Case Title: State v. Traci E. Stanton

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-7-01

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2003-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). In February 1997, Traci Stanton invited her boyfriend, her brother, and her sister-in-law, Nancy Smith, to her house to play cards and drink beer. Stanton admitted drinking approximately one and one-half bottles of beer, although her brother recalled that she drank between three and five beers. At approximately 11:30 p.m., Stanton drove her Porsche to purchase more beer while Smith rode in the front passenger seat. After purchasing the beer, Stanton and Smith dropped off the beer at Stanton s house and proceeded to Smith s home to pick up her dog. On the way, Stanton was unable to steer her car around a turn with the result that her vehicle left the road and struck a tree. Police arrived on the scene shortly before 1:00 a.m. and found the vehicle on its roof. While treating Stanton, an emergency medical technician discovered a beer bottle within four inches of her head. Smith was found underneath the trunk of the car and died as a result of the extensive injuries she suffered during the accident. The morning following the accident, Stanton admitted to police that she had been driving between sixty and sixty-five miles per hour and that neither she nor Smith had been wearing a seatbelt. The posted speed limit was fifty miles per hour, but the recommended speed at the site of the accident was only thirty-five miles per hour. Stanton also admitted that she and Smith had been drinking beer in the car. A grand jury indicted Stanton for second-degree vehicular homicide based on Stanton s reckless operation of a motor vehicle. In addition, police issued Stanton summonses for several motor vehicle offenses, including driving while intoxicated (DWI), reckless driving, consumption of alcohol while driving, and failure to wear a seatbelt. The vehicular homicide was tried to a jury while the non-indictable offenses were tried simultaneously before the judge. The State relied on intoxication and other evidence such as speed to establish that Stanton recklessly operated her motor vehicle. The jury found Stanton guilty of second-degree vehicular homicide, but was not asked to state the basis for its finding of recklessness. The trial judge found Stanton guilty of all of the motor vehicle violations. The judge sentenced Stanton as if the second-degree offense were a third-degree crime and imposed the three-year parole ineligibility term required by N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5b(1). That provision mandates a minimum term for defendants convicted of vehicular homicide who were intoxicated at the time of the offense and such minimum term shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court or three years, whichever is greater, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole. Stanton appealed her vehicular homicide conviction, claiming trial error and also that N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5b(1) was unconstitutional because it permits a judge to find an element of vehicular homicide intoxication by a preponderance of the evidence rather than by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Appellate Division affirmed in part and reversed in part. State v. Stanton, 339 N.J. Super. 1 (2001). It applied the constitutional doubt doctrine and held that the three-year mandatory minimum sentence was unconstitutionally imposed because the issue of Stanton s intoxication had not been decided by the jury. The Appellate Division interpreted this Court s opinion in State v. Johnson, 166 N.J. 523 (2001), to mean that if the imposition of the mandatory minimum term depends on the existence of a fact other than a prior conviction, that fact must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and remanded to the trial court with the direction that the parole ineligibility term be vacated. Stanton s petition for certification was denied. The State s cross-petition challenging the Appellate Division s vacation of the three-year parole disqualifier was granted. The Court heard argument on January 2, 2002, and decided to withhold disposition until the United States Supreme Court decided Harris v. United States, for which certiorari had been granted on December 10, 2001. Harris was decided on June 24, 2002. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002). Supplemental briefs were filed and the case was reargued. HELD: The Appellate Division erred in vacating the three-year term of parole ineligibility because there is no right to trial by jury on a DWI offense or on the issue of intoxication for sentence enhancement purposes, there is substantial credible evidence in the record to support the judge s finding of intoxication, and there is no constitutional doubt following Harris. 1. Criminal homicide constitutes vehicular homicide when it is caused by driving a vehicle or vessel recklessly. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5a. The recklessness element may be satisfied by proof of intoxication alone or in combination with other evidence. Subsection b of the statute mandates a minimum period of incarceration for a defendant convicted of vehicular homicide if a judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5b(1) and (2). (pp. 8-12) 2. This is a typical case in which a defendant charged with vehicular homicide also is charged with DWI and other Title 39 offenses. To avoid double jeopardy problems, the vehicular homicide and the traffic offenses must be consolidated for disposition. The jury decides the indictable offenses, while the Title 39 offenses, including the DWI charge, are decided by the judge presiding over the jury trial. When a defendant is on trial for both vehicular homicide and DWI and the State relies on intoxication and other circumstantial evidence to establish recklessness, unless a special interrogatory is submitted to the jury, there is no way of knowing the basis for the jury s finding of recklessness. Consistent with long-established policy, the jury in this case decided the vehicular homicide charge and the judge, applying the required beyond a reasonable doubt standard, decided the Title 39 offenses, including the DWI. Because there is no right to a trial by jury on DWI and other Title 39 charges, the judge decided the Title 39 offenses after the jury convicted Stanton of vehicular homicide. After finding Stanton guilty of DWI, the judge used that finding of intoxication to impose the mandatory three-year term on the vehicular homicide conviction. (pp. 12-14) 3. An accused is constitutionally entitled to have a jury find each element of an indictable offense beyond a reasonable doubt. But there is no right to a trial by jury of DWI or other Title 39 offenses because they are not deemed to be serious enough. The question then is whether intoxication is truly a sentence enhancer or an element of vehicular homicide. The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue whether certain conduct is a sentence enhancement factor or an element of the offense. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), the Court held that the Constitution did not require Pennsylvania to treat a sentencing enhancement factor (visible possession of a firearm) as an element of an offense. However, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the Court held that our hate-crime statute is unconstitutional because the motive required for enhancing the penalty was essentially an element. The Court explained that other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This decision created a quagmire of unanswered questions in respect of whether trial judges are permitted to determine sentence enhancement factors. Indeed, this Court in State v. Johnson, 166 N.J. 523 (2001), found that Apprendi had created constitutional doubt regarding our No Early Release Act (NERA), which provides for mandatory minimum sentences for convictions constituting violent crimes as defined by the statute. In an apparent attempt to stem the confusion in the aftermath of Apprendi, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Harris. In deciding Harris, the Court explained that factors that extend a sentence beyond the authorized maximum are elements of the crime that must be decided by a jury. Facts that require minimum terms within the range authorized by statute, however, can be found by a judge. (pp. 15-27) 4. Under the Criminal Code, the second-degree offense of vehicular homicide has three elements: (1) that the defendant operated a motor vehicle or vessel; (2) that the defendant s operation caused the death of another; and (3) that the death was caused by defendant s reckless operation. Proof of intoxication is not a fact required for the proof of vehicular homicide. Intoxication was used in this case as a mere circumstance to be considered in determining whether Stanton had acted recklessly. The fact that intoxication affects Stanton s sentence does not by itself make it an element of the offense. Intoxication does not increase the penalty for vehicular homicide beyond the statutory maximum prescribed for that offense. (pp. 27-28) 5. The dissent mistakenly concludes that DWI is a lesser-included offense of vehicular homicide to justify the conclusion that Stanton is entitled to a jury trial on DWI and reckless driving. DWI and other Title 39 offenses are consolidated for trial with indictable offenses not because they are lesser-included criminal offenses of the crimes charged in an indictment, but because our jurisprudence requires consolidation of even Title 39 offenses to avoid double jeopardy problems. The dissent s conclusion that there should be a jury trial on the Title 39 offenses has no foundation in our Constitution, the jurisprudence of this Court, or legislative enactments. Hence, the dissent s conclusion represents a drastic and unwarranted departure from the existing law. Such a change should properly be by legislative, rather than judicial judgment. (pp. 28-36) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the judgment of the Law Division is reinstated. JUSTICE LONG has filed a separate, dissenting opinion, in which she concludes that intoxication is an element of the enhanced, second-degree offense of vehicular homicide. JUSTICE ZAZZALI has filed a separate, dissenting opinion, expressing the view that when the finding of any fact triggers imposition of a minimum period of imprisonment, a jury must find that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. JUSTICE ALBIN has filed a separate, dissenting opinion, expressing the view that the majority opinion strikes a blow to the constitutional right of trial by jury by diminishing the role and importance of the jury and ceding from the jury to the judge the relevant fact-finding power that determines the real-time length of a defendant s sentence. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, and VERNIERO join in JUSTICE COLEMAN s opinion. JUSTICE LONG filed a separate dissenting opinion in whch JUSTICES ZAZZALI and ALBIN join. JUSTICE ZAZZALI filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICES LONG and ALBIN join. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICES LONG and ZAZZALI join. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 7 September Term 2001 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRACI E. STANTON, a/k/a TRACI FRY and TRACI PFAFF, Defendant-Respondent. Argued January 3, 2002 Reargued November 18, 2002 Decided April 17, 2003 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 339 N.J. Super. 1 (2001). Mark Paul Cronin Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Peter C. Harvey, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Jordana Jakubovic, Deputy Attorney General and Carol M. Henderson, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel and on the briefs). Linda Mehling, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by COLEMAN, J. This appeal involves a conviction for second-degree vehicular homicide, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5b, based on defendant s reckless operation of her motor vehicle. The State relied on intoxication and other evidence such as speed to establish that defendant recklessly operated her motor vehicle. The jury was not asked to state the basis for its finding of recklessness. The sentencing provision for vehicular homicide mandates a minimum term of imprisonment for defendants who were intoxicated at the time of the offense and such minimum term shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court or three years, whichever is greater, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5b(1). The trial court found that defendant should be sentenced as if the offense were third-degree, found that defendant was intoxicated, and sentenced defendant to imprisonment for three years subject to parole ineligibility of three years. The issue before us is whether the jury should have been required to determine the sentence enhancement factor the intoxication. We hold that the jury was not required to make that determination. [Ibid.] In other words, [t]he Johnson holding, as we understand it, applies to every statute imposing a mandatory parole ineligibility term because of the capacity of that term to increase real time. Ibid. Rather than declare N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5b(2) unconstitutional, the Appellate Division elected to engage in judicial surgery to sustain the statute on an assumption that the Legislature intended to act in a constitutional manner, . . . [stating:] That can only be done by excising . . . the references to the preponderance standard and the court s findings and then construing the excised statute as Johnson construed NERA. Id. at 7-8. According to the procedure articulated in State v. DeLuca, 108 N.J. 98, 111, cert. denied, New Jersey v. DeLuca, 484 U.S. 944, 108 S. Ct. 331, 98 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1987), the trial judge was required to decide the DWI offense after the jury returned a verdict on vehicular homicide. Ibid. Although the DWI offense was not tried to a jury, each element of that offense, including intoxication, still had to be found beyond a reasonable doubt. Ibid. The Appellate Division found that although both N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5b and N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 define intoxication identically, the principles set forth in Johnson still required a jury finding of intoxication beyond a reasonable doubt. Stanton, supra, 339 N.J. Super. at 8-9. The panel reasoned that even though the judge found intoxication beyond a reasonable doubt [that] does not mean that the jury either did[,] or would have[,] [because] it was free to attribute the fatal accident to speeding alone and there was evidence on which it could have found that defendant was not intoxicated. Ibid. As a remedy, the Appellate Division vacated the three-year parole disqualifier but affirmed defendant s conviction, stating that it was satisfied that there was no reversible error attending the jury verdict of guilt of vehicular homicide. Id. at 9. The panel remanded to the trial court with the direction that the judgment of conviction should be modified by vacating the parole ineligibility term. Ibid. Defendant s petition for certification was denied. State v. Stanton, 169 N.J. 609 (2001). The State s cross-petition for certification challenging the Appellate Division s vacation of the three-year parole disqualifier was granted. Ibid. While this appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Harris v. United States on December 10, 2001. 534 U.S. 1064, 122 S. Ct. 663, 151 L. Ed. 2d 578 (2001). We heard oral arguments on January 2, 2002, and decided to withhold disposition until Harris was decided. Harris was decided on June 24, 2002. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 122 S. Ct. 2406, 153 L. Ed. 2d 524 (2002). After supplemental briefs were filed with this Court, the case was reargued before us on November 18, 2002. (1) If the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or with a blood alcohol concentration at or above the prohibited level as prescribed in R.S.39:4-50, or if the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while his driver s license or reciprocity privilege was suspended or revoked for any violation of R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of P.L.1981, c. 512 (C.39:4-50.4a), by the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles pursuant to P.L.1982, c. 85 (C.39:5-30a et seq.), or by the court for a violation of R.S.39:4-96, the defendant shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court. The term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term. The minimum term shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court or three years, whichever is greater, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole. (2) The court shall not impose a mandatory sentence pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection unless the grounds therefor have been established at a hearing. At the hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, the prosecutor shall establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or with a blood alcohol concentration at or above the level prescribed in R.S.39:4-50 or that the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while his driver s license or reciprocity privilege was suspended or revoked for any violation of R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of P.L.1981, c. 512 (C.39:4-50.4a), by the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles pursuant to P.L.1982, c. 85 (C.39:5-30a et seq.), or by the court for a violation of R.S.39:4-96. In making its findings, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant information. [N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5a, -5b(1) and (2).] Subsection a describes what constitutes the offense of vehicular homicide. The [p]rescribed culpability requirement applies to all material elements of the offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2c(1). Intoxication in combination with other evidence or standing alone may satisfy the recklessness element. State v. Jamerson, 153 N.J. 318, 335 (1998); State v. LaBrutto, 114 N.J. 187, 204 (1989); State v. Casele, 198 N.J. Super. 462, 472 (App. Div. 1985). In other words, a defendant s sobriety or insobriety is only one of several circumstances a jury is permitted to consider when deciding whether the element of recklessness, as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(3), has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. LaBrutto, supra, 114 N.J. at 204; see State v. Dively, 92 N.J. 573, 583 n.7 (1983). Some of the other circumstances, other than intoxication, that are considered in relation to recklessness regardless of whether or not the operator was intoxicated are excessive speed, weather and lighting conditions, and known substantial safety defects in the motor vehicle or vessel. See, e.g., DeLuca, supra, 108 N.J. at 109. Subsection b of the statute focuses on the sentencing provisions for a second-degree vehicular homicide. That subsection mandates a minimum period of incarceration for a defendant convicted of vehicular homicide if that defendant is found by a judge, after conducting a hearing prescribed by N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5b(2), to have been intoxicated at the time of the offense. In order to better understand the critical issue raised, with respect to the sentence enhancement, we must give context to the procedural framework in which the issue is presented. (b) Establishes the required kind of culpability; (c) Negatives an excuse or justification for such conduct; (d) Negatives a defense under the statute of limitations; or (e) Establishes jurisdiction or venue. [Ibid.] The focus in this appeal respecting the vehicular homicide will be on N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(h)(1), (2), (3)(a) and (b). Because the issue of whether a sentence enhancement factor should be decided by the jury is intertwined with whether such a factor is an element of the offense tried before the jury, an initial review of recent United States Supreme Court decisions in this area will be informative. [Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 2419-20, 153 L. Ed 2d at ___.] Now that constitutional doubt has been removed from the analysis, which was part of defendant s Due Process Clause claim, we must now decide whether intoxication was an element of vehicular homicide. Enhanced second-degree vehicular 1. Causing Death Homicide 2. Driving a vehicle (5-10 year term with a recklessly mandatory three-year parole 3. While intoxicated or while disqualifier) license revoked Second-degree vehicular homicide 1. Causing Death (5-10 year term) 2. Driving a vehicle recklessly As is evident from that diagram, the statute describes three discrete offenses on an escalating scale of seriousness. The level of seriousness is directly related to the accelerating egregiousness of the defendant s conduct. That conduct, in turn, is expressed by the number of elements in each offense. The ordinary second-degree offense has two elements causing death and driving recklessly; the enhanced second-degree offense with mandatory parole ineligibility adds a third intoxication; and the first-degree offense adds a fourth school premises. The substance of the scheme could not be clearer, yet the Court allows the Legislature to wink and call intoxication in the enhanced second-degree offense a sentencing factor, thus removing it from the jury s ambit. At the very least, and as a matter of ordinary statutory interpretation, when a term is used more than once in a statute, it should have the same meaning and status in both places. Because it is conceded that intoxication is an element of the first-degree offense, how can it not be an element of the enhanced second-degree offense? The result is that a defendant charged with first-degree vehicular homicide, is entitled to a jury determination on intoxication whereas a defendant charged with enhanced second-degree vehicular homicide is not. There is no logical justification for such a scheme. One final note, the majority s suggestion that I have impermissibly created a criminal offense in my structural dissection of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5 is wide of the mark. Every act of statutory interpretation, the point of which is eschewing formalism in favor of substance, is exactly such a creation. That is what we are here for to strip away artifice and lay bare the statutory scheme for what it is. For the reasons I have expressed, I therefore dissent, joining my colleagues Zazzali and Albin. JUSTICES ZAZZALI and ALBIN join in this dissent. STATE OF NEW JERSEY Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRACI E. STANTON, a/k/a TRACI FRY and TRACI PFAFF, Defendant-Respondent. ZAZZALI, J., dissenting. The State may not subject a citizen to criminal punishment unless it affords that citizen a trial by jury in which guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Because I believe that the majority has denied that right in this appeal, I respectfully dissent. Today, one year after the Appellate Division vacated defendant's parole disqualifier, the Court orders her back to prison to serve a twenty-six month term of incarceration. That term represents the balance of the three-year mandatory minimum sentence imposed as a result of the trial court's determination that defendant was intoxicated when she committed vehicular homicide. Because a jury did not make that finding beyond a reasonable doubt, I believe that defendant's imminent re-incarceration violates the jury trial protections of our State Constitution. Consistent with the sentiments expressed by this Court in State v. Johnson, 166 N.J. 523 (2001), as well as the broader protections we traditionally have afforded defendants under article 1, paragraphs 9 and 10 of the New Jersey Constitution, I would hold that when the finding of any fact triggers imposition of a minimum period of imprisonment a jury must find that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I would hold unconstitutional on its face N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5b(2), the statutory provision that sets forth the procedures by which the three-year mandatory minimum term at issue is imposed. NO. A-7 SEPTEMBER TERM 2001 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRACI E. STANTON, a/k/a TRACI FRY and TRACI PFAFF, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED April 17, 2003 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Coleman CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINIONS BY Justices Long, Zazzali and Albin