Case Title: Bethune v. County of Harnett

Citation: 349 N.C. 343

Docket Number: 174PA98

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1998-12-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 174PA98
WILLIAM and HILDA BETHUNE, EVELYN BYRD, LOIS BYRD, SIRENA BYRD,
EDNA BAGGETT CROOK, JIM DAVIDSON, DAN DENNING, BEVERLY and GLENN
GREGORY, BOB GOULD, MARGARET GOURLAY, DR. SARAH HAGLER, FRANKIE
and TRUDY HAMILTON, HELEN HOFFMAN, GLENN JOHNSON, WILLIAM A.
JOHNSON, ED MENNINGER, SENATOR ROBERT MORGAN, LIDA O’QUINN,
CHARLOTTE RENN, W.K. (Billy) SEXTON, LAMAR SIMMONS, W.T. SIMMONS,
JEFFREY SURLES, STAMEY TAYLOR, DONALD RAY and DONNA TURLINGTON,
MARTHA LAYTON WINSTON, BOBBY WOMBLE, DR. J.W. BAGGETT, RUSSELL W.
BRADLEY
v.
COUNTY OF HARNETT, and DAN ANDREWS, JOE BOWDEN, TEDDY BYRD,
BEATRICE HILL, and WALT TITCHENER, Individually and as Harnett
County Commissioners
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31, prior
to a determination by the Court of Appeals, of an order entered
on 11 December 1997 by Manning, J., in Superior Court, Harnett
County, granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.  Heard
in the Supreme Court 18 November 1998.
Robert B. Morgan, pro se, Glenn Johnson, pro se, William A.
Johnson, pro se, and James P. Davidson, pro se, for
plaintiff-appellees.
Law Offices of Dwight W. Snow, by Dwight W. Snow; and
Tharrington Smith, L.L.P., by Wade M. Smith, for defendant-
appellants.
FRYE, Justice.
The sole issue in this case is whether defendants,  Harnett
County commissioners, have the power to relocate the Harnett
County courthouse outside of the original boundaries of the Town
of Lillington as they were established by legislative enactment
in the 1858-1859 session of the North Carolina General Assembly. 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we hold that they do.
In 1855, the General Assembly enacted special legislation
establishing Harnett County.  Act of Feb. 7, 1855, ch. 8, 1854-55
N.C. Sess. Laws 22; Act of Feb. 15, 1855, ch. 9, 1854-55 N.C.
Sess. Laws 23.  The local act provided, inter alia, that:  the
county seat was to be located on a tract of land at or within
three miles of the geographical center of the county; such town
was to be called Toomer; and within the limits of Toomer, the
courthouse and other public buildings were to be erected.  Ch. 9,
sec. 7, 1854-55 N.C. Sess. Laws at 24.
In 1859, the General Assembly enacted additional special
legislation pertaining to Harnett County.  Act of Feb. 16, 1859,
ch. 5, 1858-59 N.C. Sess Laws. 12.  This local act provided for
the election of county commissioners who were authorized to
purchase one hundred acres of land, suitable for a town
(Lillington), not more than three miles from the center of the
county.  Ch. 5, secs. 1, 3, 1858-59 N.C. Sess. Laws at 12,13. 
The act also provided for a vote of the county’s citizens to
choose between Toomer and Lillington as the location of the
county seat.  Ch. 5, sec. 4, 1858-59 N.C. Sess. Laws at 13.  The
sheriff of Harnett County was to hold an election and “all those
voting for the county site at Toomer, shall vote a ballot with
the name ‘Toomer,’ written or printed thereon, and those voting
for the county seat at the place selected by the commissioners
aforesaid, shall vote a similar ballot, with the name
‘Lillington’ written or printed thereon.”  Id.  Following
certification of the election results, the Governor was to
announce by proclamation which place had been selected as the
site of the county seat, and “such place shall thereafter be, and
is hereby declared to be established as the county seat of said
county.”  Ch. 5, sec. 5, 1858-59 N.C. Sess. Laws at 14.  On
31 October 1859, Governor Ellis proclaimed that “624 votes were
cast for the town of Lillington and 140 votes for the town of
Toomer,” and thus declared that Lillington had been selected as
the “future seat of justice” for Harnett County by a majority of
the voters of the county.  The Harnett County courthouse has
occupied its present location in Lillington since its original
construction, having been rebuilt twice following fire.
In June 1991, the Harnett County Board of Commissioners
(Board) appointed an Architectural Committee (Committee) to
gather information concerning the needs of Harnett County in the
location and construction of various county buildings, including
a courthouse.  The Committee concluded that a new courthouse was
necessary to adequately serve the current and future needs of the
citizens of Harnett County and recommended that a new county
courthouse be located at the Harnett County Governmental Complex
(Complex).  On 21 July 1997, the Board formally adopted a
resolution to relocate the county courthouse to the Complex site. 
We note that while the Complex is north of Lillington’s town
center and the present location of the county courthouse, the
proposed site for the new courthouse is within the present
municipal boundaries of Lillington.  We take judicial notice that
the Town of Lillington remains the county seat of Harnett County.
On 23 May 1997, plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin defendants
from moving the location of the Harnett County courthouse from
its present site.  On 11 December 1997, defendants’ motion for
summary judgment was denied, plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment was granted, and defendants were enjoined from “moving
the location of the Harnett County Courthouse . . . outside of
the boundaries of the Town of Lillington as they were established
pursuant to the legislative enactments of the North Carolina
General Assembly in its 1854-1855 and 1858-1859 sessions.” 
Defendants gave notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals on
5 January 1998.  Defendants’ petition for discretionary review
prior to a determination by the Court of Appeals was allowed by
this Court on 29 July 1998.  On 21 October 1998, this Court
allowed plaintiffs’ motion to supplement the record.
Plaintiffs contend that the local acts enacted by the
General Assembly in 1855 and 1859 conclusively established the
boundaries of the county seat of Harnett County and therefore
mandate that the Harnett County courthouse must be located within
the original one hundred acres of land acquired and delineated
pursuant to the local act of 1859.  Plaintiffs thus contend that
the location of the county courthouse may not be moved beyond the
original one hundred acres without further legislative action by
the General Assembly.
For the purpose of resolving the instant case, we will
assume, without deciding, that the local acts did affirmatively
establish the location of the county courthouse as plaintiffs
contend.  Even so, we hold that defendants have the express
authority, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 153A-169, to redesignate the
location of the Harnett County courthouse.
In 1973, the General Assembly enacted N.C.G.S. § 153A-169,
which continues to govern designation and redesignation of county
courthouse sites.  The statute provides, in relevant part, that a
county’s board of commissioners “may designate and redesignate
the site for any county building, including the courthouse.” 
N.C.G.S. § 153A-169 (1991) (emphasis added).  Plaintiffs contend
that this general statute, enacted after the special local acts,
does not empower defendants to redesignate the location of the
Harnett County courthouse because of the well-established rule
that a subsequent general law cannot repeal or supersede an
earlier local act without a clear expression of intent by the
legislature.  See, e.g., City of Durham v. Manson, 285 N.C. 741,
208 S.E.2d 662 (1974).  However, we conclude that N.C.G.S. §
153A-3(d) contains the necessary expression of legislative
intent.
Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 153A-3(d),
[i]f a power, right, duty, function, privilege, or
immunity is conferred on counties by this Chapter
[153A], and a local act enacted earlier than this
Chapter omits or expressly denies or limits the same
power, right, duty, function, privilege, or immunity,
this Chapter supersedes the local act.
N.C.G.S. § 153A-3(d) (1991).  We note that a county exercises its
powers, rights, and duties through the actions of its elected
board of commissioners.  N.C.G.S. § 153A-12 (1991); see also
Board of Comm’rs of McDowell County v. Hanchett Bond Co., 194
N.C. 137, 138 S.E. 614 (1927).
By enacting N.C.G.S. § 153A-169, the General Assembly
conferred upon county boards of commissioners the power or right
to “designate and redesignate the site of any county building,
including the courthouse.”  However, plaintiffs’ construction of
the 1855 and 1859 local acts omits or limits the power to
redesignate the location of the county courthouse, which is a
power or right conferred by chapter 153A of the General Statutes. 
Therefore, to the extent that the 1855 and 1859 special local
acts concerning Harnett County omit or limit the authority of the
elected Board to designate or redesignate the location of the
county courthouse, the local acts are superseded by N.C.G.S. §
153A-169.
Because defendants exercised a power expressly conferred
upon them in their official capacity as county commissioners, we
hold that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for
plaintiffs.  For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial
court is reversed and the case remanded for entry of summary
judgment in favor of defendants.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.