Case Title: State v. Pandolfo

Citation: 106 N.W.2d 615

Docket Number: 

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1960-12-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
106 N.W.2d 615 (1960) STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Samuel C. Parker PANDOLFO, Jr., Defendant and Appellant. Cr. No. 294. Supreme Court of North Dakota. December 12, 1960. E. J. McIlraith, Minot, for defendant and appellant. Leslie R. Burgum, Atty. Gen., William S. Murray, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent. SATHRE, Chief Justice. This is a criminal case. The defendant was convicted in the District Court of Burleigh County by a jury of the crime of wilfully, unlawfully and fraudulently making and filing a sworn application to the Securities Commission for registration as a salesman of Securities, and knowingly subscribing to, or causing to be made, material false statements in said application for such registration, in violation of Section 10-0410, 1957 Supplement NRDC 1943. *616 The instant case and a companion case were on the calendar for trial at the December 1958 term of the District Court of Burleigh County. The companion case was tried in December 1958 and resulted in conviction. The defendant appealed to this Court and the conviction was affirmed. N.D., 98 N.W.2d 161. The instant case was continued from time to time and finally set for trial January 19, 1959. When the case was called for trial the defendant's attorney stated to the court that he appeared only for the purpose of arguing a motion for continuance and that he could not appear for the defendant in the instant case because he was going to Denver, Colorado and would "not be back until Friday", whereupon he left the courtroom. After his attorney had withdrawn from the case the defendant presented a motion for continuance supported by a lengthy affidavit in which he stated that he had been unable to obtain legal counsel to represent him in the action; that he had contacted several firms of attorneys in the cities of Minot, Fargo, Mandan, Bismarck and Dickinson. In the affidavit it is further stated that the affiant's brother had recently been killed in an automobile accident in the State of Wyoming and that the affiant desired an opportunity to attend the funeral. After some discussion between the defendant and the Court with reference to counsel the defendant stated: The attorney for the State then made the following statement: A recess was then taken from 10:40 a. m. to 11:20 a. m. After recess the following proceedings were had: The Court: Arraignment was then had and the defendant entered a plea of not guilty. The Court then informed the defendant that he would be given until 9:30 a. m. the following day to secure a lawyer. The defendant thereupon made the following statement to the Court: The case was called for trial the following day at 9:30 a. m. and Pandolfo informed the court that he had been unable to secure counsel and that he was willing to represent himself and that he was ready to proceed with the trial of the case acting as his own counsel. The case was tried to the court and jury, the defendant acting as his own attorney. The jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty and judgment and sentence was entered thereon. Thereafter in due time the defendant made a motion for a new trial which was denied, and the defendant appealed from said Order and from the Judgment of Conviction and assigned the following specifications of error: That the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a continuance and thereby preventing him from securing counsel to conduct his defense. That the Court erred in its instructions to the jury. That the Court erred in reading to the jury a certain bill of particulars furnished to the defendant by counsel for the state, defendant's exhibit "H". That the Court erred in insisting that the case be tried with or without counsel for defendant. We shall consider the specifications in the order stated. With reference to the first specification the record shows that the trial of the case was continued at the request of the defendant from December 9th to January 6th, 9th, 12th and finally January 19th. In his affidavit in support of his motion for continuance he stated he had contacted firms of lawyers in five cities in North Dakota, but that the attorneys contacted were otherwise engaged and were unable to represent him. He stated also that he had engaged certain lawyers in Denver, Colorado, but they were occupied in trying cases in Federal Court and for that reason were unable to act as his counsel. The situation thus presented is unique. It would seem that among the several firms of lawyers solicited by the defendant at least one attorney would be available to represent him. But even though defendant was unable to secure counsel the evidence shows that he was not a stranger to court procedure. He had been tried and convicted of similar offenses in other states, including Montana and Colorado, and as noted herein had recently been tried and convicted of a like offense in North Dakota. The trial court offered to appoint counsel for him but he refused the offer, and he also refused to *619 be represented by Mr. Mills who was his attorney when the case was called for trial. The prosecuting attorney and the court treated him fairly in every respect, made suggestions as to procedure and took no advantage of any procedural error on the part of the defendant in conducting his own defense. Under the circumstances and the record before us we cannot say the defendant was prejudiced because of the fact that he conducted his own defense without the assistance of counsel. The general rule applicable in such cases is stated as follows in 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1437, page 1140. It is next contended that the court erred in his instructions to the jury. After the defendant had examined the instructions the following discussion was had by the court and the defendant: In his brief defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to explain and define the term "fraudulent practice." He overlooks the fact that the term is explained and defined by the language of the *620 statute. It states: "It shall be fraudulent practice and it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to subscribe to or cause to be made, any material, false statement or representation in any application, financial statement or other document or statement required to be filed under any provisions of this Act." The statute states in clear, specific and unmistakable language that "it shall be fraudulent practice * * * for any person knowingly to subscribe to * * * or cause to be made, any material false statement or representation in any application, etc." We assume that the members of the jury possessed ordinary intelligence and that they had no difficulty in understanding the meaning of the term "fraudulent practice" as defined in the statute. The next contention of the defendant is that the court erred in reading to the jury a bill of particulars furnished by the state to the defendant. The bill of particulars is a somewhat detailed explanation of the offense with which the defendant is charged. He introduced it in evidence as his exhibit "H". He himself read it to the jury. It was his exhibit, introduced by himself. Under these circumstances we fail to see how he would be prejudiced because the court read it to the jury as part of his instructions. It is finally argued that the court erred in insisting that the case be tried without counsel for the defendant. This specification is practically the same as the first specification, and the views we expressed in reference to same are applicable here. As pointed out herein the trial was continued at defendant's request from time to time, to enable him to secure a lawyer and it seems rather strange that not one lawyer in any of the law firms whom the defendant claims he contacted was available. Be that as it may, the defendant agreed to act as his own lawyer and conducted his own defense. As pointed out herein the defendant stated that he did not want the lawyer who argued his motion for continuance to act as his counsel because he was to be one of defendant's witnesses notwithstanding the attorney general's statement that the State had no objection thereto. It is clear from the record before us that it was defendant's own fault that his counsel withdrew from the case. Both the court and the prosecuting attorney urged the defendant to retain his attorney to conduct his defense but he refused to do so, notwithstanding the attorney had recently defended him in a case in which he was charged with a like offense. Under the facts and circumstances as disclosed by the record before us there is room for doubt as to whether the several maneuvers of the defendant and his counsel were made in good faith, or whether they were made for the purpose of obtaining further delay of the trial. In any event, as we have pointed out, it was defendant's own fault that he did not have a lawyer to conduct his defense, and therefore he is not now in a position to complain. The order denying the motion for a new trial and the judgment are in all things affirmed. TEIGEN and STRUTZ, JJ., concur. BURKE, Judge (concurring specially). I concur in the opinion filed by Chief Justice SATHERE. I think, however, that reference should be made to an additional statement of the defendant as shown by the record. This statement is as follows: "Your Honor, as you stated, this is merely a misdemeanor, it is not a real serious offense from one viewpoint. Mr. Mills vanished for the reason that there are 59 charges of mail fraud filed against me and Universal Securities in that indictment, and each can carry five years, which is a total *621 of 295 years. Counsel is trying to protect Universal Securities and my position in that. That is why he did not care to linger; it is important 295 years and 59 counts of mail fraud is not a misdemeanor your Honor." From this statement it clearly appears that the reason defendant's counsel was not present to represent the defendant in the instant case was because defendant, himself, had sent his counsel away to attend to other business for him and did so at a time when, according to his own statements, he knew he could not obtain other counsel to try the case. It is thus clear that defendant was not unable to obtain counsel, and that his failure to have counsel to represent him in this case was due to his own deliberate act. His complaint on this score is clearly not meritorious. BURKE and MORRIS, JJ., concur.