Case Title: Raines v. U.S. Healthworks Medical Group

Citation: 

Docket Number: S273630

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2023-08-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
KRISTINA RAINES et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
S273630 
 
Ninth Circuit 
21-55229 
 
Southern District of California 
3:19-cv-01539-DMS-DEB 
 
 
August 21, 2023 
 
Justice Jenkins authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, 
Groban, and Evans concurred. 
 
1 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
S273630 
 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
This case requires us to clarify the meaning of the term 
“employer” as used in the California Fair Employment and 
Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code,1 § 12900 et seq.).  Subject to 
specified exceptions, section 12940 of the FEHA makes it an 
“unlawful employment practice” for “any employer” “to make 
any medical or psychological inquiry of an applicant” (§ 12940, 
subd. (e)(1)), and section 12926, subdivision (d) states that, for 
purposes of the FEHA, the term “ ‘[e]mployer’ includes any 
person regularly employing five or more persons, or any person 
acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly . . . .”  
(Italics added.)  The italicized language might be interpreted as 
merely incorporating the common law principle of respondeat 
superior, or some variant thereof, into the FEHA’s statutory 
liability.  Were we to adopt this interpretation of the statutory 
language, liability for a violation of the statute would reside 
with the employer, not with the employer’s agent.2  Conversely, 
the italicized language could also be reasonably interpreted to 
mean that an employer’s agents are subject to all the obligations 
and liabilities that the FEHA imposes on the employer itself.  
 
1  
All further undesignated statutory references are to the 
Government Code. 
2  
When we use the term “employer” without any 
qualification, we use it in the ordinary common law sense, not 
in a sense specially defined by a statute such as the FEHA. 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
2 
Recognizing this ambiguity, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit asked this court to answer the following 
question:  “Does California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, 
which defines ‘employer’ to include ‘any person acting as an 
agent of an employer,’ Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(d), permit a 
business entity acting as an agent of an employer to be held 
directly liable for employment discrimination?”  (Raines v. U.S. 
Healthworks Medical Group (9th Cir. 2022) 28 F.4th 968, 969.)  
We conclude that an employer’s business entity agents can be 
held directly liable under the FEHA for employment 
discrimination in appropriate circumstances when the business-
entity agent has at least five employees and carries out FEHA-
regulated activities on behalf of an employer. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs Kristina Raines and Darrick Figg, on behalf of 
themselves and a putative class, allege that they received offers 
of employment that were conditioned on successful completion 
of preemployment medical screenings to be conducted by 
defendant U.S. Healthworks Medical Group (USHW), who was 
acting as an agent of plaintiffs’ prospective employers.  Plaintiffs 
assert that USHW and its affiliates and successors (collectively, 
defendants) are “the nation’s and California’s largest providers 
of occupational health.”  Plaintiffs claim that as part of its 
medical screenings, USHW required job applicants to complete 
a written health history questionnaire that included numerous 
health-related questions having no bearing on the applicant’s 
ability to perform job-related functions.  According to plaintiffs, 
these questions covered details of the applicant’s health history 
including “whether the applicant has and/or has ever had: 1) 
venereal disease; 2) painful or irregular vaginal discharge or 
pain; 3) problems with menstrual periods; 4) irregular 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
3 
menstrual period; 5); penile discharge, prostate problems, 
genital pain or masses; 6) cancer; 7) mental illness; 8) HIV; 9) 
permanent disabilities; 10) painful/frequent urination; 11) hair 
loss; 12) hemorrhoids; 13) diarrhea; 14) black stool; 15) 
constipation; 16) tumors; 17) organ transplant; 18) stroke; or 19) 
a history of tobacco or alcohol use.”  In addition, the 
questionnaire asked whether the job applicant was pregnant, 
sought information regarding medications taken, and required 
the job applicant to disclose prior job-related injuries and 
illnesses. 
Plaintiff Kristina Raines received an offer from Front 
Porch Communities and Services (Front Porch) for a position as 
a food service aide, but the offer was conditioned on her passing 
the preemployment medical screening conducted by USHW.  
Raines alleges that she responded to most of the questions on 
the written questionnaire, but she declined to answer the 
question about the date of her last menstrual period.  She 
alleges that the exam was then terminated, and Front Porch 
revoked its offer of employment. 
Plaintiff Darrick Figg received an offer from the San 
Ramon Valley Fire Protection District to serve as a member of 
the volunteer communication reserve, but his offer, too, was 
conditioned on his passing the preemployment medical 
screening conducted by USHW.  Figg alleges that he answered 
all the questions, successfully passed the screening, and was 
hired for the position. 
Raines filed a state court action against Front Porch and 
USHW.  After she later filed a first amended complaint that 
added additional defendants and class claims, defendants 
removed the action to federal court.  (See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).)  
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
4 
There, Raines filed a second amended complaint, adding Figg as 
a named plaintiff, dismissing Front Porch as a defendant 
(pursuant to a settlement), and adding additional defendants.  
Defendants successfully moved to dismiss (see Fed. Rules 
Civ.Proc., rule 12(b)(6), 28 U.S.C.), and plaintiffs then filed a 
third amended complaint.  That complaint, which is the 
operative complaint, alleges claims under the FEHA, the Unruh 
Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51 et seq.), unfair competition law 
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.), and the common law right 
of privacy. 
Defendants again moved to dismiss, and the district court 
granted the motion with prejudice as to all claims except 
plaintiffs’ unfair competition law claim.  In dismissing plaintiffs’ 
FEHA claim, the district court concluded that the FEHA does 
not impose liability on the agents of a plaintiff’s employer. 
As to plaintiffs’ unfair competition law claim, the district 
court had granted dismissal without prejudice, but plaintiffs 
requested an order dismissing the claim with prejudice, and the 
district court granted their request.  Plaintiffs then appealed the 
dismissal of their other claims.  After holding oral argument, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit asked this 
court to answer the question quoted on page 2, ante. 
II. DISCUSSION 
At issue in this case is the proper interpretation of the 
definition of “ ‘[e]mployer’ ” in section 12926, subdivision (d).  In 
part II.A., we discuss our prior decisions interpreting that 
provision and conclude that they do not resolve the question the 
Ninth Circuit has put before us.  In part II.B., we examine the 
text of section 12926, subdivision (d); its legislative history; the 
interpretation 
federal 
courts 
have 
given 
to 
federal 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
5 
antidiscrimination laws that use similar language; and public 
policy considerations.  Our examination of these indicators of 
legislative intent leads us to conclude that the agent-inclusive 
language of section 12926, subdivision (d) permits a business-
entity agent of an employer to be held directly liable for violation 
of the FEHA when it carries out FEHA-regulated activities on 
behalf of an employer.  Lastly, in part II.C., we consider and 
reject 
defendants’ 
arguments 
in 
favor 
of 
a 
contrary 
interpretation. 
A. The Relevance of Reno v. Baird and Jones v. 
Lodge at Torrey Pines 
As noted on page 1, ante, section 12926, subdivision (d) 
provides that, for purposes of the FEHA, the term “ ‘[e]mployer’ 
includes any person regularly employing five or more persons, 
or any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or 
indirectly . . . .”  We have explored the meaning of this provision 
in two cases:  Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640 (Reno) and 
Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 
1158 (Jones). 
The issue in Reno was whether an employer’s supervisory 
employees could be held personally liable under the FEHA for 
their acts of employment discrimination.  The plaintiff in Reno 
alleged discrimination and wrongful discharge, and she sued, 
among others, the individual supervisors who, she alleged, were 
directly responsible for the alleged discriminatory acts.  She 
argued that the individual defendants, as agents of her 
employers, could be held personally liable under the plain 
meaning of section 12926, subdivision (d), which makes “any 
person acting as an agent of an employer” into an “ ‘[e]mployer’ ” 
for purposes of the FEHA.  (See Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 
643–644, 647.)  We concluded that the agent-inclusive language 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
6 
of section 12926, subdivision (d) does not impose liability on all 
agents, including individual employees of the same employer, 
and adopting that interpretation of section 12926, subdivision 
(d) would be inconsistent with the provision’s express exemption 
for employers with fewer than five employees.  (Reno, at pp. 647, 
650–651.)  In so concluding, we noted “ ‘the incongruity that 
would exist if small employers [with fewer than five employees] 
were exempt from liability while individual nonemployer 
supervisors were at risk of personal liability.’ ”  (Id. at p. 651, 
quoting Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 
55, 71.)  We added:  “ ‘The Legislature clearly intended to protect 
employers of less than five from the burdens of litigating 
discrimination claims.  [Citation.] . . . [I]t is “inconceivable” that 
the Legislature simultaneously intended to subject individual 
nonemployers to the burdens of litigating such claims.’ ”  (Reno, 
at p. 651, quoting Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics, at p. 72.) 
We further explained that imposing personal liability on 
supervisory employees would severely damage the exercise of 
supervisory judgment because supervisors would fear that their 
routine workplace decisions might lead to personal financial 
ruin.  Among other things, this possibility would cause 
supervisors to have interests in conflict with those of their 
employers.  (Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 651–653.)  In 
addition, we noted that corporate decisions are often made 
collectively, and therefore assessing individual blame in a 
particular case of discrimination might be difficult.  Individual 
employees might even find themselves pitted against one 
another, trying to protect their own interests.  (Id. at p. 662.)  
Finally, we commented that defending even an unmeritorious 
lawsuit can be expensive, and supervisors should not have to 
face that cost every time they make a routine personnel decision.  
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
7 
(Id. at p. 663.)  For these reasons, we concluded in Reno that, 
notwithstanding the agent-inclusive language of section 12926, 
subdivision (d), “individuals who do not themselves qualify as 
employers may not be sued under the FEHA for alleged 
discriminatory acts.”  (Reno, at p. 663.) 
In Reno, however, we declined to address the question 
presented in this case:  whether section 12926, subdivision (d) 
permits direct liability for other types of agents, such as business 
entities acting as independent contractors.  (See Reno, supra, 18 
Cal.4th at p. 658.)3 
In Jones, we extended Reno’s holding to a claim of 
retaliation in violation of section 12940, subdivision (h), holding 
that supervisorial employees are not liable under the FEHA for 
their retaliatory acts.  (Jones, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 1173–
1174.)  We reached that conclusion despite the retaliation 
provision’s broad wording, which refers not merely to the 
“employer” 
but 
to 
“any 
employer, 
labor 
organization, 
employment agency, or person.”  (§ 12940, subd. (h), italics 
added.)  Our reasoning closely tracked our analysis in Reno.  
Noting, among other things, the FEHA’s exemption for 
employers having fewer than five employees (Jones, at p. 1165), 
we reasoned that it would be incongruous to hold a supervisor 
liable for retaliation while exempting small employers from such 
liability (id. at pp. 1167–1168).  We said:  “All of the[] reasons 
[we gave in Reno] for not imposing individual liability for 
 
3  
Because Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th 640 expressly reserved 
the question we are now deciding, we cannot draw any strong 
conclusion from the Legislature’s failure to amend the FEHA’s 
definition of employer during the more than two decades since 
we decided that case. 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
8 
discrimination — supervisors can avoid [doing acts of] 
harassment but cannot avoid [making] personnel decisions, it is 
incongruous to exempt small employers but to hold individual 
nonemployers liable, sound policy favors avoiding conflicts of 
interest and the chilling of effective management, corporate 
employment decisions are often collective, and it is bad policy to 
subject supervisors to the threat of a lawsuit every time they 
make a personnel decision — apply equally to retaliation.”  (Id. 
at p. 1167.)  We also noted that section 12940, subdivision (j), 
which governs harassment, expressly imposes liability on the 
employees who are responsible for the harassment.  It provides 
(as it did when Jones was decided):  “An employee of an entity 
subject to this [harassment] subdivision is personally liable for 
any harassment prohibited by this section that is perpetrated by 
the employee . . . .”  (§ 12940, subd. (j)(3).)  That provision, in our 
view, made it clear that the Legislature used express language 
in section 12940 when it wanted to impose personal liability on 
employees, and therefore the absence of such language in the 
retaliation provision (§ 12940, subd. (h)) supported the inference 
that the Legislature did not intend to impose personal liability 
on employees for their acts of retaliation.  (Jones, at p. 1162–
1163.)4 
 
4  
In deciding Reno, we did not consider subdivision (j)(3) of 
section 12940 because the text of that subdivision was first 
added to section 12940 after Reno was decided.  (See Stats. 2000, 
ch. 1047, § 1, p. 7690.)  We did, however, note that the term 
“employer” is specially defined for purposes of the FEHA’s 
harassment provision, omitting the exemption for employers 
having fewer than five employees.  (See Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th 
at pp. 645, 650.)  That and other provisions of section 12940 
made clear that section 12940 treats harassment differently 
 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
9 
Although we directly address in part II.B., post, whether 
section 12926, subdivision (d) permits FEHA liability for 
business-entity agents of employers, it is useful here to highlight 
the ways in which the considerations that motivated our 
decisions in Reno and Jones are either absent or much 
diminished in a case, like this one, involving a business-entity 
agent with five or more employees.5  At least in cases involving 
a business-entity agent with five or more employees, the 
incongruity of imposing liability on the agent while exempting 
employers with fewer than five employees does not exist.  In 
addition, such a business-entity agent will likely perform a 
narrowly defined task for multiple clients over the course of 
several years.  Thus, it more likely can bear the cost of legal 
counsel to ensure that its policies and methods meet applicable 
statutory and common law standards.  As to the potential for 
conflicts of interest between the agent and the employer, it is 
perhaps true that a business-entity agent’s interest in 
minimizing its own liability might sometimes conflict with the 
interests of the employer that has hired it.  However, a business-
entity agent is more likely than an employee agent to have 
 
from discrimination.  (Reno, at pp. 645, 650.)  We also noted that 
the conduct that might lead to a harassment claim is avoidable, 
but a supervisor cannot avoid making personnel decisions 
despite the risk that such decisions could lead to a claim of 
discrimination.  (Id. at pp. 645–646.) 
5  
As noted, plaintiffs allege that USHW and its affiliates 
and successors (defendants here) are large business enterprises 
operating on a national scale, and our analysis takes that 
allegation into consideration.  The question of whether, and to 
what extent, the analysis we apply here would apply to a 
business-entity with fewer than five employees is not before us.  
Accordingly, we express no view on that question. 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
10 
comparable bargaining power to the employer, enabling it to 
negotiate such differences at the time that it initiates or renews 
its business relationship with the employer.  Indeed, such 
negotiations might include the question of indemnification 
regarding any potential FEHA liability that might arise.  
Finally, the role of a business-entity agent is often formally 
defined by the terms of its contract with the employer.  
Therefore, its fault, if any, for the employer’s actions can be 
easily determined. 
In short, in a case involving a business-entity agent, the 
competing statutory mandates that we needed to harmonize in 
Reno and Jones do not come into play, and the policy arguments 
that informed our analysis in those cases apply, if at all, with 
much less force.  Hence, Reno and Jones do not control the 
outcome here.  With that in mind, we turn to address the Ninth 
Circuit’s question. 
B. Section 12926, Subdivision (d) 
When as here we are interpreting a statutory provision, 
“ ‘ “ ‘[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s 
intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.  We first examine 
the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense 
meaning. . . .  If the language is clear, courts must generally 
follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would 
result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.  If 
the statutory language permits more than one reasonable 
interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the 
statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’  
[Citation.]  ‘Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in 
the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of 
which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase, 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
11 
sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative 
purpose.’ ” ’ ”  (Brennon B. v. Superior Ct. (2022) 13 Cal.5th 662, 
673.)  Consistent with this approach, we begin our analysis by 
examining the plain meaning of section 12926, subdivision (d).  
We conclude that the provision’s most natural reading imposes 
FEHA liability on the business-entity agents of employers, but 
the provision is not without some ambiguity.  Therefore, we 
examine the relevant legislative history of the provision, federal 
cases interpreting federal antidiscrimination laws that use 
similar language, and public policy considerations.  These 
indicators of legislative intent serve to confirm our conclusion 
that section 12926, subdivision (d) can impose direct liability on 
the business-entity agents of employers for their FEHA-
regulated activities. 
1. Plain Meaning 
Section 12926, subdivision (d) states that, for purposes of 
the FEHA, the term “ ‘[e]mployer’ includes . . . any person acting 
as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly . . . .”  The most 
natural reading of this language is that a “person acting as an 
agent of an employer” is itself an employer for purposes of the 
FEHA.  Indeed, this interpretation accounts for and reasonably 
construes the word “includes” (§ 12926, subd. (d)), a word that, 
in this context, can only be intended to broaden the scope of the 
term “employer.”  In addition, because “partnerships, 
associations, corporations, [and] limited liability companies” 
come within the FEHA’s definition of the word “ ‘[p]erson’ ” 
(§ 12925, subd. (d)), it follows that a business-entity agent of a 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
12 
FEHA plaintiff’s employer is, for purposes of the FEHA, an 
employer of the plaintiff.6 
Defendants, however, point out that we reached a 
different conclusion in Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th 640, holding that 
the agent-inclusive language of section 12926, subdivision (d) 
does not extend FEHA liability to agents.  Defendants’ argument 
misconstrues the scope of our holding in Reno.  In Reno, we did 
not categorically reject the natural reading of section 12926, 
subdivision (d), a reading that supports the conclusion here that 
the FEHA can impose liability on certain business-entity 
agents.  Rather, employing the principle that the provisions of a 
statute are to be interpreted in light of their context, we found 
it inconceivable that the Legislature simultaneously exempted 
from FEHA liability employers of fewer than five employees 
while imposing FEHA liability on supervisorial employees.  
(Reno, at p. 651.) 
The incongruity we identified in Reno is simply not 
present in a case like this one.  (See p. 9, ante.)  But as Reno 
implicitly recognized, the natural reading of section 12926, 
subdivision (d) that we have described is not the only possible 
interpretation of the provision.  (See Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th at 
p. 658 [expressing “no opinion on whether the ‘agent’ language 
merely 
incorporates 
respondeat 
superior 
principles”].)  
Therefore, we will examine other indicators of legislative intent 
in order to confirm the correct interpretation of the statutory 
language. 
 
6  
Section 12926, subdivision (d) creates an express 
exception for “religious association[s] or corporation[s] not 
organized for private profit.” 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
13 
2. Legislative History 
The FEHA was enacted in 1980 (Stats. 1980, ch. 992, § 4, 
p. 3140 et seq.), combining into one act the Fair Employment 
Practices Act (FEPA) (Lab. Code, former § 1410 et seq.; 
addressing employment discrimination) and the Rumford Fair 
Housing Act (Health & Saf. Code, former § 35720 et seq.; 
addressing housing discrimination).  The FEHA’s definition of 
employer came directly from the FEPA, and therefore its 
wording dates back to the FEPA’s enactment in 1959.  At that 
time, the FEPA defined employer as follows:  “ ‘Employer,’ 
except as herein provided, includes any person regularly 
employing five or more persons, or any person acting as an agent 
of an employer, directly or indirectly; the State or any political 
or civil subdivision thereof and cities.”  (Lab. Code, former 
§ 1413, subd. (d), as enacted by Stats. 1959, ch. 121, § 1, p. 2000, 
italics added.)  As relevant to our inquiry concerning the liability 
of an agent, the italicized part of the FEPA definition of 
employer is identical to the FEHA’s present definition of 
employer (§ 12926, subd. (d)), and it is, of course, the part of the 
definition we must construe in this case. 
Of significance to our analysis, the FEPA’s 1959 definition 
of employer took its agent-inclusive language from the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) (29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.), a federal 
law that assures fair labor practices and workplace democracy.  
At that time, and still today, the NLRA provided that “[t]he term 
‘employer’ includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, 
directly or indirectly.”  (Labor Management Relations (Taft-
Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub.L. No. 80-101 (June 23, 1947) 61 Stat. 
136, 137, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), italics added.)  That the 
FEPA adopted the NLRA’s agent-inclusive language informs 
our analysis because, as amicus curiae Legal Aid at Work points 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
14 
out, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had 
interpreted the NLRA’s definition of employer to impose 
employer status on certain employer agents.  (See Hudson Pulp 
& Paper Corp. (1958) 121 NLRB 1446, 1450–1451; Hugh J. 
Baker & Co. (1955) 112 NLRB 828, 838; The Hearst Corp. (1952) 
101 NLRB 643, 648, fn. 3; Western Ass’n of Engineers, Architects 
and Surveyors (1952) 101 NLRB 64, 64; J.D. Jewell, Inc. (1952) 
99 NLRB 61, 64, fn. 15; Southland Manufacturing Co. (1951) 94 
NLRB 813, 829; Jackson Daily News (1950) 90 NLRB 565, 565; 
Association of Motion Picture Producers, Inc. (1949) 85 NLRB 
902, 903; see also p. 26, fn. 10, post.)  The Legislature did not 
make an express reference to these NLRB decisions when, in 
1959, it adopted the NLRA’s agent-inclusive language into the 
FEPA, but the decisions are consistent with the conclusion that 
the Legislature intended the FEPA’s agent-inclusive language 
to permit direct liability for the agents of an employer in 
appropriate circumstances.  (Cf. Yamaha Corp. of America v. 
State Bd. of Equalization (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 338, 353 
[presumption that the Legislature is aware of long-standing 
administrative interpretation of a law that the Legislature is 
reenacting]; Coca-Cola Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1945) 25 
Cal.2d 918, 922–923 [same].)  In addition, there is a very strong 
presumption that when, in 1980, our Legislature adopted that 
language into the FEHA, the language retained the same 
meaning.  (See Robinson v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. 
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 226, 235 [interpreting the FEHA consistently 
with the way the FEPA had previously been interpreted]; 
Buchwald v. Katz (1972) 8 Cal.3d 493, 502 [“ ‘where legislation 
is framed in the language of an earlier enactment on the same 
or an analogous subject, which has been judicially construed, 
there is a very strong presumption of intent to adopt the 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
15 
construction’ ”]; see also Union Oil Associates v. Johnson (1935) 
2 Cal.2d 727, 734–735.) 
Thus, the legislative history of the agent-inclusive 
language of section 12926, subdivision (d) supports an 
interpretation of that language as permitting direct FEHA 
liability on the business-entity agents of an employer.7 
3. Federal Antidiscrimination Laws 
Also instructive regarding the definition of employer in 
section 
12926, 
subdivision 
(d) 
are 
various 
federal 
antidiscrimination laws that define employer in similar terms.  
Because these federal laws were enacted after our Legislature 
enacted the definition of employer that now appears in section 
12926, subdivision (d), they are not, strictly speaking, part of the 
legislative history of the latter provision, but the parties rely on 
them by way of analogy.  We, like the parties, find these 
decisions helpful in interpreting the reach of the statutory 
language at issue.  State courts, when interpreting state law, 
commonly find federal court interpretations of federal laws that 
use similar language to be persuasive authority.  (See Williams 
v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97, 109; 
Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 984; Carter 
v. California Dept. of Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914, 
930, fn. 8; State Dept. of Health Services v. Superior Court (2003) 
31 Cal.4th 1026, 1040; Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 
 
7  
By contrast, had the Legislature intended the agent-
inclusive language merely to incorporate respondeat superior 
into the FEHA, it could have done so explicitly, as it has done in 
other provisions.  (See, e.g., Civ. Code, §§ 2334 [“A principal is 
bound by acts of his agent . . . .”], 2338 [“a principal is 
responsible to third persons for the negligence of his agent in the 
transaction of the business of the agency”].) 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
16 
Cal.4th 61, 74; Romano v. Rockwell International, Inc. (1996) 14 
Cal.4th 479, 498.)  More specifically, “ ‘[i]n interpreting 
California’s FEHA, California courts often look for guidance to 
decisions construing federal antidiscrimination laws, including 
title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964.’ ”  (Williams v. 
Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist., at p. 109, quoting Chavez 
v. City of Los Angeles, at p. 984; see Lyle v. Warner Brothers 
Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 278; Miller v. 
Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 463; State 
Dept. of Health Services v. Superior Court, at p. 1040; Aguilar v. 
Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 129–130 
(plur. opn. of George, C. J.); id. at p. 150, fn. 3 (conc. opn. of 
Werdegar, J.); Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 647; Turner v. 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1245–1246.) 
Three federal antidiscrimination laws have definitions of 
employer that are similar to the definition that appears in 
section 12926, subdivision (d).  Both title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (Title VII) (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) (42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101 et seq.) define “ ‘employer’ ” as “a person engaged in an 
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more 
employees . . . , and any agent of such a person.”  (42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(b); see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).)  Using nearly identical 
language, with a minor difference in the minimum number of 
employees required to come within the ambit of the statute, the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) (29 
U.S.C. § 621 et seq.) defines “ ‘employer’ ” as “a person engaged 
in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more 
employees” and “any agent of such a person.”  (29 U.S.C. 
§ 630(b).)  Like the FEHA, these three federal laws define 
employer in a way that includes an employer’s agents.  
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
17 
Therefore, all three federal laws raise a similar issue to the one 
now before us:  Does the agent-inclusive language in these 
definitions mean that plaintiffs may sue the agents of their 
employers, subjecting the agents to the same liability that the 
law imposes on the employers? 
Federal circuit court decisions have arrived at different 
conclusions on that question.  Several courts have concluded 
that 
the 
agent-inclusive 
language 
merely 
incorporates 
respondeat superior liability into the relevant statutory scheme.  
(See, e.g., Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp. (4th Cir. 1994) 30 
F.3d 507, 510 [“we read [the agent language in the ADEA’s 
definition of ‘employer’] as an unremarkable expression of 
respondeat superior — that discriminatory personnel actions 
taken by an employer’s agent may create liability for the 
employer”]; Grant v. Lone Star Co. (5th Cir. 1994) 21 F.3d 649, 
652 [“the purpose of the ‘agent’ provision in [42 U.S.C.] 
§ 2000e(b) was to incorporate respondeat superior liability into 
title VII”]; Miller v. Maxwell’s Intern. Inc. (9th Cir. 1993) 991 
F.2d 583, 587 [“ ‘[t]he obvious purpose of [the agent language of 
Title VII’s definition of employer] was to incorporate respondeat 
superior liability into the statute’ ”].)  Notably, however, these 
decisions all involved the question whether the particular 
federal law at issue imposed personal liability on the individual 
employee agents of an employer; that is, they addressed the 
question we decided in Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th 640.  Moreover, 
these decisions embrace the point we made in Reno that 
imposing personal liability on supervisorial employees would be 
incongruous in light of the exemption these federal laws create 
for small employers.  (See Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., at 
p. 510; Grant v. Lone Star Co., at p. 652; Miller v. Maxwell’s 
Intern. Inc., at p. 587.)  As discussed above (see p. 9, ante), there 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
18 
is no such incongruity here.  Therefore, these decisions are of 
little assistance in resolving the precise question we confront 
here — whether the agent-inclusive language of the relevant 
definition of employer imposes liability on a third party 
business-entity agent as opposed to an individual employee 
agent. 
Yet other federal decisions have addressed variants of the 
issue we now confront and have interpreted the agent-inclusive 
language to subject at least some business-entity agents to 
direct liability.  These courts have often relied on the high 
court’s decision in Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. 
Manhart (1978) 435 U.S. 702 (Manhart), which involved a class 
action challenging the Los Angeles Department of Water and 
Power’s (Department) practice of demanding higher retirement 
contributions from female employees than from male employees.  
This practice was actuarially justified based on the longer life-
expectancy of women, but the high court concluded that it 
violated Title VII.  The court limited the scope of its decision, 
however, saying:  “Nothing in our holding implies that it would 
be unlawful for an employer to set aside equal retirement 
contributions for each employee and let each retiree purchase 
the largest benefit which his or her accumulated contributions 
could command in the open market.”  (Manhart, at pp. 717–718.)  
After noting that limitation, the high court commented in a 
footnote:  “We do not suggest, of course, that an employer can 
avoid his responsibilities by delegating discriminatory programs 
to corporate shells.  Title VII applies to ‘any agent’ of a covered 
employer . . . .  In this case, for example, the Department could 
not deny that the administrative board [that oversaw its pension 
plan] was its agent after it successfully argued that the two were 
so inseparable that both shared the city’s immunity from suit 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
19 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”  (Manhart, at p. 718, fn. 33, citation 
omitted.)  This footnote is hardly free from ambiguity.  It could 
be read to say that the employer would bear respondeat superior 
liability for the discriminatory programs of the “corporate 
shells” (ibid.) that acted as its agents, or it could be read to say 
that the corporate shells would themselves bear employer 
liability. 
In Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n. (2d Cir. 1982) 
691 F.2d 1054 (Spirt), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals read 
the Manhart footnote in the latter manner, although it did so in 
a case involving an agent that was an independent business 
entity, not a corporate shell of the employer.  Spirt concluded 
that an insurance corporation and investment fund that acted 
as an agent to a university, providing retirement benefits to the 
university’s employees, came within the agent-inclusive 
language of Title VII’s definition of employer and therefore was 
liable under Title VII to the university’s employees.  The Second 
Circuit said:  “It is clear that plaintiff’s contract for retirement 
benefits is not with [her employer], but with TIAA–CREF, an 
independent insurer.  Plaintiff clearly is not an employee of 
TIAA–CREF in any commonly understood sense.  However, it is 
generally recognized that ‘the term “employer,” as it is used in 
Title VII, is sufficiently broad to encompass any party who 
significantly affects access of any individual to employment 
opportunities, regardless of whether that party may technically 
be described as an “employer” of an aggrieved individual as that 
term has generally been defined at common law.’ ”  (Spirt, at p. 
1063, quoting Vanguard Justice Society, Inc. v. Hughes (D.Md. 
1979) 471 F.Supp. 670, 696.)  The Second Circuit then discussed 
the high court’s comment in Manhart that “ ‘Title VII applies to 
“any agent” of a covered employer,’ ” (Spirt, at p. 1063, quoting 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
20 
Manhart, supra, 435 U.S. at p. 718, fn. 33), and it noted that 
many courts “have held Manhart applicable to pension plans 
run by third-party insurers.”  (Spirt, at p. 1063.)  The Second 
Circuit therefore concluded that TIAA–CREF, the pension plan 
administrator for the plaintiff’s employer, was an “employer” of 
the plaintiff for purposes of Title VII.  (Spirt, at p. 1063.) 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals, in Carparts Distri. Ctr. 
v. Automotive Wholesaler’s (1st Cir. 1994) 37 F.3d 12 (Carparts), 
extended the reasoning of Spirt, supra, 691 F.2d 1054 to an ADA 
case.  The plaintiffs in Carparts were a wholesale distributor of 
automotive parts and its sole shareholder and president, 
Ronald S.  The defendants were the Automotive Wholesaler’s 
Association of New England and its administering trust.  Since 
1977, the parts distributor had participated in a self-funded 
medical reimbursement plan offered by the defendants.  But in 
1990, the defendants capped benefits for AIDS-related illnesses 
at $25,000, knowing that Ronald S. was HIV positive.  In 
response to the cap, the plaintiffs sued the defendants, alleging 
discrimination based on disability in violation of the ADA.  The 
federal district court dismissed the claims, holding that the ADA 
did not apply because, among other things, neither defendant 
was an “employer” of Ronald S. within the meaning of the ADA.  
The First Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal order and 
remanded.  (Carparts, at p. 21.)  Because, as noted, the 
definitions of employer in the ADA and Title VII are, for all 
relevant purposes, the same, the First Circuit looked at how 
courts had interpreted Title VII’s definition, focusing in 
particular on Spirt, supra, 691 F.2d 1054.  (See Carparts, at pp. 
16–18.)  The First Circuit conceded that defendants were not the 
employers of Ronald S. in the ordinary sense of the term, but it 
nonetheless concluded that there were three valid theories 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
21 
according to which the defendants might be liable to Ronald S. 
under the ADA.  (Carparts, at p. 16.)  Two of those theories are 
noteworthy here.  “First, defendants would be ‘employers’ [of 
Ronald S.] if they functioned as [his] ‘employer’ with respect to 
his employee health care coverage, that is, if they exercised 
control over an important aspect of his employment.”  (Id. at p. 
17.)  “Second, even if the defendants did not have authority to 
determine the level of [Ronald S.’s] benefits, and even if 
Carparts retained the right to control the manner in which the 
Plan administered these benefits, defendants would still be 
rendered ‘employers’ of [Ronald S.] if defendants are ‘agents’ of 
a ‘covered entity,’ who act on behalf of the entity in the matter of 
providing and administering employee health benefits.”  (Ibid., 
italics added.)  Thus, the court construed the agent-inclusive 
language of the ADA’s definition of employer as imposing direct 
ADA liability on an employer’s agents under certain 
circumstances.  Having announced several theories by which the 
defendants might be liable under the ADA, the court concluded 
that further development of the record was necessary to 
determine whether any of the theories applied.  (Carparts, at p. 
18.)8 
 
8  
The third theory the Carparts court discussed is 
inapplicable here.  The court explained that in some Title VII 
cases the existence of an employee-employer relationship 
between the plaintiff and the defendant has been held to be 
unnecessary for purposes of imposing liability.  In these cases, 
entities that engaged in an industry affecting commerce and had 
the requisite number of employees were held liable for their 
discriminatory acts toward individuals who made no claim of 
being employees of the offending entity.  (See Sibley Memorial 
Hospital v. Wilson (D.C. Cir. 1973) 488 F.2d 1338, 1341; see also 
 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
22 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Williams v. City 
of Montgomery (11th Cir. 1984) 742 F.2d 586 (Williams), applied 
the agent-inclusive language of Title VII’s definition of employer 
to a municipal entity, concluding, as the court did in Spirt, 
supra, 691 F.2d 1054, that an institutional agent of an employer 
can be directly liable under Title VII to the employer’s 
employees.  In Williams, the court upheld a determination that 
the Montgomery City-County Personnel Board (the Board) had 
discriminated against the plaintiff based on race when it 
terminated his employment with the City of Montgomery.  The 
plaintiff was an employee of the city, not of the Board, but the 
Board was the city’s agent and was responsible for the city’s 
employment decisions, and therefore, the Eleventh Circuit 
concluded, it came within Title VII’s definition of employer and 
was directly liable.  (Williams, at pp. 588–589.)  After quoting 
the agent-inclusive language of Title VII’s employer definition 
(Williams, at p. 588), the court said:  “ ‘Where the employer has 
delegated control of some of the employer’s traditional rights, 
such as hiring or firing, to a third party, the third party has been 
found to be an “employer” by virtue of the agency relationship.’  
[Citation.] . . . [¶] . . . [¶]  The [provisions of Alabama law] 
 
Association of Mexican-American Educators v. State of 
California (9th Cir. 2000) 231 F.3d 572, 581; Christopher v. 
Stouder Memorial Hospital (6th Cir. 1991) 936 F.2d 870, 875; 
Pardazi v. Cullman Medical Center (11th Cir. 1988) 838 F.2d 
1155, 1156; Doe on Behalf of Doe v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. (7th Cir. 
1986) 788 F.2d 411, 422; Gomez v. Alexian Brothers Hosp. (9th 
Cir. 1983) 698 F.2d 1019, 1021.)  The Ninth Circuit’s question to 
this court is not concerned with an employer’s potential liability 
under the FEHA to nonemployees.  Rather, it is expressly 
concerned with “liab[ility] for employment discrimination.”  
(Raines v. U.S. Healthworks Medical Group, supra, 28 F.4th at 
p. 969, italics added.) 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
23 
illustrate the Board’s power to exercise duties traditionally 
reserved to the employer:  establishing a pay plan, formulating 
minimum standards for jobs, evaluating employees, and 
transferring, promoting, or demoting employees.  These 
functions are traditionally exercised by an employer, but the 
Board utilizes these powers in the instant case; and, therefore, 
the Board is an agent of the City for purposes of Title VII.”  
(Williams, at p. 589, italics added.)  On that basis, the Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment holding the Board 
liable for the plaintiff’s discriminatory termination.  (Id. at p. 
590.) 
Finally, in DeVito v. Chicago Park Dist. (7th Cir. 1996) 83 
F.3d 878 (DeVito), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
extended the holding of Williams, supra, 742 F.2d 586 to an ADA 
case.  In DeVito, a park district employee alleged he was 
terminated in violation of the ADA.  At issue, among other 
things, was whether the park district’s personnel board came 
within the ADA’s definition of employer.  In holding that it 
might, the Seventh Circuit expressly relied on the definition’s 
agent-inclusive language.  The court, however, recognized an 
exception for agents that were small entities with few 
employees.  The court said:  “The plain language of the ADA 
defines employer as ‘a person engaged’ in an industry affecting 
commerce who has 25 or more employees[9] . . . and any agent of 
such person.’  [Citation.]  Because (as discussed previously) the 
[personnel] Board is an agent of the Park District, it seems at 
 
9  
The minimum number of employees set forth in the ADA’s 
employer definition dropped to 15 as of July 26, 1994, but the 
25-employee minimum applied in DeVito.  (See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12111(5)(A).) 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
24 
first glance that the Board should be subject to suit.  But . . . 
[a]gents are liable under the ADA only if they ‘otherwise meet 
the statutory definition of [an] “employer.” ’  [Citation.]  For 
example, an agent of an employer is not liable under the ADA 
unless it has the requisite number of employees and is engaged 
in an industry affecting commerce.”  (DeVito, at p. 882, fn. 
omitted.)  Having reached that conclusion, the Seventh Circuit 
remanded the case for the district court to conduct the requisite 
factfinding to determine whether the park district’s personnel 
board qualified as the plaintiff’s “employer” for purposes of the 
ADA. 
These federal cases hold that under federal civil rights 
law, aggrieved employees may sue, not only their employer, but 
also the institutional agents of their employer if those agents 
engage in an industry affecting commerce and are responsible 
for the civil rights violation at issue.  The latter condition, that 
the agent be responsible for the violation, is analyzed in 
different ways, but the federal courts have generally focused on 
whether the agent exercised an administrative function 
traditionally exercised by the employer.  For example, in Spirt, 
the court considered whether the agent exercised a gatekeeper 
role that would normally be exercised by the employer and, by 
serving in that role, violated the plaintiff’s rights.  Specifically, 
the court held that it was appropriate to impose direct liability 
on an agent where, as was true in Spirt, the agent “ ‘significantly 
affects access . . . to employment opportunities.’ ”  (Spirt, supra, 
691 F.2d at p. 1063.) 
The court in Carparts, supra, 37 F.3d 12 reached a similar 
conclusion, noting that the agents in that case affected access to 
benefits in a similar way as the agent in Spirt.  The court said:  
“Just as ‘delegation of responsibility for employee benefits 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
25 
cannot insulate a discriminatory [retirement benefits] plan from 
attack under Title VII,’ Spirt, 691 F.2d at 1063, neither can it 
insulate a discriminatory health benefits plan under Title I of 
the ADA.”  (Carparts, supra, 37 F.3d at pp. 17–18.) 
Similarly, in Williams, the court considered whether the 
agent performed functions, typical of the employer, that might 
give rise to a civil rights violation.  The court noted that the 
personnel board that was acting as the employer’s agent in 
Williams exercised “ ‘control of some of the employer’s 
traditional rights, such as hiring or firing.’ ”  (Williams, supra, 
742 F.2d at p. 589.)  The court further noted the agent’s “power 
to exercise duties traditionally reserved to the employer:  
establishing a pay plan, formulating minimum standards for 
jobs, evaluating employees, and transferring, promoting, or 
demoting employees.”  (Ibid.)  Finally, the court commented that 
“[t]hese functions are traditionally exercised by an employer, 
but the [employer’s agent] utilizes these powers in the instant 
case . . . .”  (Ibid.)  On that ground, the court held that the agent 
bore direct liability for violating the plaintiff’s civil rights.  
(Ibid.) 
The holding of DeVito, supra, 83 F.3d 878, which likewise 
involved a personnel board of a municipal employer, is to the 
same effect.  In reaching its holding, the court did not emphasize 
the personnel board’s exercise of employer functions, but the 
facts of the case make clear that the personnel board had 
authority over the termination of the municipal employer’s 
employees.  (Id. at p. 879.) 
These cases establish that an employer’s agent can, under 
certain circumstances, appropriately bear direct liability under 
the federal antidiscrimination laws.  As noted on pages 15 to 16, 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
26 
ante, we have long held that “ ‘[i]n interpreting California’s 
FEHA, California courts often look for guidance to decisions 
construing federal antidiscrimination laws, including title VII of 
the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964.’ ”  (Williams v. Chino Valley 
Independent Fire Dist., supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 109.)  The federal 
court decisions in Spirt, supra, 691 F.2d 1054, Carparts, supra, 
37 F.3d 12, Williams, supra, 742 F.2d 586, and DeVito, supra, 
83 F.3d 878 support the conclusion that a business-entity agent 
of an employer can fall within the FEHA’s definition of 
employer, and it may be directly liable for FEHA violations, in 
appropriate situations.  Although the question presented in this 
case does not require that we go further and attempt to identify 
the specific scenarios in which a business-entity agent will be 
subject to liability under the FEHA, we recognize as a necessary 
minimum that, consistent with the FEHA’s language and 
purpose, a business-entity agent can bear direct FEHA liability 
only when it carries out FEHA-regulated activities on behalf of 
an employer.10 
 
10  
This interpretation is supported by the NLRB decisions 
cited on page 14, ante.  In those decisions, the NLRB imposed 
liability on business-entity agents only when the agent 
performed some NLRA-regulated activity on behalf of the 
employer and violated the NLRA in performing that activity.  
(See, e.g., Hudson Pulp & Paper Corp., supra, 121 NLRB at pp. 
1450–1451 [business entity designated to act as employer’s 
agent with respect to “the hiring, discharging, and supervision 
of its driver employees” liable as “employer” for NLRA violations 
committed in that capacity]; Association of Motion Picture 
Producers, Inc., supra, 85 NLRB at p. 903 [association that 
“acted as agent of its members in negotiating labor contracts” 
liable as “employer” for NLRA violations committed in that 
capacity].) 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
27 
4. Public Policy 
This reading of section 12926, subdivision (d) also finds 
support in the public policy underlying the enactment of the 
FEHA.  If a business entity contracts with an employer to 
provide services that will affect that employer’s employees, and 
if, in providing those services, the business-entity agent violates 
FEHA’s antidiscrimination policies, causing injury to the 
employer’s employees, it is consistent with sound public policy 
to treat the business entity as an employer of the injured 
employees for purposes of applying the FEHA.  This 
interpretation imposes FEHA liability not only on the employer 
but also extends it to the entity that is most directly responsible 
for the FEHA violation.  Moreover, when, as is often the case, 
the business-entity agent has expertise in its field and has 
contracted with multiple employers to provide its expert service, 
this interpretation extends FEHA liability to the entity that is 
in the best position to implement industry-wide policies that will 
avoid FEHA violations. 
In addition, reading the FEHA to authorize direct liability 
on an employer’s business-entity agents furthers the statutory 
mandate that the FEHA “be construed liberally” in furtherance 
of its remedial purposes (§ 12993, subd. (a)), including the 
purpose of “provid[ing] effective remedies that will both prevent 
and deter unlawful employment practices and redress the 
adverse effects of those practices on aggrieved persons” 
(§ 12920.5).  Moreover, the interpretation we advance today will 
not impose liability on individuals who might face “ ‘financial 
ruin for themselves and their families’ ” were they held directly 
liable under the FEHA.  (Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 653.) 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
28 
Therefore, we conclude that legislative history, analogous 
federal court decisions, and legislative policy considerations all 
support the natural reading of section 12926, subdivision (d) 
advanced here, which permits business-entity agents to be held 
directly 
liable 
for 
FEHA 
violations 
in 
appropriate 
circumstances. 
C. Defendants’ Arguments 
Defendants argue that a business-entity agent of an 
employer should not be held directly liable under the FEHA 
because, according to the law of agency, an agent acts under the 
control of its principal, and therefore the principal is the entity 
primarily responsible for any inadequate performance by the 
agent.  Defendants concede that an agent may, at times, be held 
directly liable to a third party that it has injured, but defendants 
contend that liability may be imposed only if the agent has 
breached a duty it owes to that third party, and such duty must 
exist independent of the agency relationship. 
At the outset, it is important to note that defendants’ 
argument relies heavily on the common law of agency.  Here, 
however, we are interpreting the scope of statutory language 
referencing agent liability, and so the common law of agency is 
not determinative.11 
In any event, defendants’ arguments assume a degree of 
employer control of the agent that has not yet been shown here.  
Plaintiffs allege that the degree of employer control over 
USHW’s medical screening questionnaire varied from employer 
 
11  
Because the issue here is statutory, we need not address 
the extent to which an agent may be held liable at common law 
for its misfeasance in performing work done on behalf of its 
principal.  Accordingly, we express no view on the subject. 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
29 
to employer,12 and although the district court noted, in the 
context of finding the complaint’s agency allegations sufficient, 
that plaintiffs alleged employer control over USHW, the precise 
extent of that control is unclear.13  More importantly, the basis 
of the district court’s dismissal of the FEHA cause of action was 
not that USHW lacked responsibility under the FEHA because, 
as a factual matter, it acted without any independent control 
over the content of the medical screening questionnaire.  Rather, 
the basis of the district court’s ruling was that the FEHA’s 
definition of employer simply does not impose direct liability on 
an agent regardless of how much control the agent has.  
Accordingly, to answer the Ninth Circuit’s question of whether 
a business-entity agent may ever be held directly liable under 
the FEHA, we need not express a view on the significance, if 
any, of employer control over the acts of the agent that gave rise 
to the alleged FEHA violation. 
Defendants also assert that an employer’s obligations 
under the FEHA may not be delegated to an agent; it follows, 
according to defendants, that an employer’s agent cannot be 
held liable under the FEHA.  It is true that an employer’s 
obligations under the FEHA may not be delegated, thus freeing 
 
12  
The operative complaint asserts that the “[e]mployers 
often required that USHW use the employers’ own physical 
examination form, rather than USHW’s medical form, in 
conducting the physical examination component of the pre-
placement exam.”  (Italics added.) 
13  
The operative complaint alleges that the “employers . . . 
delegated 
to 
Defendants 
employment 
decisionmaking 
authority” and that based on that delegation of authority, 
“Defendants . . . approved of, authorized and ratified the use of 
the Health History Questionnaire(s) and Impermissible Non-
Job-Related Questions.” 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
30 
the employer of liability.  However, the question we decide here 
is not whether an employer may delegate its FEHA obligations 
to its business-entity agents, but whether, under the language 
of the FEHA, the business-entity agents of an employer can be 
liable for violations of their own FEHA obligations.  We have 
concluded that, by statute, business-entity agents can be 
considered “employers” for purposes of FEHA liability, and as 
such, they are independently liable for violations of the FEHA.  
Stated another way, a business-entity agent’s obligation to 
comply with FEHA and its consequent liability for FEHA 
violations results from the entity’s own engagement in FEHA-
regulated activities on the employer’s behalf.  Thus, a rule 
holding that the business-entity agents of an employer can be 
held liable for FEHA violations neither delegates the employer’s 
FEHA obligations nor abrogates the employer’s FEHA liability.  
Nor will it lead to a double recovery for the plaintiff, as 
defendants argue; rather, it merely increases the number of 
defendants that might share liability for the plaintiff’s damages. 
Last, as discussed (see pp. 9–10, ante), this is not a 
situation like the one we considered in Reno, where imposing 
FEHA liability on supervisorial employees might lead to a 
conflict between the supervisorial employee’s duty to implement 
their employer’s policies and the supervisorial employee’s self-
interest in avoiding FEHA liability.  At least in a case like this 
one, involving a business-entity agent that is alleged to be a 
large enterprise with more than five employees, the agent and 
the employer are more likely to have comparable bargaining 
power, and the agent can use that bargaining power to avoid 
contractual obligations that will force it to violate the FEHA.  
That fact makes the situation of a large business-entity agent 
fundamentally unlike that of an employee agent. 
RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
31 
For these reasons, we reject defendants’ arguments.  
Simply put, we are not persuaded by defendants’ arguments 
that business-entity agents with at least five employees are 
categorically exempt from liability for FEHA violations under 
section 12926, subdivision (d). 
III. CONCLUSION 
We answer the Ninth Circuit’s question as follows:  The 
California Fair Employment and Housing Act, which defines 
“employer” to “include[]” “any person acting as an agent of an 
employer” (§ 12926, subd. (d)), permits a business entity acting 
as an agent of an employer to be held directly liable as an 
employer for employment discrimination in violation of the 
FEHA in appropriate circumstances when the business-entity 
agent has at least five employees and carries out FEHA-
regulated activities on behalf of an employer.  We do not decide 
the significance, if any, of employer control over the act(s) of the 
agent that gave rise to the FEHA violation, and we also do not 
decide whether our conclusion extends to business-entity agents 
that have fewer than five employees.  We base our conclusion on 
our interpretation of the FEHA’s definition of employer(§ 12926, 
subd. (d)); we express no view of the scope of a business entity 
agent’s possible liability under the FEHA’s aider and abettor 
provision (§ 12940, subd. (i)). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JENKINS, J. 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
EVANS, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Raines v. U.S. Healthworks Medical Group 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding  XX on request by 9th Circuit (Cal. Rules of 
Court, rule 8.548) 
Review Granted (published) 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S273630 
Date Filed:  August 21, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:   
County:   
Judge:   
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Phillips, Erlewine, Given & Carlin, R. Scott Erlewine, Brian S. Conlon 
and Kyle P. O’Malley for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Matthew Rodriquez, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Michael L. Newman, Assistant Attorney General, 
Srividya Panchalam, Francisco V. Balderrama and Christopher Paul 
Kailani Medeiros, Deputy Attorneys General, for the Attorney General 
of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Alexis Alvarez; and Sachin S. Pandya for AIDS Legal Referral Panel, 
Bet Tzedek, California Employment Lawyers Association, Civil Rights 
Education and Enforcement Center, Disability Rights Advocates, 
Disability Rights California, Disability Rights Education and Defense 
Fund, Disability Rights Legal Center, Impact Fund and Legal Aid at 
Work as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
 
 
Reed Smith, Raymond A. Cardozo, Kathryn M. Bayes; Ogletree, 
Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, Tim L. Johnson and Cameron O. 
Flynn for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
R. Scott Erlewine 
Phillips, Erlewine, Given & Carlin LLP 
39 Mesa Street, Suite 201 
San Francisco, CA 94129 
(415) 398-0900 
 
Raymond A. Cardozo 
Reed Smith LLP 
101 Second Street, Suite 1800 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
(415) 659-5990