Case Title: Armstrong v. American Colloid Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-06-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Armstrong v. American Colloid Co.1986 WY 140721 P.2d 1069Case Number: 85-247Decided: 06/24/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Johnny R. ARMSTRONG, 
Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

AMERICAN COLLOID COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, and Myron R. Durtsche, Jr., Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from District 
Court, Big Horn County, John T. Dixon, J.

Joseph E. 
Darrah, Powell, and Michael K. Davis (argued) of Redle, Yonkee & Arney, 
Sheridan, for 
appellant.

Ross D. 
Copenhaver, Powell, and Michael Golden (argued) of Williams, Porter, Day and 
Neville, Casper, for 
appellees.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is a case in which 
appellant claims he was wrongfully discharged by his employer. The same 
dispositive issues that were involved in Leithead v. American Colloid Company, 
Wyo., 721 P.2d 1059 (1986) are presented in this case. In an amended complaint, 
the discharged employee, John Armstrong, claimed that his employer, American 
Colloid Company, and his supervisor, Myron Durtsche Jr., were liable for damages 
on the theories of:

a. Breach of Employment 
Contract;

b. Malicious Conspiracy 
and Interference with Employment;

c. Breach of the Implied 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing;

d. Discharge in Violation 
of Public Policy;

e. Intentional Infliction 
of Emotional Distress;

f. Misrepresentation; 
and

g. Promissory 
Estoppel.

[¶2.]     American Colloid and 
Mr. Durtsche moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the district court 
on all claims. Appellant Armstrong has raised only four of the claims on appeal, 
and three of them are really just alternatives to his primary contention of 
breach of contract. Because we agree with appellant that he could only be 
discharged for cause under his contract, and because we will reverse and remand 
on that basis, we need not discuss his three alternative issues: promissory 
estoppel, the covenant of good faith, and discharge against public 
policy.

[¶3.]     In August of 1979, Mr. 
Durtsche invited appellant to his office to discuss a job opportunity with 
American Colloid. Appellant had lost his prior job a week earlier. At the 
meeting, Mr. Durtsche offered appellant a position as a scraper operator and 
told him that it was a steady job that he could have as long as he wanted to 
stay. Appellant accepted the offer and went to work immediately. 

[¶4.]     Appellant did not sign 
a contract; but, soon after joining the company, he met with the safety 
inspector who gave him an employment handbook and explained some of its 
provisions. He was given another handbook in the fall of 1980. The key 
employment provisions remained unchanged.

[¶5.]     In late July, 1982, 
appellant's immediate supervisor, Ned Walker, told him that the company had 
decided to let him go. In his affidavit and deposition, appellant claims that he 
was permanently terminated because he had reported a safety violation to his 
superiors. But Mr. Durtsche testified in his deposition that appellant was 
simply laid off for lack of work. Appellant disputes Mr. Durtsche's explanation, 
claiming that Mr. Durtsche assured him several days before the termination that 
there would be no layoffs. Appellant also stated in his deposition that several 
American Colloid employees took over his tasks within a week after he was fired 
and that several new scraper operators were hired. There is clearly a genuine 
issue of material fact as to why appellant was fired.

[¶6.]     The district court did 
not consider the reasons for appellant's termination because it held that the 
employment contract was at will. The court based this holding on its decision in 
Leithead v. American Colloid Company, 721 P.2d 1059, supra, where the same 
contractual issues were raised and the same handbooks interpreted. But we have 
reversed the district court's holding in Leithead, and we must reverse its 
decision in this case for the same reasons. The "specific terms and the general 
tenor of the handbooks gave appellant an enforceable right to be discharged only 
for cause." Id., at 1063. The case must be remanded for further proceedings to 
determine: First, what constitutes sufficient cause for discharge under 
appellant's contract, and second, the reason appellant was discharged. As we 
pointed out earlier, our reversal on the breach of contract issue makes 
determination of the promissory estoppel, good faith and public policy issues 
unnecessary. Appellant has not raised the three remaining issues set forth in 
his amended complaint - interference with contract, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and misrepresentation - and we will affirm the district 
court's summary judgment with respect to these issues. See Pritchard v. State, 
Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Wyo., 540 P.2d 523, 524 
(1975).

[¶7.]     Affirmed in part and 
reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

[¶8.]     THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
concurring and dissenting.

[¶9.]     My position with 
respect to disposition of this appeal is the same as my position in Leithead v. 
American Colloid Company, Wyo., 721 P.2d 1059 (1986). I agree that the summary 
judgment must be reversed. I would extend the scope of the trial to include the 
factual question of the effect of the language in the employee 
handbook.