Case Title: Powder River Oil Co. v. Powder River Petroleum Corp

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-04-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Powder River Oil Co. v. Powder River Petroleum Corp1992 WY 43830 P.2d 403Case Number: 91-119Decided: 04/16/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
POWDER RIVER OIL COMPANY, 
a Wyoming corporation, 

and W.R. "Bob" Gibson, 
d/b/a Powder River Oil Company, 

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

POWDER RIVER PETROLEUM 
CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation,

 and Walter Van Norman, Jr., 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from District 
Court, Niobrara County, John T. Langdon, J.

Morris R. Massey 
of Brown & Drew, Casper, for appellants.

Richard R. 
Wilking of Schwartz, Bon, McCrary, & Walker, Casper, for 
appellees.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

URBIGKIT, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      This case 
involves application of the Wyoming common law of trade name infringement and 
unfair competition. Appellants, W.R. Gibson (Gibson) and Powder River Oil 
Company, Inc., filed suit against appellees, Walter Van Norman, Jr. (Van Norman) 
and Powder River Petroleum Corporation, Inc., seeking injunctive relief 
preventing the use of a confusing and similar trade name. The trial court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Powder River Petroleum Corporation finding 
that actual confusion among the customers of Powder River Oil Company was not 
established. Powder River Oil Company appeals the order granting summary 
judgment. We reverse and remand.

I.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Powder River Oil 
Company asks whether the trial court erred

(1) in determining 
[appellants] have no right to relief absent a showing of confusion among the 
parties' customers as to the source of goods or services and (2) in concluding 
[appellants] have no redress from the Secretary of State's grant to [appellees] 
of the authority to do business under a name demonstrated to be deceptively 
similar to the trade name and corporate name under which [appellants] conduct 
the same business.

[¶3]      Powder River 
Petroleum Corporation claims only one issue is before this 
court:

[W]hether [the trial 
court judge] erred when he determined that there were no genuine issues of 
material fact and that Appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.

[¶4]      We consider these 
issues during the course of a unified discussion. 

II.

FACTS

[¶5]      Gibson conducts 
an oil and gas exploration and production business under the name Powder River 
Oil Company. Gibson began using the trade name in 1961. In 1963, Gibson filed a 
Wyoming trade name registration for Powder River Oil Company. The business 
entity itself was actually incorporated in 1968 under Wyoming law as Powder 
River Oil Company.

[¶6]      Powder River Oil 
Company acquires oil and gas leases. After additional geology work, Powder River 
Oil Company determines which leases have sufficient potential for an exploratory 
well. Powder River Oil Company then contributes the geology expenses and lease 
acquisitions to a drilling partnership formed with outside investors. Powder 
River Oil Company also purchases producing wells from which oil or gas 
production is sold to processors. Powder River Oil Company's operations are 
presently concentrated within the geographic area of Wyoming known as the Powder 
River Basin, particularly Campbell and Crook Counties.

[¶7]      Van Norman is the 
president of Powder River Petroleum Corporation a closely held family 
corporation. Powder River Petroleum Corporation had been incorporated in 1988 
under the Delaware state corporate code. Despite Powder River Oil Company's 
protests over the similarity of the names, Powder River Petroleum Corporation, 
following Delaware incorporation, secured authority to register its trade name 
with the Secretary of State as a foreign corporation doing business in Wyoming. 
Prior to 1988, the Van Norman family oil business in Wyoming had not used the 
name Powder River Petroleum Corporation.

[¶8]      Powder River 
Petroleum Corporation acquires oil and gas leases and, after drilling sites are 
selected, finances the drilling program in-house without the utilization of an 
outside investor program. The oil or gas produced is also sold to processors. 
Powder River Petroleum Corporation's operation area is presently contained 
within Albany and Niobrara Counties in the southeastern portion of the Powder 
River Basin.

[¶9]      Seventeen months 
after Powder River Petroleum Corporation registered to do business in Wyoming, 
Powder River Oil Company filed this lawsuit seeking a permanent injunction 
prohibiting use of the name Powder River Petroleum Corporation. Powder River Oil 
Company complained that the use of a deceptively similar trade name caused 
unfair competition, confusion and threatened the business reputation of Powder 
River Oil Company. After one year of discovery proceedings, Powder River 
Petroleum Corporation moved for summary judgment contending that trade name 
infringement could not exist as a matter of law unless "customers" were 
confused. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor 
of Powder River Petroleum Corporation with a decisional finding that the 
similarity of names had created confusion among suppliers of the two companies, 
but not as required by law among "customers."

III.

DISCUSSION

[¶10]   Disputes between parties involving 
the validity of trademarks or trade names and infringement can rarely be 
determined satisfactorily on a motion for summary judgment because full 
development of the facts at trial is particularly important for a proper 
resolution. Defined fact-finding for dispositive decision is required. Frederick 
Warne & Co., Inc. v. Book Sales Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
However, when appellate review of summary judgment is required, this court 
proceeds on a frequently stated ordered course. "Summary judgment is proper only 
when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the prevailing party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, 
Inc., 789 P.2d 866, 869 (Wyo. 1990), reh'g 820 P.2d 986 (Wyo. 1991). See 
W.R.C.P. 56(c). The court considers the record from the viewpoint most favorable 
to the party opposing the motion, giving all favorable inferences to be drawn 
from the facts contained in affidavits, depositions and other proper material 
appearing in the record to the opposing party. Roth v. First Sec. Bank of Rock 
Springs, Wyo., 684 P.2d 93 (Wyo. 1984) (quoting Reno Livestock Corp. v. Sun Oil 
Co. (Delaware), 638 P.2d 147 (Wyo. 1981)). Summary judgment eliminates the 
expense and burden of a formal trial when only questions of law are involved; 
however, this court must be persuaded that no material facts are in dispute and 
the trial court's judgment was correct as a matter of law. Fiscus v. Atlantic 
Richfield, 773 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 1989). We accord no deference to and are not bound 
by the trial court's decisions on issues of law. True Oil Co. v. Sinclair Oil 
Corp., 771 P.2d 781 (Wyo. 1989). "`Summary judgment is notoriously inappropriate 
for the determination of claims in which issues of intent, good faith and other 
subjective feelings play dominant roles.'" Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625, 635 
(Wyo. 1986) (quoting Croxen v. United States Chemical Corporation of Wisconsin, 
558 F. Supp. 6, 7 (N.D.Iowa 1982)).

[¶11]   The theoretical origin of this case 
lies in the body of common law known as trade name infringement. Trade name 
infringement is directly related to trademark infringement with the historical 
root of each lying in the desire of tradesmen to identify the origin of goods. 
See George J. Alexander, Commercial Torts § 1.3 (2d ed. 1988). Ultimately, trade 
names and trademarks are accorded similar protection by law being subsets of the 
broad topic of unfair competition and all resting on the same general principle. 
Bernstein v. Friedman, 62 Wyo. 16, 160 P.2d 227 (1945); Standard Oil Company v. 
Standard Oil Company, 252 F.2d 65 (10th Cir. 1958). These classifications should 
be considered as a continuum of rights recognized by common law and often by 
statute protecting competition within the business market-place. See 1 J. Thomas 
McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 1:2 (2d ed. 1984). Unfair 
competition originated as a commercial tort, but now represents an independent 
body of law. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 708-816 introductory note at 1 
(1979).1

[¶12]   These name contestants have spent 
extensive litigative time and effort debating the effect of the various 
registrations of trade or corporate names with the Wyoming Secretary of State. 
Powder River Oil Company argues its prior registration, first as a trade name 
then as a corporate name, entitles it to special protection. Powder River 
Petroleum Corporation responds by saying that the Secretary of State's decision 
to allow registration of its corporate name cannot be contested at this point. 
Both arguments are without merit. Wyoming accepts the majority rule that 
administrative acceptance of a corporate name by a state agency will be given no 
judicial weight in litigation over rights to the name. Plains Tire and Battery 
Co. v. Plains A to Z Tire Co., Inc., 622 P.2d 917 (Wyo. 1981); First Nat. Bank 
of Lander v. First Wyoming Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 592 P.2d 697 (Wyo. 1979); 1 J. 
Thomas McCarthy, supra, at § 9:3. This rule is rooted in sound 
policy.

     It can no longer be 
argued that in allowing incorporation under its laws, a state thereby intends to 
license the commission of what would otherwise be a tortious act. In other 
words, a state does not pass upon the legality of a corporate name by merely 
permitting incorporation under that name.

Hulburt Oil 
& Grease Co. v. Hulburt Oil & Grease Co., 371 F.2d 251, 254 (7th Cir. 
1966), cert. denied 386 U.S. 1032, 87 S. Ct. 1482, 18 L. Ed. 2d 594 (1967). The 
legal rights protected by common law infringement and unfair competition actions 
flow from prior use of the trade name in commerce with protection limited to the 
territory in which the use is established. First Nat. Bank of Lander, 592 P.2d  
at 704; 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, supra, at § 22:1. Therefore, this appeal must be 
treated as a common law action for trade name infringement and unfair 
competition. Consideration of this court will be given to the appropriateness of 
summary judgment decision on either infringement or unfair competition 
controversies.

[¶13]   The boundaries for Wyoming 
infringement and unfair competition laws were developed by Chief Justice Blume 
in Bernstein. The party seeking protection proved a secondary meaning had been 
established in the trade name "Western Ranchman Outfitters" and injunctive 
relief was affirmed preventing the use of Western Outfitters by a competitor. 
Bernstein, 160 P.2d  at 228, 234. The analytical framework conjunctively 
considered: (a) the character of the terms used in the trade name seeking 
protection; (b) the strength of that trade name; (c) the necessity for 
"secondary meaning" for geographic or descriptive trade names; (d) the 
likelihood of confusion created by the challenged trade name to prove 
infringement; and finally (e) a finding of express or implied fraud on the part 
of the business owner who infringed on the trade name seeking protection to 
prove unfair competition. Id. at 228-34. Subsequent opinions of this court 
applied the rules and analysis of Bernstein to trade name disputes involving 
tire stores, financial institutions and non-profit corporations. Plains Tire and 
Battery Co., 622 P.2d 917; First Nat. Bank of Lander, 592 P.2d 697; Wyoming Nat. 
Bank of Casper v. Security Bank & Trust Co., 572 P.2d 1120 (Wyo. 1977); 
Debruyn v. Golden Age Club of Cheyenne, 399 P.2d 390 (Wyo. 1965). We apply the 
Bernstein analysis to the present facts to determine whether Powder River 
Petroleum Corporation was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 
law.

A. The Character 
Of The Terms

[¶14]   The trade name Powder River Oil 
Company, which appellants are trying to protect, is a composite formed from the 
combination of the geographic term "Powder River" with the descriptive term 
"Oil" and the generic term "Company." Similarly, the trade name Powder River 
Petroleum Corporation is a composite of geographic, descriptive and generic 
terms. The trade names do not appear to be deceptive or confusing on their face; 
therefore, we determine the character and strength of the name seeking 
protection, Powder River Oil Company, in the relevant market area. Plains Tire 
and Battery Co., 622 P.2d  at 921.

[¶15]   The validity of a composite trade 
name is not judged by an examination of its component parts; rather, the 
validity is determined by viewing the trade name as a whole. California Cooler, 
Inc. v. Loretto Winery, Ltd., 774 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1985). Words which would 
not qualify for trade name protection used individually may become subject to 
infringement when used in combination. Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 
531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 429 U.S. 830, 97 S. Ct. 91, 50 L. Ed. 2d 94 
(1976). Dissecting a composite trade name which includes geographic and 
descriptive terms to determine if the name is primarily geographical is not 
appropriate. Plains Tire and Battery Co., 622 P.2d  at 923; 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, 
supra, at § 14:6. "The total commercial impression created by a composite [name] 
may be merely arbitrary or suggestive even though its separate parts [are] 
geographically descriptive." 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, supra, at § 
14:6.

[¶16]   The trial court erred in evaluating 
this case as one which would determine the exclusive use of "Powder River" in 
connection with the oil and gas business. Powder River is a geographical term 
which, in common use to designate a section of the country cannot be 
appropriated by anyone for exclusive use as a trade name. Wyoming Nat. Bank of 
Casper, 572 P.2d  at 1123. While a geographic term alone sometimes carries a 
secondary meaning suggesting an element of quality, the trial court made no such 
specific finding in this case. Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 
179 U.S. 665, 21 S. Ct. 270, 45 L. Ed. 365 (1901); 3 Rudolf Callmann, The Law Of 
Unfair Competition Trademarks and Monopolies § 18.15 (4th ed. 1983). The 
composite trade name, Powder River Oil Company, must be evaluated in its 
entirety to assess its strength.

B. The Strength 
Of The Trade Name

[¶17]   The strength of a trade name refers 
to its ability to be protected from infringement and whether proof of secondary 
meaning is required. Four classes of names are generally recognized: (1) 
generic; (2) descriptive, which includes geographically descriptive names; (3) 
suggestive; or (4) arbitrary, also called fanciful. 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, supra, 
at §§ 4:2, 4:4, 11:1. The court in American Television and Communications Corp. 
v. American Communications and Television, Inc., 810 F.2d 1546, 1548-49 (11th 
Cir. 1987) summarized the definitions commonly applied to the 
classifications:

     A generic name 
suggests the basic nature of the article or service. Most courts hold that a 
generic term is incapable of achieving trade name protection. * * * A 
descriptive term identifies a characteristic or quality of an article or 
service, and may become a protectable trade name only if it acquires a secondary 
meaning. * * * The distinction between descriptive and generic terms is one of 
degree. * * * A suggestive term suggests, rather than describes, a 
characteristic of the goods or services and requires an effort of the 
imagination by the consumer in order to be understood as descriptive; it 
requires no proof of secondary meaning to be protectable. An arbitrary or 
fanciful name bears no relationship to the product or service and is also 
protectable without proof of secondary meaning.

[¶18]   Powder River Oil Company does not 
represent an arbitrary or fanciful name unrelated to the product. Similarly, no 
effort of imagination is required to suggest what business is involved. The 
composite trade name Powder River Oil Company is descriptive of the business and 
the geographic area where the business is conducted. Descriptive names require a 
secondary meaning to be eligible for protection from infringement and unfair 
competition. Plains Tire and Battery Co., 622 P.2d  at 921; First Nat. Bank of 
Lander, 592 P.2d  at 703; Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corp. v. Appalachian Log Homes, 
Inc., 871 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1989); American Television and Communications 
Corp., 810 F.2d  at 1549. The trade name Powder River Oil Company must be 
classified as "weak," meaning that proof of a secondary meaning in addition to 
proof of a likelihood of confusion is required to establish infringement. FS 
Services, Inc. v. Custom Farm Services, Inc., 471 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1972); 1 J. 
Thomas McCarthy, supra, at § 11:1.

C. Secondary 
Meaning For Descriptive Names

[¶19]   Secondary meaning issues create 
concepts of an intangible and ephemeral nature. 2 J. Thomas McCarthy supra, at § 
32:36. Secondary meaning is found in a trade name which is used to identify a 
business with a name genealogy of a larger, more distinctive meaning. Bernstein, 
160 P.2d  at 229. A process of association creates secondary meaning when the 
trade name used "becomes distinctive and distinguishes not only the producer of 
a particular service and its quality but also the name of the producer of that 
service." Wyoming Nat. Bank of Casper, 572 P.2d  at 1124. Secondary meaning 
creates a commercial impression separate and apart from the descriptive words. 
In re Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 190 U.S.P.Q. 175, 176 (Trademark Trial & 
Appeal Bd. 1976).

[¶20]   The protection accorded descriptive 
trade names which acquire a secondary meaning is settled. The difficulty, as 
Chief Justice Blume noted, lies in the application of law to the facts in the 
case. Bernstein, 160 P.2d  at 232. The acquisition of secondary meaning is a 
question of fact and generally should not be decided by summary judgment. Marker 
Intern. v. DeBruler, 844 F.2d 763 (10th Cir. 1988). With this admonishment in 
mind and reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing 
summary judgment, we shall examine whether the trade name, Powder River Oil 
Company, has achieved a secondary meaning.

[¶21]   Proof of secondary meaning requires 
a showing that the trade name or trademark in question has come to represent the 
good will and reputation of the business. Bernstein, 160 P.2d  at 228; Frederick 
Warne & Co., Inc., 481 F. Supp.  at 1195. Several nonexclusive factors, 
involving both direct and circumstantial evidence, may be considered to 
determine if a secondary meaning exists. These factors 
include:

Direct 
Evidence

[1] direct consumer 
testimony

[2] consumer 
surveys

Circumstantial 
Evidence

[3] exclusivity, length, 
and manner of use

[4] amount and manner of 
advertising

[5] amount of sales and 
number of customers

[6] established place in 
the market

[7] proof of intentional 
copying.

Echo Travel, 
Inc. v. Travel Associates, Inc., 870 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir. 1989); see 1 J. 
Thomas McCarthy, supra, at §§ 15:10-15:20. Direct evidence of secondary meaning 
is often difficult to obtain. Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corp., 871 F.2d  at 596. We 
shall examine the available evidence relating to each of these factors within 
appellate review concepts regarding summary judgment to consider possible proof 
of any secondary meaning in the name Powder River Oil 
Company.

(1) Direct Consumer 
Testimony

[¶22]   The relevant consumer class for 
Powder River Oil Company's product is composed of purchasers or potential 
purchasers of crude oil and natural gas production. The most restricted relevant 
market area is the Powder River Basin of Wyoming. While the litigants may 
dispute the consumer class and market definitions as too broad or too confined, 
no persuasive evidence exists in the present record supporting any different 
application. No affidavits or other evidence supporting a secondary meaning in 
the name Powder River Oil Company exist in the record from this consumer 
class.

(2) Consumer 
Surveys

[¶23]   

(3) Exclusivity, 
Length and Manner of Use

[¶24]   Powder River Oil Company is not an 
exclusive user of the composite terms in its name. The record discloses 
thirty-eight non-party entities in Wyoming who use the geographic term "Powder 
River" in combination with other descriptive or generic words. Third party use 
of a substantially similar trade name to promote the same goods or services to 
the same consumer class weighs against a finding of secondary meaning. Echo 
Travel, Inc., 870 F.2d  at 1269. However, no inferences favorable or unfavorable 
to Powder River Oil Company are possible because the record does not disclose if 
entities such as Powder River Crude Processors or Powder River Exploration and 
Development are direct competitors in the oil and gas exploration and producing 
business.

[¶25]   The record does disclose that 
Powder River Oil Company first used its trade name in 1961 and registered the 
name in 1963. Also, Powder River Oil Company's incorporation date of 1968 
predates Powder River Petroleum Corporation's existence by twenty years. Powder 
River Oil Company's use of its name for such a long period of time prior to 
Powder River Petroleum Corporation's entry into the market is evidence of 
secondary meaning. Plains Tire and Battery Co., 622 P.2d  at 921; Wyoming Nat. 
Bank of Casper, 572 P.2d  at 1124.

(4) Amount and Manner 
of Advertising

[¶26]   It is undisputed that Powder River 
Oil Company does not advertise in the conventional sense of using mass media 
available to the general public. However, Powder River Oil Company did maintain 
listings in Armstrong Oil Directories which may be relevant to members of 
the consumer class. The record, however, does not disclose the effect of this 
type of listing which is the test of its evidentiary value for secondary 
meaning. 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, supra, at § 15:16.

(5) Amount of Sales 
and Number of Customers

[¶27]   No evidence exists in the record 
disclosing the amount of Powder River Oil Company's sales or the number of its 
customers.

(6) Established Place 
in the Market

[¶28]   Powder River Oil Company presented 
two affidavits with evidentiary value on this point. Kenneth C. Naramore, a 
former President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Stockmens Bank in 
Gillette, Wyoming, stated Powder River Oil Company had developed within the area 
both good will and an aggressive business reputation. Elvin L. Sprague, an 
independent geologist from Denver, Colorado, stated his view that the trade name 
Powder River Oil Company distinguished the business reputation of appellants in 
Wyoming and assisted in obtaining drilling prospect 
investors.

(7) Proof of 
Intentional Copying

[¶29]   The record does not disclose when 
Powder River Petroleum Corporation first learned of the prior user's identity. 
However, the record discloses that Powder River Petroleum Corporation became 
aware of the existence of Powder River Oil Company during the process of 
registering the trade name Powder River Petroleum Corporation with the Wyoming 
Secretary of State. Powder River Petroleum Corporation provides no explanation 
for the selection of its name. Consequently, insufficient evidence exists in the 
present record to suggest intentional copying of the trade name took place to 
benefit from use of any existing good will which had been created in the 
name.

[¶30]   Summarizing these secondary meaning 
factors, we find, under the limited record available, that Powder River Oil 
Company used its name more than twenty-five years prior to Powder River 
Petroleum Corporation. This long and continuous use favors Powder River Oil 
Company. Bernstein, 160 P.2d  at 231; Bishop v. Hanenburg, 39 Wn. App. 734, 695 P.2d 607 (1985). Additionally, Powder River Oil Company has established a place 
or distinction in the market as a dominant firm in oil and gas exploration 
sufficient to warrant protection of its good will and reputation. First Nat. 
Bank of Lander, 592 P.2d  at 703. Therefore, we hold Powder River Oil Company has 
established a secondary meaning in its trade name. On remand, the trial court 
will be free to re-examine the evidence using a more complete record to 
determine as an issue of fact whether secondary meaning has been achieved 
without the favorable inferences present in this summary judgment-determined 
proceeding. See Frederick Warne & Co., Inc., 481 F. Supp.  at 1198-99 and 
Travel Magazine, Inc. v. Travel Digest, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 
1961).

D. The 
Likelihood of Confusion - Infringement

[¶31]   The test of trade name infringement 
is the "`likelihood of confusion.'" Plains Tire and Battery Co., 622 P.2d  at 923 
(quoting 3 Rudolf Callmann, supra, at § 80); 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, supra, at § 
9:1. Wyoming initially used this test in Bernstein, 160 P.2d  at 232. The use of 
the test applied by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Standard Oil was 
reaffirmed in other Wyoming decisions on trade name confusion. Wyoming Nat. Bank 
of Casper, 572 P.2d  at 1121-22 (citing Standard Oil, 252 F.2d at 72); Plains 
Tire and Battery Co., 622 P.2d  at 922-23 (quoting Standard Oil, 252 F.2d at 
73-74). As applied in Standard Oil, the court determined a likelihood of 
confusion existed from Standard Oil of Ohio's potential use of the confusingly 
similar trade name "Sohio" within the marketing area of Standard Oil of Indiana 
which had used trade names and trademarks including "Standard Oil," "Standard," 
"SO," "SO Co," "S O C O" and "Solite." Standard Oil, 252 F.2d  at 68-69, 76. The 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a limited injunction preventing use of 
"Sohio" in the marketing of petroleum products to the general public within a 
fifteen state area including Wyoming. Id. at 69, 78-79. The federal district 
court had issued the limited injunction because no evidence of trade name 
confusion was presented involving oil exploration or production activities. 
Standard Oil Company v. Standard Oil Company, 141 F. Supp. 876 (D.Wyo. 1956), 
aff'd 252 F.2d 65 (10th Cir. 1958).2

[¶32]   Subsequent Wyoming cases applying 
the likelihood of confusion test also involved products or services directed at 
the general public as a consumer class. In Wyoming Nat. Bank of Casper, two 
banks, First National Bank of Casper and Wyoming National Bank of Casper, 
attempted to stop a Wyoming Bancorporation subsidiary bank from changing its 
name to "First Wyoming Bank-Casper." Wyoming Nat. Bank of Casper, 572 P.2d  at 
1121. Another name change involving the Wyoming Bancorporation subsidiary in 
Lander was challenged in First Nat. Bank of Lander, 592 P.2d  at 699. First 
National Bank of Lander wanted to change its name to "First Wyoming Bank, 
N.A.-Lander." First Wyoming Savings and Loan Association successfully challenged 
the name change by establishing a likelihood of confusion sufficient to require 
injunctive relief in Fremont County. First Nat. Bank of Lander, 592 P.2d  at 703. 
In Plains Tire and Battery Co., Plains Tire and Battery Company sought 
protection from customer confusion caused by the existence in the same market of 
Plains A to Z Tire Company. Plains Tire and Battery Co., 622 P.2d  at 919. 
Injunctive relief was ordered. Id. at 929.

[¶33]   As a result of the development of 
Wyoming's common law, the likelihood of confusion test has only been applied 
when products or services were offered to the general public as customers. 
Therefore, Wyoming has not considered, until this case, if potential confusion 
or actual confusion among suppliers or in a customer group which is severely 
limited by the nature of the business is sufficient to warrant protection from 
infringement and unfair competition. We must begin with an examination of the 
analysis framework which is used to determine the likelihood of confusion to see 
if its scope can be extended to meet our factual 
situation.

[¶34]   In Standard Oil, the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals relied upon the Restatement rule that a designation became 
confusingly similar to a trademark or trade name if prospective purchasers 
regarded it as indicating the source identified by the trademark or trade name. 
Standard Oil, 252 F.2d  at 72 (quoting Restatement of Torts § 728 (1938), omitted 
from Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 711-756 introductory note at 1 (1979)). 
This rule was similar to § 32(1)(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.S. 1114(1), 
which at the time of the Standard Oil decision required confusion, mistake or 
deception by "purchasers as to the source or origin of such goods or 
services."3 Determining whether a confusing 
similarity existed required the Standard Oil court to analyze several factors 
including: the "[d]egree of similarity in appearance, sound and meaning" between 
the trade name seeking protection and the challenged trade name; the "[i]ntent 
of the [party] adopting" the challenged designation; and "[t]he degree of care 
likely to be exercised by purchasers." Standard Oil, 252 F.2d  at 72 (citing 
Restatement of Torts § 729 (1938), omitted from Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 
711-756 introductory note at 1 (1979)) (hereinafter Standard Oil factors). This 
court approved the use of the Standard Oil factors in Wyoming Nat. Bank of 
Casper, 572 P.2d  at 1124-25.

[¶35]   While the Standard Oil factors for 
determining a likelihood of confusion remain viable, they are not considered 
exclusive and no one factor is determinative. Coherent, Inc. v. Coherent 
Technologies, Inc., 935 F.2d 1122 (10th Cir. 1991). The facts of a particular 
case often invite consideration of multiple factors. Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover 
Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1983) (Beer Nuts I). The most frequently 
referenced alternative list of factors was announced by Judge Friendly in 
Polaroid Corporation v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2nd Cir.), 
cert. denied 368 U.S. 820, 82 S. Ct. 36, 7 L. Ed. 2d 25 (1961) (hereinafter 
Polaroid factors). The eight Polaroid factors incorporate the Standard Oil 
factors and broaden the view to guide the inquiry into the likelihood of 
confusion by considering:

(1) the strength of the 
trade name seeking protection;

(2) the degrees of 
similarity between the two trade names;

(3) the competitive 
proximity of the products or services involved;

(4) the likelihood that 
the prior owner will "bridge the gap" between the two 
markets;

(5) the existence of 
actual confusion;

(6) the lack of good 
faith of the user of the challenged trade name in adopting the 
name;

(7) the quality of the 
product marketed under the challenged trade name; and

(8) the sophistication of 
the buyers.

Id. at 495. 
Judge Friendly acknowledged that even this list cannot account for all 
possibilities requiring courts to take other variables into account. Id. 
Although originally used to address the likelihood of confusion where the 
products differed, the Polaroid factors apply where the product or market 
classification is the same. See Western Pub. Co., Inc. v. Rose Art Industries, 
Inc., 910 F.2d 57 (2nd Cir. 1990); Eclipse Associates Ltd. v. Data General 
Corp., 894 F.2d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 1990); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum 
Corp., 818 F.2d 254 (2nd Cir. 1987); and Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. 
Pacific Graphics, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D.Wash. 
1991).

[¶36]   The Polaroid factors create a 
balancing test. Western Pub. Co., Inc., 910 F.2d at 60-61; Hard Rock Cafe 
Licensing Corp., 776 F. Supp.  at 1463. The court in Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover 
Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1986) (Beer Nuts II) provided an 
illustration of the interrelationship between the analysis factors. "For 
example, a small degree of similarity between two [trade names] may lead to a 
finding that confusion is likely when the products are identical, inexpensive 
items. On the other hand, very similar [trade names] may not generate confusion 
as to the source of the products where the products are very different or 
relatively expensive." Id. at 925.

[¶37]   The likelihood of confusion in this 
case requires a broader review than that afforded by the Standard Oil factors 
because of the limited number and sophisticated nature of the customers involved 
when we consider any claim of supplier or buyer confusion. Therefore, the court 
will utilize the framework provided by Judge Friendly's Polaroid factors to 
assess the likelihood of confusion between Powder River Oil Company and Powder 
River Petroleum Corporation.

(1) Strength of the 
Powder River Oil Company Trade Name

[¶38]   The acquisition of secondary 
meaning, as previously determined, in the trade name Powder River Oil Company 
means that it is entitled to protection. See Plains Tire and Battery Co., 622 P.2d  at 921-22.

(2) Degree of 
Similarity

[¶39]   A confusing similarity exists if 
trade names "look or sound similar or convey the same idea or meaning." Beer 
Nuts II, 805 F.2d  at 925; 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, supra, at §§ 
23:5-23:8.

"It is not necessary for 
similarity to go only to the eye or the ear for there to be infringement. The 
use of a designation which causes confusion because it conveys the same idea, or 
stimulates the same mental reaction, or has the same meaning is enjoined on the 
same basis as where the similarity goes to the eye or the 
ear."

Plains Tire and 
Battery Co., 622 P.2d  at 923 (quoting Standard Oil, 252 F.2d at 74). 
Similarities in the trade names are to be weighed more heavily than differences. 
Beer Nuts II, 805 F.2d  at 925. The examination must consider the meaning of the 
trade names taken as a whole. Id. Whatever technical distinctions may be made 
between various terms, the primary concern of the reviewing court is the meaning 
of the trade name to the prospective purchasers. Hancock v. American Steel & 
Wire Co. of New Jersey, 40 C.C.P.A. 931, 203 F.2d 737 
(1953).

[¶40]   A comparison of the trade names in 
question, Powder River Oil Company and Powder River Petroleum Corporation, 
directs a conclusion that a similarity of meaning is involved. See 2 J. Thomas 
McCarthy, supra, at § 23:8. Both trade names connote business entities selling 
hydrocarbon products from the Powder River Basin of Wyoming. Oil is a common 
synonym of petroleum. Roget's International Thesaurus 1125 (4th ed. 1977). 
Company and corporation are synonymous in the public mind. Black's Law 
Dictionary 255 (5th ed. 1979). The commercial impression created by the trade 
name Powder River Petroleum Corporation conveys the same meaning as the 
protected trade name Powder River Oil Company.4 Since both entities market 
identical goods, oil and gas production direct from the wells, the similarity 
weighs heavily against Powder River Petroleum Corporation's use. Specialty 
Brands, Inc. v. Coffee Bean Distributors, Inc., 748 F.2d 669, 673 (Fed. Cir. 
1984).

(3) Product 
Proximity

[¶41]   The competitive proximity between 
Powder River Oil Company and Powder River Petroleum Corporation is termed 
"substantially identical" by Powder River Oil Company. Powder River Petroleum 
Corporation disputes the market comparison by pointing out that it has only four 
long-standing customers buying its oil and gas produced in Wyoming. Powder River 
Petroleum Corporation also argues it is not in direct competition with Powder 
River Oil Company since the two businesses operate in different counties and a 
mistaken purchase is "hardly likely."

[¶42]   A claim that no likelihood of 
confusion exists when there is a lack of direct competition misstates the law. 
Direct competition between the parties is not necessary for there to be a 
likelihood of confusion. Standard Oil Co. of N.M. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 
56 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1932); 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, supra, at § 24:4. Confusion, 
or the likelihood of confusion, not competition, is the real test of 
infringement. Continental Motors Corp. v. Continental Aviation Corp., 375 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1967).

[¶43]   The use of the trade names Powder 
River Oil Company and Powder River Petroleum Corporation within the same 
industry, petroleum, supports a finding of competitive proximity. Mobil Oil 
Corp., 818 F.2d  at 258. Also, competitive proximity is measured by reference to 
the first two Polaroid factors. Id. The acquisition of a secondary meaning 
entitles Powder River Oil Company to protection against infringement of its 
trade name. Plains Tire and Battery Co., 622 P.2d  at 923; Continental Motors 
Corp., 375 F.2d  at 861. The long and continuous prior use of the trade name in 
the petroleum industry favors broader protection for Powder River Oil Company. 
See Bernstein, 160 P.2d  at 229 and Mobil Oil Corp., 818 F.2d  at 258. While the 
record is limited, it discloses that both entities operate within the relevant 
market area we have defined as the Powder River Basin. It is presumptive to 
assume that competitive proximity is guided by political boundaries such as 
county lines. Competitive proximity is more properly demonstrated by a showing 
of practice within the industry. Powder River Oil Company's right to protect its 
trade name coupled with the similarity between the trade names Powder River Oil 
Company and Powder River Petroleum Corporation weighs in favor of a finding of 
competitive proximity even if direct competition is not present. Mobil Oil 
Corp., 818 F.2d  at 258; Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 
1963).

(4) 
Likelihood the Prior Owner Will "Bridge the Gap"

[¶44]   The record indicates that both 
Powder River Oil Company and Powder River Petroleum Corporation have expanded or 
contracted their operations as economic conditions varied within the state. Such 
expansion, even if we assume they operate in different markets, could bring the 
two parties into direct competition. A conclusion that Powder River Oil Company 
could thus "bridge the gap" between its present market area and Powder River 
Petroleum Corporation's market area may be a permissible inference in this 
proceeding, but one to which, without more evidentiary support, we would attach 
minimal weight.

(5) The 
Existence of Actual Confusion

[¶45]   The analysis of the first three 
Polaroid factors is regarded as perhaps the most significant in determining the 
likelihood of confusion. Mobil Oil Corp., 818 F.2d  at 258. However, the trial 
court in this case focused its decision to grant summary judgment in favor of 
Powder River Petroleum Corporation on the fifth Polaroid factor. The trial court 
determined proof of actual confusion among "customers" was required as a matter 
of law to prove infringement. While the trial court found evidence of confusion 
among suppliers serving the parties, the trial court said "customers" were not 
confused. In review, we shall determine: first, whether proof of actual 
confusion is required as a matter of law to show infringement; and second, 
whether a showing of actual confusion is limited to customers. If the answer to 
these questions is "no," then the trial court erred as a matter of law in 
granting summary judgment on the infringement action.

[¶46]   There is no more positive proof of 
likelihood of confusion than evidence of actual confusion. Plains Tire and 
Battery Co., 622 P.2d  at 924 (quoting Standard Oil, 252 F.2d at 74). However, 
"[t]he test of infringement is the likelihood of confusion, not the proof 
of actual confusion." 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, supra, at § 23:2 (emphasis in 
original). A showing of actual confusion is not essential to an infringement 
action. E. Remy Martin & Co., S.A. v. Shaw-Ross Intern. Imports, Inc., 756 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1985); Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 380 F.2d 923 (8th Cir. 
1967); Standard Oil of N.M., 56 F.2d  at 976. The Bernstein court recognized that 
it was not necessary to show instances of actual confusion if the court could 
view the similarity between trade names and find that a likelihood of confusion 
existed. Bernstein, 160 P.2d  at 233. Therefore, the answer to the first question 
before this court is "no." Proof of actual confusion is not required as a matter 
of law to show infringement.

[¶47]   The existence of actual confusion 
is weighed in the balancing of the Polaroid factors. When actual confusion is 
present, it is often proven with direct testimony. Plains Tire and Battery Co., 
622 P.2d  at 925. In addition, actual confusion is commonly established utilizing 
evidence such as consumer surveys, misdirected mail, or misdirected telephone 
calls. See First Nat. Bank of Lander, 592 P.2d  at 703, using consumer surveys; 
Standard Oil, 252 F.2d  at 74-75, using consumer surveys; Bernstein, 160 P.2d  at 
234, referring to numerous letters in the record as evidence of a likelihood of 
confusion; International Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079 (7th Cir. 1988), approving use of misdirected letters as evidence of 
confusion; Plains Tire and Battery Co., 622 P.2d  at 927, receiving employee 
testimony of misdirected phone calls; and Armco, Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm 
Co., Inc., 693 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1982), receiving employees testimony of 
misdirected phone calls.

[¶48]   Powder River Oil Company's evidence 
of confusion included an affidavit from Gibson claiming misdirected phone calls 
and misdirected mail. Records of misdirected telephone calls to Powder River Oil 
Company included: a call from someone seeking to purchase an interest in Powder 
River Petroleum Corporation; calls from companies soliciting business from 
Powder River Petroleum Corporation; a call from an oil industry journalist 
seeking information about Powder River Petroleum Corporation; and calls from 
companies which supplied services to Powder River Petroleum Corporation. Various 
misdirected documents included over $55,000 in bills from suppliers for services 
rendered to Powder River Petroleum Corporation but mailed to Powder River Oil 
Company and business solicitations from service and supply companies.5 The trial court found this evidence 
was sufficient to indicate actual confusion existed and we agree when viewed in 
the light most favorable to the party opposing summary 
judgment.

[¶49]   Despite finding actual confusion, 
the trial court granted Powder River Petroleum Corporation's motion for summary 
judgment because the confusion did not include "customers." The view that 
infringement requires a likelihood of confusion among customers is too 
restrictive. Marathon Mfg. Co. v. Enerlite Products Corp., 767 F.2d 214 (5th 
Cir. 1985). Trade names, like trademarks and service marks, serve the basic 
legal purpose of identifying a business. The identification carries various 
social policy values including consumer protection, property rights, economic 
efficiency and universal concepts of justice. 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, supra, at § 
2:1. Limiting infringement claims to actions where a likelihood of confusion 
among customers is shown devalues the other policy reasons for securing trade 
name protection. For example, securing the advantage of a good business 
reputation is a significant policy reason for protecting trade names. Bernstein, 
160 P.2d  at 228. A business reputation, earned over years of conscious effort, 
deserves protection from those who would tarnish it unfairly by using a 
confusingly similar trade name. Entities such as suppliers, distributors and 
service companies certainly consider the business reputation of a firm with 
which they do business; and especially for transactions based on assessment of 
good credit. If a likelihood of confusion among suppliers, distributors, service 
companies or other relevant classifications exists, it deserves consideration as 
a relevant factor in determining infringement.

[¶50]   Other state and federal courts 
agree that the likelihood of confusion should not be limited to customers. In 
Bishop, 695 P.2d  at 611, the court considered misdirected billings from a 
supplier as evidence of confusion. The case involved a drapery wholesaler with a 
limited retail clientele who sought protection for the firm's trade name. The 
court reasoned that "if a supplier is confused by similar businesses with 
identical names, the consuming public is likely to be similarly confused." Id. 
Federal courts have long recognized that a likelihood of confusion is not 
limited to customers. In the leading case, Mastercrafters C. & R. Co. v. 
Vacheron & Const.-Le C.W., 221 F.2d 464 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied 350 U.S. 832, 76 S. Ct. 67, 100 L. Ed. 743 (1955), the court found visitors to the homes of 
buyers of the infringer's cheaper, electric clocks were likely to be confused 
into believing the cheaper clocks were in fact luxury Swiss models. The 
likelihood of confusing the visitor was sufficient for the Swiss clock 
distributors to seek an injunction and damages. Id. at 467. In Marathon Mfg. 
Co., a nickel cadmium battery manufacturer, Marathon, sued to stop the 
infringer, Enerlite, from using the Marathon name on a battery product made for 
video cameras. Marathon proved a likelihood of confusion existed in the nickel 
cadmium battery industry. Marathon Mfg. Co., 767 F.2d  at 221. Enerlite 
challenged that Marathon had not proven confusion from the actual or typical 
purchasers of Marathon products. The court held Marathon did not have to prove 
confusion on the part of actual buyers. The likelihood of confusion is not 
predicated upon a claim that the public may be misled. Id.

[¶51]   Perhaps the most persuasive 
evidence of the change in the former attitude requiring a likelihood of 
confusion among purchasers came in 1962. In that year, Congress amended § 
32(1)(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1114(1)(a), eliminating language 
requiring a showing that the infringer's use of a registered mark is likely to 
cause confusion or mistake or to deceive "purchasers as to the source or origin 
of such goods or services." Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub.L. No. 87-772, § 17, 76 
Stat. 773, 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2850. The quoted language, which was a part of 
the Act when Standard Oil was decided, was eliminated. The purpose of the 
amendment was specifically to allow evidence of any kind of confusion to support 
infringement litigation. Marathon Mfg. Co., 767 F.2d  at 221; Hard Rock Cafe 
Licensing Corp., 776 F. Supp.  at 1461.

[¶52]   The effect of the elimination of 
"purchasers" from the likelihood of confusion test is easily demonstrated by a 
comparison of arguments in the present case with those offered in Mobil Oil 
Corp. Powder River Petroleum Corporation argues there is little likelihood that 
crude oil and natural gas purchasers would make a mistake and buy products from 
it when they intended to purchase from Powder River Oil Company. Powder River 
Petroleum Corporation points out that oil and gas purchasers have to install 
pipelines or tank farms at the wells, so there is no material chance of 
potential customers mistakenly trading with one party while thinking the 
purchase was with the other. The Mobil Oil Corp. court considered a similar 
argument. Mobil Oil sought protection from infringement and unfair competition 
by Pegasus Petroleum in the petroleum industry. Mobil Oil Corp., 818 F.2d  at 
255. Pegasus Petroleum argued its oil trading business was conducted with 
sophisticated buyers, not with the public, and no actual confusion had been 
proven. Id. at 258-60. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding 
that a likelihood of confusion existed not in the fact that a third party would 
do business with Pegasus Petroleum believing it was related to Mobil Oil, but 
rather in the likelihood that Pegasus Petroleum would gain crucial credibility 
during the initial phases of a deal. Id. at 259. As an example, the court said 
an unsuspecting oil trader might accept a "cold" phone call from Pegasus 
Petroleum, a familiar procedure in oil trading, because the trader believed 
Pegasus Petroleum was related to Mobil Oil. Id. We find the logic persuasive 
that a likelihood of such initial interest confusion can occur when a 
confusingly similar trade name is used.

[¶53]   We hold that a showing of the 
likelihood of confusion is not limited to "customers." In weighing the analysis 
factors, a court should consider the likelihood of confusion within the range of 
relevant classifications potentially affected by the alleged infringement. 
Therefore, the trial court's failure in this case to consider evidence of actual 
confusion among suppliers was an error of law. In our review, we find the fifth 
Polaroid factor, the existence of actual confusion, weighs strongly in favor of 
Powder River Oil Company. We shall continue our analysis to determine if summary 
judgment in favor of Powder River Petroleum Corporation could possibly be 
granted based on the weight accorded other Polaroid factors or on the unfair 
competition action.

(6) Lack of Good 
Faith

[¶54]   Evidence of the intent of Powder 
River Petroleum Corporation in adopting its name is not part of the record. No 
deposition testimony or affidavits address the reasons for the choice of the 
name. The record does not disclose if Powder River Petroleum Corporation knew of 
the existence of Powder River Oil Company prior to attempting to register with 
the Secretary of State. The selection process utilized by Van Norman in deciding 
what to name his company is not in evidence. Therefore, it is not possible to 
weigh this factor or attach any reasonable inferences to it, especially in a 
summary judgment proceeding. See Cordova, 719 P.2d  at 635.

(7) Quality of the 
Product

[¶55]   No evidence of the product quality 
of the crude oil or natural gas marketed by Powder River Petroleum Corporation 
is present in the record. However, a senior user may seek to protect its 
reputation even when the infringer's goods are of top quality. Mobil Oil Corp., 
818 F.2d  at 259-60.

(8) Sophistication of 
the Buyers

[¶56]   The limited evidence contained in 
the record suggests that crude oil and natural gas buyers are sophisticated and 
therefore more capable of discriminating between similar trade names. See 2 J. 
Thomas McCarthy, supra, at § 23:29. If such a finding were made, it would weigh 
in favor of Powder River Petroleum Corporation. However, a more fully developed 
record is necessary to establish whether or not a likelihood of confusion among 
buyers exists. Some courts have found a likelihood of confusion can exist even 
with sophisticated buyers in the petroleum industry. See Mobil Oil Corp., 818 F.2d  at 260.

[¶57]   Reviewing the Polaroid factors used 
to analyze the likelihood of confusion between the trade names, we find the 
balance weighs in favor of Powder River Oil Company. Secondary meaning entitles 
Powder River Oil Company to protect its name. A confusing similarity is present 
between Powder River Oil Company and Powder River Petroleum Corporation. 
Competitive proximity between the two entities is present. Actual confusion has 
been shown among suppliers. The remaining factors fail to shift the balance in 
favor of Powder River Petroleum Corporation. Therefore, summary judgment in 
favor of Powder River Petroleum Corporation on the infringement claim was 
inappropriate.

E. Express or 
Implied Fraud - Unfair Competition

[¶58]   The line distinguishing between 
common law trademark or trade name infringement and unfair competition is not 
always straight. As Professor McCarthy points out, unfair competition rules 
offer broader protection. 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, supra, at § 8:1. Infringement 
claims consider only the trademark or trade name seeking protection. Unfair 
competition claims expand the consideration to issues of image and trade dress. 
Id. The general rule is the same facts which support an action for trademark 
infringement also support an action for unfair competition under common law and 
the Lanham Act under Section 43(a). Frederick Warne & Co., Inc., 481 F. Supp.  at 1195; 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, supra, at § 27:3. The likelihood of 
confusion is the test of both areas. New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of California, 
Inc., 595 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1979). As previously noted, the record lacks 
sufficient factual development on the issue of express or implied fraud for a 
finding to be made favorably or unfavorably regarding unfair competition 
resulting from an alleged trade name violation. Bernstein, 160 P.2d  at 229-30. 
Summary judgment in favor of Powder River Petroleum Corporation was also 
inappropriate on the issue of unfair competition.

IV.

CONCLUSION

[¶59]   The decision of the trial court in 
granting summary judgment in favor of Powder River Petroleum Corporation and 
against Powder River Oil Company is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial 
court for further proceedings in conformity herewith.

[¶60]   Reversed and 
remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1 The 
American Law Institute project to draft a separate Restatement of the Law of 
Unfair Competition has resulted in three Tentative Draft volumes. Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition §§ 1-8 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1988); Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition §§ 7, 9-27 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1990); 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §§ 21, 28-37 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 
1991). The goal of the project is to attempt to integrate traditional common law 
rules relating to trademark and trade name protection with statutory 
formulations. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, Reporters' Memorandum 
to the Members of the Institute at xvii (Tentative Draft No. 3, 
1991).

2 The 
Standard Oil case originated in Wyoming's federal district court where over one 
hundred and thirty witnesses generated more than five thousand pages of 
transcript during the longest federal court trial in the state's history to that 
point. Standard Oil, 141 F. Supp.  at 878. Two thousand exhibits were prepared 
and examined. Id. The only non-federal infringement decision cited by the 
federal district court was Justice Blume's opinion in Bernstein. Id. at 
884.

3 Most 
reported federal decisions on likelihood of confusion are premised upon the 
statutory authority of the Trademark Act of 1946 which is more commonly known as 
the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 1051 et. seq. (1991) (hereinafter Lanham Act). 
The Lanham Act provides for a system of registration of trademarks and codifies 
many of the common law rules relating to unfair competition, trademarks and 
trade names. "The common law test for likelihood of confusion is the same as the 
Lanham Act test." Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 
1484 n. 2 (10th Cir. 1987).

4 As 2 J. 
Thomas McCarthy, supra, at § 23:11 points out, similarity of trade names is a 
determination made on the facts of each case making prior decisions of little 
value; but, examples of confusion found by other courts provide useful guidance. 
See Clamp Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Enco Mfg. Co., Inc., 870 F.2d 512 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied 493 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 201, 202, 107 L. Ed. 2d 154, 155 (1989) (affirming 
trial court ruling that confusing similarity may exist between infringer's use 
of "No-Twist" on "C" clamps and protected user's "Kant-Twist"); Beer Nuts II, 
805 F.2d  at 926 (holding that infringer's "Brew Nuts" conveys same meaning or 
idea as protected "Beer Nuts" on snack food); Specialty Brands, Inc. v. Coffee 
Bean Distributors, Inc., 748 F.2d 669, 676 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (demonstrating 
likelihood of confusion between infringer's "Spice Valley" on brands of tea and 
protected user's "Spice Island"); and Hancock, 203 F.2d  at 740-41 (holding 
infringer's use of "Tornado" on wire fencing carried identical meaning to 
protected user's "Cyclone").

5 Also 
present in the record is a rejection notice for an oil purchase from a Powder 
River Petroleum Corporation customer which was misdirected to Powder River Oil 
Company. The admissibility of this document as evidence of customer confusion is 
disputed by the parties. The record does not disclose if the trial court ruled 
on the document's admissibility during the unrecorded summary judgment hearing. 
Because of the failure to record the summary judgment hearing, it is similarly 
not clear from the record if Powder River Petroleum Corporation objected to the 
document's admissibility. The trial court's decision letter mentions the 
rejection notice, but fails to disclose what weight was attached to the 
evidence. In light of the trial court's decision, evidence of customer confusion 
such as this rejection notice may be a material fact. However, for the purposes 
of this proceeding, we find it unnecessary to rule on the admissibility of the 
document and it has not been considered.