Case Title: Estate of Hopgood v. Boyd

Citation: 2013 WI 1

Docket Number: 2011AP000914

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2013-01-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
2013 WI 1 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP914 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Estate of Danny L. Hopgood by Angela M. Turner, 
Special Administrator, Carolyn Turner, a minor, 
by her Guardian ad Litem, Ronald C. Curtis, Ula 
Hopgood, a minor, by her Guardian ad Litem, 
Michael D. Egelhoff, Perry Macon, Aaron  
Stroud, John Odom, Jr. and Michael Sensy, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Jimmy D. Boyd, 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
Kenosha Beef International, Ltd. Employee Health 
Plan and Wisconsin Department of Health 
Services, 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
(No Cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 3, 2013 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 6, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel R. Moeser 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Daniel A. Rottier, Timothy S. Trecek, Rhonda L. 
Lanford, and Habush, Habush & Rottier, S.C., Milwaukee, and 
Ronald Curtis and Curtis Law Office, Milwaukee, and Michael D. 
Egelhoff and Egelhoff Law Offices, Wauwatosa, and oral argument 
by Daniel A. Rottier. 
For the defendant-respondent, the cause was argued by John 
J. Glinski, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
2013 WI 1
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP914 
(L.C. No. 
2010CV1484) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Estate of Danny L. Hopgood by Angela M. Turner, 
Special Administrator, Carolyn Turner, a minor, 
by her Guardian ad Litem, Ronald C. Curtis, Ula 
Hopgood, a minor, by her Guardian ad Litem, 
Michael D. Egelhoff, Perry Macon, Aaron Stroud, 
John Odom, Jr. and Michael Sensy, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Jimmy D. Boyd, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Kenosha Beef International, Ltd. Employee 
Health Plan and Wisconsin Department of Health 
Services, 
 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 3, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioners, a group 
consisting of the Estate of Danny L. Hopgood and individuals who 
No. 
2011AP914   
 
2 
 
suffered injuries arising from an automobile accident,1 seek 
review of an order of the court of appeals summarily affirming 
the circuit court, which entered summary judgment in favor of 
respondent Jimmy D. Boyd.2  Because Boyd was an agent of the 
State of Wisconsin, the petitioners served notices of claims 
upon the attorney general.  Boyd moved for dismissal on the 
ground that the notices were not properly "sworn to" as Wis. 
Stat. § 893.82(5) (2009-10) requires.3  The circuit court agreed 
with Boyd and granted summary judgment. 
¶2 
The petitioners argue that their notices were properly 
"sworn to" under Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5) because each notice of 
claim in this case complies with Kellner v. Christian, 197 Wis. 
2d 183, 539 N.W.2d 685 (1995).  Additionally, the petitioners 
argue that Newkirk v. Dept. of Transp., 228 Wis. 2d 830, 598 
N.W.2d 610 (Ct. App. 1999), which subsequently interpreted 
Kellner, unreasonably extended its holding.   
¶3 
We conclude that Kellner sets forth two requirements 
in order for a notice of claim to be properly "sworn to" under 
                                                 
1 The petitioners in this matter are as follows: the Estate 
of 
Danny 
L. 
Hopgood, by Angela M. Turner; the special 
administrator, Carolyn Turner, by her guardian ad litem Ronald 
C. Curtis; Ula Hopgood, by her guardian ad litem Michael D. 
Egelhoff; Perry Macon; Aaron Stroud; John Odom, Jr.; and Michael 
Sensy.  This opinion will refer to them collectively as "the 
petitioners." 
2 Estate of Hopgood v. Boyd, No. 2011AP0914, unpublished 
slip op. (Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2012), summarily affirming the 
circuit court for Dane County, Daniel R. Moeser, J., presiding. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes refer 
to the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No. 
2011AP914   
 
3 
 
Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5).  First, a formal oath or affirmation 
must be taken by a claimant.  Kellner, 197 Wis. 2d at 198.  
Second, the notice of claim must contain a statement showing 
that the oath or affirmation occurred.  Id.  To the extent that 
Newkirk appears to expand those requirements, it misapplied 
Kellner and we withdraw that language in Newkirk. 
¶4 
We further conclude that the notices in this case meet 
the two Kellner requirements and are therefore properly "sworn 
to" under Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5).  Nevertheless, in the future, 
to promote certainty and to avoid unnecessary litigation, we 
urge claimants to file notices of claims using a jurat in which 
the notary sets forth that the notice was "sworn to" or affirmed 
before the notary.4  Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals 
and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
I 
¶5 
This case arises out of an automobile accident 
involving a vehicle owned by the State of Wisconsin and driven 
by Boyd.  The state-owned vehicle was traveling on Highway 142 
in the Township of Paris, Kenosha County, Wisconsin.  Boyd lost 
control of the vehicle and it went off the road, rolling over 
several times.  Danny L. Hopgood died in the accident and Perry 
                                                 
4 "'Jurat' is the name given to the notary's written 
certificate, which should appear after the signature of a person 
who has given an oath, or has made a sworn statement."  
Wisconsin 
Dep't 
of 
Financial 
Institutions, 
Notary 
Public 
Information 
10 
(2012), 
available 
at 
http://www.wdfi.org/Notary_Public_and_Trademarks/pdf/notary_info
_brochure.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2012). 
No. 
2011AP914   
 
4 
 
Macon, Aaron Stroud, John Odom, Jr., and Michael Sensy each 
sustained injuries.  The petitioners collectively allege that 
Boyd was negligent and that his negligence caused the injuries.   
¶6 
The complaint alleges that Boyd was acting as an agent 
or representative of the State of Wisconsin.  Thus, the 
petitioners were each required to file a notice of claim upon 
the attorney general under Wis. Stat. § 893.82(3).5   
¶7 
The notices in this case were prepared by attorneys 
from the law firm of Habush Habush & Rottier, S.C.  They were 
executed before two different notaries public, Cynthia A. Wagner 
and Karla Christel.  Both were paralegals at the law firm.  As 
part of the summary judgment proceedings before the circuit 
court, Wagner and Christel submitted affidavits describing the 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.82(3) provides the following: 
(3) Except as provided in sub. (5m), no civil action 
or civil proceeding may be brought against any state 
officer, employee or agent for or on account of any 
act growing out of or committed in the course of the 
discharge of the officer's, employee's or agent's 
duties, . . . unless within 120 days of the event 
causing the injury, damage or death giving rise to the 
civil action or civil proceeding, the claimant in the 
action or proceeding serves upon the attorney general 
written notice of a claim stating the time, date, 
location and the circumstances of the event giving 
rise to the claim for the injury, damage or death and 
the names of persons involved, including the name of 
the state officer, employee or agent involved. Except 
as provided under sub. (3m), a specific denial by the 
attorney general is not a condition precedent to 
bringing the civil action or civil proceeding. 
No. 
2011AP914   
 
5 
 
oaths they administered to each petitioner when the notices were 
executed.6   
¶8 
The first oath was administered to Perry Macon by 
Wagner.  Macon read the notice of claim and Wagner also read it 
to him.  She asked him if he understood what he had read, and he 
answered "yes."  Macon then raised his right hand and Wagner 
asked him if he swore that the information contained in the 
notice was the truth and nothing but the truth so help him God 
based on the knowledge and information he had at the time of 
signing the notice.  Macon said "yes."  Wagner asked if Macon 
understood that he was swearing under "penalty of perjury" and 
if he understood what that meant.  Macon again answered "yes."  
Macon signed the notice in Wagner's presence and Wagner also 
signed it. 
¶9 
Wagner later administered an oath to Angela M. Turner.  
Turner signed a notice of claim on behalf of the Estate of Danny 
L. Hopgood, Carolyn Turner, and Ula Hopgood.  Attorney Ronald C. 
Curtis and Attorney Michael D. Egelhoff, the guardians ad litem 
for Carolyn Turner and Ula Hopgood, were also present.  Wagner 
asked Turner to raise her right hand and asked if she swore that 
the information contained in the notice was the truth and 
nothing but the truth so help her God based on the knowledge and 
information she had at the time of signing the notice.  Turner 
answered "yes" in response.  Wagner further asked Turner if she 
                                                 
6 The affidavits submitted by Wagner and Christel are 
uncontroverted and neither party disputes their characterization 
of the oaths that were administered. 
No. 
2011AP914   
 
6 
 
understood that she was signing the notice "under penalty of 
perjury" and if Turner understood what that meant, and Turner 
indicated that she understood.  Turner then signed the notice of 
claim in Wagner's presence, and Wagner signed the notice as 
well. 
¶10 The 
remainder 
of 
the 
oaths 
in 
this 
case 
were 
administered by Christel.  Christel administered three separate 
oaths to Attorney Ricardo Perez, who represented Aaron Stroud, 
John Odom, Jr., and Michael Sensy.7  For each notice of claim, 
Christel asked Attorney Perez if he understood what he had read.  
He replied "yes."  He then raised his right hand and Christel 
asked him if the information contained in each notice was the 
truth and nothing but the truth so help him God based on the 
knowledge and information that he had at the time of signing the 
notice.  Attorney Perez replied "yes."  Christel then asked 
Attorney Perez if he understood that he was swearing "under 
penalty of perjury" and if he understood what that meant, and 
Attorney Perez indicated that he understood.  Attorney Perez 
signed each notice of claim before Christel, and she also signed 
each of them.  
¶11 All of the notices that are the subject of this appeal 
contain substantially identical written statements regarding the 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.82(1)(b) defines a "claimant" to 
mean "the person or entity sustaining the damage or injury or 
his or her agent, attorney or personal representative."  The 
parties do not dispute that Attorney Perez could properly swear 
to the notices on his clients' behalf. 
No. 
2011AP914   
 
7 
 
oaths that were taken before Wagner and Christel.  Specifically, 
the notices state: 
The Notary Public who signed below has given me an 
oral oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth so help me God; and in giving 
this Notice to the Office of the Attorney General I 
did so bearing in mind the penalties of false 
swearing. 
I hereby certify that all statements contained herein 
are true, and that the injuries and damage actually 
occurred; that I have read the above and foregoing 
Notice of Claim, and that the same is true to my own 
knowledge, except as to those matters therein stated 
upon information and belief, and as to those matters, 
I believe the same to be true. 
The notary blocks on the notices that Wagner and Christel signed 
are 
also 
substantially 
identical. 
 
They 
each 
state 
the 
following: 
Personally appeared before me this ___ day of [month], 
2009, the above named [claimant], to me known to be 
the claimant herein, who signed the foregoing in my 
presence. 
¶12 After the notices were signed, the petitioners served 
them upon the attorney general and proceeded to commence an 
action against Boyd.8  After the petitioners commenced this 
action, Boyd moved for dismissal.  In his motion, Boyd argued 
that the petitioners each failed to strictly comply with the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 893.82.  Boyd contended that the 
petitioners had not properly "sworn to" the notices as they were 
                                                 
8 The parties do not dispute that the attorney general was 
served using an appropriate method and that the petitioners' 
service on the attorney general was timely. 
No. 
2011AP914   
 
8 
 
required to do by Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5).9  Because the notices 
did 
not 
contain a statement by the notaries that they 
administered the oaths and instead included a statement by the 
claimants to the same effect, Boyd argued that the notices were 
defective.   
 
¶13 In opposition to Boyd's motion, the petitioners argued 
that the notices were properly "sworn to" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.82(5) and Kellner.  Although the notary blocks did not 
contain statements by the notaries that the notices were "sworn 
to" before them, the petitioners argued that the text of the 
notices clearly stated that the oaths had in fact been 
administered by the notaries.  Because the law does not require 
in a notice of claim that a notary state a claim has been "sworn 
to," the petitioners argued that the notices strictly complied 
with Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5).   
 
¶14 Treating Boyd's motion to dismiss as a motion for 
summary 
judgment, 
the 
circuit 
court 
determined 
that 
the 
petitioners 
did 
not 
strictly 
comply 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.82(5) provides the following: 
(5) The notice under sub. (3) shall be sworn to by the 
claimant and shall be served upon the attorney general 
at his or her office in the capitol by certified mail. 
Notice shall be considered to be given upon mailing 
for the purpose of computing the time of giving 
notice. 
No. 
2011AP914   
 
9 
 
§ 893.82(5).10  The circuit court, interpreting the court of 
appeals' analysis of Kellner in Newkirk, concluded that a notice 
of claim must contain a statement by the authorized person 
giving the oath that the oath was taken.  Because none of the 
notices contained such a statement, the circuit court determined 
that the notices were defective.  Accordingly, the circuit court 
granted summary judgment to Boyd.   
 
¶15 The petitioners moved the circuit court to reconsider 
its decision.  They contended that although they had provided 
supplemental affidavits proving that the notices were "sworn 
to," the notices contained all of the information that the 
statute requires.  Additionally, the petitioners contended that 
nothing in Kellner, which interpreted Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5), 
requires in the notice of claim a statement by the authorized 
person giving the oath that the oath was taken.  They 
additionally argued that Kellner, not Newkirk, controlled the 
disposition of the case.   
 
¶16 In an oral decision, the circuit court denied the 
motion for reconsideration.  The circuit court concluded that 
"Newkirk does control" the result in the case, and that when one 
"read[s] all the cases together, you need some authorized person 
to say that the parties took an oath . . . ."   
                                                 
10 The parties submitted matters outside the pleadings in 
litigating the motion to dismiss and the circuit court did not 
exclude the additional evidence that was submitted.  Therefore, 
the circuit court properly converted the motion to dismiss to a 
motion for summary judgment.  Wis. Stat. § 802.06(2)(b).   
No. 
2011AP914   
 
10 
 
¶17 The petitioners appealed and the court of appeals 
summarily affirmed the circuit court.  The court of appeals 
reasoned that this case was controlled by language in Kellner 
"stating that a notice of claim must contain an 'acknowledgement 
by an authorized person that the oath was taken.'"  The court of 
appeals 
also 
relied 
on 
Newkirk, 
explaining 
that 
Newkirk 
"interpret[ed]" Kellner to "mak[e] it clear that a notice of 
claim...must include...an 'acknowledgement by an authorized 
person that the oath was taken,' and...must be in a form 
rendering the signer 'punishable for perjury' should the 
statement be untrue."   
II 
¶18 In this case, we are called to determine whether the 
circuit court properly granted summary judgment in favor of 
Boyd.  We review a circuit court's grant or denial of summary 
judgment independent of the determinations of the circuit court 
and the court of appeals.  Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 
Wis. 2d 304, 315, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987).     
¶19 The circuit court's decision to grant summary judgment 
turned 
on 
its 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.82(5).  
Interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, which we 
review independent of the determinations of the circuit court 
and the court of appeals.  Kellner, 197 Wis. 2d at 190. 
III 
¶20 To resolve this dispute, we must first determine what 
Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5) requires in order for a notice of claim 
to be properly "sworn to" by a claimant.  We begin by examining 
No. 
2011AP914   
 
11 
 
the text of Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5), which requires that a notice 
of claim "shall be sworn to by the claimant and shall be served 
upon the attorney general at his or her office in the capitol by 
certified mail."11  The text of the statute does not set forth 
any definition of what "sworn to by the claimant" means and does 
not indicate whether it is the claimant or an authorized person 
who must show on the face of a notice of claim that it was 
"sworn to."  Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5). 
¶21 We look then to other statutes that may inform our 
inquiry.  Wisconsin Stat. § 990.01, which sets forth general 
definitions, provides that the term "sworn" includes "'affirmed' 
in all cases where by law an affirmation may be substituted for 
an oath."  Wis. Stat. § 990.01(41).  That definition suggests an 
oath or affirmation is required for a notice of claim to be 
"sworn to" by a claimant.  Wisconsin Stat. § 990.01(41) does 
not, however, set forth any standard advising us who must state 
                                                 
11 Serving a notice of claim is an essential step in 
commencing an action against the State.  Within 120 days of an 
event causing injury, damage or death that gives rise to the 
civil action or proceeding, a claimant must serve upon the 
attorney general a "written notice of claim stating the time, 
date, location and the circumstances of the event" giving rise 
to the claim.  Wis. Stat. § 893.82(3).  The notice of claim must 
additionally contain the names of persons involved, including 
the name of the state officer, employee or agent implicated in 
the injury-causing event.  Id.   
Wisconsin Stat. § 893.82(2m) forbids a claimant from 
bringing an action against a state officer, employee or agent 
unless the claimant "complies strictly" with the requirements 
set forth in the statute.  Failure to give notice that strictly 
complies with the statute is a jurisdictional defect.  Ibrahim 
v. Samore, 118 Wis. 2d 720, 726, 348 N.W.2d 554 (1984). 
No. 
2011AP914   
 
12 
 
on the face of a notice of claim that its contents were "sworn 
to." 
¶22 Wisconsin Stat. § 887.03 sheds some light on our 
inquiry.  It sets forth acceptable methods by which an oath or 
affirmation may be administered, allowing them to be in "any of 
the usual forms."  Wis. Stat. § 887.03.  Any person who takes an 
oath or affirmation in the "usual forms" is deemed to have been 
lawfully sworn or affirmed for "any oath or affidavit required 
or authorized by law."  Id.  The phrase "usual forms" is not 
defined in the statutes.  Although that statute provides some 
guidance, it likewise does not advise us who must state on the 
face of a notice of claim that it was "sworn to." 
¶23 Because the statutes do not set forth who must state 
that a notice of claim was "sworn to," we look for guidance in 
case law.  This court interpreted what the phrase "sworn to" 
means under Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5) in Kellner.  In that case, a 
resident at the adolescent training unit at the Mendota Mental 
Health Institute was injured while playing basketball in the 
patient courtyard under the supervision of a residential care 
technician.  197 Wis. 2d at 188.  Following the injury, the 
resident and his parents commenced an action against the 
residential care technician, the director of the Mendota Mental 
Health Institute, and the management services director of the 
Mendota Mental Health Institute.  Id.   
¶24 Because the defendants were employees of the State of 
Wisconsin, the resident and his parents were required to serve 
notices upon the attorney general.  The resident and his father 
No. 
2011AP914   
 
13 
 
were assisted by an attorney in executing their notices.  The 
attorney asked the resident and his father to read the notices 
he had prepared, whether they understood the notices, and 
whether the content of the notices were true and accurate to the 
best of their knowledge.12  Id. 
¶25 The resident and his father signed the notices and the 
attorney, as guardian ad litem for the resident, also signed the 
resident's notice.  The notices were executed before a notary 
who verified that the signers were known to her to be the 
persons who signed them.  The notary signed a notary block that 
stated the following:  
Personally came before me this 28th day of October, 
1991, the above named [claimant], to me known to be 
the person who executed the foregoing instrument and 
acknowledged the same. 
Id. at 189.  No oath was administered by the notary.  The 
resident's mother later executed her notice of claim before a 
witness who was not authorized to administer oaths.   
¶26 The notices were served upon the attorney general and 
the State of Wisconsin denied the claims.  When the resident and 
his parents commenced an action, the State argued that the 
circuit court lacked jurisdiction because the notices did not 
comply with Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5).    
                                                 
12 Although the attorney asked whether the resident and his 
father believed the contents of the notices were true, the 
attorney did not ask them to swear an oath or affirmation to 
that effect.  
No. 
2011AP914   
 
14 
 
¶27 This court agreed with the State.  Examining the 
statute, the Kellner court determined that the clear language of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5) requires a claimant to take a formal oath 
or affirmation that the contents of the notice are true.    
¶28 Under Kellner, an oath or affirmation must be more 
than a mere acknowledgement.13  Id. at 190-91.  The Kellner court 
dismissed acknowledgements as merely "a method of authenticating 
an instrument by showing that it was the act of the person 
executing it."  Id. at 192 (citing H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical 
Contractors of Alaska, Inc., 563 P.2d 258, 260 (1977)).  
Acknowledgements are unacceptable because they merely provide 
official evidence of a document's execution, not of the truth of 
a document.14  Anderson's Manual for Notaries Public § 2.20(a) 
(9th ed. 2001).     
¶29  An oath or affirmation, by contrast, is "in some form 
an unequivocal and present act by which the affiant consciously 
takes upon himself the obligation of an oath."  Kellner, 197 
Wis. 2d at 192.  Oaths and affirmations generally consist of a 
"solemn declaration, accompanied by a swearing to God or a 
revered person or thing, that one's statement is true or that 
                                                 
13 An "acknowledgment" is defined in the statutes as "a 
declaration by a person that the person has executed an 
instrument for the purposes stated therein . . . ."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 706.07(1). 
14 A popular treatise that discusses oaths and affirmations 
notes that generally, a requirement that a document be "sworn 
to" contemplates that the "facts contained in it are true, and 
not an acknowledgement."  Rosemary Gregor, 3 Am. Jur. 2d 
Affidavits, § 2 (2012). 
No. 
2011AP914   
 
15 
 
one will be bound to a promise."  Marie K. Pesando, 58 Am. Jur. 
2d Oath and Affirmation, § 1 (2012). 
¶30 Unlike 
acknowledgements, 
oaths 
and 
affirmations 
require a person to swear or affirm the truth of a statement.  
Id.  They are solemn, formal, and signify an obligation to speak 
the truth.  Id.  As this court declared in Kellner, oaths and 
affirmations "impress[] upon a[] claimant the fact that he or 
she is bound by the accuracy and truthfulness of the statement 
in the notice of claim."  Kellner, 197 Wis. 2d at 193.     
¶31 Although Kellner requires an oath or affirmation, it 
did not set forth any specific format by which an oath or 
affirmation must be administered.  Kellner simply requires that 
whatever the form, the oath or affirmation must be "an 
unequivocal and present act" by which the claimant consciously 
takes upon himself the obligation of an oath or affirmation.  
Id. at 192.  If such an oath or affirmation is administered, it 
is acceptable under Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5). 
¶32 However, describing the manner in which an oath may be 
administered does not address the question of who must state on 
the face of a notice of claim that it was "sworn to."  In answer 
to that question, Kellner set forth a second requirement, which 
is that the notice of claim must "contain a statement showing 
that the oath or affirmation occurred."  197 Wis. 2d at 198.   
¶33 What a claimant must do to comply with that second 
requirement is sharply disputed by the parties.  Boyd argues 
that the court of appeals' analysis in Newkirk set forth the 
correct procedure.  We turn to examine Newkirk.   
No. 
2011AP914   
 
16 
 
¶34 The notice of claim in Newkirk was similar to the 
notices before this court in Kellner.  Newkirk was injured in an 
automobile accident.  Newkirk, 228 Wis. 2d at 832.  She 
commenced 
an 
action 
against 
the 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Transportation and several of its employees, alleging that they 
were negligent in failing to have proper signs in the area where 
the accident occurred.  Id.  A notice of claim was signed by 
Newkirk's attorney and served upon the attorney general.  Id.  
Under the attorney's signature, the following statement appeared 
on the notice of claim: 
I, Melissa Newkirk, claimant, being sworn, state that 
I have read the notice of claim and know the contents 
to be true. 
Id. at 833.  Newkirk's signature followed her statement, but her 
execution of the document was not notarized.  Id.  Other than 
her statement, there was no evidence that she had taken any oath 
or affirmation or any indication who may have sworn her to the 
notice of claim.   
¶35 After rejecting Newkirk's argument that her signature 
alone was sufficient, the court of appeals interpreted Kellner 
in the following manner: 
Among other things, Kellner makes it clear that: (1) 
strict 
compliance 
with 
§ 
893.82(5), 
stats., 
is 
required in all cases; and (2) the oath required by 
the statute's terms (a) must include, among other 
things, an "acknowledgment by an authorized person 
that the oath was taken," and (b) must be in a form 
rendering the signer "punishable for perjury" should 
the statement be untrue.  
Id. at 837 (citation omitted).   
No. 
2011AP914   
 
17 
 
 
¶36 The petitioners argue that the analysis in Newkirk is 
flawed in two respects.  First, they argue that Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.31(1), the perjury statute, does not punish an individual 
for falsely swearing to a notice of claim before a notary 
public.15  Wisconsin Stat. § 946.31(1) lists several instances 
when a person can be prosecuted for perjury, but they argue that 
falsely swearing to a notice of claim is not one of them.  
Second, the petitioners contend that Kellner does not require a 
notice of claim to contain a statement by a notary that the oath 
or affirmation was taken before the notary.  We address each 
argument in turn.   
                                                 
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 946.31(1) states the following: 
Perjury. (1) Whoever under oath or affirmation orally 
makes a false material statement which the person does 
not believe to be true, in any matter, cause, action 
or proceeding, before any of the following, whether 
legally constituted or exercising powers as if legally 
constituted, is guilty of a Class H felony: 
(a) A court; 
(b) A magistrate; 
(c) A judge, referee or court commissioner; 
(d) An administrative agency or arbitrator authorized 
by statute to determine issues of fact; 
(e) A notary public while taking testimony for use in 
an action or proceeding pending in court; 
(f) An officer authorized to conduct inquests of the 
dead; 
(g) A grand jury; 
(h) A legislative body or committee. 
No. 
2011AP914   
 
18 
 
¶37 Newkirk interpreted Kellner to require that a notice 
of claim be in a form that renders the signer punishable for 
perjury should the statement be untrue.  Newkirk, 228 Wis. 2d at 
837.  However, the Kellner court did not require that a notice 
of claim be in a form that allows for an individual's 
prosecution for perjury.  Kellner's holding requires that a 
notice of claim "contain a statement showing that the oath or 
affirmation occurred."  Kellner, 197 Wis. 2d at 192.     
¶38 The Kellner court expressly recognized that Wisconsin 
law punishes falsely swearing to a notice of claim under Wis. 
Stat. § 946.32, the false swearing statute.16  After its 
                                                 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 946.32 states the following: 
False Swearing. (1) Whoever does either of the 
following is guilty of a Class H felony: 
(a) Under oath or affirmation or upon signing a 
statement pursuant to s. 887.015 makes or subscribes a 
false statement which he or she does not believe is 
true, when such oath, affirmation, or statement is 
authorized or required by law or is required by any 
public 
officer 
or 
governmental 
agency 
as 
a 
prerequisite to such officer or agency taking some 
official action. 
(b) Makes or subscribes 2 inconsistent statements 
under oath or affirmation or upon signing a statement 
pursuant to s. 887.015 in regard to any matter 
respecting which an oath, affirmation, or statement 
is, in each case, authorized or required by law or 
required by any public officer or governmental agency 
as a prerequisite to such officer or agency taking 
some 
official 
action, 
under 
circumstances 
which 
demonstrate that the witness or subscriber knew at 
least one of the statements to be false when made. The 
period of limitations within which prosecution may be 
commenced runs from the time of the first statement. 
No. 
2011AP914   
 
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discussion illustrating the solemnity required of an oath or 
affirmation, the Kellner court stated that a "claimant who makes 
a fraudulent claim while under oath can be charged with false 
swearing."  197 Wis. 2d at 194 (emphasis added).  
¶39 False swearing as defined in Wis. Stat. § 946.32 does 
punish an individual who falsely swears to a notice of claim.  
Unlike perjury, as defined in Wis. Stat. § 946.31(1), the false 
swearing 
statute 
penalizes 
individuals 
who 
"make[] 
or 
subscribe[] a false statement which [they] do not believe to be 
true," when made under an oath or affirmation that is authorized 
or required by law.  Wis. Stat. § 946.32(1)(a).  The Kellner 
court recognized this distinction, using the term "false 
swearing" when referring to a notice of claim and using the term 
"perjury" 
when 
referring 
broadly 
to 
other 
oaths 
and 
affirmations.  197 Wis. 2d at 191, 194.  The Kellner court did 
not, however, hold that a notice of claim must be in a form that 
is punishable under the perjury statute.17 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2) Whoever under oath or affirmation or upon signing 
a statement pursuant to s. 887.015 makes or subscribes 
a false statement which the person does not believe is 
true is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. 
17 An individual swearing to a notice of claim in most 
circumstances cannot be prosecuted for perjury.  Swearing to a 
notice of claim before a notary does not satisfy the elements of 
the perjury statute because it is not "in any matter, cause, 
action or proceeding," or before any of the parties listed in 
the statute.  Wis. Stat. § 946.31(1).  Any requirement that 
mandated 
a 
format 
that 
is 
punishable 
by 
perjury 
would 
effectively eliminate the common practice of swearing or 
affirming a notice of claim before a notary, because that act is 
not punishable under the perjury statute. 
No. 
2011AP914   
 
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¶40 Likewise, the Newkirk court's conclusion that Kellner 
requires a statement by an authorized person on the face of a 
notice 
of 
claim 
that 
the 
oath 
was 
administered 
also 
unnecessarily expands the holding of Kellner.  Newkirk, 228 Wis. 
2d at 837.  The Newkirk court interpreted Kellner to require the 
following: 
Among other things, Kellner makes it clear that: (1) 
strict 
compliance 
with 
§ 
893.82(5), 
stats., 
is 
required in all cases; and (2) the oath required by 
the statute's terms (a) must include, among other 
things, an "acknowledgment by an authorized person 
that the oath was taken," and (b) must be in a form 
rendering the signer "punishable for perjury" should 
the statement be untrue.  
Id. (citation omitted).   
¶41 Kellner requires "evidence on the face of the notice 
that the claimant has sworn to its contents."  Kellner, 197 Wis. 
2d at 194.  The Kellner court recognized that oral swearing to a 
notice of claim without some evidence on the face of the notice 
is insufficient, but did not require that the statement on a 
notice of claim be in any specific format.  Id. at 193-94.  
¶42 Kellner's holding does not require in a notice of 
claim that an authorized person be the one making the statement 
that an oath or affirmation occurred.  Id.  Instead, Kellner 
requires that "the notice . . . contain a statement showing that 
the oath or affirmation occurred."  Id. at 198. 
¶43 Kellner's holding set forth two requirements.  First, 
a claimant must make an oath or affirmation as to the 
truthfulness of the contents of the notice.  Id.  Second, the 
No. 
2011AP914   
 
21 
 
notice "must contain a statement showing that the oath or 
affirmation 
occurred" 
before 
the 
notary. 
 
Id. 
 
Neither 
requirement demands that a false notice of claim be punishable 
for perjury or that a notice of claim must contain a statement 
by a notary that an oath or affirmation was administered.  To 
the extent that Newkirk expanded Kellner's holding in either 
respect, its language expanding Kellner is withdrawn.18 
IV 
¶44 Having identified who must state on the face of a 
notice of claim that it was "sworn to," we turn to evaluate the 
notices of claims presented in this case.  Here, Wagner and 
Christel 
administered 
oaths 
to 
the 
petitioners 
in 
their 
capacities as notaries public.  Wis. Stat. § 706.07(1)(c).  
¶45 Kellner's first requirement that each claimant must 
make an oath or affirmation as to the truthfulness of the 
contents of each notice of claim is satisfied.  The oaths 
administered in this case were unquestionably in a form that 
constitutes "an unequivocal and present act by which the affiant 
consciously takes upon himself the obligation of an oath."  
Kellner, 197 Wis. 2d at 192.  No one disputes that the verbal 
oaths here failed to meet the "any of the usual forms" 
requirement in Wis. Stat. § 887.03.   
                                                 
18 See supra ¶35 (indicating that the notice "(a) must 
include, among other things, an "acknowledgment by an authorized 
person that the oath was taken," and (b) must be in a form 
rendering the signer "punishable for perjury" should the 
statement be untrue.")  
 
No. 
2011AP914   
 
22 
 
¶46 Additionally, the notices of claims satisfy the second 
Kellner requirement that they contain statements showing that 
the oaths or affirmations occurred before the notaries in this 
case.  Kellner, 197 Wis. 2d at 198.  The statement on each 
notice of claim clearly indicates that Wagner or Christel, who 
notarized it, administered an oath to each petitioner.  The 
statements aver that each oath was made under penalty of false 
swearing and certify that the statements made in the notices 
were true to the best of the petitioners' knowledge.  Each 
notice of claim in this case provides sufficient evidence on its 
face that the oaths or affirmations occurred before the 
notaries. 
¶47 Having determined that the text of the notices of 
claims fulfill the mandate of Kellner, we observe that the 
uncontested affidavits submitted by Wagner and Christel add 
further support to our conclusion.  The parties submitted those 
affidavits in connection with Boyd's motion to dismiss and the 
circuit court accepted them and converted the motion to one of 
summary judgment.  
¶48 The affidavits describe in detail the process by which 
the petitioners swore to the notices in this case.  Wagner and 
Christel aver that they notarized the statements contained in 
the notices, all of which contained a statement that "[t]he 
Notary 
Public 
who 
signed 
below 
has 
given 
me 
an 
oral 
oath . . . ."  Wagner and Christel further depict a series of 
solemn, formal oaths that they administered at the time the 
notices were executed and notarized.  The affidavits clearly 
No. 
2011AP914   
 
23 
 
show that Wagner and Christel not only administered proper 
oaths, but also notarized the documents with the knowledge that 
they were endorsing the statements on the notices.  They leave 
no room for doubt that the letter and the spirit of Kellner is 
satisfied in this case. 
¶49 Although we conclude that the notices in this case 
comply with Kellner, we nevertheless urge parties in the future 
to file notices of claims using a jurat in which the notary sets 
forth that the notice was "sworn to" or affirmed before the 
notary.  The parties at oral argument expressed a desire for 
greater "certainty" regarding what must appear on a notice of 
claim.  The Kellner court likewise emphasized a greater need for 
certainty in order to avoid a case-by-case analysis of whether a 
claimant has complied with the requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.82(5).  See Kellner, 197 Wis. 2d at 195.  Notices that 
clearly comply with the statute not only reduce the number of 
meritless claims, but they also fulfill the purpose of enabling 
the 
attorney 
general 
to 
more 
effectively 
conduct 
legal 
business.19  Id. at 194.  
                                                 
19 The purposes of Wis. Stat. § 893.82 are set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 893.82(1).  That statute states the following: 
(1) The purposes of this section are to: 
(a) Provide the attorney general with adequate time to 
investigate claims which might result in judgments to 
be paid by the state. 
(b) Provide the attorney general with an opportunity 
to effect a compromise without a civil action or civil 
proceeding. 
No. 
2011AP914   
 
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¶50 Furthermore, as this court noted in Kellner, the 
purposes of Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5) are "reinforced" by avoiding 
an added level of litigation.  Id.  The reason such an added 
level of litigation is undesirable is on full display in this 
case.  The merits of this case have not yet begun to be 
addressed by the parties or the circuit court even though it is 
more than a year after the complaint was filed.   
¶51 Although neither Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5) nor Kellner 
requires any specific format, in order to promote certainty and 
avoid unnecessary litigation, we urge parties in the future to 
file notices of claims using a jurat in which the notary sets 
forth that the notice was "sworn to" or affirmed before the 
notary.  Wisconsin Stat. § 706.07(8)(c) provides a statutory 
form of a jurat for a verification upon oath or affirmation: 
State of .... 
County of .... 
Signed and sworn to (or affirmed) before me on (date) 
by (name(s) of person(s) making statement). 
................................. 
(Signature of notarial officer) 
(Seal, if any) 
................................. 
Title (and Rank) 
[My commission expires: ....] 
                                                                                                                                                             
(c) Place a limit on the amounts recoverable in civil 
actions 
or 
civil 
proceedings 
against 
any 
state 
officer, employee or agent. 
No. 
2011AP914   
 
25 
 
Wis. Stat. § 706.07(8)(c).  Any jurat in the statutory form 
described above unambiguously complies with the mandates of 
Kellner and Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5).   
V 
¶52 In sum, we conclude that Kellner sets forth two 
requirements in order for a notice of claim to be properly 
"sworn to" under Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5).  First, a formal oath 
or affirmation must be taken by a claimant.  Kellner, 197 Wis. 
2d at 198.  Second, the notice of claim must contain a statement 
showing that the oath or affirmation occurred.  Id.  To the 
extent that Newkirk appears to expand those requirements, it 
misapplied Kellner and we withdraw that language in Newkirk. 
¶53 We further conclude that the notices in this case meet 
the two Kellner requirements and are therefore properly "sworn 
to" under Wis. Stat. § 893.82(5).  Nevertheless, in the future, 
to promote certainty and to avoid unnecessary litigation, we 
urge claimants to file notices of claims using a jurat in which 
the notary sets forth that the notice was "sworn to" or affirmed 
before the notary.  Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals 
and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded. 
  
 
 
No. 
2011AP914   
 
 
 
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