Case Title: Opinion of the Justices to the Senate

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12092

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12092 
 
OPINION OF THE JUSTICES TO THE SENATE. 
 
 
 
Beach.  Public Land.  Real Property, Beach, Littoral property. 
 
 
 
 
On May 26, 2016, the Justices submitted the following 
response to a question propounded to them by the Senate. 
 
 
 
To the Honorable the Senate of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts: 
 
The undersigned Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court 
respectfully submit this response to the question set forth in 
an order adopted by the Senate on April 13, 2016, and 
transmitted to us the next day.  For reasons outlined below, we 
are unable to answer specifically, either yes or no, the 
question as it has been presented to us. 
 
The order concerns a bill, House No. 753, that is presently 
pending in the Senate committee on Rules, entitled "An Act 
preserving public trust rights in land affected by ocean 
 
 
2 
erosion."1  The order indicates that "the bill was reported 
favorably out of the joint committee on Environment, Natural 
Resources and Agriculture" before being referred to the Senate 
committee.  The bill proposes an amendment to G. L. c. 91, § 35.  
Chapter 91 is the Massachusetts waterways statute; together with 
the regulations promulgated thereunder, it provides for 
extensive State regulation of the Commonwealth's interest in 
tidelands and other coastal and inland waterways, including 
great ponds.  Section 35 presently consists of one sentence:  
"The provisions of this chapter relative to great ponds shall 
apply only to ponds containing in their natural state more than 
ten acres of land, and shall be subject to any rights in such 
ponds which have been granted by the commonwealth."  The bill 
would add a second sentence to § 35, following the existing 
text, that states:  "Where sea level rise, storms, or other 
natural processes have caused the landward or lateral movement 
of a barrier beach into an area which was previously occupied by 
the bottom of any Great Pond or onto any other public land, the 
portion of the barrier beach relocated into the former bottom of 
the Great [P]ond or onto other public land shall be and remain 
in public ownership." 
                                                        
1 We note that identically worded bills have been filed in 
at least three previous sessions of the Legislature.  See House 
No. 804 of 2013-2014 (188th General Court); House No. 254 of 
2011-2012 (187th General Court); House No. 4725 of 2009-2010 
(186th General Court). 
 
 
3 
 
The order further recites that "grave doubt exists whether 
the bill, if enacted, would comply with" art. 10 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, and that "some decision must 
be made on the current bill prior to the end of this legislative 
session" on July 31, 2016.  The order then states the question 
that the Senate puts to us:  "Does House No. 753, if enacted, 
comply with" art. 10 and the Fourteenth Amendment? 
 
We are unable to answer the question as it is presented 
because the meaning of some of the significant terms and 
concepts in the bill are unclear to us, the question itself is 
quite broad and not susceptible to a single yes or no answer, 
and a complete answer may depend on facts and circumstances we 
do not have before us. 
 
1.  The principal focus of the bill appears to be on the 
migration of barrier beaches into great ponds.  It declares that 
any barrier beach that moves as a result of natural forces into 
an area that is, or perhaps at one time was, a great pond shall 
thereafter be deemed public land.2,3  What constitutes a great 
                                                        
 
2 The bill is not limited to the movement of beaches into 
great ponds.  It also provides that the natural movement of a 
barrier beach "onto any other public land" shall result in the 
beach becoming public land.  Neither the bill nor the order 
specifies whether "other public land" refers only to land owned 
by the Commonwealth or also includes land owned by a 
municipality or by the Federal government. 
 
 
 
4 
pond, and the significance of a body of water being a great 
pond, has been discussed in many of our cases.  See 
Massachusetts Water Resources Commission, Compilation and 
Summarization of the Massachusetts General Laws, Special Laws, 
Pertinent Court Decisions, Etc., Relating to Water and Water 
Rights 26 (1965) (Compilation and Summarization); 
J.J. Whittlesey, Law of the Seashore, Tidewaters and Great Ponds 
in Massachusetts and Maine 12-13 and 25-31 (1932) (Law of the 
Seashore).  It suffices to say that a pond that exceeds ten 
acres in its natural state is a great pond.  See G. L. c. 91, 
§ 35; 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 9.02 (2014) (defining "[g]reat 
[p]ond").  With limited exceptions, the waters of a great pond 
and the land that comprises the bed of the pond to the natural 
low water mark belong to the Commonwealth, and the ponds are 
held in trust for certain public uses.  See Massachusetts Water 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
Moreover, the bill does not indicate whether the "public 
ownership" that would result from the migration of a barrier 
beach into a great pond, or onto other public land, necessarily 
signifies ownership by the Commonwealth.  The import seems to be 
that a barrier beach that moves into a great pond would be in 
the "public ownership" of the Commonwealth.  We assume that a 
barrier beach that moves "onto any other public land," not owned 
by the Commonwealth, is intended under the bill to become the 
property of the public entity that owns that land, which may be 
a municipality or the Federal government. 
 
 
3 The bill does not indicate whether it contemplates that a 
barrier beach, before its movement into a great pond or onto 
other public land, was publicly or privately owned.  Presumably 
it could be either.  We assume that the bill would apply to all 
barrier beaches, even those that are privately owned and those 
owned by a municipality or by the Federal government. 
 
 
5 
Resources Commission, Compilation and Summarization, supra; 
J.J. Whittlesey, Law of the Seashore, supra. 
 
The term "barrier beach," although central to the bill, is 
not defined in the bill or in the Senate's order.  It does not 
appear to be defined anywhere in G. L. c. 91, in the regulations 
promulgated by the Department of Environmental Protection 
pursuant to G. L. c. 91, or in any other chapter of the General 
Laws.  The term has been defined by the Department of 
Environmental Protection and the Office of Coastal Zone 
Management for environmental management purposes, i.e., to 
regulate development and other activities in environmentally 
sensitive areas;4 we are not aware of any specific definition of 
                                                        
 
4 See, e.g., 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.29(2) (2014), 
promulgated pursuant to G. L. c. 131, § 40, the wetlands 
protection statute.  That regulation defines a "[b]arrier 
[b]each" for wetlands protection purposes as "a low-lying strip 
of land generally consisting of coastal beaches and dunes 
extending roughly parallel to the trend of the coast.  It is 
separated from the mainland by a narrow body of fresh, brackish 
or saline water or a marsh system.  A barrier beach may be 
joined to the mainland at one or both ends."  310 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 10.29(2).  See also Massachusetts Barrier Beach Task 
Force, Guidelines for Barrier Beach Management in Massachusetts 
(1994).  The term is also defined by the Department of 
Environmental Protection in a similar fashion in Title 5 of the 
State environmental code, which governs on-site sewage treatment 
and disposal.  See 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 15.002 (2014). 
 
 
This court has also used the term in several of its 
opinions, typically referring to a particular land formation at 
issue in a case, but never in the sense of providing a 
definition of the term or suggesting that it has a universally 
understood meaning.  See, e.g., Doherty v. Planning Bd. of 
Scituate, 467 Mass. 560, 563 (2014); Friends & Fishers of 
 
 
6 
the term for the purpose it is being used by the Legislature 
here, to define the fee ownership of real property.  We are 
reluctant to opine on the important question posed without a 
specific understanding of what is meant by the Legislature when 
it uses the term in this particular context. 
 
Even if we were to assume the Legislature intends to define 
"barrier beach" in a manner similar to the existing 
environmental protection regulations, there is no indication 
that the new language is meant to apply only to those movements 
of barrier beaches that occur after the statute is amended.  
Some language in the bill suggests that it may apply as well to 
movements of barrier beaches that have already occurred; 
however, it contains no reference to a point in time past when 
the phrases "previously occupied by the bottom of any Great 
Pond" and "the former bottom of [a] Great [P]ond" are to be 
measured.  It is conceivable, therefore, that the passage of the 
bill would turn an existing barrier beach that is now privately 
owned into public land if it is located in what was, at some 
undefined point in the past, "an area which was previously 
occupied by the bottom of any Great Pond."  We make this 
observation to underscore the potential significance of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
Edgartown Great Pond, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 
446 Mass. 830, 832 (2006); Lorusso v. Acapesket Improvement 
Ass'n, 408 Mass. 772, 774, 776 (1990). 
 
 
7 
proposed change and its potential effect on existing and future 
property rights. 
 
2.  The question framed for our advice, like the bill 
itself, is not entirely clear.  We are asked whether the bill, 
if enacted, would "comply with" art. 10 of the Declaration of 
Rights5 and with the Fourteenth Amendment.6  These constitutional 
provisions protect a variety of rights and interests.  We assume 
that the question is focused on takings of real property, and 
that by asking whether the bill would comply with these 
provisions, the question in essence asks whether the bill, if 
                                                        
 
5 Article 10 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
provides, in part:  "Each individual of the society has a right 
to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and 
property, according to standing laws.  He is obliged, 
consequently, to contribute his share to the expense of this 
protection; to give his personal service, or an equivalent, when 
necessary: but no part of the property of any individual can, 
with justice, be taken from him, or applied to public uses, 
without his own consent, or that of the representative body of 
the people.  In fine, the people of this commonwealth are not 
controllable by any other laws than those to which their 
constitutional representative body have given their consent.  
And whenever the public exigencies require that the property of 
any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall 
receive a reasonable compensation therefor. . . ." 
 
 
6 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides:  "All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they 
reside.  No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
 
 
8 
enacted, would effect a taking of private property for public 
purposes, for which just compensation would be required. 
 
Even on that assumption, however, the question is too broad 
to permit a single answer.  The question would require us to 
determine whether, in any imaginable scenario, the bill's 
declaration that land will be "in public ownership" would 
establish a physical taking of privately-owned property; and if 
so, whether that taking would be for a permissible public 
purpose.  These types of issues are typically resolved in 
adversary litigation, on concrete sets of facts.  Here there are 
no concrete facts.  We have not been supplied with legislative 
facts, a report of testimony or other evidence that was before 
the joint committee, or other material that might inform our 
views on the matter presented.  We have no facts pertaining to 
particular properties -- beaches, ponds, or adjacent properties 
-- that may be affected by the proposed new language.  There is 
also no indication as to how many properties might be affected. 
 
With the limited information we have, we cannot say 
definitively that there would or would not be permissible, 
compensable takings if this bill were enacted.  There are simply 
too many uncertainties for us to give a single answer that would 
apply to all properties that might be affected, and all possible 
scenarios. 
 
 
9 
 
3.  The court recently discussed various common-law 
principles in White v. Hartigan, 464 Mass. 400, 407-408 (2013), 
that may have some bearing on the question, and, at least, will 
serve to illustrate some of the difficulties that the question 
entails.7  The court stated that "littoral (shoreline) boundaries 
are not fixed, because natural processes of accretion or erosion 
can change them," and that "[t]he line of ownership [of littoral 
property] follows the changing water line" (citations omitted).  
Id. at 407.  The court has applied these principles to littoral 
property on ponds.  See Lorusso v. Acapesket Improvement Ass'n, 
408 Mass. 772 (1990).  The Lorusso case involved a coastal pond, 
as the bill before us seems to contemplate.8  The court held that 
certain littoral property owners on Green Pond in the town of 
Falmouth had acquired ownership of accretions to their property, 
                                                        
 
7 In White v. Hartigan, the court expressly left open a 
question similar to the question on which the Justices are now 
being asked to opine.  The court said:  "We offer no view as to 
any interest the Commonwealth may arguably have in the portions 
of the beach that have migrated into the beds of the upland 
coastal ponds.  See Attorney General v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct 
Corp., 133 Mass. 361, 364 (1882) ('The great ponds of the 
Commonwealth belong to the public, and, like the tide waters and 
navigable streams, are under the control and care of the 
Commonwealth')."  White v. Hartigan, 464 Mass. 400, 406 n.12 
(2013). 
 
 
8 Neither the bill nor the Senate order expressly 
differentiates between inland great ponds and coastal great 
ponds.  Because the bill speaks of the movement of a "barrier 
beach" into a great pond, we believe the bill must be aimed at 
coastal great ponds, like those that were present in White v. 
Hartigan, supra. 
 
 
 
10 
in the former bed of the pond, that were the result (in part) of 
the natural movement of a barrier beach into the pond.9  The 
court's opinion does not indicate, however, whether Green Pond 
is a great pond, and does not discuss any special principles 
that might apply in the case of great ponds.10 
 
Generally speaking, "[a] littoral proprietor on a great 
pond containing more than ten acres has ownership of the soil to 
low water mark."  Massachusetts Water Resources Commission, 
Compilation and Summarization, supra at 27.  See, e.g., Potter 
                                                        
 
9 The accretions in that case resulted from a combination of 
the natural landward movement of a "barrier beach" (also 
referred to by the court and the parties as a "sand bar") and 
the dumping of "spoil" (excavated soil) from a public dredging 
project.  The court stated in relevant part: 
 
 
"We begin our legal analysis by setting forth some 
well-established relevant principles having to do with the 
rights of littoral landowners.  One of these is that, when 
the boundary between the water and the land changes by the 
gradual deposit of sand and clay and the like, then the 
line of ownership ordinarily follows the changing water 
line.  Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 342 
Mass. 251, 253-254 (1961).  A littoral owner can acquire 
ownership of such accretions caused by either natural 
processes or human intervention if they were not caused by 
the owner himself.  Id. at 254." 
 
Lorusso v. Acapesket Improvement Ass'n, 408 Mass. 772, 780 
(1990). 
 
 
10 Parenthetically, we note that the Commonwealth was named 
as a defendant in the Lorusso case.  It asserted no claim to the 
disputed land, and on appeal it urged the affirmance of the 
judgment of the Land Court that had determined that the littoral 
property owners had acquired ownership of the sand bar as an 
accretion to their property.  Lorusso v. Acapesket Improvement 
Ass'n, supra at 773. 
 
 
11 
v. Howe, 141 Mass. 357, 359 (1886) (recognizing that ownership 
of private property bounded by great pond extends to natural low 
water mark); Inhabitants of W. Roxbury v. Stoddard, 7 Allen. 
158, 167 (1863) (describing boundary of property on great pond 
as "to low-water mark").  The natural water lines of a great 
pond, as with other bodies of water, may of course change over 
time as a result of natural events including accretion or 
reliction.11  This would seem to be especially true in cases of 
coastal ponds, where the contours of the coastlines, beaches, 
and ponds will be affected by storms, rises in sea level, and 
other natural forces.  The question then becomes whether the 
boundaries of the littoral property on great ponds change along 
with these natural changes in the water lines.  It is a question 
that raises important and complex competing principles of 
private property law and the Commonwealth's protection of the 
public trust that were not addressed in the Lorusso case, supra.  
                                                        
 
11 "Accretions are additions of alluvion (sand, sediment, or 
other deposits) to waterfront land; relictions are lands once 
covered by water that become dry when the water recedes."  Stop 
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Environmental 
Protection, 560 U.S. 702, 708 (2010).  The Court described the 
process of "avulsion" as a sudden or perceptible change to the 
littoral land by natural forces, as opposed to the gradual and 
imperceptible change that constitutes accretion or reliction.  
Id. at 708-709. 
 
 
 
12 
The issues cannot properly be resolved in an advisory opinion, 
at least not with the limited information we have here.12 
 
4.  For these reasons, we respectfully respond to the 
Senate order by saying that we are unable to answer the question 
as it has been presented. 
 
 
 
                                                        
 
12 Often, when the Justices are faced with a request for an 
advisory opinion, we invite interested individuals and 
organizations to submit briefs on the question or questions 
presented.  These briefs can provide useful background 
information, inform our views, and sharpen our advice. 
 
 
We do not think this is a suitable occasion to request 
briefs, for two reasons.  First, as we have said, the scope of 
the question asked of us is extremely broad.  Even with the 
assistance of briefs, we doubt we would be able to provide a 
response to the question as it has been presented.  See, e.g., 
Answer of the Justices, 364 Mass. 838, 846-847 (1973) ("Thus, 
the question is 'abstract' in the sense that it cannot be 
answered at its present level of generality without first 
considering each of the multitude of factual questions which are 
implicit in it.  No single answer could possibly be 
appropriate").  Second, as we also have stated, we are mindful 
that significant private property rights are at stake, which 
will almost certainly be litigated if the bill were enacted.  In 
these particular circumstances, and especially in light of the 
breadth of the bill and the question, those rights are better 
left for adjudication in adversary litigation, where they can be 
considered on a fully developed record, with reference to 
concrete facts.  Cf. Opinion of the Justices, 363 Mass. 889, 898 
(1973) ("Where private rights are involved . . . it would 
normally be inappropriate for us to give an opinion on a matter 
of statutory construction which could be brought to the court by 
the usual litigation process, initiated by the parties in 
interest"). 
 
 
13 
 
The foregoing response is submitted by the Chief Justice 
and the Associate Justices subscribing hereto on the 26th day of 
May, 2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RALPH D. GANTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FRANCIS X. SPINA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ROBERT J. CORDY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MARGOT BOTSFORD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FERNANDE R.V. DUFFLY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BARBARA A. LENK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GERALDINE S. HINES