Case Title: In re Child of Nuradin A.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018 ME 36

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2018-03-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 36 
Docket: 
Cum-17-447 
Submitted 
On Briefs: February 26, 2018 
Decided: 
March 15, 2018 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILD OF NURADIN A. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  The father of a child appeals from a judgment of the District Court 
(Portland, Eggert, J.) terminating his parental rights to the child pursuant to 
22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i), (ii), (iv) (2017).1  The father 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment and the 
court’s discretionary determination that termination is in the child’s best 
interest.  Because the evidence supports the court’s findings and discretionary 
determination, we affirm the judgment. 
 
[¶2]  Based on competent evidence in the record, the court found, by clear 
and convincing evidence, that (1) the father was unwilling or unable to protect 
the child from jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to change within 
a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs, (2) the father was 
                                         
1  The mother’s parental rights were terminated in September 2017.  The mother did not appeal 
that decision.   
 
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unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child within a time which is 
reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs, (3) the father failed to make a 
good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the child, and (4) termination 
of the father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child.  See 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2); In re Caleb M., 2017 ME 66, ¶ 27, 159 A.3d 345.  We review the 
factual findings supporting the determination of parental unfitness for clear 
error.  See In re Logan M., 2017 ME 23, ¶ 3, 155 A.3d 430.  The court based these 
determinations on the following findings of fact. 
 
[¶3]  When the father’s identity was established, the father 
was homeless and was living a lifestyle in which he had little 
responsibility and mainly consisted of moving around and partying 
involving use of drugs and alcohol.  When he worked it was through 
[a program] doing temporary assignments. . . .  [When the Jeopardy 
Order was entered in November 2016,] he had not yet become 
involved in [the child’s] life and had not visited with him, but had 
dropped off some clothes for [the child] with [the Department of 
Health and Human Services].   
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
At the time of the [termination] hearing [the father] had not 
made significant progress in fulfilling the requirements of the 
Jeopardy Order or the rehabilitation and reunification plan.  He has 
visited [the child] from time to time but has not been regularly 
doing so and has not had a visit since August 7, 2017.  His visits 
have been suspended by [the service provider] for missing three 
visits and he has not taken the steps necessary to reestablish those 
visits.  During the visits he has participated in he had been 
 
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developing a bond with his son and had learned some basic skills 
for caring for him in a visitation setting. . . . 
 
 
[The father] completed a substance abuse evaluation at [a 
service provider]. . . .  He was diagnosed with both alcohol use 
disorder and cannabis use disorder. . . .  [The father] declined to 
take part in any treatment with the excuse that he was too busy.  
[The father] explains his refusal by stating that he will deal with the 
issue by himself and that he would not do group sessions with 
other drug addicts. . . . 
 
 
[The father] has not . . . engaged in any [mental health] 
treatment.  The reason for the requirement was some explosive 
behavior on his part, with assaultive behavior toward the mother.  
Since the Jeopardy Order was entered [the father] has been 
involved in a fight . . . in which he broke his hand after attacking a 
man who was showing a picture of [the child] in a bar where he was 
having a couple of beers. . . .  [The father] has also acted in an 
explosive fashion at the time of [the child’s] first birthday when 
DHHS granted his request for additional time with [the child], but 
not the full amount of his request.  His response was to get very 
angry and then to not even see his son on that birthday. . . .  
 
 
[The father] has made some progress toward getting housing 
assistance, but when this will actually come to fruition is not known 
with certainty, perhaps in a month or so.  In the meantime he 
continues to live in an apartment which is not considered 
habitable.  He has also done no parenting education and is not 
enrolled in any program to provide that education.   
 
 
. . . In the year that [the father] has known that he is [the 
child’s] parent he has taken some small steps toward 
rehabilitation, but he is still woefully short of success.  He is still 
without a stable home, drinks and smokes marijuana when it is 
inappropriate, has not dealt with his explosiveness, and has not 
enrolled in any parenting programs.  In short, he is still not capable 
of taking on the responsibility of being a single parent who has to 
provide for a child every day, all day.   
 
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[¶4]  These findings are sufficient to support the court’s conclusion that 
the father is unable to protect the child from jeopardy, is unable to take 
responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the 
child’s needs, and did not make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify 
with the child.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii), (iv).  The court did not 
abuse its discretion by concluding that termination of the father’s parental 
rights is in the best interest of the child.  See In re Logan M., 2017 ME 23, ¶ 5, 
155 A.3d 430.  As the court found, the child’s “father is not now capable of caring 
for [the child] on a full time basis, and there is no indication that he will be 
available to do so in the near future.  [The child] needs to have a permanent 
placement at this time.”   
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cory R. McKenna, Esq., Fairfield & Associates, P.A., Portland, for appellant father 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office 
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Portland District Court docket number PC-2016-60 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY