Case Title: In re S.M.

Citation: 163 Vt 136, 655 A.2d 726

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1994-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN_RE_SM.93-225; 163 Vt 136; 655 A.2d 726

[Filed 30-Dec-1994]

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press. 


                           No. 93-225


In re S.M. & M.M, Juveniles               Supreme Court

                                          On Appeal from
                                          Rutland Family Court


                                          October Term, 1994



Silvio T. Valente, J.

Adele Pastor of Corsones and Corsones, Rutland, for appellant children

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Alexandra N. Thayer,
 Assistant Attorney General, Waterbury for appellant SRS 

Robert Appel, Defender General, and Henry Hinton, Appellate Attorney,
 Montpelier, for appellee father 

Kathleen De Veaux, Rutland, for appellee mother



PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


     GIBSON, J.   The Commissioner of Social and Rehabilitation Services
(SRS) and juveniles S.M. and M.M. appeal from an order of the Rutland Family
Court denying SRS's petition to terminate the residual parental rights (TPR)
of the juveniles' parents.  Appellants raise three claims on appeal: (1) in
every dispositional review the court must consider the factors enumerated in
33 V.S.A.  5540, even where the court does not find a substantial change of
material circumstances; (2) the court erroneously concluded that no
substantial change of circumstances existed as to father; and (3) the court
erred by not considering mother's lack of progress in its
change-of-circumstances analysis.  We reverse. 

 

     In August 1990, SRS filed a CHINS (children in need of care and
supervision) petition alleging that two-year-old M.M. and her one-month-old
brother, S.M., had been physically abused by their parents, who also had
failed to protect them from abuse.  The court granted the petition in
November 1990, finding the children CHINS.  In January 1991, the court held a
disposition hearing and transferred legal custody and guardianship of M.M.
and S.M. to the Commissioner of SRS, who placed the children in foster care. 

     The court-approved case plan submitted by SRS originally called for the
children's reunification with their parents.  To achieve reunification, the
plan of services required the parents to participate in parenting classes and
to engage in mental health counseling. Throughout the next year, the parents
completed various parenting classes, and received counseling individually and
together from a number of different service providers.  Progress in therapy
was slow, due in part to the parents' denial that they were responsible for
their children's abuse. 

     In December 1991, SRS changed the case plan goal from reunification to
termination so the children could be freed for adoption.  A petition to
terminate was filed in February 1992 for consideration during the
eighteen-month dispositional review hearing.  33 V.S.A.  5531.  A hearing
on the petition extended over thirteen days during November and December
1992.  In February 1993, the court denied the request to terminate the
parents' residual parental rights, concluding that SRS had failed to sustain
its burden to show a substantial change of material circumstances.  It found
that after the children were placed in custody, there was never an extended
period of time when one or both of the parents were not engaged in some kind
of program contemplated by the case plan.  It reasoned that due to father's
progress, albeit irregular and limited to specific parenting strategies, his
capacity to parent had not stagnated or deteriorated.  The court further
concluded that it need not address mother's progress relevant to a
substantial change of material circumstances because it had already
concluded, based on father's situation, that no change of circumstances
existed.  SRS thereafter filed a motion to 

 

reconsider and to amend the order, which the court denied in March 1993.  SRS
and the children appealed. 

                                  I.

     Appellants' first argument focuses on the extent of the family court's
inquiry in considering whether to terminate residual parental rights during a
dispositional review hearing pursuant to 33 V.S.A.  5531.  Appellants
argued below that the court must address the best interest factors in 33
V.S.A.  5540 whenever it considers termination during the  5531
dispositional review.  The court rejected the argument, and appellants raise
it again on appeal. 

     Essentially, appellants ask this Court to collapse into one step the
well-established two- step inquiry required in every post-disposition TPR
hearing when the issue arises during an eighteen-month dispositional review. 
It is well settled that the family court must conduct a two- step analysis
whenever it considers modifying an existing disposition order.  In re M.M.,
159 Vt. 517, 521, 621 A.2d 1276, 1279 (1992); see 33 V.S.A.  5532(a). 
First, the court must find a substantial change in material circumstances. 
In re B.W., ___ Vt. ___, ___,