Case Title: Jennifer Taylor Hayes and Timothy Hayes v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee of Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc., Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-R5, and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1190002

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2020-06-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:  June 5, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
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1190002
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Jennifer Taylor Hayes and Timothy Hayes
v.
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee of
Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc.,
Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-R5,
and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court
(CV-17-901069)
MENDHEIM, Justice.
AFFIRMED.  NO OPINION.
Bolin, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.
Parker, C.J., and Stewart, J., dissent.
1190002
PARKER, Chief Justice (dissenting).
Jennifer Taylor Hayes and Timothy Hayes appeal from a
summary judgment entered against them by the Baldwin Circuit
Court on their counterclaim against Deutsche Bank National
Trust Company, as trustee of Ameriquest Mortgage Securities,
Inc., Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-R5,
and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (hereinafter referred to
collectively as "the Bank").  Because the Hayeses provided
substantial evidence that the Bank breached the terms of their
mortgage by failing to credit payments made by the Hayeses, I
would reverse the summary judgment.
In 2004, the Hayeses executed a mortgage on their house
in Fairhope to secure a loan from Deutsche Bank National Trust
Company.  By 2013, they had fallen behind on their payments. 
The Bank foreclosed and, when the Hayeses did not move out,
sued for ejectment in the Baldwin Circuit Court.  The Hayeses
counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract and wrongful
foreclosure, arguing that the Bank had failed to apply certain
payments to their account.  The terms of the loan required the
Bank to apply payments or to return them.  
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The Bank moved for a summary judgment on the Hayeses'
counterclaim.  The Hayeses responded to the Bank's motion with
deposition testimony of Timothy Hayes that "there were many
payments made '05, '06, '07, '08, '09, always different
mortgage servicing companies.  There were payments made in
those periods. They're not being credited at all."  The
circuit court entered a summary judgment in favor of the Bank,
and the Hayeses appeal. 
This Court reviews an appeal from a summary judgment de
novo, that is, "[w]e apply the same standard of review the
trial court used in determining whether the 
evidence presented
to the trial court created a genuine issue of material fact." 
Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. DPF Architects, P.C., 792
So. 2d 369, 372 (Ala. 2000).  To prevail on a motion for a
summary judgment, the movant "must make a prima facie showing
that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that he
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. ... If this
showing is made, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to
rebut the movant's prima facie showing by 'substantial
evidence.'"  Lee v. City of Gadsden, 592 So. 2d 1036, 1038
(Ala. 1992).  "Substantial evidence" is "evidence of such
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weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of
impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the
fact sought to be proved."  West v. Founders Life Assurance
Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989); § 12-21-12,
Ala. Code 1975. 
The Hayeses argue that they presented substantial
evidence that the Bank had breached the terms of the loan and
that the foreclosure was therefore wrongful.  In response, the
Bank argues that Timothy's deposition testimony does not
constitute substantial evidence because it was uncorroborated
by any financial records or documents and was insufficiently
specific to satisfy Rule 56(e), Ala. R. Civ. P. I disagree.
This Court has never held that, in a breach-of-contract
or 
wrongful-foreclosure 
action, 
testimony 
must 
be 
corroborated
by financial records or documents to constitute substantial
evidence.  Indeed, it is hornbook law that testimony itself
may stand alone as substantial evidence of the existence of a
fact.  See Fleming James, Jr., & Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
Civil Procedure 270 (2d ed. 1977) ("Where there is direct
testimony of the existence of a simple fact ... such testimony
is generally held in civil cases to satisfy the test of
sufficiency -- it will, as we say, justify or warrant a
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1190002
finding by the trier that the fact existed."), Joseph L.
Lester, Alabama Evidence § 3:16 (2019 ed.) ("[T]he testimony
of one percipient witness to the truth of a certain material
proposition of fact will satisfy the sufficiency requirement
for that proposition."); cf. Smith v. State, 53 Ala. App. 27,
29, 296 So. 2d 925, 927 (Crim. App. 1974) (holding that, at
trial, "[a] fact may be established as firmly by the testimony
of one witness as by the testimony of an entire community"). 
Furthermore, this Court has held that corroboration goes to
credibility, and credibility is a determination for the 
finder
of fact.   See Hardy v. Hardin, 200 So. 3d 622, 633 n.9 (Ala.
2016) ("In Hardin's appellate brief, he characterizes Hardy's
testimony as 'self serving' and 'uncorroborated.' But it is
the role of the fact-finder ... to assess credibility and to
resolve conflicts in the evidence.").  Thus, even though
Timothy's deposition testimony was not corroborated by
documents, it was substantial evidence. 
Moreover, Timothy's testimony satisfied Rule 56(e)
because it contained specific facts, not legal conclusions.
This Court has addressed the specificity requirement of Rule
56(e).  Adams v. Tractor & Equip. Co., 180 So. 3d 860, 870
(Ala. 2015).  In that case, the defendant moved for a summary
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judgment, and the plaintiff submitted an affidavit stating
that he had reviewed a contract provision but had not signed
it.  There, as here, the movant argued that the statement was
"conclusory" and not sufficiently specific.  This Court held:
"Although [the plaintiff's] ... affidavit was not detailed, it
contained a recitation of specific facts -- that he had
reviewed the guaranty provision at issue and that he did not
sign the guaranty provision -- that constituted substantial
evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact ...." 
180 So. 3d at 870.  Adams also cited Bradley Outdoor, Inc. v.
Colonial Bank, 952 So. 2d 359, 362–63 (Ala. 2006), for the
proposition 
that 
"an 
affidavit 
that 
contained 
legal
conclusions, not statements of fact, was insufficient to
create a genuine issue of material fact."  Adams, 180 So. 3d
at 870.  Thus, under the distinction recognized by Adams,
"specific facts" means historical facts as opposed to legal
conclusions.  In this case, the facts Timothy testified to --
that he made payments to the Bank during certain years and
that those payments were not credited to his account -- are
historical facts, not legal conclusions.  Thus, this testimony
satisfied Rule 56(e). 
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Accordingly, 
Timothy's 
deposition 
testimony 
was
substantial evidence in support of the Hayeses' claim of
breach of contract and wrongful foreclosure. Because this
evidence created a genuine issue of material fact, summary
judgment was improper. Therefore, I would reverse the summary
judgment.
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