Case Title: In re S.R.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1991-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 90-379


In re S.R., Juvenile                         Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
                                             District Court of Vermont,
                                             Unit No. 3, Caledonia Circuit

                                             June Term, 1991


Dean B. Pineles, J.

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Martha Csala,
  Assistant Attorney General, and Keith Aten, Law Clerk (On the Brief),
  Waterbury, for plaintiff-appellee

Christopher Jeffrey, Montpelier, for defendant-appellant mother

Michael Rose, St. Albans, for defendant-appellant father


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley and Johnson, JJ.


     ALLEN, C.J.   The parents of S.R., a juvenile, appeal the termination
of their residual parental rights.  We affirm.
     S.R.'s mother argues that the juvenile court's findings concerning her
mental illness and conditions in the home did not warrant the  termination.
She also claims that the court's findings of risk to S.R. were not supported
by clear and convincing evidence.  Finally, she claims that stagnation in
parental capacity was caused primarily by the Vermont Department of Social
and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) rather than by fault on her part.
     S.R.'s father joins the arguments advanced by the mother.  He also
raises separate challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the
court's findings in support of termination of his rights.  In addition, he
argues that the findings regarding the quality of the preadoptive foster
home are irrelevant and violate his constitutional rights.
     We hold that the juvenile court's findings are sufficiently supported
by the evidence and that those findings in turn support the conclusion that
termination of parental rights is in the best interests of S.R.  We also
find that the court's inquiry into the quality of the preadoptive foster
home was relevant and did not violate the father's constitutional rights.
For these reasons, we affirm the juvenile court's order terminating the
rights of both parents.
                                    I.
     S.R., a child with special needs, is the daughter of parents who never
married but have lived together for over ten years.  Her father has an
alcohol problem which causes stress and discord in her relationship with
him.  Her mother suffers from seizures.
     In 1986, when S.R. was nine months old, the juvenile court found her to
be a child in need of care and supervision and transferred custody to SRS.
This disposition was based on a diagnosis by a psychologist at Boston
Children's Hospital that her mother suffered from a rare psychological
disorder known as Munchausen syndrome by proxy.  It causes a parent, usually
the mother, to report or cause a serious illness or injury in her child in
order to gain the attention and sympathy of the medical community.  This
illness, recognized in the psychiatric community and by the courts (see,
e.g., People v. Phillips,