Case Title: State v. IOWA DIST. COURT FOR LYON COUNTY

Citation: 348 N.W.2d 221

Docket Number: 

State: iowa

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Date: 1984-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
348 N.W.2d 221 (1984) STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff, v. IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR LYON COUNTY, Defendant. No. 83-545. Supreme Court of Iowa. May 16, 1984. *222 Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., and Roxann M. Ryan and Douglas F. Staskal, Asst. Attys. Gen., for plaintiff. Randy L. Waagmeester, County Atty., for defendant. Considered by UHLENHOPP, P.J., and HARRIS, McCORMICK, McGIVERIN, and LARSON, JJ. UHLENHOPP, Justice. In this case the State challenges the legality of an award of attorney fees against it for the defense of criminal cases. Division IV of chapter 422 of the Iowa Code of 1981 relates to the retail sales tax. Section 422.58(5) of that division provides: Another section of the Code makes a fraudulent practice a public offense. Iowa Code § 714.8(10). The Iowa Department of Revenue conducted a sales tax audit in Lyon County of the affairs of Randall L. Riggs, and referred its report to the Attorney General. An Assistant Attorney General wrote the Lyon County Attorney stating inter alia: The County Attorney deferred to prosecution by the Attorney General, who in the name of the State filed informations against Riggs for the alleged violations. Before the district court, Riggs would not establish his indigency or obtain an attorney. The court therefore appointed an attorney for him. Subsequently he was convicted of the charges and sentenced. The district court then allowed the defense attorney a fee in the following order: The court also ordered Riggs to reimburse the State for the fee. We will subsequently quote relevant portions of section 331.778. The State petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari to test the authority of the district court to require it to pay the fee. We granted a writ. The problem presented requires consideration of rules, statutes, and decisions on the subject. As to the prosecution of public offenses, subsections 1 and 2 of section 331.756 in the county home rule chapter of the Code provide: The county attorney shall: Subsections 1 and 2 of section 13.2 of the Code provide: In addition, paragraph 1 of rule 5 of the rules of criminal procedure states: As to the district court's authority to appoint an attorney for an accused, subsections 1 and 3 of section 331.778 of the home rule chapter provide: As to the fee of a court-appointed attorney, section 815.7 of the Code provides in pertinent part: As to liability for the fee, we set forth the rule of general applicability in *224 State v. Iowa District Court of Sioux County, 286 N.W.2d 22, 24 (Iowa 1979): We also stated in Hulse v. Wifvat, 306 N.W.2d 707, 713, 714 (Iowa 1981): The general rule of county liability is subject to an exception for State liability in certain classes of cases specified in section 815.1 of the Code: Under these rules, statutes, and decisions, such liability as exists for defense attorney fees in State cases presently rests on the counties irrespective of who prosecutes the cases except in the cases specified in section 815.1, when it rests on the State. The prosecutions involved here do not come within section 815.1, and the State is not liable for the defense attorney fee. The State does not raise an issue as to whether the county is in fact liable for this attorney fee, and that question is not before us. Neither do we consider the future effect on cases of this kind of Senate File 495 of the Seventieth General Assembly. WRIT SUSTAINED.