Case Title: McCreary v. Weast

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-01-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
McCreary v. Weast1999 WY 5971 P.2d 974Case Number: 96-244Decided: 01/25/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
Dean 
McCREARY, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

Pamela R. WEAST, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the 
Sweetwater County District Court, John D. Troughton, 
J.

 

Daniel R. Erd of 
David E. Arnold Law Offices, Rock Springs, and John P. LaBuda of Palmer & 
LaBuda, Rock Springs, for Appellant.

Robert J. Reese 
of Reese & Mathey, Green River, for Appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument; retired November 2, 1998.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      To resolve the 
questions presented in this case, we are obliged to construe our statute of 
limitations relating to sexual assault on a minor, Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-105(b)(ii) 
(1997),1 and we must scrutinize the 
procedure that the trial court invoked for resolving the application of the 
statute of limitations. The issues arise out of a verdict and judgment in favor 
of Pamela R. Weast (Weast) for damages attributable to sexual assaults committed 
upon her during her minority. The trial judge permitted the jury to determine 
the application of the statute of limitations without any guidance with respect 
to the law. We hold that the trial judge did not meet his well-settled duty with 
respect to the statute of limitations, which is usually considered to be a 
question of law. The trial judge erred in relegating to the jury the function of 
determining the law while submitting to the jury only the language of the 
statute. The statute inherently is ambiguous because it contains no definition 
of the term "discovery." It should be construed cohesively with our existing 
cases adopting discovery of the cause of action as the triggering event for the 
commencement of the time within which the case must be filed to satisfy the 
applicable statute of limitations. In addition, we must resolve the novel 
question relating to the effect of the late realization of psychic trauma upon 
the commencement of the time provided in the statute of limitations. We reverse 
the case, and remand it to the trial court for a new trial in accordance with 
the principles set forth in this opinion.

[¶2]      In his Brief of 
Appellant, Dean McCreary (McCreary) defines the issues in this 
way:

FIRST 
ISSUE

Does the 
statutory period, provided in W.S. § 1-3-105(b), begin to run upon discovery of 
the acts constituting sexual assault, whether or not the injured party has 
discovered the full extent of the resulting harm?

SECOND 
ISSUE

Did the jury 
have insufficient evidence, or inadequate instructions to properly determine the 
question of the statute of limitations?

In the Brief of 
Appellee, filed on behalf of Weast, the issues are framed in this 
way:

1. Whether the 
district court committed reversible error in denying defendant's motion for 
summary judgment.

2. Whether the 
district court committed plain error in its instructions to the 
jury.

3. Whether there 
was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to make a factual finding on the 
statute of limitations issue.

[¶3]      On November 14, 
1994, Weast, who was then thirty-six years old, filed this action naming 
McCreary as the defendant and alleging that he had sexually assaulted her from 
1962 through 1982. McCreary was married to Weast's sister. Weast and her mother 
resided with McCreary and Weast's sister during most of the time that the 
claimed sexual abuse occurred. McCreary was many years older than Weast, and he 
played a father-like role in the home. While initially asserting causes of 
action for battery; criminal sexual contact, intrusion and assault; infliction 
of emotional stress; and punitive damages, Weast ultimately submitted a Second 
Amended Complaint alleging physical and sexual abuse described as repeated and 
regular episodes of sexual intrusion and sexual contact constituting sexual 
assault in the second degree as defined by Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-303 (Repl. 1988) and 
indecent liberties as defined by Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-105 (Repl. 1994).2

[¶4]      The theory of 
Weast's claim is that, although she always was aware of the sexual abuse, she 
did not comprehend and, for that reason, did not discover until February of 1993 
the psychic trauma she had sustained as a product of the abuse. In February of 
1993, Weast had gallbladder surgery. She was anesthetized for the surgery, and 
when she awoke she discovered McCreary standing over her hospital bed. She 
asserts that, at that moment in time, her memory "started flooding," and she 
began to experience severe emotional and psychological problems. In June of 
1993, Weast began counseling, and she was even hospitalized at one point. Her 
therapist explained that Weast "exhibited symptoms of post-traumatic stress 
disorder which were due to the rape trauma syndrome." The therapist explained 
that even though Weast was always aware she had been molested, she had kept her 
memories "underground or blanketed * * * throughout all that time." The 
therapist testified that Weast did not recognize the harm McCreary had caused 
her until she began therapy. According to the therapist, it is quite common for 
victims of sexual abuse to begin to confront their memories in their early or 
middle thirties.

[¶5]      McCreary filed a 
Motion to Dismiss Complaint and a Motion for More Definite Statement. In a 
letter to counsel, the trial judge reserved a ruling on the motion to dismiss, 
and granted the motion for a more definite statement. It was in response to that 
letter that the Second Amended Complaint was filed. McCreary then filed an 
Answer to Second Amended Complaint, and approximately one year later, McCreary's 
motion for summary judgment was filed. The thrust of the motion for summary 
judgment was that the statute of limitations had expired. The trial judge ruled 
that there were genuine issues of material fact with respect to the discovery by 
Weast of her injuries, and the motion for summary judgment was 
denied.

[¶6]      Subsequently, a 
jury trial was held, and McCreary moved for a directed verdict at the end of 
Weast's case, again urging that the causes of action were barred by the statute 
of limitations. The trial court reserved its ruling on that motion, and 
submitted the case, including the question relating to the statute of 
limitations, to the jury. The only instruction given with respect to the statute 
of limitations was Instruction No. 7, which stated:

INSTRUCTION NO. 
7

[¶7]      You are 
instructed that pertinent portions of the Wyoming Statutes provide in pertinent 
part:

 

Civil actions 
can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this chapter, after the 
cause of action accrues . . . W.S. § 1-3-102.

(b) . . . a 
civil action based upon sexual assault . . . against a minor may be brought 
within the later of:

(i) Eight (8) 
years after the minor's eighteenth birthday; or

(ii) Three (3) 
years after the discovery.

W.S. § 
1-3-105(b).

Neither party 
objected to the jury instructions given by the trial 
court.

[¶8]      Following its 
deliberations, the jury returned this verdict:

VERDICT

1. Do you find 
that Dean McCreary inflicted sexual assault upon Pamela Weast, during the time 
she was a minor, which caused her damages?

Yes X ----- No 
-----

If your answer 
to question number 1 is no, sign the verdict and return it to the Court. If your 
answer was yes, answer questions number 2 and 3.

2. What total 
amount of damages, if any, were sustained by Pamela Weast?

$ 250,000.00 
--------------

3. Is Pamela 
Weast's cause of action for sexual assault against Dean McCreary barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations?

Yes ----- No X 
-----

McCreary 
submitted a Motion for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, which was denied. 
He takes this appeal from the Judgment entered by the trial court based upon the 
verdict of the jury.

[¶9]      We are compelled 
to reverse this case, and remand it for a new trial. We have often said that the 
application of a statute of limitations is a question of law. Woodard v. Cook 
Ford Sales, Inc., 927 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Wyo. 1996); Hiltz v. Robert W. Horn, 
P.C., 910 P.2d 566, 570 (Wyo. 1996); Bredthauer v. TSP, 864 P.2d 442, 446 (Wyo. 
1993); Union Pacific Resources Co. v. State, 839 P.2d 356, 366-67 (Wyo. 1992); 
Mills v. Garlow, 768 P.2d 554, 555 (Wyo. 1989); Diamond Hill Inv. Co. v. 
Shelden, 767 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Wyo. 1989); Mason v. Laramie Rivers Co., 490 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Wyo. 1971). In Mills, 768 P.2d  at 555, we 
said:

Ordinarily the 
question of whether or not a cause of action is barred by a statute of 
limitations is a mixed question of law and fact, but where the facts are not in 
dispute, as here, the question is one of law.

Under this 
language, we could allow for the submission of the factual issues relating to 
the statute of limitations to the jury. The trial court, however, submitted the 
legal issues as well as the factual issues to the jury.

[¶10]   Addressing a problem of damages, 
this court spoke prophetically in Martinez v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949, 
960 (Wyo. 1990):

It is the 
function of the jury to apply the law as it has been explained by the court. See 
cases cited in 88 C.J.S. Trial § 297 (1955). The jury is not justified in 
furnishing its own interpretation of the law nor in arriving at its verdict in 
the light of its view as to the way things ought to be. Permitting the jury to 
determine the rules of law without guidance from the court, among other things, 
creates a substantial risk of inconsistent verdicts in very similar cases. The 
duty of the court, on the other hand, is to provide sufficient instruction to 
allow the jury to apply the appropriate law correctly. Shortfall in performing 
the responsibility of either the court or the jury results in an injustice to 
the parties, and a new trial is mandated.

(Emphasis 
added.) In this instance, we perceive that the trial court forsook its duty, and 
left the jury to determine the issue of the statute of limitations without 
guidance. A new trial is required under such 
circumstances.

[¶11]   It is true that the legislature 
provided no direction in adopting the statute of limitations that is before us. 
The statute provides only:

 

(b) 
Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, a civil action based upon sexual 
assault as defined by W.S. 6-2-301(a)(v) against a minor may be brought within 
the later of:

(i) Eight (8) 
years after the minor's eighteenth birthday; or

(ii) Three (3) 
years after the discovery.

Wyo. Stat. § 
1-3-105(b). The intended meaning of the word "discovery" in the statute is not 
specified.

[¶12]   The interpretation of the statute 
is a matter of law, and it is a function assigned to the courts. Gunderson v. 
State, 925 P.2d 1300, 1304 (Wyo. 1996). The fundamental rule we invoke in the 
interpretation of a statute is that we must ascertain, if possible, what the 
legislature intended by the language it used. Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. 
Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Rasmussen 
v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 128, 50 P. 819, 821 (1897)). We examine the language of 
the statute in light of the objects and purposes the legislature intended to 
accomplish. State v. Stovall, 648 P.2d 543, 545 (Wyo. 1982). If a word has a 
well-settled meaning in law at the time it is used by the legislature, we assume 
that the intention of the legislature was to encompass that definition, unless 
some different definition is clearly manifested. Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 1038. (Wyo. 1979).

[¶13]   For a number of years, Wyoming has 
been identified as a state that applies the discovery rule to determine when a 
cause of action accrues to start the running of the statute of limitations. The 
seminal case was Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334 (Wyo.), cert. denied 444 U.S. 863, 
100 S. Ct. 132, 62 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1979). The rule was summarized recently in Nowotny 
v. L & B Contract Industries, Inc., 933 P.2d 452, 456-57 (Wyo. 
1997):

Under the 
discovery rule as adopted in Wyoming, the statute of limitations will typically 
run from the date of the incident. The discovery rule can have the effect, 
however, of delaying the accrual of the cause of action in cases in which the 
injury or damage is not immediately apparent. We have said specifically that, "a 
tort is not complete and actionable until all the elements, duty, breach, 
proximate cause, and damage, are present." Davis v. City of Casper, 710 P.2d 827, 829 (Wyo. 1985). This serves to balance the equities in latent injury cases 
when the injured party would be barred from bringing an action only because that 
person was unaware of the injury.

(Emphasis 
added.) In applying the discovery rule in a product liability action, we held 
that, in a case in which a latent injury was caused by an intrauterine 
contraceptive device, " '[a] claim does not accrue until the injury is 
discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should be discovered.' " 
Olson v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc. 696 P.2d 1294, 1297 (Wyo. 1985) (quoting Hansen 
v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis.2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578, 581 (1983)). We have 
consistently applied the discovery rule over the years.

[¶14]   McCreary cites a case from a 
federal district court, in which the court stated:

The cases which 
have been brought to date have fallen into two categories: (1) those where the 
Plaintiff claims she knew about the sexual assaults at or before majority, but 
that she was unaware that other physical and psychological problems were caused 
by the prior sexual abuse; and (2) cases * * * where the Plaintiff claims due to 
the trauma of the experience she had no recollection or knowledge of the sexual 
abuse until shortly before she filed suit.

Johnson v. 
Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1367 (N.D.Ill. 1988). McCreary then relies upon 
decisions from our sister jurisdictions addressing the first situation, and 
holding that the discovery rule does not extend the period in which the claim 
must be asserted because the necessary elements of the claim were known. Evans 
v. Eckelman, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1609, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1990); Derose v. Carswell, 
196 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1987); Doe v. First United Methodist 
Church, 68 Ohio St.3d 531, 629 N.E.2d 402 (1994). McCreary contrasts those 
decisions with the second category of cases in which the discovery rule is 
invoked to extend the time for asserting the claim. Mary D. v. John D., 264 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Cal.App. 1989); E.W. v. D.C.H., 231 Mont. 481, 754 P.2d 817 
(1988). McCreary then cites the following cases for the proposition that the 
discovery rule does not toll the statute of limitations in sexual assault cases. 
Franke v. Geyer, 209 Ill. App.3d 1009, 154 Ill.Dec. 710, 568 N.E.2d 931, 933 
(1991); Raymond v. Ingram, 47 Wn. App. 781, 737 P.2d 314, 317 (1987). See also 
Farris v. Compton, 802 F. Supp. 487 (D.D.C. 1992);3 Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); Baily v. Lewis, 763 F. Supp. 802 (E.D.Pa.), aff'd 950 F.2d 722 
(3rd Cir. 1991); Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, 736 F. Supp. 1512 (S.D.Ind. 1990); 
Cassidy v. Smith, 817 P.2d 555 (Colo. App. 1991); Rigazio v. Archdiocese of 
Louisville, 853 S.W.2d 295 (Ky.App. 1993); Seto v. Willits, 432 Pa. Super. 346, 
638 A.2d 258, appeal denied 538 Pa. 648, 647 A.2d 902 (1994); Sanchez v. 
Archdiocese of San Antonio, 873 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. App. 1994); O'Neal v. Division 
of Family Services, State of Utah, 821 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1991); and Whatcott v. 
Whatcott, 790 P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1990).

[¶15]   Weast relies upon a different 
series of cases for the proposition that when time is required in order to 
discover the harm caused by child sexual abuse, the statute of limitations does 
not start to run until the date of the delayed discovery. Ulibarri v. 
Gerstenberger, 178 Ariz. 151, 871 P.2d 698 (1993); Wimberly v. Gatch, 635 So. 2d 206 (La. 1994); Lemmerman v. Fealk, 201 Mich. App. 544, 507 N.W.2d 226 (1993), 
rev'd, 449 Mich. 56, 534 N.W.2d 695 (1995); Petersen v. Bruen, 106 Nev. 271, 792 P.2d 18, 24 (1990); McCollum v. D'Arcy, 138 N.H. 285, 638 A.2d 797 (1994); Jones 
v. Jones, 242 N.J. Super. 195, 576 A.2d 316, cert. denied 122 N.J. 418, 585 A.2d 412 (1990); Roberts v. Southwest Community Health Services, 114 N.M. 248, 837 P.2d 442 (1992); Leonard v. England, 115 N.C. App. 103, 445 S.E.2d 50 (1994); 
Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1989); Ault v. Jasko, 70 Ohio St.3d 114, 
637 N.E.2d 870 (1994); Vesecky v. Vesecky, 880 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Tex. App. 1994), 
rev'd 933 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1996); Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345, 1349 (Utah 
1993); Hammer v. Hammer, 142 Wis.2d 257, 418 N.W.2d 23 (1987).4 While the cases cited by Weast 
indeed are persuasive, we conclude that we must chart our own 
course.

[¶16]   We have had no equivocation in 
articulating the proposition that the claim does not arise so as to start the 
period of the statute of limitations running until the element of damage is 
discovered. Nowotny, 933 P.2d at 456-57; Davis v. City of Casper, 710 P.2d 827, 
829 (Wyo. 1985); Metzger v. Kalke, 709 P.2d 414, 419-20 (Wyo. 1985); Olson, 696 P.2d  at 1297; Duke, 589 P.2d  at 343. The critical point to be resolved then is 
whether Weast, for purposes of applying the statute of limitations, must be 
charged with knowledge of her psychic trauma simply because she admittedly was 
aware of the physical trauma. Wyoming has espoused the rule that damages cannot 
be the object of speculation or conjecture. E.g., Reiman Const. Co. v. Jerry 
Hiller Co., 709 P.2d 1271, 1277 (Wyo. 1985); Krist v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 667 P.2d 665, 672 (Wyo. 1983); Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123, 1134 
(Wyo. 1978); Opheim v. United Mobile Homes, Inc., 511 P.2d 1289, 1290-91 (Wyo. 
1973); Blakeman v. Gopp, 364 P.2d 986, 991 (Wyo. 1961). In these cases, the rule 
is expressed by invoking the phrase "reasonable degree of certainty," and in 
Blakeman, that phrase was applied to future damages. Blakeman, 364 P.2d  at 991. 
In light of these cases, Weast could not have brought an action to assert 
possible psychic trauma.

[¶17]   More than sixty years ago in the 
context of claims apparently time barred by the worker's compensation statutes, 
this court said:

[I]t seems to us 
palpably unjust to the employee to deny him compensation because he has tried to 
keep his place on the employer's pay roll by doing his regular work and then has 
found that conditions produced at the time of the accident, and which medical 
science could not recognize or whose final consequences it could not forecast, 
have gradually and ultimately produced a compensable injury. We do not think the 
language employed in the law by our State Legislature was reasonably intended to 
produce any such result.

Baldwin v. 
Scullion, 50 Wyo. 508, 530-31, 62 P.2d 531, 539 (1936). This proposition, based 
upon a recognition of a second compensable injury, is still followed in the law 
of worker's compensation in Wyoming. Casper Oil Co. v. Evenson, 888 P.2d 221, 
224 (Wyo. 1995). We adopt for the period of limitations articulated in Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-3-105(b) the concept of a second compensable 
injury.

[¶18]   If the trial court or the jury is 
satisfied that psychic trauma has been proximately caused by a sexual assault 
upon a minor, and medical science could not recognize that trauma, or its final 
consequences could not be forecast, the period of limitations described in the 
statute does not begin to run until the damage is identified. The factual issue 
then to be resolved is whether a party such as Weast discovered or in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the psychic trauma. That 
factual resolution would establish the date on which the statute of limitations 
begins to run for purposes of a claim for sexual assault against a 
minor.

[¶19]   It is clear in this case that more 
than eight years had expired after Weast's eighteenth birthday. The only part of 
the statute affording comfort to Weast is whether she brought her action within 
"[t]hree (3) years after the discovery." Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-105(b)(ii). We remand 
this case to the trial court for a new trial. We agree that this is an instance 
in which the question of whether the claim is barred by the statute of 
limitations is a mixed question of law and fact. Mills, 768 P.2d  at 555. It 
would be appropriate for the trial court to submit the question of fact to the 
jury, but that question clearly is when Weast discovered or in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered the psychic trauma. The tenor of the 
instruction to the jury, in addition to the language of the statute, should 
encompass the definition of discovery as found in Olson, 696 P.2d  at 1297, but 
specifying the discovery of the psychic injury. It should not be necessary to 
explain the second compensable injury rule to the jury. If the trial court does 
explain the second compensable injury rule, it should make clear the proposition 
that the statute of limitations for Weast's claim for psychic damages would not 
start until the discovery of those damages, even though the discovery of the 
physical damages occurred at an earlier date.

[¶20]   Reversed and remanded for a new 
trial in accordance with this opinion.

Footnotes

1 Wyo. Stat. 
§ 1-3-105(b)(ii) provides:

(b) 
Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, a civil action based upon sexual 
assault as defined by W.S. 6-2-301(a)(v) against a minor may be brought within 
the later of:

(i) 
Eight (8) years after the minor's eighteenth birthday; 
or

(ii) Three (3) years after the discovery.

Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-301(a)(v) (Repl. 1988) 
provides:

(a) 
As used in this article:

* * 
*

(v) 
"Sexual assault" means any act made criminal pursuant to W.S. 6-2-302 through 
6-2-305[.]

Wyo. Stat. §§ 6-2-302 through 6-2-304 (Repl. 1988) provided, prior to 
July 1, 1997:

§ 
6-2-302. Sexual assault in the first degree.

(a) 
Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in 
the first degree if:

(i) 
The actor causes submission of the victim through the actual application, 
reasonably calculated to cause submission of the victim, of physical force or 
forcible confinement;

(ii) The actor causes submission of the victim by threat of death, 
serious bodily injury, extreme physical pain or kidnapping to be inflicted on 
anyone and the victim reasonably believes that the actor has the present ability 
to execute these threats;

(iii) The victim is physically helpless, and the actor knows or 
reasonably should know that the victim is physically helpless and that the 
victim has not consented; or

(iv) The actor knows or reasonably should know that the victim through a 
mental illness, mental deficiency or developmental disability is incapable of 
appraising the nature of the victim's conduct.

§ 
6-2-303. Sexual assault in the second degree.

(a) 
Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault in 
the second degree if, under circumstances not constituting sexual assault in the 
first degree:

(i) 
The actor causes submission of the victim by threatening to retaliate in the 
future against the victim or the victim's spouse, parents, brothers, sisters or 
children, and the victim reasonably believes the actor will execute this threat. 
"To retaliate" includes threats of kidnapping, death, serious bodily injury or 
extreme physical pain;

(ii) The actor causes submission of the victim by any means that would 
prevent resistance by a victim of ordinary 
resolution;

(iii) The actor administers, or knows that someone else administered to 
the victim, without the prior knowledge or consent of the victim, any substance 
which substantially impairs the victim's power to appraise or control his 
conduct;

(iv) The actor knows or should reasonably know that the victim submits 
erroneously believing the actor to be the victim's 
spouse;

(v) 
At the time of the commission of the act the victim is less than twelve (12) 
years of age and the actor is at least four (4) years older than the 
victim;

(vi) The actor is in a position of authority over the victim and uses 
this position of authority to cause the victim to submit; or (vii) The actor 
inflicts sexual intrusion in treatment or examination of a victim for purposes 
or in a manner substantially inconsistent with reasonable medical 
practices.

(b) 
A person is guilty of sexual assault in the second degree if he subjects another 
person to sexual contact and causes serious bodily injury to the victim under 
any of the circumstances listed in W.S. 6-2-302(a)(i) through (iv) or paragraphs 
(a)(i) through (vi) of this section.

(c) 
A person is guilty of sexual assault in the second degree if he subjects a 
person between the age of twelve (12) years through fifteen (15) years to sexual 
contact and causes serious bodily injury to the 
victim.

§ 
6-2-304. Sexual assault in the third degree.

(a) 
Except under circumstances constituting a violation of W.S. 14-3-105, an actor 
commits sexual assault in the third degree if:

(i) 
The actor is at least four (4) years older than the victim and who inflicts 
sexual intrusion on a victim under the age of sixteen (16) years; 
or

(ii) The actor is an adult and subjects a victim under the age of twelve 
(12) years to sexual contact without inflicting sexual intrusion on the victim 
and without causing serious bodily injury to the 
victim.

2 In 1962, 
indecent liberties was proscribed by Wyo. Stat. § 14-28 (1957), which 
provided:

It 
shall be unlawful for any person, including but not limited to parent, guardian 
or custodian knowingly to take immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any 
such child [a child under the age of 19 years] or knowingly to cause or 
encourage any such child to cause or encourage another child to commit with him 
or her any immoral or indecent act.

Any 
person who shall violate the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty 
of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not less than 
one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or 
imprisoned in the penitentiary not to exceed ten (10) years, or by both such 
fine and imprisonment.

In 
Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-112 (1977), the text of the statute remained the same, but the 
two paragraphs were identified as (a) and (b).

In 
1978, this provision was amended and renumbered as Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-105 to 
read:

Any 
person knowingly taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child 
or knowingly causing or encouraging any child to cause or encourage another 
child to commit with him any immoral or indecent act is guilty of a felony, and 
upon conviction shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor 
more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or imprisoned in the penitentiary not 
more than ten (10) years, or both.

Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 25, § 1 (1978).

3 Reversed 
without opinion, 318 U.S.App.D.C. 78, 84 F.3d 1452 (D.C. Cir. 
1996).

4 The holding 
in Hammer was limited by Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 Wis.2d 302, 
533 N.W.2d 780 (1995).