Case Title: STATE v MINER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-02-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13085 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE OF M O N T A N A 1975 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - JOHN M I C H A E L MINER, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Sixth Judicial D i s t r i c t , Honorable C. R. Sande, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : James A. Tulley argued, Big Timber, Montana O.J. Paulson, Big Timber, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas A. Budewitz argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Kenneth R. Olson, County Attorney, Big Timber, Montana Submitted: December 10, 1975 Decided : . . , I . - - - Filed: M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal by defendant John Michael Miner from a judgment entered i n the d i s t r i c t court, Sweet Grass County, Hon. C. B. Sande, presiding. The judgment followed a jury verdict finding Miner g u i l t y of burglary. Miner appeals. O n the night of September 7, 1974, Ullman Lumber Company i n Big Timber, Montana was burglarized. Taken i n t h e burglary were approximately $70 i n cash and $1100 i n checks written t o Ullman Lumber Company. The testimony of witnesses indicates t h i s chronology of events: Immediately before the burglary, Sheri S t i e f and Eileen Brannin, while "cruising the drag", spotted a man they l a t e r identified a s defendant walking back and f o r t h i n front of Ullman Lumber Company. Later four teenagers who were conversing i n a c a r d i r e c t l y across the s t r e e t from the lumber company saw someone inside the s t o r e whereupon one of the teenagers, T i m Rostad, l e f t t o c a l l the police. While Rostad was absent, the other three teenagers continued t o watch t h e s t o r e window, and one of the teenagers, Lila Fuller, saw someone inside the store. Later she i d e n t i f i e d defendant a s the person inside the store. A t about t h i s time, these same teenagers noted someone running through t h e s t o r e and decided t o investigate more closely. Driving past the s t o r e , they saw two men run through the yard and jump the back fence. Later these teenagers while driving i n the v i c i n i t y , saw a man walking down a side s t r e e t , whom they l a t e r identified a t t r i a l a s defendant. Meanwhile, Tim Rostad had succeeded i n a l e r t i n g t h e police. Deputy Brannin while conducting a surveillance of the immediate v i c i n i t y , spotted a man walking down a side s t r e e t t h a t he l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d a s defendant. After finishing h i s general surveillance, Deputy Brannin returned t o ~ l l m a n ' s where Tim Rostad informed him t h a t a man matching t h e description of t h e person he had seen i n ~ l l m a n ' s was i n a telephone booth nearby. Upon being confronted by Deputy Brannin, t h i s man i d e n t i f i e d himself as Gary Eugene Radi. A t t h i s time, Tim Rostad a l s o i d e n t i f i e d Radi a s the man he had seen inside t h e Ullman Lumber Company e a r l i e r . A few days l a t e r the Sweet Grass County s h e r i f f requested photographs of Radi and h i s known associates from the Billings police department. From the s e t of s i x photos received, witnesses thought t h e one photo of defendant might have been the man they saw, but they were not sure. Deputy Brannin did i d e n t i f y defendant a s the man he had seen from t h i s f i r s t s e t . O n September 11, 1974, a new s e t of photographs received. This s e t contained two pictures each of defendant and Radi and one of another suspect. These photos showed defendant with longer h a i r and glasses, similar t o h i s appearance a t the time of a r r e s t . Upon viewing the two s e t s of photos, along with miscellaneous photos pulled from the o f f i c e f i l e s , several witnesses made positive identification. Eileen Brannin and Sheri S t i e f i d e n t i f i e d defendant a s the man they sawwaZliSng back and f o r t h outside t h e lumber company. Lila Fuller i d e n t i f i e d defendant a s the man she observed inside t h e store. T i m Rostad i d e n t i f i e d Radi a s t h e man he saw inside the s t o r e and l a t e r i n the near v i c i n i t y . Based upon the above f a c t s Miner was charged with one count of burglary and one count of t h e f t on September 12, 1974. In due course, motions were made t o dismiss the Information and t o suppress photo i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s made of defendant. After a hearing, the d i s t r i c t court denied both motions, and the case proceeded t o t r i a l . The jury returned a verdicr of g u i l t y on t h e count of burglary. Miner was sentenced t o ten years i n prison. It is from t h i s judgment and sentence t h a t defendant now appeals. Three issues a r e presented f o r review: 1) Whether o r not t h e Information f i l e d against defendant was supported by probable cause? 2) Whether o r not the t r i a l court erred i n denying defendant's motion t o suppress photo i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s made of defendant? 3) Whether o r not the t r i a l court erred i n giving i t s Instruction No. 21 a s t o defendant's accountability f o r t h e a c t s of another? In the f i r s t issue defendant contends the Information f i l e d was not supported by probable cause. W e find no merit i n t h i s contention. Section 95-1301(a), R.C.M. 1947, allows the f i l i n g of an Information i f a f t e r review of the evidence supporting the a f f i d a v i t the court i s s a t i s f i e d t h a t there i s probable cause t o believe t h a t an offense has been committed by defendant. The defi- n i t i o n of probable cause t o a r r e s t i s discussed extensively i n State ex r e l . Pinsoneault v. D i s t r i c t Court, 145 Mont. 233, 240, 400 P.2d 269. There the Court held t h a t t h e expression "probable cause", a s used i n the federal Constitution, r e f e r r i n g t o the issuance of warrants, means t h a t there i s a probability t h a t a crime has been committed by the person named i n the warrant. In determining t h e probability t h a t defendant committed an offense, the guidelines suggested i n S p i n e l l i v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L ed 2d 637, have been noted with approval by t h i s Court. See: State v. Troglia, 157 Mont. 22, 482 P.2d 143. Generally those guidelines s t a t e t h a t a mere probab- i l i t y i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r probable cause, a prima f a c i e showing not being necessary. Also a f f i d a v i t s of probable cause a r e subject t o much l e s s rigorous standards than the admissibility of evidence. Finally, judges reviewing such a f f i d a v i t s should use t h e i r common sense i n determining whether probable cause e x i s t s . With these guidelines in mind, we review the pertinent f a c t s : Three witnesses p d t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d defendant a s e i t h e r in the s t o r e , walking suspiciously i n front of the s t o r e immediately prior t o the burglary, o r walking i n the v i c i n i t y of t h e s t o r e immediately a f t e r t h e burglary. Deputy Brannin a l s o i d e n t i f i e d defendant a s being i n the v i c i n i t y immediately a f t e r the burglary. Several witnesses saw two men inside t h e lumber yard with one of the men matching t h e description of defendant. Gary Radi, a known associate of defendant, was seen i n t h e s t o r e and l a t e r stopped and questioned i n the immediate v i c i n i t y . Of a l l t h i s evidence going t o probable cause, the only point of confusion seems t o be a s t o who was seen inside the store. Defendant contends since three witnesses did not agree with Lila F u l l e r ' s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of defendant a s being i n t h e s t o r e , there i s a breakdown i n probable cause. F i r s t , probable cause i s determined on the basis of probability not percentages. I f one witness could positively identify defendant a s being i n the s t o r e t h i s would point t o the probability he was indeed involved i n the burglary--this i s what probable cause i s a11 about. Second, any one piece of evidence i s not determinative of probable cause, r a t h e r a l l evidence must be examined before any determina- t i o n can be made; and upon such examination there a r e ample f a c t s t o support a finding of probable cause t o a r r e s t . Since the f a c t s show defendant present a t the time and location of the burglary, h i s i n t e n t i s t o be determined from the f a c t s and circumstances presented, a jury question. State v. Cooper, 158 Mont. 102, 489 P.2d 99. In the second issue defendant contends the t r i a l court erred i n denying defendant's motion t o suppress photo i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s of defendant. Again, we find no merit i n t h i s contention. Defendant alleges t h e photo lineup procedure was a violation of h i s r i g h t t o counsel because by the time the second s e t of photos was shown the proceedings had ceased being investigatory and had become accusatory. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L ed 2d 1149. However, t h e f a c t s indicate it was only a f t e r the second s e t of photos was shown t h a t some witnesses positively i d e n t i f i e d defendant. It was upon the basis of t h i s positive iden- t i f i c a t i o n t h a t t h e Information was f i l e d and defendant arrested. A case i n point a s t o the c r i t i c a l stage where r i g h t t o counsel i s required i s Kirby v. I l l i n o i s , 406 U.S. 682, 690, 92 S e c t . 1877, 32 L ed 2d 411,418, where two men arrested upon suspicion of a crime but not yet formally charged, were confronted and i d e n t i f i e d by the victim of t h a t crime. The United States Supreme Court upheld the v a l i d i t y of t h i s confrontation i n the absence of counsel on the b a s i s t h a t t h e c r i t i c a l stage of formal proceedings against the suspects had not been i n i t i a t e d . The Court said : "In t h i s case we a r e asked t o import i n t o a routine police investigation an absolute constitu- t i o n a l guarantee h i s t o r i c a l l y and r a t i o n a l l y appli- able only a f t e r the onset of formal prosecutorial proceedings. W e decline t o do so. I I See a l s o ; United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 93 S.Ct. 2568, Since the United States Supreme Court saw no need f o r counsel during a physical lineup a f t e r a r r e s t but p r i o r t o the f i l i n g of formal charges, t h i s Court sees no reason t o require counsel during a photo lineup p r i o r t o the time defendant was arrested. Accordingly, t h i s Court finds the c r i t i c a l stage where police procedure changes from investigative t o accusatorial was not reached a t the time the photo displays of defendant were made and therefore defendant was not e n t i t l e d t o counsel a t t h a t time. Defendant a l s o contends the photo lineup procedure used was so suggestive a s t o almost compel witness i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of him a s the g u i l t y party and a s such was a violation of the due process clause of the F i f t h and Fourteenth Amendments. In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L ed 2d 1247,1253, the Court i n dealing with a photo lineup s i t u a t i o n similar t o the instant one said: 'I* * 5~ The danger t h a t use of the technique may r e s u l t i n convictions based on misidentification may be substantially lessened by a course of cross- examination a t t r i a l which exposes t o the jury the method's potential f o r error. W e a r e unwilling t o prohibit i t s employment, e i t h e r i n t h e exercise of our supervisory power o r s t i l l l e s s , a s a matter of constitutional requirement. Instead, we hold t h a t each case must be considered on i t s own f a c t s , and t h a t convictions based on eyewitness i d e n t i f i c a t i o n - - - - - -. a t t r i a l following a p r e t r i e l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n by photograph w i l l be s e t aside on t h a t ground only i f the photographic i d e n t i f i c a t i o n procedure was so impermissibly suggestive a s t o give r i s e t o a ver substantial likelihood of irreparable misidenti i- cation." (Emphasis supplied.) iL See also: Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 Therefore, unless t h e e r r o r i s obvious and the pre- judice c l e a r , the defendant's remedy is i n e f f e c t i v e cross-examin- ation with t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n question then becoming one of weight t o be determined by the jury and not one of admissibility. Applying the Simmons t e s t t o the f a c t s of t h i s case, t h i s Court perceives no photo lineup procedure which was so flagrantly suggestive as t o require a suppression of the photo identifications. The photos used f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n were categorized i n t o three s e t s . The f i r s t s e t contained pictures of defendant and known associates, including Gary Radi. The second s e t from which several witnesses made positive i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of defendant, contained pictures of defendant and Gary Radi. The t h i r d s e t contained miscellaneous pictures pulled out of the s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e f i l e . These photo s e t s were shown together not t o c r e a t e impressions but r a t h e r t o verify descriptions and information already gathered. In h i s f i n a l issue, defendant contends t h a t the aiding and abetting instruction given by the d i s t r i c t court was improper. The c o u r t ' s Instruction No. 21 reads: "You a r e instructed t h a t a person i s responsible f o r t h e conduct which i s an element of an offense i f the conduct i s e i t h e r t h a t of the person himself o r t h a t .d another and he e i t h e r before o r during the commission of an offense, and with the purpose t o promote o r f a c i l i t a t e such commission, s o l i c i t s , a i d s , abets, agrees o r attempts t o a i d , such other lerson i n t h e planning o r commission of the offense. The source of t h i s instruction i s section 94-2-107(3), R.C.M. 1947. Defendant does not contend t h e instruction does not adequately s t a t e t h e law but r a t h e r t h a t it is not supported by any evidence which was presented a t t r i a l . This Court cannot agree. It i s t r u e t h a t no instruction may be given which i s not supported e i t h e r by some evidence o r some logical inference from other evidence which was presented a t t r i a l . But, i n t h i s case, there i s s u f f i c i e n t support i n the t r a n s c r i p t f o r the giving of t h i s instruction. Defendant was seen walking back and f o r t h i n f r o n t of the lumber s t o r e immediately p r i o r t o the burglary. Defendant f i t t h e description of one of the two men seen inside t h e lumber yard. He was l a t e r seen i n t h e v i c i n i t y by several witnesses. He i s an admitted associate of Gary Radi who was positively i d e n t i f i e d a s being inside the store. I f , despite t h e testimony of Lila Fuller, t h e jury a c t u a l l y believed it was Radi alone who entered t h e building, it s t i l l had s u f f i c i e n t evidence before it t o f i n d t h a t defendant was collaborating with him on the burglary. Where there i s substantial evidence t o support t h e j u r y ' s verdict, t h i s Court w i l l not reverse. S t a t e v. Stoddard, 147 Mont. 402, 412 P.2d 827; S t a t e v. Cor, 144 Mont. 323, 396 P.2d 86; State v. Robinson, 109 Mont. 322, 96 P.2d 265. The judgment of the d i s t r i c t court/?s affirmed. r: