Case Title: Commonwealth v. Mcneil

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13379

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2023-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13379 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MICHAEL J. MCNEIL. 
 
 
 
Essex.     April 3, 2023. - June 28, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Shoplifting.  Habitual Offender.  Evidence, Other offense, 
Guilty plea.  Practice, Criminal, Plea, Finding of guilty.  
Statute, Construction.  Words, "Offense." 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Lynn Division of the 
District Court Department on June 29, 2021. 
 
 
After transfer to the Salem Division of the District Court 
Department, a motion to dismiss was heard by Randy S. Chapman, 
J., a question of law was reported by him to the Appeals Court, 
and a conditional plea was accepted by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Valerie A. DePalma for the defendant. 
Marina Moriarty, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Michelle May Peterson, pro se, amicus curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
LOWY, J.  General Laws c. 266, § 30A (§ 30A), provides that 
first and second offense shoplifting is punishable by fine only.  
Third offense shoplifting, however, is punishable by fine or 
imprisonment.  G. L. c. 266, § 30A.  The issue we address in 
this case is whether a "guilty-filed" disposition constitutes a 
predicate "offense" under § 30A.  We conclude that it does.1 
 
Background.  The defendant, Michael J. Mcneil, was charged 
in the District Court with shoplifting, third offense, in 
violation of § 30A.  The disposition in one of the predicate 
offenses on which the Commonwealth relied in support of the 
third offense portion of the charge was a guilty-filed 
disposition2 after the defendant pleaded guilty. 
The defendant moved to dismiss so much of the complaint 
that alleged a third offense, asserting that his previous case, 
which was guilty-filed, cannot serve as a predicate offense.  
Thereafter, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 34, as amended, 422 
Mass. 1501 (2004), the District Court judge reported to the 
Appeals Court the question whether a guilty-filed disposition 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Michelle May 
Peterson. 
 
2 As discussed in further detail infra, a guilty-filed 
disposition occurs where a judge suspends a defendant's sentence 
indefinitely only after a defendant's guilt has been 
adjudicated, by either a guilty verdict or guilty plea, and both 
the Commonwealth and the defendant have agreed to the 
disposition.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Simmons, 448 Mass. 687, 
693-694 (2007). 
3 
 
constitutes a predicate offense under § 30A.3  Subsequently, the 
defendant entered a conditional plea to shoplifting, third 
offense, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (b) (6), as appearing 
in 482 Mass. 1501 (2019), conditioned on the outcome of the 
reported question.  The defendant then filed a notice of appeal 
from his guilty plea, which was consolidated with the reported 
question, and we transferred the case sua sponte from the 
Appeals Court.4 
Discussion.  When construing a statute, "[o]ur fundamental 
aim is to discern and effectuate the intent of the Legislature" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Velazquez v. Commonwealth, 
491 Mass. 279, 281 (2023).  "To that end, '[t]he language of the 
statute is the primary source of insight into the intent of the 
Legislature'" (citation omitted).  Id.  "Therefore, where the 
statute is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry into the 
Legislature's intent need go no further than the statute's plain 
 
3 The question reported by the judge stated:  "Where a 
defendant is charged with third offense shoplifting, does a 
'guilty-filed' disposition on a shoplifting charge constitute a 
conviction which may be used as a predicate offense?" 
 
4 Rule 12 (b) (6) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
Procedure allows a defendant to tender a plea "while reserving 
the right to appeal any ruling or rulings that would, if 
reversed, render the Commonwealth's case not viable."  Here, 
there was no ruling to appeal, as the judge had reported the 
determinative issue without otherwise acting on the defendant's 
motion to dismiss.  We confine our opinion and the disposition 
to the reported question. 
4 
 
and ordinary meaning" (citation omitted).  Id.  "A fundamental 
tenet of statutory interpretation is that statutory language 
should be given effect consistent with its plain meaning and in 
light of the aim of the Legislature unless to do so would 
achieve an illogical result."  Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 
353, 360 (2001). 
The shoplifting statute penalizes "[a]ny person who 
intentionally takes possession of . . . any merchandise 
displayed, held, stored or offered for sale by any store or 
other retail mercantile establishment with the intention of 
depriving the merchant of [its] possession . . . without paying 
to the merchant the value thereof."  G. L. c. 266, § 30A.  Where 
the value of the stolen goods is less than $250, the statute 
provides for imprisonment only "for a third or subsequent 
offense."  Id.  Because "offense" is not defined in § 30A, we 
are charged with interpreting its meaning as guided by the 
principles of statutory interpretation discussed supra. 
"The generally recognized purpose of . . . graduated 
sentencing laws [such as § 30A] is to punish offenses more 
severely when the defendant has exhibited an unwillingness to 
reform his miscreant ways and to conform his life according to 
the law" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Resende, 474 Mass. 
455, 467-468 (2016).  "[A] second or subsequent offense is often 
regarded as more serious because it portends greater future 
5 
 
danger and therefore warrants an increased sentence for purposes 
of deterrence and incapacitation" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Baez, 480 Mass. 328, 332 (2018).  "Particularly 
salient here is the implicit link between enhanced punishment 
and behavioral reform, and the notion that the former should 
correspondingly increase along with a defendant's [forgone] 
opportunities for the latter" (citation omitted).  Resende, 
supra at 467. 
While we have previously explained that "offense" has 
different meanings in different contexts, we have noted, with 
specific reference to § 30A, that "sentencing statutes tend to 
treat the word 'offense' as synonymous with 'conviction'[5] or 
'adjudication'" (emphasis added).  Wallace W. v. Commonwealth, 
 
5 "The ordinary legal meaning of 'conviction' . . . is the 
confession of the accused in open court, or the verdict returned 
against him by the jury, which ascertains and publishes the fact 
of his guilt; while 'judgment' or 'sentence' is the appropriate 
word to denote the action of the court before which the trial is 
had, declaring the consequences to the convict of the fact thus 
ascertained."  Commonwealth v. LeRoy, 376 Mass. 243, 245 n.1 
(1978), quoting Commonwealth v. Lockwood, 109 Mass. 323, 325 
(1872).  The Court in Lockwood did recognize, however, that the 
word conviction has sometimes been "used in a more comprehensive 
sense, including the judgment of the court upon the verdict or 
confession of guilt."  Lockwood, supra at 329.  The defendant 
argues that we should interpret the term offense in § 30A as 
synonymous with the latter definition of conviction and as a 
result a guilty-filed disposition should not constitute an 
offense.  For the reasons discussed infra, we conclude that a 
guilty-filed disposition constitutes an offense under § 30A by 
virtue of the legislative intent behind graduated sentencing 
statutes and the adjudication of the defendant's guilt that is 
incumbent in a guilty-filed disposition. 
6 
 
482 Mass. 789, 796 (2019).  Consistent with the legislative 
intent behind such statutes, we see no reason to reach a 
different conclusion here. 
There is a long-standing practice in this Commonwealth of 
entering a guilty-filed disposition in certain criminal matters.  
See Commonwealth v. Simmons, 448 Mass. 687, 693 (2007) ("The 
earliest written countenance of the practice in Massachusetts is 
found in an 1831 decision of the old Municipal Court of 
Boston").  A guilty-filed disposition allows a judge discretion 
to suspend a defendant's sentence indefinitely so long as the 
defendant's factual guilt has been determined, by either a 
guilty verdict or guilty plea, and both the defendant and the 
Commonwealth consent to the guilty-filed disposition.  Id. at 
693-694, quoting Commonwealth v. Dowdican's Bail, 115 Mass. 133, 
136 (1874).6  See United States v. Curet, 670 F.3d 296, 302-303 
 
6 The guilty-filed practice was described in this court's 
seminal decision endorsing the practice as follows: 
 
"It has long been a common practice in this Commonwealth, 
after verdict of guilty in a criminal case, when the court 
is satisfied that, by reason of extenuating circumstances, 
or of the pendency of a question of law in a like case 
before a higher court, or other sufficient cause, public 
justice does not require an immediate sentence, to order, 
with the consent of the defendant and of the attorney for 
the Commonwealth, and upon such terms as the court in its 
discretion may impose, that the indictment be laid on file 
. . . ." 
 
Dowdican's Bail, 115 Mass. at 136.  See Simmons, 448 Mass. at 
693-694.  This long-standing common law practice has been 
7 
 
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 1041 (2012) ("The effect of a 
guilty-filed disposition in Massachusetts is to suspend 
sentencing of the defendant; such a disposition occurs after 
either a verdict or plea establishing the defendant's guilt" 
[emphasis added]).  The guilty-filed disposition developed "[a]s 
a predecessor to modern probation" and "allow[s] the would-be 
sentencing judge discretion in circumstances adjudged to be 
unduly harsh."  Simmons, supra at 693. 
We have previously stated that "a judgment of conviction 
does not enter unless sentence is imposed" (emphasis added), and 
placing a case "on file" means that a sentence is not 
immediately imposed; rather, it is suspended indefinitely.  
Simmons, 448 Mass. at 688 n.2.  However, when there is a guilty-
filed disposition, the judge "retains the ability, at any time, 
to remove the indictment from the file" and to sentence the 
defendant (emphasis added).  Id. at 696.  See Commonwealth v. 
Bianco, 390 Mass. 254, 259 (1983) ("As we have already 
indicated, it is always within the power of the [judge] to 
remove an indictment from the file and to impose a sentence 
thereon").  The reason that the judge has this authority is that 
the defendant's guilt has been formally adjudicated by either an 
 
acknowledged by and "enjoys the support of the Legislature."  
Id. at 694 (inferring support where "Legislature has not merely 
acquiesced [to guilty-filed practice], but has delineated 
expressly crimes where the case may not be placed on file"). 
8 
 
accepted guilty plea or a guilty verdict at trial.  See, e.g., 
Simmons, supra at 693-694 (guilty-filed disposition enters after 
guilty verdict); MacDonnel v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 277, 278 
(1967) ("he pleaded guilty and the complaint was placed on 
file").  In short, the entry of a guilty-filed disposition 
necessarily entails an adjudication of the defendant's guilt.7 
Thus, "[t]he point of sentence enhancement is to punish 
more severely offenders who have persevered in criminal 
activity" (citation omitted), Resende, 474 Mass. at 467, and the 
purpose of a guilty-filed disposition is to suspend sentencing, 
"not to prevent a guilty finding from entering" (emphasis 
added), Commonwealth v. Powell, 453 Mass. 320, 329 (2009).  See 
Wallace W., 482 Mass. at 796-797; Simmons, 448 Mass. at 692-700.  
While no sentence is imposed with the entry of a guilty-filed 
disposition, there is a definitive adjudication of guilt, and 
therefore, in keeping with the statutory purpose of increased 
penalties for those who are repeatedly adjudged guilty of 
 
7 As illustrated in Commonwealth v. Powell, 453 Mass. 320, 
328-330 (2009), a factual determination of the defendant's guilt 
is essential to a guilty-filed disposition. The suspension of a 
sentence without such a determination necessarily constitutes a 
continuance without a finding.  Id.  See Commonwealth v. 
Millican, 449 Mass. 298, 304 (2007) ("A continuance without a 
finding requires either a plea of guilty or an admission to 
sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty"). 
9 
 
criminal wrongdoing, it is clear that a guilty filed disposition 
constitutes an offense under § 30A.8  See Resende, supra. 
Conclusion.  We answer the reported question in the 
affirmative and hold that a guilty-filed disposition constitutes 
an offense under G. L. c. 266, § 30A. 
So ordered. 
 
8 Our conclusion that a guilty-filed disposition constitutes 
a predicate offense due to the formal adjudication of a 
defendant's guilt is consistent with how the United States Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit has considered the 
applicability of a guilty-filed disposition in similar contexts.  
See, e.g., Curet, 670 F.3d at 307-308 (defendant's prior guilty-
filed disposition was valid predicate for career offender 
purposes because it involved prior adjudication of defendant's 
guilt).