Case Title: In re Parentage of John M.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97227, 97327

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2004-09-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket Nos. 97227, 97327 cons.-Agenda 19-May 2004.
In re THE PARENTAGE OF JOHN M., a Minor (Javier Valdivia v.
Maria Matias Izaguirre et al. (Maria Matias Izaguirre, Appellant;
Dennis Dean Malkowski, Appellee; Lisa Madigan, Attorney Generalof the State of Illinois, Appellant)).
Opinion filed September 23, 2004. 
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the
court:
	Intervenor, Lisa Madigan, in her capacity as Attorney General of
the State of Illinois, and defendant Maria Izaguirre(1) (Maria) appeal
directly to this court from an order of the Kane County circuit court
holding the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (the Act) (750 ILCS 45/1
et seq. (West 2000)) unconstitutional and dismissing with prejudice
the "Petition to Determine a Father-Child Relationship" brought by
plaintiff, Javier Valdivia (Javier), pursuant to section 7 of the Act (750
ILCS 45/7 (West 2000)). The circuit court entered its ruling upon a
motion brought by defendant Dennis Dean Malkowski (Dennis).
	We reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand for further
proceedings.

BACKGROUND
	On May 22, 2002, Javier filed a petition in the circuit court of
Kane County, pursuant to section 7 of the Illinois Parentage Act,
asking the court to determine the existence of a father-child
relationship between himself and John M. (Baby John), a child born to
Maria on August 31, 2001. Javier alleged in the petition that he is
Baby John's biological father, that he has visited Baby John since
Baby John's birth, and that he is willing and able to provide financial
support for Baby John. Javier asked the court to issue an order
establishing his paternity. Javier also asked the court to determine his
child support obligation and to set a reasonable visitation schedule.
	Dennis was married to Maria at the time of Baby John's birth
and, thus, is Baby John's presumed father pursuant to section 5(a)(1)
of the Act (750 ILCS 45/5(a)(1) (West 2002)). In response to Javier's
petition, Dennis asked the court to stay all proceedings, including any
genetic testing, pending the appointment of a guardian ad litem for
Baby John. Dennis then moved for the involuntary dismissal of
Javier's petition. In support of the dismissal motion, Dennis presented
three arguments. First, Dennis argued that the Illinois Parentage Act,
"as applied to this case," is unconstitutional because it allows a
"stranger" to attack the legitimacy of a child. Citing to the United
States Supreme Court case Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
105 L. Ed. 2d 91, 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989), Dennis contended that
Illinois law, "as utilized by the plaintiff[,] is an attempt by the plaintiff
to intercede into the sacred family unit of a husband, wife and child
born during the marriage." Dennis further alleged:
		"[T]o the extent that Illinois law creates the possibility that a
child can have two fathers, the child is denied due process of
law and the equal protection of law guaranteed by the
Constitutions of the United States of America and the State
of Illinois."
	In Dennis' second argument, under the heading "Best Interests,"
Dennis contended:
		 "Prior to granting any relief prayed for by the plaintiff,
Illinois should require that there be a best interests hearing to
determine if it is in the best interest that there be any genetic
parentage testing at all and whatsoever. The superior rights
of marriage, and a child born to a married couple, should be
considered prior to letting a stranger conduct a legal and
scientific incursion into the lives of a mother, father, and
infant child, which will permanently and adversely effect [sic]
each of them." (Emphasis added.)
Dennis then concluded:
		"Basic and fundamental fairness, constitutional guarantees of
equal protection of law and due process of law demand that
this court hold a hearing to determine the best interest of the
minor child as to whether or not a parentage issue should or
can be raised by any person other than the natural mother's
husband before allowing any further proceedings herein
whatsoever."
	In his third argument, Dennis challenged Javier's standing to
bring the petition to establish a parent-child relationship. Dennis
argued that Javier did not have standing because Dennis and Maria
were married at the time that Baby John was born and there was
evidence (apparently Dennis' attached affidavit) that Dennis was
neither sterile nor impotent, and that Dennis and Maria engaged in
"conjugal contact" around the time that Baby John was conceived. No
authority was cited for this "lack of standing" argument.
	 Dennis submitted an affidavit in support of his dismissal motion.
In the affidavit(2) Dennis asserted that he and Maria were married on
December 19, 1997, that they have not divorced, and that no suit to
dissolve the marriage had been filed. In the course of this marriage,
Maria gave birth to a son, Baby John, on August 31, 2001. Dennis is
named as Baby John's father on Baby John's birth certificate. Dennis
further asserted that he is neither impotent nor sterile and that he and
Maria engaged in sexual intercourse around the time of Baby John's
conception.
	Dennis stated that, shortly after Baby John's birth, in October or
November of 2001(3), Javier took Baby John to live with him. Maria
and her nine-year-old daughter, Betzaida Izaguirre, also began living
with Javier at that time. About four months later, however, Maria and
the children returned to Dennis' residence. According to Dennis, when
Maria returned, she said that she began living with Javier to protect
Baby John; that Javier held her against her will; and that she and the
children had been required to live in a basement, where it was damp
and cold. Dennis further stated that Maria and the children left the
marital residence again on June 17, 2002 (the date of the first court
hearing on Javier's petition). When Dennis went to court, he
discovered that Maria and the children were with Javier. Maria refused
to speak with Dennis. Moreover, when Dennis returned home after
the court hearing, he found that Maria's and the children's belongings
had been removed from his premises. According to the affidavit,
Maria and the children have been living with Javier since that time.
	Maria, represented by Prairie State Legal Services, Inc., entered
an appearance on June 27, 2003. The record contains no pleadings by
Maria in response to Javier's petition.(4)
	In December 2002, a guardian ad litem was appointed for Baby
John. Thereafter, on April 8, 2003, the court held a hearing on
Dennis' motion to dismiss. The court heard no witness testimony and
received no documentary evidence. Javier, Maria, Dennis and Baby
John were each represented by counsel, who presented arguments to
the circuit court. After hearing these arguments, the court ruled as
follows:
			"Okay. It seems to me that several factors of this statute
are problematic.
			First of all, I think there were presumptions or an objective
or a consideration in society that marriage in a family has
some sanctity and that that is a basis for our statutes, our
government and much else of what we do in government and
society.
			Secondly, although it is present in this case, the absence of
any time limit herein which is this time limit could come into
place [sic] I see as a problem and I agree with Mr. Peskind
[defense counsel] and I agree with Ms. Kostelney [guardian
ad litem] and all of the cases that say that we have to
consider the best interest of the child in determining the
custody, matter of visitation and any adoption situations of
parentage or termination of parentage.
			And so I am going to find the statute unconstitutional. It
is I think, too, violates some of the basic tenants [sic] of our
society. I think the presumption of the paternity is of the
husband in this case. Certainly, there is no divorce, no legal
separation or no court orders in effect ending that marital
relationship.
			 And I don't think that we can, I don't think the statute is
clear enough to rely on it."
	The court's written order contains two findings:
			"1. That 750 ILCS 45/1 et seq. [the Parentage Act] and
specifically 750 ILCS 45/7 [section 7] is unconstitutional and
violates the constitutional rights of due process and equal
protection of law guaranteed and applied to Dennis
Malkowski and Baby John as provided for in the Constitution
of the United States of America, Fourteenth Amendment and
the Illinois Constitution.
			2. The Court also finds that the statute is facially
unconstitutional in that it fails to allow a court to determine
best interests of children in considering petitions brought
under 750 ILCS 45/7."
	The court dismissed Javier's petition with prejudice.
	Having declared the Parentage Act unconstitutional, the court
sent notice to the Illinois Attorney General pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 19. On May 30, 2003, Lisa Madigan, as Attorney General
of the State of Illinois, filed a petition to intervene, which the court
granted, and on September 2, 2003, the Attorney General submitted
a memorandum of law in support of the constitutionality of the Act.
	Javier filed a motion for reconsideration in which he attacked the
circuit court's finding of unconstitutionality. In this motion, Javier
argued that the circuit court's reasoning in finding the Parentage Act
unconstitutional, i.e., the sanctity of marriage and the societal
importance of preserving that unity, failed to take into consideration
the facts of this case. Javier pointed out that, although Maria and
Dennis were legally married when Baby John was born, they had not
been living together as man and wife; that Javier and Maria had an
ongoing relationship that began in January 2000; and that Maria and
Baby John have been living with Javier since October 2001. Javier
argued that, in accordance with the statute, he was entitled to establish
his paternity. Once paternity was established, a best interests hearing
could be held, in accordance with section 14 of the Act (see 750 ILCS
45/14 (West 2002)), before determining what rights he should be
afforded. Javier also filed with the court a DNA Parentage Test
Report showing a 99.99997% probability of his paternity to Baby
John.
	Maria moved to vacate the circuit court's order finding the
Parentage Act unconstitutional and dismissing Javier's petition. Maria,
like Javier, argued that the court's finding of unconstitutionality was
improperly premised on assumptions derived from the unsubstantiated
assertions contained in Dennis' motion and affidavit. Maria
contradicted several of Dennis' assertions in her own affidavit, which
she attached to her motion.
	In her affidavit, Maria asserted that she had obtained a plenary
order of protection against Dennis in November 2000 because Dennis
had been abusive to her during the marriage. The order of protection
granted Maria exclusive possession of one bedroom in the marital
home and prohibited Dennis from physically abusing her, harassing
her, or interfering with her personal liberty. Maria further alleged that
she did not have sexual relations with her husband since before
November 2000. Moreover, Maria claimed that, in March 2001,
Dennis tried to force her to have an abortion after she told him that
she was pregnant and that he was not the father. In addition, Maria
asserted that, in September 2001, after Baby John was born, Dennis
locked her and her children out of the marital residence and would not
allow them to return until sometime in October 2001.
	Maria alleged in her affidavit that she and the children resided in
the marital home from October 2001 until June 2002, when she left
Dennis, taking the children with her, because Dennis was threatening
her life and she was concerned for her own safety. Maria stated that
she rented a room in Javier's mother's home and she continues to
reside there with her children.
	Maria admitted that Dennis is listed as Baby John's father on
Baby John's birth certificate but claimed this was because hospital
personnel never asked her to identify the child's father before entering
the information. Maria further alleged that Dennis has shown little
interest in Baby John since his birth, that Dennis has seen Baby John
on only two occasions since June 2002, that Dennis did not visit Baby
John in the hospital when he was sick, and that Dennis has not assisted
in Baby John's care or provided any financial support for her or the
children since June 2002.
	In contrast, Maria stated that Javier accompanied her on her
doctor visits during the pregnancy, visited Baby John frequently in the
hospital when he was sick, has seen Baby John daily since June 2002,
and has been providing financial support for Baby John since his birth.
Maria averred, too, that she had her own insurance, provided by her
employer, which covered most of the medical expenses incurred
during her pregnancy.
	On October 2, 2003, the court held a hearing with regard to the
motions filed in opposition to its April 8, 2003, order. Again, no
evidence was taken. The court heard arguments of counsel and then
entered its ruling. The entirety of its judgment is as follows:
			"Having heard all of the arguments and reviewed the
considerations that went into my first-my initial ruling in this
case, I have reconsidered it and I'm going to deny the
requested relief. The original ruling will stand.
			I believe today was the first time in this case we've
allowed to-or heard anything about any facts; and I think
based on the law and public policy on which my decision was
originally made, I believe that this statute as written is
unconstitutional."
An order denying all postjudgment motions was issued.
	Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 302(a), appeal was brought
directly to this court by the Attorney General and by Maria Izaguirre.
134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a). The two appeals have been consolidated by
order of this court.

ANALYSIS
	At issue in the case at bar is the constitutionality of the Illinois
Parentage Act of 1984 (750 ILCS 45/1 et seq. (West 2002)), the
statutory scheme which governs proceedings to determine paternity.
Our Act is derived from the Uniform Parentage Act of 1973,  9B
U.L.A. 287 (1987). In re Marriage of Slayton, 277 Ill. App. 3d 574
(1996). Its purpose is to further the public policy of Illinois to
"recognize[ ] the right of every child to the physical, mental,
emotional and monetary support of his or her parents," without regard
to the parents' marital status. 750 ILCS 45/1.1, 3 (West 2002).
	Under the Act, a father-child relationship may be established by
presumption (750 ILCS 45/5(a) (West 2002)), by consent (750 ILCS
45/6 (West 2002)), or by judicial determination (750 ILCS 45/7 (West
2002)). The Act recognizes four situations which will give rise to a
presumptive father-child relationship. The one pertinent to the case at
bar is found in section 5(a)(1) and provides that a man is presumed to
be the natural father of a child if "he and the child's natural mother are
or have been married to each other, even though the marriage is or
could be declared invalid, and the child is born or conceived during
such marriage." 750 ILCS 45/5(a)(1) (West 2002). Although two of
the four presumptions found in section 5(a) are "conclusive," the
presumption in section 5(a)(1) is rebuttable by clear and convincing
evidence. 750 ILCS 45/5(b) (West 2002).
	Legal determinations regarding the father-child relationship are
governed by section 7 of the Act (750 ILCS 45/7 (West 2002)). A
father-child relationship may be established pursuant to section 7(a),
or disestablished pursuant to sections 7(b) and 7(b.5). Section 7(a)
permits various parties to bring an action to establish a child's
paternity, without regard to whether parentage is presumed under
section 5(a). Section 7(a) provides in pertinent part:
			"An action to determine the existence of the father and
child relationship, whether or not such a relationship is
already presumed under Section 5 of this Act [750 ILCS
45/5], may be brought by the child; the mother; a pregnant
woman; any person or public agency who has custody of, or
is providing or has provided financial support to, the child;
the Illinois Department of Public Aid if it is providing or has
provided financial support to the child or if it is assisting with
child support collection services; or a man presumed or
alleging himself to be the father of the child or expected
child." (Emphases added.) 750 ILCS 45/7(a) (West 2002).
	Thus a man alleging himself to be the biological father of a child
has standing to bring an action to establish his relationship to the child,
without regard to whether another man is already presumed to be the
child's father pursuant to section 5(a) of the Act. Moreover, once a
petition to establish parentage is filed with the court, the court,
pursuant to section 11(a) of the Act, "may, and upon request of a
party shall, order or direct the mother, child and alleged father to
submit to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) tests to determine inherited
characteristics." (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 45/11(a) (West 2002).
If the results of paternity testing obtained pursuant to this section
show that the presumed father is not the biological father, the
presumption in section 5 is rebutted. 750 ILCS 45/11(g) (West 2002).
	Although the Act contains no express requirement that a court
consider the best interests of the child before any testing is conducted
or a legal determination of paternity is made (see In re Marriage of
Slayton, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 577), section 14 of the Act provides that
any decisions regarding custody and visitation "shall [be] determine[d]
in accordance with the relevant factors set forth in the Illinois
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act [750 ILCS 5/101 et seq.]
and any other applicable law of Illinois, to guide the court in a finding
in the best interests of the child." 750 ILCS 45/14 (West 2002). Thus,
even though paternity may be established upon the filing of a petition
pursuant to section 7(a), any parental rights of the biological father,
such as the right to have custody of, or visitation with, the child, shall
not be granted unless it is in the child's best interest.
	In the case at bar, Javier, relying on the statutory right granted
him in section 7(a) of the Act, filed a petition in the circuit court of
Kane County, seeking a judicial determination of his paternity to Baby
John. Dennis, as Baby John's presumed father, sought to bar Javier
from establishing his paternity. Dennis argued that the Act, by
permitting a putative father to rebut the presumption of paternity
recognized in section 5(a)(1) of the Act, unconstitutionally infringes
upon his rights and the rights of the family. This is so, Dennis argued,
because the Act makes no provision for a best interests hearing prior
to the paternity determination.
	Agreeing with Dennis, the circuit court dismissed Javier's petition
with prejudice. The court made two specific rulings: (1) that the
statute violates due process and equal protection rights "guaranteed
and applied to Dennis Malkowski and Baby John" and (2) that "the
statute is facially unconstitutional in that it fails to allow a court to
determine best interests of children in considering petitions brought
under 750 ILCS 45/7."
	The circuit court's judgment is before us on direct review.
Because a statute's constitutional validity is a question of law, we
review de novo the circuit court's decision declaring the statute
unconstitutional. Arvia v. Madigan, 209 Ill. 2d 520, 536 (2004);
People v. Einoder, 209 Ill. 2d 443, 450 (2004). When considering the
constitutionality of a statute on review, we begin with the presumption
that the statute is constitutional. People v. Huddleston, No. 96367
(June 4, 2004); Vuagniaux v. Department of Professional Regulation,
208 Ill. 2d 173 (2003). Further, we have an obligation to construe the
statute in a manner which upholds its constitutionality, if such a
construction is reasonably possible. Wickham v. Byrne, 199 Ill. 2d 309, 316 (2002). The burden of clearly establishing the statute's
constitutional infirmity is on the party challenging the validity of a
statute. People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d 264, 290 (2003).
	Our task of reviewing the circuit court's judgment in the case at
bar is hampered by a lack of clarity in the court's ruling. The scope of
the ruling is not readily apparent from the text of the order. The court
declared the statute unconstitutional, apparently invalidating the
Parentage Act in its entirety, rather than some portion thereof. In
addition, the circuit court used the terms "as applied" and "facially"
when finding the statute unconstitutional, making it unclear whether
the court intended to find the Act, either in whole or in part,
unconstitutional "as applied" or "on its face" or both. More
importantly, however, the court's "findings" that the Act violates due
process and equal protection are conclusory and unsupported by any
legal analysis or explanation. The circuit court never engaged in any
of the traditional analyses associated with due process and equal
protection claims.
	This court noted in In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 302-03 (2001),
that there are general procedures that courts follow when addressing
due process challenges:
		"The analysis courts use when confronted with a claim that
a statute violates the due process guarantees of the United
States and Illinois Constitutions depends on the nature of the
right upon which the statute supposedly infringes. Ordinarily,
courts will employ a relaxed scrutiny of statutes, looking only
to see whether the statute bears a rational relationship to a
legitimate state interest. [Citation.] However, in cases where
the right infringed upon is among those considered a
'fundamental' constitutional right, courts subject the statute
to 'strict' scrutiny. To survive strict scrutiny, the means
employed by the legislature must be 'necessary' to a
'compelling' state interest, and the statute must be narrowly
tailored thereto, i.e., the legislature must use the least
restrictive means consistent with the attainment of its goal."
	Similarly, there are analytical procedures which are typically
followed when an equal protection challenge is made. In City of
Urbana v. Andrew N.B., Nos. 95408, 95803 cons. (June 24, 2004),
we explained:
			"Equal protection guarantees that similarly situated
individuals will be treated similarly, unless the government
demonstrates an appropriate reason to do otherwise.
[Citation.] The shorthand we have developed for the degree
of deference we give in evaluating the appropriateness of
such a reason is the term 'scrutiny.' In cases like the one
before us, where the statutory classification at issue does not
involve fundamental rights, we employ so-called rational
basis scrutiny and ask only whether the challenged
classification bears a rational relation to a legitimate
purpose."
	Although any substantive due process analysis must begin with
a careful description of the asserted right (see Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302, 123 L. Ed. 2d 1, 16, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1447 (1993)),
the court, in the case at bar, never identified the nature of the right
purportedly infringed upon by the statute, nor did the court, with
regard to the equal protection challenge, identify which individual or
class of individuals was being treated differently than others similarly
situated. Efforts by the Attorney General and Maria, in their
postdismissal motions and memorandums of law, to inject traditional
constitutional due process and equal protection analysis into the
proceedings were summarily rejected by the circuit court. As a
consequence, our task, initially, is to define the parameters of the
circuit court's holdings.

A. Whether the Parentage Act Violates Due Process and Equal
Protection Rights "Guaranteed and Applied" to Dennis and Baby
John
	The circuit court's first ruling is that the Parentage Act violates
due process and equal protection rights "guaranteed and applied" to
Dennis and Baby John. Because the court makes specific reference to
Dennis and Baby John, we logically conclude that the circuit court
intended by this ruling to find the Parentage Act unconstitutional "as
applied" to the parties in the case before us. This being so, we need
not review the court's ruling on its merits. Because the circuit court
never held an evidentiary hearing and made no findings of fact, it
could not have found the Act unconstitutional as applied to Dennis
and Baby John.
	A court is not capable of making an "as applied" determination
of unconstitutionality when there has been no evidentiary hearing and
no findings of fact. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.  at 300-01, 123 L. Ed. 2d 
at 15-16, 113 S. Ct.  at 1446 (when there are no findings or evidentiary
record, the constitutional challenge must be facial). Without an
evidentiary record, any finding that a statute is unconstitutional "as
applied" is premature. See In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 299-300
(2001); see also Desnick v. Department of Professional Regulation,
171 Ill. 2d 510, 555-56 (1996) (McMorrow, dissenting) (reaching the
merits of a constitutional "as applied" challenge without the
presentment or circuit court consideration of any evidence creates
constitutional due process concerns). Nor would it be appropriate for
this court, sua sponte, to consider whether the statute has been
constitutionally applied since we, as a reviewing court, are not arbiters
of the facts. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's first ruling.
We are limited, therefore, to a review of the Act's facial validity.

B. Whether the Parentage Act Is Facially Unconstitutional
Because It Does Not Require a Best Interests Hearing Prior to a
Finding of Paternity 
At the outset, we note that a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully. In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200, 210-11 (1994). This is
because a statute is facially invalid only if no set of circumstances exist
under which the Act would be valid. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697, 707, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100 (1987).
The fact that the statute could be found unconstitutional under some
set of circumstances does not establish the facial invalidity of the
statute. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates,
Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 504, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 375, 102 S. Ct. 1186,
1196 (1982) (" 'Although it is possible that specific future applications
... may engender concrete problems of constitutional dimension, it will
be time enough to consider any such problems when they arise' "),
quoting Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35,
52, 16 L. Ed. 2d 336, 348, 86 S. Ct. 1254, 1265 (1966). With this
standard in mind, we turn to the circuit court's second ruling, that "the
statute is facially unconstitutional in that it fails to allow a court to
determine best interests of children in considering petitions brought
under 750 ILCS 45/7."
	Interpreting the circuit court's order literally, the circuit court
invalidated the Parentage Act because section 7 of the Act allows
"petitions" to be brought without a prior best interests hearing. As
noted earlier, however, section 7 governs petitions brought to
establish paternity, as well as actions to disestablish paternity. In
addition, section 7(a), which permits petitions to establish paternity,
affords standing to a number of individuals and entities in addition to
putative fathers and encompasses situations where the child's mother
was not married and, therefore, there is no presumed father.
Accordingly, section 7 embraces a multitude of situations which were
not under consideration by the circuit court at the time of its ruling.
Thus, we think a more reasonable interpretation of the circuit court's
order is one that limits the reach of the circuit court's finding of
unconstitutionality to the narrow circumstances that were before it.
Therefore, we interpret the circuit court order to mean that section
7(a) of the Act is facially invalid to the extent that it permits, without
a prior best interests hearing, a paternity action brought by a man
alleging himself to be the biological father of a child who was born
during the marriage of the mother to another man. Even with this
narrow interpretation of the circuit court's ruling, however, we are
unable to affirm the court's finding that the Parentage Act is facially
invalid.
	 The circuit court declared the Parentage Act facially
unconstitutional because it does not provide for a best interests
hearing before allowing a paternity action to proceed. However,
neither the circuit court's order, nor its verbal rulings, provided any
explanation why, even under the limited circumstances set forth
above, the failure to hold a preliminary best interests hearing would,
in all cases, render the statute unconstitutional. Indeed, the court
never stated whether the statute's invalidity stems from a violation of
federal or state constitutional principles and we are left to wonder
what constitutional provision the court applied here to find the Act
invalid.
	Additionally, the court never identified the party whose rights or
interests it found were being infringed by the lack of a best interests
hearing. Generally, when a best interests hearing is required prior to
some action, it is for the protection of the child. Here, however, the
challenge to the constitutionality of the Act was raised by the
presumed father. The court never explained why a presumed father,
when attempting to assert his own rights under the Act, has standing
to challenge the Act on the grounds that it is against the child's best
interests. This is an issue that has been considered in other courts. See
In re Marriage of Thier, 67 Wash. App. 940, 945, 841 P.2d 794, 797
(1992) (the best interests of the child "standard cannot be invoked on
behalf of someone other than the child' " (emphasis omitted)), quoting
McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash. 2d 299, 310, 738 P.2d 254, 261
(1987).
	Finding no explanation for the circuit court's holding that a
preliminary best interests hearing is constitutionally required, we turn
to the arguments presented by the appellee, Dennis, who is the party
who challenged the constitutionality of the statute in the court below.
As noted earlier, the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute
bears the burden of clearly establishing its unconstitutionality. In re
Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d 53, 58 (2002).
	In his brief before this court, Dennis argues that, by not providing
for a preliminary best interests hearing, the statute is unconstitutional
because it permits the "automatic invasion of an intact family by a
stranger" and "allows an interloper to involuntarily invade the marital
relationship and impugn its integrity." He claims the statutory scheme
works a hardship on children "raised by a [presumed] father," whom
"they considered their father." Similarly, in the court below, Dennis
argued that the statute is unconstitutional because a 10-year-old child,
living with the husband and wife, raised by the husband as his child,
could be displaced by a biological father who is a stranger, but "comes
in ten years later *** and says I want a cotton swab, I'm the dad."
Dennis also posited that there could be a situation where the child of
the biological father seeking to establish paternity was a product of
rape.
	The very wording of Dennis' arguments, however, demonstrates
the failure of proof as to the statute's facial validity. In advancing his
arguments, Dennis makes numerous assumptions or suggests various
hypothetical situations wherein the statute might be applied
unconstitutionally. Without expressing any opinion on the
constitutionality of the statute in the circumstances suggested by
Dennis, we find that Dennis fails to carry his burden of clearly
showing that, in all instances, the failure to hold a best interests
hearing before allowing a paternity action to proceed would be
unconstitutional. In particular, Dennis has not shown why it would be
unconstitutional to allow a paternity action to proceed without a best
interest hearing in a situation where the biological father has been
living with the child or where the marriage between the child's mother
and the presumed father has already disintegrated so that there is no
"intact family." Thus, Dennis' arguments do not support the circuit
court's holding that the statute is facially invalid.
	In addition to the above arguments, Dennis urges this court to
affirm the circuit court's ruling by discussing "Family Law Trends"
and public policy considerations. He suggests that the inability of
courts to consider the best interests of children before determining
parentage is "lamentable" and that a court "should" have this ability.
He cites the special concurring opinions in J.S.A. v. M.H., 343 Ill.
App. 3d 217 (2003), which emphasize the importance of allowing
courts to consider children's best interests when making paternity
determinations. He suggests that our Parentage Act overemphasizes
the biological connection and is out of step with current realities.
Dennis concludes: "Not only is the statutory scheme here arguably
unconstitutional, sociologically and scientifically it is no longer
appropriate as evidenced by trends in family law." (Emphasis added.)
	The trends and policy considerations provided by Dennis are not
authority which would support a finding that the statutory scheme at
issue here is facially unconstitutional. Further, Dennis argues the
invalidity of the statute by stating only that it is "arguably"
unconstitutional. Dennis' arguments show, at best, a disagreement
with the wisdom of our current legislative scheme. As this court held
in Hayen v. County of Ogle, 101 Ill. 2d 413, 420-21 (1984), where
objections "pose what are essentially questions of policy [they] are
more appropriately directed to the legislature than to this court."
When assessing the constitutionality of a statute " 'we do not sit as a
superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide
whether the policy which it expresses offends the public welfare.' "
Hayen v. County of Ogle, 101 Ill. 2d  at 421, quoting Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423, 96 L. Ed. 469, 472, 72 S. Ct. 405, 407 (1952). See also Smith v. Board of Education of
Oswego Community High School District, 405 Ill. 143, 147 (1950)
("The wisdom of *** legislation is a question for the General
Assembly and not for this court. It is our function to determine
whether the legislation is forbidden by the constitution).
	The burden of clearly showing the facial invalidity of the
Parentage Act has not been met. For this reason, we reverse the
circuit court's judgment that the Parentage Act is facially
unconstitutional because section 7(a) of the Act makes no provision
for a best interests hearing before allowing a paternity action to
proceed.
	Having found that the statute is not unconstitutional, we reverse
the dismissal of Javier's petition and remand for further proceedings.

CONCLUSION
	For the forgoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is
reversed and the cause is remanded to that court.
Reversed and remanded.
 
 
1.                 
     
Maria is married to Dennis Malkowski and identifies herself in her brief as Maria Malkowski, not Maria Izaguirre.
2.                 
Some of the matters asserted in the affidavit were repeated in a "Background" section of the motion for involuntary 
dismissal.
3.                  
           
           
Although the affidavit and motion were filed on the same day, the motion states that Baby John was taken from the marital 
residence in October, while the affidavit states that Baby John was taken in November.
4.            
Although Maria did not respond to Javier's petition, she responded to a "Counterclaim/Cross-claim for Custody" filed by 
Dennis. In this petition, Dennis sought temporary and permanent custody of both Baby John and Betzaida. Maria moved to strike the 
counterclaim/cross-claim as it related to Betzaida, alleging that Dennis did not have standing to seek custody of her. It is unclear whether 
any action was taken by the court on this counterclaim/cross-claim.