Case Title: People v. Kidd

Citation: 2022 IL 127904

Docket Number: 127904

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2022-11-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
2022 IL 127904 
 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
 
 
 
(Docket No. 127904) 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.  
ANTONIO D. KIDD, Appellant. 
 
 
Opinion filed November 28, 2022. 
 
 
JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
 
Chief Justice Theis and Justices Anne M. Burke, Michael J. Burke, Carter, and 
Holder White concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
 
Justice Overstreet dissented, with opinion. 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
A jury found Antonio D. Kidd guilty on two counts of predatory criminal sexual 
assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2016)). The appellate court 
affirmed the convictions. 2021 IL App (4th) 190345-U. Kidd argues on appeal that 
the trial court committed reversible error when it denied his pretrial motion to 
 
 
 
 
 
- 2 - 
dismiss the indictment. We find the indictment does not set forth all the elements 
of the charged offenses and, therefore, the court erred by failing to dismiss the 
indictment. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and the 
trial court. 
 
¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
In June 2017, the Sangamon County grand jury indicted Kidd on two counts of 
predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. In both counts of the indictment, the 
grand jury alleged, “KIDD ***, who was over the age of 17, committed an act of 
sexual contact, however slight, with T.F., in that said defendant placed his penis in 
contact with the mouth of T.F. and T.F. was under the age of 13 years old.” The 
first count asserted the contact occurred “between the 28th day and the 29th day of 
August,” 2016, and the second count asserted the contact occurred between July 1, 
2011, and August 29, 2016. 
 
¶ 4 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Trial Court Proceedings 
¶ 5 
 
Kidd represented himself during some of the pretrial proceedings. He filed a 
pro se motion to dismiss the indictment for not sufficiently stating the elements of 
the offense charged. At the hearing on the motion, the prosecutor asserted, “Both 
of the two predatory criminal sexual assault counts include all of the necessary 
factors that the State must prove at trial.” Kidd responded: 
“They [are] charging me with sexual conduct *** by sexual contact; *** you’re 
charging me with a penetration case, *** but accusing me of a conduct case. 
There’s no way I can make a proper defense ***.  
 
 
 
 
 
* * * 
 
*** [I]n order for that to be used as contact alone, which, contact is, under 
the definition, is sexual penetration or conduct, and in order for them to use the 
sexual contact, they would have to put the whole definition in there, *** 
[including] contact, *** for purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the 
victim or accused.” 
 
 
 
 
 
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The prosecutor persisted, claiming the indictment “appropriately charged Mr. Kidd 
with sexual contact.” The court ruled as follows: 
“I do find that *** both counts of the indictment in this matter sufficiently set 
forth the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault as was indicated. *** I do 
not find that the failure to allege the various motives, if you will, such as sexual 
gratification [affect the completeness of the indictment].” 
The court denied Kidd’s motion to dismiss the complaint. 
¶ 6 
 
Kidd also moved to dismiss count II on grounds its date range overlapped with 
the date range for count I. The court denied the motion to dismiss and did not 
require from the prosecutor any clarification of the dates. 
¶ 7 
 
Kidd requested reappointment of defense counsel before trial. Immediately 
before trial, the prosecutor orally moved to amend both counts of the indictment to 
add to each an allegation that Kidd made the sexual contact “for the purpose of the 
sexual gratification of the Defendant or victim.” Defense counsel objected and 
moved to dismiss the indictment. The court denied both the prosecutor’s motion to 
amend the indictment and Kidd’s motion to dismiss the indictment, finding that 
Kidd suffered no prejudice, as the indictment sufficiently informed him the State 
would prove he made the contact for the purpose of sexual gratification. The court 
said: 
“[Kidd] seized on *** the definition of sexual conduct which is exactly that 
language for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of another. He knew 
it. He wasn’t surprised.”  
¶ 8 
 
The case proceeded to trial with an indictment that did not include an allegation 
that Kidd sought sexual gratification for himself or the victim when his penis made 
contact with T.F. After the presentation of the evidence, the court instructed the 
jurors that a defendant commits an act of predatory criminal sexual assault of a 
child if “he is 17 years of age or older and intentionally commits an act of contact, 
however slight, between the sex organ or anus of one person and the part of the 
body of another for the purposes of sexual gratification of the Defendant and the 
victim is under 13 years of age.” The court also eliminated the overlap in the dates 
 
 
 
 
 
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for the two counts, requiring proof of an act of sexual contact “between July 1, 
2011[,] through August 27, 2016,” for a conviction on count II. 
¶ 9 
 
The jury found Kidd guilty on both counts. Kidd again raised his objections to 
the indictments in his posttrial motion, which the trial court denied. The court 
sentenced Kidd to 25 years in prison on each count, with the sentences to run 
consecutively. 
 
¶ 10 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Appellate Court Proceedings 
¶ 11 
 
Kidd argued on appeal that the trial court should have dismissed the indictment 
because it did not set forth all the elements of the alleged offense. The appellate 
court held that, by alleging an act of sexual contact, the indictment sufficiently 
alleged contact “for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal.” 2021 IL App 
(4th) 190345-U, ¶ 8. The court affirmed the convictions. Id. ¶ 78. We granted 
Kidd’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021). 
 
¶ 12 
 
 
 
 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
¶ 13 
 
Kidd argues on appeal that the trial court should have dismissed the indictment 
because it did not set forth all the elements for the charge of predatory criminal 
sexual assault of a child by sexual contact, the charge on which the jury found him 
guilty. The State contends the indictment adequately alleged both sexual contact 
for the purpose of sexual gratification and sexual penetration. To resolve the issues, 
we must construe section 111-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 
ILCS 5/111-3(a)(3) (West 2016)) and section 11-1.40 of the Criminal Code of 2012 
(Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2016)). 
¶ 14 
 
We review de novo issues of statutory construction. Board of Education of 
Chicago v. Moore, 2021 IL 125785, ¶ 18. Our primary objective in statutory 
construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature, and the most reliable 
indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute. Id. ¶ 20. We also review 
de novo the issue of whether an indictment states the elements of the charged 
offense. People v. Espinoza, 2015 IL 118218, ¶ 15. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 15 
 
 
 
 
 A. The Indictment Must Delineate the Nature and  
 
 
 
 
 
Elements of the Charged Offenses Pursuant to  
 
 
 
 
 Section 111-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
¶ 16 
 
Section 111-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 provides in pertinent 
part: 
 
“(a) A charge shall be in writing and allege the commission of an offense 
by: 
 
 
 
 
 
* * * 
 
(3) Setting forth the nature and elements of the offense charged.” 725 
ILCS 5/111-3(a)(3) (West 2016). 
¶ 17 
 
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of an indictment before trial in a 
pretrial motion, the indictment must strictly comply with section 111-3. People v. 
Carey, 2018 IL 121371, ¶ 21 (citing People v. Rowell, 229 Ill. 2d 82, 93 (2008), 
and People v. Benitez, 169 Ill. 2d 245, 257 (1996)). If the indictment does not 
strictly comply with section 111-3, the “rule requiring a showing of prejudice does 
not apply, and the proper remedy is dismissal.” People v. Cuadrado, 214 Ill. 2d 79, 
87 (2005); Benitez, 169 Ill. 2d at 258 (citing People v. Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d 441, 
448 (1991)). 
 
¶ 18 
 
 
 
 
B. A Predatory Criminal Sexual Assault Indictment Alleging  
 
 
 
 
Contact Requires an Allegation That the Purpose of the  
 
 
 
 
 
Contact Was for Sexual Gratification 
¶ 19 
 
The indictment in this case charged Kidd with two counts of predatory criminal 
sexual assault of a child. Section 11-1.40(a) of the Criminal Code prescribes the 
elements that must be alleged in an indictment to state a charge of predatory 
criminal sexual assault of a child: 
 
“(a) A person commits predatory criminal sexual assault of a child if that 
person is 17 years of age or older, and commits an act of contact, however slight, 
between the sex organ or anus of one person and the part of the body of another 
 
 
 
 
 
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for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused, 
or an act of sexual penetration, and: 
 
(1) the victim is under 13 years of age[.]” 720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) 
(West 2016). 
¶ 20 
 
According to the statute, an indictment charging predatory criminal sexual 
assault of a child must plead allegations establishing contact or penetration. When 
the indictment alleges “contact” with a victim 13 years or younger, the indictment 
must allege (1) the perpetrator was 17 years of age or older, (2) the perpetrator 
committed an act of contact between the sex organ or anus of one person and a part 
of the body of another person, and (3) the perpetrator made the contact for the 
purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused. Id. But, when 
the indictment alleges an act of penetration by a perpetrator 17 years of age or older 
with a victim 13 years of age or younger, the indictment sufficiently pleads a count 
of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, without any allegation about the 
purpose of the penetration. Id. 
¶ 21 
 
This court in People v. Terrell, 132 Ill. 2d 178, 203-05 (1989), reviewed 
sections 12-14 (aggravated criminal sexual assault) and 12-16 (aggravated criminal 
sexual abuse) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, ¶¶ 12-14, 
12-16), the predecessor statutes to the statute under review. The Terrell court 
explained that the former statute permitted convictions in either of two ways: if the 
prosecution proved an act of sexual penetration, the trier of fact could convict 
without evidence concerning the purpose of the act; if the prosecution proved only 
sexual contact, for a conviction the trier of fact needed to find the defendant 
committed the contact “ ‘for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the 
victim or the accused.’ ” Terrell, 132 Ill. 2d at 208; see also People v. Novak, 163 
Ill. 2d 93 (1994). We find that our interpretation of the predatory criminal sexual 
assault statute under review is consistent with the reasoning used in Terrell and 
Novak by this court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 22 
 
 
 
 
C. The Ambiguous Indictment of Kidd Did Not Set Forth  
 
 
 
 
 All the Elements for a Charge of Sexual Contact. 
¶ 23 
 
As Kidd pointed out in his pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment, the 
prosecution hindered Kidd’s preparation for trial by failing to clarify the charge. 
Because the indictment did not include any allegation of the purpose of the contact, 
the prosecution appeared to “charg[e Kidd] with a penetration case.” By then using 
language of only contact, without adding the element of purpose, the prosecution 
did not charge a violation of the statute. The prosecutor affirmed the State had no 
intention of proving that Kidd made contact for the purpose of sexual gratification, 
by repeatedly asserting that the indictment alleged all necessary elements, even 
though Kidd pointed out the indictment failed to allege purpose. The trial court 
agreed with the prosecutor that the “failure to allege the various motives, *** such 
as sexual gratification,” did not affect the sufficiency of the indictment. 
¶ 24 
 
The State’s brief on appeal thoroughly supports Kidd’s claim that the 
incomplete indictment hampered his preparation. The State now claims its 
“indictment set forth the facts necessary to establish all the elements of predatory 
criminal sexual assault of a child through sexual penetration.” Because the 
indictment included an allegation that Kidd placed his penis in contact with T.F.’s 
mouth, according to the State, the indictment asserted an act of penetration, even 
though the indictment specifically called the act “sexual contact,” not “sexual 
penetration.” And the State adds that Kidd’s own remark, that the State charged 
him with a penetration case, shows that he knew the State meant for the indictment 
to charge sexual penetration. 
¶ 25 
 
We do not here confront a case of a mere omission of an element from the 
charging instrument. The prosecutor and the court told Kidd the State could prove 
predatory criminal sexual assault by proving contact without also proving the 
purpose of the contact. Then, immediately before trial, the prosecutor sprang on 
Kidd the news that the State intended to prove Kidd acted for the purpose of sexual 
gratification. While the court did not allow the State to amend the indictment, the 
court permitted the change by including the statutory language of purpose in the 
jury instructions. And now, for the first time on appeal, the State claims it actually 
pled and proved not sexual contact but sexual penetration. 
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 26 
 
Because Kidd filed a pretrial motion questioning the sufficiency of the 
allegations in the indictment, he did not need to show prejudice to obtain reversal 
of the conviction here. See Cuadrado, 214 Ill. 2d at 88; Rowell, 229 Ill. 2d at 93. 
This case shows why courts must dismiss the indictment before trial when the 
charging instrument fails to set forth all the elements of the offense. Kidd pointed 
out the ambiguity in the indictments, and the trial court forced him to complete his 
preparation for trial without a clear statement of the charges on which the State 
intended to proceed.  
¶ 27 
 
In Espinoza, 2015 IL 118218, ¶¶ 1, 3, the State charged Espinoza with domestic 
battery of “ ‘a minor.’ ” Before trial, Espinoza made an oral motion for an 
amendment to identify the minor by his initials. Id. ¶ 5. The State refused to amend 
the complaint, and the circuit court dismissed the complaint because it violated 
section 111-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. Id. ¶ 7. The circuit court 
in a second, similar case reached a similar conclusion, and the courts consolidated 
the cases for appeal. Id. ¶¶ 8-10. The Espinoza court held: 
“[W]here an indictment or information charges an offense against persons or 
property, the name of the person or property injured, if known, must be stated 
in the charging instrument and the allegation must be proved as alleged. 
[Citation.] In the cases before it, the charging instruments at issue charged 
crimes committed against individual persons, but neither charging instrument 
contained any information suggesting the victims’ identities. [Citation.] 
Further, the State declined to cure the defects in the charging instruments. 
Under the circumstances, the trial courts acted properly in dismissing both 
criminal complaints.” Id. ¶ 10. 
¶ 28 
 
The Espinoza court rejected the State’s argument that Espinoza needed to show 
the complaint’s deficiency prejudiced him. In the case before us, the trial court 
adopted the reasoning rejected in Espinoza, finding that Kidd knew the State needed 
to prove the purpose of the contact, and therefore he suffered no prejudice from the 
omission of that element in the indictment. The trial court’s reasoning would apply 
just as well if the State had finally decided, immediately before trial, to amend the 
indictment to charge sexual penetration, as Kidd’s remarks showed he knew the 
State might have intended that charge. The trial court’s failure to dismiss the 
insufficient indictment violated Kidd’s “fundamental right to be informed of the 
 
 
 
 
 
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nature and cause of criminal accusations made against him.” Id. ¶ 15 (citing Rowell, 
229 Ill. 2d at 92-93). 
¶ 29 
 
In the present case, the appellate court argued at length that the absence of 
language concerning sexual gratification did not affect the sufficiency of the 
indictment because “sexual contact is, in effect, contact done for the purpose of 
sexual gratification or arousal.” 2021 IL App (4th) 190345-U, ¶ 57. The court 
decided the clause “for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal” had no effect 
on the meaning of the statute. The court’s interpretation violated the principle of 
statutory construction that “[n]o part of a statute should be rendered meaningless or 
superfluous.” Van Dyke v. White, 2019 IL 121452, ¶ 46 (citing Skaperdas v. 
Country Casualty Insurance Co., 2015 IL 117021, ¶ 15). The appellate court’s 
reasoning also conflicts irreconcilably with this court’s explanation, in Terrell, 132 
Ill. 2d at 209-11, that when the prosecution proves sexual penetration, it need not 
also prove the defendant acted for sexual gratification but, if the prosecution proves 
only sexual contact, it must also prove the defendant acted for the purpose of sexual 
gratification, because “it is possible for the touching which is part of that offense to 
occur accidentally or unintentionally.” 
 
¶ 30 
 
 
 
 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶ 31 
 
By failing to allege in the indictment that when Kidd made sexual contact with 
T.F. he acted for the purpose of sexual gratification, the State violated the 
requirement of section 111-3(a)(3) that the indictment must include all elements of 
the charged offenses. The trial court committed reversible error by denying Kidd’s 
pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment, and the appellate court erred by affirming 
the convictions. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the appellate court and 
the trial court and remand to the trial court with directions to dismiss the indictment. 
See People v. Stapinski, 2015 IL 118278, ¶ 56. 
 
¶ 32 
 
Judgments reversed. 
¶ 33 
 
Cause remanded with directions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 34 
 
JUSTICE OVERSTREET, dissenting: 
¶ 35 
 
I respectfully dissent from my colleagues’ reversal of defendant’s convictions 
and sentence in this case on the basis that the indictment did not strictly comply 
with the pleading requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. 
Specifically, the indictment in this case alleged penis-to-mouth contact, which, in 
Illinois, is an act of sexual penetration. The majority’s analysis is based on the 
erroneous conclusion that the indictment failed to allege sexual penetration. 
¶ 36 
 
There is no question that, under both the federal constitution and the Illinois 
Constitution, a defendant has the fundamental right to be informed of the “nature 
and cause” of criminal accusations made against him. U.S. Const., amend. VI; Ill. 
Const. 1970, art. I, § 8. The Illinois legislature codified this principle in section 
111-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (720 ILCS 5/111-3 (West 2018)). 
People v. Wisslead, 198 Ill. 2d 389, 394 (1985) (“Section 111-3 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure of 1963 mirrors this constitutional principle, requiring, 
inter alia, that a charging instrument set forth ‘the nature and elements of the 
offense charged.’ ” (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, ¶ 111-3(a)(3))). 
Specifically, section 111-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states, with respect 
to the “form of charge,” as follows: 
 
“(a) A charge shall be in writing and allege the commission of an offense 
by: 
 
(1) Stating the name of the offense; 
 
(2) Citing the statutory provision alleged to have been violated; 
 
(3) Setting forth the nature and elements of the offense charged; 
 
(4) Stating the date and county of the offense as definitely as can be 
done; and 
 
(5) Stating the name of the accused, if known, and if not known, 
designate the accused by any name or description by which he can be 
identified with reasonable certainty.” (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/111-3 
(West 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
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Here, the focus of our analysis is on the third requirement in section 111-3(a), that 
the indictment set “forth the nature and elements of the offense charged.” Id. § 111-
3(a)(3).  
¶ 37 
 
This court has specifically held that section 111-3 is “designed to inform the 
accused of the nature of the offense with which he is charged so that he may prepare 
a defense and to assure that the charged offense may serve as a bar to subsequent 
prosecution arising out of the same conduct.” People v. Simmons, 93 Ill. 2d 94, 99-
100 (1982). Nonetheless, in People v. Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d 441, 448 (1991) 
(quoting People v. Gilmore, 63 Ill. 2d 23, 29 (1976)), this court held that, in an 
appeal from a circuit court’s denial of a pretrial motion to dismiss a charging 
instrument, it is improper for the reviewing court to consider whether the charging 
instrument “ ‘apprised the accused of the precise offense charged with sufficient 
specificity to prepare his defense and allow pleading a resulting conviction as a bar 
to future prosecution arising out of the same conduct.’ ” Instead, this court has held 
that, when an indictment or information is attacked before trial, as is the case here, 
the reviewing court must determine whether the indictment strictly complies with 
the pleading requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Id.1  
¶ 38 
 
In the present case, prior to trial, defendant filed a pro se motion to dismiss the 
indictment, which the circuit court denied. Therefore, per Thingvold, our task is to 
determine whether the indictment strictly complied with pleading requirements. 
The specific question we must answer is: does the indictment strictly comply with 
section 111-3(a)(3)’s requirement that it set “forth the nature and elements” of 
predatory criminal sexual assault of a child? 
 
 
1I note parenthetically that this court has not been consistent in adhering to a standard of review 
that excludes any consideration of the purpose of section 111-3 in reviewing whether a charging 
instrument strictly complies with section 111-3. In People v. Meyers, 158 Ill. 2d 46, 54 (1994), a 
case decided after Thingvold, we reviewed the sufficiency of a criminal complaint that was 
challenged prior to trial. The Meyers court concluded that the complaint was sufficient to withstand 
a motion to dismiss, noting that, although some allegations of the complaint could have been made 
“with greater particularity,” “the relevant inquiry is not whether the alleged offense could be 
described with greater certainty, but whether there is sufficient particularity to enable the accused 
to prepare a proper defense.” (Emphasis added.) Id.; see also People v. Klepper, 234 Ill. 2d 337, 
351 (2009) (citing Meyers and applying the same standard in evaluating whether a pretrial motion 
challenging an information would have been successful). 
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 39 
 
Here, when I consider the indictment in light of the requirements of section 111-
3, I reach the conclusion that the indictment does, in fact, strictly comply with 
section 111-3(a)(3)’s pleading requirements. Therefore, I believe that the circuit 
court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment and that this 
court should affirm defendant’s convictions and sentence. 
¶ 40 
 
As stated, the narrow issue on appeal centers on whether the indictment sets 
“forth the nature and elements of the offense charged.” The charged offense is 
predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. The indictment sets forth the “nature 
and elements” of this offense by alleging facts that, if proven, establish all the 
required elements of the commission of this offense by sexual penetration. 
¶ 41 
 
The legislature has defined the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of 
a child, in relevant part, as follows:  
“A person commits predatory criminal sexual assault of a child if that person is 
17 years of age or older, and commits an act of contact, however slight, between 
the sex organ or anus of one person and the part of the body of another for the 
purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused, or an act 
of sexual penetration ***.” (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/11-1.40 (West 
2016). 
¶ 42 
 
The majority correctly construes this statute as providing for a conviction of the 
offense in one of two ways: (1) if the prosecution pleads and proves an act of sexual 
penetration, the trier of fact can convict the defendant without the State pleading 
and proving the additional element that the purpose of the defendant’s act was for 
sexual gratification, or (2) alternatively, if the prosecution pleads and proves only 
contact between certain body parts of the defendant and the accused, the trier of 
fact must also find that the purpose of the contact was for sexual gratification or 
arousal of the victim or the accused. My disagreement with the majority’s analysis 
centers on the majority’s conclusion that the indictment at issue here fails to allege 
the necessary elements to establish acts of “sexual penetration.” On the contrary, 
the indictment does allege acts that are, unquestionably, acts of sexual penetration.  
¶ 43 
 
Both counts of the indictment alleged that defendant “committed an act of 
sexual contact, however slight, with T.F., in that said defendant placed his penis in 
contact with the mouth of T.F.” (Emphasis added.) In the definitions section of 
 
 
 
 
 
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article 11 of the Criminal Code of 2012, the legislature has specifically defined 
“sexual penetration,” in relevant part, as follows: “any contact, however slight, 
between the sex organ *** of one person and *** [the] mouth *** of another 
person.” (Emphases added.) Id. § 11-0.1. 
¶ 44 
 
Therefore, the act of placing one’s penis in contact with the mouth of a child 
falls squarely within the definition of “sexual penetration” for purposes of alleging 
the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child by sexual penetration. 
Accordingly, in the present case, as the indictment alleged specific acts of sexual 
penetration, the allegations in the indictment strictly complied with section 111-
3(a)’s requirement that the indictment set forth the “nature and elements” of the 
offense charged, i.e., penis-to-mouth contact, and no additional allegations about 
the purpose of this contact was required. Nothing more needed to be alleged in the 
indictment with respect to the “nature and elements of the offense[s] charged.” 
¶ 45 
 
I recognize that the indictment does not specifically use the term “penetration.” 
However, the word “penetration” is not required under section 111-3(a) for the 
indictment to set “forth the nature and elements of the offense charged.” As I have 
explained above, in Illinois, it is not necessary that defendant’s penis actually 
“penetrated” T.F.’s mouth to be found guilty of the statutorily defined offense of 
predatory criminal sexual assault of a child by “sexual penetration.” Instead, penis-
to-mouth contact alone is the equivalent of sexual penetration, and this contact is 
specifically and plainly alleged in both counts of the indictment in no uncertain 
terms. The absence of the word “penetration” does not transform actual acts of 
sexual penetration, as alleged here, into mere acts of sexual contact requiring the 
State to now plead and prove the purpose of defendant’s acts. Instead, the 
legislature has determined that there is no need for the State to prove sexual 
gratification when a defendant places his penis in contact with a child’s mouth. 
¶ 46 
 
Had the indictment alleged that defendant knowingly contacted his penis to 
T.F.’s leg, such an allegation would require additional proof of the purpose of the 
contact. However, with an allegation of penis-to-mouth contact, the purpose of the 
contact is not an element of the offense, and this court should not require the 
indictment to include this element where this indictment factually alleges acts that 
plainly constitute sexual penetration.  
 
 
 
 
 
- 14 - 
¶ 47 
 
In its analysis, the majority gives some significance to the fact that the jury 
instructions in this case instructed the jury that it must find that defendant 
intentionally committed the penis-to-mouth contact for the purposes of defendant’s 
sexual gratification. However, we are not asked to evaluate whether any errors in 
the jury instructions resulted in an unfair trial. Instead, the issue defendant has 
raised before this court pertains only to the sufficiency of the indictment. The 
analysis of this issue, in turn, is strictly an evaluation of whether the indictment 
complies with section 111-3. The sufficiency of the jury instructions does not factor 
into this analysis. Regardless, to the extent that the jury instructions incorrectly 
stated the law, that was to defendant’s benefit, as the instructions required the State 
to prove the purpose of defendant’s acts of sexual penetration, which was not an 
element of the crimes alleged in the indictment. 
¶ 48 
 
The majority concludes that the record establishes that defendant was hindered 
in his preparation for trial by the State’s failure to clarify the charge. My review of 
the record finds no support for this conclusion. Instead, the defense benefited from 
the State having to prove an additional element that was not required to secure the 
convictions. Regardless, since we are reviewing a pretrial motion challenging the 
indictment and adhering to the standard of review set out in Thingvold, prejudice is 
not part of the analysis per Thingvold, cited by the majority.  
¶ 49 
 
In addition, to the extent that prejudice is considered, the record establishes that 
the indictment was sufficient for the defendant to prepare his defense. This is true 
because, regardless of whether defendant’s acts are called “penetration” or merely 
“contact,” the defendant always understood that he had to defend the allegations 
that he knowingly placed his penis in contact with the mouth of T.F. as alleged in 
both counts of the indictment. This requirement of the defense remained steadfast 
and never wavered throughout the parties’ dispute about the sufficiency of the 
indictment. Therefore, nothing about the allegations in the indictment prevented or 
hindered defendant from defending against these alleged acts of sexual penetration. 
If anything, as stated, by requiring the State to also prove the purpose of defendant’s 
sexual penetration, defendant benefited by being provided an additional avenue of 
defense that should not have been available.  
¶ 50 
 
Although the standard of review here is strict compliance with the pleading 
requirements of section 111-3, I do not believe the analysis of strict compliance 
 
 
 
 
 
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must be completely divorced from any consideration of the very purpose of section 
111-3, which is, as this court has specifically stated, to inform the accused of the 
nature of the offense with which he is charged so that he may prepare a defense and 
to assure that the charged offense may serve as a bar to subsequent prosecution 
arising out of the same conduct. Simmons, 93 Ill. 2d at 99-100; Meyers, 158 Ill. 2d 
at 54. To the extent relevant, the indictment in this case satisfied the purposes for 
which section 111-3 was enacted. The indictment informed defendant of the nature 
of the offense (penis-to-mouth contact with a person under 13 years of age) such 
that he can and did prepare his defense, and the indictment described the nature and 
elements of the charged offenses sufficiently to bar future prosecutions arising out 
of the same conduct 
¶ 51 
 
Regardless of which standard is applied, the indictment here strictly complied 
with section 111-3. The indictment charged defendant with two counts of predatory 
criminal sexual assault of a child. The indictment was in writing, specifically named 
the alleged committed offense, provided citation of the relevant statutory provision, 
provided the date of the offenses and the county of their occurrences, and provided 
defendant’s name and the victim’s initials. The indictment alleged specific acts of 
sexual penetration in that defendant “placed his penis in contact with the mouth of 
T.F. and T.F. was under the age of 13 years old.” Because this indictment strictly 
complies with all requirements of section 111-3, defendant’s convictions and 
sentences in this case should be affirmed.