Case Title: State v. Wadsworth

Citation: 109 Ariz. 59, 505 P.2d 230

Docket Number: 2399

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1973-01-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
109 Ariz. 59 (1973) 505 P.2d 230 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Lee Anthony WADSWORTH, Appellant. No. 2399. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. January 19, 1973. Rehearing Denied February 27, 1973. *60 Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen. by William P. Dixon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, and Al Vermeire, Law Student, University of Arizona, Tucson, for appellee. Lewis & Roca by Paul G. Ulrich, David L. Grounds, Richard L. Parrish and William C. Lewis, Jr., Phoenix, for appellant. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is an appeal from a jury verdict and judgment of guilty to the crime of furnishing marijuana in violation of § 36-1002.07 A.R.S. with a sentence of not less than five years nor more than five years and one day in the Arizona State Prison. The defendant raises only one question on appeal which he states in his brief as follows: The facts necessary for a determination of the matter on appeal are as follows. On 16 November 1970, the defendant, in the company of others, including Agent William Greenlee of the Arizona Department of Public Safety, "pulled out a baggie of marijuana, * * * and rolled a cigarette, * * * and passed it around to the people in the room." After the second time the cigarette was passed around, Agent Greenlee *61 pinched out the fire and placed the butt in his coat pocket. Thereafter, a conversation ensued between Agent Greenlee and the defendant regarding the possible purchase of a hundred kilograms of marijuana. The defendant provided Agent Greenlee with a second marijuana cigarette before leaving. Upon these facts the defendant was convicted and this appeal followed. Defendant does not deny that he violated the statute in question, § 36-1002.07 A.R.S., but attacks the statute itself. Arizona has two basic drug statutes. The first, under Title 32, Chapter 18 (Pharmacy), 10 A.R.S., concerns regulation of the so-called "dangerous drugs." Dangerous drugs are defined in § 32-1901, subsec. 9 A.R.S. which lists such compounds as amphetamines, barbiturates, mescaline, and central nervous system depressants and includes the substances commonly called "L.S.D." and "speed." § 32-1992, subsec. A A.R.S. provides: § 32-1991 A.R.S. provides that the State Board of Pharmacy, the "division of narcotics enforcement and criminal intelligence within the department of public safety, all officers exercising police powers, and county attorneys shall enforce the provisions of" Chapter 18 concerning dangerous drugs. Persons convicted of selling or delivering or otherwise disposing of dangerous drugs are to be punished by an imprisonment of one year to life, § 32-1996, subsec. C A.R.S. The second of the Arizona drug statutes is found in Title 36, Chapter 9 (Regulation of Narcotics, Alkalies, Acids and Poisons), 11 A.R.S. Article 1 is titled "Uniform Narcotic Drug Act" and § 36-1001, subsec. 14 A.R.S. states: Cannabis is defined in Section 13 of § 36-1001 A.R.S. as including marijuana. The furnishing of a narcotic drug is punished under § 36-1002.01 A.R.S. which provides in relevant part: The furnishing of marijuana is punished as follows in § 36-1002.07 A.R.S.: Our statutes, then, provide that the sale or furnishing of marijuana, though included in the narcotic drugs section, is punished somewhat less severely than the sale of narcotic drugs "other than marijuana", but more severely than the sale or giving away of dangerous drugs including "L.S.D." and "speed." In evaluating defendant's claim of denial of equal protection in the classification of marijuana with narcotic drugs, we must *62 look to the United States Supreme Court for guidance. That court has said: And: The defendant contends that scientists are now in virtually unanimous agreement that marijuana has fundamentally different effects than heroin, opium, morphine and other so-called "hard drugs," and that in response to this "overwhelming" scientific evidence the continued classification of marijuana with narcotic drugs rather than with dangerous drugs and the resulting severe penalty is a violation of defendant's rights under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The defendant quotes the United States Supreme Court as follows: Defendant has filed with this court an extensive if not exhaustive appendix on the subject, containing numerous articles by recognized authorities who discuss the alleged arbitrary classification of marijuana with narcotic rather than with dangerous drugs. These articles in the main are concerned with the characteristics of the various drugs discussed and their effects on the human body and resulting behavior of the user. For the purpose of this opinion, we will admit that dangerous drugs such as "L.S.D." and "speed" are more harmful to the user than marijuana, and that scientifically marijuana may not necessarily be included with the drugs defined in the narcotic drug statute, § 36-1001 A.R.S. This is not, however, persuasive. The fact that a drug in the list of narcotic drugs may be less harmful than those listed in the dangerous drug statute does not make the classification unreasonable. *63 The classification, we believe, is reasonable and not arbitrary despite the fact that some of the drugs listed could be classified differently. We agree with the dissent of Chief Justice Underwood of the Illinois Supreme Court who said: The legislative intent in this State was to proscribe the use of marijuana, not to scientifically categorize it according to its composition and effect, and we believe there was a reasonable basis for the classification of marijuana with the narcotic drugs rather than the dangerous drugs. We believe there is, however, another reason why the classification and especially the penalties imposed can be sustained. The fact that an objectionable practice is widespread may mandate a stiffer penalty in order to discourage its continued use than a more harmful, less often used practice. We take judicial notice of the fact that marijuana is one of the most widely used drugs among our young. Also, we note that Arizona's geographical proximity to Mexico, a primary source of marijuana, contributes to the magnitude of the problem in this State. These are facts which our State legislature may have considered as justification for retaining marijuana under the Narcotic Drug Act, with its resulting more severe penalties, rather than classifying it with the drugs listed in the Dangerous Drug Act with its lesser penalties. We have stated: It should be noted that the defendant does not contend that the legislature lacks the power to prohibit the sale, use or possession of marijuana, but questions the legislative classification with the "attendant *64 draconian penalties." Accepting the proposition, as defendant does, that the legislature may, under the police power, prohibit the use of marijuana, it follows that stronger penalties designed to prevent the present widespread use of marijuana are reasonable. We may doubt whether the legislation is wise and does in fact accomplish the ends desired, but we cannot constitutionally question the reasonableness of the legal classification and the resulting penalty. We believe that a comment on the sentence in this case is indicated. The statute (§ 36-1002.07 A.R.S.) provides for a statutory minimum of five years, three years of which must be served before the defendant is eligible for parole. The trial court, therefore, was faced with giving defendant either five years or probation. Because of the defendant's age and because of the amount of marijuana involved in the offense, we searched the record carefully to satisfy ourselves that the sentence did not constitute an abuse of the trial court's discretion. The record indicates that the defendant, after having been arrested on the charge of furnishing marijuana, entered into a plea agreement through his attorney to plead guilty to the crime of "possession" (§ 36-1002.05, subsec. A A.R.S.) which would have allowed the court to sentence him to a year in the County Jail rather than the five year minimum sentence in the Arizona State Prison. After the original charge was withdrawn and the "possession" charge filed, the defendant refused to plead guilty and the "possession" charge was then dropped and the "furnishing" charge refiled. At the time of sentencing, the following transpired: And before passing sentence, the court discussed the defendant's past record: We find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in imposing the sentence the defendant received in the instant case. Judgment affirmed. HAYS, C.J., STRUCKMEYER and HOLOHAN, JJ., and EINO M. JACOBSON, Court of Appeals Judge, concur. LOCKWOOD, J., did not participate in the determination of this matter.