Case Title: State ex rel. Martin v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 2003-Ohio-3625

Docket Number: 20021535

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Martin v. Indus. Comm., 99 Ohio St.3d 280, 2003-Ohio-3625.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. MARTIN, APPELLEE, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, 
APPELLANT, ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Martin v. Indus. Comm., 99 Ohio St.3d 280, 2003-Ohio-
3625.] 
Workers’ compensation — Industrial Commission’s denial of request for 
change-of-occupation benefits reinstated, when. 
(No. 2002-1535 — Submitted April 29, 2003 — Decided July 23, 2003.) 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 01AP-1173. 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Appellee-claimant Ellen D. Martin’s  workers’ compensation claim 
has been allowed as an occupational disease for “fume/vapor upper respiratory 
inflammation.”  In late 2000, she moved appellant Industrial Commission of Ohio 
for change-of-occupation benefits pursuant to R.C. 4123.57(D) and 4123.68.  The 
commission denied that request because claimant’s condition was not caused by 
dust. 
{¶2} 
Claimant petitioned the Court of Appeals for Franklin County for a 
writ of mandamus.  The court granted a limited writ ordering the commission to 
determine whether claimant’s condition was dust-induced without considering the 
description of the claim allowance to be conclusive. 
{¶3} 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
{¶4} 
R.C. 4123.57(D) reads: 
{¶5} 
“If an employee of a state fund employer makes application for a 
finding and the administrator finds that the employee has contracted silicosis * * * 
or coal miners’ pneumoconiosis * * * or asbestosis * * * and that a change of 
such employee’s occupation is medically advisable in order to decrease 
substantially further exposure to silica dust, asbestos, or coal dust and if the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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employee, after the finding, has changed or shall change the employee’s 
occupation to an occupation in which the exposure to silica dust, asbestos, or coal 
dust is substantially decreased, the administrator shall allow the employee an 
amount equal to fifty per cent of the statewide average weekly wage per week for 
a period of thirty weeks * * * .” 
{¶6} 
R.C. 4123.68 also provides: 
{¶7} 
“All conditions, restrictions, limitations, and other provisions of 
this section, with reference to the payment of compensation or benefits on account 
of silicosis or coal miners’ pneumoconiosis apply to the payment of compensation 
or benefits on account of any other occupational disease of the respiratory tract 
resulting from injurious exposures to dust.” (Emphasis added.) Id., paragraph 
following subsection (AA). 
{¶8} 
In State ex rel. Middlesworth v. Regal Ware, Inc. (2001), 93 Ohio 
St.3d 214, 754 N.E.2d 774, we declared that these two sections must be read 
together in considering eligibility for compensation.  Consequently, claimants 
with dust-induced respiratory occupational diseases are now eligible for change-
of-occupation benefits if all other conditions are met. 
{¶9} 
The present claim is allowed for “fume/vapor upper respiratory 
inflammation.”  There is no reference to dust.  Claimant nevertheless asserts 
entitlement to change-of-occupation benefits on two bases.  She initially proposes 
that all respiratory occupational diseases are eligible for change-of-occupation 
benefits, citing State ex rel. Wooten v. Indus. Comm. (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 296, 
8 OBR 391, 456 N.E.2d 1248.  Wooten, however, was decided before 
Middlesworth, which specifically acknowledged the statutory requirement that the 
disease be dust-induced. 
{¶10} Claimant alternatively proposes that causation by dust is not 
excluded, since a chemist emphasized the presence of workplace dust in his 
report.  This, too, is unpersuasive.  Every word in a claim’s allowance has 
January Term, 2003 
3 
meaning.  State ex rel. Saunders v. Metal Container Corp. (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 
85, 556 N.E.2d 168.  Language cannot therefore be added or deleted informally, 
and we have expressly said this of dust and dust-inducement.  State ex rel. 
Bowman v. Indus. Comm. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 317, 603 N.E.2d 1000. 
{¶11} Claimant validly observes that the mere absence of a reference to 
dust in the claim’s allowance does not exclude compensation under R.C. 
4123.57(D).  For this reason, the court in Middlesworth—after expanding change-
of-occupation eligibility—ordered the commission to determine whether 
“interstitial pulmonary fibrosis with bilateral apical lung disease” was dust-
related. 
{¶12} In the present case, the commission has already determined the 
reason for claimant’s respiratory inflammation—exposure to fumes and vapors.  It 
has already performed the step missing in Middlesworth.  It has reviewed the 
medical evidence and was persuaded that fumes and vapors alone precipitated 
claimant’s occupational disease.  There is no more to be determined, and for this 
reason, there is no need for an order to the commission to further consider the 
claim. 
{¶13} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the order of 
the commission is reinstated. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and O'DONNELL, JJ., 
concur. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., dissenting. 
{¶14} I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Granger Co., L.P.A., and Mark S. Granger, for appellee. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Gerald H. Waterman, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellant. 
 
Littler Mendelson, P.C., and Michael A. Womack, for Columbus Fair 
Auto Auction, Inc. 
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