Case Title: Ulm v. Ford Motor Company

Citation: 170 Vt. 281, 750 A.2d 981

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2000-01-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Ulm v. Ford Motor Company (97-308); 170 Vt. 281; 750 A.2d 981

[Filed 07-Jan-2000]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of 
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 97-308

James L. Ulm	                                 Supreme Court

	                                         On Appeal from
     v.		                                 Windham Superior Court

Ford Motor Company	                         April Term, 1999
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of
Massachusetts, Inc.

Richard W. Norton, J.

       Michael F. Hanley and Barney L. Brannen of Plante, Hanley & Brannen,
  P.C.,  White River Junction, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

       John J. Boyland of Boylan & Bowen, Springfield, Wendy F. Lumish of
  Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A., Miami, Florida, and
  James M. Campbell and Kurt B. Gerstner of Campbell Campbell & Edwards,
  Boston, Massachusetts, for Defendant-Appellant Ford Motor Co.

       Neal D. Ferenc, Moretown, for Intervenor-Appellant Kaiser Foundation
  Health Plan  of Massachusetts, Inc.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       AMESTOY, C.J.   Defendant Ford Motor Company appeals from a Windham
  Superior  Court jury verdict awarding plaintiff James Ulm $1.25 million for
  injuries he sustained as a  passenger in a Ford Bronco where the claimed
  cause of injury was a defective steering system.   On appeal, defendant
  argues that (1) the court erred in denying defendant's motion for judgment 
  as a matter of law because plaintiff failed to establish that the alleged 

 

  defect caused plaintiff's injuries; (2) the court erred in excluding
  evidence that plaintiff was not  wearing a safety belt when the accident
  occurred; (3) the court abused its discretion in allowing  plaintiff to
  introduce into evidence or to use in cross-examination references to other
  incidents of  sector-shaft failure without a showing of substantial
  similarity, and the evidence was either  irrelevant or unfairly
  prejudicial; (4) defendant was unfairly prejudiced by the manner in which 
  excited utterances were admitted and emphasized by both plaintiff and the
  court; and (5) the  court erred in allowing prejudgment interest after the
  jury rendered a general verdict.   In this  appeal, we also address
  intervenor Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Massachusetts' (Kaiser)  appeal
  of the superior court's decision dismissing Kaiser's claim for subrogation
  rights.  We  affirm the decision in all respects.
  
       Facts introduced at trial established that on September 9, 1990, after
  spending the day  boating on the Harriman Reservoir in Wilmington,
  plaintiff and friend Gary Corey left the reservoir  boat landing in a 1978
  Ford Bronco, owned by friend Chris Wood.  Corey drove the Bronco along  the
  dirt road leading to his cottage at a speed of approximately twenty to
  twenty-five miles per  hour.  As the vehicle approached a curve in the
  road, Corey lost control of the steering.  The vehicle  went off the road,
  climbed an embankment, struck a tree, and rolled over onto its passenger
  side.   Plaintiff broke his back and sustained a spinal cord injury that
  paralyzed him from the waist down.   Plaintiff brought a strict liability
  action against Ford, alleging that defective design in the 1978 Ford 
  Bronco steering system caused the steering gear sector shaft to break at
  some point prior to the  accident, causing the loss of steering control
  which led to the accident.   

       The jury awarded $1,250,000 in damages, of which $260,000 was
  allocated to emotional  distress damages.  Post-trial, plaintiff sought
  prejudgment interest based on the total past 

 

  economic losses to which his economist had testified.  After adjustments
  for pretrial settlements  and prejudgment interest, the court entered
  judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $1,290,460.52.  

           I.  Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

   A.  Defendant's Failure to Renew Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

       We first address defendant's argument that the court erred in denying
  its motion for  judgment as a matter of law.  Although defendant moved for
  judgment as a matter of law at the  close of plaintiff's case, it failed to
  renew the motion at the close of the evidence as V.R.C.P. 50(b)  requires. 
  Defendant argues that plaintiff introduced no evidence after defendant made
  its motion  and urges a more flexible interpretation of the renewal
  requirement, in accordance with the federal  approach to the rule.  See
  Greenwood v. Societe Francaise De, 111 F.3d 1239, 1244 n.6 (5th Cir.  1997)
  (courts have "excused technical noncompliance [with Rule 50(b)] where the
  purposes of the  requirement have been satisfied").  It also argues that
  where a defendant moves for judgment as a  matter of law at the close of a
  plaintiff's case, and then objects to a jury charge on the same grounds, 
  the objection to the jury charge suffices as a renewal of the original
  motion.  See id. at 1245.  

       Contrary to federal interpretation, we have "construed [Rule 50]
  strictly and held that even  where a motion for directed verdict was made
  at the end of plaintiff's case, if not renewed at the  close of all
  evidence as required by V.R.C.P. 50(b), the issues are waived."  Lent v.
  Huntoon, 143  Vt. 539, 551,