Case Title: Calkins v. Boydston

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-08-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Calkins v. Boydston1990 WY 87796 P.2d 452Case Number: 89-278Decided: 08/29/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
TERRY G. CALKINS, 

APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

GERALD D. BOYDSTON; AND 
MARINELL BOYDSTON, INDIVIDUALLY, 

APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Park County, Hunter Patrick, J.

Terry W. Mackey, 
Cheyenne, for appellant.

Kathryn A. 
Jenkins and Stephen H. Kline, Cheyenne, for appellees.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, and MACY, JJ., and BROWN, Ret. 
J.

BROWN, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1]      Appellant Terry 
G. Calkins brought this action in the trial court against appellees Gerald 
Boydston and Marinell Boydston for injuries suffered when his leg was caught in 
the drive shaft of a pump unit. At the time of the injury appellant and 
appellees were working for Boydston and Franzen Well Service, Inc., a Wyoming 
corporation. In his complaint, appellant charges his co-employees with culpable 
negligence. The trial court granted appellees' motion for a summary 
judgment.

[¶2]      In the single 
issue on appeal, appellant states:

The trial court erred in 
granting summary judgment to the Appellees, because there was a genuine issue as 
to a material fact; and the case should have been submitted to a 
jury.

[¶3]      We 
affirm.

[¶4]      Boydston and 
Franzen Well Service, Inc., performs well service work for oil companies. 
Marinell Boydston was the secretary-treasurer of the company since its 
incorporation in 1959 and was primarily responsible for handling the day-to-day 
paperwork in the office. She was not involved in supervising the employees in 
the field or inspecting the equipment and, although she kept the records of OSHA 
inspections and distributed OSHA regulations to the tool pushers, she was not 
involved in OSHA inspections. Gerald Boydston, son of Marinell Boydston, became 
president of Boydston and Franzen less than two weeks before appellant was 
injured. For eight years before becoming president, he was employed by Shell 
Chemical Company in Norco, Louisiana and had no connection with Boydston and 
Franzen.

[¶5]      Appellant was 
employed by Boydston and Franzen in 1977 as a derrick hand and by 1986 had 
worked his way up to operator. On February 8, 1986, appellant was oiling a 
running pump truck when his right leg was caught in the drive shaft, causing 
serious injury. Appellant had used the pump truck on which he was injured "off 
and on" since he first went to work for Boydston and Franzen. Although he had 
told the Boydstons the pump needed to be replaced because it was old and worn 
out, he never told them the drive shaft was unguarded nor did he tell them he 
thought the pump was unsafe. Neither did the other employees ever tell the 
Boydstons the drive shaft was unguarded or the pump was dangerous. Before the 
accident, appellant never thought the pump was unsafe; therefore, he did nothing 
to correct the condition of the pump. 

[¶6]      There is no 
evidence that either Marinell or Gerald Boydston had actual knowledge that the 
pump was unguarded. Gerald Boydston, although employed at Boydston and Franzen 
only a short time, visited the well where the injury occurred a few days before 
the accident. He did not observe the pump or the unguarded shaft before the 
accident, and he never heard any complaints about the pump being unsafe. The 
complaints about the pump had nothing to do with the drive shaft or safety of 
the pump but instead concerned the general operation of the pump and the need to 
replace it with a newer model.

[¶7]      In his complaint 
against appellees, appellant alleges culpable negligence. A summary judgment in 
favor of appellees was granted by the court and this appeal 
followed.

[¶8]      In Boehm v. Cody 
Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo. 1987), this court 
said:

     A motion for summary 
judgment places an initial burden on the movant to make a prima facie showing 
that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that summary judgment should 
be granted as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Once a prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the 
motion to present specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact 
does exist. England v. Simmons, Wyo., 728 P.2d 1137, 1140-1141 (1986). We 
analyze challenges to a grant of summary judgment by reviewing the record in a 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion giving him all favorable 
inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Id. Conclusory statements or mere 
opinions are insufficient, however, to satisfy an opposing party's burden. Jones 
Land and Livestock Co. v. Federal Land Bank of Omaha, Wyo., 733 P.2d 258, 263 
(1987).

Generally, 
summary judgment is not appropriate in simple negligence cases, O'Donnell v. 
City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Wyo. 1985), because the trier of fact must 
determine whether an actor's conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. 
Culpable negligence, however, involves more than unreasonable conduct; it 
involves willfulness and when a party fails to raise a genuine issue of material 
fact on this element, summary judgment is appropriate. Bryant v. Hornbuckle, 728 P.2d 1132, 1137 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶9]      Under the 
worker's compensation statute in effect at the time appellant was injured, W.S. 
27-12-103(a) (1977),1 an employer and his employees 
acting within the scope of their employment were immune from suit for injuries 
incurred by a fellow employee unless they were culpably negligent. In construing 
that language, this court held that culpable negligence is willful misconduct 
such as is done purposely, with knowledge or with reckless disregard of the 
consequences and that misconduct arising from a thoughtless, heedless or 
inadvertent act or an error in judgment does not constitute culpable negligence. 
Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1362 (Wyo. 1981).

[¶10]   In Barnette, the trial court's 
finding of culpable negligence was affirmed on the basis of evidence 
demonstrating that an employee told the defendant he was concerned for his 
safety because the emergency brake on one of the vehicles did not work. The 
court's finding of culpable negligence was based on defendant's knowledge that 
the vehicle was unsafe and yet he purposely refused to fix it.

[¶11]   Since Barnette, this court has 
addressed the issue of culpable negligence on several occasions and consistently 
affirmed summary judgments in favor of co-employees on the issue of culpable 
negligence in the absence of evidence demonstrating actual knowledge or 
willfulness on the part of the defendant. Baros v. Wells, 780 P.2d 341 (Wyo. 
1989); Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light Company, 779 P.2d 1169 (Wyo. 
1989); Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188 (Wyo. 1989); Poulos v. HPC, Inc., 765 P.2d 364 
(Wyo. 1988); Johnston v. Conoco, Inc., 758 P.2d 566 (Wyo. 1988); Smith v. 
Ensley, 752 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1988); Stundon v. Sterling, 736 P.2d 317 (Wyo. 
1987); Bettencourt v. Pride Well Service, Inc., 735 P.2d 722 (Wyo. 1987); 
Bryant, 728 P.2d 1132. In Stephenson, this court upheld an order awarding 
summary judgment to three co-employees on the issue of culpable negligence 
despite their admission that they had knowledge of the hazardous condition which 
caused injury to the plaintiff. We stated: "[T]he co-employee appellees may not 
have fulfilled their duty to provide appellant with a safe working environment 
but that the breach of this duty was a matter of negligence at most, and 
appellant failed to present evidence of culpable negligence." Stephenson, 779 P.2d  at 1175.

[¶12]   In Baros, 780 P.2d  at 345, the 
court again upheld a summary judgment in favor of a co-employee stating: "Even 
if we were to agree that this activity was extremely dangerous, that does not 
equate to culpable negligence. There is nothing in the record to indicate that 
Wells anticipated or realized the serious nature of the risk involved or that he 
willfully disregarded such risk."

[¶13]   In Poulos, the award of summary 
judgment was upheld in favor of two co-employees on the ground that the evidence 
failed to demonstrate a state of mind consistent with culpable negligence. 
Relying heavily on evidence of OSHA violations in that case, appellant filed a 
wrongful death action alleging that several of her son's co-employees were 
culpably negligent. This court said that evidence of OSHA violations, while 
perhaps sufficient to demonstrate ordinary negligence, was insufficient to 
demonstrate culpable negligence. See also Stundon, 736 P.2d 317.

[¶14]   In a case involving a culpable 
negligence claim against ten co-employees, the court upheld summary judgment for 
five production department employees despite the appellant's argument that they 
were responsible for safety, were aware of the accumulation of grease and should 
have taken action to correct it. Case, 776 P.2d  at 188. The court found that 
"their supervisory actions relating to [the appellant] were passive, 
encompassing only a general duty to supervise and maintain a safe workplace" and 
did not constitute action making it highly probable that harm would follow or a 
state of mind approaching an intent to harm. Id., 776 P.2d  at 194. The court 
also affirmed the trial court's award of summary judgment in favor of the 
company's mine manager who was primarily responsible for overseeing the 
development of safety procedures and safety training. The court held that the 
evidence did not reflect the required state of mind or reckless disregard and 
concluded that the co-employees' mere failure to rectify the condition before 
the appellant's injury did not create a genuine issue of material fact on the 
question of culpable negligence. Id. at 195.

[¶15]   In Bryant, this court affirmed a 
summary judgment in favor of a co-employee where the injured employee, at the 
direction of the defendant, used a butane torch to thaw a tank valve on a truck 
containing petroleum residue. The fumes from the tank ignited, an explosion 
occurred and the employee was severely burned. The evidence produced in support 
of the motion for summary judgment was that the defendant was conforming to an 
industry standard, that he himself used the butane torch method for thawing 
frozen water valves, that he was not aware of other such incidents and that he 
did not anticipate or expect an explosion. This court found such evidence 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case that there was no culpable negligence 
and to warrant summary judgment if unrefuted. We stated: "The harmful 
consequences were unknown to him; the risk was not obvious; it was not highly 
probable that harm would follow. Consequently, the burden of establishing a 
genuine issue of material fact shifted to appellant." Bryant, 728 P.2d  at 1136. 
The evidence produced in opposition to the motion for summary judgment showed 
only that the danger of the butane torch procedure was widely known in the 
industry. It did not show that the defendant actually knew that an explosion was 
highly probable or that a high probability of an explosion was obvious. 

[¶16]   If appellant in this case is to 
avoid a summary judgment, he must come forth with evidence that Gerald and 
Marinell Boydston had actual knowledge that the pump was unguarded and that 
their failure to provide a guard was done willfully. It is not sufficient for 
appellant to show that the Boydstons' failure to maintain the pump in a safe 
condition was careless, inadvertent or an error in judgment. Barnette, 622 P.2d 1349. It is not sufficient for appellant to show that in failing to place a 
guard on the drive shaft the Boydstons violated OSHA regulations, breached a 
duty to provide a safe workplace or acted ineffectually or unreasonably. See 
Poulos, 765 P.2d 364; Stephenson, 779 P.2d 1169; and Baros, 780 P.2d 341. The 
case law is clear that appellant must show that the Boydstons knew of the risk 
of harm or that the risk was obvious and yet they willfully disregarded the 
risk. The evidence in the record fails to make such a showing.

[¶17]   Although the Boydstons may have 
been generally aware of the possibility of harm from unguarded drive shafts, 
there is no evidence that either of them knew the degree of danger presented by 
the particular pump on which appellant was injured. Poulos, 765 P.2d 364. The 
Boydstons were not aware of the dangerous condition at the pump; this 
circumstance is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on the 
issue of willfulness. Case, 776 P.2d  at 194. Even assuming that they failed to 
fulfill their duty to provide appellant with a safe working environment, the 
breach of that duty is a matter of negligence at most and not a matter of 
culpable negligence. Stephenson, 779 P.2d 1169. The Boydstons did not know the 
pump was in a dangerous condition, they did not purposely refuse to fix it, they 
had no reason to expect that it would cause harm, and they did not evidence a 
state of mind approaching an intent to do harm. Given the lack of evidence to 
the contrary, the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor 
of the Boydstons.

[¶18]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 W.S. 27-12-101 through 
W.S. 27-12-805 (1977) repealed by Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 353; re-enacted as W.S. 
27-14-104 et seq.; amended by 1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 161; presently cited as 
W.S. 27-14-104, et seq. (Cum.Supp. 1990).