Case Title: People v. Carter

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94895

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2003-11-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 94895-Agenda 13-September 2003.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 							KINGSLEY L. CARTER,
Appellee.
Opinion filed November 20, 2003.
	 
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Kingsley Carter, was charged with first degree murder
and aggravated battery with a firearm. On January 20, 2000, following a
jury trial in the circuit court of Peoria County, defendant was convicted of
both first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm and
sentenced to a term of 30 years' imprisonment for the offense of first
degree murder. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in not
sua sponte issuing an involuntary manslaughter instruction to the jury, and
reversed and remanded for a new trial. No. 3-00-0512 (unpublished
order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed the State's petition for
leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315), and we now reverse the appellate
court.


BACKGROUND


	The following evidence was adduced at trial. Defendant, 53 years
old, and the victim, Roy Williams, who was over sixty years old, were
next-door neighbors. Defendant believed that between 1995 and 1999 the
victim routinely vandalized his property by "keying" his car, throwing
garbage into his yard, hitting the side of his house with a sledgehammer,
throwing objects onto the roof of his house, and urinating in his basement
through a leaky window.
	Defendant testified that in December 1999 he purchased a shotgun
because he was frightened by the victim's guests. He testified that strange
people gathered at the victim's house and he became concerned when
they hung around the victim's yard and had "loud discussions." Therefore,
he kept the shotgun loaded and hidden in the closet for his safety.
	On April 6, 1999, defendant called the police to report an alleged
incident of vandalism. Defendant told the police that the victim had
"keyed" his car. The police responded to defendant's home to investigate
his complaint, and defendant informed them that he did not actually see the
victim vandalize his property, but that he was certain the victim was
responsible. After speaking with the victim and after examining the car and
discovering no damage beyond normal wear and tear the police
discontinued the investigation.
	On April 16, 1999, defendant finished his lunch and walked outside
to his front yard. It was then that he allegedly observed several holes in the
back window of his car. He drove his car to the police station to report
the damage, and on the way to the police station the window allegedly
shattered. He completed the incident report at approximately 2 o'clock
in the afternoon, and returned home.
	On that same evening, the victim and his wife were at their home
watching television. At approximately 11:15 p.m. the victim decided to go
to the store for a snack. He exited the house through the front door, and
walked to his truck parked on the street in the front of the house.
	Meanwhile, also at 11:15 p.m., defendant decided to retaliate against
the victim by damaging the victim's truck. Defendant testified that he was
angry with the police for failing to promptly respond and investigate his
shattered car window and as a consequence he retrieved a 12-gauge
pump action shotgun, walked outside into his front yard and fired two
shots into the windshield of the victim's truck located 20 feet in the
distance. After the second shot entered the windshield, the door to the
truck flew open and he saw the victim get out of the truck and run into the
street. Defendant followed the victim into the street and fired a third shot
into the air, causing the victim to trip as he ran. Defendant then continued
to walk toward the victim who was by then lying on the ground. Defendant
fired a fourth shot in front of the victim. As the victim attempted to get up
off the ground, defendant fired a fifth shot to the side of the victim.
Defendant then returned to his house and placed the shotgun against the
wall next to the front door.
	The police responded to the 911 call from the victim's wife. At the
scene, the police discovered the victim in his front yard bleeding heavily
from his left leg. Police also observed a late model Oldsmobile with a
broken back window parked in a nearby driveway, and a truck with
gunshot holes to the windshield parked along the curb. The police
recovered three spent shotgun shells, each holding approximately 130
pellets, in defendant's front yard. The police arrested defendant after the
victim identified him as the shooter. The police retrieved a shotgun from
defendant's home and a fourth spent shell casing inside the chamber of the
shotgun.
	The victim died in surgery due to massive hemorrhaging. A forensic
pathologist testified that the victim had approximately 59 shotgun pellet
holes on the back left leg, a few pellet holes on the right leg, six pellet
holes on the mid-back, one pellet hole in the right neck, and one pellet
hole in the lower lip, together totaling 77 wounds.
	At trial, defendant argued that he lacked the intent or knowledge
required to support a murder conviction. Defendant testified that he only
meant to damage the victim's property and that he did not intend to hit or
strike the victim with his gunshots. He stated that it was coincidence the
victim was inside his truck when he decided to shoot out the truck's
windshield. He told the jury that once he realized the victim was inside the
truck after firing the first and second shot, he only meant to frighten the
victim when he continued shooting. Defendant testified that he did not aim
at the victim and that he was not familiar with the scatter of shotgun pellets.
Defendant stated, "I don't feel [the victim's] death was-I don't feel I
contributed to his, I mean, I caused his death solely. I just don't feel that.
I feel something else that happened to [the victim] from the time he got in
the ambulance until they pronounced him dead at the hospital, it was
something else that caused him to die. You don't normally die from being
shot in the leg." Further, defendant presented expert testimony to explain
that he suffered from a delusional disorder that hampered his relationships
with others and blurred reality and fiction.
	The State argued that defendant possessed the intent and knowledge
required to support a murder conviction. The State presented evidence
that defendant served five years in the Air Force and two years in the
Navy to show that he was familiar with guns and their destructive
capabilities. The State urged the jury to disbelieve defendant's assertion
that it was coincidence the victim was inside the truck when he decided to
shoot out the truck's windshield. The State argued that the defendant's
deliberate pulling of the pump handle, reloading of the chamber after firing
shots, and continued shooting at the victim as he fled, fell, and continued
to flee demonstrated the necessary intent and knowledge required for a
murder conviction.
	Following arguments, defense counsel tendered an involuntary
manslaughter instruction to the trial court, and the trial court held
arguments concerning whether the evidence warranted the lesser-offense
instruction. Following a recess to consider the issue, the trial court
discussed with both parties whether it believed the evidence warranted an
involuntary manslaughter instruction. The trial court held that "it would
appear" the evidence warranted an instruction. The trial court then
questioned whether defendant personally wanted the instruction.
However, the trial court called a second recess when defendant informed
the court that he and his counsel did not discuss the giving of an
involuntary manslaughter instruction, nor did defendant understand the
concept of what it meant to give a lesser-offense instruction. The trial court
instructed defense counsel to clarify and discuss the issue with defendant.
	Following a recess, this exchange occurred:
			"THE COURT: Do you have any questions you need to ask
me about your right to have that [the involuntary manslaughter
instruction] included and your right to have it not included?
			THE DEFENDANT: I don't want it included.
			THE COURT: You do not want it included?
			THE DEFENDANT: No, I don't.
			THE COURT: You have discussed that with your
attorney ***?
			THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have.
			THE COURT: [Defense Counsel], anything you wish to state
on the record?
			COUNSEL: Judge, I have spent a great deal of the week
researching this issue and it would be against my advice to-for
[defendant] to make this decision, but I have gone over it with
him and it is his decision and he may very well be right, it's just
against my advice to do so."
The trial court did not instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter, and
the jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and aggravated
battery with a firearm.
	Defense counsel filed a motion to set aside the verdict or for a new
trial. Defense counsel claimed that it was error not to instruct the jury on
involuntary manslaughter and that defendant's mental defect prevented him
from making a rational choice regarding the giving of the instruction. Prior
to hearing oral arguments on the posttrial motion, the trial court allowed
defense counsel to withdraw after defendant complained that he was
dissatisfied with counsel's representation. On June 21, 2000, with new
representation, defendant argued his posttrial motion to the court.
	Defendant testified that he did not recall discussing the involuntary
manslaughter instruction with his attorney, he did not recall discussing the
instruction or receiving admonishments from the trial judge, nor did he
recall opposing the instruction. Defendant's trial counsel also testified in
support of defendant's motion. Defendant's trial counsel testified on direct
examination that he discussed the giving of a lesser-offense instruction at
least three times with defendant. He testified that he thoroughly explained
the meaning of the instruction including that defendant could receive less
time if found guilty of the lesser offense. However, he stated that he
believed the waiver was not knowing and voluntary. The trial court denied
the motion.
	Defendant appealed, and the appellate court reversed defendant's
conviction and remanded for a new trial. The appellate court held that the
trial court abused its discretion when it failed to give the lesser-offense
instruction sua sponte after determining that the instruction was warranted
by the evidence. According to the appellate court, once the trial court
determined that the evidence warranted an instruction, the trial court was
required to give the instruction. Relying upon this court's decision in
People v. Garcia, 188 Ill. 2d 265, 281 (1999), the appellate court held
that "it is the duty of the trial court, independent of defendant's actions or
understanding, to protect 'society's interest in avoiding the unjustified
exoneration of wrongdoers and in punishing a defendant only to the extent
of his crime.' " Accordingly, the appellate court held, "Once the trial court
exercised its discretion and determined that it was appropriate to give an
involuntary manslaughter instruction, it was an abuse of discretion to deny
the instruction based upon the mistaken belief that the defendant had a
right to stop the court from giving the instruction." No. 3-00-0152
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted the
State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.
ANALYSIS

	The State first asserts that the facts of this case did not warrant an
involuntary manslaughter instruction. The State points to evidence that
defendant fired several shots from a loaded shotgun in the direction of the
victim. Further, defendant followed the victim as he fled and continued to
shoot at the victim as the victim ran and fell to the ground. Additionally,
defendant admitted that he continued to shoot at the victim after the victim
was lying on the ground. Therefore, the State argues that no version of the
evidence would support a verdict of involuntary manslaughter. Instead, the
evidence reveals a deliberate act by defendant, done willfully and with
knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm, sufficient to constitute the offense of murder and insufficient
to establish the offense of involuntary manslaughter.
	Defendant contends that this argument is waived because it was not
argued before the appellate court and was not included in the State's
petition for leave to appeal. Defendant appealed the conviction, and
argued that the evidence supported an involuntary manslaughter
instruction. The State did not respond to this argument. The appellate
court held that the evidence warranted an involuntary manslaughter
instruction, and the State appealed to this court. In its petition for leave to
appeal, the State did not challenge the appellate court's finding that the
evidence warranted the giving of an involuntary manslaughter instruction.
Despite several opportunities, the State has failed to address this issue.
The State first presented this issue in its brief to this court after we granted
its petition for leave to appeal.
	Supreme Court Rules 341(e)(7) and 315(g) provide that a party
must raise arguments and provide citation to legal authority or to the
record in the petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(g); 188 Ill. 2d
R. 341(e)(7). Failure to comply with Rules 341(e)(7) and 315(g) results
in waiver. See City of Chicago Heights v. Living World Outreach Full
Gospel Church & Ministries, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 1, 26 (2001); but see
People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 169 (2003). We recognize waiver is
a limitation on the parties not on the court. Unzicker v. Kraft Food
Ingredients Corp., 203 Ill. 2d 64, 73 (2002). However, in the instant
case, the State repeatedly failed to raise or address this argument. We
hold that the issue is waived.
	The State next contends that the appellate court's reversal was
improper because reversal was predicated on an alleged error invited by
defendant. According to the State, defendant requested that the trial court
proceed in the manner he later claimed was in error, and as a
consequence defendant is precluded from raising the issue on appeal.
	Under the doctrine of invited error, an accused may not request to
proceed in one manner and then later contend on appeal that the course
of action was in error. People v. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d 209, 227 (2001);
People v. Lowe, 153 Ill. 2d 195, 199 (1992); People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d 228, 240-41 (2000). The record clearly illustrates, and neither
party disputes, that when asked whether he wished to submit an
involuntary manslaughter instruction defendant answered that he did not
want the instruction given to the jury. Defendant unequivocally opposed
the giving of a lesser-offense instruction, and continued to oppose the
instruction even after his attorney disagreed with his decision.
	We agree with the State. Action taken at defendant's request
precludes defendant from raising such course of conduct as error on
appeal. See Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d  at 227 ("To allow defendant to object,
on appeal, to the very verdict forms he requested at trial, would offend all
notions of fair play" (emphasis in original)).
	We also reject defendant's assertion that his decision to oppose the
involuntary manslaughter instruction was not knowing or voluntary.(1)
Defendant contends that it is clear from the record that he did not
understand the decision he was making and believed he was deciding not
to plead guilty. Defendant argues his conduct during the proceedings when
he made his decision evinces his confusion. Further, defendant directs this
court to his trial counsel's testimony during posttrial arguments as support
for his argument that he did not understand the nature and consequences
of his decision.
	The record belies defendant's assertion. After defendant displayed
some initial confusion, the trial court ordered a recess so that defense
counsel could explain and discuss the matter with defendant. Defendant
returned from recess certain of his decision. He remained certain of his
decision after questioning from the trial court, and after his counsel
indicated for the record that it was against his advice. Defense counsel
stated, "I don't know what his exact words were [during the recess], but
he made it clear that he did not want any lesser-included instruction. He
believed that he didn't commit murder and wanted the case to be dealt
with that way." Defendant's trial counsel further informed the court that he
"went over all of the alternatives [including the sentencing ranges for
involuntary manslaughter], told him what I thought, and then he decided."
	We also disagree that trial counsel's testimony during posttrial
arguments supports that defendant's testimony was neither knowing nor
voluntary. This plainly distorts trial counsel's testimony. Defendant's trial
counsel testified that the decision must have been neither knowing or
voluntary because it was against his better judgment. Simply stated,
because defendant did not follow defense counsel's advice, defendant
must not have understood the decision or its ramifications. Several
comments by defendant's trial counsel during posttrial arguments illustrate
this point:
			"I believe that if he rejected an involuntary manslaughter
instruction, that then he obviously couldn't understand the
decision or ramifications of the decision that he was making.
* * *
			I say that [he could not understand the nature and
consequences of the decision] because it seems to me that if
anybody could understand the nature and consequences of that
decision, they wouldn't have made that decision. But you know,
I didn't state it as a psychologist, I stated it as an attorney.
* * *
			Well, if he didn't understand them [the ramifications of his
decision], or either he didn't understand them or he chose to
ignore them, but either way, he made a decision that I disagreed
with."
Notably, defendant's trial counsel also agreed that one advantage to
defendant's position was that the jury "could find him not guilty and he
could walk out the door a free man."
	In People v. Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d 224, 229 (1994), we held that
defendant, rather than his counsel, has the right to make the decision
whether to tender an instruction on a lesser-included offense. Our holding
in Brocksmith rests upon the principle that a defendant should ultimately
have the ability to make the decision because it concerns "the potential
loss of liberty on an initially uncharged offense." Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d 
at 229. The mere existence of a decision against counsel's advice does not
establish that defendant could not understand the consequences of his
decision. Rather, in this case, the record simply demonstrates that
defendant exercised his right to oppose the tendering of the lesser-offense
instruction, a decision which protected him against the possibility of a
compromise verdict by the jury. Therefore, the record does not
demonstrate that defendant's decision to oppose the giving of a lesser-offense instruction was not knowing or voluntary.
	Despite our finding that defendant cannot request the court proceed
in one manner and then contend the action was in error, we are compelled
to comment further to provide guidance to our trial courts. We observe
that waiver is a limitation on the parties and not on the court (People v.
Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 127 (1998)), and a reviewing court may ignore
waiver "to ensure the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of
precedent" (Lowe, 153 Ill. 2d at 199). Therefore, we look beyond waiver
to address the issue in this case: whether the appellate court misinterpreted
when a lesser-offense instruction is mandatory and erred in finding that the
trial court had a duty to give the involuntary manslaughter instruction sua
sponte.
	In this case, neither defendant nor the State requested the giving of
a lesser-offense instruction. Rather, defendant objected, and ultimately the
trial court did not tender the instruction to the jury. Under these
circumstances, we are guided by our decision in People v. Taylor, 36 Ill. 2d 483 (1967), where we clearly rejected the notion that a trial court has
a duty to give the instruction sua sponte. Like defendant in the instant
matter, in Taylor neither the defendant nor his attorney requested the
lesser-offense manslaughter instruction, the State did not request a lesser-offense instruction, and the trial court did not tender the instruction to the
jury. Taylor, 36 Ill. 2d  at 491. The defendant complained on appeal that
the trial court erred in failing to give the manslaughter instruction sua
sponte. We held that the decision is discretionary.
			"The decisions of the court indicate no more than an
application of the familiar procedural rule that error cannot be
assigned in a reviewing court with respect to a matter upon which
the trial court was not called upon to rule. So it has been said,
'The general statement contained in the cases, that a
manslaughter instruction should be given where there is evidence
justifying it, must be understood in the sense the duty exists when
such instruction is offered by either side, when the circumstances
justify it, but does not apply to cases where no instructions for
manslaughter are offered in the case. The failure to give an
instruction for manslaughter where none was tendered is not
error.' [Citation.]
			The result is that when the evidence in a murder case would
support a verdict of manslaughter, and the defendant does not
request a manslaughter instruction, the giving of such an
instruction is committed to the discretion of the trial judge."
Taylor, 36 Ill. 2d  at 489.
	Importantly, in Taylor we also rejected the assertion that whenever
the evidence warrants a lesser-offense instruction, the instruction must be
tendered.
		"Many decisions of this court have stated that '*** if there is any
evidence in the record which, if believed by the jury, would
reduce a charge of murder to manslaughter, an instruction
defining that crime should be given. [Citations.] Under these
authorities it is immaterial that the defendant did not request a
manslaughter instruction, or objected to it.
			On the other hand it has been held that the failure to give a
manslaughter instruction cannot be asserted as a ground for
reversal in a reviewing court unless such an instruction has been
requested. [Citations.] *** 'No such instructions having been
asked by plaintiff in error, the court had a right to assume that
plaintiff in error preferred to submit the case to the jury in such
way that the jury would be compelled to find the defendants
guilty of murder or not guilty. It was the right of plaintiff in error
to submit that question to the jury and require the jury to pass on
the question of his guilt or innocence of the crime of murder, and
it was not the duty of the court to submit issues and questions to
the jury which the parties, by their action, said they did not desire
passed upon.' ***.
* * *
			When the evidence will support either charge and the
prosecution does not tender an instruction on the lesser offense,
the defendant has a choice, subject to the judge's authority to
instruct sua sponte, of submitting one or both instructions.
Different views have been expressed as to the consequences of
submitting both instructions. It has been said that 'merciful, or
weak jurors may disregard even overwhelming proof of
culpability and acquit entirely or convict of a lower crime than the
evidence reflects.' [Citation.] It has also been said that to give
both instructions 'is apt to induce a doubtful jury to find the
defendant guilty of the less serious offense rather than to continue
the debate as to his innocence.' [Citation.]
			It may be that more accurate results would be obtained if the
trial judge was required to instruct as to both the greater and the
lesser offenses whenever the evidence would sustain either
verdict, and in some jurisdictions such a requirement has been
imposed by statute or by decision. [Citation.] But we are not
sufficiently persuaded that we are willing to eliminate by
judicial decision an established procedure that has long been
considered to operate for the benefit of those accused of
crime." (Emphasis added.) Taylor, 36 Ill. 2d  at 488, 490-91.
	We will not depart from this well-established procedure. See People
v. Garcia, 188 Ill. 2d 265, 270 (1999); People v. Barnard, 104 Ill. 2d 218, 232 (1984); see also People v. Sinnott, 226 Ill. App. 3d 923, 932
(1992). When the evidence will support either charge, a trial court may
exercise discretion and consider several factors in arriving at the decision
to tender or not tender the lesser-offense instruction. It is appropriate for
the trial court to give weight to the views of the prosecution, the defense,
and also society's interest in avoiding unjustified exoneration of
wrongdoers and in punishing an accused only to the extent of the crime.
However, no one consideration predominates over another. Rather, this
well-established procedure is a balancing exercise and where facts exist
like those before us today the decision has long been committed to the
discretion of the court.
	The appellate court erred in finding that the trial court had a duty to
give the involuntary manslaughter instruction sua sponte. Furthermore,
there is no evidence to suggest the trial court abused its discretion when
it declined to tender the instruction. The trial court considered the
appropriate factors and chose not to tender the lesser-offense instruction
in light of the defendant's opposition to the instruction. The exercise of
restraint in giving the instruction does not signal an abuse of the court's
discretion.
CONCLUSION	For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is reversed and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
 Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
1.                 
The parties do not raise and we make no comment regarding what
action, if any, the trial court must take to ensure that a defendant's
decision to tender or withhold a lesser-offense instruction is knowing or
voluntary.