Case Title: Stroup v. Oedekoven

Citation: 

Docket Number: 98-104

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-12-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Stroup v. Oedekoven1999 WY 180995 P.2d 125Case Number: 98-104Decided: 12/28/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

            

 

PATRICIA 
J. STROUP, as Personal

Representative 
of the Estate of SCOT OWEN

STROUP, 
Deceased, and on behalf of

PATRICIA 
J. STROUP, DIANA K. FINCH

and 
POLLY ANN BEYER,

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

BYRON 
OEDEKOVEN, SHERIFF OF

CAMPBELL 
COUNTY, WYOMING,

Appellee(Defendant).

 

 

                              
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County:

                                           
The Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants:

H. W. 
Rasmussen of Badley & Rasmussen, P.C., Sheridan, WY.

 Representing 
Appellee:

Gary R. 
Scott of Hirst & Applegate, P.C., Cheyenne, WY.

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

 

*Retired 
November 2, 1998.

 

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

 [¶1]      After an inmate 
committed suicide while in the custody of the Campbell County Detention Center, 
his survivors instituted this wrongful death action against the Campbell County 
Sheriff.  A four-day bench trial 
resulted in judgment for the sheriff.  
In this appeal, the survivors assert that the district court abused its 
discretion in refusing to grant a jury trial even though their demand for jury 
trial was over four months tardy.  
In addition, although the district court found the decedent's fault to be 
0%, they contend that the decedent's intentional conduct in committing suicide 
should not have been considered in assessing fault under Wyoming's comparative 
fault statute.  Finally, the 
survivors argue that the district court's findings are not supported by the 
record.  Finding no error, we 
affirm. 

 

 

                                                                       
ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Appellant 
presents three issues for our review:

 

I.  Did the trial court abuse its discretion 
by denying Plaintiff's Motion for Jury Trial[?]

 

II.  Is Wyoming's Comparative Fault Statute § 
1-1-109 applicable to a claim for failure to prevent suicide of an 
inmate?

 

III.  Are the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law entered by the District Court supported by the 
evidence?

 

Appellee's 
statement of the issues is substantially the same.

 

 

                                                                       
FACTS

 

[¶3]      This case arose 
after Scot Stroup (Stroup) committed suicide on September 30, 1995, while in the 
custody of the Campbell County Detention Center.  In accord with our standard of review, 
we present the facts in the light most favorable to appellee, Campbell County 
Sheriff Byron Oedekoven.

 

[¶4]      A severe 
alcoholic, Stroup began to drink more heavily after his September 1994 
divorce.  As his mental and physical 
health deteriorated, Stroup became frequently involved with the law.  In 1995, Stroup was incarcerated in the 
Campbell County Detention Center (CCDC) on five separate 
occasions.

 

[¶5]      On the first of 
these occasions, March 6 through March 30, Stroup was placed on special watch 
when he arrived because he was extremely intoxicated and stated he wanted to 
kill himself.  Under special watch, 
an inmate is housed in an observation cell in the booking area, and a detention 
officer checks on the inmate every 15 minutes.  During his March incarceration, Stroup 
was removed from special watch on March 9, and he served the rest of his time 
without incident.  During Stroup's 
next three stays in the CCDC, April 28 through May 1; May 28 through May 29; and 
June 4 through August 4, Stroup was not the subject of a special 
watch.

 

[¶6]      In late August of 
1995, Stroup was jailed in Sheridan for an alcohol-related incident.  This led to the revocation of his 
probation, a probation stemming from offenses committed in Campbell County.  Following a short stay in the Sheridan 
County jail, Stroup was transferred to the Johnson County jail in Buffalo, where 
his mother and sister visited him.  
During this visit, Stroup mentioned that he was contemplating suicide, 
and the mother and sister reported Stroup's suicidal thoughts to the Johnson 
County jailers.  While still in 
custody of Johnson County, Stroup met with a counselor on September 5.  After performing a suicide evaluation, 
the counselor concluded that Stroup was a low risk for 
suicide.

 

[¶7]      When transferred 
from Johnson County to the Campbell County Detention Center (CCDC) on September 
10, 1995, Stroup was again placed on special watch.  The CCDC's medical director ordered that 
Stroup be taken off special watch on September 12, noting that Stroup was eating 
and sleeping regularly; he was alert; his mood had changed; he stated he would 
not hurt himself; and he wanted to be moved into general 
housing.

 

[¶8]      After moving into 
general housing, Stroup underwent further mental health counseling.  On September 18, Stroup met individually 
with a psychologist.  In this 
session, Stroup denied being suicidal, and the psychologist concluded Stroup was 
not an immediate suicide risk.  The 
psychologist recommended that Stroup be monitored for depression.  Stroup also participated in group 
counseling on September 14 and 21.  
During those sessions, the group counselor did not observe anything that 
led him to believe that Stroup was a suicide risk.

 

[¶9]      Stroup was last 
seen alive, in the day room, at about 9 p.m. on September 30, around medication 
time.  When the medication officer 
noticed that Stroup had left the day room without receiving his scheduled 
medication, the officer asked an inmate to check Stroup's cell.  The inmate did so and discovered Stroup 
hanging from the crossbar of a cell window with a bed sheet tied around his 
neck.  The medication officer ran to 
the cell, cut the bed sheet to let Stroup down, and performed mouth to mouth 
resuscitation while emergency personnel were summoned.  Upon their arrival, the emergency 
medical personnel continued CPR, and also attempted to revive Stroup by using a 
breathing tube.  Their efforts began 
at 9:37 p.m. and ceased at 9:50 p.m.  
Stroup was pronounced dead at 9:55 p.m.

 

[¶10]   This wrongful death action was 
instituted by Stroup's mother, Patricia Stroup (appellant), acting individually 
and as personal representative of her son's estate, and on behalf of Stroup's 
sisters Diana Finch and Polly Beyer.  
Appellant did not demand a jury trial in the original complaint, filed 
December 19, 1996.  Nor did she 
demand a jury trial in her amended complaint of February 3, 1997.  Sheriff Oedekoven filed an answer to the 
amended complaint on February 10, 1997.  
This was the final pleading in the case, and neither party filed a demand 
for jury trial within ten days of its filing, as required by W.R.C.P. 
38(b)(1).1

 

[¶11]   Initially assigned to a judge from 
the Sixth Judicial District, Campbell County, the case was re-assigned to a 
judge outside the sixth district on July 8, 1997, but that judge was immediately 
disqualified by appellant.   
The appellant then filed a motion for jury trial and demand for jury 
trial on July 11, 1997, nearly five months after Sheriff Oedekoven filed his 
answer to the amended complaint.  
The case was eventually re-assigned to another judge outside the sixth 
district, who denied appellant's motion for jury trial.

 

[¶12]   After a four-day bench trial, the 
district court found that neither Sheriff Oedekoven nor CCDC personnel were at 
fault in regard to Stroup's suicide.2  The district court also considered 
Stroup's fault, but found that Stroup was 0% at fault.  Appellant took nothing from her 
complaint.  This appeal 
followed.

 

                                                       
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶13]   The district court made extensive 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  

 

The 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict.  Hopper v. All Pet 
Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 538 (Wyo. 1993).  While the findings are presumptively 
correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence 
in the record.  Id. Due 
regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the credibility 
of the witnesses, and our review does not entail weighing disputed 
evidence.  Id.  Findings of fact will not be set aside 
unless the findings are clearly erroneous.  
Id.  A finding is 
clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing 
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been committed.  
Id. 

 

Springer 
v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Wyoming, 944 P.2d 1173, 1175-76 (Wyo. 1997).

 

[¶14]   After a party has waived its right 
to a jury trial under W.R.C.P. 38, the district court's decision to grant a jury 
trial is discretionary.  W.R.C.P. 
39(b).  In reviewing for an abuse of 
discretion, we apply the following standard:

 

Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.

 

Vaughn 
v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998)  (quoting 
Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986)).

 

 

                                                                 
DISCUSSION

 

Jury 
Trial

 

[¶15]   Appellant concedes the demand for 
jury trial was untimely under W.R.C.P.  
38(b)(1), and the right to a jury trial was thus waived pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 38(d).  Therefore, 
appellant can argue only that the district court abused its discretion in 
refusing to order a jury trial pursuant to W.R.C.P. 39(b), which provides in 
pertinent part:

 

Rule 39. 
Trial by jury or by the court.

 

(b)  By the Court.  Issues not demanded for trial by jury as 
provided in Rule 38 shall be tried by the court; but, notwith­standing the 
failure of a party to demand a jury in an action in which such a demand might 
have been made of right, the court in its discretion upon motion may order a 
trial by a jury of any or all issues.

 

[¶16]   To support her motion for jury 
trial, appellant relied on two grounds.  
First, she claimed she desired the trier of fact to be from Campbell 
County and that she did not demand a jury trial in the first instance because 
she was content with the judge from Campbell County acting as the trier of 
fact.  Second, she claimed that 
discovery had revealed conflicting evidence on at least two factual issues, 
issues she claimed developed following discovery.

 

[¶17]   This court has observed that the 
"Federal courts have been extremely reluctant to use their discretionary power 
under Rule 39(b), often pointing out that discretion should be exercised only 
under an extraordinary showing."  
Patterson v. Maher, 450 P.2d 1005, 1008 n.2 (Wyo. 1969).  It is appellant's burden to establish 
that the district court has abused its discretion.  In Re General Adjudication of All 
Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76, 102 (Wyo. 
1988); Duncan v. Laramie County Community College, 768 P.2d 593, 596 
(Wyo. 1989); Kavanaugh v. State, 769 P.2d 908, 913 (Wyo. 1989).  It is also appellant's burden to bring 
us a complete record on which to base a decision.  Scherer v. Scherer, 931 P.2d 251, 
254 (Wyo. 1997); Stadtfeld v. Stadtfeld, 920 P.2d 662, 663 (Wyo. 1996). 

 

[¶18]   Appellant's motion for jury trial 
was the subject of a September 10, 1997 hearing.  The transcript from this hearing, if 
any, is not part of the record on appeal.  
The only record before us is the one-page order denying appellant's 
motion for jury trial.  Without a 
transcript before us to determine what transpired at this hearing or some other 
record of the reason(s) the district court relied on in denying appellant's 
motion for jury trial, we cannot determine whether the district court abused its 
discretion.  We, therefore, hold 
that appellant has not sustained her burden of establishing an abuse of 
discretion on the part of the district court in denying the motion for jury 
trial.

 

Comparative 
Fault

 

[¶19]   The district court considered 
Stroup's fault in making its determination under Wyoming's comparative fault 
statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109 (Lexis 1999).  Appellant argues that Stroup's fault, if 
any, should not have been considered in making the comparative fault 
determination.  However, because the 
district court found Stroup's fault to be 0%, we consider the error, if any, 
harmless and decline to answer the question of whether the decedent's fault 
should be considered in this type of case.

 

[¶20]   We do note, however, that the few 
cases on point indicate that this question is not settled.  A number of jurisdictions permit the 
decedent's fault to be considered when comparing fault.  Hickey v. Zezulka, 487 N.W.2d 106, 123-24 (Mich. 1992); Champagne v. U.S., 513 N.W.2d 75, 76-77, 79-81 
(N.D. 1994); Molton v. City of Cleveland, 839 F.2d 240, 249 (6th Cir. 
1988); Heflin v. Stewart County, Tennessee, 1995 WL 614201 (Tenn.Ct.App. 
Oct. 20, 1995).  These courts reason 
generally that, although a jury is required to compare the apple of intentional 
suicidal conduct against the orange of negligence, "[j]urors are capable of 
reaching a rational and sensible balance between the decedent's fault and the 
negligent jailer's fault."  
Hickey v. Zezulka, 487 N.W.2d  at 124.  Several other courts hold that the act 
of suicide cannot constitute contributory fault in a custodial suicide case, 
reasoning that "[a] duty to prevent someone from acting in a particular way 
logically cannot be defeated by the very action sought to be avoided."  Myers v. County of Lake, Ind., 30 F.3d 847, 853 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Sauders v. County of Steuben, 693 N.E.2d 16, 19 (Ind. 1998).  Put 
another way, "[i]f the custodian has a duty to protect the inmate from himself, 
the fact that the inmate tried to harm himself is a reason for liability rather 
than a defense."  Myers v. County 
of Lake, Ind., 30 F.3d  at 852.  
Given 1) that the courts are divided on this issue, and 2) Wyoming's 
comparative fault statute does not provide a definitive answer, we are content 
to wait for a more appropriate time to answer this question.  We hold that the error, if any, in 
considering the fault of the decedent was harmless because the district court 
attributed 0% of the fault to the decedent.

 

The 
District Court's Findings

 

[¶21]   In addition to challenging a number 
of the district court's findings of basic fact, appellant also challenges the 
district court's ultimate finding that the sheriff and CCDC personnel were not 
negligent in caring for Stroup.  
After a careful review, we conclude that the district court's findings 
are supported by the record.

 

[¶22]   In a negligence case, the plaintiff 
has the burden of proving four elements:  
(1) the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant 
breached that duty; (3) the defendant's breach of his duty was the proximate 
cause of the plaintiff's injuries; and (4) the plaintiff was injured.  Anderson v. Duncan, 968 P.2d 440, 
442 (Wyo. 1998); John Q. Hammons v. Poletis, 954 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Wyo. 
1998); Daily v. Bone, 906 P.2d 1039, 1043 (Wyo. 1995).  At trial, the focus was on element two, 
whether the sheriff or the detention center personnel breached their duty to 
Stroup.

 

[¶23]   In our consideration of this case, 
however, we discovered a question still remains concerning the existence of a 
duty.3  In fact, in R.D. v. W.H., 875 P.2d 26, 29 n.1 (Wyo. 1994), we specifically reserved the question of whether a 
duty exists in this sort of case:

 

Courts 
in different situations have recognized other "exceptions" to the general rule 
that a decedent's suicide precludes a finding of liability against a 
tort-feasor.  For example, some 
institutions, such as jails or hospitals, have been found to have a special duty 
of care to prevent those in their custody from committing suicide.  See, e.g., McLaughlin v. 
Sullivan, 123 N.H. 335, 461 A.2d 123, 125 (1983); and Krieg [v. 
Massey, 781 P.2d 277, 279 (Mont. 1989)].   In this decision, we do not 
consider what other excep­tion may apply in Wyoming to the general 
rule.

 

[¶24]   The district court determined that 
the sheriff owed Stroup a duty, and this ruling is not a subject of this on 
appeal.4  Judicial restraint usually demands that 
we address only those issues properly before us and preserved for our 
review.  Stephens v. State, 
774 P.2d 60, 63 (Wyo. 1989).  
Moreover, we generally refrain from inquiring into a question not raised 
by the parties.  Belle Fourche 
Pipeline Co. v. Elmore Livestock Co., 669 P.2d 505, 514-15 (Wyo. 1983); 
Pritchard v. State, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Dep't of Health 
and Social Servs., 540 P.2d 523, 524 (Wyo. 1975).  The question of whether a duty exists 
and, if so, the scope of that duty, is too important a question to be decided 
without briefing on the issue. Therefore, we will assume, without deciding, that 
a duty exists.5 

 

[¶25]   We first address appellant's 
challenge to the district court's finding that Stroup was seen alive in the day 
room at about 9 p.m. on the night of his death.  Relying on testimony from CCDC inmates 
that they did not see Stroup after the 5:30 p.m. lockdown and the fact that 
Stroup's body was cold when found, appellant argues that the district court's 
finding "defies logic."  
Essentially, appellant asks us to disregard the testimony from three 
detention officers who reported seeing Stroup in the day room around 9:00 p.m. 
while medication was being passed.  
In addition, she asks us to disregard the EMT's testimony that a body 
will become cold quickly due to shock, which can cause rapid cooling of the skin 
due to decreased blood circulation.  
It is not our task to re-weigh disputed evidence or to re-assess the 
credibility of witnesses.  
Springer v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Wyoming, 944 P.2d  at 
1176.  We find abundant record 
support for the district court's finding and conclude it is not clearly 
erroneous.

 

[¶26]   Contrary to appellant's arguments, 
the record also supports the district court's findings that Stroup was monitored 
for depression and suicidal ideation, and that the CCDC followed its policies in 
doing so.  Stroup had a pattern of 
expressing his suicidal thoughts when he was first incarcerated.  The record reveals that CCDC personnel 
analyzed Stroup upon his September 10, 1995 arrival and placed him on special 
watch.  He was removed from special 
watch, upon his own request, after he appeared to stabilize.  To help with his depression, Stroup 
continued taking Prozac.  Stroup 
reported that the Prozac was helping.  
In addition, Stroup attended individual and group counseling, but neither 
of his counselors nor any of the medical personnel considered Stroup a suicide 
risk.  This evidence supports the 
district court's findings that the CCDC followed its polices for obtaining 
information about inmates and developing medical plans, and we conclude that the 
district court's findings in this regard are not clearly 
erroneous.

 

[¶27]   Appellant also points out that the 
CCDC did not follow its policy of using an inmate bulletin board to alert 
detention officers to the special needs of inmates.  However, while the district court found 
that the CCDC had not followed its policy, it also found that no evidence 
established that the actions of CCDC personnel would have been any different if 
the inmate bulletin board policy had been followed.  As discussed above, the CCDC followed 
its policies by monitoring Stroup and his medical needs, and the discharge of 
these duties supports the finding that the actions of the CCDC would not have 
altered had the bulletin board been in use.

 

[¶28]   Appellant next complains that the 
CCDC was negligent because its personnel were not aware of the information 
contained in the petition that revoked Stroup's probation.  This petition included two letters 
stating that Stroup was trying to drink himself to death. However, the district 
court found that even if CCDC personnel had been privy to these letters, their 
course of action would not have changed.  
In addition to the previously recited evidence detailing Stroup's care, 
this finding is buttressed by testimony from the psychologist that the 
information contained in the petition was too old to warrant suicide watch.  The district court's finding is 
supported by the record and not clearly erroneous.

 

[¶29]   Appellant also complains about two 
findings regarding supervision of Stroup on the night of his death.  First, contrary to the district court's 
findings, she complains that the jail did not perform appropriate "walk 
throughs" whereby detention officers account for inmates.  She also complains that the jail 
violated its policy by permitting Stroup to have his cell locked for an extended 
period of time.

 

[¶30]   Generally, CCDC detention officers 
perform a walk through approximately every 30 minutes.  For the night of September 30, a 
detention officer testified that she performed a visual accounting of all the 
prisoners in Stroup's cell block at 8:30 and 9 p.m.  Again, the district court's findings are 
supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous.

 

[¶31]   On the second point, inmates in the 
CCDC were not permitted to close and lock their cell doors for extended 
periods.  When inmates did lock 
their cell doors, a light was triggered in an observation tower.  If the detention officer in the 
observation tower noticed a cell was locked, the lock could be "popped" open 
with the flick of a switch.  At the 
time Stroup was discovered hanging, his cell door was closed and locked.  However, there is no evidence regarding 
when Stroup locked his cell door.  A 
fellow inmate visited him around 8 p.m,, and Stroup's cell door was closed, but 
not all the way, and not locked.  
Since the record does not tell when Stroup locked his cell door, it is 
impossible to examine whether the interval of time that passed would be 
sufficient to establish a breach of duty.  
A finding of negligence cannot be left to speculation.  John Q. Hammons v. Poletis, 954 P.2d  at 1356.

 

[¶32]   Finally, appellant asks us to upset 
the district court's ultimate determination that the sheriff and his staff were 
not negligent in their care of Stroup.  
However, because appellant's argument for the most part assumes the 
success of her challenges to the district court's other findings, a detailed 
analysis of this claim is unnecessary.  
We do note that

 

[p]redicting 
suicide is impossible.  At best 
psychologists can group inmates according to risk.  False positives are common;  that is to say, most persons in these 
high-risk categories do not attempt to harm themselves.  See David Lester & Bruce L. 
Danto, Suicide Behind Bars:  
Prediction and Prevention, 23-36, 75-101 (1983); Madelyn S. Gould 
et al., "The Clinical Predic­tion of Adolescent Suicide," in 
Assessment and Prediction of Suicide 130-43 (Ronald W. Maris et al., 
eds., 1992);  Ronald L. Bonner, 
"Isolation, Seclusion, and Psychosocial Vulnerability as Risk Factors for 
Suicide Behind Bars,"  id. 
112 . . . .  A duty to take maximum 
precautions would make life miserable for the many persons who are in categories 
of risk and could be con­signed to months if not years without clothing (or 
even to spend time in restraints) despite an objectively low probability of 
harm. 

 

Myers v. 
County of Lake, Ind., 30 F.3d  at 850.  Moreover, because 
clever inmates can commit suicide no matter what a jailer does to curtail their 
opportunities, failure to prevent a suicide does not necessarily show the lack 
of reasonable care.  Id.  After a careful review of the record, we 
find ample support for the findings of the district court, and we conclude the 
findings are not clearly erroneous.  

 

[¶33]   We do not address appellant's other 
challenges to the district court's findings.  By upholding the district court's 
determination that the appellee was not negligent, the other factual challenges 
(that mother and sister placed blocks on their phones to prevent Stroup from 
calling, and that the survivors did not suffer any damages) have become 
moot.

 

 

                                                                
CONCLUSION

 

[¶34]   This unfortunate case was fully 
presented to the district court over the course of a four-day trial.  Finding no error warranting reversal, we 
affirm. 

 

FOOTNOTES

1W.R.C.P. 38 provides in relevant part:

 

Rule 
38.  Jury trial of 
right.

 

(b) Demand. 

 

(1) By Whom;  Filing.  Any 
party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury by (A) 
serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing at any time after 
the commencement of the action and not later than 10 days after service of the 
last pleading directed to such issue, and (B) filing the demand as required by 
Rule 5(d).  Such demand may be 
endorsed upon a pleading of the party.

 

* * *

 

(d) Waiver.  The failure of a party to serve and file a demand as 
required by this rule constitutes a waiver by the party of trial by jury.  A demand for trial by jury made as 
herein provided may not be withdrawn without the consent of the 
parties.

 

2The 
district court also denied appellant's claims for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, punitive damages, and her civil rights claim brought 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1983, 1988.  Appellant does not take 
issue with these rulings on appeal. 

3The 
question of whether appellee is entitled to (1) immunity under the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act or (2) qualified immunity is not before this court.  See Darrar v. Bourke, 910 P.2d 572, 576-77 (Wyo. 1996) ("qualified immunity is available to peace officers 
in spite of the waiver of immunity in the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act"); 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
1-39-112, 1-39-103(a)(iii), 7-2-101(iv)(A) and (H) (Lexis 1999); cf. 
Vigil v. Ruettgers, 887 P.2d 521, 524-25 (Wyo. 1994).  Even if a peace officer is unable to 
claim immunity from suit, we would still need to determine if there is an 
enforceable duty requisite to a finding of tortious conduct under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 
1-39-112 (Lexis 1999).  See 
Daily v. Bone, 906 P.2d 1039, 1043 (Wyo. 1995) (existence of duty is a 
question of law).

4The index to the record on appeal indicates that the sheriff moved for 
summary judgment.  However, none of 
the summary judgment materials are part of the record on appeal.  

5This duty has been described in this fashion:  

 

Prison officials have a duty to exercise ordinary and reasonable care for 
the protection of the persons in their custody.  The scope of this duty does not 
generally extend to protecting prisoners from self-inflicted injury or 
death.  However, it can be expanded 
to include self-inflicted injury or death when the prison officials know or 
should know that the prisoner might harm himself or herself. 

An apparent majority of other jurisdictions have reached the same 
conclusion.  Thus, in both prison 
and psychiatric hospital settings, the courts consistently hold that custodians 
have a duty to protect prisoners or patients from reasonably foreseeable 
self-destructive acts. 

 

Cockrum 
v. State, 
843 S.W.2d 433, 436 (Tenn.App. 1992) (citations omitted); see also Jane 
M. Draper, Annotation, Civil Liability of Prison or Jail Authorities 
for Self-inflicted Injury or Death of Prisoner, 79 A.L.R. 3rd 1210, 1214 
(1977); Pretty on Top v. City of Hardin, 597 P.2d 58, 60-62 (Mont. 1979) 
("special circumstances" required to invoke duty); Sauders v. County of 
Steuben, 693 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Ind. 1998).