Case Title: In re F.M.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S270907

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2023-05-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
In re F.M.,   
a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.  
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
F.M., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S270907 
 
Sixth Appellate District 
H048693 
 
Santa Cruz County Superior Court 
19JU00191 
 
 
May 4, 2023 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, Groban, 
Jenkins, and Evans concurred. 
 
1 
In re F.M. 
S270907 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
Some crimes, known as wobbler offenses, are punishable 
either as misdemeanors or as felonies at the discretion of the 
sentencing court.  Welfare and Institutions Code section 702 
provides that when a minor is found to have committed a 
wobbler offense, “the court shall declare the offense to be a 
misdemeanor or a felony.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 702; all 
undesignated statutory references are to this code.)  We 
explained in In re Manzy W. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1199 (Manzy W.) 
that this “mandatory express declaration” requirement exists 
partly to “ensur[e] that the juvenile court is aware of, and 
actually exercises, its discretion” as to whether a juvenile’s 
wobbler offense should be adjudicated as a misdemeanor or 
felony.  (Id. at pp. 1204, 1207.)  We later elaborated that the 
express declaration contemplated by section 702 must be made 
at a hearing “before or at the time of disposition.”  (In re G.C. 
(2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1126 (G.C.).) 
A juvenile court’s choice to classify a wobbler as a 
misdemeanor or felony can have significant implications for the 
juvenile.  If an offense is treated as a felony, it may constitute a 
serious or violent felony for purposes of the “Three Strikes” law, 
potentially exposing the juvenile to dramatically increased 
sentences if he or she reoffends.  (Pen. Code, § 667.)  If the 
juvenile court treats the offense as a misdemeanor, the 
conviction will not qualify as a “strike” in any future 
prosecution.  In enacting section 702, the Legislature 
In re F.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
manifested special concern with ensuring that juvenile courts 
understand the choice they are making when they decide to 
subject a juvenile to the consequences that may attend a felony 
conviction.  (Manzy W., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1207.)  
In this case, the trial court did not comply with section 
702’s express declaration mandate.  That point is undisputed.  
The question is whether the Court of Appeal erred in declining 
to remand the matter to the juvenile court.  We hold that it did.  
A section 702 error requires remand unless the record as a whole 
demonstrates that the juvenile court “was aware of, and 
exercised its discretion” as to wobblers.  (Manzy W., supra, 14 
Cal.4th at p. 1209.)  Because the record here does not 
demonstrate such awareness, we reverse and remand for 
further proceedings. 
I. 
F.M. first came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court 
after he punched a classmate in 2019.  The juvenile court 
sustained an allegation that F.M. had committed simple battery 
(Pen. Code, § 242) and placed him on probation (Petition A).  The 
dispositional order for Petition A is not before us. 
The following year, F.M. was again brought before the 
juvenile court after he and a group of gang members threatened 
a victim with a deadly weapon and then fled from police.  A 
wardship petition (Petition B) alleged a number of offenses, 
including various forms of felony assault for the benefit of a 
criminal street gang.  (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (a)(1), (2), (4), 
186.22, subds. (a), (b)(1)(A).)  F.M. admitted that he had 
committed felony assault with force likely to produce great 
bodily injury (id., § 245, subd. (a)(4)), that he actively 
participated in a criminal street gang (amended by the district 
In re F.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
attorney to be alleged as a misdemeanor rather than as a felony) 
(id., § 186.22, subd. (a)), and that he committed felony reckless 
evasion of a police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)).  The 
juvenile court dismissed the remaining allegations while noting 
in a minute order that they would be considered in the rendering 
of a disposition.     
The Petition B allegations that F.M. admitted — assault 
with force likely to produce great bodily injury, active 
participation in a criminal street gang, and reckless evasion of 
a police officer — are wobbler offenses.  Each may be punished 
by imprisonment in a state prison or by imprisonment in a 
county jail for less than a year.  (Pen. Code, §§  245, subd. (a)(4); 
186.22, subd. (a); Veh. Code, § 2800.2; see Pen. Code, § 17, 
subd. (a) [defining felony and misdemeanor].)  The district 
attorney ultimately charged the assault and reckless evasion 
allegations as felonies and the street gang participation 
allegation as a misdemeanor, and the juvenile court accepted 
the admission of these allegations as such.  The pretrial hearing 
transcript does not reveal any discussion of the juvenile court’s 
discretion to treat the offenses as felonies or as misdemeanors, 
though the minute order for the proceeding includes a statement 
that “[t]he Court has considered whether the above offense(s) 
should be felonies or misdemeanors.”  The juvenile court 
determined that F.M. had violated his probation and committed 
him to the custody of Santa Cruz County Juvenile Hall until the 
dispositional hearing.   
While in custody, F.M. participated in an assault on 
another minor.  The district attorney responded with another 
wardship petition (Petition C) alleging felony assault with force 
likely to produce great bodily injury, undertaken for the benefit 
of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (a)(4), 186.22, 
In re F.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
subd. (b)), as well as felony active participation in a criminal 
street gang (id., § 186.22, subd. (a)).  These offenses are 
wobblers.  (Id., § 17, subd. (a).)  At a pretrial hearing, F.M. 
admitted the felony assault charge without the gang allegation, 
and the juvenile court dismissed the other allegations.  As with 
the pretrial hearing for Petition B, the hearing transcript does 
not reveal any discussion of the court’s discretion to treat the 
offenses as felonies or misdemeanors.  And this time, the court 
did not include in its minute order any statement indicating that 
it had considered whether the offenses should be treated as 
felonies or as misdemeanors.   
Petitions B and C were resolved at a dispositional hearing 
in November 2020.  The juvenile court continued F.M.’s 
wardship and found him suitable for placement at a ranch camp.  
Neither the transcript nor the minute order for the dispositional 
hearing indicate that the juvenile court acknowledged its 
discretion to treat the offenses F.M. admitted as misdemeanors 
rather than as felonies.  F.M. appealed. 
On appeal, the Attorney General argued that F.M. 
forfeited any argument that the juvenile court had failed to 
comply with section 702’s express declaration requirement by 
failing to raise the issue before the juvenile court at or before 
the dispositional hearing on Petitions B and C.  The Attorney 
General relied on G.C. for this proposition, contending that G.C. 
established that a juvenile court’s violations of section 702 
constitute “forfeitable legal error” and are therefore subject to 
the general principle that an objection to a juvenile court’s 
dispositional order cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.  
(See G.C., supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 1131.)   
In re F.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
The Court of Appeal rejected this argument.  In G.C., the 
juvenile court failed to declare at the original dispositional 
hearing whether certain wobbler offenses were to be treated as 
felonies or as misdemeanors, in violation of section 702.  (G.C., 
supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 1122.)  But the minor did not appeal that 
dispositional order before the time to appeal had expired.  (Id. 
at p. 1124.)  The minor first raised his section 702 arguments on 
appeal from a subsequent dispositional order involving the 
potential modification of the minor’s placement.  (G.C., at 
p. 1124.)  We held that a minor’s failure to file a timely notice of 
appeal deprives an appellate court of jurisdiction to consider a 
claim of section 702 error.  (G.C., at pp. 1129–1130.)  The Court 
of Appeal found this reasoning inapplicable, as there is no 
question here that F.M.’s appeal from the dispositional order on 
Petitions B and C was timely filed.  (In re F.M. (July 26, 2021, 
H048693) [nonpub. opn.].) 
Turning to the merits, the Court of Appeal concluded that 
the juvenile court failed to comply with section 702’s express 
declaration requirement, but that remand was unnecessary 
because the record established that the juvenile court “was both 
aware of and exercised its discretion to treat the sustained 
allegations as felonies.”  In particular, the Court of Appeal 
emphasized that the juvenile court noted on the record “that the 
assault charge ‘is considered a serious violent felony’ and thus 
‘could be counted as a strike’ offense in any adult court case 
brought against him in the future”; that the juvenile court 
declined to reinstate probation for the allegation sustained in 
Petition A; and that the juvenile court contemplated committing 
F.M. to the Division of Juvenile Justice — a commitment which, 
at the time of the dispositional order, could only have been 
imposed for certain felony offenses.  The court held that these 
In re F.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
“recitations on the record” made clear that the juvenile court 
“elected to designate the offenses as felonies” and thus remand 
“would be redundant.”  We granted review. 
II. 
Section 702 provides in relevant part:  “If the minor is 
found to have committed an offense which would in the case of 
an adult be punishable alternatively as a felony or a 
misdemeanor, the court shall declare the offense to be a 
misdemeanor or felony.”  As we explained in Manzy W., the 
statute was enacted in 1976 as part of a substantial revision to 
the juvenile court law, under which minors could no longer be 
physically confined for a period longer than that for which they 
could be imprisoned had they committed the offenses as an 
adult.  (Manzy W., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1205, citing Stats. 
1976, ch. 1071, pp. 4814–4833.)  This new requirement made it 
necessary, where it had not been before, to determine whether 
wobbler offenses alleged against a juvenile are felonies or 
misdemeanors.  Section 702’s express declaration requirement 
facilitates that determination.  (Manzy W., at pp. 1205–1206.) 
We said in Manzy W. that “the purpose of the statute is 
not solely administrative”; section 702 “also serves the purpose 
of ensuring that the juvenile court is aware of, and actually 
exercises its discretion” as to wobbler offenses.  (Manzy W., 
supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1207.)  This recognition comports with 
the general purposes of the juvenile court law:  “to provide for 
the protection and safety of the public and each minor under the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court” (§ 202, subd. (a)); “to preserve 
and strengthen the minor’s family ties whenever possible, 
removing the minor from the custody of his or her parents only 
when necessary for his or her welfare or for the safety and 
In re F.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
protection of the public” (ibid.); to facilitate “reunification of the 
minor with his or her family” if removal from parental custody 
proves necessary (ibid.); and “to secure for the minor custody, 
care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that 
which should have been given by his or her parents” (ibid.).  The 
juvenile court law “shall be liberally construed to carry out these 
purposes.”  (Ibid.)  Against this backdrop, the Legislature that 
enacted section 702 is best understood as having viewed section 
702’s express declaration requirement as calculated to secure for 
those subject to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction a guarantee that 
the court understood and exercised its discretion as to wobbler 
offenses with the purposes of the statutory scheme in mind.  (See 
Manzy W., at p. 1207.) 
Since section 702’s enactment, we have thrice remanded 
for further proceedings to remedy noncompliance with its 
express declaration requirement.  The first, In re Ricky H. (1981) 
30 Cal.3d 176 (Ricky H.), involved a minor alleged to have 
committed burglary and assault.  (Id. at p. 180.)  The assault 
count was a wobbler.  (Id. at p. 191; see Pen. Code, § 245, 
subd. (a).)  We held that the record did not “demonstrate that 
the court made an express finding that the assault offense was 
either a misdemeanor or a felony” despite the wardship petition 
describing the assault count as a felony, the juvenile court’s 
setting of a felony-level maximum period of confinement, and 
the minutes of the dispositional hearing reciting that the minor 
was committed for a felony conviction.  (Ricky H., at p. 191.)  
Each of these factors was “insufficient” or “inadequate,” or did 
not otherwise satisfy section 702’s mandate.  (Ricky H., at 
p. 191.)  We reasoned that the fact that a juvenile court behaves 
as though the offense is a felony does not show that the court 
made a conscious choice to treat the offense as a felony or as a 
In re F.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
misdemeanor — precisely the choice that section 702’s express 
declaration mandate requires juvenile courts to make.  (Ricky 
H., at pp. 191–192.)  
Similarly, in In re Kenneth H. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 616 
(Kenneth H.), the minor was found to have committed a wobbler 
offense, and the juvenile court failed to make an express 
declaration as to its choice to treat the offense as a felony or as 
a misdemeanor.  (Id. at pp. 618–620.)  The Attorney General 
opposed remand on the grounds “that the accusatory pleading 
(the petition) described the offense as a felony; that at the 
jurisdictional hearing the court found the allegations of the 
petition to be true; that the finding of truth was referred to at 
the dispositional hearing; and that the court would not have 
found the allegations of the supplemental petition true if it had 
not found the burglary to be a felony.”  (Id. at p. 619.)  We 
rejected these arguments and remanded for compliance with 
section 702, explaining that “the crucial fact is that the court did 
not state at any of the hearings that it found the [offense] to be 
a felony.”  (Kenneth H., at p. 620.) 
Manzy W. came next.  Again, the juvenile court imposed a 
felony-level term of confinement for a wobbler offense without 
making an express declaration that it was exercising its 
discretion to treat the offense as a felony rather than as a 
misdemeanor.  (Manzy W., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1201.)  We 
reaffirmed Ricky H. and Kenneth H., explaining that “neither 
the pleading, the minute order, nor the setting of a felony-level 
period of physical confinement may substitute for a declaration 
by the juvenile court as to whether an offense is a misdemeanor 
or a felony.”  (Manzy W., at p. 1208.)  To comply with section 702, 
the juvenile court must “ ‘state at any of the hearings’ ” that it 
was exercising its discretion to treat the offense as a felony.  
In re F.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
(Manzy W., at p. 1208, quoting Kenneth H., supra, 33 Cal.3d at 
p. 620.)   
Even as we affirmed the holdings in Kenneth H. and Ricky 
H. in Manzy W., we also explained that remand is not 
“ ‘automatic[ally]’ ” required “whenever the juvenile court fails 
to make a formal declaration” as mandated by section 702.  
(Manzy W., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1209.)  Where the record 
shows that “the juvenile court, despite its failure to comply with 
the statute, was aware of, and exercised its discretion to 
determine the felony or misdemeanor nature of a wobbler,” 
remand “would be merely redundant,” and “failure to comply 
with the statute would amount to harmless error.”  (Ibid.)  We 
held that the failure to comply with section 702 in Manzy’s case 
could not be regarded as harmless under that standard.  (Manzy 
W., at p. 1210.)  We emphasized that over the course of the 
relevant hearings, “the juvenile court did not at any time refer 
to its discretion to declare the offense a misdemeanor” and that 
neither the district attorney nor counsel for the minor ever 
“point[ed] out to the juvenile court that it had such discretion.”  
(Ibid.)  On such a record, we explained, “it would be mere 
speculation to conclude that the juvenile court was actually 
aware of its discretion in sentencing Manzy.”  (Ibid.)  We 
reversed and remanded for compliance with section 702.  
(Manzy W., at p. 1210.) 
III. 
Before this court, the Attorney General argues that F.M. 
forfeited his right to challenge the juvenile court’s lack of 
compliance with section 702 by failing to raise it before the 
juvenile court.  The Attorney General contends that sentencing 
errors not raised before the trial court cannot be challenged on 
In re F.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
appeal 
unless 
the 
sentence 
ultimately 
imposed 
was 
“unauthorized” as a matter of law.  (See People v. Scott (1994) 9 
Cal.4th 334, 354 (Scott).)  On this view, where a sentencing 
court’s error suggests only that the sentence was “imposed in a 
procedurally or factually flawed manner,” a defendant’s failure 
to raise the issue in the trial court forfeits the claim.  (Ibid.)   
The same argument was raised before the Court of Appeal, 
which rejected it.  We granted review to decide the issue 
presented by F.M.’s petition:  whether this matter should be 
remanded to the juvenile court in light of its failure to comply 
with section 702.  As a result, the issue of forfeiture is not 
squarely before us.  Nevertheless, we address it pursuant to 
California Rule of Court 8.516.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
8.516(b)(2).)  We conclude that F.M. has not forfeited his right 
to challenge the juvenile court’s failure to comply with 
section 702. 
It is true that a defendant who fails to object before the 
trial court to a sentence on the ground that it is being “imposed 
in a procedurally or factually flawed manner” generally forfeits 
the right to challenge such an error on appeal.  (Scott, supra, 9 
Cal.4th at p. 354; see People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234 
[“It is settled that failure to object and make an offer of proof at 
the sentencing hearing concerning alleged errors or omissions 
in the probation report waives the claim on appeal.”].)  But 
“neither forfeiture nor application of the forfeiture rule is 
automatic.  [Citation.]  Competing concerns may cause an 
appellate court to conclude that an objection has not been 
forfeited.”  (People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593.)   
Such concerns are present in the context of section 702 
error.  Specifically, application of the forfeiture rule would 
In re F.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
render unreviewable most claims of section 702 error on appeal 
because in cases where the section 702 issue was raised in the 
juvenile court, the court in all likelihood would have been 
apprised of its discretion and no section 702 error would arise.  
In Manzy W., we noted that neither “the prosecution [n]or 
Manzy’s counsel point[ed] out to the juvenile court that it had 
such discretion” as one reason why we could not be certain that 
the section 702 error was harmless.  (Manzy W., supra, 14 
Cal.4th at p. 1210.)  We remanded the case for compliance with 
section 702’s express declaration requirement.  (Manzy W., at 
pp. 1210–1211.)  While we did not have any forfeiture argument 
before us, we treated the fact that no party raised a section 702 
error in the juvenile court as a factor suggesting that a remand 
was appropriate.  (Manzy W., at pp. 1210–1211.)  It would have 
made little sense for Manzy W. to rely on that fact if a section 
702 error not raised in the juvenile court were forfeited on 
appeal. 
The Attorney General relies on G.C. for the proposition 
that a juvenile court’s failure to comply with section 702 is 
“forfeitable legal error.”  (G.C., supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 1131.)  But 
the Attorney General overreads G.C. in arguing that the phrase 
“forfeitable legal error” supports a finding of forfeiture here.  
G.C. held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider any 
section 702 error after the time within which to file an appeal 
from the dispositional order had expired.  (G.C., at pp. 1129–
1130.)  G.C. argued that we could nonetheless reach the section 
702 error because it rendered his sentence unauthorized as a 
matter of law and therefore correctable “at any time.”  (G.C., at 
p. 1130.)  We rejected this argument on the ground that the 
alleged section 702 error went to the manner in which the 
sentence was entered, not to the lawfulness of imposing it.  
In re F.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
(G.C., at p. 1131.)  But we did not say that claims of section 702 
error are forfeited when the juvenile does not raise them in the 
juvenile court.  Rather, we used the phrase “forfeitable legal 
error” to contrast section 702 errors with errors that fall within 
the “narrow” class of errors that are correctable at any time.  
(G.C., at pp. 1131, 1130.) 
We have no occasion here to elucidate the full extent of 
what “forfeitable legal error” in the section 702 context might 
encompass.  We note only that a natural reading of G.C.’s use of 
the word “forfeitable” is that a defendant who fails to file a 
timely appeal of a dispositional order has forfeited any right to 
challenge a section 702 error made in the rendering of that 
disposition.  G.C. does not support the Attorney General’s 
forfeiture argument here; in fact, we said that “upon timely 
appeal the proper course would have been to remand the case 
for the [juvenile] court to exercise its [section 702] discretion” 
(G.C., supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 1131) without any mention of 
whether the section 702 claim had to have been raised first in 
the juvenile court. 
IV. 
Section 702 requires the juvenile court to declare on the 
record at a hearing “before or at the time of disposition” its 
choice whether to treat an alleged wobbler as a misdemeanor or 
as a felony.  (G.C., supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 1126.)  “[N]either the 
pleading, the minute order, nor the setting of a felony-level 
period of confinement may substitute” for the required 
declaration.  (Manzy W., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1208.)  The 
juvenile court’s failure to make this declaration as to each of the 
wobbler offenses alleged in Petitions B and C was error.  (See 
ante, at pp. 2–4.) 
In re F.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
The parties focus their arguments on whether we must 
remand under the standard announced in Manzy W.  There, we 
said a juvenile court’s failure to comply with section 702’s 
express declaration requirement must be corrected on remand 
unless the record as a whole establishes that the juvenile court 
“was aware of, and exercised its discretion to determine the 
felony or misdemeanor nature of a wobbler.”  (Manzy W., supra, 
14 Cal.4th at p. 1209.)  We reaffirm that standard and remand 
accordingly. 
A. 
The Attorney General contends that while we recognized 
the propriety of harmless error review in Manzy W., we “did not 
elucidate” the standard.  He asserts that we evaluate claims of 
section 702 error under the harmless error standard set forth in 
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson), which requires 
reversal only when “it is reasonably probable that a result more 
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the 
absence of the error.”  (Id. at p. 836.) 
The Attorney General is correct that a juvenile court’s 
failure to comply with section 702 is not structural error.  In 
Manzy W., we “disagree[d] with the minor that remand is, in 
effect, ‘automatic’ whenever the juvenile court fails to make a 
formal declaration under . . . section 702.”  (Manzy W., supra, 14 
Cal.4th at p. 1209.)  But it does not follow that Watson applies 
in this context.  Indeed, Manzy W. already established the 
relevant standard for assessing whether section 702 error is 
harmless:  Where the record in a case shows “that the juvenile 
court . . . was aware of, and exercised its discretion to determine 
the felony or misdemeanor nature of a wobbler,” failure to 
comply with section 702 “would amount to harmless error.”  
In re F.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
(Manzy W., at p. 1209.)  The “key issue” under this standard is 
whether the juvenile court “was aware of its discretion” under 
section 702.  (Manzy W., at p. 1209.) 
The Manzy W. standard does not require a juvenile to 
show a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome, and 
adopting Watson would be inconsistent with Manzy W. and 
subsequent Court of Appeal decisions.  In Manzy W., we 
concluded that a section 702 error was not harmless because 
“[n]othing in the record establishe[d] that the juvenile court was 
aware of its discretion to sentence the offense as a misdemeanor 
rather than a felony.”  (Manzy W., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1210.)  
We acknowledged that the juvenile court had set a felony-level 
term for the offense, rejecting a more lenient recommendation 
from the probation department, but we emphasized that the 
juvenile court “did not at any time refer to its discretion to 
declare the offense a misdemeanor.”  (Ibid.)  We further 
emphasized that neither “the prosecution [n]or Manzy’s counsel 
point[ed] out to the juvenile court that it had such discretion.”  
(Ibid.)  Finally, we noted that the juvenile court consistently 
referred to the possession offense as a felony — again, without 
ever acknowledging its discretion to treat the offense as a 
misdemeanor.  (Ibid.)  Stating that “it would be mere 
speculation to conclude that the juvenile court was actually 
aware of its discretion in sentencing Manzy,” we remanded.  (Id. 
at p. 1210; see id. at p. 1211.)  
Nothing in this analysis suggests that Manzy had 
demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have 
received a more lenient sentence but for the error.  Had that 
been relevant, we would have given weight to the juvenile 
court’s rejection of a more lenient sentence, as the dissenting 
opinion in Manzy W. did in arguing that remand was 
In re F.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
unwarranted.  (Manzy W., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1212 (dis. opn. 
of Baxter, J.).)  Instead, our analysis turned entirely on whether 
the record showed that the juvenile court was “aware of” and 
“exercised” its discretion as to wobblers — precisely the 
discretion that section 702 was enacted to “ensur[e]” that 
juvenile courts would exercise.  (Manzy W., at pp. 1207, 1209 
(maj. opn.).) 
The same is true of the Court of Appeal cases that the 
Attorney General identifies as having been “[a]dequately guided 
by the rule set forth” in Manzy W. over the years.  (See In re 
Raymundo M. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 78, 90–93 (Raymundo M.); 
In re Cesar V. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 989, 1000 (Cesar V.); In re 
Ramon M. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 665, 675–676 (Ramon M.); In 
re Eduardo D. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 545, 548–549 (Eduardo 
D.); In re Jorge Q. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 223, 238 (Jorge Q.).)  
Each of these cases involved a section 702 error, but none 
applied or cited the Watson standard or any other standard that 
examines the probability of whether a more favorable outcome 
would have followed had the juvenile court complied with 
section 702.  The cases that conducted any analysis at all applied 
Manzy W.’s “aware of, and exercised its discretion” standard.  
(Manzy W., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1209.)   
In Cesar V. and Eduardo D., the Attorney General 
conceded that the section 702 errors at issue compelled a 
remand under the rule of Manzy W.  (Cesar V., supra, 192 
Cal.App.4th at p. 991; Eduardo D., supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 548.)  Cesar V. accepted the Attorney General’s concession 
without analysis and remanded.  (Cesar V., at pp. 1000–1001.)  
Eduardo D. analyzed whether remand was warranted under 
Manzy W.’s standard.  (Eduardo D., at pp. 548–549.)  It 
explained that “the juvenile court did not orally indicate on the 
In re F.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
record whether the crime was a felony or a misdemeanor.  Nor 
did the juvenile court use any language that demonstrated an 
awareness of its discretion to make such a determination.”  (Id. 
at p. 549.)  The court noted that “the minute order reflect[ed] 
that [the offense] was a felony and the minor’s period of 
confinement was set not to exceed the felony period of three 
years,” but explained that these facts “do not satisfy the 
requirements” of section 702.  (Eduardo D., at p. 549.)  The court 
remanded, without any consideration of whether the record 
suggested that the petition might have been adjudicated 
differently had section 702’s mandate been followed.  (Eduardo 
D., at p. 549.) 
The courts in Jorge Q. and Ramon M. also remanded with 
similar reasoning.  (Jorge Q., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 238; 
Ramon M., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at pp. 675–676.)  In Jorge Q., 
the court reiterated that the absence of an “express oral on-the-
record finding” violated section 702.  (Jorge Q., at p. 238.)  It 
noted that Manzy W. had “settled any further controversy about 
whether an express finding is necessary” and remanded, 
explaining:  “There is nothing in the record to indicate that the 
juvenile court was aware it had such discretion or to indicate the 
juvenile court had exercised its discretion.”  (Jorge Q., at p. 238.)  
As in Eduardo D., the court gave no indication that it considered 
whether the juvenile court might have adjudicated the petition 
differently had it complied with section 702.  All that mattered 
was whether “[t]he record . . . demonstrate[d] the exercise of 
discretion,” and it did not.  (Jorge Q., at p. 238.)  In Ramon M., 
the court remanded without reciting Manzy W.’s harmless error 
standard, but it similarly did not demand any showing that 
compliance with section 702 would have resulted in a different 
outcome.  (Ramon M., at pp. 675–676.) 
In re F.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
Finally, in Raymundo M., the Court of Appeal did not 
remand, but as the Attorney General acknowledges, it based 
that decision on the ground that there was no section 702 error 
at all, not on any analysis of Manzy W.’s harmless error 
standard.  (Raymundo M., supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 90–93.)  
In sum, Manzy W. set forth a harmless error standard that does 
not incorporate an assessment of whether it is “reasonably 
probable that a result more favorable to the [juvenile] would 
have been reached in the absence of the error” (Watson, supra, 
46 Cal.2d at p. 836), and subsequent Court of Appeal decisions 
have applied Manzy W. with that understanding. 
Moreover, section 702 error is distinct from other errors 
where we apply the Watson standard.  The Attorney General 
analogizes this case to various cases involving the sentencing of 
adults, in which courts have remanded after certain sentencing 
errors only upon a showing that a different result might have 
been reached absent the error.   (See People v. Champion (1995) 
9 Cal.4th 879, 933–934 (Champion); People v. Price (1991) 1 
Cal.4th 324, 492 (Price); People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 
233 (Avalos).)  But none of those cases involved errors of the kind 
at issue here. 
In Champion, we held that a trial court’s failure to give 
reasons for imposing consecutive sentences was error under a 
statute that requires courts to “state the reasons for [their] 
sentencing choice[s].”  (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (c); see 
Champion, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 933–934.)  In a brief passage, 
we held that the failure to state reasons was “harmless” and 
declined to remand because the record showed ten aggravating 
circumstances that justified imposition of consecutive sentences 
while showing no mitigating circumstances.  (Champion, at 
p. 934.)  It was “inconceivable,” we said, that the trial court 
In re F.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
would not have imposed consecutive sentences even if it had 
complied with the statutory requirement to state its reasons for 
doing so.  (Ibid.) 
In Avalos, the defendant argued that he was entitled to a 
remand for resentencing because the trial court improperly 
relied on an aggravating circumstance in sentencing him to a 
consecutive term.  (Avalos, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 233.)  We 
agreed that this was error but, applying Watson, declined to 
remand in light of other aggravating factors that would have 
justified the same sentence.  (Avalos, at p. 233.)  Similarly, the 
defendant in Price argued that three of the ten reasons relied on 
by the trial court in imposing an upper term were not supported 
by the record.  (Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 491.)  We again 
declined to remand, citing Avalos and explaining that “[w]hen a 
trial court has given both proper and improper reasons for a 
sentence choice, a reviewing court will set aside the sentence 
only if it is reasonably probable that the trial court would have 
chosen a lesser sentence had it known that some of its reasons 
were improper.”  (Price, at p. 492, citing Avalos, at p. 233.) 
The issues presented in Champion, Avalos, and Price did 
not have to do with whether a trial court understood the full 
extent of its lawful discretion and its obligation to exercise it.  
Although the trial courts in those cases did not make explicit the 
reasoning for a particular decision or relied on improper reasons 
for a decision, there was no suggestion that they were unaware 
of the decision they were tasked with making.  This distinction 
is significant because section 702 manifests a specific legislative 
commitment to “ensuring that the juvenile court is aware of, and 
actually exercises, its discretion” as to wobblers.  (Manzy W., 
supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1207).  Applying Watson to assess the 
likelihood of a more favorable result does not address the risk of 
In re F.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
courts misapprehending the extent of their lawful authority in 
this particular context. 
Further, there is a practical difference in assessing the 
effect of an error when the court has not articulated whether a 
discretionary decision was made in the first place, as compared 
to when there were errors in a decision the court actually 
rendered.  In the latter scenario, we may decline to remand 
because the record reflects aggravating circumstances so 
numerous that it would be “inconceivable” that the trial court 
would “impose a different sentence” absent the error.  (See 
Champion, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 934.)  By contrast, where the 
concern is that no discretionary decision was made, attempting 
to discern the likelihood of a “more favorable” decision is a more 
speculative inquiry.  Instead of hypothesizing what decision the 
juvenile court would have made if it had understood the extent 
of its lawful authority, reviewing courts have consistently held 
that remand is appropriate in these circumstances.  (Ante, at 
pp. 14–17.) 
B. 
Applying Manzy W., we conclude that a remand is 
required on this record.  The Court of Appeal justified its refusal 
to remand with three considerations:  first, that the offenses 
F.M. admitted were alleged as felonies in Petitions B and C; 
second, that the juvenile court rejected the probation 
department’s recommendation to return F.M. to his parents’ 
custody and to reinstate probation, which would have been 
consistent with treating the offenses as misdemeanors; and 
third, that the juvenile court directed the probation department 
to consider whether to commit F.M. to the custody of the 
Division of Juvenile Justice or to send him to a ranch camp, 
In re F.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
when a commitment to the Division could only have been 
imposed if the offense were treated as a felony.  But similar 
considerations were presented in Manzy W.:  The offenses at 
issue were alleged as felonies (Manzy W., supra, 14 Cal.4th at 
p. 1202), and the juvenile court considered imposing (and in fact 
imposed) a sentence harsher than that recommended by the 
probation department (id. at pp. 1202–1203).  Here, as in Manzy 
W., these features of the record are not enough to show that the 
juvenile court was “aware of, and exercised its discretion” to 
treat a wobbler as a misdemeanor or as a felony.  (Id. at p. 1209.)   
The Attorney General says, “That the assault and evasion 
offenses were alleged as felonies and the court stated a felony-
level maximum time of confinement is consistent with the court 
having understood its discretion to designate the wobbler 
offenses as misdemeanors or felonies.”  But it is also consistent 
with the opposite proposition:  that the trial court did not 
understand its discretion in treating the wobblers as felonies.  
These aspects of the record do not demonstrate the awareness 
required by Manzy W.  (See Ricky H., supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 191.)   
The Attorney General also points to the juvenile court’s 
statement in the minute order for Petition B that “[t]he Court 
has considered whether the above offense(s) should be felonies 
or misdemeanors.”  But there are no offenses listed “above” the 
statement, only a list of all of the allegations that F.M. was 
charged with at the end of the minute order.  The statement 
could have referred to the three offenses F.M. admitted to in the 
hearing or to the full list of charges, which included those that 
were dismissed but would be considered in the rendering of a 
disposition.  The minute order does not specify which wobbler 
offenses were considered, and the transcript of the proceedings 
does not contain any further clarification or otherwise indicate 
In re F.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
that the juvenile court was aware of its discretion.  We have said 
that a minute order may not “substitute for a declaration by the 
juvenile court as to whether an offense is a misdemeanor or 
felony.”  (Manzy W., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1208; see Ricky H., 
supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 191 [finding insufficient a minute order 
that “recited that the minor was committed to the Youth 
Authority ‘for conviction of [a] felony’ ”].)  Here too, the minute 
order does not show that the juvenile court was “aware of, and 
exercised its discretion.”  (Manzy W., at p. 1209.) 
Further, the language at issue appears only in the minute 
order for Petition B; it did not appear in the record of Petition C, 
which also involved F.M.’s admission of a wobbler offense.  The 
juvenile court was required to separately exercise its discretion 
as to that offense, and the record contains insufficient indication 
that it did so. 
F.M. urges us to go beyond Manzy W. to articulate with 
more specificity what a juvenile court must say in order to avoid 
a remand for a section 702 error.  We decline to suggest that any 
particular script is necessary to satisfy section 702.  The 
standard set forth in Manzy W. is well calibrated to resolving 
these issues:  A section 702 error is not harmless unless the 
record shows that the juvenile court was “aware of, and 
exercised its discretion” as to each wobbler alleged against the 
minor.  (Manzy W., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1209.)  That standard 
was not met here. 
 
 
In re F.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  In re F.M. 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 7/26/21 – 6th Dist. 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S270907 
Date Filed:  May 4, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Santa Cruz 
Judge:  Denine J. Guy 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael Reed, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant 
Attorney General, Seth K. Schalit and Donna M. Provenzano, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Michael Reed 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 386 
Salinas, CA 93902 
(831) 250-0820 
 
Donna M. Provenzano 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
(415) 510-3844