Case Title: State ex rel Pipoly v. State Teachers Retirement Sys.

Citation: 2002-Ohio-2219

Docket Number: 20011797

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-05-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Pipoly v. State Teachers Retirement Sys., 95 Ohio St.3d 327, 2002-Ohio-
2219.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. PIPOLY, APPELLANT, v. STATE TEACHERS RETIREMENT 
SYSTEM, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Pipoly v. State Teachers Retirement Sys., 95 Ohio St.3d 
327, 2002-Ohio-2219.] 
Schools — Mandamus sought to compel State Teachers Retirement System of 
Ohio to award relator disability retirement benefits based on claim of 
multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome — Court of appeals’ denial of 
writ affirmed when relator fails to establish a clear legal right to 
disability retirement benefits or a corresponding clear legal duty on the 
part of STRS to provide them. 
(No. 2001-1797 — Submitted March 12, 2002 — Decided May 22, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 00AP-1081. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Appellant, Pamela J. Pipoly, worked as a swim instructor for the 
Mahoning County Board of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities at 
the Leonard Kirtz School in Austintown, Ohio.  After being exposed to certain 
chemicals in the enclosed pool area at which she worked, she took an employer-
approved unpaid disability leave of absence from September 13, 1994, to 
September 1, 1997.  Pipoly worked half days on September 2 and 3, 1997, and 
stopped after she again experienced difficulty with her work environment.  Her 
employer advised her to apply for disability retirement benefits.  Pipoly had 
previously been allowed workers’ compensation benefits for hypersensitivity 
reaction to chlorine and possible trichloramine, disorders related to chemical 
bronchitis, tachycardia, allergic rhinitis, maxillary sinusitis, chemical sensitivity, 
and major depression. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶2} 
In October 1997, Pipoly applied for disability retirement benefits 
with appellee, State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio (“STRS”).  Pipoly 
claimed that she was incapacitated for the performance of her duties as a teacher 
because of multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome, which she acquired while 
working as a swim instructor.  Pipoly also submitted the reports of Stoyan 
Daskalov, M.D., one of her attending physicians, and Frank J. Agresta, Ph.D., a 
psychologist who had examined her in 1995 in conjunction with her workers’ 
compensation claim.  Dr. Daskalov diagnosed Pipoly as suffering from allergic 
rhinitis and chemical sensitivity, but at one point in his report opined that she was 
not permanently incapacitated for the performance of duty as a teacher, because 
she could teach in an appropriate environment.  Agresta concluded that Pipoly 
suffered from depression and that this condition was permanently incapacitating. 
{¶3} 
Psychiatrist Ralph G. Walton, M.D., conducted an examination of 
Pipoly on behalf of STRS in February 1998, and he determined that he could not 
find any psychiatric reasons for disability. 
{¶4} 
In March 1998, a STRS medical review board, which consisted of 
three physicians, reviewed the application and evidence and determined that 
Pipoly was not disabled for purposes of disability retirement benefits.  After 
Pipoly submitted further information, including records relating to her workers’ 
compensation claim, the medical review board requested additional medical 
evaluations of her. 
{¶5} 
Richard A. Katzman, M.D., a specialist in pulmonary diseases, 
examined Pipoly and determined that although her symptoms were consistent 
with those of persons who claimed to have multiple chemical sensitivity 
syndrome, he could not find objective evidence of any disease.  Dr. Katzman 
concluded that Pipoly was not incapacitated for the performance of duty as a 
teacher.  Jeffrey C. Hutzler, M.D., a psychiatrist, examined Pipoly and diagnosed 
panic disorder but found no signs of psychosis or other major psychiatric disorder.  
January Term, 2002 
3 
Dr. Hutzler concluded that Pipoly is “not incapacitated in her ability to teach from 
a psychiatric standpoint.” 
{¶6} 
Pipoly again submitted additional reports, including several by one 
of her treating physicians, Donald S. Nelson, M.D.  Dr. Nelson diagnosed Pipoly 
as having multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome and stated that she was 
completely disabled by this condition. 
{¶7} 
In February 1999, upon request by STRS, Pipoly was examined by 
Roger A. Friedman, M.D.  Dr. Friedman noted that the diagnosis of multiple 
chemical sensitivity syndrome was questionable because of doubts regarding its 
existence, and he determined that Pipoly suffered from routine allergies.  Dr. 
Friedman concluded that there was no evidence of any permanent disability. 
{¶8} 
In May 1999, the medical review board recommended that 
Pipoly’s application for disability retirement benefits be denied. 
{¶9} 
Pipoly then submitted additional records from Dr. Nelson, and 
STRS ordered further evaluation.  Richard L. Green, M.D., examined her in 
August 1999 and stated that there is a “tremendous controversy in the medical 
community about labeling this disorder [i.e., multiple chemical sensitivity 
syndrome] a disease,” but that he believed that multiple chemical sensitivity 
syndrome is “primarily a psychiatric disorder and is not founded on any medical 
pathophysiologic abnormalities.”  Dr. Green stated that there were “no objective 
physical findings and no objective reproducible and scientifically reliable 
laboratory studies to confirm any disease and the ongoing disease process.” 
{¶10} Dr. Friedman received the additional evidence submitted by Pipoly 
and again concluded that she was not permanently incapacitated for the 
performance of her duty as a teacher. 
{¶11} On September 2, 1999, the disability committee of STRS voted to 
sustain the recommendation of the medical review board to deny Pipoly’s 
application for disability retirement benefits.  In March 2000, Pipoly submitted 
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two additional evaluations to STRS, including an evaluation by Scott E. Singer, 
M.D., M.P.H., in which he stated that he was unable to verify with objective 
evidence any of Pipoly’s concerns regarding her claim of multiple chemical 
sensitivity syndrome.  On April 14, 2000, following an adjudicatory hearing, the 
retirement board of STRS unanimously denied Pipoly’s application for disability 
retirement benefits.  The board did not specify its reasons for denying benefits. 
{¶12} In September 2000, Pipoly filed a complaint in the Court of 
Appeals for Franklin County for a writ of mandamus to compel STRS to award 
her disability retirement benefits.  Following the submission of evidence and 
briefs, a court of appeals magistrate issued a detailed decision recommending 
denial of the writ.  In August 2001, the court of appeals approved and adopted the 
magistrate’s decision and denied the requested writ of mandamus.  This cause is 
now before the court upon Pipoly’s appeal as of right. 
{¶13} The General Assembly established STRS to pay retirement 
allowances and other benefits of Ohio public school teachers.  R.C. 3307.03; see, 
generally, Buchter, Hastings, Sheeran & Stype, Ohio School Law (2001) 264, 
Section T 11.1.  The State Teachers Retirement Board (“STRB”) manages the 
STRS funds.  R.C. 3307.03.  The determination of whether a STRS member is 
entitled to disability retirement is solely within the province of the STRB.  See 
R.C. 3307.62(F); cf. Fair v. School Emp. Retirement Sys. (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 
118, 7 O.O.3d 192, 372 N.E.2d 814, syllabus, holding similarly regarding the 
disability retirement determination by the School Employees Retirement Board 
for members of the School Employees Retirement System. 
{¶14} Pipoly asserts that she is entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel 
STRS to award her disability retirement benefits.  The determination by STRS 
and its retirement board, STRB, of whether a person is entitled to disability 
retirement benefits is reviewable by mandamus because R.C. 3307.62 does not 
provide any appeal from the administrative determination.  See, e.g., State ex rel. 
January Term, 2002 
5 
Ryan v. State Teachers Retirement Sys. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 362, 364, 643 
N.E.2d 1122; State ex rel. McMaster v. School Emp. Retirement Sys. (1994), 69 
Ohio St.3d 130, 133, 630 N.E.2d 701; State ex rel. Ruby v. State Teachers 
Retirement Sys. of Ohio (Dec. 6, 1989), Summit App. No. 13844, 1989 WL 
147983 (“Since R.C. 3307.42 [now R.C. 3307.62] does not provide an adequate 
remedy at law, a cause of action in mandamus is available” to challenge the 
decision of the STRS retirement board to terminate disability retirement benefits); 
cf. R.C. 119.12 and 2506.01, which are inapplicable here.  Consequently, 
mandamus is an appropriate remedy where no statutory right of appeal is 
available to correct an abuse of discretion by an administrative body.  See State ex 
rel. Alben v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 133, 135, 666 N.E.2d 
1119.  The term “abuse of discretion” means an unreasonable, arbitrary, or 
unconscionable decision.  State ex rel. Elsass v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Commrs. 
(2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 529, 533, 751 N.E.2d 1032. 
Duty to Explain Decision on Disability Retirement Benefits 
{¶15} Pipoly initially asserts that she is entitled to the requested writ of 
mandamus because STRS did not identify or explain its reasons for denying her 
application for disability retirement benefits pursuant to State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. 
Comm. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 203, 567 N.E.2d 245.  In Noll, we held, “In any 
order of the Industrial Commission granting or denying benefits to a claimant, the 
commission must specifically state what evidence has been relied upon, and 
briefly explain the reasoning for its decision.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at syllabus. 
{¶16} Upon consideration, we decline Pipoly’s request to extend Noll to 
orders of the STRS and STRB granting or denying disability retirement benefits.  
By the plain language of its syllabus, Noll is limited to Industrial Commission 
orders involving workers’ compensation claims.  “ ‘The syllabus of a Supreme 
Court opinion states the controlling point or points of law decided in and 
necessarily arising from the facts of the specific case before the Court for 
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adjudication.’ ”  (Emphasis sic.)  Agee v. Russell (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 540, 546, 
751 N.E.2d 1043, quoting former S.Ct.R.Rep.Op. 1(B).  Noll did not specify its 
application to all administrative proceedings and it did not involve any matters 
other than workers’ compensation. 
{¶17} Moreover, Noll relied heavily on State ex rel. Mitchell v. Robbins 
& Myers, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 481, 484, 6 OBR 531, 453 N.E.2d 721, where 
we granted a writ of mandamus directing the commission to specify the basis for 
its decision, “first and foremost, because the duty to so specify the basis for its 
decisions is imposed upon the [Industrial] [C]ommission by statute.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
{¶18} It is axiomatic that in mandamus proceedings, the creation of the 
legal duty that a relator seeks to enforce is the distinct function of the legislative 
branch of government, and courts are not authorized to create the legal duty 
enforceable in mandamus.  State ex rel. Woods v. Oak Hill Community Med. Ctr., 
Inc. (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 459, 461, 746 N.E.2d 1108; Davis v. State ex rel. 
Pecsok (1936), 130 Ohio St. 411, 5 O.O. 20, 200 N.E. 181, paragraph one of the 
syllabus; State ex rel. Stanley v. Cook (1946), 146 Ohio St. 348, 32 O.O. 419, 66 
N.E.2d 207, paragraph eight of the syllabus.  Accepting Pipoly’s request to extend 
Noll and Mitchell  to require that STRS and STRB state what evidence they relied 
upon and specify their reasoning in denying her application for disability 
retirement benefits would contravene the foregoing precedent because neither 
R.C. 3307.62 nor any administrative rule adopted thereunder imposes any duty on 
STRS or STRB to do so.  Woods, Davis, and Stanley; see, also, State ex rel. 
Leonard v. White (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 516, 517, 664 N.E.2d 527 (“R.C. 149.43 
does not impose any duty on public officials to provide written reasons for 
withholding requested records”); but, cf., State ex rel. Ochs v. Indus. Comm. 
(1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 674, 710 N.E.2d 1126, where we extended Noll in a 
mandamus proceeding to apply to a decision of the Bureau of Workers’ 
January Term, 2002 
7 
Compensation disapproving a settlement agreement despite the absence of any 
statutory duty imposing these requirements on the bureau. 
{¶19} The Court of Appeals for Franklin County similarly rejected a 
request to extend Noll to disability determinations of the School Employees 
Retirement System by ordering it to explain its decisions: 
{¶20} “Thus, while this court has recently extended the requirements of 
Noll in the context of disability determinations under the Public Employees 
Retirement System (‘PERS’) * * * we did so in part because the regulations at 
issue there specified that the PERS board shall state the basis for its denial.  Here, 
nothing in the statute or regulations suggests that the SERS retirement board or 
the members of its medical advisory board must issue a decision [consistent with 
Noll].”  (Emphasis sic.)  State ex rel. Copeland v. School Emp. Retirement Sys. 
(Aug. 5, 1999), Franklin App. No. 98AP-1173, 1999 WL 569279, appeal 
dismissed based on mootness (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 1507, 728 N.E.2d 1. 
{¶21} Furthermore, in Noll, 57 Ohio St.3d at 206, 567 N.E.2d 245, the 
lead opinion  emphasized that our “docket has been inundated with * * * cases” in 
which the commission failed to comply with Mitchell and its progeny.  There has 
been no comparable flood of cases involving disability determinations by STRS 
and STRB.  And the administrative record in this case, as submitted in the 
mandamus proceeding, is not so voluminous that a review of the record is overly 
burdensome.  In fact, our review in a mandamus proceeding challenging an 
administrative determination on an application for disability retirement benefits is 
not any more burdensome than reviewing a summary judgment entered by a trial 
court without a detailed opinion.  See Civ.R. 52. 
{¶22} Therefore, 
while 
extending 
Noll 
to 
STRS 
and 
STRB 
determinations may be tempting based on policy considerations, see Ochs, 85 
Ohio St.3d at 675-676, 710 N.E.2d 1126, we will not impose the Noll 
requirements in the absence of a statutory duty or a comparable need for these 
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requirements in cases other than workers’ compensation cases.  See, e.g., State ex 
rel. Schwaben v. School Emp. Retirement Sys. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 280, 285, 
667 N.E.2d 398 (“However, while it may be tempting to decide this case on 
subjective principles of equity and fundamental fairness, this court has a greater 
obligation to follow the law”).  Accordingly, STRS had no clear legal duty 
cognizable in mandamus to specify what evidence it relied upon and explain the 
reasoning for its retirement board’s decision denying Pipoly’s application for 
disability retirement benefits. 
Denial of Disability Retirement Benefits 
{¶23} Pipoly next asserts that STRS abused its discretion in denying 
disability retirement benefits.  Pipoly contends that overwhelming evidence from 
her treating physician, Dr. Nelson, as well as other examiners, demonstrated that 
her multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome precludes her from returning to her 
job as a swim instructor.  In order to be entitled to disability retirement benefits, 
an STRS member must be mentally or physically incapacitated for the 
performance of duty by a disabling condition, either permanent or presumed to be 
permanent for twelve continuous months following the filing of an application.  
R.C. 3307.62(C). 
{¶24} As noted previously, pursuant to R.C. 3307.62, the determination 
whether a member of STRS is entitled to disability retirement benefits is vested 
solely in STRS.  See Schwaben, 76 Ohio St.3d at 284, 667 N.E.2d 398, and Fair, 
supra, at syllabus, construing analogous statutes.  STRS and its retirement board 
were not required to accept the views of those physicians, including Dr. Nelson, 
concerning multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome, as stated by the same court of 
appeals recently in a separate case involving STRB: 
{¶25} “Given the apparent controversy in the medical community (as 
reflected in the record) concerning appellant’s medical condition, it was well 
within the discretion of STRB to appoint additional examining physicians whose 
January Term, 2002 
9 
views on multiple chemical sensitivity might differ from the views of appellant’s 
treating physicians.  Much of the concern on the part of STRB as reflected in the 
record relates to appellant’s desire not to be examined by an appointed examiner, 
but, rather, for STRB to make its determination on the basis of opinions rendered 
by her treating physicians.”  State ex rel. Peaspanen v. Ohio State Teachers 
Retirement Bd. (2001), 143 Ohio App.3d 164, 170, 757 N.E.2d 826. 
{¶26} STRS did not abuse its discretion here in refusing to credit the 
opinions of Dr. Nelson and other examining physicians who determined that 
Pipoly suffered from multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome and that it was 
disabling for purposes of STRS disability retirement benefits.  Dr. Katzman, Dr. 
Friedman, and Dr. Singer examined Pipoly and concluded that there was no 
objective evidence of a disabling physical disorder referred to as multiple 
chemical sensitivity syndrome.  Dr. Hutzler and Dr. Walton examined Pipoly and 
found no evidence of any disabling mental disorder.  R.C. 3307.62 did not require 
STRS or its retirement board to consider only the findings of Pipoly’s treating 
physicians.  Cf., e.g., Schwaben, 76 Ohio St.3d at 282, 667 N.E.2d 398, and 
McMaster, construing an analogous disability retirement provision.  Dr. Katzman, 
Dr. Hutzler, Dr. Friedman, Dr. Walton, and the three physicians on the STRS 
medical review board all agreed that based on the objective medical evidence, 
including medical examinations of Pipoly, she was not permanently incapacitated 
for the performance of duty as a teacher. 
{¶27} The decision of the STRS retirement board to deny Pipoly’s 
application for disability retirement benefits was neither unreasonable, arbitrary, 
nor unconscionable; instead, it was based on substantial and significant medical 
evidence.  See, also, Theresa Canavan’s Case (2000), 432 Mass. 304, 314-315, 
733 N.E.2d 1042 (trial court erroneously permitted evidence about multiple 
chemical sensitivities where there was insufficient evidence that diagnosis was 
based on reliable methodology); Rakowski v. McCall (1998), 246 A.D.2d 734, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
667 N.Y.S. 512 (administrator of public employees’ retirement system had 
exclusive authority to evaluate and resolve conflicts in medical testimony 
concerning certain medical experts’ diagnosis of multiple chemical sensitivity 
allegedly triggered by unknown substances in disability retirement claimant’s 
workplace).  Pipoly is also not entitled to relief under State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm 
(1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 315, 626 N.E.2d 666, because this is not a workers’ 
compensation case involving permanent total disability and STRB did not abuse 
its discretion in denying disability benefits. 
{¶28} Based on the foregoing, Pipoly has not established a clear legal 
right to disability retirement benefits or a corresponding clear legal duty on the 
part of STRS to provide them.  Accordingly, we affirm the well-reasoned 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Brown & Margolius, L.P.A., James Mitchell Brown and Rachel C. 
Wilson, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Christopher S. Cook, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. 
__________________