Case Title: ALTA WELTY; WELTY'S INC., a Wyoming corporation; WELTY'S GENERAL STORE; and WELTY'S GENERAL MERCHANTS V. LOIS I. BRADY, as Bankruptcy Trustee for Johanna P. Welty

Citation: 

Docket Number: 05-73

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-12-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
ALTA WELTY; WELTY'S INC., a Wyoming corporation; WELTY'S GENERAL STORE; and WELTY'S GENERAL MERCHANTS V. LOIS I. BRADY, as Bankruptcy Trustee for Johanna P. Welty2005 WY 157123 P.3d 920Case Number: 05-73Decided: 12/08/2005
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
ALTA 
WELTY; WELTY'S INC., a Wyoming

corporation; 
WELTY'S GENERAL STORE;

and 
WELTY'S GENERAL MERCHANTS,

 
 
Appellants

(Defendants),

 
 
v.

 
 
LOIS I. 
BRADY, as Bankruptcy

Trustee 
for Johanna P. Welty,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofTetonCounty

The 
Honorable Nancy Guthrie, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

            
Joe M. Teig and Paula A. Fleck of Holland & Hart, LLP, Jackson, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Teig.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Robert M. Shively and Amy M. Taheri of Shively, Taheri & Rochelle, P.C., Casper, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Shively.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Alta Welty, 
Welty's Inc., Welty's General Store, and Welty's General Merchants (collectively 
referred to as "the Weltys") appeal from the district court's order confirming 
an arbitration award in favor of Johanna Welty (Johanna)1.  The Weltys claim the district court 
should have vacated the arbitration award because Johanna engaged in fraud to 
procure the award and the arbitrators committed manifest mistakes of fact and 
law.  Finding no error, we 
affirm.       

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The Weltys state 
the issues on appeal as follows:

            

            
This appeal raises the issues of whether the District Court erred in its 
application of the Uniform Arbitration Act and Wyoming case law which provide that 
arbitration awards procured by fraud, or mistake of fact or law, must be 
vacated.  More specifically, the 
issues for review are:

 
 
A.        Did 
the District Court err as a matter of law when it refused to vacate an 
arbitration award based on newly-discovered evidence that the award was procured 
by fraud?

 
 
B.        Did 
the District Court err as a matter of law when it refused to vacate an 
arbitration award based on the mistakes of fact and law committed by the 
arbitration panel?

 
 
Johanna 
articulates a single appellate issue:

 
 
            
After finding that Appellants did not show by clear and convincing 
evidence that the arbitration award was obtained by fraud or a manifest mistake 
of fact or law, did the District Court properly deny the Defendants'/Appellants' 
Motion to Set Aside the Arbitration Award?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Alta Welty and 
Frank Welty, Jr. (Alta and Frank Jr.) owned and operated a general store in 
Dubois.  The store, which had been 
in the Welty family for many years, operated as a proprietorship under the 
business names Welty's General Store or Welty's General Merchants until it was 
incorporated as Welty's Inc. in 1992.  
Alta and Frank Jr. had a child, Frank Welty, III (Frank III).   

 
 
[¶4]      Johanna married 
Frank III on December 29, 1973.  
Alta and Frank Jr. attended the wedding festivities and, according to 
Johanna, presented the newlyweds with several wedding gifts, including a check 
for $20,000 to each of them.  Alta 
then directed the couple to write two separate checks returning the money to 
Welty's General Store, with a notation on the memo line indicating the checks 
were a loan to the store with interest at ten percent (10%) per annum.  Johanna claimed  the same gift/loan transaction occurred 
for twelve years, from 1973 through 1984.  
Thus, she maintained, over the years, she received $240,000 as gifts from 
Alta and Frank Jr. and returned the funds as loans to Welty's General Store at 
ten percent interest.  Based upon 
conversations with Alta, Johanna believed the loans would be repaid when she and 
Frank III took over the store at a reduced price.   

 
 
[¶5]      Johanna and Frank 
III settled in California with their daughter, although Frank 
III lived and worked in other locations during their marriage.  Johanna often worked in the general 
store during the summers and purchased items for resale in the store, without 
compensation.  She also performed 
the work necessary to have the store listed on the National Register of Historic 
Places, again without compensation.  
Frank Jr. passed away in 1994, after a lengthy illness.    

 
 
[¶6]      On February 23, 
2000, Frank III served Johanna with divorce papers, beginning a long and bitter 
divorce battle in California.  On July 12, 2002, Johanna's attorney 
sent a letter to Alta, formally requesting repayment of the loans.  Johanna did not receive a response to 
her demand and, consequently, filed an action in federal district court against 
the Weltys.  The federal court 
complaint included two counts:  
breach of contract for money lent and promissory estoppel.  The parties undertook discovery, 
including taking the depositions of Johanna, Alta and Frank III.  The Weltys moved for summary judgment on 
both counts.  The federal district 
court granted summary judgment to the Weltys on Johanna's breach of contract 
claim, finding that the statute of limitations had expired, but denied the 
Weltys' motion for summary judgment on Johanna's promissory estoppel claim.    

 
 
[¶7]      The parties 
agreed to submit Johanna's promissory estoppel claim to binding arbitration 
before a panel of three arbitrators.  
The arbitration agreement was signed by Alta and Frank III, on behalf of 
all of the defendants.  The parties 
agreed to forego an evidentiary hearing before the arbitrators and submitted the 
case to the panel upon briefs, exhibits, and counsel's oral arguments.  The arbitration panel held a hearing on 
May 7, 2004, and issued its decision on June 4, 2004, awarding Johanna $837,500, 
together with interest in the amount of $65.75 per day, effective May 8, 
2004.    

 
 
[¶8]      On June 9, 2004, 
Johanna filed a motion for confirmation of the arbitration award, and the 
district court set a hearing on her motion.  Prior to the hearing, the Weltys filed a 
motion for a continuance, requesting additional time to prepare a motion to 
vacate the arbitration award.  The 
district court granted the Weltys' request for a continuance and gave them until 
September 2, 2004, to file a motion to vacate the arbitration award.  On that day, the Weltys filed a response 
opposing Johanna's motion for confirmation of the arbitration award and 
requesting vacation of the arbitration award.  The Weltys also sought leave to 
supplement the arbitration record with newly-discovered evidence of fraud.  They claimed to have recently discovered 
bank statements and canceled checks, which showed Johanna lied when she 
testified Frank Jr. and Alta had gifted her $20,000 per year from 1973 through 
1984 and she had loaned those funds to Welty's General Store.      

 
 

[¶9]      The district 
court held a hearing on the parties' motions and, subsequently, entered an order 
denying the Weltys' motion to set aside the arbitration award and a judgment 
confirming the arbitration award.  
The Weltys filed a notice of appeal from the district court's 
orders.     

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶10]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-36-114 
(LexisNexis 2005) articulates the statutory bases for vacation of an arbitration 
award.  Section 1-36-114 states, in 
pertinent part:  

 
 
  (a) Upon application of a party the 
court shall vacate an award where:

 
 
     (i) The award was 
procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;

 
 
     (ii) There was evident 
partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, corruption of any of the 
arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any 
party;

 
 
     (iii) The arbitrators 
exceeded their powers;

 
 
     (iv) The arbitrators 
refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown, refused to 
hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise conducted the hearing as 
to prejudice substantially the rights of a party;  or

 
 
     (v) There was no 
arbitration agreement, the issue was not adversely determined by a court as 
provided by law and the applicant did not participate in the arbitration hearing 
without raising the objection.  The 
fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a 
court of law or equity is not a ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the 
award.

 
 
[¶11]   In addition to the reasons 
articulated in the statute, our case law sets out other bases for vacation of an 
arbitration award.  However, the 
scope of judicial review of arbitration awards is very narrow.  As such, we have stated that an 
arbitration award may be vacated if the appellant shows by clear and convincing 
evidence that the award 

 
 
"was 
obtained by fraud, corruption, behavior beyond the bounds of natural justice, 
excess of authority, or a manifest mistake of fact or law appearing upon the 
face of the award . . . ." 

 

Matter 
of Town of Greybull, 560 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Wyo. 1977) quoting Riverton Valley Electric Assoc. v. Pacific 
Power and Light Co., 391 P.2d 489, 500 (Wyo. 1964).2  See also, Texas West Oil and Gas Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 
726 P.2d 1056, 1062 (Wyo. 1986).  Clear and convincing evidence is the 
"kind of proof which would persuade a trier of fact that the truth of the 
contention is highly probable.'" Alexander v. Meduna, 2002 WY 83, ¶ 29, 
47 P.3d 206, 216 (Wyo. 2002) quoting MacGuire v. Harriscope Broadcasting Co., 
612 P.2d 830, 839 (Wyo. 1980).

 
 
[¶12]   When reviewing the district court's 
order after an arbitration, we "undertake a full review of the record without 
deference to the views of the trial court.'"  JBC of Wyoming Corp. v. City of Cheyenne, 
843 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Wyo. 1992) quoting Inter-Mountain Threading, Inc. v. Baker 
Hughes Tubular Serv., Inc., 812 P.2d 555, 558 (Wyo. 1991).  "[T]he issue of whether the arbitrator 
exceeded his authority is primarily a question of law.  We owe no deference to the trial court's 
determination of questions of law."  
JBC of Wyoming Corp., 843 P.2d  
at 1194.

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
            
A.        
Fraud

 
 
[¶13]   The Weltys claim the arbitration 
award should have been vacated on the basis of fraud, pursuant to § 
1-36-114(a)(i), because the arbitrators relied upon Johanna's perjured testimony 
about the gift/loan transactions.  
In a related argument, they also claim the district court erred by 
refusing to consider the newly discovered bank statement evidence.  

 
 
[¶14]   We will consider first the Weltys' 
contention that the district court erred by denying their motion to supplement 
the record and allegedly refusing to consider their "newly discovered" evidence 
of fraud.  The district court's 
order does not contain a specific ruling on their motion to supplement the 
record.  The Weltys argue that the 
district court's quotation of language from Mole v. Queen Ins. Co. of America, 14 A.D.2d 1, (N.Y. App. Div. 1961), as follows:  "[t]he purpose and nature of arbitration 
are wholly incompatible with the entertaining of motions for rehearing on the 
ground of newly discovered evidence," indicates the district court denied their 
motion to supplement the record.  We 
believe, however, the Weltys misinterpreted the district court's rationale.  Other statements in the district court's 
order clearly show the district court did consider their supplemental evidence 
for the limited purpose of determining whether there was clear and convincing 
evidence of fraud.  The district 
court was not, however, persuaded by the supplemental evidence and concluded the 
Weltys had not met their evidentiary burden.    

 
 
 [¶15]  We turn next to the Weltys' substantive 
claim that Johanna procured the arbitration award by fraud.  The Weltys contend their supplemental 
evidence proved Johanna lied during her deposition when she described the twelve 
annual gift/loan transactions.  The 
Weltys' supplemental evidence of fraud included:  recently-located bank statements from a 
Welty's General Store account at a Riverton bank for the years 1973 through 
1978, part of 1979, 1980 and 1981; and the statements for a Welty's General 
Store account at a Dubois bank for the years 1973 through 1981.  The bank statements simply reflect the 
amounts of debits and credits.  They 
do not specify the check payees or the sources of deposits.  The bank statements do not specifically 
document the checks written to Johanna for the $20,000 per year gift or deposits 
of the loan proceeds.  There were, 
however, two $20,000 deposits shown in the statements.     

 
 
[¶16]   The panel reviewed the check stubs 
from the same two accounts at the arbitration hearing.  Like the bank statements, the check 
stubs did not show the yearly transactions claimed by Johanna.  Thus, the bank statements merely 
corroborated the evidence already considered by the arbitrators.  On the entire record, the arbitrators 
found that the credible testimony of the witnesses, together with the available 
documentary evidence, compelled a finding that Johanna had made the loans.  Johanna testified about the twelve 
yearly gift/loan transactions, but did not identify any particular account the 
gifts came from or into which the Weltys deposited the loan proceeds.  Furthermore, Alta testified that she and 
her husband had other accounts in addition to the two accounts represented by 
the bank statements.  Thus, the bank 
statements from the two accounts did not conclusively establish that Johanna 
lied about the gift/loan transactions.  

 
 
[¶17]   Further, the arbitrators considered 
other evidence which supported a finding that the gift/loan transactions 
existed.  Johanna testified that her 
husband, Frank III, kept copies of the checks received from his parents each 
year and copies of the checks returning the funds as loans to the general 
store.  At the hearing, she 
submitted copies of the checks showing the transactions in 1982, 1983, and 
1984.  The copies of those checks 
were kept in a safety deposit box in an envelope labeled by Frank III as "copies 
of checks evidencing loans to Welty's Store."  She also presented copies of deposit 
slips from her own accounts, showing deposits of $20,000 into her account in 
1980 and 1981.  Each deposit slip 
contained a notation indicating the source of the funds was a gift or "annual 
gift" from Alta and Frank Jr.  
Johanna testified that, for the years 1973 through 1980, the copies of 
the checks were kept in a business safe, which mysteriously disappeared from 
their California home in 1994.  She was, therefore, unable to offer 
copies of the checks for those years.  Johanna did, however, present a copy of a 
deposit slip, showing a $20,000 deposit into her account in 1974.    

 
 
[¶18]   In addition to the bank account 
information, Johanna offered other evidence which supported her position.  She presented copies of financial 
statements, dated 1985 and 1990, for "Mr. and Mrs. Frank Welty, III."  The statements were prepared by Frank 
III and represented that he and his wife owned over $300,000 worth of equity in 
the family business.  Johanna also 
proffered a copy of a certified letter which she sent to Frank III in 1987, 
which summarized the loans made to Welty's General Store over the years and the 
value of Johanna's work in having the store building placed on the National 
Register of Historic Places.  She 
testified that he asked her to prepare and send the letter to him so that he 
could use it in negotiating a purchase or lease of the store from his 
parents.  A 1983 letter from Alta 
and Frank Jr. lends further credence to Johanna's claim that it was the intent 
of the parties to have Frank III and Johanna eventually take over the 
store.  The letter details many of 
the store operations and includes advice from Alta about how to make it 
profitable.    

 
 
[¶19]   The bank statements the Weltys 
presented in support of their fraud claim simply are not sufficient to undermine 
the other evidence presented in the case and certainly are not adequate to 
convince a trier of fact it is highly probable that Johanna lied about the 
gift/loan transactions.  The 
district court properly denied the Weltys' motion to vacate the arbitration 
award on the basis of fraud.  

            
   

B.        
Mistakes of Fact and Law

 
 
[¶20]   The Weltys claim the arbitrators 
made five manifest mistakes of fact and/or law, 

requiring 
vacation of the arbitration award.  
They maintain the panel improperly:  
1) assumed Welty's Inc. was liable for the award; 2) excused Johanna's 
failure to provide sufficient documentation of the loans; 3) excused Johanna's 
failure to make a timely claim on Frank Jr.'s estate; 4) created a loan 
agreement in absence of clear and definite terms; and 5) ignored evidence that 
the gift/loan transaction was actually an "ill-advised" estate planning 
tool.  

 
 
[¶21]   Several of the Weltys' claims of 
manifest mistake, including the lack of documentation to show the loan 
transaction, improper creation of a loan agreement, and ignoring evidence that 
the gift/loan transactions were simply estate planning devices, concern the 
weight and sufficiency of the evidence to support the arbitration award.  In considering the Weltys' contentions, 
we are mindful that "[t]his Court favors arbitration or other forms of 
alternative dispute resolution."  Scherer v. Schuler Custom Homes 
Construction, Inc., 2004 WY 109, ¶ 16, 98 P.3d 159, 163 (Wyo. 2004).  See also, Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Tilden, 
2003 WY 31, ¶ 7, 64 P.3d 739, 741-42 (Wyo. 2003); Simon v. Teton Board of Realtors, 4 P.3d 197, 201-02 (Wyo. 2000).   As 
we explained many years ago in Riverton 
Valley Electric Assoc., 391 P.2d  at 498, arbitrators have broad powers to 
make factual determinations, and "absent a mistake upon the evidence tantamount 
to fraud . . . or willful and intentional failure to consider it, the weight and 
sufficiency of the evidence" is for the arbitrators to determine.  Id.  
In addition, 

 
 
[t]he 
reviewing court must observe the principle that arbitrators are free to fashion 
forms of relief which could not be ordered by a court in law or equity.  W.S. 1-36-114(a)(v). . . . [W]e are 
reluctant to disturb an arbitrator's just solution to a controversy, even if it 
differs from the resolution we might have chosen, had we been in the 
arbitrator's place.  See Matter of Town of Greybull, 560 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Wyo.1977).  As a 
voluntary method for resolution of disputes, arbitration is embedded in the 
public policy of Wyoming and is favored by this court.  T 
& M Properties v. ZVFK Architects and Planners, 661 P.2d 1040, 1043 
(Wyo.1983).

 

JBC of 
Wyoming Corp., 843 P.2d  
at 1194.  See also, Pecha v. Smith, Keller & Assoc., 942 P.2d 387, 390-91 (Wyo. 1997).  

 
 
[¶22]   In accordance with the parties' 
arbitration agreement, the arbitration panel considered the elements of 
promissory estoppel in its decision.  
The general theory of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is: "If an 
unambiguous promise is made in circumstances calculated to induce reliance, and 
it does so, the promisee if hurt as a result can recover damages.'"  B 
& W Glass, Inc. v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 829 P.2d 809, 813 
(Wyo. 1992), 
quoting Goldstick v. ICM Realty, 788 F.2d 456, 462 (7th Cir.1986).  Thus, 
the elements of a promissory estoppel claim are:  "(1) the existence of a clear and 
definite promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action by 
the promisee; (2) proof that the promisee acted to its detriment in reasonable 
reliance on the promise; and (3) a finding that injustice can be avoided only if 
the court enforces the promise."  City of Powell v. Busboom, 2002 WY 58, ¶ 
8, 44 P.3d 63, 66 (Wyo. 2002), quoting Roussalis v. Wyoming Medical Center, 
Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 253 (Wyo. 2000).  
See also, Parkhurst v. Boykin, 2004 WY 90, ¶ 21, 
94 P.3d 450, 460 (Wyo. 2004).  "The 
party who is asserting promissory estoppel is assigned the burden of 
establishing all of the elements of the doctrine with a standard of strict  proof.'"  Roussalis, 4 P.3d  at 253 quoting B & W Glass, 829 P.2d  at 
819.

 
 
[¶23]   The panel concluded Johanna had 
satisfied the elements of promissory estoppel.  In particular, the panel 
found:

 
 
            
* * *

 
 
            
7.         The 
credible testimony of the witnesses and the available documentary evidence 
compel a finding of loans in the form of bank checks from Plaintiff Johanna P. 
Welty to Welty's General Store in the amount of $20,000.00 per year for twelve 
years, beginning on or about January 1, 1974 and concluding on or about January 
1, 1985, with notations that the payment was a loan to bear interest at ten 
percent per annum.  The agreement to 
repay such loans at said rate was clear and definite.

 
 
            
8.         
Plaintiff Johanna P. Welty relied on the agreement to her detriment by 
forbearing to make demand for payment when more documents evidencing the 
agreement would have been discoverable, as well as uncompensated work over the 
years.

 
 
            
9.         The 
equities support the enforcement of the agreement between the parties to the 
extent provided herein.  It would be 
unjust for Alta Welty to, retrospectively, deprive Plaintiff Johanna P. Welty of 
the benefit of the loans under the circumstances where Alta Welty received 
forbearance on the repayment due to the acts and conduct which gave Johanna P. 
Welty reason to believe that she was building equity and would ultimately become 
an owner of the business. 

 
 
                        
* * * 

 
 
[¶24]   We discern no manifest mistake of 
fact or law on the face of the arbitrators' decision.  As explained fully in the fraud 
discussion, supra, there was evidence 
to support Johanna's claim that Alta and Frank Jr. had promised to repay the 
loans when Johanna and Frank III took over the general store business.  Furthermore, there was evidence that 
Johanna relied upon that promise to her detriment by not insisting upon 
repayment of the loans in the ordinary course of business and making 
considerable efforts throughout the years to assist with the business.  The Weltys' appellate claims do not 
reach the level required to overturn an arbitration award and we, therefore, 
defer to the arbitrators' findings on the weight and sufficiency of the 
evidence.   We also defer to 
the arbitrators' right to consider the relative equities of the parties and 
fashion an award.  The arbitrators 
did not commit a manifest mistake of fact or law on the face of the award and, 
consequently, there is no legal basis to overturn their decision.    

 
 
[¶25]   The Weltys also claim the panel 
committed a manifest mistake of law and fact when it assumed liability on the 
part of the corporation, Welty's Inc.   They claim, since the corporation 
did not exist when the loans were made, the panel erred by making it jointly and 
severally liable for the award.  The 
particular findings disputed by the Weltys stated:

 
 
4.         At 
the time the loans were made, Welty's General Store and Welty's General 
Merchants were dba[]s for Defendant Alta Welty and her now-deceased husband, 
Frank Welty, Jr.  The business was 
incorporated in 1992, and Welty's Inc. took over operation of the store, 
including its assets and liabilities.

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
10. 
      Equity 
requires all Defendants, including Welty's Inc., to be jointly and severally 
liable for the damages awarded to Plaintiff Johanna P. Welty.  The award against Welty's Inc. is 
justified by the fact that the checks written by Plaintiff Johanna P. Welty were 
actually written to the store, although it was at the time a proprietorship, and 
the testimony establishes that the business was incorporated and would have 
succeeded to all assets and assumed all liabilities of the former 
proprietorship, including any "accounts" in favor of Plaintiff Johanna P. Welty 
that were or should have been carried on the books of the prior business.     

 
 
The 
Weltys assert there was no evidence to support the arbitrators' determination 
the corporation assumed responsibility for the general store's debts.   

 
 
[¶26]   However, the Weltys did not object 
to the panel's consideration of Welty's Inc.'s responsibility to Johanna and, in 
fact, specifically submitted the issue of the corporation's responsibility to 
the arbitration panel, when Frank III and Alta signed the arbitration agreement 
on behalf of Welty's Inc.  The 
charge of the arbitrators was set forth in the arbitrator's agreement, as 
follows:

 
 

5.                  
Jurisdiction 
of Arbitrators.  The parties agree 
to submit to binding arbitration, under the terms and conditions of this 
Agreement, the following questions:

 
 

a.                  
Whether 
a clear and definite agreement existed between Johanna Welty  and [the] Welty[]s that loans of her 
gift money and/or the value of her various efforts on behalf of Welty's General 
Store would be credited to her account and repaid when she became a co-owner of 
the store with Frank A. Welty, III.

 
 

b.                  
Whether 
Johanna P. Welty relied on her agreement with [the] Welty[]s to her 
detriment.

 
 

c.                  
Whether 
the equities support the enforcement of the agreement between the parties.  

 
 

d.                  
If the 
questions above are answered in the affirmative, the amount which will 
compensate Johanna P. Welty. 

 
 
 [¶27]  Although not expressed in so many words, 
the Weltys suggest the arbitrators exceeded their authority by finding Welty's 
Inc. was liable for the award.  As 
we have stated in other cases, the parties' agreement defines the arbitrators' 
authority.  See e.g., Wild West Trading Co. v. GBS&H 
Architects, Landscape Architects, Planners, Inc., 881 P.2d 1070, 1074 (Wyo. 
1994); Matter of Town of Greybull, 
560 P.2d  at 1178.  "The broad 
freedom an arbitrator has to resolve disputes and fashion remedies is limited by 
the contractual nature of the arbitration agreement from which he draws his 
powers."  Wild West Trading Co., 881 P.2d  at 1074.  See also, Fox v. Tanner, 2004 WY 157, ¶ 14, 101 P.3d 939, 943 (Wyo. 2004).  Of 
course, if an arbitration panel considers a claim not identified for resolution 
in the arbitration agreement, then it exceeds its authority and the award must 
be vacated.  JBC of Wyoming Corp., 843 P.2d  at 
1196.  Nevertheless, when an issue 
appears to be submitted to arbitration by the parties and there is no objection 
to the arbitrator's consideration of a particular issue, a later claim the 
arbitrator exceeded its authority by considering that claim is waived.   See RivertonValley Electric Assoc., 391 P.2d  at 
493-94.        

      

[¶28]   The federal district court 
complaint included claims against "Welty's Inc., a Wyoming corporation." 
 The parties entered into the 
arbitration agreement to finally resolve the federal court litigation.  The arbitration agreement specifically 
stated the "[arbitration] decision shall, when rendered, be fully binding upon 
the parties as if it were a judgment rendered in the United States District 
Court for the District of Wyoming in the underlying action . . .".  Alta and Frank III signed the arbitration 
agreement on behalf of Welty's Inc.  
The questions submitted to the arbitration panel do not, in any way, 
indicate the Weltys were arguing Welty's Inc. was less responsible for the loan 
repayments than any of the other defendants.  Moreover, the Weltys did not object to 
the arbitrators' consideration of Welty's Inc.'s responsibility to Johanna until 
the matter was submitted to the district court for confirmation of the 
arbitration award.  Under these 
circumstances we conclude the arbitration panel was within its authority when it 
considered the corporation's responsibility for the loan and, in any event, the 
Weltys waived that argument by failing to submit it to the arbitration 
panel.

 
 
[¶29]   Finally, the Weltys argue the 
arbitrators committed a manifest mistake of fact and law when they excused 
Johanna's failure to file a timely claim upon Frank Jr.'s estate when he died in 
1994.  They claim, since Johanna 
argued that one-half of the gifts were from Frank Jr., she was required to file 
a claim against his estate.  This 
argument is somewhat perplexing.  It 
is irrelevant that the source of the funds for the loans was the gifts from Alta 
and Frank Jr.  Johanna's claim was 
based upon the failure of Welty's General Store to repay the loans when they were due.  At the time of Frank Jr.'s death in 
1994, no disagreement had arisen regarding repayment of the loans.  Johanna did not know that her loans to 
the general store would not be repaid until Frank III served her with divorce 
papers in 2000.  Thus, Johanna did 
not have a claim against Frank Jr. when he passed away in 1994 and, 
consequently, she was not required to submit a claim against his estate.  

 
 
[¶30]   Affirmed.  

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Johanna declared bankruptcy while this 
action was pending, rendering this claim an asset of the bankruptcy estate.  An order substituting Trustee Louis I. 
Brady as appellee was entered on August 16, 2005.

 
 

2Johanna 
argued to the district court that the parties' arbitration agreement limited the 
scope of judicial review to the bases set out in § 1-36-114.  She argued the agreement prohibited 
review of the common law bases for vacation of an arbitration award, including 
manifest mistakes of law or fact.  
Johanna does not, however, continue to argue before this Court the 
standard of review is limited to the statutory bases.  Consequently, we will apply the 
standards of judicial review found in our statutes and case law.