Case Title: McCray v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 100, 2001

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST ATE OF DELAWARE
DAVID G.  McCRAY,
   §
   §
No.  100, 2001
Defendant Below,
   §
Appellant,
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Court Below—Superior Court 
   §
of the State of Delaware, in
v.
   §
and for Sussex County in
   
   §
IS96-06-0218.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
   §
   §
Plaintiff Below,
   §
Appellee.
   §
Def.  ID No.  9606002576
Submitted: April 12, 2001
Decided:
May 24, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and STEELE, Justices.
O R D E R
This 24th day of May 2001, upon consideration of the appellant’s
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The appellant, David G. McCray, has appealed from the Superior
Court’s denial of his motion for a new trial.  The appellee, State of Delaware,
has moved to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that it
is manifest on the face of McCray’s opening brief that the appeal is without
merit.  We agree and affirm.
1McCray v.  State, Del.  Supr., No.  44, 1997, Holland, J., 1997 WL 683284
(Oct.  27, 1997 (ORDER). 
2
(2)
On July 15, 1996, McCray was indicted for the offenses of
Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree and Continuous Sexual Abuse
of a Child.   In November 1996, after a two-day trial, a Superior Court jury
convicted McCray of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree.  The
State nolle prossed the charge of Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child.
McCray was sentenced to 25 years at Level V imprisonment suspended after
15 years for work release and probation.  
(3)
On direct appeal, McCray’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 26(c).  McCray did not raise any issues for this Court’s
consideration.  By Order dated October 27, 1997, this Court affirmed
McCray’s conviction and sentence.1
(4)
On December 27, 2000, McCray filed a pro se motion for a new
trial in the Superior Court.  McCray claimed that newly discovered evidence
mandated a new trial.  By order dated January 29, 2001, the Superior Court
denied relief, holding that the motion was untimely and thus procedurally
barred under Superior Court Criminal Rule 33.  This appeal followed.
2Del.  Supr.  Ct.  R.  8; Jenkins v.  State, Del.  Supr., 305 A.2d 610, 613 (1973).
3
(5)
In his opening brief on appeal, McCray appears to raise three
issues:  (i) insufficient evidence; (ii) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (iii)
“prejudice.”  None of these appellate claims was fairly presented to the
Superior Court in McCray’s new trial motion, and we will not consider them
here for the first time on appeal.2
(6)
It appears from the record that McCray’s newly discovered
evidence consists of copies of two undated letters.  The first letter appears to
be from the minor complaining witness to McCray.  The second letter appears
to be from the minor complaining witness to a third party.  The second letter
is accompanied by a copy of an envelope that is postmarked December 31,
1996.  Both letters state that McCray did not commit the crime. 
(7)
Rule 33 provides that “[a] motion for a new trial based on the
ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only before or within two
3Cf.  Downes v.  State, Del.  Supr., ___ A.2d ___ (2001), No.  401, 1999,  per
curiam, 2001 WL 323847 (March, 30, 2001) (providing that defendant could seek
postconviction relief on basis of newly discovered evidence within three years after his
conviction became final, even though relief on that ground would have been time-barred
had it been asserted in motion for new trial).
4Maxion v.  State, Del.  Supr., 686 A.2d 148, 151 (1996) (quoting State v.  Halko,
Del.  Super., 193 A.2d 817, 820 (1963), aff’d, 204 A.2d 628 (1964).
5Jackson v.  State, Del.  Supr., 654 A.2d 829, 832-33 (1995).  
6Blankenship v.  State, Del.  Supr., 447 A.2d 428, 433-34 (1982).
4
years after final judgment.”3  “The time limits of Rule 33 are generally
`jurisdictional and mandatory.’”4  
(8)
McCray’s conviction became final on November 13, 1997, when
this Court issued its mandate following McCray’s direct appeal.5  McCray did
not file his motion for new trial until December 27, 2000.  McCray has not
provided this Court, nor did he provide the Superior Court, with a reason why
he filed his motion for a new trial more than three years after his conviction
became final.  
(9)
Moreover, McCray’s newly discovered evidence consists solely
of post-trial child witness recantations in the form of unverified letters.  A
motion for a new trial on the basis of a witness’ recantation “is generally
viewed with suspicion, and a denial of such a motion will not be reversed on
appeal unless there has been an abuse of discretion by the Trial Court.”6  We
5
find that the Superior Court properly exercised its discretion in denying
McCray’s untimely motion for a new trial.  
(10)
It is manifest on the face of McCray’s opening brief that this
appeal is without merit.  The issues on appeal are clearly controlled by settled
Delaware law, and to the extent the issues on appeal implicate the exercise of
judicial discretion, there was no abuse of discretion.  
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is hereby
AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ E. Norman Veasey
Chief Justice