Case Title: MacLeish v. Boardman & Clark LLP

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2016AP002491

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2019-03-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
2019 WI 31 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP2491 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
David Macleish, Hayden Macleish, Kay Macleish 
and Robin Macleish, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Boardman & Clark LLP, Quale Hartmann, S.C., 
Continental Casualty Company and OneBeacon 
Insurance Company, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 381 Wis. 2d 471, 915 N.W.2d 455 
 (2018 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 26, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 24, 2019 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Josann M. Reynolds 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Douglas W. Kammer, and Kammer Law Office, S.C., 
Portage. There was an oral argument by Douglas W. Kammer. 
 
For the defendants-respondents, there was a brief filed by 
Bruce A. Schultz, Karen M. Gallagher, and Coyne, Schultz, Becker 
& Bauer, S.C., Madison. There was an oral argument by Bruce A. 
Schultz. 
 
 
 
2019 WI 31
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP2491 
(L.C. No. 
2012CV3621) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
David MacLeish, Hayden MacLeish, Kay MacLeish 
and Robin MacLeish, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Boardman & Clark LLP, Quale Hartmann, S.C., 
Continental Casualty Company and OneBeacon 
Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 26, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioners, collectively 
the MacLeish children,1 seek review of an unpublished court of 
appeals decision affirming the circuit court's order dismissing 
their legal malpractice claim against the law firm that 
                                                 
1 The petitioners are David, Hayden, Kay, and Robin 
MacLeish. 
No. 
2016AP2491   
 
2 
 
administered their father's estate.2  The court of appeals 
assumed without deciding that the MacLeish children could bring 
a 
claim 
for 
legal 
malpractice 
based 
on 
the 
negligent 
administration of an estate.  It nevertheless affirmed the 
circuit court's dismissal of the claim against the Boardman law 
firm3 because the children failed to demonstrate that the firm's 
alleged negligent administration of their father's estate 
thwarted their father's clear testamentary intent. 
¶2 
The MacLeish children contend first that we should 
alter the test for standing to permit third party non-clients to 
bring legal malpractice actions.  Specifically, they argue that 
this court should abandon Auric v. Continental Cas. Co., 111 
Wis. 2d 507, 331 N.W.2d 325 (1983),4 and instead adopt the 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 51 (2000).  
In the event we do not adopt the Restatement, the parties 
advance 
that 
we 
should 
reaffirm 
the 
Auric 
exception 
to 
                                                 
2 MacLeish v. Boardman & Clark LLP, No. 2016AP2491, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2018) (per curiam) 
(affirming order of the circuit court for Dane County, Josann M. 
Reynolds, Judge). 
3 There are four respondents in this case:  Boardman & 
Clerk, LLP, Quale Hartmann, S.C., Continental Casualty Company, 
and OneBeacon Insurance Company.  We refer to them collectively 
as "Boardman." 
4 In Auric, we determined that "the beneficiary of a will 
may maintain an action against an attorney who negligently 
drafted or supervised the execution of a will even though the 
beneficiary is not in privity with that attorney."  Auric v. 
Continental Cas. Co., 111 Wis. 2d 507, 509, 331 N.W.2d 325 
(1983). 
No. 
2016AP2491   
 
3 
 
nonliability and apply it beyond claims of negligent will 
drafting and execution to also encompass a claim of negligent 
administration of an estate. 
¶3 
Alternatively, 
applying 
the 
Auric 
exception, 
the 
MacLeish children further argue that the court of appeals erred 
when it determined that the children failed to demonstrate that 
their 
father's 
clear 
testamentary 
intent 
was 
thwarted.  
According to the children, Boardman's failure to construe the 
will to create a trust for their mother for her lifetime with a 
remainder interest to them caused them to lose significant tax 
benefits and incur additional probate expenses. 
¶4 
We reject the MacLeish children's invitation to adopt 
the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 51 
(2000).  The Auric exception remains the operative standard. 
¶5 
We conclude that the narrow Auric exception to the 
rule of nonliability of an attorney to a non-client applies to 
the administration of an estate in addition to the drafting and 
execution of a will.  That is, a non-client who is a named 
beneficiary in a will has standing to sue an attorney for 
malpractice 
if 
the 
beneficiary 
can 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
attorney's negligent administration of the estate thwarted the 
testator's clear intent. 
¶6 
Applying Auric to the facts of this case, we determine 
that Charles MacLeish's clear testamentary intent was not 
thwarted by any alleged negligence on the part of Boardman.  As 
a result, we conclude that the MacLeish children's claim against 
Boardman for legal malpractice was properly dismissed. 
No. 
2016AP2491   
 
4 
 
¶7 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I 
¶8 
Charles MacLeish died in April of 1984.  His one-page 
will, which was drafted in 1967 by Attorney James Hill, 
provided: 
I, Charles MacLeish, of the Town of Caledonia, 
Columbia County, Wisconsin, do make, publish and 
declare this instrument as my Last Will and Testament. 
FIRST:  I direct the payment of my just debts and 
funeral expenses. 
SECOND:  All the rest, residue and remainder of my 
property I give, devise and bequeath to my beloved 
wife, Thelma MacLeish, to use the income and so much 
of the principal as she may need for her care, comfort 
and support during her lifetime, meaning and intending 
hereby to give to my wife, Thelma MacLeish, the life 
use of the income and so much of the principal as she 
may need. 
THIRD:  At the death of my wife, Thelma, I direct that 
the remainder of my estate in existence at that time 
be placed in trust until my youngest child shall have 
completed his college education through a Bachelor's 
degree or indicated in writing to the trustee that he 
did not desire any further education, at which time 
said trust shall terminate and the remainder of my 
estate shall be divided equally between my four 
children. 
FOURTH:  I nominate and appoint my beloved wife, 
Thelma MacLeish, executrix of this my Last Will and 
Testament and request of her that she employ the firm 
of Hill, Miller & Quale in the settlement of my 
estate. 
IN WITNESS THEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and 
seal this 1st day of February, 1967. 
No. 
2016AP2491   
 
5 
 
¶9 
Attorney Forrest Hartmann, a former partner of the 
will's drafter, and subsequently a member of the Boardman firm, 
handled the administration of the estate.  He advised Thelma 
MacLeish, Charles's wife, to claim full use of the federal 
estate tax marital deduction. 
¶10 Thelma followed Attorney Hartmann's advice and treated 
all the assets of Charles's estate as though they passed 
directly to her.  She also claimed a federal estate tax marital 
deduction for those assets. 
¶11 The effect of this action was that Charles's estate 
was not subject to estate tax in 1984.  Instead, the assets that 
had been in Charles's estate would be subject to estate tax at 
the time of Thelma's death. 
¶12 In February of 2008, Thelma died.  As a result of the 
administration of Charles's estate twenty-four years earlier, 
Thelma's estate included those assets that had passed from 
Charles's estate to Thelma.  Thelma's estate incurred a federal 
estate tax of $261,343.5 
¶13 Dissatisfied with the tax that had been levied on 
Thelma's estate and with the additional probate expenses, the 
MacLeish children brought suit for legal malpractice against 
                                                 
5 Thelma was a good steward of the funds that had been in 
Charles's estate.  The complaint alleges that at the time of 
Charles's 
death, 
his 
estate 
was 
valued 
at 
approximately 
$608,000.  At Thelma's death, the amount had grown to 
approximately $2.7 million. 
No. 
2016AP2491   
 
6 
 
Boardman.  They asserted that the tax and expenses would have 
been avoided if the estate had been administered differently. 
¶14 Specifically, the MacLeish children alleged that there 
would have been no estate tax if, in 1984, a trust had been 
imposed over Charles's assets.  In their complaint, they allege 
that "the will of Charles MacLeish should have been construed to 
create a trust for the benefit of Thelma MacLeish for her 
lifetime, with a remainder to the four plaintiffs in this 
action."  They further allege that absent such a trust, "the 
property in which these plaintiffs had a remainder interest was 
delivered to Thelma MacLeish. . . . The estate was probated as 
though the plaintiffs had a future interest for Wisconsin 
Inheritance Tax purposes, but treated for federal taxes as if 
the property were devised to Thelma MacLeish absolutely (instead 
of an interest in a trust or other limited interest) and free of 
any trust or ownership interest of these plaintiffs." 
¶15 The 
complaint 
additionally 
detailed 
the 
MacLeish 
children's 
view 
that 
Boardman's 
method 
of 
administration 
"wasted" Charles's unified credit and resulted in "entirely 
avoidable" estate tax on Thelma's estate.  Accordingly, in the 
MacLeish children's estimation, the tax and additional expenses 
incurred on Thelma's estate was the result of Boardman's 
negligent administration of Charles's estate. 
¶16 Moving for summary judgment, Boardman contended that 
Charles's will unambiguously does not call for the creation of a 
No. 
2016AP2491   
 
7 
 
trust.6  It argued that Attorney Hartmann did just as the will 
instructs and that Charles's testamentary intent was not 
thwarted by Attorney Hartmann's administration of the will.  As 
a result, Boardman asserted that the MacLeish children cannot 
maintain a legal malpractice claim pursuant to Auric, 111 
Wis. 2d 507. 
¶17 The circuit court agreed and granted summary judgment 
to Boardman.  Applying the rule that "a third-party beneficiary 
of a will may maintain a legal malpractice action for negligence 
against an attorney only where the beneficiary can show the 
attorney's 
actions 
thwarted 
the 
decedent's 
testamentary 
intent[,]" it concluded that Charles's intent was not thwarted. 
¶18 In the circuit court's view, Charles's will "did not 
create a trust as a matter of law, nor did he intend to create a 
trust."  The circuit court observed that the MacLeish children 
"carry 
the 
burden 
of 
presenting 
evidence 
that 
Charles' 
testamentary intent was thwarted before their negligence claim 
                                                 
6 Prior proceedings at the circuit court and court of 
appeals are not relevant to the determination before us.  Before 
the summary judgment motion that is the subject of this appeal 
was filed, the circuit court granted summary judgment to 
Boardman, determining that the MacLeish children did not present 
sufficient evidence of damages to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact on this element of their negligence cause of 
action.  The court of appeals reversed, concluding that there 
was a genuine factual dispute on damages.  MacLeish, No. 
2014AP575, unpublished slip op., ¶2.  After remand to the 
circuit court, Boardman again moved for summary judgment motion, 
filing the motion we address here. 
No. 
2016AP2491   
 
8 
 
can be presented to a trier of fact.  This they have failed to 
do." 
¶19 The MacLeish children appealed, and the court of 
appeals affirmed.  It framed its analysis by assuming without 
deciding that the Auric exception to attorney nonliability is 
applicable not only to the negligent drafting of a will but to 
the negligent administration of a decedent's estate where the 
alleged negligence thwarts the decedent's clear testamentary 
intent.  MacLeish v. Boardman & Clark LLP, No. 2016AP2491, 
unpublished slip op., ¶10 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2018). 
¶20 Applying 
this 
assumption, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded that "Charles's will did not create a trust, as argued 
by the MacLeish siblings, and therefore by definition the 
attorney's failure to read the will as creating a trust could 
not have thwarted any clear intent of Charles."  Id., ¶13.  It 
determined that the MacLeish children can point to no "language 
in the will [that] manifests an intent by Charles that a trustee 
be appointed, that the assets of Charles's estate be held by a 
trustee for the benefit of Thelma, or that enforceable duties 
with respect to those assets be imposed upon a trustee."  Id., 
¶16. 
II 
¶21 We are asked to review whether the MacLeish children 
have standing to bring this legal malpractice action against 
Boardman.  A determination of standing presents a question of 
law reviewed independently of the determinations rendered by the 
No. 
2016AP2491   
 
9 
 
circuit court and court of appeals.  State v. Popenhagen, 2008 
WI 55, ¶23, 309 Wis. 2d 601, 749 N.W.2d 611. 
¶22 We also examine the court of appeals' determination 
that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment to 
Boardman on the ground that the MacLeish children did not 
establish that Charles's clear testamentary intent was thwarted.  
We review a summary judgment decision independently of the 
determinations rendered by the circuit court and court of 
appeals, applying the same methodology as the circuit court.  
SECURA Ins. v. Lyme St. Croix Forest Co., LLC, 2018 WI 103, ¶15, 
384 
Wis. 2d 282, 
918 
N.W.2d 885. 
 
Summary 
judgment 
is 
appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  Id. 
¶23 In our review, we interpret Charles's will.  When the 
facts are undisputed, the interpretation of a will is a question 
of law that we review without deference to the circuit court or 
court 
of 
appeals. 
 
McCarville 
v. 
McWilliams 
(Matter 
of 
McWilliams' Estate), 78 Wis. 2d 328, 335 n.5, 254 N.W.2d 277 
(1977). 
III 
¶24 We begin by addressing the legal standard for standing 
of a non-client to bring suit against an attorney for 
malpractice.  In doing so, we consider the MacLeish children's 
invitation to adopt the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers § 51.  We further consider whether the Auric exception 
to nonliability may be applied to a claim for negligent 
No. 
2016AP2491   
 
10 
 
administration of an estate.  Finally, we apply our chosen 
standard to the facts of this case. 
A 
¶25 The MacLeish children attempt to bring suit against 
Boardman, which they allege negligently administered their 
father's estate.  Charles, and not the MacLeish children, was 
Boardman's client. 
¶26 Generally, an attorney cannot be held liable to a 
third party for any act committed within the scope of the 
attorney-client relationship.  Yorgan v. Durkin, 2006 WI 60, 
¶27, 290 Wis. 2d 671, 715 N.W.2d 160 (citations omitted); Green 
Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 321, 401 N.W.2d 816 
(1987).  Stated differently, "only an attorney's clients may 
normally sue that attorney for malpractice."  Beauchamp v. 
Kemmeter, 2001 WI App 5, ¶7, 240 Wis. 2d 733, 625 N.W.2d 297. 
¶27 This rule serves to protect the attorney-client 
relationship.  To extend an attorney's liability to third 
parties not in privity with the attorney may create damaging 
effects on the defendant attorney's relationship with the 
client.  Green Spring Farms, 136 Wis. 2d at 329.  "That is, if 
an attorney must be responsible not only to his or her own 
client but also to a third-party nonclient, a potential conflict 
of interest may be inevitable, thus impairing an attorney's 
ethical obligations to represent his or her own client zealously 
within the bounds of the law."  Id. 
¶28 However, the general rule is not without exceptions.  
See Newhouse by Skow v. Citizens Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 176 
No. 
2016AP2491   
 
11 
 
Wis. 2d 824, 841, 501 N.W.2d 1 (1993) (explaining that "the well 
established rule of law in Wisconsin is that absent fraud or 
certain public policy considerations, an attorney is not liable 
to third parties for acts committed in the exercise of his 
duties as an attorney") (emphasis added).  In certain estate 
planning matters, this court has carved out a limited exception.  
Beauchamp, 240 Wis. 2d 733, ¶7; see Auric, 111 Wis. 2d at 509. 
¶29 In Auric, the testator's attorney failed to have his 
secretary sign the will as a witness, resulting in the will 
being invalid.  Auric, 111 Wis. 2d at 510.  A beneficiary of the 
invalid will brought a negligence claim against the attorney.  
Id. at 511. 
¶30 The circuit court ruled that the attorney could not be 
liable because there was no privity between the beneficiary and 
the attorney.  Id. at 511-12.  On bypass, this court reversed,  
determining that "the beneficiary of a will may maintain an 
action against an attorney who negligently drafted or supervised 
the execution of the will even though the beneficiary is not in 
privity with that attorney."  Id. at 509. 
¶31 This exception to the general rule of attorney 
nonliability to non-clients provides for "one way to make an 
attorney accountable for his negligence."  Id. at 513.  "It is 
consistent with and promotes this state's longstanding public 
policy supporting the right of a testator to make a will and 
have its provisions carried out."  Id. at 514.  Therefore, 
"[p]ublic policy supports the imposition of liability on an 
attorney who acts negligently in drafting or supervising the 
No. 
2016AP2491   
 
12 
 
execution of a will resulting in a loss to a beneficiary named 
therein."  Id. 
¶32 The Auric exception is a narrow one.  Tensfeldt v. 
Haberman, 2009 WI 77, ¶72, 319 Wis. 2d 329, 768 N.W.2d 641.  It 
is properly applied when "there is no question that the 
decedent's 
intent 
was 
thwarted 
due 
to 
the 
attorney's 
negligence."  Id.  "In these cases, if the court did not allow 
the third party beneficiaries to bring suit, there would be no 
one 
to 
vindicate 
the 
client's 
expectation 
of 
competent 
representation because by definition, the client is deceased."  
Id.  Accordingly, to establish third party beneficiary standing, 
"[t]he third party beneficiary must be able to establish that 
the attorney's failure thwarted the decedent's clear intent."  
Id., ¶73 (citing Auric, 111 Wis. 2d at 513). 
¶33 The MacLeish children argue that this court should 
abandon the Auric exception to attorney nonliability to non-
clients.  They instead urge this court to adopt the Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 51 to control standing to 
bring a legal malpractice claim. 
¶34 Entitled "Duty of Care to Certain Nonclients," § 51 of 
the Restatement provides: 
For purposes of liability under § 48,[7] a lawyer owes 
a duty to use care within the meaning of § 52[8] in 
each of the following circumstances: 
                                                 
7 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 48 
(2000), 
denominated 
"Professional 
Negligence——Elements 
and 
Defenses Generally," provides: 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP2491   
 
13 
 
(1) 
to a prospective client, as stated in § 15; 
(2) 
to a nonclient when and to the extent that: 
(a) 
the 
lawyer 
or 
(with 
the 
lawyer's 
acquiescence) the lawyer's client invites 
the nonclient to rely on the lawyer's 
opinion 
or 
provision 
of 
other 
legal 
services, and the nonclient so relies; and 
(b) 
the nonclient is not, under applicable tort 
law, too remote from the lawyer to be 
entitled to protection; 
(3) 
to a nonclient when and to the extent that: 
(a) 
the lawyer knows that a client intends as 
one 
of 
the 
primary 
objectives 
of 
the 
representation that the lawyer's services 
benefit the nonclient; 
(b) 
such a duty would not significantly impair 
the lawyer's performance of obligations to 
the client; and 
(c) 
the absence of such a duty would make 
enforcement of those obligations to the 
client unlikely; and 
                                                                                                                                                             
In addition to the other possible bases of civil 
liability described in §§ 49, 55, and 56, a lawyer is 
civilly liable for professional negligence to a person 
to whom the lawyer owes a duty of care within the 
meaning of § 50 or § 51, if the lawyer fails to 
exercise care within the meaning of § 52 and if that 
failure is a legal cause of injury within the meaning 
of § 53, unless the lawyer has a defense within the 
meaning of § 54. 
8 Section 52 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers, entitled "The Standard of Care," sets forth in relevant 
part:  "(1) For purposes of liability under §§ 48 and 49, a 
lawyer who owes a duty of care must exercise the competence and 
diligence 
normally 
exercised 
by 
lawyers 
in 
similar 
circumstances." 
No. 
2016AP2491   
 
14 
 
(4) 
to a nonclient when and to the extent that: 
(a) 
the lawyer's client is a trustee, guardian, 
executor, or fiduciary acting primarily to 
perform similar functions for the nonclient; 
(b) 
the lawyer knows that appropriate action by 
the lawyer is necessary with respect to a 
matter 
within 
the 
scope 
of 
the 
representation to prevent or rectify the 
breach of a fiduciary duty owed by the 
client to the nonclient, where (i) the 
breach is a crime or fraud or (ii) the 
lawyer has assisted or is assisting the 
breach; 
(c) 
the nonclient is not reasonably able to 
protect its rights; and 
(d) 
such a duty would not significantly impair 
the performance of the lawyer's obligations 
to the client. 
¶35 The MacLeish children contend that the Restatement 
presents a better approach than the well-established general 
rule of nonliability and the Auric exception.  They argue that 
broad immunity for attorneys from claims by non-clients is bad 
public policy.  In their view, the Restatement provides a 
workable standard that narrows such immunity. 
¶36 Adopting the Restatement as the MacLeish children urge 
would 
significantly 
change 
the 
general 
rule 
of 
attorney 
nonliability to non-clients.  In the context of this case, 
adopting the MacLeish children's position would result in the 
elimination of the specific requirement that a third party 
beneficiary demonstrate that the testator's clear intent was 
thwarted in order to proceed with a legal malpractice claim. 
No. 
2016AP2491   
 
15 
 
¶37 We decline to displace the Auric line of cases and 
replace it with the Restatement (Third) standard.  There are 
several reasons for this determination.9 
¶38 First, the Auric exception and cases interpreting it 
are grounded in the constitutional right to make a will and have 
it carried out according to the testator's intentions.  See 
Auric, 111 Wis. 2d at 513.  Extending or rewriting the exception 
"presents a considerable risk that an attorney would be held 
liable, not for thwarting testator intentions, but for properly 
                                                 
9 We further observe that our rejection of the Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 51 is not out of step 
with the determinations of courts in our sister states.  The 
Restatement has not been widely adopted, although few states 
have squarely addressed the issue. 
Some 
states 
have 
expressly 
declined 
to 
adopt 
the 
Restatement.  See Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling Sav. Bank, 
311 P.3d 1, ¶14 n.2 (Wash. 2013); see also Chem-Age Indus., Inc. 
v. Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756, ¶¶33-35 (S.D. 2002) (recognizing that 
the Restatement is not binding and concluding that "even if we 
were to recognize the third party beneficiary exception, 
plaintiffs have brought forth insufficient evidence to invoke it 
here").  Arizona, on the other hand, has explicitly adopted the 
Restatement formulation.  Paradigm Ins. Co. v. Langerman Law 
Offices, PA, 24 P.3d 593, ¶29 (Ariz. 2001) (en banc). 
Others have looked to the Restatement for guidance or 
support, see Moore v. Anderson Zeigler Disharoon Gallagher & 
Gray, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888, 897 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (stating 
that the court's conclusion is "reinforced" by the Restatement), 
or have articulated that the Restatement is correct in factual 
situations significantly different from that presented here.  
Pedersen v. Barnes, 139 P.3d 552, 557 (Alaska 2006) (agreeing 
with one of the parties "that section 51 of the Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers articulates the correct 
standard for determining the circumstances in which a guardian's 
lawyer owes a duty to the guardian's ward"). 
No. 
2016AP2491   
 
16 
 
carrying them out."  Beauchamp, 240 Wis. 2d 733, ¶18.  Adopting 
the Restatement would unmoor the exception to nonliability from 
its constitutional foundation and potentially open liability of 
attorneys to third parties in a variety of contexts beyond the 
facts of this case. 
¶39 Second, when presented with the opportunity in the 
past, we have been reluctant to expand attorney liability to 
non-clients in the estate planning context.  For example, in 
Tensfeldt we concluded that "[e]xtending the Auric exception to 
attorneys who give negligent advice stretches the exception too 
far."  Tensfeldt, 319 Wis. 2d 329, ¶77.  The court was explicit 
in its instruction that the Auric exception "is a narrow one."  
Id., ¶72. 
¶40 The court of appeals has correctly followed suit.  For 
example, in Beauchamp, it favored narrow attorney liability by 
determining that "third parties may not maintain a cause of 
action for malpractice against the drafting attorney unless they 
are named in an executed or unexecuted will or similar estate 
planning document."  Beauchamp, 240 Wis. 2d 773, ¶9; see also 
Anderson by Smithson v. McBurney by Stebnitz, 160 Wis. 2d 866, 
872-73, 467 N.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1991). 
¶41 Third, the Auric standard is consistent with the 
ethical duties of estate planning attorneys.  As the court of 
appeals in Beauchamp observed, maintaining narrow limits on 
attorney liability to third parties "ensures that attorneys face 
fewer conflicts of interest in estate planning.  Holding 
attorneys accountable to a nebulous class of third parties who 
No. 
2016AP2491   
 
17 
 
are likely to be more concerned with their own hopes of 
inheritance than testator intent further compromises the duty an 
attorney owes to the client."  Beauchamp, 240 Wis. 2d 733, ¶19. 
¶42 Accordingly, 
we 
reject 
the 
MacLeish 
children's 
invitation to adopt the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers § 51.  The Auric exception remains the operative 
standard. 
B 
¶43 Having determined that the Auric exception is the 
operative standard, we turn now  to examine whether the 
exception 
applies 
to 
the 
precise 
claims 
made 
here.  
Specifically, we must determine whether the narrow exception can 
be applied to the alleged negligent administration of a will in 
addition to its drafting and execution. 
¶44 As the court of appeals observed, we have not 
previously addressed whether the Auric exception allows for a 
third party beneficiary to bring a legal malpractice action 
against an attorney who negligently administers an estate, as 
opposed to an attorney who negligently drafts a will.  MacLeish, 
No. 2016AP2491, unpublished slip op., ¶10.  However, for the 
duration of this case, both parties, the circuit court, and the 
court of appeals have seemingly operated under the assumption 
that it does or should apply.  We now take this opportunity to 
clarify that the Auric exception applies to a claim that an 
attorney negligently administers an estate. 
¶45 Our determination is supported by both the language of 
Auric and the public policies on which it is premised.  
No. 
2016AP2491   
 
18 
 
Specifically, the Auric court wrote that "[i]n this state, there 
is a constitutional right to make a will and to have it carried 
out according to the testator's intentions."  Auric, 111 
Wis. 2d at 513 (emphasis added); see Biart v. First Nat'l Bank 
of Madison (In re Ogg's Estate), 262 Wis. 181, 186, 54 
N.W.2d 175 (1952).  "This right reflects a strong concern that 
people should be as free as possible to dispose of their 
property upon their death."  Auric, 111 Wis. 2d at 513. 
¶46 The constitutional right to make a will and have it 
carried out according to the testator's intentions is implicated 
by the administration of a will just as it is by the will's 
drafting.  Accordingly, the same public policies that drove the 
Auric decision apply with equal force here.  See Auric, 111 
Wis. 2d at 514 ("It is consistent with and promotes this state's 
longstanding public policy supporting the right of a testator to 
make a will and have its provisions carried out."). 
¶47 We emphasize, however, that the strictures recognized 
in Tensfeldt apply equally to a malpractice claim based on 
negligent administration as to a claim based on negligent 
drafting.  Namely, "[t]he third party beneficiary must be able 
to establish that the attorney's failure thwarted the decedent's 
clear intent."  Tensfeldt, 319 Wis. 2d 329, ¶73. 
¶48 We therefore conclude that the narrow Auric exception 
to the rule of nonliability of an attorney to a non-client 
applies to the administration of an estate in addition to the 
drafting and execution of a will.  That is, a non-client who is 
a named beneficiary in a will has standing to sue an attorney 
No. 
2016AP2491   
 
19 
 
for malpractice if the beneficiary can demonstrate that the 
attorney's negligent administration of the estate thwarted the 
testator's clear intent. 
IV 
¶49 Having 
determined 
that 
the 
Auric 
exception 
is 
applicable to claims of negligent administration of an estate, 
we turn next to apply Auric to the facts of this case to 
determine if the MacLeish children can proceed with their claim 
against Boardman despite their status as non-clients. 
¶50 In order to proceed with their claims pursuant to the 
Auric exception, the MacLeish children must demonstrate that 
Charles's clear testamentary intent was thwarted by Boardman's 
alleged negligence.  See supra, ¶48; Tensfeldt, 319 Wis. 2d 329, 
¶73.  Stated differently, the proper threshold question is 
whether the third party beneficiaries, here the MacLeish 
children, are attempting to stand in for the deceased testator 
to ensure that his testamentary intent is fulfilled.  See 
Tensfeldt, 319 Wis. 2d 329, ¶72. 
¶51 The 
MacLeish 
children 
contend 
that 
Boardman's 
negligent administration of Charles's will thwarted Charles's 
testamentary intent.  Their complaint alleges that "the will of 
Charles MacLeish should have been construed to create a trust 
for the benefit of Thelma MacLeish for her lifetime, with a 
remainder to the four plaintiffs in this action."  They further 
allege that Boardman was negligent "[f]or probating Charles 
MacLeish's Estate without setting up such a trust, though the 
same was suggested by the language of the will . . . ."  Because 
No. 
2016AP2491   
 
20 
 
no trust was imposed, they argue, substantial and avoidable 
estate tax was paid from Thelma's estate and additional probate 
expenses were incurred. 
¶52 Resolving the question of whether Charles's clear 
testamentary intent was thwarted requires the examination of 
Charles's will to determine whether it requires the imposition 
of a trust.  Our aim in construing a will is to determine the 
testator's intent.  Breese v. Bennett (In re Breese's Estate), 7 
Wis. 2d 422, 425, 96 N.W.2d 712 (1959).  The best evidence of 
the testator's intent is the language of the document itself.  
Madison Gen. Hosp. Med. & Surgical Found., Inc. v. Volz (In re 
Ganser's Estate), 79 Wis. 2d 180, 187, 255 N.W.2d 483 (1977); 
Caflisch v. Staum (In re Estate of Kuhn), 2000 WI App 113, ¶6, 
235 Wis. 2d 210, 612 N.W.2d 385 (citation omitted).  When the 
will is unambiguous, there is no need to look further to 
determine the intent of the testator, as it is clearly stated in 
the will.  Id. 
¶53 The formation of a trust requires three elements:  (1) 
trustees who hold property and are subject to equitable duties 
to deal with the property for the benefit of others; (2) 
beneficiaries to whom the trustees owe these equitable duties; 
and (3) trust property that is held by the trustees for the 
beneficiaries.  Wisconsin Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. Morgan, 2010 WI 
94, ¶62, 328 Wis. 2d 469, 787 N.W.2d 22 (citing Sutherland v. 
Pierner, 249 Wis. 462, 467, 24 N.W.2d 883 (1946)). 
¶54 "[I]n order to create a trust the intention of the 
testator must be manifest and mandatory."  Paine v. Shero (In re 
No. 
2016AP2491   
 
21 
 
Doe's Will), 192 Wis. 333, 335, 212 N.W. 781 (1927); see also 
Otjen v. Frohbach, 148 Wis. 301, 308, 134 N.W. 832 (1912) ("The 
intention to create a trust must be clear, and the writing 
employed 
must 
be 
reasonably 
certain 
in 
its 
material 
terms . . . .").  "No trust is created unless the settlor 
manifests an intention to impose enforceable duties . . . ."  
Wilson v. Dixon (In re Wadleigh's Estate), 250 Wis. 284, 291, 26 
N.W.2d 667 (1947) (citation omitted). 
¶55 The second paragraph of Charles's one-page will is the 
relevant portion for purposes of this analysis.  It provides: 
All the rest, residue and remainder of my property I 
give, devise and bequeath to my beloved wife, Thelma 
MacLeish, to use the income and so much of the 
principal as she may need for her care, comfort and 
support during her lifetime, meaning and intending 
hereby to give to my wife, Thelma MacLeish, the life 
use of the income and so much of the principal as she 
may need. 
¶56 As the court of appeals did, we find Schomberg v. 
Gaenslen (In re Zweifel's Will), 194 Wis. 428, 216 N.W. 840 
(1927), instructive to the situation at hand.  The will at issue 
in Zweifel provided in relevant part that property would be 
devised to the testator's wife as follows: 
for her use and benefit, with full power and authority 
to sell, convey and dispose of absolutely in fee any 
part or all of my real or personal property, or both, 
at such price and consideration and upon such terms 
and conditions as she may see fit and proper, vesting 
in my wife, Emilie Zweifel, full power and authority 
to execute deed or deeds of conveyance with or without 
covenants 
of 
warranty 
to 
all 
intents 
and 
purposes . . . . 
No. 
2016AP2491   
 
22 
 
Id. at 431.  The court interpreted this will to "give[] the 
widow absolute power of disposition, not accompanied by any 
trust."  Id. at 436. 
¶57 Charles's will is very similar to the will at issue in 
Zweifel.  By its plain language, the will gave property to the 
testator's wife without restrictions, i.e. the wife had absolute 
power of disposition over the testator's assets during her 
lifetime.  The Zweifel court based its conclusion that the will 
did not call for the imposition of a trust on the fact that the 
will called for the devisee's exclusive control over the 
testator's assets.  Id.  We do the same here. 
¶58 It is true that the absence of the word "trust" from 
the second paragraph of Charles's will is not dispositive.  
Otjen, 148 Wis. at 308.  However, the language of the will is 
unambiguous——it does not reflect an intent to create a trust, 
regardless of what the MacLeish children's expectation or 
"suggestion" may be.  The language cannot be construed to compel 
the creation of a trust either as a matter of administration or 
by its explicit text.  Instead of appointing any person to 
oversee his assets, directing that his assets be held for 
Thelma's benefit and imposing enforceable duties, Charles's will 
gives Thelma absolute power over the disposition of his assets.  
In other words, the will provides that Charles's property be 
devised to Thelma's exclusive control with no strings attached. 
¶59 Further, as the court of appeals correctly observed, 
"[t]he word 'trust' appears in the will, but only and clearly in 
connection with events postdating Thelma's passing."  MacLeish, 
No. 
2016AP2491   
 
23 
 
No. 2016AP2491, unpublished slip op., ¶16.  Yet the children 
contend that a trust should have been imposed at the time of 
Charles's passing, twenty-four years prior to Thelma's death. 
¶60 In the third paragraph, the will states: 
At the death of my wife, Thelma, I direct that the 
remainder of my estate in existence at that time be 
placed in trust until my youngest child shall have 
completed his college education through a Bachelor's 
degree or indicated in writing to the trustee that he 
did not desire any further education, at which time 
said trust shall terminate and the remainder of my 
estate shall be divided equally between my four 
children. 
The use of the word "trust" in the third paragraph of the will 
indicates that Charles was aware of the mechanism, yet chose not 
to employ it in the second paragraph.  "[T]he inclusion of 
language respecting certain heirs and the omission of it in 
respect to others manifest[s] a testamentary intention to make 
distinction between them."  Zens v. Ferdinand (In re Ferdinand's 
Estate), 7 Wis. 2d 577, 583, 97 N.W.2d 414 (1959); see also 
Rosenbaum v. Bishop Tr. Co. (In re Friend's Will), 259 Wis. 501, 
508-09, 49 N.W.2d 423 (1951). 
¶61 Because 
the 
language 
of 
Charles's 
will 
devises 
property to Thelma without restrictions, Boardman's failure to 
impose a trust did not thwart the testator's clear intent.  To 
determine otherwise would be to potentially hold Boardman liable 
"not for thwarting testator intentions, but for properly 
carrying them out."  Beauchamp, 240 Wis. 2d 733, ¶18. 
¶62 Accordingly, we determine that Charles MacLeish's 
clear testamentary intent was not thwarted by any alleged 
No. 
2016AP2491   
 
24 
 
negligence on the part of Boardman.  As a result, we conclude 
that the MacLeish children's claim against Boardman for legal 
malpractice was properly dismissed. 
V 
¶63 In sum, we reject the MacLeish children's invitation 
to adopt the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers 
§ 51.  The Auric exception remains the operative standard. 
¶64 We further conclude that the narrow Auric exception to 
the rule of nonliability of an attorney to a non-client applies 
to the administration of an estate in addition to the drafting 
and execution of a will.  That is, a non-client who is a named 
beneficiary in a will has standing to sue an attorney for 
malpractice 
if 
the 
beneficiary 
can 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
attorney's negligent administration of the estate thwarted the 
testator's clear intent. 
¶65 Applying Auric to the facts of this case, we determine 
that Charles MacLeish's clear testamentary intent was not 
thwarted by any alleged negligence on the part of Boardman.  As 
a result, we conclude that the MacLeish children's claim against 
Boardman for legal malpractice was properly dismissed. 
¶66 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 
2016AP2491   
 
 
 
1