Case Title: Curtis Jones, Et Ux. v. Martin Electronics, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2006-05-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC04-1538 
____________ 
 
CURTIS JONES, et ux.,  
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
MARTIN ELECTRONICS, INC., 
Respondent. 
 
[June 15, 2006] 
CORRECTED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a decision of a district court of appeal on the following 
question, which the court certified to be of great public importance: 
MAY AN EMPLOYEE RECEIVING WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION BENEFITS LITIGATE ENTITLEMENT TO 
ADDITIONAL BENEFITS THEN, HAVING OBTAINED AN 
AWARD OF THE ADDITIONAL WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
BENEFITS, BRING SUIT IN CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE 
PERSONAL INJURIES SUSTAINED ON THE JOB THAT WERE 
THE BASIS FOR THE AWARD?  
Martin Elecs., Inc. v. Jones, 877 So. 2d 765, 769 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  We rephrase the certified question 
to address the factors presented more specifically as follows: 
 
 
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IS AN EMPLOYEE WHO IS ENTITLED TO AND HAS 
RECEIVED WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS FOR A 
WORKPLACE INJURY BUT HAS NOT PURSUED THE 
COMPENSATION CASE TO A CONCLUSION ON THE MERITS 
ESTOPPED FROM LATER FILING A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION 
AGAINST THE EMPLOYER IN CIRCUIT COURT FOR TORT 
DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE SAME WORKPLACE 
INJURY IF THE EMPLOYER’S CONDUCT THAT CAUSED THE 
WORKPLACE INJURY RISES TO THE LEVEL OF 
INTENTIONAL CONDUCT SUBSTANTIALLY CERTAIN TO 
RESULT IN INJURY FOR WHICH THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY 
DOCTRINE IS NOT AVAILABLE?  
For the reasons that follow, we answer the rephrased question in the negative. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The facts of the underlying action were detailed in the district court’s 
opinion below.  The essential facts are not in dispute.  On May 1, 2000, while 
working for Martin Electronics, Mr. Jones suffered third-degree burns over three-
fifths of his body’s surface when an explosion occurred in a building on Martin 
Electronics’ premises.  See Martin Elecs., 877 So. 2d at 767.  Mr. Jones did not 
regain consciousness until July 11, 2000.  See id.  He endured twenty-four 
surgeries and all of his fingers and both thumbs were amputated.  See id.  From the 
beginning, Martin Electronics and its workers’ compensation carrier voluntarily 
provided workers’ compensation benefits.  See id.   
A dispute between the parties 
arose concerning only the hourly rate for attendant care that Mrs. Jones furnished.  
See id.  Mr. Jones filed a petition to alter this attendant care benefit with the Office 
of the Judges of Compensation Claims in February of 2001.  See id.  Prior to a 
 
 
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contested hearing on the petition, the parties completed a preprinted standard form 
stipulation by answering questions with regard to the incident.  See id.  On this 
form, Mr. Jones circled “yes” in response to the statement “accident or 
occupational disease accepted as compensable.”  See id.  On January 29, 2003, the 
judge of compensation claims entered an order granting the petition, approving and 
adopting as a finding of fact the parties’ stipulation to the effect that Mr. Jones 
sustained a compensable injury and awarding additional monies for Mrs. Jones’s 
attendant services.  See id.  With a modification not pertinent to the instant matter, 
the First District affirmed the modification of additional attendant care benefits.  
See Martin Elecs. v. Jones, 871 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). 
 
While receiving these compensation benefits, Curtis and Annie Jones (“the 
Joneses”) filed the complaint in circuit court in the present case on January 7, 
2003, seeking damages in tort.  As amended on March 18, 2003, the complaint 
alleged in pertinent part:  
7. At the time of his injuries, CURTIS JONES was an employee of 
MARTIN and was in the course and scope of his employment with 
MARTIN.  
8. While MARTIN did not have an actual intent to injure CURTIS 
JONES, the injuries to CURTIS JONES were the result of intentional 
conduct on the part of MARTIN that was substantially certain to 
result in injury or death.  
Martin Elecs., 877 So. 2d at 767.  Martin Electronics moved for summary 
judgment on the basis that Mr. Jones had elected the workers’ compensation 
 
 
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system as his remedy for the injuries alleged in this civil lawsuit, and, therefore, as 
a matter of law was precluded from recovering damages from Martin Electronics 
in a civil action.  See id. at 767-68.  The circuit court denied Martin Electronics’ 
motion for summary judgment, ruling that Mr. Jones was entitled to receive 
workers’ compensation benefits and also pursue the tort action against Martin 
Electronics under the allegations presented.  See id. at 766.  The trial court 
reasoned that Martin Electronics was not entitled to workers’ compensation 
immunity if the facts alleged in the complaint were established.  See id.  
 
Martin Electronics sought review in the First District of the trial court’s 
order which determined that it was not entitled to immunity.  See id.  Martin 
Electronics asserted on appeal that Mr. Jones had elected the workers’ 
compensation remedy by actively pursuing the workers’ compensation claim to a 
conclusion on the merits, and, therefore, the Joneses were judicially estopped from 
pursuing the intentional tort claim.  See id. at 768.   
 
In its opinion, the First District held that Mr. Jones had elected his remedy 
under the workers’ compensation statutory scheme, reasoning that 
filing a petition for additional attendant care benefits, litigating before 
the judge of compensation claims on the theory that a covered 
industrial accident occurred, and obtaining an order predicated on the 
finding that Mr. Jones sustained an injury by accident “implie[d] a 
conscious intent . . . to choose compensation benefits over a tort 
action.”   
 
 
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Id. (quoting Velez v. Oxford Dev. Co., 457 So. 2d 1388, 1390 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1984)).  Ultimately, the district court reversed the trial court’s order denying 
Martin Electronics’ motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for entry 
of a summary final judgment in favor of Martin Electronics.  See Martin Elecs., 
877 So. 2d at 768.  The district court also certified the question currently before 
this Court as one of great public importance.  See id. at 769.  
 
Review of the First District’s decision is sought here, which we have 
granted.  See Jones v. Martin Elecs., Inc., 894 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 2005) (table).  
ANALYSIS 
Workers’ Compensation Immunity 
 
Florida’s workers’ compensation system was designed, intended, and 
contemplated for workplace injuries that have occurred in the course and scope of 
employment.  The workers’ compensation system seeks to balance competing 
interests and provide tradeoffs between employees and employers.  Specifically, 
the workers’ compensation system provides employees limited medical and wage 
loss benefits, without regard to fault, for losses resulting from workplace injuries in 
exchange for the employee relinquishing his or her right to seek certain common 
law remedies from the employer for those injuries under certain circumstances.   
On the date Mr. Jones was injured, section 440.11(1) of the Florida Statutes 
(2000), provided, “The liability of an employer prescribed in s[ection] 440.10 shall 
 
 
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be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer . . . to the employee 
. . . .”  § 440.11(1), Fla. Stat. (2000).  This provision provides the employer 
immunity from liability for an employer’s negligence that has caused the 
employee’s workplace injury.  See Aguilera v. Inservices, Inc., 905 So. 2d 84, 90-
91 (Fla. 2005).  Notwithstanding the tradeoffs provided, we have established and 
continue to hold that an employer’s immunity under the workers’ compensation 
system does not extend to workplace injuries caused by conduct of the employer so 
egregious that it is tantamount to an intentional tort.  See id. at 90 (“The workers’ 
compensation system limits liability only for negligent workplace conduct which 
produces workplace injury, but does not extend to immunize intentional tortious 
conduct.”) (citing Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683, 687 (Fla. 2000) (“[W]e 
reaffirm our prior decisions recognizing, as have our district courts and many 
jurisdictions around the country, that workers’ compensation law does not protect 
an employer from liability for an intentional tort against an employee.”)).  
However, an employee is not precluded from filing an action against his or her 
employer for intentional conduct substantially certain to result in injury simply 
because some workers’ compensation benefits have been paid.  See Wishart v. 
Laidlaw Tree Serv., Inc., 573 So. 2d 183, 184 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Velez v. 
Oxford Dev. Co., 457 So. 2d 1388, 1390 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).  Precluding a 
worker from pursuing a remedy for a workplace injury caused by an employer’s 
 
 
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intentional tortious conduct would conflict with the intent and spirit of Florida’s 
workers’ compensation system and would not operate to further its goals if the 
mere payment of some compensation benefits under the factual circumstances here 
operated to eliminate such a right. 
 
Martin Electronics asserts that the Joneses are estopped from advancing this 
action because Mr. Jones elected his exclusive remedy under the workers’ 
compensation statutory scheme by filing for and receiving a change in only the 
attendant care benefits being paid by Martin Electronics’ workers’ compensation 
insurance carrier.  See Martin Elecs., 877 So. 2d at 768.  For the reasons provided 
in our analysis below, we hold that an employee who is injured in the workplace 
during the course and scope of his or her employment and receives workers’ 
compensation benefits, but does not pursue a compensation claim to a conclusion 
on the merits, may file an action against an employer for that workplace injury 
under these circumstances if the employer’s conduct is to the level of intentional 
conduct substantially certain to result in injury for which workers’ compensation 
immunity is not available.  
Election of Remedies 
The district court below held that Mr. Jones elected his exclusive remedy 
under the workers’ compensation statute by merely filing for an adjustment in the 
rate of attendant care benefits that the Joneses received for Mrs. Jones’s attendant 
 
 
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care.  See Martin Elecs., 877 So. 2d at 768.  The district court explained that Mr. 
Jones’s actions with respect to this adjustment in benefits “implie[d] a conscious 
intent . . . to choose compensation benefits over a tort action.”  Id. (quoting Velez, 
457 So. 2d at 1390).  However, our review of the facts in the instant matter leads 
us to conclude that Mr. Jones’s actions with respect to this claim under these 
circumstances did not amount to an inconsistent election of remedies which would 
bar the subsequent common law action against Martin Electronics under the 
allegations here. 
We have established that “[a]n election of remedies presupposes a right to 
elect.  It is a choice shown by an overt act . . . .”  Williams v. Robineau, 168 So. 
644, 646 (Fla. 1936).  However, in the context of workers’ compensation, the point 
upon which a worker’s action with regard to a compensation claim constitutes an 
election of the workers’ compensation remedy to the exclusion of a civil action is 
not entirely clear.  Florida courts have clearly stated that the “[m]ere acceptance of 
some compensation benefits . . . is not enough to constitute an election” of 
remedies.  Velez, 457 So. 2d at 1390 (quoting Whitney-Fidalgo Seafoods, Inc. v. 
Beukers, 554 P.2d 250, 254 (Alaska 1976)); see also Wheeled Coach Indus., Inc. v. 
Annulis, 852 So. 2d 430, 432 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Hernandez v. United 
Contractors Corp., 766 So. 2d 1249, 1252 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Lowry v. Logan, 
650 So. 2d 653, 657 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Wishart, 573 So. 2d at 184.  In Wheeled 
 
 
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Coach Industries, Inc. v. Annulis, 852 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), the Fifth 
District reasoned that “to constitute an election of remedies the workers’ 
compensation remedy must be pursued to a determination or conclusion on the 
merits . . . .  There must be evidence of a conscious intent by the claimant to elect 
the compensation remedy and to waive his other rights.”  Id. at 433 (quoting 
Lowry, 650 So. 2d at 657); see also Williams v. Duggan, 153 So. 2d 726, 726 (Fla. 
1963); Robineau, 168 So. at 426; Hernandez, 766 So. 2d at 1253.  An analysis of 
the facts in Wheeled Coach Industries is helpful to our resolution of this case. 
In Wheeled Coach Industries, an employee was killed while working on a 
truck.  See 852 So. 2d at 431.  The employer’s workers’ compensation carrier 
began making benefit payments without the employee’s widow ever filing a claim 
for workers’ compensation benefits.  See id. at 432.  The same circumstance is 
presented here.  See Martin Elecs., 877 So. 2d at 767.  Approximately seven 
months later, the employee’s widow filed a petition with the Office of the Judges 
of Compensation Claims seeking a change in the payment schedule from biweekly 
to monthly.  See Wheeled Coach Indus., 852 So. 2d at 431.  The petition was 
granted and the deceased employee’s widow began receiving monthly benefits 
payments.  See id.  Subsequently, the employee’s widow filed a wrongful death 
action alleging that the employer had intentionally caused her husband’s death.  
See id. at 430.  The employer moved for summary judgment on the theory that the 
 
 
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employee’s widow had elected her remedy under the workers’ compensation 
scheme by accepting benefits and applying for a change in the benefit payment 
schedule.  See id. at 431.  The trial court denied the motion and the employer 
sought review in the Fifth District.  See id. at 430.  On appeal, the Fifth District 
reasoned that the employee’s widow had not elected her remedy under the 
workers’ compensation scheme because she had not filed a claim for benefits, only 
for an interim change, nor had she proceeded to a conclusion on the merits in the 
workers’ compensation case.  See id. at 432.  The Fifth District noted that the 
widow’s “petitioning to change the schedule of payments did not evince a 
conscious intent to elect workers’ compensation benefits or to waive her other 
rights.”  Id.  The district court added that “even if [the widow’s] request to 
reschedule the payments constituted a petition for benefits, she would not be 
precluded from filing suit because she did not pursue the workers’ compensation 
claim to a conclusion on the merits.”  Id. at 433. 
The facts of the instant matter are most similar to those in Wheeled Coach 
Industries.  Subsequent to Mr. Jones’s catastrophic injuries, the compensation 
carrier for Martin Electronics began paying compensation benefits despite the fact 
that no claim for such benefits had been filed.  See Martin Elecs., 877 So. 2d at 
767.  Approximately ten months later, Mr. Jones filed a petition with the Office of 
the Judges of Compensation Claims only for an adjustment in the hourly rate of 
 
 
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attendant care benefits which the compensation carrier had voluntarily paid since 
shortly after his injury.  See id.  After a hearing in which Martin Electronics 
contested the appropriate rate of attendant care benefits, the judge of compensation 
claims entered an order granting the petition and adjusting only the rate of 
attendant care benefits.  See id.  Unlike the Fifth District in Wheeled Coach 
Industries, however, the First District below held that these actions with regard to a 
petition for an adjustment in the attendant care benefit rate being paid did 
constitute a “conscious intent . . . to choose compensation benefits over a tort 
action.”  Martin Elecs., 877 So. 2d at 768.  We disagree with the district court’s 
holding below.   
We hold that the petition for an adjustment in attendant care benefit rates 
under these circumstances did not amount to pursuit to a conclusion on the merits 
of a workers’ compensation claim and, therefore, did not constitute an inconsistent 
election of remedies.  The petition was simply a request for a change in the rate 
used to calculate a benefit that the compensation carrier had been voluntarily 
providing from the time of injury.  The facts here are most similar to the widow’s 
request in Wheeled Coach Industries for a change in the payment schedule of the 
compensation benefits already being paid.  The sole subject matter of the contested 
hearing regarding the petition here addressed the rate for attendant care services.  
The issue of whether the incident which resulted in Mr. Jones’s injuries was 
 
 
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compensable or caused by neglect or intent was not litigated pursuant to this 
petition.  Neither Mr. Jones’s entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits nor 
the extent of his injuries was ever a contested issue, as the compensation carrier for 
Martin Electronics began voluntarily making benefit payments almost immediately 
after Mr. Jones sustained his injuries.  See Martin Elecs., 877 So. 2d at 767.  
Therefore, the petition, hearing, and resulting order here did not constitute 
litigation to a conclusion on the merits of Mr. Jones’s compensation claim and, in 
accordance with established Florida law, did not constitute an election by Mr. 
Jones of his workers’ compensation remedy.  See Duggan, 153 So. 2d at 726; 
Robineau, 168 So. at 426; Wheeled Coach, 852 So. 2d at 433; Hernandez, 766 So. 
2d at 1253; Lowry, 650 So. 2d at 657.    
Similarly, the petition filed here did not evince a conscious intent to choose 
workers’ compensation benefits and to reject any potential tort claim.  Although 
Mr. Jones was required to complete a standard pretrial form questionnaire, and he 
did circle “yes” next to the statement “Accident or occupational disease accepted 
as compensable,” the answering of this yes/no question on a standard form 
questionnaire required to have the attendant care benefit rate issue resolved was 
not a “conscious intent by [Mr. Jones] to elect the compensation remedy and to 
waive his other rights.”  Lowry, 650 So. 2d at 657; see also Wheeled Coach Indus., 
852 So. 2d at 433.  The fact that Mr. Jones could receive benefits under the 
 
 
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workers’ compensation statutory scheme is not contested.  The issue here is 
whether his actions constituted such an election.  The answer to a standard yes/no 
question on a form prehearing questionnaire which was designed only to outline 
the disputed issues was not enough to constitute a knowing waiver of any common 
law rights against Martin Electronics for the intentional injuries as alleged here.            
 
We reaffirm the long line of cases holding that the mere receipt of 
compensation benefits under these circumstances does not constitute an election of 
remedies on the part of this injured employee.  See Wheeled Coach Indus., 852 So. 
2d at 432; Hernandez, 766 So. 2d at 1252; Lowry, 650 So. 2d at 657; Wishart, 573 
So. 2d at 184; Velez, 457 So. 2d at 1390.  In the instant matter, the conduct with 
regard to the petition for only an adjustment in the rate of attendant care benefits 
did not amount to such a clear overt act evincing a waiver of all common law 
intentional tort remedies.  The Joneses are not barred from filing the present action 
against Martin Electronics. 
Protections Against Double Recovery 
Our decision today will not allow an employee to be entitled to a double 
recovery.  Benefits under the workers’ compensation act include medical expenses 
and disability benefits.  See §§ 440.13, 440.15, Fla. Stat. (2000).  Although in a tort 
action an injured employee may theoretically be entitled to recover some of the 
same types of damages recoverable under the compensation act, namely medical 
 
 
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expenses and lost wages, the common law award for an employer’s intentional 
tortious conduct represents a supplemental remedy for damages such as pain and 
suffering, and loss of spousal services, which are not provided for under the 
workers’ compensation act.  The tort action may also provide an avenue for the 
imposition of punitive damages against an employer who intentionally injures 
employees.  Ultimately, an injured employee would only be entitled to recover for 
each element of damage once.  The workers’ compensation statute specifically 
includes a provision which both protects against double recovery and operates to 
ensure that workers’ compensation carriers are reimbursed in the instance that a 
third-party tortfeasor is found liable for the employee’s injuries.  See § 440.39, Fla. 
Stat. (2000). 
Section 440.39 of Florida’s workers’ compensation statute ensures both that 
litigants will not be allowed double recovery for their injuries and that workers’ 
compensation coverage will not ultimately be responsible in situations where an 
employee’s injuries are caused by the employer’s, or any other third party’s, 
tortious conduct.  See § 440.39, Fla. Stat. (2000).  Under the workers’ 
compensation statute, if an injured employee files a civil action for damages 
previously compensated by workers’ compensation benefits, compensation 
insurance carriers are authorized to file a notice of payment of benefits which 
operates as a lien on any subsequent judgment to the extent that the judgment 
 
 
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includes damages of the same type as benefits paid under the workers’ 
compensation plan (e.g., medical benefits and wage compensation).  See § 
440.39(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000).  After judgment is entered against a tortfeasor and 
in favor of the injured employee, the workers’ compensation coverage will be 
reimbursed from liability damages for benefits paid as a result of the injury.  If, 
however, the employer has engaged in conduct against the injured employee such 
that the employee is entitled to damages for pain and suffering and other elements 
of damage not covered under the workers’ compensation statutory scheme, section 
440.39 allows the workers’ compensation coverage to be refunded or credited for 
amounts previously paid.  
Further, even if the workers’ compensation carrier does not file a notice of 
payment in any subsequent civil action which would operate as a lien on any 
judgment in favor of the injured employee, Florida’s collateral source statute 
would at least prevent a double recovery on the part of the injured employee.  See 
§ 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. (2005).  Section 768.76 of the Florida Statutes states that 
“the court shall reduce the amount of [damage] award[s] by the total of all amounts 
which have been paid for the benefit of the claimant.”  Id.  Florida courts have 
stated that “workers’ compensation benefits are a collateral source within the 
meaning of section 768.50(2)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (1983).”  Am. Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Decker, 518 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), adopted in Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 
 
 
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v. Chambers, 526 So. 2d 66, 67 (Fla. 1988).  Therefore, even if the insurance 
carrier fails to take the actions necessary to entitle it to a reimbursement, the 
employee would still not be allowed double recovery because the court would 
reduce any amount paid as workers’ compensation benefits as a collateral source. 1   
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we answer the rephrased certified question in the 
negative and hold that an employee who receives compensation benefits for a 
workplace injury under these circumstances is not barred from filing an action 
against an employer for the injury.  The employee has not consciously elected an 
inconsistent workers’ compensation remedy under these circumstances, and if the 
claimant can demonstrate that the employer’s conduct causing the workplace 
injury is to the level otherwise required by law for such action, there is no 
compensation bar.  Accordingly, we quash the decision below, and remand with 
instructions to return the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
                                          
 
 
1.  It is important to note, however, that this Court has approved a holding 
that the collateral source statute does not extinguish a carrier’s right under section 
440.39 to apply for a lien on the judgment thereby recovering the amount of any 
benefits paid to an injured employee whose injuries are later adjudicated to be 
caused by a third-party tortfeasor.  See Am. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Decker, 518 So. 2d 
315, 318-19 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), adopted in Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chambers, 
526 So. 2d 66, 67 (Fla. 1988).  The importance of the two statutory provisions is to 
simply operate to preclude double recovery.   
 
 
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PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D03-4091 
 
 
(Taylor County) 
 
Thomas M. Ervin, Jr. of Ervin, Chapman and Ervin, David H. Burns, Robert Scott 
Cox and Talley Kaleko of Cox and Burns, P.A., and Benjamin L. Crump of Parks 
and Crump, LLC, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioners 
 
Fred M. Johnson of Fuller, Johnson and Farrell, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
Andrew L. Patten of Sponsler, Bennett, Jacobs and Cristal, P.A., Tampa, Florida, 
on behalf of Florida Defense Lawyers Association, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae