Case Title: In re The Lock Revocable Living Trust. Concurring Opinion by J. G. Nakamura [pdf].

Citation: 109 Haw. 146

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2005-12-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

    

 

  

z

00 3

3

IN THE MATTER OF &

THE ANNIE QUON ANN LOCK REVOCABLE LIVING TRYST

 

No. 25214

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(T. NO, 01-1-0030 (GWBC))

DECEMBER 9, 2005

C.d., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND DUFFY, JJ.; AND

Moon,
5., RECUSED,

CIRCUIT JUDGE NAKAMURA, IN PLACE OF ACOBA,
‘CONCURRING SEPARATELY

OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.s

Beneficiaries-appellants Katie Lock Tamashiro, Philia

Lau, Jacalyn Lock, Ranceford Lock, Gaylynne Sakuda, Natalie

vrata, Verna Cancino, and Carol Lock (hereinafter, collectively,
Appellants] appeal from the First Circuit Court’s* July 2, 2002
final judgment granting the Petition of Successor Trustee for
Determination of Beneficiaries and Distribution of Estate (the
petition). The trial court essentially adopted petitioner-
interpretation of the Annie

 

appellee Lena L. Wong’s (Lena Wong! s

 

\ the Honorable Gary W.8. Chang presided over the underlying
proceeainge

 
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Quon Ann Lock (Annie Lock) Revocable Living Trust Agreement (the
Trust) as mandating distribution of the Trust assets in equal
shares to Annie Lock’s two surviving siblings, beneficiaries-
appellees Lena Wong? and Mah Tim Lock.

on appeal, Appellants challenge the trial court's July
2, 2002 findings of fact (FOFs), conclusions of law (Cols), and
order granting the petition. Appellants essentially contend that
the plain and unambiguous language of the Trust dictates a per
stipes distribution, discussed infra, and, thus, the trial court
erred in (1) concluding that the language of the Trust was
ambiguous and (2) considering extrinsic evidence of Annie Lock’s
intent. For the reasons discussed below, we hold that
Appellants’ contentions lack merit. Accordingly, we affirm the
trial court’s final judgment.

1. BACKGROUND

On March 22, 1993, Annie Lock, as settlor and trustee,
executed the Trust, wherein all her assets are now held. At the
time, Annie Lock’s parents were deceased, and, of Annie Lock’s

eight siblings, three were deceased.

 

Article IV of the Trust provides in pertinent part

Agof the date of my death, . . . the trustee shall
Giscribate the remaining ruse principal (including property
to which the trustee nay be entitled under my will or from
any other source), per stirpes, tomy then living brothers

 

 

As stated infia, tena wong is the sister of Annie Lock and,
therefore, a beneficiary under the Trust- Lena Wong ie also the named
buccessor trustee. Ar uch, she essentially wears ‘two hats” in thie case.
Thus, for purposes of clarity, Lena Wong 1 referred to as Petitioner Lena
ong in her capacity as successor trustee and as Beneficiary Lena wong in her
Capacity se one of the beneficiaries under the Trust

 

 
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an © ania
foregoing persons shall teil ce survive me, and cull leave
S descendant oF descendants Tiving at the tine of my death,
jen descendants shall represent their ancestors and take
Such ancestor's share, per stirpes, otherwise the share of
such decedent shall top cut, thereby increasing the share
Of the others of eaid foregoing persons or their
Gescendants, as the case my be.

 

 

B. Despite the preceding provisions of this instrunent, the
trustee may elect to withhold any property otherwise
Gistributable under paragraph A of this Article toa
beneficiary who has not reached the age of twenty-five years
and may retain the property for that beneficiary in 3
Separate trust naned for the beneficiary, co be distributed
fo the beneficiary when he or she reaches the age of cvanty-
five years, oF before then if the trustee so elects

 

 

‘The Trust named Annie Lock's sister, Lena Wong, as successor

trustee
Annie Lock passed away on June 23, 1999. Annie Lock

had never been married and had no children born to or adopted by

 

her. Thus, Annie Lock had no surviving spouse and no surviving
issue at the tine of her death. Annie Lock was survived by two
siblings, sister Lena Wong and brother Wah Tim Lock, nunerous
nieces and nephews, and several grandnieces and grandnephews.’
on March 2, 2001, Petitioner Lena Wong, as successor
trustee of the Trust, filed the petition. The petition sought a
judicial determination of the Trust beneficiaries and
distribution of the Trust assets.‘ Petitioner Lena Wong

maintained that the Trust estate should be distributed, in equal

shares, to herself and her brother, Wah Tim Lock.

 

> Annie Lock’s six predeceased siblings had a total of eighteen
children, Of these eighteen children, one predeceased Annie Lock. That
Child, Francie Lock, ‘was survived by tix chiléren, Annie Lock's grandniect

fand grandnephews

 

+ as of guly 2, 2002, the Trust assets had a gross value of
approximately $850,000 and an eatinated net value of $750,000.

 

 
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on April 25, 2002, Virginia Naomi Shimada, Annie Lock’s
niece, on behalf of herself and other Lock descendants, filed a
memorandum in opposition, arguing that the language of Article IV

of the Trust unambiguously provided for the distribution of the

 

Trust's assets to all of Annie Lock’s siblings, “per stirpes.
under a per stirpes distribution, as advocated by Shimada, each
of Annie Lock's eight siblings would receive a one-eighth share,
with the surviving childzen of any predeceased sibling taking the
share of the deceased parent in equal shares.

on May 9, 2001, dudge Colleen K. Hirai appointed Rhonda
L, Griswold, Beg. (the Master), to serve as the Master to review,
analyze, and provide recomendations regarding the interpretation
of the Trust. In her report of June 1, 2001, the Master

concluded that:

 

Although the [Successor] Trustee [Lena wong] contends
that the clause “per atimpes, to my then living Brothe:
sisters in equal shares’ i ambiguous, Paragraphe A and B of
heticle iv when read in thelr entirety are Felatively clear’
the Eruet estate is to be distributed co Annie Lock's
burviving brothert and sisters in equ:

Sibling doea not survive her, that predeceased eibling’s
Share ie to be distributed to his or her then Living
Gescendante, per stirpen, If the descendant 1a not yet age
25, the descendant’s share shell be Kept in trust until he
OF she reaches age 25.

   

 

 

 

 

 

‘The Master recommended that the Trust assets be distributed to
all of Annie Lock’s siblings per stirpes.

Pursuant to a hearing held on June 8, 2003, the
petition was deemed a contested matter and was assigned to the
Honorable Gary W.B. Chang. On July 9, 2001, Shimada filed a

motion for summary judgment, contending that the Trust provided

 
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for a per stirpes distribution of the Trust assets. On July 27,
2001, Beneficiaries Lena Wong and Wah Tim Lock filed a memorandum
in opposition to Shimada’ motion for summary judgment
(vemorandum in opposition), arguing that the Trust assets should
be equally divided between them as the only two surviving
siblings of Annie Lock. Petitioner Lena Wong joined in the
memorandum in opposition on July 31, 2001. On September 13,
2001, the trial court issued an order denying shimada’s motion
for sunmary judgment, finding that there was an ambiguity in the
rust. On Novenber 28, 2001, Shimada filed a notice of
withdrawal from active participation in the proceedings.

A jury-waived trial was scheduled for the week of
February 11, 2002. However, at a status conference held on
ganuary 28, 2002, trial was taken off the civil calender.
Instead, the trial court directed Petitioner Lena Wong and
Beneficiaries Lena Wong and Wah Tim Lock (hereinafter,
collectively, Appellees} to file a stipulation of facts and

proposed FOFs, COLe, and order in connection with the petition,

 

to be served upon all parties in interest, together with a non-
hearing notice stating that, unless a party in interest files a

the trial

 

written objection within ten days from such servic

 

court would grant the relief sought in the petition.
on May 28, 2002, Appellees filed a stipulation of
facts, and, on May 30, 2002, Appellees filed a notice of the

proposed ruling based upon the stipulated facts.

 
 

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fon June 10, 2002, Appellants, conprising eight of annie
Lock's nieces and nephews, filed their objections to the
stipulation of facts and the notice of the proposed ruling, on
the ground that Annie Lock’s intent to distribute her Trust
assets “to her siblings, per stirpes, is clear and unambiguous
based on a reading of the Trust as a whole.” Despite Appellants’
objections, the trial court entered its FOFs, Cous, and order
granting the petition on July 2, 2002. The trial court's Fore

and CoLs state in pertinent part:

Pindinge of Fact:

ie!" inzien reapect to the beneficiaries and distribution
Of the estate, Paragraph A cf Article IV of the Trust
fi, hereinafter "Paragraph A," provides that Annie
Lotk's estate shall be distributed “per stizpes, £0 sy
then living brothere and alsters in equal shares."

is. in describing the beneficiaries of the Trust,
Paragraph A is ambiguous because the provision “per
Stizpes, to ay then living brothers and sisters in
‘equal shares" is susceptible, on its face, to t™ (2)
plausible, yet conflicting, interpretations

20. Gn the one hand, "per starpes" means that an estate is
fo be divided into as many equal al ‘there are
Siblings. whether eurviving or deceased, Of
Gecedent. “iad Annie Lock wished to have her estate
Gistribsted "per stizpes,” her estate would be divided
Snto eight. (6) shares, one for each sibling; the
children of @ deceased sibling would then share their
parent's portion:

a1. Hence, ‘per stirpes" {@ in conflict with the remainder
Of the provision, that directs Annie Lock’s estate ¢:
be distributed "to my then living brothers and siate;
En equal shares," to those siblings who are living a=
the time of Annie Leck's death

 

       

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

conclusions of Law:

i. Ratnough ehe phrase ~per stirpes* standing alone has 2
Singie meaning, an vanbiguity” arises from Paragraph A
of the Trust Agreenent wien read as a whole, for

fea document nay still be ambiguous
dathougn Se contains no words Or phrases
Anbiguous in themselves. The ambiguity in
the document may arive solely from the
unusual use therein of otherwise
Unambiguous words or phrases. An
anbiguity say arise from vorde plain in

 

 

 

 
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themselves but uncertain when applied to
the subject matter of the instrument,

Hokana-v. Reline com, $7 Haw. 470, at 474-75,

E35 pad 27s at 262 (1977) (citations omitted)

5. in the ingtant proceeding, this court further had
Uncontroverted avorn statements regarding Annie Lock’s
Shtent ions regarding the disposition of her astate,
and was authorized to consider auch extrinaie
Gvidence, ae the david Supreme Court has:

oot “dope (ed) the View allowing extrinsic,
evidence, ies, all evidence outside of the
Writing including parol evidence, co be
CSnsidered by the court to determine the true

Gheent of the parties if there is any doubt or

 

 

enbodying the:¥ bargain. (]

(ompnasie added). Iikanal, 57 Naw. at 476, 559 9.26

6. This Court is empowered to reform the subject Trust,
Zven in the absence of any anbiguity; according ©o

Sogert, Zrust# and Trustees (Revised Second Edition,

ious) § 391
fe, due to a mistake in the drafting of a trust
Instrument, {t does not contain the terns of
the trast as intended by the settlor and trustee,
the settlor or other interested party may.
aintain a euit in equity to bave the instrument
Teformed co that it will contain the terns
hich vere actually agreed upon.
7. 1 thi Court had entertained any Goubt regarding its
Authority to consider extrinsic evidence in the instant
Ease, the issue se to be resolved in favor of Petitioner.
G8 Haw. 236, 244, 639 7.26 400,

 

 

 

ioe tigen

8. This Court properly admitted evidence of (annie
Eberle inteat, Because “it ig clear that there was a

Controversy before the probate court and the Hokana

Fule should apply.” See In-re Estate of Tkuta, 6¢

Baw, at 24a, 699 9.24 at 408.

Tn'tavaii, intestacy is not favored, and this Court

If divectea to apply legal doctrines in order to

preserve or effectuate 2 trust. See In re Estate of

P52 Haw. 40, 469 P24 183 (1970)

huts, ce Hew. at 245, 639 P.2d at 406 ("the law

Sonora intestacy and presumes against it").

io. Were Annie Lock’s estate to be distributed “per stirpes
the result would be az though [Annie Lock] had died
Githoue a trust of will. See Sectien 560:2-109,
Hawari Rev[ssed) Stat (utes). Given the number of persons
and the growing remoteness of their familial connection to
fannie teck!, Ehis could hardly have been [Annie Lock]
invention.

an, Invaccordance with the intentions of (Annie tock! , the
Estate of Annie Quon Ann Lock shall be distributed in
equal shares to Seneficiaries Lena L. Wong and wan Tim
ESek, whe are the only siblings of Annie Quon Ann Lock
who survived her’

 

 

   

 
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‘The trial court also entered numerous findings with respect to
the extrinsic evidence it relied upon in determining Annie Lock’s
intent. The trial court relied on (1) the affidavit of Richard
Ing, Annie Lock’s former attorney who had prepared the Trust,
which essentially provides that Ing made a mistake in drafting
the Trust and (2) the affidavit of Mary Lock, a widow of one of
Annie Lock's predeceased brothers, which tends to corroborate
Ing’s sworn statenents. Both affidavits indicate that Annie Lock
intended her assets to be distributed only to her siblings who
are living at the time of her death.

on July 2, 2002, final judgment was entered in favor of
Appellees. Appellants timely appealed on July 16, 2002.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Construction of a Trust

“The construction of a trust is a question of law which
this court reviews de nove.” In re Medeiros Testamentary Trust
and Life Ins. Trust, 105 Hawai'i 24, 288, 96 P.3d 1098, 1102
(2004) (citations onitted) .

B. Conclusions of Law
‘This court reviews the trial court’s Cole de novo.

Bremer v. Weeks, 104 Hawai'i 43, 51, 85 P.3d 150, 158 (2004). “A
COL is not binding upon an appellate court and is freely
reviewable for its correctness." te vy, , 105
Hawai‘ 445, 453, 99 P.34 96, 104 (2004) (citations omitted).

Moreover, “[a] COL that is supported by the trial court’s (F0Fs]

 
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and that reflects an application of the correct rule of law will
not be overturned.* Id. (citations omitted) .
qII. S81

AL .¢ Trial Court’ hat wv
Ambiguous

Appellants maintain on appeal that Paragraph A, Article
IV of the Trust (Paragraph A) is not ambiguous, and, therefore,
the trial court erred by considering extrinsic evidence to
deternine Annie Lock’s intentions with respect to the
distribution of her Trust assets. Specifically, Appellants
challenge COL Nos. 4, 5, and @ and argue that the use of the
words “per stixpes" and “descendants” throughout Article IV of
the Trust “together make it clear that a pex stixpes distribution
was intended." (Emphasis in original.) Furthermore, Appellants
state that the Trust “goes on to explain the nature of a per
stimmes distribution in eight (8) subsequent paragraphs of the
trust." (Smphasis in original.) ‘Thus, Appellants submit that
annie Lock “intended her trust estate to be distributed to her
siblings per stirpes, namely, that each of the eight siblings
and/or their respective families would take a share, with the
surviving children of any predeceased sibling taking the share of
their deceased parent in equal shares.”

In response, Appellees urge that the language of
Paragraph A is anbiguous on its face. Appellees emphasize that
the first sentence of Paragraph A, which appears to provide that

only a surviving brother or sister qualifies as a beneficiary

 
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under the Trust, conflicts with the second sentence of Paragraph
A, which suggests that the children of a non-surviving brother or
sister of Annie Lock may also qualify as beneficiaries.

Appellees maintain that thie conflict creates an ambiguity and
that, therefore, the trial court properly admitted and considered
extrinsic evidence of Annie Lock’s intent.

When construing a trust, this court is guided by
principles relating to the interpretation of trusts as well as
those relating to the interpretation of wills. Trust Created
Under the Will of Damon, 76 Hawai'i 120, 124, 869 P.2d 1339, 1343,
(2994). *A fundamental rule when construing trusts is that the
Intention of the settlor as expressed in a trust instrument shall
prevail unless inconsistent with some positive rule of law." Id.
(internal brackets, quotation marks, and citation omitted).
Additionally, “in construing a trust document to determine the

ettior’s intent, the inetrusent must be read as a whole, not in
fragments.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Inxe
Lopez, 64 Haw. 44, 49, 636 P.24 731, 735 (2981)).

Simitarly, (this court has held] that when interpreting
Wille, a0 single word of an ambiguous clause should be
Yiceratly interpreted se though standing alone. Zach word,
phrase, Clause and sentence of the paragraph should be
Considered in relation to each other and the paragraph
{feelf construed ae a part of the will as a whole,

 

 

Id. (internal brackete and quotation marks omitted) (citing

Queen's Hosp. v. Hite, 38 Haw. 494, 505 (1950)). In determining
whether an ambiguity exists,
under the parel evidence rule, the test lies not necessarily

Un the presence of particular ambiguous words or phrases but
rather invehe purport of the document itaeif, whether or not

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particular words or phrases in thenselves be uncertain or
Eoabtfel in meaning. In other words, a document may still
cre henselae ‘snbiauis ma

Unsnbiauous words or phrases. An embiguity may arise from
Merde plain in thesseives Bat uncertain when applied to the
Dubject matter of the instrument. In shore, auch an

gublasity arises from the use of words of doubtful or
Sneertain seaming oF application:
Hokama v. Reline Corp,, 57 Haw. 470, 474-75, 559 P.2d 279, 202
(2977) (citing Midkiff v. Castle & Cooke, Inc., 45 Haw. 409, 422,

 

368 P.2d 887, 894 (1962) (citations omitted) (emphases added)).
Applying these principles, we hold that the language of
Article IV of the Trust is ambiguous on its face. As previously

stated, the disputed language of Paragraph A provides:

A. Agot the date of av death, . . . the trustee shall

 

fo which the trustee may be entitled under my will or from

any other source), per stizpes. omy then Living brothers:

andoisters in ecial shares.
PBestolns Sersone shall fai] to survive ne, and shall Teave
S descendant or descendants Tiving at the

Such descendants shall represent their ancestors and take
Such ancestor's share, per stizpes, otherwise the share of
Such decedent shall drop out, thereby increasing the share
Of the others of said foregoing persons or their
Gescendante, as the case may be.

 

 

 

 

 

(some enphases in original.) (Some emphases added.) Although
the phrases “per stirpes" and “to my then living brothers and
aisters* in the first sentence of Paragraph A are unambiguous
when separately considered, they are inconsistent with one
another when Paragraph A is read as a whole. As this court has
previously stated, “it is well-established that ‘per stixpes’
means ‘by or according to root,’ ‘according to or by stock,’ oF

‘py right of representation,’ i.e., that the descendants are to

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take through or as representatives of a parent.*? First Hawaiian

kv. K i Un xe ate of 1, 80 Hawai'i 233,
235, 909 P.2d S61, 563 (1995) (citing Restatement (Second)
Property (Donative Transfers) §§ 25.9 and 28.2 (1986).
Moreover, “[ilmplicit in the phrase is the concept that the
sroot’ or ‘stock’ begins with the ancestors of those who are to
take and not with the takers thenselves." Id; see also Heller
ve Sokol, 316 A.2d 193 (Md. 1974) (stating that “per stirpes
means taking the share of one’s ancestors).

In the present case, a per stizpes distribution of the

Trust assets would result in each of Annie Lock’s eight siblings
taking a one-eighth share, with the surviving children of any
predeceased sibling taking the share of their deceased parent in
equai shares. Under a per stirpes distribution, it is irrelevant
whether any of Annie Lock’s eight siblings survive her at the
time of her death; as long as her siblings leave a living
descendant, then such descendant is entitled to “take through or
ae representatives of a parent." However, the firet sentence of

Paragraph A aleo provides that the Trust assets are to be

 

 

§ We nove that, in 2996, the legislature enacted Hawai'i Revis
Statutes {iRS) # 560:2-709. Seq 1996 Haw. Sees. L. Ret 288, § 1 at 63.
Bection 560:2-709(c) provides « definition of “per stirpes":

 

   

(c) Per stixpes. If 2 governing instruent executed after
January 1. 1987 calle for property to be distributed “per
Stirpes," the property is divided into as many equal share
ae there are:

{dy Surviving children of the designated ancestor; and

(2) Deceased children who left surviving descendante

 

 

 

cuted in 1993,

 

(Bnphesis added.) inasmuch az Annie Lock’s Trust was «
Section 5€0;2°709(c) ie not applicable in this case

 

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distributed to Annie Lock’s “then Living brothers and sisters.”
(smphasis added.) Inasmuch as part of the first sentence
xequixes the sibling to be alive at the time of Annie Lock’s
death, the first sentence is clearly inconsistent with a per
stixpes distribution, which does not require the sibling to be
alive at the tine of Annie Lock’s death.

Moreover, the second sentence of Paragraph A also
conflicts with the requirenent in the first sentence that a
sibling be alive at the time of Annie Lock’s death in order for
him or her to take under the Trust. As stated in the Trust, the
second sentence of Paragraph A provides an explanation of how to
Gistribute the Trust assets “[i]n the event that any of said
foregoing persons{,]" ise, Annie Lock’s living brothers and
sisters at the time of her death, “shall fail to survive [annie
Lock.]* Clearly, on sta face, Article IV is susceptible to two
contradictory interpretations: (1) a distribution of the Trust
assets among Annie Lock's brothers and sisters that are alive at
the time of her death or (2) a per stirpes distribution of the
trust assets, resulting in each of Annie Lock’s eight siblings

receiving a one-eighth share of the Trust assets. Based on the

 

foregoing, the ambiguity in Article IV of the Trust arises fron
the unusual use therein of otherwise unambiguous words and

phrases. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court correctly

 

concluded that an ambiguity existe in Article IV of the Trust.

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‘The Trial Court's Conclusion that Extrinsic Evidence is
Adnissible to Determine Annie Locks intent

1. The Trial Court's Application of the “Hokama Rule”

 

Appellants next argue that the trial court incorrectly
applied the ‘Hokama rule’ with respect to the admission of
extrinsic evidence in the context of this case because the Hokama
rule involved a disputed contract, not a disputed trust
Moreover, Appellants allege that the trial court “ignored Hawai'i
trust law that specifically prohibits extrinsic evidence absent

the finding of an ‘ambiguity’ in the trust language

In Hokama, this court adopted

the view allowing extrinsic evidence, i.e., all evidence

Suteide of the writing including pa

Considered by che court to determine che
ies if there 1a any doubt ox controversy as to the

ning of the language embodying cheir bargain.

 

 

    

Hokama, 57 Haw. at 476, 559 P.2d at 263. Hokama also eliminated
the common law distinction between “patent” and “latent”
ambiguities and permitted "parol evidence of the surrounding
circumstances in the making of a contract to aid the trial court

* where the

 

in its determination of the intention of the parti
contracts at isaue presented an ambiguity on their face, i.e., a
patent ambiguity. Id. Thie court applied the Hokama rule in
Graham v. Washington Univ., S@ Haw. 370, $69 P.2d 896 (1977), and
in In-re Estate of Ikuta, 64 Haw. 236, 639 P.2d 400 (1981),

wherein each case involved ambiguous language used in the context
of a trust. The court in Graham applied the Hokama rule and held

that the trial court should have admitted extrinsic evidence to

oe
   

* FOR PUBLICATK

 

ascertain the settlor’s intent with respect to his trust.
Graham, 56 Haw. at 375-76, 569 P.24 at 899-900. In applying the
Hokama rule in Ikuta, this court held that the trial court
properly considered extrinsic evidence to determine the settlor’s
intent with respect to his trust. Ikuta, 64 Haw. at 244-45, 639
P.2d at 405-06. Both Graham and Ikuta essentially stand for the
proposition that, where there is “any doubt or controversy[,]”
ue., an ambiguity, “as to the meaning of the language” used in a
trust, extrinsic evidence may be considered by the court to
determine the true intent of the settlor. Finally, although

ndeg by (Appellante] that [the settlor’s]
TE possible from the trust
ie is equally true that

it Le true as cont
Gheene mist be gat
instrument iteele,

 

     
  
  

the trust and the sectlor’s
Conception of any ambiguous words, employed by her] in the
trust instrument, say be received and considered for the
purpose of a‘éing the court in construing the instrument to
Serermine (her) intent.

Graham, 58 Haw. at 375-76, 569 P.2d at 900 (quoting In xe Trust
ata jett, 38 Haw. 407, 409-20 (1949)). Thus, inasmuch
as there is doubt or controversy, i.e., an ambiguity, as to the
meaning of the language used in the Trust, Appellants’
contentions are wholly without merit. Accordingly, we hold that
the trial court properly admitted extrinsic evidence of Annie
Lock’s intent under the Hokama rule.

2. The Trial Court’s Findings and Conclusion with respect
to Annie Lock’s Intent

Appellants further allege that, assuming arguendo the
language of the Trust is ambiguous, COL No. 11 is wrong because,
“{a]ithough not artfully stated, the Trust language repeatedly

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and specifically states Annie [] Lock’s intent that the Trust
[assets] be distributed per stirpes.** In response, Appellees
counter that none of the other articles of the Trust support a
per stirpes interpretation.

In this case, the trial court’s findings with respect
to the evidence of Annie Lock’s intent focus solely on the two
affidavits proffered by Appellees, i.e., the affidavits of
Richard Ing and Mary Lock. Inasmuch as Appellants do not object
to the trial court’s findings with respect to the subject

affidavits, these findings are undisputed. See Hawai'i Rules of

 

Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 28(b) (4) (C) (2003)"; Okada

‘Trucking Co. v, Bd. of Water Supply, 97 Hawai'i 450, 458, 40 P.3d

73, @1 (noting that FOPs not challenged on appeal are binding on

the appellate court), reconsideration denied, 101 Hawai'i 233, 65

 

« cou No, 12 states, in ite entirety:

in accordance with the intentions of the settler, the Estate of
Annie {] Lock shall be distributed in equal sha

Reneficlaries Lena i. wong and Nah Tim Lock, who
Siblings of Annie (J Lock who survived her

 

 

> under HRAP Rule 28(D) (4) (C), appellants are required to provide,
Anter alia, the followin

(4) A concise statement of the points of error set forth in
Separately mumered paragraphs. Zach point shall stat

(i) the aliegee error committed by the court or agency; (ii)
where inthe record the alleged error occurred; and (it)
Gihere in the Fecord the alleged error was objected to or the
tanner in which the alleged error wae brought to the
Retention of the court or agency. “where applicable, each
point shall also include the following

 

 

 

jci ncn the point involves a finding or conclusion of the
court of ageney, & quotation of the finding or conclusion
Srged ae error:

Joints not presented in accordance with this section
with be disregarded, except that the appellate court, at ite
option, may notice a plain error not presented.

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eee
P.3d 10 (2002); Kawamata Farms, Inc. v. United Ari Prod., 26
Hawai'i 214, 252, 948 P.24 1055, 1093 (1997) (“Tf a finding is
not properly attacked, it is binding; and any conclusion which
follows from it and is a correct statement of law is valid.)
(Citation omitted.); Leibert v. Fin. Factors, Ltd., 71 Haw. 265,
288, 788 P.24 833, 835 (1990) (FOFs not specified as error on
appeal pursuant to HRAP Rule 28(b) (4) (C) are treated as
unchallenged on appeal); cf. Amfac, Inc. v, Waikiki Beachcomber
Inv. Cos, 74 Haw. 85, 125, 839 P.2d 10, 32 (conclusion of law not
challenged on appeal is treated as binding on the appellate
courts), reconsideration denied, 74 Haw. 650, 843 P.2d 144
(a9s2).

As previously mentioned and according to his affidavit,

ing was Annie Lock’s former attorney who prepared the Trust. In

 

0 doing, Ing borrowed a standard form template from the Will and
Trust form book published by Hawaiian Trust Company (the
template). Ing readily admits that he “forget” to remove the
term “per etirpes” and the “explanatory provision” from the
template when he drafted Annie Lock's Trust.* Article IV of the
template provides in relevant part:

A, Ae of the date of my death, . . - the trustee shall
Qlertibure the remaining trust principal (including property
Co'thich the trustee nay be entitled under my will or from
any other source), per atizpes, to my then living
Gescendants

 

+ ang’s affidavit ie unclear ae to what he means by “explanatory
provision,” ius, whether he is referring to the second sentence in Paragraph
Proven ie aor pert of the template language, or whether it refers to
Birdorsph 8, waich eorcesponds £0 Paragraph B of the templat

 

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B. Despite the preceding provisions of this instrument, the
Efustes may elect to withheld any property otherwise
Glstributable under paragraph A of this Article toa
beneficiary who has not reached the age of twenty-five years
and may Fetain the property for that beneficiary in a
Separae trust naned for the beneficiary, to be distributed
forthe beneficiary when he or she reaches the age of twenty-
Hive years, of before then If the trustee so elects. .

  

(emphases in original.) With respect to the circumstances

 

surrounding the creation of Annie Lock’s Trust, Ing avers that

5. Affiant agrees that the language of Paragraph A Le
Confusing as fo who are the beneficiaries of the Estate
Secause the term "per atirpee” could refer to ail eight (8)
brothers end sisters of Annie Lock and their descendants or
fo only the five (5) brothers and sisters of Annie Lock who
Were iiving at the tine Annie Lock nade and entered into the
Trust Agreement and their descendants, white the phrase "to
fy thea living brothers and sisters” refers to only the tro
(2) brothers and sisters of Annie Lock who vere Living at
the tine of her death.

Gr" Before preparing the Trust agreement, Affiant met with
Aanie tock and her Brother, Wah Sing Lock, ("] whom Affiant
had known for-almost thirey (30) years, so discuss the
estate plas of Annie Lock

se *Xe Phe weering, Wan Ging Lock completed a confidential
Questionnaire for Annie Lock, on which Wah Sing ueck listed
Eily the five (5) brothers and sisters of Annie Leck who
Gere living st the tine of the meeting.

Bo ae a result, Affienc was unaware at the tine of the
meeting that three (3) brothers and sisters of Annie Lock
had alfeacy died prior to the necting

5. At the meeting, the distribution of the Eetate was
Glecussed and considered, including, but not limited to, the
Gistribution of the Betate to the five (5) brothers and
Sitters of Annie Leck who were Living at the tine of the
eeting and their descendants,

Tor However, Nlah Sing Lock suggested that the Eetate be
Giseribuces to only the brothers and sisters of {] Annie
flock who are idving at the tine of her death.

{S0* Xinie Lock agrees wits che suggestion of wah Sing Lock,
thereby deciding to distribute the Hutate to only the
Brothers and sisters of {) Annie Lock who are living at the
Cine of her death

2)" Therefore, i¢ vas Affiant’s intention to prepare
Paragraph A to reflect the decision of Annie Lock to
Glseribute the Estate to oaly che brothers and isters of (]
Basie Lock who are Living at the time of her death.

ids. In preparing Paragraph A, Affiant used a standard fore
in’ the Will and trust form bock published by Hawaiian Trust
Company, which contained the language "per stirpes to sy
then 1iving descendants in equal shares," as well as an
explanatory provision.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

+ Wah Sing Lock passed away prior to Annie Lock

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eee

14. Walle Aftiant changed the word “descendants” to
Serothere and sisters,” Affiant forgot to remove the term
Sper seirpes,* as well ae the explanatory provision.

TES" Aécorsingiy, the language "per stirpes, to my then
}iving brothers and sistera in equal shares" as set forth in
Paragraph A should have read "to my then living brothers and
Sisters in equal shares,” and the explanatory provision
Should have Been resoved.

 

 

    

Despite Ing’s sworn statement that the template contained the

language “per stirpes to my then living descendants in equal

 

shares,” the template does not contain the phrase “in equal
shares.” (Emphasis added.) However, Appellants do not challenge
FOP No. 22, which states, in its entirety:

im dvafting Paragraph A, Richard Ing used as his template a
Elendard form set forth in the Will and Trust form book
Published by Wawaiian Trust Company, and this standard form
Boatains the language “per stizpes to my then living
Getcendante in equal shares", as well as an explanatory
provision:

Notwithstanding this finding, a comparison of the template and
the Trust indicates that the template language, “per stirpes, to
my then living descendants,’ was altered to “per stirpes, to ny
then living brothers and sisters in equal shares." Although FOF
No. 22 may be erroneous, it would not affect the outcome of the
trial court’s decision. See Torres v. Torres, 100 Hawai'i 397,
412, 60 P.34 798, 619 (2002) (noting that in order for a court's
erroneous finding to constitute reversible error, appellant must
indicate how the erroneous finding affected the outcome of the
trial court's decision). The only relevant inquiry in this case
is whether the affidavit evinces the intent of the settlor, Annie
lock. Here, Ing clearly avers that it was Annie Lock’s intent to
distribute her estate to her siblings who are alive at the tine
of her death

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Further, the affidavit of Mary Lock, Wah Sing Lock’s

widow, corroborates Ing’s sworn statements regarding Annie Lock’s

intent:

1. Affiant is the widow of Sonny Lock, who was also known as Wah
Sing tock, who wae the brother of Annie Lock, and who died prior
fo the death of Annie Lock

3° “tn early 2993, Sony Lock took Annie Lock to meet with
Richard ng, who is an attorney, to discuss and decide who
her estate would be left to wnen she died and to have her
Fevocable Living trust prepared.

so'°dter in 2982, Annie Lock cold Affiant that at that
necting with Richard Ing, Sonny Lock had advised her to
Teave her estate only co her surviving brothers and sisters,
asd that is what Annie Lock had decided to do,

i° Ghovely betore her death in mid-1999 at. St. Francis
fiospital, Annie Lock again told Affiant that she was leaving
her estate only to her surviving brothers and sisters,
Specifically sentioning Lena Nong and Wah Tim Lock, who were
tke only surviving brothers and sisters of Annie Lock at
thse cine!

5. Affient has no interest in the estate of Annie Lock as a
beneficiary or in any other capacity.

2. “Graig Lock and Claire Asam ave the children of Sonsy
Lock and Affiant, are the nephew and niece of Annie Leck,
Sei are potential beneficiaries of the estate of Annie Lock

 

the trial court expressly found that Mary Lock's sworn statements
were contrary to the interests of Mary Lock's children.

As the trial court found in its undisputed findings,
the affidavits proffered by Appellees make it clear that Annie
Lock intended distribution of the Trust assets among her siblings
who survived her. Thus, inasmuch as COL No. 11 is supported by
the trial court’s undisputed FOFs, and reflects an application of
the correct rule of law, COL No. 11 is correct. Accordingly, we
hold that the trial court did not err in distributing the Trust
asset in equal shares to Lena Wong and Wah Tim Leck, the only

eiblings that survived Annie Lock at the time of her death."

 

\ gppellants algo raise on appeal that the trial court incorrectly
concluded that it "is empowered to reform the subject Trust, even in the
(continued...)

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IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s

guly 2, 2002 final judgment in favor of Appellees.

 

on the briefs: L
for
Jame 8, 1. Kosbib Or
Neal. acu, and
Keith K. Hayashi (of ih nmto—

Beet eee,
pagent Bosses OM rcuateed
appellants Katie Lock ne
Zamaghtzo, Pee a ene Dat Or

pace tee, Manes

Patrick ¥. Taomae, for
petitioner-appellee
Lena L. Wong in her capacity
ae successor trustee

Gaylora G. Tom, for
beneficiaries-appellee
Lena L. Wong and Wah Tim
Lock

(. , ,continued)
absence of ambiguity." Although the trial court concluded that the Trust was
SREGESSuot GPvateo hele, “alternatively, that even if the Trust was not
SENRCus, 1f had the power to reform che Trust "(4]f, due to a mistake in the
seeeieeece'S Tilet inctronene, it does not contain the terns of the trust ae
GEeended by the wettlor and trustee(.J" COL No. € (quoting Bogert, § 991
FESrSSnd’cruscees (Revised Second Zaition, 1963)).. Inasmuch as we hold that
The Trust ie anbiguous, we need not reach this issue.

 

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