Case Title: State v. Klie. ICA s.d.o., filed 07/19/2007 [pdf], 114 Haw. 301. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 12/20/2007 [pdf].

Citation: 116 Haw. 519

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2007-12-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

000 ==~

 

 

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent /Plaintif£-Appellee,
THOMAS E. KLIE, Petitioner /Defendant-Appellant

 

No. 27992

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(HPD CR. NO. 06078163) ix

 

DECEMBER 27, 2007

 

1856 Wy 42 930.002

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFF®| JJ

OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.
on December 20, 2007, this court accepted a timely
application for a writ of certiorari, filed by
petitioner/defendant-appellant Thomas E. Klie on Decenber 4,
2007, requesting that this court review the September 5, 2007

judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeale (ICA), entered
pursuant to its July 19, 2007 summary disposition order.

the ICA affirmed the District Court of the First
via his no

 

‘Therein,
Circuit's? May 19, 2006 judgment, convicting Klie

contest plea -- of and sentencing him for the offense of street

‘The Honorable Lono J. Lee presided over the underlying proceedings

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

SSS

solicitation of prostitution, in violation of Hawai'i Revised
Statutes (HRS) § 712-1207 (Supp. 2006), quoted infra,

(hereinafter, street solicitation].

 

In his application, Kiie essentially reasserts the sole
argument made in his direct appeal, namely, that the district
court erred in denying his motion for a deferred acceptance of no
contest (DANC) plea, filed pursuant to HRS § 853-1 (1993), quoted
Anfza. specifically, Klie contends that a DANC plea is available
in street solicitation cases, and the district court, therefore,
committed error in finding that it lacked the discretion to grant
the motion. Based on the discussion below, we hold that the Ica
erred in concluding that the district court properly denied
Klie's motion for a DANC plea. Consequently, the May 19, 2006
judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the district
court for reconsideration of Klie’s motion consistent with this
opinion.
T. BACKGROUND

A core ict Court

On May 18, 2006, the respondent /plaintif£-appellee
State of Hawai'i (the prosecution) orally charged Klie as
follows:

lola or about February 23, 2006, in the City and County of
Honolulu, State of Hawai't, while within the boundaries of
Waikiki and while on any public property, [klie) did otter
OF agree to engage in sexual conduct with another person in
return for a fee, thereby committing the offense of [altreet

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

[slolicieatior in Waikiki.) in violation of [lection
712-1207 subsection (1) of the (HRS."]

 

That same day, Klie entered a plea of no contest.’ The
Aistrict court accepted Klie’s plea, whereupon Kite moved for a
DANC plea, pursuant to HRS § 853-1.‘ Defense counsel argued
that: ”

Based upon ay review of State v.lamilil, €7 Hawai'i 102,
952 P.24 390 (2998), dicceseq fully infra.) the supreme
court had indicated that if a charge allows for probation as

ible sentence that that would permit the deferes ples

a in thie aituation

Kithough the statute(, Lae; MRS § 722-1207(4);] talks
about shall ("be sentenced fo a mandatory term of thirty
Gays imprisonment,"] there ie also the possibility of the
probation, (referring to HRS § 712-1207(5), quoted infra.)
find based on that, and I think the prosecutor would agree,
Mr. Kise would qualify for all purposes. ie'e never been
arrested or convicted of anything else in his life. He
nose! citizen

Tals lo a situation that certainly would never occur
again and he does « lot of good in his practice helping out
with regara to emergency care in the Brome, in rather
Indigent areas, tough areas as an emergency doctor. Based
fon that, we would asx the [court to deter acceptance of the
Bo contest plea.

   

   

 

 

 

* wes § 712-1207(2) provides that “(i]t shall be unlawful for any
person within the boundaries of Waikiki and while on any public property, to
Sefer or agree to engage in sexual conduct with another person én retur® for a
fee." “Street solicitation is a petty misdemeanor. HRS § 732-2207(4)

 

 

 

» Prior to its acceptance of the plea, the district court engaged in =
colloguy with Klie to determine whether he entered the plea knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently, and whether he understood the consequences
thereof.

+ Section 953-1 provides that a motion for @ DANC plea may be made:

(2) When a defendant voluntarily pleads guilty or
holo contendere, prior to commencement of trial,
to 2 felony, misdemeanor, or perty nisdenesnor;

(2) Tt appearn to the court that the defendant i2
not likely again to engage in a criminal course
of conduct; and

(3) The'ends ‘of Justice and the welfare of society
do not require that the defendant shall
presently sutfer the penalty impoaed by law,

the court, without accepting the plea of nolo contendere or
fentering & judgnent of guilty and with the consent of the

Getendant and atter considering che recommendations, if any,

of the prosecutor, may defer further proceedings.

 

3
*** FORPUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

SSS

In opposition, the prosecution asserted tha

   

in regards to sentencing, your Honor, {the prosecution) will
be asking for a five bundved dollar fine inthis case and
£ix months probation. the [prosecution] 's reading of the
BLL is that {[,] when a statute, when the
sentencing schene is very specific and mandatory, in this
case mandatory use the word shall, the (elourt has no
Siseretion to go beyond the scope of the sentencing scheme.
Here in this case, it’s either jail of probation, your
Honor. And based upon the reading of state vy, Hamill, your
Honor, when the scheme in mandatory and it's specific,
deferral is not an option at this time, your Konor.

 

 

 

 

 

‘The district court denied Klie’s motion, ruling that:

‘The position of this {clourt as counsel you are aware after
pretrial in thie matter that Tagree with the
(prosecution) 's position in this case, okay.” fortunately
for Dr. Klie, T don't doubt the good you do with your
Practice. However, this statute is specific and does
indicate that. However, you would be entitied to probation
and jail certainly would fot be appropriate in thie case-

 

 

In other words, the district court believed that it had no
Giscretion to entertain Klie’s motion for a DANC plea.
Thereafter, the district court sentenced Klie to six months’
Probation and ordered him to pay various fines and fees. The
district court filed its judgment on May 19, 2006. Klie filed a
timely notice of appeal on June 23, 2006.
B. Appeal Before the ICA

On direct appeal, Klie maintained that the district

court erred in finding that it had no discretion to consid

 

granting his motion for a DANC plea. Klie argued that, because

“the offense charged is probationable, (DANC] ple

 

may be
considered by the [district] sentencing court." The prosecution
responded that the subject statute's sentencing scheme would not

Permit DANC pleas, discussed in more detail infra.

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

On guly 19, 2007, the ICA issued its summary
disposition order, wherein it concluded that:

Upon careful review of the record and the briefs aubmitted
by the parties and having given due consideration to the
arguments. advanced and the issues as raised by the parties,
te conclude that the district court properly denied Ki
otion for a DANC plea. MRS § 712-1207(2) & (4); State v.

‘a law. 75, 037 P.24 776 (1392); Statenve
HAMLLL, 87 Hawai'l 202," 952 P.24 390 (1930)

 

 

 

 

ICA's Sunmary Disposition Order (SD0) at 2. Thereafter, on
Septenber 5, 2007, the ICA entered its judgment on appeal. on
Decenber 4, 2007, Klie filed his application, which this court
granted on Decenber 20, 2007.
TT. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Writ of certiorari

This court reviews the decision of the Ica for
(2) grave errors of law or of fact or (2) obvious inconsistencies
in the decision of the ICA with that of the supreme court,
federal decisions, or ite own decisions and whether the sagnitude
of such errors or inconsistencies dictate the need for further
appeal. HRS § 602-59(b) (Supp. 2006).
B. Motion for a DANC Plea

‘The grant or denial of a motion for a DANC plea ie
within the discretion of the district court and will not be
Aisturbed unless there has been manifest abuse of discretion.
State vi Tom, 69 Haw, 602, 603, 752 7.24 597, 597 (1988). “An
abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court has clearly

exceeded the bounds of reason or has disregarded rules or

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a
party litigant.* State v. Davia, 87 Hawai't 249, 253, 953 P.2d
1347, 1351 (1998) (internal quotation marka and citation
omitted) .
C. Statutory Construction

‘The interpretation of a statute is a question of law,
which is reviewed on appeal de novo. State v. Wells, 78 Hawai't
373, 376, 894 P.2d 70, 73 (1995).

IIT. DISCUSSION

on application, Klie essentially reasserts the argument
he made before the district court and the ICA, i.e., that the
district court erred in refusing to grant his motion for a DANC
plea. Klie’s entire argument consists of the following four
points:

(2) The question presented 1s whether the [district] court
is prohibited fron accepting a deferred plea under
limms'§) 853-1 for violation of [uas §] 742-3207
offering £0 engage in sexial conduct with another
person on public property in Waikiki, Hawal'l

(2) THAie) pled'no contest £0 the charge of HS [5]
712-1207, and the [district] court refused to consider
or grant’ (Kiie]’s motion £0 defer acceptance of his
plea, because the {district} court stated it had no
Power to do so under the statute

(3) The [district] court refused co consider the granting
ofa motion for deferred plea to Violation of HRs (8)
12°30,

(4) tn (State v. mamili,) 07 Hawai'i 192, 982 P.24 290
(1998), the Suprene Court of Hawai'i stated BANC pleas
are not applicable where offenses charged are non-
probationable. Under MRS (5) 712-1207(8) (, quoted
Infra,] «defendant nay be placed on probation for
violating the street solicitation statute in maikikt,
Hawai'i, therefore, a court should have the power to
Grant 4 deferred plea for violation of [ims s)
iiz-a2070)

 

   

 

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

The sole issue, therefore, is whether the charged offense with

respect to which Klie ent

 

1 a no contest plea is excluded from
the possibility of deferral under HRS chapter 853.

Preliminarily, we observe that, when construing a
statute, this court “foremost obligation is to ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the legislature, which 1s to be
obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute
itself." State v. Valdivia, 95 Hawai'l 465, 472, 24 P.3d 661,
668 (2001) (citation omitted). ‘where the statutory language ia
unambiguous, the court's sole duty is to give effect to its plain
and obvious meaning.” State v. Sakamoto, 101 Hawai‘ 409, 412,
70 P.3d 635, 638 (2003) (citations omitted).

HRS chapter 853 sets forth the procedure for the
acceptance of, inter alia, a DANC plea. As noted above, the
district court

may defer final adjudication of a criminal cage vhen (2) a
Gefendant voluntarily pleads guilty or no contest prior to
Che comencenent of trial and (2) the court concludes (a)
Chat the defendant is not likely to engage in a criminal
course of conduct and (b) that the ende of justice and
welfare of society do not require that the defendant
mnt ly suffer the penalty imposed by lav. RS § 033~

However, sluch deferrals are constrained by HRS

which sets out the circunstances under which
Chapter e53 “eball not apply."

 

 

Id. at 412, 70 P.34 at 638. Specifically, DANC pleas do not
apply when “(t}he offense charged is nonprobationable.” HRS
§ 853-4(5) (emphasie added) .

In this case, Klie pled no contest to the offense of

street solicitation, in violation of HRS § 712-1207(1). The

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

penalties for violating section 712-1207 are set forth in HRS

§§ 712-1207(4) and (5), which provide in relevant part

 

 

(4) Wotwithstanding any law to the contrary, any
person violating this section shall be guilty of « petty
Risdeneanor and shall be sentenced to a mandatory tern of
thirty days imprisonment. The term of imprisonment shall be
imposed imediately, regardless of whether the defendant
appeals the conviction, except as provided in subsection

e-
(5) At an option to the mandatory term of thixty dave
mu finds ie

‘5 BE a perioa oes
lHoaths. subject to the mandatory condition chat the
Gefendant observe geographic restrictions that prohibit the
Gefendant from entering or remaining on public property. in
Waikiki and other areas in the State designed by county
ordinance during the hours from € p.m. £0. a.m. Upon any.
violation of the geographic restriccions by the defendant’
the court, after Rearing, shall revoke the defendant's
probation and inmeaiately impose the mandatory thirty day
Eerm of imprisonment.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Bnphasis added.) By the express terms of subsections (4) and
(5), the offense under HRS § 712-1207 is probationable and, thus
is not excludable under HRS § @53-4(5)

This court's case law lends further support to the
above conclusion. In State v. Tom, 69 Haw. 602, 752 P.2d 597
(1988), this court held that the trial court did not err in
denying @ DANC plea when the statute at issue -- HRS § 291-4(b)

(2985) (driving under the influence (DUI))* -- did not afford the

 

* ums § 291-4(b) provides in part that:

 

1A person comitting the offense of (DUI) shall be sentenced
fas follows without possibility of probation or suspension of
(1) For the first offense, or any offense not preceded
within a five-year period by 2 conviction under this
section, by:
() A’ fourteen-hour minimum alcohol abuse
Fehabilitation program
(a) Mineey-day prompt. susp
absolute prohibition from operating a motor
(continued...)

 

 

   

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

defendant a probation sentence. Id. at 603, 752 P.2d at 598. In

that:

 

|, the trial court ruled that: (1) it lacked the

 

discretion to grant a DANC plea because HRS § 853-4(5) provided

that such a plea was not available in cas

 

2 involving
nonprobational offenses; (2) the sentencing provisions of HRS

§ 291-4 called for mandatory sentencing without the possibility
of probation; and (3) allowing a DANC plea in DUI cases would
enable a defendant to avoid the enhanced sentencing schene
mandated by the DUI statute. Id. at 603, 752 P.2d at 598. on
appeal, this court, after holding that the plain language of the
statutes involved prohibited the grant of a DANC plea in a DUI
case, stated:

‘The DUI statute provides for an enhanced sentencing schene
for multiple offenses within a five year period. A repeat
Offender given 2 DANC plea on the first offense could thus
‘eecape enhanced sentencing under the DUI statute by
Committing a second offense after DANC jurisdiction had
expired but within the five year period of the DUI

sntencing achene. This result would contravene the
Eecognized serious aature of DUT offense.

 

 

 

Id. (citation omitted).
‘Thie court again reviewed a DANC plea in Dannenberg, a

case cited by the ICA. In Dannenberg, the trial court granted a

 

*(. continued)
vehicle during suspension of License [;]
(©) Any one or more of the following:

Ui) “"Seventy-txo hours of commialty
service work; oF

(44) Not Jess than forty-eight hours of
imprisonment; oF

(Uy X Eine of not 1
‘than $1, 000.

 

 

than 6150 but not nore

(Emphasis added.)

 

0 Ten. 69 Haw. at 603, 752 P.2d at 588.

 
*** FORPUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

SSS
DANC plea in a prostitution case, which was charged under HRS

 

§ 722-1200 (1985). At the time of the offense, HRS § 712-1200(4)
set forth the sentencing scheme in prostitution cases and
provided in relevant part that:

Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, &
person convicted of committing the offenses of presritution
Shall be sentenced as follows

(a) For the first offense, a fine of $500 and the
Person may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of no more
than ehirey' days (+)

(b) For any subsequent offense, a fine of $500 and a
term of imprisonment of thirty days, ‘without possibility of
suspeasion of sentence or probation.

 

74 Haw. at 79-80, 837 P.2d at 778 (emphases omitted). In
determining whether the aforementioned sentencing scheme
prohibited a DANC plea, this court initially stated that:
In State v. Bicel, 66 Haw. 101, 657 P.24 1026 (1983), we.
interpreted (nJotwithstanding any other law to the
contrary" in the above statute as language "taking aay the
trial court's power to grant (DANC] pleas in prostitution
caves." (Zd.] at 102, 657 P.24 at 1626. Today we affirm
that holding and clarity cur reasoning.
Id. at 80, 837 P.2d at 778 (original brackets omitted). In so
doing, this court reviewed the relevant legislative history, id.

at 81, 837 P.2d at 779, observing that “[t]he [legislative

 

intent was clearly to limit discretion of the trial court in
sentencing prostitution offenses and to provide a mandatory
sentencing structure unlike that for other petty misdemeanors.”

Ad. Consequently, this court reasoned that, “[i]f trial courts

 

were permitted to grant DANC . . . pleas, the mandatory fine for
first time offenders anticipated by the legislature would become

no more than a discretionary fine.” Id, at 62, 837 P.2d at 779.

-10-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

‘Thereafter, in Hamili, a case relied upon by both Klie

and the ICA, this court noted that, after the issuance of

 

Dannenbera, the legislature amended HRS § 712-1200(4) in 1993 to
allow the acceptance of DANC via its elimination of the phrase
snotwithstanding any other law to the contrary.” 87 Hawai'i at
106 n.5, 952 P.2d at 394 n.5. In Hamili, the defendant pled no
contest to the offense of prohibited fishing with gill nete, in
violation of HRS § 168-30.2(a) (2) (2993). Id. at 103, 952 P.24
at 391. The defendant then moved to defer his plea, which was
granted. Id, at 104, 952 P.2d at 392. On petition for a writ of
mandamus, thie court held that the district court abused its
discretion by deferring the defendant's plea, explaining that

‘4 DANC plea is unavailable for persone convicted of
Violating the gill net fishing statute. After conviction,
‘The use of the vero "shall" signals that this is a manaatory
sentencing provision. There ig no possible sentence apart
‘fron the three alternatives provided by the statute. The

‘entencine court has discretion in deciding wnich
alternative ig appropriate, but the court ia Limited to the
‘sholces provided. Recause the sentencing court ie Limited
Ko the altermatives expressly counexated in GRs s 180-70.
‘And probation in not an enumerated alternative, the offense

 

 

for which the sentence is imposed is nonprobationabie.
‘Thus, wRS§ 053-4 (5) which provides that the DANG plea is
not applicable where the offense charged is
nonprobationable, prohibits the alloy

(Phe

  

among three alzernatives, whieh do not
Consequently, the (aistrict court] manifestly abused (ité]
Aiscretion By alloving [the defendants] a DANC ples

 

Id. at 107, 952 P.2d at 395 (emphases added) (original emphasis
and citation omitted).
Although recognizing Hamili’s holding that the offense

under the gill net fishing statute was a nonprobationable offense

ue
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

because probation was not an available sentencing option, the
Prosecution, on direct appeal, argued that the subject etatute’s

mandatory sentencing scheme preclude

 

a DANC plea. The
Prosecution grounded its contention upon the fact that HRS § 712-
1207(4) contained the phrase *[n]otwithstanding any law to the
contrary," which, under Rice and Dannenberg signaled removal of
the trial court’s power to grant DANC. The prosecution -- and
the ICA -- however, overlook the fact that HRS § 712-1200
specifically provides an alternative sentence of probation.
Further, the Dannenberg court did not rely solely upon the
aforementioned phrase to conclude that DANC pleas were
impermissible; in fact, it reaffirmed its holding in Rice and
clarified its reasoning, which reasoning demonstrated that,
because the prostitution statute carried enhanced mandatory
sentencing provisions, a DANC plea would render the mandatory
fine for first time offenders “no more than a discretionary
fine.” 74 Haw. at 82, 837 P.2d at 779

Here, HRS § 712-1207 clearly does not constitute an
enhanced sentencing scheme. Rather, like Hamili, subsections
712-1207(4) and (5) simply provide two alternatives (three in
Hamili) -- thirty days’ imprisonment or probation. “The
sentencing court has discretion in deciding which alternative is
appropriate, but the court is limited to the choices provided.”

Hamili, 87 Hawai'i at 107, 952 P.2d at 395. Because the

 

sentencing court is limited to the alternatives expressly

waz-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

enumerated in the subject statute, and probation ig an enumerated
alternative, the offense for which the sentence is imposed ia
probationable. Thus, we believe that HRS § 853-4(5), which
states that DANC is inapplicable when the offense charged is
nonprobationable, does not apply in the instant case.
Notwithstanding the clear and unambiguous language of
the subject statute, the prosecution -- on direct appeal and
relying on legislative history -- argued that the legislature did

not intend to permit DANC pleas

 

‘The legislature finds that the level of prostitution in
aikiki has become intolerable. One ie unable to walk down
the trects without repeatedly being accosted for purposes
of solicitation. Moreover, the legislature finds that =
igh level of prostitution is nearly alvays followed by an
increase in other criminal actsvitiee relating to theft,
robbery, assault, and drugs. Such activity is abhorrent to
Fesidente and visitors alike and 1s driving both from one of
the state's prine attraction. efforts by ehe Honoluly
police departnent to crack down on prostitucion and other
Criminal activity in the Waikiki area have had Limited
effect. The legislature further finde and declares that
more stringent measures are necessary to preserve Waikiki as
foprine ateraction and to protect the health, safety, and
Weléare of residents and visitors to Waikike

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
   

for prostitution
Ae a mandatory condition of probation and bail, defendance
must observe geographical restrictions prohibiting them from
entering or walking on the public

Waikiki during the hours from € p. Tra
Gefendant resides in Waikiki and chooses to remain in
Waikiki during the prohibited hours, the defendant must
therefore stay off the streeta and sidevalke during those
hours. Alehough the restriction covers + large physical
apace, it is narrowly tailored to cover only the hours most
Closely associated with the crime. Adaitionally, be
Festriction is sufficiently definite to provide the average
person with adequate notice of what behavior is prohibited.

    

 

(Quoting 1998 Haw. Sess. L Act 149, § 1 at $34.) (Format
altered.) Based upon the above findings, the prosecution argued

that permitting DANC pleas for street solicitation offenses is

-13-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

a sSssssseSSSSSSSSS
incompatible with the legislature's express findinge that street
solicitation in Waikiki has becone intolerable and poses serious
threats to the health, safety, and welfare of residents and
visitors

‘This court, however, hae previously stated that, where
the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is bound by its plain
and unambiguous language:

We cannot change the language of the statute, eupply a want,

cor enlarge upon it in order to make it auit 4 certain sate

of facta. We do not legislate or make lave.” Even when che

court is ‘convinces in ies ow mind that the (liegislatuce

Feally meant and intended something not expressed by the

phraseology of the [alct, it has no authority to depart from

the plain meaning of the language used.

Sakamoto, 101 Hawai'i at 413, 70 P.3d at 639 (citations omitted).

 

 

Here, the prosecution did not assert that HRS § 712-1207 is
ambiguous; yet, it resorted to an examination of the legislative
history. Nevertheless, even assuming arguendo that the statute
is ambiguous, the legislative history further supporta the

conclusion that DANC pl The aforementioned

 

are permissibl

 

Purpose clearly acknowledg

 

that probation is an alternative
option under HRS § 712-1207 -- with the added enhancenent of
Geographical restrictions. There is no indication from the
legislature that it intended to limit the district court's
discretion in sentencing street solicitation offenses. Indeed,
HRS § 712-1207(5) empowers the district court to determine
whether probation “is warranted based upon the defendant's

record."

nia
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

Consequently, we hold that the ICA erred in eunmarily
affirming the district court's refusal to consider Klie’s motion

for a DANC ple

 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we vacate the May 19, 2006
judgment and remand this case to the district court for
reconsideration of Klie’s motion for a deferred acceptance of no

contest plea consistent with this opinion.

Scot Stuart Brower, for
pet itioner/defendant-appellant,

on the application

Daniel H. Shimizu, BaP hhrinmae

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,

for respondent /plaineite- Presets Conran
appeliee
Yoon 6. Oubloith

-15-