Case Title: State v. Frantz

Citation: 

Docket Number: 123096

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2022-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
 
No. 123,096 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
BARBARA MARIE FRANTZ, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1.  
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal defendant 
the right of cross-examination, but this right is not absolute, and at times it must bow to 
accommodate other legitimate interests in the trial process. Trial judges retain wide 
latitude under the Confrontation Clause to impose reasonable limits on cross-
examination. 
 
2.  
 
Criminal defendants have a right to present relevant evidence, but that right is 
subject to reasonable restrictions, and defendants must still comply with established rules 
of procedure and evidence. 
 
3.  
 
The Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-
examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever 
extent, the defense might wish. As the party alleging error, the criminal defendant has the 
burden to prove the district court abused its discretion. Criminal defendants state a 
violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing they were prohibited from engaging in 
 
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otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on 
the part of the witness, and thereby to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors could 
appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.  
 
Appeal from Leavenworth District Court; MICHAEL D. GIBBENS, judge. Opinion filed December 
30, 2022. Affirmed. 
 
Joseph A. Desch, of Law Office of Joseph A. Desch, of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the 
brief for appellant, and Barbara Frantz, appellant pro se, was on the supplemental brief.  
 
Kristafer Ailslieger, deputy solicitor general, argued the cause, and Shawn M. Boyd, deputy 
county attorney, Todd Thompson, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him 
on the briefs for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by  
 
WALL, J.:  Barbara Marie Frantz appeals her conviction for the first-degree 
premeditated murder of her estranged husband, Gary. Frantz asks this court to reverse her 
conviction, arguing: (1) the district court violated her Sixth Amendment rights when it 
imposed limits on her cross-examination of a State's witness; (2) the district court erred in 
denying her motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's evidence; and 
(3) there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction. Acting pro se, Frantz also 
filed a second brief raising several other claims of error.  
 
For the reasons discussed more fully in this opinion, we first conclude the district 
court's limits on cross-examination were reasonable and did not constitute an abuse of 
discretion or otherwise deprive Frantz of her confrontation rights under the Sixth 
Amendment. Second, the State presented evidence during its case sufficient to establish a 
prima facie case of first-degree, premeditated murder against Frantz. Third, our review of  
 
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the record confirms the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. 
Finally, we hold the issues Frantz raised in her pro se brief fail to demonstrate error. 
Thus, we affirm her conviction. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
At around 8:30 p.m. on January 27, 2017, Officer Ezekiel Stevenson of the 
Leavenworth Police Department was dispatched to the Stove Loft Apartments in 
response to reports that shots had been fired. He found Gary Frantz lying in a parking lot 
across the street from the apartment complex. Gary had suffered six gunshot wounds, 
including a sucking chest wound, and he was having difficulty breathing. Gary was 
surrounded by several fellow Stove Loft tenants when Officer Stevenson arrived at the 
scene. 
 
 
Officer Stevenson began administering first aid and questioning Gary about the 
shooting. Body camera footage recorded the following exchange between Officer 
Stevenson and Gary: 
 
"Officer Stevenson:  Do you know who shot ya, Gary? 
"Gary:  My [inaudible]. 
"Officer Stevenson:  Hunh? 
"Gary:  My wife. 
"Officer Stevenson: You're wife? What's your wife's name? 
"Gary:  Barbara. 
"Officer Stevenson:  Barbara what? 
"Gary:  Frantz. 
"Officer Stevenson:  Barbara what? 
"Gary:  Frantz! 
"Officer Stevenson:  Frantz? Okay. What did she shoot you for? 
 
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"Gary:  I don't know. 
"Officer Stevenson:  'Kay. Were you guys having an argument? 
"Gary:  No."  
 
 
About a minute later, Stevenson again asked, "Why did your wife shoot you?" and 
Gary said, "I don't know." After several minutes, Gary was no longer speaking.  
He eventually succumbed to his injuries.  
 
Around midnight, law enforcement went to the apartment of Frantz' and Gary's 
son, Patrick Frantz. They informed Patrick that Gary had died two hours earlier, and they 
believed Frantz had shot him. While police were at his apartment, Patrick called his 
maternal grandmother, Rosella Reece, to tell her what had happened. Neither Patrick nor 
Reece knew Frantz' whereabouts.  
 
After the shooting, law enforcement was on the lookout for Frantz' silver two-door 
Hyundai Genesis. In the early morning hours of January 28, 2017, they found Frantz' car 
parked in the driveway of Reece's home in Burlingame. Frantz was still in the car, and 
law enforcement took her into custody.  
 
Law enforcement recovered eight shell casings from the crime scene. The shell 
casings were the same type of ammunition that law enforcement found during a search 
of Frantz' apartment. During that search, law enforcement also found a box for a 9-
millimeter handgun with a spent casing inside. A firearm tool mark examiner later 
determined the eight shell casings from the crime scene and the spent casing found in 
Frantz' apartment had all been fired from the same gun. But the gun was never located. 
 
The State charged Frantz with the first-degree premeditated murder of Gary. 
Before trial, Frantz filed a motion to present evidence of an alternative perpetrator. In the 
motion, she noted some Stove Loft tenants originally described the shooter as a white 
 
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man, so Frantz wished to present evidence that Patrick was the shooter. After an 
evidentiary hearing, the district court granted Frantz' motion.  
 
State's Case in Chief  
 
 
Testimony of Fellow Apartment Tenants 
 
 
At Frantz' trial, at least a half dozen tenants of the Stove Loft Apartments testified 
to witnessing events related to the shooting. Those tenants said they heard several 
gunshots, a pause, and then several more gunshots. Several tenants said they looked out 
their window and saw a larger man being chased by a smaller person who was shooting at 
him. Witnesses generally described the shooter as white and slim, with short hair and 
wearing a cap. Because the shooter had short hair, one witness originally believed the 
shooter was a man, but she was "not going to bet [her] life on that." Another witness said 
the shooter appeared to be a young adult or woman. Several witnesses also testified to 
seeing the shooter get into a silver or light-colored two-door car before driving off. And 
one of those witnesses was also able to identify the make of the car as a Hyundai.  
 
 
After the shooting, several tenants went outside to help Gary. Three tenants 
testified that before police arrived, they asked Gary who had shot him, and Gary said his 
wife shot him. And four tenants testified that Gary gave the same response when police 
later asked him the same question.  
 
At trial, only one tenant, Debra Raynal, identified Frantz and placed her at the 
crime scene. Raynal testified she went to her window after hearing gunshots on the night 
of the shooting. She saw someone walking toward a light-colored two-door car. The 
person got in the car and drove north. Raynal assumed the person was a young man 
because of the person's clothing and short hair. When police arrived on the scene, Raynal 
went outside and told them she had seen a young, white man in his 20's.  
 
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Despite the initial description she had given to police, Raynal later identified 
Frantz as the person she saw fleeing the crime scene after the shooting. Raynal testified 
she first recognized Frantz in the courtroom during a prior motions hearing. Raynal 
explained she was able to identify Frantz at that time because she could see Frantz' build 
and view Frantz' face in profile. According to Raynal, this was important because on the 
night of the shooting, she had observed only the profile of the perpetrator's face. Before 
that motions hearing, Raynal had seen Frantz' picture in the newspaper but had not 
recognized Frantz as the shooter because the photographs showed only a frontal view of 
Frantz' face.  
 
Patrick's Direct Examination 
 
The State also called Patrick as a witness. Patrick testified he had moved into an 
apartment in the Legends area of Kansas City, Kansas, with his parents in May 2014. In 
early 2016, Gary and Frantz separated, and Frantz moved into another apartment near 
the Legends. Later that year, Gary and Patrick moved into separate apartments in 
Leavenworth. By early 2017, Patrick did not have much of a relationship with either of 
his parents and had little to no contact with them in the weeks before the shooting.  
 
According to Patrick, Frantz "had a few delusional ideas." She believed Gary 
was trying to poison her. She also believed Patrick and Gary were trying to collect a 
settlement from KU behind her back. Patrick said he had no knowledge of Gary trying to 
poison Frantz.  
 
Patrick said he went with Frantz to buy a 9-millimeter handgun in October 2016. 
He also took her to a shooting range the same day to show her how to load and safely  
 
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handle the gun. He and his mother went shooting one other time before Thanksgiving 
2016. The only other time Patrick handled the gun was when he cleaned it at his mother's 
apartment.  
 
Patrick testified he worked at the front desk of a hotel near the Legends, and on 
the night of the shooting, he had worked from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. A timecard showed 
Patrick had clocked into work that day at 2:59 p.m. and clocked out at 11:09 p.m. Patrick 
testified it took him about 20 to 25 minutes to drive home from work, so he would have 
arrived at his home in Leavenworth around 11:30 p.m. on the night of the shooting.  
 
When law enforcement notified him of Gary's death later that night, Patrick said 
he was distressed that his father had been murdered. He said he knew his mother was 
responsible, even before the officers told him she was a suspect, because she is the only 
one who would want to harm Gary.  
 
Patrick's Cross-examination 
 
Frantz fully explored several theories of impeachment during Patrick's cross-
examination. Though he told police he had not been in contact with Gary for months, 
Patrick admitted he sent angry text messages to Gary about a week before the shooting. 
Gary had a set of Patrick's keys, and Patrick wanted Gary to return the keys in person. 
Instead, Gary left the keys under a statue outside Patrick's apartment. This angered 
Patrick because someone could have stolen the keys, and he expressed that anger in a 
couple of text messages. Patrick explained he had forgotten about those messages until 
prosecutors showed them to him.  
 
Similarly, Patrick said he had not been in contact with Frantz since Thanksgiving 
2016. And he told police he cut off contact with Frantz because she had attacked him. But 
on cross-examination, Patrick admitted Frantz called the police that Thanksgiving 
 
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because he would not leave her apartment. Patrick also admitted that Gary had called 911 
to complain about Patrick on another occasion. The nature of Gary's complaint was not 
disclosed at trial. 
 
Defense counsel also questioned Patrick about discrepancies between his account 
of the phone call with Reece on the night of the shooting and Reece's account. According 
to Patrick's written statement to police, Reece told him she thought Frantz was going to 
commit suicide because Frantz left her therapy animal and some belongings at Reece's 
house a couple days before the shooting and, as she left, Frantz told Reece she would 
"see [Reece] in heaven."  
 
 
But Reece said she told Patrick that Frantz had said, "[S]ee you later," after 
dropping some items off at Reece's house. And Reece did not remember telling Patrick 
she was concerned Frantz might harm herself. When asked about these discrepancies on 
cross-examination, Patrick said he was the one who had inferred Frantz might hurt 
herself, not Reece. He also said he could not remember whether Reece told him Frantz 
had said "see you in heaven" or "see you later."  
 
Reece also testified that, during the call, Patrick said the shooting happened at 
8 p.m. When defense counsel asked Patrick why he said Gary was shot at 8 p.m., Patrick 
said the police told him Gary was shot at that time. But law enforcement's conversation 
with Patrick on the night of the shooting was captured on an officer's body camera. And 
in the video footage, police informed Patrick that Gary passed away two hours earlier. 
Because the police were talking to Patrick around midnight, that would suggest Gary died 
around 10 p.m., not 8 p.m.  
 
Frantz also elicited testimony from Patrick suggesting he had a financial interest in 
Gary's assets and the outcome of the trial. Patrick admitted he had taken action to prevent 
Frantz from receiving Gary's pension after the murder, and he had been fighting with 
 
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Frantz' family over Gary's Jeep. Patrick also testified Frantz was the only beneficiary 
under Gary's life insurance policy, and the outcome of the criminal proceedings could 
affect how much of Gary's estate Patrick would receive.  
 
Testimony of the Forensic Pathologist 
 
 
Dr. Michael Handler, a forensic pathologist who subspecialized in forensic 
neuropathology, performed Gary's autopsy. He testified Gary's cause of death was 
multiple gunshot wounds, including a wound that perforated Gary's right lung. Dr. 
Handler explained the injury to Gary's lung would have made it much more difficult for 
Gary to breathe and would have affected his thought processes. But Dr. Handler added 
that Gary's injuries would not have rendered him incoherent or delusional. Dr. Handler 
also did not observe any injuries to Gary's brain or any other brain disease that would 
have altered Gary's cognition. Thus, Dr. Handler opined there was "no reason to believe 
that [Gary's] brain is incapable of saying what he wants to say until the moment he dies." 
 
 
State's Exhibits 
 
As part of its case in chief, the State played the video of Gary's dying declarations 
made to Officer Stevenson and the video of law enforcement's conversation with Patrick 
on the night of the shooting. In the latter video, Patrick told police he had not talked to 
Gary in a while and wanted nothing to do with Gary because of the way Gary had 
handled Frantz' medical problems. Patrick also said he had always disliked Gary and 
hated him for his mistreatment of Frantz, but Patrick did not condone what Frantz had 
done.  
 
The video of Patrick's conversation with police also shows that Patrick had a 
goatee at the time. But Raynal and another Stove Loft tenant had testified the shooter had 
no facial hair. 
 
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The State also presented several posts from Frantz' Facebook page. In a lengthy 
message posted on the day of the shooting, Frantz wrote, "To my Mom I thank you for 
my life. I love you with all my heart. I will see you again someday." Later in the post, 
Frantz wrote,  
 
"My ex-husband that I have been there so much for Stood Beside you took care of you 
loved honored respected. I have been raped by you I've had [sic] been cheated on by you 
and you helped end my life. Only to have you destroy me I hope you rot in hell if not I 
hope you rot in prison."  
 
In several other posts, Frantz accused Gary of abusing her and cheating on her. She also 
called him "pathetic," "cowardly," "a liar," and "a piece of shit."  
 
Defense Evidence 
 
Frantz called several witnesses in her defense. Frantz' ex-sister-in-law, Della 
Beauclair, testified she was at Reece's house the day after the shooting when Patrick 
came over. She described Patrick's demeanor as "odd" and "emotionless." According to 
Beauclair, Patrick said he did not care if Gary was dead or alive, and he was more 
worried about Reece than he was about what had happened to Gary. Beauclair also 
testified that Patrick said he left work early the day of the shooting because he was sick, 
and he had asked someone to cover for him. Patrick also said he thought it was odd there 
was not much blood at the crime scene. Beauclair asked if Patrick had been to the crime 
scene, and Patrick said he had not but police said there was not much blood at the scene. 
 
Frantz also called Jennifer Johnson, a registered nurse with a doctorate in nursing 
practice. Johnson had watched the video from Officer Stevenson's body camera, which 
showed Gary having difficulty breathing and speaking. She opined Gary had been 
 
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suffering from hypoxia, a condition in which the brain or other organs are not receiving 
enough oxygen. She explained that when the brain is not receiving enough oxygen, an 
individual can experience memory and word loss, and otherwise have difficulty 
communicating. According to Johnson, there was "really no way to know whether or not 
[Gary] understood or could effectively articulate what he was trying or meaning to say."  
 
Frantz also presented a short clip of the video from Officer Stevenson's body 
camera. The video had been slowed down to highlight Gary's first answer when 
Stevenson asked who shot him. Frantz argued the clip showed Gary had originally said, 
"My boy." 
 
Conviction, Sentence, and Appeal 
 
The jury convicted Frantz of first-degree premeditated murder. The district court 
sentenced her to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 25 years. Because 
the district court imposed a life sentence, Frantz appealed directly to our court. 
Jurisdiction is proper. See K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-3601(b)(3). 
 
Additional facts will be provided in the analysis as needed to resolve the issues 
raised by the parties. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Frantz contends her conviction should be reversed because: (1) the district court 
limited the scope of Patrick's cross-examination; (2) the district court erred in denying 
Frantz' motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's evidence; and (3) the 
evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. In her pro se briefing, Frantz raises 
several other claims of error. We address each of these challenges in turn. 
 
 
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I. 
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion or Violate Frantz' Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause Rights by Limiting Her Cross-examination of Patrick 
 
For her first issue on appeal, Frantz argues the district court erred by limiting her 
cross-examination of Patrick. To fully resolve the issue and the parties' competing 
arguments, we first identify several additional facts relevant to Frantz' Sixth Amendment 
challenge. Second, we identify the applicable legal framework and controlling standard 
of our review. Third, we discuss how certain preservation questions complicate our 
substantive review and explain how we resolve those issues in this case. Finally, we 
analyze the merits of Frantz' challenge and ultimately affirm the district court's rulings.  
 
A. Additional Relevant Facts 
 
At trial, the district court excluded two lines of inquiry during the defense's cross-
examination of Patrick—questions about Patrick's hospitalization for depression and 
questions about an alleged prior threat Patrick made to his girlfriend.  
 
As to Patrick's hospitalization for depression, the subject was first addressed 
during the evidentiary hearing on Frantz' motion to present evidence of an alternate 
perpetrator. At that hearing, Patrick's partner, Kelly Neumann, testified she began dating 
Patrick several months after Gary's death. Neumann said she had Patrick hospitalized 
three times in 2017 "[f]or depression; for suicidal tendencies; for, you know, erratic 
behavior; for just sadness." According to statements Patrick had made to her, Neumann 
understood Patrick to be depressed because he was very close to his mother and she was 
in custody. Neumann added that Patrick had also lost his dad and "he was not 
emotionally prepared to handle his own life."  
 
As to the prior threats Patrick purportedly made to his girlfriend, the subject was 
also addressed at the hearing on Frantz' motion to present evidence of an alternate 
 
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perpetrator. At that hearing, Neumann testified that in December 2017, 11 months after 
the killing, Patrick was heavily medicated and became aggressive with her. Neumann 
said Patrick "may have" said he could kill her at the time, but she could not remember. 
Later, the following colloquy took place: 
 
"Q:  Okay. Has he ever told you that he could kill you and get away with it? 
"A:  No. I don't—no. 
"Q:  Okay. Would you ever tell anybody that he said that? 
"A:  No. 
"Q:  Okay. So you never said, Patrick told me he could kill me and get away with it? 
"A:  I don't believe so, no. 
"Q:  Okay. Well, you don't believe so or no? 
"A:  I don't—I mean—it was a—when he was medicated [for depression], he would 
mumble and say a lot of things. He would also cry at the drop of a hat. So, you 
know, things like that."  
 
At trial, defense counsel attempted to cross-examine Patrick on both subjects—his 
hospitalization for depression and the alleged prior threat. First, defense counsel inquired 
about Patrick's hospitalization, asking him, "In fact, you were—after [Gary's murder] 
occurred, you actually went to the hospital; correct?" The State asked to approach, telling 
the court "I believe that the defense attorney is trying to get into Patrick being 
hospitalized regarding some depression." The State objected to this line of inquiry, 
arguing Patrick's hospitalization for depression would be improper impeachment because 
it involved a specific instance of conduct and was also irrelevant.  
 
Defense counsel argued they were not asking the question to adduce character 
evidence, but to impeach Patrick's direct testimony. Defense counsel explained Neumann 
had previously testified at a motion hearing that Patrick said he was depressed because he 
was close to his mother and she was in custody. Defense counsel claimed that Patrick's 
statement was inconsistent with his testimony on direct examination that he thought his 
 
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mom killed Gary and she was the only one who could have done it. Defense counsel also 
claimed Patrick was hospitalized because he was suicidal, which showed consciousness 
of guilt. According to the defense, excluding evidence related to Patrick's hospitalization 
would violate Frantz' Sixth Amendment right to present a defense.  
 
The district court sustained the State's objection. It ruled that if the evidence of 
Patrick's depression and hospitalization was being offered as character evidence affecting 
his credibility, it was inadmissible under K.S.A. 60-422(c). The court stated the evidence 
was also likely inadmissible under K.S.A. 60-446 because Patrick's character was not in 
issue.  
 
Later during Patrick's cross-examination, the defense also inquired about Patrick's 
alleged prior threat to his girlfriend: 
 
"Q:  . . . Had you ever made threats to your father? 
"A:  No. 
"Q:  Have you—had you ever made threats to anyone? 
"A:  No. 
"Q:  Never told your girlfriend you could kill her and get away with it."  
 
The State objected to defense counsel's question about Patrick's purported threat to 
his girlfriend, arguing it was improper character evidence founded on a specific instance 
of conduct. The State also argued the alleged threat was not relevant to the identity of 
Gary's killer. Defense counsel responded:  "I asked if he ever threatened to kill his father. 
. . . He said no. So I asked, have you ever threatened to kill anyone, and he said no. But 
he has said he can kill and get away with it." Beyond impeachment, defense counsel 
argued the alleged threat was also relevant because it was an admission by Patrick that he 
had killed before.  
 
 
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The district court found the alleged threat did not constitute an admission that 
Patrick had previously killed someone. The court also ruled that defense counsel could 
not impeach Patrick by asking him about the alleged threat against Neumann because that 
threat was not otherwise relevant. However, the court clarified that the defense could 
impeach Patrick's statement (that he had never threatened anyone) by calling a witness 
who would testify to having been threatened by Patrick. The defense called no such 
witness at trial. 
 
Frantz renewed her objections to these two rulings in her motion for new trial. 
Frantz again claimed those limitations violated her Sixth Amendment right to present a 
defense. In its order denying Frantz' motion, the district court ruled that the evidence 
regarding Patrick's mental health and hospitalization was inadmissible under K.S.A. 60-
422(d), reasoning: 
 
"The defense effort to cross examine Patrick Frantz about his mental health and 
hospitalization following the murder of his father was relevant as tending to prove a trait 
of his character. The trait the defense was trying to prove could be inferred to be honesty 
or veracity. The trait could not be proven by acts of specific conduct such as his mental 
health but by opinion testimony only."  
 
The district court also upheld its ruling to limit Frantz' inquiry into the alleged threat 
Patrick made against Neumann. The court found there was insufficient evidence the 
alleged threat was ever made and defense counsel's question would have been prejudicial, 
even if Patrick had denied making the threat.  
 
 
On appeal, Frantz argues the evidence regarding Patrick's hospitalization for 
depression and the alleged threat were important to her defense. She argues the jury 
would have had more information about Patrick's personality and possible motive to kill  
 
16 
 
 
 
Gary if she had been allowed to pursue these lines of questioning. She claims the district 
court's limitations on her cross-examination of Patrick served no legitimate purpose and 
thus violated her Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine witnesses against her.  
 
B. Relevant Legal Framework and Standard of Review 
 
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the 
right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. Implicit 
in this right of confrontation is a criminal defendant's right of cross-examination. 
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973); 
State v. Thomas, 307 Kan. 733, 738, 415 P.3d 430 (2018). But this right is not absolute, 
and at times it must "'bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial 
process.'" Thomas, 307 Kan. at 738.  
 
As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the Sixth Amendment 
guarantees an opportunity for cross-examination to establish a witness' bias, not 
unlimited cross-examination for any purpose:  
 
"'"The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the 
opportunity of cross-examination."' Of particular relevance here, '[w]e have recognized 
that the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function 
of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.' It does not follow, of course, 
that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment prevents a trial judge from 
imposing any limits on defense counsel's inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution 
witness. On the contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation 
Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on 
concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the 
witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. And as we 
observed earlier this Term, 'the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for 
effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and  
 
17 
 
 
 
to whatever extent, the defense might wish.' Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 
(1985). [Citations omitted.]" Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-79, 106 S. Ct. 
1431, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986). 
 
Likewise, criminal defendants have a right to present relevant evidence, but that 
right is subject to reasonable restrictions. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308, 
118 S. Ct. 1261, 140 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1998). "[S]tate and federal rulemakers have broad 
latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal 
trials." 523 U.S. at 308. And "the accused, as is required of the State, must comply with 
established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and 
reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence." Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302; see 
State v. Stano, 284 Kan. 126, 131, 159 P.3d 931 (2007). For these reasons, reviewing 
courts have traditionally been reluctant to impose constitutional constraints on ordinary 
evidentiary rulings made by trial courts. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689, 106 
S. Ct. 2142, 90 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1986); United States v. Austin, 933 F.2d 833, 842 (10th 
Cir. 1991). 
 
"Because a district court may exercise reasonable control over the scope of cross-
examination, appellate courts review the court's decision to limit cross-examination for 
an abuse of discretion." Thomas, 307 Kan. at 739. And to the extent this issue also 
involves the district court's decision to limit cross-examination based on evidentiary 
rulings, those rulings are also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Atkinson, 276 
Kan. 920, 925, 80 P.3d 1143 (2003). "A district court abuses its discretion when (1) no 
reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the district court; (2) the 
judicial action is based on an error of law; or (3) the judicial action is based on an error of 
fact." Thomas, 307 Kan. at 739. 
 
As the party alleging error, Frantz has the burden to prove the district court abused 
its discretion. 307 Kan. at 739. "[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the 
 
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Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise 
appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of 
the witness, and thereby 'to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could 
appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.' Davis v. Alaska, 
[415 U.S.] at 318." Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680. 
 
C. Preservation Questions 
 
Before addressing the merits of this issue, we pause to address potential 
preservation issues. Kansas law generally requires the proponent of excluded evidence to 
proffer sufficient evidence to the trial court to preserve the issue for appellate review. 
K.S.A. 60-405. And the failure to make an adequate proffer precludes review because the 
appellate court has no basis to consider whether the trial court abused its discretion. State 
v. Evans, 275 Kan. 95, 100, 62 P.3d 220 (2003). 
 
At trial, Frantz did not make a proffer to establish how Patrick would have 
answered the challenged questions or testified in response to the excluded lines of 
questioning. Frantz proffered only some of the substance of Neumann's testimony from 
the motion hearing. But the district court judge who heard the testimony at that motion 
hearing did not preside over the trial. Thus, the trial court judge may not have been aware 
of the entire substance of Neumann's testimony at the time of his rulings. Furthermore, 
Frantz' arguments on appeal address only the limitations on Patrick's cross-examination. 
We question whether Frantz' partial proffer of Neumann's testimony was adequate for 
purposes of reviewing the issue on appeal. 
 
Nevertheless, neither party has briefed whether Frantz provided an adequate 
proffer. See State v. Davis, 313 Kan. 244, 248, 485 P.3d 174 (2021) (an issue not briefed 
is deemed waived or abandoned). And, more importantly, the State does not object. Thus, 
 
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we will reach the merits of Frantz' argument. And for that purpose, we assume Patrick 
would have testified consistently with Neumann's testimony at the motion hearing.  
 
D. The District Court's Limits on Patrick's Cross-examination Did Not Violate 
Frantz' Right to Confrontation. 
 
The district court made two evidentiary rulings that had the effect of limiting the 
scope of Frantz' cross-examination of Patrick. To thoroughly evaluate Frantz' claim that 
these rulings violated her Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, we first analyze each 
of the evidentiary rulings for potential error under Kansas' rules of evidence. Then, we 
explore whether the limitations were reasonable, considering the scope of Frantz' cross-
examination of Patrick in its entirety.  
 
1. 
The District Court Did Not Err by Excluding Evidence of Patrick's 
Hospitalization for Depression 
 
 
As previously noted, Frantz did not make a proffer of the excluded testimony. But 
for purposes of our analysis, we assume for the sake of argument Patrick would have 
testified he was hospitalized for depression, suicidal tendencies, and erratic behavior, and 
his depression was caused by Frantz' incarceration and Gary's death.  
 
In its evidentiary ruling, the district court found Frantz' question about Patrick's 
hospitalization for depression was calculated to elicit character evidence affecting 
Patrick's credibility. And on appeal, Frantz does not directly challenge the district court's 
characterization of the excluded testimony as character evidence. Nonetheless, the record 
indicates Frantz may have offered additional grounds for admitting Patrick's testimony, 
including that such testimony could have been used to impeach Patrick with a prior 
inconsistent statement or to show Patrick's consciousness of guilt. Thus, we first review 
the district court's ruling under the evidentiary rules governing the admission of character 
 
20 
 
 
 
evidence. Then, we address whether the evidence was otherwise admissible as 
impeachment evidence or to establish Patrick's consciousness of guilt.  
 
First, when viewing the excluded testimony as potential character evidence, 
several statutes govern our analysis of the district court's ruling. K.S.A. 60-420 generally 
allows any party to admit evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness: 
 
"Subject to K.S.A. 60-421 and 60-422, for the purpose of impairing or supporting the 
credibility of a witness, any party including the party calling the witness may examine the 
witness and introduce extrinsic evidence concerning any conduct by him or her and any 
other matter relevant upon the issues of credibility." 
 
But this general rule is subject to several limitations. Relevant here, K.S.A. 60-422 
excludes evidence of any character trait other than honesty or veracity, and it prevents a 
party from establishing a witness' character traits through specific instances of conduct:  
 
"As affecting the credibility of a witness . . . (c) evidence of traits of his or her character 
other than honesty or veracity or their opposites, shall be inadmissible; (d) evidence of 
specific instances of his or her conduct relevant only as tending to prove a trait of his or 
her character, shall be inadmissible."  
 
Even so, evidence of specific instances of a witness' conduct can be admissible when 
character is in issue at trial. K.S.A. 60-446 ("When a person's character or a trait of his or 
her character is in issue, it may be proved by testimony in the form of opinion, evidence 
of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of the person's conduct."); see also State v. 
Price, 275 Kan. 78, 91, 61 P.3d 676 (2003) (K.S.A. 60-446 "'deals with the rather rare 
situations where character is an ultimate issue [i.e., a fact necessary to liability, defense or 
damages] as contrasted with the use of character merely as circumstantial evidence of 
another fact.'").  
 
 
21 
 
 
 
If, as Frantz argues on appeal, testimony regarding Patrick's hospitalization for 
depression would show his violent character, then such evidence was offered to establish 
a character trait other than honesty or veracity. K.S.A. 60-422(c) makes clear that 
evidence establishing any character trait other than honesty or veracity, or their opposites,  
shall be inadmissible. Thus, to the extent Frantz intended to offer Patrick's testimony to 
establish his propensity toward violence, the district court properly excluded such 
evidence under K.S.A. 60-422(c).  
 
If, as Frantz seemed to argue to the district court, this testimony was offered to 
prove Patrick's dishonesty or lack of veracity, that testimony would relate to a specific 
instance of conduct (his hospitalization) and would be inadmissible under K.S.A. 60-
422(d). Further, the district court also found evidence regarding Patrick's hospitalization 
for depression, a specific instance of conduct, would not be admissible under K.S.A. 60-
446 because Patrick's character was not an ultimate issue at trial. On appeal, Frantz does 
not challenge the district court's ruling under K.S.A. 60-446. For these reasons, we 
conclude the district court did not err in excluding Patrick's testimony as improper 
character evidence. 
 
 
Second, the record also suggests Frantz wanted to question Patrick about his 
depression and hospitalization to impeach him with a prior inconsistent statement. Frantz 
believed Patrick's statements to Neumann—that he was depressed because his mother 
was in custody—would impeach Patrick's testimony on direct examination that he 
believed Frantz had killed Gary. But a witness' prior statement is only proper 
impeachment material if it contradicts or is inconsistent with what the witness has said on 
the stand. State v. Worth, 217 Kan. 393, 396, 537 P.2d 191 (1975). We see no incongruity 
between Patrick's prior statement that he was depressed because his mother was in 
custody for killing his father and Patrick's testimony that he believed his mother 
committed the crime. Because Patrick's prior statement to Neumann was not appropriate  
 
22 
 
 
 
impeachment evidence, the district court did not err by excluding it. See Worth, 217 Kan. 
at 395-96 (district court did not err in striking witness' prior testimony offered for 
impeachment purposes when that testimony was not inconsistent with witness' direct 
testimony). 
 
 
Finally, Frantz argued Patrick's hospitalization for suicidal tendencies showed a 
guilty conscience, and thus would constitute circumstantial evidence that Patrick killed 
Gary. Evidence of a defendant's conduct following the commission of an alleged crime 
may be circumstantially relevant and thus admissible to establish the defendant's 
consciousness of guilt. State v. Webber, 260 Kan. 263, 274, 918 P.2d 609 (1996); State v. 
Cathey, 241 Kan. 715, 730, 741 P.2d 738 (1987), disapproved of on other grounds by 
State v. Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, 133 P.3d 48 (2006). And "'[c]ircumstantial evidence 
that would be admissible and support a conviction if introduced by the State cannot be 
excluded by a court when offered by the defendant to prove his or her defense that 
another killed the victim.'" State v. Burnett, 300 Kan. 419, 433, 329 P.3d 1169 (2014).  
 
 
While Kansas courts have not broached the issue, other jurisdictions have held that 
suicide attempts, as well as suicidal ideations, may be admissible to establish a person's 
consciousness of guilt. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 416 Pa. Super. 160, 175-76, 
610 A.2d 1020 (1992) (listing decisions from other jurisdictions finding suicide attempts 
evidence of consciousness of guilt and finding evidence of suicidal thoughts admissible 
for same purpose); see also 73 A.L.R.5th 615 (discussing admissibility of evidence 
relating to accused's suicide attempt). But these courts have generally found such 
evidence admissible only when there is a sufficient nexus between the crime and the 
suicide attempt to support an inference the defendant was attempting to evade 
prosecution by committing suicide. See Mathis v. State, 287 So. 3d 1268, 1270 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2019) ("Courts have recognized suicide attempts to be 'indicative of a desire to 
avoid prosecution and [a] circumstance from which guilt may be inferred.'"); Lamerand 
v. State, 540 S.W.3d 252, 261 (Tex. App. 2018) ("Keith attempted suicide shortly after 
 
23 
 
 
 
learning that he had been accused of sexually assaulting Kathryn and that the police were 
investigating him. Given the timing, a jury could have reasonably inferred that Keith's 
suicide attempt evidenced a consciousness of guilt."). 
 
 
Assuming, without deciding, that evidence of suicidal ideations can be probative 
of a witness' state of mind and may tend to establish a guilty conscience in certain 
circumstances, Frantz has not proffered a sufficient nexus between Patrick's suicidal 
thoughts and Gary's murder to support that inference. And based on the record before us, 
no such nexus exists. Patrick never faced prosecution for Gary's murder. And Patrick was 
hospitalized for depression months after Gary's death. See Meggison v. State, 540 So. 2d 
258, 259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (finding defendant's suicide attempt after pleading 
guilty not probative of flight from pending prosecution); People v. Foster, 56 Ill. App. 3d 
22, 32, 371 N.E.2d 961 (1977) (finding defendant's suicide attempt not probative of 
consciousness of guilt because not made in close temporal proximity to murder), rev'd on 
other grounds by 76 Ill. 2d 365, 392 N.E.2d 6 (1979). 
 
 
Moreover, on appeal, Frantz does not mention Patrick's suicidal ideations. Frantz 
argues only that she should have been allowed to question Patrick about his 
hospitalization for depression. But any potential nexus between Patrick's general 
depression and his alleged guilt would be even more tenuous than the nexus between his 
suicidal ideations and his alleged guilt. We conclude the district court did not err in 
excluding this evidence.  
 
2. 
The District Court Did Not Err by Limiting Frantz' Ability to Elicit 
Testimony During Patrick's Cross-examination of an Alleged Threat 
He Made Against His Girlfriend 
 
Frantz also argues the district court should have admitted Patrick's testimony in 
response to her question whether he had previously told Neumann he could kill her and 
get away with it. Again, Frantz did not make a proffer to establish how Patrick would 
 
24 
 
 
 
have answered any questions about the alleged threat, so we will assume for the sake of 
argument that Patrick would have testified consistently with Neumann's testimony at the 
motion hearing.  
 
Frantz claims the alleged threat was a statement against interest suggesting Patrick 
had previously killed someone. And she asserts Patrick's admission that he had killed 
before would be relevant to whether he killed Gary. Alternatively, Frantz argues the 
testimony was admissible to establish Patrick's propensity toward violence and to 
impeach his prior testimony that he had never threatened anyone. We address each of 
these arguments in turn.  
 
First, Frantz contends the excluded testimony was an admission against Patrick's 
interests and was relevant to the identity of the shooter. If Patrick had admitted to killing 
someone before, that admission might have been relevant because it could have some 
tendency to prove the identity of Gary's killer. See State v. Page, 303 Kan. 548, 550, 363 
P.3d 391 (2015) (quoting K.S.A. 60-401[b]) ("Relevant evidence is evidence that has 
'"any tendency in reason to prove any material fact."'"). And "[g]enerally, all relevant 
evidence is admissible. K.S.A. 60-407(f)." State v. Miller, 308 Kan. 1119, 1167, 427 P.3d 
907 (2018). But the district court did not limit cross-examination because Patrick's 
admission or statement against interest was not relevant. Instead, the district court found 
Patrick's alleged threat was not an admission or statement against interest in the first 
place. We agree. 
 
The phrase "I could kill you and get away with it" expresses a mere possibility 
or hypothetical—it is not confirmation of past conduct. See The American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language 416 (5th ed. 2011) ("[C]ould" is "[u]sed with 
hypothetical or conditional force:  If we could help, we would."). While someone might 
be confident in their ability to get away with murder because they had done so 
previously, the purported threat attributed to Patrick does not support that connotation. 
 
25 
 
 
 
 
Second, Frantz argues she should have been allowed to question Patrick about the 
alleged threat to establish Patrick's character trait of being prone to violence. But as the 
State argues, if Frantz wished to question Patrick about the threat to establish his 
propensity for violence and suggest Patrick killed Gary, any testimony it could elicit 
would be inadmissible under K.S.A. 60-447. That statute provides that "when a trait of a 
person's character is relevant as tending to prove conduct on a specified occasion . . . 
evidence of specific instances of conduct other than evidence of conviction of a crime 
which tends to prove the trait to be bad shall be inadmissible." K.S.A. 60-447(a). Because 
the alleged threat would have been a specific instance of conduct (other than a 
conviction) offered to prove Patrick's violent character, its admission was prohibited by 
K.S.A. 60-447(a).  
 
 
And if Frantz wished to question Patrick about the alleged threat to establish 
Patrick's character trait of being prone to violence, any testimony the question could elicit 
would also be inadmissible under K.S.A. 60-422 for two reasons. First, the alleged threat 
would have established a character trait other than dishonesty or lack of veracity and thus 
been inadmissible under K.S.A. 60-422(c) (evidence of witness' character traits unrelated 
to honesty or veracity inadmissible). Second, the alleged threat would have been a 
specific instance of Patrick's conduct offered to prove a trait of his character and would 
be inadmissible under K.S.A. 60-422(d) (evidence of specific instances of conduct 
relevant to prove witness' character trait inadmissible). 
 
Finally, Frantz contends she should have been allowed to question Patrick about 
the alleged threat against his girlfriend to impeach his earlier testimony on cross-
examination. As previously noted, Frantz first asked if Patrick had ever threatened Gary, 
which Patrick denied. Next, Frantz asked if Patrick had ever threatened anyone, which  
 
26 
 
 
 
Patrick also denied. Frantz then asked if he had ever told his girlfriend that he could kill 
her and get away with it. Only this third question drew an objection from the State, which 
the district court sustained.  
 
 
Frantz argues she should have been allowed to question Patrick about the alleged 
threat to impeach his testimony that he had never threatened anyone. But based on the 
record before us, Frantz has failed to establish any error on this basis. Again, we assume 
Patrick would have testified consistently with Neumann's testimony at the motion 
hearing. But Neumann's testimony regarding the alleged threat was, at best, ambiguous. 
She initially denied that Patrick had told her he could kill her and get away with it. When 
pressed further, she responded by saying Patrick would say things under his breath. But 
she never specifically testified Patrick made the alleged threat. In short, the record before 
us fails to establish Patrick ever threatened Neumann. And we cannot conclude the 
district court abused its discretion by preventing Frantz from questioning Patrick about an 
alleged threat that was never substantiated. See State v. Vonachen, 312 Kan. 451, 460, 
476 P.3d 774 (2020) (appellant has burden to provide record sufficient to establish 
claimed error). 
 
Furthermore, the district court did not preclude Frantz from impeaching Patrick's 
testimony that he had never threatened anyone. We note Frantz' second question—
whether Patrick had threatened anyone—elicited testimony regarding a specific instance 
of Patrick's conduct. And that testimony may have been inadmissible under K.S.A. 60-
447, K.S.A. 60-422(d), or both. We need not decide that question today because the State 
did not object to that inquiry. But the district court also recognized the State's failure to 
object to Frantz' inquiry opened the door for her to impeach Patrick's testimony that he 
had never threatened anyone in the past. Thus, the district court ruled that Frantz could 
impeach that testimony by calling a rebuttal witness or witnesses to testify to prior threats 
Patrick had directed toward them. Frantz did not accept this invitation, however.  
 
 
27 
 
 
 
The district court's ruling complies with K.S.A. 60-420, which permits parties to 
impair or support a witness' credibility through cross-examination, through the 
introduction of extrinsic evidence, or both. See also State v. Beans, 247 Kan. 343, 346, 
800 P.2d 145 (1990) (holding defendant need not first cross-examine witness before 
presenting extrinsic evidence impeaching witness' direct testimony). The district court's 
ruling is also consistent with our caselaw holding defendants should be allowed to 
present rebuttal evidence when necessary to impeach purportedly false testimony from a 
key witness for the State. See, e.g., State v. Macomber, 241 Kan. 154, 159, 734 P.2d 1148 
(1987) (district court committed reversible error when it excluded evidence of a key 
witness' drug use when that evidence was offered to show the witness had testified falsely 
about her drug use). Frantz fails to explain how limiting the method of impeachment 
(through rebuttal witness rather than cross-examination), as opposed to preventing her 
from impeaching Patrick at all, constitutes an abuse of discretion. Instead, Frantz' 
opportunity to call a rebuttal witness to impeach Patrick's testimony further illustrates the 
reasonableness of the district court's limitation on cross-examination. See Van Arsdall, 
475 U.S. at 679; Thomas, 307 Kan. at 741.  
 
Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude the district court's evidentiary 
rulings impacting the scope of Patrick's cross-examination were either legally and 
factually sound or otherwise correct under Kansas' rules of evidence. See State v. 
Robinson, 293 Kan. 1002, 1027, 270 P.3d 1183 (2012) (upholding district court's 
evidentiary ruling as right for the wrong reason). 
 
3. 
The Limits on Cross-examination Did Not Violate the Sixth 
Amendment 
 
Even though the district court's limitations on her cross-examination complied 
with applicable statutes, Frantz nevertheless contends the limits on cross-examination 
 
28 
 
 
 
violated the Sixth Amendment because they served no legitimate purpose and impaired 
her ability to confront a key witness for the State. We disagree with both contentions.  
 
First, we reject Frantz' assertion that the limits on Patrick's cross-examination 
served no legitimate purpose. The challenged limitations were the byproduct of the 
district court's reasonable interpretation and application of the Kansas rules of evidence. 
Our established rules of evidence exist to ensure the fairness, reliability, and efficiency of 
trials. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302; State v. Humphrey, 217 Kan. 352, 364, 537 P.3d 
155 (1975). Thus, the exclusion of inadmissible evidence concerning Patrick's personal 
health history and the alleged prior threat to Neumann served legitimate interests in the 
trial process. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679 (trial judges have wide latitude to impose 
reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns about harassment and 
questioning that is only marginally relevant). 
 
Second, Frantz was given a constitutionally sufficient opportunity to cross-
examine Patrick. In deciding whether the district court's limits on cross-examination 
impaired Frantz' Sixth Amendment rights, we must consider whether Frantz was still able 
to "'engag[e] in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical 
form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby "to expose to the jury the facts from 
which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the 
witness."'" Atkinson, 276 Kan. at 929 (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680). In other 
words, we must determine "whether a reasonable jury would have received a significantly 
different impression of the witness' credibility had counsel pursued the proposed line of 
cross-examination." United States v. Garcia, 13 F.3d 1464, 1469 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing 
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680).  
 
The record shows that even with the district court's limits, Frantz extensively 
cross-examined Patrick. Frantz' cross-examination of Patrick takes up 141 pages of the 
trial transcript, compared to only 34 pages of his direct examination. During Patrick's 
 
29 
 
 
 
cross-examination, Frantz elicited testimony directly supporting her theory of defense 
that Patrick was the shooter and disclosing Patrick's potential motives and biases. For 
example, Frantz elicited testimony that (1) Patrick had sent angry text messages to Gary 
six days before the shooting but told police he had not had contact with Gary for weeks; 
(2) Patrick told a detective that he thought Frantz had bought a gun from Cabela's when 
he in fact knew she did because he went with her; (3) Gary had called 911 on Patrick 
before; (4) Frantz had called the police on Patrick before; (5) Patrick had access to Frantz' 
apartment; (6) the outcome of the trial could affect how much of Gary's property Patrick 
would inherit; (7) Patrick told Neumann that he hated Gary; and (8) Patrick testified 
police had told him Gary was shot at 8 p.m. even though bodycam video showed police 
had indicated only that Gary had died from a gunshot wound around 10 p.m. 
 
Frantz asserts the jury would have had even more information about Patrick if she 
had been allowed to pursue the excluded lines of questioning. But the touchstone for 
whether the Confrontation Clause has been satisfied is not whether the defendant was 
able to engage in "'cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever 
extent, the defense might wish.'" Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679. Instead, the proper inquiry 
is whether the defendant was able to present sufficient information for the jury to make a 
discriminating appraisal of the witness' motives and bias. United States v. Mullins, 613 
F.3d 1273, 1283 (10th Cir. 2010); see also Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680 (limits on cross-
examination violate Confrontation Clause where they prevent defendant from engaging in 
otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on 
the part of the witness). Here, the district court's limitations did not prevent Frantz from 
providing the jury with sufficient information to make a discriminating appraisal of 
Patrick's credibility. Through cross-examination, Frantz was able to put before the jury 
facts showing Patrick had motive and opportunity to murder Gary as well as a potential 
bias to frame Frantz—either because he did it, because he wanted to receive the entirety  
 
30 
 
 
 
of Gary's estate, or both. The limitations the district court placed on Patrick's cross-
examination only prevented Frantz from adducing evidence that was inadmissible and 
would not have given the jury a significantly different impression of Patrick's credibility.  
 
We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting Frantz' 
cross-examination of Patrick. The challenged limitations served legitimate interests in the 
trial process by excluding testimony that was inadmissible under our rules of evidence. 
And those limits did not prevent Frantz from engaging in the otherwise appropriate cross- 
examination of Patrick. Because the district court's limitations fell within the wide 
latitude afforded to courts to impose reasonable limitations on cross-examination, we 
hold Frantz' Confrontation Clause rights were not violated.  
 
II. The District Court Did Not Err by Denying Frantz' Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal at the Close of the State's Evidence 
 
 
Next, Frantz argues the district court erred by denying her motion for judgment of 
acquittal after the close of the State's evidence. Frantz contends she was entitled to a 
judgment of acquittal because of the lack of direct evidence identifying her as the person 
who shot Gary. Before reaching the merits of this challenge, we first discuss a potential 
waiver issue under our established precedent.  
 
 
A. Waiver Rule Adopted by this Court 
 
In State v. Blue, 225 Kan. 576, 578, 592 P.2d 897 (1979), we held that when a 
defendant unsuccessfully moves for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's 
evidence and then proceeds to present evidence, the defendant waives any error in denial 
of the motion. We later modified this rule to provide that a defendant does not waive 
error if he or she presents only rebuttal evidence confined to the substance and credibility 
of the witnesses for the State or a codefendant and does not try to refute any elements of 
 
31 
 
 
 
proof adduced in the State's case. State v. Copes, 244 Kan. 604, 610-11, 772 P.2d 742 
(1989); see also State v. Murdock, 286 Kan. 661, 670-71, 187 P.3d 1267 (2008) 
(recognizing Copes modified waiver rule). "If the motion for acquittal is renewed after 
the close of all of the evidence, the trial court should consider all of the evidence in ruling 
upon that motion." Copes, 244 Kan. at 607. 
 
 
This rule has been adopted by the federal appellate circuits and appears to have 
been adopted by many, if not most, states. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 783 F.2d 
1082, 1085 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (stating "[a]ll eleven numbered circuits and the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals are now on record . . . as adhering to the waiver 
rule" and listing cases in footnote); Thomas v. State, 330 Ark. 442, 446, 954 S.W.2d 255 
(1997) ("A defendant who goes forward with the production of additional evidence after 
a directed-verdict motion is overruled waives any further reliance upon the former 
motion."); State v. Seeley, 326 Conn. 65, 71, 161 A.3d 1278 (2017) ("The so-called 
waiver rule provides that, when a motion for [a judgment of] acquittal at the close of the 
state's case is denied, a defendant may not secure appellate review of the trial court's 
ruling without [forgoing] the right to put on evidence in his or her own behalf."); Cox v. 
State, 19 N.E.3d 287, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) ("[O]ne who elects to present evidence 
after a denial of [her] motion for directed verdict made at the end of the State's case 
waives appellate review of the denial of that motion."); State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 
857 n.7 (Minn. 2008) ("[W]e have held that where a defendant chooses to introduce 
evidence after his motion for judgment of acquittal has been denied, we consider the 
'whole record' and not just the evidence produced by the State."); Woods v. State, 242 So. 
3d 47, 54 (Miss. 2018) ("When the defendant proceeds with his case after the state rests 
and the court overrules the defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the defendant has 
waived the appeal of that directed verdict."); State v. Smith, 944 S.W.2d 901, 916 (Mo. 
1997) (by presenting evidence in his own defense after State rested, defendant waived 
challenge to sufficiency of evidence raised in motion for judgment of acquittal at close of 
State's evidence); State v. Combs, 297 Neb. 422, 430, 900 N.W.2d 473 (2017) (if court 
 
32 
 
 
 
denies defendant's motion to dismiss or for directed verdict at end of State's case, and 
defendant proceeds to present evidence, defendant waives appellate review of denial of 
motion); State v. Hill, 163 N.H. 394, 395-96, 42 A.3d 842 (2012) (when court denies 
challenge to sufficiency of evidence after close of State's case, and defendant proceeds to 
present evidence, court reviews entire trial record); State v. Kinsella, 796 N.W.2d 678, 
682 (N.D. 2011) ("[O]ur adherence to the waiver rule is consistent with the position taken 
by the federal circuit courts of appeals and the majority of state courts."); State v. 
Phillips, 416 S.C. 184, 191 n.7, 785 S.E.2d 448 (2016) ("Under the waiver rule, a 
defendant who presents evidence in his own defense waives the right to have the court 
review the denial of directed verdict based solely on the evidence presented in the State's 
case-in-chief."); State v. Gilley, 297 S.W.3d 739, 763 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008) 
(defendant waived right to appeal denial of motion for judgment of acquittal at close of 
State's case because he presented evidence); State v. Griffith, 129 Wash. App. 482, 489, 
120 P.3d 610 (2005) ("When a defendant presents a defense case in chief, he waives his 
right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss made at the end of the State's case in 
chief."); McEuen v. State, 388 P.3d 779, 782 (Wyo. 2017) ("We have previously held that 
a defendant's introduction of evidence following denial of a judgment of acquittal is a 
waiver of the appeal of that motion."). But see United States v. Alvarez-Valenzuela, 231 
F.3d 1198, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2000) (failure to renew motion for judgment of acquittal at 
end of trial, after motion has been made at end of the government's case, does not mean 
that it has been waived, but only that higher standard of review is to be imposed); 2A 
Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Crim. § 463 (4th ed.) (discussing federal circuits in 
which status of waiver rule is uncertain). 
 
 
But some courts and jurists have criticized this waiver rule because it "seriously 
limits the right of the accused to have the prosecution prove a prima facie case before he 
is put to his defense." Cephus v. United States, 324 F.2d 893, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1963), 
abrogated by Foster, 783 F.2d 1082; see also State v. Perkins, 271 Conn. 218, 272, 856 
 
33 
 
 
 
A.2d 917 (2004) (Katz, J., dissenting) (waiver rule cuts against well-established principle 
that "'[a] criminal defendant has the right to put the state to its burden and need not 
defend until and unless the state has presented a prima facie case'"). This critique has 
persuaded some states to reject the waiver rule altogether. See In re Anthony J., 117 Cal. 
App. 4th 718, 732, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 865 (2004) (declining to adopt federal waiver rule 
because "[s]uch a rule offends the most basic premises of our criminal justice system, the 
presumption of innocence and the duty of the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt"); Kontos v. State, 363 So. 2d 1025, 1034 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) (a 
timely motion to exclude at the close of State's case entitles defendant to be discharged at 
that point, and allowing defendant to cure error in court's improper denial of the motion 
"would lead to the demise of the motion to exclude as a procedural corollary to the 
defendant's presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proof"). 
 
Here, the waiver rule adopted by our court in Blue would seemingly apply. After 
the district court denied Frantz' motion, Frantz presented evidence in her defense, and 
some of that evidence refuted the State's proof that Frantz was the shooter. Beauclair's 
testimony suggested that Patrick left work early on the day of the shooting and that he 
had unique knowledge of the crime scene. Frantz also presented an enhanced version of 
Officer Stevenson's bodycam video to support her argument that Gary had identified "my 
boy" as the shooter.  
 
Even so, we need not decide the continuing validity of this waiver rule or its 
application here because the State failed to preserve the issue for appeal. By failing to 
raise or brief the waiver issue, the State has abandoned any argument related to the rule 
adopted in Blue. See State v. Boysaw, 309 Kan. 526, 542-43, 439 P.3d 909 (2019) 
(argument deemed waived, abandoned for failure to brief issue).  
 
 
34 
 
 
 
B. The District Court Properly Denied Frantz' Motion  
 
Turning to the merits, Frantz was charged with the first-degree premeditated 
murder of Gary. To secure a conviction, the State needed to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Frantz intentionally killed Gary and the killing was done with premeditation. 
See K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5402. The district court did not err in denying Frantz' motion 
for judgment of acquittal because the State presented sufficient evidence in its case-in-
chief to support a prima facie case of first-degree premeditated murder. 
 
1. 
Standard of Review and Legal Framework 
 
"A challenge to a denial of a motion for acquittal is, at the core, a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence." State v. Cottrell, 310 Kan. 150, 163, 445 P.3d 1132 (2019). 
"'When examining the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, the standard of 
review is whether, after reviewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, the appellate court is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found 
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court does not reweigh the 
evidence, assess the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicting evidence.'" State v. 
Raskie, 293 Kan. 906, 919-20, 269 P.3d 1268 (2012). 
 
 
Moreover, appellate courts do not differentiate between circumstantial and direct 
evidence in terms of probative value. "'A conviction of even the gravest offense can be 
based entirely on circumstantial evidence and the inferences fairly deducible therefrom. If 
an inference is a reasonable one, the jury has the right to make the inference.'" State v. 
King, 308 Kan. 16, 28, 417 P.3d 1073 (2018). 
 
 
35 
 
 
 
2. 
The State Presented Sufficient Evidence During Its Case-in-Chief to 
Prove Frantz Was the Shooter 
 
The main issue at Frantz' trial was the identity of Gary's killer, and Frantz argues 
the State presented insufficient evidence during its case to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that she was the one who shot and killed Gary. Frantz claims the only evidence 
directly placing her at the scene of the shooting was Raynal's identification testimony at 
trial and Gary's dying declaration. Frantz essentially argues Raynal's identification is so 
incredible that this court should disregard it in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. 
Frantz also asserts Gary's dying declaration, on its own, cannot support her conviction 
because it is open to interpretation. 
 
 
As to the eyewitness identification evidence, Raynal was the only Stove Loft 
tenant who testified to seeing Frantz in the parking lot on the night of the shooting. But 
Raynal had originally told police she had seen a young man (not a middle-aged woman) 
leaving the scene. And Raynal could not identify Frantz until she saw Frantz in court at a 
pretrial hearing when Frantz was wearing handcuffs and a jail jumpsuit.  
 
 
Given the circumstances surrounding the identification, Frantz moved to suppress 
Raynal's identification before trial, but the district court denied that motion. See State v. 
Corbett, 281 Kan. 294, 304-05, 130 P.3d 1179 (2006) (courts may exclude eyewitness 
identification if impermissibly suggestive procedure led to substantial likelihood of 
misidentification). On appeal, Frantz does not challenge the district court's denial of her 
motion or otherwise argue the district court should have excluded Raynal's testimony.  
 
 
Raynal's identification certainly had its shortcomings, but this is not one of those 
rare cases where a witness' testimony is so incredible no reasonable fact-finder could 
have relied on it in reaching a guilty verdict. See State v. Milo, 315 Kan. 434, 450, 510 
P.3d 1 (2022). Raynal explained that at the time of the shooting, she observed only the 
 
36 
 
 
 
profile of the perpetrator. And she was able to identify Frantz at the hearing because that 
was the first time since the shooting that she saw Frantz' profile and build. And Raynal 
testified the perpetrator's short hair initially led her to believe the shooter was male, and it 
had not occurred to her that a woman would commit such a crime. Raynal was also 
subjected to vigorous cross-examination, and the district court instructed the jury on 
factors to consider when weighing the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony. 
Under these circumstances, we trust juries to determine the credibility and weight of 
witness testimony, and we will not revisit those determinations on appeal. See State v. 
Lopez, 299 Kan. 324, 329-30, 323 P.3d 1260 (2014); Corbett, 281 Kan. at 306. 
 
 
As to Gary's dying declaration, Frantz argues Gary's statement is open to 
interpretation because his first answer to Officer Stevenson's question, "Do you know 
who shot ya, Gary?" is unintelligible on the body camera footage. But our review of the 
evidence confirms a rational fact-finder could have found that Gary reliably identified 
Frantz as his killer in response to questioning by law enforcement. Gary's first response 
to Officer Stevenson's question regarding the identity of his killer is difficult to 
understand on video, but multiple witnesses testified to hearing Gary say his wife was the 
shooter when Officer Stevenson repeated his question. In the video admitted by the State, 
Gary also corrects other people when they misstate Frantz' name, but Gary never corrects 
Officer Stevenson when he asks Gary why "your wife" or "she" shot him. Several 
witnesses also testified to hearing Gary identify his wife as the shooter before Officer 
Stevenson arrived on the scene. And no witness ever testified to hearing Gary identify 
"my boy" or Patrick as the killer. 
 
 
Moreover, while Raynal's identification and Gary's dying declaration may have 
been the only evidence directly placing Frantz at the scene of the crime, the State 
presented other circumstantial evidence that Frantz was the shooter. During the State's 
case, witnesses testified they saw a silver or light-colored two-door Hyundai leaving the 
scene of the shooting, and Frantz drove a silver two-door Hyundai. Police arrested Frantz 
 
37 
 
 
 
in this very vehicle hours after the shooting. Gary was shot with a 9-millimeter gun, and 
Frantz had purchased a 9-millimeter handgun a few months before the shooting. 
Markings on the shell casings found at the crime scene matched markings on a shell 
casing found in Frantz' apartment, indicating they had all been fired from the same gun. 
And Frantz had made several vitriolic Facebook posts about Gary, including one on the 
day of the shooting in which she said of Gary, "I hope you rot in hell if not I hope you rot 
in prison." 
 
 
Frantz argues that absent Gary's dying declaration, this circumstantial evidence is 
insufficient to support her conviction, and thus the question before us is whether the 
dying declaration on its own was sufficient to support her conviction. But we need not 
consider the merits of this claim because parties cannot pick and choose which facts and 
evidence appellate courts consider when reviewing for sufficiency. Instead, appellate 
courts must consider all the evidence presented (in this instance, by the State in its case-
in-chief) and construe that evidence in a light most favorable to the State. State v. 
Darrow, 304 Kan. 710, 716, 374 P.3d 673 (2016). Frantz' argument simply invites us to 
reweigh the evidence, which is not the proper function of a reviewing court. Viewing the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we hold a reasonable jury could have 
found beyond reasonable doubt from the evidence presented during the State's case that 
Frantz was Gary's killer. 
 
III. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Frantz' Conviction for First-
degree Premeditated Murder 
 
 
In her sufficiency challenge, Frantz contends the State's evidence identifying her 
as the shooter was further undercut by expert opinion testimony presented during the 
defense's case. She also contends the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that Frantz killed Gary intentionally and with premeditation. We 
disagree with both contentions.  
 
38 
 
 
 
 
A. Standard of Review and Relevant Legal Framework 
 
 
We review Frantz' issue under the same sufficiency of the evidence standard 
identified in the previous issue. The only difference is that we now consider all the 
evidence presented at trial—rather than limiting our inquiry to the evidence the State 
presented during its case-in-chief.  
 
 
B. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Prove Frantz Was the Shooter  
 
 
As noted in the previous issue, the State presented sufficient evidence during its 
case to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Frantz shot and killed Gary. This evidence 
included Raynal's in-court identification of Frantz, Gary's dying declaration, and other 
circumstantial evidence suggesting Frantz was the shooter.  
 
 
 
In the previous issue, we reviewed only the sufficiency of the evidence the State 
presented during its case. But in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 
jury's verdict, we consider all the trial evidence. Capitalizing on this expanded 
evidentiary review, Frantz argues the expert opinion testimony she elicited from Johnson 
during the defense's case substantially undercut the reliability of Gary's dying declaration.  
 
Johnson opined Gary was suffering from hypoxia when he made the declaration 
that Frantz shot him and thus there was no way to be sure he was effectively 
communicating at the time. Frantz argues this evidence could support an inference that 
Gary identified "my boy"—that is, Patrick—as the killer and Gary was merely calling out 
for Frantz in his dying moments.  
 
But when reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts do not 
consider whether the evidence may be susceptible to more than one inference, or even 
 
39 
 
 
 
which inference is most compelling. Instead, appellate courts must view the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the State to determine if a jury could have reasonably drawn 
conclusions or inferences supporting the defendant's guilt. See State v. Scaife, 286 Kan. 
614, 618, 186 P.3d 755 (2008). And as noted in the previous issue, our review of the 
State's evidence confirms a rational fact-finder could have found that Gary reliably 
identified Frantz as his killer.  
 
Also, Johnson did not definitively say Gary did not know what he was saying or 
that he could not understand what was being said to him. And her opinion was refuted by 
the State's expert, Dr. Handler. He testified the lack of oxygen to Gary's brain would not 
have rendered him incoherent or unable to speak. Dr. Handler also stated there was no 
reason to believe Gary was incapable of saying what he wanted to say before his death. 
Resolving the conflict between Johnson's and Dr. Handler's expert opinion testimony in 
the State's favor, as we must, the evidence supports a finding that Gary understood what 
he was saying when he made his dying declaration. 
 
 
Viewing all the evidence presented at trial in a light most favorable to the State, 
we hold a reasonable jury could have found beyond reasonable doubt that Frantz was 
Gary's killer. 
 
C. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Prove Beyond Reasonable Doubt 
that Frantz Killed Gary Intentionally and with Premeditation 
 
 
While the main issue at trial was the identity of Gary's killer, Frantz also argues 
the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Frantz killed Gary intentionally 
and with premeditation. "A person acts 'intentionally,' or 'with intent,' with respect to the 
nature of such person's conduct or to a result of such person's conduct when it is such 
person's conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." 
 
40 
 
 
 
K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-5202(h). And "[p]remeditation means to have thought the matter 
over beforehand." State v. Kettler, 299 Kan. 448, 466, 325 P.3d 1075 (2014). 
 
 
Both intent and premeditation may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. 
Juries presume a person intends all the natural consequences of his or her acts. State v. 
Roberts, 314 Kan. 835, 850, 503 P.3d 227 (2022); Kettler, 299 Kan at 466-67. And we 
have identified several factors relevant to determining whether circumstantial evidence 
gives rise to an inference of premeditation, including:  "'(1) the nature of the weapon 
used; (2) lack of provocation; (3) the defendant's conduct before and after the killing; 
(4) threats and declarations of the defendant before and during the occurrence; and (5) the 
dealing of lethal blows after the deceased was felled and rendered helpless.' [Citation 
omitted.]" 299 Kan. at 467. 
 
 
Gary was shot six times with a gun. See State v. Salary, 301 Kan. 586, 601, 343 
P.3d 1165 (2015) (finding defendant's use of a handgun to shoot victim multiple times 
supported inference of premeditation). Witnesses heard several shots, a pause, and then 
more shots. See State v. Cosby, 293 Kan. 121, 134, 262 P.3d 285 (2011) (finding 
evidence supporting premeditation included the defendant firing multiple shots with a 
pause between the first and second shot). Witnesses testified the shooter was chasing 
Gary while firing. See State v. Clemons, 273 Kan. 328, 335, 45 P.3d 384 (2002) (finding 
evidence sufficient to support premeditation where two witnesses testified to seeing 
defendant chase victim across street). Witnesses also testified the shooter immediately 
left the scene. See State v. Alvidrez, 271 Kan. 143, 149, 20 P.3d 1264 (2001) (fleeing 
scene of shooting without calling for or rendering aid could support inference of 
premeditation). When Officer Stevenson asked Gary why his wife had shot him, Gary 
said he did not know and they had not been fighting, suggesting a lack of provocation. 
See Kettler, 299 Kan. at 468 (while first-degree murder victim had previously robbed co-
defendant, no evidence showed victim did anything on day of his murder to entice co-
defendants to confront him). Frantz had posted several angry messages directed at Gary 
 
41 
 
 
 
on social media. And on the day of the shooting, she posted that she hoped Gary would 
"rot in hell" or "rot in prison." See 299 Kan. at 468 (defendant's threatening statements 
before shooting supported inference of premeditation). This evidence is sufficient to 
support the jury's finding that Frantz acted intentionally and with premeditation. 
 
IV. Frantz' Pro Se Claims 
 
 
In her supplemental pro se brief, Frantz raises numerous other points of error, 
including violations of her due process rights, insufficiency of the evidence, prosecutorial 
error, and a challenge to the validity of her arrest warrant.  
 
A. Frantz Has Failed to Establish Any Violation of Her Due Process Rights 
 
 
Frantz argues she was denied due process of law because (1) the State concealed 
exculpatory evidence; (2) her conviction was secured through perjured testimony; (3) her 
trial transcripts are inaccurate or incomplete; and (4) the district court erroneously denied 
her motion for judgment of acquittal. We will address these arguments in turn.  
 
 
 
First, Frantz claims the State concealed exculpatory evidence because it did not 
inform the jury that Officer Stevenson misunderstood Gary's dying declaration or that 
Gary may have been responding to bystanders rather than Officer Stevenson's questions. 
Prosecutors have an affirmative duty to disclose evidence favorable to the accused, and 
failure to do so violates the defendant's due process rights. State v. Breitenbach, 313 Kan. 
73, 97, 483 P.3d 448 (2021). But prosecutors do not have a duty to draw inferences from 
the evidence in favor of the defense and argue those inferences to the jury. Here, the State 
disclosed Officer Stevenson's bodycam footage to the defense, and that footage was 
played for the jury. Frantz was free to argue at trial that Officer Stevenson misheard Gary 
or that Gary was responding to other bystanders in the video.  
 
 
42 
 
 
 
 
Frantz also claims a law enforcement officer lied to conceal body camera footage 
of a conversation with Patrick's neighbor. See Breitenbach, 313 Kan. at 97 (for purposes 
of determining whether prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence, law enforcement's 
knowledge of evidence imputed to prosecutor). But nothing in the record shows that 
footage of the conversation exists or that law enforcement lied to conceal its existence. In 
fact, the record shows Frantz knew of the conversation and its substance.  
 
 
Second, Frantz asserts the State secured her conviction through perjured 
testimony. She claims the State manipulated one of the Stove Loft tenants into testifying 
that Gary identified his wife as the shooter both before and after Officer Stevenson 
arrived on the scene. She also alleges Raynal was manipulated into identifying Frantz as 
the shooter at trial.  
 
 
"'A conviction obtained by the introduction of perjured testimony violates a 
defendant's due process rights if (1) the prosecution knowingly solicited the perjured 
testimony, or (2) the prosecution failed to correct testimony it knew was perjured.'" 
Haddock v. State, 282 Kan. 475, 508, 146 P.3d 187 (2006).  
 
 
Frantz raised a similar claim in her motion for new trial, and the district court 
found Frantz had failed to establish that any witness had committed perjury. See K.S.A. 
2021 Supp. 21-5903(a)(1) (defining perjury as "intentionally and falsely . . . testifying . . . 
to any material fact upon any oath or affirmation legally administered in any cause, 
matter or proceeding before any court"). Our review of the record has uncovered nothing 
to suggest any witness intentionally and falsely testified at Frantz' trial; thus, we affirm 
the district court's finding.  
 
 
Third, Frantz alleges court reporters altered the trial transcripts included in the 
record on appeal. Criminal defendants have a due process right to reasonably accurate 
trial transcripts, and a defendant may be entitled to a new trial if manifestly incomplete or 
 
43 
 
 
 
inaccurate transcripts preclude meaningful appellate review. State v. Holt, 298 Kan. 531, 
537, 314 P.3d 870 (2013). But when an appellant claims the denial of due process based 
on inaccurate or incomplete transcripts, the appellant "must make the best feasible 
showing possible that a complete and accurate transcript might have changed the 
outcome of the appeal." 298 Kan. at 538. Here, nothing in the record supports Frantz' 
claim that unidentified portions of the transcript have been altered or omitted. Moreover, 
Frantz fails to show that an accurate or complete transcript might have changed the 
outcome of her appeal.  
 
 
Fourth, Frantz argues the district court violated her due process rights by denying 
her motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case because there was 
insufficient evidence to support her conviction for first-degree murder. As previously 
noted, Frantz waived any claim of error regarding the district court's denial of her motion 
for judgment of acquittal. See Copes, 244 Kan. at 610-11. Furthermore, our review of the 
record confirms the State presented sufficient evidence in its case in chief to support 
Frantz' conviction. Indeed, all the evidence discussed in our sufficiency of the evidence 
analysis in Issue III (other than Johnson's expert opinion testimony) was presented before 
the close of the State's evidence. Thus, we hold Frantz has failed to establish a violation 
of her due process rights. 
 
B. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Frantz' Conviction 
 
 
Next, Frantz argues the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that her 
actions were the proximate cause of Gary's death. See State v. Wilson, 308 Kan. 516, 522, 
421 P.3d 742 (2018) ("'[U]nlawful conduct which is broken by an independent 
intervening cause cannot be the proximate cause of the death of another for the purpose 
of a conviction for homicide.'"). But Dr. Handler testified Gary died from his gunshot 
wounds. Dr. Handler also testified Gary had some broken ribs due to receiving CPR. He 
explained such injuries were common in people who had received CPR and did not 
 
44 
 
 
 
contribute to Gary's death. Thus, there is no evidence to suggest an intervening event 
severed the causal connection between Frantz shooting Gary and Gary dying.  
 
 
Frantz also argues the State presented insufficient evidence to prove she acted with 
the mens rea, or culpable mental state, for first-degree premeditated murder. As discussed 
in Issue III, we hold the State fulfilled its burden to prove this element beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  
 
C. The State Did Not Commit Reversible Prosecutorial Error 
 
 
Frantz argues the prosecutor committed prosecutorial error by stating facts not in 
evidence during closing argument. The prosecutor stated once during closing that Frantz 
"waited in [Gary's] parking lot." Frantz asserts there is no evidence to show she waited in 
the parking lot.  
 
 
When reviewing claims of prosecutorial error, we use a two-step process. State v. 
Sherman, 305 Kan. 88, 109, 378 P.3d 1060 (2016). First, we must determine if error 
occurred—whether the acts complained of fall outside the wide latitude afforded to 
prosecutors to conduct the State's case and attempt to obtain a conviction in a manner that 
does not offend the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. 305 Kan. at 109. If we 
find error has occurred, we must then determine whether the error prejudiced the 
defendant's due process rights to a fair trial. In conducting that analysis, we determine 
whether the State can demonstrate there is no reasonable possibility that the error 
contributed to the verdict. 305 Kan. at 109.  
 
 
We find the prosecutor's comment falls within the wide latitude afforded 
prosecutors in arguing their case. While no evidence directly shines light on when Frantz 
arrived at Gary's apartment, it was reasonable to argue from the evidence that she waited 
for him in the parking lot. Frantz apparently had to drive at least 20 minutes to arrive at 
 
45 
 
 
 
Gary's apartment in Leavenworth, and she and Gary were not on good terms, so it seems 
reasonable to infer from this evidence Frantz was unlikely to have known his 
whereabouts. See State v. Longoria, 301 Kan. 489, 524, 343 P.3d 1128 (2015) 
(prosecutor has wide latitude in crafting arguments and drawing reasonable inferences 
from evidence). The challenged statement falls within the wide latitude afforded to 
prosecutors in arguing the case.  
 
D. Frantz Did Not Preserve Her Challenge to Her Arrest Warrant for Review 
 
 
Frantz claims her arrest warrant is "illegal" because the supporting affidavit 
omitted information. The affidavit states, "Barbara has told her son, Patrick Frantz, she 
wanted Gary, 'to get what he deserves.'" And Patrick told law enforcement that Frantz 
had texted him saying Gary "was gonna get what's coming to him through her turning in 
his phone." Frantz now claims the affidavit omitted that she believed Gary had child 
pornography on his phone, and she wanted to turn in his phone so he would go to prison 
for possessing child pornography. 
 
 
If law enforcement deliberately omitted information from the affidavit supporting 
Frantz' arrest warrant, that omission may violate Frantz' Fourth Amendment rights if the 
missing information would have negated a probable cause finding. See United States v. 
Banks, 884 F.3d 998, 1009 (10th Cir. 2018). But parties generally may not raise 
constitutional claims for the first time on appeal. State v. Daniel, 307 Kan. 428, 430, 410 
P.3d 877 (2018). Frantz does not cite to any point in the record where she raised this 
issue before the district court. See Kansas Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5) (2020 Kan. S. 
Ct. R. 34) (requiring appellant to include a pinpoint reference to the location in record 
where issue was raised and ruled on). Nor has she briefed why we should consider her  
claim despite her failure to raise it below. See Daniel, 307 Kan. at 430 (although there are 
exceptions to general rule that constitutional issue cannot be raised for first time on 
appeal, litigant must assert the exceptions); Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5). 
 
46 
 
 
 
 
 
Even so, Frantz' challenge to the affidavit fails under the record before us. Even 
assuming the omission of the information was deliberate, Frantz would only be entitled to 
relief if she can show the inclusion of the omitted information negated probable cause. 
State v. Breazeale, 238 Kan. 714, 725, 714 P.2d 1356 (1986). But our review of the 
affidavit shows that even with the addition of the omitted information, the affidavit still 
establishes probable cause to arrest Frantz for first-degree premeditated murder. The 
affidavit states:  (1) Frantz and Gary were having marital problems; (2) Frantz believed 
Gary was poisoning her and she expressed a desire to get revenge by getting him sent to 
prison; (3) Frantz had recently purchased a handgun; (4) Frantz was acting strangely 
shortly before the shooting; (5) Gary was shot multiple times with a handgun; and 
(6) Gary said Frantz shot him. The totality of this information, as well as reasonable 
inferences drawn from this information, would support a reasonable belief that Frantz 
committed the first-degree premeditated murder of Gary. See Rosendahl v. Kansas Dept. 
of Revenue, 310 Kan. 474, 481, 447 P.3d 347 (2019) (defining probable cause as "'the 
reasonable belief, drawn from the totality of information and reasonable inferences 
available to the arresting officer, that the defendant has committed or is committing a 
specific crime'"). 
 
E. 
We Decline Frantz' Request to Take Judicial Notice of Certain Documents 
and Information and Her Request to Add an Exhibit to the Record 
 
 
Frantz asks this court to take judicial notice of several documents and pieces of 
information, including two witness statements given to police on the night of the 
shooting; a complaint she filed with the State Board of Examiners of Court Reporters  
alleging court reporters had altered transcripts; and several other allegations of 
professional misconduct. But none of these items are subject to judicial notice under 
K.S.A. 60-460.  
 
 
47 
 
 
 
 
Frantz also asks this court to independently request a copy of Officer Stevenson's 
body camera footage to determine if the State has altered the video provided on appeal. 
But Frantz has the burden to designate a record sufficient to establish error on appeal 
(including her claim that the State has altered evidence), and she has not done so. 
Vonachen, 312 Kan. at 460. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In sum, we hold the district court did not abuse its discretion or violate Frantz' 
Confrontation Clause rights by limiting her cross-examination of Patrick. The district 
court imposed those limits to prevent Frantz from adducing evidence which was 
inadmissible under established evidentiary rules. And the district court's limitations did 
not prevent Frantz from otherwise effectively cross-examining Patrick. We also hold that 
Frantz waived any challenge to the district court's denial of her motion for judgment of 
acquittal at the close of the State's evidence. And the State presented sufficient evidence 
to support Frantz' conviction for first-degree premeditated murder. Finally, we hold 
Frantz' supplemental briefing failed to establish any other error requiring reversal.  
 
 
Affirmed.  
 
* * * 
 
STEGALL, J., concurring:  I concur in the result, but I do so only after considering 
and rejecting the waiver rule from State v. Blue, 225 Kan. 576, 578, 592 P.2d 897 (1979). 
The majority recognizes that this rule precludes appellate review of a trial court decision 
to deny a motion for acquittal at the close of the State's case-in-chief if the defendant 
proceeds to put on evidence in his or her own defense. Often referred to as a "waiver," the 
rule is premised on the idea that on a subsequent motion for acquittal—or on appellate 
review—all the evidence against the defendant ought to be considered. See, e.g., State v. 
 
48 
 
 
 
Copes, 244 Kan. 604, 607, 772 P.2d 742 (1989) ("If the motion for acquittal is renewed 
after the close of all of the evidence, the trial court should consider all of the evidence in 
ruling upon that motion."). The majority provides a helpful string cite to numerous other 
jurisdictions that have adopted the same rule. State v. Frantz, 316 Kan. ___, ___, slip op. 
at 31-32; see, e.g., State v. Seeley, 326 Conn. 65, 71, 161 A.3d 1278 (2017) ("'The so-
called waiver rule provides that, when a motion for [a judgment of] acquittal at the close 
of the state's case is denied, a defendant may not secure appellate review of the trial 
court's ruling without [forgoing] the right to put on evidence in his or her own behalf.'"). 
 
The majority concedes the Blue waiver rule would typically apply here to preclude 
appellate review of the district court's decision to deny Frantz' motion for acquittal at the 
conclusion of the State's evidence. But due to a lack of briefing by the State, the majority 
reaches the merits on the issue anyway. Frantz, 316 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 33. 
 
More often than not, when an issue is not properly preserved for appellate review, 
we will not decide it. This is often true even when the parties don't specifically raise the 
issue of preservation. See State v. Parry, 305 Kan. 1189, 1192, 390 P.3d 879 (2017) (an 
appellate court has discretion to sua sponte reach a preservation issue not raised by either 
party). I would prefer to stick with our general practice and consider preservation issues 
even when not argued by the parties. If an issue is not properly preserved, it is not 
properly before us absent a preservation exception. And mutual agreement of the parties 
to present an unpreserved issue to this court is not—in itself—a recognized exception to 
our preservation requirements. State v. Godfrey, 301 Kan. 1041, 1043, 350 P.3d 1068 
(2015) (Exceptions to our general bar against unpreserved claims are:  "'(1) The newly 
asserted claim involves only a question of law arising on proved or admitted facts and is 
determinative of the case; (2) consideration of the claim is necessary to serve the ends of 
justice or to prevent the denial of fundamental rights; or (3) the district court is right for 
the wrong reason.'"). 
 
 
49 
 
 
 
Given this, I will consider the application of the Blue waiver rule in this case. And 
it isn't difficult to conclude the rule ought to be discarded. As the majority recites, there 
are simple fairness problems with the rule. Frantz, 316 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 32-33. For 
example, some courts have found the rule "presents a defendant whose motion to dismiss 
has been erroneously denied with a Hobson's choice:  resting and sacrificing the right to 
present a defense out of fear that his or her testimony may cure defects in the 
prosecution's case, or putting on such evidence and thereby possibly assisting the 
prosecution in proving its case." In re Anthony J., 117 Cal. App. 4th 718, 732, 11 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 865 (2004). 
 
But even more basic, the rule violates one of the most sacrosanct principles of 
American criminal law—the prohibition against being put in jeopardy twice for the same 
accusation. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796, 89 S. Ct. 2056, 23 L. Ed. 
2d 707 (1969) ("Like the right to trial by jury, [the prohibition on double jeopardy] is 
clearly 'fundamental to the American scheme of justice.'"); Green v. United States, 355 
U.S. 184, 187-88, 78 S. Ct. 221, 2 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1957) ("The underlying idea, one that is 
deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State 
with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to 
convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, 
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and 
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be 
found guilty."); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571, 97 S. Ct. 
1349, 51 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1977) ("[A]lthough the Court of Appeals may correctly have 
believed 'that the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation, . . . 
[n]evertheless, "[t]he verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed . . . without 
putting [the defendants] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution."'"); 
Green, 355 U.S. at 200 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (describing the prohibition of double 
jeopardy as an "indispensable requirement of a civilized criminal procedure"); Ex parte  
 
50 
 
 
 
Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168, 21 L. Ed. 872 (1873) ("If there is anything settled in 
the jurisprudence of England and America, it is that no man can be twice lawfully 
punished for the same offence."). 
 
Simply put, the government doesn't get two bites at the conviction apple. But this 
is exactly what the Blue rule allows. To make the point clear, consider what happens 
when a trial court does grant a motion to acquit following the State's evidence.  
 
"A judgment of acquittal . . . terminates the prosecution; and the double jeopardy clause 
of the fifth amendment bars further proceedings against the defendant for the same 
offense. If the trial court grants a motion for acquittal . . . the order is final and not 
appealable by the state. Appellate review of the decision after acquittal would constitute 
double jeopardy. [Citations omitted.]" State v. Gustin, 212 Kan. 475, 479-80, 510 P.2d 
1290 (1973).  
 
"[A]n acquittal through a directed verdict is immediate, is accorded finality, and renders 
the question of guilt no longer at issue. The defendant then stands acquitted of the offense 
to which the motion is directed and the grant has the same force and effect as the return 
of a verdict of not guilty by the trier of fact, whether it is the court or a jury." 75A Am. 
Jur. 2d Trial § 851.  
 
This is as it must be because the "'constitutional protection against double jeopardy 
unequivocally prohibits a second trial following an acquittal.'" United States v. 
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129, 101 S. Ct. 426, 66 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1980); see also 
K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-5110(a)(1) (additional prosecution "is barred" following "a 
determination that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a conviction"). 
 
So, in a hypothetical case in which the State fails to present sufficient evidence for 
a conviction, and the trial court correctly grants a motion for judgment of acquittal at the 
close of the State's evidence, the defendant may no longer be prosecuted for that alleged 
offense. But—according to the Blue waiver rule—if the trial court commits legal error 
 
51 
 
 
 
and denies the same motion, the State is free to get its second bite during the defendant's 
presentation of evidence and the defendant is prevented from seeking appellate review of 
the error. In my view, the application of this rule turns a blind judicial eye to potential 
double jeopardy violations of both the United States and Kansas Constitutions.  
 
A defendant who was legally entitled to an acquittal—even if he or she did not 
obtain that acquittal at the time it was asked for through the legal error of a judge—must 
have the same double jeopardy protections afforded an identical defendant who in fact 
did obtain a legally correct judgment of acquittal. To vindicate this double jeopardy right, 
an appellate court has an obligation to consider whether the motion for acquittal at the 
close of the State's case was denied in error. If it was, then everything that happened 
afterward—even if sufficient evidence was later presented—must nonetheless be 
disregarded as a violation of double jeopardy principles. 
 
Given this, I would use today's opportunity to abrogate the Blue waiver rule and 
reach the merits of the properly preserved question presented by Frantz—did the district 
court err when it denied Frantz' motion for acquittal after the State's case-in-chief? 
Because I agree with the way the majority opinion analyzes this question, I concur in the 
judgment.  
 
 
LUCKERT, C.J., and ROSEN, J., join the foregoing concurring opinion.