Case Title: In re Estate of Gorton

Citation: 167 Vt. 357, 706 A.2d 947

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1997-12-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Estate of Gorton  (96-454); 167 Vt. 357; 706 A.2d 947

[Opinion Filed 12-Dec-1997]

[Motion for Reagrument Denied 31-Dec-1997]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            No. 96-454

In re Estate of Doris I. Gorton              Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
                                             Addison Superior Court

                                             September Term, 1997

Matthew I. Katz, J.

Andrew Jackson, Middlebury, for Appellant.

James C. Foley of Deppman & Foley, P.C., for Appellee.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       JOHNSON, J.  Appellants Leo and Betty Lou Gorton, the son and
  daughter-in-law of the deceased, Doris Gorton, appeal from a decision of
  the superior court dismissing their claim against the estate of the
  deceased.  Appellants allege that they had an oral agreement with the
  deceased to provide services and make payments to her during her life in
  exchange for the transfer of a barn and farmland to them upon her death. 
  They contend that the court erred by concluding that their allegations are
  insufficient to establish reliance on the oral agreement such that they are
  equitably entitled to specific performance.  Appellants also appeal the
  court's decision that, under V.R.C.P. 72(d), they are not entitled to a
  jury trial on their claim.  We reverse and remand for trial by court.

       This case presents us with a procedural puzzle.  Although the parties
  refer to the motion before the superior court as a motion for summary
  judgment, the record contains no affidavits, depositions, answers to
  interrogatories or admissions.  Further, the decision of the court
  indicates that the court assumed that all of appellants' allegations were
  supported by sworn testimony in the probate court, evidently without ever
  reviewing that testimony.  Thus, we

 

  review the superior court decision as though it dismissed appellants'
  request for a trial de novo on the pleadings.  See V.R.C.P. 12(c).  To
  review a judgment on the pleadings, we consider all the factual allegations
  in the pleadings of the nonmoving party and all reasonable inferences that
  can be drawn from them to be true and allegations to the contrary by the
  moving party to be false.  Thayer v. Herdt, 155 Vt. 448, 456, 586 A.2d 1122, 1126 (1990).  The administratrix of the estate is not entitled to
  judgment if appellants' allegations, if proved, permit recovery. Id.  Thus,
  we summarize the facts as alleged by appellants.

       Leo Gorton, Sr. and Doris I. Gorton owned and operated a farm in
  Cornwall, Vermont, where they raised their six children.(FN1)  The farm
  consists of seventy acres and a barn on the west side of West Street and
  forty-two acres and a home on the east side of West Street.  None of the
  six children continued in farming.  Appellants Leo Gorton, Jr. and Betty
  Lou Gorton live next door to the family farm on their own land.  Leo Jr.
  worked in the construction business, and Betty Lou worked at the Middlebury
  A & P.

       In 1986, Doris first complained of ailments that later were diagnosed
  as resulting from cancer, and Betty Lou left her job of fourteen years to
  care for her mother-in-law.  In April 1988, Doris was diagnosed with cancer
  and began chemotherapy treatments, and in May 1988, Leo Sr. died, leaving
  his share of the farm to his wife Doris.  Because Doris wanted to keep the
  farm in the family, Leo Jr. and Betty Lou agreed to pay Doris $350 per
  month and one-half of her real estate taxes, plus provide assistance by
  maintaining her home and farm and providing for her care.  In exchange,
  Doris agreed that upon her death certain farmland would be conveyed to Leo
  Jr. and Betty Lou.  Under the agreement, Leo Jr. and Betty Lou began
  farming a portion of his mother's land by purchasing beef cattle in June
  1988.  Doris spoke with her attorney, a surveyor, friends and family
  members over the years about the agreement.

       The same summer, Doris and Leo Jr. hired a survey technician, Ramona
  Powers.  They

 

  explained to Ms. Powers that they wanted her to prepare maps of the land
  Doris intended to convey to Leo Jr. and Betty Lou.  Ms. Powers prepared
  maps indicating the four lots that were to be conveyed: seventy acres on
  the west side of West Street and three lots of 3.75 acres, 8.75 acres and
  4.75 acres on the east side of West Street.  In 1989, Doris visited her
  attorney, Mike Mathes, and informed him that she had an agreement with Leo
  Jr. and that Leo Jr. was getting a large part of the farm, including a
  large pasture and barn on the west side of the road.  In 1991, Leo Jr. and
  Betty Lou purchased 178 acres of land that has no road frontage but that
  adjoins Doris's land on the west side of the street.  Attorney Mathes
  represented the seller at the closing and remembers Leo Jr. informing him
  that he was purchasing the 178 acres to go along with the land he was
  getting from his mother.  Leo Jr. invested in expensive fencing and spent
  over a week enclosing all the lands, which he operated as one farm.

       Performing their part of the agreement, Leo Jr. and Betty Lou paid
  Doris $350 monthly and one-half the taxes on the whole farm every year
  until Doris died, an amount three times the rental value of the farm
  property.  Betty Lou cared for Doris by preparing meals, driving her to
  hospital appointments and staying overnight with her in the last months of
  her life, while Leo made substantial repairs and capital improvements to
  Doris's home.

       In August 1994, Betty Lou informed attorney Mathes that Doris's cancer
  was terminal. Based on the maps prepared by Ramona Powers, attorney Mathes
  prepared three deeds covering the four lots and took them to Doris's house
  on August 22, 1994, but Doris was not feeling well enough to discuss the
  deeds.  On August 31, 1994, Betty Lou telephoned attorney Mathes and told
  him that Doris was alert and able to deal with the deeds but attorney
  Mathes was unable to get to Doris's home that day.  Doris died on September
  1, 1994

       In January 1995, the administratrix of the estate of Doris Gorton sent
  Leo Jr. a demand for rent payment of $350 per month for the last five
  months and for one-half of the property taxes on the entire farm for use of
  the barn and farmlands.  Leo Jr. and Betty Lou responded by filing a claim
  against the estate for the barn and the surveyed lands on the basis of the
  oral

 

  agreement with Doris.  The administratrix disallowed the claim.  Following
  a hearing, the probate court concluded that (1) the testimony of attorney
  Mathes must be excluded due to the attorney/client privilege,(FN2) (2)
  appellants had an oral contract with the deceased for the transfer of real
  estate in exchange for payments and care given her in her lifetime, (3)
  appellants had not shown a change in position in reliance on the oral
  agreement requiring specific performance, but (4) appellants were entitled
  to damages for the expenses they incurred as a result of the oral contract.

       Appellants requested a trial de novo by jury in superior court.  See
  V.R.C.P. 72(d) and Reporter's Notes (appeal from probate court is by trial
  de novo in superior court).  Rule 72 limits the issues before the superior
  court to those raised by appellants in their statement of questions.  See
  Reporter's Notes to V.R.C.P. 72.  Appellants' statement asserted that they
  were raising all issues that were before the probate court, but then
  specified two questions regarding recovery only: (1) whether appellants
  were entitled to specific performance, and (2) if not, whether appellants
  were entitled to damages.  Because appellants won damages before the
  probate court and the administratrix did not appeal from that judgment, we
  review this case as though the only issue before the superior court was the
  issue of specific performance.(FN3)

       The administratrix filed a motion for summary judgment in superior
  court without any supporting affidavits.  Appellants responded to the
  motion, also without any supporting affidavits, but with references to the
  taperecording of the testimony before the probate court. The court granted
  the administratrix's motion without reviewing the testimony, holding that,

 

  accepting all appellants' factual claims as true, the agreement was too
  vague to enforce and was barred by the Statute of Frauds.  The court also
  held that appellants had no right to trial by jury because an action for
  specific performance sounded in equity, and therefore, did not afford the
  right to trial by jury.  Nonetheless, the court affirmed the decision of
  the probate court awarding appellants damages.  Appellants appeal.

                                     I.

       In general, a contract for the sale of lands is controlled by the
  Statute of Frauds and must be in writing to be enforceable.  Chomicky v.
  Buttolph, 147 Vt. 128, 130,