said that, to show prejudice, an appellant must show "circumstances 
which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice or conduct which offends the 
public sense of fair play."  Teniente v. State, 2007 WY 165, ¶ 11, 
169 P.3d 512, 520 (Wyo. 2007); see also 
Orona-Rangal v. State, 2002 WY 134, ¶ 16, 53 P.3d 1080, 1085 (Wyo. 
2002).  In other cases, we have 
characterized prejudice as conduct which "so undermined the proper functioning 
of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced 
a just result."  Duke v. State, 2004 WY 120, ¶ 36, 99 P.3d 928, 943 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)); see also Page v. State, 2003 WY 23, ¶ 8, 
63 P.3d 904, 908-09 (Wyo. 2003).  In 
other words, focusing solely on an outcome determination is insufficient; the 
Court must also look at "whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally 
unfair or unreliable."  Allen v. State, 2002 WY 48, ¶ 35, 43 P.3d 551, 563 (Wyo. 2002).  Perhaps 
the ultimate question is whether the appellant was denied his right to a fair 
trial.  Teniente, 2007 WY 165, ¶ 12, 169 P.3d  at 
521.

 
 
[¶35]   We cannot find the district court's 
error in this case to be harmless.  
The appellant had a constitutional right to have the facts of the case 
determined solely by the jury.  The 
court's intrusion into that role denied the defendant that fundamental 
protection.  Two circumstances 
support this conclusion.  First, one 
jury had already failed to convict the appellant of stalking based upon the same 
evidence.  Second, this jury 
indicated by its question that it was unsure of what facts made up the course of 
conduct necessary to find the appellant guilty of stalking.  There is a reasonable probability that, 
without the judge's inappropriate evidentiary guidance, the jury would not have 
reached the verdict that it did.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶36]   The appellant's constitutional 
right against double jeopardy was not violated by the district court's failure 
to dismiss the stalking charge.  The 
retrial after a mistrial did not invoke subsequent jeopardy, and the appellant 
was not punished twice for the same offense, inasmuch as the crime of violation 
of a protection order is not a lesser-included offense of the crime of 
stalking.  Neither, for the same 
reason, did the district court commit plain error in refusing to instruct the 
jury that criminal entry is a lesser-included offense of stalking.  The district court committed plain 
error, however, by guiding the jury toward particular evidence during the jury's 
deliberations.  For that reason, the 
judgment and sentence must be reversed, and the case remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings.

 
 
[¶37]   Resolution of the appeal in this 
manner makes the fourth and fifth stated issues moot, and we therefore decline 
to address them.  The same is true 
of the second part of the jury question issue.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Stalking 
is a misdemeanor unless committed in any of a particular number of ways listed 
in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506(e), which includes "in violation of any condition 
of . . . bail[.]"  The words "bail" 
and "bond" have somewhat different meanings, but are often used interchangeably 
when referring to the conditions of a criminal defendant's release from 
custody.  See Black's Law Dictionary 160, 200 (9th 
ed. 2009).  In the instant case, the 
elements instruction for stalking, given at both trials used the words "bail 
(bond)."

 
 

2Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-4-404 (LexisNexis 2003) reads in pertinent part as 
follows:

 
 
            
(a)  Any person who willfully 
violates a protection order or valid foreign protection order as defined in W.S. 
35-21-109(a), is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more 
than six (6) months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars 
($750.00); or both.

3W.R.Cr.P. 
3(e) sets forth the requirements for the amendment of an information.  If those requirements were met in this 
case, such is not reflected in the record.

 
 

4While 
the victim presented this testimony at trial, the prosecutor emphasized in 
closing argument that the appellant violated the protection order by having 
contact with the victim.

 
 

5We 
are totally perplexed by these seemingly unchallenged amendments to the 
information.  Without a peep from 
the appellant, the stalking allegation went from covering a 24-day period, to 
covering a 29-day period, to covering a 181-day period, to covering a 123-day 
period.  The procedures and 
protections of W.R.Cr.P. 3(e) demand more observance than that, especially where 
a course of conduct forms the basis of the criminal 
allegations.

 
 

6We 
must confess that our jurisprudence is not entirely consistent in considering 
the question of whether a double jeopardy allegation is non-jurisdictional, and 
therefore can be waived, or is jurisdictional, and therefore cannot be 
waived.  Compare Taylor, 2003 WY 97, ¶ 11, 74 P.3d  at 1239; Kitzke, 2002 WY 147, ¶¶ 8-9, 55 P.3d  at 
699; and Davila v. State, 831 P.2d 204, 205-06 (Wyo. 1992), with Taylor v. 
State, 612 P.2d 851, 861 (Wyo. 1980) and Hutchins v. State, 483 P.2d 519, 521 
(Wyo. 1971).  The question has only 
been raised tangentially in this case by the statement of differing standards of 
review by the parties.  Because the 
double jeopardy protections "involve the state's power to bring the defendant 
into court," we will in this case treat double jeopardy as jurisdictional, and 
will address it even though there was no objection below.  
See Kitzke, 2002 WY 147, ¶ 8, 55 P.3d  at 699; see also Martin v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 374, 377 (Ky. 2005); United States 
v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 568-76, 109 S. Ct. 757, 762-66, 102 L. Ed. 2d 927 
(1989); Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62, 96 S. Ct. 241, 242, 46 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1975); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31, 
94 S. Ct. 2098, 2103-04, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1974).  The issue deserves further study.  In that regard, it would be helpful to 
address the issue as one of forfeiture, rather than one of waiver, where it 
arises out of a failure to object below, rather than out of the entry of a 
guilty plea.  See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 730-38, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1775-80, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508 
(1993).

 
 

7Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-4-404 is set forth at fn. 2, supra at 2.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506(b) provides as 
follows:

 
 
           
(b)   Unless otherwise 
provided by law, a person commits the crime of stalking if, with intent to 
harass another person, the person engages in a course of conduct reasonably 
likely to harass that person, including but not limited to any combination of 
the following:

(i)     Communicating, 
anonymously or otherwise, or causing a communication with another person by 
verbal, electronic, mechanical, telegraphic, telephonic or written means in a 
manner that harasses;

(ii)     Following a person, 
other than within the residence of the defendant;

(iii)    Placing a person under 
surveillance by remaining present outside his or her school, place of 
employment, vehicle, other place occupied by the person, or residence other than 
the residence of the defendant; or

(iv)    Otherwise engaging in a 
course of conduct that harasses another person.

 
 

8Indirectly 
raised, but not fully developed in this appeal, is the question of whether cases 
such as Bilderback; Owen v. State, 902 P.2d 190 (Wyo. 1995); 
and Rivera v. State, 840 P.2d 933 
(Wyo. 1992), are consistent with cases such as Rouse; State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118 (Wyo. 
1993); and Duffy v. State, 789 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1990), and in particular, with United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 
113 S. Ct. 2849, 125 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1993).  
The question is whether sentencing merger should be limited to instances 
where the crimes are greater and lesser-included offenses.  See Commonwealth v. Shank, 883 A.2d 658, 
670 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) and Commonwealth v. Gatling, 807 A.2d 890, 
899 (Pa. 2002); but compare State v. 
Steele, 577 P.2d 524, 528 (Or. Ct. App. 1978).  See also Bruce A. Antkowiak, Picking Up the Pieces of the Gordian Knot: 
Towards a Sensible Merger Methodology, 41 New Eng. L. Rev. 259 (2007); Anne 
Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy and 
Multiple Punishment:  Cutting the 
Gordian Knot, 77 U. Colo. L. Rev. 595 (2006); and Kathryn A. Pamenter, United States v. Dixon:  The Supreme Court Returns to the 
Traditional Standard for Double Jeopardy Clause Analysis, 69 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 575 (1994).

 
 

9Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-3-302(a) (LexisNexis 2009) provides as 
follows:

 
 
            
(a) A person is guilty of criminal entry if, without authority, he 
knowingly enters a building, occupied structure, vehicle or cargo portion of a 
truck or trailer, or a separately secured or occupied portion of those 
enclosures.

 
 

10Both 
sides cite Thomas v. State, 2003 WY 
53, ¶¶ 10-15, 67 P.3d 1199, 1202-03 (Wyo. 2003), for the proposition that the de novo standard of review applies where 
a party has offered an instruction that has been denied, whether or not that 
party objects to the denial.  It is 
true that in Thomas we concluded that 
three separate discussions between the court and counsel was sufficient to 
preserve the issue.  Id.  At the same time, we noted the 
preference for presentation of proposed instructions in writing and the 
preference for objecting to the denial of an offered instruction.  Id.  In the instant case, there is little 
distinction between de novo review 
and plain error review because the lesser-included offense question presented 
here is a purely legal one.

 
 

11Were 
the procedural dictates of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-209 (LexisNexis 2009) 
followed, it is likely that this information would be available in the 
record.

 
 

12The 
parties have not analyzed for us the legislative intent of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-11-209 (LexisNexis 2009), which provides as follows:

 
 
            
After the jurors have retired for deliberation, if 
there is a disagreement between them as to any part of the testimony, or 
if they desire to be informed as to any part of the law arising in the case, 
they may request the officer to conduct them to the court where information upon 
the matter of law shall be given.  
The court may give its recollection as to 
the testimony on the points in dispute, in the presence of or after 
notice to the parties or their counsel.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added).  We are not inclined to 
construe this statute on our own initiative, and we do not need to do so to 
answer the question presented in this case.  Whatever the legislative intent may have 
been, it cannot have been contrary to the constitutional principles outlined 
above.

 
 

BURKE, 
Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 
[¶38]   I respectfully dissent.  The district court correctly provided a 
substantive response to the jury questions as mandated by our decision in Heywood, 170 P.3d 1227.  That substantive response did not 
"invade the province of the jury."  
There was no plain error and the conviction should be affirmed. 

 
 
[¶39]   In order to establish plain error, 
an appellant must demonstrate the violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law.  The rule of law that governs 
this case was announced and applied in Heywood.  That rule of law was not violated 
here.

 
 
[¶40]   In Heywood, this Court reversed the 
defendant's convictions on three counts of second degree sexual assault because 
the district court did not provide a substantive response to a jury 
question.  In Heywood, the jury presented this 
question:  

 
 
Are 
the three counts 

1. 
In the shed? 

2. 
Use of the sex toys? 

3. 
When removing the splinter?

 
 

Id., 
¶ 18, 170 P.3d  at 1232.  The court 
provided this response: 

 
 
The 
Court is unable to further instruct on this.  You must rely on your recollection of 
the evidence and argument and consider the Instructions. 

 
 

Id., 
¶ 19, 170 P.3d  at 1232.  We found 
that answer inadequate and reversed Mr. Heywood's conviction.  We explained: 

 
 
The 
jury must be adequately instructed to allow it to apply the law to the facts. 

 
 
. 
. .

 

This 
jury question, if that is what it was, facially reflects the jury's 
confusion.  Instruction No. 3 
informed the jury that "[e]ach count is a separate charge, and the proof as to 
each must stand on its own, so you must separately consider and determine what 
the evidence shows  as to each count."  It is easy to surmise that, as the jury 
began its deliberations, it had no idea what the allegation in count I (or count 
II or count III) was, and therefore asked the judge for guidance.  The judge's answer-"I can't tell 
you"-was inadequate.  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 1-11-209 and 7-11-204 (LexisNexis 2007) clearly permit the judge further 
to instruct the jury after deliberations have begun when a question arises as to 
the evidence or the law, and in numerous cases over the years we have addressed 
the exercise of that discretion.  See, e.g., Carlson v. Carlson, 888 P.2d 210, 214-15 
(Wyo. 1995); In re CH, 783 P.2d 155, 
158 (Wyo. 1989); Johnston v. State, 
747 P.2d 1132, 1133-35 (Wyo. 1987); Hoskins v. State, 552 P.2d 342, 349 
(Wyo. 1976).

Beyond 
the power to answer such questions is the duty to answer such questions: A 
number of courts have held that if the original instructions are incomplete or 
if the jury, or any of the individual jurors, express confusion or lack of 
understanding of a significant element of applicable law, it is the court's duty 
to give additional instructions.  
The refusal of a jury's request for an instruction may constitute 
reversible error.  75A Am. Jur. 2d 
Trial § 944 
(2007).

The 
foregoing principles of law can be summarized for present purposes as follows: 
(1) instructions that leave doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime 
was committed are insufficient; (2) instructions that confuse or mislead the 
jury are insufficient; (3) jury questions revealing confusion or a lack of 
understanding should be answered. 

 
 

Id., 
¶¶ 26, 27, 28, 29, 170 P.3d  at 1234-35 (footnote omitted).

 
 

[¶41]   We concluded the opinion with this 
statement:  "Reversible error 
occurred . . . when the district court failed . . . to provide the 
jury with a substantive response to its question 
concerning 
the charged offenses, because the question 
reflected obvious and understandable confusion as to how to apply the law to the 
facts."  Id., ¶ 33, 170 P.3d  at 
1236.

 
 
[¶42]   When our holding in Heywood is applied to this case it is 
difficult to find a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law.  The jury question "facially reflects the 
jury's confusion."  Our holding in 
Heywood requires that such a question 
be answered.  In Heywood, we did not discuss the subtle 
distinctions that may exist between questions of law and questions of fact or 
indicate that those distinctions may be significant, as the majority opinion now 
holds.  We did not say that jury 
questions must be answered substantively only if the answer to the question is a 
"response to a question of law."  To 
the contrary, we unequivocally stated that "jury questions revealing confusion 
or a lack of understanding should be answered."  Id., ¶ 29, 170 P.3d  at 1235.  In Heywood, we explicitly stated that a 
judge is permitted to answer jury questions "as to the evidence or the 
law."  Id., ¶ 27, 170 P.3d  at 1235. 

 
 
[¶43]   If the trial judge was not 
permitted to provide a substantive response to the jury question, one wonders 
what would have been the appropriate response.  Clearly, the question should not have 
been ignored.  The district court's 
response to the jury question in Heywood appears to be the type of 
response that the majority is stating should have been provided here:  "The Court is unable to further instruct 
on this.  You must rely on your 
recollection of the evidence and argument and consider the Instructions."  Id., ¶ 19, 170 P.3d  at 1232.  The problem, of course, for this trial 
judge, (who coincidentally was the trial judge who was reversed in Heywood) and other trial judges forced 
to deal on a time-sensitive basis with jury questions, is that we specifically 
rejected that response in Heywood.  The result we reach in this case simply 
cannot be squared with our decision in Heywood and provides no meaningful 
guidance to trial judges who will be confronted in the future with questions 
from the jury.  

 
 
[¶44]   Certainly, if a trial court 
provides a substantive response to a jury question, that response cannot invade 
the province of the jury.  The 
response provided here did not do that.  
The response mentioned only "other incidents" and two specific types of 
conduct: "violation of protection order" and "telephone calls."  It was reasonable for the trial court to 
reference violation of the protection order in its response, because the jury 
question made specific reference to that item.  I also see no harm in the district 
court's limited reference to the "telephone calls."  "Telephonic" communications were 
referenced in one of the other jury instructions.  Most significantly, however, the court 
throughout the instruction made it clear that it was the function of the jury to 
determine if any of those incidents had occurred.  The district court reminded the jurors 
of the State's burden of proof and referenced other jury instructions applicable 
to the case.  There were only 11 
jury instructions given in this case.  
Instruction 1 specifically advised the jury of their role as fact 
finder.  It stated in pertinent 
part:  

 
 
The 
role of the jury is different from that of the judge.  Your function and purpose is to 
determine the facts.  That job is 
exclusively that of the jury.  I 
will not intentionally intrude upon your prerogatives as fact finders.  So, if at any time I make a comment 
regarding the facts or otherwise indicate, directly or indirectly, how I might 
view the facts it will be unintentional and you may totally disregard my acts or 
comments.

 
 
I 
find nothing in the record or the instruction to indicate that the trial judge 
usurped the function of the jury or that Mr. Snow was prejudiced in any manner 
by the response to the question, a response, it should be emphasized, that was 
agreed to by Mr. Snow.

 
 
[¶45]   In conclusion, Mr. Snow has failed 
to demonstrate that the district court violated a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law by providing a substantive response to the jury question.  Such a response was clearly and 
unequivocally required by our decision in Heywood.  The substantive response did not invade 
the province of the jury, and Mr. Snow has failed to establish 
prejudice.  There was no plain 
error.