Case Title: City of Chesapeake v. Gardner Enterprises

Citation: 

Docket Number: 961142

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1997-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and 
Koontz, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 
 
CITY OF CHESAPEAKE 
 
v.  Record No. 961142 
OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
                                     February 28, 1997 
GARDNER ENTERPRISES, INC., ETC. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE 
 
Robert S. Wahab, Jr., Judge Designate 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider the validity of a local zoning 
ordinance prohibiting the construction of additional buildings or 
structures to support a nonconforming use.
*
 
The facts in this appeal are not in dispute.  Gardner 
Enterprises, Inc., t/a Greenlawn Memorial Gardens (Greenlawn), 
owns a 47-acre parcel of land in the City of Chesapeake.  The 
property has been in continuous use as a cemetery since 1953.  In 
1969, the City adopted a zoning ordinance designating cemeteries 
as a conditional use in the zoning district where Greenlawn is 
located.  This zoning restriction remains in effect under the 
present zoning ordinance. 
 
Greenlawn has operated the cemetery as a nonconforming use 
since 1969.  In 1973, 1975, 1988, and 1990, Greenlawn received 
building permits for the construction of mausoleums on the 
property without obtaining a conditional use permit.  During this 
                     
     
*A "nonconforming use" is "a lawful use existing on the 
effective date of the zoning restriction and continuing since 
that time in non-conformance to the ordinance."  Knowlton v. 
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Va., 220 Va. 571, 572 n.1, 260 S.E.2d 
232, 234 n.1 (1979). 
 
 
 
 
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time period, the zoning ordinance did not prohibit the 
construction of additional structures to support a nonconforming 
use. 
 
In 1993, the City adopted a comprehensive amendment to its 
zoning ordinance.  Section 15-104.B of the amended ordinance 
provides: 
 
A building containing a lawful nonconforming use shall 
not be enlarged, extended, reconstructed or moved, 
except in changing the use of the building or structure 
to one which is permitted or for which a conditional 
use permit has been granted; in addition, no additional 
buildings or structures may be constructed to carry out 
or support the nonconforming use on the site. [Emphasis 
added.] 
 
 
In 1995, Greenlawn requested a building permit for the 
construction of an additional mausoleum.  The zoning 
administrator denied the application, finding that the ordinance 
expressly prohibited the construction of new buildings or 
structures to support a nonconforming use, and that Greenlawn was 
required to obtain a conditional use permit before any additional 
building permits could be issued.  The Board of Zoning Appeals 
upheld the zoning administrator's decision. 
 
Greenlawn filed a motion for declaratory judgment in the 
trial court, requesting the court to rule that § 15-104.B 
directly conflicts with Code § 15.1-492 and therefore is void.  
The trial court declared § 15-104.B invalid, holding that this 
section prohibits additional structures on nonconforming uses of 
land, while Code § 15.1-492 only authorizes limitations on 
nonconforming uses of buildings or structures. 
 
 
 
 
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On appeal, the City contends that the trial court failed to 
construe Code § 15.1-492 in a rational manner consistent with 
legislative intent.  The City argues that the trial court made an 
invalid distinction between uses of land and uses of buildings or 
structures.  The City asserts that § 15-104.B of the zoning 
ordinance does not exceed the authority granted by Code § 15.1-
492, because the statute implicitly authorizes local governments 
to adopt zoning regulations prohibiting the construction of new 
structures supporting nonconforming land uses. 
 
In response, Greenlawn alleges that Code § 15.1-492 only 
grants local governing bodies the authority to prohibit the 
structural alteration of a nonconforming building and the 
structural alteration of a building housing a nonconforming use. 
 Greenlawn contends that the City lacks statutory authority to 
prohibit the construction of additional buildings to support a 
nonconforming land use as long as the character of the land use 
does not change.  We disagree with Greenlawn. 
 
The Dillon Rule of strict construction controls our 
determination of the powers of local governing bodies.  This rule 
provides that municipal corporations have only those powers that 
are expressly granted, those necessarily or fairly implied from 
expressly granted powers, and those that are essential and 
indispensable.  Ticonderoga Farms v. County of Loudoun, 242 Va. 
170, 173-74, 409 S.E.2d 446, 448 (1991); City of Richmond v. 
Confrere Club of Richmond, 239 Va. 77, 79, 387 S.E.2d 471, 473 
 
 
 
 
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(1990).  When a local ordinance exceeds the scope of this 
authority, the ordinance is invalid.  See City of Richmond, 239 
Va. at 80, 387 S.E.2d at 473; Tabler v. Board of Supervisors, 221 
Va. 200, 204, 269 S.E.2d 358, 361 (1980).  Thus, we must 
determine whether the authority to prohibit the construction of 
additional buildings to support a nonconforming use is expressly 
granted or necessarily implied from the powers granted to local 
governing bodies in Code § 15.1-492. 
 
Code § 15.1-492 provides that: 
 
Nothing in this article shall be construed to authorize 
the impairment of any vested right, except that a 
zoning ordinance may provide that land, buildings, and 
structures and the uses thereof which do not conform to 
the zoning prescribed for the district in which they 
are situated may be continued only so long as the then 
existing or a more restricted use continues and such 
use is not discontinued for more than two years, and so 
long as the buildings or structures are maintained in 
their then structural condition; and that the uses of 
such buildings or structures shall conform to such 
regulations whenever they are enlarged, extended, 
reconstructed or structurally altered and may further 
provide that no "nonconforming" building or structure 
may be moved on the same lot or to any other lot which 
is not properly zoned to permit such "nonconforming" 
use.  [Emphasis added.] 
 
 
The plain language of Code § 15.1-492 applies to (1) 
nonconforming land uses, including buildings and structures 
supporting those uses; and (2) nonconforming buildings and 
structures.  This section allows local governments to limit a 
nonconforming land use, or a nonconforming building or structure, 
to its existing use or to a more restricted use.  Included in 
this authority is the power to require that "the buildings or 
 
 
 
 
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structures are maintained in their then structural condition."  
When a property owner wishes to make certain changes to, or to 
move, a building or structure which supports a nonconforming use 
or is itself nonconforming, the proposed changes are subject to 
the regulations of the zoning ordinance. 
 
However, Code § 15.1-492 does not expressly address the 
construction of additional facilities to support a nonconforming 
use.  Under Dillon's Rule, therefore, we must determine whether 
the power to prohibit such construction is necessarily or fairly 
implied from the powers expressly granted by the statute.  See 
Ticonderoga Farms, 242 Va. at 173-74, 409 S.E.2d at 448; City of 
Richmond, 239 Va. at 79, 387 S.E.2d at 473. 
 
We look to the purpose and objective of Code § 15.1-492 in 
considering whether this authority necessarily is implied from 
the powers expressly granted by the statute.  Gordon v. Fairfax 
County, 207 Va. 827, 833, 153 S.E.2d 270, 275 (1967).  The 
statute must be given a rational interpretation consistent with 
its purposes, and not one which will substantially defeat its 
objectives.  Mayor v. Industrial Dev. Auth., 221 Va. 865, 869, 
275 S.E.2d 888, 890 (1981); Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Lassiter, 
193 Va. 360, 364, 68 S.E.2d 641, 643 (1952). 
 
The purpose of statutes such as Code § 15.1-492 is to 
preserve rights in existing lawful buildings and uses of land, 
subject to the rule that public policy opposes the extension and 
favors the elimination of nonconforming uses.  See 8A Eugene 
 
 
 
 
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McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.184 (3d ed. 1994).  
Nonconforming uses are not favored in the law because they 
detract from the effectiveness of a comprehensive zoning plan.  
See, e.g., Annotation, Construction of New Building or Structure 
on Premises Devoted to Nonconforming Use as Violation of Zoning 
Ordinance, 10 A.L.R.4th 1122, § 2[a] (1981). 
 
Code § 15.1-492 expressly grants local governments the power 
to regulate existing structures.  Implicit in such power is the 
authority to regulate new construction.  This power necessarily 
is implied from the statutory language protecting nonconforming 
uses only "so long as the buildings or structures are maintained 
in their then structural condition."  
 
To interpret the statute otherwise would allow a property 
owner to build additional structures in support of a 
nonconforming use, but would prohibit that owner from enlarging, 
reconstructing, moving, or repairing an existing building or 
structure on the same property.  Under such an interpretation, 
Greenlawn would be required to obtain a conditional use permit to 
enlarge, extend, move, or reconstruct an existing mausoleum, but 
could construct any number of additional mausoleums on the 
property without obtaining a conditional use permit. 
 
Such an interpretation would thwart the legislative 
objective of granting local governments the authority to regulate 
changes pertaining to nonconforming uses.  In contrast, the 
interpretation we adopt permits local governments to regulate 
 
 
 
 
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such changes, while preserving the property owner's vested right 
to conduct the nonconforming use. 
 
We disagree with Greenlawn that Knowlton v. Browning-Ferris 
Industries of Virginia, 220 Va. 571, 260 S.E.2d 232 (1979), 
requires a different result.  In Knowlton, Fairfax County alleged 
that the defendants were no longer maintaining a valid 
nonconforming use, because the hog raising and general trucking 
operation conducted when the County was initially zoned had 
developed into a specialized refuse collection and disposal 
business.  Id. at 576, 260 S.E.2d at 237. 
 
In holding that the character of the use had changed, we 
recognized that a nonconforming use need not remain static, and 
that an increase in size or scope of the use is merely one 
circumstance relevant to a determination whether the character of 
the use has changed.  Id.  These principles, however, are not at 
issue here because the City does not contend that Greenlawn seeks 
to change the character of its nonconforming use.  Instead, as 
stated above, the issue is whether a municipality has the power, 
necessarily implied from Code § 15.1-492, to prohibit the 
construction of additional buildings supporting a nonconforming 
use. 
 
We also conclude that Greenlawn's reliance on Board of 
Supervisors v. Trollingwood Partnership, 248 Va. 112, 445 S.E.2d 
151 (1994), is misplaced.  The issue presented there was whether 
a property owner's site plans for earlier phases of a development 
 
 
 
 
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were sufficient to create a vested property right permitting the 
property owner to expand its development of the nonconforming use 
to an additional land area for which no site plans had been 
approved.  We held that the site plans for the earlier phases 
were insufficient to give the property owner a vested right in 
developing the additional area of the property.  Id. at 115, 445 
S.E.2d at 152-53. 
 
We reject Greenlawn's assertion that this holding protects 
the expansion of any nonconforming use that has not increased in 
land area or changed in character.  Those issues were not 
addressed in Trollingwood and are not supported by its holding. 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the trial court's 
judgment and enter final judgment in favor of the City. 
 
Reversed and final judgment.