Case Title: Toscano v. Spriggs

Citation: 343 Md. 320

Docket Number: 101/95

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1996-08-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Kathryn C. Toscano v. Hope Spriggs, No. 101, September Term, 1995.
[Respondeat Superior - Motor Tort - Non-owner Operator -
Presumption 
Of 
Agency 
And 
Presumption 
Of 
Permissive 
Use
Distinguished.  Held:  Presumption Of Agency Conclusively Rebutted
By Uncontradicted Evidence That Purpose Of Trip Was Transporting To
Place Of Employment A Person Not Employed By Owner Of Vehicle.]
Circuit Court for Prince GeorgeUs
County Case #CAL90-17217
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 101
September Term, 1995
____________________________________
KATHRYN C. TOSCANO
v.
HOPE SPRIGGS
____________________________________
Murphy, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker, 
JJ. 
____________________________________
Opinion by Rodowsky, J.
____________________________________
Filed:  August 21, 1996
We issued certiorari to the Court of Special Appeals, after
its unreported decision in this motor vehicle tort action, to
review that courtUs application of the presumption that the operator
of a motor vehicle is the agent, servant or employee of its owner
and is acting within the scope of such employment.  In holding that
the presumption had not been rebutted, the intermediate appellate
court relied heavily on the presumption of permissive use,
articulated in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 105 Md. App. 1, 657 A.2d 1183, cert. granted, 340 Md. 268,
666 A.2d 144 (1995), cert. dismissed, ____ Md. ____, ____ A.2d ____
(1996) [No. 91, September Term, 1995, dismissed July 24, 1996].  In
the instant case we agree with the ownerUs argument that the
presumption of agency was conclusively negated, and we shall
reverse.  
The facts relevant to agency involve three individuals:  the
petitioner, Kathryn C. Toscano (Toscano); John Edward Farmer
(Farmer); and Charles David Breedlove (Breedlove).  Toscano was the
owner, but not an occupant of, a Ford Thunderbird automobile when
it was involved in the subject accident.  Farmer and Breedlove were
in the Thunderbird at the time of the accident.  The latter was
licensed to operate a motor vehicle but the former was not.  When
the accident occurred one or the other was driving, but just which
one was the driver was not resolved by a fact-finding in the trial
court.  
-2-
At the time of the accident, October 29, 1987, Toscano resided
in Waldorf, Maryland, and she was employed full time in Clinton,
Maryland.  Separated or divorced from her husband, Toscano had
custody of her two young children who were tended to by a live-in
nanny.  
Breedlove in October 1987 was ToscanoUs gentleman friend.  He
had been married and divorced.  Perhaps five nights a month he
spent the night at ToscanoUs home.  In November 1987 he moved into
ToscanoUs home, and the couple later had a child.  They separated
in July 1990.  
Farmer was fifteen years old at the time of the accident.  He
never knew his father.  His mother resided somewhere in the
Alexandria, Virginia area where Farmer was enrolled in public
school.  His mother seems to have let the child fend for himself
with the result that, in the summer and fall of 1987, he was on
some form of probation in Northern Virginia.
Toscano first encountered Farmer in July 1987.  He was working
in the kitchen of a night club in the Georgetown section of
Washington, D.C. where Breedlove was also employed.  Toscano took
the youth to her heart and to her home.  She fed him and bought him
clothes.  She drove him to school and picked him up after school.
She discussed his problems with his probation officer and with the
guidance counselor at his school.  She sought FarmerUs motherUs
consent for Toscano to be recognized legally as his foster mother,
-3-
but the birth mother would not consent.  Toscano considered herself
to be the de facto foster mother of Farmer.  
The accident occurred when ToscanoUs Thunderbird struck a
pedestrian, the respondent, Hope Spriggs (Spriggs), while she was
crossing Maryland Route 210 in Prince GeorgeUs County.  In July 1990
Spriggs filed a multi-count complaint against Toscano, Farmer, and
by amendment to the complaint, Breedlove.  Uncertain as to which
occupant was the operator, Spriggs pled, alternatively, counts of
negligence against each occupant, counts of negligent supervision
and negligent entrustment against Toscano as to each occupant, and
counts of respondeat superior liability against Toscano predicated
on each occupantUs being her agent.  Judgment in favor of Spriggs
was entered against Farmer and Breedlove, both of whom had
defaulted.  Damages were awarded, based on the proof produced at
the trial of Toscano.  Neither Farmer nor Breedlove testified at
trial.  As part of her case, the plaintiff read into evidence
portions of the deposition of Toscano who denied that either
Breedlove or Farmer had her permission or was her agent.  At the
close of the plaintiffUs case the trial court granted a motion for
judgment in favor of Toscano on all counts against her.
There were cross-appeals to the Court of Special Appeals.
Spriggs argued that there was sufficient evidence of negligent
entrustment to Breedlove, but Spriggs did not question on appeal
the ruling in favor of Toscano on alleged negligent entrustment to
-4-
Farmer.  Spriggs also challenged judgment for Toscano on the agency
issue, but she factually limited that argument to agency on
BreedloveUs part.  She argued that "ToscanoUs assertion that she did
not ever allow David Breedlove to use her car did not destroy the
presumption 
of 
agency 
.... 
 
Such 
assertion 
was 
neither
uncontradicted nor conclusive ...."  Court of Special Appeals No.
1313, September Term, 1994, AppellantUs Brief at 17.  In the Court
of Special Appeals Toscano, by cross-appeal, presented, inter alia,
the issue of trial court error in admitting hearsay testimony that
Breedlove was the driver.
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court as to
negligent entrustment, but reversed on agency.  On the claim of
negligent entrustment the intermediate appellate court concluded
that BreedloveUs driving record and the evidence of ToscanoUs notice
of that record were insufficient to support the claim.  With
respect to agency, Toscano had argued that "[t]he only testimony at
trial was that at the time the accident occurred, Mr. Breedlove and
Mr. Farmer were proceeding to Mr. FarmerUs workplace to take Mr.
Farmer to work."  Court of Special Appeals No. 1313, September
Term, 1994, Appellee/Cross-AppellantUs Brief at 10.  The Court of
Special Appeals did not directly address that argument.  That court
considered Toscano to have contended that "her denial that she had
given anyone permission to drive the vehicle was so convincing that
-5-
the presumption of agency had been rebutted as a matter of law."
The court found no merit in that contention.
In addition, the appellate opinion speaks of an "accident
caused by the negligence of ... Breedlove," and says that "[a]t the
time of the accident, Breedlove was driving an automobile owned by
... Toscano."  In the concluding paragraph of the opinion the court
stated:  "It may well be that, on remand, the jury will conclude
that Breedlove was neither an agent nor a permissive user."  
We granted ToscanoUs petition for the writ of certiorari.  It
raises two issues:  (1) whether the presumption of agency was
conclusively rebutted, and (2) whether the Court of Special Appeals
could decide the identity of the driver of the Toscano vehicle.
Spriggs 
did 
not 
file 
any 
cross-petition 
for 
certiorari.
Consequently, the holding of the Court of Special Appeals affirming
denial of the claim of negligent entrustment to Breedlove is final.
I
"Mere ownership of a car does not impose liability for
injuries caused in the driving of it.  Liability, when it
exists, is not for the car, but only for the act or
omission of the person driving.  And when the owner has
not himself been the negligent cause of an injury, he can
be held liable vicariously only when the negligence has
been that of his servant engaged in his affairs.  He is
not even liable for the negligence of his general
servant, his chauffeur, for instance, unless at the time
the servant has been conducting the ownerUs affairs."
Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 20-21, 152 A. 498, 499 (1930).
There is a presumption that the operator of a motor vehicle is
the agent of the owner.  It was first recognized by this Court in
-6-
Vonderhorst Brewing Co. v. Amrhine, 98 Md. 406, 56 A. 833 (1904),
a case involving an intersectional collision between the plaintiffUs
horse-drawn bread wagon and the defendantUs horse-drawn beer barrel
wagon.  Chief Judge McSherry, writing for the Court, relied in part
upon Joyce v. Capel & Slaughter, 8 Car. & Pay. 370 (1838), a nisi
prius decision involving a collision between a boat and a barge on
the Thames River.  In Joyce, regulations of the WatermenUs Company
required identifying numbers to be affixed to barges.  Id.  In
answer to the defendantUs argument that there was no proof that the
person steering the barge was a servant of the defendant, the trial
judge ruled that it was the defendantUs obligation to show that the
barge had been hired out.  Id. at 370-71.
Maryland appellate courts have applied the presumption of
agency in numerous cases.  E.g., Campfield v. Crowther, 252 Md. 88,
249 A.2d 168 (1969); Williams v. Wheeler, 252 Md. 75, 249 A.2d 104
(1969); Martin Furniture Corp. v. Yost, 247 Md. 42, 230 A.2d 338
(1967); House v. Jerosimich, 246 Md. 747, 230 A.2d 282 (1967);
Phillips v. Cook, 239 Md. 215, 210 A.2d 743 (1965); State ex rel.
Shipley v. Walker, 230 Md. 133, 186 A.2d 472 (1962); Hoerr v.
Hanline, 219 Md. 413, 149 A.2d 378 (1959); Grier v. Rosenberg, 213
Md. 248, 131 A.2d 737 (1957); Fowser Fast Freight v. Simmont, 196
Md. 584, 78 A.2d 178 (1951); Brown v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 187
Md. 613, 51 A.2d 292 (1947); Erdman v. Horkheimer & Co., 169 Md.
-7-
     We recognize that, arguably, there are inconsistencies among
1
the above-cited opinions.  No party to the instant case, however,
has asked us to reexamine the scope or application of the
presumption of agency. 
204, 181 A. 221 (1935); Mackey v. Dorsey, 104 Md. App. 250, 655
A.2d 1333 (1995).   
1
There is also a presumption that a non-owner-operator of a
motor vehicle operates it with the permission of the owner.  State
Farm, 105 Md. App. at 8-9, 657 A.2d at 1186-87.  A presumption of
permissive use is implied in the presumption of agency.  Id. at 11,
657 A.2d at 1188.
A presumption of permissive use, as consistent with Maryland
law, was applied in Royal Indem. Co. v. Wingate, 353 F. Supp. 1002
(D. Md.), affUd., 487 F.2d 1398 (4th Cir. 1973).  An automobile
rental company had leased a vehicle on short term to Mooney.
Wingate, 353 F. Supp. at 1003.  Wingate was operating the leased
vehicle when it collided with the tort plaintiff.  Id.  The lessorUs
insurer disclaimed coverage for Wingate because the omnibus clause
in its policy required an insured to operate with the permission of
the lessor, but the lease had limited operation of the vehicle to
Mooney.  Id.  Neither Mooney nor Wingate testified.  The court read
21 J. Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 12274 (1962) as
recognizing a presumption of permissive use.  353 F. Supp. at 1004.
The court concluded that "[s]uch a presumption would seem eminently
-8-
     A number of other jurisdictions have enacted statutes which
2
create a presumption of permissive use.  For cases decided under
such statutes see, e.g., McClellan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 247 A.2d
58 (D.C. 1968); De Bolt v. Dagett, 416 N.W.2d 102 (Iowa 1987);
Lawrence v. Myles, 634 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1995) (statute not cited but
nonetheless in effect); Guerrieri v. Gray, 203 A.D.2d 324, 610
N.Y.S.2d 301 (1994); Smyth v. Pellegrino, 28 A.D.2d 537, 279
N.Y.S.2d 694 (1967); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. LumbermenUs Mut.
Casualty Co., 11 N.C. App. 490, 181 S.E.2d 727 (1971). 
reasonable, and this court is not prepared to say that it would be
rejected by the Court of Appeals of Maryland."  Id.  
Other states, as a matter of their common law, recognize a
presumption of permissive use.  See, e.g., Hille v. Safeco Ins.
Co., 25 Ariz. App. 353, 543 P.2d 474 (1975); Alred v. Jones, 189
So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1966); Van Zwol v. Branon, 440 N.W.2d 589 (Iowa
1989); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hugee, 32 F. Supp. 665
(E.D.S.C.), affUd, 115 F.2d 298 (4th Cir. 1940); American Fidelity
Co. v. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 124 Vt. 271, 204 A.2d
110 (1964).2
ToscanoUs liability to Spriggs involves only the presumption
of agency.  In the instant matter that presumption has been
rebutted under the facts, which we review below.  
Toscano testified via deposition in the plaintiffUs case that,
from the day after she purchased the Thunderbird, no one but she
drove it.  This evidence was contradicted by the nanny and by a
neighbor in Waldorf who gave evidence of instances when Breedlove
was driving the Thunderbird, unaccompanied by Toscano.  
-9-
In her deposition Toscano said that on the night of the
accident she came home from work, put the Thunderbird in the
garage, hung up the key in the house, and went on foot to visit a
neighbor approximately one mile away.  There was also evidence
that, customarily, Toscano never walked to visit the neighbor.
After one to two hours Toscano returned home.  Only after she
received a telephone call advising of the accident did she realize
that the Thunderbird was missing.  She went to the accident scene.
Spriggs argues that the contradictions of ToscanoUs testimony
are sufficient to permit the inference that Breedlove had
permission to drive the Thunderbird at the time of the accident.
This argument of Spriggs in support of agency fails to distinguish
between permissive use and agency.  Proof of permissive use is not
the equivalent of proof of agency.  
In State ex rel. Shipley v. Walker, 230 Md. 133, 186 A.2d 472
(1962), the personal injury plaintiff appealed from a judgment
entered on a directed verdict in favor of the owner of an
automobile operated at the time of the accident by the ownerUs newly
licensed, sixteen year old stepson.  The stepson had been furnished
the vehicle in order to exchange a pair of shoes purchased for him
by his mother.  The accident occurred after that task was
accomplished and while the operator was practicing driving in sand
on an unpaved, dead end, private road.  Id. at 136, 186 A.2d at
473.  This Court affirmed because it was clear that the stepson was
-10-
not the agent or servant of the owner at the time of the accident.
The presumption of agency had been rebutted and "[t]he mere fact
that the owner has given permission to the driver to use his car is
not enough to make him liable."  Id. at 137, 186 A.2d at 473-74.
See also Pollock v. Watts, 142 Md. 403, 121 A. 238 (1923).  
The plaintiff also introduced through ToscanoUs deposition,
without objection by Toscano, FarmerUs statement to Toscano that he
and Breedlove, at the time of the accident, were in a hurry to get
Farmer to work at the club in Georgetown.  Through ToscanoUs
deposition and without objection from Toscano, the plaintiff also
read into evidence ToscanoUs testimony that Farmer told her that
BreedloveUs truck, in which he had come to Waldorf, had overheated
and that Breedlove had said, "ULetUs take her car and get you to
work.U"  Inasmuch as neither Breedlove nor Farmer testified
directly, either in person or by deposition, the above-quoted
evidence was the only proof describing the purpose of the
automobile trip in the Thunderbird.  
Whether Breedlove or Farmer was driving at the time of the
accident is immaterial, inasmuch as the uncontradicted purpose of
the trip was not for the benefit of Toscano.  It was for the
benefit of Farmer.  Spriggs submits that driving Farmer to work
benefits Toscano, but this Court does not recognize, even in the
relationship of a birth parent and child, the so-called "family
purpose doctrine."  Williams v. Wheeler, 252 Md. at 81-82, 249 A.2d
-11-
at 108; Talbott v. Gegenheimer, 245 Md. 186, 189, 225 A.2d 462, 464
(1967); Slutter v. Homer, 244 Md. 131, 140, 223 A.2d 141, 145
(1966); Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. at 21, 152 A. at 499;
Baitary v. Smith, 140 Md. 437, 439, 116 A. 651, 652 (1922);
Pollock v. Watts, 142 Md. at 406, 121 A. at 239; Myers v. Shipley,
140 Md. 380, 392, 116 A. 645, 650 (1922).  See also Whitelock v.
Dennis, 139 Md. 557, 116 A. 68 (1921). 
There are a number of cases in our reports in which the use of
the ownerUs vehicle uncontrovertedly was, or could be found to be,
used with the permission of the owner, but in which the
uncontradicted evidence of the purpose of that permitted use, as a
matter of law, rebutted the presumption that the operator was the
agent of the owner.  Illustrative is Tregellas v. American Oil Co.,
231 Md. 95, 188 A.2d 691 (1963).  There the vehicle was owned by
the defendant-employer and operated with permission by its
salesman-employee, but the accident occurred on a weekend when the
salesman was on a trip to visit his parents.  Id. at 98, 188 A.2d
at 692.  There was no contradictory evidence as to the tripUs
purpose, so that the presumption of agency was rebutted as a matter
of law.  Id. at 104, 188 A.2d at 695-96.  See also Butt v. Smith,
148 Md. 340, 129 A. 352 (1925) (holding that the presence of the
employerUs products in the employerUs truck being operated by the
employee on a Sunday while not on company business did not create
a jury issue with respect to agency).  
-12-
A directed verdict in favor of the owner of a vehicle was
affirmed in Miller v. Shegogue, 221 Md. 292, 157 A.2d 272 (1960),
where the owner had left the vehicle with an independent garageman
who was test driving the vehicle when the accident occurred.  The
same result was reached where the owner left the vehicle with the
independent garageman so that the latter could sell it on the
ownerUs behalf.  See Bell v. State ex rel. Tondi, 153 Md. 333, 138
A. 227 (1927).
The presumption of agency was also conclusively rebutted where
the ownerUs employee was involved in an accident while driving the
ownerUs truck, but it was uncontradicted that the employee was
proceeding to his home from a farewell party honoring one of the
employerUs managers.  Wells v. Hecht Bros. & Co., 155 Md. 618, 142
A. 258 (1928).  
Here, the plaintiffUs own evidence furnished the only
explanation of the purpose of the trip.  It was not for the benefit
of Toscano, and there is no inference to the contrary.  The
presumption of agency was conclusively rebutted.
II
The second issue presented by ToscanoUs petition complains
about the factual assumption or conclusion in the opinion of the
Court of Special Appeals that Breedlove was the negligent driver.
As explained in Part I, resolution of that factual issue is not
required to decide the instant case.  ToscanoUs concern (i.e.,
-13-
ToscanoUs insurerUs concern) anticipates a claim by Spriggs that
Breedlove was a permissive user who was covered for damages awarded
in this case under the omnibus clause of ToscanoUs insurance policy.
It may be that ToscanoUs insurer considers that its likelihood of
being able to rebut the presumption of permissive use would be
greater if it can be established that Farmer was the negligent
driver, and that the insurer is concerned that the tactic will
encounter an argument to the contrary based on the way in which the
Court of Special Appeals wrote its opinion.  
It is clear that ToscanoUs second issue is premature.  
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED IN PART.  CASE
REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR THE ENTRY
OF A JUDGMENT AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT
OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE
GEORGEUS COUNTY.  COSTS IN THIS COURT
AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
TO BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENT, HOPE
SPRIGGS.