Case Title: Tammy Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc.

Citation: 2004 WI 112

Docket Number: 2002AP001915

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2004-07-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
2004 WI 112 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-1915 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Tammy Kolupar,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc. and Randall  
Thompson,  
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 175 
Reported at: 266 Wis. 2d 659, 668 N.W.2d 798 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 13, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 12, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas R. Cooper   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: SYKES, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Paul M. Erspamer and Lisko & Erspamer, S.C., Waukesha, and oral 
argument by Paul M. Erspamer. 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief by James 
W. Hammes, Kathryn Sawyer Gutenkunst, and Cramer, Multhauf & 
Hammes, 
LLP, 
Waukesha, 
and 
oral 
argument 
by 
Kathryn 
S. 
Gutenkunst. 
 
 
2
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Mary Catherine Fons, 
Stoughton, on behalf of Fons Law Office; Judy Tomczak, Madison, 
on behalf of Tomczak Law Office, LLC; Jeff Scott Olson, Madison, 
on behalf of The Jeff Scott Olson Law Firm, S.C.; and Edward W. 
Harness, Milwaukee, on behalf of he Consumer Guardian Group.  . 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by De Vonna Joy, Big Bend, 
on behalf of the Consumer Justice Law Center; and Gwendolyn G. 
Connolly, Milwaukee, on behalf of the Law Office of Gwendolyn G. 
Connolly.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Jon G. Furlow and 
Michael Best & Friedrich, LLP, Madison, on behalf of Fairfield 
Resorts, Inc., and oral argument by Jon G. Furlow. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Stephen E. Meili and 
Marissa Santiago, Madison, on behalf of The Consumer Law 
Litigation Clinic of the University of Wisconsin Law School; Peg 
Lautenschlager and Cynthia Hirsch, Madison, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Department of Justice; and Mitchell Hagopian, Madison, 
on behalf of The Wisconsin Coalition for Advocacy, Inc.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Colleen D. Ball, 
Wauwatosa, and Jeffrey R. Myer, Milwaukee, on behalf of Legal 
Action of Wisconsin, and oral argument by Jeffrey R. Myer. 
 
 
 
2004 WI 112 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-1915   
(L.C. No. 
00 CV 2571) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Tammy Kolupar,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc. and Randall  
Thompson,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 13, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals.1  In the beginning this case 
involved a suit by Tammy Kolupar (Kolupar) against Wilde Pontiac 
Cadillac (Wilde) and one of Wilde's employees, Randall Thompson, 
over the sale of an unsatisfactory used car.  Kolupar's 
underlying claims are no longer at issue; Kolupar and Wilde 
settled, and the circuit court entered a default judgment 
against Thompson.  The primary question in this review is 
                                                 
1 Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2003 WI App 175, 
266 Wis. 2d 659, 668 N.W.2d 798.   
No. 02-1915 
2 
whether the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in 
awarding reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
¶2 
Kolupar argues that the circuit court failed to apply 
the proper legal analysis when it concluded that $15,000 was an 
appropriate award for fees and costs.  In her view, the circuit 
court: (1) failed to expressly consider factors approved by this 
court for determining reasonable attorney fees; (2) failed to 
apply the "lodestar" method for determining reasonable attorney 
fees; and (3) erred by considering the recommendation of a 
discovery referee appointed by the court.  Kolupar asserts that 
if the court had considered and applied the appropriate law, it 
would have determined that a substantially higher award of 
attorney fees was appropriate. 
¶3 
Wilde counters that the circuit court did in fact 
undertake 
an 
appropriate 
analysis 
and 
therefore 
did 
not 
erroneously exercise its discretion.  Wilde posits that this 
court should defer to the circuit court's decision. 
¶4 
The 
circuit court's 
primary 
explanation for the 
$15,000 award for fees and costs indicates that the court 
believed Kolupar pleaded an excessive number of claims in her 
complaint. The court also stated that this "over-pleading" at 
the outset caused the case to be "over-tried" and discovery to 
be "well over-done." While both Kolupar and Wilde seem to 
acknowledge that each spent more time litigating this small case 
than the case deserved, they each pin the blame on the other 
side's 
unreasonableness 
as 
the 
source 
of 
the 
excessive 
litigation.   
No. 02-1915 
3 
¶5 
We uphold the circuit court's decision to award 
$15,000 in attorney fees.  The court's explanation mirrored the 
sparse information it had available to make its decision.  If 
Kolupar had properly submitted the documentation supporting the 
number 
of 
hours 
reasonably 
expended, 
then 
the 
court's 
explanation would likely not withstand scrutiny.  However, the 
circuit court's explanation comported with the type and amount 
of information it had in the absence of such documentation.  As 
a result, the circuit court's explanation reflected Kolupar's 
unmet burden to demonstrate the reasonableness of the requested 
award.  By contrast, although the circuit court understood that 
substantial costs were incurred, it did not explain why it 
concluded that no costs were appropriate.  We therefore remand 
the issue to the circuit court to address the issue of costs.    
BACKGROUND 
¶6 
On March 29, 2000, Kolupar sued Wilde and Thompson in 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court to recover damages allegedly 
incurred in connection with the purchase of a 1985 Mercedes Benz 
190E.  According to Kolupar's civil complaint, Thompson, Wilde's 
new car manager, accepted Kolupar's 1993 Pontiac Sunbird in 
exchange for the Mercedes, and represented that the Mercedes was 
in good mechanical condition.  The transaction took place in 
March of 1994 at the Wilde dealership, but a court has never 
formally determined whether Thompson was acting as an agent of 
Wilde or whether he was "curbing cars" on his own. 
¶7 
Kolupar asserted that both Wilde and Thompson were 
liable for fraud, federal and state odometer law violations, 
No. 02-1915 
4 
breach of express and implied warranties, and violations of 
Wisconsin's motor vehicle statute, Wis. Stat. § 218.01 (1993-
94).2  Wilde responded to the complaint by denying any 
involvement in the transaction.3  In May 2001, Kolupar dropped 
the federal odometer claim——which permitted treble damages——when 
Wilde moved for summary judgment based upon the federal claim's 
two-year statute of limitation.  If the case had gone to trial, 
the main factual issue likely would have been whether Thompson 
acted under Wilde's actual or apparent authority. 
¶8 
There was no trial.  In December of 2002, two and one-
half years after Kolupar initiated suit, Wilde and Kolupar 
settled the underlying claim for $6,600 dollars plus taxable 
costs.  Between the inception of litigation and this settlement, 
the parties litigated the suit vigorously through numerous 
motions, near-constant correspondence, and headstrong, sometimes 
obstinate behavior regarding discovery matters that ultimately 
necessitated the appointment of a discovery referee.   
¶9 
By the time the parties settled, Kolupar asserted that 
she had accumulated approximately $41,000 in attorney fees and 
                                                 
2 Subchapter I of Chapter 218 of the Wisconsin Statutes has 
since been substantially renumbered and revised.  See 1999 Wis. 
Act 31; see also Conversion Table for Subchapter I of Chapter 
218, Wisconsin Statutes 3596-98 (2001-02).  All references are 
to the 1993-94 statutes unless otherwise noted. 
3 Thompson failed to comply with numerous court deadlines 
and the court granted Kolupar's motion for default judgment 
against him on February 25, 2002.  While Thompson did appear by 
attorney to address the attorney fee issue in May 2002, his 
involvement is not material to our discussion.   
No. 02-1915 
5 
almost $11,000 in litigation expenses.  Along with the $6,600 
settlement, Wilde offered $15,000 in attorney fees, but Kolupar 
rejected that offer.  Thus, the settlement left unresolved the 
issue of attorney fees.   Since the $6,600 plus taxable costs 
for the underlying claim encompassed Kolupar's § 218.01(9) 
claim, and since that section provides that a court has 
authority to award "actual costs, including a reasonable 
attorney fee," Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Thomas R. Cooper, 
concluded that attorney fees were appropriate in this case. 
¶10 Judge Cooper held hearings on May 13 and May 14, 2002, 
in order to resolve the issue of attorney fees and costs.  The 
court received testimony from Frank T. Crivello (a former 
circuit judge who served as a discovery referee), Kolupar, Paul 
Erspamer 
(Kolupar's 
attorney), and 
Patrick 
Donahue 
(vice-
president of Wilde).  The testimony focused primarily on 
establishing 
each 
party's 
culpability 
for 
the 
escalating 
litigation expenses incurred by the parties.  
¶11 Near the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Cooper 
addressed the billing documentation submitted by Kolupar.  Wilde 
asked 
that 
Judge 
Cooper 
refuse 
to 
consider 
the 
written 
information because Kolupar filed the billing information in 
violation of a local rule.  Milwaukee County Circuit Court Rule 
365 directs that a party who wishes to submit any documents in 
support of a motion (other than a motion for summary judgment or 
dismissal) must provide opposing counsel with the materials no 
later than 10 days before the hearing date.  Wilde did not 
No. 02-1915 
6 
receive the invoice until Friday, May 10, 2002, for a Monday, 
May 13, 2002, hearing. See Milwaukee Cty. Ct. R. 365(a).4  
¶12 Judge Cooper agreed with Wilde, holding that Kolupar's 
submission failed to comport with local rules.  As a sanction 
for noncompliance, Judge Cooper declined to consider the 
untimely filed material in his decision.    
¶13 At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Cooper awarded 
Kolupar $15,000 in fees and costs.  Judge Cooper stated that he 
was relying, at least in part, on the recommendation of 
Crivello.  Crivello testified at the hearing that: 
In thirty years in [the] practice of law, as well as 
fifteen years as a circuit judge myself[,] I have 
never seen a $6,000.00 case grow barnacles the way 
this one has.  
. . . . 
I have served as special master in cases on 
numerous occasions here in Milwaukee County since 
leaving the bench. The only case that I have ever seen 
that approached this magnitude was . . . a multi-
million dollar insurance case with fifteen defendants, 
including 
one 
British 
defendant. 
 
So 
without . . . going through every page of the several 
                                                 
4 Milwaukee County Circuit Court Rule 365(a) provides: 
If a movant desires to file a brief, affidavit, or 
other documents in support of a motion other than one 
for summary judgment or dismissal, such motion and 
supporting materials shall be received by all counsel 
of record and/or parties not represented by counsel of 
record and filed with the deputy court clerk of the 
assigned judge no later than ten (10) calendar days 
(including Saturdays, Sundays and holidays) before the 
time specified for the hearing. 
Milwaukee Cty. Ct. R. 365(a).  
No. 02-1915 
7 
thousand pages I have in my possession, I recall three 
or four 
instances where 
I sanctioned 
[Kolupar's 
attorney] 
myself by 
barring 
the 
presentation of 
testimony, or documents, or witnesses.  
. . . .  
Having examined the case in terms of discovery 
and evidence over the course of three hearings and 
months of correspondence, I think that the discovery 
and evidentiary issues in this case were grossly 
inflated.  This was a two-person transaction for an 
automobile. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . So 
I 
would . . . adopt 
the 
offer 
in 
judgment and award the plaintiff the $6,600.00, which 
apparently she has accepted, and I would award 
$15,000.00 from the defendant to the plaintiff in 
fees.  And that is how I would dispose of this case if 
I were asked to.  
I am troubled——and I don't mean to be offensive 
to these lawyers, who[m] I have a great deal of 
professional respect for. . . .  And I don't think the 
case is worth much more than [$]15,000 in fees, 
frankly.  Although I know both sides spent a lot more 
time than that.  
When lawyers decide to do that, then they bear 
the onus of that decision.    
¶14 On the second day of the hearing, after testimony and 
argument, Judge Cooper explained his decision as follows:  
There is no question this case was over-tried.  
Discovery was over——well over-done.  It was over-
[pled] right from the get-go on the complaint.  There 
was the shotgun pleading where everything was [pled] 
against Wilde short of conquering Europe during World 
War II. 
So that was the framework, and the daunting 
discovery mountain was created right from the get-go.  
And that was based upon the plaintiff's pleading.  A 
lot of that I think was over-pled, but it only applies 
as to what are reasonable attorney's fees during the 
No. 02-1915 
8 
course of a contentious non-cooperative discovery 
process. 
. . . .  
Like [counsel] said, this matter was over-tried.  
The long and short of it, it comes down to——I 
appreciate [the discovery referee's] recommendation.  
I think it's appropriate. I happen to concur with it.  
In 
my 
discretion 
I 
believe 
that 
there 
is 
entitlement for reasonable attorney's fees on behalf 
of the plaintiff. Reasonable attorney's fees in my 
mind of $15,000. . . . 
. . . . There was way too much work done, and 
there should have been a focus, and much earlier in 
the proceedings.  And there is nobody here with clean 
hands, so that's the order of the Court.  Joint and 
several.   
 
¶15 When Kolupar asked Judge Cooper to clarify the issue 
of costs, he responded that $15,000 included both fees and 
costs.   
¶16 After her motion for reconsideration was denied by the 
circuit court, Kolupar appealed.  A divided court of appeals 
voted to uphold the circuit court's determination.  It concluded 
that Judge Cooper did not err by excluding Kolupar's billing 
documentation for untimely filing, did not err by considering 
the recommendation of the discovery referee, applied the correct 
legal standard in reaching its conclusion as to attorney fees, 
and did not deny taxable costs.  In dissent, Judge Ralph Adam 
Fine 
concluded 
that 
Judge 
Cooper 
did 
not 
consider 
the 
appropriate factors in reaching a reasonable attorney fee award, 
and 
the 
court 
should 
have 
relied 
on 
Kolupar's 
billing 
No. 02-1915 
9 
documentation rather than the recommendation of the discovery 
referee.   
DISCUSSION 
¶17 Under the American Rule, the parties to a lawsuit bear 
the 
cost 
of 
their 
own 
attorney 
fees 
absent 
legislative 
authorization to shift costs.  Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, 
Inc. v. West Virginia Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 
598, 602 (2001); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983); 
Kremers-Urban Co. v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 119 Wis. 2d 722, 
744, 351 N.W.2d 156 (1984) ("Each party to a lawsuit, under [the 
American Rule], should bear its own costs of litigation.").   
The Wisconsin legislature has authorized courts to award costs 
and attorney fees to successful litigants in many contexts.  
See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 100.18(11)(b) (2001-02) (Wisconsin 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA)); Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7) 
(2001-02) 
(Wisconsin 
Lemon 
Law); 
425.308(1-2) 
(2001-02) 
(Wisconsin Consumer Act (WCA)). 
¶18 Kolupar's 
complaint 
included 
a claim 
for 
relief 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 218.01(9)(b), now renumbered as Wis. 
Stat. § 218.0163(2).  Chapter 218 of the Wisconsin Statutes 
regulates the automobile business in many respects.  See Dep't 
of Transp. v. Transp. Comm'n, 111 Wis. 2d 80, 92, 330 N.W.2d 159 
(1983).  Part of its design is "to protect Wisconsin buyers of 
motor vehicles from fraud."  Id. at 94 (citing State v. Helwig, 
262 Wis. 299, 301, 54 N.W.2d 907 (1952)).  To this end, § 218.01 
provides that "retail buyers" who suffer pecuniary loss may 
No. 02-1915 
10 
recover damages in court.  In 1994, the time of the relevant 
transaction in this case, § 218.01(9)(b) provided as follows: 
Any retail buyer suffering pecuniary loss because of a 
violation by a licensee of sub.(3)(a)4., 5., 6., 8., 
9., 10., 11., 18. or 31. may recover damages for the 
loss in any court of competent jurisdiction together 
with costs, including reasonable attorney fees. 
 
¶19 An interesting question, though one not presented by 
the present case, is whether the word "may" in § 218.01(9)(b) 
indicates that the decision to award or not award costs and 
attorney fees is discretionary.  Unlike some fee-shifting 
statutes, § 218.01(9)(b) does not use the word "shall," which 
would indicate that costs, including attorney fees, must be 
awarded to successful litigants.  However, we note that the 
language does not state that the court may award costs, 
including reasonable attorney fees, but rather provides that a 
retail buyer suffering pecuniary loss for a recognized violation 
"may recover damages for the loss in any court of competent 
jurisdiction together with costs, including reasonable attorney 
fees." Wis. Stat. § 218.01(9)(b) (emphasis added).  It would 
certainly be odd for a circuit judge to decline to impose 
damages once it has been determined that the plaintiff suffered 
pecuniary loss as a result of a listed violation by the 
defendant.  Given that the statute directs that the court "may" 
award 
damages 
"together 
with 
costs, 
including 
reasonable 
attorney fees," the statute may dictate that where damages are 
awarded, costs——including attorney fees——should follow.   
No. 02-1915 
11 
¶20 In this case, Kolupar's recovery of $6,600——plus 
taxable costs——resulted from Wilde's offer of settlement, as 
opposed to a factfinder's determination that Kolupar met the 
statutory 
threshold 
entitling 
her 
to 
recover 
under 
§ 218.01(9)(b).  The settlement was in satisfaction of Kolupar's 
underlying claims, including her § 218.01(9)(b) claim.  Even if 
the award of costs were at the discretion of the court, Judge 
Cooper said here he was persuaded that the statute controlled 
and that reasonable attorney fees were due.     
A. 
Attorney Fees    
¶21 We now turn our attention to the specific question 
presented by this case: Once costs are either required or found 
appropriate, how should the court arrive at a proper attorney 
fee award? 
¶22 Judge 
Cooper 
expressly 
determined 
that, 
in 
his 
discretion, $15,000 in attorney fees was reasonable.  When a 
circuit court awards attorney fees, the amount of the award is 
left to the discretion of the court.  First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank 
v. Nicolaou, 113 Wis. 2d 524, 537, 335 N.W.2d 390 (1983).  We 
uphold the circuit court's determination unless the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion.  Standard Theatres, 
Inc. v. Transp. Dep't, 118 Wis. 2d 730, 747, 349 N.W.2d 661 
(1984).  We give deference to the circuit court's decision 
because the circuit court is familiar with local billing norms 
and will likely have witnessed first-hand the quality of the 
service rendered by counsel.  Id.  Thus, we do not substitute 
our judgment for the judgment of the circuit court, but instead 
No. 02-1915 
12 
probe the court's explanation to determine if the court 
"employ[ed] a logical rationale based on the appropriate legal 
principles and facts of record."  Hughes v. Chrysler Motors 
Corp., 197 Wis. 2d 973, 987, 542 N.W.2d 148 (1996) (quoting 
Vill. of Shorewood v. Steinberg, 174 Wis. 2d 191, 204, 496 
N.W.2d 57 (1993)).   
¶23 What are the appropriate legal principles courts are 
to apply in determining whether a fee is appropriate?   
¶24 Supreme 
Court 
Rule 
20:1.5 
addresses 
reasonable 
attorney fees.  This rule was not drafted as a guide for courts 
to determine reasonable fees under fee-shifting statutes; it was 
designed to govern the ethical obligation of attorneys to charge 
reasonable fees.  Nonetheless, this court has endorsed the 
factors set out in SCR 20:1.5 and encourages courts to apply 
these factors when they are required to determine or evaluate 
attorney fees.  See Shorewood, 174 Wis. 2d at 204 (citing 
cases).  Using the enumerated factors helps courts exercise 
their discretion with a consistent set of legal principles, 
allowing applicants and their opponents to structure legal 
arguments and present evidence in the same manner. 
¶25 Supreme Court Rule 20:1.5(a) lists "[t]he factors to 
be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee."  
These factors are: 
(1) the 
time 
and 
labor 
required, 
the 
novelty 
and 
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly;   
No. 02-1915 
13 
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the 
acceptance of the particular employment will preclude 
other employment by the lawyer;      
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for 
similar legal services; 
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained; 
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the 
circumstances; 
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship 
with the client;  
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer 
or lawyers performing the services; and 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
¶26 Although SCR 20:1.5 does not purport to be exhaustive, 
its factors encompass a variety of considerations appropriate in 
the fee-shifting context.  Admittedly, the factors are often 
quite subjective.  Therefore the results are open to significant 
variation.  The factors do not lead to a single unitary value as 
the only reasonable fee.  They can justify a range of reasonable 
fees and different methods of calculating them.  In the 
abstract, we might imagine an attorney using the factors to 
determine the reasonable range of fees that the attorney may 
ethically charge, and then determine the fees that he or she 
will actually charge based upon the market, or his or her 
perception of the market, for legal services.  As a practical 
manner, attorneys probably determine the market value of their 
services, and then employ the factors to evaluate whether that 
No. 02-1915 
14 
market rate is reasonable.  Either way, conceptually speaking, 
the factors serve to ferret out unreasonable fees; they do not 
command the analytical precision to lead a user to a single 
reasonable figure.   
¶27 Thus, when courts endeavor to determine a reasonable 
fee using the factors listed in SCR 20:1.5, variation is to be 
expected.  To the extent that discretionary decision-making can 
be made more uniform and transparent by providing an objective 
framework 
to 
assess 
these 
factors, 
such 
a 
framework 
is 
desirable.   
¶28 The quest for a suitable framework for employing the 
SCR 20:1.5 factors is not uncharted territory.  More than 20 
years 
ago, 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
refined 
the 
methodology in federal courts for awarding attorney fees under 
fee-shifting statutes.  Hensley, 461 U.S. 424.  The Court 
acknowledged that the facts of each particular case ultimately 
govern the amount of fees.  Id. at 429.  Noting that the 
legislative history of the statute at issue in that case 
expressed approval of 12 factors adopted by the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 
F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974),5 id. at 429-30, the Court 
                                                 
5 These factors are: 
(1) 
time 
and 
labor 
required; 
(2) 
novelty 
and 
difficulty of issues; (3) skill required; (4) loss of 
other employment in taking the case; (5) customary 
fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) 
time limitations imposed by client or circumstances; 
(8) amount involved and result obtained; (9) counsel's 
experience, 
reputation, 
and 
ability; 
(10) 
case 
No. 02-1915 
15 
outlined a procedure for determining the amount of a reasonable 
attorney fee that incorporates an objective component while 
utilizing the Johnson factors.  The Court stated: "The most 
useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable 
fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation 
multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.  This calculation 
provides an objective basis on which to make an initial estimate 
of the value of a lawyer's services."  Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.  
The structural starting point employed by the Court appears to 
have been inspired by Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. of Philadelphia 
v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 168 
(3rd Cir. 1973), which commented that "the amount thus found to 
constitute reasonable compensation should be the lodestar of the 
court's fee determination."  (Emphasis added).   
¶29 The Hensley Court explained that the product of 
reasonable hours multiplied by a reasonable rate——the so-called 
"lodestar" figure——subsumes many of the twelve Johnson factors, 
461 U.S. at 434 n.9, but a court ought not end its analysis 
after arriving at that number.  A court may adjust this lodestar 
figure up or down to account for any remaining Johnson factors 
not embodied in the lodestar calculation.  Id. at 434.  Since 
Hensley, the lodestar approach has become "the guiding light of 
[the 
Court's] 
fee-shifting 
jurisprudence." 
 
Gisbrecht 
v. 
                                                                                                                                                             
undesirability; (11) nature and length of relationship 
with the clients; and (12) awards in similar cases.   
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 
1974).   
No. 02-1915 
16 
Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 801 (2002) (citing Burlington v. Dague, 
505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992)). 
¶30 The obvious similarities between the Johnson factors 
and the factors enumerated in SCR 20:1.5 have their origin in 
the 
American 
Bar 
Association's 
Code 
of 
Professional 
Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule 2-106 (1969).  Hensley's 
endorsement of a method to analyze the Johnson factors under an 
objective framework is compelling.  It reinforces the circuit 
court's 
discretion 
to 
set 
an 
award 
within 
a 
range 
of 
reasonableness and at the same time injects the exercise of that 
discretion with objectivity and uniformity.  These aspirations 
are so important and desirable that we adopt Hensley's lodestar 
methodology and direct the circuit courts to follow its logic 
when explaining how a fee award has been determined.   
¶31 With respect to Judge Cooper's explanation for the fee 
award in this case, we note the dearth of hard facts available 
to the court.  If Judge Cooper had relied on the Hensley 
lodestar approach that we adopt today, he would have been within 
his discretion to significantly reduce the attorney fee award to 
nothing or nearly nothing.  As Hensley makes clear, "[t]he party 
seeking an award of fees should submit evidence supporting the 
hours worked and rates claimed.  Where the documentation of 
hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award 
accordingly."  461 U.S. at 433 (emphasis added).  As noted, 
Judge Cooper did not consider any billing invoices or other 
documentation of the hours worked as a sanction for Kolupar's 
failure to comply with local rules.  The court of appeals 
No. 02-1915 
17 
affirmed Judge Cooper's interpretation of the rule giving rise 
to the sanction, and Kolupar did not raise this issue in her 
petition for review.  Because this issue is not properly before 
us, we do not address it, see Wis. Stat. § 809.62(6); see also 
White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 
454 (1982) (authorizing courts to reject fee requests when the 
requests fail to comply with local rules), except to observe 
that litigants who demand strict enforcement of the rules 
against others become vulnerable when they do not follow the 
rules themselves.  On the facts presented here, Kolupar did not 
fully satisfy her burden to produce evidence of the hours 
worked, and Judge Cooper could have reduced her award, perhaps 
to a nominal amount, solely on that basis.   
¶32 Judge Cooper nevertheless concluded that attorney fees 
were appropriate.  The absence of billing documentation meant 
that he had few objective facts to rely upon in arriving at a 
figure for Kolupar's fees.  The testimony reiterated the total 
amount Kolupar sought in fees and costs was approximately 
$53,000, and the court accepted that this figure constituted 
Kolupar's actual attorney fees and litigation expenses.  Without 
the billing invoices, however, the court could not know how much 
time Kolupar's attorney spent on particular tasks, and therefore 
could make no assessment as to whether the hours her attorney 
exercised in pursuing the claim were reasonable.  This rendered 
any analysis under a lodestar approach impractical. 
¶33 With respect to an analysis using the SCR 20:1.5 
factors outside the lodestar framework, which until today has 
No. 02-1915 
18 
been the accepted methodology, Kolupar stresses that Judge 
Cooper did not expressly mention the factors nor did he discuss 
the full array of factors in his analysis.  Judge Cooper's 
analysis is best explained by considering the amount and type of 
the information teased out at the hearing.  The nature of the 
information did not lend itself to a factor-by-factor analysis 
because the lion's share of the testimony and argument focused 
myopically on who was more at fault for certain delays in 
discovery rather than on what SCR 20:1.5 factors or other 
methodology should guide the court to an appropriate award. 
¶34 This 
becomes 
clear 
if 
we 
examine 
the 
factors 
individually and compare them with the information adduced at 
the hearing.  Kolupar had the burden to demonstrate the amount 
of fees submitted were reasonable, Milwaukee Rescue Mission, 
Inc. v. Redevelopment Auth. of Milwaukee, 161 Wis. 2d 472, 494, 
468 N.W.2d 663 (1991) (citing Standard Theatres, 118 Wis. 2d at 
748), and Kolupar failed in this regard because Judge Cooper had 
little relevant information to assist him in making his fee 
award.6  In the end, although we agree with Kolupar that, ideally 
                                                 
6 By combing the information available from the hearing 
transcript, we do not mean to imply that a hearing is always 
necessary or that a proper exercise of discretion will require 
courts to similarly focus on testimony if there is a hearing.  
We encourage the bar and judiciary to develop uniform procedures 
for determining attorney fees when appropriate, which may or may 
not include a hearing.     
No. 02-1915 
19 
the court should discuss each of these factors, we cannot 
justify a finding that Judge Cooper erroneously exercised his 
discretion when Kolupar failed in her burden to provide the 
court with anything meaningful to discuss.  
¶35 We look to the eight factors set out in SCR 20:1.5 in 
relation to the award.   
¶36 Paragraph (a)(1) lists "the time and labor required, 
the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the 
skill requisite to perform the legal services properly."  
Kolupar presented evidence as to the rate charged, $145 per 
hour, but because of the sanction, she did not present detailed 
information of what activities her attorney performed.  Thus, 
Judge Cooper could not reach a conclusion as to whether the time 
Kolupar's attorney spent on the matter was reasonable, even if 
the rate was reasonable.  By all accounts, the legal questions 
involved were neither novel nor particularly difficult, nor was 
the level of skill required to perform these legal services such 
that it warranted a large fee.   The factual questions required 
investigation, and the testimony certainly explained some of the 
successes 
and 
failures 
of 
Kolupar's 
attorney's 
factual 
inquiries, yet the testimony did not establish the amount of 
                                                                                                                                                             
The above discussion is necessary for our analysis to 
demonstrate the dearth of reliable information available to 
Judge Cooper in the absence of Kolupar's billing information.  
When 
the 
court 
is 
presented 
with 
reliable 
and 
accurate 
documentation as to the amount and nature of the time expended 
on the case, it would not be improper for the court to rely 
principally on that documentation.   
No. 02-1915 
20 
time expended in those pursuits.  Without a global accounting of 
how the attorney's time was spent, Judge Cooper could not arrive 
at a figure for the investigative component of Kolupar's 
attorney's bill, much less a figure for all his activities.   
¶37 Paragraph 
(a)(2) 
speaks 
to 
the 
likelihood, 
"if 
apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular 
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer."  
Kolupar's attorney testified at the hearing that he was not 
precluded from taking on other work while this case proceeded.   
¶38 Paragraph (a)(3) addresses the fee customarily charged 
in the locality for similar services.  Some testimony touched on 
the 
hourly 
rate 
other 
attorneys 
charge, 
but 
as 
already 
discussed, even assuming the hourly rate was reasonable, that 
figure is not useful where the court is without reliable 
information as to how the hours claimed were spent.  No 
information was given regarding the overall size of attorney 
fees in automobile fraud cases, nor would we expect there to be 
a typical attorney fee based on an hourly rate calculation 
because the amount of work reasonably required would vary widely 
from case to case.   
¶39 Setting to one side paragraph (a)(4) for the moment, 
we note that no evidence regarding any time limitations imposed 
by Kolupar was presented under paragraph (a)(5).   
¶40 Paragraph (a)(6) permits the consideration of the 
nature and length of time of the professional relationship 
between Kolupar and her attorney.  The testimony suggests that 
the attorney-client 
relationship extended only 
to matters 
No. 02-1915 
21 
involving the particular automobile transaction at issue in this 
lawsuit.  We do not see how the limited nature of their 
professional relationship would dictate a particular total value 
for all her attorney's services.  
¶41 Paragraph (a)(7) speaks to the experience, reputation, 
and ability of the lawyer performing the services. Kolupar's 
attorney testified that he had 18 years of experience and had 
handled similar cases in the past.  Again, this information may 
buttress the reasonableness of a particular hourly rate, a 
particular contingent percentage, or a particular fixed fee, but 
it fails to establish the valuation of an overall fee based on 
an hourly rate without a companion figure for the amount of 
hours expended and the tasks performed. 
¶42 Paragraph (a)(8) addresses whether the fee is fixed or 
contingent.  Here the fee was neither fixed nor contingent, but 
was calculated at an hourly rate.  This only serves to highlight 
the unhelpfulness of information regarding other factors that 
support the reasonableness of such a particular hourly rate in 
the absence of specific documentation about the hours expended.   
¶43 Judge Cooper's explanation relied almost entirely on 
"the amount involved and the results obtained" pursuant to 
paragraph (a)(4), and for good reason.  In this case, the 
primary SCR 20:1.5 factor on which the court had objective and 
reliable information was paragraph (a)(4).  The Hensley case 
discusses this "important" factor at length, and directs that 
courts ask: "[D]id the plaintiff achieve a level of success that 
makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for 
No. 02-1915 
22 
making a fee award?"  461 U.S. at 434.  In evaluating this 
factor, the Court stated that "the most critical factor is the 
degree of success obtained."  Id. at 436.  "Where a plaintiff 
has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a 
fully compensatory fee."  Id. at 435.   
¶44 Judge Cooper emphasized that the case was over-tried 
and over-pled:  "There is no question this case was over-tried.  
Discovery was over——well over-done.  It was over-[pled] right 
from the get-go on the complaint.  There was the shotgun 
pleading where everything was [pled] against Wilde short of 
conquering Europe during World War II.  So that was the 
framework, and the daunting discovery mountain was created right 
from the get-go.  And this was based upon the plaintiff's 
pleading."   
¶45 Indeed, Kolupar asserted five claims, one of which was 
a federal claim that she eventually abandoned because the 
statute of limitation had long passed.  This federal claim would 
have authorized the court to award treble damages.  When Kolupar 
first itemized her damages in August of 2000, the figure was 
$10,600 plus unspecified repair expenses, interest charges, and 
financing charges.  Absent the amounts for which Kolupar did not 
provide a specified value,7 and considering the potential for 
treble damages, Wilde faced a claim at this time for at least 
$31,800.   
                                                 
7 When amounts were eventually specified for these classes 
of damages, they were significant.  See infra note 9. 
No. 02-1915 
23 
¶46 In April, 2001, over a year after Kolupar instigated 
the litigation, she provided the court a more specific damage 
calculation.  In this new itemization of damages, she sought to 
recover for: 
1. 
Loss of use of a reliable motor vehicle, 
specifically, the 1993 Pontiac Sunbird calculated at a 
reasonable rental rate for similar vehicle for [a 31-
day period]. 
2. 
Judgment against Tammy Kolupar by Waukesha 
State Bank in the principal amount of $9,155.67, 
together with interest accruing since May, 1995 at 12% 
per annum (less an offset for $2,000.00 received by 
Tammy Kolupar upon sale of the 1985 Mercedes).   
3. 
Repair costs to the Mercedes (currently 
known to be $615.76, but investigation continue[s]).   
4. 
Loan payments and finance charges paid on 
the Mercedes loan. 
5. 
Insurance premiums paid on the Mercedes 
(believed to be $384.00 for the period 04/28/94 to 
06/25/94). 
6. 
Attorneys' fees (accruing) 
7. 
Litigation expenses (accruing).   
¶47 With respect to the judgment in item 2, the requested 
sum of $9,155.67, with 12% annual interest calculated from May 
1, 1995, through April 13th, 2001 (the date of the itemization), 
subtracting $2,000,8 equals $15,976.17.  When this amount is 
added to the other specific figures, the total is $16,975.93.  
At this time, Kolupar still pursued the federal odometer claim 
and its treble damages, and, including only the hard numbers and 
                                                 
8 The $2,000 subtracted represents money received by Tammy 
Kolupar upon the sale of the 1985 Mercedes. 
No. 02-1915 
24 
excluding the unvalued itemized damages, this figure multiplied 
by a factor of three (as per the treble damages under the 
federal odometer claim) brings the requested damages to a 
minimum of $50,927.79.   
¶48 Even after the federal odometer claim was dropped, 
Kolupar's requested damages were still quite large.  In June of 
2001, once Kolupar acknowledged that the statute of limitation 
had run on the federal claim, she submitted to the court an even 
more specific itemization.9  The total of all her damages, 
including a recalculation of the interest as of June 19, 2001, 
indicates that Kolupar sought $20,719.71.  She also asked for 
approximately $35,000 in attorney fees and costs.   
¶49 Thus, 
from 
both 
Tammy 
Kolupar's 
and 
Wilde's 
perspectives, the amounts involved were quite large.  The $6,600 
settlement figure she received was only 32% of her lowest 
itemization of damages, and was only 13% of the $50,927.79 
itemized in April of 2001, which parenthetically, did not 
include all her requested damages.  We note that, of the 
approximately $41,000 in attorney fees that Kolupar sought, 
$15,000 amounts to approximately 36% of the fees requested.  
While we do not approve a bright-line rule under which courts 
simply apply a strict ratio of the amount claimed and the amount 
of settlement to arrive at a reasonable fee, we do find it 
                                                 
9 The actual damages claimed included $2,500 loss of market 
value for the 1993 Pontiac Sunbird, $16,362.79 for the bank 
judgment plus interest minus $2,000, $615.76 cost to repair 
Mercedes, $857.16 in loan payments and finance charges, and $384 
in insurance premiums on Mercedes. 
No. 02-1915 
25 
significant that the fee in this case constituted a higher 
percentage of the total sought than the same ratio between the 
requested damages and the settlement. 
¶50 The court clearly thought the case was over-pled, 
contributing to the excessive fees.  Wilde was presented with a 
claim for over $50,000 in damages.  The extent of Wilde's 
exposure may have caused it to adopt an uncompromising attitude 
with respect to this claim.  Thus, to some extent the court was 
hypothesizing that the over-pleading instigated the contentious 
litigation that was to follow.   This cause-and-effect appears 
reasonably based, and, in any event, we owe Judge Cooper 
deference.10 
¶51 While Kolupar's attorney has characterized the $6,600 
as an excellent result because he was able to persuade the bank 
to accept this payment in full satisfaction of the outstanding 
principal and accumulated interest on her car loan, this is not 
the type of result with which SCR 20:1.5(a)(4) is concerned.  
This is indeed a good conclusion for Tammy Kolupar, but not with 
respect to this lawsuit.  It is a good result with respect to 
                                                 
10 Kolupar takes issue with Judge Cooper's reliance on the 
discovery referee's recommendation.  She asserts that it was 
erroneous for Judge Cooper to consider the discovery referee's 
opinion.  This position misstates the level of reliance apparent 
from the record.  Judge Cooper did not state that he was 
adopting the recommendation of the discovery referee.  Instead, 
Judge Cooper stated that he appreciated his recommendation and 
happened to concur.  This is quite separate from a situation 
where a court abdicates its discretionary authority.  We see no 
error in acknowledging on the record a knowledgeable court 
officer's opinion.  This is not the same as wholesale adoption 
of that opinion.  
No. 02-1915 
26 
any potential litigation she might face over the loan with 
Waukesha State Bank.  With respect to her lawsuit against Wilde, 
the results obtained were a fraction of the amount she sought, 
which the court deemed excessive and which perhaps contributed 
to the protracted litigation.   
¶52 The circuit court might well have explained its 
decision with more depth.  But as Hensley dictates, a court need 
give only a "concise but clear explanation of its reasons for 
the fee award when the reasonableness [of the requested fee] is 
challenged."  461 U.S. at 437.  Here, $15,000 is sustainable 
given the facts of this case and the lack of objective 
information provided to the trial court.   Accordingly, we 
affirm the fee award.   
B. 
Costs 
 
¶53 We note that § 218.01(9)(b) does not authorize a court 
to award reasonable attorney fees alone; it authorizes a court 
to award costs, and the costs include reasonable attorney fees.  
In this case, the court made it clear that it was awarding 
$15,000 in attorney fees, which included costs.  At the 
conclusion of the fee hearing, the following exchange occurred: 
 
[THE COURT]:  In my discretion I believe that 
there is entitlement for reasonable attorney's fees on 
behalf of the plaintiff.  Reasonable attorney's fees 
in my mind of $15,000.  I am ordering $15,000 fee to 
plaintiff for attorney's fees and costs that was 
originally submitted as an offer of judgment.   
The flip side is Wilde has to swallow whatever fees 
they have.  I think that establishes what the statute 
intended . . . .  There was way too much work done, 
and there should have been a focus, and much earlier 
No. 02-1915 
27 
in the proceedings.  And there is nobody here with 
clean hands, so that's the order of the Court.  Joint 
and several.   
 
[KOLUPAR'S ATTORNEY]: 
As to the costs? 
 
[THE COURT]: 
Fees and costs, $15,000. 
(Emphasis added).  
 
¶54 The 
court 
made 
a 
formal 
finding 
that 
$15,000 
represented a reasonable attorney fee, but then the court 
aggregated the cost award as part of the $15,000 award.  In 
effect, the court awarded no costs.   
 
¶55 Section 218.01(9)(b) does not state that the court may 
award costs or attorney fees.  Costs and attorney fees are 
linked; the court is authorized to award costs, including a 
reasonable attorney fee.  While the court may retain discretion 
to award $0 in costs or nominal costs, a decision to do so must 
be explained.  Here, the court offered no explanation.  The 
court may have believed the party's settlement for $6,600 plus 
taxable costs included the costs requested by Kolupar.  Or 
perhaps the court believed the costs should not be awarded at 
all.  An explanation is required.  We therefore remand the 
matter of costs to the circuit court. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
¶56 DIANE S. SYKES, J., did not participate. 
 
 
No.  02-1915.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶57 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  This is a 
consumer protection case under a consumer protection law.  The 
consumer in this case has been victimized twice:  once by the 
defendants, the second time by the legal system.    
¶58 By affirming the fees awarded by the circuit court, 
the majority opinion contravenes the spirit and letter of the 
statutes that "were designed to keep open the courthouse doors 
to persons whose claims do not justify the retention of a lawyer 
unless, by prevailing, that person can recover his or her 
attorneys fees."11   
¶59 Judge Fine's vigorous dissent in the court of appeals 
criticizes the defendants for taking advantage of Ms. Kolupar in 
the car transaction and in delaying and obfuscating the trial 
gives the reader the flavor of the case.12  Judge Fine wrote:   
Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., and its employee Randall 
Thompson not only took advantage of an eighteen-year-
old woman but they also delayed and obfuscated the 
litigation process.  Indeed, from my review of the 
record, I believe that they pursued a scorched-earth 
Rambo-litigation policy that has no place in our 
justice system.13 
¶60 The circuit court compounded the auto dealer's harm to 
Ms. Kolupar by failing to properly exercise its discretion in 
awarding reasonable attorney fees and costs.14   
                                                 
11 Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2003 WI App 175, 
¶32, 266 Wis. 2d 659, 668 N.W.2d 798 (Fine, J., dissenting).   
12 Kolupar, 266 Wis.2d 659, ¶23 (Fine, J., dissenting). 
13 Id.   
14 The method of evaluation of fees is set forth in the 
majority opinion, ¶¶24-29.  I agree with the lodestar approach. 
No.  02-1915.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶61 The majority opinion delivers the final blow to Ms. 
Kolupar by affirming the circuit court's erroneous discretionary 
award of fees.   
¶62 The majority shifts the blame to Ms. Kolupar for the 
low award, asserting that the record before the circuit court 
had a "dearth of hard facts."15  And whose fault was that?   
¶63 The dearth of hard facts was caused by the circuit 
court's refusal to admit Ms. Kolupar's documentation in support 
of her attorney's fees.  Why weren't these documents admitted?  
Because the circuit court ruled that the submission was late 
under local court rules.  I agree with Judge Fine that the 
circuit court incorrectly applied Local Rule 365.  As Judge Fine 
wrote: 
The rule, however, governs "motions"; it does not 
apply to exhibits offered at trials or evidentiary 
hearings.  Kolupar never filed a motion for attorneys 
fees; the statute permits them and she demanded them 
in her complaint.  Indeed, the trial court sua sponte 
set the hearing on the attorney-fees matter: "We'll 
all meet back here on the date set for trial to the 
court on May 13th and we'll consider the attorneys' 
fee issue."16      
¶64 And even if this local rule applied in the present 
case (which it does not) and the documents were a few days late, 
the circuit court's sanction of refusing to admit the documents 
was too harsh and it was an erroneous exercise of discretion.   
                                                 
15 Majority 
op., 
¶31. 
 
See 
also, 
majority 
op., 
¶5 
(complaining about the sparse information).  
16 Kolupar, 266 Wis. 2d 659, ¶28 (Fine, J., dissenting).   
No.  02-1915.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶65 Does the majority opinion address the issue of the 
applicability of the local rule?  No!  The majority begs off by 
again placing the blame on Ms. Kolupar, claiming that Ms. 
Kolupar did not present the issue in her petition for review and 
therefore did not preserve the issue for appeal as a matter of 
right.17   
¶66 I disagree.  The petition for review presented the 
following issue:  "Did the trial court erroneously exercise its 
discretion by failing to apply and consider the correct legal 
standard?"  Included within the stated issue is the question 
whether the local rule was correctly applied.  The petitioner is 
not required to set forth in the petition for review every 
argument that she will make in this court.   
¶67 Moreover, the arguments of the parties did not focus 
on the state of the record.  Neither party complains about the 
lack of documentation of the attorney's work in the record.  As 
Judge Fine pointed out, "No one [that is, neither the parties 
nor the circuit court] disputes that Kolupar's lawyer did what 
he said he did and that his hourly rate was reasonable."18 
¶68 Rather, the briefs debate whether the circuit court 
considered the correct factors in reaching its decision.  Ms. 
Kolupar's position is that the circuit court did not consider 
the correct legal standards.  The defendant's position is that 
                                                 
17 Majority op., ¶31.  The majority could, of course, 
exercise its discretion to address the issue but apparently is 
unwilling to do so.  See Wis. Stat. § 809.62(6).  If it did 
address the issue, the result of the case would be different.  
18 Kolupar, 266 Wis. 2d 659, ¶34.   
No.  02-1915.ssa 
 
4 
 
the circuit court considered the correct factors.  Why doesn't 
the majority opinion hold that the defendants waived any 
objection to the lack of documentation of attorney fees in the 
record and to Ms. Kolupar's supposed failure to assert that the 
local rule was improperly applied?19  If there is waiver, this 
court may proceed to decide the substantive issue.   
¶69 The circuit court based its award of fees on the 
comments of the discovery master, which were not supported by 
any facts relating to the work of Ms. Kolupar's attorneys.  
Judge Fine properly questioned the circuit court's and court of 
appeals' deferral to the discovery master and the failure of the 
circuit court to consider on the record any of the factors 
relating to fees.  The former judge appointed to be a discovery 
master was not appointed to assess the fees.  He held no 
hearings, examined no evidence, and made no findings in regard 
to fees.  Nevertheless, he offered an opinion on fees, which 
apparently significantly influenced the circuit court.  Judge 
Fine wrote, somewhat harshly but not without justification, as 
follows: 
Yet, the Majority defers to the unfocused musings by 
both a former judge, appointed to oversee a small part 
of the discovery disputes in this case, and the trial 
court. 
 . . . . 
The trial court here never considered on the record 
any of the factors [in determining attorney fees].  
Rather, it deferred to the off-hand assessment of the 
                                                 
19 See State v. Guerard, 2004 WI 85, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___; State v. Evans, 2004 WI 84, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___. 
No.  02-1915.ssa 
 
5 
 
former judge who, as the Majority notes, was only 
appointed to be a discovery master.  The trial court's 
abdication of its responsibility was palpable, as 
reflected by the transcript in the record. . . . Wilde 
suggested the $15,000 figure, and the former judge 
adopted it without any analysis beyond his view that 
more 
was 
not 
warranted 
because, 
with 
Kolupar's 
acceptance of the $6,600 offer of settlement, the case 
was 'just barely above a small claims case.'20 
¶70 The discovery master erred in viewing the amount of 
recovery as determinative of reasonable attorney fees.  The 
amount of the recovery is not a measure of what the fee-shifting 
award should be in consumer protection cases.21   
¶71 Because the circuit court excluded Ms. Kolupar's 
supporting 
documents, 
relied 
on 
the 
master's 
unsupported 
proposed fee of $15,000, and failed to consider the factors the 
majority sets forth, it erroneously exercised its discretion in 
awarding only $15,000 in fees.  I would reverse the judgment and 
remand the cause for reconsideration of attorney fees as well as 
costs, guided by the majority opinion's discussion of fees.  
¶72 Accordingly, I dissent. 
¶73 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
                                                 
20 Kolupar, 266 Wis. 2d 659, ¶¶24, 27. 
21 Shands 
v. 
Castrovinci, 
115 
Wis. 2d 352, 
358, 
340 
N.W.2d 506 (1983). 
No.  02-1915.ssa 
 
 
 
1