Case Title: Peroutka v. Cronin.

Citation: 117 Haw. 323

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2008-03-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
LAW UBRAF

‘+8 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER.

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

MICHAEL A. PEROUTKA, CHUCK BALDWIN, and DAVID P. PORTER,
Appellants-Appellants,

KEVIN B, CRONIN', Chief Election Officer, State of Hawai'i,

Appellee-Appellee.
(CTV, No, 04-1-1904)

 

RALPH NADER, PETER MIGUEL CAMEJO, and ROBERT H. STIVER,
Appellants

KEVIN B. CRONIN, Chief Blection Officer, State of Hawai‘ii
(crv. NO, 4-1-1905)

 
     

NO. 27233 =
Be oS 2
ABPEAL FROM THE FIRST cracurr corr = SEE
(G2. Nos. 04=1"1904 and O4-1-1908) Heo. OG
Bio: os
wanci 27, 2008 Fale
3

 

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND DUFFY,
AND CIRCUIT JUDGE ALM, IN PLACE OF ACOBA, J., RECUSED

&

OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J.

Appellants Michael A. Peroutka, Chuck Baldwin
("Peroutka/Baldwin”), David P. Porter (“Porter”), and Ralph
Nader, Peter Miguel Camejo ("Nader/Camejo”), and Robert H. Stiver

 

 

Pursuant to Hawai" Rules of Appellate Procedure (*HRAP") Rule
43(c)_ (2008), Revin B, Cronin hae been substituted as a party to the instant
appeal in place of Ovayne D. Yoshina, in his official capacity.

 
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(stiver”) (collectively, “Appellants”), appeal from the first
circuit court's April 5, 2005 final judgments in favor of
Appellee, Kevin B. Cronin ("Chief Election Officer”).? The
instant case is a consolidated secondary appeal from the circuit
court’s April 5, 2005 judgments affirming the decisions of the
Chief Election Officer. On appeal, Appellants present the
following points of error: (1) the circuit court erred in
determining that the procedures used in verifying signatures on
Appellants nomination petitions are not unconstitutional; (2) the
circuit court erred in determining that the review of Appellants’
petitions by the Chief Election Officer was not arbitrary or
capricious; and (3) the circuit court erred in determining that
Appellants were provided a fair administrative hearing. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm the circuit court's April 5, 2005
final judgments.

1. BACKGROUND
on Septenber 3, 2004, Peroutka/Baldwin and Nader/Camejo
filed petitions with the Office of Elections to place their nanes
dential ballot as president/vice president. on
September 20, 2004, the Office of Elections issued a letter

 

on Hawaii's pri

 

informing Appellants that they had failed to garner the requisite
number of signatures necessary for inclusion on the presidential
ballot. In proofing its calculations, the Office of Elections
discovered that the numbers initially released needed to be
revised. On September 24, 2004, the Office of Elections informed

Appellants of its revised calculations.

 

+ the Honorable Sabrina S. McKenna presided.

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on September 23, 2004, Nader/Camejo filed a written
equest for a hearing, which began on September 29, 2004. Over
the objection of Nader/Camejo, the Chief Election officer
presided over the hearing. Prior to the completion of the
hearing, the parties reached a settlement. The terms of the
settlement were as follows: (1) invalid signatures would be
reviewed in the presence of 2 Nader/Camejo representative, who
would be allowed to flag those signatures as to which the
representative disputed the findings of the Office of Elections;
(2) the flagged signatures vould be reviewed by the Chief
Election Officer, whose decision on whether or not to count the
signatory “shall be final”; and (3) Nader/Camejo retained only
the right to “challenge those Hawaii statutory or administrative
rules that exceed those that are permissible under the U.S.
constitution or federal statutes, . . . as amended, or under the
Hawaii Constitution.”

The signature review process took place between October
7 and 12, 2004, and the Chief Election Officer reviewed the
findings of the Office of Elections’ staff and the signatures
that were flagged. On October 18, 2004, the Chief Election
officer issued his findings and determined that Nader/Camejo had
failed to gather the requisite number of valid signatures
required by Hawai'i Revised Statutes ("HRS") § 11-113 (2004), and
thus did not qualify for inclusion on Hawaii’s presidential
ballot. Nader/Camejo filed a timely notice of appeal to the
circuit court on October 18, 2004.
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2.  Beroutka/Baldwin
on Septenber 24, 2004, Peroutka/Baldwin filed a written

 

request for a hearing. The hearing was held on September 30,
2004, and Peroutka/Baldwin objected to the Chief Election
officer's presiding over the hearing. The Chief Election Officer
issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision on
october 5, 2004, which determined that Peroutka/Baldwin had
failed to gather the requisite number of valid signatures
required by HRS § 11-113, and thus did not qualify for inclusion
on Hawaii's presidential ballot. Peroutka/Camejo filed a timely
notice of appeal to the circuit court on October 18, 2004.
3. Appeal before the circuit court:

On appeal before the circuit court, both
Peroutka/Baldwin and Nader/Camejo raised identical arguments, as
follows: (1) Appellants were not provided a fair administrative
hearing before an impartial and unprejudiced election officers

 

(2) the administrative decision was arbitrary, capricious, and/or
not based on any credible evidence; and (3) the practices and
procedures used to count and determine the validity and
sufficiency of the signatures were unconstitutional. On November
23, 2004, the circuit court filed its decision affirming the
administrative decision of the Chief Election Officer. Therein

the circuit court held: (1) that “it is not clear, manifest, and

 

unmistakable that the relevant laws or procedures” used in
verifying signatures were unconstitutional, inasmuch as
Appellants failed to rebut the presumption that the legislative

enactments and statutory scheme at issue in the instant case are
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constitutional; (2) that the administrative rules and decisions
were reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious; and (3) that
Appellants failed to show either a pecuniary or institutional
interest that would disqualify the Chief Election Officer from
being involved in the administrative hearing.

on April 5, 2005, the circuit court filed its final
judgments. On April 13, 2005, Appellants timely filed @ joint
notice of appeal.

IL, STANDARD OF REVIEW

Secondary Adninistrative Appeal

“on secondary judicial review of an administrative

 

decision, Hawai("]i appellate courts apply the same standard of

review as that applied upon primary review by the circuit court.”

Kaiser Found, Health Plan, Inc, v. Dep't of Labor & indus.

Relations, 70 Haw. 72, 80, 762 P.2d 796, 800-01 (1988). For
adninistrative appeals, the applicable standard of review is set
forth in Hawai" Revised Statutes ("HRS") § 91-14 (2004), which

provides:

Upon review of the record the court may affirm the decision of the
agency oF Tenand the case with instructions fer further
Procecdingay or it may reverse or modify the decision and order if
Eke substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejodiced
because the adninistrative findings, conclusions, decisions, or
orders are

(2) io violation of constitutionel or statutory

provisions; or
(2) Envexcess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction

 

 

e 5 or
(4) Affected by other error of law; or
(5) Clearly erfonsous in view of the zeliable, probative,

 

Gnd substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitvary, capricious, or ch

Giseretion or clearly’ unwarrant

discretion,

 

 
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HRS § 91-14(g). Pursuant to HRS § 91-14(g) (5), administrative

 

findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous
standard, which requires this court to sustain its findings
wunless the court is left with a firm and definite conviction
that a mistake has been made.” Bumanglag v. Oahu Sugar Cou
Ltda, 78 Hawai'i 275, 279, 892 P.2d 468, 472 (1995) (block format
and citation omitted). Administrative conclusions of law,
however, are reviewed under the de nove standard inasmuch as they
are “not binding on an appellate court.” Id. (block format and
citation omitted). “where both mixed questions of fact and law
are presented, deference will be given to the agency’s expertis
and experience in the particular field and the court should not
substitute its own judgment for that of the agency.” Dole Hawaii,
DivicCastle & Cooke, Inc. v. Ramil, 71 Haw. 419, 424, 794 P.2d
1115, 1118 (1990). “To be granted deference, however, the
agency's decision must be consistent with the legislative
purpose.” Camara v. Agsalud, 67 Haw. 212, 216, 685 P.2d 794, 797
(19e4).
B. Statutory Interpretation

“rhe constitutionality of a statute is a question of
law that we review under the right/wrong standard.” Child
Support Enforcement Agency v, Doe, 109 Hawai'i 240, 246, 125 P.3d
461, 467 (2005) (citation omitted). Moreover, “(w)e have long
held that: (1) legislative enactments are presumptively
constitutional; (2) a party challenging a statutory schene has
the burden of showing unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable

doubt; and (3) the constitutional defect must be clear, manifest,
 

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and unmistakable.” Id, (citations and quotation marks omitted).
However, this presumption “does not apply to laws which classify
on the basis of suspect categories or impinge on fundamental
rights expressly or impliedly granted by the constitution.” Id.
(citation omitted). When this occurs, “[s]uch laws are presumed
to be unconstitutional unless the state shows compelling state
Interests which justify such classifications, and that the laws
are narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgnents of
constitutional rights.” Id, (citations and emphasis omitted) .
Tir. DIscussroN

A. Appellants’ Assertion That Hawaii's Regulatory Framework
Prescribing Signatory Requirements For a Presidential
Candidate’s Inclusion On a General Election Ballot Ts
Unconstitutional Is Deemed Waived Pursuant To Hawai'i Rules
Of Appellate Procedure Rule 28(b) (7) (2005).

Appellants assert that Hawaii's regulatory framework
prescribing signatory requirements for a presidential candidate's
inclusion on a general election ballot are unconstitutional
because it deprived (1) them of their rights to be candidates and
(2) the voters of the right to associate with 2 candidate of
their choice.

HRS § 11-113(c) (2) (B) (1993) provides:

() ALL candidates for President and Vice President of the

united States shail be qualified for inclusion on the general
lection Ballot under either of the following procedures

 

2) tn the case of candidates of parties or croups not
quelitied to place candidates on the prinary or general
@lection ballots, the person desiring to place the names on
the general election ballot shail fle with the chic
election officer not later than 4:30 p.n. on the sixtieth
Gay prior'to the generat eiection

 

 

is) A petition which shall be upon the form prescribed
and provided by the chief election officer containing the
 

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signatures of currently registered voters which constit
hot less than one per Cent of the votes cast in the Sta
the last presidential election. ‘The petition shall contain
the hanes of the candidates, a statenent that the persons
Signing intend to support those cendidates, the address of
Gach sagnatory, the date of the signer’s signature and other
Untormation av determined by the chief election officer.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Pursuant to HRS § 11-113(c) (2) (B), the Chief Election
officer determined that the minimum number of signatures of
registered voters required to qualify for inclusion on Hawaii's
2004 general election ballot as president and vice president was
3,711. According to his Septenber 20, 2004 letter, the chief
Election Officer informed Peroutka/Baldwin and Nader/Canejo that
of their 7,195 and 7,184 signatures submitted, only 3,481 and
3,672 were valid, respectively. The number of valid signatures
was revised lower in his Septenber 24, 2004 letter, which stated
that Peroutka/Baldwin had a revised 3,471 signatures, and
Nader/Canejo had a revised 3,124 signatures. Because both
campaigns did not meet the minimum number of valid signatures,
the Chief Election officer determined that neither campaign would
be included in Hawaii's general election ballot.

In the instant case, Appellants do not contest whether
the one percent signature requirement is constitutional.”

Indeed, even though Appellants’ point of error suggests that they

2 we observe that the federal district court for the District of
hawai's has rendered a sip opinion in this case, wherein Lt held that the one
percent signature requirement is not unconstitutional under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution, Mader ¥. Cronin, No. 04
Odéil, slip op. at 5-7 (D. Haw. Feb. 7, 2008)

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are asserting that Hawaii's signatory requirements are
unconstitutional, Appellants have not advanced any argument to
that effect.

Instead, Appellants argue that because signatory
restrictions implicate the fundamental right to candidacy,
Hawaii's regulatory framework should be Liberally construed in
favor of the candidate. specifically, their arguments are
focused around the issue of whether the Chief Election officer

 

clearly erred in his implementation of Hawaii's signatory

requirements, as follows: (1) it is clearly erroneous to reject

 

signatures merely because they are illegible; (2) “although the
office of Elections requires that signatories provide their
address and date of birth . . . the examiners did not attempt to
validate signatories by cross-referencing that information on the
statewide voter registration systen"; and (3) it is clearly
erroneous to reject a signature merely because the signatory’s
Listed on the

 

address on the petition did not match the addr
statewide voter registration system ("SVRS") .
Because Appellants present no argument in support of
their point of error that Hawaii’s signatory requirements are
unconstitutional, this point of error is deemed waived. See
Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule (“HRAP”) 28(b) (7)
(2005) (*[TJhe appellant shall file an opening brief, containing
the following sections . . . : (7) The argument, containing the
contentions of the appellant on the points presented and the
reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and

parts of the record relied on. . . . Points not argued may be
   

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deemed waived.

B. The Chief Election Officer's Interpretation and Application
of Hawaii's Regulatory Framework Prescribing Signatory
Requirements Was Not Clearly Erroneous

 

As delineated above, Appellants assert that the Chief
Election Officer's interpretation and application of the statute
and rules comprising Hawaii's signatory requirements should be
Liberally construed in favor of Appellants because of the
constitutional rights involved in the instant case.
specifically, they assert that the Chief Election Officer’ s

conduct was clearly erroneous in the following ways: (1) it was

 

clearly erroneous to reject signatures merely because they were
illegible; (2) “although the Office of Elections require(d) that
signatories provide their address and date of birth . . . the
examiners did not attempt to validate signatories by cross-
referencing that information on the statewide voter registration
system”; and (3) it was clearly erroneous to reject a signature
merely because the signatory’s address on the petition did not
match the address listed on the SVRS.

Hawai'i Administrative Rules (“HAR”) § 2-51-112 (2004),
entitled “Presidential petitions; qualification of
signatories(,]” provides, in its entirety:

‘To determine whether an individual is qualitied to sign a

presidential petition, the chief election officer oF designated
sfesentative shall determine whether the signatory is an ective
Fepistered voter by checking the statewide voter registration
aysteny provides thst 2 properly executed voter registration form
Shell be effective if it is received by the clerk and the
iiant’ s nane has been entered in the statewide voter

Eagistration system on or before the date on which the petition is
flea

 

    

   

   

HAR § 2-51-113(b) and (d), entitled “Presidential

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petitions; verification of signatories(,]” provides:

(b) Upon receipt of a petition containing at least, the
minimum number ef signatures required pursuant. to HRS $ 11~
T13(c) (2) (b)s, the chief election officer or designated
23th dctative shall. verity whether the signatory 18 eligible to
HGn che petition, Zo be eligible, the signatory sust be
HSlatered voter in Hawaii and must oppear in the statewide voter
iedideracion system as an active registered voter.

(G] Te the signatory on the petition exis
an active registered voter in the statewide voter
fegistration system, then the signatory shall be

(2) 1£ the signatory on the petition does not
exist aa an active ragistered voter in the statewide
ote: registration system, then the signatory shall
ot be counted:

(GT there are duplicate signatories on
party petition, and the signatory is an active
Pegiteered voter, then the signatory shall be counted
ones; and

Tay re the signetory does not provide all of the
required infornation on the petition or if the information

 

 

 

 

 

jg) the chiee election officer may verify that the voter's
signature on the petition corresponds with the voter's signature
Sibthe"vocer's registration form. If the signature does not
SSerespond, then the voter's signature on the petition shall not
SereSakeed! “the chief election officer or designates
Pepresentative shall indicate on the petition that the voter's
EiBadeure is invalid because it does not match the signature on
the voter’ s registration form.

 

(emphasis added.)

According to the Chief Election Officer's Findings of

Fact,

 

A signature Ss deemed: (a) valid Lf the signatory is listed
Sycelve” in the State Voter Registration System, (SVR), (6)
[hvala if" the signatory is listed as “inactive” in the SVRS, (c)
SGntaining insufficient information if the information submitted
Sythe signatory could not be verified due to insufficient
Piecmation (ice. no octal security number, date of birth,
Signature, of could not be read from the record), (d) of no record
UeNthe signatory does not appear in the SVRS, (e) fo have @
Gieterent address if the address information on the petition did
Sot natch the address in the SVRS, and (f) to be a duplicate if
the signatory eppeared twice on the petition.

 

 

 

 

checked

 

‘The circuit court found that “the signatory i

a
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a

 

against the (SVRS) to determine if he is an active regist
voter." According to the circuit court, because “[t]he SVRS
allows for voter records to be pulled up by either social
security number or nane[,]" “it is critical that signatories
comply with the requirement of printing their name in order to
avoid illegibility issues, which will result in the record not .
» « being accessible.” The circuit court also found that the

petition form contained the following columns that were filled

out by the signatory:

 

(2) “Print Your Nane Here,” (2) “Sign the Name Under Which
You Are Registered co vote,” (3) “Print the Reside
Address at Which You are Registered to Vote,

Date," and (S) "Date Signed.” ‘There is additionally a
colunn for the voter's "social Security Number,” however
Completing this column is optional.

    

 

Finally, the circuit court found that “{mJost signatories did not
provide their social security number.”

Based on the affidavits of Stiver and Porter, two of
the Appellants in this case, Appellants allege that it was
clearly erroneous for the Chief Election Officer to reject a
large number of signatures as illegible without making a serious
effort to decipher the nanes or use other identifying
information. HAR § 2-51-113(b) (4), however, clearly provides
that the Chief Election Officer “nay” not count a signature “if
the information is not legible.” Moreover, the circuit court
“confirmed that many of the names submitted were not legible, as
found below-thus, this finding was not clearly erroneous.”
Additionally, Appellants have not pointed to anything in the
record substantiating their claim: namely, the petitions
themselves. See HRAP Rule 28(b) (7). Accordingly, we must

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“sustain (the Chief Election Officer's] findings” because we
cannot say “with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake
has been made.” Bumanglag, 78 Hawai'i at 279, 892 P.2d at 472
(block format and citation omitted).

Again based on the affidavits of Stiver and Porter,
Appellants assert that although the Office of Elections requires
that signatories provide their address and date of birth on the
petition form, it was clearly erroneous to not attempt to
validate signatories by cross-referencing that information on the
svRS. Appellants, however, fail to point to anything in Hawaii's
regulatory framework that compels the Chief Election Officer to
cross-reference a signatory’s address or date of birth to the
Anformation within the SVRS. Apparently, the SVRS is set up in
such a way that voter records are pulled up by either social
security number or name. Providing a social security number on a
petition is optional, and the circuit court found that most
signatories did not provide one. Accordingly, when a signatory
elects not to provide his or her social security number, the
Chief Election Officer's only option is to pull the voter's
records by his or her name. However, if the name as written on
the petition is illegible, the Chief Election Officer “may” not
count that signatory. HAR § 2-51-113(b) (4). The circuit court
“confirmed that many of the names submitted were not legible, as
found below!.]” As such, we cannot say “with a firm and definite
conviction that a mistake has been made(]” when the Chief
Election Officer purportedly did not attempt to validate

signatories by cross-referencing other information in the

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petition with information in the SVRS. Bumanglag, 78 Hawai'i at
279, 892 P.2d at 472 (block format and citation omitted).

Finally, Appellants assert that HAR § 2-$1-113(b) does
not authorize invalidating a signature merely because the
signatory’s address on the petition is different fron the address
provided in the statewide voter registration system. The Chief
Election Officer asserts that the state has an interest in
detecting fraudulent or questionable signatures. Pursuant to
this interest, the state employs signatory requirements that are
necessary to ensure that the signatory is in fact a registered
voter.

Nevertheless, Appellants assert that an address change
should not disqualify a signatory from signing a petition,
inasmuch as HRS § 11-21(c) (2004)‘ does not disqualify a
registered voter from voting for the same reason. However,
Appellants’ reliance on HAS § 11-21(c) is misplaced, inasmuch as
HAR § 2-51-113(b) (4) provides that the Chief Election officer
vmay” not count a signature “[iJ£ the signatory does not provide
all of the required information on the petition . * one of
the colunns on the petition form required a signatory to “Print
the Residence Address at which You are Registered to Vote(.]”

+ as § 11-21(6) provides:

{c) Any person whose nane appears on the registered voters List
those Fesidence has changed since the last election, and whom the
Ulunt, Clerk has not teatsferses under section 11-20, may apply en

2 form prescribed by the chief elections officer at the person's
ew polling place on the day of the election for transfer of

 

  

 

 

 

precinct,
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In Light of the state’s interest in detecting fraudulent or
questionable signatures, we cannot say that it was clearly
erroneous for the Chief Election Officer to reject a signature
pecause the signatory provided a different address on the
petition form than was provided in the SVRS.

c. The Circuit Court Did Not Exr When It Determined That
Appellants Were Provided With a Fair Adninistrative Hearing

Appellants assert that because the Chief Election
officer presided over the administrative hearing requested by
peroutka/Baldwin, Appellants did not receive a fair and impartial
hearing, and were therefore denied their constitutional right to
due process. Appellants also assert that Nader/Camejo were
compelled to settle because they could not receive a fair and
impartial hearing inasmuch as the Chief Election Officer presided
over the hearing. The circuit court held that, pursuant to
‘Sitagaloa v. Bd, of Trs, of Emplovees’ Ret. Sva,, 74 Haw. 161,
940 P.2d 367 (1992), Appellants received a fair and impartial
hearing because the Chief Election Officer did not have a
pecuniary interest, and his only institutional interest was to
ensure that a fair election was conducted.*

In Sifagaloa, the Board of Trustees of the Employees’
Retirement System, upon reviewing a decision submitted by the
Medical Board, denied Sifagaloa’s request for disability
retirement benefits. 74 Haw. at 186-87, 840 P.2d at 370, The
same Board of Trustees adjudicated his appeal from the Medical

+ appellants appear to assert that Sifagalea is inapposite, even
‘though they theaselves rely on language in the case when making theif
Srgusent. Sigagalea is squarely on point

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Board’s decision. Id, at 187, 840 P.24 at 370, After conducting
hearings on the matter, the Board affirmed the Medical soard’s
decision. Id, at 187-88, 840 P.2d at 370. On appeal, Sifagaloa
asserted that he was denied his constitutional right to due
process because the Board's conflicting interests of awarding
retirement benefits and preserving the retirement fund brought
about an appearance of impropriety whereby their impartiality
might reasonably be questioned. Id, at 188, 640 P.2d at 370-71.
This court determined that administrative agencies are subject to
the same “basic requirement of due process” of a “fair trial ina
fair tribunal[.]” Id. at 189, 640 P.2d at 371 (citations and
quotation marks omitted). Even though “a biased decisionmaker is
constitutionally unacceptable(,]” it does not necessarily follow
“that the disqualification of decision-makers on grounds of
actual bias prevents unfairness in all cases.” Id. (citations,
quotation marks, brackets, and ellipsis omitted).

In observing that “our systen of justice has always
endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness(,]" this
court observed “that justice can perform its high function in the
best way only if it satisfies the appearance of justice.” Id. at
189-80, 840 P.2d at 371 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets
omitted). This court held, however, that “[aln appearance of
impropriety does not occur simply where there is a joinder of
executive and judicial power.” Id. at 191, 640 P.2d at 372.
Instead, “(aldministrators serving as adjudicators are presumed

to be unbiased.” Id, at 192, 840 P.2d at 372. To overcome this

 

Presumption, the party asserting impropriety has the burden of

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establishing a disqualifying interest. Id.

In the instant case, Appellants’ assert that it was
improper for the Chief Election officer to conduct the hearing
when, “by virtue of his role as Chief Election Officer, [he was)
responsible for establishing and executing the policies governing
the Office of Elections(.]” However, this court clearly held
that a mere “joinder of executive and judicial power” is
Anaufficient to constitute an appearance of impropriety. see.
Sifagaloa, 74 Haw. at 191, 840 P.2d at 372. Because Appellants
have failed to show that the Chief Election Officer had a
“direct, personal, pecuniary interest” in his exercise of
judicial power, see id. at 192, 840 P.2d at 372, we hold that the
circuit court did not err when it held that Appellants were
provided with a fair administrative hearing.

IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, we affirm the circuit

court's April 5, 2005 final judgments.

on the briefs:

Eric A, Seitz and
Lawrence T. Kawasaki for

appellants-appellants Michael A.

Peroutka, Chuck Baldwin, and -

David P.'Porter and Ralph Nader, ee Linen
Peter Miguel Canejo, and

Robert H Stiver Peccsue Co are

Aaron H. Schulaner and Holly .
Shikada, Deputy Attorneys Can 6 Dallp ee

General’ for appellee-appellee
Kevin B, Cronin, Chief Election ies
Officer, State of Hawai'i

a7