Case Title: Soles v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Soles v. State1991 WY 51809 P.2d 772Case Number: 90-221Decided: 04/17/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
Gaylene SOLES and Kenneth 
Soles, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

v.

The STATE of 
Wyoming, 
Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from the District 
Court, TetonCounty, Elizabeth A. Kail, 
J.

Affirmed.

Robert N. Williams of 
Meyer and Williams, Jackson, for appellants.

James K. Lubing and 
Robert B. Brodie of Goody & Lubing, Jackson, for 
appellee.

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., 
and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

OPINION

MACY, Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellants Gaylene 
Soles and Kenneth Soles sought to recover damages from Appellee State of 
Wyoming, alleging that the State was negligent in inspecting the stairway on 
which Mrs. Soles fell and injured herself. The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the State on the basis that the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act does not permit tort suits for negligent inspections of 
buildings.

[¶2.]     We affirm.

[¶3.]     The Soleses pose these 
questions:

     I. Does a governmental 
entity which performs periodic inspections as part of maintenance on a building 
waive immunity for negligently performed maintenance pursuant to W.S. § 1-39-106 
(1977 as amended)?

     II. Does a failure to 
designate the record as required by Rule 302 of the local rules for the district 
courts render a judgment based on a motion for summary judgment 
void?

     III. Is a material 
issue of fact presented which precludes the entry of summary judgment on a 
negligence question in favor of the State of Wyoming?

[¶4.]     On April 21, 1987, Mrs. 
Soles slipped and fell down a stairway on the outside of a building located in 
Jackson, Wyoming. The accident occurred as Mrs. Soles 
was leaving the building after taking her grandson there to attend the Learning 
Center (a special children's program run by Teton County). Because the building 
housed a child care facility, the Department of Fire Prevention & Electrical 
Safety conducted annual inspections of the building. All inspection reports 
indicated that the building met the requirements for having handrails in the 
stairways. The Soleses alleged that the building in question was built, 
maintained, and controlled by the State.1 Documents in the record indicate 
that the building was owned and operated by TetonCounty and that it was known as the Social 
Services Building. The State leased 714 square feet of space in that building to 
provide office space for the Division of Public Assistance and Social Services. 
The lease between TetonCounty and the State provided:

     Said rental shall 
include utilities, snow removal, necessary repairs and maintenance, barrier free 
access to the building and rest rooms for the handicapped and janitorial 
services.

[¶5.]     Mrs. Soles' claim was 
for medical expenses (past and future), loss of wages and earning capacity (past 
and future), and pain, suffering, mental anguish, and loss of enjoyment of life 
(past and future). Mr. Soles' claim was premised upon the loss of services, 
consortium, companionship, society, and support of his wife (past and 
future).

[¶6.]     The State has abrogated 
sovereign immunity to a limited extent. We have pointed out on several occasions 
that the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 
1-39-101 to -120 (1988 & Supp. 1990), is a close-ended tort claims act. 
Sawyer v. City of Sheridan, 793 P.2d 476 
(Wyo. 1990). 
"By this, we simply mean that unless the claim falls within one of the statutory 
exceptions, it will be barred." Id. at 478. The Soleses seek to overcome the 
State's claim of immunity via § 1-39-106:

     A governmental entity 
is liable for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or property 
damage caused by the negligence of public employees while acting within the 
scope of their duties in the operation or maintenance of any building, 
recreation area or public park.

The Soleses assert that 
the inspections performed by the Department of Fire Prevention & Electrical 
Safety are encompassed by the word "maintenance." They base this in part upon 
the answers given by the state fire marshal, as well as one of his employees, 
which indicate that such inspections were preventative maintenance.

[¶7.]     We must construe § 
1-39-106 in the light of the facts pleaded by the Soleses. For this purpose, we 
examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the Soleses, and we 
give them the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from 
the record. Wagner v. First Wyoming Bank, N.A. Laramie, 784 P.2d 224 (Wyo. 1989). If a statute 
is clear and unambiguous, we will not resort to rules of statutory construction, 
and the words will be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Johnson v. 
Statewide Collections, Inc., 778 P.2d 93 (Wyo. 1989). Under these circumstances, 
"maintenance" means, "the labor of keeping something (as buildings or equipment) 
in a state of repair or efficiency: care, upkeep." Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 1362 (1986). "Inspection," as used in the context of 
this case, means, "an examination or a survey of a community, of premises, or of 
an installation by an authorized person (as to determine compliance with 
regulations or susceptibility to fire or other hazards)." Id at 1170. If a 
statute employs a term which has a standard popular meaning, the term is 
presumably used in its ordinary and usual sense unless another sense is clearly 
intended. Wyo. Stat. § 8-1-103(a)(i) (1989); 
Mendicoa v. State, 780 P.2d 1346 (Wyo. 1989). We hold that § 1-39-106 does not 
provide a waiver of sovereign immunity for the negligence claims pleaded because 
the inspections conducted by the Department of Fire Prevention & Electrical 
Safety simply were not "maintenance" as contemplated by that 
statute.

[¶8.]     The Soleses also rely 
upon the "shall be liberally construed" language found in Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-101 
(1988). To the extent that this statute is applicable, it must be tempered by 
the plain statement of purpose given in the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, as 
it provides more guidance in a case such as this than does § 1-1-101. The 
purpose of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act is:

     (a) The Wyoming 
legislature recognizes the inherently unfair and inequitable results which occur 
in the strict application of the doctrine of governmental immunity and is 
cognizant of the Wyoming Supreme Court decision of Oroz v. Board of County 
Commissioners, 575 P.2d 1155 (1978). It is further recognized that the state and 
its political subdivisions as trustees of public revenues are constituted to 
serve the inhabitants of the state of Wyoming and furnish certain services not 
available through private parties and, in the case of the state, state revenues 
may only be expended upon legislative appropriation. This act is adopted by the 
legislature to balance the respective equities between persons injured by 
governmental actions and the taxpayers of the state of Wyoming whose revenues 
are utilized by governmental entities on behalf of those taxpayers. This act is 
intended to retain any common law defenses which a defendant may have by virtue 
of decisions from this or other jurisdictions.

     (b) In the case of the 
state, this act abolishes all judicially created categories such as 
"governmental" or "proprietary" functions and "discretionary" or "ministerial" 
acts previously used by the courts to determine immunity or liability. This act 
does not impose nor allow the imposition of strict liability for acts of 
governmental entities or public employees.

Section 1-39-102. A 
liberal interpretation does not permit, or require, us to force words out of 
their natural meaning; it means only that "words should not be forced out of 
their natural meaning and should receive a fair and reasonable construction so 
as to obtain the objects for which a statute is designed." Thomson v. Wyoming In-Stream Flow Committee, 651 P.2d 778, 789 
(Wyo. 1982). 
As contemplated by § 1-39-106, "maintenance" does not include 
"inspection."

[¶9.]     The Soleses cite case 
law from several jurisdictions which they claim supports the conclusion that the 
inspections performed by the Department of Fire Prevention & Electrical 
Safety should be encompassed by § 1-39-106. We have recognized the main thrust 
of these cases in DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1986). The basic message conveyed by 
DeWald and the cases cited by the Soleses, as it pertains to this case, is that 
the doctrine distinguishing between the public-duty rule and the special-duty 
rule is no longer recognized. The concept that a governmental entity may have a 
duty to the public in general but no special duty to individual citizens is no 
longer viable. That holding is not relevant here, for the question is not 
whether the State owed a duty to the Soleses; rather, it is whether the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act abrogated sovereign immunity under the circumstances of 
this case.

[¶10.]  The Soleses also assert that the State 
failed to comply with Rule 302 of the Uniform Rules for the District Courts of 
the State of Wyoming in that it made no reference to its 
discovery materials in its second motion for summary judgment (the first motion 
for summary judgment was denied by the district court). The Soleses do not 
demonstrate this issue was ever raised before the district court, nor do they 
show any prejudice occurred. Even if we assume that error existed, we disregard 
any error which does not affect a substantial right. W.R.A.P. 7.04. See Smith v. 
Kennedy, 798 P.2d 832 (Wyo. 1990).

[¶11.]  Finally, the Soleses argue that this case 
should be reversed, citing Knudson v. Hilzer, 551 P.2d 680 (Wyo. 1976), for the 
proposition that negligence cases do not lend themselves to summary disposition. 
That rule is not applicable under the circumstances presented here because no 
statutory waiver of sovereign immunity exists under the Wyoming Governmental 
Claims Act upon which the Soleses could base their claims.

[¶12.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 
This action originally included TetonCounty as a defendant. The claims against 
TetonCounty were settled, and, 
therefore, this appeal involves only the State.