Case Title: Coleman v. Strohman

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-11-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Coleman v. Strohman1991 WY 147821 P.2d 88Case Number: 90-152Decided: 11/21/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
JAMES 
D. COLEMAN, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

ROBERT 
W. STROHMAN, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

Appeal 
from the District Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

Les 
Bowron of Beech Street Law Offices, Casper, for appellant.

John 
I. Henley of Vlastos, Brooks & Henley, Casper, for appellee.

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, 
MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

 [¶1.]     Appellant James Coleman 
sued to recover damages for personal injuries he suffered when appellee Robert 
Strohman punched him. The jury found Strohman acted in self-defense when he 
committed the battery and denied recovery. Coleman appeals the jury's 
verdict.

 [¶2.]     The controlling issue 
here is whether the district court erred in not instructing the jury on 
Coleman's alternative theory of recovery, which was that Strohman acted 
negligently in his use of self-defense.

 [¶3.]     We 
affirm.

 [¶4.]     Strohman's 
seventeen-year-old son rode his motorcycle through the intersection in front of 
Coleman's house without coming to a complete stop at the stop sign. After first 
yelling at him, Coleman jumped in his car and chased the young Strohman, who 
escaped by driving his motorcycle down a ravine. On arriving home, he informed 
his father (Strohman) of the incident.

 [¶5.]     About two hours later, 
a co-worker, who lived across the intersection from Coleman, asked Strohman to 
come over and work on his wife's car. On his way to the co-worker's house, 
Strohman, riding a bicycle, noticed Coleman in his front yard. Strohman rode 
over, laid his bicycle down, and while standing on the sidewalk, asked Coleman 
if "he was the man [who] was chasing a young fellow on the motorcycle awhile 
ago." 

 [¶6.]     At this point, Coleman 
and Strohman provided conflicting testimony of the events leading to the 
altercation. Coleman testified that Strohman hit him without verbal or physical 
provocation and without warning. Strohman testified that Coleman dropped his 
shoulder, attempted to hit him, he blocked the swing, and struck Coleman on the 
left cheek, knocking him to the ground.

 [¶7.]     The trial court refused 
to instruct the jury on Coleman's alternative claim that Strohman was negligent 
in using excessive force to defend himself. The trial court instead gave the 
following instruction:

"The 
Defendant, will not be liable to the Plaintiff on his claim of battery if the 
affirmative defense of self-defense is established. This defense is established 
if you find both of the following:

"1. 
The Defendant honestly and reasonably believed (although perhaps mistakenly) 
that under the circumstances it was necessary for him to use force to protect 
himself against an actual or apparent threatened harmful contact; 
and

"2. 
The Defendant used no more force than a reasonably prudent person would have 
used under the same or similar circumstances to protect himself against the 
actual or apparent threatened attack."

 [¶8.]     The jury observed the 
witnesses, heard the evidence, deliberated, and returned a verdict finding that 
Strohman acted in self-defense when he punched Coleman. The jury, in other 
words, believed Strohman's version of the incident.

 [¶9.]     Coleman admits that the 
jury's finding of self-defense bars his claim for battery. Coleman maintains, 
however, that the trial court should have instructed the jury that "the 
Defendant negligently used excessive force to repel a perceived 
attack."

 [¶10.]  In Tatman v. Cordingly, 672 P.2d 1286, 1289 
(Wyo. 1983), we stated that the following 
instruction accurately stated the law of self-defense in Wyoming and its 
limits:

"Thus, 
even acting in self-defense, a person may be liable for injury inflicted upon 
the aggressor. This is the case when the defendant is not justified in his 
belief that he was in danger, or when the defendant uses excessive force, or 
when the defender continues to exert force after the aggressor is rendered 
disarmed or helpless."

 [¶11.]  We explained in Tatman that a claim of self-defense 
"must be based upon reasonable grounds." 672 P.2d  at 1290. The jury is, 
therefore, required to apply an objective standard in deciding whether an 
individual's belief that it was necessary to defend himself was 
reasonable.

 [¶12.]  Coleman's theory of negligence depended 
upon the jury finding that Strohman failed to act reasonably in defending 
himself and that he used excessive force. The self-defense instruction given 
required the jury to find that Strohman's use of self-defense was both 
reasonable and without excessive force. We stated in Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361, 
1363-64 (Wyo. 1986), that "[t]he trial court is not obligated to give 
instructions in the language of their proponent and may refuse proposed 
instructions, though correct, if the principles embodied in the requested 
instructions are covered by other instructions."

 [¶13.]  Appellant claims the court should have 
instructed the jury that appellant could recover if appellee "negligently used 
excessive force." Negligence is a failure to act as a reasonable, prudent person 
in the same or similar circumstances. The instruction given by the court 
required, to establish self-defense, that appellee must have "honestly and 
reasonably believed * * * it was necessary for him to use force * * * [and that 
he] used no more force than a reasonably 
prudent person would have used under the same or similar circumstances * * 
*." Although the term negligence is not employed in this type case, the 
principle for which appellant contends is clearly embodied in the instruction 
given. Thus, the principle that an individual's use of self-defense must be no 
more force than a reasonably prudent person would use under the same or similar 
circumstances was before the jury when it decided the issues presented in this 
case. It was not error to refuse appellant's instruction on 
negligence.

 [¶14.]  The verdict of the jury and the judgment 
entered thereon are affirmed.

URBIGKIT, 
Chief Justice, dissenting.

 [¶15.]  I respectfully dissent. To approve what 
turned out to be a directed verdict for Robert W. Strohman by the trial court's 
elimination of a significant claim for recovery is wrong for two valid reasons. 
Although the second reason, refusal to give a theory of the case instruction, is 
troubling and, in my opinion, clearly wrong, Barber v. Sheridan Trust & Savings 
Bank, 53 Wyo. 65, 78 P.2d 1101 (1938), the first reason, a procedural due 
process denial, is of greater concern.

 [¶16.]  In this case, both parties pleaded, 
prepared and tried the case on dual theories for contended recovery by the 
assaulted appellant, James D. Coleman. Those theories were battery as an 
intentional tort and negligent infliction of harm as a non-intentional tort. For 
the first time at instruction conference, the trial court, over the objection of both counsel, 
withdrew negligence from jury decision. The psychological impact on the jury 
would certainly have been substantial where, in opening statement and evidence, 
the jury was presented with two theories to then have the case submitted as only 
an intentional tort fist-fight. In reality, the substantial affect on the jury 
of the directed verdict which denied the negligence claim from jury review was 
then under the failed situation of the case to also predetermine the jury 
verdict on the intentional tort.1 By instruction given and denied, 
the jury verdict result becomes procedurally determined on both issues.

 [¶17.]  I likewise do not find the trial court to 
have been substantively correct in denial to the litigant of his theory of the 
case instruction. Smith v. State, 773 P.2d 139 (Wyo. 1989); Stapleman v. State, 680 P.2d 73 
(Wyo. 1984); Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Service, Inc. v. 
Jericho Plantation, Inc., 481 So. 2d 343 (Ala. 1985); Clary 
Ins. Agency v. Doyle, 620 P.2d 194 (Alaska 
1980); Newell v. Town of OroValley, 163 Ariz. 527, 789 P.2d 394 (1990); White v. Uniroyal, Inc., 155 Cal. App. 3d 1, 202 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1984); Nelson v. 
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 694 P.2d 867 (Colo. App. 1984); Garrett Freightlines, Inc. v. Bannock Paving 
Co., Inc., 112 Idaho 722, 735 P.2d 1033 (1987); Martin v. Heddinger, 373 N.W.2d 486 
(Iowa 1985); Schallenberger v. Rudd, 
244 Kan. 230, 767 P.2d 841 (1989); Moody 
v. Pulte Homes, Inc., 423 Mich. 150, 378 N.W.2d 319 (1985); Tope v. Taylor, 235 Mont. 124, 768 P.2d 845 (1988); Colorado Environments, Inc. 
v. Valley Grading Corp., 105 Nev. 464, 779 P.2d 80 (1989); Adams v. United Steelworkers of America, 
AFL-CIO, 97 N.M. 369, 640 P.2d 475 (1982); Burke v. American Network, Inc., 95 Or. 
App. 274, 768 P.2d 924 (1989); Kreager v. 
Blomstrom Oil Co., 379 N.W.2d 307 (S.D. 1985); Goode v. Dayton Disposal, Inc., 738 P.2d 638 (Utah 1987); Gammon v. Clark Equipment Co., 104 Wn.2d 613, 707 P.2d 685 (1985); Danco, Inc. v. 
Donahue, 341 S.E.2d 676 (W. Va. 1985). See also Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, 
Inc., 731 P.2d 1195 (Wyo. 1987).

 [¶18.]  This modest list is only representative 
of the identically stated multitude of decisions nationwide. We consider here a 
very basic principle of both justice and fairness in the operation of any 
judicial system.

 [¶19.]  This writer remains adamant that the 
Wyoming 
judicial system is far too willing to take the case away from the litigants by 
denial of a theory of the defense or claim. McInturff v. State, 808 P.2d 190, 198 
(Wyo. 1991), 
Urbigkit, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. Furthermore, we would 
normally achieve an earlier final disposition, retain constitutional right to a 
jury decision and most likely secure enhancement of justice by a more confined 
and curtailed fact finding function by the trial judge. Denial of the theory of 
the case or defense instruction moves decision making from the jury to the trial 
court. Erickson v. Magill, 713 P.2d 1182 (Wyo. 1986); Vassos v. Roussalis, 658 P.2d 1284 
(Wyo. 1983); Barnes v. Fernandez, 526 P.2d 983 
(Wyo. 1974). 
The case should not be removed from jury review by the rejection of theory of 
the case instructions by the litigants. Rather, we should continue the 
historical philosophy that rights of recovery should be applied in decision by 
the fact finding jury, Cimoli v. 
Greyhound Corporation, 372 P.2d 170 (Wyo. 1962), and not by the preclusive 
decision making, as a matter of law, by the trial judge.

 [¶20.]  What we do in this denied theory of the 
case appeal is to apply our own "factual" analysis upon that decision initiated 
by the trial court while the jury is excluded from the decisional process. Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello, 382 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1963) and Culver v. Sekulich, 80 Wyo. 437, 344 P.2d 146 
(1959). "It is the function of an appellate court to ascertain whether or not 
there was substantial evidence upon which the trier of fact could base its 
opinion if it believed the testimony. It is not for us [the appellate court] to 
evaluate the evidence that was presented." Culver, 344 P.2d  at 156. Consequently, 
it is the jury that is denied its constitutional fact finding responsibility 
when we reverse general principles in denying the jury as the venire of the 
citizenry its right to determine the facts. Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 6, 8 and 9; Brenner v. City of Casper, 723 P.2d 558 (Wyo. 1986); Long v. 
Forbes, 58 Wyo. 533, 136 P.2d 242 
(1943).

 [¶21.]  The theory of the case instruction rule 
is universal in court application and was well-defined and consistently applied 
in Wyoming 
legal history until case deviation in recent time. This court has succinctly 
recognized that "[b]oth parties were entitled to proper instructions covering 
their respective theories regarding the evidence submitted, and, it was, of 
course, for the jury then to determine the issue." Barber, 78 P.2d  at 
1109.

I. 
PROCEDURAL

 [¶22.]  In his 1989 complaint, Coleman alleged 
negligence and intentional act theories for recovery. Strohman responded in 
answer by general denial and eleven affirmative defenses. Those included failure 
to state a claim; Coleman caused his own injury; Coleman was negligent; 
assumption of risk; failure to mitigate; the complaint was ambiguous and failed 
to set forth a complaint in a clear and concise fashion; no proximate cause; if 
Strohman was negligent, which negligence is denied, Coleman assumed the risk or 
was more negligent (comparative negligence); injuries resulted from events not 
involving negligence; injuries proximately caused by acts of others than 
Strohman, which included Coleman; and finally, lack of jurisdiction by 
contention that damages were insufficient to reach the court's minimum 
jurisdiction ($7,000).

 [¶23.]  A jury of twelve was first requested by 
Coleman and then re-requested by Strohman. Pretrial memoranda were submitted in 
which Coleman reiterated his two theories for recovery, negligence or 
intentional act:

1. 
Did the actions of the Defendant constitute negligence (i.e., did Defendant 
breach a duty owed to Plaintiff)?

2. 
Was the Defendant acting in self-defense or stated differently, was the 
Plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence?

Strohman 
responded by memorandum which did not enumerate legal issues or factual 
theories. The pretrial order provided in part:

Pretrial 
memoranda were submitted by counsel, filed herewith, and incorporated in this 
order for purposes noted. These memoranda do not restate the issues which are 
framed by the pleadings.

 [¶24.]  The defense of failure to state a claim 
filed by Strohman was never called up for hearing and no other attacks on the 
dual theories of Coleman were made pre-trial or during the evidentiary 
presentation. At the close of Coleman's evidence and again after the close of 
all evidence, Strohman moved for a directed verdict which was overruled without 
significant discussion by the litigants or the trial 
court.

 [¶25.]  The first notice given by the trial court 
that negligence would not be submitted as a jury issue was at the instruction 
conference. Both litigants objected to that decision.

[COUNSEL 
FOR STROHMAN]: The Defendant Robert Strohman would object in that several 
instructions that were tendered by the parties are not to be given by the Court. 
The first of this is Plaintiff's Offered Instruction No. 14, this was an 
instruction that both the plaintiff and the defendant requested, and the 
definition of negligence both the plaintiff and defendant feel in this matter 
that the Jury should be entitled to determine that Mr. Strohman, if he did not 
act in self defense, nevertheless did not act intentionally, but rather merely 
negligently. We have this belief or the defendant has this belie[f] due to the 
fact that the Jury could reasonably find that force was not necessary to thwart 
an attack upon him by the plaintiff, in reality but the defendant could have 
easily inferred Mr. Coleman's actions to be significant threat of force, so that 
he reacted accordingly. While this may have been a misperception it would not be 
fair to the defendant to have this misperception, this negligent act defined as 
an intentional act, upon which punitive damages could be 
awarded.

The 
defendant states that this would be depriving him of his rights to due process 
of law based upon the fact that a driver going through an intersection with a 
misperception of the facts and circumstances, would not be subjected to the same 
civil remedies as this defendant now apparently will be subjected to if the Jury 
finds in the plaintiff's favor.

The 
defendant also objects that plaintiff's offered Instruction No. 19, defining 
comparative negligence and comparative fault to the parties will not be given, 
again the defendant feels that the Jury could easily find from the facts of this 
litigation that one or both of the parties were negligent, and the Jury ought to 
have the opportunity to make that finding.

Defendant 
further objects that his proffered Instruction F was not given. Instruction F 
defines the right of the defendant to stand his ground and not retreat so long 
as he does not use deadly force, if he in fact perceives threatened attack upon 
his person. We believe this is a proper statement of the law of Wyoming, and that there 
is no sufficient instruction to the Jury to convey this 
law.

* 
* * * * *

The 
defendant further objects that its offered Instruction H was not given, again 
defining negligence and fault, once again the defendant believes that there was 
sufficient evidence so that the Jury could in fact find negligence and fault on 
the part of both the plaintiff and the defendant, and the Jury should have been 
permitted to make that determination.

[COUNSEL 
FOR COLEMAN]: It is the position of the Plaintiff James Coleman in this case, 
which position is that as stated by [Strohman's counsel] and in partial 
agreement with the defendant that certain instructions offered by the plaintiff, 
which presented the theory of negligence, were improperly refused by this Court, 
and those are specifically Plaintiff's Offered Instructions 5, 11, 12, 14, 16 
and 17. The plaintiff brought a complaint which alleged intentional battery or 
negligence on the part of the defendant. These instructions would have allowed 
the Jury to be instructed on alternative theories and that the alternative 
theory instruction was No. 5. Rather than discuss each of those individually let 
it be said that it was the plaintiff's position that the Wyoming Supreme Court 
in Tatman versus Cordingly impliedly suggested that even if an actor acted in 
self defense, he may nevertheless be liable for injury inflicted if he is not 
justified in this belief[,] that he was in dange[r] or that if he used excessive 
force to defend himself. The Wyoming Supreme Court did not specifically use the 
word negligence, but it is plaintiff's position that the theory is supported by 
the Restatement of Torts Second at Section 8 A, regarding state of mind and 
intent, that there is a descending continuum regarding the state of mind which 
is in three parts, specific intent to cause harm or secondly a probability that 
consequences will flow, may then decrease and become less than substantially 
certain. The actor conduct allows us the character of intent and becomes * * * 
mere reckless, and thirdly as that probability decreases a farther amount only 
to a risk that result will follow becomes ordinary negligence and defined by 
Section 382 of the Restatement. That line of thinking also appears in Prosser on 
Torts at Section 8.

It 
is Plaintiff's position that the facts of this case demonstrated that the Jury 
could find that the defendant was liable for the injuries suffered by the 
plaintiff on the theory of intentional miscond[u]ct, if it found that nothing 
about the plaintiff's actions in any way provoked the defendant striking him. 
Alternatively it is the plaintiff's position that the Jury could reasonably find 
that some physical movement on the part of plaintiff provoked an unreasonable 
response from the defendant, which was either the unreasonable use of self 
defense or the use of excessive force to defend himself. Neither of which 
constitute an intentional infliction of a battery, and both of which suggest a 
lack of prudence on the part of the defendant.

In 
effect the Court has dismissed that portion of the plaintiff's complaint and 
reduced this case to one which only allows the Jury to determine the question of 
battery, and I believe with some differences of opinion about the effect of that 
ruling, plaintiff and defendant are in effect in agreement on that 
subject.

As 
for the instructions which the Court refused as offered by the defendant, 
plaintiff's position is, which do not apply to this theory of negligence, 
plaintiff's theory, those were properly refused. They are older statements of 
the law, which have been supplemented and made modern by the decision in Tatman 
versus Cordingly.

One 
other instruction refused by the Court which the plaintiff offered, Instruction 
No. 7, which defined intent and carried forward with this descending statement 
of mind concept as defined above did mention negligence, and it properly defines 
this descending theory of the state of mind of an actor as earlier 
discussed.

* 
* * * * *

[COUNSEL 
FOR COLEMAN]: I do need to state one other objection, that is due to the 
Court[']s ruling on instructions already given the plaintiff's offered Special 
Verdict Form has in effect been refused, that verdict form would have allowed 
the Jury to select one of two alternative theories of recovery, which the 
Plaintiff offered, and should have been discussed in the objections made to all 
of the refused instructions discussed above.

 [¶26.]  Responsive to these objections and 
comments, the trial court specifically rejected and marked the instructions as 
"INSTRUCTION REQUESTED BY [defendant or plaintiff] AND REFUSED BY THE COURT," 
which were tendered to present the issue of negligence recovery by a jury 
decision.2 Although neither the opening nor 
the closing arguments are provided in the record for present consideration, it 
is apparent from reading the entire transcript that negligence was a significant 
theory of Coleman's case for general approach and evidentiary presentation. 
Likewise, the obvious theory of defense was factually the automatic reaction of 
Strohman in repelling the attack when Coleman tried to hit him first. Negligence 
or lack thereof was intrinsically woven into the evidence and organization of 
the case by both litigants.

 [¶27.]  Here, a theory of the case instruction 
analysis is different from most cases. Normally, the litigants dispute its 
usage, but both agreed here that the case properly involved a negligence claim. 
In denial of any negligence instruction, the trial court usurped both litigants' 
due process rights to identify their litigation. By the trial court's decision, 
the inevitability of appeal was created no matter what the jury decision might 
have been. A directed verdict on negligence against Coleman was granted without 
any specific request made by the favored litigant, Strohman. Rights to both due 
process and to a jury trial were violated. In Goodman v. State, 573 P.2d 400, 408 
(Wyo. 1977) (quoting Blakely v. State, 474 P.2d 127, 129 
(Wyo. 1970)), 
we said:

"In 
order to meet the basic requirements of due process, it was necessary for the 
court in Blakely's trial to instruct on defendant's theory of the case . . .," 
and failure to do so resulted in a denial of due process.

II. 
NEGLIGENCE CLAIM FOLLOWING A BATTERY 
OCCURRENCE

 [¶28.]  We then move to the substantive issue - a 
negligence claim following a battery occurrence - where alternative claims are 
founded on intentional and negligent tort. Analysis requires a two-stage 
consideration to properly understand the case. It is first necessary to 
determine whether both conventional assault and an intentional battery tort can 
be simultaneously pleaded and pursued with a negligence based claim. If this 
first stage is answered in the affirmative, then the second inquiry is factual - 
was this case one where the technical condition of some evidence existed to 
require mandatory submission of the theory of the case instruction to the jury? 
Here, as earlier stated, the case is different from most of the many theory of 
the case appeals since here both litigants agreed that the issue was properly 
presented for jury decision, but the trial court refused to permit the jury to 
decide the issue.

 [¶29.]  Neither Strohman in present appellate 
briefing nor the majority in its opinion undertake this character of analysis, 
but instead rely on the giving of a self-defense instruction as a factor of the 
intentional tort claim which resulted in the jury verdict for Strohman. 
Self-defense is not ignored. What is ignored is the method of exercise of a 
judicial right which invades questions of a negligence tort in causing injury to 
another. I find that conceptual approach presents a complete non-sequitur which 
will be addressed after the properly defined issues are reviewed in conjunction 
with available precedent.

III. 
COMBINING CLAIMS FOR INTENTIONAL TORT OF BATTERY WITH A NEGLIGENCE CLAIM FOR PHYSICAL 
INJURY

 [¶30.]  It is almost too obvious to require a 
statement that alternative theories of recovery can be pleaded under W.R.C.P. 
8(e)(2), which states:

A 
party may set forth two (2) or more statements of a claim or defense alternately 
or hypothetically, either in one (1) count or defense or in separate counts or 
defenses. When two (2) or more statements are made in the alternative and one of 
them if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made 
insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements. 
A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as he has regardless 
of consistency and whether based on legal or on equitable grounds or on both. 
All statements shall be made subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 
11.

See also Lane Co. v. Busch Development, 
Inc., 662 P.2d 419 (Wyo. 1983). It should be equally obvious that 
action in self-defense can exceed reason and invade negligence. Likewise, what 
was an illegal battery can invoke negligent misconduct as an additional tortious 
offense against the victim. Whether done right or wrong, self-defense may be 
proper in a degree of resistance, but reach negligent assaultive conduct in the 
way it was carried out. The general course of action may be intentional, but the 
performance negligent in conduct.3

 [¶31.]  Since neither Strohman nor the majority 
cite authority rejecting alternative pleadings of the two theories as a matter 
of legal thesis in every case, the cases cited by Coleman provide support to the 
claim which is based on logic of the availability of both for a claimed right to 
recover damages. We then come to the second inquiry as emplaced in the facts of 
the case. Is there evidence upon which negligence as an issue of liability could 
state a claim in proof? Restated - if Coleman had filed suit within a strategy 
to retain a liability carrier in the case for Strohman to avoid an intentional 
conduct insurance policy exclusion by pleading only negligence, would Strohman 
still be entitled to a directed verdict under this actual evidence? See Morris v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 771 P.2d 1206 (Wyo. 1989).

 [¶32.]  Factually, the evidence is conflicting. 
We will accept Strohman's presentation that Coleman threatened first and 
Strohman resisted in self-defense by brushing aside the attack. Strohman then 
struck the bespectacled Coleman in the face with his fist.4 Strohman tells us in testimony that 
it was "reflex." I can find clear propriety for the jury to have considered 
whether some reaction for the self-defense by Strohman was proper, but the 
"cold-cocked" blow as described by the police officer was unnecessary, 
negligent, tortious and consequently subject to damage award by the jury. We may 
have a very proficient pugilist who sought only an excuse to hit, hurt and 
injure. The jury should have decided.

 [¶33.]  We also need to address the ratio 
decidendi that the jury verdict on self defense is preclusive. Here, I find a 
problem with a determination that a theory of the case instruction was properly 
refused when the jury answered the only questions with which they were 
presented.

 [¶34.]  The jury verdict form which was used 
provided:

1. 
Did the defendant, Robert W. Strohman, commit a battery upon the plaintiff on 
August 6, 1988?

Yes 
X No ___

If 
you have answered No. 1 "No", please sign the verdict form and notify the 
bailiff. If you have answered No. 1 "Yes", proceed to No. 
2.

2. 
Do you find from the evidence that the defendant, Robert W. Strohman, acted in 
self-defense?

Yes 
X No ___

If 
you have answered No. 2 "Yes", please sign the verdict form and notify the 
bailiff. If you have answered No. 2 "No", proceed to No. 
3.

3. 
What amount of money would fairly and reasonably compensate the plaintiff for 
his injuries proximately caused by the defendant?

$ 
____

4. 
Do you find that punitive damage should be assessed against the 
defendant?

Yes 
___ No ___

 [¶35.]  There is nothing in either "yes" decision 
of the verdict form or in the trial evidence which demonstrates that if a third 
question, which was in effect requested by Coleman, had been given that it would 
have been answered "no." That question would have been something in the nature 
of proposed Instruction 11 which was refused:

Even 
if you find that the Defendant acted in self-defense, you may still find him 
liable upon Plaintiff's claim for negligence if you find that his use of 
self-defense or his use of excessive force was mistaken. If the Defendant was 
not justified in his belief that he was in danger, or if he used excessive force 
to defend himself he is liable to Plaintiff for such negligent acts. In 
considering the issue of negligence you must also consider whether or not the 
Plaintiff was guilty of negligence which contributed to the events which led to 
his injuries.[5]

 [¶36.]  The reason to characterize the 
dispositive issue of the jury's finding of self-defense as a non-sequitur is 
because it relates in no way to whether the injury to Coleman was negligently 
inflicted. The jury had no choice to consider negligence which changed the case 
from consideration of the characteristic and damage in the conduct (negligence) 
to the temporal prior question of the reason for the conduct 
(self-defense).

 [¶37.]  There is nothing in this record that 
determines that self-defense was only to be served, even if appropriate, by a 
punch in the face. The jury verdict as phrased determined that Strohman properly 
reacted to conduct of Coleman and in no way did it determine that what was done 
in reaction was not in some regard improper, e.g., negligent. An interesting 
metamorphosis occurs within this appeal. The fistfight victor (one punch 
winner), Strohman, argues that the multitude of insurance coverage cases which 
address negligence as an insured liability activity for defense or payment do 
not apply. That conclusion is achieved without any explanation of why negligent 
conduct recovery under insurance company liability is somehow different than 
here where the same components of the individual's negligence in assault and 
battery were initially sought to be litigated by both parties. Why the 
negligence component of those insurance cases as a basis of liability is 
different from the included negligent liability contention of a straight civil 
lawsuit is not explained by any logical concept. Alm v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 369 P.2d 216 (Wyo. 
1962).

 [¶38.]  The majority ignores the extended body of 
case law involving Alm and followed 
by Morris, 771 P.2d 1206, and applies 
preclusion by a halfway presented case. Under this approach, the insurance cases 
could never have developed because the incident of tort would only be considered 
under an intentional concept, e.g., excluded policy coverage. Logic and rational 
reasoning is misplaced or ignored. Obviously, negligence has to be considered to 
present a viable insurance coverage issue. The insurance case question is 
identical to the issue of contended and denied negligence.

 [¶39.]  To demonstrate that the posture adopted 
by the majority simply lacks foundation either in precedent or in legal 
philosophy, we review an array of cases where intentional tort versus negligence 
is considered and others where the similar principle of negligence in assault 
cases is derived from excessive force. For this jurisdiction, Morris, 771 P.2d 1206 is a normal and 
illustrative example of the body of the law. Morris considered the intentional 
tort/negligence issue within the context of whether an alcoholic condition 
extended beyond the capacity to form the intent to commit the intentional tort. 
Our discussion in the case was supported by a significant array of citations. 
Without intent, there cannot be an intentional tort; liability, if any, is based 
upon other theories, e.g., negligence. We said in Morris, 771 P.2d  at 1214-15 (footnote 
omitted):

Another 
problem is created by the intoxication factor as it relates to the capacity to 
form an intent necessary to meet the insurance policy intentional-injury 
exclusion. Parkinson v. Farmers Ins. 
Co., 122 Ariz. 343, 594 P.2d 1039 (1979); 
Transamerica Insurance Co. v. 
Thrift-Mart, Inc., 159 Ga. App. 874, 285 S.E.2d 566 (1981); Badger Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Murry, 54 Ill. App.3d 459, 12 Ill.Dec. 672, 370 N.E.2d 295 (1977); Burd v. Sussex Mutual Ins. 
Co., 56 N.J. 383, 267 A.2d 7 (1970); Garden State Fire & Casualty Co. v. 
Keefe, 172 N.J. Super. 53, 410 A.2d 718, certification denied 84 N.J. 389, 
420 A.2d 317 (1980); United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Brannan, 22 Wn. App. 341, 589 P.2d 817 
(1979); Kenna v. Griffin, 4 Wn. App. 363, 481 P.2d 450 (1971). Thus, the issue of whether Morris was too drunk to 
form the requisite intent is a material issue. This inquiry was specifically 
addressed by the Georgia Supreme Court in a very similar circumstance in 
reversal of summary judgment received by the homeowner's insurance carrier after 
a shooting death where the court considered whether intoxication may render a 
person incapable of forming an intent or expectation of injuring 
another.

"The 
question of intent or expectation here uniquely fits the pattern of those issues 
of material fact which are not appropriate issues for summary judgment but are 
decided by the trier of fact."

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. 
Morgan, 258 Ga. 276, 368 S.E.2d 509, 510 (1988). See Note, 
The Intentional Injury Exclusion: When is 
There No Intent Behind the Intention?, 11:3 Am.J.Trial Advoc. 527 
(1988).

 [¶40.]  The multitude of cases addressing this 
issue of the visible distinction between intentional assault tort and negligent 
injury contentions within the insurance law subject of policy exclusion is 
illustrated by 227 pages in Annotation, Construction and Application of Provision of 
Liability Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding Injuries Intended or Expected by 
Insured, 31 A.L.R.4th 957 (1984).6 See also Annotation, Liability Insurance: Specific Exclusion of 
Liability for Injury Intentionally Caused by Insured, 2 A.L.R.3d 1238 (1965 
& 1991 Supp.).7

 [¶41.]  Illustrative of these cases in recognized 
differentiated concepts between the intentional tort and negligent action is Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 
54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 113, 419 P.2d 168, 177 (1966), where Justice Tobriner 
recognized:

Further, 
[tort claim defendant] might have been able to show that in physically defending 
himself, even if he exceeded the reasonable bounds of self-defense, he did not 
commit wilful and intended injury, but engaged only in nonintentional tortious 
conduct. Thus, even accepting the insurer's premise that it had no obligation to 
defend actions seeking damages not within the indemnification coverage, we find, 
upon proper measurement of the third party action against the insurer's 
liability to indemnify, it should have defended because the loss could have 
fallen within that liability.

  [¶42.] The purpose required to establish the intent 
assault tort was considered in State Farm 
Fire & Casualty Company v. Muth, 190 Neb. 248, 207 N.W.2d 364 (1973), 
where the concept questioned whether the bodily injury was expected or intended 
for coverage exclusion compared to non-intended result for which coverage 
existed. The court found that a non-intended result did not produce an 
intentional tort.

 [¶43.]  The symmetry in concept between 
intentional tort and negligent conduct was considered by a federal court in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Steinemer, 723 F.2d 873, 875 (11th Cir. 1984) (footnote omitted):

Under 
the majority rule the exclusion applies if the insured intended to do a 
particular act, and intended to do some harm, even if the harm actually done was 
radically different from that intended. See Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. 
Spreen, 343 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 3d Dist.Ct. App. 1977) (no insurance 
coverage for man who intentionally struck another man in face with fist, causing 
severe injury, but intending only to do minor harm). On the other hand, an 
"intentional injury" exclusion will not apply if the insured intentionally does 
an act, but has no intent to commit harm, even if the act involves the 
foreseeable consequences of great harm or even amounts to gross or culpable 
negligence. Id at 651; see, e.g., Phoenix Insurance Co. v. 
Helton, 298 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1st Dist.Ct.App. 1974) (insurance exclusion does 
not apply where man injured member of crowd as he drove car slowly into crowd 
thinking crowd would disperse).

 [¶44.]  Steinemer considered intention where two 
young men were involved with a BB gun. The firing of the gun was intended; the 
resulting eye injury (or any injury for that matter) was completely undesired 
and unexpected. Consequently, because the tort was unintentional, the policy 
exclusion would not apply and coverage was left in place for concepts of 
determined negligently committed injury.

 [¶45.]  The basic principle supporting Coleman's 
negligence theory of the case has an ancient history, long pre-dating the 
multiplicity of current insurance coverage adaptations which only continue that 
historical perspective. One of the earliest of quiescent concept and pithy 
phraseology is Elliott v. Brown, II 
Wend. 497, 500 (N.Y. 1829):

It 
was held in [Cockcroft v. Smith, (Salk. 642)] a good defence. But the 
principle is laid down by the court, though they say contrary to common 
practice, that for a small assault there must not be an unequal return; but the 
question should be, what was necessary for a man's defence; not who struck 
first. * * *

The 
same principle was recognized in South 
Carolina, in the case of The State v. Wood, (1 Bay, 351.) The defendant was indicted 
for an assault and battery on a woman. He proved that she struck him first with 
a cowskin, whereupon he gave her several severe blows with a large stick and 
left her speechless on the ground. The court directed a verdict against the 
defendant. They agreed that the general rule of law is, that it is a 
justification to the defendant that the prosecutor or plaintiff gives the first 
blow; but the resistance ought to be in proportion to the injury offered. Where 
a man disarms the aggressor, or puts it out of his power to do further injury, 
he ought to desist from further violence; and if he commits any further outrage, 
he becomes the aggressor. The case in Salk. 642, is cited as sound law. So the 
master of a vessel has a right to use proper chastisement for disobedience of 
orders; but if it be excessive, and out of proportion to the offence, he becomes 
a trespasser. (15 Mass.R. 347, 365.) 
And so in all cases where the right of chastisement is given by law, if 
unnecessary severity is used, an action or an indictment lies. The plaintiff in 
this case had no greater rights than those who are permitted by law to chastise 
others under their control. Admitting that the defendant gave the first blow, 
this authorized the plaintiff to resist force by force, and to disarm or disable 
his adversary; but it did not authorize an athletic, gigantic man to crush 
almost to death a little, feeble old man. There can be no manner of doubt, then, 
that had Elliott sued Brown, he would have been entitled to recover exemplary 
damages; and from former decisions, should this recovery be sustained, it is a 
bar to any action which Elliott may bring. Can the law tolerate such injustice? 
How can the plaintiff be in any better situation in the eye of the law and of 
reason by being plaintiff, than he would be in were he the defendant? If the law 
is as stated in the court below, any person who is assaulted ever so slightly, 
and that too upon his own provocation, may turn upon his assailant and beat him 
as much as he pleases without killing him, and yet recover damages from the man 
whom he has thus abused. The law is not chargeable with such injustice. It is 
true that both parties may be guilty of a breach of the peace, and may be liable 
to punishment by indictment at the suit of the people, whose laws they have both 
offended; but a civil action cannot surely be sustained by each of them against 
the other.

 [¶46.]  Similar well-defined precedent in the 
older case law is found in The 
Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore R.R. Co. v. Larkin, 47 Md. 155 
(1877). The court considered expulsion of the plaintiff "with unnecessary and reckless violence and 
indignity," id. at 163 (emphasis in original), after a dispute had developed 
about the passenger's failure to immediately produce his ticket. Even if 
plaintiff had acted with fault, the court found the railroad's responsive 
conduct justified not only the verdict which was affirmed but also punitive 
damages.

 [¶47.]  The Indiana court in Adams v. Waggoner, 33 Ind. 531, 533 
(1870) took us to Exodus 21:18, 19 in 
otherwise concluding:

If 
the appellant had been entirely without fault when the appellee attacked him, 
but in defending himself had used an excess of force, a suit for damages could 
have been maintained by the appellee for the excess, although he was the first 
in the wrong; and can it be said or held that, as to his right to recover 
damages for the cutting he received, he is placed in a worse situation by an 
agreement to fight than he would have been upon an unprovoked assault upon an 
innocent man?

 [¶48.]  In Powell v. Meiers, 54 N.D. 336, 209 N.W. 547, 548 (1926), the lady of the residence was "[r]oused to anger, * * * by the 
epithets heaped on her by the defendant, plaintiff struck him in the face with a 
hand towel, approximately 14 inches by 36 inches, which she had in her hand when 
she came out of the kitchen in response to their call." The court then 
stated:

The 
testimony is clearly sufficient to support a verdict by the jury that the 
defendant used more force than was necessary to defend himself against the 
attack made upon him by the plaintiff. We are not impressed that defendant, 
Meiers, was in such grave danger of personal harm at the hands of Mrs. Powell 
that he was justified in hitting and kicking her with the force disclosed by the 
record, or at all. A hand towel can scarcely be considered a dangerous weapon, 
and there is nothing to suggest that the defendant was a man of such timidity 
that the flourishing of a towel by a lady should fill him with alarm. If he did 
experience "more pangs and fears than wars or women have," the record does not 
suggest it.

Id. 209 N.W.  at 549.

 [¶49.]  Similarly stated in Fraguglia v. Sala, 17 Cal. App. 2d 738, 62 P.2d 783, 786-87 (1936) (quoting 4 Am.Jur., 153), the California court 
stated:

"One 
who, in acting in self-defense, uses force in excess of that which he is 
privileged to use, is liable for so much of the force used as is excessive, and 
the other person has the normal privilege of defending himself against the use 
or attempted use of excessive force. In other words, to the extent that 
excessive violence and unnecessary force is used in repelling an assault, one 
becomes liable as trespasser and subject to an action for assault and battery. 
In determining whether the particular means used is or is not excessive, the 
amount of force exerted, the means or instrument by which it is applied, the 
manner or method of applying it, and the circumstances under which it is applied 
are factors to be considered."

See also 6 Am.Jur.2d Assault and Battery § 162 (1963) for a 
summary of the law regarding excess force in repelling an attack which can 
create civil liability. Additional cases involving excessive force self-defense 
liability include Bethley v. 
Cochrane, 77 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 1955); Reber v. Sandoz, 63 So. 2d 876 (La. App. 
1953); and Jahner v. Jacob, 233 N.W.2d 791 (N.D.), cert. denied 423 U.S. 870, 96 S. Ct. 134, 46 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1975) (following Meiers and quoting 6 Am.Jur.2d, supra, §§ 161, 162 and 
163).

 [¶50.]  Discussion in a case establishing the 
interplay between the insurance coverage exclusion and negligence and 
intentional conduct is found in Allstate 
Ins. Co. v. Novak, 210 Neb. 184, 313 N.W.2d 636 (1981), where the defendant 
claimed self-defense in hitting the plaintiff in the face resulting in injury 
and related litigation. In requiring defense by the insurance carrier until 
facts of occurrence could be determined, the court said, in addition to a 
defendant's verdict on liability, that there could be "a finding that while the 
act may be unlawful it was negligent and not intentional, thereby bringing the 
act within the coverage of the policy." Id. 
313 N.W.2d  at 640. Accord Hanover Ins. 
Group v. Cameron, 122 N.J. Super. 51, 298 A.2d 715 
(1973).

 [¶51.]  The intent to injure differentiation 
between a negligent offense and an intentional offense in the insurance 
exclusion cases has continued relevance here.

Examination 
of self-defense as a concept of tort law is helpful in determining how to 
interpret an insurance policy which indemnifies against tort damages and 
contains an exclusionary clause for injuries "expected or intended" by the 
insured. In discussing the evolution of the concept of fault in tort law, 
Prosser offers some important historical insights.

"Originally 
the man who hurt another by pure accident, or in self-defense, was required to 
make good the damage inflicted. `In all civil acts,' it was said, `the law doth 
not so much regard the intent of the actor, as the loss and damage of the party 
suffering.' There was . . . a rule, undoubtedly supported by the general feeling 
in the community, that `he who breaks must pay.'"

Prosser, 
Handbook on the Law of Torts § 75 at 
492 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted). As social policy and community 
sentiment, much of this may still be true today, but modern tort law does seek 
to characterize the behavior of the actor as either blameworthy or morally 
faultless. In tort law, therefore, there is usually a need to distinguish 
between negligence and intent. This is a matter of "line 
drawing."

"* 
* * [T]he distinction between intent and negligence obviously is a matter of 
degree. Apparently the line has been drawn by the courts at the point where the 
known danger ceases to be only a foreseeable risk which a reasonable man would 
avoid, and becomes a substantial certainty."

Prosser, 
supra, § 8 at 32 (emphasis supplied) 
* * *.

Transamerica Ins. Group v. Meere, 143 
Ariz. 351, 694 P.2d 181, 186-87 (1984). For a case extending reasonable self-defense where 
excessive force was not found by the fact finder to have been used, see Travis v. Hall, 431 N.E.2d 519 (Ind. 
App. 1982).

IV. 
WYOMING CASE 
LAW

 [¶52.]  What is surprising within this entire 
discussion is that Wyoming has a case which is completely 
consistent with the entirety of the case law cited in this dissent and 
completely unnoticed in appellee's brief and the majority opinion. In Alm, 369 P.2d 216, plaintiff-insured was 
sued in a complaint which stated two causes of action, negligence and 
intentional assault. In reversing summary judgment granted to the insurance 
carrier, we stated:

If 
the petitioner in the injury case felt she might recover, even though her 
alleged injury was only the result of the insured's negligence, she was entitled 
to so plead. If she felt she could get a better recovery by pleading her injury 
was intentionally inflicted, she also had that right. The question of the 
insured's insurance coverage would not have affected the manner in which she 
voiced her minimum and maximum claim in different counts. * * 
*

* 
* * * * *

From 
what has been said, we must conclude the summary judgment of the district court 
was in error in that it failed to recognize that under the allegations of simple 
negligence contained in the first count of the injury action, the insured could 
have suffered liability from which he was entitled to be defended and 
indemnified by the company. The summary judgment of the district court is 
reversed and the case remanded with direction to enter summary judgment in favor 
of the insured on the sole issue of the company's liability and to proceed with 
the trial of the issue of the amount of damages.

Id. at 
219-20.

 [¶53.]  In comparable analysis of theory of a 
claim, we find an alternative concept in Condict v. Hewitt, 369 P.2d 278, 279 
(Wyo. 1962) 
(emphasis added):

The 
evidence as a whole was amply sufficient to have justified a conclusion on the 
part of the trial court that Condict either acted as an aggressor or used more force than was necessary for 
self-defense.

The 
judgment for plaintiff rendered by the trial court was modified and affirmed on 
appeal.

 [¶54.]  The authority used for decision by the 
majority, Tatman v. Cordingly, 672 P.2d 1286 (Wyo. 1983), fails factually to support the argument presented and in 
fact is consistent with Morris, Condict, 
Alm, Annotation, supra, 31 
A.L.R.4th 957, and the negligent assault cases which I have recited in detail. 
In Tatman, no claim on a negligence 
theory was made and that issue was not presented since only the intentional 
assault offense was litigated into a resulting defendant's verdict. However, 
even Tatman recognized that 
self-defense provided only a limit in privilege beyond which conduct can extend 
to create liability.

 [¶55.]  The majority misses the entire 
perspective by utilizing the precedent of a case that did not raise negligence 
claim issues for any authority justifying this decision. The verdict employed in 
Tatman demonstrates why in a dual 
faceted case, such as we have here, additional provisions are required to 
properly address the entire thesis presented by the litigant for court 
resolution. Here, we have failure to instruct on the theory of the case - not 
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict on a unitary theory of 
intentional assault, e.g., intended injury.

 [¶56.]  In research of other Wyoming cases, no 
inconsistency between Alm, Morris and 
Tatman can be developed. In Petsch v. Florom, 538 P.2d 1011 
(Wyo. 1975), 
we have the assault victim's successful verdict which was affirmed on the 
intentional assault complaint. See also 
Jelly v. Dabney, 581 P.2d 622 (Wyo. 1978); Glover v. Berger, 72 Wyo. 221, 263 P.2d 498 (1953) (unprovoked assault with a deadly weapon); Mahoney v. Pearce, 38 Wyo. 151, 265 P. 446 (1928) (assault with fists); Wilson 
v. Hall, 34 Wyo. 465, 244 P. 1002 (1926) (aggravated battery with fists and 
kicking); Hanson v. Shelburne, 23 Wyo. 445, 153 P. 899 (1915) (assault with a 
cane); Williams v. Campbell, 22 Wyo. 
1, 133 P. 1071 (1913) (hand assault in argument over a horse); and Yount v. Strickland, 17 Wyo. 526, 101 P. 942 (1909) (fight over ditch with excessive force in repelling assault by 
chewing on finger).

 [¶57.]  It can be concluded from a review of all 
of the Wyoming 
cases that there is no authority presented to justify forcing the litigant to 
try his case on only one of two available theories for recovery. Consequently, 
we create an anomaly which has support in neither our historical precedent nor 
the general common law of other jurisdictions.

V. 
CONCLUSION

 [¶58.]  I do not ignore the majority's reliance 
on the text of the self-defense instruction and in particular the 
reasonably-prudent-person/no-more-force criteria. Where no choice is given to 
the jury, the jury cannot and will not exercise choice. The fact of the matter 
is that the entire expanse of a negligence component in the assault and battery 
injury litigation was removed here by directed verdict.

 [¶59.]  I return to where I started in dissent in 
strong concern about the failure to give a theory of the case instruction where 
supported by any evidence and stating a viable claim or defense. Here 
particularly, where both litigants postured the issues for jury decision on that 
dual basis, the trial court should not have effectively rendered the verdict 
against Coleman by preventing consideration of each of the claims he presented 
for jury determination.

 [¶60.]  I would reverse and remand for retrial on 
the basis of a negligent assault theory of recovery in accord with the pleadings 
and trial evidence previously submitted which was then denied by the trial 
court's directed verdict foreclosing jury review.

1 In Tegtmeier, Theory of the Defense, 42 Mercer L.Rev. 
593, 593 (1991), the author explores the axiom that in a jury trial presentation 
"[w]ithout an effective theory, there is no credibility [and] [w]ithout 
credibility, the trial is but a futile exercise." This well-considered article 
relates to the criminal defense, but can equally and emphatically be applied to 
the plaintiff's tort case. If the jury or judge cannot understand where the 
trial presentation is going, they certainly cannot or will not be able to tell 
when or if ever counsel, as captain of the ship, gets there. By directed verdict 
of non-instruction, Coleman's theory of the case was decimated and the integrity 
of his status before the jury was destroyed. Following the decision of the trial 
court on denial of the second theory upon which the trial presentation had been 
centered, the case continued like a lame duck with, at best, only one wing 
remaining.

2 In total, Coleman and Strohman 
submitted ten instructions relating to Coleman's negligence theory for recovery. 
All ten were rejected by the trial court. The more comprehensive addressing both 
intentional tort and negligence as obviously submitted by Coleman followed his 
pleading and evidentiary theory of the case presentation in 
statement:

INSTRUCTION 
NO. 5

The 
Plaintiff claims he was injured through the acts of the Defendant. Specifically, 
he claims damages under two alternative theories. First, Plaintiff claims that 
the Defendant committed a battery upon him by intentionally and without his 
consent striking him in a rude, insolent or angry manner causing injury and 
damage. In the alternative, he claims that in the mistaken belief of his need to 
defend himself from Plaintiff, the Defendant negligently used excessive force to 
repel a perceived attack which resulted in Plaintiff's injuries. Defendant 
denies fault.

In 
order to prevail on this first claim (the tort commonly referred to as battery) 
the Plaintiff must prove by a greater 
weight of the evidence:

1) 
The Defendant intentionally struck Plaintiff in a rude, insolent or angry 
manner, and

2) 
Plaintiff did not consent to those acts, and

3) 
Plaintiff suffered injury and damages as a result, and

4) 
The nature and extent of Plaintiff's injuries or damages.

With 
respect to the first claim, the Defendant admits that he struck the Plaintiff, 
but contends that he did so in defense of himself. With respect to his claim of 
self defense, the Defendant must 
prove by a greater weight of the evidence:

1) 
The [D]efendant honestly and reasonably believed that under the circumstances it 
was necessary for him to use force to protect himself against an actual or 
apparent threatened harmful contact; and

2) 
The Defendant used no more force than a reasonably prudent person would have 
used under the same or similar circumstances to protect himself from the actual 
or apparent imminent contact.

You 
must first decide if the three elements of battery have been proved by 
Plaintiff, then decide if the two elements of self defense have been proved by 
the Defendant.

With 
respect to his second claim (negligence) the Plaintiff must prove by a greater weight 
of the evidence:

1) 
The Defendant negligently used excessive force to repel a perceived attack 
and,

2) 
The negligence of the Defendant caused or contributed to the injury and damages 
suffered by the Plaintiff, and

3) 
The nature extent of Plaintiff's injuries and damages.

The 
Defendant claims that his negligence was less than that of the Plaintiff. With 
respect to Defendant's claim that the Plaintiff was negligent, the Defendant must 
prove:

1) 
Plaintiff negligently provoked Defendant's acts, and

2) 
Plaintiff's negligence caused or contributed to his own injuries and 
damages.

Plaintiff 
denies that he was negligent and denies that his negligence (if any) contributed 
to his injuries.

GIVEN: 
____________ Judge

INSTRUCTION 
REQUESTED BY PLAINTIFF AND REFUSED BY THE COURT.

/s/ 
Judge

(Emphasis 
in original.)

3 Coleman cries in contention of 
violated due process in his appellate brief:

It 
is beyond dispute that prior to their confrontation, Appellee owed Appellant a 
duty. Appellee's duty was to defend himself only when justified and only by 
using reasonable force to protect his person. It is equally clear that a breach 
of that duty which proximately caused an injury to Appellant would sound in 
negligence. In the instant matter, the jury could have found that Appellee's 
instinctive reaction to whatever threat he believed Appellant posed, was not 
justified, was not reasonable, and was illustrated by the use of a degree of 
force clearly unreasonable under the circumstances. His actions, according to 
the findings of the jury, were not intentional. However, the jury's 
consideration of Appellee's liability should not have ended at that point. It 
was clear, prejudicial, reversible error for the District Court to take from the 
jury Appellant's theory of negligence, which theory had 
been:

- 
properly pleaded;

- 
never challenged by motion by Appellee;

- 
never questioned by the District Court prior to or during 
trial;

- 
tested and found to have merit following Appellee's repeated Motions for 
Directed Verdict.

4 Strohman 
testified:

A. 
When Mr. Coleman was in my face, I started to ask him if there was a problem, 
why not let the police handle it, but I did not get my question 
out.

* 
* * * * *

Q. 
* * * Now going back, you said you didn't get to finish your statement or 
question about why not letting the police handle this, what happened next in 
terms of your movement or his movement?

A. 
At that particular time when I was trying to ask a question, Mr. Coleman dropped 
his shoulder and shaking his hand, dropped his shoulder and started to swing. I 
blocked his swing with my left hand and hit him with my right 
hand.

Q. 
Okay, and you say that he dropped his hand and he dipped his shoulder, and, I 
think, you said also he was shaking his hands. You need to help me out and 
describe that for me a little better.

A. 
He dropped his shoulder and started to swing his hand, I blocked his punch and 
protected and hit him in self defense.

The 
testimony of Coleman was directly contrary in contention that he was brutally 
hit without warning. That the one punch winner had a hair-triggered proclivity 
to hit could hardly be denied on this evidence; self-defense or 
not.

5 As an abstract assessment of 
probabilities without the informed knowledge required by observation of the jury 
itself or an understanding of their attitudes and persuasions where, as here, 
voir dire is not reported, it would seem likely that the jury would have voted 
"yes" on the question and then awarded damages in something not significantly 
greater than a moderate amount.

6 The annotated case, Terrio v. McDonough, 16 Mass. App. 163, 450 N.E.2d 190 (1983), provides an interesting statement and 
footnote:

In 
response to an inquiry by the judge whether Terrio waived her right to amend her 
complaint to include a claim for injuries resulting from a negligent act of 
McDonough, in addition to the claim based on his deliberate act, Terrio's 
counsel said she did waive that 
right. Her position was resolute that the fall was not accidental, but the 
result of a purposeful push. Responding to a further question, Terrio's counsel 
said that so far as she knew the plaintiff was not going to adduce any evidence 
which would warrant recovery on a negligence theory.

2. 
Terrio kept an anchor to windward. Asked by the judge if she waived the right to 
recover on a finding of a negligent, rather than an intentional act, she 
answered that she did not waive such a right and would accept an award based on 
negligence. No negligence question was ever put to the 
jury.

Id. 450 N.E.2d  
at 193. Obviously, this is the direct opposite of what was addressed here where 
the negligent action recovery theory was directly presented in pleading and 
evidence and then denied by the trial court through directed verdict instruction 
preclusion.

7 Representative cases include Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Blakeney, 340 So. 2d 754 (Ala. 1976); Mullen v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 73 Cal. App. 3d 163, 140 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1977); Breland v. Schilling, 550 So. 2d 609 (La. 
1989); Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co. v. 
Shields, 31 Mich. App. 649, 187 N.W.2d 894 (1971); Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Sipple, 255 N.W.2d 373 (Minn. 1977) (reflex action to an anticipated assault); and State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. 
Muth, 190 Neb. 248, 207 N.W.2d 364 (1973). The intentional shooting case of 
City of Louisville v. Yeager, 489 S.W.2d 819 (Ky. 1973) is not inapposite to these citations 
and the well-defined thesis developed to differentiate between negligent conduct 
and the intentional assaultive tort.