Case Title: Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Callahan

Citation: 2017-Ohio-5700

Docket Number: 2017-0223

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2017-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Callahan, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-5700.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-5700 
CLEVELAND METROPOLITAN BAR ASSOCIATION v. CALLAHAN. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Callahan, Slip Opinion No. 
2017-Ohio-5700.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
including failing to act with reasonable diligence in representing two 
clients—Public reprimand. 
(No. 2017-0223—Submitted April 5, 2017—Decided July 6, 2017.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2016-046. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Michael William Callahan, of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0051964, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1991.  On 
October 5, 2016, relator, Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association, charged 
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Callahan with professional misconduct based on his neglect of the personal-injury 
claims of two clients. 
{¶ 2} A panel of the Board of Professional Conduct considered the cause on 
the parties’ consent-to-discipline agreement.  See Gov.Bar R. V(16). 
{¶ 3} In their consent agreement, the parties stipulate that Natasha Moore 
and her minor daughter, LaShierry Thompson-Moore, hired Callahan to represent 
them in personal-injury matters following an August 2012 automobile accident.  
Callahan had minimal contact with Moore from the time she completed her medical 
treatment in October 2012 until he submitted a demand package to an insurance 
adjuster employed by the other driver’s insurance company on May 8, 2014.  The 
insurer never made a settlement offer, and Callahan failed to file a lawsuit before 
the statute of limitations expired on Moore’s claim.  Consequently, Moore’s action 
is time barred. 
{¶ 4} Upon realizing that the statute of limitations had elapsed, Callahan 
called Moore to report his error.  He offered to pay her $1,500 for her noneconomic 
damages and to have her medical bills paid, but he did not advise her in writing that 
she should consult with independent counsel before settling her possible legal-
malpractice claim against him.  Moore accepted Callahan’s settlement offer.  
Callahan did not pay the agreed amount and failed to inform Moore that her own 
insurance company later rejected as untimely the medical bills he had submitted 
because the statute of limitations on her personal-injury claim had expired. 
{¶ 5} After Moore filed a grievance with relator, Callahan reported his 
errors to his professional-liability-insurance carrier and retained counsel.  Moore 
retained new counsel to resolve her legal-malpractice claim against Callahan.  That 
claim has been settled and paid in full. 
{¶ 6} Callahan waited two years and nine months after the accident to file a 
complaint in the Sandusky County Court of Common Pleas on behalf of Thompson-
Moore and filed it just one day before her 20th birthday—the date the statute of 
January Term, 2017 
 
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limitations would have expired.  He did not attend a scheduled pretrial conference 
even though he had received a scheduling notice.  After he failed to participate in 
another pretrial conference by telephone, the judge presiding over the case ordered 
him to appear and show cause for his absences. 
{¶ 7} In accordance with Thompson-Moore’s wishes, the judge issued an 
order for Callahan to withdraw from her case and to facilitate the transfer of the 
case file to new counsel.  But instead of withdrawing, Callahan filed a Civ.R. 41(A) 
notice of voluntary dismissal.  The court struck the notice of voluntary dismissal 
from the record and ordered Callahan to show cause why he should not be held in 
contempt for failing to abide by the court’s order to withdraw from the 
representation.  Thereafter, Callahan filed a motion to withdraw from the case and 
sent letters of explanation and apology to the judge stating that he had not meant to 
defy the court’s order to withdraw when he filed the notice of voluntary dismissal 
and a letter of apology to Thompson-Moore.  The court granted his motion to 
withdraw and dismissed the contempt charge.  Thompson-Moore retained new 
counsel, settled her personal-injury claim, and is satisfied with the settlement. 
{¶ 8} Callahan admits that his conduct in these two cases violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in 
representing a client), 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep the client reasonably 
informed about the status of a matter), and 1.8(h)(2) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
settling a potential malpractice claim without notifying the client in writing that the 
client should seek independent counsel). 
{¶ 9} The parties agree that no aggravating factors are present in this case.  
See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B).  They also stipulate that relevant mitigating factors 
include the absence of a prior disciplinary record, the absence of a dishonest or 
selfish motive, Callahan’s timely, good-faith effort to make restitution and rectify 
the consequences of his misconduct, and his full and free disclosure to relator and 
his cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings.  See Gov.Bar R. 
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V(13)(C)(1) through (4).  Additional stipulated mitigating factors include the 
absence of lasting harm to the affected clients and Callahan’s acquisition and use 
of law-practice-management software to avoid similar problems in the future. 
{¶ 10} The parties note that we have publicly reprimanded attorneys who 
have engaged in comparable misconduct and stipulate that that is the appropriate 
sanction in this case.  See, e.g., Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Bernard, 98 Ohio St.3d 
414, 2003-Ohio-1483, 786 N.E.2d 450 (publicly reprimanding an attorney who 
failed to reasonably communicate with a client and settled and dismissed a 
personal-injury case without the client’s knowledge or consent); Lorain Cty. Bar 
Assn. v. Nelson, 144 Ohio St.3d 414, 2015-Ohio-4337, 44 N.E.3d 268 (publicly 
reprimanding an attorney whose misconduct included neglecting a single client 
matter, failing to reasonably communicate with the client, and failing to deliver all 
of the papers and property to which the client was entitled upon termination of the 
representation). 
{¶ 11} The panel and the board considered three additional cases in which 
we have publicly reprimanded attorneys for comparable misconduct, see Cleveland 
Metro Bar Assn. v. Sweeney, 146 Ohio St.3d 335, 2016-Ohio-469, 56 N.E.3d 932; 
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Smith, 143 Ohio St.3d 436, 2015-Ohio-2000, 39 N.E.3d 
488; Disciplinary Counsel v. Dundon, 129 Ohio St.3d 571, 2011-Ohio-4199, 954 
N.E.2d 1186, found that the consent-to-discipline agreement conforms to Gov.Bar 
R. V(16), and recommend that we adopt the agreement in its entirety. 
{¶ 12} We agree that Callahan’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 
1.4(a)(3), and 1.8(h)(2) and that a public reprimand is the appropriate sanction for 
his misconduct.  Therefore, we adopt the parties’ consent-to-discipline agreement. 
{¶ 13} Accordingly, Michael William Callahan is hereby publicly 
reprimanded.  Costs are taxed to Callahan. 
Judgment accordingly. 
January Term, 2017 
 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, O’NEILL, FISCHER, 
and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Heather M. Zirke, Bar Counsel, and Kari L. Burns, Assistant Bar Counsel, 
for relator. 
Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder Co., L.P.A., and Joseph F. Nicholas Jr., for 
respondent. 
_________________