Case Title: In the Matter of State of New York v. Humberto G. (Anonymous) The People &c. ex rel. Joseph II. v. Superintendent of Southport Correctional Facility

Citation: 

Docket Number: Case No. 95

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2010-06-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 95  
The People &c. ex rel. Joseph 
II.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Superintendent of Southport 
Correctional Facility, et al.,
            Appellants.
------------------------------
No. 96  
In the Matter of State of New 
York,
            Appellant,
        v.
Humberto G. (Anonymous),
            Respondent.
Case No. 95:
Andrea Oser, for appellants. 
David M. LeVine, for respondent.
Case No. 96:
Andrea Oser, for appellant.
Rachael E. Seevers, for respondent.
SMITH, J.:
Article 10 of the Mental Hygiene Law, enacted in 2007,
provides that certain imprisoned sex offenders may be transferred
to mental hospitals, rather than being released, when their
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prison terms expire.  The statute raises important questions
concerning the procedural and substantive rights of the prisoners
to whom it applies, but those questions are not before us in this
case.  We have here the narrower issue of whether the statute
applies to a particular class of prisoners: those who were
incarcerated for violating the conditions of a term of post
release supervision (PRS) that was improperly added to their
sentences by the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS)
without court authorization.  We hold that these prisoners are
within the coverage of the statute, which we read as applying to
offenders actually imprisoned, even if the procedure that led to
their imprisonment was flawed.
I
Both of these cases involve men convicted of serious
sex crimes -- assaults of vulnerable strangers on the street. 
Joseph II assaulted a child, Humberto G. a developmentally
disabled adult.  Both were sentenced to imprisonment.  Both were
required by statute to be sentenced also to a term of PRS (see
Penal Law § 70.06 [6]; § 70.45).  However, as happened in a
number of cases before our decisions in Matter of Garner v New
York State Dept. of Correctional Servs. (10 NY3d 358 [2008]) and
People v Sparber (10 NY3d 457 [2008]), the sentencing court
failed to impose the PRS term.  DOCS nevertheless included PRS in
its record of each man's sentence -- a practice we decided in
Garner was unlawful.
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Joseph completed his prison sentence in August 2006,
and Humberto completed his in January 2007.  Both men began their
improperly-imposed PRS terms -- not in the community, but in a
psychiatric hospital.  Mental Hygiene Law article 10 had not then
been enacted, but Joseph was involuntarily committed to a
hospital under article 9 of the Mental Hygiene Law (Mental
Hygiene Law § 9.27), and Humberto committed himself voluntarily,
also under article 9 (Mental Hygiene Law § 9.13).  Both, while in
the hospital, violated the terms of their PRS -- Joseph by trying
to escape, Humberto by assaulting a fellow patient -- and both
were returned to prison.
Article 10, which created a new procedure for the
confinement of sex offenders on the expiration of their prison
terms, became effective on April 13, 2007.  At first the State
took no action under the new statute in either Joseph's or
Humberto's case, presumably because there seemed no imminent
prospect that either would be released.  But our April 2008
decision in Garner changed that, making clear that the PRS terms
that had allowed the State to reincarcerate Joseph and Humberto
were unlawful.  Correction Law § 601-d and Penal Law § 70.85,
enacted in response to Garner and Sparber and effective June 30,
2008, effectively give prosecutors in such cases a choice either
to seek resentencing or to forego PRS, and in the autumn of 2008
the prosecutors in Joseph's and Humberto's cases chose the latter
option.  Faced with the prospect that the men would soon be
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freed, the State began article 10 proceedings, asking that each
man be found "a sex offender requiring civil management" and be
held in custody past his scheduled release date.
Joseph and Humberto contended that article 10 did not
apply to them.  They asserted that they were not "detained sex
offenders" within the meaning of that article, because their PRS
terms, and thus their imprisonment resulting from violations of
PRS conditions, were unlawful.  Both succeeded below, using
different procedural vehicles.  Joseph, after his release from
custody was stayed under article 10, began a habeas corpus
proceeding, which Supreme Court dismissed; the Appellate Division
reversed and granted the writ (People ex rel. Joseph II v
Superintendent of Southport Correctional Facility, 59 AD3d 921
[3d Dept 2009]).  Humberto made a motion to dismiss the article
10 proceeding against him, which Supreme Court granted; the
Appellate Division affirmed (Matter of State of New York v
Humberto G., 65 AD3d 690 [2d Dept 2009]).  We granted leave to
appeal in both cases, and we now reverse.
II
As these cases illustrate, the State's efforts to
confine certain sex offenders whose prison terms have expired
predate the enactment of Mental Hygiene Law article 10.  The
State formerly proceeded in a number of cases, as it did in
Joseph's, under Mental Hygiene Law article 9, which contains
provisions for the involuntary admission to mental hospitals of
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people who are mentally ill and in need of involuntary care and
treatment (see Mental Hygiene Law §§ 9.27, 9.31).  We held,
however, in State of N.Y. ex rel. Harkavy v Consilvio (7 NY3d 607
[2006]) (Harkavy I) that the State was required to proceed in
such cases under Correction Law § 402, a statute applicable to
prison inmates believed to be mentally ill, rather than the more
general provisions of article 9.
Evidently believing that section 402 procedures were
inadequate to protect the public, the Legislature responded to
Harkavy I by enacting article 10, a statute specifically designed
to deal with sex offenders who are completing their prison terms. 
The statute sets out procedures for determining whether a
"detained sex offender" is a "sex offender requiring civil
management" -- a term defined as "a detained sex offender who
suffers from a mental abnormality" (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03
[q]).  A subcategory of "sex offender requiring civil management"
is a "dangerous sex offender requiring confinement" -- i.e., one
whose mental abnormality involves "such a strong predisposition
to commit sex offenses, and such an inability to control
behavior, that the person is likely to be a danger to others and
to commit sex offenses if not confined to a secure treatment
facility" (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 [e]; see Mental Hygiene Law
§§ 10.05-10.08; § 10.03 [q]).  In State of N.Y. ex rel. Harkavy v
Consilvio (8 NY3d 645 [2007]) (Harkavy II), we decided that, as
to the prisoners involved in Harkavy I, the new statute had
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superseded Correction Law § 402 and that future proceedings
concerning those prisoners should be held under article 10.
Under article 10, a prisoner can be found to be a "sex
offender requiring civil management" (and thus perhaps a
"dangerous sex offender requiring confinement") only if he or she
is a "detained sex offender" (see Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 [q]
["'Sex offender requiring civil management' means a detained sex
offender who . . . ."]).  The main issue in these cases is
whether Joseph and Humberto were detained sex offenders when the
State began proceedings against them under article 10.
Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 (g) defines "detained sex
offender."  The part of the definition that is relevant to this
case says:
" (g) 'Detained sex offender' means a person
who is in the care, custody, control, or
supervision of an agency with jurisdiction,
with respect to a sex offense or designated
felony, in that the person is . . .
" (5) A person convicted of a sex offense who
is, or was at any time after September first,
two thousand five, a patient in a hospital
operated by the office of mental health, and
who was admitted directly to such facility
pursuant to article nine of this title or
section four hundred two of the correction
law upon release or conditional release from
a correctional facility . . . ."
Joseph and Humberto are clearly persons of the kind
described in subsection (5).  Both were patients in a hospital
operated by the Office of Mental Health after September 1, 2005,
and both were admitted to the hospital under Mental Hygiene Law
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article 9 "directly . . . upon release or conditional release
from a correctional facility" -- Joseph involuntarily and
Humberto voluntarily.  Humberto argues that subsection (5)
applies only to involuntary patients, but the plain text of the
statute contradicts that argument.
On its face, the introductory language of section 10
(g) also fits Joseph and Humberto.  It is beyond dispute that,
when the article 10 proceedings began, they were in fact in
DOCS's custody, and DOCS can be an "agency with jurisdiction"
(see Mental Hygiene § 10.03 [a] ["'[a]gency with jurisdiction' .
. . can include the department of correctional services"]).  Nor
can it be doubted that each man was confined "with respect to a
sex offense."  Joseph and Humberto argue, however, that "custody"
must mean lawful custody and that since their confinement was
unlawful under Garner, the definition of "detained sex offender"
cannot apply to them.  We reject this argument.
No doubt it is often reasonable to read "custody" as
implying "lawful custody."  Here, however, the statute is best
read as making no distinction between those properly and
improperly confined.  To see why, it is helpful to remember that
article 10, which applies only to "detained" sex offenders, is
the result of our decision in Harkavy I, which drew a distinction
between prison inmates and other people.  The sex offenders on
whose behalf Harkavy I was brought argued that Mental Hygiene Law
article 9, which generally governs the commitment of mentally ill
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people to hospitals, could not be applied to them because they
were prisoners, and therefore subject to the more specific
provisions of Correction Law § 402 for commitment of "any person
undergoing a sentence of imprisonment" (Correction Law § 402
[l]).  Accepting that argument, we held that "the Legislature
intended the procedures of Correction Law § 402 to be used to
evaluate for commitment all imprisoned persons" (7 NY3d at 613
[emphasis added]).  The prisoners in Harkavy I sought this
result, apparently because they preferred section 402 procedures
to those used under article 9; we referred in Harkavy I to
section 402's "attendant procedural requirements including court
supervision, pretransfer notice and an opportunity to be heard
within a reasonable period of time prior to the inmate's proposed
release date" (id. at 614).  
If Joseph and Humberto had been involved in the Harkavy
I litigation, they would likely have argued that they were
persons "undergoing a sentence of imprisonment" within the
meaning of section 402, despite the fact that their
"imprisonment" violated the law.  And that argument would have
been plainly correct.  The point of Harkavy I was that the
Legislature enacted certain procedures specifically designed for
the transfer of inmates from prisons to mental hospitals.  There
is no reason why people whose confinement violated the law should
not have been treated the same way as other inmates.  And there
is no reason to suppose that the Legislature intended to treat
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them differently when it enacted article 10, which provided a new
way of dealing with the prisoners affected by the Harkavy I
decision.
It is true that the enactment of Mental Hygiene Law
article 10 has made special procedures applicable to those in
prison less desirable from the prisoners' point of view.  Now
that the alternative to an article 9 proceeding is an article 10
proceeding, Joseph and Humberto are arguing, in substance, that
the State must proceed against them under article 9 if at all --
thus seeking to come within the statute that the prisoners in
Harkavy I sought to escape.  This change in the preference of
prisoners seems to result, at least in part, from the
unattractive prospect of being sent to a "secure" mental health
facility -- the consequence of being found a "dangerous sex
offender requiring confinement" under article 10.  But of course
it is the Legislature's preference, not the prisoners', that
controls.  Just as we held in Harkavy I that the Legislature
intended a distinction between prisoners and other people alleged
to be mentally ill, we now conclude that the Legislature intended
to draw a similar line between prisoners and non-prisoners when
it enacted article 10.  The legality of the prisoners' custody is
irrelevant in both situations.
There is no injustice in holding prisoners situated as
Joseph and Humberto are to be within article 10's scope.  The
point of the prisoner/non-prisoner distinction we recognized in
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Harkavy I is not that one group should be treated more or less
favorably than the other, but that different situations may call
for different procedures.  Indeed, there is no apparent reason
why the Legislature had to limit article 10 to "detained" sex
offenders.  It could equally well have subjected all people who
had committed sex offenses and were thought to be mentally ill --
including those living in the community -- to the procedures
described in article 10.  It chose not to do so, perhaps because
it thought article 9 procedures adequate to deal with sex
offenders who are not detained, or perhaps because it thought
that those who are detained present a more serious threat to
public safety.
We do not decide here whether there are any valid
constitutional objections to article 10.  But assuming, as we
must for present purposes, that it can be validly applied to
lawfully detained prisoners, it can be applied with equal
validity to those whose imprisonment resulted from a procedural
error.  We hold that such prisoners are within the statute's
coverage.
III
Our conclusion that Joseph and Humberto are "detained
sex offenders" subject to article 10 disposes of the only issue
raised in the Humberto G. case.  In the Joseph II case, one other
issue requires brief attention.
Joseph argues that he was entitled to notice and an
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opportunity to be heard before the issuance of an order under
Mental Hygiene Law § 10.06 (h) staying his release from DOCS's
custody.  The State argues, and Joseph does not dispute, that
this claim is now moot, since Joseph was released after the
Appellate Division decision in his favor.  Joseph suggests,
however, that we should exercise our discretion to decide a moot
controversy where the issue presented is significant, likely to
recur, and, because it arises in situations of relatively brief
duration, apt to evade review (see Matter of Hearst Corp. v
Clyne, 50 NY2d 707 [1980]).
The State does not challenge Joseph's assertion that
the issue he raises is significant and likely to recur; it does
dispute his claim that it will evade review.  Without resolving
that dispute, we decline to address the issue here.  It is barely
alluded to in Joseph's habeas corpus petition; it was not
discussed by either court below; and the State, as appellant in
this Court, has not briefed or argued the merits of the question. 
If this issue is one that should be addressed by means of the
mootness exception, it can be addressed in some other case.
Accordingly, in People ex rel. Joseph II v
Superintendent of Southport Correctional Facility, et al., the
order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, without
costs, and the petition dismissed.  In Matter of State of New
York v Humberto G., the order of the Appellate Division should be
reversed, without costs, and Humberto G.'s motion to dismiss the
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article 10 proceeding denied.        
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People ex rel Joseph II. v Superintendent of Southport
Correctional Facility, et al.
Matter of State of New York v Humberto G. (Anonymous)
Nos. 95 & 96 
CIPARICK, J.(dissenting) :
Because I believe that a prisoner must be lawfully in
custody in order to qualify as a "detained sex offender" as that
term is defined in Mental Hygiene Law article 10, I dissent.  
A civil management proceeding under article 10 of the
Mental Hygiene Law is commenced when an "agency with
jurisdiction" notifies the Attorney General and the Commissioner
of the Office of Mental Health that a "detained sex offender" is
nearing an anticipated release date (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.05
[b]).  An "agency with jurisdiction" is an agency "which, during
the period in question, would be the agency responsible for
supervising or releasing" the "detained sex offender" (id. §
10.03 [a]).  As relevant here, article 10, which became effective
in April 2007, defines the term "detained sex offender" to mean: 
"a person who is in the care, custody,
control, or supervision of an agency with
jurisdiction . . . in that the person is 
. . . [a] person who stands convicted of a
sex offense . . . and is currently serving a
sentence for, or subject to supervision by
the division of parole, whether on parole or
on post-release supervision, for such offense
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or for a related offense; . . . [or a] person
convicted of a sex offense who is, or was at
any time after September first, two thousand
five, a patient in a hospital operated by the
office of mental health, and who was admitted
directly to such facility pursuant to article
nine of this title or section four hundred
two of the correction law upon release or
conditional release from a correctional
facility, provided that the provisions of
this article shall not be deemed to shorten
or lengthen the time for which such person
may be held pursuant to such article or
section respectively (id. § 10.03 [g] [1],
[5].
  
From these legislative pronouncements, the majority
draws several conclusions with which I agree.  First, I believe
the majority correctly concludes that the Legislature limited the
scope of article 10 to sex offenders who are actually and
presently in the custody or care of the relevant agency with
jurisdiction (see majority op., at 10); I also agree that it is
"often reasonable to read 'custody' as implying 'lawful custody'"
(id. at 7; see Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 [g]).  I part company
with the majority, however, when it concludes that "the legality
of [a] prisoner['s] custody is irrelevant" (majority op., at 9)
in ascertaining whether he or she is a "detained sex offender."
In State of N.Y. ex rel. Harkavy v Consilvio (7 NY3d
607 [2006]) (Harkavy I), we determined that the proper procedure
for involuntary commitment of an inmate was Corrections Law § 402
rather than article 9 of the Mental Hygiene Law (see id. at 614). 
We recognized in State of N.Y. ex rel. Harkavy v Consilvio (8
NY3d 645 [2007]) (Harkavy II), decided after the legislative
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enactment of article 10 of the Mental Hygiene Law, that persons
similarly situated to the Harkavy I petitioners -- sex offenders
improperly transferred to Office of Mental Health facilities
directly from Department of Correctional Services (DOCS)
facilities pursuant to article 9 -- had been specifically
designated for inclusion within the new article 10, thus making
that new procedure the proper vehicle to involuntarily commit a
sex offender nearing the end of his or her prison sentence (see
id. at 652).  We did not contemplate, at that time, whether the
DOCS detention was or could be illegal.  
The following year, we concluded in People v Sparber
(10 NY3d 457, 469-470 [2008]) and Matter of Garner v New York
State Dept. of Correctional Servs. (10 NY3d 358, 362 [2008]) that
a term of postrelease supervision must be judicially pronounced
in order to be valid and that it could not be administratively
imposed by DOCS.  Moreover, recently, we reaffirmed the concept
that "the administrative imposition by DOCS of any additional
penalty other than that issued by the sentencing court is a
nullity" (People v Williams, 14 NY3d 198, 218 [2010], citing
Garner, 10 NY3d at 362; see also Earley v Murray, 451 F3d 71, 76
[2d Cir 2006], reh denied 462 F3d 147 [2006], cert denied sub
nom. Burhle v Earley, 551 US 1159 [2007]).  
In both of the cases presently before us, DOCS
impermissibly imposed PRS.  Accordingly, Joseph II. and Humberto
G. were in DOCS custody for violating unlawfully imposed PRS
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*  As the majority notes, in both cases, the District
Attorney declined to seek resentencing pursuant to Correction Law
§ 601-d to include a term of PRS.  
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conditions at the time the Attorney General commenced article 10
proceedings against them.*  Yet the majority concludes that the
status of the incarceration of both is unimportant.  I disagree. 
An invalid term of PRS and a subsequent violation should not be
permitted to serve as the basis for further proceedings under
article 10, especially because such proceedings may result in a
significant curtailment of liberty (see generally Kansas v
Hendricks, 521 US 346, 356-347 [1997] [recognizing liberty
interest in remaining free from restraint, but upholding a state
sex offender civil commitment statute because it complied with
due process requirements]).
The majority's argument to the contrary is not
convincing.  The majority explains that, in Harkavy I, we
recognized a legislative distinction between imprisoned persons
and non-imprisoned persons; it also concludes that "the
Legislature intended to draw a similar line between prisoners and
non-prisoners when it enacted article 10" (majority op., at 8-9). 
While that conclusion is accurate, it is irrelevant.  Joseph II.
and Humberto G.'s administratively imposed PRS terms are a
nullity and, thus, their incarceration as a result of a
"violation" of an unlawfully imposed term of PRS was likewise
illegal.  In short, these two prisoners are unlawfully in DOCS
custody and thus DOCS may not be considered "an agency with
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jurisdiction" as contemplated by article 10.  
That the majority views the legality of the custody
"irrelevant" is troubling; such a result encourages and rewards
DOCS errors.  For instance, if a DOCS inmate "slips through the
cracks" or DOCS "miscalculates" a sentence to extend beyond the
actually-imposed sentence, that illegal detention and custody
could, under the majority's rationale, serve as the basis for an
article 10 proceeding.  That result would be untenable. 
Accordingly, I would hold that neither prisoner qualifies as a
"detained sex offender" and, in both cases, would affirm the
orders of the Appellate Division.          
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
In Case No. 95:  Order reversed, without costs, and petition
dismissed.  Opinion by Judge Smith.  Judges Graffeo, Read and
Pigott concur.  Judge Ciparick dissents and votes to affirm in an
opinion in which Chief Judge Lippman and Judge Jones concur.
In Case No. 96:  Order reversed, without costs, and respondent's
motion to dismiss denied.  Opinion by Judge Smith.  Judges
Graffeo, Read and Pigott concur.  Judge Ciparick dissents and
votes to affirm in an opinion in which Chief Judge Lippman and
Judge Jones concur.
Decided June 15, 2010