Case Title: JASON GERALD PHILLIP V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0080

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-02-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
JASON GERALD PHILLIP V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 14225 P.3d 504Case Number: S-09-0080Decided: 02/12/2010
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
JASON 
GERALD PHILLIP,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. 
Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Alden.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Craig.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Jason Gerald 
Phillip (the appellant) was involved in a bar fight, during which he bit off a 
piece of a fellow patron's ear.  As 
a result of this incident, he was charged with and convicted of aggravated 
assault and battery.  On appeal, he 
claims that the district court erred in instructing the jury regarding an 
aggressor's forfeiture of a self-defense claim, asserting that there was no 
evidence showing that he was the aggressor in the altercation.  The appellant also asserts that an 
Affidavit of Indigency, containing statements inconsistent with his in-court 
testimony, should not have been admitted into evidence.  He argues that the inconsistent 
statements were inadmissible inasmuch as they involved collateral matters and 
that they resulted in an erroneous application of the falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus 
maxim.  Finally, he contends 
that the admission of the affidavit resulted in an abridgement of his 
constitutionally protected right to equal protection, his Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination, and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  Finding no abuse of discretion or other 
error, we will affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      1.    Did the district court err 
when it gave the jury an instruction regarding an aggressor's right to 
self-defense?

 
 
2.    Did the district court err 
when it admitted into evidence the appellant's Affidavit of Indigency for 
impeachment purposes?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      This matter 
arose out of a fight that occurred in a bar in Casper, Wyoming, on July 18, 
2008.  During the altercation, the 
appellant bit off a piece of the ear of another patron, and as a result was 
charged with one count of aggravated assault and battery.  The appellant pled not guilty and a jury 
trial was held.  The jury found the 
appellant guilty as charged.  The 
appellant timely appealed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Did 
the district court err when it gave the jury an instruction regarding an 
aggressor's right to self-defense?

 
 
[¶4]      The appellant did 
not object at trial to the instruction to which he now takes exception.  Therefore, we review the appellant's 
claim under the three-part plain error analysis.

 
 
First, 
the record must clearly present the incident alleged to be error.  Second, appellant must demonstrate that 
a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, not 
merely arguable, way.  Last, 
appellant must prove that he was denied a substantial right resulting in 
material prejudice against him.

 

 

Ogden 
v. State, 
2001 WY 109, ¶ 9, 34 P.3d 271, 274 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting CB v. State, 749 P.2d 267, 268-69 (Wyo. 1988)).

 
 
[¶5]      At trial, the 
jury received Instruction No. 15 from the district court.  It read:

 
 
YOU 
ARE INSTRUCTED that generally, the right to use self-defense is not available to 
one who is the aggressor or provokes the conflict.  However, if one who provokes a conflict 
thereafter withdraws from it in good faith and informs his adversary by words or 
actions that he wants to end the conflict, and he is thereafter pursued or 
attacked, he then has the same right of self-defense as any other 
person.

 
 
When 
reviewing claims involving jury instructions, we review the 
instructions

 
 

as 
a whole without singling out individual instructions or parts of them.  Ellison v. State, 
3 P.3d 845, 849 (Wyo. 2000).  We give 
the trial courts great latitude in instructing the jury.  Merchant 
v. State, 
4 P.3d 184, 190 (Wyo. 2000). We "will not find reversible error in the jury 
instructions as long as the instructions correctly state the law and the entire 
set of instructions sufficiently covers the issues which were presented at the 
trial."  Id.  (quoting 
Harris 
v. State, 
933 P.2d 1114, 1126 (Wyo. 1997)).

 
 

Coburn 
v. State, 
2001 WY 30, ¶ 9, 20 P.3d 518, 520 (Wyo. 2001).  There is no question Instruction No. 15 
is a correct statement of Wyoming law.  
In fact, the instruction is the exact language found in Wyoming Criminal 
Pattern Jury Instruction 8.04.  
However, our inquiry does not end there.  Specifically, when reviewing the 
propriety of a self-defense instruction, we have said the 
following:

 
 
It 
is initially the court's obligation to determine whether there is evidence 
before the jury from which it could infer that the defendant was at fault and be 
regarded as an aggressor and deprive himself of the right of self-defense. The 
instruction cannot be given as a matter of course in every case involving a 
claim of self-defense.

 
 

Cullin 
v. State, 
565 P.2d 445, 450-51 (Wyo. 1977) (internal citations omitted).  

 
 
[¶6]      The appellant 
argues that the district court abused its discretion in giving Instruction No. 
15, claiming that there was no evidence presented at trial that supported a 
finding that he was the aggressor in the conflict.  Specifically, the appellant claims the 
only evidence against him was that "he was a person of color with an 
insufficiently deferential tone toward the white person who attacked him."  The record does not support this 
assertion.

 
 
[¶7]      With regard to 
the evidence that the defendant was the aggressor, the district court 
specifically commented as follows during the instruction conference:  "And in this case, there is certainly 
plenty of evidence from which both sides can argue as to who was or wasn't the 
aggressor and who was or wasn't defending themselves and whether or not the 
force necessary -- or the force used was necessary."  Our review of the record supports the 
district court's finding.  The 
victim described the circumstances leading up to the altercation as 
follows:

 
 
[THE 
PROSECUTOR:]  And there -- did there 
become [sic] a time where you stood up from your seat?

 
 
[THE 
VICTIM:] Yeah, that's when the argument really started to 
escalate.

 
 
Q.    All right. Why do you say the 
argument was really escalating at that point?

 
 
A.    Cause you could kind of tell 
that it was -- it was going -- it wasn't going to continue with, Oh, hey, you 
know, we're okay now and let's shake hands and have a drink. You could tell it 
was going to continue on to a more aggressive manner.

 
 
Q.    And as you stood up, could 
you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury where your back 
was?

 
 
A.    Yeah, I was -- when I had 
stood up, the chair swivels, you know.  So I swiveled out towards the opening and 
had stood up, and my back was facing the bar at the time, three feet away from 
the bar.

 
 
Q.    Okay.  So you're facing the 
patrons?

 
 
A.    Well, I was facing -- my back 
was facing the bar.

 
 
Q.    All right. And using Exhibit 
3 again, can you illustrate where he was when you stood up and had your back on 
the bar?

 
 
A.    I -- I believe that the other 
picture would be better.

 
 
Q.    All right. The first 
exhibit?

 
 
A.    Yes, 
sir.

 
 
Q.    And this is Exhibit 1, for 
the record.

 
 
A.    He was standing just right 
here in this area.  If my back was 
facing the bar, it would be a little more towards the -- right around this table 
area here he was standing.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
Q.    Can you tell us approximately 
how many feet away?

 
 
A.    Five at the max, probably. 
 He -- at the time there was enough 
distance where [the bar owner] was standing, and it was about a body length. And 
he was telling him, you know, this is -- you need to chill out.  Let's just call it done.  So there was, like, enough room for one 
person in between us.

 
 
Q.    All right.  And when [the bar owner] came over, did 
that end this argument?

 
 
A.    Not really.  I mean, he continued to kind of argue 
with [the bar owner] a little bit and, like, I wasn't saying anything.  I wasn't behind [the bar owner], you 
know.  I was just standing there, 
kinda.

 
 
Q.    And when [the bar owner] 
walked away, did the argument continue?

 
 
A.    When [the bar owner] turned 
away, he came -- come [sic] towards me.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
Q.    And when [the bar owner] 
walked away, did this argument then become physical?

 
 
A.    Yes, 
sir.

 
 
Q.    And how long did it take 
after [the bar owner] walked away before it became 
physical?

 
 
A.    He had come towards me, I 
mean, directly as [the bar owner] had turned.  And I felt -- I felt threatened, you 
know. I mean --

 
 
Q.    Well, let's talk about that 
for a minute. What do you mean he came at you?

 
 
A.    He had come towards me and, 
you know, not a -- not a hey-let's-shake-hands manner.  You know, it was -- he had come towards 
me, not to be friends with me.

 
 
Q.    How would you describe his 
walk or --

 
 
A.    It was definitely aggressive. 
 I mean, it wasn't like he took off 
jogging after me. There was [sic] only five steps, but it was an aggressive 
stride.

 
 
Q.    What did you think was about 
to happen?

 
 
A.    I definitely felt that we 
were going to end up fighting right then and definitely intimidated -- you know, 
I was intimidated by it.

 
 
Q.    And let's talk about the 
physical size for a moment. How tall are you, sir?

 
 
A.    5-9.

 
 
Q.    And how much do you 
weigh?

 
 
A.    180 pounds, 
roughly.

 
 
Q.    And he comes at you. What do 
you do?

 
 
A.    I -- I jabbed 
him.

 
 
The 
prosecutor reminded the jury about this testimony in his rebuttal closing 
statement, when he said:

 
 
Let's 
talk about the punch.  [Defense 
Counsel] says, [W]ell, you know, it's kind of out of the blue, wham.  What'd you hear from [the victim]?  He's coming at me.  Well, why'd you punch him?  I was threatened.  I was scared and here he come[s].  The fight's on.  He talked about aggressive 
walks.

 
 
[¶8]       There is no 
dispute that the appellant and the victim had been engaged in a verbal 
confrontation, based on the appellant's, the victim's, and the witnesses' 
testimonies.  It is also not 
disputed that the victim threw the first punch.  However, the record also shows the victim 
testified he only punched the appellant after the appellant came toward him in 
an aggressive manner.  In instances 
such as that presented here, where opposing parties claim the other was the 
aggressor, "our task is not to weigh the evidence, [but] only to determine 
whether the district court could reasonably conclude that there was competent 
evidence from which the jury might find [the party claiming self-defense] was 
the aggressor."  Causey v. 
State, 2009 WY 111, ¶ 13, 215 P.3d 287, 292 (Wyo. 2009).  Instruction No. 15 is a correct 
statement of Wyoming law, and we find that the jury was presented with testimony 
that could reasonably support a finding that the appellant was the aggressor in 
these circumstances.  Therefore, the 
appellant has failed to show a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law, 
thereby failing to prove plain error.

 
 
Did 
the district court err when it admitted into evidencethe appellant's 
Affidavit of Indigency forimpeachment 
purposes?

 
 
[¶9]      At trial, the 
appellant testified that the interaction between him and the victim escalated 
after the appellant was challenged as to the value of his jewelry.  On direct examination, the appellant 
stated:

 
 

A.     
. 
. . . I usually wear a lot of jewelry, all right?  And the only thing I have on today is my 
watch.  And they started asking 
about my rings and, you know, stuff like that, "Oh, it's fake."  And -- 

 
 
[Defense counsel:]  And you say "they."  Who do you mean when you say 
"they?"

 
 
A.    [The victim] and his 
friends.

 
 
Q.    Okay.

 
 
A.    And I'm like, "Bro, I don't 
buy anything that's fake."  All 
right?  I don't make a 100,000, 125 
grand a year to buy, like, silver or something that's fake, you know.  So they started laughing at me.  All right?

 
 
On 
cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned the appellant regarding what he 
perceived as inconsistencies between the appellant's testimony and information 
sworn to in the appellant's Affidavit of Indigency.  Specifically, the prosecutor pointed out 
that the appellant swore in his affidavit that he owned only $100.00 worth of 
jewelry and his last paycheck was only $2,300.00, both statements being 
inconsistent with his in-court testimony that he owns a lot of jewelry that is 
not fake and that he earns in excess of $100,000 per year.  The appellant's counsel objected to the 
admission of the Affidavit of Indigency on relevancy grounds, which objection 
was overruled.

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶10]   The appellant contends that the 
Affidavit of Indigency containing prior inconsistent statements should not have 
been admitted into evidence.  
Because the appellant's counsel properly objected to the introduction of 
the affidavit, we will review the district court's decision to allow the 
evidence for an abuse of discretion.

 
 
A 
trial court's decision on the admissibility of evidence is entitled to 
considerable deference, and will not be reversed on appeal unless the appellant 
demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion.  As long as there exists a legitimate 
basis for the trial court's ruling, that ruling will not be disturbed on 
appeal.

 
 

Wimbley 
v. State, 
2009 WY 72, ¶ 10, 208 P.3d 608, 611 (Wyo. 2009) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  In addition to 
the general admissibility issue raised, the appellant argues on appeal that 
reversible error occurred when the inconsistencies between the affidavit and his 
trial testimony were used to invoke the falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus 
maxim.  Finally, the appellant 
contends that the admission of the affidavit resulted in a violation of certain 
constitutionally protected rights.  
Because these claims were not the subject of an objection below, we will 
address them under the plain error standard of review articulated 
above.

 
 

Prior 
Inconsistent Statements

 
 
[¶11]   Before addressing the appellant's 
constitutional and other arguments, we first must determine whether the district 
court abused its discretion in allowing the Affidavit of Indigency into 
evidence.  The affidavit contained a 
sworn statement which was inconsistent with the appellant's trial 
testimony.  "Showing that a witness 
made statements inconsistent with his testimony is one of five recognized means 
of impeachment."  Christopher B. 
Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 6:99 (2007); Diamond Mgmt. 
Corp. v. Empire Gas Corp., 594 P.2d 964, 969 (Wyo. 1979).  Regarding impeaching a witness 
using a prior inconsistent statement, we have said that "[t]he purpose of this type of impeachment evidence is 
to show a witness to be generally capable of making errors in his testimony. 
 In doing so, counsel can resort to 
the witness' own prior statements in which that witness has given a contrary 
version."  Willis v. State, 2002 WY 79, ¶ 18, 46 P.3d 890, 896 (Wyo. 2002) (citations omitted).  The admissibility of evidence of prior 
inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes is not without limits, however.  We have said that all impeachment is 
subject to the rule against impeachment on collateral 
matters.

 
 

Generally 
speaking, any permissible kind of impeaching matter may be developed on 
cross-examination, since one of the purposes of cross-examination is to test the 
credibility of the witness.  
However, the cross-examiner may not 
impeach 
a 
witness on a 
collateral matter.  Collateral matters 
are 
generally considered to include facts irrelevant to the substantive issues in 
the case and facts which are not independently provable by extrinsic evidence, 
apart from 
impeachment 
purposes.  The test which determines if a matter is 
collateral is whether the matter could be introduced for any purpose other than 
to contradict.

 
 

Law 
v. State, 2004 
WY 111, ¶ 22, 98 P.3d 181, 189 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting People v. Hutson, 223 Ill. App. 3d 50, 
165 Ill. Dec. 541, 584 N.E.2d 975, 978 (1991)).

 
 
[¶12]   Application of the "collateral matters" rule is somewhat 
more relaxed, however, when applied to prior inconsistent 
statements:

 
 
Using 
prior inconsistent statements to impeach is subject to the rule against 
impeachment on collateral matters, although the rule is not enforced with much 
rigor.  Prior inconsistent 
statements indicate self-contradiction, which seems a somewhat more serious 
matter and one that merits some explanation, than counterproof from wholly 
independent sources, so courts allow somewhat more leeway to use prior 
statements.  Still, if a prior 
statement tends neither to undermine an assertion by the witness on some 
substantive point in the case nor to demonstrate or refute bias, capacity, or 
truthful disposition on the part of the witness, then the statement relates to a 
collateral matter and may be excluded.

 
 
Christopher 
B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 6:99 (2007).  Finally, the same authority notes the 
significance of prior inconsistent statements to the credibility 
determination:

 
 
The 
rule against contradicting on collateral matters also has less bite when the 
contradiction proceeds through questions about (even using other witnesses to 
prove) prior inconsistent statements by the witness being attacked.  Here, after all, the witness has 
contradicted himself, and this fact has some independent significance in 
appraising his credibility.

 
 

Id. 
at 
§ 6:89.  Furthermore, before 
extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statements may be admitted, W.R.E. 
613(b) requires that certain procedural safeguards be 
observed.

 
 
(b) 
Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent 
statement of witness.  Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement 
by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to 
explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to 
interrogate him thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require.  This provision does not apply to 
admissions of a party-opponent as defined in Rule 
801(d)(2).

 
 
[¶13]   The appellant does not argue that 
the Affidavit of Indigency was admitted in contravention of W.R.E. 613(b).1  Instead, the appellant contends that his 
prior inconsistent statements were inadmissible because they represented 
impeachment on collateral matters.  
Specifically, the appellant asserts that while there were inconsistencies 
between his in-court statements and those made in the affidavit, "[n]one of 
these facts had anything to do with the facts of consequence to the 
determination of the action."  We 
disagree.

 
 
[¶14]   As explained above, evidence of a 
prior inconsistent statement is not collateral if it could be admissible for 
some purpose other than to contradict, or if it demonstrates or refutes the 
truthful disposition of a witness (see 
supra ¶¶ 11-12).  We have held 
that "when a 
defendant in a criminal action takes the witness stand in his own defense, his 
credibility becomes an issue . . . ."  Montez v. State, 670 P.2d 694, 
696 (Wyo. 1983).  "Credibility of witnesses is always a question of fact 
for the trier of fact to determine."  Barnes v. State, 858 P.2d 522, 
534 (Wyo. 1993).  The evidence 
of the prior inconsistent statement here was offered, admitted, and ultimately 
used for the purpose of challenging the appellant's credibility.2  Furthermore, it is conceivable that the 
Affidavit of Indigency and the statements contained therein would have been 
independently admissible for purposes other than to show contradiction.  Finally, whether evidence was collateral 
is a question primarily left to the discretion of the district court and, upon 
reviewing the entire record, we cannot say that the district court abused its 
discretion in admitting the affidavit.  See State v. Shaffer, 682 N.E.2d 1040, 
1044 (Ohio App. 3d 1996) ("The decision whether to admit a prior 
inconsistent statement which is collateral to the issue being tried and 
pertinent to the credibility of a witness is a matter within the sound 
discretion of the trial judge.").

 
 

Falsus 
in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus

 
 
[¶15]   The 
appellant next contends that the district court erred when it allowed the 
prosecutor to use the inconsistencies in his testimony to invoke the falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus maxim  
which translated is "false in one thing, false in all."  Parkel v. Union Pac. Coal Co., 69 Wyo. 
122, 128, 237 P.2d 634, 636 (Wyo. 1951). 

 
 
Under 
the maxim, falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, as strictly interpreted, if a 
witness testifies falsely as to any one material part of his testimony, his 
testimony should be discarded as a whole, and cannot be relied on for any 
purpose whatever, unless strongly corroborated; but this rule is not 
inflexible.

 
 

Id. 
(quoting 70 C.J. Witnesses § 969 
(1935)).  Although we have 
previously recognized and applied this maxim, see Montez v. State, 527 P.2d 1330, 1332 
(Wyo. 1974); Parkel, 69 Wyo. at 128, 
237 P.2d at 635-636; Haywood v. 
Kukuchka, 55 Wyo. 41, 46-47, 95 P.2d 71, 72 (Wyo. 1939); Rue v. Merrill, 42 Wyo. 511, 525-26, 297 P. 379, 384-85 (Wyo. 1931), the concept has been subject to criticism.  Addressing the maxim, Professor Wigmore 
had the following comment:

 
 
It 
may be said, once for all, that the maxim is in itself worthless; -- first, in 
point of validity, because in one form it merely contains in loose fashion a 
kernel of truth which no one needs to be told, and in the others it is 
absolutely false as a maxim of life; and secondly, in point of utility, because 
it merely tells the jury what they may do in any event, not what they must do or 
must not do, and therefore it is a superfluous form of 
words.

 
 
IIIA 
John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 1008 
(Chadbourn rev. 1970).

 
 
[¶16]   The 
appellant asserts that the falsus in uno 
concept was expressed in Jury Instruction No. 4, which included the language 
from Wyoming Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 1.02 and 
read:

 
 
If 
you believe from the evidence in this case that any witness willfully and 
corruptly swore falsely to any material fact in this case, then you are at 
liberty to disregard all or any part of that testimony, except insofar as the 
same has been corroborated by other and credible evidence, and the facts and 
circumstances proven during the trial. 

 
 
The 
appellant then directs us to statements made during closing argument wherein the 
prosecutor stated:   

 
 
Ladies 
and gentlemen, you saw State's Exhibit 32; it's a pauperis form or public 
defender form that people fill out and perhaps you thought, why is that 
important?

 
 
Ladies 
and gentlemen, the defendant took an oath, first few lines of it.  The following information is the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, when he filled it 
out.

 
 
Did 
he fill it out correctly?  No.  He lied about his address, about the 
worth of his jewelry, his paycheck.  
He'll tell everyone at the bar and he'll tell everyone on direct, "I make 
$125,000 a year."  Look at how much 
he makes on the form.  When he wants 
something, ladies and gentlemen, he'll tell you what he wants, and he hopes you 
want to hear it.  He wanted [the 
public defender], and he filled out the form so he could get 
her.

 
 
Ladies 
and gentlemen, Instruction Number 4 tells you you can disregard a person's 
testimony if you believe it was false.

 
 
Look 
at Exhibit 32 when you start judging his testimony.  It's something -- he told you something 
he wants you to hear and wants you to believe.  But is it the truth?  It's a very difficult question.  It's a very difficult question for all 
of us.  Where is the truth and how 
do you judge it?

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
Look 
at the photos of both the victim and the defendant. And I want to paint him in a 
bad light?  No.  I want to get to the truth.  Under oath, he was deceptive on his 
public defender form to get what he wanted and he asks you to believe him 
now.  You get to judge 
that.

 
 
[¶17]   The appellant claims that Jury 
Instruction No. 4 and the prosecutor's reference thereto resulted in an 
erroneous application of the falsus in 
uno maxim because the inconsistent prior statements were not related to a 
material fact.  It is true that the 
maxim should only be applied, if applied at all, where a witness falsely 
testifies to a material fact.  
However, under the facts presented here, we cannot say that Jury 
Instruction No. 4, and the prosecutor's related comments, resulted in plain 
error inasmuch as we question whether the falsus in uno maxim, as a separate legal 
concept, was ever even considered by the jury.  Jury Instruction No. 4, which was a 
general instruction and not given as a result of, or in relation to, the 
appellant's prior inconsistent statement, merely told the jury it was at liberty to disregard any witness's testimony if it 
believed from the facts that the witness's testimony was false.  Likewise, 
the prosecutor never told the jury that it must disregard all of the appellant's 
testimony because of the inconsistencies, as required by strict application of 
the falsus in uno maxim.  Rather the prosecutor merely referenced 
the inconsistencies and told the jury it may consider such inconsistencies when 
judging the appellant's credibility.  
We have said that "[c]ounsel are allowed wide latitude during the scope 
of their closing arguments, and a prosecutor may comment on all of the evidence 
in the record and suggest reasonable inferences from that evidence."  Teniente v. State, 2007 WY 165, ¶ 30, 
169 P.3d 512, 524 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶18]   Given 
the state of the record as it relates to the alleged error, we are unable to say 
that the appellant met the first prong of plain error analysis.  That is, the record does not 
clearly present the incident alleged to be error.  We find that the falsus in uno maxim was never plainly 
invoked in either the jury instruction or in the prosecutor's comments.  To find otherwise would require us to 
speculate and assign meaning not expressly conveyed in either instance.   Furthermore, even if the jury was 
erroneously instructed on the falsus in 
uno concept, the appellant fails to point to 
anything in the record showing that the jury applied this maxim to his 
prejudice.  The jury may have 
assigned more weight to the victim's version of the events, or found the state's 
evidence to be more credible; however, nothing in the record indicates that the 
jury disregarded all or even part of the appellant's testimony.  Therefore, the appellant also fails to 
satisfy the prejudice requirement of the plain error test.   

 
 
Constitutional 
Arguments

 
 
[¶19]   In his final arguments concerning 
the admissibility and use of the Affidavit of Indigency, the appellant contends 
that allowing the affidavit into evidence resulted in a violation of his right 
to equal protection, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and his Fifth 
Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination.  We will discuss each argument briefly 
below.

 
 
[¶20]   The appellant asserts the admission 
of the Affidavit of Indigency violated his constitutionally protected right to 
equal protection by implicitly revealing to the jury that he was represented by 
a court-appointed attorney.  The 
appellant contends that as an indigent, he was wrongfully subjected to ill 
feelings, resentment, and a general belief that those who are represented by 
public defenders are more likely to be guilty than those represented by retained 
counsel.  The appellant cites no 
authority holding that that admission of an indigency affidavit, under the 
circumstances and for the purpose presented here, amounts to a violation of law. 
 In fact, the only authority the 
appellant cites involves a defendant being presented to a jury in prison 
clothing and shackles  clearly a different scenario than the present.  Furthermore, the appellant provides no 
support for his statements that the public is resentful of defendants 
represented by court-appointed counsel and automatically assume the individual 
is guilty.  Without more, the 
appellant is unable to satisfy the requirements of the plain error standard of 
review.  While it is clear from the 
record that the affidavit was used at trial, the appellant fails to show a 
violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law or that he was unfairly 
prejudiced.

 
 
[¶21]   Next the appellant claims that 
admission of the Indigency Affidavit resulted in a violation of his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination.  We find it difficult to discern the 
thrust of the appellant's argument inasmuch as he does not specify what 
information contained in the affidavit might have been incriminating.  The appellant cites one tangentially 
related case and then concludes, without analysis or argument, that that case 
should govern here.  The case cited, 
United States v. Hardwell, 80 F.3d 1471 (10th Cir. 1996), is readily distinguishable from the present case.  In Hardwell, the defendant was convicted of 
money laundering.  Id. at 1479.  The prosecution introduced the 
defendant's financial affidavit into evidence in its case in chief as 
substantive evidence of the fact the defendant did not have a legitimate source 
of income.  Id. at 1483.  The lack of a legitimate source of 
income was a key element to the money laundering charge.  Id.  
The court held such use of that evidence violated the defendant's 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.  Id. at 1484.

 
 
[¶22]   Here, in contrast, the affidavit 
was not used as substantive evidence, but only for purposes of impeachment, and 
not until the appellant was testifying during the presentation of his case.  The United States Supreme Court has held 
that such a use is proper and not in contravention of a defendant's Fifth 
Amendment rights.  In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S. Ct. 643, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1971), the Court held that voluntary statements made by 
a defendant, although later deemed inadmissible as substantive evidence by the 
Fifth Amendment, could be used as impeachment evidence against the defendant if 
he testifies.  Id. at 226, 91 S. Ct.  at 646.  Addressing the admissibility of evidence 
obtained in violation of Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), the Court 
pointed out that: 

 
 

Miranda 
barred the prosecution from making its case with statements of an accused made 
while in custody prior to having or effectively waiving counsel.  It does not follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissible 
against an accused in the prosecution's case in chief is barred for all 
purposes, provided of course that the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies 
legal standards. 

 
 

Harris, 
401 U.S.  at 224, 91 S. Ct.  at 645.  In holding the substantively inadmissible 
statements could be used for impeachment purposes, the Court stated: 

 
 
Every 
criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to 
do so.  But that privilege cannot be 
construed to include the right to commit perjury.  Having voluntarily taken the stand, 
petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the 
prosecution here did no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing devices 
of the adversary process. 

 
 

Id. 
at 225, 91 S. Ct.  at 645-46 (citation omitted).  The Court succinctly concluded by 
explaining:  "The shield provided by 
Miranda cannot be perverted into a 
license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation 
with prior inconsistent utterances.  We hold, therefore, that petitioner's 
credibility was appropriately impeached by use of his earlier conflicting 
statements."  Id. at 226, 91 S. Ct.  at 
646.

 
 
[¶23]   We agree with the reasoning in Harris.  As a result, we find it unnecessary to 
determine whether the evidence admitted via the Affidavit of Indigency was 
obtained in violation of the appellant's Fifth Amendment rights inasmuch as the 
evidence here was used only for impeachment purposes. 

 
 
[¶24]   Finally, the appellant contends 
that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when he was compelled to 
answer the questions on the Affidavit of Indigency without counsel present. 
 Once again, it is unnecessary for 
us to determine whether the appellant's right to counsel was, or was not, 
abridged here inasmuch as the same principle discussed above in the Fifth 
Amendment discussion applies in the context of an alleged Sixth Amendment 
violation.  That is, even if the 
evidence was unlawfully obtained because a defendant's right to counsel was not 
properly observed, the evidence may still be used for impeachment purposes.  Recognizing the decision and rationale 
in Harris, the United States Supreme 
Court, in Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 110 S. Ct. 1176, 108 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1990), a case addressing a violation 
of a defendant's right to counsel, stated:

 
 
The 
prosecution must not be allowed to build its case against a criminal defendant 
with evidence acquired in contravention of constitutional guarantees and their 
corresponding judicially created protections. But use of statements so obtained 
for impeachment purposes is a different matter.  If a defendant exercises his right to 
testify on his own behalf, he assumes a reciprocal obligation to speak 
truthfully and accurately, and we have consistently rejected arguments that 
would allow a defendant to turn the illegal method by which evidence in the 
Government's possession was obtained to his own advantage, and provide himself 
with a shield against contradiction of his untruths. 

 
 

Id. 
at 351, 110 S. Ct.  at 1180 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  In the present case, because the 
evidence contained in the affidavit was used only for impeachment, the 
appellant's claim that he was denied his right to counsel must necessarily 
fail.  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶25]   We find that evidence in the record 
could reasonably support the jury's conclusion that the appellant was the 
aggressor in the altercation; therefore the district court did not err 
when it instructed the jury regarding an aggressor's forfeiture of his right to 
self-defense.  We also find that the 
Affidavit of Indigency was properly admitted as a prior inconsistent statement 
under W.R.E. 613(b), and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting the affidavit.  We further 
hold that the appellant was unable to satisfy his burden of showing that the 
jury was erroneously instructed on the falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus maxim, 
or that even if so instructed, that he was prejudiced thereby.  Finally, we conclude that the appellant 
failed to demonstrate that the admission of the Affidavit of Indigency resulted 
in an abridgement of his constitutionally protected right to equal protection, 
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, or his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel.

 
 
[¶26]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
record is clear that the procedural safeguards of W.R.E. 613(b) were properly 
observed.  The appellant was 
presented with a copy of the Affidavit of Indigency and given the opportunity to 
explain the inconsistencies between his in-court statement and his sworn 
statements in the affidavit during both cross-examination and redirect 
examination.

 
 

2Inconsistent 
statements admitted only for impeachment purposes should be considered by the 
jury only 
for the limited purpose offered.  See Medrano v. State, 914 P.2d 804, 809 
(Wyo. 1996); Channel v. State, 592 P.2d 1145, 1149-50 (Wyo. 1979).  
Upon request, a 
defendant is entitled to a jury instruction setting forth the limited purposes 
of the testimony.  Cazier v. 
State, 2006 WY 153, ¶ 34, 148 P.3d 23, 34 
n.6 (Wyo. 2006).  In the absence of 
such a request, we cannot find fault with the district court for not giving a 
limiting instruction.  
Id.