Case Title: Hanna v. Cloud 9, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94-41

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-02-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Hanna v. Cloud 9, Inc.1995 WY 11889 P.2d 529Case Number: 94-41Decided: 02/10/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

Paul 
T. HANNA, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

CLOUD 9, INC., a Wyoming Corporation, Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

District 
Court of Laramie County, Edward L. Grant, J.

Douglas G. Madison and 
Randall B. Reed of Dray, Madison & Thomson, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant.

Patrick J. Murphy of 
Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, for appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Chief Justice.

[¶1]      A patron of 
Appellee's bar filed a complaint for negligence against the bar to recover for 
injuries he sustained in a fight with another patron. That injured patron now 
appeals the trial court's entry of summary judgment against him, following its 
determination that no genuine issues of material fact exist and, under the 
undisputed facts, Appellee owed no duty of care to the 
patron.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant Paul 
Hanna presents the following issues for our review:

I.          
Did [bartender] Susan Riggs have reason to believe that [patron] Paul 
Hanna was in imminent danger and have an opportunity to intervene prior to the 
second assault and battery in the bar?

II.          
What duty did Cloud Nine, Inc. owe [patron] Paul Hanna once the second 
assault and battery commenced?

[¶4]      Appellee Cloud 9, 
Inc. rephrased the issues as:

I.          
Did the district court properly grant summary judgment to the bar, and 
against its intoxicated patron, for injuries that patron sustained in a fight 
with another bar patron.

II.          
Did the district court properly conclude that the bar did not owe a duty 
of protection to appellant under all the circumstances?

III.         Even 
if the bar owed a legal duty of care to appellant, and even if the bar breached 
that duty of care, was the bar a remote cause, not a proximate cause, of 
appellant's injuries?

FACTS

[¶5]      The Cloud 9 Bar, 
located in the Cheyenne airport, is operated independently of but adjoins the 
Cloud 9 Restaurant. Appellant Paul Hanna was an employee of the Cloud 9 
Restaurant. On the evening of Sunday, September 27, 1992, Hanna, who was off 
duty and had spent the afternoon watching a football game and drinking a six 
pack of beer, went to the Cloud 9 Bar where he drank two more beers and visited 
with friends.

[¶6]      Between 
approximately 8:00 and 8:30 that evening, Hanna left the bar and walked into the 
restaurant coffee shop to visit with fellow employees. A short time later, Hanna 
left the coffee shop and entered the kitchen of the restaurant hoping to make 
plans for the evening with the kitchen employees. Once inside the kitchen, Hanna 
encountered the manager of the restaurant, Louis Kutsulis (Louis). When Louis 
saw Hanna, Louis immediately, allegedly without provocation, began yelling 
vulgarities at him which eventually led to a shoving match between the 
two.

[¶7]      While Hanna and 
Louis were yelling at and shoving each other, an employee who had been working 
in the kitchen went into the Cloud 9 Bar and alerted Louis' son, Phillip 
Kutsulis (Phillip), that Hanna and Louis were fighting in the kitchen. Phillip 
entered the kitchen, and after more shouting and shoving between the three, 
Phillip and Louis forced Hanna out the back door of the kitchen and threw him 
off the loading dock.

[¶8]      Hanna proceeded 
toward home, which was within walking distance, and then realized he had left 
his coat and keys in the bar. Hanna returned to the bar and entered through the 
back door. From here the accounts of what happened diverge. What is certain is 
that Hanna met Phillip in the bar and the two fought. During that fight, Phillip 
kicked Hanna in the arm, breaking it, and also inflicted other less serious 
injuries upon him.

[¶9]      On December 8, 
1992, Hanna filed a complaint in district court: against Phillip Kutsulis and 
Louis Kutsulis for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress; against Louis Kutsulis for negligent employment and retention; and 
against Appellee Cloud 9, Inc., for negligence (premises liability) and 
negligent selection of lessee. Hanna obtained a $75,000 judgment against Louis 
and Phillip Kutsulis, jointly and severally; however, the trial court granted 
Appellee's summary judgment motion, finding no genuine issues of material fact 
existed and Appellee, as a matter of law, owed Hanna no duty of care. Hanna has 
abandoned, on appeal, his claims of liability premised upon negligent selection 
of lessee, raising only those issues relating to premises 
liability.

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review

[¶10]   This Court will affirm an entry of 
summary judgment only if no genuine issues of material fact exist and the 
prevailing party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wyo.R.Civ.P. 
56(c). We review a summary judgment in the same light as the district court, 
examining the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing 
the motion and affording that party the benefit of all favorable inferences 
which may fairly be drawn from the record. Mountain Cement Co. v. Johnson, 884 P.2d 30, 32 (Wyo. 1994).

2. Premises Liability

[¶11]   This Court most recently addressed 
the question of tavern keeper liability in White v. HA, Inc., 782 P.2d 1125 
(Wyo. 1989). In White, we held that a tavern keeper owes a duty to his invitee 
to exercise reasonable care in protecting the invitee from the physical assault 
of another invitee if the injured invitee proves:

· 
a disturbance which did attract or should have attracted the tavern keeper's 
attention;

· 
the lapse of a reasonable amount of time between the attracting disturbance and 
the subsequent tortious act on the injured invitee by the other invitee, within 
which time period the tavern keeper had the opportunity to avert the impending 
danger or subsequent tortious act; and

· 
a relationship between the attracting disturbance and the subsequent tortious 
act.

White, 782 P.2d  at 
1129.

[¶12]   We have said the disturbance must 
be more than a battle of violent words; it must be "action, threat of action, or 
some type of demonstration." White, 782 P.2d  at 1129 (quoting Fisher v. Robbins, 
319 P.2d 116, 120 (Wyo. 1957)). In Mayflower Restaurant Co. v. Griego, 741 P.2d 1106 (Wyo. 1987), for example, we found that a threat to assault the injured 
patron, accompanied by shirt-grabbing, constituted the requisite attracting 
disturbance.

[¶13]   Hanna offers three incidents to 
qualify for the requisite attracting disturbance to give rise to the tavern 
keeper's duty:

· 
A July 12, 1992, incident involving Phillip and bar patrons, which incident did 
not involve Hanna, as he was not present, or Louis, as he was not 
present;

· 
The September 27, 1992, "kitchen incident" which occurred about fifteen minutes 
before the tortious act in question (Phillip's kick to Hanna's arm) and which 
involved, at first, Hanna and Louis, and, later, Hanna, Louis, and Phillip; 
or

· 
The September 27, 1992, "bar incident" which occurred anywhere between moments 
to several minutes before the tortious act in question, depending upon which 
"eye witness" version is accepted.

[¶14]   The district court correctly made 
short-shrift of both the July incident and the "kitchen incident." The July 
incident fails as a matter of law to qualify as the attracting disturbance 
because it lacks relationship with the September 27 tortious act. It lacks 
relationship because: neither Louis nor Hanna were present on July 12, the July 
12 incident's subject matter differed from the September 27 incident's subject 
matter, and the two and one half month interval destroyed the imminence element 
inherent in the relationship between the attracting disturbance and the 
subsequent intentional tortious act.

[¶15]   The "kitchen incident" fails to 
qualify as a matter of law because it did not occur in the bar. The tavern 
keeper's duty to exercise care extends only to the bar's physical boundaries. 
White, 782 P.2d  at 1132. We hold that the attracting disturbance must occur on 
the tavern keeper's premises.

[¶16]   The "kitchen incident" also fails 
to qualify as a matter of law because the movant, Cloud 9, Inc., showed with its 
submitted summary judgment material that the bartender, Riggs, did not know 
about the "kitchen incident." In this regard, Riggs' deposition testimony 
was:

Q.        What 
personal knowledge did you have, if any, regarding trouble that Phillip Kutsulis 
may have been in whether he caused it or was just involved in it in the Cloud 9 
Bar?

A.        None. Not 
before that little contra - you know, that little fight that came through the 
doorway, not before at all that I know of.

[¶17]   Hanna does not point us to any 
competent evidence in his submitted opposition material to contradict Riggs' 
testimony that she did not know about the "kitchen incident" when it was 
occurring. Considering, in a light most favorable to Hanna, the depositions of 
two witnesses, Wayne Lackey, a restaurant employee, and Gus Anastopoulos, an 
off-duty bar employee, the most Riggs knew from witnessing Wayne Lackey enter 
the bar to inform Phillip of Louis and Hanna's fight in the kitchen was just 
that, i.e., that Wayne Lackey told Phillip there was a fight and that Phillip 
left the bar. Riggs did not know Phillip accosted Hanna in the kitchen or that 
they engaged in a word battle there. It is not a reasonable inference from that 
quantum of information that Riggs knew the "kitchen incident" involved Phillip 
and Hanna and was of such a nature as to qualify for the attracting 
disturbance.

[¶18]   That leaves, as our remaining 
determination, the question whether the "bar incident" qualifies as the 
attracting disturbance, following which disturbance a reasonable amount of time 
elapsed in which the tavern keeper had the opportunity to avert the tortious 
act. Four witnesses, Riggs, Hanna, and Jonathon Howard and Anna Kutsulis, both 
restaurant employees, related different accounts of the "bar incident." Those 
four accounts are:

1. Riggs: Riggs reported that Phillip and 
Hanna were fighting as they entered the bar. In effect, under her version, no 
attracting disturbance existed. The tortious act and the attracting disturbance 
were one act, and no time elapsed in which the tavern keeper could have averted 
the tortious act.

2. Hanna: Hanna's account really consists 
of two versions, one in his deposition testimony of June 28, 1993, and the other 
in his affidavit dated August 12, 1993. In his deposition testimony, Hanna 
reported that he did not argue with Phillip; everything happened so fast that he 
did not have time to even blink. He entered the bar, walked a few steps, saw 
Phillip walking toward him, Phillip "started" to yell "something," and then 
Phillip kicked him, which kick broke Hanna's arm as he tried to block it. 
Phillip kicked Hanna once more, hitting him between the neck and shoulders and 
knocking him to the ground on his stomach. Phillip hovered over Hanna's 
backside, grabbed his long hair and began dragging Hanna out of the bar, yelling 
"hit me or something, you [expletive deleted], so I can kill you." A fellow 
employee then intervened and pulled Phillip off of Hanna.

[¶19]   Similar to Riggs' account, this 
version, relied upon by Appellee in its motion for summary judgment, presents 
the attracting disturbance and the tortious act as one act. The tavern keeper 
had no opportunity to avert the tortious act.

[¶20]   In his later affidavit, executed 
after Appellee's motion for summary judgment and filed in response thereto, 
Hanna contradicted his deposition version by changing his account to this: Hanna 
entered the bar and before he could get by Phillip, Phillip began yelling 
vulgarities at him. At one point in his tirade, Phillip said to Hanna "come on, 
hit me so I can kill you." Phillip then kicked Hanna, which kick Hanna blocked 
with his arm, breaking it. Hanna estimated that approximately five minutes 
passed between the time Phillip attacked him and the two were 
separated.

[¶21]   The difference between the two 
versions could arguably create a question of fact concerning the lapse of time 
between the attracting disturbance and the tortious act. However, this Court has 
previously announced a policy against allowing a party to create questions of 
fact by contradicting his earlier deposition testimony with an affidavit. We 
stated:

The main concern of the courts faced with such an 
issue has been "that parties not thwart the purpose of Rule 56 by generating 
issues of fact through affidavits that contradict their own 
depositions."

Morris v. Smith, 837 P.2d 679, 685 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Camfield Tires, Inc. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 719 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir. 1983)).

[¶22]   The factors we consider in 
determining whether the submission of the later affidavit constitutes an attempt 
to create a sham fact issue are:

whether the affiant was cross-examined during his 
earlier testimony, whether the affiant had access to the pertinent evidence at 
the time of his earlier testimony or whether the affidavit was based on newly 
discovered evidence, and whether the earlier testimony reflects confusion which 
the affidavit attempts to explain.

Morris, 837 P.2d  at 685 
(quoting Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1237 (10th Cir. 1986)). If this Court 
determines that the conflict between the affidavit and the earlier deposition 
testimony raises only a sham issue of fact, we disregard the contrary affidavit 
for summary judgment purposes. Morris, 837 P.2d  at 685.

[¶23]   Our review of the present situation 
in light of the above-outlined factors reveals that Hanna was cross-examined 
during his earlier deposition testimony, he had access to the pertinent evidence 
since the subject matter was his own memory of the events, and, lastly, the 
earlier testimony did not reflect confusion which the affidavit attempted to 
explain. We thus, in our review of the order granting summary judgment, 
disregard Hanna's affidavit, which affidavit we have found void of any attempt 
to explain the contrary deposition testimony.

3. Howard: In an affidavit dated August 11, 
1993, Howard recounted that the fight in the bar lasted approximately five 
minutes. Howard stated that he entered the bar and witnessed Phillip kicking 
Hanna. Phillip then screamed to Hanna "come on, hit me so I can kill you" and 
kicked Hanna in the arm. Howard did not specify what length of time passed 
between the threat and the kick.

[¶24]   We conclude that Howard's 
affidavit, filed in response to the motion for summary judgment, did not create 
an issue of material fact. A motion for summary judgment places an initial 
burden upon the movant to make a prima facie showing that no genuine issues of 
material fact exist; once that showing is made, the burden shifts to the 
nonmovant to present specific facts showing that genuine issues of fact do 
exist. Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo. 
1987).

[¶25]   In its motion for summary judgment, 
Appellee relied upon Hanna's deposition testimony that no time passed between 
the attracting disturbance and the tortious act. In this regard, Hanna testified 
he did not have time to even blink between the time he entered the bar and 
Phillip kicked him. Hanna reiterated this when he testified that he and Phillip 
did not argue; everything happened too fast for either of them to say 
anything.

[¶26]   Because Howard's affidavit did not 
contradict Hanna's deposition testimony by specifying what length of time passed 
between any act which may have constituted an attracting disturbance and the 
tortious act, it fails to create a question of fact regarding that lapse of 
time.

4. Kutsulis: Anna Kutsulis testified early 
in her March 31, 1993, deposition that Phillip and Hanna argued in the bar for 
five to ten minutes, but by the end of her testimony she agreed it may have been 
closer to one or two minutes. Anna reported that Hanna and Phillip only argued 
in the bar; the fighting took place outside the bar. Although Anna did testify 
that Phillip warned Hanna to leave Louis alone or Phillip would beat him up, she 
did not state that Phillip issued any threats of immediate 
violence.

[¶27]   As we noted earlier in our 
discussion, an argument alone cannot create an attracting disturbance. See 
Fisher, 319 P.2d  at 120. Because Anna's testimony established only that Hanna 
and Phillip argued, we can extract from her testimony no facts establishing an 
attracting disturbance. Anna's account of the events thus creates no genuine 
issues of material fact.

[¶28]   Our painstaking review of the 
varying accounts of the events which culminated in Hanna's injuries reveals no 
questions of fact concerning the attracting disturbance and the subsequent 
tortious act. Under the facts submitted by Appellee in its motion for summary 
judgment, which facts Hanna failed to refute, the tavern keeper had no 
opportunity to intervene and avert the tortious act. We thus affirm the district 
court's determination that, under the undisputed facts, Appellee owes no duty of 
care to Hanna.

[¶29]   We have concluded that the tavern 
keeper had no opportunity to intervene and avert the tortious act. We address 
lastly Hanna's contention that even if the tavern keeper had no opportunity to 
prevent the fight, she had the opportunity, and thus the duty, to intervene 
after the fight commenced.

[¶30]   We will assume, in addressing this 
argument, that the tavern keeper did have a duty to intervene and that she did 
breach that duty. We nonetheless find no questions of fact exist and conclude 
that, because under none of the accounts presented could the tavern keeper have 
prevented the injuries of which Hanna complains, Appellee is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.

[¶31]   As in our earlier summary judgment 
analysis, we disregard Hanna's affidavit. This leaves five minutes as the 
longest reported duration of the fight, as estimated by Howard. However, as we 
noted earlier, Howard's affidavit failed to specify what length of time elapsed 
between Phillip's threat and his kick to Hanna's forearm. Howard's affidavit 
also neglected to specify what length of time elapsed between the beginning of 
the fight and Phillip's kicks to Hanna's forearm and neck. We rely then upon 
Hanna's deposition testimony which specified that Hanna sustained his most 
serious injuries, the initial kick to his forearm and the second kick to his 
neck, as the fight started and within seconds thereafter.

[¶32]   Whether the tavern keeper's 
intervention had been in the form of summoning police assistance or in 
physically separating Phillip and Hanna, and even if we accept as true Howard's 
estimate that the fight lasted five minutes, beginning to end, the tavern 
keeper's intervention could not have prevented the injuries which formed the 
basis of Hanna's damages claim, i.e., the kicks to his forearm and neck. Hanna 
sustained the injuries too quickly for intervention of any sort. We thus 
conclude no questions of fact exist and, as a matter of law, the tavern keeper's 
failure to intervene after the fight commenced was not the proximate cause of 
Hanna's injuries.

CONCLUSION

[¶33]   The decision of the district court 
is affirmed.