Case Title: Allen v. Woodfield Chevrolet, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94814

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2003-10-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 94814-Agenda 12-May 2003.
CHARLES ALLEN et al., Appellees, v. WOODFIELD							CHEVROLET, INC., Appellant.
Opinion filed October 17, 2003.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	At issue in this appeal is whether certain amendments to the
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Act) (815
ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 1996)), which govern consumer fraud
claims against new or used vehicle dealers, violate the Illinois
constitutional prohibition against special legislation. See Ill. Const.
1970, art. IV, §13. The trial court found no constitutional infirmity;
the appellate court reversed. 332 Ill. App. 3d 605. We hold that the
statutory amendments constitute impermissible special legislation and
therefore affirm the appellate court judgment invalidating these
amendments.

BACKGROUND
	In April 1996, plaintiff, Charles Allen, purchased a used vehicle
from defendant, Woodfield Chevrolet, Inc. In November 1998,
plaintiff filed an action against defendant in the circuit court of Cook
County in connection with that purchase. In count I, plaintiff sought
monetary damages under the Act for false and misleading conduct.
Plaintiff alleged that defendant "advertised one price and then charged
a different price for the same car." In count II, plaintiff sought a
declaration that certain amendments to section 10a of the Act
constitute special legislation on behalf of car dealers and are thus
unconstitutional. See Pub. Act 87-1140, eff. January 1, 1993; Pub.
Act 89-144, eff. January 1, 1996. Alternatively, plaintiff sought a
declaration that these amendments violate the equal protection clauses
of the state and federal constitutions. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2;
U.S. Const., amend. XIV, §1. Among the challenged amendments was
a provision requiring that plaintiff provide defendant with 30-days
written notice before filing suit. See 815 ILCS 505/10a(h) (West
1996). Plaintiff admitted, in his complaint, that he did not comply with
the presuit notice requirement.
	Plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings as to count II,
arguing that the amendments "treat car dealers more favorably than
other similarly-situated consumer-fraud defendants and treat
consumers who have claims against car dealers differently than
consumers having claims against non-car dealers." Plaintiff maintained
that the "car-dealer classification," created by the amendments, is not
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The trial court rejected
plaintiff's argument: "[T]he classification is properly related to the
problem sought to be remedied by the amendments, which is to
encourage settlement between consumers and automobile dealers as
well as avoid unnecessary litigation and limit attorney's fees." The trial
court thus denied plaintiff's motion, entered judgment in favor of
defendant on count II, and dismissed count I based on plaintiff's
failure to provide defendant with the statutorily required presuit
notice. Plaintiff appealed.
	The appellate court reversed, holding that the subject
amendments violate the constitutional prohibition against special
legislation. 332 Ill. App. 3d 605. The appellate court stated, in
relevant part:
			"Assuming that the state has a legitimate interest in the
settling of disputes and in discouraging lawsuits brought
merely to generate attorney fees, there is nothing more
unique about a fraud case brought against a car dealer than
one brought against any other person or entity subject to the
Act. Moreover, the effect of the legislation in this case is to
penalize the consumer and not the attorneys who, according
to the legislative history, are the ones the legislators deemed
responsible for filing lawsuits merely to generate fees for
themselves." 332 Ill. App. 3d at 614.
The appellate court did not consider plaintiff's equal protection
challenge. 332 Ill. App. 3d at 617.
	We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal, and allowed
the Illinois Automobile Dealers Association and the Chicago
Automobile Trade Association to file a joint amicus curiae brief in
support of defendant. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 345. For the reasons
discussed below, we now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

ANALYSIS
I. Amendments to the Consumer Fraud Act
	The Act, originally adopted in 1961 (see 1961 Ill. Laws 1867),
declares unlawful unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.
815 ILCS 505/2 (West 1996). The Act confers upon the Attorney
General the power to investigate alleged violations of the Act and to
prosecute offenders, pursuing injunctive relief, restitution and civil
penalties. 815 ILCS 505/3 through 505/7 (West 1996). With the
addition of section 10a to the Act in 1973, the General Assembly
expressly authorized private causes of action for deceptive business
practices proscribed under the Act. Pub. Act 78-904, eff. October 1,
1973 (codified at 815 ILCS 505/10a(a) (West 1996)).
	Prior to the adoption of the subject amendments, section 10a did
not distinguish among consumer fraud litigants or claims. Generally,
any "person," as that term is defined in the Act (815 ILCS 505/1(c)
(West 1992)), who suffered damage as a result of a violation of the
Act committed by any other person could bring an action under
section 10 A. 815 ILCS 505/10a(a) (West 1992). The only express
requirement was that the action be commenced within three years
from the date it accrued. 815 ILCS 505/10a(e) (West 1992). "Proof
of a public injury, a pattern, or an effect on consumers generally" was
not required under section10a (815 ILCS 505/10a(a) (West 1992)).
But see J. Feehan, The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and the "Public
Injury" Debate, 80 Ill. B.J. 136 (1992). The court, in its discretion,
could award actual damages, or any other relief it deemed proper,
including injunctive relief and attorney fees and costs. 815 ILCS
505/10a(a), (c) (West 1992). The court could also award punitive
damages. See Martin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 163 Ill. 2d 33,
79-82 (1994).
	The subject amendments, effective in 1993 and 1996, added
provisions to section 10a that changed the substantive and procedural
requirements for consumer fraud claims against a single group of
defendants, namely, new and used vehicle dealers. The amendments
also affected the remedies available to consumer fraud plaintiffs in
actions against vehicle dealers.
	The 1993 amendment added subsections (f) and (g) which
contain offer-of-judgment provisions. At any time more than 30 days
prior to trial, a consumer fraud plaintiff or the defendant vehicle dealer
may make an offer to allow judgment to be taken against the dealer.
Under subsection (f), if the plaintiff rejects the dealer's offer of
judgment and later fails to obtain a judgment greater than the offer,
the plaintiff forfeits attorney fees and costs from the date of the offer.
Under subsection (g), if the dealer rejects the plaintiff's offer and the
plaintiff later obtains a judgment equal to or greater than the offer, the
dealer must pay interest at the statutory rate from the date of the offer
to the date the judgment is paid. See Pub. Act 87-1140, eff. January
1, 1993.
	The 1996 amendment added language to existing subsection (a)
limiting the circumstances under which the trial court may make an
award of punitive damages against a new or used vehicle dealer, and
making proof of a "public injury" a required pleading element of a
cause of action against a vehicle dealer. The 1996 amendment also
added subsection (h), which requires consumer fraud plaintiffs to
provide vehicle dealers with a 30-day written notice before filing suit.
Subsection (h) additionally sets forth procedures for pre-suit
settlement offers from vehicle dealers. If a potential plaintiff rejects a
pre-suit settlement offer and in a subsequent action obtains a judgment
less than the presuit offer, the court may not award attorney fees and
costs incurred by the plaintiff after the rejection of the offer. See Pub.
Act 89-144, eff. January 1, 1996.
	Following the adoption of these amendments, section 10a read,
in relevant part:
			"§10a. Action for actual damages. (a) Any person who
suffers actual damage as a result of a violation of this Act
committed by any other person may bring an action against
such person. The court, in its discretion may award actual
economic damages or any other relief which the court deems
proper; provided, however, that no award of punitive
damages may be assessed under this Section against a party
defendant who is a new vehicle dealer or used vehicle dealer
within the meaning of Chapter 5 of the Illinois Vehicle Code,
unless the conduct engaged in was willful or intentional and
done with evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of
others. Proof of a public injury, a pattern, or an effect on
consumers and the public interest generally shall be required
in order to state a cause of action under this Section against
a party defendant who is a new vehicle dealer or used vehicle
dealer within the meaning of Chapter 5 of the Illinois Vehicle
Code. Proof of such public injury may be shown by any one
of the following factors:
				(1) Violation of a statute that has a public interest
impact.
				(2) Repeated acts prior to the act involving the plaintiff.
				(3) Potential for repetition.
			***
			(c) Except as provided in subsections (f), (g), and (h) of
this Section, in any action brought by a person under this
Section, the Court may grant injunctive relief where
appropriate and may award, in addition to the relief provided
in this Section, reasonable attorney's fees and costs to the
prevailing party.
* * *
			(f) At any time more than 30 days before the
commencement of trial, a party, who is a new vehicle dealer
or used vehicle dealer within the meaning of Chapter 5 of the
Illinois Vehicle Code and who is defending a claim under this
Act, may serve upon the party seeking relief under this Act an
offer to allow judgment to be taken against the defending
party to the effect specified in the offer with costs then
accrued. If within 10 days after service of the offer, the
offeree serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either
party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance
together with proof of service of the notice; the court shall
then enter judgment. An offer not accepted shall be deemed
withdrawn and evidence of the offer is not admissible except
in a proceeding to determine costs. When a party seeking
relief under this Act does not accept an offer filed with the
clerk and served upon the attorney for that party more than
30 days before the commencement of trial and when that
party fails to obtain a judgment in an amount more than the
total offer of settlement, that party shall forfeit and the court
may not award any compensation for attorney's fees and
costs incurred after the date of the offer.
			(g) At any time more than 30 days before the
commencement of trial, a party who is seeking relief under
this Act from a new vehicle dealer or used vehicle dealer
within the meaning of Chapter 5 of the Illinois Vehicle Code
may serve the dealer an offer to allow judgment to be taken
against the dealer to the effect specified in the offer with
costs then accrued. If within 10 days after service of the
offer, the offeree serves written notice that the offer is
accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of
acceptance together with proof of service of the notice; the
court shall then enter judgment. An offer not accepted shall
be deemed withdrawn and evidence of the offer is not
admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs. When
a dealer does not accept an offer filed with the clerk and
served upon the attorney for the dealer more than 30 days
before the commencement of trial and if the party seeking
relief against a dealer obtains a judgment in an amount equal
to or in excess of the offer amount, the party seeking relief
shall be paid interest on the offer amount at the rate as
provided in Section 2-1303 of the Code of Civil Procedure
from the date of the offer until the judgment is paid.
			(h) At least 30 days prior to the filing of an action under
this Section, a party who is seeking relief shall serve a written
notice of the nature of the alleged violation and demand for
relief upon the prospective party, who is a new vehicle dealer
or used vehicle dealer within the meaning of Chapter 5 of the
Illinois Vehicle Code, against whom such action will be
commenced. Any person receiving such a demand for relief
may, within 30 days of service of the demand for relief,
submit a written offer of settlement, which offer is to be
exclusive of attorney's fees, to the party serving the notice
and demand. The party who is seeking relief must certify in
any cause of action that the notice and demand was served
upon the named defendants and the substance of their
response, if any. If the offer of settlement is rejected in
writing by the party who is seeking relief, then, in any
subsequent action, the court shall deny any award of
attorney's fees and costs requested by the party seeking relief
under this Act incurred after the rejection of the written offer
of settlement, if the judgment is less than the amount
contained within the offer of settlement. All written offers of
settlement under this subsection shall be presumed to be
offered without prejudice in compromise of a disputed
matter." 815 ILCS 505/10a (West 1996).
	Section 10a, as amended, clearly divides consumer fraud plaintiffs
into two groups: consumers defrauded by new and used vehicles
dealers, who are subject to the statutory amendments, and all other
defrauded consumers who are not subject to the amendments. The
statute likewise divides consumer fraud defendants into two groups:
new and used vehicle dealers to whom the amendments apply, and all
other purveyors of consumer goods and services who are outside the
scope of the amendments. Whether this classification runs afoul of the
special legislation clause is the question we now take up.

II. Special Legislation Challenge
	We begin our analysis with the presumption that the Act, as
amended by Public Act 87-1140, effective January 1, 1993, and
Public Act 89-144, effective January 1, 1996, is constitutional. See In
re Estate of Jolliff, 199 Ill. 2d 510, 517 (2002); Best v. Taylor
Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 377 (1997). This presumption means
that we must uphold the statute's validity if reasonably possible. See
Beaubien v. Ryan, 198 Ill. 2d 294, 298 (2001). This presumption also
requires that plaintiff, as the party challenging the statute in this case,
bear the burden of clearly establishing the statute's constitutional
infirmity. See Jolliff, 199 Ill. 2d  at 517; Beaubien, 198 Ill. 2d  at 298.
Because the constitutionality of a statute is an issue of law, we review
de novo the appellate court's decision invalidating the statutory
amendments. See Jolliff, 199 Ill. 2d  at 517; In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 296 (2001).
	The special legislation clause of the Illinois Constitution provides:
			"The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law
when a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a
general law is or can be made applicable shall be a matter for
judicial determination." Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §13.
The special legislation clause expressly prohibits the General Assembly
from conferring a special privilege or benefit upon a person or group
of persons while excluding others similarly situated. Best, 179 Ill. 2d 
at 391. Although the legislature enjoys broad discretion in making
statutory classifications, the legislature is prohibited, under the special
legislation clause, from making arbitrary classifications which
discriminate in favor of a select group without a sound and reasonable
basis. Jolliff, 199 Ill. 2d  at 519. Our analysis thus involves a dual
inquiry. We must determine first whether the statutory amendments
discriminate in favor of a select group and, if so, whether the
classification created by the statutory amendments is arbitrary. See
Jolliff, 199 Ill. 2d  at 519. Where, as here, the statute under
consideration does not affect a fundamental right or involve a suspect
classification, it will be judged under the rational basis test. Under this
test, the statute is constitutional if the legislative classification is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Unzicker v. Kraft Food
Ingredients Corp., 203 Ill. 2d 64, 86 (2002); Jolliff, 199 Ill. 2d  at 520.
	Turning to the first inquiry-whether the statutory amendments
discriminate in favor of a select group-we conclude that the
amendments plainly favor new and used vehicle dealers. The
amendments discourage consumers defrauded by vehicle dealers from
pursuing claims under section 10a by making it more burdensome for
consumers to do so. For example, a consumer defrauded by a vehicle
dealer must provide the dealer with a 30-day presuit notice. 815 ILCS
505/10a(h) (West 1996). No other consumer fraud defendant is
entitled to such notice. A plaintiff's failure to provide this statutory
notice could result in dismissal of the cause of action, as was the case
here. Additionally, in order to state a cause of action against a vehicle
dealer, a consumer must plead facts demonstrating "a public injury, a
pattern, or an effect on consumers and the public interest generally."
815 ILCS 505/10a(a) (West 1996). This pleading requirement is
inapplicable to claims against all other consumer fraud defendants.
Moreover, a consumer defrauded by a vehicle dealer must contend
with special offer-of-judgment rules, not applicable in any other
consumer fraud case. These rules, like the pretrial settlement rules,
carry the risk of forfeiture of attorney fees. 815 ILCS 505/10a(f)
through (h) (West 1996). The statutory amendments also seek to
shield dealers from punitive damage awards that other consumer fraud
defendants may bear. See 815 ILCS 505/10a(a) (West 1996). At
bottom, the amendments place new and used vehicle dealers on more
advantageous footing than all other retailers subject to the Act, thus
creating a favored class of retailers.
	Our conclusion that the amendments discriminate in favor of
vehicle dealers is, of course, not dispositive of whether the
amendments constitute special legislation. We must further determine,
under the second part of our dual inquiry, whether the classification
effected by the amendments is arbitrary. See Jolliff, 199 Ill. 2d  at 519.
If this court can reasonably conceive of circumstances that justify
distinguishing the class that the statute benefits from the class outside
its scope, the classification will be deemed constitutional. Unzicker,
203 Ill. 3d at 86; Jolliff, 199 Ill. 2d  at 520.
	The appellate court could conceive of no such circumstance:
"[T]here is nothing more unique about a fraud case brought against a
car dealer than one brought against any other person or entity subject
to the Act." 332 Ill. App. 3d at 614. Thus, the appellate court
concluded that the classification was arbitrary and violated the
prohibition against special legislation. Defendant, as appellant, urges
us to reverse the appellate court. Defendant argues that the different
treatment accorded to vehicle dealers under the amendments is
consistent with other legislation regulating the activity of selling
automobiles. Defendant also argues that the legislature perceived a
problem specific to vehicle dealers which separates them from all
other retailers, thus justifying different treatment under the Act.
	In support of its first argument, defendant cites the Motor
Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act (815 ILCS 375/1 et seq. (West
2002)), the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act (815 ILCS 710/1 et seq.
(2002)), and the New Vehicle Buyer Protection Act (815 ILCS 380/1
et seq. (2002)) as examples of legislation which impose regulations on
vehicle dealers that are not imposed on other retailers. Further citing
this court's decision in Fireside Chrysler-Plymouth, Mazda, Inc. v.
Edgar, 102 Ill. 2d 1 (1984), defendant maintains that the present
legislation is no different from these statutes and is not constitutionally
infirm.
	In Fireside, we considered a special legislation challenge to a
Sunday-closing law applicable only to vehicle dealers. Although we
had 20 years earlier struck down a nearly identical Sunday-closing law
as special legislation (Courtesy Motor Sales v. Ward, 24 Ill. 2d 82
(1962)), we recognized that recent legislation (including the three
statutes to which defendant here cites) "demonstrate[s] a legislative
purpose to regulate certain aspects of the business of selling
automobiles in a manner different from other retail enterprises."
Fireside, 102 Ill. 2d  at 6. We held that the Sunday-closing law was
part of that regulatory scheme. Fireside, 102 Ill. 2d  at 6-7.
	Fireside does not support defendant's argument that different
treatment of vehicle dealers is justified in this case. Unlike the Sunday-closing law, and the other statutes defendant cites, the statutory
amendments at issue here cannot reasonably be deemed part of the
legislative scheme for regulating the business of selling automobiles.
The "Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act" (815
ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 1996)), as the name suggests, is "intended
to curb a variety of fraudulent abuses." Scott v. Ass'n for Childbirth
at Home, International, 88 Ill. 2d 279, 288 (1981). The Act is also
intended to "provide a remedy to individuals injured by [such
abuses]." Scott, 88 Ill. 2d  at 288. The amendments to section 10a of
the Act changed the way in which a consumer, defrauded by a vehicle
dealer, may exercise his or her statutory right to seek redress. The
amendments, in effect, limited the protections the Act affords those
consumers. The amendments do not speak to the sales practices of
vehicle dealers. We therefore reject defendant's argument that the
statutory amendments to section 10a are simply part of the
legislature's ongoing regulation of automobile sales.
	We next consider defendant's argument that the legislature
perceived a problem specific to vehicle dealers that separates them
from all other retailers. In support, defendant directs our attention to
the legislative history of the statutory amendments. This court will
consider legislative history in ascertaining the intent of the General
Assembly if the resolution of an issue so requires. Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at
382; see, e.g., Unzicker, 203 Ill. 2d  at 86-88 (where this court
undertook a comprehensive review of legislative history because the
reason for the classification was not apparent from the face of the
statute); Jolliff, 199 Ill. 2d  at 521-22 (where this court considered
legislative history in determining whether statutory classification was
arbitrary). In this case, the reason for the classification is not apparent
from the language of the statute itself. Accordingly, we turn to the
legislative history of Public Acts 87-1140 and 89-144.
 	Public Act 87-1140 was first introduced in the House of
Representatives as House Bill 3410. The bill was passed in the House
and referred to the Senate as a "shell" bill, i.e., a bill with a name but
no text. 87th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 5, 1992, at
27-28; 87th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 6, 1992, at 92.
In the Senate, the bill was amended first to add what is now section
10a(f), which, as set forth above, permits vehicle dealers who are
defending a consumer fraud claim to make an offer of judgment prior
to trial. This provision was patterned after the federal "Offer of
Judgment Rule" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 68) and intended "to encourage
reasonable settlements of disputes by penalizing parties that reject
reasonable settlement offers." 87th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate
Proceedings, June 19, 1992, at 16 (statements of Senator Weaver).
Proponents of the provision cited abuses by attorneys who discourage
clients from settling disputes with vehicle dealers in order to generate
higher fees. See 87th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, June 19,
1992, at 17, 19-20 (statements of Senators Weaver and Jacobs).
Opponents of the offer-of-judgment provision believed it would have
a "chilling effect" on a consumer's right to seek redress under the Act
by limiting the consumer's ability to pay attorney fees and, in turn,
obtain legal representation. 87th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings,
June 19, 1992, at 17-18, 20 (statements of Senator Dunn).
	The Senate also adopted a second amendment to House Bill 3410
that added what is now section 10a(g), permitting a consumer fraud
plaintiff to make an offer of judgment before trial in a suit against a
vehicle dealer. The purpose of this amendment was to "balance the
scales" and "even up what [the Senate] did with Amendment No. 1."
87th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, June 23, 1992, at 162
(statements of Senator Hawkinson).
	Public Act 89-144 began life as Senate Bill 317. This bill changed
the pleading requirements for a cause of action against a vehicle dealer
by adding a "public injury" element, and attempted to raise the bar for
an award of punitive damages against a vehicle dealer. It also
established a presuit notice requirement, and set forth procedures for
presuit settlement offers from vehicle dealers. According to one of its
sponsors, Senate Bill 317 was intended to address the problem posed
by an "aggressive group of plaintiffs' attorneys" who "churn"
consumer fraud cases against vehicle dealers, i.e., who pursue small
claims without a good-faith basis in order to "ring up" attorney fees
recoverable under the Act. 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings,
April 26, 1995, at 30 (statements of Senator Cronin). The 30-day
notice provision was meant to remedy this problem by giving the
parties an opportunity to work out a settlement before it goes to trial,
"almost like mandatory arbitration." 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate
Proceedings, April 26, 1995, at 31-32 (statements of Senator Cronin).
Senators opposed to the bill found its provisions "onerous" for
consumers, a view reportedly shared by numerous consumer groups.
89th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 26, 1995, at 29-32
(statements of Senators Palmer and Trotter).
	In the House of Representatives, Senate Bill 317 was described
as an attempt to provide vehicle dealers protection from abuses of
section 10a and to clean up confusion stemming from judicial
misinterpretation of the Act that purportedly resulted in excessive
punitive damage awards against vehicle dealers. 89th Ill. Gen. Assem.,
House Proceedings, May 22, 1995, at 268-71, 276 (statements of
Representatives Cross and Brunsvold). The bill was also described as
a measure to promote settlement, keep cases out of court and, in turn,
"keep attorney's fees down." 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House
Proceedings, May 22, 1995, at 275-76 (statements of Representatives
Cross and Brunsvold). The amendatory language, applicable only to
vehicle dealers, was reported to be the product of negotiation and
agreement between the Trial Lawyers Association and the office of
the Attorney General. 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May
22, 1995, at 273, 276-77, 290 (statements of Representatives Cross
and Brunsvold); see also 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings,
April 26, 1995, at 30 (statements of Senator Cronin). Representatives
opposed to Senate Bill 317 questioned the necessity of creating a
separate standard under the Act for consumer fraud claims against
vehicle dealers-the main target of consumer complaints. The
legislation, it was argued, creates a maze of notice and negotiation
requirements for consumers and sets up pleading requirements
impossible to prove, thus giving an unfair advantage to vehicle
dealers. 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 22, 1995, at
270-93 (statements of Representatives Schakowsky, Scott, and
Currie).
	The history of Public Acts 87-1140 and 89-144 demonstrates
that they were enacted in response to a perceived problem: abuses of
the Act by certain members of the plaintiffs' bar who purportedly
pursue consumer fraud cases against vehicle dealers simply to
generate legal fees recoverable under the Act. Because the General
Assembly is not required to convince this court of the correctness of
its judgment, we will not second-guess its conclusion that this
problem, of whatever magnitude, exists. See Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 377,
389-90 (declining to consider, for purposes of constitutional challenge
to Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995, whether the
legislature's judgment that the civil justice system needs reform was
correct); Bernier v. Burris, 113 Ill. 2d 219, 230 (1986) (stating that
existence of medical malpractice crisis identified by the legislature was
at least debatable for purposes of special legislation challenge); Grace
v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 485 (1972) (assuming, for purposes of
special legislation challenge, that problems described by proponents
of the legislation do exist). Our task is not to determine whether the
statutory amendments are wise; our task is to determine whether they
are constitutional. See Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 390.
	"[T]he hallmark of an unconstitutional classification is its
arbitrary application to similarly situated individuals without adequate
justification or connection to the purpose of the statute." Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 396; see also Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179,
193-94 (1952) ("it must appear that the particular classification is
based upon some real and substantial difference in kind, situation or
circumstance in the persons or objects on which the classification
rests, and which bears a rational relation to the evil to be remedied and
the purpose to be attained by the statute"). In evaluating a challenged
statutory provision under the special legislation clause, we must
consider "the natural and reasonable effect of the legislation on the
rights affected by the provision." Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 394. As discussed
below, application of these principles in the present case leads us to
conclude that the statutory amendments to section 10a of the Act
constitute impermissible special legislation.
	Under the punitive damage provision added by Public Act
89-144, a court may not award punitive damages where a vehicle
dealer defrauds a consumer unless the plaintiff pleads and proves that
the dealer's conduct was "willful or intentional and done with evil
motive or reckless indifference to the rights of others." 815 ILCS
505/10a(a) (West 1996). Limiting the circumstances under which a
vehicle dealer may be subject to punitive damages does not constitute
a disincentive for attorney abuse of section 10a-the problem the
legislature sought to address. According to the legislative history,
attorneys pursue consumer fraud claims to "ring up" fees recoverable
under the Act. 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 26,
1995, at 30 (statements of Senator Cronin). Attorney fees, however,
may be awarded in the absence of punitive damages. Thus, the
punitive damage provision, which favors vehicle dealers, is not
adequately connected to the purpose of the legislation.
	The "public injury" provision suffers from the same infirmity.
Under this provision, in order to state a cause of action against a
vehicle dealer under section 10a, a consumer must plead facts
demonstrating a "public injury, a pattern, or an effect on consumers
and the public interest generally." 815 ILCS 505/10a(a) (West 1996).
Factors demonstrating a public injury include violation of a statute
that has a public interest impact, repeated acts prior to the act
involving the plaintiff, and the potential for repetition. 815 ILCS
505/10a(a) (West 1996). This additional hurdle increases the burden
to consumers defrauded by vehicle dealers by requiring proof of an
element not required in any other consumer fraud case. We fail to see
in what way this increased burden to consumers, and concomitant
benefit to vehicle dealers, addresses the problem of attorney abuse
perceived by the legislature. To be sure, an attorney cannot "ring up"
fees if the minimum pleading requirements cannot be satisfied and the
case cannot proceed. The result, however, is that consumers who have
legitimate claims against vehicle dealers may be precluded entirely
from vindicating their rights under the Act.
	The provisions governing presuit notice and offers of settlement
(815 ILCS 505/10a(h) (West 1996)) and the provisions governing
pretrial offers of judgment (815 ILCS 505/10a(f), (g) (West 1996))
are also problematic. Under these provisions, a consumer defrauded
by a vehicle dealer runs the risk of forfeiting attorney fees recoverable
under the Act if the consumer improvidently rejects a vehicle dealer's
presuit offer of settlement or pretrial offer of judgment. That the
consumer's rejection of the offer was made in good faith or the
difference between the offer and judgment is slight is of no
consequence; if the offer is greater than the judgment ultimately
obtained, the statutory amendments prohibit the court from awarding
attorney fees. See 815 ILCS 505/10a(f), (h) (West 1996). The ability
to recover attorney fees, however, allows defrauded consumers,
whose claims are frequently small, to obtain counsel and seek redress
under the Act. See Majcher v. Laurel Motors, Inc., 287 Ill. App. 3d
719, 732 (1997); Totz v. Continental Du Page Acura, 236 Ill. App. 3d
891, 910 (1992). Compromising a consumer's ability to recover legal
fees renders the protections of the Act illusory.
	Defendant contends, however, that the legislative history
demonstrates that the General Assembly "perceived a crisis with
respect to lawsuits filed against automobile dealers under the Act, and
rationally undertook to reduce the burden on the automobile
industry." According to defendant, vehicle dealers are thus "unique
among retailers," and the classification favoring them does not offend
the special legislation clause.
	Defendant's conclusion that the legislature perceived a "crisis"
amounts to unsupported hyperbole. This aside, we disagree with
defendant's contention that vehicle dealers are "unique among
retailers" for purposes of the statutory amendments to section10a.
Rather, as is demonstrated by the following exchange during the
House debates on Senate Bill 317, vehicle dealers are indistinguishable
from other retailers:
			"Currie: *** Could I ask why you want to single out car
dealers rather than, for example, yacht dealers or other
people who might in some manner defraud a hapless
consumer?
* * *
			Cross: Well, Representative, this was language that was
agreed upon by ... as I said earlier, the trial lawyers and the
Attorney General's Office. In talking with them, it was an
attempt to compromise, it was an attempt to work out an
agreement. As I just said earlier, they are neutral on the Bill.
This seems to be one area where there has been an abuse of
this statute prior to this proposed Amendment. That's the
reason for limiting it to that. If you want to broaden the
people or the entities or the agencies that have been listed,
*** I'll be glad to work with you on that. If you want to
include yacht dealers that's fine. If you want to include
refrigerator dealers that's fine, if you want to include air
conditioner dealers that's fine, motorcycle dealers. I'd be
more than happy to talk to you about it." (Emphasis added.)
89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 22, 1995, at
290-91 (statements of Representatives Currie and Cross).
Despite the "unique" position defendant claims vehicle dealers occupy,
they are apparently no more unique than yacht dealers, refrigerator
dealers, air conditioner dealers or motorcycle dealers.
	Defendant also contends that the amendments to section 10a
further the legislature's objectives by promoting the equitable
settlement of lawsuits against vehicle dealers and preventing the filing
of frivolous suits against vehicle dealers. Defendant states: "There can
be no better benefit bestowed upon the consumer who believes he/she
has been wronged by an automobile dealer than to resolve the dispute
quickly." Without regard to whether a "better benefit" may be
bestowed upon a consumer, we disagree with defendant that the
punitive damage provision and public-injury pleading requirement
promote settlement or prevent the filing of frivolous suits. To the
extent the provisions governing presuit notice, presuit offers of
settlement, and pretrial offers of judgment (815 ILCS 505/10a(f)
through (h) (West 1996)) encourage consumers and vehicle dealers to
evaluate the merits of a claim realistically, we agree with plaintiff that
this is an area "where a general law *** can be made applicable." Ill.
Const. 1970, art. IV, §13. We note that the federal offer-of-judgment
rule, upon which subsection 10a(f) was modeled, is a rule of general
applicability in civil proceedings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 68.
	We are cognizant that the legislature is not required to choose the
single, most effective remedy against a perceived problem. Bernier,
113 Ill. 2d  at 252. Here, however, the remedy chosen by the
legislature, and the resulting classification, are not adequately
connected to the purpose of the statute. Indeed, the remedy turns the
statute on its head. Rather than protecting consumers from unethical
business practices of vehicle dealers, the amendments protect vehicle
dealers from legitimate claims that the consumers of their products
may possess. As we have previously recognized, "[t]he courts of this
State must be open to all those similarly situated upon the same
conditions, and where procedures are provided which are applicable
to some and not applicable to others under substantially like
circumstances and there are no discernible logical reasons apparent for
the variations, they must fall as violative of [the special legislation
clause]." Lorton v. Brown Community Unit School District No. 1, 35 Ill. 2d 362, 366 (1966). The amendments to section 10a of the Act,
which establish procedures applicable only to consumers pursuing
fraud claims against vehicle dealers, fall into this category.
Accordingly, we hold that Public Acts 87-1140 and 89-144 are void
as impermissible special legislation. The effect of our determination is
to relegate the parties to such rights as they may have had prior to the
enactment of this legislation. See Grasse, 412 Ill.  at 201.
	Our decision today is consistent with prior decisions of this court
invalidating legislative classifications that had an artificially narrow
focus, designed primarily to confer a benefit on a particular group,
rather than to promote the general welfare. See Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at
395 (collecting cases). We note, too, that our decision does not leave
vehicle dealers, or any other consumer fraud defendant, who may be
faced with defending a frivolous suit without recourse. Under the Act,
a court may award attorney fees and costs to the "prevailing party."
815 ILCS 505/10a(c) (West 1996). This provision applies to
prevailing defendants, as well as prevailing plaintiffs. See Graunke v.
Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth Volvo, Inc., 247 Ill. App. 3d 1015, 1020
(1993). Vehicle dealers, as well as all parties to a consumer fraud suit,
may also seek sanctions under Supreme Court Rule 137 where it
appears that a pleading, motion, or other paper has been "interposed
for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." 155 Ill. 2d R. 137.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court invalidating Public Acts 87-1140 and 89-1144 as
violative of the special legislation clause of our state constitution (Ill.
Const. 1970, art. IV, §13).



Affirmed.
	Like the majority, I believe that the amendments to section 10a(a)
of the Act run afoul of the special legislation clause. Neither the
punitive damages limitation nor the public-injury pleading requirement
bears a meaningful relation to the abuses identified by the legislature,
as neither provision restricts an attorney's ability to "ring up" fees in
vehicle cases involving only nominal claims. I therefore join in the
majority opinion to the extent that it invalidates these two particular
amendments.
	That said, I am convinced that the remaining amendments to
section 10a are perfectly constitutional. The special legislation clause
does not prohibit all classifications; rather, its purpose is to prevent
only arbitrary legislative classifications. In re Petition of the Village
of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d 117, 122 (1995). Accordingly, if any set
of facts can reasonably be conceived to justify distinguishing the class
to which the statute applies from the class to which the statute is
inapplicable, then the General Assembly may constitutionally classify
persons or objects for purpose of legislative regulation or control and
may enact laws applicable only to those persons or objects. In re
Petition of the Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d  at 122. Stated
differently, a statute will be held unconstitutional as special legislation
"only if it was enacted for reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of
a legitimate State goal." (Emphasis added.) Bilyk v. Chicago Transit
Authority, 125 Ill. 2d 230, 236 (1988). In this context, the General
Assembly is not required to convince this court of the correctness of
its legislative judgment, as this court is not empowered to adjudicate
the accuracy of legislative findings. Best v. Taylor Machine Works,
179 Ill. 2d 367, 389-90 (1997).
	According to the majority, the amendments at issue "were
enacted in response to a perceived problem: abuses of the Act by
certain members of the plaintiffs' bar who purportedly pursue
consumer fraud cases against vehicle dealers simply to generate legal
fees recoverable under the Act." Slip op. at 12-13. According to one
of the amendments' sponsors, "[t]his seems to be one area where
there has been an abuse of this statute." 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House
Proceedings, May 22, 1995, at 290-91 (statement of Representative
Cross). That this problem exists must be taken as true, as "[c]ourts are
not empowered to 'adjudicate' the accuracy of legislative findings."
Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 389.(1) Consequently, the only question for this
court is whether the amendments at issue were enacted "for reasons
totally unrelated" to the problem identified by the legislature.
(Emphasis added.) Bilyk, 125 Ill. 2d  at 236. If they were not, then
they are constitutional and must be enforced.
	There is no question that the amendments relating to notice and
settlement are directly related to the abuses identified by the
legislature. See 815 ILCS 505/10a(f), (g), (h) (West 1996). The notice
requirement provides that, at least 30 days prior to filing suit against
a car dealer under the Act, the plaintiff must serve the dealer with both
a notice of claim and a demand for relief. 815 ILCS 505/10a(h) (West
1996). The dealer then has 30 days in which to make a settlement
offer, which the plaintiff may accept or reject. 815 ILCS 505/10a(h)
(West 1996). If the plaintiff rejects the offer, and the judgment
ultimately obtained is less than that offer, then the plaintiff forfeits
attorney fees and costs from the date of the offer. 815 ILCS
505/10a(h) (West 1996). The settlement provisions allow both
consumer fraud plaintiffs and car dealer defendants, at any time more
than 30 days before trial, to tender an offer of judgment to be entered
against the car dealer. If the plaintiff rejects the dealer's offer and later
fails to obtain a judgment greater than that offer, then the plaintiff
forfeits attorney fees and costs from the date of the offer. 815 ILCS
505/10a(f) (West 1996). If the dealer rejects the plaintiff's offer, and
the plaintiff later obtains a judgment greater than or equal to that
offer, then the plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest as of the
date of the offer. 815 ILCS 505/10a(g) (West 1996). 
	No one can seriously contend that the foregoing amendments
were enacted for reasons "totally unrelated" to the problem identified
by the legislature: namely, the filing and dragging out of nominal
vehicular fraud claims for the sole purpose of "ringing up" statutory
attorney fees. Sections 10a(f) and 10a(h) give car dealers, who the
legislature specifically identified as uniquely subject to the Act's
abuse, the opportunity to assess a claim, make a settlement offer, and
at least attempt to stem the accumulation of superfluous fees. Section
10a(g), in turn, ensures that the risk is spread evenly, as car dealers
who improvidently reject a reasonable settlement offer run the risk of
paying not only the judgment, attorney fees, and costs, but
prejudgment interest as well.(2) In other words, these amendments
narrowly target an isolated form of litigation abuse while
simultaneously preserving an injured victim's statutory right to relief,
including the collection of attorney fees. Admittedly, these
amendments may someday induce a plaintiff to accept a less-than-ideal
settlement offer, and they may even insulate the occasional car dealer
from paying the plaintiff's attorney fees simply because the offer
exceeded the judgment by a single dollar. That, however, is not our
concern. "[T]he search for less onerous alternative means of securing
a governmental interest" has no place in rational-basis review
(Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 103 Ill. 2d 483, 509 (1984)),
and the legislature is by no means limited to choosing the single, most
effective remedy for a given problem (Bernier v. Burris, 113 Ill. 2d 219, 252 (1986)).
	In sum, I agree with the majority's decision to invalidate the
amendments to section 10a(a) of the Act. The remaining amendments,
however, are constitutional and should be enforced.
	JUSTICE GARMAN joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.
	 
1.   The existence of this problem is further corroborated by the fact that both the Illinois
	Trial Lawyers Association and the Illinois Attorney General's office willingly participated in the drafting of these amendments.
2.   The majority's characterization of these amendments as a wholesale bonanza for car dealers
	is incomplete at best. Indeed, the majority opinion focuses exclusively upon the unique benefits that car dealer defendants enjoy
	under sections 10a(f) and 10a(h), while nowhere acknowledging the concomitant and equally unique burden that such defendants bear
	under section 10a(g). Only car dealers risk the assessment of prejudgment interest for improvidently rejecting a settlement offer. See
	815 ILCS 505/10a(g) (West 1996).