Case Title: Upshaw v. State

Citation: 350 So. 2d 1358

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1977-10-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
350 So. 2d 1358 (1977) Terrance W. UPSHAW v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 49760. Supreme Court of Mississippi. October 26, 1977. *1359 Michael B. Martz, J.A. Jennings, Jackson, for appellant. A.F. Summer, Atty. Gen. by Billy L. Gore, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before PATTERSON, SUGG and WALKER, JJ. SUGG, Justice, for the Court: Defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County for raping a female child under the age of twelve years and was sentenced to death. The defendant and his wife resided in Moss Point and in March, 1975 the defendant's wife requested that she and the defendant be permitted to live with Mr. and Mrs. M.L. Ruffin in Jackson for a short time until they could find employment. Mrs. Ruffin consented to her sister's request and the defendant arrived at the Ruffin's home on March 19, 1975. The defendant's wife remained in Moss Point but planned to move to Jackson after defendant secured employment. On March 20, 1975 Mrs. Ruffin retired to her bedroom along with her youngest son and her eight year old daughter, Sophia, about 8:30 p.m. Mr. Ruffin arrived home from a union meeting about midnight and placed the two children in their bedroom before retiring. Mrs. Ruffin awakened about 5:30 a.m. the next morning and proceeded to the room occupied *1360 by defendant and her oldest son, to awaken the oldest son for school. Upon observing that the defendant was not in his bed, she proceeded to the bedroom occupied by the two youngest children and discovered the defendant in bed with the children. Her questions to the defendant about the reason he was in the children's bed were ignored and she awakened the children and pulled them out of bed. She took her daughter to the bathroom and discovered that the child had been sexually abused, awakened her husband, informed him that the child had been raped and obtained a pistol from the closet. Mr. Ruffin told his wife to replace the pistol and call the police. He proceeded to the children's bedroom and dragged the defendant out of bed when the defendant stated: "I know you are going to kill me for this." About 6:00 a.m. the police responded to the Ruffin's call, arrested the defendant, advised him of his rights, and transported him to the police station. Upon arriving at the jail, defendant's clothing was taken as evidence and he was dressed in a city jail uniform. We will first address defendant's argument that the death penalty for the rape of a female child under the age of twelve years constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the United States Constitution. After oral argument, we deferred consideration of the case until the United States Supreme Court decided Coker v. Georgia, ___ U.S. ___, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 53 L. Ed. 2d 982 (1977). After the decision in Coker additional briefs were requested on the applicability of Coker to this case. In Coker the Court took great pains to limit its decision to the applicability of the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman. The Court stated: "That question, with respect to rape of an adult woman, is now before us." At least six other times the majority opinion referred to the rape of an "adult woman." As we view Coker the Court carefully refrained from deciding whether the death penalty for the rape of a female child under the age of twelve years is grossly disproportionate to the crime. In considering this question we must accept the United States Supreme Court's concept that the Eighth Amendment bars the death penalty for minor crimes. Certainly rape of a female child under the age of twelve years is not a minor crime and we are of the opinion that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit death as a punishment for the crime. In reaching this conclusion we follow the principle that it is the function of the legislative department, and not the judicial department, to define crimes and prescribe the punishment therefor. The question of whether the death penalty is an appropriate punishment for the rape of a female child under twelve years of age should rest in the legislatures of the fifty states of the Union. Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent in Coker, stated: Chief Justice Burger further stated in his dissent: In addition to the observations of the Chief Justice, we suggest that it is arguable whether the life of a victim might be saved if the rapist knew he would not be put to death unless he killed his victim; however, we do not feel that we have the right to substitute our judgment for the judgment of the legislature on the question of punishment for a major crime such as the one involved in this case. We therefore hold that the death penalty is a permissible punishment for the rape of a female child under the age of twelve years. In Jackson v. State, 337 So. 2d 1242 (Miss. 1976), following the death penalty cases decided by the United States Supreme Court,[1] we reversed a sentence of death and remanded the case for a new trial. In Jackson we exercised the inherent power of the Court and prescribed rules of procedure for cases involving the death penalty. We adopted detailed rules providing for a bifurcated trial, permitting jury instructions as to lesser included offenses in proper cases, provided for automatic appellate court review and prescribed appropriate aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be considered by the jury, all in accord with the death penalty cases listed in footnote one. Following our decision in Jackson the state legislature enacted Miss.Gen.Laws Ch. 458 (1977), which made extensive changes in the procedure for the trial and review in death penalty cases. Because the defendant was not afforded a bifurcated trial in accord with Jackson and Miss.Gen.Laws Ch. 458 (1977), this case is reversed for retrial in accordance with the procedure outlined therein. Dobbert v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 97 S. Ct. 2290, 53 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1977). Having reached this conclusion, other assignments of error must be considered because this case is remanded for retrial. Defendant contends that the indictment is fatally defective because it does not charge an essential element of the crime in that it does not charge that the defendant "willfully" raped the female child. The indictment charges the following: Section 97-3-65(1)[2] Mississippi Code Annotated (Supp. 1974) defines the crime of rape of a female child under the age of twelve years in the following language: The crime with which defendant was charged consists of unlawfully having carnal knowledge of a female child under the age of twelve years. The indictment contains the charge of the necessary elements of the crime as defined by statute. If the *1362 word "willfully" had been inserted in the indictment it would have been surplusage. The defendant also argues that the state failed to prove that he willfully committed the offense. This argument is without merit because willfullness is not an essential element of the crime of rape of a female child under the age of twelve years. Defendant also contends that his motion for directed verdict should have been sustained because of a variance in the name of the victim stated in the indictment and the actual name of the victim shown by the proof. The indictment charges that defendant had carnal knowledge of Sophia Catchine Ruffin, but Sophia's mother testified that the child's name was actually Sophia Catecine Ruffin. The rule in this state concerning a variance in a victim's name in an indictment and the victim's actual name is found in Hughes v. State, 207 Miss. 594, 42 So. 2d 805 (1949) as follows: In addition to the rule expressed in Hughes, another rule is that not every variance between an indictment and the proof requires an amendment to the indictment or a reversal because of the variance. In Roney v. State, 153 Miss. 290, 297, 120 So. 445 (1929), the rule was stated as follows: In the instant case the evidence and indictment clearly establishes that defendant was fully aware of the identity of his victim and the crime with which he was charged. A conviction or acquittal on the indictment would preclude another prosecution for the same act and protect the defendant against double jeopardy. The final assignment of error is stated in defendant's assignments of error in the form of a question, as follows: Under this assignment of error defendant argues that: (1) his arrest was illegal because the officer arrested him without a warrant and did not inform him of the object and cause of the arrest as required by section 99-3-7 Mississippi Code Annotated (1972); (2) his clothing could not be seized and used as evidence because his arrest was illegal; (3) his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution were violated; (4) the biographical evidence elicited from defendant as to his age violated his constitutional rights. The crime was discovered by the parents at approximately 5:30 a.m. The police were immediately notified and arrived at the home of the parents at approximately 6:00 a.m. After talking to the parents and ascertaining the details of the crime, the defendant, who was still in the home, was arrested and advised of his rights under *1363 Miranda. The record does not reflect that the officers informed defendant of the object and cause of his arrest, but the officer who testified about the arrest was not specifically questioned about whether he informed the defendant of the reason for his arrest. In Clay v. State, 184 So. 2d 403 (Miss. 1966) we reversed and remanded because a defendant testified that he was not advised of the object and cause of his arrest and held that evidence obtained as a result of his illegal arrest could not be introduced at defendant's trial. In Clay we stated: Later, in Baylor v. State, 246 So. 2d 516 (Miss. 1971), we addressed the same question and stated: In the case before us the state met the burden of proving probable cause for the arrest of the defendant. The officers responded to a call within thirty minutes, interviewed the parents, and arrested defendant, who was then present in the parents' home, after ascertaining there was probable cause to believe that a felony had been committed and the defendant had committed it. The failure to inform him of the object and cause of his arrest merely shifted the burden of proving probable cause to the state, which burden the state met. Defendant's argument that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated fails because his clothing was taken as a result of a legal arrest. This procedure was in accord with our holding in Wright v. State, 236 So. 2d 408 (Miss. 1970) where we stated: Defendant's argument that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated is fully answered by our decision in Baylor v. State, 246 So. 2d 516 (Miss. 1971) where we stated: Following defendant's arrest he was advised of his constitutional rights, transported to the police station and placed in a cell where he was requested to remove his clothing and put on a prisoner's uniform. Defendant complied with this request and subsequent tests revealed the presence of semen on some articles of defendant's clothing. Therefore, the seizure and examination of defendant's clothing did not violate his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, furthermore, defendant was advised of his constitutional rights before his clothes were taken. It was not necessary for the officers to specifically inform him that any evidence found from an examination of his clothes could be used against him. Defendant further argues that the biographical data, which included his age, should not have been introduced. This argument is based on the provisions of section 97-3-65(1) Mississippi Code Annotated (Supp. 1974) which provides that any person under eighteen years of age may not suffer the death penalty. This argument is without merit for two reasons: (1) defendant was advised of his constitutional rights before the data was secured from him, and (2) Miranda warnings do not apply to biographical data elicited from an accused for the purpose of booking the accused. Appellant relies on Proctor v. United States, 131 U.S.App.D.C. 241, 404 F.2d 819 (1968), but better reasoned cases hold that *1365 the questions asked during routine bookings of suspects are usually held to be non-interrogative within the meaning of Miranda. See Toohey v. United States, 404 F.2d 907 (9th Cir.1968); State v. Rassmussen, 92 Idaho 731, 449 P.2d 837 (1969); People v. Hernandez, 69 Cal. Rptr. 448 (Cal. App. 1968); Clarke v. State, 3 Md. App. 447, 240 A.2d 291 (1968); People v. Rivera, 26 N.Y.2d 304, 310 N.Y.S.2d 287, 258 N.E.2d 699 (1970). It appears to us that the type interrogation with which the Court was concerned in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966) was an interrogation that had as its purpose the determination of the accused's connection with the commission of the crime being investigated and the revelation of the facts which reflect on his innocence or guilt. Routine questions asked in booking a suspect relating to his name, age, and place of residence are not proscribed by Miranda. Moreover, in this case defendant was given his Miranda warnings before the booking took place. When proof of age of a defendant is a necessary element in the prosecution of a case the better practice would be to introduce defendant's birth certificate together with proof that defendant is the person named in the birth certificate. This case was considered by a conference of the judges en banc. REVERSED AND REMANDED. PATTERSON, C.J., INZER and SMITH, P. JJ., and ROBERTSON, WALKER, BROOM, LEE and BOWLING, JJ., concur. [1] Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S. Ct. 2960, 49 L. Ed. 2d 913 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944 (1976); and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S. Ct. 3001, 49 L. Ed. 2d 974 (1976). [2] Enacted by Miss.Gen.Laws, Ch. 576 § 8 (1974).