Case Title: State v. Maldonado. ICA Opinion, filed 06/06/2005 [pdf], 108 Haw. 446. Dissenting Opinion by J. Nakamura [pdf]. S.Ct. Order Granting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 07/12/2005 [pdf], 108 Haw. 1. S.Ct. Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, filed 12/14/2005 [pdf].

Citation: 108 Haw. 436

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2005-10-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

|

aa

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAMAIT,

~--000~

  

Lee fd ah

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appeliae,
ai
JOBERT LYLE MALDONADO, Respondent /Defendant-Appellant,,
and

KEVIN WAYNE ANTHONY and WENDY UALANI TOMIKO OKIMOTO, Defendants.

 

No. 25606

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NO. 02-1-1297)
ccTosER 14, 2005

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY DUFFY, J.
Following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of the

First Circuit, the Honorable Victoria S. Marks prt

 

Aiding,
respondent-defendant-appellant Jobert Lyle Maldonado was found

guilty of

 

(1) one count of promoting a dangerous drug in the
first degree in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS)

§ 712-1241(1) (a) (Supp. 2001);! (2) one count of promoting a

 

‘HRs § 712-1242, entitled “Promcting @ dangerous drug in the first
ree,” provides in velevant part

 

(2) A person commits the offense of pronoting # dangerous drug in
the first degree if the person knowingly:

 

id) Manufactures # dangerous drug in any anount |]
(2) Promoting 2 dangeross orug in the first deoree is class A
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

dangerous drug in the second degree, HRS.§ 712-1242(1) (b) (4)
(1993 & supp. 2001);7 (3) two counts of promoting a dangerous

drug in the third degree, HRS § 712-1243 (1993 & Supp. 20017;"

 

felony,

a) Notwithstanding any lew to the contrary, if the commission of
the offense of prometing a dangerous drug in the first degree under this
Section invelved the possession, distribution, or manufacture of
Rethanphetanine, st any of its salts, isomers, and salte of isomers, the
Person convicted shell be sentenced ¢o an inseterainate term of
Unprisonment of twenty years with a randstory minimum term of
imprisonment, the length of which shell not Be less than one year and
fot greater than ten years, st the discretion of the sentencing court
for & conviction under subsection 1(a), (1) (by oF (2) (e) and not less
than'ten years for 2 conietion under Subsection (1) (a). The person
Eonvicted shall not be eligible for parole during the mandatory term of
inprisonsent-

 

 

+ RS § 712-1242, entitled “Promoting a dangerous drug in the second
degree,” provides in velevant part:

(1) A person commits the offense of promoting # dangerous drug in
ond degree if the person knowingl:

   

(b) Foesesses one oF more preparstions, compounds, mixtures,
or substances of an aggregate weight off
Us)" cne-eignen cunce or more, containing
ethamphetanine, heroin, morphine, ‘oF cocaine or
ny of their reepective salts, isomers, and
Salts of iseners(e)

 

 

i2) Promoting s dangerous drug in the second degree is a Cl
felony.

i3) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, if the comission of
tthe offense of promoting a dangerous drug in the second cegree under
this section involved the possession or distribution of methamphetamine,
Of any of its oalts, isomers, and salts of isomers, the person convicted
Shall be sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of ten years
‘ith a mandatory minimum tere of imprisonment, the length of which shall
Ee'not less than six months and not greater than five years, at the
Siecretion of the sentencing court. The person convicted shall not be
Gligible for parele during the mandatory term of imprisonment

 

 

> ns § 722-2243, entitled “Promoting a dangerous drug in the third
degree,” provide:

 

(2) A person commits the offense of promoting @ dangerous drug in
the third degree if the person knowingly possesses eny dengerous drug in
any amount

(2) Promoting 6 dangerous drug in the third degree is 2 Class C

felony.
2) Notwithstanding any lew to the contrary, if the comission of
(cont ined.

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

and (4) one count of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia,
HRS § 329-43.5 (1993).‘ On June 6, 2005, the Intermediate Court
of Appeals (ICA) issued a published opinion vacating the cizcuit
court’s January 24, 2003 judgment and remanding for further
proceedings. State v. Maldonado, No. 25606 (Haw. App. June 6,
2005) (hereinafter, ICA Opinion]. The State of Hawai'i
(hereinafter, the prosecution] subsequently applied for a writ of
certiorari to review the ICA Opinion.

We granted the prosecution's application for a writ of
certiorari for two purposes: first, to address the following
question raised by the prosecution -- whether HRS § 603-11

(1993),* the so-called “knock-and-announce” rule, may be

 

(continued)
the offense of promoting # dangerous drug in the third degree under this
Section savolved the possession cr distribution of methamphetamine, the
Person convicted shall be sentenced to an indeterminate term of
Exprisonment of five years with a mandatory minimum term of

fit, the length of which shall be net less than chixcy days and
jer than twovand-ashalf years, at the discretion of the
Sentencing court. The person convicted shall not be eligible for parole
Garing the mandatory term of imprisonment.

 

    

+ wns § 329-43.5, entitled “Prohibited acts related to drug
paraphernalia,” provides

(a) 1 4s unlawtel for any peraon to use, oF to possess with intent te
use, drug parephernalis to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare,

analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, snge:
of otherwise introduce into the hunan body a controlled substance in
violation of this chapter. Any person who Violates this section is,
guilty of a class © felony and upon conviction may be imprisoned
Pursuant to section 706-660 and, if appropriate aa provided in section
506-641, fined pursuant to section 706-600.

      

 

RS 603-11, entitled “Entering house to arrest,” provides:

Wnenever it is necessary to enter # house to arrest an offender, and
(cont Inve...)

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

satisfied by substantial compliance. For the reasons stated by
the ICA and adopted herein, we agree that, based on the facts of
this case, where the police opened a closed screen door and broke
the threshold of Maldonado’s dueling prior to announcing that
they bore an arrest warrant and without waiting for 2 reasonable
time after demanding entry, #RS § 803-11 was violated, with the
consequence that the subsequent search of Maldonado’'s home and
seizure of evidence therefrom were invalid. Second, although we
agree with the ICA’s application of HRS § 803-11, we also granted
certiorari to notice error in the ICA’s analysis of the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting Maldonade’s convictions in
Light of the illegal search and seizure. Because there was
insufficient admissible evidence to support his conviction on any
of the counts, we now vacate the ICA Opinion in part and remand
the case to the circuit court for entry of a judgment of

acquittal.

+1. -continued)

entrance 1s refused, the officer or person making the arrest may force
Gn entrance by breaking doors or other barriers. But before breaking
ny door, the officer or person shall firse demand entrance ine loud
voice, and state thet the officer or person is the bearer of a warrant
Sf seresty or if it is ine case in wnich arrest is lawful withoot
warrant, the officer or person shel) substantial
Information in an audible voice

 

 

 

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

1. BACKGROUND
Because it is not necessary to address any dispute

regarding the substantive facts, this court adopts the following

 

factual background set forth in the ICA Opinion:

(on June 25, 2002, the State charged Maldonado with five
counts relating to contraband. Maldonado filed his Motion to

Suppress Evidence (Wotion to Suppress) on August 7, 2002, asking
that “all evidence obtained ar s result of an silegel seizore and
fearch of the Defendant's residence” be suppressed. Hearings on

the motion took place on August 22, Septenber 5, and Septenber 16,
2002.

 

 

Atvthe hearings, Deputy Sheriff Cayetano’ (Cayetano)
testified that on June 10, 2002 he was contacted by the Honoluly
Police Department (HPD) recarding 2 tip HPD.had received on the
whereaboute of one of Hawaii's mest wanted fugitives, Rebert,
Maldonado (Robert], Maldonedo’s brother. The tipster provided
Information that Robert was at Maldonado’ s hone and thee. firearms
and drugs might be present. Police officers, including Officer
Yosenor (Yosenori) and Officer Pagan (Pagan), went to Maldonado’s
residence to assist Cayetanc in executing the arrest warrant for
Robert. Bese on Sober='s status as “nost-wantes,” the officers
Were armed and had oh bullet-proof vests. The officers approached
the house, and Cayetanc could see that the lights were on, the
exterior screen dost was closes, and the interior wooden door was
open.

 

 

 

Cayetano had his gun unhclstered and to his side. Cayetano
testified that he simulraneousiy knocked on and opened the screen
door and “announced, “Sheriff's Office, Police.” it was only
‘after Cayetano knocked and opened the screen door that Re asked if
he could enter and stated that he had a "retake warrant.”

Cayetano testified when he opened the screen door, he looked into
the house and ic war possible that a portion of his opper body
Erossed the threshold of the house, but he did not enter the
house. After Cayetano opened the door, he saw Maldonado, Wendy
Okimoto (Okimote}, and Kevin Wayne Anthony (Arthony)* in’a back
Yoon. The three individuals in the back room looked in the
direction of the officers

 

 

* Although the TCA opinion called into question the circuit court's
factual fingings regarding the precise sequence of events leading to the
search of Maldenade’s hone, we, like the ICA, decline to express an opinion as
to whether those findings are clearly erroneous because we agree with the ICA
that, even on the facts as found, the circuit court's conclusions cf law
regarding the motion to suppress were erroneous

 

co-defendants Wendy Okincto and Kevin Mayne Anthony were charged with
the sane first four counts ao Jobert Maldonado (Maldonado), but they were
acquitted of al counts. (Footnote in ICA Opinion.)
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

Cayetano testified that he said(,) “serift's office,
police: is Robert here?” and Maldonado said(,] “Wo.” Cayetano
Eestified that he asked, "Oo you mind us coming in? We’ Fe locking
for Robert," and Msidenade said, "Yeah, yeah, yeah." The officers
then entered the house. Cayetano asked Maldonado if he was the
Dune of the place, and Maldonado said yee. Cayetano testifies
thet he Anstructes Maldonado, Okinoto, and Anthony £0 exit the
house for safety reagcna and’ wait cutaide with other polite
Ditivers; Haldonads, Okimote, and Anthony left che novee.

 

   

‘Yosenori testified that he knocked on the screen door, saw
tthe screen door wee unlocked, and then opened the screen door
‘hile announeing{,] “Police and sheriffs,” Yosenori testified
That he opened che screen door becsuse he could see people in the
house through the screen dooty but did not “have a good picture”
Of their movenents, "like if snyone might have Been pulling out a
Weapon or something.” Yosenori stated that the screen door opened
Outward and he had his back against the door holding 1t open snd
fied one fost on the platform in front of the door and one foot on
the Gooreiil. Yosenori hea his wespon cut, but he was holding it
Soun toward the ground. Yosenori testified that Cayetano told the
people to cone out of che Feo

There. Neldonado said no. Yosenori asked who lived ther:
Ualdenado said he did. Youenori asked Maldonado if he was
Rebert’s brother, snd Maldonado said yes. Yosenori testified that
Cayeteno asked if they could go inside and look for Robert, anc
Naldonado sai “yeah.”

 

  

 

Yosenori testified that he entered the house first and went
into the closest room, but found no one in the room. He then went
fo the back room from’ which Maldonado, Okimote, and Anthony had
exited. Yosencri noticed that “right oot in the open in the
iddle of the flocr” there were three glass pipes with residue
{aside Based on Yosenori’s experience and training, he believed
the pipes were used to snoke rethanphetanine, Yosenori also found
a'giass dish with sone crystal substance inside, a can of acetone,
and 2 box of Baking soda. Following procedure, Yosenori notified
the harcotice division clandestine Lab te

 

  

 

pagan testified that six or seven officers approsched the
house. The officers secured the perineter of the house, and
Pagan, Cayetano, and Yosenori went to the front door. As the
Officers spproached the house, Pagan was holding a shotgun towards
the hosse. While ne was standing behind Cayetano and Yosenor! at
the front door, he held the shotgun pointed downward. Pagan
testified that when Cayetano esked Maldonado if Robert was there,
Maldonado aneweres no. Cayetano then asked Maldonado if they
Could “make entry into the residence to mske sure that [Robert]
sen’ there.” Yosenori asked the same question. Pagan testified
thet he heard Maldonado answer yes to the officers’ questions:
After the officers entered the Meuse, Fagan raised his shotgun
but he dig not point i at Maldonado, Okimoto, and Anthony. Pagan
testified thet firearms were found by the police "on the side of
the noose.”

 

 

 

Maldonado testified that on June 10, 2002, he was with
Okimote and Anthony in a room in his house when'he Neard "one Loud
noise thet said oh, everybody, get cut of the room.” He stated

 

‘
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

 

that by the time he cane out from the back room, the police were
Sright inside my decrway already; in fact, they were pretty much
snaide my house." The police hed their gins out and one officer
hag 2 rifle pointing in the general directicn of Meldonedo,
Okinote, and Anthony. Maldonado claimed he felt threatened and
Scared because of the presence of the police and their firearms,
even though no one sade any verbal threats.  Meldonsdo testifies
that when the police asked whether they could look for Robert,
Maléonase said{,] “I guess[,)” or “yeah,” agreeing with the
request.

 

 

 

The circuit court denied Maldonade's Notion to Suppress and
issued its "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Orger Denying
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence” on November 12, 2002.
‘The circuit court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were
3s follows!

 

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On une 10, 2002, the Department of Public Safety and
the Honeiuiu Police Department acted ona tip that
parcle violator, Robert Maldonado (defendant JOBERT
EALoo\abo's brother) was currently st an apartment at
1706A Apaki Street.

2. A Sheriff's deputy and Honolulu Police Department
Seficers were in possession of an arrest warrant
Guthorizing then fo arrest Robert Maldonado; and when
the officers went to that address they confronted
Sefendant JOSERT MALDONADO.

 

3. According to the information given to the officers,
Firearms were purported to be present. at the premises
where Robert Noldonado had bean reported, Which Ww
Gefendant JOSERT MALDONADO" © reeigence.

 

4. hen they approached the premises where Robert
Maldonado was reported tobe, one or more officers
knocked on the door, announced thelr presence and
office (both the police and the sheriff) and denanded
Gntzyi then one oF nore officers pare daily entered the
Enent door of defendant HALDONADO's residence, by
Opening a screen door outward and crossing the
threshold with part of one officer's body.

 

5. The wooden interior door had been open before the

officers arrived at the premises, and the officers
Could see through the screen door te. the interior of
the residence before opening the screen door.

 

6. The officers asked defendant JOBERT MALDONADO if
Robert Maldonado was present, but when defendant
MALDONADO told them Robert was not there, the officers
asked to check the premises anyway.

7. Defendant MALDONADO gave the officers permission to
Check the premises st which tine the officers entered,
and once inside they saw what appeared to be &
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

“elandestine 1ab" used for the production of
ethanphetanine.

©. Also chsezved within the residence were the two other
Covdefendents, KEVIN WAYNE ANTHONY ana WENOY UALANT
‘TEMIKO OKINOTO, who hag both exited the room where the
Purported clandestine iab was found.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAK

1. The officers who approached defendant MALDONADO were
in compliance with § 804-11 [sic] HRS requirements to
knock snd announce their office, and demand entry
before forcibly entering the promises to execute a

warrant of arrest. Seal,] gail) State vs larads, 98
Haw(ari ) 16(, 41 p.3a 174} (2002) -

2." Im addition to satisfying the “knock and Announce”
rule, the officers in this case also obtained
permission from defendant JOBER! MALDONADO to enter
the premises to search for Robert Maldonadc.

3. Even 4 the officers had not met the requirements of
the "Knock and Announce” rule, the officer's [etc]

    

premises constituted an exigent circumstance
Justifying entry into the residence.

4. Concerning discovery of egutpnent suspected of being a
Scvcslied “clandestine lap" ang other contraband
Gbserved by the officers, once the officers were
properly in the residence, observation of these
Rateriale was proper snd allowable as the evidence wae
Gn “open view.” State vy Stachlex, 56 Haw. 412, 570
Pid i323] (2577)

 

Following the circuit court’s oral denial of
Maldonado’ s motion to suppress on September 16, 2002, the case
proceeded to trial, and on Novenber 8, 2002, Maldonado was found
guilty by the jury on all five counts alleged in the complaint.
On January 24, 2003, the circuit court entered a final written
judgment sentencing Maldonado to an indeterminate term of varying
length for each count, the sentences to be served concurrently

but with a mandatory minimum of two and a half years.
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

Maldonado appealed on January 28, 2003 and the case vas,
assigned to the ICA. Maldonado argued, inter alia, that the
circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress and in
denying his motions for a judgment of acquittal. The ICA agreed
in part, and on June 6, 2005, issued a published opinion vacating
the judgment of conviction and sentence and remanding for further.
proceedings.

In its ppinion, the ICA found that the entry of
Maldonado’s hone was in violation of HRS § 803-11 and, thus, that
the cizeuit court had erred in denying Maldonado’s motion te
suppress the evidence collected as a result of the subsequent
illegal search and seizure. The ICA found, however, that there
was substantial evidence in the record to support Maldonado! #
convictions and that the circuit court’s denial of his motions
for acquittal was therefore not error. Specifically, the ICA
relied on the following evidence as being sufficient to support
Maldonado’'s conviction on each count: (1) contraband found in
the back corner rooms (2) the fact that Maldonado lived at the
residence and had control of the house; (3) the fact that
Maldonado was witnessed exiting the room where drugs and
contraband were found; (4) a pipe with the initials “JM” found in
the back room; and (5) methamphetamine found in Maldonado’ s pants

pocket.
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

The prosecution filed an application for a writ of
certiorari challenging the ICR’s conclusion with respect to the
legality of the police entry into Maldonado’s home. In its :

application, the prosecution argued that the entry, as well as
the subsequent search and se{zure, was valid for any or all of

the following reasons: (1) the police substantially complied

 

with the “knock-and-announce” rule; (2) the possible presence of
firearms at Maldonado’s home constituted exigent circumstances
such as to excuse the police from compliance with the “knock-and-
announce” rules (3) Maldonado consented to the search; and (4)
the drug paraphernalia and other items of evidence were found in
plain view. The ICA rejected these arguments as follows: (1)

the police violated the “knock-and-announce” rule, HRS $ 803-11,

 

by (a) failing to announce that they bore an arrest warrant
before “breaking” Maldonado’s door, and (b) failing to wait a
reasonable time after demanding entry and before breaking

Maldonade's door; (2) the possible presence of fir

 

rms, without
more, did not constitute exigent circumstances excusing non-
compliance with HRS § 803-11; (3) Maldonado’s consent to the

police search of his home was based on duress and was also the

 

* Ag the ICA noted, “breaking” as used in HRS § 803-11 is a term of art
and does not imply or require the use of any physical force beyond thet
[Evolved fn opening @ closed but unlocked door. Harada, 9© Hawai'i at 22, 41
Pod ot 1767 Seate vy Dixon, 63 Howal' 13, 16, 920 F.2d 261, 186 (2396)

20

 

 

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

been in plein view but for the sile58) entry By the police.

We granted the prosecstion's application tor
Inpcoperiy relied on the very evidence obtained a» reslt of

‘Il. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Motion to Suppress

givclisira samamiiimn tents Seige
State v. Anderson, 84 Hawai'i 462, 467, 935 P.2d 1007, 1012
(907) (cltattone, embasen, and internal quotation signta
was ‘right’ or ‘wrong’.” State v, Kaubi, 86 Hawai'i 195, 197,

948 P.2d 1036, 1038 (1997).

un
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence/Judgment of Acquittal

[Evidence adduced in the trial court must be considered in the
strongest light for the prosecuticn when the appellate court,
passes on the legal suéficiency of such evidence to support @
Conviction; the Sane standard applies whether the case was before
S'Judge or Jury. The cest on appeal ie not whether guilt, ss
Established beyond 2 reasonable doubt, but whether there was
Substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of
fet

 

 

 

 

State v. Richie, 88 Hawai'i 19, 33, 960 P.2d 1227, 1241 (1998)
(quoting State v, Quitog, 85 Hawai'i 128, 145, 936 P.2d $59, 576
(1997). “‘Substantial evidence’ as to every material element of
the offense charged is credible evidence which is of sufficient
quality and probative value to enable @ person of reasonable
caution to support a conclusion.” Richie, 88 Hawai'i at 33, 960

P.2d at 1241 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

 

‘The standard to be applies by
notion for a judgment of acquiteal 18 whether, pon the evidence
USewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution snd in fell,
Fecognition of the province of the trier of fact, a reasonable
hnind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. An
Gppellote court employs the sane standard of review

State v. Keawe, 107 Hawai'i 1, 4, 108 P.3d 304, 307 (2005)
(brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Pong, 78 Hawai'i 262, 265,
892 P.2d 455, 458 (1995)).

TIT. pIscussoN
A. The Circuit Court Erred When It Denied Maldonado’ s Motion to

5 “caus onclu e Police

Home and Seiure of Evidence Therefrom Were Tlleaal.
‘The ICA concluded that “[bJecause the [HPD and

trial court in reling upon

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sheriff's Department] officers failed to follow the mandate of
HRS § 803-11 and illegally entered Maldcnado’s home, the items

2
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

seized as [a] result of the illegal entry should have been
suppressed." We hereby affirm this conclusion and adopt the
reasoning set forth in Section III.A of the ICA Opinion. Rather
than repeat the ICA's analysis in full, we will review two key
points in the ICA Opinion, as well as make a third point of our
1. The Police Violated HRS § 803-11 By Failing to Announce

That They Were Bearers of an Arrest Warrant Before

Breaking the Door of Maldonado’ s Dwelling.

As the ICA noted, this court has previously stated that
the requirement in HRS § 803-11 that law enforcement announce
that it is the bearer of an arrest warrant prix to “breaking any

door” is not to be taken lightly. Dixon, @3 Hawai'i at 17, 924

 

P.2d at 185, Here, the circuit court found that the police: (1)

 

knocked on the screen door: (2) announced their presence and
demanded entry: (3) opened the screen doors and then (4)
partially entered the house. Although the circuit court did not
make any express written findings with respect to whether the
police announced their purpose (i.e, that they had come to
execute @ retake warrant for Robert Maldonado) before opening the
screen door, the record demonstrates, as the ICA noted, that they
did not do so until after the four events above had already
transpired. By failing to state that they bore a warrant prior

to opening the screen door, the police violated HRS § 803-11.

3
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

2. The Police Also Violated HRS § 803-11 By Failing to
Wait a Reasonable Time After Demanding Entry Before
Breaking the Door of Maldonado’ s Dwelling.

As the ICA also noted, law enforcement must wait a
reasonable time after demanding entzy before breaking the door.
See State v, Garcia, 77 Hawai'i 461, 469, 687 P.2d 671, 678 (App.
1995) (ten-second delay insufficient under HRS § 803-37"). Here
again, the circuit court did not enter any written finding, but
the evidence in the record as to the length of time between the
demand for entry and the opening of the screen door demonstrates,
as the ICA noted, that the two events were essentially
simultaneous, We therefore concur with the ICA and hold that the
police violated HRS § €03-11 by failing, prior to breaking the
screen door of Maldonado’s house, to (1) state that they were
bearers of an arrest warrant, and (2) wait a reasonable tine

after demanding entry. Accordingly, the ICA was correct in

* HRs § 203-37 (1993), the companion statute to HRS § 603-11, sets forth
‘the knock-and-announce rule with respect to the execution of search warrants
as opposed to arrest warrants), ond provides in pertinent part: “If the
doors are shut the officer must declare the officer's office and the officer's
Dusiness, and denand entrance. If the doors, gates, or other bars to the
fentrance ere not inesistely opened, the officer may break then.” This court
has previously trestes both statutes similarly, and we consider then jointly
for present purposes az well, See Wazada, 98 awai't at 29, 41 P.3d at 185
(preferring & reading that avoide necneruity between the two statutes}; State
wtlenekt, $2 Hawai 562, 65, 993 P.2a 1291, 2194 (2000) (wAltheugh the
Tenguege, of as $6 802-12 and €03-37 differs, ‘the purposes of the “knock and
announce’ rule are identical in each context |.]*)

 

 

 

 

 

 

a
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

concluding that the circuit court erred in denying Maldonado’ s
motion to suppress."

3. The Doctrine of Substantial Compliance Contravenes the
Plain Language of BRS § 803-11.

In addition to noting our agreement with the ICA, we
now address a doctrinal point. Both the prosecution and the ICA

dissent contend that the validity of the search and seizure

 

should be analyzed under a “doctrine of substantial compliance”
(Le., a lack of ‘strict compliance with the terms of HRS § 803-11
should not warrant suppression of subsequently obtained evidence
Af the purposes of the statute are not offended). This
contention is without merit.

First, our prior case law contains no reference to
substantial compliance: rather, it establishes that the knock-
and-announce rule must be strictly followed. For example, in
Harada, we held that “the requirements of the knock and announce
rule are not met when police officers fail to orally demand

entry, and a demand of entry cannot be implied from simply

% We also agree with the ICA thet neither Maldonado’ e consent nor the
‘plain view" doctrine excuses the failure of the police to comply with #RS S
863-11 because both were premised on, and the fruit of, the prior illegal
entry. See State t. Pau, 72 Faw. 505, 508-10, 824 P.2d 893, £35-36 (1982)
(defendant's waiver of constitutional rights is invalid where induced by
iflegai search); State v. Phillipe, 67 Haw. 535, 541, 696 P-24 246, 351” (1985)
(A search is not to be mace 1egel by what it turns up.” (Citation, quotation
harks, and brackets omittea.)]. Finally, we agree thet the possibie presence
Of firearms does not constitute an exigent’ circumstance suspending, excusing,
Of otherwise obviating lew enforcenent's duty to comply with HiRE # 803-11,
where, as here, it does not require an innediate response "to prevent ininent
Ganger to life or serious danage to property, or to forestall the likely
escape of 2 suspect or the threstened renovel or destruction of evidence.”

Statevs Lloyd, 61 Haw. 505, £12, 606 P.2d 913, 918 (1980).

 

  

 

 

   

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

‘Police, search wi +" 98 Hawai'i at 29, 41 P.3d at
185. (Emphasis added.) Significantly, we held that law
enforcement must explicitly make a demand for entry even though
it would be reasonable to infer that if law enforcement officials
standing at the entry to a residence state, “Police, search
warrant,” then it follows that they wish to enter the residence
to execute the warrant. Thus, given that we have previously
found a violation of the knock-and-announce rule where law
enforcement could be deemed to have substantially complied, the
ICA majority in this case correctly rejected the argument that
“substantial compliance” with HRS § 803-11 is legally sufficient
in the absence of exigent circumstances. To remove any remaining
doubt, we now expressly reject the doctrine of substantial
compliance because it violates the plain language of the statute.
To employ the substantial compliance analysis in a
statutory reconstruction of what is plain and unambiguous in HRS
§ 803-11 would infringe on the legislature's prerogatives in our
governmental system of separation of powers. It is true that
both the fourth amendent to the United States Constitution and
article I, section 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution require only

that a search or seizure must be r

 

sonable. See Dixon, 63

% the constitutional analysis is relevant because, although the ICA
dissent ie packaged in terme cf “substantial compliance,” its contents are
Simply the view thet law enforcement in this case acted reasonably under the
circumstances

 

1
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

Hawai'i at 22-24, 924 P.2d at 190-92 (noting that the common-law
“knock-and-announce” principle is part of the constitutional
reasonableness inquiry and quoting with approval Wilson v.
Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995), for the proposition that not
“every entry must be preceded by announcement” because the
“Fourth Anendnent’s flexible requirement of reasonableness”
allows consideration of “countervailing law enforcement
interests”). See also Richards v, Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394
(1997) (whether failure to comply with a common-law knock-and-
announce rule when executing a warrant will be excused depends on
whether compliance was reasonable under the circumstances of a
Given case). However, where the legislature has enacted a valid
statute that provides greater protection than the constitution,
conformance to the statutory mandate, and not the lower
reasonableness standard set forth by the state or federal
constitution, is required. Harada, 98 Hawai'i at 49-50, 41 P.3d
at 206 (Acoba, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Because the statute thus affords greater protection than the

 

constitution, the constitutional reasonableness inquiry is not

implicated. Accordingly, we find no room in the knock-

 

© We caution, however, that in requiring strict compliance with HRS §
803-11 we do not mean to repudiate our prior case law using the constitutional
Feasonsbleness standaré as 3 aupnfiller (je, using reasonableness to
determine whether law enforcement has in fect’ strictly complied with the
Statute where the plain languege of the statute is silent}. For example,
neither HRS § 603-11 nor HRS § 803-37 states exactiy how long law enforcement
Hust wait efter announcing its presence before areaking a door. Accordingly,
(continued. --)

 

7
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

and-announce statute for the doctrine of substantial compliance:
to limit the protection afforded by HRS § 803-11 with such an
overlay would violate the express language of the statute and be

incompatible with this jurisdiction's viable and controlling

precedents.
B. The Circuit Court Erred in Denying Maldonado’s Motions for
Sudgnent oi

vs 3 Support
Although the ICA correctly ruled that the evidence
seized from Maldonado’s hone as @ result of the illegal entry
should have been suppressed, it then erroneously relied on that
same evidence to conclude that “substantial evidence existed to
support a11 of the convictions, and the circuit court did not err
in denying Maldonado’ s motions for judgment of acquittal.” This
court has previously held that “[a)ssuming an unreasonable search
or seizure, any evidence derived therefrom is inadmissible in a
criminal prosecution, and a conviction obtained thereby must be
reversed.” State v. wallace, 80 Hawai'i 382, 393, 910 P.2d 695,
706 (2996) (internal citations, quotation marks, and ellipsis
omitted). However, this court in Wallace went further and held
not only that such a conviction must be reversed, but that, “for

purposes of determining whether the double jeopardy clause of

 

BU, -continued)
he court

law enforcement
abe, 867 Po2d Y sexasa,
5. Concurring in part and dies

whether, under the circumstances of the given case,

bie amount of time. Garcda, 17 Nawai'd at
Hawai's at 50-1, 41 F-3d- st 206-07 (Acaba,
ting in part)

      
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

article I, section 10 (of the Hawai'i Constitution) precludes
retrial of a defendant whose conviction has been set aside
because of insufficient evidence, . . . sufficiency of the
evidence is reviewed based only on the evidence that was properly
admitted at trial.”? Wallace, 80 Hawai'i at 414 n.30, 910 P.2d
at 727 n.30 (emphasis in original). See also whiting v. State,
88 Hawai'i 356, 359 n.2, 966 P.2d 1082, 1085 n.2 (1998) (citing
Wallace for the proposition that material elements of the charged
offense or offenses must be supported by substantial and
admissible evidence).

Here, as the ICA correctly concluded, 211 evidence
obtained as 2 result of the illegal search and seizure of
Naldonado’'s home should have been suppressed and thus was not
properly admitted at trial. As set forth above, however, the ICA
nevertheless relied on the following evidence as being sufficient
to support Maldonado’ s conviction on each count: (1) contraband

found in the back corner room: (2) the fact that Maldonado lived

 

© Tt bears emphasis that this court in 0 holding relied solely on the
greater protections afforded under article 1, section 10 of the Hawal't
Sonstitution, as opposed to the protections provides under the fifth amendment
to the United States Constitution. wallace, 60 Howai's at 413 0.29, 1¢ 1.30,
Sto Pezd at 126 n.23, 12) 0-30. in Mallace, we expressly declined to follow
Surks y, United Giateg, 4370.5. 1 (1976), shich held that the fifth amendnent
Soc net ber the appellate court from considering inaduissible evidence in
Geciding whether retrial is permitted. id, at 1é-17. See also

Melson, a68 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) ("re is quite clear from Our opinion in
Eizis “hat 2 reviewing court must consider all of the evidence samitted by the
FLEE Score in deelding whether retrial 19 permissible under the Double
Jeopardy Clause."), Accordingly, we reject the ICA's application of Wallace
in 39 Hawaii 213, 218-19, 83 P.3d 1198, 1203-04 (App. 2001)
(holding that eliace allows the appellate court to consider inadmissible
evidence in measuring sufficiency)

    

 

 

 

9
 

* FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

at the residence and had control of the house; (3) the fact that
Maldonado was witnessed exiting the room where drugs and
contraband were found; (4) 2 pipe with the initials “JM” found in
the back room; and (5) methamphetamine found in Maldonado’ s pants
pocket. Because all of that evidence was discovered subsequent
to and as @ result of the illegal entry and thus was
inadmissible, it should not have been relied upon in measuring
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the convictions.
Moreover, because it does not appear upon review of the record
that there was any other, admissible evidence against Maldonado,
the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction
on any of the counts. Therefore, jeopardy attached, and he may
not be retried.“ Consequently, the circuit court erred in
denying Maldonado’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.
TV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the ICA Opinion with

espect to Sections I, II, and III.A, but vacate with respect to

 

hs in Wallace, we again emphasize that in those cases uhere there
remains substantisl, sdnissible evidence to support @ conviction, jeopardy
Goes not attach ond’ the appropriate appellate remedy is not to direct entry of
fo Judgment of acquittal, bat instesd to vacate the conviction and renand for e
new trial. gee 80 Wawai's at 414 n.30, 810 P.2d at 127 n.30
laistinguishing between reversel for trial error and reversal for evidentiary
inswfficiency:

 

  

  

   

 

20
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

Sections III.B and IV. Accordingly, we remand this case to the

circuit court for entry of a judgment of acquittal.

on the wri
Ryan Yeh, Gi
Deputy Prosecuting .
Attorney, for petitioner/ Mic Delhorinnn~
plaintift-appellee
State of Hawas's Seeds ame

Jack Schweigert
for respondent /defendant- ou T
appellant Jobert Lyle C Am
Maldonado

Yartns, Digs Ore