Case Title: MACPHERSON v SMOYER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1980-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 14578 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 JAMES MAePHERSON et al. , Plaintiffs and Respondents, VS. FRANKLIN R . SMOYER et al., Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: District Court of the First Judicial District, In and for the County of Lewis and Clark. Honorable Peter G . Meloy, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Petaja, Smoyer and Berry, Helena, Montana Jeanette Berry argued, Helena, Montana Far Respondents: Hughes, Bennett, Kellner and Sullivan, Helena, Montana John Sullivan argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: November 19, 1980 Decided: DEC 3 0 1986 -- - m - * 2 Filed: > Y , , 2 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. P l a i n t i f f s brought t h i s a c t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l District seeking i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f and t o q u i e t t i t l e t o r e a l property. Defendants counterclaimed f o r i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f and t o q u i e t t i t l e t o t h e property i n question. The District Court entered judgment i n favor of p l a i n t i f f s and denied defendants' counterclaim i n i t s en- t i r e t y . From t h i s judgment defendants appeal. A t i s s u e i n t h i s appeal i s a small t r a c t of land, perhaps no l a r g e r than 2 5 f e e t i n length. Easement i s s u e s , t h e r e f o r e , make up t h e bulk of t h e argument. Property a s w e l l a s c i v i l procedure i s s u e s w e r e presented f o r review. The c a s e i s a d i s p u t e among neighbors who a r e owners of c e r t a i n property on t h e n o r t h f a c e of a h i l l located on t h e south boundary of Helena, Montana. Speci- f i c a l l y , t h e property includes Lots 1 1 through 2 3 of Block 4 1 of t h e Corbin Subdivision of t h e C i t y of Helena; most of t h e closed and vacated north-south a l l e y t o t h e west of t h e s e Lots 1 1 through 23; Lots 24 through 36 of Block 4 2 of t h e Corbin Subdivision; and t h e closed and vacated Cooke S t r e e t located between Lots 1 1 through 2 3 of Block 41 and Lots 24 through 36 of Block 4 2 . Within t h i s tract of land t h e r e i s a road providing access t o a l l residences on t h e h i l l . The following f a c t s w e r e derived from t h e extended f i n d i n g s of f a c t made by t h e D i s t r i c t Court. The only p l a t on record i s t h e Corbin Subdivision recorded i n L e w i s and Clark County. The o r i g i n a l owners, t h e S c h i l l e r s , p e t i t i o n e d t h e C i t y of Helena f o r vacation of a p o r t i o n of Cooke S t r e e t and t h e north-south a l l e y s located within t h e 4 0 0 block of Cooke S t r e e t . I n 1952 t h e C i t y of Helena granted t h e p e t i t i o n by means of a resolution. The r e s o l u t i o n vacated and discon- tinued t h a t p o r t i o n of Cooke S t r e e t located within t h e disputed a r e a , s u b j e c t t o a requirement t h a t no building be b u i l t thereon and a l s o s u b j e c t t o t h e r i g h t s of any p u b l i c u t i l i t y company, including t h e City, t o use t h e land vacated f o r s e r v i c i n g t h e a r e a and adjacent a r e a i n t h e C i t y of Helena. I n 1958, t h e S c h i l l e r s quitclaimed t o t h e C i t y of Helena a l l of t h e i r " r i g h t s , t i t l e , i n t e r e s t , claim and demand" t o a l l t h e vacated a l l e y s and t h e p o r t i o n of vacated Cooke S t r e e t located within t h e e x t e r i o r boundaries of Blocks 4 1 and 42. The S c h i l l e r s then r e p e t i t i o n e d f o r t h e c l o s i n g and vacation of t h e north-south a l l e y s and t h e p o r t i o n of Cooke S t r e e t located within Blocks 4 1 and 42. This p e t i t i o n w a s granted e f f e c t i v e December 29, 1958, by t h e C i t y of Helena. The 1958 r e s o l u t i o n d i d n o t contain any conditions o r requirements which f o r b i d s t h e construction of buildings on t h e vacated a r e a s . I n 1960 t h e S c h i l l e r s conveyed t o p l a i n t i f f , James Macpherson, t h e property i n question. The land a t t h a t t i m e was n o t developed and served a s horse pasture. I n 1961 t h e Macphersons b u i l t a house a t t h e h i g h e s t p o i n t on t h e property i n question, marked a s "M" on t h e d i a - gram. Macphersons b u i l t a switchback road s t a r t i n g a t t h e n o r t h e a s t corner of Lot 36, Block 4 2 , which l e d t o t h e i r house. From 1963 through 1970 Macpherson s o l d and conveyed o t h e r t r a c t s of land within t h i s block t o s e v e r a l o t h e r persons. Through a series of conveyances, Macpherson a t - tempted t o r e t a i n an easement on an access road t o h i s house. In 1970 Macpherson sold and conveyed land to the Ecks, predecessors in interest of defendants Smoyer of Lots 21 through 23. Lots 21 through 23 have a steep east to west slope, with the higher ground located to the east. The east 25 feet of these lots, the property in dispute on which the access road is located, is a bench-like area which is approxi- mately on the same level as that on which the Macphersons' house is built. Immediately to the west of the bench-like area, the property drops off steeply to the west. Macphersons offered to sell the Ecks the west 100 feet of Lots 21 through 23, Block 41. A buy-sell agreement was entered into. Later, it was discovered that because of recent ordinance changes the sale, as proposed in the buy- sell agreement, would not leave the Ecks with sufficient lot t o allow construction of a house thereon. Macphersons agreed t o convey t o t h e Ecks t h e east 25 f e e t of Lots 21 through 23 Block 41,and t o reserve thereon an easement f o r Macphersons t o i n g r e s s and e g r e s s f o r driveway purposes. The deed f o r t h e s a l e was recorded. P l a i n t i f f s d i d n o t i n t e n d t o convey t o t h e Ecks any p a r t of closed and vacated Cooke S t r e e t t o t h e e a s t of Lots 21 through 23, Block 4 1 , and t h i s was known t o and understood and accepted by t h e Ecks. During t h e Ecks' ownership of t h e t r a c t of land now owned by defendants, they occasionally drove up 'the switch- back road, beyond t h e p o i n t a t which it f i r s t entered i n t o p l a i n t i f f s ' property a t t h e w e s t end of Lots 28 and 29, Block 42. The Ecks' a c t i v i t y i n t h i s regard w a s t o d e t e r - mine whether it would be p o s s i b l e t o have cement t r u c k s pour concrete f o r t h e Ecks' planned residence from a p o i n t off p l a i n t i f f s ' driveway on t h e e a s t 25 f e e t of Lots 21 through 23. Stanley Eck understood t h a t he needed p l a i n t i f f s ' permission t o d r i v e up t h e road beyond t h e p o i n t a t which it f i r s t entered i n t o p l a i n t i f f s ' property a t t h e w e s t end of Lots 28 and 29, Block 42, and he sought and obtained such permission from p l a i n t i f f s . O n January 30, 1973, t h e Ecks conveyed t h e t r a c t of land t o Ervin and Katherine Chester. On September 19, 1975, t h e Chesters conveyed t o defendants, Franklin R. and Ann L. Smoyer, husband and wife, Lots 21 through 23, Block 4 1 , a l l of t h e closed and vacated a l l e y t o t h e w e s t of s a i d Lots 2 1 and 22 and t h e east one-half of t h e closed and vacated a l l e y t o t h e w e s t of s a i d Lot 23. A t t h e t i m e of defendants' purchase of t h e property, t h e r e were no s t r u c t u r e s located thereon. Defendants subse- quently constructed a residence on t h i s property, which was f i r s t occupied by defendants i n June 1976. Access t o defendants' residence i s by means of an a s p h a l t driveway constructed by defendants during t h e summer of 1976 on t h e w e s t p o r t i o n s of Lots 2 1 and 22, Block 4 1 , and on t h e e a s t p o r t i o n of t h e closed and vacated a l l e y t o t h e w e s t of s a i d l o t s . Defendants' driveway l e a d s from t h e switchback road t o a two-car garage located i n t h e w e s t ground f l o o r p o r t i o n of defendants' residence. The switchback road, from t h e p o i n t a t which it f i r s t e n t e r s onto p l a i n t i f f s ' property a t t h e w e s t end of Lots 28 and 29, Block 42, t o t h e p o i n t a t which it dead-ends a t p l a i n t i f f s ' residence, has, s i n c e t h e t i m e of i t s construc- t i o n i n 1961, been considered by p l a i n t i f f s t o be t h e i r p r i v a t e driveway. Since 1961 a l l of t h e maintenance and improvement of t h i s p o r t i o n of t h e road has been a t t h e s o l e d i s c r e t i o n and expense of p l a i n t i f f s . I n 1973 p l a i n t i f f s placed a post-and-chain g a t e on t h i s p o r t i o n of t h e road. During t h e summer of 1976 defendants drove t h e i r vehi- c l e s up t h e switchback road t o t h e e a s t of t h e i r a s p h a l t driveway and residence and onto p l a i n t i f f s ' property. Defendants would then n e g o t i a t e t h e u-turn located within t h e l o t s , would proceed along t h e road t o t h e west and would park and leave t h e i r v e h i c l e s i n t h e a r e a where t h e road c r o s s e s t h e e a s t 25 f e e t of Lots 2 1 through 23. Defendants parked t h e i r v e h i c l e s on t h e disputed property, located and marked a s "A" on t h e diagram. plain- t i f f s made repeated r e q u e s t s t o defendants t o remove t h e i r vehicles. Defendants continued t o park t h e i r v e h i c l e s i n t h i s a r e a . P l a i n t i f f s f i l e d a d e c l a r a t o r y a c t i o n t o determine t h e n a t u r e of t h e property i n t e r e s t s of t h e disputed a r e a . Defendants answered and counterclaimed. P r i o r t o t h e conveyance of t h e land t o t h e Ecks i n 1970, p l a i n t i f f s openly and continuously used and maintained a l a r g e p o r t i o n of t h e a r e a of closed and vacated Cooke S t r e e t between Lots 21 through 23, Block 4 1 , and Lots 24 through 26, Block 4 2 , f o r driveway purposes and a s a means of i n g r e s s and e g r e s s t o t h e i r residence. P r i o r t o defen- d a n t s ' f i l i n g of a counterclaim, t h e r e was no challenge o r o b s t r u c t i o n o r any c o n t e s t on t h e road. Defendants raise numerous i s s u e s on t h i s appeal, cre- a t i n g t h e appearance of a complex land d i s p u t e . Upon c l o s e review w e f i n d one i s s u e w i l l dispose of t h e e n t i r e property dispute: Whether t h e reserved easements i n t h e deed from t h e p l a i n t i f f s t o t h e Ecks, t h e predecessors i n i n t e r e s t of defendants, conclusively e s t a b l i s h t h a t defendants have no r i g h t of access over p l a i n t i f f s ' p r i v a t e driveway. W e l i m i t our consideration of t h i s matter t o t h e deed from p l a i n t i f f s t o t h e Ecks, by which p l a i n t i f f s f i r s t conveyed t h e land now owned by defendants. This instrument and i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s c o n t r o l l i n g . The Eck deed con- t a i n s two reserved easements i n favor of p l a i n t i f f s , as f i r s t p a r t i e s . The reserved easements provided a s follows: "excepting and reserving o u t of t h e granted premises t o t h e F i r s t P a r t i e s , t h e i r h e i r s and a s s i g n s , t h e following: "An easement, right-of-way and r i g h t of p r i v a t e driveway upon and over a l l of t h e E a s t Twenty- f i v e Feet (E 25') of each of s a i d Lots 2 1 , 22 and 23, f o r t h e exclusive use a s a driveway and means of i n g r e s s and e g r e s s by t h e F i r s t Par- ties, t h e i r h e i r s and assigns, together with the use, maintenance, repair and/or reconstruc- tion of the private driveway presently located on the East Twenty-five Feet (E 25' ) of each of said Lots 21, 22 and 23; and "An easement, right-of-way and right of ingress and egress over and upon a certain strip of land Twenty Feet (20') in width following the present access roadway furnishing ingress and egress to all of the lands of the First Par- ties, running over and across the premises herein conveyed, for the purpose of using (in common with Second Parties, their heirs and assigns), maintaining, repairing and improving said roadway which presently crosses said tract and provides access to the tract herein con- veyed and access to the lands of the First Parties, together with the right in the First Parties, their heirs and assigns, to maintain and/or reconstruct said roadway." The reserved easements are binding on defendants, as they are the successors in interest of the Ecks. Defendants have no right to use the access road known as Cooke Lane or South Cooke located within the exterior boundaries of the property at which point the access road first crosses onto plaintiffs' retained property at the west end of Lots 28 and 29 of Block 42. Upon a complete review of the record, we come to that conclusion based on the following considera- tions: The Document 1. The reserved easements in the deed from plaintiffs to the Ecks are reservations and exceptions out of the granted premises and do not expressly provide anyone with a right-of-way over the land retained by plaintiffs. 2. Defendants' claim of a right to use the access road beyond the point it first crosses plaintiffs' property at the west end of Lots 28 and 29, Block 42, is inconsistent with the reading of the first reserved easement in the deed. The easement expressly reserves "all of the east 25 feet of [defendants'] property as a private driveway . . . the exclusive use as a driveway and means of i n g r e s s and egress t o t h e property retained by [ p l a i n t i f f s ] t o t h e e a s t . " Defendants a r e excluded from the use of t h i s area of t h e driveway. The e a s t 25 f e e t of defendants' property i s f o r p l a i n t i f f s ' "exclusive use." 3 . The f i r s t reserved easement i n t h e deed from plain- t i f f s t o the Ecks does - n o t contain any provisions f o r " i n common" use of t h e access road beyond p l a i n t i f f & ' property f o r o t h e r persons. This i s i n s t a r k c o n t r a s t t o the exis- tence of an express provision f o r an " i n common" use i n t h e second reserved easement i n the Eck deed r e l a t i n g t o the c e r t a i n s t r i p of land located on t h e w e s t end of Lot 21, which w a s c l e a r l y intended t o insure access on the road f o r r e s i d e n t s who l i v e higher up on t h e h i l l . 4 . Section 70-1-516, MCA, provides t h a t a reservation o u t of the g r a n t of p r o p e r t i e s i s t o be i n t e r p r e t e d i n favor of t h e grantor. The I n t e n t -- of t h e P a r t i e s 1. Stanley Eck, who o r i g i n a l l y handled the negotia- t i o n s with p l a i n t i f f s which l e d t o t h e d r a f t i n g and execu- t i o n of t h e "Eck" deed, understood t h e reservation t o mean t h a t he needed p l a i n t i f f s ' permission t o t r a v e l on the access road a f t e r t h e p o i n t where t h e road f i r s t entered on p l a i n t i f f s ' property a t t h e w e s t end of Lots 28 and 29, Block 42. Eck, i n f a c t , asked f o r and received permission from p l a i n t i f f s before driving on t h e road beyond t h a t point. This layman's understanding of h i s limited property i n t e r e s t s i n t h a t s m a l l p a r c e l of land i s c o n s i s t e n t with t h e readings of t h e reservation, t h e i n t e n t of t h e grantor ( p l a i n t i f f s ) , t h e physical location of t h e property and o t h e r findings made by t h e District Court. Here, t h e p a r t i e s , by t h e i r conduct, intended t o consider it an exclusive easement f o r p l a i n t i f f s . S t a t e By and Through Montana, E t c . v. Cronin (1978), - Mont. , 587 P.2d 395, 35 St.Rep. 1798; Larson v. Burnett (1972), 158 Mont. 421, 492 P.2d 921. 2. The expressed i n t e n t of p l a i n t i f f s i n d r a f t i n g t h e deed was t h a t t h e a r e a was reserved f o r a p r i v a t e driveway f o r t h e i r exclusive use. The Location of t h e Area and Physical Facts ---- Our reading of t h e f i r s t reserved easement i s con- s i s t e n t with t h e physical f a c t s of t h e property. The east 25 f e e t of defendants' property is geographically a bench- l i k e extension of p l a i n t i f f s 1 property. The reason f o r t h i s i s t h a t a t t h e w e s t end of t h e east 25-foot p o r t i o n of de- fendants' property, t h e ground l e v e l drops sharply t o t h e w e s t t o t h e p o i n t where defendants' residence i s located i n t h e western p o r t i o n of t h e i r l o t . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e road dead-ends a t t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' residence, which i s located a t t h e h i g h e s t p o i n t of t h e property i n question. These f a c t s , taken together, are c o n s i s t e n t with t h e conclusion t h a t t h e " i n common" use of t h e switchback road ends where t h e paving ends, a t t h e p o i n t a t which t h e road f i r s t e n t e r s onto p l a i n t i f f s 1 r e t a i n e d property a t t h e w e s t boundary of Lots 28 and 29, Block 42. Defendants' a s s e r t i o n s t h a t they own o r have an in- terest i n t h a t p a r c e l of land by a l t e r n a t i v e property the- o r i e s do n o t m e e t t h i s C o u r t ' s agreement. The l i t i g a t i o n i n t h i s case i s c l e a r . The i s s u e surrounds t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and reading of t h e deed with t h e f a c t s applied t o t h a t reading. W e f i n d no m e r i t i n t h e o t h e r property t h e o r i e s advanced t o t h i s Court and s h a l l n o t address them speci- f i c a l l y only t o uphold t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s extensive and proper findings of f a c t and conclusions of l a w . The residential hill in dispute has been overburdened by claims and counterclaims of alternative property theories that surpass most complex land cases before this Court. There is no need here to further impose that burden on this small tract of land. Among numerous alleged errors raised by defendants during the course of this litigation, this Court finds it imperative to address one in particular: Whether defendants' affidavits of disqualification of the district judge, which were filed after the entry of the district judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law, prevented the judge from entering judgment in favor of plaintiffs in accordance with the findings and conclusions. Defendants contend that they effectively disqualified the district judge from entering judgment in this case by the filing of affidavits of disqualification after entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law in favor of plain- tiffs. In addition, defendants suggest that the judge should not have accepted jurisdiction of this case because of certain business dealings which the judge and his wife have had with James Macpherson and with the attorney for plaintiffs, John Sullivan. We find that the filing of the affidavits was untimely and that the allegations of bias were without merit. Briefly, the record reflects the following facts: The district judge entered his findings and conclusions on September 18, 1978, at which time he directed plaintiffs "to prepare a judgment in accordance with the . . . Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and to present the same to the Court on or before the 26th day of September, 1978." On September 25, 1978, defendants filed an affidavit of disqualification of the district judge, together with a motion for disqualification which stated that it was being made "pursuant to Supreme Court Rule, 34 State Rep. 26." The affidavit of disqualification was signed by defendant Franklin R. Smoyer and was certified to have been made in "good faith" by counsel for defendants, Charles E. Petaja and J. Mayo Ashley. The affidavit alleged that Smoyer had observed actions by the district judge throughout the course of the trial "that indicated that he was biased and preju- diced against [defendants] and in favor of Plaintiffs." On September 27, 1978, the district judge held an in- chambers conference with counsel for both parties to discuss the effect of defendants' affidavit of disqualification. The September 27 conference was not reported, but the topics discussed were mentioned during a similar conference the next day which was reported. In addition, counsel for defendants conceded that they themselves did not agree with their clients' allegations of bias and prejudice on the part of the judge, noting that they had "tremendous personality problems with [their clients]." On September 28, 1978, defendants pointed out that the affidavit of disqualification was an attempt to disqualify the judge "for cause," and that under subsection 6 of the Supreme Court's new disqualification rule, a hearing would have to be held on the allegations contained therein before a judge assigned by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Plaintiffs argued that the attempted disqualification was untimely and that the court had jurisdiction to enter judg- ment under the decision in In re Miller's Estate (1924), 71 Mont. 330, 229 P. 851. Plaintiffs filed a motion for entry of judgment on October 2, 1978. O n October 31, 1978, counsel f o r defendants i n i t i a t e d an unscheduled, unnoticed ex p a r t e conference with t h e d i s - - t r i c t judge, a t which t i m e they advised t h e judge t h a t they had "discovered" ( i n t h e public records of Lewis and Clark County) c e r t a i n o t h e r business a f f a i r s t h a t a f f e c t e d t h e i r a b i l i t y t o r e c e i v e a f a i r t r i a l . O n November 1, 1978, t h e d i s t r i c t judge entered judg- ment. I t w a s then f i l e d with the c l e r k of c o u r t and n o t i c e of e n t r y was given by both t h e c l e r k of c o a r t and counsel f o r p l a i n t i f f s . S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , t h e c o u r t f i l e d a minute e n t r y s t a t i n g : "The motion f o r e n t r y of judgment i n t h e above-entitled matter was granted t h i s day. The judg- ment having been entered, t h e Court withdraws from f u r t h e r proceedings i n t h i s cause." Later t h a t afternoon, defen- d a n t s f i l e d a "Supplemental A f f i d a v i t f o r D i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n of Judge," i n which they set f o r t h o t h e r t r a n s a c t i o n s which they contended demonstrated a " c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t " on t h e p a r t of t h e judge, which " l e d t o b i a s and p r e j u d i c e a g a i n s t [defendants] during t h e course of t h i s l i t i g a t i o n . " Defendants f i l e d t h e i r d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n as one " f o r cause" under subsection 6 of t h i s C o u r t ' s new d i s q u a l i f i c a - t i o n rule--which w a s promulgated on December 2 9 , 1976, t o be e f f e c t i v e f o r a c t i o n s f i l e d on o r a f t e r March 1, 1977. his case was f i l e d on February 15, 1977, p r i o r t o t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h e new d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n r u l e . The c o n t r o l l i n g d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n r u l e , t h e r e f o r e , w a s former s e c t i o n 93-901, R.C.M. 1947. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e f a c t o r s which amount t o an automatic d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n under subdivisions (1) through (3) of s e c t i o n 93-901, R.C.M. 1947, subdivision ( 4 ) provides t h a t a p a r t y may d i s q u a l i f y a d i s t r i c t judge upon making and f i l i n g an a f f i d a v i t t h a t t h e p a r t y ". . . has reason t o b e l i e v e , and does believe, he cannot have a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l hear- i n g o r t r i a l before a d i s t r i c t judge by reason of t h e b i a s o r p r e j u d i c e of such judge." Under t h i s provision, a judge could be d i s q u a l i f i e d even a f t e r t r i a l t o prevent him from r u l i n g on p o s t - t r i a l motions, such as a motion f o r a new t r i a l . S t a t e v. D i s t r i c t Court of Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t . (1962), 140 Mont. 447, 450, 373 P.2d 314, 316. Nevertheless, t h i s Court has recognized an exception f o r t h e e n t r y of judgment i n cases where t h e d i s q u a l i f i - c a t i o n i s attempted a f t e r t h e d e c i s i o n i n a case b u t p r i o r t o t h e e n t r y of judgment pursuant t o t h a t decision. Thus, i n I n r e Miller's E s t a t e , supra, one of t h e i s s u e s was whe- t h e r " t h e d i s t r i c t judge, having been d i s q u a l i f i e d a f t e r t h e v e r d i c t , was without a u t h o r i t y t o render judgment." This Court held: "This c o u r t decided i n S t a t e ex rel. Carleton v. D i s t r i c t Court, 33 Mont. 138, 8 Ann. C a s . 752, 82 Pac. 789, t h a t an a f f i d a v i t imputing b i a s and p r e j u d i c e may be f i l e d a f t e r a t r i a l has been had and while a motion f o r a new t r i a l i s pending, a t any t i m e before t h e d a t e set f o r t h e hearing of such motion. I n s o f a r a s t h a t d e c i s i o n permits a change of judge, when a p p l i - c a t i o n is made under Section 8868 [ s e c t i o n 93- 901, R.C.M. 19471 p r i o r t o t h e d a t e set f o r a hearing upon a motion f o r a new t r i a l upon t h e ground t h a t it is --- pro hac v i c e a proceeding independent of t h e t r i a l of t h e cause on t h e m e r i t s , w e have no p a r t i c u l a r f a u l t t o f i n d with it. -- he r u l e there- announced may not, however, be extended t o permit t h e f i l i n g of a d i s q u a l i - - - - fying a f f i d a v i t a f t e r v e r d i c t and p r i o r --- t o t h e e n t r y of judgment. The r e n d i t i o n of judgment is toomuch a p a r t of t h e t r i a l o f t h e a c t i o n - - - - - - - -- on t h e m e r i t s t o be characterized a s a s e p a r a t e , -- -- independent in the s e n s e t h a t t h e t e r m i s used i n t h e foregoing s e c t i o n . The ----- t r i a l c o u r t committed no e r r o r i n disregarding t h e a f f i d a v i t and rendering j u d g m e v Mont. a t 336, 229 P. a t 852. (Emphasis added.) The r u l e of Miller's E s t a t e is a p p l i c a b l e here. The f i n d i n g s and conclusions entered by t h e d i s t r i c t judge, p r i o r t o t h e f i l i n g of t h e a f f i d a v i t of d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n , e x p r e s s l y d i r e c t e d t h a t a judgment be prepared " i n accord- ance with" t h e f i n d i n g s and conclusions. Rule 58, M.R.Civ.P., r e q u i r e d t h a t where t h e c o u r t d i r e c t s e n t r y of judgment f o r r e l i e f o t h e r than money o r c o s t s , " t h e judge s h a l l promptly settle o r approve t h e form of t h e judgment and d i r e c t t h a t it be e n t e r e d by t h e c l e r k . " Under t h e s e circumstances t h e judgment was as much a p a r t of t h e f i n d i n g s and conclusions a s t h e judgment r e q u i r e d by t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t i n Miller's E s t a t e . Accordingly, although t h e d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n pre- vented t h e d i s t r i c t judge from r u l i n g on p o s t - t r i a l motions under Rules 59 and 60, M.R.Civ.P., and from withdrawing t h e f i n d i n g s and conclusions previously e n t e r e d , it was n o t e f f e c t i v e t o prevent e n t r y of judgment i n f a v o r of p l a i n - t i f f s i n accordance w i t h t h e f i n d i n g s and conclusions e n t e r e d on September 18, 1978. W e f i n d t h a t defendants' f i l i n g of an a f f i d a v i t f o r a n attempted d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n of t h e d i s t r i c t judge was untimely made. The d i s t r i c t judge was c o r r e c t i n e n t e r i n g h i s judg- ment and withdrawing from t h e case. This c a s e i s , from i t s i n c e p t i o n , a splendid example of a n abuse of t h e j u d i c i a l system. The D i s t r i c t Court was burdened by excessive arguments and procedures many t i m e s t h e amount t h a t a c t u a l l y should have occurred. This Court was a l s o burdened by b r i e f s of e x t r a o r d i n a r y l e n g t h . How- e v e r , p l a i n t i f f s ' r e q u e s t t h a t w e impose and assess a p e n a l t y a g a i n s t defendants i n t h i s c a s e i s without m e r i t . The a p p l i c a t i o n of Rule 32, M.R.App.Civ.P., i s n o t a p p l i - c a b l e a s t h e r e w e r e l e g i t i m a t e i s s u e s regarding deed i n t e r - p r e t a t i o n and c o n s t r u c t i o n of r e a l p r o p e r t y law presented. Affirmed. We concur: %~CP%%&,& Chief Justice