Case Title: Robert J. Pleus, Jr. v. Charles J. Crist, Jr., Governor

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC09-565

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2009-07-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-565 
____________ 
 
ROBERT J. PLEUS, JR.,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
CHARLES J. CRIST, JR., GOVERNOR,  
Respondent. 
 
[July 2, 2009] 
 
LABARGA, J. 
 
Petitioner Robert J. Pleus, Jr., a retired judge of the Fifth District Court of 
Appeal, filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this Court seeking an order 
compelling Governor Crist to fill the vacancy created in the Fifth District Court of 
Appeal by the Petitioner’s mandatory resignation.1  The issue raised by the petition 
concerns the extent of the Governor’s authority in making judicial appointments 
                                          
 
1.  Article V, section 8, of the Florida Constitution provides, in pertinent 
part, that ―[n]o justice or judge shall serve after attaining the age of seventy years 
except upon temporary assignment or to complete a term, one-half of which has 
been served.‖  Petitioner has served on the Fifth District Court of Appeal as a 
senior judge since his retirement.  
 
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under the Florida Constitution.2  Specifically, we are called upon to decide whether 
the Governor must fill the vacancy created by Petitioner’s resignation with a 
judicial appointment from the list of nominees certified to him on November 6, 
2008, and do so within sixty days of receiving that list.3  Having reviewed the 
parties’ pleadings, as well as the briefs filed by Amici Curiae,4 and in consideration 
of the oral arguments, we conclude that the Florida Constitution mandates that the 
Governor appoint a judicial nominee within sixty days of the certification of 
nominees by the Judicial Nominating Commission for the Fifth Appellate District.  
We also conclude that, within this process, the Governor is not provided the 
authority under the constitution to reject the certified list and request that a new list 
be certified. 
I.  Background 
The facts are not in dispute.  Petitioner tendered his resignation as judge of 
the Fifth District Court of Appeal to the Governor on September 2, 2008, to 
                                          
 
 
2.  This case does not involve any claim that the process for the selection of 
the nominees was tainted by impropriety or illegality.  Our decision in this case 
should not be understood to suggest that no remedy would be available to address 
such a tainted process. 
3.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(8), Fla. Const.   
 
4.  Amicus briefs were filed, with leave of Court, by the Appellate Practice 
Section of The Florida Bar, the Central Florida Association for Women Lawyers, 
and the Florida State Conference of Branches of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People. 
   
 
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become effective on January 5, 2009.  Having accepted the Petitioner’s letter of 
resignation, the Governor requested that the Judicial Nominating Commission for 
the Fifth Appellate District (hereinafter ―JNC‖) provide him with a list of qualified 
applicants.  A total of twenty-six applicants sought the appointment.  The JNC 
reviewed the applications and conducted interviews.  On November 6, 2008, the 
JNC certified to the Governor a list of six nominees for appointment to the Fifth 
District Court of Appeal. 
In a letter dated December 1, 2008, the Governor advised the JNC Chair that 
he was rejecting the certified list of nominees.  In the interest of diversity in the 
courts, the Governor requested that the JNC reconvene to consider the applications 
of three African-Americans who had applied to fill the vacancy.  The JNC met to 
consider the Governor’s request, and resubmitted the original list of nominees to 
the Governor.  The Governor has not filled the vacancy to date. 
II. History and Intent of Article V, Section 11(c), Florida Constitution 
 
Article V, section 11(c), governs the time periods applicable to judicial 
nominating commissions in nominating judicial applicants to fill vacancies and to 
the governor in making judicial appointments.  That provision of the constitution 
expressly requires the following: ―The nominations shall be made within thirty 
days from the occurrence of a vacancy unless the period is extended by the 
governor for a time not to exceed thirty days.  The governor shall make the 
 
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appointment within sixty days after the nominations have been certified to the 
governor.‖ 
 
In the past, we have discussed at length the origin and purpose of article V, 
section 11, of the Florida Constitution, explaining the restraints the constitutional 
provision places on the Governor’s appointment power: 
In the deliberations of the Florida Constitutional Revision 
Commission, it was proposed that judicial nominating commissions 
be created to screen applicants for judicial appointments within their 
respective jurisdictions and to nominate the three best qualified 
persons to the Governor for his appointment.  The commissions were 
to be an arm of the executive appointive power to supplant, at least in 
part, the Governor’s so-called ―patronage committee‖ composed of 
political supporters, to insure that politics would not be the only 
criteria in the selection of judges, and to increase generally the 
efficiency of the judicial appointive process. 
. . . . 
 
. . . [T]he judicial nominating commissions [of the Revised 
Article V of the Florida Constitution, effective January 1, 1973] are 
elevated to constitutional stature and permanence.  The process of 
non-partisan selection has been strengthened even further because 
nominations made by the judicial nominating commissions have now 
been made binding upon the Governor, as he is under a constitutional 
mandate to appoint ―one of not fewer than three persons nominated by 
the appropriate judicial nominating commission.‖  Moreover, the 
Governor must make the appointment within sixty days after the 
nominations have been certified to him.  Fla. Const., art. V (Rev.), § 
11(a), F.S.A.  However, this same provision confers upon the 
Governor the express power to make the final and ultimate selection 
by appointment. 
. . . . 
 
. . . The purpose of the judicial nominating commission is to 
take the judiciary out of the field of political patronage and provide a 
method of checking the qualifications of persons seeking the office of 
judge.  When the commission has completed its investigation and 
reached a conclusion, the persons meeting the qualifications are 
 
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nominated.  In this respect the commissioners act in an advisory 
capacity to aid the Governor in the conscientious exercise of his 
executive appointive power. 
 
. . . . 
This appointive power is diluted by the Constitution to the 
extent that a nomination must be made by the appropriate 
commission, unrestrained by the influence of the Governor.  To allow 
the Governor to guide the deliberations of the commissions by 
imposing rules of procedure could destroy its constitutional 
independence.  This does not preclude him from making 
recommendations concerning rules. 
Seeking to remove some of the discretion of the Governor’s 
office in the appointment of judicial officers is an apparent goal of the 
people which can best be attained by providing discretion to their 
commissions to promulgate rules of procedure for their hearings and 
findings, independent of any of the three standard recognized 
divisions of state government.  While the function of the commissions 
is inherently executive in nature, the mandate for the commissions 
comes from the people and the Constitution, not from the Legislature, 
the Governor, or the Courts. 
 
In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 276 So. 2d 25, 28-30 (Fla. 1973) 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 
Similarly, in Spector v. Glisson, 305 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1974), we restated the 
objective that underlies displacing sole executive prerogative from the judicial 
appointment process: 
The nominating commission process in § 11 of Art. V is really 
a restraint upon the Governor—not a new process for removing from 
the people their traditional right to elect their judges as provided in the 
basic, preceding § 10 of Art. V.  One of the principal purposes behind 
the provision for a nominating commission in the appointive process 
was—not to replace the elective process—but to place the restraint 
upon the ―pork barrel‖ procedure of purely political appointments 
without an overriding consideration of qualification and ability.  It 
was sometimes facetiously said in former years that the best 
 
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qualification to become a judge was to be a friend of the Governor!  
The purpose of such nominating commission, then, was to eliminate 
that kind of selection which some people referred to as ―picking a 
judge merely because he was a friend or political supporter of the 
Governor‖ thereby providing this desirable restraint upon such 
appointment and assuring a ―merit selection‖ of judicial officers. 
 
Id. at 783 (emphasis added).   
III. Discussion 
―The interpretation of the Florida Constitution is a question of law‖ for the 
Court.  Jackson-Shaw Co. v. Jacksonville Aviation Authority, 33 Fla. L. Weekly 
S972, S975 (Fla. Dec. 18, 2008).  In interpreting the constitution, our analysis is 
straightforward.  We begin with an examination of the explicit language of article 
V, section 11(c).  ―If that language is clear, unambiguous, and addresses the matter 
in issue, then it must be enforced as written.‖  Lawnwood Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Seeger, 
990 So. 2d 503, 511 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Fla. Soc’y of Ophthalmology v. Fla. 
Optometric Ass’n, 489 So. 2d 1118, 1119 (Fla. 1986)).  ―Our goal in construing a 
constitutional provision is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the framers and 
voters.‖  Id. at 510.  As we have previously explained: 
 
The fundamental object to be sought in construing a 
constitutional provision is to ascertain the intent of the framers and the 
provision must be construed or interpreted in such manner as to fulfill 
the intent of the people, never to defeat it.  Such a provision must 
never be construed in such manner as to make it possible for the will 
of the people to be frustrated or denied. 
 
 
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Ford v. Browning, 992 So. 2d 132, 136 (quoting Crist v. Fla. Ass’n of Crim. 
Defense Lawyers, 978 So. 2d 134, 140 (Fla. 2008)).  We remain mindful that in 
construing a constitutional provision, we are not at liberty to add words that were 
not placed there originally or to ignore words that were expressly placed there at 
the time of adoption of the provision.  See Lawnwood, 990 So. 2d at 512.   
With these principles in mind, we turn to the language of article V, section 
11(c), of the Florida Constitution:  
(c)  The nominations [for judicial office] shall be made within 
thirty days from the occurrence of a vacancy unless the period is 
extended by the governor for a time not to exceed thirty days.  The 
governor shall make the appointment within sixty days after the 
nominations have been certified to the governor.  
  
Art. V, § 11(c), Fla. Const. (emphasis added).   The plain language of article V, 
section 11(c), mandates that the Governor, upon receipt of the certified list of 
nominees from a judicial nominating commission, make an appointment from that 
list within sixty days to fill the judicial vacancy.  Significantly, in addition to the 
mandatory language that is expressly stated in the provision, we note the absence 
of any language granting the Governor authority to reject the JNC’s certified list of 
nominees or to extend the time in which the appointment for judicial office must 
be made.  Cases such as In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor and Spector 
provide ample historical support for this interpretation. 
 
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Petitioner Pleus has sought mandamus relief in this Court.  To be entitled to 
mandamus relief, ―the petitioner must have a clear legal right to the requested 
relief, the respondent must have an indisputable legal duty to perform the requested 
action, and the petitioner must have no other adequate remedy available.‖  
Huffman v. State, 813 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. 2000).  Based upon our foregoing 
analysis, we hold that article V, section 11(c), imposes a clear and indisputable 
legal duty upon the Governor in his exercise of appointing judicial nominees to act 
within sixty days of receiving the certified list of nominees.  Petitioner, as a citizen 
and taxpayer, has a clear legal right to request that the Governor carry out that 
duty.  See Chiles v. Phelps, 714 So. 2d 453, 456 (Fla. 1998).  In so holding, we 
reject the proposition that the Governor’s failure to act within the mandated time 
frame obviates that duty.  To hold otherwise would render the constitutional 
provision nugatory. 
We also reject the argument that mandamus does not lie because the 
appointment process is an executive function that is inherently discretionary.  By 
allowing this mandamus proceeding, we do not direct the Governor’s discretionary 
decision as to the actual appointment to fill the judicial vacancy.  Rather, we 
simply recognize and enforce the mandate contained in article V, section 11, which 
requires the Governor to adhere to his duty to make an appointment within the 
mandated time frame from the certified list of nominees.  We recognize that, in 
 
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fulfilling this constitutional duty, the Governor has discretion in his selection of a 
nominee from the list. 
Finally, we reject the argument that an action for declaratory judgment in the 
circuit court is an adequate legal remedy under the facts and circumstances of this 
case, thus requiring denial of mandamus in this Court.  As the Court stated in In re 
Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Judicial Vacancies), 600 So. 2d at 462, 
―[v]acancies in [judicial] office are to be avoided whenever possible.  We are 
confident that the framers of article V intended that the nominating and 
appointment process would be conducted in such a way as to avoid or at least 
minimize the time that vacancies exist.‖  In this case, the passage of almost six 
months since the petitioner’s resignation became effective warrants our decision, 
now, in this mandamus proceeding in order to effectuate the intent of the framers 
to avoid or minimize further delay in filling this judicial vacancy.  Moreover, while 
we applaud the Governor’s interest in achieving diversity in the judiciary—an 
interest we believe to be genuine and well-intentioned—the constitution does not 
grant the Governor the discretion to refuse or postpone making an appointment to 
fill the vacancy on the Fifth District Court of Appeal.5 
                                          
 
 
5.  It should be noted that the Legislature has also addressed the interest of 
diversity in the judicial nominating process in section 43.291(4), Florida Statutes 
(2008).  That section provides that the Governor, in appointing members of each 
judicial nominating commission, ―shall seek to ensure that, to the extent possible, 
the membership of the commission reflects the racial, ethnic, and gender diversity, 
 
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CONCLUSION 
We conclude that the Governor is bound by the Florida Constitution to 
appoint a nominee from the JNC’s certified list, within sixty days of that 
certification.  There is no exception to that mandate.  Therefore, we hold that under 
the undisputed facts and specific circumstances present in this case, the Governor 
lacks authority under the constitution to seek a new list of nominees from the JNC 
and has a mandatory duty to fill the vacancy created by Petitioner’s retirement with 
an appointment from the list certified to him on November 6, 2008.  Because we 
believe the Governor will fully comply with the dictates of this opinion, we grant 
the petition but withhold issuance of the writ. 
 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Original Proceeding – Mandamus 
 
Talbot C. D’Alemberte of D’Alemberte and Palmer, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
                                                                                                                                        
as well as geographic distribution, of the population within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the court for which nominations will be considered.‖  § 43.291(4), 
Fla. Stat. (2008).   
 
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Jason Gonzalez, Gerald B. Curington, Erik M. Figlio, and Carly A. Hermanson, 
Executive Office of the Governor, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
Siobhan Helene Shea, Chair, Appellate Practice Section, The Florida Bar, 
Tallahassee, Florida, on behalf of Appellate Practice Section, The Florida Bar;  
Keersten Heskin Martinez of Fisher, Rushmer, Werrenrath, Dickson, Talley and 
Dunlap, P.A., Orlando, Florida, and Joyce C. Fuller of J.C. Fuller, P.A., Winter 
Park, Florida, on behalf of The Central Florida Association of Women Lawyers; 
and Charles E. ―Chuck‖ Hobbs, II, Tallahassee, Florida, on behalf of The Florida 
State Conference of Branches of the NAACP, 
 
 
as Amici Curiae