Case Title: People v. Reed

Citation: 

Docket Number: S082776

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2018-05-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
SEE DISSENTING OPINIONS 
Filed 5/7/18 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S082776 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
   
ENNIS REED, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. TA037369-01 
 
____________________________________) 
 
This automatic appeal follows from defendant Ennis Reed’s 1999 
conviction and death sentence for the murders of Amarilis Vasquez and Paul 
Moreland.  Reed contends that several errors occurred during the guilt and penalty 
phases of his trial.  After carefully considering defendant’s claims, we find that 
they do not merit reversal of the guilt or penalty verdicts.  So we affirm the 
judgment in its entirety.    
I.  FACTS 
Defendant Ennis Reed was charged in an amended information with two 
counts of murder (Penal Code § 187, subd. (a)),1 two counts of attempted murder 
(§§ 667/187(a)), the special circumstance of multiple murder (§ 190.2, subd. 
(a)(3)), and various enhancements.  The charges arose out of two separate 
incidents, but were consolidated in a single trial.     
                                              
1 
All subsequent statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
noted.  
2 
A.  Guilt Phase  
1.  The Vasquez Murder  
At around 8:00 p.m. on September 24, 1996, Carlos Mendez and his wife 
Amarilis Vasquez took a meal break from their jobs at a plastics factory.  The 
couple headed to Tacos El Unico, a Mexican fast food restaurant on Long Beach 
Boulevard in the City of Compton.  Mendez and Vasquez parked in the 
restaurant’s lot and ordered food to go.  After they got back into their pickup 
truck, the couple noticed a man walking toward the truck with a large pistol.  
Mendez had never seen the man before.  As Mendez started the truck, the man 
started shooting at them from a distance of roughly 20 feet.  Vasquez — sitting in 
the passenger seat — was hit first, in the head.  Mendez was then shot in the right 
cheek.  He got out of the truck and started running, but was hit again, this time in 
the left thigh.  Mendez fled about 15 feet from the truck before realizing that his 
wife was still inside.  By the time Mendez ran back to the passenger side of the 
truck, the man had disappeared.  Vasquez died from the gunshot wound to her 
head, while Mendez survived.   
Officer James Lewis of the Compton Police Department was one of the first 
law enforcement officers to arrive on the scene.  Officer Lewis interviewed 
Mendez, who was clearly “very, very upset.”  Mendez described the shooter as a 
black male with a black jacket.  Later that evening, Detective Michael Paiz of the 
Compton Police Department interviewed Mendez at the hospital.  Mendez 
described the shooter as a black male “about 5’8” to 5’11” in height, 20 to 25 
years in age, clean shaven, short black hair, wearing a black jacket and black 
pants.”  At trial, the parties stipulated that Officer Peters of the Compton Police 
Department would have testified that, on the day of the incident, Mendez 
described the shooter as “a male black adult, 25 years old, wearing black pants and 
3 
a black jacket, clean shaven, with short hair, 5’11”, 150 to 180 pounds, medium 
complexion.”   
In January of 1997, Detective Paiz showed Mendez a six-photo array that 
included a photograph of defendant Reed.  “[R]ight away,” Mendez picked the 
photo of Reed.  In May of 1998, Mendez identified Reed as the shooter at a 
preliminary hearing that Reed attended.  About two months later — on July 14, 
1998 — Mendez attended a live lineup at the county jail.2  Mendez quickly 
selected Reed because his face “look[ed] like the same as in the photo.”  Mendez 
also identified Reed in court during the trial.   
2.  The Moreland Murder  
On November 22, 1996, Roy Fradiue was hanging out with his friend Paul 
Moreland at Fradiue’s uncle’s house.  The two started drinking sometime that 
evening — or possibly earlier — and smoked marijuana as well.  Moreland died 
with phencyclidine (PCP) and cocaine in his system; a deputy medical examiner 
opined he must have ingested the cocaine within hours of his death.   
At around 11:00 p.m., Fradiue and Moreland left the house to walk to a 
store on Long Beach Boulevard in the City of Compton.  As the two were 
walking, Fradiue noticed a man standing with several “dudes” in the yard outside 
of a duplex on Glencoe Avenue.  Fradiue had never seen the man before.  He 
noticed that the man was holding “some type of rifle” with the barrel resting on his 
shoulder, pointing backward.  The man said something to Moreland, but Fradiue 
could not understand what.  Once Fradiue and Moreland passed the duplex, 
Fradiue heard a shot.  He did not see the man fire the rifle but assumed that the 
man fired into the air because “it didn’t hit nothing.”  Then, the man started firing 
                                              
2 
It was Reed who requested the live lineup after the preliminary hearing. 
 
 
4 
at Fradiue and Moreland.  Fradiue headed south on Temple Avenue, while 
Moreland headed north.  The man fired once at Fradiue, but the shot hit a pole 
instead.3  Fradiue kept running and, a few minutes later, he heard “three or four 
more shots.”  Roland Darby was at his house near the intersection of Glencoe and 
Temple at the time of the shooting and recalled hearing a series of shots, a pause,4 
and then another series of shots.  A few blocks away, Fradiue ran into another 
friend, who drove him back to his uncle’s house.   
Officer George Betor of the Compton Police Department was the first 
officer to arrive on the scene.  He found Moreland’s body at the corner of Glencoe 
and Temple avenues.  Moreland had been shot nine times.  Officer Betor collected 
three shell casings and bullet fragments from the area surrounding Moreland’s 
body.   
The next night, Officer Betor and two colleagues chased a man named 
Chico McLaine — a suspect in an unrelated matter — into a house near the scene 
of Moreland’s murder.  The officers encountered an unidentified man in the house 
but did not arrest him.  The officers also found an SKS rifle and magazine, both of 
which Officer Betor seized because they fired the same caliber of bullet as the 
shell casings that the officer had found the night before.  A forensic expert 
identified two of the three casings found near Moreland’s body as having been 
fired by the SKS rifle.  The third shell casing had been “worked through” the 
weapon but not fired.  Tests were inconclusive, however, as to whether the bullet 
fragments came from the SKS rifle.  Law enforcement also could not obtain any 
                                              
3 
Detective Paiz visited the scene during trial and found a rusty bullet hole in 
a “No Parking” sign on Temple Street.  He testified that the bullet that created the 
hole was traveling in a “southwesterly direction.”   
4 
At trial, Darby estimated the length of the pause as “about five to ten 
seconds” but was confronted with an interview report that indicated that he told an 
officer on the night of the incident that the pause was “two to three minutes.”   
5 
fingerprints from the weapon or magazine.  When shown the gun during his trial 
testimony, Fradiue stated that it “look[ed] like” the weapon he saw on November 
22.   
Officer Marvin Pollard of the Compton Police Department testified that —  
earlier in the same night as officers pursued McLaine –– he had encountered Reed 
and filled out a field interview card describing their interaction.  The card 
indicated that Officer Pollard encountered Reed near the intersection of Glencoe 
and Temple avenues.  Officer Pollard stated that other officers were present, but 
that they did not enter any building during the encounter.  The interview card 
included a description of Reed’s tattoo, which Officer Pollard relied on to identify 
the defendant in court.  The card also described Reed as weighing 122 pounds, 
although Officer Pollard could not recall if the information came from Reed 
himself or his state ID card.  In the “Persons with Subject” area of the interview 
card, Officer Pollard wrote “I. McLaine.”   
Fradiue never contacted the police after escaping from the shooting that 
killed Moreland.  In April 1997 — roughly six months after Moreland’s death — 
Officer Paiz contacted Fradiue and showed him a six-photo array that included a 
photo of Reed.  Fradiue testified that he selected Reed’s photo after studying the 
array for “10 minutes,” although Officer Paiz recalled that the identification took 
roughly “10 seconds.”  Fradiue thought that the shooter had “real short” hair, and 
admitted that Reed was the only subject in the lineup with “real short hair.”  
Fradiue also identified Reed at the same post-preliminary hearing lineup that 
Mendez attended, as well as at trial.   
3.  Defense Evidence  
Reed called a single witness, Foster Slaughter.  Slaughter was sitting 
outside the Zodiac motorcycle club at the time of the Vasquez murder.  Slaughter 
was about 50 feet from Tacos El Unico when someone started shooting at Mendez 
6 
and Vasquez.  Slaughter saw the assailant only from the side but described him as 
a black male with long hair and a “big long coat.”  He estimated that the assailant 
weighed 190 to 200 pounds, although he admitted that the coat could have given 
him that impression.  Slaughter testified that Reed did not “look like the one was 
there [sic].”   
On rebuttal, the prosecution called Officer Kenneth Roller of the Compton 
Police Department.  Officer Roller interviewed Slaughter immediately after the 
incident.  Officer Roller’s report indicated that Slaughter had described the 
assailant to him as a black male adult “wearing a three-quarter length black jacket 
and dark jean pants.”  The officer testified that he would have included additional 
information in the description had Slaughter provided any.   
The jury convicted Reed of both counts of murder (in the first degree) and 
both counts of attempted murder.  The jury also found true the special 
circumstance of multiple murder.   
B.  Penalty Phase  
The first penalty phase trial ended in a hung jury, with the jury voting seven 
to five in favor of life without parole.  The penalty phase retrial commenced on 
July 30, 1999.  The parties stipulated that Reed had been convicted of attempted 
murder on September 12, 1992, “on an aiding and abetting theory . . . wherein he 
was charged as being the driver in a drive-by shooting, not the shooter.”  A parole 
officer testified that Reed was released from prison on August 3, 1996, and 
reported to the parole office two days later.  The prosecution also introduced the 
following evidence specific to the two murders.   
1.  The Vasquez Murder   
Carlos Mendez recounted what happened on the day of his wife’s murder.  
He also testified about the effect of her death on him.  Defense counsel cross-
7 
examined Mendez about the circumstances of his identification of Reed as the 
shooter.  Officer Robert Childs of the Compton Police Department arrived on the 
scene and collected nine shell casings and two expended bullets from the area 
surrounding Mendez’s truck.  A forensic pathologist testified about the cause of 
Vasquez’s death.   
2.  The Moreland Murder 
Roland Darby heard gunshots on the night of Moreland’s murder.  He also 
looked out the window and saw Moreland’s dead body.  Roy Fradiue recounted 
the circumstances of Moreland’s murder.  Defense counsel cross-examined 
Fradiue on various factors relating to the strength of his identification of Reed as 
the shooter:  Fradiue had consumed alcohol and marijuana, it was dark out, and he 
had never seen the shooter before.  Detective Paiz described the rusty bullet hole 
in the sign on Temple Street.  Floyd Moreland — Paul’s father — testified about 
his son’s life and that he missed Paul “terribly.”  Officer Betor described the scene 
of Moreland’s murder and recounted finding the SKS rifle in the nearby house.  A 
forensic pathologist testified about the cause of Moreland’s death.   
3.  Defense Case  
Joe Galindo was at his girlfriend’s house near Tacos El Unico on the 
evening of Vasquez’s murder.5  He was on her porch when he heard three 
gunshots.  He then saw a black, “somewhat stocky” man run past his girlfriend’s 
house at a distance of roughly 50 feet.  Galindo did not see the man’s face but did 
not believe that Reed was the man.  Galindo — who was 6’1” and weighed about 
200 pounds — testified that the man he saw “must have been at least my height or 
                                              
5 
Galindo could not be located to testify during the guilt phase, and the trial 
court denied defense counsel’s request for a continuance to allow the defense to 
find him.  (See, infra, Part II.A.2.)    
8 
a little bit taller.”  Defense counsel then read Slaughter’s testimony from the guilt 
phase to the jury.   
Dolores Sheen was the executive director and principal of the middle 
school Reed attended for seventh grade.  Reed displayed poor literacy and 
performed at a third or fourth grade level.  Reed was initially interested in school, 
but his interest waned over time.  Often tardy or absent, Reed began to exhibit 
behavioral disorders.  Sheen attempted to involve Reed’s mother in his education, 
but his mother did not provide any “visible support system.”  The school did not 
promote Reed to eighth grade.   
Dolores Churchill was Reed’s great-aunt.  She testified that Reed’s father 
and mother separated when Reed was in kindergarten.  Reed had minimal contact 
with his father and his relationship with his mother was “strained.”  Reed always 
manifested learning disabilities and stopped going to school after seventh grade.  
Reed was always considerate, however, and tended toward “quietness” and 
“withdrawing, rather than an explosion of temper.”   
On rebuttal, Officer Lewis described his interview of Mendez immediately 
after the shooting.  Mendez then recounted how he had selected Reed in both a 
photographic and live lineup.  Officer Childs testified that, when he interviewed 
Galindo on the night of Vasquez’s murder, Galindo told him only that the shooter 
was a “black male adult in a plaid shirt.”   
On August 4, 1999, the jury recommended imposition of the death penalty.  
On September 29, the trial court denied Reed’s motion for a new trial and 
sentenced him to death.   
9 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Jury Selection and Pretrial Claims  
1.  Batson/Wheeler Motion  
Reed is African American.  He contends the prosecutor violated his state 
and federal constitutional rights to equal protection and a jury drawn from a fair 
cross-section of the community by peremptorily excusing five black prospective 
jurors at the guilt phase.  (See Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 89 
(Batson); People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 276-277 (Wheeler).)  We find 
no error.   
a.  Factual Background 
The trial court began voir dire on May 25, 1999.  After exclusions for 
hardship, the jury venire consisted of 123 people, including 42 black jurors, 49 
white jurors, 16 Hispanic jurors, 14 Asian jurors, one “Middle East[ern]” juror, 
and one juror whose race we are unable to determine.  Once the parties excused 
certain jurors for cause or by stipulation, 82 prospective jurors remained.  The first 
18 jurors to enter the jury box included nine white jurors, six black jurors, two 
Hispanic jurors, and one Asian juror.  Following a brief round of voir dire, the 
prosecution exercised peremptory strikes against Corrine T. (a white woman), Bert 
A. (a black man), Billie L. (a black woman), Betzaida C. (a Hispanic woman), and 
Janice C. (a black woman).  During a second round of peremptory strikes, the 
prosecutor excused Bruno B. (a Hispanic man), Nickey W. (a black man), and 
Mary C. (a black woman).   
After the prosecutor struck Mary C., defense counsel raised a 
Batson/Wheeler objection.  Defense counsel noted that the prosecution had used 
five of his eight strikes up to that point on black prospective jurors.  Without 
hearing from the prosecution, the trial court overruled the objection, stating “there 
10 
has not been a showing of a strong likelihood” that the prosecutor’s challenges 
were racially motivated.   
Before the jury was sworn, the prosecutor struck five additional jurors, one 
of whom was a black woman.  The prosecutor also exercised three peremptory 
strikes during the selection of alternate jurors, one of which removed a black 
woman from the panel.  The resulting guilt phase jury initially consisted of three 
black jurors, five white jurors, one Hispanic juror, two Asian jurors, and one 
“Middle East[ern]” juror.  During the trial, one black juror was excused for 
hardship and replaced by a Hispanic alternate.   
b.  Analysis        
Both the United States and California Constitutions prohibit discriminatory 
use of peremptory strikes.  (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 89; Wheeler, supra, 22 
Cal.3d at pp. 276-277; People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1157-1159.)  To 
assess whether such prohibited discrimination has occurred, our inquiry under 
Batson/Wheeler follows three distinct, familiar steps.  First, the party objecting to 
the strike must establish a prima facie case by showing facts sufficient to support 
an inference of discriminatory purpose.  (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 
162, 168 (Johnson).)  Second, if the objector succeeds in establishing a prima facie 
case, the burden shifts to the proponent of the strike to offer a permissible, non-
biased justification for the strike.6  (Ibid.)  Finally, if the proponent does offer a 
non-biased justification, the trial court must decide whether that justification is 
                                              
6  
In cases where the trial court has concluded no prima facie case has been 
established, it is the better practice to “offer prosecutors the opportunity to state 
their reasons so as to enable creation of an adequate record for an appellate court, 
should it disagree with the first-stage ruling, to determine whether any 
constitutional violation has been established.”  (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 
363, 388 (Scott).) 
11 
genuine or instead whether impermissible discrimination in fact motivated the 
strike.  (Ibid.) 
The trial court denied Reed’s Batson/Wheeler motion at the first step of the 
inquiry, finding Reed had not established a prima facie case.  But it did so at a 
time when California courts applied an unduly stringent standard for Batson 
claims at step one.  (See People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1293.)  In 
Johnson, the United States Supreme Court rejected our previous standard — 
requiring that it be “ ‘more likely than not’ ” that purposeful discrimination 
occurred — as inconsistent with federal constitutional protections, and instead 
favored a standard turning on whether the opponent of the strike has “ ‘produc[ed] 
evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference’ ” of 
discrimination.  (Carasi, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1293, quoting Johnson, 545 U.S. at p. 
170.)  As the People concede, the trial court here denied the motion using the 
“more likely than not” standard that Johnson disapproved.  In these circumstances, 
we conduct our own independent review of the record and apply the Johnson 
standard to determine whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor 
excused a juror on a discriminatory basis.  (People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 
313, 342 (Bonilla).)     
Although we examine the entire record when conducting our review, 
certain types of evidence are especially relevant.  These include whether a party 
has struck most or all of the members of the venire from an identified group, 
whether a party has used a disproportionate number of strikes against members of 
that group, whether the party has engaged those prospective jurors in only 
desultory voir dire, whether the defendant is a member of that group, and whether 
the victim is a member of the group to which a majority of remaining jurors 
belong.  (Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 384.)  We may also consider 
nondiscriminatory reasons for the peremptory strike that “necessarily dispel any 
12 
inference of bias,” so long as those reasons are apparent from and clearly 
established in the record.  (Ibid.)        
What Reed relies on primarily to advance his challenge is evidence of 
disproportionate strikes against black jurors.  The prosecutor used five of his first 
eight peremptory strikes (roughly 63 percent) on black jurors, even though such 
jurors constituted only 34 percent of the venire.  Considered in the context of the 
entire jury selection process, however, these initial strikes do not support an 
inference of discriminatory intent.  (See People v. Garcia (2011) 52 Cal.4th 706, 
748 [considering ratio of stricken challenged jurors in context of overall strikes, 
including those made after Batson/Wheeler motion].)  The prosecutor’s next four 
strikes all targeted non-black jurors, and taken together, his strikes did not target 
black jurors in a particularly disproportionate manner.  The prosecutor exercised 
13 strikes during the selection of regular jurors, and three more while selecting 
alternates.  Six of the prosecutor’s thirteen regular juror strikes (46 percent) — and 
seven of sixteen overall (44 percent) — targeted black jurors.  Although these 
figures exceed the 34 percent ratio of black jurors in the venire, they do so only 
barely.  Viewed in its overall context, the pattern of strikes by itself does not 
suggest the inference of discrimination that might otherwise be drawn from the 
prosecutor’s initial strikes.   
What is more, the prosecutor first signaled his acceptance of a jury at a time 
when it contained two black jurors, and three black jurors ultimately sat on the 
jury.  (See People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 906 [noting that prosecutor’s 
repeated passing of “an African-American woman who ultimately served as a 
juror in the guilt phase” helped dispel any inference of discriminatory motive].)  It 
is true that the prosecutor used his last strike on a black woman before the trial 
court empaneled the jury.  But another black juror replaced her, and the prosecutor 
immediately accepted the panel.  While acceptance of one or more black jurors by 
13 
the prosecution does not necessarily settle all questions about how the prosecution 
used its peremptory challenges, these facts nonetheless help lessen the strength of 
any inference of discrimination that the pattern of the prosecutor’s strikes might 
otherwise imply.  (See People v. Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472, 487 [“The 
prosecutor’s acceptance of a panel including these African-American prospective 
jurors, while not conclusive, was ‘an indication of the prosecutor’s good faith in 
exercising his peremptories . . . .’ ”].)  Most notably, the prosecutor’s decision to 
strike one black juror while accepting another who replaced her suggests that non-
race related differences between the jurors, rather than race, explain the 
prosecutor’s actions.  (See ibid.) 
Reed also argues that the prosecutor struck the challenged jurors without 
asking them voir dire questions.  Yet the prosecutor did in fact engage Billie L. in 
a lengthy colloquy regarding her views on the death penalty.  More important, the 
attorneys received the jurors’ questionnaires prior to commencement of voir dire.  
What we have held is that under these circumstances, an attorney’s failure to 
engage jurors in voir dire is less significant than when the attorneys know nothing 
about the jurors prior to striking them.  (See People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 
574, 615 (Taylor).)  Accordingly, we accord no great weight to the prosecutor’s 
limited voir dire.       
We find further evidence dispelling any inference of bias in the struck 
jurors’ questionnaires and answers during voir dire.  (See People v. Sanchez 
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 435-439 (Sanchez) [considering nondiscriminatory reasons 
for peremptory challenges that are apparent from and “clearly established” in the 
record].)  While we are not relying here solely on hypothesized prosecutor reasons 
to strike a juror in assessing a Batson/Wheeler motion, a record devoid of any 
support for race-neutral reasons justifying prosecutor strikes would raise further 
concerns.  In this case, however, the record is not devoid of support for race-
14 
neutral reasons for excusing each of the jurors in question.  Bert A. wrote that his 
brother had a negative experience with law enforcement when he was convicted of 
robbery in 1984.  We have previously recognized a relative’s negative experiences 
with law enforcement as a race-neutral hypothetical reason for a strike that dispels 
any inference of discriminatory intent.  (See People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 
804, 836 (Harris).)  Moreover, Bert A. reported that he had previously served on a 
criminal jury that hung.  We have also recognized such a disclosure as the sort that 
sufficiently dispels any inference of discrimination.  (See People v. Farnam 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 138 (Farnam).)    
Similarly, both Janice C. and Mary C. reported that their spouses had prior 
contact with law enforcement.  Janice C. wrote that her spouse had been convicted 
of a drug offense in 1977, while Mary C. stated that her husband had been arrested 
or charged with a crime 10 years prior to Reed’s trial.  (See People v. Booker 
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 167 [“A negative experience with the criminal justice 
system is a valid neutral reason for a peremptory challenge”]; Harris, supra, 57 
Cal.4th at p. 836.)           
Billie L. stated in her questionnaire that she was “[s]trongly against” the 
death penalty and, during voir dire, she repeated this view, commenting that “I 
believe that maybe we should just not have a death penalty.”  These statements 
were later subject to a measure of equivocation, given her statement that “Each 
case is unique.  The death penalty must be considered very carefully.”  Even so, 
the prosecutor could have had a reasonable preference to strike Billie L. because 
of the risk –– in light of her earlier statements –– that she would in fact refuse to 
impose the death penalty.  We have previously held that the declaration of 
opposition to the death penalty, even when combined with some subsequent 
equivocation, reasonably dispels any inference of discrimination.  (See Scott, 
15 
supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 384-385; People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 440-
441.)   
Finally, Nickey W. offered answers on his questionnaire that were 
sufficiently conflicting to raise the possibility for reasonable concern by the 
prosecutor.  In response to a question about whether he understood and agreed that 
the fact defendant had been charged with certain crimes was not evidence of his 
guilt, Nickey W. wrote “no,” but then added “you are innocent until proven 
[guilty].”  Later, Nickey W. rejected the proposition that a defendant is not 
required to prove that he is innocent, and elaborated that “the defendant has to 
prove his [innocence].”  The concerns raised by Nickey W.’s response to critical 
aspects of the questionnaire provide a strong reason for the prosecutor to excuse 
him.  (See People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446, 470.) 
Reed also contends that a comparison between the jurors struck by the 
prosecution and the non-black jurors that ultimately served on the jury proves 
these rationales could not have motivated the prosecutor’s strikes.  In particular, 
Reed suggests that, if the rationale for the prosecutor’s strikes against black jurors 
Bert A., Janice C., and Mary C. was grounded in their relatives’ arrests or criminal 
convictions, the prosecutor should have also challenged non-black jurors with 
relatives who had comparable experience with the criminal justice system.  We 
have often declined to undertake comparative juror analysis at step one of the 
Batson/Wheeler framework.  (See, e.g., Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th 411 at p. 439; 
Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 616-617; Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th 313 at p. 350.)   
Nonetheless, such analysis can be helpful in certain circumstances to assess 
whether a defendant established a prima facie case of bias.  (See Scott, supra, 61 
Cal.4th at p. 390; Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th at 874-876 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).) 
Reed’s comparisons in this case, however, are unavailing.  
16 
It is true that Bert A., Janice C., and Mary C. have family members who 
were arrested or convicted of crimes.  Nonetheless, the prosecution had additional, 
independent reasons for striking these potential jurors aside from the fact that their 
relatives had a criminal history.  For one, Bert A. indicated that he previously 
served on a criminal jury involving a murder charge that resulted in a hung jury.  
(See Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 138 [concluding that sitting on a hung jury 
“constitutes a legitimate concern for the prosecution”].)  Mary C.’s questionnaire 
answers, meanwhile, were frequently incomplete and, in particular, she failed to 
answer critical questions related to her husband’s criminal history.  
There is a further distinction in whether the relevant family members had 
been convicted of their respective crimes.  The relatives of Bert A. and Janice C. 
had indeed been convicted.  Bert A.’s brother was convicted and served time for 
burglary, and Janice C.’s husband was convicted on drug charges.  Although Reed 
compares Bert A. and Janice C. with jurors whose family members had been 
arrested, no evidence suggests these family members were convicted or served 
time in prison.  The prosecutor could have readily concluded that a criminal 
conviction, or time spent in prison, was more significant than simply having a 
family member arrested.  (See People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 78 
[“[N]o inference of group bias appears from the prosecutor’s decision to challenge 
a prospective juror whose family members were serving or had served prison 
terms”].) 
Accordingly, Reed fails to demonstrate that the totality of relevant facts 
give rise to an inference of discriminatory intent for the prosecutor’s strikes.  (See 
also People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 189 [a prosecutor may “excuse a 
prospective juror for a variety of reasons, finding no single characteristic 
dispositive”].)  
 
17 
     2.  Motion for a Continuance  
On the first day of trial, Reed motioned to continue proceedings so he could 
secure the presence of Joe Galindo as a defense witness.  The trial court denied the 
motion.  Reed contends that the trial court’s decision was an abuse of discretion, 
and that it violated his federal constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment 
and his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.  We reject the 
claim. 
During the first morning of trial, Reed’s attorney made an oral motion for a 
continuance to secure the presence of Joe Galindo.  Reed’s attorney stated only 
that Galindo was a member of the National Guard who had been deployed, 
“perhaps to Yugoslavia.”  The prosecutor then objected to the continuance.  He 
explained to the trial court that Galindo did not witness the shooting of Vasquez 
and Mendez but did see someone running away from the location of the shooting 
shortly after it occurred.  He further explained that Galindo could not identify the 
fleeing individual but could offer a description of him that is “somewhat 
consistent, somewhat inconsistent with the way the defendant looks.”  Reed’s 
attorney then stated that the prosecutor’s description of Galindo’s anticipated 
testimony was “fair and accurate.”  The trial court denied the motion without 
hearing further argument.  After the penalty phase retrial — at which Galindo 
testified — Reed moved for a new trial based on the earlier denial of his motion 
for a continuance.  The trial court denied the motion.   
A criminal trial may be continued only upon a showing of good cause.  
Trial courts have wide discretion to determine whether such cause exists.  (§ 1050, 
subd. (e); People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 450.)  In making that 
determination, courts consider whether the moving party has acted diligently, the 
anticipated benefits of the continuance, the burden that the continuance would 
impose on witnesses, jurors, and the court, and whether a continuance will 
18 
accomplish or hinder substantial justice.  (Doolin, at p. 450.)  On appeal, we 
review all circumstances relevant to the motion to determine whether the trial 
court’s decision was so arbitrary as to deprive the movant of due process.  (Ibid.)     
We find no abuse of discretion here.  Reed’s attorney requested a 
continuance of unknown duration, and suggested to the trial court that Galindo 
might not be available to testify for quite some time.7  Indeed the trial court was 
understandably concerned that granting a continuance would delay the trial 
indefinitely.  Under these circumstances, the trial court did not act arbitrarily in 
believing that any continuance would impose a significant burden on everyone 
involved in the trial, not least the prospective jurors who had filled out lengthy 
juror questionnaires and arrived at court that day for the beginning of juror 
selection.   
Nor did Reed’s attorney suggest Galindo’s testimony was particularly 
beneficial to the defense.  In fact, defense counsel expressly agreed with the 
prosecutor’s contention that the anticipated testimony would only be partially 
exculpatory, in that Galindo’s description of the individual would be “somewhat 
consistent, somewhat inconsistent” with Reed.  Reed argues that Galindo’s 
testimony at the penalty phase retrial was more helpful to the defense than 
suggested during the request for a continuance.  While we consider all 
circumstances relevant to a ruling on a motion for a continuance, we focus 
particular attention on the reasons actually given for the request.  (See People v. 
Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1118 [“ ‘There are no mechanical tests for 
deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process.  
                                              
7  
We also note that defense counsel did not mention his efforts to secure 
witness Galindo’s attendance until after the motion for a new trial.  Although it 
appears that counsel did go to some lengths in attempting to serve the witness, he 
did not relay this information at the time the continuance was sought. 
19 
The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every 
case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request 
is denied.’ ”], quoting Ungar v. Sarafite (1964) 376 U.S. 575, 589, italics added.)  
And the reasons presented to the trial judge were not particularly compelling. 
Reed also cites numerous cases where reviewing courts have found an 
abuse of discretion to have occurred after a trial court denied a continuance to 
secure a witness.  Yet none of those cases present the circumstances here:  a 
request for a continuance that would not only have been of indefinite duration but 
also of limited apparent utility.  (See Jennings v. Superior Court (1967) 66 Cal.2d 
867, 871 [request for four day continuance]; People v. Buckey (1972) 23 
Cal.App.3d 740, 744 [request for continuance until “next court day” for “highly 
necessary” testimony]; Bennett v. Scroggy (1986) 793 F.2d 772, 775 [witness 
“probably could have been located overnight”]; U.S. v. Flynt (1984) 756 F.2d 
1352, 1360 [continuance “would not have resulted in any cognizable 
inconvenience to the court or the government”]; Hicks v. Wainwright (1981) 633 
F.2d 1146, 1149-1150 [witness available to give “critical” testimony “that evening 
or at any time thereafter”]; U.S. v. Powell (1978) 587 F.2d 443, 446 [request for 
four day continuance]; Johnson v. Johnson (1974) 375 F. Supp. 872, 876 
[witnesses could have appeared “the next day”].)     
So we find no abuse of discretion.8 
                                              
8 
Although Reed’s briefing is unclear, he appears to challenge the trial 
court’s denial of his motion for a new trial based on the denial of the motion for a 
continuance.  Because we hold that the denial of Reed’s motion for a continuance 
did not deny him a fair trial, we also reject any challenge to the trial court’s ruling 
on the motion for a new trial.  Our rejection of the merits of Reed’s argument 
regarding the continuance also suffices to reject any constitutional “ ‘gloss’ ” on 
that claim.  (See People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1050 fn. 4.)   
20 
B.  Guilt Phase Claims  
1.  Sufficiency of the Evidence for the Murder of Amarilis Vasquez and 
Attempted Murder of Carlos Mendez  
Reed contends the prosecution introduced insufficient evidence to prove his 
identity as the assailant of Vasquez and Mendez.  He maintains that the 
prosecution’s failure to carry its burden violated his right to due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  (See Jackson v. 
Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 315-316.)  We find no error.   
On appeal, the test for sufficiency of the evidence is whether evidence was 
presented from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the prosecution sustained its burden of proof.  (People v. 
Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 479 (Boyer).)  Although we assess whether the 
evidence is inherently credible and of solid value, we must also view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the jury verdict and presume the existence of every 
fact that the jury could reasonably have deduced from that evidence.  (Id. at p. 
480.)  Even identification of defendant by a single eyewitness may be sufficient to 
establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant’s identity as perpetrator of the 
crime charged.  (Ibid.)   
Mendez’s testimony and identification constitute the only evidence 
introduced to prove Reed’s identity as the shooter in the Vasquez incident.  
Nevertheless, when viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, we find 
that Mendez’s testimony provided sufficient evidence to sustain Reed’s 
convictions.  Mendez identified Reed as the shooter in two separate lineups and at 
the preliminary hearing, and reiterated that identification at trial.  There was 
nothing “inherently improbable” about this testimony.  (See Boyer, supra, 38 
Cal.4th at p. 480.)  Defense counsel also cross-examined Mendez about the factors 
that might undermine the reliability of his identification:  Mendez had never seen 
21 
the shooter before, and was understandably under substantial stress during the 
incident.  Under these circumstances, the jury could reasonably have weighed the 
value of Mendez’s identification and relied on it to find that Reed was the shooter. 
Reed argues that the identification procedures were unduly suggestive 
because, Reed maintains, he was the only bald individual in the six-photo array 
and the only person to appear in both the photo array and in-person lineup.  But 
defense counsel did not object to the identification procedures, and Reed does not 
now argue the trial court erred when it admitted evidence that Mendez identified 
Reed on those two occasions.  Any other sufficiency argument based on the 
identification procedures attacks the credibility of Mendez’s testimony, which we 
do not question when considering sufficiency of the evidence so long as the 
witness’s testimony is not inherently improbable.  (See People v. Jennings (2010) 
50 Cal.4th 616, 638 (Jennings) [In considering the sufficiency of the evidence 
“[w]e neither reweigh the evidence nor reevaluate the credibility of witnesses.”].)  
Reed also argues that several factors rendered Mendez’s identification not 
credible, especially when compared to Slaughter’s exculpatory testimony.  Once 
again, however, these arguments go to the credibility of Mendez’s testimony and 
its weight, which we cannot reconsider on appeal. 9  Accordingly, we find 
sufficient evidence of Reed’s guilt for the murder of Amarilis Vasquez and 
attempted murder of Carlos Mendez.          
                                              
9 
Reed also asks us to consider Galindo’s exculpatory testimony as part of 
this claim.  But when considering the sufficiency of the evidence, of course, we 
are limited to considering the evidence actually presented to the jury.  (See People 
v. Horton (1961) 191 Cal.App.2d 592, 598 [“On a review of the sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain the judgment of conviction, an appellate court is not permitted 
to go outside that record.”].)   
22 
2.  Sufficiency of the Evidence for the Murder of Paul Moreland and 
Attempted Murder of Roy Fradiue  
Reed next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence identifying him as the 
shooter in the murder of Paul Moreland and attempted murder of Roy Fradiue.  
We apply the same standard as to Reed’s challenge to his convictions for the 
Vasquez/Mendez incident, and we reject the claim as well. 
Fradiue’s testimony was the principal evidence of Reed’s involvement in 
the Moreland/Fradiue shooting.  Fradiue identified Reed as the shooter on three 
occasions:  from the photo array, in the in-person lineup, and during trial.  And as 
with Mendez’s testimony, Reed’s trial counsel cross-examined Fradiue on the 
circumstances that might lead the jury to doubt his identification:  Fradiue was 
intoxicated, and he never reported the incident.  Nothing rendered Fradiue’s 
testimony inherently unreliable, so we hold that the jury could have reasonably 
relied on it to conclude that Reed was the shooter.  (See Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th 
at p. 480.)  What is more, the evidence put Reed very near the scene of the 
shooting the night after it occurred, and with an individual whose last name 
matched someone whom the police chased that same night into a home that 
contained the murder weapon.  Considering all this evidence in the light most 
favorable to the guilty verdicts, the jury could reasonably have connected Reed to 
the murder weapon as the unidentified man that Officer Betor encountered in the 
house.  (See ibid. [We “must presume every fact the jury could reasonably have 
deduced from the evidence.”].)   
Reiterating arguments advanced in his previous claims, Reed contends here 
that the identification procedures behind Fradiue’s testimony were suggestive.  He 
also offers several reasons why Fradiue’s testimony could be unreliable.  Such 
arguments fail to establish that Fradiue’s testimony was inherently improbable, 
however, because they merely invite us to reweigh the evidence introduced at trial.    
23 
(See Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th 616 at p. 638.)  Reed also cites People v. Trevino 
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 667 and People v. Blakeslee (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 83, but those 
cases are inapposite.  In Trevino, the eyewitness identification was highly 
equivocal, in contrast to Fradiue’s consistent identification of Reed as the shooter.  
(39 Cal.3d at p. 696 [“Mrs. Nyberg was never able to positively identify Rivas as 
the second man at the apartment.”].)  And in Blakeslee, the prosecution offered no 
direct evidence of the defendant’s guilt at all.  (2 Cal.App.3d at p. 838 [“No one 
witnessed the shooting, no one placed defendant in the apartment at the time of the 
shooting, no one saw defendant with a weapon, and no one identified defendant 
with any particular weapon.”].)  Because the circumstances of this case are 
different, we reject Reed’s claim.          
3.  Mendez’s References to Reed as the “Devil”  
During his testimony at the guilt phase, Mendez referred to Reed as “this 
devil” or “that devil” on 13 occasions (for example when testifying “I saw this 
devil coming with pistol, you know, against us”).  Defense counsel did not object 
at any point or move for a mistrial.  Mendez also referred to Reed as “that devil” 
or “this devil” three times during his testimony at the penalty phase retrial.  
Defense counsel objected after the second of these outbursts and the trial court 
admonished Mendez to refer to Reed as “the defendant” or “Mr. Reed.”  Mendez 
nevertheless referred to Reed as “this devil” once more, but defense counsel did 
not object or request a mistrial.  Reed argues that the trial court abrogated its duty 
to protect the jury from improper influence by failing to control Mendez and 
admonish the jury to disregard his outbursts.  (See Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966) 
384 U.S. 333, 362 [due process requires an impartial jury free from improper 
influence].)    
24 
Courts indeed retain broad power to control their courtrooms and protect a 
defendant’s right to a fair trial.  (People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1237; 
see also People v. Merkouris (1956) 46 Cal.2d 450, 556 [“It is the duty of a judge 
in the administration of justice to preserve the order of the court and see to it that 
all persons whomsoever . . . indulge in no act or conduct calculated to obstruct the 
administration of justice.”].)  But we have never held that a trial court must sua 
sponte admonish the jury to ignore a witness’s emotional outbursts.  (See People 
v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 727 [A trial court “ ‘has no sua sponte duty to 
exclude evidence or to remedy misconduct.’ ”], quoting People v. Freeman (1994) 
8 Cal.4th 450, 490.)  In Medina, we reiterated that due process did not compel a 
trial court to recognize and correct all instances of arguable prosecutorial 
misconduct.  (Ibid.)  So too with a witness’s emotional outbursts.  Reed was 
represented at trial, so the responsibility fell to defense counsel to protest any 
objectionable testimony.  (See People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 894 [A 
defendant must object to allegedly inadmissible evidence to preserve the claim.].)  
Indeed it is not inconceivable that, in certain circumstances, defense counsel 
would decide as a matter of strategy to allow a witness to engage in emotional 
outbursts, perhaps to undermine that witness’s credibility.  Imposing a duty on 
trial courts to intervene in these situations risks unnecessarily enmeshing trial 
courts in choices best left to defense counsel.  (Cf. People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 
Cal.4th 1293, 1312 [“[W]hether or not to object to evidence at trial is largely a 
tactical question for counsel.”].)   
Reed likens Mendez’s conduct to the circumstances of Rodriguez v. State 
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1983) 433 So.2d 1273.  Leaving aside that the case merely 
constitutes potentially persuasive authority, it is easily distinguishable.  In that 
case, defense counsel had moved for a mistrial after a witness’s outbursts.  (Id. at 
p. 1274.)  The circumstances were similar in Fuselier v. State (Miss. 1985) 468 
25 
So.2d 45, another case Reed cites.  (Id. at pp. 52-53 [noting that defense counsel 
repeatedly objected to the victim’s daughter being allowed to sit with the 
prosecution during trial].) Accordingly, the cases do not support Reed’s theory 
that the court had a duty to sua sponte intervene to control Mendez and admonish 
the jury.  We find no error.     
4.  Jury Instructions Related to Eyewitness Identification  
At the time of defendant’s trial, CALJIC No. 2.92 was the model jury 
instruction that addressed eyewitness identification factors.  The trial court 
proposed to give a version of the instruction that omitted two factors listed in the 
model:  “Whether the witness had prior contacts with the alleged perpetrator” and 
“The witness’[s] capacity to make an identification.”  Reed argues the trial court 
erred reversibly in overruling defense counsel’s objection to these omissions.  
Although we agree with Reed that the trial court erred in striking the omitted 
factors, we do not think it reasonably probable that the Reed would have received 
a more favorable result had the court given the complete instruction.  (See People 
v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 214 (Ward) [reviewing potential error in substance 
of CALJIC No. 2.92 under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 harmless error 
standard].)      
a.  Striking of CALJIC No. 2.92 Factors was Erroneous  
A defendant is entitled to a specific “pinpoint” jury instruction if it relates 
to particular facts or a theory of the defense and is supported by substantial 
evidence.  (People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 542.)  More specifically, 
“CALJIC No. 2.92 or a comparable instruction should be given when requested in 
a case in which identification is a crucial issue and there is no substantial 
corroborative evidence.”  (People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1144.)  The 
trial court clearly believed that eyewitness identification was a major issue in the 
26 
case, as it included CALJIC No. 2.92 in the instructions.  But it nonetheless 
overruled Reed’s request that it give an unmodified version of the instruction.   
The trial court chose to omit any reference in the instructions to “[w]hether 
the witness had prior contacts with the alleged perpetrator” because, it concluded, 
no evidence existed that any “witnesses have ever had any contact with Mr. 
Reed.”  The People attempt to defend this rationale on appeal, arguing that Reed 
had to supply substantial evidence of prior contacts between the defendant and 
witnesses for the instruction to be relevant.  But this argument ignores that a lack 
of evidence of prior contacts with the eyewitness is also relevant to the strength of 
an identification.  As defense counsel explained to the trial court, the portion of 
CALJIC No. 2.92 in dispute calls jurors’ attention to the fact that eyewitness 
identifications are considered to be less reliable when the eyewitness has never 
seen the suspect before.  Indeed it would make no sense to condition a defendant’s 
right to this portion of the instruction on a showing of prior contacts between the 
witness and the defendant, because such evidence would tend to favor the 
prosecution.  Accordingly, we hold that the trial court should have included this 
factor in the version of CALJIC No. 2.92 given to the jury.            
For the factor concerning “[t]he witness’[s] capacity to make an 
identification,” the trial court reasoned that its applicability is limited to “someone 
who is of minor age” or similar circumstances.  We read this to indicate that the 
trial court believed the factor applicable only to capacity limitations that are innate 
(e.g., age or mental disability) as opposed to exogenous (e.g., intoxication).  There 
is no apparent reason, however, to give the instruction this limited interpretation.  
Although some contemporaneous definitions of “capacity” might suggest such a 
limitation, others do not.  (See Webster’s 9th New Collegiate Dict. (1987) p. 203 
[including both “mental or physical ability” and “potential for . . . experiencing” as 
definitions]; see also People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 514 fn. 5 [noting 
27 
that CALJIC No. 2.92 was promulgated in 1984].)  Evidence that Fradiue was 
intoxicated when attacked — something that defense counsel brought to the 
court’s attention when discussing jury instructions — justified leaving the 
“capacity” factor in the instructions.   
Nevertheless, defense counsel conceded — perhaps unnecessarily — that 
an argument based on Fradiue’s intoxication was not “really a capacity argument.” 
Counsel appeared to agree that this factor could be omitted if the instruction given 
to the jury included the catchall “Any other evidence relating to the witness’ 
ability to make an identification.”  We therefore hold that Reed forfeited any 
challenge on appeal to the omission of this factor from the jury instructions.  (See 
People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 653 [objection to trial court’s voir dire is 
forfeited where defense counsel submitted particular questions but then 
“assent[ed]” to trial court’s alternate approach].)  
 
b.  Any Error Related to the Modification of CALJIC No. 2.92 was 
Harmless         
Although the trial court should have instructed the jury with a version of 
CALJIC No. 2.92 that included the requested factors, its failure to do so was 
harmless.  The instruction the trial court did use included the catchall “Any other 
evidence relating to the witness’ ability to make an identification,” which gave 
defense counsel the latitude to offer arguments based on the lack of prior contacts 
between Reed and the eyewitnesses and Fradiue’s intoxication.  In fact, defense 
counsel argued during closing that Fradiue’s identification was unreliable because 
he had “been drinking all day.”  And while defense counsel did not offer any 
specific argument based on the lack of prior contacts, the trial court’s decision to 
modify CALJIC No. 2.92 did not preclude defense counsel from doing so.  We are 
not persuaded, furthermore, that there is any reasonable probability that Reed 
would have obtained a more favorable result if defense counsel had offered such 
28 
an argument.  The focus of Reed’s attorney’s closing argument was the asserted 
unreliability of Fradiue’s and Mendez’s identifications.  Because “defendant 
strongly attacked the accuracy of the eyewitness identifications,” there is no 
reasonable probability that the inclusion of the omitted CALJIC No. 2.92 factors 
— and any additional argument expressly connected thereto — would have led to 
a more favorable verdict for the defendant.  (Ward, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 214.)                
C.  Penalty Phase Claims  
1.  Issues Relating to Lingering Doubt  
Reed argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the penalty 
phase retrial jury on lingering doubt.  (See People v. Gay (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1195, 
1218 (Gay) [“’The lingering doubts of jurors in the guilt phase may well cast their 
shadows into the penalty phase and in some measure affect the nature of the 
punishment.’ ”], quoting People v. Terry (1964) 61 Cal.2d 137, 146.)  He also 
claims that other aspects of the trial court’s communications with the jury intruded 
on defense counsel’s ability to argue lingering doubt, and essentially directed a 
verdict of death.  We find no error.   
a.  Factual Background  
Before the penalty phase retrial, and again after the close of the evidence, 
the trial court informed jurors that Reed’s guilt for Vasquez’s and Moreland’s 
murders was to be “conclusively presumed” and had been “conclusively proven.”  
After the end of the retrial, defense counsel requested two jury instructions 
relating to lingering doubt.  The prosecutor objected, and the trial court declined to 
give the instructions.  The instructions given addressed the section 190.3 factors to 
determine a murder penalty, including factor (k), which directs the jury to consider 
“[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it 
is not a legal excuse for the crime.”  The jury instructions also stated that the 
29 
defendant had previously been convicted of first degree murder with a special 
circumstance found true.   
During closing argument, defense counsel argued at length that problems 
with Mendez and Fradiue’s identifications of Reed should lead the jury to reject 
the death penalty.  After the jury deliberated for several hours, it asked the court 
the following question: 
 
If the jury agrees that one of the cases presented warrants the death penalty, 
however, one of the cases contains some doubt, according to the 
instructions, is it sufficient for awarding death?   
Defense counsel argued that the trial court should respond “no” and inform the 
jury that it could consider lingering doubt as a circumstance in mitigation.  The 
prosecutor argued that “legally the answer to the question is yes,” but expressed 
concern that telling the jury “yes” would be “telling them how they should vote.”  
The parties therefore settled on the following answer:  “All things considered, 
including whatever doubt you may have on one of the murders, all things 
considered, you can chose one or the other.”  The trial court then instructed the 
jury as follows:  
 
That all things considered in this case, in the context of your question, the 
jury still may choose which of the two penalties is appropriate in this case.  
The answer is yes.   
After further deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of death.   
b.  Analysis 
We can readily address Reed’s contention that the trial court erred in 
refusing to instruct the jury before it began deliberating on lingering guilt.  We 
have “put to rest” the “Cox dictum that a lingering doubt instruction may be 
required as a matter of statutory law.”  (Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 512-
513.)  Rather, “the standard instructions on capital sentencing factors, together 
with counsel’s closing argument, are sufficient to convey the lingering doubt 
30 
concept to the jury.”  (Id. at p. 513; see also People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 
269, 369-370 [“Neither state nor federal law requires a trial court to instruct a 
penalty jury to consider lingering doubt as a factor in mitigation.”].)  Reed does 
not dispute that the trial court instructed using the standard sentencing factors and 
that his attorney argued lingering doubt extensively during closing.  We therefore 
find no error.  
Reed also challenges the trial court’s response to the jury’s query.  As an 
initial matter, the Attorney General argues that Reed has waived this claim 
“because defense counsel both participated in the formulation of a response and 
affirmatively approved of the response ultimately given.”  But the response given 
to the jury differed in two material respects from that to which the parties agreed:  
The trial court omitted the proposed instruction’s reference to lingering doubt and 
added “[t]he answer is yes” to the end of the response.  Because the instruction 
given materially differs from that to which Reed’s attorney acceded, Reed did not 
waive the issue.   
On the merits, we find no error.  We reject the argument that the question’s 
reference to “doubt” entitled Reed to his proposed lingering doubt instruction.  In 
People v. Brooks, the jury asked whether “one item in mitigation was enough for a 
sentence of life without the possibility of parole,” a concept that we have 
repeatedly held that a trial court does not need to specifically explain to the jury.  
(People v. Brooks (2017) 2 Cal.5th 674, 768.)  We did not embrace the 
defendant’s contention that the jury’s question required the trial court to give his 
proposed instruction on the issue.  (Id. at pp. 768-769.)  The circumstances here 
are similar.  The sheer fact that the jury appeared to be confused about lingering 
doubt did not automatically entitle the defendant to his proposed instruction.  
Instead, we review the trial court’s response for abuse of discretion to determine 
whether it adequately satisfied the jury’s request for information.  (Id. at p. 769.)   
31 
Here, there was no abuse of discretion.  The instruction was an accurate 
statement of relevant law.  Lingering doubt is but one factor a jury may consider 
when determining the appropriate penalty.  And no single section 190.3 factor 
“determines which penalty — death or life without the possibility of parole — is 
appropriate.”  (Virgil, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1279, quoting People v. Prieto 
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 263.)  Accordingly, a jury may impose a death sentence 
notwithstanding its belief that mitigating circumstances, including lingering doubt, 
exist.  (See CALJIC No. 8.88 [“To return a judgment of death, each of you must 
be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison 
with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without 
parole.”].)  The trial court’s statement that, even if the jury has some doubt, it “still 
may choose which of the two penalties is appropriate” was therefore an accurate 
statement of the significance of the existence of lingering doubt in jury’s penalty 
determination.  Reed seizes on the prosecutor’s comment that “telling [the jury] 
yes they can” — something the trial court added to the end of the supplementary 
instruction — “will be telling them how they should vote.”  He argues that even 
the prosecutor recognized that the court’s statement essentially directed a death 
verdict.  Read as a whole, however, the supplemental instruction did not direct a 
verdict but instead advised the jury that it could impose a death sentence based on 
“all things considered in this case” even if it found lingering doubt.  We therefore 
find no error.         
Reed also takes issue with the trial court’s statements that his guilt was to 
be “conclusively presumed” and had been “conclusively proven.”  But we have 
previously held that similar statements do not impede a defendant’s ability to 
argue lingering doubt.  (See People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 265 [“The 
trial court properly instructed the jury that the penalty phase jury 
must conclusively accept the previous guilt phase jury’s findings on 
32 
defendant’s guilt and on the truth of the special circumstance allegations.”]; see 
also People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1236, 1238 [holding that trial 
court’s statement that defendant’s guilt “has already been decided” “did not 
remove the question of lingering doubt from the jury, but only told it the truth: that 
in the penalty phase defendant’s guilt was to be conclusively presumed as a matter 
of law”].)  Reed relies on Gay, supra, 42 Cal.4th 1195, but that case is 
distinguishable.  In Gay, the error was evidentiary:  the trial court erroneously 
precluded defense counsel from introducing evidence inconsistent with the prior 
jury’s guilty verdict.  (42 Cal.4th at p. 1218.)  Here, by contrast, the defense 
introduced considerable testimony during the penalty phase retrial asserting that 
Reed was not the shooter.  Gay did note that the trial court’s instructions to the 
jury compounded its evidentiary error.  (42 Cal.4th at p. 1224.)  But those 
instructions told the jury to “disregard” any statements or evidence that 
contradicted the prior jury’s verdict.  (Id. at p. 1225.)  In contrast, the instructions 
here did nothing of the sort.  Because of this, the instructions were not erroneous.   
Finally, Reed argues that the trial court erred by failing to inform the 
penalty phase retrial jury of the first jury’s deadlock and that Galindo did not 
testify during the first trial.  Defense counsel did not request either of these 
instructions.  Any claim based on the trial court’s failure to instruct on these points 
is therefore forfeited.  (Cf. Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 675 [failure to request 
pinpoint instruction forfeits claim on appeal].)  On the merits, we have made clear 
that “the fact of a first jury’s deadlock, or its numerical vote, is irrelevant to the 
issues before the jury on a penalty retrial.”  (People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 
920, 968, abrogated on other grounds in People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 
109-111.)  As for information about Galindo’s absence during the guilt and first 
penalty phases, it too bore no obvious relevance to the issue before the penalty 
retrial jury.  Reed argues that the information highlighted the weakness of the 
33 
prosecution penalty phase case, as the first penalty phase jury deadlocked even 
without Galindo’s testimony.  But this argument depends on information about the 
first jury’s deadlock being admissible –– it is not.  Any other argument based on 
Galindo’s absence would serve only to attack the validity of the guilt phase 
verdict, something a defendant cannot do when offering lingering doubt evidence.  
(See Gay, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 1223 [A “defendant may not ‘relitigate’ the 
guilt verdict.”], quoting State v. Teague (Tenn. 1995) 897 S.W.2d 248, 252.)  
Accordingly, no error resulted from failing to inform the jury of that fact.   
2.  Alleged Coercion of Juror No. 1  
At about 10:45 a.m. on the second day of deliberations, the penalty retrial 
jury informed the trial court that it had reached a verdict.  The trial court read 
aloud a verdict of death signed by the jury foreman, and the jury collectively 
affirmed that this was indeed its verdict.  The trial court then individually polled 
the jurors.  When asked whether the verdict was in fact the juror’s verdict, Juror 
No. 1 answered “No.”  Asked again, Juror No. 1 reiterated “No.”  The trial court 
then polled Jurors No. 2 through No. 6, all of whom responded “Yes.”  At this 
point, the trial court stopped and instructed the jury as follows: 
 
It appears that we do not have a unanimous verdict.  I’m going to return the 
verdict form to you and ask the jurors to go back into deliberations, please.  
Thank you.   
Just after 2:00 p.m. that afternoon, the jury returned a verdict of death.  This time, 
all jurors collectively and individually affirmed that the death verdict was their 
true verdict.  Reed argues that the trial court’s actions coerced Juror No. 1 to 
acquiesce in a majority guilty verdict.  Specifically, he argues that the court should 
have admonished the jurors that each should arrive at his or her own decision and 
that the jury was not required to reach any verdict.  We are not persuaded.        
34 
The trial court’s comments were quite benign.  They were not marred by 
the problems we have recognized in other instructions in potential holdout juror 
situations.  (See People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 162 [It is error for 
instruction to deadlocked jury to “single out minority jurors or encourage those 
jurors . . . to consider, along with the arguments and the evidence, ‘their own 
status as dissenters.’ ”], quoting People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 848; 
People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 783 (Peoples) [“Coercion occurs where 
‘the trial court, by insisting on further deliberations, expresse[s] an opinion that 
a verdict should be reached.’ ”], quoting People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 
730, 775.)  Reed argues that the lack of “cautionary instructions” implied that the 
jury needed to reach a verdict.  But before deliberations began the court instructed 
the jury that “each of you must consider the evidence for the purpose of reaching a 
verdict if you can do so” and that “each of you must decide the case for yourself.”  
The instructions also told jurors not to “decide any question in a particular way 
because a majority of the jurors, or any of them, favor that decision.”  Under the 
circumstances, the initial jury instructions adequately conveyed that jurors did not 
need to reach a verdict, and that they should not acquiesce in a verdict with which 
they did not agree.  The trial court therefore did not err in not offering 
supplemental instructions when it emerged that the jury’s verdict was not 
unanimous.         
3.  Penalty Phase Retrial  
Reed contends that retrying the penalty phase after the initial jury 
deadlocked violated his rights under the United States and California 
Constitutions.  We have consistently rejected these claims, and see no reason to 
reconsider in this case.  (See, e.g., Peoples, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 751.) 
     
35 
4.  Assorted Instructional Errors  
a.  No Preference for the Death Penalty  
Reed argues that the trial court erred when it denied his request for an 
instruction that the law does not have a preference for death.  We have repeatedly 
held that trial courts need not include such an instruction in light of the standard 
penalty phase jury instructions.  (See, e.g., People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 
652, 699.)  Reed offers no persuasive reason to rethink our precedent.    
 
b.  Deterrent Value and Monetary Cost of Death Penalty  
Reed also argues that the trial court should have instructed the jury that it 
could not consider the deterrent (or non-deterrent) effect of the death penalty, or 
the cost of executing a defendant versus imprisoning him or her for life.  These 
instructions are unnecessary, however, when “such considerations are not raised at 
trial.”  (People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 696.)  Reed does not contend 
that either party raised arguments related to cost or deterrence, so we reject the 
claim. 
c.  CALJIC No. 17.41.1  
Reed faults the trial court for instructing the jury using CALJIC No. 
17.41.1, which asked jurors to advise the court if “any juror refuses to deliberate 
or expresses an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case based on 
[penalty or punishment, or] any [other] improper basis.”  We disapproved use of 
this instruction in 2002 but have since rejected “claims that the instruction violates 
a defendant’s federal constitutional rights.”  (People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 
547, 587; see also People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 805-806.)  Reed’s trial 
occurred prior to our 2002 opinion, and he fails to persuade that we should 
reconsider our precedent.      
 
 
36 
d.  CALJIC No. 8.85  
Reed argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury with a version 
of CALJIC No. 8.85 that included inapplicable factors and failed to specify 
whether each factor was aggravating, mitigating, or potentially either.  But we 
have long held that the state and federal constitutions do not require trial courts to 
provide such a gloss on CALJIC No. 8.85.  Reed has not demonstrated why we 
should overturn settled law on the question.  (See, e.g., People v. Thomas (2011) 
51 Cal.4th 449, 505 [“ ‘[T]he jury is capable of deciding for itself which factors 
are “applicable” in a particular case.’ ”], quoting People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 
739, 777; People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 1178-1179 [rejecting claim 
that instructions must advise whether CALJIC No. 8.85 factors are aggravating, 
mitigating, or potentially either].)  
 
e.  CALJIC No. 8.88  
Reed argues that CALJIC No. 8.88 is unconstitutional in various respects.  
As he recognizes, we have repeatedly rejected these claims.  (See, e.g., People v. 
Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1211; People v. Coffman (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 
124.)  Reed offers no reason to conclude otherwise.    
5.  Multiple Murder Special Circumstance  
The only special circumstance alleged and found true in this case was that 
set forth in section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3) — the so-called “multiple murder” 
special circumstance.  Reed argues that the criterion violates the Eighth 
Amendment of the federal Constitution by failing to “genuinely narrow” the 
category of defendants eligible for the death penalty.  We have consistently 
rejected this argument, however, and see no reason to rethink those decisions.  
(See, e.g., People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 934 [citing past cases].)  
37 
6.  Other Challenges to California’s Death Penalty Law  
Reed lodges several other challenges to the constitutionality of California’s 
capital sentencing scheme, all of which he concedes we have previously rejected.  
We are not persuaded to reconsider our precedent.  Specifically, we reaffirm that 
the state’s death penalty scheme does not violate the federal Constitution by 
failing to sufficiently narrow the class of offenders eligible for the death penalty 
(People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 488); permitting arbitrary and capricious 
sentencing (id. at p. 489); allowing for a death sentence without the jury finding 
beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of aggravating factors, that aggravating 
factors outweigh mitigating ones, or that death is the appropriate penalty (ibid.); 
not requiring written jury findings regarding aggravating factors (id. at p. 490); 
forgoing inter-case proportionality review (ibid.); allowing prosecutors to use 
unadjudicated criminal activity as a factor in aggravation (id. at p. 489); 
employing restrictive adjectives such as “extreme” or “substantial” to describe 
factors in mitigation (People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 968); not 
identifying which factors are aggravating and which are mitigating (ibid.); or 
providing different procedural safeguards to capital and non-capital defendants 
(Winbush, 2 Cal.5th at p. 490).  Last, we reaffirm that the state’s use of the death 
penalty does not violate international norms or evolving standards of decency in 
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  (Ibid.)     
7.  Reliability of California’s Criminal Justice System  
Reed argues that the state’s criminal justice system is too unreliable to 
allow for the imposition of the death penalty.  To the extent that Reed challenges 
the strength of the eyewitness identifications of him, we have already rejected the 
claim.  (See Sections II.B.1-2, supra.)  To the extent he argues that the state’s 
criminal justice system allows for an unconstitutionally high chance of a wrongful 
38 
conviction, we recently discussed that claim at some length and rejected it.  (See 
People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 296.)  We see no reason to reconsider.   
8.  Method of Execution  
 
Reed argues that California’s use of lethal injection in the administration of 
the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment.  But a “challenge to the method 
of a future execution is not cognizable on appeal, because such a claim does not 
impugn the validity of the judgment.”  (People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 
270.)   
9.  Cumulative Error  
Reed argues that the cumulative effect of the errors at his trial requires 
reversal.  Because we have found but one error — which was harmless — there is 
no prejudice to cumulate.  (See Section II.B.4, supra.)  We therefore reject the 
claim.    
 
 
39 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
We affirm the judgment.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
PEÑA, J.* 
 
 
                                              
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned 
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY LIU, J. 
 
 
After the prosecutor used five of his first eight peremptory strikes to excuse 
five of the six black prospective jurors in the jury box, counsel for defendant Ennis 
Reed raised a challenge under Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 89 and 
People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 276–277.  This pattern of strikes, 
considered in the totality of circumstances, easily raised an inference of 
discrimination, and the trial court should have asked the prosecutor to give his 
reasons for the strikes.  I respectfully disagree with the contrary conclusion in 
today’s opinion. 
In addition, this case provides another example of the problematic nature of 
eyewitness identification evidence, particularly where such evidence is the sole or 
principal evidence against the defendant.  (See People v. Sánchez (2016) 63 
Cal.4th 411, 494–498 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.) (Sánchez).)  As explained further 
below, it is time to consider rules that assign the trial court a stronger gatekeeping 
role in this context. 
I. 
As today’s opinion notes, the trial court erred in requiring Reed to show a 
“strong likelihood” that the disputed strikes were racially motivated.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 10.)  In Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162 (Johnson), the high 
court rejected this court’s rule that a prima facie case under Batson requires a 
showing that it is “ ‘more likely than not’ ” the strikes were based on 
2 
impermissible bias.  (Johnson, at p. 168.)  The high court explained:  “[W]e 
assumed in Batson that the trial judge would have the benefit of all relevant 
circumstances, including the prosecutor’s explanation, before deciding whether it 
was more likely than not that the challenge was improperly motivated.  We did not 
intend the first step to be so onerous that a defendant would have to persuade the 
judge—on the basis of all the facts, some of which are impossible for the 
defendant to know with certainty—that the challenge was more likely than not the 
product of purposeful discrimination.  Instead, a defendant satisfies the 
requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the 
trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.”  (Id. at p. 170.) 
The showing required to establish an inference of discrimination at 
Batson’s first step is a “low threshold.”  (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 
384 (Scott); accord, Sorto v. Herbert (2d Cir. 2007) 497 F.3d 163, 170 
[“The first step of the Batson analysis, requiring the showing of a prima facie case, 
is not meant to be onerous.”]; Paulino v. Castro (9th Cir. 2004) 371 F.3d 1083, 
1092 (Paulino) [the showing required at Batson’s first stage “ ‘ “is not 
onerous” ’ ”]; Stacey v. State (Ga. 2013) 741 S.E.2d 881, 841 [same]; People v. 
Hecker (N.Y. 2010) 942 N.E.2d 248, 264 [same]; Valdez v. People (Colo. 1998) 
966 P.2d 587, 596 [same].)  The threshold is low because “[t]he Batson framework 
is designed to produce actual answers to suspicions and inferences that 
discrimination may have infected the jury selection process.  See [Batson,] 476 
U.S., at 97–98, and n. 20.  The inherent uncertainty present in inquiries of 
discriminatory purpose counsels against engaging in needless and imperfect 
speculation when a direct answer can be obtained by asking a simple question.”  
(Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 172.)  The finding of a prima facie case is not 
tantamount to proof or even a presumption of unlawful discrimination; it simply 
prompts inquiry into the prosecutor’s actual reasons for a peremptory strike. 
3 
The court observes that the factors “especially relevant” to the first-stage 
inquiry “include whether a party has struck most or all of the members of the 
venire from an identified group, whether a party has used a disproportionate 
number of strikes against members of that group, whether the party has engaged 
those prospective jurors in only desultory voir dire, whether the defendant is a 
member of that group, and whether the victim is a member of the group to which a 
majority of remaining jurors belong.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11.)  Almost all of 
these factors point to the existence of a prima facie case here.  At the time of the 
Batson motion, the prosecutor had used five of his first eight peremptory 
challenges to strike five of the six black prospective jurors in the jury box.  The 
prosecutor engaged in voir dire with only one of the five black jurors whom he 
struck.  And Reed himself is black.  It is evident — and the court does not dispute 
— that these circumstances gave rise to an inference of discrimination.  (Cf. 
Paulino, supra, 371 F.3d at pp. 1090–1092 [finding prima facie case where the 
defendant was black and the prosecution had used five out of six peremptory 
strikes to excuse five out of six black jurors while accepting one black juror].) 
Today’s opinion nonetheless affirms the trial court’s first-stage ruling by 
resorting to two arguments.  First, the court says that the totality of the record, 
including events after the trial court ruled on the Batson motion, dispels “the 
inference of discrimination that might otherwise be drawn from the prosecutor’s 
initial strikes.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 12.)  Second, the court hypothesizes reasons 
for each of the strikes and concludes that the prosecutor could have had 
“objectively strong reasons for dismissing the prospective jurors.”  (Id. at p. 16.)  
Neither argument is persuasive. 
A. 
While acknowledging that “[t]he prosecutor used five of his first eight 
peremptory strikes (roughly 63 percent) on black jurors, even though such jurors 
4 
constituted only 34 percent of the venire,” the court says we cannot limit our 
analysis to the circumstances at the time the trial court ruled on the Batson motion.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 12.)  Instead, we must look to “the entire jury selection 
process,” which reveals that “[s]ix of the prosecutor’s thirteen regular juror strikes 
(46 percent) — and seven of sixteen overall (44 percent) — targeted black jurors.”  
(Ibid.)  In addition, “the prosecutor first signaled his acceptance of a jury at a time 
when it contained two black jurors, and three black jurors ultimately sat on the 
jury.”  (Ibid.) 
As an initial matter, I note that this approach — considering events that 
occurred after the trial court ruled on the Batson motion — is at odds with our 
recent statement that “the question at the first stage concerning the existence of a 
prima facie case depends on consideration of the entire record of voir dire as of the 
time the motion was made . . . .”  (Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 384, italics added, 
citing People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 624.)  It is also in tension with our 
holding in People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266 that analysis of postruling 
developments is “forfeited” on appeal if the defendant did not bring those 
developments to the trial court’s attention by “renew[ing] his Batson/Wheeler 
claim.”  (Id. at p. 1319.)  Chism, like Scott, relied on Lenix’s statement that 
“appellate review is necessarily circumscribed. . . .  [T]he trial court’s finding is 
reviewed on the record as it stands at the time the [Batson/Wheeler] ruling is 
made.”  (Lenix, at p. 624, quoted in Chism, at p. 1319.)  Today’s opinion cuts 
against this statement.  Although Chism and Lenix were addressing third-stage 
Batson analysis, there is no reason to think today’s recognition of our obligation to 
“examine the entire record” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 11) should apply only to review 
of first-stage rulings and not to review of third-stage rulings as well.  (See Chism, 
at pp. 1350–1352 (conc. & dis. opn. of Liu, J.) [appellate review of third-stage 
ruling requires consideration of postruling developments].) 
5 
In appellate review of a first-stage ruling, postruling developments can be 
relevant in assessing the significance of a pattern of strikes.  “[T]he percentage of 
potential black jurors struck can change depending on when the defendant objects.  
If a black juror ‘is the first person called, and thus the first person struck, all (or 
100%) of the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges will have been exercised against 
African-Americans,’ whereas if the same juror is ‘called at the end of the voir 
dire, the percentage may be far lower.’ ”  (Paulino, supra, 371 F.3d at p. 1091.)  
And “the time at which a statistical pattern is pointed out . . . may be relevant to 
the weight of the apparent disparity” between the percentage of strikes used 
against black jurors and the percentage of black jurors in the venire.  (Ibid.)  
Today’s opinion applies this line of reasoning.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 12.) 
But it is perhaps inaccurate to say that such reasoning sheds light on 
whether the trial court’s first-stage ruling was correct.  The first step in the Batson 
framework is to decide whether the prosecutor must state reasons for a disputed 
strike, and the trial court must decide (and can only decide) that question based on 
the circumstances up to that point.  Postruling developments, such as the final 
percentage of strikes used on black jurors, are better understood as going to the 
ultimate issue of whether the prosecutor acted with discriminatory intent, not to 
the preliminary issue of whether the prosecutor should have been required to state 
reasons for a strike at the time the challenge was made.  Postruling developments 
can provide a basis for denying a Batson claim on appeal — whether or not the 
first-stage ruling was correct when made — if the totality of the record, including 
such developments, permits no reasonable inference that the prosecutor acted with 
discriminatory intent. 
In support of this approach, the court cites People v. Garcia (2011) 52 
Cal.4th 706 (Garcia).  There, the prosecutor used her first three strikes against 
female jurors, and the defendant filed a Wheeler motion.  The trial court found no 
6 
prima facie case of discrimination.  On appeal, we said the three strikes comprised 
too small a sample for us to infer gender discrimination.  (Garcia, at p. 747.)  We 
observed that women comprised 56 percent (42 out of 75) of the jury pool, 50 
percent (7 out of 14) of the jurors ultimately struck by the prosecutor, and — 
“[m]ost telling” — 83 percent (10 out of 12) of the seated jury.  (Id. at p. 748.)  
These circumstances overwhelmingly indicated that the prosecutor did not act with 
discriminatory intent. 
The postruling developments in this case are not nearly so compelling.  The 
fact that three black jurors ultimately sat on the jury is certainly relevant.  But I 
would not say the final percentage of strikes used on black jurors (46 percent in 
the process of selecting the 12-person jury and 44 percent overall, including 
selection of alternates) “only barely” exceeds the percentage of black jurors in the 
venire (34 percent).  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 12.)  In any event, the more telling 
comparison is not to the percentage of black jurors in the venire, but to the 
percentage of blacks among those jurors who reached the jury box and could have 
been struck.  When selection of the 12-person jury had concluded, 38 jurors had 
been considered; nine of them, or 24 percent, were black.  Ten additional jurors, 
including one black juror, were considered in the selection of alternates.  So when 
the entire jury selection process had concluded, a total of 48 jurors had been 
considered; 10 of them, or 21 percent, were black.  Thus, the final percentage of 
strikes used on black jurors was substantially greater than the percentage of blacks 
among the jurors whom the prosecutor could have struck, whether in the selection 
of the 12-person jury (46 percent versus 24 percent) or in the entire process (44 
percent versus 21 percent).  In the end, the prosecutor struck seven of the 10 black 
jurors whom he could have struck.  These statistics do not dispel the inference of 
discrimination arising from the initial pattern of strikes. 
7 
It is true that the prosecutor, after initially using five out of eight strikes to 
remove five out of six black jurors, thereafter used only two out of eight further 
strikes to remove two out of four black jurors.  But there is a potential ambiguity 
in the inference to be drawn from postruling behavior that is apparently 
nondiscriminatory.  Such behavior may indicate that the prosecutor was acting 
without discriminatory intent all along, or it may indicate that the prosecutor 
shifted his approach after a Batson challenge was made.  In some cases, like 
Garcia, the postruling evidence of nondiscrimination is so strong, and the 
preruling evidence of discrimination is so weak, that there is no ambiguity.  But 
the ambiguity is certainly present here, where the prosecutor’s pattern of strikes 
before the Batson challenge differs markedly from his strikes afterward. 
In light of this ambiguity and the other considerations above, I do not find 
the postruling developments in this case to be so probative as to permit no 
reasonable inference that the prosecutor acted with discriminatory intent.  The trial 
court erred in finding no inference of discrimination from the initial pattern of 
strikes, and subsequent developments in jury selection do not dispel that inference. 
B. 
The other tack the court takes to find no prima facie case of discrimination 
is to hypothesize reasons for each of the disputed strikes.  We have said that 
“nondiscriminatory reasons for a peremptory challenge that are apparent from and 
‘clearly established’ in the record . . . and that necessarily dispel any inference of 
bias” are relevant to first-stage analysis.  (Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 384, 
citations omitted.)  But the reasons hypothesized by the court fall far short of 
“necessarily dispel[ling] any inference of bias.”  (Ibid.) 
It is worth noting at the outset that although our case law has often 
hypothesized reasons for a disputed strike as part of first-stage Batson analysis, the 
United States Supreme Court has never approved this practice.  (Cf. Williams v. 
8 
Louisiana (2016) 579 U.S. __, __ [136 S.Ct. 2156, 2157] (conc. opn. of Ginsburg, 
J., joined by Breyer, Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ.) [state rule permitting the trial court 
instead of the prosecutor to supply a race-neutral reason at Batson’s second step 
“does not comply with this Court’s Batson jurisprudence”].)  In Johnson, the high 
court found an inference of discrimination based on the prosecutor’s removal of all 
three black prospective jurors in a case where a black defendant was charged with 
killing his white girlfriend’s child.  (Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at pp. 164–165.)  
The trial judge’s “own examination of the record had convinced her that the 
prosecutor’s strikes could be justified by race-neutral reasons.  Specifically, the 
judge opined that the black venire members had offered equivocal or confused 
answers in their written questionnaires.”  (Id. at p. 165.)  But the high court 
assigned no weight to the trial court’s hypothesized reasons for the strikes. 
Johnson made clear that “[t]he Batson framework is designed to produce 
actual answers to suspicions and inferences that discrimination may have infected 
the jury selection process.  [Citation.]  The inherent uncertainty present in 
inquiries of discriminatory purpose counsels against engaging in needless and 
imperfect speculation when a direct answer can be obtained by asking a simple 
question.”  (Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 172.)  On this point, Johnson quoted 
the Ninth Circuit’s statement in Paulino that “ ‘[i]t does not matter that the 
prosecutor might have had good reasons . . . [;] [w]hat matters is the real reason 
they were stricken.’ ”  (Johnson, at p. 172, quoting Paulino, supra, 371 F.3d at 
p. 1090, italics omitted by Johnson.)  Paulino said that “[w]hile we may consider 
whether ‘the record contains entirely plausible reasons, independent of race, why’ 
a prosecutor may have exercised peremptories, [citation], such reasons have 
usually helped persuade us that defendant made no prima facie showing where 
defendant challenged the excusal of just one juror.”  (Paulino, at pp. 1091–1092.)  
Where there is “a pattern of strikes that raises a plausible inference of 
9 
discrimination,” such reasons have less persuasive value.  (Id. at p. 1092.)  In 
Paulino, as in this case, the prosecutor struck five out of six black jurors.  The trial 
court, at Batson’s first step, had engaged in “detailed” evaluation of each strike 
and had found “ ‘objective reasons for all of these jurors to be excused.’ ”  (Id. at 
p. 1089.)  But Paulino, like Johnson, assigned no weight to such reasons.  (Id. at 
p. 1091.) 
“Of course, there may be circumstances where the explanation for a 
prosecutor’s strike of a particular juror is so obvious that there is little or no reason 
to think anything else could have motivated the strike.  (See, e.g., People v. 
Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 982–983 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.) [‘[The struck juror] 
was married to a convicted murderer.  None of the seated or alternate jurors had 
anything remotely similar in their backgrounds.’].)  In such cases, trial courts need 
not and should not subject prosecutors to idle inquiry; they may swiftly and 
justifiably reject ‘a spurious claim interposed simply for purposes of harassment or 
delay.’ ”  (People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 872–873 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.) 
(Harris).)  But “[b]ecause it is all too easy to comb the record and find some 
legitimate reason the prosecution could have had for striking a minority juror, 
dispelling an inference of discrimination otherwise arising from the totality of 
circumstances ‘requires more than a determination that the record could have 
supported race-neutral reasons for the prosecutor’s use of his peremptory 
challenges.’  (Williams v. Runnels (9th Cir. 2006) 432 F.3d 1102, 1110.) . . . .  
‘[I]n light of [Johnson v. California], an inquiry into apparent reasons is relevant 
only insofar as the strikes are so clearly attributable to that apparent, non-
discriminatory reason that there is no longer any suspicion, or inference, of 
discrimination in those strikes.’  (United States v. Stephens (7th Cir. 2005) 421 
F.3d 503, 516.)”  (Ibid.) 
10 
Here, the court’s hypothesized reasons for the strikes of Janice C. and Mary 
C. are underwhelming.  Janice C., a systems engineer, was married with one child 
and was “neutral” on the death penalty.  Mary C., a retired clerk, was married with 
two children and believed the death penalty “is OK in some case[s].”  The court 
posits that the prosecutor might have struck them because Janice C.’s spouse had 
been convicted of a drug offense in 1977 and Mary C.’s husband had been arrested 
or charged with a crime 10 years before Reed’s trial.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.)  
The court also notes that Mary C., on her questionnaire, did not “answer critical 
questions related to her husband’s criminal history.”  (Id. at p. 16.)  But the 
prosecutor did not ask either Mary C. or Janice C. about these matters during voir 
dire.  (Cf. Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 250, fn. 8 [“. . . Warren [a 
struck juror] had a brother-in-law convicted of a crime having to do with food 
stamps for which he had to make restitution.  [Citation.]  [The prosecutor] never 
questioned Warren about his errant relative at all; . . . the failure to ask undermines 
the persuasiveness of the claimed concern.”].) 
Reed observes that if the prosecutor’s concern about Janice C. and Mary C. 
had to do with their family members’ arrests or criminal convictions, then the 
prosecutor should have struck similarly situated non-black jurors.  It is notable that 
the court addresses this contention not by dismissing the appropriateness or 
relevance of such comparison, but by engaging in comparative juror analysis.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 15–16.)  Today’s opinion is the third time in recent years 
that the court has engaged in such analysis at step one of the Batson inquiry.  (See 
Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 439–440; Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 836–
838.)  This emerging practice implicitly disavows our prior statements that 
comparative juror analysis in evaluating hypothesized reasons at stage one “is 
inappropriate” (Sánchez, at p. 439) or “has little or no use” (People v. Bonilla 
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 350).  As I have explained elsewhere, such analysis is part 
11 
of what it means to consider all relevant circumstances at Batson’s first stage; no 
other jurisdiction has rejected the relevance of comparative juror analysis in 
testing a hypothesized reason for a contested strike; and our case law declining to 
engage in such analysis defies “a mountain of contrary authority.”  (Sánchez, at 
p. 492 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.) [collecting cases]; see Harris, at pp. 874–876 (conc. 
opn. of Liu, J.).) 
Here, at least three non-black jurors seated on the final jury had relatives 
who had been arrested:  Juror No. 2801’s daughter had been arrested for 
possession of drugs; Juror No. 9716’s brother-in-law had been arrested for an 
unspecified misdemeanor; and Juror No. 1923’s brother had been arrested for an 
“unknown” offense.  In addition, two alternate jurors had more direct encounters 
with law enforcement than either Janice C. or Mary C.:  Juror No. 8989 was 
arrested for disturbing the peace, and Juror No. 0402 was arrested, convicted, and 
sentenced to a fine and probation for possession of an illegal knife.  Whether a 
prosecutor would regard these jurors’ experiences with law enforcement as more 
or less disqualifying than a spouse’s 20-year-old conviction on drug charges 
(Janice C.) or a spouse’s 10-year-old arrest or charge for an unspecified crime 
(Mary C.) is a matter of speculation — precisely the kind of “needless and 
imperfect speculation” disapproved by the high court.  (Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. 
at p. 172.) 
People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50 does not support the court’s view.  
There, the juror in question had a nephew who was convicted of robbery murder 
and sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole, and another 
nephew who had been imprisoned for drug offenses.  (Id. at pp. 77–78.)  Further, 
the defendant’s showing of discrimination was “meager,” with three black jurors 
excused but four black jurors remaining impaneled at the time the Batson 
challenge was made.  (Id. at p. 76.)  We said that “on this record no inference of 
12 
group bias appears from the prosecutor’s decision to challenge a prospective juror 
whose family members were serving or had served prison terms.”  (Id. at p. 78, 
italics added.)  The court overreads Lancaster by quoting the previous sentence 
without the italicized words.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 16.) 
The reasons posited by the court for the strike of Nickey W. are also 
questionable.  Nickey W. was a 45-year-old black man employed by Burlington 
Northern Railway; he was married with two children.  The court says the 
prosecutor could have been concerned with Nickey W.’s “conflicting” answers 
regarding the proper burden of proof.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 15.)  But in Johnson, 
the high court assigned no weight to the trial court’s finding that “the black venire 
members had offered equivocal or confused answers in their written 
questionnaires.”  (Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 165.)  Here, moreover, Juror No. 
1923 gave an answer to a critical question that was no less confused and 
contradictory than Nickey W.’s.  Asked if he will follow the trial court’s 
instructions on the law that applies to the case even if he disagrees with it, Juror 
No. 1923 responded “yes” but further explained:  “Because I am instructed to 
follow the court instructins [sic] not the law.”  The prosecutor accepted this juror 
without seeking clarification in voir dire. 
The court cites People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446 (Sattiewhite), 
but the prosecutor in that case “engaged Prospective Juror P.M. in an in-depth voir 
dire, covering more than five pages of transcript, in which P.M. displayed 
confused, rambling, and incoherent thinking.”  (Id. at p. 470.)  That juror, we said, 
“exhibit[ed] obvious signs of being unsuitable for the jury.”  (Ibid.)  Here, the 
prosecutor did not engage Nickey W. in voir dire, and the court does not say his 
questionnaire answers were so confused or incoherent that he was obviously 
unsuitable for the jury. 
13 
The court’s hypothesized reasons could have given the prosecutor 
“reasonable concern” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 14) or “ ‘legitimate concern’ ” (id. at 
p. 15), and “[t]he prosecutor could have readily concluded” that the black jurors 
should be removed for those reasons (id. at p. 16).  But in order to dispel an 
inference of discrimination at Batson’s first step, more is required.  The posited 
reasons must be ones “that are apparent from and ‘clearly established’ in the 
record and that necessarily dispel any inference of bias.”  (Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th 
at p. 384, citations omitted.)  The court’s loose reasoning in support of its 
hypothesized reasons includes citation to cases decided under the wrong (i.e., pre-
Johnson) legal standard for first-stage analysis.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 13–15, 
citing People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 440–441, and People v. Farnam 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 138.)  And today’s opinion is devoid of the confident 
language we have used in other cases relying on hypothesized reasons.  (See, e.g., 
Scott, at p. 385 [“we doubt that any prosecutor would have kept R.C. on the jury” 
because the prosecutor “had successfully prosecuted R.C.’s son a year or two 
earlier and had committed her son to prison — with the assistance of the same lead 
investigator who would be testifying in the current prosecution”]; ibid. [“The 
record also established compelling reasons to excuse H.R., who in his 
questionnaire said he was so opposed to the death penalty as to be unwilling to 
impose it under any circumstances.”]; People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 644 
[“the record . . . shows obvious race-neutral reasons for the excusal of all three of 
the prospective jurors in question”]; Sattiewhite, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 470 [the 
juror “exhibit[ed] obvious signs of being unsuitable”].)  Today’s opinion does 
exactly what the high court says we should not do:  it indulges “the imprecision of 
relying on judicial speculation to resolve plausible claims of discrimination.”  
(Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 173.) 
14 
In sum, at the time the Batson challenge was made, the trial court should 
have asked the prosecutor to state his reasons for striking five out of six black 
jurors.  In some cases, an available remedy for first-stage Batson error is a remand 
for the trial court to complete the Batson analysis.  (See, e.g., Madison v. 
Commissioner, Ala. Dept. of Corrections (11th Cir. 2012) 677 F.3d 1333, 1339; 
Paulino, supra, 371 F.3d at p. 1092.)  But a remand likely is not practical here 
because the trial occurred almost 20 years ago.  (Cf. Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 
552 U.S. 472, 486 [no “realistic possibility” that the question of whether 
discriminatory intent was the determinative cause of the disputed strike “could be 
profitably explored further on remand at this late date, more than a decade after 
petitioner’s trial”].)  I acknowledge that reversal of the judgment is a severe 
remedy for this kind of error.  But there are no other options for giving meaningful 
effect to Batson’s mandate.  As a result of the trial court’s error, we cannot be 
confident that Reed was convicted by a jury selected without regard to race. 
II. 
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as to both murders, Reed 
contends that the Vasquez murder conviction was wholly based, and the Moreland 
murder almost wholly based, on unreliable eyewitness testimony.  As the court 
notes, the sufficiency standard is not a high bar; as long as the evidence can 
reasonably support the verdict, we defer to the jury’s credibility determinations 
and weighing of the evidence.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 20–22.) 
But reliance on uncorroborated eyewitness testimony remains problematic.  
“[M]istaken eyewitness identifications have played a role in a substantial number 
of wrongful convictions and unsolved crimes.”  (Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at 
p. 498 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.), citing Garrett, Convicting the Innocent: Where 
Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong (2011) p. 48 [finding that 190 of the first 250 
inmates exonerated by DNA testing since 1989 were misidentified by an 
15 
eyewitness].)  The limited nature of sufficiency-of-the-evidence review is poorly 
suited to detect or prevent miscarriages of justice that may result from erroneous 
eyewitness identification.  Such review is premised on our trust in jurors’ ability to 
make sound credibility determinations.  But the jury’s ability to perform that 
function with regard to eyewitness testimony is questionable.  “We presume that 
jurors are able to detect liars from truth tellers.  But as scholars have cautioned, 
most eyewitnesses think they are telling the truth even when their testimony is 
inaccurate, and ‘[b]ecause the eyewitness is testifying honestly (i.e., sincerely), he 
or she will not display the demeanor of the dishonest or biased witness.’  
[Citation.]  Instead, some mistaken eyewitnesses, at least by the time they testify at 
trial, exude supreme confidence in their identifications.”  (State v. Henderson (N.J. 
2011) 27 A.3d 872, 889 (Henderson).) 
The limitations of sufficiency-of-the-evidence review suggest that the 
problem needs to be addressed upstream.  One possible solution is to revise 
eyewitness jury instructions to more closely align with research into the 
limitations of eyewitness evidence.  (See, e.g., Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at 
pp. 495–498 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.) [arguing that the part of CALJIC No. 2.92 that 
links reliability of eyewitness testimony to the witness’s degree of certainty should 
be reexamined in light of research demonstrating a lack of such correlation]; 
Henderson, supra, 27 A.3d at pp. 925–926 [urging modification of jury 
instructions in accordance with generally accepted scientific evidence].)  But 
given the documented problems with eyewitness testimony and the extent to 
which jurors rely on it (see Henderson, at p. 889 [“ ‘there is almost nothing more 
convincing [to a jury] than a live human being who takes the stand, points of 
finger at the defendant and says, “That’s the one” ’ ”], I am not sure we can rely 
solely on jury instructions to adequately address the issue.  
16 
The adoption of best, or at least better, practices by law enforcement can 
help prevent false eyewitness identification.  For example, there is a general 
consensus that identifications made through photo lineups or live lineups should 
be videotaped and that the person operating the lineup should not be aware of who 
the suspect is in order to avoid consciously or unconsciously cuing the witness.  
(California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice, Final Report (2008) 
p. 27.)  But there is little that courts can do to induce law enforcement to adopt 
these practices unless courts themselves subject such evidence to greater scrutiny.  
Fortunately, there is a substantial body of high-quality research on visual 
perception and memory to inform such scrutiny by courts, including a 2014 report 
by the National Academy of Sciences.  (Nat. Research Council, Identifying the 
Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification (2014).) 
The problematic nature of eyewitness evidence has led some state high 
courts to assign trial courts a stronger gatekeeping role in the admission of such 
evidence.  Of course, courts have the power to exclude evidence when its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect (Evid. Code, 
§ 352), and courts can exercise the power to exclude eyewitness evidence when, 
for example, blatantly suggestive lineup procedures make the identification 
unreliable.  But the New Jersey and Oregon high courts, recognizing the special 
problems posed by eyewitness evidence, have gone further. 
In Henderson, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that defendants can 
obtain a pretrial hearing on the admissibility of eyewitness evidence if they can 
show some evidence of suggestiveness that could lead to mistaken identification.  
If the defendant makes that showing, then the state must offer proof on the 
reliability of the identification, with the defendant carrying the ultimate burden to 
prove “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”  (Henderson, 
17 
supra, 27 A.2d at p. 920.)  If the defendant meets the burden, then the evidence 
should be suppressed.  (Ibid.) 
The Oregon Supreme Court has taken a somewhat different approach based 
on Oregon’s Evidence Code.  When a defendant has filed a pretrial motion to 
exclude eyewitness evidence, the trial court must determine by a preponderance of 
the evidence whether the eyewitness identification was “rationally based” on the 
witness’s perceptions.  (State v. Lawson (Or. 2012) 291 P.3d 673, 693 (Lawson).)  
The court may consider evidence of close observation of the suspect’s face 
supporting such a determination.  (Ibid.)  On the other hand, observations of non-
facial features like race, height, weight, clothing, or hair color “generally lack the 
level of distinction necessary to permit the witness to identify a specific person as 
the person whom the witness saw.”  (Ibid.)  If the state meets this threshold but the 
defendant introduces competing evidence to undermine the reliability of the 
identification, then the state “must establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the identification was based on a permissible basis rather than an 
impermissible one, such as suggestive police procedures.”  (Ibid.) 
Although I express no definitive view on the merits of these approaches or 
others, I continue to believe the issue of eyewitness identification “deserves our 
careful attention.”  (Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 498 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).)  
This case illustrates some of the problems.  There were several features of the 
identifications that called their reliability into question:  the witnesses were under 
a high level of stress; in the case of the Vasquez murder, the witness’s attention 
was likely focused on the gun threatening him; the assailant was viewed under 
poor lighting conditions and at a considerable distance; there are questions about 
whether the witnesses viewed Reed’s face clearly; cross-racial identification was 
involved; the time between the occurrence of the crime and the identification of 
the photo lineup was several months; and the witness in the Moreland murder was 
18 
intoxicated.  (See Henderson, supra, 27 A.3d at pp. 921–922 [discussing factors 
affecting reliability of eyewitness identifications]; Lawson, supra, 291 P.3d at 
pp. 688–689 [same].)   
The eyewitness evidence in this case could have benefited from the kind of 
screening that New Jersey and Oregon have adopted before it was allowed to go to 
the jury.  The facts of this case illustrate both the stakes involved in eyewitness 
identification and the challenges such evidence presents.  The time has come for 
the Legislature, the Judicial Council, or this court to develop principles that guide 
the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY KRUGER, J. 
 
 
I respectfully dissent from the court’s judgment for the reasons expressed in 
Justice Liu’s dissenting opinion.  (See dis. opn. of Liu, J., ante, pt. I.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Reed 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S082776 
Date Filed: May 7, 2018 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge:  John Joseph Cheroske 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Gail Harper, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Sharlene A. Honnaka and William H. Shin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Gail Harper 
P.O. Box 330057 
San Francisco, CA  94133 
(415) 291-8469 
 
William H. Shin 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 269-6077