Case Title: In re S.F.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 10/21

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2022-02-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
In Re: S.F., No. 10, September Term, 2021.  Opinion by Hotten, J.  
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE – APPEALS – MOOTNESS  
 
A case is moot when “at the time it is before the court, there is no longer an existing 
controversy between the parties, so that there is no longer any effective remedy which the 
court can provide.’”  Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance v. Levitsky, 353 Md. 188, 200, 
725 A.2d 1027, 1033 (1999) (citations omitted).  This Court has discretion “to express [its] 
views on the merits of a moot case . . . in instances where[] the urgency of establishing a 
rule of future conduct in matters of important public concern is imperative and manifest. . 
. .”  J.L. Matthews, Inc. v. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Comm’n, 368 
Md. 71, 96, 792 A.2d 288, 302–03 (2002) (citations and quotation omitted).  In the case at 
bar, Petitioner, a juvenile at the time, was ordered as a condition of probation to attend 
school regularly without suspensions.  Petitioner appealed the “no-suspension” condition 
of probation as impermissibly vague.  Before the case reached this Court, the issue became 
moot because Petitioner completed probation.  This Court decided to address the merits of 
whether a “no-suspension” condition is impermissibly vague because the number of 
students on probation meant the issue would recur frequently, the limited duration of 
juvenile probation suggested the issue would continue to evade judicial review, and 
providing guidance to juvenile courts when ordering conditions of probation implicated a 
matter of important public concern.  
 
CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCING – CONDITIONS OF PROBATION 
 
Juvenile courts have broad discretion when imposing conditions of probation, but a 
juvenile court abuses its discretion when a condition of probation is “vague, indefinite or 
uncertain[,] . . . arbitrary or capricious. . . .”  Allen v. State, 449 Md. 98, 111, 141 A.3d 194, 
202 (2016) (citations and quotations omitted).  A condition of probation is not vague when 
it provides reasonable and specific guidance so that the probationer understands “what is 
required[.]”  Meyer v. State, 445 Md. 648, 680, 128 A.3d 147, 166 (2015).  In the case at 
bar, this Court found that the condition ordering Petitioner to attend school regularly 
without suspensions was not vague because it reasonably informed Petitioner to abide by 
school rules, pursuant to the student code of conduct, while on probation.  The 
determination by a third party, specifically a school administrator, of whether Petitioner 
violated a condition of probation did not render the condition of probation vague.  See, e.g., 
Hudgins v. State, 292 Md. 342, 349, 438 A.2d 928, 931 (1982) (holding that a condition of 
probation was not made vague by permitting the Maryland State Police to determine 
whether defendant adequately cooperated as an informant).  This Court held that the 
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Petitioner to attend school regularly 
without suspensions as a condition of probation.
 
 
Circuit Court for Frederick County 
Case Nos.  C-10-JV-18-000271 & 
C-10-JV-19-000094 
Argued: October 7, 2021 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 10 
 
September Term, 2021 
 
__________________________________ 
 
IN RE: S.F. 
__________________________________ 
 
Getty, C.J., 
McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Booth, 
Biran, 
Gould, 
 
JJ. 
__________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Hotten, J. 
Watts, J., dissents. 
__________________________________ 
 
Filed: February 3, 2022 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2022-02-03 
14:30-05:00
S.F.1 was charged with second-degree assault and misdemeanor theft in the Circuit 
Court for Frederick County, sitting as a juvenile court (“the juvenile court”).  S.F. was 
twelve years old at the time.  Each charge was alleged in a separate Delinquency Petition,2 
filed approximately five months apart, and the cases proceeded separately.  S.F. entered an 
Alford plea3 for each charge.  The juvenile magistrate in each case recommended probation.  
An identical condition of probation for each case was for S.F. to attend school regularly 
without suspensions.  
Counsel for S.F. excepted to the no-suspension condition of probation as 
impermissibly vague in both cases.  A hearing for both exceptions occurred on June 5, 
2019.  The juvenile court denied the exceptions and ordered S.F. to “[a]ttend school 
regularly without any . . . suspensions. . . .”  S.F. noted a timely appeal to the Court of 
Special Appeals, which affirmed. 
 
1 “Out of respect for the privacy interests of the parties, we shall refer to them by 
their initials throughout this opinion.”  In re: R.S., 470 Md. 380, 386 n.1, 235 A.3d 914, 
918 n.1 (2020). 
 
2 Delinquency proceedings are initiated when someone under the age of 18 commits 
an act that would be a crime if the person were an adult.  Md. Code Ann., Courts and 
Judicial Proceedings (“Cts. & Jud. Proc.”) § 3-8A-01.  The State’s Attorney files a 
Delinquency Petition with the juvenile court alleging the child is delinquent.  Md. Rule 11-
103. 
  
3 “An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly 
consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he [or she] is unwilling or unable to 
admit his [or her] participation in the acts constituting the crime.”  North Carolina v. Alford, 
400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 167 (1970).  “Maryland permits acceptance of an [Alford] 
plea.”  Banegura v. Taylor, 312 Md. 609, 613 n.1, 541 A.2d 969, 971 n.1 (1988) (citations 
omitted). 
 
2 
 
S.F. filed a petition for writ of certiorari on March 17, 2021.  By this point, S.F. had 
successfully completed probation and the juvenile court closed the cases.  S.F. 
acknowledged that the appeal was “moot as to him[, b]ut the issue [was] not moot to the 
many children who may be subject to no-suspension conditions of probation as a result of 
the Court of Special Appeals’ reported opinion.”   
We granted certiorari on May 11, 2021 to address the following question: “Is it 
improper for a juvenile court to make a school’s discretionary decision to suspend a child 
a violation of the child’s probation?”   
We answer the question in the negative and shall affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Special Appeals. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND4 
The Underlying Incidents 
On or about October 8, 2018 during regular school hours, S.F., followed by another 
student enrolled at Monocacy Middle School in Frederick, Maryland, ran into a classroom 
and began to punch another student, J.C., who fell into a metal desk, striking his head.  S.F. 
claimed that he was retaliating for an earlier provocation from J.C.  Thereafter, S.F. had to 
be pulled from J.C. during a second physical altercation that occurred in the hallway.  On 
 
4 The facts underlying the appeal are derived from the State’s recital of the proof 
that would have been presented at trial and other documents submitted during the juvenile 
court proceedings. 
 
3 
 
November 19, 2018, the State filed a Delinquency Petition charging S.F. with second-
degree assault in violation of Md. Code Ann., Criminal Law (“Crim. Law”) § 3-203.5   
On December 9, 2018, Officer Steven Brown with the Frederick City Police 
Department responded to a burglary at 150 Stonegate Drive in Frederick City, Maryland.  
The sliding door of a home was found open and several items, including a pair of Nike Air 
Jordan’s with blue soles and a red Tommy Hilfiger jacket with blue lining were missing.  
On January 8, 2019, Officer Brown returned to 150 Stonegate Drive, where the homeowner 
advised Officer Brown that S.F. was seen wearing a pair of Nike Air Jordan’s with blue 
soles and a red Tommy Hilfiger jacket at a nearby McDonald’s restaurant.  These items 
belonged to the homeowner’s son, who was “able to provide pictures from Snapchat 
showing [S.F.] was wearing the jacket.”  The State explained that “if called to testify, the 
witnesses would identify [S.F.] as the party responsible[]” for the theft of the personal 
property.  On April 3, 2019, the State filed a Delinquency Petition that charged S.F. with 
theft of at least $100 but less than $1,500 pursuant to Crim. Law § 7-104.6   
 
5 Crim. Law § 3-203 provides that a “person may not commit an assault[,]” which 
pursuant to Crim. Law § 3-201 includes the crime of battery.  See Elias v. State, 339 Md. 
169, 183, 661 A.2d 702, 709 (1995) (“In Maryland, battery is a common law misdemeanor 
which is generally defined as the ‘unlawful application of force to the person of another.’”) 
(citations omitted). 
 
6 Crim. Law § 7-104 provides in pertinent part: 
 
(a) A person may not willfully or knowingly obtain or exert unauthorized 
control over property, if the person: 
(1) intends to deprive the owner of the property; 
(2) willfully or knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the property in 
a manner that deprives the owner of the property; 
(continued . . .) 
 
4 
 
Circuit Court Proceedings 
S.F. entered an Alford plea to the count of second-degree assault on February 12, 
2019 before the juvenile court.  The juvenile magistrate delayed the date of disposition so 
the Maryland Department of Juvenile Services (“DJS”)7 could complete a pre-disposition 
investigation.  S.F. was also placed on pre-disposition supervision by DJS. 
Amy S. Gass, the assigned Case Management Specialist for DJS, submitted a Social 
History Investigation & Recommendation to the juvenile court on March 29, 2019.  The 
report documented S.F.’s medical health, behavioral history, school disciplinary record, 
and criminal offenses.  Ms. Gass noted that S.F. “has a long history of behavioral incidents 
in school.”  While enrolled at Monocacy Middle School from September 2018 to 
November 2018, S.F. was cited for twenty-two distinct disciplinary infractions ranging 
from disruption and disrespect to fighting and assault, the latter of which resulted in a short-
 
(. . . continued) 
 
(3) or uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing the use, 
concealment or abandonment probably will deprive the owner of the 
property. 
*** 
(g)(2) Except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, a person 
convicted of theft of property or services with a value of at least $100 but 
less than $1,500, is guilty of a misdemeanor. . . . 
 
7 DJS “is an executive agency whose primary task is to appropriately manage, 
supervise and treat youth who are involved in the juvenile justice system in Maryland.  
[DJS] is involved in nearly every stage of the juvenile justice process from the moment a 
youth is brought into a juvenile intake center . . . to the time when a youth returns to the 
community after completing treatment.”  About Us, Maryland Department of Juvenile 
Services, https://djs.maryland.gov/Pages/about-us/About.aspx (last visited Nov. 29, 2021), 
archived at https://perma.cc/E9JN-E776.  
 
5 
 
term suspension.  S.F. transferred to Heather Ridge Middle School in Frederick for the 
Spring 2019 semester and was cited for sixteen distinct disciplinary infractions between 
January and February 2019.  In the summary and recommendations section of the report, 
Ms. Gass concluded that S.F. “has a history of problematic behavior in school and in the 
home. . . .  Given the rapid accumulation of charges, [DJS] does recommend a period of 
supervised probation[.] . . .”  (Emphasis removed). 
On April 2, 2019, during the disposition hearing, a juvenile magistrate 
recommended that S.F. be placed on probation subject to several conditions.  In addition 
to the standard conditions of supervision, S.F. was required to “report to [his] probation 
officer as directed, appear in court when notified, permit [his] probation officer to come to 
[his] home, or if [he was] arrested, attend school regularly without any unexcused 
absences, suspensions or tardies . . . remain drug and alcohol free . . . and [s]ubmit to a 
drug and alcohol assessment. . . .”  (Emphasis added).  During the hearing, counsel for S.F. 
objected to the inclusion of the no-suspension condition of probation.  The juvenile 
magistrate rejected the argument that the condition was vague:  
[S]uspensions go to behavior related issues like not fighting in school, not 
showing up high at school.  And these are all affirmative[] behaviors on the 
part of the respondent.  And if the respondent violates his probation as a 
result of a suspension, [] it [would] be at the time of the [violation of 
probation] hearing that [the suspension] is litigated[.] . . .   
 
(Emphasis added). 
 
6 
 
Following the hearing, counsel for S.F. filed an exception, pursuant to Maryland 
Rule 11-111(c) (2021),8 to the condition of “‘[a]ttend school regularly without any 
unexcused absences, suspensions or tardiness’, specifically the part regarding 
suspensions.”  (Emphasis omitted).  Counsel for S.F. excepted to the condition because it 
could be violated without any willful behavior by S.F.  According to counsel, “[S.F.] seeks 
to remove only the possibility of being found in violation in a way in which he has no 
control, [i.e.], being suspended from school.”  The State filed a response requesting the 
juvenile court to deny the exception because “whether or not a suspension was due to the 
Respondent’s willful behavior is a factual determination to be made by the trial court[, and] 
it is not cause to strike a valid probation condition.”   
In a separate proceeding, on May 16, 2019, S.F. entered an Alford plea to the charge 
of theft in violation of Crim. Law § 7-104.  S.F. agreed to waive the five-day waiting period 
before disposition, and the juvenile magistrate recommended S.F. be placed on concurrent 
probation for the counts of assault and theft, supervised by DJS.  Over objection from 
counsel for S.F., one of the conditions for probation again required that S.F. attend school 
regularly without suspensions.  S.F. filed another exception to the no-suspension condition 
 
8 Maryland Rule 11-111(c), as codified at the time, provided in pertinent part:  
 
Review by Court if Exceptions Filed.  Any party may file exceptions to the 
magistrate’s proposed findings, conclusions, recommendations or proposed 
orders.  Exceptions shall be in writing, filed with the clerk within five days 
after the magistrate’s report is served upon the party, and shall specify those 
items to which the party excepts, and whether the hearing is to be de novo or 
on the record. 
 
The relevant rule is now codified at Md. Rule 11-103(e) and took effect on January 1, 2022.  
 
7 
 
of probation pursuant to Md. Rule 11-111(c).  S.F. requested “in the interest[] of judicial 
economy[]” that the exceptions hearing concurrently address the identical no-suspension 
condition of probation for both cases.   
On June 5, 2019, the juvenile court considered argument on the exception to the 
condition of probation for both cases.  The juvenile court denied the exception, explaining 
that: 
[H]onestly, I don’t think that saying no suspensions -- I just can’t go along 
with the argument that it’s vague or indefinite or uncertain.  I do think that -
- I can see your argument by saying [“]live a correct life,[”] what does that 
mean?  I mean, that’s vague.  But I don’t think that this term of probation or 
condition of probation is vague in any way.  So I’m going to deny the 
exceptions and affirm the Magistrate’s decision in putting that in there. 
 
The juvenile court disagreed with the argument that the no-suspension condition of 
probation would subject S.F. to arbitrary punishment:  
I would hope that most schools, if not all schools would actually give an 
explanation as to the suspension and give the child an opportunity to contest 
the suspension.  But even assuming that . . . there’s no explanation, if a child 
comes before me for a violation of probation hearing, I would want to know 
the basis for the suspension.  So I don’t think that you’d have to fear that. 
  
Prior to the June 5, 2019 hearing, S.F. and his mother moved to Dauphin County, 
Pennsylvania.  The relocation to another jurisdiction did not affect the disposition of the 
juvenile court, and courtesy supervision was provided by Pennsylvania juvenile authorities 
through interstate compact.9  On October 17, 2019, S.F.’s mother requested closure of his 
 
9 “The Interstate Compact on Juveniles (ICJ) is a multi-state agreement that provides 
the procedural means to regulate the movement across State lines of juveniles who are 
under court supervision.”  Christopher Holloway, Interstate Compact on Juveniles, United 
States Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs Fact Sheet (Sept. 2000),  
(continued . . .) 
 
8 
 
cases.  Pennsylvania juvenile authorities agreed and recommended discharge from 
supervision on April 9, 2020.  Following several assessments, Ms. Gass filed a report 
requesting closure of S.F.’s cases on May 20, 2020.  The juvenile court closed S.F.’s cases 
on May 22, 2020. 
Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals 
Before the closure of S.F.’s cases, S.F. timely noted an appeal to the Court of Special 
Appeals on June 7, 2019.  The Court affirmed the juvenile court and held that the condition 
of probation was not unduly vague and did not lack procedural safeguards.  In re S.F., 249 
Md. App. 50, 60, 61, 245 A.3d 30, 36, 37 (2021).   
According to the Court, the condition of probation was “clear, definite and capable 
of being properly comprehended and understood not only by the individual upon whom 
they are imposed but by those responsible for their enforcement.”  Id. at 55, 245 A.3d at 
33 (quoting Watson v. State, 17 Md. App. 263, 274, 301 A.2d 26, 31–32 (1973)).  The 
Court found “no confusion about what it means to be suspended from school. . . .”  Id. at 
57, 245 A.3d at 34.  The code of student conduct informed S.F., like all students enrolled 
in Fredrick County Public Schools (“FCPS”), of behavior punishable by suspension.  Id., 
245 A.3d at 34.  FCPS posted the student code of conduct online, and the student code of 
conduct appeared in the FCPS Calendar Handbook distributed at the beginning of the 
school year.  Id., 245 A.3d at 34.  The student code of conduct explained what sort of 
 
(. . . continued) 
 
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/fs200012.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/M7RV-
QS7U.  
 
9 
 
misconduct warranted a suspension.  Id., 245 A.3d at 34.  For example, assault may lead 
to “‘suspension pending parent conference,’ ‘short term out of school suspension,’ ‘long 
term out of school suspension,’ or ‘extended out of school suspension.’”  Id., 245 A.3d at 
34 (citation omitted). 
The Court rejected S.F.’s claim that the no-suspension condition was impermissibly 
vague because it vested the determination of its violation in a third party.  Id. at 58, 245 
A.3d at 35.  The Court noted that conditions of probation often involved discretionary 
determinations by third parties, such as probation officers who must decide whether a 
party’s conduct constitutes a parole violation.  Id., 245 A.3d at 35 (citing Hudgins v. State, 
292 Md. 342, 344, 438 A.2d 928, 929 (1982); Russell v. State, 221 Md. App. 518, 523–24, 
109 A.3d 1249 (2015); Wiseman v. State, 72 Md. App. 605, 608, 531 A.2d 1311, 1313 
(1987)).  A school administrator’s power to suspend, while discretionary, according to the 
Court, was constrained by the student code of conduct.  Id. at 59, 245 A.3d at 35. 
The Court was also unpersuaded that evidence of Black students being 
disproportionately suspended rendered the no-suspension condition impermissibly vague.  
Id., 245 A.3d at 36.  The Court assumed the truth of S.F.’s argument that suspensions occur 
too frequently and disproportionately against Black students.  Id., 245 A.3d at 36.  Like the 
juvenile court, the Court reasoned that if S.F. experienced discrimination or arbitrary 
treatment, then the probation officer, followed by the juvenile court, would have an 
opportunity to assess the validity of the suspension.  Id., 245 A.3d at 35.  Based on the 
“policies and procedures defined by [FCPS’] code of conduct,” the Court concluded that 
 
10 
 
the no-suspension condition of probation was sufficiently definite and certain.  Id. at 60, 
245 A.3d at 36. 
The Court also found that FCPS’ student code of conduct provided sufficient 
“procedural safeguards” when imposing a suspension.  Id., 245 A.3d at 36.  The Court 
noted that the FCPS student code of conduct required prior notice and description of 
charges against any student facing suspension, which was also documented in the student 
information system.  Id., 245 A.3d at 36.  FCPS policy also directed school personnel to 
use positive behavioral interventions before suspension, and that only a school 
administrator may impose a suspension.  Id., 245 A.3d at 36.  The Court also explained 
that a student suspension does not automatically violate the no-suspension condition of 
probation because the State must prove before a juvenile court that the student violated the 
terms of probation.  Id. at 61, 245 A.3d at 36–37.   
The Court affirmed the juvenile court’s imposition of the no-suspension condition 
of probation.  Thereafter, S.F. filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted.  In 
re: S.F., 474 Md. 632, 255 A.3d 169 (2021). 
DISCUSSION 
Standard of Review 
A juvenile court possesses “broad authority” to impose conditions of probation.  
Bailey v. State, 355 Md. 287, 294, 734 A.2d 684, 687 (1999); Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-8A-
19(d)(1) (“In making a disposition on a petition under this subtitle, the court may: . . . 
[p]lace the child on probation . . . upon terms the court deems appropriate[.] . . .”).  Similar 
to the discretion of a circuit court in imposing conditions of probation in a criminal matter, 
 
11 
 
the discretion afforded to a juvenile court is “broad but it is not boundless.”  Cooley v. 
State, 385 Md. 165, 175, 867 A.2d 1065, 1071 (2005) (quoting Nelson v. State, 315 Md. 
62, 70, 553 A.2d 667, 671 (1989)); In re Roger S., 338 Md. 385, 393, 658 A.2d 696, 700 
(1995) (noting “that the Juvenile Causes Act is to be construed liberally to achieve its 
purposes,” but “[e]ven a remedial statute should not be construed so broadly as to create 
the possibility of ‘results that are unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common 
sense’”) (citations and other marks omitted). 
The exercise of this broad authority is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  In re Elrich 
S., 416 Md. 15, 30–31, 5 A.3d 27, 35–36 (2010) (“In a juvenile delinquency matter . . . the 
[juvenile] court’s ultimate decision, however, will not be disturbed unless ‘there has been 
a clear abuse of discretion.’”) (quoting In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 586, 819 A.2d 1030, 
1051 (2003)) (other citations omitted); see also Meyer v. State, 445 Md. 648, 663, 128 A.3d 
147, 156 (2015) (applying the abuse of discretion standard of review to conditions of 
probation in a criminal matter).  An abuse of discretion occurs when the juvenile court, as 
with any court, “exercises discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner or when [the 
court] acts beyond the letter or reason of the law.”  Cooley, 385 Md. at 175, 867 A.2d at 
1071 (citation omitted); see also In re Adoption of Jayden G., 433 Md. 50, 87, 70 A.3d 
276, 297–98 (2013) (stating that a juvenile court abuses its discretion if its ruling “‘does 
not logically follow from the findings upon which it supposedly rests or has no reasonable 
relationship to its announced objective.’”) (quoting King v. State, 407 Md. 682, 697, 967 
A.2d 790, 799 (2009)) (citation omitted). 
 
 
12 
 
The Contentions of the Parties 
As a threshold issue, S.F. argues that this Court should reach the merits of the appeal 
because it would provide valuable guidance to the “many children who may be subject to 
no-suspension conditions of probation” and “to address and correct racial disparities in our 
justice system.”  (Citation omitted).   
S.F. acknowledged his case was moot in the petition for writ of certiorari, but the 
State failed to contest the issue of mootness in its answer.  In the past, according to 
Petitioner, this Court rejected belated efforts by the Respondent to dismiss a case for 
mootness. 
According to S.F., the State also misstated the scope of the record by arguing this 
Court should avoid addressing the issue of a no-suspension condition of probation until a 
more complete factual record is presented on appeal.  The State agrees that Black students 
and students with disabilities are disproportionately targeted for suspension, and according 
to S.F., the record reflects that S.F. is a Black student, was diagnosed with a disability, and 
received accommodations at school through an individualized education program.10  
Addressing the merits of the case, according to S.F., would allow this Court to determine 
whether the no-suspension condition of probation impermissibly exposes S.F. and similarly 
situated students to arbitrary and capricious punishment. 
 
10 “The terms ‘individualized education program’ or ‘IEP’ means a written 
statement for each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in 
accordance with [20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)].”  John A. v. Bd. of Educ. for Howard Cty., 400 
Md. 363, 371 n.8, 929 A.2d 136, 141 n.8 (2007) (citation omitted). 
 
13 
 
S.F. also asserts that the Court has been fully briefed on the issue by both parties.  
In addition, a total of twenty national and local organizations have filed two amicus briefs 
on the merits.  According to S.F., this Court should reach the merits. 
On the merits, S.F. contends that the condition of probation requiring S.F. to attend 
school “without suspension” was unduly vague because “it failed to adequately apprise 
him (or the authorities responsible for enforcing the conditions) of what actions he must 
take or refrain from to avoid a violation.”  According to S.F., a term of probation must be 
clear, definitive, and capable of being understood by both the probationer and the person(s) 
responsible for monitoring compliance. 
Suspensions, S.F. contends, lack procedural safeguards and may be imposed with 
“essentially unfettered discretion [by] the school authorities.”  Once a school official 
suspends a student, according to S.F., “the State only needs to prove that the child was 
suspended[,]” and “need not prove that the child engaged in any particular behavior[.]”   
S.F. argues that because school suspensions disproportionately impact Black 
students and students with disabilities, the no-suspension condition of probation “import[s] 
this discriminatory treatment into juvenile court proceedings[.]”  According to S.F., a child 
faces a “virtually impossible” challenge to affirmatively prove during a juvenile court 
hearing that the suspension was imposed arbitrarily.  S.F. recommends that this Court reject 
no-suspension conditions of probation as not only impermissibly vague, but also a flawed 
practice to be avoided by juvenile courts. 
The State counters that the case should be dismissed as moot pursuant to Md. Rule 
8-602(c)(8), because S.F. successfully completed probation and there is no longer a 
 
14 
 
controversy between the parties regarding the no-suspension condition of probation.  The 
State acknowledges several exceptions to the general rule that moot cases are dismissed, 
but argues the only exception potentially relevant to the case at bar—an issue of public 
importance which recurs frequently and evades judicial review—does not apply.  While 
no-suspension conditions of probation recur frequently, according to the State, the issue 
will not evade judicial review because juvenile probation can last “years”, and a juvenile 
court termination of probation will not necessarily moot the case.   
The State also argues that this Court should dismiss the case because the record 
lacks evidence regarding how FCPS imposes suspension generally or specifically against 
S.F.  Without a suspension in this case, there is no opportunity for this Court to determine 
how the juvenile court would assess an alleged violation of the no-suspension condition of 
probation.  The State asks this Court to dismiss the case for mootness. 
Assuming this Court reaches the merits, the State argues that the no-suspension 
condition of probation is neither inherently vague, nor rendered vague by permitting a third 
party, like a school administrator, to determine whether the behavior of a student warrants 
suspension.  The State notes that determining compliance with probation conditions are 
routinely vested with third parties.  Law enforcement officers may determine whether a 
probationer violated a law, or an employer may determine whether a probationer 
maintained gainful employment.  In the case at bar, S.F. was to obey “all house rules” 
which necessitated a third party, the parent or guardian, to determine whether S.F. complied 
with the condition of probation.  A no-suspension condition of probation, according to the 
State, is no more vague. 
 
15 
 
The State further contends that S.F. has conflated vagueness with process.  
According to the State, “[w]hether the ‘no suspensions’ condition is impermissibly vague 
does not depend upon whether a student is entitled to appeal the imposition of a 
suspension.”  Even if the process following a suspension weighed upon the determination 
of vagueness, the State argues that school suspension does not “ipso facto result in a 
violation of probation, and a violation of probation does not ipso facto result in the 
revocation of probation.”  According to the State, the juvenile court must determine, 
following a hearing, whether the student in fact violated the terms of probation, and 
whether a violation warrants revocation of probation.  The hearing also provides the student 
an opportunity to argue that the suspension did not arise from willful conduct.   
The State also points to several procedural safeguards at the state and local level 
that “provide detailed information about the due process afforded to a student accused of 
violating 
the 
code 
of 
conduct.” 
 
State 
regulation 
pursuant 
to 
COMAR 
13A.08.01.11(C)(2)(b) requires that students must be informed of reasons for a suspension 
and given an opportunity to respond prior to the suspension.  FCPS codified its discipline 
policy at FCPS Regulation 400-08, which provides specific guidance on what behaviors 
may trigger a suspension.  These publicly available documents demonstrate, the State 
asserts, that a suspension does not arise from “unfettered discretion” of school 
administrators, rather it follows from a specific set of proscribed behaviors that is provided 
to students and families every year. 
 
16 
 
Finally, the State agrees with S.F. that suspensions disproportionately impact Black 
students and students with disabilities, but disputes whether it renders the condition of 
probation impermissibly vague. 
Analysis 
A. 
We exercise our discretion to reach the merits of the case despite S.F.’s 
completion of probation. 
The decision to dismiss a case for mootness is discretionary.  Md. Rule 8-602(c) 
(“The court may dismiss an appeal if: . . . (8) the case has become moot.”).  “A question is 
moot ‘if, at the time it is before the court, there is no longer any existing controversy 
between the parties, so that there is no longer an effective remedy which the court can 
provide.’”  Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance v. Levitsky, 353 Md. 188, 200, 725 A.2d 
1027, 1033 (1999) (quoting Attorney Gen. v. Anne Arundel Cty. School Bus Contractors 
Ass’n, Inc., 286 Md. 324, 327, 407 A.2d 749, 752 (1979)). 
“We have the constitutional authority [] to express our views on the merits of a moot 
case . . . in instances where[] the urgency of establishing a rule of future conduct in matters 
of important public concern is imperative and manifest.”  J.L. Matthews, Inc. v. Maryland-
National Capital Park and Planning Comm’n, 368 Md. 71, 96, 792 A.2d 288, 302–03 
(2002) (citations and quotations omitted); see also In re: O.P., 470 Md. 225, 249, 235 A.3d 
40, 54 (2020) (“there are several exceptions to the mootness doctrine[]”).  We have 
exercised discretionary authority to reach the merits of a moot case when “the matter 
involved is likely to recur frequently, and its recurrence will involve a relationship between 
government and its citizens, or a duty of government, and upon any recurrence, the same 
 
17 
 
difficulty which prevented the appeal at hand from being heard in time is likely again to 
prevent a decision[.] . . .”  Lloyd v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections of Balt. Cty., 206 Md. 
36, 43, 111 A.2d 379, 382 (1954). 
In Coburn v. Coburn, this Court decided to address a moot issue involving an 
expired protective order issued pursuant to Maryland’s domestic violence statute, because 
protective orders occur frequently but often “escape judicial review by this Court due to 
[their] limited duration.”  342 Md. 244, 250, 674 A.2d 951, 954 (1996) (noting that 
protective orders, according to then Md. Code Ann., Family Law § 4-506(g), do not exceed 
200 days in duration).  This Court also explained that the mooted controversy “involves 
construction of a statute routinely applied by courts of this state, and our interpretation of 
it will assist judges in determining whether victims of abuse are in need of protection.”  Id., 
674 A.2d at 954.  This Court concluded that the issue of domestic violence protective orders 
concerned an issue of public importance that would recur frequently and warranted review 
on the merits.  Id., 674 A.2d at 954. 
Similar to Coburn, the issue of a no-suspension probation condition will likely 
reoccur, involve the same parties within the juvenile justice system (e.g., students, public 
school systems, probation officers, the State’s Attorney, and the juvenile court), likely 
evade judicial review, and concerns a matter of public interest—the nexus between juvenile 
justice and the public education system, sometimes referred to as “the school-to-prison 
pipeline.”11  In the 2018–19 school year, Maryland Public Schools recorded 67,608 
 
11 “The term ‘school to prison pipeline’ refers to the link between school failure,  
(continued . . .) 
 
18 
 
suspensions, and at any given time, there are approximately 2,000 juveniles on probation 
in 
Maryland. 
 
Maryland 
Office 
of 
the 
Public 
Defender, 
Probation,  
http://dls.maryland.gov/pubs/prod/NoPblTabMtg/CmsnJuvRefCncl/MOPDProbationRec
ommendations.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2021), archived at https://perma.cc/YA9S-6H2T.  
Attending school regularly, along with not “[b]eing suspended from school[,]” are 
“standard” conditions of probation.  Paul J. Hirschfield, The Role of Schools in Sustaining 
Juvenile Justice System Inequality, 28 Future of Children 11, 19 (2018), 
https://futureofchildren.princeton.edu/sites/futureofchildren/files/media/vol28issue1.pdf, 
archived at https://perma.cc/UW3A-EBCT.  While the parties did not supply the exact 
number of juveniles in Maryland who have a no-suspension probation condition, these 
figures indicate the issue is likely to reoccur.   
The issue of no-suspension conditions of probation also implicates the overlapping 
duties of the government “to assist children in becoming responsible and productive 
members of society[,]” while holding young offenders accountable for offenses committed 
in order to promote “[p]ublic safety and the protection of the community[.]”  Cts. & Jud. 
Proc. § 3-8A-02(a).  Public schools are entrusted with the educational and character 
 
(. . . continued) 
 
zero-tolerance discipline policies, exclusionary discipline, school-based arrest and the 
likelihood that youth who have these experiences in school will become involved in the 
juvenile, and later, adult criminal justice systems.”  Nicole Joseph, The Civil Rights Crisis 
in Our Schools, 49 Oct. Md. B.J. 12, 13 (Sept./Oct. 2016), https://nicolejosephlaw.com/wp-
content/uploads/2020/06/Civil-Rights-in-School-MD-Bar-Journal-2016.pdf, archived at 
https://perma.cc/UA7X-UWB4 (citing School to Prison Pipeline, NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund (Feb. 16, 2018),  https://www.naacpldf.org/case-issue/school-prison-pipeline/, 
archived at https://perma.cc/VG68-STR5). 
 
19 
 
development of young people, while the juvenile justice system, including probation 
officers, the State’s Attorney, and juvenile courts, is tasked with the rehabilitation of young 
offenders.  Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 275, 208 A.2d 575, 580 (1965).12  The case at bar 
clearly addresses a significant “relationship between government and its citizens[.]”  In re: 
O.P., 470 Md. at 249, 235 A.3d at 54 (citation omitted). 
We reject the State’s argument that “there is no reason to believe that this issue will 
continue to evade review[]” because juveniles can be on probation for years.  While it is 
true that some juvenile conditions of probation may last for years, there are countless 
others, including the case at bar, which are terminated before the case reaches this Court.  
According to the Urban Institute, “the vast majority of youth probation terms can be 
completed in six months or less.”  Urban Institute, Transforming Juvenile Probation (Apr. 
27, 
2021), 
https://www.aecf.org/resources/transforming-juvenile-probation-terms, 
archived at https://perma.cc/CRD7-CYCM.  Given the time it takes to resolve an appeal 
 
12 Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-802(a) defines the purposes of the juvenile justice system in 
pertinent part: 
 
(1) To provide for the care, protection, safety, and mental and physical 
development of any child coming within the provisions of this subtitle; 
 
(2) To provide for a program of services and treatment consistent with the 
child’s best interests and the promotion of the public interest; 
 
(3) To conserve and strengthen the child’s family ties and to separate a child 
from the child’s parents only when necessary for the child’s welfare[.] 
 
 
20 
 
before the Court of Special Appeals and come before this Court,13 it is likely that many no-
suspension conditions for probation will evade review.  
This issue also concerns a matter of public importance.  The intersection between 
school discipline and the criminal justice system has captured the attention of the General 
Assembly, social science researchers, and in part, the Maryland Judiciary.  In 2017, the 
General Assembly established the “Commission on the School-to-Prison Pipeline and 
Restorative Practices.”  Maryland Commission on the School-to-Prison Pipeline and 
Restorative Practices, Final Report and Collaborative Action Plan at 10 (Dec. 20, 2018), 
https://www.law.umaryland.edu/media/SOL/pdfs/Programs/ADR/STPP%20%20RP%20
Commission%20Final%20Report.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/XF5C-548H.  The 
report examined the “school-to-prison pipeline” that pushes a “student out of school and 
into the juvenile or criminal justice system[.]”  Id. at 22 (citation omitted).  Contributing 
factors include overly harsh discipline, biased disciplinary decisions, and segregated and 
under-resourced schools.  Id.   
The report highlighted how exclusionary discipline, like suspension, “has a 
disparate impact on students of color and students with disabilities.  Black students in 
kindergarten through 12th grade nationwide were 3.8 times as likely to receive one or more 
out-of-school suspensions as White students [].”  Id. (citation omitted).  In response to the 
work by the Commission, the General Assembly enacted Md. Code Ann., Education § 7-
 
13 In the case at bar, S.F. first appeared before the circuit court sitting as a juvenile  
court on February 12, 2019.  This Court granted certiorari on May 11, 2021, more than  
two years after a juvenile magistrate recommended the no-suspension condition of 
probation.   
 
21 
 
306, which requires each county board of education to review its disciplinary practices and 
policies and to encourage “restorative approaches” to student discipline. 
The action taken by the General Assembly was consistent with empirical social 
science research that has found both implicit bias in how suspensions are administered and 
its disproportionate impact on Black students and students with disabilities.  See Brief for 
The National Center for Youth Law et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, In re S.F., 
474 Md. 632, 255 A.3d 169 (2021) (No. 10, Sept. Term 2021) (“Black students are 
overrepresented in suspensions for all types of behaviors, and are more likely to be 
disciplined for ‘less serious and more subjective reasons.’ . . .  White students tend to be 
disciplined for ‘more objectively observable’ offenses, like smoking or vandalism, [while] 
Black students tend to be disciplined for behaviors that are more ‘subjective in nature[]’ 
like disrespect, defiance, or noncompliance[,] . . . which do not require exclusion from 
school or justice system involvement.”) (footnote and citations omitted).14  
The issue also implicates ongoing efforts by the Maryland Judiciary to eliminate 
discrimination on the basis of race, background, or identity in the administration of justice.  
In 2020, the Maryland Judiciary formed the Committee on Equal Justice, whose purpose 
is to “build the knowledge and proficiencies of judges and judiciary personnel to strengthen 
 
14 We note that the record reflects that S.F. is a Black student and a student with a 
diagnosed disability.  While no suspension occurred while S.F. was on probation in the 
case at bar, the general inequities of school suspension policies found by the Commission 
remain relevant for S.F., and similarly situated students, presently enrolled in public 
schools.  See, e.g., In re: S.F., 249 Md. App. at 59 n.3, 245 A.3d at 35 n.3 (citing Lena V. 
Groeger et al., Miseducation: Is There Racial Inequality at Your School?, Pro Publica (Oct. 
16, 2018), https://projects.propublica.org/miseduation/district/2400330, archived at 
https://perma.cc/X85C-63X6. 
 
22 
 
the judiciary’s commitment to equal justice under law for all.”  Maryland Judiciary, Equal 
Justice 
Committee 
Information 
(last 
visited 
Nov. 
4, 
2021),  
https://www.courts.state.md.us/equaljustice/committee, 
archived 
at 
https://perma.cc/V2C7-PDB4.  One of the specific objectives is to “[d]evelop 
considerations for how judges can improve sentencing to ensure equal justice.”  Maryland 
Judiciary, Sentencing Subcommittee Draft Interim Report and Recommendations for Equal 
Justice 
Committee’s 
Consideration 
(June 
2021), 
https://www.courts.state.md.us/sites/default/files/import/ejc/pdf/sentencingupdate. 
pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/K3ZZ-NREY.   
Amid ongoing efforts throughout state and local government to reform student 
disciplinary policies and procedures, this case could assist juvenile courts in assessing 
whether a suspension policy is impermissibly vague, thereby subjecting a student to 
arbitrary or capricious punishment.  “Accordingly, we decline to dismiss this appeal” for 
mootness.  In re O.P., 470 Md. at 250, 235 A.3d at 55.   
B. 
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by ordering no school 
suspensions as a condition of probation. 
 
The juvenile court system was developed in the twentieth century following “a 
national outcry against the resulting barbarism, as it appeared . . . to be, of treating children 
and juveniles the same as adults.”  In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 90, 646 A.2d 1012, 1014 
(1994) (quoting In re Johnson, 254 Md. 517, 521–22, 255 A.2d 419, 421 (1969)) (quoting 
Fortas, Equal Rights—For Whom? 42 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 401, 405–06 (1967)).  Unlike the 
adult system, the juvenile court was designed to be more “informal and flexible in nature, 
 
23 
 
psychiatric and psychological assistance was sought, the rules of evidence were relaxed, 
and many proceedings were not open to the public.”  Id. at 91, 646 A.2d at 1014. 
The purpose of the juvenile court system, when adjudicating cases involving 
children who have committed delinquent acts, was codified at Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-8A-
02, which provides in pertinent part: 
(a) The purposes of this subtitle are: 
 
(1) To ensure that the Juvenile Justice System balances the following 
objectives for children who have committed delinquent acts: 
(i) Public safety and the protection of the community; 
(ii) Accountability of the child to the victim and the community 
for offenses committed; and 
(iii) Competency and character development to assist children 
in becoming responsible and productive members of society; 
*** 
(4) To provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and 
physical development of children coming within the provisions of this 
subtitle; and to provide for a program of treatment, training, and 
rehabilitation consistent with the child’s best interests and the 
protection of the public interest[.] 
*** 
(8) To provide judicial procedures for carrying out the provisions of 
this subtitle. 
 
 
One of the judicial procedures expressly provided by the statute is ordering 
probation: 
In making a disposition on a petition under this subtitle, the [juvenile] court 
may . . . [p]lace the child on probation or under supervision in his own home 
or in the custody or under the guardianship of a relative or other fit person, 
upon terms the court deems appropriate, including community detention. 
 
Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-8A-19(d)(1) (markings omitted) (emphasis added). 
 
Juvenile courts have broad discretion in establishing conditions of probation.  Cts. 
& Jud. Proc. § 3-8A-19(d)(1); see also Moore v. Miley, 372 Md. 663, 680, 814 A.2d 557, 
 
24 
 
568 (2003) (discussing the jurisdictional provisions applicable to juvenile cases, which 
“should be construed in a manner to maximize the juvenile court’s flexibility and ability to 
exercise its discretion”).  “[A] juvenile court may place a child on probation . . . ‘upon 
terms the court deems appropriate. . . .’”  In re W.Y., 228 Md. App. 596, 611, 142 A.3d 
602, 611 (2016) (citation omitted); Md. Rule 11-101(b)(5) (2021)15 (“‘Probation’ means a 
status created by a court order under which a child adjudicated to be delinquent . . . is to 
remain subject to supervision of the Court under conditions the Court or the agency 
designated by it deems proper, but is not removed from his home.”).  Similar to probation 
for adults, probation for juveniles represents a bargain.16  See Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 
275, 208 A.2d 575, 580 (1965) (noting probation permits a defendant to retain his or her 
freedom so long as the defendant conforms “with established communal standards and the 
safety of society”).  As with any juvenile delinquency disposition, juvenile probation must 
 
15 Effective January 1, 2022, the definition of probation applicable to delinquency 
proceedings is codified without substantial change at Md. Rule 11-402(b)(5) (“‘Probation’ 
means a status created by a court order under which a child adjudicated to be delinquent is 
to remain subject to supervision of the court under conditions the court, or the agency 
designated by it, deems proper, but is not removed from his home.”). 
 
16 Unlike adult probation, juvenile probation is not considered a punishment for a 
crime, nor does juvenile probation follow a conviction.  Compare Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Safety and Corr. Servs., 430 Md. 535, 561, 62 A.3d 123, 139 (2013) (“It is well-settled in 
this State that [adult] probation is a form of a criminal sanction.”) (citation omitted), with 
In re Ann M., 309 Md. 564, 570, 525 A.2d 1054, 1057 (1987) (“Under the Juvenile Causes 
Act, no disposition of a juvenile petition, whether of a delinquent, CINA or a CINS, may 
result in a criminal conviction.”) (citation omitted); In re Appeal Misc. No. 32, 29 Md. App. 
701, 704, 351 A.2d 164, 165 (1976) (citation omitted) (“Judges in juvenile cases do not 
think in terms of guilt, but rather in terms of the need of the child for protection, guidance, 
or rehabilitation.”).   
 
25 
 
balance the “competing objectives” of public safety, accountability, and rehabilitation.  
Moore, 372 Md. at 673–74, 814 A.2d at 564.   
The exercise of a juvenile court’s discretion in establishing a condition of probation, 
similar to establishing a condition of probation for an adult, is “limited in several important 
respects[.]”  Allen v. State, 449 Md. 98, 111, 141 A.3d 194, 203 (2016).17  “[A] condition 
of probation must not be vague, indefinite or uncertain, conditions of probation must not 
be arbitrary or capricious, conditions of probation must be constitutional, conditions of 
probation must not exceed statutory limits, and conditions of probation must be reasonable 
and have a rational connection to the offense[.]”  Id., 141 A.3d at 203 (citations and 
quotations omitted).  
When assessing conditions of probation, this Court has held that generality of terms 
does not equate to vagueness.  In Meyer v. State, this Court explained that a condition of 
probation term is not vague if the court provides the defendant with reasonable and specific 
guidance regarding the condition and “the defendant understands what is required of him 
[or her].”  445 Md. 648, 680, 128 A.3d 147, 166 (2015).  In Meyer, the circuit court 
restricted Meyer’s driving privileges as a condition of probation following a series of motor 
 
17 The United States Supreme Court held in In re Gault that the constitutional 
guarantee of due process applies to juvenile proceedings.  387 U.S. 1, 13, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 
1436 (1967).  Conditions of probation that are vague or overbroad violate due process.  
Wayne R. LaFave et al., Probation Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 6 Crim. Proc. § 
26.9(b) (4th ed. 2021); see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S. Ct. 
2294, 2298 (1972) (“It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for 
vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.”).  We accordingly apply principles 
for assessing vague, overbroad, indefinite, arbitrary, or unconstitutional conditions of 
probation for adults to conditions of probation for juveniles. 
 
26 
 
vehicle violations.  Id. at 658, 128 A.3d at 153 (“[Meyer] will not be allowed to operate a 
motor vehicle . . . during the time of any probation[]”).   
This Court determined that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning 
a “no-driving” special condition of probation.  Id. at 681, 128 A.3d at 166.  The circuit 
court appropriately considered the “facts and circumstances” of Meyer’s multiple driving 
violations, including one incident that resulted in the death of another.  This Court found 
that the “no-driving” condition was designed “to keep Meyer, a recidivist, from committing 
any further motor vehicle violations.”  Id., 128 A.3d at 167.  Despite the brief and general 
phrasing, this Court concluded that the concise “no-driving condition was unambiguous, 
specific, and Meyer clearly understood the standard of conduct required. . . .”  Id., 128 
A.3d at 167 (emphasis added).  Under the circumstances, the circuit court did not need to 
say more than “[Meyer] will not be allowed to operate a motor vehicle[]” for Meyer to 
appreciate what conduct would violate the condition of probation.  Id. at 658, 128 A.3d at 
153. 
The no-suspension condition of probation, similar to the “no-driving” condition of 
probation in Meyer, reasonably apprised S.F. of “what is required of him[]” under the 
circumstances.  Id. at 680, 128 A.3d at 166.  The juvenile magistrate was presented with 
“a long history of behavioral incidents in school.”  S.F. was suspended once in 2011 (at 
age 5), once during the 2016–17 school year, four times during the 2017–18 school year, 
and two times during the 2018–19 school year—following the incidents that led to the case 
at bar.  A DJS report further documented “a history of problematic behavior in school . . . 
[and] rapid accumulating of charges[.]”  Like the circuit court in Meyer, the juvenile 
 
27 
 
magistrate in the case at bar was aware of the facts and circumstances of S.F.’s case and 
imposed a no-suspension condition of probation to keep S.F. from further and repeated 
disciplinary problems at school.  The no-suspension condition provided an easily 
understandable expression of the “standard of conduct required” for a middle school 
student.  Meyer, 445 Md. at 681, 128 A.3d at 167.  S.F. was already familiar with the FCPS 
code of conduct, the process of suspensions, and what past behavior had led to suspension.  
The condition of probation, while phrased generally, gave reasonable indication of what 
behavior was required under the circumstances.  
The no-suspension condition was also consistent with the “[o]bey all house rules” 
condition of probation.  The juvenile court ordered both conditions of probation because 
of recent instances of behavioral misconduct, and the conditions worked in tandem to 
inform S.F. that his conduct must conform with behavioral expectations at school and at 
home.  The juvenile court, like the circuit court in Meyer, did not need to provide any more 
specific guidance than “attend school regularly without any . . . suspensions” in order for 
S.F. to understand what was required of him under the circumstances. 
Our previous cases have demonstrated that allowing a third party, such as a school 
administrator in this case, to take action that determines compliance with the condition of 
probation does not make the condition vague.  In Hudgins, a condition of probation 
required the defendant to “work with the State Police until there was satisfaction for what 
he was charged with, until the State Police were satisfied that he had worked out for what 
he was charged with.”  292 Md. at 344, 438 A.2d at 929 (emphasis added).  This Court 
rejected the defendant’s contention that the condition was vague, id. at 348, 438 A.2d at 
 
28 
 
931, and explained that “the nature of the probationary penalty is such that the 
circumstances of a case . . . render it desirable, or perhaps necessary, that the condition of 
probation be expressed in somewhat general terms.”  Id., 438 A.2d at 931.  This Court 
stated “there can be little doubt that [the defendant] understood” the meaning of the 
condition of probation, as it plainly meant that he must supply the State Police with 
information “reasonably available to him concerning criminal activity of others[.]”  Id. at 
349, 438 A.2d at 931.  The fact that a third party, namely the State Police, had wide 
discretion in determining what actions the defendant needed to take did not render the 
condition of probation vague.  Id., 438 A.2d at 931 (noting defendant “agreed to comply 
with all reasonable instructions given by the police in furtherance of his role as 
informant[]”).  It would have been impractical for the circuit court to have enumerated 
specific acts of cooperation when the assistance required by the State Police would vary 
based on the needs of the case.  
Similar to Hudgins, the no-suspension condition may have been general because it 
left enumerating the specific suspension-worthy behaviors to FCPS, but it was not “too 
vague, indefinite, and uncertain to be given any constriction or application.”  Id. at 348, 
438 A.2d at 931 (emphasis added).  FCPS’ code of conduct is detailed and prescriptive in 
defining suspension-worthy behavior.  For example, S.F. was found to have committed 
second-degree assault against another student.  According to FCPS Reg. No. 400-08, 
assault is defined as “[t]he unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a 
violent physical attack upon a person.  This includes threatening language or gestures 
without actually touching another person.”  Frederick County Public Schools, Reg. No. 
 
29 
 
400-08 (Mar. 15, 2018) (“FCPS Reg. No. 400-08”).  Conduct that satisfies this definition 
of assault triggers a “tier 2” response, which includes behavioral interventions such as a 
parent-teacher conference, loss of privileges, temporary removal from class, and in-school 
suspension.  Depending on severity and practicality, the school may impose a short-term 
or long-term suspension as well.  
The discretion built into the FCPS code of conduct regarding when a teacher or 
school administrator institutes discipline does not make the no-suspension condition of 
probation vague.  Similar to how the expectations of the police informant varied based on 
the needs of law enforcement within a particular case in Hudgins, the circumstances in 
which certain behavior warrants discipline, including suspension, will vary based on the 
dynamics of student behavior within a school environment.  What behavior is expected of 
students will vary depending on the circumstances.18  Teachers and school administrators, 
like the State Police in Hudgins, are in a better position than the juvenile court to specify 
what conduct is required at different points during the school day.  The discretion afforded 
to school personnel in determining whether particular behavior violated the student code 
of conduct does not make the no-suspension condition of probation impermissibly vague.19  
 
18 FCPS Reg. No. 400-08 defines “Disruptive Behavior” as “[a]ctions which 
interfere with the effective operations of the school.”  There are numerous situations in 
which conduct in one circumstance may constitute “Disruptive Behavior” but not another.  
As one example, boisterous behavior may be tolerated during recess, but not during a 
standardized test. 
 
19 The discretion afforded to school personnel does not dilute the specific behavioral 
expectations provided in the student code of conduct.  The no suspension condition of 
probation may be generally worded, but it provides highly detailed and “‘specific rules  
(continued . . .) 
 
30 
 
In response, S.F. cited several cases from California for the proposition that 
conditions of probation are vague when third parties have discretion in assessing 
compliance.  We find the cases cited by S.F. distinguishable based on whether the condition 
of probation provides advance notice of what behavior is required by the probationer, and 
therefore do not support the proposition that permitting a third party to determine 
compliance with a condition of probation necessarily renders the condition vague.  In 
People v. Pirali, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 335, 344 (Ct. App. 2013), the court found a condition 
of probation that prohibited purchase or possession of pornographic or sexually explicit 
materials as defined by the probation officer to be vague.  The condition was vague, 
according to the court, because the “condition does not sufficiently provide defendant with 
advance knowledge of what is required of him[,]” as the defendant may not learn his 
conduct was violative of the terms of probation only until “after defendant already 
possesses the material.”  Id. (emphasis added).   
Unlike Pirali, S.F. knew in advance what behavior was required of him.  The no-
suspension condition of probation informed S.F. that he must adhere to school rules and 
not behave in a manner, as articulated by the FCPS code of conduct, that would warrant 
 
(. . . continued) 
 
designed to govern the conduct of the [student] within the ambit’ of a general condition 
imposed by the [juvenile] court.”  Russell v. State, 221 Md. App. 518, 529, 109 A.3d 1249, 
1256 (2015) (quoting Costa v. State, 58 Md. App. 474, 82, 473 A.2d 942, 946 (1984)).  We 
are unaware of any Maryland appellate case that considered a condition of probation, 
subject to clear and definite rules of conduct, to be vague.  Smith v. State, 306 Md. 1, 7, 
506 A.2d 1165, 1168 (1986); Hudgins, 292 Md. at 348; 438 A.2d at 931; Douglas v. State, 
130 Md. App. 666, 674, 747 A.2d 752, 757 (2000).   
 
31 
 
suspension.  Further unlike the defendant in Pirali, S.F. would not have to wait until a 
meeting with his probation officer to discover what types of behavior would violate the no-
suspension condition of probation.20 
In another case cited by S.F., People v. Turner, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803, 807 (Ct. App. 
2007), the court found that a probation condition requiring the defendant “not [to] possess 
any sexually stimulating or sexually oriented material as deemed inappropriate by [the] 
probation officer” was an “inherently imprecise and subjective standard.”  According to 
the court, the retroactive determination by the probation officer of what constitutes sexually 
explicit material rendered the condition of probation vague.  Id. at 806.  The court 
accordingly modified the condition so the probation officer must inform the defendant in 
advance about which materials would violate the terms of probation.  Id. at 807.  In the 
case at bar, FCPS, by virtue of its student code of conduct, informed S.F. in advance of the 
type of conduct that would trigger a suspension.  The cases cited by S.F. are distinguishable 
from the case at bar because the no-suspension condition of probation provided S.F. with 
sufficient advance notice of what behavior was required. 
We accordingly hold that the no-suspension condition of probation was not 
impermissibly vague because it reasonably apprised S.F. of what behavior was required of 
him under the circumstances. 
 
20 We note a distinction between the type of behavior that warrants a suspension and 
whether a student in fact acted in a way that warranted suspension.  The juvenile court must 
determine whether a student willfully violated the no-suspension condition of probation.  
See infra slip op. at 31. 
 
32 
 
C. 
Whether a probationer willfully violated a condition of probation is a distinct 
issue from vagueness and must be determined by the juvenile court before 
revocation of probation. 
 
A generally worded condition of probation does not mean a probationer may be 
found in violation of probation “from factors beyond his [or her] control and through no 
fault of his [or her] own.”  Hudgins, 292 Md. at 349, 438 A.2d at 931.  A school suspension 
does not automatically result in a violation of probation, because whether a violation of a 
condition of probation occurred, is a question of fact to be determined by the juvenile court.  
Id. at 348, 438 A.2d at 931.  Therefore, assuming S.F., or another similarly situated student, 
was suspended, there are two layers of procedural safeguards designed to protect against 
arbitrary or capricious punishment. 
First, when a third-party informs a probation officer that a condition of probation 
has been violated, the probation officer is not automatically and immediately bound to 
report the purported violation to the juvenile court.  A probation officer has some discretion 
in reporting a purported violation to the juvenile court.  See State v. Alexander, 467 Md. 
600, 607, 226 A.3d 1, 5 (2020) (describing a similar reporting procedure for adult 
probation).  Maryland Rule 11-116, at the time of proceedings,21 set forth the procedure 
for initiating violation of probation proceedings: 
a.  Revisory Power.  An order of the court may be modified or vacated if the 
court finds that action to be in the best interest of the child or the public, 
except in cases involving commitment of a child to the Maryland Department 
of Health for placement in a State mental hospital.  In cases involving such 
commitment the court shall proceed as provided in Rule 11-115. 
 
 
21 The rule has been recodified at Md. Rule 11-423 and went into effect on January 
1, 2022. 
 
33 
 
b.  Sua Sponte or on Petition.  The court may proceed under section a. of 
this Rule on its own motion, or on the petition of any party or other person, 
institution or agency having supervision or custody of the respondent, setting 
forth in concise terms the grounds upon which the relief is requested.  If the 
court proceeds on its own motion, the order shall set forth the grounds on 
which it is based. 
 
c.  Hearing--When Required.  If the relief sought under section a. of this 
Rule is for revocation of probation and for the commitment of a respondent, 
the court shall pass an order to show cause why the relief should not be 
granted and setting a date and time for a hearing.  The clerk shall cause a 
copy of the petition and Show Cause Order to be served upon the parties.  In 
all other cases, the court may grant or deny the relief, in whole or in part, 
without a hearing. 
 
d.  Conduct of Hearing.  In the interest of justice, at any hearing held 
pursuant to this Rule the court may decline to require strict application of the 
rules in Title 5, except those relating to the competency of witnesses. 
 
Second, once the juvenile court is made aware of a purported violation and has 
docketed proceedings against probationer, the State has the burden in establishing, by a 
preponderance of evidence, that a violation of a condition of probation has occurred.  Cts. 
& Jud. Proc. § 3-8A-18(e); see also Hammonds v. State, 436 Md. 22, 31, 80 A.3d 698, 703 
(2013) (noting a similar standard for revocation of adult probation).  The juvenile court 
then must determine whether a violation of a condition of probation warrants revocation of 
probation.  Moore, 372 Md. at 668, 814 A.2d at 561 (noting that the juvenile court found 
the child in violation of probation); Hammonds, 436 Md. at 31, 80 A.3d at 703 (describing 
a similar process for adult probation). 
In the case at bar, part of the prima facie case of a violation of the no-suspension 
condition of probation necessarily requires proof of S.F.’s alleged misbehavior and an 
 
34 
 
explanation from a school administrator for why it warranted suspension.  This information 
must be recorded by school personnel according to FCPS Reg. No. 400-08: 
All administrative imposed discipline will be documented in the student 
information system.  All discipline that results in suspension (for 1 or more 
days) will be maintained as part of the individual student’s permanent record.  
The discipline record will consist of a description of the student’s behavior 
that resulted in the disciplinary action and a copy of the correspondence sent 
to the parent(s) informing them of the student’s suspension or expulsion. 
 
(Emphasis added). 
S.F. may also present a defense during the violation of probation hearing that the 
suspension “resulted from factors beyond his control and through no fault of his own.”  
Hudgins, 292 Md. at 349, 438 A.2d at 931.  During the hearing before the juvenile court, 
S.F. raised a concern about being suspended because of the misconduct of other students, 
such as another student starting a fight.  If such an incident occurred, S.F. could argue that 
while he may have retaliated and received a suspension, it was not a willful violation of a 
condition of probation.  See Hammonds, 436 Md. at 36–37, 80 A.3d at 706–07 (“The 
inquiry at the probation revocation proceeding, then, should have been whether the 
evidence showed, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Petitioner willfully” violated a 
condition of probation).  We agree with the Court of Special Appeals that the “possibility 
that a suspension could be imposed too quickly or arbitrarily would, when it happens, 
represent a failure of execution” by school administrators, In re: S.F., 249 Md. App. at 59, 
245 A.3d at 36, and in such a circumstance, should lead the juvenile court to find that the 
suspension arose “from factors beyond his [or her] control and through no fault of his [or 
her] own.”  Hudgins, 292 Md. at 349, 438 A.2d at 931.  
 
35 
 
CONCLUSION 
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in determining S.F.’s “no-suspension” 
condition of probation was not vague because it reasonably informed S.F. of the behavior 
required while on probation.  Whether a suspension was arbitrarily or capriciously imposed 
against a student based on race, disability, or other factor, did not bear on the vagueness of 
the no-suspension condition of probation in this case, and generally is a question of fact to 
be determined by the juvenile court when deciding if a violation of a condition of probation 
resulted from factors beyond the control or fault of a student. 
For the reasons previously explained, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special 
Appeals. 
 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS IS AFFIRMED.  
COSTS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY 
PETITIONER.  
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 10 
 
September Term, 2021 
______________________________________ 
 
IN RE: S.F. 
______________________________________ 
 
Getty, C.J. 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Booth 
Biran 
Gould, 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Watts, J. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed: February 3, 2022 
 
Circuit Court for Frederick County 
Case Nos.  C-10-JV-18-000271 & 
C-10-JV-19-000094 
Argued: October 7, 2021 
 
Respectfully, I dissent.  The Majority concludes that making a school’s 
discretionary decision to suspend a child a violation of probation is not an impermissibly 
vague condition of probation.  See Maj. Slip Op. at 2, 31.  In so concluding, the Majority 
appears to acknowledge that children may be subject to disparate treatment with respect to 
school decisions imposing suspension.  See Maj. Slip Op. at 34-35.  Nonetheless, the 
Majority holds:   
Whether a suspension was arbitrarily or capriciously imposed against a 
student based on race, disability, or other factor, d[oes] not bear on the 
vagueness of the no-suspension condition of probation in this case, and 
generally is a question of fact to be determined by the juvenile court when 
deciding if a violation of a condition of probation resulted from factors 
beyond the control or fault of a student.  
 
Maj. Slip Op. at 35. 
 
Essentially, the Majority indicates that to avoid being found in violation of probation 
as a result of a suspension that may have been arbitrarily or capriciously imposed based on 
race, disability, or other factors, a juvenile must show as a matter of fact that the suspension 
was based on factors that were beyond the juvenile’s fault or control.1  See Maj. Slip Op. 
at 35.  Unlike the Majority, I would not leave in place the no-suspension condition of 
probation and require that to avoid a violation of probation a juvenile shoulder the burden 
of proving that a suspension resulted from factors beyond the juvenile’s control or fault, 
such as race, disability, or other factors. 
I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and hold that a 
 
1Although the majority opinion does not expressly impose the burden of proof on 
the juvenile, it is plain that the juvenile would bear the burden as the State without a clear 
mandate from this Court or other authority obviously would not. 
- 2 - 
condition of probation in juvenile court indicating that a child may have no suspensions is 
impermissible because the condition fails to provide a juvenile with adequate notice of the 
conduct that will result in a violation of probation.  In my view, a juvenile court could 
accomplish the same goals that a no-suspension condition of probation is designed to 
ensure—namely, that a child engages in appropriate behavior in a school setting and 
protecting the public—by imposing a condition of probation that would require a child to 
report any suspension immediately to a probation officer. 
A probation condition requiring that a child attend school regularly without 
suspension fails to provide adequate notice to a child of what conduct will constitute a 
violation of probation because the child’s conduct is not determinative of whether the child 
will receive a suspension at school but rather the determination is subject to very broad 
discretionary decision-making authority by school officials.  Compounding the concern, in 
this case, S.F., Petitioner, and amici curiae have contended that decisions concerning 
school suspensions result in disparate outcomes based on circumstances such as race and 
disability.  This is a premise that the Majority seemingly accepts.2  Because school 
 
2The Majority states:  
 
We agree with the Court of Special Appeals that the “possibility that a 
suspension could be imposed too quickly or arbitrarily would, when it 
happens, represent a failure of execution” by school administrators, In re[] 
S.F., 249 Md. App. [50,] 59, 245 A.3d [30,] 36 [(2021)], and in such a 
circumstance, should lead the juvenile court to find that the suspension arose 
“from factors beyond his [or her] control and through no fault of his [or her] 
own.”  Hudgins[ v. State], 292 Md. [342,] 349, 438 A.2d [928,] 931 [(1982) 
(cleaned up)]. 
 
Maj. Slip Op. at 34 (some alterations in original). 
- 3 - 
suspensions are discretionary decisions by school officials that based on the same conduct 
may vary from child to child, a no-suspension condition of probation does not provide 
sufficient notice to a child of the conduct that will result in a violation of probation.  
Permitting the exercise of discretion in the decision-making process for school 
suspensions is not wrong or improper.  It is necessary because children are different and 
their conduct is different and it would not be possible or desirable for schools to impose a 
rigid form of school discipline because conduct in schools should be handled on an 
individual basis.  The issue is that, because decisions about children’s conduct will result 
in different outcomes, those outcomes should not be the basis of a violation of probation; 
rather, the juvenile’s conduct should be the basis for alleging a violation of probation. 
The school process for suspensions is set forth in both the Code of Maryland and 
Code of Maryland Regulations (“COMAR”).  COMAR 13A.08.01.11B(10) generally 
defines a “suspension” as “the application of extended suspension, in-school suspension, 
short-term suspension, or long-term suspension.”  An “in-school suspension” “means the 
removal within the school building of a student from the student’s current education 
program for up to but not more than 10 school days in a school year for disciplinary reasons 
by the school principal.”  COMAR 13A.08.01.11B(4).  A “short-term suspension” is “the 
removal of a student from school for up to but not more than 3 school days for disciplinary 
reasons by the principal.”  COMAR 13A.08.01.11B(9).  COMAR 13A.08.01.11B(5) 
defines a “long-term suspension” as “the removal of a student from school for a time period 
between 4 and 10 school days for disciplinary reasons by the principal.”  An “extended 
suspension” is “the exclusion of a student from a student’s regular program for a time 
- 4 - 
period between 11 and 45 school days,” and may occur only under certain circumstances.  
COMAR 13A.08.01.11B(3).   
In-school, short-term, and long-term suspensions (i.e., suspensions for ten school 
days or less) may be imposed for a wide variety of conduct at the discretion of the school 
principal.  Md. Code. Ann., Educ. (1978, 2018 Repl. Vol.) (“ED”) § 7-305(a)(1) provides 
that, with limited exceptions, “in accordance with the rules and regulations of the county 
board, each principal of a public school may suspend for cause, for not more than 10 school 
days, any student in the school who is under the direction of the principal.”  
For suspensions of ten school days or less, in addition to imposition of such a 
suspension being subject to the discretion of the principal, little process is required.  For 
example, ED § 7-305(a)(2) and (a)(3) require that “[t]he student or the student’s parent or 
guardian promptly shall be given a conference with the principal and any other appropriate 
personnel during the suspension period[,]” as well as “a community resources list provided 
by the county board[.]”  No right to appeal such a suspension is provided.3 
 
3Insofar as an extended suspension is concerned, except as provided in ED § 7-
305.1, “at the request of a principal, a county superintendent may suspend a student for 
more than 10 school days[.]”  ED  § 7-305(c).  An extended suspension may be imposed 
where the superintendent or designated representative has determined that “[t]he student’s 
return to school prior to the completion of the suspension period would pose an imminent 
threat of serious harm to other students and staff” or “[t]he student has engaged in chronic 
and extreme disruption of the educational process that has created a substantial barrier to 
learning for other students across the school day, and other available and appropriate 
behavioral and disciplinary interventions have been exhausted.”  
COMAR 
13A.08.01.11B(3)(a).  The superintendent or designated representative must “limit[] the 
duration of the exclusion to the shortest period practicable” and the school system must 
“provide[] the excluded student with comparable educational services and appropriate 
behavioral support services to promote successful return to the student’s regular academic 
program.”  COMAR 13A.08.01.11B(3)(b), (c). 
- 5 - 
In Frederick County, consistent with COMAR 13A.08.01.11B, suspensions for ten 
school days or less are determined by the school principal.  See Frederick Cty. Pub. Schools 
Reg. No. 400-04(II)(D)-(F), (I) (amended Nov. 15, 2017), available at https://apps. 
fcps.org/legal/documents/400-04 [https://perma.cc/WQ8L-348A].  According to the 
current version of Reg. No. 400-08, in Frederick County Public Schools, the consequences 
for various conduct may include a wide range of discipline, ranging from a classroom 
response consisting of verbal correction to detention, suspension, or expulsion.  See 
Frederick Cty. Pub. Schools Reg. No. 400-08(II)(E) (amended Oc. 28, 2020), available at 
https://apps.fcps.org/legal/documents/400-08 [https://perma.cc/N5EY-TKEC].  Reg. No. 
400-08(II)(B) provides that “[i]t is expected that prior to imposing disciplinary measures, 
positive behavioral interventions and supports should be considered as practicable.”  The 
regulation states that “[w]hile school principals/designees have discretion in imposing 
discipline based upon the facts of the investigation and the needs of the students, long term 
suspensions and requests for extended suspensions/expulsions should be considered as last 
resort options.”4   
Reg. No. 400-08(II)(E) includes a table identifying “Tiers of Interventions” and the 
wide range of responses available to school officials for an offense falling under each tier.  
According to the Majority, a no-suspension condition of probation is “not too vague, 
indefinite, and uncertain” to be given application because the “FCPS’ code of conduct is 
 
4Like Reg. No. 400-04(II)(D), (E), and (I), Reg. No. 400-08(II)(E) defines in-school, 
long-term, and short-term suspensions as removals of students by the school principal for 
disciplinary reasons. 
- 6 - 
detailed and prescriptive in defining suspension-worthy behavior.”  Maj. Slip Op. at 28 
(cleaned up).  The Majority indicates that assault is conduct that “triggers a ‘tier 2’ 
response” under Reg. No. 400-08, making a wide range of interventions possible, “such as 
a parent-teacher conference, loss of privileges, temporary removal from class, and in-
school suspension[,]”  as well as a short-term or long-term suspension.  Maj. Slip Op. at 
29.  It appears that under the Majority’s reasoning because assault is described as conduct 
for which a student could be suspended it does not matter that other possible consequences 
are also available and that a suspension could be imposed for reasons not related to the 
student’s conduct. 
In actuality, under Reg. No. 400-08(II)(F), “assault” is conduct that warrants either 
a Tier 2 or Tier 3 response.  A Tier 2 response for assault could consist of over twenty 
possible consequences ranging from, among other things, community service, detention, 
development of a behavior contract or behavior intervention plan, loss of privileges, a 
parent/administrator conference, to in-school removal or an in-school suspension.  See 
Reg. No. 400-08(II)(E).  A Tier 3 response could involve one of five actions: suspension 
pending a parent conference, short-term out-of-school suspension, long-term out-of-school 
suspension, extended out-of-school suspension, or expulsion.  See id.  In other words, the 
regulation confirms that, as with other misconduct in school, where assault is concerned a 
school principal has a wide range of discretion as to which disciplinary response to choose 
from and impose, and a juvenile would have no control over whether or how a principal 
would exercise his or her discretion at any time.   
Provisions governing school suspensions provide no notice to a juvenile as to the 
- 7 - 
conduct that will actually result in a suspension and afford little process for infractions that 
result in suspensions of ten school days or less.  Regardless of whether a suspension is 
labeled a minor or extended suspension, under the language of the probation order at issue 
in this case, a suspension would constitute a violation of probation.  What the discretionary 
school suspension process demonstrates is that certain conduct by one child at one school 
could result in a suspension and hence a violation of probation while the same conduct by 
a different child at another school (or even the same school) would not.  The reality is that 
different schools or one school may decide to take different actions with respect to the same 
conduct by different children. 
The Majority concludes that discretionary decision-making with respect to school 
suspensions does not render a no-suspension condition of probation impermissibly vague 
because there are other conditions of probation that similarly require decisions by third 
parties before a probationer’s conduct would be deemed a violation.  See Maj. Slip Op. at 
29-30.  In support of this proposition, the Majority relies on the case of Hudgins v. State, 
292 Md. 342, 438 A.2d 928 (1982), for the analogy that because a probationer may be 
ordered to cooperate with a law enforcement officer (giving the officer the discretion to 
determine whether the cooperation was satisfactory), school officials having discretion 
with regard to the imposition of a suspension does not render a no-suspension condition of 
probation impermissibly vague.  See Maj. Slip Op. at 27-29.  From my perspective, though, 
for a number of reasons, the type of condition relied on by the Majority for the comparison 
is very distinct from the circumstances of school suspensions.  To be sure, the condition in 
Hudgins that the Majority discusses has an element of third-party decision-making.  But, 
- 8 - 
importantly, the decision-making process in that instance was not alleged to have produced 
a disparate outcome based on race, disability, or other factors beyond the probationer’s 
control. 
In Hudgins, 292 Md. at 344, 438 A.3d at 929, a condition of probation mandated 
that the defendant “work with the State Police until there was satisfaction for what he was 
charged with, until the State Police were satisfied that he had worked out for what he was 
charged with.”  The objection to the condition was that the language was allegedly so 
generic or vague as to render the condition of probation unenforceable.  See id. at 347, 438 
A.2d at 930.  We rejected the contention, stating “there can be little doubt that [the 
defendant] understood the” meaning of the condition of probation, as it plainly meant that 
he must supply the State Police with information “reasonably available to him concerning 
criminal activity of others[.]”  Id. at 349, 438 A.2d at 931.  We recognized, though, “that a 
probation requirement may be so amorphous that it is not reasonable to say that the 
defendant’s complained of action was regulated by the standard of conduct imposed by the 
sentencing judge, thus rendering the penalty inherently incapable of enforcement.”  Id. at 
348, 438 A.2d at 931.   
Unlike with a no-suspension condition, the defendant in Hudgins would have been 
aware of the action he was required to take to comply with the condition of probation.  The 
defendant in Hudgins would have known that he was required to take action, i.e., engage 
in conduct, to supply a law enforcement officer with sufficient information concerning 
- 9 - 
criminal activity until the officer found his effort satisfactory.5  Although the defendant 
could not control the officer’s decision as to whether his conduct was satisfactory, the 
condition was clear as to what was required of the defendant.  With school suspensions, 
that is not the case.  Two students may engage in the very same conduct and based on the 
discretion of school officials one child may receive a suspension while the second may not 
for reasons totally unrelated to either child’s conduct.   
The Majority’s rationale seems to be that because Frederick County school 
regulations set out what conduct may potentially result in a suspension, a child is on notice 
to avoid all such conduct and the fact that some students may be suspended while others 
are not does not mean that the condition of probation is too vague to be enforceable.  See 
Maj. Slip Op. at 28-29.  In my view, in addition to a juvenile not being able to tell what 
conduct will actually result in a suspension, this sets too high a bar for children with respect 
to conduct that may result in a violation of probation.  Under Frederick County Reg. No. 
400-08(II)(F)-(J), conduct that may qualify for an in-school suspension includes using 
disrespectful language, gambling, disruptive cell phone use, unauthorized computer use, 
 
5Although the Majority does not mention this type of condition of probation, there 
are cases in which probationers have been ordered to successfully complete certain 
programs.  The decision-making process, at least in terms of successfully completing a 
specific program, such as an alcohol or substance abuse rehabilitation program, would have 
definitive criteria by which a probationer’s participation in the program could be assessed.  
Stated otherwise, assessing whether the probationer successfully completed a program 
would not be an entirely discretionary determination but rather would be based on set 
criteria.  Probationers who are required to participate in a program as a condition of 
probation will know that their performance will be deemed satisfactory or unsatisfactory 
and will have definite, set guidelines to follow.  By contrast, a juvenile has no notice of 
whether the juvenile will indeed be the individual whom a school will begin suspension 
proceedings against. 
- 10 - 
class cutting, leaving campus, misbehavior on a school bus, defiance of authority, setting 
a false fire alarm, smoking cigarettes, cheating, and plagiarism.  Any of this conduct at the 
discretion of school officials may result in an in-school suspension and, under a no-
suspension condition of probation, would per se constitute a violation of probation.  In 
other words, conduct as such as cheating on a test or smoking a cigarette in school could 
result in a juvenile being suspended and found in violation of a probation.  Although the 
consequences for any violation of probation depend on the gravity of the violation, 
undeniably, there is conduct that may result in a suspension from school but which should 
not automatically result in a violation of probation.6 
Nonetheless, the Majority concludes that school rules are spelled out and available 
to a juvenile and, as such, the juvenile would be aware of the conduct that could get the 
juvenile in trouble, i.e., suspended, and found in violation of probation.  See Maj. Slip Op. 
at 30-31.  That may be true.  Importantly, though, it is the school’s response to the 
conduct—not whether the juvenile engages in conduct that violates school rules—that 
determines whether a suspension will be imposed and hence whether there will be a 
violation of probation or not.7  The problem is that the requirement that a juvenile have no 
 
6The Majority states that “[a] school suspension does not automatically result in a 
violation of probation, because whether a violation of a condition of probation occurred is 
a question of fact to be determined by the juvenile court.”  Maj. Slip Op. at 32 (citation 
omitted).  This observation is of no consequence, though, because, in the event of a no-
suspension condition of probation, the sole question of fact to be determined by the juvenile 
court is whether the juvenile incurred a suspension. 
7The Majority states that “[w]e are unaware of any Maryland appellate case that 
considered a condition of probation, subject to clear and definite rules of conduct, to be 
vague.”  Maj. Slip Op. at 30 n.19 (citations omitted).  Again, this comment does not take 
 
- 11 - 
suspensions gives the juvenile no notice and little control as to what conduct will actually 
result in a violation of probation. 
The Majority’s conclusion that “[w]hether a suspension was arbitrarily or 
capriciously imposed against a student based on race, disability, or other factor, d[oes] not 
bear on the vagueness of the no-suspension condition of probation” and is a fact to be 
determined by a juvenile court in deciding whether “a violation of a condition of probation 
resulted from factors beyond the control or fault of a student[,]” Maj. Slip Op. at 35, 
establishes a difficult if not impossible standard for a juvenile to meet and will cause 
violation of probation proceedings to unnecessarily become mini-trials concerning the 
behavior and motivation of school officials.  The focus of a juvenile violation of probation 
proceeding should be to determine whether the juvenile has engaged in conduct that 
violates probation, not whether the juvenile has been wrongfully suspended or the subject 
of disparate or inappropriate treatment.  Allegations of disparate or unequal treatment are 
difficult to prove even in protracted civil trials involving extensive discovery, including 
interrogatories, the production of documents, and depositions, etc., and often expert 
testimony, and will be nearly impossible for a juvenile to establish within the confines of 
a violation of probation hearing.  
In my view, rather than imposing as a condition of probation that a juvenile have no 
suspensions, a juvenile court should impose a condition of probation that requires a 
 
into account that, with a no-suspension condition of probation, it is not the student’s 
conduct that ultimately determines whether a violation of probation will occur, but rather 
it is the decision of a school official as to whether or not a suspension is imposed that 
determines the basis of an alleged violation of probation.  
- 12 - 
juvenile to notify a probation officer of any suspension, i.e., a notice of suspension 
condition of probation.  This is similar to the type of condition imposed for adults and 
juveniles with respect to arrests.  As a condition of probation, probationers are required to 
obey all laws and to report any arrests to a probation officer.  If a similar condition requiring 
the reporting of a suspension were imposed in juvenile cases, a probation officer would 
have the ability to pursue either a violation of probation or the modification of a probation 
order based on the conduct underlying the suspension.  The circumstance that the juvenile 
had been “suspended” would not by itself constitute an automatic or per se violation of 
probation.  Under this type of probation condition, a juvenile’s conduct would form the 
basis for determining a violation of probation as opposed to an inquiry into whether the 
suspension was arbitrarily or capriciously given for reasons beyond the juvenile’s control 
or fault. 
With a condition requiring that a juvenile report any suspension, depending on the 
conduct at issue, a probation officer would be free to institute a violation of probation or in 
the alternative under Maryland Rule 11-423(a),8 in the absence of the allegation of a 
 
8Maryland Rule 11-423(a) provides in relevant part: 
 
(a) Revisory Power. 
 
(1) Authority. The court may modify or vacate an order if the court finds that 
action to be in the best interest of the respondent or the public. 
 
(2) On Motion. The court may exercise its authority under subsection (a)(1) 
of this Rule on motion of any party.  A motion shall state with particularity 
the grounds on which the relief is requested.  The court may grant or deny 
the relief, in whole or in part, without a hearing. 
 
- 13 - 
violation of probation, a juvenile court could review the conduct underlying the suspension 
and determine whether the juvenile’s probation order should be modified.  In this manner, 
this Court and the Maryland justice system could accomplish the same goal as a no-
suspension probation condition and take a step forward in fulfilling the principle of equal 
justice under law in juvenile delinquency cases. 
For the above reasons, respectfully, I dissent. 
 
 
(3) Own Initiative. The court may exercise its authority under subsection 
(a)(1) of this Rule on its own initiative.  If it proposes to do so, the court shall 
notify the parties of its intent and inform them of the right to respond and 
request a hearing within 10 days.  The court may not modify or vacate an 
order earlier than 10 days after the issuance of the notice.  If a timely request 
for a hearing is made, the court shall conduct a hearing. 
 
(4) On Recommendation. The court may exercise its authority under 
subsection (a)(1) of this Rule on written recommendation to the court by the 
appropriate governmental agency exercising supervision or custody of the 
respondent.  The governmental agency making the recommendation shall (A) 
notify the parties of the recommendation and provide a copy of the 
recommendation to the parties, (B) inform the parties of the right to respond 
and request a hearing within 10 days from the date the notice was sent, and 
(C) provide a copy of the notice and recommendation to the court, 
accompanied by a statement of the date that notice was sent.  A response or 
request for a hearing shall be filed with the clerk.  The court may not act on 
the recommendation earlier than 10 days from the date that notice is issued, 
unless the parties consent in writing to the entry of an order implementing 
the recommendation.  If a timely request for a hearing is made, the court shall 
conduct a hearing. 
 
Committee note: This Rule is not intended to preclude a governmental 
agency from making a recommendation in writing in advance of a scheduled 
hearing or on the record in a court proceeding.