Case Title: Frenzel v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92-96

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-03-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Frenzel v. State1993 WY 48849 P.2d 741Case Number: 92-96Decided: 03/26/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Paul Albert FRENZEL, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Park County, Hunter Patrick, J.

Michael J. 
Krampner (argued), Casper, and Donna S. Sears, Lander, for 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Barbara L. Boyer, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program, and 
Michael M. Robinson (argued), Student Intern., for 
appellee.

Before MACY, 
C.J., THOMAS, CARDINE and GOLDEN, JJ., and URBIGKIT, J. 
Retired.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant 
challenges his conviction of seven separate counts of first degree sexual 
assault (W.S. 6-2-302). He argues that the State's expert improperly testified 
concerning the victim's credibility and concerning "Child Sexual Abuse 
Accommodation Syndrome." Additionally, appellant alleges that several of the 
State's other witnesses improperly testified to the victim's rendition of the 
assaults and on the defendant's prior bad acts.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Appellant 
presents the issues as follows:

I. Did the trial court 
err when it allowed the psychologist to vouch for the veracity of the State's 
complaining witness?

II. Did the trial court 
err in allowing prosecution witnesses to recite the allegations of the accuser, 
even though those recitations were not for the purpose of refuting an allegation 
of recent fabrication?

III. The trial court 
erred in allowing the psychologist to testify that the complaining witness 
suffered from a "syndrome" which could only be the result of the offenses 
alleged, when that syndrome is not generally recognized in the field of 
psychology.

IV. The trial court erred 
in allowing evidence of other "bad acts" which were not admissible under Rule 
404(b), W.R.E.

[¶4]      In addition, the 
State raises a fifth issue:

V. Must the victim's 
compensation surcharges be modified?

BACKGROUND

[¶5]      For a complete 
understanding of the contentious testimony in this case, it is necessary to 
briefly describe the parties involved and their relationship to one another. It 
is easiest to keep track of the parties by their connection to the appellant. 

[¶6]      Appellant has two 
siblings, a sister, age 47 (T-1) and a brother, age 44 (B-1). Both of these 
siblings live in California and evidently have done so for most of their adult 
lives. The man to whom T-1 had been married for twenty-five years is now married 
to the appellant's second daughter (D-2), the prosecutrix. T-1's husband 
mistakenly believed that he was divorced from T-1 when he married 
D-2.

[¶7]      Appellant has 
fathered children with four separate women. He and his first wife (W-1) produced 
one child, a daughter (D-1). Appellant and his second wife (W-2) produced D-2 
(the prosecutrix) and a third daughter (D-3). Appellant became separated from 
W-2 and began a non-marital relationship with another woman (W-3) which produced 
three sons (S-1, S-2, S-3). Appellant then became estranged from W-3 and has 
since begun a new relationship with another woman (W-4) and produced another son 
(S-4).

[¶8]      In the Fall of 
1989, appellant, W-4, D-2, D-3, S-1, S-2 and S-3 all moved to Cody, Wyoming. At 
the time, appellant was 44, W-4 was 18, D-2 was 17, D-3 was 15, S-1 was 10, S-2 
was 8 and S-3 was 5. They moved into a trailer home six miles outside of town. 
The testimony is disputed as to when the children started school, but at some 
point all the children did attend school in Cody. Appellant worked periodically 
cleaning carpets and driving a truck. The prosecutrix (D-2), went to school 
occasionally and worked at a local fast food restaurant. It was during this 
approximate five-month stay in Cody when D-2 claims the sexual abuse 
occurred.

[¶9]      During the 
family's five-month stay in Cody, appellant allegedly committed seven different 
acts of first degree sexual assault on his daughter, D-2. Four separate 
incidents account for each of the seven assaults. Each assault involved forced 
penetration either orally or vaginally with the appellant's penis or another 
object.

[¶10]   Within a few days of the last 
assaults, appellant moved his family back to California. Once in California, 
appellant and W-4 moved to Los Angeles and both D-2 and D-3 moved in with D-1. 
While in California, D-2 was arrested on a warrant issued in Park County, 
Wyoming for bad checks she wrote in Cody. The Park County sheriff and his wife 
travelled to California to bring D-2 back to face the check writing charges. It 
was on this trip back to Wyoming when D-2 first began to relate her sexual abuse 
history to the authorities.

[¶11]   In our discussion of the alleged 
trial errors, we will further relate the relevant facts as 
necessary.

DISCUSSION

Clinical Psychologist's 
Expert Testimony

[¶12]   Appellant makes two challenges to 
the admission of expert testimony from the State's expert. First, he argues that 
the testimony was the equivalent of vouching for the victim's credibility. 
Second, appellant asserts that the expert should not have been permitted to 
testify concerning the "Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome" (CSAAS). Both 
of these objections are premised on W.R.E. 702 which permits admission of expert 
testimony only if it will assist the trier of fact. Rule 702 
provides:

If scientific, technical, 
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise.

[¶13]   Appellant correctly asserts that 
expert opinion which vouches for the victim's credibility violates W.R.E. 702. 
Montoya v. State, 822 P.2d 363, 365 (Wyo. 1991); citing Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357 (Wyo. 1988). Then appellant argues that expert testimony which discusses 
CSAAS violates W.R.E. 702 because CSAAS is not generally recognized in the field 
of psychology and thus is not sufficiently reliable to assist the 
jury.

[¶14]   In order to properly address these 
issues, it is necessary to understand the content of the expert's testimony. Dr. 
Ned Tranel was qualified as an expert in child psychology and child sexual 
psychopathology. The relevant testimony developed as 
follows:

[Dr. Tranel]: There is, 
when one encounters a condition of child sexual psychology, child sexual abuse 
accommodation syndrome and a syndrome refers to a pattern of behaviors which are 
called symptoms, and in order for this syndrome to exist, then we look at the 
presence of or question whether they are, there is evidence of certain 
characteristics or symptoms, and there are five of these.

[Prosecutor]: Could you 
list those?

[Dr. Tranel]: * * * 
[F]irst one is secrecy * * *. The second one is a sense of hopelessness, and the 
reason that's relevant is because there is usually a child involved and usually 
the perpetrator is an adult * * *.

The third characteristic 
is a pattern of accommodation, * * * which enables the person to survive over a 
long period of time * * *.

The fourth characteristic 
is delayed reporting. Sometimes disclosure is used instead of reporting, and 
reporting is delayed and conflicted, and the reason for this, and in this case 
there is a classic pattern here[.]

* * * * * 
*

     The last 
characteristic we find in this syndrome is retraction or sometimes called 
recanting or taking back the disclosure of the sexual abuse * * 
*.

So those are the five 
characteristics of this child's sexual abuse accommodation syndrome as it's 
called.

After being 
admitted as an expert, Dr. Tranel continues his 
dissertation:

[Prosecutor]: And could 
you tell us, you mentioned about the child accommodation syndrome, what patterns 
of behavior manifested by [the victim] and the testing results indicated whether 
or not she may fit within that particular syndrome? [Dr. Tranel]: Yes. I listed 
the symptoms there and then I looked at the test data from my evaluation to 
determine whether those, whether there was consistency, and as I indicated, 
there was. There was evidence that this was, I use the term classic pattern, 
there was, first of all, the secrecy that I mentioned, and that was re-enforced 
by the abortive attempt that she made early on to disclose the pattern of abuse. 
She first attempted to report this to her grandmother who didn't believe her and 
called her a liar. She made another abortive attempt to report this to her 
uncle, * * * who believed her but then also participated in the abusive pattern, 
and there were other abortive attempts during her academic career but none of 
them were followed through on with any length of time because, mainly because of 
the frequent and sudden moves that characterized her life throughout her 
academic career. So the secrecy was sustained until, I have it in my note, I 
don't recall the exact date, it was returning from California to Wyoming with 
the Sheriff or Deputy, and that finally led to disclosure, which was pursued 
more diligently. The second feature I mentioned was the helplessness, and that 
was part of the environment in which she lived as well as the relationship 
between her and the abusers, those including her father, her grandfather, and 
her uncle. All of them, of course, older and bigger, plus she was experiencing 
the helplessness associated with a pattern of extreme poverty and cultural 
deprivation and academic failure, and she had no opportunity to overcome that 
and feel good about herself.

* * * * * 
*

Then the third thing was 
the entrapment or the accommodation where she eventually learned techniques for 
surviving or living with this continuing pattern, and one of the techniques she 
used or typically was to react initially with aggression and fighting and 
succumb and adapt and assume a passive stance as things continued 
on.

Then the next thing was 
the delayed disclosure, and I already mentioned the attempts at disclosure which 
were not fruitful, and the last one, and I have no evidence of this from 
anywhere, that there was ever an occasion of recantation or taking back what she 
said. That apparently did not ever occur as far as I know.

[Prosecutor]: How does 
the absence of recantation fit into your evaluation of her as it pertains to 
that syndrome?

     [Dr. Tranel]: That's 
not surprising in view of her age. Recantation is a common part of this syndrome 
among younger children at early ages, particularly, and I am talking about four 
to eight years on, recanting is common. Among older adults it's less common. 
It's not surprising we don't see recantation here at the level of eighteen or 
nineteen years old.

* * * * * 
*

Prosecutor]: Can you 
summarize for us, Dr. Tranel, your opinion as to whether or not the character 
and personality type of [the victim], based upon your testing of her and 
evaluation, is consistent with the behavior pattern of other adolescents who 
have been victims or manifested symptoms of child sexual 
psychopathology?

[Dr. Tranel]: Yes I 
can.

[Prosecutor]: What is 
your opinion?

[Dr. Tranel]: My opinion 
is that this is a classic pattern of a long history of child sexual abuse. The 
symptoms evident today are consistent with a pattern of sexual abuse. The 
behavior is consistent with a pattern of sexual abuse. The cognitive and the 
academic functioning is also consistent with a pattern of prolonged severe 
sexual abuse.

Vouching for Victim's 
Credibility

[¶15]   Since defense counsel failed to 
timely object to this testimony, we view this error through our plain error 
spectacles. To establish plain error, there must be: (1) violation of a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law, (2) in a clear and obvious manner, (3) which 
adversely affects a substantial right. Zabel, 765 P.2d  at 
362.

[¶16]   Upon close scrutiny of the 
testimony, we feel that Dr. Tranel did not clearly violate our rule against 
vouching for credibility. We reach this conclusion realizing that often an 
expert's testimony will have the incidental effect of supporting the victim's 
credibility. Montoya, 822 P.2d  at 365 (citing Zabel, 765 P.2d  at 361, and Griego 
v. State, 761 P.2d 973 (Wyo. 1988)). However, incidental bolstering of the 
victim's credibility alone does not make the expert testimony improper. 
Id.

[¶17]   Dr. Tranel's remarks do not rise to 
the level of clear error as we found in Zabel and more recently in Whiteplume v. 
State, 841 P.2d 1332 (Wyo. 1992). In Zabel, the expert repeatedly used terms 
synonymous with credibility ("fabricating," "verification," "lying"). 765 P.2d  
at 359-60. In Whiteplume, during a police officer's testimony, he stated that he 
had determined the victim had been raped and then directly linked that 
conclusion to the victim's story. 841 P.2d  at 1337. Nowhere in Dr. Tranel's 
testimony does he directly vouch for the victim's credibility nor use any 
synonymous terms like "fabricate." Nor does Dr. Tranel state that he concluded 
that the victim had been abused, instead he states that she fits the mold of 
behavior for sexual abuse.

[¶18]   Recently, we held that where a 
clinical psychologist, testifying as an expert, discusses general symptoms of 
rape victims, there is no violation of the rule against vouching for 
credibility. Rivera v. State, 840 P.2d 933, 939 (Wyo. 1992). We think Dr. 
Tranel's testimony more closely parallels the testimony in Rivera. Dr. Tranel 
simply discussed the typical behavior tendencies of a child sexual abuse victim 
and then related them to the victim. Therefore, we hold that Dr. Tranel's 
testimony did not violate the rule against vouching for 
credibility.

Admissibility of CSAAS 
Evidence

[¶19]   Appellant next contends that Dr. 
Tranel's testimony concerning the five characteristics of CSAAS was 
inadmissible. Appellant argues that CSAAS is not a recognized diagnosis within 
the field of psychology, and therefore was inappropriately offered to assist the 
trier of fact. This argument is couched in terms of United States Supreme Court 
precedent, Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) and Cullin v. 
State, 565 P.2d 445 (Wyo. 1977), both of which addressed the admissibility of 
scientific evidence before we adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence. In Rivera, 
however, we concluded that the admissibility of scientific evidence should be 
analyzed in accordance with our Rules of Evidence, specifically W.R.E. 702. 840 P.2d  at 941. Therefore, we apply the Wyoming Rules of 
Evidence.

[¶20]   Previously, we used three criteria 
in assessing the admissibility of scientific expert witness testimony. First, 
the subject matter of the expert testimony must be beyond the understanding of 
laypersons and be distinctly related to some science. Second, the expert must 
possess sufficient skill, experience, or knowledge within the science to raise 
the inference that the expert's testimony will assist the trier of fact. Third, 
the scientific basis of the expert testimony must be in such a state of 
development so as to permit the expert to make a reasonable opinion. Buhrle v. 
State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Wyo. 1981) (quoting Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C.App. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 973, 98 S. Ct. 529, 54 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1977)); (Buhrle, applying the three-part test, held inadmissible evidence 
of the "battered woman syndrome" because the state of the science was not 
sufficiently demonstrated).

[¶21]   We have held expert testimony 
concerning behavioral characteristics of adolescent victims of sexual assault 
admissible because it may assist the jury in understanding the victim's 
inconsistent behavior. Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 978-79 (Wyo. 1988). 
However, the expert in Griego based her testimony on her professional experience 
as a safe house coordinator and psychologist, not on CSAAS. Therefore, this 
court has not yet faced the admissibility of CSAAS evidence. We will here flesh 
out the basic purpose of CSAAS and examine how other jurisdictions have dealt 
with it.

[¶22]   The purpose of CSAAS is to define a 
"common language" for clinical psychologists dealing with child sexual abuse and 
to assist them in providing therapy and treatment. CSAAS is not intended as a 
means of detecting the existence of abuse. John E.B. Myers, Jan Bays, Judith 
Becker, Lucy Berliner, David L. Corwin and Karen J. Saywitz, Expert Testimony in 
Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 69 Neb.L.Rev. 1, 66-67 (1989) (citing Summit, The 
Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 Child Abuse & Neglect 177 
(1983)); see also Robert J. Levy, Using "Scientific" Testimony to Prove Child 
Sexual Abuse, 23 Fam.L.Q. 383, 393 (1989). The five recognized behavioral 
symptoms of CSAAS are: "(1) secrecy, (2) helplessness, (3) entrapment and 
accommodation, (4) delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure, and (5) 
retraction." Myers et al., supra at 66-67. Because CSAAS is not diagnostic, the 
majority of courts dealing with CSAAS testimony have limited its admissibility. 
Id. at 68; see also McCormick on Evidence § 206, pp. 925-26 (4th ed. 1992). Some 
jurisdictions require a limiting instruction when CSAAS evidence is offered. See 
People v. Housley, 6 Cal. App. 4th 947, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 438 (1992); Davenport 
v. State, 806 P.2d 655, 660 (Okla. 1991). Other courts will not admit testimony 
concerning CSAAS if offered to prove abuse occurred. See State v. J.Q., 252 N.J. 
Super. 11, 599 A.2d 172, 182-83 (1991); People v. Logan, 168 A.D.2d 918, 564 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1990). Several jurisdictions admit CSAAS testimony solely to 
rehabilitate the victim's credibility. See People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 398 (1990); People v. Nelson, 203 Ill. App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 
161, 166, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990); State v. Dodson, 452 N.W.2d 610, 614 (Iowa 
App. 1989). A few jurisdictions never admit CSAAS because it has not attained 
scientific acceptance. See Lantrip v. Commonwealth, 713 S.W.2d 816, 817 (Ky. 
1986).

[¶23]   Generally, limits placed on the 
admissibility of CSAAS are intended to address its shortcomings due to its 
limited purpose. Therefore, these courts have fashioned the admission of CSAAS 
so as to avoid its being relied upon by the prosecution or the jury as proof 
that the abuse actually occurred.

[¶24]   CSAAS testimony is restricted 
because it offers no help to the jury of proof that abuse occurred. There is 
general agreement on the notion that CSAAS is unreliable for determining whether 
abuse actually occurred. Andrew Cohen, The Unreliability of Expert Testimony on 
the Typical Characteristics of Sexual Abuse Victims, 74 Geo.L.J. 429, 442 
(1985); Myers, et al., supra at 61; Levy, supra at 393; Marion D. Hall, The Role 
of Psychologists as Experts in Cases Involving Allegations of Child Sexual 
Abuse, 23 Fam.L.Q. 451, 463 (1989); see also J.Q. 599 A.2d  at 184; Lantrip, 713 S.W.2d  at 817. The evidence is unreliable because there is considerable 
controversy and dispute over the inclusive traits. The list of symptoms 
associated with child sexual abuse includes behaviors which might also be 
manifest in a child who was not sexually abused but has been subject to some 
other childhood stress. Id.

[¶25]   CSAAS evidence can be very 
prejudicial due to its unreliability. In Beckley, the Michigan court 
wrote:

Indeed, the evidence has 
a very limited use and should be admitted cautiously because of the danger of 
permitting an inference that as a result of certain behavior sexual abuse in 
fact occurred, when evidence of the syndrome is not a conclusive finding of 
abuse.

Beckley, 456 N.W.2d  at 405-06. Because of the potential severe prejudicial effect, W.R.E. 403 
also plays a role in the decision on whether to admit CSAAS evidence. Rule 403 
provides:

     Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.

When CSAAS 
evidence is freely admitted without limitation, the danger of misleading the 
jury becomes significant.

[¶26]   Other jurisdictions, like ours, 
have admitted expert testimony concerning common behaviors of sexually abused 
children without limitation. They have done so because the evidence provided 
insight into the sexually abused child's often strange demeanor. Griego, 761 P.2d  at 979; United States v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 1990); State 
v. Edward Charles L., 183 W. Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123, 141 (1990); United States 
v. St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417, 420 (8th Cir. 1987); State v. Timperio, 38 Ohio 
App.3d 156, 528 N.E.2d 594, 597 (1987); State v. Geyman, 224 Mont. 194, 729 P.2d 475, 479 (1986); State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 610 (Minn. 1984); State v. 
Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215, 1216 (1983). In each of these cases, 
however, the testifying experts based their remarks concerning common behaviors 
of sexually abused children on their own personal professional experience, 
apparently without mention of CSAAS. Griego, 761 P.2d  at 978; Hadley, 918 F.2d  
at 853; Edward Charles L., 398 S.E.2d  at 139; St. Pierre, 812 F.2d  at 419; 
Timperio, 528 N.E.2d  at 596; Geyman, 729 P.2d  at 479; Myers, 359 N.W.2d at 
608-09; Middleton, 657 P.2d  at 1216.

[¶27]   Recently, in commenting on the 
relevance and admissibility of expert testimony concerning behavior of sexual 
assault victims, we said:

Expert testimony that 
discusses the behavior and characteristics of sexual assault victims and the 
range of responses to sexual assault encountered by experts is admissible. 
Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036 (Wyo. 1987). Such testimony is relevant and 
helpful in explaining to the jury the typical behavior patterns of adolescent 
victims of sexual assault. Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973 (Wyo. 1988). It assists 
the jury in understanding some of the aspects of the behavior of victims * * *. 
Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357 (Wyo. 1988).

Rivera, 840 P.2d  
at 939. As is evident from this passage, we recognized that sexual abuse 
behavior evidence is relevant as an explanation for a victim's reactions to 
sexual abuse.

[¶28]   In both Scadden and Griego we quote 
People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 291, 298 (1984) 
which said:

[E]xpert testimony on 
rape trauma syndrome may play a particularly useful role by disabusing the jury 
of some widely held misconceptions about rape and rape victims, so that it may 
evaluate the evidence free of the constraints of popular 
myths.

Although Bledsoe 
dealt with the admissibility of "rape trauma syndrome" evidence, it was invoked 
as the guiding precedent for dealing with CSAAS testimony by both the California 
court in People v. Bowker, 203 Cal. App. 3d 385, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1988), and the 
Michigan Court in People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391. Since we previously sought 
guidance on the similar issue of admissibility of "rape trauma syndrome" 
evidence from California jurisprudence, we also consider the California position 
on the admissibility of CSAAS testimony.

[¶29]   In Bowker, a child psychologist 
testified at great length concerning CSAAS and explained in detail each of the 
five specific behavior traits associated with CSAAS. 249 Cal. Rptr.  at 888. The 
California Court of Appeals held that CSAAS evidence is admissible only to 
demonstrate that the victim's behavior is not inconsistent with being sexually 
abused and therefore the jury must be instructed that CSAAS is not intended to 
prove that the victim's claim of abuse is true. Id. at 892. However, the court 
affirmed the sexual abuse conviction because there was sufficient other 
testimonial and physical evidence which supported the conviction. Id. at 
892-93.

[¶30]   Most recently, a New Jersey court 
grappled with CSAAS admissibility and held that "CSAAS evidence is generally 
reliable to explain secrecy, belated disclosure and recantation by a child sex 
abuse victim; * * * CSAAS is not reliable to prove that sex abuse, in fact, 
occurred[.]" J.Q., 599 A.2d  at 189. In so holding, that court reversed a 
father's conviction for sexual assault against his daughters because the 
prosecution improperly bolstered the victims' credibility and because the 
prosecution expert's opinion that the children had been abused was based solely 
on CSAAS and similar syndrome evidence. Id. As far as the expert testimony is 
concerned, that case is very similar to ours because the expert in J.Q. 
explained all five symptoms of CSAAS despite the fact that neither victim ever 
recanted. Id. at 177.

[¶31]   Today, we adopt, generally, the 
view taken by California in Bowker, by Michigan in Beckley, and by New Jersey in 
J.Q. We do so because we find that CSAAS evidence has yet to reach the stage of 
development which would permit an expert to reasonably conclude, on the basis of 
CSAAS alone, that abuse occurred. Therefore, CSAAS does not assist the trier of 
fact on the issue of whether abuse actually occurred. Additionally, we believe 
that admission of CSAAS evidence, without limitation, would run too high a risk 
of misleading the jury and therefore be more prejudicial than probative under 
W.R.E. 403. However, we also find that CSAAS evidence is relevant and admissible 
to dispel myths the public might hold concerning a child sexual abuse victim's 
post-abuse behavior if that behavior is an issue in the 
case.

[¶32]   Qualified experts on child sexual 
abuse may, therefore, use evidence of CSAAS characteristics of sexually abused 
children for the sole purpose of explaining a victim's specific behavior which 
might be incorrectly construed as inconsistent with an abuse victim or to rebut 
an attack on the victim's credibility. For example, if the facts of a particular 
case show that the victim delayed reporting the abuse, recanted the allegations, 
kept the abuse secretive, or was accommodating to the abuse, then testimony 
about that particular characteristic of CSAAS would be admissible to dispel any 
myths the jury may hold concerning that behavior. Additionally, if requested, a 
limiting instruction concerning the narrow purpose of CSAAS should be granted. 
However, expert testimony of CSAAS cannot be used for the purpose of proving 
whether the victim's claim of abuse is true.

[¶33]   Having determined the general 
parameters for admitting CSAAS testimony, we must now discern whether Dr. 
Tranel's testimony, concerning CSAAS, was proper. Again, we apply plain error in 
reviewing this issue.

[¶34]   Throughout Dr. Tranel's testimony, 
he never directly states that, because D-2 represents a classic case of CSAAS, 
she was abused. Instead he explains in detail each specific CSAAS characteristic 
and how it applies in D-2's case. The majority of this testimony appeared to 
explain D-2's behavior, which included delayed reporting, accommodation, secrecy 
and helplessness. Therefore, it was appropriate for the State to explain some of 
these inconsistencies through Dr. Tranel's CSAAS 
testimony.

[¶35]   Dr. Tranel, however, also described 
the fifth trait of CSAAS, recantation, which he explained was inapplicable to 
D-2. Since D-2 never recanted, the explanation of that particular type of 
behavior was unnecessary, and Dr. Tranel's CSAAS testimony exceeded its 
admissible purpose. We cannot say, however, that Dr. Tranel's impermissible 
comments regarding recantation adversely affected the appellant's substantial 
rights.

[¶36]   Although Dr. Tranel's testimony 
references CSAAS often, CSAAS is not the sole basis for his ultimate conclusion 
that D-2's case represents "a classic pattern of a long history of child sexual 
abuse." Dr. Tranel performed a battery of psychological and intelligence tests 
when he examined D-2. In fact, as evidenced by the prosecutor's questions, Dr. 
Tranel's ultimate conclusion appears to be grounded in the totality of his 
examination not solely on his CSAAS analysis. Therefore, unlike the expert 
testimony in J.Q., sufficient admissible bases exist to support Dr. Tranel's 
testimony.

[¶37]   In addition, we do not feel that it 
is reasonably likely that the jury would have returned a different verdict had 
they not heard the improper CSAAS testimony. On cross-examination, appellant 
attacked the credibility of CSAAS by eliciting the current status - 
non-recognition - of CSAAS in the psychology profession. We must assume that 
this evidence put the jury on notice of the weight afforded Dr. Tranel's 
comments regarding CSAAS.

[¶38]   In reaching our decision today, we 
acknowledge the inherent difficulties of proving sexual abuse. Usually, only two 
eye witnesses exist, the victim and the accused, thus putting a premium on 
credibility. It is, therefore, often necessary for the prosecution to enlist the 
services of an expert to explain the victim's unusual behavior in delayed 
reporting, accommodation and like aberrations. However, we cannot abrogate 
time-tested and fundamental tenets of evidence because child sexual abuse is an 
increasingly prevalent problem. Rule 702, W.R.E. requires that expert evidence 
assist the trier of fact in order to be relevant and admissible. The 
determination of whether the evidence assists the trier of fact is premised on 
the reliability of that evidence. CSAAS evidence has not yet reached the stage 
of development to make it, alone, a reliable indicator of the existence of 
sexual abuse.

Witnesses' Recitation of 
Accuser's Allegations

[¶39]   Appellant's next claim of error 
alleges that three of the State's witnesses were permitted to testify, 
improperly, about the victim's allegations. Appellant argues that Dr. Tranel, 
the sheriff, and the sheriff's wife each gave inadmissible hearsay testimony 
when they discussed the specifics of the victim's allegations against 
appellant.

[¶40]   Appellant argues that the testimony 
of the sheriff and the sheriff's wife concerning the victim's accusations 
against the appellant were inadmissible hearsay. The State asserts that this 
testimony was admissible as prior consistent statements under W.R.E. 
801(d)(1)(B). Rule 801(d)(1)(B) provides:

(d) Statements which are 
not hearsay. - A statement is not hearsay if: (1) Prior Statement by Witness - 
The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to 
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is * * * 
consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied 
charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or 
motive[.]

[¶41]   For a statement to be admissible as 
a prior consistent statement, we require the existence of two conditions: (1) 
that the prior statement is consistent with the declarant's testimony, and (2) 
that there is an express or implied charge, against the declarant, of recent 
fabrication or improper influence or motive. Montoya, 822 P.2d  at 367 (citing 
Makinen v. State, 737 P.2d 345, 349 (Wyo. 1987)). In other words, a witness may 
testify concerning what another witness (declarant) said, so long as the 
declarant's testimony is consistent with what the witness claims the declarant 
said and the declarant's testimony is being challenged as false or improperly 
influenced.

[¶42]   A prior consistent statement may be 
used as substantive evidence if the alleged improper influence arose after the 
statement was made. Montoya, 822 P.2d  at 367 (citing Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 71 (Wyo. 1989)). However, if the prior consistent statement was made after 
the improper influence arose, then the statement may only be used for 
rehabilitative purposes. Id. When a prior consistent statement is admissible 
only for rehabilitative purposes, a limiting instruction must be given, but only 
if requested. Id.

[¶43]   Again, because the appellant failed 
to raise a timely objection to the testimony of the sheriff and the sheriff's 
wife concerning the victim's prior consistent statements, the alleged error must 
be plain error. Admitting the testimony by the sheriff and his wife concerning 
the victim's prior consistent statements was not an unequivocal violation of a 
clear rule of law which resulted in substantial prejudice to the appellant. The 
testimony of both the sheriff and the sheriff's wife concerning the victim's 
prior statements was consistent with the victim's testimony, and the appellant 
had implicitly raised the charge of improper influence in his opening 
statement.

[¶44]   Appellant correctly asserts that 
the prior consistent statements arose after the alleged improper influence. Both 
the sheriff and his wife testified to statements made by the victim following 
her arrest for check writing fraud. Therefore, the prior consistent statements 
testimony should have been limited to rehabilitative purposes. However, since no 
limiting instruction was requested by appellant, the court did not err in 
failing to give the instruction.

[¶45]   Next, appellant asserts that Dr. 
Tranel's testimony concerning the victim's statements to him about the alleged 
abuse was inadmissible hearsay. Appellant incorrectly claims that he made a 
proper objection to Dr. Tranel's testimony. The objection appellant points to 
was raised after Dr. Tranel's direct testimony had been completed, and it fails 
to mention hearsay. Therefore, plain error is again 
applicable.

[¶46]   Appellant fails to cite 
specifically to any part of Dr. Tranel's testimony which amounts to inadmissible 
hearsay. In his brief he simply writes, "Dr. Tranel's testimony, reciting [the 
victim's] version of events in general outline cannot be justified as an 
exception to the hearsay rule * * *." This makes it difficult for us to assess 
whether there was a hearsay violation. From the record, we cannot say that 
admission of Dr. Tranel's testimony was clearly violative of a rule of law so as 
to present substantial prejudice to the appellant.

Prior "Bad Acts" 
Evidence

[¶47]   Appellant's final claim of error 
alleges that several of the State's witnesses were permitted to testify to prior 
"bad acts" by the appellant, in contravention of W.R.E. 404(b). This claim is 
asserted against the testimonies of Dr. Tranel, the sheriff, the sheriff's wife, 
and T-1's husband.

Rule 404(b), W.R.E., 
provides:

Other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts. - Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident.

Whether evidence 
of other "bad acts" by the accused meets the requirements of W.R.E. 404(b) is 
determined by looking to five factors. The five factors are as 
follows:

(1) Proof of the other 
similar crimes [acts] must be plain, clear and convincing. 

(2) The other crimes 
[similar acts] must not be too remote in time from the charged 
offense.

(3) The evidence of the 
other crimes [similar acts] must be introduced for a purpose sanctioned by Rule 
404(b) of the [Wyoming] Rules of Evidence.

(4) The element of the 
charged offense that the evidence of other crimes [similar acts] is introduced 
to prove must be a material issue in the case.

(5) There must be a 
substantial need for the probative value of the evidence of the other crimes 
[similar acts].

Rivera, 840 P.2d  
at 940.

[¶48]   Over time, we have further 
clarified our approach to Rule 404(b) evidence. The five-part test is not a rule 
of evidence itself but instead is simply an analytical tool. Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020 (Wyo. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 962, 107 S. Ct. 459, 93 L. Ed. 2d 405 
(1986). Each of the five factors need not be satisfied before a trial judge may 
admit Rule 404(b) evidence. Rivera, 840 P.2d  at 940 (citing Story, 721 P.2d at 
1032). There is no specific time limitation in determining remoteness of the 
similar act. Britton v. State, 845 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Wyo. 1992). The specific 
exceptions listed in W.R.E. 404(b) are not exhaustive but are only illustrative. 
Gezzi v. State, 780 P.2d 972, 974 (Wyo. 1989) (holding that testimony by a third 
party about prior sexual misconduct by the accused was admissible to corroborate 
the victim's testimony because victim's credibility was directly at 
issue).

[¶49]   The challenged testimony of the 
sheriff and his wife went as follows:

[Prosecutor]: And 
generally can you tell us what she told you?

[Sheriff]: She wanted to 
get some help. She wanted someone to be aware of what her father had been doing 
to her for several years.

[Prosecutor]: Generally 
can you explain what it was that she said her father had been 
doing?

[Sheriff]: That he had 
been molesting her for many years and named several things that he had 
done.

* * * * * 
*

[Prosecutor]: What else 
did you visit with her about?

[Sheriff's Wife]: Then 
she started talking about her father had sexually molested her since she was a 
child. At this point [victim] started sobbing.

As to Dr. 
Tranel's testimony, appellant claims that Dr. Tranel's "outline of the accuser's 
story" violated W.R.E. 404(b).

[¶50]   The thrust of appellant's argument 
concerning these three witnesses is that they testified to other "similar acts" 
of the accused without personal knowledge of the acts. Support for the 
assertion, that personal knowledge is required, is premised on our previous case 
law concerning the admissibility of other similar acts by the accused. However, 
appellant cites no authority which requires personal knowledge before a third 
party witness may testify to "similar acts" by the accused, nor does appellant 
cite to W.R.E. 602 (lack of personal knowledge). Rule 5.01, W.R.A.P., requires 
reasons and citations of authority in support of a party's contentions. Gulf Oil 
Corp. v. Wyo. Oil and Gas Conservation Comm'n, 693 P.2d 227, 238-39 (Wyo. 1985). 
Since appellant has failed to present a cogent argument on the issue of personal 
knowledge as a requisite to Rule 404(b) evidence, we will not review the 
issue.

[¶51]   As to appellant's more generic 
argument - that the testimony of the sheriff, the sheriff's wife, and Dr. Tranel 
was inadmissible under our W.R.E. 404(b) approach - we find that the appellant 
was not substantially prejudiced. Both the sheriff's and his wife's contended 
testimony was very general in describing the alleged similar act by the accused. 
Without the advantage of an objection and discussion of the propriety of the 
testimony, we cannot discern the purpose for which the testimony was 
introduced.

[¶52]   Again, appellant omits any clear 
reference to statements by Dr. Tranel which allegedly violate W.R.E. 404(b). It 
does not appear, from our own careful review of the record, that Dr. Tranel 
testified to any particular similar acts of the appellant. Although the entirety 
of Dr. Tranel's testimony infers that there were previous instances of similar 
abuse by appellant, we cannot locate any statement which amounts to a violation 
of W.R.E. 404(b).

[¶53]   Appellant also asserts that the 
testimony of T-1's husband, concerning an earlier incident involving the 
appellant grabbing D-2's crotch and then lewdly commenting, was inadmissible 
under W.R.E. 404(b). T-1's husband testified that the incident occurred only two 
or three years prior to the alleged abuse of these charges. We feel that this 
act of grabbing the victim's crotch is sufficiently similar in nature and close 
enough in time under our approach to W.R.E. 404(b) to hold that the rule was not 
clearly violated.

Victim's Compensation 
Surcharge

[¶54]   Appellee has brought to our 
attention an error by the district court in applying W.S. 1-40-119. The court 
extended the time for payment of a $700.00 victim's compensation fund surcharge 
which was imposed on appellant. Appellee is correct in stating that W.S. 
1-40-119 is mandatory in requiring payment of the surcharge within ten days of 
imposition. We have recognized that the statute gives the district court no 
discretion to extend the time for payment, Seaton v. State, 811 P.2d 276, 282 
(Wyo. 1991), and any part of the sentence which extends the time for payment of 
the surcharge beyond the ten-day limit is unlawful and must be vacated. Hamburg 
v. State, 820 P.2d 523, 531 (Wyo. 1991).

[¶55]   Therefore, we vacate that portion 
of appellant's sentence imposing a surcharge for the victim's compensation 
fund.

[¶56]   Judgment affirmed in part and 
reversed in part.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶57]   In initial consideration, I would 
reject Dr. Ned Tranel as a qualified expert witness in Wyoming court proceedings 
carte blanche. Dr. Tranel may be considered a member of a platoon, if not an 
army, of the new mode of forensic witnesses. These experts are generically 
characterized as witnesses with testimony for hire. With that direction, these 
experts provide escape from effective cross-examination because the theories 
which they profess, for a fee, are often not "generally accepted" as valid 
determinates.

[¶58]   Even if I could accept Dr. Tranel's 
nonmedically recognized expertise, which I do not, the vouching and verification 
of the complainant's testimony by reference to the Child Sexual Abuse 
Accommodation Syndrome should not be permitted. Lessard v. State, 719 P.2d 227 
(Wyo. 1986); Smith v. State, 564 P.2d 1194 (Wyo. 1977). This case disregards the 
forbidden terrain for testimony pontificated by some "experts" which was 
carefully excised from trial usage by direction of this court in Zabel v. State, 
765 P.2d 357 (Wyo. 1988). Zabel's direction to protect the truth in decision 
making by the jury must be followed. Otherwise, we turn trials into forensic 
witness combat where, in a criminal context, the defendant never has an equal or 
fair fight while seeking justice. Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570, 590 (Wyo. 1990), 
Urbigkit, J., dissenting.

[¶59]   This case provides another example 
of the results of an "expert witness/bad acts" prosecutorial campaign where 
evidence of guilt is unequally contested. The search for truth is submerged 
under the visible surface and obscured by the free flowing, but expensive, 
hypothesis delivered by the prosecution's expert. The resulting evidentiary test 
focuses primarily on the expert's communication skills and vague recitation of 
behavioral characteristics which are then combined with the derogatory 
connotations, provided for adverse jury influence, from non-relevant bad acts 
testimony. In this case, we add the redundancy of the sole witness' exculpatory 
testimony to both validate whatever the complainant said and to provide 
independent stimuli for jury decisional motivation. The decision here clearly 
bypasses the reliability requirement of the Frye test for expert testimony 
introduction. Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (C.A.D.C. 
1923). I would agree with the analysis provided by 
appellant:

The Frye test has 
survived the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, United States v. Brown, 
577 [557] F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261 (6th 
Cir. 1977), and presumably is still part of Wyoming law when a person professing 
expertise purports to interpret test results and other scientific data. There 
are, after all, at least two parts to the introduction of scientific evidence. 
First there is the test data itself, and [s]econd, there is the expert's 
interpretation or opinion regarding that data. This is as true with 
psychological testing as it is with the polygraph. The test data is meaningless 
and irrelevant without the interpretive expert opinion. But with an expert 
opinion that does not conform to the Frye standard the entire matter is 
inadmissible.

And, in 
conclusion, appellant states:

The testimony of Dr. 
Tranel which vouched for the credibility of the accuser, as well as the 
repetition of the accuser's story by others, and the lack of acceptance of Dr. 
Tranel's theories, and the repetition of prior dissimilar misconduct by 
Appellant would each, taken individually, be sufficient grounds for reversal of 
Appellant's conviction and remand for a new trial. Considered in combination, 
these significant and serious evidentiary deficiencies are part of a considered 
program to bolster the credibility of the accuser and destroy the character of 
the Appellant, prior to evidence of crimes charged in this case being presented. 
That is an inappropriate method of proving the offenses charged, a method which 
denies Appellant the benefit of due process of law and the presumption of 
innocence.

[¶60]   I respectfully 
dissent.