Case Title: People v. Hagberg

Citation: 

Docket Number: 86888

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 86888-Agenda 8-March 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								PATRICK HAGBERG, Appellant.


Opinion filed July 6, 2000.
	JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a bench trial, defendant, Patrick Hagberg, was
convicted of the unlawful possession of a controlled substance
(720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 1998)) and of a traffic violation. For
the unlawful possession count, the circuit court of McHenry
County sentenced him to 24 months' probation. Defendant
appealed only his unlawful possession conviction. The appellate
court reversed defendant's conviction and vacated his sentence,
holding that (1) a field test cannot be sufficient to sustain a finding
that a substance is a controlled substance and (2) the State failed
to prove the field test's reliability. 301 Ill. App. 3d 491. We
granted the State's petition for leave to appeal.
	The State now asks this court to reverse the appellate court
and reinstate defendant's conviction. Defendant argues that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction and also cross-appeals, claiming that he did not knowingly and understandingly
waive his right to a jury.
BACKGROUND
	Only two witnesses, both police officers, testified at
defendant's trial. One officer testified regarding a vial of cocaine
that the State ultimately failed to prove was defendant's and that
did not form the basis of defendant's conviction.
	The other officer, William Bukovsky, testified concerning the
substance that did form the basis of defendant's conviction.
Bukovsky, a patrolman, stated that he stopped defendant because
defendant was driving a vehicle with a broken taillight. Through his
computer, Bukovsky discovered that defendant's driver's license
was suspended. Defendant was arrested for that violation.
	Bukovsky took defendant into custody, and defendant rode in
the back of Bukovsky's squad car to the police station. The officer
inspected the squad car daily and had not had any passengers in the
back seat of his car since the last inspection. After defendant left
the car, he asked Bukovsky to look into the car because defendant
had dropped his wallet. While searching for the wallet, Bukovsky
found a "folded-up piece of paper" on the floor of the back seat.
Inside the paper was a "white, powdery substance." Bukovsky then
asked defendant if it was his, and defendant denied ownership.
	Bukovsky performed a field test on the substance. He testified
that the test
		"is basically several contained little packets with-I guess,
the easiest thing to say, it's got a little glass vial in there,
you put the substance in there, you shake it, you wait a
couple minutes and when it turns a certain color that tells
you if it tested positive for cocaine. There are different test
kits for different kinds of drugs."
Bukovsky could not remember what color the substance became
when it tested positive for cocaine. He recalled that the directions
for the test, including the correct color, were listed on the packet.
Bukovsky had performed between 20 and 30 field tests but had
used the test for cocaine only five or six times. He had also
received approximately four to six hours of training in field tests at
the University of Illinois Corrections Academy. The State offered
no other evidence regarding either the field test that was conducted
by Bukovsky or the identification of the substance in the white
folded paper. The State stipulated that the substance was never
tested in a laboratory.
ANALYSISSufficiency of the Field Test
	The State argues that this court should reinstate defendant's
conviction because the field test was sufficient to prove that the
substance was a controlled substance. Defendant contends that a
field test alone is never sufficient to support a conviction for
possession. Defendant further argues that, even if a field test can
be sufficient, the field test in this case was not.
	This court discussed the sufficiency of a field test in People v.
Clark, 7 Ill. 2d 163 (1955). In Clark, a police informant, who was
a drug addict, told the defendant that he "had some topcoats for
which he wanted to get some 'stuff.' " Clark, 7 Ill. 2d  at 165. The
informant went to the defendant's apartment and purchased two
sealed packets of powder for $10. Those packets were taken to the
police officer, who field tested them. The white powder tested
positive for a derivative of opium. Later, the powder was tested by
a chemist and determined to be heroin, which is a derivative of
morphine, a principle alkaloid of opium.
	The defendant argued that there was some doubt as to
whether the powder tested by the chemist was the same powder
that was sold by the defendant. Clark, 7 Ill. 2d  at 171. This court
held that the lack of a proper chain of custody did not mandate
reversal because a field test had been done on the substance
purchased from the defendant, and that field test had yielded a
positive result. Clark, 7 Ill. 2d  at 171.
	As defendant correctly notes, in People v. Judkins, 28 Ill. 2d 417 (1963), this court found a field test to be insufficient. Judkins,
however, is distinguishable from Clark. In Judkins, the officer
testified that the field test could show only that the substance
"might be" narcotics. Judkins, 28 Ill. 2d  at 419. No other evidence
was presented to demonstrate that the substance actually was
narcotics. In Clark, by contrast, the officer testified that the
substance was a derivative of opium. Clark, 7 Ill. 2d  at 171. Thus,
Judkins did not hold that field tests categorically are insufficient
but only that the particular test used in that particular case was
insufficient.
	Contrary to defendant's assertions, we agree with the State
that this court has never held that a field test is insufficient to
identify the substance as a narcotic simply because the test was a
field test. Although the situation in which the test is conducted
might be relevant to the accuracy of the test, the fact that it is a
field test by itself does not make the test insufficient. This court's
prior case law does not suggest such a general rule, and we see no
reason to create one now.
	Given that a field test can be sufficient in some cases, we now
consider whether the field test in this case was sufficient to sustain
defendant's conviction. When determining whether the evidence
against a defendant was sufficient to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, the relevant question is whether, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261
(1985). In a controlled substance case, the State must present
sufficient evidence that the substance at issue is a controlled
substance. People v. Park, 72 Ill. 2d 203, 211 (1978).
	In this case, the State's only evidence regarding the identity of
the powder found in the folded white piece of paper was the
testimony of Officer Bukovsky. Bukovsky had performed a field
test on the substance and determined from that test that the
substance was cocaine. During cross-examination, however,
Bukovsky admitted that he could not remember the name of the
test, the instructions for performing the test (although he did testify
that the instructions were listed on the test itself), the color that
indicated that the substance was cocaine, or the color that the
substance actually turned. Officer Bukovsky merely asserted that
the substance somehow turned the right color, whatever that color
might be. Standing alone, such vague and speculative testimony is
by no means sufficient to support defendant's conviction. We
therefore hold that the evidence was insufficient to convict
defendant of unlawful possession of a controlled substance.
Jury Waiver
	Defendant also claims that he did not knowingly and
understandingly waive his right to a jury under section 103-6 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103-6 (West
1998)). Defendant claims that, because he was not present at the
court appearance at which the jury waiver was filed, his waiver was
not proffered with the proper understanding. We have already
reversed defendant's conviction and therefore do not reach this
issue.
CONCLUSION
	In sum, we agree with the appellate court that defendant's
conviction should be reversed. We do so not because we endorse
the general rule that a field test can never be sufficient but because
the evidence in this case did not sufficiently support defendant's
conviction. Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate court is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE HEIPLE, specially concurring:
	I concur in the majority's holding that the evidence in this case
was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
substance found in defendant's possession was a controlled
substance. The opinion falls short, however, in failing to hold that
field tests currently in use, which seek to identify the composition
of an unknown substance on the basis of a color change, are never
sufficient to prove the composition of that substance beyond a
reasonable doubt.
	While positive results from a color-change test conducted in
the field may well be sufficient as a preliminary screening
mechanism and thus give rise to probable cause, such tests are, by
their nature, nonspecific.(1) In other words, such tests can indicate
only that a substance may contain, for example, cocaine. These
tests cannot, and do not purport to, exclude the possibility that a
tested substance may be something other than the controlled
substance which the test seeks to identify.
	Although I concur in the result reached by the majority, I
would further hold that the State may never meet its burden to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based solely upon the
testimony of a police officer concerning the results of a color-change test conducted in the field.
1.      1See, e.g., P. Gianelli & E. Imwinkelreid, Scientific Evidence §§23-2,
23-2(B) (1993).