Case Title: In the Matter of Angela Sallee Field Trapp

Citation: 

Docket Number: 22S-DI-00254

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2023-12-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 22S-DI-254 
In the Matter of 
Angela Sallee Field Trapp, 
 Respondent. 
Decided: December 11, 2023 
Attorney Discipline Action 
Hearing Officer David J. Hensel 
Per Curiam Opinion 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur. 
Justice Molter concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Dec 11 2023, 11:11 am
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Per curiam. 
We find that Respondent, Angela Trapp, committed attorney 
misconduct by impermissibly communicating with a represented person 
about the subject of the representation and knowingly making false 
statements to a court about the impermissible communication. For this 
misconduct, we conclude that Respondent should be suspended for 30 
days with automatic reinstatement. 
The matter is now before us on the report of the hearing officer this 
Court appointed to hear evidence on the Indiana Supreme Court 
Disciplinary Commission’s verified disciplinary complaint. Respondent’s 
2007 admission to this state’s bar subjects her to this Court’s disciplinary 
jurisdiction. See Ind. Const. art. 7, § 4. 
Procedural Background and Facts  
Respondent represented “Husband” in consolidated marital dissolution 
and protective order proceedings (hereinafter the “Divorce Case”) 
initiated in the wake of a domestic dispute. Respondent also represented 
Husband in a criminal proceeding (hereinafter the “Criminal Case”) 
arising from the same domestic dispute. Wife was represented by counsel 
in the Divorce Case, and Respondent knew this. 
In early April 2019, Wife’s protective order petition was granted by 
agreement and Husband’s protective order petition was dismissed. An 
agreed provisional order entered in the Divorce Case around the same 
time indicated that issues remaining to be resolved included attorney fees, 
valuation of marital assets, and division of the marital estate. The marital 
assets included several firearms allegedly in the home at the time the 
domestic incident occurred that police did not find when they searched 
the property. 
Without notifying Wife’s counsel, Respondent subpoenaed Wife in the 
Criminal Case and took a taped statement from her in August 2019. 
During that interview Respondent questioned Wife about the domestic 
incident and asked her several questions about the firearms and other 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-DI-254 | December 11, 2023 
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marital property over the objection of the deputy prosecutor, who 
referenced the Divorce Case and Wife’s right to have her counsel present. 
When later confronted about this by Wife’s counsel, Respondent stated 
“We asked zero questions about the divorce case.” And when Wife’s 
counsel filed a motion for an order to produce the taped statement, 
Respondent filed an objection inaccurately stating that “Wife’s Counsel 
had one (1) month[’s] notice of the taped statement” and the taped 
statement was not relevant to matters at issue in the Divorce Case. The 
court issued the order to produce and denied Respondent’s subsequent 
motion to reconsider, noting that in an earlier pleading Respondent had 
represented that trial in the Criminal Case would impact the outcome of 
the Divorce Case. The court added that Respondent “should be prepared 
to discuss Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 and its comments at the final 
dissolution hearing.” Respondent emailed the recorded statement to 
Wife’s counsel the following day. 
In November 2020, Wife’s successor counsel moved for Respondent to 
be disqualified in the Divorce Case due to Respondent’s questioning of 
Wife without her counsel present. In February 2021, successor counsel 
appeared for Husband in the Divorce Case, Respondent withdrew her 
appearance, and the motion to disqualify was denied as moot. 
In July 2022, the Commission filed a disciplinary complaint alleging 
Respondent violated the following Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct: 
3.3(a)(1): Knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a 
tribunal. 
4.2: Improperly communicating with a person the lawyer knows to 
be represented by another lawyer in the matter. 
8.4(d): Engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of 
justice. 
An evidentiary hearing was held in March 2023. Following the submission 
of proposed findings by the parties, the hearing officer issued a 17-page 
report finding that Respondent violated all three rules as charged and 
recommending a short suspension with automatic reinstatement. 
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Respondent has petitioned for review of that report, responsive briefs 
have been filed, and the matter is now ripe for our consideration. 
Discussion and Discipline 
Respondent concedes she violated Rule 4.21 but seeks review of the 
hearing officer’s findings and conclusions that she violated Rules 3.3(a)(1) 
and 8.4(d). The Commission carries the burden of proof to demonstrate 
attorney misconduct by clear and convincing evidence. Admis. Disc. R. 
23(14)(g). And while the review process in disciplinary cases involves a de 
novo examination of all matters presented to the Court, a hearing officer’s 
findings nevertheless receive emphasis due to the unique opportunity for 
direct observation of witnesses. See Matter of Gabriel, 120 N.E.3d 189, 190 
(Ind. 2019). 
The hearing officer expressly found that Respondent “was not a 
credible witness” at the final hearing and was “evasive and combative.” 
(Report at 10, 17). We will not second-guess this credibility determination, 
and our own review of the transcript amply supports the evasiveness 
finding. This credibility determination in turn undercuts many of 
Respondent’s arguments on review, which rely to a large extent on her 
own discredited testimony. 
We agree with the hearing officer’s ultimate conclusions that 
Respondent violated Rule 3.3(a)(1). Respondent points to her own 
testimony that the reference to “Wife’s counsel” having been given notice 
of the taped statement was a scrivener’s error. But Respondent’s 
testimony was not credited and finds little circumstantial support in the 
record. Moreover, Respondent does not explain why she failed to correct 
 
1 Although Respondent quibbles at the margins regarding the scope of her violation, the 
parties appear to agree that the precise contours of Respondent’s Rule 4.2 violation have little 
ultimate bearing on sanction. (See Resp. at 11; Reply at 1 n.1). Respondent concedes she 
crossed the Rubicon in her questioning of Wife, and that concession is sufficient for our 
purposes today. See Matter of Martin, 166 N.E.3d 345 (Ind. 2021); Matter of Litz, 894 N.E.2d 983 
(Ind. 2008). 
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this false statement, which Rule 3.3(a)(1) also required her to do. See 
Matter of Powell, 76 N.E.3d 130, 134 (Ind. 2017). Respondent’s challenges to 
the hearing officer’s determination that additional statements Respondent 
made to the trial court were false similarly invite a reweighing of 
testimony, find little circumstantial support, and are undercut by 
Respondent’s contemporaneous pattern of deception in her 
communications with Wife’s counsel.2 
We are similarly unpersuaded by Respondent’s challenge to the 
hearing officer’s finding of a Rule 8.4(d) violation. Respondent’s acts of 
misconduct unduly prolonged the litigation in the Divorce Case, required 
the court and Wife’s counsel to expend additional resources to force 
Respondent to turn over the taped statement, and led to disqualification 
proceedings that ultimately compelled Husband to retain new counsel. 
This easily meets the threshold for prejudice under Rule 8.4(d). See Matter 
of Neary, 84 N.E.3d 1194, 1197 (Ind. 2017). 
Turning to the question of sanction, we have regularly imposed 
reprimands for similar violations of Rule 4.2. See, e.g., Matter of Steele, 181 
N.E.3d 976, 980 (Ind. 2022); Martin, 166 N.E.3d at 347; Litz, 894 N.E.2d at 
984; Matter of Baker, 758 N.E.2d 56, 58 (Ind. 2001). Were Respondent’s 
misconduct so limited, we might be inclined to do so here as well. But we 
agree with the Commission that Respondent’s additional acts of 
dishonesty toward the court in the Divorce Case elevate this to a more 
serious level that warrants a short suspension. See, e.g., Matter of Lynn, 918 
N.E.2d 334, 335 (Ind. 2009); Matter of Gaydos, 738 N.E.2d 276, 277 (Ind. 
2000); Matter of Chovanec, 640 N.E.2d 1052, 1054 (Ind. 1994). 
 
2 Respondent’s argument that dishonesty toward opposing counsel is not encompassed 
within Rule 3.3, while true, misses the point. Respondent’s broader pattern of deception is 
probative of her mens rea underlying the statements to the court that are subject to Rule 3.3 
and undercuts her assertions of inadvertence and lack of knowledge. 
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Conclusion 
The Court concludes that Respondent violated Professional Conduct 
Rules 3.3(a)(1), 4.2, and 8.4(d). For Respondent’s professional misconduct, 
the Court suspends Respondent from the practice of law in this state for a 
period of 30 days, beginning January 22, 2024. Respondent shall not 
undertake any new legal matters between service of this opinion and the 
effective date of the suspension, and Respondent shall fulfill all the duties 
of a suspended attorney under Admission and Discipline Rule 23(26). At 
the conclusion of the suspension period, provided there are no other 
suspensions then in effect, Respondent shall be automatically reinstated to 
the practice of law, subject to the conditions of Admission and Discipline 
Rule 23(18)(a). The costs of this proceeding are assessed against 
Respondent, and the hearing officer appointed in this case is discharged 
with the Court’s appreciation. 
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur. 
Molter, J., concurs in part but dissents from the sanction, believing a 
public reprimand is warranted. 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  RES P O N DE N T  
Nicholas W. Levi 
Michael E. Brown 
Kightlinger & Gray, LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  I ND I A NA SU P RE ME CO U R T  
D I SC I PL I NA R Y C OMM ISS I O N  
Greg N. Anderson, Acting Executive Director 
Angie L. Ordway, Staff Attorney 
Indianapolis, Indiana