Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE PROTEST UPON THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF KENNETH C. ROSE v. WESTATES CONSTRUCTION CO.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83-211

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-07-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE PROTEST UPON THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF KENNETH C. ROSE v. WESTATES CONSTRUCTION CO.1985 WY 99703 P.2d 1084Case Number: 83-211Decided: 07/30/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
PROTEST UPON THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF KENNETH C. ROSE, APPELLANT 
(EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT), 

v. 

WESTATES CONSTRUCTION 
CO., APPELLEE (EMPLOYER).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, CarbonCounty, Robert A. Hill, 
J.

 
 
K. Craig 
Williams of Williams, Kelly & Waldrip, Rawlins, for appellant.

Catherine L. 
MacPherson of Johnson, MacPherson & Noecker, Rawlins, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The primary issue 
presented in this case is whether the district court properly applied the 
"odd-lot doctrine" under the Wyoming worker's compensation statute in 
denying a claim for permanent total disability. There is a corollary question 
with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the district court's 
award of a permanent partial disability of twenty percent. We affirm the award 
entered by the district court.

[¶2.]     The appellant, Kenneth 
C. Rose, states the issues to be dealt with as follows:

"I.

"AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE 
APPELLANT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM RECEIVING ONE HUNDRED PERCENT PERMANENT 
DISABILITY BY EMPLOYMENT AVAILABLE TO HIM IN THE COUNTY OF HIS RESIDENCE FOR 
WHICH HE WAS NOT QUALIFIED BY EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING.

"II.

"ON THE FACTS OF THE 
PRESENT CASE, THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION DENYING ONE HUNDRED PERCENT TOTAL 
DISABILITY IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE EVEN ASIDE FROM THE FACT 
THAT IT IS BASED UPON A REPORT BASED UPON LEGALLY IRRELEVANT 
PREMISES.

"A. REVEREND LUNDGREN'S 
REPORT, AS AMPLIFIED BY MARIE HILL'S TESTIMONY, SHOWS AN INABILITY BY MR. ROSE 
TO HOLD GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT.

"B. MR. ROSE'S HORSE 
RAISING PARTNERSHIP DOES NOT DISQUALIFY HIM FROM RECEIVING ONE HUNDRED PERCENT 
PERMANENT DISABILITY.

"III.

"THE DISTRICT COURT 
FAILED TO PROPERLY CONSIDER AND EVALUATE ALL RELEVANT FACTORS IN DETERMINING THE 
EXTENT OF DISABILITY."

 

The appellee, 
Westates Construction Company, has agreed with the statement of the issues made 
by the appellant.

[¶3.]     Kenneth C. Rose injured 
his back while working as a laborer on a dam construction project. He slipped 
and fell while carrying a heavy cement form. An orthopedic surgeon who examined 
him two days later diagnosed a severe lumbosacral spine sprain superimposed on 
first degree spondylolisthesis of L-5 on S-1. He was treated by being placed in 
traction, and a body cast was applied. Rose applied for and received temporary 
total disability benefits arising out of this injury, and Westates Construction 
acquiesced in the temporary total disability benefits.

[¶4.]     Some six months later 
Rose was re-examined by the treating orthopedic surgeon. In a letter to the 
clerk of the district court that physician stated, among other 
things:

"* * * At the present 
time, I feel that he is one hundred percent disabled from doing the work, which 
he was doing at the time of the injury of driving heavy equipment. * * 
*"

Following this 
examination Rose filed a claim for permanent total disability benefits, and 
Westates Construction Company contested that claim.

[¶5.]     At the request of 
Westates Construction Company, Stress Management and Biofeedback Institute of 
Wyoming conducted an examination of Rose which included an examination by 
another orthopedic surgeon. At the hearing of this case testimony was received 
from Rose and from the manager of the Carbon County Job Service Office. In 
addition, three exhibits were admitted into evidence by stipulation. These 
consisted of a copy of the letter from appellant's orthopedic surgeon, a portion 
of which is quoted above; the report from the Stress Management and Biofeedback 
Institute of Wyoming; and a portion of a document entitled Manual for Orthopedic 
Surgeons in Evaluating Permanent Physical Impairment. Included in the report 
from the Stress Management and Biofeedback Institute was a letter from the 
orthopedic surgeon who examined the appellant as a part of the Institute's 
examination. That orthopedic surgeon concurred in the prior diagnosis of 
appellant's condition, and the letter report further 
stated:

"This man is effectively 
prevented from returning to the type of work that he was doing at the time of 
injury, and I doubt that it will improve, that is, I feel this injury is 
permanent.

"According to the Manual 
for Orthopedic Surgeons in Evaluating Permanent Physical Impairment, this injury 
would carry a 20 per cent whole body permanent physical impairment. I feel 
effectively, however, that the patient is 100 per cent functionally 
impaired."

[¶6.]     In the report from the 
Stress Management and Biofeedback Institute of Wyoming there also was included a 
document entitled "McCarron-Dial Work Evaluation" prepared by a certified 
occupational evaluator using a system described as a neuro-psychological 
approach to vocational and work evaluation. There was attached to that 
evaluation a listing of potential job placements statistically derived from the 
results of testing which theoretically the person evaluated could perform within 
one year, given his limitations and proper training. There were fifty-five 
occupational titles generated pursuant to this evaluation.

[¶7.]     The manager of the 
Carbon County Job Service office testified that of the fifty-five potential 
occupational titles twenty-two were available in CarbonCounty, although she had no current 
vacancies. In addition she testified that her testimony did not take into 
consideration any physical limitations of the appellant.

[¶8.]     Rose testified that he 
had attended school through the eighth grade, and he then joined the Army in 
1946. While serving in the Army he received training in heavy equipment 
operation, and also earned a General Education Diploma. After leaving military 
service he worked as an ambulance driver, and then as a laborer in a mine. He 
then was hired as a police officer, and held that job for eighteen years. In 
1974 he retired to become a horse rancher but within a few months he returned to 
police work, accepting a job as Chief of Police in Shelburn, Indiana. He then accepted a similar position 
in Medicine Bow, Wyoming, and after leaving that position he 
worked as a heavy equipment operator, first for a coal mine, and subsequently 
for various construction companies until he was injured. Rose also testified 
that he suffered constant lower back pain and required medication because of his 
injury. He was required to refrain from any stooping, bending or heavy lifting, 
and could not sit or stand for any lengthy period of time. In addition, he said 
in his testimony that he had invested in a quarter-horse-raising partnership, 
which he helped to supervise in January of 1983. Upon cross-examination he 
admitted that his experience with the Police Department of the City and 
County of 
Denver had included work in 
a supervisory capacity. He further testified that he had not looked for work 
since he was injured.

[¶9.]     In comments from the 
bench following closing statements by counsel at the hearing, the district judge 
stated that it was clear that Rose suffered from a permanent disability and that 
he was one hundred percent disabled from doing the work he was doing at the time 
of the injury, which was the functional impairment described by the second 
orthopedic surgeon. The court went on to find that there were other available 
occupations which Rose was capable of engaging in, and simply because they were 
not currently available on the job market that did not result in his being one 
hundred percent permanently disabled. The district judge indicated that his 
personal feeling was that there might be more than a twenty percent permanent 
partial disability but something less than one hundred percent. He said, 
however, that the evidence available in the case would only justify twenty 
percent. The district judge also commented on the fact that Mr. Rose's 
participation in the partnershp for raising quarter-horses was compatible with 
his managerial and supervisory skills as a police officer, a sergeant 
supervising individuals in the Denver Police Department.

[¶10.]  The order reducing the court's oral 
comments to documentary form was entered on August 26, 1983, and the district 
judge formally held that the claim for permanent total disability was denied and 
awarded Rose benefits for a twenty percent permanent partial disability pursuant 
to the provisions of § 27-12-403(h), W.S. 1977. Following the entry of that 
order Rose filed a motion for a new trial and to modify the award. Upon the 
denial of that motion an appeal was taken which designated the order initially 
entered and the order denying the motion for new trial and for modification of 
an award as the orders which are appealed.

[¶11.]  Permanent total disability currently is 
defined in § 27-12-405(a), W.S. 1977, as follows:

"(a) Permanent total 
disability means the loss of both legs or both arms, total loss of eyesight, 
paralysis or other conditions permanently 
incapacitating the employee from performing any work at any gainful occupation 
for which he is reasonably suited by experience or training." (Emphasis 
added.)

This statutory 
definition is compatible with the odd-lot doctrine which this court first 
recognized in In re Iles, 56 Wyo. 
443, 110 P.2d 826 (1941). Rose's claim for permanent total disability is 
premised upon this "odd-lot doctrine." He contends that the injury to his back 
has permanently incapacitated him from performing any work in any gainful 
occupation for which he is reasonably suited by experience or 
training.

[¶12.]  Under our law the burden of proof is upon 
the injured workman initially to establish that he is incapacitated "from 
performing any work at any gainful occupation for which he is reasonably suited 
by experience or training." If he demonstrates that he is so disabled that the 
services which he is reasonably equipped to perform by his experience and 
training are not marketable in a well-known branch of the labor market in the 
community so as to provide a steady and continuous source of income rather than 
sporadic or intermittent employment, the burden of proof then is shifted to the 
employer to demonstrate that light work of a special nature which the injured 
employee could perform but which is not generally available is in fact available 
to him. Schepanovich v. United States 
Steel Corporation, Wyo., 669 P.2d 522 
(1983).

[¶13.]  The employee's burden of proof is not met 
by his establishing that he is no longer capable of working at the job in which 
he was employed at the time of his injury. In order to shift the burden to the 
employer the evidence of the degree of obvious physical impairment coupled with 
other facts, such as mental capacity, education, training, or age, must prima 
facie place the injured employee in the odd-lot category, and in that situation 
the employer cannot rely upon any presumption of light work being available. But 
in Schepanovich v. United States Steel 
Corporation, supra, this court also noted that a corollary of the general 
purpose principle must be that if the medical impairment is so limited or 
specialized in nature that the employee is not obviously unemployable or 
relegated to the odd-lot category, it is not unreasonable to require him to meet 
a burden of proof with respect to establishing unavailability of work to a 
person in his circumstances. We there held, following other jurisdictions, that 
in order to sustain that burden of proof the employee must show reasonable 
efforts have been made to obtain suitable employment. In this instance the 
appellant testified that he had not attempted to work or to look for any work 
since his injury, and under the circumstances of this case he did not shift the 
burden of proof to the employer. Schepanovich v. United States Steel 
Corporation, supra.

[¶14.]  While it is unnecessary under the 
circumstances to consider whether the burden of proof which might be imposed 
upon the employer was met, we would be remiss if we did not comment upon the 
evidence here encompassed in the McCarron-Dial Work Evaluation reflecting 
potential job placements which the injured person theoretically could perform 
within a year, given his limitations and proper training. Our statutory 
definition with respect to the odd-lot doctrine is limited to those gainful 
occupations for which the employee is reasonably suited by experience or 
training at the time of the injury, and does not encompass any obligation on the 
part of the injured employee to enter into any training program in order to 
improve his chances of employment. In addition to objecting to this report, Rose 
asserts that the trial court should not have relied upon his participation in 
the partnership for raising horses in reaching its determination. We do not 
perceive the record as manifesting a reliance upon any income from that venture 
as having any impact upon Rose's disability. Obviously that would be improper. 
In re Iles, supra; Chatfield v. Industrial Accident Board, 
140 Mont. 516, 
374 P.2d 226 (1962); 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 57.51, p. 10-164.64 
(1983). In this instance, however, the district court simply concluded that the 
participation in the horse-raising partnership corroborated the supervisory 
skills which the district judge had found that Rose had acquired as a product of 
his police experience.

[¶15.]  As we have noted, the district judge then 
awarded a twenty percent permanent partial disability pursuant to § 
27-12-403(h), W.S. 1977, which provides:

"(h) For any other injury 
known to surgery or medicine to constitute permanent partial disability, the 
employee shall receive compensation in the amount proportional to the extent of 
permanent partial disability based as near as may be upon the foregoing 
schedule. One (1) factor to be considered is the ability of the employee to 
continue to perform work for which he was reasonably suited by experience or 
training prior to the injury."

The burden of 
proof is, of course, upon Rose. Jones v. 
Jesse's Disposal Service, Wyo., 702 P.2d 1299 
(1985).

[¶16.]  Like the district court, we are somewhat 
dissatisfied with the nature of the proof relating to permanent partial 
disability in this instance. Some of the circumstances might well lead to a 
conclusion that a higher level of disability is present in Rose's case. The 
district judge, however, pointed to the only evidence on which he could make a 
determination of disability as the twenty percent whole body permanent physical 
impairment level established pursuant to the Manual for Orthopedic Surgeons in 
Evaluating Permanent Physical Impairment referred to in the letter from the 
second orthopedic surgeon who had examined Rose.

[¶17.]  We previously have held that a district 
judge may consider other factors reflected in the evidence beyond the 
physician's rating of disability in order to arrive at a finding of permanent 
partial disability. McCarty v. Bear Creek 
Uranium Co., Wyo., 694 P.2d 93 (1985); State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division v. Colvin, Wyo., 681 P.2d 269 (1984). We also recently have held 
that a determination of the degree of permanent partial disability is a question 
of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact. Abas v. State of Wyoming, ex rel. Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Division, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1153 (1985); Pacific Power and Light 
v. Parsons, Wyo., 692 P.2d 226 
(1984).

[¶18.]  In this instance the only other evidence 
of disability was that related by Rose himself with respect to limitations of 
function, and it is the task of the trial court to weigh and evaluate that 
evidence along with the other evidence in the record. Furthermore, Rose's 
testimony was consistent with his medical diagnosis and treatment and not in 
conflict with the evaluation by the doctors.

[¶19.]  We conclude that Rose was not successful 
in bringing himself within the odd-lot doctrine of permanent total disability in 
accordance with our statute and precedents. We do not find any prejudicial error 
in the consideration of his activities in his horse-racing partnership by the 
district judge. Finally, the evidence does support the finding of a permanent 
partial disability of twenty percent.

[¶20.]  While, as we have indicated, we are in 
accord with the sense of dissatisfaction relative to the proof of disability 
which the district judge felt, we conclude that there is nothing which would 
justify this court in holding that the award was not proper, and the judgment of 
the district court is affirmed.