Case Title: Larkin v. City of Burlington

Citation: 172 Vt. 566, 772 A.2d 553

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2001-04-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Larkin v. City of Burlington (99-219); 172 Vt. 566; 772 A.2d 553

[Filed 31-Apr-2001]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 1999-219

                            SEPTEMBER TERM, 2000

John Larkin	                       }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
     v.	                               }	Chittenden Superior Court
                                       }	
City of Burlington	               }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. S1406-97 CnC

                                                Trial Judge: Matthew I. Katz

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Plaintiff John Larkin appeals the superior court's dismissal of his
  suit seeking damages  resulting from defendant City of Burlington's refusal
  to apply to his zoning permit application the  terms of a consent judgment
  entered into by the City and a previous owner of the subject property.   We
  affirm.

       In 1985, Northshore Partnership and Northshore Development, Inc.
  (hereinafter "Northshore")  entered into a development agreement with the
  City concerning property owned by Northshore.   Northshore later sought the
  City's approval to develop a portion of the property commonly referred to 
  as the marina site.  The City denied the permit application.  Northshore
  appealed the permit denial  and brought a damages suit in the superior
  court, (FN1) which was eventually settled pursuant to a  consent judgment
  signed by the City and Northshore on April 26, 1989.  The consent judgment 
  allowed Northshore to apply for a permit seeking no more than sixty
  residential units on the marina  site.  Under the agreement, permit
  approval would be "subject to all ordinances and regulations duly  adopted
  and in effect on the date hereof."  The consent judgment provided that it
  "shall be binding on  the successors and assigns of Northshore."

       In March 1990, the City granted Northshore approval to construct a
  38-condominium-unit  development on the marina site.  Two years later, the
  City extended the zoning permit to allow  construction on the project by no
  later than March 1993.  Northshore never built the project and  never
  sought an extension of the permit deadline.  Eventually, title to the
  property was transferred to  the Chittenden Bank through foreclosure
  proceedings.  Larkin entered into a purchase and sale 

 

  agreement with the bank on March 14, 1997.  Before he purchased the
  property, Larkin was given a  copy of a May 1995 appraisal specifically
  noting that the property had no development permits or  approvals, and that
  the status of the 1989 consent judgment was unclear.  The purchase and sale 
  agreement itself contained handwritten amendments, initialed by Larkin,
  indicating that the property  would be conveyed "as is" under a limited
  warranty deed.

       In June 1997, the same month he purchased the subject property from
  the bank, Larkin sought  the benefits of the consent judgment in applying
  for a zoning permit to construct a sixty-unit elderly  housing project on
  the marina site.  In August 1997, following two days of public hearings,
  the  planning commission denied the permit based on design review criteria
  contained in the then-current  zoning laws, as opposed to those in place at
  the time of the 1989 consent judgment.  The commission  stated that the
  large scale and site design of the planned buildings created a 460-foot
  continuous  vertical wall that blocked lake views from public access
  trails.  The commission concluded that the  development would need to be
  scaled down and sited differently to avoid creating a massive visual 
  barrier and to better respect the area's natural areas.

       In September 1997, Larkin appealed the planning commission's decision
  to the environmental  court.  Larkin also filed a suit in the superior
  court, seeking damages and injunctive and declaratory  relief based on
  claims that the City's refusal to apply the consent judgment to his permit
  application  violated a court order, violated his constitutional due
  process and property rights, and constituted a  breach of contract.  The
  parties agreed to consolidate the two actions in the environmental court. 
  In  June 1998, the environmental court granted partial summary judgment in
  favor of Larkin, ruling that  the consent judgment applied to his zoning
  permit application.  The court remanded the matter to the  planning
  commission to consider the application in light of the 1989 consent
  judgment, and  simultaneously transferred the matter to the superior court,
  presumably to consider the viability of  Larkin's damage claims.  The City
  filed a notice of appeal of the environmental court's decision, but  this
  Court dismissed it for failure to appeal from a final judgment or seek
  interlocutory appeal.  In  July 1999, the planning commission granted
  Larkin approval to build two eighteen-unit residential  structures on the
  marina site.  The permit was granted under terms of the consent judgment.

       Meanwhile, the City moved for dismissal of the transferred superior
  court action, claiming that  the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
  to consider the matter.  In November 1998, the superior  court granted the
  City's motion, ruling that the environmental court had already granted
  Larkin the  declaratory relief he sought, and that he was not entitled to
  damages stemming from the City's  exercise of its governmental authority. 
  Noting that the City of Burlington and its planning  regulations had
  changed considerably since Northshore's permit application in the
  mid-1980s, the  court stated that the City may not barter away its
  attributes of sovereignty with respect to its zoning  powers.  In response
  to Larkin's motion for reconsideration, the court concluded that Larkin's 
  complaint should be dismissed not only for the reasons stated in its
  earlier order, but also because the  environmental court had exclusive
  subject matter jurisdiction over claims stemming from actions  taken by
  city officials concerning zoning matters.  On appeal, Larkin contends that
  the superior court  erred in dismissing his complaint for lack of subject
  matter jurisdiction, arguing that his claim for  damages was outside the
  environmental court's narrowly defined statutory authority, and that the 
  superior court retained jurisdiction over its own consent judgment.  For
  the most part, Larkin does  not brief the initial (and alternative) basis
  for the superior court's judgment - that the City was not  bound by a
  consent judgment requiring it to abdicate its zoning authority.  

 

       We need not address which court had subject matter jurisdiction over
  Larkin's damage claims  because, regardless of which one did, we agree with
  the superior court that those claims should be  dismissed.  Before
  addressing the substantive issues, we make the following preliminary
  points.   First, the environmental court's decision regarding the
  applicability of the consent judgment was not  a final judgment because the
  matter was remanded to the planning commission and transferred to the 
  superior court.  See Huddleston v. Univ. of Vermont, 168 Vt. 249, 251,