Case Title: Ex parte Madison County Board of Education and Jim Nash, personnel director for the Madison County Board of Education. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: A.S., a minor, by and through her natural parents and next friends, J.S. and R.S.; et al. v. William Ford Re Application Overruled; Opinion of March 14, 2008 Withdrawn; Opinion Substituted; Petition Granted in Part and Denied in Part; Writ Issued.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1061715

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 06/27/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
____________________
1061715
____________________
Ex parte Madison County Board of Education and Jim Nash,
personnel director for the Madison County Board of Education
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: A.S., a minor, by and through her natural parents
and next friends, J.S. and R.S.; et al.
v.
William Ford Reaves et al.)
(Madison Circuit Court, CV-05-217)
On Application for Rehearing
STUART, Justice.
1061715
2
This Court's opinion of March 14, 2008, is withdrawn, and
the following is substituted therefor.
The Madison County Board of Education ("the Board") and
Jim Nash, the personnel director for the Board, petition this
Court for a writ of mandamus directing Judge Karen K. Hall to
grant their motions for a summary judgment dismissing the
federal 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against them on the basis of
qualified immunity.  We grant the petition as to Nash and deny
it as to the Board.
Facts
During the fall of 2002, A.S. was an 11-year-old fifth-
grade student attending Madison County Elementary School.
According to A.S., her physical-education teacher, William
Ford Reaves, raped her.  She did not tell anyone about the
rape, but she asked to be removed from Reaves's physical-
education class.  Her class schedule was changed, and she had
no further contact with Reaves.  In January 2003, A.S.
transferred to Riverton Middle School.  Her parents did not
provide Madison County Elementary School officials with any
reason for the transfer.  However, it appears from the
materials submitted to this Court that A.S. wanted to change
1061715
3
schools because some of the other students at Madison County
Elementary School made fun of her learning and speech
disabilities.  
In May 2004, A.S. told a couple of girlfriends at
Riverton Middle School that Reaves had raped her.  The
girlfriends encouraged A.S. to tell the counselor at Riverton
Middle School.  After A.S. informed the school counselor about
the rape, the school counselor notified A.S.'s parents and the
principal at Riverton Middle School, who notified Nash.  Nash
immediately placed Reaves on administrative leave and went to
Riverton Middle School to investigate.  Nash and the principal
met with A.S.'s parents; A.S.'s parents refused to allow Nash
to interview A.S.  As part of his investigation into the
allegation, Nash  interviewed the principal, the assistant
principal, the counselor at Madison County Elementary School,
Reaves, a student teacher under Reaves's supervision, and an
aide in Reaves's class.  The student teacher and the aide
stated that they had never seen Reaves act inappropriately.
Nash reported his findings to the superintendent.  School
and/or 
Board 
officials 
arranged 
for 
A.S. 
to 
receive
counseling.
It appears that over a period of 16 years before they
became aware of this allegation, school and/or Board officials
1061715
Nash did not participate in the investigations of the
1
first reported incident in 1986 or the fourth reported
incident in 1996.
4
had investigated various allegations of inappropriate conduct
by Reaves on 5 occasions and had placed  written reports in
Reaves's employee file.   Nash was aware of three of the five
investigations at the time they were being conducted,  and
1
school officials reprimanded Reaves in some form in response
to each investigation.
The first investigation occurred in 1986, before Nash
became personnel director.  The report of that investigation
indicated that Reaves had been accused of inappropriately
touching a female high-school student on her buttocks and
inappropriately commenting that another female high-school
student was "looking good."  The high-school principal orally
reprimanded Reaves and placed a notation about the incident in
Reaves's employee file.
The second reported incident occurred in 1990.  A female
student complained to her high-school principal that Reaves
had asked her if she liked sex, had walked into the girls'
locker room while female students were changing clothes, had
straddled her legs while she performed sit-ups in his
1061715
5
physical-education class, had touched her breast through her
clothing, and had rubbed her leg.  Nash and other school
officials investigated the allegation and obtained written
statements from the student and three other student witnesses.
The student was removed immediately from Reaves's class.  When
the principal confronted Reaves, Reaves denied the accusations
and stated that he would be more careful in his conduct toward
students.  The principal and the assistant principal increased
their supervision of Reaves.
The third reported incident occurred in 1991 when two
female 
high-school 
students 
informed 
the 
high-school 
principal
that Reaves had touched the legs of one of the female
students, had commented that she should not have worn a
certain shirt because he could see her black bra, had stated
that "he bet there wasn't a girl in the school he couldn't
get," and had rubbed a female student's hair, commented on her
chest, and patted her on the stomach.  The principal and Nash
interviewed the two students making the complaint, as well as
two other female students.  The two students alleging the
misconduct by Reaves made written statements about the
incidents.  The principal and Nash also reinterviewed two of
1061715
6
the students who had been involved in the 1990 investigation
and were told of additional inappropriate sexual conduct and
comments by Reaves.  The students' schedules were changed and
they had no further contact with Reaves.  When confronted with
the accusations, Reaves denied the misconduct.  School
officials, including the superintendent, met with the Board's
attorney and determined, with counsel's advice, that there was
insufficient evidence to terminate the employment of Reaves,
a tenured teacher.  Another written reprimand was placed in
Reaves's file, and he was transferred to Madison County
Elementary School, where he would not have contact with high-
school-age females.
In 1996, the fourth report was created when a female
student at Madison County Elementary School and her mother
reported that Reaves had told the student to "suck my right
nut."  The principal investigated the incident, and Reaves
denied making the statement, stating that he had instead said
"suck my nose."  The principal, who did not involve Nash in
the investigation of the incident, informed Reaves that any
additional report would result in a recommendation that
Reaves's employment be terminated.
1061715
It is unclear from the materials submitted to this Court
2
whether this incident occurred before or after the alleged
rape of A.S.
According to the materials before this Court, criminal
3
charges were filed against Reaves but were subsequently
dropped.
7
The fifth incident occurred in 2002 when female students
in Reaves's physical-education class complained to the school
counselor about the way Reaves made them perform push-ups.2
The school counselor reported the complaints to the principal
but refused to give the principal the students' names.  The
principal investigated and interviewed two adult female
teaching assistants in Reaves's class.  The assistants
informed the principal that the female students had performed
the push-ups in the normal and proper way.  The principal
confronted Reaves and ordered him not to place himself in such
a questionable situation in the future.
In 2004, when school officials and Nash learned of A.S.'s
accusation 
that 
Reaves 
had 
raped 
her 
in 
2002,  
Nash
3
immediately placed Reaves on administrative leave.  Reaves
retired before a decision was made as to whether to terminate
his employment. 
1061715
8
In 2005, A.S. and her parents sued Reaves, the Board,
Nash, and others alleging state and federal claims, including
a Title IX claim and the following 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim:
"46.  The School Board defendants [which include
the Board and Nash] deprived plaintiff A.S. of the
constitutional right to be free from sexual abuse
and molestation under the color of state law and
acted with deliberate indifference.
"47.  The School Board defendants violated 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983 (2000) by allowing an employee, the
defendant 
Reaves, 
to continue teaching and/or
coaching with multiple complaints on his record for
sexual harassment while taking no action to punish
this pedophile or to stop this pedophile's sexual
misconduct.  As a proximate result of the said
violation, the plaintiff A.S. was sexually molested
and raped.
"48.  The above named defendants also failed to
develop, implement or administer procedures or
policies reasonably designed to provide protection
for the mentally handicapped plaintiff from sexual
molestation while attending a public school.
"49.  This violation of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983
(2000) by the above named Defendants, proximately
caused injuries and damage to the Plaintiff, A.S.
..." 
  The Board and Nash answered, alleging among other defenses
State-agency immunity, immunity under the Eleventh Amendment
to the United States Constitution, and qualified immunity.  In
2007, they moved for a summary judgment, arguing that they
1061715
9
were immune from liability.  After conducting a hearing, the
trial court entered a summary judgment for Nash on all state-
law claims, entered a summary judgment for Nash and the Board
on the Title IX claim, and denied the Board's and Nash's
summary-judgment motion on A.S.'s § 1983 claim.  The Board and
Nash timely filed this petition for a writ of mandamus.
Standard of Review
"'"Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary
writ, to be issued only where there is (1)
a clear legal right in the petitioner to
the order sought; (2) an imperative duty
upon the respondent to perform, accompanied
by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court."  Ex
parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499
(Ala. 1995)....  Our review is further
limited to those facts that were before the
trial court.  Ex parte American Resources
Ins. Co., 663 So. 2d 932, 936 (Ala. 1995).'
"Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So. 2d 788,
789 (Ala. 1998)."
Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Youth Servs., 880 So. 2d 393, 398
(Ala. 2003).
"'While the general rule is that the
denial of a motion for summary judgment is
not reviewable, the exception is that the
denial of a motion grounded on a claim of
immunity is reviewable by petition for writ
1061715
10
of mandamus.  Ex parte Purvis, 689 So. 2d
794 (Ala. 1996)....
"'Summary judgment is appropriate only
when "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and ... the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., Young v. La
Quinta Inns, Inc., 682 So. 2d 402 (Ala.
1996).  A court considering a motion for
summary judgment will view the record in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, Hurst v. Alabama Power Co., 675 So.
2d 397 (Ala. 1996), Fuqua v. Ingersoll-Rand
Co., 591 So. 2d 486 (Ala. 1991); will
accord the nonmoving party all reasonable
favorable inferences from the evidence,
Fuqua, supra, Aldridge v. Valley Steel
Constr., Inc., 603 So. 2d 981 (Ala. 1992);
and will resolve all reasonable doubts
against the moving party, Hurst, supra, Ex
parte Brislin, 719 So. 2d 185 (Ala. 1998).
"'An 
appellate 
court 
reviewing 
a
ruling on a motion for summary judgment
will, de novo, apply these same standards
applicable in the trial court.  Fuqua,
supra, 
Brislin, 
supra. 
Likewise, 
the
appellate court will consider only that
factual material available of record to the
trial court for its consideration in
deciding the motion.  Dynasty Corp. v.
Alpha Resins Corp., 577 So. 2d 1278 (Ala.
1991), Boland v. Fort Rucker Nat'l Bank,
599 So. 2d 595 (Ala. 1992), Rowe v. Isbell,
599 So. 2d 35 (Ala. 1992).'
"Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912-13 (Ala. 2000)."
1061715
A.S. argues the Board waived any immunity it might have
4
had because the Board did not present the defense of immunity
to the trial court as a ground for summary judgment.  We,
however, need not determine whether the Board waived the
ground of immunity because federal immunity is not available
to the Board.
11
Ex parte Turner, 840 So. 2d 132, 135 (Ala. 2002).  See also Ex
parte Sawyer, 876 So. 2d 433 (Ala. 2003)(addressing a petition
for a writ of mandamus filed by a public official seeking
review of the trial court's denial of immunity in a § 1983
action).
Discussion
The Board and Nash contend that they have a clear legal
right to a summary judgment on A.S.'s § 1983 claim. 
First, the Board contends that it has a clear legal right
to a summary judgment on A.S.'s § 1983 claim because, it says,
it is immune from suit under § 1983.   In Monell v. New York
4
City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978),
the United States Supreme Court held that a cause of action
under § 1983 can be brought against a local government when
its official policies result in a constitutional tort.  In
Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701, 737
(1989), the Supreme Court further held that it is a court's
1061715
12
duty to identify  governmental bodies "who speak with final
policymaking authority for the local governmental actor
concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular
constitutional or statutory violation at issue."  However, it
is well established that if a local government body is acting
as an "arm of the State," which includes agents or
instrumentalities of the State, then Eleventh Amendment
immunity bars the suit.  Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977), and Regents of the
Univ. of California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429-30 (1997).
"Whether a defendant is an 'arm of the State' must be assessed
in light of the particular function in which the defendant was
engaged when taking the actions out of which liability is
asserted to arise."  Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th
Cir. 2003).  See McMillan v. Monroe County, Alabama, 520 U.S.
781, 785-86 (1997); Jett, 491 U.S. at 738 (question is whether
school superintendent "possessed final policymaking authority
in the area of employee transfers").  Secondly, the
determination is dependent on an analysis of state law.
McMillan, 520 U.S. at 786. 
1061715
13
In Manders, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that although the decision
whether an entity is an "arm of the State" for Eleventh
Amendment purposes is a question of federal law, "the federal
question can be answered only after considering provisions of
state law."  338 F.3d at 1309.  See also Regents of the Univ.
of California, 519 U.S. at 429 n.5 (stating that the Eleventh
Amendment question "can be answered only after considering the
provisions of state law that define the agency's character").
To assist in the analysis, the Manders court established the
following four-factor test to apply when determining whether
an entity is an "arm of the State" in carrying out a
particular function:  
"(1) [H]ow state law defines the entity; (2) what
degree of control the State maintains over the
entity; (3) where the entity derives its funds; and
(4) who is responsible for judgments against the
entity." 
338 F.3d at 1309. We apply this four-factor federal law test
to the facts of this case to determine whether the Board is an
1061715
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
5
states:  "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against any one of the United States by Citizens of
another State or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."
14
"arm of the State" and thus entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity.5
In the case before us, the Board's function that is at
issue here involves the Board's ability to transfer and/or
terminate a teacher's employment.  It is with regard to this
particular function that we will evaluate whether the Board is
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
1. How State law defines a county board of education. 
The Alabama Legislature has specifically defined and
designated the responsibilities of a county board of
education.  In § 16-8-1, Ala. Code 1975, the legislature
provided that a county board of education "shall be composed
of five members, who shall be elected by the qualified
electors of the county."  Section 16-1-30(b), Ala. Code 1975,
provides that a county board of education shall determine its
own written educational policy for the board and its employees
and "shall prescribe rules and regulations for the conduct and
1061715
15
management of the schools."  A county board of education is
vested with the "general administration and supervision" of
the schools in its county.  § 16-8-8, Ala. Code 1975.
Specifically, a county board of education "may suspend or
dismiss for immorality, misconduct in the office, ... or
whenever, in the opinion of the board, the bests interests of
the school require it, superintendents, principals, teachers,
or any other employees ...." § 16-8-23, Ala. Code 1975.
Likewise, a county board of education can transfer any teacher
to a different position, school, or grade if the board
determines a transfer is needed. § 16-24-5, Ala. Code 1975.
The legislature also specifically provided that a teacher
subject to transfer or termination has the right to contest
the board's decision by a hearing before the board. § 16-24-6,
Ala. Code 1975.  Thus, the Board maintains significant
authority with regard to the employment and conduct of its
teachers; this factor lends little weight to the Board's being
considered an "arm of the State" and thereby entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity.
2.  The degree of control the State maintains over the
county board of education.  
1061715
16
The Board argues that because the State superintendent of
education has final, binding "authority to review actions and
orders of county and city boards of education ... in matters
relating to finance and other matters seriously affecting the
educational interest," see § 16-4-8, Ala.  Code 1975, a county
board of education is governed by and limited by the
boundaries set by the State.  The Board provides an extensive
list of limitations placed on the authority of county boards
of education.  This Court, however, has specifically
recognized:
"However broad may be the powers of the State Board
of Education, ... we think it clear that the
authority 
to 
exercise 
general 
control 
and
supervision over the county ... boards of education
does not include the authority to exercise the
powers and authority which the Legislature has
specifically conferred upon such local boards.
"....
"In regard to the authority to transfer or
reassign teachers from one public school to another
public school within a ...  county school system, it
is conferred upon local boards of education ...."
In re Opinion of the Justices No. 180, 276 Ala. 239, 241, 160
So. 2d 648, 650 (1964).
1061715
17
Thus, because the legislature has specifically vested in
county boards of education the authority to transfer, suspend,
or dismiss teachers, this second factor does not weigh in
favor of the Board's being considered an "arm of the State"
and thereby entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
3.  Where the county board of education derives its
funds.  
The Board argues that because this Court has held that
all public-school funds are State funds, whether collected at
the State or the local level, we must conclude that this
factor weighs heavily in favor of the Board's being considered
an "arm of the State."  See Mobile, Alabama-Pensacola,
Florida, Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Williams, 331 So.
2d 647, 648 (Ala. 1976)(holding that regardless of whether the
public-school funds come from the State treasury or from local
taxation, public-school funds are State funds); and State v.
Tuscaloosa County, 233 Ala. 611, 613, 172 So. 892, 894
(1937)("[P]ublic school funds, as between the county and
State, are State funds.").  The fact that this Court has
declared all public-school funds to be State funds does not
address the question from where the Board derives its funds.
1061715
The Board in its brief on application for rehearing
6
provided information from the Alabama Education Department,
Annual Report 2004, indicating that in 2004 the Board received
54.24% of its funding from the State.  This information,
however, is contained in the argument of counsel and is not
supported by any documentation.
18
Nothing properly before us indicates the source of the Board's
funds;  therefore, without any documentation to support this
6
factor, we cannot conclude that it weighs in favor on the
Board.
4.  Who is responsible for judgments against the entity.
The Board boldly asserts that, "[i]f all school funds are
State funds, then any judgment against the Madison County
Board of Education must be satisfied entirely from State funds
allocated and intended for the education of students in
Madison County."  As with the third factor, such a general
conclusion without any evidentiary support does not support
the conclusion that any judgment against the Board would be
payable out of the State treasury.
Thus, application of the Manders test to the facts before
us does not support a finding that the Board has established
a right to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
1061715
19
Before the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit developed the Manders test, the court
addressed a situation similar to the one before us in Stewart
v. Baldwin County Board of Education, 908 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir.
1990).  The court held that the Baldwin County Board of
Education was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity
because the Baldwin County Board of Education was not acting
as an arm or alter ego of the State.  Recognizing that
Eleventh Amendment immunity extended to an entity that was an
arm of the State, the court noted that because the Baldwin
County Board of Education managed its own funding, established
the general policy for education in Baldwin County schools,
administered and supervised education in the schools in
Baldwin County, and was "subject to a significant amount of
local control," 908 F.2d at 1511, the Baldwin County Board of
Education could not be considered an arm of the State and
therefore was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.  
The Board argues in its application for rehearing that
this Court should not find Stewart persuasive, in light of the
holdings in McMillan and Regents of the University of
California.  However, we recognize that "[u]ltimately, of
1061715
20
course, the question whether a particular state agency has the
same kind of independent status as a county ... is a question
of federal law."  Regents of the Univ. of California, 519 U.S.
at 430 n. 5.  Moreover, as the McMillan Court stated:
"[O]ur inquiry is dependent on an analysis of state
law. ... This is not to say that state law can
answer the question for us by, for example, simply
labeling as a state [agency] an [agency that]
clearly makes county policy.  But our understanding
of the actual function of a governmental [agency],
in a particular area, will necessarily be dependent
on the definition of the [agency's] functions under
relevant state law."  
520 U.S. at 786.   Thus, because § 1983 liability is
determined by federal law, and because Stewart, which holds
that a board of education is not entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity, reflects what we understand to be the
federal law with regard to the status of a county board of
education and its authority to suspend, dismiss, or terminate
a teacher,  we conclude that the Board, which fulfills the
same role for the schools in Madison County as the Baldwin
County Board of Education does for the schools in Baldwin
County, is also not an arm of the State for the purposes of §
1983 liability and is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
1061715
21
Because the Board has not established that it is entitled
to immunity from the § 1983 claims, it has not established a
clear legal right to a summary judgment on immunity grounds,
and the petition for the writ of mandamus is denied in this
regard.
Nash also contends that he has a clear legal right to a
summary judgment on A.S.'s § 1983 claim, because, he says, he
is entitled to qualified immunity.
"'[G]overnment 
officials 
performing
discretionary 
functions 
generally 
are
shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly 
established 
statutory 
or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.'
"Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct.
2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).  'Qualified immunity is
designed to allow government officials to avoid the
expense and disruption of going to trial, and is not
merely a defense to liability.' Hardy v. Town of
Hayneville, 50 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1189 (M.D. Ala.
1999).  'An official is entitled to qualified
immunity if he is performing discretionary functions
and his actions do "'not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.'"'  Hardy, 50 F.
Supp. 2d at 1189 (quoting Lancaster v. Monroe
County, 116 F.3d 1419, 1424 (11th Cir. 1997))."
Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Youth Servs., 880 So. 2d at 402.
First, we must determine whether A.S. has established a
1061715
22
clear constitutional right to be safe from sexual abuse by a
teacher while in school.  In C.B. v. Bobo, 659 So. 2d 98
(Ala. 1995), this Court recognized:  
"'If the Constitution protects a schoolchild
against being tied to a chair or against arbitrary
paddlings, then surely the Constitution protects a
schoolchild from physical abuse ... by a public
schoolteacher.  ... It is uncontrovertible that
bodily integrity is necessarily violated when a
state actor sexually abuses a schoolchild and that
such misconduct deprives the child of rights
vouchsafed by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Obviously,
there is never any justification for sexually
molesting 
a 
schoolchild, 
and 
thus, 
no 
state
interest, analogous to the punitive and disciplinary
objectives attendant to corporal punishment, which
might support it.'"
659 So. 2d at 103-04 (quoting Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist.,
15 F.3d 443, 450-52 (5th Cir. 1994)(emphasis added in C.B.)).
A.S.'s 
complaint 
alleges 
a 
violation 
of 
her
constitutional right to bodily integrity  –- "to be free from
sexual abuse and molestation."   Nash recognizes that A.S.
pleads this clearly established constitutional right, and he
appears to concede that A.S.'s right to bodily integrity may
have been violated by Reaves's actions.
Next, we must consider whether A.S. can establish that
Nash acted with deliberate indifference to the violation of
1061715
23
her constitutional right to bodily integrity.  In Ray v.
Foltz, 370 F.3d 1079  (11th Cir. 2004), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that, to
overcome qualified immunity, not only must the government
official 
violate 
a 
clearly 
established 
statutory 
or
constitutional right of the plaintiff, but the government
official also must have acted with deliberate indifference to
that right.  The Court of Appeals stated:
"Deliberate indifference is not the same thing
as negligence or carelessness.  See Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d
251 (1976).  On the contrary, the Supreme Court has
made 
clear 
that 
a 
state 
official 
acts 
with
deliberate indifference only when he disregards a
risk of harm of which he is actually aware.  Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128
L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (to be deliberately indifferent
a state 'official must both be aware of facts from
which 
the 
inference 
could 
be 
drawn 
that 
a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must
also draw the inference')(emphasis added). ...
"Following this guidance, we have stated that in
order 
to 
establish 
deliberate 
indifference,
plaintiffs must be able to [establish] that the
defendant (1) was objectively aware of a risk of
serious harm; (2) recklessly disregarded the risk of
harm; and (3) this conduct was more than merely
negligent. McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255
(11th Cir. 1999)."
370 F.3d at 1083.  
1061715
The 
parties 
agree 
that 
Nash 
was 
performing 
a
7
discretionary function; therefore, our focus is solely on
whether Nash's actions violated A.S.'s constitutional right.
24
Nash contends that he presented substantial evidence
indicating that he is entitled to qualified immunity because
he was performing a discretionary function and because, he
argues, his actions did not violate A.S.'s constitutional
right.   Specifically, he maintains that a reasonable person
7
would not view his actions as being deliberately indifferent
to A.S.'s constitutional right to bodily integrity.  A.S.
contends that Nash demonstrated deliberate indifference to the
risk of harm to the female students at the elementary school
and to her specifically by his failure to recommend to the
superintendent that Reaves's employment by the Madison County
Board of Education be terminated.  Specifically, she maintains
that Nash had notice of the risk of harm to her and other
female students "by allowing an employee, the defendant
Reaves, to continue teaching and/or coaching with multiple
complaints on his record for sexual harassment while taking no
action to punish this pedophile or to stop this pedophile's
sexual misconduct."  Because A.S. alleges that Nash is
individually liable for a constitutional injury caused
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25
directly by someone else, her claim against  Nash rests on
"supervisor liability."  
"'"Supervisor liability [under § 1983]
occurs 
either 
when 
the 
supervisor
personally participates in the alleged
constitutional violation or when there is
a causal connection between actions of the
supervising 
official 
and 
the 
alleged
constitutional deprivation.  The causal
connection can be established when a
history of widespread abuse puts the
responsible supervisor on notice of the
need to correct the alleged deprivation,
and 
he 
[she] 
fails 
to 
do 
so. 
The
deprivations that constitute widespread
abuse 
sufficient 
to 
noti[fy] 
the
supervising official must be obvious,
flagrant, 
rampant, 
and 
of 
continued
duration, 
rather 
than 
isolated
occurrences."'
"Braddy v. Florida Dep't of Labor & Employment Sec.,
133 F.3d 797, 802 (11th Cir. 1998)(quoting Brown v.
Crawford, 
906 
F.2d 
667, 
671 
(11th 
Cir.
1990)(citations 
omitted 
and 
emphasis 
added)).
Accord George v. McIntosh-Wilson, 582 So. 2d 1058,
1062-63 (Ala. 1991)."
Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Youth Servs., 880 So. 2d at 403.
In Doe ex rel. Doe v. City of Roseville, 296 F.3d 431
(6th Cir. 2002), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit confronted a factual situation similar to the
one now before this Court.  In Roseville, a female elementary-
school student alleged that she had been abused by one of her
1061715
26
male elementary-school teachers in 1992.  The teacher had had
complaints alleged against him throughout his teaching career.
During the 1975-76 and 1976-77 school years, several girls
alleged that the teacher had touched them inappropriately.
The teacher received an oral warning.  The teacher was
transferred to a different elementary school, and in 1979 the
superintendent was notified that the teacher had fondled four
sixth-grade 
girls. 
 
The 
superintendent 
investigated, 
concluded
that the teacher had used "poor judgment," placed a sealed
letter of reprimand in his file, and transferred him to yet
another school.  No additional allegations of improper
behavior were made until 1988 when several girls reported that
the 
teacher 
had 
touched 
them 
inappropriately. 
 
The
superintendent conducted another investigation and issued a
letter of reprimand.  Additionally, the superintendent
contacted the board of education and the district attorney,
informing them of the two incidents requiring a letter of
reprimand.  The teacher was again transferred, and in 1992 and
1993 the special-education student who was the plaintiff in
the Roseville case was allegedly sexually abused.  "The abuse
included [the teacher's] removing her clothing; touching her
1061715
27
private parts with his hands and penetrating her vagina with
his fingers; taking her into the boys' bathroom and, while
wearing [a] mask, tying her wrists with rope, gagging her,
hanging her from a hook on the door and hitting her with a
small wooden bat; and ... while again wearing a mask, putting
his fingers in her vagina and slapping her face."  296 F.3d at
435-36.  The student did not immediately report the abuse, but
informed her parents of it in 1994, almost a year after a
criminal investigation had been initiated against the teacher
regarding another unrelated incident of sexual abuse against
a neighbor of the teacher's.
The student sued several entities and individuals
involved in employing and supervising the teacher, including
the superintendent who investigated the incidents, asserting,
among other claims, a § 1983 claim.  In determining whether
the supervisors were immune from the § 1983 claim, the Court
of Appeals recognized that
"it is not enough for the plaintiff to show that the
defendant supervisors were sloppy, reckless or
negligent in the performance of their duties.
Rather, ... '[a] plaintiff must show that, in light
of the information defendants possessed, the teacher
who engaged in sexual abuse showed a strong
likelihood that he would attempt to sexually abuse
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28
other students, such that the failure to take
adequate 
precautions 
amounted 
to 
deliberate
indifference to the constitutional rights of the
students.'... 
Put 
another 
way, 
we 
said, 
the
plaintiff must show that the 'defendants' conduct
amounted to a tacit authorization of the abuse.'"
296 F.3d at 439.
The court in Roseville acknowledged that the conduct of
the supervisors was "disturbing," but it held that their acts
did not constitute participation in or knowing acquiescence to
the abuse.  Noting that the teacher's actions were sporadic -–
occurring in 1976 and then not until 1988, more than 10 years
apart -– the court concluded that the supervisors were not
confronted with conduct that was "'obvious, flagrant, rampant,
and of continued duration.'"  296 F.3d at 440 (quoting Braddy
v. Florida Dep't of Labor & Employment Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 802
(11th Cir. 1998)).  The court then stated:
"Viewed from the 
perspective 
of 
the 
twenty-first
century, the responses of [the supervisors] to
reports of [the teacher's] conduct are disturbing.
Hindsight 
reveals 
that 
[the 
teacher] 
was 
a
pedophile.  But our task is not to reconstruct the
reality of [the teacher's] proclivities.  Our task
is to determine whether [the supervisors] were
confronted with conduct that was 'obvious, flagrant,
rampant, and of continued duration, rather than
isolated 
occurrences,' 
... 
or 
with 
'such 
a
widespread pattern of constitutional violations' ...
that 
their 
actions 
demonstrated 
deliberate
1061715
Nash was involved in investigating only two incidents --
8
the 1990 and 1991 incidents -- before the incident involving
A.S.  Nash's investigation of the 1991 incident, which
involved revisiting the 1990 incident, resulted in meetings
29
indifference to the danger of [the teacher's]
sexually abusing students.  We hold that they were
not.  We cannot weave the threads of such a pattern
on the loom of hindsight, and the facts as [the
student] portrays them do not demonstrate anything
more 
than 
negligence 
on 
the 
part 
of 
these
defendants. 
 
Although 
[the 
student] 
had 
a
constitutional right to be free from sexual abuse at
the hands of a school teacher or official, she did
not have a constitutional right to be free from
negligence in the supervision of the teacher who is
alleged to have actually abused her.  Negligence is
not enough to impose section 1983 liability on a
supervisor."
296 F.3d at 440-41.  The court then held that the supervisors
were entitled to qualified immunity.
Like the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
Roseville, we conclude that Nash's actions were at most
negligent and that he is entitled to qualified immunity.  Nash
presented substantial evidence indicating that the previous
incidents of misconduct by Reaves were not "obvious, flagrant,
rampant, and of continued duration," but were 5 isolated
occurrences over a 16-year period that did not provide a basis
for terminating Reaves's employment or provide him with
sufficient notice that Reaves would seriously harm A.S.   A.S.
8
1061715
with various school officials, including the superintendent,
to discuss whether a recommendation should be made to the
Board to terminate Reaves's employment.
30
relies on the facts that Nash had knowledge of the past
incidents involving Reaves, that he had investigated the
incidents and believed the female students' claims of
misconduct by Reaves, and that he had failed to recommend to
the Board or to other Board officials after investigating
those incidents that Reaves's employment be terminated; these
instances, however, do not amount to deliberate indifference
but to, at most,  negligence.  As the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit recognized, we cannot use hindsight to conclude
that Nash inferred from these incidents that Reaves posed a
substantial risk of harm to the female students.  Thus,
because Nash has established a clear legal right to qualified
immunity, he is entitled to a summary judgment on A.S.'s §
1983 claim.   Therefore, Nash has shown a clear legal right to
a dismissal of A.S.'s § 1983 claim on the ground of federal
qualified immunity.
Conclusion
Because the Board has failed to establish that it is
entitled to immunity, we deny the petition as to it.  Nash,
1061715
31
however, has established that he is entitled to immunity on
A.S.'s § 1983 claim; therefore, he has established a clear
legal right to the dismissal of that claim, and the trial
court is directed to enter a summary judgment in favor of Nash
on A.S.'s § 1983 claim.
APPLICATION OVERRULED; OPINION OF MARCH 14, 2008,
WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; PETITION GRANTED IN PART AND
DENIED IN PART; WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Lyons, Woodall, Smith, and Bolin,
JJ., concur.
Stuart, J., concurs specially.
Parker and Murdock, JJ., concur in the result.
1061715
32
STUART, Justice (concurring specially).
I recognize that whether the Madison County Board of
Education ("the Board") is an "arm of the State" and is thus
entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the
United States Constitution  for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is a
question of federal law.  I further recognize that under
current federal law a board of education is not entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity; that the Board is not entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity; and that, consequently, the Board
has not established a clear legal right to a summary judgment
on this ground.  I also recognize that this Court does not
review a denial of a summary judgment by a petition for a writ
of mandamus unless an exception applies.  See Liberty Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 825 So. 2d 758, 761-62 (Ala. 2002) ("[B]ecause
an 'adequate remedy' exists by way of an appeal, the denial of
a motion to dismiss or a motion for a summary judgment is not
reviewable by petition for writ of mandamus."). I write
specially to state that my review of the materials submitted
to this Court indicates that the Board is entitled to a
summary judgment on the merits.  The Board presented
substantial evidence indicating that there was not a genuine
1061715
33
issue of material fact with regard to A.S.'s § 1983 claim.
A.S. did not establish otherwise.  Therefore, if I had been
the trial judge, I would have granted the Board's summary-
judgment motion.
1061715
34
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result).
"There is no area of the law which is more confusing
than qualified immunity, unless it is that of
deliberate indifference."
Judge Robert Propst
Flowers v. Bennett, 
123 F. Supp. 2d 595, 601 
(N.D. Ala. 2000).
Before conducting research in an effort to understand the
issue presented in the present case, my vote for the most
confusing area of the law likely would have gone to that area
of Alabama state law dealing with "sovereign immunity" (or at
least to the manner in which this Court has sometimes applied
that law).  See generally Alabama Dep't of Transp. v. Harbert
Int'l, Inc., [Ms. 1050271, March 7, 2008] ___ So. 2d ___, ___
(Ala. 2008) (Murdock, J., concurring specially) (addressing
so-called "State immunity"); Ex parte Randall, 971 So. 2d 652,
609 (Ala. 2007) (Murdock, J., dissenting) (addressing so-
called "State-agent immunity").  After reading quite a number
of federal cases dealing with Eleventh Amendment immunity,
however, I am now amenable to the suggestion that Judge Propst
has identified more deserving candidates.
1061715
35
The United States Supreme Court has stated that the issue
of qualified immunity turns on two questions: (1) whether the
defendant 
was 
performing a discretionary function and
(2) 
whether 
the 
defendant's 
conduct 
violated 
clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights.  As the Court
held in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982):
"[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known."  The latter question, itself, has
been examined in two parts: (a) "'[t]aken in the light most
favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts
alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional
right?'" and, (b) if so, was "'the right ... clearly
established ... in light of the specific context of the
case'"?  Scott v. Harris, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 127 S. Ct. 1769,
1774 (2007) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201
(2001)).  Despite these holdings, under the approach utilized
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
in Ray v. Foltz, 370 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir. 2004), and accepted
1061715
In Ray v. Foltz, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
9
Circuit quoted the "clearly established constitutional right"
36
by the main opinion, the issue whether a state official has
acted with "deliberate indifference," rather than merely
innocently or negligently, must somehow be spliced onto the
immunity analysis.
The main opinion quotes the Harlow v. Fitzgerald standard
as part of a longer passage from this Court's opinion several
years ago in Ex parte Alabama Department of Youth Services,
880 So. 2d at 393, 402-03 (Ala. 2003).  ___ So. 2d at ___.
Without any predicate explanation of how, or even whether, the
concept of "deliberate indifference" is properly part of the
qualified-immunity analysis, the main opinion then states
that,
 "[i]n Ray v. Foltz, 370 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir. 2004),
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit held that, to overcome qualified immunity,
not only must the government official violate a
clearly established statutory or constitutional
right of the plaintiff, but the government official
also must have acted with deliberate indifference to
that right."
___ So. 2d at ___ (emphasis added).  In this regard, the
approach reflected in the main opinion seems little or no
different than that in Ray v. Foltz itself.   As a result, and
9
1061715
standard from Harlow v. Fitzgerald and concluded that the
constitutional right violated in that case was a clearly
established one.  The opinion then moved to the issue of
"deliberate indifference" (which, if not for the manner in
which it is discussed in Ray v. Foltz and some other cases, I
would have assumed was simply a substantive, scienter element
of the underlying constitutional/§ 1983 action), without
explaining how that concept relates to the above-stated
elements of the qualified-immunity defense.  Nevertheless, the
manner in which the court organized its opinion does suggest
that the issue of deliberate indifference is to be considered
in the context of a qualified-immunity analysis.  370 F.3d at
1081-85 (Part II).
Ray v. Foltz relied heavily upon the discussion of
deliberate indifference in Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791
(11th Cir. 1987) (en banc).  The discussion in Taylor,
however, does not appear to be anything more than a discussion
of an element of the underlying cause of action.  I also note
that in Williams v. Board of Regents of University System of
Georgia, 477 F.3d 1282, 1300 (11th Cir. 2007), a case, like
the present case,  involving supervisor liability, the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit discusses the deliberate-
indifference standard as a substantive element of the causes
of action under Title IX and § 1983.  477 F.3d at 1295-97
(Part II.B.3).  The opinion in Williams makes no reference to
the concept of deliberate indifference in its separate
discussion of qualified immunity.  As to that issue, the
opinion focuses solely on whether the defendant was "executing
a discretionary responsibility" and, if so, whether the right
of the plaintiff that was violated was a "'clearly established
statutory or constitutional right[] of which a reasonable
person would have known,'" consistent with the above-discussed
United States Supreme Court cases.  477 F.3d at 1300-02
(Part III.B and III.C) (quoting Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.3d
1479, 1486 (11th Cir. 1991)).  Compare Saucier v. Katz, supra.
37
because the arguments of both parties in this case are based
on this approach, I accept this approach for purposes of the
1061715
38
present case.  On that basis, I concur in the result reached
by the main opinion as to Nash.
I also concur in the result reached by the main opinion
as to the Madison County Board of Education.