Case Title: State v. Stokes

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94-KO-1880

State: louisiana

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Date: 1994-11-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
#27838-r-SLZ 
2017 S.D. 21 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
 
* * * * 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
NATHAN DALE STOKES, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
* * * * 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
MINNEHAHA COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
* * * * 
 
THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS E. HOFFMAN 
Judge 
 
* * * * 
 
 
MARTY J. JACKLEY 
Attorney General 
 
CAROLINE SRSTKA 
Assistant Attorney General 
Pierre, South Dakota 
Attorneys for plaintiff 
 
and appellee. 
 
 
BEAU J. BLOUIN of 
Minnehaha County Public 
Defender’s Office 
Sioux Falls, South Dakota 
 
 
 
Attorneys for defendant 
and appellant. 
 
 
* * * * 
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS   
FEBRUARY 13, 2017 
 
OPINION FILED 05/03/17 
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ZINTER, Justice 
 
[¶1.]  
Nathan Stokes appeals from convictions of simple assault and 
intentional damage to property.  He argues that the trial court erred in admitting 
purported business records (a text-message log).  We reverse and remand for a new 
trial. 
Facts and Procedural History 
[¶2.]  
Nathan Stokes is the ex-boyfriend of Lyndsey Braunesreither.  The two 
met on Facebook and became involved in an on-and-off relationship for roughly four 
years.  Stokes lived with Braunesreither in Sioux Falls from January 2014 to 
August or September 2014.  They then dated casually until June or July 2015.  
They broke up at the end of July 2015.   
[¶3.]  
On August 13, 2015, Braunesreither returned home from work 
sometime after 8:20 p.m. and let her dogs outside.  Braunesreither and her 
boyfriend at that time, Michael Blue, planned to meet at Braunesreither’s home 
later that evening.  Braunesreither’s and Stokes’s accounts of the rest of the evening 
sharply conflict. 
[¶4.]  
According to Braunesreither, her doorbell rang around 8:53 p.m.  She 
expected Blue but found Stokes standing at the door.  She told Stokes he needed to 
leave, but Stokes said he would not until she spoke with him.  Braunesreither 
responded that she was going to call the police.  As Braunesreither went upstairs to 
get her phone, she could hear the garage side door being kicked in.  Braunesreither 
retrieved pepper spray from her purse and went downstairs to get the dogs.  At that 
point, Braunesreither found Stokes standing near her fireplace and she discharged 
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the pepper spray, hitting Stokes in the face.  Stokes responded by throwing 
Braunesreither to the ground, wresting the pepper spray from her, and spraying 
her.  Braunesreither then kicked Stokes, grabbed a bar stool from the kitchen to 
keep Stokes at a distance, and attempted to leave through the front door.  However, 
Stokes blocked her, holding the door closed.  Stokes told Braunesreither to go 
downstairs.  Braunesreither then promised that she would not call the police if 
Stokes just left.  Stokes ultimately left and she could hear car “wheels peel out” as 
he departed. 
[¶5.]  
Braunesreither then locked the front door, rinsed her eyes out, and 
called the police at 9:05 p.m.  Two officers responded.  Upon arrival, the officers 
confirmed that pepper spray or some sort of chemical irritant had been used inside 
the house.  They also observed the bar stool on the floor.  One officer further 
observed that the door leading to the garage had a split locking mechanism and a 
boot mark in the middle with scrapes and marks consistent with it being kicked in.  
Stokes could not be located by the police at that time. 
[¶6.]  
Stokes’s version of that night was quite different.  He denied being at 
Braunesreither’s residence at the time alleged.  Stokes claimed that he was at 
home, sick with the flu and texting friends.  More specifically, he claimed that he 
was sick with the flu during the week of August 10, that he did not go into work on 
August 12, and that he was sent home after his first morning break on August 13.  
Stokes claimed that he spent the remainder of that day and evening at home 
napping and texting his friends Abbey and Rachel. 
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[¶7.]  
Stokes was indicted on two counts of burglary in the first degree; three 
counts of simple assault; one count of false imprisonment; and one count of 
intentional damage to property.  A part II information alleged that Stokes had been 
convicted of three prior felonies.  An amended part II information alleged that he 
had been convicted of two prior assaults within the last ten years. 
[¶8.]  
During cross-examination of Stokes at trial, the State offered Exhibit 
14 “as a self-authenticating business record.”  Exhibit 14 purported to be Verizon’s 
log of Stokes’s text messages sent and received on August 13, 2015, between 8:50 
p.m. and 9:59 p.m., encompassing the time that Braunesreither alleged Stokes was 
inside her home.  The exhibit showed no texting on Stokes’s phone during the time 
of the alleged crime.  The exhibit was offered to rebut Stokes’s claim that he was at 
home texting Abbey and Rachel.  Stokes objected to the exhibit for lack of 
foundation. 
[¶9.]  
At that point the State attempted to establish a foundation through 
Stokes.  The State asked him whether Verizon was his cellular-phone carrier; if his 
phone number was the one listed in Exhibit 14 as sending and receiving text 
messages; whether one of the phone numbers listed on the log was Rachel’s; and 
whether he had received a text message from Rachel at 8:50 p.m.  Stokes responded 
that Verizon was his carrier, and that the number listed was his.  However, he 
could not recall what Rachel’s phone number was or if he had received a text 
message from her at that time.  The State then asked Stokes if he remembered 
receiving a text message at 8:50 p.m. “from someone,” and Stokes replied that he 
did remember.  So the State then asked if Stokes thought the records were incorrect 
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if they indicated that he received a text message at 8:50 p.m.  Stokes replied that he 
did not think they would be incorrect.  The State then pointed out that the phone 
records did not indicate a reply message was sent to that text message until 9:22 
p.m., and the State again asked Stokes if he believed the record to be inaccurate.  
Stokes responded that he did not believe it was inaccurate.  He did not, however, 
admit that Exhibit 14 was what it was purported to be: a Verizon record of all of his 
text messages made and received from his phone during the time in question. 
[¶10.]  
Stokes reasserted his foundation objection after this showing, and the 
trial court took the offer under advisement.  The court later overruled Stokes’s 
objection, stating that the cell phone records were not “testimonial” in nature, which 
suggested that there may have been some concern about a hearsay–confrontation 
question.  See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 
158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004).  Stokes, however, renewed his business-record-foundation 
objection, arguing that the State failed to introduce a witness who could testify that 
the log was “kept in the normal course of business records or anything along those 
lines.”  The court overruled the objection and admitted the records, ruling that the 
records were admissible based on “a combination of the inherent reliability of cell 
phone records as being his or her records of his or her own cell phone are 
characterized by [an] inherent guarantee of trustworthiness.” 
[¶11.]  
Stokes was found guilty of misdemeanor simple assault (count 5 
alleging assault by physical menace) and misdemeanor intentional damage to 
property (count 7 alleging damage to Braunesreither’s garage side door).  The jury 
acquitted on the remaining charges involving conduct allegedly occurring inside the 
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home: assault (counts 3 and 4 alleging an attempt to cause and recklessly causing 
bodily injury to Braunesreither), burglary (counts 1 and 2 alleging entry or 
remaining in the home), and false imprisonment (count 6 alleging the actual 
restraint of Braunesreither).  Pursuant to the part II information, Stokes was 
sentenced to two years in the penitentiary with credit for time served.  He appeals, 
contending that the circuit court erred in admitting the cellular-phone records.1 
Decision  
[¶12.]  
We review evidentiary rulings under the abuse of discretion standard.  
State v. Martin, 2015 S.D. 2, ¶ 7, 859 N.W.2d 600, 603.  Additionally, “evidentiary 
rulings made by the trial court are presumed correct[.]”  State v. Berget, 
2014 S.D. 61, ¶ 13, 853 N.W.2d 45, 51-52.  However, “admission of evidence in 
violation of a rule of evidence is an error of law that constitutes an abuse of 
discretion[.]”  Johnson v. O’Farrell, 2010 S.D. 68, ¶ 12, 787 N.W.2d 307, 312.   
[¶13.]  
Exhibit 14 purports to be Verizon’s record of all of Stokes’s cellular-
phone activity at the exact time the crimes were alleged to have occurred.  Business 
records qualify for a hearsay exception if they are records of a regularly conducted 
business activity.  The exception requires that: 
(A) 
The record was made at or near the time by—or from 
information transmitted by—someone with knowledge; 
(B) 
The record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted 
activity of a business, organization, occupation, or calling, 
whether or not for profit; 
                                            
1. 
Stokes also contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in failing to 
admonish the jury to not speculate on the answer to a withdrawn question 
regarding limitations on Stokes’s visitation with his children.  Because we 
are remanding for a new trial, we do not reach this question. 
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(C) 
Making the record was a regular practice of that activity; 
(D) 
All these conditions are shown by the testimony of the 
custodian or another qualified witness, or by a certification that 
complies with a rule or a statute permitting certification; and 
(E) 
The opponent does not show that the source of 
information or the method or circumstances of preparation 
indicate a lack of trustworthiness.    
 
SDCL 19-19-803(6)(A)-(E) (emphasis added).  Thus, foundation for admissibility 
requires the “testimony of the custodian or [an]other qualified witness” that the 
records have been prepared and kept in the course of a regularly conducted business 
activity.  DuBray v. S.D. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 2004 S.D. 130, ¶ 15, 690 N.W.2d 657, 
662-63 (quoting SDCL 19-16-10 (transferred to SDCL 19-19-803(6)(D)).  
Alternatively, that foundation may be laid by a written certification of those 
conditions made in compliance “with a rule or a statute permitting certification[.]”  
SDCL 19-19-803(6)(D). 
[¶14.]  
SDCL 19-19-902(11) is a rule permitting certification of the 
foundational requirements for admission of domestic records of any regularly 
conducted activity.  To provide the necessary foundation for admission of business 
records, the certification must “meet[] the requirements of [SDCL] 19-19-803(6)(A) 
[to] (C) as shown by a certification of the custodian or another qualified person[.]”  
SDCL 19-19-902(11).  “In other words, Rule 902(11) extends Rule 803(6) ‘by 
allowing a written foundation [for a business record] in lieu of an oral one.’”  5 Jack 
B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 902.13[1], at 
902-37 (Mark S. Brodin ed., 2d ed. rel. 114-11/2015) (quoting United States v. 
Adefehinti, 510 F.3d 319, 327-328 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).  Ultimately, whether by 
testimony under SDCL 19-19-803(6)(D) or certification under SDCL 19-19-902(11), 
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foundation must be laid by the custodian or another qualified person.  The 
custodian or other qualified person must show that the record was made at or near 
the time of the recorded act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis by—or from 
information transmitted by—someone with knowledge; that the record was kept in 
the course of a regularly conducted activity of the business; and that making the 
record was a regular practice of that activity.  SDCL 19-19-803(6)(A) to (C). 
[¶15.]  
Here, Exhibit 14 was hearsay, and it was admitted over objection and 
without testimony or certification of the foregoing foundational requirements for the 
hearsay exception that is available for business records.  As Stokes correctly 
observes, there was no testimony or certificate explaining how and when the data 
was generated.  Thus, there was no foundation for the hearsay exception permitted 
under SDCL 19-19-803(6). 
[¶16.]  
The State responds to this foundational deficiency, arguing that Stokes 
“authenticated” the record generated by his cell phone during his cross-
examination.  Stokes, however, only made limited admissions regarding certain 
entries on the exhibit.  He offered no testimony regarding the business activity that 
created what was purported to be a Verizon log of all messages sent and received 
during the time of the alleged offense.  “[A] proper foundation consists of testimony 
‘that a document has been prepared and kept in the course of a regularly-conducted 
business activity.’”  DuBray, 2004 S.D. 130, ¶ 15, 690 N.W.2d at 662 (quoting State 
v. Brown, 480 N.W.2d 761, 763 (S.D. 1992)).  But Stokes was not a custodian of the 
record or “other qualified witness” who could provide that foundation for the log.  
See SDCL 19-19-803(6)(D).  While “[t]he phrase ‘another qualified witness’ is given 
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a very broad interpretation,” the witness must nonetheless possess “enough 
familiarity with the record-keeping system of the entity in question to explain how 
the record came into existence in the course of a regularly conducted activity of the 
entity.”  5 Weinstein, supra ¶ 14, § 803.08[8][a], at 803-83 to -86.   
[¶17.]  
Notwithstanding this foundational deficiency, the State contends that 
Exhibit 14 was admissible because it was “authenticated” under SDCL 
19-19-901(b)(1) and 901(b)(6).  SDCL 19-19-901(b) offers a non-exhaustive list of 
examples satisfying the general authentication requirement that an “item is what 
the proponent claims it is.”  See SDCL 19-19-901(a).  SDCL 19-19-901(b)’s examples 
include: 
(1) 
Testimony of a witness with knowledge.  Testimony that 
an item is what it is claimed to be. 
. . . 
(6) 
Evidence about a telephone conversation.  For a telephone 
conversation, evidence that a call was made to the number 
assigned at the time to: 
(A) 
A particular person, if circumstances, including 
self-identification, show that the person answering was 
the one called . . . .   
 
SDCL 19-19-901(b)(1), -(6)(A).  The State notes that Stokes “identified his phone 
number, which was the same target phone number listed on Exhibit 14’s text 
message logs.  [Stokes] also testified that his cell phone carrier is Straight Talk, 
which is part of Verizon Wireless.”  According to the State, this evidence satisfied 
the authentication rules’ requirements.   
[¶18.]  
The State’s reliance on the authentication rules in 
SDCL 19-19-901(b)(1) and (b)(6) is misplaced because it is based on the erroneous 
premise that authentication of a document satisfies the foundational requirements 
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necessary to qualify for a hearsay exception.  Authenticating an item of evidence 
only concerns the production of “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the 
item is what the proponent claims it is.”  SDCL 19-19-901(a).  SDCL 
19-19-803(6)(D), however, requires more.  It sets forth additional foundational 
requirements to qualify a business record under the business-records hearsay 
exception.  As previously noted, to qualify for the hearsay exception, the proponent 
must produce foundational testimony or certification required for business records.  
Because the hearsay rules require this additional foundational showing, a 
proponent seeking admission must not only authenticate in accordance with 
SDCL 19-19-901 (show that the exhibit is a record of what the proponent claims it 
is), but also lay the foundation required in SDCL 19-19-803(6) (show that the 
exhibit was kept and prepared in the course of a regularly conducted business 
activity).  See Zafer Taahhut Insaat ve Ticaret A.S. v. United States, 833 F.3d 1356, 
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding “[a]uthentication and hearsay are two separate 
requirements” that cannot be conflated).   
[¶19.]  
Thus, authentication that Exhibit 14 was a copy of Stokes’s cell-phone 
log under SDCL 19-19-901 did not substitute for the required showing that the log 
was also kept and prepared in the ordinary course of a regularly conducted business 
activity.  Because the State did not lay the required foundation for Exhibit 14’s 
admission under the hearsay exception, the circuit court erred as a matter of law in 
admitting the exhibit.2 
                                            
2. 
We also note that Stokes’s cross-examination was not sufficient to either 
“authenticate” the business record as required by SDCL 19-19-901(a) or, as 
                                                                                                     (continued . . .) 
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[¶20.]  
The remaining question is whether the error prejudiced Stokes.  An 
error in admitting evidence under SDCL 19-19-803(6) “does not warrant reversal 
absent a showing that substantial rights of the party were affected.”  Brown, 
480 N.W.2d at 764.  This requires a showing that the error must have “in all 
probability” affected the jury’s decision.  Martin, 2015 S.D. 2, ¶ 7, 859 N.W.2d at 
603.  
[¶21.]  
Stokes argues that Exhibit 14 affected the jury’s decision because “the 
cell phone records were a significant piece of evidence in a closely contested case.”  
Stokes points out that the case required a resolution of a credibility dispute between 
Stokes and Braunesreither concerning his presence at her home at the time she 
claimed: his defense was that he was home texting at that time, and the exhibit 
negated his claim.  The State, however, contends that Exhibit 14’s admission did 
_________________________________ 
(. . . continued) 
the circuit court apparently ruled, satisfy the hearsay rule because the 
exhibit was inherently reliable and trustworthy.  See SDCL 19-19-807 
(granting a hearsay exception for statements that have “equivalent 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness”).  Exhibit 14 was offered to 
rebut Stokes’s defense that he was at home texting at the time of the alleged 
crimes.  The exhibit rebutted that defense only because it purported to be a 
log of all Stokes’s text messages, and according to the exhibit, there was no 
text message activity during the relevant times.  But Stokes did not admit in 
his cross-examination that Exhibit 14 was a complete Verizon record of all 
his cellular-phone messages for the time in question.  He only made 
concessions regarding his cell carrier and two numbers on the exhibit.  
Moreover, the “text log” is on the last page of the exhibit, and that page 
contains nothing but a list of numbers and times with no reference to 
Verizon.  Thus, with respect to authentication, Stokes did not concede that 
the record “was what the proponent claims it [was].”  See SDCL 19-19-901(a).  
And with respect to hearsay, the exhibit was not facially admissible as a 
matter of law under the residual hearsay exception in SDCL 19-19-807.  The 
State has not argued that the other procedural and substantive requirements 
for the Rule 807 residual hearsay exception were satisfied. 
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not affect the jury’s verdict because Exhibit 14 was merely cumulative.  The State 
argues that its other evidence—Braunesreither’s testimony and the physical 
evidence—was sufficient to convict.   
[¶22.]  
The State’s reliance on the other evidence is misplaced.  
Braunesreither’s credibility was the central issue in the case, and the physical 
evidence did not corroborate Braunesreither’s testimony regarding the identity of 
the perpetrator.  The physical evidence included photographs depicting damage to 
the garage door, pepper spray residue, the barstool, and Braunesreither’s injuries.  
That evidence did tend to prove that there was an assailant, but not that it was 
Stokes.   
[¶23.]  
The ultimate issue for the jury was whether Stokes was at home 
texting or whether he was at Braunesreither’s home engaging in all of the acts she 
alleged.  Stokes correctly points out that although he testified that he was at home 
texting at the time alleged, the cell-phone log “leaves open a period of time between 
8:50 p.m. and 9:22 p.m. during which Stokes [was not texting and] may have been 
at least present outside Braunesreither’s home and exhibiting threatening 
behavior.”  That period of time was significant because although the jury apparently 
disbelieved Braunesreither and acquitted on the five charges involving the later, 
more extensive acts in the home, it convicted on the two charges involving the 
initial, brief activity outside the home.  Further, the State concedes in its brief that 
Exhibit 14 “had a tendency to make the fact that [Stokes] was home sick texting all 
night less probable.”  For these reasons, we agree there is a reasonable probability 
that admission of the cell-phone log contributed to the jury’s decision.  Because the 
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evidentiary error was prejudicial, we reverse and remand for a new trial on counts 5 
and 7.   
[¶24.]  
GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and SEVERSON, WILBUR, and KERN, 
Justices, concur.