Case Title: Johnston v. Board of Trustees, School Dist. No. 1 West, Sheridan County, Wyo.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 5817

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-04-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Johnston v. Board of Trustees, School Dist. No. 1 West, Sheridan County, Wyo.1983 WY 38661 P.2d 1045Case Number: 5817Case Number: 5817Decided: 04/15/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
MATTHEW JOHNSTON AND 
LORRAINE JOHNSTON, DAN SCOTT AND JEANNE SCOTT, RICHARD M. DAVIS, JR. AND SUSAN 
E. DAVIS, DAN J. DANIELS AND JAN DANIELS, JAMES E. McLAUGHLIN AND BETTE 
McLAUGHLIN, AND JERRY MEYER, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 
SCHOOL DISTRICT # 1 WEST, SHERIDAN COUNTY, WYOMING; LYNN SIMONS, SUPERINTENDENT 
OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION FOR THE STATE OF WYOMING; THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR 
THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS). No. 5817

Appeal from the District 
Court, SheridanCounty, Leonard McEwan, 
J.

William G. 
Myers, III of Burgess & Davis, Sheridan, signed the brief and appeared in oral 
argument on behalf of 
appellants.

Rex O. Arney of 
Redle, Yonkee & Arney, Sheridan, signed the brief on behalf of appellee 
Sheridan County School Dist. No. 1. A.G. McClintock, Atty. Gen. and Edgar Young, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., signed the brief on 
behalf of appellees Superintendent of Public Instruction and State Bd. of 
Educ. Young appeared in oral argument.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE and 
BROWN, JJ.

RAPER, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     What is a school-year 
day? That is the principal, if not the only, question in this appeal. The trial 
judge held that the appellee Board of Trustees, School District No. 1 West, 
Sheridan County (District Board) was authorized by § 21-4-301, W.S. 19771 to adopt a four-day school week 
resulting in a 144 calendar day school year. By the same order, appellee Lynn 
Simons, Superintendent of Public Instruction for Wyoming (State Superintendent) 
and the appellee State Board of Education (State Board), were enjoined from 
taking any steps to deprive the school district from loss of entitlements under 
the school foundation program2 by reason of the four-day school 
week and directed to use all necessary and appropriate efforts to prevent loss 
of school district revenue from any state or federal source. The appellants are 
residents, taxpayers, and in some instances parents of children enrolled in 
School District No. 1 West who sought to enjoin such action of appellee District 
Board.

[¶2.]     The appellants frame 
the issues to be:

1. "Whether Appellees' 
actions contravene the Wyoming Education Code of 1969 generally and Wyo. Stat. 
1977, § 21-4-301 and § 21-13-307(a)(ii) specifically."

2. "Whether Appellees 
lack statutory and common law authority to implement alternative scheduling for 
pupil attendance in Sheridan County School District # 1 
West."

3. "Whether Appellees 
have statutory or common law justification for violation of the Wyoming 
Education Code of 1969."

4. "Whether actions taken 
by the Appellees contravene the requirements of equal protection under the 
Wyoming Constitution, statutes and common law."

5. "Whether the actions 
of the Appellees are in violation of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure 
Act."

[¶3.]     We will 
reverse.

[¶4.]     The facts of the case 
are simple and not much in dispute in any material way. Gleaned from the record 
and briefs, it appears that in November 1981, the District Board heard a 
presentation at a school board convention about the Colorado plan of 
alternative scheduling of classes to a shortened school week and year. It 
directed research and evaluation for adaptability of the four-day week to its 
district. Some of the states where the plan was in effect were contacted. It was 
determined that a search team of approximately fourteen persons, made up of four 
parents (including one board member), two students, and the rest school teachers 
and school administrators, would visit Colorado and New Mexico schools where the 
plan was in effect.

[¶5.]     Upon return of the team 
in April 1982, it reported and recommended adoption of the four-day school week 
to the District Board. Public meetings were noticed and held in early May 1982. 
Over 200 parents protested the idea and recommended further study. On May 19, 
1982, the District Board adopted the plan it proposed to submit to the State 
Board and State Superintendent for permission to try the 
concept.

[¶6.]     At the meeting with the 
State Board on June 3, 1982, the program was offered. Petitions of protest 
reportedly signed by some 385 parents of the district were presented. The State 
Board approved the plan subject to its passing legal muster with the attorney 
general and a satisfactory system of evaluation being provided. The attorney 
general's opinion, which we will later allude to in footnote 3, generally 
approved the concept for the district on an experimental or pilot project basis 
but not for general application throughout the state. The net effect of the 
scheme was to lengthen the number of hours students attended school each day for 
four days of each week, thus reducing the number of school days in the school 
year to 144.

[¶7.]     The appellants brought 
this suit to enjoin placing the plan into operation and eventually for a 
declaratory judgment. The district judge denied injunctive relief and held the 
plan lawful, enjoined the State Superintendent and State Board from interfering 
with the district in obtaining school foundation funds, and directed that both 
make every effort to see that the district was not deprived of any loss of 
revenues from federal and state funds.

[¶8.]     We need not discuss the 
merits of such an alternative scheduling plan nor express approval or 
disapproval of the idea in reaching a decision. However laudable the program 
might be, that will not validate unlawful expedients to effect its 
accomplishment. Witzenburger v. State ex 
rel. Wyoming Community Development 
Authority, Wyo., 575 P.2d 1100, 1135 
(1978).

[¶9.]     Section 21-4-301, supra 
fn. 1, mandates that each school district "shall operate its schools and classes 
for a minimum of one hundred seventy-five (175) days each school year." Section 
21-13-307(a)(ii), supra fn. 2, directs that each school district which operates 
its schools for a term of "one-hundred eighty (180) days or more during the 
previous school year" shall be eligible to share in funds from the foundation 
account. Provision is made for a prorated share if a term is less than 180 days 
as well as for emergency and excused closures.

[¶10.]  In Board of County Comm'rs of County of 
Campbell v. Ridenour, Wyo., 623 P.2d 1174, 1184 (1981), we 
summarized some rules of statutory construction appropriately applicable to the 
case now before us:

"The primary objective in 
ascertaining the meaning of a law is legislative intent; and, if such intent is 
expressed clearly and without ambiguity in the language of the statute, such 
intent must be given effect. Intent must be found in the language of the statute 
itself. Oroz v. Hayes, Wyo. 1979, 598 P.2d 432, 434. Where the 
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys clear and definite 
meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to rules of statutory construction; 
and the court has no right to look for and impose another meaning. 
Wyoming State Treasurer v. City of Casper, Wyo. 1976, 551 P.2d 687, 698. The plain, 
ordinary and usual meaning of words used in a statute controls in the absence of 
clear statutory provisions to the contrary. State v. Stern, Wyo. 1974, 526 P.2d 344, 
346. Courts will not enlarge, stretch, expand or extend a statute to matters not 
falling within its express provisions. Lo Sasso v. Braun, Wyo. 1963, 386 P.2d 630, 
632. Courts will not usurp the power of the legislature by deciding what should 
have been said. Barber v. State Highway 
Commission, 1959, 80 Wyo. 340, 342 P.2d 723. * * 
*"

See also Wyoming State Department of Education v. 
Barber, Wyo., 649 P.2d 681 (1982) and School Districts Nos. 2, 3, 6, 9 and 
10 in County of Campbell v. Cook, Wyo., 424 P.2d 751 
(1967).

[¶11.]  The trial judge concluded that the word 
"day" was ambiguous.3 Ambiguity exists when a word or 
group of words in a statute is susceptible of more than one meaning. State ex 
rel. Albany County Weed and Pest District v. Board of County Comm'rs of County 
of Albany, Wyo., 592 P.2d 1154 (1979).

[¶12.]  We have searched for some definition of 
"day" which would permit compressing 175/180 days into 144 days, but none we 
find will fit. Webster's applicable definitions of day 
are:

"1: the time of light or 
interval between one night and the next: the time between sunrise and sunset or 
from dawn to darkness 2: the period of the earth's rotation on its axis 
ordinarily divided into 24 hours, measured by the interval between two 
successive transits of a celestial body over the same meridian, and taking a 
specific name from that of the body - see SOLAR DAY, MEAN SOLAR DAY, SIDEREAL 
DAY 3a: CIVIL DAY b among most modern 
nations: the mean solar day of 24 hours beginning at mean midnight * * *" 
(Emphasis in original.)

Black's Law 
Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) sets out as a first definition that a day is a period 
of time consisting of twenty-four hours and including the solar day and the 
night. A solar day is there defined as a term sometimes used as meaning that 
portion of the day when the sun is above the horizon, but properly it is the 
time between two complete (apparent) revolutions of the sun or between two 
consecutive positions of the sun over any given terrestrial meridian, and hence, 
according to the usual method of reckoning, from noon to noon at any given 
place. Also included, and one which appears rather appropriate, is that a day is 
a period of time within the limits of 
a natural day set apart either by law or by common usage for the transaction of 
particular business or performance of labor, as in banking, in laws regulating 
the hours of labor, in contracts for so many "days' work," and the like; the 
word day may signify six, eight, ten or any number of hours. A natural day is 
then defined as properly the period from midnight to midnight, though sometimes 
taken to mean the daytime or time between sunrise and 
sunset.

[¶13.]  Black, supra, defines a calendar day as 
containing twenty-four hours - the time from midnight to midnight. We gather 
from a perusal of Words and Phrases and sampling of some of the cases there 
cited that the most common definition of a day is the period from midnight to 
midnight, which is the same as a calendar day.

[¶14.]  All of the members of this court having 
gone to school and experienced the passing of one day to the next over a long 
period of time, it seems reasonable to take judicial notice of the fact that 
ordinarily a day commences in the A.M. (ante meridiem - before noon) and ends in 
the P.M. (post meridiem - after noon) and those two phenomena occur only once in 
each twenty-four hour period.

[¶15.]  We are satisfied that with this very 
express, clear statutory language, construed in accordance within the plain, 
ordinary meaning of the word day, the legislature fully intended that students 
be at school on 175 separate days during a school year. We find no ambiguity. 
While we need not reach the question because it was not presented, it appears 
that adoption of the alternative schedule may have jeopardized the foundation 
entitlements, supra fn. 2, of the school district in that there is a clear 
statutory mandate that school be held on 180 separate days during the school 
year.

[¶16.]  We will only note in passing that the 
attempted evasion of the 175/180 day statutory requirement has no sound basis. 
The general provisions of § 21-2-304(a)(i)4 authorizing the State Board to 
prescribe minimum standards for education programs; § 21-2-304(a)(v)5 to investigate educational needs 
and means of improving the educational system; § 21-2-305(a)(ii)6 to require reports and assistance 
from school boards; and § 21-3-110(a)(v)7 requiring district boards of 
trustees to submit reports concerning finances or any other matter required by 
the State Board or law, are a pretty frail support as against a more clear 
specific statute. We notice from § 21-2-304(a)(ii) that the State Board has the 
duty to withhold funds from schools "failing to comply with any applicable law." 
Where a special provision is made by law, it prevails over the general. Town of Worland v. Odell & Johnson, 79 Wyo. 1, 329 P.2d 797 
(1958). Courts will not read into laws what is not there, Matter of Adoption of Voss, Wyo., 550 P.2d 481 (1976), nor read into statutes exceptions not made by the legislature. 
Lo Sasso v. Braun, 
Wyo., 386 P.2d 630 (1963). We cannot see wherein, under 
the general powers of the State Board, it may disregard and make any exception 
to the 175/180 day requirements. The State Superintendent and State Board should 
have gone to the legislature through the governor to seek an exception for a 
pilot program. Section 21-2-306, W.S. 1977.8 The legislature has thus reserved 
to itself the authority granted it by § 1, Art. 7, Wyoming Constitution: "The 
legislature shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a complete 
and uniform system of public instruction * * 
*."

[¶17.]  In the light of our disposition, there is 
no need to consider any of the other issues raised by 
appellants.

[¶18.]  The order of the district court approving 
the alternative 144 day scheduling is reversed and vacated and the district 
court directed to grant by decree the relief sought by 
appellants.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 21-4-301, W.S. 
1977 in pertinent part provides: "* * * Each school district shall operate its 
schools and its classes for a minimum of one hundred seventy-five (175) days 
each school year."

2 Section 
21-13-307(a)(ii), W.S. 1977 provides:

"(a) Each district which 
meets the following requirements shall be eligible to share in the distribution 
of funds from the foundation account:

* * * * * 
*

"(ii) Operated all 
schools for a term of one hundred eighty (180) days or more during the previous 
school year; provided, that if the school term of any school in a district was 
less than one hundred eighty (180) days, the amount allotted per classroom unit 
under section 21.1-232 of the statutes [§ 21-13-309] for such school shall be in 
proportion to the length of the term the school actually operated, unless caused 
by closures of schools due to fuel shortages, fire, construction problems, 
weather, civil disturbance or threatened civil disturbance, days of national 
recognition, widespread illnesses, or whenever necessary to protect the health, 
safety or welfare of students, teachers and other employees, provided such 
closures are approved by the state board of education or are the result of 
presidential or gubernatorial executive orders."

3 This holding is contrary 
to the views of the attorney general upon whose opinion the State Board and 
State Superintendent relied. The attorney general concluded that "the State 
Board may not generally authorize school districts to utilize school calendars 
which have less than 175/180 calendar days" and that 175/180 days mean calendar 
days. The attorney general's opinion then set out the justification for a pilot 
schedule, based on a series of statutes, which was then adopted by the State 
Superintendent and State Board and which we now 
disapprove.

4 Section 21-2-304(a)(i), 
W.S. 1977 provides:

"(a) In addition to any 
other duties assigned to it by law, the state board shall:

"(i) Prescribe minimum 
standards with which public schools and other educational institutions receiving 
money from any state fund, except the University of Wyoming and the community colleges, must 
comply. Such standards shall relate to and include:

"(A) General education 
programs;

"(B) Site selection and 
building and construction of public schools; and

"(C) The evaluation and 
accreditation of the public schools."

5 Section 21-2-304(a)(v), 
W.S. 1977 provides:

"(v) Conduct 
investigations within or without the state regarding educational needs and means 
of improving conditions to insure an adequate educational system for the state 
of Wyoming."

6 Section 21-2-305(a)(ii), 
W.S. 1977 provides:

"(ii) Require such 
reports and other assistance from school boards and officials as it may from 
time to time deem necessary and advisable."

7 Section 21-3-110(a)(v), 
W.S. 1977 provides:

"(v) Submit such reports 
concerning finances or any other matter as the state board or state law may 
require."

8 Section 21-2-306, W.S. 
1977 provides:

"The state superintendent 
and the state board shall, in accordance with section 9-21 of the statutes [§ 
9-2-103], report to the governor and recommend such legislation concerning 
education and appropriations for educational activities as they may deem 
appropriate."