Case Title: Com. v. Callahan

Citation: 675 S.W.2d 391

Docket Number: 

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 1984-09-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
675 S.W.2d 391 (1984) COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Movant, v. Sam CALLAHAN and Lonnie Pack, Respondents. Supreme Court of Kentucky. September 13, 1984. *392 David L. Armstrong, Atty. Gen., Robert W. Hensley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for movant. Office of Public Advocate, Covington, for respondents; Robert J.W. Howell, Covington, of counsel. GANT, Justice. This action arises on discretionary review from an opinion of the Court of Appeals reversing the convictions of the respondents because of what that court conceived as prejudicial error during the final argument. During his argument, defense counsel made the following attempt to define reasonable doubt: The prosecutor objected to this, which objection was sustained. Subsequently, during his closing argument, the prosecutor stated: Paradoxically, the trial court, in deference to RCr 9.56, gave no definition of reasonable doubt. However, we disagree with the Court of Appeals which, in its opinion, seems to hold that, having sustained the objection of the Commonwealth to the argument of defense counsel, it was prejudicially erroneous to permit discussion of its concept of reasonable doubt by the Commonwealth. We disagree that the colloquy of the prosecutor constituted any attempt to define the phrase "reasonable doubt," and, indeed, it deferred to the trial court for its nonexistent definition. This case is a part of the progeny spawned by Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 98 S. Ct. 1930, 56 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1978), in which case the Supreme Court of the United States appeared to criticize, in dictum, the definition of "reasonable doubt" contained in Merritt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 386 S.W.2d 727 (1965). The reaction to the dictum in that case was the enactment of RCr 9.56(2), which reads: "The instructions should not attempt to define the term `reasonable doubt.'" This rule, together with Commentary in Palmore, Instructions To Juries, Vol. 2, Sec. 13.01, have been construed as an open invitation to both prosecution and defense to define the words "reasonable doubt." That Commentary reads: The removal of the definition of reasonable doubt from the instructions in the *393 Commonwealth is well founded in case and textbook law. In 9 Wigmore, Evidence, Section 2497 (Chadbourn rev. 1981), there is contained an excellent annotation on the subject, one quote, at page 412, reading: Having prohibited the court from definition of the term "reasonable doubt" in the instructions, by RCr 9.56(2), we can hardly condone a client-serving definition by defense counsel or prosecutor in either voir dire, opening statement or closing argument. As stated in Taylor, supra, ". . . arguments of counsel cannot substitute for instructions by the court." We do not intend by this holding that counsel cannot point out to the jury which evidence, or lack thereof, creates reasonable doubt, but all counsel shall refrain from any expression of the meaning or definition of the phrase "reasonable doubt." As stated in Wigmore, supra, page 408: Prospectively, trial courts shall prohibit counsel from any definition of "reasonable doubt" at any point in the trial, and any cases in this jurisdiction to the contrary are specifically overruled. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the other alleged errors in the trial of this case. All concur.