Case Title: Ex parte Tahsin Industrial Corporation, U.S.A. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: John W. Clanton v. Tahsin Industrial Corporation, U.S.A.)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1070998

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2008-08-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: 08/22/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2008
_________________________
1070998
_________________________
Ex parte Tahsin Industrial Corporation, U.S.A.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  John W. Clanton
v.
Tahsin Industrial Corporation, U.S.A.)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-07-901818)
LYONS, Justice.
Tahsin 
Industrial 
Corporation, 
U.S.A. 
("Tahsin"),
petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the
1070998
2
Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order granting John W.
Clanton's consolidated motion for a partial summary judgment,
for a judgment on the pleadings, and to strike its defense
that the Sales Representative's Commission Contracts Act, § 8-
24-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the Commission Act"), applies
only to transactions and shipments within Alabama.  Tahsin
further asks us to direct the trial court to reinstate its
defense relating to the Commission Act.  We deny the petition.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Tahsin is a New Jersey corporation that manufactures
outdoor apparel and sports gear.  In 1996 Tahsin and Clanton,
a resident of Alabama, entered into a sales-representation
agreement, which provided that Clanton "shall serve as
[Tahsin's] exclusive sales representative for all accounts
located in the assigned territory specified on Schedule B."
Schedule B specified that Clanton's assigned territory
included Alabama and 16 other states.  As compensation for
Clanton's 
services, 
the 
sales-representation 
agreement
provided that "[Clanton] shall be entitled to a commission on
the net sales of goods to [Tahsin's] customers in the assigned
territory for orders received by the company ...."  The
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3
agreement further provided that "[c]ommission statements
containing accurate purchase order numbers, shipping dates,
customer's name and address, invoice numbers and invoice
dollar amounts shall be sent, together with payment, to
[Clanton] on or about the Fifteenth (15th) day of the month
following the month which the goods are paid for by the
customer."    
On August 31, 2007, Clanton sued Tahsin in the Jefferson
Circuit Court, claiming that Tahsin had breached the sales-
representation 
agreement 
by 
secretly 
selling 
products 
directly
to accounts within his assigned territory and by using other
sales representatives to sell products to accounts within his
territory.  Clanton asserted that Tahsin had failed to furnish
him, on a monthly basis, certain invoices reflecting  sales
that had occurred within his territory and the commissions
owed from these sales.  Clanton asserted that the sales-
representation agreement with Tahsin is governed by the
Commission Act, and Clanton therefore sought an award of
treble damages and attorney fees pursuant to § 8-24-3, Ala.
Code 1975.  Section 8-24-3 provides: "A principal who fails to
1070998
Section 8-24-2(a) provides: "The terms of the contract
1
between the principal and sales representative shall determine
when a commission is due."
4
pay a commission as required by Section 8-24-2
 is liable to
[1]
the sales representative in a civil action for three times the
damages sustained by the sales representative plus reasonable
attorney's fees and court costs." 
On October 24, 2007, Tahsin answered Clanton's complaint,
asserting general denials of liability and special defenses.
Tahsin's fifth defense asserted:  "Alabama Code 1975[,] § 8-
24-1 et seq.[,] applies only to commissions due and owing for
transactions 
or 
shipments within Alabama" ("the fifth
defense").  On December 21, 2007, Clanton filed a consolidated
motion for a partial summary judgment, for a judgment on the
pleadings, or to strike Tahsin's fifth defense.  Clanton
argued that the plain language of the Commission Act does not
limit its application to transactions or shipments within
Alabama.  
After a hearing on Clanton's motion, the trial court
issued an order striking the fifth defense.  The trial court's
March 10, 2008, order stated:
"[T]he court concluded that [Clanton] is not limited
to recover for acts or breaches which occurred
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5
within the State of Alabama.  The legislature could
have limited the operation of the statute, if that
had been its intent.  In the absence of such
limitation, the plaintiff is entitled to prove all
of his claims, wherever they arise, in this forum."
Tahsin then petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus
directing the trial court to vacate its March 10, 2008, order
and to reinstate Tahsin's fifth defense.
II. Analysis
Tahsin contends that it has a clear legal right to have
the order of the trial court vacated and its fifth defense
reinstated.  According to Tahsin, the trial court's order
striking its fifth defense improperly gives § 8-24-3
extraterritorial 
effect 
and 
thereby 
improperly 
creates
subject-matter jurisdiction for an Alabama court to award
punitive damages for conduct that occurred outside Alabama.
Tahsin avers in its petition:
"Mandamus is a proper means to review the order
of a trial court disallowing the right of a party to
assert an affirmative defense.  See Ex Parte Buffalo
Rock Co., 941 So. 2d 273, 277 (Ala. 2006)."
An affirmative defense is in the nature of a confession
and avoidance.  See Ex parte Wilson, [Ms. 1051697, November 2,
2007] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2007) (Lyons, J., concurring
specially).  By asserting that it is not subject to the
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statutory claim for three times the damages allegedly
sustained by Clanton plus reasonable attorney fees and court
costs under the Commission Act, Tahsin only partially avoids
judgment because its defense, if upheld, would not be
determinative of the action.  See Ex parte Employers Mut. Cas.
Co., 845 So. 2d 773, 776 (Ala. 2002) ("Likewise, governed by
the particular concerns of judicial economy raised by the
scenario involved here--a trial court's pretrial decision to
strike a potentially determinative affirmative defense--we
have previously issued the writ [of mandamus] after holding
that the trial court's decision was erroneous, focusing mainly
on the inherent prejudice on the petitioner.").  We find no
basis for relief by way of mandamus stemming from Tahsin's
reliance on authority dealing with striking an affirmative
defense. 
Tahsin further avers in its petition:
"Mandamus is a proper procedure to review
questions of subject matter jurisdiction. See Ex
Parte Davidson, 782 So. 2d 237, 240 (Ala. 2000); Ex
Parte Alabama Department of Mental Health, 837 So.
2d 808, 810-11 (Ala. 2002)." 
We have heretofore recognized mandamus as the appropriate
remedy when the underlying action is beyond the subject-matter
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7
jurisdiction of the circuit court.  In Ex parte Davidson, 782
So. 2d 237 (Ala. 2000), cited by Tahsin, this Court issued the
writ of mandamus in a setting where the trial court's order
was void for having been entered after posttrial motions had
been denied by operation of law pursuant to Rule 59.1, Ala. R.
Civ. P.  In Ex parte Alabama Department of Mental Health, 837
So. 2d 808 (Ala. 2002), also cited by Tahsin, this Court
awarded mandamus relief where the petitioners asserted State
and State-agent immunity under the Alabama Constitution of
1901.  See also Ex parte Fluor Contractors Int'l, 772 So. 2d
1157, 1159-60 (Ala. 2000), dealing with a claim seeking an
award of benefits under the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act,
§ 25-5-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, for an injury that  occurred
while the employee was working outside Alabama, a circumstance
giving rise to subject-matter jurisdiction only if one of the
conditions specified in § 25-5-35(d) applies; Ex parte
Blankenship, 893 So. 2d 303, 307 (Ala. 2004), dealing with a
sheriff's immunity under the Alabama Constitution of 1901
("[W]e grant the petition for a writ of mandamus and direct
the Talladega Circuit Court to vacate its order denying the
motion to dismiss and to enter an order dismissing the action
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8
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction."); Ex parte Punturo,
928 So. 2d 1030, 1035 (Ala. 2002), dealing with jurisdiction
conferred by the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act ("PKPA"),
28 U.S.C. § 1738A, and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act ("UCCJA"), § 30-3-20 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, and issuing
the writ of mandamus ("[T]he PKPA and the UCCJA foreclosed the
Tuscaloosa County Circuit Court from exercising jurisdiction
over the parties and the issues.").  None of the foregoing
cases is analogous to the theory of the absence of subject-
matter jurisdiction advanced here by Tahsin.  
"Subject-matter jurisdiction concerns a court's power to
decide certain types of cases."  Ex parte Seymour, 946 So. 2d
536, 538 (Ala. 2006).  It is axiomatic that an Alabama circuit
court has subject-matter jurisdiction over an action for
breach of the sales-representation agreement, given the amount
in controversy in this case.  See, e.g., Rose v. Delaney, 576
So. 2d 232, 233 (Ala. 1991) ("This case is a breach of
contract action, a civil matter over which the circuit court
has jurisdiction.  § 12-11-30, Alabama Code 1975.").  We see
no defect in the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction
with respect to Tahsin's claimed error in striking its fifth
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9
defense.  If a trial court erroneously rejects a contention
that the United States Constitution requires it to refrain
from awarding a certain form of damages, notwithstanding a
state statute authorizing such damages, the remedy is appeal
from the final judgment.  
III. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing reasons, we deny Tahsin's
petition.
PETITION DENIED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin,
Parker, and Murdock, JJ., concur.