Case Title: St. Croix County Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Michael D.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2014AP002431

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2016-05-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
2016 WI 35 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP2431 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In re the termination of parental rights to 
Matthew D., a person under the age of 18: 
 
St. Croix County Department of Health and Human 
Services, 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Michael D., 
          Respondent, 
Juanita A., 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 360 Wis. 2d 492, 864 N.W.2d 121) 
(Ct. App. 2015 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 12, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 17, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
St. Croix 
 
JUDGE: 
Edward F. Vlack, III 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, C. J. concurs, joined by BRADLEY, R. 
G., J. 
PROSSER, J. concurs 
BRADLEY, R. G., J. concurs 
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. and BRADLEY, A. W., J. dissent 
(co-authored) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Steven L. Miller and St. Croix Department of Health and Human 
Services, and oral argument by Steven L. Miller. 
 
 
 
 
2 
For the respondent-appellant, there was a brief by Susan E. 
Alesia, assistant state public defender, and oral argument by 
Susan E. Alesia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 35
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 2014AP2431    
(L.C. No. 
2013TP10) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the termination of parental rights to 
Matthew D., a person under the age of 18: 
 
St. Croix County Department of Health and Human 
Services, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael D., 
 
          Respondent, 
 
Juanita A., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 12, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA G. BRADLEY, J.   The issues before us arise 
from St. Croix County's petition to terminate Juanita A.'s 
parental rights to her son, Matthew D., born March 23, 2009.  
The petition alleges both that Matthew was a child in continuing 
need of protection or services ("continuing CHIPS"), under Wis. 
No. 2014AP2431    
 
2 
 
Stat. § 48.415(2)(2013-14),1 and that Juanita failed to assume 
parental responsibility, under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6).2  We must 
determine 
whether 
Juanita 
received 
proper 
notice 
under 
§ 48.415(2), and, if so, whether sufficient evidence supports the 
remaining 
elements 
of 
the 
continuing 
CHIPS 
ground 
for 
termination.  The notice issue requires us to clarify whether 
Waukesha County v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 
N.W.2d 607, created an unequivocal rule that the statutorily 
prescribed written notice must be given in the last order 
placing a child outside his or her home and whether six months 
must pass after that last order before filing a termination of 
parental rights ("TPR") petition.   
¶2 
We hold that the notice Juanita received satisfied the 
statutory notice requirement in a TPR action based on continuing 
CHIPS, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the 
remaining elements of continuing CHIPS set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(2).  We further hold that Steven H. did not establish a 
"last order, plus six-months rule"; rather, Steven H. emphasized 
that parents facing termination of parental rights based on 
continuing CHIPS must have received written notice in one or 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2013-
14 version unless otherwise indicated.  We cite to the most 
recent version of the statutes because no pertinent changes have 
been made. 
2 St. Croix County's termination of parental rights petition 
also included Matthew's father, Michael D., but Michael D. did 
not contest the petition. 
No. 2014AP2431    
 
3 
 
more court orders warning them that termination may occur.  In 
Steven H., the last order contained the written notice; 
therefore, based on the facts in that particular case, the 
written notice required by § 48.415(2) was satisfied by the last 
order.   
¶3 
In adhering to the important principle of stare 
decisis, we do not overrule Steven H.  Rather, we acknowledge 
that two sentences in that case directly contradict the plain 
language of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2).  As a result, our circuit 
and appellate courts have issued inconsistent decisions when 
addressing factual scenarios such as the one presented here 
where the last order does not comply with the statutory notice 
requirements, but the circuit court finds another order did 
comply and the parent was adequately warned that parental rights 
were at stake and how to prevent a termination of those rights.  
Since Steven H., circuit courts have had to decide whether to 
follow the plain statutory language when a parent did not 
receive notice in the last order or follow the two sentences in 
Steven H. that conflict with the court's extensive discussion of 
the legislative purpose of Wis. Stats. §§ 48.356(2) and 
48.415(2)——to provide adequate notice to parents.  Our opinion 
clarifies Steven H. so that our circuit courts are able to 
consistently apply the plain language of the statute, and ensure 
that parents facing termination of their parental rights receive 
the notice required by Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2) without delaying a 
very important purpose of these statutes——permanency for the 
child.  
No. 2014AP2431    
 
4 
 
¶4 
Accordingly, we clarify Steven H., leaving intact its 
analysis and discussion; however, the conflicting sentence in 
paragraph 3 is withdrawn3 and we clarify that the last sentence 
in paragraph 31 shall not be construed to create a last order, 
six-months rule. The language in the last sentence in paragraph 
31 is limited to the facts of Steven H. where only the last 
order contained the written notice and the child had been out of 
the home for six months or longer.4  The plain language of 
§ 48.415(2) does not require that the written notice must be in 
the last order or that six months must pass after the last order 
before the petition to terminate parental rights may be filed.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' decision5 and  
affirm the circuit court's order6 terminating Juanita's parental 
rights to Matthew.    
                                                 
3 We withdraw this sentence:  "We conclude that Wis. Stat. 
§§ 48.356(2) and 48.415(2) require that the last order specified 
in § 48.356(2) placing a child outside the home, which must be 
issued at least six months before the filing of the petition to 
terminate parental rights, must contain the written notice 
prescribed by § 48.356(2)."  Waukesha Cnty. v. Steven H., 2000 
WI 28, ¶3, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607. 
4 The last sentence in paragraph 31 of Steven H. states:  
"Under § 48.415(2) the parents will be given adequate notice of 
the conditions for return and time to make any necessary changes 
to forestall the termination of parental rights if the last 
order issued at least six months before the filing of the 
petition involuntarily terminating parental rights contains the 
written notice."  Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶31. 
5 St. Croix Cnty. DHHS v. Michael D., No. 2014AP2431, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2015). 
6 The Honorable Edward F. Vlack presiding. 
No. 2014AP2431    
 
5 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
Juanita has physical, cognitive and mental health 
challenges.  When Matthew was born on March 23, 2009, Juanita 
had two other sons in her home, 12-year-old John, who is 
autistic, and 3-year-old Henry, who was removed from Juanita's 
home in May 2009 because Juanita was unable to properly 
supervise and maintain reasonable control over Henry.  Juanita's 
parental rights to Henry were terminated in May 2012.  When 
Matthew was eight days old, he was removed from Juanita's home 
based on reports that Matthew's two older brothers had dropped 
him, shaken him, and were not properly supporting his head when 
holding him.  Matthew was returned to Juanita at the end of May 
2009.   
¶6 
In June 2009, the circuit court found Matthew to be a 
child in need of protection or services following an incident 
where police were called to Juanita's home and found Matthew 
struggling to breathe.  Juanita told police Matthew had not 
taken a breath for a minute and his lips turned blue, but she 
did not want to call 911 for a "little problem like that."    
Matthew was taken to the hospital for treatment. He recovered 
and remained in Juanita's care subject to certain conditions and 
with support and services in place to assist her.  The circuit 
court extended this in-home placement continuing CHIPS order 
several times.  At the end of July 2011, when Matthew was almost 
two and one-half years old, he was again removed from Juanita's 
home, based on concerns that Juanita could not properly care for 
No. 2014AP2431    
 
6 
 
him and that her inability to adequately supervise Matthew put 
him in danger.   
¶7 
In August 2011, the circuit court issued a written 
CHIPS order changing Matthew's placement from Juanita's home to 
a foster home.  At a court hearing on October 5, 2011, where 
Juanita appeared with her lawyer, the circuit court read the TPR 
warnings to Juanita, and on October 11, 2011, the court issued a 
dispositional order amending the August order and attaching the 
conditions Juanita was required to meet before Matthew could be 
returned to her home.  This October 11 order also had attached a 
"Notice Concerning Grounds to Terminate Parental Rights" that 
Juanita had signed.  Under Wis. Stat. § 48.356, whenever the 
court orders a child to be placed outside the home because the 
child has been found to be in need of protection or services, 
the court must orally inform the parent—if present in court—of 
any applicable grounds for termination of parental rights and 
the conditions necessary for the child to be returned to the 
home.  Additionally, any written order placing a child outside 
the home, or extending the out-of-home placement, must contain 
this information. 
¶8 
Juanita returned to the circuit court on December 12, 
2011, where the court again gave oral TPR warnings to Juanita 
and ordered an extension of the October 11 dispositional order.    
The extension contained a provision notifying Juanita that:  
"All conditions of the dispositional order/consent decree remain 
in effect," but the court did not attach the separate TPR 
warnings.  Juanita appeared for another hearing on September 6, 
No. 2014AP2431    
 
7 
 
2012, where the circuit court again gave her oral TPR warnings. 
On September 11, 2012, the circuit court issued another 
extension order, which contained the same language noted above:  
"All conditions of the dispositional order/consent decree remain 
in effect" but it did not attach separate TPR warnings.  
¶9 
St. Croix County first filed a TPR petition as to 
Matthew in January of 2013, but it was dismissed without 
prejudice on June 12, 2013 because the prosecutor inadvertently 
failed to appear for the pre-trial hearing.  On June 18, 2013, 
St. Croix County filed a second TPR petition seeking to 
terminate Juanita's parental rights based on continuing CHIPS 
under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2), and failure to assume parental 
responsibility under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6).  On September 4, 
2013, the circuit court issued another extension order, which 
contained the same language noted above:  "All conditions of the 
dispositional order/consent decree remain in effect" but it did 
not attach separate TPR warnings.7 
                                                 
7 In her brief, Juanita emphasizes the numerous written 
orders in this case:  "There were 27 written orders in Matthew's 
CHIPS case[.]"  We note that only 4 of the 27 written orders 
were CHIPS orders requiring written notice under Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.356(2).  Juanita also emphasizes that there were ten CHIPS 
court hearings in this case.  We note that seven of those ten 
hearings required oral TPR warnings under Wis. Stat. § 48.356(1).  
Juanita received oral warnings at three of the seven hearings.  
The deficiencies of these notices and warnings under § 48.356 in 
Matthew's CHIPS case do not affect our holding that Juanita 
received sufficient notice in this TPR case because the TPR 
statute based on continuing CHIPS grounds requires proof only 
that the written notice under § 48.356(2) be given in one or more 
of the CHIPS orders. 
No. 2014AP2431    
 
8 
 
¶10 The fact-finding hearing, tried to the court, occurred 
in December 2013.  After St. Croix County presented its case, 
Juanita moved the circuit court to dismiss the TPR petition, 
arguing failure of proof on the elements and inadequate notice 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2) and Wis. Stat. § 48.356.  The 
circuit court denied both motions.  With respect to the notice 
issue, the circuit court ultimately ruled Steven H. did not 
establish an unequivocal "last order, plus six-months rule."  
Instead, it held that "substantial compliance" with the notice 
statute was sufficient.  It reached this conclusion based on 
Steven 
H.'s 
emphasis 
on 
the 
legislative 
purpose 
of 
the 
Children's Code, the court of appeals' interpretation of Steven 
H. in Waushara County v. Lisa K., 2000 WI App 145, 237 Wis. 2d 
830, 615 N.W.2d 204, and Steven H.'s discussion that the purpose 
of the notice statutes "is meant to ensure that a parent has 
adequate notice of the conditions with which the parent must 
comply for a child to be returned to the home.  The notice is 
also meant to forewarn parents that their parental rights are in 
jeopardy."  Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶37.  The circuit court 
then found the notice given to Juanita sufficient to comply with 
the statutes: 
[Notice to Juanita] was sufficient under § 48.356(2) 
to inform her that her parental rights were in danger 
of being terminated and advising her of the conditions 
necessary for the return of the child.  Although only 
one TPR warning was written, this Court finds it is 
not fatal that the 2012 extension order did not 
contain written TPR warnings.  From the date of the 
October 5, 2011, extension hearing, [Juanita] appeared 
before the court, with counsel, on at least ten 
No. 2014AP2431    
 
9 
 
different occasions related to this matter.  She was 
given a written TPR warning on October [11], 2011, and 
given oral TPR warnings on three occasions including: 
October 5, 2011, December 12, 2011, and September 6, 
2012.  Less than five months after the September 6, 
2012, TPR warnings were given, the first [TPR] 
Petition . . . was filed.  The current [TPR] Petition 
. . . was filed less than one year after the September 
6, 2012, hearing.  The number and frequency of the 
court proceedings, in addition to four occasions since 
October 5, 2011, [Juanita] was orally given TPR 
warnings, lead this Court to conclude that she had 
sufficient notice under § 48.356(2).  [Juanita] had 
notice of the conditions required of her for the child 
to return to her care and that her legal rights were 
in jeopardy if she did not meet those conditions.    
¶11 Further, the circuit court rejected Juanita's claim 
that she was "confused" about whether termination was looming: 
This Court has noted the number and frequency of the 
[CHIPS] proceedings . . . as well as the number of 
warnings, both oral and written, she was given in the 
two years prior to the filing of the current Petition.  
In 
addition, 
she 
has 
had 
full 
representation 
throughout [the CHIPS proceedings] and these present 
proceedings, and has not raised, through counsel or 
personally, any issue of confusion with regard to the 
obligations, conditions, or consequences until now.  
¶12 The circuit court found grounds existed on the 
continuing CHIPS allegation, but that St. Croix County failed to 
prove Juanita had not assumed parental responsibility for 
Matthew.  The circuit court found Juanita unfit to parent 
Matthew and the case proceeded to a dispositional hearing.  At 
the conclusion of the dispositional hearing, the circuit court 
found it was in Matthew's best interests to terminate Juanita's 
parental 
rights. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
entered 
the 
order 
terminating Juanita's parental rights in May 2014.   
No. 2014AP2431    
 
10 
 
¶13 Juanita appealed to the court of appeals, which 
reversed the circuit court and remanded "for vacation of the 
termination order and dismissal of the termination of rights 
petition."  St. Croix Cnty. DHHS v. Michael D., No. 2014AP2431, 
unpublished slip op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2015).  Citing 
Steven H., the court of appeals ruled that because the last 
order Juanita received did not contain written notice warning 
her about termination, St. Croix County failed to establish the 
notice element required under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)1.  St. 
Croix Cnty. DHHS v. Michael D., No. 2014AP2431, unpublished slip 
op., ¶16 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2015).  
II.  ANALYSIS 
¶14 This 
appeal 
involves 
issues 
relating 
to 
the 
involuntary termination of parental rights, under Chapter 48 of 
the Wisconsin Statutes, the Children's Code.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 48.417 requires the authorized agency to file a petition to 
terminate parental rights under certain circumstances including 
when:  "[t]he child has been placed outside of his or her 
home . . . for 15 of the most recent 22 months" and "the 
petition shall be filed . . . by the last day of the 15th 
month . . . the child was placed outside of his or her home."  
Wis. Stat. § 48.417(1)(a).  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415 sets forth 
the grounds for termination, including "Continuing need of 
protection or services," which provides in relevant part: 
Grounds 
for 
involuntary 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights.  At the fact-finding hearing the court or jury 
shall 
determine 
whether 
grounds 
exist 
for 
the 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights. . . . Grounds 
for 
No. 2014AP2431    
 
11 
 
termination of parental rights shall be one of the 
following: 
. . .  
(2) 
Continuing 
need 
of 
protection 
or 
services. 
Continuing need of protection or services, which shall 
be established by proving any of the following: 
(a) 1. That the child has been adjudged to be a child 
or an unborn child in need of protection or services 
and placed, or continued in a placement, outside his 
or her home pursuant to one or more court orders under 
s. 48.345, 48.347, 48.357, 48.363, 48.365, 938.345, 
938.357, 938.363 or 938.365 containing the notice 
required by s. 48.356 (2) or 938.356 (2). 
2. 
a. In this subdivision, "reasonable effort" 
means an earnest and conscientious effort to take good 
faith steps to provide the services ordered by the 
court 
which 
takes 
into 
consideration 
the 
characteristics of the parent or child or of the 
expectant mother or child, the level of cooperation of 
the parent or expectant mother and other relevant 
circumstances of the case. 
b. That the agency responsible for the care 
of the child and the family or of the unborn child and 
expectant mother has made a reasonable effort to 
provide the services ordered by the court. 
3. That the child has been outside the home for a 
cumulative total period of 6 months or longer pursuant 
to such orders not including time spent outside the 
home as an unborn child; and that the parent has 
failed to meet the conditions established for the safe 
return of the child to the home and there is a 
substantial likelihood that the parent will not meet 
these conditions within the 9-month period following 
the fact-finding hearing under s. 48.424. 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)1.-3.   
A.  Notice 
¶15 The 
first 
issue 
is 
whether 
the 
written 
notice 
requirements under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)1. were satisfied.  
No. 2014AP2431    
 
12 
 
This issue requires statutory interpretation, which is a 
question of law that we review de novo.  Shannon E.T. v. Alicia 
M. V.M., 2007 WI 29, ¶31, 299 Wis. 2d 601, 728 N.W.2d 636.  Our 
standards for interpreting statutes are well-known and need not 
be repeated here.  See State ex re. Kalal v. Circuit Court for 
Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
¶16 The language of Wis. Stat § 48.415(2)(a)1. requires 
St. Croix County to prove Matthew "has been adjudged to be a 
child . . . in need of protection or services and placed, or 
continued in a placement, outside his or her home pursuant to 
one or more court orders . . . containing the notice required by 
s. 48.356(2)."  (Emphasis added.)  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.356 
requires the circuit court to give oral and written warnings to 
parents whose children are placed outside their home "of any 
grounds for termination of parental rights under s. 48.415 which 
may be applicable."  Section 48.356 provides in full:  
Duty of Court to Warn. (1) Whenever the court orders a 
child to be placed outside his or her home, orders an 
expectant mother of an unborn child to be placed 
outside of her home, or denies a parent visitation 
because the child or unborn child has been adjudged to 
be in need of protection or services under s. 48.345, 
48.347, 48.357, 48.363, or 48.365 and whenever the 
court reviews a permanency plan under s. 48.38(5m), 
the court shall orally inform the parent or parents 
who appear in court or the expectant mother who 
appears in court of any grounds for termination of 
parental 
rights 
under 
s. 
48.415 
which 
may 
be 
applicable and of the conditions necessary for the 
child or expectant mother to be returned to the home 
or for the parent to be granted visitation. 
(2) In addition to the notice required under sub. (1), 
any written order which places a child or an expectant 
No. 2014AP2431    
 
13 
 
mother outside the home or denies visitation under 
sub. (1) shall notify the parent or parents or 
expectant mother of the information specified under 
sub. (1). 
Subsection (1) sets forth the required oral warnings and 
subsection (2) sets forth the required written warnings.  Only 
subsection (2) is referenced in the TPR based on continuing 
CHIPS statute.  
¶17 We begin by emphasizing that this is a TPR case, not a 
CHIPS 
case. 
 
Therefore, 
the 
case 
is 
governed 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. § 48.415(2)——a TPR statute.  Section 48.415(2) makes the 
written notice in the CHIPS statute, Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2), an 
element to prove in a TPR case grounded in continuing CHIPS to 
ensure that a parent whose rights are being terminated has——at 
least one time——received written notice to that effect.  The 
language of the TPR statute does not specifically mention the 
last order, the first order or use the term every order.  
Rather, it references one or more of the court's written orders 
notifying a parent of applicable grounds for termination of 
parental rights.8  We are not at liberty to disregard the plain 
                                                 
8 We are confident that applying the plain language of Wis. 
Stat. § 48.415(2) will not result in our circuit courts ignoring 
the notice requirement in CHIPS cases under Wis. Stat. § 48.356.  
Based on Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2)'s requirement that "any written 
order which places a child . . . outside the home . . . shall 
notify the parent or parents" of potential TPR grounds and 
conditions necessary for a child to be returned to the home, 
parental rights and notice requirements will not be diluted by 
our decision in this case. 
 
No. 2014AP2431    
 
14 
 
words of the statute and we will not attempt to improve the 
statute by adding words not chosen by the legislature.  It is 
undisputed that the October 11, 2011 written order contains the 
statutorily prescribed termination of parental rights warnings.  
Thus, the statutory requirement was satisfied in this case 
because one order——the October 11, 2011 order——included the 
written TPR notice warning Juanita that her parental rights to 
Matthew were in jeopardy.   
¶18 We could end our analysis here but for the fact that 
Steven H. has created a question in the court of appeals and 
circuit courts as to whether Steven H. created a bright-line 
rule requiring that the last order in a CHIPS case contain the 
written notice in order to satisfy Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)1.  
Courts, including the circuit court in the instant case, are 
ruling different ways on this question.  As we have seen here, 
this circuit court, faced with the factual scenario where a 
parent had adequate notice despite the last order not containing 
the Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2) warnings, concluded the elements for 
termination based on continuing CHIPS were satisfied because one 
order had the written warnings attached.  This circuit court, 
faced with a choice between the plain language of Wis. 
Stat. § 48.415(2) requiring only one order and two conflicting 
sentences in Steven H. about the last order, chose to apply the 
plain language of the statute.   
¶19 The court of appeals, in Lisa K., 237 Wis. 2d 830, ¶13 
reached a similar conclusion.  In Lisa K., the last extension 
order before the TPR filing did not contain the notice required 
No. 2014AP2431    
 
15 
 
by Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2), but the previous dispositional orders  
contained the requisite notice.  Lisa K., 237 Wis. 2d 830, ¶2.  
After discussing Steven H., the court of appeals rejected Lisa 
K.'s argument that Steven H. created a last order, six-months 
rule.  Id., ¶¶5-6.  Rather, the court of appeals held that 
"notice and adequate information were the dispositive factors in 
CHIPS notices which are followed by termination of parental 
rights proceedings," id., ¶8, and therefore, as long as a parent 
"had more than adequate notice of what was expected of her for 
the return of her children to her, and was more than adequately 
forewarned that her parental rights were in jeopardy . . . it is 
not relevant . . . that the final order . . . did not contain" 
all the notice requirements of § 48.356(2).  Lisa K., 237 
Wis. 2d 830, ¶10.   
¶20 Additional cases demonstrate the factual variations 
that arise in TPR cases and how the courts have reached 
differing decisions based on Steven H.  See State v. Amelia A., 
Nos. 2015AP630-31, unpublished slip op., ¶¶1-2 (Wis. Ct. App. 
June 9, 2015)(affirming termination of parental rights where 
August 2012 order contained statutory notices but August 2013 
order did not; held that because TPR petition was filed in 
November 2013, which was less than six months after August 2013 
order, August 2012 order controls decision); Portage Cnty. DHHS 
v. Julie G., No. 2014AP1057, unpublished slip op., ¶¶20-21 
(acknowledging Steven H. last order, six-months rule); Walworth 
Cnty. DHHS v. Jeanna R., No. 2009AP1952, unpublished slip op., 
¶17 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 11, 2009)(same);  Dunn Cnty. DHSS v. 
No. 2014AP2431    
 
16 
 
Debra O., Nos 2008AP17715077, unpublished slip op., ¶15 (Wis. 
Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2009)(citing Steven H. for the proposition “we 
recognize it may not be necessary in every TPR case to 
demonstrate that the parent was provided the requisite notice of 
conditions in every single order, as long as the parent had 
adequate notice given the facts of the case.”);  Pierce Cnty. v. 
Amy F., No. 2004AP1552, unpublished slip op., ¶¶7-10 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Aug. 31, 2004)(where parent received required notice with 
first CHIPS order, Steven H. does not support her claim that 
failure to receive the last order with identical warnings as the 
first order requires dismissal);  see also Comment, Wis JI—
Children 
324A 
("The 
Committee 
believes 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.415(2) requires only that the last order placing the 
child/children outside the home contain the written warnings 
regarding the termination of parental rights.").   
¶21 Thus, some courts read Steven H. to say the statutory 
notice must be in the last order filed six months before the 
TPR.  Others read Steven H. to say as long as the parent has 
adequate notice of the conditions required for return of the 
child and sufficient warning that parental rights are in 
jeopardy, the last order need not contain the notices required 
in Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2).  As a result, some courts are not 
following the plain language of the statute, which requires that 
to prove continuing CHIPS as a TPR ground, the State must prove 
the parent received "one or more" orders containing the required 
notice. 
No. 2014AP2431    
 
17 
 
¶22 Today, we clarify our decision in Steven H.  The issue 
in Steven H. as it relates to the present case was whether Wis. 
Stat. §§ 48.415(2) and 48.356(2), in a TPR case based on the 
continuing CHIPS ground, "require that each and every order 
placing a child outside his or her home contain the written 
notice prescribed by § 48.356(2) in order for the termination of 
parental rights to proceed."  Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶2, 
¶16.  The answer to that question was and remains no.  We 
reached that answer by applying the language of both statutes, 
cognizant 
of 
the 
legislative 
purposes 
expressed 
in 
the 
Children's Code.  We noted the legislature used "one or more 
court orders" in § 48.415(2) but "any order" in § 48.356(2).  We 
examined in depth the expressed legislative purposes set forth 
in the Children's Code in Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1), which directs 
"that courts act in the best interests of a child, that courts 
avoid impermanence in family relations and that courts eliminate 
the need for children to wait unreasonable periods of time for 
their parents to correct the conditions that prevent their 
return to the family."  Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶36.  Based 
on these considerations, we held that even though Steven H. 
received the statutorily prescribed notice in only one written 
order (the last order before the TPR petition was filed), this 
satisfied the statutes because the notice served its dual 
purpose of (1) "ensur[ing] that a parent has adequate notice of 
the conditions with which the parent must comply for a child to 
be returned to the home"; and (2) "forewarn[ing] parents that 
their parental rights are in jeopardy."  Id., ¶37.   
No. 2014AP2431    
 
18 
 
¶23 We explained in Steven H. that interpreting the 
different terminology in Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2) ("one or more 
court orders") and Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2)("any order") as the 
appellant parent requested would frustrate the important goals 
of the Children's Code: 
If the court interprets the statutes as Steven H. 
requests, [the child] would likely remain in the 
impermanence of foster care for many more months until 
the alleged defects in [the deficient orders] could be 
cured.  This interpretation is not required by the 
words 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. § 48.356(2) 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. § 48.415(2).  Furthermore, this interpretation 
is contrary to the express legislative policy of the 
Children's Code that courts act in the best interests 
of a child, that courts avoid impermanence in family 
relations and that courts eliminate the need for 
children to wait unreasonable periods of time for 
their parents to correct the conditions that prevent 
their return to the family.  Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1)(a).   
Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶36.  As the circuit court here 
observed, 
this 
case 
has 
been 
pending 
since 
April 
2009.  
Dismissing the petition because the last order did not have the 
requisite warnings despite compliance with the "one or more" 
language of the TPR statute, runs contrary to the purpose of the 
Children's Code.  It also would cause us to reject and abandon   
the extensive and thoughtful analysis in Steven H. about the 
purposes for the Children's Code, which resulted in the Steven 
H. holding: "that Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2) and 48.415(2) do not 
require that each and every order removing a child from his or 
her home contain the written notice prescribed by § 48.356(2) in 
order for the termination of parental rights to proceed."  
Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶3.   
No. 2014AP2431    
 
19 
 
¶24 The plain language of § 48.415(2) requires that in a 
TPR case where the underlying ground to terminate is based on 
continuing 
CHIPS, 
the 
statutory 
notice 
requirements 
are 
satisfied when at least one of the CHIPS orders contains the 
written notice required under § 48.356(2).  In Steven H., the 
last order satisfied this requirement.  In Juanita's case, the 
October 11, 2011 order satisfied this requirement.9  Accordingly, 
we make clear today that Steven H. did not create a bright-line 
"last order, six-months" rule and we withdraw the language in 
Steven H. creating that suggestion.  See supra nn.3-4. 
¶25 Although bright-line rules are helpful in practice, we  
cannot change the language of this statute, but must apply the 
statutory words chosen by the legislature.  The language of Wis. 
Stat. § 48.415(2) is not ambiguous; it is very clear——only one 
                                                 
9 We also note that in addition to the one written notice, 
Juanita also received three oral warnings from the circuit court 
at three separate hearings:  October 5, 2011, December 12, 2011, 
and September 6, 2012 (which was less than five months before 
the first petition to terminate was filed).  Further, Juanita 
had just a few months earlier gone through a separate TPR for 
her other son, Henry, where her parental rights were terminated; 
moreover, Juanita was represented by counsel throughout all 
proceedings.  The circuit court made a specific factual finding 
that despite the non-compliant September 11, 2012 order, Juanita 
did in fact receive sufficient notice and understood both the 
conditions necessary for return and the consequences for failing 
to meet those conditions.  The record demonstrates Juanita had 
adequate notice that her parental rights to Matthew were in 
jeopardy.  
Further, we are not persuaded by Juanita's contention she 
was confused.  The circuit court found that Juanita was not 
confused, and we see nothing to suggest that finding was clearly 
erroneous.   
No. 2014AP2431    
 
20 
 
or more of the written notices required under Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.356(2) must be proven in a TPR case based on continuing 
CHIPS.  The legislature does not explain why it used "one or 
more" in the TPR statute, but used "any" in the CHIPS statute.  
This does not, however, change our analysis.  The legislature 
used "one or more" in § 48.415(2) and that is the language we 
must apply in this TPR case.   
¶26 Our holding does not alter the statutory duty of the 
circuit court in CHIPS proceedings under Wis. Stat. § 48.356, 
whenever the court orders a child to be placed outside his or 
her home, to (1) orally warn parents who appear in court of any 
grounds for termination of parental rights which may be 
applicable and (2) include written notice of such grounds in any 
written orders for such out-of-home placement.  These procedures 
effectuate another express legislative purpose set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 48.01(ad) of assuring that parents' "constitutional and 
other legal rights are recognized and enforced."  However, the 
legislature has not incorporated these mandates into the 
elements necessary to prove a continuing CHIPS ground in a TPR 
action under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2).  Accordingly, under a plain 
reading of the text of § 48.415, a TPR action based on 
allegations of continuing CHIPS is not precluded solely by 
noncompliance with § 48.356 in CHIPS proceedings, provided the 
elements of continuing CHIPS are proven.   
¶27 Although Juanita's case does not involve an issue as 
to the six-months rule referenced in Steven H., we address it 
for clarity.  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(2) does not say the 
No. 2014AP2431    
 
21 
 
agency seeking a TPR must wait to file until six months after 
the last CHIPS dispositional order or extension thereof; rather, 
§ 48.415(2)'s only reference to six months comes in Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(2)(a)3., 
which 
provides 
that 
the 
agency 
seeking 
termination must prove:  "That the child has been outside the 
home for a cumulative total period of 6 months or longer 
pursuant to such orders."  There is no language stating the "6 
months" must be after the last CHIPS dispositional order or 
extension; rather, the "6 months" is a "cumulative total period" 
under the CHIPS orders.  Any other interpretation would require 
reading language into the statute that does not exist and 
unnecessarily delays permanency.  Accordingly, we also withdraw 
any language in Steven H. suggesting the agency must wait six 
months after the last out-of-home placement order is issued 
before filing a TPR petition.   
B.  Sufficiency of the Evidence10 
¶28 The second issue is whether there was sufficient 
evidence to meet the other elements of the continuing CHIPS 
                                                 
10 Although sufficiency of the evidence was not raised in 
the petition for review, we elect to address it in the interest 
of efficiency.  See State v. Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d 121, 126, 449 
N.W.2d 845 (1990)(When decision on "issue for which the court 
accepted the petition for review" results in need to decide a 
second issue, we may elect to decide the second issue.); Chevron 
Chem. Co. v. Deloitte & Touche, 176 Wis. 2d 935, 945, 501 N.W.2d 
15 (1993)("[O]nce a case is before us, we have discretion to 
review 
any 
substantial 
and 
compelling 
issue 
the 
case 
presents."). 
No. 2014AP2431    
 
22 
 
ground for TPR under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a).  The elements 
are: 
(1) The child has been adjudged CHIPS and placed or 
continued in placement outside his or her home 
pursuant to one or more CHIPS orders containing the 
statutorily prescribed notice; § 48.415(2)(a)1., 
(2) The responsible agency "made a reasonable effort 
to 
provide 
the 
services 
ordered 
by 
the 
court"; § 48.415(2)(a)2., 
(3) The child has resided outside the home "for a 
cumulative total period of 6 months or longer" under 
CHIPS order(s); § 48.415(2)(a)3., and 
(4) "[T]he parent has failed to meet the conditions 
established for the safe return of the child to the 
home and there is a substantial likelihood that the 
parent will not meet these conditions within the 9-
month period following the fact-finding hearing under 
s. 48.424." § 48.415(2)(a)3. 
St. Croix County had the burden to prove all four elements by 
clear and convincing evidence.   
¶29 Our 
standard 
of 
review 
in 
a 
challenge 
to 
the 
sufficiency of the evidence is whether there is any credible 
evidence to sustain the verdict.  Sheboygan Cnty. DHHS v. Tanya 
M.B., 2010 WI 55, ¶49, 325 Wis. 2d 524, 785 N.W.2d 369.  Under 
this standard, we conclude the evidence was sufficient. 
¶30 First, as already discussed above, there is credible 
evidence to show St. Croix County satisfied the first element——
the notice element.  It is undisputed that Matthew was a child 
in need of protection or services placed outside his home under 
CHIPS orders and one of those orders——the October 11, 2011 
order——contained the written notice prescribed by statute. 
No. 2014AP2431    
 
23 
 
¶31 Second, there is credible evidence to show St. Croix 
County made reasonable efforts to provide Juanita services 
ordered by the court.  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)2. defines 
"reasonable effort" as "an earnest and conscientious effort to 
take good faith steps to provide the services ordered by the 
court which takes into consideration the characteristics of the 
parent or child . . . , the level of cooperation of the 
parent . . . and other relevant circumstances of the case."  The 
trial court found St. Croix County "did make reasonable efforts 
to provide services ordered by the court."  There is credible 
evidence both in the testimony at the fact-finding hearing in 
this case and in the CHIPS file to support this element.   
¶32 Dina Williams testified that she is employed by St. 
Croix County as a child protection social worker and worked with 
Juanita since Matthew was initially removed from the home when 
he was eight days old.  Williams explained the efforts St. Croix 
County made to provide services to Juanita: 
We've had a coordinated family services team, a 
community support team.  Juanita's had an individual 
therapist, three different individual therapists at 
minimum.  She's had a mental health worker, a 
psychiatrist that monitors her medications.  We have 
provided respite services, transportation in way of -- 
whether it be a gas card or taking her to and from 
places if needed, as well as for Matthew.  There's 
personal care workers for both Juanita and for John.  
Again, the Birth to 3, early Head Start.  He's had 
early childhood.  Now he's in the 4K and preschool 
program.  
Williams testified that since Matthew was removed in 2011, 
Juanita 
received 
twice-a-week 
and 
then 
three-times-a-week 
No. 2014AP2431    
 
24 
 
supervised 
visits 
from 
St. 
Croix 
County 
employees 
who 
transported Matthew to Juanita's home, offered parenting and 
safety suggestions during the visits, and provided any other 
help Juanita needed.  One of those employees, Ann Larson, a 
program aide at St. Croix County Family and Children's Services 
Department, testified that she tried to help Juanita learn 
better parenting skills by making suggestions with respect to 
proper food portions, talking to Juanita about safety concerns 
such as pill bottles within Matthew's reach, getting a lock on 
the gate in the yard, and fixing a large gap in the gate that 
Matthew could slip through and escape from the yard.  Larson 
also testified she was there to provide resources for Juanita, 
but Juanita had not asked for any help to improve her parenting 
skills.   
¶33 Dawn Noll, another St. Croix County program aide, 
testified that she worked with Juanita for seven years, offering 
parenting suggestions and providing transportation.  After 
Matthew was removed from Juanita's home, Noll transported 
Matthew back and forth for weekly supervised visits with 
Juanita, and helped Juanita with parenting.  Juanita testified 
she had a personal care worker assigned by the County who came 
two hours a day on Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, Friday and every 
other Saturday to help Juanita bathe and do household chores.  
Williams testified:  "We have exhausted all services that we can 
possibly think of or that are available to us or to the family."  
Collectively, this testimony is sufficient to demonstrate that 
No. 2014AP2431    
 
25 
 
St. Croix County made reasonable efforts to provide services to 
Juanita.   
¶34 Third, it is not disputed that Matthew was outside his 
home for more than six months.  He was removed in July 2011 and 
never returned.  The TPR petition was filed in June 2013.  
Matthew was outside the parental home for much longer than the 
required "cumulative period of six months."   
¶35 Fourth, 
there 
is 
credible 
evidence 
establishing 
Juanita's failure to meet the conditions necessary for Matthew's 
safe return to Juanita's home.  The circuit court imposed 14 
conditions: 
(1) 
Juanita 
shall 
demonstrate 
the 
ability 
to 
supervise Matthew at all times.   
(2) 
Juanita shall demonstrate the ability to provide, 
enforce and follow through with age appropriate 
discipline 
techniques 
with 
Matthew, 
when 
necessary. 
(3) 
Juanita shall continue to learn parenting skills 
with the Parent Aide with St. Croix County Family 
& Children's and demonstrate the ability to use 
these skills. 
(4) 
Juanita 
shall 
provide 
a 
structured 
routine, 
including but not limited to, meals, naps, 
bedtime, bathing, etc., for Matthew and follow 
through with this routine. 
(5) 
Juanita shall keep her home free of all safety 
hazards that may endanger Matthew's health and/or 
safety, out of his reach including, but not 
limited to, all sharp objects, food that has been 
out longer than 2 hours, raw meat, heavy objects 
that are at risk of falling on or near Matthew, 
plastic bags, hangers, electric cords, electric 
outlets, and medications, and will demonstrate 
the ability to follow through. 
No. 2014AP2431    
 
26 
 
(6) 
Juanita 
shall 
learn 
and 
practice 
basic 
housekeeping skills and basic home management 
skills which will also help in keeping the home 
free from safety hazards. 
(7) 
Juanita shall demonstrate the ability to keep 
Matthew safe while playing outside by following 
him where he is playing, holding his hand when 
walking to different areas and staying within 10 
feet or less of him in non-enclosed settings. 
(8) 
Juanita shall follow through with Birth to 3, 
Early 
Head 
Start 
and 
Speech 
Therapy 
recommendations when it comes to teaching Matthew 
verbal skills and having Matthew use his words to 
enhance his speech and communications skills.  
Juanita will demonstrate this ability without the 
assistance, 
guidance 
or 
support 
of 
other 
individuals. 
(9) 
Juanita 
shall 
follow 
through 
with 
all 
recommendations made by her physicians when it 
pertains to her physical health and well-being.  
Juanita shall follow through with basic hygiene 
and self-care techniques to improve overall basic 
functioning and health.  
(10) Juanita shall sign any and all releases deemed 
necessary and appropriate by the Department.  
This includes releases to be signed for the 
social Worker to discuss Juanita's health and 
well-being 
with 
her 
various 
health 
care 
providers.  These will be signed at the time 
requested.  If a request is deemed by Anita to be 
unreasonable the court shall be notified for a 
review hearing to be scheduled as soon as 
possible. 
(11) Juanita shall not have any other individuals 
living with her (aside from her eldest son, John 
or her sister, Julie) without permission of the 
social worker and GAL. 
(12) Warnings for Termination of Parental Rights shall 
be administered to Juanita. 
No. 2014AP2431    
 
27 
 
(13) Juanita shall meet with the assigned social 
worker as deemed necessary and appropriate and 
will also acknowledge unannounced home visits. 
(14) In all other respects, the current CHIPS Court 
Order recommendations are still in effect and 
will continue to be followed.   
¶36 Although we agree with Juanita that she was able to 
meet some of these conditions, the record contains credible 
evidence establishing that she failed to meet all of them.  
Williams testified Juanita attempted to meet the conditions for 
return, but "she's not able to complete all of them on a 
consistent basis."  Williams explained: 
 Juanita 
"has 
not 
demonstrated 
the 
ability 
to 
supervise 
Matthew 
at 
all 
times 
without 
the 
assistance of others.  She has not been able to 
demonstrate the ability to provide, enforce, and 
follow 
through 
with 
age-appropriate 
discipline 
techniques with--at all times on her own without 
assistance.  She does at times, but not always." 
Juanita's focus is frequently on arguing with her 
older son and "Matthew is often just lost in the 
shuffle" leaving Matthew unsupervised. 
 Juanita's parenting skills have improved, but she 
does not have "the ability to use these skills" "on 
a consistent and ongoing basis."  
 Juanita typically does not have a structured plan 
for the visits. 
 Juanita's 
ability 
to 
make 
her 
home 
safe 
has 
improved, "but there continues to be incidents 
where, again, medications have been left out.  This 
is something I have repeatedly talked to Juanita 
about." When playing outside, "the gate [is] not 
properly latched, if latched at all." 
 With regard to the condition to keep a clean home, 
Juanita cannot do this on a consistent basis.  "She 
needs reminders" "continuous reminders on [how] to 
keep the house clean."  The floor was "filthy," 
No. 2014AP2431    
 
28 
 
there were dirty dishes "from last night's meal 
still out on the counter, food, dishes in the living 
room," dirty laundry, and the bathroom was so dirty 
Matthew did not want to use it. 
 Juanita is "often sitting when [Matthew's] off 
playing" and not within the ten-feet required by the 
conditions to keep him safe. 
 Juanita keeps up with the early education and speech 
requirements but only because she is reminded to do 
so.  Once reminded, Juanita will "make the effort to 
do it for a short period of time, but it doesn't 
continue as an ongoing basis."  
 Juanita has rescinded all of her medical releases 
and will not allow any contact with her personal 
physicians or her "protective payee in regards to 
her financial situation and whether or not she is 
able 
to 
financially 
support 
herself 
and 
her 
children."   
Williams' testimony provides credible evidence to establish 
Juanita's failure to meet the conditions. 
¶37 There was also credible evidence demonstrating a 
substantial likelihood that Juanita would not meet the imposed 
conditions within the nine-month period following the fact-
finding hearing.  Williams testified that Juanita would not be 
able to comply with the conditions for return within the nine 
months following the hearing and that:  "We have exhausted all 
services that we can possibly think of or that are available to 
us or to the family."  St. Croix County Department of Social 
Services worked with Juanita since Matthew was eight days old.  
It provided her with significant support for years, yet Juanita 
could not consistently demonstrate an ability to properly 
supervise Matthew or maintain a safe home for Matthew.  Williams 
testified that Juanita would be able to exhibit the parenting 
No. 2014AP2431    
 
29 
 
skills she had been taught for at most one month "before she 
goes back to the old behaviors."  There was nothing to show that 
Juanita could accomplish in another nine months what she was 
unable to do in the prior four and a half years.  Thus, credible 
evidence supports this element.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶38 We hold that the notice Juanita received satisfied the 
statutory notice element of a TPR action grounded in continuing 
CHIPS set forth in Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2).  The notice required 
under Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2)(a)1. was satisfied with the written 
October 11, 2011 order.  In a TPR case based on the continuing 
CHIPS ground, Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(2) does not require proof 
that notice was given in every CHIPS order removing a child from 
the home or extension thereof; it also does not require proof 
that notice was in the last CHIPS order.  Rather, it requires 
proof that one or more of the CHIPS orders removing a child from 
the home, or extension thereof, contain the written notice 
required under § 48.356(2).   
¶39 We further hold that Steven H. did not establish an 
unequivocal "last order, plus six-months rule."  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 48.415(2) does not use the term last order; rather, the 
legislature chose to use the phrase "one or more."  Accordingly, 
if "one or more" of the CHIPS orders in a TPR case contains the 
statutorily prescribed written notice, regardless of whether it 
was the first, last, or any order in between, such notice 
satisfies the phrase "one or more."  Likewise, the statutes do 
not require that six months must pass after the last CHIPS order 
No. 2014AP2431    
 
30 
 
before a TPR petition can be filed.  Rather, the relevant 
statute requires proof that a child was "outside the home for a 
cumulative total period of 6 months or longer."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(2)(a)3.  We do not overrule Steven H.  It remains good 
law except that we withdraw our conflicting sentence in 
paragraph 3 and clarify the last sentence in paragraph 31.  See 
supra ¶2, ¶4 nn.3-4, & ¶¶18-25, ¶27. 
¶40 We also hold that the record contains credible 
evidence sufficient to establish continuing CHIPS as a ground 
for terminating Juanita's parental rights.  The record contains 
credible evidence showing:  Matthew was adjudged CHIPS and 
placed outside Juanita's home pursuant to one or more CHIPS 
orders containing the statutorily prescribed written notice; St. 
Croix County made reasonable efforts to provide services to 
Juanita; Matthew resided outside of Juanita's home for longer 
than six months; Juanita failed to meet all of the conditions 
required for his return; and there was a substantial likelihood 
that Juanita would not meet those conditions within the nine 
months following the fact-finding hearing.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the court of appeals' decision and affirm the circuit 
court's order terminating Juanita's parental rights to Matthew. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
No.  2014AP2431.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶41 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
C.J. 
(concurring).   I 
fully join the majority opinion.  However, I write in 
concurrence to address what appears to be Justice Shirley 
Abrahamson's practice of lending the prestige of her judicial 
office to further private interests.   
¶42 Justice Abrahamson says she writes to "compare Justice 
Rebecca G. Bradley's public approach to the role of a new 
justice in deciding cases argued and pending on her appointment 
and the approach taken in the past in this court and in the 
United States Supreme Court regarding the role of a new 
justice."1  However, an examination of what she says in her three 
separate writings, when combined with what she does not tell 
readers of those separate writings, evidences that she is 
engaged in a different pursuit.   
¶43 Justice 
Abrahamson's 
writings 
repeatedly 
omit 
important facts well known to her; they are attached to court 
decisions in which her assaults on Justice Rebecca Bradley are 
not relevant to legal issues presented to the court for 
decision; and this is the third opinion since December 18, 2015, 
in which she has attacked Justice Rebecca Bradley by implying 
that her decisions about when to participate in cases pending 
before the court are improper.   
¶44 Therefore, as Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, I write to provide transparency by setting out important 
                                                 
1 Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶136. 
No.  2014AP2431.pdr 
 
2 
 
facts known to Justice Abrahamson, which she has chosen to omit 
from her writings in three cases.     
¶45 A brief narration of relevant historic facts is 
necessary to understand my concerns.  On September 17, 2015 and 
September 18, 2015, Justice N. Patrick Crooks did not attend 
oral argument in six cases that were argued on those two days.  
He watched oral argument on WisconsinEye and then participated 
in our decision conferences by telephone.  As arguments began on 
September 17 and again on September 18, I told counsel that 
Justice Crooks would be absent from oral argument, but would 
participate in the decision conference by phone.   
¶46 The court reached tentative decisions in five of the 
six cases argued.  Justice Crooks would have participated in the 
released opinions of all cases that were tentatively decided if 
his death had not intervened.2   
¶47 On September 17, we heard oral argument in St. Croix 
County, the case now before us.  Justice Abrahamson asserts that 
Justice Rebecca Bradley is "[t]aking a different and contrasting 
approach to this prior precedent."3  However, Justice Abrahamson 
                                                 
2 Justice Abrahamson asserts, "There is precedent in this 
court for a member of the court to do as Justice Crooks 
explained he would do."  Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶141 
n.53.  
If there is "precedent" that was created by other justices' 
absences from oral argument and subsequent participations in the 
decision conference by phone as Justice Abrahamson asserts, it 
is not noted in our opinions.  This absence is reasonable 
because the manner in which a justice participates has nothing 
to do with issues presented to the court for review.   
3 Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶147.  
No.  2014AP2431.pdr 
 
3 
 
knows that Justice Crooks participated in St. Croix County in 
very much the same manner as Justice Rebecca Bradley has:  both 
listened to oral argument on WisconsinEye and both participated 
in the decision conference, Justice Crooks by phone and Justice 
Rebecca Bradley in person when the court held a second decision 
conference.  Furthermore, Justice Rebecca Bradley's decision to 
participate in St. Croix County is not a legal issue presented 
to the court for resolution in St. Croix County. 
¶48 Twice before, once in a dissent and once in a 
concurrence, Justice Abrahamson omitted important facts known to 
her and in so doing, through the facts that she did relate, she 
drew into question the propriety of Justice Rebecca Bradley's 
decisions about whether to participate in pending cases.  The 
repetitive nature of her omissions of known facts heightens my 
concern. 
¶49 For example, in her dissent in State v. Matalonis, 
2016 WI 7, 366 Wis. 2d 443, 875 N.W.2d 567, Justice Abrahamson 
said, "the court heard oral argument in the instant case 
[Matalonis] and eight other cases.  Justice N. Patrick Crooks 
participated in these nine cases."4  Justice Abrahamson asserted 
that Justice Rebecca Bradley's "participation in those cases 
without a reargument appear[s] to be internally inconsistent and 
inconsistent with the court's prior practice."5   
                                                 
4 State v. Matalonis, 2016 WI 7, ¶73, 366 Wis. 2d 443, 875 
N.W.2d 567 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting)   
5 Id., ¶82.   
No.  2014AP2431.pdr 
 
4 
 
¶50 When she wrote her dissent in Matalonis implying 
impropriety in Justice Rebecca Bradley's participation because 
the court did not hold another oral argument, Justice Abrahamson 
knew that Justice Crooks did not participate in oral argument in 
Matalonis because she knew that he did not attend oral arguments 
on September 18.  Nevertheless, Justice Abrahamson did not 
disclose to readers of Matalonis that Justice Crooks watched 
oral argument on WisconsinEye, just as Justice Rebecca Bradley 
has, and that his involvement in the decision conference was by 
telephone, while Justice Rebecca Bradley personally participated 
in a subsequent decision conference.  Justice Abrahamson also 
did not disclose to readers of Matalonis that the court has no 
prior practice to follow when a justice joins the court mid-
term.6  And finally, Justice Rebecca Bradley's decision to 
participate in Matalonis is not relevant to deciding the legal 
issues presented by that case. 
¶51 Justice Abrahamson's omissions have caused at least 
one reader to question Justice Rebecca Bradley's decision to 
                                                 
6 The last death that occurred during a court term was that 
of Justice Horace Wilkie, who died May 23, 1976.  Although 
Justice Abrahamson was appointed to replace him, she did not 
join the court mid-term as Justice Rebecca Bradley has.  Rather, 
she began September 7, 1976, at the beginning of the court's 
term.   
No.  2014AP2431.pdr 
 
5 
 
participate in 
Matalonis, claiming that her participation 
violated Matalonis's rights of due process and equal protection.7    
¶52 The first time Justice Abrahamson made allegations 
about Justice Rebecca Bradley's participation was in her 
concurrence to New Richmond News v. City of New Richmond, 2015 
WI 106, 365 Wis. 2d 610, 875 N.W.2d 107, which was argued 
September 18.  There, she wrote, "Prior to September 21, 2015 
[the date of Justice Crooks' death], the court heard oral 
argument 
in 
nine 
cases. 
 
Justice 
N. 
Patrick 
Crooks 
participated."8  Once again, when she issued her concurrence in 
New Richmond News, Justice Abrahamson knew that Justice Crooks 
did not participate in oral arguments for all of those cases 
because six cases were argued on September 17 and September 18 
when Justice Crooks was absent from oral argument.  She also 
knew that the court did not reach a tentative decision in New 
Richmond News at the decision conference on September 18 because 
she refused to vote, held the case and voted for the first time 
after Justice Crooks' death.   
¶53 Omitting important facts known to her at the time of 
her writings permits Justice Abrahamson to imply that by 
deciding to participate in St. Croix County and Matalonis, and 
                                                 
7 The author of the motion for reconsideration states that 
"Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson provides much of the background 
of facts and circumstances pertinent to Matalonis' motion for 
reconsideration in her dissenting opinion, State v. Matalonis, 
2016 WI 17, ¶¶68-84."  Mot. for Recons. 2 n.2  
8 New Richmond News v. City of New Richmond, 2015 WI 106, 
¶10, 
365 
Wis. 2d 
610, 
875 
N.W.2d 
107 
(Abrahamson, 
J., 
concurring).   
No.  2014AP2431.pdr 
 
6 
 
deciding not to participate in New Richmond News, Justice 
Rebecca Bradley violated established rules of this court.   
¶54 Nothing could be further from the truth.  As Justice 
Abrahamson well knows, this court has no procedure that directs 
how the court and the justices are to proceed when a justice 
leaves mid-term and another justice takes his or her place. 
Limited guidance is found in our Internal Operating Procedures 
which provide:  
A justice may recuse himself or herself under any 
circumstances sufficient to require such action.  The 
grounds for disqualification of a justice are set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 757.19.  The decision of a 
justice to recuse or disqualify himself or herself is 
that of the justice alone.    
IOP, II.L.1.  Although the IOP is not directly on point, it 
supports Justice Rebecca Bradley's decisions.  Furthermore, 
Justice Abrahamson is well aware that Justice Rebecca Bradley 
did extensive research in advance of deciding how to proceed 
because Justice Rebecca Bradley shared her research with the 
court. 
¶55 And finally, Justice Abrahamson is well aware that 
this court was presented with her version of United States 
Supreme Court procedures that she asserts are employed when a 
justice leaves the United States Supreme Court mid-term.  She 
also knows that we did not adopt those procedures for use by 
Wisconsin Supreme Court justices.  All of those facts are 
missing from her three writings that attack Justice Rebecca 
Bradley.  
No.  2014AP2431.pdr 
 
7 
 
¶56 Because Justice Abrahamson has omitted important facts 
from her separate writings that were well known to her when she 
personally attacked Justice Rebecca Bradley and because her 
attacks immediately preceded the election of a justice to our 
court, it appears that Justice Abrahamson is using the prestige 
of her judicial office to further private interests.   
¶57 While Justice Abrahamson is free to speak in support 
of her political views in many other forums, as Justice Ann 
Walsh 
Bradley 
did 
in 
her 
public 
endorsement 
of 
Joanne 
Kloppenburg, Justice Rebecca Bradley's opponent in the April 5, 
2016 
election 
for 
supreme 
court 
justice, 
justices 
are 
constrained from doing so in court opinions, which should 
address legal issues presented to the court for decision.  
Accordingly, I respectfully concur in the majority opinion.  
¶58 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA G. 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
 
 
 
No.  2014AP2431.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶59 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  
This case 
presents a classic example of the challenges facing appellate 
courts.  It compels us to resolve a question arising out of the 
convergence of ambiguous statutory language, well-reasoned but 
conflicting precedent, and a heart-wrenching factual situation. 
¶60 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415 is the Wisconsin statute 
listing 
grounds 
for 
the 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights.  
Subsection (2) discusses the ground of "Continuing Need of 
Protection or Services" and sets out what a county must prove to 
establish this ground. 
¶61 Subsection (2)(a)1. lists the first item of proof: 
 
(a)1. 
That the child has been adjudged to be 
a child . . . in need of protection or services and 
placed, or continued in a placement, outside his or 
her home pursuant to one or more court orders under 
s. 48.345, 48.347, 48.357, 48.363, 48.365, 938.345, 
938.357, 938.363 or 938.365 containing the notice 
required by s. 48.356(2) or 938.356(2). 
¶62 To understand what the first item of proof requires, 
we must examine and interpret Wis. Stat. § 48.356, especially 
subsection (2).  The statute reads: 
 
48.356 Duty of court to warn. 
 
(1) Whenever the court orders a child to be 
placed outside his or her home, orders an expectant 
mother of an unborn child to be placed outside of her 
home, or denies a parent visitation because the child 
or unborn child has been adjudged to be in need of 
protection or services under s. 48.345, 48.347, 
48.357, 48.363, or 48.365 and whenever the court 
reviews a permanency plan under s. 48.38(5m), the 
court shall orally inform the parent or parents who 
appear in court or the expectant mother who appears in 
court of any grounds for termination of parental 
rights under s. 48.415 which may be applicable and of 
the conditions necessary for the child or expectant 
No.  2014AP2431.dtp 
 
2 
 
mother to be returned to the home or for the parent to 
be granted visitation. 
 
(2) In addition to the notice required under 
sub. (1), any written order which places a child or an 
expectant mother outside the home or denies visitation 
under sub. (1) shall notify the parent or parents or 
expectant mother of the information specified under 
sub. (1). 
¶63 As the majority opinion explains, after St. Croix 
County presented its case at a fact-finding hearing, Juanita's 
counsel moved the circuit court to dismiss the TPR petition on 
grounds that the county had failed to prove elements related to 
the statutory sections quoted above.  Majority op, ¶10.  In 
short, Juanita claimed that the county had not provided adequate 
written notice under the statutes. 
¶64 One of the ablest circuit judges in Wisconsin, Edward 
F. 
Vlack, 
concluded 
that 
there 
had 
been 
"substantial 
compliance." 
¶65 Judge Vlack's terminology was ironic because in 1988 
the court of appeals held: "If a statute is mandatory, its 
observance is usually said to be imperative.  We conclude that 
substantial 
compliance 
with 
sec. 
48.356(2), 
Stats., 
is 
insufficient."  D.F.R. v. Juneau Cty. DSS, 147 Wis. 2d 486, 493, 
433 N.W.2d 609 (Ct. App. 1988) (citation omitted).  The court of 
appeals then ruled: "Because the department did not establish 
that D.F.R.'s children had been outside her home for a 
cumulative total period of one year or longer pursuant to 
dispositional orders containing the notice required by sec. 
48.356(2), Stats., the trial court erred in terminating D.F.R.'s 
parental rights."  Id. at 499. 
No.  2014AP2431.dtp 
 
3 
 
¶66 The result in D.F.R. introduced grave uncertainty and 
hardship into the lives of two young children. 
¶67 More than a decade later, this court reviewed a case 
in which the circuit court terminated a father's rights to his 
daughter.  The court of appeals reversed the circuit court  
because some orders removing the daughter from her home did not 
include the written notice prescribed by Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2) 
(1997-98). 
¶68 The court of appeals reluctantly followed the D.F.R. 
case: 
Despite our firm belief that substantial compliance 
should apply in this case, we are compelled by D.F.R. 
v. Juneau County Department of Social Services, 147 
Wis. 2d 486, 433 N.W.2d 609 (Ct. App. 1988), to 
reverse the termination order. 
 
. . . .  
 
This is an extremely unfortunate case.  However, 
the result is compelled by the statutes and D.F.R.  
The author of this opinion has believed D.F.R. to be 
incorrect from the beginning.  This court believed 
when D.F.R. was decided, and still believes now, that 
substantial compliance is a viable and reasonable tool 
with which to reach the correct result in a case like 
this one.  When a parent receives actual notice, like 
the one Steven orally obtained from the trial court at 
the March 27, 1996 hearing, the hypertechnical notice 
requirements of the statute should not have to be 
followed to the letter. 
Waukesha Cty. v. Steven H., No. 1998AP3033, unpublished slip op. 
at 2, 7 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 1999). 
¶69 On 
review, 
a 
unanimous 
supreme 
court 
reversed, 
concluding that: 
Wis. Stat. §§ 48.356(2) and 48.415(2) do not require 
that each and every order removing a child from his or 
her home contain the written notice prescribed by 
No.  2014AP2431.dtp 
 
4 
 
§ 48.356(2) in order for the termination of parental 
rights 
to 
proceed. . . .  
This 
interpretation 
of 
§§ 48.356(2) and 48.415(2) ensures that a parent 
receives the written notice required by § 48.356(2) in 
a timely manner and does not vitiate a termination of 
parental rights proceeding when one or more previous 
orders fails to contain the statutorily prescribed 
written notice. 
Waukesha Cty. v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, ¶3, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 
N.W.2d 607. 
¶70 There were no amendments to the relevant statutes 
between 
1988 
and 
2000 
that 
necessitated 
an 
altered 
interpretation of the two statutes.  What changed was the 
court's perception that unbending adherence to the statutory 
text was producing unconscionable results for children, even 
though the affected parents had received plenty of actual 
notice, though perhaps not the repeated written notice implied 
by Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2). 
¶71 This court's Steven H. opinion was a brilliant 
exercise of judicial craftsmanship.  It discerned the ambiguity 
in the wording of Wis. Stat. § 48.356 in relation to Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(2).  It distinguished the D.F.R. case.  It seized on a 
fact——that the "last order entered a year before the start of 
the proceeding to involuntarily terminate parental rights did 
contain 
the 
written 
notice 
required," 
Steven 
H., 
233 
Wis. 2d 344, ¶23——to create a rule.  It addressed earnestly the 
critical importance of protecting parents from the state 
"precipitously or capriciously terminating parental rights."  
Id., ¶5.  It admonished judges that "the better practice is to 
include the written notice" in § 48.356(2) in all orders to 
which the statute applies.  Id., ¶3. 
No.  2014AP2431.dtp 
 
5 
 
¶72 The plain truth, however, is that the opinion in 
Steven H. deliberately chose not to follow the strict terms of 
the statute.  Thus, it opened the door for the majority opinion 
in this case. 
¶73 The entire court approved the Steven H. opinion in 
2000.  The entire court should approve the majority opinion now.  
Footnote 9 of the majority opinion succinctly provides the 
foundation for the court's inevitable decision and illustrates 
why the facts make the law. 
¶74 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
No.  2014AP2431.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶75 REBECCA G. BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  For the third 
time this term, Justice Shirley Abrahamson has written a 
separate 
opinion 
discussing 
my 
participation 
or 
non-
participation in cases pending in this court before I joined the 
court.1  See New Richmond News v. City of New Richmond, 2015 WI 
106, 365 Wis. 2d 610, 875 N.W.2d 107; and State v. Matalonis, 
2016 WI 7, ¶79, 366 Wis. 2d 443, 875 N.W.2d 567.  The dissent 
authors criticize my decision to participate in three cases:  
this case, Matalonis, and State v. Parisi, 2016 WI 10, 367 
Wis. 2d 1, 875 N.W.2d 619;2 but not other pending cases including 
New Richmond News.  The dissent further suggests this court had 
an established procedure to follow when a new justice joins the 
court mid-term and that the three cases  in which I chose to 
participate cannot be distinguished from other cases.  The 
dissent is wrong on both points and I write separately to 
explain my reasons for participating in certain cases and not 
participating in others.   
¶76 No Wisconsin statute, rule of appellate procedure, 
internal operating procedure ("IOP") or supreme court rule 
specifically addresses the participation of a newly-appointed 
justice in cases that were argued but not decided before the new 
                                                 
1 For the first time, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley joins the 
dissent. 
2 See State v. Parisi, 2016 WI 10, 367 Wis. 2d 1, 875 N.W.2d 
619.  In Parisi, Justice Abrahamson did not write her own 
dissent and instead joined the dissent of Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley, who wrote about the merits of that case rather than my 
participation.   
No.  2014AP2431.rgb 
 
2 
 
justice was sworn in.  The dissent has not cited any Wisconsin 
authority because none exists.  This is the first time a newly-
appointed justice joined the court mid-term due to the death of 
a supreme court justice.3  In four cases that were argued but not 
decided before I was sworn in, this court was deadlocked on 
whether to affirm or reverse the court of appeals:  this case, 
New Richmond News, Matalonis, and Parisi.  Significantly, in 
those cases where the court was deadlocked at the time I joined 
the court, no orders had been issued affirming the court of 
appeals.  After substantial research, I learned there was 
precedent on how to proceed in New Richmond News, which was the 
only one of the deadlocked cases that had come to this court on 
bypass from the court of appeals.  Under State v. Richard 
Knutson, Inc., 191 Wis. 2d 395, 396-97, 528 N.W.2d 430 (1995), 
when a case is before this court on a petition to bypass or a 
certification, and a tie vote results, the case is remanded to 
the court of appeals for decision.  That precedent was followed 
when this court vacated the bypass petition in New Richmond 
News, under Richard Knutson, Inc., and remanded the case to the 
court of appeals.  This procedure recognizes that this court 
                                                 
3 There is one other time in history of which we are aware  
where a supreme court justice died before the court's term  
concluded. Chief Justice Horace W. Wilkie died on May 23, 1976. 
After his death, orders were issued on June 30, 1976 affirming 
the county courts in cases where the supreme court was equally 
divided.  See Punches v. Schmidt, 73 Wis. 2d 206, 243 N.W.2d 518 
(1976); State v. Kline, 73 Wis. 2d 337, 243 N.W.2d 519 (1976).  
Justice Abrahamson was appointed to fill the vacancy created by 
Chief Justice Wilkie's death, but she was not sworn in until 
September 1976 when this court's new term began.  
No.  2014AP2431.rgb 
 
3 
 
could benefit from a decision rendered by the court of appeals 
and then revisit the issues if one of the parties petitions for 
supreme court review.  
¶77 There is not, however, any Wisconsin authority with 
respect to new justices handling pending "deadlocked" cases that 
have come to this court on petitions granted for review.  If I 
declined to participate in the three "deadlocked" cases, the 
court of appeals' decisions would stand.  This court, however, 
decided many months ago (April 2015 for this case and Matalonis, 
and June 2015 for Parisi) that the court of appeals' decisions 
in these three cases merited this court's review.  Hundreds of 
petitions for review are filed with this court every year and 
this court accepts only a limited number of cases.  When this 
court accepts a case for review, not only do the parties 
undertake significant time and expense to litigate the matter 
before the supreme court, but the people of the State deserve 
the issues presented to be decided by the supreme court.  
Although our court of appeals judges do an excellent job, they 
serve a different role than the supreme court.  The court of 
appeals' primary function is error-correcting.  See Cook v. 
Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 188, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997).  The supreme 
court, on the other hand, serves the primary function of "law 
defining and law development."  Id.  As a member of this court, 
it is my duty to participate in those cases so that the people 
of Wisconsin receive a decision from the supreme court.  In each 
of the deadlocked cases, nothing had been decided and no orders 
or opinions had been issued at the time I joined the court.  It 
No.  2014AP2431.rgb 
 
4 
 
is also important to note that the initial vote on these three 
cases after the passing of Justice Crooks was 3-3.  Although 
this case and Parisi ultimately were released as 5-2 decisions, 
this could not have impacted my analysis regarding these cases 
in which I would participate because at the time I chose to 
participate, these cases were deadlocked 3-3.  The dissent 
misleads the public in paragraph 145 by omitting this important 
fact when it references the 5-2 final result in this case and 
Parisi.  In doing so, the dissent implies this case and Parisi 
were treated differently.  That is not true.  My participation 
analysis was consistent with respect to each of these cases. 
¶78 In each deadlocked case, I watched oral arguments on 
WisconsinEye4 and would have requested re-argument if important 
questions had been left unanswered.  We are fortunate to have 
every oral argument video-recorded and available for viewing on 
WisconsinEye.  These recordings are of high quality, allowing 
viewers 
to 
see 
the 
argument 
as 
if 
they 
were 
present.  
WisconsinEye has multiple video-cameras, which rotate between 
the lawyers arguing at the podium and the justices asking 
questions.  All demeanors, hand gestures, and other non-verbal 
forms of communication are contained in the video-recordings.  
These video-recordings have allowed past justices, who could not 
attend oral argument in person, to do the same thing I did——
watch the oral argument on WisconsinEye.   
                                                 
4 WisconsinEye, http://www.wiseye.org (last visited Feb. 23, 
2016). 
No.  2014AP2431.rgb 
 
5 
 
¶79 Following my review of each deadlocked case, I 
participated in conferences with my fellow justices for further 
discussion of and to reach a majority decision in each case, 
pursuant 
to 
IOP 
II.E, 
governing 
post-argument 
decision 
conference.  This reasonable procedure provided the best option 
allowing this court to timely decide cases upon which it agreed 
the supreme court needed to give guidance.  The people of 
Wisconsin deserve timely decisions from this court.  If the oral 
arguments had not been video-recorded and available for viewing, 
we would have been forced to subject these parties to the 
additional cost and inconvenience of re-arguing, for the sake of 
one new justice, the exact same arguments that had already been 
presented a short time earlier to the other six justices.  
Justice Abrahamson's proposed procedure requiring reargument 
would have delayed justice, added unnecessary expense, and may 
have even delayed these cases into the 2016-17 term.   
¶80 Similar to Wisconsin, there is no federal rule 
specifically addressing what should occur when a new justice 
joins the court after the term has commenced, with respect to 
pending cases on which the court has reached an impasse and no 
decision has been issued.  While there is a federal rule 
addressing petitions for rehearing, such petitions are similar 
to Wisconsin's reconsideration motions and, like the Wisconsin 
rule, the federal rule applies only to judgments or decisions of 
the court.  This is made clear in Stephen M. Shapiro, et al.,  
Supreme Court Practice, 838 (10th ed. 2013), which states that 
"rehearing petitions have been granted in the past where the 
No.  2014AP2431.rgb 
 
6 
 
prior decision was by an equally divided Court."  (Emphasis 
added.)  At the risk of being unduly repetitive but in order to 
underscore the significance of this fact, no judgments or 
decisions had been issued in the deadlocked cases at the time I 
joined the court.   
¶81 My participation in the deadlocked cases is supported 
by the past practices of the United States Supreme Court under 
similar circumstances.  Following the death of Chief Justice 
William H. Rehnquist and the appointment of Justice Samuel 
Anthony Alito, Jr., that Court revisited three cases in which 
the Court was presumed to be deadlocked; Justice Alito joined 
the 5-4 majority in each case following re-argument.  See 
Shapiro, supra, at 838.   
¶82 Even though Justice Abrahamson explained her concerns 
in her concurrence in New Richmond News, she elected to write 
separately a second time in Matalonis, criticizing my decision 
to participate in Matalonis.  Although I could have responded to 
her dissent in Matalonis, I chose not to because the dissent was 
unrelated to the merits of the case.  I believed Matalonis would 
be Justice Abrahamson's last separate writing criticizing my 
participation and I chose not to write separately to avoid 
further delaying the release of the Matalonis opinion.   
¶83 In the dissent here, Justice Abrahamson goes beyond  
her writings in New Richmond News and Matalonis by including  a 
reference to the allegations of Matalonis's lawyer——allegations 
made 
in 
a 
motion 
for 
reconsideration 
based 
on 
Justice 
Abrahamson's criticism of my participation.  By memorializing in 
No.  2014AP2431.rgb 
 
7 
 
her dissent here the adversarial allegations made by an attorney 
not even involved in the case at hand, Justice Abrahamson has 
revealed her true motivation behind her critical concurrence and 
dissents.  Justice Abrahamson's separate writings were not about 
documenting for future courts how to properly handle pending 
cases when a justice dies mid-term and a new justice joins the 
court.  
Including the 
non-prevailing lawyer's adversarial 
allegation from Matalonis——an entirely separate case——in the 
dissent in this TPR case is entirely inappropriate and serves 
only one purpose:  to give others material——within a published 
Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, no less——to attack and 
criticize me.  The Code of Judicial Conduct requires that:  "A 
judge 
shall 
dispose 
of 
all 
judicial 
matters 
promptly, 
efficiently and fairly."  SCR 60.04(1)(h).  Part II of the 
dissent 
here 
violates 
this 
rule 
and 
is 
cumulative 
and 
unnecessary as similar writings already exist in both New 
Richmond News and Matalonis.   
¶84 Justice Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley 
suggest in this dissent that I am sharing "for the very first 
time" my explanation on my participation.  See dissent, ¶135.  
Although this is the first time I have shared my reasoning for 
participation in a written opinion, Justices Abrahamson and Ann 
Walsh Bradley have known my reasons since October 2015 when I 
provided them (and the entire court) with my reasons for 
participating based on the substantial research I conducted.  I 
did not feel it necessary or appropriate to delay release of 
these opinions to include a discussion of my participation 
No.  2014AP2431.rgb 
 
8 
 
decision.  Justice Abrahamson now joined by Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley did not agree with the reasonable, well-researched, and 
supported decision I made.  Instead of accepting it, Justice 
Abrahamson chose to repeatedly criticize me:  first in New 
Richmond News by arguing I should have participated and then in 
Matalonis because I did participate.  In New Richmond News, she 
complained that remanding to the court of appeals delays a 
decision, yet in Matalonis and St. Croix, (joined by Justice Ann 
Walsh Bradley in St. Croix), advocates for a procedure that 
delays both decisions.  Justice Abrahamson also engaged in 
multiple revisions of the dissent here causing substantial delay 
in the release of this opinion.  Her decision to write 
separately in these cases has delayed justice, and with respect 
to this case in particular, where efficient resolution is 
paramount because this case involves a child's well-being, this 
is particularly troubling.  Part II of the dissent contributes 
nothing to any legitimate function of the court and serves only 
to perpetuate the diminished reputation of Wisconsin's highest 
court, which my other colleagues and I are striving to restore.    
The time Justice Abrahamson spent on these separate writings 
would have been better served drafting a proposed rule to 
establish 
a 
procedure 
specifically 
addressing 
these 
circumstances.  Perhaps this court should enact a rule outlining 
the proper procedure for processing deadlocked cases when a new 
justice joins the court after the term has commenced so new 
justices are not forced to defend themselves against decisions 
made in good faith.  At present, no such rule or procedure 
No.  2014AP2431.rgb 
 
9 
 
exists, and as I have explained, neither Justice Abrahamson's 
experience in 1976 nor the United States Supreme Court practices 
mirrors the circumstances presented here. 
 
 
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
1 
 
¶85 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. and ANN WALSH BRADLEY, 
J.   (dissenting).  Stare decisis (Latin for "let the decision 
stand") is a basic tenet of the rule of law.1  Although stare 
decisis is not a mechanical formula requiring blind adherence to 
precedent, 
departing 
from 
precedent 
requires 
special 
justification,2 and "[n]o change in the law is justified by a 
change in the membership of the court or a case with more 
egregious facts."3   
¶86 Although 
the 
majority 
opinion 
states 
that 
it 
"adher[es] to the important principle of stare decisis,"4 it does 
not.  The majority opinion, without special justification, 
departs from a unanimous, workable, and settled precedent of 
this court, Waukesha County v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, 233 
Wis. 2d 344, 
607 
N.W.2d 607, 
and 
unjustly 
terminates 
the 
parental rights of Juanita A., a single mother with cognitive 
difficulties, to her son, Matthew D.  The termination is based 
on continuing "child in need of protection or services" 
("CHIPS") grounds.   
¶87 At issue in the instant case is whether Juanita A. 
received notice required under Wis. Stat. §§ 48.356(2) and 
                                                 
1 See Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2006 WI 91, 
¶31, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216.   
2 Bartholomew, 2006 WI 91, ¶31 (citing Johnson Controls, 
Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶94, 264 
Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257).   
3 State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 442, 511 N.W.2d 591 
(1994) (Abrahamson, J., concurring) (quoted source omitted).   
4 Majority op., ¶3.   
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
2 
 
48.415(2) of the grounds for termination of her parental rights 
and the conditions for the return of Matthew D. to her home.   
¶88 The 
notice 
requirements 
contained 
in 
these 
two 
statutes are an important part of the "panoply of procedures" 
created by the legislature "to assure that parental rights will 
not be terminated precipitously or capriciously when the state 
exercises its awesome power to terminate parental rights."5   
¶89 As the court of appeals in the instant case correctly 
concluded, under this court's unanimous decision in Steven H., 
Juanita A. did not receive the required statutory notice of the 
grounds 
for 
termination 
of 
her 
parental 
rights 
and 
the 
conditions for the return of her son.     
¶90 Rather, over the course of these proceedings, at least 
27 orders were issued, four of which were required under Wis. 
Stat. § 48.356(2) to contain written notice of the grounds for 
termination of her parental rights and the conditions for the 
return of Juanita A.'s son.  Only one of those four orders6 
contained the required notice.  Oral warnings, also required by 
statute, were provided only three of the seven times they were 
required.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.356(1).  Compounding these notice 
deficiencies, after receiving the only order containing the 
required notice, Juanita A. received several orders containing 
                                                 
5 Waukesha Cnty. v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, ¶25, 233 
Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607.     
6 This order, issued on October 11, 2011, revised an order 
entered on August 2, 2011, which did not contain written 
warnings.   
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
3 
 
contradictory information or suggesting that termination of her 
parental rights may no longer have been a risk.   
¶91 The majority opinion sets aside these troubling facts, 
departs from Steven H., and concludes that one order containing 
a 
required 
statutory 
notice 
is 
sufficient 
to 
allow 
the 
termination of Juanita A.'s parental rights to Matthew D.7  In so 
doing, the majority opinion withdraws the language in Steven H. 
adopting the "last order" notice rule and replaces it with an 
"at least one order" notice rule.8   
¶92 We disagree with the majority opinion.  We would 
adhere to the unanimous opinion in Steven H. and affirm the 
court of appeals in the instant case.  We would hold that 
Juanita A. did not receive the required statutory notice of the 
grounds 
for 
termination 
of 
her 
parental 
rights 
and 
the 
conditions for the return of Matthew D.; the "last order" 
placing Matthew D. outside the home did not contain the required 
statutory notice.   
¶93 We write separately to make two points:  
1. The majority opinion departs from precedent.  Although 
the statutes at issue in Steven H. and in the instant 
case have not changed, the majority opinion is 
misleading in stating that it "adher[es] to the 
                                                 
7 Majority op., ¶2.   
8 Majority op., ¶17. 
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
4 
 
important principle of stare decisis" in "clarifying" 
Steven H. by limiting its holding to its facts.9   
 
To interpret Steven H. as limited to its facts, the 
majority opinion withdraws the holding in Steven H. 
adopting the "last order" notice rule.10   
 
The majority opinion is misguided.  It ignores the 
accepted rules of statutory interpretation, dilutes 
the 
notice 
given 
to 
parents, 
and 
departs 
from 
precedent without special justification.  
 
Nothing aside from the membership of the court has 
changed since Steven H.  A change in membership of the 
court does not justify a departure from precedent.     
 
2. 
The change in membership of this court——specifically, 
the participation of Justice Rebecca G. Bradley, the 
author of the majority opinion in the instant case——
appears inconsistent with past practice in this court 
and in the United States Supreme Court regarding the 
participation of a newly appointed justice in cases 
                                                 
9 See majority op., ¶¶3-4.   
10 See majority op., ¶¶4 & nn.3-4, 17. 
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
5 
 
heard and tentatively decided prior to the new 
justice's joining the court.11       
¶94 For the reasons set forth, we dissent and write 
separately.    
I 
 
¶95 In Steven H., this court addressed whether written 
notice of the grounds for termination of parental rights and the 
conditions necessary for the child to be returned to the home is 
required, as Wis. Stat. § 48.356 states, in "any written order"12 
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Supreme Court Internal Operating Procedure II.E 
states that after oral argument, "[w]hen possible, the court 
reaches a decision in each of the cases argued that day, but any 
decision is tentative until the decision is mandated."   
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.356 provides:  
(1) Whenever the court orders a child to be placed 
outside his or her home, orders an expectant mother of 
an unborn child to be placed outside of her home, or 
denies a parent visitation because the child or unborn 
child has been adjudged to be in need of protection or 
services under s. 48.345, 48.347, 48.357, 48.363, or 
48.365 and whenever the court reviews a permanency 
plan under s. 48.38(5m), the court shall orally inform 
the parent or parents who appear in court or the 
expectant mother who appears in court of any grounds 
for termination of parental rights under s. 48.415 
which 
may 
be 
applicable 
and 
of 
the 
conditions 
necessary for the child or expectant mother to be 
returned to the home or for the parent to be granted 
visitation. 
(2) In addition to the notice required under sub. (1), 
any written order which places a child or an expectant 
mother outside the home or denies visitation under 
sub. (1) shall notify the parent or parents or 
expectant mother of the information specified under 
sub. (1). 
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
6 
 
placing the child outside the home, or in "one or more court 
orders . . . containing 
the 
notice 
required 
by 
s. 
48.356(2) . . ." as stated in Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)1.13   
 
¶96 In other words, two statutes that are not consistent 
govern the notice requirements in CHIPS and termination of 
parental rights proceedings.  The court unanimously so concluded 
in Steven H.:14  "[A]lthough Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2) speaks of 
written notice in any order placing the child outside the home, 
§ 48.415(2) speaks of one or more court orders placing the child 
containing written notice."15  "The words 'one or more orders' in 
§ 48.415(2) are not the equivalent of 'any,' 'each,' 'all,' or 
'every' order."16   
 
¶97 To harmonize this inconsistency, the Steven H. court 
unanimously held: (1) that Wis. Stat. §§ 48.356(2) and 48.415(2) 
did not require that every order removing a child from his or 
                                                 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(2) provides in relevant part:  
(2) 
Continuing 
need 
of 
protection 
or 
services. 
Continuing need of protection or services, which shall 
be established by proving any of the following: 
(a)1. That the child has been adjudged to be a child 
or an unborn child in need of protection or services 
and placed, or continued in a placement, outside his 
or her home pursuant to one or more court orders under 
s. 48.345, 48.347, 48.357, 48.363, 48.365, 938.345, 
938.357, 938.363 or 938.365 containing the notice 
required by s. 48.356 (2) or 938.356 (2). 
14 See Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶¶30-32.   
15 Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶22.   
16 Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶30.   
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
7 
 
her 
home 
contain 
the 
notice 
prescribed 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.356(2); and (2) "that Wis. Stat. §§ 48.356(2) and 48.415(2) 
require that the last order specified in § 48.356(2) placing a 
child outside the home, which must be issued at least six months 
before the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights, 
must contain the written notice prescribed by § 48.356(2)."17  
Nonetheless, the court advised that circuit courts should 
include the written notice required by Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2) in 
all orders to which the statute applies.18  The notice can easily 
be attached to each written order.   
¶98 The majority opinion's rejection of the "last order" 
notice rule in Steven H. and adoption of an "at least one order" 
notice rule19 is misguided for the following reasons.  
¶99 First, contrary to the majority opinion's insinuations 
of conflict in decisions of the court of appeals, the "last 
order" notice rule is settled law in Wisconsin. 
¶100 Relying on a court of appeals decision issued shortly 
after Steven H. was mandated in 2000, namely Waushara County v. 
Lisa K., 2000 WI App 145, 237 Wis. 2d 830, 615 N.W.2d 204, the 
majority opinion explains that even though the "last order" in 
the instant case did not contain the required notice, notice was 
still adequate.   
                                                 
17 Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶3 (emphasis added).   
18 Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶3.   
19 Majority op., ¶¶4, 17.   
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
8 
 
¶101 In Lisa K., the court of appeals did not apply Steven 
H.'s "last order" notice rule.  Instead, Lisa K. distinguished 
Steven H. on its facts, noting that in Lisa K., the required 
notices of the grounds for termination of parental rights and 
the conditions for the return of the child were given on all 
occasions they were required except in the last order, and the 
parent did not complain of confusion as a result of the absence 
of notice.20  As a result, "[c]onsidering Steven H.'s dual focus 
on adequate notice of the conditions with which a parent must 
comply and the warning that parental rights are in jeopardy," 
the court of appeals concluded that Lisa K. had "more than 
adequate notice . . . ."21   
¶102 Lisa K. is distinguishable.  Unlike the parent in Lisa 
K., Juanita A. understandably complains of confusion in the 
instant case.  Juanita A. did not receive the required notice in 
three of the four orders placing Matthew D. outside her home.  
After receiving the only order containing the required notice, 
Juanita A. received orders containing contradictory information 
or suggesting that her parental rights to Matthew D. were no 
                                                 
20 Waushara Cnty. v. Lisa K., 2000 WI App 145, ¶10, 237 
Wis. 2d 830, 615 N.W.2d 204.  In Lisa K., the parties also 
argued that part of the "last order" incorporated by reference 
the previous notices given to the parent.  The court of appeals 
did not, however, reach the question of whether that satisfied 
the 
statutory 
notice 
requirements. 
 
See 
Lisa 
K., 
237 
Wis. 2d 830, ¶2 nn.2-3.    
21 Lisa K., 237 Wis. 2d 830, ¶10.   
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
9 
 
longer in jeopardy.22  The circuit court's oral warnings 
regarding termination of parental rights and the conditions for 
the return to the home were also deficient.  Oral warnings were 
provided on three of the seven occasions they were required, and 
were not given at the final hearing.   
¶103 Although the majority opinion relies on Lisa K., it 
does not adopt the "adequate notice" standard adopted in Lisa 
K.23  
¶104 Instead, the majority opinion relies on Lisa K. to 
demonstrate its contention that "Steven H. has created a 
question in the court of appeals and circuit courts as to 
whether Steven H. created a bright-line rule requiring that the 
last order in a CHIPS case contain the written notice in order 
to satisfy Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)1.  Courts . . . are ruling 
different ways on this question."24   
¶105 Lisa K. is the only court of appeals decision cited by 
the majority opinion that concludes that failing to provide 
notice of the grounds for termination of parental rights and the 
conditions necessary for the child to be returned to the home in 
the "last order . . . placing the child outside the home, which 
                                                 
22 For example, permanency hearing orders given on June 5, 
2013, and May 15, 2014, state at first that the court finds the 
permanency goal is no longer returning Matthew D. to Juanita 
A.'s home, but later state that the permanency goal remains 
return to the home.   
23 The majority opinion suggests at times, however, that 
notice in the instant case was "adequate."  Majority op., ¶¶18-
19. 
24 Majority op., ¶18.   
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
10 
 
must be issued at least six months before the filing of the 
petition to terminate parental rights"25 does not require 
dismissal of the petition to terminate parental rights.   
¶106 In fact, the court of appeals has consistently 
followed the "last order" notice rule in Steven H.  As the court 
of appeals put it in the instant case, Steven H.'s adoption of 
the "last order" notice rule "was unequivocal.  The last order 
must contain the notice prescribed by Wis. Stat. § 48.356(2)."26   
¶107 For cases recognizing and applying the "last order" 
notice rule in Steven H., see, for example:27 
• State v. Amelia A., Nos. 2015AP630-31, unpublished slip 
op., ¶¶10-11 (Wis. Ct. App. June 9, 2015); 
• Portage 
Cnty. 
DHHS 
v. 
Julie 
G., 
No. 
2014AP1057, 
unpublished slip op., ¶¶20-21 (Wis. Ct. App. July 31, 
2014); 
• Florence Cnty. DHS v. Jennifer B., Nos. 2011AP88-90, 
unpublished slip op., ¶11 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2011); 
                                                 
25 Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶3.   
26 St. Croix Cnty. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Michael 
D., No. 2014AP2431, unpublished slip op., ¶13 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Jan. 16, 2015).  
27 Unpublished court of appeals decisions may be cited for 
purposes other than as precedent or authority.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.23(3). For example, citations to unpublished 
decisions are permissible to show conflict among the districts 
of the court of appeals.  See State v. Higginbotham, 162 
Wis. 2d 978, 996-98, 471 N.W.2d 24 (1991).  We are citing 
unpublished court of appeals cases to show consistency of 
reasoning and result in court of appeals cases. 
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
11 
 
• Walworth Cnty. v. Jeanna R., No. 2009AP1952, unpublished 
slip op., ¶¶16-17 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 11, 2009); 
• Dunn 
Cnty. 
DHS 
v. 
Debra 
O., 
Nos. 
2008AP1775-77, 
unpublished slip op., ¶¶6-7 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2009); 
and 
• State v. Zena H., Nos. 99-1777, 99-1813, unpublished slip 
op., ¶17 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2000). 
¶108 The majority opinion cites some (but not all) of these 
authorities, but fails to recognize the court of appeals' 
consistent recognition and application of the "last order" 
notice rule adopted by Steven H.28   
¶109 Instead, the majority opinion argues that these cases 
"demonstrate the factual variations that arise in TPR cases and 
how the courts have reached differing decisions based on Steven 
H."29  Simply because different cases, with different facts, 
raising different legal issues have arisen since Steven H. does 
not undermine Steven H.'s unanimous, "unequivocal," "last order" 
notice rule.    
¶110 Wisconsin jury instructions also recognize the "last 
order" notice rule adopted by Steven H.  See Comment, Wis JI——
Children 324A.     
¶111 Second, the majority opinion relies on Pierce County 
v. Amy F., No. 2004AP1552, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Aug. 31, 2004), to support its position that courts are ruling 
                                                 
28 Majority op., ¶20.   
29 Majority op., ¶20.   
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
12 
 
in different ways on whether Steven H. created a bright-line 
rule requiring that the last order in a CHIPS case contain the 
written notice.30   
¶112 Amy F. is inapposite.  It addressed a different 
question, namely whether a petition to terminate parental rights 
should be dismissed because the parent did not receive the "last 
order." 
¶113 Third, the "last order" notice rule unanimously 
adopted in Steven H., unlike the "at least one order" notice 
rule adopted by the majority opinion in the instant case, 
fulfills the expressed legislative purposes of the Children's 
Code.     
¶114 As the court stated in Steven H., the expressed 
legislative purposes of the Children's Code, set forth in Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.01, 
"assist[] 
the 
court 
in 
interpreting 
the 
inconsistent language of the two statutes."31  Among other 
                                                 
30 Majority op. ¶20.   
31 Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶32.   
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.01, captioned "Title and legislative 
purpose" provides in relevant part as follows:  
(1) This chapter may be cited as "The Children's 
Code". In construing this chapter, the best interests 
of the child or unborn child shall always be of 
paramount consideration.  This chapter shall be 
liberally 
construed 
to 
effectuate 
the 
following 
express legislative purposes: 
(a) While recognizing that the paramount goal of this 
chapter is to protect children and unborn children, to 
preserve 
the 
unity 
of 
the 
family, 
whenever 
appropriate, by strengthening family life through 
assisting parents and the expectant mothers of unborn 
(continued) 
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
13 
 
things, 
the 
expressed 
purposes 
include 
"assist[ing] 
parents . . . in changing any circumstances in the home which 
might harm the child . . . ," and "provid[ing] judicial and 
other procedures through which . . . interested parties are 
assured fair hearings and their constitutional and other legal 
rights 
are 
recognized 
and 
enforced . . . ." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.01(1)(a), (ad).   
¶115 Unlike the majority opinion's "at least one order" 
notice rule, the "last order" notice rule ensures that parents 
"will be given adequate notice of the conditions for return and 
time to make any necessary changes to forestall the termination 
                                                                                                                                                             
children, whenever appropriate, in fulfilling their 
responsibilities as parents or expectant mothers.  The 
courts and agencies responsible for child welfare, 
while assuring that a child's health and safety are 
the paramount concerns, should assist parents and the 
expectant mothers of unborn children in changing any 
circumstances in the home which might harm the child 
or unborn child, which may require the child to be 
placed outside the home or which may require the 
expectant mother to be taken into custody.  The courts 
should recognize that they have the authority, in 
appropriate cases, not to reunite a child with his or 
her family.  The courts and agencies responsible for 
child welfare should also recognize that instability 
and impermanence in family relationships are contrary 
to the welfare of children and should therefore 
recognize the importance of eliminating the need for 
children to wait unreasonable periods of time for 
their parents to correct the conditions that prevent 
their safe return to the family. 
(ad) To provide judicial and other procedures through 
which children and all other interested parties are 
assured fair hearings and their constitutional and 
other legal rights are recognized and enforced, while 
protecting the public safety. 
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
14 
 
of parental rights . . . ." while avoiding the confusion that 
might result if a parent receives orders without the statutory 
notice after receiving earlier orders containing the required 
notice.32   
¶116 Moreover, the majority opinion's "at least one order" 
notice rule dilutes the notice received by parents.  Because 
petitions to terminate parental rights based on continuing CHIPS 
are filed by the State or county, the circuit court does not 
necessarily know whether an order placing a child outside the 
home will be the "last order."33  As a result, circuit courts 
have an incentive under the "last order" notice rule to provide 
notice in all CHIPS orders.  Under the majority opinion, a 
circuit court can simply provide the warnings in the first order 
placing the child outside the home and dispense with notice 
thereafter.    
¶117 Although the majority opinion expresses "confiden[ce]" 
that its holding will not dilute the notice received by 
parents,34 the court is wading into dangerous waters.  "A 
parent's desire for and right to the companionship, care, 
custody, and management of his or her children is an important 
interest that undeniably warrants deference and, absent a 
powerful countervailing interest, protection."  Sheboygan Cnty. 
                                                 
32 Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶¶31, 35.   
33 See Kenosha Cnty. v. Jodie W., 2006 WI 93, ¶8, 293 
Wis. 2d 530, 716 N.W.2d 845.   
34 Majority op., ¶17 n.8.   
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
15 
 
v. Julie A.B., 2002 WI 95, ¶22, 255 Wis. 2d 170, 648 N.W.2d 402 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Diluting the notice 
received by parents of the grounds for termination of parental 
rights and the conditions for the child's return undermines the 
fairness 
and 
adequacy 
of 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights 
proceedings and may raise significant constitutional due process 
issues.   
¶118 Fourth, the majority opinion's interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 48.415(2) ignores and violates accepted rules of 
statutory interpretation.  The majority opinion states that 
"[o]ur standards for interpreting statutes are well-known and 
need not be repeated here."35  It appears that the majority 
opinion's failure to state the rules resulted in the majority 
opinion's failure to apply them.   
¶119 The majority opinion examines Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2), 
but 
essentially 
ignores 
the 
text 
of 
a 
related 
statute 
§ 48.356(2).  The majority opinion states that because this is a 
termination of parental rights case, "not a CHIPS case," only 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2) is relevant.36  This conclusion ignores 
the fact that § 48.415(2) deals specifically with termination of 
parental rights actions based on CHIPS and cross-references "the 
notice required by [Wis. Stat. §] 48.356(2)."37 
                                                 
35 Majority op., ¶15.   
36 Majority op., ¶17.   
37 Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)1.   
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
16 
 
¶120 In its plain-meaning analysis, the majority opinion 
overlooks the well-accepted rule that context is important to 
meaning, as is the structure of the statute in which the 
operative language appears.  Statutory language is interpreted 
in the context in which it is used, as part of a whole; not in 
isolation, but in relation to the language of surrounding or 
closely related statutes.38  Thus, the majority opinion errs in 
its statutory interpretation.   
 
¶121 Furthermore, as we stated previously, the majority 
opinion dilutes the statutory notice requirements and may be 
treading on the constitutional rights of a parent.  A statutory 
interpretation that does not raise constitutional issues is 
preferable to one that does.39     
¶122 Fifth and finally, the majority opinion is misleading 
when it states it is "clarifying" Steven H. by interpreting 
Steven H. to be limited to its facts.40   The "unequivocal" 
holding of Steven H. is not limited to its facts.  Steven H. 
expressly applies to termination of parental rights cases based 
on continuing CHIPS.  The Steven H. court states:  
We conclude that Wis. Stat. §§ 48.356(2) and 48.415(2) 
require that the last order specified in § 48.356(2) 
placing a child outside the home, which must be issued 
                                                 
38 See Noffke ex rel. Swenson v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, ¶11, 315 
Wis. 2d 350, 760 N.W.2d 156.    
39 See Jankowski v. Milwaukee Cnty., 104 Wis. 2d 431, 439, 
312 N.W.2d 45 (1981) ("'[S]tatutes should be construed so as to 
avoid constitutional objections.'") (quoting Niagara of Wis. 
Paper Corp. v. DNR, 84 Wis. 2d 32, 50, 268 N.W.2d 153 (1978)).   
40 See majority op., ¶4.     
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
17 
 
at least six months before the filing of the petition 
to terminate parental rights, must contain the written 
notice prescribed by § 48.356(2).   
Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶3; see also Steven H., ¶31.   
¶123 The majority opinion explicitly withdraws this holding 
of Steven H.,41 ostensibly to "clarify" that Steven H. applied 
only to its facts.  But Steven H. unequivocally adopted a "last 
order" notice rule for termination of parental rights cases 
based on continuing CHIPS.  Steven H. did not limit its holding 
to the precise facts and circumstances of that case. 
¶124 Thus, the majority opinion's adoption of the "at least 
one order" notice rule departs from precedent.  And no 
sufficient justification is provided for this departure.42  
Adhering to precedent is "the preferred course [of judicial 
action] 
because 
it 
promotes 
evenhanded, 
predictable, 
and 
consistent development of legal principles . . . and contributes 
to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process."43   
¶125 "This court is more likely to overturn a prior 
decision when one or more of the following circumstances is 
present:  (1) Changes or developments in the law have undermined 
the rationale behind a decision; (2) there is a need to make a 
decision correspond to newly ascertained facts; (3) there is a 
showing that the precedent has become detrimental to the 
                                                 
41 See majority op., ¶¶4 & nn.3-4, 17.   
42 Bartholomew, 293 Wis. 2d 38, ¶32 (citations omitted).   
43 State v. Luedtke, 2015 WI 42, ¶40, 362 Wis. 2d 1, 863 
N.W.2d 592 (quoting State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 504, 579 
N.W.2d 654 (1998)).   
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
18 
 
coherence and consistency in the law; (4) the prior decision is 
'unsound in principle'; or (5) the prior decision is "unworkable 
in practice.'"44   
 
¶126 The majority opinion does not state which, if any, of 
these circumstances justifies its departure from precedent in 
the instant case.  The answer in the instant case is none.   
¶127 No changes or developments in the law have occurred.  
No newly ascertained facts undermine the court's unanimous 
decision in Steven H.   
¶128 To the contrary, subsequent circumstances bolster the 
unanimous holding in Steven H.  Since Steven H. was decided in 
2000, the legislature has amended Wis. Stat. § 48.415 nine times 
and Wis. Stat. § 48.356 twice.45  By amending both statutes 
without 
removing 
the 
conflicting 
language 
or 
otherwise 
disturbing the "last order" notice rule in Steven H., the 
legislature "accepted and ratified" our holding.46 
                                                 
44 Bartholomew, 293 Wis. 2d 38, ¶33.   
45 See 2011 Wis. Act 271; 2011 Wis. Act 257; 2009 Wis. Act 
185; 2009 Wis. Act 94; 2007 Wis. Act 116; 2007 Wis. Act 45; 2005 
Wis. Act 293; 2005 Wis. Act 277; 2003 Wis. Act 321; 2001 Wis. 
Act 109; 2001 Wis. Act 2.   
46 See Tex. Dep't of Housing & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive 
Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2015) 
("Congress' decision . . . to amend the FHA while still adhering 
to the operative language . . . is convincing support for the 
conclusion that Congress accepted and ratified the unanimous 
holdings of the Court of appeals . . . ."); see also Antonin 
Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal 
Texts 322 (2009) ("If a word or phrase has been authoritatively 
interpreted by the highest court in a jurisdiction . . . a later 
version of that act perpetuating the wording is presumed to 
carry forward that interpretation.).   
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
19 
 
¶129 The majority opinion does not argue that the court's 
unanimous decision in Steven H. is detrimental to the coherence 
or consistency of the law or that it is unworkable.  Contrary to 
the majority opinion's suggestion, the court of appeals has all 
but universally followed Steven H.'s "last order" notice rule.   
 
¶130 At best, the majority opinion's sole justification for 
its departure from precedent is that Steven H. is unsound in 
principle because it does not "apply the statutory words chosen 
by the legislature."47  Wrong!  Steven H. applied the accepted 
rules of statutory interpretation. 
 
¶131 As we explained more fully above (and as the Steven H. 
court unanimously concluded), the statutory words chosen by the 
legislature are inconsistent.  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.356(2) 
requires that notice accompany "any written order" placing the 
child outside the home.  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(2) requires 
notice in "one or more court orders under s. 48.345, 48.347, 
48.357, 48.363, 48.365, 938.345, 938.357, 938.363, or 938.365 
containing the notice required by s. 48.356(2) . . . ."   
 
¶132 The 
majority 
opinion 
tries 
to 
escape 
this 
inconsistency by arguing that because the instant case is a 
termination of parental rights case, we must apply only Wis. 
Stat. § 48.415(2).  However, this termination of parental rights 
action is based on continuing CHIPS.  Under Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.356(2), any written CHIPS order placing a child outside the 
home must contain written notice of the grounds for termination 
                                                 
47 See majority op., ¶25.   
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
20 
 
of parental rights and the conditions for the return of the 
child.  Moreover, Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2) explicitly refers to 
"the 
notice 
required 
by 
s. 
48.356(2)," 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.356(2) requires notice in "any written order."   
 
¶133 The question is:  What, if anything, has changed since 
the court's unanimous decision in Steven H.?  The answer is the 
membership of the court.   
 
¶134 Four justices who have joined the court since our 
unanimous decision in Steven H. now simply disagree with Steven 
H.  A change in membership of the court is not a sufficient 
justification for departing from precedent.48  "When existing law 
is open to revision in every case, deciding cases becomes a mere 
exercise of judicial will, with arbitrary and unpredictable 
results."49    
II 
¶135 We turn now to the participation of a new member of 
the court in deciding the instant case.  Justice Rebecca G. 
Bradley's concurring opinion in the instant case explains 
publicly, for the very first time, her decision to participate 
in (some, but not all) cases argued before she became a member 
of the court.     
                                                 
48 See Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶138 ("No change in 
the law is justified by 'a change in the membership of the court 
or a case with more egregious facts.'") (quoting Stevens, 181 
Wis. 2d at 441-42 (Abrahamson, J., concurring)).   
49 Luedtke, 362 Wis. 2d 1, ¶40 (quoting Schultz v. Natwick, 
2002 WI 125, ¶37, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 653 N.W.2d 266).   
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
21 
 
¶136 All the decisions (but one) in cases argued and 
tentatively decided before the new justice's appointment to the 
court have been released.  This writing is to update the status 
of these cases and compare Justice Rebecca G. Bradley's public 
approach to the role of a new justice in deciding cases argued 
and pending on her appointment and the approach taken in the 
past in this court and in the United States Supreme Court 
regarding the role of a new justice.   
¶137 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court is now 
addressing the implications of the recent death of Justice 
Antonin Scalia and the possibility that a new justice will be 
appointed to fill his seat.  The eight United States Supreme 
Court justices are expected to follow the Court's past practice 
of setting selected cases for reargument to enable a new justice 
to participate in deciding these cases.  The practice has been 
described previously and we summarize it below.50         
                                                 
50 See New Richmond News v. City of New Richmond, 2015 WI 
106, ¶24, 365 Wis. 2d 610, 875 N.W.2d 107 (Abrahamson, J., 
concurring) (describing the past practice of the United States 
Supreme Court following the resignation, retirement, or death of 
a member of the Court).   
(continued) 
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
22 
 
¶138 The 
facts 
and 
circumstances 
of 
the 
change 
in 
membership of the court, the status of cases heard in September 
and October, and the issues raised by a new justice's joining 
the court has been set forth previously.51  
¶139 The question of a new justice's participation in cases 
upon his or her appointment should, we hope, be approached by 
the court and the justices in a descriptive, analytical, and 
historical 
manner, 
free 
from 
divisiveness 
or 
offensive 
posturing, personal attacks, and false accusations.52    
¶140 Engaging in or responding to such personal attacks and 
accusations neither sheds light on the inquiry before us nor 
promotes public trust and confidence in the court.   
                                                                                                                                                             
Media accounts following the recent death of Justice 
Antonin Scalia concur in the descriptions of the practice in the 
United States Supreme Court in prior separate writings on this 
issue.  See Adam Liptak, Deadlocks and Rearguments: What's Ahead 
for the Supreme Court, N.Y. Times (Feb. 18, 2016) ("Q. Would a 
new justice be able to vote on cases argued before he or she was 
confirmed?  A. No.  Cases in which the current justices were 
deadlocked, 4 to 4, would require rearguments to allow a new 
justice 
to 
participate.") 
(emphasis 
added); 
Adam 
Liptak, 
Scalia's Absence Is Likely to Alter Court's Major Decisions This 
Term, N.Y. Times (Feb. 14, 2016); see also Tom Goldstein, Tie 
votes will lead to reargument, not affirmance, SCOTUSblog (Feb. 
14, 2016, 3:14 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/02/tie-votes-
will-lead-to-reargument-not-affirmance/.   
51 See New Richmond, 365 Wis. 2d 610, ¶7 (Abrahamson, J., 
concurring); 
State 
v. 
Matalonis, 
2016 
WI 
7, 
¶70, 
366 
Wis. 2d 443, 
875 
N.W.2d 567 
(Abrahamson, 
J., 
dissenting) 
(quoting New Richmond, 365 Wis. 2d 610, ¶7). 
52 The election for Justice Rebecca G. Bradley's seat was 
held on Tuesday, April 5, 2016.   
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
23 
 
¶141 To summarize the historical facts briefly, Justice N. 
Patrick Crooks passed away on September 21, 2015.  Justice 
Rebecca G. Bradley joined the court on October 9, 2015.  During 
the period between September 8, 2015, and October 9, 2015, when 
Justice Rebecca G. Bradley was not a member of the court, the 
court heard oral argument and tentatively decided sixteen cases.  
See Supreme Court Internal Operating Procedure II.E.53   
                                                 
53 It was announced at oral arguments on September 17, 2015, 
and September 18, 2015, that Justice N. Patrick Crooks would not 
be attending oral arguments in the six cases argued and 
tentatively decided on those dates (including the instant case).  
It 
was 
announced 
that 
Justice 
N. 
Patrick 
Crooks 
would 
participate in these cases by watching oral arguments on 
WisconsinEye 
and 
discussing 
the 
cases 
in 
conference 
via 
telephone.  
Thus counsel were aware of the nature of Justice N. Patrick 
Crooks' participation in the cases argued on September 17, 2015 
and September 18, 2015.  Counsel did not object.  
There is precedent in this court for a member of the court 
to do as Justice Crooks explained he would do.  There is also 
precedent in this court for a member of the court who has not 
attended oral argument to decline to participate in deciding the 
case.  
In contrast, counsel did not know that Justice Rebecca G. 
Bradley, who was appointed to the court after oral argument, 
would be participating in the cases heard and tentatively 
decided prior to her appointment.  Until the decisions were 
released, counsel had no opportunity to ask for reargument with 
Justice Rebecca G. Bradley present or to object to Justice 
Rebecca G. Bradley's participation without reargument. 
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
24 
 
¶142 In 12 of these cases, Justice Rebecca G. Bradley did 
not participate in the decision of the court.54  In one of these 
cases, a case before this court on bypass from the court of 
appeals, New Richmond News v. City of New Richmond, 2015 WI 106, 
¶1, 365 Wis. 2d 610, 875 N.W.2d 107, the court's per curiam 
decision explained the new justice's non-participation as 
follows: "The court is equally divided on whether to affirm or 
reverse the judgment of the circuit court for St. Croix County. 
This case was argued before the full court; however, Justice N. 
Patrick Crooks passed away prior to the court's decision.  
Justice Rebecca G. Bradley was appointed to the court after the 
court's decision, and therefore did not participate."55 
                                                 
54 See In re Marriage of Meister, 2016 WI 22, ¶49, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 876 N.W.2d 746; State v. Smith, 2016 WI 23, ¶59, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; United Food & Commercial 
Workers Union v. Hormel Foods Corp., 2016 WI 13, ¶107, 367 
Wis. 2d 131, 876 N.W.2d 99; Wis. Pharmacal Co., LLC v. Neb. 
Cultures of Cal., Inc., 2016 WI 14, ¶86, 367 Wis. 2d 221, 876 
N.W.2d 72; Burgraff v. Menard, Inc., 2016 WI 11, ¶81, 367 
Wis. 2d 50, 875 N.W.2d 596; Hoffer Props., LLC v. DOT, 2016 WI 
5, ¶48, 366 Wis. 2d 372, 874 N.W.2d 533; State v. Valadez, 2016 
WI 4, ¶56, 366 Wis. 2d 332, 874 N.W.2d 514; State v. Dumstrey, 
2016 WI 3, ¶52, 366 Wis. 2d 64, 873 N.W.2d 502; Winnebago Cnty. 
v. Christopher S., 2016 WI 1, ¶58, 366 Wis. 2d 1, ___ 
N.W.2d ___; Wis. Dep't of Justice v. Wis. Dep't of Workforce 
Dev., 2015 WI 114, ¶60, 365 Wis. 2d 694, 875 N.W.2d 545; New 
Richmond News, 365 Wis. 2d 610, ¶4; State v. Iverson, 2015 WI 
101, ¶62, 365 Wis. 2d 302, 871 N.W.2d 661. 
55 New Richmond, 365 Wis. 2d 610, ¶1.  The per curiam 
opinion went on to explain that Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, 
Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, and Justice David T. Prosser would 
affirm.  Chief Justice Patience Drake Roggensack, Justice 
Annette Kingsland Ziegler, and Justice Michael Gableman would 
reverse.  
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
25 
 
¶143 In three of these cases (including the instant case), 
Justice Rebecca G. Bradley participated in the decisions.56   
¶144 One of these three cases in which Justice Rebecca G. 
Bradley participated, namely State v. Matalonis, 2016 WI 7, 366 
Wis. 2d 443, 875 N.W.2d 567, was a 4-3 decision overturning the 
decision of the court of appeals.  A motion for reconsideration 
was 
filed 
alleging 
that 
Justice 
Rebecca 
G. 
Bradley's 
participation violated the defendant's equal protection and due 
process rights.  The motion was denied.   
¶145 In two of the cases in which Justice Rebecca G. 
Bradley participated, namely the instant case and State v. 
Parisi, 2016 WI 10, 367 Wis. 2d 1, 875 N.W.2d 619, the final 
vote in each of the two cases was 5-2.  Thus, the instant case 
and Parisi present different fact situations than Matalonis, in 
which Justice Rebecca G. Bradley appears to have cast the 
deciding vote, and New Richmond, a bypass case in which the 
justices 
were 
evenly 
divided 
without 
Justice 
Rebecca 
G. 
Bradley's participation.    
¶146 In prior writings reviewing the experiences and 
practices of this court and the United States Supreme Court, 
when a new justice joins the court, the conclusion was as 
follows:  A new justice who did not participate in oral argument 
                                                 
56 The other two cases are State v. Parisi, 2016 WI 10, 367 
Wis. 2d 1, 875 N.W.2d 619; and State v. Matalonis, 2016 WI 7, 
366 Wis. 2d 443, 875 N.W.2d 567. 
A decision in one case (argued, like the instant case, on 
September 17, 2015) has not yet been released:  State v. LeMere, 
No. 2013AP2433-CR. 
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
26 
 
does not participate in the decision of the case unless the 
other members of the court decide that the case should be 
reargued.57  The new justice may participate in reargument.   
¶147 Taking a different and contrasting approach to this 
prior precedent, Justice Rebecca G. Bradley explains in her 
concurrence in the instant case that the new justice alone, not 
the court, decides whether the new justice will participate in a 
case that has been argued and tentatively decided before the new 
justice joined the court.   
¶148 Justice Rebecca G. Bradley's public explanation of 
whether she will participate in cases argued but not decided 
before her appointment to the court and her explanation for her 
decision 
to 
avoid 
reargument 
are 
useful 
and 
important 
information for the bench, bar, and public.  It sets a new 
precedent that informs and guides future practices of this 
court.  In sum, it is beneficial to finally have Justice Rebecca 
Bradley's public explanation in writing as part of the court's 
record. 
* * * * 
¶149 We conclude that the majority opinion, without special 
justification, departs from a unanimous, workable, and settled 
precedent of this court, Waukesha County v. Steven H., 2000 WI 
                                                 
57 Audio recordings of oral arguments in this court have 
been available for many years.  Likewise, audio recordings of 
oral arguments in the United States Supreme Court have been 
available since 1955.  See Oyez, http://www.oyez.org/about 
("[Oyez] is a complete and authoritative source for all of the 
Court's audio since the installation of a recording system in 
October 1955.").   
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
27 
 
28, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607, and unjustly terminates the 
parental rights of Juanita A., a single mother with cognitive 
difficulties, to her son, Matthew D.  In so doing, the majority 
opinion withdraws language in Steven H. adopting the "last 
order" notice rule and replaces it with an "at least one order" 
notice rule.58   
¶150 The 
majority 
opinion 
provides 
no 
"special" 
justification for departing from precedent.  The only change 
since Steven H. is in the membership of this court.   
¶151 For the reasons set forth, we dissent and write 
separately.  
 
                                                 
58 See majority op., ¶17. 
No.  2014AP2431.ssa & awb 
 
 
 
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