Case Title: Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S216305

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2015-12-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed 12/3/15 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
MICHELLE QUESADA, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S216305 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/3 B239602 
HERB THYME FARMS, INC., 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BC436557 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
To buyers and sellers alike, ―labels matter.‖  (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court 
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 328.)  They serve as markers for a host of tangible and intangible 
qualities consumers may come to associate with a particular source or method of 
production.  (Id. at pp. 328–329.)  Misrepresentations in labeling undermine this 
signifying function, preventing consumers from correctly identifying the goods and 
services that carry the attributes they desire while also hampering honest producers‘ 
attempts to differentiate their merchandise from the competition. 
Among those labels Kwikset cited as making a difference to some consumers, and 
as potentially actionable under state unfair competition law if misused, was the 
designation of produce or other food as ―organic.‖  (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 
supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 332–333.)  Here we must decide whether such a state law claim 
is viable, or whether the federal regulatory regime for certifying organic growers 
preempts a state claim that a certified grower is intentionally mislabeling conventionally 
grown produce and selling it as organic. 
2 
 
We hold a state law claim that produce is being intentionally mislabeled as organic 
is not preempted.  When Congress entered the field in 1990, it confined the areas of state 
law expressly preempted to matters related to certifying production as organic, leaving 
untouched enforcement against abuse of the label ―organic.‖  Moreover, a central purpose 
behind adopting a clear national definition of organic production was to permit 
consumers to rely on organic labels and curtail fraud.  Accordingly, state lawsuits 
alleging intentional organic mislabeling promote, rather than hinder, Congress‘s purposes 
and objectives.  Because the Court of Appeal concluded to the contrary, finding these 
state fraud claims impliedly preempted, we reverse its judgment. 
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
This case is a putative class action challenging an herb grower‘s marketing of its 
herbs as organic.  Because this appeal follows the granting of a motion for judgment on 
the pleadings (Code Civ. Proc., § 438), we accept as true the allegations of the complaint 
(Angelucci v. Century Supper Club (2007) 41 Cal.4th 160, 166). 
Defendant Herb Thyme Farms, Inc. (Herb Thyme), is a large herb-growing 
operation with multiple farms throughout California.  Most of its farms use conventional 
growing methods, but one of its farms uses organic processes and has been properly 
certified by a registered certifying agent.  When it comes time for distribution and 
marketing, however, Herb Thyme brings its conventionally grown and organic herbs to 
the same packing and labeling facility, processes them together, and sends blended 
conventional and organic herbs out under the same ―Fresh Organic‖ label and packaging.  
As well, Herb Thyme packages and labels as organic some herbs that are entirely 
conventionally grown. 
Plaintiff Michelle Quesada is a consumer who purchased Herb Thyme herbs at a 
premium in the belief they were, in fact, 100 percent organic.  Her suit, filed as a class 
and representative action, challenges as false advertising and unfair competition Herb 
Thyme‘s practice of selling conventionally grown herbs under an organic label.  The 
3 
 
operative complaint, the second amended complaint, alleges violations of the Consumers 
Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.), unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. 
Code, § 17200 et seq.), and false advertising law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17500 et seq.). 
Herb Thyme sought judgment on the pleadings on federal preemption and primary 
jurisdiction grounds.  The Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 (7 U.S.C. §§ 6501–
6522; Organic Foods Act), Herb Thyme argued, vests the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) with exclusive authority to regulate the labeling and marketing of 
organic products and both expressly and impliedly preempts state truth-in-advertising 
requirements.  In the alternative, Herb Thyme asked the trial court to defer action under 
primary jurisdiction principles unless and until an administrative complaint had been 
pursued through the USDA.  The trial court agreed with both express and implied 
preemption arguments and entered a defense judgment. 
The Court of Appeal affirmed.  It disagreed with the trial court‘s finding of 
express preemption, reasoning that the express preemption provisions in the Organic 
Foods Act limited state organic certification programs but did not foreclose state false 
advertising suits.  However, it agreed such suits were a potential obstacle to Congress‘s 
purposes and objectives of establishing uniform national standards for organic production 
and labeling, and thus impliedly preempted. 
We granted review to consider these preemption questions. 
DISCUSSION 
I. 
State and Federal Regulation of Organic Products 
The ―first [use of] the word ‗organic‘ to describe a method of farming in which the 
farmer strove for improved natural soil condition through the use of natural additions of 
manure and compost and the avoidance of chemical amendments‖ traces to the 1940s, 
perhaps not coincidentally the time when use of synthetic pesticides first became 
widespread.  (Watnick, The Organic Foods Production Act, the Process/Product 
Distinction, and a Case for More End Product Regulation in the Organic Foods Market 
4 
 
(2014) 32 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol‘y 40, 45 & fn. 20 (Watnick); see Pasquinelli, One 
False Move: The History of Organic Agriculture and Consequences of Non-Compliance 
with the Governing Laws and Regulations (2010) 3 Golden Gate U. Envtl. L.J. 365, 368 
& fn. 13.)  Sales of organic products remained a niche industry for another generation, 
but by the 1970s a broader market for organic food had begun to emerge.  (Amaditz, The 
Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 and Its Impending Regulations:  A Big Zero for 
Organic Food? (1997) 52 Food & Drug L.J. 537, 538 (Amaditz); Lathrop, Pre-empting 
Apples with Oranges: Federal Regulation of Organic Food Labeling (1991) 16 J. Corp. 
L. 885, 886 (Lathrop).) 
This nascent unregulated market was not without its problems.  For one, the 
absence of any uniform, agreed-upon standards created consumer confusion:  ―Even the 
most sophisticated organic consumer finds it difficult to know, with certainty, what the 
term ‗organic‘ really means.‖  (Sen.Rep. No. 101-357, 2d Sess., p. 289 (1990), reprinted 
in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 4943.)  For another, the combination of 
consumers willing to pay a premium for organic products and the absence of definite 
standards created incentives for sharp practices.  (Id. at pp. 289–290, reprinted in 1990 
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at pp. 4943–4944; Amaditz, supra, 52 Food & Drug 
L.J. at p. 539 [―Because no regulations existed, unscrupulous producers could proffer 
almost any organic claim to render their food more marketable.‖]; Lathrop, supra, 16 J. 
Corp. L. at pp. 890–891.) 
The several states stepped in first.  Oregon enacted a first-of-its-kind state organic 
certification law in 1973.  (Or. Rev. Stat. former § 632.925; see Watnick, supra, 32 
UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol‘y at p. 45 & fn. 24; Lathrop, supra, 16 J. Corp. L. at pp. 886, 
891.)  California followed in 1979, modeling its statute on Oregon‘s template.  (Health & 
Saf. Code, former §§ 26469, 26569.11–26569.17, 26850.5–26850.6, added by Stats. 
1979, ch. 914, pp. 3143–3149; see Bones, State and Federal Organic Food Certification 
Laws: Coming of Age? (1992) 68 N.D. L.Rev. 405, 410; Lathrop, at p. 891.)  By 1990, 22 
5 
 
states had some form of regulation of organic production.  (Sen.Rep. No. 101-357, 2d 
Sess., p. 289, supra, reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 4943; Bones, 
at p. 408 & fns. 11–13; Lathrop, at pp. 891–892 & fn. 53.) 
Frustratingly, however, no two state laws were the same.  (Sen.Rep. No. 101-357, 
2d Sess., p. 289, supra, reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 4943.)  
This multiplicity of certification procedures and standards presented ongoing difficulties 
for both consumers and the marketplace.  (Ibid. [―While State action represents a positive 
step forward for the organic foods industry, the differing state laws have also [led] to 
consumer confusion and troubled interstate commerce.‖].)  Seeking uniformity, the 
organic producer community lobbied for federal regulation.  (Id. at p. 290, reprinted in 
1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 4944; Franzen, Will GATT Take a Bite Out of 
the Organic Food Production Act of 1990? (1998) 7 Minn. J. Global Trade 399, 401.) 
In 1990, Congress responded.  The Organic Foods Act (7 U.S.C. § 6501 et seq.) 
directs the establishment of national baseline standards for the production, labeling, and 
sale of organic products.  Aside from prohibiting the use of synthetic chemicals, the act 
itself does not define organic production.  (Id., § 6504; see Sen.Rep. No. 101-357, 2d 
Sess., p. 292, supra, reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 4946 
[acknowledging that ―[o]rganically produced food defies simple definition‖].)  It leaves 
that task to the USDA, which is to issue regulations supplying suitable definitions.  (7 
U.S.C. §§ 6517–6518, 6521(a).)  Complementary state standards are permitted and, with 
the USDA‘s approval, may be more stringent than federal standards.  (Id., § 6507(b); 
Sen.Rep. No. 101-357, 2d Sess., pp. 295, 567, supra, reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. 
& Admin. News, pp. 4949, 5221.)  The act also does not establish certification 
procedures, but again directs the USDA to do so.  (7 U.S.C. § 6503.)  Producers may 
label and sell their products as organic only if they have been produced in compliance 
with an approved organic plan.  (Id., §§ 6504, 6505(a), 6506(a)(2), 6513.)  Individual 
plan approval must come from either state officials or private certifying agents.  (Id., 
6 
 
§§ 6513(a), 6514(a).)  Producers who have been certified may label their products as 
organic and use the official USDA Organic seal.1 
After some delay, the USDA in 2000 issued its final rule adopting implementing 
regulations, with the regulations to take effect in 2002.  (65 Fed.Reg. 80548 (Dec. 21, 
2000).)  The final rule establishes detailed production and handling requirements for any 
product being sold as organic.  (7 C.F.R. §§ 205.105, 205.200–205.290, 205.600–205.607 
(2015).)  The rule regulates organic labeling, including establishing the precise 
compositional requirements for products labeled ― ‗100 percent organic,‘ ‖ ― ‗organic,‘ ‖ 
and ― ‗made with organic . . . ingredients.‘ ‖  (Id., §§ 205.300–205.309 (2015).)2  As the 
Organic Foods Act had contemplated, the final rule also sets out the procedure for states 
to draft their own organic regulatory programs (including more restrictive requirements) 
and submit them for USDA approval.  (Id., §§ 205.620–205.622 (2015).)  Other portions 
of the final rule spell out the details of producer certification.  (Id., §§ 205.400–205.406 
(2015).) 
Thereafter, California became the first state to have its own organic program 
approved.  (See Food & Agr. Code, §§ 46000–46029; Health & Saf. Code, §§ 110810–
110959.)  The California Organic Products Act of 2003 incorporates by reference federal 
regulations under the Organic Products Act.  (Food & Agr. Code, § 46002, subd. (a).)  
Additionally, it grants authority to the Secretary of the Department of Food and 
                                              
1  
This is the mark:  
 
 
 
2  
For example, products labeled ―organic‖ must contain ―not less than 95 percent 
organically produced raw or processed agricultural products.‖  (7 C.F.R. § 205.301(b) 
(2015).)  Moreover, any nonorganic components are subject to their own restrictions and 
requirements.  (Ibid.) 
7 
 
Agriculture to maintain lists of registered certified organic producers and handlers, 
conduct inspections of organic operations, and adopt additional regulations governing 
organic production.  (Food & Agr. Code, §§ 46002, subd. (b), 46003.5, 46013.1, 46013.2, 
46014.4, 46018.1; Health & Saf. Code, § 110950.) 
With respect to enforcement, the federal Organic Foods Act imposes civil 
penalties for labeling or selling products as organic when the act has not been complied 
with.  (7 U.S.C. § 6519(a).)  The act contemplates a cooperative state-federal 
enforcement regime.  (Sen.Rep. No. 101-357, 2d Sess., p. 304, supra, reprinted in 1990 
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 4958 [―The Committee expects that enforcement 
responsibilities will be shared among the Secretary [of the USDA], the governing State 
officials, and the certifying agents.‖].)  As noted, states may establish organic 
certification programs (7 U.S.C. § 6507); once federally approved, these state programs 
take principal responsibility for certifying growers and instituting administrative 
proceedings for noncompliance with the governing standards (7 C.F.R. § 205.668(b) 
(2015)).  California‘s state program authorizes anyone to file a complaint concerning 
noncompliance (Food & Agr. Code, §§ 46004, 46016.1, subd. (a); Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 110940, subd. (a)) and authorizes both the Secretary of the Department of Food and 
Agriculture and county agricultural commissioners to conduct investigations and impose 
civil penalties (Food & Agr. Code, §§ 46000, subd. (b), 46016.1–46017; Health & Saf. 
Code, §§ 110915, 110930, 110940).  County agricultural commissioners may also ask 
their district attorneys to bring enforcement actions.  (Food & Agr. Code, §§ 46006, 
46018.2.) 
We must decide whether this regulatory framework leaves room for claims under 
state laws of general application targeting fraud and misrepresentation. 
8 
 
II. 
Preemption 
 
A. 
General Principles 
―The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution establishes a 
constitutional choice-of-law rule, makes federal law paramount, and vests Congress with 
the power to preempt state law.‖  (Viva! Internat. Voice for Animals v. Adidas 
Promotional Retail Operations, Inc. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 929, 935; see U.S. Const., art. VI, 
cl. 2; Arizona v. United States (2012) 567 U.S. ___, ___ [183 L.Ed.2d 351, 368, 132 S.Ct. 
2492, 2500].)  Similarly, federal agencies, acting pursuant to authorization from 
Congress, can issue regulations that override state requirements.  (See, e.g., Wyeth v. 
Levine (2009) 555 U.S. 555, 576; Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs. 
(1985) 471 U.S. 707, 713; Dowhal v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare (2004) 
32 Cal.4th 910 , 919, 934–935.)  Preemption is foremost a question of congressional 
intent:  did Congress, expressly or implicitly, seek to displace state law?  (Wyeth, at 
p. 565; Jankey v. Lee (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1038, 1048.) 
We have identified several species of preemption.  Congress may expressly 
preempt state law through an explicit preemption clause, or courts may imply preemption 
under the field, conflict, or obstacle preemption doctrines.  (Brown v. Mortensen (2011) 
51 Cal.4th 1052, 1059; In re Jose C. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 534, 550; Viva! Internat. Voice for 
Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 935–
936.)  Two of these are at issue here:  express preemption and obstacle preemption.  The 
burden is on Herb Thyme, the party asserting preemption, to demonstrate either applies.  
(Viva!, at p. 936; Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly (2004) 33 Cal.4th 943, 956.) 
 
B. 
Express Preemption 
Herb Thyme contends the Organic Foods Act expressly preempts suit under 
general state consumer laws because it comprehensively displaces state remedies and 
enforcement procedures.  We conclude, as the Court of Appeal did, that the act‘s express 
preemptive effect is substantially narrower and does not extend to the claims here. 
9 
 
We begin with the statutory text, necessarily the source of the best evidence 
concerning the breadth of Congress‘s preemptive intent.  (Brown v. Mortensen, supra, 51 
Cal.4th at pp. 1059–1060.)  ―[O]ur task is to ‗ ―identify the domain expressly pre-
empted.‖ ‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 1062.) 
The Organic Foods Act‘s provisions explicitly displace state law in two regards.  
First, they set aside existing state standards for what it means to produce something 
organically.  (7 U.S.C. § 6505(a)(1).)3  The Organic Foods Act effectively federalizes the 
term ―organic‖—an agricultural product is, and may be labeled as, organic if and only if 
it has been produced in accordance with federally approved standards for what that term 
is to mean.4  The many occasionally conflicting state definitions growers and consumers 
had had to cope with before are no more, largely supplanted by a single federal 
definition.  (See Sen.Rep. No. 101-357, 2d Sess., p. 289, supra, reprinted in 1990 U.S. 
Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 4943; 65 Fed.Reg. 80548, 80664, 80682 (Dec. 21, 
2000).)5   
Second, the Organic Foods Act federalizes certification, the process by which 
growers may seek to demonstrate their production methods comply with the uniform 
federal standard.  At the time of enactment, growers faced a patchwork of differing 
regulations, with dozens of entities offering certification and state requirements varying 
widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  (65 Fed.Reg. 80548, 80664 (Dec. 21, 2000).)  
                                              
3  
This provision reads: ―On or after October 1, 1993—[¶] (A) a person may sell or 
label an agricultural product as organically produced only if such product is produced and 
handled in accordance with this chapter; and [¶] (B) no person may affix a label to, or 
provide other market information concerning, an agricultural product if such label or 
information implies, directly or indirectly, that such product is produced and handled 
using organic methods, except in accordance with this chapter.‖  (7 U.S.C. § 6505(a)(1), 
italics added.) 
4  
There are exceptions relating to processed foods and very small growers (see 7 
U.S.C. § 6505(c), (d)), but they are not implicated here. 
5  
States may append their own additional requirements, but only after receiving 
federal approval.  (7 U.S.C. §§ 6506(d), 6507(b); 7 C.F.R. § 205.620 (2015).) 
10 
 
Under the Organic Foods Act, the USDA is directed to establish a federal certification 
program.  (7 U.S.C. § 6503(a).)  States are permitted to establish their own certification 
programs (id., § 6503(b)), but these programs must be approved by the USDA before 
taking effect (id., § 6507(a); 7 C.F.R. § 205.620(e) (2015)).  Certification, whether under 
the USDA‘s national program or under a federally approved state program, is to be 
carried out only by certifying agents who themselves have been federally accredited.  (7 
U.S.C. §§ 6503(d), 6513(a), 6514; 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.500–205.510 (2015).) 
These provisions establish federal exclusivity in the affected domains.  Whether 
production processes qualify as organic is to be measured ―only . . . in accordance with‖ 
the provisions of the Organic Foods Act.  (7 U.S.C. § 6506(a)(1)(A), italics added.)  Use 
of an organic label requires certification, which may be issued only by federally approved 
certifying agents and only pursuant to a federal certification program, or federally 
approved state certification program.  The effect of these provisions, as the USDA 
observed in its final rule implementing regulations under the act, is that ―[s]tates and 
local jurisdictions are preempted . . . from creating programs of accreditation‖ for 
certifying agents and, further, ―[s]tates also are preempted . . . from creating certification 
programs to certify organic farms or handling operations‖ except as approved by the 
USDA.  (65 Fed.Reg. 80548, 80682 (Dec. 21, 2000).) 
In contrast, no similar language of exclusivity is included in the provisions of the 
Organic Foods Act governing sanctions for misuse of the organic label.  The act provides 
for, inter alia, potential civil fines of up to $10,000 and ineligibility for certification for a 
period of five years.  (7 U.S.C. § 6519(c).)  But unlike those portions of the Organic 
Foods Act governing the standards for organic production and certification, nothing in 
section 6519(c) suggests these federal remedies are intended to displace whatever state 
law remedies might exist for deception.  (See 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.660–205.668 (2015) 
[discussing enforcement without suggesting displacement of preexisting state remedies 
for fraud].)  The same is true of section 6520 and the regulations adopted pursuant to it 
11 
 
(see 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.680–205.681 (2015)), which establish the procedures for growers to 
challenge state or federal government actions; they too do not address or suggest 
displacement of state consumer actions.  As a matter of express preemption, we have no 
reason to conclude Congress intended its federal remedies as not only a floor—ensuring 
that, whatever else state law might provide for, some teeth would back up the new federal 
regulation of organic labeling—but also a ceiling, with states prohibited from continuing 
to augment these limited remedies.  On the subject of state consumer-deception laws of 
general application, the text of the Organic Foods Act offers only silence. 
Notably, the Organic Foods Act permits states to adopt more stringent standards 
governing organic production.  (7 U.S.C. § 6507(b).)  The standards it imposes are 
minimum, not absolute, standards.  If the act operates that way even in areas where it 
explicitly preempts state law, then it is all the more difficult to infer that in matters of 
enforcement, where no explicit preemption language is used, Congress clearly intended 
to demand exclusivity and not simply provide a floor. 
Consistent with this view of the text, those courts to consider the reach of the 
Organic Foods Act have found no express preemption of state consumer protection 
lawsuits.  In In re Aurora Dairy Corp. Organic Milk Marketing (8th Cir. 2010) 621 F.3d 
781, the Eighth Circuit considered and rejected the argument that the act expressly 
preempted state mislabeling claims.  It recognized the limited nature of express 
preemption under the act, which extends to state standards and certification programs not 
approved by the USDA but no further.  In contrast, ―Congress did not expressly preempt 
state tort claims, consumer protection statutes, or common law claims.‖  (Id. at p. 792.)  
Federal trial courts have arrived at the same conclusion.  (See Jones v. ConAgra Foods, 
Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2012) 912 F.Supp.2d 889, 894–895 [claim under California unfair 
competition and false advertising laws that ―organic‖ food is mislabeled because it 
contains disqualifying ingredients is not expressly preempted]; Brown v. Hain Celestial 
Group, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2012) 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 108561, p. *26 [same].)  In Brown, 
12 
 
for example, the court rejected an argument for express preemption of any state law 
claims challenging whether a product was properly labeled ―organic,‖ holding instead 
that only independent state certification laws were preempted.  (Brown, at pp. *25–*26.)  
To hold otherwise ―would mean that a consumer would have no protection against 
deceptive or fraudulent labeling based on the use of the term ‗organic,‘ ‖ despite ―the 
absence of clear congressional intent to do this.‖  (Id. at p. *26.) 
Herb Thyme relies on one additional district court case, All One God Faith, Inc. v. 
The Hain Celestial Group, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2012) 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 111553, 2012-2 
Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 78,018, to support its argument, but that decision is inapposite.  The 
case involved a federal Lanham Act mislabeling claim, not a state claim, and the court 
concluded the claim was barred on grounds of primary jurisdiction, not preemption.  
Moreover, the principal authority the court relied upon, POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-
Cola Co. (9th Cir. 2012) 679 F.3d 1170, was subsequently reversed by POM Wonderful 
LLC v. Coca-Cola Co. (2014) 573 U.S. ___ [189 L.Ed.2d 141, 134 S.Ct. 2228]. 
Noting the Organic Foods Act preempts existing state organic certification 
programs and requires future certification programs to be submitted for federal approval 
(7 U.S.C. § 6507; 65 Fed.Reg. 80548, 80682 (Dec. 21, 2000)), Herb Thyme argues the 
scope of express preemption reaches beyond certification of grower processes and agents 
to laws of general application that might otherwise provide private causes of action for 
mislabeling and deception.  The only remedies for mislabeling, it maintains, are those in 
the act, except insofar as a state submits additional remedies to the USDA for approval 
under section 6507.  Herb Thyme analogizes to the federal regulation of workplace safety 
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.), which it 
contends preempts all state regulations affecting the covered subject matter except insofar 
as they have been submitted to the appropriate federal agency for approval. 
However, by its terms, section 6507 requires only the submission of certification 
programs, the state programs pursuant to which state officials and certifying agents will 
13 
 
grant or revoke certification of the processes used by farms and handling operations 
within a state‘s borders.  (See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6506(d), 6507; 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.620–205.622 
(2015).)  Nor does the analogy to workplace safety regulation provide assistance.  The 
federal approval requirement under the Occupational Safety and Health Act is facially 
broader, extending to any ―State plan for the development of [occupational safety and 
health] standards and their enforcement.‖  (29 U.S.C. § 667(b), italics added.)  No 
corresponding provision of the Organic Foods Act raises any possibility of subjecting 
enforcement mechanisms to federal approval.  Moreover, even under the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act, ―state laws of general applicability . . . that do not conflict with 
OSHA standards and that regulate the conduct of workers and nonworkers alike would 
generally not be pre-empted.‖  (Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn. (1992) 
505 U.S. 88, 107.)  The same holds true under the Organic Foods Act; laws of general 
applicability regulating deception by every seller of goods and services are not expressly 
preempted. 
Accordingly, like the Court of Appeal and every previous court to consider the 
question, we conclude the Organic Foods Act does not expressly preempt general state 
consumer fraud statutes. 
 
C. 
Obstacle Preemption 
As an alternative to express preemption, Herb Thyme argues the state claims 
pleaded here interfere with congressional goals and should be barred.  Far from posing an 
obstacle, we conclude claims such as these affirmatively further the purposes of the act.  
Accordingly, they are not impliedly preempted. 
Obstacle preemption permits courts to strike state law that stands as ―an obstacle 
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.‖  
(Hines v. Davidowitz (1941) 312 U.S. 52, 67; accord, Viva! Internat. Voice for Animals v. 
Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 936.)  It requires 
proof Congress had particular purposes and objectives in mind, a demonstration that 
14 
 
leaving state law in place would compromise those objectives, and reason to discount the 
possibility the Congress that enacted the legislation was aware of the background tapestry 
of state law and content to let that law remain as it was.  Ultimately, ―what constitutes a 
‗sufficient obstacle [for a finding of implied preemption] is a matter of judgment, to be 
informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and 
intended effects.‘ ‖  (Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 992, italics 
omitted, quoting Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council (2000) 530 U.S. 363, 373.) 
Historically, the United States Supreme Court and this court have conducted the 
search for congressional intent through the lens of a presumption against preemption.  
(E.g., Wyeth v. Levine, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 565; Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC (2005) 
544 U.S. 431, 449; Brown v. Mortensen, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 1060, 1064.)  The 
presumption is founded on ―respect for the States as ‗independent sovereigns in our 
federal system‘ ‖; that respect requires courts ―to assume that ‗Congress does not 
cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.‘ ‖  (Wyeth, at p. 565, fn. 3.)  The strength 
of the presumption is heightened in areas where the subject matter has been the 
longstanding subject of state regulation in the first instance; where federal law touches ―a 
field that ‗ ―has been traditionally occupied by the States,‖ ‘ ‖ the party seeking to show 
preemption ―bear[s] the considerable burden of overcoming ‗the starting presumption that 
Congress does not intend to supplant state law.‘ ‖  (De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medical and 
Clinical Services Fund (1997) 520 U.S. 806, 814; see CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood 
(1993) 507 U.S. 658, 663–664 [―In the interest of avoiding unintended encroachment on 
the authority of the States, however, a court interpreting a federal statute pertaining to a 
subject traditionally governed by state law will be reluctant to find pre-emption.‖].)  A 
rebuttal of the presumption requires a demonstration that preemption was the ― ‗ ―clear 
and manifest purpose of Congress.‖ ‘ ‖  (Wyeth, at p. 565.) 
The regulation of food labeling to protect the public is quintessentially a matter of 
longstanding local concern.  The first state legislation designed to address fraud and 
15 
 
adulteration in food sales was enacted in 1785.  (Bones, State and Federal Organic Food 
Certification Laws: Coming of Age?, supra, 68 N.D. L.Rev. at p. 409.)  California began 
regulating food mislabeling in the 1860s, just a few years after statehood.  (See Stats. 
1862, ch. 365, § 5, pp. 484–485 [―It is hereby forbidden, and declared a misdemeanor, to 
sell any article, to be used as food or drink by persons, under a false name, with intent to 
deceive the purchaser as to the real nature of the article.‖]); Farm Raised Salmon Cases 
(2008) 42 Cal.4th 1077, 1088.)  In response to widespread mislabeling, misbranding, and 
adulteration by food suppliers, by the late 18th century ―many if not most states exercised 
their traditional police powers to regulate generally the marketing of impure or 
deceptively labeled foods and beverages.‖  (Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, supra, 33 Cal.4th 
at p. 960; see id. at pp. 959–961.)6 
Given this longstanding state oversight, the federal government has assumed a 
more peripheral role and routinely left undisturbed local policy judgments about how best 
to protect consumers.  ―If there be any subject over which it would seem the States ought 
to have plenary control, and the power to legislate in respect to which it ought not to be 
supposed was intended to be surrendered to the general government, it is the protection of 
the people against fraud and deception in the sale of food products.‖  (Plumley v. 
Massachusetts (1894) 155 U.S. 461, 472.)  ―[T]he supervision of the readying of 
foodstuffs for market has always been deemed a matter of peculiarly local concern.‖  
(Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul (1963) 373 U.S. 132, 144.)  Federal minimum 
standards for the processing of foodstuffs ordinarily do not foreclose ―state control over 
the distribution and retail sale of those commodities in the interests of the consumers of 
                                              
6  
Outside of food regulation as well, states have long concerned themselves with the 
protection of consumers against deceptive and unfair business practices.  (California v. 
ARC America Corp. (1989) 490 U.S. 93, 101; Farm Raised Salmon Cases, supra, 42 
Cal.4th at p. 1091.) 
16 
 
the commodities within the State.‖  (Id. at p. 145.)  This includes state regulation 
―designed to prevent the deception of consumers.‖  (Id. at p. 146.) 
 Consequently, the presumption against preemption ―applies with particular force‖ 
where state consumer protection laws regulating deceptive food labeling are at issue.  
(Farm Raised Salmon Cases, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1088; see Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, 
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 974 [given the states‘ ―extensive and dominant‖ exercise of police 
power to regulate food labeling, ―a strong presumption against preemption applies‖]; 
General Motors Corp. v. Abrams (2d Cir. 1990) 897 F.2d 34, 41–42 [―compelling 
evidence of an intention to preempt is required‖ where consumer protection is 
concerned].)  The expectation Congress would have said something expressly if it had 
intended to override the states‘ longstanding regulatory primacy is at its apex here.  (See 
Farm Raised Salmon Cases, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1091.) 
In recent years, the continuing vitality of the nearly 70-year-old presumption 
against preemption has come into question.  Four Supreme Court justices have called for 
its abandonment.  (CTS Corp. v. Waldburger (2014) 573 U.S. ___, ___ [189 L.Ed.2d 62, 
79–80, 134 S.Ct. 2175, 2189] (conc. opn. of Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Thomas & 
Alito, JJ.); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing (2011) 564 U.S. ___, ___ [180 L.Ed.2d 580, 594-595, 
131 S.Ct. 2567, 2579–2580] (plur. opn. of Thomas, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Scalia & 
Alito, JJ.); Altria Group, Inc. v. Good (2008) 555 U.S. 70, 98–103 (dis. opn. of Thomas, 
J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Scalia & Alito, JJ.).)  However, this view has yet to command 
a majority.  Nor is it clear those justices arguing for presumptionless preemption analysis 
would apply that approach to obstacle preemption.  CTS Corp. and Altria Group were 
express preemption cases, while PLIVA was a conflict preemption case.  The separate 
opinions in the two express preemption cases limited their call for a repeal of the 
presumption to cases interpreting express preemption clauses (CTS Corp., at p. ___ [189 
L.Ed.2d at p. 80, 134 S.Ct. at p. 2189]; Altria Group, at p. 102), while the conflict 
preemption case offered a theory of interpretation arguably applicable only to cases 
17 
 
where compliance with state and federal law would be impossible (PLIVA, at p. ___ [180 
L.Ed.2d 580, 594–595, 131 S.Ct. 2567, 2579–2580]).  In contrast, both Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Scalia have continued to sign opinions employing the presumption in 
obstacle preemption cases (see Hillman v. Maretta (2013) 569 U.S. ___, ___ [186 
L.Ed.2d 43, 51–52, 133 S.Ct. 1943, 1950]), while Justice Alito has complained of the 
court‘s ―giv[ing] short shrift to our presumption against pre-emption‖ in another obstacle 
preemption case (Arizona v. United States, supra, 567 U.S. at p. ___ [183 L.Ed.2d at 
p. 401, 132 S.Ct. at p. 2530] (conc. & dis. opn. of Alito, J.)).7 
For now, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. (1947) 331 U.S. 218, 230, the original 
source of the presumption, and the countless cases that have followed it remain the law.  
Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan still endorse and apply a 
presumption.  (CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, supra, 573 U.S. at p. ___ [189 L.Ed.2d at p. 79, 
134 S.Ct. at pp. 2188–2189] (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J., joined by Sotomayor & Kagan, 
JJ.); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, supra, 564 U.S. at p. ___ [180 L.Ed.2d at pp. 605–607, 131 
S.Ct. at pp. 2590–2592] (dis. opn. of Sotomayor, J., joined by Ginsburg, Breyer & Kagan, 
JJ.); see Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona (2013) 570 U.S. ___, ___ [186 
L.Ed.2d 239, 257–259, 133 S.Ct. 2247, 2260–2261] (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.) 
[questioning whether a ―presumption‖ is the best way to characterize the appropriate 
canon of construction, while espousing the view that ―a court must not lightly infer a 
congressional directive to negate the States‘ otherwise proper exercise of their sovereign 
power‖].) 
                                              
7  
The fourth justice, Justice Thomas, does not recognize obstacle preemption as ever 
affording a legitimate basis to set aside state law.  (See Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc. (2015) 
575 U.S. ___, ___ [191 L.Ed.2d 511, 526, 135 S.Ct. 1591, 1603] (conc. opn. of Thomas, 
J.); Hillman v. Maretta, supra, 569 U.S. ___, ___ [186 L.Ed.2d 43, 58, 133 S.Ct. 1943, 
1955] (conc. opn. of Thomas, J.); Wyeth v. Levine, supra, 555 U.S. at pp. 594–602, 604 
(conc. opn. of Thomas, J.); see generally Sharkey, Against Freewheeling, Extratextual 
Obstacle Preemption: Is Justice Clarence Thomas the Lone Principled Federalist? 
(2010) 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & Liberty 63, 86–93.) 
18 
 
Accordingly, in this obstacle preemption case, we continue to conduct our analysis 
from the starting point of a presumption that displacement of state regulation in areas of 
traditional state concern was not intended absent clear and manifest evidence of a 
contrary congressional intent.  With this presumption in mind, we consider the evident 
purposes and objectives of the Organic Foods Act. 
When it adopted the act, Congress identified a series of related problems on both 
the demand and supply sides that were hampering development of a healthy organic 
market.  On the demand side, the absence of consistent national standards for organic 
production had led to ―consumer confusion‖ in the face of ―a confusing array of private 
and State labels,‖ with ―[e]ven the most sophisticated organic consumer find[ing] it 
difficult to know, with certainty, what the term ‗organic‘ really means.‖  (Sen.Rep. No. 
101-357, 2d Sess., p. 289, supra, reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 
p. 4943.)  Worse, Congress noted ―growing evidence that some conventionally grown 
food is deliberately mislabeled as ‗organic‘ by dishonest traders looking to cash in on the 
premium prices organic food commands.‖  (Id. at pp. 289–290, reprinted in 1990 U.S. 
Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 4943–4944.)  From the supply side, growers had ―no 
choice but to produce and label their products according to conflicting standards.‖  (Id. at 
p. 289, reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 4943.)  They were 
sometimes competing with producers subject to lower standards, or with others able to 
get away with intentional mislabeling, and often found ―large food chains and distributors 
concerned about verifying the authenticity of organic items‖ and therefore unwilling ―to 
purchase organic products.‖  (Id. at p. 290, reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. 
News, p. 4944.) 
Against this background, the first section of the Organic Foods Act expressly 
articulates Congress‘s intentions.  ―It is the purpose of this chapter—[¶] (1) to establish 
national standards governing the marketing of certain agricultural products as organically 
produced products; [¶] (2) to assure consumers that organically produced products meet a 
19 
 
consistent standard; and [¶] (3) to facilitate interstate commerce in fresh and processed 
food that is organically produced.‖  (7 U.S.C. § 6501.)  These three goals interrelate and 
mutually reinforce each other.  A uniform national standard for marketing organic 
produce serves to boost consumer confidence that an ―organic‖ label guarantees 
compliance with particular practices, and also deters intentional mislabeling, ―so that 
consumers are sure to get what they pay for.‖  (Sen.Rep. No. 101-357, 2d Sess., p. 289, 
supra, reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 4943.)  In turn, uniform 
standards ―provide a level playing field‖ for organic growers, allowing them to 
effectively market their products across state lines by eliminating conflicting regulatory 
regimes.  (Id. at p. 290, reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 4944.)  
Standards that enhance consumer confidence in meaningful labels and reduce the 
distribution network‘s reluctance to carry organic products may increase both supply and 
demand and thereby promote organic interstate commerce.  (Id. at pp. 289–290, reprinted 
in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 4943–4944.) 
By all appearances, permitting state consumer fraud actions would advance, not 
impair, these goals.  Substitution fraud, intentionally marketing products as organic that 
have been grown conventionally, undermines the assurances the USDA Organic label is 
intended to provide.  Conversely, the prosecution of such fraud, whether by public 
prosecutors where resources and state laws permit,8 or through civil suits by individuals 
or groups of consumers, can only serve to deter mislabeling and enhance consumer 
                                              
8  
Notably, the state statutes governing enforcement of the Organic Foods Act 
pursuant to the state‘s federally approved plan explicitly acknowledge the resource 
limitations that may constrain effective government enforcement.  (Food & Agr. Code, 
§ 46004, subd. (b) [noncompliance complaints shall be handled promptly ―to the extent 
funds are available‖]; Health & Saf. Code, § 110940, subd. (b) [same].)  The Attorney 
General highlights this point in her amicus curiae brief, explaining that preemption of 
state consumer laws ―would interfere with [the Organic Food Act‘s] purposes, leaving 
enforcement solely to federal and state administrative agencies with substantial resource 
limitations.‖ 
20 
 
confidence.  (See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 451 [―Private 
[state] remedies that enforce federal misbranding requirements‖ can ―aid, rather than 
hinder‖ the effectiveness of those labeling requirements].)  From the grower perspective 
too, anything that deters the few bad apples, the ―dishonest traders looking to cash in on 
the premium prices organic food commands‖ (Sen.Rep. No. 101-357, 2d Sess., p. 290, 
supra, reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 4944), enhances the 
overall health of the interstate market and benefits those producers that play by the rules 
in processing and marketing their products.  Private claims like those here are thus 
consistent with the Organic Foods Act‘s goals of reassuring consumers and enabling fair 
competition. 
We may consider as well statements by the USDA, which Congress charged with 
adopting regulations to implement the Organic Foods Act.  (7 U.S.C. § 6521.)  The 
agency‘s views are entitled to considerable weight here, where some aspects of the 
subject matter are recondite and the USDA, as the entity responsible for preparing 
regulations under the statutory scheme, has relevant technical expertise.  (See Geier v. 
American Honda Motor Co. (2000) 529 U.S. 861, 883; Jevne v. Superior Court (2005) 35 
Cal.4th 935, 958.) 
When the USDA issued its final rule adopting implementing regulations, it 
emphasized that the uniform federal standards for organic certification were designed to 
supplement and enhance, rather than foreclose, state law consumer remedies for 
deception.  The final rule commentary recognized ―consumer fraud involving organic 
food does occur,‖ and recited multiple instances where state civil and criminal remedies 
for such fraud had been pursued.  (65 Fed.Reg. 80548, 80668 (Dec. 21, 2000).)  
However, the legal framework necessary for effective fraud deterrence was often lacking:  
―[O]nly about half of the States have any organic legislation, and few of those States have 
laws with enough teeth to permit prosecution of organic fraud.  In States without similar 
laws, the costs associated with remedies via the tort system may be high.‖  (Id. at 
21 
 
p. 80668.)  Part of the problem was the absence of a clearly defined and accepted 
meaning for ―organic.‖  (See id. at pp. 80663–80664, 80668.)  By ―[p]roviding a common 
set of definitions on organic attributes,‖ the USDA hoped to ―reduce the cost associated 
with enforcement actions in consumer fraud cases‖ (id. at p. 80668), because the new 
regulations would establish a benchmark against which claims could be measured for 
deception.  These rules categorically were not intended to prohibit future state fraud 
actions; to the contrary, the USDA expected the standards ―established in this final rule 
. . . to fill in important State and regional gaps in enforcement in organic fraud cases.‖  
(Ibid., italics added; see id. at p. 80682 [while the Organic Foods Act may preempt some 
state laws, it does not federalize the entire area; instead, it ―contemplates a significant 
role for the States and, in fact, envisions a partnership between the States and the Federal 
Government‖ in fulfilling the act‘s purposes].)  In the eyes of the USDA, the Organic 
Foods Act and its regulations would enable consumers and public prosecutors in every 
state, not just those few with preexisting laws ―with enough teeth‖ (id. at p. 80668), to 
effectively combat misuse of the organic label on a going-forward basis. 
The especially strong presumption against preemption in this precise area 
reinforces this conclusion.  Congress was surely aware of both the extensive history of 
state regulation of food labeling and the widespread state regulation of general deception 
in the marketplace.  (See Farm Raised Salmon Cases, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 1088, 
1091.)  Yet it made note of, and expressly set aside, only those state laws establishing 
either standards for the meaning of ―organic‖ or standards for certification.  (7 U.S.C. 
§§ 6503, 6505(a)(1), 6506(a)(1)(A), 6507(a); see Sen.Rep. No. 101-357, 2d Sess., p. 289, 
supra, reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 4943.)  If it intended to 
disable state common law and statutory remedies for fraud and deception in this specific 
area, ―its failure even to hint at [such an intent] is spectacularly odd . . . .‖  (Medtronic, 
Inc. v. Lohr (1996) 518 U.S. 470, 491 (plur. opn. of Stevens, J.); see Segedie v. Hain 
Celestial Group, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 60739, pp. *18–*19 
22 
 
[rejecting obstacle preemption in part because of clearly defined limits on express 
preemption under the Organic Foods Act].)   
Moreover, because the Organic Foods Act contains no private right of action, 
implied preemption would render organic labeling uniquely immune from suits for 
deception because of legislation Congress passed, in part, to prevent food from being 
―deliberately mislabeled as ‗organic.‘ ‖  (Sen.Rep. No. 101-357, 2d Sess., p. 290, supra, 
reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 4944.)  Congressional intent is the 
touchstone of preemption analysis, including implied preemption analysis.  To infer from 
legislation motivated by an explicit concern over the proliferation of fraud in organic 
sales that Congress intended to eliminate existing fraud remedies would be strange 
indeed.  (See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 487 (plur. opn. of Stevens, J.) 
[doubting that Congress would have intended to impliedly preempt state remedies against 
an ―industry that, in the judgment of Congress, needed more stringent regulation‖]; POM 
Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., supra, 573 U.S. at p. ___ [189 L.Ed.2d at p. 153, 134 
S.Ct. at p. 2239] [―It is unlikely that Congress intended [a federal statute‘s] protection of 
health and safety to result in less policing of misleading food and beverage labels than in 
competitive markets for other products.‖].) 
The only published appellate decision to consider the scope of implied preemption 
under the Organic Foods Act, In re Aurora Dairy Corp. Organic Milk Marketing, supra, 
621 F.3d 781 (Aurora Dairy), is instructive.  In Aurora Dairy, the Eighth Circuit held 
preempted only state consumer protection claims asserting the defendant dairy should not 
have been permitted to sell milk as USDA Organic because its production methods were 
not actually consistent with federal regulations—that is, claims making a frontal assault 
on the validity of the organic producer‘s government certification.  These claims were 
preempted because they conflicted with the exclusive role of federally certified agents in 
certifying a producer‘s methods as organic.  (Id. at pp. 796–797.)  Preempted as well 
23 
 
were claims against the federally sanctioned agent alleging that it erred either in initially 
granting certification or in not thereafter revoking certification.  (Id. at pp. 787, 795–796.) 
But Aurora Dairy expressly distinguished as not preempted state law claims that 
merely challenged the truth of facts relating to certification.  (Aurora Dairy, supra, 621 
F.3d at p. 797.)  For example, the plaintiffs contested representations that milk was being 
produced without antibiotics or pesticides and that defendants‘ cows received humane 
treatment.  (Id. at p. 790.)  Though evidence of inhumane treatment might have precluded 
a certifying agent from granting certification, this potential overlap did not require 
preemption.  Aurora Dairy rejected the producer‘s argument that ―because the class 
plaintiffs‘ claims are based upon allegations that Aurora, despite its certification, 
knowingly failed to comply with provisions of the [Organic Foods Act] and 
[implementing regulations] upon which certification is based, those claims must be 
dismissed, because certification means that Aurora complied with the statute and 
regulations.‖  (Id. at pp. 797–798.)  Certification decisions inevitably rested upon only 
sampled inspections of a producer‘s operations; allowing proof of dairy 
misrepresentations, unlike direct challenges to certification, would not require a court to 
decide whether a certifying agent had erred based on what the agent had seen.  (Id. at 
p. 798.)  Considering the structure and evident purposes of the Organic Foods Act, the 
Eighth Circuit concluded suits challenging representations relevant to certification posed 
no obstacle and need not be preempted.  (Id. at pp. 798–799.) 
Herb Thyme asserts the claims here fall in the category the Eighth Circuit deemed 
preempted.  Herb Thyme notes, correctly, that ―split operation[s]‖—operations that 
involve both conventional and organic growing (7 C.F.R. § 205.2 (2015))—are required 
to establish protections against inadvertent commingling.  A grower‘s plan must include a 
―description of the management practices and physical barriers established to prevent 
commingling of organic and nonorganic products on a split operation . . . .‖  (Id., 
§ 205.201(a)(5); see id., § 205.272(a) [―The handler of an organic handling operation 
24 
 
must implement measures necessary to prevent the commingling of organic and 
nonorganic products and protect organic products from contact with prohibited 
substances.‖].)  A claim that the anti-commingling protocols in Herb Thyme‘s organic 
plan are inadequate to ensure ―true‖ organic production, notwithstanding the plan‘s 
approval by a federal certifying agent, might well be seen as an obstacle to Congress‘s 
goal of a consistent national standard; growers arguably should be permitted to rely on 
agent approval of their plan as confirmation that the production methods in the plan are 
sufficient.  (See Aurora Dairy, supra, 621 F.3d at pp. 796–797.) 
Given the operative complaint, however, we have no occasion to determine 
whether such a claim would be preempted, nor whether we agree with the Eighth Circuit 
concerning the area of implied preemption it identifies.  (Cf. Segedie v. Hain Celestial 
Group, Inc., supra, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 60739, at pp. *12–*19 [disagreeing with 
Aurora Diary and rejecting obstacle preemption even for claims that challenge whether 
products made by certified production methods are truly organic].)  Unlike the complaint 
at issue in Aurora Dairy, the complaint here accepts as valid Herb Thyme‘s certification 
and compliance with federal regulations on its certified organic farm.  Quesada concedes 
Herb Thyme can and does grow organic herbs, which it is entitled to package and sell 
using a USDA Organic label. 
The gravamen of these claims is different.  Herb Thyme has both certified organic 
and conventional growing operations.  Underlying each cause of action is the allegation 
that Herb Thyme not only sells its organic herbs under an organic label, but also 
knowingly and intentionally sells some conventional herbs under an organic label and at 
an organic premium price.  Thus, according to the operative complaint, Herb Thyme 
sometimes intentionally mixes its conventional herbs in with organic herbs.  On other 
occasions, it fills orders for organic herbs entirely with conventional herbs.  According to 
the complaint, this fraud is willful: ―At all relevant times herein Defendants were aware 
that Herb Thyme‘s ‗Fresh Organic‘ herb products were not 100% organic herb products‖; 
25 
 
―Herb Thyme deliberately promoted and continues to promote its conventionally grown 
fresh herb products to consumers in a false and misleading manner‖ in order to garner the 
premium prices organic products command; a USDA Organic label is included on 
packaging ―with the specific intent of deceiving consumers into believing Herb Thyme‘s 
conventional herbs are, in fact, organic‖; ―Stated simply, Defendant[] lied about the 
nature of its ‗Fresh Organic‘ product line of herbs.‖  The essence of these claims is that 
Herb Thyme‘s packaging implicitly represents the herbs within came from its properly 
certified organic farm, and that representation is, in many cases, intentionally false. 
Whether or not the improper certification claims preempted in Aurora Dairy 
would pose an obstacle to congressional purposes and objectives, the claims just recited 
do not.  Congress enacted national standards to boost consumer confidence in the 
assurances an organic label carries, protect fair competition, and promote the growth of 
the interstate market for organic goods.  (7 U.S.C. § 6501.)  It singled out the very 
practice alleged here, the deliberate mislabeling of conventional produce as organic, as a 
major reason why national legislation was needed in the first place.  (Sen.Rep. No. 101-
357, 2d Sess., pp. 289–290, supra, reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 
pp. 4943–4944.)  The Organic Foods Act cannot be interpreted, under the guise of 
obstacle preemption, as shielding from suit the precise misconduct Congress sought to 
eradicate.  To grant immunity against claims of intentional commingling and fraudulent 
substitution of conventional for organic produce would neither bolster national standards 
nor enhance consumer confidence, but might instead cause consumers to avoid paying 
organic premiums ―upon realizing preemption grants organic producers a de facto license 
to violate state fraud, consumer protection, and false advertising laws with relative 
impunity . . . .‖  (Aurora Dairy, supra, 621 F.3d at p. 799; see Segedie v. Hain Celestial 
Group, Inc., supra, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 60739, at pp. *14–*15 [state fraud claims in 
fact promote a consistent national organic standard].) 
26 
 
Herb Thyme further contends permitting this suit to proceed would interfere with 
the exclusive role granted the USDA, state Department of Agriculture, and certifying 
agents to ensure compliance with national standards.  But while the Organic Foods Act 
surely gives these entities a leading role in monitoring grower behavior, nothing in the 
text of the act or its evident purposes suggests Congress intended that role to be 
exclusive.  As discussed in the context of express preemption, the enforcement 
framework established by the act does not use the language of exclusivity.  (Ante, pp. 10–
11.)  The Court of Appeal noted the omission of a federal private right of action as a basis 
for inferring exclusivity, but the United States Supreme Court and this court have often 
explained that such an omission does not demonstrate Congress was opposed to 
enforcement under state law, and indeed sometimes may support the contrary inference, 
that preemption of state law claims was not intended.  (Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, supra, 
518 U.S. at p. 487 (plur. opn. of Stevens, J.) [the omission of a federal private right of 
action makes less plausible the inference that Congress intended the preemption of state 
remedies]; see Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 448; Rose v. Bank 
of America, N.A. (2013) 57 Cal.4th 390, 395–398; Farm Raised Salmon Cases, supra, 42 
Cal.4th at pp. 1095–1099.) 
More generally, the overarching legislative scheme is difficult to reconcile with 
Herb Thyme‘s contention that Congress intended only ―one expert umpire‖ to have a say.  
The regulatory regime the Organic Foods Act establishes is unlike that under, for 
instance, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, where a single federal agency 
centrally regulates the dissemination of pharmaceuticals and tightly controls the exact 
wording of the disclosures that go with them.  (21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.; see PLIVA, Inc. v. 
Mensing, supra, 564 U.S. at p. ___ [180 L.Ed.2d at pp. 588–591, 131 S.Ct. at pp. 2574–
2576].)  The Organic Foods Act and its implementing regulations set guidelines, but 
every certified grower has its own individual production plan, and responsibility for 
approval of that plan and subsequent enforcement of compliance with it is widely 
27 
 
distributed among local and state officials and certifying agents.  (7 U.S.C. §§ 6513–
6515; see Food & Agr. Code, §§ 46000–46029 [splitting enforcement among the 
Secretary of the Department of Food and Agriculture and 58 county agricultural 
commissioners]; Health & Saf. Code, §§ 110810–110959 [same].)  In California alone, 
there are currently more than 30 different active private certifying agents; nationally, 
there are nearly 80.9  Given this underlying model, there is little reason to think Congress 
would have viewed private suits aimed at fraudulent substitutions as a hindrance rather 
than a help.  (Segedie v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc., supra, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 60739, 
at pp. *14–*16; see Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, supra, 544 U.S. at pp. 451–452 
[dismissing the concern that varying outcomes in state suits would be anathema to 
uniform national labeling requirements and finding no preemption].) 
Herb Thyme expresses concern that absent preemption of Quesada‘s false 
advertising and unfair competition claims, whether its produce is organic would be 
evaluated by a lay jury applying a nebulous ―reasonable consumer‖ standard.  However, 
these claims are decided by a judge, not a jury.  (Hodge v. Superior Court (2006) 145 
Cal.App.4th 278, 284–285; People v. Witzerman (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 169, 176–177.)  
Moreover, given the express preemption of state standards for what qualifies as organic, a 
judge necessarily would decide whether Herb Thyme‘s produce is organic using the 
standards of the Organic Foods Act and its implementing regulations, as fully 
incorporated into state law.  (See 7 U.S.C. § 6505(a)(1); Food & Agr. Code, § 46002; 
Health & Saf. Code, § 110820.) 
Alternatively, Herb Thyme contends that the only permitted avenue for consumers 
to challenge organic mislabeling is through a complaint to the USDA, state Department 
of Food and Agriculture, or certifying agent, followed by an administrative appeal and, 
                                              
9  
The USDA maintains on its Web site a list of all certifying agents, subdivided by 
state.  (See  [as of Dec. 3, 2015].) 
28 
 
ultimately, appeal to a United States District Court.  (See 7 U.S.C. § 6520.)  While it is 
true citizens may lodge complaints with state or federal officials when they suspect 
grower misconduct (65 Fed.Reg. 80627 (Dec. 21, 2000); Food & Agr. Code, § 46004, 
subd. (a); Health & Saf. Code, § 110940, subd. (a); 3 Cal. Code Regs., § 1391.3, 
subd. (a)), the appeal procedures Herb Thyme points to are expressly available only to 
―[p]ersons subject to the Act‖ (7 C.F.R. § 205.680 (2015); accord, 3 Cal. Code Regs., 
§ 1391.5, subd. (b))—certified growers and agents—as well as unsuccessful applicants 
for certification (7 C.F.R. § 205.681(a) (2015); see 3 Cal. Code Regs., § 1391.5, subd. 
(b)).  Consumers appear to have no standing to pursue those remedies.  Nothing in the 
language of the act and its regulations forecloses consumers from pursuing other avenues 
for redress that may actually be open to them. 
Finally, Herb Thyme argues private suits like this one interfere with its federally 
established entitlement to label and sell its herbs as organic and conflict with federal 
control over who may, and may not, use the USDA Organic label.  However, certification 
is not a grant of a right to use an organic label on all one‘s products; neither certified nor 
uncertified growers are permitted to label as organic that which has not been produced in 
accordance with an approved organic plan.   (7 U.S.C. § 6505(a)(1)(A); 7 C.F.R. 
§ 205.102 (2015).)  Certification cannot insulate from suit intentional fraud of the sort 
alleged here; these claims do not contest Herb Thyme‘s ability to do anything its federal 
certification actually permits it to do.  Federal authorization to use a particular label need 
not preempt state consumer protection suits where, as in this area, Congress was surely 
aware of the prevalence of such state suits and elected not to expressly preempt them, 
thereby leaving them in place as an effective complementary way of promoting public 
health and safety.  (See Wyeth v. Levine, supra, 555 U.S. at pp. 573–575 [rejecting a 
similar argument for preemption]; Segedie v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc., supra, 2015 
U.S. Dist. Lexis 60739, at pp. *16–*18 [in reliance on Wyeth, rejecting the same 
argument under the Organic Foods Act].) 
29 
 
In sum:  the complaint here alleges Herb Thyme has engaged in fraud by 
intentionally labeling conventionally grown herbs as organic, thereby pocketing the 
additional premiums organic produce commands.  The purposes and objectives 
underlying the Organic Foods Act do not suggest such suits are an obstacle; to the 
contrary, a core reason for the act was to create a clear standard for what production 
methods qualify as organic so that fraud could be more effectively stamped out and 
consumer confidence and fair market conditions promoted.  Nor does anything in the text 
or background of the act and its regulations indicate Congress intended remedial 
exclusivity for the enforcement mechanisms it provided.  Finding no obstacle to 
congressional purposes and objectives, we conclude the complaint here is not preempted. 
III. 
Primary Jurisdiction 
In the alternative, Herb Thyme asks us to affirm on primary jurisdiction grounds.  
(See generally Nader v. Allegheny Airlines (1976) 426 U.S. 290, 303–304; Farmers Ins. 
Exchange v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 377, 390.)  The trial court declined to rule 
formally on this argument, and the Court of Appeal did not address it.  Consequently, 
although Quesada sought review as to both preemption and primary jurisdiction, we 
limited the issues when granting review and explicitly confined ourselves to the only 
matter developed below, federal preemption.  We decline to address the applicability or 
inapplicability of the primary jurisdiction doctrine to this case, leaving it to the lower 
courts in the first instance in the event Herb Thyme chooses to pursue the argument. 
30 
 
 
DISPOSITION 
We reverse the Court of Appeal‘s judgment and remand for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J.  
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
1 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 222 Cal.App.4th 642 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S216305 
Date Filed: December 3, 2015 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Carl J. West 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Kiesel Boucher Larson, Law Office of Raymond P. Boucher, Boucher, Raymond P. Boucher, Maria L. 
Weitz; Whatley Kallas, Edith M. Kallas, Alan M. Mansfield; Public Justice, Leslie A. Brueckner; Kiesel + 
Larson, Helen Zukin; Johnson & Johnson and Neville Johnson for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Lexington Law Group, Mark N. Todzo and Howard Hirsch for Center for Food Safety and Organic 
Consumers Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Public Citizen Litigation Group, Adina H. Rosenbaum; Chavez & Gertler and Mark A. Chavez for Public 
Citizen, Inc., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Nicklas A. Akers, Assistant Attorney General, Michele Van Gelderen 
and Steven De Salvo, Deputy Attorneys General, for State of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Greenberg Traurig, Mark D. Kemple, Karin L. Bohmholdt and Angela L. Diesch for Defendant and 
Respondent. 
 
U.S. Chamber Litigation Center, Inc., Kate Comerford Todd, Tyler R. Green; Morrison & Foerster, Ruth 
N. Borenstein and William L. Stern for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Leslie A. Brueckner 
Public Justice 
555 Twelfth Street, Suite 1230 
Oakland, CA  94607 
(510) 622-8205 
 
Mark D. Kemple 
Greenberg Traurig 
1840 Century Park East, Suite 1900 
Los Angeles, CA  90067 
(310) 586-7700