Case Title: Fullerton v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 246, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-03-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ROBERT D. FULLERTON, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 246, 2006 
 
Defendant-Below   
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
§ 
ID # 0410000810  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff-Below 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted:  December 12, 2006 
   Decided:  March 8, 2007 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R  
 
This 8th day of March 2007, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1)  
Defendant-Appellant Robert D. Fullerton appeals his Superior Court 
conviction of Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited and 
Possession of Alcohol by an Underage Person.  Fullerton makes three arguments 
on appeal.  First, he contends that the trial court should have excluded the specific 
reason why police were conducting an investigation the night of Fullerton’s arrest.  
Second, he contends that the prosecutor’s use of this statement during closing 
arguments exceeded the limitations placed upon the evidence by the trial judge.  
 2
Finally, he contends that the trial court erred by not granting his motion for 
judgment of acquittal.  We find no merit in Fullerton’s arguments and affirm. 
(2)  
On October 2, 2002, Officer Grajewski of the New Castle County 
Police Department responded to a complaint of “shots fired.”  It was quickly 
determined that the suspected shooter drove a small red vehicle with beads hanging 
from the rearview mirror.  Officer Grajewski found a vehicle matching this 
description parked in front of 8 Stanton Avenue.  Grajewski was granted 
permission to enter the home. 
(3)  
While inside, Grajewski saw Robert Fullerton sitting on a bed in a 
bedroom.  When Grajewski entered the room, Fullerton stood up and dropped six 
.32 caliber bullet casings onto a dresser positioned next to the bed.  After obtaining 
permission to search the room, Grajewski found a .32 caliber revolver directly 
under the mattress where Fullerton was sitting.  Grajewski also noticed that 
Fullerton’s speech was slurred and he smelled like alcohol. 
(4)  
Fullerton was only 16-years-old at the time of the commission of the 
offenses.  A reverse amenability motion was filed on December 14, 2005 but was 
withdrawn on October 4, 2004.  A Superior Court jury found him guilty of 
Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited (“PDWPP”) and 
Possession of Alcohol by an Underage Person.  Following the verdict, Fullerton 
 3
filed a Motion for a New Trial and a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal.  Both 
motions were denied by the Superior Court. 
(5)  
Fullerton first argues that the trial judge should have excluded the 
explanation for the police investigation that evening.  Specifically, he argues that 
the complaint, “shots fired,” should have been excluded pursuant to D.R.E. 403.  
We review the admission of such statements for abuse of discretion.1 
(6)  
Prior to trial, the State revealed that it intended to elicit testimony 
from Officer Grajewski that he was investigating a complaint of “shots fired.”  
Defense counsel moved in limine to exclude such testimony and argued that 
Grajewski should explain his presence by testifying that he was simply 
“investigating a complaint.”  The trial court denied Fullerton’s motion.  In doing 
so, the court explained: 
I don’t believe it’s unreasonable for the State to be able to tell the jury 
why the police were responding to this particular area, and that they 
were responding to investigate a report that “shots fired” at this 
address, and they contacted the person at the address who identified 
the car, and based upon the identification of the car they proceeded to 
look for it and found the car, and the case went from there. 
 
Obviously, the details that Ms. Fagan gave cannot be introduced, and 
without her being present to give those details would be inappropriate 
to be given to the jury.  But I will allow the State to put it in an 
appropriate context as to why the police responded to that particular 
area. 
                                          
 
1 Williams v. State, 494 A.2d 1237, 1241 (Del. 1985). 
 4
(7)  
While “the preferable practice [is] to permit the State to introduce 
background evidence limited to a statement that the police were present based 
‘upon information received,”2 statements that explain the purpose of the police 
officer’s presence can be admissible at trial.3  “In criminal cases, an arresting or 
investigating officer should not be put in the false position of seeming just to have 
happened upon the scene; he should be allowed some explanation of his presence 
and conduct.”4  The admissibility of such evidence, however, is subject to D.R.E 
403.  That is, if the statement is unduly prejudicial to the Defendant, the officer 
should only be permitted to testify that he was acting “upon information received.” 
(8)  
The police in this case were responding to a complaint about shots 
being fired and were given a description of the potential shooter’s vehicle.  The 
statement in this case provided the context for the officer’s presence at the home as 
well as his actions while inside.  The complaint explains why the officer was inside 
the residence looking for a gun and, more specifically, why the officer searched the 
room for a gun after witnessing the Defendant drop spent casings on the dresser.   
(9)  
Unlike McNair, where the reason for the police officers presence was 
a tip from a confidential informant identifying the defendant as carrying illegal 
drugs, the statement in this case did not directly implicate the defendant.  It was 
                                          
 
2 McNair v. State, 703 A.2d 644 (Del. 1997) (TABLE). 
3 Johnson v. State, 587 A.2d 444, 448 (Del. 1991). 
4 Id. 
 5
within the trial judge’s discretion to admit the statement because its probative 
value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.   
(10)  Fullerton next argues that the prosecutor used the complaint beyond 
the limitations set by the trial judge. We review the trial court’s denial of 
Fullerton’s motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion.5 
(11) Fullerton’s argument is unsupported by the record.  Despite his 
assertions to the contrary, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the 
prosecutor was precluded from making an argument based upon the evidence 
admitted.  The trial court addressed this argument and explained that the prosecutor 
did not violate any order of the trial court.6   
(12)  Fullerton finally contends that the trial court erred by denying his 
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal.  We review the denial of this motion to 
determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, [including all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom,] any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”7  Conflicting testimony does not require a motion for judgment 
                                          
 
5 Durham v. State, 867 A.2d 176, 178 (Del. 2005).   
6 The trial court stated, “Consistent with the Court’s ruling, details concerning what the victim 
had stated to the police were not presented to the jury and the jury was simply told that the police 
responded to a “shots fired” complaint and obtained a description of the vehicle and its 
occupants.” 
7 Dixon v. State, 567 A.2d 854, 857 (Del. 1989). 
 6
of acquittal to be granted because “[t]he jury is the sole judge of a witness' 
credibility and is responsible for resolving conflicts in testimony. . . . [I]t is within 
the jury's discretion to accept one portion of a witness' testimony and reject another 
part.”8 
(13)  In his original motion, Fullerton argued that the jury verdict was 
against the weight of the evidence.  While Fullerton denied having any knowledge 
that a gun was underneath the mattress he was sitting on, the resident of the home, 
who was also in the bedroom at the time of the search, denied possession of the 
gun.   A jury could reasonably resolve this conflict in evidence against Fullerton. 
Furthermore, the officer witnessed Fullerton drop six .32 caliber casings on the 
dresser, the sane caliber as the revolver which was found.  The Superior Court did 
not err when it denied Fullerton’s motion for a judgment of acquittal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
/s/Henry dupont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                          
 
8 Pryor v. State, 453 A.2d 98, 100 (Del. 1982).