Case Title: LexisNexis Risk Data Mgmt., Inc. v. N.C. Admin. Office of Courts

Citation: 

Docket Number: 101PA14

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2015-08-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
NO. COA13-586 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 1 April 2014 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Wake County 
No. 09 CRS 19207 
JASON LYNN YOUNG 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 5 March 2012 by 
Judge Donald W. Stephens in Wake County Superior Court.  Heard 
in the Court of Appeals 12 December 2013. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney 
General Robert C. Montgomery, Assistant Attorney General 
Amy Kunstling Irene, and Assistant Attorney General Daniel 
P. O’Brien, for the State. 
 
Appellate 
Defender 
Staples 
S. 
Hughes, 
by 
Assistant 
Appellate Defender Barbara S. Blackman, for defendant-
appellant.   
 
HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge. 
 
 
Jason Lynn Young (“Defendant”) appeals a jury verdict 
finding him guilty of first-degree murder of his wife, Michelle 
Fisher Young (“Michelle”).  Defendant argues that the trial 
court erred by admitting evidence of the entry of a default 
judgment in a wrongful death action and a child custody 
complaint against Defendant in his subsequent criminal trial.  
We agree, vacate the judgment, and remand for a new trial.   
-2- 
 
 
I. Facts & Procedural History 
The Wake County Grand Jury indicted Defendant for first-
degree murder on 14 December 2009.  Defendant’s case was tried 
in Wake County Superior Court on 31 May 2011 with Judge Donald 
W. Stephens presiding.  On 27 June 2011, a mistrial was declared 
when the jury deadlocked eight to four to acquit Defendant.  
Defendant’s retrial began at the 17 January 2012 session of 
Wake County Superior Court, with Judge Stephens again presiding.  
On 5 March 2012, the jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree 
murder and sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without 
parole.  Notice of appeal was given in open court.  The 
testimony presented at trial tended to show the following facts. 
A. State’s Evidence 
Michelle Young was found at her home by her sister, 
Meredith Fisher (“Meredith”), around 1:00 p.m. on 3 November 
2006.  Meredith found Michelle after Defendant called Meredith, 
asking her to retrieve some printouts of eBay searches for Coach 
purses.  Defendant was out of town on a business trip and left a 
voicemail for Meredith stating his plan to purchase these purses 
as a belated anniversary present.  Defendant did not want 
Michelle to find out beforehand.  
-3- 
 
 
 
Meredith complied with Defendant’s requests and entered the 
Youngs’ home through the garage door, which was broken, and then 
through the unlocked kitchen door to the home’s mudroom.  
Meredith noticed her sister’s car was in the garage and that her 
keys and purse were visible near the kitchen counter.  After 
entering, Meredith called out Michelle’s name and heard no 
response.  Meredith heard the Youngs’ dog, “Mr. G.,” whimpering, 
but she did not see him.  The house was cold.  
 
As Meredith ascended the home’s stairs, she saw what she 
thought was dark red hair dye at the top of the staircase in the 
bathroom of the Youngs’ two-and-a-half-year-old daughter, Emily.1  
Meredith first thought that Emily had smeared hair dye around 
the home and that Michelle would be angry about the mess.  When 
Meredith reached the top of the stairs and looked to the left, 
she saw Michelle lying on the floor, surrounded by a large 
amount of blood.  
Meredith called 911, and as she did, Meredith said “[Emily] 
lifted up the covers and just kind of stared at me and I just 
kind of stared back at her and then she just kind of got on me 
and clung to me as I called 911.”  During the call, Emily 
continually asked for band-aids and said that her mother “has 
                     
1 The pseudonym “Emily” is used to protect the identity of the 
child involved in this case. 
-4- 
 
 
boo-boos everywhere.”  The 911 operator asked Meredith if 
Michelle had any personal problems, to which Meredith replied 
“[u]m not really. You know her and her husband fight a little 
bit, but nothing too ridiculous.”  Meredith also told the 911 
operator that her “niece is very smart for her age” and that she 
thought Emily was saying “there was somebody in the house.”  
Paramedics and the Wake County Sheriff’s Office responded to 
Meredith’s call.  
Emily was not injured and appeared “clean” when Meredith 
arrived, except for some dried blood on Emily’s toenails and on 
the bottom of her pajama pants.  Meredith said she did not clean 
Emily.  Emily was wearing fleece pajamas, was not wearing 
underpants or footwear, and did not urinate or defecate on 
herself or the bed.  Emily clung to Meredith’s hip until they 
both were taken away by emergency personnel.  Later, Meredith 
called her mother Linda Fisher (“Linda”) in New York to tell her 
of Michelle’s passing and later told Defendant’s mother Pat 
Young (“Pat”) of Michelle’s death. 
 
Sheriff’s officers found Michelle with a large amount of 
coagulated, 
dried 
blood 
around 
her 
body 
and 
with 
blood 
splattering against the walls of her bedroom.  Michelle’s body 
was discolored, cold, and stiff.  She was not wearing shoes and 
-5- 
 
 
was dressed in sweatpants and a zip-up sweatshirt.  Blood was 
observed on the opposite side of the bed from where Meredith 
found Emily.  Defendant’s DNA and fingerprints were present in 
the bedroom, although none of his fingerprints contained blood. 
Michelle was lying face-down just outside of a closet 
labeled “his closet.”  A child’s doll was near Michelle’s head.  
Blood was also found on the exterior of this closet, and inside 
of the closet door.  The only blood found outside of the second 
floor of the Youngs’ home was found on the doorknob leading from 
the kitchen to the garage, and its DNA markers were consistent 
with Michelle’s DNA.  No blood was found in or on Defendant’s 
vehicle, his clothes, or in the hotel room where he stayed on 2 
November 2006.  
The medical examiner who conducted the autopsy, Dr. Thomas 
Clark (“Dr. Clark”), opined that Michelle experienced blunt 
force trauma to her head and body.  The trauma included a broken 
jaw, 
skull 
fracturing, 
brain 
hemorrhaging, 
lacerations, 
abrasions, and dislodged teeth.  Dr. Clark stated that there 
were likely at least thirty blows delivered to Michelle, and the 
medical examiner testified that he thought the blows were 
inflicted by “a heavy blunt object” with a rounded surface that 
produced crescent-shaped skull fractures.  Dr. Clark said the 
-6- 
 
 
autopsy did not produce evidence of a sexual assault against 
Michelle.  Michelle was approximately twenty weeks pregnant when 
she passed away. 
Small footprints in blood, consistent with a child’s 
footprints, were found around the bedroom and at the top of the 
stairwell landing.  Investigators testified that blood was 
smeared on the walls at a child’s level in Emily’s bathroom.  
Investigators said the blood smearing could indicate that Emily 
was in her bathroom with the door closed.  Investigators did not 
find blood in the sink or bathtub of either the master bathroom 
or Emily’s bathroom.  
 
Several other pieces of evidence were presented by federal, 
state, and county investigators.  Michael Smith of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, Andy Parker of the Wake/Raleigh City 
and County Bureau of Investigation (“CCBI”), and Karen Morrow of 
the State Bureau of Investigation testified at trial.  Smith, 
Parker, and Morrow testified that footwear impressions in blood 
were made by two distinct shoe types on pillows found near 
Michelle.  These included impressions that corresponded with 
size 12 Hush Puppy Orbital, Sealy, and Belleville shoes which 
all had the same outsole design.  Smith, Morrow, and Parker also 
testified that there were additional impressions made by a 
-7- 
 
 
different shoe type, consistent with a size 10 Air Fit or 
Franklin athletic shoe.  Karen Morrow and Greg Tart of the State 
Bureau of Investigation testified that Defendant at one time 
owned size 12 Hush Puppy Orbitals, which were purchased on 4 
July 2005.  The State never produced shoes matching either of 
the impressions.  The State also never produced a murder weapon. 
A jewelry box in the master bedroom had two drawers 
removed, and DNA testing showed four markers that did not 
include Defendant or Michelle’s DNA.  Meredith testified that 
Michelle “didn’t really have a lot of fancy jewelry” except her 
wedding and engagement rings, and that she “always wore” her 
wedding and engagement rings.  Michelle’s wedding and engagement 
rings were both missing from her body when she was found and the 
rings were not recovered.  Additional unidentified fingerprints 
were found in the house.  Investigators found no signs of forced 
entry.  
Printouts from eBay concerning purses were found on an 
office printer with three fingerprints; one matched Defendant 
and two others remain unidentified.  Forensic analyst Beth 
Whitney of the CCBI (“Ms. Whitney”) also said Internet searches 
for purses were made between 7:05 p.m. and 7:23 p.m. on 2 
November 2006.  Ms. Whitney testified that MapQuest inquiries 
-8- 
 
 
for directions between Raleigh and Clintwood, Virginia, were 
also made that evening, as well as e-mail logins to Defendant’s 
personal email account.  Ms. Whitney also found that, at an 
undetermined time, Internet searches were made on the Youngs’ 
home computer for “anatomy of a knockout,” “head trauma 
blackout,” “head blow knockout,” and “head trauma.” 
i. Evening of 2 November 2006 
Michelle’s sorority sister and close friend, Ms. Shelly 
Schaad (“Ms. Schaad”), arrived at the Youngs’ home around 6:30 
p.m. on 2 November 2006.  Ms. Schaad arrived to have dinner and 
to watch Grey’s Anatomy on television with Michelle.  Ms. Schaad 
said she was surprised Defendant was still home.  Ms. Schaad 
picked up dinner on the way to the Youngs’ house and invited 
Defendant to eat.  Defendant said he planned to stop at the 
Cracker Barrel in Greensboro to have dinner, drive three hours 
to Galax to spend the evening, and then drive two hours the next 
morning to a 10:30 meeting.  As Defendant left for the evening, 
Ms. Schaad asked Defendant if he would return for the N.C. State 
football game on 4 November 2006.  Defendant said it depended on 
whether his father-in-law, Alan Fisher, would come for the 
weekend.  Defendant expected his father-in-law to visit, and 
Defendant 
had 
spent 
the 
afternoon 
cleaning 
the 
yard 
in 
-9- 
 
 
anticipation of his arrival.  Defendant’s father-in-law called 
and cancelled his visit that evening.  After he left, Defendant 
called the Young residence seven times that evening. 
Michelle and Ms. Schaad had dinner, bathed Emily, diapered 
her, and dressed her in pajamas.  Michelle and Ms. Schaad talked 
about an argument between the Youngs over Defendant’s mother-in-
law, Linda, staying at their home for the majority of the time 
between Thanksgiving and Christmas.  Defendant was upset with 
the length of her potential stay.  
Ms. Schaad testified that she had an “eerie feeling” that 
evening.  Ms. Schaad asked Michelle if she was scared to be 
alone.  Ms. Schaad testified that Michelle 
proceeded to say, you know, Jason’s heard a 
lot of noises lately around the house, you 
know, but her thoughts were, you know, if -- 
and her exact words to me, if someone’s 
going to break in and their intention is to 
kill you, then that’s what they’re going to 
do, and it was very unsettling.   
 
Ms. Schaad said she felt like the two were being watched and 
asked Michelle to walk her to her vehicle before she left that 
evening. 
ii. Defendant’s Location on 2 and 3 November 2006 
Defendant purchased gasoline in Raleigh at approximately 
7:30 p.m. on 2 November 2006 and then went to a Cracker Barrel 
-10- 
 
 
restaurant in Greensboro.  Defendant called his mother Pat, who 
lived in Brevard, while at the Raleigh gas station.  Defendant 
paid for his meal at the Cracker Barrel at 9:25 p.m. and checked 
into a room at the Hampton Inn in Hillsville, Virginia at 10:54 
p.m.  Data from the keycards used to gain access to the hotel 
rooms showed that Defendant entered his room at 10:56 p.m. and 
did not use his keycard to re-enter his hotel room for the 
remainder of his stay. 
Security camera footage tended to show that Defendant wore 
a light shirt, jeans, and brown slip-on shoes at the Cracker 
Barrel and upon entering the Hampton Inn.  Two pairs of brown 
slip-on shoes were found in Defendant’s vehicle when police 
later seized it on 3 November 2006. 
Defendant was also captured on video at the hotel just 
before midnight at the front desk and walking down a hallway 
that lead to stairs and an exit door, wearing what appeared to 
be a darker colored shirt with a light-colored horizontal stripe 
across the chest.  Defendant was not shown on surveillance 
footage for the remainder of the evening. 
The night-clerk at the Hampton Inn distributed check-out 
receipts and hung copies of the USA Today on door handles 
between 3:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. or later.  Both the receipt for 
-11- 
 
 
Defendant’s stay as well as a weekend edition of the USA Today 
were found in Defendant’s Ford Explorer on 3 November 2006, when 
police seized it.  
Early in the morning on 3 November 2006, Hampton Inn Clerk 
Mr. Keith Hicks (“Mr. Hicks”) noticed that the emergency door on 
the first floor at the western end of the hotel was propped open 
with a small red rock.  Mr. Hicks removed the rock and shut the 
door.  Immediately next to the door was a glass door that could 
only be accessed via keycard between 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.  A 
sign next to the door listed the hours the door was locked; at 
all other times the glass door was unlocked. 
When Mr. Hicks returned to the front desk and reviewed the 
hotel’s surveillance cameras, he noticed that the camera was 
malfunctioning in the same stairwell where the door was left 
ajar.  Mr. Hicks later determined that the camera was unplugged, 
and Mr. Hicks asked a maintenance worker, Elmer Goad (“Mr. 
Goad”), to plug the camera in again.  Mr. Goad testified that if 
someone were six feet tall, they would be able to easily reach 
the camera’s plug.  The last image from the camera was at 
11:19:59 p.m. on 2 November 2006, and no images were recorded 
until 5:50 a.m. on 3 November 2006, when Mr. Goad got a 
stepladder and plugged the camera in again. 
-12- 
 
 
The camera worked properly from 5:50 a.m. until 6:34 a.m., 
but at 6:35 a.m., the camera was pointed at the ceiling.  Mr. 
Goad put the camera back in position and focused it on the 
bottom of the stairs at 6:38 a.m.  The hotel said the camera was 
never unplugged previously and that the only other time that 
camera was tampered with was several years prior, when some 
guests snuck in and out of the exit door.  CCBI investigator 
Andy Parker performed a fingerprint analysis on the camera and 
testified that the State did not find Defendant’s fingerprints 
on 
the 
security 
camera. 
 
Investigator 
Eddie 
McCormick 
(“Investigator McCormick”) also testified that tests conducted 
by the State did not show that any fibers were transferred from 
the Hampton Inn where Defendant stayed on 2 November 2006 to the 
Youngs’ home at 5108 Birchleaf Drive. 
The hotel had no record of when Defendant left on 3 
November 2006.  The State’s first evidence showing his location 
was from a call he made to his mother Pat around thirty miles 
from the hotel near Wythville, Virginia at 7:40 a.m.  Defendant 
made several calls to his mother and others while driving to 
Clintwood, 
with 
several 
lasting 
ten 
seconds 
or 
less.  
Investigator McCormick testified it was possible the large 
number of short calls could be from dropped phone calls, but he 
-13- 
 
 
also 
said 
that 
“knowing 
what 
I 
know 
about 
telephonic 
investigations,” the call frequency reflected a person who was 
panicked.  
Defendant was thirty minutes late to his 10:00 a.m. sales 
call in Clintwood, Virginia.  Defendant purchased gas in 
Duffield at 12:06 p.m. and then left a voicemail for Meredith. 
Detective Richard Spivey of the Wake County Sheriff’s 
Office (“Detective Spivey”) testified that his deputy drove 
between Raleigh and Hillsville, Virginia in two hours and 
twenty-five minutes without traffic.  Three gas receipts were 
found in Defendant’s vehicle, one from Raleigh on 2 November 
2006, Duffield on 3 November 2006, and Burlington at 8:32 p.m. 
on 3 November 2006.  Officers also canvassed gas stations 
between Hillsville and Raleigh.  Ms. Gracie Calhoun (“Ms. 
Calhoun”), who worked at the Four Brothers BP in King, North 
Carolina, said she saw a man drive to a pump and attempt to pump 
gas in the early morning hours of 3 November 2006.  The State’s 
investigators said that the Four Brothers BP was along the most 
direct route between Raleigh and Hillsville and was the only gas 
station open at that particular exit. 
Ms. Calhoun was shown a photograph of Defendant’s white 
Ford Explorer on 5 November 2006 and asked if she saw the car on 
-14- 
 
 
3 November 2006.  When Ms. Calhoun was shown Defendant’s 
photograph, she identified him as the vehicle’s driver.  Ms. 
Calhoun was not asked to provide a physical description prior to 
seeing Defendant’s photo, and stated that the Defendant was 
“just a little bit taller than me,” although Ms. Calhoun is five 
feet tall and Defendant is six-foot-one.  Ms. Calhoun stated 
that she had not seen any news reports about the case when she 
was asked about the vehicle.  Ms. Calhoun said she remembered 
Defendant specifically because he cursed at her, and that it 
left an impression because only one other person had ever cursed 
at her during her tenure at the Four Brothers BP.  It is around 
a forty to forty-five minute drive from the Hillsville Hampton 
Inn to the Four Brothers BP. 
Ms. Calhoun testified that Defendant came into the store 
and cursed at her because the pumps were not on, threw $20 at 
her, pumped $15 of gas and drove off without returning for 
change.  Store records showed several gas and in-store purchases 
between 5:00 a.m. and 5:40 a.m., including a $15 gas purchase at 
5:27 a.m. and a $20 gas purchase at 5:36 a.m.  
After the first trial concluded, Defendant’s counsel 
learned that Ms. Calhoun had received disability benefits since 
she was a child.  Ms. Calhoun stated that when she was six-
-15- 
 
 
years-old, she was hit by a truck.  This accident caused her 
brain to be dislodged from her skull and to fall onto the 
street.  Doctors reinserted her brain and Ms. Calhoun stated 
that she has had memory problems her entire life as a result of 
the accident. 
The State presented evidence that a newspaper delivery 
person passed by the Youngs’ home between 3:30 a.m. and 4 a.m. 
and noticed that the interior, exterior, and driveway lights 
were on, which she considered unusual at that hour.  The 
delivery person testified that she saw a light colored SUV in 
front of the home and that a minivan was across the street.  
After Defendant arrived and learned from his mother of 
Michelle’s passing, he spoke with Meredith over the phone.  
Meredith told Defendant to come to her home because the Youngs’ 
home was a crime scene.  When speaking to Meredith, he asked 
about Emily, what had happened, and seemed upset over the phone. 
Officers began to question Meredith and friends of the 
Youngs about possible marital problems.  After the questioning, 
Defendant’s friends Josh Dalton and Ryan Schaad suggested he not 
speak to police until he retained counsel.  On counsel’s advice, 
Defendant never answered any questions from law enforcement or 
spoke about Michelle’s death with friends or family. 
-16- 
 
 
Defendant arrived at Meredith’s home along with his mother, 
sister, and brother-in-law around 9 or 10 p.m. on 3 November 
2006.  Defendant hugged Meredith and went to see Emily.  
Meredith said Defendant was wearing “dress pants, dress shoes, a 
thermal cut crew neck shirt, a couple buttons here, and a dress 
shirt over that open.”  Police arrived at the home and Defendant 
refused to speak with them.  Later in the evening, Defendant and 
Linda were alone in the home, watching Emily, and Linda said 
Defendant told her that his lawyer said he could not talk to 
anyone and that he was “going to take a hit on the house.”  
iii. Marital Difficulties 
 
The State produced several witnesses who testified that the 
Youngs experienced difficulties in their marriage, including   
Meredith, Ms. Schaad, and Defendant’s friend Josh Dalton.  Ms. 
Schaad described the Youngs’ relationship as “volatile.” 
Meredith also noted marital problems between Michelle and 
Defendant and suggested divorce to Defendant and Michelle.  
Meredith said the Youngs “would get in screaming matches.  
They’d fight in public.”  Meredith testified that on 1 November 
2006, Michelle told Meredith that she had fought with Defendant 
and that he threw a remote at her.  Meredith averred that before 
-17- 
 
 
her 
death, 
Michelle 
became 
“withdrawn,” 
“depressed” 
and 
“miserable.”  
 
On 12 September 2006, Defendant sent an e-mail to the work 
address of his former fiancée, Genevieve Cargol (“Ms. Cargol”) 
professing his love for her.  Defendant and Ms. Cargol did not 
have contact for several years before this e-mail, which Ms. 
Cargol did not receive at the time.  Ms. Cargol testified that 
Defendant 
was 
violent 
at 
several 
points 
during 
their 
relationship, once punching and breaking Ms. Cargol’s car 
windshield, punching a hole in a wall, and forcibly removing the 
engagement ring from her finger. 
 
Defendant had extra-marital affairs with two other women 
while married to Michelle.  Defendant communicated with one of 
these women, Michelle Money (“Ms. Money”) regularly and engaged 
in sexual intercourse in Orlando, Florida on 7 October 2006.  
Defendant’s friend Josh Dalton stated that Defendant said “he 
felt like he was in love with” Ms. Money.  Defendant and Ms. 
Money discussed meeting on 3 through 5 November 2006, although 
Ms. Money said Defendant did not want to meet that weekend as he 
had a business meeting as well as friends and family staying at 
his home.  Defendant and Ms. Money also contacted each other 
several times by phone on 2–3 November 2006.  Ms. Money said 
-18- 
 
 
Defendant sounded normal during the calls and that he also 
mentioned having left printouts in his office for a Coach purse 
he planned to buy for Michelle.  Defendant also had a sexual 
relationship with a different woman in the Youngs’ home while 
Michelle was out of town on another occasion. 
On 27 October 2006, Michelle saw a counselor by herself, 
Ms. Kimberly Sargent.  Ms. Sargent testified that Michelle 
“cried the entire session.”  Ms. Sargent said her “assessment of 
the situation was that [Michelle] was being verbally abused.” 
iv. Emily’s Statements at Daycare 
 
Emily returned to daycare the Monday after Michelle’s 
death.  The State introduced testimony of Emily’s daycare 
teacher, Brooke Bass (“Ms. Bass”).  Defendant objected to 
admitting this testimony and was overruled. 
Ms. Bass testified that Emily kept to herself more than 
usual that week.  Ms. Bass said Emily asked for a “mommy” doll 
and was given a bucket of dolls to play with.  Ms. Bass saw 
Emily select a female doll with long brown hair that Emily 
called the “mommy doll,” and a second female doll with short 
hair.  Ms. Bass stated that Emily began hitting the two dolls 
together.  Another daycare teacher, Ashley Palmatier (“Ms. 
Palmatier”) asked Emily what she was doing and said Emily hit 
-19- 
 
 
the dolls together and said “mommy’s getting a spanking for 
biting.”  Emily then laid the doll face-down on a dollhouse bed, 
saying “mommy had boo-boos all over, mommy has red stuff all 
over.”  Emily’s teachers told police what she said at daycare.  
Ms. Bass testified that Emily did not return to the daycare 
after these statements were made.  These statements were not 
introduced at Defendant’s first trial. 
v. Introduction of Civil Suits 
 
Evidence of two separate civil suits was introduced at 
Defendant’s second trial over Defendant’s objection.  The State 
introduced evidence showing Linda, on behalf of the estate, 
filed a wrongful death action and a request for a slayer 
declaration against Defendant on 29 October 2008.  Defendant did 
not respond to the suit, and on 5 December 2008, Judge Stephens 
heard Plaintiff Linda’s motion for entry of a default judgment.  
Judge Stephens reviewed the affidavits and entered a judgment 
that Defendant “unlawfully killed” Michelle.  Defendant was the 
beneficiary of Michelle’s $4 million life insurance policy, but 
did not make a claim on the policy.  Defendant’s assets were 
seized as a result of the $15 million judgment for Linda. 
 
After Michelle’s death, Defendant took Emily to Brevard, 
and the Fisher family was allowed to see Emily at several 
-20- 
 
 
visits.  Defendant later did not want the Fishers to have 
contact with Emily.  Defendant refused to agree to a visitation 
schedule, and the Fishers filed suit. 
The Fishers filed a child custody complaint against 
Defendant on 17 December 2008.  The complaint said Defendant 
“brutally murdered Michelle Marie Fisher Young . . . at their 
residence.  Michelle was pregnant with [Defendant’s] son at the 
time of her murder.  Upon information and belief [Emily] was in 
the residence at the time [Defendant] murdered her mother.”  The 
lawsuit requested a psychological evaluation of Defendant, and 
would have required discovery and depositions.  Defendant agreed 
to a consent order and transferred primary physical custody of 
Emily to Meredith.  The consent order required that no discovery 
or depositions be taken. 
vi. Defendant’s Mistrial Testimony 
 
Defendant testified at his first trial, and the State 
introduced his testimony at the retrial.  Defendant denied 
killing his wife, denied being present when she was killed, and 
denied having any knowledge of who killed Michelle.  Defendant 
said that he loved Michelle, that he did not plan to divorce 
Michelle, and that he did not plan to leave Michelle for any of 
the other women he had sexual relationships with.  Defendant 
-21- 
 
 
testified that after Emily was born, Michelle had a miscarriage.  
Defendant said he and Michelle began trying to conceive another 
child as soon as Michelle received medical clearance to bear 
another child.  Defendant said he was “ecstatic” that he would 
soon have a son. 
 
Defendant testified that he thought he and Michelle didn’t 
fight much more than other couples, but that the couple “fought 
more openly than other couples.”  Defendant said he encouraged 
his sister-in-law Meredith to mediate disputes between Michelle 
and Defendant.  Defendant testified that his disputes with 
Michelle never turned physical.  Defendant also testified that 
he had “a lot of guilt” for spending his anniversary weekend 
with Ms. Money, rather than his wife Michelle, and so he planned 
to purchase a Coach handbag to “make up for a lot in a big way.”  
Defendant called Meredith several times to retrieve the papers 
from the family printer because he “really wanted it to be a 
surprise.”  Defendant thought that the gift had special 
significance because it was a leather purse for his and 
Michelle’s third anniversary, which is commonly known as the 
“leather anniversary.” 
 
Defendant said he had just begun a new job with an 
electronic health records company, and a schedule was set for 
-22- 
 
 
him to make a sales call in Clintwood, Virginia.  Defendant’s 
sales call was at 10:00 a.m. on 3 November 2006, so Defendant 
said he planned to “break the trip up” by staying at a hotel 
about half-way between Clintwood and Raleigh.  Defendant said he 
did not make a hotel reservation prior to staying at the Hampton 
Inn in Hillsville.  After checking into the hotel, Defendant 
said he called Michelle and Ms. Money. 
Defendant said he was nervous about the sales call, as it 
was his first solo sales call.  Defendant said he wanted to 
review the software on his computer and forgot his charging 
cable for his computer in his car.  Defendant said he left the 
hotel room door slightly ajar so he could re-enter without 
disturbing his neighbors.  As he left to go to his vehicle, 
Defendant said he went out the exit door, noticed it was a type 
of door which would not allow re-entry, broke off a piece of 
shrubbery to prop the door, retrieved his charger and re-entered 
the room.  
Defendant said he finished on his computer around 11:53 
p.m. and said he wanted to smoke a cigar and catch up on some 
sports news.  Defendant said he then picked up a newspaper from 
the front desk, walked down the hallway, inserted a stick in the 
door, went outside and smoked.  Defendant said he later re-
-23- 
 
 
entered and went to sleep.  Defendant also said he arrived 
thirty minutes late for his appointment the next morning because 
he had gotten lost.  Defendant said he tried to call his 
appointment to let them know he would be late, but that the cell 
phone service was “nil to one bar.”  
After his sales meeting, Defendant drove south toward 
Brevard, arrived at his mother’s house, and his stepfather told 
him that Michelle was dead.  Defendant said he “just broke” and 
cried.  Defendant said some friends called and told him he 
needed “to get a lawyer before” talking to anyone.  Defendant’s 
sister left a message for an attorney she previously employed, 
and Defendant eventually met with a lawyer, who advised him to 
not speak with police. 
Defendant also said he purchased a pair of brown Hush Puppy 
Orbital shoes, and that they were donated to Goodwill by 
Michelle prior to 2 November 2006.  Defendant also introduced a 
photograph of himself in 2007 at Emily’s third birthday party, 
showing Defendant wearing a dark pullover with a stripe on it.  
Defendant also said he could not afford a lawyer for a custody 
fight between Defendant and Michelle’s family.  Defendant also 
made internet searches on his home computer for head trauma and 
anatomy of a knockout, which he said he made after being the 
-24- 
 
 
“first responder” to a car accident where a person was knocked 
out.  
The State offered several pieces of evidence to rebut 
Defendant’s testimony.  The State noted that prior to trial, 
Defendant received copies of all the State’s investigative 
files, which included field and interview notes.  The State’s 
analysis of Defendant’s computer activities did not show 
Defendant completed work-related activities on his computer that 
evening.  The State produced testimony from Meredith and other 
friends of the Youngs that Defendant did not like smoking and 
that he disliked the smell of smoke.  The State also introduced 
evidence showing that on 2 November 2006 at 11:40 p.m. it was 
cold and windy where Defendant said he smoked the cigar.  
Detective Spivey testified that no “substantial outerwear” 
besides a suit jacket was found in Defendant’s luggage.  
The State rested its case on 24 February 2012.  Defendant 
moved to dismiss the case at that time.  The trial court denied 
Defendant’s motion, and Defendant began presenting his case on 
27 February 2012. 
B. Defendant’s Evidence  
Defendant’s mother Pat said Defendant called her the 
evening of 2 November 2006 and discussed bringing home a wash 
-25- 
 
 
stand and an antique dresser when Defendant’s family visited at 
Thanksgiving.  Defendant said he would call Michelle to see if 
he could spend the evening at their home and pick the furniture 
up, as he was nearby in southern Virginia.  Pat said Defendant 
noted that he would have to leave early on Saturday to get home 
for his guests who were attending the N.C. State football game. 
Defendant was thirty minutes late to his meeting at 
Dickinson Hospital with Jennifer Sproles; he said he was lost 
and was not able to call because of poor cell phone service.   
Defendant called Pat in the morning on 3 November 2006 to tell 
her he would pick up a wash stand at her home in Brevard.  
Defendant introduced testimony from an AT&T analyst who said the 
large number of short phone calls were consistent with dropped 
phone calls.  Defendant later called Pat asking her to call 
Meredith about the eBay printouts, which Pat did. 
 
Before Defendant arrived at her home on 3 November 2006, 
Pat received a call from Linda stating that Michelle was 
deceased.  Pat decided not to tell Defendant over the phone.  
When Defendant arrived at her home, Defendant’s stepfather told 
Defendant of Michelle’s death, and Defendant fell to the ground 
and began crying. 
-26- 
 
 
 
Defendant’s sister Heather McCracken (“Heather”) and his 
brother-in-law, Joe McCracken (“Joe”), came to the home to see 
Defendant, who was pale, crying, and laying with a blanket 
draped over himself in a recliner.  Joe drove Defendant, Pat, 
and Heather in his Ford Explorer to Meredith’s home in Fuquay-
Varina.  During the ride, Defendant said he would lose his home 
and that there was no way he could afford the home.  Defendant’s 
luggage remained in his vehicle and Pat said nothing was removed 
between his arrival in Brevard and their arrival at Meredith’s 
home in Fuquay-Varina. 
 
Pat and Defendant’s family later packed up the Youngs’ home 
two months after Michelle’s death and found a cigar humidor that 
said “Quick Set” on the exterior.  Defendant previously sold 
Quick Set locks.  A credit card purchase was made on a credit 
card in Michelle’s name at a Tampa, Florida store called “Cigars 
by Antonio.” 
 
Defendant introduced testimony of a newspaper deliveryman 
who drove by the Youngs’ home at 5108 Birchleaf Drive around 
3:50 a.m., noticed that nothing seemed unusual, and did not see 
a vehicle. 
A neighbor, Cynthia Beaver (“Ms. Beaver”), testified that 
she passed by the Youngs’ home between 5:20 and 5:30 a.m. and 
-27- 
 
 
saw that the home’s lights and driveway lights were on, and that 
there was a light-colored “soccer-mom car” with its lights on 
and placed at the edge of the driveway.  Ms. Beaver said a white 
male was in the driver’s seat and another person was in the 
passenger’s seat, who may have been a female.  Another neighbor, 
Fay Hinsley, said she saw an empty S.U.V. at the edge of the 
driveway between 6 and 6:30 a.m.  
Unlike the first trial, Defendant did not testify at his 
second trial.  Defendant rested his case on 29 February 2012.  
The jury returned a unanimous verdict finding Defendant guilty 
of first-degree murder of Michelle.  The trial court then 
entered a life without parole sentence as required by law. 
II. Jurisdiction 
 
Defendant’s appeal from the superior court’s final judgment 
lies of right to this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A–
27(b), 15A–1444(a) (2013).   
III. Analysis 
a. Introduction of Civil Judgment and Pleadings 
 
Defendant argues that introduction of a default judgment 
and complaint in a wrongful death suit, which stated that 
Defendant killed Michelle, is reversible error.  We agree.  
Defendant also argues that introducing the child custody 
-28- 
 
 
complaint into evidence against Defendant was reversible error.  
We agree.2 
 
Introduction of the complaints and default judgment concern 
whether the trial court erred by violating N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-
149 (2013).  Introduction of this evidence is reviewed de novo.  
State v. Young, 324 N.C. 489, 494, 380 S.E.2d 94, 97 (1989) 
(holding that a violation of a statutory mandates is reviewable 
de novo without objection). 
The State argues that State v. Ashe, 314 N.C. 28, 331 
S.E.2d 652 (1985) precludes de novo review of these issues 
because Defendant cited only Rule 403 of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure when objecting to introduction of the default judgment 
and complaint.  We disagree.  Ashe recognizes that “when a trial 
court acts contrary to a statutory mandate and a defendant is 
prejudiced thereby, the right to appeal the court’s action is 
preserved, notwithstanding defendant’s failure to object at 
trial.”  Id. at 39, 331 S.E.2d at 659.  Further, “‘where 
evidence is rendered incompetent by statute, it is the duty of 
the trial judge to exclude it, and his failure to do so is 
reversible error, whether objection is interposed and exception 
                     
2 Because we grant Defendant a new trial based on the trial 
court’s improper admission of evidence under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
1-149, we do not address Defendant’s motion for appropriate 
relief because it is moot. 
-29- 
 
 
noted or not.’”  Christensen v. Christensen, 101 N.C. App. 47, 
54–55, 398 S.E.2d 634, 638 (1990) (quoting State v. McCall, 289 
N.C. 570, 577, 223 S.E.2d 334, 338 (1976)) (emphasis added), 
superseded by statute as stated in Offerman v. Offerman, 137 
N.C. App. 289, 527 S.E.2d 684 (2000). 
Under de novo review, we examine the case with new eyes.  
“[D]e novo means fresh or anew; for a second time, and an appeal 
de novo is an appeal in which the appellate court uses the trial 
court’s record but reviews the evidence and law without 
deference to the trial court’s rulings.”  Parker v. Glosson, 182 
N.C. App. 229, 231, 641 S.E.2d 735, 737 (2007) (quotation marks 
and citations omitted).  “Under a de novo review, the court 
considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own 
judgment for that of the lower tribunal.”  Craig v. New Hanover 
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 337, 678 S.E.2d 351, 354 
(2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
The first issue concerning admitting evidence of the 
default judgment may also be reviewed as an evidentiary matter 
de novo, for an abuse of discretion, and under plain error.  
State v. Mason, 315 N.C. 724, 731, 340 S.E.2d 430, 435 (1986); 
State v. Martinez, 212 N.C. App. 661, 664, 711 S.E.2d 787, 789 
-30- 
 
 
(2011); State v. Johnson, 209 N.C. App. 682, 692, 706 S.E.2d 
790, 797 (2011).   
“When 
discretionary 
rulings 
are 
made 
under 
a 
misapprehension of the law, this may constitute an abuse of 
discretion.”  Gailey v. Triangle Billiards & Blues Club, Inc., 
179 N.C. App. 848, 851, 635 S.E.2d 482, 484 (2006). 
Plain error is explained in State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C 506, 
723 S.E.2d 326 (2012): 
For error to constitute plain error, a 
defendant 
must 
demonstrate 
that 
a 
fundamental error occurred at trial. To show 
that an error was fundamental, a defendant 
must 
establish 
prejudice 
that, 
after 
examination of the entire record, the error 
had a probable impact on the jury’s finding 
that the defendant was guilty. Moreover, 
because 
plain 
error 
is 
to 
be 
applied 
cautiously and only in the exceptional case, 
the error will often be one that seriously 
affects the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings. 
 
Id. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334 (quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-149 provides that “[n]o pleading can be 
used in a criminal prosecution against the party as proof of a 
fact admitted or alleged in it.”  Id. (emphasis added).3  
Further: 
                     
3 We note that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-149 was not brought to the 
-31- 
 
 
[A] judgment in a civil action is not 
admissible 
in 
a 
subsequent 
criminal 
prosecution 
although 
exactly 
the 
same 
questions are in dispute in both cases, for 
the reason that the parties are not the 
same, and different rules as to the weight 
of the evidence prevail. 
 
State v. Dula, 204 N.C. 535, 536, 168 S.E. 836, 836–37 (1933) 
(quotation marks and citation omitted).   
Dula is a criminal embezzlement case where a civil 
complaint showing a contract for the sale of thirteen pianos was 
admitted by the defendant’s answer.  The defendant alleged in 
his answer that he had paid the full price of the pianos 
described in the complaint and had settled the contract with 
plaintiff’s agent.  Dula, 204 N.C. at 535, 168 S.E. at 836.  At 
the 
defendant’s 
criminal 
trial, 
evidence 
from 
the 
civil 
pleadings was introduced to show that the pianos involved in the 
civil dispute were the identical pianos at issue in the criminal 
dispute, thus seeking to prove a fact from the pleadings in a 
criminal case.  Id. at 536, 168 S.E. at 836.  The trial court 
was reversed for allowing this evidence at the defendant’s 
criminal trial.  Id. at 537, 168 S.E. at 837.  Thus, Dula 
provides an example of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-149 as applied and 
                                                                  
trial court’s attention by the State or Defendant’s counsel.  In 
our review, we did not uncover mention of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-
149 in common references, such as the Trial Judges’ Bench Book. 
-32- 
 
 
illustrates the second portion of the statute, namely that civil 
judgments and/or pleadings may not be used to prove a fact 
contained therein at a subsequent criminal trial.   
In State v. Wilson, 217 N.C. 123, 7 S.E.2d 11 (1940), our 
Supreme Court recognized that reading “certain allegations of 
fact contained in the complaint in a civil action against [the 
defendant]” and asking the defendant “if he had not failed to 
deny them by any answer” would infringe upon the statutory 
guarantee against using pleadings in “‘a criminal prosecution 
against the party as proof of a fact admitted or alleged.’” Id. 
at 126–27, 7 S.E.2d at 13 (quoting State v. Ray, 206 N.C. 736, 
737, 175 S.E. 109, 110 (1934)).  
Wilson was also a criminal embezzlement case where a civil 
court’s order finding the defendant had “made loans to himself 
of his wards’ funds [and] mismanaged the funds belonging to the 
estate of his wards.”  Id. at 126, 7 S.E.2d at 13.  The court 
didn’t question “[t]he propriety of the action of Judge Sink in 
making the orders referred to,” but did find it was “prejudicial 
to the defendant on this trial, charged with a felony, to have 
the weighty effect of those statements, opinions and court 
orders, relative to the matter then being inquired into, laid 
before the impaneled jury.”  Id. at 126, 7 S.E.2d at 12.  The 
-33- 
 
 
Supreme Court said it would be proper to cross-examine the 
defendant at length about his transactions as administrator of 
the estate for impeachment purposes, “but it would not have been 
competent for the State to offer affirmative evidence of these 
collateral matters” unless they were so connected with the 
indicted charge as to illuminate the question of “fraudulent 
intent or to rebut special defenses.”  Id. at 127, 7 S.E.2d at 
13. 
The State cites several cases where civil pleadings and 
judgments were admitted in a subsequent criminal trial.  State 
v. Rowell, 244 N.C. 280, 93 S.E.2d 201 (1956); State v. 
Phillips, 227 N.C. 277, 41 S.E.2d 766 (1947); State v. McNair, 
226 N.C. 462, 38 S.E.2d 514 (1946); State v. Fred D. Wilson, 57 
N.C. App. 444, 291 S.E.2d 830, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 563, 
294 S.E.2d 375 (1982).  None of these cases involve default 
judgments against a defendant, wrongful death judgments against 
a defendant, or non-testifying defendants.  Additionally, these 
cases involve admitting pleadings and/or judgments in a civil 
case at a subsequent criminal trial for a different purpose than 
as proof of a fact alleged in the criminal trial. 
In Rowell, the defendant was charged criminally for 
involuntary manslaughter, as he caused his passenger’s death 
-34- 
 
 
after colliding with a large truck operated by Mr. Wiley Goins.  
244 N.C. at 280, 93 S.E.2d at 201.  The decedent’s estate filed 
a wrongful death action against Mr. Goins, which was pending at 
the time of the defendant’s trial.  Id.  Mr. Goins testified on 
behalf of the State, and on cross-examination, the defendant’s 
counsel asked Mr. Goins whether he was facing a wrongful death 
suit from the decedent’s estate.  Id.  The trial court refused 
to allow Mr. Goins to be cross-examined on the pending lawsuit.  
Id.  The Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction, 
holding that cross-examination of the pending civil action would 
show the bias of the witness and that the witness had an 
interest 
in 
the 
outcome 
of 
the 
criminal 
prosecution 
of 
defendant.  Id. 
In Phillips, the defendant’s relationship with his wife 
deteriorated when his first wife discovered that he had entered 
into a bigamous marriage with another woman from Raleigh 
(“second wife”).  227 N.C. at 278–79, 41 S.E.2d at 767.  The 
defendant was charged with murdering his first wife.  Id.  The 
second wife testified and the Court held that her testimony “was 
a proper link in the chain of circumstances tending to show 
motive.”  Id. at 279, 41 S.E.2d at 766.  A complaint filed by 
the second wife to annul the bigamous marriage was also 
-35- 
 
 
introduced, but the Court held that the complaint was only used 
to corroborate the testimony of the second wife and that the 
error was harmless.  Id.  Thus, the complaint showing a bigamous 
contract of marriage was not used to show “proof of a fact 
alleged” by the second wife, but was only used for corroborative 
purposes.  Id. 
In McNair, the defendant was prosecuted for larceny of an 
automobile.  226 N.C. at 462, 38 S.E.2d at 515.  The defendant 
had filed a civil complaint concerning the ownership of a 
vehicle and then testified at his criminal trial in a contrary 
manner from his complaint.  Id. at 463–64, 38 S.E.2d at 516.  
The State explicitly announced that they were introducing the 
complaint to impeach the defendant’s contrary testimony at 
trial.  Id.  Thus, the court said “no impingement upon the 
statute was intended or resulted from the cross-examination.”  
Id. at 464, 28 S.E.2d at 516. 
In Fred D. Wilson, the defendant was prosecuted for 
obtaining property via false pretenses in a real-estate scheme, 
and the State presented several outstanding civil judgments 
against the defendant.  57 N.C. App. at 449–50, 291 S.E.2d at 
833.  This Court distinguished the case from Dula, saying that 
in Dula “pleadings and a civil judgment entered against 
-36- 
 
 
defendant were erroneously admitted to prove the same facts 
necessary 
to 
obtain 
a 
criminal 
conviction 
against 
the 
defendant.”  Id. at 450, 291 S.E.2d at 834.  This Court held 
that rather than attempting to prove the truth of the facts 
underlying the civil judgment, the State was attempting to show 
the defendant’s financial motive for committing his crimes in 
Fred D. Wilson, as he had defaulted on several judgments due to 
insufficient funds.  Id.   
This Court addresses a different set of facts than Fred D. 
Wilson, McNair, Phillips, and Rowell.  Before the re-trial, 
Defendant’s counsel learned that the State planned to introduce 
evidence about the civil actions against Defendant.  Defendant’s 
counsel did not research whether this evidence was admissible, 
nor did counsel move prior to trial to exclude the evidence on 
any ground.  Rather, Defendant’s counsel requested discovery of 
the civil attorney’s files.  The State replied that it planned 
to produce all public records in the civil case, have a witness 
explain the documents, and cross-examine Defendant if he 
testified.  The trial court held that the evidence could be 
inquired into at trial, if relevant. 
During the trial, Wake County Clerk Lorrin Freeman (“Ms. 
Freeman”) testified that on 29 October 2008, Linda filed a 
-37- 
 
 
wrongful death lawsuit against Defendant on behalf of the 
estate.  Ms. Freeman introduced Linda’s request for Defendant’s 
disqualification 
under 
the 
slayer 
statute. 
 
Ms. 
Freeman 
explained that a wrongful death action is a monetary claim for 
relief filed against a party who is alleged to have directly 
caused a decedent’s death.  The prosecutor requested Ms. Freeman 
to read the sixth paragraph of the complaint aloud in court in 
front of the empaneled jury, which said “[i]n the early morning 
hours of November 3rd, 2006 Jason Young brutally murdered 
Michelle Young.” 
Ms. Freeman testified that the file showed no attorney on 
Defendant’s behalf, and she also stated that Defendant did not 
respond to the suit.  Ms. Freeman explained that by failing to 
answer, Defendant’s action had “the legal implication or the 
legal result of the defendant having admitted the allegations as 
set forth in the complaint.”  Ms. Freeman entered a default on 2 
December 2008 and thereafter, Linda moved for a default judgment 
and slayer declaration.  
Judge Stephens heard the motion on 5 December 2008.  Ms. 
Freeman testified, over Defendant’s objection, that Judge 
Stephens reviewed the evidence and attachments to the motion and 
entered a judgment declaring that Defendant killed Michelle.  
-38- 
 
 
Ms. Freeman also testified that Defendant could have presented 
evidence in the civil action, and Defendant levied a Rule 403 
objection.  
In sum, Ms. Freeman read aloud a civil judgment that 
declared Defendant had killed his wife.  Ms. Freeman read aloud 
that Judge Stephens, the presiding judge in Defendant’s criminal 
trial, entered judgment against Defendant after reviewing the 
evidence.  Ms. Freeman read aloud that Defendant did not respond 
to the complaint and informed the jury that his action was 
legally operative as an admission under a civil standard.  
Additionally, 
the 
trial 
court 
admitted 
a 
“Child 
Custody 
Complaint Motion for Psychological Evaluation” into evidence 
without any restrictions which also included statements that 
Defendant had killed his wife Michelle.  
The State did not offer an explicit purpose at trial for 
offering evidence of the default judgment nor did the State 
offer a purpose for admitting the child custody complaint.  The 
State 
now 
articulates 
an 
impeachment 
purpose 
on 
appeal, 
asserting that the civil pleadings and judgment were used to 
show Defendant’s unusual reaction to civil suits and to show 
Defendant’s silence in not responding to the lawsuits cast doubt 
on his subsequent testimony at his first trial.  The State also 
-39- 
 
 
argues the purpose of introducing the evidence contained in the 
civil filings was to “show that [Defendant] had great incentives 
to answer the civil matters and explain the evidence.”  This 
stated purpose demonstrates the State’s intention of introducing 
these 
civil 
pleadings 
and 
judgments: 
to 
show 
proof 
of 
Defendant’s guilt, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-149.   
Further, the State’s argument that the civil suits were 
used to cast doubt on Defendant’s 22 June 2011 testimony 
concerns testimony that the State actually introduced at the 
second trial. This purpose was not stated at trial, and the 
impeachment value of introducing these civil suits remains 
unclear, as Defendant did not file a custody complaint, nor did 
he testify at the second trial.  Essentially, the State is 
requesting to impeach evidence it offered. 
Secondly, the State cannot articulate a corroborative 
purpose for this evidence.  These civil complaints would only be 
useful in corroborating the opinions of guilt made by Michelle’s 
mother, 
Linda 
Fisher. 
 
Linda’s 
opinions 
are 
themselves 
inadmissible, leaving no proper corroborative purpose.  State v. 
Kim, 318 N.C. 614, 621, 350 S.E.2d 347, 351 (1986).  No res 
judicata effect was applicable.  Dula, 204 N.C. at 536, 168 S.E. 
at 837.     
-40- 
 
 
The jury instructions did not explicitly prohibit the jury 
from using the default judgment or the child custody complaint 
filed against Defendant as proof of Defendant’s guilt in the 
criminal case.  The trial court ruled that the civil matters 
“might be relevant to any number of matters that the jury has 
already heard and will hear.”  However, the transcript shows the 
trial court did not articulate a clear basis for admitting 
either item or the limited purposes for which the jury could use 
these judgments: 
If a civil complaint is filed by plaintiff 
and the parties in a civil action are 
designated plaintiff, the person bringing 
the complaint, and the defendant, the person 
or entity being sued, if a civil complaint 
is filed by a plaintiff with the clerk of 
Superior 
Court, 
Lorrin 
Freeman 
and 
her 
office, and if a civil summons is issued by 
an officer of the court commanding the 
defendant named in the complaint to respond 
and otherwise answer to the allegations of 
the complaint within the time required by 
law and if the defendant named in the 
complaint 
is 
properly 
served 
with 
this 
complaint and this summons and if the 
defendant is an adult and is not otherwise 
incapacitated or in the military and if the 
defendant fails to file an answer to that 
civil complaint or otherwise respond to the 
allegations within the time required by law 
and if the plaintiff filing the complaint 
moves that the court to enter judgment in 
the plaintiff’s favor by reason of that 
failure to respond or answer, then under the 
rules of civil law in civil cases and under 
the rules of the court a judgment can be 
-41- 
 
 
entered in favor of the plaintiff bringing 
the lawsuit. Both failure for the defendant 
named to respond or otherwise answer the 
allegations, for purposes of the civil case 
that’s been filed the allegations of the 
complaint under those circumstances, whether 
actually true or not, which have not been 
denied by the named defendant are deemed in 
the civil law to have been admitted for the 
purpose of allowing the plaintiff to have 
judgment entered in the plaintiff’s favor. 
The entry of a civil judgment is not a 
determination of guilt by any court that the 
named defendant has committed any criminal 
offense. 
 
. . . . 
 
I further instruct you there is evidence 
that tends to show that a civil complaint 
was filed in the Civil Superior Court of 
Wake County against the defendant by Linda 
Fisher on behalf of the Estate of Michelle 
Young and that a civil summons was issued by 
the clerk of the court commanding the 
defendant to answer or otherwise respond to 
the allegations of that civil complaint 
within the time required by law. There is 
further evidence that tends to show that the 
defendant 
was 
timely 
served 
with 
these 
documents and that he did not file an answer 
or otherwise respond to the complaint and 
that a default judgment was entered against 
him by reason of that failure. 
 
As I previously instructed you, when a 
defendant 
in 
a 
civil 
action 
has 
been 
properly served with the civil summons and 
the civil complaint and fails to timely 
respond, upon motion of the plaintiff the 
Court 
is 
authorized 
to 
enter 
a 
civil 
judgment against the defaulting defendant. 
For 
purpose 
of 
the 
civil 
law, 
the 
allegations of the complaint which have not 
-42- 
 
 
been denied, whether actually true or not, 
are deemed to be admitted for the purpose of 
allowing the plaintiff to have a civil 
judgment entered against the defendant. The 
burden of proof in a civil case requires 
only that the plaintiff satisfy the Court or 
the jury by the greater weight of the 
evidence that the plaintiff’s claims are 
valid. This means that the plaintiff must 
prove that the facts are more likely than 
not to exist in the plaintiff’s favor. When 
there is a default, that burden of proof is 
deemed in law to be met. 
 
The entry of a civil default judgment is not 
a determination of guilt by the Court that 
the 
named 
defendant 
has 
committed 
any 
criminal offense.  
 
Still further, the State does not point to an instance where a 
trial court has attempted to gain admission of a default 
judgment and a slayer determination in a homicide prosecution.  
Defendant points our attention to In re J.S.B., 183 N.C. App. 
192, 202, 644 S.E.2d 580, 586, writ denied, review denied, 361 
N.C. 693, 652 S.E.2d 645 (2007), as an example where this Court 
held that a voluntary manslaughter finding from a termination of 
parental rights proceeding could not be used if the State 
commenced 
a 
subsequent 
criminal 
prosecution 
against 
that 
defendant. 
 
Admitting the wrongful death judgment, the complaint in 
that case, and the complaint in the child custody case were also 
abuses of discretion.  “When the intrinsic nature of the 
-43- 
 
 
evidence itself is such that its probative value is always 
necessarily outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the 
evidence becomes inadmissible under [Rule 403] as a matter of 
law.”  State v. Scott, 331 N.C. 39, 43, 413 S.E.2d 787, 789 
(1992).  Defendant’s presumption of innocence was irreparably 
diminished by the admission of these civil actions.  This is 
similar to the prejudice that a jury has when it learns a 
defendant is previously convicted of a charged offense.  State 
v. Lewis, 365 N.C. 488, 498, 724 S.E.2d 492, 499 (2012).  
Criminal judgments are clearly admissible in slayer actions.  
Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287 N.C. 47, 57, 213 
S.E.2d 563, 569 (1975).  However, as Defendant states, the 
converse is typically not true because admitting such evidence 
creates great prejudice against the Defendant’s innocence and 
increases the chance that an unreliable guilty verdict may be 
rendered.  Even greater still is the prejudice to Defendant when 
a juror is told that the presiding judge in the case reviewed 
the evidence before the jury and entered a default judgment 
against a defendant.  The danger of unfair prejudice vastly 
outweighed the probative value in this case and admission of the 
evidence was abuse of discretion in Defendant’s trial.  It is 
also an abuse of discretion to make a ruling under a 
-44- 
 
 
misapprehension of the law as occurred here, where the trial 
court conducted no inquiry concerning N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-149. 
Because the trial court disregarded a statute, we hold the 
trial court erred in admitting evidence of both the entry of 
default judgment against Defendant and the child custody 
complaint against Defendant, and because entry of both items was 
prejudicial to Defendant, we hold that Defendant must receive a 
new trial.  Because we hold that the trial court violated § 1-
149 in admitting these civil matters, we do not address 
Defendant’s 
arguments 
concerning 
judicial 
opinions 
or 
Defendant’s argument that insufficient evidence existed to deny 
a motion to dismiss.  We continue to address the admissibility 
of Emily’s statements and evidence of Defendant’s silence.  We 
address these issues because they are likely to recur at 
Defendant’s re-trial. 
b. Admission of Emily’s Statements at Daycare 
Defendant argues that statements made by Emily to daycare 
workers that were admitted via the workers’ testimony were 
hearsay outside the scope of any exception and/or overwhelmingly 
prejudicial.  Defendant objected to this evidence at trial.  
This issue is an evidentiary issue that is reviewed de novo.  
“When the admissibility of evidence by the trial court is 
-45- 
 
 
preserved for review by an objection, we review the trial 
court’s decision de novo.”  Martinez, 212 N.C. App. at 664, 711 
S.E.2d at 789.  “When preserved by an objection, a trial court’s 
decision with regard to the admission of evidence alleged to be 
hearsay is reviewed de novo.”  Johnson, 209 N.C. App. at 692, 
706 S.E.2d at 797.   
The State argues that Defendant did not preserve this issue 
for appellate review.  We disagree.  After the prosecution 
advised the court outside the jury’s presence that it would put 
forth two witnesses that would relate Emily’s statements at 
daycare, the following dialogue occurred between Defendant’s 
counsel and the trial court: 
THE COURT: Okay. I know you’ve objected to 
the testimony of the witness. We heard Ms. 
Palmatier Friday afternoon. I take it you 
object 
to 
this 
line 
of 
testimony 
and 
evidence in its entirety. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We would, your Honor, on 
grounds previously stated. 
 
THE COURT: As I understand, your position is 
that the statement of the child is hearsay 
and not otherwise admissible, as well as 
it’s not a foundation to show that the 
capacity of the child to fully understand 
and appreciate and relate her observations 
due to her age and that her conduct is also 
ambiguous. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That is correct, your 
Honor, 
as 
well 
as 
confrontation/cross-
-46- 
 
 
examination grounds and due process and 403. 
 
THE COURT: And as I understand it, you 
object to any testimony with regard to the 
child 
herself 
because 
you 
contend 
the 
testimony with regard to the child is not 
relevant to any issue in these proceedings. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That is correct. 
 
THE COURT: I mean, the learning and her 
schooling and observations about the folks 
at school and things like that. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That is correct, your 
Honor. 
 
THE COURT: All right. Well, I do believe it 
is relevant and I have overruled your 
previous objections and your objections are 
preserved for the record and the objection 
goes to the testimony of every witness on 
this subject as I understand it. 
 
This portion of the trial transcript demonstrates the trial 
court’s granting of a line or continuing objection pursuant to 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1446(d)(10) (2013); State v. Crawford, 344 
N.C. 65, 76, 472 S.E.2d 920, 927 (1996).  While Defendant’s 
counsel objected to a question on redirect asking the first 
daycare worker to compare the size of the dolls to Defendant and 
Michelle, this was a properly lodged objection as it exceeded 
the scope of the granted line objection, although the objection 
was sustained.  Defendant’s second objection when the second 
daycare worker took the stand and began to relate hearsay 
-47- 
 
 
statements was a simple reaffirmation of the originally granted 
line objection.  Therefore de novo review of this issue is 
appropriate. 
The State presented the testimony of Emily’s daycare 
worker, Ms. Palmatier.  Ms. Palmatier testified during voir dire 
that on 9 November 2006 she told a Wake County detective that 
Emily hit two female dolls together with a dollhouse chair and 
said, “[M]ommy’s getting a spanking for biting. . . . [M]ommy 
has boo-boos all over.”  Ms. Palmatier then testified that, 
after a nap, Emily said “[Mommy] fell on the floor.  Now she’s 
on the bed with animals, animals were in the barn, they were 
asleep.  There was a cow.  Daddy bought me new fruit snacks.”  
The State argued that this was evidence Emily saw the murder, 
and that it was probative of Defendant’s identity as she was 
later found unharmed.  
Defendant’s counsel objected to this evidence, citing 
hearsay, due process, lack of competency, relevance, and undue 
prejudice.  The trial court ruled that (1) the statements met 
the present sense impression, excited utterance, and residual 
hearsay exceptions; (2) the evidence was relevant to determine 
the killer’s identity; and (3) the evidence was more probative 
than prejudicial. 
-48- 
 
 
The court sua sponte excluded Emily’s post-nap statements 
and granted the defense a continuing objection to Emily’s 
testimony.  The trial court instructed the jury that evidence 
was being introduced of Emily’s observations, made when she “may 
have had some memory” of Michelle’s death.  The trial court 
instructed the jury that it could use Emily’s statements to 
determine whether Emily witnessed a portion of the assault on 
Michelle.  
Emily’s daycare teacher then testified that on 9 November 
2006, Emily asked her for “the mommy doll.”  The teacher gave 
Emily a bucket of dolls.  Emily picked two dolls, one female 
with long hair and one with short hair, and hit them together.  
Ms. Palmatier testified that she saw Emily strike a “mommy doll” 
against another doll and a dollhouse chair while saying, 
“[M]ommy has boo-boos all over” and “[M]ommy’s getting a 
spanking for biting. . . . [M]ommy has boo-boos all over, mommy 
has red stuff all over.” 
Defendant first argues that the evidence was not relevant.  
Relevant evidence is evidence that has “any tendency to make the 
existence 
of 
any 
fact 
that 
is 
of 
consequence 
to 
the 
determination more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence.”  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401.  “A 
-49- 
 
 
trial 
court’s 
rulings 
on 
relevancy 
are 
technically 
not 
discretionary, though we accord them great deference on appeal.”  
State v. Lane, 365 N.C. 7, 27, 707 S.E.2d 210, 223 (2011).  We 
agree with the State that the evidence clearly related to the 
identity of Michelle’s assailant.  The evidence was probative 
that Emily observed her mother’s assault, and that the assailant 
cared for Emily in some way, as he or she left Emily unharmed 
after the assault. 
 
Secondly, Defendant argues that the statements made at 
daycare were inadmissible hearsay and do not fit within any 
hearsay exception.  We hold the statements are hearsay, but that 
they fit within the excited utterance exception pursuant to this 
Court’s decisions in State v. Rogers, 109 N.C. App. 491, 501, 
428 S.E.2d 220, 226, cert. denied, 334 N.C. 625, 435 S.E.2d 348 
(1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1008 (1994), and State v. Thomas, 
119 N.C. App. 708, 712–14, 460 S.E.2d 349, 352–53, disc. review 
denied, 342 N.C. 196, 463 S.E.2d 248 (1995). 
Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”  N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 801(c).  A “statement” is an oral or written 
-50- 
 
 
assertion or “nonverbal conduct of a person . . . intended by 
him as an assertion.”  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 801(a).   
Emily’s statements consisted of striking the “mommy” doll 
while saying, “[M]ommy’s getting a spanking for biting” and 
“[M]ommy has boo-boos all over, mommy has red stuff all over.”  
The trial court found that these were statements made by Emily, 
and that they were offered for the truth of the matter asserted.  
We agree, and note that the trial court also found that these 
phrases spoken by Emily were to describe past events via the 
words and actions of a two and a half year old child.  The age 
of Emily at the time of the statements likely meant she could 
express herself in a limited way as to her observations.  Fact-
finders 
may 
find 
that 
an 
alternate 
meaning 
exists 
when 
considering the words of young children who lack the verbal 
clarity often present in adults.  See, e.g., State v. Smith, 315 
N.C. 76, 80, 337 S.E.2d 833, 837 (1985) (considering statements 
of a young child that used figurative language to describe a sex 
act). 
However, if a statement is hearsay, it may still be 
admitted if it falls within one of the exceptions to the hearsay 
rule.  The primary exception at issue in this case is the 
excited utterance exception.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 
-51- 
 
 
803(2).  For the excited utterance exception to apply, “there 
must be (1) a sufficiently startling experience suspending 
reflective thought and (2) a spontaneous reaction, not one 
resulting from reflection or fabrication.”  Smith, 315 N.C. at 
86, 337 S.E.2d 
at 841.  “The rationale underlying the 
admissibility 
of 
an 
excited 
utterance 
is 
its 
inherent 
trustworthiness.”  State v. Guice, 141 N.C. App. 177, 200, 541 
S.E.2d 474, 489 (2000), opinion adhered to as modified on 
reconsideration, 151 N.C. App. 293, 564 S.E.2d 925 (2002). 
Excited utterances are often made and admitted into 
evidence because they fall within a timeframe that is close in 
proximity to the startling event.  See, e.g., id. at 201, 541 
S.E.2d at 489 (finding a statement made to an officer within 
“several minutes” of the defendant dragging the victim from the 
home and while struggling to breathe fell within the requisite 
time frame).  However, this Court has held that “the stress and 
spontaneity upon which the exception is based [are] often 
present for longer periods of time in young children than in 
adults.” Rogers, 109 N.C. App. at 501, 428 S.E.2d at 226 
(quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Smith, 315 N.C. 
at 87–88, 337 S.E.2d at 841 (“This ascertainment of prolonged 
stress is born of three observations.  First, a child is apt to 
-52- 
 
 
repress the incident.  Second, it is often unlikely that a child 
will report this kind of incident to anyone but the mother.  
Third, the characteristics of young children work to produce 
declarations ‘free of conscious fabrication’ for a longer period 
after the incident than with adults.” (citation and quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 
Our State’s appellate courts have thus extended the length 
of time that the excited utterance exception may apply.  See 
Smith, 315 N.C. at 79, 86–90, 337 S.E.2d at 836, 841–43 (four 
and five-year-olds’ statements made two to three days after 
being sexually abused were admissible); Thomas, 119 N.C. App. at 
712–14, 460 S.E.2d at 352–53 (five-year-old’s statements made 
four to five days after sexual abuse were admissible); Rogers, 
109 N.C. App. at 501, 428 S.E.2d at 226 (five-year-old’s 
statements made three days after sexual abuse admissible).  
 
Thus, the outer time limit at present is four to five days 
from the event a child has made statements about.  Emily was 
also younger than the other children discussed above in prior 
cases this Court has considered.  Emily’s statements were made 
six days after her mother was killed and were made while she 
played with dolls, without prompting or questioning from adults.  
We hold that the attendant circumstances in this case merit 
-53- 
 
 
application of the excited utterance exception and that the 
trial court did not err in admitting Emily’s statements.  
Because we hold Emily’s statements were admitted properly under 
the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, we do not 
address whether the present sense impression or residual 
exception apply to this case. 
c. Defendant’s Silence as Substantive Evidence 
 
The trial court offered the following jury instructions as 
they relate to Defendant’s refusal to speak with police and his 
family members: 
Ladies and gentlemen, the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution protects a 
citizen’s 
right 
to 
refuse 
to 
answer 
questions of the police during a criminal 
investigation. 
The 
exercise 
of 
that 
Constitutional right may not be used as 
evidence against that citizen later at trial 
to create an inference of guilt.  Therefore, 
the 
defendant’s 
decision 
not 
to 
answer 
questions by law enforcement officers during 
the 
criminal 
investigation 
may 
not 
be 
considered against him as evidence of guilt 
to the pending charge.  However, that same 
Fifth Amendment does permit the jury to 
consider the defendant’s refusal to answer 
police questions to the extent that the 
evidence surrounding that refusal bears upon 
the 
defendant’s 
truthfulness 
if 
the 
defendant elects to testify or made a 
statement at a later time.  The evidence 
presented in this case tends to show that 
the defendant elected to testify at a prior 
trial. 
 
-54- 
 
 
Therefore, I instruct you that you may 
consider evidence of the defendant’s refusal 
to 
answer 
police 
questions 
during 
this 
investigation for one purpose only.  If, in 
considering the nature of that evidence, you 
believe that such evidence bears upon the 
defendant’s truthfulness as a witness at his 
prior trial, then you may consider it for 
that purpose only. Except as it relates to 
the defendant’s truthfulness, you may not 
consider the defendant’s refusal to answer 
police questions as evidence of guilt in 
this case. 
 
I 
also 
instruct 
you 
that 
this 
Fifth 
Amendment protection applies only to police 
questioning. It does not apply to questions 
asked by civilians, including friends and 
family of the defendant and friends and 
family of the victim. 
 
 
Defendant argues that the trial court committed plain error 
by instructing the jury that it could consider Defendant’s 
failure to speak with friends and family as substantive evidence 
of guilt.  We disagree and find that the instruction was proper.  
The Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination 
does not extend to questions asked by civilians.  Oregon v. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304-05 (1985) (“The Fifth Amendment, of 
course, is not concerned with nontestimonial evidence.  Nor is 
it concerned with moral and psychological pressures to confess 
emanating from sources other than official coercion.” (citations 
and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added)). 
-55- 
 
 
Defendant argues that Defendant’s silence in response to 
questions from non-officers should be offered for impeachment 
purposes only.  Defendant cites State v. Mack, 282 N.C. 334, 
339–40, 193 S.E.2d 71, 75–76 (1972), and State v. Hunt, 72 N.C. 
App. 59, 61, 323 S.E.2d 490, 492 (1984), aff’d without 
precedential value, 313 N.C. 593, 330 S.E.2d 205 (1985), for the 
proposition that pre-arrest silence may only be used to impeach 
a defendant’s pre-trial statement or trial testimony.  Mack held 
that “[p]rior statements of a witness which are inconsistent 
with his present testimony are not admissible as substantive 
evidence because of their hearsay nature.”  282 N.C. at 339, 193 
S.E.2d at 75; see also State v. Black, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 
735 S.E.2d 195, 202 (2012) (citing Mack, 282 N.C. at 339–40, 193 
S.E.2d at 75)), appeal dismissed, review denied, ___ N.C. ___, 
738 S.E.2d 391 (2013).  However, Mack concerned the substantive 
use of silence within the context of a testifying non-party 
witness making statements to a police officer.  282 N.C. at 339, 
193 S.E.2d at 75.  Hunt was affirmed without precedential value 
by the North Carolina Supreme Court, 313 N.C. at 593, 330 S.E.2d 
at 205, but also involved silence with respect to police 
questioning.  72 N.C. App. at 61–62, 323 S.E.2d at 492. 
-56- 
 
 
Defendant’s friends and family asked him about Michelle’s 
murder on several occasions and Defendant did not offer 
statements to his friends and family about the evening’s events.  
The State contends that Defendant’s later version of events 
offered at his first trial were inconsistent with his earlier 
silence and that the discrepancy “tend[s] to reflect the mental 
processes of a person possessed of a guilty conscience seeking 
to divert suspicion and to exculpate [himself].”  State v. 
Redfern, 246 N.C. 293, 298, 98 S.E.2d 322, 326 (1957) (holding 
that conflicting statements amount to “substantive evidence of 
substantial probative force, tending to show consciousness of 
guilt”).  Defendant’s silence to non-officers may provide 
substantive evidence of guilt because statements or silence to 
questioning from non-police officers are not granted the same 
protections under the Fifth Amendment and are probative of 
Defendant’s mental processes.  Thus, the evidence was proper for 
substantive consideration by the jury. 
Defendant also argues that the trial court committed plain 
error in offering its jury instruction.  Defendant argues that 
the trial court should have instructed the jury that the 
evidence did not create a presumption of guilt, was insufficient 
alone to establish guilt, and that the evidence could not be 
-57- 
 
 
considered as to premeditation and deliberation.  State v. 
Myers, 309 N.C. 78, 88, 305 S.E.2d 506, 512 (1983).  Defendant 
argues that a new trial was required because the case was 
“entirely circumstantial.”  Id. 
In Myers, the defendant objected to the instruction, the 
witnesses relied upon by the State had severe credibility 
issues, and the trial court placed an “emphasis upon the 
negative aspect of defendant’s statements.”  Id.  Here, there 
was minimal mention by the State that Defendant was silent to 
his friends and family.  We hold that Defendant’s pre-arrest 
silence coupled with evidence that whoever killed Michelle did 
so with premeditation and deliberation and the limited referral 
to Defendant’s silence about the murder to friends and family 
did not rise to the level of plain error having a probable 
impact on the verdict.  See Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 518, 723 
S.E.2d at 334. 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The introduction into evidence of the civil complaints and 
judgment was in error and violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-149, as 
the evidence was used to prove a fact — namely, that Defendant 
had killed Michelle — Defendant is deemed to have admitted in 
the wrongful death civil action and which had been alleged in 
-58- 
 
 
the child custody proceeding.  This evidence also severely 
impacted Defendant’s ability to receive a fair trial.  As such, 
we order a 
NEW TRIAL. 
Judges STROUD and DILLON concur.