Case Title: Hathi v. Krewstown Park Apartments

Citation: 385 Pa. Super. 613, 561 A.2d 1261

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1989-07-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
385 Pa. Superior Ct. 613 (1989) 561 A.2d 1261 Raminik HATHI & Shushila Hathi, Individually and in Their Own Right, and as Parents and Natural Guardians of Shamil Hathi, a Minor, Appellants, v. KREWSTOWN PARK APARTMENTS and Lipton & Fogel, Appellees. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued April 25, 1989. Filed July 19, 1989. Brian P. Meehan, Philadelphia, for appellants. Earl T. Britt, Philadelphia, for appellees. Before McEWEN, OLSZEWSKI and MELINSON, JJ. *614 OLSZEWSKI, Judge: Appellants, Raminik Hathi and Shushila Hathi, appeal from an order of the trial court granting appellees' motion for partial summary judgment. Appellants urge us to interpret 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5533(b), which provides an infancy exception to time for commencing an action, as including parents' claims for medical expenses and loss of minor's services due to personal injury to a minor child. For reasons that follow, we affirm. On October 29, 1986, appellants commenced suit to recover damages in their own right and on behalf of their minor son, Shamil, for personal injuries sustained by him on appellees' property, the Krewstown Park Apartments. Appellants' complaint averred that on September 6, 1984, "while minor was playing behind Building H . . . he was caused to suffer serious injuries when his bicycle hit a ditch and/or gutter and the handlebars of his bicycle which caused internal damage to his pancreas." Complaint at 2. Appellants' complaint requested recovery on behalf of Shamil for pain and suffering and present and future medical expenses (Count I) and in their own right for expenditures and lost income (Count II). In their answer and new matter and a motion for partial summary judgment, appellees asserted that appellants' claim in their own right was barred by the statute of limitations. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524.[1] On April 21, 1988, the trial court granted appellees' motion for partial summary judgment on Count II of appellants' complaint. This timely appeal followed. Our standard of review on the granting of a motion for summary judgment is well settled. Neil v. Allstate Insurance Co., 379 Pa.Super. 299, 302, 549 A.2d 1304, 1305 (1988). With these principles in mind, we address appellants' contention that summary judgment was improper. Appellants urge that their claim in their own right "attaches to the minor's claim under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5533(b), and should accordingly be preserved as it arises out of the same incident and is joined with their claim on behalf of the minor child." Appellants' brief at 6. We begin our discussion by delineating 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5533: While no appellate court in this Commonwealth has specifically addressed appellants' contention, we find a Federal District Court decision discussing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5533 to be instructive: Apicella v. Valley Forge Military Academy and Junior College, 630 F. Supp. 20, 23-24 (E.D.Pa. 1985) (emphasis in original). We find the facts of Apicella to be analogous to the case at bar and the rationale of Apicella to be compelling. Appellants' claim is not derivative of Shamil's claim and appellants have not alleged that they were affected by the conditions of infancy, insanity or imprisonment. Appellants, therefore, do not receive the benefit of § 5533(b). Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that their claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Order affirmed. [1] 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524 provides in pertinent part: Two year limitation The following actions and proceedings must be commenced within two years: . . . (2) An action to recover damages for injuries to the person or for the death of an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect or unlawful violence or negligence of another.