Case Title: State v. Hicks.

Citation: 113 Haw. 60

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-12-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

 

000-

 

 

STATE OF HAWAT'T, Plaintiff-appellee,

   

 

No. 27566

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(cR. NO. 04-1-1824)

DECEMBER 7, 2006
MOON, C.J, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.

Defendant-appellant Gilbert 0. Hicks (hereinafter,

Hicks or the Defendant] appeals from the October 11, 2005

ntence of the Circuit

 

judgment of conviction and probation
Court of the First Circuit, the Honorable Richard W. Pollack

presiding, adjudicating Hicks guilty of and sentencing him for
the offense of sexual assault in the third degree, in violation
of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-732(1)(e) (Supp. 2005),

a former youth

 

quoted infra. Briefly stated, Hicks

correctional officer at the Hawai'i Youth Correctional Facility

aad
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(the H¥CF) -- was charged with and convicted of sexual assault
for grabbing the testicles of a minor who was committed to the
HYCE [hereinafter, Complainant]. Hicks was subsequently
sentenced to five years’ probation subject to certain conditions.
on appeal, Hicks challenges the trial court’s denials
of his (1) oral motion for judgment of acquittal made at the
close of plaintiff-appellee state of Hawaii's (the prosecution)
case-in-chief and (2) notion for new trial or judgment of
acquittal made after the verdict was rendered. Hicks maintains
that there was insufficient evidence that the HYCF is a "state
correctional facility" and that Complainant was "an imprisoned
person," as required by HRS § 707-732(2) (e). Specifically, Hicks
argues that the HYCF -- a correctional facility under the
jurisdiction of the Office of Youth Services within the

Department of Human Services -- does not fall within the phrase

 

"state correctional facility," which term encompasses only adult
prisons and correctional facilities under the supervision of the
Department of Public Safety and that, therefore, Complainant

cannot be said to be "imprisoned." Additionally, Hicks requests

for the first time on appeal a review of the sexual assault

 

statutes "as they are either void for vagueness or otherwi

 

violate [his] rights to due process" under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and

article I, sections § and 14 of the Hawai'i Constitution. For

 
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the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court’s October

a1, 2005 §

with one c

indictment

RS § 707-

(Bold emph

“

 

judgment of conviction and probation sentence

1. BACKGROUND

on September 15, 2004, Hicks was charged by indictment

ount of sexual assault in the third degree. The

averred that:

on or around the 18th day of January) 2004, to and
Gheluding the 23rd day of January(] 2004, in the City and
County of Honolulu, state of Havai'i, GILBERT 0. HICKS,
‘hile employed in a state correctional facility, aid
Wmowingly subject to sexual contact, (Complainant) , an
inprisoned person, by placing his hand on. (Complaisanc]
scrotum, thereby conmitting the offense of Sexual Asgaule in
fhe Third Degree, in violation of (HRS §) 707-7324) (e) f-)

 

 

732 provides in relevant part:

Sexual assault in the third degree. (1) A person
commits the offense of sexual assault in the third degree
ier

 

ici "Te person, waite employed:

(1) ""ja'a state corrections) facilicy:

(Gb Bye private company providing
2 correctional facility;

(440) By a private company providing comunity
Based residential aervices to person:
committed to the director of public
and having recelved notice of this
statute;

Uv) By'a private correctional facility
operating in the State of Hawai'i, or

(wv) Rea law enforcement officer aa defined in

Section 710-1000(13), knowingly subiecte
‘fo -semial_contact an imprisoned person. a
Berson confined to-a detention factiiey. a

steed £0 the dir

aafety.a person residing ina private
Gorrectional facility operating in the
‘State of Hawaii ox a person in custody.

re gexual

vices at

 

 

sety

 

 

ia) Setuat assault in the third degree is a class ¢
felony.

8 in original.) (Underscored emphases added.)

 

 

qe

undisputed that, at the time of the offense, Complainant wae a
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minor housed at the HYCF and that Hicks was a Youth Correction
Officer (¥CO) employed by the HYCF.
A. The Tri

A four-day jury trial began on duly 12, 2005.
Witnesses testifying for the prosecution consisted of, inter
alia, @ ¥CO, several former HYCF wards,’ the HYCF’s head nurse
and staff physician, a YCO and Internal Affaire Investigator, and

Complainant. Hicks testified in his defense.

 

2. Testimony of the Prosecution’ s Witne:
on July 14, 2005, Complainant? testified as to the
incident that formed the basis of the underlying offense against
Hicks:
@. By the prosecutions) I'd 1ike to draw your
atvention tothe week of January 18eh to the 23rd of 2004;

this week, January 18 to the 23rd, 2008
Daring that week, were you house

 

 

in Module BP

   

A. (By Complainants] Yes.
@. Did you experience any painful incident that
week?
Q. here id i happen?
Xi In = when we was (eie] Lning up

for go back to school, in the module.
‘You were inside the module?
Okay. Do you -- approxizately what
tine waa ie that S© happened?
‘About 12:08 er 1210.

 

 

    

Okay. Te this the normal time that you Line up to
go back to sencol?

 

S Minors housed at the HYCF are referred to as *warde.*

 

* Complainant testified that he spent a total of approximately aix
months in the HYCF between the age of fourteen or fiftesn and eighteen.
Apparently, the HYCP consists of three modules -- A, B, and C. Complainant
Stated chat he had lived in all three modules; at the tine of the offense,
however, he was housed in Module B

 

 
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©. And who was there? what staff menbers were in the
nodule at the time?
Rohr, Hicks.
Dust tr licks!

@! Mieve were che other warde?

A. waiting in Line, too.

Q. ow did the incident start?

Ri Me bas, like, a verbal conflict,
Like, tatking about -- he told ne to grab'hie dick or his
balls and I'eold hin to grab mine; and, like, a while after,
hhe cane up to me and grabbed mine and grabbed sy ~~ my balls
and my dick and twisted it and -=

Q. Te started with him telling you to grab his dick
or hie baile?

yea

 

O:_ War be speaking just to you or was he speaking to
wre ust

@. Just te your

@. Kas ‘he ooking directly at your

@! hat dia you think he was -- what did you think
hie meaning was when he said that?

Re ifvm] not too sure. He has his mind of his om.
r{vm) not really ==

@. You weren't sure what he meant?

K. Yean. T'vaen't sure what he meant

Q! Any idea why he would say this co you?

RL oko.

0. Mas he expr
said i to you?

A. Laughing.

@! Laughing. okay. So when you heard him say this,
what did you say back to him?

"Say =” what aid'T say back to him? *why don't you
grab my balls or ick.

 

ng any emotion at the time that he

 

6.° 1. and why até you say this back

to hin?
"A. Me was [sic] just joking. 1 thought

we was feicl just joking,

@.” Okay. You just said it back --

Ri Suet tor Iatigh, you know.

Q. Okay. But what did be do
immediately after you said that?

Re. Re walked up to me and grabbed ay

balls and my dick and twisted it.
O: How close were the tuo of you before
=- before he walked up £0 you?
‘A. Maybe, Like, two feet avay.
@. So \how many’ stepe did he take to

before he grabbed you?
A. Tlvm] not too sure.

AL Maybe, Like, two steps

 
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0. Two steps. Mow did he grab you?
Ai a grabbed oe with his Fight Rand and
twiated ie up toward the right, Like clockwine kind.

10. Did he grab you through your
clothing?

When asked whether he tried to defend himself during the
incident, Complainant responded negatively, stating that he did
not touch Hicks "[b]ecause it would have been wrong for me to hit
a ¥CO, and I could have gotten in trouble for that."

‘Three former wards of the HYCP, who were present at the
time of the incident, testified to the event between Hicks and
Complainant. They all testified to observing Hicks grabbing
Complainant's testicles while they were standing in line in
Module # to return to school in the afternoon. Further, HYCF
head nurse, Linda Hadley, testified that she examined Complainant
and observed Complainant’s right testicle to be "swollen, red,
and [that he was in] lots of pain." HYCF staff physician, Dr.
Robert Bidwell, also testified that he conducted "a medical
history" of Complainant -- not a physical examination -- and, in
his opinion, the injury was consistent with the explanation
Complainant gave of having his testicles grabbed and twisted.

‘The testimony of YCO Cathy Jean Kaleo Narciel, who has
been employed at the HYCF for six years, revealed that the duties
of a ¥CO consisted of "security[,] custody and control of wards."

She explained that:

 
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(The wards) are troubled youths that have been sentenced to
prison and -~ that's basically what it is. They're in jail,
And I’m a correctional officer for the youth

 

 

Marciel further stated that

{A Yoo} can be assigned toa sodule [or]... to
Central Control. And'=- well, if you're in the podile, you
normally take the kids to school.

Gential Control is the heart of our facility. rr
‘opens and closes doors and -- it's our security area.

 

icenérai control contains) four monitors for) five
monitors that view the different modules, outside, inside,
onthe strects. It's all cameras that we have within
Gitterent parte of the facility

 

 

injesides watching the monitors, [¥cos assigned to
central Control] release ana -~ [] open and close doors and
watch where everyone's going. That's their job.

    

She described the morning routine in the modules as "what
normally we do, the routine is we open up each cell door and we
wake them up, tell them, go ahead and clean your room."

linen asked whether the HYCF is a state correctional
facility and whether Complainant was "a minor imprisoned at
HYCF," Marciel answered "yes" to both inguiries. Hicks did not
object to the questions or the answers. Marciel then described

the conversation she had with Complainant the morning of January

 

29, 2004 when she observed Complainant "holding his groin area":

A. [By Marcel] And, #0, T said, "wnat’e
wrong?” and he said, "I'm sorry. I'gotta see the murge.*
Tsaid, ‘Well, when did this happen?* He goes, "I don’t
know."

T said, "Did you --" 1 asked him if he saw the nurse
last night, and he said yeah. And I said, “Well, just wait
for her to'come up this morning." You know, that’s normal
for then. You know, they wee the nurse twice a day, two OF
three times a day.

 

 

Q. [By the prosecution] Did you ask him why he was

hurting in that area?
*

Yes, 1 ia.
What did he tel1 your
He said that "my belle are sore."

   

 

 
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And 1 said -- 1 said, shat? ® And he said, *Yeah. Hicks

grabbed my Balle." And’ 1 said, "wnat?" Aad then he oad,

Gh. ie was out of playing, oF
Marciel testified that she believed Complainant wae hurting
because *(hle was walking real slow." She also stated that she
was assigned by her supervisor to take Complainant to the
hospital to get checked, Marciel indicated that she "placed
shackles* on Complainant before transporting him to the hospital
and, at the hospital, she had to be near Complainant at all
times, right outside the examination curtain.

Another YCO and Internal Affaire Investigator, Henry
Bell Haina, Jr., testified that he was assigned to investigate
the case of misconduct involving Hicks and Complainant by the
youth facility administrator Kaleve Tufono-Iosefa. when asked
whether Complainant was "imprisoned at [the] HYCF back in January
of 2004," Haina answered in the affirmative. Haina testified
that he narrowed the specific date as to when the incident
occurred to January 21, 2004 by reviewing

the reporting of the incident; the statenent of
[complainant] as to how long he wae in pain and the tine

elenent between it and the reporting to Cathy Marciel and
The medical unit; going back and looking at sign-in eheste
fand figuring out when Mr. Hicks wae on duty [in Module 8]

    

 

As previously testified by Marciel, Haina explained that there
are four cameras in each nodule and one outeide the door for a
total of five caneras for each module. Using the January 29,

2004 videotape of Module C, entered as State’s exhibit 7, Haina

further described what each camera looks at, including the YCO

 
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desk and the inside of the entrance door to the module. Haina,

however, testified that the January 21, 2004 videotape was not

preserved.

on cross-examination, the following colloquy occurred:

 

ignment ~~ oF

0. thy the defense counsels] Your

you were assigned by Ms. Faleve Tufono-lose!
{By tiainatl Yee, sir,

 

BU The tas the <- he's the adeinistrator?
Youth Facility Administrator,
yer?

 

also used the word "warde

 

interchangeably.
‘pangeab)y  eeyday conversation’s sakel,] you could call

ner the wardens, She fs the top person at the facility:
S.Shur perhaps "VFA" is he more correct term, more
‘Ay That ig the actual Fitie.

 

6." fino de Ma. Tosefa accountable to? ra there

ve shove MSIE, sharon Agnew, the executive director.

3, Executive Director of Youth Services?

AL Yes, sir

2: ASS" ehe oversees not just the youth correctional
eactitly, bur other <= 1 guess, other programs within the
Eefice of Youn Services; correct?

Ay Yee, pir

a: X88" sgnew Je accountable to [the] Director of
muman Services?

Bor believe £0.

 

hrough the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses,
che prosecution admitted as exhibits, inter alia, photographs of
the secured cell doors within Module B and the January 29, 2004
video of Module ¢, showing the wards in orange prison type
unifores Lined up at the security door in front of Hicks, who was
dressed in a YCO uniform.

2. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

 

At the close of the prosecution's case, Hicks orally

moved for judgment of acquittal:

 
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Your Honor, the [prosecution] having completed ite
evidence, the defense soves for Judgnent of acquittal. They
have not ‘established a prima facle case. specifically, they
need to prove that (Complainant) was imprisoned. the’ {HYC#|
under the jurisdiction of the Deparcnent of jiuman
vices, ‘ot the Department of Public satety, and? don't
think it’s been established that the [SYCF] ie a prison,
Buch that (Complainant) was in prison at the tine of tho
Alleged incident. So ve would submit there's been a feilure
f= there should be judgnent in favor of the defense

   

 

In response, the prosecution argued tha

Our argunent is that we did establish that, that one
witness in pareicular testified directly to that demue, that
he isan inprisoned minor at (che) HYCP. ‘I believe there's
more than one witness, Your Nonor, that testified co that,
effect.” There's no requirement that we bring in someone
from the Department of Munan Services or the Department of
Public Safety to say that. It doesn't say chat we have to
have anyone in particular testify to that. And, #0, it may
go to wight ifvhe vanes to argue that Se’s not imprisone
Bur ir cereainily dooen't, at this stage in the proceedings,
constitute « lack of prima facie proof.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Thereafter, the trial court orally denied the motion for judgment

of acquittal, stating that:

Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government and draving a favorable inference thereto, the
Telourr believes @ prima facia [eic] case bas been
established.

 

3. Hicks’s Testimony
on July 14, 2005, Hicks testified that he has been
working as a YCO at the HYCP since 1980. In January 2004, Hicks
stated that he worked in Module B and typically worked the
midnight shift; however, on January 21, 2004, he worked from 6:00

a.m. to

  

0 p.m. Hicks, however, denied any contact with

Complainant on January 21, 2004:

Il, ses, Hicks) have 2 recollection that st{, i.e.
vanuary 21,°2006,] waa a normal day. The -- t can't say it
vas anychiog out’ of the ordinary that particular day. The
wards lined up for school; 1 did my head counts; they went
to school; they cane back{.]

 

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When asked whether he remembered Complainant specifically during
his shift, Hicks responded that:

We was in the module; but I don’t renenber personally,
Like, How'you doing, [Complainant]? Because that’ was the
first -- he was new tome that day. That was the First tine
[had seen (Complainant] in that month. If he had been
there earlier, 7 don’t remenber.

Hicks maintained that’ January 21, 2004 was the only time he saw

 

 

 

Complainant because it was the only day in January that he worked
the day shift.

Moreover, Hicks described the scene on the January 29,
2004 videotape, in which he clained that he was the person being
harassed:

As you can see (from the videol, the wards -- the
wards cone Back to bother ne, to say things tome, to —

they know 1 can't physically touch them and all T'can do is
give then 2 day suspension. 50, Hey —- this and that. They
Zan say almost anything they want, and they do that to get
inte your head, 0 Bother you, fo make you do things.
Basically, T just ignore it.

Re you can see right there (indicating), same
sane = the sime View, ‘The wards beve Co -- this’ ie what
you call a safe area, and they are standing on the outeide
Of the square. So, in case of 2 code red or seeing where
Tre attacked, which is called
door and let" and lets me cut.
‘haven't ete that area.

 

   

 

 

 

 

    

 

on crose-examination, Hicks was asked whether it was
true that, if a ward touches a YCO in an offensive manner, he can
be disciplined, Hicks answered that "[t]hey’re already in jail."
4. The Verdict
on guly 15, 2005, the trial court instructed the jury.
‘The relevant instruction was based on HRS § 707-732(1) (e) and the
definition of "sexual contact" set forth in HRS § 707-700 (Supp.

2005):

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The (DJefendant, Gilbert Hicks, is charged with the
‘Assault in the Taird Degree. A person

ise of Sexual Assault in the Third Degree if

smployed in a state correctional, knowingly

subjects to sexual contact an imprisoned person,

‘There ave four material elements of the offense of
Sexual Assault in the Third Degree, each of which the
Prosecution mist prove beyond a reasonable doube. These
Pour elenence are

 

  

 

 

2) That on or about August 18th, 2008, to and
including January 23%, 2004, in the city and county of
Honolulu, state of Hawal'i, the [D]efendant subjected
[Complainant] to sexual contact; and

2) That the [DJefendant did so while (Complainant) was
imprisoned; and

3) That the [Dlefendant did so while the (D]efendant
was employed in a state correctional facliiey, and

3) That the [D]etendant did so knowingly,

 

Sexual contact means any touching, other than acts of
sexual penetration, of the sexual or other intimate pares of
2'person not married to the actor or of the sexual of other
Intimate parte of the actor by the person, whether directly
or through the clothing or other maverial intended £0 cover
the sexual or other intimate parts.

 

That same day, the jury returned its verdict, finding Hicks
guilty of sexual assault in the third degree.
B. Motion for New Tri eal

on duly 25, 2005, Hicks filed a motion for new trial or
judgment of acquittal (motion for new trial), pursuant to, inter
alia, Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rules 29 (motion
for judgment of acquittal) and 23 (notion for new trial) (2005).
Hicks maintained that the prosecution had not proven every
element of the offense; specifically, Hicks argued that the
prosecution did not present substantial evidence that Complainant
was an imprisoned person, Hicks contended that a juvenile ward

is not a "prisoner* in the

 

of the Department of Human Service:

custody of the Department of Public Safety:

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Be de not disputed that [aldult prisons and
correctional facilities are Under the Jurisdiction of the
Department of Public Safety. The [NYCF], where
[Complainant] was confined, fails under the Jurisdiction of
fhe Office of Youth Services within the Department of Munan
rrvices:

 

 

 

cution filed its

 

on August 17, 2005, the pros
menorandun in opposition, arguing that substantial evidence was
adduced that Complainant was imprisoned at the HYCF, pointing
specifically to Marciel’s testimony that the HYCF is a state
correctional facility and that Complainant was a minor imprisoned

at the HYCF, The prosecution further asserted that:

‘me rules of statutory construction indicate chat the
undefined phrase, ‘imprisoned person,” sust be read to bear
Tee common, ordinary or usual eaning. Giga HRS § 1-14

Webster’ s Collegiate Dictionary, sth
‘ean Neritage On-line Dictionary,
e Neo put in or as if in prison; contine.*
According to Random Kouse Webster's Dictionary, 3r@ edition,
Page 362, "imprison* meana "eo confine in or ao if ina
Brison.*\ None of these common, ordinary and sual seanings
BE simprison can be interpreted to exclude Juvenile innat
Confined ina youth correctional facility.” Hor do these
Conon, ordinary and tsual seanings of “imprison draw a
Gierinéelon between the confinesent of adults under he
Department of Public Safety and the Confinenent of children
Under the Department of Munan Service

Statutory construction rules also dictate that
lundefined words should not be given meanings that lead to
absurdity cr inconsistency, The penetration statute, HRS
$ 1707-731 seexual assault in the second degree," contains
Ene ane language in igsue.” It would be absurd to believe
thet the legislature intended to punish guards for sexual
penetration and sexual contact with adults confined in a
Sorractional facility Like (ehe Oahu Conmunity Correctional
Genter] under the supervision of the Department of Public
Safety, but to allow guards to have sexual penetration and

yrual contact with juveniles confined in a correctional
Escility like [ehe] #YCF under the supervision of the
Departnent of Hunan Services. This absurd result would be
Gnconaistent with the overall statutory schene for sexual
offense, which evidences a strong legislative intent to
Provide more, not leas, protection for minors against
Sefenders

 

   

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

cual

   

(citations omitted.)

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on August 18, 2005, the trial court held a hearing on

the motion for new trial, at the conclusion of which the court,

persuaded by the prosecution's arguments, orally denied the
motion, A written order was filed on September 2, 2005. In eo
doing, the trial court entered the following findings of fact

(POFs) and conclusions of law (CoLs) +
emmmvas oF Fact

2. The (plrogecution, in ita case at exial, presented
witnesses who testified chat the [HYCF] isa ‘state
Correctional facility and that. (Complainant) was a ward,
Confined and imprisoned at [the] HYCF at the time of the

offense.
2! the testimony and evidence presented by the
se at trial, did not disput

Detense, in it
SONCWUSIONE OF LAW

2. The specific language of the Indictrent alleges
‘that the Defendant, while employed in a state correct ional
facility, aid knowingly subject to sexual contact,
(Conpiainase], an *inprisoned perso!

2. "the phrase "imprisoned peraon" is not defined in
the statute or in any other velevant part of the Hawal't

Penal code.
3 Smeve the atatute does not provide @ legal

@etinition for a word or phrase, the court must lock to ite
common, ordinary or usual weaning.

4. "Merriam Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 10th
edition, defines the word "imprison" as "eo put in oF as if
in prison; confine.

 

 

 

 

    

 

smple and substantial evidence chat
‘confined" person at a state
correctional facility and vas held in or as if in prison.”
6. The language on the face of HRS §707-73211) fe) (2)
does not eupport the Defendant's legal argunent that the
‘applies only to adulta confined

   

     

7: HRS. § 707-732(2) (e) (2) states that 2 person
commits the offense of sexual assault in the third degree if
the person, while employed in 2 state correctional facility.

knowing subjects to sexial contact an isprisoned person, a
person confined to a detention facility, a person committed
fo the director of public safecy, a person residing ina
private correctional facility operating in the state of
Haval's, or a person in custody, or causes the person to
have sexual contact with the actor.

 

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8. There is nothing in the language of Has § 707~
792(2) (2) (1) “that indicates a legislative intent to exclude
Hon the meaning of "imprisoned person* a vara confined or
imprisoned ina state correctional facility, like [ehel
myer.

9. ven Af the [clourt were to accept the Defendant's
argument that the distinctions between adult criminal
proceedings and juvenile delinquency proceedings create an

webiguity a2 to whether a juvenile can be congideres an
imprisoned person,* any potential ambiguity is resolved by
HRS chapter 452, entitied *Hawal'l Youth Correctional
Pacilicies."

$o, HRS § 352-2.2(a) state, "{t]hie chapter creates
within the department of human services and tobe places
“thin the office of youth services under the supervision of
the dizector and auch’ other subordinates as the director
shall designate, the Hawai'i youth correctional facilities,
inorder to provide for the incarceration, punishmest, and
inetivstional care and services to reintegrate into their
Communities and families children committed by the courts of
the Star

I.” Merriam Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 19th
edition, defines "incarceration" in essentially the sume way
St defined "imprigon," that is, "to put in prison; to
Subject to confineneitt.*

S2\° Se"theretore appears clear that notwithstanding
any differences between aduit criminal and juvenile
delinquency proceedings, the legislature views juveniles
Confined to a youth corvectionsl facility as incarcerated or
Inprisoned persons

{b.) Et would algo be incongruous to interpret HRS
§ 707-733 (2) (e) (1) dn a manner that provides incarcerated
Adulte vith protection against sexual assault by
Correctional officers but denies the sane protection to
Uncarcerates ehilaren.

 

 

 

 

     

   

   

(auphasis and brackets in original.)
c. nt of Convic wobation Sentence

on October 10, 2005, Hicks was sentenced to five years’
probation subject to certain conditions, including a ninety-day
jail term to be served on weekends in alternating increments
beginning Friday or Saturday. The judgment of conviction and
probation sentence was filed the next day. On October 24, 2005,
Hicks timely filed his notice of appeal with the circuit court.’

> Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HPAP) Rule 4(b) (2005) provides

in relevant part
(continued...)

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II, STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Motion for Judoment of Acquittal

‘The standard to be applied by the trial court in
ruling upon a notion for a judgnent of acquittal is whether,
tipon the evidence vieved in the light nost favorable to the
prosecution and in full recognition of the province of the
Erier of fact, 2 reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. An appellate court employs the
seme stanasrd of review.

State v. Maldonado, 108 Hawai'i 436, 442, 121 P.3d 901, 307

(2005) (citation omitted) (format altered).

B. Motion for New Trial

"(T]he granting or denial of a motion for new trial is

 

within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be
disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion." state v. Yanada,
108 Hawai'i 474, 478, 122 P.3d 254, 258 (2005) (citation

ed that an abuse of discretion

 

omitted). It is well-establie!
occurs if the trial court has "clearly exceed[ed] the bounds of
reason or disregards rules or principles of law or practice to
the substantial detriment of a party litigant." id, (citation

omitted) .

 

2s continued)
(2) TIME AND PLACE OF FILING. In a criminal case, the

notice of appeal thall be filed in the circuit, district, oF
family court within 30 days after the entry of the judgnent

or order appealed fron.

 

(2) EEPECE OF pOST-JUDGMEUT MOTIONS. 1 a timely
motion in Srrest of judgment under [MRP] ‘Rule 34 or
for a new trial under (HRP?) Rule 33... . has been wade, an

 

 

appeal from a judgnent of conviction may be taken with
Gays after the entry of any order denying the notion
Waderscored exphases and capitalization in original.)
Algo, in his opening brief, Hicks indicates that he did not post bail
pending appeal and is in compliance with all terms and conditions of
robation:

   

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Furthermore, at a hearing on a motion for new trial,
the trial court acts as the trier of fact. State v. St, Clair,
102 Hawai'i 280, 267, 67 P.3d 779, 786 (2003) (citation omitted).

In thie Juriediction, a trial court’s rors are aubject to
the clearly ervoneous standard of review. aa FOP is clearly
erroneous when, despite evidence to support the finding, the
(ppellate court Se left with the definite and firm
Conviction that a mistake has been committed, And where
Ehere ie substantial evidence, whlch is credible evidence of
Sufeicient quantity and probative value to justify a
Teasonable person in reaching conclusions that support the
bors, the fers cannot be set aside. Moreover, an appellate
Court will not pase upon issues dependent upon credibility
Se witnesses and the weight of the evideace; this is the
province of the trial judge.

 

 

 

 

     

Id. (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
A trial court's conclusions of law, however, are reviewed de
nove, under the right /wrong standard of review. State v. Kido,
109 Hawai'i 458, 461, 128 P.34 340, 343 (2006).
©. Constitutional questions

‘The constitutionality of a statute is a question of
law, which is reviewed de nove, under the right/wrong standard.
State v. Friedman, 93 Hawai'i 63, 67, 996 P.2d 268, 272 (2000).
vWe anewer questions of constitutional law by exercising our own
independent constitutional judgment based on the facts of the
case." Id, (citation and internal quotation marks onitted).
D. Statutory Interpretation

"the interpretation of a statute is a question of law
reviewable de novo." State v. Kalani, 108 Hawai'i 279, 283, 118

P.3d 1222, 1226 (2005) (citation and internal quotation marks

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omitted). rt is well settled that our foremost obligation when

construing a statute

Le to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
legisiature, which ig to be obtained primarily rem the
Language contained in che statute iteelf. And ve must read
statutory language in the context of the entire statute and
Construe st in a manner consistent with ite purpose

 

 

 

Id. (citation omitted).
TIT. DISCUSSION
on appeal, Hicks argues that: (1) the prosecution
failed to adduce sufficient evidence that the HYCF is a "state
correctional facility" and that Complainant was an "imprisoned
person," as mandated under HRS § 707-732(2) (e); and (2) the

lt statutes are unconstitutional. Accordingly, Hicks

 

sexual
urges this court to reverse his conviction or remand for new

trial. gach of Hicks’ contentions is addressed in turn.

A, Sufficiency of the Evidence

‘This court has repeatedly announced that, when passing
on the legal sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction,

evidence adduced in the trial court mist be considered in
the strongest light for the prosecution when the appellate
court passes on the legal sufficiency of such evidence £0
fupport a conviction; the same standard applies whether the
case was before a judge or a jury. ‘The test on appeal is
hot whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt,
but whether there was substantial evidence to support. the
Conclusion of the trier of fact.

State v, Viglielmo, 105 Hawai'i 197, 202-03, 95 P.3d 952, 957-58

(2004) (citations omitted) (format altered). "Substantial

   

 

evidence" is "credible evidence which is of sufficient quality

and probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to

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support a conclusion." state v, Fone, 78 Hawai'i 262, 265, 892
P.2d 455, 458 (1995) (brackets, internal quotation marks, and
citations omitted) «

Hicks maintains that the trial court erred in denying
hie oral motion for judgment of acquittal and his motion for new
trial because the prosecution presented insufficient evidence
that the HYCF is a "state correctional facility" and that
complainant was an "imprisoned person." Hicks specifically
argues that ‘no representative of the facility administration or

Department of Human Services testified to the character of the

 

HYCF or legal atatus of the minor wards." Thus, Hicks asserts

that "[e]haracterization of the facility as a prison by lay
employees and the wards does not suffice to establish that

[complainant] was imprisoned.*
As quoted gupra, HRS § 707-732(1) (e) provides that a

person commits the offense of sexual assault in the third degree

if

(e) the person, while employed:
(1) "ina etate correctional tacility()
__towingly aubjecte to sexual eontact
a person confined to
S'Usteation facility, 3 person comiveed
to the director of publie safery, a person
Hesiding in a private correctional
facility operating in the state of
Hawal'l, or a person in custody, or causes
the person to nave sexual contact with the
actor {el

 

 

 

(Emphases added.)

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1. The HYCP as a "State Correctional Facility”

Hicks appears to argue that the HYCF does not fall
within the phrase "state correctional facility" because a youth
correctional facility -- like the HYCF -- is separate and
different from "the prison system." Hicks asserts that, "[iln a
juvenile facility[,] the focus is on rehabilitation." He also
asserts that "(t]he Department of Public Safety controls jails
and prisons while the Department of Hunan Services is responsible
for juveniles." Accordingly, Hicks submits that "adult prisoners
and juvenile warde" are not "the same for purposes of sexual
assault." In other words, Hicks implicitly contends that only an
adult state correctional facility under the supervision of the
Director of Public Safety can be a "state correctional facility."

‘The phrase "state correctional facility® is not defined

Penal Code, i.e., HRS chapter 701 to

 

anywhere in the Hava
chapter 712A, including the pertinent definition section of HRS
chapter 707, which containe the sexual assault statutes. Hicks,
thus, urges this court to limit the meaning of the subject phrase
essentially to only adult correctional facilities -- and not
juvenile facilities. Such restriction, however, is inappropriate

in light of the “general principles of statutory construction"

 

that ‘courte [are to] give words their ordinary meaning unle:
something in the statute requires a different interpretation."
Saranillio v. Silva, 78 Hawai'i 1, 10, 889 P.2d 685, 694 (2995)
(citation omitted); gee also HRS § 1-14 (1993) (*The words of a

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law are generally to be understood in their most known and usual
signification, without attending so much to the literal and

on of the words as to their

 

strictly grammatical constru:
general or popular use or meaning.")

By its plain and obvious meaning, the phrase
‘correctional facility" undoubtedly encompasses youth
correctional facilities. Absent from the Hawai'i Penal Code,
including HRS § 707-732, is any language limiting the scope of
the "correctional facility" to adult correctional facilities. In
fact, in 2002 and 2004, the legislature expanded uRs
§ 707-732(1) (e) to include persons employed not only in state
correctional facilities, but also to those employed

(iS) Bye private company providing services ata
sorrectional facility:
(is) Ev aprivate company providine community-based

reidential services to persona_comitted to the
Sivector of public safety and having received notice
of this
ay) Beal Sirectional facility operat
() Baa Taw enforcement officer a0 defined in
7io-T0003) (-}

 

 

HRS § 707-732(1) (e) (emphases added); sce 2002 Haw. Sess. L. Act
36, § 2 at 107; 2004 Haw. Sess. L. Act 61, § 5 at 304.
specifically, the legislature etated that the purpose for the
expansion of the statute was "to ensur[e] that sexual offenses
committed by any correctional facility employee against inmates
are prohibited, regardless of the employer," Sen. Stand. Comm,
Rep. No. 2913, in 2002 Senate Journal, at 1403 (emphasis added),
and "to provide[] needed protection to persons under the custody

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" Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 88, in 2002 House

 

of the state,
Journal, at 1268 (emphasis added). See also Sen. Stand. Comm.

Rep. No. 3162, in 2002 Senate Journal, at 1509. stated
differently, the legislature's focus was on ensuring that the
legislation covered employees of all correctional institutions
intended to be included, and not on defining strictly exclusive
categories. Thus, the type of agency overseeing the youth
correctional facility is not determinative as to whether the
facility is a “correctional facility." It follows then that
Hicks’s argument that the HYCF is not governed by the Department
of Public Safety does not exclude the HYCF from the phrase
"correctional facility." Accordingly, by its ordinary meaning,
we believe that the phrase "correctional facility" mst be
construed to include a youth correctional facility, such as the
HYCP. However, the issue remains whether a youth correctional
facility -- specifically, the HYCF -- is a state correctional
facility.

HRS chapter 352, entitled ‘Youth Correctional
Facilities,* does not expressly provide that a youth correctional
facility ie a state correctional facility. Nonetheless, the
legislature, in enunciating the purpose of the youth correctional
facilities, clearly indicated that:

(a) This chapter creates within the department of

 

robe pia ie office of youth
[Loge the
executive director of the office Of youth services,) and

 

uch other subordinates ae the director shall designate, the
wail youth correctional fat ih order to provide

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for the incarceration, punishment, and institutional om
and services to reiategrate into thelr communities and
anilies, eniléren committed by the cours of the state

 

 

HRS § 352-2.1(a) (1993) (emphases added). HRS § 352-8 (1993 &
Supp. 2005) further provides in relevant part that "the director
shail be the guardian of every youth committed to or received at
the Hawas‘i youth correctional facilities." Accordingly,
inasmuch as HRS chapter 352 clearly mandates that youth
correctional facilities be placed under the supervision of a
Hawai'i agency, i,e., the Department of Hunan Services, we hold,
as a matter of law, that the HYCF is a state correctional

facility."

 

The dispositive iesue, however, is whether there wi
credible evidence of sufficient quality and probative value to
enable a juror of reasonable caution to support a conclusion that
Hicks was employed by the HYCP, which, as we have previously
concluded, is a "state correctional facility." Hicks did not
dispute that he was a YCO employed by the HYCF. Indeed, Hicks
testified that he worked (1) as a YCO at the HYCP since 1960 and
(2) in Module B on January 21, 2004 from 6:00 a.m to 2:00 p.m.
‘Thus, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, there was sufficient evidence to enable the jury to
conclude that Hicks was employed "in a state correctional

facility."

 

«tm Light of our holding supra, we need not address Hicks’ argurent
Zicion failed to present sufficient evidence showing that the

fe correctional facility.

 

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2. Complainant as an "Imprisoned Person"
Next, Hicke maintains that there was insufficient

in this case, Complainant

 

evidence to establish that a minor
-- committed to the HYCF, is an ‘imprisoned person" because, in
juvenile proceedings and juvenile facilities, the focus is on
rehabilitation. Hicks again states that "(p]risons and [ylouth
(clorrectional [f]acilities are operated by separate
department [s] of the [e]xecutive branch of government." He
argues that a juvenile ward of the court is not a "prisoner":

wards in the HYCP are a separate class of individuals,
fas evidenced by the insistence of the Deparenent of timan
‘on referral to then as SUCK, rather than as
or prisoners.

 

 

 

   

In response, the prosecution asserts that the plain
reading of the phrase “an imprisoned person" as used in HRS

§ 707-732(1) (e) encompasses "juveniles confined to a youth

 

correctional facility" because:

Ie would be abgurd to believe that che legislature intended
to puniah guards for sexual [contact] with adults in an
adult correctional facility, but not to punish guards for
seul. {eontact] with juveniles confined in a youth
Correctional facility like [che] HYCP, simply Because they
supervision of a different state departvent .
absurd result sould be inconsistent vith the overall

   

 

    

Further, the prosecution contends that, *[v]iewing all of the
evidence in the atrongest light for the prosecution and in full
recognition of the province of the trier of fact, there was
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable mind might fairly

conclude that" Complainant was "an imprisoned person."

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Sse
Like the phrase "state correctional facility," the word

"imprisoned" is not defined anywhere in the Hawai'i Penal Code.

Thus, the undefined word must be read to bear its conmon,

ordinary or usual meaning. Saranillio, 78 Hawai'i at 10, 889
P.2d at 694; see also HRS § 1-14. The Webster Third New

 

International Dictionary (1993) defines "inprison* as "to put in
prison: confine ina jail." Id. at 1137 (emphasis added).
consequently, the issue before this court is whether there was
substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Complainant
was confined to the HYCF.

In the present case, the testimony of Marciel and Haina
clearly support the conclusion that Complainant was confined to
the HYCP, For example, Marciel testified that her ¥CO job duties
involved *security[,] custody and control of wards" and further
explained that the wards are "troubled youths that have been
sentenced to prison. . . . They're in jail, and I'ma
correctional officer for the youth." Thus, the circuit court did
not err in concluding that there was sufficient evidence for the
jury to conclude that Complainant was confined and, therefore,

Accordingly, the circuit court properly

 

"an imprisoned person

 

© qm support of nis contention that juvenile wards are not prisoners
and, therefore, are not "imprisoned person(e),” Hicks relied on three non-
Hawai'i cases, tates, 362 U.S. $41 (1966); District of
Eolunbia ve denny Has 737 Aad 866 (0.C. App. 2998) ; and State v. McBride, 234
SOMA Gra Tove); Oe at 20-22, Ne agree with the prosecution, however,
Chat the three cases relled upon by Hicks do not indicate that a juvenile ward
[e'not an "inprisoned person.”

in'Kants the issue was) notwithstanding the social welfare philosophy
and civil Sroceedings nature underlying the District of Columbia's duvenile

(Continued...)

 

    

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denied Kicks’ oral motion for judgment of acquittal and motion

for new trial
B. ns ity of the sexu atutes

Finally, for the first time on appeal, Hicks contends

that:

‘me gexual assault statutes are unconstitutional because
they permit conviction of sex offense without any proof of
bexlal intent. Ail criminal convictions require proof of
state of mind. Gee HRS § 702-204 [(1993)*]. Sexuat Assault
{n the Third Degree requires only knowing “sexual

 

 

3(. .,continuea)
court Act, whether the regulresent of 2 "full investigation” by the tantly
Gourt judge prior to waiving a juvenile to adult court should be more broadly
GReerpreeed fo include certain limited rights that adulea have in criminal
Gases, such as the right toa hearing, the right to certain discovery and the
Elgne ‘co weitten findings. 363 0.8. at 955-62. The Suprene Court decided in
the affireative, essentially noting that the isprisonnent of a juvenile is 50
[Ose liberty depriving than the imprisonment of an adult. id, at ss4.. The
court in JereyM. was presented with a dispute over attorney's fee limitations
[athe District of colunbis’s Prison Litigation Reform Act. Although the
court discussed philosophical distinctions between adult criminal proceedings
Ged juvenile delinguency proceedings based on the civil character snd social
welfare focus of their duvenile Court Act, the appellate court pointed out
that ‘congress affizmatively amended the Act to replace the word ragule” with
the word "prisoner," and then defined “prisoner” to expressly include
Juveniles adjudieated delinquent of crimes. 717 A.2d at Eastly, the
jSeue in HeBride wae wnether the trial court was too harsh when it sentenced
the defendant (who was sighteen and a half at che tine of the offense) to
Concurrent teras of fifteen to twenty-two years at a state prison, 334 8.24
Gt 26, The defendant argued that, based on the traditional philosophy of
fehabititacion rather than puniehnent for youthful offenders, be should have
been sentenced toa youth facility for an indeterminate term: Id, The
appellate court ultimately decided that the sentence was too long, but that
hevdetervence created by imposing a fixed minimum term of imprisonment in
State prison was more important than the general desirability of placing the
Gefendant in a youth facility. Ig, at 29. The court, therefore, ordered that
the defendant be tentenced ©0 seven to twelve years if a state prison. Id.

 

 

 

   

 

«uns 5 702-204 provides in relevant part thats

[Al person is not guilty of an offense unless the
person acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, oF
hegligentiy, as the law specifies, vith respect to each
Clenent of the offense. Rhen the state of mind required to
Gstablien an element of an offense is sot specifies by che
{aw, the elenent ie established if, with respect thereto, a
person acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly

 

 

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ee

contact."("] Most troubling Le that sexual contact ts
Gefined merely ae contact with the body parts associated
With sex, thefe ie no statutory requirenent of sexoal
Purpose, gratification or invent.

     

In other words, Hicks argues that the legislature should have
drafted the "sexual contact" statute more narrowly to require
proof of sexual intent, sexual purpose or sexual gratification
and that, because it failed to do so, the statute ie
unconstitutional. Specifically, Hicks, directing this court to
the exclusions in the text of Alaska’s “sexual contact"

definition statute,’ asserts that Alaska’s "sexual contact"

> ssexual contact is defined as

 

‘any touching, other than acts of "sexual penetration’, of
ER Gexual of other intimate parte of = person not sarried
forthe actor, or of the gexial of other intimate parte of
the actor by’ the person, whether directly or through the
Elething or other material intended to cover the sexual oF
other intimate part

 

 

RS § 707-700.
+ Alaska Statute § 12,82.900(b) (58) provides:
‘ {g]emual contact" means

(a) the defendant's

Tey fnowingly touching, directly or through
Giotnisg, the victim's genitals, anus, or female
breast, Or

(ii) knowingly causing the victin to touch, directly
Gr through clothing, the defendant's or victim's
genitals, snus, or fenale breast,

(B) but "eenual contact" dows not include acts

ii) "°*that may reasonably be construed to be normal
Caretaker responsibilities for a child,
Ghteractions with @ child, or affection for a
ehila;

(ii) perfotmed for the purpose of administering «
Recognised and lawful form of treatment that is
Fessonably adapted £0 promoting the physical or
Renral healeh of the person being treated; or

(544) that are a necessary part of a search of a
person committed to the custody of the
Bepartoent of corrections or the Department of
Health and Social services|.)

 

 

 

 

 

 

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definition "has survived" constitutional challenge "because of
ite attempt to proscribe only conduct which is sexual in nature."
Hicks, thus, implies that Hawaii's definition of "sexual contact*
would have been struck down by the Alaska court as
unconstitutional. Accordingly, Hicks maintains that Hawaii's
sexual assault statutes are unconstitutionally overbroad because
"the scheme punishes an excessively broad range of conduct under
the banner of sexual assault in violation of due process rights
of [Hicks] and others.

“Generally, the failure to properly raise an issue at
the trial level precludes a party from raising that issue on
appeal.” State v, Hoclund, 71 Haw. 147, 150, 785 P.24 1311, 1313
(1990) (citing State v. Cummings, 49 Haw. 522, 423 P.2d 438
(2967)). Specifically, this court has held that

‘the question of the constitutionality of a statute cannot be

Fained for the first tine on appeal. =

Hav. 370, 355 7.24 25 (1960). However, in casea where we

have considered the constitu ionality of a statute raieed

for the first time on appeal, we have done so on the ground

that the constitutionality of the statute is of great public

Import and justice required that ve consider the issue. See,

ug.) Pulioka v. Kam, Ss Maw. 7, S14 Pad sea (2973); Smith

SevGmith, 56 Haw, 295, 535 7.242109 (1975).

State v, Ildefonso, 72 Haw. 573, 584, 827 P.2d 648, 655 (1992).

(rin the exercise of this diecretion{,] an appellate court
should determine whether the consideration of the issue
Fequires aaditional facts, whether the resolution of the
question will affect the integrity of the findings of fact
Sf the erisl court.) and whether the question i¢ of great
public inpore.

State v. Kapela, 82 Hawai'i 361, 392 n.4, 922 P.2d 994, 1005 n.4

 

 

 

 

(app. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
(first set of brackets in original).

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Although Hicks concedes that the constitutionality

issue is raised for the first time on appeal, he contends,
without more, that such does not make the issue unreviewable,
citing Kapela. Although this court’s consideration of the
constitutionality of the sexual assault statutes would not (1)
require additional facts or (2) affect the integrity of any
factual findinge of the trial court, we have considered the
constitutionality of HRS § 707-700 on the grounds of vagueness or
overbreadth, holding that the subject "statute is not
unconstitutionally vague" because the definition of "sexual
contact" is “crystal clear." State v, Richie, 88 Hawai'i 19, 31-
32, 960 P.2d 1227, 1239-40 (1998); see also State v. Kalani, 108
Hawai'i 279, 288, 118 P.3d 1222, 1231 (2005). As such, we
decline to address Hicks’ constitutional challenge. However,
even if we were to conclude that the question present is of great
public import, Kicks’ argument -- as demonstrated below -- lacks
merit.

Preliminarily, we note that, with the exception to
statutes that create suspect classifications, *{e]very enactment
of the Hawai'i Legislature is presumptively constitutional, and

the burden of showing the

 

the party challenging a statute hi
alleged unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt." State vy.
Bui, 104 Hawai's 462, 466, 92 P.24 471, 475 (2004) (citation,

internal quotation marka, and footnote omitted). In Richie, the
defendant contended that his conviction of promoting prostitution

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in the second degree should be reversed because the definition of
‘sexual contact" was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 68
Hawai'i at 31, 960 P.2d at 1239. As previously stated, this
court held that the subject “statute is not unconstitutionally
vague" because the definition of "sexual contact is "crystal

clear":

‘The statute establishes a bright-line rule, which in
laypersons’ terme can be sinmarized aa: "You can 2ook but,
yourean't touch." thie definition gives the person of
Srdinary intelligence & reasonable opportunity to know what
Conduct se pronibited.. It alao conatitutes an explicre
Standard that avoids arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement and ie not subjective

Ida at 31-32, 960 P.2d at 1239-40. However, the Richie court

 

recognized that

   

clain, is distinct
clear and precise in its terms,
Sonatieutionally protected conduct
conduct is includes in its proscripticns,

  

Id. at 32, 960 P.24 1240 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). In that case, the defendant specifically argued that
the constitutionally protected conduct infringed upon by the
definition of "sexual contact" was nude dancing. Id. This court
nonetheless rejected the argument, holding that

nothing in the definition of “sexual contact” in mes

¥°707-700 pronibite nude dancing Der ge. individuals are

hot prevented from dancing in the nade. The conduct

prohibited ip the touching of sexual or intimate parte

Fhos, the statute still permits dancing in the nude and

Allows custoners to look at perforeers dancing in the nude;

That ‘the custemere cannot dois Souch the performers
Id. (emphases in original). The defendant then argued
overbreadth by raising "extreme and patently absurd" examples,

fashion designers,

 

| contending that dance instructor:

 

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i

 

tailors, and even Santa Claue and the Easter Bunny could be

prosecuted under the definition of "sexual contact." Id, This

court responded:

In reviewing @ penal statute, we accord it a Limited and
Feassuasie interpretation in orer to preserve its overall
purpote and to avoid absurd resulte. (The defendant's]
Rttenpe to apply HRS § 707-700 £0 extrene and absurd
Situations is nce sufficient to render it unconetitutionally
overbrosd

 

1d. (ellipsis omitted)
in Kalani, the defendant was convicted of sexual
assault by kissing a nine-year-old gir] and inserting his tongue
into her mouth. 108 Hawas‘i at 261, 118 P.3d at 1224. On
appeal, the defendant argued that, "if this court allows the
definition of ‘sexual and other intimate parts’ to be broadened
to inelude parts of the body not commonly associated with sexual
relations, such as the mouth, tongue, hair, neck, shoulders, back
and waist, the definition of ‘sexual contact’ will no lenger be
crystal clear." Id, at 287, 118 P.3d at 1230 (sone internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted). ‘The court, however,
rejected the defendant's contention, reasoning that the defendant
had not established that a person of ordinary intelligence would
not know that his conduct constituted sexual contact and, thus,
failed to denonstrate that HRS § 707-700 is unconstitutionally
vague with respect to his conduct. id, at 288, 118 P.3d at 1232.
Here, Hicks has not demonstrated that the sexual
assault statutes are unconstitutionally vague or overbroad with

respect to his conduct. The sole basis of Hicks’ challenge is

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his citation to Alaska’s "sexual contact" definition statute.
However, the difference between Alaska’s definition statute and
Hawaii's definition statute does not somehow render Hawaii's
sexual assault statutes unconstitutional. Accordingly, Hicks has
not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the sexual assault

statutes under which he was convicted are unconstitutional ag

applied to hie conduct.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's

October 11, 2005 judgment of conviction and probation sentence.

Stuart N. Fujioka (of g
Nishioka & Fujioka), Bec laan.

for defendant -appeliant
Peamuse Oroue any are

 

on the brief

Christopher D. W. Young
and Marcus B. Sierra,

Deputy Attorneys General,
for plaintiff-appellee J ON.
Gnne. Daftigs th

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