Case Title: BRANDON KEITH BUTCHER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-11-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
BRANDON KEITH BUTCHER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 146123 P.3d 543Case Number: 04-208Decided: 11/22/2005
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
BRANDON 
KEITH BUTCHER,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
Koski, Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Marion Yoder, Senior 
Assistant Public Defender.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

            
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      A jury found the 
appellant guilty of second-degree murder as a lesser-included offense to the 
charge of first-degree murder.  We 
affirm the judgment and sentence entered by the district 
court.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
            
1.         
Did the district court err in denying the appellant's motion for judgment 
of acquittal on the first-degree murder charge?

 
 
            
2.         
Was there sufficient evidence to sustain the finding of guilt on the 
lesser-included offense of second-degree murder?

 
 
            
3.         
Was the jury improperly instructed on the meaning of the word 
"purposely?"

 
 
            
4.         
Was cumulative prejudicial "flight" evidence improperly 
admitted?

 
 

5.                  
Did the 
prosecutor commit misconduct by eliciting irrelevant prejudicial evidence and by 
making improper argument?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶2]      In the early 
evening hours of June 17, 2003, John DiIorio accompanied Shawn Kouri and Becky 
Cavender to The Lounge, a bar in Casper, Wyoming.  
Cavender went to play dice, while DiIorio and Kouri sat at a nearby 
table, where they were given two free drinks by the bartender.  When DiIorio said he was not feeling 
well, Kouri took him to a friend's home to get something to eat.  Shortly thereafter, they returned to The 
Lounge to pick up Cavender.  As they 
entered the bar, the appellant stopped Kouri and asked for a ride to a house on 
Lincoln 
Street.  
Kouri agreed, and the appellant got in the back seat of Kouri's car.  DiIorio sat in the front passenger 
seat.  The trio proceeded to the 
Lincoln 
Street address, but upon seeing two police cars 
there, they returned to The Lounge.  

 
 
[¶3]      Kouri parked in 
the parking area in front of the bar.  
The appellant got out of the vehicle and spoke with Kouri through the 
open window.  DiIorio repeatedly 
asked the appellant what they were talking about, but the appellant ignored him, 
which upset DiIorio.  The appellant 
calmed DiIorio down and walked away toward the bar.  Kouri talked to DiIorio for a few 
minutes, and then went into the bar to find Cavender, leaving DiIorio sitting in 
the car. 

 
 
[¶4]      Shortly 
thereafter, the appellant spoke with Jenna Myers, whom he had accompanied to the 
bar to pick up Ashley Hessler, and asked for the keys to her car.  Rather than giving the keys to the 
appellant, Myers went with him to the car and unlocked the doors.  The appellant reached into the back seat 
area and grabbed his hunting knife, which was in a leather sheath.  The appellant tucked the knife into the 
waistband of his shorts and adjusted his shirt so the knife was not 
visible.  

 
 
[¶5]      Myers locked the 
car doors and suggested to the appellant that they go back into the bar.  The appellant declined the invitation 
and, instead, asked Myers about the identity of the man sitting in the front 
seat of Kouri's car.  When Myers 
identified the man as "John DiIorio," the appellant asked if he was the one who 
had raped Hessler.  Myers confirmed 
that he was, at which point the appellant said something to the effect that he 
"should go stab him" or "should stick him."  Myers told the appellant not to do 
anything stupid, and again tried to get him to return to the bar.  Once again, the appellant declined. 

 
 
[¶6]      Myers left the 
appellant standing next to her car and went back into the bar.  Inside, she told Jeff Maxfield that the 
appellant was "going to stab somebody."  
Maxfield ran outside to stop the appellant.  As he exited the bar, Maxfield saw the 
appellant running toward him from Kouri's car and wiping a knife on his 
shorts.  The appellant asked 
Maxfield to help him get away from the area.  When Maxfield refused, the appellant 
tucked the knife into his shorts and ran toward the bar's lower parking 
lot.  

 
 
[¶7]      Maxfield and 
other bar patrons ran to Kouri's car, where they found DiIorio slumped over in 
the driver's seat, with blood on his hands, shirt and pants.  They pulled DiIorio out of the car, laid 
him on the ground, and administered CPR while waiting for an ambulance to 
arrive.  DiIorio was taken to the 
hospital, where he died of his injuries.  
An autopsy revealed that DiIorio died of a stab wound, the knife having 
entered his chest at a steep right to left angle which, coupled with extensive 
internal injuries, indicated that he was moving away from his attacker when the 
fatal injury was inflicted.  

 
 
[¶8]      The police 
apprehended the appellant in a Glenrock, Wyoming, park on the night of June 18, 
2003.  The appellant had changed his 
appearance and had attempted to garner enough money and other resources to leave 
the area.  He had also disposed of 
his bloody clothes and the knife with which he had stabbed DiIorio.  The knife was never recovered.  

 
 
[¶9]      At trial, the 
appellant admitted stabbing DiIorio, but maintained that he did so in 
self-defense.  According to the 
appellant, DiIorio was "acting crazy" after they returned to The Lounge from 
their excursion to Lincoln 
Street.  
He testified that he retrieved his knife from Myers' car and hid it in 
his clothing because DiIorio kept "mad-dogging" him (staring at him), and 
because DiIorio had earlier threatened him with a knife as he talked to 
Kouri.  The appellant further 
testified that he went to Kouri's car to confront DiIorio after learning from 
Myers that DiIorio had raped Hessler.  
The appellant stated that, as he approached the passenger's door, DiIorio 
extended his right arm out of the window and slashed at him with a knife, as 
though he was trying to get him away from the vehicle.  The appellant claimed that DiIorio then 
started to open the door, at which time the appellant slammed it shut and 
stabbed DiIorio in the chest.  The 
appellant testified that he stabbed DiIorio because he felt threatened by 
DiIorio's actions and did not believe that he could safely retreat. 

 
 

Did the 
district court err in denying the appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal 
on the first-degree murder charge?

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶10]   Motions for judgment of acquittal 
are governed by W.R.Cr.P. 29, which provides in relevant part as 
follows:

 
 
(a)       At close of evidence. -- Motions for 
directed verdict are abolished and motions for judgment of acquittal shall be 
used in their place.  The court on 
motion of a defendant or of its own motion shall order the entry of judgment of 
acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information or 
citation after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is 
insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.  If a defendant's motion for judgment of 
acquittal at the close of the evidence offered by the state is not granted, the 
defendant may offer evidence without having reserved the 
right.

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
            
(c)        After discharge of jury. -- If the jury 
returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict, 
a motion for judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed within 10 days after 
the jury is discharged or within such further time as the court may fix during 
the 10-day period.  If a verdict of 
guilty is returned, the court may on such motion set aside the verdict and enter 
judgment of acquittal within 10 days after such motion is filed, and if not so 
entered shall be deemed denied, unless within such 10 days the determination 
shall be continued by order of the court, but a continuance shall not extend the 
time to a day more than 30 days from the date the verdict is returned.  If no verdict is returned, the court may 
enter judgment of acquittal.  It 
shall not be necessary to the making of such a motion that a similar motion has 
been made prior to the submission of the case to the jury.

 
 
[¶11]   We apply the following standard in 
reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of 
acquittal:

 
 
            
"In reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, we 
examine and accept as true the evidence of the prosecution together with all 
logical and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, leaving out entirely 
the evidence of the defendant in conflict therewith.

 
 
            
A motion for judgment of acquittal is to be granted only when the 
evidence is such that a reasonable juror must have a reasonable doubt as to the 
existence of any of the essential elements of the crime.  Or, stated another way, if there is 
substantial evidence to sustain a conviction of the crime, the motion should not 
be granted.  This standard applies 
whether the supporting evidence is direct or 
circumstantial."

 
 

Wise v. 
State, 654 P.2d 116, 117 (Wyo. 1982) (quoting Weathers v. State, 652 P.2d 970, 
972 (Wyo. 
1982)).  We do not substitute our judgment for 
that of the jury; rather, we determine whether a reasonable jury could have 
found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Hankinson v. State, 2002 WY 86, ¶ 6, 47 P.3d 623, 626 (Wyo. 2002); Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 368 
(Wyo. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 980 (2001).  An appellant must support his motion for 
judgment of acquittal with "something more than a reference to defense evidence 
that, if believed by the jury, would have supported acquittal."  Harlow v. State, 2005 WY 12, ¶ 52, 105 P.3d 1049, 1071 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 

[¶12]   Where a defendant introduces 
evidence after denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the end of 
the State's case, he waives that motion, and only a similar motion made after 
return of the verdict may be claimed as error.  Id., ¶ 50, 105 P.3d  at 1070; Robinson, 11 P.3d  at 368; Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 339 
(Wyo. 
1995).

 
 

Discussion

 
 
[¶13]   The appellant was charged with a 
single count of first-degree murder.  
The jury was instructed that the elements of that crime 
are:

1.         
On or about the 18th day of June, 2003;

 
 
2.         
In Natrona County, 
Wyoming;

 
 
3.         
The Defendant Brandon Keith Butcher;

 
 
4.         
Unlawfully and purposely; and

 
 
5.         
With premeditated malice;

 
 
6.         
Killed a human being, John DiIorio.

 
 
[¶14]   At the close of the State's case, 
defense counsel moved for judgment of acquittal on the ground that "the State 
has not met its burden to show either premeditated malice or malice."  The district court denied that motion, 
and the appellant proceeded to present evidence.  Consequently, he has waived his right to 
challenge that denial on appeal.  
After trial, however, the appellant renewed his motion for judgment of 
acquittal, on the same grounds as his earlier motion.  Despite the intervening conviction for 
the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder, the latter motion sought 
"judgment of acquittal on the single count contained in the information."  That motion, like the earlier one, was 
denied.  

 
 
[¶15]   This Court must confess a certain 
amount of confusion as it addresses this issue.  The appellant's brief contains nineteen 
pages of argument in which it is contended that the State did not prove either 
premeditation or deliberation, and that, therefore, the charge of first-degree 
murder should not have gone to the jury.  
Our confusion arises out of the fact that, by finding the appellant 
guilty of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder, the jury had, in 
effect, acquitted him of the charged offense of first-degree murder.  There can be no possible error or 
prejudice here.  Even if the 
district court had granted the appellant's post-verdict motion for judgment of 
acquittal on the charge of first-degree murder, that would have had no effect 
upon the finding of guilt on the lesser-included offense.1

 
 
Was 
there sufficient evidence to sustain the finding of guilt on the lesser-included 
offense of second-degree murder?

 
 

Standard 
of Review

 
 

[¶16]   In Leyva v. State, 2005 WY 22, ¶ 7, 106 P.3d 873, 875 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 28, ¶ 
16, 86 P.3d 851, 857 (Wyo. 2004)), we 
recently reiterated the applicable standard of review for this 
issue:

 
 
            
The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence issues is well 
established.  "We assess whether all 
the evidence presented is adequate to form the basis for an inference of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by a finder of fact when that evidence is 
viewed in the light most favorable to the State."  Estrada-Sanchez v. State, 2003 WY 45, ¶ 
6, 66 P.3d 703, ¶ 6 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
"We 
leave out of consideration the evidence presented by the unsuccessful party 
which conflicts with the successful party's evidence and afford every favorable 
inference to the successful party's evidence which may be reasonably and fairly 
drawn from that evidence.  Even 
though it is possible to draw other inferences from the evidence presented, the 
jury has the responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence.  We will not substitute our judgment for 
that of the jury when we are applying this rule; our only duty is to determine 
whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, 
have come to the same result as the jury actually did."

 
 
Discussion

 
 
[¶17]   The jury was instructed that the 
elements of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder 
are:

 
 
1.         
On or about the 18th day of June, 2003;

 
 
2.         
In Natrona County, 
Wyoming;

 
 
3.         
The Defendant Brandon Keith Butcher;

 
 
4.         
Unlawfully and purposely; and

 
 
5.         
Maliciously;

 
 
6.         
Killed a human being, John DiIorio.

 
 
[¶18]   The appellant's sufficiency of the 
evidence argument starts out plainly enough with this averment:  "In this case, there was insufficient 
evidence of both purpose and malice."  
Unfortunately, this clearly stated premise is then buried under a 
landslide of muddied legal assertions and evidentiary conclusions not supported 
by the record.  The result is a 
complicated olio of contentions involving general intent, specific intent, 
malice, purpose, and deliberation.  
It is as if counsel did not notice that the jury acquitted the appellant 
of the specific intent crime of first-degree murder.2

 
 
[¶19]   These meanderings aside, we believe 
the appellant's intention is as first stated in his brief; that is, he 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove either purpose or 
malice.  The words "purposely" and 
"maliciously" were defined for the jury as follows:

 
 
"Purposely" 
means that the act which caused the death was intentionally 
done.

 
 
"Maliciously" 
means the state of mind in which an intentional act is done without legal 
justification or excuse.  The term 
"maliciously" conveys the meaning of hatred, ill will or hostility toward 
another.

 
 
This 
instruction, which duplicates Wyoming Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 21.04(b) 
(1996), was given precisely as offered by the appellant, and neither side 
objected to it.  

 
 

[¶20]   The element of "purposely" in a 
second-degree murder charge means intentionally or deliberately.  Lopez, 2004 WY 28, ¶ 18, 86 P.3d  at 
857.  Furthermore, second-degree murder is a 
general intent crime in which the "purposely" element requires only that the 
State prove the appellant acted purposely, not that he killed purposely.  Id.; see also Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 
100, ¶¶ 37-38, 49 P.3d 975, 990 (Wyo. 2002).  "Purposely" in this context simply 
distinguishes the act from one committed "carelessly, inadvertently, 
accidentally, negligently, heedlessly or thoughtlessly."  Lopez, ¶18, 86 P.3d  at 857 (quoting State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1138 (Wyo. 1993)).

[¶21]   It is safe to say that the evidence 
in the present case conclusively established that the appellant acted purposely 
in committing the act that caused DiIorio's death.  After experiencing some sort of 
"mad-dogging" incident with the victim, and after confirming the victim's 
identity as the man who had raped a friend, the appellant armed himself, refused 
entreaties to desist from confronting DiIorio, approached DiIorio and 
intentionally stabbed him.  The 
defense at trial was not "I didn't do it," or even "I did it accidentally or 
carelessly or negligently."  The 
defense was "I did it in self-defense."  
Part of that self-defense argument was the appellant's concession that "I 
pulled my knife out, and I stabbed down into the car one time."  The appellant's bald assertion in his 
appellate brief to the contrary notwithstanding, there was not a hint of 
evidence at trial that the appellant acted in any manner other than purposely in 
stabbing DiIorio.

 
 
[¶22]   There is in the district court file 
a sheet of paper that reads as follows:

 
 
Instruction 
#9 + #13

 
 
Definitions 
for "purposely" are not the same.

 
 
Could 
you please clarify definition for us?

 
 
[¶23]   This item is identified in the 
clerk of court's index as "Questions by Jury to Judge."3  The appellant contends that the 
existence of this note shows that the jury was confused about the "purposely" 
element and that this confusion somehow affected the verdict.  However, the record does not reflect 
that this question was actually posed by the jury to the judge, or if so, how it 
was answered.  We cannot assume from 
a blank record that the appellant was somehow prejudiced by something that 
appears not to have occurred.  
Furthermore, if there was any confusion and any resultant prejudice, the 
latter was to the State, rather than the appellant, inasmuch as the jury 
returned a verdict of guilt as to the lesser of the two crimes described in 
Instruction Nos. 9 and 13.4

 
 

[¶24]   In regard to the element of malice, 
the appellant contends that "there was insufficient evidence in [the 
appellant's] case of the type of malice required to sustain a finding of murder 
at all, whether first or second degree."  
Preliminarily, we will note that the definition of malice in the 
instructions given to the jury, which definition originally came from State v. Sorrentino, 31 Wyo. 129, 224 P. 420, 423 (1924), 
misstates the holding of that case and has since been corrected.  See Strickland v. State, 2004 WY 91, ¶ 
15, 94 P.3d 1034, 1043 (Wyo. 2004), and Keats v. State, 2003 WY 19, ¶¶ 16-33, 64 P.3d 104, 109-114 (Wyo. 2003).  Any error in the present case, however, 
inured to the benefit of the appellant because the definition given required the 
State to prove both an intentional act done without legal justification or 
excuse, and hatred, ill will, or hostility.

 
 
[¶25]   What is the evidence that at the 
time the appellant stabbed DiIorio, he did so intentionally, without legal 
justification or excuse, and with hatred, ill will, or hostility?  We need not repeat the evidence that the 
act of stabbing was intentional.  
There is no evidence to the contrary, and the appellant admitted that he 
intentionally stabbed DiIorio.  Was 
there legal justification or excuse?  
The appellant testified that DiIorio struck at him with a knife and that 
he stabbed DiIorio in self-defense.  
Given that there were no other witnesses to the stabbing itself, the 
appellant asks this Court to apply the "Eagan" 
rule:

 
 
Where an 
accused is the sole witness of a transaction charged as a crime, as in the case 
at bar, his testimony cannot be arbitrarily rejected, and if his credibility has 
not been impeached, and his testimony is not improbable, and is not inconsistent 
with the facts and circumstances shown, but is reasonably consistent therewith, 
then his testimony should be accepted.

 
 

Eagan v. 
State, 58 
Wyo. 167, 128 P.2d 215, 226 (1942).

 
 
[¶26]   In Eagan, the 
appellant was charged with first-degree murder for killing his wife by shooting 
her in the neck with a pistol.  He 
claimed that the gun discharged accidentally, and there was evidence that the 
weapon was defective.  On the basis 
of the above-stated rule, this Court set aside Eagan's second-degree murder conviction, but 
sustained a judgment for the lesser included offense of manslaughter based on 
criminal carelessness.  Id. at 
230.

 
 

[¶27]   For several reasons, we will not 
apply the Eagan rule in 
this case.  To begin with, the 
appellant did not request an Eagan instruction, which deficiency 
forecloses appellate review.  Wilks, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 39, 49 P.3d  at 
991; Dangel v. State, 724 P.2d 1145, 1149 
(Wyo. 
1986).  Furthermore, even the appellant's own 
version of events supports his conviction.  
See Wilks, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 39, 
49 P.3d  at 991.  And finally, other witnesses testified 
as to the immediate events leading up to the killing, leaving the appellant's 
credibility far from unscathed and his testimony improbable.  See Griswold v. State, 994 P.2d 920, 928 
(Wyo. 1999); Dangel, 724 P.2d  at 1148; and Leitel v. State, 579 P.2d 421, 424-25 
(Wyo. 
1978).  The purpose of the Eagan rule is to prevent the arbitrary 
rejection of a defendant's testimony where he or she is the only witness to the 
crime, where his or her credibility has not been impeached, and where his or her 
story is reasonably consistent with the known facts and circumstances.  Nearly the opposite situation exists 
here; the appellant's version of events is so inconsistent with the proven facts 
and circumstances that acceptance of that version would seem to be arbitrary, 
rather than reasonable.

 
 

[¶28]   Going back then to the evidence of 
malice, we find that it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the 
appellant's claim of self-defense was untrue.  The appellant armed himself and 
instigated the confrontation with DiIorio.  
He voiced hostile thoughts about DiIorio immediately before the slaying, 
even threatening to "stick" or "stab" DiIorio.  He persisted in approaching DiIorio 
despite Myers' plea that he go back inside the bar with her.  And he used a deadly weapon in a deadly 
manner, from which an inference of malice may be drawn.  See Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 
252 (Wyo. 2000); Cutbirth v. State, 663 P.2d 888, 891 
(Wyo. 
1983); and Leitel, 579 P.2d  at 424.  There was sufficient evidence from which 
a reasonable jury could have found that the element of malice was proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt.

 
 
Was the 
jury improperly instructed on the meaning of the word 
"purposely?"

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 

[¶29]   We have often reiterated our 
standard for the appellate review of jury instructions and will not do so again 
here.  See Reilly v. State, 2002 WY 156, ¶¶ 
14-16, 55 P.3d 1259, 1264-65 (Wyo. 2002); Williams v. State, 2002 WY 136, ¶¶ 
11-12, 54 P.3d 248, 251 (Wyo. 2002); Black v. State, 2002 WY 72, ¶¶ 5-7, 46 P.3d 298, 300 (Wyo. 2002); Brown v. State, 2002 WY 61, ¶¶ 9-10, 44 P.3d 97, 100 (Wyo. 2002); and Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, ¶¶ 8-12, 34 P.3d 271, 274 (Wyo. 2001).  Suffice it to say that, in criminal 
cases, an essential function of jury instructions is to instruct the jury 
concerning the elements of the crime.  
Reilly, 2002 WY 156, ¶ 16, 55 P.3d  at 1265; Williams, 2002 WY 136, ¶ 11, 54 P.3d  at 
251.  Failure to object to an instruction at 
trial forecloses appellate review of that instruction absent plain error.  Reilly, 2002 WY 156, ¶ 14, 55 P.3d  at 
1264; Ogden, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 9, 34 P.3d  at 
274.  Plain error exists only when (1) the 
record is clear concerning the alleged error; (2) a clear and unequivocal rule 
of law was violated; and (3) the appellant was materially prejudiced by denial 
of a substantial right.  
Furthermore, the doctrine of "invited error" prohibits a party from 
raising on appeal alleged trial court errors that were induced by that party's 
actions.  Hughes v. State, 2003 WY 35, ¶ 22, 65 P.3d 378, 384 (Wyo. 2003); Blumhagen v. State, 11 P.3d 889, 895 
(Wyo. 2000); James v. State, 998 P.2d 389, 393 (Wyo. 
2000).  As applied to jury instructions, the 
invited error doctrine provides that use of an instruction proposed by the 
appellant may not be grounds for reversal unless such was "necessarily 
prejudicial."  Vanvorst v. State, 1 P.3d 1223, 1230 
(Wyo. 2000).  See also Wilson v. State, 14 P.3d 912, 
919 (Wyo. 2000); Vigil v. State, 859 P.2d 659, 664 (Wyo. 
1993); and Dallenbach v. State, 562 P.2d 679, 681 
(Wyo. 1977).

 
 
Discussion

 
 
[¶30]   A brief review of the procedural 
setting will be helpful in this review.  
The appellant was charged with first-degree murder, which includes 
second-degree murder as a lesser offense.  
Wyoming's Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions for first-degree murder are 
found in Part 21.01, and those for second-degree murder are found in Part 
21.04.  In its proposed jury 
instructions, the State offered 21.01A (first-degree murder elements), 21.01C 
(first-degree murder definition of "purposely'), and 21.04A (second-degree 
murder elements), but not 21.04B (second-degree murder definition of 
"purposely").  The appellant, on the 
other hand, offered 21.01A (first-degree murder elements), 21.04A (second-degree 
murder elements), and 21.04B (second-degree murder definition of "purposely"), 
but not 21.01C (first-degree murder definition of "purposely"). 

 
 
[¶31]   The district court gave both 
elements instructions and both instructions defining "purposely." The definition 
instructions were the two instructions identified in the alleged jury note and 
discussed hereinabove in our consideration of the sufficiency of the 
evidence.  Instruction No. 9, which 
followed the first-degree murder elements instruction, defined "purposely" as 
meaning "intentionally."  
Instruction No. 13, which followed the second-degree murder elements 
instruction, defined "purposely" as meaning "that the act which caused the death 
was intentionally done."

 
 

[¶32]   In this third argument, the 
appellant repeats and enlarges upon his contention that the jury was confused by 
being given both of these definitions.  
Having already dealt with that contention, we will not do so again.  The appellant goes on, however, and also 
argues that these definition instructions were improper because "the type of 
purposeful' conduct necessary to establish second degree murder cannot be 
undertaken thoughtlessly."  We will 
not further consider this argument because, frankly, we are unable to make any 
sense of it.5  There is not a hint of evidence in the 
record that the appellant's stabbing of DiIorio was "undertaken thoughtlessly," 
or that the jury convicted the appellant under any such standard.  Second-degree murder requires that the 
death result from an act that was intentionally done, and that is how the jury 
was instructed.  Lopez, 2004 WY 28, ¶ 18, 86 P.3d  at 
857.  The evidence included the appellant's 
admission that he intentionally stabbed DiIorio.  That evidence, alone, could have 
satisfied the "purposely" element of second-degree murder.  In rejecting the appellant's 
self-defense claim, the jury could have convicted him of first-degree murder, 
but convicted him only of the lesser offense.  Inasmuch as that process requires the 
jury first to consider the first-degree murder charge, the only rational 
inference to be made is that the jury fully understood and applied the law as it 
distinguishes between the two crimes, and resolved any doubts in the appellant's 
favor.  Specifically, the jury must 
have understood the difference between the specific intent to kill required for 
first-degree murder and the general intent to do the act that results in death 
required for second-degree murder.  
There was no prejudice to the appellant.

 
 
Was 
cumulative prejudicial "flight" evidence improperly 
admitted?

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 

[¶33]   Generally, we review decisions 
regarding the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion.  Law v. State, 2004 WY 111, ¶ 14, 98 P.3d 181, 187 (Wyo. 2004); Strickland, 2004 WY 91, ¶ 29, 94 P.3d  at 
1048.  Where there was no trial objection, 
however, the plain error standard applies:  
(1) the record must clearly reveal the alleged error; (2) there must have 
been an obvious violation of an unequivocal rule of law; and (3) the appellant 
must have been materially prejudiced by denial of a substantial right.  Brown v. State, 2005 WY 37, ¶ 8, 109 P.3d 52, 55 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
Discussion

 
 
[¶34]   In his appellate brief, the 
appellant lists the following in complaining about the "great quantum" of flight 
evidence admitted at his trial:

 
 
            
1.  Jeffrey Maxfield 
testified that he saw the appellant run toward him from the scene of the 
stabbing, and then run away.

 
 
            
2.  Lance Thormalen testified 
that the appellant appeared at his house after the stabbing, changed his clothes 
and, with Thormalen's help, surreptitiously disposed of 
them.

 
 
            
3.  Brittany Jensen 
testified, over the course of two days, about how the appellant appeared at her 
home in Glenrock the day after the stabbing and got her to take him all over 
Casper looking 
for resources.

 
 
            
4.  During the course of 
cross examination of defense witness Kelleen Gilstad, who had testified on 
direct examination about the appellant's actions after the stabbing, the State 
adduced flight evidence. 

 
 
            
5.  In closing argument, the 
State referred to this flight evidence and characterized it as not being the 
actions of an innocent man.

 
 

[¶35]   The first element of the plain 
error standard is met because the record clearly contains this testimony and 
argument.  The second element has 
not been met, however, because the appellant has not shown how the admission of 
this testimony, or the prosecutor's referral to it in closing argument, violated 
a clear and unequivocal rule of law.  
This is not a case where a flight instruction was given, contrary to our 
holding in Hadden v. State, 2002 WY 
41, ¶ 39, 42 P.3d 495, 508 (Wyo.), cert. 
denied, 537 U.S. 868 (2002).  Rather, the appellant contends that it 
was improper to allow the jury to consider evidence of flight as substantive 
evidence of guilt and that admission of the flight evidence resulted in an 
unfair trial.

 
 

[¶36]   While the appellant cites several 
cases and treatises for the proposition that flight is not very probative of 
guilt, he does not cite any authority for the proposition that flight evidence 
is not admissible.  Perhaps that is 
because this Court has consistently held that evidence of flight is admissible 
as circumstantial evidence of guilt.  
See Cureton v. State, 2003 WY 
44, ¶ 11, 65 P.3d 1250, 1253 (Wyo. 2003); Baier v. State, 891 P.2d 754, 760 (Wyo. 
1995); Miller v. State, 830 P.2d 419, 427 (Wyo. 
1992); Gentry v. State, 806 P.2d 1269, 1275 
(Wyo. 1991); Smizer v. State, 752 P.2d 406, 411 (Wyo. 
1988); Sanchez v. State, 694 P.2d 726, 730 
(Wyo. 1985); and Jones v. State, 568 P.2d 837, 845 n.10 
(Wyo. 1977).

 
 

[¶37]   We assume that the appellant's 
objection to the use of flight evidence as "substantive" evidence of guilt has 
reference to the traditional view that such evidence, being only circumstantial, 
is not direct evidence of guilt, but may only support an inference of guilt 
based upon "consciousness of guilt."  
See Christopher B. Mueller 
& Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal 
Evidence § 85 (2d ed. 1994).  Even if we assume that this traditional 
view is the law, we cannot see that admission of the flight evidence in this 
case violated that law.  In fact, 
after summing up the flight evidence during closing argument, the prosecutor 
contended that such was "proof and evidence of how desperate and the 
consciousness of guilt that this man was involved with."  There simply was no clear violation of 
an unequivocal rule of law.

 
 
Did the 
prosecutor commit misconduct by eliciting irrelevant prejudicial evidence and by 
making improper argument?

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶38]   Where there has been an objection 
below, claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed under a harmless error 
standard:

 
 
Wyoming 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.04 states that "any error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded by the 
reviewing court."  Wyoming Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 52(a) and Wyoming Rule of Evidence 103(a) contain similar 
provisions.  The test for harmless 
error is as follows:

 
 
"An 
error is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might 
have been more favorable to the defendant if the error had never occurred.  To demonstrate harmful error, the 
defendant must show prejudice under circumstances which manifest inherent 
unfairness and injustice or conduct which offends the public sense of fair 
play.'"

 
 

Condra 
v. State, 2004 WY 
131, ¶ 7, 100 P.3d 386, 389 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 
10, 63 P.3d 875, 881 (Wyo. 2003)).  Where there has not been an objection 
below, claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed under the plain error 
standard set forth earlier herein.  
Condra, 2004 WY 131, ¶ 6, 100 P.3d  at 389.

 
 

[¶39]   We decide claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct by reference to the entire record, and where the claim is one of 
improper argument, we consider it in the context of the entire argument.  Law, 2004 WY 111, ¶ 12, 98 P.3d  at 
191.  We are reluctant to find plain error in 
a closing argument "lest the trial court becomes required to control argument 
because opposing counsel does not object."  
Belden v. State, 2003 WY 89, ¶ 
38, 73 P.3d 1041, 1087 (Wyo. 2003), cert. 
denied, 540 U.S. 1165 
(2004) (quoting James v. State, 888 P.2d 200, 
207 (Wyo. 
1994)).  The question is whether, "based on the 
entire record, a reasonable possibility exists that, in the absence of the 
error, the verdict might have been more favorable to the accused."  Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 103, ¶ 56, 98 P.3d 143, 157 (Wyo. 2004).  "The burden of establishing 
prosecutorial misconduct rests upon the appellant who raises the issue."  Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 32, 43 P.3d 80, 
94 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
Discussion

 
 
[¶40]   
The appellant complains of seven incidents of alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct, four involving examination of witnesses and three 
involving closing argument:

 
 
            
1.         
During cross examination of the appellant, the following colloquy 
occurred:

 
 
Q.        How 
long did you know Ashley Hessler?

 
 
A.        Since 
about  I'd say February of 2003.

 
 
Q.        And 
that's when you got out of prison?

 
 
A.        About 
a month after.

 
 

The 
district court sustained defense counsel's objection to the second question as 
being violative of W.R.E. 609,6 as interpreted by Ramirez v. State, 994 P.2d 970, 973 
(Wyo. 2000).  The jury was then instructed that the 
question and answer had been stricken "from the jury's consideration." 

 
 
            
2.         
Toward the end of the cross examination of the appellant, the following 
colloquy occurred:

 
 
Q.        Now, 
[defense counsel] had inquired a little bit into the fact that you had been 
previously convicted of aggravated assault and battery?

 
 
A.        Yes, 
sir.

 
 
Q.        Isn't 
it true, Mr. Butcher, that you also were convicted of a robbery in connection to 
that same charge?

 
 
A.        Yes, 
sir.

 
 
Q.        And 
you received a five-to-seven-year sentence for those 
charges?

 
 
Defense 
counsel's objection to the last question on the same basis as its earlier 
objection was sustained, and the jury once again was instructed that the 
question was stricken.  

 
 
            
3.         
During the examination of Lance Thormalen, a witness for the State, the 
following question and answer occurred, to which defense counsel did not 
object:

 
 
Q.        Did 
he say anything else?

 
 
A.        Just 
that he had plans for Rawlins already.  
He was kind of looking forward to going back.

 
 
            
4.         
During the examination of Brittany Jensen, a witness for the State, the 
following question and answer occurred, to which defense counsel did not 
object:

 
 
Q.        And 
how long have you known Mr. Butcher?

 
 
A.        I 
knew him when I was younger, but I didn't know him well like a friend, so I 
didn't know him until he got out of prison this time.

 
 
            
5.         
During rebuttal closing, the prosecutor, without objection, responded as 
follows to defense counsel's argument that the State had tremendous power in 
making a decision to charge first-degree murder:

 
 
The 
tremendous and awful power of the State.  
I wish I had some of that power right now because I'm awful tired.  You know, I've been working 12- and 
14-hour days because I got a tremendous responsibility in analyzing all this 
information.  Trying to figure out 
who to call to the witness stand, trying to figure out what it is that they're 
going to say.  And they want you to 
believe that somehow I've got a whole lot more power than they got and that this 
power is awful.  And I told you that 
my job basically is to get to the bottom of the truth.

 
 
            
6.         
Later in rebuttal closing, while discussing an eight-inch knife the 
appellant had at some time before this incident left in a third person's car, 
the prosecutor commented as follows, also without 
objection:

 
 
Now, if 
I was going to be attacked by a knife like that oneI wouldn't want to, but if I 
was, I'll guarantee you I'd want that person sitting in the car when they tried 
to do it because all you're going to do is jump back . . . 
.

 
 
            
7.         
In concluding his rebuttal closing, the prosecutor made the following 
comment, to which there was no objection:

 
 
He makes 
reference to the fact thatsomething to the effect that my job is to fill in 
gaps or I didn't fill in the gaps.  
Well, my job isn't to fill in the gaps.  That's what we've been trying to do for 
the last week is fill in the gaps for you ladies and gentlemen so that you can 
come to a hard concrete and fair decision based on facts and based on supported 
by the law.

 
 

[¶41]   Turning first to the two questions 
posed to the appellant during cross examination, we note again that both 
questions and answers were stricken by the district court pursuant to Ramirez, 994 P.2d  at 973, which 
interpreted W.R.E. 609 as limiting evidence of a witness's prior convictions for 
impeachment purposes to the fact of a prior felony conviction, what the felony 
was, and the date of the conviction.  
The effect of the district court striking these questions and answers was 
to remove them from the evidence to be considered by the jury.  At the outset of the trial, and again 
prior to deliberations, the jury was instructed that "if any evidence is 
admitted and afterwards is ordered by me to be stricken out, you must disregard 
entirely the matter thus stricken . . . ."  
We presume that the jury followed these instructions.  Allen v. State, 2002 WY 48, ¶ 76, 43 P.3d 551, 575 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 899 
(2002); Ramirez v. State, 739 P.2d 1214, 1220 
(Wyo. 
1987).

 
 
[¶42]   Applying the harmless error 
standard, we cannot say that there is any likelihood that the verdict would have 
been more favorable to the appellant in the absence of these questions and 
answers.  W.R.E. 609 authorized the 
State to elicit evidence of the fact, nature, and date of the appellant's felony 
conviction.  The only additional 
information presented to the jury was the length and date of imprisonment.  Even without our presumption that the 
jury followed the district court's instructions and disregarded the latter 
information, it is extremely unlikely that such had any impact upon the 
verdict.  Consequently, any error 
was harmless.7

 
 

[¶43]   The third and fourth allegations of 
prosecutorial misconduct concern non-responsive answers from State witnesses to 
innocuous questions asked by the prosecutor.  The effect of both was to inform the 
jury that the appellant had been in prison.  The appellant has not alleged that the 
prosecutor purposely asked the questions, knowing that the witnesses would 
violate the dictates of Ramirez, 994 P.2d  at 973.  Without such, the appellant simply 
cannot satisfy the second requirement of the plain error rule; that is, he 
cannot show the clear violation of an unequivocal rule of law.8  Furthermore, given the strong evidence 
of guilt in this case, and given the fact that the jury already knew of the 
appellant's felony conviction, we cannot see any likelihood that he was 
prejudiced by this additional information.  
Perhaps that is why trial counsel did not object.

 
 
[¶44]   The appellant's next allegation of 
prosecutorial misconduct is directed to the prosecutor's comments during 
rebuttal closing about the "tremendous and awful power of the State."  We have set out above the full statement 
of the prosecutor, and will not repeat it here.  The appellant characterizes this 
statement as misconduct because the prosecutor "crossed the line" by 
personalizing the case and, essentially, testifying.  The prosecutor's statement did not, 
however, occur in a vacuum.  During 
closing argument, defense counsel stated as follows:

 
 
            
What a tremendous power it is to charge someone with first-degree 
murder.  Tremendous power.  We, as citizens, grant this power to the 
district attorney.  And when we do, 
we trust and we hope that they will use this power wisely.  They haven't done that, ladies and 
gentlemen.  They haven't done that 
because now first, second, [degree murder] it doesn't matter.  Murder is murder.  But is that the truth?  We'll talk about these charges a little 
bit later.

 
 
            
When we grant this tremendous power, we say, Please do not abuse this 
power.  In this case, that power was 
abused.

 
 

[¶45]   We do not find prosecutorial 
misconduct in the prosecutor's response to the "tremendous power" allegations 
made by defense counsel in her closing argument.  The State is allowed to respond to such 
allegations.  Moore v. State, 2003 WY 153, ¶ 32, 80 P.3d 191, 197 (Wyo. 2003).  Although the prosecutor's personalized 
"I'm awful tired" comment pretty much missed the mark as a response, and the 
added comment that "my job basically is to get to the bottom of the truth" came 
dangerously close to personal vouching, we conclude that, in the context of the 
full record and the entirety of the parties' arguments, there was neither a 
clear violation of an unambiguous law, nor any resultant prejudice to the 
appellant.  If the appellant was 
overcharged, the jury took care of that by finding him guilty of a 
lesser-included offense.

 
 
[¶46]   The next allegation of 
prosecutorial misconduct is directed at the prosecutor's stated desire not to be 
"attacked by a knife like that one."  
The appellant contends that the prosecutor personalized the case, 
testified, and raised a topic not touched upon in the defense closing.  The full context of that statement, with 
the complained-of portion highlighted, is as follows:

 
 
            
Now, he walked over here and pulled this knife out and said, Well, I 
certainly wouldn't want this knife flung at me or swung at me.  Well, nobody would want this knife flung 
or swung at them.  This is a 
three-and-a-half inch blade.  The 
one that Mr. Butcher had was eight inches long.  You saw him hold that ruler up and show 
it and hold it like that.  And what 
did Ginger Casciato tell us?  Mr. 
Butcher when he borrowed her car stuck that eight-inch knife with no sheath on 
it whatsoever right in between her seat so that he could have access to that 
thing any time, anyhow.

 
 
            
* * * *

 
 
            
I asked Mr. Butcher, you know, why do you carry knives?  Well, I run around with some awful crazy 
people.  Sounds like somebody that 
likes to use knives, doesn't it, ladies and gentlemen?  And someone that always has access to 
one right there and then when he needs it.

 
 
            
Now, if I was going to be attacked by a 
knife like that one  I wouldn't want to, but if I was, I'll guarantee you I'd 
want that person sitting in the car when they tried to do it because all you're 
going to do is jump back.  
And while he's trying to open the door and get outside, you're 
flat down the road.  And that is the 
responsibility and the duty that Mr. Butcher had.  And that's exactly what Instruction 
Number 28 and Number 23 tell you.  
And that's why I told you to pay attention to 
those.

 
 
[¶47]   The totality of this passage is a 
proper commentary upon the evidence, and is a proper response to the appellant's 
self-defense argument, despite the prosecutor's momentary lapse into 
personalization.9  Furthermore, it was a proper topic for 
rebuttal because defense counsel spent considerable time during his closing 
argument discussing different knives and their sizes. In fact, the highlighted 
portion of the prosecutor's statement is more a comment on the evidence than it 
is a personal statement.  The point 
of the statement is to evaluate the need for deadly force under the 
circumstances.   And even if it 
was improper, there is little likelihood of prejudice in this one isolated 
comment in the midst of all the evidence and argument about 
knives.

 
 
[¶48]   Finally, the appellant complains 
that the prosecutor's "fill in the gaps" argument was a "self-testimonial 
combined with personal attack on defense counsel."  Once again, however, the prosecutor's 
statement must be reviewed in context.  
It was, no doubt, made in response to the following allegation made by 
defense counsel in his closing argument:

 
 
            
And whether Mr. Butcher said to him John DiIorio swept at me with a knife 
or whether he said he was in a fight with him, again, I can't tell you which 
took place and I won't try to.  I 
won't try to fill in the gaps like [the prosecutor] was trying to 
do.  I want you to rely on 
the evidence we do have.  Not what 
might have happened, not what should have happened, not what could have 
happened; but the evidence that we can rely on that we do know what 
happened.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.) 

 
 

[¶49]   Because there was no objection at 
trial, the question here is whether the prosecutor's response, set forth 
hereinabove as allegation number seven, amounted to plain error.  It did not.  In his brief, the appellant supports 
this allegation by citing to cases describing the prosecutor's "special aura of 
legitimacy" and condemning the practice of prosecutors offering personal 
opinions on the evidence or the defendant's guilt.  See Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 
1218 (10th Cir. 2003); and United 
States v. Splain, 545 F.2d 1131, 1134 (8th 
Cir. 1976).  While we can agree that this is the law, 
we do not believe that it was violated in this case.  We have trouble, at the outset, 
construing the prosecutor's words as a personal opinion or belief about 
anything.  Secondly, prosecutors are 
allowed to respond to the closing arguments of defense counsel.  Moore, 2003 WY 153, ¶ 32, 80 P.3d  at 
199; Fortner v. State, 835 P.2d 1155, 1158 
(Wyo. 
1992).  And finally, under plain error analysis, 
the appellant has the burden of showing prejudice.  Here, the prosecutor's internally 
contradictory statement"my job isn't to fill in the gaps.  That's what we've been trying to do for 
the last week is fill in the gaps"simply cannot be seen to have had any effect 
upon the eventual verdict.  Neither 
can the words that followed"so that you can come to a hard concrete and fair 
decision based on facts and based on supported by the 
law."

 
 

[¶50]   We have said many times that we are 
reluctant to find plain error in closing arguments because we do not want to 
place the district court in the position of having to act as opposing 
counsel.  Belden, 2003 WY 89, ¶ 38, 73 P.3d  at 
1087.  We would expect that appellate counsel 
would begin to take us at our word in that regard, and would raise as plain 
error only those closing arguments that did, indeed, violate an unambiguous rule 
of law in an unambiguous manner, and that, at least arguably, resulted in 
prejudice to the appellant.  This 
innocuous passage about filling in the gaps or not filling in the gaps just does 
not come close to plain error.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶51]   The district court did not err in 
denying the appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal as to first-degree 
murder, and there was sufficient evidence to support the appellant's conviction 
for the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder.  The jury was properly instructed as to 
the meaning of the word "purposely," no prejudicial "flight" evidence was 
improperly admitted, and prosecutorial misconduct did not occur during witness 
examination or closing argument.

 
 
[¶52]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 
  1Perhaps the 
appellant is attempting through this argument to hint that this was a compromise 
verdict, and that he would have preferred a compromise between second-degree 
murder and manslaughter.  There is 
no legitimacy to such an argument.

 
 
  2Two of the 
appellant's appellate contentions are, for instance, that "there was little 
credible evidence that disputed Mr. Butcher's testimony that he did not intend a 
death to occur, and that he did not approach the victim with that purpose in 
mind[,]" and "[t]here was no evidence that Mr. Butcher ever stated that he 
intended to kill the victim . . . ."  

 
 
  3Instruction No. 
13 is the definitions instruction quoted above.  It followed Instruction No. 12, which 
was the elements instruction for second-degree murder.  Instruction No. 9 defined "purposely" as 
meaning "intentionally."  It 
followed Instruction No. 8, which was the elements instruction for first-degree 
murder.

 
 
  4Also unexplained 
in the record are certain markings on the original of Instruction No. 13.  The word "purposely" is circled, and the 
word "act" is underlined.  Those 
markings indicate a correct understanding of the word's definition as an element 
of second-degree murder.  We simply 
do not know if the jury made the markings, indicating that understanding, just 
as we do not know the origin or purpose of the 
note.

 
 
  5As with the 
appellant's earlier issues, this issue is hopelessly entangled in an 
inexplicable foray into the difference between first-degree and second-degree 
murder.  For example, the appellant 
contends in his appellate brief as follows:

 
 
            
As long as the Wyoming Legislature retains hierarchical degrees and kinds 
of murder, the distinguishing factors between and among each sort of homicide 
must also be maintained.  This 
maintenance presupposes careful and thorough instruction, and vigilance on the 
part of the courts to assure that prosecutors are not allowed to obtain 
improperly inflated convictions.  
Relying on the empty direction that "premeditation implies an interval, 
however brief, between the formation of the intent or design to kill and the 
commission of the act which resulted in death" (a notion not specified by the 
Wyoming Legislature), without requiring juries to debate and consider 
"deliberation" and "purpose" does not serve the purpose of preserving 
distinctions.  If not checked by the 
courts, prosecutors will continue to charge and juries will continue to render 
verdicts in virtual disregard of deliberation and 
purpose.

 
 
  6W.R.E. 609(a) 
provides that

 
 
[f]or the 
purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, (1) . . . evidence that an 
accused has been convicted of . . . a crime [punishable by death or imprisonment 
in excess of one (1) year under the law under which the witness was convicted] 
shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting 
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
accused[.]

 
 
  7That is not to 
say that we accept the State's appellate argument that "the prosecutor was 
merely attempting to establish the requisite foundation for the admissibility of 
appellant's prior convictions under rule 609." One does not lay the foundation 
for legitimate questions by asking illegitimate 
questions.

 
 

  8Black's Law Dictionary 1237 (7th ed. 
1999) defines "prosecutorial misconduct" as 
"[a] prosecutor's improper or illegal act (or failure to act), esp. involving an 
attempt to persuade the jury to wrongly convict a defendant or assess an 
unjustified punishment."  Surely, an 
allegation of prosecutorial misconduct cannot be sustained on the basis of an 
apparently innocent question.

 
 
  9The passage is 
confusing because three knives are being discussed, without clear 
distinction:  the 
three-and-a-half-inch knife found in Kouri's car after DiIorio's death which the 
appellant claims DiIorio swung at him through the car window, the eight-inch 
murder weapon, and an eight-inch knife the appellant once placed in witness 
Ginger Casciato's car.