Case Title: State of New Jersey v. G.V.

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-59-98

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2000-01-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). PER CURIAM G.V. was convicted by a jury of the repeated sexual molestation of his young daughter (pseudonym- Laura ) during the five-year period between 1985 and 1990. Some of the evidence admitted at trial related to acts of sexual molestation that G.V. had allegedly committed years before on an older sister of the victim (pseudonym - Linda). By the time Laura was six years old, her father, G.V. began molesting her by touching her genitalia or having her touch his. By the time Laura was eight years old, G.V. began having sexual intercourse with her. On some occasions, G.V. forced Laura to engage in sexual activities with her younger brother. G.V. committed these acts at night while Laura's mother (pseudonym - Nancy ) was at work. Laura did not tell anyone about the molestation because G.V. had threatened to kill her, her family, and her pets if she revealed their secret. The sexual assaults ended when Laura was ten years old. By 1989, Linda had married and Nancy and G.V. had separated. In January 1992, while G.V. was visiting the family with his girlfriend, an altercation ensued, resulting in Nancy obtaining a temporary restraining order (TRO) against G.V. Two days later, Nancy agreed to vacate the TRO, believing that she and her husband would reconcile. After Nancy vacated the restraining order, Laura experienced a deep depression. Laura was hospitalized and, while attending a group therapy session, Laura revealed to another girl that she had been sexually molested by her father. Upon this girl's advice, Laura reported the sexual abuse to a nurse. The Division of Youth and Family Services was informed, which, in turn, notified Nancy of Laura's allegations. When Nancy questioned her older daughter, she learned that Linda also had been sexually assaulted by her father from the age of four to eight; that when Linda was six years old, G.V. began having sexual intercourse with her; and that the assaults occurred while Nancy was at work. Linda was permitted to testify about these sexual assaults at G.V.'s trial. A complaint was filed charging G.V. with the sexual abuse of Laura. G.V. was not charged with sexually abusing Linda because the statute of limitations had expired. At trial, G.V. denied the charges. He asserted in his defense that the charges had been fabricated because the family was angry that he had left Nancy for another woman. At the conclusion of trial, the judge instructed the jury that the evidence regarding G.V.'s sexual assault of Linda, the older sister, should not be considered as demonstrating that G.V. had a disposition to commit the offenses charged, but failed, more specifically, to explain to the jury the relevance of that evidence to material issues that were genuinely in dispute and, thus, to restrict the jury's consideration of that evidence to only those issues that were genuinely in dispute. The jury convicted G.V. of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, endangering the welfare of his child, and terroristic threats. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of fifteen years imprisonment. In an unreported opinion, the Appellate Division reversed the convictions, finding that the older sister's testimony was inadmissible because it constituted other-crime evidence that was not relevant to prove intent or to disprove possible defenses of accident or mistake (the purposes for which the trial court had admitted the evidence), and was more prejudicial than probative. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certification. HELD: The older sister's testimony was inadmissible because it constituted other-crimes evidence that was not relevant to prove intent or to disprove possible defenses of accident or mistake, and was more prejudicial than probative. 2. State v. Marrero provides guiding principles crucial to the decision in this case: 1)the other-crime evidence must be relevant to an issue genuinely in dispute; 2)the other-crime evidence must be necessary for the disputed issue's proof; and 3)the court must explain precisely to the jury the permitted and prohibited uses of the evidence. Those controlling principles were not followed by the trial court, thus, the Appellate Division was constrained to reverse the convictions. (pp. 8-9) 3. The principles in State v. Cusick were inapplicable to this case; neither mistake nor intent to obtain sexual gratification was genuinely in dispute. Moreover, the prosecutor compounded the trial court's analytical errors by misusing the testimony. The prosecutor's description of the other-crime evidence was too broad, in essence, urging the jury to use G.V.'s character and past conduct as a basis for inferring that Laura's testimony was true. (pp. 9-12) 4. The dissent suggests that because the other-crime evidence might have been admissible for purposes other than to establish the main charge of aggravated sexual assault by penetration. This is simply not possible; neither absence of intent or accident or inadvertence or motive were genuinely at issue as to the main crime of sexual assault involving penetration. (pp. 13-14) 5. Because G.V. objected to admission of the evidence, the error admitting the other-crime evidence cannot be considered as plain error. Nor was the admission of Linda's testimony harmless error. There is nothing more prejudicial than the erroneous admission of such testimony. Finally, even if the evidence had been admissible on the subsidiary issues in the case, the jury charge did not guide the jury as to how to use the evidence for its limited purposes. An erroneous jury charge will rarely stand on the ground that it was harmless error. Thus, the conviction must be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. (pp. 14-17) 6. The other-crime evidence is relevant to the defense theory that Laura's story of sexual molestation was fabricated as revenge for her father's having abandoned her mother and coming to their home with his girlfriend. On retrial, if the defendant disclaims this vendetta defense, Linda's testimony would be inadmissible. If on the other hand, G.V. renews the vendetta defense, then the trial court would have to complete the Marrero analysis, balancing the probative worth of the evidence against its prejudicial effect. (pp. 17-20) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. JUSTICE LONG, concurring in part and dissenting in part, concurs with the Court's affirmance of the Appellate Division's conclusion that Linda's testimony was improperly admitted at trial. She dissents from the majority's determination that Linda's testimony may be relevant and, therefore, possibly admissible on another basis-- to refute the vendetta defense. Justice Long finds that Linda's testimony does not, in any legitimate way, address Laura's bias or vendetta. JUSTICE COLEMAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part, concurs with the determination in the majority opinion that the other-crime evidence is admissible to rebut the vendetta defense; however, he finds that any error related to the admissibility of and jury instructions concerning the other-crime evidence to be harmless and would uphold the convictions. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN, STEIN and LONG join in PARTS II and III of the opinion; JUSTICES O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN, COLEMAN, and VERNIERO join in PART IV of the opinion. JUSTICE LONG has filed a separate opinion, in which CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ joins, concurring in Parts II and III of the Court's opinion and dissenting from Part IV. JUSTICE COLEMAN has filed a separate opinion, in which JUSTICES GARIBALDI and VERNIERO join, concurring in Part IV and dissenting from Parts II and III. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 59 September Term 1998 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. G.V., Defendant-Respondent. Argued September 14, 1999 -- Decided January 27, 2000 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Teresa A. Blair, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Alan I. Smith, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for respondent (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney). PER CURIAM A jury has convicted defendant of the repeated sexual molestation of his young daughter during the five-year period between 1985 and 1990. Some of the evidence admitted at trial related to acts of sexual molestation that he had allegedly committed on an older sister of the victim. Those offenses were claimed to have occurred years before the offenses charged in the indictment. The trial court instructed the jury that the evidence should not be considered as demonstrating that defendant had a disposition to commit the offenses charged, but failed, more specifically, to explain to the jury the relevance of that evidence to material issues that were genuinely in dispute and, thus, to constrict the jury's consideration of that evidence to such issues as were genuinely in dispute. The jury convicted defendant of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, endangering the welfare of his child, and terroristic threats. After merging the sexual assault conviction into the aggravated sexual assault conviction, the court sentenced the defendant to an aggregate term of 15 years imprisonment. In an unreported opinion, the Appellate Division reversed the convictions. The Appellate Division found that the older sister's testimony was inadmissible because it constituted other-crime evidence that was not relevant to prove intent or to disprove possible defenses of accident or mistake (the purposes for which the trial court had admitted the evidence), and was more prejudicial than probative. We granted the State's petition for certification. 157 N.J. 645 (1999). In addition to being relevant to an issue genuinely in dispute, the other-crime evidence must be necessary for [the disputed issue's] proof. Stevens, supra, 115 N.J. at 301. Because of its damaging nature, in determining the probative worth of other crime evidence, a court should consider . . . whether its proffered use in the case can adequately be served by other evidence. Id. at 303; see also Oliver, supra, 133 N.J. at 151 (stating that [a]n important factor in weighing the probative value of other-crime evidence is whether other, less-inflammatory evidence can prove the same fact in issue ). Once it is determined that the other crime evidence is material to a fact genuinely in issue and that the other-crime evidence is necessary, the probative value of the proffered evidence [must] be carefully balanced against the danger that it will create undue prejudice against the defendant. Stevens, supra, 115 N.J. at 302. Where the probative value is outweighed by prejudice to the defendant, then it is inadmissible. Evid. R. 4 (currently N.J.R.E. 403). Consequently, the primary focus of Evidence Rule [404(b)], when examined in conjunction with Evidence Rule [403], is to view it as a rule of exclusion rather than a rule of inclusion. State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 337-38 (1992). 1. The evidence of the other crime must be admissible as relevant to a material issue; 2. It must be similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged; 3. The evidence of the other crime must be clear and convincing; and 4. The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice. [Ibid. (quoting Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b), 608(b) and 609(a), 38 Ermory L.J. 135, 160 (1989)).] When other-crime evidence is admitted, the court must instruct the jury on the limited use of the evidence. Cofield, supra, 127 N.J. at 340-41; see also Stevens, supra, 115 N.J. at 304. Because of the inherently prejudicial nature of other-crime evidence, the court's instruction 'should be formulated carefully to explain precisely the permitted and prohibited purposes of the evidence, with sufficient reference to the factual context of the case to enable the jury to comprehend and appreciate the fine distinction to which it is required to adhere.' Cofield, supra, 127 N.J. at 341 (quoting Stevens, supra, 115 N.J.. at 304). [State v. Marrero, supra, 148 N.J. at 482-83, 495.] The supposed possible defense was never raised by the defendant. Moreover, to do so in the context of this case would have been absurd. If we were dealing with an isolated incident, or even a few separate occasions, of allegedly improper touching, the possible defense might have been an issue. But this case involves an horrendous course of patent sexual depravity which continued for years. No reasonable defense, under these circumstances, would rely on the theory that these atrocious acts were simply misinterpreted expressions of fatherly affection. Nor can it be fairly said that if the defendant committed the acts in question, there was a material factual dispute with regard to whether he was seeking sexual gratification. As stated in State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 301 (1989), a necessary corollary to the principle that other-crime evidence can be admitted to prove any fact in issue . . . is the requirement that the issue be genuine, and that the other-crime evidence be necessary for its proof. Neither of these requirements were satisfied here. As the prosecutor's summation plainly demonstrates, the evidence of defendant's sexual depravity with his first daughter was offered for no reason other than to demonstrate that defendant was predisposed to engaging in sexual conduct with his daughters in their prepubescent years. The evidence was not admissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b), supra. Therefore, the convictions must be set aside and the matter remanded for a new trial. As the Appellate Division noted, the analytical errors were compounded by the prosecutor's misuse of the testimony. During summation, the prosecutor made no attempt to suggest to the jury that the other-crime evidence should be considered only as bearing on defendant's intent to obtain gratification or to rebut a defense of mistaken physical contact. Instead, the prosecutor described the other-crime events in broad terms that, in essence, urged the jury to use defendant's character and past conduct as a basis for inferring that Laura's testimony was true. The Appellate Division opinion contains longer excerpts of the prosecutor's summation. The following example will suffice to make the point: [Laura] said the defendant would say it was our secret, don't tell anybody. And then as [Linda] got older, sexual intercourse began. Similar fact pattern with [Laura]. It is just the way he operates. It is not two girls getting together. That's what he was interested in doing, having sex with younger girls, pre-teen age girls. [Emphasis added.] If that is not an allusion to propensity, then we do not know what would be. Our dissenting members suggest that the defenses of accident or mistake or absence of intent to seek sexual gratification were genuinely disputed at least in respect of the charges of criminal sexual contact (that is, sexual contact without penetration as in the leg-rubbing incident). If that were the case, then the trial court would have to have had explain[ed] precisely to the jury that limited purpose. It did not do so. Moreover, we doubt that the trial court would have found that so limited a purpose would pass the probativeness/prejudice test required by Marrero, supra, 148 N.J. at 482. There is enormous potential for prejudice in the improper admission of a defendant's prior convictions. Commentators have suggested that such error should be considered harmful per se. See The Riddle of Harmless Error, where Chief Justice Traynor wrote: The erroneous admission of evidence of other crimes also carries such a high risk of prejudice as ordinarily to call for reversal. [State v. Atkins, 151 N.J. Super. 555, 570 (App. Div. 1977), rev'd, primarily on issue of intoxication charge and that evidence of burglary was undisputed, 78 N.J. 454 (1979) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added in original).] [T]he question whether an error is reason for reversal depends finally upon some degree of possibility that it led to an unjust verdict. State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 335 (1971). [U]pon that question the reviewing judge [is] inevitably remitted to his [or her] own conscientious judgment. Id. at 338. This Court has sought to prevent overuse of the harmless error doctrine. In State v. Czachor, 82 N.J. 392, 404 (1980), the Court explained that errors which impact substantially and directly on fundamental procedural safeguards . . . are not amenable to harmless error rehabilitation. As stated in State v. Simon, 79 N.J. 191, 206 (1979): Errors impacting directly upon . . . sensitive areas of a criminal trial are poor candidates for rehabilitation under the harmless error philosophy . . . . For this reason, the rule of harmless error should be summoned only with great caution in dealing with the breach of fundamental procedural safeguards designed to assure a fair trial. (Citations omitted). There is widespread agreement that other-crime evidence has a unique tendency to turn a jury against the defendant. The likelihood of prejudice is acute when the proffered evidence is proof of a defendant's uncharged misconduct. State v. Stevens, supra, 115 N.J. at 302. Finally, even if the evidence had been admissible on the subsidiary issues in the case, the charge in this case left the jury wholly unguided as to how to use the evidence for such limited purposes. An erroneous charge will rarely stand on the ground that it was harmless error. State v. Weeks, 107 N.J. 396, 410 (1987). Although reviewing courts are ordinarily reluctant to reverse on the ground of plain error when no objection to the charge has been made, it has been repeatedly emphasized that incorrect instructions of law are poor candidates for rehabilitation under the harmless error theory. Ibid. (citations omitted). These well-settled principles compel the conclusion that defendant's conviction must be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. In reversing the defendant's conviction in Oliver, the Court distinguished the cases in which instructional errors had been found to be harmless: By contrast, the trial court in this case did not explain the relationship between the other-crime evidence and the issues and facts on which it could be considered. Although the court did clearly instruct the jury that it was not to use the evidence to determine that defendant was a bad person or that he had been disposed to commit the crimes charged in the indictment, it did not clearly instruct the jury on how it could use the other-crime evidence. Precisely that situation prompted this Court to find reversible error in Cofield. STATE OF NEW JERSEY Plaintiff-Appellant, v. G.V. Defendant-Respondent. LONG, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. The Appellate Division concluded that Linda's testimony was improperly admitted at defendant's trial and that a retrial is in order. To the extent that the majority affirms that conclusion, I concur. Where I part company from my colleagues is in connection with their separate determination that Linda's testimony may be relevant, and therefore possibly admissible on another basis - to refute the so-called vendetta defense. More particularly, the majority reasons that Linda's testimony may be admissible because it makes it more probable that Laura's testimony was not the product of bias. I respectfully disagree. Linda's testimony does not, in any legitimate way, address Laura's bias or vendetta. The kind of evidence that would be relevant on those issues would be testimony, for example, from Linda, or some other person, that Laura expressed no animosity against defendant, indicated her love for him or accepted her parents' break up with equanimity. Linda's testimony could not be further from that point. Indeed, the only logical link between Linda's testimony and Laura's possible bias is defendant's propensity to commit sex crimes. The only way that Linda's testimony can be related to Laura's bias is if a jury reaches the conclusion that because defendant committed sexual acts against Linda, it is more likely that he committed them against Laura and thus, it is more likely that Laura is being truthful and unbiased when she reports them. This is exactly what N.J.R.E. 404(b) was meant to prohibit. Linda's testimony does not make it more likely that Laura is not biased. It simply does not follow that two daughters, angry at their father's treatment of their mother, would be less likely than one to trump up a story. What is more likely is that the jury will conclude that because defendant had sexual contact with Linda he must have done so again with Laura. The Federal Rules have recently cast off 200 years of evidentiary practice in cases like this by allowing the use, for any relevant purpose, of sexual assault or child molestation evidence not charged in the indictment or information. Fed. R. Evid. 413, 414, 415. See Jeffrey G. Pickett, The Presumption of Innocence Imperilled: The New Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 and the Use of Other Sexual Evidence in Washington, 70 Wash. L. Rev. 883 (1995). Based on their prior opinions as to the importance of N.J.R.E. 404(b), I do not believe that my colleagues in the majority would subscribe to such a scheme. It is therefore hard for me to understand why they are willing to allow this most meager pretext to justify admission of what is clear propensity evidence, when by doing so they are effectively dismantling the Rule. Chief Justice Poritz joins in this opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 59 September Term 1998 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. G.V., Defendant-Respondent. That rule makes it clear that other-crime evidence is admissible only if relevant to prove some other disputed fact genuinely at issue in the case. See generally State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469, 482 (1997); State v. Oliver, 133 N.J. 151, 141 (1993); State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 300 (1989). Where the other-crime evidence tends to make the existence of a material fact reasonably likely, [the other-crime evidence] is admissible subject to the 'probativeness/prejudice' balancing under . . . N.J.R.E. 403. Marrero, supra, 148 N.J. at 482. In other words, relevant evidence may be excluded pursuant to N.J.R.E. 403, which provides: Except as otherwise provided by these rules or other law, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of (a) undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury or (b) undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. [N.J.R.E. 403]. Over the years, a four-part test has evolved for making the determinations required by N.J.R.E. 403(a) and 404(b). The test is as follows: 1. The evidence of the other crime must be admissible as relevant to a material issue; 2. It must be similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged; 3. The evidence of the other crime must be clear and convincing; and 4. The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice. Relevancy is the hallmark of admissibility of evidence. In determining whether evidence is relevant, the inquiry should focus on the logical connection between the proffered evidence and a fact in issue. State v. Hutchins, 241 N.J. Super. 353, 358 (App. Div. 1990). If the evidence offered makes the inference to be drawn more logical, then the evidence should be admitted unless otherwise excludable by a rule of law. State v. Covell, 157 N.J. 554, 565 (1999). Relevant evidence can be both direct and circumstantial. Here, L.J.V. offered only circumstantial evidence. Consequently, [r]elevance is the screen which permits the admission of evidence of similar identifiably associated conduct while screening out evidence of misconduct which has no relationship with the conduct on trial. State v. Gookins, 263 N.J. Super. 58, 63 (App. Div. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 135 N.J. 42 (1994). NO. A-59 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. G.V., Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED January 27, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz