Case Title: Lovitt v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 001015

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2000-11-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
ROBIN LOVITT 
 
v.  Record No. 001015   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
    Record No. 001420               November 3, 2000 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 
Benjamin N. A. Kendrick, Judge 
 
 
 
In these appeals, we review the capital murder conviction 
and death sentence imposed on Robin Lovitt, along with his 
conviction for robbery. 
I.  PROCEEDINGS 
 
Lovitt was indicted for capital murder based on the 
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of Clayton Dicks 
during the commission of a robbery, in violation of Code § 18.2-
31(4).  Lovitt also was indicted for the robbery of Dicks, in 
violation of Code § 18.2-58. 
 
In the first stage of a bifurcated trial conducted under 
Code § 19.2-264.3, a jury convicted Lovitt of the offenses 
charged.  In the penalty phase of the trial, the jury fixed his 
punishment for capital murder at death based on a finding of 
"future dangerousness," and for robbery at life imprisonment.  
The trial court sentenced Lovitt in accordance with the jury 
verdict. 
 
We consolidated the automatic review of Lovitt's death 
sentence with his appeal of the capital murder conviction.  Code 
§ 17.1-313(F).  We also certified Lovitt's appeal of his robbery 
conviction from the Court of Appeals and consolidated that 
appeal with his capital murder appeal.  Code § 17.1-409. 
II.  GUILT PHASE EVIDENCE 
 
We will state the evidence presented at trial in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the 
trial court.  Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 60, 515 S.E.2d 
565, 568 (1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 955, 
(2000); Roach v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324, 329, 468 S.E.2d 98, 
101, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 951 (1996).  The evidence showed 
that in the early morning hours of November 18, 1998, Clayton 
Dicks was stabbed six times in the chest and back while working 
during the overnight shift at Champion Billiards Hall (the pool 
hall) in Arlington County. 
 
A few months before the killing, Lovitt worked as a cook at 
the pool hall on an evening shift that ended when Dicks arrived 
to begin the overnight shift.  Amy Hudon, the manager at the 
pool hall, testified that about two months before Dicks was 
killed, she had trouble opening a cash register drawer near a 
pool table and asked Lovitt to help her open the drawer.  Lovitt 
opened it by "wedging" a pair of scissors into the drawer's 
 
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latch.  About two months before the killing, Lovitt quit working 
at the pool hall. 
 
On November 17, 1998, the day before the killing, Lovitt 
went to the Arlington home of his cousin and tried to sell him a 
television set.  The same day, Lovitt spoke to an acquaintance 
in a failed attempt to find a job. 
 
Later that night, Lovitt went to the pool hall between 8:00 
and 10:00 p.m. and spoke with people he knew.  When Lovitt asked 
some of them for money, each refused his request.  Two of these 
people recalled that Lovitt wore a flannel shirt that night.  
The bartender that night, Thomas Schweiker, did not know Lovitt 
but remembered giving matches to a man leaning over the bar.  
Later, Schweiker noticed that a pitcher containing cash from 
cigarette sales was missing from beneath the bar where the man 
had been leaning.  Schweiker testified that the man, an African-
American in his middle or late twenties, had a stocky build and 
facial hair, and was wearing a plaid flannel shirt. 
 
Dicks arrived at the pool hall between 1:30 and 2:00 a.m.  
The other employees present when Dicks arrived had left the pool 
hall by 3:00 a.m., leaving Dicks as the sole employee on the 
premises.  The last four patrons in the pool hall that morning 
left between 2:45 and 3:00 a.m.  One of these patrons was 
Officer Dennis A. Holland of the United States Capitol Police, 
who was a long-time patron at the pool hall.  Holland testified 
 
3
that he saw a man who looked "familiar" enter the pool hall as 
he and his friends were leaving.  Holland described the man as 
being black, about five feet, ten or eleven inches tall, 
weighing between 185 and 190 pounds, and wearing a flannel 
shirt. 
 
About 3:25 a.m., José N. Alvarado and Carlos Clavell 
entered the pool hall and saw two men arguing behind the bar.  
Alvarado testified that one man was shorter than the other, and 
that the shorter man repeatedly shoved the taller man, who was 
wearing an apron.  Alvarado stated that he and Clavell watched 
as the shorter man stabbed the taller man six or seven times 
with a silver-colored weapon.  Alvarado saw blood on the taller 
man's apron and watched as the taller man fell to the floor 
behind the bar.  Clavell testified that he heard the taller man 
begging the shorter man to stop attacking him.  Both Alvarado 
and Clavell saw the assailant repeatedly kick the man who had 
fallen to the floor. 
 
Alvarado and Clavell immediately ran from the pool hall to 
a service station, where Alvarado telephoned the "911" emergency 
response number and reported what they had seen.  Although 
Alvarado could not identify Lovitt as Dicks's assailant at the 
preliminary hearing held in this case, Alvarado testified at 
trial that he was about "80% certain" that Lovitt was the 
assailant. 
 
4
 
When police and emergency medical personnel arrived at the 
pool hall in response to Alvarado's telephone call, they found 
Dicks lying on the floor behind the bar in a pool of blood.  
Dicks was alive but was unable to speak and was taken by 
helicopter to a nearby hospital.  The multiple stab wounds 
prevented his heart from functioning, and he died while awaiting 
surgery. 
 
Dicks had been stabbed six times, five times in the chest 
and once in the back.  Four of these wounds were lethal.  Dicks 
also suffered two areas of internal hemorrhage on both sides of 
his head, as well as external abrasions on both shoulders and on 
his left knee. 
 
The police recovered from the pool hall a cash register 
that was lying on the floor near where Dicks was found.  The 
register was broken into pieces, the cash drawer had been 
removed from the register and was missing, and a torn piece of a 
ten-dollar bill was found nearby.  A pair of scissors with 
orange handles that was usually kept in a container on the bar 
was missing.  A police canine unit found an orange-handled pair 
of scissors bearing blood lying open in the woods about 15 yards 
behind the pool hall. 
 
Warren A. Grant, Lovitt's cousin, testified that Lovitt 
arrived at Grant's home in the early morning hours of November 
18, 1998.  Grant lived about a quarter of a mile from the pool 
 
5
hall in a residential area located on the "other side" of the 
woods.  Grant stated that Lovitt knocked on his door sometime 
between 1:30 and 3:00 a.m.  Lovitt was wearing a plaid shirt and 
entered the house carrying what looked like a large, square, 
gray metal box.  After Lovitt unsuccessfully tried to open the 
locked box, Grant eventually opened it by using a screwdriver to 
"pop" some of the screws securing the box.  Lovitt removed money 
from the opened cash register drawer and divided the cash 
between himself and Grant.  Lovitt left the cash register drawer 
with Grant and instructed him to "[g]et rid of [it]."  A few 
days later, Grant began cutting the cash drawer into pieces with 
tin snips and put them in a bag. 
 
Grant's girlfriend, Delores L. Harris, testified that she 
was in Grant's house that morning and watched Grant and Lovitt 
open the cash register drawer.  She noticed that Lovitt looked 
"sweaty" and gave him a towel. 
 
On November 20, 1998, Arlington Detective Noel E. Hanrahan 
obtained pieces of the cash register drawer from Grant.  Four 
days later, Lovitt was arrested and charged with the present 
offenses.  At that time, he was wearing a plaid shirt and a dark 
jacket, and he told the police that he had been wearing the same 
clothes for the past few days.  When Officer Stephen Ferrone 
collected Lovitt's clothing at the jail, Ferrone asked a 
detective whether he needed to seize Lovitt's jacket.  Ferrone 
 
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testified that, upon hearing this question, Lovitt stated, "I 
wasn't wearing it when it happened." 
 
Julian J. Mason, Jr., a forensic scientist employed by the 
Virginia Division of Forensic Science, qualified as an expert 
witness on the subject of tool mark identification.  He 
testified that the cash register drawer Grant surrendered to the 
police had been removed from the broken cash register found on 
the floor of the pool hall.  Mason also stated that the pry 
marks on the cash register drawer were made by the scissors that 
were found in the woods behind the pool hall. 
 
Lawrence Abrams, an identification technician for the 
Arlington County Police Department, testified that he was not 
able to obtain fingerprints from the handle of the scissors due 
to its irregularly-shaped surface.  The only identifiable 
fingerprints obtained in relation to the present crimes were 
Grant's fingerprints that were obtained from the cash register 
drawer. 
 
Carol Palmer, a forensic scientist employed by the Virginia 
Department of Forensic Science, qualified as an expert witness 
on DNA testing.  Palmer extracted human DNA from two places on 
the scissors, on a blade near the tip and on a blade near the 
finger loops.  She also extracted blood from three small 
circular areas on the left front side of Lovitt's jacket, but 
the DNA tests were inconclusive and Palmer was unable to 
 
7
determine whether the blood on the jacket was human.  Palmer 
found no blood on the flannel shirt, black jeans, or shoes that 
Lovitt was wearing when he was arrested. 
 
Palmer testified that she performed DNA testing using the 
"polymerase chain reaction," or PCR, technique on the DNA 
extracted from the scissors.  The DNA extracted from the tip of 
the scissors displayed a DNA profile that matched the DNA 
profile of Dicks.  The profile derived from this sample did not 
match the DNA profiles of either Lovitt or Grant, thus 
eliminating both as contributors of this DNA.  Palmer stated 
that the chance of someone other than Dicks contributing the DNA 
sample on the tip of the scissors was 1 in more than 5.5 
billion. 
 
The DNA extracted from the mid-section of the scissors also 
matched the DNA profile of Dicks.  However, Palmer stated that 
this DNA evidence, unlike the DNA evidence from the tip of the 
scissors, did not exclude either Lovitt or Grant and, thus, was 
inconclusive as to them. 
 
After Lovitt's arrest, he was incarcerated in the Arlington 
County Jail in the same unit as Casel Lucas.  Lovitt and Lucas 
developed a friendship during the two months that they lived 
together in this unit.  Lovitt first told Lucas that after 
leaving the bathroom at the pool hall on the night of the 
murder, Lovitt saw a Hispanic man stabbing Dicks.  Lovitt told 
 
8
Lucas that, at that time, Lovitt saw the cash register drawer, 
grabbed it, and ran from the pool hall. 
 
According to Lucas, Lovitt later stated that he knew Dicks 
and was aware that no one else would be in the pool hall late at 
night.  Lovitt further related that he waited in the bathroom 
until everyone left the pool hall before coming out of the 
bathroom to attempt to open the cash register drawer.  Dicks 
confronted Lovitt as he unsuccessfully attempted to open the 
cash drawer.  Lovitt told Lucas that he had to kill Dicks 
because Dicks had recognized him.  According to Lovitt, Dicks 
asked him, "[W]hy [are] you doing this?"  Lovitt admitted to 
Lucas that he stabbed Dicks several times and took the cash 
register drawer to his cousin's house where he and his cousin 
split the money before leaving to buy some drugs.  Lovitt told 
Lucas that he discarded the murder weapon while en route to or 
from Grant's house, and that he changed his clothes at Grant's 
house because he had blood on his shirt and pants. 
 
Detective Irv Ellman testified that he has been employed by 
the City of Alexandria Police Department for about 15 years.  He 
stated that he has known Lucas since 1994, that he knows other 
people in the law enforcement community who know Lucas, and that 
Lucas has a reputation among the law enforcement community for 
being truthful. 
 
9
 
On cross-examination, Ellman testified that he was aware of 
Lucas's felony convictions.  When asked if he knew how many 
convictions Lucas had, Ellman stated, "Myself, I'm responsible 
for probably 14 counts, some burglaries and a recent armed 
burglary.  That is how I know that he is truthful."  When asked 
whether Lucas had testified on a previous occasion in an 
unrelated case in order "to cut a deal against someone else," 
Ellman replied that he knew Lucas had testified in an earlier 
case, but did not know if he had made a "deal" with the 
prosecutor.  When asked whether he believed that Lucas would lie 
to help or save himself, Ellman replied, "No." 
 
Detective Stuart Chase of the Arlington County Police 
Department testified that Carlos Clavell, one of the two 
witnesses to the killing, told Chase that he saw "a light-
colored vehicle, probably a Cadillac" parked in the pool hall 
parking lot when he and Alvarado arrived at the pool hall that 
night.  Clavell told Chase that he saw the Cadillac again when 
he and Alvarado ran to telephone the police, but that the car 
was gone when they returned to the pool hall with the police. 
 
Andre M. Boyd and Tashia A. Davis testified that they were 
at the pool hall on the night of the killing, and that Lovitt 
asked each of them for money.  Boyd and Davis left the pool hall 
together between 2:45 and 3:00 a.m. on November 18, 1998.  
According to Boyd, he and Davis walked to Boyd's mother's house 
 
10
about seven blocks away.  However, Davis testified that she and 
Boyd left the pool hall parking lot in a 1987 gray Cadillac and 
drove to Boyd's mother's house on Oxford Street. 
 
State Trooper T. L. Robinson testified that on November 18, 
1998, between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m., he was notified by a police 
dispatcher to "be on the lookout" for an older white Cadillac.  
Robinson reported to the dispatcher that 10 to 15 minutes 
earlier, he had seen a white, 1973 Cadillac Eldorado pass below 
a highway ramp on which he was parked. 
III.  PENALTY PHASE EVIDENCE 
 
During the penalty phase of the trial, the Commonwealth 
presented evidence of Lovitt's criminal record.  In October 
1975, when Lovitt was 11 years old, he was charged with assault 
and placed in protective supervision.  Also as a juvenile, in 
August 1979, Lovitt was committed to the Beaumont Learning 
Center of the State Department of Corrections (Beaumont) based 
on adjudication of charges of breaking and entering and larceny.  
While at Beaumont, Lovitt was disciplined for fighting, assault, 
and possessing contraband items.  After his release from 
Beaumont in 1980, Lovitt was convicted of grand larceny in 1981 
and was sentenced to 12 months in jail. 
 
Between 1983 and 1985, Lovitt was convicted of petit 
larceny, grand larceny, breaking and entering, and distribution 
of marijuana.  In 1986, Lovitt was convicted of attempted 
 
11
robbery and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of from one 
to three years.  After being released on parole in August 1987, 
Lovitt's parole was revoked in August 1988 based, in part, on 
additional arrests and his failure to pass certain drug tests.  
Lovitt later was convicted of statutory burglary and grand 
larceny.  While incarcerated on these convictions and the parole 
violation, Lovitt was disciplined for damaging property and for 
fighting. 
 
In September 1990, Lovitt again was released on parole.  In 
early 1991, Lovitt was convicted of possession of cocaine, grand 
larceny, and burglary.  While incarcerated on these charges, 
Lovitt was the subject of ten disciplinary actions for offenses 
including possession of contraband, disobeying direct orders, 
assault, possession of intoxicants, and manufacturing "shank 
handles."  After being released on parole in October 1996, 
Lovitt was convicted in 1997 of possession of marijuana, petit 
larceny, unlawful entry, assault and battery, and destruction of 
property.  Lovitt was on parole at the time of the present 
offenses. 
 
In October 1998, Arlington County Police Officer Jerome A. 
Lee detained Lovitt in an apartment parking lot in Arlington.  
Lovitt had parked his car behind the apartments, appeared to be 
very nervous, and consented to a search of his vehicle.  Lee 
found a long kitchen knife on the floor of the passenger area 
 
12
and a soda can used to smoke crack cocaine in the rear floor 
area of the vehicle. 
 
Lovitt presented testimony from his sister, Amanda Jones, 
who testified that Lovitt was the oldest of 12 children and that 
he helped take care of his younger siblings, although not 
"gladly."  Lovitt also presented testimony from four deputies 
employed by the Arlington County Sheriff's Office, who stated 
that Lovitt had not presented any disciplinary problems while 
being held in jail on the present charges. 
IV. ISSUES PREVIOUSLY DECIDED 
 
On appeal, Lovitt raises certain arguments that we have 
resolved in previous decisions.  Since we find no reason to 
modify our previously expressed views, we reaffirm our earlier 
holdings and reject the following arguments: 
 
A.  Imposition of the death penalty constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the United States 
Constitution and the Constitution of Virginia.  Rejected in 
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 654, 667, 529 S.E.2d 769, 776 
(2000); Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 347, 360 n.2, 519 
S.E.2d 602, 607 n.2 (1999); Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 
453, 470 S.E.2d 114, 122, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 887 (1996). 
 
B.  The "future dangerousness" aggravating factor is 
unconstitutionally vague because (1) it requires jurors to reach 
a finding based on the confusing standard of a "probability" 
 
13
"beyond a reasonable doubt;" and (2) the failure to provide jury 
instructions regarding the meaning of the term "future 
dangerousness" violates the United States Constitution and the 
Constitution of Virginia.  Rejected in Johnson, 259 Va. at 667, 
529 S.E.2d at 776; Walker, 258 Va. at 61, 515 S.E.2d at 569; 
Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 299, 513 S.E.2d 642, 647, 
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 177 (1999); Williams v. 
Commonwealth, 248 Va. 528, 536, 450 S.E.2d 365, 371 (1994), 
cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1161 (1995); Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 
Va. 455, 476-78, 248 S.E.2d 135, 148-49 (1978), cert. denied, 
441 U.S. 967 (1979). 
 
C.  The "future dangerousness" aggravating factor 
unconstitutionally permits consideration of unadjudicated 
conduct.  Rejected in Johnson, 259 Va. at 667, 529 S.E.2d at 
776; Cherrix, 257 Va. at 299, 513 S.E.2d at 647; Williams, 248 
Va. at 536, 450 S.E.2d at 371. 
 
D.  Virginia's penalty phase instructions do not adequately 
instruct the jury concerning mitigation.  Rejected in Buchanan 
v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275-76, (1998); Yarbrough, 258 Va. at 
360 n.2, 519 S.E.2d at 607 n.2; Cherrix, 257 Va. at 299, 513 
S.E.2d at 647; Swann v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 222, 228, 441 
S.E.2d 195, 200, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 889 (1994). 
 
E.  The post-verdict review of the death sentence by the 
trial court does not satisfy constitutional standards because 
 
14
the trial court may consider hearsay evidence contained in a 
pre-sentence report and is not required to set aside the death 
sentence upon a showing of good cause.  Rejected in Johnson, 259 
Va. at 667-68, 529 S.E.2d at 776; Walker, 258 Va. at 61, 515 
S.E.2d at 569; Cherrix, 257 Va. at 299-300, 513 S.E.2d at 647; 
Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 76, 445 S.E.2d 670, 675-76, 
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 971 (1994). 
 
F.  The trial court's refusal to permit the defendant to 
question prospective jurors individually during voir dire 
violates the defendant's constitutional right to a fair and 
impartial jury.  Rejected in Cherrix, 257 Va. at 300, 513 S.E.2d 
at 647; Goins, 251 Va. at 453, 470 S.E.2d at 122; Swann, 247 Va. 
at 228, 441 S.E.2d at 200. 
 
G.  The trial court's refusal to permit the defendant to 
make additional peremptory strikes as an added procedural 
safeguard in death penalty cases fails to ensure the defendant's 
constitutional rights.  Rejected in Walker, 258 Va. at 64, 515 
S.E.2d at 571; Clagett v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 85, 472 
S.E.2d 263, 266-67 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1122 (1997); 
Swann, 247 Va. at 227, 441 S.E.2d at 199. 
 
H.  This Court's proportionality review in death penalty 
cases, as presently conducted, unconstitutionally denies 
defendants meaningful review because this Court fails to give 
appropriate consideration to cases in which sentences of life 
 
15
imprisonment are imposed.  Rejected in Bailey v. Commonwealth, 
259 Va. 723, 740-41, 529 S.E.2d 570, 580-81 (2000). 
V. MOOT ISSUE 
 
Lovitt challenges the constitutionality of the Virginia 
death penalty statutes on the basis that the aggravating factor 
of vileness, as set forth in Code § 19.2-264.4(C), is 
unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to his case.  
He bases this argument on his assertion that the statutory terms 
are unconstitutionally vague.  However, we do not address 
Lovitt's arguments regarding this issue, because the jury 
elected to base his sentence of death only on the "future 
dangerousness" predicate.  When a death sentence is based solely 
on "future dangerousness," all issues related to the "vileness" 
predicate are rendered moot.  See Swann, 247 Va. at 228 n.2, 441 
S.E.2d at 200 n.2; Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 414, 374 
S.E.2d 46, 53 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028 (1989). 
VI. ADDITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE 
 
Lovitt argues that the "future dangerousness" aggravator is 
unconstitutionally "vague as applied," because this Court has 
allowed the language of this aggravating factor to be applied in 
an "unfettered" manner in several other of the capital murder 
convictions that the Court has upheld on appeal.  We find no 
merit in this argument, because our determination of the 
sufficiency of the evidence of "future dangerousness" in other 
 
16
cases does not provide a basis for reversing the jury's finding 
of "future dangerousness" in Lovitt's case.  Lovitt's allegation 
that the evidence in his case of "future dangerousness" was 
insufficient as a matter of law must be determined based on the 
facts of his own case.  Thus, the application of the "future 
dangerousness" predicate in other cases does not affect the 
question whether Lovitt's death sentence should be upheld. 
VII.  JURY SELECTION 
 
Lovitt argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing to strike one juror for cause after she stated with 
visible emotion that about ten years earlier, when she was a 
student at the University of Florida, five neighbors whom she 
did not know were murdered.  We disagree with Lovitt's argument. 
 
On appellate review, we give deference to the trial court's 
determination whether to exclude a prospective juror, because 
the trial court was able to see and hear each member of the 
venire respond to the questions posed.  Thus, the trial court is 
in a superior position to determine whether a juror's responses 
during voir dire indicate that the juror would be prevented or 
impaired in performing the duties of a juror as required by the 
court's instructions and the juror's oath.  Vinson v. 
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 459, 467, 522 S.E.2d 170, 176 (1999), 
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 2226 (2000); Stewart v. 
Commonwealth, 245 Va. 222, 234, 427 S.E.2d 394, 402, cert. 
 
17
denied, 510 U.S. 848 (1993).  A trial court's decision on this 
issue will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing that the 
trial court abused its discretion.  Vinson, 258 Va. at 467, 522 
S.E.2d at 176; Roach, 251 Va. at 343, 468 S.E.2d at 109. 
 
In conducting our review, we consider the juror's entire 
voir dire, not merely isolated statements.  Vinson, 258 Va. at 
467, 522 S.E.2d at 176; Clagett, 252 Va. at 90, 472 S.E.2d at 
269; Mackall v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 240, 252, 372 S.E.2d 759, 
767 (1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989).  In the present 
case, the juror was asked whether her experience in Florida 
would make it difficult for her to serve as a juror.  She 
replied, "I think it is something that I would find emotionally 
challenging, but at the same time, if I was picked as a juror, I 
would be able to do my duty."  In response to a question whether 
her experience made her predisposed to the death penalty, the 
juror stated that the Florida case "has nothing to do with this 
case, I'm sure."  In addition, the juror responded in the 
affirmative when asked whether she could "keep an open mind" in 
deciding the case. 
 
The above responses are illustrative of the entire voir 
dire of the juror, which contains no indication that the trial 
court abused its discretion in accepting her statement that she 
could fulfill the duties of a juror in the trial of the case.  
Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
 
18
discretion in refusing to strike this juror for cause from the 
jury panel. 
VII. GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
 
Lovitt argues that the trial court erred when it permitted 
Detective Irv Ellman to testify concerning witness Casel Lucas's 
reputation for truth and veracity.  Lovitt objected to Detective 
Ellman's testimony prior to its admission on the grounds of 
relevance.  When the Commonwealth responded that Detective 
Ellman would testify concerning Lucas's reputation for 
truthfulness in the police community, and the trial court ruled 
that the testimony was admissible, Lovitt made no further 
objection.  Ellman then testified, as stated above, that he had 
known Lucas since 1994, that he knew others in the law 
enforcement community who knew Lucas, and that Lucas had a good 
reputation in that community for being truthful.1
 
After the Commonwealth rested its case and the trial court 
denied Lovitt's motion to strike the evidence, Lovitt moved the 
court to strike Ellman's testimony on two new grounds.  First, 
Lovitt argued that the Commonwealth had failed to lay a 
foundation for Ellman's testimony and had established only that 
Lucas had admitted his involvement in 14 felony offenses.  
                     
 
1Lovitt does not argue on appeal that the trial court erred 
in overruling the objection to Ellman's testimony that he made 
on the grounds of relevance.  Since Lovitt has abandoned that 
 
19
Second, Lovitt asserted that the "police community" was "too 
small a group and not a proper group" upon which to base 
testimony about Lucas's reputation for truthfulness.  The 
prosecutor did not object to the timeliness of these new 
objections and, after the trial court considered counsel's 
arguments, it upheld its earlier ruling that Ellman's testimony 
was admissible and denied Lovitt's motion to strike the 
testimony.2
 
This sequence of events reveals that after the Commonwealth 
rested its case, Lovitt presented to the trial court new 
challenges to previously admitted evidence.  In essence, Lovitt 
was requesting that the evidence be reopened so that Ellman's 
testimony could be stricken and the jury instructed to disregard 
it.  Our holdings in Woodson v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 285, 288, 
175 S.E.2d 818, 821 (1970); Poole v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 258, 
260, 176 S.E.2d 821, 823 (1970), make it abundantly clear that 
after the Commonwealth has rested its case, it is not error for 
the trial court to refuse a new objection that has been raised 
regarding previously admitted evidence.  Here, the trial court 
                                                                  
argument on appeal, we do not consider the merits of that 
objection. 
 
2On brief, Lovitt raises an additional, new argument that 
the trial court erred in refusing to strike Detective Ellman's 
testimony because it consisted only of Ellman's opinion, which 
was based on specific acts.  Since Lovitt did not raise this 
argument at trial, we do not consider the argument here.  Rule 
5:25. 
 
20
considered the arguments of counsel and although the court did 
not rely on the timing of Lovitt's objections in making its 
ruling, the court rejected the objections, thus declining to 
reopen the evidence.  Accordingly, the result that the trial 
court reached was proper under Woodson and Poole.3
 
Lovitt next argues that the trial court erred in permitting 
a probation officer to testify that Lovitt failed to appear for 
an appointment which was scheduled to take place five hours 
after the time of the killing.  Lovitt also argues that the 
trial court erred in admitting into evidence a capias for 
Lovitt's arrest, which showed that Lovitt missed a required 
court appearance on the day following Dicks's killing.  Lovitt 
concedes that this evidence of flight is "marginally probative," 
but contends that its prejudicial effect as evidence of prior 
bad acts outweighs its probative value.  We disagree with 
Lovitt's arguments. 
 
Flight by a defendant after the commission of a crime is 
probative evidence of guilt of that crime.  Clagett, 252 Va. at 
93, 472 S.E.2d at 271; Boykins v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 309, 
313-14, 170 S.E.2d 771, 774 (1969).  The admission of such 
evidence of a potentially prejudicial nature is a matter 
submitted to the trial court's sound discretion for a 
                     
 
3In light of our holding, we need not address the merits of 
the reasons given by the trial court underlying its denial of 
 
21
determination whether the probative value of the evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect.  See Orbe v. Commonwealth, 258 
Va. 390, 402, 519 S.E.2d 808, 815 (1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. 
___, 120 S.Ct. 1970 (2000); Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 87, 
340 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986).  Here, Lovitt's conduct tended to 
prove that immediately after the killing, he sought to avoid any 
contact with law enforcement officials and the courts.  This 
evidence also directly rebutted the assertion of defense counsel 
during opening argument that Lovitt did not avoid contact with 
the police in the days following the killing.  Thus, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in balancing the probative 
value of this evidence against its potential prejudicial effect 
that Lovitt had disregarded his probation officer's instructions 
and was being sought by the police for failure to appear at a 
court hearing of an unspecified nature. 
 
Lovitt next argues that the trial court erred in denying 
his motion to strike the capital murder charge on the ground 
that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law.  He notes 
that José Alvarado, one of two witnesses to the killing, was 
unable to identify Lovitt at the preliminary hearing as Dicks's 
assailant and, at trial, was only "80% certain" that Lovitt was 
the assailant.  Lovitt also contends that the testimony 
concerning the Cadillac automobile parked in the pool hall lot, 
                                                                  
these two new objections. 
 
22
and the fact that Warren Grant's blood and fingerprints were 
found on the cash register drawer while Lovitt's were not, 
"favor[] Lovitt's innocence."  Lovitt also observes that the DNA 
found near the handle of the scissors, which failed to exclude 
Lovitt as its donor, also failed to exclude Grant.  Thus, Lovitt 
argues, the totality of the evidence "does not rise to the 
'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard."  We disagree with 
Lovitt's arguments. 
 
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, is sufficient to support the jury verdict.  As 
stated above, the jury received evidence that Lovitt had an 
immediate need for money.  He had worked at the pool hall, and 
he was familiar with the employee work shifts and the location 
of cash kept on the premises.  Also, he knew that he could pry 
open the cash register drawer with a pair of scissors, as he had 
done on an earlier occasion.  Lovitt was seen at the pool hall 
earlier in the evening when he was unsuccessful in his attempt 
to obtain money from some people he knew.  Later, the bartender 
at the pool hall, who did not know Lovitt, noticed that a 
pitcher containing some cash was missing from beneath the bar in 
an area where a man matching Lovitt's general description had 
been standing. 
 
Officer Holland testified that a person matching Lovitt's 
general description was in the pool hall about 3:00 a.m., 
 
23
shortly before the killing.  José Alvarado, who witnessed the 
killing, testified that he was "80% certain" that Lovitt was 
Dicks's assailant. 
 
A pair of scissors belonging to the pool hall was 
identified as the murder weapon and was found in the woods that 
led from the pool hall to Grant's house.  Lovitt could not be 
eliminated as a possible source of the DNA found on the murder 
weapon. 
 
Grant and his friend, Delores Harris, testified that Lovitt 
appeared at Grant's house, which was a short distance from the 
pool hall, in the very early morning hours of the day in 
question, carrying a cash register drawer that was later 
determined to have been taken from the pool hall.  After Grant 
pried open the drawer, Lovitt divided the money with Grant. 
 
At the time he was arrested, Lovitt volunteered to the 
police officer collecting his clothes that he was not wearing 
the jacket "when it happened."  Lovitt later admitted his 
commission of the crime to Casel Lucas.  Several aspects of this 
confession were corroborated by other evidence, such as the 
evidence that Lovitt was unable to open the cash register drawer 
at the time of the offense, and evidence that Lovitt fled to 
Grant's house after the killing.  In addition, there was 
evidence corroborating Lucas's statement that Lovitt told him 
that he decided to kill Dicks because he could identify Lovitt.  
 
24
Dicks would have been able to identify Lovitt based on his 
earlier employment at the pool hall. 
 
Lovitt's attacks on the credibility of Alvarado, Grant, 
Harris, Davis, Boyd, and Lucas were resolved against Lovitt by 
the jury's determination of Lovitt's guilt.  Thus, based on the 
above-stated evidence, and the reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn from the evidence, we conclude that the evidence is 
sufficient to support the jury's determination of guilt on the 
capital murder charge. 
 
Lovitt next argues that the trial court erred in refusing 
to permit Lovitt's counsel to testify after Carol Palmer, a 
forensic witness, made a statement during cross-examination that 
allegedly was inconsistent with a statement she had made to 
Lovitt's counsel prior to trial.  Lovitt's counsel requested 
that he be allowed to testify that in an earlier telephone 
conversation with him, Palmer replied in the affirmative when he 
asked her, "[W]ould you expect there to be a blood transfer from 
the victim to the perpetrator?"  Lovitt asserts that the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying his counsel's request to 
withdraw from the case and allow his co-counsel to complete 
Lovitt's defense. 
 
In response, the Commonwealth contends that Lovitt did not 
argue in the trial court that he should be allowed to withdraw 
and have his co-counsel continue representing Lovitt.  The 
 
25
Commonwealth asserts that, instead, Lovitt's counsel argued that 
he should be permitted to testify and then continue to represent 
Lovitt along with his co-counsel.  We agree with the 
Commonwealth's argument. 
 
At the time he asked the court to be allowed to testify 
concerning his telephone conversation with Palmer, Lovitt's 
counsel did not request to withdraw from his representation of 
Lovitt and have co-counsel remain as sole counsel in the case.  
Lovitt's counsel asserted only that because "something [came] up 
in the middle of the trial that was unexpected and 
unanticipated[,] . . . I can testify."  Since Lovitt's counsel 
did not argue to the trial court that he should be allowed to 
withdraw from the case and co-counsel continue Lovitt's 
representation, we will not consider that argument on appeal.  
Rule 5:25. 
VIII. SENTENCING PHASE ISSUES 
 
Lovitt contends that the trial court erred in denying his 
request to argue to the jury that he would die in prison if 
given a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole.  We disagree. 
 
There is no evidence in the record to support such an 
argument, which is speculative in nature.  Moreover, the 
argument is incorrect as a matter of law, since prisoners who 
have received a sentence of life imprisonment without 
 
26
possibility of parole are not precluded from receiving executive 
clemency for crimes they have committed.  See Va. Const. art. V, 
§ 12.  In addition, we observe that the jury was instructed that 
the words "imprisonment for life" mean "imprisonment for life 
without the possibility of parole."  Lovitt was permitted to 
argue to the jury that he would not be eligible for parole.  In 
fact, Lovitt argued that "he can die in prison just because of 
the nature of prisons.  He can die in there.  And we certainly 
know that he is not eligible for parole." 
 
Lovitt next contends that the evidence is insufficient to 
support the jury's finding of "future dangerousness."  Lovitt 
argues that his prior burglary, larceny, and narcotics 
convictions are not evidence of "future dangerousness," and that 
his aggressive behavior while incarcerated never resulted in 
criminal charges being brought against him.  He also argues 
that, since he is ineligible for parole after being convicted of 
these offenses, the only society that should be considered in 
this case for purposes of "future dangerousness" is prison 
society.  We disagree with Lovitt's arguments. 
 
Under Code § 19.2-264.2, the death penalty may not be 
imposed unless the trier of fact finds one or both of the two 
aggravating factors that we have referred to as "future 
dangerousness" and "vileness."  Roach, 251 Va. at 347, 468 
S.E.2d at 111-12; Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 139, 410 
 
27
S.E.2d 254, 265 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 946 (1992).  In 
the present case, the jury found "future dangerousness," meaning 
that "there is a probability that [Lovitt] would commit criminal 
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious 
threat to society."  Code § 19.2-264.2. 
 
This Court has recognized that the facts and circumstances 
surrounding a capital murder may be sufficient, standing alone, 
to support a finding of "future dangerousness."  See Roach, 251 
Va. at 348, 468 S.E.2d at 112; Murphy v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 
136, 145, 431 S.E.2d 48, 53, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 928 (1993).  
Here, Lovitt murdered Dicks, an innocent employee, to facilitate 
a robbery and to avoid being identified as its perpetrator.  The 
jury was entitled to find that this violent, calculated action 
was strong evidence that Lovitt is a dangerous person who would 
commit future criminal acts of violence. 
 
In addition, the jury was entitled to consider Lovitt's 
extensive criminal record, which we have recited in detail.  
This record includes an attempted robbery conviction and three 
burglary convictions.  As we observed in Yeatts: 
Burglary laws are based primarily upon a recognition 
of the dangers to personal safety created by the usual 
burglary situation–the danger that the intruder will 
harm the occupants in attempting to perpetrate the 
intended crime or to escape and the danger that the 
occupants will in anger or panic react violently to 
the invasion, thereby inviting more violence. 
 
 
28
242 Va. at 140, 410 S.E.2d at 266 (citations omitted).  Thus, 
Lovitt's prior burglary convictions, in addition to his 
attempted robbery conviction, were relevant evidence in 
determining his "future dangerousness." 
 
The jury also heard evidence that Lovitt committed several 
criminal offenses while released in the community on supervised 
probation or parole.  This evidence demonstrated that Lovitt did 
not refrain from further serious criminal activity, even when 
the consequences of such criminal behavior would be especially 
severe. 
 
We find no merit in Lovitt's argument that the only 
relevant "society" for the jury's consideration of his "future 
dangerousness" was prison society.  Code § 19.2-264.2 requires 
that the jury make a factual determination whether the defendant 
"would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a 
continuing serious threat to society."  The statute does not 
limit this consideration to "prison society" when a defendant is 
ineligible for parole, and we decline Lovitt's effective request 
that we rewrite the statute to restrict its scope.  Thus, we 
conclude that the evidence of the present offenses and of 
Lovitt's prior criminal behavior, including the evidence of his 
behavior while incarcerated for earlier offenses, is sufficient 
to support the jury's finding of "future dangerousness." 
IX. SENTENCE REVIEW 
 
29
Passion and Prejudice 
 
Under Code § 17.1-313(C), we review the death sentence 
imposed on Lovitt to determine whether it (1) was imposed under 
the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary 
factor; or (2) is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty 
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the 
defendant.  Lovitt argues that his sentence was based on 
passion, prejudice, and arbitrariness because, during the trial, 
Dicks's family sat in the three rows of seats closest to the 
jury box.  Lovitt contends that the jury showed its prejudice by 
the contents of two notes that it sent to the judge on the 
second day of the guilt phase trial, and by the fact that it 
reached its verdict in the guilt phase trial in one and one-half 
hours.  We find no merit in this argument. 
 
In the first note at issue, the jury asked whether Lovitt 
had been identified before the trial in a police "lineup."  
While the trial court and counsel were discussing this question, 
the jury sent the judge a second note, requesting that all 
personal information about the jurors be removed from the public 
record in the case.  In response to these notes, the trial court 
cautioned the jury to restrict its consideration of the case to 
the evidence presented.  The court also informed the jury that 
the court would not tolerate any interference or intimidation 
from any outside source, and that any such conduct would be 
 
30
quickly addressed.  In response to questioning by the court, the 
jurors indicated that no outside source had attempted to 
influence them, and that they had not discussed the case with 
anyone else. 
 
These notes from the jury do not provide any indication of 
passion or prejudice, and the trial court's responses to them 
were proper.  In addition, the record does not show that the 
jurors knew the identity of the spectators who sat in the seats 
nearest the jury box.  Moreover, the length of time that the 
jury deliberated in the guilt phase trial did not indicate 
passion or prejudice on its part and, if anything, reflected the 
overwhelming nature of the evidence presented against Lovitt. 
Excessiveness and Proportionality 
 
Lovitt argues that the trial court erred when it denied his 
motion to commute the sentence to life imprisonment "based upon 
a proportionality review of similar cases."  We find no merit in 
this argument. 
 
Initially, we observe that the death penalty statutes do 
not require a proportionality review by the trial court.  
Instead, Code § 19.2-264.5 directs that "[a]fter consideration 
of the [post-sentence] report, and upon good cause shown, the 
[trial] court may set aside the sentence of death and impose a 
sentence of imprisonment for life."  This provision permits the 
capital murder defendant the same opportunity as any other 
 
31
criminal defendant, under a precise and unambiguous standard, to 
request that the trial court alter the jury's verdict.  Bassett 
v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 844, 860, 284 S.E.2d 844, 854 (1981), 
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 938 (1982).  Here, after hearing argument 
from Lovitt's counsel comparing the facts and circumstances of 
Lovitt's case and the sentences imposed, with the facts and 
circumstances of other capital murder cases and the sentences 
imposed in those cases, the trial court declined to exercise its 
discretionary authority under the statute to impose a sentence 
of life imprisonment.  Based on the record before us, we 
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
declining to alter the sentence fixed by the jury. 
 
In conducting this Court's proportionality review, we must 
determine whether "other sentencing bodies in this jurisdiction 
generally impose the supreme penalty for comparable or similar 
crimes, considering both the crime and the defendant."  Johnson, 
259 Va. at 683; 529 S.E.2d at 786 (quoting Jenkins v. 
Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 461, 423 S.E.2d 360, 371 (1992), 
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1036 (1993)).  We have compared the 
record in the present case with the records of other capital 
murder cases, including those in which a sentence of life 
imprisonment was imposed.  We also have examined the records of 
all capital cases reviewed by this Court pursuant to 
Code § 17.1-313(E).  Since the jury imposed the death sentence 
 
32
based on the "future dangerousness" predicate, we give 
particular consideration to other capital murder cases in which 
the death penalty was obtained under that predicate. 
 
Lovitt has directed our attention to certain capital murder 
convictions in which sentences of life imprisonment were 
imposed.  However, under our proportionality review, we must 
consider whether juries generally impose a death sentence for 
conduct similar to that of the defendant, not whether certain 
juries have declined to impose the death sentence in other 
particular cases.  Jackson v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 625, 636, 
499 S.E.2d 538, 545 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1067 (1999); 
King v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 353, 371, 416 S.E.2d 669, 679, 
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 957 (1992); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 
Va. 260, 283-84, 257 S.E.2d 808, 824 (1979), cert. denied, 445 
U.S. 972 (1980). 
 
The record shows that Lovitt planned to commit the offense 
of robbery and murdered Dicks for the sole reason of eliminating 
any witness to the robbery.  The multiple stab wounds inflicted 
on Dicks reflect an escalation of the violent and dangerous 
criminal activity detailed in Lovitt's prior criminal record.  
As stated above, Lovitt's prior record includes numerous felony 
convictions, including a conviction for attempted robbery and 
multiple convictions on burglary charges.  Lovitt committed 
several of these prior crimes while on supervised probation or 
 
33
parole, which is further evidence of his continuing failure to 
refrain from serious criminal conduct. 
 
We observe that juries in this Commonwealth, with some 
exceptions, generally have imposed the death sentence for 
convictions of capital murder based on a finding of "future 
dangerousness" in which the underlying predicate crime was 
robbery.  See, e.g., Jackson, 255 Va. 625, 499 S.E.2d 538; 
Roach, 251 Va. 324, 468 S.E.2d 98, Chandler v. Commonwealth, 249 
Va. 270, 455 S.E.2d 219, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 889 (1995); 
Joseph v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 78, 452 S.E.2d 862, cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 876 (1995); Swann, 247 Va. 222, 441 S.E.2d 195; 
Chichester v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 311, 448 S.E.2d 638 (1994), 
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1166 (1995); Dubois v. Commonwealth, 246 
Va. 260, 435 S.E.2d 636 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1012 
(1994); Yeatts, 242 Va. 121, 410 S.E.2d 254; Savino v. 
Commonwealth, 239 Va. 534, 391 S.E.2d 276, cert. denied, 498 
U.S. 882 (1990); Mackall, 236 Va. 240, 372 S.E.2d 759; Townes v. 
Commonwealth, 234 Va. 307, 362 S.E.2d 650 (1987), cert. denied, 
485 U.S. 971 (1988).  Based on this review, we hold that 
Lovitt's death sentence is neither excessive nor 
disproportionate to penalties imposed by other sentencing bodies 
in the Commonwealth for comparable crimes, considering both the 
crime and the defendant. 
X. CONCLUSION 
 
34
 
We find no reversible error in the judgments of the trial 
court.  Having reviewed Lovitt's death sentence pursuant to Code 
§ 17.1-313, we decline to commute the sentence of death.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the trial court's judgments. 
Record No. 001015 –- Affirmed.
Record No. 001420 –- Affirmed.
 
35