Case Title: State v. Gray

Citation: 344 Md. 417

Docket Number: 15/96

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1997-01-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No.  15
  September Term, 1996
___________________________________
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
KEVIN D. GRAY
___________________________________
Bell,  C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Raker
    Murphy, Robert C.
 (retired, specially assigned)
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Karwacki, J.
Bell, C.J. & Eldridge, J., dissent
___________________________________
      Filed: January 15, 1997      
           
      We do not mean, nor is there any evidence in the record, to suggest that
1
Vanlandingham and Williams' murders are related.
  The issue presented in this case is whether the introduction
of a nontestifying codefendant's confession implicating a defendant
and others, which is redacted to exclude the names of all those
involved in the crime, other than the confessor, by using the words
"deleted" and "deletion," violates a defendant's rights under the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, even if the jury is instructed to consider the
confession only against the codefendant-confessor?  We shall hold
that under the circumstances in this case it does not and reverse
the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
I.
Stacey Williams was beaten on November 10, 1993, by a group of
six young men.  Within a few hours, Williams died from his
injuries.  Following a preliminary investigation, the police
arrested Anthony Bell.  In a written statement to police, Bell
implicated himself, Jacquin Vanlandingham, and Kevin Domonic Gray,
the Petitioner, as participants in the beating.  Vanlandingham was
fatally shot two days after Williams' death,  and Gray was arrested
1
one day later.  These three individuals were the only ones
identified by name in Bell's statement to police as those involved
in the murder, although evidence adduced at trial suggested that as
many as six persons participated in the attack on Williams.
-2-
Bell and Gray were scheduled to be tried jointly in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City.  Prior to trial, however, Gray
moved to sever his trial from Bell's, or alternatively to exclude
his confession from evidence.  The trial court denied both motions
but ordered the redaction of Gray and Vanlandingham's names from
Bell's confession.
At trial, the State presented the testimony of Tracy
Brumfield, Shay Yarberough, and Baltimore City Homicide Detective
Homer Pennington.  Brumfield testified that she saw Gray,
Vanlandingham, and several others chase Williams down the street.
Yarberough, the only witness to Williams' beating, testified that
he saw Vanlandingham lift Williams over his head and drop him on
the sidewalk.  Yarberough also testified that Gray attempted the
same maneuver, albeit less successfully, and, along with the other
five members of the group, including Bell, repeatedly kicked
Williams about the ribs, neck, and head.
Detective Pennington testified that his investigation led him
to arrest and interview Bell.  In the course of that interview,
Bell formally confessed to participating in the beating of
Williams, implicating both Gray and Vanlandingham in the process.
The State was permitted to read Bell's confession into
evidence over his objection, but, as indicated, supra, was
concomitantly required to redact the names of Gray and Vanlanding-
ham, and insert in their place, the words "deletion" or "deleted."
-3-
A copy of the redacted confession was admitted into evidence with
blank white spaces indicating where the names of Gray and
Vanlandingham had been.
Unlike Bell, Gray testified in his own defense, claiming that
he was speaking with his girlfriend on a public telephone when the
fray ensued.  Chanel Brown, Gray's girlfriend, testified that he
had called her from a telephone booth and, during that
conversation, said that Vanlandingham was fighting.  Defense
witness Lamont Mathews testified that although he had witnessed
Williams' beating, he placed Gray at a telephone booth "up the
street" during the melee.  The jury nonetheless convicted Gray of
involuntary manslaughter, for which he was sentenced to ten years
imprisonment with all but seven years suspended.
Gray appealed that judgment to the Court of Special Appeals,
claiming that the introduction of Bell's redacted confession
violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, and was
contrary to the holding in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123,
88 S. Ct. 1620, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968).  The intermediate
appellate court agreed and reversed Gray's conviction.  Gray v.
State, 107 Md. App. 311, 667 A.2d 983 (1995).  We granted the
State's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.
II.
-4-
      The "Bruton Rule" was extended to state court proceedings in Roberts v.
2
Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 88 S. Ct. 1921, 20 L. Ed.2d 1100 (1968).
In the trial of every criminal case, state or federal, a
defendant has the right "to be confronted with witnesses against
him."  U.S. Const. amend. VI; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403,
85 S. Ct. 1065, 1068, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923, 926 (1965)(Sixth Amendment
made applicable to states through Fourteenth Amendment); Smallwood
v. State, 320 Md. 300, 306, 577 A.2d 356, 359 (1990); Harris v.
State, 306 Md. 344, 361, 509 A.2d 10, 128 (1986).  Implicit in this
principle is the right to cross-examine those witnesses.  Pointer,
380 U.S. at 406-07, 88 S. Ct. at 1069-70, 13 L. Ed. 2d at 928;
Smallwood, 320 Md. at 306, 577 A.2d at 359.
 
In Bruton v. United States, supra, the United States Supreme
Court held that the admission of a nontestifying codefendant's
pretrial confession implicating another codefendant by name,
violated that defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation right,
notwithstanding an instruction to the jury to disregard the
confession in determining the nonconfessing defendant's guilt.2
Bruton was tried and convicted along with one Evans, who, during
the preceding investigation, orally confessed to a postal inspector
that he and Bruton perpetrated an armed postal robbery.  The postal
inspector subsequently testified to Evans' confession.  The trial
judge duly instructed the jury that the confession was competent
evidence against Evans only and was not to be used in assessing
-5-
      The relevant portion of the judge's instruction advised the jurors that:
3
"A confession made outside of court by one defendant may
not be considered as evidence against the other defendant,
who was not present and in no way a party to the
confession.  Therefore, if you find that a confession was
in fact voluntary and intentionally made by the defendant
Evans, you should consider it as evidence in the case
against Evans, but you must not consider it, and should
disregard it, in considering the evidence in the case
against the defendant Bruton.
Bruton's innocence or guilt.   The Supreme Court nevertheless
3
reversed Bruton's conviction.
In so doing, the Court repudiated its previous position that
"`it is reasonably possible for the jury to follow' sufficiently
clear instructions to disregard the confessor's extrajudicial
statement that his codefendant participated with him committing the
crime."  Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126, 88 S. Ct. at 1622, 20 L. Ed. 2d
at 479 (quoting Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 239, 77
S. Ct. 294, 299, 1 L. Ed. 2d 278, 284 (1957)).  The reason for the
departure, articulated initially by the Delli Paoli dissent, was
that:
"too often such admonition against misuse [of
a codefendant's confession] is intrinsically
ineffective in that the effect of such a
nonadmissible declaration cannot be wiped from
the brains of the jurors.  The admonition
therefore becomes a futile collection of words
and fails of its purpose as a legal protection
to defendants . . . . The Government should
not have the windfall of the jury being
influenced by evidence against a defendant
which, as a matter of law, they should not
consider but which they cannot put out of
their minds.
-6-
352 U.S. at 247-48, 77 S. Ct. at 302, 1 L. Ed. 2d at 288
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
The Court acknowledged three arguments supporting the use of
limiting instructions in this area, namely the probative value of
the confession, judicial economy, and the integrity of the jury
system itself, but categorically rejected the first two.  While the
confession may be the best evidence of the confessor's guilt,
alternative ways exist to allow the State the benefit of the
confession without infringing upon the nonconfessing defendant's
constitutional rights.  Bruton, 391 U.S. at 133-34, 88 S. Ct. at
1626, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 483-84.  The use of redactions is but one
example.  Id. at 134 n.10, 88 S. Ct. at 1627 n.10, 20 L. Ed. 2d at
484 n.10.
Similarly, joint trials conserve state resources by avoiding
the necessity of duplicate proceedings, reduce inconveniences to
witnesses, and accelerate the judicial process.  Id. at 134, 88 S.
Ct. at 1627, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 484.  Nevertheless, fundamental
constitutional rights, such as the right of confrontation, are
seldom sacrificed upon the altar of judicial efficiency.  Id. at
135, 88 S. Ct. at 1627, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 484. 
Turning to the third argument in support of limiting
instructions, the Court acknowledged that inadmissible evidence
inevitably finds its way before the jury, but that reliance on the
jury's ability to perform its role is justified under many
-7-
circumstances.  Id., 88 S. Ct. at 1627, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 484.  In
those instances, "[i]t is not unreasonable to conclude . . . [that]
the jury can and will follow the trial judge's instructions to
disregard such information.  Id., 88 S. Ct. at 1627, 20 L. Ed. 2d
at 484-85.  When, however,
"the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial
statements of a codefendant who stands side-
by-side with the defendant, are deliberately
spread before the jury in a joint trial . . .
the risk that the jury will not, or cannot,
follow instructions is so great, and the
consequences of failure [are] so vital to the
defendant, that the practical and human
limitations of the jury system cannot be
ignored."
Id. at 135-36, 88 S. Ct. at 1627, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 485.  The Court
concluded that:
"despite the concededly clear instructions to
the jury to disregard Evans' inadmissible
hearsay evidence inculpating [Bruton], in the
context of a joint trial, we cannot accept
limiting 
instructions 
as 
an 
adequate
substitute for [Bruton's] constitutional right
of cross examination . . . . The effect is the
same as if there had been no instruction at
all."
Id. at 137, 88 S. Ct. at 1628, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 485-86.
III.
Nineteen years later in Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 107
S. Ct. 1702, 95 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1987), the practice of omitting any
references to a defendant from a statement being introduced against
a confessing codefendant was challenged — a practice initially
-8-
      Kareem Martin was a fugitive at the time of trial.
4
suggested by the Court itself.  See, Part II., supra.  Clariss
Marsh, Benjamin Williams and Kareem Martin were charged with
assaulting Cynthia Knighton and murdering her son, Koran, and her
aunt, Ollie Scott.  Over Marsh's objection, Marsh and Williams were
tried together.   At trial, the state introduced a confession made
4
by Williams shortly after his arrest.  The confession had been
redacted to omit all references to Marsh.  In fact, on its face,
the confession implicated no one other than Williams and Martin in
the crimes.  Williams did not testify.  Nevertheless, Marsh was
linked to the confession via her own testimony that she was in the
vehicle on the way to the crime scene when, by Williams' admission,
he and Martin discussed their plans to rob and kill the victims,
although Marsh claims not to have heard the conversation.  Marsh
also testified to being in the house during the robbery, but could
not explain why she did not attempt to flee or otherwise assist the
victims.
During his closing remarks, the prosecutor cautioned the jury
not to use Williams' confession as evidence against Marsh. 
Nevertheless, he linked Marsh to the confession by suggesting that
if Marsh was in the car during Martin and Williams' conversation,
she was, by implication, part of the criminal enterprise.  Marsh
was convicted of two counts of felony murder and one count of
assault with intent to commit murder.
-9-
      We note that under Maryland law, there is no difference, in terms of
5
evidentiary value, between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence.  See, e.g.,
Magnum v. State, 342 Md. 392, 398, 676 A.2d 80, 82 (1995).
Marsh successfully appealed her conviction to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.  781 F.2d 1201
(1986).  In reversing her conviction, that court opined:
"Sanctioning the admission of an extrajudicial
statement 
in 
circumstances 
in 
which 
a
substantial risk exists that the statement
will be used against the defendant not only
denies 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment 
Right 
to
Confrontation, but raises serious due process
concerns 
regarding 
the 
validity 
of 
the
conviction and the fundamental fairness of the
trial process.  It is no answer to this
unfairness to say that the evidence that set
the stage was subject to cross-examination. .
. . [T]he determination of whether there
exists a substantial risk that the jury might
have [improperly] considered [the confession]
`may 
require 
consideration 
of 
other
evidence.'" 
781 F.2d at 1212 (citations omitted).  Assuming the existence of
such a risk, the Sixth Circuit noted that the only direct evidence5
suggesting Marsh knew beforehand that the victims would be robbed
and executed was Williams' account of his conversation with Martin
just prior to the crime.  Id. at 1210.  In view of the lack of
other evidence connecting Marsh to the activities of Williams and
Martin, the prosecutor's linkage of Marsh to the confession proved
"powerfully incriminating" to her with respect to the critical
element of intent, id. at 1213, thereby violating her Sixth
Amendment confrontation right.  Noting that other courts of appeals
have declined to adopt the "evidentiary linkage" or "contextual
-10-
      In support of this principle, the Court cited Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S.
6
307, 324-25 n.9, 105 S. Ct. 1965, 1976 n.9, 85 L. Ed. 2d 344, 359-60 n.9
(1985)(Court presumes that jurors, conscious of the gravity of their task, attend
closely the particular language of the trial court's instructions in a criminal case
and strive to understand, make sense of, and follow the instructions given them),
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26, 91 S. Ct. 643, 645-46, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1,4-5
(1971)(provided jury is properly instructed, statements obtained in violation of
Miranda can be used to impeach defendant's credibility, even though inadmissible to
prove defendant's guilt), Marshall v. Longberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438-39 n.6, 103 S.
Ct. 843, 853 n.6, 74 L. Ed. 2d 646, 661-62 n.6 (1983)(crucial assumption underlying
the system of trial by jury is that jurors will follow the instructions given them
by the trial judge), Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415, 105 S. Ct. 2078, 2082,
85 L. Ed. 2d 425, 431 (1985)(codefendant's confession properly admitted to prove
defendant's confession was not coerced), Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101
S. Ct. 654, 658, 66 L. Ed. 2d 549, 555 (1981)(instruction admonishing jury not to
consider improperly admitted eyewitness testimony sufficient to cure error), Walder
v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65-66, 74 S. Ct. 354, 356, 98 L. Ed. 503, 507
(1954)(illegally obtained evidence properly admitted to impeach defendant with
appropriate limiting instruction).  Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206-07, 107
S. Ct. 1702, 1707, 95 L. Ed. 2d 176, 185 (1987).
implication" approach to the Bruton problem, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.  476 U.S.
1168, 106 S. Ct. 2887, 90 L. Ed. 2d 976 (1986).
The Supreme Court in Marsh rejected the Sixth Circuit's
analysis and characterized the holding in Bruton as "a narrow
exception" to the general principle that jurors follow instructions
given them.   Marsh, 481 U.S. at 206-07, 107 S. Ct. at 1707, 95 L.
6
Ed. 2d at 185. The Court premised its holding upon three basic
assumptions.  First, "where the necessity of . . . linkage [to
other evidence] is involved, it is a less valid generalization that
the jury will not likely obey the instruction to disregard the
evidence."  481 U.S. at 208, 107 S. Ct. at 1708, 95 L. Ed. 2d at
186.  Unlike specific testimony directly inculpating the defendant,
as was the case in Bruton, inferential incrimination can be avoided
-11-
by dissuading the jury from making the inference in the first
instance.  Id., 107 S. Ct. at 1708, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 186.
Second, the practical effect of the "linkage" or "contextual
approach" to the Bruton question would place an impossible burden
upon trial courts.  If limited to facially incriminating
confessions,  Bruton compliance could be had by simple redaction.
Id. at 208-09, 107 S. Ct. at 1708, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 186 (citing
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 134 n.10, 88 S. Ct. at 1627 n.10, 20 L. Ed. 2d
at 484 n.10).  Conversely, an analysis requiring linkage requires
both a pretrial and post-trial determination of whether, after
viewing all the evidence introduced, the confession is so
"powerfully incriminating" that it should either be excluded in the
first instance or the defendant granted a new trial.  Id. at 209,
107 S. Ct. at 1708, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 187.  Such a result not only
invites defense malfeasance, but consumes large quantities of time
and guarantees nothing in the way of certainty.  Id., 107 S. Ct. at
1708, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 187.
Finally, although it might be suggested that the simple remedy
to the Bruton problem is to forego joint trials when the confession
of one defendant might conceivably incriminate the other, the
efficacy of that remedy is questionable.  Id., 107 S. Ct. at 1708,
95 L. Ed. 2d at 187.  Not only do joint trials serve an important
function in our criminal justice system in terms of efficiency,
they protect defendants from the unfair advantage that a later-
-12-
      The Court also acknowledged that Bruton could be complied with by not using
7
codefendant confessions at all, but rejected that suggestion, noting that
"confessions `are . . . essential to society's compelling interest in finding,
convicting, and punishing those who violate the law.'"  Richardson v. Marsh, 481
U.S. 200, 210, 107 S. Ct. 1702, 1708, 95 L. Ed. 2d 176, 187-88 (1987)(quoting Moran
v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1143, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410, 424 (1986)).
tried defendant has over his earlier-tried counterpart, and avoid
the criticism associated with inconsistent verdicts.   Id., 107 S.
7
Ct. at 1708-09, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 187.
In the end, the Court declined to extend Bruton's reach,
concluding that "the calculus changes when confessions that do not
name the defendant are at issue."  Id. at 211, 107 S. Ct. at 1709,
95 L. Ed. 2d at 188.  Having said that, however, the Court
specifically reserved the issue of "the admissibility of a
confession in which the defendant's name has been replaced with a
symbol or neutral pronoun."  Id. at 211 n.5, 107 S. Ct. at 1709
n.5, 95 L.2d Ed. at 188 n.5.  This, of course, is the issue
presently before us.
IV.
There exits a substantial split of authority on the proper
approach to the question expressly left open in Marsh.  Some courts
subscribe to the "contextual" or "evidentiary linkage" approach to
the Bruton problem.  Those jurisdictions principally rely upon the
notion that when a nontestifying codefendant's confession tends to
inculpate a defendant in light of other evidence presented, or to
be presented, at trial, thereby creating a "substantial risk" that
-13-
the jury will improperly use the confession, the defendant's Sixth
Amendment confrontation right is denied.  See, e.g., United States
v. Van Hemelryck, 945 F.2d 1493, 1502-03 (11th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Pendegraph, 791 F.2d 1462, 1465-66 (11th Cir. 1986);
People v. Fletcher, 13 Cal. 4th 451, 456, 917 P.2d 187, 189 (1996);
Smith v. United States, 561 A.2d 468, 474 (D.C. 1989); People v.
Cruz, 121 Ill.2d 321, 330-31, 521 N.E.2d 18, 22-23 (1988); People
v. Kahn, 200 A.D. 129, 136-37, 613 N.Y.S.2d 198, 203-04 (1994);
State v. Johnson, 71 N.C. App. 90, 92, 321 S.E.2d 510, 513 (1984).
Other jurisdictions, however, employ the "facial implication"
doctrine, holding that when the complaining defendant's name is
replaced with a neutral pronoun, and the confession does not
otherwise, by itself, inculpate that defendant, it is admissible
against the confessing codefendant.  See, e.g., United States v.
Hoac, 990 F.2d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Williams, 936 F.2d 698, 700 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v.
Strickland, 935 F.2d 822, 825-26 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Donohue, 948 F.2d 438, 444 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Vogt,
910 F.2d 1184, 1192; (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Espinoza-
Seanez, 862 F.2d 526, 535 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Gonzales, 749 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Belle, 593 F.2d 487, 493 (3d Cir. 1979); Hodges v. Rose, 570 F.2d
643, 646-47 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Dady, 536 F.2d 675,
-14-
      See, e.g., Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S. Ct. 1726, 23 L. Ed.
8
2d 284 (1969) wherein four defendants, one Caucasian and three African-Americans,
where tried together.  Harrington, the Caucasian, had made statements placing
himself at the scene of the crime.  The confession of a nontestifying codefendant
was introduced against that codefendant.  Although the confession did not implicate
Harrington by name, it did refer to "the white guy."  Under the circumstances, the
Court concluded the inculpatory effect was the same as if it had.  See also United
States v. Foree, 43 F.3d 1572, 1578 n.9 (11th Cir. 1995)(jury compelled by other
evidence to conclude that defendant was person named in nontestifying codefendant's
confession); People v. Terry, 2 Cal. 3d 362, 387-88, 466 P.2d 961, 976-77 (1970).
677-78 (6th Cir. 1976); Harris v. State, 218 Ga. App. 472, 473, 462
S.E.2d 425, 427 (1995); State v. Craney, 662 A.2d 899, 903 (Me.
1995); Commonwealth v. Sanford, 323 Pa. Super 436, 439-40, 470 A.2d
998, 999-1000 (1984).
At 
their 
extremes, 
neither 
approach 
is 
completely
satisfactory.  Evidentiary linkage, applied in its most liberal
form, completely undermines the long held, and vitally necessary,
presumption that juries follow trial court instructions.  The
approach also has practical administrative difficulties and may
harm defendants as much as it may protect them.
Similarly, 
while 
the 
facial 
implication 
doctrine 
has
simplistic appeal, redacted confessions with "neutral pronouns may
still prove impossible to `thrust out of mind.'"  People v.
Fletcher, 13 Cal. 4th at 463, 917 P.2d at 195 (quoting Marsh, 481
U.S. at 208, 107 S. Ct. at 1707-08, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 186).  The
possibility 
certainly 
exists 
whereby 
notwithstanding 
the
substitution of a defendant's name with a neutral pronoun, a jury
could reach but one conclusion — that the omission is, in fact, the
nonconfessing codefendant.   Although one might argue that is so
8
-15-
       The other option is to grant a severance and try the nonconfessing
9
defendant separately if the state otherwise chooses to introduce the facially
incriminating confession against the confessing defendant.
only when linked with other evidence admitted at trial, the
inferential step that the jury must take to reach that conclusion
may be so small as to be no step at all.  In those instances, the
act of redaction becomes a mere formalistic exercise devoid of the
Constitutional 
protections 
undergirding 
Bruton, 
and 
the
confession's exclusion from evidence is warranted.  See Clark v.
9
Maggio, 737 F.2d 471, 476 (5th Cir. 1984)(redaction technique must
be employed cautiously and carefully to avoid violating the spirit,
if not the letter, of Bruton).
Despite the State's assertions to the contrary, it does not
necessarily follow from Bruton or Marsh that a confession that does
not implicate a nonconfessing codefendant by name, automatically,
and without further inquiry, passes Constitutional muster.  We
reject, in its most pristine form, the facial implication doctrine
urged by the State.
We think the better approach is that typified by the holding
in United States v. Pendegraph, supra, where the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that "a
redacted confession may still violate the Bruton rule if the
statement compels a directly inculpating inference" between the
redacted confession and the nonconfessing codefendant.  791 F.2d at
1465 (emphasis added) (where the word "individual" was substituted
-16-
for Pendegraph's name in his codefendant's confession, the jury
could infer that Pendegraph was that "individual" if only because
there was no other possibility); see also United States v.
Washington, 952 F.2d 1402, 1407 (D.C. Cir. 1991)(with proper
limiting instruction, Confrontation Clause not violated by redacted
statement that, when viewed with other evidence, does not create an
inevitable association with the nonconfessing defendant).
As we see it, this approach accords with the rationale of
Bruton as explained and limited by Marsh.  The substantial risk to
which Bruton speaks comes not from the incriminatory tendency of a
nontestifying codefendant's confession as to another defendant, but
from the belief that in certain exceptional circumstances, a jury
will not be able to resist the temptation to ignore the trial
court's instructions to overlook what has been thrust into their
line of sight.  Indeed, jurors are strongly presumed to follow
trial court instructions.  See n.6, supra.  When however, the
directly (and undeniably) inculpatory statements of a codefendant
are given to the jury's consideration, notwithstanding a limiting
instruction to the contrary, the presumption is overcome and a
substantial risk therefore exists that the jury will use the
confession as evidence against the nonconfessing defendant.
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136-37, 107 S. Ct. at 1628, 20 L.Ed.2d at 485.
In other words, a Bruton violation occurs when jurors are compelled
to do, as rational human beings, that which they have been
-17-
instructed by the trial court they must not — link a nonconfessing
defendant to a nontestifying codefendant's confession.  The
compulsion to make the impermissible inference must be compelling,
inevitable, and subject to little or no debate.  Otherwise, the
general 
and 
strong 
presumption 
that 
jurors 
follow 
their
instructions is not overcome, and the requirements of Bruton are
therefore satisfied.  See Marsh, 481 U.S. at 211, 107 S. Ct. at
1709, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 188.  
To be sure, some courts have predicated their conclusions that
a confession creates a "substantial risk" that the jury will not
heed trial court instructions and therefore is "powerfully
incriminating" to a defendant based upon the relative strength of
the state's case.  See, e.g., United States v. Key, 725 F.2d 1123,
1126 (7th Cir. 1984); English v. United States, 620 F.2d 150, 152
(7th Cir. 1980).  That analysis, however, concerns whether the
denial of a defendant's confrontation rights was harmless, see,
e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed.
705 (1967), not whether the denial of those rights occurred in the
first place.  We agree that 
"[t]he decision on how to `Brutonize' a
statement, if necessary, must ordinarily be
made early in the trial, when the judge is not
in an ideal position to assess the strength of
the government's case.  A judge can decide at
the outset, however, whether a codefendant
statement is likely to incriminate other
defendants in such a way as to create a
substantial risk that the jury will consider
it in deciding on the guilt of those
-18-
defendants.  If the incriminating references
ultimately adds little to the government's
case, then their exclusion does no harm, and
the confrontation rights of the defendants are
preserved.  We do not read Bruton as
guaranteeing a right of confrontation only as
against testimony that proves to be vital to
the prosecution's case.
Hodges v. Rose, supra, 570 F.2d at 647 n.9.  It was in this manner
that the trial judge in the case sub judice ordered the redaction
of Bell's confession, but otherwise allowed the State the benefit
of its evidentiary value.
V.
As indicated in Part I., supra, the State substituted the
words "deletion" or "deleted, for the names of Gray and Vanlanding-
ham.  Bell's redacted confession, read to the jury and introduced
into evidence, provided in pertinent part:
"Question, what can you tell me about the
beating of Stacey Williams that occurred on
10, November, 1993?
Answer, an argument broke out between deletion
and Stacey in the 500 block of Louden Avenue.
Stacey got smacked and then ran into Wildwood
Parkway.  Me, deleted, and a few other guys
ran after Stacey.  We caught up to him on
Wildwood Parkway.  We beat Stacey up.  After
we beat Stacey up, we walked him back to
Louden Avenue.  I then walked over and used
the phone, Stacey and the others walked down
Louden.
Question, when Stacey was beaten on Wildwood
Parkway, how was he beaten?
Answer, hit, kicked.
Question, who hit and kicked Stacey?
-19-
Answer, I hit Stacey.  He was kicked, but I
don't know who kicked him.
Question, who was in the group that beat
Stacey?
Answer, me, deleted, deleted, and a few other
guys.
Question, did anyone pick Stacey up and drop
him to the ground?
Answer, no, when I was there.
Question, what was the argument over between
Stacey and deleted?
Answer, some money that Stacey owed deleted.
Question, how many guys were hitting on Sta-
cey?
Answer, about six guys.
Question, do you have a black jacket with Park
Heights written on the back?
Answer, yes.
Question, who else has these jackets?
Answer, deletion."
Prior to the confession's introduction into evidence, the court
cautioned the jury that 
"the statement provided by Mr. Bell is to be
considered by you as evidence against Mr. Bell
only and in no way is Mr. Bell's statement
provided to the detective about which he's
about to testify to be considered as evidence
against Mr. Gray.  It is evidence against Mr.
Bell only, and, as I will instruct you later,
you will consider the evidence against the
defendants individually and reach a separate
verdict as to each defendant."
-20-
Taking its cue from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
the intermediate appellate court relied heavily upon Smith v.
United States, 561 A.2d 468 (D.C. 1989) wherein blank spaces were
used in place of Smith's name in his co-defendant's inculpatory,
but otherwise redacted, confession.  The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia opined that:
"In order to determine whether a substantial
risk exists [that the jury will improperly use
the confession against the non-confessing
codefendant], `the trial court must consider
the degree of inference the jury must make to
connect the defendant to the statement and the
degree of risk that the jury will make that
linkage despite a limiting instruction.'  The
trial court's assessment as to whether the
redaction effectively avoids linkage with the
defendant must be make in the context of other
evidence admitted at trial."
Smith, 561 A.2d at 474 (quoting Foster v. United States, 548 A.2d
1370, 1379 (D.C. 1988)).  Applying that standard, the Court of
Special 
Appeals 
noted 
that 
"mere 
deletion 
of 
[Gray 
and
Vanlandingham's names]" failed to eliminate from Bell's confession
Bruton hazards because the jury "did not have to make a substantial
inference that [Gray] was [one of] the person[s] neutrally
referenced in the redacted statement."  Gray, 107 Md. App. at 327,
667 A.2d at 990.  In other words, in light of other evidence
presented at Gray's trial, "the jury could reasonably infer that it
was appellant whose name had been `deleted.'"  107 Md. App. at 328,
667 A.2d at 991.
-21-
While we agree that the jury could have reasonably inferred
that one of the deleted names belonged to Gray, that inference was
not compelled.  As both the trial court and the intermediate
appellate court acknowledged, as many as six individuals
participated in the attack on Williams.  The Court of Special
Appeals, however, pointed out that "only three were positively
identified — Bell, appellant, and [Vanlandingham]" and concluded
that "[Gray]'s role was clearly demonstrated by Bell's confession,
rendering it facially incriminating[.]"  107 Md. App. at 327, 667
A.2d at 990.  We disagree.
As we have said, a Bruton violation occurs when a
codefendant's confession, either facially, or by compelling and
inevitable inference, inculpates a nonconfessing defendant.  Under
those circumstances, there is a substantial risk that the jury will
not heed the trial court's instructions to disregard the confession
as evidence against the nonconfessing defendant or defendants.
True, Shay Yarberough implicated the same individuals from the
witness stand as did Bell's confession, but Yarberough also
testified that at least three other individuals were involved in
the fray, whom he could not (or would not) identify.  Other than by
inference, the jury had no way of knowing that Yarberough's
testimony and Bell's confession paralleled, and the prosecution did
-22-
       Although there is no evidence or allegation of misconduct in this case,
10
the Marsh Court alluded to the possibility that prosecutorial attempts to undermine
a trial court's limiting instruction by encouraging jurors to make impermissible
inferences regarding the relationship between a defendant and a nontestifying
codefendant's confession may form the basis of a Bruton challenge.  481 U.S. at 211,
107 S. Ct. at 1709, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 188.  At least two courts have provided relief
upon this basis.  See United States v. Sherlock, 865 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1989);
People v. Cruz, 521 N.E.2d 18, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 869, 109 S. Ct. 177, 107 L.
Ed. 2d 146 (1988).
not, in any way, suggest such a coincidence.   It was that very
10
inference that the trial court instructed the jury that they must
not make.
As we indicated, supra, that the jury could have reasonably
connected Gray to Bell's confession is not sufficient to raise a
Bruton challenge.  Although the jury knew at the time of trial
Vanlandingham was dead, the omitted references in Bell's confession
could have been any one of at least four other individuals — a fact
emphasized by the States' Attorney no less than three times during
her final summation.  The jury was instructed not to use Bell's
confession as evidence against Gray, and, in light of the strong
presumption that the jury followed those instructions, Gray's Sixth
Amendment confrontation right was adequately protected.  His
unsupported speculation about what the jury might have done if they
drew an impermissible inference is simply insufficient to warrant
a reversal upon these facts.  In short, "there does not exist [in
the present case] the overwhelming probability of [the jury's
inability to follow trial court instructions] that is the
foundation of the Bruton[]   . . . Rule."  Marsh, 481 U.S. at 208,
107 S. Ct. at 1707, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 185.
-1-
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO
THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM
THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR BALTIMORE CITY.  COSTS IN THIS
COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT.
Dissenting Opinion follows next page:
Bell, C.J., and Eldridge, J., dissenting:
We would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special
Appeals for the reasons set forth in Judge Cathell's excellent
opinion for that court.  See Gray v. State, 107 Md. App. 311, 667
A.2d 983 (1995).