Case Title: Rutherford v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 653, 2015

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2016-06-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DAMON RUTHERFORD, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 653, 2015 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  Cr. ID Nos. 1312008135 and 
§  1508013143 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: April 15, 2016 
Decided: 
June 3, 2016 
 
Before HOLLAND, VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 3rd day of June 2016, upon consideration of the appellant's Supreme 
Court Rule 26(c) brief, the State's response, and the record below, it appears to the 
Court that:   
(1) 
In February 2014, a New Castle County grand jury indicted 
Rutherford for Assault in the First Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the 
Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”), Possession of a Firearm by a Person 
Prohibited (“PFBPP”), Offensive Touching, Harassment, Assault in the Third 
Degree, Terroristic Threatening, and Possession of Marijuana.  Most of the charges 
arose from Rutherford’s assaults on his ex-girlfriend, which included shooting her 
with a BB gun.  Rutherford’s bail conditions included no contact with the victim.  
 
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In March 2015, a New Castle County grand jury re-indicted Rutherford for Assault 
in the First Degree, PFDCF, PFBPP, Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the 
Commission of a Felony (“PDWCF”), Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person 
Prohibited (“PDWBPP”), Offensive Touching, Harassment, Assault in the Third 
Degree, Terroristic Threatening, and Possession of Marijuana.   
(2) 
On April 21, 2015, Rutherford pled guilty to Assault in the Second 
Degree as a lesser included offense of Assault in the First Degree and PDWDCF in 
exchange for dismissal of the other claims.  The State agreed to cap its 
recommendation for non-suspended Level V time to five years.  Sentencing was 
scheduled for July 24, 2015.   
(3) 
Two weeks before sentencing Rutherford filed pro se motions to 
dismiss or replace his counsel and to withdraw his guilty plea.  The motions were 
referred to Rutherford’s counsel.  At the July 24, 2015 sentencing hearing, 
Rutherford stated that he wanted a different attorney and to withdraw his guilty 
plea.   
(4) 
Rutherford was informed that he could hire his own attorney, but 
would not be provided a different attorney at State expense.  Sentencing was 
rescheduled for September so Rutherford could move to dismiss his counsel and to 
withdraw his guilty plea.  The State indicated that Rutherford was facing new 
charges for contacting the victim in violation of the no-contact provision in his bail 
 
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conditions.  Rutherford subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, 
which was referred to his counsel, and a motion to dismiss his counsel. 
(5) 
On September 4, 2015, sentencing was deferred again until the 
Superior Court could conduct a colloquy with Rutherford regarding his waiver of 
counsel and then resolve his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  On September 24, 
2015, the motion to dismiss counsel was withdrawn.  In October 2015, Rutherford 
was charged by information with three counts of Breach of Bond Conditions.  The 
charges arose from Rutherford contacting the victim in violation of the no-contact 
provision in his bail conditions. 
(6) 
On November 6, 2015, Rutherford pled guilty to three counts of 
Breach of Bond Conditions in exchange for the State agreeing not to recommend 
any non-suspended Level V time.  Rutherford was then sentenced for all of his 
crimes as follows: (i) for Assault in the Second Degree, three years of Level V 
incarceration with credit for thirteen days previously served, suspended after one 
year for decreasing levels of supervision; (ii) for PDWDCF, three years of Level V 
incarceration; and (iii) for each count of Breach of Bond Conditions, six months of 
Level V incarceration, suspended for six months of Level III probation.  This is 
Rutherford’s direct appeal.   
(7) 
On appeal, Rutherford’s counsel (“Counsel”) filed a brief and a 
motion to withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26(c) (“Rule 26(c)”).  Counsel 
 
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asserts that, based upon a complete and careful examination of the record, there are 
no arguably appealable issues.  By letter, Counsel informed Rutherford of the 
provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided Rutherford with a copy of the motion to 
withdraw and the accompanying brief.  Counsel also informed Rutherford of his 
right to identify any points he wished this Court to consider on appeal.  Rutherford 
has raised several issues for this Court’s consideration.  The State has responded to 
the issues raised by Rutherford and asked this Court to affirm the Superior Court's 
judgment. 
(8) 
When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief 
under Rule 26(c), this Court must: (i) be satisfied that defense counsel has made a 
conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims; and (ii) 
conduct its own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally 
devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without an 
adversary presentation.1 
(9) 
Rutherford first argues that his guilty pleas were involuntary because 
the Superior Court did not timely address his grievances regarding Counsel and he 
only pled guilty because Counsel would not prepare for trial.  These claims are 
contrary to the record.   
                                                 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); Leacock v. State, 690 A.2d 926, 927-28 (Del. 1996). 
 
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(10) There is no indication in the record that Rutherford told the Superior 
Court that he was displeased with Counsel before his April 21, 2015 guilty plea.  In 
the Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea form, Rutherford indicated that he had freely 
and voluntarily decided to plead guilty, no one had threatened or forced him to 
plead guilty, and he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation.  During his 
April 21, 2015 guilty plea colloquy with the Superior Court, Rutherford stated that 
he understood the plea agreement, he understood he was waiving certain trial 
rights, and he was guilty of Assault in the Second Degree and PDWDCF.  Absent 
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, which he has not identified, 
Rutherford is bound by these representations.2   
(11) Although Rutherford complained about Counsel to the Superior Court 
after the April 21, 2015 guilty plea and filed a motion to dismiss counsel, the 
motion to dismiss counsel was withdrawn on September 24, 2015.  Rutherford 
appeared with Counsel at his November 6, 2015 guilty plea and sentencing.  
Rutherford again indicated in the Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea form that he had 
freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty, no one had threatened or forced him 
to plead guilty, and he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation.  Rutherford 
also indicated during his guilty plea colloquy that he understood he was waiving 
certain trial rights and that he was guilty of Breach of Bond Conditions.  Having 
                                                 
2 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 
 
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carefully reviewed the positions of the parties and the record, we conclude there is 
no merit to Rutherford’s claims that his guilty pleas were involuntary.        
(12) Rutherford next contends that Counsel was ineffective.  This Court 
will not review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time on 
direct appeal.3  
(13) Finally, Rutherford contends that the Superior Court illegally 
enhanced his sentence based on its unfounded opinion that the victim lived in fear.   
“Appellate review of a sentence is limited to whether the sentence is within the 
statutory limits prescribed by the General Assembly and whether it is based on 
factual predicates which are false, impermissible, or lack minimal reliability, 
judicial vindictiveness or bias, or a closed mind.”4  In this case, Rutherford pled 
guilty to five felonies carrying a maximum statutory penalty of forty-eight years of 
Level V incarceration.  Rutherford was sentenced to a total of seven years and six 
months of Level V incarceration, suspended after four years, less than the five 
years of non-suspended Level V time requested by the State.  This sentence does 
not exceed the statutory limits.   
(14) To the extent Rutherford argues that his sentence violates the 
guidelines in the Delaware Sentencing Accountability Commission Benchbook 
(“SENTAC Guidelines”), “a defendant has no legal or constitutional right to 
                                                 
3 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 
4 Weston v. State, 832 A.2d 742, 746 (Del. 2003). 
 
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appeal a statutorily authorized sentence simply because it does not conform” to 
SENTAC Guidelines.5  In asking for five years of non-suspended Level V time, the 
State argued that Rutherford showed no remorse for his actions, engaged in 
domestic violence, unduly depreciated his offenses, failed to comply with multiple 
court orders, had a prior history of violent criminal conduct, and was not amenable 
to supervision in the community.  Rutherford acknowledged that he and the victim 
had an abusive and toxic relationship.  The sentencing order lists vulnerability of 
the victim, undue depreciation of the offense, lack of remorse, and need for 
correctional treatment as aggravating factors.  Nothing in the records suggests that 
the Superior Court enhanced Rutherford’s sentence on the basis of false, 
impermissible, or unreliable information. 
(15) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that 
the remainder of Rutherford’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any 
arguably appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Rutherford’s counsel has 
made a conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly 
determined that Rutherford could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal.   
 
 
                                                 
5 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 845 (Del. 1992). 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior  
Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice