Case Title: Keehn v. Town of Torrington

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Keehn v. Town of Torrington1992 WY 79834 P.2d 112Case Number: 91-232Decided: 07/14/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Sheri KEEHN, as personal 
representative of Brent Keehn, Deceased, and on behalf of Jake Wayne Keehn, 
Shanda Lynn Keehn, Budd Gittens, Max Gittens, Billie Jones, Doug Keehn, Richard 
Keehn, and Georgia Keehn, and Rhonda Slagowski Birch, as personal representative 
of Kirt Slagowski, Deceased, and on behalf of Sierra Deanne Slagowski, Rick 
Slagowski, Delores Slagowski, Roger Slagowski, Danny Slagowski, Connie Staker, 
Pat Defa, Wendy Slagowski, Laura Russell, Diane Harris, and Lorraine 
Hansen,

 Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

The TOWN OF TORRINGTON, 
Wyoming, Torrington Police Department, 

and Patrolman Brad 
Schuppan, 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from District 
Court of Goshen County, J.T. Langdon, J.

Richard J. 
Mulligan of Fix & Mulligan, Jackson, for appellants.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dennis M. Coll, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee Brad Schuppan.

Alan B. Minier 
of Hirst & Applegate, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellee Town of 
Torrington.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, JJ.

* Chief Justice at the 
time of oral argument.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellants, 
personal representatives for the estates of Brent Keehn and Kirt Slagowski, 
appeal from a district court order which granted to the town of Torrington and 
to Officer Brad Schuppan their motions for summary judgment in joint wrongful 
death actions. Two issues are contested by the parties on appeal: (1) Whether, 
under the circumstances of this case, an issue of material fact exists as to 
whether Officer Schuppan breached his duty to apprehend, arrest and remove drunk 
drivers from the road on June 15, 1988; and (2) Whether, under the circumstances 
of this case, Officer Schuppan had the authority to execute a DWUI arrest 
outside of the Torrington city limits. We will affirm.

FACTS

[¶2]      Officer Brad 
Schuppan of the Torrington Police Department was on duty during the late evening 
hours of June 14 and the early morning hours of June 15, 1988. While on patrol, 
Officer Schuppan noticed a red Suzuki Samurai parked in the tavern area of 
downtown Torrington. At approximately 2:15 a.m. on June 15, 1988, Officer 
Schuppan observed the Samurai headed west through Torrington on Highway 26. The 
Samurai had a burned-out headlight.

[¶3]      Recognizing an 
opportunity to check for a possible DWUI violation, Officer Schuppan followed 
the Samurai through one traffic light, one stop sign, and around two slight 
curves - a total distance of six-tenths of a mile. Observing nothing out of the 
ordinary, Officer Schuppan decided to stop the Samurai to issue a "fix-it" order 
for the burned-out headlight. Officer Schuppan reasoned that the "fix-it" stop 
would afford him yet a better opportunity to check for driver intoxication. 
Officer Schuppan accordingly activated his overhead lights to initiate the stop. 
The Samurai promptly pulled over. The stop was logged at 2:22 a.m. and occurred 
just outside of the Torrington city limits.

[¶4]      Officer Schuppan 
approached the Samurai looking for anything "hinky," i.e., unusual or 
suspicious. He shined his flashlight into the vehicle and noticed that it was 
occupied by four individuals, but did not observe any furtive behavior. Officer 
Schuppan then introduced himself to the driver, William Romero. Officer Schuppan 
informed Mr. Romero that he had been stopped for a burned-out headlight and 
asked for his driver's license. Mr. Romero grasped his wallet and withdrew his 
license without hesitation. Officer Schuppan observed that Mr. Romero had no 
difficulty with eye-hand coordination, that his speech was not impaired, that he 
did not appear nervous or upset, and that his eyes were not watery or bloodshot. 
Although Officer Schuppan detected a slight odor of alcohol coming from the 
vehicle, he could not place the odor as coming from Mr. Romero. 

[¶5]      Officer Schuppan 
returned to his patrol car to complete the paperwork for the "fix-it" order. 
Upon return, he received a report of a stolen car and of broken glass in 
downtown Torrington. Believing that the two incidents were related, Officer 
Schuppan aborted his plans to issue a "fix-it" order, returned Mr. Romero's 
driver's license, and told him to have his headlight fixed. Officer Schuppan 
then proceeded to investigate the reported incidents. Dispatch records indicate 
that the stop ended at 2:24 a.m.

[¶6]      At 4:40 a.m., the 
red Suzuki Samurai was involved in a head-on collision thirty-two miles west of 
Torrington on Highway 26. The Samurai had crossed the center line and collided 
with the vehicle of Manuel Otero. Mr. Otero was killed in the accident, as were 
two passengers of the Romero vehicle, Brent Keehn and Kirt Slagowski. Mr. Romero 
had a blood alcohol content of 0.13 percent.

[¶7]      Following 
compliance with the presentation of claims procedure outlined in Wyoming's 
Governmental Claims Act, personal representatives for the estates of Mr. Keehn 
and Mr. Slagowski timely filed wrongful death actions in district court. The 
joint complaint alleged that Officer Schuppan was negligent in failing to arrest 
Mr. Romero for driving while intoxicated on June 15, 1988, and sought to hold 
the town of Torrington vicariously liable. The town of Torrington and Officer 
Schuppan duly responded, after filing appropriate responsive pleadings, with 
motions for summary judgment. The motions were resisted by the estates of Mr. 
Keehn and Mr. Slagowski. The district court granted summary judgments for the 
town of Torrington and for Officer Schuppan following a hearing. This appeal 
followed.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶8]      When reviewing 
the propriety of a summary judgment, this court reviews the record from the 
vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion to determine 
whether there exists an issue of material fact which would preclude the court 
from issuing a judgment as a matter of law. Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of 
Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo. 1987). An issue of material fact exists when a 
disputed fact, if proven, would have the effect of establishing or refuting one 
the essential elements of the cause of action or defense asserted by the 
litigants. McLaughlin v. Michelin Tire Corp., 778 P.2d 59, 63 (Wyo. 1989). If no 
issue of material fact is found to exist, summary judgment is appropriate - even 
in a negligence case. DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 651 (Wyo. 
1986).

DISCUSSION

[¶9]      The Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act provides that governmental entities and public employees 
acting within the scope of their duties are immune from suit in tort except as 
expressly waived by the legislature. Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-104(a) (June 1988). The 
waiver of governmental immunity applicable to the instant case is found in Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-39-112. Section 1-39-112 provides that "[a] governmental entity is 
liable for damages resulting from tortious conduct of peace officers while 
acting within the scope of their duties." The litigants do not dispute that 
Officer Schuppan was a peace officer acting within the scope of his duties 
during the early morning hours of June 15, 1988. Rather, the present controversy 
centers on whether reasonable minds could differ as to whether Officer 
Schuppan's conduct was or was not tortious.

[¶10]   When evaluating a peace officer's 
conduct under Wyoming's Governmental Claims Act, we apply general principles of 
tort law. The tort which Officer Schuppan is alleged to have committed is that 
of negligence. Negligence is defined generically as the failure to act as a 
reasonable man of ordinary prudence under like circumstances. McClellan v. 
Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 411 (Wyo. 1983). Translated into the law enforcement 
context, negligence is the failure to act as a reasonable peace officer of 
ordinary prudence under like circumstances. The circumstances which are taken 
into account when determining negligence are those as they appeared at the time 
of the alleged tortious act or omission. DeWald, 719 P.2d  at 652. This court has 
stated that it will not unfairly use hindsight in assessing the issue of 
negligence. Id.; accord Green v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 257 N.Y. 190, 
177 N.E. 416, 417 (1931) (Cardozo, C.J., stating that negligence cannot be 
evaluated in light of "the wisdom born of the event").

[¶11]   The elements that a plaintiff must 
establish to maintain a negligence action in a court of law are: (1) that the 
defendant owed to the plaintiff a duty to conform to a specified standard of 
care; (2) that the defendant breached the duty of care; (3) that the defendant's 
breach of the duty of care proximately caused injury to the plaintiff; and (4) 
that the injury sustained by the plaintiff is compensable by money damages. See, 
MacKrell v. Bell H[2]S Safety, 795 P.2d 776, 779 (Wyo. 1990); W. Page Keeton et 
al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 30 (5th ed. 1984). Elements (1) 
and (2), duty and breach of duty, address whether the conduct of the alleged 
tortfeasor was in fact negligent. Element (3), proximate cause, is considered 
only after negligence is first established to determine whether the tortfeasor 
should be legally responsible for his negligence. Finally, element (4), 
injury/damages, is considered to determine the extent of the tortfeasor's 
liability to the plaintiff if the foregoing issues are resolved 
affirmatively.

[¶12]   Consistent with the foregoing 
requirements, appellants in the instant case assert that Officer Schuppan had a 
duty to act as a reasonable peace officer of ordinary prudence with respect to 
enforcing Wyoming's drunk driving laws on June 15, 1988. They aver that Officer 
Schuppan breached his duty of care on the date in question by failing to 
administer field sobriety tests to Mr. Romero to determine the extent of his 
intoxication. Appellants reason that, had the field sobriety tests been 
performed, Officer Schuppan would have known that Mr. Romero was intoxicated and 
would have arrested him for DWUI. Extending this line of reasoning, appellants 
assert that the accident would not have occurred had Mr. Romero been arrested. 
Accordingly, they conclude that the failure to arrest Mr. Romero was the 
proximate cause of the accident and seek damages for the resulting deaths of Mr. 
Keehn and Mr. Slagowski.

[¶13]   Whether and to whom a duty of care 
exists under a given set of circumstances is a question of law. MacKrell, 795 P.2d  at 779; Keeton, supra, § 37. This court has previously noted that peace 
officers have a general duty to apprehend, arrest, and remove drunk drivers from 
Wyoming's roadways. DeWald, 719 P.2d  at 649. This duty emanates from Wyoming's 
drunk driving law, Wyo. Stat. § 31-5-233 (June 1989). Section 31-5-233, enacted 
for the protection of the public at large as well as for the individual 
inebriate and his/her passengers, provides in pertinent part:

(b) No person shall drive 
or have actual physical control of any vehicle within this state if the 
person:

(i) Has an alcohol 
concentration of ten one-hundredths of one percent (0.10%) or more; 
or

(ii) To a degree which 
renders him incapable of safely driving:

(A) Is under the 
influence of alcohol;

(B) Is under the 
influence of a controlled substance;

or

(C) Is under the 
influence of a combination of any of the elements named in subparagraphs (A) and 
(B) of this paragraph.

[¶14]   Subsumed within the general duty to 
apprehend, arrest, and remove drunk drivers from Wyoming's roadways is the duty 
to investigate potential DWUI violations. This brings us to the precise duty 
issue raised by this appeal: What is the nature and extent of a peace officer's 
duty to investigate a potential DWUI violation when, during an unrelated traffic 
stop, it is reasonably suspected that the driver has been drinking alcoholic 
beverages. While this case presents the opportunity to define specifically a 
peace officer's duty in this respect, we decline to do so both on the ground 
that it is beyond our arena of expertise and on the ground that rigid rules are 
not consistent with the realities of law enforcement. Consequently, we resort to 
traditional tort principles and hold that a peace officer's duty to investigate 
a potential DWUI violation during an unrelated traffic stop is dictated by what 
a reasonable peace officer of ordinary prudence would do under like 
circumstances.

[¶15]   While the appellants acknowledge 
that the question of duty is a matter of law, they properly assert that the 
question of whether a duty has been breached is for the fact finder, unless 
reasonable minds could not differ. Hozian v. Weathermon, 821 P.2d 1297, 1299 
(Wyo. 1991); Keeton, supra, § 37. Appellants contend that summary judgment was 
inappropriate in this case because reasonable minds stand to differ on whether 
Officer Schuppan breached his duty to apprehend, arrest, and remove drunk 
drivers from the road on June 15, 1988, by failing to adequately investigate the 
extent of Mr. Romero's intoxication.

[¶16]   Proper evaluation of the 
appellants' contention requires that we apply our aforementioned standard of 
review in light of the legal and factual realities inherent in the field of law 
enforcement. As to the legal realities, it is first important to note that the 
United States and Wyoming Constitutions protect individuals from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4. A 
warrantless arrest is an unreasonable seizure when not supported by probable 
cause. Probable cause for a warrantless arrest exists when, under the totality 
of the circumstances, a prudent, reasonable, and cautious peace officer would be 
led to believe that a crime has been or is being committed and that the 
individual arrested is the perpetrator. Jandro v. State, 781 P.2d 512, 517-18 
(Wyo. 1989); Wyo. Stat. § 7-2-103 (June 1987). A peace officer who executes a 
warrantless arrest without probable cause can be held liable for the 
constitutional tort of false arrest. See generally Town of Jackson v. Shaw, 569 P.2d 1246 (Wyo. 1977); Rodarte v. City of Riverton, 552 P.2d 1245 (Wyo. 
1976).

[¶17]   A second legal reality of note is 
that investigative detentions are also subject to the constraints imposed by the 
fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and by Article 1, § 4 of the 
Wyoming Constitution. A peace officer may temporarily detain an individual for 
the purpose of investigation only when he has a reasonable suspicion, based on 
all the circumstances, that criminal activity "may be afoot." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 911 (1968); see also United 
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989); Olson v. 
State, 698 P.2d 107 (Wyo. 1985). Investigative detentions are limited in both 
scope and duration. Peace officers are encouraged, if not constitutionally 
obliged, to employ "the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or 
dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325-26, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238 (1983) (plurality); 
see also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605 
(1985).

[¶18]   A third legal reality worth noting 
is that it is lawful in Wyoming, as in other states, to drink and drive safely. 
Wyo. Stat. § 31-5-233 (June 1989). A peace officer may not arrest an individual 
for DWUI merely because it is late at night and, during an unrelated traffic 
stop, the officer detects the odor of alcohol. Rather, the peace officer must 
have probable cause to believe that the individual has actual physical control 
of a motorized vehicle while legally intoxicated. Wyo. Stat. § 31-5-233 (June 
1989). Section 31-5-233 defines legal intoxication as having a blood alcohol 
content equal to or greater than 0.10% or as being otherwise incapable of 
driving safely while under the influence of an intoxicant.

[¶19]   As to the factual realities, 
governments simply do not have the resources to protect all citizens at all 
times from the consequences of all illegal or tortious activity. Consequently, 
law enforcement agencies and personnel must be afforded some discretion as to 
how to marshall their time, talents, and assets to achieve the greatest overall 
good. That an intoxicated driver or other law violator causes injury to another 
does not, without more, necessarily mean that a governmental entity or public 
employee was negligent. See Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-102(b) (June 1988) (governmental 
entities or public employees are not subject to strict liability). Rather, the 
facts of each case must be independently examined.

[¶20]   Examining the facts of the instant 
case in light of the foregoing discussion and the applicable standard of review, 
we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment. The 
undisputed facts of this case are that Officer Schuppan conducted numerous 
informal sobriety tests on Mr. Romero, none of which indicated that Mr. Romero 
was legally intoxicated.1 As denominated by this court, these 
tests included:

[¶21]   1. Motor Vehicle Operation Test. 
Officer Schuppan followed Mr. Romero for a distance of six-tenths of a mile 
through the traffic control areas of downtown Torrington. He personally observed 
Mr. Romero properly respond to traffic signals and properly negotiate curves in 
the road. Officer Schuppan noticed no erratic or unusual driving behavior. 
Officer Schuppan's testimony is confirmed by Mr. Romero. Mr. Romero testified he 
experienced no difficulty driving until 15 to 20 minutes outside of 
Torrington.

[¶22]   2. Verbal Proficiency Test. Officer 
Schuppan engaged Mr. Romero in conversation after stopping him for driving with 
a burned-out headlight. One of Officer Schuppan's covert motives for doing so 
was to check to see if Mr. Romero was under the influence of alcohol. Officer 
Schuppan testified that Mr. Romero's speech was not slurred and that his speech 
patterns were not impaired. This testimony was also confirmed by Mr. Romero. In 
response to the query, "How were you talking?" Mr. Romero responded "I seemed to 
be talking okay at the time."

[¶23]   3. Eye-Hand Coordination Test. 
Officer Schuppan asked Mr. Romero to produce his driver's license. Again, one of 
his motives was to determine if Mr. Romero was physically or mentally impaired 
by the influence of alcohol. Officer Schuppan testified "I've had people that go 
through all their pictures and credit cards and things and bypass their license 
three or four times. You finally have to say, there it is. . . . The guy [Mr. 
Romero] grabbed his wallet, I can't remember when he got it out, but he went 
right to his license, got it out and handed it to me." Mr. Romero confirmed 
Officer Schuppan's testimony in this regard as well.

[¶24]   4. Overt Manifestations Test. In 
what is really a garden-variety sobriety test, Officer Schuppan looked for any 
overt indication that Mr. Romero was legally intoxicated. He testified that Mr. 
Romero's eyes were not bloodshot or watery, that he could not smell the odor of 
alcohol coming specifically from Mr. Romero's breath, that Mr. Romero's behavior 
was not evasive or furtive in nature, that he did not appear to be nervous or 
upset, and that his reactions were very good. Mr. Romero did not submit evidence 
to controvert Officer Schuppan's observations along these lines.

[¶25]   After conducting the foregoing 
informal sobriety tests, Officer Schuppan determined that he had no reason to 
further detain Mr. Romero for the purpose of conducting more extensive sobriety 
testing, let alone probable cause to arrest Mr. Romero for DWUI. Officer 
Schuppan concluded that "all I've got at this point is a guy with a headlight 
out." Officer Schuppan's conclusion was confirmed by Mr. Romero. Mr. Romero 
testified, "I didn't think I was that - I wasn't drunk - I thought I wasn't 
drunk enough not to drive and the police officer must have thought that too 
because he let us go."

CONCLUSION

[¶26]   Viewing the undisputed facts of 
this case in light of the applicable standard of review and the legal and 
factual realities of law enforcement, we hold that no reasonable fact finder 
could conclude that Officer Schuppan acted as an unreasonable peace officer of 
substandard prudence by not arresting Mr. Romero on June 15, 1988. Consequently, 
we do not consider the other elements of appellants' negligence action, nor do 
we reach the second issue presented by the parties. The district court's order 
which granted to the town of Torrington and to Officer Schuppan their motions 
for summary judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Appellants did point to 
several inconsistencies between the testimony of Officer Schuppan and that of 
Mr. Romero which they assert create an issue of material fact. Those 
inconsistencies were essentially that Officer Schuppan failed to see Kirt 
Slagowski sleeping in the Samurai when it was parked in downtown Torrington and 
that Officer Schuppan failed to see the beer cans that were alleged to be on the 
floor of the Samurai when he shined his flashlight into the vehicle following 
the stop. We fail to see how either one of these alleged oversights creates an 
issue of material fact as to whether Officer Schuppan was negligent on the date 
in question.