Case Title: Peterson v. State

Citation: 572 S.W.2d 475

Docket Number: 60778

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 1978-11-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
572 S.W.2d 475 (1978)
David Ray PETERSON, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
No. 60778.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
November 6, 1978.
Larry D. Harman, Asst. Public Defender, Gerald Kiser, Public Defender, Liberty, for appellant.
John D. Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Paul Robert Otto, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
DONNELLY, Judge.
On January 21, 1977, appellant appeared in the Circuit Court of Clay County, Missouri, without counsel, entered a plea of guilty to a charge of burglary in the second degree, and was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of eight years.
On February 28, 1977, appellant filed in the Circuit Court of Clay County, Missouri, his Motion to Vacate Judgment under Rule 27.26. On March 25, 1977, the Motion to Vacate Judgment was overruled.
On April 3, 1978, the Kansas City District of the Court of Appeals affirmed. On June 15, 1978, the cause was transferred to this Court. We finally determine the cause "the same as on original appeal." Mo.Const., Art. V, § 10.
The determinative issue on appeal is whether the trial court committed reversible error in failing to have a written waiver *476 of counsel signed in compliance with § 600.051, RSMo Supp. 1976. Section 600.051 reads as follows:
"(1) That the defendant has been charged with the offense of . . . (nature of charge must be inserted before signing);
Respondent asserts that appellant's contention should not be sustained because the trial court's failure to require a written waiver of the right to assistance of counsel was not prejudicial to appellant. We do not agree. To borrow from Judge McMillian in State v. Mills, 521 S.W.2d 495, 498 (Mo.App. 1975), if the practice of judicially determining the prejudicial effect of failure to follow the rule mandated by § 600.051 is encouraged by subjective judicial constructions, the exceptions may well become better known than the rule itself. In other words, if we, the judiciary, constantly give currency to this practice, the value and benefits to be derived from use of the statutory written form will be lost.
In State v. Clifton, 549 S.W.2d 891 (Mo. App.1977) the Missouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District, felt compelled to insist on strict compliance with Rule 20.02(a) of this Court insofar as it requires that prior to voir dire examination of the jury the court must read to the jury MAI-CR No. 1.02. We also feel compelled by § 600.051 to insist on strict compliance with its provisions. *477 The General Assembly has fixed the signing of a written waiver form as being a necessary part of the procedure to be followed in a criminal case wherein a defendant may receive a jail sentence or confinement, and the courts must abide it.
We hold that since the effective date of § 600.051 (August 13, 1976) the use of the written form prescribed therein has been mandatory and that failure to use the written form as mandated is reversible error. The judgment of the trial court is clearly erroneous. Rule 27.26(j).
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to enter judgment setting aside the conviction and permitting withdrawal of plea, and for further proceedings thereafter according to law.
MORGAN, C. J., and FINCH, RENDLEN, SEILER and SIMEONE, JJ., concur.
BARDGETT, J., concurs in result.