Case Title: Tadday v. National Aviation Underwriters

Citation: 

Docket Number: 5741

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-03-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Tadday v. National Aviation Underwriters1983 WY 26660 P.2d 1148Case Number: 5741Case Number: 5741Decided: 03/17/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
SHERIDAN NEWSPAPERS, 
INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

CITY OF SHERIDAN, AND ROGER F. 
KROUT, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

CITY OF SHERIDAN, AND ROGER F. 
KROUT, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS),

v.

SHERIDAN NEWSPAPERS, 
INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF). 

Appeal from the District 
Court, SheridanCounty, Leonard McEwan, 
J.

ARE NOT AN 
OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] 

Lawrence A. 
Yonkee of Redle, Yonkee & Arney, Sheridan, for appellant in Case No. 5724 and appellee 
in Case No. 5725.

Duane C. 
Buchholz, Asst. City Atty., Sheridan, for appellees in Case No. 5724 and 
appellants in Case No. 5725.

Before ROONEY, C.J.,* and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE** and BROWN, 
JJ.

* Became Chief Justice on 
January 1, 1983.

** Chief Justice 
at time of oral argument.

ROSE, Justice.

[¶1.]     The appellant Sheridan 
Newspapers, Inc., publisher of the Sheridan Press newspaper, brought this action 
to gain access to certain categories of records maintained by the Sheridan police 
department. The trial judge entered an order from which Sheridan Newspapers, 
Inc. appeals in Case No. 5724, and from which the City of Sheridan appeals in 
Case No. 5725. We will reverse in 5724 and affirm in 5725.

[¶2.]     Since July 31, 1981, 
the chief of police of Sheridan has denied the 
Sheridan Press and other news-disseminating agencies the right to inspect 
certain kinds of records maintained by the Sheridan police department, and particularly 
the "rolling log" and "case reports." In lieu of press inspection, members of 
the police department have held press conferences and furnished representatives 
of the press with news releases prepared by the detectives.1 This method of news dissemination 
is unacceptable to the press.

[¶3.]     In this appeal the 
newspaper contends that it has a statutory right2 and constitutional rights3 of routine access to the rolling 
log and police case reports. The appellant newspaper concedes that these rights 
are qualified by the discretion authority of the chief of police, as custodian 
of the controversial records, to deny disclosure of particular documents or 
information contained within given records or categories of records on a 
case-by-case or document-by-document basis when disclosure of such information 
would be in violation of the statute4 and therefore contrary to the 
public interest.5 The Wyoming Public Records Act 
provides that the custodian must, if requested by the applicant, furnish a 
statement containing grounds for denial of access,6 and any person denied the right of 
access may apply to the district court for an order directing the custodian of 
the record to show cause why inspection should not be permitted.7 In this case, the chief of police 
did not furnish any factual basis or reasons for closing the records when 
responding to the appellant newspaper's request for explanation for 
closure.

ROLLING LOG

[¶4.]     The rolling log, which 
is also referred to as the "daily log," is prepared by the police dispatchers 
and can be described as a chronological index of all reports and complaints 
received by the department; in other words, it is any information that callers 
report to the dispatcher over the telephone. The rolling log typically contains 
one line of information concerning each subject reported to the department. The 
dispatcher receiving a call records a case number, type of case, a brief 
description of the event, the name of the person reporting the matter and the 
name of the officer assigned to the case. These entries are not verified and are 
used by the department as an index.

[¶5.]     In testifying about the 
rolling log, the chief of police acknowledged that this form of document 
contained no information obtained as a result of investigation.8

CASE REPORT

[¶6.]     The term "case report" 
speaks of information recorded on a form on which is entered data relating to 
various sorts of police activity. A case report may detail a matter from 
complaint, through investigation, to arrest. It may, on the other hand, record a 
situation in which police have checked out a tip from an anonymous caller to 
which no further attention is given, no culpable party discovered, no arrest 
made, and with no further communications from the initial complainant.9

[¶7.]     It is conceded by the 
newspaper that the case reports may contain material obtained as a result of 
investigation. It is the press' contention that even if this is so, the 
custodian has no resulting authority to invoke a blanket withdrawal of this 
class of record without exercising his discretion on a case-by-case or 
document-by-document basis within the parameters of his statutory 
limitations.

TRIAL COURT'S 
HOLDING

[¶8.]     The trial court found 
that the rolling log and case reports are public records. The court further 
decided that members of the public (which of course includes the press)10 have a right to inspect "jail 
logs," traffic accident reports, and complaints and citations issued. The trial 
judge went on to hold, however, that the custodian of the police records may 
properly deny public access to the police rolling log and case reports and that 
plaintiff newspaper and the public do not have a constitutional or statutory 
right of access to inspect these categories of police records.

CONTENTION OF THE 
PARTIES

[¶9.]     Both parties have 
appealed. In Case No. 5724, Sheridan Newspapers, Inc. contends that blanket 
closure of the rolling-log and case-report categories of police records is 
unlawful in that appellant has a statutory and constitutional right to routinely 
inspect those records, subject to the police chief's right of withdrawal in 
instances where the inspection is prohibited by court rule or order (e.g., § 
9-9-103(a)(iii), supra) - or where it can be shown that disclosure of the 
disputed record is investigatory in character as contemplated by § 
9-9-103(b)(i), supra,11 and that disclosure would 
therefore be contrary to the public interest. The press goes on to contend that 
in this case the records custodian did not show any valid and legally acceptable 
reasons why the questioned categories of records should or could be 
withdrawn.

[¶10.]  In Case No. 5725, the City of Sheridan appeals from the 
part of the judgment which, it alleges, restricts the closure authority of the 
chief of police. The aspects of the judgment to which it objects are those which 
it says engraft upon the Wyoming Public Records Act additional requirements 
which must be met by the record custodian before he may exercise his discretion 
to deny the plaintiff or the public the right to inspect these records. In the 
City's language, objections are made to these following alleged additional 
requirements which are contained in the judgment:

"(1) any exclusion must 
be on a `case-by-case basis', and

"(2) `such exclusion 
shall be only on a very limited basis', and

"(3) `only upon 
extraordinary circumstances', and

"(4) `for good cause 
shown', and

"(5) `then only for such 
limited time as may be necessary.'"12

ISSUES FOR DECISION IN 
CASE NO. 5724

[¶11.]  Summarized, the main questions in this 
appeal where Sheridan Newspapers, Inc. is appellant may be said to be these: 

1. How is the Public 
Records Act to be construed with respect to police records?

2. What, if any, 
authority do the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution and 
Article 1, Sections 20 and 6 of the Wyoming Constitution give the press to have 
access to the records of law enforcement agencies?

The Law

The Court's Historical 
Disclosure Position

[¶12.]  In Laramie River Conservation Council v. 
Dinger, Wyo., 567 P.2d 731, 733 (1977), we 
compared Wyoming's Public Records Act with the Federal 
Freedom of Information Act and said:

"The policy and dominant 
object of the Freedom of Information Act is on disclosure, not 
secrecy."

We went on to 
say:

"* * * We hold that 
analysis to be applicable to Wyoming's Public Records Act."

[¶13.]  This holding is but another pronouncement 
from this court having to do with making the public's business available to the 
public whenever that is possible. The courts, legislature, administrative 
agencies, and the state, county and municipal governments should be ever mindful 
that theirs is public business and the public has a right to know how its 
servants are conducting its business. Furthermore, it is for government to 
remember that the written, viewing and broadcasting press are the eyes and ears 
of the people. The citizenry must be permitted to hear and see what public 
officers and their employees say and do whenever the imparting of this knowledge 
does not run contrary to the rights of those otherwise protected in a way that 
would result in disclosure having the effect of inflicting such irreparable harm 
as is recognized at law.

[¶14.]  It was in this vein that we addressed a 
court-closure issue in Williams v. 
Stafford, Wyo., 589 P.2d 322, 325 (1979), when we said:

"There is almost 
universal agreement among the courts, which have considered the right-of-access 
issue, that access to court proceedings should be limited only in exceptional 
circumstances. See Gannett Pacific Corp. 
v. Richardson, supra; Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome 
[478 Pa. 484, 
387 A.2d 425 (1978)], supra; and Keene 
Publishing v. Keene District Court, [117] N.H. [959], 380 A.2d 261 (1977). 
The reason for requiring all court proceedings to be open, except where 
extraordinary reasons for closure are present, is to enhance the public trust 
and confidence in the judicial process, and to insulate the process against 
attempts to use the courts as tools for persecution. Gannett Pacific Corp. v. Richardson, 
supra."

[¶15.]  The justices of this court, in line with 
the concept of maximum disclosure, have recently opened the Wyoming Supreme 
Court to television coverage so that the people may better see and understand 
the judicial system.

[¶16.]  In Record-Times, Inc. v. Town of Wheatland, 
Wyo., 650 P.2d 297 (1982), when addressing the meaning of a statute which speaks 
to the municipalities' obligation to publish the towns' bills, this court 
concerned itself with the subject of public disclosure of the people's business 
when we held that the intent of the legislature was - and the applicable statute 
required - that the town publish the individual salaries of its employees.13 In the Record-Times opinion we 
said:

"* * * [U]nderlying the 
main issue in this case is the question of public access to public information. 
* * * [W]e are certain that the intent of the legislature in enacting § 15-1-110 
was to insure that the business of each municipality in Wyoming would be subject 
to public scrutiny with respect to the expenditure of funds for all acquired 
debts. The legislature has on several 
occasions expressed the need for maintaining an open and accountable government. 
Examples of this intention are the enactment of the Public Records Act (§§ 
9-9-101 to 9-9-105, W.S. 1977, 1982 Cum.Supp.) and the open meetings statutes 
(§§ 9-11-101 to 9-11-107, W.S. 1977). We said in Laramie River Conservation Council v. 
Dinger, Wyo., 567 P.2d 731, 734 (1977):

"`* * * Confrontation has 
a salutary effect and causes those in positions of public responsibility to 
practice thoughtfulness and wisdom in their utterances and carefully weigh their 
decisions. Paraphrased from Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, [410 U.S. 73, 93 S. Ct. 827, 35 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1973)] supra, such disclosure acts are broadly 
conceived to permit access to information long shielded unnecessarily from 
public view and create judicially enforceable rights to secure information from 
possibly unwilling hands. The disclosure acts promote within the agencies 
affected a sensitiveness to the needs of the public and make democratic 
government function in a modern society. With some necessary exceptions, 
recognized by Wyoming's records and meetings acts, state 
agencies must act in a fishbowl. * * *'" (Emphasis and bracketed matter added.) 
650 P.2d  at 300-301.

In the Record-Times, Inc. opinion we went on to 
say:

"* * * The reason for 
openness and accountability in all phases of government cannot be stated any 
better than it was in Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 100 S. Ct. 2814, 65 L. Ed. 2d 973 
(1980):

"`People in an open 
society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult 
for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing.' 448 U.S.  at 572, 100 S. Ct.  at 2825.'" 650 P.2d  at 301.

The Issues of This 
Case

[¶17.]  We come then to the question which asks 
whether the trial court acted properly when it decided that the press has no 
statutory or constitutional right to routinely inspect the City of Sheridan's 
police rolling log and case reports.

[¶18.]  Where the Wyoming Public Records Act 
statutes restrict (for purposes of the facts of this case) withdrawal to those 
circumstances where disclosure of investigatory documents would not be in the 
public interest under § 9-9-103(b)(i), it seems that the triggering of the 
custodian's withdrawal of the rolling log and case reports had little if 
anything to do with investigatory considerations. The record would suggest that 
the reason for withdrawal of the two questioned categories of police records 
from press inquiry found its origin in reaction to public and reporter 
irritation rather than investigatory concerns. Public criticism, together with 
the violation by the reporters of some of the police department's news-gathering 
rules, bothered the chief of police, and the result was his withdrawal of such 
police records as are at issue here. The chief gave the following as an example 
of news items with respect to which he has objection:

"Sharon Busby, 458 Park, 
had a shocking experience instead of an intended nap late Wednesday afternoon. 
She had been resting when she heard a noise outside her home. She ran to her 
front porch, and was greeted by a man who stood yelling obscenities at her while 
he relieved himself on her front steps. He zipped up and drove off with a male 
companion in a Sheridan pickup while Busby called the police. 
Neither of the men were found."

The city 
attorney disapproved of an item appearing in the Sheridan Press which was 
referred to in the evidence as the "Capillupo Story." It read:

"Connie Capillupo must 
not have been pleased when she returned to her home at 556 N. Gould Saturday 
afternoon. She had left for a few hours, and returned to find someone had made 
himself at home, apparently fixing something to eat and napping on the couch 
before sleeping - and wetting - in her bed. The culprit left behind a pair of 
boots."

[¶19.]  Chief of Police Krout was offended by 
stories appearing in the press concerning a Mr. Showers and a Mr. Washut. The 
Showers item read as follows:

"Paul J. Showers, Jr., 
was jailed late Sunday night on disorderly conduct and open container charges. 
Reportedly, Showers fell asleep in the Centennial Theater, 36 E. Alger, during a 
movie, and could not be roused until police were called. A half-full bottle of 
beer was reportedly found in the seat with Showers."

[¶20.]  The chief objected to the Washut story 
because the Sheridan Press reporter had authored a story from the jail log which 
contained information that had not been disclosed through the news release 
prepared by the department detectives. The department news release read as 
follows:

"A vehicle driven by 
Stephen Washut, Sheridan, struck a parked vehicle belonging to 
Richard Loeber in the 1600 block of DeSmet at 11:08 p.m. on Saturday. One 
citation issued."

[¶21.]  The incident was reported in the Sheridan 
Press as follows:

"Stephen T. Washut was 
arrested for driving while under the influence of intoxicating beverages at 
11:23 Saturday night after Washut reportedly struck a parked vehicle belonging 
to Richard Loeber in the 1600 block of DeSmet."

The Washut 
incident provided the incentive for the chief's denial of access to the jail 
log, even though he was forced to admit that the news report was accurate. 
However, he closed the jail log because the news report was at variance with the 
prepared news release. His further reason for invoking his closure policy was 
that he wanted to protect the privacy of individuals who are arrested by the 
police department. He pointed out as an example of his concern the fact that Mr. 
Washut was never convicted of the charge of driving while under the 
influence.

[¶22.]  These news stories and an incident 
involving another reporter provided the impetus for blanket closure of the 
Sheridan police 
records. Krout explained:

"One reporter was caught 
several times in the detectives office when no one was present or after closing 
hours and was reading cases."

He went on to 
say that one of the reasons for closing all records was to prevent the offending 
reporter from breaking the rules and procedures of the department.

Statutory 
Construction

[¶23.]  In interpreting statutes relating to 
public access to public records generally - including police records - the 
applicable rule is that these statutes should be construed liberally. It is said 
in Annot., 82 A.L.R.3d 19, 42, Validity, Construction, and Application of 
Statutory Provisions Relating to Public Access to Police Records:

"Referring to a statute 
providing that public records should be open for inspection at all reasonable 
times, it was held that doubt should be resolved in favor of disclosure of 
records held by governmental units, in Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Dayton (1976) 
45 Ohio St.2d 107, 74 Ohio Ops 2d 209, 341 N.E.2d 576. The court said that, 
aside from the exceptions to disclosure mentioned in the statute, records should 
be available to the public unless 
[emphasis in text] the custodian of such 
records can show a legal prohibition to disclosure. [Emphasis 
added.]"

[¶24.]  As noted above, in assigning the same 
legislative intent to the Wyoming Public Records Act as is found characteristic 
of the Federal Freedom of Information Act, we said in Laramie River Conservation Council v. 
Dinger, supra:

"The policy and dominant 
object of the Freedom of Information Act is on disclosure, not secrecy. Exemptions, therefore, are to be construed 
narrowly. Department of Air Force v. 
Rose, 1976, 425 U.S. 352, 96 S. Ct. 1592, 1599, 48 L. Ed. 2d 11; National Labor Relations Board v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 1975, 421 U.S. 132, 95 S. Ct. 1504, 44 L. Ed. 2d 29; Renegotiation Board v. Grumman Aircraft 
Engineering Corporation, 1975, 421 U.S. 168, 95 S. Ct. 1491, 44 L. Ed. 2d 57; 
and Environmental Protection Agency v. 
Mink, 1973, 410 U.S. 73, 93 S. Ct. 827, 35 L. Ed. 2d 119. We hold that analysis 
to be applicable to Wyoming's Public Records Act." (Emphasis 
added.) 567 P.2d  at 733.

In this appeal, 
the Wyoming Public Records Act will, in accord with our holding in the Laramie 
River Conservation Council case, receive a liberal construction in favor of 
disclosure and against withholding, and "exemptions" will be "construed 
narrowly." Additionally, we recognize the appropriate rule of law to be that 
police records should be available to the public except in those instances where 
the custodian "can show a legal prohibition to disclosure," Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Dayton, 45 
Ohio St.2d 107, 74 Op.2d 209, 341 N.E.2d 576 (1976), and see § 9-9-103(a)(iii) 
and (b)(i), supra n. 5.

Constitutional 
Rights

[¶25.]  The Sheridan Press has a constitutional 
right to the disputed material under the applicable freedom-of-the-press and 
due-process provisions of the federal and state constitutions. (See n. 3, 
supra.) This right is qualified by the Wyoming statutes which provide that the 
records, or portions thereof, may be withdrawn when the statute or a court 
directs withdrawal or where the disputed materials are investigatory as 
described by statute and the custodian finds withdrawal to be in the public 
interest. (See nn. 4 and 5, supra.)

[¶26.]  In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721, 92 S. Ct. 2646, 2692, 
33 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1972), the Supreme Court said:

"The press has a 
preferred position in our constitutional scheme, not to enable it to make money, 
not to set newsmen apart as a favored class, but to bring fulfillment to the 
public's right to know. The right to know is crucial to the governing powers of 
the people * * *."

[¶27.]  In Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 429, 94 S. Ct. 1800, 1819, 
40 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1974), Justice Douglas concurring said:

"Free speech and press, 
within the meaning of the First Amendment, are, in my judgment, among the 
pre-eminent privileges and immunities of all citizens."

[¶28.]  In Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833, 94 S. Ct. 2800, 2809, 
41 L. Ed. 2d 495 (1974), the Supreme Court acknowledged

"* * * that `news 
gathering is not without its First Amendment protections,' * * for `without some 
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated,' 
* * *." (Quoting from Branzburg v. 
Hayes, supra, 408 U.S.  at 707 and 681, 92 S. Ct.  at 2670 
and 2656.) 417 U.S.  at 833, 94 S. Ct.  at 
2809.

[¶29.]  Again in Pell v. Procunier, supra, the Court 
said:

"The constitutional 
guarantee of a free press `assures the maintenance of our political system and 
an open society,' Time, Inc. v. Hill, 
385 U.S. 374, 389 [87 S. Ct. 534, 543, 17 L. Ed. 2d 456] (1967), and secures `the 
paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning 
public officials,' Garrison v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 [85 S. Ct. 209, 217, 13 L. Ed. 2d 125] (1964). See 
also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254 [84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686] (1964). By the same token, `"[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression 
comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional 
validity."' New York Times Co. v. United 
States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 [91 S. Ct. 2140, 2141, 29 L. Ed. 2d 822] (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. 
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 [91 S. Ct. 1575, 29 L. Ed. 2d 1] (1971); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 [83 S. Ct. 631, 639, 9 L. Ed. 2d 584] (1963); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 [51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357] (1931). Correlatively, the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments also protect the right of the public to receive such 
information and ideas as are published. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 
U.S. [753], at 762-763 [92 S. Ct. 2576 at 2581-82, 33 L. Ed. 2d 683]; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 [89 S. Ct. 1243, 1247, 
22 L. Ed. 2d 542] (1969)." 417 U.S.  at 832, 94 S. Ct.  at 
2809.

[¶30.]  In Houston Chronicle Publishing Company v. City 
of Houston, Tex.Civ.App., 531 S.W.2d 177, 82 A.L.R.3d 1 (1975), where the 
right of police record availability was denied as it has been here, the Texas 
court, in supporting the Chronicle's right of access, said:

"We hold that the press 
and the public have a constitutional right of access to information concerning 
crime in the community, and to information relating to activities of law 
enforcement agencies. In determining the reach of this constitutional right of 
access, it is necessary to weigh and evaluate legitimate competing 
interests."

[¶31.]  According to the Houston Chronicle court, the "competing 
interests" which the custodian must take into account when exercising discretion 
are discussed as follows:

"As applied to this case, 
the competing legitimate interests are clear and important. The first legitimate 
interest to be considered is the people's right to know. This interest is 
particularly sensitive and important as applied to police activity. The 
increasing crime rate is a subject of paramount importance to the public. We 
have, on the one hand, those who fear that the activities of the police will 
lead to impositions on the individual in the form of wire tapping or police 
brutality. Their focus of concern is on the creation of a police state. On the 
other hand, we have those with a legitimate fear of ever increasing criminal 
activity, violence, and unsafe streets.

"The City and State have 
a legitimate interest in preserving the secrecy of their records from the eyes 
of defendants and their counsel in criminal actions. The trial of a criminal 
case is an adversary proceeding. Whatever we hold to be available to the press 
must also be available to the public. At the present time the records contained 
in the offense report are not available to criminal defense counsel except in 
cases where good cause is shown in a motion under the discovery provisions of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure. * * * Discovery of such reports has been denied. 
* * *.

"Furthermore, the state 
has a legitimate interest in preventing excess publicity which might lead to a 
denial of due process and endanger the prosecution. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S. Ct. 1507, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1966)." 531 S.W.2d  at 186.

[¶32.]  We confirm that First and Fourteenth 
Amendment constitutional rights of access to the police records may be and in 
Wyoming are 
conditioned by statutory restrictions and balanced with relevant 
competing-interest considerations. The Public Records Act does not make all 
records available for public inspection in all circumstances. The legislature 
does indeed have authority to promulgate and has imposed such statutory 
restraints upon the news-gathering business as will best serve the public good. 
These restraints may not, however, unlawfully deny the people's right to be kept 
informed. A restriction having this effect would run the risk of a First or 
Fourteenth Amendment violation.

[¶33.]  Given the policy of the state as 
announced through the Public Records Act,14 the custodian, in any exercise of 
his right to withdraw, must confine his withdrawal discretion to those areas and 
circumstances prescribed by this Act. Having taken this restriction into 
account, the custodian must then employ his discretion on a selective basis 
rather than through the withdrawal of entire categories of public records - as 
was done by the chief of police in this case. Since the public policy which 
pertains to the Public Records Act speaks to the philosophy of disclosure, it is 
therefore contrary to that philosophy for the police chief to withdraw entire 
categories of public records - or any public records - without first addressing 
the issue which asks whether or not the withdrawal of individual records, documents, or 
portions thereof violates provisions of the Act. In other words, the language of 
the statute imposes a legislative presumption which says that, where public 
records are involved, the denial of inspection is contrary to the public policy, 
the public interest and the competing interests of those involved. This, then, 
places the burden of proof upon the custodian to show that the exercise of his 
discretion does not run afoul of statutory limitations in any particular 
instance where custodial withdrawal is effected.

[¶34.]  Consistent with the thought that the 
blanket withdrawal of the rolling log and case reports are violative of the 
statutory and constitutional rights of the appellant, we hold that the appellee 
cannot sustain a denial of access to the rolling log and case reports on the 
ground that the records may, from time to time - or occasionally - or sometimes 
- contain exempt investigatory material. See: Northern California Police Practices Project v. Craig, 90 Cal. App. 3d 116, 153 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1979); Johnson v. Winter, 127 Cal. App. 3d 435, 
179 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1982); State ex rel. 
Stephan v. Harder, 230 Kan. 573, 641 P.2d 366 (1982); Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 96 S. Ct. 1592, 48 L. Ed. 2d 11 (1976); Mead Data Central, Inc. v. United States 
Department of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 
410 U.S. 73, 93 S. Ct. 827, 35 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1973).

[¶35.]  Northern California Police Practices Project 
v. Craig, supra, was an action brought by a civil liberties organization and 
others against the State Highway Patrol, seeking disclosure under the Public 
Records Act of material utilized by the patrol training officers. The court held 
that the plaintiffs were entitled to nonsensitive materials contained in 
documents otherwise exempt from disclosure. The Court of Appeals 
said:

"The PRA is modeled upon 
the Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (Cook v. Craig, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d 
[773] at p. 781, 127 Cal.Rptr. 712). Like the PRA `The focus of the FOIA is 
information, not documents, and an agency cannot justify withholding an entire 
document simply by showing that it contains some exempt material.' * * * While 
it is true that Congress amended the FOIA in 1974 expressly to require 
disclosure of `[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a [public] record' (5 
U.S.C. § 552(b)), the amendment only codified the interpretation theretofore 
accorded the Act by the federal courts. * * * Similarly, the PRA has been 
judicially interpreted to require segregation of exempt from nonexempt materials 
contained in a single document. (American 
Federation of State, etc. Employees v. Regents of University of California(1978) 80 Cal. App. 3d 913, 
919, 146 Cal.Rptr. 42)." 153 Cal.Rptr., at 178.

[¶36.]  The California Court of Appeals also said 
in Johnson v. Winter, supra:

"* * * The PRA has been 
judicially construed to require that where nonexempt materials are not 
inextricably intertwined with exempt materials and are reasonably segregable, 
segregation and disclosure of the nonexempt materials is required to satisfy the 
objectives of the act. (Northern Cal. 
Police Practices Project v. Craig (1979) 90 Cal. App. 3d 116, 123-124, 153 
Cal.Rptr. 173). We also note that the PRA has recently been amended to provide 
that when a request is received for a copy of records, any `reasonably 
segregable portion of a record' is to be provided after deletion of the portions 
which are exempt by law. (Stats. 1981, ch. 968, § 3.5.)" 179 Cal. Rptr.  at 
588-589.

[¶37.]  State ex rel. Stephan v. Harder, supra, 
was a declaratory-judgment action which sought disclosure of names of physicians 
and the amount of public funds paid to each for abortions performed during a 
particular time period. The public records involved contained both confidential 
and nonexempt information. In this regard, the Kansas court said:

"We have seen that the 
information requested exists as a part of official public records which are by 
law required to be kept and maintained. The same records, however, contain 
information which is by law confidential and may not be released. We think it is 
far more consistent with the purpose of the Kansas public records inspection act to 
interpret that act as we now do. We hold that the act implies a duty upon the 
agency to delete confidential and nondisclosable information from that which may 
be disclosed, and thus to carry out the act's purpose of making available for 
public inspection all disclosable parts of the public record. Were this not so, 
any record which an agency is required by law to keep could be rendered 
inaccessible to public scrutiny by including confidential material therein." 641 P.2d  at 374.

[¶38.]  In Mead Data Central, Inc. v. U.S. Department 
of Air Force, supra, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
holds as follows:

"The focus of the FOIA is 
information, not documents, and an agency cannot justify withholding an entire 
document simply by showing that it contains some exempt material. It has long 
been a rule in this Circuit that nonexempt portions of a document must be 
disclosed unless they are inextricably intertwined with exempt portions. In 
1974, Congress expressly incorporated that requirement into the FOIA, which now 
states that `[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided * 
* * after deletion of the portions which are exempt.' 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (Supp.V 
1975)." 566 F.2d  at 260.

[¶39.]  Provisions of the Freedom of Information 
Act were construed in Environmental 
Protection Agency v. Mink, supra. Regarding the mixture of exempt and 
disclosable material in the same documents, the Supreme Court said:

"* * * Congress sensibly 
discarded a wooden exemption that could have meant disclosure of manifestly 
private and confidential policy recommendations simply because the document 
containing them also happened to contain factual data. That decision should not 
be taken, however, to embrace an equally wooden exemption permitting the 
withholding of factual material otherwise available on discovery merely because 
it was placed in a memorandum with matters of law, policy, or opinion. It 
appears to us that Exemption 5 contemplates that the public's access to internal 
memoranda will be governed by the same flexible, commonsense approach that has 
long governed private parties' discovery of such documents involved in 
litigation with Government agencies. And, as noted, that approach extended and 
continues to extend to the discovery of purely factual material appearing in 
those documents in a form that is severable without compromising the private 
remainder of the documents." 410 U.S.  at 91, 93 S. Ct.  at 
838.

[¶40.]  From these authorities, it can be 
concluded that the City of Sheridan and its chief of police may not deny 
inspection of individual or classes of documents, including rolling logs and 
case reports, simply because some exempt material may be contained in those 
records. Neither can a particular police record - again including a rolling log 
or case report - be withdrawn where it is possible for the sensitive information 
to be excised and the balance of the record made available to public inspection. 
Exempt material can be segregated. The records may be structured to provide the 
information the public is entitled to have. Houston Chronicle Publishing Company v. City 
of Houston, supra. The chief of police must exercise discretion to deny 
inspection of case reports where disclosure would impair an investigation or 
compromise the prosecution of a case, or where the custodian is otherwise 
exercising his discretion within the authority of the Wyoming Public Records 
Act. The judgment of the trial court, as it now stands, provides for blanket 
exemption of these categories of records, absent a showing that the documents 
qualify for lawful withdrawal. This is not permissible under the Public Records 
Act. The appellant has both a statutory and constitutional right of access to 
the rolling log and the case reports. 

[¶41.]  For the custodian to identify a document 
or portions thereof as falling within a category which statutorily qualifies for 
withdrawal is not to say that the document or piece of information may in fact 
be withdrawn. Where police-record information is identified as being qualified 
for withdrawal, the custodian must still exercise his discretion within the 
parameters of statutory restrictions. He must next test any contemplated 
withholding decision by asking whether withdrawal will be in the public 
interest. The issue of custodial withdrawal procedure and the standards for the 
exercise of discretion was addressed in Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis.2d 
417, 279 N.W.2d 179, 184 (1979), where the court said:

"To implement this 
presumption [that withdrawal is contrary to the public interest], our opinions 
have set out procedure and legal standards for determining whether inspection of 
records is mandated by the statute. In the first instance, when a demand to 
inspect public records is made, the custodian of the records must weigh the 
competing interests involved and determine whether permitting inspection would 
result in harm to the public interest which outweighs the legislative policy 
recognizing the public interest in allowing inspection. Beckon v. Emery, [36 Wis.2d 510, 153 N.W.2d 501, 503 (1967).] If the custodian decides not to allow inspection, he 
must state specific public-policy reasons for the refusal. These reasons provide 
a basis for review in the event of court action. * * * The custodian of the 
records must satisfy the court that the public policy presumption in favor of 
disclosure is outweighed by even more important public-policy 
considerations.

"Whether harm to the 
public interest from inspection outweighs the public interest in inspection is a 
question of law. The duty of the custodian is to specify reasons for 
nondisclosure and the court's role is to decide whether the reasons asserted are 
sufficient. It is not the trial court's or this court's role to hypothesize 
reasons or to consider reasons for not allowing inspection which were not 
asserted by the custodian. If the custodian gives no reasons or gives 
insufficient reasons for withholding a public record, a writ of mandamus 
compelling the production of the records must issue. Beckon, supra, 36 Wis.2d at 518, 153 N.W.2d  at 504 states, `[T]here is an absolute right to inspect a public document 
in the absence of specifically stated 
sufficient reasons to the contrary.' 
(Emphasis supplied.)" (Bracketed material added.)

[¶42.]  We agree that the procedure outlined in 
Newspapers, Inc., supra, and Beckon v. Emery, 36 Wis.2d 510, 153 N.W.2d 501 (1967), for the exercise of the custodian's discretion is sound. The 
kinds of factors which he must consider in contemplating nondisclosure of public 
information are recognized competing legitimate interests - such as the public's 
right to know - the crime rate, as a factor of importance to the public - the 
concern of those who fear that police activity will interfere with their 
individual rights as those fears are balanced against the concerns of those who 
perceive law enforcement to be too lax and inadequate. The custodian must 
protect the prosecutorial and investigatory process but, in doing this, may not 
carelessly withhold public information under the guise that it has prosecutorial 
or investigatory value when such is not the case. There may be other 
public-interest concerns which the law recognizes and which may properly be 
ground into the discretion-exercising process, but they must be real and not 
fancied, and they must contain public and/or private welfare considerations 
which will have a lawful counterbalancing effect when placed on the scales in 
the public-interest weighing process.

[¶43.]  Given the provisions of our Public 
Records Act, § 9-9-101 through § 9-9-105, we find the contemplation of the great 
issues as discussed in Newspapers, Inc. 
v. Breier, supra, Beckon v. 
Emery, supra, and Houston Chronicle 
Publishing Company v. City of Houston, supra, to be sound. In Wyoming, public records 
(including police records) are to be open to the public unless the custodian - 
after restricting his decision-making to areas authorized by statute and after 
weighing the competing interests involving the public's right to know against 
specific statutory mandate and perceived harm to the public interest through 
disclosure - decides to withdraw the record or a part thereof. When he does 
withdraw records, reasons therefor must be given so that these reasons may 
provide grounds for review should court action result (see nn. 6 and 7, supra). 
In that event, the custodian must be able to satisfy the court that, in the 
balancing process, statutory withdrawal, when viewed in the spotlight of 
public-interest protections, outweighs the public policy which emphasizes 
disclosure. If, however, the custodian gives either no reasons or inadequate 
reasons for withdrawal, appropriate legal action is available to force an 
automatic disclosure of the records. Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 
supra.

[¶44.]  As we have noted, the Wyoming statutes provide 
that the custodian may withdraw from inspection only such records as may be 
described as investigatory or intelligence, or those compiled for prosecution 
purposes. See § 9-9-103(b)(i), W.S. 1977, 1982 Cum. Supp., supra n. 5. It is for 
us, then, to decide whether "rolling logs" and "case reports" are investigatory 
or intelligence records, or records compiled for prosecution purposes. If these 
categories of records do fall within these statutory classifications, we must 
then resolve the question which asks whether or not the public interest required 
their withdrawal. Ancillary to these main issues is the question which wants to 
know whether the custodian furnished adequate reason for withdrawing these 
categories of public records even if they do fall within the statutory 
categories which qualify them for withdrawal, and even if public-interest 
considerations weigh in favor of nondisclosure.

[¶45.]  We therefore address the first question, 
which is: Are the rolling logs and case reports investigatory and/or 
intelligence records within the meaning of the statute, or are they records 
compiled for such prosecution or law-enforcement purposes as are contemplated by 
statute? It is clear to us that all 
information in these categories of public police records does not fall within 
the statutory investigatory or prosecutorial exemptions of the statute. As a 
matter of fact, the chief of police testified that the rolling-log information 
is not acquired as a result of investigatory activity (supra, n. 8) We do not, 
however, doubt that some information 
in these records (particularly the case reports) may well fall within these 
statutorily authorized withdrawal categories. We have, however, no way of 
knowing what public-interest considerations the custodian took into account 
which he perceived would outweigh the state's policy of nondisclosure. Given the 
condition of the record, we are unable to ascertain whether the records were 
investigatory in character - and, if they were, what competing interests the 
chief was balancing which would permit him to come to the conclusion that the 
public good required the press be denied their access. There is no disclosure of 
this information in the record, unless it can be said that, with reference to 
the rolling log, the custodian wanted to protect those who called in with 
initial complaints and information. We consider this explanation given for 
withdrawal to be insufficient in that the relevant provisions of the Public 
Records Act did not give the chief of police of Sheridan blanket authority to withdraw the 
rolling log and case reports from public inspection out of any such inadequate 
considerations. These categories of public records may not be carte blanche 
described as the kinds of records that the statutes permit the custodian to 
withdraw from press and public inquiry. There may be some investigatory or 
prosecutorial information or records within these categories of police 
documents, but such information has not been sorted out for selective withdrawal 
and the action of the chief of police in invoking blanket withholding instead of 
withdrawal on a case-by-case or record-by-record basis, according to statutory 
authority, is not shown to be justified.

[¶46.]  Having said this about the first query 
(i.e., Do the rolling logs and case reports fall into the categories of 
information with respect to which the custodian may exercise his right of 
withdrawal?), the second and third questions seem to answer themselves. Since 
there is no showing whether the two categories of withdrawn records contain 
investigatory or prosecutorial material, or are otherwise statutorily qualified 
for withdrawal, we are only able to say that the record at least is such that it 
must be concluded that these records as a class could not be withdrawn, but we 
cannot say - because of lack of proof - whether or not the public's interest 
would require any particular records or portions of records to be withdrawn. 
Lastly, it follows from what we have said that the custodian has failed to show 
adequate reason for record-withdrawal. Nondisclosure cannot rest upon the 
chief's decision to exclude public records from inspection just because the 
people whose names have appeared in the newspaper have become irate; nor will 
nondisclosure be permitted to rest upon the pique that the chief of police has 
with the way the newspaper gathers its news.

[¶47.]  It was said in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 
427 U.S. 539, 613, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 49 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1976):

"* * * [T]he press may be 
arrogant, tyrannical, abusive and sensationalist, just as it may be incisive, 
probing and informative. But at least in the context of prior restraints on 
publication, the decision of what, when, and how to publish is for editors not 
judges * * *" -

or - we might 
add - the keepers of public records.

[¶48.]  Case No. 5724 is reversed.

DECISION IN CASE NO. 
5725

[¶49.]  In Case No. 5725, it is the City of 
Sheridan that 
seeks relief from the judgment of the court. The trial court ordered that the 
public be permitted to inspect the "jail log," "reports of the investigation of 
vehicular and traffic accidents" and "complaints and citations issued." The 
court further ordered that there was nothing to preclude the chief of police 
from excluding any of those records from public scrutiny providing he did 
so

"on a case by case basis 
* * * it being understood that such exclusion shall be only on a very limited 
basis and only upon extraordinary circumstances and for good cause shown and 
then only for such limited time as may be necessary."

[¶50.]  The appellant frames the statement of the 
issues as follows:

"(1) Assuming that a jail 
log, reports of investigations of vehicular and traffic accidents and complaints 
and citations prepared and maintained by a police department are `public 
records' within the context of the Wyoming Public Records Act, has the District 
Court imposed additional requirements not included in or contemplated by the 
Statute upon the Custodian when he considers denying the right of inspection of 
such records and thereby, in effect, granted a permanent injunction preventing 
the Custodian of those records from carrying out his statutory duty 
by:

(a) imposing upon him a 
requirement that any restriction of such records be on a `case-by-case basis'?, 
and

"(b) by imposing upon him 
a requirement that any restriction upon access to such records `shall be only on 
a very limited basis and only upon extraordinary circumstances and for good 
cause shown and then only for such limited time as may be 
necessary'?"

[¶51.]  We will affirm the trial court and hold 
that the court's order does not impose any restrictions upon the custodian of 
police records which is not authorized by statute.

[¶52.]  We do this on the theory that we perceive 
the trial court to be carrying out the law pertaining to the Wyoming Public 
Records Act as we have described our understanding of the law in the foregoing 
opinion in Case No. 5724, where Sheridan Newspapers, Inc. is the 
appellant.

[¶53.]  By his order, the judge has simply said 
that the documents in question may be withdrawn from public view when, in the 
discretion of the custodian, the statutorily authorized conditions exist. (See 
n. 5, where the withdrawal conditions under § 9-9-103 are set out.) We 
understand the judge's order to hold that the documents in question are public 
records and that they must stand for public inspection unless inspection is 
foreclosed by order or rule of the Supreme Court (§ 9-9-103(a)(iii)), or the 
custodian finds the public interest to require withdrawal of any of the records 
or portions thereof as contemplated by § 9-9-103(b)(i).

[¶54.]  According to our interpretation of the 
court's order, instead of restricting the custodian's authority under the 
statute, the court was attempting to specify the conditions for withdrawal that 
were contemplated by the statute where it is provided that the custodian may 
exercise his discretion to withdraw the questioned document when it is in the 
public interest, as contemplated by § 9-9-103(b)(i). Thus, the trial judge has 
said that the "jail log," "reports of the investigation of vehicular and traffic 
accidents" and "complaints and citations" could be withdrawn by the custodian 
"on a case by case basis" for a "very limited" time under "extraordinary 
circumstances" for "good cause shown." We interpret the "cause" mentioned in the 
phrase "good cause shown" to be the cause contemplated by § 9-9-103(a)(iii) or 
(b)(i). Of course, if the court in fact sought to permit the custodian to 
withdraw public records for some cause which was not contemplated by the Public 
Records Act, then such withdrawal would be in violation of the statute and the 
public policy of the state which recognizes disclosure and rejects public-record 
withholding except where authorized by statute. Laramie Rivers Conservation Council v. 
Dinger, supra.

[¶55.]  But this is not the way we understand the 
court's order. We understand it to be an attempt to define the authority of the 
records custodian within the parameters of the statute and the law pertaining to 
the subject of public-records withdrawal as discussed in our opinion in Case No. 
5724, and it is with this understanding that we affirm the judgment.

[¶56.]  Case No. 5725 is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 This denial of access 
was outlined in a letter from the chief of police, custodian of police records, 
in the following form:

"July 31, 
1981

"TO: All News Media 
Stations

"FROM: Roger F. Krout, 
Chief of Police "The purpose of this letter is to advise all news media and 
their representatives of the policy which will be followed by the Sheridan 
Police Department in any future releases of information from department records, 
reports, and logs.

"Effective immediately, 
all news releases from the Sheridan Police Department will be in the form of a 
written statement prepared by the Department and disseminated uniformly to all 
news media.

"Once each week at a time 
to be fixed, a news conference will be held by the Police Department and 
conducted by a representative of the Detective's Office, the Assistant Chief, or 
the Chief of Police.

"Effective immediately, 
no information concerning an ongoing investigator or a report of crime will be 
disseminated without the personal approval of the Chief of Police, or in his 
absence the Assistant Chief, the senior Detective, or the City 
Attorney.

"All records of 
investigation transferred to the office of CountyAttorney and information contained therein, will be 
released only upon the specific approval of the CountyAttorney.

"Following the arrest of 
any individual or individuals for the commission of a crime, information 
concerning those persons and the specific crime for which arrested will be made 
available to news media unless to do so would not serve a legitimate law 
enforcement function such as compromising a continuing 
investigation.

"No media representative 
will be permitted individual access to reports, case files, or logs' of cases in 
progress.

"/s/ Roger F. Krout 

Chief of 
Police

"RFK: 11w 

"CC: Sheridan 
Press 

KWYO Radio 

KROE 
Radio

Billings Gazette 

Casper Star Tribune 

KSGW 
TV"

2 Under the Wyoming Public 
Records Act, § 9-9-101 through § 9-9-105, W.S. 1977, enacted by Ch. 145, S.L. of 
Wyoming 1969, as amended. See nn. 4 and 5, infra.

3 Under Art. 1, § 20 
freedom-of-speech-and-press, and Art. 1, § 6 due-process clauses of the Wyoming 
Constitution, and the First (freedom-of-speech-and-press) and Fourteenth 
(due-process) Amendments to the Federal Constitution. In Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 
51 S. Ct. 532, 75 L. Ed. 2d 1117 (1931), Mr. Justice Hughes said that the First 
Amendment was applicable to the states by reason of the due-process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.

4 Public records are 
defined at § 9-9-101(a)(i), W.S. 1977, 1982 Cum.Supp., as follows:

"(i) `Public records' 
when not otherwise specified shall include any paper, correspondence, form, 
book, photograph, photostat, film, microfilm, sound recording, map drawing, or 
other document, regardless of physical form or characteristics, and including 
all copies thereof, that have been made by the state of Wyoming and any * * * 
municipalities * * * or received by them in connection with the transaction of 
public business, except those privileged or confidential by law;" Section 
9-9-102(a), W.S. 1977 requires:

"All public records shall 
be open for inspection by any person at reasonable times, except as provided in 
this act [§§ 9-9-101 to 9-9-105] or as otherwise provided by law, but the 
official custodian of any public records may make such rules and regulations 
with reference to the inspection of such records as shall be reasonably 
necessary for the protection of such records and the prevention of unnecessary 
interference with the regular discharge of the duties of the custodian or his 
office."

5 The Act makes provision 
for denying the right to inspect a public record or portions thereof and the 
sections of the statute which, for purposes of this appeal, address denial, are 
found in § 9-9-103, W.S. 1977, 1982 Cum.Supp. where it is provided:

"(a) The custodian of any 
public records shall allow any person the right of inspection of such records or 
any portion thereof except on one (1) or more of the following grounds or as 
provided in subsection (b) or (d) of this section:

* * * * * *

"(iii) Such inspection is 
prohibited by rules promulgated by the supreme court, or by the order of any 
court of record.

"(b) The custodian may 
deny the right of inspection of the following records, unless otherwise provided 
by law, on the ground that disclosure to the applicant would be contrary to the 
public interest:

"(i) Records of 
investigations conducted by, or of intelligence information or security 
procedures of, any sheriff, county attorney, district attorney, city attorney, 
the attorney general, police department or any investigatory files compiled for 
any other law enforcement or prosecution purposes;

* * * * * *

"(v) Interagency or 
intraagency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a 
private party in litigation with the agency."

6 Section 9-9-103(e), W.S. 
1977 reads:

"If the custodian denies 
access to any public record, the applicant may request a written statement of 
the grounds for the denial, which statement shall cite the law or regulation 
under which access is denied, and it shall be furnished forthwith to the 
applicant."

7 Section 9-9-103(f), W.S. 
1977 reads:

"Any person denied the 
right to inspect any record covered by this act may apply to the district court 
of the district wherein the record is found for any order directing the 
custodian of such record to show cause why he should not permit the inspection 
of such record."

8 When the chief of police 
was being questioned, this exchange took place:

"Q. But, the record 
[rolling log] doesn't reflect any of the materials or information obtained as a 
result of an investigation.

"A. No, sir."

9 The description of the 
case report is substantially from the City of Sheridan's brief.

10 We said in Williams v. Stafford, Wyo., 
589 P.2d 322, 325 (1979):

"* * * Their [the press'] 
right to be present [at a bail-bond hearing] derives from their status as 
members of the public." Citing Gannett 
Pacific Corporation v. Richardson, 59 Haw. 224, 580 P.2d 49, 55 
(1978).

The court said 
in Houston Chronicle Publishing Company 
v. City of Houston, Tex.Civ.App., 531 S.W.2d 177, 82 A.L.R.3d 1 
(1975):

"However, it has often 
been said that the first amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional 
right of special access to information not available to the public generally. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 94 S. Ct. 2800, 41 L. Ed. 2d 495 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington 
Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 94 S. Ct. 2811, 41 L. Ed. 2d 514 (1974)."

11 Appellee cites as 
authority for custodial withdrawal, subsection (v) of § 9-9-103(b), W.S. 1977, 
but the City does not cite one single authority for the proposition that the 
rolling logs or case reports are interagency or intraagency memorandums within 
the contemplation of the Act. We will therefore not consider the issue. This 
court will not consider appellate contentions that are supported with 
perfunctory argument and no authority. Barnette v. Doyle, Wyo., 
622 P.2d 1349 (1982).

12 From the appellant 
City's brief in case No. 5725.

13 Section 15-1-110, W.S. 
1977 provides:

"The governing body of 
each city and town shall designate a legal newspaper and publish once the 
minutes of all its regular and special meetings and the titles of all ordinances 
passed. If no newspaper is published in the city or town the proceedings or 
ordinances need not be published. The clerk of each city or town, within 
forty-eight (48) hours after adjournment of every meeting, shall furnish the 
newspaper a copy of the proceedings of the meeting. The copy shall include every 
bill presented to the governing body showing the amount of the bill, the amount 
allowed, the purpose of the bill and the claimant."

14 The policy of the state 
is on disclosure - not secrecy. Laramie 
River Conservation Council v. Dinger, supra.

ROONEY, Chief Justice, 
concurring in Case No. 5724 and dissenting in Case No. 5725, with whom RAPER, Justice, joins.

[¶57.]  At the outset, I want to emphasize that I 
believe the City1 acted improperly in denying to the 
Newspaper2 access to general information 
contained in its records. This right to access is specifically and positively 
set forth in the Wyoming Public Records Act, §§ 9-9-101 through 9-9-105, W.S. 
1977 (now §§ 16-4-201 through 16-4-205, W.S. 1977, 1982 Replacement). I disagree 
with the dicta in the majority opinion which would extend by judicial fiat the 
perimeters of the right of access beyond that specifically set forth in such 
act.

[¶58.]  I agree that access cannot be denied to 
entire categories of records simply because one or more of the items therein may 
be that to which access can properly be denied. However, if the category 
includes only that to which access can properly be denied, access to the 
category itself can properly be denied, e.g. a category of pending investigative 
matters. In this instance the "rolling log" record and "case report" record were 
categorized types of records containing information other than that excepted by 
statute from public access, and the City could not properly deny access to 
them.

[¶59.]  If the City first recorded incoming calls 
and complaints on index cards which were directed into an area of specific 
action whereby the investigative or intelligence information was immediately 
separated, there could be a different result. Today, the initial information can 
be computerized to obtain the same end. Investigative and intelligence 
information can be immediately segregated, and access to the specifically 
segregated information can properly be denied. Such was not done in this 
instance, and the City's action was contrary to that required by the Wyoming 
Public Records Act.

[¶60.]  My basic disagreement with the majority 
opinion is the establishment by it of a requirement over and beyond the 
statutory requirement for denying access to police investigative reports3, intelligence information4, and security procedures. The 
statutory language with reference to police records is plain and 
unambiguous:

"(b) The custodian may 
deny the right of inspection of the following records, unless otherwise provided 
by law, on the ground that disclosure to the applicant would be contrary to the 
public interest;

"(i) Records of 
investigations conducted by, or of intelligence information or security 
procedures of, any sheriff, county attorney, city attorney, the attorney 
general, police department or any investigatory files compiled for any other law 
enforcement or prosecution purposes." Section 9-9-103(b)(i), W.S. 1977 (now § 
16-4-203, W.S. 1977, 1982 Replacement).

[¶61.]  In construing a statute, its words must 
be given their plain and ordinary meanings, Jahn v. Burns, Wyo., 593 P.2d 828 
(1979); Schwager v. State, Wyo., 589 P.2d 1303 (1979); Belco Petroleum 
Corporation v. State Board of Equalization, Wyo., 587 P.2d 204 (1978). When 
a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to rules of 
construction and the court may not look for or impose another meaning. Board of County Commissioners of County of 
Campbell v. Ridenour, Wyo., 623 P.2d 1174, reh. denied 627 P.2d 163 
(1981); State v. Sinclair Pipeline 
Company, Wyo., 605 P.2d 377 (1980); and Hayes v. State, Wyo., 599 P.2d 558 
(1979).

[¶62.]  The statute provides in plain, simple 
language that the custodian may deny the right to inspect police (1) records of 
investigation, (2) intelligence information, or (3) security procedures on the 
ground that disclosure would be contrary to the public interest. In other words, 
once inspection of the specific type of record is requested, denial to do so can 
be made on the ground that such would be contrary to the public interest. The 
custodian need not exercise additional discretion. The legislature has decided 
that these types of records fall into the status whereby inspection would be 
contrary to the public interest, and that inspection of them may be denied for 
that reason. The majority opinion would require the custodian to decide whether 
or not these records are such that inspection would be contrary to the public 
interest. The legislature has already made this decision. In the absence of 
statute, police records are generally held to be confidential, Whittle v. 
Munshower, 221 Md. 258, 155 A.2d 670 (1959), cert. denied 362 U.S. 981, 80 S. Ct. 1069, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1016 (1960). Our statute relaxes this 
confidentiality, but only to the extent set forth in the statute. It specifies 
that only information from investigative reports, intelligence information and 
security procedures is to be in the realm of that which disclosure would be 
contrary to the public interest. Therefore, disclosure to such information may 
be denied on that basis without more.

[¶63.]  Of course, labeling information as 
"investigative" or "intelligence" or "security procedure" does not make it so. 
One seeking information is entitled to a court determination of the propriety of 
such labeling. This determination can be made in camera or otherwise. Conway v. United States Internal Revenue 
Service, 447 F. Supp. 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) 
specifically permits in camera examination under the federal act at the 
discretion of the court. In this instance, the records in question may have 
contained some investigative or intelligence matters, but that fact would not 
prevent access by the Newspaper to the records. If City wanted to prevent 
disclosure of such investigative and intelligence matter, it should not have 
been included in the broad category with many other types of information. For 
this reason, I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion in Case No. 
5724.

[¶64.]  I dissent from the result reached by the 
majority opinion in Case No. 5725 because I believe the trial court added 
requirements to those set forth by statute for denying access to police 
investigative reports, intelligence information and security procedures. The 
statute does not require "extraordinary circumstances," "good cause shown" or a 
limitation on time for denial of access. As already noted, the statute is plain 
in setting forth the requirements. They are not to be enlarged by judicial 
legislation.

[¶65.]  Take an example. Information is requested 
concerning security procedures taken by the police acting in cooperation with 
the secret service for protection of the president on a visit to the city. All 
the custodian of the records need write in refusing such access is that the 
disclosure would be contrary to public interest. On challenge in court pursuant 
to statute and with reference to statutory requirements, the court need only 
satisfy itself that the information was of security procedures. It would be 
unnecessary to decide whether or not the placing of guards at specific points 
was in the public interest; whether or not back-up personnel was being 
strategically placed in the public interest; whether or not crowd infiltration 
was needed and in the public interest; whether or not dog-assisted inspection of 
a meeting place was in the public interest, and so on.

[¶66.]  With the requirements added by the 
majority opinion, the custodian would also have to show "good cause" to place 
personnel on roof tops and other places, to infiltrate the crowd, to search the 
meeting place, etc. He would have to show extraordinary circumstances in 
protecting this visit as distinguished from other presidential visits. He could 
limit access for only a limited time even though the same procedures are used 
for other visits and lose much of their efficacy if they become well 
known.

[¶67.]  I believe the plain words of the statute 
set forth the requirements for refusing disclosure and an effort to enlarge or 
embellish such is improper. For this reason, I dissent from the majority opinion 
in Case No. 5725.

FOOTNOTES

1 Appellee in Case No. 
5724 - appellant in Case No. 5725 is referred to herein as "City."

2 Appellant in Case No. 
5724 - appellee in Case No. 5725 is referred to herein as 
"Newspaper."

3 Investigative records 
are those compiled for law enforcement purposes through inquiry, information or 
observation. See Williams v. Internal 
Revenue Service, 345 F. Supp. 591 (D.C. Del. 1972), aff'd 479 F.2d 317, 
cert. denied 414 U.S. 1024, 94 S. Ct. 448, 38 L. Ed. 2d 315 (1973); and Stein v. Department of 
Justice and FBI, 662 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir. 1981).

4 Intelligence information 
is that obtained from sources which would provide information only on a 
confidential basis or that pertaining to matters or persons believed to be 
furnished only if kept confidential to such matters or persons. See Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 421 U.S. 992, 95 S. Ct. 1999, 44 L. Ed. 2d 482, 
reh. denied 422 U.S. 1049, 95 S. Ct. 2669, 45 L. Ed. 2d 702 (1975); Sims v. Central Intelligence 
Agency, 642 F.2d 562 (D.C. Cir. 1980).