Case Title: Commonwealth v. Simon

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11666

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-04-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11666 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  WALLY JACQUES SIMON. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     January 11, 2019. - April 10, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Robbery.  Constitutional Law, 
Assistance of counsel, Burden of proof, Double jeopardy.  
Practice, Criminal, Capital case, New trial, Assistance of 
counsel, Cross-examination by prosecutor, Presumptions and 
burden of proof, Duplicative convictions, Double jeopardy. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 13, 2007. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Maynard M. Kirpalani, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on June 20, 2016, was heard by 
him. 
 
 
 
Jennifer H. O'Brien for the defendant. 
 
Emily K. Walsh, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  A jury convicted the defendant, Wally Jacques 
Simon, of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-
2 
 
 
murder for the killing of Christopher Barbaro (Christopher).1  We 
consolidated the defendant's direct appeal with his appeal from 
the denial of his motion for a new trial.  On appeal, the 
defendant contends that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel; the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof 
during cross-examination of a witness for the defendant; and the 
double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution was violated when he was convicted of and 
sentenced for felony-murder as well as the predicate offenses of 
armed home invasion and armed robbery. 
 
For the reasons stated infra, we vacate the defendant's 
underlying felony conviction of armed robbery as duplicative, 
affirm the defendant's remaining convictions, and affirm the 
denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial.  After a 
thorough review of the record, we also decline to exercise our 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to grant a new trial or to 
reduce or set aside the verdict of murder in the first degree. 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts that the jury could 
have found, reserving pertinent facts for the discussion of the 
defendant's arguments.  On October 24, 2007, at approximately 
                     
 
1 The defendant was also convicted of armed robbery, armed 
home invasion, assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon, and carrying a firearm without a license. 
3 
 
 
12:30 A.M., Christopher's brother, Bryan Barbaro (Bryan),2 heard 
loud bangs and "some fumbling around" in the apartment below his 
own.  The apartment was occupied by Christopher.  Bryan went 
downstairs to investigate the loud noises and found his brother 
on the ground "flailing . . . trying to get air."  Bryan went to 
call for help, but was confronted by the defendant who was 
attempting to leave the apartment with a bag of money and rare 
coins.3  The defendant shot Bryan and a struggle ensued.  During 
the struggle, the bag carrying the coins ripped open and coins 
scattered on the floor.  The defendant fled the scene in a dark 
sport utility vehicle (SUV). 
 
Bryan and Christopher had been friends of the defendant.  
Bryan had met the defendant at a local gym where the defendant 
exercised, and periodically, the defendant had worked for 
Bryan's construction company.  Bryan had introduced the 
defendant to Christopher, and eventually, the defendant had 
supplied marijuana to Christopher, who was a marijuana dealer.  
Bryan testified that he had known the defendant for about seven 
                     
 
2 We refer to the victims by their first names for the sake 
of clarity. 
 
 
3 The victim had an extensive coin collection that he kept 
in a safe in his apartment. 
 
4 
 
 
years.4  The defendant also had been to Bryan and Christopher's 
residence. 
 
After the defendant fled, Bryan went to his apartment to 
call 911.  During the telephone conversation with the emergency 
dispatcher, Bryan stated that he recognized the assailant as 
"Wally," who worked out at a local gym.  He also recounted the 
events of the shooting, gave a physical description of the 
assailant, and described the vehicle he drove -- a black SUV. 
 
When police arrived, they observed a twenty dollar bill on 
the street in front of the house.  Inside the house, police 
noticed coin books and various paper currency scattered on the 
stairway leading up to the second floor.  The lock to the door 
of Christopher's apartment was broken.  Inside his apartment, 
police found Christopher dead from a gunshot wound to the head.  
There were multiple spent .25 caliber shell casings on the 
floor.  On the third floor, police discovered Bryan lying on the 
couch with a gunshot wound to the chest.  He was slipping in and 
out of consciousness.  Bryan reiterated to the responding 
officers that Wally was the shooter. 
                     
 
4 Prior to trial, Bryan passed away from an unrelated 
illness.  His grand jury testimony was read into the record at 
trial.  Both the prosecution and defense agreed in a joint 
motion to admit the complete grand jury testimony and the 
entirety of Bryan's 911 call.  The defendant was subjected to a 
colloquy with the judge to ensure that he understood that his 
attorney strategically chose to allow what normally would have 
been inadmissible hearsay. 
5 
 
 
 
Police immediately obtained the defendant's address from 
the local gym, located the defendant, and began to surveil him.  
The defendant was driving a dark SUV.  Police followed the 
defendant to downtown Boston and approached him once he got out 
of his vehicle.  Trooper Michael Banks of the State police 
stated that he wanted to talk to the defendant and pat frisked 
him while other officers stood nearby on the sidewalk.  The 
defendant responded that he was speaking with his attorney on 
his cellular telephone (cell phone) and did not want to talk to 
police until meeting with his attorney.5  Soon thereafter, 
attorney Daniel Solomon came out to the street and approached 
the officers.6  Banks said to Solomon, "There was an incident in 
Winchester last night, and we want to talk to [the defendant] 
about it."  Solomon informed Banks that he and the defendant 
would return to his office and that Solomon would notify police 
whether the defendant would speak with them.  Banks gave Solomon 
his cell phone number, and waited with the other five or six 
officers downstairs for approximately one hour. 
                     
 
5 At trial, the jury were informed that the defendant had 
arranged an appointment with his attorney, Daniel Solomon, a few 
days prior to discuss another criminal matter.  The jury also 
heard that Solomon worked on a wide range of civil cases, 
including construction matters. 
 
 
6 Solomon did not represent the defendant at trial; he 
testified on behalf of the defendant as to what took place 
during his interview with the defendant in his office. 
6 
 
 
 
While waiting for Solomon to confer with the defendant, 
Banks received a telephone call from another trooper who had 
spoken with Bryan at the hospital.  Bryan was shown a 
photographic array and identified the defendant as the man in 
his brother's apartment.  Upon receiving this information, Banks 
telephoned Solomon to ask if the defendant would be willing to 
speak with them.  Solomon consented, and the defendant, with 
Solomon present, proceeded to talk with Detective Paul DeLuca 
and Trooper Scott McCormack.  Police did not give the defendant 
Miranda warnings prior to or during their questioning. 
 
At the outset of the interview, McCormack stated that a 
double shooting and home invasion had taken place in Winchester 
the previous night, that one of the victims had died, and that 
the surviving victim had identified the defendant from a 
photographic array.  McCormack then asked the defendant if he 
knew anyone in Winchester and where he had been the previous 
night.  In response, the defendant said that he had known Bryan 
for several years and that they had met at the local gym.  The 
defendant also said that he had worked for Bryan and knew 
Christopher through Bryan.  In addition, the defendant provided 
an alibi for his whereabouts the previous night.  He claimed 
that he was home watching a televised boxing event, and then 
went to his friend Dolores Mazil's home in Lynn before returning 
home to sleep.  Before police could ask another question, 
7 
 
 
Solomon advised the defendant not to say anything else.  The 
interview lasted approximately five to ten minutes.  The 
defendant was then arrested. 
 
The next day, the defendant repeatedly telephoned an 
acquaintance, Anunzie Viel, who resided with Dolores in Lynn.  
Neither Mazil nor Viel could corroborate the defendant's alibi.7 
 
After arresting the defendant, police searched his SUV and 
his home.  In the defendant's SUV, police discovered a coin 
consistent with the types of coins Christopher collected.  A 
search of the defendant's home produced a .25 caliber bullet in 
his top dresser drawer -- the same caliber as the gun that 
killed Christopher and injured Bryan.  Police also discovered 
$1,000 in cash in the defendant's spouse's home. 
 
2.  Procedural history.  Prior to trial, the defendant 
filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to police 
during his interview because he never received a Miranda 
warning.8  The motion judge denied the motion, and the defendant 
                     
 
7 At trial, Anunzie Viel testified that the defendant had 
not telephoned her to request that she provide him with a false 
alibi.  She previously had testified before the grand jury that 
he had asked her to provide an alibi.  Viel stated that her 
inconsistency was a result of police pressure regarding another 
open criminal case. 
 
 
8 The defendant also sought to exclude testimonial hearsay 
from Bryan's 911 call.  The trial judge denied defendant's 
motion to exclude the 911 call and grand jury testimony and 
reported his decision to the Appeals Court.  We transferred the 
case to this court on our own motion, consolidated it with the 
8 
 
 
sought an interlocutory appeal, which a single justice reported 
to this court.  We affirmed the motion judge's decision and 
concluded, inter alia, that although the defendant was in 
custody and police did not give him the Miranda warnings prior 
to conducting the interview, the presence of the defendant's 
attorney during police questioning, coupled with the fact that 
the defendant had an opportunity to consult with counsel before 
the questioning, substituted adequately for the giving of the 
Miranda warnings.  Commonwealth v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 289, 
cert. denied, 562 U.S. 874 (2010) (Simon I).  The defendant did 
not raise, and this court did not address, whether Solomon was 
ineffective for advising the defendant to speak with police 
without having conducted any factual investigation into the 
severity of the allegations against the defendant. 
 
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of 
murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder.  In 
June 2016, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial.  The 
motion was supported by his own affidavit and an affidavit from 
Solomon.  In Solomon's affidavit, he testified that before 
conducting the interview with police he "asked the defendant 
                     
defendant's interlocutory appeal from the denial of his motion 
to suppress, and affirmed in part the judge's decision.  
Commonwealth v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 295-301, cert. denied, 562 
U.S. 874 (2010).  Ultimately, the 911 call and Bryan's grand 
jury testimony were admitted in evidence at trial via a joint 
motion.  See note 4, supra. 
9 
 
 
repeatedly whether he knew why [police] were there and whether 
he 'did anything.'"  Solomon claimed that the defendant 
"repeatedly and vociferously denied" any knowledge why police 
wanted to question him.  Furthermore, Solomon stated:  "During 
my meeting alone with the defendant, at no time did I go over 
his Miranda rights or his right to remain silent."  Following a 
nonevidentiary hearing, the motion judge, who was also the trial 
judge, denied the defendant's motion.  The motion judge presumed 
"for purposes of this decision only" that Solomon's conduct of 
conferring with the defendant and permitting him to speak with 
police fell measurably below that which might be expected from 
an ordinary fallible lawyer.  The motion judge concluded, 
however, that Solomon's conduct did not deprive the defendant of 
an otherwise available, substantial ground of defense. 
3.  Discussion.  a.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  In 
his appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial, the 
defendant contends that Solomon, who did not represent him at 
trial but was present during the police interview, was 
ineffective.  The defendant contends that Solomon allowed him to 
confer with officers without first conducting an investigation 
into the allegations. 
 
Generally, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, 
the defendant bears the burden of showing "that there has been a 
'serious incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention of 
10 
 
 
counsel -- behavior of counsel falling measurably below that 
which might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer,' and 
that counsel's poor performance 'likely deprived the defendant 
of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defence.'"  
Commonwealth v. Millien, 474 Mass. 417, 429–430 (2016), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).  In reviewing 
the judge's denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial, we 
look to see whether the judge committed "a significant error of 
law or other abuse of discretion."  Commonwealth v. Duart, 477 
Mass. 630, 634 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1561 (2018), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Forte, 469 Mass. 469, 488 (2014).  We 
show particular "deference to the action of a motion judge who 
was also the trial judge."  Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 
303, 307 (1986). 
 
In the context of a case of murder in the first degree, we 
consider whether error, if any, created a substantial likelihood 
of a miscarriage of justice.  To show that Solomon's actions 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, 
the defendant must satisfy two prongs:  (1) that counsel's 
erroneous legal advice caused the defendant to give his 
statement to police; and (2) that the defendant's statement 
likely influenced the jury's conclusion.  See Commonwealth v. 
Celester, 473 Mass. 553, 572 (2016).  Under this more favorable 
standard of review, we consider a defendant's claim even if the 
11 
 
 
action by trial counsel does not "constitute conduct falling 
'measurably below' that of an 'ordinary fallible lawyer'" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Williams, 453 Mass. 203, 
205 (2009). 
 
The defendant predominantly relies on our decision in 
Celester.  The defendant in Celester had been arrested for 
murder and was given Miranda warnings.  His attorney, however, 
had not conducted any factual investigation into the allegation 
against his client before advising him to speak with police.  
Celester, 473 Mass. at 565.  The attorney instructed the 
defendant, "[T]ell [police] what you told me," at which point 
the defendant made inculpatory statements during his police 
interview.  Id.  In Celester, we recognized that a person's 
right to speak with counsel is not "actualize[d] or 
substantively meaningful if counsel fails to provide at least 
minimally competent advice" and that counsel has "an obligation 
at the very least to discuss with his client the self-
incrimination privilege and the potential consequences of giving 
a statement to the police" (quotations and citation omitted).  
Id. at 568, 571.  We agreed with the defendant's contention that 
his attorney "provided ineffective assistance by instructing or 
advising him [(without conducting an investigation)] to make a 
statement to police that had an inculpatory effect."  Id. at 
12 
 
 
569-570.  Moreover, we concluded that the defendant's statement 
likely influenced the jury's verdict.  Id. at 573. 
 
The record in this case shows that Solomon advised the 
defendant to speak with police, or at least acquiesced to 
police's request to speak with the defendant, after consulting 
with him for approximately forty-five minutes to an hour.  
Furthermore, Solomon testified in his affidavit that he did not 
inform the defendant of his Miranda rights prior to allowing 
officers to interview him.  Although the defendant's statements 
to police were exculpatory in nature, Solomon's conduct of 
allowing police to interview the defendant without fully 
understanding the allegations against his client and without 
informing his client of his Miranda rights caused the defendant 
to give his statement to police.9  See Celester, 473 Mass. at 571 
& n.23 ("before affirmatively advising a client to speak about 
the case to the police, it is necessary for counsel to undertake 
some investigation of the charge and the government's evidence"; 
counsel has "obligation at the very least to discuss with his 
client the self-incrimination privilege and the potential 
                     
 
9 At trial, Solomon testified that he did not speak 
substantively with police prior to the interview.  He stated 
that he did not ask them any questions because he did not think 
that they would tell him anything.  He claims that they hovered 
outside his office while he was talking with the defendant, so 
he invited officers into his conference room to better 
understand what was occurring. 
13 
 
 
consequences of giving a statement to the police").  See also 
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) ("any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in 
no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any 
circumstances").  Cf. Simon I, 456 Mass. at 289. 
 
Having satisfied the first prong, the defendant must 
establish that the jury were likely to have been influenced by 
the defendant's statement to police.  The facts of this case 
depart significantly from Celester when considering prejudice.  
In Celester, 473 Mass. at 573, we concluded that the defendant's 
statement to police "placed him directly at the scene of the 
crime at the exact time the crime was committed . . . [and] 
strongly reinforc[ed] [a percipient witness's] trial testimony."  
The defendant's statement that flowed from counsel's erroneous 
legal advice certainly influenced the jury's conclusion.  Id. 
 
Here, the defendant made two statements during his police 
interview that the jury ultimately heard.  First, the defendant 
admitted that he knew Christopher and Bryan.  Second, the 
defendant stated that on the night of the killing he was at his 
friend's house in Lynn before returning home to sleep.  Unlike 
the defendant's statements in Celester, these two statements did 
not inculpate the defendant in the murder.  Contrast Celester, 
473 Mass. at 573.  Moreover, the information gathered from the 
defendant's statement to police also was admitted through other 
14 
 
 
sources at trial.  For example, Bryan's 911 call was played for 
the jury.  During the call, Bryan described his relationship 
with the defendant and identified him as the shooter.  Bryan's 
grand jury testimony was also read in evidence, in which he 
testified extensively about his seven-year relationship with the 
defendant and that the defendant was involved in dealing 
marijuana with Christopher. 
In addition, the jury heard about the defendant's purported 
alibi through the testimony of Viel.  Specifically, Viel 
testified that she had several telephone conversations with the 
defendant starting on the morning following the shooting and 
that the defendant was not with her the night of the shooting.  
The jury also heard Viel being impeached with her grand jury 
testimony, in which she stated that the defendant had asked her 
to provide a false alibi for the evening of the shootings.10  
Furthermore, Mazil testified that the defendant had not been 
with her the night of the shooting.  The defendant's cell phone 
records also were admitted in evidence through his former 
spouse's testimony.  The cell phone records showed that the 
defendant placed multiple calls to Viel and Mazil hours after 
the shooting.  The jury reasonably could infer that the 
                     
 
10 Viel testified at trial that she had made that statement 
to the grand jury because she was "on bond from [a] federal 
charge.  And an officer was threatening . . . [her] that if [she 
did not] say this that he was gonna make [her] time even worse." 
15 
 
 
defendant was calling Viel and Mazil to ask them to corroborate 
his alibi. 
There were independent sources apart from the defendant's 
statement to police that established the defendant's 
relationship with the brothers and that the defendant gave a 
false alibi.  Moreover, the defendant's statement to police was 
exculpatory in nature and did not tie him to the scene of the 
crime.  Cf. Celester, 473 Mass. at 573.  Therefore, we conclude 
that the defendant's statements were unlikely to have influenced 
the jury's conclusion. 
b.  Burden shifting.  The defendant argues that the 
Commonwealth engaged in impermissible burden shifting by 
suggesting that the defendant and Solomon had a duty to obtain 
or preserve evidence during the police interview in Solomon's 
conference room.  Specifically, the defendant suggests that the 
prosecutor impermissibly questioned Solomon about his recording 
capabilities and whether he ever asked police to bring a tape 
recorder to the interview.  The defendant contends that this 
error was reinforced when the prosecutor restated during his 
closing argument that Solomon and the defendant did not request 
the police interview to be recorded.11  Neither the contested 
                     
 
11 The prosecutor argued, "And you heard me ask [Solomon], 
did you have a recording device in your office?  No.  Did you 
ask for this conversation to be recorded? . . .  Absolutely 
not." 
16 
 
 
cross-examination nor the closing argument was objected to at 
trial.  Therefore, we review error, if any, for a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Wright, 
411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014). 
"[A] prosecutor shifts the burden of proof when, for 
example, he or she calls the jury's attention to the defendant's 
failure to call a witness or witnesses, or when the prosecutor 
offers 'direct comment on a defendant's failure to contradict 
testimony.'"  Commonwealth v. Tu Trinh, 458 Mass. 776, 787 
(2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100, 117 
(2010), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1013 (2011).  In such cases, the 
prosecution lessens the Commonwealth's burden of proof by 
signaling to the jury that the defendant has an affirmative duty 
to present evidence of his or her innocence.  Tu Trinh, supra.  
"It is not improper," however, "for counsel to respond to 
arguments raised by the defense, and to make an argument 
presented by way of reasonable inferences that could be drawn 
from the evidence" (citations omitted).  Miranda, supra at 116.  
Furthermore, it is "permissible for the prosecution to address 
any reasons or justifications that would explain why no 
recording was made, leaving it to the jury to assess what weight 
they should give to the lack of a recording."  Commonwealth v. 
DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 448-449 (2004).  While it is 
preferable that a recording be made "whenever practicable," we 
17 
 
 
have said that, where no such recording is made, "the defendant 
is entitled (on request) to a jury instruction . . . cautioning 
the jury that, because of the absence of any recording of the 
[interview] in the case before them, they should weigh evidence 
of the defendant's alleged statement with great caution and 
care."  Id. at 447-448. 
Here, although the defendant claims error in the 
Commonwealth's questioning, the Commonwealth initially did not 
raise the issue whether Solomon had recording capabilities in 
his office.  During cross-examination of an arresting officer, 
defense counsel asked whether recording an interview is an 
"optimal" police procedure and questioned the officer about why 
he did not attempt to record the interview with the defendant, 
and whether he had asked if Solomon himself had a recording 
device before or during the interview.  Each Commonwealth 
witness present at the interview was asked by defense counsel if 
it is necessary for police to record a defendant's interview, 
whether they had an opportunity to record this specific 
interview, and why they did not take further action in order to 
record the interview.12  In response, the Commonwealth properly 
questioned its witnesses about recording the interview.  During 
                     
 
12 On more than one occasion, defense counsel asked officers 
why they did not go to a nearby office supply store to purchase 
a recording device prior to the interview. 
18 
 
 
the cross-examination of Solomon, which the defendant 
specifically challenges here, the Commonwealth asked why he did 
not make efforts to have the interview recorded.  Solomon 
confirmed that he was aware that it was an option to record the 
interview but that he did not have a recording device present, 
nor did he request to have the interview recorded. 
The recording capabilities available at the attorney's 
office are relevant to why no recording existed.  The 
Commonwealth did not shift the burden of proof onto the 
defendant; it instead addressed why no recording of the 
interview was made in response to arguments raised by the 
defense.  The Commonwealth properly responded by presenting 
reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, see Miranda, 458 
Mass. at 116, including justifications that explained why no 
recording was made, see DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. at 448-449. 
Further, during trial, the judge gave jury instructions 
regarding the Commonwealth's burden of proof.  The judge 
informed the jury that the "burden of proof never shifts.  The 
defendant is not required to call any witnesses or produce any 
evidence since he is presumed to be innocent."  Where the jury 
are instructed on the burden of proof and there is nothing to 
suggest that they did not otherwise heed the instruction, we 
must assume that they did.  See Commonwealth v. Stanley, 363 
Mass. 102, 105 (1973).  Moreover, the judge instructed the jury 
19 
 
 
about the absence of a recorded interview.  The judge stated 
that this court has "expressed a preference that such 
interrogations be recorded whenever practicable.  Here, where 
there is no videotape or audiotape recording of this 
interrogation, you should weigh evidence of the defendant's 
alleged statement with caution and care."  See DiGiambattista, 
442 Mass. at 447-448.  There was no error. 
c.  Double jeopardy.  The defendant argues that, as he was 
convicted of felony-murder in the first degree with the 
predicate offenses of both armed robbery and armed home 
invasion, a conviction on all three counts violates the double 
jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment and art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  The defendant is correct, 
and the Commonwealth concedes that a conviction on an underlying 
felony is duplicative of a felony-murder conviction, and that 
the underlying felony must accordingly be vacated.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Lucien, 440 Mass. 658, 673-674 (2004).  This is 
not cause, however, to overturn the defendant's convictions. 
 
"When a murder conviction is based on a felony-murder 
theory, the underlying felony, whatever it may be, is always a 
lesser included offense and the conviction for that felony, in 
addition to the conviction of murder, is duplicative."  
Commonwealth v. Gunter, 427 Mass. 259, 276 (1998), citing 
Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 375, 398 (1995).  The 
20 
 
 
appropriate remedy, then, "is to vacate both the conviction and 
the sentence on that [predicate] felony."  Gunter, supra at 275.  
That is the case when there is only one underlying felony upon 
which a defendant is convicted.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Alcequiecz, 465 Mass. 557, 558 (2013) (felony-murder and armed 
burglary duplicative such that armed burglary must be vacated); 
Gunter, supra at 276 (conviction of armed assault in dwelling 
vacated as duplicative where it served as predicate offense for 
felony-murder). 
 
Here, jurors specifically found the predicate offenses to 
be both armed robbery and armed home invasion.  In Commonwealth 
v. Rasmusen, 444 Mass. 657, 666 (2005), we addressed a similar 
issue where the defendant was convicted of felony-murder on two 
underlying felonies.  There, while either felony could have 
served as the underlying offense, our analysis determined which 
offense was "better suited to serve as the predicate felony."  
Id. at 667.  The facts of that case more closely connected the 
defendant's armed burglary conviction to the victim's murder, 
while the home invasion conviction was considered independent of 
the murder in those circumstances.  Id. at 666-667.  We vacated 
the defendant's conviction of and sentence for armed burglary as 
duplicative of his felony-murder conviction while the home 
invasion conviction and sentence remained.  Id. at 667.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bin, 480 Mass. 665, 666 n.2 (2018), citing 
21 
 
 
Rasmusen, supra at 666-667 (reinstatement of defendant's armed 
home invasion conviction was appropriate while attempted armed 
robbery conviction properly should have been vacated as 
duplicative). 
 
Applying a similar factual analysis here, we determine that 
the defendant's armed robbery conviction is more closely related 
to Christopher's murder and is thus the only conviction that 
should be vacated as the underlying felony.13 
 
4.  Conclusion.  For the above reasons, we vacate the 
defendant's underlying felony conviction of armed robbery and 
affirm the remaining convictions.  We also affirm the order 
denying the defendant's motion for a new trial.  Furthermore, we 
have reviewed the record in its entirety and see no basis to 
grant extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
13 The defendant broke into the second-floor apartment where 
Christopher lived, took money and rare coins from his safe, and 
shot Christopher in the head.  Bryan did not become involved 
until he heard noises coming from the downstairs apartment.  The 
armed robbery conviction, arising from the taking of cash and 
coins from Christopher's apartment, is more directly related to 
his murder than the armed home invasion, which also relates to 
the defendant's confrontation with Bryan.  As such, the 
defendant's armed robbery conviction is "better suited" to serve 
as the predicate offense.  Commonwealth v. Rasmusen, 444 Mass. 
657, 667 (2005).