Case Title: In the Matter of the Petition of Joseph Budner Elad for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Citation: 

Docket Number: 417, 2023

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2024-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
IN 
THE 
MATTER 
OF 
THE 
PETITION OF JOSEPH BUDNER 
ELAD FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS 
CORPUS 
§ 
§   
§  No. 417, 2023                   
§ 
 
 
Before VALIHURA, LEGROW, and GRIFFITHS, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
This 30th day of January, 2024, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The petitioner, Joseph Budner Elad, is the defendant in ejectment 
proceedings filed by Truist Bank in the Superior Court concerning property located 
at 2700 Philadelphia Pike, Claymont, Delaware (the “Property”).1  Elad has filed a 
complaint seeking to invoke the original jurisdiction of this Court to issue a writ of 
habeas corpus.  The complaint alleges that various Superior Court judges have 
violated Elad’s natural and constitutional rights and federal statutes and asserts 
various errors in the ejectment proceedings and a related mortgage foreclosure action 
in which Elad also is a defendant.2  Elad seeks the following relief:  (i) to void all 
orders issued in the ejectment and foreclosure proceedings; (ii) to assemble a grand 
jury and conduct a jury trial to establish alleged wrongdoing by the Superior Court 
judges in connection with the proceedings relating to the Property; (iii) removal of 
 
1 Truist Bank v. Elad, N23C-02-243 (Del. Super.). 
2 JDT Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Elad, N17L-06-100 (Del. Super.). 
 
2 
the judges from their judicial positions; and (iv) damages of more than $40,000,000 
from the judges and others.3 
(2) 
Before discussing the merits of this matter, we address some procedural 
issues.  On January 5, 2024, Truist Bank filed a motion to affirm.  Supreme Court 
Rule 25(b) permits motions to affirm in “civil appeals from orders denying petitions 
for extraordinary writs.”  But Elad did not file this matter as an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s denial of extraordinary writs, and Rule 25(b) therefore does not 
permit a motion to affirm.4  Moreover, Rule 43, which “governs the exercise of the 
Court’s original jurisdiction over proceedings involving . . . extraordinary writs[,]” 
provides that “[a]n answer is requested to be filed within 20 days of the filing of the 
complaint. . . .”5  Although the operative complaint in this matter was filed on 
November 27, 2023, the time to file an answer began to run after December 12, 2023, 
when the Court granted Elad’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis.6  Thus, even if 
 
3 Elad has filed various documents in the Superior Court making similar allegations and seeking 
similar relief.  E.g., Truist Bank v. Elad, N23C-02-243, Docket Entry Nos. 42, 47, 48, 53. 
4 See DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 25(b) (“Motions to affirm may only be filed in civil appeals from orders 
denying petitions for extraordinary writs. . . .  In all other cases in which a party seeks expedited 
resolution of a civil appeal, the party shall follow the procedures set forth in subparagraph e.”). 
5 Id. R. 43(b)(ii). 
6 See In re Elad, No. 417, 2023, Docket Entry No. 2, Letter from Senior Court Clerk to Elad (Del. 
filed Nov. 15, 2023) (acknowledging initial filing in this matter, directing Elad to file a Form N 
Complaint and to pay the filing fee or file a motion and affidavit to proceed in forma pauperis, and 
stating that “[t]he time to file an answer under Rule 43(b)(iii) will not start to run until the filing 
fee is paid or the motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted”). 
 
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deemed an answer under Rule 43, Truist Bank’s filing was untimely.7  For these 
reasons, the motion to affirm is stricken. 
(3) 
On January 9, 2024, the Clerk’s office struck Elad’s response to the 
motion to affirm.  Rule 25 does not permit any response to a motion to affirm unless 
requested by the Court.8  Similarly, Rule 43 does not permit any further submissions 
following an answer to the complaint, unless directed by the Court.9  The Court 
therefore concludes that the response was appropriately stricken. 
(4) 
Turning to the merits of the complaint, we conclude, after careful 
review, that this action must be dismissed.10  As an initial matter, this Court has no 
original jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus.11  Moreover, habeas relief is 
not available to Elad because he is not detained, and the matter therefore is without 
merit even if viewed as an appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of the requests 
 
7 The last day of the twenty-day period following the Court’s granting of Elad’s motion to proceed 
in forma pauperis was January 1, 2024, a legal holiday; an answer, if any, therefore was due by 
the end of the day on January 2, 2024.  DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 11(a). 
8 See id. R. 25(a)(iii) (“There shall be no briefing, argument or response to the motion, unless 
requested by the Court.”). 
9 See id. R. 43(b)(ii) (permitting the filing of an answer and providing that “unless the Court 
otherwise directs, no further submissions of the parties shall be accepted”); id. R. 43(b)(vii) (“Upon 
receipt of the writ, no further submission by the petitioner will be accepted without leave of the 
Court.”).   
10 See id. R. 29(c) (permitting sua sponte dismissal of a petition seeking to invoke the original 
jurisdiction of the Court over extraordinary writs); see also id. R. 43(b)(ii) (“If the complaint is 
directed against a judge who does not desire to appear or participate in the proceeding, the judge 
may so advise the Clerk by letter. . . .  The complaint shall not be taken as admitted whether or not 
such a letter is submitted.”). 
11 In re Cantrell, 678 A.2d 525, 526 (Del. 1996); see also In re Boston, 1988 WL 19719, at *1 
(Del. Feb. 29, 1988) (“It is clear that this Court has no original jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas 
corpus.”). 
 
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for habeas relief that he filed in that court.12  “[T]he writ of habeas corpus under 
Delaware law provides relief on a very limited basis.”13  The “sole purpose” of a writ 
of habeas corpus under Delaware law “is to determine the legality of a detention and 
not the underlying merits of a controversy.”14  Elad is not detained by the State; 
therefore, habeas relief is not available.15 
(5) 
The complaint also is without merit to the extent that it seeks a writ of 
mandamus.16  “A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy issued by this Court 
 
12 See, e.g., In re Elad, No. 417, 2023, Docket Entry No. 7, Complaint in Proceedings for 
Extraordinary Writ, at 4 (Del. filed Nov. 27, 2023) (alleging that Superior Court judges “illegally 
denied or dismissed” Elad’s “Habeas Corpus filings”). 
13 Hall v. Carr, 692 A.2d 888, 891 (Del. 1997). 
14 In re Hargreaves, 1986 WL 16284, at *1 (Del. Jan. 7, 1986); see also Hall, 692 A.2d at 891 
(stating that a writ of habeas corpus under Delaware law “provides an opportunity for one illegally 
confined or incarcerated to obtain judicial review of the jurisdiction of the court ordering the 
commitment”). 
15 Cf. Taylor v. State, 2002 WL 31477136, at *1 (Del. Nov. 4, 2002) (“[I]t appears that Taylor has 
been released from prison and is currently serving a probationary sentence at Level II.  As such, 
he is not a person ‘imprisoned or restrained of liberty’ within the meaning of the statute governing 
habeas corpus and his request for habeas corpus relief is moot.” (citation omitted)); Family Court 
v. Alexander, 522 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Del. 1987) (“The nature of the writ of habeas corpus in 
Delaware strongly suggests that once the person for whose benefit the writ has issued is no longer 
in custody the proceedings are at an end. . . .  In Delaware, therefore, only the legality of current 
deprivations of liberty are controvertible in habeas corpus proceedings.”); Olson v. Anstreicher, 
327 A.2d 603, 604 (Del. 1974) (stating that “[i]n Delaware habeas corpus is a writ designed to 
obtain the ‘speedy release of persons illegally deprived of their liberty’” and determining that 
habeas relief was not available to a person challenging his involuntary commitment to the 
Delaware State Hospital because he had been released on convalescent leave and could challenge 
any recall from convalescent leave under the statute establishing procedures for involuntary 
commitments). 
16 Elad’s complaint, filed on November 27, 2023, does not appear to refer to a writ of mandamus, 
but certain of his other filings, including the document by which he commenced this action on 
November 14, 2023, do.  In recognition of Elad’s status as a self-represented litigant, we have 
afforded Elad leniency in presenting his claims to this Court and have reviewed his various filings 
to discern the substance and decide the merits of his claims.  See generally Gunzl v. R&K Motors 
 
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to compel a trial court to perform a duty.”17  A writ of mandamus will issue only if 
the petitioner can show:  (i) that he has a clear right to the performance of a duty; (ii) 
that no other adequate remedy is available; and (iii) that the Superior Court has 
arbitrarily failed or refused to perform its duty.18  “[I]n the absence of a clear showing 
of an arbitrary refusal or failure to act, this Court will not issue a writ of mandamus 
to compel a trial court to perform a particular judicial function, to decide a matter in 
a particular way, or to dictate the control of its docket.”19   
(6) 
Elad’s complaint is based on various claims of legal error in the 
foreclosure and ejectment proceedings.  For example, Elad asserts that he was not 
properly served, was denied due process, and was denied a jury trial; the bank did 
not present an original promissory note to demonstrate a debt; the court should not 
have allowed seizure of the Property because Elad had surplus equity; and the court 
illegally denied or dismissed his habeas corpus filings.  To the extent that the 
complaint seeks to void the Superior Court’s orders—or otherwise compel a 
different result—in the foreclosure or ejectment proceedings based on such claims 
 
& Machine Shop, 2004 WL 1058367, at *1 (Del. May 4, 2004) (stating that the Court “affords 
self-represented litigants a degree of leniency in filing documents on appeal”). 
17 In re Foster, 2010 WL 424659, at *1 (Del. Feb. 5, 2010); see also In re Bordley, 545 A.2d 619, 
620 (Del. 1988) (“The peremptory writ of mandamus has traditionally been used only to confine 
a trial court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority 
when it is its duty to do so.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
18 Bordley, 545 A.2d at 620. 
19 Id. 
 
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of legal error, this action cannot provide the relief he seeks.20  Similarly, Elad’s 
requests for assembly of a grand jury and a jury trial concerning alleged wrongdoing 
by the Superior Court judges, removal of the judges from their judicial positions, 
and damages are well beyond the scope of relief available in a mandamus proceeding 
and are not supported by a showing of a clear right to the performance of a duty. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the complaint in proceedings for 
extraordinary writ is DISMISSED. 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Abigail M. LeGrow 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
20 See id. (stating that the Court will not issue a writ of mandamus to compel a trial court to decide 
a matter in a particular way).