Case Title: Alan Lyndell Wade v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC08-573

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2010-05-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC08-573 
_____________ 
 
 
ALAN LYNDELL WADE, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[May 6, 2010] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Alan Lyndell Wade was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, two 
counts of kidnapping, and two counts of robbery in the July 2005 murders of Carol 
and Reggie Sumner.  In accord with the jury‘s recommendation, the trial court 
sentenced Wade to death for each murder.  In this appeal, Wade challenges his 
convictions and sentences.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  
For the reasons explained below, we affirm. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
In August 2005, Alan Wade, Michael Jackson, Tiffany Cole, and Bruce 
Nixon were indicted on two charges each of first-degree murder, armed 
 
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kidnapping, and armed robbery in the murders of Carol and Reggie Sumner, a 
retired couple residing in Jacksonville, Florida.  Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
Nixon pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree murder in exchange for his 
cooperation with the State and his testimony against his three codefendants at their 
separate trials.  Nixon was sentenced to concurrent sentences of forty-five years.  
At the time of Wade‘s trial, Jackson had been convicted and sentenced to death.  
See Jackson v. State, 18 So. 3d 1016 (Fla. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1144 
(2010).  Following Wade‘s trial, Cole too was tried and sentenced to death. 
A.  Guilt Phase 
At Wade‘s trial, the evidence established the following.  At the time of the 
murders, Wade had known codefendant Jackson for at least a year.  In the summer 
of 2005, Wade had visited and partied with Jackson and his girlfriend Cole in 
South Carolina.  In June, Wade arrived at his longtime friend Nixon‘s home in 
Jacksonville, driving a Mazda RX-8 that Cole had rented in South Carolina.  Wade 
told Nixon of a vague plan to rob someone but offered no specifics.  The next time 
Wade contacted Nixon was two evenings before the July 8 murders.  Wade called 
and asked whether Nixon would like to join him, Jackson, and Cole in digging a 
hole.  Nixon agreed and purloined four shovels from his neighborhood before his 
three codefendants appeared at his home in the Mazda. 
 
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The foursome drove around before deciding on a good location for the 
hole—a remote, wooded area located just across the state line in Georgia.  Leaving 
the car parked on the road, the foursome hiked into the woods, where the three men 
dug a large, deep hole, while Cole held a flashlight.  When the group returned to 
the car, Wade asked Jackson whether Nixon could join their robbery plan, and 
Jackson agreed.  The group then went to Wade‘s house but left when Wade‘s 
mother ordered Jackson out of her home.  She considered Jackson a bad influence 
on her son. 
 
Over the next two days, the four codefendants moved forward with the plan 
to rob and kill the Sumners.  Cole drove Nixon, Jackson, and Wade by the 
Sumners‘ Jacksonville home and called the Sumners on her cell phone.  Cole knew 
the victims from when she and they had lived in South Carolina, and Jackson knew 
them through Cole.  Both Reggie and Carol Sumner were sixty-one and in 
extremely poor health.  The Sumners were chosen as victims because of their 
vulnerability and the belief that they had considerable financial resources.  The 
four codefendants planned to gain entry to the Sumners‘ house while the couple 
was at home and obtain information regarding their financial accounts and the 
means to access those accounts.  Jackson said that he would kill the victims with a 
lethal injection of medication.  He promised his codefendants that they would share 
 
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the money obtained from the Sumners‘ accounts and that each would get about 
$50,000. 
 
The codefendants made preparations to effect their plan.  Shortly after 
midnight on July 7, 2005, Jackson, Cole, and Wade went to Wal-Mart and 
purchased disposable rubber gloves.  Then, at about 8:30 on the evening of the 
murders, all four codefendants went to an Office Depot, where Cole purchased 
duct tape and a large roll of plastic wrap.  Finally, they obtained a toy gun that shot 
plastic pellets. 
 
At approximately 10 p.m. on July 8, 2005, Cole drove her three 
codefendants in the Mazda to the Sumners‘ home.  She and Jackson remained in 
the car after dropping Wade and Nixon near the home.  Wade had the duct tape in 
his waistband, and Nixon had the toy gun.  As Wade and Nixon approached the 
victims‘ house, the pair donned plastic gloves.  When Carol Sumner opened the 
door, they asked to use her phone, and she invited them in.  Upon entering, Wade 
quickly pulled out the phone line, while Nixon pointed the toy gun at the couple.  
Wade grabbed Mr. Sumner around the neck and pushed him down into a chair.  
They told the couple that they wanted bank and credit cards.  Mrs. Sumner began 
to cry and pleaded with Wade and Nixon not to hurt her and her husband.  Nixon 
took the Sumners into the spare bedroom, where he used duct tape to secure their 
legs and hands and to cover their mouths and eyes.  Jackson then entered the home 
 
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after being signaled that the victims were secured, and he and Wade began 
searching for financial information.  A pile of mail and financial statements and 
Reggie Sumner‘s coin collection were taken to the Mazda. 
 
At Jackson‘s direction, Wade and Nixon walked the Sumners out to their 
own Lincoln Town Car and put the couple in its trunk.  According to plan, the two 
cars headed for the predug grave, making only one stop to put gas in the Lincoln.  
After arriving near the gravesite, Jackson opened the Lincoln‘s trunk and began 
screaming when he saw that the victims had worked their way out of the duct tape.  
The couple lay with their eyes uncovered and hugging each other in the trunk.  
Jackson ordered Nixon to bind them again.  Then, when Wade was unable to back 
the Lincoln up to the edge of the grave, Nixon did so.  Jackson then sent Nixon to 
wait with Cole at the road, where she had remained with the Mazda. 
 
Later, Wade and Jackson drove the Lincoln up to the road where Cole and 
Nixon waited.  Jackson held a yellow legal pad and reported that it contained the 
previously unknown personal identification numbers (PINs) for the Sumners‘ bank 
cards.  Then, with Wade and Nixon in the Lincoln and Jackson and Cole in the 
Mazda, the foursome drove to Sanderson, Florida, where they abandoned the 
Lincoln after wiping it clean of prints.  They left the four shovels in its trunk. 
All four codefendants then returned to Jacksonville in the Mazda.  They 
went to an automated teller machine (ATM), where Jackson withdrew money from 
 
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one of the Sumners‘ accounts, and then the group went to their hotel.  
Subsequently, Wade and Cole went to Wal-Mart, where they purchased gloves and 
bleach.  They also returned to the Sumners‘ home and stole the computer.  Nixon 
stayed with his codefendants another day and then went home.  Wade, however, 
stayed with Cole and Jackson and traveled with them to Charleston, South 
Carolina.  There, Cole rented two hotel rooms—one for her and Jackson and the 
other for Wade. 
Carol Sumners‘ daughter reported her inability to contact the couple to the 
Jacksonville Sheriff‘s Office on July 10, and the next day the couple was reported 
missing and a ―BOLO‖ issued for the couple‘s car.  On July 12 the car was found, 
and the law enforcement investigation of the Sumners‘ financial accounts revealed 
an unusual number of recent ATM withdrawals.  Video from the ATMs revealed 
Michael Jackson‘s face and a silver Mazda in the background.  Wade called Nixon 
to inform him that the Lincoln had been found and told Nixon to ―be cool.‖  About 
this same time, Nixon went to a keg party.  There, while intoxicated, Nixon told a 
friend that he had buried someone alive and showed his wallet containing about 
$200 in $20 bills. 
Posing as Reggie Sumner, Jackson contacted Jacksonville law enforcement 
officers by phone on July 12, and he assured the homicide detective that he and his 
―wife‖ were fine.  Cole, posing as Carol Sumner, made the same assurances.  
 
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Jackson also reported that he was having trouble accessing the Sumners‘ accounts 
and requested the detective‘s help.  On July 14, Jackson, Cole, and Wade were 
located and arrested at their South Carolina hotel, and their rooms were searched 
pursuant to warrants.  Carol Sumner‘s key ring containing the keys to the Lincoln 
was found on the nightstand in Wade‘s room.  In the room with Jackson and Cole, 
law enforcement officers found a suitcase full of the Sumners‘ financial records, 
bags of recent purchases made on the Sumners‘ accounts, receipts for those 
purchases and for purchases made earlier in Jacksonville, and other items, 
including the Sumners‘ driver licenses, credit and bank cards, and checks and 
check register.  Notably, a check for $8,000 on the Sumners‘ account had been 
made payable to Alan Wade.  Officers also searched Cole‘s car, a Chevy Lumina, 
and the Mazda, which had not been returned to the rental agency but had been 
recovered by law enforcement officers.  In the Lumina, the officers found Reggie 
Sumner‘s coin collection, and in the Mazda, they found Wade‘s fingerprints on one 
of the victims‘ magazines.  They also found an unused roll of plastic wrap with 
Cole‘s and Jackson‘s fingerprints on it. 
Nixon was arrested, and he took officers to the Georgia gravesite.  A roll of 
duct tape was found there, and on the morning of July 15, law enforcement officers 
began excavation of the gravesite.  Both victims were found fully clothed and 
sitting in crouched positions, with at least two feet of dirt over their heads.  The 
 
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medical examiner testified that both Reggie and Carol were alive in the hole before 
the dirt was shoveled on them.  Their nostrils, mouths, throats, esophagi, and 
tracheae contained fine sprays of dirt, indicating that the dirt was inhaled.  Both 
victims died of a combination of mechanical asphyxiation, as the dirt compressed 
their chests and abdomens, and smothering, as the dirt piled up around their heads 
and obstructed their noses and mouths. 
Wade declined to testify in his own defense, and after inquiry, the trial court 
found the waiver voluntary.  The jury subsequently found Wade guilty of two 
counts of first-degree murder, determining that they were both premeditated and 
committed in the course of a robbery or kidnapping or both, and of two counts 
each of robbery and kidnapping.1 
B.  Penalty Phase and Sentencing 
During the penalty phase, two witnesses gave victim impact statements.  
Wade then called six witnesses to testify: Bruce Nixon, Wade‘s mother and older 
sister, the mother of one of his friends, the assistant principal from his middle 
school, and the former youth pastor of his church.  In sum, the witnesses testified 
that Wade‘s parents divorced when he was eight and his father essentially dropped 
out of Wade‘s life.  His father‘s absence had a negative impact on Wade‘s life.  
                                          
 
 
1.  Although the indictment charged armed robbery and armed kidnapping, 
the charges were later amended to delete the ―armed‖ element on these two counts 
in light of the evidence that a toy gun was used. 
 
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Wade‘s mother, however, took him to church regularly, and as a young boy, he 
was kind, smart, and well-behaved.  After the divorce, however, his mother was 
unable to spend a lot of time with him because she worked full time to support 
them, and during his teens, she struggled with breast cancer.  In his early teens, 
Wade began using drugs.  When he was in sixth grade, Wade was involuntarily 
committed to a rehabilitation center for seventy-two hours following a drug-related 
incident.  The police had given his mother the option of commitment in lieu of his 
arrest.  Later, when Wade was sixteen, his mother had to withdraw him from 
school to avoid being arrested herself because of his truancy.  The next year, 
because of his continued drug use and escalating disregard for his responsibilities, 
she kicked him out of the house as a measure of ―tough love.‖  In 2004, Wade 
introduced his mother to Jackson, whom she deemed a bad influence on Wade for 
a variety of reasons.  Since his arrest for the murders, however, Wade had become 
a model prisoner.  He earned his general equivalency diploma, read dozens of 
books, tutored other inmates in math, and was a mentor to others.  After 
deliberations, the jury voted eleven-to-one to recommend a death sentence for each 
murder. 
 
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Subsequently, the trial court held a Spencer2 hearing at which Wade‘s 
mother testified, as did Wade‘s father.  Carol Sumner‘s daughter also testified that 
she did not believe the death penalty was an appropriate sentence for Wade.  Four 
other witnesses gave victim impact statements. 
 
On March 4, 2008, the circuit court imposed sentences of death for both 
murders.3  The court found the following seven statutory aggravators established 
beyond a reasonable doubt as to each murder: (1) Wade was previously convicted 
of a capital felony—the contemporaneous murder of the other victim; (2) the 
murder was committed in the course of a kidnapping; (3) the murder was 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); (4) the murder was cold, calculated, 
and premeditated (CCP); (5) the murder was committed for financial gain; (6) the 
murder was committed to avoid arrest; and (7) the victim was especially vulnerable 
due to age or disability. 
In mitigation, the court found three statutory mitigators, affording only one 
great weight, and twenty nonstatutory factors.  With respect to the substantial 
domination mitigator, the court stated that the factor was ―not clearly established‖ 
                                          
 
 
2.  See Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688, 690-91 (Fla. 1993) (requiring a 
hearing for the presentation of additional evidence to be held after the jury makes a 
sentence recommendation). 
 
3.  The trial court sentenced Wade to sentences of life on the two kidnapping 
convictions and to fifteen years on the two robbery convictions, with all sentences 
to run concurrently with the death sentences. 
 
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and entitled to little weight because ―Wade alone was responsible‖ for bringing 
Nixon into the criminal scheme.  Moreover, although Wade followed Jackson‘s 
instructions, no direct evidence established that Wade‘s ―personality was subdued 
by‖ Jackson within the meaning of the mitigator.  Similarly, the trial court found 
no direct evidence that Wade‘s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct 
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.  
Ascribing some weight to the statutory factor, the court noted that the ―evidence 
suggests that [Wade] knew exactly what he was doing‖ and was not under the 
influence of drugs or suffering a ―mental aberration‖ at the time of the murders.  
Finally, the court ascribed great weight to the statutory mitigator of the defendant‘s 
age.  Wade was eighteen when he participated in murdering the two victims. 
The trial court also found a number of nonstatutory mitigating factors, 
ascribing each only some or little weight and finding many to be either duplicative 
of others or ―more an argumentative conclusion than a fact.‖  The factors, which 
largely relate either to Wade‘s home life or his behavior since his arrest, are as 
follows: (1) Wade‘s parents were divorced, and he grew up without a father (little 
weight); (2) Wade was raised by an absentee mother (some weight); (3) Wade was 
raised in a negative family setting (argumentative, little weight); (4) Wade had 
difficulty in school (some weight); (5) Wade lacked emotional maturity 
(argumentative, little weight); (6) Wade lacked parental guidance (duplicative, 
 
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some weight); (7) Wade had a history of substance abuse (little weight); (8) Wade 
had a difficult childhood (duplicative, little weight); (9) Wade had mental health 
issues in his youth (little weight); (10) Wade‘s mother threw him out of the house 
when he was sixteen (little weight); (11) Wade is a model prisoner (some weight); 
(12) Wade desires to help others (some weight); (13) Wade has changed for the 
better in prison (argumentative, some weight); (14) Wade is not known as a violent 
person in jail and has had only one disciplinary review (duplicative, some weight); 
(15) Wade exhibits positive personality traits in prison (duplicative, some weight); 
(16) Wade now has the affection and support of his family (little weight); (17) 
Wade was well-behaved at trial (duplicative, some weight); (18) Wade has 
demonstrated a potential for rehabilitation (duplicative, some weight); (19) Wade 
has helped others in prison and could contribute to society (duplicative, little 
weight); and (20) Wade would be a model prisoner with a purposeful life 
(duplicative, little weight). 
After considering the aggravating and mitigating factors in the case, the trial 
court concluded that the seven aggravators ―far outweighed‖ the mitigation and 
that death was the appropriate penalty. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
In this appeal from his convictions and sentences, Wade makes the 
following arguments: (A) his death sentences are disproportionate to codefendant 
 
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Nixon‘s sentences, and the trial court erred in sentencing Wade to death without 
considering Nixon‘s sentence; (B) the prosecutor made statements during closing 
arguments in both phases of trial that constitute fundamental error; (C) the trial 
court erred in denying Wade‘s motion for mistrial regarding a ―golden rule‖ 
violation by the prosecutor; (D) the trial court erred in denying the defense motion 
to preclude imposition of the death penalty under Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 
(1972); (E) the trial court erred in denying the defense motion to disallow the death 
penalty as a sentence because Florida does not have uniform standards for 
determining whether to seek the death penalty; (F) the trial court erred in 
dismissing potential juror Butler for cause; and (G) the death sentences are 
precluded by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  We address these issues in 
turn below, followed by our independent review concerning the proportionality of 
the death sentences and regarding the sufficiency of the evidence for the murder 
convictions. 
A.  Consideration of Codefendant Nixon’s Sentence 
 
As previously stated, three of the codefendants—Wade, Jackson, and Cole—
were sentenced to death for both murders.  Although originally indicted with the 
others on charges of first-degree murder, Nixon pleaded guilty to the lesser charges 
of second-degree murder in exchange for his cooperation and truthful testimony at 
each of his codefendants‘ trials.  At his sentencing, Nixon‘s revised sentencing 
 
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scoresheet provided the court with discretion to sentence Nixon anywhere from the 
lowest guidelines sentence—forty-seven and one-tenth years—to life in prison, and 
even to go below the guidelines based on any mitigation found by the trial court.  
Nixon‘s original scoresheet reflected a range of fifty-two years to life.  The 
scoresheet was recalculated when the ―armed‖ element of the kidnapping and 
robbery charges was deleted. 
After hearing mitigation testimony at Nixon‘s sentencing hearing, the court 
imposed concurrent forty-five-year sentences for the second-degree murders.  
Nixon was sentenced after all three of his codefendants were tried and the juries 
recommended death sentences, but before Wade or Cole was sentenced. 
 
Wade first contends that his death sentences are not proportional to 
codefendant Nixon‘s sentences for a term of years.  Thus, he claims that his 
sentences must be commuted to life because Nixon was equally culpable for the 
murders.  Wade‘s contention fails.  In Shere v. Moore, 830 So. 2d 56, 60 (Fla. 
2002), we stated that ―where more than one defendant was involved in the 
commission of the crime,‖ we would consider the relative culpability of the 
codefendants in determining the proportionality of the death sentence imposed.  
We deemed such analysis necessary because equally culpable codefendants should 
not be treated differently.  We have recognized, however, that ―[i]n order to have 
that same degree of blame or fault the codefendants must, at a minimum, be 
 
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convicted of the same degree of the crime.‖  Id. at 61.  Accordingly, Nixon‘s 
sentences for second-degree murder do not provide a basis for concluding that 
Wade‘s death sentences are disproportionate.  Furthermore, ―where the 
codefendant‘s lesser sentence was the result of a plea agreement or prosecutorial 
discretion, this Court has rejected claims of disparate sentencing.‖  England v. 
State, 940 So. 2d 389, 406 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Kight v. State, 784 So. 2d 396, 401 
(Fla. 2001)); accord Smith v. State, 998 So. 2d 516, 528 (Fla. 2008), cert. denied, 
129 S. Ct. 2006 (2009). 
 
Wade also argues that in sentencing him for the two murders, the trial court 
erred by not considering Nixon‘s ―disparate‖ forty-five-year sentences as 
mitigation.  This argument is not preserved for review.  Although Wade was 
sentenced after the same court sentenced Nixon, Wade never requested that the 
trial court consider Nixon‘s sentence as mitigation of his own sentence.  Wade is 
precluded from making this argument for the first time on appeal. 
B.  Fundamental Error in Closing Arguments 
 
Wade contends that the prosecutor made a number of improper and 
misleading statements during the guilt- and penalty-phase closing arguments.  
Wade, however, did not preserve these claimed errors for review by 
contemporaneously objecting to them.  See Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879, 898-
99 (Fla. 2000) (reiterating general rule that where an appellant does not object 
 
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contemporaneously, improper closing argument comments are not cognizable on 
appeal unless they constitute fundamental error).  Accordingly, we review each of 
these statements below to determine whether—either separately or cumulatively—
the statements constitute error that reaches down into the validity of the trial such 
that a guilty verdict or death recommendation could not have been obtained 
without the assistance of the alleged error.  See Simpson v. State, 3 So. 3d 1135, 
1146 (Fla.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 91 (2009). 
1.  Alleged Error in Guilt-Phase Closing Arguments 
 
During closing argument, the prosecutor stated that ―Alan Wade chose 
Bruce Nixon as our witness.‖  Wade argues that this was improper because it 
placed the onus on Wade for forcing the State to use Nixon as a witness.  We 
disagree.  ―The proper exercise of closing argument is to review the evidence and 
to explicate those inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence.‖  
Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 134 (Fla. 1985).  Here, the jury was aware and 
the State had made it clear that Nixon was involved in these murders and testified 
pursuant to a plea agreement.  In context, the prosecutor made the disputed remark 
to emphasize that it was Wade who invited his friend Nixon to join the robbery-
murder scheme after obtaining Jackson‘s approval.  Accordingly, the prosecutor‘s 
statement did not constitute improper argument but was fair comment on the 
evidence adduced at trial. 
 
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Wade next argues that the prosecutor improperly tried to minimize the plea 
agreement that Nixon made with the State and misrepresented Nixon‘s actual 
sentence to the jury.  On cross-examination defense counsel questioned Nixon 
about his plea agreement for second-degree murder, under which the trial court 
could—pursuant to the original scoresheet—sentence Nixon to a term of fifty-two 
years up to life for each murder.  The twenty-year-old Nixon responded that he saw 
no ―difference between getting first-degree murder and get[ting] 52 to life . . . .  
It‘s carrying the same amount of time.‖  Then, in closing argument, the prosecutor 
pointed to this testimony to preempt any defense claim that Nixon was lying by 
pointing out that Nixon thought that under the plea agreement he would essentially 
get a life sentence, which ―isn‘t really a great deal.‖  Accordingly, the prosecutor‘s 
statement was fair comment on the evidence. 
Wade also claims that because Nixon was sentenced to forty-five years in 
prison for the murders, the State misrepresented Nixon‘s potential lowest sentence 
to the jury.  Nixon, however, was not sentenced until after Wade‘s penalty phase 
was conducted; thus, the prosecutor did not know what sentence would actually be 
imposed.  As explained in the foregoing section, Nixon‘s scoresheet was revised 
downward at Nixon‘s sentencing because the ―armed‖ element of the kidnapping 
and robbery charges was removed, as it was for all of the defendants in the case. 
 
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During an extended closing argument, the prosecutor separately made the 
following three statements: (1) ―So why would this guy lie, to get that deal?  To get 
life?  That‘s why he‘s lying?‖; (2) ―There‘s no way Bruce Nixon is that bright‖;  
and (3) ―The only reason [Nixon] was involved was because he wanted money and 
his best friend [Wade] gave him the opportunity and he [Nixon] told the police the 
truth.‖   Wade argues that these three statements constituted improper vouching. 
We have previously stated that improper vouching or bolstering occurs when 
the State ―places the prestige of the government behind the witness or indicates 
that information not presented to the jury supports the witness‘s testimony.‖  
Williamson v. State, 994 So. 2d 1000, 1013 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Hutchinson v. 
State, 882 So. 2d 943, 953 (Fla. 2004)).  In their context, the challenged statements 
of the prosecutor did not constitute such improper vouching.  The first statement, 
as explained above, was rebuttal to Wade‘s argument that Nixon was willing to lie 
for a lighter sentence.  The other two statements were made as part of the 
prosecutor‘s explanation of how all the evidence presented at trial by law 
enforcement officers, the medical examiner, and other witnesses corroborated 
Nixon‘s testimony.  The statements were thus part of a ―fair reply‖ to the defense 
argument that Nixon was not credible.  See id. at 1013 (holding that the 
prosecutor‘s suggestion that a witness‘s testimony was credible was ―fair reply‖ to 
defense argument that it was not). 
 
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Wade next argues that the prosecutor made an impermissible comment on 
his constitutional right not to testify.  In discussing Nixon‘s testimony, the 
prosecutor stated the following: 
Bruce Nixon was the last one in and the first one out.  There is 
no evidence that Alan Wade said a word to law enforcement about 
Bruce Nixon.  Why is Bruce Nixon—not in March.  Why is Bruce 
Nixon in July right after these crimes telling the police Alan Wade, 
my best friend, the son of my de facto mother, is committing these 
crimes with me?  All he had to do was give up Tiffany Cole and 
Michael Jackson. 
 
Wade specifically challenges the statement underlined above.  Viewed in isolation, 
the prosecutor‘s statement might be construed as referring to Wade‘s silence.  
However, in context it is clear that the prosecutor was simply relying on the fact 
that Wade had not implicated Nixon to demonstrate that Nixon had no reason to lie 
about his best friend‘s involvement in the crimes at the time he confessed to police.  
Nevertheless, even if the comment was erroneous, it does not constitute 
fundamental error.  See Poole v. State, 997 So. 2d 382, 391 (Fla. 2008); see also 
Jones v. State, 998 So. 2d 573, 589 (Fla. 2008) (stating that to require mistrial, an 
improper comment must deprive the defendant of a fair trial). 
2.  Alleged Error in Penalty-Phase Arguments 
 
Wade claims that the prosecutor made two improper arguments during the 
penalty phase.  First, he asserts that the prosecutor made an impermissible ―golden 
rule‖ argument in addressing the applicability of the HAC aggravator.  In his 
 
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argument, the prosecutor first explained the definition of HAC and then recounted 
the facts of the crime to the jury.  During that recitation of the facts, the prosecutor 
stated the following: 
 
How about being driven down that road, stopping for gas in a 
trunk not knowing what‘s going on, wondering where they are at, why 
have they stopped, are they going to be set free, what is in store for 
them? 
 
Was their horror over?  No.  It had just begun.  A 35-mile drive 
going to where they could not know, probably 45 minutes in the trunk 
of their car, perhaps more.  They get to somewhere else.  They stop.  
They don‘t know where they‘re at.  There are no lights.  There are no 
friends.  There‘s no family. 
 
The prosecutor then continued with the description of the victims being buried 
alive and stated that the facts of the crime were consonant with a finding of HAC. 
 
We find no error in the prosecutor‘s argument.  A prohibited ―golden rule‖ 
argument invites jurors to put themselves in the victim‘s position and then imagine 
the victim‘s final pain, terror, and defenselessness.  Bailey v. State, 998 So. 2d 545, 
555 (Fla. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2395 (2009).  Here, the State‘s recitation 
of the facts of the case was accurate and did not invite the jury to put themselves in 
the victims‘ place.  The HAC aggravator ―applies in physically and mentally 
torturous murders‖ and ―focuses on the means and manner in which the death is 
inflicted and the immediate circumstances surrounding the death, rather than the 
intent and motivation of a defendant, where a victim experiences the torturous 
anxiety and fear of impending death.‖  Barnhill v. State, 834 So. 2d 836, 849-50 
 
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(Fla. 2002).  Thus, the prosecutor merely explained the evidence consistent with 
the application of the HAC aggravator. 
 
Second, Wade argues that the prosecutor improperly instructed the jurors by 
telling them that a vote for life would be both irresponsible and a violation of their 
lawful duty.  During closing argument, the prosecutor stated the following: 
 
You might hear an argument about life is enough.  Life is 
however many years he‘s got left and leaves that prison only when he 
dies.  What I suggest to you is that argument tells you that this 
defendant should not be held fully accountable for his actions.  The 
argument in essence says let‘s take the easy way out.  I know life is 
life and I know it will be a miserable life in prison and let‘s give him 
life, but that‘s not the law of the State of Florida.  You have to weigh 
and weigh this aggravation and you will find that it cries out for full 
accountability. 
 
Ask you[rselves] what facts that you heard in mitigation rises to 
the level to legally mitigate against the actions of July, 2005?  Did you 
hear anything to outweigh, to contradict the aggravating factors?  Are 
we saying that he was deprived, therefore, he was depraved?  It‘s not 
the environment but it‘s how you choose to deal with the 
environment. 
Wade claims that the underlined language above is nearly identical to arguments 
we previously deemed impermissible in cases such as Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 
411, 421 (Fla. 1998). 
 
We disagree.  Although the prosecutors in Urbin and in this case both urged 
the jury not to ―take the easy way out‖ and vote for life, there is an important 
difference between the two cases.  In Urbin the prosecutor told the jury that it was 
their duty to return a recommendation of death—that the law required them to 
 
- 22 - 
make that recommendation.  Id.; see also Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252, 
1282 (Fla. 2005) (stating in a postconviction case that prosecutor‘s statement 
admonishing the jury not to do the ―easy thing‖ and vote for life, which ―would not 
be the legal thing to do,‖ was made ―while explaining . . . the purpose of 
aggravating and mitigating factors‖ and concluding that ―[e]ven assuming the 
comment was improper it was harmless‖).  In this case, the prosecutor correctly 
told the jurors that it was their duty actually to weigh the factors, but he in no way 
implied that the jury was required by law to return a recommendation of death.  
Accordingly, the prosecutor‘s argument does not constitute error, much less 
fundamental error. 
 
Having reviewed the alleged errors discussed above, we hold that none of 
the prosecutor‘s statements either individually or cumulatively constitute 
fundamental error. 
C.  Motion for Mistrial Based on an Alleged “Golden Rule” Violation 
In the foregoing section, we addressed claims that the prosecutor committed 
fundamental error in closing arguments.  We now turn to Wade‘s preserved claim 
that the prosecutor made an impermissible ―golden rule‖ argument. 
 
The prosecutor concluded the guilt phase with a review of the case as 
follows: 
 
At the beginning of this case in jury selection we talked about 
the presumption of innocence, the cloak of innocence.  His [Wade‘s] 
 
- 23 - 
cloak of innocence has been dirtied with the dirt of the Sumners‘ 
grave. 
 
This case as I told you in opening is about love and greed, the 
love of Carol and Reggie‘s family and neighbors that was passed on to 
law enforcement who worked so hard to put a chain together, a chain 
that began when Rhonda [Carol Sumner‘s daughter] spoke to the 
Sheriff‘s Office, a chain that continued through fingerprints, through 
checks, through direct evidence, through timelines, a chain that had a 
link of a key, the key to the crime who left his mark on that mail.[4] 
 
Ladies and gentlemen, it was greed that brought you here today.  
When you are done I ask you to walk out not into the darkness of 
greed, into the terror of the night drive in the back of a trunk but into 
the light of justice.  In the last link in this chain the justice will be 
when you find that man not just guilty but fully accountable for every 
action that he committed when he abducted, robbed and buried Reggie 
and Carol alive.  Thank you. 
Wade immediately moved for mistrial, arguing that the underlined language above 
constituted a ―golden rule‖ violation.  The trial court denied the motion, and Wade 
did not request a curative instruction. 
 
―A motion for mistrial should be granted only when the error is deemed so 
prejudicial that it vitiates the entire trial, depriving the defendant of a fair 
proceeding.‖  Floyd v. State, 913 So. 2d 564, 576 (Fla. 2005).  We review the trial 
court‘s ruling on a mistrial motion for abuse of discretion.  Id.  
 
As we explained previously, an impermissible ―golden rule‖ argument 
invites jurors to put themselves in the victim‘s position and then imagine the 
victim‘s suffering.  See Bailey, 998 So. 2d at 555; Merck v. State, 975 So. 2d 1054, 
                                          
 
 
4.  Here, the prosecutor refers to the discovery of Wade‘s fingerprint on the 
Sumners‘ mail recovered from the Mazda. 
 
- 24 - 
1062 (Fla. 2007).  We conclude that the prosecutor‘s argument here does not 
violate the prohibition on such arguments.  Accordingly, we hold that the comment 
does not constitute reversible error and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying the motion for mistrial.  
In holding that the argument did not constitute a ―golden rule‖ argument, we 
do not suggest that this argument was proper.  We recognize that the prosecutor‘s 
statement might be subject to challenge as an improper ―blatant appeal to jurors‘ 
emotions,‖ Ruiz v. State, 743 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1999), in that it suggested that an 
acquittal would constitute walking ―into the darkness of greed‖ rather than ―into 
the light of justice.‖ 
D.  Motion to Preclude the Death Penalty 
 
After the jury in this case recommended sentences of death in both murders 
by a vote of eleven to one, Wade filed a motion to preclude the imposition of the 
death sentences.  In his motion and accompanying memorandum, he argued that 
Florida‘s death penalty scheme is unconstitutional because it fails to preclude 
problems of arbitrariness in capital sentencing and thus does not comply with 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).  The defendant‘s argument was based on 
the Capital Jury Project (CJP) study, a research initiative that attempted to analyze 
jurors‘ understanding of their role and the exercise of their discretion in capital 
sentencing cases through post-sentencing juror interviews.  See Capital Jury 
 
- 25 - 
Project, http://albany.edu/scj/CJPhome.htm.  Wade argued that the fourteen-state 
study demonstrated, for example, that a large percentage of jurors make premature 
determinations regarding sentencing during the guilt phase and believe that they 
are required to recommend death under certain circumstances.  The trial court 
orally denied an evidentiary hearing at which Wade proposed to present testimony 
regarding the CJP study and denied the motion to preclude imposition of a death 
sentence. 
 
On appeal, Wade uses the CJP study to challenge the constitutionality of the 
jury selection process in his case.  Comparing the results of the CJP study with 
answers to voir dire questioning in his own case, Wade concludes that the jury 
selection process resulted in the seating of a panel of ―pro death-biased jurors‖ 
after the State was permitted to use peremptory and cause challenges to strike 
jurors who showed a lack of support for the death penalty.  Further, Wade claims 
he was wrongly forced to use two peremptory challenges to strike jurors who 
strongly supported the death penalty.  Finally, Wade argues that the trial court 
erred in denying his motion to preclude imposition of a death sentence without 
hearing legal testimony that Florida‘s use of the same jury in the guilt and penalty 
phases of trial violates Furman.  As explained below, we hold that Wade is entitled 
to no relief. 
 
- 26 - 
 
First, we have previously rejected the contention that potential jurors should 
not be subject to removal for cause or by peremptory challenge for expressing 
hesitancy concerning the recommendation of a death sentence.  In San Martin v. 
State, 705 So. 2d 1337, 1343 (Fla. 1997), we explained as follows: 
[W]e find no merit to this claim as ―the Constitution does not prohibit 
the States from ‗death qualifying‘ juries in capital cases.‖  Lockhart v. 
McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173, 106 S. Ct. 1758, 1764, 90 L. Ed.2d 137 
(1986).  Indeed, any group ―defined solely in terms of shared attitudes 
that render members of the group unable to serve as jurors in a 
particular case [ ] may be excluded from jury service without 
contravening any of the basic objectives of the fair-cross-section 
requirement.‖  Id. at 176-77, 106 S. Ct. at 1766-67.  As the Supreme 
Court further noted in Lockhart, not all individuals who oppose the 
death penalty are subject to removal for cause in capital cases; ―only 
those who cannot and will not conscientiously obey the law with 
respect to one of the issues in a capital case.‖  Id. at 176, 106 S. Ct. at 
1766.  Moreover, the State may properly exercise its peremptory 
challenges to strike prospective jurors who are opposed to the death 
penalty, but not subject to challenge for cause.  Under Florida law, a 
party‘s use of peremptory challenges is limited only by the rule that 
the challenges may not be used to exclude members of a ―distinctive 
group.‖  See State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984) (holding that 
race-based peremptory challenges violate the defendant‘s right to an 
impartial jury); State v. Alen, 616 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1993) (same as to 
ethnicity); Abshire v. State, 642 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1994) (same as to 
gender).  Both parties have the right to peremptorily strike ―persons 
thought to be inclined against their interests.‖  Holland v. Illinois, 493 
U.S. 474, 480, 110 S. Ct. 803, 807, 107 L. Ed.2d 905 (1990).  Thus, 
we find no constitutional infirmity in Florida‘s jury selection process 
in general. 
See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 180 (1986) (stating that jurors may be 
struck for cause when their opposition to the death penalty would preclude them 
from impartially following the law). 
 
- 27 - 
 
In a related argument, Wade contends that he was wrongly forced to use 
peremptory challenges to remove two prospective jurors (Ms. Cue and Mr. 
Meyers) who expressed strong support for the death penalty.  This claim, however, 
is not preserved for review.  In order to demonstrate that the use of a peremptory 
challenge to cure the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause was reversible error, 
a defendant must exhaust all remaining peremptory challenges and show that an 
objectionable juror served as a juror.  Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 96-97 (Fla. 
2004).  That is, Wade must prove prejudice by showing that a person actually sat 
on the jury whom Wade challenged for cause, attempted to strike peremptorily, or 
otherwise challenged after his peremptory challenges had been exhausted.  Id. at 
97 (citing Trotter v. State, 576 So. 2d 691, 693 (Fla. 1990)).  First, Wade never 
sought Ms. Cue‘s dismissal for cause, and Wade‘s cause challenge to Mr. Meyers 
was based on Meyers‘ availability.  Thus, Wade did not seek to disqualify either 
juror based on voir dire statements regarding the death penalty.  Second, although 
defense counsel struck these two prospective jurors with peremptories and timely 
requested additional peremptories after exhausting his allotted challenges, counsel 
failed to identify any juror he would have stricken if the court had granted his 
request.  Accordingly, Wade has neither preserved nor demonstrated reversible 
error. 
 
- 28 - 
 
Further, Wade states that the CJP study shows that many jurors prematurely 
make a sentencing decision during the guilt phase of trial.  As a result, he argues 
that the Federal Constitution requires that Florida use two separate juries in death 
penalty cases—one to adjudicate guilt and one to recommend a sentence.  
Although Wade argued in his trial court motion that jurors‘ premature 
determination that death is the appropriate penalty is unconstitutional, he did not 
argue—as he does in this appeal—that this alleged Furman violation can be 
remedied through the use of separate guilt- and penalty-phase juries.  Further, 
although on appeal he requests that a new penalty phase be held, he did not request 
such relief below.  Accordingly, this claim is not preserved for review.  See 
Doorbal v. State, 983 So. 2d 464, 492 (Fla. 2008) (―For an issue to be preserved for 
appeal, it must be presented to the lower court, and the specific legal argument or 
ground to be argued on appeal must be part of that presentation.‖). 
 
On its merits, the argument collides with United States Supreme Court 
precedent.  Florida adopted a single-jury bifurcated trial scheme in 1972.   See ch. 
72-72, § 1, Laws of Fla.  Since then, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 
(1976), the United States Supreme Court has approved bifurcated guilt and penalty 
proceedings before a single jury in death penalty cases.  In Gregg, the Court stated 
that the concerns it expressed in Furman ―are best met by a system that provides 
for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the 
 
- 29 - 
information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to 
guide its use of the information.‖  Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (plurality opinion).  
Subsequently, the Supreme Court concluded that the States‘ interests in using a 
unitary jury were sufficient to serve as a proper, neutral justification for excluding 
jurors from the guilt phase who could not impartially serve during the penalty 
phase.  Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 182.  Moreover, the Court found that the use of two 
different juries would be highly inefficient: 
Finally, it seems obvious to us that in most, if not all, capital cases 
much of the evidence adduced at the guilt phase of the trial will also 
have a bearing on the penalty phase; if two different juries were to be 
required, such testimony would have to be presented twice, once to 
each jury.  As the Arkansas Supreme Court has noted, ―[s]uch 
repetitive trials could not be consistently fair to the State and perhaps 
not even to the accused.‖ 
Id. at 181 (quoting Rector v. State, 659 S.W.2d 168, 173 (Ark. 1983)). 
E.  Motion to Strike Notice of Death Penalty 
 
Wade next argues that the trial court erred in summarily denying his motion 
to strike the State‘s notice of intent to seek the death penalty and to preclude 
imposition of the death penalty in his case.  Wade contends, as he did below, that 
because no statewide uniform protocol governs the decision of a state attorney to 
seek the death penalty in a first-degree murder case, Florida‘s capital sentencing 
scheme is unconstitutional under Furman.  This argument is meritless. 
 
- 30 - 
 
In State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1986), we addressed a question 
regarding the scope of prosecutorial discretion in seeking the death penalty when a 
circuit court made a pretrial determination that the State lacked sufficient evidence 
to seek the death penalty in a first-degree murder case.  The State sought a writ of 
prohibition, arguing that the trial court exceeded its authority.  We agreed and held 
that under article II, section 3 of Florida‘s constitution, ―the decision to charge and 
prosecute is an executive responsibility, and the state attorney has complete 
discretion in deciding whether and how to prosecute.‖  Bloom, 497 So. 2d at 3 
(emphasis added).  We have emphasized that ―the judiciary has authority to curb 
pretrial prosecutorial discretion ‗only in those instances where impermissible 
motives may be attributed to the prosecution, such as bad faith, race, religion, or a 
desire to prevent the exercise of the defendant‘s constitutional rights.‘‖  State v. 
Donner, 500 So. 2d 532, 533 (Fla. 1987) (quoting Bloom, 497 So. 2d at 3); see also 
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (explaining that to state a claim 
of selective prosecution for a crime, a petitioner must show that the enforcement 
system had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory 
purpose). 
Further, the Supreme Court has long recognized that such wide prosecutorial 
discretion in determining whether to pursue the death penalty in a specific case 
does not run afoul of Furman.  In Gregg, the petitioner argued that Georgia‘s death 
 
- 31 - 
penalty scheme was unconstitutional because of the ―opportunities for 
discretionary action‖ inherent in the process, which included the prosecutor‘s 
―unfettered authority to select those persons whom he wishes to prosecute for a 
capital offense and to plea bargain with them.‖  428 U.S. at 199.  The Supreme 
Court explained that such discretionary aspects of capital sentencing were not 
inconsistent with Furman: 
The existence of these discretionary stages is not determinative 
of the issues before us.  At each of these stages an actor in the 
criminal justice system makes a decision which may remove a 
defendant from consideration as a candidate for the death penalty.  
Furman, in contrast, dealt with the decision to impose the death 
sentence on a specific individual who had been convicted of a capital 
offense.  Nothing in any of our cases suggests that the decision to 
afford an individual defendant mercy violates the Constitution.  
Furman held only that, in order to minimize the risk that the death 
penalty would be imposed on a capriciously selected group of 
offenders, the decision to impose it had to be guided by standards so 
that the sentencing authority would focus on the particularized 
circumstances of the crime and the defendant.  
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199 (emphasis added).  Relying on Gregg, the court in Proffitt 
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 254 (1976), rejected a petitioner‘s contention that 
Florida‘s death penalty scheme was unconstitutional in part because the prosecutor 
has wide discretion to decide whether to charge a capital offense and whether to 
accept or reject a plea to a lesser offense.  In McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 
296 (1987), the Supreme Court rejected a claim of racial bias in the imposition of 
death sentences and again emphasized that ―discretion is essential to the criminal 
 
- 32 - 
justice process‖ and insisted it would ―demand exceptionally clear proof‖ before 
finding an abuse of that discretion.   Id. at 297. 
Wade‘s reliance on Freeman v. Attorney General, 536 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th 
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 921 (2009), to support his contention is 
misplaced.  The defendant in Freeman did not challenge the state attorney‘s 
protocol for determining whether to pursue a death sentence.  What Freeman 
argued was that the prosecutor sought a death sentence in his case because of the 
defendant‘s race—an impermissible motive.  In this case, Wade admits that he 
neither argues for nor offers evidence of the presence of impermissible motives in 
the prosecutor‘s decision to pursue the death penalty in this case. 
Accordingly, we reject Wade‘s argument on this point. 
F.  Dismissing a Juror for Cause 
Wade argues that the trial court committed reversible error in excusing a 
juror for cause because of her views regarding the death penalty.  We have 
previously explained that 
[a] potential juror may be excused ―for cause‖ if the juror has a state 
of mind regarding the case ―that will prevent the juror from acting 
with impartiality.‖  § 913.03(10), Fla. Stat. (2006).  In a capital case, 
this standard is met if a juror‘s views on the death penalty ―prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of his or her duties as a juror in 
accordance with the juror‘s instructions or oath.‖  Fernandez [v. 
State], 730 So. 2d [277, 281 (Fla. 1999)].  ―A juror must be excused 
for cause if any reasonable doubt exists as to whether the juror 
possesses an impartial state of mind.‖  Ault v. State, 866 So. 2d 674, 
683 (Fla. 2003). 
 
- 33 - 
Johnson v. State, 969 So. 2d 938, 946 (Fla. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2056 
(2008).  Thus, in review of claims that the trial court erred in dismissing a juror for 
cause, we consider all of the juror‘s voir dire responses regarding the death 
penalty, Johnson, 969 So. 2d at 946, and defer to the trial judge‘s determination of 
a juror‘s qualifications ―because trial courts have a unique vantage point in their 
observation of jurors‘ voir dire responses.‖  Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930, 939 
(Fla. 2003).  In light of the trial court‘s great discretion in determining juror 
competency, we will not overturn the trial court‘s decision on a cause challenge 
absent manifest error. 
 
During voir dire in this case, the prosecutor asked the jurors about their 
views on the death penalty.  Ms. Butler responded that her views were ―mixed.‖  
Asked if her death penalty views would impair her ability to make a decision 
regarding the defendant‘s guilt or innocence, she responded: ―No.  You‘re going to 
have to really show me the facts.  I have to live with it.‖  Asked if she meant that 
because the death penalty was involved she would require extra facts from the 
State, she answered: ―I‘ve got to really know.  I got to really feel that or know for 
sure that.‖  The prosecutor then turned to the penalty phase, and the following 
exchanges occurred: 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  And then you‘re going to be asked does 
the—do the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, and if 
you believe they do beyond a reasonable doubt my question is: Can 
 
- 34 - 
you vote for the death penalty or is your personal feelings going to be 
weighing on you and cause you some concern? 
 
[MS. BUTLER]:  (Nods head affirmatively.) 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Yes? 
 
[MS. BUTLER]:  Yeah. 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Yes, you can or yes it‘s going to be 
weighing on you and cause you some concerns? 
 
[MS. BUTLER]:  Well, if I got—if the facts is there then, yes, I 
can go for the death penalty depending on it.  
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Let me ask you a question I‘m going to ask 
everyone else later.  The burden of proof the state has to prove is 
proving a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Court will 
define that for you. 
 
That burden of proof is the same in any criminal case whether 
it‘s a shoplifting case, a burglary case or a death penalty case. 
 
Would you hold the state to a higher burden of proof because 
the death penalty is a possible penalty? 
 
[MS. BUTLER]:  Possibly, yeah. 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Possibly? 
 
[MS. BUTLER]:  Yeah. 
Subsequently, defense counsel questioned Ms. Butler as follows: 
 
[COUNSEL]:  Okay.  And, Ms. Butler, in this particular case, 
ma‘am, do I take it then that you‘d just rather not sit—you don‘t feel 
that you could be a fair juror in this case just because— 
 
[MS. BUTLER]:  No. 
 
[COUNSEL]:  I‘m sorry, ma‘am? 
 
[MS. BUTLER]:  I just don‘t feel comfortable in this case. 
Defense counsel then asked the panel members to select a number from one 
to five to describe their attitude toward the death penalty, with one representing 
―somewhat in favor‖ and five indicating ―strongly in favor.‖  In defense counsel‘s 
questioning of Ms. Butler, the following exchange occurred: 
[COUNSEL]:  I had down here something about the burden of proof.  
Mr. Plotkin [prosecutor] asked you and I think you indicated you could sit in 
 
- 35 - 
a guilt phase of a trial, right?  Find someone guilty or not guilty, you could 
do that, right? 
[MS. BUTLER]:  I could do that, yes. 
 
[COUNSEL]:  I think his questions dealt with would you 
require the state to have a higher burden of proof in a death case.  I 
think that‘s where we had talked—he talked to you a little bit about 
that.  You remember that? 
 
[MS. BUTLER]:  Yes. 
 
[COUNSEL]:  Now let me ask you this:  The law is—burden of 
proof is beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt in death 
cases and non-death cases.  In a DUI case and in a—I don‘t know, a 
robbery case same—it‘s the same burden of proof, okay? 
 
Now knowing that the state has the burden of proof, okay—we 
don‘t have a burden, but they have a burden of proof not only in the 
guilt phase but also in the penalty phase.  They have to prove these 
aggravators beyond and to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt.  
Okay.  That‘s the standard burden in every case.  You wouldn‘t 
require them to have a higher burden than that, would you? 
 
[MS. BUTLER]:  If they‘ve got proof—if they—if they have 
sole proof that whatever it was that occurred then, yes, I could—I 
could see myself voting for the death penalty. 
 
[COUNSEL]:  Okay.  So if —if in the— in the penalty phase— 
 
[MS. BUTLER]:  In the penalty phase. 
 
[COUNSEL]:  —if they presented aggravation, factors that 
beyond a reasonable doubt outweighed the mitigators, then you could 
apply the law and follow the law and vote death, is that right? 
 
[MS. BUTLER]:  Yeah. 
 
[COUNSEL]:  Okay.  All right.  Now that I said that on my 
scale, one to five, where would you be? 
 
[MS. BUTLER]:  I‘m still a two. 
 
At the conclusion of voir dire and out of the presence of the prospective 
jurors, the trial judge sua sponte dismissed Ms. Butler and another person for 
cause.5  The judge explained that he did not see how Ms. Butler could qualify to 
                                          
 
 
5.  The prosecutor then also moved for the two jurors‘ dismissal ―for the 
record.‖ 
 
- 36 - 
serve based on her views regarding the death penalty and noted that she ―waffled 
on two or three things.‖  The court rejected defense counsel‘s objection and 
contention that he had rehabilitated her.  At the conclusion of jury selection, 
defense counsel entered a standing objection to Ms. Butler‘s dismissal. 
 
As evidenced by the foregoing transcript excerpts, Ms. Butler consistently 
expressed her discomfort in a death penalty case and made several statements 
suggesting that she would require the State to meet a higher standard, including 
requiring that the State produce ―sole proof.‖  We conclude that her equivocal 
statements regarding her ability to recommend a death sentence provide sufficient 
basis for the trial court‘s determination that she was disqualified as a juror.  See 
Johnson, 969 So. 2d at 948 (―Persistent equivocation or vacillation by a potential 
juror on whether he or she can set aside biases or misgivings concerning the death 
penalty in a capital penalty phase supplies the reasonable doubt as to the juror‘s 
impartiality which justifies dismissal.‖).  Accordingly, we hold that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in excusing her for cause.  
 
Wade also argues that the trial court should have excused two other potential 
jurors—Ms. Cue and Mr. Meyers—for cause because of their pro-death-penalty 
views.  First, as we explained previously, this argument is not preserved.  Wade 
did not challenge Ms. Cue for cause, and he challenged Mr. Meyers for cause 
based on his availability to serve.  Second, Wade used peremptories to strike these 
 
- 37 - 
potential jurors and did not preserve for review his claim that the trial court should 
have granted him additional peremptory challenges. 
G.  Applicability of Roper v. Simmons 
Citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), which held that it is 
unconstitutional to execute defendants who were under the age of eighteen at the 
time they committed their crimes, Wade argues that his death sentence is 
unconstitutional.  Admitting that he was eighteen when the Sumners were 
murdered, Wade contends that age cannot be the sole factor used to separate adults 
from juveniles for purposes of determining death eligibility.  He argues that Roper 
requires consideration of other factors—such as immaturity and the influence of 
others—that demonstrate he was actually a juvenile at the time of the crimes.  We 
have previously rejected such an alteration of Roper‘s bright-line rule.  See Hill v. 
State, 921 So. 2d 579, 584 (Fla. 2006) (―Roper only prohibits the execution of 
those defendants whose chronological age is below eighteen.‖).  Accordingly, we 
hold that Wade is entitled to no relief on this claim. 
H.  Sufficiency of the Evidence and Proportionality 
In the direct appeal of a death-sentenced defendant, this Court has a duty to 
review both the sufficiency of the evidence and the proportionality of the sentence, 
regardless of whether the appellant raises these issues.  See Fla. R. App. P. 9.142 
(a)(6).  
 
- 38 - 
1.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
In determining whether sufficient evidence supports the murder convictions, 
this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict.  
See Smith v. State, 7 So. 3d 473, 509 (Fla. 2009).  We conclude that a rational trier 
of fact could have found the existence of the elements of first-degree murder (both 
as premeditated and felony murder) beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Simpson v. 
State, 3 So. 3d 1135, 1147 (Fla.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 91 (2009).  In summary, 
the evidence showed that Wade—with Jackson and Cole—planned to commit a 
robbery, and then Wade invited Nixon to join them in their criminal scheme.  
Together, the group planned the details of the robbery and murders, and Wade 
participated in obtaining the materials needed to implement the plan.  On July 8, 
2005, first Wade and Nixon entered the Sumners‘ home, and then Wade and 
Jackson obtained their financial account information.  Subsequently, Wade and 
Nixon put the Sumners in the trunk of their own car and drove them to the 
gravesite in Georgia.  There, Wade and Jackson placed the couple in the hole and 
buried them alive after obtaining the PINs to the couple‘s financial accounts.  The 
group later obtained money from the Sumners‘ bank account, and Wade and Cole 
returned to the Sumners‘ home and stole their computer.  Within days, authorities 
arrested Wade with Cole and Jackson in a South Carolina hotel where they found 
 
- 39 - 
evidence linking all three to the crimes, including a check for $8,000 on the 
Sumners‘ account made out to Wade and dated July 8, 2005. 
2.  Proportionality 
We have stated that the death penalty is reserved for the most aggravated 
and least mitigated of first-degree murders.  Lebron v. State, 982 So. 2d 649, 668 
(Fla. 2008).  Thus, in conducting a proportionality review, we consider the totality 
of the circumstances in the capital case and compare the case with other similar 
capital cases to determine whether the case falls in this category and the death 
sentence is thus warranted.  Our review is qualitative rather than quantitative in 
nature. 
 
As we explained previously, in imposing two death sentences in this case, 
the trial court found seven aggravating factors as to each murder, including HAC 
and CCP, which are two of the weightiest of the aggravators.  Further, the court 
found three statutory mitigators.  Although the court ascribed great weight to the 
age mitigator because Wade was only eighteen at the time of the murders, the court 
did not ascribe significant weight to the other two statutory mitigators.  The court 
found that both substantial domination and the impaired capacity to conform to the 
requirements of law mitigators had little evidence to support them.  Further, the 
trial court found many of the twenty nonstatutory mitigating factors were 
duplicative. 
 
- 40 - 
 
We hold that the death sentences in this case are proportional to other capital 
cases which involved multiple murders and similar aggravation and mitigation.  In 
Frances v. State, 970 So. 2d 806, 810 (Fla. 2007), cert. denied 128 S. Ct. 2441 
(2008), for example, the defendant and his brother gained admission to the home of 
family friends, murdered the two people there, and then stole items from the home 
and took the family‘s car.  The trial court sentenced Frances to death for both 
murders, finding two statutory aggravators as to both murders—prior capital felony 
conviction and committed in the course of a robbery—and the additional 
aggravator of HAC as to one of the murders.  Id. at 812.  In mitigation, the court 
found the statutory mitigator of Frances‘s age and other nonstatutory mitigation, to 
some of which the trial court ascribed serious weight.  Id.; see also Hunter v. State, 
8 So. 3d 1052, 1057 (Fla. 2008) (affirming multiple death sentences where 
defendant and codefendants invaded home and murdered its occupants with 
baseball bats, and where the court found five statutory aggravators—prior violent 
felony conviction, HAC, CCP, committed in the course of a burglary, and 
committed to avoid arrest—and three statutory mitigators, including defendant‘s 
age), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2005 (2009); Davis v. State, 2 So. 3d 952, 965 (Fla. 
2008) (affirming death sentences where defendant entered home of friends and 
killed its two occupants, and the court found four aggravating factors—HAC, CCP, 
prior capital felony based on the contemporaneous murder, and committed in the 
 
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course of a burglary—and three statutory mitigators, including the defendant‘s 
age), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2872 (2009). 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
Having reviewed Wade‘s claims and after independently reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence and the proportionality of Wade‘s death sentences, we 
affirm the judgment and sentences. 
 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J, and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, and 
PERRY, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., specially concurs with an opinion, in which QUINCE, C.J., 
LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
PARIENTE, J., specially concurring. 
 
I concur in the affirmance of the convictions.  I write only to express my 
concern with two of the prosecutor‘s closing arguments.   
The first argument I consider objectionable is the prosecutor‘s argument that 
a recommendation of life imprisonment would be to ―take the easy way out.‖   
This argument implies that any sentence less than death is impermissible and 
would be an abdication of the jury‘s responsibility.  While the argument in this 
case is not as egregious as the one we condemned in Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 
411, 421 (Fla. 1998), the argument is still one prosecutors should avoid.  
 
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A jury‘s recommendation of life is not the ―easy way out.‖  To the contrary, 
as we have now made absolutely clear by our newly adopted Standard Jury 
Instructions, a jury is never obligated or required to recommend death under the 
law in this state.  See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.11 (Penalty Proceedings—
Capital Cases); see also In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases—
Report No. 2005-2, 22 So. 3d 17, 22 (Fla. 2009) (adopting the ―amendment stating 
that the jury is ‗neither compelled nor required to recommend death‘ ‖). 
 
As to the second objectionable argument, the prosecutor made an emotional 
and inflammatory appeal to the jurors by stating, ―When you are done I ask you to 
walk out not into the darkness of greed, into the terror of the night in the back of 
the trunk but into the light of justice.‖  Because the victims in this case were both 
bound and placed into a trunk, this argument impermissibly invited the jury to 
place themselves in the victims‘ place—in the trunk.  Regardless of whether or not 
the argument is considered an impermissible ―golden rule‖ argument, as the 
majority points out, it is improper because it is a ―blatant appeal to the jurors‘ 
emotions.‖   
This type of argument simply should have no place in a prosecutor‘s closing 
arguments—especially in a capital case.  Death penalty cases, by the very nature of 
the crimes involved, have the potential to arouse emotions and passions.  As 
officers of the court, prosecutors must ensure, to the extent possible, a 
 
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dispassionate and objective jury deliberation process.  Prosecutors have an 
obligation not to inject ―elements of emotion and fear into the jury‘s deliberations.‖  
Urbin, 714 So. 2d at 419 (quoting King v. State, 623 So. 2d 486, 488 (Fla. 1993)).  
As has been repeatedly stated: 
Although prosecutors have an awesome responsibility and the facts of 
the crime often inspire righteous indignation, they are also officers of 
the court who have duties to both ―refrain from improper methods 
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction‖ and ―to use every 
legitimate means to bring about a just one.‖   
Salazar v. State, 991 So. 2d 364, 383 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Gore v. State, 719 So. 2d  
 
1197, 1202 (Fla. 1998)), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1347 (2009). 
 
While no reversible error occurred in this case, I once again urge prosecutors 
to remember to exercise caution in closing argument and to not cross the line from 
zealous advocacy to impermissible emotional and inflammatory arguments.   
QUINCE, C.J., and LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,  
Michael R. Weatherby, Judge – Case No. 16-2005-CF-010263-BX 
 
Frank J. Tassone, Jr. and Rick Sichta of Tassone and Sichta, LLC, Jacksonville, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Meredith Charbula, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee