Case Title: World Harvest Church v. Grange Mut. Cas. Ins. Co.

Citation: 2016-Ohio-2913

Docket Number: 2014-1161

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2016-05-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
World Harvest Church v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-2913.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-2913 
WORLD HARVEST CHURCH, APPELLEE, v. GRANGE MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as World Harvest Church v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., Slip Opinion 
No. 2016-Ohio-2913.] 
Insurance—Commercial liability insurance policy—Abuse or molestation 
exclusion—Vicarious liability—Attorney fees—Postjudgment interest. 
(No. 2014-1161—Submitted October 13, 2015—Decided May 12, 2016.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 13AP-290, 2013-Ohio-5707. 
_____________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we address whether an abuse or molestation exclusion 
in a commercial liability insurance policy excludes coverage for an award of 
damages based on the insured’s vicarious liability for a claim arising from its 
employee’s physical abuse of a child in the insured’s care and custody.  We 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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conclude that it does.  Because we hold that coverage is excluded, we also conclude 
that the policy does not provide coverage for an award of attorney fees or 
postjudgment interest arising from the award of damages. 
RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
The Underlying Lawsuit 
{¶ 2} In May 2006, Michael and Lacey Faieta initiated a civil action against 
World Harvest Church and Harvest Preparatory School (collectively, “WHC”) and 
WHC’s employee, Richard Vaughan, for claims arising from an incident involving 
the Faietas’ two-and-a-half-year-old son, A.F., who attended WHC’s daycare 
service. 
{¶ 3} The Faietas dropped off A.F. for daycare in the morning of January 
17, 2006. Sometime that afternoon, Vaughan took over for A.F.’s regular classroom 
teacher.  When Mr. Faieta picked up his son that evening, he noticed bright red 
marks and abrasions on his son’s rear end, back, and upper thigh areas.  The Faietas’ 
complaint alleged that A.F. complained of pain and that he stated that Vaughan had 
beaten him with a knife.1  The Faietas contacted WHC to report A.F.’s injuries and 
                                                 
1  The Tenth District Court of Appeals summarized the circumstances surrounding the injuries as 
follows: 
 
To put into context WHC’s conduct after A.F.’s injuries, we first briefly 
summarize the circumstances surrounding A.F.’s injuries, construing the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs’ favor.  A.F. was potty trained and 
therefore not susceptible to diaper rash, and he had no history of allergies, 
sensitive skin, or rashes.  He had no marks on his body either when he was 
dropped off at the Cuddle Care classroom on the morning of January 17, 2006 or 
later, when his morning teacher left for the day at 1:00 p.m.  Shortly before 6:00 
p.m., Michael Faieta picked up his daughter and then picked up A.F. in their 
respective classrooms.  A.F. was in the Cuddle Care classroom alone with 
Vaughan, who had taken over for the afternoon teacher sometime after 4:00 p.m.  
According to Mr. Faieta, A.F. was anxious and upset, his eyes were red, and he 
clung to his father’s side as his belongings were gathered.  Vaughan did not give 
Mr. Faieta any paperwork or say that A.F. had experienced any problems that day, 
and he did not indicate he had seen any sort of rash or other marks on A.F.’s body. 
Upon their using the restroom on the way out of the building, Mr. Faieta 
observed the numerous fresh cuts, welts, and red marks on A.F.’s back, buttocks 
and thighs.  The marks were linear and consistent with being hit with a ruler.  In 
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request remedial action against Vaughan.  By letter dated January 26, 2006, WHC, 
through its headmaster, told the Faietas not to come to WHC or its school under 
threat of WHC’s filing trespass charges. 
{¶ 4} The Faietas’ complaint asserted claims for assault and battery against 
Vaughan, claims for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress 
against Vaughan and WHC, and claims for negligent hiring and supervision and 
respondeat superior against WHC.  The Faietas requested an award of 
compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees, plus interest and 
costs. 
{¶ 5} WHC admitted in response to the complaint that Vaughan was a 
daycare provider for WHC and that at all relevant times, he had acted within the 
scope and course of his employment.  But WHC denied that any acts by Vaughan 
were unlawful, negligent, or otherwise actionable. 
{¶ 6} At the time of the incident, WHC was insured under a commercial 
policy issued by appellant, Grange Mutual Casualty Company (“Grange”), 
including a general liability policy and umbrella policy.  In response to the Faietas’ 
complaint, WHC submitted a claim under the Grange policies asking Grange to 
defend the Faietas’ lawsuit.  Grange agreed to defend the matter and retained a law 
                                                 
the car on the way home approximately an hour later, A.F. told his father that 
Vaughan had “spanked” him with a “knife.”  At home, upon being shown pictures 
of various objects, A.F. pointed to a ruler as the object used to “spank” him.  After 
A.F.’s mother, Lacey Faieta, arrived home and looked at the marks on A.F., she 
spoke with their pediatrician and the police, who advised her to take A.F. to 
Children’s Hospital.  The emergency physicians at Children’s Hospital found 
A.F.’s injuries to be consistent with physical abuse, and the matter was forwarded 
to Franklin County Children Services (“FCCS”) and the Columbus Police 
Department (“CPD”) for investigation. 
 
Faieta v. World Harvest Church, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-527, 2008-Ohio-6959, ¶ 26-27. 
 
 
 
 
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firm to do so but also expressly reserved its right to deny coverage and refuse 
payment of any claim. 
{¶ 7} The case proceeded to a trial, and the jury entered a verdict in favor 
of the Faietas and against WHC and Vaughan.  The jury awarded the Faietas 
$764,235 in compensatory damages from WHC, $5 million in punitive damages, 
and attorney fees.  The jury awarded $134,865 in compensatory damages from 
Vaughan and $100,000 in punitive damages. 
{¶ 8} According to the jury’s answers to interrogatories, the jury found that 
the Faietas’ damages were directly and proximately caused by Vaughan’s 
intentional harm or battery of A.F., intentional infliction of serious emotional 
distress by Vaughan “and/or World Harvest,” and WHC’s negligent supervision of 
Vaughan as an employee. 
{¶ 9} Final judgment was entered in favor of the Faietas in the total amount 
of $2,871,431.87, of which WHC was solely liable for $2,789,066.87.  Vaughan 
was found to be primarily liable for $82,365, “an amount for which World Harvest 
[was] secondarily liable.” 
{¶ 10} On appeal, the Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict 
and award. Faieta v. World Harvest Church, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-527, 
2008-Ohio-6959.  The parties did not appeal the decision to this court and, instead, 
settled the claims for $3,101,147. 
The Grange Lawsuit 
{¶ 11} In July 2009, WHC filed suit against Grange over a dispute in 
coverage under the commercial insurance policies.  Specifically, WHC alleged that 
Grange improperly refused to indemnify it for any portion of the judgment awarded 
to the Faietas.  WHC asserted claims seeking relief for breach of contract, 
respondeat superior, and lack of good faith in the denial of coverage and seeking a 
declaration that WHC was entitled to payment from Grange for all or some of the 
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amount WHC had paid to resolve the Faietas’ lawsuit.  Grange defended, asserting 
that the insurance policies did not provide coverage. 
{¶ 12} In its commercial general liability policy, Grange agreed to pay those 
sums that WHC, the insured, would become legally obligated to pay as damages 
because of “bodily injury” or “property damage” as those terms were defined in the 
policy.  The policy applied only to “bodily injury” caused by an “occurrence,” 
which the policy defined as an “accident.”  But the policy excluded from coverage 
“bodily injury” that was “expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.” 
{¶ 13} Two endorsements further modified the coverage for bodily injury.  
An endorsement regarding corporal punishment stated that the exclusion for bodily 
injury did not apply if the injury resulted from “corporal punishment to [WHC’s] 
student administered by or at the direction” of the insured.  A second endorsement, 
titled the “Abuse or Molestation Exclusion” (“the abuse exclusion”), further 
modified the coverage for “bodily injury” and stated: 
 
This insurance does not apply to “bodily injury”, “property 
damage” or “personal and advertising injury” arising out of: 
1. The actual or threatened abuse or molestation by anyone 
of any person while in the care, custody or control of any insured, 
or  
2. The negligent: 
a. Employment; 
b. Investigation; 
c. Supervision; 
d. Reporting to the proper authorities, or failure to so report, 
or 
e. Retention; 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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of a person for whom any insured is or ever was legally responsible 
and whose conduct would be excluded by Paragraph 1. above. 
 
{¶ 14} On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court entered 
judgment in favor of WHC, finding that Grange was obligated to indemnify WHC 
in the amount of $1,472,677 plus interest, representing the compensatory damages, 
attorney fees, and postjudgment interest awarded to the Faietas.  The court further 
held that Grange was not responsible to indemnify WHC for the punitive damages 
awarded to the Faietas. 
{¶ 15} Both WHC and Grange appealed to the Tenth District Court of 
Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment to the extent that it ordered 
Grange to indemnify WHC for (1) $82,365 in compensatory damages for which 
WHC was secondarily liable, (2) $693,861, representing the full amount of attorney 
fees awarded, and (3) “that portion of the postjudgment interest award on these 
amounts.”  2013-Ohio-5707, ¶ 69.  The appellate court also affirmed the trial 
court’s conclusion that Grange had no obligation to cover any amount of the 
punitive damages awarded.  Id.  But the appellate court reversed the portion of the 
trial court’s judgment ordering Grange to indemnify WHC for the remaining 
compensatory damages. 
{¶ 16} Both Grange and WHC moved for reconsideration.  The appellate 
court denied Grange’s motion but, on WHC’s request, modified its decision to 
affirm that Grange was obligated to pay for the postjudgment interest assessed on 
the full amount of the judgment.  10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-290, ¶ 23 (May 29, 
2014) (on reconsideration). 
{¶ 17} We accepted Grange’s discretionary appeal but denied WHC’s 
cross-appeal.  140 Ohio St.3d 1521, 2014-Ohio-5251, 20 N.E.3d 729.  Thus, the 
only propositions for this court’s consideration are the following: 
 
January Term, 2016 
 
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(1) A commercial liability policy containing an Abuse or 
Molestation Exclusion which excludes damages arising out of abuse 
“by anyone” of any person in the care, custody or control of any 
insured, as well as the negligent employment or supervision of an 
abuser, eliminates coverages of sums awarded based on the 
insured’s vicarious liability for its employee’s abuse of a child in the 
insured’s care and custody. 
(2) When attorney’s fees are awarded solely in conjunction 
with non-covered conduct, “compensatory” attorney’s fees are not 
covered damages under liability insurance policies. 
(3) A liability insurance policy’s supplementary payments 
clause cannot be reasonably construed as an agreement to pay post-
judgment interest on non-covered claims. 
 
ANALYSIS 
Scope of the Appeal 
{¶ 18} The first issue presented is whether the abuse exclusion bars 
coverage under the policy for the sum awarded based on WHC’s vicarious liability 
for claims arising from its employee’s physical abuse of a child. 
{¶ 19} Grange contends that all damages arising out of the abuse are 
excluded from coverage regardless of the cause of action asserted against WHC.  
WHC counters that only those damages awarded because of the direct liability of a 
bad actor and the direct liability of the employer would be excluded from coverage, 
not those damages based on the employer’s vicarious liability for its employee’s 
abuse.  Central to WHC’s claim is its assertion that the exclusion contains no 
language excluding damages awarded based on the insured’s vicarious liability. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 20} WHC also contends that (1) Vaughan’s actions constituted 
“excessive corporal punishment” rather than abuse and are therefore covered by the 
policy and (2) the abuse exclusion is intended to exclude only sexual abuse, not 
physical abuse, from coverage.  Although presented as counterarguments, these 
contentions raise issues that we declined to address when we denied discretionary 
review of WHC’s cross-appeal.  Because we did not accept the cross-appeal, these 
arguments are outside the scope of this appeal. 
{¶ 21} Indeed, the appellate court squarely addressed these arguments when 
it concluded that the exclusion unambiguously applied to physical abuse and not 
just sexual abuse.  2013-Ohio-5707, ¶ 45-47.  “The plain and ordinary meaning of 
the word ‘abuse,’ which is not defined in the [Grange] policies, is, as pertinent here, 
physical maltreatment,” id. at ¶ 45, and therefore, “WHC’s narrow construction of 
the term ‘abuse’ as only ‘sexual abuse’ is, thus, belied by the above authorities 
which define the term more broadly to include physical abuse,” id. at ¶ 48.  
Additionally, “it was conclusively determined in the personal-injury case that 
Vaughan’s battery constituted abuse of the Faietas’ minor child.”  Id. at ¶ 48. 
{¶ 22} The appellate court similarly rejected WHC’s argument that the 
corporal-punishment endorsement permitted coverage and therefore concluded that 
“the 1993 corporal punishment endorsement does not change the fact that claims 
concerning Vaughan’s battery and WHC’s negligent supervision are excluded 
under the policy’s CGL abuse or molestation exclusion.”  Id. at ¶ 52.  These 
conclusions are not before this court on Grange’s appeal, and therefore, we do not 
review them. 
{¶ 23} Additionally, the appellate court concluded that the policies did not 
provide coverage for damages awarded based on Vaughan’s direct liability for 
battery and his intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Id. at 54.  That holding 
and the argument that the acts do not constitute an “occurrence” under the policies 
are also not before us, as WHC concedes. 
January Term, 2016 
 
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{¶ 24} The scope of this appeal is limited to whether the abuse exclusion 
eliminates coverage for damages awarded for WHC’s vicarious liability for abuse.  
More specifically, the scope of this appeal is limited to the appellate court’s 
conclusion that Grange was obligated to indemnify WHC for $82,365 in 
compensatory damages that were awarded based on WHC’s vicarious liability for 
Vaughan’s intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting from the abuse of 
the Faietas’ son. 2   
{¶ 25} The appellate court concluded that “unless corporate management 
committed the intentionally wrongful conduct, the corporate insured will not be 
denied coverage on the basis of an employee’s intentional tort,” and that “WHC’s 
corporate management did not commit Vaughan’s intentionally wrongful conduct.”  
2013-Ohio-5707, ¶ 37.  In other words, as the appellate court later clarified, even if 
Vaughan acted intentionally, and thus his conduct was excluded from coverage 
because it was not accidental and thus not an “occurrence,” coverage turned on 
whether Vaughan’s act was intentional from the perspective of WHC, the entity 
seeking coverage.  10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-290, ¶ 7 (May 29, 2014) (on 
reconsideration).  And because WHC did not intend the act, Grange could not deny 
coverage.  The appellate court also found that the policies did not provide coverage 
for injury arising from an intentional act from the perspective of the insured, and 
thus WHC would not be covered if the jury had found that it was directly liable for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.  2013-Ohio-5707, ¶ 40. 
{¶ 26} On reconsideration, the appellate court noted that Grange had 
asserted that the abuse exclusion barred coverage for WHC’s vicarious liability 
based on Vaughan’s intentional infliction of emotional distress, even if the act could 
                                                 
2   The appellate court held that Grange’s argument that “bodily injury” did not include emotional 
injury failed because the umbrella policy expressly included “mental anguish, mental injury or 
disability” resulting from bodily injury.  And both the general liability and umbrella policies 
provided coverage for damages incurred “because of ‘bodily injury,’ ” including emotional-distress 
damages.  2013-Ohio-5707, ¶ 38-39.  That holding has not been challenged on appeal.   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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not be excluded from coverage as an intentional act (rather than a covered 
accidental “occurrence”).  But the appellate court did not address the merits of that 
argument in its reconsideration decision.  10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-290, ¶ 7 
(May 29, 2014) (on reconsideration). 
{¶ 27} The effect of the abuse exclusion on the issue of coverage is central 
to the inquiry and the basis of this appeal. 
Application of the Abuse Exclusion to Vicarious Liability 
{¶ 28} Insurance contracts are construed by the same rules used to construe 
contracts.  Hybud Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., Ltd., 64 Ohio St.3d 657, 
665, 597 N.E.2d 1096 (1992). 
 
As we stated in Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 
216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, our task when interpreting 
an insurance policy is to “examine the insurance contract as a whole 
and presume that the intent of the parties is reflected in the language 
used in the policy.”  Id. at ¶ 11, citing Kelly v. Med. Life Ins. Co. 
(1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 130, 31 OBR 289, 509 N.E.2d 411, paragraph 
one of the syllabus. Moreover, “[w]e look to the plain and ordinary 
meaning of the language used in the policy unless another meaning 
is clearly apparent from the contents of the policy.” Id., citing 
Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co. (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 241, 7 
O.O.3d 403, 374 N.E.2d 146, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
 
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. White, 122 Ohio St.3d 562, 2009-Ohio-3718, 913 
N.E.2d 426, ¶ 17. 
{¶ 29} “[A]n exclusion in an insurance policy will be interpreted as 
applying only to that which is clearly intended to be excluded.”  (Emphasis sic.)  
Hybud Equip. Corp. at 665.  Ambiguity in the policy language is construed against 
January Term, 2016 
 
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the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured, particularly when the ambiguity 
exists in a provision that purports to limit or qualify coverage under the insurance 
policy.  Westfield Ins. Co. v. Hunter, 128 Ohio St.3d 540, 2011-Ohio-1818, 948 
N.E.2d 931, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 30} With these principles in mind, we turn to the policy language in this 
case. 
{¶ 31} The language of the abuse exclusion is broad.  It excludes from 
coverage “ ‘bodily injury’ * * * arising out of * * * [t]he actual or threatened abuse 
or molestation by anyone of any person while in the care, custody or control of any 
insured.”  It excludes from coverage actual or threatened abuse or molestation.  
And it covers actual or threatened abuse or molestation by anyone.  The victim, 
however, must be in the care, custody, or control of an insured. 
{¶ 32} Additionally, the abuse exclusion eliminates coverage for damages 
awarded for claims of bodily injury arising from the insured’s negligence in 
employing, investigating, supervising, or retaining the bad actor, as well as from 
negligence in reporting, or failing to report, the abuse or molestation to the 
authorities. 
{¶ 33} We do not find any language in the abuse exclusion that limits its 
application to damages awarded for an insured’s direct liability.  The failure to 
include an express denial of coverage for claims of secondary, or vicarious, 
liability, does not support the interpretation advanced by WHC, i.e., that the policy 
must therefore cover vicarious liability.  Nor does it render the exclusion 
ambiguous. 
{¶ 34} The exclusion covers a narrow category of conduct—actual or 
threatened abuse by anyone.  But construing the exclusion to apply only to that 
which is clearly excluded, as we must, its plain wording states that there is no 
coverage as long as the claim is for bodily injury that arises out of the abuse by 
anyone of any person while in the care, custody, or control of the insured. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
{¶ 35} We find that the abuse exclusion simply does not limit the exclusion 
to claims for bodily injury arising from direct liability, while failing to exclude 
claims for bodily injury arising from secondary, or vicarious, liability, for the same 
conduct.  Indeed, the language in the exclusion is simple and unambiguous: there 
is no coverage for any injury arising from abuse or molestation.  To hold otherwise, 
we would have to insert language into the exclusion.  We may not do so, particularly 
when the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous.  “ ‘Where a written 
agreement is plain and unambiguous it does not become ambiguous by reason of 
the fact that in its operation it will work a hardship on one of the parties thereto and 
corresponding advantage to the other.’ ”  S & M Constructors, Inc. v. Columbus, 
70 Ohio St.2d 69, 71, 434 N.E.2d 1349 (1982), quoting Ullmann v. May, 147 Ohio 
St. 468, 72 N.E.2d 63 (1947), paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 36} To hold that the exclusion applies to claims of direct liability but not 
to vicarious liability would require rewriting the policy language.  But we refrain 
from infringing on freedom-of-contract principles and expanding our limited role 
in interpreting contract language.  “A court must construe a contract against its 
drafter, but when the terms are unambiguous and clear on their face, the court need 
not look beyond the plain language of the contract to determine the rights and 
obligations of the parties.” Beasley v. Monoko, Inc., 195 Ohio App.3d 93, 2011-
Ohio-3995, 958 N.E.2d 1003, ¶ 30 (10th Dist.). 
{¶ 37} Here, WHC’s vicarious liability arose from its admission that 
Vaughan acted within the scope of his employment when he committed the abusive 
acts while A.F. was in WHC’s care, custody, and control.  And those acts gave rise 
to the damages awarded for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Thus, the 
language of the abuse exclusion encompasses WHC’s vicarious liability for 
Vaughan’s intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from the abuse.  
Accordingly, we overrule the appellate court’s conclusion that Grange is obligated 
January Term, 2016 
 
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to indemnify WHC for any damages awarded based on vicarious liability for 
Vaughan’s intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Attorney Fees and Postjudgment Interest 
{¶ 38} In the Faietas’ lawsuit, the jury also found that the Faietas were 
entitled to attorney fees from WHC, but not from Vaughan, and the trial court 
awarded attorney fees of $693,861.87.  In this coverage dispute, the appellate court 
concluded that Grange was obligated to indemnify WHC for the entire amount of 
attorney fees awarded because the fees could not be allocated between the covered 
and noncovered claims.  2013-Ohio-5707, ¶ 59. 
{¶ 39} Because the result of our decision is that no claims are covered by 
the insurance policies, allocation between covered and noncovered claims is 
unnecessary.  Accordingly, there is no basis to conclude that Grange must 
indemnify WHC for the attorney fees awarded on noncovered claims. 
{¶ 40} The appellate court initially vacated the portion of the interest award 
attributable to amounts not covered under the Grange policies and determined that 
Grange was obligated to indemnify WHC only for the postjudgment interest 
attributable to the portion of the judgment it determined that the policies covered.  
Id. at ¶ 60-61.  On reconsideration, the appellate court modified its decision to 
conclude that Grange must indemnify WHC for the postjudgment interest assessed 
on the full amount of the judgment, or $229,716.  10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-
290, ¶ 23 (May 29, 2014) (on reconsideration). 
{¶ 41} The appellate court reasoned that the general liability policy did not 
limit coverage for postjudgment interest to a covered injury, because the policy 
applied to “any judgment.”  Id. at ¶ 16.  The relevant policy language states:  
 
We will pay, with respect to * * * any “suit” against an 
insured we defend:  
* * *  
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All interest on the full amount of any judgment that accrues 
after entry of the judgment and before we have paid, offered to pay, 
or deposited in court the part of the judgment that is within the 
applicable limit of insurance. 
 
The policy defines “suit” as “a civil proceeding in which damages because of 
‘bodily injury’ * * * to which this insurance applies are alleged.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  The appellate court concluded that this definition was satisfied. 
{¶ 42} We must, however, view the insurance contract as a whole.  Safeco 
Ins. Co. of Am., 122 Ohio St.3d 562, 2009-Ohio-3718, 913 N.E.2d 426, ¶ 17.  As 
discussed above, pursuant to the abuse exclusion, the policy does not apply to 
bodily injury arising out of abuse.  Because the Faietas’ suit is not one that alleges 
bodily injury to which the insurance applies, it is not one for which Grange must 
pay interest on a judgment.  Accordingly, we conclude that Grange is not obligated 
to pay any amount of postjudgment interest awarded to the Faietas. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 43} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the language of 
Grange’s abuse exclusion bars coverage for an award of damages based on WHC’s 
vicarious liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from 
Vaughan’s abuse of A.F. while in WHC’s care and custody.  Because we hold that 
coverage is excluded, and there are no remaining covered claims for damages 
awarded in the Faietas’ lawsuit, we also conclude that the policy does not provide 
coverage for an award of attorney fees and postjudgment interest.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment reversed. 
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., 
concur. 
_________________ 
January Term, 2016 
 
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Robert P. Rutter, for appellee. 
Tucker Ellis, L.L.P., Irene C. Keyse-Walker, and Benjamin C. Sassé; 
Gallagher, Gams, Pryor, Tallan & Littrell, L.L.P., and James R. Gallagher, for 
appellant. 
Reed Smith, L.L.P., and James M. Doerfler, urging affirmance for amicus 
curiae United Policyholders. 
Landskroner Grieco Merriman, L.L.C., and Drew Legando, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Association for Justice. 
Michael M. Neltner, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Association of 
Civil Trial Attorneys. 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Thomas E. Szykowny, urging 
reversal for amici curiae Ohio Insurance Institute and Property Casualty Insurers 
Association of America. 
_________________