Case Title: CODY LEE FREDERICK V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-02-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
CODY LEE FREDERICK V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 27151 P.3d 1136Case Number: 05-173Decided: 02/15/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
CODY LEE 
FREDERICK,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and 
Marion Yoder, 
Senior Assistant Public Defender.  
Argument by Ms. Yoder.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Daniel M. Fetsco, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Fetsco.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ., and PARK, 
D.J.

 
 
PARK, 
D.J., delivers the opinion of the Court; GOLDEN, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

 
 

PARK, 
District Judge.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Cody 
Lee Frederick (hereinafter "Frederick"), was originally charged with one 
count of first-degree sexual assault.  
Frederick 
and the State agreed that he would plead guilty to a lesser charge of 
third-degree sexual assault and the State would recommend probation and possible 
deferral of the conviction.  The 
district court rejected the agreement and entered a sentence of two to four 
years.  In this appeal, Frederick challenges the 
district court's rejection of the plea agreement, the order of restitution, and 
the payment of public defender fees.

 
 
[¶2]      We affirm the 
sentence and remand for correction of those portions of the judgment and 
sentence that required payment of restitution and public defender 
fees.

 
 

 
 
[¶3]      The following 
issues are presented on appeal:

 
 
I.       Whether 
imposition of sentence was proper?

 
 
II.      Did the trial 
court err by ordering the defendant to pay restitution?

 
 
III.     Did the trial court err 
by entering a written judgment and sentence requiring payment of public defender 
fees after orally waiving those fees?

 
 

 
 
[¶4]      On October 9, 
2003, Frederick 
had been drinking, and after offering to drive the victim home, ended up at her 
apartment.  There was no direct 
evidence as to the amount of alcohol consumed by Frederick; however, the State accepted defense 
counsel's representation that it was in excess of twelve beers.  Frederick attempted to kiss the victim, who 
rebuffed him.  Later, Frederick forcefully 
grabbed the victim and attempted to remove her clothing.  He eventually succeeded in dragging the 
victim into her bedroom, where he held her down and sexually assaulted 
her.

 
 
[¶5]      On June 14, 2004, 
an Information was filed charging Frederick with first-degree sexual assault, in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2003).  On June 28, 2004, Frederick appeared for 
arraignment in district court and entered a plea of not 
guilty.

 
 
[¶6]      On December 13, 
2004, Frederick 
appeared for a change of plea.  The 
district court advised Frederick of his rights and made the necessary 
inquiries required by W.R.Cr.P. 11.  
Frederick 
acknowledged that he understood his rights; that this agreement was not binding 
on the court; and that the plea could not be withdrawn.   

 
 
[¶7]      Frederick's counsel 
informed the court that the parties had reached an agreement.  The precise terms of this agreement are 
unclear.  Counsel informed the court 
that:

 
 
            
The agreement is that my client submit an Alford plea to the count.  And in exchange for that, he would 
receive a third degree sexual assault disposition, and the sentence would be 
five to seven years suspended.  And 
furthermore, Your Honor, if the PSI supports a 301 agreement, the state has 
agreed to agree to that.

 
 
The 
prosecutor added that: "The state would leave the option of 301 open pending the 
result of the PSR."  The confusion 
about the agreement stems from the fact that under this statute, there is no 
authority for suspending a sentence.  

 
 
[¶8]      Frederick's counsel 
advised that this was to be an Alford 
plea.  An Alford plea allows an individual accused 
of a crime to voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the 
imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his 
participation in the acts constituting the crime.  North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).  Counsel explained to the court that this 
plea was necessary because Frederick had had so much to drink on the 
evening in question that he did not remember what had happened.  The State then offered the facts 
previously discussed, and Frederick agreed this was the evidence that the 
State could present.  Because there 
was a possible disposition under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301 (LexisNexis 2005), 
which allows for possible dismissal of the charge if the defendant successfully 
completes probation, the court did not enter the plea.  The court then referred Frederick to the 
Department of Probation and Parole for an interview for the Presentence 
Investigation Report (PSR).

 
 
[¶9]      On April 18, 
2005, Frederick 
appeared for sentencing.  The judge 
who presided over the change of plea had accepted another judicial appointment, 
and a different judge imposed the sentence.  The parties agreed that under Wyoming statutes, Frederick was eligible for sentencing under § 
7-13-301.  The victim, who had 
previously submitted a victim impact statement in the PSR, was present at the 
hearing but did not speak.  
Frederick 
indicated that he accepted responsibility, and he made a brief 
apology.

 
 
[¶10]   The district court then announced 
that deferral under § 7-13-301 was inappropriate.  The court indicated that it had reviewed 
the court file with the initial charge and the PSR.  The court also rejected probation 
"because of the severity of the charge" and because the court believed that 
Frederick was 
not sincere in his acceptance of responsibility and apology.  The court imposed a sentence of not less 
than two nor more than four years of incarceration.  

 
 
[¶11]   On May 2, 2005, Frederick's counsel argued a motion for reconsideration of 
sentence, reasserting that Frederick was a good candidate for treatment 
under § 7-13-301 or at least for probation.  The district court denied the motion, 
stating that the physical evidence of bruising confirmed the victim's version of 
a nonconsensual, forcible assault; and the court continued to be skeptical of 
Frederick's 
acceptance of responsibility.  The 
court also considered the impact of the crime on Frederick's community.

 
 
[¶12]   Frederick asserts that he had a binding plea 
agreement that was improperly rejected by the district court and that the 
district court abused its discretion when it ordered restitution and 
reimbursement of public defender fees.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶13]   When a plea of guilty is entered as 
a result of a plea agreement, any promises made by the State must be fulfilled 
and whether a prosecutor has violated an alleged agreement is a question that is 
reviewed de novo.  Spencer v. State, 2005 WY 105, ¶ 12, 118 P.3d 978, 982-983 (Wyo. 2005).  A 
plea agreement is a contract between the defendant and the State to which the 
general principles of contract law are applied. "When determining whether a 
breach of the plea agreement has occurred we: (1) examine the nature of the 
promise;  and (2) evaluate the 
promise in light of the defendant's reasonable understanding of the promise at 
the time the plea was entered.'"  Ford v. State, 2003 WY 65, ¶ 11, 69 P.3d 407, 410 (Wyo. 2003).  The 
prosecutor "must explicitly stand by" the terms of any agreement; and if the 
State is unable to carry out the terms, the correct remedy is withdrawal of the 
plea.  Ford, ¶ 18, 69 P.3d  at 412.  
The State may not obtain the benefit of the agreement and at the same 
time avoid its obligations without violating either the principles of fairness 
or the principles of contract law.  
Id.

 
 
[¶14]   The standard of review of 
restitution orders is confined to a search for procedural error or a clear abuse 
of discretion.  Penner v. State, 2003 WY 143, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 1045, 1047 (Wyo. 2003).  The 
court-ordered restitution should be supported by sufficient evidence to afford a 
reasonable basis for estimating the loss.  
Id.  The restitution can be challenged only 
for abuse of discretion by the court.  
Id.  "Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily and capriciously."  Monjaras v. State, 2006 WY 71, ¶ 8, 136 P.3d 162, 164 (Wyo. 2006).  Under 
this standard, the inquiry is whether the court's choice is reasonable. A victim 
impact statement is credible evidence to support an order of restitution.  Penner, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d at 1047(citation 
omitted).

 
 
[¶15]   There is a distinction between the 
standard of review of factual challenges to the amount of restitution ordered 
and challenges to the authority of the court to make a restitution award.  Challenges to the factual basis of an 
award of restitution can be waived if the defendant enters into a plea agreement 
and then fails to object at sentencing.  
Penner, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d  at 1047.  If the defendant does not object to the 
amount of restitution ordered by the district court, the reviewing court must 
review for plain error.  Id. at 1048.  
If the defendant challenges the authority of the district court to 
order restitution, then review is under a de novo statutory interpretation 
standard, because a court has only that authority to act which is conferred by 
the subject statute.  Id.

 
 

 
 
Improper Sentence

 
 
[¶16]   Frederick contends that the district court 
improperly imposed a sentence of a term of years instead of either deferring the 
sentence under § 7-13-301 or placing him on probation.  Frederick argues that the district court did 
not follow the mandates of W.R.Cr.P. 11(e) because he was not told that the plea 
could not be withdrawn, and because he was not allowed to withdraw the plea when 
the recommendation was rejected by the district court.  He also argues that 
the district court committed error by imposing a sentence that was inconsistent 
with the charge of third-degree sexual assault; that defense counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object; and, finally, that the State violated the 
terms of the agreement.  Each will be discussed in turn.  This Court found 
that the record does not substantiate Frederick's contentions.

 
 
[¶17]   Imposition of a sentence in a criminal 
proceeding based on a plea agreement is governed by W.R.Cr.P. 11(e), which 
provides:

 
 
            
            
Plea 
agreement procedure.

 
 
(1)    In General.  The attorney for 
the state and the attorney for the defendant or the defendant when acting pro se 
may engage in discussions with a view toward reaching an agreement that, upon 
the entering of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charged offense or to a 
lesser related offense, the attorney for the state will do any of the 
following:

 
 
   (A) Agree not to prosecute other crimes 
or move for dismissal of other charges; 

 
 
   (B) Make a recommendation, or agree not 
to oppose the defendant's request, for a particular sentence, with the 
understanding that such recommendation or request shall not be binding upon the 
court; or

 
 
   (C) Agree that a specific sentence is 
the appropriate disposition of this case.

 
 
            
The court shall not participate in any such discussions.

 
 
(2)    Disclosure of Agreement; Decision 
of Court.  If a 
plea agreement has been reached by the parties, the court shall, on the record, 
require the disclosure of the agreement in open court or, on a showing of good 
cause, in 
camera, at the time the plea is offered.  If the agreement is of the type specified in 
subdivision (e)(1)(A) or (e)(1)(C), the court may accept or reject the 
agreement, or may defer its decision as to the acceptance or rejection until 
there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence report.  If the agreement is 
of the type specified in subdivision (e)(1)(B), the court shall advise the 
defendant that if the court does not accept the recommendation or request, the 
defendant nevertheless has no right to withdraw the plea.

 
 
(3)    Acceptance of Agreement.  If the court 
accepts the plea agreement, the court shall inform the defendant that it will 
embody in the judgment and sentence the disposition provided for in the plea 
agreement.

 
 
(4)    Rejection of Agreement.  If the court 
rejects the plea agreement, the court shall, on the record, inform the parties 
of this fact, advise the defendant personally in open court or, on a showing of 
good cause, in 
camera, that the court is not bound by the plea agreement, afford the 
defendant the opportunity to then withdraw the plea, and advise the defendant 
that if the defendant persists in a guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere the 
disposition of the case may be less favorable to the defendant than that 
contemplated by the plea agreement.

 
 
(5)    Notification to Court.  Except for good 
cause shown, notification to the court of the existence of a plea agreement 
shall be given at the arraignment or at such other time, prior to trial, as may 
be fixed by the court.

 
 
[¶18]   The nature of the agreement between the 
State and Frederick must be 
determined before this Court can resolve the questions of whether proper 
procedures were followed or whether the State violated the agreement.  

 
 
[¶19]   At the change of plea hearing, the 
district court made specific inquiries of Frederick.  

 
 
THE COURT:  Again, the Court is not bound by any plea 
agreement.  Do 
you understand that?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir.

 
 
THE COURT:  The Court would order a presentence 
investigation report . . .

 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir.

 
 
THE COURT:  . . . and depending on that report, make a 
decision as to an appropriate sentence.  Regardless of that sentence, you would not be 
allowed to withdraw your plea.

 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir.

 
 

Frederick then entered a plea of guilty, and the district court made 
additional inquiries:

 
 
THE COURT:  Was the plea that you entered voluntary?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir.

 
 
THE COURT:  Was it the result of any force or 
threats?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  No, sir.

 
 
THE COURT:  Was it the result of any promises?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  No, sir.

 
 
 
 
[¶20]   Notwithstanding this exchange, 
Frederick argues that he and the State had a 
plea agreement either under W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(1)(A) or (C).  Frederick then argues that because this was an 
agreement, and not a recommendation, the sentence was improper because he was 
not given an opportunity to withdraw his plea when it was rejected by the 
district court.

 

[¶21]   The question is whether the court was 
presented with a recommendation under W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(1)(B) or a binding 
agreement under W.R.Cr.P.11(e)(1)(C).  The State had agreed only to amend the 
Information to charge sexual assault in the third degree (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-304 (LexisNexis 2005)) instead of sexual assault in the first degree (§ 
6-2-302) and to consider sentencing under § 7-13-301.  Since no other 
crimes were alleged and no charges were dismissed, W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(1)(A) does 
not apply.  An 
agreement made pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(1)(C) is binding on the court; and if 
it rejects the agreement, the court must allow the defendant the opportunity to 
withdraw the plea.  
A recommendation under W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(1)(B) is not binding on the court, 
and the defendant does not have the right to withdraw the plea.  

 
 
[¶22]   The court stated unequivocally that 
this was a nonbinding recommendation and that Frederick would not be allowed to withdraw his 
plea.  This 
could not have been made any clearer.  Frederick stated that he understood.  There were no 
objections or attempts to correct the judge when he stated that the agreement 
was not binding and could not be withdrawn.  In addition, when Frederick presented his motion to reconsider 
the sentence, he did not claim that the sentence was improper, and he 
specifically conceded "that we both recognize that this Court does have the 
ability to impose the sentence that is imposed."  Frederick's counsel then went on to explain that perhaps 
the district court had not recognized that Frederick would be a good candidate for 
deferral or for probation, arguments that did not seem to be persuasive.  There is no 
question of Frederick's recognition 
that the district court considered the agreement to be only a nonbinding 
recommendation.  
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the parties did not have a 
binding agreement but, instead, presented the district court with a sentencing 
recommendation that the court rejected.  The district court was not required to inform 
Frederick that the plea could be withdrawn, or 
to allow him to withdraw his plea when it rejected the recommendation.

            

[¶23]   Frederick also argues that although the charge 
to which the plea was entered was third-degree sexual assault, the court 
sentenced him as though the charge was first-degree sexual assault.  Frederick argues that the district court 
improperly engaged in "real-offense" sentencing in which the defendant is 
punished for his "actual" crime instead of the crime for which the conviction 
was entered.  
The more appropriate "offense-of-conviction" sentencing, according to 
Frederick, occurs when the defendant is 
sentenced only for those crimes that were actually admitted with the plea.  At the sentencing 
hearing, the court noted that the original charge was "first degree sexual 
assault." The court said that sentencing under § 7-13-301 was not appropriate; 
further, the court also rejected probation and imposed a sentence of not less 
than two nor more than four years  in the state penitentiary because of "the 
severity of the charge," the court's impression as to the insincerity of 
Frederick's apology, and the impact of the crime on his community.

 
 
[¶24]   In denying Frederick's motion to reconsider, the court 
expanded on its reasons, stating:

 
 
            
Mr. Frederick, as I started to say, I reviewed the file, I reviewed the 
presentence report.  
Before arriving at my decision, I found it particularly significant that 
the investigating officer found bruises on the victim's arms and legs.  That does not 
comport with your explanation to the probation officer that this was a 
consensual event.

 
 
            
The reason I am telling you this is because I did not rely on and I'm not 
relying exclusively on the victim's explanation of the circumstances.  The physical 
evidence of bruises on her arms and legs is something that is obvious, and it is 
visible.  It is 
not something that is subject to much interpretation.  And the officer's 
opinion, those bruises were consistent with forcible sexual contact.

 
 
            
There are some other things that I considered in arriving at your 
sentence.  As 
you may recall, I advised you that I didn't believe you in the couple words that 
you told me about your acceptance of this conviction.  The record can't 
reflect that, but I will describe my recollection today of your appearance when 
you said that.

 
 
            
You didn't look at me, the way you are now.  You looked down at 
the floor, you mumbled the words.  I don't know you, I don't know your 
personality, I don't know your speech traits, but it was my conclusion that you 
were not sincere in what you said.

 
 
* * * *

 
 
I also considered the impact of my sentence on the 
community in which you live.  We all know Pine Bluffs is a very small 
community.  I 
suspect that this particular charge and conviction and crime [were] talked about 
in every public for[u]m in Pine Bluffs. 

 
 
* * * *

 
 
I reviewed the statute, Wyoming Statute 6-2-304, which 
defines third degree sexual assault.  And I compared that with the statutes which 
define and describe first and second degree sexual assaults. 

 
 
I can understand how you were surprised at my sentence 
because the plea agreement seemed to suggest that this charge would be 
deferred.  And 
then you end up with a judge who throws you in jail.  So I can understand 
[Counsel's] response, and I can understand your response. 

            

However, it continues to be my belief that this was a 
serious offense, it was nonconsensual, it was violent.  It occurred after 
you had been drinking.  I don't consider that to be an excuse.

 
 
[¶25]   Frederick's contention is that the sentencing 
judge improperly considered the evidence of bruising as evidence that this was a 
forcible attack, and that sentence was imposed for first-degree sexual assault 
instead of third-degree sexual assault.  First-degree sexual assault, under § 6-2-302, 
as originally charged in this case, occurs when:

 
 
(a)    Any actor who inflicts sexual 
intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in the first degree if:

 
 
(i)      The actor causes 
submission of the victim through the actual application, reasonably calculated 
to cause submission of the victim, of physical force or forcible 
confinement;

 
 
            
* * * *

 
 
Third-degree sexual assault, § 6-2-304, as charged here, 
occurs when:

 
 
(a)    An actor commits sexual assault 
in the third degree if, under circumstances not constituting sexual assault in 
the first or second degree:

 
 
            
* * * *

 
 
(iii)    The actor subjects a victim to 
sexual contact under any of the circumstances of W.S. 6-2-302(a)(i) through (iv) 
or 6-2-303(a)(i) through (vi) without inflicting sexual intrusion on the victim 
and without causing serious bodily injury to the victim. 

 
 
The difference between the two charges is that third-degree 
sexual assault does not include the elements of sexual intrusion or serious 
bodily injury.  "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury 
which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes miscarriage, severe 
disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 
member or organ.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(x) (LexisNexis 
2005).  

            

[¶26]   The district court indicated that it 
considered a number of factors, including undisputed evidence of bruising.  A court is given 
broad discretion in sentencing and may consider a wide variety of factors about 
the defendant and his crimes.  Manes v. State, 2004 WY 70, ¶ 9, 92 P.3d 289, 292 (Wyo. 
2004).  The 
sentence will not be overturned unless there is a clear abuse of 
discretion.  
Id.  Due process 
requires that sentence be imposed only on accurate information.  Id.  Frederick does not challenge the accuracy of 
the evidence, only that it was a factor in sentencing.  Victim impact 
information about other crimes or convictions unrelated to the particular crime 
for which sentence is about to be imposed is permissible.  Id.  W.R.Cr.P. 32(a) specifically 
permits information about the defendant's characteristics to be considered by 
the district court before imposing sentence.  Id.  

 
 
[¶27]   Frederick told both the reporting law 
enforcement officer and the author of the PSR that the sexual contact was 
consensual.  
This was in direct conflict with the evidence of bruising and could 
indicate a lack of acceptance of full responsibility.  The district court 
had reservations about Frederick's acceptance of 
responsibility and remorse.  The fact that Frederick misrepresented the facts and did not 
accept that he had engaged in serious criminal conduct with significant trauma 
to the victim are appropriate factors in determining sentence.  Doherty v. State, 
2006 WY 39, ¶ 35, 131 P.3d 963, 974 (Wyo. 2006).  (The district court is permitted to consider a 
defendant's character when exercising its discretion in imposing a 
sentence.)  The 
district court specifically said that the evidence was useful because it was 
relevant to Frederick's credibility 
and to whether he truly accepted responsibility.  The bruising was also relevant because it was 
an indication of the force used, thus an indication of the extent of the 
criminal conduct involved.  The district court's statements indicate that 
the evidence was properly considered and they fall short of any indication that 
the court was sentencing Frederick for first-degree 
sexual assault.  

 
 
[¶28]   The district court considered 
undisputed evidence in reaching its decision.  It considered both the PSR and Frederick's statements.  Further, neither 
Frederick nor his counsel objected to or contradicted the evidence of the 
victim's bruising.  
The district court properly relied upon the PSR and its own articulated 
observations to formulate its sentencing decision.  As in Manes, we are 
compelled to follow precedent and conclude that Frederick had a fair sentencing hearing.  There was no 
evidence that the initial charge prejudiced Frederick in terms of the sentence 
imposed.  
Frederick has not shown any prejudice, and he 
is not entitled to a new sentencing hearing.

 
 
[¶29]   Frederick also contends that the sentencing 
procedure violated W.R.Cr.P. 32; that his counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object at various stages; and that the prosecutor violated the plea agreement 
between the parties.  
These can be discussed fairly briefly.  First, a review of the change of plea hearing 
indicates that there was compliance with the applicable rules.  Frederick was advised of his rights and the 
consequences of a plea, and there was confirmation that the plea was 
voluntary.1  All requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 32 were 
meticulously followed.  Frederick suggests that at the time of 
sentencing, the district court should have repeated that the plea was not 
binding.  The 
rules do not require the defendant, who has been properly advised at the change 
of plea hearing, to be advised of his rights again at the time of 
sentencing.  
"[T]he language of W.R.Cr.P. 11(b) no longer requires the district court 
to perfunctorily repeat information on rights and consequences which has 
previously been conveyed during arraignment or during other on the record 
proceedings in the presence of counsel."  Follett v. State, 2006 WY 47, ¶ 23, 132 P.3d 1155, 1163 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶30]   The contention that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object can be disposed of in an equally summary 
manner.  "When 
reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the paramount 
determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's 
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance."  
Hirsch v. 
State, 2006 WY 66, ¶ 15, 135 P.3d 586, 593-594 (Wyo. 2006).  There is a "strong presumption" that counsel 
effectively represented the defendant and made appropriate strategic decisions. 
 Id.  Under the 
two-prong standard articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 206, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), an appellant claiming ineffective assistance 
of counsel must demonstrate on the record that counsel's performance was 
deficient and that prejudice resulted.  Id.  Frederick fails to present any analysis of the 
performance of his counsel.  We "have consistently held that we will not 
consider claims unsupported by cogent argument or pertinent authority."  Martinez v. State, 2006 WY 20, ¶ 31, 128 P.3d 652, 665 (Wyo. 
2006).  The 
record indicates that Frederick was well 
represented.  
He was faced with a charge of first-degree sexual assault, ended up with 
a conviction of third-degree sexual assault, and a sentence of two to four 
years.  That 
conviction is not only on the low end of the sentence for third-degree sexual 
assault, but it is substantially less than the mandatory minimum five-year 
sentence for first-degree sexual assault.  The facts, as conceded by Frederick, are more than sufficient to support 
the conviction.  
With this outcome, it is difficult to comprehend how it could be asserted 
that counsel was ineffective. 

 
 
[¶31]   Finally, Frederick contends that the prosecutor violated 
the agreement between the parties.  Frederick does not point to any statement or 
any action of the prosecutor to support this contention except to state that the 
prosecutor had an obligation to somehow correct statements made in the PSR; 
however, Frederick only expresses concern that the PSR author did not believe 
deferral was appropriate largely due to Frederick's statement to her that the 
sex was consensual.  
There is no assertion of any misstatement or other error in the PSR; 
indeed, Frederick's counsel stated that the report was 
"basically" correct.  
As indicated, the agreement between Frederick and the State was that the State 
would not object to consideration under § 7-13-301.  The State fully 
complied with the terms of this agreement.

 
 
[¶32]   When assessing the reasonableness of a sentence, 
consideration must be given to the crime, its attendant circumstances and the 
character of the defendant. Monjaras, ¶ 15, 136 P.3d  
at 165-166. Frederick pled guilty and 
accepted the State's version of the events of October 9, 2003. The facts 
presented to the district court and acknowledged by Frederick in the presence of his attorney 
amounted to a forcible rape of the victim. When it imposes a sentence, the court must consider all 
relevant facts. Martinez, ¶ 31, 128 P.3d  at 665. The court must "inform itself 
about the circumstances surrounding the offense and also the facts relating to 
the accused." Id. 
The district court properly carried out this mandate. It considered the 
nature of the crime and Frederick's character, and there was no violation of 
Frederick's constitutional rights. Third-degree sexual assault, of 
which Frederick was convicted, provides a maximum 
prison term of fifteen years. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-306(a)(iii) 
(LexisNexis2005). The sentence of two to four years which Frederick received is well within this range. 
It appears to this Court that in imposing the sentence, the district court 
considered the facts supporting the charge and that it took into account 
appropriate particular mitigating circumstances, including the letters and 
statements presented on behalf of Frederick. We will not disturb the sentence 
imposed by the district court.

 
 
Abuse of Discretion in Ordering Restitution and Public 
Defender Fees

 
 
[¶33]   Frederick does not believe that the district 
court properly ordered restitution.  The PSR indicated that the victim had medical 
expenses of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500).  The prosecutor 
explained to the district court that the victim was mistakenly billed for the 
forensic examination ("a sexual assault kit").  The prosecutor said that steps were being 
taken to "get that straightened out" and get the bill redirected to the 
requesting agency.  
The district court then ordered Frederick to "pay restitution for the expenses 
incurred by the victim" and that restitution should be directed to the State or 
to the "agency which assisted her."  Frederick made no objection to restitution. 
 The Judgment 
and Sentence ordered restitution to the victim in the sum of two thousand five 
hundred dollars ($2,500) "for any items not returned or damage done as a result 
of this offense"; the judgment did not direct restitution to the agency that 
ordered the examination.  

 
 
[¶34]   Since there was no objection to the 
restitution, the order can be reversed only if there was no authority for it, or 
if the order of restitution constitutes plain error.  Merkison v. State, 
996 P.2d 1138, 1141-1142 
(Wyo. 2000).  
Frederick argues that there is insufficient 
evidence of damages; that there is no proof that the victim actually incurred 
these expenses; and that the forensic examination was not necessary because 
sexual intrusion is not an element of third-degree sexual assault.  

 
 
[¶35]   The Wyoming legislature has created a clear 
mandate and procedure for the collection of restitution in criminal cases.  Coleman v. State, 
2005 WY 69, ¶ 12, 115 P.3d 411, 413-414 (Wyo. 2005).  The applicable statute is Wyo. Stat. Ann § 
7-9-102 (LexisNexis 2005).

 
 
Order to pay upon conviction:

 
 
            
In addition to any other punishment prescribed by law the court shall, 
upon conviction for any misdemeanor or felony, order a defendant to pay 
restitution to each victim as determined under W.S. 7-9-103 and 7-9-114 unless 
the court specifically finds that the defendant has no ability to pay and that 
no reasonable probability exists that the defendant will have an ability to 
pay.

 
 
[¶36]   The procedure by which restitution is 
ordered is set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-103 (LexisNexis 2005).

 
 

Determination of amount owed; execution:

 
 
(a)    As part of the sentencing process 
including deferred prosecutions under W.S. 7-13-301, in any misdemeanor or 
felony case, the prosecuting attorney shall present to the court any claim for 
restitution submitted by any victim.

 
 
(b)    In every case in which a claim 
for restitution is submitted, the court shall fix a reasonable amount as 
restitution owed to each victim for actual pecuniary damage resulting from the 
defendant's criminal activity, and shall include its determination of the 
pecuniary damage as a special finding in the judgment of conviction or in the 
order placing the defendant on probation under W.S. 7-13-301.  In determining the 
amount of restitution, the court shall consider and include as a special 
finding, each victim's reasonably foreseeable actual pecuniary damage that will 
result in the future as a result of the defendant's criminal activity.  A long-term 
physical health care restitution order shall be entered as provided in W.S. 
7-9-113 through 7-9-115.

 
 
(c)     The court shall order the 
defendant to pay all or part of the restitution claimed or shall state on the 
record specific reasons why an order for restitution was not entered.  If the court 
determines that the defendant has no ability to pay and that no reasonable 
probability exists that the defendant will have an ability to pay in the future, 
the court shall enter specific findings in the record supporting its 
determination.

 
 
(d)    Any order for restitution under 
this chapter constitutes a judgment by operation of law on the date it is 
entered.  To 
satisfy the judgment, the clerk, upon request of the victim or the district 
attorney, may issue execution in the same manner as in a civil action.

 
 
(e)    The court's determination of the 
amount of restitution owed under this section is not admissible as evidence in 
any civil action.

 
 
(f)     The defendant shall be 
given credit against his restitution obligation for payments made to the victim 
by the defendant's insurer for injuries arising out of the same facts or 
event.

 
 
[¶37]   Wyo. Stat. Ann § 7-9-101 (LexisNexis 
2005) defines the pertinent terms:

 
 
            
(iii)       "Pecuniary 
damage" means all damages which a victim could recover against the defendant in 
a civil action arising out of the same facts or event, including damages for 
wrongful death.  
It does not include punitive damages and damages for pain, suffering, 
mental anguish and loss of consortium.

            
(iv)       "Restitution" 
means full or partial payment of pecuniary damage to a victim.

            
(v)        "Victim" 
means a person who has suffered pecuniary damage as a result of a defendant's 
criminal activities.  
An insurer which paid any part of a victim's pecuniary damages shall be 
regarded as the victim only if the insurer has no right of subrogation and the 
insured has no duty to pay the proceeds of restitution to the insurer. 

 
 
[¶38]   This Court must address the difference 
between the oral ruling of the district court and the written Judgment and 
Sentence.  The 
district court orally ruled that payment should be made to the state or to the 
agency that assisted the victim.  The Judgment and Sentence directed 
restitution to the victim.  When a discrepancy exists between the oral 
pronouncement and the written order, the oral pronouncement prevails.  Sampsell v. State, 
2001 WY 12, ¶ 5, 17 P.3d 724, 725 (Wyo. 2001).  
The Judgment and Sentence should be corrected to be consistent and order 
restitution to the appropriate state agency.  This is consistent with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-309(g) (LexisNexis 2005) which provides that the investigating agency shall 
be responsible for the costs of any examination.

 
 
[¶39]   Under the two-pronged analysis, this 
Court must first determine whether there was authority for the order of 
restitution.  
Authority to order restitution to be paid to the agency requesting the 
forensic examination comes from the statutes that require restitution and from § 
6-2-309(j), which provides that the victim shall be reimbursed for any costs 
incurred, and that a "convicted offender of a sexual assault shall be ordered to 
reimburse any costs incurred . . . as a direct result of the sexual 
assault."  
Since a victim is any person who suffers pecuniary damage, the agency is 
a victim for purposes of restitution.

 
 
[¶40]   Frederick argues that there is no evidence that 
the victim had to pay the costs of the forensic examination, so any order was 
beyond the statutory authority.  We have already ruled that restitution is to 
be paid to the agency, so this argument fails.  The victim impact statement and the comments 
of the prosecutor, to which there were no objections, establish that the 
hospital billed for these expenses and that they would be paid by the 
investigating law enforcement agency.  We have held that a victim impact statement, 
such as that incorporated into the PSR in this case, is credible evidence upon 
which a court may impose a restitution amount.  Penner, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d  at 1047.  There is no dispute 
that costs were incurred in the amount of two thousand five hundred dollars 
($2,500).  
Finally, Frederick contends that 
since third-degree sexual assault does not have sexual intrusion as an element 
of the crime, restitution may not be ordered for the examination.  The law enforcement 
officers requested the forensic examination in order to determine whether a 
crime had been committed and, if so, the nature of the crime.  The fact that 
Frederick eventually entered a plea to a lesser 
charge does not ameliorate the need for a forensic examination at the start of 
the investigation.  
The first prong of the test, that there must be authority for 
restitution, was established. 

 
 
[¶41]   "This Court has held that, when a 
defendant knowingly and voluntarily agrees in a plea agreement to pay 
restitution, and then fails to object at sentencing to the restitution amount, 
he waives his right to challenge on appeal the factual basis of the restitution 
award."  Chippewa v. State, 
2006 WY 11, ¶ 7, 126 P.3d 129, 131 (Wyo. 2006).  
If Frederick had concerns 
about the amount, he had an obligation to object at the time of sentencing.  This would have 
allowed the district court the opportunity to correct any errors.  Janssen v. State, 
2005 WY 123, ¶ 25, 120 P.3d 1006, 1012 (Wyo. 2005).  We have made clear that it is the defendant's 
obligation to object to any sentencing information he contends is inaccurate; 
and that a defendant must challenge the accuracy of the information and has the 
duty to "deny, dispute, or disprove" it.  Martinez, ¶ 45, 128 P.3d  at 669. 
 Since there 
was no objection at sentencing, and no contention of plain error presented in 
the appeal, we could summarily dispose of this issue.  We will not consider 
nonjurisdictional issues unless they have been presented with at least a minimum 
effort to provide a cogent legal argument.  Bailey v. State, 
12 P.3d 173, 178 (Wyo. 
2000).   
The conclusion must be that the failure to object and the lack of any 
plain error analysis on appeal constitutes a waiver of any claim regarding 
restitution.  
We will, however, review the record to determine whether the order of 
restitution constitutes plain error.  A defendant who asserts plain error must 
demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and 
obvious way, and that a substantial right has been adversely affected and that 
the defendant was materially prejudiced.  Nixon v. State, 4 P.3d 864, 871 (Wyo. 
2000).  
Frederick does not articulate, and this Court 
is unable to find, any violation of an unequivocal rule of law.   

 
 
[¶42]   Frederick finally challenges the payment of 
public defender fees as set out in the written order.  The oral 
pronouncement at sentencing was that Frederick was unable to pay.  The State concedes 
that the Judgment and Sentence must be amended to conform to the oral 
ruling.

 
 
[¶43]   The sentence imposed by the district 
court is affirmed.  
The matter is remanded for the purpose of correcting the Judgment and 
Sentence so that it conforms to the oral ruling of the district court concerning 
payment of restitution and public defender fees.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The district court 
advised Frederick of his right to a jury trial and to have the State prove all 
charges beyond a reasonable doubt; of the right to an attorney who could be 
provided by the State; of the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and 
to have his own witnesses in court by service of process; of the right to remain 
silent; and of the right to an appeal.  The district court also advised Frederick that a plea would result in a waiver 
of a trial and of these rights, that a factual basis would be required under 
oath, and of the consequences of a plea, including the loss of certain civil 
rights.  The 
district court specifically advised Frederick of the penalties for the amended charge, ensured 
that Frederick was not under the influence of any 
drugs, medication, or alcohol, and that his plea was entered voluntarily and not 
precipitated by any force, threats, or promises.

  

  

GOLDEN, Justice, dissenting.

 
 
[¶44]   I respectfully dissent.  After reading the 
transcript of the change of plea hearing, I believe that the parties agreed on a 
specific sentence as part of the plea bargain.  When presenting the plea agreement to the 
district court, defense counsel stated that, as part of the agreement, Frederick 
"would receive a third degree sexual assault disposition, and the sentence would be five 
to seven years suspended.  And furthermore, Your Honor, if the PSI 
supports a 301 agreement, the state has agreed to agree to that." (Emphasis added.) The 
State acknowledged that the statement presented by defense counsel corresponded 
with its understanding of the plea agreement.  

 
 
[¶45]   While it would have been helpful to 
this Court for the parties to have put the plea agreement in writing, I believe 
the above-quoted language is sufficient to indicate that this was an agreed 
sentence as contemplated by W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(1)(C).  In such case, 
Frederick retained the right to withdraw his 
plea in the event the district court rejected the terms of the plea 
agreement.  The 
district court, however, apparently misunderstood the nature of the plea 
agreement and instead, in accordance with W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(2), advised Frederick that he "would not be allowed to 
withdraw [his] plea."  
Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel corrected the district 
court.  

 
 
[¶46]   At sentencing, the district court 
rejected the sentencing terms of the plea agreement and sentenced Frederick to imprisonment for a term of two to 
four years.  
Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel objected to the sentence on 
the basis that it ran contrary to the plea agreement.  On appeal, 
Frederick argues that the lack of objection at 
both the change of plea hearing and the sentencing hearing equates to both 
prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of defense counsel.  Frederick also 
claims that the district court erred in not advising him at sentencing, as 
required by W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(4), that he could withdraw his plea as a consequence 
of the court's rejection of the agreed upon sentence.  Because I believe 
these claims have merit, I would reverse and remand with directions that 
Frederick be allowed to withdraw his plea.

 
 
[¶47]   I am compelled to discuss one 
additional item.  
The majority opinion discusses the issue of reimbursement for a sexual 
assault medical examination pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-309(j) (LexisNexis 
2005).  The 
majority remands the case for the purpose of correcting the judgment and 
sentence to reflect the district court's oral pronouncement that reimbursement 
for the sexual assault medical examination should be paid to either the state or 
the agency that assisted the victim.  I believe this is in error.  The ambiguity of 
the oral pronouncement as to where payment should be directed reflects the 
confusion on the issue of reimbursement.  The district court did not know precisely who 
should be reimbursed because there was no evidence that the cost of the 
examination had been paid, let alone by whom.  All the prosecutor was able to say was that 
the victim had been erroneously billed for the medical examination and that she 
was attempting to correct the billing mistake.  Since no specific loss payee was identified, 
the district court's decision regarding reimbursement was premature.  The district 
court's order requiring Frederick to reimburse the 
victim for the cost of the medical examination should simply be 
reversed.