Case Title: People v. Rogers

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89313

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 89313-Agenda 8-March 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								WILLIAM A. ROGERS, Appellant.
Opinion filed July 26, 2001.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the McHenry County circuit court,
the defendant, William Rogers, was convicted of two counts of
criminal sexual assault, six counts of aggravated criminal sexual
abuse, and six counts of child pornography for videotaping his
sexual activities with two teenage boys who lived in his
neighborhood. The trial judge imposed 15-year sentences on each
of the two criminal sexual assault counts, to run concurrently with
7-year sentences on each of the six aggravated criminal sexual
abuse counts. The trial judge also imposed concurrent 10-year
sentences on each of the six child pornography counts. The judge
ordered consecutive sentences under section 5-8-4(b) of the
Unified Code of Corrections. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(b) (West 1998).
The defendant first would serve 15 years for the criminal sexual
assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse convictions against
the older boy. The defendant next would serve 15 years for the
criminal sexual assault and the aggravated criminal sexual abuse
convictions against the younger boy. The defendant finally would
serve 10 years for the child pornography convictions. The
defendant's three consecutive sentences totaled 40 years'
imprisonment. The judge also ordered the defendant to pay
restitution.
	After sentencing, the defendant obtained a new attorney, who
filed a motion to reduce the defendant's sentence. Another judge
heard and denied the defendant's motion, and the appellate court
affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence. People v.
Rogers, No. 2-95-0542 (1997) (unpublished order under Supreme
Court Rule 23). We denied the defendant's first petition for leave
to appeal. People v. Rogers, 175 Ill. 2d 549 (1997).
	In 1998, the defendant then through counsel filed a post-conviction petition, which the trial court summarily dismissed as
patently without merit. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal
in part, but remanded the cause for further proceedings on the
defendant's claim that his appellate attorney was ineffective for
failing to raise the issue that certain counts of the indictment were
based on a single act.(1) No. 2-98-0725 (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted the defendant's second
petition for leave to appeal. People v. Rogers, 189 Ill. 2d 675
(2000); see 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We now affirm.

ANALYSIS
	The defendant raises three issues in his appeal. We focus
initially on his first two contentions: whether the trial court erred
in summarily dismissing ineffective assistance of counsel claims
against his trial attorney and his appellate attorney. The defendant
asserts that his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to advise,
prior to the defendant's decision to reject the State's guilty plea
offer, that he could receive consecutive sentences totaling 40
years. The defendant also asserts that his appellate attorney was
ineffective in failing to raise a meritorious issue on direct appeal:
namely, that the defendant was denied a meaningful hearing on his
motion to reduce sentence because the trial judge hearing the
motion gave deference to the sentencing judge.(2)
	The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a
procedural mechanism through which a criminal defendant can
assert "that in the proceedings which resulted in his or her
conviction there was a substantial denial of his or her rights under
the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Illinois or
both." 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1998); see People v. Coleman,
183 Ill. 2d 366, 378-79 (1998). In a post-conviction proceeding,
the trial court does not redetermine a defendant's innocence or
guilt, but instead examines constitutional issues which escaped
earlier review. See People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 89 (1999). A
post-conviction petition is a collateral attack upon a prior
conviction and sentence, not a substitute for or an addendum to a
direct appeal. People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 425 (1999).
Consequently, any issues which were decided on direct appeal are
barred by res judicata; any issues which could have been raised on
direct appeal are forfeited. West, 187 Ill. 2d  at 425.
	The petition must enunciate clearly "the respects in which
petitioner's constitutional rights were violated" and must include
"affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations"
or an explanation why such evidence is not attached. 725 ILCS
5/122-2 (West 1998). The Act further provides: "If the petitioner
is sentenced to imprisonment and the court determines the petition
is frivolous or is patently without merit, it shall dismiss the
petition in a written order, specifying the findings of fact and
conclusions of law it made in reaching its decision." 725 ILCS
5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 1998).
	We turn to the allegations of the defendant's petition.

Trial Counsel
	 The defendant's post-conviction petition did not claim that
his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to advise him of the
sentencing range for the charged offenses. Instead, the defendant
alleged that he was penalized for exercising his right to a jury trial
when he received a sentence 28 years longer than the State's plea
offer. The defendant attached to his petition a letter from the
McHenry County State's Attorney's office, which offered to
recommend a 12-year sentence in return for the defendant's guilty
plea.
	 In an affidavit attached to his post-conviction petition,
however, the defendant stated:
			"I was never properly admonished as to the ultimate
possible length of my sentence.
			*** I was never properly admonished or instructed as to
how the indictments could be calculated other than the
minimus [sic] and maximus [sic] of each offense.
			*** Until I was actually sentenced, I was led to believe
by both the prosecution and defense attorneys, that the
maximum possible sentence was thirty years."
	In a supplement to his petition, the defendant alleged,
"Because of the failure to advise defendant of the sum total of
possible consecutive sentences, he was deprived of his right to be
fully informed before rejecting the plea offer extended to him" by
the State.
	However, the record belies the defendant's claim he was
never advised of the possible length of his sentence. In the hearing
on the defendant's presentencing motion to reinstate bond, the
defendant's attorney stated:
		"[The defendant] understands that those sentences could
be from forty years to sixty years or whatever. He
understood that when he came to my office for the first
time way back when we sat down, and I gave him all of
the options, and I told him that the sentence could be
extended based on certain circumstances. So this is
nothing new to him. He just didn't learn about the
sentence after he was convicted.  He's known what the
sentence could be all along."
	We have consistently upheld the dismissal of a post-conviction petition when the record from the original trial
proceedings contradicts the defendant's allegations. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 382; accord People v. Jones, 66 Ill. 2d 152, 157 (1977)
("A court may also properly dismiss a post-conviction petition if
the record of proceedings at trial shows the petition to be
nonmeritorious").
	The trial court correctly dismissed this claim.

Appellate Counsel
	The defendant's post-conviction petition claimed his appellate
attorney was ineffective for failing to raise unspecified
nonsentencing issues. The defendant also alleged he was
			"denied his statutory right to a Motion to Reduce
Sentence, when the judge in denying the motion to reduce
the sentence of incarceration, stated that the sentencing
judge was within the statutory sentencing parameters and
there was not abuse of discretion. *** By applying an
appellate standard for review of sentence, instead of
entertaining arguments to reduce for any reason, that
judge frustrated the purpose of the statute and thereby
denied defendant his constitutional right to due process of
law ***."
	The two-pronged Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), test applies to claims of
ineffective appellate counsel. People v. Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d 248,
269-70 (1989). A defendant who claims that appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise an issue on appeal must allege facts
demonstrating such failure was objectively unreasonable and that
counsel's decision prejudiced defendant. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d  at 377.
If the underlying issue is nonmeritorious, the defendant has
suffered no prejudice. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d  at 377. Normally, appellate
counsel's choices concerning which issues to pursue are entitled
to substantial deference. People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525, 532-33
(1995).
	Section 5-8-1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections provides
for a motion to reduce a sentence. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(c) (West
1998). Such a motion allows the trial court "the opportunity to
review a defendant's contention of sentencing error and save the
delay and expense inherent in appeal if they are meritorious."
People v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d 389, 394 (1997). However, sentence
determinations rest within the sentencing judge's discretion, and
a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment absent an abuse
of discretion. People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209-10 (2000);
People v. Crete, 113 Ill. 2d 156, 164 (1986); see also People v.
Hanna, 155 Ill. App. 3d 805, 811-12 (1987) (holding that a trial
court has discretion to, but need not, hear additional evidence on
a motion to reduce sentence).
	Here, in ruling on the defendant's motion to reduce sentence,
the judge stated: "Under the limited area in which I believe I'm
hearing this motion, I will find that the Judge was within the
sentencing parameters of the statute, and second, the Court cannot
find an abuse of discretion." We have found no authority
indicating this judge was required to exercise plenary review over
the defendant's sentence. Accordingly, the defendant's appellate
attorney was not ineffective in failing to pursue this issue. Again,
the trial court correctly dismissed this claim.
	In a supplemental brief, the defendant raises another issue
never previously addressed in this case. The defendant contends
that his consecutive sentences under section 5-8-4(b) violated
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). Recently, however, in People v. Wagener, 196 Ill.
2d ___ (2001), we held that consecutive sentences under section
5-8-4(b) do not violate Apprendi. See also People v. Carney, No.
90549 (June 21, 2001) (holding that consecutive sentences under
section 5-8-4(a) do not violate Apprendi). We, therefore, reject
the defendant's contention.(3)

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons we have discussed, we affirm the judgment
of the appellate court.



Affirmed.
 



1.      1The propriety of the appellate court's ruling on the single-act issue
is not before us.

2.      2In his initial brief, the defendant asserted that his appellate attorney
was ineffective for failing to raise a double-enhancement issue. In his
reply brief, the defendant "withdraws" this contention.

3.      3The defendant cannot raise this nonmeritorious constitutional issue
in a post-conviction context. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1998). We
do not decide, however, whether a meritorious Apprendi issue is
cognizable in a post-conviction proceeding, i.e., whether Apprendi
applies retroactively to cases on collateral review.