Case Title: CLIFF & CO., LTD., A Wyoming Corporation; and SAM RATCLIFF v. ANDREW W. ANDERSON; NORMAN C. MOORE; COULTER ENTERPRISES, A Wyoming Partnership; FDIC, FORMERLY STOCKMENS BANK & TRUST COMPANY, A Wyoming Banking Corporation; and DORR INVESTMENTS, A Wyoming Partnership

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
CLIFF & CO., LTD., A Wyoming Corporation; and SAM RATCLIFF v. ANDREW W. ANDERSON; NORMAN C. MOORE; COULTER ENTERPRISES, A Wyoming Partnership; FDIC, FORMERLY STOCKMENS BANK & TRUST COMPANY, A Wyoming Banking Corporation; and DORR INVESTMENTS, A Wyoming Partnership1989 WY 150777 P.2d 595Case Number: 88-255Decided: 07/11/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
CLIFF & CO., LTD., A 
WYOMING CORPORATION; AND SAM RATCLIFF, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS),

v.

ANDREW W. ANDERSON; 
NORMAN C. MOORE; COULTER ENTERPRISES, A WYOMING PARTNERSHIP; FDIC, FORMERLY 
STOCKMENS BANK & TRUST COMPANY, A WYOMING BANKING CORPORATION; AND DORR 
INVESTMENTS, A WYOMING PARTNERSHIP, APPELLEES 
(PLAINTIFFS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Terrence L. O'Brien, 
J.

Michael A. 
Maycock, Gillette, for 
appellants.

J. John Sampson, 
Sheridan, for 
appellees.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellants Cliff & 
Co., Ltd. and Sam Ratcliff appeal from an order of the district court confirming 
the foreclosure sale of a hotel and bar and granting a deficiency judgment to 
appellees Andrew W. Anderson, Norman C. Moore, Coulter Enterprises, FDIC, and 
Dorr Investments. Appellants more particularly contest the district court's 
prior order in this action which granted appellees a partial summary judgment 
and a decree of foreclosure upon the finding that appellees were entitled to 
foreclose their mortgage on the subject premises and to obtain a judgment for 
any deficiency.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellants present the 
following issues for our consideration:

A. WHETHER THE COURT 
BELOW ERRED IN GRANTING A DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT BASED UPON A SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IMPROPERLY RENDERED WHEN THERE WAS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT IN 
EXISTENCE.

B. WHETHER THE COURT 
BELOW ERRED BY RELYING UPON FACTS WHICH ARE NOT CONTAINED IN THE 
RECORD.

[¶4.]     The genesis of this 
controversy was a real estate transaction occurring near the end of the energy 
boom in Campbell County, 
Wyoming, in the early part of this 
decade. In June 1981 appellees, as sellers, entered into an agreement with 
appellant Cliff & Co., Ltd., as buyer, and with appellant Ratcliff, Abner 
Castleberry, and Edward Young, as individual guarantors,1 for the sale of the Montgomery Bar 
and Hotel in Gillette, Wyoming. Appellees owned all of the stock in Montgomery 
Bar and Hotel, Inc., a Wyoming corporation (hereinafter "the corporation"), 
which in turn owned all the assets of the hotel and bar, including the land, 
building, inventory, and liquor license. The transaction was accomplished on 
June 16, 1981, by the execution of a series of documents, the nature and effect 
of which are at the center of the dispute in this case.

[¶5.]     The documents include a 
purchase agreement by which appellant Cliff & Co., Ltd. agreed to purchase 
all the stock of the corporation for a total sum of $476,054.41, with a down 
payment of $126,054.41 and the $350,000 balance to be evidenced by a promissory 
note and to be paid in monthly installments into an escrow account at Stockmens 
Bank & Trust Company.2 Concurrently, appellant Cliff & 
Co., Ltd. executed a promissory note to appellees for the balance of the 
purchase price. The promissory note similarly provided for monthly installments 
of principal and interest to be paid into the escrow account. The purchase 
agreement and promissory note were personally guaranteed by Castleberry, Young, 
and appellant Ratcliff. Additionally, in accordance with the purchase agreement, 
appellant Cliff & Co., Ltd. and the corporation (the stock of which had been 
conveyed to Cliff & Co., Ltd.) executed a mortgage (designated as "Mortgage 
Deed") granting appellees a mortgage interest in the subject property as 
security for the indebtedness. The mortgage was recorded on July 13, 1981. 
Appellant Cliff & Co., Ltd. and the corporation also executed a security 
agreement granting appellees a security interest in various collateral of the 
corporation, primarily consisting of the furniture and equipment of the 
business. A corresponding financing statement was filed. At the same time, and 
as further security for the indebtedness, appellant Cliff & Co., Ltd. 
executed an assignment back to appellees of the stock of the corporation. 
Finally, appellant Cliff & Co., Ltd. and appellees signed escrow 
instructions to Stockmens Bank & Trust Company providing for payments on the 
promissory note to be made to the escrow account and for disbursements to be 
made to appellees as directed.

[¶6.]     Although not otherwise 
indicated in the record, the complaint and amended complaint of appellees 
indicate that, by warranty deed dated December 21, 1981, the corporation deeded 
the subject property to appellant Cliff & Co., Ltd. and that such deed was 
recorded on February 25, 1982. In their answer to the amended complaint, 
appellants admitted to that averment.3

[¶7.]     Debt payments pursuant 
to this rather cumbersome transaction were made as agreed until 1986 when the 
buyer and guarantors (appellants, et al.) fell into default. As a result, the 
parties entered into a "Modification Agreement" wherein appellees agreed to 
reduced monthly installment payments for the year 1987 in consideration for 
which appellant Cliff & Co., Ltd. executed an assignment of the premises' 
liquor license to appellees. The liquor license assignment was placed in the 
original escrow account for receipt by appellees in the event of further 
default. The modification agreement provided that, except as therein modified, 
the original purchase documents were to remain in full 
effect.

[¶8.]     By early 1987 
appellants (and Castleberry and Young) were unable to make the payments as 
modified. After notices demanding payment, appellees filed suit on May 22, 1987, 
seeking judgment on the promissory note, foreclosure on both the mortgage and 
the lien created by the security agreement, and a deficiency judgment. By 
amended complaint appellees added claims seeking delivery of the assigned and 
escrowed liquor license and for an award of the income from the property. The 
defendants answered, asserting as an affirmative defense that appellees' only 
remedy upon default was enforcement of the forfeiture provision contained in the 
purchase agreement.

[¶9.]     Appellees then moved 
for summary judgment. Affidavits and the transaction documents were submitted by 
the parties in support of and in opposition to the motion. After a hearing, the 
district court entered a partial summary judgment and decree of foreclosure in 
favor of appellees. There was a factual dispute as to the amount due and owing 
on the obligation; however, the parties subsequently stipulated to that amount 
and to appellees' reasonable attorney's fees and costs. In the meantime, the 
district court had appointed a receiver to manage the 
property.

[¶10.]  Appellees, as highest bidders, purchased 
the property for $100,000 at the foreclosure sale held May 20, 1988.4 Upon appellees' motion, the 
district court entered an order confirming the foreclosure sale and granting a 
deficiency judgment for $190,233.01. This appeal followed.

[¶11.]  Appellants' primary contention, as we 
understand it, is to the following effect: The purchase agreement is in the form 
of an installment land contract;5 the forfeiture provision contained 
therein is consistent with an installment land contract but is inconsistent with 
the remedy provisions contained in the note and mortgage; thus, there is an 
ambiguity in the documents which required the presentation of extrinsic evidence 
on the question of the parties' intent and precluded the entry of summary 
judgment authorizing foreclosure. Appellants, understandably, seek a 
construction of the agreement (or at least a factual issue as to its 
construction) whereby the forfeiture provision would be considered the exclusive 
remedy upon default and which would accordingly relieve them from the deficiency 
judgment.6 Although we sympathize with 
appellants' plight, we are unable to interpret the agreement in the manner urged 
by them.

[¶12.]  This is essentially a contract case and, 
in order to evaluate appellants' contentions, we must apply our established 
rules of contract interpretation. The primary purpose in interpreting or 
construing a contract is to determine the intent of the parties. True Oil 
Company v. Sinclair Oil Corporation, 771 P.2d 781 (Wyo. 1989); Farr v. Link, 746 P.2d 431 (Wyo. 1987). The 
interpretation and construction of a contract are done by the court as a matter 
of law. Id.; Amoco Production Company v. 
Stauffer Chemical Company of Wyoming, 612 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 
1980). Where an agreement is in writing and the language is clear and 
unambiguous, the intent of the parties is to be secured from the words of the 
contract. True Oil Company, 771 P.2d 781; Amoco Production Company, 612 P.2d 463. The contract as a whole should be considered, taking into consideration the 
relationship between the various parts. True Oil Company, 771 P.2d 781; Kost v. 
First National Bank of Greybull, 684 P.2d 819 (Wyo. 1984).

[¶13.]  A written agreement may consist of 
several documents, and reference in a contract to extraneous writings renders 
them part of the agreement. Hensley v. Williams, 726 P.2d 90 (Wyo. 1986); Williams v. Waugh, 593 P.2d 583 (Wyo. 1979). Sales 
transaction documents concurrently executed should be considered together. 
Marple v. Wyoming Production Credit 
Association, 750 P.2d 1315 (Wyo. 1988); Hensley, 726 P.2d 90.

[¶14.]  If a contract is ambiguous, the 
determination of the parties' intent may be made by resort to extrinsic 
evidence. True Oil Company, 771 P.2d 781; Rouse v. Munroe, 658 P.2d 74 
(Wyo. 1983). A 
contract is ambiguous if it is obscure in its meaning because of indefiniteness 
of expression or because of a double meaning being present. Farr, 746 P.2d 431; 
E & E Mining, Inc. v. Flying "D" Group, Inc., 718 P.2d 58 (Wyo. 1986). Whether or 
not a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the court. Farr, 746 P.2d 431; Hensley, 726 P.2d 90. An ambiguity justifying extrinsic evidence is not 
generated by the subsequent disagreement of the parties concerning the 
contract's meaning. Amoco Production Company, 612 P.2d  at 
465.

[¶15.]  With the foregoing principles in mind, we 
turn to the terms of the parties' agreement and particularly to the terms 
regarding the sellers' remedies upon default. The purchase agreement is the 
primary transaction document. It provides for the buyer's purchase of the 
corporate stock from appellees, specifying, inter alia, purchase price, payment 
terms, security, and default remedy. The default provision in the purchase 
agreement provides as follows:

4. Failure to Comply. In the event that 
BUYER fails or neglect[s] to comply with any terms or make any payments when 
said payments are due and payable SELLERS shall have the right at any 
time thereafter to notify the BUYER in writing of the nature and extent of such 
default, and if such default is not corrected within thirty (30) days after the 
mailing of said notice, the SELLERS 
shall have the right at any time thereafter, without further notice, to terminate and cancel all rights of the 
BUYER under this agreement, and all payments made hereunder by the BUYER shall 
be kept and retained by the SELLERS as liquidated damages and rent. The 
SELLERS shall have the further right to re-enter and take possession of said 
corporate assets and be released of all obligations to convey the same to the 
BUYER.

(Emphasis 
added.) We agree with appellants that the above provision is a standard 
forfeiture provision of the type frequently encountered in installment land 
contracts. We also note, as did the district court, that the language of the 
provision is permissive rather than obligatory.

[¶16.]  The purchase agreement additionally and 
specifically incorporates by reference the promissory note representing the 
unpaid balance and the security documents including the mortgage on the realty, 
the security agreement and financing statement with respect to the personalty, 
and the assignment back of the corporate stock. The default provision in the 
promissory note reads:

A failure to pay the 
principal or any part thereof or interest or any part thereof when due shall 
cause the whole note to become due and collectible at the option of the holder. 
Failure to exercise this option shall not constitute a waiver of the right to 
exercise same at any other time.

[¶17.]  Correspondingly, the mortgage addresses 
the remedy upon default by providing for notice of breach to mortgagors and 
thirty days to cure the breach and providing that, upon failure to 
cure:

Mortgagees shall declare 
the whole of the then indebtedness secured hereby immediately due and payable, 
and it shall be lawful for Mortgagees to enforce the provisions of this mortgage 
either by or in equity, as they may elect, or to foreclose this mortgage by 
advertisement and sale of the above described property, at public ven[]ue, for 
cash, according to Wyoming statutes governing mortgage foreclosures, and cause 
to be executed and delivered to the purchaser at any such sale a good and 
sufficient deed or deeds of conveyance of the property so sold and to apply the 
net proceeds arising from such sale first to the payment of the costs and 
expenses of such foreclosure and sale and in payment of all monies expended for 
taxes, assessments, repairs, insurance or other advancements, together with 
stipulated interest thereon from respective advancement dates to the date of 
such sale, and then to the payment of the balance due on account of the 
principal and interest indebtedness secured hereby, together with interest at 
the same rate thereon up to the time of such sale, and the surplus, if any, 
shall be paid to said Mortgagors, their legal representatives, heirs, successors 
or assigns; there shall be included as due from Mortgagors in any or all court 
proceedings all related costs, including abstract extension and such attorney 
fees and costs as may be decreed by the court, and in any statutory foreclosure 
by advertisement, all costs and a reasonable attorney fee. Mortgagors consent to entry of personal 
judgment for and upon any deficiency of said indebtedness remaining unliquidated 
following foreclosure or other sale proceeds of the real and collateral security 
as aforesaid.

(Emphasis 
added.) Finally, with respect to the furniture and equipment, the security 
agreement, by incorporation of the financing statement, provides appellees with 
the remedies available under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and 
includes a covenant by the debtors to pay any deficiency.

[¶18.]  Considering all the above instruments 
together as reflecting the parties' agreement, it is apparent that the 
forfeiture provision of the purchase agreement expresses, in permissive terms, a 
remedy different from those found in the mortgage, note, and security agreement. 
We do not agree with appellants, however, that the existence of more than one 
remedy creates an ambiguity.

[¶19.]  An argument similar to that of appellants 
was presented to this Court in Hensley, 726 P.2d 90. In that case, a real estate 
transaction was accomplished by an installment land contract accompanied by a 
promissory note for the balance remaining after the down payment. In an 
arrangement resembling that in the instant case, the installment contract in 
Hensley contained a forfeiture provision whereas the promissory note provided 
for acceleration of the debt upon default. The district court in Hensley, in a 
summary judgment decision, gave the sellers the election of either enforcing the 
forfeiture or proceeding to judgment on the amount due under the terms of the 
note. The sellers opted to obtain judgment on the balance due on the note. On 
appeal, the purchasers argued that the distinct remedies in the contract and 
note were ambiguous, requiring extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the 
parties. In affirming the district court, we held that the default provisions, 
when considered together, were not ambiguous but rather that they afforded the 
sellers alternative remedies.

[¶20.]  We believe that a consideration of the 
various default provisions involved in the instant case compels the same 
conclusion. We agree with the district court that there is no ambiguity, that 
the remedy provided by the purchase agreement is permissive, and that appellees 
were entitled to alternative remedies under the terms of the agreement.7

[¶21.]  A further and more basic question, 
however, is presented by this case. The question, which was neither reached by 
the district court nor directly briefed by the parties, is whether the 
transaction at issue represents an installment land contract or a conveyance 
with a mortgage back. The significance of this determination can readily be 
seen. If the agreement represents a conveyance with a mortgage back, the 
forfeiture provision was unenforceable. See generally E. Rudolph, The Wyoming 
Law of Real Mortgages at 147 (1969) (cornerstone of mortgage law is rule that 
prohibits contemporaneous release or waiver of the equity of redemption - rule 
operates to nullify any agreement made at the time of the mortgage providing for 
forfeiture upon default). A mortgagee's only remedy upon mortgage default is 
foreclosure and public sale, either by power of sale pursuant to Wyo. Stat. §§ 
34-4-101 to -113 (1977) or by judicial sale in accordance with Wyo. Stat. §§ 
1-18-101 to -112 (1977). L Slash X Cattle Company, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 623 P.2d 764 (Wyo. 
1981). See also Marple, 750 P.2d  at 1318, n. 2 (in case of equitable mortgage, 
foreclosure was the remedy - not quiet title). Additionally, in contrast to the 
finality and harshness of a forfeiture, in a mortgage transaction the mortgagor 
has a statutory right of redemption pursuant to § 1-18-103(a), which applies to 
foreclosure sales pursuant to judicial decree, execution, or power of sale. See 
Fitch v. Buffalo Federal Savings and Loan 
Association, 751 P.2d 1309 (Wyo. 1988). Conversely, when a transaction is 
accomplished by means of an installment land contract, the seller, while often 
able to enforce a forfeiture provision, is not entitled to a deficiency. Baldwin 
v. McDonald, 24 Wyo. 108, 156 P. 27 
(1916).

[¶22.]  In an installment land contract, the 
seller agrees to accept payments from the purchaser, generally by a series of 
installments over time, until the purchase price as established by the contract 
has been paid. When the contract price has been paid, the seller must deliver a 
deed to the purchaser. Insurance Company of North America v. Ventling, 771 P.2d 388 (Wyo. 
1989); E. Rudolph, supra at 147-48. Prior to the final installment payment and 
delivery of the deed, the seller retains legal title. Id.; Baldwin, 156 P. 27; 
7 R. Powell, The Law of Real Property ¶ 938.20[1] (1989). Although the purchaser 
usually is given the right to possession, his interest in an installment land 
contract is equitable, not legal. Insurance Company of North America, 771 P.2d 388; Baldwin, 156 P. 27.

[¶23.]  The fundamental difference distinguishing 
a mortgage from an installment land contract, at least in states applying a lien 
theory to mortgages,8 is that, in a mortgage, fee title 
has vested in the purchaser/mortgagor. Marple, 750 P.2d 1315; Baldwin, 156 P. 27. When a question as to the nature of the transaction arises, however, and in 
order for a court to find a mortgage, it must be shown that the parties intended 
a mortgage transaction rather than an installment land contract; i.e., there 
must have been an intent to create a security, as construed from the written 
agreement and the surrounding circumstances. Angus Hunt Ranch, Inc. v. Reb, 
Inc., 577 P.2d 645 (Wyo. 1978); Baldwin, 156 P. 27. See also 7 R. Powell, supra, ¶ 
938.20[3] at 84D-13 (installment land contract not the functional equivalent of 
a mortgage absent clear proof that parties intended to create a 
mortgagor-mortgagee relationship (citing Angus Hunt Ranch, 
Inc.)).

[¶24.]  In the instant case, we have little 
difficulty determining that the transaction created a mortgage. The agreement 
included a mortgage back to appellees/sellers expressly stated to be security 
for the underlying debt. The intent to create a security is clear. The intent to 
create a security arrangement is also evidenced by the security agreement and 
financing statement executed in connection with the personalty involved in the 
transaction. Further, we have said that "a security interest arrangement, in 
case of doubt, should be defined as a mortgage in order to protect all parties 
by denial of forfeiture and affording statutory rights of redemption." Marple, 
750 P.2d  at 1318.

[¶25.]  Although, by the nature of the 
transaction, title to the property is somewhat difficult to trace,9 we are satisfiedthat fee title to 
the property was transferred to the buyer; i.e., Cliff & Co., Ltd. The 
transaction was basically a stock transaction. The corporation had title to the 
property. The corporate stock, corporate seal, corporate records, and 
resignations of appellees as officers and directors of the corporation were 
transferred to appellant Cliff & Co., Ltd. at closing. Simultaneously, and 
somewhat inexplicably, appellant Cliff & Co., Ltd. executed an assignment 
back of the stock to appellees by means of what was referred to as a "slip 
assignment." We confess we are somewhat at a loss as to the intended effect of 
this assignment back. It is not apparent from the record whether or not the 
assignment back was placed in the escrow account for reconveyance upon default, 
although we might assume that it was considering the concurrent mortgage, 
security agreement, and change of corporate officers and directors, all of which 
indicate the purchasers assumed ownership and control of the corporation.10 To the extent this assignment back 
creates some doubt as to title ownership of the property, however, such doubt is 
resolved by the corporation's subsequent conveyance of the property to appellant 
Cliff & Co., Ltd. by warranty deed. The warranty deed was recorded, 
evidencing record ownership of the property in appellant Cliff & Co., Ltd. 
Fee title thus vested in the buyer, thereby foreclosing any potential status of 
the agreement as an executory sales transaction. Marple, 750 P.2d  at 1318. 
Accordingly, the forfeiture provision in the agreement was a 
nullity.

[¶26.]  In conclusion, we hold that there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and that appellees were entitled to foreclosure 
and a deficiency judgment as a matter of law. The transaction at issue was in 
essence a conveyance with a mortgage back. Title to the subject property vested 
in appellant Cliff & Co., Ltd., and appellees were entitled to the remedy of 
foreclosure and sale, including a deficiency judgment, upon the purchaser's 
default on the underlying debt. The forfeiture remedy contained in the purchase 
agreement, and urged by appellants as the sole remedy, was in fact not available 
to appellees in this mortgage transaction as a matter of law, regardless of what 
was contemplated by the parties at the time of contracting. Although the 
deficiency judgment certainly imposes a substantial hardship on appellants, we 
are convinced that, under the terms of this agreement, had the default occurred 
in an economic climate where property values were increasing, appellants would 
have undoubtedly and rightfully insisted upon the protections afforded by a 
mortgage foreclosure, as opposed to urging forfeiture.

[¶27.]  Appellants' other issue concerns the 
finding of the district court that the parties were sophisticated businessmen. 
Appellants assert this finding is not supported in the record. While appellants' 
contention is correct, we agree with appellees that the sophistication of the 
parties, or lack thereof, is not material here where our interpretation of the 
parties' agreement is made from the language of the instruments themselves, in 
conjunction with applicable law, without resort to extrinsic evidence to 
determine the parties' intent.

[¶28.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Appellants Ratcliff, 
Castleberry, and Young apparently were the principal, if not sole, owners and 
officers of Cliff & Co., Ltd. Castleberry died during the course of the 
proceedings below. Although Castleberry and Young were defendants below, neither 
(or, in the case of Castleberry, his representative or estate) pursued an 
appeal.

2 Stockmens Bank & 
Trust Company subsequently went into receivership with FDIC as the 
receiver.

3 The parties to this 
appeal somewhat surprisingly do not mention this warranty deed in their briefs, 
apparently attaching little significance to it. The vesting of title, however, 
is a critical factor with respect to determining the nature of the transaction 
at hand. See infra.

4 The sale figure was 
fairly close to the value of the property as appraised. The low figure in 
relation to the purchase price reflects the depressed local property market 
existing after the decline in energy industry activity.

5 Installment land 
contracts are alternatively known as contracts for deed.

6 The posture of 
appellants in this case is diametrically opposed to that normally taken by 
purchasers in cases of this sort. In the usual situation, the purchaser wishes 
to avoid the harshness of a forfeiture and seeks to have the agreement construed 
as a mortgage with the attendant protections afforded by mortgages, including 
the right of redemption and the right to surplus proceeds upon foreclosure sale. 
Appellants' position is again a reflection of the previously noted deflated 
property values in CampbellCounty.

7 Cases reaching a similar 
result, although generally referring to situations where only one remedy was 
expressly provided, include: Anderson v. Long Grove Country Club Estates, Inc., 
111 Ill. App.2d 127, 249 N.E.2d 343 (1969) (where forfeiture provision in 
contract is not exclusive, seller may seek any other legal remedy available to 
him); Lonas v. Metropolitan Mortgage and Securities Company, 432 P.2d 603 
(Alaska 1967) (seller not limited to remedy of forfeiture provided in the 
contract where that remedy was not made exclusive); Kathman v. Wakeling, 69 Wn.2d 195, 417 P.2d 840 (1966) (a remedy provided in a contract is to be 
considered permissive rather than exclusive, unless made exclusive in the 
contract either expressly or by necessary implication). See also Annotation, 
Provision in land contract for pecuniary forfeiture or penalty upon default of 
the purchaser as affecting the vendor's right to maintain an action for the 
purchase price, 32 A.L.R. 617 (1924) (it is frequently held that forfeiture 
provision does not preclude vendor from maintaining an action for the purchase 
price or an action upon a note or other obligation given for the purchase 
price).

8 Wyoming has long adhered 
to the mortgage lien theory. Marple, 750 P.2d 1315; Robinson Merc. Co. v. 
Davis, 26 Wyo. 484, 187 P. 931 
(1920).

9 The unorthodox mix of 
conveyancing documents in this case is similar to that which this Court 
encountered in the Marple case, wherein we described the sales documents as 
curious and convoluted. Marple, 750 P.2d  at 1317-18.

10 The 1986 liquor license 
assignment to appellees in connection with the "Modification Agreement" also 
indicates ownership of the property and assets of the business by the buyer.