Case Title: Travis v. Brand

Citation: 

Docket Number: S268480

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2023-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
ARNETTE TRAVIS et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
BILL BRAND et al., 
Defendants and Respondents;  
REDONDO BEACH WATERFRONT, LLC, et al., 
Appellants. 
 
ARNETTE TRAVIS et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
BILL BRAND et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
S268480 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Eight 
B298104, B301479 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BC665330 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 30, 2023 
 
Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in 
which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and 
Cantil-Sakauye* concurred.  
 
 
 
 
* 
Retired Chief Justice of California, assigned by the Chief 
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 
Constitution. 
1 
 
TRAVIS v. BRAND 
S268480 
 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
Several defendants were sued for their alleged failure to 
make certain required disclosures under the Political Reform 
Act of 1974 (Gov. Code, § 81000 et seq.).1  After prevailing in the 
lawsuit, defendants successfully sought attorney’s fees under 
section 91003, subdivision (a) (section 91003(a)), which grants 
trial courts discretion to award attorney’s fees “to a plaintiff or 
defendant who prevails.”2  The question we address here is 
whether a trial court’s discretion to award fees to a prevailing 
defendant is coextensive with its discretion to award fees to a 
prevailing plaintiff.  The text of the statute does not specify the 
standard that should govern an award of fees to either 
prevailing party.  Nonetheless, in order to effectuate the purpose 
of encouraging private litigation enforcing the Political Reform 
Act, we interpret section 91003(a) to impose an asymmetrical 
standard, which constrains the trial court’s discretion to award 
attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant.  Consistent with the 
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Government 
Code unless otherwise specified. 
2  
The statute applies to actions “for injunctive relief to 
enjoin violations or compel compliance with” the act.  
(§ 91003(a).)  Section 91012, also part of the Political Reform Act 
and discussed later in this opinion, contains similar language to 
section 91003(a) as it relates to awardable attorney’s fees (see 
fn. 5, post) if the plaintiff or defendant “prevails in any action 
authorized by this title.”   
TRAVIS v. BRAND 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
2 
 
standard adopted in similar contexts, including the enforcement 
of civil rights and fair housing and employment laws, a 
prevailing defendant under the Political Reform Act “should not 
be awarded fees and costs unless the court finds the action was 
objectively without foundation when brought, or the plaintiff 
continued to litigate after it clearly became so.”  (Williams v. 
Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97, 115 
(Williams).)  Because the Court of Appeal affirmed an award of 
attorney’s fees under section 91003(a) in this case without first 
considering whether this standard had been met, we reverse the 
judgment and remand for further proceedings.   
I. 
In 2010, residents of the City of Redondo Beach (City) 
approved Measure G, which authorized 400,000 square feet of 
new development in the City’s King Harbor-Pier area.  The City 
sought out a private developer to assist with the project and 
ultimately entered into an exclusive negotiating agreement with 
CenterCal Properties, LLC.  (Redondo Beach Waterfront, LLC v. 
City of Redondo Beach (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 982, 988 (Redondo 
Beach Waterfront).)  In 2016, the project passed several 
milestones:  the City notified CenterCal Properties that its 
application seeking approval of the vesting tentative tract map 
was “ ‘deemed complete’ ”; the harbor commission certified the 
environmental impact report and approved both a coastal 
development permit and a conditional use permit; and the city 
council passed a resolution reciting its approval “ ‘shall confer a 
vested right to proceed with development.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 988–
989.)  The City and CenterCal Properties signed an agreement 
for lease of property and infrastructure financing the following 
year.  (Id. at p. 989.)   
TRAVIS v. BRAND 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
3 
 
Meanwhile, some City residents who opposed the 
development started soliciting signatures to place a local 
initiative — the King Harbor Coastal Access, Revitalization, 
and Enhancement Act (later designated Measure C) — on the 
ballot for the next general municipal election.  Measure C sought 
to place zoning restrictions on the highly contested $400 million 
waterfront project.  Measure C appeared on the March 7, 2017, 
ballot, and was approved by the voters.  (Redondo Beach 
Waterfront, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 990.)   
These events triggered various lawsuits, but we are 
concerned here only with one:  an action seeking injunctive relief 
against certain Measure C supporters to compel their 
compliance with the Political Reform Act.  The lawsuit was filed 
by two City residents who opposed Measure C and supported the 
development project, Arnette Travis and Chris Voisey 
(collectively, plaintiffs).  Plaintiffs alleged that some supporters 
of Measure C had violated and continued to violate the Political 
Reform Act by failing to disclose the actual identity of entities 
who were supporting the ballot measure.  These supporters 
included Rescue Our Waterfront, a political action committee 
(PAC), and Wayne Craig, a principal officer of the committee; 
Redondo Beach Mayor Bill Brand and City Councilmember Nils 
Nehrenheim; and Brand’s mayoral campaign committee as well 
as its treasurer, Linda Moffat (collectively, defendants).  
According to the complaint, the Rescue Our Waterfront PAC 
was a committee “ ‘primarily formed’ ” to support Measure C 
and was therefore required to disclose this information to the 
public.  (Travis v. Brand (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 240, 246 
(Travis); see Gov. Code, § 84107; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, 
TRAVIS v. BRAND 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
4 
 
§ 18247.5.)3  The complaint further alleged that the Rescue Our 
Waterfront PAC was controlled by candidates Brand and 
Nehrenheim, which likewise should have been disclosed to the 
public.  (Travis, at p. 247; see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 18521.5.)  
Failure to disclose this information, plaintiffs argued, had the 
effect of deceiving voters.  (Travis, at p. 247.)   
Following a five-day bench trial, the trial court ruled in 
defendants’ favor on all claims.  It determined that the Rescue 
Our Waterfront PAC was a general purpose committee 
(§ 82027.5) — and therefore not primarily formed to support 
Measure C — and that neither Brand nor Nehrenheim exerted 
significant control or influence over it.  (Travis, supra, 
62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 248, 252–253.)  The court awarded 
defendants costs and attorney’s fees as prevailing parties under 
section 91003(a) in the amount of $896,896.60.  (Travis, at 
p. 253.)  In addition to declaring that defendants were the 
prevailing parties in the action, the trial court found plaintiffs’ 
lawsuit “was frivolous, unreasonable and groundless.”  The trial 
court reasoned that plaintiffs “prosecuted their private 
enforcement action in order to punish the [d]efendants for their 
 
3  
As summarized by the Court of Appeal:  “General purpose 
committees support or oppose more than one candidate or ballot 
measure.  (Gov. Code, § 82027.5.)  Primarily formed committees 
support or oppose a single candidate, single measure, multiple 
candidates in a single election, or multiple measures in a single 
election.  (Id., § 82047.5.)  A committee can be either general 
purpose or primarily formed.  Either type of committee may also 
be candidate-controlled, which means a candidate has 
significant influence over the committee.  (Id., § 82016.)”  
(Travis, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 246.)  “Committees 
primarily formed to support or oppose a measure must say so in 
their name, for example, ‘No on Measure A.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 246–
247.) 
TRAVIS v. BRAND 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
5 
 
free speech and their public support to guard against the 
[development] project.”   
As relevant here, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial 
court’s award of attorney’s fees to defendants.  (Travis, supra, 
62 Cal.App.5th at p. 265.)  The court held that section 91003(a) 
grants trial courts discretion to award attorney’s fees and costs 
“ ‘to a plaintiff or defendant who prevails,’ ” such that both 
“prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants are to be treated 
alike” in determining their entitlement to a fee award.  (Id. at 
pp. 263, 264.)  Because defendants were “unquestionably” the 
prevailing parties in this litigation, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion to 
award them attorney’s fees (id. at p. 264), irrespective of any 
finding that the lawsuit was frivolous.   
In construing the attorney’s fees statute to define a single 
standard that applies equally to both prevailing plaintiffs and 
defendants, the Court of Appeal rejected two decisions — People 
v. Roger Hedgecock for Mayor Com. (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 810 
(Hedgecock) and Community Cause v. Boatwright (1987) 
195 Cal.App.3d 562 (Boatwright) — which held that a 
prevailing defendant seeking attorney’s fees under the Political 
Reform Act had to establish that the plaintiff’s claims were 
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.  (Hedgecock, at 
p. 815; Boatwright, at p. 574.)4   
 
4  
Those decisions in turn were based on the reasoning of 
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC (1978) 434 U.S. 412 
(Christiansburg), which involved attorney’s fee awards under 
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Pub.L. No. 88-352 
(July 2, 1964) 78 Stat. 241).  We discuss these decisions further, 
post.   
TRAVIS v. BRAND 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
6 
 
We granted review to resolve the conflict and to determine 
whether an asymmetrical standard applies to a prevailing 
defendant’s request for attorney’s fees under the Political 
Reform Act.   
II. 
California follows the American rule regarding attorney’s 
fees.  Under that rule, litigants are ordinarily responsible for 
paying their own attorney’s fees, unless a statute or agreement 
provides otherwise.  (Essex Ins. Co. v. Five Star Dye House, Inc. 
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 1252, 1257; Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.)  The 
statutory exception at issue in this case is set forth in 
Government Code section 91003(a).  It currently states, in 
pertinent part:  “Any person residing in the jurisdiction may sue 
for injunctive relief to enjoin violations or to compel compliance 
with the provisions of this title. . . .  The court may award to a 
plaintiff or defendant who prevails that party’s costs of 
litigation, including reasonable attorney’s fees.”  (Ibid.)   
The parties agree that this statute gives the trial court 
discretion to decide whether to award attorney’s fees in cases 
arising under the Political Reform Act.  They disagree, however, 
about 
the 
legal 
framework 
governing 
that 
discretion.  
Defendants, echoing the Court of Appeal, argue that prevailing 
plaintiffs and defendants “are to be treated the same” in 
determining whether to award attorney’s fees.  Plaintiffs, on the 
other hand, contend that a defendant’s opportunity to recover 
attorney’s fees is more limited than that of a plaintiff:  a 
prevailing defendant may recover attorney’s fees only when the 
plaintiff’s suit was “ ‘frivolous, unreasonable or without 
foundation.’ ”  A contrary rule, in plaintiffs’ view, would chill 
TRAVIS v. BRAND 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
7 
 
private enforcement of the Political Reform Act and thus 
undermine its purpose.  We agree with plaintiffs.   
A. 
The United States Supreme Court construed a similarly 
worded fee statute as imposing an asymmetrical standard in 
Christiansburg, supra, 434 U.S. 412, which affirmed the denial 
of attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in an action under 
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The fee statute there — 
like the one here — was silent on what standard to apply when 
awarding attorney’s fees.  The statute there provided, “ ‘In any 
action or proceeding under this title the court, in its discretion, 
may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee.’ ”  
(Christiansburg, 
at 
pp. 413–414, 
quoting 
42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(k).)  In analyzing what standard should govern a fee 
award to a successful defendant, Christiansburg emphasized 
that a private plaintiff in a title VII action “is the chosen 
instrument of Congress to vindicate ‘a policy that Congress 
considered of the highest priority.’ ”  (Christiansburg, at p. 418.)  
Christiansburg also recognized that when a court awards fees to 
a prevailing plaintiff, the fee is assessed “against a violator of 
federal law.”  (Ibid.)  These two “strong equitable considerations 
counseling an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII 
plaintiff . . . are wholly absent in the case of a prevailing 
Title VII defendant.”  (Ibid.)  Indeed, to assess fees against 
plaintiffs “simply because they do not finally prevail would 
substantially add to the risks inhering in most litigation and 
would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous 
enforcement of the provisions of Title VII.  Hence, a plaintiff 
should not be assessed [an] opponent’s attorney’s fees unless a 
court finds that [the] claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or 
groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it 
TRAVIS v. BRAND 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
8 
 
clearly became so.”  (Id. at p. 422.)  The Supreme Court 
cautioned courts considering these fee requests to “resist the 
understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by 
concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, 
his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation.”  
(Id. at pp. 421–422, italics omitted.)   
B. 
Two Court of Appeal decisions subsequently applied the 
Christiansburg standard to requests for attorney’s fees under 
the Political Reform Act.  Before discussing these opinions, we 
provide a brief overview of the Political Reform Act.   
“The State of California has determined that the [Political 
Reform Act] is vitally important to its republican form of 
government.”  (Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. 
Superior Court (2006) 40 Cal.4th 239, 260; see Thirteen 
Committee v. Weinreb (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 528, 532 (Weinreb) 
[“The manifest purpose of the financial disclosure provisions of 
the [Political Reform] Act is to insure a better informed 
electorate and to prevent corruption of the political process”].)  
In enacting the Political Reform Act by initiative, the voters 
declared that “[p]revious laws regulating political practices have 
suffered from inadequate enforcement by state and local 
authorities.”  (§ 81001, subd. (h).)  The Political Reform Act 
expressly states that its provisions are to be “liberally construed 
to accomplish its purposes.”  (§ 81003.)  One of its objectives is 
that “[a]dequate enforcement mechanisms should be provided to 
public officials and private citizens in order that this title will 
be vigorously enforced.”  (§ 81002, subd. (f).)  One method of 
enforcement is through private actions for injunctive relief.  
(§ 91003(a).)   
TRAVIS v. BRAND 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
9 
 
Both Hedgecock and Boatwright considered the purposes 
and objectives of the Political Reform Act when determining 
what standard to apply to attorney’s fee requests under the 
statute.  In Hedgecock, the district attorney filed a civil lawsuit 
for injunctive relief based on various defendants’ alleged failures 
to report campaign contributions made to a mayoral candidate.  
(Hedgecock, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at pp. 812–813.)  The district 
attorney later voluntarily dismissed the civil lawsuit, after 
deciding to pursue a criminal action and allowing the Fair 
Political Practices Commission to file its own civil action against 
many of the same defendants.  (Id. at pp. 813–815.)  Contending 
they were the prevailing party, defendants then sought 
attorney’s fees from the trial court.  (Id. at p. 814.)  The trial 
court agreed with the district attorney that defendants were not 
the prevailing party following the voluntary dismissal, and 
denied fees solely on that basis.  (Ibid.)  The Court of Appeal did 
not address this ground for denying fees; instead, the court 
denied fees on the ground that “the district attorney’s suit was 
not frivolous or groundless” within the meaning of the 
Christiansburg standard.  (Id. at p. 815.)   
The Hedgecock court justified its reliance on the 
Christiansburg standard by focusing on the statutory purpose of 
encouraging private enforcement of the Political Reform Act.  
(Hedgecock, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at pp. 815–819.)  The 
“primary purpose of the prevailing party attorneys’ fee 
provisions of the Political Reform Act is to encourage private 
litigation enforcing the act.”  (Id. at p. 816.)  But a rule allowing 
the routine award of attorney’s fees to prevailing defendants in 
Political Reform Act lawsuits, like a rule allowing the routine 
award of fees to prevailing defendants in the civil rights actions 
at issue in Christiansburg, “ ‘could discourage all but the most 
TRAVIS v. BRAND 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
10 
 
airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of 
ultimate success.’ ”  (Hedgecock, at p. 817.)  The Hedgecock court 
found the Christiansburg analysis persuasive, stating:  “ ‘No 
matter how . . . meritorious one’s claim may appear at the 
outset, the course of litigation is rarely predictable.  Decisive 
facts may not emerge until discovery or trial.  The law may 
change or clarify in the midst of litigation.  Even when the law 
or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a 
party may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing 
suit.’ ”  (Id. at p. 817.)   
The Hedgecock court further held that the need to 
incentivize private enforcement is particularly acute for actions 
brought under the Political Reform Act.  “Where the actionable 
wrong is the adulteration of the political process,” the Hedgecock 
court observed, “the damage to the citizenry is significant but 
the injury to any one citizen is not only nebulous but also 
indirect.”  (Hedgecock, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at p. 817.)  “The 
attorney’s fee provisions of the Political Reform Act are designed 
to ameliorate the burden on the individual citizen who seeks to 
remedy what is essentially a collective wrong.”  (Ibid.; cf. Eddy 
v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of America (D.C. Cir. 1995) 59 F.3d 201, 
205 [“the presumption favoring fee-shifting in civil rights cases 
reflects the unique importance of the enforcement of these 
statutes to the nation as a whole, as well as to their direct 
beneficiaries”].)5 
 
5  
The Hedgecock court was interpreting section 91003(a) as 
well as section 91012, a separate but similarly worded provision 
of the Political Reform Act.  (Hedgecock, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d 
at p. 815.)  Section 91012 currently provides in relevant part:  
 
TRAVIS v. BRAND 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
11 
 
The Boatwright court reached the same result in an action 
brought by a nonprofit corporation against a state assemblyman 
for alleged reporting violations under the Political Reform Act.  
(Boatwright, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at pp. 565–566.)  The Court 
of Appeal affirmed the judgment in favor of the defendant, but 
reversed the order requiring the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s 
attorney’s fees and costs.  (Id. at p. 566.)  The plaintiff argued 
on appeal that a prevailing defendant should be awarded fees 
“only if the plaintiff’s claim is frivolous, unreasonable, 
malicious, or clearly groundless.”  (Id. at p. 574.)  The court 
acknowledged that section 91012 “[o]n its face . . . contains no 
such limitation,” but it concluded that Hedgecock and 
Christiansburg supported the plaintiff’s interpretation of the 
statute.  (Boatwright, at pp. 574–575.)  The court noted that 
“[t]he statute at issue in Christiansburg was similar to [the 
Political Reform Act] in that it contained no limitation on a 
prevailing defendant’s right to fees,” but the United States 
Supreme Court nonetheless “rejected an argument that the 
plain meaning of the statute entitled a prevailing defendant to 
fees on the same basis as a prevailing plaintiff.”  (Id. at p. 575.)  
It was persuaded by Christiansburg’s conclusion that an 
asymmetrical fee standard was necessary to encourage private 
enforcement actions, and by Hedgecock’s application of this 
standard to the Political Reform Act, where encouraging such 
claims was “ ‘perhaps even more critical’ ” to “ ‘remedy what is 
essentially a collective wrong.’ ”  (Boatwright, at p. 575, quoting 
Hedgecock, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at p. 817.)   
 
“The court may award to a plaintiff or defendant other than an 
agency, who prevails in any action authorized by this title, that 
party’s costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney’s fees.”   
TRAVIS v. BRAND 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
12 
 
C. 
The Court of Appeal below expressly disagreed with 
Hedgecock and Boatwright.  (See Travis, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 264.)  It believed the high court had “considerably limited” 
the scope of the Christiansburg standard in Fogerty v. Fantasy, 
Inc. (1994) 510 U.S. 517 (Fogerty).  (Travis, at p. 264.)  Based on 
its view that the fee provision here resembled the one in Fogerty 
more than the one in Christiansburg, the Court of Appeal 
concluded “prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants are to 
be treated alike” under the Political Reform Act.  (Travis, at 
p. 264.)  We conclude the Court of Appeal’s reliance on Fogerty 
was misplaced.   
Fogerty involved a prevailing defendant in the distinct 
context of a private copyright dispute.  The fee statute at issue 
in Fogerty resembled the one here, insofar as it did not expressly 
articulate any particular standard to inform a court’s discretion 
in awarding attorney’s fees to a prevailing party, as well as the 
fee statute at issue in Christiansburg.  (See Fogerty, supra, 
510 U.S. at p. 519, quoting the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. 
§ 505 [“in any copyright infringement action ‘the court 
may . . . award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing 
party’ ”].)  To determine what standard should apply, the high 
court again examined “[t]he goals and objectives” of the 
governing statutory scheme.  (Fogerty, at p. 524.)  It concluded 
that the goals and objectives of the Copyright Act differed from 
those underlying the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and thus 
warranted applying a different standard for awarding attorney’s 
fees to prevailing defendants.  (Fogerty, at pp. 524–527.)   
First, “in the civil rights context, impecunious ‘private 
attorney general’ plaintiffs can ill afford to litigate their claims 
TRAVIS v. BRAND 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
13 
 
against defendants with more resources,” so Congress sought “to 
provide incentives for the bringing of meritorious lawsuits[] by 
treating successful plaintiffs more favorably than successful 
defendants in terms of the award of attorney’s fees.”  (Fogerty, 
supra, 510 U.S. at p. 524.)  Litigants in copyright actions, on the 
other hand, “ ‘can run the gamut from corporate behemoths to 
starving artists.’ ”  (Ibid.)  And “it is by no means always the 
case that the plaintiff in an infringement action is the only 
holder of a copyright; often times, defendants hold copyrights 
too.”  (Id. at p. 526.)   
Second, “the policies served by the Copyright Act are more 
complex, more measured, than simply maximizing the number 
of meritorious suits for copyright infringement.”  (Fogerty, 
supra, 510 U.S. at p. 526.)  The primary purpose of copyright, 
after all, is not to incentivize the greatest number of copyright 
infringement suits, but to offer a limited exclusive right to the 
copyright holder so as “ ‘ “to promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 527, quoting U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, 
cl. 8.)  While copyright law grants the holder of a copyright “ ‘the 
right to their original expression,’ ” it also “ ‘encourages others 
to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a 
work.’ ”  (Fogerty, at p. 527.)  To achieve both of these goals, “it 
is peculiarly important that the boundaries of copyright law be 
demarcated as clearly as possible. . . .  [A] successful defense of 
a copyright infringement action may further the policies of the 
Copyright Act every bit as much as a successful prosecution of 
an infringement claim by the holder of a copyright.”  (Ibid., 
italics added.)  Accordingly, “defendants who seek to advance a 
variety of meritorious copyright defenses should be encouraged 
to litigate them to the same extent that plaintiffs are encouraged 
to litigate meritorious claims of infringement.”  (Ibid.)  
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
14 
 
We disagree with the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that 
this case is unlike Christiansburg and more like Fogerty.  
(Travis, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 264.)  To determine whether 
“election law disputes are more like the ordinary civil litigation 
setting in Fogerty” (id. at p. 264), we must examine the goals 
and objectives of the Political Reform Act.  (Accord, Martin v. 
Franklin Capital Corp. (2005) 546 U.S. 132, 139–140 [“When 
applying fee-shifting statutes, ‘we have found limits in “the 
large objectives” of the relevant Act, which embrace certain 
“equitable considerations” ’ ”].)   
As discussed above, the voters intended for the Political 
Reform Act to be robustly enforced to promote the important 
public policy of transparency.  (See Flannery v. California 
Highway Patrol (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 629, 642 [“the Political 
Reform Act expressly encourages enforcement by private citizen 
suits”]; Weinreb, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d at p. 538 [the act is 
“dependent upon private litigation as a means of enforcement”].)  
As the ballot pamphlet explained about the Political Reform Act, 
“Proposition 9 will establish standards which give citizens a 
basis for the faith and trust which must lie at the heart of our 
political process,” undergirded “at last” by “full, fair and 
independent enforcement of the law.”  (Ballot Pamp., Primary 
Elec. (June 4, 1974) rebuttal to argument against Prop. 9, p. 37.)   
The policies and objectives of the Political Reform Act are 
not analogous to the Copyright Act in the context of attorney’s 
fee awards.  The Copyright Act “serves the purpose of enriching 
the general public through access to creative works” and to that 
end seeks to ensure that “the boundaries of copyright law [are] 
demarcated as clearly as possible.”  (Fogerty, supra, 510 U.S. at 
p. 527.)  The statute achieves its objectives “by striking a 
balance between two subsidiary aims:  encouraging and 
TRAVIS v. BRAND 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
15 
 
rewarding authors’ creations while also enabling others to build 
on that work.”  (Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (2016) 
579 U.S. 197, 204, citing Fogerty, at p. 526.)  “That is 
why . . . Fogerty insisted on treating prevailing plaintiffs and 
prevailing defendants alike — because the one could ‘further the 
policies of the Copyright Act every bit as much as’ the other.”  
(Kirtsaeng, at p. 204, quoting Fogerty, at p. 527.)  We see no 
similar need to strike a balance between conflicting aims under 
the Political Reform Act.  Maximizing the number of meritorious 
suits through the Political Reform Act’s private enforcement 
mechanism is of primary importance.  Encouraging such claims 
is the best way to further the act’s objective of ensuring that 
“[a]dequate enforcement mechanisms . . . be provided to public 
officials and private citizens.”  (§ 81002, subd. (f); see also id., 
subd. (a) [finding that “[r]eceipts and expenditures in election 
campaigns should be fully and truthfully disclosed in order that 
the voters may be fully informed and improper practices may be 
inhibited”].)  A rule allowing defendants to recover their 
attorney’s fees whenever they prevail would discourage a large 
number of plaintiffs who may have colorable claims but “ ‘who 
dare not risk the financial ruin caused by an award of attorney 
fees if they ultimately do not succeed.’ ”  (Williams, supra, 
61 Cal.4th at p. 103.)   
Although the Court of Appeal correctly recognized the 
difficulty in generalizing about the relative resources available 
to plaintiffs and defendants in Political Reform Act litigation 
(Travis, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 264 [noting the resources 
available to either side could “ ‘ “run the gamut” ’ ”]), we do not 
believe this is a reason to reject the approach outlined in 
Christiansburg.  Even if some plaintiffs may have sufficient 
resources to pursue their claims, that fact does not undermine 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
16 
 
our conclusion that the statutory scheme here, which depends 
on an individual acting as a private attorney general to enforce 
a law for a public benefit, is more like the antidiscrimination 
laws at issue in Christiansburg (and those laws discussed post) 
than the copyright scheme at issue in Fogerty.  Indeed, a rule 
subjecting unsuccessful plaintiffs to substantial financial risk in 
Political Reform Act cases, where the plaintiff often will have 
suffered no particularized harm, would discourage all but a few 
from seeking to enforce laws vital to ensuring transparency in 
the political process.  We therefore cannot say that the factors 
justifying the Christiansburg rule are “absent” here.  (Fogerty, 
supra, 510 U.S. at p. 523.)   
The Court of Appeal’s ruling below does not accurately 
capture the distinct interests of plaintiffs under the two 
statutory schemes, either.  While the typical plaintiff in a 
copyright suit will generally be pursuing that plaintiff’s own 
interests, the typical plaintiff under the Political Reform Act 
represents broader interests.  As the Hedgecock court aptly 
recognized, the award of attorney’s fees under the Political 
Reform Act is “designed to ameliorate the burden on the 
individual citizen who seeks to remedy what is essentially a 
collective wrong.”  (Hedgecock, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at p. 817.)   
A defendant’s interests under the Copyright Act are also 
distinguishable from a defendant’s interests under the Political 
Reform Act.  The high court emphasized that the successful 
defense of a copyright action “may further the policies of the 
Copyright Act every bit as much” as the successful prosecution 
of an infringement claim.  (Fogerty, supra, 510 U.S. at p. 527.)  
A successful defense of an action under the Political Reform Act, 
by contrast, merely confirms that the action lacks merit.  As 
plaintiffs note, whereas a nonprevailing defendant in a Political 
TRAVIS v. BRAND 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
17 
 
Reform Act lawsuit has violated the law and the public policy 
underlying the statutory scheme, a nonprevailing plaintiff is 
“guilty only of bringing an unsuccessful suit.”  There is no 
overriding equitable reason to award fees to a prevailing 
defendant in a Political Reform Act action unless the lawsuit 
“was objectively without foundation when brought, or the 
plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.”  
(Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 115.)6   
This court interpreted yet another similarly worded fee 
statute as articulating an asymmetrical standard in Williams, 
supra, 61 Cal.4th 97.  The statute at issue in that case, a 
provision of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act 
(§ 12900 et seq.; FEHA), provided that “ ‘the court, in its 
discretion, may award to the prevailing party . . . reasonable 
attorney’s fees and costs . . . .’ ”  (Williams, at p. 101.)7  Williams 
recognized that the Legislature in enacting the FEHA fee 
provision, like Congress in enacting the similar title VII 
provision discussed in Christiansburg, had “sought ‘to 
encourage persons injured by discrimination to seek judicial 
 
6  
Defendants contend plaintiffs in this case are pursuing 
their own self-interest rather than seeking to protect the public.  
We express no opinion on the merits of this factual claim, and 
we are not persuaded that this claim should alter how we 
interpret section 91003(a).  Even when a plaintiff does have a 
distinct stake in the Political Reform Act enforcement action, a 
prevailing defendant’s interests can be protected by an award of 
fees if the action is determined to be frivolous.   
7  
Our opinion in Williams cited to former section 12965, 
subdivision (b).  (Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 101.)  
Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature renumbered former 
subdivision (b) of section 12965 as current subdivision (c)(6).  
(Stats. 2021, ch. 278, § 7; see Stats. 2022, ch. 420, § 25.)  The 
language of this subdivision was left unaltered.   
TRAVIS v. BRAND 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
18 
 
relief.’ ”  (Williams, at p. 112, quoting Assem. Off. of Research, 
3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1915 (1977–1978 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended Jan. 18, 1978, p. 1.)  This policy, we went on 
to observe, would be “frustrated if attorney fee awards were 
routinely made to prevailing defendants.”  (Williams, at p. 112; 
see id. at pp. 113–114.)  To promote the legislative goal of 
private enforcement, we found it “inescapable” that the 
Legislature intended a trial court’s discretion in awarding fees 
to a prevailing defendant in FEHA cases “to be bounded by the 
Christiansburg rule, or something very close to it.”  (Williams, 
at p. 112.)  Although the FEHA statute “did not ‘distinguish 
between awards to FEHA plaintiffs and to FEHA defendants,’ 
we concluded on the basis of legislative history and public policy 
that ‘the Legislature intended trial courts to use the 
asymmetrical standard of Christiansburg . . . as to both fees and 
costs.’ ”  (Pollock v. Tri-Modal Distribution Services, Inc. (2021) 
11 Cal.5th 918, 949 (Pollock), quoting Williams, at p. 109.)  
Applying the Christiansburg standard, and restating it without 
substantive revision, we held that “an unsuccessful FEHA 
plaintiff should not be ordered to pay the defendant’s fees or 
costs unless the plaintiff brought or continued litigating the 
action without an objective basis for believing it had potential 
merit.”  (Williams, at pp. 99–100; id. at p. 115 [“A prevailing 
defendant . . . should not be awarded fees and costs unless the 
court finds the action was objectively without foundation when 
brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly 
became so”].)  Thus, both the United States Supreme Court and 
this court have adopted the same asymmetrical fee-shifting 
standard for certain attorney’s fee awards in similar contexts 
involving enforcement of important public rights. 
TRAVIS v. BRAND 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
19 
 
In light of the foregoing authorities, defendants’ insistence 
that the Political Reform Act’s fee statute “says what it means 
and means what it says” rings hollow.  The United States 
Supreme Court rejected this plain meaning argument as applied 
to a similarly worded attorney’s fees statute.  The high court 
reasoned that the statutory language “does not even invite, let 
alone require” the “mechanical construction” that prevailing 
plaintiffs and defendants are entitled to fee awards on the same 
basis. 
 
(Christiansburg, 
supra, 
434 
U.S. 
at 
p. 418.)  
Christiansburg counsels that simply because a statute affords 
discretion to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party does 
not mean that discretion must be exercised in the same way for 
plaintiffs and defendants.  (See ibid. [statute granting discretion 
to award fees to the prevailing party “provide[s] no indication 
whatever of the circumstances under which either a plaintiff or 
a defendant should be entitled to attorney’s fees”].)  We apply 
the same analysis here to section 91003(a) and reject a 
mechanical construction that awards fees to a prevailing 
defendant “ ‘on the same basis as a prevailing plaintiff.’ ”  
(Christiansburg, at p. 418.)  Identifying the appropriate 
standard to guide the trial court’s discretion depends instead on 
a construction of the statutory text in conjunction with the 
purpose underlying the governing statutory scheme.  (See id. at 
pp. 418–419; Fogerty, supra, 510 U.S. at p. 527; accord, 
Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 103, 113–114.)  Federal case 
law provides persuasive support for our conclusion that “even a 
neutrally-worded fee statute does not necessarily have an 
identical application to every prevailing party.  Rather, when 
the statute establishes a flexible standard, a consideration of 
policy and [legislative] intent must guide the determination of 
the circumstances under which a particular party, or class of 
TRAVIS v. BRAND 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
20 
 
parties (such as plaintiffs or defendants), is entitled to fees.”  
(Dorn’s Transp. v. Teamsters Pension Trust Fund (3d Cir. 1986) 
799 F.2d 45, 49.)   
We also find it significant that our application of the 
Christiansburg standard in Political Reform Act cases is 
consistent with the standard used for numerous public laws 
designed to be enforced by individuals acting as private 
attorneys general and in other similar contexts.  (See, e.g., 
Browder v. City of Moab (10th Cir. 2005) 427 F.3d 717, 723 
[applying the Christiansburg standard to a claim for attorney’s 
fees by a defendant prevailing on claims under the Clean Water 
Act (Federal Water Pollution Control Act) and the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act]; Lane v. Residential Funding 
Corp. (9th Cir. 2003) 323 F.3d 739, 748 [applying the 
Christiansburg standard to an action under the Real Estate 
Settlement Procedures Act]; Bercovitch v. Baldwin School, 
Inc. (1st Cir. 1999) 191 F.3d 8, 10–11 [applying the 
Christiansburg standard to attorney’s fees awarded to a 
prevailing defendant under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act]; Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt (9th Cir. 1999) 182 F.3d 1091, 
1095 [applying the Christiansburg standard to a defendant’s 
claim for fees under the Endangered Species Act because that 
act and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “have a common purpose”]; 
Com’rs Court of Medina Cy., Tex. v. U.S. (D.C. Cir. 1982) 
683 F.2d 435, 439 [declaring that the Christiansburg standard 
generally applies to fee awards under the Voting Rights Act, 
except “where the procedural posture of a particular case 
renders the general rule inapplicable”]; Consol. Edison Co. v. 
Realty Investment Assoc. (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 524 F.Supp. 150, 153 
[“Congress’ design of encouraging citizen suits [under the Clean 
Air Act] would be substantially frustrated were [the statute] 
TRAVIS v. BRAND 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
21 
 
read to permit prevailing defendants to recover attorneys’ fees 
with the same relative ease that successful plaintiffs enjoy”]; 
accord, Arcese v. Daniel Schmitt & Co. (Mo.Ct.App. 2016) 
504 S.W.3d 772, 789 [applying the Christiansburg standard to 
actions under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, a 
consumer protection statute].)  In those contexts, as here, 
plaintiffs would be discouraged from bringing colorable claims 
to enforce laws for the benefit of the public if they faced the 
prospect of paying a defendant’s attorney’s fees whenever their 
suit ultimately proved unsuccessful.  (See generally Weinreb, 
supra, 168 Cal.App.3d at p. 538 [“These decisions provide an 
impressive array of authority in aid of interpretation of a 
political reform enactment which is similarly dependent upon 
private litigation as a means of enforcement”].)   
We are mindful of the financial burden that an action 
under the Political Reform Act can impose on some defendants, 
who are themselves participants in the political process.  But 
the expense of defending against a lawsuit that has objective 
merit under the Political Reform Act, even when the lawsuit is 
ultimately unsuccessful, is fairly characterized “as a cost of 
political participation.”  (Hedgecock, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 818.)  California’s campaign disclosure laws, after all, were 
enacted to “give citizens a basis for the faith and trust which 
must lie at the heart of our political process.”  (Ballot Pamp., 
Primary Elec., supra, rebuttal to argument against Prop. 9, 
p. 37.)  Faith, trust, and transparency are vital aspects of self-
government, and measures to promote these values serve 
compelling interests.  Given the number of state and local 
campaigns and the multiplicity of PACs, the voters were aware 
as early as 1974 that meaningful compliance with these 
disclosure laws depended on private enforcement actions.  We 
TRAVIS v. BRAND 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
22 
 
agree with Hedgecock that “the need to avoid discouraging 
enforcement of the act must be deemed paramount. . . .  While 
we understand the financial burden a suit such as this can 
impose, in view of the fundamental need to enforce high 
standards of political ethics we do not believe it unfair to treat 
the price of defending against a reasonably grounded but 
ultimately unsuccessful allegation as a ‘cost of doing business’ 
in politics which is appropriately borne by the political 
participant.”  (Hedgecock, at pp. 818–819.)  Moreover, as 
previously noted (see fn. 6, ante), a prevailing defendant is not 
entirely without recourse.  When a trial court determines that 
an action was objectively without foundation, the prevailing 
defendant may still recover attorney’s fees.  (See Williams, 
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 115.)   
In sum, we conclude the Christiansburg standard applies 
to discretionary awards of both attorney’s fees and costs to 
prevailing defendants under the Political Reform Act.  The 
statute at issue here is not comparable to the one discussed in 
Fogerty.  Instead, we conclude applying an asymmetrical 
standard to fee awards under the Political Reform Act is 
consistent with the principles outlined by our high court in 
Christiansburg.  To reiterate, under the asymmetrical standard, 
a prevailing defendant “should not be awarded fees and costs 
unless the court finds the action was objectively without 
foundation when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate 
after it clearly became so.”  (Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at 
p. 115; accord, Christiansburg, supra, 434 U.S. at p. 421 
[prevailing defendants may recover only when “the plaintiff’s 
TRAVIS v. BRAND 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
23 
 
action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even 
though not brought in subjective bad faith”].)8   
III. 
The trial court awarded defendants attorney’s fees under 
both Government Code section 91003(a) as well as Code of Civil 
Procedure section 1021.5.  The Court of Appeal upheld the 
award under Government Code section 91003(a) (Travis, supra, 
62 Cal.App.5th at p. 263) but never considered whether 
plaintiffs objectively brought their suit without foundation or 
continued to prosecute it after it clearly became so.  (See 
Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 115.)  Nor did the Court of 
Appeal consider the award’s validity under Code of Civil 
Procedure section 1021.5.   
Whether defendants have demonstrated that plaintiffs’ 
lawsuit was objectively groundless — or whether the fee award 
could instead be upheld under Code of Civil Procedure section 
1021.5 — is a matter for the Court of Appeal to determine in the 
first instance.  We express no view on the merits of awarding 
attorney’s fees under either statute.  We reverse the judgment 
of the Court of Appeal and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  (See Pollock, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 
pp. 929, 951.)  
 
8  
We perceive no material difference between the standard 
set forth in Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 115 and the 
standard in Christiansburg, supra, 434 U.S. at p. 422.  Although 
they use slightly different phrasing, they are functionally 
equivalent and embody a single standard which we apply here.   
TRAVIS v. BRAND 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.* 
 
* 
Retired Chief Justice of California, assigned by the Chief 
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 
Constitution. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Travis v. Brand 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 62 Cal.App.5th 240 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S268480 
Date Filed:  January 30, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  Malcolm H. Mackey 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
The Sutton Law Firm, Bradley W. Hertz, James R. Sutton, Nicholas L. 
Sanders; Shumener, Odson & Oh, Betty M. Shumener, John D. 
Spurling and Daniel E. French for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Carlson & Messer and Jeanne L. Zimmer for Defendant and 
Respondent Nils Nehrenheim. 
 
Gabriel & Associates and Stevan Colin for Defendants and 
Respondents Bill Brand, Brand for Mayor 2017 and Linda Moffat. 
 
Law Offices of Bobak Nayebdadash and Bobak Nayebdadash for 
Defendants and Respondents Wayne Craig and Rescue Our 
Waterfront, P.A.C. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Betty M. Shumener  
550 South Hope Street, Suite 1050 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
(213) 344-4201 
 
Jeanne L. Zimmer 
5901 West Century Boulevard #1200 
Los Angeles, CA 90045 
(310) 265-2699 
 
Stevan Colin 
1709 Haynes Lane 
Redondo Beach, CA 90278 
(310) 379-8655