Case Title: Nadra v. Mbah

Citation: 2008-Ohio-3918

Docket Number: 20070525

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-08-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Nadra v. Mbah, 119 Ohio St.3d 305, 2008-Ohio-3918.] 
 
NADRA, APPELLEE, v. MBAH ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Nadra v. Mbah, 119 Ohio St.3d 305, 2008-Ohio-3918.] 
Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code – Statute of limitations – R.C. 2305.10(A) is 
applicable statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims in Ohio. 
(No. 2007-0525—Submitted February 27, 2008—Decided August 12, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 06AP-829, 2007-Ohio-501. 
_________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
R.C. 2305.10 is Ohio’s general statute of limitations for personal injury and thus 
is applicable to claims under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code filed in 
state court.  (Owens v. Okure (1989), 488 U.S. 235, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 
L.Ed.2d 594, construed and applied.) 
__________________ 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
I. Introduction 
{¶ 1} We are asked to determine which statute of limitations governs 
actions filed in Ohio under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code.  The United States 
Supreme Court has instructed that in Section 1983 actions, courts must apply a 
state’s general or residual statute of limitations that governs personal-injury 
actions.  Owens v. Okure (1989), 488 U.S. 235, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594.  
We hold that R.C. 2305.10, which contains a two-year limitations period, is 
Ohio’s general statute of limitations governing personal injury in Ohio.  
Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
II. Facts 
{¶ 2} After receiving reports of child abuse, on January 2, 2002, Franklin 
County Children’s Services (“FCCS”) and the Columbus Police investigated the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
home of appellee, Reverend Iyabo Nadra.  They found Nadra’s nine-year-old son 
locked in the basement.  On January 3, 2002, appellant, Mindy Grote, an FCCS 
case worker, and appellant, Susan Mbah, an FCCS intake worker, filed a 
complaint alleging that Nadra punished her son by locking him in the basement, 
chaining him to a pole at times, withholding food from him, and making him use 
a bucket as a toilet.  Consequently, the complaint asserted that Nadra’s son was 
abused, neglected, and dependent. 
{¶ 3} The juvenile court granted temporary custody of the child to 
FCCS.  On August 20, 2002, the juvenile court terminated FCCS’s temporary 
custody and granted permanent custody of Nadra’s son to the child’s father. 
{¶ 4} The state also charged Nadra with kidnapping, abduction, and 
child endangering.  On November 12, 2003, a jury found Nadra not guilty on 
charges of abduction and kidnapping, but could not reach a verdict on the child-
endangering charge. 
{¶ 5} On February 25, 2005, Nadra, proceeding pro se, filed a civil 
action against Mbah and Grote alleging that the child-abuse complaint was false 
and that FCCS failed to return her child to her custody after the criminal charges 
against her were resolved.  Nadra claimed that these actions caused her to suffer 
injuries, including “irreversible harm and damage to her physical, mental and 
spiritual person.” 
{¶ 6} Apparently interpreting Nadra’s complaint to allege an action 
against state officials acting under color of law, Mbah and Grote filed a motion 
for summary judgment arguing that the two-year statute of limitations for 
personal injury in R.C. 2305.10 and the two-year statute of limitations in R.C. 
2744.04 had both expired before Nadra filed her complaint.  Ultimately, the trial 
court granted summary judgment in favor of Mbah and Grote as to all Nadra’s 
claims, finding that the limitations periods in R.C. 2744.04 and 2305.10 had 
expired before Nadra filed her complaint. 
January Term, 2008 
3 
{¶ 7} The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court that to 
the extent that Nadra alleged claims against a political subdivision, her complaint 
was time-barred because the two-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2744.04(A) 
had expired before Nadra filed suit.  Nadra v. Mbah, Franklin App. No. 06AP-
829, 2007-Ohio-501, 2007 WL 339175, at ¶ 24.  But the court of appeals held that 
the trial court erred when it applied the two-year statute of limitations in R.C. 
2305.10 to Nadra’s Section 1983 claims.  Id. at ¶ 41.  Instead, the court of appeals 
held that the proper statute of limitations was R.C. 2305.09(D), which provides a 
four-year limitations period, and therefore Nadra’s claims were not time-barred.  
Thus, the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of 
the trial court. 
{¶ 8} This cause is before this court upon the acceptance of Mbah and 
Grote’s discretionary appeal.  They argue that R.C. 2305.10, not R.C. 2305.09(D), 
is the applicable statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim. 
III. Analysis 
A.  Courts Must Apply a State’s General or Residual Statute of Limitations 
Governing Personal Injuries 
{¶ 9} Congress enacted Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code to afford a civil 
remedy for deprivations of federally protected rights caused by persons acting 
under color of state law.  Wyatt v. Cole (1992), 504 U.S. 158, 161, 112 S.Ct. 
1827, 118 L.Ed.2d 504.  “The paradigmatic §1983 claim in 1871 [when the 
statute was first enacted] involved a victim of violence or harassment who sued 
state officials for failing to prevent the harm.”  Okure, 488 U.S. at 250, 109 S.Ct. 
573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594, fn. 11.  Yet, “Congress did not establish a statute of 
limitations or a body of tolling rules applicable to actions brought in federal court 
under § 1983 - a void which is commonplace in federal statutory law.  When such 
a void occurs, this Court has repeatedly ‘borrowed’ the state law of limitations 
governing an analogous cause of action.”  Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of New 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
York v. Tomanio (1980), 446 U.S. 478, 483-484, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 64 L.Ed.2d 440.  
The court in Tomanio reasoned that “[i]n 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Congress ‘quite 
clearly instructs [federal courts] to refer to state statutes’ when federal law 
provides no rule of decision for actions brought under § 1983.”  (Brackets sic.)  
Id. at 484, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 64 L.Ed.2d 440, quoting Robertson v. Wegmann 
(1978), 436 U.S. 584, 593, 98 S.Ct.1991, 56 L.Ed.2d 554. 
{¶ 10} However, because Section 1983 can override state laws and 
supplements any available state remedy, the 1983 remedy can have no precise 
counterpart in state law.  Wilson v. Garcia (1985), 471 U.S. 261, 272, 105 S.Ct. 
1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254.  Therefore “it is ‘the purest coincidence’ when state 
statutes or the common law provide for equivalent remedies; any analogies to 
those causes of action are bound to be imperfect.”  (Citation omitted.)  Id., 
quoting Monroe v. Pape (1961), 365 U.S. 167, 196, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 
(Harlan, J., concurring).  Thus, “[t]he practice of seeking state-law analogies for 
particular § 1983 claims bred confusion and inconsistency in the lower courts and 
generated time-consuming litigation.  Some courts found analogies in common-
law tort, others in contract law, and still others in statutory law.  Often the result 
had less to do with the general nature of § 1983 relief than with counsel’s artful 
pleading and ability to persuade the court that the facts and legal theories of a 
particular § 1983 claim resembled a particular common-law or statutory cause of 
action.  Consequently, plaintiffs and defendants often had no idea of whether a 
federal civil rights claim was barred until a court ruled on their case.”  (Footnote 
omitted.)  Okure, 488 U.S. at 240, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594. 
{¶ 11} In an attempt to remedy the confusion, the court again examined 
the question of choice of a statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims in 
Wilson, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254.  The court found that 
“practical considerations help to explain why a simple, broad characterization of 
all § 1983 claims best fits the statute’s remedial purpose.”  Id. at 272, 105 S.Ct. 
January Term, 2008 
5 
1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254.  “The federal interests in uniformity, certainty, and the 
minimization of unnecessary litigation all support the conclusion that Congress 
favored this simple approach.”  Id. at 275, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254.  The 
court found that “[g]eneral personal injury actions, sounding in tort, constitute a 
major part of the total volume of civil litigation in the state courts today, and 
probably did so in 1871 when §1983 was enacted.”  (Footnote omitted.)  Id. at 
279, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254.  Thus, the court held that Section 1983 
claims are best characterized as personal-injury actions for the purpose of 
determining the most appropriate statute of limitations.  Accordingly, Wilson 
instructed courts to borrow a state’s statute of limitations for personal-injury 
actions to govern Section 1983 claims.  Id. at 280, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d. 
254. 
{¶ 12} Unfortunately, however, Wilson did not end the confusion in 
determining the proper statute of limitations when state law provides multiple 
statutes of limitations for personal-injury actions.  Okure, 488 U.S. at 241, 109 
S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594.  The defendants in Okure contended that Section 
1983 actions should be governed by a one-year New York statute of limitations 
that applied to eight intentional torts.  However, the court in Okure found that 
every state has multiple intentional-tort limitations provisions and reasoned that 
“[w]ere we to call upon courts to apply the state statute of limitations governing 
intentional torts, we would succeed only in transferring the present confusion over 
the choice among multiple personal injury provisions to a choice among multiple 
intentional tort provisions.”  Id. at 244, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594. 
{¶ 13} The court went on to find that “[i]n marked contrast to the 
multiplicity of state intentional tort statutes of limitation, every State has only one 
general or residual statute of limitations governing personal injury actions.”  Id. at 
245, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594.  The court explained that “[s]ome States 
have a general provision which applies to all personal injury actions with certain 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
specific exceptions.  Others have a residual provision which applies to all actions 
not specifically provided for, including personal injury actions.”  Id. at 246, 109 
S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594.  Thus, the court held that “where state law provides 
multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, courts considering 
§1983 claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury 
actions.”  Id. at 249-250, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594, fn. 12. 
{¶ 14} However, the court in Okure cautioned that “[c]ourts should resort 
to residual statutes of limitations only where state law provides multiple statutes 
of limitations for personal injury actions and the residual one embraces, either 
explicitly or by judicial construction, unspecified personal injury actions.  See, 
e.g., Small v. Inhabitants of Belfast, 796 F.2d 544 (CA1 1986) (construing 
Maine's catchall statute as the general personal injury provision); Alley v. Dodge 
Hotel, 163 U.S.App.D.C. 320, 501 F.2d 880 (1974) (per curiam) (construing 
District of Columbia's catchall statute as the general personal injury provision).”  
Okure, 488 U.S. at 250, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594, fn. 12. 
B.  R.C. 2305.10 Is Ohio’s General Statute of Limitations for 
Personal-Injury Actions 
{¶ 15} Ohio has multiple statutes of limitations that apply to personal-
injury actions.  See, e.g., R.C. 2305.11 (libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false 
imprisonment, and abortion-related claims), 2305.111 (assault or battery), 
2305.113 (medical, dental, optometric, or chiropractic claims), and 2744.04 
(action against a political subdivision).  Okure instructs us to apply Ohio’s general 
or residual statute of limitations that applies to personal-injury actions. 
{¶ 16} In the instant case, the court of appeals held that for purposes of 
Section 1983 claims, R.C. 2305.09(D) is Ohio’s residual statute of limitations for 
unspecified personal-injury actions.  Appellants argue that R.C. 2305.10 is the 
appropriate statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions.  We begin by 
examining the language of these statutes. 
January Term, 2008 
7 
{¶ 17} R.C. 2305.09 provides: 
{¶ 18} “An action for any of the following causes of action shall be 
brought within four years after the cause thereof accrued: 
{¶ 19} “ * * *  
{¶ 20} “(D) For an injury to the rights of the plaintiff not arising on 
contract nor enumerated in sections * * * 2305.10 to 2305.12 * * * of the Revised 
Code.”1 
{¶ 21} R.C. 2305.10(A) provides that an action “for bodily injury or 
injuring personal property shall be brought within two years” after the cause of 
action accrues.2  
{¶ 22} The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently held that the 
appropriate statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions in Ohio is R.C. 
2305.10, Ohio's two-year statute of limitations for bodily injury and injury to 
personal property.  Browning v. Pendleton (C.A.6, 1989), 869 F.2d 989.  See also 
Kuhnle Bros., Inc. v. Geauga Cty. (C.A.6, 1997), 103 F.3d 516; Collyer v. 
Darling (C.A.6, 1996), 98 F.3d 211, 220; Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Joint 
Vocational School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (C.A.6, 1991), 926 F.2d 505, 510. 
{¶ 23} Of the appellate districts that have addressed this issue, most have 
also held that R.C. 2305.10 is the appropriate statute of limitations.  See Erkins v. 
Cincinnati Mun. Police Dept. (Oct. 23, 1998), 1st Dist. No. C-970836, 1998 WL 
735367, at *2; Lutchey v. Napoleon (Dec. 20, 1999), 3d Dist. No. 7-99-02, 1999 
WL 1215320, at *1; Freshour v. Carroll (Aug. 17, 1989), 4th Dist. No. 88 CA 34, 
at *4, 1989 WL 98477; Rowe v. Artis (Jan. 8, 2001), 5th Dist. No. 
20000CA00081, 2000CA00081, 2001 WL 30063, at *3; Gaston v. Toledo (1995), 
                                                          
 
1.  Although R.C. 2305.09 as it existed in 2002 differs from the current version, the differences do 
not affect our analysis.  See 145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1380-1381. 
 
2.  This current version of the statute differs from the 2002 version, but the quoted language has 
not changed.  See 149 Ohio Laws, Part I, 412. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
106 Ohio App.3d 66, 78, 665 N.E.2d 264 (6th Dist.); Harman v. Gessner (Sept. 9, 
1997), 7th Dist. No. 96 C.A. 123, at *3, 1997 WL 568009; Francis v. Cleveland 
(1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 593, 596, 605 N.E.2d 966 (8th Dist.); Peoples Rights 
Org., Inc. v. Montgomery (2001), 142 Ohio App.3d 443, 482-483, 756 N.E.2d 127 
(12th Dist.). 
{¶ 24} However, two appellate districts, including the Tenth, have held 
that the four-year statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.09(D) applies to 
Section 1983 claims.  See Prohazka v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees (Dec. 16, 
1999), 10th Dist. No. 99AP-2, 1999 WL 1189036, *9; Bojac Corp. v. Kutevac 
(1990), 64 Ohio App.3d 368, 370-371, 581 N.E.2d 625 (11th Dist.). 
{¶ 25} Relying on its prior decision in Prohazka, the court of appeals 
herein held that four years is the appropriate limitations period for Section 1983 
actions, reasoning that R.C. 2305.09(D) is Ohio’s residual statute of limitations 
for personal injury.  Nadra v. Mbah, Franklin App. No. 06AP-829, 2007-Ohio-
501, 2007 WL 339175, at ¶ 41.  In Prohazka, the court reasoned that “[t]he 
express language of R.C. 2305.10 limits the provision’s application to actions for 
‘bodily injury or injuring personal property.’  The language of R.C. 2305.09(D), 
by contrast, applies the provision otherwise to all undelineated personal-injury 
actions.” Id., Franklin App. No. 99AP-2, 1999 WL 1189036, at *9.  Thus, the 
appellate court herein held that R.C. 2305.09 is Ohio’s residual personal injury 
statute of limitations applicable to Section 1983 actions.  Id.  We find that R.C. 
2305.10 is not as limited in its application as Prohazka holds. 
{¶ 26} Okure describes a general statute of limitations as applying to all 
personal-injury actions with certain exceptions.  Okure, 488 U.S. at 246, 109 S.Ct. 
573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594.  We have recognized that personal injury includes injury to 
one’s body and injury to one’s reputation.  Smith v. Buck (1929), 119 Ohio St. 
101, 162 N.E. 382. 
January Term, 2008 
9 
{¶ 27} Clearly, R.C. 2305.10 applies to most cases involving bodily 
injury.  For example, we have recognized that “[w]hen bodily injury results from 
negligence, the two-year statute of limitations, R.C. 2305.10, is the appropriate 
statute of limitations.”  Love v. Port Clinton (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 98, 524 N.E.2d 
166.  Interpreting the two-year statute of limitations in G.C. 11224-1 (the 
predecessor to R.C. 2305.10),3 we adopted the prevailing rule that a statute of 
limitations that covers injuries to the person or bodily injury “governs all actions 
the real purpose of which is to recover for an injury to the person, whether based 
upon contract or tort, and a general statute, limiting the time for bringing an action 
out of a contractual relationship, is without application.”  Andrianos v. 
Community Traction Co. (1951), 155 Ohio St. 47, 50, 44 O.O. 72, 97 N.E.2d 549.  
We further recognized that this provision “is not confined to any particular type of 
injury, nor does it concern itself with the circumstances under which an injury 
was inflicted.  On its face, it clearly covers all actions based on a claim respecting 
bodily injury.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 51, 44 O.O. 72, 97 N.E.2d 549. 
{¶ 28} We have also held that claims of humiliation and loss of reputation 
allege “personal injury” and are governed by the two-year statute of limitations in 
R.C. 2305.10, not the four-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.09(D).  
Lawyers Coop. Publishing Co. v. Muething (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 273, 280-281, 
603 N.E.2d 969. 
{¶ 29} Thus, R.C. 2305.10 applies to personal injury, including bodily 
injury, harassment, and loss of reputation. 
C.  R.C. 2305.09(D) Excludes Coverage of Injuries Governed by R.C. 2305.10 
{¶ 30} We also find that, compared to R.C. 2305.10, R.C. 2305.09(D) 
applies to a relatively narrow range of personal-injury claims.  In Okure, the court 
                                                          
 
3.  Both G.C. 11224-1 and R.C. 2305.10 contain the language “[a]n action for bodily injury or 
injuring personal property shall be brought within two years after the cause” accrues (G.C. 11224-
1 says “arose”).  See Peoples Rights Org., Inc. v. Montgomery (2001), 142 Ohio App.3d 443, 482, 
756 N.E.2d 127.    
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
rejected intentional-tort statutes of limitations as governing Section 1983 claims, 
finding an intentional-tort analogy “particularly inapposite in light of the wide 
spectrum of claims which § 1983 has come to span.”  Okure, 488 U.S. at 249, 109 
S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594.  We similarly find that the range of actions governed 
by R.C. 2305.09(D) is too narrow to apply to Section 1983, because R.C. 
2305.09(D) specifically excludes claims governed by R.C. 2305.10, which applies 
to a host of personal-injury actions.  Therefore, similar to the intentional-tort 
analogy rejected in Okure, we find that the scope of R.C. 2305.09(D)’s coverage 
for personal injuries is too narrow to be analogous to the “broad array” of actions 
filed in Section 1983 actions.  While R.C. 2305.09(D) might be a residual statute 
of limitations, it is not a residual statute of limitations for personal injuries as 
defined in Okure. 
{¶ 31} Therefore, we hold that R.C. 2305.10 is Ohio’s general statute of 
limitations for personal injury applicable to all claims under Section 1983, Title 
42, U.S.Code, filed in state court.  Okure, 488 U.S. at 246, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 
L.Ed.2d 594.  Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in holding that R.C. 
2305.09(D) governs Section 1983 claims in Ohio. 
IV. Nadra’s Complaint Is Time-Barred 
{¶ 32} Nadra’s complaint asserted that the child-abuse complaint against 
her was false and that FCCS failed to return custody of her child to her after 
criminal charges of child abuse against her were resolved.  The child-abuse 
complaint was filed on January 3, 2002, and the permanent custody of Nadra’s 
child was awarded to the child’s father on August 20, 2002, thereby effectively 
terminating FCCS’s authority over Nadra’s child.  The cognizable events in this 
case for purposes of the statute of limitations were the filing of the child-abuse 
complaint and the award of permanent custody.  Both occurred more than two 
years prior to the filing of Nadra’s complaint on February 25, 2005.  Thus, 
January Term, 2008 
11 
Nadra’s complaint is barred by the two-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.10.  
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶33} R.C. 2305.09(D) provides a four-year limitations period for “an 
injury to the rights of the plaintiff not arising on contract nor enumerated in 
sections 1304.35, 2305.10 to 2305.12, and 2305.14 of the Revised Code.”  What 
is a claim brought pursuant to Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code but an allegation 
of an “injury to the rights of the plaintiff”?  To establish a Section 1983 claim, 
“two elements are required: (1) the conduct in controversy must be committed by 
a person acting under color of state law, and (2) the conduct must deprive the 
plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of 
the United States.” (Emphasis added.) 1946 St. Clair Corp. v. Cleveland (1990), 
49 Ohio St.3d 33, 34, 550 N.E.2d 456.  Ohio has a statute of limitations that 
exactly applies to the injuries Nadra alleges.  Instead of applying it, the majority 
undergoes a laborious, United States Supreme Court-authorized analysis to 
determine that the sky is chartreuse.  It merely had to look up to see that it’s blue. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_______________ 
 
Iyabo Nadra, pro se. 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and R. Matthew 
Colon, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellants. 
 
Nancy Hardin Rogers, Attorney General, and William P. Marshall, 
Solicitor General, urging reversal for amicus curiae state of Ohio. 
_______________