Case Title: State v. Machuca

Citation: 

Docket Number: S057910

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2010-02-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: February 11, 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
THOMAS GREGORY MACHUCA,
Respondent on Review.
(CC
050647097; CA A133362; SC S057910)
En Banc
On review from the
Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted
December 16, 2009.
John R. Kroger,
Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review.  With him
on the briefs were Joanna L. Jenkins, Assistant Attorney General, and Jerome
Lidz, Solicitor General.
Peter Gartlan, Chief
Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed
the briefs for respondent on review.
Kevin L. Mannix, Sarah
Hunt Vasche, Ross A. Day, and Tara Lawrence, Kevin L. Mannix, P. C., Salem,
filed a brief on behalf of amici curiae Oregon Anti-Crime Alliance  and
Crime Victims United of Oregon.
Kevin M. Sali, Hoffman Angeli LLP, Portland, and John Henry Hingson III, John Henry Hingson III P.C., Oregon City, filed a brief on behalf of amici curiae ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc.
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
The decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
*Appeal from Multnomah
County Circuit Court, Nely L. Johnson, Judge. 231 Or App 232, 218 P3d 145
(2009).
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
The state seeks review of a Court of Appeals decision that reversed and remanded
defendant's DUII conviction.  The Court
of Appeals concluded that the trial court had erroneously admitted test results
of defendant's blood alcohol content.  The court reasoned that (1) defendant's
consent to have his blood drawn and tested had been unlawfully coerced because
he had been read the legal consequences for refusing to consent to those procedures
as required by Oregon's implied consent statutes, ORS 813.095 to 813.136; and
(2) the dissipation of alcohol from defendant's bloodstream over time did not,
by itself, provide an alternative justification for a warrantless blood draw
conducted to secure evidence of defendant's blood alcohol content.  State v.
Machuca, 231 Or App 232, 218 P3d 145 (2009).  We allowed the state's
petition for review, and, for the reasons that follow, we now reverse the Court
of Appeals decision. 
We
take the facts from the Court of Appeals opinion and the record below:
"Defendant was involved in a single-car
accident on Naito Parkway in Portland; he suffered injuries and was transported
to the hospital emergency room facilities at Oregon Health and Science
University (OHSU).  Officer Oelke, the first officer on the scene, arrived at
approximately 1:52 a.m.  Officer Ladd arrived a few minutes later and took over
the investigation.  By 2:10 a.m., Ladd concluded that there was probable cause
to believe that defendant had committed the crime of DUII.  Ladd then went to
OHSU to investigate further. 
"After Ladd's arrival, hospital personnel
allowed him to enter the emergency room facilities through a locked entry door,
and he was directed by security staff to 'emergency room two.'  Defendant was
alone in the room, 'lying on a hospital bed receiving some care.'  There was a
very strong smell of alcohol in the room.  Defendant, snoring loudly and in a
deep sleep, was slow to wake.  Ladd asked defendant several questions to
evaluate his comprehension.  Ladd explained why he was there and that defendant
was under arrest for DUII and reckless driving.  He gave defendant Miranda
warnings and asked defendant questions from the standard DUII Interview Report
form.  Defendant responded to the questions slowly but directly.  Ladd
testified that defendant 'understood he'd bee[n] in a wreck, knew where he was,
he was in Portland at the hospital * * *.  So he was fully aware of his
situation, surroundings and why he was at the hospital.'  Then Ladd read
defendant his Driver and Motor Vehicle Services Division 'implied consent
rights and consequences' and asked defendant if he would like to take a blood
test.  Defendant agreed to take the test, and Ladd summoned a nurse who
administered the test, extracting defendant's blood at 3:18 a.m.  
"Defendant was charged with reckless
driving and DUII.  He moved to suppress the evidence obtained by the officer at
the hospital, arguing that it was obtained in violation of Article I, section
9, of the Oregon Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution."
Machuca, 231 Or App at 234-37 (footnotes omitted; brackets in
original).
At
the suppression hearing, the state argued that the warrantless taking of
defendant's blood did not violate Article I, section 9, of the Oregon
Constitution because (1) defendant had consented to the blood draw, and (2) the
evanescent nature of blood alcohol evidence in the human body had created an
exigency that, combined with probable cause to believe that defendant's blood
contained evidence pertaining to the crime of DUII, was sufficient under
Article I, section 9, to excuse any warrant requirement.  As part of the state's
case, the forensic scientist who had tested defendant's blood sample testified
regarding the procedures used to ascertain the sample's alcohol content.  Among
other things, the scientist explained the concept of blood alcohol dissipation:
"The longer it is between when the person last consumed
the alcohol and when the blood sample is drawn for analysis, the longer that
time period is, the lower the blood alcohol content will be.  So if there's an
initial blood draw at the hospital for the hospital to do a testing -- I mean,
I don't know the facts of this case, but sometimes it's another hour or two
later when they finally do the blood draw that is then going to come to the
Crime Lab."  
When
asked how the dissipation rate was assessed for testing purposes, the scientist
answered:
"Well, there's an average dissipation rate
that we use in the lab to estimate the difference, and so, you know, it depends
-- it varies from person to person, but our average dissipation rate that we
use for calculations is .015 per hour.  So that's how much lower the blood
alcohol content would get per hour, .015 percent."
The
trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress the blood alcohol evidence. 
In its written opinion, the trial court concluded:
"The state established its burden of
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's consent to
have his blood drawn and analyzed was given voluntarily based on the totality
of the circumstances.  The state did not meet its burden, however, with respect
to the second proffered exception to the warrant requirement, i.e., the
existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances.  More specifically, the
state failed to prove that the evidence it sought would have been sacrificed by
the time it would take the officers to obtain a search warrant."    
Machuca,
231 Or App at 337.  Based on the trial court's ruling, defendant entered
a conditional plea of guilty,(1)
reserving the right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress.
On
appeal, defendant contended that the trial court had erred in refusing to
suppress the results of the blood alcohol test.(2) 
Among other things, defendant claimed that he had agreed to the blood draw only
after Officer Ladd had read him the required Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV)
implied consent form setting out the consequences for refusing to consent to having
his blood drawn.(3) 
Defendant argued that his decision to allow his blood to be taken and tested therefore
was not a free exercise of his will and could not be viewed as a valid consent
to a warrantless search and seizure for purposes of Article I, section 9.  
In an en
banc decision, a divided Court of Appeals agreed, citing this court's decision
in State v. Newton, 291 Or 788, 636 P2d 393 (1981) overruled in part
on other grounds by State v. Spencer, 305 Or 59, 750 P2d 147 (1988):
"What is determinative in this context, however, is
that the consent was procured through a threat of economic harm and loss of
privileges.  It was obtained only after defendant was given the warnings
required by ORS 813.130(2) about the consequences of a refusal to allow a blood
test.  Under State v. Newton, a consent to search obtained in that
fashion is coerced by the fear of adverse consequences and is ineffective to
excuse the requirement to obtain a search warrant."
Machuca, 231 Or App at 240 (internal citation omitted). 
In reaching that conclusion, the majority relied on the following statement from
Newton: 
"Where a person's consent to a seizure is solicited,
and the person consents only after being warned that he will suffer a
substantial penalty if he refuses, the resulting consent cannot be regarded as
a free exercise of will.  We therefore hold that defendant's submission to the
breath test was not a voluntary consent to seizure because it was
coerced."  
291 Or at 801.  According to
the Court of Appeals' majority, that statement, when considered together with
the "views expressed in the separate concurring and dissenting opinions
[in that case]," announced the opinion of the court with respect to the Article
I, section 9, analysis used in that case.  Machuca , 231 Or App at 243 n
7.  As a result, although the majority expressed some misgivings regarding the
abstract correctness of Newton's coercion statement, it nevertheless
concluded that it was required to acknowledge and follow that holding:  
"[W]e cannot turn a blind eye, as the dissent suggests,
to a determination by a majority of the Supreme Court that is labeled as a
holding by the court and is relevant to the outcome reached by that majority
and that has not been distinguished, questioned, or implicitly overturned in
subsequent opinions of that court."  
Id. at 243.  
After
holding that defendant's consent to the blood draw had not been voluntary for
purposes of Article I, section 9, the Court of Appeals' majority went on to
examine whether exigent circumstances justified the blood draw as a
constitutionally permissible warrantless search.  Citing this court's decision
in State v. Moylett, 313 Or 540, 548-49, 836 P2d 1329 (1992), the Court
of Appeals' majority opined that, in order to draw defendant's blood without a
warrant and not violate Article I, section 9, the state was required to prove
that:  (1) police authorities had probable cause to believe that defendant's
blood contained relevant evidence that would be revealed once that blood was
analyzed; (2) a warrant could not have been obtained without sacrificing that
evidence; and (3) the extraction of defendant's blood was made promptly once
defendant had been taken to a place where the extraction could be made.  Noting
that the state had failed to provide any evidence demonstrating that the
arresting officer could not have quickly obtained a warrant to draw and test
defendant's blood, the majority held: 
"[t]he
state was not relieved of its duty to obtain a warrant under Article I, section
9.  The requirement to obtain a warrant is not excused by the mere fact that
alcohol dissipates in the bloodstream over time."
Machuca, 231 Or App at 247.  The Court of Appeals therefore
concluded that the trial court erred in not suppressing the blood alcohol test results.                      
Four
Court of Appeals judges dissented.  The dissent opined that treating Newton's
statement respecting coercion as a binding precedent for purposes of
interpreting the implied consent law was erroneous because:  (1) that analysis
was joined by only three members of this court; and (2) under settled Oregon
law, an accurate statement regarding the lawful consequences that may occur if
consent to a legal search is withheld is not coercive with respect to a
defendant's decision to allow such a search to take place.(4) 
231 Or App at 248-50 (Haselton, J., dissenting).  
As
noted, we allowed the state's petition for review and now examine the Court of
Appeals' Article I, section 9, analysis regarding (1) the role that exigent
circumstances play in blood draws conducted under scenarios like the one at
issue here, and (2) defendant's participation in the blood draw obtained in
this case.(5)
We
begin with the Court of Appeals' exigent circumstances analysis, focusing, in
particular, on the Court of Appeals' reliance on Moylett for the
proposition that the state was required to prove that the arresting officer could
not have obtained a warrant to draw defendant's blood without inevitably
sacrificing evidence of defendant's blood alcohol content.  The state argues
that Moylett's exigency analysis is, essentially, an anomaly -- a
holding that is at odds with the case on which it is based -- State v.
Milligan, 304 Or 659, 748 P2d 130 (1988) -- and that Moylett has not
been followed since it was announced.  To determine the correctness of that
assertion, we turn to this court's previous decisions regarding the evanescent
nature of alcohol in the blood stream as an exigent circumstance justifying a
warrantless seizure of a person's blood.
This
court first recognized the "highly evanescent" nature of blood
alcohol content over 30 years ago in State v. Heintz, 286 Or 239, 594 P2d
385 (1979).  The defendant in Heintz was found guilty of second-degree
manslaughter after the vehicle that he was driving left the road and crashed
into a power pole, killing the passenger riding with him.  The defendant's
conviction was based, for the most part, on evidence that the defendant was
intoxicated at the time of the accident, a determination that had turned primarily
on evidence derived from warrantless blood draws and subsequent blood alcohol tests
that police authorities had had medical personnel conduct after the defendant
was taken to a hospital.  On review, this court concluded that the warrantless blood
draws did not violate Article I, section 9.  Among the factors that the court
cited in reaching that conclusion was the observation that -- due to the
tendency of alcohol to rapidly dissipate from the blood stream once alcohol
consumption has stopped -- the warrantless blood draws had been necessary to
preserve that evidence.  In that regard, the court stated:
"Finally, it is also clear that alcohol in
blood after drinking is 'highly evanescent evidence' in that 'the percentage of
alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the
body functions to eliminate it from the system.'"
Heintz,
286 Or at 248 (quoting Cupp v. Murphy, 412 US 291, 296, 93 S Ct 2000, 36
L Ed 2d 900 (1973), and Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757, 770, 86 S
Ct 1826, 16 L Ed 2d 908 (1966) (internal citations omitted)).                   
This
court emphasized that same proposition nine years later in State v. Milligan,
304 Or 659, 748 P2d 130 (1988).  Like Heintz, Milligan involved a
defendant who, while intoxicated, crashed the car that he was driving, killing
his passenger.  The defendant was convicted of negligent homicide based, in
part, on blood alcohol evidence obtained without a warrant after police
officers had samples of the defendant's blood drawn at the hospital to which he
was taken after the accident.  In concluding that the search of the defendant's
body and the seizure of his blood did not violate Article I, section 9, this
court began with the observation that, at the time that the defendant was
seized, the police had probable cause to believe that the blood alcohol
evidence in his body was rapidly dissipating: 
"When he was seized, the officers had probable cause to
believe that defendant was a vessel containing evidence of a crime he had
committed -- evidence that was dissipating with every breath he took.  See
State v. Heintz, supra, 286 Or at 248, 249."  
Milligan,
304 Or at 665.  Citing State v. Matsen/Wilson, 287 Or 581, 601 P2d 784
(1979), the court then observed:
"Warrantless seizure and search under such circumstances
therefore is constitutionally justified, unless a warrant can be obtained
without sacrificing the evidence."  
Millligan,
304 Or at 665-66 (citation omitted).  
Matsen/Wilson,
one of the principal decisions cited in Milligan, was a case in which
police had, through a protracted period of surveillance, developed probable
cause to search a residence that was being used for drug trafficking.  Police
officers had not yet obtained a search warrant when the individual they
suspected of being the primary drug supplier for the operation unexpectedly
arrived at the house.  At that point, police officers raided the house without
a warrant.  On review, the state argued that the warrantless incursion into the
residence had been necessary to prevent a loss of evidence.  This court
disagreed, observing:
"More specifically, the evidence does not
support the trial court's finding of exigent circumstances because the state
failed to prove that destruction of contraband or the escape of the defendants
was imminent.  The fact that drugs are usually of a destructible nature,
and the fact that suspects are likely to run out the back door when police
enter the front door[,] does not ipso facto create exigent circumstances."
Matsen/Wilson,
287 Or at 587 (emphasis added).
Milligan,
however, differed from Matsen/Wilson in that the state had provided
evidence underscoring exactly the type of exigency that had necessitated a
warrantless blood draw from the defendant in that case.  In Milligan, this
court explained how testimony before the trial court had demonstrated the need
to secure evidence of the defendant's blood alcohol content before it had
dissipated:
"In order to determine accurately the level
of alcohol in a suspect's blood at the time of the alleged crime, the police
must obtain an initial sample of the suspect's blood with as little delay as
possible.  Testimony at the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss
established that alcohol dissipation rates vary from person to person.  To
determine the dissipation rate of any particular individual, it is necessary to
take more than one blood sample.  A nurse at the hospital testified that the 'usual
practice' was to draw the blood samples one hour apart.  Thus, the first blood
sample must be drawn early enough so that a measurable amount of alcohol will
still be present in the suspect's blood an hour later.  This evidence
established that exigent circumstances existed justifying the warrantless
extraction of at least the initial blood sample, so long as the extraction
was made promptly after the suspect was taken to a place where it could be
made.  He was taken to such a place in this case.  No warrant was required for
the initial testing of defendant's blood."   
Milligan,
304 Or at 666 (emphasis added).  Later, in a footnote, the court reiterated
that the testimony in Milligan relating to blood alcohol dissipation had
been sufficient to establish exigent circumstances in that case:
"The trial court held that no exigent
circumstances existed vis-a-vis the initial extraction of blood because
no evidence showed the amount of time that would have been lost in obtaining a
warrant.  As we have already noted, this legal conclusion asks too much of the
evidence.  From the testimony the trial court accepted, exigent circumstances
existed justifying the initial, warrantless extraction because alcohol was dissipating
at some significant rate."
Id.
at 666 n 5 (emphasis in original). 
Milligan
became, in turn, the foundation for the court's subsequent decision in Moylett,
albeit with a significant alteration.  In Moylett, the defendant had
rear-ended a stopped pickup truck.  The defendant was hospitalized soon after
the collision, but not before the investigating police officer had noted the odor
of alcohol on the defendant's breath, along with other indicia of
intoxication.  Three blood samples were taken from the defendant while at the
hospital, the first one drawn without a warrant.  The trial court subsequently suppressed
the evidence obtained from the warrantless sample.  This court affirmed that
ruling.  In doing so, the court relied extensively on Milligan, citing
that case for the proposition that 
"[i]n
the context of an alcohol-related crime, there commonly will be an exigency
because, as we already have noted, a suspect is 'a vessel containing evidence
of a crime he had committed -- evidence that [i]s dissipating with every breath
he t[akes].'" 
Moylett,
313 Or at 550 (quoting Milligan,  304 Or at 665 (brackets in original)). 
The court also acknowledged that, as in Milligan, there was evidence in
the record before it that  
"[t]he loss of alcohol evidence which creates the
exigency occurs because of the biological fact that the human body metabolizes
and expels alcohol."
Id. 
The court nevertheless determined that, in addition to that evidence, Milligan's
exigency analysis also required the state to prove that a warrant could not
have otherwise been expeditiously obtained:
"The exigency created by the dissipating
evidence of blood alcohol, however, did not make the blood sample seizures per
se reasonable under Article I, section 9.  The state was still required to
prove, in order to justify the warrantless extraction of defendant's blood,
that it could not have obtained a search warrant 'without sacrificing the
evidence' and that the blood sample that it obtained had been extracted
'promptly.'  State v. Milligan, supra, 304 Or at 666."
Moylett,
313 Or at 550-51.  Concluding that there was evidence in the record that police
officers could have quickly obtained a warrant to test the first sample of the
defendant's blood, the court affirmed the trial court order suppressing that
evidence.  Id. at 551.
After
examining the cases set out above, we conclude that the exigent circumstances
analysis set out in Moylett, which required the state to prove
"that it could not have obtained a search warrant without sacrificing the
evidence," unnecessarily deviated from this court's established case law. 
Until Moylett, the court's focus had been on the exigency created by
blood alcohol dissipation.  Moylett, however, shifted that focus away
from the blood alcohol exigency itself and onto the speed with which a warrant
presumably could have issued in a particular case.  In our view, that shift was
unsupported by the cases that preceded it, and we disavow it now. 
Milligan
was not, and is not now, to the contrary.  We agree with the observation in
Milligan that a "[w]arrantless seizure and search under such circumstances
therefore is constitutionally justified, unless a warrant can be obtained
without sacrificing the evidence."  304 Or at 665-66.  Milligan,
however, illustrates that when probable cause to arrest for a crime involving
the blood alcohol content of the suspect is combined with the undisputed evanescent
nature of alcohol in the blood, those facts are a sufficient basis to conclude
that a warrant could not have been obtained without sacrificing that evidence.
It
may be true, phenomenologically, that, among such cases, there will be
instances in which a warrant could have been both obtained and executed in a
timely fashion.  The mere possibility, however, that such situations may occur
from time to time does not justify ignoring the inescapable fact that, in every
such case, evidence is disappearing and minutes count.  We therefore declare
that, for purposes of the Oregon Constitution, the evanescent nature of a
suspect's blood alcohol content is an exigent circumstance that will ordinarily
permit a warrantless blood draw of the kind taken here.  We do so, however, understanding
that particular facts may show, in the rare case, that a warrant could have
been obtained and executed significantly faster than the actual process otherwise
used under the circumstances.  We anticipate that only in those rare cases will
a warrantless blood draw be unconstitutional.
Applying
the foregoing rule, this is not the rare case.  Here, the state's evidence was
sufficient to establish an exigency justifying the warrantless seizure of
defendant's blood for constitutional purposes, and the Court of Appeals erred
in concluding otherwise.
As
noted earlier, the state argued before the trial court and the Court of Appeals
that, in addition to probable cause/exigent circumstances, the warrantless
blood draw also was permissible under Article I, section 9, because defendant
had voluntarily consented to it.  In rejecting that argument, the Court of
Appeals' majority concluded that the plurality opinion in State v. Newton,
291 Or 788, established that advising a suspect of the "adverse legal
consequences" for refusing to permit a blood draw is coercive as a matter
of law, rendering a suspect's consent to a blood draw constitutionally involuntary. 
According to the Court of Appeals' majority:
"[A] consent to search obtained in that fashion is
coerced by the fear of adverse consequences and is ineffective to excuse the
requirement to obtain a search warrant."
Machuca, 231 Or App at 240.  The state
challenges that ruling.  However, because we have concluded that the state
established exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless blood draw under
the Oregon Constitution, we need not determine whether defendant's consent was
valid under Article I, section 9, nor do we need to determine whether the Court
of Appeals correctly interpreted and relied on the plurality opinion in Newton.
Although the warrantless blood draw in
this case did not violate Article I, section 9, the legislature has nevertheless
expressed a policy preference against physically compelling blood draws or
breath tests, by permitting a suspect to refuse the test.  ORS 813.100(2)
provides:
"No chemical test of the person's breath or
blood shall be given, under subsection (1) of this section, to a person under
arrest for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants in
violation of ORS 813.010 or of a municipal ordinance, if the person refuses the
request of a police officer to submit to the chemical test after the person has
been informed of consequences and rights as described under ORS 813.130."
At the same time, however, the
legislature has imposed penalties for refusing the test, mandating longer
license suspensions for refusing a test than for failing it, and permitting a
refusal to be used as evidence against the person in a civil or criminal court proceeding.
 ORS 813.130(2)(a); ORS 813.310.  As this court stated in State v. Spencer,
305 Or 59, 71, 750 P2d 147 (1988):
"[T]he statute's references to a driver's 'refusal' do
not evince a legislative concern that the driver make a voluntary and fully
informed decision whether to submit to the test.  Consent being implied by law,
a driver may not legally refuse.  A driver, however, can physically
refuse to submit, and the implied consent law, recognizing that practical
reality, forbids the use of physical force to compel submission."
(Emphasis in original.)  Thus, the legislative policy
embodied in the implied consent law was "'designed to overcome the
possibility of physical resistance, despite legal consent, without resort to
physical compulsion' by imposing adverse legal consequences on a refusal to
submit to the test."  Id. at 67 (quoting Newton, 291 Or at
793).
Here, defendant had been validly
arrested for DUII and was accurately informed of his rights and the prescribed
consequences that would flow from a refusal to consent to the blood draw.  To
the extent that defendant's decision to permit the blood draw was influenced,
even significantly, by the statutory advice of rights and adverse consequences
of refusing the blood draw, the implied consent law operated exactly as the
legislature intended.
The
decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit
court is affirmed.
1. ORS
135.335(3) provides: 
"With the consent of the court and the
state, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or no contest
reserving, in writing, the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of
an adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion.  A defendant who
finally prevails on appeal may withdraw the plea."
2. The
blood sample that the hospital took for Officer Ladd revealed that,
approximately an hour and a half after defendant's accident, his blood-alcohol
content was .20.  ORS 813.010(1)(a) provides:
"A person commits the offense of driving
while under the influence of intoxicants if the person drives a vehicle while
the person:
"(a) Has 0.08 percent or more by weight of
alcohol in the blood of the person as shown by chemical analysis of the breath
or blood of the person made under ORS 813.100, 813.140 or 813.150[.]"
3. Under
ORS 813.100(1), persons operating motor vehicles on Oregon highways are deemed
to have implicitly given their consent to a chemical blood test to determine
blood alcohol content if (1) they are receiving medical care in a health care
facility immediately after a motor vehicle accident, and (2) they have been
arrested for driving under the influence of an intoxicant.  Before such a test
is administered, however, ORS 813.100(1) also requires that a person requested
to take the test be informed of the consequences of refusing to do so as set
out in ORS 813.130.  ORS 813.130(2) provides, in part:
"(a)
Driving under the influence of intoxicants is a crime in Oregon, and the person
is subject to criminal penalties if a test under ORS 813.100 shows that the
person is under the influence of intoxicants.  If the person refuses a test or
fails, evidence of the refusal or failure may also be offered against the
person.
"* * * * *
"(c)
If the person refuses or fails a test under ORS 813.100, the person's driving
privileges will be suspended.  The outcome of a criminal charge for driving
under the influence of intoxicants will not affect the suspension.  The
suspension will be substantially longer if the person refuses a test.
"(d) If the person refuses a test or fails
a breath test under ORS 813.100 and has an Oregon driver license or permit, the
license or permit will be taken immediately and, unless the person does not
currently have full valid driving privileges, a temporary driving permit will
be issued to the person.
"(e) If the person refuses a test under ORS
813.100, the person will not be eligible for a hardship permit for at least 90
days, and possibly for one year, depending on the person's driving record.  The
person may possibly qualify for a hardship permit in 30 days if the person
fails a test, depending on the person's driving record."
4. In
support of that proposition, the Court of Appeals' dissent cited, among other
cases, this court's decision in State v. Hirsch, 267 Or 613, 518 P2d 649
(1974).  Machuca, 231 Or App at 249-50 (Haselton, J., dissenting).  In Hirsch,
the defendant argued that his consent to a search was involuntary, because it
was preceded by an officer's statement that the officer would get a search
warrant if necessary.  This court rejected the defendant's argument, relying on
a statement in Chief Justice O'Connell's dissent in State v. Douglas,
260 Or 60, 81, 488 P2d 1366 (1971):
"'* * * The officer's threat that he would
obtain a warrant if defendant did not consent to the search did not constitute
the kind of coercion that renders a search involuntary.  Concededly such a
threat may be coercive in the sense that an accused would not have consented to
the search in the absence of the threat.  But not all coercion inducing consent
to a search is constitutionally impermissible.  If the officers threaten only
to do what the law permits them to do, the coercion that the threat may produce
is not constitutionally objectionable.'"
Hirsch, 267 Or at 622.
5. We decline, however, to take up defendant's request --
presented as part of his response to the state's petition for review -- that we
also review an issue that the Court of Appeals decided against defendant;
namely, whether police officers must have either a warrant or consent before
entering a criminal suspect's hospital room.  See ORAP 9.20(2) (party's
questions raised in response to petition for review are properly before the
court, although the court need not address them).