Case Title: State v. Hannah

Citation: 126 Ariz. 575, 617 P.2d 527

Docket Number: 14869-PR

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1980-09-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
126 Ariz. 575 (1980) 617 P.2d 527 STATE of Arizona, Petitioner, v. The Honorable J. Richard HANNAH, Judge of the Superior Court, Division Twelve, in and for the County of Pima, State of Arizona, Respondent, and O'Neal Harris, Real Party in Interest. No. 14869-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. September 10, 1980. Stephen D. Neely, Pima County Atty., by D. Jesse Smith, Deputy County Atty., Tucson, for respondent. Armand Salese, Tucson, for real party in interest. CAMERON, Justice. We granted this petition for review of a decision and opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division Two, State v. Hannah, 126 Ariz. 578, 617 P.2d 530 (App. 1980). We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-120.24 and Rule 31.19, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S. We must answer only one question: May a prior felony conviction be used for enhanced punishment pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604(B), if the prior conviction is obtained after the commission of the principal offense? The facts necessary for a disposition of this matter on appeal are as follows. Defendant O'Neal Harris was charged with three Class 2 felonies, all alleged to have been committed on 10 August 1979. At the *576 time of these offenses, defendant had previously committed four forgeries on 2 and 3 November 1978, but he was not convicted of these offenses until 22 October 1979. The county attorney timely alleged these offenses as prior convictions prior to trial. The trial court dismissed these allegations on the ground that prior convictions may only enhance punishment when the conviction of the prior offense occurs prior to the commission of the principal offense. The State sought and was granted relief by the Court of Appeals in a special action which vacated the trial court's order dismissing the allegation of prior convictions. Defendant petitioned this court to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. We granted the petition in order to settle the law which has become confused as a result of the adoption of the new criminal code which became effective 1 October 1978. A.R.S. § 13-604 provides for the enhanced punishment of dangerous and repetitive offenders. Paragraph B reads: As Harris' principal offenses are Class 2 felonies, and the prior convictions are felonies, A.R.S. § 13-604(B) governs his sentencing. It is noted that A.R.S. § 13-604 covers many aspects of the sentencing of the persistent and repetitive offender. § 13-604(A), for example, is both an enhanced punishment section as well as a statute of limitations (10 years), on the use of prior offenses in sentencing. § 13-604 is not a true recidivist statute as that term is commonly understood. Recidivist statutes have usually been construed to mean that the defendant must have been convicted of the crime before the second crime was committed in order for the statute to apply. See Annotation, 24 A.L.R.2d 1247. The purpose of such recidivist statutes is to deter crime by serving as a warning to first offenders and to encourage their reformation. Our state legislature has clearly indicated that it was concerned not only with deterring the commission of crime, but also with punishing the persistent or repetitive offender regardless of when the defendant committed the other offense. The statute, § 13-604(B), refers to prior convictions and not prior offenses. So long as the defendant was convicted of the other offense before the conviction in the principal offense, the enhanced punishment provisions of § 13-604(B) are applicable. In fact, subsection H of § 13-604 makes it clear that conviction of the other offense need not occur prior to the commission of the principal offense: Defendant argues that this statute should be construed to mean that when two offenses are consolidated for trial, their convictions may be counted as separate prior convictions for enhancement of later crimes. We disagree. Subsection H excludes the "spree offender" who commits *577 more than one crime in a connected series of events "on the same occasion," but includes successive but separate crimes even though the defendant could be convicted of both in a single trial. The Comment to § 703(F), now § 604(H), supports this interpretation: Section 604(B) does not require that the conviction of the prior offense precede the commission of the principal offense. § 604(B) merely requires a defendant to have "previously been convicted." Defendant, however, relies on our prior case of State v. Lopez, 120 Ariz. 607, 587 P.2d 1184 (1978), to support his position that the prior conviction must be obtained before the commission of the second offense in order to be used to enhance the punishment for the second crime. We disagree. The statute at issue in Lopez, supra, was quite different from the one we consider here. Former A.R.S. § 13-1649(A) stated: It clearly provided that the second offense must occur after the conviction upon the first offense. The present statute is not so restricted. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. The order of the trial court dismissing the allegation of prior conviction is set aside, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. STRUCKMEYER, C.J., HOLOHAN, V.C.J., and HAYS and GORDON, JJ., concur.