Case Title: Bergley v. Mann's

Citation: 99 N.W.2d 849

Docket Number: 

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1959-12-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
99 N.W.2d 849 (1959) Madge BERGLEY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MANN'S, a Corporation, and Frank Risovi and Mike Kurtz, also known as Michael Kurtz, a Partnership, Defendants, and Frank Risovi and Mike Kurtz, also known as Michael Kurtz, a Partnership, Defendants and Appellants. No. 7789. Supreme Court of North Dakota. December 10, 1959. *851 Duffy & Haugland, Devils Lake, for appellants. Douglas B. Heen and David Garcia, Devils Lake, for plaintiff-respondent. MORRIS, Judge. On reassignment. This is an action for personal injuries which plaintiff alleges that she received as a result of the negligence of the defendants. The defendant Mann's, a corporation, operates a department store in the City of Devils Lake. The defendants Frank Risovi and Mike Kurtz, copartners, were employed by Mann's to install a new store front. In doing their work they erected a temporary false front which was a wooden structure approximately 25 feet wide, 16 feet high and 4 feet deep. It sat on the sidewalk and extended out 4 feet from the building to which it was attached by braces at each top corner. The braces were new one-by-four lumber nailed to the building at one end and to the false front at the other. The false front was constructed mostly of two-by-fours and three-quarter inch Nuwood sheeting. It was perpendicular. There was about 4 feet of unobstructed sidewalk between the base of the front and the curb. On May 19, 1957 while the plaintiff was standing on the sidewalk the false front parted from the building at the top and fell outward across the unobstructed portion of the sidewalk and partly into the street trapping the plaintiff beneath it and injuring her. The jury rendered a verdict against the defendants Risovi and Kurtz and dismissed the suit against Mann's. The partners appeal from a judgment entered pursuant to the verdict. They made a motion in the alternative for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. From an order denying this motion they also appeal. At the close of the testimony the appellants made a motion for directed verdict. Among the grounds stated was that the *852 undisputed evidence shows that the false front was properly and safely constructed and that there was no negligence on the part of the appellants in the construction or maintenance thereof. It was further urged that there is evidence of an intervening human cause, namely the milling and pushing of a crowd that was watching an automobile exhibition and that there is no evidence of negligence on the part of the appellants. The appellants contend in support of their motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable under the record here presented and that without the application of the doctrine the evidence is wholly insufficient to warrant the jury in determining that the appellants were negligent. In support of this contention it is asserted that the testimony of Risovi negatives any inference of negligence of the appellants in constructing or maintaining the false front and that its fall was probably due to the milling and jostling of a crowd of spectators who were viewing an automobile exhibition on the street. Risovi testified in detail as to the manner in which the front was constructed including the type and kind of lumber and the size and number of the nails used in securing it in place. He says that he directed the moving of the front from another location to the Mann's store and supervised and inspected its attachment to the building by means of the one-by-four boards which were of new lumber. He stated that he had 40 years experience, that he had built many false fronts, had always built them in the same way and attached them to the building in the same manner. He testified that he had been a foreman of other contractors who built the fronts in the same way and that in this instance the front was built and tied to the building in the regular way. When the top of the false front pulled away from the building at the beginning of its fall the one-by-four braces broke. The nails did not pull out. Photographs of the scene taken after the accident, as well as Risovi's statement, indicate this to be true. The accident took place on Sunday afternoon. No work was being done on Sunday. Some material and tools had been stored inside the false front on Saturday night. There was a wheelbarrow, a water barrel and some mortar mix on top of it. These items were standing in their original position after the fall. Some bricks had been stacked on the sidewalk inside the front. These were scattered about. There was also some iron scaffolding which Risovi testified was leaning against the building. The pictures indicate that this scaffolding and a stepladder had fallen outward when the front collapsed. On the Sunday afternoon that the accident happened an exhibition of small Canadian cars took place on the street in the block in which Mann's store was located and in the adjacent block. A policeman who was assigned to prevent the spectators from coming out into the street estimated the crowd at four or five hundred people in the two blocks. Another witness estimated the crowd at two to three hundred. They were mostly on the sidewalk on both sides of the street and moved back and forth along the two blocks where the demonstration was taking place. There was nothing unusual about the crowd and nothing unusual about the people in front of Mann's store. At one time five to nine people were seen leaning against the false front. There were at least thirty people in front of it when it began to fall. The plaintiff does not know what caused the front to fall and invokes the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to establish the appellants' negligence. This frequently quoted explanation of the doctrine by the Supreme Court of the United States is found in Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233, 33 S. Ct. 416, 418, 57 L. Ed. 815, Ann.Cas. 1914D 905: Where the thing that caused the plaintiff's injury is shown to be under the control of the defendant and the accident is of such a nature that it does not ordinarily happen in the absence of negligence on the part of the controlling defendant it affords an inference of negligence which is ordinarily sufficient to make out a prima facie case for the plaintiff and casts upon the defendant the burden of going forward with the evidence. Shearman and Redfield on Negligence, Revised Edition, Section 56; 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, Sections 295 and 311; 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 220(2), (9). A study of many cases from other jurisdictions discloses that the general rule of res ipsa loquitur is easily stated but its application is fraught with difficulties and solutions in this respect have not always been consistent. The appellants argue that the defendant Risovi explained in detail the manner in which the false front was erected and attached to the building and the manner in which tools and other articles were stored within the front on Saturday night. It is further pointed out that he also testified as an expert to the fact that the front was built and attached to the building in the usual manner and that it could not have fallen without the application of some external force. On the basis of this testimony it is urged that any inference which could have been drawn from the accident was dispelled and that as a matter of law the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur became inapplicable and it was error for the court to permit the jury to draw an inference of negligence against the appellants. This argument rests wholly upon the uncorroborated testimony of the defendant Risovi, an interested party. The trier of facts, which in this case is the jury and not the judge, is not required to accept the uncontradicted evidence of an uncorroborated interested party. Stormon v. Weiss, N.D., 65 N.W.2d 475; Ives v. Hanson, N.D., 66 N.W.2d 802; City of Minot v. Kitzman, N.D., 71 N.W.2d 633. In Lejeune v. General Petroleum Corporation, 128 Cal. App. 404, 18 P.2d 429, 435, a seaman was injured when an anchor chain that was being hauled in suddenly reversed. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was held to apply despite the fact that interested witnesses testified without contradiction that the machinery was in good order. The court said: In this case Risovi's credibility and the weight to be given to his testimony were for the jury and did not prevent the consideration of any inference that might arise under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. We cannot say as a matter of law that Risovi's testimony has overcome the inference of negligence that the jury was entitled to draw from the circumstances of the accident. The appellants next contend that the crowd that gathered on the street and in front of and about the false front during the automobile exhibition constituted an intervening cause or force that is a probable reason for the fall of the front and *854 that therefore the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot be applied. It is further argued that when an intervening force is present the defendant does not have control and management of the instrumentality causing the injury and therefore the doctrine can have no application. There is nothing in the evidence to indicate that the crowd was disorderly or that it surged or pushed against the false front. The only contact that people in the vicinity appear to have had with the structure was that some time before it fell a few people were seen leaning against it. The evidence is inconclusive that the crowd or any of the people in it brought about or contributed to the fall, but even assuming the probability of such action on the part of the crowd we have a situation of conflicting probabilities for there still remains the probability of negligent construction or the negligent storage within and against the inside of the false front by the appellants. The appellants argue that to permit the jury to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to such a situation would be to require the jury to guess as between the two probabilities and it is therefore the duty of the court to deny the application of the doctrine. Such an argument might prevail in a case where it could be demonstrated that the probabilities were equal or favored the intervention of the extraneous force. But that is not the situation here. The evidence indicates scarcely more than a possibility that the crowd may have exerted some pressure on the false front. The most that the appellants can hope for in such a situation is that the jury will consider their contentions in a favorable light for the weight to be given to the probabilities is clearly for the jury. In Wood v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America, 273 Wis. 93, 76 N.W.2d 610, 614, the court said: In reaching that conclusion the court quoted from Prosser on Torts, Second Edition, p. 216, Section 43, footnote 20, as follows: In Glowacki v. North Western Ohio Railway & Power Co., 116 Ohio St. 451, 157 N.E. 21, 53 A.L.R. 1486, a child was injured by picking up a live electric wire that had fallen to the ground from an electric power line belonging to the defendant company. The plaintiff urged the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The defendant claimed that the wire had been shot down during the night and the defendant did not know about it until after the child was injured and produced substantial testimony in support of the defense. The court announced the following rule in the syllabus: *855 In Benjamin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 62 Ohio App. 83, 23 N.E.2d 447, it was held: A substantial judgment based on the verdict was sustained. Manuel v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 134 Cal. App. 512, 25 P.2d 509, 511, involved a broken high voltage wire that fell across a fence resulting in injury to the plaintiff. The defendant contended that the electric wire was broken by the impact of a rifle bullet. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was held applicable. The court said: In Bressler v. New York Rapid Transit Corporation, 277 N.Y. 200, 13 N.E.2d 772, it appears that the plaintiff was injured by the breaking of a pane of glass. A piece of glass pierced her eye and destroyed the sight. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable. The Supreme Court of California, in Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915, 924, 53 A.L.R.2d 124, said that: The cause of plaintiff's injuries was the fall of the false front. Clearly it was not such an occurrence as could ordinarily be anticipated. The circumstances of the accident raise an inference of negligence on *856 the part of the appellants who erected and maintained the structure. As we have pointed out, the jury was not bound by Risovi's explanation. The appellants also introduced some evidence implying that the fall was due to the crowd or to some persons in it. Whether this inference was true is a question of fact which it was proper for the jury and not the court to resolve. The court properly refused to resolve it against the verdict of the jury and to grant the appellants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The order denying the appellants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is sustained. This is not the first time a false front has fallen. The event is usually accompanied by no more dire results than injury to feminine dignity. To such an occurrence, in the absence of a strong probability of the application of an outside force, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies. The thing speaks for itself and gives rise to an inference of improper construction or insecure attachment. The appellants quote Section 350, Restatement of the Law of Torts, as follows: They then argue that plaintiff was not a traveler on the sidewalk but merely a licensee and that: It is stated in 25 Am.Jur., Highways, Section 537, that: The controversy at this point seems to be whether the plaintiff at the time of her injury was a traveler with respect to whom the appellants owed the duty of exercising reasonable care or whether she was a licensee to whom they owed no duty except not to harm her willfully, recklessly or wantonly. The plaintiff and her son were watching the races, or exhibition as it was sometimes called, which extended over a street area of two blocks. Mann's store was in one block and the "National Tea" in the other. The plaintiff and her son started watching in front of Mann's store. After the first races were over they walked down to the National Tea, then came back to Mann's store where they stopped. The exhibition was just over and they were ready to leave when the accident occurred. It was apparently authorized by the city authorities. Two policemen were present whose chief purpose was to keep people out of the street while the exhibition was being held. The weight of authority is that both children and adults may use streets for pleasure as well as for moving from place to place. 25 Am.Jur., Highways, Section 429. It is clear that at the time of her injury the plaintiff was lawfully upon *857 the sidewalk which was maintained for the use and convenience of the public. The fact that her purpose was one of pleasure and that she stopped for a short time does not render her a mere licensee of the abutting property owners as the appellants seem to contend and by no rule to be found in the books can she be considered a licensee of the appellants who were independent contractors and themselves using a part of the sidewalk for a special and unusual use. In order to be a traveler it is not necessary that one should keep constantly moving. Silverman v. Usen, 128 Me. 349, 147 A. 421. In Reed v. City of Madison, 83 Wis. 171, 53 N.W. 547, 549, 17 L.R.A. 733, it is said: The duty that the appellants owed to the plaintiff was that owed to a traveler on the sidewalk, not a mere licensee. We come now to the appellants' motion for a new trial which challenges the instructions of the court with respect to res ipsa loquitur. After the court had defined the term "burden of proof" and stated: the court went on to say: Strictly speaking the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not shift the burden of proof to the defendant. That burden abides with the plaintiff throughout the trial and renders it incumbent upon him to prove the defendant's negligence by a preponderance of all the credible evidence. Lejeune v. General Petroleum Corporation, 128 Cal. App. 404, 18 P.2d 429; Lea v. Carolina Power and Light Co., 246 N.C. 287, 98 S.E.2d 9; 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, Section 311; 65 C.J. S. Negligence § 220(9b), p. 1020; Jones Commentaries on Evidence, Second Edition, Volume 2, Section 518. Jones, supra, quotes a suggested instruction from Briglio v. Holt, 85 Wash. 155, 147 P. 877, 879, as follows: While the first part of the instruction with respect to the qualification of the rule of the burden of proof may be subject to criticism we doubt that standing alone it would be sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a reversal. However, an error of much graver import appears in the later part of this instruction by which the jury was told that where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies "the fact of the injury itself is treated as proving negligence unless the defendant, who had control of the thing, can explain and show that the injury was not due to his want of ordinary care." Here we refer to the passage quoted earlier in this opinion from Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233, 33 S. Ct. 416, 57 L. Ed. 815, Ann.Cas.1914D, 905, wherein it is said that res ipsa loquitur means that the facts of the occurrence warrant an inference of negligence which is to be weighed as evidence but not necessarily accepted as sufficient. In Prosser on Torts, Second Edition, Section 43, it is said: The application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur under the circumstances presented in this case created an inference of negligence which the jury might accept or reject regardless of any explanation offered by the appellants. To advise the jury that "the fact of the injury itself is treated as proving negligence" would under any circumstances be erroneous. The court further instructed the jury that: The appellants challenge this instruction by asserting that the inference does not operate as evidence and cannot be considered along with other evidence of negligence. We do not agree with this contention. The inference does operate as *859 evidence in the sense that it, together with evidence of the circumstances surrounding the accident, may create a prima facie case in favor of the plaintiff and may be considered by the jury in reaching its final verdict. See quotation from Prosser, supra. Also 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, Section 309; 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 220(9). The plaintiff points to the rule that though an instruction standing alone may be erroneous it must be considered in connection with the remainder of the charge and if the instructions as a whole correctly advise the jury as to the law the error will not be considered prejudicial, citing Ferderer v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 77 N.D. 169, 42 N.W.2d 216; Moe v. Kettwig, N.D., 68 N.W.2d 853; Froh v. Hein, 76 N.D. 701, 39 N.W.2d 11. This is a salutary rule to apply in the proper case but it cannot be applied here. The instructions on res ipsa loquitur are in part erroneous and are such that they would tend to confuse the jury. The inferences to be drawn from the evidence are conflicting which increases the probability of prejudice. See Rott v. Provident Life Insurance Co., 69 N.D. 335, 286 N.W. 393. The errors are not cured by other parts of the instructions nor can it be said that when taken as a whole the instructions correctly state the law. It follows that the errors contained therein are prejudicial. The order denying the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is sustained. The judgment and order denying the motion for a new trial are reversed and a new trial granted. SATHRE, C. J., and BURKE, J., concur.