Case Title: Tillman v. Baskin

Citation: 260 So. 2d 509

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1972-03-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
260 So. 2d 509 (1972)
Easter Mae TILLMAN, Petitioner,
v.
Bobbie Jean BASKIN and Elizabeth Benton, Respondents.
No. 40765.

Supreme Court of Florida.
March 22, 1972.
*510 Russell Troutman, Sidney H. Parrish and Gary W. Udouj of Law Offices of Russell Troutman, Winter Park, for petitioner.
Rodney G. Ross of Pitts, Eubanks, Ross & Rumberger, Orlando, for respondents.
ERVIN, Justice.
We have for review on petition for writ of certiorari the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Tillman v. Baskin, Fla.App. 1971, 242 So. 2d 748.
At the close of the plaintiff's case in this nonjury, gross negligence action, the trial judge granted the defendants' motion for directed verdict and entered a final judgment in their favor. On appeal, the Fourth District Court affirmed. The District Court held the motion was properly granted, even though the evidence would not have supported such a motion in a jury trial. In this connection the District Court said:
which indicates plaintiff's evidence made out a prima facie case.
The District Court distinguished jury and nonjury trials, saying,
We have jurisdiction under Article V, Section 4(2), Florida Constitution, because of the apparent conflict between this holding and the decisions of this Court and the Third District Court of Appeal in Hartnett v. Fowler, Fla. 1957, 94 So. 2d 724, and Wayjay Bakery, Inc. v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., Fla.App. 1965, 177 So. 2d 544.
Rule 1.420(b) F.R.C.P., 30 F.S.A., the involuntary dismissal rule, provides in part:
The District Court properly concluded that in a nonjury trial a Rule 1.420 (b) F.R.C.P. motion for involuntary dismissal is the proper method by which a defendant may obtain a verdict in his favor *511 following the presentation of the plaintiff's case. Rule 1.480 F.R.C.P., motions for directed verdicts, accomplish the same goal in jury trials.
The issue before this Court is whether the lower appellate court also properly concluded that under the involuntary dismissal rule the trial judge in a nonjury case may weigh the evidence and rule in the defendant's favor before the defendant presents his evidence even though the plaintiff has established a prima facie case.
An affirmative answer to this question would create an important difference between involuntary dismissals and their jury-trial counterparts, directed verdicts. It is clear that a judge in ruling on a latter motion may not weigh the evidence.
The question posed by this case has been considered by courts in other jurisdictions with rules of civil procedure similar to ours. Since it was amended in 1946, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), which is virtually identical to Florida's Rule 1.420 (b), has been interpreted by federal courts as permitting a trial judge to "weigh the evidence, consider the law, and find for the defendant at the close of the plaintiff's case." 5 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 1158 (2d ed. 1971). In the past, several of this state's district courts of appeal have followed this holding. Gibson v. Gibson, Fla.App. 1965, 180 So. 2d 388; Tampa Wholesale Co. v. Foodtown, U.S.A., Inc., Fla.App. 1964, 166 So. 2d 711. This was the rule relied upon by the District Court in this case. Tillman v. Baskin, supra. Only the Third District Court of Appeal has indicated it does not intend to follow the federal answer to this question. Wayjay Bakery, Inc. v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., supra.
Federal courts apparently feel justified in permitting their trial judges to weigh evidence following the presentation of a plaintiff's prima facie case, because such a holding enables judges "to expedite the trial of cases," and "dispose of cases at the earliest opportunity." Bach v. Friden Calculating Mach. Co., 6th Cir.1945, 148 F.2d 407, 410. Their interpretation of the rule regarding involuntary dismissals, however, has not been universally accepted. Professor Roscoe Steffen of the University of Chicago Law School has called it "a misbegotten offspring of an unseemly desire for speed and hurry [which] has no place in our system of justice." 27 U. Chicago L.Rev. 94, 125 (1959). The Supreme Court of Alaska also has rejected the federal interpretation, stating:
We agree. There is nothing in Rule 1.420(b) making mandatory a weighing of the facts before the end of all the testimony. Fairness and justice demand that this not be done where the plaintiff has presented a prima facie case in his favor. We prefer the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court of Alaska to that followed by the federal courts. It is inconceivable that a trial judge can fairly find for a *512 defendant after hearing nothing more than testimony from a plaintiff establishing a prima facie case in that plaintiff's favor. When a prima facie case is made by plaintiff, fairness would appear to require that the trial judge weigh it in the light of the strength or weakness of the defendant's defense evidence, if any, as in the case of a jury trial. We hold that a trial judge cannot weigh evidence when ruling on a defendant's Rule 1.420(b) F.R.C.P. motion for involuntary dismissal following the presentation of a prima facie case by a plaintiff.
The decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, is quashed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for new trial.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, ADKINS and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
ROBERTS, C.J., concurs in judgment only.
BOYD, J., and RAWLS, District Court Judge, dissent.