Case Title: River Springs Ltd. Liability Co. v. Board of County Com'rs of County of Teton

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94-23

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-07-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
River Springs Ltd. Liability Co. v. Board of County Com'rs of County of Teton1995 WY 112899 P.2d 1329Case Number: 94-23, 94-38Decided: 07/19/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
RIVER SPRINGS LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANY, a Wyoming limited liability company, Appellant, 
(Plaintiff),

v.

BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF TETON, in their capacity as officers of Teton 
County, a political subdivision of the State of Wyoming,

 Appellee 
(Defendant).

BECHO, INC.; and 
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, a Utah corporation sole, 

Appellants 
(Petitioners),

v.

BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF TETON COUNTY, Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Respondent).

Appeal from District 
Court, Teton County, Elizabeth A. Kail, J.

William P. 
Schwartz, Ranck & Schwartz, Jackson, for appellant River Springs Ltd. 
Liability Co.

Stephen R. 
Duerr, John L. Gallinger, and Marilyn S. Kite, Holland & Hart, Jackson, 
for appellants Becho, Inc. and Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.

Paul O. Vaughn, 
Teton County Deputy County Atty., Jackson, and Philip White, Jr., Laramie, 
for appellee Bd. of County Com'rs of Teton County.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen.; Mary B. Guthrie, Deputy Atty. Gen.; Larry A. Bobbitt, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen.; Thomas A. Roan, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen.; and Mary A. Throne, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., for amicus curiae State of Wyoming.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      These 
consolidated cases require us to revisit the definition of minerals in the 
context of the language in WYO. STAT. § 18-5-201 (1977), which limits the zoning 
authority of a board of county commissioners so it cannot "prevent any use or 
occupancy reasonably necessary to the extraction or production of the mineral 
resources in or under any lands subject thereto." The cases come before us by 
virtue of questions certified to this court pursuant to WYO.R.APP.P. 11 from the 
District Court of the Ninth Judicial District in and for Teton County, which we 
agreed to answer. The primary issue is whether sand, gravel, rock, and limestone 
are "mineral resources" within the intent of WYO. STAT. § 18-5-201. Collateral 
issues are raised with respect to preemption by the Wyoming Environmental 
Quality Act (EQA), WYO. STAT. § 35-11-101 to -1428 (1994) of any regulatory 
authority by a board of county commissioners or, in the alternative, the extent 
of the limitation on the authority of the board of county commissioners by the 
combined thrust of these statutes. We answer the certified questions by holding 
that sand, gravel, rock, and limestone are not minerals for purposes of WYO. 
STAT. § 18-5-201. There is no inhibition by that statute upon the authority of 
the board of county commissioners to limit land use by foreclosing the 
extraction of sand, gravel, rock, and limestone. The authority of the county to 
prohibit land use is not preempted but, if extraction is permitted by the board 
of county commissioners, the authority to regulate the mining process is 
assigned by statute to the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ). We remand 
the cases to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with this 
opinion.

[¶2]      The certified 
questions presented by the district court in Case No. 94-23 are:

1. Whether sand, gravel 
and rock excavated and removed from alluvial deposits are "mineral resources" 
within the meaning of W.S. 18-5-201 (1977), which states in pertinent part that 
"no zoning resolution or plan shall prevent any use or occupancy reasonably 
necessary to the extraction or production of the mineral resources in or under 
any lands subject thereto." (Emphasis supplied).

2. Whether, W.S. § 
18-5-201 (1977) and/or the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act, W.S. § 35-11-101 
et. seq., preempt or otherwise constrain a Board of County Commissioners' zoning 
authority to prohibit mineral extraction and production activities.

3. Whether, W.S. § 
18-5-201 (1977) and/or the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act, W.S. § 35-11-101 
et. seq., preempt or otherwise constrain a Board of County Commissioners' zoning 
authority to regulate the aforementioned activities, and if so, the extent of 
that preemption or limitation.

The certified 
questions presented by the district court in Case No. 94-38 are:

1. Whether limestone 
material, extracted for use as gravel products for road base purposes and 
riprap, constitutes "mineral resources" within the meaning of § 18-5-201 W.S. 
(1977), which states in pertinent part that "no zoning resolution or plan shall 
prevent any use or occupancy reasonably necessary to the extraction or 
production of the mineral resources in or under any lands subject thereto?" 
(emphasis supplied)

2. If the material 
constitutes "mineral resources," whether W.S. § 18-5-201(1977) preempts or 
otherwise constrains a board of county commissioners zoning authority to 
regulate the aforementioned activities and, if so, the extent of that preemption 
or limitation?

[¶3]      All the parties 
are in accord that the issues before the court are captured in the certified 
questions in the two cases.1 We answer the certified questions 
in Case No. 94-23 as follows:

1. No.

2. Yes, assuming that the 
extraction and production activities are accomplished for 
minerals.

3. Assuming that the 
activities relate to minerals, the board of county commissioners cannot 
prohibit those activities, but it can regulate such activities so long as they 
are not regulated under the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act, Wyo. Stat. § 
35-11-101 to -1428 (July 1994).

We answer the 
certified questions in Case No. 94-38 as follows:

1. No.

2. Assuming the material 
constitutes minerals, the board of county commissioners cannot prohibit the 
extraction or production of the material, but it can regulate such activities so 
long as they are not regulated under the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act, Wyo. 
Stat. § 35-11-101 to -1428 (July 1994).

[¶4]      In October of 
1992, River Springs Limited Liability Company (River Springs) acquired 
fifty-eight acres of unimproved property in Teton County. Teton County 
previously had zoned this tract as a Residential-Agricultural 3 use in its Teton 
County Comprehensive Plan and Implementation Program (the Plan). The Plan was 
adopted on December 6, 1977, and it became effective on January 1, 1978. The 
tract of land on which River Springs wants to conduct its operations currently 
is platted for a three-lot residential subdivision, and it is bounded by the 
Snake River, a residential area, and two state highways.

[¶5]      In December of 
1992, River Springs filed an application with Teton County for a Conditional Use 
Permit (CUP), seeking to excavate alluvial deposits from the site, to conduct 
processing activities to render those materials usable for commercial purposes, 
and to stockpile the processed materials for future use. Specifically, River 
Springs asked to screen the excavated materials to separate out usable rock, 
sand, and gravel; wash the excavated materials to clean them of dirt and mud; 
crush the aggregate and rock into smaller usable aggregate and gravel; and mix 
the aggregate and gravel with hot tar to create asphalt. The application by 
River Springs was submitted because the Plan prohibits mining activities unless 
a CUP is granted by the Board of County Commissioners of Teton County (Board). 
River Springs submitted additional documentation consisting of a traffic 
analysis, air quality study, alternative site analysis, material cost analysis, 
drainage calculations, noise analysis, wildlife assessment, visual impact 
analysis, wetlands study, and miscellaneous other materials at the time it 
submitted its application for a CUP. On January 5, 1994, the Board officially 
denied the application by River Springs for a CUP. 

[¶6]      In the meantime, 
on August 18, 1993, the DEQ granted a permit to River Springs to operate a 
limited rock, sand, and gravel mining operation on its property. In addition, 
River Springs obtained from the DEQ permits to conduct screening, washing, and 
crushing operations as well as production of asphalt. At the time it sought 
declaratory relief from the district court, River Springs was engaged in 
intermittent screening and washing activities on its property and desired to 
initiate crushing operations and the production of asphalt with its equipment. 
The Board, on September 22, 1993, demanded River Springs cease and desist its 
activities because it did not have a CUP to conduct them. The Board asserted 
River Springs is proscribed from conducting these activities absent its consent 
in the form of a CUP in spite of any permits issued by the DEQ. River Springs 
commenced its action for a declaratory judgment on October 4, 1993.

[¶7]      Becho, Inc. and 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Becho) sought review of the 
action of the Board in denying a CUP. Becho had sought a CUP pertaining to a 
limestone quarry known as the Fox Creek Quarry, which had been opened in 1949 
and operated for various purposes since that time. The quarry produced limestone 
which was used for sugar beet refining until 1975. In 1975, the DEQ issued a 
full mining permit to the quarry pursuant to the EQA. About 1977 or 1978, the 
use of limestone from the quarry for sugar beet refining ended and, from 1979 
through 1988, previously quarried limestone was removed for use in road base and 
construction. In addition, reclamation operations were undertaken. From 1988 
until 1993, only small quantities of previously quarried limestone were removed, 
and there was virtually no activity at the quarry.

[¶8]      Even though DEQ 
had issued a full mining permit in 1975, it has taken the position that any 
further extraction, mining, processing, or reclamation activities will require a 
new or revised permit. An application for a revised permit was being processed 
at the time the application was made to the Board. Becho now has entered into a 
contract with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints to extract and 
process limestone from this quarry, including gravel products for road base and 
riprap.2

[¶9]      The Board has 
asserted that renewed mining activities at the quarry can be pursued only upon 
the issuance of a CUP or, if the Board accepts the use as a "grandfathered" use. 
With respect to this as a "grandfathered" use, the Board's position is that the 
use must not only have existed prior to the adoption of the zoning ordinance, 
but it must have been continued without interruption since its inception. On 
July 20, 1993, the Board decided the Becho quarry was not a "grandfathered" 
nonconforming use because it had been substantially dormant from 1988 to 1993. 
The Board, therefore, insisted that Becho comply with the CUP requirements of 
the Plan, despite the issuance of a mining permit by the DEQ in 1975. Becho 
sought judicial review of the Board's decision in the district 
court.

[¶10]   The first certified question in 
both cases raises the question of whether gravel, sand, rock, and limestone are 
to be considered minerals for purposes of the application of WYO. STAT. § 
18-5-201. The statute grants zoning authority to each board of county 
commissioners, and it provides:

To promote the public 
health, safety, morals and general welfare of the county, each board of county 
commissioners may regulate and restrict the location and use of buildings and 
structures and the use, condition of use or occupancy of lands for residence, 
recreation, agriculture, industry, commerce, public use and other purposes in 
the unincorporated area of the county. However, nothing in W.S. 18-5-201 through 
18-5-207 shall be construed to contravene any zoning authority of any 
incorporated city or town and no zoning resolution or plan shall prevent any 
use or occupancy reasonably necessary to the extraction or production of the 
mineral resources in or under any lands subject thereto.

WYO. STAT. § 
18-5-201 (1977) (emphasis added).

We understand 
the thrust of this statute to be that a board of county commissioners cannot 
inhibit the extraction or production of mineral resources in or under any lands 
otherwise subject to zoning.

[¶11]   In 1944, this court first 
considered the criteria for determining what is or is not a mineral. In Chittim 
v. Belle Fourche Bentonite Products Co., 60 Wyo. 235, 250, 149 P.2d 142, 145-46 
(1944), we said:

Bentonite would appear to 
be a mineral within the definition adopted by the Court in McCombs v. 
Stephenson, 154 Ala. 109, 44 So. 867, and approved by the authors of Morrison's 
Mining Rights 16th Ed. (1936) p. 250, as follows: "any form of earth, rock, or 
metal of greater value while in place than the enclosing country or superficial 
soil". And Mr. Lindley, Vol. I, Lindley on Mines, 3rd Ed. (1914), Sec. 93, p. 
156, sums up an exhaustive examination of the English and American case law on 
the subject with the statement:

"The real test seems to 
be the character of the deposit as occurring independently of the mere soil, 
valuable in itself for commercial purposes, that is, near enough to a market to 
have a value."

[¶12]   More than forty years later, we 
specifically addressed the question of whether gravel was a mineral. Miller Land 
& Mineral v. Highway Comm'n, 757 P.2d 1001 (Wyo. 1988). We expressly 
overruled the test adopted in Chittim, and we stated with respect to 
it:

These definitions are 
more productive of protracted litigation than of justice in arriving at a 
decision as to whether gravel is a mineral.

Miller Land 
& Mineral, 757 P.2d  at 1004.

Having disavowed 
the Chittim criteria, we then adopted a different test, saying:

In an effort to cut the 
Gordian Knot, we join the vast majority of courts and hold that gravel is not a 
mineral, and, insofar as gravel is concerned, we adopt what is commonly known as 
the "ordinary and natural meaning" test articulated in Heinatz v. Allen, 147 
Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949):

"In our opinion 
substances such as sand, gravel and limestone are not minerals within the 
ordinary and natural meaning of the word unless they are rare and exceptional in 
character or possess a peculiar property giving them special value, as for 
example sand that is valuable for making glass and limestone of such quality 
that it may profitably be manufactured into cement. Such substances, when 
they are useful only for building and road-making purposes, are not regarded as 
minerals in the ordinary and generally accepted meaning of the 
word."

Miller Land 
& Mineral, 757 P.2d  at 1004 (emphasis added). See also Farley v. Booth Bros. 
Land and Livestock Co., 890 P.2d 377 (Mont. 1995) (holding scoria is not a 
mineral for purposes of mineral reservation).

[¶13]   In answering these certified 
questions, we have not been persuaded to depart from the ordinary and natural 
meaning test. Neither River Springs nor Becho asserts that the sand, gravel, 
rock, or limestone being excavated is intended for any other purpose than that 
related to "road-making." River Springs, in its brief, expressly articulated the 
processing activities that it wishes to conduct:

(i) screening the 
excavated materials to separate usable rock, sand and gravel products, (ii) 
washing the excavated materials with water to remove dirt and mud, (iii) 
crushing the aggregate and rock into smaller usable aggregate and gravel 
products and (iv) mixing aggregate and gravel with hot tar to create 
asphalt. (Emphasis added.)

The first 
certified question in the Becho case captures the intended use for road base 
purposes and riprap. It is clear, in considering these certified questions, we 
are contemplating sand, gravel, rock, and limestone for some use other than one 
that would make them "rare and exceptional in character or possess a peculiar 
property giving them special value." We hold that Becho's limestone and other 
products and River Springs' sand, gravel, and rock are not "minerals" within the 
context of WYO. STAT. § 18-5-201.

[¶14]   If these are not minerals, then we 
are satisfied Teton County and all the Wyoming counties are free to apply their 
zoning and planning authority under WYO. STAT. § 18-5-201 to "regulate and 
restrict the location and use of buildings and structures and the use, condition 
of use or occupancy of lands for residence, recreation, agriculture, industry, 
commerce, public use and other purposes in the unincorporated area of a county." 
The activities River Springs and Becho contemplate are industrial, or possibly 
commercial, and the counties have clear authority to apply their zoning plans in 
a way that would inhibit such activities. See Croxton v. Bd. of County Comm'rs 
of Natrona County, 644 P.2d 780 (Wyo. 1982). Counties should have, and do have, 
broad authority to require compliance with zoning provisions in their efforts to 
promote orderly development of unincorporated areas. See Snake River Venture v. 
Bd. of County Comm'rs of Teton County, 616 P.2d 744 (Wyo. 1980).

[¶15]   There are limits, however, upon the 
zoning powers of a county. It cannot rezone for a higher use to cut off an 
existing nonconforming use. WYO. STAT. § 18-5-207 (1977). Similarly, it cannot 
regulate a previously permitted use. In such an instance, the permitted use, in 
effect, would be "grandfathered," just as though it had been in existence upon 
the adoption of the zoning provision. With respect to a preexisting use, whether 
antedating the Plan adopted in Teton County or existing at the time of a change 
in zoning, the county could not insist upon a CUP, nor could it prohibit the 
use.

[¶16]   In denying Becho had a 
"grandfathered" use, the Board contended that not only must such a use have been 
a preexisting use, but it had to have been maintained in continuous operation 
since its inception. The Board concluded Becho's quarry operations had been 
"substantially dormant" from 1988 until 1993. The essence of the Board's 
position was that the Becho use had been abandoned. This decision is not 
justified by any definition of a preexisting use in the Plan because none 
appears. The Board apparently concluded Becho's operation was not a 
"grandfathered" use based only upon its decision that the use had been 
abandoned.

[¶17]   Without any extended discussion of 
the concept of a "grandfathered" use, we have recognized that principle in 
Rogers v. City of Cheyenne, 747 P.2d 1137 (Wyo. 1987), appeal dismissed, 485 U.S. 1017, 108 S. Ct. 1568, 99 L. Ed. 2d 884 (1988), and Snake River Venture. The 
concept of a "grandfathered" use which we have acknowledged does not 
substantially depart from that of other jurisdictions. The Supreme Court of West 
Virginia has articulated this definition:

A non-conforming use is a 
use which, although it does not conform with existing zoning regulations, 
existed lawfully prior to the enactment of the zoning regulations. These 
uses are permitted to continue, although technically in violation of the current 
zoning regulations, until they are abandoned. An exception of this kind 
is commonly referred to as a "grandfather" exception.

Longwell v. 
Hodge, 171 W. Va. 45, 47, 297 S.E.2d 820, 822 n. 1 (1982) (emphasis added). This 
definition was reaffirmed by that court in McFillan v. Berkeley County Planning 
Comm'n, 190 W. Va. 458, 438 S.E.2d 801, 806 (1993). See also the cases cited in 
83 AM. JUR.2D Zoning & Planning § 624, at 520 (1992).

[¶18]   The Illinois Court of Appeals 
recently held a stone quarry which had been operated for seventy years was a 
lawful use. The court stated:

Since the quarry was in 
operation prior to the inception of the * * * zoning ordinance, it is permitted 
as a preexisting use under the ordinance and operates as a legal nonconforming 
use.

County of Du 
Page v. K-Five Const. Corp., 267 Ill. App.3d 266, 204 Ill.Dec. 702, 703, 642 N.E.2d 164, 165 (Ill.Ct.App. 1994).

In addressing 
the proposition of abandonment, that court said this:

A claim of abandonment of 
a nonconforming use must be shown by more than a mere cessation of use; 
such a claim also requires that an intent to abandon the use be 
demonstrated. County of Du Page, 204 Ill.Dec. at 707, 642 N.E.2d  at 168 
(citations omitted, emphasis added).

The zoning 
provision provided for abandonment if the nonconforming use was discontinued for 
a period of twelve consecutive months. The provision, in effect, justified the 
court in finding a presumed intent to abandon if the circumstances continued for 
a period of twelve consecutive months. In applying the concept of abandonment, 
the court ruled a nonconforming use could not be legally resumed if the premises 
become vacant or remain unoccupied or not used for a continuous period of one 
year.

[¶19]   These definitions and the rationale 
supporting them are persuasive. Becho's limestone quarry was opened in 1949 and 
had been in existence almost thirty years prior to implementation of the Plan in 
1978. It was a lawful, nonconforming use. The reliance of the Board on the 
proposition that the quarry had been substantially dormant, even if correct, 
does not constitute a cessation of use. It is uncontroverted that some activity, 
although minimal, was taking place at the quarry during the years 1988 through 
1993.

[¶20]   If we look for an intention to 
abandon in accordance with the view of the Illinois Court of Appeals, we cannot 
identify such an intention. The quarry was actively operated, even though at a 
reduced level of activity, from 1949 until 1993. This does not evidence an 
intention to abandon the operation. There were continuing efforts to renew the 
mining permit with the DEQ. Furthermore, the EQA addresses abandonment. WYO. 
STAT. § 35-11-401(e) (1994) provides, in pertinent part:

(viii) After the mining 
operations have ceased or within thirty (30) days after abandonment of the 
mining operation, the operator shall notify the administrator of such fact and 
commence reclamation and restoration in compliance with the rules and 
regulations of the land quality division of the department of environmental 
quality. The rules and regulations for reclamation shall at all times be 
reasonable; and

(ix) Immediate 
reclamation will not be required if the landowner advises the department in 
writing of his intent to further utilize the product of the mine, and if he 
assumes the obligation of reclamation.

Becho took no 
affirmative steps to reclaim and restore in accordance with this statute and the 
rules and regulations of the DEQ. Instead, by applying for renewal of a mining 
permit, Becho advised the DEQ of its intent to further utilize the product of 
the quarry.

[¶21]   The record does not support the 
ruling of the Board that Becho's nonconforming use had been abandoned. We hold 
it was a lawful "grandfathered" use, and the Board is not justified in requiring 
Becho to seek either a variance or a CUP. Becho's continued excavation, 
extraction, production, and processing activities will be regulated by the DEQ 
under the EQA.

[¶22]   With respect to preemption, we are 
satisfied the regulation of Becho's quarry operations is not preempted by the 
state pursuant to the authority provided by the EQA. Our decision in this regard 
is informed by K N Energy, Inc. v. City of Casper, 755 P.2d 207 (Wyo. 1988), in 
which we observed that, since conflict between sovereign powers reserved to the 
state or granted to municipalities was possible, the doctrine of preemption had 
no application. This conclusion was premised upon the proposition that a 
municipality has no sovereign power other than that granted by the legislature. 
This proposition pertains equally to a county. Dunnegan v. Laramie County 
Comm'rs, 852 P.2d 1138 (Wyo. 1993). In this situation, our task is to harmonize 
the several statutory provisions and endeavor to afford legitimate effect to all 
of them; we have no occasion to invoke the doctrine of preemption.

[¶23]   In adopting the EQA, the 
legislature explicitly and specifically has granted the authority to prohibit 
and regulate mining activities to the DEQ. As discussed above, if the county 
zoning forecloses activities the DEQ otherwise would regulate, there can be no 
excavation, extraction, production, or processing of sand, gravel, rock, or 
limestone. If the zoning regulations cannot or do not inhibit these activities, 
however, then the regulation of those activities is accomplished by the DEQ. The 
authority of Teton County is limited by the authority granted to DEQ by the 
language of the EQA.

[¶24]   The statutory scheme is exhaustive 
in its requirements relating to the extraction and production of "minerals." The 
minerals within the purview of the regulatory authority of the DEQ are 
specifically listed:

"Minerals" means coal, 
clay, stone, sand, gravel, bentonite, scoria, rock, pumice, 
limestone, ballast rock, uranium, gypsum, feldspar, copper ore, iron ore, 
oil shale, trona, and any other material removed from the earth for reuse or 
further processing * * *.

WYO. STAT. § 
35-11-103(e)(ii) (1994) (emphasis added).3

The 
pervasiveness of the DEQ's authority is demonstrated by a specific exclusion 
from compliance with the provisions of the EQA. The provisions of the EQA do not 
apply to:

The extraction of sand, 
gravel, dirt, scoria, limestone, dolomite, shale, ballast or feldspar by a 
landowner for his own noncommercial use from land owned or leased by him * * 
*.

WYO. STAT. § 
35-11-401(e)(iii) (1994).

We are satisfied 
the EQA is sufficiently broad in this area to control the regulation of the 
removal of the identified minerals from the earth for reuse or further 
processing. It follows that the Board has no authority to regulate Becho's 
activity.

[¶25]   The same conclusion is not 
applicable to River Springs, which commenced its activities after implementation 
of the Plan in 1978. It applied for a CUP in December of 1992, with full 
knowledge that its site was zoned for residential and agricultural purposes. 
There is no legal compulsion with respect to the issuance of a CUP for 
commercial sand, gravel, and rock quarrying by Teton County in an area known to 
be zoned for residential and agricultural purposes.

[¶26]   In this instance, the regulation by 
the DEQ has a somewhat limited scope. It is provided in WYO. STAT. § 
35-11-401(e)(vi) (1994) that:

Surface mining 
operations, whether commercial or noncommercial, for the removal of sand, 
gravel, scoria, limestone, dolomite, shale, ballast or feldspar from an area of 
ten (10) acres or less of affected land if the operator has written permission 
for the operation from the owner and lessee, if any, of the surface; provided 
that the operator shall notify the land quality division of the department of 
environmental quality of the location of the land to be mined before commencing 
operations * * *.

The record 
discloses River Springs had sought such an exclusion from regulation by the DEQ. 
The significant conclusion is that, if the state has the authority to regulate, 
but excludes certain instances from its regulation, the local authority may 
invoke its regulatory power. We recognize the authority of the Board to regulate 
these activities so long as regulation by the county does not conflict with a 
regulation by the state.

[¶27]   Under the circumstances, River 
Springs proceeded at its own risk. The Plan was valid as applied to River 
Springs, and the issuance of a limited mining permit by the DEQ manifests a 
decision not to exercise state regulatory authority. The Board considered the 
application by River Springs for a CUP and denied it. That action constitutes a 
decision to prohibit the use sought by River Springs because that use was not 
permissible under the Plan.

[¶28]   The answers to the certified 
questions result in this summary of our holdings. Sand, gravel, rock, and 
limestone are not minerals for purposes of the application of WYO. STAT. § 
18-5-201. A county can prohibit the extraction or processing of sand, gravel, 
rock, and limestone pursuant to its zoning authority, but a "grandfathered" use 
cannot be prohibited. If the county permits the extraction, production, or 
processing of sand, gravel, rock, or limestone, or must do so because the use 
was a preexisting use, then regulation of those activities is accomplished under 
the EQA by the DEQ. If, however, the DEQ, pursuant to an exception in the 
statute, does not regulate those activities, they may be regulated by the county 
in a way that does not conflict with state regulation.

[¶29]   These cases are remanded for 
further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1           
The Brief of Appellant River Springs Limited Liability Company in Case 
No. 94-23 recites the certified questions in that case in its Statement of the 
Issues. In Case No. 94-38, the Brief of Appellant Becho, Inc. and Corporation of 
the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints repeats 
the certified questions in that case as its Statement of the Issues Presented 
for Review. In the Answer Brief of Appellee Teton County Board of County 
Commissioners, filed in both cases, the Statement of Issues is: "The issues are 
set forth in the trial court's certified question orders." Finally, in the 
Amicus Curiae Brief of State of Wyoming, under the Statement of the Issues, it 
is said: "The issues presented are the questions that were certified from the 
district court by the Honorable Elizabeth Kail, pursuant to Rule 11.03, 
W.R.A.P."

2           
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1961 (1993) defines "riprap" 
as 1: a foundation or sustaining wall of stones thrown together without order 
(as in deep water, on a soft bottom, or on an embankment slope to prevent 
erosion) 2: stone used for riprap.

3           
The fact that the legislature has included sand, gravel, rock, and 
limestone in the definition of minerals subject to regulatory authority does not 
necessarily make them minerals for other purposes. Miller Land & Mineral v. 
Highway Comm'n, 757 P.2d 1001 (Wyo. 1988). As we stated, we do not consider it a 
cogent argument that gravel must be a "mineral" because the Wyoming legislature 
included gravel in the definition of minerals for purposes of reclamation. 
Miller Land & Mineral, 757 P.2d  at 1003. Instead, the list articulated in 
WYO. STAT. § 35-11-103(e)(ii) (1994) manifests a legislative intent that the DEQ 
should control the removal of materials such as this from the earth in order to 
protect all aspects of Wyoming's environment, including the air, the water, and 
the land.