Case Title: In re Disqualification of Scott

Citation: 2024-Ohio-1462

Docket Number: 24-AP-033

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2024-04-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as In re Disqualification of Scott, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2024-Ohio-1462.] 
 
 
 
IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF SCOTT. 
THE CITY OF CLEVELAND v. ST. ANTHONY CHURCH. 
[Cite as In re Disqualification of Scott, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2024-Ohio-1462.] 
Judges—Affidavits of disqualification—R.C. 2701.031—Standing—Because name 
of party in the underlying cases is a fictitious name registered and used by 
affiant, affiant is considered a party to the cases and has standing to file an 
affidavit of disqualification—Affiant failed to demonstrate bias or 
prejudice—Disqualification denied. 
(No. 24-AP-033—Decided April 4, 2024.) 
ON AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION in Cleveland Municipal Court,  
Housing Division, Case Nos. 2022-CRB-003944 and 2022-CRB-003945. 
____________ 
KENNEDY, C.J. 
{¶ 1} Albert Thrower, who avers that he is doing business as St. Anthony 
Church, the defendant in the two underlying cases, has filed an affidavit of 
disqualification pursuant to R.C. 2701.031 seeking to disqualify Judge W. Moná 
Scott of the Cleveland Municipal Court, Housing Division, from presiding over the 
cases.  Judge Scott was not asked to file a response to the affidavit of 
disqualification. 
{¶ 2} This matter presents the threshold question whether Thrower has 
standing to seek Judge Scott’s disqualification.  R.C. 2701.031 permits “any party 
to [a municipal-court] proceeding or the party’s counsel” to file an affidavit of 
disqualification against the municipal-court judge.  As explained below, because at 
the time the underlying cases were filed, St. Anthony Church was a fictitious name 
registered and used by Thrower, he is considered a party to the cases.  Therefore, 
Thrower has standing to file the affidavit of disqualification. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 3} Turning to the merits of the affidavit of disqualification, Thrower has 
not established that the judge should be disqualified.  Therefore, the affidavit of 
disqualification is denied.  The cases shall proceed before Judge Scott. 
Trial-Court Proceedings 
{¶ 4} On May 20, 2022, the city of Cleveland filed complaints against St. 
Anthony Church, charging it with misdemeanor counts of failure to comply with 
an order of the Cleveland Building Department.  At that time, Thrower had 
registered “St. Anthony Church” as a fictitious name with the Ohio secretary of 
state.  The fictitious-name registration expired November 15, 2022, because 
Thrower had failed to file a renewal application.  On December 22, 2022, Thrower 
filed articles of incorporation with the secretary of state for St. Anthony Church, 
Inc. 
{¶ 5} On March 29, 2023, Thrower pleaded no contest to the charges on 
behalf of St. Anthony Church.  Thrower had filed a corporate authorization with 
the court, and he told the judge that he was St. Anthony Church’s sole shareholder 
and principal agent.  The judge noted that St. Anthony Church was “an organization 
LLC or entity,” and Thrower was referred to as the “Defendant representative” and 
“Defense representative.”  The judge was also informed that St. Anthony Church 
was “currently registered with the Ohio Secretary of State.”  Judge Scott found the 
defendant guilty and later imposed community-control sanctions. 
{¶ 6} On January 11, 2024, Judge Scott held a status hearing, for which 
Thrower appeared by Zoom.  At the beginning of the hearing, the following 
exchange occurred between Judge Scott and Thrower: 
 
[Judge Scott]: Mr. Thrower, are you in a room by yourself?  
Can you take off the—you got to unmute yourself.  And then, good 
morning, Attorney Sheehan. 
[Attorney Sheehan]: Good morning, Your Honor. 
January Term, 2024 
3 
 
[Judge Scott]: Mr. Thrower, are you in a room by yourself? 
[Thrower]: Yes. 
[Judge Scott]: Okay.  Do you want to take off the mask while 
you’re in there— 
[Thrower]: Oh, Okay. 
[Judge Scott]:—virtually?  I believe we’re pretty safe in here 
in our own virtual—thanks. 
That being said, we are here for a status update on two cases.  
We’ll hear from [the housing-court specialist] with the status update, 
and then we will hear from Mr. Thrower on behalf of St. Anthony 
Church and his counsel of record, Attorney Sheehan. 
 
{¶ 7} The housing-court specialist stated that St. Anthony Church had 
complied with some, but not all, of the community-control conditions.  Judge Scott 
then asked Thrower, on behalf of St. Anthony Church, questions related to the 
housing-court specialist’s report.  At the end of the hearing, the judge continued the 
cases for another status hearing. 
{¶ 8} On March 13, Thrower filed this affidavit of disqualification.  The 
affidavit refers to the affiant as “Albert Thrower DBA St Anthony Church expired 
DBA.”  It also refers to “St Anthony Church-Defendant-expired DBA owned by 
Albert Thrower.”  Thrower signed the affidavit as “Albert Thrower for self/expired 
DBA.”  (Underlining sic.) 
{¶ 9} Because the question of standing asks whether a particular individual 
is entitled to have a court hear a controversy, a threshold issue is whether Thrower 
is qualified pursuant to R.C. 2701.031 to file an affidavit of disqualification against 
Judge Scott. 
 
 
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Standing to File an Affidavit of Disqualification 
{¶ 10} Standing to file an affidavit of disqualification is conferred by 
statute.  See In re Disqualification of Gallagher, 173 Ohio St.3d 1201, 2023-Ohio-
2977, 228 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 26.  R.C. 2701.031 provides that “[i]f a judge of a municipal 
or county court allegedly is interested in a proceeding pending before the judge, 
allegedly is related to or has a bias or prejudice for or against a party to a proceeding 
pending before the judge or to a party’s counsel, or allegedly otherwise is 
disqualified to preside in a proceeding pending before the judge, any party to the 
proceeding or the party’s counsel may file an affidavit of disqualification with the 
clerk of the supreme court.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 11} Under this plain and unambiguous language, only a “party to the 
proceeding or the party’s counsel” may file an affidavit of disqualification.  Id.  
Chief justices “have ‘strictly enforced’ this statutory language and have 
consistently found that ‘individuals who do not qualify as a “party” or “party’s 
counsel” do not have standing to file an affidavit of disqualification.’ ”  Gallagher 
at ¶ 26, quoting In re Disqualification of Grendell, 137 Ohio St.3d 1220, 2013-
Ohio-5243, 999 N.E.2d 681, ¶ 2; see also In re Disqualification of Leach, 173 Ohio 
St.3d 1252, 2023-Ohio-4776, 229 N.E.3d 1233.  For purposes of R.C. 2701.031, a 
“party’s counsel” includes counsel of record in the underlying case from which the 
judge’s disqualification is sought or an attorney retained by a party in the 
underlying case to file an affidavit of disqualification in this court.  See Gallagher 
at ¶ 29-34. 
{¶ 12} In the affidavit of disqualification, Thrower describes himself as 
“DBA St Anthony Church expired DBA” and indicates that St. Anthony Church is 
an “expired DBA owned by Albert Thrower.”  “D.b.a.” means “[d]oing business 
as” and usually precedes a person’s or business’s assumed name.  Black’s Law 
Dictionary 499 (11th Ed.2019).  The use of “d.b.a.” often “signals to a consumer 
that a person or company is doing business under a fictious name.”  Perk v. 
January Term, 2024 
5 
 
Tomorrows Home Solutions, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107012, 2019-Ohio-103, 
¶ 19. 
{¶ 13} “ ‘Fictitious name’ means a name used in business or trade that is 
fictitious and that the user has not registered or is not entitled to register as a trade 
name.  It does not include the name of record of any domestic corporation that is 
formed under Chapter 1701 or 1702 of the Revised Code.”  R.C. 1329.01(A)(2).  
R.C. 1329.01(D) provides, in relevant part: 
 
Any person who does business under a fictitious name and 
who has not registered and does not wish to register the fictitious 
name as a trade name or who cannot do so because the name is not 
available for registration shall report the use of the fictitious name 
to the secretary of state, on a form prescribed by the secretary of 
state, setting forth all of the following: 
(1) The name and business address of the user * * *: 
(2) The fictitious name being used; 
(3) The general nature of the business conducted by the user. 
 
As noted above, Thrower reported the use of the fictitious name “St. Anthony 
Church” to the secretary of state. 
{¶ 14} Doing business under a fictitious name does not create an entity 
distinct from the person operating the business or entity.  See, e.g., Patterson v. 
V&M Auto Body, 63 Ohio St.3d 573, 575, 589 N.E.2d 1306 (1992), quoting Duval 
v. Midwest Auto City, Inc., 425 F.Supp. 1381, 1387 (D.Neb.1977) (a sole 
proprietorship doing business under a fictitious name “ ‘does not create an entity 
distinct from the person operating the business’ ”); Perk at ¶ 19.  “ ‘The individual 
who does business as a sole proprietor under one or several names remains one 
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person, personally liable for all his obligations.’ ”  Patterson at 575, quoting Duval 
at 1387. 
{¶ 15} At the time the complaints were filed against St. Anthony Church, 
St. Anthony Church was a fictitious name that Thrower used for business.  And 
because St. Anthony Church was merely a fictitious name, there was no legal 
distinction between Thrower and St. Anthony Church.  See LexisNexis, a Div. of 
RELX, Inc. v. Moreau-Davila, 2017-Ohio-6998, 95 N.E.3d 674, ¶ 58 (2d Dist.); 
Woods v. Marcano, 2018-Ohio-4324, 122 N.E.3d 633, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.).  Thrower 
was the party against whom the complaints were filed in May 2022, and he 
therefore is a party to the underlying proceedings. 
{¶ 16} Moreover, in affidavit-of-disqualification proceedings, “a ‘party’ is 
defined as ‘[o]ne by or against whom a lawsuit is brought; anyone who both is 
directly interested in a lawsuit and has a right to control the proceedings, make a 
defense, or appeal from an adverse judgment.’ ”  In re Disqualification of 
Berhalter, 173 Ohio St.3d 1255, 2023-Ohio-4881, 229 N.E.3d 1235, ¶ 21, quoting 
Black’s at 1350-1351.  Thrower submitted transcripts of two hearings in the 
underlying cases.  A review of those transcripts makes clear that he is directly 
interested in the action and has the right to control the proceedings.  Thrower was 
referred to as the defendant’s representative, he entered pleas on behalf of St. 
Anthony Church, and he had to answer for the defendant’s purported violations of 
community-control conditions. 
{¶ 17} Based on this record, Thrower is considered a “party to the 
proceeding[s]” pursuant to R.C. 2701.031 for purposes of filing an affidavit of 
disqualification. Therefore, Thrower has standing to file an affidavit of 
disqualification.  This decision will now turn to the allegation in the affidavit of 
disqualification. 
 
 
January Term, 2024 
7 
 
Affidavit-of-Disqualification Proceedings 
{¶ 18} R.C. 2701.031 provides that if a judge of a municipal court 
“allegedly is interested in a proceeding pending before the judge, allegedly is 
related to or has a bias or prejudice for or against a party to a proceeding pending 
before the judge or to a party’s counsel, or allegedly otherwise is disqualified to 
preside in a proceeding pending before the judge,” then a party to the proceeding 
or the party’s counsel may file an affidavit of disqualification with the clerk of this 
court. 
{¶ 19} Thrower alleges that Judge Scott is biased and prejudiced against 
him.  In support of the allegation, Thrower states that the judge “ordered [him] to 
remove his mask when he was appearing on Zoom” for the January 11 hearing.  
Because he previously had cancer, Thrower claims that the judge’s order 
endangered his health and exposed him to risks associated with COVID-19 and 
influenza. 
Disqualification of a Municipal-Court Judge 
{¶ 20} As set forth above, R.C. 2701.031 provides two specific grounds and 
a catchall provision for the disqualification of a municipal-court judge.  Granting 
or denying the affidavit of disqualification turns on whether the chief justice 
determines that the allegations of interest, bias, prejudice, or disqualification 
alleged in the affidavit exist.  R.C. 2701.031 and 2701.03(E). 
{¶ 21} The burden falls on the affiant to submit “specific allegations on 
which the claim of interest, bias, prejudice, or disqualification is based and the facts 
to support each of those allegations.”  R.C. 2701.03(B)(1).  Therefore, “[a]n 
affidavit must describe with specificity and particularity those facts alleged to 
support the claim.”  In re Disqualification of Mitrovich, 101 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-
Ohio-7358, 803 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 4. 
{¶ 22} Thrower alleges one basis for the disqualification of Judge Scott: the 
judge is biased and prejudiced against him. 
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{¶ 23} “The term ‘bias or prejudice’ ‘implies a hostile feeling or spirit of 
ill-will or undue friendship or favoritism toward one of the litigants or his attorney, 
with the formation of a fixed anticipatory judgment on the part of the judge, as 
contradistinguished from an open state of mind which will be governed by the law 
and the facts.’ ”  In re Disqualification of O’Neill, 100 Ohio St.3d 1232, 2002-Ohio-
7479, 798 N.E.2d 17, ¶ 14, quoting State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt, 164 Ohio St. 
463, 132 N.E.2d 191 (1956), paragraph four of the syllabus.  “ ‘Bias or prejudice 
on the part of a judge will not be presumed.  In fact, the law presumes that a judge 
is unbiased and unprejudiced in the matters over which he presides, and bias or 
prejudice must be strong enough to overcome the presumption of his integrity.’ ”  
Id. at ¶ 16, quoting 48A Corpus Juris Secundum, Judges, Section 108, at 731 
(1981).  A determination of whether a judge is biased or prejudiced is based on the 
judge’s words and/or actions and whether they convey that the judge is predisposed 
to an outcome of a case. 
Analysis 
{¶ 24} Thrower has not established that Judge Scott’s disqualification is 
warranted. 
{¶ 25} Contrary to Thrower’s contention, Judge Scott did not order him to 
remove his mask during the January 11 hearing.  The judge asked whether he was 
in a room by himself and whether he wanted to remove his mask.  He replied, “Oh, 
Okay.”  The judge merely asked an open-ended question; it was not a directive.  
Thrower did not inform the judge in response that he was uncomfortable with 
removing the mask due to any potential health risks.  This brief interaction between 
the judge and Thrower does not support a finding that Judge Scott has hostile 
feelings or ill will toward Thrower or that the judge has formed a fixed anticipatory 
judgment on any remaining issue in the underlying cases. 
{¶ 26} Therefore, this allegation lacks merit. 
 
January Term, 2024 
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Conclusion 
{¶ 27} The affidavit of disqualification is denied.  The cases shall proceed 
before Judge Scott. 
________________________