Case Title: GAYE WINTER and JO/ETTA, LLC, a Wyoming close limited liability company v. ANDY PLEASANT doing business as A. PLEASANT CONSTRUCTION ; ANDY PLEASANT, doing business as A.PLEASANT CONSTRUCTION v. GAYE WINTER and JO/ETTA, LLC, a Wyoming close limited liability company

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0058

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
GAYE WINTER and JO/ETTA, LLC, a Wyoming close limited liability company v. ANDY PLEASANT doing business as A. PLEASANT CONSTRUCTION ;  ANDY PLEASANT, doing business as A.PLEASANT CONSTRUCTION v. GAYE WINTER and JO/ETTA, LLC, a Wyoming close limited liability company2010 WY 4222 P.3d 828Case Number: No. S-09-0058, S-09-0059Decided: 01/12/2010
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
GAYE 
WINTER and JO/ETTA, LLC, a Wyoming close limited liability 
company,Appellants(Defendants),v.ANDY PLEASANT doing 
business as A. PLEASANT 
CONSTRUCTION,Appellee(Plaintiff).

ANDY 
PLEASANT doing business as A. PLEASANT 
CONSTRUCTION,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.GAYE WINTER and 
JO/ETTA, LLC, a Wyoming close limited liability 
company,Appellees(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County

The 
Honorable Jere A. Ryckman, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Gaye Winter and Jo/Etta, LLC, a Wyoming close limited liability 
company:

V. 
Anthony Vehar of Vehar Law Offices, P.C., Evanston of 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Andy Pleasant doing business as A. Pleasant Construction:

Patrick 
J. Crank and Matthew D. Obrecht of Speight, McCue & Crank, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Crank.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      These combined 
appeals arise from a judgment relating to a construction contract 
(Contract).  In S-09-0058, Don 
Winter, Gaye Winter, and Jo/Etta, LLC (Winter) appeal from the district court's 
ruling that a materialman's lien (Amended Lien Statement) filed against their 
property, was valid.  In S-09-0059 
Andy Pleasant, doing business as A. Pleasant Construction (Pleasant 
Construction), appeals the district court's holding that Winter did not breach 
the Contract, the district court's interpretation of the Contract, and the 
district court's damages award.  
Finding that the district court committed an error of law in finding that 
the Amended Lien Statement was valid, we will reverse that portion of the 
judgment.  Finding no error with 
respect to the district court's breach of contract analysis, contract 
interpretation, or damages award, we will uphold that portion of the judgment, 
except we will remand for the limited purposes set forth below. 

 
 
issues

Issue 
in S-09-0058:

 
 
            
1.    Whether the 
district court erred in finding that the Amended Lien Statement complied with 
the requirements of Wyo. Stat. § 29-1-301 (LexisNexis 
2009)?

 
 

Issues 
in S-09-0059:

 
 

1.      
Whether 
the district court erred in finding the word "monthly," as used in the Contract, 
to be ambiguous?

 
 

2.      
Whether 
the district court erred in finding that the Project Manual was incorporated 
into the Contract?

 
 

3.      
Whether 
the district court's damages calculation is factually and legally 
flawed?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶2]      Winter and 
Pleasant Construction entered into a contract in which Pleasant Construction 
agreed to construct an office building for Winter (the Winters Professional 
Building).  The Contract provided 
that Winter was to pay Pleasant Construction "on a Monthly basis" as work was 
completed.  Sometime after a 
substantial amount of construction had been completed, Winter stopped making 
payments.  In response, Pleasant 
Construction wrote Winter a letter in which it unilaterally terminated the 
Contract between the parties and filed an Amended Lien Statement1 against the property pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-301 (LexisNexis 2009).2  Pleasant Construction then filed a 
two-count Complaint with the district court.  In Count I, Pleasant Construction 
alleged breach of contract on the part of Winter for failure to make payments, 
and requested damages.  In Count II, 
Pleasant Construction sought to establish the validity of the Amended Lien 
Statement and requested that the district court foreclose the lien and order the 
property sold to cover Pleasant Construction's damages.  Winter counter-claimed for breach of 
contract for changing the construction plans without authorization, constructing 
the building in a defective manner, and for wrongfully terminating the 
contract.  The district court upheld 
the validity of the Amended Lien Statement, found Pleasant Construction in 
breach of contract, but awarded Pleasant Construction damages for unpaid labor 
and materials expended on the project and offset that award by several 
deductions for breaches committed by Pleasant Construction.3  In S-09-0058, Winter appeals the district 
court's ruling that the Amended Lien Statement was valid and consequently 
challenges the district court's damages award to Pleasant Construction.  In S-09-0059, Pleasant Construction 
appeals the district court's decision that Winter did not breach the contract, 
the district court's interpretation of the Contract, as well as the amount of 
the district court's damages award.  
We will address each of these appeals in turn.  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

Issue 
in S-09-0058:

 
 
1.    Whether the district court 
erred in finding that the Amended Lien Statement complied with the requirements 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-301 (LexisNexis 2009)?

 
 
[¶3]      We have 
repeatedly stated that

 
 
[q]uestions 
of statutory interpretation are matters of law.  In interpreting statutes, our task is to 
give effect to the legislature's intent.  
We look first to the plain meaning of the language chosen by the 
legislature and apply that meaning if the language is clear and 
unambiguous.  A statute is clear and 
unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree on 
its meaning with consistency and predictability.  All statutes must be construed in pari materia; and in ascertaining the 
meaning of a given law, all statutes relating to the same subject or having the 
same general purpose must be considered and construed in harmony.  If, however, the wording of a statute is 
ambiguous or capable of varying interpretations, we employ well-accepted rules 
of statutory construction.

 
 

Bangs 
v. Schroth, 
2009 WY 20, ¶ 32, 201 P.3d 442, 456 (Wyo. 2009) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted).  "Lien statutes 
create remedies in derogation of common law and must be strictly 
construed.'"  Sheridan Commercial Park, Inc. v. 
Briggs, 848 P.2d 811, 815 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Burg v. Ruby Drilling Co., 783 P.2d 144, 
152 (Wyo. 1989)).  Accordingly, "in 
order to perfect a materialman's or mechanic's lien, full compliance with all 
statutory requirements is necessary."  
White v. Diamond Int'l Corp., 
665 P.2d 463, 466 (Wyo. 1983).

 
 
[¶4]      The statute at 
issue here, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-301(a), provides in pertinent part that, "In 
order to have a perfected lien pursuant to this title, a lien claimant shall 
file with the county clerk a lien statement sworn to before a notarial 
officer."  (Emphasis added.)  The notary block of the Amended Lien 
Statement reads:

 
 
On 
this 11th day of May, 2006, before me personally appeared Robert T. 
McCue, to me personally known, who being by me duly sworn, did say that he is 
the attorney for A. Pleasant Construction and that the above and foregoing 
AMENDED LIEN STATEMENT was signed on behalf of A. Pleasant Construction by 
authority of Andy Pleasant.[4]

 
 
Winter 
asserts that the Amended Lien Statement is invalid, arguing that it does not 
meet the requirements of § 29-1-301(a) because the information contained in the 
Amended Lien Statement was not "sworn to" as being true and correct.  Alternatively, Pleasant Construction 
argues that the Amended Lien Statement complies with the "sworn to" provision in 
§ 29-1-301(a) because the notary block indicates that the claimant was "duly 
sworn," and that is all that the statute requires.

 
 
[¶5]      When addressing 
this issue, the district court correctly pointed out

 
 
There 
is no need for the claimant to swear to his own identity  that is the 
vocation of the notary public.  In a 
perfect world, however, the phrase would specify that the claimant has sworn to 
the truthfulness of the document or, at a minimum, that the claimant has been 
"duly sworn upon [h]is oath," as directed by the Notaries Public 
Handbook.

 
 
Notwithstanding 
this observation, the district court concluded that "[a]lthough not ideal, the 
notary certificate included in the Amended Lien Statement is acceptable.  The lien is 
valid."

 
 
[¶6]      Although we agree 
with the district court's observations, we do not agree with the conclusion that 
the lien statement is valid.  We 
find that for a lien statement to be valid, the plain language of the phrase 
"sworn to" in the lien statute requires that the lien affiant swear to the truth 
and accuracy of the lien statement.  
We have noted that a statutory "[i]nterpretation should not produce an 
absurd result."'  Hede v. Gilstrap, 2005 WY 24, ¶ 6, 107 P.3d 158, 163 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Rodriguez v. Casey, 2002 WY 111, ¶ 9, 
50 P.3d 323, 326 (Wyo. 2002)).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-105(b) (LexisNexis 
2009) provides that "[a] notary . . . establishes the identity of the person 
signing the document and attests that the signature on the document was made in 
his presence."  Given the fact that 
§ 32-1-105(b) requires that the notary public determine the identity of the 
affiant, it would make little sense to conclude that the affiant need only swear 
to his or her identity.  Moreover, 
swearing to one's identity does nothing to assure the factual accuracy of the 
lien statement.  Interpreting § 
29-1-301(a) in any way except to require that the accuracy and truth of the 
contents of the lien statement be "sworn to" would lead to an absurd result.5 

 
 
[¶7]      The Amended Lien 
Statement here fails to indicate that the affiant, Robert T. McCue, was swearing 
to the accuracy of the lien statement.  
Instead, the Amended Lien Statement, merely indicates that he "duly 
swor[e]" to his identity and/or to his authority as a representative of A. 
Pleasant Construction.  That 
statement is insufficient to create a valid lien statement under the plain 
language of § 29-1-301(a).  The 
district court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that the Amended Lien 
Statement was valid.6  

 
 

Issues 
in S-09-0059:

 
 
[¶8]      The three issues 
in this appeal directly relate to the Contract between the two parties as well 
as a separate Project Manual, which sets forth in greater detail the parties' 
agreement.  It is important to 
determine whether in addition to the Contract, any part of the Project Manual 
also governs the parties' relationship, because both parties argue that the 
other was the first to breach the agreement, and because Pleasant Construction 
argues that the district court's findings of breach and damages were flawed 
because of its erroneous incorporation of the Project Manual into the 
Contract.  

 
 

1.      
Whether 
the district court erred in finding the word "monthly," as used in the Contract, 
to be ambiguous?

 
 
[¶9]      Whether a term in 
a contract is ambiguous is a matter of contract interpretation.  

 
 
Our 
primary focus in construing or interpreting a contract 
is to determine the parties' intent, and our initial inquiry centers on whether 
the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous. If the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, then we secure the 
parties' intent from the words of the agreement as they are expressed within the 
four corners of the contract. Common sense and good faith are leading precepts of contract 
construction, and the interpretation and construction of contracts is a matter 
of law for the courts. 

 
 

Cent. 
Wyo. Med. Lab., LLC v. Med. Testing Lab, Inc., 
2002 WY 47, ¶ 16, 43 P.3d 121, 127 (Wyo. 2002) (internal citations omitted). 

 
 
[¶10]   The pertinent part of the Contract 
reads as follows:

 
 
That 
for in consideration of the payments and agreements hereinafter mentioned, the 
Contractor will commence and complete the scope of work to supply and erect the 
Winters Professional Building at 375 W. Flaming Gorge Way, Green River, Wyoming 
as outlined in the project manual, plans and specifications supplied by Plan 
One/Architects, dated 1/24/2005, for the sum of 
$3,333,188.36.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
A.    Pleasant Construction will 
continue to work with the Owner, Architect, Engineers and Sub-Contractors 
throughout the project on value-engineering solutions.  Any cost savings, as well as Contract 
changes will be addressed through a written Change Order Authorization as they 
occur. 

 
 
The 
Owner will pay the Contractor on a Monthly basis as Pay 
Applications are submitted for the percentage of work completed, with final 
payment due within 20 days of completion.  
On each application 10% retainage will be held.  This will be due and payable upon 
submitting the final application and proof of substantial completion.  

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
[¶11]   Pleasant Construction submitted a 
Pay Application to Winter on November 30, 2005, for work which had been done on 
the Winters Professional Building.  
However, that was never paid by the time Pleasant Construction terminated 
the Contract on January 17, 2006.  
The district court found that the Contract was ambiguous with respect to 
when Winter was required to make payments to Pleasant Construction for completed 
work because the word "monthly" was ambiguous in that it did not set forth a 
definite time for payment.  The 
district court noted that the term "monthly" was not defined within the 
Contract, and stated that the indefiniteness conveys a double meaning and 
therefore ambiguity arises as to when payments were due.  The consequence of this finding was that 
the district court then determined that Winter was not in breach of contract for 
failure to make timely payments to Pleasant Construction.

 
 
[¶12]   On appeal, Pleasant Construction 
argues that the district court's finding is factually and legally 
erroneous.  Specifically, Pleasant 
Construction argues that the term "monthly" cannot have any other meaning than 
once a month.  We find it 
unnecessary to determine whether the district court correctly found the term 
"monthly" to be ambiguous because we "may affirm its decision on any legal 
grounds appearing in the record."  
Yeager v. Forbes, 2003 WY 134, 
¶ 12, 78 P.3d 241, 246 (Wyo. 2003).  
As we will discuss further below, prior to Winter's non-payment, Pleasant 
Construction was in material breach of contract for changing the Contract 
without first obtaining written change order authorization, failing to comply 
with the plans and specifications, and for not building the Winters Professional 
Building in a workmanlike manner.  
We have stated that "the party first committing a substantial breach of 
contract cannot complain that the other party . . . fails to perform.'"  Baker v. Speaks, 2008 WY 20, ¶ 14, 177 P.3d 803, 807 (Wyo. 2008) (quoting Williams v. Collins Commc'ns, Inc., 720 P.2d 880, 891 (Wyo. 1986)).  
Accordingly, Winter was not in breach for failing to make further 
payments. 

 
 

2.      
Whether 
the district court erred in finding that the Project Manual was incorporated 
into the Contract?

 
 
[¶13]   The district court stated that 
"[t]he Parties' contract references and, consequently, incorporates the Project 
Manual, plans, and specifications dated January 24, 2005."  It further concluded 
that

 
 
[Pleasant 
Construction] breached the contract in four ways.  First, [it] failed to adhere to the 
specifications set forth in the contract plans and Project Manual.  Second, [it] failed to provide written 
change order documents to reflect cost-saving modifications to the 
contract.  Third, [it] failed to 
meet [its] duty to provide a building completed in a skillful, workmanlike 
manner.  Finally, [it] improperly 
terminated the contract in a manner that violated the requirements of the 
Project Manual.

 
 
Pleasant 
Construction asserts that the district court erred as a matter of law when it 
made these legal conclusions.  To 
support this claim, Pleasant Construction argues that the district court's 
finding that Pleasant Construction was in breach of contract was based on the 
district court improperly incorporating the entire Project Manual into the 
Contract, instead of only incorporating the "plans" and parts of the 
"Specifications" contained in the Project Manual that relate to "the scope of 
work to supply and erect . . ." the Winters Professional Building as called for 
by the plain language of the Contract.

 
 
[¶14]   We have repeatedly stated that 
"[w]e will affirm a district court's action on appeal if it is sustainable on 
any legal ground appearing in the record even if the legal ground or theory 
articulated by the district court is incorrect."  Hoy v. DRM, Inc., 2005 WY 76, ¶ 21, 
114 P.3d 1268, 1279 (Wyo. 2005).  
Accordingly, because none of the breaches are dependent on finding that 
the Project Manual, in whole, was incorporated into the Contract, we find it 
unnecessary to determine whether the district court did in fact find that the 
entire Project Manual was incorporated by reference into the Contract, and if it 
did, whether or not that was error.  
For instance, the first breach relies on a part of the Project Manual 
that Pleasant Construction admits was incorporated into the Contract, and the 
remaining three breaches exist as a result of the Contract itself, not as a 
result of any part of the Project Manual.  
We will address each breach in turn.

 
 
[¶15]   The first breach pertains to 
Pleasant Construction's failure to adhere to the specifications set forth in the 
Contract plans and Project Manual.  
Specifically, the district court cited three instances where construction 
defects violated specifications found in the Project Manual.  All three of the sections that the 
district court cited, which related to the corresponding defects, were found in 
"Division 5  Metals" of the Project Manual.  While countless pages of Pleasant 
Construction's briefs are devoted to arguing that the parties did not intend to 
incorporate the entire Project Manual into the Contract, Pleasant Construction 
admits that Division 5 was incorporated.  
After arguing that Division 1 of the Project Manual was not intended by 
the parties to be incorporated into the Contract, Pleasant Construction states 
that

 
 
The 
remaining portions of the "Specifications"  Divisions 2 to 16, all specify the 
types of materials and construction techniques that must be used during the 
construction of the Winters Professional Building.  These "Specifications" all directly 
relate to the "scope of work to supply and erect . . ." the Winters Professional 
Building and were incorporated into the Contract of Agreement.  

 
 
Therefore, 
Pleasant Construction's argument that the district court erred in incorporating 
the project manual into the Contract does not apply here, where Pleasant 
Construction has conceded that the sections of the project manual it allegedly 
breached were incorporated.

 
 
[¶16]   In addition to claiming that the 
district court erred as a matter of law in incorporating the Project Manual, 
Pleasant Construction argues that the district court's conclusions regarding its 
breaches were contrary to the evidence.  
Our task is to determine whether the record contains sufficient evidence 
to support the district court's factual findings relating to the breach of this 
portion of the Project Manual.  The 
pertinent portion of Division 5 of the Project Manual set forth the requirements 
for the location of embed plates and anchor bolts, as well as requiring that the 
building be constructed so as to be plumb.  
The defects noted by the district court included some embed plates being 
rotated and some that were missing altogether, so that they could not be 
properly welded; many anchor bolts did not sufficiently project or were also 
missing altogether; and the building was out of plumb.  The record supports the district court's 
findings concerning these breaches.  
For instance, Robert Lower (Lower), a structural engineer, testified that 
there were anchor bolts that "insufficient[ly] project[ed] from the top of the 
concrete to place a nut on top of the baseplate and thread it onto the anchor 
bolt."  He also testified that three 
embed plates were rotated so that "one side . . . had been welded adequately, on 
the other side there was not an opportunity to weld it, so we designed an 
additional plate that would be welded to our connection and bolted to the wall . 
. . ."  Lower further testified that 
in one section of the building an "embed plate was missed altogether."  Eric Green, a structural 
engineer/consultant, testified that there were "some improperly connected anchor 
rods, some welds that were improper, and some bolting connections that were 
improper."  He also testified that 
there was "improper alignment and plumbness of the framing."  Lower testified that "the columns along 
the west wall have out of plumbness; a couple of the columns over 2 inches out 
of plumb from the main floor to the second floor.  Most of the columns have a little bit of 
out of plumbness."  Because Pleasant 
Construction admits that this section of the Project Manual was incorporated 
into the Contract, and sufficient evidence in the record supports a finding that 
Pleasant Construction failed to comply with the requirements of the section, we 
cannot say that the district court erred in finding the 
same.

 
 
[¶17]   The second breach relates to 
Pleasant Construction's failure "to provide written change order documents to 
reflect cost-saving modifications to the contract."  As noted above, whether the district 
court properly interpreted the parties' Contract with respect to this breach, 
does not depend on whether or not the Project Manual was partially or fully 
incorporated into the parties' agreement, as this breach relates to the express 
terms of the Contract, itself.  

 
 
[¶18]   The Contract provides, in part, 
that, "Any cost savings, as well as Contract changes will be addressed through a 
written Change Order Authorization as they occur."  The original plans were created on 
January 24, 2005.  The plans were 
then amended numerous times and those amendments were eventually consolidated 
into a new set of plans on July 25, 2005, which plans did not contain features 
included in the original plans such as a waterfall and the curving staircase in 
the lobby of the building.  Winter 
testified that she received only the January 24, 2005 plans and never received 
the amended July 25, 2005 plans, containing the cost-saving changes.  Although Pleasant Construction testified 
that Winter received a copy of the changes, there is no evidence to support this 
assertion.  Charles Vanover, the 
architect for the Winters Professional Building, testified that although he was 
aware that changes had been made to the original plans in order to reduce the 
price of the building, including removing the waterfall and fireplace, he did 
not discuss those changes with Winter.  Accordingly, we cannot say that the 
district court committed an error in finding Pleasant Construction in breach of 
contract for failing to obtain written "Change Order Authorization" as required 
by the Contract. 

 
 
[¶19]   The district court also found that 
Pleasant Construction had "failed to meet [its] duty to provide a building 
completed in a skillful, workmanlike manner."  Again, this breach does not depend on 
the partial or full incorporation of the Project Manual because, as the district 
court pointed out, citing Alpine Climate 
Control, Inc. v. DJ's, Inc., 2003 WY 138, ¶ 12, 78 P.3d 685, 689 (Wyo. 
2003), "[e]ach building or construction contract includes either an express or 
an implied warranty ensuring the work will be sufficient for a certain purpose 
and will be performed in a skillful, careful, diligent, and workmanlike 
manner.'"

 
 
[¶20]   Pleasant Construction argues that 
the district court incorrectly found it in breach of this standard because 
Winter was the first to breach by failing to make payments and, but for Winter's 
breach, Pleasant Construction would have continued to complete the work and 
would have fixed the "minor construction errors."  However, as noted above, Winter's 
nonpayment did not constitute a breach of contract due to the ambiguity of the 
word "monthly."  See supra ¶ 11.  Thus, Pleasant Construction's argument 
fails because it terminated the contract without first fixing the construction 
defects.  As indicated above, there 
was sufficient evidence in the record supporting the district court's finding 
that Pleasant Construction's work resulted in numerous construction defects 
which were not in conformity with the parties' agreement, which left Pleasant 
Construction in breach of contract.  
See supra ¶ 15.  Furthermore, when asked whether Pleasant 
Construction thought it had ever "done worse work than [it] did on the Winter 
building," Andy Pleasant responded "[n]o."  Many of the experts testified 
similarly.  Lower testified that he 
had never seen a building that Pleasant Construction constructed so out of 
plumb, and that out of the eight hundred or so buildings Lower had worked with 
in his twenty years of experience, "probably half a dozen" were as out of plumb 
as the Winters Professional Building.  
Eric Green testified that in his ten years engaged in forensic structural 
engineering, he had only seen one other building as out of plumb as the Winters 
Professional Building.  Even Charles 
Vanover, the architect for the Winters Professional Building, testified that he 
agreed with Andy Pleasant's testimony that he had never seen Pleasant 
Construction do worse work than it had on the Winters Professional 
Building.  The district court did 
not err in finding that Pleasant Construction breached the Contract by failing 
to perform the work in a workmanlike manner.

 
 
[¶21]   Finally, the district court found 
Pleasant Construction in breach of contract for terminating the Contract in 
violation of a provision of the Project Manual.  Section 14.1.1 of the Project Manual 
provides

 
 
The 
Contractor [Pleasant Construction] may terminate the Contract if the Work is 
stopped for a period of 30 consecutive days through no act or fault of the 
Contractor or a Subcontractor, Sub-subcontractor or their agents or employees or 
any other persons or entities performing portions of the Work under direct or 
indirect contract with the Contractor, for any of the following 
reasons:

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
.4         
the Owner [Winter] has failed to furnish to the Contractor promptly, upon 
the Contractor's request, reasonable evidence as required by Section 2.2.1. 

 
 
Section 
2.2.1 of the Project Manual states

 
 
The 
Owner shall, at the written request of the Contractor, prior to commencement of 
the Work and thereafter, furnish to the Contractor reasonable evidence that 
financial arrangements have been made to fulfill the Owner's obligations under 
the Contract.  Furnishing of such 
evidence shall be a condition precedent to commencement or continuation of the 
Work.  After such evidence has been 
furnished, the Owner shall not materially vary such financial arrangements 
without prior notice to the Contractor.

 
 
[¶22]   Pleasant Construction sent a letter 
to Winter on January 4, 2006, stating that "A. Pleasant Construction is going to 
suspend performance until the two pending Pay Applications have been paid as 
provided in the contract and until you have assured A. Pleasant Construction 
that future Pay Applications will indeed be paid as they are submitted."  The parties then met on January 13, 
2006, to discuss Winter being able to provide financial assurance.  Gaye Winter testified that Pleasant 
Construction refused to review documentation evidencing Winter's ability to meet 
future financial obligations.  
Pleasant Construction then terminated the Contract in a letter dated 
January 17, 2006.  The time from 
Pleasant Construction's work stoppage on January 4, until it terminated the 
Contract on January 17, did not total 30 days, as required by Section 14.1.1.4 
of the Project Manual.  As a result, 
the district court found Pleasant Construction in breach of the 
contract.

 
 
[¶23]   Pleasant Construction argues that 
the district court erred when it made this determination, because the district 
court erroneously concluded that the Project Manual was incorporated into the 
Contract.  Again, it is unnecessary 
for us to determine whether this provision of the Project Manual was 
incorporated into the Contract or whether Pleasant Construction breached it, 
because even if these provisions were not incorporated into the Contract, 
Pleasant Construction's termination of the Contract breached the Contract 
itself.  Pleasant Construction had 
no legal justification for terminating the Contract in response to Winter's 
unwillingness to pay.  Prior to 
Winter's unwillingness to pay, Pleasant Construction had materially breached the 
Contract, as discussed above, due to the numerous construction defects and 
changing the plans without written change order documentation.  See supra ¶ 15-20.  Accordingly, the district court did not 
err when it found Pleasant Construction in breach of contract for terminating 
the Contract.  

 
 

3.      
Whether 
the district court's damages calculation is factually and legally 
flawed?

 
 
[¶24]   Pleasant Construction argues that 
the district court's damages calculation was clearly erroneous, due to finding 
Pleasant Construction in breach of contract and because the district court made 
certain deductions from the damages award which were not supported by the 
record.  A district court's 
determination as to the amount of damages to award is a question of fact.  Velasquez v. Chamberlain, 2009 WY 80, ¶ 
27, 209 P.3d 888, 895 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
This 
Court applies a clearly erroneous 
standard when reviewing findings of fact made by the district court after a 
bench trial.  A finding is clearly erroneous when, even though 
substantial evidence supports it, the reviewing court is left with the definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake was made.

 
 
We 
do not substitute ourselves for the trial court as a finder of facts; instead, 
we defer to the trial court's findings unless they are unsupported by the record 
or erroneous as a matter of law.  
Although the factual findings of 
a trial court are not entitled to the limited review afforded a jury verdict, 
the findings are presumptively correct.

 
 

This 
Court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record, but we 
do not reweigh the evidence.  Due 
regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the credibility 
of the witnesses.  We accept the 
prevailing party's evidence as true and give to that evidence every favorable 
inference which may fairly and reasonably be drawn from it.  Findings may not be set aside because we 
would have reached a different result.

 
 

Id. 
at ¶ 14, at 891 (internal citations omitted). 

 
 
[¶25]   "In general, the legal remedy for a 
breach of contract is the award of damages designed to place the plaintiff in 
the same position in which he would have been had the contract been fully 
performed, less proper deductions."  
Dewey v. Wentland, 2002 WY 2, 
¶ 52, 38 P.3d 402, 420-21 (Wyo. 2002).  
In awarding damages to Pleasant Construction, the district court stated 
"[Pleasant Construction] is entitled to the value of labor and materials 
expended in [Winter]'s project if those values are demonstrated with prima facie 
evidence.  However, because of [its] 
breach of contract, [Pleasant Construction] must reimburse [Winter] for 
defective construction and overcharges as supported by the evidence."  This case is different than the typical 
damages case for a breach of contract, in that the breaching party, Pleasant 
Construction, was awarded damages, instead of the non-breaching party, 
Winter.  However, because "[t]he law 
will not put a victim in a better position than he would have been in had the 
wrong not been done," Alcaraz v. 
State, 2002 WY 57, ¶ 16, 44 P.3d 68, 73 (Wyo. 2002), Winter was required to 
pay for the labor and materials expended by Pleasant Construction, which 
resulted in a net damages award for Pleasant Construction.7

 
 
[¶26]   The following is this Court's best 
effort to illustrate the district court's damages calculation, which is a 
difficult task due to the numerous calculations involved.  The district court awarded Pleasant 
Construction a gross damages award in the amount of $252,121.34 for time and 
labor expended on the project which had yet to be paid by Winter.  To arrive at this gross damages award, 
the district court began by taking $875,695.26, the total amount billed to 
Winter, and subtracting from that amount $651,307.07, the total amount paid by 
Winter, but then adding back in an additional $18,686.45 that had not been paid 
by Winter, and subtracting a stipulated deduction in the amount of $62,477.00, 
for a gross damages award of $252,121.34.  
Interestingly enough, there appears to be a mathematical error in this 
portion of the district court's calculation which was not pointed out by either 
party.  This Court's calculation of 
gross damages equals $180,597.64 ($875,695.26 less $651,307.07 plus $18,686.45 
less $62,477.00), however, the district court calculated the gross damages award 
as $252,121.34.  The difference 
between the district court's subtotal and this Court's subtotal is 
$71,523.70.  It is unclear from the 
record whether there was a legitimate $71,523.70 deduction which the district 
court inadvertently left out of its damages calculation, or whether this was a 
mathematical miscalculation.  In any 
case, while this omission/error could have a significant impact on the total 
judgment amount, it does not affect our analysis with regard to the 
appropriateness of the deductions and calculations.  This Court will not further address the 
matter, but instead, will remand to the district court to allow it to address 
the apparent inconsistency.

 
 
[¶27]   From the gross damages award of 
$252,121.34, the district court made several deductions due to the fact that 
Pleasant Construction was in breach of contract, most of which are contested by 
Pleasant Construction and are consequently the focus of the remaining portion of 
this opinion.  These deductions 
were:  $20,000 to correct 
overbilling for removal of cement foundation; $90,000 to correct the 
"out-of-plumbness" of the building; $30,266.24, representing the amount Winter 
paid another contractor to fix Pleasant Construction's mistakes; $16,461.45, 
representing the amount of structural steel to complete the construction of the 
stairs.8  Once these deductions were applied to 
the gross damages award of $252,121.34, Pleasant Construction was left with a 
final damages award of $95,393.65.

 
 
[¶28]   We find that the district court's 
damages calculation were not clearly erroneous as all four of the challenged 
deductions were supported by testimony and evidence in the record.  With regard to the $20,000 deduction to 
correct an overbilling error, Pleasant Construction does not contest this 
deduction in its brief, so we will not address it.  As to the $90,000 "out-of-plumbness" 
deduction, the district court noted that "[Pleasant Construction] admitted that 
[its] work was, at least partially, to blame for moving the Winters Professional 
Building out of plumb."  
Furthermore, there was expert testimony by Dinesh Sheth (Sheth) 
supporting the $90,000 figure to fix the problem, which the district court found 
to be reasonable.  Pleasant 
Construction argues that the district court's reliance on Sheth's testimony 
relating to the "out-of-plumbness" damages was clearly erroneous because the 
district court found Sheth's testimony relating to other damages to be 
speculative and not credible.  The 
district court conceded that it was critical of Sheth's testimony, but found 
"that his calculations and proposed methods to correct the plumbness of the 
building are reasonable."  Sheth 
explained how he came to his estimation on the cost of fixing this problem by 
providing an estimation of the cost of equipment and labor which would be 
necessary.  Furthermore, Sheth was 
not the only expert to testify to the severity of the "out-of-plumbness" of the 
building.  Engineers Robert Lower 
and Eric Green also testified.  
Although neither estimated a specific dollar amount for fixing the 
plumbness of the building, both did indicate that the fix would be expensive 
because it was a wide-spread problem.  
We find that there was sufficient evidence presented to the district 
court to support the substantial cost of correcting the "out-of-plumbness," so 
we cannot say that the $90,000 deduction was clearly erroneous. 

 
 
[¶29]   There was also sufficient evidence 
presented to support the $30,266.24 deduction for the cost of paying a different 
contractor to fix the mistakes made by Pleasant Construction.  Following Pleasant Construction's 
termination of the Contract, Winter hired Davis Contractors to continue the work 
on the Winters Professional Building.  
According to Don Davis's testimony, approximately forty to forty-five 
percent of his company's time spent working on the Winters Professional Building 
was rework to correct the defects left by Pleasant Construction.9  Pleasant Construction argues that 
Davis's estimation that forty to forty-five percent of his work was "rework" was 
speculative and not supported by anything showing how he arrived at that 
calculation.  However, the district 
court found his estimate of forty percent credible.  "Due regard is given to the opportunity 
of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses . . . ."  Lieberman v. Mossbrook, 2009 WY 65, ¶ 
40, 208 P.3d 1296, 1308 (Wyo. 2009) (quoting Cook v. Eddy, 2008 WY 111, ¶ 6, 193 P.3d 705, 708 (Wyo. 2008)).  Having 
reviewed the record, we are not "left with the definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been committed."  Id.  The district court correctly deducted 
$30,266.24 from the damages award to Pleasant Construction. 

 
 
[¶30]   Finally, there was sufficient 
evidence to support the $16,461.45 deduction for additional steel.  In making this deduction, the district 
court stated, "[Winter] is entitled to damages for [Pleasant Construction]'s 
failure to properly budget for Structural Steel' to include the cost of the 
five sets of stairs that would be necessary for completion of the Winters 
Professional Building."  The total 
allocated amount for structural steel was $285,385.50, and out of that amount, 
the estimated amount for completed work was $256,846.95, which left $28,538.55 
to complete the remaining stairs.  
Expert testimony by Sheth indicated that it would actually cost 
approximately $45,000 to complete the remaining stairs, instead of 
$28,538.55.  Accepting this 
testimony, the district court took the difference between $45,000 and 
$28,538.55, equaling $16,461.45.  
The district court then deducted $16,461.45 from Pleasant Construction's 
damages award.  Pleasant 
Construction does not contest this amount or the calculation by Sheth as 
inaccurate; Pleasant Construction's only argument relating to the structural 
steel damages is that Winter was the first to breach so no deduction should have 
been made.  However, having already 
determined that Pleasant Construction was the party in breach, and also having 
found expert testimony supporting the amount of damages with respect to 
structural steel, we cannot say that the district court was clearly erroneous in 
these findings and calculations.  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶31]   We hold that the district court 
erred as a matter of law when it found that the Amended Lien Statement was 
valid.  Accordingly, we reverse that 
portion of the district court's decision.  
However, the invalidity of the Amended Lien Statement does not affect the 
damages portion of this opinion.  We 
conclude that the district court did not err by finding that Winter had not 
breached the contract, by finding Pleasant Construction in breach of contract, 
or in calculating damages, with the exception of the potential mathematical 
error.  We will, therefore, uphold 
those portions of the district court's decision.  We do, however, find it necessary to 
remand this case to the district court in order for it to address the apparent 
error in the damages calculation.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Pleasant 
Construction filed an original Notice of Intent to file a lien statement 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 29-2-107 (LexisNexis 2009), which statute requires 
notice be given to an owner prior to filing "any claim against a building or an 
improvement for materials furnished stating the amount of any claim and from 
whom it is due."  However, due to 
errors in the legal description of the property, as well as calculation errors 
in the original Notice of Intent, Pleasant Construction filed an amendment to 
that notice to correct the errors.  
The corrections led to the "Amended Lien Statement."  Thus, any reference to a lien statement 
filed by Pleasant Construction will refer to the Amended Lien 
Statement.

 
 

2Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 29-1-301 provides the procedure for perfecting a mechanic's 
lien.  

 
 

3The 
district court upheld the validity of the Amended Lien Statement in an Order in 
response to Winter filing a Motion to Dismiss, in which Winter sought to dismiss 
the portions of Pleasant Construction's case pertaining to the Amended Lien 
Statement, arguing that it was invalid.  
The district court's legal conclusion that the Amended Lien Statement was 
valid was then referenced throughout the district court's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order.  In 
S-09-0058, Winter appeals the portions of the district court's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order which relate to its earlier legal conclusion that 
the Amended Lien Statement is valid.  

 
 

4The 
notary block also contained the Notary Public's signature, commission expiration 
date and official seal.  The 
validity of the Amended Lien Statement is not affected by Robert T. McCue 
signing on behalf of, and as attorney for, A. Pleasant Construction, as we have 
held that an attorney may create and sign a lien statement on behalf of a 
client.  Stricker v. Frauendienst, 669 P.2d 520, 
521 (Wyo. 1983).

 
 

5We 
acknowledge Pleasant Construction's argument that the predecessor statute to § 
29-1-301(a), Wyo. Stat. § 29-11 (1957) (the legislature renumbered and 
recodified the statutes in 1977, which resulted in the numerical change from § 
29-11 to § 29-1-301), was amended in 1981, at which time the legislature changed 
the statute from requiring that a lien statement ". . . in all cases shall be 
verified by the oath of the person filing the lien . . ." to its current form 
requiring that a lien statement be "sworn to."  However, this change does not affect our 
interpretation of the current version of § 29-1-301(a).

 
 

6Winter 
additionally argues that if we find the Amended Lien Statement to be invalid, 
this would in some way invalidate any subsequent damages award to Pleasant 
Construction.  In other words, 
Winter argues that a valid damages award is dependent on a valid lien.  We reject this argument because it is 
the existence of a debt, or in this case, a damages award, that allows for the 
existence of a lien, not the other way around.  51 Am. Jur. 2d Liens §13 (2009).  "Because a lien is a right to encumber 
property until a debt is paid, it presupposes the existence of a debt.  If there is no debt in the first 
instance, there is no need for a lien, so a lien cannot legally exist or 
attach.  In other words, without a 
debt, there can be no lien.  
Although a lien is an incident of, and inseparable from, the debt it 
secures, it is distinct from that debt; liens relate to assets or collateral, 
while the indebtedness underlying a lien appertains to a person or legal entity 
(the debtor)."  Id.

 
 

7If 
Winter were not required to pay for the labor and materials provided by Pleasant 
Construction, Winter would stand to profit from Pleasant Construction's breach, 
which would be contrary to the goal in awarding damages for breach of 
contract.  WSP, Inc. v. Wyo. Steel Fabricators & 
Erectors, Inc., 2007 WY 80, ¶ 19, 158 P.3d 651, 655 (Wyo. 2007) ("[d]amages 
should compensate for an individual's loss and no more."). 

 
 

8The 
deduction for the stairs was derived as follows:  The total allocated amount of structural 
steel was $285,385.50, and out of that amount, the estimated amount complete was 
$256,846.95, which left $28,538.55 to complete the remaining stairs.  Expert testimony indicated that it would 
actually cost approximately $45,000 to complete the remaining stairs, instead of 
$28,538.55, so the district court took the difference between $45,000 and 
$28,538.55, which is $16,461.45, and deducted that from the damages award to 
Pleasant Construction.

 
 

9The 
total amount billed to Winter by Davis Contractors was 
$75,665.60.