Case Title: Midwest Neurosciences Associates, LLC v. Great Lakes Neurosurgical Associates, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2016AP000601

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2018-12-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
2018 WI 112 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP601 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Midwest Neurosciences Associates, LLC and 
Neurosurgery and Endovascular Associates, SC, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
Great Lakes Neurosurgical Associates, LLC and 
Yashdip Pannu, M.D., 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 379 Wis. 2d 766, 909 N.W.2d 209  
(2018 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 19, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 10, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Ozaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Paul V. Malloy 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. concurs. 
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J. dissents. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: DALLET, J. did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
defendants-respondents-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Joan M. Huffman, Paul R. Erickson, and Gutglass, 
Erickson, Bonville & Larson, S.C., Milwaukee.  There was an oral 
argument by Joan M. Huffman. 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants, there was a brief filed by 
Frank M. Gumina, Patrick M. Harvey, and Husch Blackwell LLP, 
Milwaukee.  There was an oral argument by Patrick M. Harvey.
 
 
2018 WI 112
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP601 
(L.C. No. 
2015CV324) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Midwest Neurosciences Associates, LLC and 
Neurosurgery and Endovascular Associates, SC, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Great Lakes Neurosurgical Associates, LLC and 
Yashdip Pannu, M.D., 
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 19, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished 
decision 
of 
the 
court 
of 
appeals, 
Midwest 
Neurosciences Assocs., LLC v. Great Lakes Neurosurgical Assocs., 
LLC, No. 2016AP601, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 
2017), reversing the Ozaukee County circuit court's1 non-final 
order.  The non-final order denied Midwest Neurosciences 
Associates, LLC ("Midwest") and Neurosurgery and Endovascular 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Paul V. Malloy presided. 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
2 
 
Associates S.C.'s ("NEA") motion to stay this action and compel 
arbitration pursuant to the Amended and Restated Operating 
Agreement ("Operating Agreement"), as well as the circuit 
court's granting of Yashdip Pannu, M.D. ("Dr. Pannu") and Great 
Lakes Neurosurgical Associates, LLC's ("Great Lakes") motion for 
declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that the Membership 
Interest Redemption Agreement ("Redemption Agreement") was a 
valid contract.  The court of appeals remanded to the circuit 
court with instructions to grant Midwest's motion to compel 
arbitration pursuant to the Operating Agreement.  We reverse the 
court of appeals and remand to the circuit court to determine 
whether the Redemption Agreement is enforceable.   
¶2 
The crux of the issue before us concerns the circuit 
court's role in determining the proper forum of dispute 
resolution when a subsequent contract, if enforceable, does not 
contain an arbitration clause as is present in an initial 
contract.  As a part of that analysis we consider whether a 
contract which contains a merger clause and which does not 
contain an arbitration clause can change the forum of dispute 
resolution when a prior agreement between the parties contains 
an arbitration clause.2  The parties make competing arguments 
                                                 
2 The parties disagree as to whether the Redemption 
Agreement was validly formed.  The JAMS Arbitration Rules in the 
Operating Agreement, however, require that even the issue of 
arbitrability be arbitrated.  See infra note 7.  "JAMS provides 
arbitration and mediation services worldwide," including the 
creation of rules that can be used to govern the arbitration of 
disputes 
at 
the 
parties' 
agreement. 
 
JAMS 
Comprehensive 
Arbitration Rules & Procedures Rule 1, at 1, 6 (July 1, 2014), 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
3 
 
regarding a court's role in determining the applicability of 
this arbitration provision.  They take contrary positions 
regarding whether all disputes, even arbitrability itself, must 
be submitted to arbitration.  The parties present conflicting 
views of precedent regarding the judiciary's role in deciding 
motions to compel arbitration when a subsequent contract does 
not select arbitration as the forum for dispute resolution and 
does contain a merger clause which states that the subsequent 
agreement supersedes all prior contracts.  Relatedly, the 
parties dispute whether all parties here can be compelled to 
arbitrate when arguably only one co-defendant is contractually 
required to arbitrate pursuant to the initial contract.  
¶3 
The claims in the underlying lawsuit that called upon 
the court to decide whether the dispute belonged in arbitration, 
involve whether Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu violated restrictive 
covenants 
in 
the 
Operating 
Agreement 
and 
the 
Ancillary 
Restrictive 
Covenant 
Agreement 
("Ancillary 
Restrictive 
Covenant").  The Redemption Agreement, however, does not contain 
an arbitration provision and in fact, purports to release those 
restrictive covenants.  Therefore, which contract controls is 
seminal in the first instance as to whether arbitration should 
be ordered.  Ultimately, regardless of forum, the controlling 
documents will also impact the underlying dispute itself.   
                                                                                                                                                             
https://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/ 
JAMS_comprehensive_arbitration_rules-2014.pdf. 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
4 
 
¶4 
The circuit court concluded on summary judgment that 
even though the initial agreement, here the Operating Agreement, 
required arbitration it was superseded by a later, valid and 
enforceable Redemption Agreement which did not so require the 
parties to submit to arbitration.  The court of appeals reversed 
and remanded with instructions to grant Midwest's motion to 
compel arbitration.3   
¶5 
We reverse the court of appeals and conclude that the 
fundamental principles of freedom to contract allow parties to a 
previous contract to subsequently contract for a different forum 
of dispute resolution.  Here, it is necessary that the circuit 
court initially determine whether the parties contracted to 
arbitrate.  The court's authority to order arbitration is 
dependent on the terms of a contract.  If the Redemption 
Agreement is the parties' contract, then the court lacks 
authority to order arbitration.  Thus, the court must first 
ascertain 
which 
contract 
controls 
the 
forum 
of 
dispute 
resolution.  In sum, we conclude that it is a court's duty to 
determine whether a contract calls for arbitration and when a 
dispute exists as to whether a second contract without an 
arbitration clause supersedes a first contract with such a 
                                                 
3 Presiding Judge Reilly concurred, expressing concern that 
Cirilli v. Country Insurance & Financial Servs., 2009 WI App 
167, 322 Wis. 2d 238, 776 N.W.2d 272, and Mortimore v. Merge 
Technologies Inc., 2012 WI App 109, 344 Wis. 2d 459, 824 N.W.2d 
155, erode freedom of contract and prevent parties from 
subsequently contracting out of arbitration.   
No. 
2016AP601 
 
5 
 
clause, the determination of arbitrability must be decided in 
the first instance by the circuit court rather than the 
arbitrator. 
¶6 
We also conclude, however, that the cause must be 
remanded to the circuit court, not to compel arbitration as was 
ordered by the court of appeals, but rather, because the 
parties' competing affidavits submitted in support of their 
positions on summary judgment raised genuine issues of material 
fact concerning whether the Redemption Agreement is a valid 
contract.4  Therefore, we reverse and remand to the circuit court 
for further proceedings. 
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶7 
Dr. Pannu was Great Lakes' president, 100 percent 
owner, and sole practicing physician.  Arvind Ahuja, M.D. 
("Dr. Ahuja") was the sole Member of Midwest and later the sole 
Member of NEA.  William McCullough, M.D. ("Dr. McCullough") was 
the sole Member of Metro Neurosurgical, S.C. ("Metro").  In 
2015, the three Members of Midwest were NEA, Great Lakes, and 
Metro. 
 
The 
presidents 
of 
each 
were 
also 
practicing 
neurosurgeons and had offices adjacent to St. Luke's Medical 
Center in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.  The current dispute involves 
                                                 
4 We need not weigh in on the host of issues that might 
relate to a non-signatory being bound by an arbitration 
agreement, such as (1) assumption, (2) agency, (3) estoppel, (4) 
veil piercing, and (5) incorporation by reference.  Zurich Am. 
Ins. Co. v. Watts Indus., Inc., 417 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 
2005). 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
6 
 
only Drs. Pannu and Ahuja and the applicability of an 
arbitration provision from a contract entered into a decade 
previous.   
¶8 
Specifically, on August 1, 2005, the parties at issue 
executed an Operating Agreement which modified a previous 
operating agreement of August, 2002 so to admit, among others, 
Dr. Pannu to Midwest.5  Dr. Pannu executed the Operating 
Agreement as President of Great Lakes and also signed a personal 
guaranty for the obligations of Great Lakes.  The Operating 
Agreement contains the arbitration clause at issue.   
¶9 
The Operating Agreement created rights, obligations, 
and restrictions for the Members of Midwest and the physicians 
that worked for the Members.  The document includes various 
other provisions.  For example, the Operating Agreement controls 
how Midwest was to be managed and operated.  For instance, 
subsection 1.2(a) dictates that Midwest shall have a registered 
office and subsection 5.5(b) grants Midwest's president the 
power to unilaterally terminate Members.   
¶10 Section 8.5 of the Operating Agreement grants Members 
the right to voluntarily withdraw from Midwest.  Under Section 
8.5, a Member could withdraw from Midwest by "giving written 
                                                 
5 Midwest's primary purpose was to assist its Members, who 
employed 
physicians, 
in 
"the 
operation 
of 
their 
medical 
practices." 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
7 
 
notice to [Midwest] at least ninety (90) days before the stated 
effective date of the withdrawal."6 
¶11 Section 13.3 dictates that the "Operating Agreement 
shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws 
of the State of Wisconsin without regard to its choice of law 
provisions." 
¶12 Section 13.1 of the Operating Agreement provides: 
Amendments to Operating Agreement.  No Amendment 
or modification of this Operating Agreement shall be 
valid unless in writing and signed by all of the 
Members.  Unless otherwise provided in such an 
amendment or modification, this Operating Agreement 
shall be considered to be amended only to the minimal 
extent necessary to give effect to this Operating 
Agreement, and the other terms and conditions of this 
Operating Agreement shall continue to apply with full 
force and effect.  
¶13 Section 13.7 of the Operating Agreement is entitled 
"Arbitration," and states, in pertinent part: 
Arbitration. . . . [T]he 
parties 
hereto 
agree 
to 
resolve any and all disputes arising with respect to 
the terms and conditions of this Operating Agreement 
hereby by arbitration . . . .  The arbitration shall 
be governed by the laws of the State of Wisconsin, 
this Operating Agreement and JAMS' Arbitration Rules[7] 
to the extent not inconsistent with the foregoing. 
                                                 
6 The provision of notice under Section 8.5 was subject to 
the provisions of Section 13.8, which provided that the notice 
was "valid only if in writing and upon actual receipt by the 
intended recipient of the notice."  This provision factors into 
the arguments about the Redemption Agreement's enforceability. 
7 JAMS Arbitration Rule 11, "Interpretation of Rules and 
Jurisdictional Challenges," in relevant part, provides: 
(b)  Jurisdictional and arbitrability disputes, 
including disputes over the formation, existence, 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
8 
 
¶14 Section 8.13 contains a "Covenant Not to Compete," 
which details, among other things, a restriction that the 
doctors practice in their specialty for a designated period of 
time, in a specified area, and at particular facilities.8  On 
March 6, 2006, Dr. Pannu personally signed the Ancillary 
Restrictive Covenant containing similar terms to Section 8.13 of 
the Operating Agreement.  The Ancillary Restrictive Covenant, 
however, did not specifically incorporate by reference Section 
13.7, the arbitration section, of the Operating Agreement.   
¶15 Nearly ten years later, in 2015, Great Lakes and NEA 
were two of three remaining Members of Midwest.  On February 13, 
2015, the Members unanimously voted to dissolve Midwest as of 
March 31, 2015.  One doctor relocated out of state and is not 
part of this lawsuit.9  Dr. Ahuja, who had no hospital privileges 
in the Milwaukee area, had previously announced his intention to 
vacate his practice from the offices.   
                                                                                                                                                             
validity, interpretation or scope of the agreement 
under which Arbitration is sought, and who are proper 
Parties to the Arbitration, shall be submitted to and 
ruled on by the Arbitrator.  The Arbitrator has the 
authority to determine jurisdiction and arbitrability 
issues as a preliminary matter. 
JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures Rule 11(b), 
supra note 2, at 14. 
8 The underlying litigation in this case claims that Great 
Lakes and Dr. Pannu violated non-compete restrictive covenants. 
9 Dr. McCullough moved to Texas and vacated the offices. 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
9 
 
¶16 On March 16, 2015, the Members restructured the 
dissolution process such that NEA would buy out the Members' 
interests in Midwest.  Great Lakes would vacate the premises no 
later than May 15, 2015.  Great Lakes, however, was subject to 
the non-compete provisions of the Operating Agreement.  After 
discussing the logistics of how the purchases would work, the 
Members unanimously voted to rescind the vote to dissolve 
Midwest.10  
¶17 On March 30, 2015, Midwest's attorney sent an e-mail 
to 
Dr. Pannu, 
Dr. Ahuja, 
and 
Great 
Lakes' 
and 
Midwest's 
accountants attaching a "proposed [Redemption Agreement] and 
[an] Assignment Agreement" which concerned, in part, the release 
of the non-compete provision with Midwest.  The recipients of 
the e-mail were instructed to ask any questions at their 
"earliest opportunity" because "we intend to exchange funds and 
sign documents tomorrow."  On March 31, 2015, in response to a 
suggestion from Great Lakes' accountant, Midwest's attorney 
added one paragraph to the Redemption Agreement and confirmed 
                                                 
10 NEA's offer to buy the other Members' interests came in 
response to the Members being advised that there were unforeseen 
difficulties with winding down Midwest related to expenses and 
lease obligations.  Prior to voting, the Members had a lengthy 
discussion regarding retirement plans and lease obligations.  
With respect to the retirement plans, it was determined that 
actuarial calculations would be done to determine how much 
Dr. Pannu and Dr. McCullough would pay.  In addition, it was 
agreed that Midwest's accountant would calculate the projected 
wind-down expense budget for Midwest and that Dr. Pannu and 
Dr. McCullough would pay their projected wind-down expenses 
based on that budget.  
No. 
2016AP601 
 
10 
 
that his assistant had sent the "the final agreement."  The e-
mail also contained the following instructions: "Please sign and 
deliver per my earlier email."11  
¶18 On the same day, Dr. Pannu executed the Redemption 
Agreement 
and 
the 
accompanying 
Assignment 
Agreement12 
and 
delivered them to Midwest's attorney.  The Redemption Agreement 
distinguishes Great Lakes from Dr. Pannu as "Pannu" and 
"Y. Pannu," respectively, and also notes that it is Great Lakes, 
"Pannu", that holds a one-third membership interest in Midwest. 
¶19 The Redemption Agreement outlines Great Lakes and 
Midwest's desire to "set forth the terms upon which [Great 
Lakes] will sell and [Midwest] will redeem [Great Lakes'] entire 
Membership Interest" in Midwest.  For instance, the Redemption 
Agreement indicates that Great Lakes "desires to voluntarily 
surrender [Great Lakes'] membership in [Midwest] effective 
March 31, 2015, pursuant to Section 8.5 of the Operating 
                                                 
11 Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu assert that Midwest's attorney 
was acting as both Midwest's and NEA's attorney when he 
circulated the Redemption Agreement.  They allege that this does 
not create a conflict of interest because Dr. Ahuja cannot 
approve the transaction with respect to Midwest, while rejecting 
the same transaction with respect to NEA.  Midwest and NEA, 
however, allege that if Midwest's attorney "was representing 
Midwest, he could not also represent NEA" because Great Lakes 
was still a Member of Midwest.  It is not necessary for us to 
answer this disagreement. 
12 The Assignment Agreement states that, as of March 31, 
2015, 
Great 
Lakes 
"transfer[red] 
and 
assign[ed] 
to 
[Midwest] . . . all of [Great Lakes'] right, title and interest 
in and to the Membership Interests."   
No. 
2016AP601 
 
11 
 
Agreement," and Section 2 of the Redemption Agreement dictates 
that Great Lakes "shall sell, assign and transfer to [Midwest], 
free 
and 
clear 
of 
all 
liens, 
claims, 
agreements 
and 
encumbrances, and [Midwest] shall purchase and acquire from 
[Great Lakes], the entire Membership Interest."  The Redemption 
Agreement 
outlines 
the 
purchase 
price 
for 
Great 
Lakes' 
membership interest and specifically identified and allocated to 
Great Lakes the amount that it was required to pay to Midwest 
for its share of the costs associated with winding down Midwest, 
as well as requiring Great Lakes to pay a set amount relating to 
retirement plans.  The Redemption Agreement also establishes 
that Great Lakes must "fully vacate" its office suite by 
April 30, 2015. 
¶20 Section 6 of the Redemption Agreement is entitled, 
"Mutual Release," and provides: 
[Midwest] Releasees [, defined as "[Midwest] and each 
of [Midwest's] Members and the Members' shareholders, 
members, 
owners, 
successors, 
assigns, 
agents, 
directors, 
officers, 
employees, 
representatives, 
attorneys, heirs, executors and administrators of such 
of the foregoing as are natural persons, and all 
persons acting by, through, under or in concert with 
any of the foregoing,] hereby jointly and severally, 
irrevocably and unconditionally release, acquit and 
forever discharge [Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu] and each 
of 
[Great 
Lakes'] 
shareholders, 
members, 
owners, 
successors, 
assigns, 
agents, 
directors, 
officers, 
employees, 
representatives, 
attorneys, 
heirs, 
executors and administrators of such of the foregoing 
as are natural persons, and all persons acting by, 
through, under or in concert with any of the foregoing 
(collectively, "Pannu Releasees"), or any of them, 
from 
any 
and 
all 
Claims[, 
defined 
as 
charges, 
complaints, 
claims, 
liabilities, 
obligations, 
promises, agreements, controversies, damages, actions, 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
12 
 
causes of action, suits, rights, demands, costs, 
losses, debts and expenses (including attorneys' fees 
and costs actually incurred), known and unknown, of 
any nature whatsoever, including without limitation, 
any 
and 
all 
claims 
under 
the 
Expense 
Sharing 
Agreement, the Operating Agreement, and any and all 
other claims, whether at common law, in contract or 
tort,] which [Midwest] Releasees now have or claim to 
have 
or 
which 
[Midwest] 
Releasees 
at 
any 
time 
heretofore had or claimed to have or which [Midwest] 
Releasees at any time hereafter may have or claim to 
have for any claims arising or accruing to the date 
hereof against each or any of the Pannu Releasees, 
other than for a breach of this Agreement.  (Emphases 
added.)  
¶21 Section 7 of the Redemption Agreement, "Release of 
Non-Compete Restrictions," states: "[Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu] 
are currently subject to non-compete restrictions contained in 
the Operating Agreement and in the [Ancillary Restrictive 
Covenant].  In consideration for the terms of this Agreement, 
[Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu's] restrictions against competition 
are hereby released and made void."  
¶22 Section 10.3 of the Redemption Agreement, "Applicable 
Law," does not reference arbitration, nor does an arbitration 
clause exist elsewhere in the Redemption Agreement.  Section 
10.3 reads: "All questions concerning the construction, validity 
and interpretation of this Agreement and the performance of the 
obligations imposed by this Agreement shall be governed by the 
internal law, not the law of conflicts, of the State of 
Wisconsin." 
¶23 According to Dr. Pannu's affidavit, he and Great Lakes 
had performed all of their obligations under the Redemption 
Agreement other than moving out of their office by April 8, 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
13 
 
2015.  For instance, Dr. Pannu said he delivered a check for 
Great Lakes' share of the wind-down expenses to Midwest's 
attorney and hand-delivered a check for Great Lakes' retirement 
plan contributions to Midwest's accounting firm.  It is 
undisputed that one of Great Lakes' checks was cashed.13 
¶24 On April 8, 2015, Dr. Pannu attempted to get a copy of 
the Redemption Agreement as signed by Dr. Ahuja.  Initially, 
Dr. Pannu exchanged text messages with Dr. Ahuja: 
 
Dr. Pannu: 
Hi 
Can u get me a copy of the  
[Redemption Agreement] signed by you 
Thx 
 
Dr. Ahuja:  
Will work on it when I am back 
? Anything up 
 
Dr. Pannu:  
No 
Attorney wants it 
So it is clean 
 
Dr. Ahuja:  
Yea and it appears not going to 
let us out of lease 
But I will take care of it 
 
Dr. Pannu:  
Ok 
 
Dr. Ahuja:  
? Who is your lawyer thx 
 
Dr. Pannu:  
[Lawyer's name]14 
                                                 
13 According to Dr. Ahuja's affidavit, the check was cashed 
in error by a clerical employee and a cashier's check in the 
same amount was sent to Dr. Pannu once the error was discovered. 
14 The attorney that Dr. Pannu named clarified on the record 
at a motion hearing on December 17, 2015, that he "was not 
involved in this" prior to April 8, 2015, and had not been 
"copied on anything . . . prior to that."  
No. 
2016AP601 
 
14 
 
 
Dr. Ahuja:  
K great  
¶25 Further, within ten minutes of sending the initial 
text message, Dr. Pannu sent an e-mail to Midwest's attorney, 
and carbon copied Dr. Ahuja and Midwest's and Great Lakes' 
accountants, asking Midwest's attorney to "let [him] know when 
you get a signed copy of the agreement from [Dr. Ahuja]."  
Midwest's attorney responded that he would meet with Dr. Ahuja 
to get his signature "[a]s soon as all of the documentation is 
accounted for."15  
¶26 According to Dr. Ahuja's affidavit, he (and thus 
Midwest and NEA) never agreed to the terms of the Redemption 
Agreement.  Initially, Dr. Ahuja said he never instructed 
Midwest's attorney to include a complete release of Great Lakes' 
or 
Dr. Pannu's 
non-compete 
obligations 
in 
the 
Redemption 
Agreement and that Dr. Ahuja in fact disagreed with releasing 
the restrictions.  Further, Dr. Ahuja stated that during an 
April 20, 2015 phone call with Dr. Pannu, he told Dr. Pannu that 
he was still reviewing the Redemption Agreement.  Moreover, 
Dr. Ahuja stated that once he had more thoroughly reviewed the 
Redemption Agreement, he determined he was not willing to sign 
it. 
                                                 
15 In the e-mail, Midwest's attorney stated that they were 
waiting 
on 
retirement 
plan 
documents 
from 
Great 
Lakes.  
According to Dr. Pannu's affidavit, Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu 
had already provided the requested documents to Midwest's 
accountant. 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
15 
 
¶27 On April 30, 2015, Great Lakes vacated the office and 
moved into different office space in the same facility that was 
shared with a physician unaffiliated with Midwest.16 
¶28 In May of 2015, Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu were advised 
that Midwest and NEA considered the Redemption Agreement to be a 
mere proposal that was subsequently rejected by Midwest and NEA. 
Thus, Midwest and NEA alleged that Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu 
were violating the non-compete covenants in the Operating 
Agreement and the Ancillary Restrictive Covenant.   
¶29 On July 1, 2015, Dr. Ahuja, on behalf of Midwest, sent 
a letter to Dr. Pannu informing him that Great Lakes' membership 
status in Midwest was being terminated effective immediately 
pursuant to Section 5.5(b) of the Operating Agreement.  The 
letter also demanded that Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu comply with 
the non-compete restrictions in the Operating Agreement and the 
Ancillary Restrictive Covenant.  
 
II.  PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶30 On September 2, 2015, Midwest and NEA filed a 
complaint against Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu alleging that Great 
Lakes and Dr. Pannu breached the non-compete covenants of the 
                                                 
16 Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu subsequently moved back into 
their old office that was shared with Midwest from June of 2015 
to January of 2016, but moved out once more in January of 2016.   
No. 
2016AP601 
 
16 
 
2005 Operating Agreement and the 2006 Ancillary Restrictive 
Covenant.17   
¶31 Before a responsive pleading was filed, Midwest and 
NEA moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration in 
accordance with Section 13.7 of the Operating Agreement.  
Midwest and NEA argued that the Operating Agreement was the 
governing contract between the parties and that Section 13.7 
within that agreement unambiguously required the parties to 
arbitrate violations of Section 8.13 of the Operating Agreement 
and the Ancillary Restrictive Covenant.  Midwest and NEA argued 
that the Operating Agreement governed because there was never a 
meeting of the minds on the Redemption Agreement, as well as the 
fact that the Redemption Agreement was never signed by all of 
the parties which was required to amend the Operating Agreement 
per Section 13.1.  Further, Midwest and NEA argued that any 
challenge to the validity of the Operating Agreement must be 
decided by an arbitrator, not the circuit court.   
¶32 On October 6, 2015, Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu filed an 
answer containing affirmative defenses and counterclaims,18 as 
                                                 
17 On February 29, 2016, Midwest and NEA filed an amended 
complaint, reiterating the causes of action in the initial 
complaint and pleading additional causes of action against Great 
Lakes and Dr. Pannu related to Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu's 
payment of rent to Midwest, as well as Great Lakes and 
Dr. Pannu's alleged tortious interference with Midwest and NEA's 
prospective and current contractual relationships.   
18 On February 29, 2016, Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu filed an 
amended counterclaim.  On April 15, 2016, Great Lakes and 
Dr. Pannu 
filed 
an 
amended 
answer 
containing 
affirmative 
defenses and counterclaims. 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
17 
 
well as a motion for declaratory judgment seeking, among other 
things, an order declaring that the Redemption Agreement was a 
valid contract.  They contended that as of March 31, 2015, the 
Operating Agreement and the non-compete provisions of the 
Ancillary Restrictive Covenant were invalid, unenforceable, 
and/or inapplicable to Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu.  Great Lakes 
and Dr. Pannu argued that the Redemption Agreement is binding 
and released them from the non-compete restrictions in the 
Operating Agreement and the Ancillary Restrictive Covenant.  
They argued that the Redemption Agreement was binding because 
Midwest 
and 
NEA 
manifested 
their 
intention 
to 
sign 
the 
Redemption Agreement and reaffirmed their intention by allowing 
Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu to fully perform the obligations 
therein.  Accordingly, the motion further sought an order 
declaring that Midwest and NEA are not entitled to arbitration.  
In subsequent responses, Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu argued that 
the circuit court must decide whether the Redemption Agreement 
is enforceable and that, at best, it is premature to compel 
arbitration because the merits of the case hinge entirely on the 
enforceability of the Redemption Agreement, which contains no 
arbitration clause and in fact, fully releases them from the 
claims asserted.  The parties filed briefs and affidavits in 
support of their respective positions.   
¶33 On December 17, 2015, the circuit court held a hearing 
on both motions.  Initially, the circuit court stated that the 
motion for declaratory judgment was "similar to a summary 
judgment motion" and that "maybe there[ are] some" factual 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
18 
 
disputes.  Nonetheless, the court found that Dr. Ahuja, through 
Midwest's attorney, made an offer that he intended to be bound 
by when the e-mail containing the "final agreement" was sent.  
Further, the circuit court noted that Dr. Pannu accepted the 
offer when he signed the Redemption Agreement and returned it 
with the check that was subsequently cashed.  Moreover, the 
circuit court held that the "minor problems" after March 31, 
2015, or Dr. Ahuja's "ambiguous" text message to Dr. Pannu on 
April 8, 2015, that a reasonable person could view as saying 
"I'm questioning the agreement," do not change the analysis 
because the Redemption Agreement was already a "done deal" and 
the "horse was kind of out of the barn and you can't put it 
back."  The circuit court granted Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu's 
motion and concluded that the Redemption Agreement was an 
enforceable contract and thus, that Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu 
were not restricted by the covenants not to compete in either 
the Operating Agreement or the Ancillary Restrictive Covenant. 
¶34 On March 16, 2016, the circuit court issued a written 
order granting Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu's motion and declaring 
that the Redemption Agreement was a valid contract.  The court 
determined that as of March 31, 2015, the Operating Agreement 
and the non-compete provisions of the Ancillary Restrictive 
Covenant were invalid, unenforceable and/or inapplicable to 
Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu.  The order also denied Midwest and 
NEA's motion to stay the action and compel arbitration. 
¶35 On March 23, 2016, Midwest and NEA petitioned for 
leave to appeal the circuit court's March 16 order, which the 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
19 
 
court of appeals granted.  On December 20, 2017, the court of 
appeals issued its decision concluding that the "determinative 
question is whether the circuit court erred by not ordering the 
parties to submit their dispute to arbitration."  Midwest 
Neurosciences, No. 2016AP601, ¶8.  The court of appeals held 
"that the question of whether the arbitration clause was 
superseded should have been submitted to arbitration."  Id., ¶2.  
As such, the court of appeals declined to address the multiple 
other issues that Midwest and NEA raised on appeal and reversed 
and remanded, instructing the circuit court to grant Midwest and 
NEA's motion to compel arbitration.  Id., ¶¶2, 8, 23. 
¶36 On February 5, 2018, Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu 
petitioned this court for review.  On May 18, 2018, we granted 
the petition.  We now reverse and remand the cause for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶37 This case comes to us on summary judgment.19  "We 
review summary judgment rulings independently, applying the 
                                                 
19 The circuit court understood Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu's 
motion for declaratory judgment to be "similar to a summary 
judgment motion" and applied the summary judgment methodology.  
Thus, while the motion was entitled a motion for declaratory 
judgment, it was actually a motion for summary judgment.  See 
WEA Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Krisik, 2013 WI App 139, ¶¶1, 4 
n.2, 8, 352 Wis. 2d 73, 841 N.W.2d 290 (reviewing a motion for 
declaratory judgment as a summary judgment motion because the 
circuit court understood the motion to "in essence [] be a 
motion for summary judgment and applied the summary judgment 
methodology"). 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
20 
 
well-established standards set forth in Wis. Stat. § 802.08 
[(2015-16)]." 20  Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2012 WI 20, 
¶20, 338 Wis. 2d 761, 809 N.W.2d 2d 529.  Thus, we independently 
review whether the circuit court correctly granted summary 
judgment to Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu.  Tatera v. FMC Corp., 
2010 WI 90, ¶15, 328 Wis. 2d 320, 786 N.W.2d 810 (citing Racine 
Cty. v. Oracular Milwaukee, Inc., 2010 WI 25, ¶24, 323 
Wis. 2d 682, 781 N.W.2d 88).  Summary judgment "shall be 
rendered 
if 
the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  Id.; § 802.08(2). 
¶38 "[A] petition to compel arbitration involves contract 
interpretation, which is a question of law that we review de 
novo."  First Weber Grp., Inc. v. Synergy Real Estate Grp., LLC, 
2015 WI 34, ¶20, 361 Wis. 2d 496, 860 N.W.2d 498.  Thus, 
"determination[s] 
of 
substantive 
arbitrability . . . [are] 
questions of law we review de novo."  Cirilli v. Country Ins. & 
Fin. Servs., 2009 WI App 167, ¶10, 322 Wis. 2d 238, 776 
N.W.2d 272.  Similarly, issues of contract interpretation are 
reviewed de novo.  Mortimore v. Merge Technologies Inc., 2012 WI 
App 109, ¶13, 344 Wis. 2d 459, 824 N.W.2d 155. 
                                                 
20 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
21 
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Fundamental Principles 
1.  Freedom to contract and laws governing arbitration 
¶39 "Freedom of contract is based on the idea that 
individuals should have the power to govern their own affairs 
without interference."  Solowicz v. Forward Geneva Nat'l, LLC, 
2010 WI 20, ¶34, 323 Wis. 2d 556, 780 N.W.2d 111.  As such, "if 
there is one thing which more than another public policy 
requires it is that [individuals] of full age and competent 
understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and 
that their contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, 
shall be held sacred, and shall be enforced by courts of 
justice."  Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 212 n.5, 321 
N.W.2d 173 (1982) (quoting Balt. & Ohio Sw. Ry. Co. v. Voigt, 
176 U.S. 498, 505 (1900)).  Thus, Wisconsin courts have 
generally sought "to enforce contracts deliberately made by the 
parties rather than set them aside."  Baierl v. McTaggart, 2001 
WI 107, ¶12, 245 Wis. 2d 632, 629 N.W.2d 277. 
¶40 Arbitration agreements are "a matter of contract."  
Joint Sch. Dist. No. 10 v. Jefferson Educ. Ass'n, 78 Wis. 2d 94, 
101, 253 N.W.2d 536 (1977) (quoting United Steelworkers v. 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)); First 
Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).  As 
such, "[a]rbitrators derive their authority only from the 
parties' advance agreement that they will submit such grievances 
to arbitration" and thus, parties cannot be "required to submit 
any dispute to arbitration unless [they have] agreed to do so."  
No. 
2016AP601 
 
22 
 
Kimberly Area Sch. Dist. v. Zdanovec, 222 Wis. 2d 27, 39, 586 
N.W.2d 41 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. 
Commc'ns Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1986)).  
Parties may contract broadly and agree to arbitrate, even the 
issue of arbitrability.  Mortimore, 344 Wis. 2d 459, ¶¶15, 20.   
¶41 Wisconsin law recognizes the need to defer to the 
parties' agreement to arbitrate and the "policy of encouraging 
arbitration as an alternative to litigation."  First Weber Grp., 
361 Wis. 2d 496, ¶24.  When parties agree to arbitration, a 
court's role is limited because a different forum of dispute 
resolution 
has 
been 
selected. 
 
In 
fact, 
the 
Wisconsin 
legislature has codified the limited role of the court.  See 
Wis. Stat. ch. 788.  In Mortimore, the court of appeals 
explained that when the parties have contracted to arbitrate, 
the court's "function is limited to a determination of whether: 
(1) there is a construction of the arbitration clause that would 
cover the grievance on its face and (2) whether any other 
provision of the contract specifically excludes it."  Mortimore, 
344 Wis. 2d 459, ¶16. 
¶42 Wisconsin's "policy of encouraging arbitration as an 
alternative 
to 
litigation," 
see 
First 
Weber 
Grp., 
361 
Wis. 2d 496, ¶24, however, is not limitless.  Even Midwest 
acknowledges that courts typically decide the initial issue of 
arbitrability.  "[A]rbitrators cannot determine whether they 
have the authority to decide arbitrability unless the parties 
give arbitrators such authority."  Kimberly Area Sch. Dist., 222 
Wis. 2d at 39-40; see generally Joint Sch. Dist. No. 10, 78 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
23 
 
Wis. 2d at 110 (stating that "parties may submit arbitrability 
to an arbitrator").  "[T]he evidence of this grant [of 
authority] must be 'clear and unmistakable,'" otherwise, "the 
question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be 
decided by the court, not the arbitrator."  Kimberly Area Sch. 
Dist., 222 Wis. 2d at 39-40; see also Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 944-45 
("silence 
or 
ambiguity" 
affects 
the 
presumption 
of 
arbitrability). 
¶43 Consequently, only those disputes that the parties 
have agreed to so submit to arbitration are relegated to proceed 
in that forum.  Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 
U.S. 287, 299 (2010).  A court should order arbitration "only 
where the court is satisfied that neither the formation of the 
parties' arbitration agreement nor (absent a valid provision 
specifically committing such disputes to an arbitrator) its 
enforceability or applicability to the dispute is in issue."  
Id. at 299; id. at 300 (stating all of the United States Supreme 
Court's opinions compelling arbitration did so only "after the 
Court was persuaded that the parties' arbitration agreement was 
validly formed and that it covered the dispute in question and 
was legally enforceable").   
¶44 In Granite Rock Co., the Court clarified that "[t]he 
test for arbitrability remains whether the parties consented to 
arbitrate the dispute in question."  Id. at 304 n.11.  Thus, in 
Granite Rock Co., the Court concluded that judicial resolution 
was required "to determine whether the parties consented to 
arbitrate the matters covered by the [arbitration] demand."  Id. 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
24 
 
at 303 n.9 & 304 (referencing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 n.1 (2006)).  This rule stems from 
the 
"principle 
that 
underscores 
all 
of 
our 
arbitration 
decisions: Arbitration is strictly 'a matter of consent,' and 
thus 'is a way to resolve those disputes——but only those 
disputes——that 
the 
parties 
have 
agreed 
to 
submit 
to 
arbitration.'"  Id. at 299 (citation omitted). 
¶45 In answering both who determines arbitrability and 
what is subject to arbitration, Wisconsin courts apply state-law 
contract principles and chapter 788.  Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 944.  
Utilization of the Wisconsin contract principles requires 
"courts to place arbitration agreements 'on equal footing with 
all other contracts.'"  Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P'ship v. 
Clark, 581 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1424, 1426 (2017).  
Accordingly, "[a] court may invalidate an arbitration agreement 
based on 'generally applicable contract defenses' like fraud or 
unconscionability, but not on legal rules that 'apply only to 
arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an 
agreement to arbitrate is at issue.'"  Id. at 1426.   
¶46 Chapter 788 of the Wisconsin Statutes is also referred 
to as the "Wisconsin Arbitration Act" and limits a court's role 
with respect to issues concerning arbitration.  A court, 
however, must still, when called upon to do so, determine in the 
first instance whether the parties agreed to arbitrate.  Then it 
becomes a court's duty to determine whether a contract calls for 
arbitration and when a dispute exists as to whether a second 
contract without an arbitration clause supersedes a first 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
25 
 
contract with such a clause, the determination of arbitrability 
must be decided in the first instance by the circuit court 
rather than the arbitrator. 
¶47 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 788.01, 
entitled 
"Arbitration 
clauses in contracts enforceable," provides that a written 
arbitration 
agreement 
"shall 
be 
valid, 
irrevocable 
and 
enforceable except upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract" (emphasis added).  As 
a result, it is a court's duty to determine whether a contract 
calls for arbitration.  Another contract that clearly and 
expressly supersedes a first contract is "grounds as exist at 
law or in equity for the revocation of a contract."  
¶48 Wisconsin Stat. § 788.02 informs when a court must 
stay proceedings to permit arbitration, as follows:  
If any suit or proceeding be brought upon any issue 
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing 
for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is 
pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved 
in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration 
under such an agreement, shall on application of one 
of the parties stay the trial of the action until such 
arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms 
of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay 
is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration. 
Section 788.03 directs how a court ordering arbitration is to 
proceed and states in part as follows: 
The party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect or 
refusal 
of 
another 
to 
perform 
under 
a 
written 
agreement for arbitration may petition any court of 
record having jurisdiction of the parties or of the 
property for an order directing that such arbitration 
proceed as provided for in such agreement. . . . The 
court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
26 
 
that the making of the agreement for arbitration or 
the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the 
court shall make an order directing the parties to 
proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of 
the agreement. 
Wis. Stat. § 788.03. 
¶49 The 
court 
may, 
after 
arbitration, 
vacate 
an 
arbitrator's award or order a rehearing by the arbitrator, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 788.10.  In addition, the court may, 
after arbitration, modify an arbitrator's award pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 788.11.  Finally, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 788.12, a 
circuit court may enter judgment "[u]pon the granting of an 
order 
confirming, 
modifying 
or 
correcting 
an 
award," 
in 
conformity therewith. 
¶50 Thus, when parties have contracted for arbitration as 
the forum for dispute resolution, a court's role is limited.  In 
this case, however, the court must first ascertain whether the 
controlling contract calls for arbitration. Thus, we are 
presented with the question of the court's role when the parties 
once contracted to arbitrate, but the court is presented with a 
later written contract that does not contain an arbitration 
clause.  Fundamental principles clearly militate in favor of the 
ability to freely contract, even if that changes the forum of 
dispute resolution.  Which contract controls is seminal to a 
determination of whether arbitration must be ordered. 
 
2.  The contracts at issue 
¶51 The contracts at issue require closer examination 
because whether the parties entered into the later contract 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
27 
 
controls initially the court's determination regarding the 
proper forum of dispute resolution, but also later may impact 
the underlying dispute.  If the Redemption Agreement is 
enforceable, its terms do not choose arbitration as the forum 
for dispute resolution.  If it is not, the matter must proceed 
according 
to 
the 
Operating 
Agreement 
and 
the 
Ancillary 
Restrictive Covenant.  Thus, it is the court that must first 
determine whether a valid contract requires arbitration.  The 
dispute regarding the Redemption Agreement presents "such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of" the 
Operating Agreement and Ancillary Restrictive Covenant.  Wis. 
Stat. § 788.01.  Before an action can be stayed to permit 
arbitration, the court must be "satisfied that the issue 
involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration 
under such an agreement."  Wis. Stat. § 788.02.  Before the 
court can order arbitration, the court must be "satisfied that 
the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to 
comply therewith is not in issue."  Wis. Stat. § 788.03. 
¶52 Initially in 2005, the parties entered into an 
Operating Agreement which "memorialize[d] certain amendments and 
modifications to the Operating Agreement of [Midwest] dated 
August 1, 2002."  This Operating Agreement changed the 2002 
contract to admit new Members but it clearly provided for 
arbitration in Section 13.7.  The Operating Agreement contained 
a restrictive covenant between Great Lakes and Midwest in 
Section 8.13.  Dr. Pannu and Midwest separately entered into an 
Ancillary Restrictive Covenant a year later.  Then about ten 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
28 
 
years later, in 2015, the dynamic and composition of the group 
changed and the parties purportedly entered into a Redemption 
Agreement, which contains a mutual release and indemnification 
as a part of winding down the business, provides for the 
surrender of Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu's membership in Midwest, 
and releases Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu from the 2005 and 2006 
restrictive covenants.  The Redemption Agreement specifically 
supersedes 
"all 
prior 
agreements, 
promises, 
covenants, 
arrangements, communications, representations or warranties, 
whether oral or written" in its merger clause.  
¶53 A 
determination 
as 
to 
whether 
the 
issue 
of 
arbitrability is to be submitted to the arbitrator is examined 
in light of the pertinent contract.  In order to determine 
whether the parties have always and forever agreed to arbitrate 
arbitrability by virtue of the JAMS Arbitration Rules in the 
Operating 
Agreement 
from 
2005, 
as 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded, 
we 
must 
further 
examine 
the 
language 
of 
the 
contracts.  "[N]o party can be compelled to arbitrate a matter 
which he or she has not agreed to submit to arbitration."  
Mortimore, 
344 
Wis. 2d 459, 
¶15 
(citing 
Cirilli, 
322 
Wis. 2d 238, ¶12); see also Wis. Stat. ch. 788.   
¶54 While a court's role is limited, courts are indeed 
called 
upon 
to 
determine 
whether 
a 
contract 
calls 
for 
arbitration.  Wis. Stat. §§ 788.01, 788.02, 788.03.  Only then, 
if the forum chosen by the contract is arbitration, will the 
presumption of arbitrability control the dispute.  Granite Rock 
Co., 561 U.S. at 301.  Here, serious questions exist as to 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
29 
 
whether the Operating Agreement still controls the issue of 
arbitrability, whether the Redemption Agreement supersedes that 
agreement, and to what extent, if any, one co-defendant, 
Dr. Pannu individually, ever agreed to arbitrate. 
¶55 We now turn to the relevant contracts at issue.  
Dr. Pannu signed the 2005 Operating Agreement as President of 
Great Lakes, not individually.  While the Operating Agreement 
contains a guaranty signed by Dr. Pannu, it is separate from the 
signature page of the Operating Agreement where he signed as 
President.  The guaranty and acknowledgement serve to guaranty 
the obligations of the signator to the contract, Great Lakes.  
If the parties were only contesting the requirement to arbitrate 
under the Operating Agreement alone, the court's role would 
perhaps be different.  See Wis. Stats. ch. 788.  That, however, 
is not the question with which we are presented. 
¶56 The parties demonstrated a willingness to later 
contract in 2006 concerning the individual restrictive covenant, 
outlined in the Ancillary Restrictive Covenant, which Dr. Pannu 
signed individually as a physician.  The Ancillary Restrictive 
Covenant does not specifically contain an arbitration clause.  
Why a subsequent restrictive agreement was necessary in 2006 
might be an additional consideration for the court if these were 
the only two agreements at issue.  This is not critical to our 
analysis, 
however, 
because 
the 
circuit 
court 
must 
first 
determine whether the Redemption Agreement is the parties' 
contract.  The Redemption Agreement from a decade later is the 
only of the three documents at issue that sets forth by its 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
30 
 
terms the distinct contractual obligations of Great Lakes the 
entity, and Dr. Pannu individually.  The Redemption Agreement 
does not contain an arbitration provision and by its terms 
supersedes 
prior 
contracts 
and 
releases 
Great 
Lakes 
and 
Dr. Pannu from the non-compete restrictions.  These conflicting 
written contractual provisions militate against the presumption 
of arbitrating arbitrability.  The court is required by chapter 
788 of the Wisconsin Statutes to determine whether the contract 
calls for arbitration.  In order to do so, it must determine 
which is the controlling contract.   
¶57 A closer examination of the terms of the contracts 
further explains why it cannot be assumed that the Operating 
Agreement alone ends the analysis as to arbitration.  Most 
typically, a challenge might be made to a contractual clause, 
but the court nonetheless orders even that issue to arbitration 
because the pertinent contract calls for arbitration.  Here, the 
language of the relevant documents call into question which of 
the contracts controls. 
¶58 The combination of the merger clause in Section 10.2 
of the Redemption Agreement, the explicit reference to the 
Operating Agreement in the "Mutual Release" in Section 6, the 
"Applicable Law" provision in Section 10.3, and the non-
existence 
of 
an 
arbitration 
provision 
in 
the 
Redemption 
Agreement, make evident that, if enforceable, the parties did 
not consent to arbitration in the Redemption Agreement.  If the 
Redemption Agreement revokes the Operating Agreement, the court 
would not order arbitration pursuant to the Operating Agreement.  
No. 
2016AP601 
 
31 
 
¶59 Section 10.2 utilizes different capitalization to 
denote "this Agreement" (referring to the Redemption Agreement) 
and "the entire agreement," calling into question whether 
Midwest, Great Lakes, and Dr. Pannu intended the Redemption 
Agreement to revoke the Operating Agreement.  The Redemption 
Agreement, unlike the Operating Agreement or the Ancillary 
Restrictive Covenant, addresses the relationship between all 
three.   
¶60 For example, the merger clause in Section 10.2 states 
that "[t]his Agreement" (meaning the Redemption Agreement) 
constitutes 
the 
"entire 
agreement" 
between 
the 
"parties" 
(meaning Great Lakes, Dr. Pannu, and Midwest)21 "pertaining to 
its 
subject 
matter" 
and 
that 
it 
"supersedes 
all 
prior 
agreements, promises, covenants, arrangements, communications, 
representations, or warranties, whether oral or written, by 
[Great 
Lakes] 
or 
[Midwest]." 
 
 
It 
"expressly 
negatives 
collateral or antecedent understandings."  See Town Bank v. City 
Real Estate Dev., LLC, 2010 WI 134, ¶39, 330 Wis. 2d 340, 793 
N.W.2d 476 (defining a merger clause as a "written provision 
which 
expressly 
negatives 
collateral 
or 
antecedent 
understandings").  No reference is made to the Arbitration 
section of the Operating Agreement. 
                                                 
21 Dr. Ahuja was only designated as a party "for purposes of 
the Mutual Releases and Indemnification set forth in Sections 6 
and 8," not Section 10.2. 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
32 
 
¶61 Furthermore, Section 6 of the Redemption Agreement by 
its terms is to "release, acquit and forever discharge" Great 
Lakes and Dr. Pannu from "any and all" "charges, complaints, 
claims, 
liabilities, 
obligations, 
promises, 
agreements, 
controversies, damages, actions, causes of action, suits, 
rights, demands, costs, losses, debts and expenses" of "any 
nature whatsoever" under "the Operating Agreement."  The 
obligation or promise to "resolve any and all disputes arising 
with respect to the terms and conditions of this Operating 
Agreement . . . by 
arbitration" 
seemingly 
fits 
within 
this 
release.  See Town Bank, 330 Wis. 2d 340, ¶46 (refusing to 
require contract drafters to "expressly identify and exclude in 
their contracts any prior oral or written communication between 
the parties that may rise to the level of an agreement"). 
¶62 In addition, the "Applicable Law" provisions in each 
of the agreements are different.  The Operating Agreement's 
"Applicable 
Law" 
provision 
provides 
that 
the 
"Operating 
Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with 
the laws of the State of Wisconsin without regard to its choice 
of law provisions."  The arbitration clause in the Operating 
Agreement specifically incorporates the JAMS Arbitration Rules 
which state that "disputes over the formation, existence, 
validity, interpretation or scope of the agreement under which 
Arbitration is sought, and who are proper Parties to the 
Arbitration, shall be submitted to and ruled on by the 
Arbitrator" (emphases added).  JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration 
Rules 
& 
Procedures, 
Rule 
11(b), 
14 
(July 
1, 
2014), 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
33 
 
https://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_ 
comprehensive_arbitration_rules-2014.pdf.   
¶63 The 
Applicable 
Law 
section 
in 
the 
Redemption 
Agreement, on the other hand, is quite different.  It contains 
no 
arbitration 
clause 
and 
states 
that 
"[a]ll 
questions 
concerning the construction, validity and interpretation of this 
Agreement and the performance of the obligations imposed by this 
Agreement shall be governed by the internal law, not the law of 
conflicts, of the State of Wisconsin" (emphases added).  Simply 
stated, the applicable law and forum selection in one contract 
is very different from the other.   
¶64 Therefore, the Redemption Agreement, if enforceable, 
supersedes by its very language the Operating Agreement's mode 
of adjudication, including its incorporation of JAMS Arbitration 
Rules that granted the authority to the arbitrator to determine 
arbitrability.  See Thomas W. Ward & Assoc., Inc. v. Spinks, 574 
So. 2d 169, 170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam) (holding 
"the trial court cannot leave it to the arbitrators themselves 
to determine which claims are subject to arbitration when it has 
not established which agreement applies"). 
¶65 Due to the foregoing, Midwest and NEA failed to 
demonstrate "clear and unmistakable" intent to arbitrate.  Riley 
Mfg. Co. v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 157 F.3d 775, 780-81 
(10th Cir. 1998).  Thus, the question of whether the parties 
agreed to arbitrate must, in this instance, be decided by the 
circuit court.  See Wis. Stat. ch. 788; see also Riley Mfg. Co., 
157 F.3d at 780-81 (holding "the existence of the merger clause 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
34 
 
in the Settlement Agreement [in combination with the lack of 
arbitration clause] raises at least an ambiguity on the question 
of the intent of the parties to allow an arbitrator to decide 
the validity of the 1991 arbitration clause" because it "raises 
legitimate questions as to the continuing existence and scope of 
the arbitration clause in the Manufacturing Agreement" and thus, 
"the question of whether an agreement to arbitrate continues to 
exist . . . is a question for the courts"). 
¶66 Consequently, 
this 
matter 
requires 
a 
judicial 
determination of "whether the parties consented to arbitrate the 
matters covered by the [arbitration] demand."  Granite Rock Co., 
561 U.S. at 303 n.9 & 304 (referencing Buckeye Check Cashing, 
546 U.S. at 444 n.1).  As will later be discussed, it is for the 
circuit court to further explore the validity and enforceability 
of the Redemption Agreement.  
 
3.  Clarifying precedents 
¶67 No Wisconsin or federal case establishes that once 
arbitration is contracted as the forum for dispute resolution, 
parties can never later contract for an alternative forum for 
dispute resolution.  To the extent Cirilli, 322 Wis. 2d 238, and 
Mortimore, 344 Wis. 2d 459, are read as concluding that a 
contract to arbitrate is irrevocable, that interpretation is 
inconsistent with the law.  Clearly, section 788.01 of the 
Wisconsin Arbitration Act contemplates that a court will enforce 
"[a] provision in any written contract to settle by arbitration 
a controversy thereafter arising out of the contract" and that 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
35 
 
such contractual provision to arbitrate "shall be valid, 
irrevocable and enforceable except upon such grounds as exist at 
law or in equity for the revocation of a contract."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 788.01 (emphasis added).  Another contract that clearly and 
expressly supersedes a first contract is "grounds as exist at 
law or in equity for the revocation of a contract."  Thus, 
Cirilli and Mortimore must not stand for the proposition that 
once parties contract for arbitration, that decision is always 
irrevocable.  
¶68 Midwest and NEA rely on Cirilli for the proposition 
that whether a subsequent agreement revokes the consent to 
arbitrate found in an earlier agreement is for an arbitrator to 
decide because it goes to the merits of the dispute.  This, 
however, construes Cirilli too broadly.   
¶69 Cirilli, unlike this case, did not involve the same 
parties entering into a subsequent contract.  322 Wis. 2d 238, 
¶¶5, 8 n.2, 8-9, 15 n.6.  Instead, in Cirilli, the plaintiffs 
claimed that a subsequent settlement the defendants reached with 
different parties released them from their duty to arbitrate 
under their original contract.  Id., ¶¶1-2.  Cirilli says 
nothing about whether parties can enter into a subsequent, 
superseding contract and agree to remove their disputes from 
arbitration.  Moreover, Cirilli neither addresses nor concludes 
that there can never be "grounds as exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of a contract."  In the case at issue, unlike 
Cirilli, there is a dispute as to whether a second contract 
without an arbitration clause supersedes the first contract with 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
36 
 
such a clause.  As a result, unlike Cirilli, the determination 
of 
arbitrability, 
whether 
the 
Operating 
Agreement 
is 
an 
unrevoked contract, must be decided, in the first instance, by 
the circuit court rather than the arbitrator.  
¶70 Midwest and NEA also assert that Mortimore, a case 
where the court of appeals remanded the matter for arbitration, 
lends further support for their cause.  See 344 Wis. 2d 459, ¶1.  
Midwest and NEA claim that there is no fundamental difference 
between the oral agreement in Mortimore and the Redemption 
Agreement here, because neither was fully executed.  At a 
minimum, Midwest and NEA seemingly acknowledge, however, that 
there is a material factual dispute in both cases upon whether 
there was a binding subsequent agreement.  
¶71 In Mortimore, Mortimore's written employment contract 
(entered in 2004) contained an arbitration clause and prohibited 
oral modifications of the contract.  Id., ¶3.  Specifically, the 
contract stated that "[n]o amendment or modification of this 
Agreement shall be: valid or binding upon [Merge Technologies] 
unless made in writing and signed by an officer of [Merge 
Technologies] . . . or upon the Executive unless made in writing 
and signed by him."  Id.  In 2006 Merge Technologies and 
Mortimore began working towards drafting a new written contract 
for Mortimore.  Id., ¶7.  As of June 19, 2016, "two 
substantively different contract drafts were being edited by two 
different people——one draft was a new contract, the other 
amended Mortimore's 2004 contract."  Id.  A cover letter was 
prepared by the head of the compensation committee for one of 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
37 
 
the contracts——which contained no arbitration clause——but the 
cover letter and the contract were never sent nor signed.  Id.  
The following day Merge Technologies decided to not offer 
Mortimore a new contract for a period and eventually decided to 
seek his resignation instead.  Id., ¶8. 
¶72 Based on these facts, the court of appeals held that 
Merge Technologies and Mortimore had, through "a process of 
negotiation," 
agreed 
to 
an 
amendment 
or 
modification 
to 
Mortimore's 2004 employment contract.  Id., ¶19.  The court of 
appeals relied on the adoption of the Commercial Arbitration 
Rules of the American Arbitration Association as a "clear and 
unmistakable expression of the parties' intent to reserve the 
question of arbitrability for the arbitrator and not the court."  
Id., ¶20.  This conclusion of the court of appeals however was 
based upon the fact that the "2004 contract contemplated that 
amendments or modifications, such as those negotiated between 
Mortimore and Merge [Technologies], would be enforceable and 
binding only if made in writing."  Id., ¶19.  Notably, despite 
this provision, "the record show[ed] that no such modifications 
or changes eliminating an arbitration requirement were ever made 
in writing."  Id.  The court of appeals concluded that 
Mortimore's "conten[tions] that this alleged oral agreement is 
enforceable . . . [and] his breach of contract claims are not 
subject to arbitration . . . is mistaken."  Id., ¶18.  Thus, 
Mortimore neither addresses nor concludes that once contracted 
for, there can never be "grounds as exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of a contract."  In the case at issue, unlike 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
38 
 
Mortimore, there is a material factual dispute as to whether a 
second written contract, which does not have an arbitration 
clause, supersedes the first written contract which does, such 
that the determination of arbitrability here must first be 
decided by the circuit court rather than the arbitrator.  
¶73 In sum, Cirilli and Mortimore do not stand for the 
proposition that once parties contract for arbitration, that 
decision is always irrevocable.  Even in Mortimore, the circuit 
court was called upon to determine whether the initial contract 
had been revoked.  See Mortimore, 344 Wis. 2d 459, ¶19.  
Clearly, section 788.01 of the Wisconsin Arbitration Act 
contemplates that a court will enforce "[a] provision in any 
written 
contract 
to 
settle 
by 
arbitration 
a 
controversy 
thereafter 
arising 
out 
of 
the 
contract" 
and 
that 
such 
contractual provision to arbitrate "shall be valid, irrevocable 
and enforceable except upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of a contract."  Wis. Stat. § 788.01.  
Another contract that clearly and expressly supersedes a first 
contract is "grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of a contract."  To the extent that language in 
Mortimore or Cirilli suggests that contracts to arbitrate are 
forever irrevocable, that language is limited by the facts of 
those cases. 
¶74 Midwest and NEA also argue that Great Lakes and 
Dr. Pannu's challenge to the Operating Agreement is governed by 
Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. 440, and Prima Paint Corp. v. 
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), and that those 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
39 
 
cases require the enforcement of the Operating Agreement.22  
Midwest and NEA argue that this is so because the challenge is 
not itself to the arbitration provision, but instead hinges on 
whether the Redemption Agreement superseded the Operating 
Agreement.  See Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 445-46 
("[U]nless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, 
the issue of the contract's validity is considered by the 
arbitrator in the first instance."); Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 
404 ("But the statutory language does not permit the federal 
court to consider claims of fraud in the inducement of the 
contract generally."). 
¶75 The challenges in Buckeye Check Cashing and Prima 
Paint, however, are also distinguishable from the challenge in 
                                                 
22 Midwest and NEA also allege that Buckeye Check Cashing, 
Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), explained that "before 
formation" and "after formation" challenges (words that Midwest 
and NEA used, not the Supreme Court) should be treated 
differently because not to do so would "permit[] a court to deny 
effect to an arbitration provision in a contract that the court 
later finds to be perfectly enforceable."  See Buckeye Check 
Cashing, 546 U.S. at 448–49.  Midwest and NEA's argument 
completely lacks merit.  Buckeye Check Cashing's explanation was 
in reference to why "a challenge to the validity of the contract 
as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must 
go to the arbitrator."  Id. at 449.  It is unsurprising that 
Buckeye Check Cashing did not make a distinction between labels 
"before formation" and "after formation" as "it is not the mere 
labeling of a dispute . . . that determines whether an issue is 
arbitrable"; it is "whether the parties consented to arbitrate 
the dispute in question."  Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of 
Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 304 n.11 (2010).  Tellingly, if a court 
found a superseding agreement revoked the parties' consent to 
arbitrate, the court could not later find that the arbitration 
provision was enforceable. 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
40 
 
this case.  In both Buckeye Check Cashing and Prima Paint there 
was only one contract.  Neither of the parties' challenges went 
to the subsequent contracting out of arbitration.  In Buckeye 
Check Cashing, the parties resisting arbitration alleged that 
"the contract as a whole (including its arbitration provision) 
[was] rendered invalid by [a] usurious finance charge" that was 
in violation of various laws.  546 U.S. at 443-44.  The parties, 
however, acknowledged that they "concluded" an agreement to 
arbitrate and never alleged that the finance charge impacted or 
revoked their consent to arbitrate.  See id. at 444 n.1; Granite 
Rock Co., 561 U.S. at 300-01.   
¶76 Similarly, in Prima Paint, the parties resisting 
arbitration alleged that the entire contract should be rescinded 
because they were fraudulently induced into entering the 
contract as whole, but "no claim [was] advanced by [the 
resisting party] that [the other party] fraudulently induced it 
to enter into the agreement to arbitrate."  388 U.S. at 398-99, 
406.  Here, however, Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu argue that the 
Redemption Agreement superseded the Operating Agreement.  In 
fact, it is because of this genuine issue of material fact that 
we send this matter back for further determination.  See, e.g., 
Joint Sch. Dist. No. 10, 78 Wis. 2d at 101 ("For arbitration is 
a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to 
arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." 
(quoting United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 582)).  Thus, neither 
Buckeye Check Cashing nor Prima Paint address nor prohibit 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
41 
 
parties from subsequently contracting out of arbitration as the 
forum of dispute resolution. 
¶77 Finally, fundamental principles of freedom to contract 
support the proposition that parties can subsequently contract 
to modify the terms of a previous contract.  In fact, here, 
various parties in various capacities did contract in 2005 and 
2006.  Contracts can involve mutual agreement to change certain 
obligations, including a duty to arbitrate.  Wisconsin law, 
including Wis. Stat. ch. 788, does not limit such freedom to 
contract, but rather chapter 788 reinforces the freedom of 
contract by enforcing parties' contractual agreements.  In fact, 
this view comports with the Federal Arbitration Act if "grounds 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract" 
and places "arbitration agreements 'on equal footing with all 
other contracts.'"  Kindred Nursing Ctrs., 137 S. Ct. at 1424; 
Wis. Stat. § 788.01; see, e.g., Sipple v. Zimmerman, 39 
Wis. 2d 481, 492, 159 N.W.2d 706 (1968) ("The contract was 
legally binding unless mutually rescinded by the parties to 
it."); Town Bank, 330 Wis. 2d 340, ¶39 (describing the fact that 
"when [a] contract contains an unambiguous merger or integration 
clause, the court is barred from considering evidence of any 
prior or contemporaneous understandings or agreements between 
the parties" as a "principle [that] stems from basic contract 
law").  Courts should remain mindful of the limited role endowed 
to them under chapter 788 and not endeavor into the province of 
the parties' contractual choice to arbitrate.   
No. 
2016AP601 
 
42 
 
¶78 The notion that no parties can ever contract out of 
arbitration is antithetical to these values and principles than 
the idea of a prohibition on contracting out of arbitration 
through 
mutual 
agreement 
and 
thus, 
a 
"limitless . . . contractual obligation to arbitrate."  Litton 
Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 209 (1991); see id. 
("[The United States Supreme Court] refuse[d] to apply [the] 
presumption [of arbitrability] wholesale in the context of an 
expired bargaining agreement, for to do so would make limitless 
the contractual obligation to arbitrate" and "determine[d] 
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate this dispute" because a 
court "cannot avoid that duty because it requires us to 
interpret a provision of a bargaining agreement.").  Neither 
Cirilli, Mortimore, Buckeye Check Cashing, nor Prima Paint 
require a competing result under these facts.  Therefore, this 
court's conclusion that a party can subsequently contract out of 
the obligation to arbitrate is not only consistent with federal 
and Wisconsin law, it is also necessitated by the fundamental 
principles underlying freedom to contract. 
 
B.  Summary Judgment 
¶79 Finally, we briefly address why we remand this case to 
the circuit court.  The principles of summary judgment are well-
defined.  Summary judgment is granted if "the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
43 
 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2); 
Hirschhorn, 
338 
Wis. 2d 761, 
¶20. 
 
Stated 
differently, summary judgment should not be granted "unless the 
facts presented conclusively show that the plaintiff's action 
has no merit and cannot be maintained."  Mrozek v. Intra Fin. 
Corp., 2005 WI 73, ¶14, 281 Wis. 2d 448, 699 N.W.2d 54. 
¶80 In determining whether to grant summary judgment, "the 
court decides whether there is a genuine issue of material fact; 
the court does not decide the fact."  Racine Cty., 323 
Wis. 2d 682, ¶25.  The moving party bears the burden of 
establishing the absence of a genuine, that is, disputed, issue 
of material fact.  AccuWeb, Inc. v. Foley & Lardner, 2008 WI 24, 
¶21, 308 Wis. 2d 258, 746 N.W.2d 447; Grams v. Boss, 97 
Wis. 2d 332, 338, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980).  Moreover, we view 
summary judgment materials in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party.  AccuWeb, 308 Wis. 2d 258, ¶21.  A factual 
issue is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable 
jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party.  
Baxter v. DNR, 165 Wis. 2d 298, 312, 477 N.W.2d 648 (Ct. App. 
1991).  A "material fact" is one that is "of consequence to the 
merits of the litigation."  Michael R.B. v. State, 175 
Wis. 2d 713, 724, 499 N.W.2d 641 (1993).  "Any reasonable doubt 
as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be 
resolved against the moving party" for summary judgment.  Heck & 
Paetow Claim Serv., Inc. v. Heck, 93 Wis. 2d 349, 356, 286 
N.W.2d 831 (1980). 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
44 
 
¶81 The question that was before the circuit court on 
summary judgment was whether the Redemption Agreement was a 
valid and enforceable contract. Competing affidavits were 
submitted which presented genuine issues of material fact. 
¶82 Nonetheless, 
the 
circuit 
court 
granted 
summary 
judgment in favor of Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu concluding that 
the Redemption Agreement was validly formed.  The circuit court 
found that Dr. Ahuja, through Midwest's attorney, made an offer 
that he intended to be bound by when the e-mail containing the 
"final agreement" was sent, and that Dr. Pannu accepted the 
offer when he signed the Redemption Agreement and returned it 
with the check that was subsequently cashed.  Prior to granting 
summary judgment, however, the circuit court acknowledged that 
"maybe there[ are] some" factual disputes.   
¶83 In this case, we conclude that the circuit court 
improperly 
granted 
summary 
judgment 
to 
Great 
Lakes 
and 
Dr. Pannu.  In support of their competing motions, the parties 
presented affidavits attempting to demonstrate their mutual 
assent, or lack thereof, to forming the Redemption Agreement.  
See Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (precluding summary judgment if there 
is a "genuine issue as to any material fact" (emphasis added)). 
¶84 In support of the position that the Redemption 
Agreement was validly formed and is enforceable, Dr. Pannu 
submitted an affidavit representing that Great Lakes and 
Dr. Pannu had performed all of their obligations under the 
Redemption Agreement other than moving out of their office by 
April 
8, 
2015, 
including 
delivering 
a 
check 
that 
was 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
45 
 
subsequently cashed.  That evidence, however, was refuted by 
Dr. Ahuja's affidavit.  Dr. Ahuja asserted that the check was 
cashed in error by a clerical employee, and that a cashier's 
check in the same amount was sent to Dr. Pannu once the error 
was discovered.  Further, Dr. Ahuja asserted that he had never 
agreed to the terms of the Redemption Agreement; had never 
instructed Midwest's attorney to include a complete release of 
Great Lakes' or Dr. Pannu's non-compete obligations in the 
Redemption Agreement, and in fact disagreed with releasing the 
restrictions; and that in April he told Dr. Pannu in a phone 
conversation about signing the Redemption Agreement that he was 
still reviewing it and shortly after the phone call determined 
that he was not willing to sign it.  He noted that the agreement 
does not contain his signature.  
¶85 At a minimum, these competing affidavits raise genuine 
issues of material fact rendering summary judgment improper.  
Hence, we reverse and remand the cause to the circuit court. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶86 The crux of the issue before us concerns the circuit 
court's role in determining the proper forum of dispute 
resolution when a subsequent contract, if enforceable, does not 
contain an arbitration clause as is present in an initial 
contract.  As a part of that analysis we consider whether a 
contract which contains a merger clause and which does not 
contain an arbitration clause can change the forum of dispute 
resolution when a prior agreement between the parties contains 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
46 
 
an arbitration clause.  The parties make competing arguments 
regarding a court's role in determining the applicability of 
this arbitration provision.  They take contrary positions 
regarding whether all disputes, even arbitrability itself, must 
be submitted to arbitration.  The parties present conflicting 
views of precedent regarding the judiciary's role in deciding 
motions to compel arbitration when a subsequent contract does 
not select arbitration as the forum for dispute resolution and 
does contain a merger clause which states that the subsequent 
agreement supersedes all prior contracts.  Relatedly, the 
parties dispute whether all parties here can be compelled to 
arbitrate when arguably only one co-defendant is contractually 
required to arbitrate pursuant to the initial contract.  
¶87 The claims in the underlying lawsuit that called upon 
the court to decide whether the dispute belonged in arbitration, 
involve whether Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu violated restrictive 
covenants 
in 
the 
Operating 
Agreement 
and 
the 
Ancillary 
Restrictive Covenant.  The Redemption Agreement, however, does 
not contain an arbitration provision and in fact, purports to 
release those restrictive covenants.  Therefore, which contract 
controls is seminal in the first instance as to whether 
arbitration should be ordered.  Ultimately, regardless of forum, 
the controlling documents will also impact the underlying 
dispute itself.   
¶88 The circuit court concluded on summary judgment that 
even though the initial agreement, here the Operating Agreement, 
required arbitration it was superseded by a later, valid and 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
47 
 
enforceable Redemption Agreement which did not so require the 
parties to submit to arbitration.  The court of appeals reversed 
and remanded with instructions to grant Midwest's motion to 
compel arbitration.   
¶89 We reverse the court of appeals and conclude that the 
fundamental principles of freedom to contract allow parties to a 
previous contract to subsequently contract for a different forum 
of dispute resolution.  Here, it is necessary that the circuit 
court initially determine whether the parties contracted to 
arbitrate.  The court's authority to order arbitration is 
dependent on the terms of a contract.  If the Redemption 
Agreement is the parties' contract, then the court lacks 
authority to order arbitration.  Thus, the court must first 
ascertain 
which 
contract 
controls 
the 
forum 
of 
dispute 
resolution.  In sum, we conclude that it is a court's duty to 
determine whether a contract calls for arbitration and when a 
dispute exists as to whether a second contract without an 
arbitration clause supersedes a first contract with such a 
clause, the determination of arbitrability must be decided in 
the first instance by the circuit court rather than the 
arbitrator. 
¶90 We also conclude, however, that the cause must be 
remanded to the circuit court, not to compel arbitration as was 
ordered by the court of appeals, but rather, because the 
parties' competing affidavits submitted in support of their 
positions on summary judgment raised genuine issues of material 
fact concerning whether the Redemption Agreement is a valid 
No. 
2016AP601 
 
48 
 
contract.  Therefore, we reverse and remand to the circuit court 
for further proceedings. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
¶91 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J., withdrew from participation. 
 
 
No.  2016AP601.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶92 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring).  There are 
two primary agreements in the instant case.  The Operating 
Agreement 
says 
that 
all 
disputes 
will 
be 
submitted 
to 
arbitration and issues of substantive arbitrability will also be 
decided by the arbitrator.  The Redemption Agreement purports to 
release Great Lakes and Pannu from any and all obligations 
imposed upon them by the Operating Agreement, including any 
agreement to arbitrate disputes. 
¶93 The legal issues about which the parties disagree are 
the effect of the Redemption Agreement on the Operating 
Agreement and whether the Redemption Agreement is a valid 
contract. 
¶94 I agree with the majority that, if valid, the 
Redemption Agreement releases Great Lakes and Pannu from the 
agreement to arbitrate contained in the Operating Agreement, and 
that the cause should be remanded to the circuit court to 
determine whether the Redemption Agreement is a valid contract. 
¶95 However, I write separately because the majority fails 
to set forth a clear analytical framework through which the 
legal issues presented in the instant case should be resolved 
and mishandles federal case law in the process.  Additionally, 
the majority stumbles in its application of the law to the facts 
in such a way that warrants both clarification and correction. 
I 
¶96 Although they are not binding on this court, several 
decisions by the federal circuit courts of appeals have 
No.  2016AP601.ssa 
 
2 
 
addressed the issue presented by the instant case.1  Of these 
cases, Dasher v. RBC Bank (USA), 745 F.3d 1111 (11th Cir. 2014), 
is the most helpful and worthy of special consideration. 
¶97 In Dasher, Dasher sued the bank for allegedly charging 
excessive 
overdraft 
fees 
in 
breach 
of 
his 
2008 
account 
agreement.  The 2008 Agreement contained an arbitration clause.  
In 2012, a new account agreement was issued and Dasher accepted 
that agreement.  The 2012 Agreement did not contain an 
arbitration clause.  When the bank moved to compel arbitration 
per the 2008 Agreement's arbitration clause, an issue arose as 
to whether that clause was effective, given that the 2012 
Agreement had superseded the 2008 Agreement. 
¶98 The Dasher court rejected the bank's argument that an 
arbitration clause in an entirely superseded agreement remains 
effective unless specifically eliminated in the superseding 
agreement.  The Dasher court explained that "[d]espite [the 
language in the cases cited by RBC], which certainly appears to 
support RBC's contention, closer examination reveals a critical 
distinction:  in each case cited by RBC, the prior agreement 
remained effective to some extent for various reasons, whereas 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Dasher v. RBC Bank (USA), 745 F.3d 1111 (11th 
Cir. 2014); Dottore v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, No. 1:09-cv-2636, 
2010 WL 3861010 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2010), aff'd, 480 Fed. 
Appx. 351 (6th Cir. 2012); Applied Energetics, Inc. v. NewOak 
Capital Mkts., LLC, 645 F.3d 522 (2d Cir. 2011); Bank Julius 
Baer & Co., Ltd. v. Waxfield Ltd., 424 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 2005); 
Riley Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Anchor Glass Container Corp, 157 
F.3d 775 (10th Cir. 1998); Patten Sec. Corp., Inc. v. Diamond 
Greyhound & Genetics, Inc., 819 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1987); 
Matterhorn, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 763 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1985). 
No.  2016AP601.ssa 
 
3 
 
here, the prior agreement is entirely superseded."2  The cases 
cited by the bank could not stand for the proposition that 
arbitration clauses in entirely superseded agreements remain 
effective unless specifically eliminated because none of those 
cases dealt with an entirely superseded agreement.3 
¶99 In my view, the Dasher case persuasively articulates 
the correct analytical framework.  
¶100 Whether, and to what extent, a second contract 
supersedes a prior contract containing an arbitration clause 
such that the prior contract's arbitration clause is rendered 
ineffective is an issue that must be decided by the court rather 
than an arbitrator.  The assertion that the prior contract's 
arbitration clause was superseded calls into question the 
enforceability of the arbitration clause specifically, including 
the agreement to arbitrate issues of substantive arbitrability.4 
¶101 In 
determining 
whether, 
and 
to 
what 
extent, 
a 
subsequent contract supersedes a prior contract, the court 
"should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the 
                                                 
2 Dasher, 745 F.3d at 1120. 
3 Id. 
4 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 
& n.1 (2006) (stating that a party resisting arbitration may 
dispute that an agreement to arbitrate "ever concluded" or 
"challenge[] specifically the validity of the agreement to 
arbitrate"); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 
U.S. 395, 402-04 (1967); see also Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. 
of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 297-300 (2010). 
No.  2016AP601.ssa 
 
4 
 
formation of contracts."5  "If the subsequent agreement only 
partially supersedes the prior agreement, amends it, or waives 
some but not all of its provisions, the second question is 
whether the arbitration provision was among the superseded, 
amended, or waived provisions."6  If, however, the subsequent 
agreement entirely supersedes the prior agreement, the court 
should 
determine 
"whether 
the 
subsequent 
agreement 
alone 
supports a motion to compel arbitration."7 
II 
¶102 I now apply the relevant state-law principles that 
govern the formation of contracts.   
¶103 The Wisconsin Arbitration Act provides, in pertinent 
part, that arbitration clauses "shall be valid, irrevocable and 
enforceable except upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract."8  A subsequent 
contract that supersedes a prior contract constitutes "grounds 
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract."9  The question, then, is whether, and to what extent, 
the Redemption Agreement, the second contract, supersedes the 
Operating Agreement, the first contract. 
                                                 
5 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 
944 (1995) 
6 Dasher, 745 F.3d at 1122. 
7 Id. at 1123. 
8 Wis. Stat. § 788.01. 
9 Majority op., ¶47. 
No.  2016AP601.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶104 A subsequent agreement's supersession of a prior 
agreement is typically accomplished by including a merger clause 
in the subsequent agreement.  In Wisconsin, this court stated 
the following with respect to merger clauses:  
[The appellant] argues . . . that an exception exists 
to the general rule that parol evidence is admissible 
with respect to the issue of integration; that 
evidence 
of 
contemporaneous 
or 
prior 
agreements, 
written or oral, which relate to the same subject 
matter as the agreement in question is not admissible 
when the written agreement embodies written terms 
excluding additional understandings or agreements not 
contained in the writing, i.e., 'merger' clauses.  
With this much we can agree.  Absent claims of duress, 
fraud, or mutual mistake, a written provision which 
expressly 
negatives 
collateral 
or 
antecedent 
understandings 
makes 
the 
document 
a 
complete 
integration.10 
¶105 A recent decision concerning merger clauses and 
supersession of contracts, Town Bank v. City Real Estate 
Development, LLC, 2010 WI 134, 330 Wis. 2d 340, 793 N.W.2d 476, 
is instructive in resolving the dispute in the instant case.   
¶106 Town Bank involved a two-phase financing agreement 
between 
a 
bank 
and 
a 
developer 
for 
the 
purchase 
and 
redevelopment of a building in downtown Milwaukee.  A Commitment 
Letter pledged financing for both phases of the project, but a 
subsequent Term Credit Agreement (TCA) executed by the parties 
provided financing for only the first phase.  The TCA contained 
the following clause: 
                                                 
10 Dairyland Equip. Leasing, Inc. v. Bohen, 94 Wis. 2d 600, 
855-56, 288 N.W.2d 852 (1980); see also Matthew v. Am. Family 
Mut. Ins. Co., 54 Wis. 2d 336, 341-42, 195 N.W.2d 611 (1972).  
No.  2016AP601.ssa 
 
6 
 
This Agreement, including the Exhibits attached or 
referring to it, the Note and the Security Documents, 
are intended by Customer and Lender as a final 
expression of their agreement and as a complete and 
exclusive statement of its terms, there being no 
conditions 
to 
the 
full 
effectiveness 
of 
their 
agreement except as set forth in this Agreement, the 
Note and the Security Documents.11 
¶107 The bank provided the first phase of financing as 
provided by the TCA, but refused to finance the second phase as 
referenced in the Commitment Letter.  The bank sued the 
developer seeking a declaratory judgment that the bank was not 
obligated to provide additional funding to the developer. 
¶108 The Town Bank court concluded that because the TCA 
contained an unambiguous merger clause, quoted above, the 
developer was precluded from introducing any evidence of prior 
understandings or agreements that may have existed between the 
parties, including the Commitment Letter.12   
¶109 Implicit in the court's holding was the conclusion 
that the TCA and Commitment Letter related to the same subject 
matter.  That is, the Town Bank court (incorrectly, in my view) 
must have concluded that the TCA was the final expression of the 
parties' financing agreement altogether, as opposed to being the 
final expression of only the first phase of financing.  Were 
this not the case, Town Bank would stand for the absurd 
proposition that a fully integrated contract with respect to one 
subject can extinguish contracts between the same parties with 
                                                 
11 Town Bank v. City Real Estate Dev., LLC, 2010 WI 134, 
¶14, 330 Wis. 2d 340, 793 N.W.2d 476. 
12 Id., ¶¶40-41. 
No.  2016AP601.ssa 
 
7 
 
respect to entirely unrelated subjects.13  This is not, and has 
never 
been, 
how 
merger 
clauses 
operate 
in 
Wisconsin 
or 
elsewhere.14 
¶110 Thus, with these state-law principles in mind, I turn 
to whether, and to what extent, the Redemption Agreement, if 
valid, supersedes the Operating Agreement. 
III 
¶111 The majority suggests that, if valid, the Redemption 
Agreement supersedes the Operating Agreement in its entirety.15  
The Redemption Agreement does no such thing. 
¶112 The merger clause in the Redemption Agreement states 
that the Redemption Agreement "constitutes the entire agreement 
between the parties pertaining to its subject matter and 
supersedes 
all 
prior 
agreements, 
promises, 
covenants, 
arrangements, communications, representations or warranties, 
whether oral or written, by [Great Lakes] or [Midwest]." 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶113 Is the "subject matter" of the Redemption Agreement 
identical to the "subject matter" of the Operating Agreement 
such that the former entirely supersedes the latter?  The answer 
is clearly, "No." 
                                                 
13 Id., ¶¶68-72 & nn.10-13 (A.W. Bradley, J., dissenting). 
14 Dairyland, 94 Wis. 2d at 608-09; Matthew, 54 Wis. 2d at 
341-42; 11 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 33:14 (4th 
ed. 2002); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213. 
15 See majority op., ¶¶47, 56, 64, 67, 75. 
No.  2016AP601.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶114 The Operating Agreement's purpose is to provide "the 
rights, obligations, and restrictions" that will apply to 
Midwest and its Members.  Within its scope are the subjects of 
capital contributions, tax distributions, allocations of profits 
and losses, the authority and powers of Midwest's officers and 
Members, etc.  It is a document that governs the internal 
operations of Midwest.  On the other hand, the Redemption 
Agreement's purpose is to "set forth the terms upon which [Great 
Lakes] will sell and [Midwest] will redeem [Great Lakes'] entire 
Membership Interest[.]"  It does not purport in any way to alter 
or address the internal operations of Midwest and how those 
operations are to be governed. 
¶115 Although there is some overlap in subject matter 
between the Operating Agreement and Redemption Agreement (e.g., 
how Great Lakes' Membership Interest is calculated and paid 
out), the subject matter of the agreements is not identical. 
¶116 The Redemption Agreement, if valid, would not entirely 
revoke the Operating Agreement as the majority suggests.16  Even 
if the Redemption Agreement is valid, the Operating Agreement 
will still have binding effect on Midwest and all of its Members 
even if it will no longer have any binding effect on Great Lakes 
or Pannu.  Would Midwest lack a written agreement as to its 
                                                 
16 At ¶¶59-60, the majority appears to read the merger 
clause in a way that is untethered to the subject matter of the 
Redemption Agreement.  This suggestion gives further support to 
the absurd proposition that merger clauses have the effect of 
extinguishing prior agreements between the parties unrelated to 
the subject matter of the contract in which the merger clause is 
contained.  See supra ¶108 and notes 13-14. 
No.  2016AP601.ssa 
 
9 
 
internal operations simply because it agreed to allow the 
voluntary dissociation of a Member and release that Member from 
obligations imposed by the Operating Agreement?  I think not. 
¶117 Indeed, we have an example of an entirely superseded 
contract in the instant case, namely, the 2002 Original 
Operating Agreement.  Section 1.4 of the 2005 Operating 
Agreement states:  "This Operating Agreement and the terms 
hereof supersede and replace the Original Agreement and its 
terms."  There is no ambiguity——the 2005 Operating Agreement 
completely and entirely extinguished the terms of the 2002 
Original Operating Agreement.  If Midwest had intended the 
Redemption 
Agreement 
to 
entirely 
supersede 
the 
Operating 
Agreement, one would expect to see language similar to what 
Midwest used to entirely supersede the 2002 Original Operating 
Agreement. 
¶118 Thus, if valid, the Redemption Agreement does not 
entirely supersede the Operating Agreement.  However, that does 
not end the inquiry.  The court must also determine if the 
Redemption Agreement supersedes the Operating Agreement at all, 
and if so, whether the Operating Agreement's arbitration clause 
is one of the superseded provisions. 
¶119 The majority asserts that the Applicable Law provision 
of the Redemption Agreement expressly supersedes "the Operating 
Agreement's mode of adjudication, including its incorporation of 
JAMS Arbitration Rules that granted the authority to the 
arbitrator to determine arbitrability."17 
                                                 
17 Majority op., ¶64. 
No.  2016AP601.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶120 The majority's assertion incorrectly conflates choice-
of-law provisions and arbitration clauses.  Providing that 
questions concerning the construction of a contract shall be 
governed by Wisconsin law says nothing about the forum in which 
those questions will be decided.   
¶121 The majority finally finds its footing when it reaches 
the Mutual Release provision of the Redemption Agreement.  I 
agree with the majority that "[t]he obligation or promise to 
'resolve any and all disputes arising with respect to the terms 
and conditions of this Operating Agreement . . . by arbitration' 
seemingly fits within this release."18 
¶122 Asserting that a subsequent contract released the 
resisting party from its obligation to submit disputes to 
arbitration is exactly the type of specific challenge to the 
enforceability of a validly formed arbitration clause that the 
United States Supreme Court requires.19  Great Lakes and Pannu do 
not argue that the arbitration clause in the Operating Agreement 
was invalidly formed.  Rather, they argue that the arbitration 
clause in the Operating Agreement cannot be enforced because the 
                                                 
18 Id., ¶61. 
19 Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 444 & n.1; Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 
402-04; see also Granite Rock, 561 U.S. at 297-300. 
No.  2016AP601.ssa 
 
11 
 
Mutual Release provision specifically revokes any obligation on 
their part to submit to arbitration.20 
IV 
¶123 The majority's focus on the principles undergirding 
freedom of contract is not misplaced or inappropriate——those 
principles support the majority's conclusion that parties that 
agreed to arbitrate disputes may undo that agreement if they so 
choose.  However, these principles alone do not provide a clear 
analytical framework through which the legal issue presented in 
the instant case should be resolved 
¶124 I would articulate that framework as follows. 
¶125 Whether, and to what extent, a second contract 
supersedes a prior contract containing an arbitration clause 
such that the prior contract's arbitration clause is rendered 
ineffective is an issue that must be decided by the court rather 
than an arbitrator.  The assertion that the prior contract's 
arbitration clause was superseded calls into question the 
enforceability of the arbitration clause specifically, including 
the agreement to arbitrate issues of substantive arbitrability.  
¶126 In 
determining 
whether, 
and 
to 
what 
extent, 
a 
subsequent contract supersedes a prior contract, the court 
                                                 
20 Puzzlingly, 
the 
majority 
calls 
into 
question 
this 
framework.  See majority op., ¶74 n.22.  To be clear, Supreme 
Court precedent establishes two ways in which arbitration 
clauses may be challenged in and resolved by a court.  The 
resisting party may dispute that an agreement to arbitrate "ever 
concluded," Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 444 n.1, or "challenge[] 
specifically the validity of the agreement to arbitrate" as 
Great Lakes and Pannu do in the instant case, Buckeye, 546 U.S. 
at 444-45. 
No.  2016AP601.ssa 
 
12 
 
should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the 
formation of contracts.  If the subsequent contract only 
partially supersedes the prior contract, amends it, or waives 
some but not all of its provisions, the second question is 
whether the arbitration provision was among the superseded, 
amended, or waived provisions.  If, however, the subsequent 
contract entirely supersedes the prior contract, the court 
should determine whether the subsequent contract alone supports 
a motion to compel arbitration. 
¶127 In the instant case, it appears that the purpose of 
the Redemption Agreement was not to nullify or extinguish the 
Operating Agreement in its entirety.  Rather, the Redemption 
Agreement sets forth the terms upon which Great Lakes will cease 
to be a Member of Midwest and release Great Lakes and Pannu from 
any and all obligations that the Operating Agreement might have 
imposed upon them, including the obligation to submit disputes 
arising out of the Operating Agreement to arbitration and to 
allow 
the 
arbitrators 
to 
decide 
issues 
of 
substantive 
arbitrability. 
¶128 However, there is a genuine issue of material fact 
with regard to whether the Redemption Agreement is a valid 
contract.  Thus, the cause should be remanded to the circuit 
court for the determination of this issue. 
No.  2016AP601.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶129 REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
majority 
nullifies 
the 
parties' 
arbitration 
agreement 
by 
creating a new rule bestowing on the judiciary the power to 
decide 
arbitrability 
even 
though 
the 
parties 
agreed 
an 
arbitrator would resolve this issue.  Ironically, the majority 
invokes "fundamental principles of freedom to contract"1 but 
nonetheless infringes on the contracting rights of private 
parties and expands the statutorily limited role of the courts 
when parties contract for arbitration.  I would honor the 
parties' contractual agreement to let the arbitrator decide 
what, if any, impact the partially-executed Redemption Agreement 
had on the existence and validity of the Operating Agreement. 
¶130 Because the parties dispute the formation of the 
Redemption Agreement as well as its effect on the continued 
existence of the Operating Agreement, this court must apply the 
rules the parties agreed to follow under their existing 
contract, for "any and all disputes arising with respect to the 
terms and conditions of this Operating Agreement."  See 
Operating Agreement, § 13.7.  The dispute here is whether the 
Redemption Agreement supersedes the Operating Agreement as to 
Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu, thereby eliminating the arbitration 
provision.  This presents an issue of substantive arbitrability, 
which the parties contractually agreed to have the arbitrator 
decide.  The majority acknowledges (albeit in a footnote) that 
"[t]he 
JAMS 
Arbitration 
Rules 
in 
the 
Operating 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶5. 
No.  2016AP601.rgb 
 
2 
 
Agreement . . . require that even the issue of arbitrability be 
arbitrated"2 but overrides the parties' chosen method of dispute 
resolution anyway.3  I would instead respect the parties' 
contract, affirm the court of appeals, and remand the matter to 
the circuit court with directions to send the case to the 
arbitrator for resolution of this preliminary dispute.4  I 
respectfully dissent. 
                                                 
2 Majority op., ¶2 n.2.  "JAMS" is an acronym for Judicial 
Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc. 
3 While the foundation of the majority's preference for 
court resolution of arbitrability disputes is unclear, its 
disdain for arbitration as a method of dispute resolution is 
transparent in its declaration that "only those disputes that 
the parties have agreed to so submit to arbitration are 
relegated to proceed in that forum."  Majority op., ¶43 
(emphasis added).  The majority misunderstands that the choice 
of method for dispute resolution belongs to the parties, not the 
court. 
4 The arbitrator would first decide arbitrability, which 
involves two inquiries:  (1) "whether there is a construction of 
the arbitration clause that would cover the grievance on its 
face" and (2) "whether any other provision of the contract 
specifically excludes it."  Joint Sch. Dist. No. 10 v. Jefferson 
Educ. Ass'n, 78 Wis. 2d 94, 111, 253 N.W.2d 536 (1977).  In this 
case, no party challenges the applicability of the arbitration 
clause in and of itself; rather, Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu 
dispute its enforceability, alleging that a second contract 
eliminated the arbitration provision.  If the arbitrator 
determines 
that 
the 
arbitration 
clause 
in 
the 
Operating 
Agreement no longer exists or is invalidated by the Redemption 
Agreement, this case returns to court for ultimate disposition 
of the underlying issue.  If the arbitrator determines the 
Redemption Agreement was never formed, the non-compete issue 
would be resolved in an arbitration of the merits.  
No.  2016AP601.rgb 
 
3 
 
I 
¶131 Principles governing arbitration disputes are rather 
straightforward and should have controlled the disposition of 
this case.  First, Wis. Stat. § 788.01 (2015-16) recognizes 
that: 
A provision in any written contract to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of 
the contract, or out of the refusal to perform the 
whole or any part of the contract . . . shall be 
valid, irrevocable and enforceable except upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract. 
Wisconsin has a longstanding "policy of encouraging arbitration 
as an alternative to litigation," First Weber Grp., Inc. v. 
Synergy Real Estate Grp., LLC, 2015 WI 34, ¶24, 361 Wis. 2d 496, 
860 N.W.2d 498 (quoted source omitted), and "[t]here is a strong 
presumption of arbitrability where the contract in question 
contains an arbitration clause," Cirilli v. Country Ins. & Fin. 
Servs., 2009 WI App 167, ¶14, 322 Wis. 2d 238, 776 N.W.2d 272. 
¶132 Second, 
the 
circuit 
court 
generally 
decides 
arbitrability unless the parties contract to have the arbitrator 
decide it, as they have done here.  See First Weber Grp., Inc., 
361 Wis. 2d 496, ¶36.  The arbitrability issue addresses whether 
the parties agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration.  See 
Kimberly Area Sch. Dist. v. Zdanovec, 222 Wis. 2d 27, 37, 586 
N.W.2d 41 
(Ct. 
App. 
1998). 
 
When 
parties 
"clearly 
and 
unmistakably" contract to have arbitrability decided by the 
arbitrator, the circuit court must honor the parties' choice.  
See AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns. Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 
649 (1986).  When the parties specifically incorporate the JAMS' 
No.  2016AP601.rgb 
 
4 
 
Arbitration Rules in their contract, the court views their 
inclusion as a clear and unmistakable agreement to remove the 
arbitrability determination from the circuit court and place it 
with the arbitrator.  Mortimore v. Merge Techs., 2012 WI App 
109, ¶20, 344 Wis. 2d 459, 824 N.W.2d 155; Oracle Am., Inc. v. 
Myriad Grp. A.G., 724 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013) 
("Virtually every circuit to have considered the issue has 
determined that incorporation of [formal] arbitration rules 
constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties 
agreed to arbitrate arbitrability."). 
¶133 Finally, as the majority recognizes,5 Chapter 788 
prescribes a limited role for the courts over arbitration 
proceedings, enumerating specific judicial powers.  Notably 
absent from this narrow conferral of judicial authority is the 
power to remove decisions over arbitrability from the arbitrator 
when the parties contractually assigned that issue to the 
arbitrator alone. 
II 
¶134 Applying these rules, the answer is obvious:  whether 
these parties will arbitrate their underlying dispute must be 
decided by the arbitrator.  The Operating Agreement upon which 
Midwest bases its non-compete claim against Great Lakes and Dr. 
Pannu contains an arbitration clause, which plainly incorporates 
JAMS Arbitration Rules: 
                                                 
5 Majority op., ¶46. 
No.  2016AP601.rgb 
 
5 
 
 
Section 13.7. Arbitration. With the exception of 
any decision made by Midwest pursuant to the terms of 
Section 5.5 hereof ["Appointment of and Powers of the 
Company President."] (which shall be deemed final), 
the parties hereto agree to resolve any and all 
disputes arising with respect to the terms and 
conditions of this Operating Agreement hereby by 
arbitration conducted by a single arbitrator selected 
from a slate of potential arbitrators residing in the 
Milwaukee, Madison or Chicago metropolitan areas, from 
a slate of five, proposed by JAMS.  The party 
requesting arbitration shall strike the first name 
from the slate and the other party shall strike the 
next, alternating until a final individual remains, 
who 
shall 
serve 
as 
arbitrator 
and 
conduct 
an 
arbitration 
proceeding 
in 
accordance 
with 
the 
Arbitration Rules of JAMS.  The arbitrator shall have 
the power to order temporary and permanent injunctive 
relief, on an expedited basis if deemed necessary.  
Any decision made by such an arbitrator within the 
scope of his or her authority shall be binding upon 
the parties.  Unless agreed otherwise by the parties 
and arbitrator, the arbitration shall take place in 
Milwaukee County.  The arbitration shall be governed 
by the laws of the State of Wisconsin, this Operating 
Agreement and the JAMS' Arbitration Rules[.] 
(Emphasis added.)  JAMS Rule 11(b) provides: 
Jurisdictional and arbitrability disputes, including 
disputes over the formation, existence, validity, 
interpretation or scope of the agreement under which 
Arbitration is sought, and who are proper Parties to 
the Arbitration, shall be submitted to and ruled on by 
the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator has the authority to 
determine jurisdiction and arbitrability issues as a 
preliminary matter. 
(Emphasis added.)  Accordingly, the arbitration provision of the 
Operating Agreement evinces the parties' contractual agreement 
to have the arbitrator, rather than the circuit court, decide 
issues of arbitrability.  The arbitration provision also 
requires "any and all disputes arising with respect to the terms 
and conditions of this Operating Agreement" be resolved in 
arbitration under JAMS rules. 
No.  2016AP601.rgb 
 
6 
 
¶135 Application of these rules under Wisconsin law easily 
resolves this preliminary issue.  The parties entered into a 
contract with an arbitration clause, which incorporates JAMS 
Arbitration Rules.  Those Rules confer exclusive authority on 
the arbitrator to decide issues of arbitrability.  Controlling 
law holds that by doing so, the arbitrability question must be 
decided by the arbitrator——not the circuit court.  The dispute 
about whether the Redemption Agreement was formed challenges the 
existence and validity of the Operating Agreement.  JAMS Rule 
11(b) controls and assigns authority to resolve this preliminary 
dispute to the arbitrator alone.   Allegations that a partially-
executed Redemption Agreement superseded the Operating Agreement 
do not alter the analysis. 
¶136 The majority expresses concern that "serious questions 
exist as to whether the Operating Agreement still controls the 
issue 
of 
arbitrability, 
whether 
the 
Redemption 
Agreement 
supersedes that agreement, and to what extent, if any, one co-
defendant, Dr. Pannu individually, ever agreed to arbitrate."6  I 
agree.  But the parties' contract specifies that the arbitrator, 
not a court, must answer these questions.  The contract could 
not be clearer:  "arbitrability disputes, including disputes 
over the . . . existence, [and] validity . . . of the agreement 
under which Arbitration is sought, and who are proper Parties to 
the Arbitration, shall be submitted to and ruled on by the 
Arbitrator."  Great Lakes and Dr. Pannu challenge the existence 
                                                 
6 Majority op., ¶54. 
No.  2016AP601.rgb 
 
7 
 
and validity of the Operating Agreement in light of the 
Redemption Agreement.  The parties agreed the arbitrator would 
decide this issue.  Dr. Pannu disputes being a proper party to 
the arbitration.  The parties agreed the arbitrator would decide 
this issue too.  Contrary to the majority's minimization of the 
arbitrator's authority to decide arbitrability as a mere 
"presumption,"7 it is the parties' contract that requires 
arbitrability to be decided by the arbitrator.  The court errs 
in interpreting Chapter 788 to require stripping the arbitrator 
of his contractual authority; nothing in Chapter 788 empowers 
the judiciary to override the parties' contracted method for 
resolving this precursory issue. 
¶137 Contrary to the majority's misconstruction of the 
issue presented, this case is not about precluding parties from 
entering into subsequent agreements or altering the parties' 
preexisting choice of forum for dispute resolution.  Certainly 
parties are free to change their minds and revoke, cancel, or 
otherwise invalidate the original agreement to arbitrate.  But 
any decision to undo a contractual agreement to arbitrate must 
be mutual.  If the parties did not dispute the formation of the 
Redemption Agreement or its applicability to each of them, the 
court may not be considering arbitration at all, given the 
unchallenged and fully executed Redemption Agreement with a 
merger clause.  See Town Bank v. City Real Estate Dev., LLC, 
2010 WI 134, 330 Wis. 2d 340, 793 N.W.2d 476.  A merger clause 
                                                 
7 Majority op., ¶54. 
No.  2016AP601.rgb 
 
8 
 
in a contract executed only by the party seeking to enforce that 
merger clause in order to evade a prior agreement to arbitrate 
does not have the same superseding effect when another party 
disputes its formation and application to all parties.8 
¶138 This court has repeatedly protected parties' freedom 
to contract.  Id., ¶33 (collecting cases).  Our goal when 
interpreting contracts freely entered into by the parties "is to 
ascertain the true intentions of the parties as expressed by the 
contractual language."  Id. (quoted source omitted).  "[T]he 
best indication of the parties' intent is the language of the 
contract itself" and unless the contract is ambiguous, we stick 
to "the four corners of the contract, without consideration of 
extrinsic evidence."  Id. (quoted source omitted). The only 
undisputed, freely-made contract before the court is the 
Operating Agreement and its plain language says the parties want 
"any and all" disputes about its existence or validity to be 
resolved by the arbitrator.  I would honor the parties' contract 
by 
enforcing 
the 
arbitration 
provision 
in 
the 
Operating 
Agreement. 
¶139 The majority opinion quotes "fundamental principles of 
freedom to contract" and acknowledges the "utmost liberty of 
contracting" and holds these rights "sacred,"9 but then proceeds 
                                                 
8 Not only do Midwest and NEA challenge the formation of the 
Redemption Agreement, they also dispute the applicability of its 
merger clause to NEA based on language restricting its scope to 
Dr. Pannu and Midwest. 
9 Majority op., ¶5, ¶39. 
No.  2016AP601.rgb 
 
9 
 
to disregard the plain text of the parties' Operating Agreement 
and to ignore well-established arbitration principles supporting 
freedom of contract rights.  The majority invents a new 
procedure for circuit courts to follow when a party to an 
existing contract requiring arbitration contends the fully-
executed first contract is void due to the parties' negotiations 
over a second contract, which one party signed but the other 
party refused to sign.  This unprecedented judicial intrusion 
directs courts to ignore the contractual conferral of authority 
on the arbitrator to decide arbitrability, and instead conduct a 
full-blown court trial over the existence and validity of the 
fully-executed contract containing the arbitration clause.  As a 
result, the parties who previously decided to resolve disputes 
out-of-court will be subjected to a circuit court calendar 
delaying any hope of resolving the merits of the non-compete 
allegations until a factfinder resolves this preliminary dispute 
in a forum the parties previously rejected in favor of private 
arbitration. 
¶140 In reaching this result, the majority erroneously 
distinguishes and "clarifies," but does not overrule, the only 
two Wisconsin cases addressing similar factual 
scenarios:  
Cirilli, 322 Wis. 2d 238, and Mortimore, 344 Wis. 2d 459. 
¶141 Cirilli involved a dispute between insurance agents 
and their former employer, Country Insurance.  322 Wis. 2d 238, 
¶2.  The Agents' written agreements with Country required 
binding arbitration for "any claim or controversy relating to or 
arising out of the relationship between the Agent and the 
No.  2016AP601.rgb 
 
10 
 
Companies."  Id., ¶3.  The Agents sued Country in circuit court 
claiming Country owed them termination commissions under the 
written agreements.  Id., ¶2.  Country filed a motion to compel 
arbitration of the Agents' claims.  Id., ¶3.  The Agents argued 
that a settlement agreement and release Country executed with 
different former agents making similar claims superseded the 
arbitration provision.  Id., ¶5, ¶9.  The Agents supported their 
argument with the decision of an arbitrator, in a prior case 
brought by different former agents, who determined the release 
voided the arbitration requirement.  Id., ¶¶6-7.  The circuit 
court agreed with the Agents' position and refused to order 
arbitration.  Id., ¶8.  The court of appeals reversed and 
ordered the matter sent to the arbitrator for determination.  
Id., ¶19.  The court of appeals held the Agents' claims for 
termination commissions fell squarely within the agreement 
requiring arbitration and the fact that another arbitrator 
decided the release voided similarly situated agents' agreements 
with Country cannot be the basis for avoiding the Cirilli 
Agents' contractual language.  Id., ¶¶15-18.  The court of 
appeals ruled that by concluding the release controlled, the 
circuit court erroneously determined the merits of the Cirilli 
Agents' claims——a task assigned to the arbitrator, not the 
circuit court.  Id. 
¶142 Cirilli prohibits circuit courts from deciding the 
merits when the parties have agreed to arbitrate disputes, even 
when the answer is obvious and even when another arbitrator has 
already ruled on the merits of an identical claim involving 
No.  2016AP601.rgb 
 
11 
 
different claimants.  Transferring a decision on the merits to 
the circuit court usurps the freedom of contract and the mutual 
decision 
two 
parties 
made 
to 
have 
disputes 
resolved 
by 
arbitration. 
¶143 What constitutes the "merits" of a case can be unclear 
when 
one 
party 
argues 
a 
subsequent 
contract 
voided 
the 
obligations under the original contract.  Typically, the merits 
will be the substantive allegation——here, Midwest's claim that 
Dr. Pannu violated his non-compete obligation goes to the 
"merits" of the dispute.  However, the "merits" in this case 
also include a determination that a subsequent contract voids 
the existing contract because such a determination altogether 
eliminates the non-compete claim.  By having the circuit court 
hold a trial whenever parties dispute the formation of a second 
contract (despite the existing contract's requirement that 
arbitrability be decided by the arbitrator), the majority 
disregards 
both 
the 
parties' 
contract 
and 
longstanding 
arbitration rules applied by both this court and the United 
States Supreme Court.10 
                                                 
10 "[A] court is not to rule on the potential merits of the 
underlying claims" even if the claims appear frivolous.  AT&T 
Tech., Inc. v. Commc'ns. Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649-50 
(1986).  Courts "have no business weighing the merits of the 
grievance, considering whether there is equity in a particular 
claim, or determining whether there is particular language in 
the written instrument which will support the claim."  Id.  Any 
doubts as to whether a claim should be arbitrated should be 
resolved in favor of arbitration.  Id. at 650.  "[A] challenge 
to the validity of the contract as a whole, and not specifically 
to the arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator."  Buckeye 
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006). 
No.  2016AP601.rgb 
 
12 
 
¶144 In attempting to distinguish Cirilli, the majority 
ignores the fact that the Cirilli Agents argued the release——
which did not contain an arbitration clause——superseded the 
underlying 
agreement 
between 
the 
parties, 
including 
its 
arbitration clause.  This is the very issue presented in this 
case and the majority is simply wrong to state otherwise.  
Whether a subsequent agreement supersedes an earlier agreement 
containing an arbitration clause is a "question[] not properly 
before the court[.]"  Cirilli, 322 Wis. 2d at 253, ¶18.  In this 
case, whether the Redemption Agreement supersedes the Operating 
Agreement inquires into the existence and validity of the 
Operating Agreement, an issue the parties agreed the arbitrator 
must decide.  The majority's interference with the arbitrator's 
exclusive province threatens the freedom to contract; it does 
not advance it. 
¶145 In Mortimore, the court of appeals ordered arbitration 
in a factual scenario almost identical to Midwest's.  Mortimore 
and his employer, Merge, had a written employment contract, 
which contained an arbitration clause for claims "'arising out 
of or relating to this Agreement.'"  Mortimore, 344 Wis. 2d 459, 
¶3.  The arbitration clause incorporated American Arbitration 
Association ("AAA") rules, and required any amendments to the 
contract be "in writing and signed" by Merge.  Id.  Merge's 
Compensation Committee and Mortimore were working on a new 
contract for Mortimore and ostensibly reached an oral agreement 
on a contract that did not contain an arbitration clause.  Id., 
¶7.  The new contract was never signed, however, because Merge 
No.  2016AP601.rgb 
 
13 
 
learned Mortimore had interfered with Merge's audit, and 
Mortimore subsequently resigned at Merge's request.  Id., ¶8.  
Mortimore sued Merge in court for breach of contract and Merge 
requested the circuit court send the matter to arbitration.  
Id., ¶¶9-10.  The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing and 
concluded the oral contract superseded the contract requiring 
arbitration.  Id., ¶10. 
¶146 The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the 
question of whether the unsigned second contract superseded the 
arbitration-requiring 
contract 
was 
a 
question 
for 
the 
arbitrator.  Id., ¶21.  The court of appeals held:  (1) deciding 
the oral agreement trumped the existing employment contract is a 
determination on the merits that courts "do not make," id., ¶19 
(citing AT&T Tech., 475 U.S. at 648-50); and (2) the parties 
unmistakably indicated they wanted the arbitrator to decide 
arbitrability as evidenced by the existing employment contract's 
adoption of AAA arbitration rules, including Rule 7(a):  "[t]he 
arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own 
jurisdiction, including any objection with respect to the 
existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement."  
Id., ¶20 (brackets in Mortimore). 
¶147 Mortimore is on all fours with the facts in the 
current case.  When parties have an existing contract with an 
arbitration clause indicating the parties want the arbitrator to 
decide arbitrability, whether a subsequent oral or partially 
executed agreement supersedes the existing contract is an issue 
the arbitrator must decide. 
No.  2016AP601.rgb 
 
14 
 
¶148 By favoring judicial resolution of the preliminary 
issue of arbitrability due to the mere possibility that a second 
contract might be valid, the majority ignores both the language 
of the Operating Agreement as well as longstanding arbitration 
principles. Because the parties dispute whether a second 
contract superseded the first, the plain text of the first 
contract, requiring that arbitrability be decided by the 
arbitrator, governs.  The parties, who agreed to resolve "any 
and all disputes" by arbitration, should get the benefit of 
their bargain.  Instead of honoring the parties' contract to 
arbitrate, the majority sets it aside. 
¶149 The majority hollowly recites the pivotal precept that 
"[f]reedom of contract is based on the idea that individuals 
should have the power to govern their own affairs without 
interference,"11 but nevertheless unseats the contractually-
chosen arbitrator in favor of a judicially-imposed circuit court 
to resolve a dispute between parties who expressly rejected the 
court system as a forum for dispute resolution.  Because I would 
enforce the parties' contractual expectations, I respectfully 
dissent. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Majority op., ¶39 (quoting Solowicz v. Forward Geneva 
Nat'l, LLC, 2010 WI 20, ¶34, 323 Wis. 2d 556, 780 N.W.2d 111). 
No.  2016AP601.rgb 
 
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