Case Title: In re Phyllis P.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84026

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1998-05-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Phyllis P., No. 84026 (5/21/98) 
 
              Docket No. 84026--Agenda 9--March 1998. 
     In re PHYLLIS P. et al. (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. 
                  Phyllis P. et al., Appellants). 
                    Opinion filed May 21, 1998. 
 
          JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court: 
          At issue is whether a respondent may dismiss his appeal from an order 
     requiring him to submit to involuntary mental health treatment without first filing 
     an affidavit from a medical doctor attesting to his competency. Respondents 
     Phyllis P., Phuong T., and Ande F. moved to dismiss their appeals after their 
     Illinois Guardianship and Advocacy Commission (GAC) attorneys explained the 
     appellate process to them, the likelihood of succeeding on their appeals, and the 
     consequences of dismissing their appeals. The appellate court denied the motions 
     without prejudice, provided that, upon refiling, the respondents attach a medical 
     doctor's affidavit attesting that the respondents were competent to dismiss their 
     appeals. The appellate court further instructed the GAC to file these affidavits in 
     all future cases. Nos. 2--97--0503, 2--97--0171, 2--97--0113 cons. The appellate 
     court granted a motion for a certificate of importance on the question of medical 
     doctor affidavits, and this court allowed the appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 316. 
          Initially, we note that all adults are presumed legally competent to direct 
     their legal affairs. People ex rel. Drury v. Catholic Home Bureau,  34 Ill. 2d 84 , 
     95 (1966). This presumption extends to the right afforded all appellants to dismiss 
     their appeals. Vincent v. McElvain, 304 Ill. 160, 163 (1922). Although all three of 
     the instant respondents were adjudicated mentally ill pursuant to either section 1-- 
     119 or section 2--107.1 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities 
     Code, they nevertheless enjoy a presumption of competency to direct their legal 
     affairs. As the Mental Health Code explicitly provides, "[n]o recipient of services 
     shall be presumed legally disabled ***." 405 ILCS 5/2--101 (West 1996). 
     Underlying this presumption is the distinction between mental illness and the 
     specific decisional capacity to exercise or waive legal rights. Indeed, the 
     presumption of legal competency notwithstanding mental illness attaches even in 
     the criminal context. See People v. Eddmonds,  143 Ill. 2d 501 , 519 (1991) (mental 
     illness does not, ipso facto, raise a bona fide doubt as to defendant's fitness to 
     stand trial). Requiring the instant respondents to file a medical doctor's affidavit 
     before they may dismiss their appeals is contrary to the competency presumption 
     to which they are entitled. 
          Furthermore, the affidavit requirement imposed by the appellate court is 
     inconsistent with provisions of the Mental Health Code. For example, respondents 
     to involuntary commitment actions are entitled to have a jury determine whether 
     they are mentally ill (405 ILCS 5/3--802 (West 1996)), but may waive this right 
     without first establishing their competence to do so. As this court has previously 
     held, where a trial court has implicitly found that a respondent had the capacity 
     to waive the right to a jury trial, as with the instant respondents, there is a strong 
     indication that the respondent is competent to waive the right to appeal. People 
     v. Owens,  139 Ill. 2d 351  (1990). 
          Finally, we note that the doctor affidavit requirement is inconsistent with 
     the common law rule that the opinion of a medical doctor is entitled to no greater 
     weight than that of a lay person, especially that of a respondent's lawyer, in 
     determining whether respondent is competent to make legal decisions. Tyler v. 
     Tyler, 401 Ill. 435, 441 (1948). Here the GAC attorneys worked directly with the 
     respondents and were in a unique position to apprise the court of any concerns 
     regarding respondents' capacity to knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently decide 
     to dismiss their appeals. That the GAC lawyers did not do so supports the 
     presumption that respondents were competent to so. 
          In conclusion, an adjudication of mental illness is not an adjudication of 
     incompetence to direct one's legal affairs. The appellate court's medical doctor 
     affidavit requirement is inconsistent with the common law presumption of legal 
     competency, the Mental Health Code as a whole, and the common law rule that 
     a lay person's opinion as to a respondent's capacity to make legal decisions is 
     entitled to as much weight as that of a medical practitioner. Accordingly, we 
     reverse the appellate court's orders in this case and remand to that court for 
     proceedings in accordance with our opinion herein. 
 
     Reversed and remanded.