Case Title: Smith vs. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC92961

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2013-09-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
LINCOLN SMITH, ET AL.,  
 
 
) 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellants-Respondents,  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
No. SC92961 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO  
) 
CORPORATION,  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Respondent-Appellant. 
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY 
The Honorable Marco A. Roldan, Judge 
 
Opinion issued September 10, 2013 
 
 
The survivors of Barbara Smith ("the Smiths") appeal from a judgment, entered 
following remand from the court of appeals for retrial solely on the issue of punitive 
damages,1 finding Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation ("B&W") liable for 
punitive damages and awarding the Smiths $1.5 million.  The Smiths contend that certain 
evidence admitted by the circuit court was outside the scope of the court of appeals' prior 
                                             
 
1 Section 537.090, RSMo Supp. 2012, "provides that in wrongful death cases 'the mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances attending the death may be considered by the trier of facts' in 
assessing damages."  Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 275 S.W.3d 748, 810 (Mo. 
App. 2008).  This Court, in Call v. Heard, 925 S.W.2d 840, 847-48 (Mo. banc 1996), "jettisoned 
the term 'aggravating circumstances damages' for 'punitive damages,' thereby solidifying its 
holding in Bennett [v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation, 896 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Mo. banc 
1995)], that aggravating circumstances damages are the equivalent of punitive damages."  
Collins v. Hertenstein, 90 S.W.3d 87, 96 (Mo. App. 2002) (internal quotations omitted).  
Therefore, to avoid confusion, this opinion refers to the wrongful death act's aggravating 
circumstances damages as punitive damages. 
mandate, and the circuit court erred in overruling their motion for new trial on the 
grounds of juror nondisclosure.  B&W cross-appeals contending that the Smiths failed to 
make a submissible case for punitive damages.  This Court ordered transfer after opinion 
of the court of appeals and, therefore, has jurisdiction.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.  The 
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. 
Factual Background 
Mrs. Smith was born May 13, 1927.  In 1944, Mrs. Smith began smoking Kool 
cigarettes, which were manufactured by B&W.  In the early 1980s, Mrs. Smith developed 
angina.  In 1990, a physician informed Mrs. Smith that she had "respiratory trouble" that 
was the beginning stage of emphysema.  After the doctor told her that she was "going to 
have to quit smoking because it was going to kill her if she didn't," Mrs. Smith quit 
smoking within the year.  Mrs. Smith was diagnosed with lung cancer in 1992.  Part of 
one lung was removed, and Mrs. Smith was apparently cancer free thereafter.  On May 
12, 2000, Mrs. Smith died from a heart attack at age 73.  
In March 2003, Mrs. Smith's survivors sued B&W in Jackson County under the 
Missouri wrongful death act, § 537.080, RSMo 2000.  They asserted claims for negligent 
design, negligent failure to warn, strict liability product defect, fraudulent concealment, 
and conspiracy.  
Because the Smiths sought an award of punitive damages, trial was bifurcated 
pursuant to § 510.263, RSMo Supp. 2012.  In the first stage of trial, the jury returned a 
verdict for B&W on the fraudulent concealment and conspiracy claims but returned a 
verdict in favor of the Smiths on the negligent design, negligent failure to warn, and strict 
liability product defect claims, awarding $2 million in compensatory damages.  The jury 
further found that Mrs. Smith was 75% at fault; accordingly, the trial court reduced the 
compensatory damages to $500,000.  Also in the first stage of trial, the jury found B&W 
liable for damages for "aggravating circumstances."  In the second stage of trial, the jury 
assessed $20 million in punitive damages.  B&W timely appealed from that judgment.  
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the compensatory damages awarded 
against B&W on the Smiths' claims for negligent design, negligent failure to warn, and 
strict product liability.  However, it held that, of the three claims upon which the jury 
returned a verdict in favor of the Smiths, the plaintiffs made a submissible case for 
punitive damages only on the strict liability product defect claim.  Smith v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 275 S.W.3d 748, 823 (Mo. App. 2008) [hereinafter Smith I].  
Because the verdict did not reflect what portion of the punitive damages were related to 
that claim, the court of appeals reversed the $20 million punitive damages award against 
B&W and remanded the case for a new jury trial "on the punitive damages as to the strict 
liability product defect claim only."  Id.  
On remand, the circuit court determined that the issue of punitive damages on the 
strict liability product defect claim again would be bifurcated. In the first stage, the jury 
was to determine if punitive damages were warranted on that claim and, if so, in the 
second stage, they would assess the amount of the award.  The circuit court ruled that the 
evidence in the first stage of the retrial would be limited to that presented in the original 
trial.  Neither party raises any issue on appeal concerning this evidentiary ruling.  
 
3
However, the circuit court ruled that the parties could present new evidence during the 
second stage of retrial.   
The case was retried, and in the first stage, the jury found B&W liable for punitive 
damages on the strict liability product defect claim.  During the second stage, B&W 
presented evidence that any punitive damages award would be paid by R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Company, which had acquired the right to manufacture Kools subsequent to the 
filing of the suit, and argued that R.J. Reynolds did not deserve to be punished with 
punitive damages.  Following the second stage, the jury returned a verdict awarding the 
Smiths $1.5 million in punitive damages.  
B&W Cross-Appeal 
Both of B&W's claims on cross-appeal challenge the circuit court's overruling of 
its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  B&W claims that the Smiths failed 
to make a submissible case for punitive damages for strict liability product defect and that 
the Smiths failed to make a submissible case because their claims are preempted by 
federal law.   
Standard of Review 
When reviewing a circuit court's denial of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
"[t]his Court must determine whether the plaintiff presented a submissible case by 
offering evidence to support every element necessary for liability."  Fleshner v. Pepose 
Vision Institute, P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 95 (Mo. banc 2010).  "Evidence is viewed in the 
light most favorable to the jury's verdict, giving the plaintiff all reasonable inferences and 
disregarding all conflicting evidence and inferences."  Id.  "This Court will reverse the 
 
4
jury's verdict for insufficient evidence only where there is a complete absence of 
probative fact to support the jury's conclusion."  Dhyne v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 
188 S.W.3d 454, 457 (Mo. banc 2006).  
Submissible Case for Punitive Damages for Strict Liability 
In its first point on cross-appeal, B&W contends that the circuit court erred in 
failing to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the Smiths failed to make 
a submissible case for punitive damages for strict liability product defect.  B&W claims 
that the Smiths failed to present clear and convincing evidence of aggravating 
circumstances related to the conduct for which the jury in the original trial found B&W 
liable for compensatory damages.2  
"A submissible case for punitive damages requires clear and convincing proof that 
the defendant intentionally acted either by a wanton, willful or outrageous act, or reckless 
disregard for an act's consequences (from which evil motive is inferred)."  Howard v. 
City of Kansas City, 332 S.W.3d 772, 788 (Mo. banc 2011) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Specific to their claim for punitive damages on their strict liability product 
defect claim, the Smiths had to present clear and convincing evidence that B&W "knew 
of the defect and danger of the product and, by selling the product, showed complete 
indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others."  Kansas City v. Keene 
                                             
 
2 B&W also attempts to argue that certain evidence was admitted erroneously during the first 
stage of trial because it related to claims other than the strict liability product defect claim.  It 
claims that its right to due process was violated by admitting such evidence.  B&W did not raise 
these claims in the point relied on and, therefore, they are not properly before this Court for 
review.  See State v. Fuente, 871 S.W.2d 438, 443 (Mo. banc 1994) ("This Court's review is 
limited to matters raised in the points relied on."). 
 
5
Corp., 855 S.W.2d 360, 374 (Mo. banc 1993); see also Howard, 332 S.W.3d at 786-88; 
Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 936 S.W.2d 104, 109-11 (Mo. banc 1996).     
In the appeal from the original trial, the court of appeals examined the evidence 
"to determine whether, as a matter of law, it was sufficient to submit the claim for 
punitive damages."  Smith I at 811.  It held that the evidence presented at the original trial 
was sufficient to support a punitive damages award on the strict liability product defect 
claim.  Id. at 823.  Accordingly, there was "sufficient evidence of conduct tantamount to 
intentional wrongdoing to submit the issue [of punitive damages] to the jury."  Id.  
B&W has failed to indicate how the evidence presented in the first stage of the 
trial on remand differed significantly from that presented in the original trial.  On remand, 
the circuit court limited the evidence presented in the first stage of the retrial to evidence 
that had been presented in the original trial, and the evidence admitted at retrial was 
almost identical to the original trial.  In both trials, Dr. David Burns and Dr. Jeffrey 
Wigand testified extensively about the defects and dangers inherent in Kool cigarettes.  
Dr. Burns testified about B&W's knowledge and conduct regarding the design, 
manufacture, advertising, and public position it took on the denial that its cigarettes are 
addictive or cause disease.  He explained to the jury that B&W's knowledge of the 
dangerous and addictive qualities of its cigarettes, and its conduct in light of that 
knowledge, was "one of the largest public health frauds that occurred in the last half 
century."  Dr. Burns stated that B&W's conduct:  
is a very clear example of a tobacco company attempting to sell its products 
to someone who is already sick, and that product is going to add further 
harm to that individual who is already sick.  So it's a conscious and 
 
6
deliberate effort to increase profits at the expense and injury of the 
individual who responds to this message.   
 
Dr. Wigand testified that, while he worked at B&W, the company president's 
favorite saying was "hook'em young, hook'em for life" in reference to nicotine addiction. 
Dr. Wigand stated that B&W trained him not to write anything down that potentially 
could be used in litigation, and that an attorney followed him around so that his 
conversations could be considered privileged.  He said that minutes from meetings were 
changed to remove any information harmful to B&W's interests.  
Drs. Burns and Wigand both described the distinctive characteristics of Kool 
cigarettes, including a high level of nicotine combined with menthol to ameliorate the 
harshness so that the smoker would be more likely to breathe deeply.  Both stated 
unequivocally that Kool cigarettes, specifically, are defective and unreasonably 
dangerous.  The fact that the doctors made isolated statements in their testimony 
suggesting that all cigarettes are inherently dangerous and defective does not negate the 
effect of their Kool-specific testimony.   
And, as was the case in the original trial, there was:  
 
sufficient evidence of conduct tantamount to intentional wrongdoing to 
submit the issue to the jury.  In the light most favorable to submissibility, 
[B&W] had an active process of creating controversy regarding the health 
risks of smoking and planned to dispute every Surgeon General's report, 
regardless of what it was based upon.  Further, [B&W] had policies of 
preventing harmful information from becoming available to the public and 
established procedures to ensure negative information did not reach the 
public.  This rises to the level of clear and convincing.   
 
 
7
Id at 823.  The circuit court did not err in overruling B&W's motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict because the evidence was again sufficient to support a 
punitive damages award on the strict liability product defect claim.  
Preemption of Strict Liability Claims 
In its second point on cross-appeal, B&W contends that the circuit court erred in 
failing to grant it a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, claiming that the Smiths failed 
to make a submissible case for punitive damages for strict liability product defect by 
failing to introduce evidence that Kool cigarettes posed any risks different than the 
inherent risk in all cigarettes and that such claims are preempted by federal law. 
The law of the case doctrine bars this claim.  "The doctrine of law of the case 
provides that a previous holding in a case constitutes the law of the case and precludes 
relitigation of the issue on remand and subsequent appeal."  Walton v. City of Berkeley, 
223 S.W.3d 126, 128-29 (Mo. banc 2007).  "The doctrine insures uniformity of decisions, 
protects the parties' expectations, and promotes judicial economy."  Id. at 129.  
The previous opinion of the court of appeals held that the Smiths' claims related to 
strict liability product defect and negligent design were not preempted by federal law.  
Smith I at 798-99.  The court of appeals also concluded that there was "sufficient 
evidence to make a submissible case on the claim that [B&W]'s cigarettes were 
unreasonably dangerous" and that "[t]he evidence presented went beyond a categorical 
attack on the danger of cigarettes in general" and "demonstrated specific design choices 
by [B&W] that had the potential to affect Mrs. Smith's health during the time period she 
 
8
smoked."  Id. at 796.  The same evidence that supported that conclusion in the original 
trial was also presented at the retrial on remand.  
The Smiths' Appeal 
 
The Smiths raise two claims on appeal.  First, they claim that the circuit court 
erred in permitting B&W to present evidence of R.J. Reynolds's conduct after the merger 
with B&W because such evidence was outside the scope of the mandate in Smith I.  
Second, the Smiths claim that the circuit court erred in overruling their motion for new 
trial based on alleged juror nondisclosure.     
Scope of the Court of Appeals Mandate 
In their first point, the Smiths contend that the circuit court erred in allowing 
B&W to introduce evidence of B&W's "merger" with non-party R.J. Reynolds,3 as well 
as evidence of R.J. Reynolds's conduct, in the second stage of the retrial.  The Smiths 
argue that the circuit court exceeded the scope of the court of appeals' mandate in 
allowing B&W to argue that any punitive damages award would be paid by R.J. 
                                             
 
3 The Smiths' use of the term "merger" is a misnomer because the companies did not actually 
merge.  A merger "exists where one corporation is continued and the others are merged in it 
without the formation of a new company."  Dodier Realty & Inv. Co. v. St. Louis Nat. Baseball 
Club, 238 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Mo. banc 1951) (quotation marks omitted).  A merger consists of a 
combination of companies "whereby one of the constituent companies remains in being—
absorbing or merging in itself all the other constituent corporations."  Id. at 325.  "A merger is 
often defined as the absorption of one corporation by another, which retains its name and 
corporate identity, with the added capital, franchises, and powers of the absorbed corporation, 
and which remains in business."  19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 2168 (2013). 
In the transaction between B&W and R.J. Reynolds, which occurred while the first case 
was pending, B&W transferred its cigarette manufacturing operations to R.J. Reynolds in 
exchange for 42% of Reynolds American, Inc., the company that owns R.J. Reynolds.  B&W 
thereby stopped manufacturing cigarettes and exists solely to hold ownership of B&W's share of 
the Reynolds American stock, and it changed its name to Brown & Williamson Holdings, Inc.  
As part of the deal, R.J. Reynolds assumed responsibility for the existing liabilities of B&W. 
 
9
Reynolds and using evidence of R.J. Reynolds's historical corporate citizenship to 
mitigate B&W's punitive damages.  
In the first stage of the retrial, the jury considered evidence that had been 
presented at the original trial and determined that punitive damages should be awarded on 
that claim.  During the second stage of retrial, however, the circuit court allowed both the 
Smiths and B&W to present evidence related to R.J. Reynolds, which had contractually 
assumed responsibility for B&W's liabilities as part of corporate transactions that 
occurred while the original trial was pending.  B&W defended itself by presenting 
extensive evidence of R.J. Reynolds's historical corporate citizenship and research and 
marketing efforts to reduce the negative effects of its products and arguing that any 
punitive damages award would be paid by R.J. Reynolds rather than B&W.   
The Smiths claim that by permitting this evidence and argument to be considered 
as mitigating evidence during the retrial, the circuit court allowed B&W to effectively 
substitute defendants and to argue that non-party R.J. Reynolds should not have to pay 
punitive damages.  The Smiths' specific claim is that this evidence and argument violated 
the court of appeals' mandate. 
On remand, all proceedings of the circuit court must be in accordance with the 
appellate court's mandate.  Frost v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 813 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Mo. banc 
1991); see also Assoc. Indus. of Mo. v. Dir. of Revenue, 918 S.W.2d 780, 782 (Mo. banc 
1996).  "There are two types of remands: (1) a general remand, which does not provide 
specific direction and leaves all issues open to consideration in the new trial; and (2) a 
remand with directions, which requires the trial court to enter a judgment in conformity 
 
10
with the mandate."  State ex rel. St. Charles Cnty. v. Cunningham, 401 S.W.3d 493, 495 
(Mo. banc 2013).  The appellate court's mandate, in conjunction with its opinion, serves 
to instruct the circuit court as to which type of remand has been ordered.   
Where a judgment is reversed and remanded with specific directions to 
enter a particular judgment, the mandate is in the nature of a special power 
of attorney and must be followed by the trial court without deviation, but 
the rule is not applicable where a judgment is reversed and remanded for 
further proceedings in accordance with the opinion because in every case of 
remand further proceedings should be 'in accordance with the opinion' 
whether or not that admonition is appended. 
 
Sebree v. Rosen, 374 S.W.2d 132, 136 (Mo. 1964) (internal citations omitted); Murphy v. 
Barron, 286 Mo. 390, 228 S.W. 492, 494-95 (1960).  Every remand is made for further 
proceedings and those proceedings are expected to be "in accordance with the opinion."  
Therefore, the use of those words "adds nothing."  Murphy, 228 S.W. at 495.  "It is the 
general rule that unless from an opinion it is apparent finality was intended it will not be 
implied from it."  Id.  To say that every remand for proceedings consistent with the 
opinion is a remand with specific directions "would leave this court at a loss to explain 
the pains to which it has gone to distinguish a simple reversal and a remandment from 
one with directions."  Id.   
The type of remand has legal consequence.  A general remand leaves all issues not 
conclusively decided open for consideration at the new trial.  Butcher v. Main, 426 
S.W.2d 356, 358 (Mo. 1968).  At retrial following a general remand, new evidence may 
be produced.  Id.  If the additional evidence introduced at the retrial presents a different 
case from that presented at the original trial to the appellate court, the circuit court "will 
be bound by the prior decision only so far as the principles of law then declared are 
 
11
applicable to the new state of facts."  Murphy, 228 S.W. at 495.  Moreover, a mandate is 
controlling only as to issues addressed therein; a lower court is free to act as to other 
issues.  Associated Indus., 918 S.W.2d at 783.  Therefore, if the mandate of the court of 
appeals in Smith I was a general remand, then the parties were free—in the discretion of 
the circuit court—to present new evidence during the retrial.    
The mandate of the court of appeals, issued January 28, 2009, reads, in relevant 
part, "Now on this day the judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the 
cause is remanded to the Circuit Court of Jackson County for further proceedings, all in 
accordance with the Opinion of this Court herein delivered."  The opinion stated, "[T]he 
case is remanded to the jury for a new trial on punitive damages as to the strict liability 
product defect claim only."  Smith I at 823.  Neither the mandate nor the opinion 
addressed what evidence would be allowed during the retrial.  "The words used do not 
import a direction of specified things, which is necessary to bring the case within the rule 
concerning reversals and remandments 'with directions.'"  Murphy, 228 S.W. at 494-95.  
With regard to ordering a retrial relative to punitive damages, the prior appeal was a 
general remand.4     
                                             
 
4 The issues that the court of appeals conclusively determined in the first appeal have all become 
the law of the case.  Following remand, the appellate court's opinion becomes, and so far as the 
facts are the same remains, "'the law of the case,' but it is not as to all issues 'res adjudicata.'"  
Butcher, 426 S.W.2d at 358.  "'The law of the case' applies where a general principle of law is 
declared as applicable to the facts of the case."  Id.  "The general rule is that the decision of an 
appellate court is the law of the case on all points presented and decided and remains the law of 
the case throughout all subsequent proceedings, both in the trial and appellate courts, and no 
question involved and decided in the first appeal of the cause will be considered on a second 
appeal, and on a retrial should not be considered by the trial court."  Feinstein v. McGuire, 312 
S.W.2d 20, 23 (Mo. 1958).  "On a second appeal or writ of error on the same facts and pleadings 
the appellate court will not notice questions determined in the previous decision.  All such are res 
 
12
As the court of appeals instructed in Smith I, the circuit court conducted a retrial 
only as to punitive damages, only on the Smiths' strict liability product defect claim, and 
only against B&W.  That is all that the general mandate required.  The mandate in Smith I 
did not address—expressly or by implication—the scope of the evidence that would be 
admissible on remand.  Although it may be that B&W sought to mitigate its damages by 
presenting evidence of R.J. Reynolds's historical corporate citizenship and research and 
marketing efforts, that did not result in R.J. Reynolds being effectively substituted as the 
defendant.  B&W was undeniably the only defendant on retrial.  While evidence 
concerning R.J. Reynolds's conduct might be of questionable relevance, the Smiths have 
made clear on this appeal that they raise no relevance issue independent of their 
contention that admission of the R.J. Reynolds evidence exceeded the scope of the 
mandate.5  
While Smith I specified the claim, the relief, and the defendant that would be the 
subject of the retrial, it decided only the submissibility of the Smiths' claim for punitive 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
judicata and closed."  Id.  During the first appeal, the court held, among other things, that the 
Smiths made a submissible case on their strict liability and their negligent design claims for 
compensatory damages.  These holdings became the law of the case, and the parties are bound 
thereby.   
5 Although it does not expressly say so, the mandate in Smith I plainly ordered a retrial on 
punitive damages against a specific party: B&W.  Punitive damages may only be awarded 
against the defendant the jury has found liable for compensatory damages in the first stage of a 
bifurcated trial, and here, that defendant was plainly B&W.  Given that the court of appeals 
remanded the case for a retrial of punitive damages on a specific claim against a specific 
defendant, the circuit court could not, on remand, conduct a trial involving issues beyond 
punitive damages, or in which punitive damages were awarded against another party, or on a 
different legal basis.  See, e.g., Denny v. Guyton, 57 S.W.2d 415, 417-21 (Mo. banc 1932) 
(holding that where Supreme Court in prior appeal reversed and remanded "for such further 
proceedings as may be necessary to determine the issue of accounting only," trial court on 
 
13
damages—an issue that was addressed in the first stage of the bifurcated punitive 
damages trial.  The determination that the Smiths had made a submissible case for 
punitive damages on their strict liability product defect claim, but not on their negligent 
failure to warn or negligent design claims, was based on the court of appeals' 
consideration of only the evidence that the parties submitted in the first stage of the 
original trial.  Significantly, Smith I did not address any issue concerning the scope of the 
evidence that had been admitted in the second stage of the original trial, when the jury 
determined the amount of the punitive damages to be awarded against B&W nor did 
Smith I address any issue concerning the scope of the evidence that might be admissible 
in a future proceeding, if such a proceeding were even to become necessary.   
The Smiths emphasize the statement from Smith I that "the conduct at issue for 
th[e] [strict liability product defect] claim is B&W's act of manufacturing or selling 
defective or unreasonably dangerous cigarettes."  Smith I at 822.  But this statement only 
specifies the conduct that could give rise to B&W's liability for punitive damages—an 
issue determined in the first stage of retrial.  The quoted statement neither expresses nor 
implies anything concerning the evidence that may properly be considered in determining 
the amount of punitive damages at retrial.  Moreover, case law establishes that evidence 
concerning a defendant's conduct, beyond the conduct that caused the plaintiff's injuries, 
may be admissible in mitigation of a punitive damage award, at least in certain 
circumstances.  Call, 925 S.W.2d at 849.  (stating that the jury may consider aggravating 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
remand could not consider defendant's new defenses to joint venture and fraud claims 
determined in first trial). 
 
14
and mitigating circumstances in assessing punitive damages); Beggs v. Universal C.I.T. 
Credit Corp., 409 S.W.2d 719, 724 (Mo. 1966); see also 25A C.J.S. Damages § 262 
(2013).  Under this authority, the court of appeals' specification in Smith I of the conduct 
that supported liability for punitive damages did not necessarily dictate the scope of the 
evidence that could be considered once liability for punitive damages was determined at 
retrial.  
In determining the scope of the Smith I mandate, it is also significant that the court 
of appeals' prior decision expressly refused to address evidentiary issues, even with 
respect to the first stage of the punitive damages trial.  In the prior appeal, B&W argued 
that a variety of evidence admitted in the first stage of trial violated its right to due 
process, because that evidence "had no nexus to Mrs. Smith's injuries."  Appellant's Br. at 
59, Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 275 S.W.3d 748 (Mo. App. W.D. filed 
April 28, 2005) (No. WD65542).  It is noteworthy that, among other things, B&W 
challenged the admission of documents generated by British-American Tobacco 
Company ("BATCo"), a sister corporation of B&W, and by BATCo's lawyers.  B&W 
argued that the BATCo documents were irrelevant, because "the evidence related to a 
non-party located outside of the United States that had no possible connection to        
Mrs. Smith," and because "[t]here was no evidence linking th[e] document[s] to B&W or 
anything B&W did or did not do."  Id. at 62-63.  Smith I did not resolve this issue.  
Instead, it held that, "[g]iven the disposition [challenging the submissibility of the Smiths' 
punitive-damage case], these points need not be addressed."  Smith I at 823-24 
(emphasis added).  The court in Smith I expressly determined it was unnecessary to 
 
15
address B&W's arguments concerning the admissibility of evidence in the first stage of 
the original trial because reversal was required for independent reasons and the 
evidentiary issues might not recur on remand.  This rationale applies with even greater 
force to evidentiary issues concerning the second stage of retrial.  When Smith I was 
issued, there was every possibility a second stage might not even be necessary on retrial 
if the jury failed to find B&W liable for punitive damages in the first stage.  Because 
Smith I explicitly refused to decide evidentiary issues concerning the first stage of the 
original trial, there is simply no basis to conclude that it decided—explicitly or 
implicitly—evidentiary issues concerning any second stage of the retrial.  
Prior to the original trial, B&W filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude 
evidence concerning R.J. Reynolds, which the circuit court sustained.  The Smiths did not 
oppose the motion, and neither party sought to introduce evidence of R.J. Reynolds's 
conduct during the trial itself.  "A ruling in limine is interlocutory only and is subject to 
change during the course of the trial.  The motion in limine, in and of itself, preserves 
nothing for appeal."  State v. Purlee, 839 S.W.2d 584, 592 (Mo. banc 1992).  Because 
neither party attempted to introduce evidence concerning R.J. Reynolds's conduct during 
the original trial, the circuit court did not actually "exclude" any evidence or finally 
decide the admissibility issue—such evidence was simply not offered.  The issue, 
therefore, could not have been raised in the appeal that led to the Smith I decision. 
Consistent with the court of appeals' mandate, the trial that occurred on remand 
was limited to the Smiths' strict liability product defect claim and determined only 
B&W's liability for punitive damages and the amount of punitive damages to be awarded 
 
16
against B&W claims were not asserted, or tried, against any other party, on any other 
legal theory, or seeking any other form of relief.  The verdict director in the first stage of 
the bifurcated punitive-damages retrial plainly focused the jury on whether B&W should 
be held liable for punitive damages.  The verdict director in the first stage, Instruction No. 
8, provided:  
If you believe:  
 
First, at the time defendant Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation sold 
the cigarettes the defendant knew of the defective condition and danger of 
the cigarettes, which was found by the first jury as described in paragraph 2 
of instruction number 7, and  
 
Second, defendant thereby showed complete indifference to or conscious 
disregard for the safety of others,  
 
Then, in Verdict A, you may find that defendant Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corporation is liable for damages for aggravating circumstances.  
 
If you find that defendant Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation is 
liable for damages for aggravating circumstances in this stage of the trial, 
you will be given further instructions for assessing the amount of damages 
for aggravating circumstances in the second stage of the trial.  
 
(Emphasis added).  
 
In its verdict, the jury found "that defendant Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corporation is liable for damages for aggravating circumstances."  (Emphasis added). 
Similarly, in the second stage of the trial, the court instructed the jury that,  
[i]n addition to the compensatory damages awarded by the jury in the 
previous trial, you may assess an additional amount as damages for 
aggravating circumstances in such sum as you believe will serve to punish 
defendant Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation for the conduct for 
which you found that defendant Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation 
is liable for damages for aggravating circumstances and will serve to deter 
 
17
defendant Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation and others from like 
conduct.  
 
(Emphasis added).  The jury's verdict states that "[w]e, the undersigned jurors, assess 
damages for aggravating circumstances against defendant Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corporation at $1.5 million."  (Emphasis added).  Consistent with the mandate in Smith I, 
and with the jury's verdicts in the two stages of the punitive damages retrial, judgment 
was entered against B&W only.  The circuit court's judgment states, "IT IS 
THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that judgment is entered for damages 
for aggravating circumstances in favor of [the Smiths] and against Defendant Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corporation in the amount of One Million Five Hundred Thousand 
Dollars ($1,500,000.00)."  (Italics added).  
The Smiths argue that by allowing this evidence and argument related to R.J. 
Reynolds to be used as mitigating evidence in the retrial, the circuit court allowed B&W 
to effectively substitute defendants and argue that non-party R.J. Reynolds should not 
have to pay punitive damages.  But R.J. Reynolds did not become "the defendant" when 
this case was retried, even though B&W sought to capitalize on its relationship to R.J. 
Reynolds to mitigate its punitive damages exposure.  No substitution of parties occurred; 
B&W remained the defendant throughout.  B&W was simply permitted to present 
evidence and argue that B&W should receive the benefit of R.J. Reynolds's conduct and 
such conduct should be considered in mitigation of the punitive damages to which B&W 
would otherwise be subject.  While B&W "defended itself" by presenting evidence of R.J. 
 
18
Reynolds's historical corporate citizenship and research and marketing efforts, this did 
not result in an "effective substitution" of parties.   
Separate and apart from the scope of the prior mandate, there may be a legitimate 
issue regarding whether evidence of R.J. Reynolds's conduct is relevant to the 
determination of the amount of punitive damages to which B&W should be subjected 
(although the issue is complicated by the fact that R.J. Reynolds is affiliated with B&W, 
is the current manufacturer of Kool cigarettes, and has assumed B&W's liability for any 
judgment in this case).  See Call, 925 S.W.2d at 849-50; Maugh v. Chrysler Corp., 818 
S.W.2d 658, 662-64 (Mo. App. 1991).  Even if this Court's review of the trial record 
suggested the Smiths made a proper relevance objection and preserved it throughout trial, 
the Smiths did not present this issue to the court of appeals prior to transfer or to this 
Court.  In fact, the Smiths have expressly disclaimed any general relevance argument, 
stating in their reply brief to this Court that "[t]he relevant issue before this court is not 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting particular evidence.  
Instead, it is whether the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in interpreting the 
scope of the appellate court's prior mandate and limited remand …." (Emphasis 
added).  The Smiths have, therefore, abandoned that issue on this appeal, even if this 
Court was to presume it was preserved throughout the retrial.  Rule 84.13 ("[A]llegations 
of error not briefed or not properly briefed shall not be considered in any civil appeal 
…."); Rule 83.08(b) ("The substitute brief … shall include all claims the party desires 
this Court to review …."); see also State v. Brookshire, 325 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Mo. 1959) 
("The questions for decision on appeal are those stated in the points relied on, and a 
 
19
question not there presented will be considered to be abandoned on appeal and no longer 
an issue in the case."). 
 It is perhaps strategic advocacy that, rather than generally arguing that the circuit 
court abused its discretion in admitting irrelevant evidence of post-injury conduct to 
mitigate punitive damages, the Smiths have instead chosen to limit their argument to the 
claim that the circuit court committed legal error, reviewable de novo, by admitting 
evidence that was outside the scope of the mandate in Smith I.  But the Smiths' attempt to 
re-characterize the issue as a legal question subject to a favorable standard of review does 
not permit this Court to ignore the fact that Smith I was a general remand.  
Juror Nondisclosure 
In their second point on appeal, the Smiths argue that the circuit court erred in 
overruling their motion for new trial based on alleged juror nondisclosure.  In their 
motion for new trial, the Smiths alleged that "several jurors held strong biases against and 
predetermined views of tobacco litigation" and "did not disclose these biases and 
prejudices during voir dire."  The motion for a new trial also alleged that several jurors 
"believed that tobacco litigation was frivolous but did not disclose such opinions during 
jury selection despite clear questions that should have prompted a response."   
 
At a post-trial hearing, the Smiths focused on proving that Juror M had failed to 
disclose 1) that his mother had a lung condition called chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disorder (COPD), and 2) that he held a predetermined view that the Smiths' lawsuit was 
 
20
frivolous.6  The Smiths first called Juror T to testify about statements Juror M allegedly 
made during the course of the trial.  B&W objected to the testimony on the grounds that it 
was juror testimony offered to impeach the verdict and hearsay.  The circuit court 
sustained the objection.  The Smiths then called Juror M to testify.  Juror M testified that 
he did not think the lawsuit was frivolous during voir dire.  He testified that he thought 
the case was interesting and that he never expressed the view that the case was frivolous 
outside the jury room.  The circuit court sustained B&W's objections to questions about 
whether Juror M said the case was frivolous during deliberations.  The Smiths also 
questioned Juror M about whether he knew his mother had died of COPD.  B&W 
objected, claiming that the Smiths had failed to specifically allege this issue in their 
motion for new trial.  The circuit court sustained the objection.  
 
The Smiths were permitted to make an offer of proof from each juror.  Juror M 
testified during the offer of proof that he did not realize his mother had died of COPD 
until he looked at the death certificate after trial.  Prior to that, he was under the 
impression that she had died of pancreatic cancer, for which she had undergone surgery.  
He testified that, while he knew his mother "didn't breathe well," he did not know at the 
time of the trial that she had a lung problem.  He also stated that his mother was 
overweight.  During the offer of proof, Juror T testified that Juror M had expressed, 
outside of deliberations, his belief that the Smiths' suit was frivolous and that his mother 
                                             
 
6 The Smiths also attempted to present evidence that one other juror held a predetermined view 
that the Smiths' lawsuit was frivolous.  The Smiths do not raise any issues related to the second 
juror in this Court.   
 
 
21
had COPD.  Juror T could not remember when Juror M made these statements.  Juror T 
also testified that Juror M did not say that smoking caused his mother's COPD.     
On appeal, the Smiths allege a number of errors in connection with the circuit 
court's handling of the motion for new trial relative to juror nondisclosure.  First, they 
allege that the circuit court erred when it found the Smiths failed to properly allege Juror 
M's failure to disclose his mother's COPD in the motion for new trial.  Second, the 
Smiths argue that the circuit court erred when it ruled that evidence supporting that claim 
was inadmissible.  Third, the Smiths allege that the circuit court erred in excluding the 
testimony in relation to their contention that Juror M failed to disclose that he thought 
their case was frivolous during voir dire.   
Standard of Review 
"This Court will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial based on 
juror misconduct unless the trial court abused its discretion."  Fleshner v. Pepose Vision 
Inst., P.C., at 86-87 (Mo. banc 2010).  A circuit court abuses its discretion when its ruling 
"is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so arbitrary 
and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful 
consideration."  Id. at 87.   
A party alleging juror misconduct during voir dire must present evidence to 
substantiate its allegations.  State v. Mayes, 63 S.W.3d 615, 625 (Mo. banc 2001).  The 
movant bears the burden of proving any allegations made in a motion for new trial.  Id.  
When making factual determinations a circuit court is free to disbelieve any, all, or none 
of the evidence.  White v. Dir. of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 298, 308 (Mo. banc 2010).  
 
22
"Where the trial court makes no specific findings of fact, the reviewing court must 
assume that all facts were found in accordance with the result reached."  State v. Revels, 
13 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Mo. banc 2000).  "Appellate courts defer to the trial court on factual 
issues 'because it is in a better position not only to judge the credibility of witnesses and 
the persons directly, but also their sincerity and character and other trial 
intangibles which may not be completely revealed by the record.'"  White, 321 S.W.3d at 
308-09.     
Juror M's Failure to Disclose his Mother's Illness 
This Court must first decide whether the Smiths properly alleged Juror M's 
nondisclosure of his mother's COPD in the motion for new trial.  Rule 78.07(a) provides 
that, in a motion for new trial, "[a]llegations of error based on matters occurring or 
becoming known after final submission to the court or jury shall be stated specifically."  
"General allegations of error not based upon specific objection or requests made during 
trial are insufficient to preserve the allegations for review; nor may deficiencies in the 
motion be supplied from the movant's brief on appeal."  Williams ex rel. Wilford v. 
Barnes Hosp., 736 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Mo. banc 1987).  Although an allegation of error may 
be general in a motion for a new trial when definite objections or requests were made 
during trial, an allegation of error must be sufficiently definite to direct the court's 
attention to the particular acts or ruling asserted to be erroneous.  Beard v. Ry. Express 
Agency, Inc., 323 S.W.2d 732, 745 (Mo. 1959) (finding that a request for new trial 
"because of the character of the arguments" was "no assignment at all"); Bowman v. 
Burlington N., Inc., 645 S.W.2d 9, 11 (Mo. App. 1982).  The purpose of a motion for new 
 
23
trial is to give the circuit court the opportunity to correct its own errors without appellate 
court intervention.  State ex rel. McNutt v. Northup, 367 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Mo. 1963); 
Rule 78.07(a).     
Rule 78.04 requires that all motions for new trial be filed not later than 30 days 
after the entry of judgment.  "A motion for new trial may not be amended to add a new 
point after the expiration of the time provided by court rule."  Blunkall v. Heavy and 
Specialized Haulers, Inc., 398 S.W.3d 534, 548 (Mo. App. 2013); Greco v. Robinson, 
747 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Mo. App. 1988); see also Lloyd v. Garren, 366 S.W.2d 341, 344 
(Mo. 1963) ("These amended motions for a new trial and to set aside verdict are a nullity 
because they were filed out of time, and they cannot be the foundation for the 
preservation of errors to be complained of on appeal.").   
Missouri courts strictly apply the rule that allegations of error must be stated 
specifically in the context of juror nondisclosure.  In Heinen v. Healthline Mgmt., Inc., 
the defendant in a wrongful death case filed a motion for a new trial after the jury 
returned a verdict for the plaintiff, alleging that eight jurors intentionally failed to 
disclose personal lawsuits during voir dire.  982 S.W.2d 244, 246 (Mo. banc 1998).  In its 
motion, the defendants alleged, "'There was intentional juror misconduct through the 
concealment of suits as follows:' and then listed the suits."  Id. at 248.  This Court held 
that the defendant's allegation preserved only the issue of undisclosed lawsuits and did 
not preserve the issue of undisclosed claims for personal injuries that did not lead to 
lawsuits.  Id. at 248-49.  This was true despite the defendant's attempts to present 
evidence at a post-trial hearing regarding the allegedly undisclosed claims.  Id.   
 
24
In Lohsandt v. Burke, the court of appeals held that an allegation that "members of 
the jury failed to answer inquiries on voir dire to the prejudice of plaintiff" was a "general 
allegation that is not sufficiently definite to direct the court's attention to the particular 
acts asserted to be erroneous."  772 S.W.2d 759, 760 (Mo. App. 1989).  In Shields v. 
Freightliner of Joplin, Inc., a case with a similar fact pattern to that presented here, the 
plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial alleging that a juror had failed to disclose: 1) that 
two orders of protection had been entered against him, and 2) that he knew or recognized 
one of the witnesses.  334 S.W.3d 685, 689 (Mo. App. 2011).  During a hearing on the 
motion, the juror was asked whether he failed to disclose any mechanical training he had 
that may have been relevant to the lawsuit.  Id. at 690.  The defendant objected, claiming 
the issue could not be considered because it had not been included in the motion for new 
trial and that counsel was unprepared to address it due to the lack of notice.  Id.  The 
court of appeals held that, because the issue of the juror's mechanical training was not 
included in the motion for new trial, it was not preserved for appellate review.  Id. at 695.  
The fact that it was raised at the hearing did not change the analysis.  Id.   
 
During voir dire, the Smiths asked a number of questions to determine whether 
any jurors had family members with lung problems.  The Smiths argue, on appeal, that 
these questions were designed to elicit whether any panel member had biases and 
prejudices against tobacco litigation.  Therefore, the Smiths argue, the statement in their 
motion for new trial that "several jurors held strong biases against and predetermined 
views of tobacco litigation" and "did not disclose these biases and prejudices during voir 
 
25
dire" was sufficient to preserve the issue for review and bring the issue to the attention of 
the circuit court.   
This statement, however, does not adequately meet the specificity requirement of 
Rule 78.07.  This statement could encompass nearly any question the Smiths asked 
during voir dire.  The very purpose of asking questions at all is to ferret out venire 
members who have a predetermined bias against one party or the other.  To preserve the 
nondisclosure of a family member's illness for review, that claim must be clearly stated in 
the motion for new trial.  It is insufficient to preserve such a claim by simply alleging in a 
motion for new trial that jurors failed to disclose biases against tobacco litigation.  See 
Heinen, 982 S.W.2d at 248; Rule 78.07.    
 
The Smiths also claim that the circuit court erred in refusing to allow them to 
present evidence that Juror M failed to disclose his mother's COPD.  Under Rule 78.07, 
with a few exceptions, all allegations of error must be properly presented in a motion for 
new trial to be preserved for appellate review.  For purposes of this rule, to say that an 
allegation of error in a motion for new trial is not preserved for review is the same as to 
say that same allegation of error was not properly before the circuit court.  If an 
allegation of error is not timely presented in a motion for new trial, then that allegation is 
never properly before the circuit court and, therefore, not preserved for review.  The first 
mention in the record of Juror M's failure to disclose his mother's illness was at the 
hearing on the motion for new trial.  The circuit court held that hearing nearly three 
months after the deadline to file the motion for new trial.  Even assuming that the Smiths 
could have amended their motion by presentation of evidence, such an amendment was 
 
26
untimely when the hearing was conducted.  The claim that Juror M failed to disclose his 
mother's COPD was, therefore, never properly before the circuit court, and the circuit 
court did not err when it excluded Juror T's testimony related to this allegation of error.   
Juror M's Failure to Disclose His Belief that Tobacco Litigation is Frivolous 
The next question to decide is whether the circuit court properly excluded 
testimony from Juror T that Juror M stated throughout the trial that he thought the Smiths' 
lawsuit was frivolous.7  "It is a well-founded and long-established rule, based on sound 
public policy, … that the affidavit or testimony of a juror is inadmissible and is not to be 
received in evidence for the purpose of impeaching the verdict of a jury."  Wingate by 
Carlisle v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctr., 853 S.W.2d 912, 916 (Mo. banc 1993).  "The rule 
extends to juror conduct either inside or outside the juror room."  Id.  "'A juror who has 
reached his conclusions on the basis of evidence presented for his consideration may not 
have his mental processes and innermost thoughts put on a slide for examination under 
the judicial microscope.'"  Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 87.  A juror may not testify 
concerning matters inherent in the verdict, such as "that the juror did not understand the 
law as contained in the court's instructions, or that he did not join in the verdict, or that he 
voted a certain way due to a misconception of the evidence, or misunderstood the 
statements of a witness, or was mistaken in his calculations, or other matters 'resting 
alone in the juror's breast.'"  Baumle v. Smith, 420 S.W.2d 341, 348 (Mo. 1967).  Two 
                                             
 
7 The Smiths' motion for new trial alleged that several jurors "believed that tobacco litigation was 
frivolous but did not disclose such opinions during jury selection despite clear questions that 
should have prompted a response."  B&W does not dispute that this alleged nondisclosure was 
specifically pleaded in the motion for a new trial and properly preserved for review.   
 
27
policy considerations require the exclusion of this type of testimony.  "First, there would 
be no end to litigation if verdicts could be set aside because one juror reportedly did not 
correctly understand the law or accurately weigh the evidence.  Second, there is no 
legitimate way to corroborate or refute the mental process of a particular juror."  
Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 87-88 (citations omitted); Baumle, 420 S.W.2d at 348.8  
 
The testimony that the circuit court excluded was precisely the type of evidence 
that violates this rule.  This Court's decision in Wingate is particularly on point.  In 
Wingate, a plaintiff moved for a new trial, alleging that one of the jurors failed to disclose 
a longstanding bias against lawsuits.  853 S.W.2d at 916.  At the post-trial hearing, the 
plaintiff introduced deposition testimony from three alternate jurors and three jurors not 
joining the verdict, testimony from a trial consultant who had interviewed the allegedly 
biased juror after the trial, and testimony from the allegedly biased juror.  Id.  This Court 
held that the depositions of the other jurors were inadmissible because they included 
comments made by the allegedly biased juror during the trial's recesses and deliberations, 
and impeached the verdict.  Id.  This Court held that the testimony of the trial consultant 
and the allegedly biased juror was admissible because it concerned the allegedly biased 
juror's thoughts about lawsuits generally but did not inquire into statements made during 
the course of the trial.  Id.   
                                             
 
8 This Court has recognized two narrow exceptions to this rule, though neither is relevant here.  
Jurors may testify about juror misconduct when a juror gathers extrinsic evidence and brings that 
evidence back into the court room.  Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 88.  Jurors also may testify about 
statements reflecting ethnic or religious bias made by a juror during deliberations.  Id. at 89.  
 
28
The Smiths argue that the rule is inapplicable here for two reasons: 1) because 
decisions of this Court state that a movant alleging juror misconduct during voir dire 
must present evidence of misconduct, and 2) because the rule is limited to statements 
made during deliberations or inside the jury room.  Both of these arguments are without 
merit.  First, the cases cited by the Smiths do indeed support the proposition that the 
movant must present evidence to prove its claims, and they state that one way to do so is 
to present evidence from a juror.  See State v. Mayes, 63 S.W.3d 615, 625-26 (Mo. banc 
2001).  But no case controverts the rule prohibiting juror testimony that impeaches the 
verdict.  It is entirely appropriate to permit testimony of an allegedly biased juror to prove 
that the juror has a particular bias.  See Wingate, 853 S.W.2d at 916.  It is inappropriate, 
however, to do so by inquiring as to what the juror said or thought about the merits of the 
case during the course of the trial.  In State v. Edmonds, cited by the Smiths, the court of 
appeals explicitly said, "Appellant mistakenly relies upon the testimony of Juror S to 
claim bias on the part of Juror P."  188 S.W.3d 119, 123 (Mo. App. 2006).  In addition to 
the policy concerns noted previously, one issue inherent in such testimony is that it is not 
particularly probative of the biases a juror had about the case prior to hearing evidence.  
It is one thing to inquire as to whether a juror thinks that all litigation of a certain type is 
frivolous—a perfectly permissible line of inquiry.  It is another thing entirely to present 
evidence of what one juror said to other jurors about a case after the jurors have heard 
some or all of the evidence.  Therefore, while the Smiths are correct that juror 
misconduct may be proved by juror testimony, they are incorrect when they assert that 
 
29
the mere fact that a juror may testify means the juror may testify about matters inherent in 
the verdict.  
Second, the Smiths offer no authority that supports their contention that a juror 
may testify about statements of other jurors made outside of deliberations or the jury 
room.  For this proposition, the Smiths cite language from Edmonds.  The court of 
appeals in Edmonds stated, "Appellant may not use the testimony of a fellow juror to 
attack the claimed bias of a juror based upon statements made within the jury room."  188 
S.W.3d at 123.  The Smiths claim that this statement supports the conclusion that only 
statements made in the jury room are inadmissible.  The rule, however, is that an affidavit 
or testimony of a juror is inadmissible to impeach the jury's verdict regardless of where it 
occurs.  Wingate, 853 S.W.2d at 916 ("The rule extends to juror conduct either inside or 
outside the juror room.").  The rule against allowing juror testimony to impeach the 
verdict is designed to prohibit testimony regarding a juror's thought process or motives.  
Flesnher, 304 S.W.3d at 87; Baumle, 420 S.W.2d at 348.  This rule's purpose would be 
drastically undermined if testimony was allowed concerning anything one juror said to 
another so long as the comments were not made during deliberations or within the 
confines of the jury room.  Therefore, any testimony regarding the thought process or 
feelings of any juror violates the rule and is inadmissible to prove juror misconduct.9  
                                             
 
9 This statement should be qualified by the understanding that this Court has expressly permitted 
exceptions to this rule, which are set out in footnote 8 above.  This Court's opinion here does not 
serve to nullify any of these exceptions.  Those exceptions do not apply here, and this statement 
is made to clarify that the rule against testimony impeaching the verdict does not stop simply 
because the juror expresses his thoughts about the case to another juror outside the jury room 
doors.   
 
30
The Smiths attempted to introduce testimony from Juror T that Juror M had 
expressed his belief that the lawsuit was frivolous.  The testimony in the offer of proof 
demonstrates that Juror T would have testified that, on several occasions outside of 
deliberations, Juror M stated that he felt the lawsuit was frivolous.  All of these 
statements came after the trial had already begun.  This testimony reflects Juror M's 
motives and thought process and is, therefore, inadmissible to impeach the verdict.  
The final question to determine is whether the Smiths presented sufficient 
evidence to prove that Juror M was biased against tobacco litigation and failed to disclose 
this bias during voir dire.  Intentional nondisclosure occurs if: 1) there exists no 
reasonable inability to comprehend the information solicited by the question asked of the 
prospective juror, and 2) the prospective juror actually remembers the experience or that 
it was of such significance that his purported forgetfulness is unreasonable.  Williams, 
736 S.W.2d at 36.  "Nondisclosure occurs only after a party asks a clear question."  
Wingate, 853 S.W.2d at 916.  If a juror's thoughts are the same as his voir dire answer, 
then "he has disclosed everything that the voir dire question requires and no 
nondisclosure of any kind occurred."  Id. at 916-17.  "The determination of nondisclosure 
is left to the discretion of the trial judge whose ruling is disturbed only by showing abuse 
of discretion."  Id.; Williams, 736 S.W.2d at 36.    
The parties do not dispute that clear questions were asked regarding whether the 
jurors thought tobacco litigation was frivolous, nor do they dispute that these questions 
should have prompted a response from Juror M, had he harbored such a bias.  The dispute 
revolves around whether the Smiths proved the alleged bias.  The only admissible 
 
31
 
32
evidence presented regarding the Smiths' allegation of error is testimony from Juror M 
that he did not think the case was frivolous during voir dire.  He testified, quite to the 
contrary, that he thought that the case was "interesting."  This evidence is insufficient to 
prove that Juror M failed to disclose a bias against tobacco litigation.  Moreover, even if 
Juror T's testimony was admissible, the Smiths' evidence would have been insufficient.  
At best, Juror T's testimony demonstrates that Juror M felt that the case was frivolous 
after the case had already begun.  Juror T could not remember when Juror M started to 
say the case was frivolous but noted that it would have been after voir dire.  This 
testimony does not show that Juror M was biased against tobacco litigation at the time of 
voir dire.  Therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the 
Smiths' motion for new trial.    
Conclusion 
Because the court of appeals' mandate in Smith I did not address any issues 
concerning what evidence could be presented at the retrial of punitive damages, and 
because the circuit court did not err in overruling the Smiths' motion for new trial or 
B&W's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the circuit court's judgment is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
 
Russell, C.J., Breckenridge, Draper,  
Wilson and Teitelman, JJ., concur.  
Stith, J., not participating.