Case Title: BMJA, LLC v. Michael G. Murphy III and Kelly L. Murphy

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1081303

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2010-01-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:01/15/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010
_________________________
1081303
_________________________
BMJA, LLC 
v.
Michael G. Murphy III and Kelly L. Murphy
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court
(CV-08-901070)
BOLIN, Justice.
This appeal raises the question whether the filing of a
judgment in the probate court is sufficient to create a lien
on real property when §§ 6-9-210 and -211, Ala. Code 1975,
require the filing of a certificate of judgment in order to
1081303
2
create such a lien, and, if not, whether a later filed
certificate of judgment can relate back to the date the
judgment was entered for purposes of notice. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History
On August 23, 2006, Michael G. Murphy III and Kelly L.
Murphy filed a complaint against East Beach Development, LLC,
and Seaside Title Company, LLC; the dispute arose out of a
contract entered into by East Beach Development, LLC, and the
Murphys pursuant to which East Beach Development was to
construct and the Murphys were to purchase a unit in a
condominium development.  In their complaint, the Murphys
sought (1) damages for breach of contract; (2) a temporary
restraining order; and (3) injunctive relief, all relating to
the failure by East Beach Development, LLC, to close on the
condominium unit (hereinafter referred to as "the subject
property") "within fifteen days" and to construct the
condominium in accordance with the contract between the
Murphys and East Beach Development, LLC.
On August 22, 2007, the trial court issued the following
judgment in favor of the Murphys:
"Upon taking of testimony, the Court finds that
the parties breached terms and conditions in the
1081303
Neither party raises the issue whether this ruling was
1
a final judgment; we assume, without deciding, that it was.
3
contract and, therefore, the contract could not be
enforced by either party. [The Murphys] are,
therefore, entitled to refund of their earnest money
provided through a letter of credit.  Judgment for
[the Murphys] for the amount of the letter of
credit, each party to bear its own costs and
attorney fees."  
1
The Murphys recorded the judgment in the Baldwin County
Probate Court on the same day it was issued.  On May 14, 2008,
East Beach Development, LLC, transferred the subject property
to BMJA, LLC ("BMJA").  
On October 1, 2008, BMJA filed this proceeding against
the Murphys, requesting declaratory relief and seeking to
quiet title to the subject property. Thereafter, on January 5,
2009,  BMJA filed a motion for a summary judgment, along with
supporting documentation.  The Murphys filed a response
opposing 
BMJA's 
summary-judgment 
motion 
along 
with
documentation supporting its opposition.  The trial court
scheduled a hearing for February 17, 2009, but subsequently,
at the Murphys' request, continued the hearing pending the
outcome of a ruling by the trial court in the Murphys' earlier
proceeding on a Rule 60(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion filed by
the Murphys on January 26, 2009.  That motion asked the trial
1081303
4
court to amend, nunc pro tunc, its August 22, 2007, judgment
in order to include Kelly L. Murphy's name in the heading of
the judgment and to include the amount of the earnest money--
$100,000.  The motion also requested that the trial court
order the clerk of the court "to amend the minutes of court to
reflect the amendments and to issue a certificate of judgement
reflecting the amendments."  The trial court in the earlier
proceeding granted the Murphys' Rule 60(a) motion on January
29, 2009, and the certificate of judgment was filed in the
probate court on March 10, 2009.  The trial court in BMJA's
later filed action then denied BMJA's summary-judgment motion,
and the parties submitted the case for decision based on
factual stipulations.  On May 18, 2009, the trial court
entered a final judgment in favor of the Murphys.  BMJA
appeals, raising the following issues: (1) whether the August
22, 2007, judgment that was recorded in the probate court was
sufficient under the provisions of Ala. Code 1975, §§ 6-9-210
and -211, to constitute a lien on the subject property
acquired by BMJA from East Beach Development, LLC, and (2)
whether the March 10, 2009, certificate of judgment obtained
by the Murphys and filed in the probate court that same day
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5
relates back to the August 22, 2007, judgment, so as to
constitute a lien as of that date. 
II.  Standard of Review
"The trial court in this case applied the law to
undisputed, stipulated facts. Our review therefore
is de novo.
"'When reviewing a case in which the trial
court sat without a jury and heard evidence
in the form of stipulations, briefs, and
the writings of the parties, this Court
sits in judgment of the evidence; there is
no presumption of correctness. Old Southern
Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 544 So. 2d 941,
942 (Ala. 1989); Craig Constr. Co. v.
Hendrix, 568 So. 2d 752, 756 (Ala. 1990).
When this Court must determine if the trial
court misapplied the law to the undisputed
facts, the standard of review is de novo,
and no presumption of correctness is given
the decision of the trial court. State
Dep't of Revenue v. Garner, 812 So. 2d 380,
382 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001); see also Ex
parte Graham, 702 So. 2d 1215 (Ala. 1997).
In this case the trial court based its
decision upon the stipulations, briefs,
writings, and arguments of the parties'
attorneys. No testimony was presented.
Therefore, we must sit in judgment of the
evidence, and the trial court's ruling
carries no presumption of correctness.'"
American Res. Ins. Co. v. H & H Stephens Constr., Inc., 939
So. 2d 868, 872-73 (Ala. 2006)(quoting Bean Dredging, L.L.C.
v. Alabama Dep't of Revenue, 855 So. 2d 513, 516-17 (Ala.
2003)).
1081303
6
III.  Discussion
BMJA first asserts that the August 22, 2007, judgment is
legally  insufficient  under  Ala. Code 1975, §§ 6-9-210 and
-211, to constitute a lien on the subject property because, it
says, those statutes make no provision for recording judgments
in the probate court.  BMJA asserts that those statutes
instead mandate the filing of a certificate of judgment.  
Section 6-9-210, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in part:
"The owner of any judgment entered in any court
of this state ... may file in the office of the
judge of probate of any county of this state a
certificate of the clerk or register of the court by
which the judgment was entered, which certificate
shall show the style of the court which entered the
judgment, the amount and date thereof, the amount of
costs, the names of all parties thereto and the name
of the plaintiff's attorney and shall be registered
by the judge of probate in a book to be kept by him
for that purpose, which said register shall also
show the date of the filing of the judgment."
(Emphasis added.)
Section 6-9-211, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in part:
"Every judgment, a certificate of which has been
filed as provided in Section 6-9-210, shall be a
lien in the county where filed on all property of
the defendant which is subject to levy and sale
under execution. ... The filing of said certificate
of judgment, as provided in Section 6-9-210, shall
be notice to all persons of the existence of the
lien thereby created."
1081303
7
(Emphasis added.)
The express language of § 6-9-210, Ala. Code 1975,
requires that the owner of a judgment seeking to create a lien
must file a certificate of judgment in the probate court.  In
Saenger Theatres Corp. v. McDermott, 239 Ala. 629, 633, 196
So. 265, 268 (1940), this Court stated:
"We deem it not out of place to observe that the
statute, Code 1923, § 7874 [now § 6-9-210], does not
authorize judgments to be recorded 'in the Probate
Court.'  What it does authorize is that 'a
certificate of the clerk or register of the court by
which the judgment or decree was rendered' be filed
and registered 'in the office of the judge of
probate.'"
(Emphasis added.)  In AmSouth Bank v. Holberg, 789 So. 2d 833
(Ala. 2001), this Court held that a party's filing of a copy
of a divorce judgment in the probate court was not sufficient
to create a lien and that, instead, the party must file a
certificate of judgment.  The Murphys argued in the trial
court that the judgment they filed in the Baldwin County
Probate Court on August 22, 2007, complied with the statutory
requirements because, they argue, the standards for compliance
with §§ 6-9-210 and -211 have been relaxed. This Court
dismissed a similar argument in Holberg, stating:
1081303
8
     "Ms. Holberg, the former wife, argues that the
statement quoted here from Saenger Theatres [Corp.
v. McDermott, 237 Ala. 489, 187 So. 460 (1939)], was
dictum and that the Corte [v. Massey, 582 So. 2d
1108 (Ala. 1991),] decision is not controlling
because the Court did not discuss the reasons for
reaching its conclusion in that case. Further, she
cites Bank of Anniston v. Farmers & Merchants State
Bank of Krum, Texas, 507 So. 2d 927 (Ala. 1987), and
Bowman v. SouthTrust Bank of Mobile, 551 So. 2d 984
(Ala. 1989), for the proposition that this Court has
relaxed its requirement of strict compliance with
the provisions of §§ 6-9-210 and -211. In Bank of
Anniston, this Court considered a case in which the
address of the defendant was not accurately listed
on the certificate of judgment. This Court stated:
"'We 
note 
... 
that 
the 
statutory
requirement that the contents of the
certificate 
of 
judgment 
be 
strictly
observed must be viewed in relation to the
purpose of the requirement. That purpose is
to provide notice of the judgment to anyone
searching title to the real property....
Here, ... the certificate of judgment was
within the chain of title and would have
given notice to anyone searching title to
the property.'
"507 So. 2d at 929. This Court also stated:
"'We cannot say that the trial court erred
in finding that the certificate of judgment
complied 
with 
the 
requirements 
of 
§
6-9-210. To hold otherwise would be a
triumph of form over substance.'
"507 So. 2d at 930.
     "In Bank of Anniston, and in Bowman as well,
this Court considered a challenge to the validity of
a judgment lien; in each case, the challenge was
1081303
9
based on an argument that the certificate of
judgment filed in the case had failed to meet the
requirements of §§ 6-9-210 and -211. In both cases,
this Court, as Ms. Holberg points out, retreated
somewhat from a strict application of the provisions
of those statutes. However, AmSouth argues that
those cases are distinguishable, and we agree.
     "AmSouth argues that Bank of Anniston and
Bowman are distinguishable because in each of those
cases the owner of the judgment filed a certificate
of judgment in the probate court. The problem in
each of those cases was that the certificate did not
include all the information required by § 6-9-210.
In this present case, however, the wife did not file
a certificate of judgment at all. Rather, she filed
a copy of the judgment of divorce.
     "Ms. Holberg argues that that distinction is
not relevant and that this Court should recognize
her filing of a copy of the judgment as sufficient
to meet the requirements of the statutes:
"'After Bowman, ... it is clear that it is
the notice aspect of a recorded judgment
that creates the judgment lien set forth in
§ 6-9-211, and not strict compliance with
the statutory requirements. It is a short
step to recognize the notice given by a
recorded original or copy of a judgment.'
"(Brief of appellee at 8.)  We decline the
invitation to take that 'short step.'
   "As this Court has frequently stated, when a
court construes a statute, the court must 'ascertain
the legislative intent from the language used in the
enactment,' and, it has stated, 'When the statutory
pronouncement is clear and not susceptible to a
different 
interpretation, it is the paramount
judicial duty of a court to abide by that clear
pronouncement.' Parker v. Hilliard, 567 So. 2d 1343
(Ala. 1990). To do otherwise would infringe on the
1081303
10
powers 
reserved 
by 
our 
Constitution 
to 
the
Legislature.
     "We must respectfully disagree with the [trial]
court's holding. Bowman and Bank of Anniston are
distinguishable and are thus not controlling. We
also conclude that we are not at liberty to waive
the 
clearly 
expressed 
requirement 
of 
the
Legislature, evidenced in § 6-9-210, that the
judgment creditor seeking to create a judgment lien
file a certificate of judgment."
 
789 So. 2d at 836-37. 
In the instant case, as in Holberg, the Murphys filed
with the probate court only a copy of the August 22, 2007,
judgment; they did not file a certificate of judgment as
required by § 6-9-210, Ala. Code 1975.  Accordingly, the
filing of the judgment failed to create a lien against the
subject property on that date.  The lien is established upon
the filing of a certificate of judgment with the probate
court.  Reuf v. Fulks, 219 Ala. 252, 122 So. 14 (1929).  
The second issue this Court must address is whether the
March 10, 2009, certificate of judgment obtained by the
Murphys and filed in the probate court on March 10, 2009,
relates back to the August 22, 2007, filing of a copy of the
trial court's judgment, thereby making the judgment lien
effective as of the earlier date. As previously noted, after
BMJA filed its motion for a summary judgment in the later
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11
action, apparently pointing out the Murphys' defective filing,
the Murphys filed a motion requesting that the trial court
that issued the August 22, 2007, judgment amend that judgment,
nunc pro tunc, to include Kathy L. Murphy's name in the
heading, to include the amount of earnest money, and to issue
a certificate of judgment.  The trial court granted their
motion and issued a certificate of judgment, dated March 10,
2009, which the Murphys then filed in the probate court.  The
Murphys contend on appeal that the amended judgment relates
back to the August 22, 2007, judgment and that the filing of
the certificate of judgment evidencing the amended judgment
thereby created a judgment lien against the subject property
on the date the first judgment was filed.  BMJA, on the other
hand, contends that there is no process of "relation back"
under Alabama law whereby a properly prepared certificate of
judgment takes effect at any date earlier than the date of its
actual recordation, i.e., in this case March 10, 2009.  We
agree.  
In Pierce v. American General Finance, Inc., 991 So. 2d
212, 216 (Ala. 2008), this Court stated:
"In Ex parte Brown, 963 So. 2d 604 (Ala. 2007),
this 
Court 
quoted 
the 
following 
'instructive
discussion of the scope of a trial court's authority
1081303
12
to correct a clerical mistake' under Rule 60(a) from
the Court of Civil Appeals' decision in Higgins v.
Higgins, 952 So. 2d 1144 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006):
"'"'The object of a Rule 60(a)[,
Ala. R. Civ. P.,] motion or a
judgment nunc pro tunc is to make
the judgment or the record speak
the truth.  Under Rule 60(a) a
correction may be made by the
trial court at any time.
"'"'The 
trial 
court's
authority to enter a Rule 60(a)
order or a judgment nunc pro tunc
is not unbridled.  It cannot be
used to enlarge or modify a
judgment or to make a judgment
say something other than what was
originally said.  If the mistake
involves an exercise of judicial
discretion, any correction is
beyond the scope of Rule 60(a)
....'
"'"McGiboney v. McGiboney, 679 So. 2d 1066,
1068 
(Ala. 
Civ. 
App. 
1995)(citations
omitted)."'"
In the instant case, the Murphys, on August 22, 2007,
filed in the probate court a copy of the trial court's
judgment, not a certificate of judgment. They contend that
their lien was effective as of that date because the
subsequent nunc pro tunc order, which provided for and became
the basis for the March 10, 2009, certificate of judgment,
related back not only to correct errors or omissions in the
1081303
13
initial money judgment, but also to cause the later filed
certificate of judgment to relate back to August 22, 2007.
The effect of this would be to subject BMJA to notice of a
judgment lien on the subject property on May 14, 2008, when
the subject property was purchased, even though that lien
could attach only by relation back from an as yet unknown
future act. On the date of its purchase, BMJA was not privy to
notice of any proper judgment lien affecting the subject
property it sought to acquire from East Beach Development,
LLC.  The requirements of § 6-9-210, Ala. Code 1975, must be
met in order to provide "notice to all persons of the
existence 
of 
the 
lien thereby created."
§ 6-9-211, Ala. Code
1975.
     In Conn v. Sellers, 198 Ala. 606, 608, 73 So. 961, 962
(1917), this Court stated:
"[T]he rule of law in respect of the effect of nunc
pro tunc proceedings is that a purchaser of real
estate takes it charged with only such judgment
liens as actually existed at the time of the
purchase, and it is not competent for a court to
fasten a lien upon the land of a third person by the
rendition of a nunc pro tunc judgment against his
grantor (1 Black on Judg. § 410), nor could the
certificate registered with the judge of probate
have been amended so as to affect plaintiff's
previously acquired title."
(Emphasis added.) 
1081303
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The creation of a judgment lien on the date the
certificate of judgment is recorded protects the substantive
rights of third parties like BMJA.  Specifically, third
parties like BMJA, seeking to secure any interest in real
property, must be able to rely upon public records to furnish
full and complete information of any conveyances, liens, or
other encumbrances affecting the real property.  Accordingly,
the trial court's amended judgment, nunc pro tunc, issuing a
certificate of judgment retroactive to August 22, 2007, fell
beyond the purview of Rule 60(a), Ala. R. Civ. P.  That
amendment sought to enlarge the August 22, 2007, judgment by
creating a lien that did not exist on that date by virtue of
the fact that the Murphys had filed only a copy of the trial's
court judgment in the probate court, not a certificate of
judgment as required by statute. Giving nunc pro tunc
relation-back treatment of the certificate of judgment would,
under these circumstances, be inimical to the legislative
purpose of § 6-9-210, Ala. Code 1975, to provide notice to
potential purchasers of the existence of a lien or other
encumbrance affecting real property.  Section 6-9-210, Ala.
Code 1975, being in derogation of common law, must be strictly
construed.  Miles v. Gay, 280 Ala. 131, 190 So. 2d 686 (1965).
1081303
15
We, therefore, conclude that the judgment lien in this case
was created when the certificate of judgment was actually
recorded, i.e., on March 10, 2009, subsequent to BMJA's
purchase of the subject property.  Accordingly, the trial
court's  judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for
proceedings  consistent with this opinion. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Stuart, and Murdock, JJ., concur.