Case Title: State v. Makuch/Riesterer

Citation: 

Docket Number: S50435

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  June 2, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
PAUL ARTHUR MAKUCH,
Petitioner on Review.
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
LEIGH ANN RIESTERER,
aka LEIGH ANN MAKUCH,
Petitioner on Review.
(CR98-1962; CR98-1961; A110292 (Control); ;A110839; SC S50435, S50478)
(Consolidated for Opinion)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 9, 2004.
Robin A. Jones, Senior Deputy Public Defender, argued the
cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review Makuch.  With
her on the briefs were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, and
Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Oregon Public Defense Services.
Harrison Latto, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for petitioner on review Riesterer.
Daniel J. Casey, Assistant Attorney General, argued the
cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With him on
the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice,** and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz,*** Balmer, and Kistler, Justices.
RIGGS, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
orders of the circuit court are affirmed in part and reversed in
part, and the cases are remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
*Appeal from Clackamas County Circuit Court, Robert R. Selander, Judge. 185 Or App 298, 59 P3d 536 (2002)
**Chief Justice when case was argued.
***Chief Justice when case was decided.
RIGGS, J.
In these two criminal cases, we decide whether the
police unlawfully obtained evidence of defendants' marijuana
growing operation such that the evidence should be suppressed. 
The trial court suppressed that evidence under an Oregon statute,
because the police had searched a lawyer's personal organizer for
defendants' last names and addresses.  The Court of Appeals
reversed that part of the trial court's orders, concluding that
the protections of the Oregon statute did not apply in
defendants' cases and that the evidence should not be suppressed
on any other ground.  State v. Makuch/Riesterer, 185 Or App 298,
59 P3d 536 (2002).  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the
Court of Appeals, and we affirm in part and reverse in part the
trial court.
The parties do not contest the facts as stated in the
Court of Appeals' opinion.
"The facts are complex and involve three separate
searches that occurred on the same day, July 7, 1998: 
(1) the search of the residence of Jeffrey Husk in
Portland; (2) the subsequent search of the residence of
defendants' attorney, Lawrence Neal, in Vancouver,
Washington, including the search of Neal's
organizer/day planner, which disclosed defendants'
names and addresses; and, finally, (3) the search of
defendants' place of business in Milwaukie, Oregon,
which revealed a marijuana grow operation.  We describe
the searches in sequence.
"On July 7, 1998, Officer Brian Schmautz of the
Portland Police Bureau sought and obtained a warrant to
search Husk's home in Portland.  The affidavit in
support of the warrant revealed that Schmautz had
received information from an informant who had seen
marijuana growing at Husk's residence.  The informant
told Schmautz that Husk had said that he had a partner
and was involved in marijuana distribution.  The
informant also told Schmautz that Husk had told him
that his partner would be coming to Husk's residence. 
Thereafter, the informant saw only one person visit the
residence and wrote down the Washington state license
plate number of that visitor.  After the visitor left,
Husk told the informant that the visitor was his
partner, Larry, an attorney in Vancouver, and stated
that he had traded marijuana cuttings with his partner. 
Schmautz determined that the license plate was for a
vehicle registered to Lawrence Neal of Vancouver,
Washington.
"Schmautz went to Husk's home and talked with
Husk, who eventually led Schmautz to his garage, where
Schmautz observed marijuana leaves and potting soil
from marijuana plants.  Schmautz asked Husk for consent
to search his home, and Husk responded that he could
not allow a search unless he contacted his friend and
attorney, Larry Neal.  Schmautz then obtained a warrant
to search Husk's residence, and the ensuing search
yielded numerous marijuana plants, as well as a recent
telephone bill that showed a call to 'L. Neal.'
"Meanwhile, Schmautz had contacted Detective
Charles Drake of the Clark County, Washington,
Sheriff's Office concerning Lawrence Neal.  Drake
applied for a warrant to search Neal's home in
Vancouver for marijuana plants and related evidence. 
In his affidavit, Drake recounted information that he
had obtained from Schmautz concerning the informant's
conversations with Husk and the informant's observation
of the Washington license plate.  Drake's affidavit
also stated that marijuana had been found in a search
of Husk's residence.  Finally, Drake's affidavit
indicated that he had sought and received records
showing that the amount of electricity used in Neal's
home was significantly greater than the amount used by
the previous occupant.
"While waiting for the Washington magistrate to
issue the warrant, Drake received word that Husk, who
was in custody, was going to be given the opportunity
to make an outside call.  Because he was concerned that
Husk would call Neal and warn him, Drake ordered police
officers to 'secure' Neal's residence pending issuance
of a warrant.  Those officers entered Neal's house and
discovered a marijuana grow operation before the
magistrate issued the warrant.  The issuing magistrate
was not informed, before he issued the warrant, that
officers had already invaded the premises and, in doing
so, had already discovered a marijuana grow operation
without the benefit of a warrant.
"Thereafter, Schmautz arrived at Neal's residence
and assisted the Washington officers with the execution
of the warrant.  Neal admitted to the police that he
grew and sold marijuana.  When Drake told Neal that his
home was being searched because Portland police had
just served a warrant on one of his 'Oregon
associates,' Neal hung his head and then blurted out,
'Paul and Leigh Ann.' Neal said that he had known 'Paul
and Leigh Ann' since their arrest in Multnomah County
for growing marijuana several years earlier.
"As the search progressed, Schmautz discovered
Neal's 'personal organizer' in an upstairs bedroom. 
That 'organizer' was a zippered, book-sized looseleaf
binder, which was clearly marked on the first page: 
'ATTORNEY/CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY PRIVILEGE CLAIMED ON
ALL CONTENTS.'   The personal organizer contained an
address section that listed several 'Pauls' and 'Leigh
Anns' or 'Leanns,' but only one 'Paul' and one 'Leigh
Ann' -- these defendants -- who shared the same
addresses.  One of those addresses was a T-shirt
business in Milwaukie, Oregon.  Shortly thereafter,
Neal admitted to Drake that 'Paul and Leigh Ann' had a
grow operation in Clackamas County in the previous year
and that he had sold them marijuana recently."
185 Or App at 300-303 (footnote omitted).  That information led
police to defendants' shop.  They eventually obtained a search
warrant for the shop, and found more than 40 growing marijuana
plants.  Id. at 303.
In the past, Neal had acted as a lawyer for both
defendants.  Neal's representation of defendants was not secret;
Neal had, among other things, filed pleadings in court on their
behalf. 
The State of Washington charged Neal with crimes
related to his marijuana growing operation.  However, the
Washington trial court suppressed all the evidence obtained from
searching Neal's home, because the police had violated Neal's
rights under the Washington Constitution.  The court not only
rejected the initial warrantless entry, it also concluded that
the search warrant should not have issued, either, because the
police had lacked probable cause to connect Neal's home with any
criminal activity.
The State of Oregon charged defendants with
manufacturing, delivering, and possessing a controlled substance. 
Before trial, defendants moved to suppress the evidence against
them.  Defendants argued, among other things, that the evidence
must be suppressed because it derived from the illegal search of
Neal's residence and personal organizer.  Defendants relied in
part on Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. (1) 
But defendants also argued that ORS 9.695 required the court to
suppress the evidence as the fruits of an illegal search of a
lawyer's files, papers, or effects related to providing legal
services. (2) 
The trial court initially denied defendants' motion to
suppress, concluding that the Neal search did not violate ORS
9.695 and that the circumstances surrounding the later search of
defendants' shop did not justify suppression on constitutional
grounds.  On reconsideration, however, the trial court concluded
that Neal's personal organizer qualified as "files, papers, [or]
effects * * * relating to the provision of legal services" under
ORS 9.695(1).  The court thus suppressed the evidence under
ORS 9.695(4).
The state appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court in part.  The Court of Appeals concluded that ORS
9.695 did not apply, because the exception found in ORS 9.695(2)
had been met:  The police had probable cause to believe that the
lawyer, Neal, had committed a crime.  Makuch/Riesterer, 185 Or
App at 309.  The court also held that the search of Neal's
personal organizer did not invade any of defendants' protected
privacy interests under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon
Constitution.  Id. at 310-11.  Thus, the court held, the evidence
obtained from the search of defendants' shop could not be
suppressed as evidence derived from prior unlawful police
conduct.  Id. at 312.  Without discussion, the court also
affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the circumstances
surrounding the actual search of defendants' shop did not require
that the evidence be suppressed.  Id.  We allowed review.
Procedurally, defendants challenge the admissibility of
evidence obtained after the search of their shop pursuant to a
warrant.  However, defendants' main arguments deal with the
earlier search at Neal's residence, not with the shop search. 
Defendants argue that (1) the Neal search was illegal;
(2) defendants were identified only by the illegally obtained
evidence from the Neal search; (3) the later search of their shop
thus was a fruit of the earlier illegal Neal search; and so
(4) the evidence obtained by searching their shop should be
suppressed.  Under the circumstances, defendants bear the initial
burden to demonstrate that the search warrant had been tainted by
showing a factual nexus between the warrant and an earlier
illegal search or seizure.  See State v. Johnson, 335 Or 511,
520-21, 73 P3d 282 (2003) ("assuming that the issuance of warrant
was proper, if the defendant is able to show that the evidence
obtained therefrom is connected to some prior governmental
misconduct, * * * the burden of proof fairly may be shifted to
the government to show that the evidence is not tainted by the
misconduct").  However, defendants must also show that the prior
illegality infringed rights that defendants are entitled to
enforce.  See State v. Kosta, 304 Or 549, 553, 748 P2d 72 (1987)
(suppression appropriate only if defendant's personal rights
under Article I, section 9, of Oregon Constitution have been
violated); State v. Tanner, 304 Or 312, 315-16, 745 P2d 757
(1987) (same). 
Both defendants argue that the Neal search violated
ORS 9.695.  In full, that statute provides:
"(1) Notwithstanding ORS 133.535, the files,
papers, effects or work premises of a lawyer relating
to the provision of legal service by the lawyer shall
not be subject to search or seizure by any law
enforcement officer, either by search warrant or
otherwise.
"(2) The provisions of subsection (1) of this
section do not apply where there is probable cause to
believe that the lawyer has committed, is committing or
is about to commit a crime.
"(3) As used in this section, 'lawyer' means a
member of the Oregon State Bar or a person licensed to
practice law in any court of this state or any court of
record of the United States or of any state, territory
or other jurisdiction of the United States.  
"(4) Evidence or the fruits thereof obtained in
violation of this section shall be inadmissible in any
criminal or civil action or proceeding, except for an
action or suit brought for violation of this section or
the rights protected thereby."
The plain text of ORS 9.695(1) does seem to apply to
the search of Neal's personal organizer.  We assume, for purposes
of argument only, that ORS 9.695 applies to a search in
Washington state. (3)  No one disputes that Neal was a "lawyer"
as defined by ORS 9.695(3), and Neal's personal organizer would
appear to be "files, papers, [or] effects * * * relating to the
provision of legal services." (4)  But defendants effectively
conceded that Neal's house was not his "work premises," as ORS
9.695(1) uses that term.  See Makuch/Riesterer, 185 Or App at 309
n 8 ("The parties agreed that Neal's residence is not protected
under ORS 9.695(1)."). (5)  Thus, ORS 9.695(1) applied only to
the search of Neal's personal organizer to find an address for
"Paul and Leigh Ann."
Even then, however, the exception found in
subsection (2) of ORS 9.695 could have made subsection (1)
inapplicable.  The state focuses its argument there, so we must
decide whether, when the police searched Neal's personal
organizer, probable cause existed to believe that Neal had
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime.  
In interpreting ORS 9.695(2), we use the now-familiar
methodology for statutory construction in which we seek the
intent of the legislature by examining the statutory text in
context. (6)
The term "probable cause" has a well-defined legal
meaning when the legislature uses it in connection with a
preliminary determination as to whether a person has committed a
crime, so we use that meaning here.  The legislature has provided
specifically that probable cause means an objective basis to
believe that something is more probable than not.  See ORS
131.005(11) (for arrests, probable cause means "that there is a
substantial objective basis for believing that more likely than
not an offense has been committed and a person to be arrested has
committed it").  Given that meaning, ORS 9.695(2) applies if
there is an objective basis to think it more probable than not
"that the lawyer has committed, is committing or is about to
commit a crime." (7)
The exception found in ORS 9.695(2) applies here.  By
the time police searched Neal's personal organizer (if not
earlier), there were objective reasons to think that Neal, more
probably than not, had committed a crime:  A marijuana growing
operation had been discovered in Neal's house, and Neal had
admitted to the officers that he grew and sold marijuana. 
Because probable cause existed to think that Neal had committed a
crime, "[t]he provisions of subsection (1) of [ORS 9.695 did] not
apply" to prohibit the search of the organizer.
Defendants argue, however, that ORS 9.695(2) allows
searches only when probable cause exists to think that the search
will produce evidence of the lawyer's crimes, not just when there
is probable cause to think that the lawyer committed some crime
somewhere.  They note that ORS 9.695(1) cross-references
ORS 133.535, which describes what may be searched for or seized
in this state. (8)  Defendants consider ORS 133.535 to be
context demonstrating the limited scope of ORS 9.695 (2). (9)
Defendants' argument, however, tracks neither the text
of ORS 9.695 nor its context.  For those materials described by
ORS 9.695, subsection (1) absolutely bars searches or seizures;
the words "[n]otwithstanding ORS 133.535" merely confirm that the
bar reaches everything that otherwise may be subject to search or
seizure.  To that absolute rule, ORS 9.695(2) creates an absolute
exception:  If probable cause exists to think that the lawyer has
or will commit "a crime," then "[t]he provisions of subsection
(1) * * * do not apply[.]"  (Emphasis added.)  So ORS 9.695
either bars searches entirely, or it does not apply at all. 
Nothing supports defendants' argument that the statute can "half
apply" -- that it will continue to bar some searches even when
the exception of ORS 9.695 (2) has been met. (10)
Because the facts meet the exception contained in
ORS 9.695(2), we conclude that ORS 9.695 did not require the
trial court to exclude the evidence derived from the Neal
search. (11)
Defendant Riesterer next argues that the evidence from
the Neal search should be suppressed under Article I, section 9,
of the Oregon Constitution.  
Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution,
protects possessory and privacy interests against unlawful search
or seizure.  Kosta, 304 Or at 553; Tanner, 304 Or at 317-23. 
However, evidence may be suppressed only if police invaded the
personal rights of the person who seeks suppression; the
violation of someone else's rights is not enough.  Kosta, 304 Or
at 553 (so holding); Tanner, 304 Or at 315-16 (to same effect).
Here, the defendants had no possessory or privacy
interest in Neal's home; they did not own it, rent it, or store
any possessions in it.  Defendants also did not have a possessory
or privacy interest in Neal's personal organizer.  Compare State
v. Cook, 332 Or 601, 605-06, 34 P3d 156 (2001) (defendant who was
next to garbage dumpster sorting clothing into duffel bag "had a
possessory and privacy interest in the bag and the clothing"). 
And defendants had no privacy interest in the fact that they were
clients of Neal, or that their names and addresses were written
in Neal's personal organizer, simply because that information was
not private; Neal's representation of defendants was a matter of
public record, and defendants do not suggest that their names or
addresses were secret or nonpublic. (12)
Defendant Riesterer does not dispute that Article I,
section 9, applies only to protected privacy interests.  She
argues, however, that ORS 9.695 gives her a protected privacy
interest under Article I, section 9, which allows her to contest
the search of Neal's personal organizer.  Whatever the truth of
that general statement, it does not help her here.  As we have
already noted, ORS 9.695 does not apply.  That statute, like all
statutes, is as broad or as narrow as the legislature makes it. 
It creates a privacy interest as far as the statute extends, but
no farther.  Because ORS 9.695 did not apply to the search of 
Neal's personal organizer, then by definition ORS 9.695 did not
give defendants a privacy interest in the organizer or its
contents. (13)
Finally, both defendants argue that the Neal search
violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
However, defendants did not preserve that argument before the
Court of Appeals.  See Makuch/Riesterer, 185 Or App at 310 n 9
("Defendants do not invoke the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution in this context.").  Thus, we do not address
it.  
Defendants finally argue that, even apart from the
issues related to the Neal search, the search of their shop
independently violated their constitutional rights.  The Court of
Appeals affirmed on defendants' cross-assignment of error without
discussing it.  Id. at 312.  We have evaluated defendants'
arguments, and we agree with the Court of Appeals that the
arguments lack merit.  A detailed discussion of our reasons would
be intensively fact-specific, however, and so it would not
benefit the bench, bar, or public.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
orders of the circuit court are affirmed in part and reversed in
part, and the cases are remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
1. Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution  provides:
"No law shall violate the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized."
2. ORS 9.695 provides, in part:
"(1) Notwithstanding ORS 133.535, the files,
papers, effects or work premises of a lawyer relating
to the provision of legal service by the lawyer shall
not be subject to search or seizure by any law
enforcement officer, either by search warrant or
otherwise.
"(2) The provisions of subsection (1) of this
section do not apply where there is probable cause to
believe that the lawyer has committed, is committing or
is about to commit a crime.
"* * * * *
"(4) Evidence or the fruits thereof obtained in
violation of this section shall be inadmissible in any
criminal or civil action or proceeding * * *."
3. Though the parties do not present the question here,
defendant Riesterer contends that ORS 9.695 applies to searches
in other states, because the statute broadly defines "lawyer" to
include lawyers licensed in other jurisdictions, and because the
statute lacks any text expressly restricting its application to
Oregon.
The issue, however, is not so clear.  The absence of a
geographic restriction in a statute may not be dispositive.  See,
e.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Anderson, 167 Or 687, 697, 120 P2d
578 (1941) ("a law enacted by the Oregon legislature necessarily
applies only to a subject within its jurisdiction, and the words,
'in Oregon,' if not expressed are necessarily implied").  And
restriction to Oregon would not make the expansive definition of
"lawyer" meaningless; it could be intended to protect out-of-state lawyers appearing pro hac vice, lawyers who live in Oregon
but practice exclusively elsewhere, lawyers who have moved to
Oregon but not yet been licensed to practice here, and lawyers
who are otherwise only temporarily in the state.
4. Before the Court of Appeals, the state argued that ORS 9.695(1) applies only to confidential
information.  As we will discuss, we need not resolve that question.  Even if ORS 9.695(1)
applied, the facts fall within the exception found in ORS 9.695(2).
5. The trial court had no evidence that Neal's home was his
work premises.  But the trial court incorrectly found on
reconsideration that Neal's home was his work premises.  Several
months had passed after the original hearing before the trial
court held the hearing on reconsideration.  At the
reconsideration hearing, the trial court asked whether there had
been evidence that Neal's home was his work premises, and one
lawyer represented (incorrectly) that there had been.  So the
trial court added a new finding (that the personal organizer had
been located "[w]hile searching the home/office premises of Larry
Neal"), and a new conclusion of law (that the personal organizer
"was the files, papers, [e]ffects on the work premises of a
lawyer").
On appeal, the state argued that "there was no evidence
that Neal ever used his home or any part thereof as a law office
or to conduct legitimate work as an attorney, and thus no support
for the trial court's finding."  (Emphasis in original.)  Neither
defendant challenged that assertion.  Moreover, both defendants
argued the case as if ORS 9.695 applied only to the personal
organizer, not to Neal's house.
The Court of Appeals, as we note in the text, ignored
the trial court's erroneous finding and accepted defendants'
apparent concession.  Under the circumstances, we follow the
Court of Appeals' approach.
6. In 2001, the legislature amended ORS 174.020 to permit parties to offer legislative history
to aid the courts in interpreting a statute.  Or Laws 2001, ch 438, § 1.  However, those
amendments apply only to "actions commenced on or after" June 18, 2001.  Id.  at §§ 2, 3. 
Defendants were indicted in 1998, so ORS 174.020, as amended, does not apply.
7. The statutory exception in ORS 9.695(2) resembles probable cause to arrest under ORS
131.005(11).  But ORS 9.695(2) is the broader of the two.  While ORS 131.005(11) requires an
objective basis to think the person has already committed a crime, ORS 9.695(2) also includes
future conduct -- the possibility that the lawyer will commit a crime.
8. ORS 133.535 provides, in part:
"The following are subject to search and seizure
under ORS 133.525 to 133.703:
"(1) Evidence of or information concerning the
commission of a criminal offense;
"(2) Contraband, the fruits of crime, or things
otherwise criminally possessed; [and]
"(3) Property that has been used, or is possessed
for the purpose of being used, to commit or conceal the
commission of an offense[.]"
9. Defendants also make what is, in effect, a policy argument -- that probable cause to suspect
a lawyer of a crime should not open the door for police to search client files for evidence of
completely unrelated crimes.  Policy arguments that are inconsistent with the words of a statute
have no place in our statutory analysis methodology, however; the Oregon Constitution entrusts
such policy determinations to the legislature.
10. But even if ORS 9.695 only permitted searches directed
toward evidence of the lawyer's crime, it would not help
defendants here; probable cause existed to believe that Neal had
committed a crime with these defendants.  
 Detective Drake, the detective who interrogated
Neal, testified that Neal initially denied knowing any other
marijuana growers.  The detective knew that was not true, because
Neal had been seen at Husk's house, where there was a marijuana
growing operation:
"And as a -- kind of to see what he would
tell me, I told him that the reason we were
there was Portland police had just finished
serving a search warrant at an associate of
his, with a friend of his, and I left it at
that to see what would happen.
"Mr. Neal kind of hung his head and
didn't say anything.  And then when I
expected for him to say Jeffery Husk, he just
blurted out the names Paul and Leigh Ann.  I
was surprised * * *.
"I asked him how long he had known Paul
and Leigh Ann.  He said about two years or
right about the time they had gotten busted
in Multnomah County for growing pot.  He told
me that he thought that was in September of
'96.  And he said that the last time that
Paul and Leigh Ann went to jail he was asked
to attend to the marijuana grow they had in
their residence."
(Emphasis added.)  Drake confirmed that that exchange took place
before he asked another officer to search for an address book to
identify "Paul and Leigh Ann."  
 Neal's statements implicated "Paul and Leigh Ann"
with committing the crimes of unlawful manufacture and unlawful
possession of a controlled substance (former ORS 475.992(1) and
(4) (1997), renumbered as ORS 475.840 (1) and (3) (2005)).  But
Neal also suggested that he had taken care of their marijuana
plants while they were in jail; that would mean Neal had aided or
abetted those crimes.  See ORS 161.155 (person is criminally
liable for another person's crime if person, "with the intent to
promote or facilitate the commission of the crime," "[a]ids or
abets or agrees or attempts to aid or abet such other person
in * * * committing the crime").
 Thus, when police searched Neal's personal
organizer for information about Paul and Leigh Ann, they had, at
a minimum, probable cause to think that Neal had aided and
abetted Paul and Leigh Ann in the unlawful manufacture and
possession of a controlled substance.
11. Before the Court of Appeals, defendants offered other arguments that ORS 9.695 applied. 
The Court of Appeals rejected them.  Makuch/Riesterer, 185 Or App at 308-09 (rejecting
defendants' arguments that Washington state court decision had issue preclusive effect and that
information obtained in violation of Washington law cannot be considered in determining
probable cause under ORS 9.695).  Defendants do not renew those arguments on review.
12. For that reason, we need not decide whether we would reach a different result if a client's
name, address, or the existence of the representation were secret for reasons related to the
representation (e.g., if the client were a domestic violence victim in hiding from an abuser, or if
the lawyer were attempting to negotiate a favorable plea bargain on behalf of a client whose
identity was not yet known to police).
13. Defendant Riesterer also suggests that the state conceded in the Court of Appeals that
defendants had a privacy interest in Neal's personal organizer.  However, the state only conceded
a privacy interest -- or the lack of a need to show one -- for purposes of ORS 9.695.  The state's
brief represented that "the state no longer argues that defendants need to establish a threshhold
privacy interest in their attorney's 'files, papers, effects or work premises' as a prerequisite to
asserting the statutory protection of ORS 9.695(1)."