Case Title: State v. Alexander Branch

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-78-03

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2005-02-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ALEXANDER BRANCH, Defendant-Appellant. Argued October 12, 2004 Decided February 1, 2005 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. James K. Smith, Jr. argued the cause for appellant (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney; M. Virginia Barta, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief) Joie_Piderit argued the cause for respondent (Peter C. Harvey, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney) JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. The right of a party to confront witnesses in court is one of the principal values protected by the hearsay rule. The rule generally shields a party from damning out-of-court statements, which are offered for their truth but are not subject to the truth-testing rigors of cross-examination. Our evidentiary rules and case law recognize many exceptions to the hearsay rule that promote both the efficiency and the fact-finding integrity of trials. This appeal explores whether hearsay used by the State to convict defendant of burglary and robbery fell within legitimate exceptions to the hearsay rule. In this case, a police detective testified that he included defendant s picture in a photographic array because he had developed defendant as a suspect based on information received. The same detective also testified to the out-of-court descriptions of the burglar given by two non-testifying child victims. Defendant claims that the detective s testimony was inadmissible and highly prejudicial hearsay that denied him a fair trial. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant s convictions, finding that the detective followed the command of State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263 (1973), when he testified about the photographic array, and finding that the children s descriptions of the burglar were excited utterances admissible under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2). We disagree and now reverse. We hold that the detective s testimony that he developed a suspect based on information received from an unknown source was inadmissible hearsay that violated defendant s right of confrontation. We also hold that the one out-of-court description of the burglar that is truly in issue did not meet the definition of an excited utterance because the child-declarant had an opportunity to deliberate before making her statement. [(Emphasis added.)] Defendant argues that the detective s hearsay testimony fell into no exception to the hearsay rule, violated his federal and state constitutional confrontation rights, and led the jury to the inescapable conclusion that a non-testifying declarant had implicated him in the crime. The State responds that the detective followed the command of Bankston, supra, when he testified that he acted based on information received to explain that he did not proceed with the photographic identification in an arbitrary manner. From the quoted colloquy, we know that Detective Calvin received the information making defendant a suspect in the crime before O Nieal and Gannon identified defendant s photograph from the array. We also know that there was no trial testimony or evidence, other than those identifications, that could have led Calvin to focus on defendant as a suspect. Thus, the jury was left to speculate that the detective had superior knowledge through hearsay information implicating defendant in the crime. Because the nameless person who provided the information to Calvin was not called as a witness, the jury never learned the basis of that person s knowledge regarding defendant s guilt, whether he was a credible source, or whether he had a peculiar interest in the case. Defendant never had the opportunity to confront that anonymous witness and test his credibility in the crucible of cross-examination. Both the hearsay rule and the right of confrontation protect a defendant from the incriminating statements of a faceless accuser who remains in the shadows and avoids the light of court. There was no legitimate need or reason for Detective Calvin to tell the jury why he placed defendant s picture in the photographic array. The only relevant evidence was the identification itself. We now determine that Calvin s gratuitous hearsay testimony violated defendant s federal and state rights to confrontation as well as our rules of evidence. [(Emphasis added.)] The detective had elicited two critical facts that had not been mentioned earlier by the children to Officer Kollmar, Gannon or their mother, See footnote 5 that the intruder had a gap in his teeth and dirty hands, and only Juliana had made those observations. Those facts were central to the State s case because they matched defendant s appearance at the time of his arrest. Because Juliana did not testify, the jury did not learn specifically how she made her observations. For example, the jury did not learn how well the light from the hallway illuminated her darkened bedroom, whether she wore glasses, whether the intruder had a small space between his teeth or a missing tooth, how long she viewed the intruder, whether the intruder looked directly at her, or other significant details that may have touched on the reliability of her observations. The State s failure to call the children as witnesses, particularly Juliana, in view of their apparent availability, is in no way dispositive in determining whether the children s statements are excited utterances, but does factor into our analysis. The Blackman court explained that the conductor s remarks would have been admissible had they been exclamatory, and coincident with the happening of the accident . . . . Ibid. Instead, because the words were merely narrative of the conditions which had brought it about, they were inadmissible hearsay, despite the short time that had elapsed between the accident and the spoken words. Ibid. In State v. Doro, a person who had witnessed the slashing of her friend s throat pursued the blood-covered killer, screaming, he has just murdered somebody catch him. 103 N.J.L. 88, 90 (E. & A. 1926). The declarant s statements were admitted under the res gestae rule because they were spontaneous and unreflecting, without time for invention or misrepresentation and part of the necessary incidents of the litigated act. Id. at 93-94. On the other hand, an accident victim s statements that were the product of forethought and constituted a narrative of a past event were treated differently at common law. Anastasio v. Rast, 128 N.J.L. 426, 428 (Sup. Ct. 1942). In Anastasio, supra, the decedent-victim made statements to a police officer within a half hour of being injured in a motorcycle accident. Id. at 426. The court ruled that the statements were not res gestae because they were not made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses and, though the deceased was suffering intense pain, he had ample time to reflect and to make a self-serving declaration if he desired. Id. at 428. Riley v. Weigand is another example of a court rejecting as res gestae a victim s non-spontaneous post-accident narrative of the events. 18 N.J. Super. 66, 77 (App. Div. 1952). In that case, a police officer responded to a home where the victim of a car accident had been taken. Id. at 70. The officer asked the victim, who later died of his injuries, what had happened. Ibid. Although only a short time had passed since the accident, and despite the victim s mortal wounds, the court concluded that the victim s out-of-court statements to the police officer lacked spontaneity, were not concomitant with the main fact under consideration, and were merely narrative of a past occurrence. Id. at 77. Accordingly, the court ruled the statement inadmissible as res gestae. Ibid. The Riley court articulated the broad contours for the admission of the excited utterance that are followed by New Jersey courts to this day: Before admitting an utterance as a part of the res gestae, the trial judge must decide the preliminary question of whether the declarant has had any opportunity for deliberation and reflection, or whether the utterance was a spontaneous one. The matters for him to consider are the element of time, the circumstances of the accident, the mental and physical condition of the declarant, the shock produced, the nature of the utterance, whether against the interest of the declarant or not or made in response to questions or involuntary, and any other material facts in the surrounding circumstances. [Id. at 73-74 (citation omitted).] The rigorous admissibility standards for excited utterances under the common law, including early New Jersey case law, have given way in recent decades to the expansion of the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Cestero v. Ferrara, 57 N.J. 497, 502 (1971). In recent times, as courts have struggled to adapt the doctrine to difficult facts, the res gestae concept has been considerably broadened and the requirement for strict contemporaneity has been modified. Ibid. The case that heralded the expansion of the excited utterance rule dealt with the brutal rape of a sixteen-year-old deaf-mute girl with a mental age no greater than that of a seven-year-old. State v. Simmons, 52 N.J. 538, 540-41 (1968) (per curiam), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 924, 89 S. Ct. 1779, 23 L. Ed. 2d 241 (1969). In Simmons, supra, the sexual assault victim was taken to a hospital emergency room; some time afterward, the police brought the defendant there to see if the victim could identify him. Id. at 541. Still emotionally distraught, [s]he was asked by her mother and the police officers whether the defendant was the man who had attacked her and, although she could not speak, she made identification by her actions . . . . Ibid. The victim was not competent to testify at trial, and thus did not testify to her out-of-court identification. Ibid. Notwithstanding that the victim s statement identifying the defendant was made some time after the crime and in response to questioning, the Court ruled that the statement was a spontaneous declaration admissible under res gestae. Id. at 542. In the wake of Simmons, supra, courts have determined that a spontaneous declaration will be admissible, even if not concomitant or coincident with the exciting stimulus, provided that in the light of all the circumstances it may be said reasonably that the exciting influence had not lost its sway or had not been dissipated in the interval. Cestero, supra, 57 N.J. at 502. We note, however, that even when this Court has applied a more expansive interpretation to the admissibility of excited utterances, the declarant always has either testified or been unavailable. See, e.g., Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1, 35 (2004) (admitting as excited utterance in malpractice action hysterical reaction of testifying plaintiff to disturbing telephone call with son s physician); Long, supra, 173 N.J. at 143, 153, 158-160 (admitting as excited utterances statements of murder victim made to her mother immediately upon completion of telephone conversations with defendant); State v. Lyle, 73 N.J. 403, 411-13 (1977) (per curiam) (admitting as excited utterance statement of murder victim made to sister after he was chased from his lover s home by her husband); State v. Graham, 59 N.J. 366, 369-71 (1971) (suggesting that statements of dying murder victim made to police in hospital could be admissible as spontaneous declarations by trial court); Cestero, supra, 57 N.J. at 499, 502-04 (admitting as excited utterance statement of testifying defendant regarding car accident made to doctor immediately upon regaining consciousness in hospital); Simmons, supra, 52 N.J. at 541-42 (admitting as spontaneous declaration gesticulation of deaf-mute rape victim incompetent to testify made at hospital after attack). We acknowledge that our cases have never articulated a distinction between a declarant s availability and non-availability in deciding the admissibility of an excited utterance. A more expansive approach to the admissibility of such hearsay is tempered, however, when either the declarant testifies or is unavailable. When the declarant testifies, the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant; when the declarant is unavailable, the rule of necessity provides a justification for the admission of such evidence. We have recognized the difficulty confronted by courts attempting to shoehorn statements of child sexual abuse victims into the excited utterance rule. In State v. D.R., we recommended the creation of the tender years hearsay exception for child sex abuse cases, acknowledging the observation of the American Bar Association that courts were tending to invoke tortured interpretations of the excited utterance exception in order to sustain admissibility of a child s out-of-court statement. 109 N.J. 348, 361, 375-78 (1988). The American Bar Association s critique that we invoked in D.R., supra, laid bare a truth that courts, perhaps even unconsciously, felt pressed to distort the analysis of the excited utterance exception in order to justify the admission of evidence necessary to uphold convictions for particularly repugnant crimes. Today, the incorporation of the tender years exception into our rules of evidence at N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) allows courts to address directly a child s out-of-court statement within a clearly applicable rule. Nevertheless, the expansive reading of Simmons, supra, a case involving the sexual abuse of an incompetent adolescent, continues in cases with very different factual scenarios. In those cases, with little emphasis placed on the declarant s opportunity to deliberate as a key factor in determining admissibility, out-of-court statements with detailed past narratives are introduced into evidence under cover of the excited utterance doctrine. An examination of two civil cases, thirty years apart, both arising from car accidents, illustrates the interpretative expansion of the excited utterance rule. In both cases, a party sought to introduce through a police officer s testimony the out-of-court statements of witnesses to the accidents under the excited utterance hearsay exception. In Sas v. Strelecki, the plaintiffs contended that an unidentified vehicle ran their car off the road causing it to crash into a parked vehicle. 110 N.J. Super. 14, 16 (App. Div. 1970). A police officer who arrived at the scene between five and ten minutes after receiving a radio signal was allowed to testify to statements made at the scene of the accident by the car s driver, its passenger, and another witness. Id. at 17. The Appellate Division ruled that the statements were not spontaneous statements and, therefore, did not fit within the hearsay exception of Evidence Rule 63(4), the predecessor to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2). See footnote 8 Id. at 18-19. The panel concluded that [c]onsidering the probable lapse in time between the accident and the call to police headquarters and the detailed explanation of the accident to the officer by the occupants of the [plaintiff s] car, it is highly unlikely that the requirement of unreflective spontaneity is satisfied. Id. at 18. In Truchan v. Sayreville Bar and Restaurant, Inc., a police officer responded to the scene of an accident in which the plaintiff was badly injured by a drunk driver. 323 N.J. Super. 40, 44-46 (App. Div. 1999). Twenty minutes after his arrival at the scene, the officer took statements from two eyewitnesses who observed the head-on collision. Id. at 47-48. The trial court ruled that the police officer could not testify to those statements as excited utterances because the eyewitnesses had sufficient time to deliberate and confer with each other. Id. at 48. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that as a result of the excitement caused by the event, the witnesses were still under the stress of the event when they related their accounts to the officer, and neither the passage of time nor the fact that the witnesses responded to questioning rendered the hearsay inadmissible. Id. at 50 (citing Simmons, supra, 52 N.J. at 542). When analyzing N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2), Truchan, supra, and other similar cases have paid nominal attention to whether the declarant had the opportunity to deliberate or fabricate before making the statement and instead have emphasized the startling event to which the statement relates and the stress of excitement affecting the declarant. See, e.g., State v. Conigliaro, 356 N.J. Super. 54, 59-64, 69-70 (App. Div. 2002). See footnote 9 The current trend to minimize the declarant s opportunity to deliberate when deciding the admissibility of a proffered excited utterance is a significant break from the common law, which frowned on the introduction of past narratives through hearsay. Riley, supra, 18 N.J. Super. at 77; see also Anastasio, supra, 128 N.J.L. at 428; Blackman, supra, 68 N.J.L. at 2. It is the increasingly frequent use of the excited utterance exception as the vehicle for introducing past narratives from non-testifying declarants that has created tension with our common law and Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ALEXANDER BRANCH, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED February 1, 2005 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Albin CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY