Case Title: Tolbert v. Gulsby

Citation: 333 So. 2d 129

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1976-05-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
333 So. 2d 129 (1976)
Gary R. TOLBERT, a minor, et al.
v.
Bruce H. GULSBY et al.
SC 1220.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 28, 1976.
*130 Braxton L. Kittrell, Jr., Mobile, for appellants.
Fred W. Killion, Jr., Mobile, for appellees.
HEFLIN, Chief Justice.
This case is an appeal from the granting of summary judgment in favor of defendants *131 below. The action arose on four counts alleging liability based on (1) negligence, (2) wantonness, (3) presence of attractive nuisance on defendant's premises and (4) presence of a dangerous instrumentality.
The undisputed facts are that plaintiff Gary R. Tolbert, a six-year-old, was shot in the eye by another child with an air rifle which was located in defendants' carport. The moving papers consisted of the pleadings and affidavits of defendants, Bruce and Esther Gulsby. Plaintiffs opposed the motion by submitting two affidavits of Curtis A. Tolbert, Gary's father, and depositions of plaintiff Gary R. Tolbert, Defendant Bruce H. Gulsby, and one Tammy Lynn Chandler. The issue on appeal is whether the trial judge erred in granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to each of the four counts.
On appeal from summary judgment, the appellate court looks at the same factors which the court below considered in ruling on the motion. 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2716, p. 430 (1973). Rule 56 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure states that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." On a motion for summary judgment all reasonable inferences from the facts are viewed most favorably to the non-moving party and the moving party is required to establish that the other party could not recover under `any discernible circumstances.' Folmar v. Montgomery Fair Company, Inc., 293 Ala. 686, 309 So. 2d 818 (1975); see United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 82 S. Ct. 993, 8 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1962); Rotermund v. United States Steel Corp., 474 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir. 1973); Nyhus v. Travel Management Corp., 151 U. S.App.D.C. 269, 466 F.2d 440 (1972).
The question before the court is this: Is there evidence which, when considered in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, would support any one of plaintiffs' theories of liability, and, thus, defeat summary judgment.
Under a negligence count, the duty owed by a landowner depends on the status of the injured party in relation to the defendant's land. See Mullins v. Pannell, 289 Ala. 252, 266 So. 2d 862 (1972); Autrey v. Roebuck Park Baptist Church, 285 Ala. 76, 229 So. 2d 469 (1969). If the injured party is determined to have been a trespasser, the landowner owes only the duty not to wantonly or intentionally injure him. City of Dothan v. Gulledge, 276 Ala. 433, 163 So. 2d 217 (1964); Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Green, 276 Ala. 120, 159 So. 2d 823 (1964). "Under ordinary conditions trespassing children, or children on the land of another as bare licensees, occupy the same position as trespassing adults." Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Green, supra; Mullins v. Pannell, 289 Ala. 252, 266 So. 2d 862 (1972). If plaintiff is found to have been on defendant's property with his consent or as his guest, but with no business purpose, he attains the status of licensee and is owed the duty not to be willfully or wantonly injured or not to be negligently injured after the landowner has discovered his peril. Autrey v. Roebuck Park Baptist Church, 285 Ala. 76, 229 So. 2d 469 (1969).
"Wantonness" has been defined by this court as
From the record before the court, there is no direct evidence that defendant Bruce Gulsby knew that plaintiff Gary Tolbert was on his property at the time of the injury. Defendant Esther Gulsby acknowledges that she had seen the plaintiff earlier in the day but states that she had no knowledge that the air rifle was propped on the carport. Bruce Gulsby maintains that he does not believe that the air rifle was cocked and, further, that he had propped it against the wall behind a lawn chair with an enclosed back and seat so that it was not in plain view. There is evidence that children frequently played in defendants' yard and that plaintiff Gary Tolbert had been there on other occasions, although there is no evidence that he was present at the time of the injury by either express or implied invitation. Based on the facts before the court, it would appear that he was either a trespasser or a licensee to whom the only duties owed were not to be intentionally or wantonly injured or not to be negligently injured after the defendants had knowledge of his peril. There is no evidence of intentional injury, nor of knowledge on the part of defendants of plaintiff's peril. Thus summary judgment on the negligence count was proper.
Arguably there is a scintilla of evidence of wanton conduct in that at least two witnesses assert that defendant Bruce Gulsby admitted that the air rifle had been left in a cocked position ready for firing. In the case of Kilcrease v. Harris, 288 Ala. 245, 259 So. 2d 797 (1972), it was held that a wanton count should go to the jury if there is the least particle of evidence to support a finding of wantonness.
Plaintiffs' complaint also contains a count asserting liability based on the attractive nuisance doctrine. This doctrine offers an exception to the limited duty owed by a landowner to a trespasser. It applies only where trespassing children are involved. Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Green, 276 Ala. 120, 159 So. 2d 823 (1964); see, Fulford, The Tort Liability of Possessors of Property to Trespassing Children in Alabama, 11 Ala. L.Rev. 1, 9-13 (1958). The doctrine evolved form the "turntable" theory pronounced by the United States Supreme Court in Sioux City and P. R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 21 L. Ed. 745 (1873) and was adopted by this court in the case of Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Crocker, 131 Ala. 584, 31 So. 561 (1901). The turntable doctrine over the years has been narrowly applied and rigorous standards of application have developed around its use. The most important restriction is that the dangerous condition on the landowner's property must be found to be naturally attractive to small childrenthus leading to the "attractive nuisance" terminology. According to Gary Tolbert's deposition, he was not attracted to Mr. Gulsby's carport because of the air rifle. Thus it appears that summary judgment was properly granted as to the attractive nuisance count.
The fourth count of plaintiff's complaint charges liability on the theory that Bruce Gulsby was maintaining a dangerous instrumentality on his property. This doctrine is based on a "straight" negligence theory and arguably developed as a reaction to the restrictive use of the attractive nuisance theory. See Fulford, The *133 Tort Liability of Possessors of Property to Trespassing Children in Alabama, supra. The doctrine is set out in Thompson v. Alexander City Cotton Mills Co., 190 Ala. 184, 191, 67 So. 407, 410 (1914), which quotes Thompson on Negligence, section 1030 (1880):
This theory was also discussed by the court in Republic Steel v. Tillery, 261 Ala. 34, 38, 72 So. 2d 719, 721 (1954) where the court reaffirmed its "straight" negligence roots:
Under this doctrine the standard is one of reasonableness: should defendant have reasonably anticipated that injury would result from the condition he created on his property? This Alabama doctrine is very similar to the statement of landowner liability to trespassing children in Restatement of Torts 2d, section 339 (1965) which reads:
For treatment of this section, see 62 Am. Jur.2d, Premise Liability, §§ 139-145 (1972); Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 25 (1967); and Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 Cal. L.Rev. 427 (1959).
The following excerpt from Fulford's law review article, 11 Alabama Law Review at 15-19, further explains this doctrine:
This court has previously noted the similarity between Alabama cases using the straight negligence doctrine in relationship to trespassing children and Section 339, Restatement of Torts 2d; however, for clarity and certainty's sake now and in the future, this court adopts Section 339, Restatement of Torts 2d, as controlling, regardless of whether the children are licensees or trespassers.
Based on the pleadings, affidavits and depositions in the case before this court, there is evidence from which a jury could conclude that defendant Bruce Gulsby knew young children played on his premises regularly and left a loaded air rifle propped against his carport wall. There is a dispute as to whether the air rifle was cocked and ready for firing. Reasonable minds could reasonably differ as to whether the air rifle constituted an obviously dangerous condition with which children were likely to come into contact and, further, whether defendant should reasonably have anticipated the injury and taken steps to guard against it. Thus it appears that summary judgment was erroneously granted as to the "dangerous instrumentality" count.
As a final argument the Gulsbys contend that summary judgment was proper because Bruce Gulsby's action of leaving the air rifle on the carport was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Their argument is that the action of the young girl who actually shot Gary Tolbert with the air rifle was the proximate and moving cause and was an intervening agency relieving Gulsby of any liability.
The concepts of proximate cause and sufficient intervening cause were discussed by this court in the case of Liberty National Life Insurance Co. v. Weldon, 267 Ala. 171, 186-87, 100 So. 2d 696, 709 (1958), where it was stated:
This court finds that the question of whether the girl's action was an unforeseeable one, not reasonably to be anticipated when defendant put the air rifle on the carport, is a question about which reasonable people could differ, thus requiring a jury determination.
Because of the nature of negligence actions, with their questions of reasonableness and proximate causation, summary judgment will not ordinarily be properly granted in such cases. In the case before this court, though, the motion was properly granted as to the negligence and attractive nuisance counts. It was not properly granted as to the wanton count. Finally, there is evidence to support the "dangerous instrumentality" count; thus reversal of the trial court's action in granting summary judgment as to this count is in order.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, REMANDED.
MERRILL, MADDOX, JONES and SHORES, JJ., concur.