Case Title: Johnson v. State

Citation: 260 So. 2d 436

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1972-03-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
260 So. 2d 436 (1972) Harold Wayne JOHNSON v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 46727. Supreme Court of Mississippi. March 27, 1972. Louie Bishop, Waynesboro, for appellant. *437 A.F. Summer, Atty. Gen. by Guy N. Rogers, Asst. Atty. Gen. and Karen Gilfoy, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. JONES, Justice: This case comes from the Circuit Court of Wayne County, where the appellant, an eighteen-year-old boy, was convicted of possession of lysergic acid diethylamide, commonly referred to as LSD. He was sentenced to serve a term of two years in the penitentiary. We are affirming as to guilt but reversing and remanding to the Circuit Court of Wayne County for the infliction of a penalty for a misdemeanor. A young boy reported to the officers and made affidavit that the appellant had delivered to him some of this drug. Subsequently, appellant was indicted for the possession of LSD and, as aforesaid, was convicted thereof. It is argued that the appellant was arrested without a warrant for arrest, and that the State failed to prove probable cause. The facts relative to the arrest were that the sheriff was present at the mayor's office with the chief of police, the mayor, and the young boy who made the affidavit. (The sheriff personally observed the making of the affidavit and the issuance of the warrant.) The chief of police took the warrant and departed in one direction, and the sheriff went in another direction. The sheriff arrested the appellant where his father worked and informed him of the cause of his arrest. As appellant and the sheriff were walking down the aisle and came near appellant's father, the appellant whirled and ran to his father, transferring a bottle from his pocket to his father's pocket. This was seen by the sheriff who took from the father's pocket an Excedrin bottle in which the LSD had been kept by the appellant. We consider this question answered by Section 2470 Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (Supp. 1971), which obviates proof of probable cause, and reads, in part, as follows: It is alleged that there were no jurors within the age group of appellant (18-20) on either the grand jury or the petit jury. It is argued that because this age group has been permitted by amendment to the United States Constitution to register and vote, they should be on the jury lists. Our Legislature has prescribed qualifications for jurors in Section 1762 Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (Supp. 1971); and as a part thereof is the requirement that jurors be twenty-one years of age or older. The fact that the Constitution of the United States was amended by Amendment XXVI does not qualify persons under twenty-one years of age as jurors under State laws. Appellant says that he was prejudiced and that it was reversible error for the district attorney to ask of one of the witnesses the following question: "Mayor Joiner, I ask you, sir, if you know the general reputation of the defendant, Harold Wayne Johnson, in the community in which he resides, as a law abiding citizen and a dealer in drugs?" Objection was made and sustained to this question, and the jury admonished to disregard it. We do not think that this was such an error as would require reversal. We do not believe a miscarriage of justice was caused thereby, and Rule 11 of this Court states: Appellant also urges that a statement by the sheriff on cross-examination by appellant's attorney constituted reversible error. Appellant's attorney was cross-examining the sheriff as to whether he had previously arrested the appellant. The answer was that appellant had been arrested on one occasion for driving recklessly. Then followed the following questions and answers: We think this answer, while improper, was elicited by appellant's attorney and appellant cannot complain thereof. It is argued that the court did not permit the appellant to present his defense. This is said because the appellant claimed he was holding the LSD for another man and he wanted to go into details about this other man's life and conduct. Objection was sustained, and we think rightfully so. It is argued that the appellant should have been sentenced as for a misdemeanor, and with this contention we agree. Mississippi's Act on Controlled Drugs (Section 6831-70 Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (Supp. 1971)) provides, relative to penalties, as follows: LSD is included in Schedule I. Therefore, the above sections are in direct conflict as to the penalty to be inflicted. One section says possession of LSD is a felony; the other provides that possession of LSD is a misdemeanor. In this situation, we can only invoke the rule used in Grillis v. State, 196 Miss. 576, 17 So. 2d 525 (1944), where Grillis was indicted for an attempt to violate either of two sections of the Mississippi Code. The punishment under one section was as for a felony and under the other as for a misdemeanor. Judge Griffith, in deciding this issue, said: We apply the rule as stated in the Grillis case, affirm the conviction, vacate the sentence, and remand to the circuit court for re-sentencing under Section (c) heretofore quoted. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for proper sentence. All Justices concur except SUGG, J., who dissents only as to part regarding punishment. SUGG, Justice (dissenting): I concur in the majority opinion except for the construction of Section 6831-70, Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (Supp. 1971). In my opinion the case of Grillis v. State, 196 Miss. 576, 17 So. 2d 525 (1944), contains a correct statement of the law, but does not apply to the statute involved because the legislative intent, when determined by applicable rules of statutory construction, gives trial judges a wide discretion in inflicting punishment on persons convicted under the provisions of the statute. In Grillis, supra, the Court held that the indictment charged elements in both sections 2336 and 2338 of the Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (1956) and stated: In Grillis, supra, the Court was dealing with an indictment that attempted to charge a crime under separate statutes enacted at different times rather than a single statute that authorized different punishment. I am of the opinion that the statute as written authorizes, in the case of possession of a controlled substance not a counterfeit substance, sentence under either subsection (a) or subsection (c), supra, at the discretion of the trial judge. It is noted that subsection (a), supra, provides that it is unlawful for any person to "manufacture, deliver, or possess a controlled substance." Subsection (a) then provides for punishment in four separate sections as follows: Under paragraphs numbered 1, 2 and 3, although a violation is defined as a felony, the trial judge may, in his discretion, punish by a fine only. Subsection (c) then defines possession as a misdemeanor and limits punishment to confinement for not more than 6 months, or fine of not more than $500.00, or both. It is noted that subsection (c) is limited to simple possession and the reduced punishment authorized by it does not apply to persons who might be convicted of manufacturing or delivering a controlled substance. Thus it appears that, from an analysis of the statute, it was the intention of the Legislature to give the trial judge wide discretion in inflicting punishment under either subsection (a) or (c), supra, where the charge is simple possession. It is a well recognized doctrine that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed and as noted in United States v. Hood, 343 U.S. 148, 151, 72 S. Ct. 568, 570, 96 L. Ed. 846, 849, (1952) the Court stated: Applying the rule of construction stated above, we should not read out of Section 6831-70, supra, subsection (a), which authorizes imprisonment for not more than 4 years as a punishment for possession of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) listed in Schedule I of the Act. We have many criminal statutes that authorize punishment by fine or imprisonment in the county jail or by imprisonment in the penitentiary at the discretion of the trial court. One example is Section 2233, Mississippi Code of 1942 Annotated (1956), which prescribes the punishment for manslaughter as follows: This Court held in Lester v. State, 209 Miss. 171, 46 So. 2d 109 (1950), and McCaffrey v. State, 185 Miss. 659, 187 So. 740 (1939), that the circuit judge has wide discretion in inflicting punishment on persons convicted of the crime of manslaughter. Sections 2242, 2243 and 2257.5 Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (Supp. 1971) are other examples of crimes where the trial judge is given the discretion of inflicting punishment either by fine, or by imprisonment in the county jail, or both, or by imprisonment in the penitentiary. This Court, in the case of Bellew v. State, 238 Miss. 734, 750, 751, 106 So. 2d 146, 153 (1958) in construing Section 2142.5 of the Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (1956) stated: Emphasis is placed on the fact that subsection (c), supra, defines simple possession as a misdemeanor, but there is authority that statutory nomenclature does not necessarily determine the grade or class of a crime. 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 20, p. 104 (1965). See, also, State v. Kelly, 218 Minn. 247, 15 N.W.2d 554 (1944), 162 A.L.R. 477 and In re Rogers, 20 Cal. App. 2d 397, 66 P.2d 1237 (1937). Because of the apparent conflict in subsections (a) and (c), supra, the Court is justified in holding that the statute is ambiguous or doubtful. We must then turn to the rules of statutory construction announced by this Court as an aid in the construction of the statute. In McCullen v. State, 217 Miss. 256, 270, 271, 272, 63 So. 2d 856, 861 (1953) the rules for statutory construction and determining the intent of the Legislature were summarized as follows: Taking the above rules of construction of statutes into consideration, it is clear that the intent of the Legislature was to permit one guilty of possession of controlled substances to be punished either under subsection (a), supra, or under the lesser punishment of subsection (c), supra. As stated in McCullen, words or phrases may be supplied by the courts and inserted in a statute where necessary to obviate repugnancy and inconsistency in the statute and to complete the sense thereof so as to give effect of the intention of the Legislature manifested therein. Although I do not believe it necessary to supply words or phrases to complete the sense of the statute or to give effect to the intention of the Legislature, such should be done rather than write out of the statute the punishment prescribed in subsection (a), supra, with reference to possession of controlled substances. As stated in Hood, supra, "We should not read out what as a matter of ordinary English speech is in." For the reasons stated, I dissent.