Case Title: Charpentier v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1987-05-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Charpentier v. State1987 WY 55736 P.2d 724Case Number: 86-210Decided: 05/04/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
Thomas 
B. CHARPENTIER, Appellant (Defendant)

 
 
v.

 
 
The 
STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff)

 
 
Public 
Defender Program: Leonard Munker, State Public Defender, and Martin J. McClain, 
Deputy State Public Defender; and Wyoming Defender Aid Program: Gerald M. 
Gallivan, Director, and William A. Kurlander, Student Intern, for 
Appellant.

 
 
A. 
G. McClintock, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; and Karen A. Byrne, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.  

 
 
Before 
Brown, C.J., and Thomas, Cardine, Urbigkit, and Macy, JJ. Macy, J., delivered 
the opinion of the Court; Urbigkit, J., filed a dissenting opinion.  

 
 
MACY, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1.]     Appellant Thomas B. 
Charpentier was found guilty by a jury of forgery in violation of § 
6-3-602(a)(i) and (iii), W.S.1977. The district court fined appellant $ 500 and 
sentenced him to one and one-half to three years in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.

 
 
[¶2.]     Appellant contends on 
appeal to this Court that, because he was not represented by counsel at the 
preindictment lineup, his conviction should be reversed. Although cognizant of 
the rule that the right to representation by counsel attaches only when 
adversarial judicial criminal proceedings have commenced, appellant urges us to 
find that the right attaches at a preindictment line-up.

 
 
[¶3.]     We decline to extend 
the right to representation by counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution to the 
preindictment lineup stage of the criminal proceedings, and consequently we 
affirm.

 
 
[¶4.]     On January 17, 1986, at 
approximately nine in the morning, two men approached a teller window at Norwest 
Bank in Gillette, Wyoming. One of the men endorse a check with the name Tom 
Charpentier and placed a driver's license belonging to Tom Charpentier on the 
counter. The signature endorsed on the back of the check matched the signature 
on the driver's license. On the front of the check, the name of the original 
payee was marked out and the name Tom Charpentier was written in its place. The 
teller cashed the check, paying the man primarily with $ 50 and $ 20 
bills.

 
 
[¶5.]     Approximately a half an 
hour later, the teller learned that the check had been reported stolen earlier 
that morning and that a stop payment order had been placed on it. The bank 
contacted the Campbell County sheriff's office, and shortly thereafter Deputy 
John Bruner arrived to investigate. He obtained a description from the teller of 
the man who cashed the check and an address for Tom Charpentier. Finding no one 
at home at the address, the deputy spoke to the landlord and was told that 
Charpentier had paid his rent that day with $ 50 bills. As he was leaving, 
Deputy Bruner saw appellant, whose appearance matched the description provided 
by the bank teller, coming out of the apartment. Deputy Bruner approached 
appellant and, following a brief discussion, arrested him for 
forgery.

 
 
[¶6.]     At the sheriff's office 
later that afternoon, appellant was placed in a lineup with four other men. The 
bank teller then was asked if the man for whom she had cashed the check that 
morning was among the five men. She identified appellant. Later that evening, 
Deputy Bruner filed a criminal complaint charging appellant with forgery and 
fraud.

 
 
[¶7.]     Prior to trial, 
appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence of identification on the 
ground that the lineup violated his constitutional right to representation by 
counsel. Citing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1972), the district court denied the motion on the ground that 
appellant's right to counsel had not attached at the time he was placed in the 
lineup and identified by the State's witness.

[¶8.]     In Kirby, the 
United States Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel attached when the defendant was identified by the victim prior 
to indictment but after arrest. The Supreme Court stated:

 

   "It has been firmly established 
that a person's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at 
or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated 
against him * * * * whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, 
indictment, information, or arraignment. 

 
 
* 
* *

 

"* 
* * * 'The rationale of [that rule is] that an accused is entitled to counsel at 
any "critical stage of the prosecution," * * * *.' * * * * We decline to 
depart from that rationale today by imposing a per se exclusionary rule upon 
testimony concerning an identification that took place long before the 
commencement of any prosecution whatever." Id., at 406 U.S. 688-90 
(emphasis in original).

 

[¶9.]     Since Kirby, the 
Wyoming Supreme Court has been confronted with a number of cases involving the 
question of when the right to counsel attaches. State v. Heiner, Wyo., 
683 P.2d 629 (1984); Brown v. State, Wyo., 661 P.2d 1024 (1983); 
Auclair v. State, Wyo., 660 P.2d 1156, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 909, 104 S. Ct. 265, 78 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1983). In each case, we applied the rule and 
rationale set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Kirby. Most 
recently in State v. Heiner, 683 P.2d  at 637, we 
said:

 

   "It is clear that in this 
jurisdiction a Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only when adversarial 
criminal proceedings have been commenced against an accused. It follows that * * 
* * evidence obtained * * * * prior to the filing of the criminal complaint 
[was] not obtained in violation of [the defendant's] Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel." (Emphasis added and citation omitted.)

 

[¶10.]  Appellant having failed to demonstrate 
any compelling reason why this Court should depart from the established rule, we 
hold that he was not entitled to counsel at the preindictment lineup. 

 
 
[¶11.]  Affirmed.  

 
 
URBIGKIT, 
J., filed a dissenting opinion.

 
 
URBIGKIT, 
Justice, dissenting.

 
 
[¶12.]  Explicit in the Wyoming Constitution, the 
bedrock of a fair and properly applied system of criminal justice requires a 
defendant be adequately represented by competent counsel, with guilt or 
innocence to be determined by a fair and impartial fact finder, normally the 
constitutionally provided jury. Article 1, § 6, Due process of law; Art. 1, § 9, 
Trial by a jury inviolate; and Art. 1, § 10, Right of accused to defend. See 
Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State 
Constitutional Law, 63 Texas L. Rev. 1141 (1985). Availability of adequate 
legal representation is clearly constrained when the participation of defense 
counsel is limited to the extent that the attorney can become involved in the 
criminal charge and trial process.

 
 
[¶13.]  The exigent-circumstance rule of the 
Alaska and California courts involving post-arrest lineups when counsel has been 
requested, more adequately accommodates my perception of constitutional due 
process and fairness.

 

   "Although extending the right to 
counsel to preindictment lineups will thus impose an additional burden upon the 
police, and may delay the staging of the lineup, these consequences do not 
appear substantial enough to justify denying defendant this protective right. 
The burden of securing counsel is exactly the same as that which police 
departments must assume if they wish to question a defendant who invokes his 
right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694; it is a requirement which governed all California 
lineups during the five years between Wade and Kirby -- without, so far as we 
are aware, significantly impeding police investigation. The delay involved in 
securing counsel will generally be a matter of hours at most. If conditions 
require immediate identification without even minimal delay, or if counsel 
cannot be present within a reasonable time, such exigent circumstances will 
justify proceeding with out counsel." People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88, 
177 Cal. Rptr. 576, 634 P.2d 927, 935 (1981).

 

[¶14.]  I agree that the Wyoming court, as the 
Alaskan court, may and in some circumstances should, assure broader safeguards 
than the minimum federal standards. See my dissent in State v. Brunmeier, 
Wyo., 733 P.2d 265 (1987). I would follow the thoughtful perspective of the 
Alaska court: 

  

   "'In evaluating evidence used at 
trial from a lineup without counsel, we are not merely concerned with the 
fundamental fairness of that lineup. We are also concerned with the need for 
counsel to be present in order to evaluate the circumstances and prepare his 
argument at trial sufficiently to provide the defendant with his sixth amendment 
right to confront identifying witnesses. ' [Quoting from Davis v. State, 
Alaska, 499 P.2d 1025, 1032 (1972).]

 

"In 
balancing the need, for prompt investigation against a suspect's right to fair 
procedures, we hold that a suspect who is in custody is entitled to have counsel 
present at a pre-indictment lineup unless exigent circumstances exist so that 
providing counsel would unduly interfere with a prompt and purposeful 
investigation." Blue v. State, Alaska, 558 P.2d 636, 641-642 
(1977).

 
 
From 
the standpoint of logic as well as participative valuation of the doer and the 
"doee," no differentiation is discernible in the adversarial criminal 
proceedings between time of arrest until time of arraignment as differentiated 
from the time and events occurring post-arraignment. Thoughtfully persuasive is 
the Michigan Supreme Court's analysis of Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 
92 S. Ct. 1877, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1972), expressed in People v. Anderson, 
389 Mich. 155, 205 N.W.2d 461 (1973), and later followed in People v. 
Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 217 N.W.2d 22 (1974).

 
 
   "* * * * In a plurality 
opinion the per se exclusionary rule was held not to apply to 
testimony concerning 'pre-indictment' out-of-court corporeal identification 
procedures. Since there is no agreement by a majority of the United States 
Supreme Court regarding the limitation of right to counsel in Kirby, we are not 
permitted to follow Kirby as authoritative precedent on the question of counsel. 
The clear rule in Michigan is that a majority of the Court must agree on a 
ground for decision in order to make that binding precedent for future cases. If 
there is merely a majority for a particular result, then the parties to the case 
are bound by the judgment but the case is not authority beyond the immediate 
parties. * * * * 

 
 
* 
* *

 

"* 
* * * Constitutional rules of construction do not permit us to read Kirby as 
abrogating the pre-indictment requirements for counsel and the other rules of 
Wade, Gilbert, Stovall and Simmons, by all of which we are still bound." 
People v. Anderson, supra, 205 N.W.2d  at 467-468.

 

See 
also the critique of Kirby v. Illinois, supra, in the dissenting opinion 
in People v. Hawkins, 55 N.Y.2d 474, 450 N.Y.S.2d 159, 435 N.E.2d 376, 
383, reargument denied 56 N.Y.2d 1032, 453 N.Y.S.2d 1028, 439 N.E.2d 402, cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 846, 103 S. Ct. 103, 74 L. Ed. 2d 93 
(1982).

 
 
[¶15.]  This subject of lineup identification, 
right to counsel, and the illogic of Kirby v. Illinois, supra is not 
without commentator review: Grano, Kirby, Biggers and Ash: Do Any 
Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the 
Innocent?, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 717, 730 (1974); Young, Supreme Court 
Report, 58 A.B.A. J. 1092 (1972); Note, Criminal Law -- The Lineup's 
Lament, Kirby v. Illinois, 22 De Paul L. Rev. 660, 675 (1973); Note, Did 
Your Eyes Deceive You?  Expert 
Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 
29 Stan. L.Rev. 969, 996 (1977); Comment, Right To Counsel At Police 
Identification Proceedings: A Problem in Effective Implementation of An 
Expanding Constitution, 29 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 65, 78, n.81 (1967); Quinn, 
In the Wake of Wade: The Dimensions of Eyewitness Identification Cases, 
42 U Colo. L. Rev. 135, 143 (1970); Note, The Pretrial Right to Counsel, 
26 Stan. L. Rev. 399, 410 (1974); Note, 1975 Wash. U.L.Q. 423, 437-440; Polsky, 
Uviller, Ziccardi, and Davis, The Role of the Defense Lawyer at a Lineup in 
Light of the Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall Decisions, 4 Crim. L. Bulletin 273 
(1968); Read, Lawyers at Lineups: Constitutional Necessity or Avoidable 
Extravagance?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 339 (1969); Note, Due Process 
Considerations in Police Showup Practices, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 377 (1969); 
Note, Pretrial Identification Procedures-Wade to Gilbert to Stovall: Lower 
Courts Bobble the Ball, 55 Minn. L. Rev. 779 (1971); Comment, Kirby v. 
Illinois: A New Approach to the Right to Counsel, 58 Iowa L. Rev. 404 
(1972); Comment, Right to Counsel at Lineup, 11 Duq. L. Rev. 405 (1973); 
Comment, Preindictment Identification Confrontation Held Not To Be Critical 
Stage Of The Prosecution Where The Accused's Right To Counsel Attaches, 4 
Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 213 (1973); Note, Is Missouri Ready to Extend the Right to 
Counsel to Pre-Indictment Lineups?, 46 U. Mo. K.C.L. Rev. 148 (1977); Pulaski, 
Neil v. Biggers: The Supreme Court Dismantles the Wade Trilogy's Due Process 
Protection, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1097 (1974); Note, Counsel Required at 
Lineup Only if Formal Judicial Proceedings Have Been Initiated, 47 Tul. L. 
Rev. 899 (1973); Note, Showdown Over the California Showup, 11 Hastings 
Const. L.Q. 135 (1983); Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A 
Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U.L. Rev. 100, 120 (1985). See 
law journals articles cited in People v. Hawkins, supra, 
n.14.

 
 
[¶16.]  As Justice Brennan so aptly observed in 
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-229, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967):

 

   "* * * * A major factor 
contributing to the high incidence of miscarriage of justice from mistaken 
identification has been the degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which 
the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification. A 
commentator has observed that 'the influence of improper suggestion upon 
identifying witnesses probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than 
any other single factor -- perhaps it is responsible for more such errors than 
all other factors combined. ' Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases 
26."

 

The 
law in Pennsylvania is also in accord. Commonwealth v. Richman, 
458 Pa. 167, 320 A.2d 351 (1974); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 472 Pa. 1, 370 A.2d 1197 (1977); Commonwealth v. Smith, 260 Pa. Super. 38, 393 A.2d 1001 
(1978).

 
 
   "In all criminal prosecutions the 
accused shall have the right to defend in person and by counsel * * * *." 
Article 1, § 10, Wyoming Constitution.

 

[¶17.]  The fiction adopted in the recent United 
States Supreme Court opinions aside, a criminal prosecution is comprehensively 
commenced when the individual is arrested and hauled off to the local 
confinement facility. The accusatory stage and its intrinsic jeopardy has then 
commenced. People v. Hutton, 21 Mich. App. 312, 175 N.W.2d 860 
(1970).

 
 
[¶18.]  An equally persuasive rationale exists 
for counseled lineups, whether pre- or post-arraignment. Adequacy of 
representation is delineated by the parameters of applied training and knowledge 
of defense counsel. If defense counsel is limited to the defendant's perception 
of the lineup and the authorities' assurance that the lineup was fair, then, as 
a matter of course, he must assume an antagonistic posture with regard to the 
procedural sufficiency of the lineup. Certainly the accused himself may not have 
had the physical capacity to know whether a lighted neon sign was used to assist 
in identification. More often than not, trials result from lack of reliable 
knowledge. The lineup can serve not only to assure the police and prepare the 
witness but also to educate defense counsel. As we should remember, the tainted 
pretrial identification may attenuate trial identification. Trull v. 
State, Tex.App., 721 S.W.2d 378 (1986).

 
 
[¶19.]  Circumstantially, this case does not 
present the exigent circumstances justifying the lineup before counsel could 
have been available. The trained eyewitness, as at trial much later, could have 
been called for the conducted lineup after the accused was provided an attorney 
as requested. Considering the cases from Campbell County, the personnel in the 
public defender's staff are demonstratively available. The accusatory stage had 
clearly been reached when the lineup was held. Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 1269, 
1309.

 
 
[¶20.]  Without the attendant dubiety of trial 
uncertainty and appellate validity engendered in this case by the uncounseled 
lineup, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that if counsel had been 
present at that lineup neither the trial nor appeal would have followed. This 
was no photograph arraignment where the defendant need not be present, but 
instead was a live lineup that could not later be accurately reproduced after 
identification was achieved. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 93 S. Ct. 2568, 37 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1973). See also People v. Dumas, 102 
Mich.App. 196, 301 N.W.2d 849 (1980).

 
 
[¶21.]  In application of the entire process 
where jeopardy exists after arrest has occurred, I would apply Justice 
Sutherland's evaluation in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527 (1932):

 

   "* * * * Even the intelligent and 
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If 
charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself 
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of 
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a 
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant 
to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge 
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He 
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against 
him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction 
because he does not know how to establish his innocence."

 

In 
United States v. Wade, supra, Justice Brennan 
commented:

 
 
   "* * * * The trial which might 
determine the accused's fate may well not be that in the courtroom but that at 
the pretrial confrontation, with the State aligned against the accused, the 
witness the sole jury, and the accused unprotected against the overreaching, 
intentional or unintentional, and with little or no effective appeal from the 
judgment there rendered by the witness -- 'that's the man. '" 388 U.S.  at 
235-236.

 
 
 

[¶22.]  Judge Wilkey, dissenting in the Circuit 
Court consideration of United States v. Ash, supra, knowledgeably 
analyzed:

 

   "'[A] little drama, stretching 
over an appreciable span of time. The accused is there in the flesh, 
three-dimensional and, always full-length. Further, he isn't merely there, he 
acts. He walks on stage, he blinks in the glare of lights, he turns and twists, 
often muttering asides to those sharing the spotlight. He can be required to 
utter significant words, to turn a profile or back, to walk back and forth, to 
doff one costume and don another. All the while the potentially identifying 
witness is watching, a prosecuting attorney and a police detective at his elbow, 
ready to record the witness' every word and reaction. ' 149 U.S. App. D.C. 1, 
17, 461 F.2d 92, 108." 413 U.S.  at 323.

 

[¶23.]  In constitutional foresight, a rational 
balancing of the rights of society and the accused, efficient operation of 
prosecutorial function, and minimized conjectural trials and appeals, our 
forefathers were wise to reiterate the right to counsel held by those criminally 
accused in this state. It is this case's derogation of that wisdom from which my 
dissent is generated.

 
 
[¶24.]  The responsibility of this court as the 
guardian of the Wyoming Constitution should not be displaced by temporal 
permutations of the United States Supreme Court in application of the nation's 
Constitution. It should be remembered that at the Wyoming Constitutional 
Convention, during those hot unairconditioned days of September, 1889, that the 
principle of an independent Supreme Court, one of the most heavily debated 
issues of the convention, was only emplaced by a vote of 21 to 17. Paramount in 
the debate were the comments of D.A. Preston:

 

   "* * * * It is true that the 
governor of the state and the other officials of the state are of some 
importance to the state, but the machinery of the state is in the supreme court, 
and unless the machinery of the state and the policy of the state is such as 
will administer justice to all alike, then I say to you, gentlemen of the 
convention, as Mr. Riner has said, let us adjourn and go home." Journals and 
Debates of the Constitutional Convention (1889) at 523.

 
 
George 
C. Smith amplified:

 

   "* * * * But the main reason that 
we ask for statehood is because we want a government in which the laws can be 
administered in a way so that we can get justice, and I say now, and I say it 
without any doubt about what I am saying at all, if you go before the people 
with this mongrel form of court, they will vote down the constitution, and you 
cannot blame them." Id. at 532.

 
 
[¶25.]  The president of the convention, Melville 
C. Brown, challenged the future of the state: 

 

   "* * * * If there is any danger 
for the constitution you propose giving them, the danger lies in adopting a 
mongrel court, not from adopting an independent supreme court as a part of the 
constitution. Some gentlemen say we want a state government whether we have a 
supreme court or not, others say we never want a state government if a supreme 
court is denied to us. It does not matter how we may view this question, we wish 
the people to say, and I am willing to trust this matter to the people of 
Wyoming. Ever since the days of the Magna Charta and the time when the 
Anglo-Saxon people resisted the government, justice has been the ruling trait of 
the English speaking people from that day down to the present, and when you say 
that you will place your form of government above this question of justice, you 
are refuting the tradition of the race, and turning backward to the days of 
barbarism." Id. at 531.

 

And 
so Wyoming received its Bill of Rights in Art. 1 to be enforced and effectuated 
by Art. 5, §§ 2 and 3 of that Constitution:

 
 
" 
§ 2. The supreme court shall have general appellate jurisdiction, co-extensive 
with the state, in both civil and criminal causes, and shall have a general 
superintending control over all inferior courts, under such rules and 
regulations as may be prescribed by law.

" 
§ 3. The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in quo warranto and 
mandamus as to all state officers, and in habeas corpus. The supreme court shall 
also have power to issue writs of mandamus, review, prohibition, habeas corpus, 
certiorari, and other writs necessary and proper to the complete exercise of its 
appellate and revisory jurisdiction."

 

[¶26.]  In recognizing the independence and the 
responsibility of this court, we, the trial bench, and the membership of the Bar 
of our state should be called to properly consider the literate and persuasive 
comments of the Vermont Supreme Court:

 

"This 
generation of * * * * lawyers has an unparalleled opportunity to aid in the 
formulation of a state constitutional jurisprudence that will protect the rights 
and liberties of our people, however the philosophy of the United States Supreme 
Court may ebb and flow.

 
 
***

 

"We 
have an opportunity to develop a sound jurisprudence of state constitutional law 
that will serve not only this generation * * * * but those who will come after 
us in the decades yet to be." State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d 233, 
235-238 (1985).

 

[¶27.]  Because appellant requested but was 
denied counsel for the lineup contrary to the spirit and text of the Wyoming 
Constitution, I would reverse and remand for trial based on otherwise available 
evidence, excluding the improper lineup. I would not find the convoluted 
discussion nor the facts of State v. Heiner, Wyo., 683 P.2d 629 (1984), 
involving a private investigation, to be authoritative or persuasive,1 and would follow the enlightened 
posture once adopted and briefly continued by the United States Supreme Court in 
United States v. Wade, supra, as well as the other trilogy cases. 
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S. Ct. 1951, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178 
(1967), and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 (1967). See also State v. Earl, Utah, 716 P.2d 803 (1986); Brennan, 
The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as 
Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y. Univ. L. Rev. 535 (1986); and 
Comment, Independent Interpretation of the Utah Constitution, 1987 Utah 
L. Rev. 79, 82.

 
 
[¶28.]  It is in that constitutional 
responsibility that I respectfully dissent.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Likewise 
unpersuasive to me is Brown v. State, Wyo., 661 P.2d 1024 (1983), where 
the defendant was not under arrest and "was free to leave" as detailed in the 
court's opinion. Charpentier was under arrest, had been given a Miranda warning, 
and faced certain prosecution.