Case Title: Gronski v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 95-23

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-01-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Gronski v. State1996 WY 11910 P.2d 561Case Number: 95-23Decided: 01/22/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming

John GRONSKI, Appellant 
(Defendant),

v. 

The 
STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County; 
Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge.

Sylvia Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; 
Gerald M. Gallivan, Director, Defender Aid Program; Bob L. Ring, Student Intern, 
for Appellant.

William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. 
Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Sr. Assistant Attorney 
General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; John 
Harjehausen, Student Director, Prosecution Assistance Program, for 
Appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, 
TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Chief Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant John 
Gronski (Gronski) appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress 
incriminating evidence found during a warrantless search of the trunk of his car 
and a duffle bag found in the trunk of his car.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Gronski states 
the following issues:

I. Whether a warrantless search with 
probable cause of a vehicle is not authorized where the vehicle is no longer 
mobile because the police had effectively seized and immobilized the car by the 
arrest of the driver and seizure of the keys?

II. Assuming that the warrantless search of 
the car based on probable cause was lawful, was the subsequent warrantless 
search of the duffel bag found in the trunk of the car lawful under Article I, 
Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution?

The State of Wyoming cites the issues 
as:

I. Did the warrantless search of a vehicle 
and its containers violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution where the vehicle was stopped and searched upon probable cause that 
it contained contraband?

II. Does Article I, Section 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution afford additional protection beyond that provided by the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, against warrantless searches of 
containers within a vehicle searched upon probable cause that it contains 
contraband?

FACTS

[¶4]      The facts in this 
case are not disputed. On July 21, 1994, a reliable informant notified Detective 
Barrett (Barrett), a Laramie County Sheriff's Department detective, that someone 
named "John," later identified as Gronski, had about eight pounds of marijuana 
at an apartment on Myers Court. The informant told Barrett that a woman named 
Jennifer Carroll (Carroll) showed him a greenish duffle bag with bags of 
marijuana in it and that Gronski and his girlfriend discussed leaving town while 
the informant was in the apartment. The informant told Barrett he saw Gronski 
put the duffle bag in a blue Lincoln Continental and gave Barrett a partial 
license plate number of the car. Based on this information, Barrett believed he 
had probable cause to obtain a search warrant. Barrett asked other deputies to 
maintain surveillance on the apartment and the car while he obtained a search 
warrant for the apartment and the car.

[¶5]      Before Barrett 
reached the station to prepare the paperwork for the warrant, however, he 
received notice that two people were driving away from the apartment in the car. 
Officers followed the car in unmarked vehicles. The officers were going to stop 
the car as soon as a marked patrol car arrived to assist them. Before a marked 
patrol car could arrive, however, Gronski parked the car in a store parking lot, 
got out of the car and locked it. When Gronski and his passenger (Carroll) left 
the car, officers stopped them, separated them, questioned them and took 
Gronski's car keys and driver's license. Officers asked Gronski for permission 
to search the car, but Gronski refused to give them permission. An officer told 
Gronski to sit in a patrol car while police questioned Carroll. During 
questioning, Carroll told officers there was marijuana either in the car or in 
the trunk of the car. Barrett decided to search the car and the trunk for the 
duffle bag without a search warrant. The duffle bag was found in the trunk and 
searched. Officers found approximately eight pounds of marijuana in the duffle 
bag.

[¶6]      Gronski filed a 
motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the car during the warrantless 
search. After an evidentiary hearing on the issue, the district court made 
findings of fact, determined the warrantless search was reasonable under the 
circumstances, and denied the motion to suppress. Gronski entered a conditional 
plea of guilty pursuant to WYO.R.CRIM.P. 11 and this appeal of the denial of his 
motion to suppress followed.

DISCUSSION

[¶7]      On review, the 
findings of the trial court regarding the motion to suppress are binding on this 
court unless clearly erroneous. Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326, 1330 (Wyo. 
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1031, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1980). The 
issue of law, whether an unreasonable search or seizure occurred in violation of 
constitutional rights, is reviewed de novo. Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 
(Wyo. 1994). The trial court found:

 

[T]he officers had 
probable cause to believe that Gronski's vehicle contained the duffle bag of 
marijuana. The informant's tip, along with the officers' own verification and 
observations, provided that probable cause. Even if exigent circumstances were 
to be required, they are present. The officers had reason to believe that 
Gronski and his passenger were preparing to leave the jurisdiction with the 
marijuana. Detective Barrett was on the way to obtain search warrants when 
Gronski and his passenger left the Myers Court residence. Once the vehicle was 
in motion, there was no time to obtain a warrant. The search was reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment and the Wyoming Constitution.

[¶8]      Gronski contends 
that a finding of probable cause is not sufficient to search a seized vehicle. 
He claims he was under arrest before the warrantless search and that, as a 
result of his arrest, the vehicle was immobilized. Thus he raises the specific 
issue of whether a warrantless search of an immobilized vehicle is authorized 
under current case law. Analyzing federal precedent, Gronski concludes that the 
warrantless search was not authorized under the "automobile exception" to the 
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment because that exception requires 
probable cause and exigency. In his view, United States Supreme Court decisions 
apply the automobile exception to the warrant requirement because exigent 
circumstances exist preventing an opportunity to obtain a warrant. Since he 
believes the car was "immobilized," no exigency supported the need for an 
immediate search and the police should have obtained a 
warrant.

[¶9]      In response, the 
State asserts that the United States Supreme Court's decisions of Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925); Chambers v. 
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970); and United States v. 
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982), permit warrantless 
searches of automobiles and closed containers in them upon probable cause. In 
this case, the State argues the police had probable cause to believe the car 
held marijuana, probably in the duffle bag, and their warrantless search of both 
was justified and constitutional.

[¶10]   The warrant clauses of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution prohibit searches conducted outside the judicial process without 
prior approval by judge or magistrate. Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 478, 481 (Wyo. 
1988). Warrantless searches and seizures are unreasonable per se under both the 
Fourth Amendment and Art. 1, § 4. Hunter v. State, 704 P.2d 713, 715 (Wyo. 
1985). This rule is subject to only a few specifically established and 
well-delineated exceptions. Id. The search and/or seizure of an automobile upon 
probable cause is one of the recognized exceptions. Id. In an earlier decision, 
this court recognized that differences exist between motor vehicles and other 
property, which permit warrantless searches of automobiles in circumstances in 
which warrantless searches would not be reasonable in other contexts. Neilson, 
599 P.2d  at 1330. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and 
seizures. Id. Reasonableness is determined by all the circumstances of each 
case. Id.

[¶11]   In Hunter, the claimant challenged 
the warrantless search of a car held by police and known to be stolen and the 
warrantless search of containers in that car. This court found that officers had 
probable cause to believe that contraband, in the form of personal belongings 
which were stolen along with the car, could be in the car or containers and held 
that probable cause existed justifying a warrantless search of the car and any 
closed containers found within the car. Hunter, 704 P.2d  at 715-717. The court's 
holding resulted from a determination that the scope of a warrantless search of 
a vehicle is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there 
is probable cause to believe it may be found. Hunter, 704 P.2d  at 717. Hunter 
relied upon United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 
(1982), which held that, on the basis of probable cause to search a car, the 
automobile exception permits a search of the entire car and anything in it that 
could contain the items being searched for. Hunter, 704 P.2d  at 
717.

[¶12]   In this case, the district court 
found that the officers had probable cause to believe marijuana was in the 
duffle bag which had been placed in the car. On that factual basis, conducting a 
warrantless search of the duffle bag was reasonable and constitutional. In his 
appeal, Gronski does not take issue with the scope of the search, but instead 
insists that no exigency existed requiring an immediate search. In his view, the 
automobile exception is defined as probable cause and exigency; it is 
constitutional only because of the mobility of the vehicle. If the vehicle is 
immobilized, the exigency ceases to exist and the constitution prohibits a 
warrantless search.

[¶13]   This court's decision in Neilson 
thoroughly explained the exigency presented by automobiles as identified in 
Carroll and Chambers. Part of that explanation bears repeating 
here:

"Neither Carroll, 
supra, nor other cases in this Court require or suggest that in every 
conceivable circumstance the search of an auto even with probable cause may be 
made without the extra protection for privacy that a warrant affords. But the 
circumstances that furnish probable cause to search a particular auto for 
particular articles are most often unforeseeable; moreover, the opportunity to 
search is fleeting since a car is readily movable. Where this is true, as in 
Carroll and the case before us now, if an effective search is to be made at any 
time, either the search must be made immediately without a warrant or the car 
itself must be seized and held without a warrant for whatever period is 
necessary to obtain a warrant for the search.

* * 
* * * *

Arguably, because 
of the preference for a magistrate's judgment, only the immobilization of the 
car should be permitted until a search warrant is obtained; arguably, only the 
`lesser' intrusion is permissible until the magistrate authorizes the `greater.' 
But which is the `greater' and which the `lesser' intrusion is itself a 
debatable question and the answer may depend on a variety of circumstances. For 
constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing 
and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and 
on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given 
probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.

On the facts before 
us, the blue station wagon could have been searched on the spot when it was 
stopped since there was probable cause to search and it was a fleeting target 
for a search. The probable-cause factor still obtained at the station house and 
so did the mobility of the car unless the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless 
seizure of the car and the denial of its use to anyone until a warrant is 
secured. In that event there is little to choose in terms of practical 
consequences between an immediate search without a warrant and the car's 
immobilization until a warrant is obtained. * * *."

Neilson, 599 P.2d  at 1332, quoting Chambers, 
399 U.S.  at 50-52, 90 S. Ct.  at 1980-81.

[¶14]   Our Neilson decision recognized 
this rationale as valid and adopted this federal precedent when considering the 
reasonableness of a warrantless automobile search. Neilson, 599 P.2d  at 1332. 
This rationale is applicable to the case at hand on the question of 
reasonableness. In this case, the district court's factual determination that 
probable cause existed justifying the warrantless search for contraband in a 
container is confirmed by the evidence in the record. Further, the record 
supports the district court's finding that at the time there was probable cause 
to believe the duffle bag contained contraband and the vehicle was not 
immobilized. As a matter of law, the car was properly searched when it was 
stopped since at the time of the stop there was probable cause to search and it 
was a fleeting target for a search. The choice presented to officers was either 
an immediate warrantless search or a seizure until a warrant could be obtained. 
Either course would have been reasonable. Id.; see Hunter, 704 P.2d  at 717. The 
trial court's denial of the motion to suppress is 
affirmed.

[¶15]   Gronski's next argument is that a 
separate analysis is required under the Wyoming Constitution's search and 
seizure provision because it offers greater protection to a citizen than the 
federal constitution. He asserts that greater protection permits the duffle bag 
to be seized but prohibits a search of it without a warrant. The State, relying 
on Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604 (Wyo. 1993), argues that Gronski has not 
proffered the proper constitutional analysis or cogent argument to warrant this 
court's concluding the provision offers greater protection as recommended by 
this court. Saldana, 846 P.2d  at 622 (Golden, J., 
concurring).

[¶16]   In Saldana, the appellant relied 
exclusively upon the state constitution to appeal a search and seizure of his 
telephone records. This court ruled that, on the facts of that case, the state 
constitution did not afford increased protection. Saldana, 846 P.2d  at 612. At 
oral argument, Gronski asserted that the recommended technique in Justice 
Golden's concurring opinion in Saldana was inapposite in this case because 
information on factors concerning constitutional history, pre-existing state law 
or matters of particular state or local concern at the time of ratification did 
not exist. In Gronski's view, the only available analytical technique was to 
determine whether Wyoming values required a judicial interpretation that this 
provision afforded more protection than its federal 
counterpart.

[¶17]   This assertion, unaccompanied by 
authority or argument, is insufficient to persuade us to consider whether the 
Wyoming Constitution's Art. 1, § 4 should be independently interpreted as 
offering greater protection than its federal counterpart. Our approach in the 
search and seizure area has usually employed the method of reading the state and 
federal constitutional provisions together and treating the scope of the state 
provision the same as the scope of the federal provision. Parkhurst v. State, 
628 P.2d 1369, 1374 (Wyo. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 899, 102 S. Ct. 402, 70 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1981), Hunter, 704 P.2d  at 715; Neilson, 599 P.2d  at 1330. In 
recent cases, invitations to independently interpret the state provision, 
unaccompanied by appropriate constitutional analysis, have been rejected. Guerra 
v. State, 897 P.2d 447, 451 (Wyo. 1995); Saldana, 846 P.2d  at 612; Goettl v. 
State, 842 P.2d 549, 557 (Wyo. 1992). Until appropriate state constitutional 
analysis is presented, an invitation that we should expand the rights protected 
by the state constitution beyond the protection provided by the federal 
constitution will not receive the court's attention. Goettl, 842 P.2d  at 
557.

[¶18]   Affirmed.