Case Title: State ex rel. Am. Std., Inc. v. Boehler

Citation: 2003-Ohio-2457

Docket Number: 20021391

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2003-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Am. Std., Inc. v. Boehler, 99 Ohio St.3d 39, 2003-Ohio-2457.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. AMERICAN STANDARD, INC., APPELLANT, v. BOEHLER ET 
AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Am. Std., Inc. v. Boehler, 99 Ohio St.3d 39, 2003-Ohio-
2457.] 
Workers’ compensation — Industrial Commission did not abuse its discretion in 
finding that claimant’s actions as the owner of residential and commercial 
rental property did not constitute sustained remunerative employment that 
would bar temporary total disability compensation — Industrial 
Commission did not abuse its discretion in determining that claimant had 
not reached maximum medical improvement. 
(No. 2002-1391 — Submitted April 15, 2003 — Decided May 16, 2003.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 01AP-1138, 2002-
Ohio-3323. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Appellee-claimant, Robert E. Boehler, has an allowed workers’ 
compensation claim arising from a 1988 industrial injury sustained while 
employed by appellant, American Standard, Inc.  In 1997, appellee Industrial 
Commission of Ohio reinstated temporary total disability compensation (“TTC”).  
Early the following year, American Standard moved the commission to terminate 
TTC, stating that claimant had achieved maximum medical improvement 
(“MMI”) and was gainfully employed. 
{¶2} 
As to the latter claim of gainful employment, American Standard 
filed surveillance reports, photographs, and videotapes that documented 
claimant’s activities at various apartment rental units that he owned.  Through 
these, American Standard hoped to show that claimant was receiving rental 
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income from these properties and was performing work activities there, which 
American Standard equated with gainful employment.  It also alleged that 
claimant was engaged in physical activities that conflicted with his assertion of an 
inability to return to his former position of employment. 
{¶3} 
American Standard’s second claim was dealt a severe blow when 
its own examining physician, Dr. S.S. Purewal, examined the tapes and other 
evidence and concluded that the captured activities were not inconsistent with 
claimant’s assertion that he could not return to his job as a tank loader/inspector.  
Dr. Purewal did, however, opine that the claimant had reached MMI—an opinion 
shared by Dr. Richard N. Kepple. 
{¶4} 
The claimant rested on a series of C-84 physician reports 
supplemental prepared by attending physician Dr. Andrew J. Gase between 
November 13, 1997, and August 13, 1998.  Collectively, these reports certified 
the claimant as unable to return to his former position from November 6, 1997, 
through December 13, 1998, due to his allowed back condition.  When asked on 
these C-84s whether the condition had “reached a treatment plateau at which no 
fundamental functional or physiological change can be expected despite 
continuing medical or rehabilitative intervention,” Dr. Gase checked the box for 
“no.”  When questioned on the same form as to whether claimant was “a 
candidate for vocational rehabilitation services focusing on return to work,” he 
responded, “yes, if he [claimant] gets treatment for his severe neurogenic pain.” 
{¶5} 
At the commission hearing, surveillance evidence revealed 
claimant’s presence at his rental units over a five-day period when other workers 
were clearly engaged in some sort of interior renovation.  Claimant was 
occasionally seen instructing workers, “assisting with picking up things, passing 
tools,” “helping to attach the paneling to the walls,” and “scraping the walls.” 
{¶6} 
Claimant denied physical participation in any of the rental 
renovations alleged.  He did, however, admit to being on the premises on the 
January Term, 2003 
3 
observed occasions.  He also testified to receiving approximately $1,700 per 
month in rental income. 
{¶7} 
A commission staff hearing officer denied American Standard’s 
motion, writing: 
{¶8} 
“Mr. Boehler is merely involved in a passive investment, as the 
owner of residential and commercial rental property * * *.  Claimant owned some 
of these rental properties prior to the injury allowed in this claim.  Prior to the 
injury, claimant was able to perform maintenance himself.  Subsequent to the 
injury, claimant had to hire independent contractors to perform the work at his 
rental properties. 
{¶9} 
“The surveillance video submitted by the employer, as well as the 
surveillance photos they submitted, does not indicate that claimant was personally 
performing any work on his rental properties.  Instead, they corroborate 
claimant’s testimony that he had hired outside contractors to perform the work 
and that he was sometimes on the job-site to observe the progress being made or 
to indicate what he wanted done. 
{¶10} “This Staff Hearing Officer hereby finds that the aforesaid 
activities by the claimant were reasonable actions by a person who has a 
substantial capital investment in the form of a passive investment in rental 
properties and, furthermore, that said activities do not rise to the level [of] self-
employment as alleged by the employer.  Therefore, it is the specific finding of 
this Staff Hearing Officer that claimant was NOT engaged in sustained 
remunerative employment from 5/16/96 through the present. 
{¶11} “Furthermore, in regard to the employer’s Motion, filed 2/2/98, 
which requested termination of Temporary Total Disability Compensation on the 
basis of both claimant’s ‘self-employment’ and on a medical basis, the following 
findings are made.  * * * In regard to the medical evidence, the 7/9/98 report from 
an orthopedic specialist, S.S. Purewal, M.D., * * * specifically indicates that he 
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had ‘reviewed the video tapes that were made on 8/15/97, 2/13-/8 [sic] and 
4/3/98.  These tapes show Mr. Boehler moving about with some limp on his right 
leg which he tends to drag.’  Dr. Purewal went on to state that ‘After reviewing 
the additional material discussed above, it is my opinion that this patient is not 
capable of returning to his former position of employment * * *.’ 
{¶12} “This Staff Hearing Officer further makes note of the fact that 
claimant originally underwent a multiple level lumbar hemi-laminectomy on 
4/7/89.  Following this surgery, claimant had physical therapy, was rehabilitated 
and returned to work.  Claimant experienced an exacerbation and underwent a 
fusion on 10/21/92.  Again, claimant was rehabilitated and returned to work.  He 
was able to work until March of 1993, when his condition again deteriorated to 
the point that he was unable to work.  He participated in rehabilitation * * * and 
the Rehabilitation Consultant found the claimant to be ‘very motivated to 
participate in this rehabilitation program so he can return to work.’ 
{¶13} “Therefore, this Staff Hearing Officer finds claimant to be a highly 
motivated individual. 
{¶14} “Claimant’s attending physician, Andrew J. Gase, M.D., indicates, 
on the C-84 Attending Physician’s Report dated August 13, 1998, that claimant 
has a ‘chronic radiculopathy with foot drop’ and ‘increased pain radiating down 
left leg and almost entire right leg with right foot drop, unable to sit in chair with 
legs bent, difficulty raising right knee’.  Dr. Gase then indicates that the claimant 
has not reached maximum medical improvement and that claimant is a candidate 
for vocational rehabilitation ‘If he gets treatment for his severe neurogenic pain’. 
{¶15} “Therefore, it is the finding of this Staff Hearing Officer that the 
claimant has not yet reached maximum medical improvement.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
{¶16} Further consideration was denied. 
{¶17} American Standard unsuccessfully petitioned the Court of Appeals 
for Franklin County for a writ of mandamus.  Finding “some evidence” to support 
January Term, 2003 
5 
the commission’s decision, the court of appeals denied the writ, prompting 
American Standard’s appeal here as of right. 
{¶18} TTC is prohibited to one who (1) has reached MMI, (2) has 
actually returned to some form of remunerative employment, or (3) is medically 
capable of returning to the former position of employment.  State ex rel. Ramirez 
v. Indus. Comm. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 630, 632, 23 O.O.3d 518, 433 N.E.2d 586.  
American Standard’s challenge has, at times, touched on all three, but has now 
narrowed to points (1) and (2).  Ultimately, its position fails. 
 
Work Activities 
{¶19} Again, Ramirez forbids TTC to those who are medically able to 
return to the former position of employment or who actually are “working”—i.e., 
exchanging labor for pay—regardless of the nature or location of the work.  State 
ex rel. Parma Community Gen. Hosp. v. Jankowski, 95 Ohio St.3d 340, 2002-
Ohio-2336, 767 N.E.2d 1143.  Disqualifying activities, therefore, have a medical 
or remunerative component.  If the activities are medically inconsistent with the 
alleged inability to return to the former job, it matters not whether the claimant is 
paid for them.  TTC is barred.  Id. at ¶ 15.  Paid activities bar TTC, regardless of 
the physical or medical nature of the work.  Even sporadic activities of either type 
can foreclose TTC.  State ex rel. Blabac v. Indus. Comm. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 
113, 717 N.E.2d 336.  Thus, claimant’s actions mean nothing if American 
Standard cannot prove that they were either remunerative or medically 
inconsistent with the claim of inability to return to his former job.  American 
Standard fails to do this. 
{¶20} American Standard repeatedly notes the physicality of claimant’s 
purported actions but never overtly accuses claimant of engaging in activity 
irreconcilable with his claimed inability to return to his former position.  Perhaps 
that is because American Standard knows that it cannot prevail, given the opinion 
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of its own physician, Dr. Purewal, that claimant’s observed actions do not 
contradict his assertion that he cannot return to his old job. 
{¶21} The remaining consideration—remuneration—is barely discussed 
by the employer.  American Standard says only that in addition to his TTC, 
claimant was getting $1,700 per month.  That amount, however, represents rental 
income not wages—a critical distinction. 
{¶22} TTC compensates for the loss of earnings a claimant sustains while 
his or her injury heals.  State ex rel. Ashcraft v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 34 Ohio 
St.3d 42, 44, 517 N.E.2d 533.  This means that TTC is precluded when the 
claimant begins to earn again, i.e., when he or she is paid money in direct 
exchange for labor.  State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. Indus. Comm., 98 Ohio St.3d 
20, 2002-Ohio-7038, 780 N.E.2d 1016, supports this, by refusing to disqualify 
claimants whose activities “produced money only secondarily” or were “only 
indirectly related to generating income.”  Id. at ¶ 23 and 24. 
{¶23} The disputed amount in this case was not given in exchange for 
claimant’s labor—it was paid pursuant to a contractual rental agreement.  
Certainly it can be argued that if claimant’s apartments were not kept up, rental 
income could evaporate.  There are, however, two key flaws in this logic.  First, it 
runs counter to Ford.  There, claimant’s industrial injury not only removed him 
from his former job but also kept him from his side business of mowing lawns.  
Claimant was forced to hire others to do this work and paid them accordingly.  
Ford argued that claimant’s act of signing payroll checks to these workers 
constituted “work” so as to foreclose TTC.  We disagreed, writing that  “this 
claimant’s activities did not, in and of themselves, generate income; claimant’s 
activities produced money only secondarily, e.g., claimant signed the paychecks 
that kept his employees doing the tasks that generated income.” (Emphasis sic.)  
Id. at ¶ 23. 
January Term, 2003 
7 
{¶24} In the case before us, rental upkeep generated income secondarily.  
It was the contractual relationship between claimant and his tenants that directly 
compelled the payment of money.  It was not directly generated by the claimant’s 
labor. 
{¶25} Second, American Standard confuses the concept of remuneration 
with claimant’s physical presence at the rental site.  If claimant had never visited 
his properties and had never participated in their rental or upkeep, leaving those 
tasks to others, claimant would still have received his rental income.  Few would 
argue that in such a case, TTC would be precluded.  This indeed suggests that the 
pivotal point of American Standard’s position is claimant’s physical presence at 
the rental units.  Nothing, however, prevents claimant from going there.  The only 
thing that is barred is claimant’s participation in any activities that are medically 
inconsistent with his allegation of an inability to return to his former position of 
employment or that directly generate income, and there is evidence of neither 
here. 
{¶26} Ford acknowledged the perils of situations such as that at issue, 
cautioning that “this rationale must be applied on a case-by-case basis and only 
when a claimant’s activities are minimal.  A claimant should not be able to erect a 
façade of third-party labor to hide the fact that he or she is working.”  Id., 98 Ohio 
St.3d 20, 2002-Ohio-7038, 780 N.E.2d 1016, at ¶ 24. 
{¶27} We conclude, therefore, that the commission did not abuse its 
discretion in finding that claimant’s actions did not constitute sustained 
remunerative employment that would bar TTC. 
 
MMI 
{¶28} Ramirez held that TTC is payable only to those with temporary 
disabilities.  Therefore, a claimant who has reached MMI forfeits TTC.  MMI 
describes a condition that has become permanent, i.e., one that will, “ ‘with 
reasonable probability, continue for an indefinite period of time without any 
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present indication of recovery therefrom.’ ”  Vulcan Materials Co. v. Indus. 
Comm. (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 31, 33, 25 OBR 26, 494 N.E.2d 1125, quoting 
Logsdon v. Indus. Comm. (1944), 143 Ohio St. 508, 28 O.O. 429, 57 N.E.2d 75, 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  Dr. Gase specified that the claimant was not MMI, 
and the commission relied on his opinion in awarding TTC.  American Standard 
criticizes that reliance, arguing that (1) other evidence indicates MMI and (2) Dr. 
Gase’s report is flawed.  Neither challenge has merit. 
{¶29} The commission’s decision need only be supported by “some 
evidence.”  State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 18, 31 
OBR 70, 508 N.E.2d 936, syllabus.  Thus, the presence of contrary evidence is 
immaterial, so long as the “some evidence” standard has been met.  And, in our 
case, Dr. Gase’s reports certainly satisfy that requirement. 
{¶30} Contrary to American Standard’s representation, Dr. Gase’s C-84s 
are not fatally ambiguous or equivocal.  American Standard argues that Dr. 
Gase’s rejection of MMI is contradicted by his physical findings, which, 
American Standard contends, demonstrate MMI.  This fails for two reasons.  
First, the commission is the exclusive interpreter of evidence presented.  State ex 
rel. Middlesworth v. Regal Ware, Inc. (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 214, 216, 754 N.E.2d 
774.  Thus, the commission could freely interpret the evidence as it chose and was 
not required to adopt American Standard’s reading. 
{¶31} Moreover, even if American Standard’s reading was accepted, it 
must still be balanced against Dr. Gase’s express certification that claimant has 
not reached MMI.  As we have said, when evidence can be read in two different 
ways, the commission does not abuse its discretion in choosing one over the 
other.  State ex rel. Copeland v. Indus. Comm. (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 238, 559 
N.E.2d 1310. 
{¶32} Finally, American Standard contends that it is inappropriate to 
allow Dr. Gase’s recommendation for vocational rehabilitation to negate a finding 
January Term, 2003 
9 
of MMI.  It relies on this quote from the court of appeals in State ex rel. Matlack, 
Inc. v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 648, 659, 598 N.E.2d 121: 
{¶33} “[T]here is a distinction in the case law between physical 
rehabilitation and occupational-type therapy related to the condition’s 
improvement, and vocational rehabilitation or job training related to claimant’s 
vocational improvement.  The former type of rehabilitation can signify continuing 
possibility of medical improvement while the latter cannot.” 
{¶34} American Standard uses well-intentioned physician responses to 
bureau-designed questions as a trap for the unwary.  The bureau’s C-84 asks—
without qualification of the word “rehabilitative”—“Has the work related 
injury(s) or disease reached a treatment plateau at which no fundamental 
functional or physiological change can be expected despite continuing medical or 
rehabilitative intervention?”  The physician is required to check “yes” or “no.”  
The form then asks, “Is the injured worker a candidate for vocational 
rehabilitation services focusing on return to work?”  
{¶35} Dr. Gase answered “no” to the former and “yes” to the latter.  This 
is not inconsistent.  The initial negative response indicates that claimant’s 
condition can be improved by further medical or rehabilitative measures.  Thus, a 
“yes” answer to the second question is completely consistent.  American 
Standard, however, wishes to focus exclusively on one thing—the presence of a 
single word, “vocational” before the word “rehabilitation” in Question 2.  We are 
not persuaded that the first question dealing squarely with the issue of MMI has 
been made so ambiguous by a single word in the second question.  In this case, 
Dr. Gase affirmed that rehabilitation would facilitate the claimant’s return to 
work.  We find, therefore, that the commission did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that claimant had not reached MMI. 
{¶36} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
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MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK, LUNDBERG 
STRATTON and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Scott, Scriven & Wahoff, L.L.P., Timothy E. Cowans and Richard 
Goldberg, for appellant. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Gerald H. Waterman, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
 
Stewart Jaffy & Assoc. Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy and Marc J. Jaffy, for 
appellee Robert E. Boehler. 
__________________