Case Title: Sylvester v. Industrial Comm'n

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90198

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 90198-Agenda 27-March 2001.
RONALD SYLVESTER, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION et al. (Acme Roofing and Sheet Metal Company, 								Appellant).
Opinion filed July 19, 2001.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Ronald Sylvester, petitioner, filed a claim under the Workers'
Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 1992))
after he was injured in the course of his employment with Acme
Roofing and Sheet Metal Company (Acme). The arbitrator hearing
the case determined that petitioner's average weekly wage was
$368.43 and awarded him 230 6/7 weeks of temporary total
disability (TTD) benefits. The arbitrator's decision was affirmed
and adopted by the Industrial Commission, and the circuit court
confirmed the Commission. The appellate court reversed the
circuit court, holding that the wage computation had been based on
an erroneous interpretation of the governing statute, section 10 of
the Act (820 ILCS 305/10 (West 1992)). 314 Ill. App. 3d 1100.
Acme petitioned this court for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R.
315(a)). We granted leave to appeal and now affirm the judgment
of the appellate court.
BACKGROUND
	Before this court the parties only dispute the calculation of
petitioner's average weekly wage during the year prior to his
injury. Accordingly, we shall limit our discussion to the facts
germane to this issue. As background, we note that petitioner's
workers' compensation claim arose out of a serious injury in May
1992 when he fell approximately 16 feet to the ground from the
raised bed of a truck, shattering both of his ankles. As a result of
this accident petitioner's right leg was amputated below the knee,
and his left foot was permanently injured. None of these facts are
in dispute.
	At the hearing before the Industrial Commission, petitioner
testified that he had been working for Acme for 19 years before
the accident and was not employed by anyone else during that
time. At the time of the accident he was a roofer foreman and
earned $21 per hour. Because the winter weather prevented much
work being done, he usually signed up for unemployment during
the winter. However, Acme put him to work for approximately
five hours per week on small jobs such as repairs or leak patching.
	Petitioner testified that his job required him to be on call for
Acme all week, year-round, and if work were available, he would
work a 40-hour week. He stated that when he worked a full week,
he worked eight hours per day, five days per week. Petitioner
introduced into evidence his union contract, which stated that he
had to be paid overtime if he worked more than 10 hours per day
or 40 hours per week. The contract also stated that a normal
workday would be from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., subject to change by
agreement between the employer and employees, and that the
lunch period was "one-half hour only." The contract further
provided that the regular workweek would "consist of 10-hour or
less than the 10-hour work days, Monday through Friday, with a
make-up day on Saturday."
	Petitioner and Acme both introduced into evidence
petitioner's wage records for the 52 weeks prior to his accident.
These documents reflected, for each week of the preceding year,
the number of hours petitioner had worked and the amount he had
earned. The number of hours worked per week varied from 3 to
40, and his weekly pay ranged from $60.75 to $818.25.
Petitioner's and Acme's submissions were identical, except that on
petitioner's copy he wrote estimates, for each week, of the number
of days he had worked that week. Petitioner testified that the
estimate was based on the number of hours worked that week.
According to petitioner's estimate, he had worked a total of 131
days during the previous 52 weeks.
	On the issue of petitioner's earnings, the arbitrator found as
follows in the written order. During the 52 weeks from May 21,
1991, to May 20, 1992, petitioner earned a total of $17,684.41, not
counting a Christmas bonus of $150. Acme issued defendant pay
checks in 48 out of the 52 weeks. Petitioner's average weekly
wage was $368.43, a figure at which the arbitrator arrived by
dividing petitioner's total pay by 48, the number of weeks in
which petitioner received pay. The arbitrator stated that "[t]his
calculation follows the method employed by the Court in Cook v.
Industrial Commission, [231 Ill. App. 3d 729 (1992)]."
	Petitioner appealed. As previously noted, the Industrial
Commission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator's decision. The
circuit court confirmed the Commission. However, the appellate
court reversed the circuit court. The appellate court reviewed its
previous decisions interpreting section 10 of the Act (820 ILCS
305/10 (West 1992)), and held that the arbitrator had erred in the
calculation of petitioner's average weekly wage. The court
endorsed its prior decisions to the effect that in order to determine
average weekly wage it was necessary to factor out all days which
the claimant had lost through no fault of his own. 314 Ill. App. 3d
1100. We granted Acme's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d
R. 315(a). We also granted leave to the Illinois Manufacturers
Association, Illinois Construction Industry Committees, Illinois
Insurance Association, National Roofing Contractors Association,
Onesource Building Services, Inc., Yellow Freight System,
Cambridge Integrated Services Group, Inc., West Bend Mutual
Insurance Company, and Custard Claims Management Services,
Inc., to submit briefs as amici curiae. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.
ANALYSIS
	As previously noted, the only dispute is over computation of
petitioner's average weekly wage. The parties agree that the case
is controlled by section 10 of the Act, which provides as follows:
			"The compensation shall be computed on the basis of
the 'Average weekly wage' which shall mean the actual
earnings of the employee in the employment in which he
was working at the time of the injury during the period of
52 weeks ending with the last day of the employee's last
full pay period immediately preceding the date of injury,
illness[,] or disablement excluding overtime, and bonus
divided by 52; but if the injured employee lost 5 or more
calendar days during such period, whether or not in the
same week, then the earnings for the remainder of such 52
weeks shall be divided by the number of weeks and parts
thereof remaining after the time so lost has been deducted.
Where the employment prior to the injury extended over
a period of less than 52 weeks, the method of dividing the
earnings during that period by the number of weeks and
parts thereof during which the employee actually earned
wages shall be followed. Where by reason of the shortness
of the time during which the employee has been in the
employment of his employer or of the casual nature or
terms of the employment, it is impractical to compute the
average weekly wages as above defined, regard shall be
had to the average weekly amount which during the 52
weeks previous to the injury, illness or disablement was
being or would have been earned by a person in the same
grade employed at the same work for each of such 52
weeks for the same number of hours per week by the
same employer." 820 ILCS 305/10 (West 1992).
	As the appellate court noted, section 10 provides four
different methods for calculating average weekly wage. (1) By
default, average weekly wage is "actual earnings" during the 52-week period preceding the date of injury, illness or disablement,
divided by 52. (2) If the employee lost five or more calendar days
during that 52-week period, "whether or not in the same week,"
then the employee's earnings are divided not by 52, but by "the
number of weeks and parts thereof remaining after the time so lost
has been deducted." (3) If the employee's employment began
during the 52-week period, the earnings during employment are
divided by "the number of weeks and parts thereof during which
the employee actually earned wages." (4) Finally, if the
employment has been of such short duration or the terms of the
employment of such casual nature that it is "impractical" to use
one of the three above methods to calculate average weekly wage,
"regard shall be had to the average weekly amount which during
the 52 weeks previous to the injury, illness or disablement was
being or would have been earned by a person in the same grade
employed at the same work for each of such 52 weeks for the same
number of hours per week by the same employer."
	In this case the parties agree that the arbitrator used the second
method, a conclusion made clear by the cite to Cook, which only
involved the second method of calculation. The parties differ on
what to divide earnings by to compute average weekly wage,
however. Acme contends that since any week in which the
employee worked at least one day is technically a "part" of a week,
and the statute provides that earnings are to be divided by the
weeks "and parts thereof remaining," weeks in which the
employee worked at least one day should be counted the same as
a full week of work. Thus, the total wages earned in the previous
52 weeks must be divided by the number of weeks in that time
period in which the employee worked even one day. Petitioner
contends that the fact finder should count the number of days the
claimant worked in the previous 52 weeks, divide that number by
the number of days in a workweek, and divide the earnings by the
result of this calculation. The arbitrator used the method suggested
by Acme, which resulted in petitioner's earnings being divided by
48, as petitioner worked at least one day in all but four of the 52
weeks preceding his injury. By petitioner's argument, his earnings
should have been divided by 26.2, as he worked only 131 days
during the previous 52 weeks and his workweek was 5 days
long-131 divided by 5 equals 26.2.
	Normally, a wage determination by the Commission is a
factual finding, and thus will be upheld on appeal unless against
the manifest weight of the evidence. D.J. Masonry Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 295 Ill. App. 3d 924, 932 (1998). However,
the issue currently before us is solely a matter of statutory
construction. Accordingly, our review is de novo (Michigan
Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503
(2000)), and we are guided by familiar principles. Our primary
goal, to which all other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and
give effect to the intention of the legislature. Henrich v.
Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 387 (1998). We
determine this intent by reading the statute as a whole and
considering all relevant parts. A.P. Properties, Inc. v. Goshinsky,
186 Ill. 2d 524, 532 (1999). We must construe the statute so that
each word, clause, and sentence, if possible, is given a reasonable
meaning and not rendered superfluous (A.P. Properties, Inc., 186
Ill. 2d at 532), avoiding an interpretation which would render any
portion of the statute meaningless or void (McNamee v. Federated
Equipment & Supply Co., 181 Ill. 2d 415, 423 (1998)). We also
presume that the General Assembly did not intend absurdity,
inconvenience, or injustice. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d  at 504. The Workers' Compensation Act is to be interpreted
liberally (McNamee, 181 Ill. 2d at 428), to effectuate its main
purpose-providing financial protection for interruption or
termination of a worker's earning power. Peoria Roofing & Sheet
Metal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 181 Ill. App. 3d 616, 620 (1989).
	Following these principles, we find Acme's interpretation is
refuted by the plain language of section 10. See Peoria Roofing,
181 Ill. App. 3d at 620. First, Acme's interpretation is inconsistent
with the statutory provision that the second calculation method is
to be used whenever the employee lost five or more calendar days,
"whether or not in the same week." According to Acme's
interpretation, the average weekly wage changes only if the
employee loses five days in the same calendar week. Thus,
Acme's construction conflicts with the "whether or not in the same
week" language, because an employee must lose five days in the
same week for the second method to produce a different result
from the first method.
	Acme's interpretation of the second method also conflicts
with the concluding phrase, "after the time so lost has been
deducted." The clear meaning of this language is that time which
an employee does not work must be factored out of the calculation
of the average weekly wage. In other words, if in a particular week
an employee works on Monday, but not Tuesday through Friday,
the latter four days must be "deducted" in calculating his average
weekly wage. Acme's interpretation of the statute does not so
allow. According to Acme, time is only deducted when it is lost in
whole-workweek increments. The clear meaning of the statute is
to the contrary.
	Our result is supported by the appellate court decisions
reviewing determinations of average weekly wage under the
second method of section 10 of the Act. See, e.g., D.J. Masonry
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 295 Ill. App. 3d 924 (1998). There, the
court considered a workers' compensation claim filed by a
masonry worker who had worked only 204 days during the
previous 52 weeks. The court confirmed the Commission's
calculation of his average weekly wage by dividing his earnings
over the previous 52 weeks by 40.8, stating flatly that "this
procedure comports with section 10." D.J. Masonry, 295 Ill. App.
3d at 933.
	Even more similar to the case at bar is Peoria Roofing, 181
Ill. App. 3d 616. That case involved a roofer who had been
working solely for the respondent during the 52 weeks preceding
his accident. He had worked in 43 different weeks, but had worked
only 134 days. The Commission determined that the number of
weeks used to calculate average weekly wage should be found by
dividing the number of days worked by five. The circuit court set
aside that decision, recalculating the wage by dividing earnings by
the number of weeks including at least one day of work. The
appellate court reversed the circuit court, reinstating the
Commission's wage calculation. Peoria Roofing, 181 Ill. App. 3d
at 620-21. The court primarily relied on the fact that, as we have
explained above, the circuit court's interpretation of the statute
was inconsistent with its plain language and rendered portions of
it superfluous.
	Acme contends that Cook and Ricketts support its
interpretation of section 10. These cases are distinguishable.
Ricketts involved a wage calculation under the third provision of
section 10, which deals with employment which has extended over
less than 52 weeks. See Ricketts v. Industrial Comm'n, 251 Ill.
App. 3d 809, 811-12 (1993). Cook did not involve the question at
issue here; rather, the claimant in that case was attempting to
extrapolate the number of weeks he had worked from his total
wages and claimed hourly wage-of which there was no evidence
in the record. See Cook, 231 Ill. App. 3d at 730-31. In neither
Cook nor Ricketts was the result based on statutory construction.
Rather, both cases were clearly decided on the insufficiency of the
evidence the claimant introduced in support of his claimed wage.
See Ricketts, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 812 ("[b]ased on claimant's
failure to provide other credible evidence concerning prior
employment, the Commission's determination of his average
weekly wage rate comports with the statutory formula"); Cook,
231 Ill. App. 3d at 731 ("[g]iven the scant evidence before the
Commission, we conclude that its determination of claimant's
average weekly wage was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence"). Although Cook did continue on to state in dictum that
the claimant's proposed average weekly formula would be
incorrect even if he had introduced sufficient evidence to support
it, petitioner in this case is not using the formula proposed in
Cook. Indeed, in its discussion the Cook court frankly recognized
that section 10 of the Act "plainly provides that lost time is to be
'deducted' before the number of weeks and parts thereof claimant
worked are divided into a claimant's earnings." Cook, 231 Ill.
App. 3d at 732-33.
	Acme urges that petitioner's construction of section 10
provides workers with a "windfall," and makes it more financially
advantageous to be injured than to be employed, relying on this
court's admonition against such a result in Hasler v. Industrial
Comm'n, 97 Ill. 2d 46 (1983). We are not persuaded by this
argument. First, the situation in this case does not rise to the level
of windfall before us in Hasler. By our calculations, deducting
"lost" time, as required by the statutory scheme, will lead to
petitioner's receiving approximately 32% more in TTD benefits
than he would have earned as regular wages.(1) By contrast, in
Hasler, the claimant was advocating for a method of wage
computation which would have resulted in her being "awarded an
amount almost six times greater than her actual earnings." Hasler,
97 Ill. 2d  at 52. It is important to note, as well, that it would be
inaccurate to state that petitioner receives a 32% "windfall,"
because his "actual earnings" for purposes of section 10 do not
include his yearly bonus, overtime pay, or the unemployment
compensation that he regularly earned during the winter months.
820 ILCS 305/10 (West 1992); Illinois-Iowa Blacktop, Inc. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 180 Ill. App. 3d 885, 893 (1989). When these
factors are taken into account, it is difficult to characterize
petitioner as having received a financial bonanza when he suffered
the two crushed ankles which resulted in the partial amputation of
one of his legs.
	As was acknowledged in Ricketts, although concern over a
windfall to the employee remains relevant in computing average
weekly wage, it is not determinative. Ricketts, 251 Ill. App. 3d at
811. With the exception of the dictum in Cook, the appellate court
has consistently rejected the windfall argument in construing
section 10 to exclude lost time from the computation of average
weekly wage. See 314 Ill. App. 3d at 1108; D.J. Masonry, 295 Ill.
App. 3d at 933-34; Peoria Roofing, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 620.
Section 10 "resulted from negotiations and compromise between
business and labor interests." Illinois-Iowa Blacktop, 180 Ill. App.
3d at 891. It "both benefits and disadvantages both business and
labor," in that although the worker is benefitted by lost time being
factored out of average weekly wage, the employer is benefitted by
the fact that overtime wages, bonuses and unemployment
compensation are excluded from the calculation of the employee's
income. Illinois-Iowa Blacktop, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 893. We see no
reason to upset this carefully crafted legislative scheme.
	Acme cites in support of its argument the following comment
of Senator Bruce during the Senate debates on House Bill 3250, by
which was enacted the current version of section 10:
		"[The bill] redefines the average weekly wage, so that a
part-time employee is not paid on a full forty-hour week,
but only receives compensation if he works ten hours, he
gets two-thirds [sic] of his ten-hour actual earnings." 81st
Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, July 1, 1980, at 22
(statements of Senator Bruce).
This comment is of little relevance to our analysis. First, the
statutory language is clear and unambiguous. When this is the case
we must apply the statute without resort to further aids of statutory
construction (Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 504),
such as legislative debates. Moreover, even if we were to consider
the Senator's comment, he would appear to have been referring to
the fourth calculation method listed in section 10, the only method
which refers to hours worked per week. This statement "has no
effect on construction workers," who are accorded "special
considerations," because of "the unique nature of their work."
Illinois-Iowa Blacktop, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 892-93.
	Acme also contends that, as in Cook and Ricketts, petitioner
failed to introduce evidence sufficient to support his claim. We see
no merit to this contention. Petitioner testified that he worked only
for Acme, that he was required to be on call all week, year-round,
and that when work was available, he worked a 40-hour week. He
also testified that when he worked a full week, he worked eight
hours per day, five days per week. For each week he worked he
estimated the number of days he worked, based on the number of
hours he worked. This testimony was supported by the union
contract, which stated that the regular workweek went from
Monday through Friday with a make-up day on Saturday, and also
stated that a normal workday was from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., with
a half-hour for lunch. Although some of the provisions of the
union contract were subject to change by mutual agreement
between employer and employees, Acme introduced no evidence
of any changes during the year preceding petitioner's injury. Nor
did Acme introduce any evidence to counter petitioner's estimates
of the number of days that he had worked. We believe there was
sufficient unrebutted evidence to establish a 5-day, 40-hour
workweek in general, and to establish the exact number of days
worked.
	Acme finally contends that we could confirm the Commission
by looking to the fourth calculation method listed in section 10,
which allows "regard [to] be had to the average weekly amount
which during the 52 weeks previous to the injury, illness or
disablement was being or would have been earned by a person in
the same grade employed at the same work for each of such 52
weeks for the same number of hours per week by the same
employer" if it is "impractical" to use any of the other methods
listed in section 10 because of the brevity or casual nature of the
employment relationship. 820 ILCS 305/10 (West 1992). We see
no basis for resort to the fourth method. Acme does not even
suggest why computation according to the other methods would be
impractical. Morever, Acme introduced absolutely no evidence of
what "would have been earned by a person in the same grade
employed at the same work for each of such 52 weeks for the same
number of hours per week by the same employer." Acme suggests,
instead, that this can be inferred from what petitioner himself
earned. This suggestion merely highlights why the fourth method
is inapplicable in this case. The point of the fourth method is
clearly to allow an employer to demonstrate how much an
established employee would have earned, when the petitioner's
work situation does not provide a sufficiently reliable basis so to
find. To contend that petitioner's own earnings are reliable
evidence of yearly earnings is to establish that the fourth method
need not be used. We reject this argument as well.
CONCLUSION
	For the reasons above stated, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court.
	Affirmed.
 



 



1.     1Petitioner's wages during the previous 52 weeks, as determined by
the arbitrator, were $17,684.41. Dividing this number by 26.2 results in
an average weekly wage of $674.98. But TTD payments are only 66
2/3% of average weekly wage. 820 ILCS 305/8(b)(2) (West 1992). 66
2/3% of $674.98 is approximately $450 per week, or $23,400 per year.
This is approximately 32% greater than $17,684.41. ($23,400-$17,684
= $5,716; $5,716/$17,684.41 = 0.32, or 32%.)