Case Title: State v. Taylor

Citation: 2014-Ohio-460

Docket Number: 2012-2136

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2014-02-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Taylor, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-460.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-460 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. TAYLOR, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Taylor, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-460.] 
Criminal law—R.C. 1.58(B)—2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 86—A defendant may 
benefit from the decrease in a classification and a penalty enacted after 
the commission of the offense but before sentencing. 
(Nos. 2012-2136—Submitted November 6, 2013—Decided February 13, 2014.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Summit County, 
No. 26279, 2012-Ohio-5403. 
_______________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} The Ninth District Court of Appeals certified a conflict between its 
decision in this case and decisions of the Fifth District Court of Appeals in State 
v. Gillespie, 2012-Ohio-3485, 975 N.E.2d 492 (5th Dist.) and State v. David, 5th 
Dist. No. 11-CA-110, 2012-Ohio-3984, on the following issue: whether the 
defendant may benefit from the decrease in a classification and penalty of an 
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offense enacted by the General Assembly that becomes effective after the 
commission of the offense but before sentencing on that offense. 
{¶ 2} On July 23, 2011, Lucious Taylor stole $550 worth of cologne 
from a Sears store.  At that time, R.C. 2913.02 classified that theft offense as a 
fifth-degree felony.  However, prior to sentencing, the General Assembly enacted 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 86 (“H.B. 86”), effective September 30, 2011, which amended 
several sections of the criminal code to decrease the offense classifications, 
thereby reducing the penalty or punishment for some offenses, and among other 
changes made theft of property valued at less than $1,000 a first-degree 
misdemeanor and correspondingly reduced the maximum punishment for the 
offense.  On December 27, 2011, the trial court convicted Taylor of a 
misdemeanor and sentenced him for that offense.  The appellate court, in a two-
to-one decision, reversed the trial court and held that because nothing in H.B. 86 
provided that Taylor was entitled to benefit from the decrease in classification of 
the theft offense, he should have been convicted of a felony, but had been 
correctly sentenced as a misdemeanant. 
{¶ 3} The outcome of this case is directly affected by R.C. 1.58(B), 
which specifies that if the penalty or punishment for an offense has been reduced 
by amendment of a statute, the reduced penalty or punishment shall be imposed 
unless sentence had been previously imposed. 
{¶ 4} We answer the certified question in the affirmative and conclude 
that the legislature intended to afford the benefit of a decreased theft offense 
classification to offenders like Taylor, and therefore the trial court properly 
convicted and sentenced him for a misdemeanor violation. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 5} On July 23, 2011, Lucious Taylor shoplifted $550 worth of 
cologne from a Sears department store in Akron, Ohio.  A Summit County Grand 
January Term, 2014 
 
3
Jury subsequently indicted him for theft of property valued at $500 or more but 
less than $5,000, a fifth-degree felony. 
{¶ 6} Effective September 30, 2011, the General Assembly enacted H.B. 
86, and among other changes to Ohio’s sentencing laws, it decreased the 
classification of theft of property valued at less than $1,000, making the offense a 
first-degree misdemeanor, which correspondingly reduced the punishment for that 
offense. 
{¶ 7} On December 19, 2011, Taylor pled no contest to theft, and the 
trial court convicted and sentenced him for a first-degree misdemeanor. 
{¶ 8} The state obtained leave to appeal the court’s decision to convict 
Taylor of a misdemeanor rather than a felony.  In a divided opinion, the Ninth 
District Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had properly sentenced 
Taylor as a first-degree misdemeanant, but it determined that the court should 
have convicted Taylor of a felony, because the General Assembly had not made 
the amendments to Section 2913.02 retroactive and because it concluded that R.C. 
1.58(B) applies only to the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment for an offense, not 
to decreases in classification or degree of offenses. 
{¶ 9} The dissent in the appellate court referenced the uncodified law 
enacted by H.B. 86, noting that it afforded the benefit of the amendments to all 
offenders included pursuant to R.C. 1.58(B), not only those who committed 
offenses on or after the effective date of the enactment.  It concluded that because 
R.C. 1.58 applied to Taylor, the decrease in classification and degree enacted by 
H.B. 86 should apply as well. 
{¶ 10} The appellate court certified a conflict with State v. Gillespie, 
2012-Ohio-3485, 975 N.E.2d 492 (5th Dist.), and State v. David, 5th Dist. No. 11-
CA-110, 2012-Ohio-3984.  In the conflict cases, the Fifth District Court of 
Appeals concluded that by incorporating R.C. 1.58(B) in uncodified law enacted 
by H.B. 86, the General Assembly signaled its intent for the amended version of 
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R.C. 2913.02 to apply to a person sentenced on and after September 30, 2011. 
The court explained that the value of the property stolen relates only to the 
penalty that may be imposed, and for property valued at less than $1,000, “[t]hat 
penalty is a misdemeanor offense with a misdemeanor sentence not a felony 
offense with a misdemeanor sentence.”  Gillespie at ¶ 15. 
{¶ 11} We accepted the certified conflict for resolution. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 12} The General Assembly is vested with the power to define, classify, 
and prescribe punishment for offenses committed in Ohio.  State v. Bates, 118 
Ohio St.3d 174, 2008-Ohio-1983, 887 N.E.2d 328, ¶ 12; State v. Thompkins, 75 
Ohio St.3d 558, 560, 664 N.E.2d 926 (1996); State v. Rush, 83 Ohio St.3d 53, 57, 
697 N.E.2d 634 (1998) (opinion of Moyer, C.J., and Cook and Lundberg Stratton, 
JJ.). 
{¶ 13} We have recognized that concomitant with its plenary power to 
prescribe crimes and penalties, the legislature may extend the benefit of lesser 
penalties and reduced punishment to those who committed offenses prior to the 
effective date of legislation.  State v. Morris, 55 Ohio St.2d 101, 378 N.E.2d 708 
(1978), syllabus.  However, an offender may not benefit from a reduction in the 
penalty or punishment when the legislature expressly provides that the amended 
sentencing provisions apply only to those offenses committed on or after the 
effective date of the enactment.  See Rush at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 14} Our role, in the exercise of the judicial power granted to us by the 
Constitution, is to interpret the law that the General Assembly enacts, and the 
primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of 
the legislature.  State v. Robinson, 124 Ohio St.3d 76, 2009-Ohio-5937, 919 
N.E.2d 190, ¶ 18.  We are guided in this task in this case by the uncodified 
language provided in Section 4 of H.B. 86: 
 
January Term, 2014 
 
5
The amendments to section[ ] * * * 2913.02 * * * of the 
Revised Code that are made in this act apply to a person who 
commits an offense specified or penalized under those sections on 
or after the effective date of this section and to a person to whom 
division (B) of section 1.58 of the Revised Code makes the 
amendments applicable. 
 
{¶ 15} R.C. 1.58(B) provides:  “If the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment 
for any offense is reduced by a reenactment or amendment of a statute, the 
penalty, forfeiture, or punishment, if not already imposed, shall be imposed 
according to the statute as amended.” 
{¶ 16} The central position advanced by the state is that R.C. 1.58(B) 
refers to amendments to the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment for an offense and 
does not refer to amendments to the classification or degree of an offense.  The 
flaw in that position, however, is that implicit in a decrease in the classification of 
an offense from a felony of the fifth degree to a misdemeanor of the first degree is 
a corresponding reduction in the penalty or punishment for that conduct.  That is 
what has occurred here, and we resolve this case in accordance with the express 
intent of the legislature as contained in the title of H.B. 86:  “to increase from 
$500 to $1,000 the threshold amount for determining increased penalties for theft-
related offenses * * * [and] to increase by 50% the other threshold amounts for 
determining increased penalties for those offenses.” 
{¶ 17} The real question presented here is not that the amendments to 
R.C. 2913.02 changed the penalty or punishment provisions or the criminal 
offense classifications, but rather whether the amendments apply to those in 
Taylor’s circumstances, who had committed the theft offense prior to the effective 
date of the amendment.  In this regard, the legislature intended that the 
amendments apply to all offenders, regardless of when their offenses were 
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committed, because it conditioned application of the reduced penalty—which 
arises by virtue of the reduced classification—on whether or not the offenders had 
been previously sentenced.  This conclusion accords with the goals of the General 
Assembly to reduce the state’s prison population and to save the associated costs 
of incarceration by diverting certain offenders from prison and by shortening the 
terms of other offenders sentenced to prison.  Ohio Legislative Service 
Commission, Fiscal Note & Local Impact Statement to Am.Sub.H.B. 86, at 3 
(Sept. 
30, 
2011), 
available 
at 
www.lsc.oh.us/fiscalnotes.cfm?ID=129_HB_86&ACT=As%20Enrolled (accessed 
Dec. 17, 2013). 
{¶ 18} In resolving this case, the appellate court concluded that Taylor 
should have been convicted of a felony offense but sentenced as a misdemeanant.  
Notably, the legislature has provided no statutory authority for those convicted of 
a felony offense to be sentenced pursuant to the sentencing statute for 
misdemeanants.  And as we observed in State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 
2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332: 
 
Judges have no inherent power to create sentences. * * * 
Rather, judges are duty-bound to apply sentencing laws as they are 
written. * * * “[T]he only sentence which a trial court may impose 
is that provided for by statute. A court has no power to substitute a 
different sentence for that provided for by statute or one that is 
either greater or lesser than that provided for by law.” Colegrove 
[v. Burns], 175 Ohio St. [437,] 438, 25 O.O.2d 447, 195 N.E.2d 
811 [(1964)]. 
 
Id. at ¶ 22. 
 
 
January Term, 2014 
 
7
 
Conclusion 
{¶ 19} R.C. 1.58(B) provides that if the penalty or punishment for an 
offense is reduced by amendment of a statute and if sentence has not already been 
imposed, then the amended reduced penalty or punishment shall be imposed.  
Thus, in accordance with R.C. 1.58(B) and the uncodified portion of Section 4 of 
H.B. 86, the determining factor on whether the provisions of H.B. 86 apply to an 
offender is not the date of the commission of the offense but rather whether 
sentence has been imposed. 
{¶ 20} In this case, Taylor had not been sentenced as of the date the 
amendments became effective and therefore pursuant to R.C. 1.58(B), the court 
had a duty to impose sentence in accord with the amended statutes. 
{¶ 21} We therefore answer the certified conflict in the affirmative and 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment reversed. 
PFEIFER, Acting C.J., HARSHA, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and O’NEILL, JJ., 
concur. 
FRENCH, J., dissents. 
WILLIAM H. HARSHA, J., of the Fourth Appellate District, sitting for 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
____________________ 
HARSHA J., concurring. 
{¶ 22} The question presented by this certified-conflict case is whether 
the legislature intended to provide the benefit of both a decreased penalty and a 
lower offense classification to offenders who committed their offense prior to the 
enactment of 2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 86 (“H.B. 86”) but who were not sentenced 
until after the act’s effective date.  I concur in the majority opinion and emphasize 
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one factor that bolsters my conclusion:  the express reference in section 4 of H.B. 
86 to R.C. 1.58(B). 
{¶ 23} Why would the legislature have included the reference to R.C. 
1.58(B), which would have applied by operation of law if the reference had not 
been included, unless its inclusion was intended to have some independent impact 
on the question of retroactivity?  Was it mere surplusage, i.e., superfluous?  The 
General Assembly is not presumed to do a useless thing, and when language is 
inserted in a statute, it is inserted to accomplish a definite purpose.  State v. 
Wilson, 77 Ohio St.3d 334, 336, 673 N.E.2d 1347 (1997).  We are reminded to 
avoid a construction that would render any provision meaningless or superfluous.  
Rhodes v. New Philadelphia, 129 Ohio St.3d 304, 2011-Ohio-3279, 951 N.E.2d 
782, ¶ 23.  This court and the rules of statutory construction have admonished 
those charged with discerning legislative intent to apply every word used in 
legislation.  State v. Moaning, 76 Ohio St.3d 126, 128, 666 N.E.2d 1115 (1996). 
{¶ 24} The legislature instructed us that “[t]he amendments to section[] * 
* * 2913.02 * * * of the Revised Code * * * apply * * * to a person to whom 
division (B) of section 1.58 * * * makes the amendments applicable.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Section 4 of H.B. 86.  R.C. 1.58(B) applies to reduce Taylor’s penalty 
because he was not sentenced until after the effective date of H.B. 86.  Because 
R.C. 1.58 applies to reduce Taylor’s penalty, the uncodified language in H.B. 86 
makes all the amendments to R.C. 2913.02 also apply, i.e., he gets both a reduced 
penalty and reduced classification regardless of whether “classification” and 
“penalty” are in effect one and the same. 
{¶ 25} If the legislature had intended that only a reduced-penalty benefit 
would apply to Taylor, it did not have to refer to R.C. 1.58(B).  That result would 
have occurred by operation of law.  Thus, it is clear to me that the legislature 
intended its reference to R.C. 1.58(B) to have the effect we give it. 
____________________ 
January Term, 2014 
 
9
 
FRENCH, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 26} The central question before us is whether the classification level of 
an offense qualifies as a “penalty” or “punishment” to the offender, apart from 
any actual sentence the offender receives.  Because the answer to this question is 
no, and because the majority largely avoids the issue, I must respectfully dissent. 
{¶ 27} 2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 86 (“H.B. 86”) amended R.C. 2913.02, 
changing Taylor’s theft of $550 worth of cologne from a fifth-degree felony to a 
first-degree misdemeanor.  We must decide whether this amendment, which 
became effective after Taylor committed his offense, but before he was sentenced, 
retroactively applies to Taylor.  Section 4 of H.B. 86 (“Section 4”) explains how 
retroactivity should work for offenders in Taylor’s position, stating:  “The 
amendments to * * * [R.C.] 2913.02 * * * apply * * * to a person to whom 
division (B) of section 1.58 of the Revised Code makes the amendments 
applicable.”  By the plain terms of Section 4, a defendant can receive the 
retroactive benefit of the statutory amendment only if R.C. 1.58(B) “makes the 
amendment[] applicable” to him.  Thus, to determine whether an amendment will 
retroactively apply to a defendant, a court must filter the amendment through R.C. 
1.58(B) to determine whether R.C. 1.58(B) forces application of the amendment. 
{¶ 28} R.C. 1.58(B) provides that “[i]f the penalty, forfeiture, or 
punishment for any offense is reduced by * * * amendment of a statute, the 
penalty, forfeiture, or punishment, if not already imposed, shall be imposed 
according to the statute as amended.”  (Emphasis added.)  Plainly, not all statutory 
amendments will be retroactive under R.C. 1.58(B).  Only those dealing with a 
“penalty, forfeiture, or punishment” qualify.  Thus, we must ultimately determine 
whether the amendment in Taylor’s case qualifies as a change in Taylor’s penalty, 
forfeiture, or punishment. 
{¶ 29} H.B. 86 changed the classification level for Taylor’s theft offense 
from a fifth-degree felony to a first-degree misdemeanor.  An offense-level 
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classification, by itself—and aside from any actual sentence—is not a penalty or 
punishment.  Taylor argues that because a felony conviction carries numerous 
collateral disadvantages, such as losing the right to vote, to hold certain public 
offices, or to apply for certain licensures, the offense-level classification is itself a 
penalty.  This argument is not persuasive.  R.C. 1.58(B) covers only reductions in 
“the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment for any offense.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Having a felony record may independently disadvantage Taylor, but any such 
disadvantages would not arise from application of R.C. 2913.02 and would not be 
penalties for Taylor’s theft offense.  They would simply be the general 
consequences of being a felon. 
{¶ 30} Moreover, not every higher offense-level classification carries 
additional consequences.  Not all offenders will be faced with the difference 
between a felony conviction and a misdemeanor conviction.  Some offenses may 
have changed only from a level-three felony to a level-four felony, or from a 
level-two misdemeanor to a level-three misdemeanor. 
{¶ 31} Taylor focuses solely on the collateral disabilities associated with 
felons, but even a felony conviction does not necessarily entail any additional 
consequences for a particular defendant.  For instance, if an offender already had 
ten felony convictions on his record, one additional felony conviction may not 
result in any new disabilities; the offender would already have been subject to the 
normal consequences of being a convicted felon.  Simply put, not every offense-
level classification comes with collateral consequences.  And even if it did, the 
classification level still would not qualify as a penalty or punishment under R.C. 
1.58(B). 
{¶ 32} Nevertheless, the majority concludes that Taylor could not be 
convicted as a felon and sentenced as a misdemeanant.  I disagree with the 
rationales supporting this conclusion. 
January Term, 2014 
 
11
{¶ 33} First, the majority states that an offense classification cannot be 
separated from the offense penalty because “implicit in a decrease in the 
classification of an offense * * * is a corresponding reduction in the penalty or 
punishment for that conduct.”  That is incorrect.  A decrease in offense 
classification does not necessarily have any corresponding reduction in the 
penalty or punishment.  For example, in Taylor’s case, the decrease in his offense 
classification had no effect on the penalty he received.  At the sentencing hearing, 
the trial judge sentenced Taylor to two years of community-control sanctions for 
his theft.  After some discussion of H.B. 86, the judge decreased Taylor’s offense 
level from a fifth-degree felony to a first-degree misdemeanor.  The judge 
explained, however, that Taylor’s sentence would have been the same regardless 
of how the offense was classified, stating:  “Now, none of this [the change in 
classification] is going to affect you in any practical order.  You will still be on 
probation.”  Thus, it is incorrect to say that a decrease in classification necessarily 
corresponds to a decrease in the actual penalty or punishment for a crime.  The 
two are not inextricably intertwined. 
{¶ 34} Second, the majority premises its decision on the idea that “the 
legislature has provided no statutory authority for those convicted of a felony 
offense to be sentenced pursuant to the sentencing statute for misdemeanants.”  
But the legislature provided precisely that authority through H.B. 86 and R.C. 
1.58(B); together, both sections allow convicted felons to be sentenced as 
misdemeanants.  And by exercising this authority, courts will be fulfilling their 
duty—contrary to the majority’s suggestion otherwise—“to apply sentencing laws 
as they are written.”  State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 
N.E.2d 332, ¶ 22.  R.C. 1.58(B) demands that in situations like Taylor’s, the pre-
H.B. 86 version of the relevant criminal statute apply for purposes of determining 
the offense classification, and the post-H.B. 86 version apply for purposes of 
determining the offender’s sentence.  In splitting the classification from the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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sentence, trial courts are applying the sentencing laws as written; they must 
simply apply different versions of the laws for different purposes. 
{¶ 35} Finally, I disagree with the majority’s reading of Section 4.  The 
majority states that “because R.C. 1.58 applied to Taylor, the decrease in 
classification and degree enacted by H.B. 86 should apply as well.”  The 
concurrence echoes this reasoning, stating that “[b]ecause R.C. 1.58 applies to 
reduce Taylor’s penalty, the uncodified language in H.B. 86 makes all the 
amendments to R.C. 2913.02 also apply.”  In essence, both opinions read H.B. 86 
to say that all the statutory amendments apply to a defendant so long as R.C. 
1.58(B) applies to the defendant. 
{¶ 36} Not so.  Section 4 clearly states that an amendment applies to an 
offender only if R.C. 1.58(B) makes the amendment apply.  It does not state that 
an amendment applies to a defendant simply whenever R.C. 1.58(B) applies to a 
defendant.  The distinction is this:  R.C. 1.58(B) may apply to a defendant in 
some sense (for instance, to give him the benefit of a decreased sentence), but this 
general application of R.C. 1.58(B) does not make all other statutory amendments 
apply to the defendant as well.  Here, R.C. 1.58(B) applies to Taylor, but it does 
not “make[] the [R.C. 2913.02 offense-level] amendments applicable” to Taylor, 
as H.B. 86 requires.  It is this critical distinction that the majority and the 
concurrence fail to acknowledge. 
{¶ 37} Ultimately, both the majority and the concurrence narrowly focus 
on who should receive the benefit of retroactive amendments, without asking 
which amendments even apply retroactively.  The opinions assume, incorrectly, 
that any statutory amendment will apply retroactively through R.C. 1.58(B).  But 
the plain language of R.C. 1.58(B) belies any such conclusion.  Only amendments 
dealing with penalties, forfeitures, or punishments can apply through R.C. 
1.58(B).  And an amendment changing the classification of an offense is not an 
amendment to a penalty or punishment.  It is not, therefore, entitled to retroactive 
January Term, 2014 
 
13
application.  Accordingly, I would hold that Taylor was not entitled to have his 
offense reduced to a first-degree misdemeanor.  I would answer the certified-
conflict question in the negative and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.  
Because the majority has concluded otherwise, I dissent. 
____________________ 
 
Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Richard 
S. Kasay, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Neil P. Agarwal, for appellant. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen Goldmeier, Assistant 
Public Defender, urging reversal on behalf of amicus curiae, Office of the Ohio 
Public Defender. 
____________________