Case Title: Commonwealth v. Norman

Citation: 

Docket Number: 032765

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
v.  Record No. 032765  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   November 5, 2004 
GEORGE HALCOTT NORMAN, III 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
Appellee, George Halcott Norman, III, was convicted in 
a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County 
of operating a motor vehicle after having been declared a 
habitual offender, second or subsequent offense, in 
violation of Code § 46.2-357.1  Norman appealed the 
conviction to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, asserting 
that he could not be convicted of this offense because an 
order of the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County had 
restored his privilege to operate a motor vehicle.  A panel 
of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s 
judgment.  Norman v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 496, 504, 
579 S.E.2d 699, 702 (2003).  Subsequently, the Court of 
Appeals granted Norman’s petition for rehearing en banc and 
thereafter reversed the conviction and dismissed the 
                                                 
1  Norman pled not guilty to the charge under Code 
§ 46.2-357.  However, he pled guilty to and was convicted 
of possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a 
felony in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2; brandishing a 
firearm in violation of Code § 18.2-282; and operating a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, second 
offense within five years, in violation of Code § 18.2-266.  
Those convictions are not before us in this appeal. 
 
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indictment.  Norman v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 628, 639, 
587 S.E.2d 742, 747 (2003). 
We awarded the Commonwealth this appeal.  The sole 
issue is whether the order of the circuit court restoring 
Norman’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the 
condition that he fulfill certain requirements terminated 
his habitual offender status.  We conclude that it did not 
do so; therefore, there was sufficient evidence to sustain 
Norman’s conviction.  Accordingly, we will reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
The incident leading to the conviction at issue 
occurred on August 14, 2001, when H. L. Gatewood, a deputy 
sheriff with the Pittsylvania County Sheriff’s Department, 
was traveling eastbound on Route 57 in Pittsylvania County 
and noticed a particular vehicle traveling westbound.  
Deputy Gatewood’s dispatcher had previously alerted him to 
be on the look out for that vehicle.  Deputy Gatewood then 
turned his police vehicle around and proceeded to stop the 
identified vehicle.  Norman was the driver and sole 
occupant of the stopped vehicle. 
After getting Norman out of the vehicle and securing a 
weapon found in it, Deputy Gatewood asked Norman for some 
form of identification.  Norman did not produce a driver’s 
 
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license, but he told Deputy Gatewood that he had a “piece 
of paper issued by the Court” at his residence.  Deputy 
Gatewood took Norman to the residence to retrieve the 
paper, which was a “Restricted Driver’s License Order, 
Entry Into Alcohol Safety Action Program” entered by the 
Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County on May 7, 2001.  At 
some point during the traffic stop, Deputy Gatewood ran a 
check on Norman’s driving status through his dispatcher.  
Deputy Gatewood testified that the status came back as 
“suspended or revoked”; he was not sure of the actual 
wording.  Deputy Gatewood also asked Norman where he was 
going.  Norman stated that he was en route to a friend’s 
house. 
The contested issue at trial, as well as on appeal, 
was whether Norman’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle 
had been fully restored so that he no longer had the status 
of habitual offender when Deputy Gatewood stopped him.  At 
trial, several pertinent orders entered by the Circuit 
Court of Pittsylvania County were introduced into evidence 
and are summarized as follows: 
1. 
An order dated August 30, 1985, declaring Norman a 
habitual offender and directing him “not to operate 
a motor vehicle on the highways of the Commonwealth 
of Virginia.” 
 
2. 
An order dated October 13, 1989, sentencing Norman 
for a conviction, based on his guilty plea, of the 
 
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offense of operating a motor vehicle after having 
been declared a habitual offender. 
 
3. 
An order dated December 20, 1999, adjudicating 
Norman’s petition for restoration of his privilege 
to operate a motor vehicle.  In pertinent part, the 
order stated: 
 
Accordingly, the prayer of the 
petition should be granted, subject to 
the conditions set forth below in that 
the petitioner is no longer addicted to, 
or psychologically dependant upon, the 
use of alcohol or drugs; that the 
petitioner is not a threat to the health 
and safety of others or to himself; . . . 
it is ORDERED that pursuant to [Code] 
§ 46.2-360 . . . the privileges to 
operate a motor vehicle in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia should be 
restored and they are hereby restored to 
George Halcott Norman, III. 
 
It is further ORDERED that this is not 
a license or privilege to drive in 
itself; that the petitioner shall present 
himself and this Order to the Department 
of Motor Vehicles for such administrative 
proceedings and payment of fees and costs 
as may be required, and further, that the 
petitioner is referred to Dan River ASAP 
for monitoring and supervision for twelve 
(12) months from the date of this Order; 
that the petitioner shall not possess or 
use alcohol, alcoholic beverages or drugs 
. . . ; that should the petitioner incur 
any alcohol or drug related offense 
during the period of supervision as set 
forth herein, the Court may in its 
discretion issue process to the 
petitioner to show cause why his 
privilege to drive should not be 
suspended permanently. 
 
4. 
An order dated May 4, 2001, finding that Norman had 
violated the terms of the December 20, 1999 order.  
The circuit court granted Norman a “restricted 
 
5
permit to drive,” allowing Norman to operate a 
vehicle “only to and from his place of employment, 
during the course of employment, to and from Dan 
River ASAP meetings, and to and from medical 
providers for himself and his mother.”  The 
restrictions were to be in effect for a period of 
12 months, and the order further provided that, if 
Norman had any violations of law, including any 
alcohol or drug related offenses, during the 12-
month period, the court would revoke his privilege 
to operate a motor vehicle. 
 
5. 
A restricted driver’s license order2 issued on May 
7, 2001, stating that “[y]ou seek a restricted 
license after having been declared [a] habitual 
offender.”  The restrictions set forth in the order 
were in accordance with the May 4, 2001 order.  
Norman signed the order acknowledging that he 
understood its contents. 
 
Based on these orders, the Court of Appeals held that 
the Commonwealth failed to prove that Norman was a habitual 
offender when he drove a vehicle on August 14, 2001.  
Norman, 41 Va. App. at 639, 587 S.E.2d at 747.  The Court 
of Appeals reasoned that Code § 46.2-360(1) does not 
distinguish between a “ ‘full restoration’ ” and a 
“ ‘conditional restoration’ ” and that the December 20, 
1999 order restored Norman’s privilege to operate a motor 
vehicle.  Id. at 636-37, 587 S.E.2d at 745-46.  The fact 
that the circuit court attached certain conditions to 
Norman’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle and retained 
the authority to enforce those conditions did not alter the 
                                                 
2  This is the same restricted driver’s license order 
that Norman provided to Deputy Gatewood. 
 
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conclusion that the circuit court restored Norman’s 
privilege to drive.  Id. at 637-38, 587 S.E.2d at 746. 
ANALYSIS 
 
Under the provisions of Code § 46.2-357, it is 
“unlawful for any person determined or adjudicated [a] 
habitual offender to drive any motor vehicle . . . on the 
highways of the Commonwealth while the revocation of the 
person’s driving privilege remains in effect.”  Code 
§ 46.2-357(A).  To establish a violation of that statute, 
the Commonwealth has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that, at the time of an alleged driving offense, a 
defendant was adjudicated a habitual offender and his/her 
privilege to operate a motor vehicle was revoked.  See Rose 
v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 430, 434, 578 S.E.2d 758, 760 
(2003).  Whether the evidence presented by the Commonwealth 
was sufficient to sustain Norman’s conviction under Code 
§ 46.2-357 turns on the effect of the December 20, 1999 
order. 
The Commonwealth argues that, although the December 
20, 1999 order restored Norman’s privilege to operate a 
motor vehicle, the restoration was subject to certain 
conditions, the violation of which would result in Norman’s 
loss of driving privileges again.  Thus, Norman’s 
adjudication as a habitual offender remained “in effect” 
 
7
within the intendment of Code § 46.2-357, meaning that he 
was properly convicted under that statute.  The 
Commonwealth also argues that the terms of the May 7, 2001 
restricted driver’s license order reflect that the circuit 
court intended-and Norman understood-that he was still 
classified as a habitual offender.  Norman’s signature on 
the license acknowledged that he had been adjudicated a 
habitual offender and was seeking “a restricted license 
after having been declared [a] habitual offender.” 
 
Norman asserts that, pursuant to Code § 46.2-360(1), a 
circuit court has three choices when a habitual offender 
petitions to have the privilege to operate a motor vehicle 
restored: (1) deny the petition; (2) restore the privilege 
to drive with or without conditions; or (3) issue a 
restricted license.  Norman contends, and the Commonwealth 
does not disagree, that the circuit court did not issue a 
restricted license in its December 20, 1999 order.  Thus, 
according to Norman, the circuit court’s order restored his 
full privileges to operate a motor vehicle, meaning that 
his status as a habitual offender was no longer in effect.  
Norman further argues that, when he violated the conditions 
set forth in the December 20, 1999 order, his privilege to 
drive reverted back to a restricted privilege as reflected 
 
8
in the May 7, 2001 restricted license order, but that his 
status did not revert back to that of a habitual offender. 
If Norman’s interpretation of the December 20, 1999 
order is correct, there was not sufficient evidence, as a 
matter of law, to find him guilty of driving after having 
been declared a habitual offender.  Conversely, if the 
Commonwealth’s view prevails, there was sufficient 
evidence, as a matter of law, to sustain Norman’s 
conviction.  In viewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we 
are required to consider “the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the 
trial court, and will accord the Commonwealth the benefit of 
all reasonable inferences fairly deducible from that 
evidence.”  Commonwealth v. Hill, 264 Va. 541, 543, 570 
S.E.2d 805, 806 (2002). 
 
When a person is determined to be or adjudicated a 
habitual offender, a license to operate a motor vehicle 
shall not be issued to that person for a period of ten 
years from the date of such determination or adjudication 
and not until the privilege to operate a motor vehicle has 
been restored by a court order in one of several 
statutorily prescribed proceedings.  Code § 46.2-356.  
Thus, unless the terms of an order adjudicating habitual 
offender status specifically limit the duration of the 
 
9
effect of the order, see Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 
246, 248-49, 402 S.E.2d 711, 712-13 (1991), “the habitual 
offender status of the person so declared continues until 
that person successfully petitions the court to have that 
status removed and [the] privilege to drive restored under 
one of the code sections permitting such petitions.”  Varga 
v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 547, 551, 536 S.E.2d 711, 714 
(2000); see also Sink v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 655, 
659, 507 S.E.2d 670, 672 (1998) (only a court of competent 
jurisdiction can restore a habitual offender’s privilege to 
operate a motor vehicle in Virginia).  One of the statutory 
provisions authorizing a proceeding to restore the 
privilege to operate a motor vehicle is Code § 46.2-360, 
the section Norman utilized. 
 
In pertinent part, Code § 46.2-360(1) allows a 
habitual offender, five years from the date of the 
adjudication or determination of habitual offender status, 
to petition a circuit court to restore the privilege to 
operate a motor vehicle.  After making certain findings not 
relevant to this appeal, “the court may, in its discretion, 
restore to the person the privilege to drive a motor 
vehicle in the Commonwealth on whatever conditions the 
court may prescribe.”  In lieu of restoring the person’s 
 
10
privilege to operate a motor vehicle, the court may issue a 
restricted license.  Code § 46.2-360(1). 
In this case, the circuit court restored Norman’s 
privilege to operate a motor vehicle.  However, the 
restoration of driving privileges was “subject to the 
conditions” set out in the court’s December 20, 1999 order 
and Norman’s fulfilling those conditions.  The court 
further provided that, if Norman incurred an alcohol or 
drug-related offense during the 12-month supervision period 
specified in the order, it could issue process to show 
cause why Norman’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle 
should not be “suspended permanently.” 
 
Based on the provisions of Code § 46.2-360 authorizing 
a circuit court to restore a person’s privilege to operate 
a motor vehicle on whatever conditions the court may 
prescribe, we conclude that the December 20, 1999 order did 
not fully restore Norman’s privilege to operate a motor 
vehicle.  Instead, the restoration of driving privileges 
was subject to the conditions imposed by the circuit court, 
which Norman had to abide by for a period of 12 months.  
During that period, his privilege to operate a motor 
vehicle thus remained under the control of the circuit 
court.  Only upon his satisfying the specified conditions 
would Norman’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle be 
 
11
restored in full and his status as a habitual offender 
removed.  It does not follow that Norman’s privilege to 
operate a motor vehicle could be fully restored while that 
restoration remained contingent upon his satisfying the 
conditions imposed by the circuit court.  As we said in 
Varga, “the habitual offender status of the person so 
declared continues until that person successfully petitions 
the court to have that status removed and [the] privilege 
to drive restored.”  260 Va. at 551, 536 S.E.2d at 714; see 
also Sink, 28 Va. App. at 659, 507 S.E.2d at 672. 
Our conclusion is consistent with the language of Code 
§ 46.2-360(1).  Under that statute, a circuit court may 
restore a habitual offender’s privilege to operate a motor 
vehicle with or without conditions or issue a restricted 
license.  By authorizing a circuit court to restore the 
privilege on whatever conditions the court may prescribe, 
the General Assembly did not intend for a restoration of 
driving privileges subject to court-imposed conditions to 
have the same legal effect as a restoration without any 
conditions.  Obviously, when the conditions are fulfilled, 
a complete restoration is then effected.  In contrast, if a 
circuit court chooses to issue a restricted license instead 
of restoring the privilege with conditions, that restricted 
 
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license will never mature into a full restoration of 
driving privileges. 
 
Thus, at the time of the offense at issue, Norman’s 
status as a habitual offender remained in effect.3  The 
circuit court terminated the conditional restoration of 
Norman’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle in the order 
of May 4, 2001, finding that Norman had violated the terms 
of the December 20, 1999 order.  Norman acknowledges, and 
we agree, that, when a circuit court issues a restricted 
license in lieu of restoring the privilege to operate a 
motor vehicle, with or without conditions, an individual’s 
status as a habitual offender continues.  See Travis v. 
Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 410, 414-15, 457 S.E.2d 420, 422 
(1995).  Similarly, when the circuit court terminated 
Norman’s conditional restoration of his privilege to drive 
and issued a restricted license order, his status as a 
habitual offender continued.  Contrary to Norman’s 
argument, our decision does not mean a habitual offender 
always remains a habitual offender.  If Norman had 
fulfilled the conditions imposed by the circuit court in 
the December 20, 1999 order, his driving privileges would 
                                                 
 
3  Although not dispositive, Norman acknowledged, when 
executing the May 7, 2001 restricted driver’s license 
order, that he had been adjudicated a habitual offender and 
was seeking a restricted license after having been declared 
a habitual offender. 
 
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have been fully restored and his habitual offender status 
would have been terminated at that time. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we hold that there was sufficient 
evidence to support Norman’s conviction under Code § 46.2-
357.  At the time of the charged driving offense, he was a 
habitual offender and the revocation of his privilege to 
operate a motor vehicle remained in effect.  Accordingly, 
we will reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia and reinstate Norman’s conviction. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
JUSTICE AGEE, with whom JUSTICE KOONTZ joins, dissenting. 
In determining that the December 20, 1999 order 
restoring Norman’s privilege to drive did not terminate 
Norman’s status as a habitual offender, the majority does 
not follow the plain language of the statute and the plain 
language of the order. 
 
The circuit court’s December 20, 1999 order is 
unequivocal: 
[F]or good cause shown the suspension 
effective pursuant to said order of April 12, 
1984 should be removed and the driving privileges 
restored, it is so ORDERED. 
Accordingly . . . it is ORDERED that 
pursuant to § 46.2-360 . . . the privileges to 
operate a motor vehicle in the Commonwealth of 
Virginia should be restored and they are hereby 
restored to George Halcott Norman, III. 
 
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(Emphasis added). 
With unmistakable clarity, the circuit court granted 
Norman’s petition and restored his privilege to drive.  At 
that time, Norman ceased to have the status of a habitual 
offender because it had been removed. 
[T]he habitual offender status of the 
person so declared continues until that 
person successfully petitions the court 
to have that status removed and his 
privilege to drive restored under one of 
the code sections permitting such 
petitions. 
 
Varga v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 547, 551, 536 S.E.2d 711, 
714 (2000). 
As the Court of Appeals noted, upon a habitual 
offender’s petition to restore driving privileges, the 
circuit court may grant the petition in only one of two 
ways under Code § 46.2-360(1): 
[(1)] restore the person’s privilege to 
drive, with or without conditions enforceable by 
the court; or [(2)] authorize the issuance of a 
restricted license.  The statute draws no 
distinction between a “full restoration” and a 
“conditional restoration.”  Hence, an 
individual’s privilege to drive is either 
restored or not restored under Code § 46.2-
360(1). 
 
Norman v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 628, 636, 587 
S.E.2d 742, 745 (2003).  The language of the statute 
makes clear that there are but two alternatives: “The 
 
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court may, in lieu of restoring the person’s privilege 
to drive, authorize the issuance of a restricted 
license . . . ”  Code § 46.2-360(1) (emphasis added).  
There is no doubt that a restricted license was not 
issued.  Consequently, there is simply no language in 
the statute that makes the termination of habitual 
offender status uncertain once the circuit court 
restores the petitioner’s privilege to drive. 
The majority, however, creates a third option: a 
restoration of driving privileges with conditions which, 
upon fulfillment, “mature[s] into a full restoration of 
driving privileges,” a sort of executory habitual offender 
status.  The majority confirms this third option upon the 
assumption that “the General Assembly did not intend for a 
restoration of driving privileges subject to court-imposed 
conditions to have the same legal effect as a restoration 
without any conditions.” 
I do not find that assumption within the plain 
language of the statute.  "When the language in a statute 
is clear and unambiguous, the courts are bound by the plain 
meaning of that language."  Blake Constr. Co./Poole & Kent 
v. Upper Occoquan Sewage Auth., 266 Va. 564, 575, 587 
S.E.2d 711, 717 (2003) (citation omitted).  Courts cannot 
“add language to the statute the General Assembly has not 
 
16
seen fit to include.”  Holsapple v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 
593, 599, 587 S.E.2d 561, 564-65 (2003).  “[N]or are they 
permitted to accomplish the same result by judicial 
interpretation.”  Burlile v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 501, 
511, 544 S.E.2d 360, 365 (2001) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
When the circuit court ordered that Norman’s driving 
privileges “are hereby restored,” his status as a habitual 
offender terminated.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent 
and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals to 
reverse Norman’s conviction and dismiss the indictment.