Case Title: Smith v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 180198

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2018-12-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
LAURENCE MARIA SMITH, 
s/k/a LAURENCE MARIE SMITH 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 180198 
CHIEF JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
December 13, 2018 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals of Virginia (“Court of 
Appeals”) erred when it found the evidence was sufficient to uphold a conviction of voluntary 
manslaughter in the Spotsylvania County Circuit Court (“trial court”). 
I.  Facts and Proceedings 
A.  The Evidence at Trial 
 
Laurence Maria Smith (“Smith”) was tried by a jury upon indictments for the first-degree 
murder of her husband, Sean McVae Smith (“Sean”), and use of a firearm during the 
commission of a felony.  Smith pled not guilty, and a four-day jury trial was held. 
 
At the beginning of trial, the parties stipulated that Sean’s death was not a suicide, that he 
was killed when a single bullet entered his mouth and struck his right carotid artery, and that at 
the time the gun was fired, the muzzle was at least four feet from Sean’s body.  Deputy Amanda 
Trippett (“Deputy Trippett”), testified that she answered a 911 call from Smith on the evening of 
March 16, 2015.  A recording of the call was then played for the jury.  During the call, Smith 
reported that she accidentally shot her husband.  Smith told Deputy Trippett “I was just cleaning” 
the gun, and “I fired” it.  Deputy Trippett asked if Sean was breathing, and Smith responded she 
did not know.  Later during the call, Smith told Deputy Trippett that Sean was not breathing.  
 
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When Deputy Trippett asked where the gun was, Smith replied she did not know.  Smith was 
crying and screaming hysterically during the call. 
 
Deputy Hernando Tavarez (“Deputy Tavarez”) responded to the house within three 
minutes of the 911 call and was the first to arrive at the scene.  Deputy Tavarez testified that a 
small girl answered the door.  Once he entered the home, Deputy Tavarez heard Smith say, “it’s 
my fault, I should not have been playing with it.”  Deputy Tavarez then saw Smith coming 
downstairs from the second floor.  Smith was hysterical, and her hands were covered in blood.  
Deputy Tavarez directed Smith to stay downstairs while he went to look for Sean.  Deputy 
Tavarez found Sean lying face down at the top of the stairs.  Sean was still alive, but he was 
unconscious and bleeding profusely.  Rescue personnel then arrived, so Deputy Tavarez stayed 
downstairs with Smith and her two young daughters.  Deputy Tavarez asked Smith where the gun 
was, and Smith replied that the gun might be under her husband’s body.  The police later found 
the gun in the downstairs master bedroom.  Deputy Tavarez testified that rescue personnel were 
unable to save Sean, and he died at the scene. 
Deputy Brandon Handy (“Deputy Handy”) testified that he arrived at the scene several 
minutes after Deputy Tavarez.  Smith’s two young daughters were at the entrance to the home 
screaming and crying.  As Deputy Handy was getting the girls out of the house, Smith also came 
to the doorway.  Smith’s hands were covered in blood and she was screaming to Deputy Handy 
“I shot him” and “arrest me.”  Deputy Handy got Smith to sit down outside, and a neighbor came 
and took the children next door.  Smith then told Deputy Handy that she had accidentally shot 
her husband.  She thought her gun was empty when she squeezed the trigger. 
Detective Earl Swift performed a gunshot residue test on Smith while she was waiting 
outside of the house.  Smith was upset and crying while he performed the test.  According to Det. 
 
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Swift, Smith kept saying things such as, “arrest me, I shot and killed my husband, I deserve to 
die because I killed by husband.”  The police determined that Sean was shot in an upstairs 
bedroom while standing by the window but that he walked into the hallway before collapsing.  
The gunshot residue test came back positive. 
Smith was then taken to the police department and interviewed by Detective Frank Corona 
(“Detective Corona”).  A video of Detective Corona’s interview with Smith was offered into 
evidence by the Commonwealth.  During the interview, Smith told Detective Corona that she and 
Sean had planned to have the flooring replaced in the upstairs spare bedroom.  In preparation for 
installation of the new flooring, Smith had moved several things from the room. She had also 
moved the gun safe out of the closet into the room.  Smith said that Sean came home from work 
and told her they needed to remove the guns from the safe before moving it any further.  Sean and 
Smith emptied the gun safe, and then Sean sent Smith downstairs to their bedroom to get her 
“peashooter.” Smith explained the “peashooter” was a tiny gun she kept in her purse.  According 
to Smith, Sean told her “don’t forget to uncock it,” and “don’t fuck around.”  Smith told Detective 
Corona that she had “popped out the magazine,” racked the slide back, and saw a bullet eject from 
the gun when she was in the bedroom.  Smith stated that she believed the gun then was empty.  
When Smith brought the gun upstairs, her husband asked if she did “like I told you.” 
 Smith told Sean “see, it’s empty” and pulled the trigger to show him it was unloaded. 
Smith explained to Detective Corona that she thought the gun was empty when she pulled the 
trigger.  She wanted to show Sean she had the skills to disarm a weapon.  Smith told Detective 
Corona that she “didn’t have any aim.”  Later in the interview, however, she admitted that she 
aimed towards the window near where her husband was standing.  Smith “dropped the gun” after 
shooting her husband, rushed to help him, and got his blood on her hands.  Smith told Det. 
 
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Corona she then retrieved the gun and put it on her bed before she called 911 because her 
daughters were in the house.  She then went back upstairs to try to help Sean. 
When Detective Corona asked Smith whether she and her husband had argued prior to the 
shooting, Smith stated they had not.  She then clarified they had been “fussing” at each other but 
not arguing.  Later, Smith admitted that she and her husband had been “arguing about twenty 
minutes before all this went down” because she scratched one of his guns when she moved the 
gun safe.  Smith also admitted that the argument upset her.  However, Smith said she was no 
longer angry when she shot her husband.  Detective Corona testified that blood was not visible on 
the gun when it was recovered.  He also testified that a swab of Smith’s gun tested negative for 
blood. 
 
Smith told Detective Corona that she had taken a gun safety course and obtained a 
concealed weapon permit in 2011.  She admitted that in that class she learned never to point her 
gun at a person unless she intended to kill.  Smith told Detective Corona that she had been 
“stupid” and “retarded” because she did not follow the basic gun safety rules.  She explained that 
Sean always took care of the weapons.  Although Sean would let her load the weapons, she said 
when unloading he would “check[] and double check[] and triple check[] to make sure 
everything is empty.”  Smith stated she wanted to show Sean that he could trust her with the gun. 
Smith’s two young daughters were questioned by police on the evening of the shooting.  
A video of the daughters’ statements was introduced by the Commonwealth without objection.  
Both daughters described their parents as “fighting” prior to the shooting.  The youngest 
daughter stated she heard her parents “yelling” about her father’s gun safe.  The older daughter 
indicated her father may have been upset because one of the weapons was scratched.  The older 
daughter recalled her mother saying she accidentally pulled the trigger when she was cleaning 
 
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her gun.  She later stated, “I don’t know if it’s actually true.”  The older daughter also said that, 
after the shooting, she and her sister waited downstairs in the master bedroom before the police 
came. 
Smith moved to strike the evidence when the Commonwealth rested.  The trial court 
denied the motion.  Smith’s first witness was Kelly Johnson, a forensic biologist with the 
Virginia Department of Forensic Science, who testified that Smith’s gun, the magazine, and the 
unspent cartridge were visually inspected and tested for blood, and no blood was found.  Lauren 
Claytor, a forensic scientist in the firearm section of the Department of Forensics, testified that 
she tested the gun used in this case.  She explained that this particular gun was capable of being 
fired with the magazine removed.  She explained that the magazine would hold six bullets and 
the firearm would also hold one in the firing chamber.  Claytor also testified that there would not 
be a discernible difference in the weight of the firearm if it was unloaded versus having one 
bullet in the chamber.  However, she also testified that there is a “peephole” in the gun so a 
person can look to see if there is a cartridge in the chamber. 
Patrick Lamb, a bloodstain pattern analyst with the Fredericksburg Police Department, 
also testified on Smith’s behalf.  Lamb explained that based on the blood patterns where Sean 
was shot, there did not appear to be any signs of a struggle between Smith and Sean.  Smith also 
called Dr. Mary Beth Williams, an expert in trauma, to testify on her behalf.  Dr. Williams 
testified that she watched the video of Smith’s interview with Detective Corona, and Smith’s 
behavior during that interview was consistent with someone who had just experienced a 
traumatic event.  Dr. Williams also met with Smith on two occasions prior to trial, and she saw 
behavior in those meetings that was also consistent with someone who had experienced a 
traumatic event. 
 
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Smith then renewed her motion to strike at the close of all the evidence.  She argued that 
the evidence proved she did not know the firearm was loaded and that the shooting was an 
accident.  The circuit court again denied Smith’s motion, finding that, while the jury could agree 
with Smith that the shooting was an accident, based upon the evidence presented the jury could 
also find that Smith acted with malice. 
B.  The Jury Instructions 
The Commonwealth and Smith submitted agreed upon jury instructions to the circuit 
court.  Jury instruction 6, a “waterfall” instruction, included instructions for first-degree murder 
as well as the lesser included offenses of second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and 
involuntary manslaughter.  Jury Instruction 6 provided, in relevant part: 
Mrs. Smith is charged with the crime of first degree murder.  The 
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the 
following elements of that crime: 
 
(1) That Mrs. Smith killed Sean Smith; and 
(2) That the killing was done with malice; and  
(3) That the killing was willful, deliberate and premeditated. 
 
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt each of the above elements of the crime 
as charged, then you shall find Mrs. Smith guilty of first degree 
murder . . . . 
 
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt each of the first two elements of the 
offense as charged but you do not find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the killing was willful, deliberate and premeditated, then you 
shall find Mrs. Smith guilty of second degree murder . . . . 
 
If you find that the Commonwealth has failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the killing was malicious but that the 
Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mrs. 
Smith killed Sean Smith and further: 
 
(1) That the killing was the result of an intentional act; and 
 
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(2) That the killing was committed while in the sudden heat of 
passion upon reasonable provocation; 
 
then you shall find Mrs. Smith guilty of voluntary manslaughter  
. . . . 
 
If you find that the Commonwealth has failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt the elements of voluntary manslaughter, but you 
find that the Commonwealth has proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt that: 
 
(1) That Mrs. Smith killed Sean Smith; and 
(2) That the killing, although unintended, was the direct result 
of negligence so gross, wanton and culpable as to show a 
callous disregard of human life; 
 
then you shall find Mrs. Smith guilty of involuntary manslaughter  
. . . .  
 
If you find that the Commonwealth has failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt any one or more of the elements of involuntary 
manslaughter, then you shall find Mrs. Smith not guilty. 
 
In jury instruction 7, the jury was instructed that if it had reasonable doubt about the grade of 
homicide, then it should find Smith guilty of the lesser offense.  The jury was also instructed that 
if it had reasonable doubt the Commonwealth had proved any of the offenses, then it should find 
Smith not guilty. 
Jury instruction 9 informed the jury that if malice was absent, the killing could be no 
more than manslaughter.  Jury instruction 10 defined heat of passion for the jury, and stated in 
relevant part: 
Heat of passion excludes malice when that heat of passion arises 
from provocation that reasonably produces an emotional state of 
mind such as hot blood, rage, anger, resentment, terror or fear, so 
as to demonstrate an absence of deliberate design to kill or to cause 
one to act on impulse without conscious reflection.  Heat of 
passion must be determined from circumstances as they appeared 
to defendant but those circumstances must be such as would have 
aroused heat of passion in a reasonable person.  If a person acts 
upon reflection or deliberation, or after his passion has cooled or 
 
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there has been a reasonable time or opportunity for cooling, then 
the act is not attributable to heat of passion. 
 
Jury instruction 12 explained that malice could be inferred from the use of deadly weapon.  Jury 
instruction 14 explained that “[p]rovocation cannot be relied upon to reduce murder in the 
second degree to manslaughter, unless the provocation has so aroused the anger of the assailant 
as to temporarily affect his reason and self-control.”  Neither the Commonwealth nor Smith 
requested an instruction on the principle that words alone are insufficient provocation to reduce 
second-degree murder to voluntary manslaughter, and no such instruction was given. 
C.  Motion to Set Aside 
The jury found Smith guilty of voluntary manslaughter.  Smith filed a motion to set aside 
the jury’s verdict based on insufficient evidence to prove the elements of the offense of voluntary 
manslaughter.  Smith argued that the Commonwealth had to prove each element of voluntary 
manslaughter, and specifically that the Commonwealth had failed to prove heat of passion upon 
reasonable provocation.  As part of her argument that the Commonwealth failed to prove heat of 
passion upon reasonable provocation, Smith asserted that words alone are never sufficient to 
constitute a reasonable provocation.  Smith argued that the evidence proved that she and Sean 
only had a brief argument and there was no physical altercation.  She also argued that even if the 
argument created reasonable provocation, the evidence showed that she was not acting in the 
heat of passion at the time of the shooting.  Accordingly, Smith asserted that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove voluntary manslaughter. 
At the hearing on her motion to set aside, Smith agreed that the instruction on voluntary 
manslaughter was a correct statement of law and that she had not objected to it.  Instead, her 
argument was that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for voluntary 
manslaughter.  She argued there was no evidence this was an intentional killing, and no evidence 
 
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of heat of passion upon reasonable provocation.  Smith reiterated that the evidence proved there 
was just a minor verbal argument between her and Sean; nothing that would qualify as 
reasonable provocation because “mere words are not enough for heat of passion.” 
The Commonwealth responded that Smith had waived this argument by agreeing to the 
jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter.  The Commonwealth argued that the jury was 
entitled to find that Smith was angry and upset when she intentionally fired the gun at Smith, and 
that the evidence was sufficient to support her conviction.  The Commonwealth asserted that if 
there was any error, Smith invited that error by allowing the voluntary manslaughter instruction 
to go the jury without objection. 
The trial court asked why Smith did not object to a voluntary manslaughter instruction 
before it was given to the jury if there was no evidence to support such an instruction.  Smith 
responded that she was not challenging the instruction, she was challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the conviction.  The trial court then found there was sufficient evidence to 
support the jury’s verdict and denied the motion.  The trial court later sentenced Smith to ten 
years’ imprisonment, in accordance with the jury’s recommendation. 
D.  Court of Appeals Opinion 
The Court of Appeals, by published opinion, affirmed Smith’s conviction.  Smith v. 
Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 399 (2018).  The Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that 
reasonable provocation was an element of voluntary manslaughter based on the jury instruction 
given at trial.  Id. at 414.  Instead of deciding whether the evidence was sufficient to support 
Smith’s conviction of voluntary manslaughter, the Court of Appeals relied on our decision in 
Blankenship v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 587 (1952), and held that a rational factfinder could 
have found the evidence was sufficient to convict Smith of the higher offense of second-degree 
 
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murder.  Therefore, she was not prejudiced by the jury’s decision to find her guilty of the lesser 
offense of voluntary manslaughter.  Id. at 415-17.  The concurrence disagreed with the 
majority’s analysis and set forth alternative bases for affirming Smith’s conviction.  See id. at 
421-36. 
 
Smith subsequently appealed to this Court, and we awarded an appeal on the following 
assignment of error: 
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s conviction 
of Appellant of voluntary manslaughter as the evidence was 
insufficient to prove Appellant intentionally killed Sean Smith and 
that Appellant acted in the “heat of passion” and “upon reasonable 
provocation.” 
 
II.  Analysis 
A.  Standard of Review 
 
“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is 
presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to 
support it.’”  Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 327 (2018) (quoting Pijor v. 
Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017)).  This Court “does not ask itself whether it believes 
that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Perkins, 295 Va. at 
327 (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth¸ 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009) (emphasis in original)).  
“Rather, the relevant question is, upon review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Perkins, 295 Va. at 327 (emphasis in original; internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 
 
 
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B.  Jury Instructions 
 
The jury in this case was given a “waterfall” instruction that set forth the elements the 
jury was required to find in order to convict Smith of first degree murder, second degree murder, 
voluntary manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter.  Jury instruction 6 was agreed upon by 
both parties.  We have stated that “instructions given without objection become the law of the 
case and thereby bind the parties in the trial court and this Court on review.”  Wintergreen 
Partners, Inc. v. McGuireWoods, LLP, 280 Va. 374, 379 (2010) (quoting Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. 
Thomas Baker Real Estate, Ltd., 237 Va. 649, 652 (1989)).  The law of the case doctrine applies 
in criminal cases.  Jiminez v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 244, 249-50 (1991). 
 
With respect to the offense of voluntary manslaughter, jury instruction 6 provided: 
If you find that the Commonwealth has failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the killing was malicious but that the 
Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mrs. 
Smith killed Sean Smith and further: 
 
(1) That the killing was the result of an intentional act; and 
(2) That the killing was committed while in the sudden heat of 
passion upon reasonable provocation; 
 
then you shall find Mrs. Smith guilty of voluntary manslaughter  
. . . . 
 
The jury was also instructed that, “[h]eat of passion excludes malice when [it] arises from 
provocation that reasonably produces an emotional state of mind such as hot blood, rage, anger, 
resentment, terror, or fear” and that the provocation must have “so aroused the anger of the 
assailant as to temporarily affect his reason and self-control.”  Neither Smith nor the 
Commonwealth asked the trial court to instruct the jury that words alone are never sufficient 
provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter, even though this principle is well established in 
our case law, and there is a model jury instruction to this effect.  See Martin v. Commonwealth, 
 
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184 Va. 1009, 1016-17 (1946), and Virginia Model Jury Instructions—Criminal, No. 33.550 
(“Words alone, no matter how offensive or insulting they may be, are never sufficient 
provocation to reduce the offense of murder to manslaughter.”). 
Although Smith raised the issue that words alone are never sufficient provocation to 
reduce murder to manslaughter in her motion to set aside the verdict, that argument came too 
late.  See Spitzli v. Minson, 231 Va. 12, 19 (1986) (“Here, the defendant did make a motion to set 
aside the verdict, but this does not save him from his failure to object to the instructions which 
submitted the issues … to the jury.”).  In this case, Smith expressly agreed to jury instructions 
that omitted the very legal principle on which she seeks to rely on appeal.  We have clearly 
stated that an agreed jury instruction becomes the law of the case, even if it imposes “an 
inappropriate standard.”  Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Watson, 243 Va. 128, 136 (1992).  
By failing to object to Jury Instruction No. 6, and by failing to request an instruction on the 
principle that words alone are insufficient provocation to support reducing murder to 
manslaughter, Smith waived any arguments on appeal with respect to defects in the wording of 
the voluntary manslaughter instruction, or as to whether an instruction on voluntary 
manslaughter should have been given at all, absent an instruction that words alone are 
insufficient provocation to support a conviction of voluntary manslaughter.  See id. 
C.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
The jury in this case was instructed that it could find Smith guilty of voluntary 
manslaughter if it found that the killing was not malicious but was still intentional and 
committed while in the sudden heat of passion upon reasonable provocation.  They were never 
instructed that a verbal argument alone is not sufficient to constitute reasonable provocation, and 
Smith never requested that the jury be so instructed.  Jurors are not expected to know the law 
 
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independently.  Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297, 300 (1976).  Because the voluntary 
manslaughter instruction was agreed upon and is now the law of the case, we need not express an 
opinion as to the correctness of this instruction.  Rather, we consider whether the evidence was 
sufficient to support Smith’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter based upon the instructions 
given in this case. 
The Commonwealth presented evidence of Smith’s familiarity with firearms and the 
methods of unloading and checking to see whether a weapon is loaded.  The jury could have 
considered the location of Sean’s wound, and reject Smith’s claim that she did not aim the gun, 
particularly in light of her ultimate admission that she aimed at the window near where Sean was 
standing.  In this case, the jury could have found that the act of pulling the trigger was an 
intentional act, and that this killing was therefore not an accident.  There was also evidence 
presented by the Commonwealth that Smith and Sean had been arguing, that Smith then went 
downstairs, got her gun, and came back upstairs and shot Sean.  The jury could have inferred that 
Smith was angry with Sean and came upstairs and shot Sean while under a heat of passion 
produced by the argument.  Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. 
Because we find the evidence sufficient to support the conviction for voluntary 
manslaughter, we need not consider whether the Court of Appeals properly applied our prior 
decision in Blankenship when it determined the evidence supported a conviction of second 
degree murder and thereby justified Smith’s conviction of the lesser offense of voluntary 
manslaughter.  Instead, because we conclude that the development of additional facts in this case 
is unnecessary and that the evidence in the record fully supports it, we will affirm the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals as the right result for a different reason.  Robinson Family, LLC v. Allen, 
 
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295 Va. 130, 141 n.9 (2018) (reviewing court may affirm the judgment of the lower court by 
applying the “right-result-different reason doctrine,” but in doing so, the reviewing court “do[es] 
not examine the lower court's reasoning”); Rickman v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 531, 542 (2017) 
(reviewing court may affirm the judgment of the lower court by applying the “right-result-
different reason doctrine,” but in doing so, the reviewing court “express[es] no view on the 
correctness of the lower court's rationale”). 
III.  Conclusion 
 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals sustaining the 
conviction. 
Affirmed. 
 
JUSTICE KELSEY, with whom JUSTICE McCLANAHAN and JUSTICE McCULLOUGH 
join, concurring. 
 
I fully agree with the Chief Justice’s opinion.  The legal analysis, as well as its specific 
holding, hews closely to our traditional view that “the doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that 
we decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest grounds available.’”  Commonwealth v. White, 293 
Va. 411, 419 (2017) (alteration and citation omitted). 
 
I concur only to call attention to Judge Humphreys’s historical analysis of the crime of 
manslaughter under English common law.  See Smith v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 399, 421-
36 (2018) (Humphreys, J., concurring).  His thesis begins with Blackstone’s definition of 
manslaughter as “[t]he unlawful killing of another without malice either express or implied,” id. 
at 423 (quoting 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *190), and thereafter surveys how an 
anfractuous series of precedents seems to suggest that “‘heat of passion upon reasonable 
provocation’ has evolved into the only currently legally recognized factor in the Commonwealth 
 
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that negates malice,” id. at 426.  The present case does not present an opportunity to test this 
thesis, but future cases no doubt will.