Case Title: State v. Alberto Fernandez

Citation: 2009 WI 29

Docket Number: 2007AP001403-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2009-04-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
2009 WI 29 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP1403-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Alberto Fernandez, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 28, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 9, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Fond du Lac   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert J. Wirtz   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant the cause was argued by Eileen 
A. Hirsch, assistant public defender, with whom on the briefs 
was Shelley M. Fite, assistant public defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Eileen 
W. Pray, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 29
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP1403-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2005CF222) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Alberto Fernandez, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 28, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL of an order of the Circuit Court for Fond du Lac 
County, Robert J. Wirtz, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This case is before the court 
on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 809.61 (2005-06).1  The court of appeals asks us whether 
State v. Loutsch, 2003 WI App 16, ¶25, 259 Wis. 2d 901, 656 
N.W.2d 781 (Ct. App. 2002), correctly interprets the criminal 
restitution statute2 when it states that a court may order only 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Wis. Stat. § 973.20.  The relevant provisions will be 
cited as we reach them. 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
2 
 
as much restitution as a defendant has the ability to pay within 
the term of the sentence.3  
¶2 
On the question involving restitution ordered during a 
sentence or probation term, we hold that the statute, when read 
as a whole, clearly permits a circuit court to order full 
restitution so long as it properly considers the defendant's 
ability to pay in setting the total restitution and, where 
applicable, in setting the amount that must be paid during any 
probation, parole, or extended supervision.  The statute gives 
no indication that that power is curtailed when probation is 
involved.  In fact, it is significant that in providing for 
converting 
unpaid 
restitution 
to 
civil 
judgments, 
the 
legislature, it seems clear, recognized that there would be 
circumstances where all the necessary restitution amounts often 
would not and could not be paid before the completion of the 
sentence or probationary period. 
¶3 
We therefore answer the certification from the court 
of appeals by holding that when a court has considered the 
defendant's ability to pay in setting restitution, the length of 
the term of probation or of the sentence does not have any 
                                                 
3 The 
instant 
case involves a withheld sentence and 
probation, with some restitution to be paid during probation; we 
therefore understand the court of appeals to be using the word 
"sentence" in its certified question in a manner broad enough to 
include a probationary disposition.  See Prue v. State, 63 Wis. 
2d 109, 114, 116, 216 N.W.2d 43 (1974)(noting that probation and 
sentence "are different concepts" but also recognizing that the 
word "sentence" "may be and often is used in a more general 
sense [to include the concept of probation]"). 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
3 
 
limiting effect on the total amount of restitution that may be 
ordered.  Here the circuit court considered the defendant's 
ability to pay in ordering restitution, as the statute requires, 
and because the circuit court did not err in considering all the 
evidence presented at the restitution hearing or in awarding 
restitution to the victims in accord with the statute, we affirm 
the circuit court's order. 
¶4 
The issue presented here is not actually the issue 
that the Loutsch court was deciding.  The focus of the Loutsch 
court's opinion was whether when ordering restitution a court 
may defer making a determination of ability to pay until 
completion of a prison sentence and commencement of extended 
supervision.  Id., ¶28.  The holding we are asked to review is 
another proposition, which appears in paragraphs 25 and 28: 
"Read together, these sections [of the restitution statute] 
plainly contemplate that the court order at sentencing an amount 
of restitution that it determines the defendant will be able to 
pay before the completion of the sentence . . . ."  Id., ¶25.   
¶5 
Despite the fact that the paragraph4 and the rest of 
the opinion are unquestionably focused on answering the question 
of when a determination of an ability to pay must be made, the 
court in the process appeared to answer a different question 
when it stated that a court could not defer determining the 
                                                 
4 The sentence immediately following reads, "These sections 
do not permit a court to defer consideration of the defendant's 
ability to pay when evidence of the defendant's ability to pay 
is presented."  State v. Loutsch, 2003 WI App 16, ¶25, 259 Wis. 
2d 901, 656 N.W.2d 781 (Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis added). 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
4 
 
amount of restitution a defendant would be able to pay during 
the term of his or her sentence.  This has been interpreted by 
some5 as saying that the total restitution ordered cannot exceed 
what the defendant has the ability to pay during the term of the 
sentence.6  Because, as we explain below, the statute does not 
limit a court's discretion to order restitution in that way, 
Loutsch is incorrect when it says the defendant's ability to pay 
during the sentence is what the statute requires the court to 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., State v. Anthony D., 2006 WI App 218, ¶7 n.2, 
296 Wis. 2d 771, 723 N.W.2d 775 ("This court has in one case 
interpreted [Wis. Stat. 973.20(13)(a)] to mean that a court may 
not order restitution in a criminal case that exceeds a 
defendant's ability to pay within the term of the sentence."). 
6 This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that the 
"during the sentence" phrase was repeated in the directions to 
the circuit court:  "[W]e remand for the court to determine what 
amount of restitution it is reasonably probable that Loutsch 
will be able to pay during the term of his sentence."  Loutsch, 
259 Wis. 2d 901, ¶28. 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
5 
 
consider.7  The portion of Loutsch that has been interpreted as 
limiting restitution in that manner is overruled.  
¶6 
That is bad news for the petitioner in this case, who 
relied on Loutsch's statement about restitution being limited to 
an amount payable during the sentence.  Alberto Fernandez 
(Fernandez) appealed an order to pay $68,794 in restitution for 
damages and injury that he caused when he crashed a stolen car.  
He argues that the circuit court erred by ordering restitution 
in an amount greater than the amount he could pay during the 
term of his sentence.  
¶7 
Fernandez also challenged the restitution order on the 
grounds that some of the claims were submitted too late, 
violating the statute's requirements and, because he was not 
given advance written notice, his due process rights.  He argues 
                                                 
7 It is worth adding that this second issue was not raised 
by Loutsch in his briefs and was not the subject of any analysis 
by the court.  Loutsch's briefs indicate that the restitution 
ordered was about $33,000, and his sentence included 54 months 
of extended supervision and 60 months of consecutive probation.  
The issue presented by a substantial restitution award and a 
relatively 
brief 
probation 
term 
was 
therefore 
not 
under 
consideration there.  There is a substantial difference in the 
value of a statement based on "a deliberative consideration of 
the 
issue 
at 
hand" 
versus 
"[s]ub-silentio 
or 
assumptive 
resolution," as has been noted.  F.T.C. v. IFC Credit Corp., 543 
F. Supp. 2d 925, 929 (N.D. Ill. 2008).  As the Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit observed under similar circumstances, 
even where a court has apparently assumed a proposition, 
"[A]ssumptions are not holdings."  U.S. v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 
453 F.3d 458, 460 (7th Cir. 2006).  See also Brecht v. 
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631 (1993) ("[S]ince we have never 
squarely addressed the issue, and have at most assumed the 
applicability [of the standard in question], we are free to 
address the issue on the merits."). 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
6 
 
that the award of restitution to insurance companies is in 
violation of the statute, which allows such awards only where 
justice requires; he says justice does not require ordering a 
man who washes dishes for $5.15 an hour to pay restitution to 
insurance companies with a combined annual net income of $1.5 
billion.   
¶8 
These additional claims all fall within the discretion 
of the circuit court because the statute permits adjournment of 
the restitution hearing and imposes no mandatory deadlines for 
claims to be made prior to a restitution hearing.  It also 
permits courts to determine when awards are required by justice, 
and such discretionary rulings will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless they apply the wrong legal standard or are not based on a 
logical interpretation of the facts.  Because the statute is 
written that way, and because the standard of review is highly 
deferential, we cannot say that the circuit court erred in 
adjourning the restitution hearing twice at the defendant's 
request and then permitting testimony concerning claims for 
restitution made after sentencing (at least where, as here, the 
defendant had notice of the injuries at the time of sentencing). 
Nor do we find the court's order of full restitution to the 
insurance companies to be reversible error; it can be inferred 
from the court's ruling that it believed that justice required 
full restitution. 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶9 
The restitution award at issue in this case stems from 
damage and injuries Fernandez caused during a brief joyride on 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
7 
 
the night of June 16, 2005, when he became intoxicated at a 
friend's party, stole a car, and drove recklessly around a Fond 
du Lac railyard.  One of the workers in the railyard, Bruce 
Dalka, had to dive out of the path of the oncoming car and in 
the process twisted his knee.  That injury, which required 
months of medical care and resulted in lost wages, accounted for 
about $65,000 of the restitution ordered.  The stolen car itself 
sustained relatively minor damage and accounted for about $3,400 
of the restitution awarded.  
¶10 At a hearing in Fond du Lac County Circuit Court on 
September 2, 2005, the Honorable Robert J. Wirtz presiding, 
Fernandez pled no contest to taking and driving a vehicle 
without consent in violation of Wis. Stat. § 943.23(2).8  The 
court withheld sentence, and Fernandez was placed on probation 
for two years.  Probation had various conditions, including 
restitution.  The circuit court asked whether there was an 
agreement as to restitution or whether a separate restitution 
hearing would be necessary.  Defense counsel requested such a 
hearing, and one was scheduled for October 10, 2005, within the 
60 days prescribed in Wis. Stat. § 973.20(13)(c)2.9  
                                                 
8 He also pled no contest to OWI/causing injury in violation 
of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(2)(a)1.  On that charge he was sentenced 
to 60 days in jail, a one-year license revocation, a fine, and 
court costs. 
9 We note that Wis. Stat. § 973.20(13)(c)2. expressly 
permits holding a separate restitution hearing; what was held to 
be prohibited in Loutsch was deferring a determination of a 
defendant's ability to pay until after he or she completes the 
in-custody portion of the sentence and begins probation or 
extended supervision.  Loutsch, 259 Wis. 2d 901. 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
8 
 
¶11 In the meantime, a judgment of conviction was entered 
on September 6, 2005.  The judgment listed restitution as a 
condition of probation on the second charge.  The judgment also 
noted that if any restitution remained unpaid at the end of the 
term of probation, "a civil judgment shall be entered for the 
balance 
due 
and/or 
other 
collection 
procedures 
will 
be 
implemented."  
¶12 At the October 20, 2005, restitution hearing, MetLife 
Auto & Home Insurance Company (MetLife)10 submitted a claim of 
$1,744.95 for additional work on the car.11  Fernandez requested 
time to investigate the new claim.  The court agreed that 
Fernandez "ought to have the opportunity to address that."  The 
court proposed the date of January 10, 2006, saying, "My problem 
is I'm booked . . . and then I go into intake in December and 
I'm fitting this into post-intake as quick as I can."  A moment 
later the court said again, "I just looked through my calendar.  
It's the only time I really have available.  It's the soonest 
time I have available."  Defense counsel twice replied, "Okay."  
The restitution hearing was continued to January 10, 2006, to 
allow defense counsel to investigate the additional claim.  The 
adjournment was done in order to accommodate Fernandez's request 
for an opportunity to investigate further, and counsel made no 
objection to the January 10, 2006, date.  The extension was 
                                                 
10 MetLife was the insurer of the stolen car. 
11 An earlier claim for $1,680.72 had been submitted prior 
to sentencing. 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
9 
 
permitted in order to ensure fairness, and it was in the court's 
discretion to do so. 
¶13 At the continued restitution hearing on January 10, 
2006, the circuit court agreed, over defense objection, to allow 
claims Canadian National Railroad (CNR), the self-insured 
employer12 of Dalka, had submitted to the district attorney on 
December 9, 2005, with notice to defense counsel on December 16, 
2005, for medical expenses and lost wages.  The CNR claim 
submitted in December was for $22,313.56; by the time of the 
January hearing, the CNR claim had doubled to $44,808.60, and 
CNR was requesting an additional $20,000 in lost wages on 
Dalka's behalf.  Dalka testified about his injury, medical care 
and lost wages, but there is nothing in the record indicating he 
ever submitted a restitution figure. 
¶14 The circuit court heard telephone testimony from 
Fernandez about the factors listed in the statute relevant to 
this case:  Fernandez's financial resources and his earning 
ability.  Fernandez testified that he was 18, living with his 
mother in Texas, taking classes for a General Educational 
Development (GED) diploma, and working as a dishwasher for $5.15 
per hour.  He said he could afford to pay $50 to $70 a month.   
¶15 The court found that if Fernandez quit his GED program 
and got a second job, he could afford $400 per month in 
restitution.  The finding that Fernandez had the ability to make 
                                                 
12 CNR's representative testified that CNR is self-insured 
and is subject to federal law but not to worker's compensation 
laws. 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
10 
 
$400 monthly payments is not contested.  The court ordered 
Fernandez to pay all the restitution requested by the two 
insurers, the car owner, and the injured worker, for a total of 
$68,794.27,13 with payments of $400 per month to begin in 
February 2006.  At the time, Fernandez's probation was set to 
terminate on September 2, 2007; there were 20 months remaining.14   
¶16 An amended judgment of conviction filed on January 17, 
2006, reflected the amount of restitution as $68,794.27 and 
directed Fernandez to pay $400 per month.  A restitution order 
filed the same day listed the following victims and amounts:  
                                                 
13 The court made no explicit finding on the record as to 
Fernandez's ability to pay the total amount of restitution.  It 
would have been preferable for the circuit court to make a more 
complete and precise record that the court considered the 
defendant's ability to pay when it set the total restitution at 
$68,794; however, given the finding that $400 per month was 
within Fernandez's ability to pay——a finding that was not 
challenged——the court did not err in setting total restitution 
in an amount that, paid at least at that rate, would require 14 
years to repay.  In any event, Fernandez's challenge to the 
restitution award was not made on the grounds that the ability 
to pay was not considered. 
14 Before Fernandez's probation expired, a petition and 
stipulation were filed with the court to extend probation.  On 
May 24, 2007, the circuit court ordered that probation be 
extended by two years to September 2, 2009.  In the petition 
Fernandez stated that the restitution was being appealed, and he 
waived the right to a hearing on the matter of extending 
probation.  The petition stated, "I understand that the Dept. of 
Corrections believes I have not made a good faith effort to pay 
and is asking the court to: extend my probation for 2 years, 0 
months."  Documentation attached to the petition showed that, as 
of May 21, 2007, no payments had been made toward court costs or 
restitution.  The extension of probation is not contested in 
this appeal. 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
11 
 
Margaret 
Roberts,15 
$250.00; 
MetLife, 
$3,175.67; 
Dalka, 
$20,560.00; and CNR, $44,808.60.  
¶17 At 
a 
post-conviction 
motion 
hearing, 
Fernandez 
challenged the restitution on the same grounds that he now 
argues before this court. He asked that the court: 
-  
Reduce the total restitution to the maximum amount, at 
the rate the court determined he had the ability to pay 
each month ($400), that could be paid during the term of 
his probation.16  
- Vacate the order for restitution to Dalka and CNR because 
(1) the claims for restitution for these victims were 
barred because they were not made at the time of 
sentencing; and (2) at the time of sentencing, Fernandez 
had not had notice that there would be claims from these 
victims. 
-  
Vacate the order for restitution to Dalka because 
Fernandez had no notice of the claim because Dalka 
neither explicitly requested restitution nor provided any 
documentation of his claim.17  
                                                 
15 Roberts was the owner of the stolen car. 
16 The maximum restitution is referred to as $9,600 in the 
post-conviction motion, assuming a 24-month probation period.  
In the briefs on appeal, the maximum amount is referred to as 
$8,000, which recognizes that by the time of the restitution 
hearing, four months of probation had already passed and 20 
months remained. 
17 Fernandez also alleged that there was not proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence to support the restitution order.  
He did not pursue that argument on appeal. 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
12 
 
-  
Vacate the order for restitution to MetLife and to CNR in 
its capacity as the insurer for Dalka.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20(5)(d) 
authorizes 
reimbursement 
to 
insurance 
companies if justice requires, but Fernandez argued that 
justice does not require it here given the disparity 
between the insurance companies' wealth and Fernandez's 
poverty. 
¶18 The circuit court denied the motion to limit the 
ordered restitution to what was payable during probation, 
stating, "[u]ltimately, what [Fernandez] owes in restitution may 
be a more significant amount to compensate the victims [than he 
can pay over the course of probation]."  The circuit court cited 
Huml v. Vlazny, 2006 WI 87, 293 Wis. 2d 169, 716 N.W.2d 807, 
which dealt with another question but acknowledged without 
disapproval a restitution award that exceeded the amount the 
defendant had the ability to pay during the term of probation.18  
The 
circuit 
court 
said 
the 
arguments 
about 
notice 
were 
unpersuasive because first, the request came in before the 
restitution hearing had concluded and restitution had been 
                                                 
18 Huml dealt with the effect of a settlement agreement on a 
restitution order.  What courts have observed is the apparent 
contradiction 
between 
Loutsch 
and 
the 
facts 
of 
Huml.  
Restitution in the underlying criminal case there had been set 
at $140,000; payments were ordered at $425 per month; and three 
years' probation was initially imposed.  As this court noted 
without further comment, a substantial amount of restitution 
would have remained outstanding after probation was terminated.  
Huml v. Vlazny, 2006 WI 87, ¶¶7-8, 293 Wis. 2d 169, 716 N.W.2d 
807. 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
13 
 
ordered, and second, Fernandez knew about the man he injured and 
therefore had notice that other claims were possible. 
¶19 Fernandez appealed; as noted above, the court of 
appeals certified the appeal to this court. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶20 Here 
we 
review 
both 
the 
interpretation 
of 
the 
restitution statute and its application to a given set of facts, 
which presents a question of law and is reviewed de novo.  See, 
e.g., State v. Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d 409, 561 N.W.2d 695 (1997).  
Reviewing the calculation of restitution involves a question of 
whether the trial court misused its discretionary authority.  
State v. Boffer, 158 Wis. 2d 655, 658, 462 N.W.2d 906, 907-08 
(Ct. App. 1990).  This court may reverse a discretionary 
decision if the trial court applied the wrong legal standard or 
did not ground its decision on a logical interpretation of the 
facts.  See State v. Behnke, 203 Wis. 2d 43, 58, 553 N.W.2d 265 
(Ct. App. 1996); State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 829, 539 
N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995). 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶21 Because Fernandez would have us interpret the statute 
as imposing a limit on the amount of restitution a court can 
order, we begin by noting that full or partial restitution is 
mandatory under the statute "unless the court finds substantial 
reason not to do so and states the reason on the record."19 
                                                 
19 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.20(1r): 
When imposing sentence or ordering probation for any 
crime, other than a crime involving conduct that 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
14 
 
¶22 The 
statute 
also 
makes 
it 
mandatory, 
without 
exception, for a sentencing court to consider specific facts in 
arriving at a decision on a restitution order.20  Three of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
constitutes domestic abuse under s. 813.12(1)(am) or 
968.075(1)(a), for which the defendant was convicted, 
the court, in addition to any other penalty authorized 
by law, shall order the defendant to make full or 
partial restitution under this section to any victim 
of a crime considered at sentencing or, if the victim 
is deceased, to his or her estate, unless the court 
finds substantial reason not to do so and states the 
reason on the record. . . .  Restitution ordered under 
this section is a condition of probation, extended 
supervision, or parole served by the defendant for a 
crime for which the defendant was convicted.  After 
the termination of probation, extended supervision, or 
parole, 
or 
if 
the 
defendant 
is 
not 
placed 
on 
probation, 
extended 
supervision, 
or 
parole, 
restitution ordered under this section is enforceable 
in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action by 
the victim named in the order to receive restitution 
or enforced under ch. 785. 
See also Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(b). 
20 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.20(13)(a): 
The court, in determining whether to order restitution 
and the amount thereof, shall consider all of the 
following: 
1.  The amount of loss suffered by any victim as a 
result of a crime considered at sentencing. 
2.  The financial resources of the defendant. 
3.  The present and future earning ability of the 
defendant. 
4.  The needs and earning ability of the defendant's 
dependents. 
5.  Any other factors which the court deems appropriate. 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
15 
 
factors 
the 
court 
"shall 
consider" 
are 
related 
to 
the 
defendant's financial situation:  the financial resources of the 
defendant, the present and future earning ability of the 
defendant, and the needs and earning ability of the defendant's 
dependents.21 
¶23 Our case law has repeatedly stressed the necessity of 
considering 
a 
defendant's 
ability 
to 
pay 
when 
ordering 
restitution.  In Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 266 N.W.2d 
403 (1978), this court addressed a situation where a defendant 
had her probation extended for continued payment of restitution 
even though she had initially made a good faith effort by making 
some payments and lacked the capacity to keep up with the 
payments.22  This court remanded for a new probation revocation 
hearing on the grounds that extending probation solely for 
nonpayment 
of 
restitution 
was 
not 
permissible 
where 
the 
                                                 
21 Fernandez argues that in requiring a court to consider 
these factors the legislature was capping the total amount that 
can be ordered at an amount within the ability to pay, and given 
the language in Wis. Stat. § 973.20(10), it was capping the 
amount at the ability to pay within the term of the sentence.  
Given the provision in § 973.20(1r) for converting any unpaid 
balance of restitution to a civil judgment, which we discuss at 
¶¶47-48 below, we disagree that these factors constitute such a 
cap. 
22 As noted above, the extension of Fernandez's probation by 
two years is not contested; it was stipulated to the circuit 
court that the requirement of a good faith effort had not been 
met, and therefore Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 266 N.W.2d 
403 (1978), does not apply to that determination.  We cite 
Huggett because it makes clear that the defendant's ability to 
pay is a relevant factor and articulates some of the policy 
concerns surrounding restitution. 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
16 
 
defendant had made a good faith effort but did not have the 
ability to pay the amount ordered: 
If the probationer lacks the capacity to pay and has 
demonstrated a good faith effort during probation, 
failure to make restitution cannot be "cause" for 
extending probation.  As we have noted previously, the 
criminal justice system should not be employed to 
supplement a civil suit or as a threat to coerce the 
payment of a civil liability or to perform the 
functions of a collection agency.   
Id. at 803-04 (citing State v. Scherr, 9 Wis. 2d 418, 424, 101 
N.W.2d 77 (1960)). 
¶24 The rationale for the rule we emphasized in Huggett 
was that absent a meaningful determination of the defendant's 
ability to pay, restitution loses a large part of its 
significance. 
Conditioning probation on making restitution also 
protects 
the 
community's interest in having the 
victims of crime made whole.  However, conditioning 
probation on the satisfaction of requirements which 
are beyond the probationer's control undermines the 
probationer's sense of responsibility. 
. . . . 
We have previously emphasized the importance of the 
trial court's determining a probationer's ability to 
pay in imposing restitution.  
Huggett, 83 Wis. 2d at 798-99, 800. 
¶25 In Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d 409, this court again recognized 
that part of the purpose of restitution is for the benefit of 
the 
defendant, 
another 
indication 
that 
the 
defendant's 
circumstances are not incidental to the setting of restitution.  
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
17 
 
Id. at 422 ("Restitution serves a dual purpose, making the 
victim whole and rehabilitating the defendant.")   
¶26 In considering the defendant's ability to pay, courts 
may consider external legal realities as well, such as the fact 
that a restitution order is not dischargeable in bankruptcy.  
State v. Foley, 142 Wis. 2d 331, 417 N.W.2d 920 (Ct. App. 
1987).23  
 
¶27 Fernandez contends, however, that there is essentially 
another consideration that the court is required to make; that 
is, where probation is ordered, the statute caps restitution at 
the amount that the defendant has the ability to pay within the 
period of probation.   
¶28 It is true that Fernandez can cite to some language in 
the statute that, at first glance, seems to support his 
position.  First, the statute describes three restitution 
payment plans, so to speak, that are within a court's discretion 
to order: "immediately, within a specified period or in 
specified installments."  Wis. Stat. § 973.20(10).  Only the 
                                                 
23 There the court held that "[t]he trial court correctly 
concluded that it could require, as a condition of Foley's 
probation, that he make restitution to the victims of his crime 
even though his civil liability to them had been discharged in 
bankruptcy.  Because the federal bankruptcy courts defer to the 
sovereignty 
of 
the 
state 
in 
criminal 
prosecutions, 
the 
restitution order does not violate the supremacy clause of the 
federal constitution."  State v. Foley, 142 Wis. 2d 331, 341-42, 
417 N.W.2d 920 (Ct. App. 1987) (citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479 
U.S. 36, 37 (1986) (declining to permit the discharge in 
bankruptcy of restitution ordered in a criminal case citing "the 
deep conviction that federal bankruptcy courts should not 
invalidate the results of state criminal proceedings")). 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
18 
 
second one, the "within a specified period" option, is further 
qualified.  It is qualified in the next sentence: "If the 
defendant is placed on probation or sentenced to imprisonment, 
the end of a specified period shall not be later than the end of 
any period of probation, extended supervision or parole."  Id.  
One way to reconcile this part of the statute with the other 
sections 
would 
be 
to 
limit 
all 
restitution 
orders 
in 
circumstances like Fernandez's to an amount that can be imposed, 
taking into consideration what he has the ability to pay during 
the term of his probation. 
¶29 A second part of Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1r) that seems to 
support 
Fernandez's 
argument 
is 
the 
statement 
that 
"[r]estitution ordered under this section is a condition of 
probation, extended supervision, or parole"——a statement that 
can technically be true only insofar as it is talking about the 
restitution 
that 
is 
being 
paid 
by 
the 
defendant 
during 
probation.  
¶30 The result of such technical or superficial reading of 
the statute, however, would be to read into the language a 
substantial limitation that contravenes all of the surrounding 
language, which repeatedly stresses the discretion of the court 
in making a decision about restitution and emphasizes that, with 
rare 
exceptions, 
either 
partial 
or 
full 
restitution 
is 
mandatory.  Such a reading also is grounded on several 
assumptions that, as we explain below, unravel in a careful 
reading of the statute. 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
19 
 
¶31 As the court of appeals noted, Loutsch has been read 
as holding what Fernandez urges.  In fact, the Loutsch court 
actually stated an even broader rule.  Loutsch referred to 
determining the amount a defendant had the ability to pay 
"before the completion of the sentence" and, elsewhere, "during 
the term of his sentence."  Loutsch, 259 Wis. 2d 901, ¶¶25, 28 
(emphasis added).   
¶32 One can arrive at such a rule only by failing to 
observe distinctions made by the three sentences of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20(10).  The first sentence lists three options available 
for repayment:  a court may require a defendant to pay 
"immediately," "within a specified period," or "in specified 
installments." 
¶33 Loutsch and Fernandez then read the second sentence 
("[i]f the defendant is placed on probation . . . the end of the 
specified period shall not be later than the end of any period 
of 
probation . . .")24 
and 
assume 
that 
probation 
is 
the 
equivalent of the second payment plan.  Such an assumption is 
incorrect.  The statute presents no barrier to a court's 
ordering immediate payment (the first option) and imposing 
probation; for that matter, the circuit court could (as it 
arguably did in Fernandez's case) require that the payment plan 
be the third option, "in specified installments."  Fernandez was 
told to pay $400 a month, which is a specified installment.  In 
                                                 
24 The sentence also mentions extended supervision and 
parole, but for simplicity's sake, we'll focus on probation 
because that is what is relevant here. 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
20 
 
either of these two scenarios, there is no further limitation 
created by the statute.   
¶34 Nevertheless, 
Loutsch 
reads 
that 
second 
sentence 
together with the third sentence, which involves a scenario not 
implicated here:  the intensive sanctions program.  Where that 
program is part of the sentence, "the end of the specified 
period shall not be later than the end of the sentence under 
[the 
intensive 
sanctions 
program 
statute]." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.20(10). 
¶35 To craft the rule that Loutsch has been interpreted to 
create, one has to start with the assumption that the payment 
plan chosen is the "within a specified period" option; add to 
that the assumption that placing a defendant on probation 
automatically puts him or her on the "within a specified period" 
plan; and proceed to the inference that when probation is 
imposed and the "within a specified period" concept comes into 
play, the total ordered restitution must be paid before the end 
of probation.  Even more mischief is done by conflating "the end 
of the sentence" language relating to the intensive sanctions 
program with "the end of any period of probation."  Jumbling 
concepts from the three sentences together and adding in the 
ability to pay analysis from Wis. Stat. § 973.20(13), one 
arrives at the argued-for rule:  a court must determine how much 
the defendant will be able to pay before the completion of the 
sentence.  
¶36 It is easy to see how the Loutsch rule would sharply 
curtail the court's discretion to determine how much restitution 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
21 
 
to order.  The "before the end of the sentence" rule, as applied 
here, would limit restitution to under $10,000 while the damages 
were six times that amount; in other cases the results could be 
even more drastic.  Where a six-month jail term was imposed, for 
example, restitution would be capped at what the defendant could 
pay during the term of the jail sentence; where that time is 
served in custody as opposed to with Huber or work-release 
privileges, the practical effect would be no recoverable 
restitution at all. 
¶37 Adopting such a rule might well create incentives to 
increase the length of probation ordered, as well.  We have 
already stated the principle that using probation for that 
purpose is improper,25 and others, such as the Judicial Council 
Committee, have alluded to the fact that doing so is a poor use 
of scarce resources.26 
¶38 As we noted above, however, the court of appeals in 
Loutsch was addressing a different question altogether——whether 
a court could delay making a determination of a defendant's 
ability to pay until a later point when he completed a prison 
sentence and began a period of extended supervision.  The 
                                                 
25 Huggett, 83 Wis. 2d at 803-04. 
26 "The availability of a civil judgment for unpaid 
restitution enforceable by the victim under s. 973.20(1), 
stats., 
substantially 
reduces 
the 
necessity 
of 
extending 
probation solely for the purpose of enforcing court-ordered 
payments, 
a 
practice 
of 
questionable 
cost-effectiveness."  
Judicial Council Committee Note, 1987, Wis. Stat. § 973.09 
(quoted in Huml, 293 Wis. 2d 169, ¶27).  
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
22 
 
confusion that has arisen in connection with Loutsch is a result 
of its rephrasing of one part of the statute that is entirely 
unrelated to the facts presented in that case.  Loutsch was not 
asking to have his restitution limited to payments during his 
probation period; he was concerned with when the determination 
of ability to pay was to be considered. 
¶39 In any event, the State argues that the Loutsch court 
was incorrect in stating that restitution must be limited to the 
defendants' ability to pay within the term of the sentence.  It 
argues that the statute does not unambiguously require such a 
rule.  The State further argues that such an interpretation is 
contrary to the legislative history and public policy, and is 
inconsistent with other provisions in the statute that clearly 
provide for unpaid portions of the restitution to be converted 
to a civil judgment. 
¶40 We agree with the State.  If we were to read the 
statute the way Fernandez urges, it would function as a cap to 
the amount of restitution a court is permitted to order.  It 
would also mean that courts would be put in the position of 
having to choose between providing restitution to some victims 
and utilizing probation because the maximum in restitution would 
depend on whether probation was imposed.  In a case where 
restitution is requested in the amount of $15,000, for example, 
what the victims could recover would turn solely on whether the 
defendant was placed on probation.  If the defendant in that 
hypothetical had the ability to pay $5,000 per year in 
restitution, and was sentenced to a fine or period of time in 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
23 
 
jail but no probation, a court might well set restitution at the 
full $15,000.  Under Fernandez's reading of the statute, if that 
same defendant were instead sentenced to a period of jail time 
and a year of probation, the amount of restitution would be 
capped at $5,000——the amount the defendant had the ability to 
pay during the term of the sentence.  We decline to endorse a 
rule that creates differences in the amount of restitution 
awarded in cases where the sole difference is whether a circuit 
court utilizes probation, because in the context of the statute 
there is no indication that the language means that.  It would 
be an odd distinction to make anyway:  after any conditional 
jail time27 is served, a person on probation is as free to work 
as a person not on probation (subject, of course, to any terms 
of probation).  There is no logical reason for the statute to 
limit the court's discretion in one case and not in the other. 
¶41 In addition, while there is necessarily some overlap 
between the payment of restitution and probation terms in cases 
where 
probation 
is 
ordered, 
the 
two 
are 
independent 
determinations.  Reading the statute the way Fernandez urges 
would mean that probation essentially determines the maximum 
                                                 
27 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.09(4)(a):   
The court may also require as a condition of probation 
that the probationer be confined during such period of 
the term of probation as the court prescribes, but not 
to exceed one year.  The court may grant the privilege 
of leaving the county jail, Huber facility, work camp, 
or tribal jail during the hours or periods of 
employment or other activity under s. 303.08(1) while 
confined under this subsection. 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
24 
 
amount that can be set in restitution and would rewrite the 
"ability to pay" consideration to become the "ability to pay 
within the period of time of probation," a provision that the 
statute does not have but that Fernandez wishes us to read in.  
Fernandez's counsel was asked at oral argument where in the 
statute's legislative history there was any indication that what 
the circuit court did here was improper.  Counsel conceded, 
"There are no sentences that say, 'Ability to pay means during 
the term of probation or sentence.'"  Creating such an arbitrary 
cap on restitution does not fit with the rest of the statute.  
¶42 Fernandez also argues that the Judicial Council Note 
following the statute notes the similarity between Wis. Stat. 
§ 920.73(13)(a) and a previous statute: "Prior s. 973.09(1m)(a), 
stats., similarly required the court to consider the defendant's 
ability to pay when determining the amount of restitution."  
Judicial Council Note, 1987, Wis. Stat. § 973.20.  Even if, in 
the prior statute, "ability to pay" was understood to mean 
"ability to pay within the probation or sentence term," as 
counsel argued it was, such a tenuous link can hardly support 
the conclusion that this statute must be so construed. 
¶43 When this court discussed the restitution statute in 
Huml, we noted, "Simplifying the procedure by which a victim 
obtains a judgment to enforce unpaid restitution is entirely 
consistent with the overarching purposes of the legislation:  to 
promote the dignity of crime victims, to maximize the respect 
afforded victims by the criminal justice system, and to increase 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
25 
 
the amount of restitution recovered."  Huml, 293 Wis. 2d 169, 
¶34. 
¶44 The same principle applies in the context of this 
question.  The legislature forcefully affirmed the rights of 
victims to recover under this statute the costs they incurred 
from another's criminal conduct.  That endorsement is powerfully 
underscored by the Wisconsin electorate, which in 1993 adopted 
the following language when it voted overwhelmingly in favor of 
amending the Wisconsin Constitution: 
This state shall treat crime victims, as defined by 
law, with fairness, dignity and respect for their 
privacy.  This state shall ensure that crime victims 
have all of the following privileges and protections 
as provided by law:  timely disposition of the case; 
the opportunity to attend court proceedings unless the 
trial court finds sequestration is necessary to a fair 
trial for the defendant; reasonable protection from 
the accused throughout the criminal justice process; 
notification of court proceedings; the opportunity to 
confer with the prosecution; the opportunity to make a 
statement to the court at disposition; restitution; 
compensation; and information about the outcome of the 
case and the release of the accused. . . .  
Wis. Const. art. I, § 9m (emphasis added). 
¶45 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.20 presents no inconsistency 
with those principles; the problems created by Fernandez's 
interpretation resolve themselves when the language is read in 
context.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
County, 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
"Context is important to meaning.  So, too, is the structure of 
the statute in which the operative language appears."  Id.  
"[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context in which it 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
26 
 
is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to 
the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and 
reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id.  When 
we look at the other key language there are several indications 
that the State's interpretation is correct, since it is the more 
reasonable one.  
¶46 The fact that restitution is provided "in addition to 
any other penalty authorized by law" (Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1r)) 
lends support to the view that restitution was viewed by the 
legislature as a distinct penalty and suggests that in the 
absence of any indication in the statute that restitution is 
intended to limit the sentence or the sentence is intended to 
limit restitution, we should not infer such limitations. 
¶47 In fact, it is significant that in providing for 
converting 
unpaid 
restitution 
to 
civil 
judgments,28 
the 
legislature, it seems clear, recognized that there would be 
circumstances where all the necessary restitution amounts often 
would not and could not be paid before the completion of the 
sentence or probationary period. 
                                                 
28 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.20(1r): 
After 
the 
termination 
of 
probation, 
extended 
supervision, or parole, or if the defendant is not 
placed on probation, extended supervision, or parole, 
restitution ordered under this section is enforceable 
in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action by 
the victim named in the order to receive restitution 
or enforced under ch. 785.   
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
27 
 
¶48 This reading of the statute is consistent with our 
statement in Huml, distinguishing the purposes of probation from 
the collection of restitution:  "Davis . . . stands for the 
proposition that once the penal and rehabilitative purposes of 
restitution have been served, only a civil debt remains."  Huml, 
293 Wis. 2d 169, ¶43.  This court went on to add: 
It is true that restitution in a criminal case is a 
remedy that belongs to the state, not to the victim.  
Termination of probation, however, signals the state's 
disavowal of any penal or rehabilitative interests.  
Thereafter, only the goal of compensating the victim 
remains.  This is an objective adequately accomplished 
by entry of a civil judgment, which can be enforced 
through civil enforcement mechanisms. 
Id., ¶44 (citations omitted). 
¶49 In short, we do not read a line or two in the statute 
to create a restriction as great as the one that would be 
created 
by 
Fernandez's 
rule 
where 
the 
evidence 
in 
the 
surrounding text of the statute is to the contrary. 
IV. FERNANDEZ'S OTHER CLAIMS 
 
¶50 As noted above, orders of restitution are within the 
discretion of the circuit court, and because it is dispositive 
of the other claims Fernandez makes, we revisit the standard of 
review 
before 
addressing 
Fernandez's 
additional 
claims.  
Reviewing a calculation of restitution involves a question of 
whether the circuit court misused its discretionary authority.  
Boffer, 158 Wis. 2d at 658.  This court may reverse a 
discretionary decision if the circuit court applied the wrong 
legal standard or did not ground its decision on a logical 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
28 
 
interpretation of the facts.  See Behnke, 203 Wis. 2d 43; 
Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817. 
 
¶51 Fernandez argues that the circuit court had no 
authority under the statute to consider claims submitted by 
Dalka and CNR after the time of sentencing or, in the 
alternative, that for equitable reasons those claims should not 
have been considered. 
¶52 The State counters that there is no language in the 
statute that requires victim claims to be submitted before 
sentencing.  The State also argues that where restitution was 
held open, there is no expectation of finality and thus no 
equitable grounds for denying the claims.  
¶53 While Wis. Stat. § 973.20(13)(c) provides the right 
for a defendant to dispute claims of losses, it does not set any 
explicit deadlines for victims' claims.  Recognizing the unique 
nature of the restitution process, the statute imposes only 
limited duties on district attorneys, requiring them to "attempt 
to obtain from the victim prior to sentencing information 
pertaining to the factor specified [as to the amount of loss 
suffered],"29 and on a court, requiring the court to "inquire of 
                                                 
29 Wisconsin Stat. 973.20(13): 
(b) The district attorney shall attempt to obtain from 
the victim prior to sentencing information pertaining 
to the factor specified in par. (a)1.  Law enforcement 
agencies, the department of corrections and any agency 
providing services under ch. 950 shall extend full 
cooperation and assistance to the district attorney in 
discharging this responsibility.  The department of 
justice shall provide technical assistance to district 
attorneys in this regard and develop model forms and 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
29 
 
the district attorney" as to any claims for restitution from any 
victims.  
¶54 There is no language in the statute that prohibits the 
consideration of claims presented before the restitution hearing 
occurred, which is when Dalka's and CNR's claims were presented.  
Where, as here, Fernandez had notice of Dalka's injuries (and 
therefore of those of his insurer, CNR) because Fernandez knew 
that Dalka had been hurt, there was no expectation of finality 
at a sentencing hearing when restitution was ordered in an 
amount to be determined.  Even if Fernandez somehow was unaware 
                                                                                                                                                             
procedures 
for 
collecting 
and 
documenting 
this 
information. 
(c) The court, before imposing sentence or ordering 
probation, shall inquire of the district attorney 
regarding the amount of restitution, if any, that the 
victim claims.  The court shall give the defendant the 
opportunity to stipulate to the restitution claimed by 
the victim and to present evidence and arguments on 
the factors specified in par. (a).  If the defendant 
stipulates to the restitution claimed by the victim or 
if any restitution dispute can be fairly heard at the 
sentencing proceeding, the court shall determine the 
amount of restitution before imposing sentence or 
ordering probation.  In other cases, the court may do 
any of the following: 
1. Order restitution of amounts not in dispute as part 
of the sentence or probation order imposed and direct 
the appropriate agency to file a proposed restitution 
order with the court within 90 days thereafter, and 
mail or deliver copies of the proposed order to the 
victim, 
district 
attorney, 
defendant 
and 
defense 
counsel. 
2. Adjourn the sentencing proceeding for up to 60 days 
pending resolution of the amount of restitution by the 
court, referee or arbitrator. 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
30 
 
of the injuries on the night of the crash, the complaint 
included information on Dalka's being taken by ambulance to the 
hospital and being told by a doctor that he had torn ligaments 
in his left knee.  
¶55 The 
circuit 
court's 
first 
scheduling 
of 
the 
restitution hearing was entirely in accord with the statute, 
which provides that at sentencing the court can "[a]djourn the 
sentencing proceeding for up to 60 days pending resolution of 
the amount of restitution by the court, referee or arbitrator."  
Wis. Stat. § 973.20(13)(c)2.  Both the first and second hearing 
dates were approved by trial counsel; it was at the defendant's 
request that the hearing was adjourned, and it was with 
counsel's acquiescence that the January 10, 2006, hearing was 
scheduled. 
¶56 When the court of appeals addressed the timelines in 
the restitution statute in State v. Perry, 181 Wis. 2d 43, 510 
N.W.2d 722 (Ct. App. 1993), it held that the timelines in the 
statute are "directory" rather than mandatory: 
It is important to note that our conclusion that the 
sixty-day time period in sec. 973.20(13)(c)2, Stats., 
is directory should not be read to imply that the 
provision is merely discretionary or permissive.  The 
legislature intended that the time limit be followed, 
despite its intent that the defendant not avoid his or 
her obligation to pay restitution.  Our determination 
that the provision is directory simply reflects that 
the legislature did not intend that the court be 
required in all cases to vacate the restitution order 
for a violation of the statutory time limitation.   
Id. at 56-57.  
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
31 
 
¶57 The Perry court noted that restitution hearings might 
be barred in some circumstances if they fell outside the 
statutory time period of sixty days; that would be true if it 
"would result in an injury or wrong."  Id. at 57.  We concur 
with the reasoning of the Perry court that given the tenor of 
the statute and the broad discretion granted to the circuit 
court under Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(c) and (d),30 the statute's 
timelines are directory.  Fernandez has shown no injury from the 
fact that the restitution hearing was held outside of the time 
                                                 
30 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.20(14): 
At any hearing under sub. (13), all of the following 
apply: 
 
 . . . . 
(c) The burden of demonstrating, by the preponderance 
of the evidence, such other matters as the court deems 
appropriate is on the party designated by the court, 
as justice requires. 
(d) All parties interested in the matter shall have an 
opportunity 
to 
be 
heard, 
personally 
or 
through 
counsel, to present evidence and to cross-examine 
witnesses called by other parties.  The court, 
arbitrator or referee shall conduct the proceeding so 
as to do substantial justice between the parties 
according to the rules of substantive law and may 
waive the rules of practice, procedure, pleading or 
evidence, except provisions relating to privileged 
communications 
and 
personal 
transactions 
or 
communication with a decedent or mentally ill person 
or to admissibility under s. 901.05.  Discovery is not 
available except for good cause shown.  If the 
defendant is incarcerated, he or she may participate 
by telephone under s. 807.13 unless the court issues a 
writ or subpoena compelling the defendant to appear in 
person. 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
32 
 
period considering that the delay of the restitution hearing was 
done at his own request for the purpose of allowing him to 
validate a claim of restitution.  The circuit court explicitly 
noted that it made the decision to permit the restitution 
hearing to be adjourned "in fairness."  It is clear from the 
record that the delay in scheduling the requested adjournment 
was caused by understandable court calendaring issues, and it is 
equally clear that Fernandez was not injured by the delay he 
sought here, except that when he asked for the additional time, 
he opened the door for additional claims to be submitted before 
the hearing concluded.   
¶58 In light of the open-ended language of the statute and 
the court of appeals' holding in Perry, there is no error at 
least where the claims are made before the hearing is concluded 
and restitution is ordered, as the claims were here.  Fernandez 
cannot show, under the statute or under the case law, that the 
trial court erred in considering claims made before the 
restitution order was entered. 
¶59 Fernandez additionally argues that the lack of advance 
written notice of the Dalka and CNR claims violated his due 
process 
rights. 
 
In 
response, 
the 
State 
contends 
that 
Fernandez's due process rights were protected by the statute, 
which provides for "an opportunity to be heard, personally or 
through counsel, to present evidence and to cross-examine 
witnesses called by other parties."  Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(d).  
¶60 We agree with the State.  The statute leaves it to the 
court to "conduct the proceeding so as to do substantial justice 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
33 
 
between the parties according to the rules of substantive law 
and may waive the rules of practice, procedure, pleading or 
evidence . . . ."  Id.  The statute explicitly notes that 
"[d]iscovery 
is 
not 
available 
except 
for 
good 
cause 
shown. . . ."  Id.  Here, Fernandez was given the opportunity to 
have counsel challenge the claims presented and to cross-examine 
the witnesses.  Given the aims of the restitution statute——to 
balance the needs of the victim to recover losses without 
complicated legal barriers against the needs of the defendant to 
ascertain the validity of the claims——the legislature clearly 
elected to give the circuit court a great deal of discretion in 
conducting a restitution hearing.  We should not impose 
arbitrary deadlines where the legislature has not done so and 
where the defendant had a full opportunity to challenge the 
claims. 
¶61 Fernandez says the court erred by ordering full 
restitution to two insurance companies because a court is 
authorized to do so only where justice requires.  Fernandez says 
that justice does not require a man who washes dishes for a 
living to reimburse insurance companies worth billions of 
dollars. 
 
The 
State 
points 
out 
that 
restitution 
is 
a 
discretionary decision of the circuit court and that the statute 
permits restitution to insurance companies.31   
                                                 
31 "[T]he restitution order may require that the defendant 
do one or more of the following: . . . If justice so requires, 
reimburse 
any 
insurer, 
surety 
or 
other 
person 
who 
has 
compensated a victim for a loss otherwise compensable under this 
section."  Wis. Stat. § 973.20(5)(d). 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
34 
 
¶62 It 
is 
within 
the 
court's 
discretion 
to 
award 
restitution to insurers.  Evidence was submitted as to the costs 
which both insurers had borne for the victims.32  The circuit 
court appears to have applied the correct legal standard and to 
have arrived at a logical interpretation of the facts in 
ordering restitution from Fernandez.  The defendant's ability to 
pay was clearly considered by the circuit court.  Such an award 
should not be reversed.  There is no evidence that the court 
applied the wrong legal standard or did not ground its decision 
on a logical interpretation of the facts when it decided justice 
required reimbursing an insurer who has compensated a victim for 
a loss.  
V. CONCLUSION 
¶63 On the question involving restitution ordered during a 
sentence or probation term, we hold that the statute, when read 
as a whole, clearly permits a circuit court to order full 
restitution so long as it properly considers the defendant's 
ability to pay in setting the total restitution and, where 
applicable, in setting the amount that must be paid during any 
probation, parole, or extended supervision.  The statute gives 
no indication that that power is curtailed when probation is 
                                                 
32 Having found that the two insurance companies were also 
"victims" that "paid money," the circuit court was clearly 
making a determination that justice required restitution to 
those companies.  The circuit court followed up those findings 
with an order requiring restitution to them for the sums the 
court found that they had paid.  The findings of the circuit 
court are supported by the record before us. 
No. 
2007AP1403-CR   
 
35 
 
involved.  In fact, it is significant that in providing for 
converting unpaid restitution to civil judgments, it seems clear 
that 
the 
legislature 
recognized 
that 
there 
would 
be 
circumstances where all the necessary restitution amounts often 
would not and could not be paid before the completion of the 
sentence or probationary period. 
¶64 We therefore answer the certification from the court 
of appeals by holding that when a court has considered the 
defendant's ability to pay in setting restitution, the length of 
the term of probation or of the sentence does not have any 
limiting effect on the total amount of restitution that may be 
ordered.  Here the circuit court considered the defendant's 
ability to pay in ordering restitution, as the statute requires, 
and because the circuit court did not err in considering all the 
evidence presented at the restitution hearing or in awarding 
restitution to the victims in accord with the statute, we affirm 
the circuit court's order. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
No.  2007AP1403-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶65 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
opinion aptly sets forth the law with regard to restitution owed 
to victims of a crime.  I part ways with the majority when it, 
like the circuit court, fails to recognize that Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20(5)(d) requires that the court distinguish between crime 
victims and insurers.  The statute provides that the sentencing 
court must order restitution to crime victims.  However, an 
order for restitution to an insurer is discretionary, and is to 
be awarded only "[i]f justice so requires."1  
¶66 Rather than requiring adherence to the plain language 
of the statute, the majority looks the other way and concludes 
that the circuit court "appears to have applied the correct 
legal standard."  Here, there was no application whatsoever of 
the "if justice so requires" standard.  A review of the record 
reveals that the circuit court's only articulated standard was: 
"they paid money."  Because the circuit court's determination 
contravenes the plain language of the statute, its history, and 
its purposes, I respectfully dissent. 
¶67 In this case, the circuit court ordered $44,808.60 in 
restitution to Canadian National and $3,175.67 in restitution to 
Met Life, both insurers.  The majority opinion dispenses with 
its analysis of whether the circuit court properly exercised its 
                                                 
1 There may also be defects in the circuit court's 
determination of Fernandez's ability to pay.  Based on the 
sparse record made by the circuit court, this court struggled in 
its review.  See majority op., ¶15, n.12 ("It would have been 
preferable for the circuit court to make a more complete and 
precise record[.]").  I write separately, however, to note that 
the 
statute 
provides 
different 
standards 
for 
ordering 
restitution to crime victims and to insurers.  
No.  2007AP1403-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
discretion in two paragraphs.  It reports that the circuit court 
"appears to have applied the correct legal standard."  Majority 
op., ¶62.  The opinion then concludes, "There is no evidence 
that the court applied the wrong legal standard or did not 
ground its decision on a logical interpretation of the facts 
when it decided justice required reimbursing an insurer who has 
compensated a victim for a loss."  Id. 
¶68 The circuit court, however, never made a determination 
that justice required reimbursing the insurers.  Rather, it 
tallied all the claims without distinguishing the claims made by 
the insurers from the claims made by the victims of the crime: 
"So, we have three parties2 out close to seventy thousand 
dollars, and rising, and I would find that they are all 
victims."  Defense counsel objected to the circuit court lumping 
the insurance companies together with the victims and making no 
distinction between the two.  The circuit court's sole response 
and analysis justifying the award was set forth in three words: 
"They paid money."    
Defense counsel: Your Honor, then I would further 
object to Canadian National being allowed to proceed 
with the claim in this case because, certainly, 973.20 
authorizes payment of restitution to a victim, but I 
do not believe that Canadian National can be construed 
as a victim in this case. 
The Court: They paid money. 
The circuit court simply concluded that because the insurers 
"paid money," they were victims entitled to restitution. 
                                                 
2 There 
were 
actually 
four 
parties 
that 
presented 
restitution claims: Roberts, Met Life (Roberts's insurer), 
Dalka, and Canadian National (Dalka's insurer).   
No.  2007AP1403-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
¶69 
The 
restitution 
statute, 
however, 
explicitly 
distinguishes between victims of crime and those who compensate 
the victims' losses.  Section 973.20(1r) states that "the 
court . . . shall order the defendant to make full or partial 
restitution . . . to any victim of a crime considered at 
sentencing[.]"  (Emphasis added.)  In contrast, the court "may 
require" reimbursement to "any insurer, surety or other person 
who has compensated a victim for a loss otherwise compensable 
under this section" "[i]f justice so requires."  Wis. Stat. 
§§ 973.20(5), (5)(d) (emphasis added). 
¶70 On its face, the statute differentiates between 
victims and those who have compensated a victim.  A court may 
order restitution to an insurer "if justice so requires."  This 
marks a change from prior law, which did not require the court 
to determine that justice required restitution to an insurance 
company.3   
¶71 This policy choice is reflected in the legislative 
history of the statute.  Wisconsin's restitution statutes were 
significantly overhauled by 1987 Wisconsin Act 398 and 1989 
Wisconsin Act 188, which added provisions intended to protect 
crime victims.  To that end, the amendments made district 
attorneys responsible for gathering information about victim 
                                                 
3 See Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(b) (1985-86) ("If the court 
places the person on probation, the court shall require 
restitution designed to compensate the victim's pecuniary loss 
resulting from the crime to the extent possible. . . . A court 
may require that restitution be paid to an insurer or surety 
which has paid any claims or benefits to or on behalf of the 
victim.") 
No.  2007AP1403-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
losses and presenting that information to the sentencing court.  
See Wis. Stat. §§ 973.20(13)(b), (c) (1987-88).  The amendments 
provided that the sentencing court "shall order" restitution "to 
any victim of the crime or, if that person is deceased, to his 
or 
her 
estate" 
regardless 
of 
whether 
the 
defendant 
was 
incarcerated or placed on probation.4  See Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1) 
(1987-88). 
 
In 
addition, 
the 
amendments 
allowed 
unpaid 
restitution to be converted to a civil judgment when the 
defendant was released from probation or parole, or immediately 
if neither probation nor a prison sentence was imposed.5  See 
id.; see also Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1) (1989-90) (providing that 
restitution "is enforceable in the same manner as a judgment in 
a civil action").   
¶72 Collectively, the amendments made it easier for 
victims to be compensated for their losses without undergoing 
                                                 
4 With minor exceptions, the prior statutes permitted 
restitution only when the defendant was placed on probation.  
Thus, the sentencing court was required to choose between 
incarceration and restitution for the benefit of victims. 
5 Under prior statutes, release from probation extinguished 
the obligation to pay restitution.  See Huggett v. State, 83 
Wis. 2d 790, 266 N.W.2d 403 (1978). 
No.  2007AP1403-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
civil litigation.6  This legislative purpose is also reflected in 
Wis. Stat. Ch. 950, Rights of Victims and Witnesses of Crime, 
which provides that a crime victim has a right to restitution 
and to a judgment against the defendant for unpaid restitution.  
See Wis. Stat. §§ 950.04(1v)(q), (r). 
¶73 At the same time, the legislature inserted the 
directive that a court determine whether "justice so requires" 
when ordering restitution to "an insurer, surety or other person 
who has compensated a victim for a loss[.]"  Compare Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20(5)(d) (1987-88) and Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(b) (1985-
86).  The amendments also required that restitution to victims 
be paid before restitution to "other persons," including 
insurers.  Wis. Stat. § 973.20(6).  By adding these provisions, 
the legislature clearly distinguished between victims and their 
insurers, who are not the direct victims of a crime.  The 
legislature applied a heightened legal standard——"if justice so 
requires"——to claims for restitution by insurers.   
                                                 
6 See Testimony of Senator Barbara Ulichny before the Senate 
Judiciary and Consumer Affairs Committee, January 9, 1990 
("Crime victims experience many losses, many of which, such as a 
sense of personal safety or physical health, can never be 
replaced.  One loss that can be measured and alleviated, 
however, is economic loss.  Requiring offenders to make 
restitution can help victims recover property damages, medical 
bills, lost wages, and other expenses.") (on file in the Records 
of the Judicial Council, Wisconsin State Law Library, Madison, 
WI); see also Testimony of Richard H. Anderson, Director, Office 
of Crime Victim Services, January 9, 1990 ("This bill extends to 
crime victims the right to at least attempt to collect the 
restitution which has been awarded, without the additional cost 
of filing a separate civil action.") (on file in the Records of 
the Judicial Council, Wisconsin State Law Library, Madison, WI).  
No.  2007AP1403-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
¶74 This standard was proposed by the Judicial Council 
Restitution Committee and incorporated into 1987 Wisconsin Act 
398.  The prefatory note to the act states that "[i]n the course 
of its work, the restitution committee examined the federal laws 
governing restitution to crime victims and this proposal 
includes several provisions drawn from those federal laws."  
Judicial Council Prefatory Note, 1987 Wis. Act 398.   
¶75 The federal statute explicitly distinguished between 
victims and insurers, providing that restitution should not be 
ordered for insured losses, except that "in the interest of 
justice," the court may "order restitution to any person who has 
compensated the victim for such loss[.]"  See 18 U.S.C. 
3663(e)(1) (1988) (originally enacted as Victim and Witness 
Protection Act of 1982, 96 Stat. 1248, 1253-54).7   
¶76 On 
October 
18, 
1985, 
the 
Restitution 
Committee 
discussed the federal standard for restitution to those who made 
                                                 
7 The federal statute has been amended several times since 
1988, but it continues to distinguish between victims and their 
insurers: 
(2) For the purposes of this section, the term 
"victim" means a person directly and proximately 
harmed as a result of the commission of an offense for 
which restitution may be ordered including, in the 
case of an offense that involves as an element a 
scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity, 
any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal 
conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or 
pattern. . . .  
(3) The court shall also order, if agreed to by the 
parties in a plea agreement, restitution to persons 
other than the victim of the offense.  
18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A(a)(2)-(3) (2000). 
No.  2007AP1403-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
payments compensating a crime victim.8  Committee reporter James 
Fullin advised the committee that the "federal law prohibits 
imposing restitution with respect to a loss for which the victim 
has received compensation, except that the court may, in the 
interest of justice, order restitution to the person who has 
compensated the victim."9  This standard, modified to "if justice 
so requires," was one of the provisions drawn from the federal 
laws that made its way into the Restitution Committee's 
legislative proposal.10  The committee's proposed legislation was 
passed by the legislature without amendment.  See 1987 Wisconsin 
Act 398.    
¶77 In addition to the plain language of the statute and 
its history which compel a conclusion that crime victims and 
insurance companies are to be treated differently, such a 
difference in treatment is also supported by the purposes of the 
restitution statute.  A restitution award to an insurance 
company that is beyond the defendant's means may undercut the 
purposes of criminal restitution.  The dual purposes of 
restitution are compensating the victim and rehabilitating the 
defendant.  See Huml v. Vlazny, 2006 WI 87, ¶38, 293 
                                                 
8 Judicial 
Council 
Restitution 
Committee, 
Summary 
of 
Proceedings, October 18, 1985 (on file in the Records of the 
Judicial Council, Wisconsin State Law Library, Madison, WI.) 
9 Id. at 4 (emphasis added). 
10 Judicial Council Restitution Committee, Draft C, January 
16, 1986 (on file in the Records of the Judicial Council, 
Wisconsin State Law Library, Madison, WI.) 
No.  2007AP1403-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
Wis. 2d 169, 716 N.W.2d 807.  "If a restitution order does not 
serve both purposes, restitution is not appropriate."  Id. 
¶78 Restitution paid to an insurance company does not 
further the goal of compensating the crime victim.  By 
definition, the victim has already been compensated by the 
insurer.    
¶79 Likewise, a restitution award to an insurance company 
may not serve the rehabilitative purpose of restitution.  
Wisconsin courts have explained, "Restitution . . . may serve to 
strengthen [an offender's] sense of responsibility and teach the 
offender to consider more carefully the consequences of his or 
her actions."  State v. Kennedy, 190 Wis. 2d 252, 257-58, 528 
N.W.2d 9 (Ct. App. 1994).  Successfully paying restitution can 
give a defendant "a positive sense of having earned a fresh 
start and will [provide] tangible evidence of his or her 
capacity to alter old behavior patterns and lead a law-abiding 
life."  Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 798, 266 N.W.2d 403 
(1978). 
¶80 Although "[s]ome financial discomfort is consistent 
with the rehabilitative goal of probation and restitution," 
State v. Foley, 153 Wis. 2d 748, 754, 451 N.W.2d 796 (Ct. App. 
1989), ordering an amount of restitution which is beyond the 
defendant's 
means 
undermines 
the 
defendant's 
sense 
of 
responsibility.  See State v. Jackson, 128 Wis. 2d 356, 363, 382 
N.W.2d 429 (1986).  Absent a meaningful determination of the 
defendant's ability to pay, restitution loses a large part of 
its rehabilitative significance.  See majority op., ¶24. 
No.  2007AP1403-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
¶81 Thus, the statute treats crime victims and their 
insurers 
differently with regard to ordering restitution.  
Because the statute distinguishes between crime victims and 
insurers, a sentencing court must do so as well.  Additionally, 
the court must explain its discretionary decision that "justice 
requires" ordering restitution for the benefit of an insurer.    
¶82 The majority incorrectly concludes that "[t]here is no 
evidence that the court applied the wrong legal standard or did 
not ground its decision on a logical interpretation of the 
facts[.]" 
 
See 
majority 
op., 
¶62. 
 
Discretion 
is 
not 
appropriately exercised when, as here, a circuit court simply 
tallies up all claims and makes a finding of the total amount of 
loss.11  The circuit court failed to distinguish between the 
crime victims and the insurers who had reimbursed their losses.  
In fact, the court wrongly determined that the insurers were 
victims of the crime.  The only reason proffered by the circuit 
court for ordering this restitution, that the insurers "paid 
money," is not sufficient to support a finding that justice 
requires their reimbursement.   
¶83 The circuit court's determination contravenes the 
plain language of the statute, its history, and its purposes.  
Because the circuit court failed to distinguish between crime 
                                                 
11 The term "discretion" contemplates more than merely 
giving an answer.  It contemplates "a process of reasoning which 
depends on facts in the record or reasonably derived by 
inference from the record that yield a conclusion based on logic 
and founded on proper legal standards."  State v. Delgado, 223 
Wis. 2d 270, 280, 588 N.W.2d 1 (1999).  The record must reflect 
the circuit court's reasoned application of the appropriate 
legal standard to the relevant facts of the case.  Id. at 281. 
No.  2007AP1403-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
victims and insurers, and failed to apply the correct legal 
standard, 
I 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised its discretion when it ordered $48,000 in restitution 
to Canadian National and Met Life.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶84 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.  
 
 
No.  2007AP1403-CR.awb 
 
 
 
1