Case Title: Idaho v. Gardner

Citation: 

Docket Number: 47242

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Date: 2021-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 47242 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
     Plaintiff-Respondent, 
  
v. 
 
EDWARD LEE GARDNER, 
 
     Defendant-Appellant. 
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Boise, April 2021 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: June 25, 2021 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Kootenai County. Benjamin Simpson, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Phelps & Associates, Spokane, Washington, for appellant. Douglas Phelps 
argued. 
 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Andrew 
Wake argued.  
_____________________ 
 
BRODY, Justice.  
Edward Lee Gardner appeals his conviction and sentence for sexual exploitation of 
children over the internet. Over the span of a year, the Internet Crimes Against Children Task 
Force (“ICAC”) received downloads of suspected child pornography from an internet protocol 
(“IP”) address associated with Gardner’s home. ICAC executed a search warrant and discovered 
that Gardner was in possession of 771 images and 10 videos of child pornography. The State 
charged Gardner with eight counts of willfully possessing or accessing sexually exploitative 
material of a child, and two counts of knowingly distributing sexually exploitative material of a 
child. Gardner pleaded not guilty and requested a jury trial. After a three-day trial, the jury found 
Gardner guilty on all 10 counts.  
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Gardner now asks that his convictions be vacated and that he receive a new trial under 
several theories: (1) the district court erred in denying his motion for acquittal after determining 
there was sufficient evidence that the pornographic images he was accused of possessing and 
distributing were depictions of actual children, as opposed to drawings or virtual depictions of 
children; (2) the district court violated his due process rights by prohibiting him from presenting 
certain arguments in closing; and (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct that 
independently or cumulatively constitute reversible error when it (a) failed to redact references to 
a polygraph examination from an audio recording of Gardner’s interview with ICAC detectives, 
and (b) allegedly violated a district court order by introducing evidence about videos of child 
pornography that were found on Gardner’s computer, but which did not underlie the charges 
against him.  
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Investigation and Interview of Gardner. 
In May 2016, ICAC began monitoring an IP address associated with Gardner’s residence 
after a number of electronic files of child pornography were downloaded from the IP address by 
an ICAC computer over a peer-to-peer file-sharing network called BitTorrent. Over the next 
year, several more files of child pornography were shared from this and another IP address 
associated with Gardner’s residence. Agents then obtained a search warrant for Gardner’s home. 
On June 22, 2017, ICAC agents stopped Gardner as he drove away from his home, and 
officers executed the search warrant. When Detective Paul Farina approached Gardner’s car, he 
introduced himself and said, “I’m with [ICAC], and we’re here to speak to you about some 
suspicious activity on the Internet.” Farina’s microphone was not on at the time, but Gardner 
allegedly replied, “I don’t have child pornography.” Farina then turned on his microphone, and 
Gardner was escorted to Farina’s vehicle, where he was interviewed. Simultaneously, ICAC 
agents searched Gardner’s home and seized his computers. 
Gardner’s interview by Detective Farina and Detective Neil Uhrig lasted approximately 
50 minutes. The detectives informed Gardner that over the past year they had received 
downloads of multiple images of child pornography from IP addresses at Gardner’s home. 
Gardner admitted that he used peer-to-peer file sharing programs such as BitTorrent, but initially 
denied that law enforcement could have received any child pornography from his IP address. 
However, as the detectives pressed Gardner about his online activities, Gardner told them he 
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used BitTorrent to “grab [] whole swath[s]” of pornography in large batches that sometimes 
contained child pornography. Gardner said he sorted through the batches to erase the child 
pornography and he “didn’t think it would be illegal if [he] just got rid of it.” 
Gardner also told the detectives that when searching for pornography he did not “look for 
children in particular[,]” but admitted that he sought out pornography of “teens mainly. . . . 16 to 
21, 22[.]” Gardner further admitted to using “15YO” and “14YO” as search terms. While 
Gardner claimed he used these terms to find non-pornographic material, such as images of girls 
in bikinis and “nudist stuff,” he acknowledged that he used such material for his sexual 
gratification. A forensic examination of one of Gardner’s seized computers later recovered the 
search terms “13yr” and a term that Detective Uhrig testified is child pornography shorthand for 
“pre-teen hardcore.” Investigators also recovered several other search terms specifically 
associated with child pornography. Uhrig testified that these included the names of two well-
known child pornography series and multiple terms referencing a Ukrainian child pornography 
“studio” known to have victimized more than 1500 pre-teen girls.  
Throughout the interview, the detectives told Gardner one of their goals was to determine 
if, in addition to possessing and distributing child pornography, he had sexually abused children. 
Thirteen and a half minutes into the interview, Detective Uhrig told Gardner he and Farina were 
trying to “make sure you’re not some predator running around the streets.” At approximately 20 
minutes into the interview, detectives reiterated this theme, directly asking Gardner whether he 
abused children:  
UHRIG: We know – Eddy, we know you’re going out and looking for this stuff. 
We need to talk about that issue, why you’re doing that, and are you going out 
and hurting children? 
GARDNER: God, no.  
FARINA: Okay. 
UHRIG: Then help us understand what your problem is so we can believe 
that. . . . 
FARINA: . . . I’ve got to make a judgment in 30 minutes with you, 45 minutes, 
whether you’re a predator or not. That’s what I’m trying to judge you right now. 
GARDNER: Uh-hmm. 
FARINA: Do you touch children? 
GARDNER: No. 
About eight minutes later, Farina asked Gardner whether he would be willing to take a polygraph 
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about abusing children: 
FARINA: So, you know, one of the things that we certainly are worried about you 
because there’s a correlation of looking at children and touching children. Would 
you be willing to do a polygraph with us that you have never touched children? 
GARDNER: Yes, sir. 
Shortly after, Farina said:  
So – so what we’re gonna do . . . I’m gonna . . . write up a report, and I’m gonna 
say what kind of guy you are, I’m gonna say what you told me, and I’m gonna say 
you did the polygraph, and I’ve got to submit it to the prosecutors for – to see if 
they want to charge you or not. I don’t make that decision. I’m merely a fact 
finder. 
Finally, in the last minutes of the interview, Farina told Gardner he believed Gardner was 
downplaying the seriousness of possessing and sharing child pornography, and reiterated the 
correlation between viewing child pornography and abusing children: 
FARINA: Should we hold you accountable for your actions? I’ll answer that for 
you. Yes, we should hold you accountable for your actions. That’s not the point. 
Doesn’t mean you’re gonna go to prison, you can get probation. I don’t know 
what’s gonna happen. I’m just saying, you’re gonna be held accountable for your 
actions. But, in the greater scheme of things, are you molesting children?  
GARDNER: God, no – 
FARINA: I don’t know. I don’t know. 
GARDNER: – no, it’s not about children. 
FARINA: So – but there’s a correlation, a strong correlation, between people that 
are looking at images of children being raped to people touching.  
Ultimately, the forensic examination of Gardner’s computer uncovered 771 still images 
and 10 videos of child pornography. Significantly, Gardner admitted during the interview with 
ICAC detectives that any materials found on his computer would be his. He also admitted that he 
was responsible for sharing the child pornography downloaded by ICAC computers from his IP 
address:  
GARDNER: You’re saying I’m sharing it, but I thought, you know, you gotta 
take it and then like purposely get out there – 
. . .  
FARINA: So you know that when you set up your BitTorrent program, you’re 
sharing, because it tells you you’re sharing.  
GARDNER: You’re sharing, yeah. 
. . .  
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FARINA: So – so I think you know to know that from when you download . . . 
that BitTorrent program . . . . 
GARDNER: Which I’m aware. 
FARINA: Okay. You’re aware, so – 
GARDNER: Doesn’t – 
FARINA: – so you’ve committed a crime. 
GARDNER: I suppose I have, yeah. 
FARINA: So, I’m gonna write up the report just like you said, and I’m gonna 
submit it to the prosecutor’s office and let them make a decision[.] 
The State charged Gardner with two counts of distribution of child pornography under 
Idaho Code section 18-1507(2)(d) for allegedly sharing two still images of child pornography 
with an ICAC computer. The State also charged Gardner with eight counts of possessing child 
pornography under Idaho Code section 18-1507(2)(a) for eight still images recovered from his 
seized computer. All ten images were watermarked with the logo of the Ukrainian producer of 
child pornography mentioned above. 
B. The State’s Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) notice of intent and agreement to redact 
polygraph references from the recording of Gardner’s interview. 
Prior to trial, the State filed a notice under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) of its intent to 
offer evidence relating to child pornography other than the images charged, to “include but not 
be limited to the child pornography downloaded from the defendant when first investigating this 
case as well as the total number of images found on the defendant’s computer and/or other 
devises [sic].” Gardner never responded to the notice.  
In addition, the State and Gardner stipulated that the State would redact references to 
Gardner taking a polygraph from the recording of Gardner’s interview with Detectives Farina 
and Uhrig. However, the parties’ precise agreement is not clear because the stipulation is not in 
the record. Notably, before trial, Gardner was administered a polygraph by an ICAC investigator, 
which indicated he was truthful when he said he had not sexually abused children. 
C. Trial proceedings. 
During the State’s opening statement, the prosecutor argued the evidence would show 
that “700-plus images of suspected child pornography and ten videos” were discovered on 
Gardner’s computer. Though there was no immediate objection from Gardner, it appears he 
objected to some aspect of this statement after the opening statements were complete. However, 
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the basis for Gardner’s objection is unclear because there is a gap in the recording of the trial 
from which the transcript on appeal was prepared. In response, the State argued it was entitled to 
discuss the number of still images and videos of child pornography, as well as publish some of 
the uncharged pornography to the jury, because Gardner did not object when the State filed the 
404(b) notice informing him that it intended to use this evidence. Nevertheless, after a recess, the 
prosecutor stated that he would not introduce any videos of child pornography:  
I will not be putting in any images or I mean, excuse me, any videos. [Gardner’s 
counsel] questioned me on that. I think under my 404(b) — I intended on doing 
that, but . . . when I take a look at [the 404(b) notice] . . . there’s one statement in 
there that just says the child pornography, but everything else says image, and so I 
could see how that could be . . . unintentionally misleading to [Gardner’s 
counsel], so . . . I will not be putting [in] any videos of children being molested. 
Gardner, however, requested the district court go further and direct witnesses not to mention the 
existence of videos in their testimony, arguing it would “simply inflame[] the jury, [and] possibly 
just confuse[] the issues.” In a colloquy with counsel, the district court noted that despite the 
State’s 404(b) notice indicating it would present evidence about the videos, Gardner had not 
objected to the notice before trial. However, it reserved ruling on the issue of whether such 
evidence was admissible. Instead, the district court instructed the State that, pending a later 
ruling, witnesses should not reference the videos in their testimony.  
 
On the second day of trial, the State again raised the admissibility of evidence about 
videos as an issue. The State told the district court that it intended to have Detective Farina 
testify that an ICAC computer downloaded videos of child pornography from the IP address at 
Gardner’s home and describe their content to the jury. In turn, Gardner asked the district court to 
exclude all evidence relating to the videos. However, the State suggested a compromise, to 
which Gardner was amenable, whereby Farina would use the word “images” instead of “video,” 
though he would still describe their content. The district court noted that “in my opinion, images 
would include videos,” but, because the parties reached an agreement, it stated that the use of the 
word “video” was a non-issue. As such, the district court did not expressly address whether 
evidence about videos was inflammatory or confusing, as Gardner contended. The court did, 
however, rule that the State’s forensic expert would be allowed to use the word “video” when 
describing the number of child pornography files recovered from Gardner’s computer.  
 
Detective Farina testified later on the second day of trial. During his testimony, the 
prosecutor asked Farina about the child pornography ICAC computers downloaded from 
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Gardner’s IP address. In his response, Farina twice used the word “video”: 
 
PROSECUTOR: Could you describe – were they images you received? 
FARINA: Yes, I received, uh, approximately twenty-ish images. They’re broken 
down to complete and incomplete, so some are complete videos and some are 
incomplete where if a video might be – 
 
PROSECUTOR: Do you mean images?  
Immediately thereafter, the district court instructed the jury to “[d]isregard the reference to video 
please. Substitute the word “images.” Farina then went on to describe the content of the videos.  
Farina also testified about his and Detective Uhrig’s interview of Gardner and the State 
played a recording of the interview for the jury. As noted above, the recording included an 
exchange between Farina and Gardner about whether Gardner would be willing to submit to a 
polygraph. After the jury listened to the recording, the district court called a recess and the jury 
was excused. At this point, the prosecutor admitted to the district court that he had made an error. 
Though the parties had previously stipulated that references to Gardner taking a polygraph would 
be redacted from the recording, the State had played an unredacted copy for the jury. 
Accordingly, the State suggested the district court give a curative instruction telling the jury to 
disregard the reference to the polygraph. Gardner’s counsel expressed reservation about the 
effectiveness of a curative instruction and stated “I don’t know if now you just say . . . he passed 
the polygraph . . . for whether or not he’d ever molested any children, which I think almost does 
better than a curative instruction[.]” The State agreed that this might be a solution to the problem 
and noted that the ICAC investigator who conducted the polygraph would be testifying later at 
trial. The district court then asked if Gardner wanted evidence he passed the polygraph 
introduced, but Gardner declined. Instead, he moved for a mistrial and requested that the court 
give a curative instruction if it denied the motion.  
 
The district court denied the motion for mistrial, holding that it was unlikely the 
references to the polygraph would influence the jury’s decision. The district court then, sua 
sponte, addressed Farina’s use of the word “video,” holding that evidence about the videos found 
on Gardner’s computer was admissible. The district court found that Gardner’s possession of 
videos was “so interconnected with the charged offense” that evidence relating to them was not 
subject to exclusion under Rule 404. Further, it held that even if Rule 404 applied, evidence 
about the videos was admissible as non-character evidence tending to show motive, intent, lack 
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of mistake, and identity. When the jury returned, the district court instructed them that they were 
to disregard the references to the polygraph in the recording. 
On the third day of trial, the ICAC investigator who conducted the forensic analysis of 
Gardner’s computer testified about the recovery of the images underlying the eight charges of 
possession of child pornography and the images were shown to the jury. On cross examination, 
Gardner’s counsel asked the investigator “you’ve heard of pictures that are not real people, 
haven’t you, where they’re actually drawn[,]” and then, referring to the charged images, elicited 
testimony that the investigator had not personally “verif[ied] these were living, live people.”  
Later, the State called Detective Farina to testify for a second time. Farina stated that 
based on their apparent sexual development, the girls in the charged images were most likely 
between 10- and 12-years old. On cross-examination, Gardner’s counsel asked Farina whether he 
had attempted to identify any of the children in the images. Farina testified he had sent the 
images to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, which maintains a database of 
identified victims of child pornography, but that the children in the charged images had not been 
identified. Gardner’s counsel then asked Farina if he was certain the children in the photographs 
were real: 
GARDNER’S COUNSEL: So if you can’t identify them as particular individuals, 
you don’t know if these are merely graphic drawings, do you?  
FARINA: I would disagree with that. I would say they’re photographs. 
GARDNER’S COUNSEL: Well, that’s your guess. 
FARINA: That’s my training and experience. 
Farina then explained that, in his experience as a detective with ICAC, the “artist” depictions of 
child pornography he had encountered were “nothing like” the charged photographs. The State 
rested after Farina’s testimony. 
Gardner declined to put on evidence of his own and made a motion for judgment of 
acquittal under Idaho Criminal Rule 29. Gardner argued the State had failed to provide sufficient 
evidence that the images depicted real children, as opposed to virtually portrayed children, 
pointing to the State’s inability to identify the particular children in the images. The State argued 
that it had no burden to identify the particular children and that whether the photographs were 
genuine was a question of fact for the jury. Further, the State made a motion to prohibit Gardner 
from making certain arguments in closing. First, the State sought a ruling that Gardner could not 
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argue the State failed to meet its burden by failing to identify the children in the images, because 
the law did not require specific identification of the victims. Second, the State sought to prohibit 
Gardner from arguing the charged images were not real photographs because “if he thought these 
were mocked-up photos, you know, the defense could have put on a case too, and they 
haven’t[.]” 
 
The district court granted the State’s motion to limit Gardner’s argument in part. The 
district court ruled that there was no requirement the State prove the identities of the victims to 
support conviction. Thus, it held Gardner could not argue this was part of the State’s burden. 
However, the court ruled Gardner could argue the State had failed to prove the images were real, 
so long as the argument was tied to evidence in the record. Further, the district court denied 
Gardner’s motion for judgment of acquittal. The district court held that a judgment of acquittal 
was not appropriate because (1) the State had presented testimony from Detective Farina and 
other witnesses from which the jury could conclude the images were genuine photographs, (2) 
Gardner admitted during his interview that he possessed some pornographic pictures of children, 
and (3) the jury had been shown the charged images and was able to evaluate for itself whether 
they were photographs, as opposed to virtual depictions. 
In his closing arguments, Gardner did not argue the State had the burden to identify the 
children nor that the images were not depictions of real children. The jury convicted Gardner on 
all counts.  
II. 
ANALYSIS 
Gardner raises three broad issues on appeal, each subject to a different standard of 
review: (1) that the district court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal, (2) that 
the district court violated his right to a fair trial by prohibiting certain statements during closing 
arguments, and (3) that the prosecutor committed misconduct entitling Gardner to a new trial. 
We will address the relevant standard of review as we address each issue below. 
A. The district court did not err in denying Gardner’s motion for a judgment of 
acquittal. 
Gardner argues that the district court erred in denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 29 motion 
because the State failed to prove the charged images depicted real children, instead of “virtual” 
child pornography. The State maintains the district court was correct in rejecting Gardner’s 
motion because there was substantial evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find the State 
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proved each element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree with the State.  
1. Standard of Review 
“In reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, the appellate court must 
independently consider the evidence in the record and determine whether a reasonable mind 
could conclude that the defendant’s guilt as to such material evidence of the offense was proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Clark, 161 Idaho 372, 374, 386 P.3d 895, 897 (2016) 
(quoting State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 109, 109 138 P.3d 308, 309 (2006)). However, this Court’s 
“review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope.” State v. Gomez-Alas, 167 Idaho 
857, ___, 477 P.3d 911, 915 (2020).  
The relevant inquiry is not whether this Court would find the defendant to be 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether after viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  
State v. Tryon, 165 Idaho 254, 258, 429 P.3d 142, 146 (2018) (quoting State v. Adamcik, 
152 Idaho 445, 460, 272 P.3d 417, 432 (2012)). Thus, this Court does not “substitute its 
judgment for that of the jury on the issue of witness credibility, weight of the evidence, or 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” Id. (internal punctuations omitted).   
2. Analysis. 
Citing Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), State v. Morton, 140 
Idaho 235, 91 P.3d 1139 (2004), and State v. Gillespie, 155 Idaho 714, 316 P.3d 126 (Ct. App. 
2013), Gardner claims his judgment of conviction must be vacated for insufficient evidence 
because of a single fact: investigators submitted the charged images to the National Center for 
Missing and Exploited Children (“NCMEC”), but NCMEC was not able to identify the victims. 
Gardner’s argument is unavailing. To begin, Gardner cites Ashcroft, Morton, and Gillespie to 
support a point that has never been in dispute, namely that the purpose of Idaho Code section 18-
1507 is to protect children (and presumably only real ones) from harm. Further, Gardner does not 
address, even tangentially, the State’s evidence that the charged images depicted real children 
nor the standard of review requiring us to affirm the jury’s verdict if there is evidence in the 
record from which a reasonable juror could find the defendant guilty. Thus, Gardner’s argument 
could only succeed if (1) the State has the burden to individually identify children in order to 
prove that they are real or (2) the failure of the NCMEC to identify a child in a pornographic 
image is conclusive proof that the image is virtual pornography. 
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Neither possibility is supported by law or logic. Idaho Code section 18-1507 requires the 
State to prove that a pornographic image depicts an actual child, but nowhere does it require the 
State to individually identify the victim. See I.C. §§ 18-1507(1)(b) - 1507(2)(j). As to NCMEC’s 
failure to identify the victims, we express no opinion about the probative value of such evidence 
as a general matter. However, we observe that the only way that NCMEC’s failure to identify a 
child would be conclusive proof that an image is virtual pornography, is if every victim of child 
pornography has been identified by NCMEC. This defies reason. 
In reviewing the evidence in the record, we note, as the district court did, that Detective 
Farina testified that, based on his training and experience, the images depicted real children, and 
that the images were in evidence for the jury to evaluate in light of their own experience. Further, 
each image was watermarked with an identifier of the Ukrainian entity that Detective Uhrig 
testified was known to have produced pornography of pre-teen girls. Based on this evidence, we 
hold that a reasonable juror could conclude the images depicted real children beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Gardner’s Rule 29 motion 
for a judgment of acquittal.  
B. The district court did not violate Gardner’s right to a fair trial by prohibiting 
certain statements during closing arguments. 
Gardner also argues that the district court erred “by limiting the defense’s ability to argue 
its theory of the case by not allowing argument” whether the pornographic images depicted 
actual children, as opposed to digitally-generated images of children, or images of adults altered 
to appear as children. Gardner contends the district court’s alleged limitation of his argument 
violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial. The State contends the district court did 
not improperly limit Gardner’s argument. The State is correct. 
1. Standard of review. 
The Sixth Amendment, in conjunction with the Fourteenth Amendment right to due 
process, requires that criminal defendants have “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete 
defense.” State v. Jones, 160 Idaho 449, 452, 375 P.3d 279, 282 (2016). As a constitutional 
question, we consider de novo whether this requirement has been satisfied. Id. at 450, 375 P.3d 
at 280. 
2. Analysis. 
Gardner’s assertion that the district court prevented him from arguing the images did not 
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depict real children is flatly contradicted by the record. The district court clearly ruled that 
Gardner could argue the images did not depict real children, then twice reiterated its ruling in an 
exchange with Gardner’s counsel: 
THE COURT: I’m going to prohibit any argument as to the State having failed to 
meet its burden of proof because it was unable to present testimony as to the 
identity of the children or purported children in the images. . . . You may argue, 
however, that the State has failed to prove that these images are of children. 
. . .  
GARDNER’S COUNSEL: So we can’t say the State’s failed to meet their burden 
that these are real people. 
GARDNER’S CO-COUNSEL: No, that’s not true. 
THE COURT: You can argue they failed to meet that burden. 
. . .  
GARDNER’S COUNSEL: So, if I argue they could’ve been photo shopped, I’m 
fine. 
THE COURT: You could argue that, but there’s no evidence in the record, and 
you’re going to face potential objections that you’re arguing matters not in the 
record, so you need to be very careful.  
This exchange demonstrates that the only limitations placed on Gardner’s closing arguments 
were (1) that he not mischaracterize the law by arguing the State was required to specifically 
identify the child pornography victims, and (2) that he only present arguments supported by the 
evidence. To the extent these were limitations of Gardner’s argument at all, they promoted, 
rather than undermined, the fairness of the trial. See State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 276–77, 
429 P.3d 149, 164–65 (2018) (observing, in a due process analysis, that closing arguments must 
fairly represent the law and evidence). Thus, Gardner’s argument the district court deprived him 
of a fair trial is not well taken.  
C. Gardner is not entitled to a new trial because of prosecutorial misconduct. 
Gardner asserts he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor failed to redact the 
references to the polygraph in the recording of Gardner’s interview. Further, Gardner argues that 
even if this error does not warrant a new trial on its own, he is entitled to a new trial under the 
cumulative error doctrine. In support, Gardner asserts that, in addition to the polygraph error, the 
prosecutor “blatantly violated the court’s order regarding videos by introduction of multiple 
statements about videos.” The only example of these statements Gardner points to are uses of the 
word “video” in the recording of Gardner’s interview by ICAC detectives that the prosecutor 
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played for the jury.  
The State argues that Gardner has failed to show there was any misconduct regarding 
statements about videos. Further, though the State admits the prosecutor erred in not redacting 
the polygraph references, it argues the error does not entitle Gardner to a new trial. In addition, 
the State contends the cumulative error doctrine needs not be considered because Gardner has 
failed to show more than a single error.  
1. Standard of review. 
Review of claims of prosecutorial misconduct depends on whether the alleged 
misconduct was objected to at trial. State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, 676–77, 462 P.3d 1125, 
1140–41 (2020). When a defendant has made a contemporaneous objection to prosecutorial 
misconduct, we review the error under the harmless error standard. Id. (citing State v. Severson, 
147 Idaho 694, 716, 215 P.3d 414, 436 (2009)). As we have recently clarified, our harmlessness 
analysis requires examining and weighing the “probative force of the evidence untainted by error 
. . . against the probative force of the error itself.” Id. at 675, 462 P.3d at 1139 (citing Yates v. 
Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991)). “When the effect of the error is minimal compared to the 
probative force of the record establishing guilt ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ without the error, it 
can be said that the error did not contribute to the verdict rendered and is therefore harmless.” Id. 
at 674, 462 P.3d at 1138 (citing Yates, 500 U.S. at 404–05). 
However, when a defendant has not made an objection to prosecutorial misconduct at 
trial, “the misconduct will serve as a basis for setting aside a conviction only when the conduct is 
sufficiently egregious to result in fundamental error.” State v. Folk, 162 Idaho 620, 632, 402 P.3d 
1073, 1085 (2017) (quoting Severson, 147 Idaho at 716, 215 P.3d at 436). To establish 
fundamental error, a defendant must demonstrate that: (1) “one or more of the defendant’s 
unwaived constitutional rights were violated”; (2) the error is clear, meaning the record contains 
evidence of the error, “including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision”; and (3) it is clear from the record that the error “actually affected the outcome of the 
trial proceedings.” State v. Miller, 165 Idaho 115, 119–20, 443 P.3d 129, 133–34 (2019). 
 “The doctrine of cumulative error provides that ‘a series of errors, harmless in and of 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.’ ” State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 
855, 873, 332 P.3d 767, 785 (2014) (quoting State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 230, 245 P.3d 961, 
982 (2010)). “It is well-established that alleged errors at trial, that are not followed by a 
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contemporaneous objection, will not be considered under the cumulative error doctrine unless 
said errors are found to pass the threshold analysis under our fundamental error doctrine.” Id. 
2. Analysis. 
 To begin, we dispose with Gardner’s argument that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct “by introduction of multiple statements about videos” contrary to an order of the 
district court. Nothing suggests the prosecutor committed misconduct as Gardner alleges. The 
order that Gardner contends the prosecutor violated directed the State to have its witnesses (other 
than the investigator who conducted the forensic examination of Gardner’s computer) substitute 
the word “image” for “video” when testifying. Yet the instances of “misconduct” highlighted by 
Gardner have nothing to do with witness testimony; they are two passing uses of the word 
“video” in the recording of Gardner’s interview by ICAC detectives that was played for the jury. 
And although Gardner does not discuss Farina’s use of the word “video” in his trial testimony, 
we note this was a violation of the district court order, but it was harmless because the district 
court ultimately held that evidence about the videos and use of the word “videos” was 
admissible. Moreover, Gardner made no objection at trial to the State’s alleged violation of the 
district court’s order. Thus, even if the State violated the order, our review would be limited to a 
fundamental error analysis. However, Gardner does not identify the fundamental error test or 
argue it has been satisfied. In sum, Gardner’s argument that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct regarding evidence of videos is meritless.  
Turning to the prosecutor’s failure to redact the polygraph references from the recording 
of the interview, there is no question this was error. The prosecutor admitted as much after the 
recording was played and the jury was excused. However, weighing the probative force of this 
error against the probative force of the evidence untainted by error, we hold the error was 
harmless. 
Gardner advances two overlapping arguments why the references to the polygraph were 
not harmless. First, Gardner argues the jury may have inferred he was guilty of sexually abusing 
children, even though he was not charged with such crimes, because detectives stated in the 
portion of the interview surrounding the polygraph references that there is a correlation between 
possessing child pornography and sexually abusing children. Second, Gardner argues that jurors 
were likely to infer that he had taken and failed a polygraph about abusing children because he 
was facing trial and Farina stated that prosecutors would factor polygraph results about abusing 
15 
 
children into their charging decision. Because Gardner contends “many in the public consider” 
the sexual abuse of children to be a “much more serious violation[]” than child pornography 
offenses, he asserts the prejudice caused by the prosecutor’s error was great.  
We disagree. In light of the record as a whole, we hold the effect of the prosecutor’s error 
was minimal. As to Gardner’s first argument, it is unclear whether the scope of the agreement 
between the parties required the prosecutor to redact only the word “polygraph” or the greater 
context of the polygraph references. But even assuming the prosecutor agreed to redact the 
greater context, the redacted recording would still include multiple statements by detectives that 
there is a correlation between possessing child pornography and abusing children, and that they 
suspected Gardner might have abused children. Detectives raised these themes throughout the 
50-minute interview. Aside from the statements made in the immediate context of the polygraph 
references, Gardner did not object to the statements at trial and has not complained of them on 
appeal. As such, we conclude there is no possibility of prejudice in the prosecutor’s failure to 
redact these statements in the context of the polygraph references. 
Gardner’s second argument is similarly unpersuasive. While Farina indicated the results 
of the polygraph would likely be a factor in a charging decision, this was only one of three 
factors Farina listed. In the recording played for the jury, Farina told Gardner he was going to 
“write up a report, and I’m gonna say [1] what kind of guy you are, I’m gonna say [2] what you 
told me, and I’m gonna say [3] you did the polygraph,” and that he would submit this report to 
prosecutors. As for “what kind of guy” Farina believed Gardner to be, Farina indicated in the 
recording that he believed Gardner was a person who intentionally downloaded child 
pornography, who downplayed that this was a serious offense, who needed to be held 
accountable, and whose denials about abusing children were unconvincing. As for what Gardner 
told Farina, Gardner admitted he sought out pornography of teenagers, that anything found on his 
devices would be his, and that he agreed with Farina he had committed a crime by sharing child 
pornography over BitTorrent. Significantly, just after Gardner’s admission that he had shared 
child pornography, Farina indicated this would appear in his report submitted to prosecutors: 
“So, I’m gonna write up the report just like you said, and I’m gonna submit it to the prosecutor’s 
office and let them make a decision[.]” Thus, in light of the recording as a whole, we do not 
think it likely jurors would assume the determinative factor in the prosecutor’s decision to charge 
Gardner was that he took and failed a polygraph about crimes unrelated to those for which he 
16 
 
stood trial.  
On the other side of the scale, there was significant and compelling evidence of 
Gardner’s guilt. Multiple law enforcement officers testified that they received child pornography 
through BitTorrent from an IP address associated with Gardner’s home; Gardner denied he had 
child pornography before investigators told him they suspected he had committed child 
pornography offenses; Gardner later admitted he searched for pornography of teenagers using 
BitTorrent; he admitted to using search terms such as “16YO,” “15YO” and “14YO”; 
investigators recovered search terms specifically relating to child pornography from Gardner’s 
computer, including terms associated with a known producer of child pornography in Ukraine; 
nearly 800 files of child pornography were discovered on Gardner’s computer; the charged 
images were watermarked with an identifier from a Ukrainian child pornography producer, 
which is known for victimizing pre-teen girls; the charged images depicted girls that detective 
Farina testified were likely between the ages of 10 and 12; and Gardner admitted that anything 
found on his computers would be his. As against the minimal effect of the prosecutor’s error, we 
are assured the result of trial would have been the same in light of this evidence. Therefore, the 
error was harmless. 
Further, we note that Gardner argues the curative instruction compounded the effect of 
the prosecutor’s error by metaphorically “re-ringing the bell.” However, the record shows that 
Gardner requested the instruction. Further, Gardner demurred when the district court asked for 
his opinion on the possibility of introducing evidence he had passed the polygraph—even though 
he had earlier suggested the introduction of such evidence would be a more effective remedy 
than a curative instruction. As such, Gardner has no basis to complain about the curative 
instruction on appeal. Thomson v. Olsen, 147 Idaho 99, 106, 205 P.3d 1235, 1242 (2009) (“The 
doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error when his own conduct 
induces the commission of the error.”).  
Finally, Gardner’s cumulative error argument is unavailing. Besides the failure to redact 
the references to the polygraph, the only misconduct that Gardner alleges the prosecutor 
committed were the mentions of the videos. As we explained above, this allegation of 
misconduct is meritless. Therefore, there is no basis for Gardner to allege the cumulative error 
doctrine applies. See Moses, 156 Idaho at 873, 332 P.3d at 785 (quoting Perry, 150 Idaho at 230, 
245 P.3d at 982) (“A necessary predicate to the application of the [cumulative error] doctrine is a 
17 
 
finding of more than one error.”). In light of the foregoing, Gardner is not entitled to a new trial. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court’s judgment of conviction is affirmed.  
 
Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices BURDICK, STEGNER, and MOELLER CONCUR.