Case Title: Snay v. Burr

Citation: 2021-Ohio-4113

Docket Number: 2020-1057

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2021-11-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Snay 
v. Burr, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-4113.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-4113 
SNAY, ET AL., APPELLANTS, v.  BURR, ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Snay v. Burr, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-4113.] 
Torts—Negligence—Duty of care—An adjacent landowner or an occupier of land 
adjacent to a public road does not owe a duty of care to an errant motorist 
who strikes an off-road object in the right-of-way, such as a mailbox, if the 
object does not affect the safety of ordinary travel on the regularly traveled 
portion of the road—Judgment affirmed. 
(No. 2020-1057—Submitted June 16, 2021—Decided November 24, 2021.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Huron County, No. H-19-016, 
2020-Ohio-3828. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we consider whether an owner of land adjacent to a 
public road (“adjacent landowner”) or an occupier of such land owes a motorist 
upon that road a duty of care with respect to a stationary object in the right-of-way 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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and if so, to what extent.  This appeal specifically asks us to consider the liability, 
if any, of an adjacent landowner for catastrophic injuries sustained by a motorist as 
a result of the motorist’s collision with the landowner’s reinforced mailbox after 
hitting a patch of ice and leaving the ordinarily traveled portion of the road. 
{¶ 2} Appellants, Cletus Snay (“Snay”) and Kelly Snay, acknowledge that 
under existing Ohio law an adjacent landowner generally owes no duty of care to a 
motorist who leaves the regularly traveled portion of the road and strikes an object 
in the right-of-way.  But they ask this court to recognize an exception to that general 
rule and to hold that an adjacent landowner does owe a duty of care to a motorist 
who unintentionally strays from the regularly traveled portion of the road if the 
landowner has consciously created a hazard in the right-of-way with knowledge of 
the danger it would present to such a motorist.  For the following reasons, we 
decline to do so. 
I. Facts and procedural background 
{¶ 3} The facts of this case are undisputedly tragic.  On the afternoon of 
December 19, 2016, Snay was driving on Young Road—a two-lane country road—
en route from his home in Norwalk to his workplace in Bellevue, a route he had 
driven without incident for five years.  Although it was sunny and clear, Young 
Road was wet and icy, with patches of “black ice.”  Snay does not remember 
anything about that day other than driving toward his workplace. 
{¶ 4} At approximately 2:44 p.m., Ohio Highway Patrol Trooper Robert 
Jones responded to a dispatch for a one-vehicle roll-over crash with a trapped 
occupant.  When he arrived on the scene, Trooper Jones found Snay’s rolled-over 
pickup truck off the north side of Young Road and emergency personnel treating 
Snay for visible head injuries.  Upon investigation, Trooper Jones concluded that 
Snay’s truck went off the right side of the road, began to fishtail, struck two 
mailboxes, and overturned.  He determined that the truck began to roll after it struck 
the first mailbox—belonging to appellees, Matthew Burr (“Burr”) and Diane 
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Burr—but before it hit the second mailbox.  There are no known witnesses to the 
accident. 
{¶ 5} As a result of the accident, Snay suffered damage to his C5–C7 discs, 
rendering him quadriplegic. 
{¶ 6} The Burrs’ mailbox was located one foot, nine inches from the edge 
of the road, within the right-of-way.1  Burr installed the mailbox in 1996 after the 
Burrs’ previous mailbox had been broken, following repeated instances of 
suspected vandalism. 
{¶ 7} Before installing the mailbox, Burr obtained from his local post office 
a one-page document of guidelines for mailbox installation published by the United 
States Postal Service.  He acknowledged that those guidelines were likely intended 
to promote traffic safety.  He recalled that the guidelines recommended, but did not 
require, that a metal mailbox support be two-inch-diameter standard-steel or 
aluminum pipe and that the support be buried no more than 24 inches deep.  For his 
mailbox support, however, Burr used an eight-inch-diameter metal pipe, which he 
buried 36 inches deep.  Burr testified that he packed the support hole for the mailbox 
with old, powdered concrete mix, dirt, and stones, with the understanding that if it 
rained and the concrete mix was still good, it “might set up” and hold the support 
in place “a little stiffer.”  Although Burr testified that he wanted the new mailbox 
post to deter vandals, he was “fairly confident” that the mailbox post would “lay 
over” if someone hit it.  Following the accident, the Burrs’ mailbox post remained 
in the ground, while the second mailbox that Snay’s truck hit was destroyed. 
{¶ 8} The Snays’ accident reconstructionist, James Crawford, agreed with 
Trooper Jones’s assessment that Snay’s truck began to roll over after striking the 
 
1.  “Right-of-way” is a “general term denoting land, property, or the interest therein, usually in the 
configuration of a strip, acquired for or devoted to transportation purposes.  When used in this 
context, right-of-way includes the roadway, shoulders or berm, ditch, and slopes extending to the 
right-of-way limits under the control of the state or local authority.”  R.C. 4511.01(UU)(2). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Burrs’ mailbox.  But unlike Trooper Jones, who did not believe the Burrs’ mailbox 
had any causative effect on the truck’s rolling over, Crawford opined that “[t]he 
mechanism [that] caus[ed] the pickup to overturn in this case was the unyielding 
heavy metal pipe mailbox support.”  Crawford’s report cited mailbox-support 
guidelines published by the United States Postal Service and by the American 
Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials with which the Burrs’ 
mailbox support did not comply.  He characterized the Burrs’ mailbox support as 
“a dangerous hazard to motorists” and “a proximate cause for the roll-over” that 
resulted in Snay’s injuries. 
{¶ 9} The Snays sued the Burrs for compensatory damages for Snay’s 
injuries and for appellant Kelly Snay’s loss of consortium, as well as for punitive 
damages.  They alleged that the Burrs were “negligent, reckless and careless in 
erecting their mailbox because it was supported by a thick, non-breakaway metal 
pipe.”  In support of their claim for punitive damages, they additionally alleged that 
the Burrs acted wantonly, recklessly, and with gross negligence. 
{¶ 10} The Burrs moved for summary judgment, arguing that they owed no 
duty of care to Snay and that Snay’s failure to control his vehicle on the regularly 
traveled portion of the road was the sole proximate cause of his injuries.  The trial 
court granted the Burrs’ motion, holding that Ohio law does not impose upon an 
adjacent landowner a duty of care to motorists who lose control of their vehicles, 
leave the ordinarily traveled portion of the road, and strike an off-road object in the 
right-of-way. 
{¶ 11} In a two-to-one decision, the Sixth District Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment.  The majority agreed with 
the trial court that the Burrs owed no duty of care to Snay, but it also held that the 
record did not support a finding that the Burrs’ conduct was a proximate cause of 
Snay’s injuries.  Judge Mayle dissented, concluding that under the facts of this case 
the Burrs owed Snay a duty to install their mailbox in a reasonably safe manner and 
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that reasonable minds could differ as to whether the Burrs’ construction of their 
mailbox was a proximate cause of Snay’s injuries. 
{¶ 12} This court accepted the Snays’ discretionary appeal, which presents 
three propositions of law.  See 160 Ohio St.3d 1438, 2020-Ohio-4938, 155 N.E.3d 
940.  In their first proposition of law, the Snays argue that an adjacent landowner 
owes a duty of care to an errant motorist who strikes an off-road hazard in the right-
of-way if the landowner has consciously created the hazard with knowledge of the 
danger it may present to a motorist who veers off the road.  In their second 
proposition of law, they ask this court to hold that the open-and-obvious doctrine 
does not apply when an adjacent landowner consciously places a hazard in a right-
of-way in close proximity to the traveled portion of the highway.  And in their third 
proposition of law, the Snays ask this court to hold that their accident 
reconstructionist’s opinion that Snay’s truck would not have overturned but for its 
collision with the Burrs’ mailbox was admissible and sufficient to demonstrate a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding proximate cause.  Because the Snays’ first 
proposition of law is dispositive of this appeal, we need not reach the second and 
third propositions of law. 
II. Analysis 
A. The foundational element of duty 
{¶ 13} Other than their claim for punitive damages, the Snays’ claims sound 
in negligence.  Liability for negligence arises from an injury caused by a 
defendant’s failure to discharge a duty owed to the injured plaintiff.  Di Gildo v. 
Caponi, 18 Ohio St.2d 125, 127, 247 N.E.2d 732 (1969).  To prove actionable 
negligence, a plaintiff must establish (1) the existence of a legal duty owed to the 
injured party, (2) the defendant’s breach of that duty, and (3) that an injury 
proximately resulted from the defendant’s breach of duty.  Mussivand v. David, 45 
Ohio St.3d 314, 318, 544 N.E.2d 265 (1989), citing Di Gildo. 
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{¶ 14} The Snays’ first proposition of law concerns the foundational 
element of duty.  “A person’s failure to exercise ordinary care in doing or failing to 
do something will not amount to actionable negligence unless such person owed to 
someone injured by such failure a duty to exercise ordinary care.”  United States 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Paramount Fur Serv., Inc., 168 Ohio St. 431, 156 N.E.2d 121 
(1959), paragraph three of the syllabus.  See also Gedeon v. East Ohio Gas Co., 
128 Ohio St. 335, 338, 190 N.E. 924 (1934) (“before failure to use [ordinary care] 
can be made the basis for recovery it must appear that the plaintiff falls within the 
class of persons to whom a duty of care was owing”).  In other words, if there is no 
duty then there can be no liability for negligence.  Jeffers v. Olexo, 43 Ohio St.3d 
140, 142, 539 N.E.2d 614 (1989).  Unlike the question whether a defendant has 
properly discharged an applicable duty of care, which is generally a question of fact 
for the jury, see Gedeon at 338, the question whether a duty exists to begin with is 
a question of law for the court, Mussivand at 318. 
{¶ 15} In the context of Ohio tort law, “[d]uty * * * refers to the relationship 
between the plaintiff and the defendant from which arises an obligation on the part 
of the defendant to exercise due care toward the plaintiff.”  Commerce & Industry 
Ins. Co. v. Toledo, 45 Ohio St.3d 96, 98, 543 N.E.2d 1188 (1989), citing Baltimore 
& Ohio Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Cox, 66 Ohio St. 276, 64 N.E. 119 (1902).  “[A] 
defendant’s duty to a plaintiff depends upon the relationship between the parties 
and the foreseeability of injury to someone in the plaintiff’s position.”  Simmers v. 
Bentley Constr. Co., 64 Ohio St.3d 642, 645, 597 N.E.2d 504 (1992).  “As a society, 
we expect people to use reasonable precautions against the risks that a reasonably 
prudent person would anticipate.”  Cromer v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Akron, 
142 Ohio St.3d 257, 2015-Ohio-229, 29 N.E.3d 921, ¶ 24, citing Commerce & 
Industry Ins. Co. at 98.  An injury is foreseeable if a reasonably prudent person 
under the same or similar circumstances as the defendant should have known that 
the conduct in question was likely to result in injury to the plaintiff or to someone 
January Term, 2021 
 
7
in a like situation.  Commerce & Industry Ins. Co. at 98.  Foreseeability alone, 
however, is not always sufficient to establish a duty of care.  Estates of Morgan v. 
Fairfield Family Counseling Ctr., 77 Ohio St.3d 284, 293, 673 N.E.2d 1311 (1997), 
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Dillon v. OhioHealth Corp., 
2015-Ohio-1389, 31 N.E.3d 1232 (10th Dist.). 
{¶ 16} The only relationship between Snay and the Burrs stems from Snay’s 
status as a motorist on the public road adjacent to the Burrs’ property and on the 
public right-of-way that extended over a portion of that property.  To assess whether 
the Burrs owed a duty of care to Snay, we therefore look to precedent that addresses 
the duties owed to motorists on public roads by adjacent landowners or occupiers 
of adjacent land, whether they be political subdivisions, utility companies, or 
private persons. 
B. Whether an adjacent landowner or an occupier of land  
adjacent to a public road owes a duty to motorists with respect to  
an off-road object in a right-of-way depends on whether the object  
affects ordinary travel on the regularly traveled portion of the road 
{¶ 17} In Manufacturer’s Natl. Bank of Detroit v. Erie Cty. Rd. Comm., 63 
Ohio St.3d 318, 587 N.E.2d 819 (1992), this court addressed two questions of law 
certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.  In 
Manufacturer’s, a fatal automobile accident occurred at a rural intersection where 
corn growing in the right-of-way obstructed motorists’ vision of cross-traffic at the 
two-way stop.  The plaintiffs sued the township where the intersection was located 
and the occupier of the adjacent land on which the corn was growing.  In an appeal 
from the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the 
federal court of appeals certified to this court two questions of Ohio law concerning 
the duties owed to motorists on public roads by the township and by the occupier 
of the adjacent land. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 18} We first addressed the township’s duty, which arose from the 
statutory requirement in R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) that a township keep its highways 
open, in repair, and free from nuisance.2  The plaintiffs argued that the extension of 
the cornfield into the right-of-way constituted a nuisance because it rendered the 
intersection unsafe by obstructing motorists’ sightlines.  Addressing the scope of 
the township’s duty, we stated that “the focus should be on whether a condition 
exists within the political subdivision’s control that creates a danger for ordinary 
traffic on the regularly travelled portion of the road.”  Manufacturer’s at 322.  In 
other words, the focus was on the condition’s effect on ordinary traffic; the 
township’s duty required it to keep the right-of-way “free from * * * conditions that 
directly jeopardize[d] the safety of traffic on the highway.”  Id.  We thus held that 
“a permanent obstruction to visibility in the right-of-way, which renders the 
regularly travelled portions of the highway unsafe for the usual and ordinary course 
of travel, can be a nuisance for which a political subdivision may be liable.”  Id. at 
323. 
{¶ 19} We then turned to the second certified question, which concerned 
the duty of the occupier of the adjacent property who was growing corn in the right-
of-way.  We began by noting that the right-of-way, having been appropriated for 
highway purposes, was under the control of the state or local government and 
therefore the occupier of the land was not free to use it as he pleased.  Id.  We stated 
that growing crops in a right-of-way serves no highway purpose and that if the crops 
create a hazard to safe travel on the highway by obstructing motorists’ vision, then 
the usage is also inconsistent with the right-of-way’s purpose.  Id. at 324.  We held 
that “where the abutting landowner or occupier uses the highway right-of-way in a 
 
2.  The General Assembly subsequently amended R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) to limit political-subdivision 
liability for injuries and deaths to those caused by “an obstacle that blocks or clogs the roadway and 
not merely a thing or condition that hinders or impedes the use of the roadway or that may have the 
potential to do so.”  Howard v. Miami Twp. Fire Div., 119 Ohio St.3d 1, 2008-Ohio-2792, 891 
N.E.2d 311, ¶ 30. 
January Term, 2021 
 
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manner inconsistent with a highway purpose, and where such usage constitutes an 
unreasonable hazard to the users of the highway, the landowner or occupier may be 
liable for damages proximately caused by the improper use of the right of way.”  
Id. 
{¶ 20} The Snays suggest that recognition of a duty under the facts of this 
case would not conflict with this court’s holding in Manufacturer’s, because, they 
contend, under the holding in Manufacturer’s, an adjacent landowner or an 
occupier of land adjacent to a public road owes a broader duty to motorists than 
does the political subdivision to which the road and right-of-way are dedicated.  
They argue that while this court limited the township’s duty to keeping the right-
of-way free from any obstruction that “renders the regularly travelled portions of 
the highway unsafe for the usual and ordinary course of travel,” id., 63 Ohio St.3d 
318, 587 N.E.2d 819, at paragraph one of the syllabus, we did not use similar 
limiting language with respect to the duty owed to motorists by the adjacent 
landowner or occupier of the adjacent land.  Instead, the Snays posit, this court held 
that a landowner’s or occupier’s duty to a motorist arises from the landowner’s or 
occupier’s use of the right-of-way “in a manner that is inconsistent with a highway 
purpose, and where such usage constitutes an unreasonable hazard to the users of 
the highway,” id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.  They maintain that “an 
unreasonable hazard to the users of the highway” encompasses an off-road hazard 
that a motorist might encounter upon veering off the road, even if the hazard does 
not endanger ordinary travel on the regularly traveled portion of the road.  We 
disagree with the Snays’ reading of Manufacturer’s. 
{¶ 21} As the Snays concede, Manufacturer’s is factually different from 
this case because the accident in Manufacturer’s occurred on the regularly traveled 
portion of the road and in the ordinary course of travel through the intersection.  
Further, there was no dispute in Manufacturer’s that the corn growing in the right-
of-way rendered ordinary travel on the road unsafe by obscuring motorists’ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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visibility of cross-traffic, which ultimately resulted in the fatal crash.  Because of 
those undisputed facts, there was no reason for the court to consider whether the 
occupier’s duty would also extend to an off-road condition that did not render 
ordinary travel on the road unsafe but which might present a hazard to a motorist 
who leaves the regularly traveled portion of the road.  Review of the opinion in 
Manufacturer’s makes clear, however, that this court focused on an obstruction’s 
effect on the safety of ordinary on-road travel with respect to both the township’s 
duty to motorists and the duty owed by an occupier of adjacent land.  See id. at 324 
(“if the crops obstruct a driver’s vision in a way that creates a hazard to safe travel 
on the highway, the usage is inconsistent with the right-of-way’s purpose”).  We 
therefore reject the Snays’ argument that this court’s holding in Manufacturer’s 
recognizes a duty to motorists owed by an adjacent landowner or an occupier of 
land adjacent to a public road with respect to obstructions in the right-of-way that 
do not affect the safety of ordinary travel on the road. 
{¶ 22} Since this court’s decision in Manufacturer’s, we have consistently 
considered the effect that an object or obstruction in a right-of-way has on the 
ordinary use of the roadway when determining the existence of duties owed to 
motorists.  See, e.g., Turner v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 118 Ohio St.3d 215, 2008-Ohio-
2010, 887 N.E.2d 1158; Link v. FirstEnergy Corp., 147 Ohio St.3d 285, 2016-Ohio-
5083, 64 N.E.3d 965. 
{¶ 23} Akin to the facts here, Turner involved a motorist’s off-road 
collision with a stationary, man-made object in the right-of-way.  In Turner, an 
automobile passenger died when the driver inadvertently drove off the road in 
darkness and fog and struck a utility pole located in a grassy portion of the right-
of-way.  The administrator of the passenger’s estate sued the utility companies for 
negligently placing, maintaining, and using the utility pole in such close proximity 
to the road.  This court held that the trial court properly granted summary judgment 
in favor of the utility companies on the plaintiff’s negligence claim. 
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{¶ 24} Although Turner involved the duty of public utilities vis-à-vis the 
placement of a utility pole, we noted that our holding in that case was consistent 
with “the approach that we have taken regarding liability of political subdivisions 
and private landowners for injuries caused by objects within the right-of-way of the 
road,” id. at ¶ 22, citing Strunk v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 6 Ohio St.3d 429, 
453 N.E.2d 604 (1983), and Manufacturer’s, 63 Ohio St.3d 318, 587 N.E.2d 819.  
We reiterated that the focus, with respect to the duties owed to motorists by political 
subdivisions and by private landowners or occupiers, is not on the location of an 
off-road object but on whether that object “makes the roadway unsafe for the usual 
and ordinary course of travel.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id.  And we held that “when a 
vehicle collides with a utility pole located off the improved portion of the roadway 
but within the right-of-way, a public utility is not liable, as a matter of law, if the 
utility has obtained any necessary permission to install the pole and the pole does 
not interfere with the usual and ordinary course of travel.”  Id. at ¶ 21.  See also 
Link at ¶ 39 (“Absent evidence of interference with the usual and ordinary course 
of travel on the roadway, [the utility companies] did not have a duty to remove off-
road objects within the public right-of-way that might come in contact with 
wayward vehicles”). 
{¶ 25} Recognizing that “a motorist is not free to drive on the right-of-way 
as he or she pleases,” Turner, 118 Ohio St.3d 215, 2008-Ohio-2010, 887 N.E.2d 
1158, at ¶ 17, we reasoned that the off-road utility pole did not interfere with the 
public’s use of the road, because “a motorist properly using the usual and ordinary 
course of travel would not come into contact with” it, id. at ¶ 26.  In reaching this 
decision, we cited with approval Ramby v. Ping, 2d Dist. Greene No. 93-CA-52, 
1994 WL 124829 (Apr. 13, 1994), in which the Second District Court of Appeals 
“declined to extend Manufacturer’s to impose a duty on adjacent landowners and 
municipalities to keep a right-of-way free of objects that pose a danger to vehicles 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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that may foreseeably leave the traveled portion of the roadway.”  Turner at ¶ 23.  
We also quoted the Second District’s rationale: 
 
“No precedent exists for imposing a duty on public or private 
landowners to remove an off-road hazard that renders only off-road 
travel unsafe, unless the off-road travel is shown to be an aspect of 
the usual and ordinary course of travel on the roadway.  Otherwise, 
every tree and solid fixed object on roadsides and road-shoulders 
would impose potential liability on public and private landowners 
for collisions occurring whenever a vehicle was driven off-road and 
into the object.” 
 
Turner at ¶ 23, quoting Ramby at *3.  See also Floering v. Roller, 6th Dist. Wood 
No. WD-02-076, 2003-Ohio-5679, ¶ 18 (landowner owed no duty to motorist who 
struck a tree in the right-of-way, because the tree did not obstruct the motorist’s 
vision and could “only be a hazard when a vehicle leaves the highway”). 
{¶ 26} Here, the Burrs’ mailbox did not render ordinary travel on the 
regularly traveled portion of Young Road unsafe.  To the extent the mailbox 
presented a hazard to motorists, it did so only with respect to those motorists who 
errantly left the road. 
C. An adjacent landowner or occupier of land adjacent to a public road 
does not owe a duty of care to motorists with respect to a hazard  
in the right-of-way that does not affect the safety  
of the ordinary course of travel on the road 
{¶ 27} Despite this court’s consistent holdings that an adjacent landowner 
or an occupier of land adjacent to a public road owes no duty to motorists regarding 
an off-road hazard that does not affect the safety of ordinary on-road travel, the 
Snays encourage us to recognize an exception to that rule.  They argue that Burr’s 
January Term, 2021 
 
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“unreasonably dangerous construction” of his mailbox, with knowledge that the 
construction was inconsistent with the nonbinding guidelines published by the 
United States Postal Service, gave rise to a duty of care to motorists who might 
foreseeably leave the road and strike the mailbox. 
{¶ 28} As support for their proposed exception, the Snays cite a footnote 
from Ramby.  After the Second District determined in Ramby that the city of 
Beavercreek did not have a duty to remove an off-road hazard that rendered only 
off-road travel unsafe, 2d Dist. Greene No. 93-CA-52, 1994 WL 124829 at *3, the 
appellate court stated that the plaintiff had identified no authority for subjecting the 
adjacent landowner to a greater duty to maintain the right-of-way free from 
nuisance than that imposed upon the city to which the right-of-way had been 
dedicated, id. at *5.  In a footnote, however, the court noted: “The only distinction 
we can envision would be if the owner of the adjacent property had actual or 
constructive knowledge of the nuisance, while the municipality had no such 
notice.”  Id. at fn. 2. 
{¶ 29} The Snays’ reliance on the Ramby footnote is unwarranted.  First, 
the footnote was dicta and therefore had no bearing on the legal holding in that case.  
Indeed, the footnote itself also states, “Notice is not an issue in the case before us.”  
Id.  Second, as far as we can discern, no Ohio appellate court has applied the 
exception that the Second District “envisione[d]” in the footnote.3  Finally, we 
reject the Snays’ characterization of the Ramby footnote as articulating an exception 
to the settled rule regarding an adjacent landowner’s duty to a motorist with respect 
to an object in the right-of-way. 
 
3.  The Sixth District has cited Ramby for the proposition that “there is no authority for imposing a 
greater duty on the adjacent landowner to remove an off-the-road hazard that did not affect travel 
upon the highway unless the landowner had actual or constructive knowledge of the danger posed 
to travelers on the highway.”  Floering, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-02-076, 2003-Ohio-5679, at ¶ 19.  
But as in Ramby, knowledge was not at issue in Floering. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 30} The footnote in Ramby focuses on knowledge of a nuisance, which 
we have defined in this context as an object or condition that renders a road unsafe 
for the usual and ordinary course of on-road travel.  See Manufacturer’s, 63 Ohio 
St.3d at 322, 587 N.E.2d 819; Strunk, 6 Ohio St.3d at 430, 453 N.E.2d 604.  The 
Second District recognized as much in its discussion of the city’s duty in Ramby.  
See id. at *3.  Although knowledge might affect exposure to liability, it is irrelevant 
to whether an object or condition constitutes a nuisance.  See Harp v. Cleveland 
Hts., 87 Ohio St.3d 506, 512, 721 N.E.2d 1020 (2000) (unsound tree limb that fell 
from the city’s adjacent property onto a motorist’s vehicle traveling along a public 
road, killing the driver, constituted a nuisance, but city’s liability was contingent 
upon its having actual or constructive knowledge of the nuisance).  If an adjacent 
landowner or occupier of land adjacent to the road has knowledge of a nuisance—
a condition that jeopardizes the safety of traffic on the ordinarily traveled portion 
of the road—in the right-of-way, while the political subdivision to which the right-
of-way was dedicated does not, the landowner or occupier might be liable for 
negligence even if the political subdivision may not.  But in any case, first there 
must be a condition or obstruction that jeopardizes the safety of traffic on the 
ordinarily traveled portion of the road. 
{¶ 31} The Snays also argue that their proposed exception to the general 
rule is consistent with 2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 368, at 268 
(1965), which states: 
 
A possessor of land who creates or permits to remain thereon 
an excavation or other artificial condition so near an existing 
highway that he realizes or should realize that it involves an 
unreasonable risk to others accidentally brought into contact with 
such condition while traveling with reasonable care upon the 
January Term, 2021 
 
15 
highway, is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to 
persons who 
(a) are traveling on the highway, or  
(b) foreseeably deviate from it in the ordinary course of 
travel. 
 
{¶ 32} This court has not previously adopted that Restatement section, and 
we decline to do so now, in part because we do not read Section 368 as imposing a 
duty on the Burrs under the facts of this case. 
{¶ 33} Section 368 refers to a landowner’s or occupier’s knowledge that an 
artificial condition “involves an unreasonable risk to others accidentally brought 
into contact with [it] while traveling with reasonable care upon the highway.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Id.  As we have already determined, the Burrs’ mailbox did not 
involve a risk of harm to ordinary travel on Young Road. 
{¶ 34} Comment e to Section 368 states that to the extent the Restatement 
section protects motorists who leave the regularly traveled portion of the road, it 
applies only “to those who reasonably and expectably deviate from the highway 
and enter upon the abutting land in the ordinary course of travel.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Section 368 distinguishes between deviations “which are normal incidents 
of travel and those which are not.”  Id. at Comment g.  Many courts that have 
adopted Section 368 have rejected the notion that a negligent deviation from the 
regularly traveled portion of a road is a normal incident of travel that must be 
foreseen and guarded against.  See, e.g., Bergen v. Texas-New Mexico Power Co., 
130 S.W.3d 379, 381 (Tex.App.2004) (deviation from the road following a tire 
blowout was not in the ordinary course of travel); Soares ex rel. Estate of Soares v. 
George A. Tomasso Constr. Corp., 66 Conn.App. 466, 469-474, 784 A.2d 1041 
(2001) (drunk driver’s deviation from the road was not in the ordinary course of 
travel); McAllen v. De La Garza, 898 S.W.2d 809, 809-812 (Tex.1995) (intoxicated 
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driver who fell asleep and veered off the road “was not travelling with reasonable 
care upon the highway nor was his deviation in the ordinary course of travel”); 
Kavanaugh v. Midwest Club, Inc., 164 Ill.App.3d 213, 517 N.E.2d 656 (1987) (no 
duty owed to driver who deviated from the highway during an epileptic seizure and 
drove into a retention pond).  In Kavenaugh, the court stated that for a duty to attach, 
there must be “facts that demonstrate that the condition of the roadway is such that 
a vehicle is likely to deviate from it in the ordinary course of travel and come in 
contact with the artificial condition.”  Id. at 218. 
{¶ 35} The Sixth District’s opinion in Swaisgood v. Puder, 6th Dist. Erie 
No. E-06-033, 2007-Ohio-307, offers an example of a deviation from the regularly 
traveled portion of a road that was part of the ordinary course of travel.  There, a 
tractor-trailer collided with an off-road utility pole located at an intersection 
adjacent to a truck stop.  The Sixth District acknowledged that a utility company 
may not place its poles within a right-of-way in a manner that will unreasonably 
interfere with the public’s reasonable and ordinary use of the road for travel.  Id. at 
¶ 19.  The plaintiff in Swaisgood presented expert testimony that the lack of 
effective clearance for large vehicles (like those that regularly used the truck stop) 
forced those vehicles to either encroach into adjacent lanes of traffic or to travel on 
the unpaved area of the right-of-way where the utility pole was located.  Id. at ¶ 22-
23.  The expert testified that the utility pole, although located off the road itself, 
was “ ‘within the area that large vehicles would typically travel.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 23.  In 
reversing the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the utility 
company, the court of appeals held that the utility pole was located in the unpaved 
path “regularly traversed by non-errant vehicles.”  Id. at ¶ 23, 35. 
{¶ 36} Unlike in Swaisgood, in this case there is no suggestion that the 
right-of-way beyond the paved portion of Young Road was typically used for 
ordinary travel on the road.  To the contrary, Snay testified that he had traveled on 
Young Road without incident and without leaving the regularly traveled portion of 
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17 
the road on his route to and from work for five years.  A vehicle traveling ordinarily 
and with due care on the road would not come in contact with the Burrs’ mailbox. 
{¶ 37} A deviation by a motorist who careens off the road after hitting a 
patch of black ice is neither expected nor a normal incident of travel.  The motorist 
is responsible for keeping his vehicle under control and on the appropriate side of 
the road, regardless of weather conditions.  Oechsle v. Hart, 12 Ohio St.2d 29, 34, 
231 N.E.2d 306 (1967).  “Skidding upon wet or icy roadway pavement,” as Snay 
did here, “is a circumstance within the power of motorists to prevent.”  Id.  And 
adjacent landowners, like the Burrs, are entitled to presume that motorists will 
observe the law and exercise ordinary care.  See Swoboda v. Brown, 129 Ohio St. 
512, 524, 196 N.E. 274 (1935). 
{¶ 38} The Burrs’ mailbox did not affect the safety of ordinary travel on the 
regularly traveled portion of Young Road.  And Burr’s knowledge that the 
mailbox’s construction was inconsistent with nonbinding postal-service guidelines 
does not warrant a departure from the general rule that the duty to motorists owed 
by an adjacent landowner or an occupier of land adjacent to the road extends only 
to conditions in the right-of-way that render ordinary travel on the regularly 
traveled portion of the road unsafe.  This is true even though there existed the 
possibility that a vehicle might negligently veer off the regularly traveled portion 
of the road and hit the mailbox. 
III. Conclusion  
{¶ 39} Because the Burrs’ mailbox did not present a hazard to ordinary 
travel on the regularly traveled portion of the road and because Snay’s deviation 
from the regularly traveled portion of the road did not constitute a normal incident 
of ordinary travel, we conclude that the Burrs did not owe a duty of care to Snay 
with respect to their mailbox.  And because there can be no liability in negligence 
without a duty of care, we affirm the judgment of the Sixth District Court of 
Appeals. 
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Judgment affirmed. 
KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
DONNELLY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by BRUNNER, J. 
_________________ 
DONNELLY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 40} This case was decided on summary judgment, which requires a 
showing “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and * * * that 
reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to 
the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made.”  Civ.R. 56(C); 
Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66, 375 N.E.2d 46 
(1978).  One aspect of deciding a case on summary judgment that has always 
concerned me is relevant here: the presence of a cogent, well-reasoned dissent.  In 
this case, one of the three judges sitting on the court of appeals dissented.  Doesn’t 
that establish that reasonable minds cannot come to but one conclusion?  And 
doesn’t the mere existence of this dissent prove that reasonable minds cannot come 
to but one conclusion—especially if another justice joins it? 
{¶ 41} In this tragic case, appellant Cletus Snay drove over a patch of ice, 
veered off the road, and struck a mailbox, which caused his pickup truck to flip.  
The injuries he suffered rendered him a quadriplegic.  The issue before us is 
whether this accident and the resulting injuries were sufficiently foreseeable such 
that whether the landowner owed Snay a duty of care is a question for the jury. 
{¶ 42} Appellee Matthew Burr constructed a mailbox in the right-of-way, 
which the majority opinion described as “land * * * devoted to transportation 
purposes.”  Majority opinion, ¶ 6, fn 1.  The supporting metal pipe for Burr’s 
mailbox was eight inches in diameter; the guidelines that Burr obtained from his 
local post office recommend not exceeding two inches in diameter.  This eight-
inch-diameter pipe was buried at least 36 inches deep; the guidelines recommend 
that the pipe be buried no more than 24 inches deep.  Finally, Burr poured concrete 
January Term, 2021 
 
19 
mix into the area around the pipe “with the understanding that if it rained and the 
concrete mix was still good, it ‘might set up’ and hold the support in place ‘a little 
stiffer.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 7, quoting Burr’s testimony.  In short, as the majority 
acknowledges, despite Burr’s understanding that the guidelines “were likely 
intended to promote traffic safety,” he intentionally exceeded the guidelines in an 
effort to “deter vandals.”  Id. at ¶ 7. 
{¶ 43} The guidelines are designed to ensure that a mailbox will “lay over” 
when struck.  By exceeding them, Burr constructed a mailbox so strong that when 
struck by Snay’s pickup truck, the truck rolled over instead of the mailbox laying 
over.  In my opinion, these facts could justify a jury’s concluding that Burr owed a 
duty of care to Snay. 
{¶ 44} The trial court, the court of appeals, and this court have concluded 
that Burr owed no duty to the Snays.  Those conclusions are inconsistent with this 
court’s holding in Manufacturer’s Natl. Bank of Detroit v. Erie Cty. Rd. Comm., 63 
Ohio St.3d 318, 587 N.E.2d 819 (1992).  In that case, we stated that “[w]here an 
abutting landowner or occupier uses the highway right-of-way in a manner 
inconsistent with a highway purpose, and where such usage constitutes an 
unreasonable hazard to users of the highway, the landowner or occupier may be 
liable for damages proximately caused by the improper use of the right-of-way.”  
Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.  The court was unanimous with regard to the 
duty of landowners and occupiers to the users of highways, and the only concern 
raised by a justice who dissented in part related to how the holding might affect the 
liability of political subdivisions.  Id. at 324 (Moyer, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  Manufacturer’s clearly stands for the proposition that 
landowners can be held to owe a duty of care to motorists based on creating an 
“unreasonable” hazard in the right-of-way. 
{¶ 45} It does not take great imagination to see how the facts of this case 
could give rise to a duty of care on the part of Burr.  He is the abutting landowner.  
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20 
He constructed a mailbox in the right-of-way, which could be deemed inconsistent 
with a highway purpose.  The mailbox he constructed was essentially an immovable 
object designed to deter vandals.  His purpose in constructing the mailbox was not 
related to transportation and could be deemed an improper use of the right-of-way.  
An immovable object in the right-of-way could be deemed an unreasonable hazard. 
{¶ 46} It is quite clear that Burr did not build an ordinary mailbox: he 
consciously constructed a mini fortress to protect his mailbox.  The Snays 
essentially argue that after doing so, Burr is not entitled to assert that the mailbox’s 
causing harm was unforeseeable and therefore he owes no duty to the public.  I 
agree.  The intentional construction of an immovable object in the right-of-way 
raises an issue of foreseeability.  For this reason alone, summary judgment was 
improper. 
{¶ 47} Moreover, the Snays presented testimony from an accident 
reconstructionist that the mailbox caused Snay’s truck to roll over and that an 
ordinary, unreinforced mailbox would not have done so.  Burr presented evidence 
that his mailbox did not cause the truck to roll over.  This contested fact should be 
resolved by a jury. 
{¶ 48} Finally, the public policy of this state that relates to foreseeability 
and whether a duty of care is owed ought not to condone the construction of 
virtually indestructible mailboxes in the right-of-way.  I am concerned that some 
might read the majority opinion as sanctioning the construction of mailboxes that 
are even stronger and more likely to cause harm than Burr’s, without regard to 
foreseeable consequences.  That slippery slope may result in death the next time a 
driver inadvertently veers off the road and strikes an intentionally indestructible 
mailbox. 
{¶ 49} The Snays may or may not be able to prove their case, but they 
should have the opportunity to try.  There are issues of material fact that are 
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21 
disputed.  It is obvious that reasonable minds cannot come to but one conclusion 
about this case.  Summary judgment was improper.  I dissent. 
BRUNNER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
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Nurenberg, Paris, Heller, & McCarthy Co., L.P.A., Kathleen J. St. John, 
Jamie R. Lebovitz, Jeffrey M. Heller, and Brian W. Parker, for appellants. 
Hanna, Campbell & Powell, L.L.P., Douglas G. Leak, Kenneth A. 
Calderone, and Anne M. Markowski, for appellees. 
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