Case Title: Kozak v. City of Lincoln Park (Opinion on Application)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 152514

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2016-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
KOZAK v CITY OF LINCOLN PARK 
 
 
Docket No. 152514.  Decided July 1, 2016. 
 
Barbara A. Kozak and Kevin J. Kozak brought a negligence action in the Wayne Circuit 
Court against the city of Lincoln Park after Barbara Kozak tripped over a three-inch elevation 
differential between two slabs of concrete that met at the centerline of a highway in the city.  
Plaintiffs alleged that defendant was liable for the resulting injuries under the highway exception 
to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1402(1), because defendant had failed to maintain the 
highway in reasonable repair.  Defendant filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 
2.116(C)(7) and (C)(10), which it supported with an affidavit from its public services director 
stating that the height differential did not render the highway either unsafe or inconvenient for 
public travel.  In response, plaintiffs submitted photographs of the height differential, an affidavit 
from a local resident stating that the roadway had been in that condition for about six years, and 
defendant’s admission that no maintenance, paving, or repaving had been done to that portion of 
the highway before the incident.  The trial court, Kathleen Macdonald, J., granted defendant’s 
motion, and the Court of Appeals, CAVANAGH and SAAD, JJ. (BECKERING, P.J., dissenting), 
affirmed in an unpublished opinion per curiam issued July 21, 2015 (Docket No. 319797).  
Plaintiffs appealed. 
 
In lieu of granting leave to appeal and without hearing oral argument, in a unanimous 
memorandum opinion, the Supreme Court held: 
 
 
The trial court should have denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition, and the 
Court of Appeals erred by concluding to the contrary.  Based on the evidence proffered by 
plaintiffs, including photographic proof of a significant gap of elevation between the slabs of 
pavement, a reasonable jury could conclude that the highway was not in a state of reasonable 
repair so that it was reasonably safe and convenient for public travel.  The only evidence 
submitted by defendant was the affidavit of its public services director, which merely articulated 
his opinion that the condition did not render the highway unsafe or inconvenient for public 
travel.  This conclusory statement was insufficient to support defendant’s motion for summary 
disposition. 
 
Court of Appeals judgment reversed; case remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings. 
©2016 State of Michigan 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Justices: 
Stephen J. Markman 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Joan L. Larsen 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Corbin R. Davis 
FILED  July 1, 2016 
 
 
 S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
BARBARA A. KOZAK and KEVIN J. 
KOZAK, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
 
v 
No. 152514 
 
CITY OF LINCOLN PARK, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
  
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION.  
The sole issue in this case is whether the lower courts erred by concluding that 
plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence of a highway defect such that reasonable 
jurors could conclude that the highway was not in a state of reasonable repair for 
purposes of the “highway exception” to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1402(1).  
Because we conclude that plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to avoid summary 
disposition, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the Wayne 
Circuit Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
OPINION 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
 
Justices: 
Stephen J. Markman 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Joan L. Larsen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
Plaintiff Barbara Kozak alleged she was injured while crossing Kings Highway in 
Lincoln Park when she tripped over a three-inch elevation differential between the two 
slabs of concrete that met at the centerline of the street.  Kozak and her husband brought 
the instant action against defendant, the city of Lincoln Park, pursuant to the “highway 
exception,” alleging that defendant failed to “maintain the highway in reasonable repair 
so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel.”  Defendant moved for 
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (governmental immunity) and (C)(10) (no 
genuine issue of material fact).  The trial court granted defendant’s motion, and the Court 
of Appeals, in a divided unpublished opinion, affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs did not 
provide evidence to counter defendant’s assertions that the road was reasonably safe and 
convenient for public travel.1 
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s determination regarding a motion for 
summary disposition.2 
The governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq., affords broad 
immunity from tort liability to governmental agencies and their employees whenever they 
are engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.3  The GTLA 
provides several exceptions to this general rule, all of which must be narrowly 
                                              
1 Kozak v Lincoln Park, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued 
July 21, 2015 (Docket No. 319797). 
2 Douglas v Allstate Ins Co, 492 Mich 241, 256; 821 NW2d 472 (2012), citing Saffian v 
Simmons, 477 Mich 8, 12; 727 NW2d 132 (2007). 
3 MCL 691.1407(1). 
 
 
 
 
3 
construed.4  One such exception, the “highway exception,” is contained in 
MCL 691.1402 and states in pertinent part: 
Each governmental agency having jurisdiction over a highway shall 
maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and 
convenient for public travel.  A person who sustains bodily injury or 
damage to his or her property by reason of failure of a governmental agency 
to keep a highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair and in a 
condition reasonably safe and fit for travel may recover the damages 
suffered by him or her from the governmental agency.  [MCL 691.1402(1).] 
This exception encompasses injuries to pedestrians.5   
In support of its motion, defendant submitted only the affidavit of Robert Bartok, 
defendant’s Director of Public Services, in which Bartok offered his opinion that the 
height differential “does not render the highway either unsafe or inconvenient for public 
travel” and that “the highway in this area is in fact reasonably safe and convenient for 
public travel.”  Plaintiff countered by submitting various forms of documentary evidence 
in support of their action, including photographs of the height differential, an affidavit 
from a local resident who stated that the roadway had been in that condition for about the 
last six years, and excerpts from Barbara’s deposition, in which she described her fall.  
Plaintiffs also submitted defendant’s answer to written interrogatories, in which 
defendant admitted that “no maintenance, paving or repaving was done to 813 King’s 
Highway prior to the alleged date of the fall.” 
                                              
4 Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm, 463 Mich 143, 158; 615 NW2d 702 (2000). 
5 See Nawrocki, 463 Mich at 171-172. 
 
 
 
 
4 
Considering defendant’s conclusory affidavit alongside the evidence submitted by 
plaintiffs, we conclude that plaintiffs created a genuine issue of material fact giving rise 
to a reasonable inference that the highway was not in reasonable repair.  Based on the 
evidence proffered by plaintiffs, including photographic proof of a significant gap of 
elevation between the slabs of pavement, a reasonable jury could conclude that the 
highway was not in a state of reasonable repair so that it was reasonably safe and 
convenient for public travel.  The only evidence submitted by defendant was the affidavit 
of Bartok, which merely articulated his opinion that the condition did not render the 
highway unsafe or inconvenient for public travel.  An affidavit that contains mere 
conclusory statements is insufficient to support a motion for summary disposition.6  
Consequently, we conclude that the trial court should have denied defendant’s motion for 
summary disposition, and the Court of Appeals erred by concluding to the contrary.7  We 
                                              
6 See Rose v Nat’l Auction Group, Inc, 466 Mich 453, 470; 646 NW2d 455 (2002) 
(stating that conclusory statements are not enough to create a genuine issue of material 
fact under MCR 2.116(C)(7)); Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 371-372; 547 
NW2d 314 (1996) (stating that an affidavit with mere conclusory allegations was 
insufficient to avoid summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10)). 
7 In dissent, Judge BECKERING focused on the trial court’s application of an excerpt from 
this Court’s decision in Wilson v Alpena Co Rd Comm, 474 Mich 161, 169; 713 NW2d 
717 (2006), in which the Court stated that “to prove her case plaintiff must present 
evidence that a reasonable road commission, aware of this particular condition, would 
have understood it posed an unreasonable threat to safe public travel and would have 
addressed it.”  We agree with the dissent that, when read in context, this language in 
Wilson does not require a plaintiff to submit evidence that literally describes what a 
reasonable road commission would do under the facts of each particular case, but rather 
that a plaintiff must submit evidence that the defect in question was of such a nature that 
it would have been apparent to a reasonable road commission that the defect rendered the 
highway not reasonably safe.  However, we note that the Court of Appeals majority did 
not misconstrue this excerpt from Wilson, but instead focused on a sufficiency-of-the-
evidence analysis. 
 
 
 
 
5 
therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the 
Wayne Circuit Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
David F. Viviano 
 
Richard H. Bernstein 
 
Joan L. Larsen