Case Title: Akron Bar Assn. v. Maher

Citation: 2006-Ohio-4575

Docket Number: 20060801

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-09-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Akron Bar Assn. v. Maher, 110 Ohio St.3d 346, 2006-Ohio-4575.] 
 
 
AKRON BAR ASSOCIATION v. MAHER. 
[Cite as Akron Bar Assn. v. Maher, 110 Ohio St.3d 346, 2006-Ohio-4575.] 
Attorneys at law — Multiple disciplinary violations — Important mitigating 
factors — Public reprimand. 
(No. 2006-0801 — Submitted June 7, 2006 — Decided September 20, 2006.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 05-064. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Douglas B. Maher of Akron, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0024038, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1977.  
On August 8, 2005, relator, Akron Bar Association, charged respondent with 
professional misconduct.  Respondent answered, and a panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline heard the cause, reviewed the 
parties’ comprehensive stipulations, and made findings of misconduct and a 
recommendation, all of which the board adopted. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 2} The board found misconduct on two counts, both involving 
respondent’s neglect of his clients’ cases.  As to the first count, the parties 
stipulated that Tina McCoy Cramer engaged respondent in 1999 to file suit for her 
after she was involved in an automobile accident in Mahoning County.  
Respondent filed a complaint on Cramer’s behalf in 2001 and refiled it in April 
2003 after a dismissal.  Respondent thereafter did not comply with defense 
counsel’s discovery requests, and he did not resolve his noncompliance after 
opposing counsel filed a motion to compel discovery.  Respondent withdrew as 
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Cramer’s counsel at the hearing on the motion to compel, and she retained another 
attorney. 
{¶ 3} The parties stipulated and the board found that respondent’s delay 
and inaction violated DR 6-101(A)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer from representing a 
client in a legal matter that the lawyer is professionally incompetent to manage), 
6-101(A)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from neglecting an entrusted legal matter), and 
7-101(A)(2) (prohibiting a lawyer from intentionally failing to carry out a contract 
of professional employment). 
{¶ 4} As to the second count of misconduct, the parties stipulated that 
Catherine Myers engaged respondent in October 1999 to file suit after she was 
involved in an automobile accident in Akron.  Respondent filed suit on October 
12, 2001, and refiled it in 2004 after a dismissal.  Respondent did not respond to 
defense counsel’s discovery requests and never asked for the medical records 
documenting his client’s injuries.  When respondent did not provide requested 
records in response to a motion to compel, the court dismissed Myers’s case for 
failure to prosecute. 
{¶ 5} The parties stipulated and the board found that respondent’s 
inaction and delay violated DR 6-101(A)(1), 6-101(A)(3), and 7-101(A)(3) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from intentionally causing a client prejudice or damage 
during a professional relationship). 
Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 6} In recommending a sanction for this misconduct, the panel and 
board considered respondent’s background and the aggravating and mitigating 
factors of his case in accordance with Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations 
Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”). 
{¶ 7} After his admission to the bar in 1977, respondent initially joined 
his father in practice.  He later became a sole practitioner and has spent most of 
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his career practicing law on his own.  Respondent’s practice mainly consists of 
criminal defense, with some domestic-relations work. 
{¶ 8} Relator did not present evidence of aggravating circumstances.  
Adopting the panel’s report, however, the board considered the aggravating effect 
of how respondent’s misconduct harmed his clients.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(h).  The board observed that respondent had neglected two personal-
injury cases, both times by failing to respond to discovery requests and motions to 
compel.  Respondent’s inaction certainly delayed both proceedings.  But at least 
in Cramer’s case, the board surmised that delay was the only damage, inasmuch 
as Cramer had new counsel to pursue her claim. 
{¶ 9} Unanswered questions as to how much respondent’s inaction 
harmed Myers, on the other hand, troubled the panel and board.  The stipulations 
suggested to them that respondent had initially dismissed Myers’s case voluntarily 
to avoid sanctions that the trial court seemed poised to impose.  Even after refiling 
the case, however, respondent’s continued inaction caused the court to dismiss the 
case for want of prosecution.  See Civ.R. 41(B)(1).  Myers has since died, and the 
panel and board expressed concern that the second dismissal might have been 
with prejudice, precluding Myers’s estate, if one were to be opened, from 
pursuing her claim. 
{¶ 10} Respondent admitted during the panel hearing that he had no 
malpractice insurance while he was representing these two clients, although he 
testified that neither Cramer nor Myers’s representative had threatened to sue him 
for malpractice.  Relator did not allege any violation of DR 1-104 (requiring 
lawyers to carry professional-liability insurance or disclose to clients that they do 
not). 
{¶ 11} Acknowledging his neglect, respondent conceded that he should 
not have accepted responsibility for either Cramer’s or Myers’s case.  He testified 
that he had little experience in personal injury, that both cases were difficult in 
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terms of establishing liability and damages, and that he had consequently 
considered the cases of low priority.  Respondent also explained that his criminal 
and domestic practices were monopolizing his professional time. 
{¶ 12} Respondent further testified to the personal difficulties he was 
having while representing Cramer and Myers, including marital troubles and 
caring for a child with autistic spectrum disorder.  Nevertheless, respondent 
accepted full responsibility for his conduct, acknowledging that these concerns 
were no excuse for his inaction.  He added that since the beginning of these 
proceedings, he has restricted his practice to the criminal and domestic areas of 
his expertise, obtained professional-liability insurance, and reconciled with his 
wife.  He has also seen much improvement in his son’s condition.  According to 
respondent, these developments have allowed him to regain control of his 
personal and professional life. 
{¶ 13} In reviewing other mitigating factors, the board found that 
respondent had no prior record of discipline or dishonest motive.  BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a) and (b).  Respondent, a recovering alcoholic since 1987, 
denied that substance abuse contributed to his misconduct.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(g). 
{¶ 14} Relator recommended a one-year suspension, stayed on the 
condition that respondent serve a one-year probation and allow his practice to be 
monitored.  Respondent requested a public reprimand.  Like the panel, the board 
recommended a public reprimand, presenting this explanation for the panel’s 
recommendation: 
{¶ 15} “We find this case almost identical to that of Medina County Bar 
Association v. Kerek, 102 Ohio St.3d 228, 2004-Ohio-2286, [809 N.E.2d 1], 
where a public reprimand was imposed.  While it is true that in Kerek the neglect 
involved only one client and that the neglect in this case encompasses two clients, 
on the other hand the Respondent in Kerek was also found to have violated other 
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disciplinary rules consisting of giving impermissible financial assistance to a 
client in violation of DR 5-103(B) and failure to cooperate [in disciplinary 
proceedings] in violation of Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G).  Such violations are not present 
in this case. 
{¶ 16} “In the Panel’s judgment Respondent’s misconduct is on a level 
equal to [that of] the Respondent in Kerek.  It is believed that this precedent, 
together with Respondent’s remorse, his twenty-eight years of being licensed 
without a violation, and the absence of any significant aggravating factors 
supporting a more severe sanction, justify the Panel’s recommendation of a public 
reprimand.” 
{¶ 17} Relator does not object to the board’s recommended public 
reprimand. 
Review 
{¶ 18} We agree that respondent violated the Disciplinary Rules cited by 
the board.  We also agree that a public reprimand is the appropriate sanction. 
{¶ 19} Respondent is therefore publicly reprimanded for his violations of 
DR 6-101(A)(1), 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(2), and 7-101(A)(3).  Costs are taxed to 
respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
James S. Thomasson and John Weisensell, for relator. 
 
Thomas Adgate, for respondent. 
______________________