Case Title: Bolduc v. Bolduc

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2023 ME 54

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2023-08-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2023 ME 54 
Docket: 
Yor-22-205 
Argued: 
December 7, 2022 
Decided: 
August 17, 2023 
 
Panel: 
STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, and LAWRENCE, JJ. 
 
 
SARAH R. BOLDUC 
 
v. 
 
DANIEL J. BOLDUC 
 
 
LAWRENCE, J. 
[¶1]  Daniel J. Bolduc appeals from a divorce judgment, entered by the 
District Court (York, D. Driscoll, J.) on March 30, 2022, awarding Daniel $35,500 
of the marital equity in the real estate owned by Sarah R. Bolduc and her father 
as joint tenants.  Daniel argues, in part, that the court erred when it valued the 
real estate as of the date the parties separated rather than the date the parties 
divorced.  We vacate the divorce judgment with respect to the court’s valuation 
and division of the marital equity in the real estate and remand to the court to 
value the real estate as of the date of the divorce, based on its own independent 
assessment of the evidence in the record, and, thereafter, equitably divide the 
parties’ marital estate.  We affirm the judgment in all other respects. 
 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The court found the following facts, which are supported by 
competent evidence in the record.  Whitmore v. Whitmore, 2023 ME 3, ¶ 3, 288 
A.3d 799.  Daniel and Sarah were married on September 6, 2014, and are the 
parents of one child.  On December 30, 2015, Sarah and her father, William 
“Mark” Foster, purchased real estate in York, Maine, as joint tenants.  Foster 
provided the entire $50,000 down payment for the purchase of the real estate.1  
Following the purchase, Daniel and Sarah used the real estate as their marital 
home and paid the mortgage using funds from their collective marital efforts.  
In March 2019, Daniel left the marital home and thereafter did not make any 
payments toward the mortgage or pay any house-related expenses.  On 
March 28, 2019, Sarah filed for divorce.  The court granted the parties’ divorce, 
after trial, on March 29, 2022. 
[¶3]  Prior to trial, the parties each obtained an appraisal of the real 
estate.  Sarah’s appraisal valued the real estate at $320,000 as of March 26, 
2019.  Daniel’s appraisal valued the real estate at $382,500 as of 
October 27, 2021.  Both appraisals were admitted in evidence without 
objection. 
 
1  The court found that Foster’s contribution of the down payment did not constitute a gift. 
 
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[¶4]  The court concluded that Foster and Sarah, as joint tenants, each 
owned a one-half interest in the real estate.  Pursuant to the statutory marital 
property presumption,2 the court found that the value of Sarah’s interest in the 
real estate was marital property and subject to division in the divorce action.  
The court determined that, because the balance of the mortgage on the real 
estate was reduced by mortgage payments made by the parties and the parties 
created equity in the real estate through this marital effort, some of the real 
estate’s equity was part of the marital estate and subject to division in the 
parties’ divorce action.  In addition, the court found that Daniel failed to provide 
any evidence from which the court could determine by how much his alleged 
renovations to the marital residence increased the real estate’s value after it 
was acquired. 
[¶5]  The court elected to value the real estate using the March 2019 
appraisal of $320,000 solely because “Sarah became responsible for the 
mortgage payments after the separation” and, therefore, it was “reasonable to 
value the marital [equity in the real estate] at the time Daniel vacated the 
 
2  The court applied the marital property presumption by relying on our precedent.  See, e.g., 
Coppola v. Coppola, 2007 ME 147, ¶ 20, 938 A.2d 786; Sewall v. Saritvanich, 1999 ME 46, ¶ 19, 726 
A.2d 224; Williams v. Williams, 645 A.2d 1118 (Me. 1994).  This presumption is also set out at 19-A 
M.R.S. § 953(3) (2023) (“All property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage and prior 
to a decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital property regardless of whether title is held 
individually or by the spouses in some form of coownership such as joint tenancy . . . .”). 
 
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property, stopped [contributing to] mortgage payments or other expenses, and 
the divorce action was initiated.”  The court then reduced the real estate’s 
$320,000 appraised value by the mortgage balance of $178,000, leaving 
$142,000 of total equity in the real estate.  The court reasoned that, in view of 
the joint tenancy of Foster and Sarah, the marital equity in the real estate was 
$71,000 (i.e., one-half of the total equity in the real estate).  The court then 
divided in half the marital equity in the real estate, awarding $35,500 to Sarah 
and $35,500 to Daniel.3 
[¶6]  After the court entered its divorce judgment on March 29, 2022, 
Daniel filed a motion for further findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The 
court denied Daniel’s motion, and Daniel timely appealed.  See M.R. App. P. 
2B(c)(1), (2)(B); M.R. Civ. P. 52(b). 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶7]  Daniel argues that the court erred in its assessment of the marital 
equity in the real estate by not considering that Foster’s interest in the real 
estate, as a joint tenant, was subject to change based on the parties’ subsequent 
 
3  The court thereafter reduced Daniel’s $35,500 portion by his share of marital debt, an IRS 
garnishment of a tax refund to the parties because of Daniel’s unpaid child support for his older child 
from another relationship, and Sarah’s marital interest in an insurance payment Daniel received for 
a totaled truck.  The court ordered that Sarah pay Daniel the remaining $10,900 of his share of the 
marital equity within ninety days of the judgment. 
 
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contributions to the marital home.4  Daniel also asserts that the court erred by 
using the March 2019 appraisal of the home rather than the October 2021 
appraisal, which was obtained closer to the time of the parties’ divorce. 
 
[¶8]  We review for clear error the court’s factual findings, including 
determinations about a property’s value or a property’s classification as marital 
or nonmarital.  Laqualia v. Laqualia, 2011 ME 114, ¶ 10, 30 A.3d 838; Nadeau v. 
 
4  Daniel also contends, in part, that the court erred by awarding Foster a one-half interest in the 
real property because Foster was not a party to the divorce action and the court therefore lacked 
jurisdiction to determine Sarah’s and Foster’s interests.  We disagree. 
 
We have recently explained, 
 
The jurisdiction of the divorce court is purely statutory, and its authority to act 
on matters of divorce must arise out of the statutory law or not at all. . . .  [A] court is 
authorized to divide marital property in proportions the court considers just after 
considering all relevant factors.  It is presumed that all property acquired by [either] 
spouse subsequent to the marriage and prior to a decree of legal separation is marital 
property. 
 
Dobbins v. Dobbins, 2020 ME 73, ¶ 12, 234 A.3d 223 (emphasis added) (alterations, citations, and 
quotation marks omitted).  As explained infra, here the court appropriately applied the marital 
property presumption and correctly classified as marital property the value of the equity Sarah held 
with her one-half interest in the real estate.  Thus, contrary to Daniel’s contention, the court had 
jurisdiction over Sarah’s one-half interest in the real estate, and it was required to equitably divide 
that marital property.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 953(1)-(3); Howard v. Howard, 2010 ME 83, ¶ 11, 2 A.3d 318 
(“In a divorce proceeding, the District Court has subject matter jurisdiction to determine the 
ownership interests of the spouses in order to divide their marital property.”).  Because Foster was 
not a party to the divorce action, the court had no personal jurisdiction over him.  See Howard, 2010 
ME 83, ¶ 12, 2 A.3d 318.  Accordingly, pursuant to section 953, Foster’s one-half interest in the real 
estate was not part of the marital estate at the time of the divorce, nor was it subject to distribution 
or award by the court.  The court also had no jurisdiction to order a sale or other disposition of the 
real estate itself, only the parties’ interest in it.  See Littell v. Bridges, 2023 ME 29, ¶ 13, 293 A.3d 445 
(explaining that, although the court lacked jurisdiction over a company owned by the spouses and 
thus could not dissolve the company, it had jurisdiction over the spouses’ membership interests in 
the company and could equitably divide that interest).  Finally, the court’s findings with respect to 
the marital interest in the real estate would not have any preclusive effect against Foster in the event 
his and Sarah’s ownership interests in the real estate might be at issue in some future action.  
See Fiduciary Tr. Co. v. Wheeler, 2016 ME 26, ¶ 10, 132 A.3d 1178. 
 
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Nadeau, 2008 ME 147, ¶ 42, 957 A.2d 108.  A finding is clearly erroneous if it is 
unsupported by competent evidence in the record.  Laqualia, 2011 ME 114, 
¶ 10, 30 A.3d 838.  “[W]e review the court’s distribution of [marital] property 
for an abuse of discretion.”  Id. (alteration and quotation marks omitted).  We 
have long recognized a three-step process that a court must follow in equitably 
distributing marital property in a divorce proceeding: (1) “distinguish marital 
from nonmarital property”; (2) “set apart nonmarital property”; and (3) “divide 
marital property in such proportion as the court deems just.”  Id. ¶ 13 
(quotation marks omitted). 
A. 
Distinguishing Marital from Nonmarital Property 
[¶9]  The classification of property as marital or nonmarital is controlled 
by statute, and there is a marital property presumption that applies to property 
that is acquired after parties are married.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 953(3) (2023).  
Pursuant to section 953(3), “[a]ll property acquired by either spouse 
subsequent to the marriage and prior to a decree of legal separation is 
presumed to be marital property regardless of whether title is held individually 
or by the spouses in some form of coownership such as joint tenancy.”5 
 
5  A party may overcome the marital property presumption by demonstrating that the property 
in question falls within one of the exceptions enumerated in 19-A M.R.S. § 953(2).  Neither party 
contends that any of these exceptions applies in this case. 
 
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[¶10]  In general, joint tenants initially hold an undivided one-half 
interest in the property, even if their initial contributions may have been 
unequal.  See, e.g., Bradford v. Dumond, 675 A.2d 957, 961 (Me. 1996); Boulette 
v. Boulette, 627 A.2d 1017, 1018 (Me. 1993); Ackerman v. Hojnowski, 2002 ME 
147, ¶¶ 10-11, 804 A.2d 412.  We have, however, consistently explained that, 
when a court is equitably dividing real property, it should consider “all equities” 
growing out of the joint tenancy relationship, including the contributions that 
the parties have made after the formation of the joint tenancy.  Ackerman, 2002 
ME 147, ¶¶ 11-12, 804 A.2d 412 (quotation marks omitted). 
[¶11]  In this case, the court correctly found that the value of the equity 
Sarah held in the real estate was marital property subject to division.  The real 
property was acquired by Sarah and Foster, as joint tenants, after the parties 
were married, thereby triggering the marital property presumption of section 
953(3).  Moreover, our review of the record leads us to conclude that the court 
correctly found that Daniel failed to provide any evidence from which the court 
could determine by how much his alleged renovations increased the real 
estate’s value after it was acquired.  We therefore also conclude that the court 
 
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did not err in finding that Sarah is a joint tenant with an equal, undivided 
interest in the real estate.6 
B. 
Division of Marital Property 
 
[¶12]  Before the court equitably divides marital property in the third 
step of the equitable distribution process, it must first determine the marital 
property’s value by conducting an independent review of the evidence 
presented by the parties.  See Findlen v. Findlen, 1997 ME 130, ¶ 12, 695 A.2d 
1216 (“[W]hen the court is presented with two appraisals as to the value of 
property . . . we will let stand any estimate within the range of expert opinion 
reached by the court through an independent review of the evidence.” (emphasis 
added)); Shirley v. Shirley, 482 A.2d 845, 849-50 (Me. 1984) (affirming a 
judgment where the court’s “decision to rely on [a] more recent appraisal . . . 
was based on [its] own independent assessment and [was] adequately 
supported by [sufficient evidence in the record]”).7  Our holdings also suggest 
that a court must determine the value of marital property as of a date as near 
 
6  Because the parties do not contend that the court erred in setting apart nonmarital property, 
we need not consider whether the court properly applied the second step of the equitable 
distribution process. 
 
7  Although not limited to such considerations, an independent assessment of valuation evidence 
may include weighing the substance of competing appraisals; the methodologies used to create the 
appraisals; and the appraiser’s credibility, credentials, and familiarity with the subject market. 
 
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as practicable to the date of the property division.8  See Levy, Maine Family Law 
§§ 7.2[2], 7.8[1] (8th ed. 2013); Crooker v. Crooker, 432 A.2d 1293, 1297 
(Me. 1981) (explaining that the court does not need to “indulge in speculation” 
by considering possible future events and that “[t]he value of marital assets 
should be determined as of the time they are distributed” (emphasis added)); 
Austin v. Austin, 2000 ME 61, ¶ 7, 748 A.2d 996 (discerning error where the 
court “fix[ed] the date of valuation as the date of the decree, rather than the date 
of the actual division of the asset” (emphasis added)). 
 
[¶13]  Here, although the court did not err in applying the first two steps 
of the equitable distribution process, it erred as of a matter of law in its 
application of the third step by, in effect, applying equitable principles to 
determine the marital property’s value.  The parties submitted two appraisals 
that were conducted approximately 2.5 years apart and reflected a $62,500 
difference in value between the earlier appraisal and the later one.  The court 
found that it was reasonable to value the marital equity in the real estate as of 
March 2019, the date of the parties’ separation, because that was when Daniel 
vacated the property, the divorce action was filed, Daniel stopped contributing 
 
8  There may be, however, circumstances in which, based on an independent assessment of the 
appraisal evidence provided by the parties, the court appropriately finds that an older appraisal 
provides a more credible analysis of the value to assign to the marital property. 
 
10 
to the household expenses, and Sarah became responsible for the mortgage 
payments.  The court’s valuation of the marital equity in the real estate, 
however, did not include findings related to its independent assessment of the 
two appraisals.  Although the court was rightfully concerned about the timing 
and circumstances surrounding the parties’ separation, these considerations 
should have been applied only after the court determined the value of the 
marital equity in the real estate based on its own independent assessment of 
the two appraisals in evidence.  The court’s decision to value the marital equity 
in the real estate as of the date of separation rather than the date of divorce was 
therefore an error of law.9  Cf. Moran v. Moran, 2022 ME 43, ¶¶ 17-21, 20 n.7, 
279 A.3d 385 (discerning error where the court valued a retirement account as 
of the date of the parties’ de facto separation rather than the date of the parties’ 
divorce because, in doing so, the court “implicitly found” that any increase in 
the account’s value would be nonmarital, and “[t]he duration of the marriage is 
 
9  Moreover, we cannot infer findings from the evidence in this record and we cannot assume that 
the court would have relied on the earlier appraisal if it had valued the property as of the date of the 
parties’ divorce.  See Ehret v. Ehret, 2016 ME 43, ¶ 9, 135 A.3d 101 (“[W]hen a motion for findings 
[pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52] has been timely filed and denied, we cannot infer findings from the 
evidence in the record. . . . [I]f the judgment does not include specific findings that are sufficient to 
support the result, appellate review is impossible and the order denying findings must be vacated.” 
(alterations and quotation marks omitted)).  We therefore cannot say that the court’s error was 
harmless.  See M.R. Civ. P. 61. 
 
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not a relevant factor” for the court to consider when “determining whether 
property is marital or nonmarital”). 
[¶14]  We therefore vacate the divorce judgment with respect to the 
court’s valuation and division of the marital equity in the real estate and 
remand for the court to determine the value of the marital equity in the real 
estate at the time of the divorce and not the separation, based on its 
independent assessment of the appraisal evidence in the record.  After such 
valuation, the court must apply section 953(1) to equitably divide the parties’ 
marital property.  If the court determines it is necessary, it may, in its discretion, 
reopen the record on remand. 
The entry is: 
 
Order denying findings and portion of the 
judgment regarding the valuation and division of 
marital property vacated.  Judgment affirmed in 
all other respects.  Remanded for further 
proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robert A. Levine, Esq. (orally), Portland, for appellant Daniel J. Bolduc 
 
Pamela Holmes, Esq. (orally), and Mary-Ann Letourneau, Esq., Holmes Legal 
Group, LLC, Wells, for appellee Sarah R. Bolduc 
 
 
York District Court docket number FM-2019-64 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY