Case Title: Cynthia Tell, as dependent widow of Donnie Lee Zeigler, deceased v. Terex Corporation and Terex Equipment Limited

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1051128

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2007-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 01/12/2007 - Tell v. Terex
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
_________________________
1051128
_________________________
Cynthia Tell, as dependent widow of Donnie Lee Zeigler,
deceased
v.
Terex Corporation and Terex Equipment Limited
Appeal from Elmore Circuit Court
(CV-04-412)
STUART, Justice.
Cynthia Tell, as dependent widow of Donnie Lee Zeigler,
deceased, appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of
Terex 
Corporation 
and 
Terex Equipment 
Limited ("TEL")
(hereinafter Terex Corporation and TEL are sometimes referred
1051128
Throughout the proceedings in the trial court and the
1
appeal in this Court, Terex Corporation and TEL were
represented jointly, filed joint pleadings, and asserted
identical arguments. 
2
to collectively as "Terex"),  on Tell's claims asserted under
1
the 
Alabama 
Extended 
Manufacturer's 
Liability 
Doctrine
("AEMLD").  Tell also challenges several discovery rulings
made by the trial court.  We reverse and remand.
Facts
Beginning in March 2003, Donnie Lee Zeigler was employed
by Elmore Sand & Gravel, Inc., as a haul-truck driver.
Zeigler was assigned to drive a 25-ton, articulated off-road
haul 
dumptruck 
manufactured 
by 
Terex 
in 
2002 
("the
dumptruck").  As part of his daily duties, Zeigler was to
inspect the dumptruck before and after he finished his shift
to check for various problems, including problems with the
brake-fluid level.
The dumptruck had been purchased by Cowin Equipment
Company, Inc., another defendant in this action, and leased to
Elmore Sand & Gravel on April 9, 2002.  Cowin Equipment
retained responsibility for servicing and repairing the
dumptruck under the terms of the Terex warranty.
1051128
3
On December 20, 2003, Zeigler was working at Elmore Sand
& Gravel.  About an hour after his shift began, Zeigler
radioed Derrell Sanders, another driver working for Elmore
Sand & Gravel, and reported that the brake light on the
dumptruck was on and that he was going to check his brakes.
About an hour after Zeigler's call, Sanders drove around
to Zeigler's dumptruck and saw Zeigler trapped under the bed
of the dumptruck, which was in the lowered position.  Sanders
immediately jumped into the cab of the dumptruck to raise the
bed and free Zeigler.  Zeigler was taken to the hospital,
where he subsequently died from his injuries.
Cynthia Tell, as Zeigler's dependent widow, sued Terex,
Cowin Equipment Company, and others; Tell asserted AEMLD
claims against Terex.  Terex moved for a summary judgment,
asserting that Zeigler had been contributorily negligent and
had assumed the risk of injury by positioning himself under
the bed of the dumptruck while it was raised and by
positioning himself under the raised bed of the dumptruck
without first putting the body-safety prop bar in place.
Terex presented evidence indicating that Zeigler had been
instructed never to get under the raised bed of the dumptruck
1051128
4
for any reason.  Terex also presented evidence indicating that
Zeigler had been instructed to never get under the raised bed
of the dumptruck without first employing the body-safety prop
bar.  The evidence also established that it was not necessary
for drivers to get under the bed of the dumptruck to refill
the brake-fluid reservoir.
Tell filed a motion seeking to strike certain materials
filed by Terex in support of its summary-judgment motion; Tell
argued that those materials were inadmissible and, therefore,
that they should not be considered by the trial court.  Tell
also filed a motion pursuant to Rule 56(f), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
claiming that she could not properly respond to Terex's
summary-judgment motion because of outstanding discovery
issues and that the trial court should delay its consideration
of the pending summary-judgment motion pending further
discovery. 
The trial court denied Tell's motion to continue the
pending summary-judgment motion, filed pursuant to Rule 56(f),
Ala. R. Civ. P., and her motion to strike certain evidentiary
materials submitted by Terex.  The trial court then entered a
summary judgment for Terex without providing a detailed
1051128
5
statement of its reasoning.  However, in its order, the trial
court 
cited 
several 
cases 
that 
recognized 
that 
the
contributory negligence of the injured party was a complete
bar to recovery under the AEMLD.  Because Tell's claims
against Cowin Equipment Company and other defendants remained
pending, the trial court certified the summary-judgment order
for interlocutory appeal, pursuant to Rule 54, Ala. R. Civ. P.
Tell appealed, asserting the following arguments:
"I.  The trial court erred in finding that Zeigler
was contributorily negligent.
"II.  The trial court erred in denying Tell's motion
to strike Terex's inadmissible evidence.
"III.  The trial court erred in denying both Tell's
motions to compel discovery, and Tell's motion to
deny or continue summary judgment pursuant to Rule
56(f)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.]."
 
Standard of Review
"A summary judgment is appropriate upon a
showing that no genuine issue of material fact
exists and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.  Rule 56, [Ala. R. Civ.
P.]. In reviewing a summary judgment, this Court
will view the evidence in a light most favorable to
the nonmovant and will resolve all reasonable doubts
against the movant."
Bean v. BIC Corp., 597 So. 2d 1350, 1351 (Ala. 1992).  
Analysis
1051128
6
I.  Whether the trial court erred in finding that
Zeigler was contributorily negligent.
Tell alleges that the trial court erred in relying on
Zeigler's alleged contributory negligence as the basis for
entering the summary judgment.  In Hannah v. Gregg, Bland &
Berry, Inc., 840 So. 2d 839 (Ala. 2002), this Court stated the
following 
principles 
concerning 
the 
application 
of
contributory negligence at the summary-judgment stage of an
action:
"A plaintiff cannot recover in a negligence
action where the plaintiff's own negligence is shown
to have proximately contributed to his damage,
notwithstanding a showing of negligence on the part
of 
the 
defendant. 
 
Likewise, 
a 
plaintiff's
contributory negligence will preclude recovery in an
AEMLD 
action. 
 
The 
question 
of 
contributory
negligence is normally one for the jury.  However,
where the facts are such that all reasonable persons
must 
reach 
the 
same 
conclusion, 
contributory
negligence may be found as a matter of law.
"To establish contributory negligence as a
matter of law, a defendant seeking a summary
judgment must show that the plaintiff put himself in
danger's way and that the plaintiff had a conscious
appreciation of the danger at the moment the
incident 
occurred. 
 
The 
proof 
required 
for
establishing contributory negligence as a matter of
law should be distinguished from an instruction
given to a jury when determining whether a plaintiff
has been guilty of contributory negligence.  A jury
determining whether a plaintiff has been guilty of
contributory negligence must decide only whether the
plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable care.  We
1051128
7
protect against the inappropriate use of a summary
judgment to establish contributory negligence as a
matter of law by requiring the defendant on such a
motion to establish by undisputed evidence a
plaintiff's conscious appreciation of danger."
840 So. 2d at 860-61.
A.  Evidence and Arguments Presented by Terex
In its motion for a summary judgment, Terex argued, among
other things, that Zeigler was contributorily negligent and
that he assumed the risk of injury when he put himself
underneath the bed of the dumptruck, and particularly when he
put himself underneath the bed of the dumptruck without first
putting in place the body-safety prop.  
In support of that motion, Terex presented the following
evidence:
Terex offered into evidence a copy of a safety-and-
maintenance manual that, Terex asserted, was provided with the
dumptruck.  This manual instructed the user: "Do not work
under or near an unblocked or unsupported body.  Always use
the body safety prop."  Terex offered the deposition testimony
and affidavit testimony of David Gaddy, the general manager of
Elmore Sand & Gravel during the time that Zeigler was employed
there.  Gaddy testified that he had orally instructed the
1051128
8
employees at Elmore Sand & Gravel, among other things, to not
"get up under a dump body."  Gaddy also testified that during
some of those conversations with employees he discussed the
use of the body-safety prop.  Gaddy testified that drivers had
no need to use the body-safety prop because they had no reason
to be under the bed of a dumptruck; according to Gaddy,
drivers were not allowed to work on the trucks and were
instructed to contact a mechanic if they had any mechanical
problem with the truck.  However, Gaddy admitted that, after
Zeigler's death, he learned that the mechanics had allowed the
drivers to add brake fluid to the reservoir of the dumptruck,
if necessary.  Gaddy also testified that he discussed with the
drivers how to raise the body-safety prop; Gaddy testified
that it "takes less than 2 seconds" to employ the body-safety
prop.  
Additionally, Terex offered the deposition testimony of
Billy Joe Gibbons, an employee of Cowin Equipment Company, the
company 
responsible 
for 
servicing 
and 
repairing 
the
dumptruck.  Gibbons testified that the body-safety prop could
be raised with one hand and that once the body-safety prop was
in place, the bed of the dumptruck could not be lowered.
1051128
9
Gibbons also testified that brake fluid could be added to the
brake-fluid reservoir without being beneath the bed of the
dumptruck, i.e., that it was possible to stand on the ground
next to the dumptruck to add brake fluid to the reservoir.
Terex also offered the deposition and affidavit testimony
of Mark Montgomery, who worked as the safety director for
Elmore Sand & Gravel.  Montgomery also testified that the
drivers or operators are instructed not to attempt to repair
or to work on the dumptrucks; they are instructed to call a
mechanic 
immediately 
if 
there 
are 
problems 
with 
the
dumptrucks.  Montgomery also testified that as Zeigler was
leaving for the day on the day before his accident, Montgomery
asked him if everything was okay with Zeigler's truck, to
which Zeigler replied "yeah, yeah, yeah."  Montgomery
testified that he regularly asked the operators this question
as they were leaving for the day.
Terex also offered the deposition testimony of Billy
Stanley, the president of Elmore Sand & Gravel. Stanley
testified that the drivers of the dumptrucks were required to
perform an inspection of their trucks both before and after
their shifts and to complete a corresponding inspection
1051128
10
report.  After the accident, Stanley reviewed the reports that
had been completed by Zeigler in the days preceding his
accident and noted that Zeigler had not reported any problems
with the brakes on the dumptruck.  Stanley also testified that
the drivers are trained to contact the maintenance department
at Elmore Sand & Gravel immediately if they discover a problem
with the trucks or if a problem develops during their shift.
In support of its motion for a summary judgment, Terex
also submitted the deposition testimony of Dupree Harvey, the
vice president of Elmore Sand & Gravel.  Harvey testified that
he had a conversation with Zeigler in May 2003 –- when Zeigler
was still a relatively new employee –-  concerning the dangers
of getting under the raised bed of a dumptruck.  Harvey
testified that he specifically asked Zeigler how he would
check his brake fluid on the dumptruck.  Harvey testified: 
"I don't know why but something just told me to
stop and talk to him about –- because he was a new
hire –- about telling him how to check his brake
fluid.  So I went up to [Zeigler] and I said,
'[Zeigler,]... show me how you check your brake
fluid.'  So he went around on the passenger side and
took off the cap, pointed to it or he took it off.
... and so I said to [Zeigler], I said, 'So you're
telling me you don't have to get underneath the bed
of the truck to check your brake fluid.'  He says,
'No, you just stand right here on the ground.  It's
about chest high.  And you can reach it right here
1051128
11
and check the brake fluid.'  And I said, 'Well, good
answer.  That's what I was looking for.'  And I
said, 'So tell me again, you don't have to get
underneath the bed of the truck to check the brake
fluid.'  And he said, 'That's correct.'"
Harvey also testified that he told Zeigler "don't ever get
underneath the bed of the truck.... period, no questions
asked."  Harvey did not know if Zeigler had ever received
training on how to use the body-safety prop because "I just
know he was told never to get underneath the bed of a truck,
under no circumstances."  Harvey added that it was unnecessary
to raise the bed of the dumptruck to check the brake fluid or
to do any of the items on the inspection checklist Zeigler was
required to do.  Harvey testified that if Zeigler had any
problems with his truck, Zeigler was supposed to report them
to Harvey; according to Harvey, Zeigler had not reported any
problems to him.  
Terex argued that, based on this evidence, Zeigler was
contributorily negligent and that, therefore, Terex was
entitled to a summary judgment as to Tell's AEMLD claims
asserted against it. 
B.  Tell's Arguments in Opposition to
Terex's Motion for a Summary Judgment
1051128
12
Tell argues that Terex was not entitled to a summary
judgment on her AEMLD claims.  As the nonmovant at the
summary-judgment stage, Tell argues that the evidence, when
construed in her favor, as it must be, Fincher v. Robinson
Bros. Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 583 So. 2d 256 (Ala. 1991),
indicates that the dumptruck malfunctioned in some respect.
She also argues that there are multiple safer, alternative
designs for the dumptruck, which would have prevented the
malfunction from occurring or would have avoided the need for
Zeigler to have been working in the path of the bed of the
dumptruck.  
Additionally, 
Tell 
argues 
that 
the evidence does
not establish that Zeigler put himself in danger's way and
does not establish that Zeigler consciously appreciated the
danger he faced from his position in relation to the raised
bed of the dumptruck at the moment the accident occurred, both
of which are required to establish contributory negligence as
a matter of law.  
Tell argues that the evidence establishes the following
in support of her argument that the dumptruck malfunctioned
and that Zeigler was not contributorily negligent:  that the
dumptruck being driven by Zeigler suffered recurring brake
1051128
13
problems; that on the day Zeigler was killed, he was
attempting to "check his brakes" by refilling the brake-fluid
reservoir and resetting the brake-overstroke sensor, which
required him to be positioned under the raised bed of the
dumptruck; that Zeigler left the raised bed of the dumptruck
in the "hold" position when he went under the dumptruck bed
and that in the "hold" position the bed of the dumptruck
should have remained in the same position as Zeigler had left
it; and, that, for some unexplained reason, the bed of the
dumptruck collapsed or lowered itself while Zeigler was
beneath the dumptruck preparing to "check on the brakes."
Tell argues that this evidence leads to the inference that the
dumptruck-bed control malfunctioned in some way because it did
not remain in the "hold" position.  Tell also argues that
because there were no other reported incidents of the bed of
the dumptruck lowering itself when it had been left in the
hold position, Zeigler could not have appreciated the danger
he faced at the moment of his death.
Tell also points out that, some time after Zeigler's
accident, a mechanic employed with Cowin Equipment Company,
the company responsible for maintaining and servicing the
1051128
As part of Tell's discovery efforts, she requested to
2
examine this hydraulic-control valve.  However, shortly before
Terex's summary-judgment motion was filed, Tell learned that
the valve had been lost or discarded and was not available for
examination by Tell.
14
dumptruck, tested a "hydraulic-control valve" from the
dumptruck operated by Zeigler and found it to be defective.
Because of this defect, the hydraulic-control valve was
removed from the dumptruck involved in this incident a year
after Zeigler's accident.   Tell asserts that the existence of
2
the defective hydraulic-control valve supports her claim that
the dumptruck malfunctioned on the day of Zeigler's accident.
Tell also relies on her expert's opinion that the design
of the dumptruck allowed employees "poor access" to the
hydraulic-brake-fluid reservoir and to the brake-overstroke
sensor.  Additionally, Tell's expert testified that the design
of the body-safety prop on the Terex dumptruck was "defective
and dangerous" because, he said, it
"requires the operator to place his arm or entire
body under the dump bed of the truck and to reach
from a dangerous position standing between the tires
in order to set it. It also cannot be set unless the
dump bed is almost completely raised, making an
operator 
vulnerable 
if 
the 
dump 
bed 
is 
not
completely 
raised 
and rendering it completely
ineffective in such an instance."
1051128
15
Tell's expert testified that the dumptruck should have been
designed so that the hydraulic-brake-fluid reservoir, the
brake-overstroke sensor, and the body-safety prop were in a
location in which it would be safer to maintain or use them.
Additionally, Tell points out that witnesses reported
seeing an unopened can of brake fluid next to the dumptruck
where Zeigler was found.  Tell argues that, because the body-
safety prop is located underneath the bed of the dumptruck,
and because Zeigler was found directly on top of the body-
safety prop and an unopened can of brake fluid was found next
to the truck, it is possible that Zeigler was attempting to
set the body-safety prop so that he could "check the brakes"
when the bed controls malfunctioned, causing the bed of the
dumptruck to come down unexpectedly on Zeigler.
C.  Analysis
The evidentiary showing required to obtain a summary
judgment on the basis of Zeigler's contributory negligence is
very demanding.  See Hannah v. Gregg, Bland & Berry, 840 So.
2d at 860-61 (recognizing that, in order to be entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law based on contributory negligence
at the summary-judgment stage of an action, the movant must
1051128
16
establish 
by 
undisputed 
evidence 
that 
the 
plaintiff
consciously appreciated the danger he faced at the time of his
death).  However, the record before us does not establish by
undisputed evidence that Zeigler consciously appreciated the
danger he faced at the moment of his death.  As Tell argued,
there are possible explanations for the accident other than
that Zeigler was contributorily negligent.  The evidence and
theories presented by Tell are sufficient to create a genuine
issue 
of 
material 
fact 
as 
to 
whether 
Zeigler 
was
contributorily negligent in placing himself where he could be
injured by the unexpected lowering of the bed of the
dumptruck.  Therefore, the trial court improperly concluded
that Terex was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  We
reverse the summary judgment in favor of Terex.
II.  Whether the trial court erred in denying Tell's
motion to strike evidence offered by Terex that Tell
says is inadmissible.
Tell next asserts that the trial court erred in denying
her motion to strike certain exhibits relied upon by Terex in
support of its summary-judgment motion, more specifically
photographs of warning stickers purportedly affixed to the
dumptruck operated by Zeigler the day of his accident and
1051128
17
affidavits of various employees submitted by codefendant
Dupree Harvey in support of his summary-judgment motion and
later adopted by Terex in support of its summary-judgment
motion.  The trial court did not state any reasons for its
denial of Tell's motion to strike.  
Because we are reversing the summary judgment in favor of
Terex, the issue whether the affidavits and the photographs
were properly considered as evidence in support of Terex's
summary-judgment motion is now moot.  However, we note that in
order for the photographs to be properly considered at trial,
they, of course, must be properly authenticated and relevant
to the issue under consideration.  See Rule 901, Ala. R. Evid.
(addressing the requirement that evidence be authenticated and
identified); Ware v. State, [Ms. CR-04-1556, March 24, 2006]
___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (photographs taken
some 14 months after defendant's arrest were inadmissible
because they were not properly authenticated; those same
photographs also were not relevant because they were taken at
a time other than the time of the defendant's arrest); and
Vandiver v. State, 73 So. 2d 566 (Ala. Crim. App. 1953)
(photographs taken several weeks after the occurrence at issue
1051128
18
were inadmissible to establish how the scene looked at the
time of the occurrence).
III.  Whether the trial court erred in denying
Tell's motions to compel discovery and Tell's motion
to deny or to continue the summary-judgment motion
pursuant to Rule 56(f), Ala. R. Civ. P.
Tell next challenges the trial court's ruling on her
motion to compel discovery and her motion to continue the
hearing on the summary-judgment motion.  Before the ruling on
the summary-judgment motion, Tell filed a motion pursuant to
Rule 56(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., asking the trial court to
continue the hearing on the summary-judgment motion  or,
alternatively, to deny Terex's summary-judgment motion.  In
support of that motion, Tell's counsel submitted an affidavit
attesting that, although he had diligently pursued discovery
of all relevant information, he could not adequately respond
to Terex's summary-judgment motion for two reasons: (1) Terex
had failed to produce a witness who was knowledgeable of the
design of the dumptruck; and (2) counsel had recently learned
that a defective hydraulic-control valve  that had been
removed from the dumptruck and that Tell had requested to
examine had been discarded and was unavailable.  Tell's
counsel also attested that, in connection with a witness
1051128
19
deposed pursuant to the Rule 30(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., a
motion to compel the deposition of the proper witness remained
outstanding.  Additionally, Tell's counsel attested that, in
connection with the hydraulic-control valve, he needed
"additional 
discovery to: (1) determine facts
relevant to how the part was misplaced, lost, or
discarded, and (2) conduct an examination of all
witnesses, 
from 
Cowin 
[Equipment 
Company] 
or
otherwise, who inspected the part and found it to be
defective.  Critical to this analysis will be the
nature of the defect and its implications for the
accident causing ... Zeigler's death."
In its summary-judgment order, the trial court expressly
denied Tell's Rule 56(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to continue
the hearing on the summary-judgment motion pending additional
discovery and the trial court implicitly denied her motion to
compel discovery from Terex.  On appeal, Tell argues that the
evidence sought by these motions "bear[s] on Zeigler's
possible appreciation of the danger at the time of his
accident, 
and 
will 
further 
negate 
any 
inference 
of
contributory negligence."  (Tell's brief at p. 62.)  Thus, she
asserts, the trial court erred in denying her motions.
We agree with Tell that the information she seeks is
highly relevant to her claims and defenses.  We also note that
Tell's counsel was not dilatory in requesting the information
1051128
20
made the basis of the Rule 56(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion.
Throughout this litigation, Tell has requested information
regarding the overall design of the dumptruck and, more
specifically, 
information 
regarding the design of the
electrical and hydraulic systems used in the dumptruck.  Even
after multiple motions to compel, Terex either failed to
respond or inadequately responded to these requests.
Additionally, Tell filed a deposition notice pursuant to
Rule 30(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., requesting to take the
deposition of a representative with knowledge of the design of
the dumptruck; the representative produced by Terex pursuant
to Rule 30(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., however, was not familiar
with the requested areas of inquiry and could not offer any
information as to the design of the dumptruck.  Tell requested
the name of an individual with this knowledge early in the
litigation, and, although Tell filed multiple motions to
compel, Terex did not comply with the requests.
Additionally, Tell asserts that she learned shortly after
Terex's summary-judgment motion had been filed that the
defective hydraulic-control valve had been lost.  Promptly
upon learning this information, Tell's counsel filed the
1051128
21
motion to continue the summary-judgment motion, pursuant to
Rule 56(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., so that she could conduct
discovery related to the circumstances of the disappearance of
the valve and the defect found to exist in the hydraulic-
control valve.  
We further note that Tell requested that the summary-
judgment motion be continued for an additional 90 days so that
she could obtain as much information as possible about the
missing valve.  According to the scheduling order in place at
the time of this request, the requested 90-day period for
additional discovery would not have delayed the trial or
impacted other deadlines that had been set by the trial court.
Rule 56(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., states:
"Should it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the [summary-judgment] motion that the
party cannot, for reasons stated, present by
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's
opposition, the court may deny the motion for
summary judgment or may order a continuance to
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just."
Additionally, this Court has recognized that
"if it can be ascertained that the information
sought by pending interrogatories and requests for
production of documents is crucial to the nonmoving
party's case, it is error to enter a summary
1051128
Our listing here is not intended to expand or limit the
3
scope of Tell's requested discovery.
22
judgment before the party moving for summary
judgment has produced the documents and answers to
the interrogatories."
Parr v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 641 So. 2d 769, 771 (Ala.
1994).  See also Reeves v. Porter, 521 So. 2d 963 (Ala. 1988).
Because the information sought by Tell is crucial to her
claims and defenses, the trial court erred in entering a
summary judgment in favor of Terex without allowing Tell
additional time for discovery.  Therefore, the trial court
erred to the extent it denied Tell's motion, filed pursuant to
Rule 56(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., to continue the hearing on the
summary-judgment motion and to the extent it denied Tell's
motion to compel additional discovery regarding the overall
design of the dumptruck, the electrical and hydraulic systems
used in the dumptruck, and the circumstances surrounding the
missing hydraulic-control valve that was removed from the
dumptruck.3
We reverse the summary judgment in favor of Terex and
TEL.  We note that the trial court erred in denying Tell's
motion filed pursuant to Rule 56(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., to
continue 
the 
summary-judgment 
hearing and to continue
1051128
23
discovery.  We remand this cause to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Nabers, C.J., and Lyons, Harwood, Smith, and Parker, JJ.,
concur.
Bolin, J., concurs in the result.
Woodall, J., concurs in part and expresses no opinion in
part.
See, J., dissents.
1051128
24
WOODALL, Justice (concurring in part and expressing no opinion
in part).
I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it reverses
the summary judgment entered in favor of Terex and TEL.  I
express no opinion concerning the other issues discussed in
that opinion, because, in my judgment, those issues are
rendered moot by our reversal of the summary judgment.