Case Title: BARNES v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
BARNES v. STATE2004 WY 146100 P.3d 1256Case Number: 04-26Decided: 11/29/2004Notice:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
October 
Term, A.D. 2004

 
 

MICHAEL 
BARNES,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Goshen County

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Dion 
J. Custis, Cheyenne, WY.  Argument 
by Mr. Custis.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, 
Prosecution Assistance Program; Jenny L. Craig, Student Director; and Chris 
Leger, Student Intern.  Argument by 
Ms. Craig.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and DONNELL, 
D.J.

 

 

 

            
DONNELL, 
District Judge.

 

[¶1]      Appellant, 
Michael Barnes, appeals a jury's verdict finding him guilty on one count of 
aggravated assault.  He claims 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Finding no support for this assertion in the record, we 
affirm.

 

[¶2]      On January 9, 
2003, Goshen County law enforcement officers received a call to respond to a 
residence on the north side of Torrington, Wyoming.  They were advised a female caller had 
reported that she was being threatened by a man with a gun.  The first officer to arrive at the scene 
was Sheriff Donald J. Murphy, followed shortly thereafter by Torrington Chief of 
Police Billy Janes, Wyoming Highway Patrolman Michael Lowry, and other 
officers.

 

[¶3]      Sheriff Murphy 
immediately observed a white pickup truck with the doors open and an individual, 
later identified as Appellant, standing between the open doors with what 
appeared to be a rifle or shotgun.  
Sheriff Murphy opened the door on his patrol car and ordered Appellant to 
put the weapon down.  Appellant then 
stepped away from his truck, lowered the gun, which turned out to be a shotgun, 
to his hip and advanced toward the Sheriff with one hand on the pistol grip of 
the shotgun, the other hand on the fore-end, and the barrel pointed in the 
Sheriff's direction.  Sheriff Murphy 
later testified that this action frightened him because Appellant seemed to be 
"looking through" him or somehow not seeing him.  Sheriff Murphy drew his service pistol, 
pointed it at Appellant, and continued to order him to drop the shotgun.  Trooper Lowry had, in the meantime, 
retrieved a shotgun from his own patrol vehicle; loaded the chamber; and pointed 
it at Appellant.  He, too, ordered 
Appellant to drop his weapon.  
Appellant turned and looked at Trooper Lowry, then lowered the barrel of 
his shotgun and laid it against his pickup truck.  He was then taken into custody and 
transported to the Goshen County detention facility.

 

[¶4]      Appellant was 
subsequently tried on one count of aggravated assault in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2003).  
At trial, the primary witnesses for the State were Sheriff Murphy, Chief 
of Police Janes, and Trooper Lowry.  
During the course of voir dire, prospective jurors were questioned by the 
State, and to a much greater degree by the defense, concerning their knowledge 
and opinions of law enforcement officers in general and their relationships, 
contacts with, and perceptions of the three primary witnesses in 
particular.  A number of potential 
jurors were dismissed for cause after having expressed strong opinions, one way 
or another, about law enforcement officers or the witnesses.  No juror was seated who had described 
any relationship with, or strong opinion of, Sheriff Murphy or the other 
officers.  The defense passed the 
jury for cause at the conclusion of voir dire.

 

[¶5]      Appellant now 
asserts ineffective assistance of counsel.  
He argues, first, that trial counsel failed to adequately question 
potential jurors to ferret out undue prejudice.  Second, he argues that, since Sheriff 
Murphy was an elected official and the victim of the crime, his attorney's 
performance was deficient in failing to request a change of venue prior to 
trial.  Appellant asserts that one 
or more persons on the jury must have voted for Sheriff Murphy; that such 
persons must, therefore, have been inherently biased in favor of the sheriff's 
testimony; that Appellant could not, therefore, receive a fair trial in Goshen 
County; and that a change of venue should have been requested.  He states the following issue for our 
consideration:

 

Appellant's case was prejudiced due to the ineffective assistance of 
counsel.

 

The 
State's issues are stated with somewhat greater 
particularity:

 

I.  Did 
Appellant's trial counsel provide ineffective assistance when she did not file a 
motion for a change of venue?

 

II.  Did 
Appellant's trial counsel fail to examine prospective jurors effectively during 
voir dire, and thereby deny Appellant the effective assistance of 
counsel?

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶6]      We have recently 
specified the standard of review in cases involving claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel:

 

            
When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
paramount determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial 
counsel's acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance.  Herdt v. 
State, 891 P.2d 793, 796 (Wyo. 1995); Starr v. State, 888 P.2d 1262, 
1266-67 (Wyo. 1995); Arner v. State, 872 P.2d 100, 104 (Wyo. 1994); 
Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 (Wyo. 1986).  The reviewing court should indulge a 
strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all 
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.  Herdt, at 796; Starr, at 
1266; Arner, at 104; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 
104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

 

            
Under the two-prong standard articulated in Strickland and 
Frias, an appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must 
demonstrate on the record that counsel's performance was deficient and that 
prejudice resulted.  
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064; Starr, at 
1266; King v. State, 810 P.2d 119, 125 (Wyo. 1991) (Cardine, J., 
dissenting); Campbell v. State, 728 P.2d 628, 629 (Wyo. 1986); 
Frias, 722 P.2d  at 145.  In 
other words, to warrant reversal on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, an appellant must demonstrate that his counsel failed to "render such 
assistance as would have been offered by a reasonably competent attorney" and 
that "counsel's deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case."  Lower v. State, 786 P.2d 346, 349 
(Wyo. 1990).  "The benchmark for 
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so 
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."  Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 686, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064.  

 

Asch 
[v. State, 2003 WY 18, 62 P.3d 945 (Wyo. 2203)], ¶11 (quoting Becker 
v. State, 2002 WY 126, ¶12, 53 P.3d 94, ¶12 (Wyo. 2002); Reyna v. 
State, 2001 WY 105, ¶19, 33 P.3d 1129, ¶19 (Wyo. 2001); Chapman v. 
State, 2001 WY 25, ¶6, 18 P.3d 1164, ¶6 (Wyo. 2001); Grainey v. 
State, 997 P.2d 1035, 1038-39 (Wyo. 2000)).  The burden of proving that counsel was 
ineffective rests entirely on an appellant.  Asch, ¶11 (citing Barkell v. 
State, 2002 WY 153, ¶10, 55 P.3d 1239, ¶10 (Wyo. 2002)).  To satisfy his burden, an appellant must 
provide more than mere speculation or equivocal inferences.  Sincock v. State, 2003 WY 115, 
¶37, 76 P.3d 323, ¶37 (Wyo. 2003) (citing Barkell, 
¶13).

 

Duke 
v. State, 
2004 WY 120, ¶36, 99 P.3d 928, ¶36 (Wyo. 2004).

 

 

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶7]      Appellant asserts 
he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed 
to request 
a change of venue.  Of course, a 
change of venue may be granted only under certain limited 
circumstances:

 

            
Criminal defendants in Wyoming have a constitutional right to a trial by 
an impartial jury.  Wyoming's 
constitutional provision grants the right to trial "by an impartial jury of the 
county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed."  Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10.  The legislative provision mirroring the 
constitution requires "[e]very criminal case shall be tried in the county in 
which the indictment or offense charged is found, except as otherwise provided 
by law."  Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 1-7-102(a) (Lexis 1999).  Trial proceedings are transferred to 
another county "only if the court is satisfied that there exists within the 
county where the prosecution is pending so great a prejudice against the 
defendant that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in that 
county."  W.R.Cr.P. 
21(a).

 

Urbigkit 
v. State, 2003 
WY 57, ¶27, 67 P.3d 1207, ¶27 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Nixon v. State, 
994 P.2d 324, 327 (Wyo. 1999)).  
This case was not one that generated a great deal of pretrial 
publicity.  In fact, most of the 
prospective jurors had no knowledge of the case when they reported for jury 
duty.  The question, then, is not 
whether a change of venue might have been appropriate prior to voir dire, as 
there was no apparent reason to anticipate such, but whether voir dire, if 
properly handled by defense counsel, would have revealed "so great a prejudice 
against the defendant that [he could not] obtain a fair and impartial trial in 
[Goshen County]."  
Urbigkit, 
¶27.  Absent such, a change 
of venue could not have been granted.

 

[¶8]      Here, Appellant 
is required to meet a two-part test.  
First, he must show that defense counsel's performance was deficient and, 
second, that this deficiency prejudiced him.  Duke, ¶36.  In cases involving jury selection, we 
have stated "[b]ecause voir dire questioning techniques are diverse, any 
inadequacy in voir dire questioning must be egregious and obvious to fall below 
the line of competence."  
Sorensen v. State, 6 P.3d 657, 661 (Wyo. 
2000).

 

[¶9]      Our review of the 
record in this matter reveals no reason to conclude that defense counsel's 
performance in questioning potential jurors was in any way deficient.  It should be noted that her questioning 
followed an in-depth examination by the prosecutor that revealed several 
relationships with law enforcement officers and potential biases among the 
members of the jury panel.  Despite 
the fact that Appellant's attorney was, quite properly, not permitted to ask 
questions that had been previously asked and answered, she was able to delve 
into issues of law enforcement relationships and bias in considerable 
detail.  Defense counsel asked 
potential jurors about people they knew, including law enforcement officers and 
members of Appellant's family.  She 
asked about opinions, rumors, feelings about, and relationships with law, 
enforcement officers.  Because the 
alleged crime involved a firearm, she asked about past experiences with guns and 
violent crime.  Ultimately, she 
succeeded in having four potential jurors excused for cause because of their 
relationships with, and strong prejudices in favor of, law enforcement 
officers.  In fact, the only 
potential juror who expressed any sort of bias at all and who was not excused 
for cause was one Mrs. Tollefson.  
However, Mrs. Tollefson did not sit on the jury.  We conclude that Appellant has not shown 
any error so egregious and obvious as to fall below the line of competence.  That being the case, we need not 
consider whether his defense was somehow prejudiced.  Sorensen, at 
661.

 

[¶10]   Appellant asserts one other 
claim.  He argues that the nature of 
the sheriff's position, that being an elected office, was such as to cause 
inherent prejudice in the sheriff's favor on the part of anyone who voted for 
him.  Appellant concludes that 
defense counsel should have inquired into potential jurors' voting decisions 
when Sheriff Murphy was elected.  He 
argues that the district court then should have presumed some sort of 
irreversible prejudice on the part of any such venire person who had voted for 
Sheriff Murphy, thus requiring a change of venue.

 

[¶11]   We need not determine whether 
inquiry into an individual's secret ballot is proper.1  We simply do not see that such 
inquisition, even if proper, would have led to any additional pertinent 
information.  Venire members were 
asked about their prejudices, their feelings, and their opinions concerning law 
enforcement officers in general and, where appropriate, Sheriff Murphy in 
particular.  Several members of the 
venire revealed biases or prejudice that resulted in their dismissals.  We see no reason to conclude here that 
questions about one's voting record would have revealed any additional 
information or would have led any juror who eventually was seated, and who 
expressed no bias or prejudice, to suddenly resolve he or she could not be 
impartial simply because that juror might have voted for one of the witnesses in 
the past.  Nothing in the record 
suggests that the trial court reasonably could have concluded that Appellant 
could not receive a fair trial in Goshen County, and nothing suggests a change 
of venue would have been appropriate.

 

[¶12]   Appellant's argument inevitably 
leads to the conclusion that a change of venue might be necessary in any case 
where a principal witness or a victim is also an elected official.  Obviously, that result would apply in 
most criminal trials and nearly any civil matter involving the government or an 
elected official either as a party or as a factual witness.  This Court is aware of no state where 
such is the rule or practice and, in a state like Wyoming, such would be 
practically impossible.  In any 
event, we are unable to conclude that Appellant was prejudiced, 
in any respect, by the failure to inquire into potential jurors' voting 
decisions.

 

[¶13]   Appellant's conviction and sentence 
are affirmed in all respects.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1While 
we do not decide the issue here, it is worth noting that at least one court that 
has considered the question has held that inquiry into how a potential juror 
voted in a secret election is not proper.  
Barry P. Goode, Religion, 
Politics, Race, and Ethnicity: The Range and Limits of Voir Dire, 92 Ky. 
L.J. 601, 628 (2004); Wallace v. 
State, 2004 Tex.App. LEXIS 5541 (2004); State v. Bolstad, 524 N.W.2d 647 
(Wisc.App. 1994).