Case Title: Pollack v. Allen

Citation: 

Docket Number: 022189

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
BRADLEY G. POLLACK, 
SUBSTITUTE TRUSTEE 
 
v.  Record No. 022189  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June 6, 2003 
WILLIAM B. ALLEN, III, COMMISSIONER 
OF ACCOUNTS FOR THE CIRCUIT COURT OF  
SHENANDOAH COUNTY 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SHENANDOAH COUNTY 
Dennis Lee Hupp, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we decide whether the circuit court 
erred by requiring a substitute trustee under deeds of 
trust to file accounts of sale with the commissioner of 
accounts when the advertised sales were not made, and 
further erred by assessing fees personally against the 
trustee for summonses and reports issued by the 
commissioner with regard to those sales that never 
occurred.  Concluding that, under the provisions of Code 
§ 26-15, an account of sale is required only for “a sale 
made,” we will reverse the judgment of the circuit court. 
 
Bradley G. Pollack, acting in the capacity of a 
substitute trustee, advertised foreclosure sales of 
timeshare units under 172 deeds of trust in three separate 
advertisements.  The advertisements apparently prompted 
payment from some of the debtors.  Accordingly, Pollack did 
not proceed with the foreclosure sales under 104 of the 
deeds of trust. 
 
On March 8, 2002, more than six months after the 
advertised foreclosure sale dates, William B. Allen, III, 
Commissioner of Accounts for the Circuit Court of 
Shenandoah County, issued 172 summonses to Pollack 
requiring him to file “FORECLOSURE TRUSTEE’S REPORT OF 
SALE, as required by [Code] § 26-15” within 30 days after 
service of the summonses and advising Pollack that failure 
to file accounts of the sales would be reported to the 
circuit court for further proceedings under Code §§ 26-13 
and –15.  Within 30 days after the summonses were served on 
Pollack, he filed accounts with regard to the 68 
foreclosure sales that were actually made. 
 
The commissioner of accounts then reported to the 
circuit court that Pollack had failed to file accounts of 
sale for the remaining 104 advertised foreclosure sales.  
The commissioner requested the court to issue summonses to 
Pollack requiring him to file the accounts and to fine 
Pollack for contempt of court for failing to comply with 
the summonses previously issued by the commissioner of 
accounts. 
 
The circuit court subsequently granted leave to 
Pollack permitting him to submit affidavits from the 
 
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holders of the 104 deed of trust notes verifying that no 
foreclosure sales were made under those particular deeds of 
trust.  After Pollack filed the affidavits, the court held 
that no further response to the summonses issued by the 
commissioner was required.  Nevertheless, the court 
assessed fees against Pollack personally in the amount of 
$750.00 for the summonses and reports issued by the 
commissioner of accounts regarding the 104 advertised 
foreclosures for which no sales occurred. 
 
Pollack objected to the order on the grounds that he 
had “presented good cause to the [c]ourt for failing to 
make reports as none were due.”  The court stayed its prior 
order while considering Pollack’s objections but 
subsequently entered an order removing the stay for the 
reasons stated in a letter opinion.  The court explained 
that, although “no accountings were due on 104 of the 172 
cases,” it was awarding fees to the commissioner of 
accounts “to compensate him for [the] time and effort” 
expended as a result of Pollack’s failure to make “[a] 
formal response . . . to each summons” issued by the 
commissioner. 
 
On appeal, Pollack contends that the circuit court 
erred by ordering him to “file reports under Virginia Code 
§ 26-15 for sales that were never held” and by assessing 
 
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fees against him personally “for the issuance of summonses 
and reports issued by the [c]ommissioner of [a]ccounts on 
sales that never occurred.”  He argues that any action 
authorized by the provisions of Code § 26-15 “presupposes a 
sale.”  There being no sales under the 104 deeds of trust 
at issue, Pollack contends that he was not required to file 
any reports and that the assessment of fees against him 
was, therefore, improper. 
 
The commissioner of accounts, however, asserts on 
brief that Pollack “foreclosed on deeds of trust securing 
172 timeshare units by advertising sales” to be conducted 
on three dates.  Claiming that Pollack failed in his duties 
to report on 104 of the advertised sales, the commissioner 
asserts that he had no choice but to proceed against 
Pollack as directed by the relevant statutes and that the 
court did not abuse its discretion in assessing fees 
against Pollack.  We do not agree with the commissioner’s 
position. 
 
To determine whether the circuit court erred, we must 
examine the language utilized by the General Assembly in 
Code § 26-15.  Our interpretation of this statute is guided 
by familiar rules of statutory construction. 
“While in the construction of statutes the 
constant endeavor of the courts is to ascertain 
and give effect to the intention of the 
 
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legislature, that intention must be gathered from 
the words used, unless a literal construction 
would involve a manifest absurdity.  Where the 
legislature has used words of a plain and 
definite import the courts cannot put upon them a 
construction which amounts to holding the 
legislature did not mean what it has actually 
expressed.” 
 
Halifax Corp. v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 262 Va. 91, 99-
100, 546 S.E.2d 696, 702 (2001) (quoting Watkins v. Hall, 
161 Va. 924, 930, 172 S.E. 445, 447 (1934)); accord Haislip 
v. Southern Heritage Ins. Co., 254 Va. 265, 268, 492 S.E.2d 
135, 137 (1997); Weinberg v. Given, 252 Va. 221, 225, 476 
S.E.2d 502, 504 (1996); Turner v. Wexler, 244 Va. 124, 127, 
418 S.E.2d 886, 887 (1992); Grillo v. Montebello 
Condominium Unit Owners Ass’n, 243 Va. 475, 477, 416 S.E.2d 
444, 445 (1992). 
 
In relevant part, Code § 26-15 provides that 
[w]ithin six months after the date of a sale made 
under any recorded deed of trust, mortgage or 
assignment for benefit of creditors, otherwise 
than under a decree, the trustee shall return an 
account of sale to the commissioner of accounts 
of the court wherein the instrument was first 
recorded.  Promptly after recording any trustee’s 
deed, the trustee shall deliver to the 
commissioner of accounts a copy of the deed.  The 
date of sale is the date specified in the notice 
of sale, or any postponement thereof . . . . 
 
 
If the commissioner of accounts of the court 
wherein an instrument was first recorded becomes 
aware that an account as required by this section 
has not been filed, the commissioner and the 
court shall proceed against the trustee in like 
manner and impose like penalties as set forth in 
 
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§ 26-13, unless such trustee is excused for 
sufficient reason. 
 
 
Under the plain terms of Code § 26-15, an account of 
sale must be returned to the commissioner of accounts 
“[w]ithin six months after the date of a sale made under 
any recorded deed of trust.”  The phrase “sale made” 
clearly contemplates an actual sale.  That occurrence, not 
the advertisement of a foreclosure sale, triggers a 
trustee’s statutory duty to file an account of sale with 
the commissioner.  The six-month period during which the 
account of sale must be filed for a “sale made” commences 
to run on the “date specified in the notice of sale, or any 
postponement thereof.”  Code § 26-15. 
 
If we adopted the interpretation of Code § 26-15 urged 
by the commissioner of accounts, we would be altering the 
statutory language.  Nothing in Code § 26-15 requires a 
trustee to file any type of report regarding an advertised 
foreclosure sale that does not take place, i.e., when a 
sale is not made.  Thus, the only accounts of sale that 
Pollack was required to return to the commissioner were for 
“sales made.”  Neither the commissioner of accounts nor the 
circuit court had authority under Code § 26-15 to proceed 
against Pollack by issuing summonses or assessing a fine or 
fees for the 104 advertised sales that were not made.  Only 
 
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when “an account as required by this section [Code § 26-15] 
has not been filed” is the commissioner or the court 
authorized to proceed against a trustee by utilizing the 
procedures and penalties allowed under Code § 26-13.∗  Code 
§ 26-15. 
 
For this reason, we conclude that the circuit court 
erred by requiring Pollack to file reports for advertised 
foreclosure sales that were not made and by assessing fees 
against Pollack personally.  Accordingly, we will reverse 
the judgment of the circuit court and enter final judgment 
here in favor of Pollack. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
                     
∗ When a fiduciary fails to make a required return, the 
provisions of Code § 26-13 authorize a commissioner of 
accounts to issue a summons calling for the fiduciary to 
make the return.  If the fiduciary fails to do so within 30 
days after service of the summons, the commissioner is 
required to report that fact to the court.  Then, the court 
is authorized to issue a summons for the fiduciary’s 
appearance and to impose a fine unless the fiduciary is 
“excused for sufficient reason.”  Code § 26-13. 
Similarly, under Code § 26-23, the assessment of costs 
against a fiduciary personally is permitted only when the 
fiduciary “fail[s], without good cause, to make the returns 
. . . required.” 
 
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