Case Title: Carter v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 182, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2002-10-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
AARON K. CARTER, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 182, 2002 
 
 
Defendant, Below  
 
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
 
)  Cr. ID No. 0105020018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  September 24, 2002 
Decided:  October 16, 2002 
 
Before VEASY, Chief Justice, WALSH and STEELE, Justices 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 16th day of October, 2002, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
In March of 2002, a Superior Court jury convicted Appellant Arron K. 
Carter of Burglary in the First Degree, twelve counts of Possession of a Firearm 
during the Commission of a Felony, three counts of First Degree Robbery, five 
counts of Second Degree Kidnapping, three counts of Aggravated Menacing, one 
count of Second Degree Conspiracy, and one count of Wearing a Disguise during 
the Commission of a Felony.   
(2) 
Carter claims that: a) the prosecutor’s repeated suggestive comments 
on the defendant’s post arrest silence violated the defendant’s Fifth and Fourteenth 
 
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Amendment Rights; and, b) in the absence of a defense objection, the trial judge 
erred by failing to intervene, sua sponte, to cure the effect of that improper 
argument.  We find no prosecutorial misconduct and, therefore, need not reach the 
second argument.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM. 
(3) 
The State’s comment in closing rebuttal did not amount to improper 
comment on the defendant’s post arrest silence and did not rise to the level of 
misconduct described by this Court in Williams v. State.1  In Williams, we reversed 
a conviction below because of prejudicial prosecutorial comment in closing 
argument that constituted plain error.  We held that the closing remarks improperly 
suggested to the Jury that in order to acquit the accused, they must believe that the 
State’s witnesses lied.  The remarks consequently improperly branded the 
defendant as a liar. 
(4) 
This case is distinguishable.  Here, the State did not use improper 
language, maintained an emphasis on the jury’s role as assessors of credibility, and 
permissibly responded to the defense’s commentary on the State’s failure to call 
certain witnesses.2  Though  the Defendant’s credibility was at issue at trial, it 
cannot be said that it was a central issue in a close case. 3  While the Defendant’s  
                                                 
1  Williams v. State, Del. Supr., No. 12, 2002, per curium (July 8, 2002) 
2  See Michael v. State, 529 A.2d 752, 762 (Del. 1987) (explaining and applying the invited 
response doctrine). 
3 Trump v. State, Del. Supr., 753 A.2d 963, 964-965 (2000).   
 
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defense that the State “had the wrong man” is similar to that of Williams, there is 
ample evidence to support the jury verdict4 and it is likely that the jury’s 
assessment of Defendant’s credibility was not a critical factor in the sense that their 
decision turned on whether they believed the defendant or the witnesses for the 
State.   
Accordingly, there was no plain error in this case sufficient to warrant 
reversal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Superior 
Court be, and hereby is, AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT 
_/s/ Myron T. Steele_________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 When arrested, Defendant was in possession of: (1) the Dudleks’ check written to cash in the 
amount of $1000, (2) $851 in cash consistent with the amounts withdrawn and plan to 
shortchange his companion on the proceeds of the robbery; and, (3) .45 caliber ammunition.  
Furthermore, Defendant’s appearance was consistent with the Dudleks’ description.