Case Title: Barron Chiropractic & Rehab., P.C. v. Norfolk & Dedham Group

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11561

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2014-10-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11561 
 
BARRON CHIROPRACTIC & REHABILITATION, P.C.  vs.  NORFOLK & 
DEDHAM GROUP. 
 
 
Norfolk.     May 5, 2014. - October 15, 2014. 
 
Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, 
& Lenk, JJ.1 
 
 
Insurance, Motor vehicle personal injury protection benefits, 
Unfair act or practice.  Contract, Insurance.  Practice, 
Civil, Summary judgment, Attorney's fees.  Consumer 
Protection Act, Insurance. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Dedham Division of the 
District Court Department on November 25, 2009.  
 
 
The case was heard by James J. McGovern, J., on a motion 
for summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Francis A. Gaimari (Robert N. Fireman & Stephen B. Byers 
with him) for the plaintiff. 
 
Joseph R. Ciollo (Michael L. Snyder with him) for the 
defendant. 
 
E. Michael Sloman, for Automobile Insurers Bureau, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
                     
 
1 Chief Justice Ireland participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his retirement. 
 
2 
 
 
Christopher M. Moutain, for American Insurance Association 
& others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  The personal injury protection (PIP) provision of 
the automobile insurance statute permits an unpaid party to 
bring an action for breach of contract against an automobile 
insurer if the latter has not paid PIP benefits for more than 
thirty days after those benefits became due and payable.  G. L. 
c. 90, § 34M, fourth par.  If the unpaid party receives a 
judgment for any amount due and payable by the insurer, it also 
may recover its costs and reasonable attorney's fees.  The 
primary question before us is whether an unpaid party who has 
brought suit and thereafter refused the insurer's tender of 
amounts due and payable, made prior to the entry of judgment, 
may proceed with the suit and, if successful, obtain a judgment 
for those amounts as well as its costs and attorney's fees.  We 
conclude that it may proceed with the action under G. L. c. 90, 
§ 34M.   
 
1.  Background.  The plaintiff, Barron Chiropractic & 
Rehabilitation, P.C. (Barron), provided chiropractic services to 
Nicole Jean-Pierre following her automobile accident on 
August 20, 2008.  Jean-Pierre was injured while driving a 
vehicle insured by the defendant Norfolk & Dedham Group 
(Norfolk) pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 34A, which requires 
3 
 
compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance, including PIP 
benefits.2  See G. L. c. 90, §§ 34A, 34M. 
 
Norfolk received notice of the accident on August 22, 2008, 
and, on October 10, 2008, received Jean-Pierre's application for 
PIP benefits.3  Shortly thereafter, pursuant to its contractual 
right under the terms of Jean-Pierre's insurance policy, as well 
as language in the PIP provision, Norfolk requested that Jean-
Pierre undergo an independent medical examination (IME)4 by Kevin 
Morgan, a licensed chiropractor of its selection.  On 
October 27, 2008, Morgan submitted his IME report to Norfolk.  
The report stated that, while treatments up to the date of the 
                     
 
2 Personal injury protection (PIP) benefits consist of "all 
reasonable expenses incurred within two years from the date of 
[the] accident for necessary medical, surgical, x-ray, and 
dental services," and, for employed persons, "any amounts 
actually lost by reason of inability to work and earn wages or 
salary or their equivalent."  G. L. c. 90, § 34A. 
 
 
3 General Laws c. 90, § 34M, third par., states that a 
"[c]laim for benefits due under the provisions of personal 
injury protection or from the insurer assigned shall be 
presented to the company providing such benefits as soon as 
practicable after the accident occurs from which such claim 
arises, and in every case, within at least two years from the 
date of the accident, and shall include a written description of 
the nature and extent of injuries sustained, treatment received 
and contemplated and such other information as may assist in 
determining the amount due and payable."  
 
 
4 The PIP provision provides that the "insured person shall 
submit to physical examinations by physicians selected by the 
insurer as often as may be reasonably required and shall do all 
things necessary to enable the insurer to obtain medical reports 
and other needed information to assist in determining the 
amounts due."  G. L. c. 90, § 34M, third par.  
4 
 
IME had been appropriate, Jean-Pierre had reached "maximum 
therapeutic benefit."  Based on this report, Norfolk concluded 
that treatments Barron provided Jean-Pierre after the date of 
the IME were unreasonable and unnecessary.  A few days 
thereafter, Norfolk provided Jean-Pierre's counsel with a copy 
of the report.  
 
Approximately nine months later, on July 27, 2009, Norfolk 
received a response to Morgan's IME report from Scott Hayden, a 
licensed chiropractor and a Barron employee.  Hayden disagreed 
with Morgan's conclusion that Jean-Pierre had reached a medical 
end result at the time of the IME, stating instead that proper 
rehabilitation had required nine treatment visits after that 
date.  On August 17, 2009, Morgan sent Norfolk an addendum to 
his initial IME report, indicating that Hayden's rebuttal had 
not altered his assessment of Jean-Pierre's care, and stating 
further that subsequent care offered by Barron, while "within 
acceptable care guidelines" and "reasonable and necessary,"  
appeared aimed largely at preexisting conditions.     
 
As an additional component of its investigation of Jean-
Pierre's claim, Norfolk sent Barron's billing statements to BME 
Gateway (BME), an independent third party, for financial 
analysis.  BME uses a computer database to determine whether a 
medical provider has sought fees that are usual, customary, and 
reasonable within a particular geographic region.  
5 
 
 
Barron submitted a bill to Norfolk seeking $3,940 in 
payment for its treatment of Jean-Pierre.  Upon review, Norfolk 
concluded that it was not liable for the entirety of this 
requested amount.  Based on BME's assessment, Norfolk deducted 
$64.05 from Barron's bill, allowing only $3,875.95 on that 
ground.  In reliance on Morgan's IME report, Norfolk also 
limited its payment to service provided prior to the date of the 
IME, declining to pay a further $1,480 in charges for treatment 
occurring after October 27, 2008.  In total, Norfolk determined 
that it was liable for only $2,395.95 of Barron's submitted 
fees, resulting in a disputed amount of $1,544.05.  
 
On November 25, 2009, more than one year after Jean-Pierre 
had submitted her application for PIP benefits, Barron filed a 
complaint in the District Court.5  Barron sought payment of 
$1,544.05, plus interest, attorney's fees, and costs pursuant to 
G. L. c. 90, § 34M; multiple damages and attorney's fees 
pursuant to G. L. c. 93A, § 11, for alleged unfair or deceptive 
practices regarding Jean-Pierre's insurance claim; and multiple 
damages and attorney's fees pursuant to G. L. c. 93A, §§ 9 and 
                     
 
5 We have construed the term "unpaid party" in G. L. c. 90, 
§ 34M, to include, as here, "an unpaid medical provider who 
treats an insured."  Boehm v. Premier Ins. Co., 446 Mass. 689, 
691 (2006).  The medical provider may thus "step into the shoes 
of the insured and bring an action in contract to recover PIP 
benefits."  Id. 
 
6 
 
11, for violations of G. L. c. 176D, § 3 (9), which prohibits 
insurers from engaging in unfair settlement practices.   
 
At some point prior to trial, Norfolk learned that Morgan's 
fee to appear as an expert witness was $500 per hour, with a 
minimum of five hours to be billed.6  Although still maintaining 
that it did not owe Barron any additional payments, Norfolk 
determined that its anticipated litigation costs would exceed 
the amount of the disputed medical fees by a substantial sum. 
Accordingly, on September 28, 2010, six days prior to the second 
scheduled trial date,7 Norfolk sent Barron a check for $1,544.05 
with an attached check stub that stated "full and final 
settlement for Nicole Jean Pierre."  Norfolk included a letter 
stating that its payment was made pursuant to Fascione v. CNA 
Ins. Cos., 435 Mass. 88 (2001) (Fascione); the letter requested 
that Barron sign an acknowledgment of the receipt of final 
payment and file a stipulation of dismissal in the District 
Court as to its claims under the PIP provision.  On October 12, 
2010, Barron's counsel returned the check to Norfolk's counsel 
with a letter stating, "Your client's offer of settlement is 
rejected."   
                     
 
6 In its pretrial memorandum, dated May 11, 2010, Norfolk 
indicated that Morgan was expected to testify as to the 
substance of his independent medical examination and report. 
 
 
7 The trial initially was scheduled for August 3, 2010, but 
was rescheduled at the parties' request for October 4, 2010. 
 
7 
 
 
Norfolk then filed a motion for summary judgment as to both 
the G. L. c. 90, § 34M, and G. L. c. 93A claims, supported by an 
affidavit from its claims supervisor, as well as by relevant 
medical records and BME's financial analysis.  Barron filed an 
opposition, but neither alleged that any issues of material fact 
remained in dispute, nor included any counter affidavits or 
other documents indicating any factual dispute.  A District 
Court judge granted Norfolk's motion for summary judgment, and, 
on Barron's appeal, the Appellate Division of the District Court 
affirmed the judgment.  Barron filed a notice of appeal in the 
Appeals Court, and we granted Norfolk's subsequent application 
for direct appellate review.  
 
2.  Discussion.  Summary judgment is appropriate where 
there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
Community Nat'l Bank v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 550, 553 (1976).  If 
the moving party, in its pleadings and supporting documentation 
pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 
(2002), asserts the absence of any triable issue, the nonmoving 
party must respond and make specific allegations sufficient to 
establish a genuine issue of material fact.  Drakopoulos v. U.S. 
Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 465 Mass. 775, 777-778 (2013).  Pederson v. 
Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 16-17 (1989).  Bare assertions made in 
the nonmoving party's opposition will not defeat a motion for 
8 
 
summary judgment.  O'Rourke v. Hunter, 446 Mass. 814, 821 
(2006).  Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (e), 365 Mass. 824 (1974) ("A party 
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading").  We review the disposition of a motion for summary 
judgment de novo.  Miller v. Cotter, 448 Mass. 671, 676 (2007).   
 
Barron contends that summary judgment was inappropriate as 
to its claim under § 34M.  Because Barron declined Norfolk's 
late tender, made on the eve of trial, it remained an "unpaid 
party" pursuant to § 34M, and was entitled to seek a judgment 
for benefits due and payable.  Relying on Fascione, supra, 
Norfolk maintains that it was entitled to summary judgment once 
it tendered a complete payment of benefits owed, notwithstanding 
Barron's rejection of that tender.  Because we conclude, for the 
reasons set forth below, that Barron was permitted to refuse 
Norfolk's tender and pursue its suit, the order granting 
Norfolk's motion for summary judgment on the G. L. c. 90, § 34M, 
claim must be vacated and the case remanded for trial.  
 
Barron also contests the entry of summary judgment for 
Norfolk as to the G. L. c. 93A claims.  In its opposition to 
Norfolk's motion, however, Barron did not allege the existence 
of any factual disputes and submitted no documentation that 
might reveal such disputes.  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (e) ("[A]n 
adverse party [to a motion for summary judgment] . . . must set 
forth specific facts [in its affidavits and pleadings] showing 
9 
 
that there is a genuine issue for trial").  Accordingly, we 
affirm the order granting Norfolk's motion for summary judgment 
on the G. L. c. 93A claims. 
 
a.  Claim under G. L. c. 90, § 34M.  The PIP provision, 
G. L. c. 90, § 34M, specifies that an "unpaid party," that is, a 
claimant whose PIP benefits remain unpaid for more than thirty 
days after those benefits become "due and payable," shall have 
the right to bring an action in contract against an insurer to 
recover those benefits, as well as attorney's fees and costs 
should the unpaid party prevail.8  Under common-law principles of 
contract, which we have deemed applicable to "action[s] in 
contract" under § 34M, see Boehm v. Premier Ins. Co., 446 Mass. 
689, 691 (2006) (Boehm), a plaintiff may reject a defendant's 
disputed tender of payment, made after the date set for payment 
has expired, and litigate its breach of contract claim to 
                     
 
8 Specifically, G. L. c. 90, § 34M, fourth par., states, in 
relevant part: 
 
 
"Personal injury protection benefits . . . shall be 
due and payable as loss accrues, upon receipt of reasonable 
proof of the fact and amount of expenses and loss 
incurred . . . .  In any case where benefits due and 
payable remain unpaid for more than thirty days, any unpaid 
party shall be deemed a party to a contract with the 
insurer responsible for payment and shall therefore have a 
right to commence an action in contract for payment of 
amounts therein determined to be due in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter . . . . If the unpaid party 
recovers a judgment for any amount due and payable by the 
insurer, the court shall assess against the insurer in 
addition thereto costs and reasonable attorney's fees." 
 
10 
 
completion.  Here, Norfolk attempted to tender the disputed 
$1,544.05 nearly one year after Barron had commenced its 
contract action, and just six days prior to trial.  We conclude 
that Barron properly could reject this tender, forgo the 
certainty it offered, and opt instead to pursue recovery not 
only of the disputed unpaid PIP benefits, but also of the 
attorney's fees and costs provided by the PIP provision.  
 
To construe this provision, we "look first to the text of 
the statute."  Boehm, supra at 690.  General Laws c. 90, § 34M, 
fourth par., provides that suits brought to recover PIP benefits 
shall sound in contract, noting that an unpaid claimant "shall 
be deemed a party to a contract with the insurer" and may bring 
an "action in contract" to obtain any benefits held to be due 
and payable.  Given these unambiguous statutory references to 
actions in contract, we have held that a § 34M suit brought to 
procure unpaid PIP benefits is governed generally by ordinary 
contract principles.9  In Boehm, supra at 689, we considered 
whether G. L. c. 90, § 34M, conferred the right to a jury trial.  
In concluding that PIP claimants were so entitled, we emphasized 
that an unpaid claimant "has a 'right' to seek recovery through 
                     
 
9 Barron contends also that it was entitled to reject 
Norfolk's efforts at late tender pursuant to the tender statute, 
G. L. c. 232A, § 1.  Since we conclude that common-law contract 
principles govern here, we do not address this argument.  See 
Fascione v. CNA Ins. Cos., 435 Mass. 88, 90 n.1 (2001). 
 
11 
 
'an action in contract,'" deeming this text "determinative of 
the issue at bar."  Boehm, supra at 691, quoting G. L. c. 90, 
§ 34M, fourth par.  At common law, we noted, parties to contract 
actions "enjoyed the right to a jury trial," and "the 
Legislature is presumed 'to know the preexisting law and the 
decisions of this court.'"  Boehm, supra, quoting Selectmen of 
Topsfield v. State Racing Comm'n, 324 Mass. 309, 313 (1949).   
 
 
"Had the Legislature intended to treat contract 
 
actions brought pursuant to § 34M, fourth par., differently 
 
from the ordinary contract action, it could have said so 
 
explicitly as it did in the very next paragraph, which 
 
directs insurers to resolve disagreements concerning 
 
subrogation through arbitration."  
  
Boehm, supra.  "That § 34M does not explicitly refer to the 
right to a jury trial," we concluded, "is of no consequence."  
Boehm, supra at 691-692.  The Legislature's explicit 
determination that an unpaid PIP claimant may file a contract 
suit "carries with it the principle[s]" of the common law of 
contracts.  Id. at 692.  See Commonwealth v. Burke, 392 Mass. 
688, 690 (1984) (statute must be construed as consistent with 
common law absent clear contrary legislative intent).    
 
Principles of contract law are "dispositive" of the present 
case, just as they were of the question addressed in Boehm.  At 
common law, tender of a sum owed under a contract is valid only 
when made prior to the parties' agreed-upon date for payment, 
12 
 
even if that tender is for the entire disputed sum.10  There can 
"be no 'tender' in the legal meaning of the word if the offer 
was made after the day fixed for payment had passed and the 
contract to pay had been broken."  Levin v. Wall, 290 Mass. 423, 
426 (1935).  See City Bank v. Cutter, 3 Pick. 414, 418 (1826) 
("the plea of tender is bad, the tender not having been made 
until the day after the debt became due against the 
defendants"); 17B C.J.S. Contracts, Tender of Performance § 729 
(2011) ("In order to be valid, a tender of payment on a contract 
must be timely . . ."); M.G. Perlin & S.H. Blum, Procedural 
Forms Annotated § 54:230, Tender (6th ed. 2009) (tender invalid 
if made after payment date).   
 
A party who receives an invalid late tender is not obliged 
to accept it.  See Levin v. Wall, supra at 427 (plaintiff 
permitted to reject tender made on first day of trial for breach 
of contract and pursue his claim to judgment); Davis v. 
Harrington, 160 Mass. 278, 280 (1894) (plaintiff who accepted 
complete tender after filing breach of contract suit "could have 
preserved his right to interest by way of damages, and also to 
                     
 
10 Norfolk never conceded its liability for $1,544.05 of 
Barron's requested fees.  Nevertheless, in light of the 
litigation costs it might incur should the case proceed to 
trial, Norfolk contends that it made a business decision to 
tender this disputed amount.  In conjunction with payments 
already made, the tendered payment, if accepted, would have 
compensated Barron for all of the PIP benefits it sought, not 
including interest. 
 
13 
 
costs, by declining to accept the payment"); Loitherstein v. 
International Business Machs. Corp., 11 Mass. App. Ct. 91, 92 
(1980) (defendant's late tender, which plaintiff rejected, did 
not extinguish plaintiff's claim for damages due to breach).  
Where a defendant attempts to tender payment after it has 
already breached the contract, "the rights of the parties 
depend, not on a tender, but on the acceptance of a payment 
which discharged the cause of action."  Davis v. Harrington, 
supra at 280.  Even if a plaintiff receives a tender of payment 
in full for a disputed sum, as here, "an underlying debt may not 
be discharged unless payment is accepted."  First Nat'l Bank v. 
Commonwealth, 391 Mass. 321, 326 (1984).  Late tender alone 
therefore does not preclude a plaintiff from filing a claim for 
breach or pursuing a then-pending suit.11    
 
Here, Norfolk's tender of $1,544.05 was made past the 
deadline set forth in the PIP provision.  General Laws c. 90, 
                     
 
11 To be sure, a plaintiff is also entitled to accept and 
thereby validate an otherwise improper late tender.  Such 
acceptance removes the "foundation of [a potential contract] 
suit" and necessitates the dismissal of a suit already 
commenced.  Davis v. Harrington, 160 Mass. 278, 280 (1894) 
(plaintiff who accepted tender made after suit had commenced not 
entitled to damages in form of interest and costs).  See Hamlen 
v. Rednalloh Co., 291 Mass. 119, 126-127 (1935) (plaintiff could 
not recover costs after accepting late payment in full with 
interest); Paul Revere Trust Co. v. Castle, 231 Mass. 129, 132 
(1918) ("when the plaintiff accepted the principal in full 
payment the right to recover the interest . . . was 
extinguished"). 
 
14 
 
§ 34M, establishes the date of breach relevant to unpaid PIP 
benefits, providing that, where "benefits due and payable remain 
unpaid for more than thirty days, any unpaid party . . . shall 
therefore have a right to commence an action in contract."  
After the expiration of that thirty-day period, Barron had yet 
to receive $1,544.05 in medical fees which it maintains were 
"due and payable."  Norfolk sent its check for that amount to 
Barron on September 28, 2010, nearly two years after Jean-Pierre 
first notified Norfolk of her claim for PIP benefits, and nearly 
one year after Barron filed suit seeking payment of the disputed 
balance.  The "day fixed for payment had passed," Levin v. Wall, 
supra at 426, and, after that point, "a tender cannot be 
effectual to bar the action for damages."  Suffolk Bank v. 
Worcester Bank, 5 Pick. 106, 108 (1827) (where there had been no 
tender at time contract suit commenced, "the tender afterwards 
cannot avail in defence of the action").  Norfolk's tender 
therefore was improper under principles of common law, and 
Barron was permitted to reject it and seek an award of the PIP 
benefits it maintained were "due and payable," as well as its 
attorney's fees, costs, and interest.        
 
Norfolk maintains nonetheless that, under our decision in 
Fascione, its tender of payment was sufficient to discharge all 
of its obligations to Barron, and that the allowance of its 
15 
 
motion for summary judgment was proper.12  This argument 
misapprehends the relevance of Fascione to the circumstances 
here.  In Fascione, supra at 89, an insurer inadvertently failed 
to pay the full amount of a PIP claimant's benefits, and 
tendered the remaining payment after the claimant had filed suit 
under G. L. c. 90, § 34M, to recover the amounts due.  We held 
that the claimant, who had accepted the insurer's tender and was 
fully compensated for her medical expenses, was not thereafter 
permitted to seek costs, attorney's fees, and interest under 
§ 34M.  Fascione, supra at 89-90, 92-94.  A claimant may only 
receive costs and attorney's fees upon obtaining "a judgment for 
any amount due and payable."  Id. at 92.  The phrase "any amount 
                     
 
12 The parties' disagreement as to the import of Fascione, 
supra, reflects differences in decisions of the Appellate 
Division of the District Court.  Certain of those decisions have 
interpreted Fascione to mean that an insurer's tender of a full 
PIP payment, made after a claimant filed suit but before 
judgment has entered, will extinguish the G. L. c. 90, § 34M, 
claim even where the claimant rejects such tender.  See, e.g., 
Essex Chiropractic Office, LLC vs. Plymouth Rock Assur. Corp., 
Mass. Dist. Ct. App. Div., No. 08-ADMS-10032 (Dec. 17, 2008) 
("it would be an absurd result if a medical provider were able 
to defeat the holding of Fascione merely by rejecting the tender 
of full payment of a PIP claim"); Kratzer vs. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., Mass. Dist. Ct. App. Div., No. 9834 (May 28, 2003). 
 
 
Other Appellate Division decisions, however, have concluded 
that "[n]othing in Fascione dictates that a tender of the 
balance due under the § 34M claim must necessarily stop that 
part of the litigation in its tracks and require a judgment of 
zero damages."  Metro West Med. Assocs., Inc. vs. Amica Mut. 
Ins. Co., Mass. Dist. Ct. App. Div., No. 10-ADMS-10009 (June 29, 
2010).  See Olympic Physical Therapy vs. ELCO Admin. Servs., 
Mass. Dist. Ct. App. Div., 10-ADMS-10017 (Aug. 17, 2010). 
 
16 
 
due and payable," we concluded, encompassed only PIP benefits 
themselves, and did not include interest.  Id. at 92-93.  
Because the claimant had accepted the insurer's full payment of 
her PIP expenses, she could not recover a judgment for costs and 
attorney's fees.  Id. at 94.   
 
Fascione affords no basis upon which to conclude that a PIP 
claimant, having filed an action in contract against an insurer 
for its delayed payment of benefits, is obliged to accept late 
tender and thus relinquish its suit.  We held in that case that 
G. L. c. 90, § 34M, provides no further remedy to a claimant who 
has accepted an insurer's late, but complete, tender of payment; 
this in no way was intended to suggest that a claimant may not 
reject such tender in an effort to obtain the attorney's fees 
and costs mandated by § 34M.  Indeed, our analysis relied on the 
claimant's acceptance of the insurer's reimbursement, which 
removed any basis for a judgment in favor of the claimant by 
compensating her for all "amount[s] due and payable."    
 
Moreover, to interpret Fascione as Norfolk suggests would 
contravene the fee-shifting provision of G. L. c. 90, § 34M, 
thereby enabling insurers to delay their payment of benefits 
without consequence.  The Legislature was "aware of the long 
delays in getting financial aid to the injured person" when it 
enacted the PIP provision.  Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 20 
(1971).  Accordingly, the thirty-day payment period, in 
17 
 
conjunction with the provision for attorney's fees and costs, 
together protect "the right and need of all accident victims to 
simple and speedy justice."  Id. at 21.  Since a cause of action 
lies against an insurer who fails to pay PIP benefits within the 
statutory period, and since the insurer will be liable for 
attorney's fees and costs if a claimant obtains a judgment for 
the unpaid amount, G. L. c. 90, § 34M, encourages the prompt 
payment of benefits.13       
 
But these incentives would diminish if an insurer could 
disregard the thirty-day deadline yet nevertheless evade 
liability for attorney's fees and costs by tendering benefits at 
will after a suit has commenced.  Under Norfolk's approach, the 
timeframe for prompt payment established by the Legislature 
would have little effect, since an insurer's delay would 
engender no more serious consequence than the payment of the 
very benefits sought from it at the outset.  See Insurance 
Rating Bd. v. Commissioner of Ins., 356 Mass. 184, 189 (1969) 
                     
 
13 This, in turn, is intended to lessen the expense of 
compulsory automobile insurance for all Massachusetts drivers, 
by reducing the number of claims that insurers will choose to 
litigate.  See Fascione, supra at 94, citing Pinnick v. Cleary, 
360 Mass. 1, 16-20 (1971) ("[T]he main objectives of the 
automobile insurance law, of which § 34M is a critical part, 
were to reduce the amount of motor vehicle tort litigation, 
control the costs of automobile insurance, and ensure prompt 
payment of claimants' medical and out-of-pocket expenses").  See 
also Dominguez v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 429 Mass. 112, 115 
(1999). 
 
18 
 
("An intention to enact a barren and ineffective provision is 
not lightly to be imputed to the Legislature").   
 
The provision for payment of attorney's fees and costs 
would be similarly toothless.  When an insurer's payment of PIP 
benefits, as here, is made on the eve of trial, a claimant may 
well have incurred substantial expenses.  If, as Norfolk 
suggests, a claimant were required to accept such late tender, 
she would be bound to forgo the recovery of those expenses 
whenever an insurer offered belated reimbursement of a disputed 
sum.  See Pine v. Rust, 404 Mass. 411, 416 (1989) ("If an offer 
of the statutory minimum amount of damages were all that could 
be expected by plaintiffs, there would be no need for provision 
in the law for the award of attorney's fees").  Moreover, a 
contract suit under § 34M is only necessary, in the first 
instance, if an insurer fails to reimburse a claimant by the 
statutory deadline.  Under Norfolk's approach, far from reducing 
the amount of litigation, § 34M would provide incentives for 
insurers to delay payment until their insureds filed suit to 
collect amounts owed; on a date of its choosing, an insurer then 
unilaterally could terminate litigation prompted only by its own 
delay.  "[E]quity will not permit" such a result, which would 
allow an insurer to "defeat a remedy which except for his 
misconduct would not be available."  Lamb v. Rent Control Bd. of 
19 
 
Cambridge, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 1038, 1039 (1984), quoting Deitrick 
v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 196 (1940).   
 
In sum, an insurer's late tender of PIP benefits, made 
after a claimant has filed suit and which the claimant declines 
to accept, does not entitle an insurer to summary judgment.  To 
be sure, an insurer may opt to tender payment of outstanding PIP 
benefits after the filing of a suit, and, if a claimant accepts 
that tender, the action under G. L. c. 90, § 34M, will be 
extinguished.  See Fascione, supra at 91.  But the mere tender 
of such late payment will not, in itself, innoculate an insurer 
against liability for attorney's fees and costs if the claimant 
opts to refuse tender and subsequently obtains a judgment for 
PIP benefits.  Here, because Barron rejected Norfolk's tendered 
check for $1,544.05, it remained an "unpaid party," and 
Norfolk's motion for summary judgment on its G. L. c. 90, § 34M, 
claim should have been denied.    
 
b.  Claims under G. L. c. 93A, §§ 9, 11.  Barron contends 
also that the judge erred in allowing Norfolk's motion for 
summary judgment on the G. L. c. 93A claims.14  To determine 
whether a business practice is unfair under G. L. c. 93A, § 11, 
                     
 
14 In its complaint, Barron set forth two separate claims 
for violations of G. L. c. 93A, one based on Norfolk's asserted 
failure to adhere to G. L. c. 90, § 34M, and one stemming from 
Norfolk's purported unfair claim settlement practices as defined 
by G. L. c. 176D, § 3 (9) (b), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (n).  As 
did the Appellate Division, we assess both claims together. 
 
20 
 
we assess "(1) whether the practice . . . is within at least the 
penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other established 
concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, 
oppressive, or unscrupulous; [and] (3) whether it causes 
substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or other 
businessmen)."  PMP Assocs., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 366 
Mass. 593, 596 (1975).   
 
In the circumstances of this case, there was no error in 
allowing Norfolk's motion for summary judgment on the G. L. 
c. 93A claims.  Norfolk's motion stated that there were no 
genuine issues of material fact as to the propriety of Norfolk's 
dealings under G. L. c. 93A, and indicated that Norfolk acted, 
at all times, in accordance with appropriate business judgments.   
In support of its motion, Norfolk included a detailed affidavit 
by one of its senior claims supervisors outlining its conduct in 
handling Jean-Pierre's claim for PIP benefits.  According to the 
affidavit, Norfolk relied in good faith on the IME report in 
deciding to limit payment to dates of medical service prior to 
October 27, 2008, and relied similarly on BME's fee analysis in 
reducing Barron's submitted bills by $64.05.  See Duclersaint v. 
Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 427 Mass. 809, 814 (1998); Lumbermens 
Mut. Cas. Co. v. Y.C.N. Transp. Co., 46 Mass. App. Ct. 209, 215 
(1999).   
21 
 
 
In its opposition to Norfolk's motion for summary judgment, 
Barron did not allege that material facts were in dispute, 
stating only that "[n]othing in Norfolk's submission 
demonstrates that no genuine issue of fact remains on the G. L. 
c. 93A claims.  Thus, the plaintiff has no burden of rebuttal."  
Nor did the opposition include counter affidavits or any other 
countervailing documentation that might have demonstrated the 
existence of genuine issues of material fact.  Although Barron 
had alluded in its initial complaint to Norfolk's purported bad 
faith,  a party opposing a motion for summary judgment may not 
"simply rest on his pleadings."  Community Nat'l Bank v. Dawes, 
369 Mass. 550, 554 (1976). See LaLonde v. Eissner, 405 Mass. 
207, 209-210 (1989) (granting summary judgment for defendant 
where plaintiffs did not dispute any relevant material fact).  
Cf. Rule 9A(a)(2) of the Rules of the Superior Court (2014) 
("Affidavits and other documents setting forth or offering 
evidence of facts on which the opposition is based shall be 
served with the memorandum in opposition [to a motion for 
summary judgment]").  Having failed to "set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 56 (e), Barron was not entitled to trial on its G. L. c. 93A 
claims. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The order allowing judgment for Norfolk on 
count 1, the G. L. c. 90, § 34M, claim, is vacated and set 
22 
 
aside, and the matter is remanded to the District Court for 
further proceedings on that claim.  The entry of judgment for 
Norfolk on counts two and three, the claims under G. L. c. 93A, 
is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.