Case Title: Michigan v. White (Opinion on Application)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 149490

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2017-12-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
PEOPLE v WHITE 
 
Docket No. 149490.  Decided December 26, 2017. 
 
 
Anthony T. White pleaded guilty in the Berrien Circuit Court to charges of armed 
robbery, MCL 750.529, and breaking and entering, MCL 750.110, in connection with the 
robbery of a gas station during which he held a gun to the cashier’s head.  The court, Dennis M. 
Wiley, J., sentenced defendant to 108 to 480 months in prison for armed robbery and 23 to 120 
months in prison for breaking and entering.  The court had assessed defendant 10 points for 
Offense Variable (OV) 4, MCL 777.34, to reflect its finding that serious psychological injury 
requiring professional treatment occurred to a victim.  This finding was based solely on the facts 
that defendant had held a gun to the cashier’s head and that she heard a trigger being pulled, 
which the court concluded was sufficient to support its scoring of OV 4 despite the lack of 
evidence that the cashier had suffered psychological distress as a result.  The Court of Appeals 
denied defendant’s delayed application for leave to appeal, and defendant sought leave to appeal 
in the Supreme Court. 
 
 
In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to 
appeal and without holding oral argument, held: 
 
 
Points for OV 4 may not be assessed solely on the basis of a trial court’s conclusion that a 
serious psychological injury would normally occur as a result of the crime perpetrated against the 
victim, and evidence of fear while a crime is being committed, by itself, is insufficient to assess 
points for OV 4.  Accordingly, the trial court erred by assessing 10 points for OV 4.  Because the 
subtraction of 10 points lowered defendant’s guidelines range for his guilty plea to armed 
robbery from a minimum of 81 to 135 months in prison to a minimum of 51 to 85 months in 
prison, the judgment of sentence was vacated and the case was remanded for resentencing.  To 
the extent that People v Apgar, 264 Mich App 321 (2004), held that a victim’s fear during a 
crime was sufficient to assess 10 points for OV 4 without any other showing of psychological 
harm, it was overruled. 
 
 
1.  MCL 777.34(1)(a) provides that OV 4 is correctly scored at 10 points when a serious 
psychological injury requiring professional treatment occurred to a victim.  The trial court here 
assessed 10 points on the sole basis of its conclusion that a person would typically suffer a 
psychological injury when confronted with the instant crime.  However, to support a score of 10 
points, MCL 777.34 requires that serious psychological injury occurred to a victim, not that a 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Kathryn L. Loomis 
reasonable person in that situation would have suffered a serious psychological injury.  
Accordingly, the trial court erred in scoring OV 4. 
 
 
2.  Defendant’s admission during his plea that the victim was afraid that he was going to 
shoot her could have supported scoring OV 4 at 10 points under Apgar, which was often cited for 
the proposition that a victim’s expression of fearfulness during a crime was sufficient to assess 
10 points for OV 4.  However, the fact that a victim is afraid at the time of the incident, by itself, 
does not give rise to a serious psychological injury requiring professional treatment.  Therefore, 
to the extent that Apgar held that a victim’s fear during a crime, by itself and without any other 
showing of psychological harm, was sufficient to assess 10 points for OV 4, it was overruled, 
and defendant’s admission was insufficient to sustain the trial court’s scoring. 
 
 
Judgment of sentence vacated; case remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
 
 
Justice CLEMENT took no part in the decision of this case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2017 State of Michigan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FILED  December 26, 2017 
 
 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 149490 
 
ANTHONY TYJUS WHITE, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH (except CLEMENT, J.)  
 
PER CURIAM.  
The issue in this case is whether the trial court erred by assessing 10 points for 
Offense Variable (OV) 4 (“serious psychological injury” to a victim occurred) when the 
only evidence to support this scoring was the victim’s fear while the crime was being 
committed.  We conclude that (a) points for OV 4 may not be assessed solely on the basis 
of a trial court’s conclusion that a “serious psychological injury” would normally occur 
as a result of the crime perpetrated against the victim and (b) evidence of fear while a 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
OPINION 
 
Chief Justice: 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
crime is being committed, by itself, is insufficient to assess points for OV 4.  
Accordingly, the trial court erred by assessing 10 points for OV 4.  Because the 
subtraction of 10 points lowers defendant’s guidelines range for his guilty plea to armed 
robbery, MCL 750.529, from a minimum of 81 to 135 months in prison to a minimum of 
51 to 85 months in prison, we vacate the sentence of the trial court and remand for 
resentencing.  People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82; 711 NW2d 44 (2006).1   
Defendant and an accomplice entered a gas station in Berrien County with guns 
drawn.  Defendant held a gun to the cashier’s head and demanded money while his 
accomplice searched the store.  The cashier gave them money, and they ordered her to lie 
down until they left.  The victim told police that she thought she heard a trigger being 
pulled, but neither of the guns went off.  During his plea colloquy, defendant agreed that 
the victim “was afraid that [defendant] was going to shoot her.”  At sentencing, the trial 
court rejected defendant’s challenge to the scoring of OV 4 at 10 points, reasoning: 
Clearly, any person who has been held at gunpoint has some 
psychological distress, and, clearly, in a situation where they believe their 
life may be ending.  I would suggest when they hear what they believe to be 
a trigger pulled, that that would heighten their psychological distress to 
somewhat a greater—much greater degree.  While there’s nothing, per se, 
indicating this—that there—that she actually suffered psychological 
distress, there’s nothing to indicate that she was fine, either.  And, the Court 
believes it is reasonable to draw a conclusion that as a result of being held 
at gunpoint with a trigger being pulled, that she suffered some type of 
psychological injury that might require some type of psychological 
counseling at some time in the—in the future. 
                                              
1 Defendant also pleaded guilty to one count of breaking and entering, MCL 750.110, and 
the trial court sentenced defendant to 23 to 120 months in prison on that charge.   
 
 
 
3 
There was no victim impact statement, preliminary examination, or victim statement in 
evidence at sentencing.  As calculated by the court, defendant’s minimum sentence 
guidelines range was 81 to 135 months, and the trial court sentenced him to 108 to 480 
months in prison.  The Court of Appeals denied defendant’s delayed application for leave 
to appeal.  
OV 4 is correctly scored at 10 points when a “serious psychological injury 
requiring professional treatment occurred to a victim.”  MCL 777.34(1)(a).  The trial 
court here assessed 10 points on the sole basis of its conclusion that people would 
typically suffer a psychological injury when confronted with the instant crime.  However, 
a trial court “may not simply assume that someone in the victim’s position would have 
suffered psychological harm because MCL 777.34 requires that serious psychological 
injury ‘occurred to a victim,’ ” not that a reasonable person in that situation would have 
suffered a “serious psychological injury.”  People v Lockett, 295 Mich App 165, 183; 814 
NW2d 295 (2012).  Accordingly, the trial court erred in scoring OV 4. 
However, our review of the trial court’s scoring of OV 4 is not limited to the 
reasoning provided by the trial court.  Klooster v City of Charlevoix, 488 Mich 289, 310; 
795 NW2d 578 (2011).  Defendant’s admission during his plea that the victim “was 
afraid that [defendant] was going to shoot her” may alternatively support scoring OV 4 at 
10 points on the basis of People v Apgar, 264 Mich App 321; 690 NW2d 312 (2004).  In 
Apgar, the Court of Appeals held that “[b]ecause the victim testified that she was fearful 
during the encounter with defendant, we find that the evidence presented was sufficient to 
support the trial court’s decision to score OV 4 at ten points.”  Id. at 329.  Apgar is often 
cited for the proposition that a victim’s “expression of fearfulness” during a crime is 
 
 
 
4 
sufficient to assess 10 points for OV 4.  See, e.g., People v Davenport (After Remand), 
286 Mich App 191, 200; 779 NW2d 257 (2009).  However, a recent Court of Appeals 
decision rejected that reasoning, concluding that “the fact that [the victim] was afraid at 
the time of the incident, by itself, does not give rise to a serious psychological injury 
requiring professional treatment.” People v Beach, unpublished per curiam opinion of the 
Court of Appeals, issued April 18, 2017 (Docket No. 330140), p 6.  We agree with the 
Beach panel and overrule Apgar to the extent it held that a victim’s fear during a crime, 
by itself and without any other showing of psychological harm, is sufficient to assess 10 
points for OV 4.2  While crime victims are often obviously, and understandably, 
frightened when a crime is being perpetrated, this fear does not necessarily result in a 
“serious psychological injury” and, as addressed earlier, a court cannot merely assume 
that a victim has suffered a “serious psychological injury” solely because of the 
characteristics of the crime.  Accordingly, defendant’s admission is insufficient to sustain 
the trial court’s scoring.3 
On remand, the trial court shall consider defendant’s issue regarding the 
assessment of court costs and shall not impose a fine for the defendant’s conviction of 
                                              
2 See also Davenport, 286 Mich App at 200; People v Earl, 297 Mich App 104, 109; 822 
NW2d 271 (2012); People v Williams, 298 Mich App 121, 124; 825 NW2d 671 (2012). 
3 Of course, a victim’s fear while a crime is being committed may be highly relevant to 
determining whether he or she suffered a “serious psychological injury [that] may require 
professional treatment” and thus may be considered together with other facts in 
determining how to score OV 4.  We merely hold that, absent other evidence of 
psychological harm, fear felt during the crime is insufficient to assess points for this 
variable. 
 
 
 
5 
armed robbery.  Because the statute under which the sentence was imposed, MCL 
750.529, does not specifically provide for the imposition of a fine, one may not be 
imposed.  See People v Cunningham, 496 Mich 145, 157; 852 NW2d 118 (2014); MCL 
769.1k(1)(b)(i).   
 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
David F. Viviano 
 
Richard H. Bernstein 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
 
 
CLEMENT, J., took no part in the decision of this case.