Case Title: Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11607

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-02-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11607 
 
JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 34186  vs.  SEX 
OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     November 3, 2014. - February 2, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification Act.  Jurisdiction, Sex offender.  Evidence, 
Sex offender. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
September 13, 2010. 
 
 
The case was heard by John S. McCann, J., on a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, and a motion for reconsideration was 
considered by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Jennifer K. Zalnasky for the plaintiff. 
 
John R. Puricelli for the defendant. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  After the Sex Offender Registry Board (board) 
classified the plaintiff as a sex offender, a judge in the 
Superior Court concluded that the board lacked jurisdiction over 
2 
 
the plaintiff because his conviction under art. 134, 10 U.S.C. 
§ 934 (1994), the "general" provision of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (code), was not a "like violation" sex offense 
requiring registration.  See G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178P.  The 
board appealed, and we transferred the case from the Appeals 
Court to this court.  We conclude that art. 134, although 
general in scope, assimilates the elements of underlying 
offenses and that under the circumstances here, where the 
plaintiff was convicted on specifications detailing "like 
violation" offenses, the art. 134 conviction is a sex offense 
under G. L. c. 6, § 178C.  Accordingly, we vacate the judgment 
and reinstate the board's classification of the plaintiff as a 
level two sex offender. 
 
1.  Factual background and procedural history.  We 
summarize the facts found by hearing examiners after evidentiary 
hearings, supplemented by undisputed facts from the record.  The 
plaintiff was convicted by general court martial of the 
following three specifications in violation of art. 134:  
(1) "Did . . . knowingly transport or ship in interstate 
commerce visual depictions of one or more minors, under the age 
of [eighteen] years, engaging in sexually explicit conduct, in 
violation of [18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)]"; (2) "Did . . . knowingly 
receive visual depictions of one or more minors, under the age 
of [eighteen] years, engaged in sexually explicit conduct, which 
3 
 
depictions had been shipped or transported in interstate 
commerce, in violation of [18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)]"; and (3) 
"Did . . . knowingly transport in interstate commerce for 
purposes of sale or distribution, obscene, lewd, lascivious or 
filthy pictures or images of his penis, in violation of [18 
U.S.C. § 1465]."  10 U.S.C. § 934 (1994). 
 
The charge was brought in 1999 after a "sting" operation in 
which the plaintiff, then a captain of the United States Air 
Force serving in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, sent lewd comments 
and images depicting child nudity and children in sexually 
suggestive poses to a Keene, New Hampshire, police officer.  The 
police officer was posing as a fourteen year old male in an 
Internet chat room.  The plaintiff pleaded guilty to the art. 
134 charge and to each of the underlying specifications.1  The 
plaintiff was sentenced to confinement for thirty months without 
pay or benefits and thereafter dismissed from military service. 
 
After the plaintiff's release from confinement in 2000 or 
2001,2 he moved to Massachusetts.  In 2002, the board notified 
                     
 
1 The plaintiff also pleaded guilty to a charge under art. 
133 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (code), concerning 
"conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman."  10 U.S.C. 
§ 933 (1994).  The Sex Offender Registry Board (board) only 
argues that the art. 134 conviction triggers sex offender 
registration, and therefore the art. 133 charge is not discussed 
in this decision. 
 
 
2 Although the board asserted that the plaintiff was 
released from custody in 2001, as a matter of convenience the 
4 
 
the plaintiff of his duty to register as a level two sex 
offender.  Following the plaintiff's appeal and an evidentiary 
hearing before a hearing examiner, the board upheld the 
classification.  The examiner determined that the specifications 
underlying the plaintiff's art. 134 conviction were each a "like 
violation" to sex offenses under G. L. c. 6, § 178C -- 
specifically, dissemination of child pornography, G. L. c. 272, 
§ 29B; and possession of child pornography, G. L. c. 272, § 29C.3  
The examiner further concluded that the plaintiff poses a 
moderate risk to reoffend and a moderate degree of 
dangerousness.  The plaintiff did not appeal the hearing 
examiner's decision. 
 
In July, 2009, the board sought reclassification of the 
plaintiff's status from level two to level three based on his 
arrest in April, 2009, for failure to register, enticing a child 
under the age of sixteen, and disseminating matter harmful to a 
child.  A new hearing examiner, in 2010, also concluded that the 
specifications underlying the plaintiff's art. 134 conviction 
were each a "like violation" to Massachusetts sex offenses and 
                                                                  
hearing examiners accepted the plaintiff's version of events 
that he was on parole from 2000 to 2001. 
 
 
3 The hearing examiner also determined that the 
specifications underlying the plaintiff's art. 134 conviction 
were a "like violation" to dissemination or possession of 
obscene matter, G. L. c. 272, § 29.  Because this is not an 
enumerated sex offense under G. L. c. 6, § 178C, we do not 
consider it.  See note 14, infra. 
5 
 
further concluded that the plaintiff poses a high risk to 
reoffend and a high level of dangerousness and classified him as 
a level three sex offender. 
 
The plaintiff appealed the 2010 decision, and a Superior 
Court judge reversed, ordering the plaintiff's release from the 
obligation to register as a sex offender.  The judge determined 
that the board lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiff, reasoning 
that the plaintiff's conviction under art. 134, a "non-specific" 
provision of the code, is not a "like violation" to a 
Massachusetts sex offense.4  In his analysis, the judge also 
noted that "[m]ilitary defendants in courts-martial are not 
provided the same constitutional protections as defendants in 
civilian criminal courts" and requiring the plaintiff to 
register as a sex offender would be "fundamentally unfair" where 
he was convicted only under a "non-specific" provision of the 
code. 
 
The board filed a motion to reconsider, which the judge 
denied without a hearing, and then appealed both the judgment 
and the denial of the motion for reconsideration.  On appeal, 
                     
 
4 The issue whether the plaintiff's conviction is a "like 
violation" to Massachusetts sex offenses was resolved in 2002 by 
the hearing examiner, and was not appealed by the plaintiff.  
Although judicial review of an agency's action is subject to a 
thirty-day filing limitation, we consider the merits of the 
question because the hearing examiner in 2010, on a request for 
reclassification filed by the board, reanalyzed the issue and 
incorporated the 2002 decision.  See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (1). 
6 
 
the board argues that the hearing examiners properly concluded 
that the plaintiff's military conviction is a "like violation" 
sex offense under G. L. c. 6, § 178C, and seeks reinstatement of 
the board's 2002 classification of the plaintiff as a level two 
sex offender.5 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  Judicial review 
of a board decision is governed by G. L. c. 30A, § 14, and is 
"confined to the record, except that in cases of alleged 
irregularities in procedure before the agency, not shown in the 
record, testimony thereon may be taken in the court."  G. L. 
c. 30A, § 14 (5).  See G. L. c. 6, § 178M.  A reviewing court 
will not disturb the board's decision unless that decision was 
(a) in violation of constitutional provisions; (b) in excess of 
the board's authority; (c) based on an error of law; (d) made on 
unlawful procedure; (e) unsupported by substantial evidence; (f) 
unwarranted by facts found by the judge, where the judge is 
constitutionally required to make independent findings of fact; 
or (g) arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.  G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).  
                     
 
5 The plaintiff's arrest in May, 2009, did not result in a 
conviction, and after the hearing examiner's reclassification in 
2010, the Appeals Court determined that reclassification without 
a conviction exceeds the board's statutory authority.  See Doe, 
Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 16748 vs. Sex Offender Registry 
Bd., 82 Mass. App. Ct. 152, 162 (2012).  The board therefore 
seeks the reinstatement of the level two classification instead 
of the level three classification. 
7 
 
See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 68549 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., ante 102, 108-109 (2014).  In conducting our 
review, we "give due weight to the experience, technical 
competence, and specialized knowledge" of the board.  G. L. 
c. 30A, § 14. 
 
b.  "Like violation" analysis.  The board argues that the 
judge erred in concluding that the plaintiff is not a sex 
offender as defined in G. L. c. 6, § 178C, and is not subject to 
the board's jurisdiction.  The judge found that the plaintiff's 
conviction under art. 134, a "non-specific" provision of the 
code, could not be a like violation under the elements-based 
test required by Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 151564 v. 
Sex Offender Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 612, 615 (2010) (Doe No. 
151564).6  For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the 
judge's ruling was erroneous. 
                     
 
6 The Superior Court judge also considered constitutional 
differences between military and civilian proceedings in 
analyzing whether an art. 134 conviction could be a "like 
violation" to a Massachusetts sex offense.  We do not consider 
any such differences to be material to the "like violation" 
analysis.  The United States Supreme Court has upheld the 
constitutionality of art. 134.  Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 
757-758 (1974).  The Court also has noted that Congress had the 
power under Federal laws to make sex offender registration a 
consequence of a military conviction.  United States v. 
Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2503 (2013).  The Legislature 
explicitly included convictions under military authority in the 
pool of offenses subject to sex offender registration.  See 
G. L. c. 6, § 178C.  Accordingly, we discern no constitutional 
infirmities in the analysis of an art. 134 conviction as a "like 
violation." 
8 
 
 
We begin our analysis with the statutory definition of a 
sex offender.  "A sex offender is defined as a person who has 
been convicted of any violation of Massachusetts law enumerated 
as a sex offense in the sex offender registry law, as well as 
any 'like violation of the laws of [a military authority].'"  
Doe No. 151564, supra at 615, quoting G. L. c. 6, § 178C.  This 
definition reflects a decision by the Legislature in 1999 to 
expand the "sex offender" definition to include not only the 
enumerated sex offenses under Massachusetts law and "a like 
violation of the law of another state," but also "a like 
violation of . . . the United States or a military, territorial 
or Indian tribal authority."  Compare G. L. c. 6, § 178C, as 
amended by St. 1999, c. 74, § 2, with G. L. c. 6, § 178C, 
inserted by St. 1996, c. 239, § 1.7  We first had the opportunity 
                     
 
7 The Massachusetts sex offender registry scheme was first 
enacted in 1996 in response to the Jacob Wetterling Crimes 
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 
which was enacted by Congress in 1994 to establish guidelines 
for State sex offender registration.  See G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-
178O, inserted by St. 1996, c. 239, § 1.  See also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 14071, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title XVII, § 170101, 108 Stat. 
2038 (1994) (repealed and replaced by 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901 et 
seq.) (Wetterling Act).  In 1997, Congress amended the 
Wetterling Act to extend State registration requirements to sex 
offenders convicted of a Federal offense or sentenced by a court 
martial.  Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 115(a)(2)(F), 111 Stat. 2463 
(1997).  The Legislature enacted a replacement sex offender 
registry scheme in 1999 that expanded the definition of "sex 
offender" and corrected several infirmities noted by this court 
in the prior version.  St. 1999 c. 74, §§ 1-20.  See Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 1211 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 447 
Mass. 750, 755 (2006). 
9 
 
to interpret the undefined term "like violation" in Doe No. 
151564, where we adopted an elements-based approach.  We 
determined that the applicable test is whether the "elements [of 
the foreign conviction] are the same or nearly the same as an 
offense requiring registration in Massachusetts" and explicitly 
rejected the board's argument that it could consider the conduct 
underlying a conviction in the "like violation" analysis.  Doe 
No. 151564, supra at 615, 618.  Our concern was that offenders 
have sufficient "notice and clarity about whether registration 
is required." Id. at 618. 
 
The plaintiff's argument that he is not a sex offender 
flows from our holding in Doe No. 151564, supra, requiring 
congruity between the elements of a sex offense in violation of 
the laws of another jurisdiction and a Massachusetts sex 
offense.  To support this argument, the plaintiff seizes on the 
fortuitous absence of a provision in the code criminalizing the 
nonviolent sex offenses8 underlying the art. 134 charge.  This 
argument is facially plausible because art. 134 itself is a 
general article and has no corollary to a Massachusetts sex 
                     
 
8 Congress enacted a statute in 2012 to criminalize 
nonviolent sex offenses under a specific provision, art. 120c, 
of the code.  10 U.S.C. § 920c (2012).  Article 134 may only be 
used to criminalize conduct not covered by another article of 
the code.  United States v. Kowalski, 69 M.J. 705, 706 (C.G. Ct. 
Crim. App. 2010).  Accordingly, nonviolent sex offenses are now 
prosecuted under art. 120c. 
10 
 
offense.9  As a consequence, the plaintiff argues, the 
specifications setting forth the particular provisions10 of 
Federal criminal law underlying the art. 134 charge may not be 
considered under the elements-based test in Doe No. 151564, 
supra at 615.  The board argues that the plaintiff's guilty plea 
to the general provision of art. 134 incorporates the underlying 
specifications and elements of the Federal offenses stated 
therein, which in turn are like violations of Massachusetts law. 
Resolution of the issue requires us to examine relevant 
provisions of the code for guidance in discerning the proper 
status of specifications.  As explained below, we are persuaded 
that the board's argument is more consistent with the treatment 
of convictions for nonviolent sex offenses under military law.  
See United States v. Medina, 66 M.J. 21, 22 (C.A.A.F. 2008). 
 
First, the specifications are part and parcel of the art. 
134 charge against the plaintiff.  Contrary to the plaintiff's 
contention, a court martial for a violation of art. 134 does not 
rest solely on the general terms of the article.  "In military 
                     
 
9 Article 134, the general provision, is characterized as 
"non-specific" because it serves a catchall purpose, allowing 
for prosecution of crimes and offenses that are not specifically 
provided for in a different article of the code.  10 U.S.C. 
§ 934 (2012).  At the time of the plaintiff's offenses, the code 
did not expressly criminalize the nonviolent sex offenses 
underlying the art. 134 charge. 
 
 
10 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1465, 2252(a)(1), 2252(a)(2) (1994 & 
Supp. V 1999). 
11 
 
justice, a charge consists of two parts:  the 'charge' -- 
typically, a statement of the article alleged to have been 
violated -- and the 'specification' -- the more detailed 
description of the conduct allegedly violative of the article."  
United States v. Fosler, 70 M.J. 225, 227 n.2 (C.A.A.F. 2011).  
Particularly for art. 134, which allows for prosecution of a 
broad range of conduct,11 the general language of the charge "is 
made specific through the language of a given specification."  
Fosler, supra at 229, quoting United States v. Jones, 68 M.J. 
465, 472 (C.A.A.F. 2010).  Because a prosecution may be 
initiated under art. 134 where the code does not contain a 
provision criminalizing the conduct at issue, the specifications 
also are essential in providing notice of the charge.12  
Accordingly, given the status of specifications in the scheme of 
military prosecutions under art. 134, the hearing examiners 
                     
 
11 In addition to prosecution of noncapital crimes or 
offenses, art. 134 allows for prosecution of "disorders and 
neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline" and 
conduct "of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces."  
10 U.S.C. § 934 (2012). 
 
 
12 This notice function of the specifications squares with 
our concern in Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 151564 v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 612 (2010), that the potential 
registrant have sufficient "notice and clarity about whether 
registration is required."  Id. at 618. 
12 
 
properly considered those specifications in determining whether 
the plaintiff is a sex offender under G. L. c. 6, § 178C.13 
 
Second, elements of any Federal offenses underlying an art. 
134 charge become part of the charge when they are described in 
specifications detailing a violation for "crimes and offenses 
not capital" under clause three of art. 134.  Medina, supra at 
25 ("A clause 3 offense, of course, incorporates the elements of 
the federal offense in question").  This rule applies here where 
the specifications demonstrate that the plaintiff was charged 
under art. 134's clause three, crimes and offenses noncapital.  
See United States v. Vines, 57 M.J. 519, 527 (C.A.A.F. 2002) 
("Typically, a specification drawn under clause 3 will allege 
facts essential to prove the charged offense, and a citation to 
the federal statute in question").  Accordingly, the plaintiff's 
conviction under art. 134 incorporates the elements of the 
                     
 
13 Our interpretation is consistent with other jurisdictions 
that have decided similar issues.  See Rodimel v. Cook County 
Sheriff's Office, 354 Ill. App. 3d 744, 744, 746-747 (2004) 
(holding that art. 134 conviction based on indecent assault 
"substantially equivalent" to Illinois sex offense under 
elements-based test).  See also People v. Gillotti, 23 N.Y.3d 
841 (2014) (art. 134 conviction predicated on possession of 
child pornography requires registration under New York's sex 
offender registration statute).  But see People v. Kennedy, 7 
N.Y.3d 87 (2006) (vacating sex offender status because art. 134 
conviction predicated on "indecent assault" specification that 
did not cite applicable Federal offense or list elements of 
crime did not provide sufficient detail to determine whether it 
was felony requiring registration in jurisdiction where 
conviction occurred). 
13 
 
underlying Federal offenses described in its specifications.14  
See Medina, supra.  For this reason, we conclude that the judge 
erred in his determination that the board lacked jurisdiction 
over the plaintiff.  The plaintiff's art. 134 conviction is a 
"like violation" because it incorporates elements of Federal 
offenses that were "the same or nearly the same as an offense 
requiring registration in Massachusetts."  Doe No. 151564, supra 
at 615. 
 
Last, we deal briefly with the plaintiff's argument that 
United States v. Brown, 529 F.3d 1260 (10th Cir. 2008), 
precludes consideration of the underlying specifications.  It 
does not.  In Brown, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit declined to consider the Federal offense described 
in a specification underlying an art. 134 conviction as a 
"conviction" triggering sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252A(b)(2) (2006).  Id. at 1261, 1263.  The underlying 
                     
 
14 See, e.g., G. L. c. 272, § 29B (dissemination of child 
pornography), and § 29C (purchase or possession of child 
pornography), which we assume to be congruent with the Federal 
statutes under which the plaintiff was charged, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252(a)(1), 2252(a)(2).  The plaintiff does not argue that the 
elements of the stated Federal offenses are not themselves "the 
same or nearly the same" as the elements of Massachusetts sex 
offenses, and accordingly we assume without deciding that the 
above is correct.  See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (b), as appearing in 
411 Mass. 1602 (1992).  In the 2010 decision, the hearing 
examiner also determined that 18 U.S.C. § 1465 was "respectively 
equivalent to the Massachusetts sex offense[] of . . . G. L. 
c. 272, § 29"; however, we do not assume that 18 U.S.C. § 1465 
is a "like violation" because G. L. c. 272, § 29, is not an 
enumerated Massachusetts sex offense under G. L. c. 6, § 178C. 
14 
 
specification described distributing child pornography in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2006).  Id. at 1262.  The plain 
language of the sentencing enhancement provision identified 
certain applicable convictions that could serve as sentencing 
enhancers, and art. 134 was not included; therefore, the court 
concluded that an art. 134 conviction could not be a sentencing 
enhancer.15  Id. at 1263. 
 
The question posed to the court in the Brown case is 
substantially different from the one posed here.  The sentencing 
enhancement provision required that the petitioner be 
"convicted" of certain applicable offenses.  Id.  The question 
on review in this case, however, asks only whether the elements 
of the crime or crimes underlying the conviction are 
sufficiently similar to the elements of a Massachusetts sex 
offense.  See Doe No. 151564, supra at 615.  The court in Brown 
noted that "the military court assimilated the elements of the 
crime from [18 U.S.C.] § 2252 -- a federal child pornography 
statute" -- into art. 134, but such assimilation did not create 
                     
 
15 The sentencing enhancement provision included military 
offenses under art. 120 but excluded art. 134.  The court 
determined that this was not irrational because "Congress could 
have quite rationally desired that soldiers convicted in a court 
martial for [violent sexual acts under art. 120] be punished 
more severely for later offenses" and because Congress has been 
expanding the list of permissible enhancers by increasing the 
sexual offenses punishable under art. 120, which were previously 
only punishable under art. 134.  United States v. Brown, 529 
F.3d 1260, 1266 (10th Cir. 2008). 
15 
 
a conviction of the underlying offense.  Brown, supra at 1263.  
Accordingly, Brown does not detract from our determination that 
the elements of a Federal offense underlying an art. 134 
conviction may be considered in the "like violation" analysis. 
 
4.  Conclusion.  Because the specifications are integral to 
an art. 134 charge and the elements of the underlying offenses 
are assimilated into the art. 134 charge, we conclude that the 
judge erred in ruling that the plaintiff is not a sex offender 
subject to G. L. c. 6, § 178C.  Consequently, we vacate the 
judgment and remand the case to the Superior Court for 
reinstatement of the plaintiff's level two classification. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.