Case Title: Young v. Smith

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1998-02-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Michelle Smith YOUNG v. Rodney SMITH

97-574                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 19, 1998


1.   Contempt -- order of -- remedy for review. -- Procedurally, an
     appellant's remedy for a review of a contempt order is appeal.

2.   Prohibition, writ of -- purpose -- such relief not available
     here. -- The purpose of the writ of prohibition is to prevent
     a court from exercising a power not authorized by law when
     there is no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise; a writ of
     prohibition is an extraordinary writ that is appropriate only
     when the lower court is wholly without jurisdiction; a writ of
     prohibition is never issued to prohibit an inferior court from
     erroneously exercising its jurisdiction; writ-of-prohibition
     relief was not available where appellant's remedy was one of
     appeal from the trial court's contempt order.

3.   Divorce -- subject-matter jurisdiction -- act by court without
     subject-matter jurisdiction void. -- Lack of subject-matter
     jurisdiction is a defense that may be raised at any time by
     either a party or the court; it is a defect that is never
     waived by a failure to raise it at a particular point in a
     proceeding; a court that acts without subject-matter
     jurisdiction or in excess of its power produces a result that
     is void and cannot be enforced. 

4.   Jurisdiction -- defined -- subject-matter jurisdiction
     discussed. -- Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine
     the subject matter in controversy between the parties to the
     suit and to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over
     them; jurisdiction of the subject matter is power lawfully
     conferred on a court to adjudge matters concerning the general
     question in controversy; it is power to act on the general
     cause of action alleged and to determine whether the
     particular facts call for the exercise of that power; subject-
     matter jurisdiction does not depend on a correct exercise of
     that power in any particular case; if the court errs in its
     decision or proceeds irregularly within its assigned
     jurisdiction, the remedy is by appeal or direct action in the
     erring court; if it was within the court's jurisdiction to act
     upon the subject matter, that action is binding until reversed
     or set aside.

5.   Jurisdiction -- underlying cause of action was divorce decree
     -- chancery court properly had jurisdiction. -- The chancery
     court possessed the power to adjudge and act on the underlying
     general cause of action, which was a decree of divorce in
     which the chancery court granted appellant custody of the
     child and granted appellee visitation rights; issues of
     divorce, child custody, paternity, child support, and
     visitation, may properly be brought in the chancery court; all
     of these issues were addressed in the chancellor's original
     order, and they were squarely within the equity jurisdiction
     that the our legislature conferred on chancery courts; the
     chancery court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of
     this case.

6.   Courts -- chancery courts have authority to issue or deny
     injunctive relief -- all courts may punish for contempt. --
     Chancery courts have the authority to issue or deny injunctive
     relief and other equitable relief; the right to punish for
     contempt is inherent in all courts; here, the contempt orders
     from which appellant appeals were the chancery court's attempt
     to enjoin appellant from violating its orders relating to
     appellee's visitation rights.

7.   Courts -- appropriate remedy for error -- petitioner's remedy
     timely appeal or direct action to obtain modification of
     chancellor's order. -- Where an appellant claims error in a
     court's decision, the appropriate procedure is to obey the
     order and pursue a remedy by appeal or direct action in the
     erring court, rather than through an appeal from the order
     finding the appellant in contempt for its violation;
     petitioner's remedy lies either through a timely appeal from
     the original divorce decree, which she claims erroneously
     granted respondent visitation, or through direct action to
     petition the chancery court to modify the decree, based on
     changed circumstances, if any, relating to the welfare of the
     child.

8.   Courts -- chancery court acted upon subject matter within its
     jurisdiction -- appeal dismissed without prejudice to
     petitioner's right to seek to modify issue of visitation
     through direct action in chancery court. -- Where the chancery
     court acts upon a subject matter within its jurisdiction, that
     the action is binding until it is reversed or set aside; the
     chancery court's decision finding petitioner in contempt for
     failing to comply with prior visitation orders was affirmed
     and the appeal dismissed without prejudice to petitioner's
     right to seek to modify the issue of visitation through direct
     action in the chancery court.


     Appeal from Randolph Chancery Court; Tom L. Hilburn,
Chancellor; affirmed and Petition for Writ of Prohibition;
dismissed.
     Dunham & Faught, P.A., by: James Dunahm, for petitioner.
     George R. Wadley, for respondent.

     Ray Thornton, Justice.
     The issue in this a case is whether a chancery court has the
power to enforce its order awarding visitation to a stepparent in
the context of a divorce decree.  Appellee Rodney Smith filed a
complaint for divorce from appellant Michelle Smith Young on May 6,
1992, in the Randolph County Chancery Court.  In his complaint,
appellee requested custody of Dustin, the child whom he regarded as
his own although Dustin was born prior to the parties' marriage. 
In her answer, appellant denied that appellee was the child's
biological father and protested any custody or visitation award. 
The chancellor ordered a paternity test, which proved that Dustin
was not appellee's biological child.  The chancery court entered
the divorce decree on December 23, 1992.  In its decree, the court
granted the parties an absolute divorce, noted that appellee was
not Dustin's biological father, granted appellant custody of
Dustin, awarded appellee the right to visitation, and awarded
appellant child support.  We note that appellant elected not to
appeal from the chancery court's divorce decree granting the
visitation rights.
     Appellant brings this appeal from the September 9, 1996 order
of the chancery court, finding her in contempt.  In the contempt
order, the chancery court found that appellant had wilfully
violated its prior visitation orders and been held in contempt for
refusing to comply with those orders, and sentenced appellant to
serve thirty days in the Randolph County Detention Center.  The
chancery court also required appellant to place a $5,000 bond with
the chancery clerk to secure future compliance with the court's
orders.  On appeal, appellant argues (1) that the chancery court
erred by enforcing its visitation orders that granted appellee
visitation rights with Dustin, and (2) that the divorce decree and
other orders of the chancery court that granted appellee visitation
rights are void because the chancery court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction.  This appeal has been certified to this court from
the court of appeals.
     Appellant has also filed a petition for writ of prohibition to
enjoin both the orders of the chancery court finding her in
contempt and the decision of our court of appeals affirming a
February 9, 1996 contempt order.  In her petition, appellant argues
that the visitation orders issued by the chancery court and
affirmed by the court of appeals exceeded the chancery court's
jurisdiction and are therefore void and unenforceable.  Appellant
also argues that the court of appeals' affirmance was an illegal
expansion of the chancery court's jurisdiction.
     The principal issue presented for decision in both the appeal
and the petition is whether the chancery court exceeded its power,
and thereby its subject-matter jurisdiction, in granting visitation
rights to a stepparent.  Procedurally, appellant's remedy for a
review of a contempt order is appeal.  Frolic Footwear v. State,
284 Ark. 487,