Case Title: MARK NICHOLAS JAVORINA V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0103

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-04-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
MARK NICHOLAS JAVORINA V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 35180 P.3d 205Case Number: S-07-0103Decided: 04/01/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
MARK 
NICHOLAS JAVORINA,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE 
OF WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofTetonCounty

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge 

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane M. 
Lozano, State Public Defender and Tina N. Kerin, Appellate 
Counsel

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Leda M. Pojman, 
Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
J., 
delivers the opinion of the Court.  
BURKE, J., files a special 
concurrence.

 
 
HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      According to the 
judgment and sentence entered by the district court, Appellant, Mark Javorina 
(Javorina), was convicted of larceny, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402(a) and 
(c)(i) (LexisNexis 2007) and possession of stolen property, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann § 6-3-403(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2007).1  The judgment and sentence went on to 
note that the two crimes merged for sentencing and only a single sentence was 
imposed on the larceny charge, of four to nine years of 
imprisonment.

 
 
[¶2]      Actually, 
Javorina was convicted of larceny and concealing stolen property.  Javorina does not challenge his 
conviction for concealing stolen property.2  The property at issue was a customized 
Harley-Davidson Fat Boy motorcycle that belonged to Charlie Jones (Jones).  Javorina contends that the district 
court erred in failing to instruct the jury, at Javorina's request, that 
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle3 (commonly referred to as joyriding) 
was a lesser-included offense of the crime of larceny under the circumstances of 
this case.  In addition, Javorina 
contends that inadmissible victim impact testimony was elicited from Jones and 
his wife, and that that evidence was argued by the prosecution in closing 
argument, as though it was a factor pertinent to Javorina's guilt.  No contemporaneous objection was made to 
the testimony or the argument, so those matters may be reviewed only for plain 
error or fundamental error.  We will 
reverse.

 
 
[¶3]      Javorina raises 
these issues:

 
 
I.  Did 
the trial court err in refusing to give an instruction on the lesser-included 
offense of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle?

 
 
II.  Was 
irrelevant victim impact testimony impermissibly elicited and argued to the jury 
by the prosecution?

 
 
The 
State rephrases the issues thus:

 
 

I.  Is 
unauthorized use of a vehicle a lesser-included offense of larceny, and did the 
district court therefore err in refusing to instruct the jury 
accordingly?

 
 
II.  Was 
the victim impact testimony and argument admitted during [Javorina's] trial 
irrelevant and, if so, was such prejudicial?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶4]      By information 
filed in the district court on September 23, 2005, Javorina was charged with the 
larceny of a $13,000 Harley-Davidson motorcycle, as well as concealing stolen 
property (the same motorcycle at issue in this case).  A trial was held on May 30 and 31, 
2006.  An Order Upon Verdict of 
Guilt was entered on June 15, 2006.  
Javorina's defense attorney sought to withdraw on July 3, 2006, and by 
order entered on July 25, 2006, that motion was granted and Javorina was allowed 
to proceed pro se.  On July 27, 
2006, the district court found it necessary to appoint a new attorney to 
represent Javorina.   By order 
entered on August 17, 2006, the proceedings were suspended pending an evaluation 
of whether Javorina was fit to proceed to sentencing.  A hearing was held on that matter on 
February 5, 2007, and on February 7, 2007, Javorina was determined to be 
competent to proceed to sentencing.  
Judgment and Sentence were entered on March 12, 2007, as was Javorina's 
Notice of Appeal.

 
 
[¶5]      The central issue 
in this case is whether Javorina was entitled to a lesser-included offense 
instruction.  For this reason, we 
set out the facts in somewhat more detail than we might otherwise, because the 
applicable standard of review requires us to do so:

 
 
A 
lesser-included offense is "necessarily included" in the greater offense if its 
elements are a subset of the latter's elements.  Dean v. State, 2003 WY 128, ¶ 14, 
77 P.3d 692, 697 (Wyo. 2003).  
However, the jury must be instructed as to the lesser offense only if 
there is at least minimal evidence that could cause the jury to convict on the 
lesser, rather than the greater offense.  
Id. at 
¶¶ 18-19, 77 P.3d  at 698-99.  
The failure to give a lesser-included offense instruction in those 
circumstances constitutes reversible error.  Paramo, 896 P.2d  at 1344.  Whether a lesser-included offense 
instruction should be given is a question of law that we review de novo.  Dean, ¶ 12, 77 P.3d  at 696. 

 
 

Heywood 
v. State, 2007 
WY 149, ¶ 10, 170 P.3d 1227, 1230-31 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶6]      On the evening of 
August 9, 2005, Jones was living at the Days Inn Motel.  Mr. Jones's wife was the manager of that 
motel.  Jones was trying to sell his 
motorcycle and had a "for sale" sign on it, using the motel phone number for 
contact purposes.  The secondary 
issue in this case arose out of the reason Jones wanted to sell the 
motorcycle.  Those facts showed that 
Jones did not so much want to sell 
it, as that it became necessary 
because his health was steadily deteriorating due to multiple sclerosis.  It was the prosecution's elicitation of 
testimony with regard to Mr. Jones's health, and the sentimental attachment he 
had to the motorcycle, that created the second issue Javorina includes in this 
appeal.

 
 
[¶7]      Javorina showed 
up at the motel and expressed an interest in buying the motorcycle and that he 
wanted to buy it so that he could take it to Sturgis, South 
Dakota, and try to sell it there.  Jones was readily able to identify the 
motorcycle as his when it was returned to him because it was, in several 
respects, a custom bike.  Jones 
allowed Javorina to test drive the motorcycle, but limited that permission to 
the K-Mart parking lot and the motel parking lot.  It was late evening and dark was 
approaching.  Jones did not have 
Javorina's name, phone number, or any other information.  Jones waited between 15 and 45 minutes 
to report the motorcycle as stolen, at which time it was 9:19 p.m.  The investigating police officer did not 
enter the motorcycle as stolen with NCIC until 3:00 a.m., because he held out 
hope that it would be returned.  The 
investigating officer viewed the situation as one where it was "an authorized 
possession with a limit on it." When the undamaged motorcycle was found the next 
morning, there was no indication that there had been an attempt to obscure the 
vehicle identification number or remove the license plates from the 
motorcycle.  Javorina and the 
motorcycle were found in plain view in the parking lot at Flagg 
Ranch.

 
 
[¶8]      An employee of 
the Days Inn Motel was apparently the first to speak with Javorina when he 
arrived there, and he described Javorina as "nervous" and "jittery."  He also described Javorina as smelling 
as though " he had been drinking because it was like very, very strong.  Honestly it kind of burned my eyes, 
that's how strong it was.  I was  I 
never really been around someone that I have smelled  I almost  it was almost 
so strong that I could taste it in my mouth."  The employee further reported that 
Javorina talked a lot, including talking to himself a lot.  This same employee also reported that 
when Javorina did not return within fifteen minutes, there initially was some 
concern that the motorcycle might have broken down, because that had happened on 
a previous occasion when another individual test drove the 
motorcycle.

 
 
[¶9]      The next witness 
called was Jones's wife, Jennifer.  
Her testimony is important for two reasons.  First, because Javorina contends in this 
appeal that she was permitted to give "victim impact" testimony during the trial 
phase of the case.  The gist of that 
testimony was to the effect that her husband loved his motorcycle and it was a 
crushing blow to him to have it stolen, especially given that the progression of 
his health problems had necessitated him having to sell the motorcycle.  The defense did not object to this 
testimony.  In addition, her 
testimony revealed that although Javorina's given name is Mark, Mrs. Jones said 
he gave her the name "Jeff" (suggesting use of an alias).  However, later testimony revealed that 
Javorina went by the nickname "Jav."  
Mrs. Jones expressed having considerable knowledge of persons who are 
intoxicated by alcohol, but testified that in her view, Javorina did not appear 
to have been drinking at all, but rather just "maybe nervous, maybe high 
strung."4

 
 
[¶10]   Mr. Jones testified and indicated 
that he did not know Javorina, although Javorina claimed they were old drinking 
buddies.  Jones did not perceive 
Javorina to be intoxicated.  He gave 
Javorina permission to test drive the motorcycle only in the immediate area of 
the motel and adjoining K-Mart parking lot.

 
 
[¶11]   A Jackson police officer testified that Javorina was found at 
the Flagg Ranch near Jackson, within TetonCounty, during the morning of August 10, 
2005.  Flagg Ranch is situated on 
the John D. Rockefeller 
Parkway in Grand TetonNational 
Park.  
The distance from the scene of the theft to Flagg Ranch is not given in 
the record; however, we take note that it is about 44.9 miles north of 
Jackson (see http://www.flaggranch.com/contact 
html). That police officer also related that he had access to Javorina's 
conversations with visitors while he was briefly incarcerated in the Park.  On August 14, 2005, the officer 
overheard Javorina telling his roommate "words to the effect" that he had been 
drinking, and that he always gets in trouble and does not remember what he is 
doing when he drinks, and that he just wanted to ride the motorcycle through the 
Park.

 
 
[¶12]   A park ranger related the 
circumstances leading up to his locating Javorina at Flagg Ranch and the 
arrest.  Javorina was drinking beer 
and visiting with other bikers.  He 
had no luggage, toothbrush, or any other property indicating that he was taking 
a trip, only the beer.  The park 
ranger charged him with driving under the influence of 
alcohol.

 
 
[¶13]   Javorina requested the trial court 
to give a lesser-included offense instruction.  The court declined to do 
so.

 
 
[¶14]   We have not had occasion to speak 
directly to this lesser-included offense issue.  However, we have held that joyriding is 
not a lesser-included offense of concealing stolen property.  DeLeon v. State, 896 P.2d 764, 767-68 
(Wyo. 1995) 
(Although it is, of course, only dicta, our discussion in DeLeon intimated that joyriding was a 
lesser-included offense of larceny.).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Lesser-Included 
Offense of Joyriding

 
 
[¶15]   The elements of larceny are set out 
in W.Cr.P.J.I. § 34.02A (2004), Larceny  Stealing, Taking and Carrying 
Away.

 
 
The 
elements of the crime of Larceny, as charged in this case, 
are:

 
 
1.  On 
or about the ___ day of __________, 20__

 
 
2.  In 
__________ County, 
Wyoming

 
 
3.  The 
Defendant, __________________

 
 
4.  Stole, 
took and carried, led or drove away

 
 
5.  Property 
of another [of the value of $1,000.00 or more]

 
 
6.  With 
intent to deprive the owner or lawful possessor.

 
 
[¶16]   Of great importance here, that 
instruction is necessarily supplemented by the meaning of the word "deprive," as 
used in the governing statute (see W.Cr.P.J.I. § 34.01 
(2004)):

 
 
"Deprive" 
means:

 
 
(A)  To 
withhold property of another permanently or for so extended a period as to 
appropriate a major portion of its economic value or with intent to restore only 
upon payment of reward or other compensation; or

(B)  To 
dispose of the property so as to make it unlikely that the owner will recover 
it.

 
 
[¶17]   The elements of the asserted 
lesser-included offense are found at § 125.02 W.Cr.P.J.I. 
(2004):

 
 
The 
elements of the crime of Unauthorized Use of Vehicle, as charged in this case, 
are:

 
 
1.  On 
or about the ___ day of ________, 20__

 
 
2.  In 
__________ County, 
Wyoming

 
 
3.  The 
Defendant, _________________

 
 
4.  [{Wilfully] 
{Wantonly} {Maliciously}] [({took possession of} {drove} {propelled} {took 
away}) (attempted to {take possession of} {drive} {propel} {take away})] a 
vehicle which was the property of another

 
 
5.  Without 
the specific authority of the owner or the owner's authorized and accredited 
agent

 
 
6.  For 
the purpose of temporarily making use of the vehicle.

 
 
[¶18]   We have already set out the 
applicable standard of review.  This 
issue is thoroughly annotated at David A. Gerregano, Annotation, Joyriding or Similar Charge as 
Lesser-Included Offense of Larceny or Similar Charge, 78 A.L.R.5th 567 (2000 and Supp. 2007).  We note that the appellate courts of the 
various states have reached varying conclusions about this question, depending 
upon the wording of statutes and the facts of the case at hand.  It is generally recognized that the 
feature that distinguishes the two crimes is the nature of the evidence relating 
to whether or not the deprivation of the property was done with the intent to 
permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle, or to only temporarily deprive the 
owner of the vehicle.  It is 
interesting to note that many of the cases have been brought by defendants who 
were denied the instruction, and others were brought by defendants in cases 
where the instruction was given, at the request of the prosecution, but over the 
defendant's objection.  For example, 
it was held that a defendant who murdered the woman whose car he stole was not 
entitled to such an instruction.  People v. Moon, 117 P.3d 591 (Cal. 2005).  In State v. Griest, 994 P.2d 1028, 1028-29 
(Ariz.App.Div. 1 2000), a defendant was convicted of joyriding, even though he 
was charged only with theft by conversion (a more serious crime).  The owner of the vehicle gave the 
defendant possession of his van for the limited purpose of jump starting a 
neighbor's car.  The owner lived in 
Yavapai County, Arizona.  
The defendant drove off in a direction inconsistent with the defendant's 
requested use of the van, so the owner reported it stolen.  The defendant was arrested "several 
hours" later in Prescott, which is also in 
YavapaiCounty.

 
 
[¶19]   After carefully reviewing the facts 
of this case, and being persuaded by the better-reasoned cases included in the 
above-cited annotation, we conclude that, upon the defendant's request, the 
district court was required to give the instruction because:  (1) Its elements are a subset of the 
greater crime's elements; and (2) there is at least minimal evidence that could 
cause the jury to convict on the lesser, rather than the greater, offense.  The failure to give the lesser-included 
offense instruction here constitutes reversible error.  Having examined the applicable statutes, 
as well as the evidence presented at trial, we conclude that, as a matter law, 
the lesser-included offense instruction was required to be 
given.

 
 
Victim 
Impact Testimony

 
 
[¶20]   Our decision in Justice v. State, 775 P.2d 1002, 1010-11 
(Wyo. 1989) 
very clearly applies to the circumstances of this case:

 
 
It is 
clear that the testimony offered by the victims of this crime with respect to 
how it affected them in connection with their lives after the crime is 
absolutely irrelevant with respect to the issues before the jury.  Their discussion of the impact of the 
crime upon them could not in any way serve to establish any of the elements of 
the crime of aggravated robbery.  
The only purpose must have been to attempt to arouse the passions of the 
jury.  Consequently, we are 
satisfied that the admission of such evidence is error, and the trial courts are 
cautioned not to permit such evidence to be presented unless there is a clear 
justification of relevance.  In the 
context of this case, however, we are persuaded that such evidence was 
harmless.  Given the other evidence 
against Justice, which the trial court aptly described as overwhelming, the 
admission of the testimony about the impact on the victims did not constitute 
prejudicial error.  See Hyde v. State, 769 P.2d 376 (Wyo.1989); 
Ortega v. State, 669 P.2d 935 
(Wyo.1983).

 
 
Also see 
Whitney v. State, 2004 WY 118, 
¶¶ 89-91, 99 P.3d 457, 487-88 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶21]   Because no contemporaneous 
objections were made, either when the offending questions were asked and 
answered, or during closing argument, we must apply the plain error 
standard.  Under that standard, the 
record first must clearly present the incident alleged to be error.  Second, a defendant must demonstrate 
that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, 
not merely arguable, way.  Last, the 
defendant must prove that he was denied a substantial right resulting in 
material prejudice to him.  Lopez v. State, 2006 WY 97, ¶ 18, 
139 P.3d 445, 452-53 (Wyo. 2006).  
Here, the first two prongs are clearly met; however, just as clearly, 
Javorina has failed to present cogent argument or to cite pertinent authority 
that convinces us that he was denied a substantial right resulting in material 
prejudice to him.  While Mr. Jones's 
medical condition and his sentimental attachment to the motorcycle were not 
relevant,5 as that term is understood in the 
law of evidence and as it applies in the context of criminal trials, the 
evidence was not so conspicuous or inflammatory as to call into question the 
validity of the jury's verdict.

 
 
[¶22]   However, we do think a brief 
postscript on this issue is in order.  
In a spirit of generosity, we will assume that in these circumstances the 
questions asked, and the argument made, found their origin in ignorance of the 
law, rather than a malicious intent to inflame the jury.  However, such situations do put a 
defendant in a difficult spot.  In 
order to preserve the error, the defendant must object to the victim's tale of 
woe, and perhaps incur disfavor with the jury in the process.  Such strategic burdens should not have 
to be borne entirely by the defendant.  
A district court should respond to such incidents sua sponte if need be 
or, upon request, permit a defendant to make the necessary objection outside the 
hearing of the jury.  In most, if 
not all, cases the ruling sustaining the objection should include an admonition 
to the jury that the State knows such evidence is not relevant, and the jury 
must not handicap the defendant for having required the State to keep its 
presentation of evidence within the bounds of the governing 
law.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶23]   With respect to the conviction for 
larceny, the judgment and sentence of the district court are reversed, and this 
matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion, including amending the judgment and sentence to accurately reflect 
Javorina's conviction for concealing stolen property, rather than possession of 
stolen property.

  

BURKE, 
Justice, specially concurring.

 
 
[¶24]   I concur in the result reached by 
the majority, but write separately because I view the victim impact evidence 
differently than the majority. 

 
 
[¶25]   Victim impact evidence, by 
definition, is evidence concerning the impact that the crime has had on the 
victim after the crime has occurred.  
The crime involved is larceny.  
Victim impact evidence in the context of this case would be evidence 
establishing the effect of the theft of the motorcycle on Mr. Jones.  From my review, there is very little, if 
any, evidence of that nature in the record.  The majority accurately points out that 
there was a great deal of evidence regarding Mr. Jones's health problems and 
sentimental attachment to his motorcycle.  
Viewed in context, however, that evidence is not victim impact evidence 
because it was relevant to explain why Mr. Jones limited his test drive 
permission to the confines of the K-Mart parking lot, and why he reported the 
loss of the vehicle within such a short time after its disappearance.  Additionally, because the VIN on the 
vehicle did not match the number on the title, it was also relevant to bolster 
Mr. Jones's credibility regarding his identification of the vehicle when it 
was returned by the police.  The 
relevance of this evidence is capsulized in this exchange between the prosecutor 
and Mrs. Jones, as referenced in the majority opinion:

 
 
Q.        
[Prosecutor]:  Okay.  So he kept it for two years when he 
couldn't ride it; is that right?

 
 

A.                 
Right.

 
 

Q.                
When he 
was unable to ride it?

 
 

A.                 
Yeah, he 
would go out every day polishing it, wiping down the bike.  It was like his baby, it got more 
attention than me.

 
 

Q.                
All 
right.  So did you feel that was 
something important in his life then?

 
 

A.                 
Oh, 
yeah.

 
 

Q.                
Now 

 
 

A.                 
It gave 
him something to look forward to.  
His disease paralyzed him just overnight, but that bike was like a hope 
for him, yeah.

 
 

Q.                
So would 
you think he spent enough time to be able to recognize that bike pretty 
well?

 
 

A.                
Oh, 
yeah.  I'm sure he 
would.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  This testimony was not 
victim impact testimony.

 
 
[¶26]   Nevertheless, it is obvious from 
review of the entire record that the prosecutor treated this evidence as victim 
impact evidence.  Victim impact 
evidence is improper because it is intended to "arouse the passions of the 
jury."  Justice v. State, 775 P.2d 1002, 1010 
(Wyo. 
1989).  There is little doubt that 
the prosecutor intentionally emphasized Mr. Jones's physical condition and love 
of his motorcycle in an attempt to appeal to the jury's emotions.  The prosecutor devoted a substantial 
portion of his relatively short closing argument to Mr. Jones's health condition 
and sentimental attachment to his motorcycle and never once attempted to tie 
those factors to any relevant issue in the trial.  In closing, the prosecutor 
stated:

 
 
Ladies 
and gentlemen of the jury.  You 
know, sometimes I struggle with this, I am not an actor and I don't bring up  I 
don't know when emotion is coming or not, so I apologize.

 

            
But you sat here yesterday with me and you heard Charlie Jones talk about 
that bike, talk about how it takes four or five hours to clean a Harley because 
you've got to  you've got to talk to a Harley first and you've got to approach 
it right.  And, you know, you'd 
thought he was talking about his wife, she was kind of jealous of the Harley, 
you know, she said that.

 
 
            
The man spent his whole life working on big motors, big diesels, big 
generators and his hobby was the big bike, it's not a diesel but it about sounds 
like one.  And then after spending a 
lifetime doing that he retired, as we all hope to do, and he wanted to enjoy his 
bike.

 
 
            
Shortly after retirement life took a turn on him and he wasn't able to 
enjoy the bike the way he wanted to.  
He could still go out and he could clean it, he could polish it.  It's amazing to me that the guy spent 
four to five hours twice a week polishing that bike right there when nobody had 
ridden it since the last time he polished it, hadn't been anywhere.  It was just sitting there, but he still 
spen[t] the time with his bike.

 
 
            
It's hard to imagine what it would be like to be bound to a wheelchair, 
but you would want to have some hope, hope for mobility, hope for freedom, hope 
for, you know, the dignity and the pride that you had when you owned your own 
business, drove your own Harley and people didn't have to do everything for 
you.

 
 
                        
. . .

 
 
That 
bike meant a lot to Charlie Jones and then one day that man right there walked 
in and lied to him about who he was, lied to him about where he lived, lied to 
him about what he intended to do with the bike.  Just a little test drive and he took it, 
he took Charlie's pride, took his baby.

 
 
                        
. . .

 
 
Now 
[defense counsel] is going to have his turn to speak and then I'll get one more 
chance at rebuttal, but before I sit down I just want to ask you to think about 
Charlie Jones, the testimony he gave yesterday, and take a good look at Mark 
Javorina and think about what he did to Charlie Jones.

 
 
[¶27]   I can conceive of no proper basis 
for these arguments.  I am not 
willing, as the majority did, to excuse this conduct on the basis that these 
comments "found their origin in ignorance of the law."  I am also unwilling to find these 
comments harmless.  The comments 
were not isolated.  They made up 
approximately 40 percent of the prosecutor's closing argument.  The prosecutor emphasized Mr. Jones's 
medical condition and attachment to his motorcycle throughout the trial.  The record reveals a concerted effort to 
focus the jury's attention on Mr. Jones's medical condition.  In short, the prosecutor attempted to 
use sympathy for the victim as a basis for the jury's decision.  Such conduct should be condemned, not 
ignored as harmless.

 
 
[¶28]   The perplexing aspect of this issue 
is that there was no apparent need for the prosecutor to resort to these 
tactics.  The case against Mr. 
Javorina was strong.  Indeed, it is 
the strength of the case that allows the majority to find the error 
harmless.  However, the 
pervasiveness of this evidence, so blatantly emphasized in the prosecutor's 
closing arguments, leads me to the inescapable conclusion that Mr. Javorina was 
denied his fundamental right to a fair trial.  This evidence taints the entire trial 
and justifies a reversal of the larceny conviction.  Additionally, although the "concealment" 
conviction is technically not before us, in light of the reversal of the larceny 
conviction and the unusual procedural posture of this case,6 I would grant a new trial on all 
counts.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1§ 6-3-403. Wrongful 
taking or disposing of property; venue of indictment.

            
(a)  A person who buys, receives, conceals or disposes of 
property which he knows, believes or has reasonable cause to believe was 
obtained in violation of law is guilty of:

(i)  A felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten 
(10) years, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, 
if the value of the property is one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or more;  or

            
            
(ii)  Repealed by Laws 1984, ch. 44, § 
3.

            
(iii)  A misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more 
than six (6) months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars 
($750.00), or both, if the value of the property is less than one thousand 
dollars ($1,000.00).

            
(b) A person may be indicted under this section in the county where he 
received or possessed the property, notwithstanding the wrongful taking occurred 
in another county.

 
 

2The evidence 
of "concealment" was, at best, slight, although Wyoming law as interpreted by 
this Court, and the instructions given at trial, are quite generous to the 
State, in this regard.  Garcia v. State, 777 P.2d 1091, 1095 
(Wyo. 1989); 
compare 8A Words and Phrases, 
"conceal," pp. 27-31 (2005).  
However, because we reverse and remand with instructions that Javorina be 
accorded a lesser-included offense instruction on "joyriding," the vitality of 
the concealment conviction may have to be revisited in light of the legislative 
intent at work in this set of crimes, as well as the applicability of 
constitutional due process and equal protection standards.  The crime of concealment does not 
require a "larceny," but only that the property be obtained in violation of 
law.  In the instant circumstances, 
"concealing" the property that was the subject of the taking without authority, 
if perchance that is the jury's verdict, would then be a far more serious crime 
than the taking itself. 

 
 

3§ 31-11-102. Unauthorized 
use of vehicle; penalty.

            
Any person who without specific authority of the owner or his authorized 
and accredited agent willfully, wantonly, or maliciously takes possession of, or 
drives, propels or takes away, or attempts to take possession of, drive, propel, 
or take away a vehicle, the property of another, for the purpose of temporarily 
making use of the vehicle, or who knowingly aids, abets or assists another in so 
doing, upon conviction, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment 
for not more than one (1) year, a fine of not more than one thousand dollars 
($1,000.00), or both.

 

4The record 
is replete with information 
concerning Javorina's profound mental illness and his struggles with 
schizophrenia and alcohol abuse.  
Indeed, it was this factor that created the long delay between trial and 
sentencing.

 
 

5W.R.E. 401 
provides:  "Relevant evidence" means 
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence.

 
 

6Mr. Javorina 
was found guilty by the jury on both counts, but the district court has not 
entered the concealment conviction, and has not sentenced Mr. Javorina on the 
concealment charge.