Case Title: State v. Ricky McMorris

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1995AP002052-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1997-10-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-2052-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of  Wisconsin, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Ricky McMorris, 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  205 Wis. 2d 727, 557 N.W.2d 255 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
 
 
UNPUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
October 30, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
September 4, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis J. Barry 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
STEINMETZ and WILCOX, J.J., join 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs and oral argument by Walter W. Stern, Union Grove. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Stephen W. Kleinmaier, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief was James E. Doyle, assistant attorney general. 
 
No. 95-2052-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 95-2052-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Ricky McMorris,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
FILED 
 
OCT 30, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed in 
part; cause remanded. 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State 
v. McMorris, No. 95-2052-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Oct. 2, 1996), affirming in part and reversing in part an order 
of the Circuit Court for Racine County, Dennis J. Barry, Judge. 
 The circuit court denied the motion of the defendant, Ricky 
McMorris, to suppress two identifications:  (1) the eyewitness's 
in-court 
identification 
of 
the 
defendant 
and 
(2) the 
eyewitness's 
identification 
of 
the 
defendant 
in 
a 
post-
indictment, pre-trial lineup conducted without notice to and in 
the absence of his counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel.   
¶2 
The court of appeals affirmed that part of the circuit 
court order denying the defendant's motion to suppress the in-
No. 95-2052-CR 
 
2 
court identification.  The defendant seeks review of this part 
of the court of appeals decision.  The court of appeals reversed 
that part of the circuit court order denying the defendant's 
motion 
to 
suppress 
the 
constitutionally 
defective 
lineup 
identification.  Neither the State nor the defendant challenges 
this part of the court of appeals decision.1  The court of 
appeals remanded the cause to the circuit court for further 
proceedings, and the parties agree that the cause must be 
remanded.   
¶3 
The only issue before this court is the admissibility 
of the eyewitness's in-court identification of the defendant 
after 
an 
identification 
in 
a 
lineup 
that 
violated 
the 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  We hold that the 
eyewitness's 
in-court 
identification 
should 
be 
suppressed 
because the State has not shown by clear and convincing evidence 
that the eyewitness's in-court identification of the defendant 
had an "independent origin," that is, that the source of the in-
court identification was the eyewitness's observation of the 
robber during the robbery and was independent of a lineup that 
violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  See 
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).  Accordingly, we 
                     
1 The State did not seek review of this part of the decision 
of the court of appeals because, as the State's brief explains, 
the United States Supreme Court has declared that evidence of an 
identification made at a lineup which was held without notice to 
and in the absence of counsel must be excluded from the trial.  
See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272-73 (1967). 
No. 95-2052-CR 
 
3 
reverse that part of the court of appeals decision admitting the 
eyewitness's in-court identification.   
I. 
¶4 
The facts are undisputed for purposes of this review. 
 On December 3, 1994, Patricia Jordan, a 67-year-old white 
woman, was robbed at knife-point as she was working alone at a 
grocery store in Mt. Pleasant, WI.   
¶5 
According to Jordan, a man entered the store, walked 
up to the cash register where she was working and asked her for 
some change.  Jordan was standing behind the counter, and the 
man was standing a couple of feet across from her on the other 
side.  When Jordan opened the cash register to provide the 
change, the man pointed a knife at her, told her to leave the 
cash drawer open and took money from the drawer.  As the robber 
removed the cash from the drawer, Jordan backed away about 10 
feet from the cash register and hid behind a meat slicer, while 
continuing to watch the robber.  Jordan was wearing her 
eyeglasses at the time of the robbery, and the store was well 
lit.  After the robber left the store, Jordan called the police.  
¶6 
About 15 to 20 minutes after the robbery, Officer 
Jason Wortock of the Mt. Pleasant Police Department arrived at 
the store.  He interviewed Jordan and took down the physical 
description she gave of the robber.  Jordan testified that the 
robber was an African-American male, at least six feet tall, 
wearing a white golfer’s cap and a tan jacket.  She said that 
she had never seen the robber before.  She described the knife 
he used as a tapered, single-edged knife about 12 inches long.  
No. 95-2052-CR 
 
4 
Jordan was the sole eyewitness to the robbery and is hereafter 
referred to as the eyewitness.  The police never recovered, by 
search warrant or otherwise, the knife, cap or jacket of the 
robber.  
¶7 
Later on the day of the robbery Officer Fulton Bell 
and Investigator Jayn Long showed the eyewitness six photographs 
of potential suspects, including one of the defendant.  All the 
photographs were of African-American men, some with facial hair, 
some without.  Apparently the police were uncertain at this time 
whether the robber had facial hair.  The eyewitness did not 
identify the defendant or anyone else from the photo array as 
the robber.   
¶8 
A store surveillance camera taped the robbery in its 
entirety. 
 
According 
to 
the 
tape, 
the 
robbery 
lasted 
approximately 25 seconds.  The eyewitness viewed the videotape 
shortly after the robbery and turned it over to Officer Wortock 
who viewed the videotape with several other officers, including 
Officer Bell and Investigator Long.  
¶9 
After seeing the videotape, Officer Bell concluded 
that the robber looked like the defendant with whom Bell was 
familiar because they had grown up in the same neighborhood.  
Officer Bell testified that he had seen the defendant on 
November 29, 1994, four days before the robbery while responding 
to a civil disturbance call, and had observed that at that time 
the defendant had full facial hair and was wearing a tan jacket 
and a cap.  (The defendant was not involved in the civil 
disturbance.)   
No. 95-2052-CR 
 
5 
¶10 Based upon her observation of the videotape and her 
subsequent in-person observation of the defendant at the Racine 
County Jail where he was incarcerated on an unrelated charge, 
Investigator Long concluded that the defendant was the robber.  
Prior to the robbery, Investigator Long had not been acquainted 
with the defendant.   
¶11 On January 4, 1995, the defendant was charged with 
armed 
robbery, 
and 
a 
public 
defender 
was 
appointed 
the 
defendant's counsel.  Five days later on January 9, 1995, 
Investigator Long, with the assistance of Corporal James 
Stratman, staged a lineup with five African-American males, 
including the defendant, all of whom were approximately the same 
weight and age as the defendant and all of whom had facial hair. 
 Apparently the police at this time were operating on the 
premise that the robber had facial hair.  After initially asking 
another man in the lineup to step forward, the eyewitness 
identified the defendant as the robber.   
¶12 The defendant's counsel did not attend the lineup, and 
at no time did the defendant waive his right to have his counsel 
present.  Investigator Long and Corporal Stratman failed to 
notify the defendant's counsel about the lineup, saying they 
were unaware that the defendant was entitled to have counsel 
present at a post-indictment lineup procedure.  The officers did 
not photograph the lineup, either by video or still camera.   
¶13 The eyewitness subsequently identified the defendant 
at the preliminary hearing on January 24, 1995, when he was 
wearing an orange jail uniform and was seated next to an 
No. 95-2052-CR 
 
6 
attorney at a table.  At the preliminary hearing the eyewitness 
testified that she knew the robber had long sideburns but was 
not sure if he had a mustache or beard.  When asked at the 
preliminary hearing why she had selected the defendant at the 
lineup, the eyewitness testified that she chose him, in part, 
because he was tall.   
¶14 The defendant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the 
lineup identification on the ground that the lineup had been 
improperly conducted in the absence of his counsel.  He also 
filed 
a 
pre-trial 
motion 
to 
suppress 
the 
in-court 
identification, 
claiming 
that 
it 
was 
tainted 
by 
the 
unconstitutional out-of-court lineup and that the in-court 
identification did not have an  origin independent of the 
lineup.   
¶15 The circuit court refused to suppress the lineup 
identification, concluding that the police had acted in good 
faith 
and 
that 
the 
lineup 
procedure 
was 
not 
otherwise 
impermissibly suggestive.  The circuit court ruled that the jury 
would be instructed that the defendant had been deprived of his 
right to counsel at the lineup.   
¶16 The court of appeals granted the defendant leave to 
appeal 
the 
suppression 
order 
and 
ordered 
the 
lineup 
identification suppressed.  This part of the court of appeals 
decision is not before us. 
¶17 In addition, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
court decision admitting the in-court identification on the 
ground that the State had shown by clear and convincing evidence 
No. 95-2052-CR 
 
7 
that an independent source existed for the eyewitness's in-court 
identification and that the in-court identification had not been 
tainted by the lineup identification.2  This part of the court of 
appeals decision is before us on review.   
II. 
¶18 This court has not previously discussed the applicable 
standard of review in determining whether an independent source 
exists for an in-court identification made after a lineup that 
violated an accused's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  The 
court has, however, considered the standard of review applicable 
to an analogous issue of attenuation in the Fourth Amendment 
context.  In State v. Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d 441, 447-48, 477 
N.W.2d 277 (1991), this court characterized as a constitutional 
fact the question whether evidence should be suppressed as the 
fruit of a prior illegal search or whether the evidence was 
sufficiently attenuated so as to be purged of the taint.  
Adhering to the Anderson analysis, we characterize as a 
constitutional fact the question whether an independent source 
exists for an in-court identification made after a lineup that 
violated an accused's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and we 
                     
2 In 
reaching 
this 
conclusion, the court 
of appeals 
considered the certainty of the eyewitness’s testimony at the 
preliminary hearing and the suppression hearing.  See State v. 
McMorris, No. 95-2052-CR, unpublished slip op. at 11 n.5 (Wis. 
Ct. App. Oct. 2, 1997). 
No. 95-2052-CR 
 
8 
apply the standard of review ordinarily applied to questions of 
constitutional fact.3   
¶19 Questions 
of 
constitutional 
fact 
are 
sometimes 
referred to as mixed questions of fact and law, requiring the 
court to determine what happened and whether the facts found 
fulfill a particular legal standard.4  Ordinarily, when reviewing 
a mixed question of fact and law, appellate courts engage in a 
two-part inquiry.  The first inquiry relates to the circuit 
court's findings of fact.  Neither the court of appeals nor this 
court will reverse a circuit court's findings of historical or 
evidentiary fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  The second 
inquiry relates to the question whether the historical or 
evidentiary facts satisfy the relevant constitutional standard. 
 Such an inquiry is made by this court independent of the 
circuit court and court of appeals.  However, in deciding 
whether the facts satisfy the constitutional standard this court 
may benefit from and draw upon the reasoning of the circuit 
court and court of appeals and may draw upon the circuit court's 
                     
3 For a similar analysis, see Tomlin v. Myers, 30 F.3d 1235, 
1241 n.12 (9th Cir. 1994).  
The State's brief asserts that not all courts use this 
standard of review in deciding identification issues.  The cases 
the State cites, however, do not involve the identification 
issue posed in this case, namely an in-court identification 
after an identification in a lineup that violated the Sixth 
Amendment.  See Brief for State at 14 n.1. 
4 See State v. Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d 3, 17-18, 556 N.W.2d 
687 (1996). 
No. 95-2052-CR 
 
9 
observational advantage.  Nevertheless, this court independently 
measures the facts against a uniform constitutional standard.   
¶20 The principal reason for independent appellate review 
of matters of constitutional fact is to provide uniformity in 
constitutional decision making.5  In applying the skeletal 
constitutional rule, appellate courts flesh out the rule and 
provide guidance to litigants, lawyers, and trial and appellate 
courts.   
¶21 We conclude, as did the parties, that whether an 
independent source exists for an in-court identification made 
after a lineup that violated an accused's Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel is a question of constitutional fact which we 
determine independent of the circuit court and court of appeals, 
benefiting from their analyses.   
III. 
¶22 Our analysis begins with a summary of the law relating 
to the admissibility of an in-court identification of an accused 
after identification in a lineup is suppressed because the 
accused was deprived of the right to counsel at the lineup.   
¶23 The parties acknowledge, and we agree, that the 
controlling United States Supreme Court decision in this case is 
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).   
                     
5 See State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 171, 388 N.W.2d 565, 
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989 (1986) ("The reason for independent 
appellate review of constitutional facts is [that] '[t]he scope 
of constitutional protections, representing the basic value 
commitments of our society, cannot vary from trial court to 
trial court, or from jury to jury.'"). 
No. 95-2052-CR 
 
10
¶24 In 
Wade, 
the 
Court 
held 
that 
an 
in-court 
identification subsequent to a constitutionally defective lineup 
in violation of an accused's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is 
not per se inadmissible.  See Wade, 388 U.S. at 240.  Once such 
a constitutionally defective lineup is established, the in-court 
identification is admissible if the State carries the burden of 
showing "by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court 
identifications were based upon observations of the suspect 
other than the lineup identification."  Wade, 388 U.S. at 240.  
The in-court identification is admissible if made "'by means 
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary 
taint.'"  Wade, 388 U.S. at 241 (quoting Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)).  Thus, if the in-court 
identification 
has 
an 
independent 
source, 
the 
in-court 
identification is admissible.6  The Wade test has been referred 
to as the "independent origin" test and as the "independent 
source" test.  See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 473 
n.18 (1980). 
¶25 The Wade test places on the State the heavy burden of 
producing clear and convincing evidence for admission of in-
court identification after identification in a lineup in which 
an accused's counsel was not present and no waiver of counsel 
occurred.  Two reasons support imposing this burden on the 
State:  First, Wade warns of the "vagaries of eyewitness 
                     
6 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967); 
United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 473 n.18 (1980). 
No. 95-2052-CR 
 
11
identification" 
and 
"[t]he 
hazards 
of 
such 
[eyewitness 
identification] testimony."  Wade, 388 U.S. at 228.  Second, the 
lineup is a critical stage of the prosecution at which, as Wade 
explains, a lawyer can make a difference.  Wade, 388 U.S. at 
236-37.  Any lesser burden on the State would disregard the 
difficulties inherent in eyewitness identification and would 
render meaningless the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a 
lineup.   
¶26 According to the Wade Court, to determine whether the 
in-court identification is "'sufficiently distinguishable to be 
purged of the primary taint,'" a court should consider various 
factors including the following:  (1) the prior opportunity the 
witness had to observe the alleged criminal activity; (2) the 
existence of any discrepancy between any pre-lineup description 
and the accused's actual description; (3) any identification of 
another person prior to the lineup; (4) any identification by 
picture of the accused prior to the lineup; (5) failure to 
identify the accused on a prior occasion; (6) the lapse of time 
between the alleged crime and the lineup identification; and (7) 
the facts disclosed concerning the conduct of the lineup.  See 
Wade, 388 U.S. at 241.   
¶27 The court has applied the Wade test to determine the 
admissibility of in-court identifications subsequent to lineups 
that violated the accused's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  
No. 95-2052-CR 
 
12
See, e.g., State v. Harper, 57 Wis. 2d 543, 546, 205 N.W.2d 1 
(1973).7   
IV. 
¶28 Applying the Wade factors, the defendant argues that 
the constitutionally defective lineup taints the eyewitness's 
subsequent in-court identification.  The State, also applying 
the 
Wade 
factors, 
argues 
that 
the 
eyewitness's 
in-court 
identification is sufficiently distinguishable from the lineup 
to be purged of the taint of the lineup.  Our independent review 
of the record persuades us that the State has not shown by clear 
and 
convincing 
evidence 
that 
the 
eyewitness's 
in-court 
identification of the defendant is independent of the lineup.   
¶29 The 
first 
Wade 
factor 
considers 
the 
witness's 
opportunity to observe the perpetrator at the time of the crime. 
 In this case, it is arguable that the eyewitness had sufficient 
opportunity to observe the robber.  The store was adequately 
lighted to permit the eyewitness a clear view of the robber; the 
eyewitness was wearing her eyeglasses at the time of the 
robbery; when the robber first approached the eyewitness, he was 
standing only a couple of feet away from her, directly across 
the counter.   
¶30 On the other hand, the eyewitness's opportunity to 
observe the robber was limited.  The entire incident lasted a 
                     
7 The court has also applied the Wade test in a case in 
which the accused's unlawful arrest was followed by a lineup 
identification and an in-court identification.  See State v. 
Walker, 154 Wis. 2d 158, 188-89, 453 N.W.2d 127, cert. denied, 
498 U.S. 962 (1990).  
No. 95-2052-CR 
 
13
mere 25 seconds.  While a court cannot specify a minimum amount 
of time necessary to demonstrate a sufficient opportunity to 
observe, the length of time for observation of the perpetrator 
is important.8  Moreover, as the robber took the money out of the 
cash register, the eyewitness moved back about 10 feet and hid 
behind a meat slicer while still observing him.  The eyewitness, 
therefore, was not directly facing the robber throughout the 
entire 25-second incident.  After reviewing the surveillance 
videotape, the circuit court found that the eyewitness's 
opportunity to observe the robber lasted approximately 20 
seconds. 
¶31 The court has also viewed the surveillance videotape, 
and it is difficult to determine from the tape how much time the 
eyewitness spent looking at the knife or the robber's face.  At 
the suppression hearing, the eyewitness acknowledged that she 
concentrated on the knife during the robbery.  She was able to 
give a detailed description of the knife.  Furthermore, in this 
case, the usual dangers inherent in eyewitness identification 
may have been exacerbated because this was a cross-race 
identification.9   
                     
8 See State v. Harper, 57 Wis. 2d 543, 546, 205 N.W.2d 1 
(1973) (in-court identification based on independent origin when 
witness observed perpetrator for two or three minutes).  
9 See Elizabeth F. Loftus & James M. Doyle, Eyewitness 
Testimony:  Civil and Criminal 97 (1992) ("It is well-
established that there exists a comparative difficulty in 
recognizing individual members of a race different from one's 
own.");  Neil Colman McCabe, The Right to a Lawyer at a Lineup: 
Support from State Courts and Experimental Psychology, 22 Ind. 
L. Rev. 905, 914 (1989) ("Several reviews of the literature on 
No. 95-2052-CR 
 
14
¶32 Under these circumstances, 25 seconds may not have 
provided sufficient time for the eyewitness to observe the 
robber's 
features 
so 
that 
she 
could 
make 
an 
in-court 
identification independent of the unconstitutional lineup.   
¶33 The second Wade factor considers any discrepancy 
between a pre-lineup description and the accused's actual 
appearance.  The eyewitness testified that shortly after the 
robbery, she gave the police the following description of the 
robber:  African-American male, at least six feet tall, wearing 
a white golfer's cap and tan jacket.  This description was 
presumably given at a time when the eyewitness would have 
retained the sharpest image of the robber.  The description 
offered no detail about the robber's facial features, coloring, 
build, age or other distinguishing characteristics.  The 
description could fit many African-American men.  
¶34 Although 
the eyewitness testified 
that 
she 
told 
Officer Wortock that the robber was at least six feel tall, 
Officer Wortock testified that the eyewitness merely told him 
that the robber was taller than she.  The eyewitness is five 
                                                                  
eyewitnesses have concluded that cross-race identifications are 
less reliable than when the witness and suspect are members of 
the same race."). 
For a discussion of the dangers inherent in eyewitness 
identification 
and 
the 
desirability 
of 
using 
a 
detailed 
cautionary 
jury 
instruction 
regarding 
the 
fallibility 
of 
eyewitness identifications, see State v. Waites, 158 Wis. 2d 
376, 383-84, 462 N.W.2d 206 (1990); Hampton v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 
450, 465, 285 N.W.2d 868 (1979)(Abrahamson, J., concurring); Wis 
JICriminal 141 (1991). 
No. 95-2052-CR 
 
15
feet tall.  Thus the eyewitness and Officer Wortock offered 
conflicting accounts of her description of the robber's height.  
¶35 Testimony about the eyewitness's recollection of the 
robber's facial hair varied.  The eyewitness first testified 
that she knew the robber had long sideburns but was not sure if 
he had a mustache or beard; she later testified that she did not 
notice any facial hair on the robber.  Officer Wortock first 
testified that the eyewitness informed him that the robber did 
not have facial hair; Wortock then testified that she did not 
say one way or another whether the robber had facial hair; still 
later, Wortock testified that he did not recall whether he had 
specifically asked her if the robber had facial hair.  The 
defendant's niece testified that the defendant, on or around the 
date of the robbery, had a goatee and full mustache.  Officer 
Bell saw the defendant four days before the robbery and at that 
time the defendant had full facial hair.   
¶36 Thus the eyewitness's descriptions of the robber 
varied, and a significant discrepancy exists between the 
eyewitness's 
initial 
description 
of 
the 
robber 
and 
the 
defendant's actual appearance.  The eyewitness's inconsistent 
statements about the robber's facial hair, the discrepancy 
between 
the 
initial 
description 
of 
the 
robber 
and 
the 
defendant's 
actual 
appearance, 
together 
with 
the 
minimal 
description furnished by the eyewitness, cast doubt on the 
eyewitness's 
ability 
to 
make 
an 
in-court 
identification 
independent of the unconstitutional lineup.   
No. 95-2052-CR 
 
16
¶37 The third Wade factor considers whether the witness 
identified any other person prior to the lineup.  The defendant 
argues that the eyewitness's request that another man in the 
lineup step forward constitutes a prior identification.  This 
argument, however, is untenable.  The eyewitness testified that 
she asked the other man to step forward so she could get a 
better look at him.  She never identified him as the robber.  
Witnesses participating in a lineup identification should be 
encouraged to examine carefully all participants to ensure an 
accurate identification.  The fact that the eyewitness did not 
identify any other person as the robber supports the conclusion 
that the eyewitness's observation of the robber at the robbery 
would enable her to identify the defendant independent of the 
unconstitutional lineup.  
¶38 The 
fourth 
Wade 
factor 
is 
whether 
the 
witness 
identified the accused's photograph from a photo array prior to 
the lineup.  The fifth Wade factor is whether the witness failed 
to identify the accused on occasions prior to the in-court 
identification.  In this case, the two factors are interrelated. 
 The eyewitness failed to identify the defendant in photographs 
she viewed on the day of the robbery.  Ordinarily, a witness's 
failure to identify an accused from a photograph only hours 
after the crime might demonstrate that the witness's in-court 
identification of the accused was not independent of an illegal 
lineup.  However, in this case, the eyewitness's failure to 
identify the defendant's photo is of limited significance.  The 
eyewitness testified that looking at a photograph is different 
No. 95-2052-CR 
 
17
from looking at the person.  Furthermore, the circuit court 
found that the defendant's photograph did not bear a reasonable 
resemblance to his appearance in the courtroom and was therefore 
misleading enough to preclude the eyewitness from accurately 
identifying him as the robber.  
¶39 The sixth Wade factor provides that a court consider 
the impact of the time lapse between the crime and the lineup 
identification.  The longer the time between the initial 
observation and the lineup, the greater the likelihood that the 
initial observation at the crime will have dimmed and that the 
second image from the lineup will play an important role at the 
in-court identification.  The robbery in the present case 
occurred on December 3, 1994, and the lineup identification 
occurred about five weeks later on January 9, 1995.  The five-
week period between the robbery and the lineup was arguably long 
enough to obscure the eyewitness's memory of her brief encounter 
with the robber at the time of the robbery and to increase the 
importance of her having seen the defendant in the lineup.  
¶40 The seventh Wade factor addresses those considerations 
which, despite the absence of counsel, are disclosed concerning 
the conduct of the lineup.  The conduct of the lineup may have a 
bearing upon whether the in-court identification is independent 
of the lineup or tainted by it.  In this case, the police failed 
to take a photograph or a video of the lineup.  The record 
contains photographs of the men in the lineup but does not 
disclose when the photographs were taken.  Thus, the only 
information we have about the physical staging of the lineup 
No. 95-2052-CR 
 
18
comes from the testimony of Investigator Long, Corporal Stratman 
and the eyewitness.   
¶41 The law enforcement officers testified that all the 
men in the lineup were similar to the defendant in terms of 
race, size, height, age and facial hair.  The State asserts that 
using men who had facial hair demonstrates the fairness of the 
lineup.  The defendant argues that staging the lineup using only 
men with facial hair suggested to the eyewitness that the robber 
had facial hair.   
¶42 Although 
both 
the 
State's 
and 
the 
defendant's 
interpretations of the lineup are reasonable and the circuit 
court found that the lineup was not unduly suggestive, we are 
mindful of the concerns the United States Supreme Court 
expressed in Wade about "the dangers inherent in eyewitness 
identification and the suggestibility inherent in the context of 
the 
pretrial 
identification." 
 
Wade, 
388 
U.S. 
at 
235.  
Considering the dangers described by the Court, we conclude that 
the physical staging of the lineup may have affected the 
eyewitness's memory of the robber by adding the detail of facial 
hair, a detail not present in her initial description.  As the 
Court stated in Wade, "[s]uggestion can be created intentionally 
or unintentionally in many subtle ways . . . and increase[s] the 
dangers inhering in eyewitness identification."  Wade, 388 U.S. 
at 229.  The lineup in this case could have crystallized the 
eyewitness's 
identification 
of 
the 
defendant 
for 
future 
reference.   
No. 95-2052-CR 
 
19
¶43 After examining the seven factors set forth in Wade, 
we conclude that the State has not demonstrated by clear and 
convincing evidence, as Wade requires, that the in-court 
identification had an origin independent of the lineup or was 
"'sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary 
taint.'"  Wade, 388 U.S. at 241.  The eyewitness's opportunity 
to observe the robber was limited to, at most, 25 seconds; she 
had never seen the robber prior to the robbery; she gave a 
general description of the robber; there was a discrepancy 
between her description of the robber immediately after the 
robbery and the defendant's actual physical appearance; there 
was a lapse of five weeks between the robbery and lineup 
identification.   
¶44 The State asks the court to consider another factor in 
addition to the seven Wade factors, namely the witness's level 
of certainty in making the in-court identification.  The 
eyewitness in this case said at the suppression hearing that she 
was positive the defendant was the robber and that she would be 
able to identify him even if he had not been in the lineup and 
she had seen him on the street.  The State argues that a 
witness's certainty in making an in-court identification is a 
proper factor for determining whether an in-court identification 
is independent of a tainted lineup.   
¶45 This "certainty" factor is not mentioned in Wade but 
is set forth in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972).  In 
Biggers, 409 U.S. at 201, the Court upheld the admission of 
testimony concerning a show-up identification by a witness who 
No. 95-2052-CR 
 
20
had been raped several months earlier.10  The Biggers Court 
promulgated a "totality of circumstances" test for trial courts 
to apply in evaluating the reliability of pre-trial, out-of-
court identifications.   
¶46 The "totality of circumstances" test includes five 
factors:  (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the 
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness's degree of 
attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior description 
of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the 
witness at the confrontation; and (5) the length of time between 
the crime and the confrontation.  Id. at 199-200.  Thus the 
Biggers "totality of circumstances" test overlaps to a large 
extent with the factors set forth in the Wade "independent 
origin" test.   
¶47 Judges differ about whether to treat the Wade and 
Biggers tests as functionally equivalent.11  We conclude that 
                     
10 A show-up is a pre-trial, out-of-court identification 
procedure in which a suspect is viewed by a witness or victim of 
a crime.  A show-up commonly occurs within a short time after a 
crime 
or 
under 
circumstances 
which 
would 
make 
a 
lineup 
impracticable or impossible.   
11 For opinions treating the two tests as functionally 
equivalent, see, e.g., Solomon v. Smith, 645 F.2d 1179, 1188 (2nd 
Cir. 1981) ("The tests of 'independent origin' set forth in Wade 
appear to be functionally identical to the reliability tests 
articulated in Neil v. Biggers"); Graham v. Solem, 728 F.2d 
1533, 1549 (8th Cir. 1984) (McMillian, J., dissenting), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 842 (1984) ("concepts of 'purged taint' and 
'independent origin' have been blended into, and superseded by, 
the 
two-step 
process 
of 
weighing 
reliability 
against 
suggestiveness articulated in Biggers").  The Wisconsin Judicial 
Benchbook lists level of certainty as to identification as a 
No. 95-2052-CR 
 
21
notwithstanding the similarity of the two tests, they are not 
functionally equivalent, and the Biggers "certainty" factor 
should not be included in the Wade test.  
¶48 The Wade and Biggers tests are derived from different 
constitutional amendments and are intended to achieve different 
purposes.  The Wade test focuses on the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel at post-indictment lineups and on the exclusionary 
remedy for a constitutional violation of the Sixth Amendment.  
The Wade test is used to exclude evidence tainted by an 
unconstitutional lineup.  Exclusion of derivative evidence is 
intended to deter unlawful police conduct and preserve judicial 
integrity.   
¶49 The inquiry in Biggers, on the other hand, evaluates 
the reliability of a pre-trial identification when it is claimed 
that the pre-trial identification was made under impermissibly 
suggestive circumstances.  Biggers uses a witness's certainty at 
a suggestive pre-trial identification procedure to measure the 
reliability of the witness's identification in that procedure.  
Biggers is based on due process considerations, not on a Sixth 
                                                                  
factor.  1 Wisconsin Judicial Handbook:  Criminal and Traffic 
CR14-4 (1992).   
For opinions treating the two tests as distinct, see, e.g., 
United States v. Batista Ferrer, 842 F. Supp. 40, 42 (D. Puerto 
Rico 1994) (stating that Biggers relates to an accused's due 
process rights, rather than the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel); Webster v. State, 474 A.2d 1305, 1316 (Md. 1984) 
(concluding that independent origin test and totality of 
circumstances 
test 
derive 
from 
distinct 
constitutional 
guarantees, call for different standards and are separate and 
distinct).  
No. 95-2052-CR 
 
22
Amendment violation or the Wong Sun exception to the fruit of 
the poisonous tree doctrine.  Under Biggers, the "totality of 
the circumstances" test is applied to determine whether a pre-
trial out-of-court identification was unreliable as a matter of 
law.  
¶50 The case at bar is a Wade case.  The issue is not 
whether a witness's observation of a perpetrator of a crime or 
an in-court identification of an accused was reliable.  The 
issue is whether a witness's observation of a perpetrator of a 
crime constitutes an independent source for that witness's in-
court identification of an accused.   
¶51 The primary concern in a Wade case is whether an 
unconstitutional 
lineup 
tainted 
a 
subsequent 
in-court 
identification.  In a Wade case, the degree of certainty 
displayed by a witness at an in-court identification is not 
relevant in determining whether the in-court identification is 
independent of a tainted lineup.  As the Wade court stated, 
"'[I]t is a matter of common experience that, once a witness has 
picked out the accused at the line-up, he is not likely to go 
back on his word later on, so that in practice the issue of 
identity may (in the absence of other relevant evidence) for all 
practical purposes be determined there and then, before the 
trial.'"  Wade, 388 U.S. at 229. 12 
                     
12 The 
Wade 
Court 
quoted 
Glanville 
Williams 
& 
H.A. 
Hammelmann, Identification Parades, Part I, [1963] Crim. L. Rev. 
479, 482.   
No. 95-2052-CR 
 
23
¶52 Considering all the evidence, we hold that the 
eyewitness's in-court identification in the case at bar should 
be suppressed because the State has not shown by clear and 
convincing 
evidence 
that 
the 
eyewitness's 
in-court 
identification of the defendant had an "independent origin," 
that is, that the source of the in-court identification was the 
eyewitness's observation of the robber during the robbery and 
was independent of a lineup that violated the defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.  
¶53 Accordingly, we reverse that part of the decision of 
the court of appeals admitting the in-court identification and 
remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed in part, and the cause is remanded. 
 
95-2052.npc 
 
1 
¶54 N. PATRICK CROOKS, 
J. (Dissenting).   
I dissent 
because I conclude the State has met its burden of establishing, 
by 
clear 
and 
convincing 
evidence, 
that 
the 
in-court 
identification is based upon observations of the eyewitness 
independent of the line-up identification.  I further conclude 
that 
the 
certainty 
of 
the 
eyewitness 
is 
an 
appropriate 
consideration 
when 
determining 
whether 
the 
in-court 
identification is admissible under United States v. Wade, 388 
U.S. 218 (1967). 
I. 
¶55 My review of the record, in accordance with the 
factors set forth in Wade, leads me to conclude that the in-
court identification is based on the eyewitness's observations 
at the time of the robbery, independent of the line-up 
identification. 
¶56 The 
first 
Wade 
factor 
considers 
the 
witness's 
opportunity to observe the perpetrator at the scene of the 
crime.   
In this case, the robbery occurred in a well-lit environment, 
and the eyewitness was wearing her eyeglasses at the time.  The 
video tape indicates that the eyewitness was within a few feet 
of and directly facing the robber.  The cash register was on the 
counter 
directly 
between 
the 
eyewitness 
and 
the 
robber; 
therefore, the eyewitness did not turn away from the robber to 
retrieve the requested change.  In fact, at no time did the 
eyewitness turn away from the robber, even when she eventually 
backed away from him.  There was nothing obstructing the 
95-2052.npc 
 
2 
eyewitness's view, and the robber made no attempt to conceal his 
face.  The robber was the only individual in the store at the 
time of the robbery, and there is no evidence that the 
eyewitness was otherwise distracted.   
¶57 Although the confrontation lasted approximately twenty 
seconds, courts have concluded that similar periods of time have 
provided witnesses with a sufficient opportunity to observe. See 
United States v. Goodman, 797 F.2d 468, 470 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(fifteen to twenty second observation); United States v. Jarrad, 
754 F.2d 1451, 1455 (9th Cir. 1985) (three to four second 
observation), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 830 (1985); Government of 
the Canal Zone v. Waldron, 574 F.2d 283, 285 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(opportunity to view assailant twice, for two to three seconds 
on each occasion); United States ex rel Phipps v. Follette, 428 
F.2d 912, 916 (2nd Cir. 1970) (twenty to thirty second 
observation), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 908 (1970).  Furthermore, 
the time period is not the only element to consider in assessing 
whether the witness had a sufficient opportunity to observe.  
Rather, the time period must be considered within the context of 
the additional circumstances surrounding the confrontation.  
Based on the circumstances as they exist in this case, I 
conclude that the eyewitness had a sufficient opportunity to 
observe the robber. 
¶58 The second Wade factor considers any discrepancy 
between 
the 
eyewitness's 
pre-lineup 
description 
and 
the 
accused's actual appearance.  In this case, there is no 
significant variance in the eyewitness's statements, and there 
95-2052.npc 
 
3 
is no discrepancy between her statements and the defendant's 
actual appearance.   
¶59 The 
eyewitness 
initially 
stated 
the 
robber 
had 
sideburns, but later testified she did not notice or did not 
know if the robber had facial hair.  The significance of this 
factor is lessened when viewed in light of the circumstances.  
In the video tape of the robbery, it is not apparent whether the 
robber did or did not have facial hair.  It is apparent, 
however, that even if the robber had facial hair, it was neither 
voluminous nor lengthy.  
¶60 Officer 
Wortock's 
testimony 
demonstrates 
no 
significant variance in the eyewitness's description of the 
robber's 
facial hair either. Officer 
Wortock 
consistently 
indicated that the eyewitness did not tell him whether or not 
the robber had facial hair.  There may be some confusion because 
Office Wortock's initial testimony at the suppression hearing 
seemingly indicated that the eyewitness stated the robber did 
not have facial hair.  However, Officer Wortock later clarified 
his testimony: 
 
Q 
 . . . the victim in this case, indicated that 
the 
assailant 
did 
not 
have 
facial 
hair, 
correct . . . ? 
 
A 
She did not say one way or the other. 
 
Q 
In your report . . . it indicates the following: 
 The assailant in this incident did not have any 
facial hair.  Was that not told to you by the 
[eyewitness]? 
 
A 
She did not say that to me.  That was my personal 
observation from the video tape. 
95-2052.npc 
 
4 
 
Q 
And was it not, didn't you testify earlier today 
that she informed you that there was no facial hair on 
this [sic] assailant? 
 
A 
When she gave me a description of the party? 
 
Q 
Yes. 
 
A 
She did not say that the party had or had not any 
facial hair. 
(R. 19 at 4-5.) (emphasis supplied.)  Furthermore, Officer 
Wortock's failure to recall whether he directly asked the 
eyewitness if the robber had facial hair provides no support for 
the contention that there is any variance in her description.   
¶61 There 
is 
also 
no 
significant 
variation 
in 
the 
eyewitness's statements regarding the robber's height.  The 
eyewitness testified that she described the robber as "at least 
six feet tall." (R. 18 at 11.)  Officer Wortock testified that 
the eyewitness described the robber as "taller than her."  (R. 
27 at 12.)  These statements vary somewhat but are consistent 
because the eyewitness is five feet tall.   Thus, an individual 
who is taller than five feet could also be at least six feet 
tall.  Furthermore, although the defendant's actual height is 
not noted in the record, there is no evidence that the 
eyewitness's 
statements 
create 
a 
discrepancy 
with 
the 
defendant's actual appearance.  
¶62 Just as there is no significant variance in the 
description, there is no discrepancy between the description and 
the 
defendant's 
actual 
appearance. 
 
The 
majority 
finds 
compelling the testimony of the defendant's niece indicating the 
95-2052.npc 
 
5 
defendant had a goatee and full mustache on or about the date of 
the robbery, as well as Officer Bell's testimony that the 
defendant had facial hair approximately four days prior to the 
date of the robbery.  This testimony does not evince a 
discrepancy.   
¶63 The trial court made no findings of fact regarding the 
defendant's actual appearance on the date of the robbery. Facial 
hair is an easily modifiable physical feature, and the defendant 
may or may not have had facial hair on the date of the robbery. 
The majority's conclusion that a discrepancy exists assumes as 
true the defendant's niece's testimony that the defendant had 
facial hair on or about the date of the robbery.  This is an 
improper assumption, as any issues surrounding inconsistent 
witness statements implicate considerations of credibility and 
are issues to be resolved by the trier of fact.  See Boyer v. 
State, 91 Wis. 2d 647, 672, 284 N.W.2d 30 (1979); Kohlhoff v. 
State, 85 Wis. 2d 148, 154, 270 N.W.2d 63 (1978).  Even assuming 
arguendo that the defendant's niece's statements are true, it 
does not create a discrepancy because the eyewitness did not 
specifically state that the robber did not have facial hair.  
¶64 The third Wade factor considers whether the witness 
identified any other individual prior to the line-up.  The 
eyewitness in this case has not identified anyone other than the 
defendant as the robber.  
¶65 The fourth Wade factor considers whether the witness 
identified the accused from a photo array prior to the line-up. 
 As the majority notes, in this case the fourth Wade factor is 
95-2052.npc 
 
6 
closely related to the fifth Wade factor, which considers 
whether the witness failed to identify the accused prior to the 
in-court identification.  The eyewitness did fail to identify 
the defendant from a photo array; however, the circuit court 
found the photo presented to the eyewitness was not a reasonable 
resemblance of the defendant.  (R. 23 at 51.) 
¶66 The sixth Wade factor considers the length of time 
between the date of the crime and the date of the line-up 
identification.  I conclude the five-week period did not obscure 
the eyewitness's recollection.  Courts have held that even a 
two- month lapse of time does not require suppression of an in-
court identification where the witness does not identify an 
individual other than the defendant in the interim.  See United 
States v. Monks,  774 F.2d 945, 957 (9th Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Barron, 575 F.2d 752, 755 (9th Cir. 1978).  As 
previously noted, the eyewitness in this case did not identify 
any individual other than the defendant as the robber. 
¶67 The seventh Wade factor considers the facts disclosed 
relating to the conduct of the line-up.  The line-up procedures 
were not suggestive in this case.  The defendant was the 
suspect, and the defendant had facial hair at the time of the 
line-up.  The additional men included in the line-up also had 
facial hair, just as they were also the same race and 
approximately the same size, height, and age as the defendant.  
 It is reasonable that individuals with physical features 
similar to that of the defendant were included, so that 
attention was not inappropriately drawn to the defendant, and 
95-2052.npc 
 
7 
such procedures were not unduly suggestive. See Messer v. 
Roberts, 74 F.3d 1009, 1016 (10th Cir. 1996) ("men shown 
possessed sufficient similarities in size, coloration, height, 
complexion, hair color, 
full mustaches, somewhat receding 
hairlines, dress and weight to pass constitutional muster.").  
It is also not unduly suggestive that all individuals in the 
line-up 
had 
facial 
hair, 
even 
though 
the 
eyewitness's 
description did not include facial hair.  See United States v. 
Schoels, 685 F.2d 379, 385 (10th Cir. 1982)(photo array of seven 
black 
men, 
all 
with 
noticeable 
facial 
hair, 
not 
unduly 
suggestive even though eyewitness described criminal as clean-
shaven), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1134 (1983).  In addition, after 
reviewing the facts surrounding the line-up, the trial court 
determined the line-up procedures were not unduly suggestive.  
(R. 23 at 71.) 
¶68 An 
analysis 
of 
the 
Wade 
factors 
under 
the 
circumstances as they exist in this case leads me to conclude 
that 
there 
is 
clear 
and 
convincing 
evidence 
that 
the 
eyewitness's in-court identification has an independent origin 
apart from the line-up identification. 
II. 
¶69 I also conclude that the certainty of a witness is a 
proper factor to consider in determining whether the in-court 
identification 
is 
independent 
of 
a 
tainted 
line-up 
identification. The "independent basis" test in Wade and the 
"totality of circumstances" test in Neal v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 
188 (1972) are derived from different constitutional amendments; 
95-2052.npc 
 
8 
however, they are both premised on concerns of accurate and 
reliable witness identification.   
¶70 The 
Biggers 
test 
is 
derived 
from 
due 
process 
considerations and is primarily based upon the need to avoid the 
"'very 
substantial 
likelihood 
of 
irreparable 
[eyewitness] 
misidentification.'"  Biggers, 409 U.S. at 381 (quoting Simmons 
v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)).  Although the Wade 
test is derived from the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the 
Court's concern in Wade was similarly that of "mistaken 
identification" and 
protecting the 
accused 
from 
pre-trial 
identification procedures replete with "innumerable dangers." 
Wade, 388 U.S. at 228.  
¶71 The Court's primary concern in Wade was not, as the 
majority 
argues, 
deterring 
unlawful 
police 
conduct 
and 
preserving judicial integrity.  In fact, the Wade Court noted 
that "[w]e do not assume that these risks are the result of 
police 
procedures 
intentionally 
designed 
to 
prejudice 
an 
accused.  Rather we assume they derive from the dangers inherent 
in eyewitness identification and the suggestibility inherent in 
the context of the pretrial identification."  Wade, 388 U.S. at 
235. 
¶72  In assessing eyewitness identification, "[i]t is the 
reliability of identification evidence that primarily determines 
its admissibility."  Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347 
(1981).  Numerous state and federal courts have held that the 
level of certainty is relevant to a witness's reliability.  See 
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977); United States v. 
95-2052.npc 
 
9 
Barron, 575 F.2d 752, 755 (9th Cir. 1978); State v. Figueroa, 
665 A.2d 63, 73 (Conn. 1995); Shaw v. State, 846 S.W.2d 482, 484 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1993).  Because the Wade and Biggers decisions 
are both premised on concerns regarding the reliability of 
witness identification, the certainty factor considered in 
Biggers is equally relevant in a Sixth Amendment Wade analysis.  
¶73 The 
witness's 
certainty 
is 
particularly 
relevant 
where, as here, it is expressed within the context of the 
observations at the time of the crime.  At the preliminary 
hearing in this case, the eyewitness identified the defendant 
during the prosecution's examination regarding the crime itself. 
 Without 
waiver, the eyewitness positively 
identified the 
defendant as the man who asked her for change, pointed the knife 
at her, and robbed her.  (R. 18 at 6-7.)  Even more convincing 
was the eyewitness's testimony at the suppression hearing, 
wherein she stated she was "positive" and "one hundred percent" 
certain that the defendant was the armed robber. (R. 19 at 25.) 
 The 
eyewitness additionally 
testified 
at 
the 
suppression 
hearing that she would be able to identify the defendant as the 
robber even if she saw him on the street, irrespective of the 
line-up.  (R. 19 at 26.) 
¶74 Undoubtedly, 
the 
majority 
would 
argue 
that 
the 
eyewitness's certainty at the preliminary hearing and the 
suppression hearing was irreparably tainted by the line-up 
identification.  Yet, "[t]his difficulty has not prevented 
courts from finding sufficient certainty even when the evidence 
of certainty comes from confrontations that took place after the 
95-2052.npc 
 
10
invocation of suggestive procedures."  United States ex rel 
Kosik v. Napoli, 814 F.2d 1151, 1159 (7th Cir. 1987).  
¶75 The majority emphasizes the unreliable nature of 
eyewitness identification; however, the Wade test is utilized to 
remedy such concerns and combat any inherent unreliability.  It 
cannot be discounted that eyewitness identification is relevant 
and extremely valuable to criminal convictions.  Therefore, such 
identification evidence should not be hastily suppressed.  As 
Justice Black noted in reference to testimony given by a 
criminally accused at a suppression hearing: 
 
The value of permitting the Government to use such 
testimony is, of course, so obvious that it is usually 
left unstated, but it should not for that reason be 
ignored.  The standard of proof necessary to convict 
in a criminal case is high, and quite properly so, but 
for this reason highly probative evidence . . . should 
not lightly be held inadmissible. 
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 397 (1968) (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
¶76 The language of Wade indicates the factors enumerated 
were proffered as a guideline -- not an all-inclusive list of 
factors to be utilized to the exclusion of any other relevant 
considerations.  See Wade, 388 U.S. at 241.  The extent of the 
witness's certainty would not be dispositive in a Wade analysis. 
Rather, it would merely be a factor to be considered in addition 
to those outlined in Wade.  See Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199. 
¶77 I conclude that a review of the record pursuant to  
Wade 
provides 
clear 
and 
convincing 
evidence 
that 
the 
eyewitness's in-court identification is independent of the line-
95-2052.npc 
 
11
up identification.  The eyewitness had a sufficient opportunity 
to observe the robber; there was no discrepancy between the 
eyewitness's description and the defendant's actual appearance; 
the eyewitness did not identify any other individual as the 
robber other than the defendant; the time period between the 
crime 
and 
the 
line-up 
did 
not 
obscure 
the 
eyewitness's 
recollection of the robber; the line-up procedures were not 
unduly suggestive.  I further conclude that the certainty of the 
witness is a relevant and appropriate consideration when 
determining whether there is an independent basis for an in-
court identification. 
¶78 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.  
¶79 I am authorized to state that Justice DONALD W. 
STEINMETZ and Justice JON P. WILCOX join this dissent.