Case Title: Troy Brown v. General Motors Corporation

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1061660

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2009-01-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 01/16/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1061660
____________________
Troy Brown
v.
General Motors Corporation
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court 
(CV-06-2133)
PER CURIAM. 
Troy Brown appeals from a summary judgment in favor of
General Motors 
Corporation 
("GM") 
on 
Brown's claims 
against GM
stemming from an allegedly defective automobile Brown
purchased.  We reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
1061660
2
Facts and Procedural History
On August 3, 2002, Troy Brown visited Bill Heard
Chevrolet 
Company 
("Bill 
Heard"), 
an 
independent 
authorized 
GM
dealership in Georgia.  Brown selected a Chevrolet Corvette
automobile and completed a retail sales contract with Bill
Heard for the purchase of the car.  As part of the retail
sales contract, Brown and Bill Heard entered into an agreement
to submit any claims arising from the sale of the car to
arbitration to be administered by the American Arbitration
Association ("the AAA").  GM was not a party to the retail
sales contract or to the arbitration agreement.  However, GM
issued with the sale of the car what it refers to as a
"written limited warranty" providing that GM would repair or
correct defects in materials or workmanship in the car for the
first three years or the first 36,000 miles of use, whichever
occurred first.  Additionally, Brown purchased a "GM
Protection Plan" that extended GM's obligation to five years
or 50,000 miles, whichever occurred first.  After completing
the paperwork for the purchase of the car, Brown drove the car
home to Alabama.  A few days later, Brown attempted to
register the car and discovered that Bill Heard had mistakenly
1061660
3
collected too much money for the taxes on the vehicle.  Brown
informed Bill Heard of the excess taxes that Bill Heard had
collected.  On August 13, 2002, an employee from Bill Heard
drove to Brown's place of business with two checks to
reimburse Brown for the taxes.  Brown signed a new retail
sales contract to reflect the difference in the amounts of
taxes collected and surrendered his copy of the original
retail sales contract that he had executed on August 3, 2002.
Brown experienced a series of problems with the car.  On
multiple occasions, Brown took the car to an authorized GM
service center for repairs and, in each instance, signed an
arbitration 
agreement 
with 
the 
individual 
service 
providers 
at
the time the car was serviced.  However, the service providers
were not ultimately able to resolve the issues with the car to
Brown's satisfaction.  In October 2005, Brown filed a
"Consumer Arbitration Demand" with the AAA and sent an
arbitration-demand letter to GM.  However, GM refused to
participate in arbitration with Brown because it was not a
signatory to the arbitration agreement.  Brown did not
petition to compel GM to arbitration.
1061660
Brown voluntarily dismissed claims of revocation of
1
acceptance and breach of implied warranties of fitness and
merchantability.
4
On August 8, 2006, Brown sued GM in the Montgomery
Circuit Court, alleging breach of warranty under 15 U.S.C. §
2310(d)(1)(A), a part of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal
Trade 
Commission 
Act 
("Magnuson-Moss 
Act"); 
misrepresentation;
and violations of the Alabama Motor Vehicle Lemon Law Rights,
§ 8-20A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975.   In October 2006, GM moved
1
to dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ.
P.  The trial court denied GM's motion.  GM answered Brown's
complaint on February 12, 2007, but did not assert any
affirmative defenses in that answer.  In June 2007, GM moved
for a summary judgment, arguing for the first time that
Brown's claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
Brown opposed that motion.  The trial court held a hearing on
GM's motion and subsequently entered a summary judgment in
favor of GM on all the remaining claims.  Brown now appeals.
Issues
Brown argues three issues on appeal.  First, Brown argues
that the trial court relied on this Court's decision in Tittle
v. Steel City Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc., 544 So. 2d 883 (Ala.
1061660
5
1989), which, Brown claims, is a decision that was wrongly
decided and should be overruled.  Second, Brown argues that
the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment for GM
because, he says, the statute of limitations was tolled while
Brown was attempting to arbitrate his disputes with GM.
Third, Brown argues that GM waived the affirmative defense of
the statute of limitations when it did not plead this defense
before moving for a summary judgment on that ground.  Because
we agree with Brown's first argument, we do not reach the
latter two issues. 
Standard of Review
"'On appeal, this Court reviews a summary
judgment de novo.'  DiBiasi v. Joe Wheeler Elec.
Membership Corp., 988 So. 2d 454, 459 (Ala. 2008)
(citing Ex parte Essary, 992 So. 2d 5, 8 (Ala.
2007)).  In order to uphold a summary judgment, we
must determine that 'there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'  Rule
56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.  'When the movant makes a
prima facie showing that those two conditions have
been satisfied, the burden then shifts to the
nonmovant to present substantial evidence creating
a genuine issue of material fact.' Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949, 952
(Ala. 2004).  Substantial evidence is 'evidence of
such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in
the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably
infer the existence of the fact sought to be
proved.' West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of
Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989); see also
1061660
6
§ 12-21-12(d), Ala. Code 1975.  In reviewing a
summary judgment, we must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant.  Johnny Ray
Sports, Inc. v. Wachovia Bank, 982 So. 2d 1067, 1071
(Ala. 2007).  'Finally, this Court does not afford
any presumption of correctness to the trial court's
ruling on questions of law or its conclusion as to
the appropriate legal standard to be applied.'
DiBiasi, 988 So. 2d at 459."
Catrett v. Baldwin County Elec. Membership Corp., [Ms.
1061538, May 23, 2008] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2008).
Analysis
In Tittle, Rodney K. Tittle purchased a new automobile
from Steel City Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc. ("Steel City"), on
October 9, 1981.  GM agreed to "repair and adjust defects in
material or workmanship that occurred during the first 12
months or first 12,000 miles in which the car was in use." 544
So. 2d at 884.  However, Steel City was unable to repair the
car.  Tittle finally sued Steel City, General Motors
Acceptance Corporation, and GM on January 29, 1986, alleging
breach of warranties.  Steel City and GM moved for a summary
judgment based upon the statute of limitations.  The trial
court granted Steel City's and GM's motions, and Tittle
appealed to this Court.  This Court held that Tittle's state-
law and Magnuson-Moss Act claims were subject to the statute
1061660
7
of limitations provided for contracts for sale in § 7-2-
725(2), Ala. Code 1975:
"(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach
occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of
knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs
when tender of delivery is made, except that where
a warranty explicitly extends to future performance
of the goods and discovery of the breach must await
the time of such performance the cause of action
accrues when the breach is or should have been
discovered; however, a cause of action for damages
for injury to the person in the case of consumer
goods shall accrue when the injury occurs."
This Court held that "Tittle's warranty [did] not extend
to the future performance of his car," and therefore upheld
the trial court's determination "that Tittle's cause of
action, by statute and by the express terms of his warranty,
accrued at the time Steel City delivered the vehicle to him."
544 So. 2d at 891. 
In the present case, Brown took delivery of the car on
August 3, 2002.  GM argues that, under Tittle, the statute of
limitations ran four years later on August 3, 2006, and,
therefore, that Brown’s action, filed on August 8, 2006, is
barred.  Brown asks us to revisit our holding in Tittle,
noting 
that 
the 
fact 
that 
many 
manufacturers 
offer
"warranties" in excess of four years highlights the error of
1061660
Section 7-2-725(1) provides:
2
"(1) An action for breach of any contract for
sale must be commenced within four years after the
cause of action has accrued. By the original
agreement the parties may reduce the period of
limitation to not less than one year but may not
extend it."
8
the approach adopted in Tittle.  He notes that, under the
accrual rule adopted in Tittle, manufacturers may offer
consumers a warranty that is not judicially enforceable in
accordance with its terms because the term of the warranty
extends beyond the four-year statute of limitations prescribed
in  § 7-2-725(1), Ala. Code 1975.  
2
After 
carefully 
considering 
Brown's 
invitation 
to
reconsider our holding in Tittle as to the time a cause of
action of the nature presented here accrues, we are convinced
that, in the interest of fairness and logic, we should accept
that invitation and overrule Tittle.
The contractual provision at issue in this case states,
in part, as follows:
"General Motors Corporation will provide for repairs
to the vehicle during the warranty period in
accordance with the following terms, conditions and
limitations.
"....
1061660
9
"Repairs Covered:  The warranty covers repairs to
correct any vehicle defect related to materials or
workmanship occurring during the warranty period.
...
"Warranty Period:  The warranty period for all
coverages begins on the date the vehicle is first
delivered and ends at the expiration of the coverage
period.
"Bumper-to-Bumper Coverage:  The complete vehicle is
covered for 3 years or 36,000 miles, whichever comes
first. ..."
In addition, Brown purchased a "GM Protection Plan," which
extended the warranty period to 5 years or 50,000 miles,
whichever occurred first.  In essence, therefore, the
"warranty" at issue consisted of a promise by GM to repair the
vehicle for any defects related to materials or workmanship
that occurred during the 5-year period (or the period it took
to drive 50,000 miles, whichever occurred first) after the
vehicle was purchased.
Brown contends that the same defects continued to occur
throughout the initial three-year warranty period.  For
example, he contends that the automobile was in the custody of
Chevrolet repair facilities for repair attempts for 81 days
during the period beginning on February 2, 2004, and ending on
June 16, 2005.  Brown filed this action on August 8, 2006.
1061660
In 
Count 
I of his 
complaint, Brown seeks monetary damages
3
and other relief based on the following allegations:
"7 ... [GM] has breached both warranties as to
[Brown].  Said vehicle ... is and has been defective
since the date of its purchase by [Brown], and said
vehicle is and has been since the date of its
purchase the subject of numerous and repeated
defects in material and workmanship. Said vehicle is
not reliable or dependable, has broken down
repeatedly, and is subject to both safety and
driveability defects.  Despite being given numerous
opportunities to cure the same by its authorized
dealers and/or service centers, [GM] has been unable
to do so.  By reason of said defects, said vehicle
is dangerous and/or unreliable when driven in its
normal or usual manner on those occasions when it
can be driven at all. 
"8. By reason of the foregoing, said warranties have
failed of their essential purpose. 
".... 
 
"10. As a proximate and direct consequence of the
breach of said warranties [Brown] has been damaged,
in that said vehicle is so substantially less
valuable than warranted as to be worthless. [Brown]
has also suffered incidental and consequential
damages resulting from said breach and from the
failure of said warranties in their essential
purpose."
In addition, in Count V of his complaint, Brown asserts a
claim under Alabama's "lemon law," Ala. Code 1975, § 8-20A-
10
Among other things, he contends that GM did not fulfill its
obligation to effectively make the necessary repairs for the
defects occurring in this vehicle during the warranty period.3
1061660
1(1), alleging, in part, as follows:
"26. [The] vehicle has, since the time of purchase
by [Brown], been periodically out of service and in
the custody of authorized dealers or repair
facilities of the Defendant, [GM], due to repair
attempts, one of which occurred during the Lemon Law
Rights period, for a cumulative total in excess of
30 calendar days. 
"27. [The] vehicle, since the time of purchase by
[Brown] has been the subject of at least one non-
conforming condition that was the subject of repair
attempts three or more times, one of which accrued
during the Lemon Law Rights period." 
11
GM argues that we should apply our holding in Tittle v.
Steel City Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc.  As noted, under Tittle,
claims of breach of what have since come to be referred to as
"repair warranties" were held to have accrued, not when the
manufacturer failed to effectively repair the vehicle as it
had "warranted" it would do, but at the time of the purchase
and tender of delivery of the vehicle.  Under Tittle,
therefore, the limitations period held to apply to Tittle's
claims expired four years following tender of delivery, see
Ala. Code 1975, § 7-2-725(1) and (2), and Tittle was
foreclosed from seeking judicial relief.
1061660
12
Under Tittle, if a "warranty" of the type and duration at
issue here -- i.e., a commitment by the manufacturer to repair
any defects that might occur for a period of five years after
the purchase of the vehicle -- is in place and defects first
occur during the fifth year of the warranty period and the
manufacturer thereafter fails to effectively make the promised
repairs, the statute of limitations will have expired before
the defects will have occurred and before the manufacturer
will have breached its promise to make the necessary repairs.
We are unable to see how such a result is either fair or
logical, or what the legislature intended.  See Thompson v.
State, 525 So. 2d 820, 823 (Ala. 1985) ("'"[T]here is no canon
against using common sense in construing laws as saying what
they obviously mean."'" (quoting Commentary to § 13A-1-6, Ala.
Code 1975, "General Rules of Construction")); Weill v. State
ex rel. Gaillard, 250 Ala. 328, 335, 34 So. 2d 132, 138 (1948)
("We cannot cast aside our common sense in trying to arrive at
the intent of the legislature."); Paterson v. Wisener, 218
Ala. 137, 138, 117 So. 663, 663 (1928) (expressing an
unwillingness to impute to the legislature a result lacking in
fairness "unless the language of the statute forcibly drives
1061660
13
us to that conclusion"); Stith Coal Co. v. Sanford, 192 Ala.
601, 606-07, 68 So. 990, 992 (1915) ("the law is a reasonable
master, and it should be so construed in the light of common
sense in ascertaining the legislative intent").
Some authorities take the position that a "warranty"
under which the manufacturer or seller undertakes to repair
defects occurring during a prescribed period following the
purchase of the vehicle is "a warranty explicitly extend[ing]
to future performance of the goods" under § 7-2-725(2), Ala.
Code 1975.  See, e.g., 4B Lary Lawrence, Lawrence's Anderson
on the Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-725:102 and :129 (3d ed.
2001).  Under this approach, a purchaser's cause of action for
the "warrantor's" failure to perform the required repairs
under the "warranty" would accrue -- quite understandably --
when that failure occurs.  § 7-2-725(2). 
Other authorities take the position that a "warranty" of
the nature presented here is not an ordinary "express
warranty" within the contemplation of the Uniform Commercial
Code ("the U.C.C.") and, therefore, in truth, is not a
"warranty" subject to breach at the time of tender of delivery
of the vehicle.  Specifically, Brown points out that an
1061660
14
"express warranty" is defined in Alabama's version of the
U.C.C. as follows:
"'(a)  Any affirmation of fact or promise made
by the seller to the buyer which relates to the
goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall
conform to the affirmation or promise.
"'(b)  Any description of the goods which is
made part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
description.
"'(c)  Any sample or model which is made part of
the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the whole of the goods shall conform to the
sample or model.'"
Brown's brief, at 22-23 (quoting § 7-2-313(1), Ala. Code 1975
(emphasis added in Brown's brief)).  Consistent with the
emphasized passages, Brown cites several authorities for the
proposition that true warranties under the U.C.C. go to "the
inherent quality of the goods or their future performance."
Cosman v. Ford Motor Co., 285 Ill. App. 3d 250, 261, 674
N.E.2d 61, 68, 220 Ill. Dec. 790, 797 (1996).  See also
Moorman Mfg.  Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 78, 435
N.E.2d 443, 447, 61 Ill. Dec. 746, 750 (1982) (U.C.C. warranty
rules "determine the quality of the product the manufacturer
promises and thereby determine the quality he must deliver");
1061660
15
Alloway v. General Marine Indus., L.P., 149 N.J. 620, 630, 695
A.2d 264, 269 (1997) ("the U.C.C. provides for express
warranties regarding the quality of goods"); 1 William D.
Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Series § 2-313.4, at 546
(2002) ("Express warranties relate exclusively to quality,
description and title of the goods and have nothing to do with
other terms of the contract.").  With this understanding, the
statutory pronouncement in § 7-2-725(2) that "[a] breach of
warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made" makes sense,
according to Brown.  See Max E. Klinger, The Concept of
Warranty Duration: A Tangled Web, 89 Dick. L. Rev. 935, 939
(1985) ("Section 7-2-725(2) presumes that all warranties,
express or implied, relate only to the condition of the goods
at the time of sale," and "[a]s a result, the period of
limitations begins to run at that time ...."). 
Brown then contends that the manufacturer's obligation at
issue here, and in Tittle, is not related to the quality or
description of the goods.  He cites numerous authorities for
the proposition that language of the nature used in the
"warranty" at issue here, obligating GM simply to make repairs
to the vehicle for such defects as might occur during the
1061660
Brown contends that Tittle essentially recognized a type
4
of warranty that does not exist in the law, i.e., a "repair"
warranty, as opposed to a "performance" warranty as
contemplated by § 7-2-313(1).
16
warranty period, concerns the performance of the "warrantor"
and has "nothing to do with the inherent quality of the goods
or their future performance."  Cosman, 285 Ill. App. 3d at
261, 674 N.E.2d  at 68, 220 Ill. Dec. at 797.  See Curtis R.
Reitz, Manufacturers' Warranties of Consumer Goods, 75 Wash.
U. L.Q. 357, 364 n.24 (1997) ("[p]romises to repair or replace
refer to future performance of [the warrantor], not to future
performance of goods"); Lawrence, § 2-725:129, at 332
(discussing the difference between a warranty of future
performance and a covenant to repair or replace); C. Dewitt,
Note, Action Accrual Date for Written Warranties to Repair:
Date of Delivery or Date of Failure to Repair?, 17 U. Mich. J.
L. Reform 713, 722 n.35 (1984) (promise to repair "relates not
to the goods and their quality, but to the manufacturer and
its obligation to the purchaser ....  [A] repair 'warranty'
falls beyond the scope of ... the on-delivery rule.").   
4
Accordingly, Brown contends that the cause of action here
accrued when the "warrantor" -- GM --  failed to adequately
1061660
17
repair the defects in the vehicle occurring during the
warranty period.  He notes that the first sentence of § 7-2-
725(2) would still remain relevant: "A cause of action accrues
when the breach occurs ...."  He points out that performance
of GM's obligation to "provide for repairs to the vehicle" is
not due at tender of delivery, but only if and when a "vehicle
defect" occurs during the warranty period.  He argues that,
only in that event, if the promised repairs fail to correct
the defect (after the promissor is allowed a reasonable
opportunity to do so), is the "warranty" breached and a cause
of action accrues.  Reitz, 75 Wash. U. L.Q. at 364 n.24
(tender of delivery date for accrual of the U.C.C. four-year
statute of limitations is "completely inappropriate to
promises to repair or replace goods that are later determined
to be defective"); Cosman, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 260, 674 N.E.
2d at  68, 220 Ill. Dec. at 797 (breach "cannot occur until
Ford refuses or fails to repair the powertrain if and when it
breaks"); Monticello v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 369 F. Supp.
1350, 1356-57 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (noting that, under Georgia law,
a written warranty that provides for repair or replacement is
breached when the purchaser returns the product to the dealer
1061660
Justice See in his dissent states that, under § 7-2-
5
725(2), "the parties are without the authority to extend the
limitations period beyond four years," and that it is "not the
function of this Court to 'improve' statutes." __ So. 2d at
__.  By our decision, however, we are not extending the
limitations period beyond the statutory four-year period.
Rather, we merely recognize that the "warranty," or
18
for repair and the repair is unsuccessful); General Motors
Corp. v. Green, 173 Ga. App. 188, 190, 325 S.E.2d 794, 796
(1984) ("'"[W]here there is an agreement to repair or replace,
the warranty is not beached until there is a refusal or
failure to repair.... [I]t is the refusal to remedy within a
reasonable time, or a lack of success in the attempts to
remedy which would constitute a breach of warranty"'");
Belfour v. Schaumburg Auto, 306 Ill. App. 3d 234, 241, 713
N.E.2d 1233, 1238, 239 Ill. Dec. 383, 387 (1999) (breach of a
3-year/50,000-mile repair warranty "cannot occur until
[Volkswagen of America, Inc., the manufacturer] refuses or
fails to repair the defect."); Poli v. Daimler Chrysler Corp.,
349 N.J. Super. 169, 180, 739 A.2d 104, 110-11 (2002) (cause
of action for breach of 7-year/70,000-mile power-train
warranty would not have accrued when car was delivered, but
rather when persistent problems appeared or when manufacturer
was unable to repair the defects).5
1061660
contractual language, at issue here is such that the accrual
of that four-year period does not commence on the date of
tender of delivery of the good. 
Although the contractual language at issue makes some use
of the term "warranty," and although the trial court, the
parties, and even this Court, for ease of reference, have
referred to this language as "warranty" language, the essence
of Brown's argument -- both to the trial court (in response to
GM's motion for a summary judgment) and to this Court (as
described in the foregoing three paragraphs of the text) -- is
that this language does not qualify as a true warranty under
§ 7-2-313.  (Even the language in a true warranty, however, is
language of a "contractual" nature.)  
Of course, the threshold and fundamental position taken
by Brown throughout this litigation is that Tittle was wrongly
decided and that, given the particular "warranty" language at
issue and the other facts presented, Brown's cause of action
could not logically be viewed as accruing on the date of
tender of his automobile.  It is our agreement in the first
instance with this fundamental proposition that compels our
reversal of the trial court's judgment.  
19
Professor Lawrence offers the following analysis:  
"When 
a 
manufacturer 
makes 
an 
express 
'warranty'
to repair or replace defective parts of goods that
runs for more than four years, a problem arises when
the plaintiff sues more than four years after the
original tender of delivery of the goods.
".... 
"Some courts meet this problem by holding that
the manufacturer's express warranty relates to
future performance.  
"....  The sounder approach is to recognize that
the failure to repair or replace is merely a breach
of a contract and not a breach of a warranty, and
1061660
20
therefore no cause of action arises until the
[manufacturer] has refused to repair or replace the
goods.  This is because until the [manufacturer] has
failed or refused to make the repairs or provide a
replacement, the buyer, not being entitled to such
a remedy, has no right to commence an action for
damages.  As a result, the action is timely brought
within four years of the [manufacturer's] failure or
refusal."
4B Lawrence's Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-
725:101 (footnotes omitted).  Under the contractual language
at issue in this case, we agree with Professor Lawrence that
the "sounder approach" is to consider that language as a
promise to repair the goods in the event a defect occurs.  
The approach adopted in Tittle cannot be correct.  As
Professor Lawrence points out, if a vehicle owner were to
assert a cause of action within the four-year statute of
limitations prescribed in Tittle, but before the manufacturer
has failed or refused to repair any defects that might
subsequently occur during the 
warranty 
period, 
the 
owner 
would
have no right to commence an action.  On the other hand, if
the owner of the vehicle waits until after a breach of the
"warranty" occurs -- that is after the "warrantor" breaches
its contractual obligation to repair a defect that occurs in
the vehicle -- the owner may have only a few weeks or even a
1061660
21
few days to bring an action to enforce his or her rights,
depending on how close to the four-year mark the manufacturer
breaches its obligation to repair the vehicle.  Indeed, if the
failure to repair the vehicle does not occur until after the
expiration of the fourth year following the purchase and
tender of delivery of the vehicle, the owner would be
completely 
foreclosed 
from 
seeking 
judicial 
enforcement 
of 
the
contractual rights for which he or she bargained.  As stated
at the outset, we find this to be unfair and illogical and a
state of affairs that the legislature could not reasonably
have intended. 
We overrule Tittle to the extent it holds that a cause of
action for breach of a contractual undertaking of the nature
presented here accrues at the time of the tender of delivery
of the goods in question, rather than at the time the
manufacturer breaches its contractual obligation to repair
that good.  Accordingly, we conclude that Brown's claim was
not barred by the four-year limitations period prescribed in
§ 7-2-725(1).  The judgment of the trial court is therefore
reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. 
1061660
22
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Parker and Murdock, JJ., concur.
Stuart and Smith, JJ., concur in part and concur in the
result.
Lyons, Woodall, and Bolin, JJ., concur in the result. 
See, J., dissents.
1061660
23
SMITH, Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the
result).
I concur in part and concur in the result.  The provision
at issue in this case does not warrant that there are no
defects in the quality of the vehicle; instead, it expresses
a promise to repair defects that may have existed at the time
of delivery but that are not found until some time during the
"warranty period."  
The applicable provision states as follows: "Repairs
Covered:  The warranty covers repairs to correct any vehicle
defect related to materials or workmanship occurring during
the warranty period. ..."  A "defect" is a "shortcoming" or
"an imperfection that impairs worth or utility."  Merriam-
Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 326 (11th ed. 2003).  Both the
"materials" of the car are installed and the "workmanship" is
performed during the manufacturing process.  If there is a
"defect" in the materials installed or the workmanship during
manufacturing, then that defect must naturally exist at the
conclusion of the manufacturing process and at time the
vehicle is delivered.
1061660
An alternate definition of "defect" could simply refer
6
to a breakage that does not occur until after delivery of the
vehicle; this would not change my analysis of GM's obligation
under the provision. 
24
However, the provision does not stop there.  It goes on
to refer to the defects "occurring during the warranty
period."  "Occur" and "occurring" mean "to be found or met
with,"  Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 858, and "to
be found to exist or appear." The American Heritage College
Dictionary 961 (4th ed. 2007).  Thus, the provision promises
to repair defects in materials or workmanship, which must
already necessarily exist immediately after the manufacturing
process and at the time of delivery, when those defects appear
or are found to exist.  GM's obligation to perform under the
provision, according to its terms, does not exist at delivery,
but only at a later time: when the defect is found, appears,
or otherwise manifests itself (so long as that occurs within
the "warranty period").6
The Court in Tittle v. Steel City Oldsmobile GMC Truck,
Inc., 544 So. 2d 883 (Ala. 1989), without specific analysis of
the language at issue, assumed that the promise in that case
was a "warranty" and that Ala. Code 1975, § 7-2-725(2), which
1061660
The warranty provision at issue in Tittle is not quoted
7
in that case; the operative provision is merely paraphrased by
the Court: "This writing [the new-car warranty] provided that
Steel City ... would repair and adjust defects in material or
workmanship that occurred during the first 12 months or first
12,000 miles in which the car was in use."  Tittle, 544 So. 2d
at 884.
Just as the use of the "formal words" "warrant or
8
guarantee" are not required to create an express warranty, see
Ala. Code 1975, § 7-2-313(2), the use of the word "warranty"
does 
not 
necessarily 
create 
such 
a 
warranty. 
 
See
Enterprise-Laredo Assocs. v. Hachar's, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 822,
831 (Tex. App. 1992) ("the use of form words such as
'warranty' or 'guarantee' [does] not automatically create an
express warranty").
25
provides that a breach of warranty accrues at delivery of the
goods, thus applied.   However, I do not believe that the
7
provision at issue here is a "warranty," although it is
labeled as such.   The various definitions of "express
8
warranty" found in Ala. Code 1975, § 7-2-313, all relate to
the inherent quality or specifications of the goods sold.  The
plain language of the provision in the instant case does not
relate to the quality of the vehicle as delivered, and it does
not promise that there are no defects in the vehicle.  "This
language clearly does not guarantee that the car will perform
free of defects for the term of the agreement. In fact ... the
1061660
26
language ... anticipates that defects will occur."  Tittle,
544 So. 2d at 891.  Instead, the provision promises the
performance of a future act on the part of GM: to repair the
vehicle when a defect is discovered.  I agree with the
following:
"[T]he failure to repair or replace is merely a
breach of a contract and not a breach of a warranty,
and therefore no cause of action arises until the
[manufacturer] has refused to repair or replace the
goods.  This is because until the [manufacturer] has
failed or refused to make the repairs or provide a
replacement, the buyer, not being entitled to such
a remedy, has no right to commence an action for
damages.  As a result, the action is timely brought
within four years of the [manufacturer's] failure or
refusal."
4B Lary Lawrence, Lawrence's Anderson on the Uniform
Commercial Code § 2-725:101 (3d ed. 2001) (footnote omitted).
Because the provision in this case is not a "warranty," its
breach did not "occur[] when tender of delivery [was] made,"
§ 7-2-725(2), but instead when GM failed to perform.
Tittle did not analyze whether the "warranty" in that
case was actually a "warranty" for purposes of § 7-2-725(2);
instead, the Court simply assumed that it was a warranty and
that § 7-2-725(2) applied.  Additionally, subsequent caselaw
discussing or applying Tittle has similarly failed to address
1061660
27
whether "repair warranties" were actually warranties or were
contractual obligations.  See, e.g., Lands v. Lull Int'l,
Inc., 963 So. 2d 626 (Ala. 2007); Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v.
Crawford, 689 So. 2d 3 (Ala. 1997); Hughes v. Hertz Corp., 670
So. 2d 882 (Ala. 1995); and Rhodes v. General Motors Corp.,
621 So. 2d 945 (Ala. 1993).  However, to the extent Tittle
requires this Court to assume that the provision in this case
is a warranty for purposes of the statute of limitations found
in § 7-2-725 and that the cause of action for the breach
accrues at the time of delivery of the goods, I agree with the
main opinion that it should be overruled.
Stuart, J., concurs.
1061660
28
LYONS, Justice (concurring in the result).
The main opinion reverses the trial court's judgment and
remands the case based on Troy Brown's contention that this
Court should overrule Tittle v. Steel City Oldsmobile GMC
Truck, Inc., 544 So. 2d 883 (Ala. 1989), in which this Court
held that the plaintiff's breach-of-warranty claim arose at
the time of delivery of the vehicle.  Because I am persuaded
that this case can be disposed of in favor of Brown based on
his contention that GM waived the affirmative defense of the
statute of limitations, I concur only in the result.
GM failed to assert the affirmative defense of the
statute of limitations in its answer.  GM nevertheless relied
on the statute-of-limitations defense in its motion for a
summary judgment.  GM can avoid the consequences of its
failure to assert the affirmative defense of the statute of
limitations in its answer if the defense of limitations
appears on the face of the complaint.  See Wallace v. Alabama
Ass'n of Classified Sch. Employees, 463 So. 2d 135, 136-37
(Ala. 1984).  
The only reference to a date appearing on the face of the
complaint is in paragraph 4:
1061660
29
"4. On or about, to-wit, the 3rd day of August,
2002, the Plaintiff, Troy Brown, purchased one (1)
2002 Chevrolet Corvette from Bill Heard Chevrolet
(an authorized dealer of the Defendant, GMC, located
in Columbus, Georgia), said automobile having been
manufactured by the Defendant, [GM], and bearing
serial number -----------."
(Emphasis added.)  The action was commenced on August 8, 2006,
four years and five days after the date referred to in the
complaint.  GM contends that the defense of limitations
appears on the face of the complaint. 
Noting the lack of Alabama authority on whether an
allegation of time preceded by the phrase "on or about" or
"to-wit" constitutes sufficient certainty to give rise to a
limitations defense appearing on the face of the complaint,
Brown relies on Lewis v. Merrill, 228 Or. 541, 365 P.2d 1052
(1961).  In that case, the Supreme Court of Oregon held that
an allegation that something occurred "on or about" a certain
day is not an averment that the event occurred on any distinct
day and that, therefore, the actual day or time may be either
before or after the stated date.  The Lewis court relied on
Conroy v. Oregon Construction Co., 23 F. 71, 73 (C.C. Or.
1885), in which the federal circuit court, when faced with the
same question, concluded: 
1061660
30
"In short, the averment amounts to nothing, so far
as time is concerned.  [Citation omitted.]  This
being so, it does not appear on the face of the
complaint when the right of action accrued, and
therefor it cannot be said that the action was not
commenced in time, and a demurrer for that cause
will not lie."
The Lewis court correctly concluded that the defense of
limitations does not appear on the face of the complaint when
the complaint avers occurrence of the event giving rise to the
claim on or about a specified date.  We are not permitted to
disregard the limiting phraseology in Brown's complaint lest
we run afoul of the rule that allegations of the complaint are
to be construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff,
with all doubts and allegations resolved in his favor.  See
Voyager Ins. Cos. v. Whitson, 867 So. 2d 1065 (Ala. 2003).
Because the defense of limitations does not appear on the face
of Brown's complaint, GM cannot extricate itself from the
consequences of its waiver of the affirmative defense of the
statute 
of 
limitations, 
and 
the 
judgment 
dismissing 
the 
action
is due to be reversed and the case remanded on this ground
alone.  I express no opinion as to the basis for reversal set
forth in the main opinion; I therefore concur only in the
result.
1061660
31
Woodall, J., concurs.
1061660
32
WOODALL, Justice (concurring in the result).
I agree with Justice Lyons; therefore, I concur only in
the result.  See Black's Law Dictionary 1122 (8th ed. 2004)
("on or about" means "[a]pproximately; at or around the time
specified").
1061660
33
SEE, Justice (dissenting).
I do not agree with the main opinion that we should
overrule Tittle v. Steel City Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc., 544
So. 2d 883 (Ala. 1989), and I do not find any other reason to
reverse the judgment of the trial court; therefore, I
respectfully dissent.
I.
In Tittle, Rodney K. Tittle purchased a new car from
Steel City Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc. ("Steel City"), on
October 9, 1981.  GM provided a warranty that it "would repair
and adjust defects in material or workmanship that occurred
during the first 12 months or first 12,000 miles in which the
car was in use." 544 So. 2d at 884.  However, Steel City was
unable to repair certain defects in the car.  Tittle sued
Steel City, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, and GM,
alleging breach of warranties based upon the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et
seq.  Steel City and GM moved for a summary judgment based
upon the statute of limitations.  The trial court granted
Steel City's and GM's motions, and Tittle appealed to this
Court.  This Court held that Tittle's state-law and Magnuson-
1061660
34
Moss Act claims were subject to the statute of limitations
provided in § 7-2-725(2), Ala. Code 1975, which states:
"(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach
occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of
knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs
when tender of delivery is made, except that where
a warranty explicitly extends to future performance
of the goods and discovery of the breach must await
the time of such performance the cause of action
accrues when the breach is or should have been
discovered; however, a cause of action for damages
for injury to the person in the case of consumer
goods shall accrue when the injury occurs."
In Tittle, based on the plain language of the statute,
this Court held that "Tittle's warranty does not extend to the
future performance of his car.  The trial court, therefore,
correctly determined 
that Tittle's cause of 
action, 
by 
statute
and by the express terms of his warranty, accrued at the time
Steel City delivered the vehicle to him." 544 So. 2d at 891.
Since that ruling, this Court has consistently held that "[a]
warranty extending to future performance of a product
guarantees the performance of that product for a stated period
of time, in contrast to a warranty to repair or replace, which
implicitly acknowledges that a product might not perform, but
provides for its repair or replacement if nonperformance in
fact occurs." Lands v. Lull Int'l, Inc., 963 So. 2d 626, 628
1061660
35
n.3 (Ala. 2007) (citing Tittle, 544 So. 2d at 889). See also
Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v. Crawford, 689 So. 2d 3, 10-11 (Ala.
1997) ("This Court has previously held that the language of an
express warranty to repair cannot be construed as a
representation that a product is entirely free of defects.
Rather than guaranteeing that the product is free of defects,
an express warranty to repair anticipates that any defects
detected 
during 
the 
term 
of 
the 
warranty 
will 
be
remedied."(citations omitted)).
The main opinion cites two possible rationales to remove
the bar of the statute of limitations prescribed in § 7-2-725.
The first is that GM's repair warranty should be viewed as an
express warranty that goes to the future performance of the
goods, placing it within an exception in § 7-2-725(2).  GM,
however, did not warrant the future performance of the car;
instead, it warranted the car against defects in "materials or
workmanship."  Brown's complaint asserts that "7 ... GMC has
breached both warranties as to [Brown].  Said vehicle ... is
and has been defective since the date of its purchase by
[Brown] ...."  Thus, Brown is asserting a defect, not claiming
1061660
36
a promise of future performance.  A promise to repair defects
in the car should not 
"be viewed as an independent or separate warranty.
Instead, ... such promises 'are generally viewed as
specifications of a remedy' and ... if the promise
to repair 'is not fulfilled, then the cause of
action is the underlying breach of warranty.'  [It
is] 'a fallacy' the argument that 'by failing to
remedy its first breach, the defendant committed a
second breach, giving rise to a brand new cause of
action and starting anew the limitations period.'"
 
Trans-Spec Truck Serv., Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 524 F.3d
315, 325 (1st Cir. 2008)(quoting New England Power Co. v.
Riley Stoker Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (Mass. Ct. App.
1985)). 
The second rationale offered by the main opinion is that
GM's repair warranty is not an express warranty under the
Uniform Commercial Code, and so the accrual date in  § 7-2-
725(2), Ala. Code 1975, does not apply.  Section 7-2-313, Ala.
Code 1975, states that "[a]ny affirmation of fact or promise
made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and
becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or
promise," and the Official Comment to that Code section states
that "[a]lthough this section is limited in its scope and
1061660
37
direct purpose to warranties made by the seller to the buyer
as part of a contract for sale, the warranty sections of this
Article are not designed in any way to disturb those lines of
case law growth which have recognized that warranties need not
be confined either to sales contracts or to the direct parties
to such a contract."   See Pack v. Damon Corp., 434 F.3d 810,
814 (6th Cir. 2006)(holding that under Michigan law a repair-
or-replace warranty extended by a remote manufacturer is an
express warranty under Michigan's version of the Uniform
Commercial Code).  Contrary to Brown's assertions, GM's
express warranty relates to the quality of the goods.  GM
promised to repair defects in "materials or workmanship," in
other words, defects affecting the quality of the goods as
manufactured and delivered.  This Court has treated
manufacturer's repair warranties as express warranties under
the Uniform Commercial Code.  See generally Ex parte GMC, 769
So. 2d 903 (Ala. 2000); Rhodes v. General Motors Corp., 621
So. 2d 945 (Ala. 1993); and Volkswagen of America v. Dillard,
579 So. 2d 1301 (Ala. 1991).  
Section 
7-2-725(1) 
provides 
that 
the 
statute 
of
limitations for the "breach of any contract for sale" is four
1061660
38
years from the date of the accrual of the cause of action.
Section 7-2-725(2) specifically provides that "[a] breach of
warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except ...
where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of
the goods ....," which is not the case here.
The main opinion also notes that many manufacturers now
offer warranties in excess of four years and, therefore, that
the current state of the law creates a situation in which an
automobile 
manufacturer 
may 
offer 
consumers 
a 
warranty 
that 
is
partially unenforceable because the term of the warranty
extends beyond 
the applicable 
statute 
of 
limitations.  Section
7-2-725(1) specifically provides that "the parties may reduce
the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not
extend it."  Therefore, based on the plain language of the
statute, this Court has consistently affirmed the principle
that
"[u]nder § 7-2-725(2), a cause of action for
breach of warranty accrues when the seller tenders
to the buyer the goods made the basis of the
warranty.  Once the cause of action accrues, the
statute provides a four-year limitations period in
which the buyer may file suit, subject to [two
exceptions] ...."
1061660
39
Tittle, 544 So. 2d 887-88.  Under the statute, the parties are
without the authority to extend the limitations period beyond
four years.  
This Court has stated:
"'Words used in a statute must be given their
natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood
meaning, and where plain language is used a court is
bound to interpret that language to mean exactly
what it says. If the language of the statute is
unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial
construction and the clearly expressed intent of the
legislature must be given effect.'"
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Nielsen, 714 So. 2d 293, 296 (Ala.
1998) (quoting IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602
So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992)).  The main opinion, however,
argues that the plain-meaning application of § 7-2-725 in
Tittle creates a harsh result when a automobile manufacturer
offers a warranty of longer than four years and, therefore,
that that application would not be "fair or logical, or what
the legislature intended" in such a case. ___ So. 2d at ___.
It is not the function of this Court to "improve"
statutes.  If the legislature would today offer a different
statute, then it is the function of that body to do so by
amendment, and not ours to do so by judicial revision.  Nor is
the plain meaning of the statute to be reformed by our
1061660
The main opinion suggests that it is "not extending the
9
limitations period beyond the statutory four-year period" but
is "merely recogniz[ing] that the 'warranty,' or contractual
language, at issue here is such that the accrual of that four-
year period does not commence on the date of tender of
40
judgment as to what we deem to be fair.  This Court has
stated: 
"There is clearly a 'rational' way to view the words
of the Legislature.  It may not reflect a policy
that the members of this Court would adopt, but that
is an entirely different matter.  If the Legislature
intends this statute to be applied in a different
manner, the Legislature may correct the statute in
its own way and its own time." 
 
Pitts v. Gangi, 896 So. 2d 433, 436 (Ala. 2004). See also
Simcala, Inc. v. American Coal Trade, Inc., 821 So. 2d 197,
203 (Ala. 2001) ("If adverse effects on market conditions
warrant a different result [than that demanded by a plain-
meaning interpretation,] it is for the Legislature, not this
Court, to amend the statute."); and Folmar & Assocs. LLP v.
Holberg, 776 So. 2d 112, 118 (Ala. 2000) ("While there may be
valid policy arguments for extending the Act ... 'it is not
for the Judiciary to impose its view on the Legislature.'"
(quoting Ex parte T.B., 698 So. 2d 127, 130 (Ala. 1997))).
This Court's holding in Tittle is based upon the plain meaning
of § 7-2-725, Ala. Code 1975.9
1061660
delivery of the good." ___ So. 2d at ___ n.5.  The main
opinion also states: "Under the contractual language at issue
in this case, we agree with Professor Lawrence that the
'sounder approach' is to consider that language as a promise
to repair the goods in the event a defect occurs." ___ So. 2d
at ___.  Thus, the main opinion treats GM's alleged breach of
the "promise to repair the goods in the event a defect occurs"
as a breach-of-contract claim independent of the breach-of-
warranty claim.  This allows Brown's cause of action to run
from GM's alleged breach of the promise to repair instead of
from the date of delivery of the goods as is provided in § 7-
2-725(2), Ala. Code 1975 ("A breach of warranty occurs when
tender of delivery is made, except ... where a warranty
explicitly extends to future performance of the goods ....").
I disagree.  This contract is a warranty.  The "contractual
language" that gives rise to the promise discussed by the main
opinion is found in the "2002 General Motors Corporation New
Vehicle Limited Warranty" section of the owner's manual.
Moreover, Brown did not allege in his complaint that GM had
breached the sales contract.  He alleged, instead, that GM had
breached both the new-vehicle warranty and the extended
warranty. See also ___ So. 2d at ___ n.3. 
41
II.
Justice Lyons, in his writing concurring in the result,
would have this Court hold that the trial court erred in
entering a summary judgment in favor of GM because, Justice
Lyons writes, GM waived its statute-of-limitations defense by
not asserting it in its initial pleading.  The record
indicates that after Brown filed his complaint, GM moved for
dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., but did
not raise the statute of limitations in that motion, and the
1061660
42
trial court denied the motion.  GM answered the complaint with
a general denial and did not raise any affirmative defenses.
This Court has stated: 
"The statute of limitations is specifically listed
as an affirmative defense in [Rule 8(c), Ala. R.
Civ. P.]; and the rule requires that it be specially
pleaded.  Once an answer is filed, if an affirmative
defense is not pleaded, it is waived. Robinson v.
Morse, 352 So. 2d 1355, 1357 (Ala. 1977).  The
defense may be revived ... if the defense appears on
the face of the complaint (cf., Sims v. Lewis, 374
So. 2d 298, 302 (Ala. 1979); and Williams v.
McMillan, 352 So. 2d 1347, 1349 (Ala. 1977))."
Wallace v. Alabama Ass'n of Classified Sch. Employees, 463 So.
2d 135, 136-37 (Ala. 1984).  
Based on the holding in Wallace, Brown argues that GM
waived the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations.
GM argues that the defense is revived because, it says, the
defense appears on the face of the complaint.  In support of
this argument, GM points to paragraph 4 of the complaint,
which states "[o]n or about, to-wit, the 3rd day of August,
2002, the Plaintiff, Troy Brown, purchased one (1) 2002
Chevrolet Corvette from Bill Heard Chevrolet ..., said
automobile having been manufactured by the Defendant, [GM]."
The complaint was filed on August 8, 2006, more than four
years after the date of purchase alleged in the complaint. 
1061660
43
Brown 
argues 
that 
the 
statute-of-limitations 
defense 
does
not appear on the face of the complaint because the words "on
or about" and "to-wit" precede the date of purchase, thus
making the date of delivery uncertain.  Brown cites Lewis v.
Merrill, 228 Or. 541, 365 P.2d 1052 (1961), in support of his
argument.  In Lewis, the Oregon Supreme Court considered
whether the plaintiff had waived the statute of limitations by
asserting the defense in a reply to a counterclaim rather than
demurring to the counterclaim.  The court held that "an
allegation that something occurred 'on or about' a certain
day, is not an averment that it occurred on any distinct day
or time. ... [A] demurrer to the complaint based on the
statute of limitations would not lie because it did not appear
on the face of the complaint when the right of action
accrued."  Lewis, 228 Or. At 543-44, 365 P.2d at 1053.  
There is no Alabama caselaw that directly addresses the
statute-of-limitations defense in this situation.  This Court
has recognized that the use of the words "on or about" and
"to-wit" can create uncertainty as to the time stated in a
pleading.  See Atchley v. Wood, 255 Ala. 227, 229, 51 So. 2d
705, 706 (1951) ("A videlicet means on or about the day
1061660
Modern "notice pleading" rules have achieved the same
10
effect of preventing prejudice from such minor inaccuracies.
44
specified.  When it is so alleged, the evidence need not prove
the date strictly as laid.  It shows an express purpose to
leave the matter of time uncertain." (citations omitted));
Nelson v. Cutter Boat & Motor Co., 260 Ala. 648, 72 So. 2d 86
(1954); Williams v. Shows, 187 Ala. 132, 65 So. 839 (1914);
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Crabtree, 230 Ala. 443,
161 So. 508 (1935); and Pollack v. Gunter & Gunter, 162 Ala.
317, 50 So. 155 (1909).  However, these cases were decided at
a time when Alabama followed the strict rules of common-law
pleading, where any variation between the dates in a pleading
and the evidence could be fatal to a plaintiff's case.
Therefore, the use of "on or about" was a way to prevent
prejudice to a plaintiff from minor inaccuracies in the
pleadings when the precise time of an event was not material
to the case.  See Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption of Rule
10
9, Ala. R. Civ. P. ("In existing Alabama practice a videlicet
is used in order to prevent prejudice from inaccuracies.  For
example, see Nelson v. Cutter Boat & Motor Co., 260 Ala. 648,
72 So.2d 86 (1954).").  
1061660
The practice that "a videlicet is used in order to
11
prevent prejudice from inaccuracies" and the opportunity to
demonstrate that the date stated in the complaint is not the
actual date are consistent in their effects.
In his writing concurring in the result, Justice Lyons
argues:  "We are not permitted to disregard the limiting
phraseology in Brown's complaint lest we run afoul of the rule
that allegations of the complaint are to be construed in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff, with all doubts and
allegations resolved in his favor." ___ So. 2d at ___ (Lyons,
J., concurring in the result).  I do not believe that the
policy of reading the complaint in a light most favorable to
the plaintiff requires us to read out of the complaint the
date chosen by the plaintiff, nor do I consider it somehow
unfair to require the plaintiff, if he maintains that he was
mistaken as to the date he chose, to present substantial
evidence of another date. See Slaney v. International Amateur
Athletic Fed'n, 244 F.3d 580, 597 (7th Cir. 2001)("[T]he court
is not required to ignore facts alleged in the complaint that
undermine the plaintiff's claim.").
45
Although Brown here prefaced his identification of the
date of the purchase with the words "on or about" and "to-
wit," the date actually listed falls outside the time allowed
by the statute of limitations for the commencement of the
action.  The date Brown specified in the complaint is the one
on which GM is entitled to rely for statute-of-limitations
purposes.  If it happened that that date were incorrect, Brown
could have offered substantial evidence of a later date and
thereby presented a question of material fact that would
preclude a summary judgment.   
11
1061660
46
Brown cannot rely on the words "on or about" and "to-wit"
to relieve him of his representation of the date that he chose
and that to all appearances is correct.  The statute-of-
limitations defense survives because "the defense appears on
the face of the complaint."  Wallace v. Alabama Ass'n of
Classified Sch. Employees, 463 So. 2d at 136.  Therefore, I
would affirm the trial court's judgment on this issue as well.
Because Brown does not demonstrate a genuine issue of
material fact to overcome GM's affirmative defense of the
statute of limitations or a sufficient basis on which Tittle
should be overruled, I respectfully dissent.