Case Title: Roskelly v. Lamone

Citation: 396 Md. 27

Docket Number: 141/05

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2006-12-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Roskelly, et al.  v.  Lamone, et al. - No. 141, September Term 2005.  Opinion by Bell, C.J.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – REFERENDUM – JUDICIAL REVIEW
A submission containing more than one third, but less than all, of the full number of
signatures necessary to complete a referendum petition, submitted to the Secretary of State
before June 1 for the purpose of extending the time for filing the signatures to complete the
referendum petition within the meaning and contemplation of the Election Law Article, is
still a petition.  Accordingly, the State Board Administrator is required to make a validity
determination of that petition, and judicial review must be sought within ten days as outlined
by statute.   
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 141
September Term, 2005
_____________________________________
THOMAS ROSKELLY, ET AL.
v.
LINDA H. LAMONE, ET AL.
_____________________________________
Bell, C.J.
          Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
______________________________________
Filed:   December 11, 2006
1MD CONST. art. II, § 17(d) provides:
“(d) Any Bill vetoed by the Governor shall be returned to the House in which it
originated immediately after the House has organized at the next regular or special
session of the General Assembly. The Bill may then be reconsidered according to
the procedure specified in this section. Any Bill enacted over the veto of the
Governor, or any Bill which shall become law as the result of the failure of the
Governor to act within the time specified, shall take effect 30 days after the
Governor's veto is over-ridden, or on the date specified in the Bill, whichever is
later. If the Bill is an emergency measure, it shall take effect when enacted. No
such vetoed Bill shall be returned to the Legislature when a new General Assembly
of Maryland has been elected and sworn since the passage of the vetoed Bill.”
This case involves the early voting legislation enacted by the Maryland General
Assembly.  Senate Bill 478, passed by the General Assembly two days before the end of the
2005 legislative session, ultimately became Chapter 5, Laws of Maryland 2006, and was
codified as a new § 10-301.1 of the Election Law Article, Maryland Code (2003, 2006 Cum.
Supp.).  It provided for early voting, eight hours each day for a five-day period beginning the
Tuesday before a primary or general election through the Saturday before the election, at
early voting sites, which each local board of elections was required to establish in its
jurisdiction.   Passed by both the Senate and the House of Delegates on April 9, 2005, SB 478
was vetoed by the Governor on May 20, 2005.  The Governor’s veto was overridden by both
houses on January 16, 2006.   Thus, pursuant to Article II, § 17(d) of the Maryland
Constitution,1 SB 478 became law on February 16, 2006.
A second piece of legislation, House Bill 1368, also related to early voting, was
introduced and enacted, as emergency legislation, during the 2006 legislative session.  That
bill, which became Chapter 61, Laws of Maryland 2006, repealed and reenacted with
amendments the new, recently passed § 10-301.1 of the Election Law Article.  As amended,
2In all but the largest counties, Charles County, and Baltimore City, the statute prescribed
that the early voting locations would be in the county seat, without specifying the exact
location.
3In Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Harford, Howard, Montgomery and Prince George’s
Counties and Baltimore City, HB 1368 designated the specific early voting locations to be
used.   In Charles County, it specified that the early voting location would be in Waldorf.
4MD CONST. art. XVI, § 1 provides:
“(a) The people reserve to themselves power known as The Referendum, by
petition to have submitted to the registered voters of the State, to approve or
reject at the polls, any Act, or part of any Act of the General Assembly, if
approved by the Governor, or, if passed by the General Assembly over the
veto of the Governor;
“(b) The provisions of this Article shall be self-executing; provided that
additional legislation in furtherance thereof and not in conflict therewith
may be enacted.” 
5Maryland Code (2003, 2006 Cum. Supp.) § 6-202 of the Elections Law Article permits
petition sponsors to obtain from the State Administrator an advance determination of the
sufficiency of the format of the petition.   It provides:
2
§ 10-301.1 altered early voting as prescribed by SB 478, by extending the hours of early
voting from eight hours daily to eleven hours and specified, either generally2 or with
particularity,3 where early voting would take place in each county and the City of Baltimore.
HB 1368 was passed on March 29, 2006, and vetoed by the Governor on April 7, 2006.  Both
houses overrode the veto on April 10, 2006, and, again, pursuant to Article II, § 17(d) of the
Maryland Constitution, HB 1368 became law.
On April 19, 2006, Marylanders for Fair Elections, Inc. (“MFFE”) and its chairman,
Thomas Roskelly (“Roskelly”), collectively “the appellants,” initiated the referral process
provided for in Article XVI of the Maryland Constitution4 by requesting an advance
determination5 of the summaries of SB 478 and HB 1368 they proposed for placement on the
“(a) In General. - The format of the petition prepared by a sponsor may be
submitted to the chief election official of the appropriate election authority,
in advance of filing the petition, for a determination of its sufficiency.
“(b) Advice of legal authority. - In making the determination, the chief
election official may seek the advice of the legal authority.”
“Chief election official” is defined “... as to the State Board, the State Administrator; or ...
as to a local board, the election director.” 
6 In that opinion, Attorney General Burch concluded that when the General Assembly
repeals or amends a referred bill in good faith, the referendum concerning the original
legislation should be removed from the ballot.  
3
signature pages of the referendum petition.  On April 25, 2006, the Attorney General wrote
Linda Lamone (“Lamone”), the State Administrator of the Maryland State Board of Elections
(“the Board”), copying Roskelly, regarding the “Summaries of SB 478 and HB 1368 for
Referendum Petition.”  Having suggested amendments to the summaries of the bills
proposed, and advised Lamone that she was “authorized to approve a summary that is
consistent with this letter,” he addressed “the subject of the advance determination, but that
will relate to whether these bills may ultimately be petitioned for referendum.”  With respect
to that and with reference to prior petition efforts, the Attorney General, citing, and
enclosing, Letter from Assistant Attorney Generals Robert A. Zarnoch and Bonnie A.
Kirkland to Honorable Donald H. Dwyer, Jr. (April 26, 2005) and 62 Opinions of the
Attorney General 405 (1977),6 noted that office’s conclusion “that a petition drive for
referendum must occur immediately after the session of the Legislature at which the bill is
initially passed by the Legislature.”
7Section 3 (b) addresses another scenario, not relevant in this case, where the bill is
passed close to the June 1st effective date.   In those cases, it provides as follows:
“If an Act is passed less than 45 days prior to June 1, it may not become
effective sooner than 31 days after its passage. To bring this Act to
4
Having obtained approval of the summaries to be placed at the top of referendum
petition signature pages, MFFE proceeded to collect the necessary signatures.  Article XVI,
§ 3 (a) of the Maryland Constitution prescribes the threshold requirements for a referendum
petition.   It provides, as relevant:
“(a) The referendum petition against an Act or part of an Act passed by the
General Assembly, shall be sufficient if signed by three percent of the
qualified voters of the State of Maryland, calculated upon the whole number
of votes cast for Governor at the last preceding Gubernatorial election, of
whom not more than half are residents of Baltimore City, or of any one
County. ...” 
Although a law passed by the General Assembly that is not an emergency law ordinarily
“shall take effect [on] the first day of June next after the session at which it may be passed,”
Article XVI, § 2 provides for the delay of the law’s effective date.   This is accomplished “if
before said first day of June there shall have been filed with the Secretary of the State a
petition to refer to a vote of the people any law or any part of a law capable of referendum”
and if the requirements of Article XVI, § 3 (b) have been met.  Section 3 (b) provides, as
relevant:
“(b) If more than one-third, but less than the full number of signatures required
to complete any referendum petition against any law passed by the General
Assembly, be filed with the Secretary of State before the first day of June, the
time for the law to take effect and for filing the remainder of signatures to
complete the petition shall be extended to the thirtieth day of the same month
with like effect.”[7]
referendum, the first one-third of the required number of signatures to a
petition shall be submitted within 30 days after its passage. If the first one-
third of the required number of signatures is submitted to the Secretary of
State within 30 days after its passage, the time for the Act to take effect and
for filing the remainder of the signatures to complete the petition shall be
extended for an additional 30 days.”
(Emphasis added).
8The Board of Elections had recommended that the petitions “be signed by at least 20%
more than the number required, since past experience indicates that a substantial number
of signatures are likely to be invalid,” and that “[i]n jurisdictions where residents move
frequently, the invalidity rate may be higher.”  
9The Maryland State Board of Elections is the other appellee in this case.
10Maryland Code (2003, 2006 Cum. Supp.) § 6-206(c) of the Election Law Article
provides:
5
(Emphasis added).
  On May 31, 2006, MFFE submitted 20,221 signatures in support of its petition to
refer Senate Bill 478, Chapter 5, Laws of Maryland 2006, to the vote of Maryland’s
registered voters.   Although more than the number required to be filed at that time, 17,062,
or 1 percent of the full number of signatures required to complete the referendum petition,
the number of signatures submitted was fewer than the number recommended by the Board
of Elections to be filed.8 
On June 8, 2006, Lamone, one of the appellees,9 wrote Roskelly, concurrently sending
him a facsimile, informing him that, pursuant to Maryland Code (2003, 2006 Cum. Supp.)
§ 6-206 (c) (5) of the Election Law Article,10 MFFE’s “petition relating to Senate Bill 478
“(c) Declaration of deficiency. -  The chief election official shall declare that the
petition is deficient if the chief election official determines that:
“(1) the petition was not timely filed;
“(2) after providing the sponsor an opportunity to correct any clerical errors,
the information provided by the sponsor indicates that the petition does not
satisfy any requirements of law for the number or geographic distribution of
signatures;
“(3) an examination of unverified signatures indicates that the petition does
not satisfy any requirements of law for the number or geographic
distribution of signatures;
“(4) the requirements relating to the form of the petition have not been
satisfied;
“(5) based on the advice of the legal authority:
“(i) the use of a petition for the subject matter of the petition is not
authorized by law; or
“(ii) the petition seeks:
“1. the enactment of a law that would be unconstitutional or
the election or nomination of an individual to an office for
which that individual is not legally qualified to be a candidate;
or
“2. a result that is otherwise prohibited by law; or
“(6) the petition has failed to satisfy some other requirement established by
law.”
6
is deficient and may not be referred to referendum for reasons stated in the enclosed letter
dated June 8 from the Office of the Attorney General.”  The Attorney General’s letter
expanded the rationale set forth in his April 25, 2006 letter.  Specifically, it stated:
“(1)
Senate Bill 478 (2005) may not be referred to referendum at this time
because a referendum effort must occur immediately after the regular session
at which the legislation is initially passed.  Thus, the required signatures
should have been filed no later than June 1, 2005.  In addition, because most
of the provisions of Senate Bill 478 were subsequently amended by House Bill
1368 (2006), those provisions of the bill may not be petitioned to referendum.”
The letter stated further:
7
“An effort to petition a bill to referendum is governed by Article XVI of the
Constitution.  Section 1(a) of Article XVI makes it clear that a bill that
becomes effective over the veto of the Governor may be petitioned to
referendum.[]  However, the Article makes no further reference to a veto or
override and instead addresses petition-gathering in all circumstances and
governing time-frames.
* * *
“[T]here are several possible interpretations of Article XVI as it applies to the
timing of a referendum.  Under one possible reading, MFFE’s filing of
signatures a year after the veto would be timely because petitioners were not
required to do anything unless and until the veto was overridden, which did not
happen until January 17, 2006.
* * *
“Another possible reading of Article XVI is that the General Assembly’s
override of the Governor’s veto triggers a new right to gather signatures until
May 31 (or June 30) of the subsequent year.  In support of such an
interpretation, §3(c) of Article XVI defines passage as ‘any final action’ by
both houses and does not include a veto override in the definition of
enactment.
* * *
“If the Constitution were construed to provide for petition drives to begin after
a veto override, it would likely result in such bills becoming effective for
several months and then suddenly being suspended if the requisite number of
valid signatures were obtained.  In the case of Senate Bill 478, which took
effect on February 16, 2006, or thirty days after the veto override, the
legislation would be suspended on June 1st.  This seems at odds with the
scheme set out in Article XVI.  For example, emergency legislation that has
already become effective is not suspended by the submission of petitions
signed by a relatively small percentage of the electorate; rather such legislation
remains effective until rejected by a majority of voters at the polls.  In addition,
under such a construction of the Constitution, the organizers of a petition drive
would likely have more than double the amount of time that the framers
deemed adequate for gathering signatures for bills that were not vetoed.[]  This
possible interpretation thus appears illogical and contrary to the basic scheme
of Article XVI.
11Maryland Code (2003, 2006 Cum. Supp.) § 6-210(c) of the Election Law Article
provides:
“(c) Verification and counting. - The verification and counting of validated
signatures on a petition shall be completed within 20 days after the filing of the
petition.”
8
“The most sensible interpretation of Article XVI is that MFFE had until May
31 ‘next after the [2005] session’ at which the bill was passed to gather the
first one-third of the signatures.  Such a construction does not double the
signature-gathering period or create the illogical result of legislation taking
effect on February 16, 2006, only to be suspended on June 1, 2006.[]” 
Cognizant that “the timing of the referendum drive in these circumstances is an issue of first
impression,” and, thus, that a court might not agree with his conclusion, the Attorney General
recommended that the local boards of election proceed with the verification of the
referendum signatures “so that the referendum process may continue without interruption in
the event that a court reaches a different conclusion.”
Consistent with that latter advice, and for the reason the Attorney General gave,
Lamone informed Roskelly that the local boards of elections nevertheless would continue to
verify signatures pursuant to § 6-210(c) of the Election Law Article.11  
Subsequently, on June 21, 2006, Lamone once again wrote to Roskelly, again sending
the letter by mail and by facsimile.  In that letter, she reported that the local boards of
elections had completed the validation of the signature pages submitted in connection with
Senate Bill 478, with the result that 16,924 names had been validated and accepted.  As this
was 138 fewer than the number required, as a threshold, to be submitted by May 31, 2006,
12Section 6-210(e)(1) provides:
“Judicial review
“(e)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, any judicial
review of a determination, as provided in § 6-209 of this subtitle, shall be
sought by the 10th day following the determination to which it relates.”
(Emphasis added).
13MFFE’s referendum effort with regard to House Bill 1368, Chapter 61, Laws of
Maryland 2006, was more successful.  On May 31, 2006, Roskelly filed petitions
containing 20,687 signatures of Maryland voters in support of that effort.  Lamone
informed Roskelly by separate letter, dated June 21, that MFFE had submitted enough
signatures for the petition process to continue for House Bill 1368.   
As we have seen, House Bill 1368 was passed as an emergency measure.  Article
XVI, § 2 of the Maryland Constitution provides, as relevant: “An emergency law shall
remain in force notwithstanding such petition, but shall stand repealed thirty days after
having been rejected by a majority of the qualified electors voting thereon.”
9
she further informed Roskelly that the verification process would not continue.   Lamone also
revisited her June 8 letter, calling Roskelly’s attention to its deficiency determination, and
pointing out that it had not been challenged within ten days, as required by § 6-210 (e) (1)
of the Election Law Article.12   She concluded, therefore, that because MFFE had not
challenged her June 8 deficiency determination in a timely fashion, for that reason, as well,
the referendum petition process for Senate Bill 478  would not continue.13
A.
On June 27, 2006, nineteen (19) days after Lamone’s June 8 determination, Roskelly
filed, in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, a Verified Complaint and an Emergency
Motion for Judicial Review.  The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that Lamone’s
deficiency determination was both substantively and procedurally flawed.  
14Maryland Code (2003, 2005 Cum. Supp.) § 6-101(i) of the Election Law Article
provides:
10
 Roskelly rejected the premise of the Lamone deficiency determination - that Article
XVI required the referendum process to be initiated in 2005, in the same year in which the
law to be referred was passed.  He argued, instead, that, because the General Assembly
overrode the Governor’s veto of Senate Bill 478 in 2006, the petition did not have to be filed
in 2005, but could be filed, as it was, in 2006.  Pointing out that “pass” and “passed,” are
defined terms, meaning “any final action upon an Act or part of an Act by both Houses of the
General Assembly,” Article XVI, § 3 (c) (emphasis added), Roskelly notes that “signatures
on a petition for referendum on an Act or part of any Act may be signed at any time after the
Act or part of an Act is passed.” Article XVI, § 3 (d) (emphasis added).   Thus, he continued,
because Senate Bill 478 was “passed,” when the General Assembly overrode the Governor’s
veto, it could still be referred to the registered voters of the State for decision.   This is
consistent, Roskelly maintained, with Article XVI, § 1 (a) of the Maryland Constitution,
which authorizes Maryland citizens “to approve or reject at the polls, any Act, . . . passed by
the General Assembly over the veto of the Governor.” (Emphasis added).  In short, Roskelly
argued that the veto override by the General Assembly constituted an “Act” by the General
Assembly in response to which referendum petitions could be filed.
Next, Roskelly submitted that Lamone’s deficiency determination was untimely as
that determination could only be made once a “petition” had been filed.  Noting that a
“petition,” as defined by § 6-101(i) of the Election Law Article,14 includes “all of the
“(i) ‘Petition’ means all of the associated pages necessary to fulfill the
requirements of a process established by the law by which individuals affix their
signatures as evidence of support for:
“(1) placing the name of an individual, the names of individuals, or a
question on the ballot at any election;
“(2) the creation of a new political party; or
“(3) the appointment of a charter board under Article XI-A, § 1A of the
Maryland Constitution.”
11
associated pages necessary to fulfill the requirements of a process … for: (1) [p]lacing … a
question on the ballot at any election,” he argued that such a determination could not occur
until the “completed petition” was filed.   Because the submission of one-third of the required
signatures contemplated the later submission of the remaining two-thirds, it is clear, he
proffers, that the petition was not completed, nor intended to have been completed, on May
31, 2006.   Indeed, relying on Article XVI, §§ 2 and 3 (b), Roskelly states that completion
could, and necessarily would, have occurred at anytime on or before June 30, 2006.
Accordingly, Roskelly argued, Lamone’s June 8 deficiency determination was “premature”
and the MFFE was not required to seek judicial review within ten days of notice of it.  In
other words, he asserts that Lamone was required to wait until June 30, 2006, before making
any deficiency determination or before verifying signatures.   
15Maryland Code (2003, 2006 Cum. Supp.) § 6-207(a) of the Election Law Article
provides:
“§ 6-207. Verification of signatures
“Generally
“(a) 
“(1) Upon the filing of a petition, and unless it has been declared deficient
under § 6-206 of this subtitle, the staff of the election authority shall
proceed to verify the signatures and count the validated signatures
contained in the petition.
“(2) The purpose of signature verification under paragraph (1) of this
subsection is to ensure that the name of the individual who signed the
petition is listed as a registered voter.”
16Despite arguing that signature verification could not proceed until the complete petition
was filed, that is, until June 30, Roskelly, recognizing the threshold requirement to trigger
a thirty day delay in the effective date of a law sought to be referred, maintained that the
threshold had been met.   Under this argument, because verification could not proceed in
the absence of a completed petition, satisfaction of the threshold requirement must be
based on the raw numbers, without regard to verification.   The fact that the signatures the
appellants submitted exceeded the number of signatures then required to be filed,
however, necessarily reflects Roskelly’s understanding that the referendum would only be
triggered by the requisite number of valid signatures.
Roskelly also complained about the accuracy of the verification or validation of
the first 1 percent of the signatures he submitted.  He maintained that a number of
signatures mailed to the Board inadvertently had been delivered after the May 31, 2006
deadline.  Had those signatures “been delivered by the post office as they should have
been,” Roskelly argued, “an estimated additional 500 signatures in support of a
referendum on Senate Bill 478, more than sufficient to meet the threshold, would have
been submitted by the initial filing deadline of May 31.”
In addition, Roskelly was unhappy with the results obtained when the new
statewide voter registration database, known as “MD Voters,” which he asserted was
prone to mistakes, was used to verify signatures.  He proffered, as an example,
12
For this proposition, Roskelly relied on § 6-207(a) of the Election Law Article,15
which provides that “[u]pon the filing of a petition, and unless it has been declared deficient
under § 6-206 of this subtitle, the staff of the election authority shall proceed to verify the
signatures contained in the petition.”[16]  
Montgomery County, where a cross-check with the legacy database discovered 121 valid
signatures that had been reported as invalid by the “MD Voters” database.   Complaining
that Lamone refused to accept this cross-count, he asked that the local boards of elections
be ordered to recheck all previously invalidated signatures.  
These arguments are pertinent only if Roskelly’s notice argument has merit.  As
we determine that it does not, we need not, and therefore, do not, consider or address
them.    
   
13
Lamone filed an Opposition to the Emergency Motion for Judicial Review.  She
contended that, in addition to having failed to gather the required number of signatures by
May 31, 2006, Roskelly failed to seek judicial review in the ten days following her June 8
determination.   Accordingly, she concluded, he was foreclosed from proceeding with the
referendum petition on Senate Bill 478.  Alternatively, Lamone contended that Senate Bill
478 was not subject to referendum, in any event, because the petition process was neither
initiated nor completed in 2005 and, just as important, by the time of the challenge in 2006,
the non-emergency legislation not only had taken effect, but it had been substantively
amended.   
Following a hearing, on June 30, 2006, the Circuit Court announced its decision. 
Defining the threshold issue to be whether the appellants’ motion for judicial review was
timely filed and, ultimately, whether it was time barred, the court found the motion to have
been untimely filed and, thus, time barred.  
The court rejected what it characterized as the appellants’ essential argument, the
single petition argument, that “the time clock does not start because there has not yet been
filed a petition.”  It was persuaded to do so by the scheme prescribed by the Constitution, that
14
authorized satisfaction of the three percent requirement could take place in two steps, which,
when utilized, required the successful completion of the first as a prerequisite to the viability
and, thus, the validity, of the second.  Further, unless the requisite number of signatures is
submitted timely in the first step, the right to submit the remainder is not engaged, and thus
there simply is then no entitlement to pursue and complete the second. 
The Circuit Court reasoned: 
“it seems to me completely incongruous to consider the document or the
documents that were filed on or before May 31st as being anything less than
or anything other than a petition.  It is not a complete petition, to be sure, but
the language that is in the Constitution makes it quite clear to me at least that
it is a petition nonetheless and that the process that takes place between May
31 and June 30 is the completion of the petition.”
 Having concluded that “the petition process can be a single petition or . . . it can be
fragmented into two installments essentially.  One that’s requiring only a third of the
signatures and then the other requiring the balance,” the court addressed whether the
validation of the signatures was required to proceed as to each petition, seriatim, or to both,
as a whole.  It concluded:
“it would seem to me completely nonsensical to suggest that a process which
has these two components could allow the first component to be a number of
signatures that are not valid and then at the end come in with the valid
signatures.  It’s quite clear that you’ve got to have . . . at least a third of the
signatures and they must be valid signatures.”
Moreover, the Circuit Court concluded that Lamone was required not only to review
the petition, but also to determine its sufficiency and to verify the signatures it contained.
17 Maryland Code (2003, 2006 Cum. Supp.) § 6-206 (a) of the Election Law Article
provides:
“(a) Review by chief election official. -  Promptly upon the filing of a petition with
an election authority, the chief election official of the election authority shall
review the petition.”
18Roskelly contended that, because he was on vacation when the June 8 determination
letter was sent and did not actually receive the letter until he returned from vacation on
June 17, he was not “notified” of the deficiency determination until that day. 
Furthermore, he observed that no one from the Board of Elections attempted to contact
him by telephone, or otherwise, to ascertain whether the deficiency determination letter
had been received.  This denied him the opportunity to investigate Lamone’s letter and
research the applicable law to formulate a challenge, he maintained.  Arguing that this is a
violation of his due process rights, he believes that the ten-day limitation period should
begin on the date of “actual” receipt.   
The Circuit Court rejected this argument, as do we.  First, § 6-210 of the Election
Law Article requires notice; it does not require actual notice.   Nor does it require that the
chief election official ensure receipt of a deficiency determination by a petition sponsor
or, by phone or otherwise, to investigate whether the sponsor has received the
determination.  Section 6-210 provides only that “the chief election official of the election
15
Section 6-206 (a) of the Election Law Article17 requires the chief election official to review
a petition promptly upon its filing with an election authority.  Pursuant to § 6-206 (c), upon
making any of the enumerated findings, see note 9, supra, “the chief election official shall
declare that the petition is deficient.”   Noting that, in this case, Lamone declared the petition
deficient,  “based on the advice of the legal authority,” § 6-206 (c) (5), for being untimely -
it should have been submitted prior to June 1, 2005 - and that, having made that
determination, as it was required to do, and notified the appellants of that fact, the court
determined that the June 8 determination triggered the appellants’ right to judicial review
under § 6-210(e).   When they did not file suit until June 27, more than ten-days after that
determination, the court found that the action was time-barred.18
authority shall notify the sponsor of the determination” and that judicial review “shall be
sought by the 10th day following the determination to which it relates.”  Such a
requirement, as Roskelly suggests, moreover, would place an unreasonable burden on the
election official and, rather than ensure, certainty, it would have the opposite effect.  It
simply is unworkable. 
What Roskelly advocates is not the law in Maryland.  Maryland Rule 7-203(a)
provides: 
“Except as otherwise provided in this Rule or by statute, a petition for judicial
review shall be filed within 30 days after the latest of:
“(1) the date of the order or action of which review is sought;
“(2) the date the administrative agency sent notice of the order or action to
the petitioner, if notice was required by law to be sent to the petitioner; or
“(3) the date the petitioner received notice of the agency's order or action, if
notice was required by law to be received by the petitioner.”
Subsection (a) of this Rule was applied in Kim v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 350
Md. 527, 714 A.2d 176 (1998), a case similar to the case sub judice.   There, the
Maryland Tax Court, acting pursuant to Md. Code (1988, 1997 Repl. Vol.), § 13-529 (c)
of the Tax-General Article, a statute requiring that “[t]he clerk of the Tax Court shall
certify the order in an appeal and mail a copy of the certified order to: (1) each party to
the appeal; and (2) the tax determining agency from which the appeal is taken,” mailed its
order to Kim, rather than serving it on him.  This Court rejected Kim’s argument that, in
so doing, the Tax court erred, holding instead:
“In the instant case, the Tax Court was required by law to send its written
order to Kim and the Comptroller. . . . Therefore, under the statute and Rule
7-203(a)(2), the relevant date governing the timeliness of an action for judicial
review was the date the written order of the Tax Court was filed and mailed to
the parties. . . . Thus, Kim's petition for judicial review should have been filed
within 30 days after [the date of mailing].”
Kim, 350 Md. at 533, 714 A.2d at 178.    
Kim is to be compared with Rockwood Cas. Ins. Co. v. Uninsured Employers'
Fund, 385 Md. 99, 867 A.2d 1026 (2005), which reached a different result under the
statute applicable to that case.  In Rockwood, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
term “serve” implies actual receipt. Rockwood involved application of Maryland Code
(1995, 2003 Repl. Vol.) § 19-406(a) of the Insurance Article, which required that, to
cancel a workers' compensation insurance policy, the insured must “serve[ ] on the
employer, by personal service or registered mail addressed to the last known address of
the employer, a notice of intention to cancel the policy.” Ins. § 19-406(a). The Court of
Appeals determined that cancellation of a policy could be accomplished only by the
insured's actual receipt of the notice.
16
See also Maryland Rule 2-613(c), governing notice of default judgments (stating
that notice is given once it is “mailed to the defendant at the address stated in the request
and to the defendant's attorney of record, if any”); Mardirossian Family Enterprises v.
Clearail, Inc., 324 Md. 191, 198, 596 A.2d 1018, 1022 (1991) (“the inclusion in the
mechanics' lien law of registered mail as an expressly authorized manner of giving notice
is strongly indicative of a legislative intent that a notice sent by registered mail within the
statutory period complies even though receipt occurs beyond the statutory period.”
(quoting Riley v. Abrams, 287 Md. 348, 356, 412 A.2d 996, 1000 (1980) (footnote
omitted))); First American Bank v. Shivers, 97 Md. App. 405, 422, 629 A.2d 1334, 1343
(1993) (holding that a bank's failure to notify objecting shareholder of effective date of
approved merger with another bank by required method of delivering notice personally or
mailing it by certified mail, return receipt requested, rendered given notice ineffective,
notwithstanding shareholder's alleged lack of diligence resulting in his failure to receive
actual notice until after running of statutory period within which to receive fair market
value of his shares).
17
The appellants noted an appeal to this Court and concurrently filed a petition for  writ
of certiorari, which we granted on July 5, 2006.  We heard argument in the case on July 25,
2006, and issued an order affirming the judgment of the trial court on that same day, with
opinion to follow.  Roskelly v. Lamone, 393 Md. 363, 902 A.2d 1173 (2006).   We now
explain the reasons for our decision.
B.
The people of Maryland reserved to themselves the Referendum - the power, by
petition, to refer an Act, or any part of one, passed by the General Assembly, with
gubernatorial approval, or over the Governor’s veto, to the registered voters of the State, for
their approval or rejection at the polls.  Article XVI, § 1 (a).  A referendum petition is
sufficient, however, only if, prior to the effective date of the Act, it is filed with the Secretary
of State and it contains the signatures of three percent of the qualified voters of the State, as
19 Maryland Code (2003, 2006 Cum. Supp.) § 6-103 of the Election Law Article provides:
“(a)
“(1) The State Board shall adopt regulations, consistent with this title, to
carry out the provisions of this title.
“(2) The regulations shall:
“(i) prescribe the form and content of petitions;
“(ii) specify procedures for the circulation of petitions for signatures;
“(iii) specify procedures for the verification and counting of
signatures; and 
“(iv) provide any other procedural or technical requirements that the
State Board considers appropriate.
“Guidelines, instructions, and forms
“(b)
“(1) The State Board shall:
“(i) prepare guidelines and instructions relating to the petition
process; and
“(ii) design and arrange to have printed sample forms conforming to
this subtitle for each purpose for which a petition is authorized by
18
defined in the Constitution.  Article XVI, §§ 2 and 3 (a).  When the effective date of an Act
of the General Assembly is, as this one was, the usual effective date, the petition will be
effective if it contains at least one-third of the required number of signatures, or a number
equivalent to one percent of the qualified voters, and is submitted prior to June 1, and the
balance of the required signatures is submitted prior to June 30.  Article XVI, § 3 (b).   
Although the referendum petition must be filed with the Secretary of State, the State
Board of Elections and the State Administrator of Elections, by statute, see Maryland Code
(2003, 2006 Cum. Supp.) Title 6 of the Election Law Article (“EL”), have been given
significant responsibilities in the referendum process.   The State Board is required to adopt
regulations and prepare guidelines and instructions relating to the petition process, EL § 6-
103,19 and receive, from the Secretary of State, the referendum petitions filed in that office,
law.
“(2) the guidelines, instructions, and forms shall be provided to the public,
on request, without charge.”
20 Maryland Code (2003, 2006 Cum. Supp.) § 6-205 of the Election Law Article provides,
as relevant:
“If the Maryland Constitution provides that a petition shall be filed with the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of State shall deliver the petition to the State
Board within 24 hours.”
19
which the Secretary of State is required to deliver within 24 hours. EL § 6-205 (a) (2).20
Upon the receipt by the State Board of a petition, the State Administrator promptly
must review it. EL § 6-205 (a).  In addition to any advance determinations authorized by EL
§ 6-202, the State Administrator is required to make appropriate determinations, i.e., that the
petition is deficient, EL § 6-206 (c), that it is sufficient as to all matters other than the validity
of the signatures, EL § 6-206 (b) (1), or that the sufficiency determination should be deferred
pending further review. EL § 6-206 (b) (2).  Unless the petition has been declared deficient,
the State Administrator’s staff “shall proceed to verify the signatures and count the validated
signatures contained in the petition.” EL § 6-207 (a).   Thereafter,
“At the conclusion of the verification and counting processes, the [State
Administrator] shall:
“(1) determine whether the validated signatures contained in the petition are
sufficient to satisfy all requirements established by law relating to the number
and geographical distribution of signatures; and
“(2) if it has not done so previously, determine whether the petition has
satisfied all other requirements established by law for that petition and
immediately notify the sponsor of that determination, including any specific
deficiencies found.”
21 Of course, the State Administrator also must certify the successful completion of the
petition process if the petition has satisfied the lawful requirements. EL § 6-208 (b).
22 Because the petition in this case is a statewide petition and refers to an enactment of the
General Assembly pursuant to Article XVI of the Constitution, the petition is required to
be filed, as it was in this case, in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.  EL § 6-209
(a) (1) (ii).
20
EL § 6-208 (a).21  The process of verifying and counting the validated signatures “shall be
completed within 20 days after the filing of the petition,” EL § 6-210 (c), and certification
of the outcome shall occur within two business days of completion of the verification and
counting process, or, if judicial review is pending, within 2 business days after a final judicial
decision.  EL § 6-210 (d). 
A person aggrieved by the State Administrator’s determination either as to sufficiency
of the petition or the number of signatures “may seek judicial review.”  See § 6-209 (a) (1)
(referencing EL §§ 6-206 and 6-208 (a) (2)). 22  A petition for judicial review of such a
determination, however, “shall be sought by the 10th day following the determination to
which it relates.  EL § 6-210 (e) (1).
In her letter to Roskelly, dated June 8, 2006, Lamone advised the appellants:
“Pursuant to Maryland Code Election Law Article Section 6-206 (c) (5), I have
determined that the petition relating to Senate Bill 478 is deficient and may not
be referred to referendum for the reasons stated in the enclosed letter dated
June 8 from the Office of the Attorney General.”
This determination was indeed consistent with the advice the Attorney General
previously had given Lamone on April 25, 2006, that “a petition drive for referendum must
21
occur immediately after the session of the Legislature at which the bill is initially passed by
the Legislature,” and that the repeal or amendment of a referred bill, in good faith, voided
the referendum process and required removal of the issue from the ballot.  And it was what
she was required by law to do.   As we have seen, EL § 6-206 requires the chief election
official to make appropriate determinations with respect to the referendum petition’s
sufficiency or deficiency.  Under subsection (c) (5) (i), the chief election official shall declare
the petition deficient, if she determines, “based on the advice of the legal authority: the use
of the subject matter of the petition is not authorized by law.”
In her letter to Roskelly dated June 21, 2006, Lamone informed the appellants of yet
another deficiency in their petition, this one being their failure to file the requisite number
of signatures to engage the referral process.   Specifically, she advised the appellants, as
required by § 6-208 (a) (1), that the number of validated signatures they submitted on May
31 was not “sufficient to satisfy all requirements established by law relating to the number
… of signatures,” they did not amount to one-third of the full number of signatures needed
to complete the referendum petition, and, thus, that the time for filing the signatures
necessary to complete the petition was not extended.    
It is undisputed that the appellants did not seek judicial review within ten days of the
mailing of the June 8 letter - the appellants filed their verified complaint and emergency
motion for judicial review on June 27, 2006, eight days beyond that time period, but within
ten days of Lamone’s June 21 letter.  If, as Lamone maintains and the trial court found, the
June 8 letter contained a determination by Lamone, that determination was properly and
23 Roskelly’s argument in this regard proceeds largely on his interpretation of certain
provisions of the Election Law Article, e.g. §§ 6-101 (i), see note 12, supra; 6-201(a) (stating
that “[a] petition shall contain: (1) [a]n information page; and (2) [s]ignature pages
containing not less than the total number of signatures required by law to be filed”), as
referring only to the final deadline in the referendum process.  We do not agree.  In any event
and more important, it is the Constitutional provisions that control.  Statutes enacted in
supplementation and aid of the Constitutional provisions, do not trump those provisions, and
we have said as much in the past.  See In re Legislative Districting of the State, 370 Md. 312,
373, 805 A.2d 292, 328 (2002) (noting that accepting a “rational goal” as a basis for avoiding
a clear requirement under a section of the Maryland Constitution is to allow a constitutional
mandate to be overridden by a non-constitutional one, and that to interpret a constitutional
provision as to subjugate it or any of its component constitutional requirements to lesser
principles and non-constitutional considerations or factors would be to amend the
constitution without the involvement of the most critical players: the State's citizens).  See
also In re Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. 574, 629 A.2d 646 (1993) (Eldridge, J.,
dissenting) (finding it impermissible to subjugate constitutional mandates to lesser
principles). 
22
timely made and mailed to the appellants, the appellants sought judicial review too late and
we must affirm the trial court’s dismissal of their action, notwithstanding the timeliness of
the action with respect to signature count and validation.
The appellants renew in this Court the argument they advanced in the Circuit Court,
that the determination by the State Administrator in the June 8 letter was premature since
their May 31 submission, because it was not complete, i.e. did not contain the full number
of the required signatures and contemplated a subsequent filing, was not the petition.23
Proceeding from that premise, they further argue that the signature validation process also
was premature – until the complete petition is filed, they maintain, neither a determination
as to the sufficiency or deficiency of the incomplete petition nor the sufficiency of the
number of signatures it contains is appropriate.  
23
As did the Circuit Court, we reject the appellants’ arguments.   We note at the outset,
whether correct or not, an issue that we need not decide here; Lamone advised the appellants,
consistent with her counsel’s advice, that their attempt to refer Senate Bill 478 to referendum
was untimely, as the petition was not filed in the year it was passed.   That was a
determination of deficiency she was required by § 2-206 (c) (5) to make.   The appellants did
not timely respond to this determination by seeking judicial review.  In rejecting the
appellants’ arguments, we are required to construe provisions of the Maryland Constitution,
in particular, Article XVI, §§ 2 and 3.   The principles guiding our task are well settled. 
As early as 1873, this Court recognized that where a “general rule for the construction
of statutes” exists, there “can be no good reason suggested why this same general principle
... should not also apply as a rule of interpretation of the Constitution.” New Central Coal Co.
v. George's Creek Coal and Iron Co., 37 Md. 537, 557 (1873).  We continue to adhere to that
principle.  Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 536-537, 873 A.2d 1122, 1133-35 (2005).
See Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604, 861 A.2d 78, 81 (2004) (“When interpreting
constitutional provisions, we generally employ the same rules of construction that are
applicable to the construction of statutory language.”); Fish Market v. G.A.A., Inc., 337 Md.
1, 8, 650 A.2d 705, 708 (1994); Luppino v. Gray, 336 Md. 194, 204 n. 8, 647 A.2d 429, 434
n. 8 (1994) (“The rules governing the construction of statutes and constitutional provisions
are the same”); Andrews v. Governor of Maryland, 294 Md. 285, 290, 449 A.2d 1144, 1147
(1982) (“in ascertaining the meaning of a constitutional provision, we are governed by the
same rules of interpretation which prevail in relation to a statute”);  Brown v. Brown, 287
24
Md. 273, 277, 412 A.2d 396, 398 (1980) (the same rules that are applicable to construction
of statutory language are employed in interpreting constitutional verbiage); Perkins v.
Eskridge, 278 Md. 619, 639, 366 A.2d 21, 36-37 (1976) (observing that the same rules apply
in constructional construction as apply in statutory construction).    
Thus, to ascertain the mandate of constitutional amendment, the court looks first to
the natural and ordinary signification of the language; if that language is clear and
unambiguous, the court need not look elsewhere.  Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 511, 374 A.2d
900, 902 (1977).   Moreover, 
“we consider the history of the provision, the evils to be remedied, as well as
the objects to be attained by its adoption. The standard we have enunciated for
this purpose is:
 “[C]onstitutions are not to be interpreted according to the words used
in particular clauses. The whole must be considered, with a view to
ascertain the sense in which the words were employed, and its words
must be taken in their ordinary and common acceptation, because they
are presumed to have been so understood by the framers and by the
people who adopted it. . . . It [the Constitution], unlike the Acts of our
legislature, owes its whole force and authority to its ratification by the
people, and they judged of it by the meaning apparent on its face. . . .
[ Manly v. State, 7 Md. 135, 147 (1854).]”
Andrews v. Governor of Maryland, 294 Md. at 290, 449 A.2d at 1147.   See also Comptroller
v. Phillips, 384 Md. 583, 591, 865 A.2d 590, 594 (2005) (“If the plain language . . . is
unambiguous and is consistent with the [enactment’s] apparent purpose, we give effect to the
[enactment] as it is written”).  We will not construe a provision so as to re-draft it under the
guise of construction or so as “to assume an Alice in Wonderland world where words have
no meaning.”  Davis v. State, 294 Md. 370, 378, 451 A.2d 107, 111 (1982), quoting Welsh
25
v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 354, 90 S. Ct. 1792, 1803, 26 L. Ed.2d 308, 326 (1970)
(concurring opinion).  
Moreover, when the meaning of a word or phrase in a constitutional or statutory
provision is perfectly clear, this Court has consistently refused to give that word or phrase
a different meaning on such theories that a different meaning would make the provision more
workable, or more consistent with a litigant's view of good public policy, or that the framers
of the provision did not actually mean what they wrote. See, e.g., Montrose Christian School
v. Walsh, 363 Md. 565, 595, 770 A.2d 111, 129 (2001) (The “phrase ‘to perform purely
religious functions’ clearly does not mean what is suggested. . . . We decline to construe
‘purely’ as if it were ‘primarily’ or ‘some’”); Dodds v. Shamer, 339 Md. 540, 554, 663 A.2d
1318, 1325 (1995) (refusing to construe a statute, specifically applicable to only four named
counties, as applicable to other counties); Mauzy v. Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84, 93, 400 A.2d
1091, 1096 (1979) (refusing to construe the statutory phrase “all professional employees” as
“only certain types of” professional employees); State Farm Mutual v. Insurance
Commissioner, 283 Md. 663, 671, 392 A.2d 1114, 1118 (1978); Wheeler v. State, 281 Md.
593, 598, 380 A.2d 1052, 1054 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 997, 98 S. Ct. 1650, 56 L. Ed.
2d 86 (1978) (“We are not at liberty to bring about a different [constitutionality] result by
inserting or omitting words” in the enactment).
A common sense reading of Article XVI, §§ 2 and 3 leads to the unmistakable
conclusion that a submission containing more than one third, but less than all, of the full
number of signatures necessary to complete a referendum petition, submitted to the Secretary
26
of State before June 1 for the purpose of extending the time for filing the signatures to
complete the referendum petition within the meaning and contemplation of the Election Law
Article, is, indeed, a petition.  Section 2 of Article XVI states, as relevant, that “[n]o law
enacted by the General Assembly shall take effect until the first day of June next after the
session at which it may be passed. . .,”  unless “before said first day of June there shall have
been filed with the Secretary of the State a petition to refer to a vote of the people any law
or part of a law capable of referendum” and the requirements of § 3 (a) and or (b) have been
met, in which case the law sought to be referred “shall be referred by the Secretary of State
to such vote.”   Neither § 3 (a) nor § 3 (b) contradicts § 2 with regard to what must be filed
– “a petition to refer to a vote of the people any law or any part of a law capable of
referendum” - or its timing.   In fact, § 3 (a), addressing its sufficiency, i.e. the number of
signatures needed, refers to “[t]he referendum petition.”    Section 3 (b), on the other hand,
prescribing an alternative to the filing of the full number of signatures by the  deadline set
by § 2 and, therefore, focusing on the number of signatures necessary to be filed to extend
the time for filing additional signatures, refers to the referendum petition in that context. 
Thus, it speaks in terms of “signatures required to complete any referendum petition” and
extending the time for filing “the remainder of signatures to complete the petition.”   
Under §3 (a), a submission, timely filed, purporting to contain the full number of
signatures required to refer a referable law to the voters, would qualify as a petition.   It
would be complete as filed.   On the other hand, pursuant to § 3 (b), not all of the required
signatures need be filed at once.   When the proponent of a referendum files with the
27
Secretary of State, before June 1, the signatures of at least one percent, or more, but less than
three percent, the full number required, of all qualified voters, the time for filing the
remainder of the signatures will be extended to June 30.   To be sure, therefore, a two-step
process for filing signatures to refer a law to referendum is permitted, but not required, by
§ 3 (b).   But the fact that the Constitution recognizes and blesses two related, but
procedurally different, approaches to the referral process does not mean that it also
recognizes two different triggers for that process.  After all, that a proponent of a referendum
is permitted to file the signatures required to engage the process in two increments does not
change the process substantively, only procedurally; the process and the requirements to
engage it remain essentially the same. 
To refer a law to the vote of the people requires, whether done in one step or two, the
filing, before the constitutionally prescribed deadline, of a minimum number of signatures
with the Secretary of State.   Section 2 of Article XVI states explicitly what is to be filed, a
“petition.”  That is true whether the filing is to be a single one or two.  To be successful, both
requirements  - the filing of the petition and the requisite number of signatures before June
1 - must be met.  Although in the case of the two-step process, an additional thirty days, is
afforded for the gathering and filing of the signatures, that additional time is obtainable only
when the  threshold filing of the petition, containing a specified number of signatures, has
timely occurred.   Entitlement to proceed to the second step, in other words, is dependent
upon the sufficiency of the compliance in the first step.   Accordingly, it is clear both from
the clear and ambiguous language of § 2 and the Constitutional scheme as a whole, that the
24 The respondents argue, as we have seen, that the Maryland Constitution does not permit
the referral of a non-emergency law that has already taken effect and/or that has been
amended in a subsequent legislative session and that Roskelly disagrees, contending that
referral is proper, where the final act of passage of the law was the override of the
Governor’s veto and the override occurred in a year subsequent to the bill’s initial
passage.   We need not address this issue in this case.  See, however, Lamone v. Capozzi,
__ Md. __, __ A. 2d __ (2006).  
28
referral process is initiated by the filing of a referendum petition by the June 1 deadline,24
whether that petition contains the minimum number of signatures required to extend that
deadline or the full number required.
Our conclusion that the referral process is triggered by a referendum petition even
when the referendum proponents are proceeding pursuant to § 3 (b) disposes of the
appellants’ arguments.   Thus, because what the appellants filed was a referendum petition,
the State Administrator was required to, as she did, review it, EL § 6-205 (a), with an eye
toward determining its sufficiency or deficiency and making the required determinations. EL
§ 6-206.    To be sure, the State Administrator advised the appellants of her conclusion that
the petition was deficient and she was not required to do more.   Nevertheless, again
following counsel’s advice and aware of the possibility that her deficiency determination
might be rejected by a court, she proceeded to verify the signatures and count the validated
ones.  EL § 6-210.  In addition to the reasons stated, this was done, and was necessary,
precisely because the appellants’ right to file additional signatures was dependent on whether
they had filled the required number prior to the deadline.   Whether a referendum petition
filed pursuant to § 3 (b) is valid is determined by reference to whether it contained, when
29
filed, the required number of valid signatures - more than one-third of the number needed to
complete the petition.  It would be an absurd result if, without a requirement of signature
verification and validation, the deadline for filing the full number of the required signatures
were extended on the basis of a petition containing unsubstantiated and, perhaps, invalid
signatures, which would be subject to validation and verification, along with the
subsequently filed signatures.  To read Article XVI, §§ 2 and 3 and EL § 6-206 in this way
would facilitate, if not encourage, the timely filing of “sham” petitions, solely for the purpose
of extending the deadline to June 30, with the hope of obtaining the requisite signatures
during the extension period.  If the framers had wished to allow this scenario under Article
XVI, they would not have established the June 1 deadline in the first place.  See Yox. V. Tru-
Rol Co., Inc., 380 Md. 326, 337, 844 A.2d 1151, 1157 (2004) (“We do not interpret statutes
in ways that produce absurd results that could never have been intended by the Legislature”).
COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE APPELLANTS.