Case Title: Hollomon v. Keadle

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-09-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Mary HOLLOMON v. Dr. W.R. KEADLE

95-1231                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
              Opinion delivered September 30, 1996


1.   Judgment -- summary judgment -- when appropriate. -- Summary
     judgment is only appropriate when no issue of material fact
     exists, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
     law.

2.   Torts -- outrage -- must be considered first. -- The supreme
     court must first decide whether a party's accusations, taken
     as true, state a claim for the tort of outrage; if the party
     cannot state a claim for outrage, then any unresolved factual
     issues are simply irrelevant.

3.   Torts -- outrage -- elements of. -- To succeed on a tort-of-
     outrage claim, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant
     intended to inflict emotional distress or knew or should have
     known that emotional distress was the likely result of his
     conduct; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous, and was
     utterly intolerable in a civilized community; (3) the
     defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress;
     and (4) the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was
     so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to
     endure it.

4.   Torts -- outrage -- appellant failed to show that employer was
     made aware that she was peculiarly susceptible to emotional
     distress. -- The supreme court concluded that appellant failed
     to establish that appellee-employer was made aware that she
     was "not a person of ordinary temperament" or that she was
     "peculiarly  susceptible to emotional distress by reason of
     some physical or mental condition or peculiarity."

5.   Torts -- outrage -- appellant failed to show that employer had
     notice of alleged severity of emotional distress. -- The
     supreme court could not say that appellant alleged that
     appellee-employer had notice of the alleged severity of her
     emotional distress where it could not be determined from her
     abstract that she ever made appellee aware that he had
     inflicted upon her distress "so severe that no reasonable man
     could be expected to endure it."

6.   Torts -- outrage -- narrow view taken in recognizing claim. --
     The supreme court has consistently taken a narrow view in
     recognizing claims for the tort of outrage that arise out of
     the discharge of an employee; the reason is that an employer
     must be given considerable latitude in dealing with employees,
     and, at the same time, an employee will frequently feel
     considerable insult when discharged. 

7.   Torts -- outrage -- conduct that meets standard must be
     determined on case-by-case basis. -- The type of conduct that
     meets the standard for an outrage cause of action must be
     determined on a case-by-case basis; the extreme and outrageous
     character of the conduct may arise from the employer's
     knowledge that the employee is peculiarly susceptible to
     emotional distress by reason of some physical or mental
     peculiarity; the conduct may become outrageous if the employer
     continues it in the face of such knowledge, where it would not
     be so if he did not know; the fact that an employer continues
     unjustifiable conduct over a long period of time can be an
     important factor weighing in favor of a finding that the
     employer's conduct towards an employee was outrageous.

8.   Torts -- outrage -- appellant knew that employer was given to
     yelling and cursing -- allegations insufficient to state
     claim. -- Where appellant knew by the second day of her
     employment with appellee-employer that he was a singularly
     unpleasant man given to constantly yelling and cursing, yet
     she remained in his employ for more than two years, and where
     there was no showing that appellee-employer had knowledge that
     appellant-employee was "peculiarly susceptible to emotional
     distress by reasons of some physical or mental condition or
     peculiarity" and proceeded in the face of such knowledge, the
     supreme court did not depart from its position that abusive
     profanity alone is not sufficient reason to bring a cause of
     action for the tort of outrage.

9.   Appeal & error -- First Amendment issue not reached. --
     Because the supreme court affirmed the trial court's finding
     that appellant's allegations were insufficient as a matter of
     law to state a claim for the tort of outrage, it did not reach
     the issue of whether appellee's speech was protected by the
     First Amendment.  


     Appeal from Garland Circuit Court; Walter Wright, Judge;
affirmed.
     William T. Mathis II, for appellant.
     Wright, Chaney, Berry & Daniel, P.A., by: Edward M. Slaughter,
for appellee.

     Andree Layton Roaf, Justice.
     This case involves a claim for the tort of outrage brought by
Appellant Mary Hollomon against her former employer, Dr. W. R.
Keadle. Hollomon alleges that Keadle repeatedly insulted her and
subjected her to veiled threats of bodily harm.  The trial court
found that  Hollomon's allegations were insufficient as a matter of
law to state a claim for the tort of outrage, and further, that the
First Amendment protected  Keadle's statements; the trial court
accordingly granted  Keadle's motion for summary judgment.  We
affirm. 
     Mary Hollomon worked for Dr. Keadle, a sixty-eight-year-old
physician, for approximately two years before she voluntarily left
his employ.  Hollomon alleges that during her employment, Keadle
repeatedly cursed her and referred to her with offensive terms,
such as "white nigger," "slut," "whore," and "the ignorance of
Glenwood, Arkansas."  Hollomon contends that Keadle frequently
made, in her presence, degrading remarks about women such as: 
"women should be at home, not working, and if they are out there
working they are whores and prostitutes...only whores and
prostitutes work" and "any time a woman wears rings [other than
wedding rings], she is a whore and a slut."  In addition, Hollomon
claims that Keadle frequently directed profanity at her in front of
patients and other employees.  In her deposition, Hollomon stated
that she became aware that Keadle was a "grouch" by the second day
of her employment with him and that he constantly yelled and cursed
and used the "F" word almost every day.  She stated that he cursed
and belittled his wife and other women in his office.
     According to Hollomon's deposition, Keadle also told her that
he had connections with the mob in California and could pay one of
his schizophrenic patients $500.00 to "take care of" anyone he
chose.  As an example of these "connections," Hollomon stated that
Keadle told her that one of his former female employees
"supposedly" died in an automobile accident in California. 
Finally, Hollomon states that Keadle told her that he carried a gun
and that he had recently pulled the gun on a patient who angered
him.  Hollomon asserts that Keadle told her these stories to
intimidate her and to suggest that he would have her killed if she
quit or caused trouble.
      Hollomon contends that she did not resign earlier because she
feared Keadle would have her killed.  In addition, Hollomon asserts
that her status as a single parent and her dire financial
condition, of which Keadle was aware, prevented her from leaving
the job.  Hollomon claims that Keadle's comments caused her 
stomach problems, loss of sleep, loss of self-esteem, anxiety
attacks, and embarrassment. In her deposition, Hollomon stated that
she told Jim Butler, a counselor, about the constant ridicule by
Keadle but admitted that she did not go to his office or seek
counseling services from him.  She further stated that Keadle's
cursing upset her stomach and that Keadle and a Dr. Jansen gave her
medication for her stomach problems. After two years and three
months of working for Keadle, Hollomon alleges that she resigned
because of his cursing. In his deposition, Keadle denied all of
Hollomon's allegations. 
     On her first argument for reversal, Hollomon claims that the
trial judge erred in granting summary judgment because genuine
issues of material fact existed concerning whether or not Dr.
Keadle made the alleged statements.  Hollomon correctly argues that
summary judgment is only appropriate when no issue of material fact
exists, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
See, Ark. R. Civ. P. 56 (c); Browning v. Browning, 319 Ark. 205,
890 S.W.2d 273 (1995).  However, this court must first decide
whether Hollomon's accusations, taken as true, state a claim for
the tort of outrage.  Rainey v. Travis, 312 Ark. 460,