Case Title: State v. Spaulding

Citation: 2016-Ohio-8126

Docket Number: 2013-0536

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2016-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Spaulding, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-8126.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-8126 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SPAULDING, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Spaulding, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-8126.] 
Criminal law—Aggravated murder—Convictions and death sentence affirmed. 
(No. 2013-0536—Submitted July 12, 2016—Decided December 15, 2016.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County, 
No. CR2012-05-1508. 
_________________ 
FRENCH, J. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal of right by defendant-appellant, Dawud Spaulding, 
who was convicted of the 2011 aggravated murders of Erica Singleton and Ernie 
Thomas and was sentenced to death.  For the reasons below, we affirm Spaulding’s 
convictions and sentence. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Pretrial Background 
{¶ 2} In 2012, the state charged Spaulding with two counts of aggravated 
murder under R.C. 2903.01(A).  Each count carried a death specification for course 
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of conduct, R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), and the first count also carried a death specification 
for witness murder, R.C. 2929.04(A)(8).  The state also charged Spaulding with the 
attempted murder of Patrick Griffin, felonious assault, domestic violence, 
menacing by stalking, intimidation of a crime victim or witness, violating a 
protection order, and having weapons while under a disability.  Four counts of the 
indictment carried firearm specifications. 
B.  The State’s Case-in-Chief 
{¶ 3} The state presented evidence of the following at a jury trial, which 
began in October 2012. 
1.  Spaulding’s relationship with Singleton 
{¶ 4} Spaulding and Singleton began dating in 1999 or 2000 and had two 
children: Dre’San, born in 2004, and Damonie, born in 2009. According to 
Singleton’s mother, by 2006, the couple was fighting “all the time.” 
{¶ 5} In 2008, Singleton allegedly stabbed Spaulding during an argument.  
While discussing this alleged incident during a 2011 police investigation, 
Spaulding said that he “deserved it” and that she was retaliating because he had 
been cheating on her.  He also told police that Singleton sprayed him with mace in 
2009 and that it angered him because he “wasn’t even cheating” at the time. 
{¶ 6} In April 2010, Singleton called 9-1-1 to report the theft of her car 
radio.  She told the responding officer, Detective Jeremy McGee, that Spaulding 
had been threatening her via telephone calls and text messages, including one that 
mentioned that her radio would look good in his car.  McGee recorded three 
voicemail messages that Spaulding had left for Singleton, and the state played them 
at trial.  On the messages, Spaulding referred to Singleton as a “dumb bitch,” 
threatened to get in “[her] grill,” said he would “get away with this,” and cautioned 
that he would be “ready” if police came to get him.  Spaulding was convicted of 
domestic violence and telecommunications harassment. 
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{¶ 7} In February 2011, Singleton called 9-1-1 to a report a domestic 
dispute.  The responding officer testified that Singleton said her ex-boyfriend had 
sent her several text messages that morning accusing her of seeing another man.  
Later, she heard a knock at her door and opened it to find Spaulding.  He struck her 
across the face, knocked her to the floor, and fled with her cell phone.  Spaulding 
pleaded guilty to felony domestic violence. 
{¶ 8} In August 2011, Singleton requested a civil protection order against 
Spaulding and testified at an ex parte hearing before Magistrate Tracy Stoner in the 
Summit County domestic-relations court.  Magistrate Stoner testified at trial and 
recalled Singleton’s testimony that Spaulding had threatened her with a gun and 
threatened her mother and sister.  Magistrate Stoner found that this testimony was 
credible evidence to support Singleton’s request and issued a one-year protection 
order.  But the order was dismissed when Singleton did not appear at the final 
hearing. 
{¶ 9} In October 2011, Singleton called 9-1-1 from a hotel to report that 
someone had slashed or let the air out of her car tires.  The responding officer 
testified that Singleton was “terrified” and that she suspected Spaulding.  She told 
the officer that Spaulding had been stalking her by using the GPS in her cell phone.  
(In December 2011, Spaulding confirmed this suspicion when he told police that 
he had tracked Singleton to a hotel, where he found her with a man named James.)  
While the officer was at the scene, Singleton had a phone conversation with a man 
she identified as Spaulding. The officer heard the man calling Singleton names, 
swearing, and accusing her of sleeping with “that ‘N’ word.” 
{¶ 10} After Spaulding learned that Singleton “was messing with James,” 
he began seeing Anitress Morris (“Peaches”).  By October or November 2011, 
Spaulding was staying at Peaches’s apartment. 
{¶ 11} Around the same time, Singleton began a relationship with Ernest 
Thomas.  Singleton often spent time at Thomas’s home at 1104 Grant Street in 
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Akron and, according to Thomas’s brother, they were becoming “real close.”  
Spaulding later told police that he had not minded Singleton seeing other men, even 
though they had “been together for ten years.” 
{¶ 12} On November 28, 2011, Singleton called 9-1-1 to report that 
Spaulding had broken into her apartment, held “a gun on [her],” and “almost cut 
[her] neck.”  Officers responded and took Singleton’s statement.  Singleton said 
that Spaulding had entered the apartment around 5:00 a.m. and stayed several hours, 
refusing to let her leave.  He had straddled Singleton in her bed, held a hand over 
her mouth, brandished a steak knife and a handgun,1 and threatened “to kill her as 
revenge for having him arrested in the past.”  He had also demanded money.  While 
officers were still at the scene, Spaulding called Singleton.  Over speakerphone, 
Sergeant Carl Woofter heard Spaulding tell Singleton three times to “let this go”; 
Spaulding also warned, “I’m watching you now.” 
{¶ 13} Police issued a warrant for Spaulding’s arrest on four first-degree 
felony charges: aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, domestic violence, and 
kidnapping.  Spaulding later told police that he had been aware that he had been 
charged and believed (incorrectly) that he was facing an attempted-murder charge.  
At trial, Lieutenant James Phister explained that Spaulding could have been 
sentenced to up to 46 years of imprisonment if convicted of these charges. 
{¶ 14} Singleton began staying at a battered-women’s shelter and again 
sought a civil protection order against Spaulding.  On December 1, 2011, she 
appeared at an ex parte hearing in Summit County before domestic-relations 
magistrate Stephan Bennett Collins.  At trial, Magistrate Collins testified that 
Singleton “gave some pretty compelling testimony as to the nature of the violence 
she had experienced.”  Magistrate Collins issued a one-year protection order and 
                                                          
 
1 Spaulding later told police that he had purchased a .25-caliber gun to protect his mother and sister 
but eventually sold it. 
January Term, 2016 
 
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scheduled a final hearing for December 14, at which Spaulding would have an 
opportunity to respond to Singleton’s allegations. 
{¶ 15} Spaulding told police that he did not speak to Singleton again until 
about a week after the November 28 incident.  He said that he offered Singleton 
$2,500 to “drop the charges” against him and that she agreed, without accepting the 
money.  On December 6, Singleton contacted police to ask whether she could have 
the charges dismissed.  A few days later, she showed her mother her life-insurance 
policies and explained, “[J]ust in case something happen[s], * * * I got a hundred 
thousand dollars on me.”  On December 14, Singleton did not appear for the final 
hearing on the civil protection order issued by Magistrate Collins. 
{¶ 16} At trial, Singleton’s mother testified that she had urged her daughter 
to leave Spaulding at various times but that Singleton kept “going back” to him.  In 
addition, the state introduced testimony from Dana Zedak, a social worker at a 
battered-women’s shelter.  Zedak testified about the dynamics of domestic 
violence.  She explained that victims are often reluctant to prosecute domestic 
violence and have a tendency to return to abusive relationships and to blame 
themselves for the violence. 
2.  The events of December 15, 2011 
{¶ 17} On December 14, 2011, Singleton asked her mother to watch 
Dre’San and Damonie.  She went to the movies with Thomas, then back to his 
house at 1104 Grant Street.  They spent an hour or two with Thomas’s nephew, 
Patrick “Pee Wee” Griffin, and his friend Anthony Shellman. 
{¶ 18} Shortly before 2:00 a.m. on December 15, Griffin left Thomas’s 
home to pick up food and to sell cocaine.  Griffin was walking out the side door of 
the house, which opened onto the driveway, when he saw someone with a gun.  The 
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person shot Griffin in the back of the neck from a distance of three or four feet.  The 
bullet transected his spinal cord and paralyzed him from the neck down.2 
{¶ 19} Shellman testified that as he was walking out the door, he heard 
Griffin say, “Ah, shit,” followed by three gunshots and Griffin’s screams.  Shellman 
ran back into the house and used a mattress for cover.  He heard someone unload a 
gun and exchange the clip.  Later, he looked into the kitchen and saw “a tall 
individual,” whom he could not identify.  Eventually, Shellman ran out of the house 
with Thomas and Singleton and called 9-1-1. 
{¶ 20} Emergency medical personnel transported Griffin to the hospital.  
His car remained at 1104 Grant Street, where it blocked Thomas’s and Singleton’s 
cars in the driveway until it was towed at 5:00 a.m.  According to Thomas’s friend, 
Niechelle Bell, she gave Thomas and Singleton a ride to Singleton’s apartment in 
Tallmadge at 3:30 or 4:00 a.m. 
{¶ 21} Around 7:45 a.m., Singleton called her mother, Kimberly (“Kim”) 
Singleton, and said she was on her way to pick up Dre’San for school.  Not long 
after, Spaulding called Kim and asked, “Did Erica make it there yet?”  Kim told 
him that Singleton was on her way.  In response, Spaulding “started laughing” and 
asked, “She ain’t made it there yet?” 
{¶ 22} At 8:01 a.m., two men found Singleton and Thomas lying in the 
driveway of 1104 Grant Street and called 9-1-1. 
 
 
                                                          
 
2 As a result of his injuries, Griffin is a quadriplegic, has undergone multiple surgeries, and requires 
constant care.  Thus, he did not testify at trial.  Instead, over defense objection, the state played a 
video recording of Griffin’s deposition from September 18, 2012.  The judge was present at the 
deposition, and Griffin was cross-examined by defense counsel.  Spaulding and lead defense 
counsel, Donald Walker, were not in the same room as Griffin but participated in the deposition 
from a nearby room via a live, closed-circuit video feed. 
January Term, 2016 
 
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3.  Initial investigation 
{¶ 23} Police were dispatched to 1104 Grant Street twice on December 15, 
2011, arriving first at 1:55 a.m. to investigate Griffin’s shooting and then at 8:05 
a.m. to investigate Singleton’s and Thomas’s deaths. 
{¶ 24} After Griffin’s shooting, police secured the crime scene, searched 
the house, and collected evidence.  They noted bullet holes in the kitchen doorframe 
and recovered .32-caliber shell casings from the front porch, the dining-room table 
and floor, and the dining-room doorframe.  Police also found evidence of drug 
trafficking in the house, including a scale and a baggie of powder cocaine.  And 
Griffin’s car contained what appeared to be drugs and $2,400 in cash. 
{¶ 25} Officers finished processing the scene around 5:00 a.m.  Three hours 
later, after Singleton’s and Thomas’s bodies were found, an officer took a six-
minute video of the crime scene, including the inside and outside of 1104 Grant 
Street and the victims. 
{¶ 26} The video showed Singleton and Thomas lying on the driveway next 
to their cars.  Singleton was face-down, holding a piece of luggage and a purse.  
Thomas was face-up several feet from Singleton.  The driver-side door of his car 
was open, keys were in the ignition, and the car was running.  A bag of clothes and 
a piece of luggage were in the backseat, and another piece of luggage was next to 
the car. 
{¶ 27} Summit County’s Chief Medical Examiner, Dr. Lisa Kohler, and 
Deputy Medical Examiner, Dr. Dorothy Dean, conducted autopsies and concluded 
that Singleton and Thomas each died from a single gunshot wound to the back of 
the head.  The medical examiners classified the deaths as homicides. 
{¶ 28} Police did not recover the weapon used to shoot Griffin, Singleton 
or Thomas.  But they did collect four 9-mm shell casings from the driveway of 1104 
Grant Street.  Lieutenant Phister testified that two of the four casings were present 
when police photographed the scene after Griffin’s shooting and that two more 
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8
were present when police returned to the scene just after 8:00 a.m.  Subsequent 
analysis by the Bureau of Criminal Investigation revealed that all four casings were 
fired from the same weapon, a 9-mm Luger. 
{¶ 29} Singleton’s mother went to 1104 Grant Street and told police that 
she suspected Spaulding.  When Detective Richard Morrison learned that 
Spaulding had outstanding felony warrants related to his alleged robbery and 
kidnapping of Singleton, he directed officers to bring Spaulding in for questioning. 
{¶ 30} Meanwhile, police continued to pursue other leads.  But, according 
to Detective Morrison, “in the end * * * everything started coming back to 
[Spaulding].” 
4.  Spaulding’s arrest and interrogation 
{¶ 31} On December 16, police arrested Spaulding at Peaches’s apartment 
around 7:00 or 8:00 p.m.  Detectives questioned Spaulding that night and two more 
times on December 19.  The state played redacted video recordings of the first and 
third interrogations at trial. 
{¶ 32} During the interviews, Spaulding consistently denied the charges 
related to the November 28 incident and responsibility for all three shootings.  He 
said he was at Peaches’s apartment all night on December 14 to 15 and that he left 
at around 7:30 a.m. on December 15 to buy marijuana on Channelwood Circle in 
Akron.  According to Spaulding, as he was driving to Channelwood Circle, he 
texted Singleton shortly before 8:00 a.m. and asked whether he could speak to their 
son, Dre’San, before Dre’San went to school.  Singleton agreed to call after she 
picked up Dre’San.  When Spaulding did not hear from Singleton, he called her 
mother, Kim, at around 8:15 a.m. to see whether Singleton had arrived.  Kim said 
no.  After that, Spaulding bought the marijuana, spent at least an hour at the house 
of his cousin Amhad, and then returned to Peaches’s apartment. 
{¶ 33} Spaulding offered police two possible leads on the December 15 
shootings.  First, he urged officers to speak to two women named Ciera and Keona, 
January Term, 2016 
 
9
who reportedly saw Singleton after Griffin was shot.  According to Spaulding, 
Singleton went to Ciera’s house early on December 15, “laughing” about someone 
getting shot.  Ciera told Spaulding that Singleton hid “some dope and a gun” at the 
house and retrieved them later.  Ciera also said that Singleton mentioned four men 
who were wearing masks.  But neither Ciera nor Keona was willing to speak to 
police.  As a second possible lead, Spaulding told officers about rumors that the 
shootings involved an attempted robbery or a drug deal gone bad.  He had heard 
that Griffin had shorted a buyer a few grams of marijuana, then started “flashing 
money around.” 
{¶ 34} During police questioning, Spaulding denied knowing that Singleton 
was staying at 1104 Grant Street.  But he admitted that by 4:00 a.m. on December 
15, he knew that Singleton was not at a shelter.  He was familiar with Thomas’s 
house, Singleton’s license plate number, and her car.  But Spaulding insisted that 
he had never been to 1104 Grant Street, that he did not know Thomas, and that he 
had not been jealous.  Spaulding suggested that if she had been home with the kids 
or had taken the kids to school, then she would not have been at the “wrong place 
at the wrong time.” 
{¶ 35} Police could not verify Spaulding’s alibi.  According to police, 
Peaches—who did not testify at trial—said that Spaulding was living with her, but 
she did not confirm that he was home all night on December 14 to 15.  Instead, she 
told police that she had called Spaulding looking for him around 7:50 a.m. on 
December 15.  Peaches was talking to Spaulding on the phone when he received a 
call informing him of Singleton’s death. 
{¶ 36} When police told Spaulding that Peaches did not back up his alibi, 
Spaulding changed his story; he said that December 14 to 15 must have been the 
night he slept in the driveway of his cousin’s house, on the west side of town. 
{¶ 37} Cell-phone records also contradicted Spaulding’s accounts.  He had 
sent text messages to Singleton during the night of the shootings expressing concern 
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that she was with another man.  Around 10:00 p.m., he texted her, “Dam u wit a 
nigga y u aint answer.”  Nine minutes later, he texted her, “Dam we just broke up 
u wit a nigga already.”  On December 15, his phone was used to place six calls—
three between 2:04 and 2:15 a.m. and three between 7:58 and 8:08 a.m.—that 
bounced off cell-phone towers in the vicinity of 1104 Grant Street.  And although 
Spaulding had denied knowing Thomas, his phone had been used to place five calls 
to Thomas’s phone on December 14 and 15. 
5.  Witness identifications and inculpatory statements 
{¶ 38} Two witnesses identified Spaulding, and two other witnesses 
testified that they had heard him make inculpatory statements. 
{¶ 39} First, Patrick Griffin identified Spaulding as his shooter.  Police 
interviewed Griffin in the hospital on December 20, 2011.  Detective Morrison 
asked Griffin several questions, including whether the shooter was Singleton’s ex-
boyfriend.  Griffin, who was unable to speak, nodded his head “yes.”  Police then 
showed Griffin six photos, including a photo of Spaulding, and asked whether any 
of the men was the shooter.  Griffin shook his head “no” to each.  Griffin viewed 
the same array again a few minutes later, after police told him about the murders of 
Singleton and Thomas.  During the second viewing, Griffin identified Spaulding’s 
photo and indicated he was “a hundred percent sure” that that man had shot him. 
{¶ 40} Griffin twice more verified his identification of Spaulding.  In May 
2012, police asked him to view the photo array again so they could record the 
identification.  (Recording had not been possible on December 20, because Griffin 
was in the intensive-care unit.)  And during a deposition in September 2012, Griffin 
identified Spaulding as his shooter via closed-circuit video. 
{¶ 41} Second, Todd Wilbur testified that he saw a man—whom he 
identified as Spaulding at trial—outside 1104 Grant Street the morning of 
December 15.  Wilbur stopped his car at the corner of Grant Street and Stanton 
Avenue for 15 to 20 seconds around 7:52 a.m.  He saw two people coming down 
January Term, 2016 
 
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from the porch of 1104 Grant Street—a black man and a black woman carrying a 
piece of luggage.  While Wilbur watched, a second black man walked down the 
sidewalk toward the house.  When she noticed the second man, the woman stopped 
in her tracks.  The two men met at the end of the driveway.  Wilbur observed 
“heated” body language, then saw the second man push the first and motion to his 
own waistband.  Wilbur did not want his son (a passenger in the car) to see a fight, 
so he drove away.  After driving about 50 feet, Wilbur “hear[d] pop and then pop.” 
{¶ 42} Later that morning, Wilbur returned to the scene.  He told police that 
he had seen an altercation and a car in the driveway.  But he was reluctant to offer 
more details because it was a rough neighborhood and he was scared.  Around nine 
months later, after moving to a new neighborhood, Wilbur approached police to 
elaborate on his statement. 
{¶ 43} Third, Anthony Shellman testified that he confronted Spaulding 
while they were both incarcerated in the Summit County Jail.  Shellman accused 
Spaulding of “kill[ing] [Shellman’s] dude” and said that he had been at 1104 Grant 
Street the night of the shootings.  Spaulding responded, “No, you wasn’t.” 
{¶ 44} Finally, James Allen Gilbert testified that he had met Spaulding in 
the Summit County Jail.  According to Gilbert, Spaulding said that Spaulding’s 
cousin had burned the clothes Spaulding “had on that day” and that “[t]he pistol in 
[his] case no longer exists.” 
C.  The Defense Case 
{¶ 45} Spaulding’s counsel tried to create reasonable doubt by suggesting 
alternative theories of the murders, supported by testimony elicited on cross-
examination. 
{¶ 46} First, the defense attempted to cast doubt on Griffin’s identification 
of Spaulding.  On cross-examination, Detective Morrison conceded that someone 
could have told Griffin information about the identity of the shooter before he first 
viewed the photo array.  Four of Griffin’s family members visited him in the 
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hospital, and only two testified that they did not tell him that police suspected 
Spaulding.  (The other two did not testify on the issue.)  The defense also implied 
that Morrison may have been unduly suggestive when, just before Griffin was 
shown the photo array, he asked Griffin whether the shooter had been Singleton’s 
ex-boyfriend. 
{¶ 47} In addition, there was conflicting testimony about whether there was 
enough light for Griffin to see his assailant at the time of the shooting.  Griffin 
testified that a light was on above the side door of 1104 Grant Street, but Shellman 
testified that the area near the side door was dark.  Two officers who responded to 
the Griffin shooting testified that they could see three or four feet away in that area, 
but one officer said that he used his flashlight and the other observed that some 
light was generated by police cruisers at the scene. 
{¶ 48} Second, the defense suggested that the murders may have been drug 
related.  Evidence indicated that Griffin and Thomas were known drug dealers and 
that drugs had been sold at 1104 Grant Street for years.  Griffin claimed that when 
he was leaving 1104 Grant Street just before his shooting, he was going to sell 
cocaine to a customer named Glen Brown.  But Carl Thomas (Thomas’s brother) 
testified that Griffin was meeting Brown at the house. 
{¶ 49} Finally, the defense implied that the shootings were related to the 
murder of David Clark (“Frog”).  Frog, a childhood friend of the Thomas brothers, 
was murdered around the corner from 1104 Grant Street in June 2011.  The defense 
implied that Thomas, who police initially believed was present when Frog was 
murdered, may have been killed by someone getting revenge on Frog’s behalf.  But 
the officer who investigated Frog’s murder testified that Thomas was not present 
when Frog died, and Detective Morrison testified that police never found any 
connection between the murders.  Carl Thomas also testified that his brother had 
long been cleared of suspicion; he denied any lingering friction between the Clark 
and Thomas families after Frog’s death. 
January Term, 2016 
 
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D.  Verdict and Sentencing 
{¶ 50} The jury convicted Spaulding of all counts and specifications, with 
two exceptions: Count 7, menacing by stalking, and the first capital specification 
to Count 1, alleging that Spaulding purposely killed Singleton to prevent her from 
testifying as a witness in another case. 
{¶ 51} After a mitigation hearing, the trial court accepted the jury’s 
recommendation to sentence Spaulding to death.  The court also sentenced 
Spaulding to 32 and a half years on the remaining counts. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
{¶ 52} On direct appeal, Spaulding raises 14 propositions of law.  For 
clarity, we address these propositions out of order. 
A. Absence of Defense Counsel 
{¶ 53} Before Spaulding’s arraignment, two capital-certified counsel were 
appointed to represent him.  But, according to Spaulding, there were a number of 
occasions when either lead counsel, Donald Walker, or co-counsel, Jason Wells, 
was absent for a hearing or part of the trial.  In proposition of law No. 1, Spaulding 
contends that these absences violated his Sixth Amendment and due-process rights. 
{¶ 54} Spaulding’s argument begins with his interpretation of former 
Sup.R. 20,3 which governed the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants 
charged with capital offenses at the time of his trial.  Pursuant to former Sup.R. 
20(I)(C), if a “defendant is entitled to the appointment of counsel, the court shall 
appoint two attorneys certified pursuant to Sup.R. 20 through 20.05.” 
{¶ 55} According to Spaulding, because former Sup.R. 20 entitled him to 
two appointed counsel, he was also entitled to have two counsel present at every 
stage of the litigation.  But Sup.R. 20 “does not require that both appointed 
                                                          
 
3 We quote the version of Sup.R. 20 that was in effect in 2011 and 2012, the period at issue in this 
case.  The cited rules are now found in Appt.Coun.R. 5.02, which became effective February 1, 
2015.  See 141 Ohio St.3d CLXXXIII-CLXXXIV. 
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attorneys be involved in every aspect of a defendant’s case.”  State v. Parker, 516 
S.E.2d 106, 114 (N.C.1999) (interpreting an analogous North Carolina law that 
entitles an indigent capital defendant to two attorneys).  In fact, capital defendants 
are generally represented by a team, which may include multiple attorneys, an 
investigator, a mitigation expert, and medical experts. Appt.Coun.R. 5.10(A). Lead 
counsel “bear[s] overall responsibility for the performance of the defense team,” 
but it is expected that he or she will “allocate, direct, and supervise the work of the 
defense team.”  Appt.Coun.R. 5.10(B); see also American Bar Association, ABA 
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death 
Penalty Cases, Guideline 10.4(B) (Rev.Ed.2003), reprinted in 31 Hofstra L.Rev. 
913, 999 (2003).  The rules do not require both appointed counsel to be present at 
every pretrial hearing or every moment of trial. 
{¶ 56} We also reject Spaulding’s related claim that his trial counsel were 
constitutionally ineffective because both were not present at every proceeding.  To 
establish a Sixth Amendment violation, a defendant ordinarily must establish both 
that counsel performed deficiently and that he or she was prejudiced by the deficient 
performance.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).  However, the United States Supreme Court “has uniformly 
found constitutional error without any showing of prejudice when counsel was  
* * * totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage 
of the proceeding.”  (Emphasis added.)  United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659, 
104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), fn. 25; see also Strickland at 692 (“Actual 
or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to 
result in prejudice”). 
{¶ 57} Here, Spaulding does not assert—nor does the record indicate—that 
both his counsel were ever “totally absent.”  As such, we decline to presume 
prejudice under Strickland.  See People v. Montiel, 5 Cal.4th 877, 906, 21 
Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277 (1993), fn. 5 (“there is no authority for the 
January Term, 2016 
 
15 
proposition that a capital defendant has the right to the courtroom presence of both 
appointed cocounsel”); see also Jones v. State, 124 Nev. 1483, 238 P.3d 827, *6 
(2008) (unpublished) (capital defendant not totally deprived of counsel where “he 
was represented by counsel at all critical stages of the criminal proceedings, albeit 
in one or two instances by only one counsel”). 
{¶ 58} Therefore, to establish a Sixth Amendment violation, Spaulding 
would have to prove that “but for” his attorneys’ isolated absences, “the result of 
the proceeding would have been different.”  Strickland at 694.  But Spaulding does 
not explain how he was prejudiced by Walker’s or Wells’s absence at any 
proceeding, or even the cumulative effect of those absences.  And the record shows 
that Walker actively represented Spaulding in Wells’s absence and that Wells 
actively represented Spaulding when Walker was absent.  Under these 
circumstances, counsel’s absences did not violate Spaulding’s rights to counsel or 
due process. 
{¶ 59} We therefore reject proposition of law No. 1. 
B. Joinder 
{¶ 60} In proposition of law No. 5, Spaulding argues that the trial court 
violated his rights to due process and a fair trial when it denied his motion for relief 
from prejudicial joinder.  We disagree. 
1.  Crim.R. 8(A) and 14 
{¶ 61} Ohio “favors joining multiple offenses in a single trial * * * if the 
offenses charged ‘are of the same or similar character.’ ”  State v. Lott, 51 Ohio 
St.3d 160, 163, 555 N.E.2d 293 (1990), quoting Crim.R. 8(A).  Crim.R. 8(A) also 
allows the joinder of offenses that “are based on the same act or transaction, or are 
based on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts 
of a common scheme or plan, or are part of a course of criminal conduct.”  
Permitting joinder “conserves resources by avoiding duplication inherent in 
multiple trials and minimizes the possibility of incongruous results that can occur 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
in successive trials before different juries.”  State v. Hamblin, 37 Ohio St.3d 153, 
158, 524 N.E.2d 476 (1988). 
{¶ 62} “Notwithstanding the policy in favor of joinder,” Crim.R. 14 permits 
a defendant to request severance of the “counts of an indictment on the grounds that 
he or she is prejudiced by the joinder of multiple offenses.”  State v. LaMar, 95 
Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 49.  In doing so, the defendant 
“has the burden of furnishing the trial court with sufficient information so that it 
can weigh the considerations favoring joinder against the defendant’s right to a fair 
trial.”  State v. Torres, 66 Ohio St.2d 340, 343, 421 N.E.2d 1288 (1981).  Even 
then, the state can overcome a defendant’s claim of prejudicial joinder by showing 
either that (1) it could have introduced evidence of the joined offenses as “other 
acts” under Evid.R. 404(B) or (2) the “evidence of each crime joined at trial is 
simple and direct.”  Lott at 163. 
{¶ 63} We review a trial court’s ruling on a Crim.R. 14 motion for an abuse 
of discretion.  State v. Hand, 107 Ohio St.3d 378, 2006-Ohio-18, 840 N.E.2d 151, 
¶ 166.  A defendant who appeals the denial of relief bears a heavy burden:  
 
He must affirmatively demonstrate (1) that his rights were 
prejudiced, (2) that at the time of the motion to sever he 
provided the trial court with sufficient information so that it 
could weigh the considerations favoring joinder against the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial, and (3) that given the 
information provided to the court, it abused its discretion in 
refusing to separate the charges for trial. 
 
State v. Schaim, 65 Ohio St.3d 51, 59, 600 N.E.2d 661 (1992). 
{¶ 64} If a defendant did not file a Crim.R. 14 motion in the trial court, 
however, we review claims of prejudicial joinder for plain error.  See Lott, 51 Ohio 
January Term, 2016 
 
17 
St.3d at 164, 555 N.E.2d 293.  To prevail under this standard, the defendant must 
establish that an error occurred, it was obvious, and it affected his or her substantial 
rights.  See Crim.R. 52(B); State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 
(2002) (an error affects substantial rights only if it “affected the outcome of the 
trial”).  We take “[n]otice of plain error * * * with the utmost caution, under 
exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.”  
State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph three of the 
syllabus. 
2.  Spaulding’s motion for relief 
{¶ 65} To determine whether the trial court erred by denying Spaulding’s 
Crim.R. 14 motion, it is first necessary to clarify the relief he sought at trial. 
{¶ 66} Spaulding’s written motion did not specify which counts of the 
indictment he wanted the trial court to sever, but defense counsel later clarified the 
request.  During a pretrial hearing, counsel expressed concern that the jurors would 
be prejudiced against Spaulding after hearing all the charges against him; he 
reasoned that the jurors would assume Spaulding’s guilt as soon as they learned 
that he was accused of shooting three victims.  Defense counsel explained that the 
menacing-by-stalking charge would permit the state to introduce evidence of 
Spaulding’s relationship with Singleton during the 17 days prior to the murders “or 
even years before that.”  And he argued that this evidence was irrelevant to the 
attempted murder of Griffin because the attempted murder arose from a “different 
fact pattern[ ]” than the murders of Thomas and Singleton. 
{¶ 67} The trial court appeared receptive to Spaulding’s concerns about the 
prejudicial impact of evidence that the state might introduce to prove menacing by 
stalking.  After hearing defense counsel’s arguments, the court said, “I think the 
only place you get with your argument is your argument about menacing by stalking 
bringing in a lot of prior conduct.  But I can’t see separating the two murders from 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
the attempted murder.”  Counsel responded, “That’s what we’re looking to do, Your 
Honor, and we’d like our objection noted.” 
{¶ 68} In light of this exchange, it became clear that defense counsel wanted 
the court to order separate trials for the crimes relating to Griffin, on the one hand, 
and the crimes relating to Singleton and Thomas, on the other hand.  But defense 
counsel did not specifically ask the court to sever the menacing-by-stalking count 
or any other count of the indictment, even when the trial court pressed the issue. 
{¶ 69} Under these circumstances, the trial court reasonably denied 
Spaulding’s request.  Counts 1 through 3 of the indictment—aggravated murder of 
Singleton, aggravated murder of Thomas, and attempted murder of Griffin—
alleged offenses that were part of a single course of criminal conduct that occurred 
on the morning of December 15, 2011.  These crimes all occurred at the same 
location and involved the same weapon.  And even though they involved three 
different victims, the evidence of these crimes was interrelated.  See Hamblin, 37 
Ohio St.3d at 158, 524 N.E.2d 476 (joinder proper when two criminal acts had 
occurred near each other, less than 20 minutes apart, in part because evidence of 
the crimes “was interrelated”). 
3.  Menacing by stalking and domestic violence 
{¶ 70} On appeal, Spaulding also claims that the trial court erred “[b]y 
denying the motion to sever the domestic violence and menacing by stalking 
charges from the aggravated murder and attempted murder charges.”  But, as 
explained above, Spaulding did not ask the trial court to sever those counts.  As 
such, we review this claim for plain error only.  Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d at 164, 555 
N.E.2d 293. 
{¶ 71} Count 6 of the indictment alleged that Spaulding committed 
domestic violence against Singleton on December 15, 2011.  And because the state 
charged Spaulding with third-degree-felony domestic violence, it had to prove not 
only that he committed domestic violence on December 15, but also that he had 
January Term, 2016 
 
19 
two or more prior domestic-violence convictions.  R.C. 2919.25(D)(4).  As such, 
the inclusion of Count 6 in the indictment meant that jurors would learn about 
Spaulding’s prior acts of domestic violence. 
{¶ 72} Count 7 charged Spaulding with committing menacing by stalking 
against Singleton between November 29 and December 15, 2011.  To convict 
Spaulding on this count, the state had to prove that he had “engag[ed] in a pattern 
of conduct” that “knowingly cause[d]” Singleton to believe that he would cause her 
physical harm or mental distress.  R.C. 2903.211(A)(1).  Accordingly, as explained 
below in the analysis of proposition of law Nos. 6 and 7, evidence of Spaulding’s 
past domestic violence would be relevant to establish both a pattern of conduct and 
that Spaulding knew that his conduct would cause Singleton to believe that he was 
going to harm her.  See State v. Horsley, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-350, 2006-
Ohio-1208, ¶ 25-26; State v. Bilder, 99 Ohio App.3d 653, 658, 651 N.E.2d 502 (9th 
Dist.1994). 
{¶ 73} Thus, the joinder of Counts 6 and 7 with the other counts of the 
indictment undeniably stood to expose the jury to significant evidence that might 
prejudice Spaulding’s trial on the remaining charges.  And, at trial, the state did 
introduce extensive evidence of Spaulding’s prior bad acts to support these charges.  
Under these circumstances, if Spaulding had requested severance of these two 
counts and provided the trial court adequate information about the prejudicial effect 
that joinder would have on his trial, the court would have been justified in severing 
these counts for trial. 
{¶ 74} That said, the trial court did not plainly err by permitting these counts 
to be tried together.  The joinder of these counts was not erroneous on its face at 
the outset of trial.  And even if it had been, given the substantial evidence of 
Spaulding’s guilt, the alleged error was not outcome determinative.  See Barnes, 94 
Ohio St.3d at 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240.  Witnesses placed Spaulding at 1104 Grant 
Street at the time of both shootings.  Griffin identified Spaulding as his shooter, and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
Wilbur saw Spaulding with Singleton and Thomas moments before their murders.  
And ballistics evidence indicated that the same weapon was used in both incidents.  
Under the circumstances, we find no plain error. 
{¶ 75} For these reasons, we reject proposition of law No. 5. 
C. Motions to Suppress 
{¶ 76} Proposition of law Nos. 2 and 4 assert that trial counsel provided 
constitutionally ineffective assistance with regard to two suppression issues.  We 
disagree. 
{¶ 77} To prevail, Spaulding must (1) show that counsel’s performance 
“fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” as determined by “prevailing 
professional norms,” and (2) demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  When 
performing a Strickland analysis, we “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”  Id. at 
689. 
1.  Griffin’s identification 
{¶ 78} In proposition of law No. 2, Spaulding argues that his trial counsel’s 
efforts to challenge Griffin’s identification were constitutionally ineffective. 
a.  Factual background 
{¶ 79} On October 18, 2012, after three days of voir dire, defense counsel 
filed a motion to suppress all evidence and statements obtained as a result of 
Griffin’s identification of Spaulding in a photo array.  Spaulding argued that the 
“identification process * * * was unduly suggestive and tainted the identification.”  
He raised two specific objections:  (1) the Akron Police Department had not 
adopted procedures for conducting photo arrays, as required by R.C. 2933.83, and 
(2) the photos in the array were themselves “unnecessarily suggestive and 
conducive to irreparable mistaken identification.” 
January Term, 2016 
 
21 
{¶ 80} On October 19, 2012, the trial court questioned defense counsel 
about the lateness of their motion.  Counsel explained that although they initially 
had reservations about it, they ultimately decided that the motion was proper in 
order to protect the record and themselves on appellate review. 
{¶ 81} The court then heard testimony from Detective Morrison about his 
interview of Griffin on December 20, 2011.  Morrison explained that at the time, 
Griffin was in the hospital’s intensive-care unit, was intubated, and could 
communicate only by nodding his head “yes” or shaking his head “no.” 
{¶ 82} Detective Morrison asked Griffin several preliminary questions 
before beginning the array, to make sure “he was with it.”  When he concluded that 
Griffin understood the preliminary questions and was responding appropriately, 
Morrison proceeded with the array. 
{¶ 83} Griffin viewed the array twice on December 20.  On the first 
viewing, he shook his head “no” to all six pictures.  But Detective Morrison testified 
that Griffin “stared, kind of had a little angry look” when he reached the fourth 
photo (later identified as Spaulding).  After Griffin failed to make an identification, 
Morrison told him that two of his friends had been killed.  Then Griffin viewed the 
array a second time.  According to Morrison, when Griffin reached the fourth photo, 
his eyes entered a “dead stare” and “tears started rolling down his eyes.”  He 
identified the person as his shooter, nodding “yes” when Morrison asked whether 
he was “100 percent sure.” 
{¶ 84} Police did not record the December 20 interview and photo array 
because Griffin was in intensive care.  But almost six months later, on May 11, 
2012, Griffin viewed the array a third time and again identified Spaulding.  Police 
recorded that identification on video. 
{¶ 85} In addition to Detective Morrison’s testimony, the state introduced a 
written copy of the Akron Police Department’s photo-array procedures, the photo-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
array instructions that were read to Griffin, the array he viewed, and the recording 
of the May 2012 identification. 
{¶ 86} After reviewing the evidence, the trial court overruled the 
suppression motion.  In a written order, the court rejected Spaulding’s claim that 
the police department had not adopted a proper photo-array procedure and also 
found, “upon its own inspection of the photo array used in this case, that the photo 
array is not impermissibly suggestive.”  The court also noted that Spaulding’s 
motion was untimely. 
b.  Analysis 
{¶ 87} Spaulding argues that his trial counsel provided constitutionally 
ineffective assistance with regard to Griffin’s identification in three ways. 
{¶ 88} First, he argues that his counsel were unprepared to challenge 
Griffin’s identification, as evidenced by their filing the suppression motion several 
days after voir dire had begun.  The trial court noted the untimeliness, and the 
prosecutor cited this as grounds for rejecting the motion.  See Crim.R. 12(C)(3) 
(requiring that any suppression motions be filed before trial).  But even so, 
Spaulding was not prejudiced by counsel’s dilatory filing:  the trial court held a 
suppression hearing and resolved the motion on its merits. 
{¶ 89} Second, Spaulding maintains that counsel’s suppression motion was 
so inadequate that it violated his Sixth Amendment rights.  Initially, he points to 
the late filing as proof that counsel were unprepared to argue the suppression issue.  
Then he argues that counsel failed to mention three facts that would have supported 
suppression:  (1) Griffin did not identify Spaulding in the first array, (2) Griffin was 
in poor health on December 20, and (3) several days passed between the shooting 
and the first array.  But even if counsel should have stressed all these points, 
Spaulding cannot establish prejudice.  Detective Morrison testified to all of this 
information during the suppression hearing.  Thus, the trial court was apprised of 
these facts before it ruled on the motion. 
January Term, 2016 
 
23 
{¶ 90} Finally, presumably in an effort to show how his trial counsel 
compounded the harm done by ineffectively arguing his suppression motion, 
Spaulding critiques counsel’s performance during Detective Morrison’s testimony 
at trial.  According to Spaulding, trial counsel should have cross-examined 
Morrison about Griffin’s initial failure to make an identification.  But “[t]he scope 
of cross-examination falls within the ambit of trial strategy, and debatable trial 
tactics do not establish ineffective assistance of counsel.”  State v. Conway, 109 
Ohio St.3d 412, 2006-Ohio-2815, 848 N.E.2d 810, ¶ 101. 
{¶ 91} Spaulding also argues that trial counsel should have objected when 
Detective Morrison vouched for Griffin’s second identification as follows: 
 
Q: Now, in your experience as a detective, do you feel 
that he was honest in the statement that he gave?  
A: The second one, yes. 
 
 
Spaulding is correct in this regard; counsel should have objected to this testimony.  
See State v. Young, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 79243, 2002-Ohio-2744, ¶ 75-77 
(officer’s testimony that a witness was “telling the truth” “improperly invaded the 
province of the jury because only it can determine witness credibility”).  But, even 
so, Spaulding cannot establish that “but for” Morrison’s vouching, the result of his 
trial would have differed.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674.  Even without Griffin’s identification, the jury heard Wilbur’s testimony that 
Spaulding was at 1104 Grant Street with Singleton and Thomas moments before 
their murders, and ballistics evidence linked those murders with the shooting of 
Griffin several hours earlier.  Furthermore, the jury knew that Griffin initially 
identified Spaulding only minutes after his first viewing of the photo array and also 
had the opportunity to view video recordings of Griffin identifying Spaulding in 
May 2012 and September 2012. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
{¶ 92} We reject Spaulding’s second proposition of law. 
2.  Spaulding’s statements 
{¶ 93} Police questioned Spaulding three times after his arrest, once on 
December 16, 2011, and twice on December 19, 2011.  During the third 
interrogation, Spaulding made statements about his movements on December 14 
and 15, his actions during the previous week, and his criminal history.  In 
proposition of law No. 4, Spaulding claims that trial counsel should have moved to 
suppress the third interrogation.4 
{¶ 94} The “failure to file a suppression motion does not constitute per se 
ineffective assistance of counsel.”  Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384, 
106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986).  Instead, the ordinary two-part Strickland 
analysis for ineffective assistance claims applies.  Id.  Thus, Spaulding must both 
“prove that there was a basis to suppress the evidence in question,” State v. Brown, 
115 Ohio St.3d 55, 2007-Ohio-4837, 873 N.E.2d 858, ¶ 65, and demonstrate a 
reasonable probability that had the evidence been suppressed, “the result of the 
proceeding would have been different,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
80 L.Ed.2d 674. 
{¶ 95} Spaulding asserts two bases for suppressing the statements he made 
during the third interrogation:  (1) he unequivocally invoked his right to counsel 
and (2) the conditions of the interrogation were unduly coercive.  He then argues 
that he was prejudiced by the admission of these statements because they exposed 
the jurors to “184 pages of discussion about Spaulding’s criminal history and close 
ties to Akron’s criminal community.”  For example, Spaulding referred to his prior 
domestic-violence convictions, his drug use, and the recent shooting of his cousin. 
                                                          
 
4 Spaulding specifically argues that his counsel were ineffective for failing to request suppression 
of Exhibit 230, a transcript of the third interrogation.  But the trial court did not admit Exhibit 230.  
For purposes of analyzing this proposition, we consider Exhibit 214A, a redacted video recording 
of the third interrogation, which was submitted to the jury. 
January Term, 2016 
 
25 
{¶ 96} Here, we cannot find ineffective assistance because, even assuming 
that the third interrogation should have been suppressed, Spaulding cannot satisfy 
Strickland’s second prong.  Spaulding’s assertion of prejudice turns solely on his 
concerns about statements that revealed aspects of his criminal history.  But the 
jury learned about Spaulding’s criminal history from numerous sources, including 
his other statements to police.  And Spaulding has failed to identify specific 
noncumulative information about his criminal history, let alone show a “reasonable 
probability” that excluding this information would have led to his acquittal on any 
of the charged offenses.  See State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389-390, 721 
N.E.2d 52 (2000).  As described above, eyewitness identifications and ballistics 
evidence provided ample basis for the jury to convict Spaulding of murder and 
attempted murder. 
{¶ 97} For these reasons, proposition of law No. 4 fails. 
D. Trial Phase 
1.  Jury view 
{¶ 98} With the agreement of both parties, the trial court permitted the jury 
to view 1104 Grant Street.  In proposition of law No. 3, Spaulding takes issue with 
how the jury view was conducted, arguing that his due-process rights were violated 
and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. 
{¶ 99} First, Spaulding objects to the absence of any record of the jury view.  
Before the jury view, the prosecutor explained to the court that she and defense 
counsel had agreed that neither of them would address the jury while they were at 
the scene.  Instead, the bailiff would read written instructions prepared by the state 
and approved by the defense.  Given this arrangement, Spaulding’s trial counsel 
waived the court reporter’s presence at the jury view.  The record includes a copy 
of the prepared instructions, but there is otherwise no documentation of what 
happened during the jury view. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
{¶ 100} Spaulding argues that due process entitles him to a complete record, 
including a record of the jury view.  But “[w]e will not reverse because of 
unrecorded proceedings when the defendant failed to object and fails to 
demonstrate material prejudice.”  State v. Drummond, 111 Ohio St.3d 14, 2006-
Ohio-5084, 854 N.E.2d 1038, ¶ 135.  Here, Spaulding’s counsel not only failed to 
object, they expressly waived the reporter’s presence, thus inviting any error.  See 
Hal Artz Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 28 Ohio St.3d 20, 502 N.E.2d 
590 (1986), paragraph one of the syllabus (“A party will not be permitted to take 
advantage of an error which he himself invited or induced”); State v. Campbell, 90 
Ohio St.3d 320, 324, 738 N.E.2d 1178 (2000) (invited error may be found “when a 
party has * * * affirmatively consented to a [proposed] procedure”). 
{¶ 101} Moreover, any assertion of prejudice here is purely speculative.  
Spaulding concedes that it is impossible to know whether “anything improper 
occur[red]” without a record.  And he did not take advantage of S.Ct.Prac.R. 
11.03(D), which allows appellants to supplement the record with a statement of 
proceedings “when no report was made or when the transcript is unavailable.”  
Instead, the record that is available undermines Spaulding’s concerns.  Shortly after 
the jury view, the trial judge asked defense counsel whether “any problems * * * 
developed on the jury view,” and he said “no.” 
{¶ 102} Spaulding also claims that his counsel were constitutionally 
ineffective for waiving the reporter’s presence at the jury view.  But even assuming 
deficient performance, Spaulding would need to rely on evidence outside the record 
to establish prejudice under Strickland.  As such, this argument is “not 
appropriately considered on a direct appeal.”  Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d at 391, 721 
N.E.2d 52 (because proof outside the record was needed to establish ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the claim was not appropriate on direct appeal). 
{¶ 103} As a second basis for relief on this claim, Spaulding asserts that 
“[t]he record * * * suggests that [he] was not present during the jury view.”  Under 
January Term, 2016 
 
27 
Ohio law, defendants have a waivable right to attend a jury view, R.C. 2945.16, but 
we have not recognized any concomitant constitutional guarantee.  State v. Were, 
118 Ohio St.3d 448, 2008-Ohio-2762, 890 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 96.  Here, it is unclear 
whether Spaulding attended the jury view.  But, if anything, the record suggests 
that he did; at a hearing the day before the jury view, the parties discussed 
arrangements for transporting him to the jury view.  At that time, the court 
explained that Spaulding would be transported separately in a van with blacked-out 
windows and that he would stay inside the van during the jury view.  Defense 
counsel assented to this procedure, noting “that’s the way it’s always done or has 
been done.” 
{¶ 104} But even if Spaulding did not attend the jury view, he cannot show 
that he was prejudiced by his alleged absence.  See Were at ¶ 98.  Defense counsel 
were present to represent his interests, and they told the court that nothing improper 
had occurred during the jury view.  Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude 
at this time that Spaulding was deprived of due process or effective assistance of 
counsel. 
{¶ 105} Finally, Spaulding argues that his due-process rights were violated 
because the trial judge did not attend the jury view and that his counsel were 
ineffective for waiving the judge’s presence.  As other courts have noted, it is 
“generally considered desirable” to have a trial judge’s oversight during a jury 
view.  Devin v. DeTella, 101 F.3d 1206, 1210 (7th Cir.1996); accord Clemente v. 
Carnicon-Puerto Rico Mgt. Assocs., 52 F.3d 383, 386 (1st Cir.1995), abrogated on 
other grounds, United States v. Gray, 199 F.3d 547, 548 (1st Cir.1999).  However, 
a judge’s absence does not automatically violate due process; instead, it is necessary 
to review “the record as a whole to determine whether the circumstances under 
which the jury view was conducted can be said to have denied [the defendant] a fair 
trial.”  Devin at 1209.  And that analysis occurs against the backdrop of our holding 
that a jury’s “view of a crime scene is neither evidence nor a crucial stage in the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
proceedings.”  State v. Richey, 64 Ohio St.3d 353, 367, 595 N.E.2d 915 (1992), 
overruled on other grounds, State v. McGuire, 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 402-404, 686 
N.E.2d 1112 (1997). 
{¶ 106} Here, we reject Spaulding’s claims for two reasons.  First, the 
record suggests that the judge did accompany the jury to 1104 Grant Street.  The 
transcript states, “The court, counsel, and jury proceeded to view the premises.”  
Second, Spaulding has failed to show how the judge’s alleged absence prejudiced 
him.  The record indicates that the bailiff was the only person to address the jury 
during the jury view, and she followed a written script that defense counsel had 
preapproved.  In addition, the day after the jury view, defense counsel told the court 
that nothing improper had occurred at the jury view.  Thus, the judge’s alleged 
absence did not violate Spaulding’s constitutional rights. 
{¶ 107} Proposition of law No. 3 fails. 
2.  Prior bad acts 
{¶ 108} In proposition of law No. 6, Spaulding asserts that “much—if not 
the majority—of” the state’s evidence at trial “concerned showing the jury that [he] 
is a career criminal and all-around bad human being.”  He then cites specific 
evidence of four “prior bad acts” and argues that it was inadmissible.5  Spaulding 
also contends that his trial counsel were constitutionally ineffective because they 
did not object to this evidence. 
a.  Evid.R. 404(B) 
{¶ 109} “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”  
Evid.R. 404(B).  However, this evidence may be admissible for other purposes, 
                                                          
 
5 Spaulding also cites six journal entries documenting prior convictions and argues that they were 
improperly admitted.  The admission of these exhibits is discussed below, in our analysis of 
proposition of law Nos. 9 and 10. 
January Term, 2016 
 
29 
such as to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”  Id.; accord R.C. 2945.59. 
{¶ 110} A trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to admit or 
exclude other-acts evidence.  See State v. Kirkland, 140 Ohio St.3d 73, 2014-Ohio-
1966, 15 N.E.3d 818, ¶ 67.  Thus, ordinarily we defer to a trial court’s evidentiary 
ruling unless the court “has clearly abused its discretion and the defendant has been 
materially prejudiced thereby.”  State v. Hymore, 9 Ohio St.2d 122, 128, 224 N.E.2d 
126 (1967).  However, when a defendant fails to object to evidence at trial—as 
here—we review the claim for plain error only.  State v. Diar, 120 Ohio St.3d 460, 
2008-Ohio-6266, 900 N.E.2d 565, ¶ 70. 
b.  Alleged events of November 28, 2011 
{¶ 111} Spaulding argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of 
the alleged events at Singleton’s apartment on November 28, 2011, because he was 
not charged with any crimes related to that incident in this case. 
{¶ 112} At trial, Officer Woofter testified that he responded to Singleton’s 
9-1-1 call on November 28.  Singleton had reported that an unwanted guest was in 
her apartment with a gun.  According to Woofter, Singleton was hysterical.  She 
was yelling and screaming and said that the man—whom she later identified as 
Spaulding—was still on the property and that he had threatened “to kill her as 
revenge for having him arrested in the past.”  Jeff Cutler, Spaulding’s probation 
officer, also testified that Singleton called him on November 29 to report 
Spaulding’s break-in.  Cutler later verified that police had issued a warrant for 
Spaulding’s arrest after the incident. 
{¶ 113} Although criminal charges for the November 28 incident were not 
part of this case, the trial court properly admitted evidence of Singleton’s reports 
about the incident and the outstanding warrant for Spaulding’s arrest.  This 
evidence was directly relevant to one of the capital specifications attached to 
Singleton’s aggravated-murder count—that Spaulding murdered her to prevent her 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30 
testimony about another criminal act.  R.C. 2929.04(A)(8).  And these events 
provided both context and a potential motive for the murders and other crimes that 
Spaulding was charged with committing.  See Evid.R. 404(B) (other-acts evidence 
may be admitted to prove motive, intent, and absence of mistake or accident). 
{¶ 114} This evidence was also relevant to prove an element of Count 7, 
menacing by stalking.  Under R.C. 2903.211(A)(1), the state had to establish that 
Spaulding “engag[ed] in a pattern of conduct” that “knowingly cause[d]” Singleton 
to believe that he would cause her physical harm or mental distress.  Thus, his past 
domestic violence was relevant to prove both a pattern of conduct and also that he 
knew that his conduct would cause Singleton to believe that he was going to harm 
her.  Horsley, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-350, 2006-Ohio-1208, at ¶ 25.  “Other 
acts evidence can be particularly useful in prosecutions for menacing by stalking 
because it can assist the jury in understanding that a defendant’s otherwise innocent 
appearing acts, when put into the context of previous contacts he has had with the 
victim, may be knowing attempts to cause mental distress.”  Bilder, 99 Ohio App.3d 
at 658, 651 N.E.2d 502; see State v. Hart, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2008-06-079, 
2009-Ohio-997, ¶ 12 (“In prosecutions for menacing by stalking, the victim’s belief 
that the defendant will cause physical harm is an element of the offense which is 
often intertwined with their past interactions”). 
{¶ 115} Moreover, to the extent that Spaulding is challenging Singleton’s 
statements to Officers Woofter and Cutler as inadmissible hearsay, his argument 
fails.  The trial court could reasonably have concluded that Singleton’s statements 
to Woofter were excited utterances, see Evid.R. 803(2), since he testified that she 
was in a hysterical state.  More importantly, Singleton’s statements to both Woofter 
and Cutler were not introduced for their truth, i.e., to prove Spaulding’s guilt of a 
crime committed on November 28.  Instead, they were introduced to show that 
Singleton had expressed fear of Spaulding and was attempting to enlist protection 
from law enforcement. 
January Term, 2016 
 
31 
{¶ 116} The trial court did not err by admitting this evidence. 
c.  2011 domestic-violence conviction 
{¶ 117} Spaulding next challenges the admission at trial of evidence of his 
July 2011 conviction for felony domestic violence against Singleton.  Cutler 
testified that Spaulding came under his supervision after receiving a three-year 
suspended sentence for the offense, but he did not provide any details about the 
nature of the incident. 
{¶ 118} This testimony was properly admitted because Spaulding’s July 
2011 conviction was not just other-acts evidence; it was proof of an element of 
Count 6.  To convict Spaulding of third-degree-felony domestic violence, the state 
had to prove that he had two or more prior domestic-violence convictions.  R.C. 
2919.25(D)(4); see State v. Harrington, 3d Dist. Logan No. 08-01-20, 2002-Ohio-
2190, ¶ 10 (“When a prior offense acts to transform a crime by increasing its degree, 
the prior offense becomes an element of the crime and must be proven by the State 
beyond a reasonable doubt”).  The state may prove a prior conviction by 
introducing a judgment entry—including the defendant’s sentence, see R.C. 
2945.75(B)(1)—but that is not “the only method to prove it.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State 
v. Gwen, 134 Ohio St.3d 284, 2012-Ohio-5046, 982 N.E.2d 626, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 119} Moreover, even if the evidence were not admissible for this 
purpose, Spaulding’s past domestic violence against Singleton was relevant to 
proving Count 7, menacing by stalking.  The 2011 conviction supported the state’s 
claim that Spaulding “knew that his conduct would cause the victim to believe that 
[he] was going to harm [her].”  Horsley, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-350, 2006-
Ohio-1208, at ¶ 25. 
{¶ 120} The trial court did not err by allowing Cutler to testify about the 
2011 conviction. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
32 
d.  2010 domestic-violence convictions 
{¶ 121} Spaulding also challenges Detective McGee’s testimony about the 
theft of Singleton’s car radio in April 2010 and Spaulding’s related convictions for 
domestic violence and telecommunications harassment.  He asserts that 
“[e]ssentially all” of McGee’s testimony on direct examination was “hearsay from 
Singleton accusing Spaulding of various criminal acts and civil torts.” 
{¶ 122} Detective McGee responded to two 911 calls from Singleton on 
April 18, 2010.  He testified that she was very distraught and initially too scared to 
tell him that she suspected Spaulding.  Later, she revealed that Spaulding had been 
repeatedly contacting her since the night before; he had sent more than 30 text 
messages and had left several voicemail messages, three of which McGee recorded.  
McGee described some of the text messages as “very threatening” and recalled one 
that said, “This radio is going to look good in my car.”  Spaulding spoke to McGee 
on Singleton’s phone and advised him, “Tell that bitch I got something for her.”  
According to McGee, Singleton was concerned that Spaulding might follow her—
especially since he knew her car.  She said that Spaulding had “all kinds of guns” 
and that she believed that he “shoots people up.”  Spaulding was convicted of 
domestic violence and telecommunications harassment for the incident. 
{¶ 123} Evidence of this incident was admissible for the same reasons that 
evidence of Spaulding’s conviction for the July 2011 domestic violence against 
Singleton was.  As explained above, to convict Spaulding of third-degree-felony 
domestic violence, the state had to prove that he had two or more prior domestic-
violence convictions.  R.C. 2919.25(D)(4); see Harrington, 3d Dist. Logan No. 08-
01-20, 2002-Ohio-2190, at ¶ 10.  And to prove menacing by stalking, the state had 
to establish that Spaulding knew that his conduct would cause Singleton to believe 
that he was going to harm her.  Horsley, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-350, 2006-
Ohio-1208, at ¶ 25.  The details of the April 2010 incident were relevant to proving 
this element of Count 7. 
January Term, 2016 
 
33 
{¶ 124} Moreover, to the extent that Spaulding is challenging Singleton’s 
statements to Detective McGee on hearsay grounds, his argument fails.  The trial 
court could reasonably could have concluded that Singleton’s statements were 
excited utterances, see Evid.R. 803(2), since McGee testified that she was 
distraught, upset, and afraid.  And, more importantly, these statements were not 
offered to prove Spaulding’s guilt of a crime committed in April 2010.  Instead, 
they were introduced for a nonhearsay purpose: to show that Singleton had 
expressed fear of Spaulding. 
{¶ 125} Under the circumstances, this evidence was not erroneously 
admitted. 
e.  2001 domestic-violence conviction 
{¶ 126} Spaulding next objects to Officer Christopher Church’s testimony 
about Spaulding’s 2001 conviction for domestic violence against his mother and 
sister.  Church, who responded to a 9-1-1 call in July 2001, testified that “Mr. 
Spaulding’s sister stated that [he] had slapped her in the face, knocked off her 
glasses; and Mr. Spaulding’s mother stated that he had threatened her.”  While 
Church was at the scene, he heard Spaulding say to his mother, in the context of 
discussing her decision to call the police, “We’ll see what happens to you.”  
Spaulding was convicted of domestic violence and sentenced to 30 days of daily 
reporting. 
{¶ 127} Like Spaulding’s 2010 and 2011 domestic-violence convictions, 
his 2001 conviction went to an element of the current domestic-violence charge 
against him.  To convict on Count 6, the state had to prove at least two prior 
domestic-violence convictions.  R.C. 2919.25(D)(4); see Harrington, 3d Dist. 
Logan No. 08-01-20, 2002-Ohio-2190, at ¶ 10.  And the 2001 conviction was also 
relevant to Count 7, because menacing by stalking is elevated to a fourth-degree 
felony if the state proves that “[t]he offender has a history of violence toward the 
victim or any other person or a history of other violent acts toward the victim or 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
34 
any other person.”  R.C. 2903.211(B)(2)(e).  Thus, the fact of the 2001 conviction 
was relevant and admissible. 
{¶ 128} Nevertheless, the state did not need to introduce evidence of the 
facts underlying the 2001 conviction for either of these purposes.  Unlike the details 
of Spaulding’s past domestic violence against Singleton, the details of this offense 
are not probative of whether she believed that Spaulding would cause her physical 
harm.  Officer Church described his recollection of the underlying offense—which 
had occurred 11 years earlier—and testified to hearsay statements from Spaulding’s 
mother and sister.  Under these circumstances, the risk that the jury may have been 
“prejudicially influenced by details of the prior crime” clearly outweighed any 
probative value of the evidence.  Harrington at ¶ 23.  For these reasons, evidence 
about the details of the 2001 offense should have been excluded. 
{¶ 129} Even so, this does not rise to the level of plain error.  Because ample 
other evidence supported Spaulding’s convictions, he cannot establish that the 
erroneous introduction of this evidence affected his substantial rights. 
f.  Ineffective assistance of counsel 
{¶ 130} Finally, Spaulding contends that trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to object to other-acts evidence.  As explained above, all but 
one of Spaulding’s evidentiary claims fail.  Thus, counsel were not deficient for 
failing to object to that testimony.  See State v. Mammone, 139 Ohio St.3d 467, 
2014-Ohio-1942, 13 N.E.3d 1051, ¶ 159.  Furthermore, Spaulding cannot establish 
that “but for” the admission of evidence about the 2001 domestic-violence incident, 
“the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  Accordingly, his Strickland claim fails. 
{¶ 131} For these reasons, we reject proposition of law No. 6. 
3.  Magistrates’ testimony 
{¶ 132} In proposition of law No. 7, Spaulding argues that the trial court 
erred by allowing the two magistrates to describe Singleton’s testimony during the 
January Term, 2016 
 
35 
ex parte domestic-relations hearings held in August and December 2011.  He 
contends that the magistrates improperly testified about his bad character and prior 
bad acts and that they also vouched for Singleton’s credibility.  Relatedly, he claims 
that trial counsel were constitutionally ineffective because they did not object to 
this testimony. 
a.  Factual background 
{¶ 133} At trial, the state introduced testimony from two magistrates from 
the domestic-relations division of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas.  
Magistrates Tracy Stoner and Stephan Bennett Collins explained that they presided 
over ex parte hearings at which Singleton gave sworn testimony about Spaulding’s 
acts of domestic violence.  According to Magistrate Stoner, in August 2011, 
Singleton testified about “various things that had caused her to be in fear.”  
Singleton told Stoner that Spaulding had threatened her with a gun and also had 
threatened her mother and sister.  Several months later, on December 1, 2011, 
Singleton testified before Magistrate Collins.  According to Collins, she “gave 
some pretty compelling testimony as to the nature of the violence that she had 
experienced” at Spaulding’s hands.  Collins stated that he “[v]ery much” found 
Singleton’s testimony persuasive. 
{¶ 134} Magistrates Stoner and Collins each issued a one-year protection 
order, meaning that they had found by a preponderance of the evidence that 
domestic violence had occurred.  At trial, the magistrates explained the terms of 
their orders and testified that the orders were later dismissed because Singleton 
failed to appear at a final hearing, during which Spaulding would have had an 
opportunity to contest her claims.  The state introduced copies of both orders at 
trial, each redacted to exclude Singleton’s narrative account.6 
                                                          
 
6 The state argues that it had to call the magistrates as witnesses because Spaulding “refused to 
stipulate to the existence of the civil protection order” he was charged with violating until they 
testified.  But the record is silent as to whether Spaulding would have entered a stipulation to the 
orders. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
36 
{¶ 135} Spaulding did not object to any part of Magistrate Stoner’s or 
Magistrate Collins’s testimony at trial. 
b.  Standard of review 
{¶ 136} Spaulding urges us to conclude that the magistrates’ testimony was 
a structural error.  Structural error is not “ ‘simply an error in the trial process 
itself’ ”; instead, it “is a ‘defect affecting the framework within which the trial 
proceeds.’ ”  Drummond, 111 Ohio St.3d 14, 2006-Ohio-5084, 854 N.E.2d 1038, 
at ¶ 50, quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 
L.Ed.2d 302 (1991).  A structural error “permeate[s] ‘[t]he entire conduct of the 
trial from beginning to end.’ ”  State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297, 
802 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 17, quoting Fulminante at 309. 
{¶ 137} We have never recognized judicial testimony as structural error, 
and Spaulding offers no persuasive reason why we should do so now.  See 
McCaffrey v. State, 105 Ohio St. 508, 513, 138 N.E. 61 (1922) (reviewing judge’s 
testimony during the trial he was presiding over and determining that no prejudice 
occurred).  Accordingly, we review this proposition of law for plain error.  See State 
v. Davis, 127 Ohio St.3d 268, 2010-Ohio-5706, 939 N.E.2d 147, ¶ 2-3. 
c.  Analysis 
{¶ 138} At bottom, Spaulding asserts that it was improper for the 
magistrates to testify because the jury may have assigned greater weight to their 
testimony than that of other witnesses. 
{¶ 139} It is prudent to avoid judicial testimony in criminal cases when 
possible, for the sake of both preserving judicial integrity and avoiding the risk of 
unduly influencing jurors.  See Hirschberger v. Silverman, 80 Ohio App.3d 532, 
540, 609 N.E.2d 1301 (6th Dist.1992); State v. Johnson, 4th Dist. Ross No. 94 CA 
2004, 1995 WL 764319, *3 (Dec. 26, 1995).  But regardless of whether the trial 
court should have excluded the magistrates’ testimony, we are unpersuaded that it 
resulted in “a manifest miscarriage of justice.”  Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 
January Term, 2016 
 
37 
804, at paragraph three of the syllabus.  Magistrates Stoner and Collins provided 
few details about the events underlying Singleton’s requests for protection orders.  
And Spaulding stipulated to the introduction of the protection orders.  Thus, the 
magistrates’ testimony was not outcome determinative for any of Spaulding’s 
convictions. 
{¶ 140} Spaulding’s concern that the magistrates improperly vouched for 
Singleton, thereby bolstering the deceased victim’s credibility with the jury, 
similarly does not rise to the level of plain error.  The fact that the magistrates issued 
civil protection orders—which are part of the record—itself proves that they 
accepted Singleton’s testimony as credible; a magistrate must find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that domestic violence occurred before issuing an 
order.  Magistrate Collins’s statement that he “very much” found Singleton’s 
testimony compelling does suggest that he was persuaded by more than a mere 
preponderance of the evidence.  But, even so, without more, Collins’s testimony 
was not outcome determinative. 
{¶ 141} For the same reasons that Spaulding cannot establish plain error, 
his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim also fails.  That is, even assuming that 
trial counsel should have objected to the magistrates’ testimony, the error was not 
outcome determinative.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674. 
{¶ 142} For all these reasons, we reject Spaulding’s seventh proposition of 
law. 
4.  Proof of prior convictions 
{¶ 143} In proposition of law Nos. 9 and 10, Spaulding argues that the trial 
court erred by admitting journal entries of his prior criminal convictions, in 
violation of Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 
574 (1997).  Relatedly, he asserts that his trial counsel were constitutionally 
ineffective for failing to object to the entries or seek a stipulation. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
38 
a.  Factual background 
{¶ 144} Spaulding was charged with two counts that were predicated on his 
convictions for prior offenses: Count 5, having weapons while under disability in 
violation of R.C. 2923.13(A), and Count 6, third-degree-felony domestic violence 
in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A).  To return a guilty verdict on Count 5, the jury had 
to find that Spaulding was “under indictment for or ha[d] been convicted of any 
felony offense involving the illegal possession, use, sale, administration, 
distribution, or trafficking in any drug of abuse.”  R.C. 2923.13(A)(3).7  And to 
convict him of third-degree-felony domestic violence, the jury had to find that 
Spaulding had previously “pleaded guilty to or been convicted of two or more 
offenses of domestic violence” or other specified acts that are substantially similar 
to domestic violence.  R.C. 2919.25(D)(4). 
{¶ 145} At trial, the state introduced two journal entries recording 
Spaulding’s prior convictions for trafficking in illegal drugs, R.C. 2925.03(A)(2).  
The first, dated March 22, 2002, recorded his guilty plea to trafficking in marijuana 
and his sentence to 18 months of community control.  The second, dated December 
13, 2002, indicates that Spaulding pled guilty to trafficking in cocaine and 
marijuana and was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 12 months and 10 
months. 
{¶ 146} The state also introduced three journal entries for prior domestic-
violence convictions.  The first, dated July 12, 2001, recorded Spaulding’s guilty 
plea to domestic violence and domestic-violence menacing.  He was fined and 
ordered to have no contact with his mother or sister.  The second, dated May 18, 
                                                          
 
7 Count 5 cites R.C. 2923.13(A)(1), which prohibits a “person [who] is a fugitive from justice” from 
carrying a firearm.  However, this citation appears to be an error.  The indictment alleges that 
Spaulding had a prior felony conviction “involving the illegal possession, use, sale, administration, 
distribution, or trafficking in any drug of abuse,” language that actually tracks R.C. 2923.13(A)(3).  
Likewise, when the jury convicted Spaulding of Count 5, it specifically found that he knowingly 
used a handgun and “was previously convicted of a felony offense involving the illegal trafficking 
in any drug of abuse.” 
January Term, 2016 
 
39 
2010, recorded Spaulding’s first conviction for domestic violence against 
Singleton.  He was fined $200 and received a ten-day suspended sentence.  The 
state also introduced a judgment entry, issued the same day, recording Spaulding’s 
conviction for telecommunications harassment.  The last entry, dated July 29, 2011, 
recorded Spaulding’s guilty plea to third-degree-felony domestic violence.  He 
received a three-year prison sentence that was suspended on the condition that he 
complete three years of community control.  The court ordered Spaulding to have 
no unlawful contact with Singleton and prohibited him from visiting his children 
outside the presence of a neutral third party. 
{¶ 147} The jury convicted Spaulding of Counts 5 and 6.  The verdict forms 
included findings that Spaulding had been convicted of a prior felony offense 
involving illegal drug trafficking and specific findings that he had been convicted 
of domestic violence in the three cases described above. 
b.  Old Chief 
{¶ 148} Spaulding argues that under Old Chief, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 
644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574, “[d]efendants have a right to stipulate to prior convictions—
when those prior convictions enhance the level of the offense.”  Thus, he maintains 
that the trial court erred by admitting journal entries of his prior convictions. 
{¶ 149} In Old Chief, the defendant was charged with violating a federal 
statute that prohibited possession of a firearm by anyone who had been convicted 
of a felony offense.  Id. at 174; 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1).  At trial, Old Chief argued that 
his offer to stipulate to his convict status rendered “the name and nature of [his 
earlier] offense”—assault causing serious bodily injury—“inadmissible under Rule 
403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the danger being that unfair prejudice from 
that evidence would substantially outweigh its probative value.”  Old Chief at 175.  
The prosecutor refused to join in the stipulation, and the trial court overruled Old 
Chief’s Fed.R.Evid. 403 objection.  Old Chief at 177. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
40 
{¶ 150} On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the trial court 
had abused its discretion by rejecting Old Chief’s offer to stipulate and “admit[ting] 
the full record of a prior judgment.”  Id. at 174.  The court explained that “the name 
or nature of the prior offense raises the risk of a verdict tainted by improper 
considerations” and that “the purpose of the evidence [was] solely to prove the 
element of prior conviction.”  Id.  Moreover, the probity of the official record of 
Old Chief’s conviction was significantly diminished because there was “no 
cognizable difference between [its] evidentiary significance” and that of Old 
Chief’s admission.  Id. at 191.  The court warned that the risk of unfair prejudice to 
a defendant is “substantial whenever the official record offered by the Government 
would be arresting enough to lure a juror into a sequence of bad character 
reasoning.”  Id. at 185. 
{¶ 151} But Old Chief does not categorically prohibit trial courts from 
admitting judgment entries offered to prove a conviction.  Instead, it constrains a 
trial court’s discretion under Fed.R.Evid. 403 when a defendant is charged with a 
crime—one element of which is the fact of a prior felony conviction—and the court 
is presented with an alternative means of proving the prior conviction—namely, a 
stipulation.  Under those circumstances, a trial court must exclude the judgment 
entry. 
{¶ 152} This court has yet to decide whether Old Chief’s reasoning applies 
only to federal prosecutions or also extends to state-law prosecutions in Ohio, 
although the court has accepted review of this question, see State v. Creech, 142 
Ohio St.3d 1421, 2015-Ohio-1353, 28 N.E.3d 121, which is currently pending in 
this court.  We need not resolve this issue here, however, because Spaulding’s 
reliance on Old Chief is unpersuasive for another reason:  his trial counsel did not 
offer to stipulate to his convictions or object to the admission of the judgment 
entries. 
 
 
January Term, 2016 
 
41 
c.  Ineffective assistance of counsel 
{¶ 153} Spaulding next argues that his trial counsel were constitutionally 
ineffective for not objecting to the journal entries or offering to stipulate to his prior 
convictions.  But even assuming that counsel should have objected to the judgment 
entries or offered to stipulate to the convictions, Spaulding has not established a 
“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  If Spaulding had stipulated to his prior offenses, the jury 
still would have learned that he had at least prior felony drug convictions and prior 
domestic-violence convictions.  See R.C. 2923.13(A) (to convict, the state had to 
prove that Spaulding had been previously convicted of a felony drug offense); R.C. 
2919.25 (to convict Spaulding of third-degree-felony domestic violence, the state 
had to prove that he had been convicted of two or more prior domestic-violence 
offenses).  And other witnesses testified about the incidents underlying the 
domestic-violence convictions. 
{¶ 154} We reject proposition of law Nos. 9 and 10. 
5.  Domestic-violence expert 
{¶ 155} Proposition of law No. 8 challenges Dana Zedak’s testimony about 
domestic violence on the grounds that she did not testify as either an expert or a lay 
witness but instead offered what Spaulding calls “pseudo-expert” opinions.  
According to Spaulding, this testimony violated his right to a fair trial and his 
counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by not objecting to it. 
a.  Factual background 
{¶ 156} Zedak testified that she is the director of community relations at a 
battered-women’s shelter.  The shelter serves victims of domestic violence by 
providing shelter, advocacy, prevention, and education services.  Zedak also has 
experience as the director of services at the same shelter and at a rape crisis center.  
She is a licensed social worker, holds a bachelor of arts degree in psychology, and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
42 
has lectured widely on domestic violence.  According to Zedak, she has worked 
with thousands of domestic-violence and sexual-assault victims and has testified as 
a domestic-violence expert in about a dozen trials. 
{¶ 157} After Zedak described her credentials, the following exchange 
occurred: 
 
[Prosecutor]: At this time, Your Honor, I would ask 
that she be qualified as an expert pursuant to the rule. 
Court: Just ask your questions. 
 
Zedak then went on to testify, without defense objection, about the typical cycle of 
domestic violence, male privilege, the “power and control wheel,” and common 
misconceptions regarding domestic violence. 
b.  Analysis 
{¶ 158} Spaulding asserts that because Zedak had “neither been qualified 
as an expert witness, nor ha[d] direct, personal knowledge of” the facts of the case, 
she was not competent to testify as either an expert witness or a lay witness.  See 
Evid.R. 701 (lay witness testimony); Evid.R. 702 (expert testimony). 
{¶ 159} Defense counsel did not object to Zedak’s testimony or challenge 
her qualifications to testify at trial, so Spaulding has waived all but plain error.  See 
State v. Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 286, 754 N.E.2d 1150 (2001).  We have found 
no plain error when a witness testifies as an expert as long as the witness satisfies 
the three requirements for testifying as an expert under Evid.R. 702.  See, e.g., State 
v. Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 404, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 153 (failure to tender 
the witness as an expert “was of no consequence” in light of his qualifications); 
Hartman at 285-288 (no plain error when state had failed to tender four witnesses 
as experts, but they were qualified to give expert testimony). 
January Term, 2016 
 
43 
{¶ 160} Here, Zedak’s testimony was consistent with Evid.R. 702:  (1) she 
testified about matters beyond the knowledge or experience of lay persons, (2) she 
had extensive experience, training, and education involving domestic-violence 
issues, and (3) she based her testimony on widely recognized information about 
domestic violence and abuse. 
{¶ 161} Moreover, even if any aspect of Zedak’s testimony were 
questionable, it did not affect the outcome of Spaulding’s trial.  “Given the other 
evidence in the record and the fact that [her] testimony was phrased in terms of 
generalities,” State v. Frazier, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25654, 2012-Ohio-790, ¶ 65, 
Spaulding cannot meet his burden to establish prejudice—or, therefore, plain 
error—under Strickland. 
{¶ 162} For these reasons, we reject proposition of law No. 8. 
6.  Crim.R. 29 
{¶ 163} In proposition of law No. 11, Spaulding argues that the trial court 
erred by denying his Crim.R. 29 motion.  Specifically, he contends that the court 
should have dismissed the attempted-murder and aggravated-murder charges. 
{¶ 164} “A motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29(A) is governed by the 
same standard as the one for determining whether a verdict is supported by 
sufficient evidence.”  State v. Tenace, 109 Ohio St.3d 255, 2006-Ohio-2417, 847 
N.E.2d 386, ¶ 37.  “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in 
a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 
the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. 
Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 165} Spaulding contends that no rational trier of fact could have 
concluded that he was responsible for attempted murder or either of the charged 
aggravated murders because Griffin did not identify him as the shooter during his 
first viewing of the photo array.  But, as explained in our analysis of proposition of 
law No. 2, Spaulding has failed to make a persuasive argument that Griffin’s later 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
44 
identifications of him as the shooter should have been suppressed.  It is not the 
province of this court to afford less weight to Griffin’s subsequent testimony 
implicating Spaulding.  Instead, “the weight to be given the evidence and the 
credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts.”  State v. DeHass, 
10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 166} Because Spaulding’s arguments ultimately go to weight and 
credibility, he has failed to establish that Griffin’s testimony was insufficient to 
support his convictions for attempted murder and aggravated murder, especially 
when considered against the backdrop of other evidence at trial.  The jury also heard 
testimony from Todd Wilbur that he saw Spaulding with Singleton and Thomas at 
1104 Grant Street around 8:00 a.m. on December 15, 2011, only moments before 
Wilbur heard popping sounds.  And ballistics evidence indicated that the same 
weapon was fired during both incidents.  As such, the jurors could reasonably have 
found sufficient evidence to convict Spaulding of attempted murder and of both 
charges of aggravated murder even in the absence of Griffin’s identification. 
{¶ 167} We reject proposition of law No. 11. 
E. Sentencing Phase 
1.  Ineffective assistance of counsel 
{¶ 168} In proposition of law No. 12, Spaulding asserts that his trial counsel 
provided ineffective assistance during the mitigation phase. 
a.  Mitigation specialist 
{¶ 169} Spaulding protests that trial counsel never hired a mitigation 
specialist, even though the trial court awarded funds for one.  But we have held that 
hiring a mitigation specialist is not “a requirement of effective assistance” of 
counsel.  McGuire, 80 Ohio St.3d at 399, 686 N.E.2d 1112.  And Spaulding cannot 
establish that trial counsel’s performance in this regard was deficient or prejudicial 
for several reasons. 
January Term, 2016 
 
45 
{¶ 170} Spaulding’s trial counsel did not retain an expert with the formal 
title of “mitigation specialist,” but they did hire two experts—Dr. John Fabian, a 
forensic psychologist and clinical neuropsychologist, and Susan Moran, an 
attorney—with the intention that they would perform the functions of a mitigation 
specialist.  Trial counsel also retained an investigator, Thomas Fields.  The team 
interviewed members of Spaulding’s family, gathered records, and performed 
psychological testing.  At the mitigation phase, trial counsel presented testimony 
from four family members and Spaulding’s unsworn statement.  And Moran sat at 
counsel table with the defense.  Given the work performed by Fabian, Moran, and 
Fields in preparation for and during the mitigation phase, trial counsel’s failure to 
hire someone with the title of “mitigation specialist” did not amount to deficient 
performance, at least on this record. 
{¶ 171} Moreover, Spaulding cannot prove that he was prejudiced by trial 
counsel’s failure to hire a mitigation specialist.  He does not identify any specific 
information that a mitigation specialist would have uncovered that had not already 
been found by the defense expert or explain how that information would have 
prompted the jury to recommend a life sentence.  In fact, it would be impossible to 
make such a showing without relying on evidence outside the record, and that is 
not permissible in a direct appeal, State v. Keith, 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 536-537, 684 
N.E.2d 47 (1997). 
b.  Failure to present psychological evidence 
{¶ 172} Spaulding also argues that trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance because they did not have Dr. Fabian testify during the mitigation phase 
or submit as evidence a 27-page report that he had prepared in advance of the 
mitigation phase. 
{¶ 173} According to his report, which was ultimately submitted to the 
court under seal, Dr. Fabian met with Spaulding seven times to conduct a forensic 
psychological and neuropsychological examination.  Testing indicated that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
46 
Spaulding has a full-scale IQ of 89, and he performed at an 11th-grade equivalent 
on the Woodcock-Johnson Performance Test.  Fabian also reviewed information 
from interviews with Spaulding and five of his family members as well as 
Spaulding’s academic history, criminal history, and prison records.  Fabian stated, 
however, that he “would have preferred to have more time to interview other half-
siblings of Mr. Spaulding that were not able to be interviewed due to their inability 
to be located or their out-of-state status.” 
{¶ 174} Dr. Fabian’s report included a detailed description of Spaulding’s 
family history and background.  The report identified “potential psychosocial 
factors that may be mitigating and relevant in this case.”  Fabian opined that 
Spaulding has a severe personality disorder marked by antisocial, borderline, and 
paranoid traits.  He stated that Spaulding also exhibits evidence of a mood disorder 
(long-term mild clinical depression) and may suffer from posttraumatic stress 
disorder due to his experiences on the streets with violence, drugs, and theft.  Fabian 
also noted Spaulding’s consistent and intense dependence on cannabis. 
{¶ 175} At the mitigation hearing, defense counsel did not ask Dr. Fabian 
to testify or submit his written report to the jury.  Instead, they asked the court to 
include the report in the record, under seal.  Spaulding now objects that trial counsel 
were deficient in both regards. 
{¶ 176} Trial counsel’s decision not to present psychological evidence in 
mitigation appears debatable, given the contents of Dr. Fabian’s report.  But we 
have long recognized that “the presentation of mitigating evidence is a matter of 
trial strategy,” Keith, 79 Ohio St.3d at 530, 684 N.E.2d 47, even if counsel’s chosen 
strategy “prove[s] unsuccessful,” State v. Frazier, 61 Ohio St.3d 247, 255, 574 
N.E.2d 483 (1991).  As long as counsel makes a strategic decision “after thorough 
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options,” the decision is 
“virtually unchallengeable.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 
L.Ed.2d 674.  Thus, even “[d]ebatable trial tactics generally do not constitute 
January Term, 2016 
 
47 
ineffective assistance of counsel.”  State v. Elmore, 111 Ohio St.3d 515, 2006-Ohio-
6207, 857 N.E.2d 547, ¶ 116. 
{¶ 177} Here, Spaulding does not assert that counsel’s failure to present 
psychological testimony was a product of incomplete investigation.  Instead, he 
points to Dr. Fabian’s report as proof of the useful evidence the defense could have 
presented at the mitigation phase.  Because counsel were fully aware of Fabian’s 
findings and the contents of his report, their decision not to introduce this evidence 
as mitigation is “ ‘virtually unchallengeable.’ ”  State v. Mundt, 115 Ohio St.3d 22, 
2007-Ohio-4836, 873 N.E.2d 828, ¶ 158, quoting Strickland at 690. 
c.  Inadequate preparation 
{¶ 178} Spaulding, in his reply brief, more broadly contends that defense 
counsel and their experts were unprepared for the mitigation phase. 
{¶ 179} “Appellate courts generally will not consider a new issue presented 
for the first time in a reply brief.”  State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-
Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 18.  But regardless, Spaulding’s allegations do not 
prove ineffective assistance.  Spaulding includes several references to a hearing that 
occurred ten days after the jury returned guilty verdicts.  At the hearing, defense 
counsel asked to postpone the mitigation hearing to allow for further preparations, 
and the trial court agreed.  The mitigation hearing did not begin until more than two 
months later.  Under these circumstances, the status of defense preparations on 
November 19, 2012, hardly proves that trial counsel were unprepared for the 
mitigation phase on January 29, 2013. 
{¶ 180} For these reasons, we reject proposition of law No. 12. 
2.  Proportionality 
{¶ 181} In proposition of law No. 13, Spaulding contends that his death 
sentence is unconstitutional because the trial court did not “evaluate [it] for 
proportionality in relation to other heinous crimes.”  This claim fails for three 
reasons. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 182} First, contrary to Spaulding’s claims, R.C. 2929.05(A) does not 
require a trial court to engage in proportionality review.  Instead, this provision 
requires an appellate court to review every death sentence for proportionality.  By 
contrast, R.C. 2929.03(F) sets forth the requirements for a trial court’s sentencing 
opinion in a capital case.  This provision says nothing about the trial court 
conducting a proportionality analysis. 
{¶ 183} Second, we have previously rejected the claim that proportionality 
requires analysis of all indictments charging capital specifications, as opposed to 
only cases in which the death penalty was imposed.  State v. Steffen, 31 Ohio St.3d 
111, 123, 509 N.E.2d 383 (1987). 
{¶ 184} Finally, we will review Spaulding’s sentence for proportionality as 
part of our independent sentence evaluation, as required by R.C. 2929.05(A). 
{¶ 185} For these reasons, we reject proposition of law No. 13. 
F. Cumulative Error 
{¶ 186} In proposition of law No. 14, Spaulding urges us to reverse his 
convictions on the grounds that the cumulative effect of his trial counsel’s errors 
rises to the level of constitutionally ineffective assistance.  However, because none 
of Spaulding’s individual claims of ineffective assistance has merit, he cannot 
establish a Strickland violation “simply by joining those claims together.”  
Mammone, 139 Ohio St.3d 467, 2014-Ohio-1942, 13 N.E.3d 1051, at ¶ 173; accord 
State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 177  
(“ ‘sheer weight of numbers’ ” does not render errors prejudicial), quoting State v. 
Hill, 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 212, 661 N.E.2d 1068 (1996). 
{¶ 187} Accordingly, we reject proposition of law No. 14. 
G. Independent Sentence Evaluation 
{¶ 188} We now independently review Spaulding’s death sentence for 
appropriateness and proportionality.  R.C. 2929.05(A).  In conducting this review, 
we must determine whether the evidence supports the jury’s finding of an 
January Term, 2016 
 
49 
aggravating circumstance, whether the aggravating circumstance outweighs the 
mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, and whether Spaulding’s death 
sentence is proportionate to those affirmed in similar cases.  Id. 
1.  Aggravating circumstances 
{¶ 189} The jury convicted Spaulding of two counts of aggravated murder, 
each with a single capital specification under R.C. 2929.04(A)(5).  At sentencing, 
the jury considered only one aggravating circumstance: that the aggravated murders 
and the attempted murder were part of a single course of conduct that involved the 
purposeful killing or attempt to kill two or more persons. 
{¶ 190} The evidence at trial supports the jury’s course-of-conduct finding 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Singleton, Thomas, and Griffin were each shot once in 
the back of the head or neck, just outside Thomas’s home at 1104 Grant Street.  The 
shootings all occurred on December 15, 2011, within hours of each other.  Police 
recovered shell casings from both incidents and determined that they had been fired 
from the same weapon, a 9-mm Luger.  The only surviving victim, Griffin, 
identified his assailant as Spaulding.  And Todd Wilbur testified that he saw a man, 
later identified as Spaulding, at 1104 Grant Street speaking to an African-American 
man and woman around 8:00 a.m. on December 15.  As Wilbur drove away, he 
heard a “pop and then pop.”  Thus, the jury properly considered this aggravating 
circumstance at sentencing. 
2.  Mitigating factors 
{¶ 191} We must weigh the above aggravating circumstance against any 
mitigating evidence about “the nature and circumstances of the offense” and 
Spaulding’s “history, character, and background.”  R.C. 2929.04(B).  In addition, 
we must consider the statutory mitigating factors under R.C. 2929.04: (B)(1) 
(victim inducement), (B)(2) (duress, coercion or strong provocation), (B)(3) 
(mental disease or defect), (B)(4) (youth), (B)(5) (lack of significant criminal 
history), (B)(6) (accomplice only), and (B)(7) (any other relevant factors). 
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a.  Spaulding’s mitigation hearing 
{¶ 192} The defense presented four mitigation witnesses and Spaulding’s 
unsworn statement.  The state presented a single rebuttal witness. 
1.  Phyllis Spaulding Lewis 
{¶ 193} Spaulding’s aunt, Phyllis Spaulding Lewis, testified that she had 
five siblings.  Her youngest brother, William Baker Spaulding, had 11 children by 
five different women.  William’s youngest children were Spaulding and his sister, 
Kamilah Spaulding. 
{¶ 194} Spaulding and Kamilah grew up living with William and their 
mother, Betty Spaulding.  Over the years, they relocated four or five times and lived 
in metropolitan housing part of the time.  William worked hard as a truck driver to 
support his family.  But he was not always able to pay the bills, especially because 
of child-support payments.  When William was diagnosed with cancer, he had to 
stop working. 
{¶ 195} According to Phyllis, Spaulding was a good and loving child.  He 
was smart and graduated from high school.  Spaulding’s mother was a strict 
disciplinarian, but William was more like a friend to him.  William devoted a lot of 
attention to Spaulding and was close to him.  By contrast, William had not paid 
much attention to his older children, many of whom lived in Detroit. 
{¶ 196} Spaulding looked up to Ronnie Spaulding, his half-brother, and 
spent a lot of time with him.  Ronnie introduced Spaulding to drugs, and eventually 
they sold drugs together.  Ronnie, a cocaine user, was in and out of jail for drug 
offenses.  He died in a car accident in August 2009. 
{¶ 197} In April 2010, Spaulding’s father died.  According to Phyllis, at 
that point, Spaulding “flipped out” and became “a different person.”  “He felt kind 
of like God had let him down * * *.”  He became disrespectful toward his mother 
and his sister, Kamilah, and began to use more drugs. 
January Term, 2016 
 
51 
{¶ 198} Phyllis emphasized that Spaulding loved Singleton and loves his 
children.  Spaulding and Singleton were sometimes aggressive toward each other, 
but Spaulding did not become “a monster” until he began using drugs after his 
father died.  But, on cross-examination, the state established that Spaulding’s 
convictions for domestic violence and drug trafficking long preceded his father’s 
death. 
{¶ 199} Phyllis asked the jury to spare Spaulding’s life and said she thought 
he would change if sentenced to life in prison. 
2.  Earl Spaulding 
{¶ 200} Earl Spaulding, Spaulding’s half-brother, testified that he moved 
back and forth between Akron and Detroit as he was growing up.  At different 
times, he lived with his mother, her parents, and his father.  Earl said that if his 
father had been around when he was growing up, Earl would not have gotten 
involved in drug dealing. 
{¶ 201} By the time Spaulding was an adult, Earl frequently visited Akron 
to see his half-siblings.  Earl recalled spending time with Spaulding and Singleton 
and seeing them argue, but he never witnessed physical violence between them.  He 
had heard about Spaulding’s convictions for domestic violence against Singleton 
and also rumors that Singleton used drugs. 
{¶ 202} Earl described Spaulding as a “good guy” who loves his kids and 
is not a “monster.” 
3.  Kamilah Spaulding 
{¶ 203} Spaulding’s younger sister, Kamilah, described him as sensitive, 
kind, and caring.  She testified that they grew up in a nice area and that their parents 
tried to isolate them from certain parts of the city.  Their mother was strict and 
wanted to ensure that her children would be successful. 
{¶ 204} Ronnie Spaulding stayed with their family several times when they 
were growing up, most recently around 2000.  He was a hard worker, but he was 
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52 
probably involved in illegal drug activity.  Kamilah said that Ronnie and Spaulding 
were close and that Ronnie influenced him.  Spaulding sold drugs to earn money; 
he had not held a regular job for four or five years before the murders. 
{¶ 205} Kamilah testified that Spaulding and Singleton argued frequently 
but that she never saw any physical violence.  On cross-examination, Kamilah said 
that Singleton had benefited from Spaulding’s drug activity.  She explained that 
although Singleton lived in government-subsidized housing, she and their children 
“had everything they needed plus some.” 
{¶ 206} Kamilah testified that Spaulding loves his children very much.  
According to Kamilah, Spaulding regularly told the kids how much he loves them 
and took them shopping, to the movie theater, and to the park. 
{¶ 207} Kamilah also said that Spaulding was “really close” to their parents.  
When their father died, Spaulding acted as though he had lost his best friend.  He 
became angry and began to “stay[ ] away” from the family. 
{¶ 208} Kamilah also described the 2001 domestic-violence incident 
involving Spaulding and their mother.  She said that Spaulding was disrespectful to 
their mother and smacked Kamilah.  And on cross-examination, Kamilah testified 
that Spaulding has no history of mental-health treatment, that he has never been 
shot at, and that his family has always supported him through his criminal problems. 
{¶ 209} Kamilah asked the jury not to sentence Spaulding to death.  She 
suggested that life in prison would be sufficient punishment and would give 
Spaulding the opportunity to continue teaching his children and to mentor other 
prisoners. 
4.  William Spaulding Jr. 
{¶ 210} William Spaulding Jr., Spaulding’s half-brother, grew up in Detroit 
and Akron.  He testified that he had a good childhood, a good family, and a good 
community.  But his mother and her relatives were “drinkers,” and he regularly had 
to defend his mother from abusive boyfriends.  In addition, William Jr. was exposed 
January Term, 2016 
 
53 
to violence and gang activity.  He sometimes got into fights, but he denied any 
involvement with drugs. 
{¶ 211} In 1995, William Jr. moved back to Akron.  He tried to steer 
Spaulding, who was then 10 or 11 years old, in the right direction.  He wanted 
Spaulding to go to school and avoid prison.  But he said that Ronnie—who was 
“into the streets a little bit”—probably did not lead Spaulding in the right direction. 
{¶ 212} At the time of Spaulding’s trial, William Jr. had convictions for 
receiving stolen property and aggravated robbery, had been in and out of prison, 
and was 17 years into a prison sentence.  He explained that prison life is hard 
because prisoners do not see their family and friends, they have to deal with 
corrections officers, and they encounter prison gangs and homosexuals.  According 
to William Jr., prisoners have a lot of time to think about their mistakes.  But they 
can improve themselves by taking classes and mentoring other prisoners. 
{¶ 213} William Jr. testified that Spaulding deserves a chance.  He said that 
Spaulding had expressed remorse in letters, saying that he was sorry for the 
situation, his family, and the families of the victims. 
5.  Unsworn statement 
{¶ 214} According to his unsworn statement, Spaulding prays for all three 
families and apologizes for their losses, especially the Singletons’. 
{¶ 215} Spaulding’s statement also reflected on his own family.  He stated 
that he thinks daily about the time he, Erica, Dre’San, and Damonie spent as a 
family and explained how close he is to his children.  He taught his children right 
from wrong, and he wants to be sure that his son and his nephews do not “go to the 
street life” like he did.  He wants to be there for them and have a positive impact 
on them. 
{¶ 216} Spaulding also stated that he respects and accepts the jury’s verdict, 
but he added, “[P]lease don’t kill me.”  He wants an opportunity to prove that if 
sentenced to life in prison, he can still help his children and see them graduate from 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
54 
high school.  He is worried about his children not having a mother or father and 
about his sister, Kamilah, losing her closest relative if he is sentenced to death. 
6.  Rebuttal witness 
{¶ 217} The state presented one rebuttal witness, Deputy Black of the 
Summit County Sheriff’s Office.  Black testified about Spaulding’s behavior in jail 
while he was awaiting trial. 
{¶ 218} According to Deputy Black, Spaulding received ten disciplinary 
write-ups for incidents like disobeying staff, not being awake in the morning, 
showing blatant disrespect, and possessing an unauthorized instrument.  Two 
entries advised using caution with Spaulding:  (1) a deputy said that she heard 
Spaulding mumble that “he would get even” as she was escorting him back from 
court, and (2) a deputy said that he or she “overheard an inmate state what sounded 
like ‘I’m a killa cop’ ” from outside a room.  Upon entering, the deputy saw 
Spaulding talking on the inmate phone and only one other prisoner in the room. 
{¶ 219} Deputy Black said that these are low-level, middle-of-the-road 
write-ups.  In his experience, Spaulding is respectful and polite. 
b.  Weight of mitigating factors 
{¶ 220} At the mitigation phase, Spaulding’s counsel asked the jury to 
consider his history, character, and background, see R.C. 2929.04(B), and other 
relevant factors under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7).  Spaulding does not now assert, nor does 
the record indicate, that any other statutory mitigating factors apply. 
{¶ 221} As an initial matter, we find nothing mitigating in the nature and 
circumstances of Spaulding’s offenses.  See R.C. 2929.04(B).  Armed with a gun, 
Spaulding went to the home of Ernie Thomas on the morning of December 15.  
Thomas was dating Erica Singleton, the mother of Spaulding’s two young children.  
At approximately 2:00 a.m., Spaulding shot Patrick Griffin as Griffin exited 
Thomas’s house, inflicting injuries that rendered Griffin a quadriplegic.  About six 
January Term, 2016 
 
55 
hours later, Spaulding returned to the house and fatally shot both Thomas and 
Singleton. 
{¶ 222} Spaulding presented significant evidence of his difficult childhood 
and family background, although aspects of his upbringing appear quite positive 
and stable.  His father had 11 children (by five different women), many of whom 
were raised in Detroit in their father’s absence and exposed to regular violence.  But 
Spaulding and his sister, Kamilah, were raised in Akron by their father, a hard 
worker, and their mother, a strict disciplinarian who sought to give them every 
opportunity.  At times, money was tight, especially after Spaulding’s father was 
diagnosed with cancer. 
{¶ 223} Spaulding and his father were very close; indeed, his father devoted 
more attention to Spaulding, his youngest son, than he had to his older sons.  
Spaulding was devastated when his father died in 2010.  There is some suggestion 
that at that point, Spaulding’s attitude toward crime and drugs changed. 
{¶ 224} Spaulding was exposed to crime by at least three of his older half-
brothers.  Ronnie Spaulding introduced Spaulding to drugs, and they eventually 
sold drugs together.  Earl Spaulding also sold drugs.  And William Jr. has been 
incarcerated several times.  We give limited weight to Spaulding’s family history 
and background.  See State v. Jackson, 141 Ohio St.3d 171, 2014-Ohio-3707, 23 
N.E.3d 1023, ¶ 297 (exposure to drugs and violence as a young person not entitled 
to significant weight). 
{¶ 225} Second, Spaulding presented evidence of his positive contributions 
as a father and uncle.  He loves his children and has tried to teach them the 
difference between right and wrong.  In his unsworn statement, Spaulding stated 
that he has attempted to steer his son and his nephews away from his own criminal 
path.  We assign some weight to this evidence of character.  See State v. Mitts, 81 
Ohio St.3d 223, 236, 690 N.E.2d 522 (1998). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
56 
{¶ 226} Third, Spaulding expressed remorse.  In his unsworn statement, he 
stated that he prays for the families of all three victims, especially the Singletons.  
He apologized for their losses.  And William Jr. testified that Spaulding had 
expressed remorse to him in letters.  Despite Spaulding’s expressions of remorse, 
he did not take responsibility for his conduct.  We therefore assign minimal weight 
to Spaulding’s remorse.  See Kirkland, 140 Ohio St.3d 73, 2014-Ohio-1966, 15 
N.E.2d 818, at ¶ 160 (assigning some mitigating weight to the defendant’s remorse 
where there was “no question that Kirkland expressed a good deal of self-loathing 
in his unsworn statement”). 
{¶ 227} Fourth, Spaulding argues that he can adjust well to life in prison.  
He committed ten relatively minor infractions during the year he was awaiting trial.  
Spaulding also emphasizes that if sentenced to a term of life imprisonment, he could 
continue to be a father to his children and a brother to Kamilah, and also could 
mentor other inmates.  William Jr. identified many opportunities for self-
improvement in prison.  And Spaulding’s counsel argued during the mitigation 
phase that Spaulding “needs and deserves an opportunity to show that he can make 
amends for the wrong he’s done.”  We afford this evidence minimal weight.  See 
State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 121, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997) (adjustment to 
incarceration afforded marginal weight).  Compare State v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio 
St.3d 12, 2014-Ohio-1019, 9 N.E.3d 930, ¶ 281 (according “some weight in 
mitigation” when the defendant’s prison conduct had been “exemplary”). 
3.  Weighing 
{¶ 228} As detailed above, Spaulding has presented mitigating evidence 
that is cumulatively entitled to some weight.  However, the aggravating 
circumstance in this case—Spaulding’s murder of two individuals and attempted 
murder of a third during a single course of conduct—outweighs the mitigating 
factors beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
 
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57 
4.  Proportionality 
{¶ 229} The death penalty is appropriate and proportionate in this case 
when compared to death sentences affirmed in similar cases.  See, e.g., State v. 
Dean, 146 Ohio St.3d 106, 2015-Ohio-4347, 54 N.E.3d 80 (one murder and six 
attempted murders); Jackson, 141 Ohio St.3d 171, 2014-Ohio-3707, 23 N.E.3d 
1023 (one murder and two attempted murders). 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 230} We reject each of Spaulding’s propositions and affirm his 
convictions and sentence of death. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and KENNEDY, JJ., 
concur. 
O’NEILL, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
O’NEILL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 231} Respectfully, I dissent. 
{¶ 232} When society sets out to take the life of a citizen, good enough is 
not good enough.  This is especially true when the state seeks to try a defendant for 
all the sins of a lifetime at once.  I would vacate the guilty verdicts in this matter 
for the reasons specific to this case that are explained below, and I would therefore 
not reach the constitutional questions regarding capital punishment, about which I 
have written many times before, e.g., State v. Wogenstahl, 134 Ohio St.3d 1437, 
2013-Ohio-164, 981 N.E.2d 900, ¶ 1-5 (O’Neill, J., dissenting). 
Prior Bad Acts and Magistrate Testimony 
{¶ 233} There simply is no justification for undermining the focus of a 
murder trial by combining it with the prosecution of other crimes and creating a 
very confusing amalgamation of multiple trials in which evidence of multiple 
crimes committed over several years was presented.  In this matter, a jury was asked 
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to take the life of a fellow citizen.  Its focus must be laser clear, and the court’s 
protection of the process must be the equivalent of “super due process.” 
{¶ 234} Along with two counts of aggravated murder and one count of 
attempted murder, the state charged appellant, Dawud Spaulding, with third-
degree-felony domestic violence, R.C. 2919.25(D)(4), and menacing by stalking, 
R.C. 2903.211(A)(1).  By definition, the prosecution of these crimes required the 
presentation of evidence that the defendant not only killed someone but had been a 
very bad and violent person for a long time as well.  The prejudice is evident on its 
face. 
{¶ 235} The domestic-violence charge required proof of prior domestic-
violence convictions.  R.C. 2919.25(D)(4).  The menacing charge required proof of 
a pattern of conduct causing the victim to fear that Spaulding would cause her 
physical harm or mental distress.  R.C. 2903.211(A)(1).  By charging these crimes 
together with the murder charges, the state set the tone of the trial.  In the sentencing 
phase of this capital case, there was the very real possibility that the jury would be 
faced with weighing Spaulding’s history, character, and background, R.C. 
2929.04(B), against the aggravating circumstance that he engaged in “a course of 
conduct involving the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons,” 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(5).  At sentencing, those are relevant issues.  But long before 
embarking on the task of weighing factors in sentencing, this jury heard very 
damaging testimony, during the guilt phase, from two magistrates suggesting that 
in the past, Spaulding had been violent toward Erica Singleton, one of the murder 
victims, and on one occasion had threatened her with a gun.  Incredibly, the jury 
would also hear testimony and see a journal entry showing that Spaulding had 
committed domestic violence against his own mother and sister in 2001.  How is 
one supposed to have a fair trial on the questions of guilt when the whole tenor of 
the testimony being presented has the undeniable effect of causing the jurors to 
view the accused in a very negative light? 
January Term, 2016 
 
59 
{¶ 236} Tragically, defense counsel remained passive in their chairs while 
this legally impermissible evidence was introduced.  In his sixth proposition of law, 
Spaulding identifies several instances of testimony as inadmissible character 
evidence and claims that his counsel were ineffective for failing to object.  The 
majority is willing to recognize that evidence of the facts of the 2001 conviction for 
domestic violence against Spaulding’s mother and sister did not have any probative 
value as to any fact in issue that outweighed the risk of a prejudicial character 
inference and that the evidence should have been excluded. See majority opinion at 
¶ 128.  But the court then decides that this is not enough to rise to the level of plain 
error and that “Spaulding cannot establish that ‘but for’ the admission of evidence 
about the 2001 domestic-violence incident, ‘the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 130, quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).  In my view, the majority stretches 
the imagination to the breaking point when it concludes that evidence of domestic 
violence against this defendant’s mother and sister had no influence on the jury’s 
decision to convict him of a violent act against the mother of his children. 
{¶ 237} In his seventh proposition of law, Spaulding claims that it was 
structural error to admit testimony from the two magistrates describing Singleton’s 
testimony during the ex parte domestic-relations hearings held in August and 
December 2011.  Spaulding argues that the jury may have assigned greater weight 
to the magistrates’ testimony than to that of other witnesses and that trial counsel 
were ineffective for failing to object.  The majority declines that invitation and 
reviews the record for plain error.  Id. at ¶ 137.  The majority then holds that 
Spaulding has not shown plain error because none of the magistrate testimony was 
“outcome determinative” and “even assuming that trial counsel should have 
objected * * *, the error was not outcome determinative.”  Id. at ¶ 141. 
{¶ 238} I believe that that is the wrong legal standard.  This court rejected 
“outcome determinative” as the test for plain error a long time ago.  The correct 
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standard is that when a criminal defendant raises an error for the first time on 
appeal, that person must “demonstrate a reasonable probability that the error 
resulted in prejudice—the same deferential standard for reviewing ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 
385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, ¶ 22.  The United States Supreme Court has 
also rejected an outcome-determinative test for analyzing plain error and ineffective 
assistance.  Strickland at 697 (“With regard to the prejudice inquiry, only the strict 
outcome-determinative test, among the standards articulated in the lower courts, 
imposes a heavier burden on defendants than the tests laid down today”); United 
States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 
(2004), fn. 9 (“The reasonable-probability standard is not the same as, and should 
not be confused with, a requirement that a defendant prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that but for error things would have been different”).  Put simply, “a 
reasonable probability that * * * the result of the proceeding would have been 
different,” Strickland at 694, is a little more could have than would have.  And that 
is why the Supreme Court clarified that a “reasonable probability” is “a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” id., instead of a probability 
sufficient to show that the outcome was wrong. 
{¶ 239} I have grave concerns that the jury reached its verdicts in this case 
for the wrong reasons.  Domestic violence against one’s mother is a special kind of 
cruelty.  There is a real risk that the jury reached its verdict based on a character 
inference from the facts of Spaulding’s crime against his mother.  For that reason, 
counsel should have objected at least to the testimony regarding Spaulding’s 
domestic violence toward his mother and sister, and we should vacate the 
convictions and remand the matter for a new trial.  This is classically a bell that 
cannot be unrung. 
{¶ 240} Moreover, magistrates and judges possess practically irrefutable 
credibility of the kind that might dissuade jurors from thinking critically about their 
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credibility.  There is a reasonable probability that the jury decided to convict 
Spaulding based on the inference that he must have done the crimes charged 
because the magistrates believed that he was dangerous enough to have issued ex 
parte civil protection orders against him in the past.  It is pure speculation to 
conclude during appellate review that if the trial court had excluded the testimony 
of the magistrates and all the prior bad acts, the outcome of the trial would have 
been the same.  But that is not the question before us.  This is inadmissible character 
evidence introduced into a capital murder case, and the refuge of concluding that 
“it didn’t change the outcome” is simply not available here. 
Old Chief—Proof of Prior Convictions 
{¶ 241} The state offered journal entries memorializing five prior 
convictions of Spaulding, two for trafficking drugs and three for domestic violence.  
The prior convictions were relevant to the domestic-violence charge and to the 
charge of having a weapon while under disability, which required proof that 
Spaulding had been “convicted of any felony offense involving the illegal 
possession, use, sale, administration, distribution, or trafficking in any drug of 
abuse.”  R.C. 2923.13(A)(3).  Spaulding claims in his ninth proposition of law that 
the trial court should not have admitted the journal entries, based on Old Chief v. 
United States, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997), and claims in 
his tenth proposition of law that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object 
to the entries or seek a stipulation to their content.  He is right. 
{¶ 242} The majority refuses to address whether Old Chief applies to state-
law prosecutions in Ohio because defense counsel did not seek a stipulation under 
Old Chief.  See majority opinion at ¶ 152.  And the majority further denies that the 
failure to seek an Old Chief stipulation was ineffective assistance because the jury 
“still would have learned that he had at least prior felony drug convictions and prior 
domestic-violence convictions” and had already heard testimony regarding the 
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incidents underlying the prior domestic-violence convictions.  Majority opinion at 
¶ 153.  This logic is mistaken. 
{¶ 243} I generally agree with the majority’s description of the import of 
Old Chief.  In Old Chief, the United States Supreme Court set out important 
guidelines for balancing under Fed.R.Evid. 403 the probative value of evidence and 
the risk of unfair prejudice that the evidence presents.  See Old Chief at 180-185.  
Ohio has an almost identical rule regarding the exclusion of otherwise probative 
evidence due to the risk of unfair prejudice.  Compare Evid.R. 403(A) (“Although 
relevant, evidence is not admissible if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice * * *”) with Fed.R.Evid. 403 (“The 
court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of * * * unfair prejudice * * *”).  We have noted that 
“federal law interpreting a federal rule, while not controlling, is persuasive 
authority in interpreting a similar Ohio rule.”  Stammco, L.L.C., v. United Tel. Co. 
of Ohio, 136 Ohio St.3d 231, 2013-Ohio-3019, 994 N.E.2d 408, ¶ 18. 
{¶ 244} Old Chief stands for two important propositions.  First, “the Rule 
403 ‘probative value’ of an item of evidence, as distinct from its Rule 401 
‘relevance,’ may be calculated by comparing evidentiary alternatives.”  Old Chief, 
519 U.S. at 184, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574; see also Fed.R.Evid. 401 
(defining “relevant” evidence).  Second, when “there is no cognizable difference 
between the evidentiary significance of an admission and of the legitimately 
probative component of the official record the prosecution would prefer to place in 
evidence,” then the “functions of the competing evidence are distinguishable only 
by the risk inherent in the one and wholly absent from the other.”  Id. at 191.  These 
are exceedingly wise observations about Fed.R.Evid. 403, and there is no good 
reason not to heed them when applying Ohio’s Evid.R. 403(A). 
{¶ 245} The five journal entries memorializing Spaulding’s prior 
convictions provide more information than merely the existence of the prior 
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convictions and the offenses of which he was convicted.  Each journal entry 
recording a conviction for drug trafficking also indicates the length of Spaulding’s 
sentence and the specific drugs he sold.  Each journal entry recording a conviction 
for domestic violence shows again the length of Spaulding’s prison sentence (if 
any) as well as an order to have no contact with the victim or victims. 
{¶ 246} Taken together, these journal entries show a progression over time 
from lighter punishments like fines and community control to terms of 
imprisonment.  The journal entries also show that Spaulding progressed from 
crimes against his own sister and mother to crimes against Singleton—for which 
he was prohibited from having unsupervised contact with his own children.  This 
is precisely the kind of content in a record of a conviction that “would be arresting 
enough to lure a juror into a sequence of bad character reasoning.”  Old Chief at 
185.  The jury was told how long Spaulding went to prison, his relationship to his 
victims, the specific kinds of drugs he was selling, and the precautions a prior court 
had taken to protect his children from him. 
{¶ 247} I believe that defense counsel were ineffective for failing to object 
to the entries or seek a stipulation to their content.  There is enough “risk inherent” 
in the surplusage of these journal entries, Old Chief at 191, to have created a 
reasonable probability that if counsel had stipulated to their content, the trial court 
would have been bound under Evid.R. 403(A) to accept the stipulation.  They did 
not.  Again, I reject the majority’s familiar retort that Spaulding cannot prove 
prejudice under Strickland because the jury heard other testimony relaying the facts 
of some of these convictions.  Are we now going to ratify the admission of 
prejudicial evidence with the observation that it does not stand alone?   To the extent 
that the testimony of the prior incidents of domestic violence was alternatively 
admissible to prove the “pattern of conduct” element in the menacing-by-stalking 
charge, R.C. 2903.211(A)(1), I believe, as I explain below, that Spaulding should 
have been tried separately for that charge. 
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64 
Severance 
{¶ 248} If Spaulding committed all the charged crimes, then he should face 
justice for all of them.  But his trial stands out as patently unfair because he had to 
face justice for all his crimes at the same time.  None of the unfairness that I have 
already discussed would have been an issue had the trial court severed the charges 
for separate trials.  Even the majority can recognize that “if Spaulding had requested 
severance of [the domestic-violence and menacing-by-stalking charges] and 
provided the trial court adequate information about the prejudicial effect that 
joinder would have on his trial, the court would have been justified in severing these 
counts for trial.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 73.  This is not a question of whether or not 
this individual had the best, or worst, lawyers imaginable.  At this level, the inquiry 
is into whether the people of Ohio have received a fair trial in which they can have 
confidence sufficient to take the life of a fellow citizen. 
{¶ 249} Instead of moving to sever the domestic-violence, menacing, and 
gun charges from the murder charges, however, Spaulding asked the court to sever 
the attempted-murder charge from the aggravated-murder charges.  That motion 
served no useful purpose.  This was an obvious mistake by defense counsel, because 
the murder charges were all connected by common evidence and the other charges 
required different proof, presenting an obvious risk of unfair prejudice. 
{¶ 250} Even under the plain-error standard, which I can agree is the correct 
standard of review, I would vacate Spaulding’s convictions on this proposition.  
There is “a reasonable probability that the error resulted in prejudice” for two 
reasons.  (Emphasis deleted.)  Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 
N.E.3d 860, at ¶ 22.  First, if the majority can recognize that the trial court would 
have been justified in severing the domestic-violence and menacing charges from 
the murder charges, then there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would 
have done so if asked.  And second, I have no doubt that the unusual volume of 
character and prior-bad-acts evidence admitted in this case had some impact on the 
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65 
jury’s aggravated-murder verdicts and death sentence.  That further undermines my 
confidence in the verdicts and supports reversal even if I cannot say that “but for 
error things would have been different,” Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83, 124 
S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157, fn. 9. 
{¶ 251} Spaulding argues in his fifth proposition of law that the trial court 
violated his rights to due process and a fair trial when it denied his motion for relief 
from prejudicial joinder.  I agree.  Finding it to be plain error that the trial judge did 
not sever the attempted- and aggravated-murder charges from the remaining 
charges, I would vacate Spaulding’s convictions and sentence and remand the 
matter for separate trials. 
{¶ 252} The claims asserted in this appeal do not fit perfectly into the plain-
error standard or the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel test articulated by the 
majority.  But I believe that they fit squarely within the plain-error and ineffective-
assistance standards that we are bound to follow by our own precedents and those 
of the United States Supreme Court.  And furthermore, I believe that a more critical 
look at the gray areas in this case shows that Spaulding did not receive the “fair 
trial and substantial justice” owed to him under Sections 10 and 16 of Article I of 
the Ohio Constitution, State v. Hester, 45 Ohio St.2d 71, 79, 341 N.E.2d 304 (1976). 
{¶ 253} For all these reasons, I dissent. 
_________________ 
 
Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Heaven 
DiMartino, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Donald Hicks; and The Law Office of Donald Gallick, L.L.C., and Donald 
Gallick, for appellant. 
_________________