Case Title: Rumson Estates, Inc. v. Mayor & Council of the Borough of Fair Haven et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-159-01

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2003-08-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Rumson Estates, Inc. owns approximately 27,000 square feet of property in Fair Haven that it proposed to subdivide into three lots of fairly equal size. In applying the floor area ratio, Rumson Estates would have been able to build three lots of about 3,600 square feet; however, the cap limited the lots to 2,600 square feet. The Fair Haven Planning Board (Planning Board) denied Rumson Estate s application for a subdivision and variance to exceed the cap. Thereafter, Rumson Estates filed an action in Lieu of Prerogative Writs in the Law Division, claiming, among other things, that the cap was ultra vires (unauthorized, beyond the scope of power allowed by law) because it altered the MLUL definition of lot and thus skewed the MLUL definition of floor area ratio. While the action was pending, Rumson Estates refiled its subdivision application without the floor area variance request, and the Planning Board granted approval subject to the cap. Thereafter, Rumson Estates moved for summary judgment, citing the Appellate Division decision in Manalapan Builders Alliance, Inc. v. Township Comm. of Manalapan for the proposition that the cap was ultra vires because it violated the definition of floor area ratio in the MLUL. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Fair Haven s purpose in enacting the cap, which was to diversify the town s residential housing stock by allowing for smaller, more affordable construction, was a legitimate one, and that Rumson Estates did not defeat the presumption in favor of the cap s validity. On appeal, a majority of the Appellate Division affirmed, observing that Fair Haven s purposes in enacting the ordinance were legitimate goals of ensuring the proportionality of new construction to other homes in the zone and providing affordable housing in a municipality with limited area and housing stock. The court upheld the cap as an exercise of the municipality s authority under the MLUL to regulate the size of structures by using, in addition to floor area ratios, other ratios and regulatory techniques. The court distinguished Manalapan Builders because the cap did not violate a definition in the MLUL. One judge dissented, concluding that if redefining the formula for floor area ratio to achieve the salutary goal of protecting environmentally sensitive land is ultra vires under Manalapan Builders, then it is also impermissible to manipulate the definition by use of a cap. The matter is before the Court as of right, based on the dissenting opinion in the Appellate Division. Ferraro Builders Rand Associates is the titleholder and Ferraro Builders, LLC is the contract purchaser of property in the R-2 zone of Atlantic Highlands. The Borough of Atlantic Highlands Planning Board (Planning Board) granted a three-lot subdivision. Each lot exceeded what was then the R-2 zone minimum lot size of 15,000 square feet. After subdivision approval, the governing body of Atlantic Highlands adopted a steep slope ordinance. The ordinance was passed in response to a landslide that had blocked the roadway and inhibited egress and ingress to the area, as well as barring access to emergency vehicles. According to the municipality, the purpose of the ordinance was to avoid such occurrences by diminishing soil disturbance on the slope and preventing slump blocking. After the adoption of the steep slope ordinance, Ferraro Builders and Rand (hereinafter Ferraro Builders) built houses on two of their lots. The proposed structure on the third lot exceeded the maximum lot disturbance when the slope factors were applied. Ferraro Builders application for a slope-area permit was denied. They appealed to the Planning Board, which held that Ferraro Builders had failed to prove that the permit request was denied improperly, arbitrarily, or capriciously. Thereafter, Ferraro Builders filed a Complaint in Lieu of Prerogative Writs claiming, among other things, that under Manalapan Builders, the steep slope ordinance was facially invalid because it changed certain definitions in the MLUL; and that the ordinance violated the uniformity requirement of the MLUL by applying a different standard to sloped areas than was applicable to flat areas in the zone. The trial court upheld the ordinance and, on appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certification. HELD: With a narrow exception, the MLUL does not preclude a municipality from adopting a zoning ordinance that defines terms differently from the definitions in the MLUL. In addition, the notion of uniformity does not prohibit classifications within a district so long as they are reasonable and so long as all similarly situated property receives the same treatment. 1. The MLUL is a comprehensive statute enabling municipalities to adopt ordinances regulating land development in a manner that promotes public health, safety, morals, and general welfare through the use of uniform and consistent procedures. Every zoning ordinance must advance at least one of the many goals of the MLUL. Zoning ordinances are presumptively valid and the challenger has the burden of proving that the presumption should be overcome. Moreover, zoning ordinances are to be liberally construed in the municipality s favor. (Pp. 10-14) 2. When a defined term is used in the MLUL, it will have a specified meaning. However, there is nothing in the legislative history or in the MLUL itself to suggest that the Legislature intended the definitional language to constitute a broad prohibition on municipal zoning initiatives. If the MLUL had provided that the exclusive method available to a municipality for controlling intensity of residential land was floor area ratio and had defined the term, both the method and the definition would be binding. The MLUL specifically provides authority for municipalities to use a number of methods to control the intensity of residential use. There is nothing in the statutory scheme to suggest that the Legislature sought to preclude or otherwise limit the use of other ratios or regulatory techniques either alone or in combination with floor area ratio. In adopting the cap, Fair Haven used another regulatory technique in conjunction with floor area ratio. Likewise, Atlantic Highlands adopted another ratio and applied a slope factor to the total land area. Neither of those initiatives were ultra vires. (Pp. 15-21) 3. A municipality may enact a zoning ordinance that alters non-mandatory definitions in the MLUL. Similarly, in regulating the intensity of land use, a municipality may adopt not only a floor area ratio based on the relationship between the lot and the buildings, but any other ratio or regulatory technique that advances the goal of the MLUL. To the extent that Manalapan Builders reached a different conclusion, it is disapproved. (P. 21) 4. A central and overriding purpose of the MLUL is statewide uniformity of process and practices in the areas of zoning and land use. The statute provides that zoning ordinance regulations shall be uniform throughout each district for each class or kind of buildings or other structures or uses of land Another basis for the uniformity requirement is the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection that guard against the arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of police power. Rumson Estates and Ferraro Builders misinterpret this uniformity principle. Uniformity does not prohibit classifications within a district so long as they are reasonable. Rational regulations based on different conditions within a zone are permissible so long as similarly situated property is treated the same. (Pp. 21-25) 5. As found by the Appellate Division, Ferraro Builders and Rumson Estates did not overcome the presumption of validity of the ordinances they challenged. Fair Haven advanced two legitimate rationales for the cap: diversification of housing stock and control of residential density. Likewise, the reasons underlying Atlantic Highlands steep slope ordinance - avoidance of soil erosion and slump blocking - are legitimate environmental goals of the MLUL. The rationales underlying these ordinances are reasonably related to the purposes of zoning. That is not to suggest that these zoning initiatives are the best ways or even successful ways to achieve the stated purposes. Rather, they are rational approaches to real problems and Rumson Estates and Ferraro Builders failed to prove otherwise. (Pp. 25-29) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES COLEMAN, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, and ALBIN join in JUSTICE LONG S opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 159 September Term 2001 A- 45 September Term 2002 RUMSON ESTATES, INC., a corporation of the State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MAYOR & COUNCIL OF THE BOROUGH OF FAIR HAVEN, Defendant-Respondent, and FAIR HAVEN PLANNING BOARD, Defendant. FERRARO BUILDERS, LLC and RAND ASSOCIATES, a New Jersey Partnership, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOROUGH OF ATLANTIC HIGHLANDS PLANNING BOARD and BOROUGH OF ATLANTIC HIGHLANDS, Defendants-Respondents. Argued February 20, 2003 Decided August 5, 2003 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 350 N.J. Super. 324 (2002) (Rumson Estates, Inc. v. Mayor & Council of the Borough of Fair Haven). On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division (Ferraro Builders, LLC v. Borough of Atlantic Highlands Planning Board). Theodore D. Parsons, Jr., argued the cause for appellant Rumson Estates, Inc. (Parsons & Nardelli, attorneys). Martin A. McGann, Jr., argued the cause for appellants Ferraro Builders, LLC and Rand Associates (Mr. McGann, attorney; Mr. McGann and Marc A. Leckstein, on the briefs). Bernard M. Reilly argued the cause for respondents Mayor & Council of the Borough of Fair Haven and Borough of Atlantic Highlands (Dowd & Reilly, attorneys). Michael B. Steib argued the cause for respondent Borough of Atlantic Highlands Planning Board. Wayne J. Peck submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae, New Jersey Builders Association in Rumson Estates, Inc. v. Mayor & Council of the Borough of Fair Haven. The opinion of the Court was delivered by LONG, J. Two basic issues are presented by these appeals. See footnote 1 The first is whether a municipality may enact a zoning ordinance that alters the definitions in the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL). N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to 136. The second is whether zoning regulations may make provision for different conditions within a zone without violating the uniformity principle of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62a. We hold that, with a narrow exception, the MLUL does not preclude a municipality from adopting a zoning ordinance that defines terms differently from the definitions in the MLUL. We also hold that the notion of uniformity does not prohibit classifications within a district so long as they are reasonable and so long as all similarly situated property receives the same treatment. [(Emphasis added).] That statute dates back to our original zoning law, which was enacted in 1928 and was modeled on the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act published by the United States Department of Commerce in 1924. Both Acts contained a uniformity section. Legal commentators note that there were two sources underpinning the uniformity provision. The first was extra-legal. During the early debates over zoning, while the subject was in the balance, the assurance to potentially hostile landowners that all property which was similarly situated would be treated alike was critical. 1 Robert M. Anderson, American Law of Zoning, 5.22 at 333-34 (2d ed. 1977) (quoting Edward M. Bassett, Zoning at 50 (1940)). That uniformity principle essentially gave notice of nondiscrimination to property owners. 1 Anderson, supra, 5.22 at 334. The other basis for the uniformity requirement was, and continues to be, the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection that guard against the arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the police power. Roselle v. Wright, 21 N.J. 400, 409-10 (1956). As a result, nearly every jurisdiction has incorporated that limit into its zoning law. 1 Anderson, supra, 5.22 at 333. Plaintiffs broadly misinterpret that uniformity principle to mean that there can be no differences in the regulation of property within a zone. More particularly, plaintiffs in Rumson Estates contend that because the cap only has an effect on the larger lots in the zone, it renders the ordinance non-uniform. The plaintiffs in Ferraro Builders echo that argument, claiming that Atlantic Highlands lacks the power to provide special rules that apply only to properties in a zone that are on a slope. Not so. In fact, nearly thirty-five years ago, in commenting on an identical uniformity provision in the prior zoning statute, this Court clearly established that uniformity does not prohibit classifications within a district so long as they are reasonable. Quinton v. Edison Park Dev. Corp., 59 N.J. 571, 580 (1971) (interpreting uniformity requirement to allow distinctions among uses within given zone so long as distinctions are not arbitrary and unduly discriminatory); State v. Gallop Bldg., 103 N.J. Super. 367, 371 (App. Div. 1968) (upholding zoning ordinance providing special buffer zone requirements for property in business zone that border on residential zone). The same conclusion has been reached by our sister jurisdictions that have had occasion to interpret uniformity language similar to our own. See, e.g., Dupont Circle Citizens Ass n v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm n, 355 A.2d 550, 559 (D.C.) (remarking that uniformity provision does not prohibit classification which is reasonable so long as regulations are applied to all property throughout district with all owners of same class being treated alike), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 966, 97 S. Ct. 396, 50 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1976); Montgomery County, Md. v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 376 A.2d 483, 501 (Md. 1977) (observing that uniformity requirement does not prohibit classification within district so long as it is reasonable), cert. denied sub nom., Funger v. Montgomery County, Md., 434 U.S. 1067, 98 S. Ct. 1245, 55 L. Ed. 2d 769 (1978); Charter Township of Oshtemo v. Central Adver. Co., 336 N.W.2d 823, 826 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (approving ordinance permitting reasonable restrictions based upon different conditions within zone), appeal denied, 426 Mich. 871 (1986); Giger v. City of Omaha, 442 N.W.2d 182, 194 (Neb. 1989) (uniformity requirement does not prohibit reasonable classifications within district). In short, plaintiffs are wrong in their crabbed interpretation of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62a. Uniformity is not absolute and rational regulations based on different conditions within a zone are permissible so long as similarly situated property is treated the same. Reasonableness of classification is the key. Constitutional uniformity and equality requires that classification be founded in real and not feigned differences having to do with the purpose for which the classes are formed. Roselle, supra, 21 N.J. at 410 (citations omitted). [Cox, New Jersey Zoning, 34-7.5 at 735.] See also Paul J. Weinberg, 24 Zoning & Plan. L. Rep. 17 (2001) (commenting that monster houses are . . . failing to match the fabric of the neighborhood (citations omitted)). It is that disconnection that was a legitimate focus of Fair Haven s disproportionality rationale. Regarding the diversification of housing stock, Fair Haven maintains that it is attempting to achieve a laudable goal that, in other contexts, we generally have recognized. See, e.g., Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 548 (1977) (adopting notion that general welfare encompasses recognition of local and regional housing needs). Fair Haven underscores the need to build smaller, more affordable houses, observing that many municipal workers cannot afford to live in town. The municipality chose to confront that problem by initiating the cap. Whether that is the most efficient methodology may be debatable. But that is a decision for the municipality rather than for us. Pierro v. Baxendale, 20 N.J. 17, 26 (1955). Once the decision was made to cap the size of houses in the R-2 zone it became presumptively valid and . . . [is] not to be nullified except upon an affirmative showing that the action taken . . . was unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. Ibid. We cannot say that that showing was made in this case. NO. A-159 SEPTEMBER TERM 2001 ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court RUMSON ESTATES, INC., a Corporation of the State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant v. MAYOR & COUNCIL OF THE BOROUGH OF FAIR HAVEN, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED August 5, 2003 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Long CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY NO. A-45 SEPTEMBER TERM 2002 ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court FERRARO BUILDERS, LLC and RAND ASSOCIATES, a New Jersey Partnership, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOROUGH OF ATLANTIC HIGHLANDS PLANNING BOARD and BOROUGH OF ATLANTIC HIGHLANDS, Defendants-Respondents. DECIDED August 5, 2003 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Long CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY