Case Title: Lewis v. Trimble

Citation: 1997-Ohio-393

Docket Number: 19952427

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-07-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
LEWIS, APPELLANT, v. TRIMBLE, ADMR., BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, 
ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Lewis v. Trimble (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 231.] 
Workers’ compensation — Application and requirements of R.C. 4123.84 with 
regard to “flow-through” or residual medical conditions — Self-insured 
employer makes a conclusive determination to allow a claim for a residual 
or “flow-through” condition, when. 
1. 
R.C. 4123.84 requires that written notice of the specific part or parts of the 
body claimed to have been injured must be given within two years of the 
time the claimant knew or should have known of the nature and seriousness 
of the residual or “flow-through” condition and its causal relation to his or 
her industrial injury.  (Clementi v. Wean United, Inc. [1988], 39 Ohio St.3d 
342, 530 N.E.2d 909, modified.) 
2. 
A self-insured employer makes a conclusive determination to allow a claim 
for a residual or “flow-through” condition when it accepts the condition as 
part of the claim, even where such acceptance occurs after the limitations 
period set forth in R.C. 4123.84 has run.  (State ex rel. Baker Material 
Handling Corp. v. Indus. Comm. [1994], 69 Ohio St.3d 202, 631 N.E.2d 
138, paragraph one of the syllabus, followed.) 
(No. 95-2427 — Submitted March 5, 1997 — Decided July 23, 1997.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Greene County, No. 95-CA-37. 
 
On May 31, 1987, claimant-appellant, Carles B. Lewis, received an injury in 
the course of, and arising out of, his employment with appellee, Dayton Power & 
Light Company, a self-insured employer (“employer”).  An application for 
benefits was filed with the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation and the claim was 
 
2
allowed for “recurrent right ventral hernia.”  Thereafter, compensation and 
benefits were paid by the employer for this condition. 
 
On October 1, 1987, claimant filed an application for Social Security 
disability benefits with the Department of Health and Human Services.  In 
conjunction with those proceedings, a psychological evaluation was conducted by 
William R. Arnold, Ph.D., on March 24, 1988, at the request of claimant’s 
counsel.  Dr. Arnold’s primary diagnosis was that claimant suffers from 
“Adjustment Disorder with depressed mood moderate,” noting that “the current 
anxiety and depressive symptoms are primarily reactive to his deteriorating 
physical status.” 
 
On February 25, 1992, claimant filed a motion with the Industrial 
Commission of Ohio (“commission”) requesting that “the instant claim be 
additionally recognized for the [psychological] condition of dysthymia pursuant to 
Dr. Arnold’s report of September 6, 1990.”  Claimant filed another motion on 
August 5, 1992, requesting an allowance for major depression and panic disorder 
with agoraphobia. 
 
In response to claimant’s motions, the employer had claimant examined by 
Dr. Richard H. Clary, M.D.  In his report, dated September 25, 1992, Dr. Clary 
noted that claimant “saw a psychologist, Dr. Arnold in 1988 for Social Security 
disability and * * * that since he has been unable to work in 1987, he has felt 
anxious and depressed.”  Dr. Clary opined that claimant “has been suffering from 
major depression and panic disorder for over 2 years * * *.  [His] psychiatric 
problems are permanent at this time and he is unable to return to his former 
employment.” 
 
On November 16, 1992, the employer filed a motion which stated: 
 
3
 
“Now comes the employer and indicates that they [sic] will accept the 
condition diagnosed by Dr. Clary as indicated in the attached report.  The 
employer further requests that an order be placed in the claim indicating that as a 
result of the conditions in this claim including the accepted depression, the 
claimant’s condition is permanent.” 
 
The employer alleges that subsequent to filing this motion, it discovered the 
existence and content of Dr. Arnold’s 1988 report rendered in conjunction with the 
proceedings on claimant’s request for Social Security disability benefits.  It claims 
that “[w]hen the allowance issue was first heard by the District Hearing Officer, * 
* * the statute of limitations defense [i.e., that claimant’s request for an additional 
allowance was time-barred under R.C. 4123.84] was raised.  The defense was 
asserted at each administrative level thereafter.”  Claimant does not dispute these 
allegations. 
 
The claim was allowed administratively for the condition “major depression 
and panic disorder with agoraphobia,” and thereafter appealed to the Greene 
County Court of Common Pleas.  After the filing of cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the trial court found that claimant’s claim for additional psychological 
conditions is barred by the two-year limitations period set forth in R.C. 4123.84. 
 
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, finding that 
the employer “is not estopped from asserting that the [claimant’s] claim is time-
barred under R.C. 4123.84 although it may have acquiesced in [claimant’s] claim 
after the limitation period expired because the limitation period invokes the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
___________________ 
 
4
 
E. S. Gallon & Associates and James R. Piercy, for appellant. 
 
Dunlevey, Mahan & Furry, Gary W. Auman, William H. Barney III and 
William P. Allen, for appellee Dayton Power & Light Company. 
 
Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy and Marc J. Jaffy, 
urging reversal for amici curiae, Ohio AFL-CIO and Ohio Academy of Trial 
Lawyers. 
___________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  This appeal raises two important issues under 
Ohio’s workers’ compensation law.  The first issue involves the application and 
requirements of R.C. 4123.84 with regard to “flow-through” or residual medical 
conditions.  The second issue is whether a self-insured employer who accepts a 
“flow-through” or residual condition as allowed, after the two-year limitations 
period set forth in R.C. 4123.84 has run, has conclusively granted that condition as 
part of the claim. 
I 
R.C. 4123.84 and Residual Conditions 
 
R.C. 4123.841 provides: 
 
“(A) In all cases of injury or death, claims for compensation or benefits for 
the specific part or parts of the body injured shall be forever barred unless, within 
two years after the injury or death: 
 
“(1) Written notice of the specific part or parts of the body claimed to have 
been injured has been made to the industrial commission or the bureau of workers’ 
compensation; 
 
“* * * 
 
“(3) In the event the employer is a self-insuring employer, one of the 
following has occurred: 
 
5
 
“(a) Written notice of the specific part or parts of the body claimed to have 
been injured has been given to the commission or bureau * * *; 
 
“* * * 
 
“(C) The commission has continuing jurisdiction as set forth in section 
4123.52 of the Revised Code over a claim which meets the requirement of this 
section, including jurisdiction to award compensation or benefits for loss or 
impairment of bodily functions developing in a part or parts of the body not 
specified pursuant to division (A)(1) of this section, if the commission finds that 
the loss or impairment of bodily functions was due to and a result of or a residual 
of the injury to one of the parts of the body set forth in the written notice filed 
pursuant to division (A)(1) of this section.” 
 
R.C. 4123.52 provides: 
 
“No modification or change nor any finding or award in respect of any 
claim shall be made with respect to disability, compensation, dependency, or 
benefits, after six years from the date of injury * * * unless written notice of claim 
for the specific part or parts of the body injured or disabled has been given as 
provided in section 4123.84 or 4123.85 of the Revised Code, and the commission 
shall not make any modification, change, finding, or award which shall award 
compensation for a back period in excess of two years prior to the date of filing 
application therefor. This section does not affect the right of a claimant to 
compensation accruing subsequent to the filing of any such application, provided 
the application is filed within the time limit provided in this section.” 
 
In Clementi v. Wean United, Inc. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 342, 530 N.E.2d 
909, this court sought to interpret the relationship between R.C. 4123.84 and 
4123.52, and concluded that “[t]he 1967 amendments to R.C. 4123.84 [H.B. No. 
268, 132 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1432-1433, effective December 11, 1967] and 
 
6
4123.52 apparently were made to expand the notice requirements and therefore the 
statute of limitations requirements to residual or flow-through conditions.”  Id. at 
346, 530 N.E.2d at 913.  We held that “R.C. 4123.84 requires a claimant to file a 
motion for an additional allowance within two years of the time the claimant knew 
or should have known of the additional condition.”  Id. at syllabus. 
 
Claimant does not challenge Clementi’s application of R.C. 4123.84’s 
notice requirements to residual or “flow-through” conditions.  Instead, claimant 
seeks a clarification of Clementi’s holding, particularly with reference to 
identifying those characteristics of a claimant’s residual condition and his or her 
knowledge thereof which will cause the statutory period to start to run. 
 
In considering claimant’s request, it has become apparent that Clementi’s 
holding has generated substantial confusion.  In a literal sense, Clementi seems to 
impose upon a claimant requirements that are either not imposed under R.C. 
4123.84 or directly conflict with other statutory provisions and case law.   
 
 
The syllabus in Clementi begins with the phrase:  “R.C. 4123.84 requires a 
claimant to file * * *.”  However, R.C. 4123.84 requires only that “[w]ritten notice 
* * * has been made” or that “[w]ritten notice * * * has been given.”  R.C. 
4123.84(A)(1) and (A)(3)(a).  The operative language was the same under the 
1967 amendments, and has remained unchanged through five subsequent 
amendments.  133 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1621; 136 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1173; 137 
Ohio Laws, Part II, 3960-3961; 143 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3378; 145 Ohio Laws, 
Part II, 3185.  In focusing its attention on a number of lower court decisions, the 
Clementi  court overlooked former R.C. 4123.512(A) (now R.C. 4123.511[A]), 
which expressly provided that “[i]f the administrator shall receive from a person 
other than the claimant written information indicating that an injury * * * has 
occurred * * *, [t]he receipt of such information and such notice by the 
 
7
administrator shall be considered an application for compensation under section 
4123.84 * * * of the Revised Code.”  136 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1150.  Also 
overlooked was our prior decision in Mewhorter v. Ex-Cell-O Corp. (1986), 23 
Ohio St.3d 13, 23 OBR 11, 490 N.E.2d 610.  There we held that: 
 
“Pursuant to R.C. 4123.84, notice of a claim by a third party to the Bureau 
of Workers’ Compensation referring to a prior claim, and filed within two years of 
the occurrence of the injury underlying such prior claim, gives the court 
jurisdiction over the subsequent claim.”  Id. at syllabus. 
 
The syllabus in Clementi goes on to require a claimant to file “a motion.”  
As astutely observed in Fulton, Ohio Workers’ Compensation Law (1991) 93, 
Section 5.7: 
 
“The use of the term ‘motion’ is unfortunate because it causes confusion.  A 
motion, or C-86, is an intra-agency application form designed by the Bureau for 
parties to use in seeking a determination on any matter.  As [a] notice statute[ ], 
R.C. * * * 4123.84 * * * merely require[s] notice of the body parts affected by a 
claimed residual injury.  The statute does not require the giving of notice on any 
particular form or on any particular blank of a form [Toler v. Copeland Corp. 
(1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 88, 5 OBR 140, 448 N.E.2d 1386], and technical rules of 
procedure should not be allowed to defeat an otherwise valid claim.  [State ex rel. 
Gatlin v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 246, 18 OBR 302, 480 
N.E.2d 487; W.S. Tyler Co. v. Rebic (1928), 118 Ohio St. 522, 161 N.E. 790.]  
Clementi’s use of the word ‘motion’ does not mandate any greater specificity for 
notice of residual injuries than R.C. * * * 4123.84 * * * generally require[s] for 
the original injury.” 
 
It is difficult to ascertain from the opinion in Clementi whether this court 
really sought to impose the requirement of filing a motion under R.C. 4123.84, or 
 
8
was merely tailoring its holding to reflect the facts of the case.  The court did, 
however, emphasize the last sentence of the first paragraph of R.C. 4123.52:  
“This section does not affect the right of a claimant to compensation accruing 
subsequent to the filing of any such application; provided such application is filed 
within the applicable time limit as provided in this section.”  Id., 39 Ohio St.3d at 
343, 530 N.E.2d at 910. 
 
This seems to suggest that the Clementi court drew support from the term 
“application” in R.C. 4123.52 to require the filing of a “motion” under R.C. 
4123.84 in the case of residual conditions.  However, even if R.C. 4123.52 could 
somehow be construed to require the filing of an application under R.C. 4123.84, 
and even if the term “application” envisions the filing of a motion in the case of 
residual conditions, it is clear from reading R.C. 4123.52 in pari materia with R.C. 
4123.84 and 4123.511(A) (formerly R.C. 4123.512[A]), that any written 
information given to the commission or bureau indicating that an injury has 
occurred to a specific part or parts of the body claimed to have been injured 
constitutes an “application,” and thus “notice,” under R.C. 4123.84. 
 
In fact, this was precisely the issue in Mewhorter, 23 Ohio St.3d 13, 23 
OBR 11, 490 N.E.2d 610.  In that case, claimant was injured on July 30, 1976.  
His claim for injury to his right arm, shoulder, and hand was denied.  He was 
admitted to the hospital and an anterior discectomy of the C 6-7 extruded disc was 
performed.  On April 17, 1978, the bureau received a fee bill and medical reports 
regarding the disc surgery from claimant’s self-insured employer, who had 
received the information from claimant’s surgeon.  However, claimant did not file 
a motion for recognition of the spinal injury until February 22, 1979.  Thus, the fee 
bill and attachments were filed within two years from the date of injury, but the 
motion was not.  The commission denied the claim for the reason that it had not 
 
9
been filed as to the spinal injury within two years of the date of the industrial 
accident as mandated by R.C. 4123.84.  We reversed, finding that upon “[r]eading 
[former] R.C. 4123.512 in pari materia with R.C. 4123.84 * * *, there can be no 
doubt that the bill and attachments, submitted by Dr. Lin to claimant’s employer 
and subsequently forwarded to the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation within the 
limitations period, were adequate for jurisdictional purposes.”  Id., 23 Ohio St.3d 
at 15, 23 OBR at 13, 490 N.E.2d at 612. 
 
Next, the motion (or notice) that Clementi requires a claimant to file is one 
“for an additional allowance.”  Id. at syllabus.    This is misleading because it 
implies that more is required under R.C. 4123.84(A)(1) than “[w]ritten notice of 
the specific part or parts of the body claimed to have been injured.”  It tends to 
indicate, in a strict sense, that in order to comply with R.C. 4123.84(A)(1), the 
notice must refer to the specific nature of the medical condition or impairment.  
However, in Dent v. AT&T Technologies, Inc. (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 187, 527 
N.E.2d 821, syllabus, this court specifically held: 
 
“An injured employee is required to give written notice of the specific part 
or parts of the body claimed to have been injured within two years after the injury, 
but is not required to include in such notice the specific nature of the physical 
condition or impairment resulting from such injury.  (R.C. 4123.84 and 4123.52, 
construed.)” 
 
Clementi’s holding required the claimant to file a motion for an additional 
allowance “within two years of the time that claimant knew or should have known 
of the additional condition.”  39 Ohio St.3d 342, 530 N.E.2d 909, syllabus.  In 
using the term “additional” to qualify the term “condition,” the court misspoke.  
An additional condition is different from a residual or flow-through condition.  An 
additional condition is a new condition occurring in a body part for which proper 
 
10
written notice has already been given in the original claim.  Additional conditions, 
by definition, are not subject to the two-year limitations period set forth in R.C. 
4123.84.  Dent, supra, 38 Ohio St.3d at 189, 527 N.E.2d at 824.  Since the 
Clementi court acknowledged that the purpose of the 1967 amendments to R.C. 
4123.84 was “to expand the notice requirements and therefore the statute of 
limitations requirements to residual or flow-through conditions,” 39 Ohio St.3d at 
346, 530 N.E.2d at 913, i.e., conditions developing in a body part not originally 
alleged to have been injured, Dent, supra, 38 Ohio St.3d at 189, 527 N.E.2d at 
824, we cannot accept that Clementi’s intent was to overrule Dent. 
 
Also, although Clementi adopted the “knew or should have known” test, it 
did not adequately inform as to what it is that the claimant must or should be 
aware of to start the running of the limitations period.  In other words, what does it 
mean to have knowledge or its equivalent of “the condition”? 
 
Claimant argues that the two-year limitations period under R.C. 4123.84 
should not begin to run until such time as “(1) There is a specific diagnosis made 
of the psychiatric or medical condition at issue; (2) The injured worker is informed 
of that diagnosis; and (3) The injured worker is informed that the medical or 
psychiatric condition is causally related to the preceding industrial injury.”  The 
employer argues that the period commences at the time claimant knew or should 
have known that “his psychological problems, or symptoms, were related to his 
industrial injury.  The focus is on the part, or parts, of the body not the ‘nature’ or 
diagnosis of the problem.” 
 
As with many competing positions, the answer lies somewhere in between.  
“[T]he purpose of the initial filing period of R.C. 4123.84 ‘* * * is to enable the 
employers to protect themselves by prompt investigation of the injuries.  It is 
primarily a notice requirement.’”  Mewhorter, supra, 23 Ohio St.3d at 14, 23 OBR 
 
11
at 12, 490 N.E.2d at 611, quoting Nackley, The Initial Filing Period in Ohio 
Workers’ Compensation Law (1980), 7 N.Ky.L.Rev. 33, 34.  The statute contains 
a number of exceptions to the requirement for written notice, such as where a 
state-fund employer pays wages in lieu of total disability compensation, or a self-
insured employer furnishes treatment or pays compensation or benefits.  R.C. 
4123.84(A)(2), (A)(3)(a) and (b).  These exceptions are in the nature of waiver.  
“By paying compensation or benefits, the self-insurer is in effect waiving the two-
year bar set forth in R.C. 4123.84, since the employer is put on notice of a possible 
claim.”  Wargetz v. Villa Sancta Anna Home for the Aged (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 
15, 17, 11 OBR 49, 51, 462 N.E.2d 1215, 1217.  The exceptions, being in the 
nature of waiver, look to the actions of the employer. 
 
However, like most workers’ compensation statutes of limitations, R.C. 
4123.84 “merely dates the period from the time of injury, disability, or accident, 
saying nothing about time of [claimant’s] discovery of the nature of the condition.  
Yet the great majority of the courts have been sufficiently impressed with the 
acute unfairness of a literal application of this language to read in an implied 
condition suspending the running of the statute until by reasonable care and 
diligence it is discoverable and apparent that a compensable injury has been 
sustained. 
 
“The number of jurisdictions that are still capable of destroying 
compensation rights for failure to file a claim at a time when its existence could 
not reasonably have been known has dwindled to three or four at the most, all 
under statutes dating the period from time to [sic, of] accident rather than time of 
injury.”  2B Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law (1996) 15-254 to 15-257, 
Section 78.41(b). 
 
12
 
Thus, the “knew or should have known” standard was adopted in Clementi 
in an apparent attempt to temper the literal harshness of R.C. 4123.84’s bar.  It is a 
judicial concession that a literal application of the statute oftentimes exacts the 
impossible of a claimant, demanding more of him or her than can reasonably be 
expected of a prudent person in asserting his or her rights.   
 
In Edwards v. AT&T Technologies, Inc. (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 119, 537 
N.E.2d 1305, claimant’s workers’ compensation claim was allowed for upper and 
lower back injuries sustained on February 10, 1976.  On December 6, 1982, she 
requested an additional allowance for “depressive neurosis.”  However, more than 
two years prior to the filing of her motion, claimant had been examined by four 
doctors, whose reports noted “some distinct indications of functional overlay,” 
“evidence of psychosomatic overlay,” “a psychophysiological reaction,” 
“conversional” symptoms, and “some conversion anxiety.”  Id., 42 Ohio St.3d at 
119, 537 N.E.2d at 1305. 
 
In applying Clementi to these facts, this court held that, although the four 
reports preceded claimant’s motion by more than two years, “we are unconvinced 
that their references to a possible psychiatric condition were sufficient to put 
[claimant] on notice of a psychiatric condition related to her industrial injury.  
Absent such evidence, we find [claimant’s] application timely.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Id., 42 Ohio St.3d at 120, 537 N.E.2d at 1306. 
 
Edwards accords with the overwhelming majority of courts which hold, in 
one form or another, that “[t]he time period for notice or claim does not begin to 
run until the claimant, as a reasonable person, should recognize the nature, 
seriousness, and probable compensable character of his or her injury or disease.”  
2B Larson, supra, at 15-206, Section 78.41(a). 
 
13
 
Since this standard is essentially one of due diligence, the focus properly 
rests upon the reasonableness of claimant’s conduct under all the surrounding 
circumstances.  This requires that all relevant factors bearing on the question of 
reasonableness be considered, including, but not limited to, the information 
available to claimant, his or her experience, education and intellectual functioning, 
and what he or she has been told or not told about the nature, seriousness, and 
probable compensable character of the condition. 
 
In this context, it becomes clear that whether or not claimant is informed of 
a specific diagnosis is not itself a determinative inquiry, but constitutes one factor 
to be considered.  Thus, under a particular set of circumstances it may be properly 
found that the statute begins to run when the claimant is informed of a specific 
diagnosis.  See, e.g., Mikoch v. Sherwin-Williams Co. (1988), 45 Ohio App.3d 1, 
3, 544 N.E.2d 698, 700 (claimant “could [not] report an ‘organic brain syndrome’ 
before his doctors diagnosed it.”); Forster v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp. (1995), 
102 Ohio App.3d 744, 658 N.E.2d 7 (limitations period held to commence when 
diagnosis of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was made, not when claimant 
previously experienced tingling in his hands). 
 
If we were to hold that the date of diagnosis can under no circumstances be 
the date the statute begins to run, we would effectively place the burden of 
diagnosis on the claimant.  Indeed, this is what the court attempted to do in 
McCurdy v. Mihm (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 363, 370, 624 N.E.2d 760, 765, when it 
stated that “an injured employee can file for benefits before the statute has run [for 
dysthymia, a condition which cannot be diagnosed until two years has elapsed] by 
claiming a ‘depression disorder not otherwise specified’ — a DSM-3 claim that is 
clearly listed by the commission as available.”  Yet, there are more than three 
hundred diagnoses listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
 
14
Disorders (3 Ed.1987) 509-515, Appendix H.  “Plainly claimant should be 
expected to display no greater diagnostic skill than any other uninformed 
layperson confronted with the early symptoms of a progressive condition.”  2B 
Larson, supra, at 15-268 to 15-269, Section 78.41(d). 
 
On the other hand, the date of diagnosis does not necessarily determine the 
date the statute begins to run.  The limitations period may properly be found to 
commence before the claimant is informed of a specific diagnosis.  Thus, the court 
in McCurdy was astute in its observation that “[a]ctual knowledge of a specific 
diagnosis is not required to commence the statute of limitations period.”  Id., 89 
Ohio App.3d at 369, 624 N.E.2d at 764.  As well stated by the trial court in that 
case, “ ‘[t]he fact that [claimant] found a doctor to put the label of “dysthymia” on 
his problem in 1989 does not change his own testimony that he knew of the 
problem within a few months of the [October 22, 1980] injury.’ ”  Id. at 365, 624 
N.E.2d at 762.  “[I]t is not necessary for the claimant to know the exact diagnosis 
or medical name for the condition if he or she knows enough about its nature to 
realize that it is both serious and work-connected.”  2B Larson, supra, at 15-271, 
Section 78.41(d). 
 
However, there are circumstances where the limitations period may remain 
tolled even after claimant is informed of a specific diagnosis.  This can occur 
where the diagnosis is confusing or misleading, or where the claimant cannot be 
reasonably expected to know what the diagnosis means.  See 2B Larson, supra, at 
15-277 to 15-279, Section 78.41(d), and 15-283 to 15-286, Section 78.41(f). 
 
The limitations period may also remain tolled where, even though the 
claimant knows he or she is suffering from some condition, the claimant had no 
reason to be aware of the seriousness of the condition.  “This feature is a salutary 
requirement, since any other rule would force employees to rush in with claims for 
 
15
every minor ache, pain, or symptom.  So, if the claimant knows he or she has some 
shortness of breath, a back injury, or even a hernia, failure to file a claim promptly 
may be excused if claimant had no reason to believe the condition serious.”  Id. at 
15-279 to 15-281, Section 78.41(e). 
 
Accordingly, we hold that R.C. 4123.84 requires that written notice of the 
specific part or parts of the body claimed to have been injured must be given 
within two years of the time the claimant knew or should have known of the nature 
and seriousness of the residual or “flow-through” condition and its causal relation 
to his or her employment. 
 
Applying this standard to the case sub judice, we find summary judgment to 
be inappropriate.  Claimant was examined by Dr. Arnold in 1988 and not again 
until August or September 1990.  Notice of a psychiatric condition was first given 
on February 25, 1992, when claimant filed his motion for allowance of dysthymia 
along with Dr. Arnold’s report dated September 6, 1990.  Thus, notice was given 
within two years of Dr. Arnold’s second report, but not within two years of his 
first report.  Accordingly, if claimant knew or should have known the nature, 
seriousness, and probable compensability of his psychiatric condition in 1988, his 
claim therefor is barred under R.C. 4123.84. 
 
If Dr. Arnold’s 1988 report were the only evidence of record, we might very 
well be inclined to agree with the employer that claimant’s 1992 request for 
allowance of dysthymia was time-barred.  However, when this report was filed in 
his claim for Social Security disability in 1988, claimant was informed by the 
administrative law judge as follows: 
 
“While I concede that the claimant undoubtedly experiences a degree of 
depression secondary to the functional limitations imposed by his physical 
impairment and his inability to work, I find no substantial longitudinal evidence of 
 
16
a mental impairment of independent significance. * * * [O]ther than the 
consultative examination conducted at the request of his attorney, he has not been 
referred for, or sought, psychological or psychiatric treatment. * * * Therefore, 
while I believe that the claimant may experience a degree of situational 
depression, I find no substantial evidence to establish that he has a mental 
impairment which significantly limits his functional capabilities.” 
 
In contrasting his second evaluation of claimant in 1990 with that of 1988, 
Dr. Arnold testified at his deposition that “[i]n this particular instance because 
[claimant] appeared to be so distressed the second time I told him I really felt like 
he needed to get some help.”  Thereafter, claimant began treatment with a clinic 
called “Positive Focus” and, on October 25, 1990, started treatment with a Dr. 
Siddiqui.  He was hospitalized in January 1991 and again in November 1991 
because of suicidal ideation and, as of 1992, was seeing a psychiatrist once a 
month and a psychologist once a week. 
 
In light of this additional evidence, there remains a genuine issue of fact as 
to whether claimant knew or should have known of the seriousness of his 
condition before February 25, 1990. 
 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals insofar as it 
bears on this issue. 
II 
Allowance of Time-Barred Residual Condition by Self-Insured Employer 
 
Having found summary judgment in favor of the employer to be 
inappropriate, it remains to be determined whether summary judgment should 
have been entered in favor of claimant. 
 
In State ex rel. Baker Material Handling Corp. v. Indus. Comm. (1994), 69 
Ohio St.3d 202, 631 N.E.2d 138, paragraph one of the syllabus, this court held: 
 
17
 
“A self-insured employer who, subsequent to the initial allowance of a 
workers’ compensation claim, certifies a medical condition as allowed on a ‘Self 
Insured Semi-Annual Report of Claim Payments’ (form C-174) has conclusively 
granted that additional condition as part of the claim.” 
 
By its terms, Baker applies to the allowance of an “additional condition.”  
However, we have no hesitation in applying Baker to the allowance of a residual 
condition as well.  The primary basis for our holding in Baker was that the self-
insured employer is the initial processing agent and adjudicator of any claim.  Id. 
at 205, 631 N.E.2d at 142.  Thus, it is irrelevant whether the condition certified is 
characterized as an initial injury or as an additional or residual condition. 
 
Equally irrelevant is the method by which the self-insurer allows the claim, 
whether it be by certifying the condition on a C-174 form, or by the more direct 
method of formally accepting the condition by motion, as occurred in this case.  In 
either instance, the allowance stands because the initial determination of allowed 
conditions necessarily is made by the self-insurer.  Id., 69 Ohio St.3d at 206, 631 
N.E.2d at 142. 
 
However, the employer argues that Baker should not apply where the 
residual condition has been accepted by the self-insurer after the claim becomes 
time-barred under R.C. 4123.84.  According to the employer, the limitations bar in 
R.C. 4123.84 is jurisdictional in nature, and can be tolled only as expressly 
provided in R.C. 4123.84.  Thus, the employer cannot waive the statutory bar by 
accepting the claim after the two-year period has expired. 
 
Claimant, on the other hand, argues that the limitations bar is not 
jurisdictional and, therefore, can be waived.  Accordingly, a self-insured employer 
who accepts a time-barred residual condition cannot subsequently withdraw that 
acceptance by alleging expiration of the limitations period. 
 
18
 
We begin our inquiry by examining our prior decisions in an effort to gain 
insight into whether and in what sense R.C. 4123.84 can be characterized as 
jurisdictional.  In Indus. Comm. v. Kamrath (1928), 118 Ohio St. 1, 9, 160 N.E. 
470, 472-473, the following view was offered: 
 
“The provisions of [R.C. 4123.84’s predecessor, G.C. 1465-72a (108 Ohio 
Laws, Part I, 319, effective May 16, 1919)] are wholly negative.  That section 
confers no rights upon an injured employee or the dependents of a killed 
employee, but its whole effect is to limit rights elsewhere conferred upon them.  It 
is strictly a statute of limitations and limits alike the rights of the injured 
employees, the rights of dependents of killed employees, and the powers of the 
administrators of the fund.” 
 
In State ex rel. Carr v. Indus. Comm. (1935), 130 Ohio St. 185, 4 O.O. 122, 
198 N.E. 480, at paragraph one of the syllabus, this court held:  “The filing of a 
claim for compensation * * * within the time specified is a condition qualifying 
the right vested by the statute.”  This holding was based upon the concept that 
where a statutory right is expressly conditioned upon its assertion before a certain 
deadline, the timeliness requirement is jurisdictional. 
 
Yet, in Gregory v. Flowers (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 48, 53, 61 O.O.2d 295, 
298, 290 N.E.2d 181, 185, this court characterized R.C. 4123.84 as a statute of 
limitations.  We further held that such statutes “are remedial in nature and may be 
generally classified as procedural legislation.”  Id. at paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
 
In Mewhorter, supra, we held that pursuant to R.C. 4123.84, notice of  
claim by a third party gives the court jurisdiction over the claim.  In so holding, we 
distinguished R.C. 4123.84 “‘in purpose from general statutes of limitations which 
serve to protect against “stale claims” or “faded memories” and to gain the 
 
19
“repose” of society.’”  Id., 23 Ohio St.3d at 14-15, 23 OBR at 12, 490 N.E.2d at 
611, quoting Nackley, supra, 7 N.Ky.L. Rev. at 34. 
 
These cases serve to illustrate that the characterization of R.C. 4123.84 
varies greatly according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.  As 
originally enacted in 1919, G.C. 1465-72a was purely a claims statute.  Claims 
were forever barred unless, within two years after the injury, “application” was 
made to the commission or self-insured employer.  108 Ohio Laws, Part I, 319.  
The statute contained no exceptions excusing lateness of application.  Thereafter, 
the statute underwent a series of amendments, the cumulative effect of which was 
to change the nature of the statute from one requiring that application be made to 
one requiring that written notice be given, and to provide for certain exceptions in 
the nature of waiver.  Compare 108 Ohio Laws, Part I, 319, with 130 Ohio Laws 
939-940. 
 
The 1967 amendments, 132 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1433, and as clarified in Am. 
H.B. No. 1, 133 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1622, effective March 18, 1969, added the 
following provision to R.C. 4123.84: 
 
“Any claim pending before the administrator of the bureau of workmen’s 
compensation, a board of review, the industrial commission, or a court on 
December 11, 1967, in which the remedy is affected by section 4123.84 of the 
Revised Code shall be governed by the terms of this section.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Moreover, even were we to assume that R.C. 4123.84 bears the 
“jurisdictional” label, this court has attached that label to so many workers’ 
compensation issues that it can scarcely be said that the term has any enduring 
significance to the issue of waiver.  The court has described as jurisdictional the 
issues of situs of injury, Indus. Comm. v. Weigand (1934), 128 Ohio St. 463, 191 
N.E. 696, and Miles v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co. (1938), 133 Ohio St. 613, 617, 11 O.O. 
 
20
339, 341, 15 N.E.2d 532, 535; whether the employer is self-insuring and whether 
it regularly employs three or more employees, id.; whether there is a causal 
connection between the employment and the injury, Kaiser v. Indus. Comm. 
(1940), 136 Ohio St. 440, 444, 17 O.O. 22, 24, 26 N.E.2d 449, 452; and even the 
broad question of whether claimant has a right to participate or to continue to 
participate in the fund.  Valentino v. Keller (1967), 9 Ohio St.2d 173, 38 O.O.2d 
412, 224 N.E.2d 748, syllabus. 
 
Indeed, as Professor Larson points out, “practically every fact the 
[commission] finds bears on its jurisdiction — it has no jurisdiction to award 
compensation in the absence of such facts as employment relation, employment by 
the employer of the requisite minimum number of employees, injury in the course 
of employment, injury arising out of employment, personal injury, injury by 
accident, existence of dependency in death cases, timely filing of claim, absence of 
self-injury, and so on. * * *”  3 Larson, supra, at 15-959 to 15-961, Section 80.41. 
 
If we were to follow the logic that a given issue is unwaivable merely 
because we have referred to it as “jurisdictional,” virtually every issue could be 
raised for the first time at even the last stages of an appeal.  This would in no small 
way disrupt the manifold rules that this court has carefully established to facilitate 
the orderly and fair administration of justice.  See State ex rel. Quarto Mining Co. 
v. Foreman (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 78, 679 N.E.2d 706.  Moreover, “the net result 
[would be] that the agency expressly created and empowered to find the facts and 
administer the Act is * * * deprived of all effective ability to perform its duty, and 
is reduced to presiding over a hollow preliminary ritual.”  3 Larson, supra, at 15-
961, Section 80.41. 
 
We must conclude, therefore, that the issue of whether R.C. 4123.84 should 
bear the “jurisdictional” label is a misdirected question.  There is no more magic 
 
21
inherent in the word “jurisdictional” than there is in the word “duty,” the term 
“special relation,” see Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Ctr. 
(1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 284, 298, 673 N.E.2d 1311, 1322, or the term “direct 
evidence.”  Mauzy v. Kelly Serv., Inc. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 578, 586, 664 N.E.2d 
1272, 1279.  Like duty, jurisdiction is only a word with which we state our 
conclusion and, like “direct evidence,” it is capable of denoting more than a single 
thought.  As one court succinctly summarized:  “These cases illustrate the problem 
resulting from various applications of the concept of ‘jurisdiction.’”  Ball v. Indus. 
Comm. (1972), 30 Colo.App. 583, 586, 503 P.2d 1040, 1042. 
 
Thus, to say that R.C. 4123.84 is or is not “jurisdictional” in nature begs the 
essential question in this case — whether the limitations bar is a waivable defense.  
Hitherto, this court has not had the opportunity to address this precise issue. 
 
In its argument, the employer focuses on the waiver provisions set forth in 
R.C. 4123.84.  “By paying compensation or benefits, the self-insurer is in effect 
waiving the two-year bar set forth in R.C. 4123.84, since the employer is put on 
notice of a possible claim.”  Wargetz, supra, 11 Ohio St.3d at 17, 11 OBR at 51, 
462 N.E.2d at 1217.  The same would hold true of a state-fund employer who, 
“with knowledge of a claimed compensable injury or occupational disease, has 
paid wages in lieu of compensation for total disability.”  R.C. 4123.84(A)(2).   
 
We agree with the employer that the two-year bar set forth in R.C. 4123.84 
cannot be waived by payments made after the two-year period has run.  By the 
express provisions of R.C. 4123.84(A), these events, to result in a waiver, must 
occur within the two-year period.  Moreover, recognizing this kind of waiver 
within the two-year period is supported by policy, in that voluntary payment 
before the claim becomes time-barred obviates the concern over the employer’s 
ability to protect itself by prompt investigation, and may mislead the claimant to 
 
22
believe that timely notice is no longer necessary.  Mewhorter, supra, 23 Ohio 
St.3d at 14-15, 23 OBR at 12, 490 N.E.2d at 611; see, also, Wargetz, supra, 11 
Ohio St.3d at 17, 11 OBR at 51, 462 N.E.2d at 1217.  However, “[w]hen the policy 
or purpose disappears, it may be doubted whether the waiver can survive.  Thus, if 
the voluntary payment of compensation is made for the first time after the entire 
claim period has run, it cannot be accused of influencing claimant as a reasonable 
person to withhold making claim.”  2B Larson, supra, at 15-426.32(33) to 15-
426.32(34), Section 78.71. 
 
However, valid waiver may also take a procedural form.  This occurs when 
a party fails to raise the defense promptly.  This court has applied procedural 
waiver to a number of issues denominated jurisdictional.  In Miles, supra, 133 
Ohio St. 613, 11 O.O. 339, 15 N.E.2d 532, the court held waived issues of situs of 
injury, the requisite minimum number of employees, and the status of the 
employer as self-insuring. 
 
In State ex rel. Gibson v. Indus. Comm. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 319, 320, 530 
N.E.2d 916, 917, the court held: 
 
“[Claimant’s] sole proposition before this court is that the commission’s 
assumption of jurisdiction over an issue that she did not intend to relitigate 
violated her right to due process of law.  We hold that this issue was not raised 
previously, and therefore has been waived.” 
 
Recently, in Quarto Mining Co., supra, 79 Ohio St.3d 78, 679 N.E.2d 706, 
we held the defense of voluntary retirement to have been procedurally waived.  In 
so doing, we relied in part on Bohn v. Watson (1954), 130 Cal.App.2d 24, 37, 278 
P.2d 454, 462, in which it was stated: 
 
“Had [appellant] desired to avail herself of the asserted bar of limitations, 
she should have done so in the administrative forum, where the commissioner 
 
23
could have prepared his case, alert to the need of resisting this defense, and the 
hearing officer might have made appropriate findings thereon.” 
 
We can find no valid reason to hold that procedural waiver should not also 
apply to the defense of untimely notice under R.C. 4123.84.  There is no provision 
in R.C. 4123.84 which expressly precludes the application of waiver to its notice 
requirements.  Instead, it contains its own waiver provisions, and provides that any 
pending claim “in which the remedy is affected by this section” shall be governed 
by its terms.  R.C. 4123.84(D).  Moreover, the adoption of the “knew or should 
have known” test indicates that there are other circumstances under which the 
court may excuse late filing.  It is not unreasonable, therefore, to interpret R.C. 
4123.84 as a defense in bar of a claim which is waived if not raised, rather than as 
a condition precedent to the power or authority of the commission to act.  
“Additionally, when we seek to interpret R.C. 4123.84 we are obliged to follow 
the dictates of R.C. 4123.95 which requires a liberal construction of ‘sections 
4123.01 to 4123.94, inclusive’ in favor of employees.”  Mewhorter, supra, 23 
Ohio St.3d at 15, 23 OBR at 12, 490 N.E.2d at 611. 
 
Other state courts have reached similar conclusions.  In Frazier v. Indus. 
Comm. (1985), 145 Ariz. 488, 490, 702 P.2d 717, 719, the employer argued that 
“A.R.S. § 23-947, as amended in 1980, provides only certain limited exceptions in 
which the commission may act if a request for hearing is not filed within 90 days.  
From this premise, the [employer] argues that the limitation period is now a 
jurisdictional bar which may be raised for the first time on appeal.” 
 
The court disagreed, holding in part that “[s]ince the court, under certain 
circumstances, may excuse a late filing, such time limitations are not 
jurisdictional.”  Id., 145 Ariz. at 491, 702 P.2d at 720. 
 
24
 
In Ball, supra, 30 Colo.App. at 588, 503 P.2d at 1042, the court similarly 
found:  “The fact that the court held the time limitation tollable indicates that the 
court could not have regarded the limitation to be jurisdictional.”  Accordingly, 
the court went on to hold that “[t]he time limitation of C.R.S. 1963, 81-14-19 is a 
statute of limitation which may be pled as a bar to a claim.  This limitation is not a 
limitation of authority or jurisdiction, but is instead a legal defense.”  Id. at 589, 
503 P.2d at 1043.  Likewise, in Logan Cty. v. York (Okla.1954), 270 P.2d 968, 
970, the court explained that “since we have held that the statute of limitations 
applicable here may be waived or tolled, we do not have a jurisdictional question * 
* *.” 
 
Thus, the majority of courts hold that the defense of lateness in filing claims 
or giving notice may be lost by failure to raise it promptly.  2B Larson, supra, at 
15-426.32(34), Section 78.72.  As Professor Larson explains: 
 
“[I]n spite of the impressive list of earlier authorities that could be mustered 
to support the ‘jurisdictional’ view, the entire content of the present section belies 
the present validity of the idea, since, taken at face value, it would simply mean 
that none of the relaxations or waivers herein discussed, based on the conduct of 
employer or employee, could exist except where authorized by express statutory 
enactment.  Regardless, then, of the theoretical question whether late filing goes to 
the right so as to affect jurisdiction, or to the remedy only, the practical fact seems 
to be that one way or another this defense can be lost by waiver in the various 
forms discussed.”  Id. at 15-426.32(40) to 15-426.32(41), Section 78.73. 
 
Lastly, the employer alleges that it did not discover Dr. Arnold’s 1988 
report until after its November 16, 1992 motion accepting claimant’s residual 
condition, and that it thereafter raised the statute of limitations defense at each 
administrative level. 
 
25
 
In Baker, supra, 69 Ohio St.3d at 206, 631 N.E.2d at 142, we adopted the 
following reasoning of the court of appeals in State ex rel. Saunders v. Metal 
Container Corp. (Nov. 29, 1988), Franklin App. No. 87AP-509, unreported, 1988 
WL 129162: 
 
“‘[W]hen * * * the employer is self-insured[,] [t]he initial determination of 
allowed conditions necessarily is made by the employer in such a situation.  The 
district hearing officer cannot modify that finding over the objection of the 
claimant, upon the assumption that the self-insured employer erroneously certified 
the condition.  The district hearing officer had no jurisdiction under R.C. 4123.52, 
or otherwise, to modify the original finding of the employer as to the allowed 
condition over the objection of the claimant.  The employer who made the 
determination and certified the claim cannot now complain, as it attempted to do 
before the district hearing officer * * * that it, the employer, had made an 
erroneous determination and certification as to the allowed condition.’” 
 
Thus, the limitations defense is waived at the moment the employer accepts 
claimant’s residual psychiatric condition as part of the claim. 
 
The fact that the employer expresses surprise at having discovered Dr. 
Arnold’s report subsequent to accepting the claim is irrelevant.  There is no 
evidence in the record, and, indeed, no allegation made, that Dr. Arnold’s report 
was fraudulently withheld.  In fact, the employer chose to accept the residual 
condition based on Dr. Clary’s September 25, 1992 report, which specifically 
stated that claimant “saw a psychologist, Dr. Arnold in 1988 for Social Security 
disability” and that since 1987, when he became unable to work, “he has felt 
anxious and depressed.” 
 
We hold that a self-insured employer makes a conclusive determination to 
allow a claim for a residual or “flow-through” condition when it accepts the 
 
26
condition as part of the claim, even where such acceptance occurs after the 
limitations period set forth in R.C. 4123.84 has run.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals insofar as it bears on this issue. 
 
However, since it is the self-insured employer who makes the initial 
determination of which conditions to accept, the only residual condition made part 
of this claim is the condition recognized by the employer in its motion, i.e., “the 
condition diagnosed by Dr. Clary as indicated in [his September 25, 1992] report.”  
The condition diagnosed by Dr. Clary was “major depression and panic disorder.” 
 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, and the order 
of the commission is reinstated to the extent that it recognizes the residual 
condition “major depression and panic disorder.” 
Judgment reversed. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs separately. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the syllabus and judgment only. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in judgment only. 
FOOTNOTE: 
1. 
R.C. 4123.84 reads, in its entirety, as follows: 
 
“(A) In all cases of injury or death, claims for compensation or benefits for 
the specific part or parts of the body injured shall be forever barred unless, within 
two years after the injury or death: 
 
“(1) Written notice of the specific part or parts of the body claimed to have 
been injured has been made to the industrial commission or the bureau of workers' 
compensation; 
 
“(2) The employer, with knowledge of a claimed compensable injury or 
occupational disease, has paid wages in lieu of compensation for total disability; 
 
27
 
“(3) In the event the employer is a self-insuring employer, one of the 
following has occurred: 
 
“(a) Written notice of the specific part or parts of the body claimed to have 
been injured has been given to the commission or bureau or the employer has 
furnished treatment by a licensed physician in the employ of an employer, 
provided, however, that the furnishing of such treatment shall not constitute a 
recognition of a claim as compensable, but shall do no more than satisfy the 
requirements of this section; 
 
“(b) Compensation or benefits have been paid or furnished equal to or 
greater than is provided for in sections 4123.52, 4123.55 to 4123.62, and 4123.64 
to 4123.67 of the Revised Code. 
 
“(4) Written notice of death has been given to the commission or bureau.
 
“(B) The bureau shall provide printed notices quoting in full division (A) of 
this section, and every self-insuring employer shall post and maintain at all times 
one or more of the notices in conspicuous places in the workshop or places of 
employment. 
“(C) The commission has continuing jurisdiction as set forth in 
section 4123.52 of the Revised Code over a claim which meets the requirement of 
this section, including jurisdiction to award compensation or benefits for loss or 
impairment of bodily functions developing in a part or parts of the body not 
specified pursuant to division (A)(1) of this section, if the commission finds that 
the loss or impairment of bodily functions was due to and a result of or a residual 
of the injury to one of the parts of the body set forth in the written notice filed 
pursuant to division (A)(1) of this section. 
 
“(D) Any claim pending before the administrator, the commission, or a court 
on December 11, 1967, in which the remedy is affected by this section is governed 
by this section. 
 
28
 
“(E) Notwithstanding the requirement that the notice required to be given to 
the bureau, commission, or employer under this section is to be in writing, the 
bureau may accept, assign a claim number, and process a notice provided by any 
method of telecommunication.  Immediately upon receipt of the telecommunicated 
notice, the bureau shall send a written notice to the employer of the bureau's 
receipt of the telecommunicated notice.  Within fifteen days after receipt of the 
notice, the employer may in writing either verify or not verify the 
telecommunicated notice.  If the bureau does not receive the written notification 
from 
the 
employer 
or 
receives 
a 
written notification verifying the 
telecommunicated notice within such time period, the claim is validly filed and 
such telecommunicated notice tolls the statute of limitations in regard to the claim 
filed and is considered to meet the requirements of written notice required by this 
section. 
 
“(F) As used in division (A)(3)(b) of this section, ‘benefits’ means payments 
by a self-insuring employer to, or on behalf of, an employee for a hospital bill, a 
medical bill to a licensed physician or hospital, or an orthopedic or prosthetic 
device.” 
 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring.  I concur in both paragraphs of the syllabus as 
well as the opinion and ultimate judgment of the majority.  Much of what Justice 
Resnick says in this opinion has needed saying for a long time.  My only 
reservation and regret is that Clementi v. Wean United, Inc. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 
342, 530 N.E.2d 909, is “modified” rather than “overruled.”