Case Title: WILDE, JR. v STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 01-180

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-08-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
WILDE, JR. v STATE2003 WY 9374 P.3d 699Case Number: 01-180Decided: 08/13/2003
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

DANNIE 
L. WILDE, JR.,

 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Tina N. 
Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument presented by Ms. Kerin.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Georgia L. 
Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument presented by Ms. 
Tibbetts.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

Hill, C.J., 
delivered the opinion of the Court; GOLDEN, J., filed a specially 
concurring opinion.

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant, Dannie 
L. Wilde, Jr. (Wilde), contends that the State and the district court committed 
a series of errors during his trial, which are so serious that his conviction 
for first-degree sexual assault1 must be reversed.  Wilde contends:  The trial court erred in determining 
that the child witnesses were competent and that their testimony was not 
"tainted;" the district court allowed the admission of multiple, hearsay 
repetitions of the victim's story; witnesses were allowed to vouch for the 
credibility of the victim; the district court allowed the admission of 
irrelevant and prejudicial "lifestyle" evidence; the prosecutor engaged in 
misconduct by violating the district court's liminal order; the district court 
committed reversible error by commenting to the jury about the effect testifying 
had on the victim; and, finally, that in combination those errors amount to 
cumulative error requiring reversal.

 

[¶2]      We conclude that 
there were errors in the proceedings below of such significance that reversal of 
Wilde's conviction is required.  
Thus, the judgment and sentence of the district court will be reversed 
and the case remanded to the district court for a new 
trial.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Wilde raises 
these issues:

 

I.          
Did the trial court err in allowing the repetition of the alleged 
victim's story through hearsay testimony?

 

II.          
Did the trial court err in its determination that the child witnesses 
were competent and "untainted?"

 

III.         
Did the trial court err in allowing irrelevant, prejudicial information 
concerning [Wilde's] lifestyle?

 

IV.        Was 
the testimony of the alleged victim improperly bolstered and vouched for by the 
testimony of Dr. Tubach (a pediatrician), Ms. Huyler (a "forensic interviewer") 
and the alleged victim's mother?

 

V.        Did 
the prosecutor commit misconduct by violating the liminal order, in closing 
argument and at sentencing?

 

VI.        Did 
the trial court commit reversible error when it commented, in the presence of 
the jury, what the effect of testifying was upon the alleged victim, as it 
improperly interjected judicial bias into the trial and expressed an opinion 
that the trial court believed the alleged victim's 
testimony?

 

VII.       Does 
cumulative error mandate a new trial for [Wilde]?

 

The 
State rephrases and reorders the issues as follows:

 

I.          
Did the district court err in concluding that the child victim and her 
sister were competent to testify at trial?

 

II.          
Was [Wilde] denied a fair trial by the district court's evidentiary 
rulings?

 

III.         
Did the testimony of three witnesses impermissibly vouch for the 
credibility of the victim, necessitating reversal of [Wilde's] 
conviction?

 

IV.        Did 
the prosecutor's conduct during trial and at sentencing constitute prosecutorial 
misconduct?

 

V.        Did 
the district court commit reversible error by its comment during the testimony 
of the child victim?

 

VI.        Was 
[Wilde] denied a fair trial due to the cumulative effects of the alleged errors 
occurring at trial?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      The nature of the 
issues raised requires us to set out the details of the evidence pertinent to 
those issues as we address them individually.  For purposes of background and context, 
we will set out the two competing theories presented to the jury for 
resolution.  The victim, AM, 
testified that Wilde lured her into his bedroom to watch him perform a body 
piercing.  AM assumed at the time 
that Wilde was going to pierce his tongue.  
Once in the bedroom, Wilde actually exposed himself to AM and pierced his 
genitals by inserting a "barbell" type piece of jewelry into his scrotum, just 
below the penis.  Wilde admitted to 
doing this piercing in front of AM, but testified that the events of that day 
then ended.

 

[¶5]      AM's testimony 
continued, averring that Wilde showed her a pistol he kept in his dresser drawer 
(and that eventually he threatened her with the pistol, telling AM she had 
better not tell what was happening), sat on top of her, pulled her pants down 
and attempted, unsuccessfully, to pierce her labium, and then proceeded to 
forcibly rape her.  AM testified 
that during the course of the sexual assault, her genitalia were injured by 
pieces of jewelry that were attached to Wilde's genitalia.  These events were alleged to have 
occurred on or about March 15, 2000.

 

DISCUSSION

 

 

[¶6]      Wilde called into 
question the competency of AM, as well as her sister AN.  Both of these child witnesses (ages 12 
and 7 at the time of trial, and 11 and 6 at the time of the alleged assault) 
admitted to telling false stories of sexual misconduct by their mother's husband 
and boyfriend.  The victim did not 
report the incident to her mother until two months after it allegedly 
occurred.  Thereafter, the victim 
talked with a number of investigators, health care professionals, and a social 
work professional, relating the same story that she told to her mother.  Wilde contended that the victim and her 
sister were not reliable witnesses because of the false accusations they had 
made in the past, and because their mother was motivated to influence their 
testimony about Wilde.  It could be 
inferred that a note she left for him was an attempt to use this situation to 
extort a pickup truck from Wilde.  
This occurred before she took her daughter to report to the 
authorities.  According to mother, 
AM delivered her revelations in installments, with each installment including 
ever more serious allegations, in response to mother's ever more insistent 
demands that AM tell the whole truth.  In addition, Wilde contended that the 
victim's testimony may have been "tainted" by the many interviews to which she 
was subjected prior to trial.

 

[¶7]      The standard of 
review applicable to a competency hearing is clearly 
established:

 

We 
have held that when a child is called into the courtroom to testify, and the 
child's competency is called into question by either party, it is the duty of 
the trial court to make an independent examination of the child to determine 
competency, and that determination will not be disturbed unless shown to be 
clearly erroneous.  English v. 
State, 982 P.2d 139, 145 (Wyo.1999).  
In English, we also held that an assertion that a child's 
testimony was tainted could best be comprehended as a part of the competency 
hearing and that a separate taint hearing is not required.  982 P.2d  at 146.   In English, we established 
that the requirement that a competency hearing on the issue of "taint," based on 
an assertion that the child's statements were the product of suggestive or 
coercive interview techniques, or some other potentially improper influence, is 
triggered whenever a party presents the court with "some evidence" that a child 
witness is incompetent.  982 P.2d at 
146-47;  Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46, 58 (Wyo.1999).

 

Alicea 
v. State, 
13 P.3d 693, 697 (Wyo. 2000) (footnote omitted); also see Billingsley v. 
State, 2003 WY 61, ¶¶9-10, 69 P.3d 390, ¶¶9-10 (Wyo. 
2003).

 

[¶8]      In this case, a 
competency hearing was conducted by the district court in accordance with the 
decisions cited above.  At the 
conclusion of that hearing, the district court determined that both the victim 
and her sister were competent to testify.  
As noted above, we will not overturn a trial court's determination that a 
witness is competent to testify unless that determination is clearly 
erroneous.  Our review of the record 
does not suggest that the trial court's rulings were clearly 
erroneous.

 

[¶9]      We do not 
question in any way the trial court's decision that the victim was competent to 
testify.  However, we do have some 
reservations as to whether the victim's sister was competent to testify to the 
very limited relevant information she was able to relate.  AN testified that she looked into 
Wilde's bedroom during the time that AM claimed to have been being raped.  AN said she was not able to see much, 
but perceived that AM and Wilde were "wrestling."  This testimony, of course, served a very 
important role in corroborating the victim's testimony.  The prosecutor's questioning of AN was 
largely leading and AN answered those questions fairly well.  However, when it came to the gravamen of 
the competency decision the district court had to make, AN faltered 
seriously.  After relating that she 
was only able to open the bedroom door a crack, her testimony 
continued:

 

            
Q.  So what happened when you opened the door a crack?  What did you see?

            
A.  I saw [AM] laying on the bed, and Dannie sitting at the 
bottom of her feet, and he was trying to take off her 
pants.

            
Q.  What did you think they were doing?

            
A.  Wrestling.

            
Q.  What did you do?

            
A.  I walked back out there [to the living room], and sat down 
and watched the movie.

            
Q.  When did you first tell somebody what you had seen that 
day?

            
A.  When [AM] told me what he did.

            
Q.  Did your mom ask you if you knew what 
happened?

            
A.  Yeah, when I saw them playing in the 
clubhouse.

            
Q.  Who else was there when your mom asked you 
that?

            
A.  [AM] and me and Paul.

            
Q.  Did you tell everybody, or did your mom take you somewhere 
else?

            
A.  Took me somewhere else.

            
Q.  Did you tell your mom what you saw when she took you 
somewhere else?

            
A.  Yes.

            
Q.  Where did you go.

            
A.  To the school that I went to when I was in 
kindergarten.

            
Q.  Was that close to your house?

            
A.  Yeah.

            
Q.  Do you recall what kind of questions your mom asked you 
about this?

            
A.  Yeah.

            
Q.  What?

            
A.  What happened.  
I forgot.

            
Q.  Did she already know what you had 
seen?

            
A.  What?

            
Q.  Did she already know what you had 
seen?

            
A.  Not yet, until I told her, she only 
knew.

            
Q.  Did she tell you to say anything?

            
A.  No.

            
Q.  Are you telling us the truth today?

            
A.  Yes.

 

The 
cross-examination, for which AN was not able to prepare, produced a 
significantly different result:

 

            
Q.  Has your sister [AM] ever asked you to lie 
before?

            
A.  No.

            
Q.  Ever in your whole life?

            
A.  Only once.

            
Q.  When was that?

            
A.  When we were  when my mom went to work, she needed someone 
to baby-sit us.

            
Q.  And what did [AM] lie about, or what did [AM] tell you to 
lie about?

            
A.  About Paul smacking my mom.

            
Q.  About Paul smacking your mom?

            
A.  Yes.

            
Q.  Is that what she told you?

            
A.  Yes.

            
Q.  Was that a lie?

            
A.  Yes.

            
Q.  Why was that a lie?

            
A.  Because that never even happened.

            
Q.  And so did you lie because [AM] asked you 
to?

            
A.  Yes, because we really needed a 
baby-sitter.

            
Q.  Because you what?

            
A.  Because we really needed a baby-sitter at this 
time.

            
Q.  Barely needed a baby-sitter at this 
time?

            
A.  If we really 

            
Q.  You really needed a baby-sitter at this 
time?

            
A.  Yes.

            
Q.  By someone besides Paul?

            
A.  Yeah.

            
Q.  So you wanted a different 
baby-sitter?

            
A.  Yes.

            
Q.  Why did you want a different 
baby-sitter?

            
A.  Because my mom didn't feel comfortable with us girls 
staying with a boy.

            
Q.  With Paul being a boy?

            
A.  Yeah.

            
Q.  Do you know why she didn't feel comfortable with you and 
[AM] staying with Paul?

            
A.  Because she kind of doesn't like boys being around young 
people.

            
Q.  Do you still live with Paul?

            
A.  Yes.

            
Q.  Is that still a problem?

            
A.  Yes.

            
Q.  Why is it still a problem?

            
A.  Because they fight a lot, and Paul keeps breaking my mom's 
heart by saying mean stuff, by saying "I hate your guts."

            
Q.  How do you know that her heart is 
broken?

            
A.  Because she tells us every bedtime to not worry, and she 
says what happened.

            
Q.  Did you and [AM] talk about coming to court 

            
A.  No.

            
Q.   today?

            
A.  Yeah.

            
Q.  What did you talk about?

            
A.  About I'm scared of Dannie.  We kept on saying, "I'm really scared of 
Dannie."

            
Q.  [AM] said that?

            
A.  Yeah.

            
Q.  Did you say that?

            
A.  Yeah.

            
Q.  Why did you say that?

            
A.  Because I am scared of Dannie.

            
Q.  Why?

            
A.  Because what he did to my sister.

            
Q.  You didn't see him do anything to your sister; is that 
right?

            
A.  I only saw him pulling down her pants.  That's the only part I 
saw.

            
Q.  And you thought they were wrestling?

            
A.  Yes.

            
Q.  Do they usually pull down pants to 
wrestle?

            
A.  No.

            
Q.  Why did you think it was wrestling?

            
A.  Because I didn't see that at first.  I just thought 

            
Q.  You didn't see what at first?

            
A.  Dannie pulling down my sister's 
pants.

            
Q.  How long were you watching?

            
A.  I only watched for a second, and then I closed the door and 
went.

            
Q.  So when did you find out that he pulled down her 
pants?

            
A.  When I saw it.

            
Q.  During that second.

            
A.  Yes.

            
Q.  So there was a second that had wrestling and pulling down 
pants in it?

            
A.  No.  I only saw 
pulling down pants.

            
Q.  So when did you see wrestling?

            
A.  I didn't.  I 
thought they were wrestling.

            
Q.  Do you like to wrestle?

            
A.  I can't remember.

            
Q.  Did you hear anything in the bedroom while you were outside 
the bedroom?

            
A.  No.

            
Q.  [But] you told me that [AM] told you to lie about Paul 

A.  Yes.

            
Q.   right?

            
A.  Yes.

            
Q.  [AM] told you to lie about anything else?

            
A.  I don't know because I'm losing my memories because I don't 
really know about the normal life.  All I really know about is what 

            
Q.  You don't know about normal life?

            
A.  Not yet.  I don't usually know about normal life unless 
I'm in the normal life.

            
Q.  What is normal life?

            
A.  It's where you go outside and play, run around, you eat 
dinner at night, you have breakfast in the morning, have lunch in the 
afternoon.

            
Q.  What's different from normal life?

            
A.  Getting 

            
Q.  What's the opposite of normal life?

            
A.  I don't know.

            
Q.  Do you know what opposites are?

            
A.  Yeah.

            
Q.  What's the opposite of hot?

            
A.  Cold.

            
Q.  What's the opposite of normal life?  What would be things 
you would be --  
that would be different and opposite from normal life?

            
A.  Getting hurt.

            
Q.  Are things that happen not in normal life true or not 
true?

            
A.  I don't know that question because I can't  I didn't hear 
you.

            
Q.  If something happens, and it's not normal life, the thing 
that happened, is it real or is it not real?

            
A.  Not real.

            
Q.  So things that don't happen in normal life aren't real, 
they're make believe?

            
A.  No.

            
Q.  What are they?

            
A.  They can be real; they can be not real.

            
Q.  What happened to your sister, was that normal life, was 
that real, was that not real, what was that?

            
A.  It was real.

            
Q.  And how do you know that?

            
A.  Because  because I know real, and I know not real.

            
Q.  How do you know that that was real?

            
A.  Because I see it in real life, and I didn't see in not real 
life.

            
Q.  Do you sometimes see things in not in real life?

            
A.  Yeah.

            
Q.  Like what?

            
A.  Like dinosaurs, like me playing with the dinosaurs, kind 
of.

            
Q.  Now, I asked you about times [AM] has asked you to lie.

            
A.  Yes.

            
Q.  Now, I want you to tell me other times that you've just 
lied.

            
A.  When I hit my sister, I said I didn't.

            
Q.  Any other times?

            
A.  When I  when I said that I don't like my sister, and [AM] 
went to go tell.  
I said I didn't like my sister.  I said that [AM] said that.

            
Q.  Have you ever lied about anyone touching you?

            
A.  Yes.

            
Q.  What did you lie about?

            
A.  My dad.

            
Q.  Who's your dad?

            
A.  [J]

            
Q.  What did you say about [J]?

            
A.  Touching me in a appropriate [sic] way with a spoon.

            
Q.  Well, what way did he touch you?

            
A.  Like in a spot where girls have to not show.

            
Q.  In the front part or the back part?

            
A.  Front.

            
Q.  Like, where you pee?

            
A.  Yeah.

            
Q.  He touched you with a spoon, you said?

            
A.  Yes.

            
Q.  What did he do with the spoon?

            
A.  He touched me where I go pee at.

            
Q.  How long did he touch you for?

            
A.  Like, one second.

            
Q.  And did you lie about that?

            
A.  Yes.

            
Q.  Did he touch you?

            
A.  No.

Q.  Why did you lie about that?

            
Q.  Because  because sometimes I never even lie, because then 
again, I really want to lie, so I do.

 

[¶10]   Given that the essence of this case was 
the credibility of AM, vis- -vis the credibility of Wilde, AN's testimony 
revealed a child whose truthfulness could be viewed as questionable, and who may 
have been coached (or who is "suggestible"), particularly with respect to the 
"one second" that is critical.  It is these concerns that inform our 
reservations.

 

 

[¶11]   We will begin our consideration of this 
issue by noting that the defense attorney made numerous and continuing 
objections to the admission of the series of hearsay statements.  AM was the first 
witness called by the State, and she related her version of the events of March 
15, 2000, in detail.  
AM's mother, Officer Schluck, Dr. Tubach, an emergency room nurse, and 
Lynn Huyler were then called as witnesses and they repeated all, or at least 
parts of, the allegations made by AM.  Wilde contends that all of this testimony was 
inadmissible because it is hearsay for which there is no exception in the 
rules.  W.R.E. 
802 provides:

 

            
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other 
rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Wyoming or by statute.

 

W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) provides:

 

The following definitions apply under this article:

            
(a) Statement.  A "statement" is (1) an oral or written 
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an 
assertion.

            
(b) Declarant.  A "declarant" is a person who makes a 
statement.

            
(c) Hearsay.  "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made 
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence 
to prove the truth of the matter asserted.

            
(d) Statements which are not hearsay.  A statement is not 
hearsay if--

                        
(1) Prior Statement by Witness.  The declarant 
testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning 
the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony, 
and, if offered in a criminal proceeding, was given under oath subject to the 
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, 
or (B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to 
rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper 
influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after 
perceiving him[.]  
[Emphasis added.]

 

[¶12]   The issue in the instant case is 
different from many of the other cases we have considered with respect to this 
issue.  Here, 
Wilde contends that AM fabricated at least part of her story, and that she told 
the same fabricated story to her mother, sister, police officer, physician, 
nurse, and "forensic interviewer."  Each of those witnesses then repeated AM's 
"consistent" story without much variation.  Thus, the circumstances presented here are 
more in the nature of several, more-or-less contemporaneous repetitions of a 
single statement, rather than prior consistent 
statements followed by a report to authorities of a complete statement.  For instance, this 
is not a case like Alicea where the victim told parts 
of the story to other persons, prior to making her report to authority 
figures.  Alicea, 13 P.3d 698-99.  In 
Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741 (Wyo. 1993) 
we said:

 

A prior consistent statement may be used as substantive 
evidence if the alleged improper influence arose after the statement was 
made.  Montoya, 822 P.2d  at 367 (citing Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 71 
(Wyo.1989)).  
However, if the prior consistent statement was made after the improper 
influence arose, then the statement may only be used for rehabilitative 
purposes.  Id.  When a prior consistent statement is 
admissible only for rehabilitative purposes, a limiting instruction must be 
given, but only if requested.  Id.

 

Frenzel, at 751; Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 72 (Wyo. 
1989); also see generally Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Admissibility of Impeached Witness' Prior Consistent 
Statement  Modern State Criminal Cases, 58 A.L.R.4th 1014 (1987 and Supp. 2001); and Jean F. Rydstrom, 
Annotation, Effect of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence Upon the Admissibility of a Witness' Prior Consistent 
Statement, 47 A.L.R.Fed. 639 (1980 and Supp. 2001).  We do not include Cook v. State, 7 P.3d 53, 57-58 (Wyo. 
2000) in our analysis because we are not called upon to review these errors 
under the plain error doctrine.

 

[¶13]   In this instance, the testimony at issue 
was admitted in the State's case-in-chief and in the face of defense counsel's 
very clear objections.  
We have repeatedly articulated the standard of review for evidentiary 
rulings.  
Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court 
and include determinations of the adequacy of foundation and relevancy, 
competency, materiality, and remoteness of the evidence.  This Court will 
generally accede to the trial court's determination of the admissibility of 
evidence unless that court clearly abused its discretion.  We have described 
the standard of an abuse of discretion as reaching the question of the 
reasonableness of the trial court's choice.  Judicial discretion is a composite of many 
things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria.  It also means 
exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  In the absence of an abuse of discretion, we 
will not disturb the trial court's determination.  The burden is on the defendant to establish 
such abuse.  Willis v. State, 2002 WY 79, ¶16, 46 P.3d 890, ¶16 (Wyo. 
2002).

 

[¶14]   We hold that the district court abused 
its discretion in admitting this hearsay testimony during the State's 
case-in-chief, and furthermore, given the repetitive nature of the evidence so 
admitted and its highly prejudicial character, that it was reversible error 
under the circumstances of this case.  4 Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. 
Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence, § 405 (2nd ed. 
1994 and Supp. 2002) ("And testifying by itself does not pave the way even for 
prior consistent statements, for the exception is not intended simply to enable 
the parties to bolster testimony by their witnesses by piling on their prior 
statements."); and see United States v. Check, 582 F.2d 668, 681 (2nd Cir. 1978) ("To repeat, aside 
from the relatively small number of prior statements that are admissible as 
being within the dispensation conferred by Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B), a witness's 
prior statements offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein are 
not immunized from the proscriptive effect of the hearsay rule.").

 

 

[¶15]   The same evidence that gave rise to the 
hearsay objections we discussed above also gave rise to Wilde's contention that 
the district court erroneously admitted evidence that primarily, or at least 
substantially, was used for the purpose of the witness vouching for the victim's 
credibility.  In 
Ogden v. State 2001 WY 109, 34 P.3d 271 (Wyo. 2001) we 
held:

 

Testimony that is otherwise admissible will not be excluded 
unless it constitutes an actual conclusion about the guilt or innocence of the 
accused party.  
Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 616 
(Wyo.1993).  "An 
interpretation of the evidence by a witness, even though that interpretation may 
be important in establishing an element of the crime and thus leading to the 
inference of guilt, is not in the same category as an actual conclusional 
statement on the guilt or innocence of the accused party."  846 P.2d  at 616.

 

Ogden, ¶23.  While we did not find the vouching in Ogden to be reversible error, we were only able to reach 
that conclusion because the vouching in that case did not rise to the level we 
have previously held to be reversible error.  See Whiteplume v. 
State, 841 P.2d 1332, 1344 (Wyo. 
1992); Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60 (Wyo. 1989); 
and also see Davis v. State, 2002 WY 88, ¶18, n.4, 47 P.3d 981, ¶18, n.4 
(Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶16]   At the outset of trial, the district 
court granted a motion in limine prohibiting the State from asking witnesses to 
vouch for the credibility of the victim.  In this case, the victim's mother was 
asked  "did she 
believe" her daughter when she related that Wilde had pierced his scrotum in 
front of AM, and mother answered that she did.  Mother also related in her testimony that AM 
had lied to her before so she wanted to make sure that AM was telling the 
truth.  Defense 
counsel did not raise specific objections as these errors occurred (although the 
district court had acknowledged a continuing objection to such testimony).  However, the 
district court did note them by admonishing the jury:

 

            
Ladies and gentlemen, before Mr. Serelson begins, I want to go back to a 
spot where the present witness testified that when [AM] told her what happened, 
she believed it.

            
Please remember that it is exclusively your function to decide what 
testimony to believe.  
The belief or opinion of another person and who's telling the truth, or 
whether what they say is accurate is an intrusion in your function.  You are the 
exclusive judges of who to believe, who's telling the truth.

            
So to the extent any witness offers any opinion or belief about the 
truthfulness of another witness, you must disregard that, and decide yourselves 
what testimony you believe, what testimony you don't.

 

[¶17]   Pediatrician Shana Tubach, M.D., also 
interviewed AM.  
In her testimony she emphasized that AM knew why she was being examined 
and wanted to go through with the exam because "she wanted the man that had hurt 
her to be put away."  
She also related, over repeated objections, the details told to her by 
AM, and that AM did not report for over two months because "she'd been very 
scared since that time, that she tried to never leave the house unless she 
needed to; that if she walked in front of a window, that she would get down and 
hide so nobody could see her."  The district court sustained an objection to 
the above quoted testimony.  Dr. Tubach also emphasized that a 
determination of whether or not sexual abuse had actually occurred was important 
to her in determining whether or not counseling was needed, leaving a distinct 
impression that she credited AM's story.

 

[¶18]   Lynn Huylar, a social worker at a child 
advocacy center, also interviewed AM and espoused an expertise in forensic 
examination of children who are alleged to have been sexually abused.  In her testimony she 
emphasized that a part of her interview process is to determine if the child 
knows what telling the truth is and whether the child is suggestible.  When Huylar was 
asked by the prosecutor if AM was able to provide a detailed account of the 
event at issue, Huylar answered that "kids who have been sexually abused will be 
able to provide those [details]."  Defense counsel objected and the objection was 
sustained.  Yet 
again, only two pages later in the transcript, the prosecutor elicited an answer 
from Huylar to the effect that she gave much weight to the details AM provided, 
because a child cannot make up that sort of detail.  Defense counsel 
objected, and the objection was sustained.  Nonetheless, the prosecutor continued to 
pursue that line of questioning:

 

            
Q.  Are you always assessing whether or not a child has a 
reason to be making something up?

            
A.   Yes.

            
Q.  And did you make an assessment in your interview of AM?

            
A.  I did, and that assessment was she shared with me that  
she said  she quoted that she wouldn't lie about this guy because she thought 
"he was pretty cool, and he helped my mom out, and he took us places." 

            
Q.  Whenever you're conducting a forensic interview, does part 
of the protocol require that you entertain the concept of an alternative 
hypothesis?

            
A.  Yes, it is.

            
Q.  And what kind of alternatives do you look for?

            
A.  Oh, benign activities that would have been misinterpreted, 
a bathing activity, a normal kind of an activity that a child just 
misinterpreted.

            
Q.  Did you make an assessment of that in this case?

            
A.  I did, and I was unable to rule out any other alternative 
explanation that would have 

            
MR. SERELSON:  
Objection.

            
COURT:  
Sustained.

 

Huylar also testified that she did the same sort of 
assessment with AM's little sister, and it can fairly be presumed that the jury 
might well have concluded that Huyler also would have concluded that she, too, 
was telling the truth.  
Despite further admonitions from the trial court, the prosecutor repeated 
her efforts to have this witness vouch for the credibility of AM during her 
redirect examination of Huylar.

 

[¶19]   Our assessment of the above-described 
testimony is that it does constitute reversible error, especially given the 
difficult credibility issues the jury had to assess in this case.  The defense objected 
to virtually every erroneous question, and the district court did its level best 
to keep the prosecutor on track.  However, despite several warnings, 
admonitions, and sustained objections, the prosecutor continued down the path of 
reversible error.

 

 

[¶20]   Wilde claims that the district court 
erred in allowing the admission of prejudicial evidence that was used to portray 
Wilde as following a perverted lifestyle, and that such evidence was not 
relevant to any issue in this case.  We agree that this evidence was admitted, in 
error, and we also reverse on this basis.

 

[¶21]   It must be recognized that "lifestyle" 
evidence is nothing more than character evidence and its admission or exclusion 
is governed by W.R.E. 404, and it is that rule which circumscribes our analysis 
of the issue raised by Wilde in this regard:

 

Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes.

            
(a)  Character evidence generally.  Evidence of a 
person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose 
of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, 
except:

            
(1)  Character of Accused.  Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character 
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;

(2)  Character of Victim.  Evidence of a 
pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, 
or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of 
peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to 
rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;

            
(3)  Character of Witness.  Evidence of the character of a witness, as 
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.

            
(b)  Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.  Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

 

[¶22]   "The prosecutor may not be the first 
party to introduce character evidence; that decision is entirely in the hands of 
the defendant."  
3 Clifford S. Fishman, Jones on Evidence Civil and 
Criminal, § 16:10 (7th ed. 1998).  Fishman continues, 
"Where evidence is relevant on a significant issue on a theory other than as 
evidence of defendant's character, on the other hand, admission depends upon its 
probative value on the non-character issue assessed against the risk of unfair 
prejudice regarding defendant's character."  A jury cannot be allowed to convict a 
defendant for bad character or for any particular "disposition to commit a crime 
regardless of the strength of the evidence concerning the offense on 
trial."  State v. Bordis, 905 S.W.2d 214, 232 (Tenn.Cr.App. 1995) 
(citing cases).  
Paraphrasing further from that case, Wilde's culpable intention under the 
circumstances at issue in this case should have been the focus of the trial, not 
the inflammatory expos© of the manner in which he had conducted his life.

 

[¶23]   As a preface to further discussion of 
this issue, we also note that Wilde had no felony criminal record, and the State 
was prohibited from using any criminal record in its case-in-chief.  In addition, the 
State had agreed that it would not use evidence concerning "sex toys and 
paraphernalia" that were seized in a search of Wilde's home.  The district court 
reserved ruling on whether it would permit the introduction of evidence that 
Wilde had exposed himself to adult women for the purpose of exhibiting his 
tattoos and body piercings.  The district court also reserved ruling on 
whether items of pornography would be admissible during the trial.

 

[¶24]   Specifically, Wilde asserts that his 
right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the introduction of a considerable 
volume of such character or "lifestyle" evidence.  The evidence in this case included several 
photographs of Wilde's groin, penis, scrotum, and anus.  The photographs 
reveal that he has many piercings to those areas of his anatomy, as well as many 
tattoos.  We 
question whether even one such photograph was probative in this case (and 
certainly whether its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect), 
but certainly more than one was too many.  Wilde did not deny that he had such piercings 
and tattoos and there was no issue about his identity as the alleged perpetrator 
of the crime at issue.  
In defiance of the motion in limine and other rulings by the district 
court, as well as objections by defense counsel (some of which were overruled), 
the State elicited testimony from various witnesses so as to reveal to the jury 
that the State found Wilde to be in possession of sexual cartoons, sexually 
explicit photographs, photographs of pierced female genitalia, a wooden paddle, 
some motorcycle goggles, a set of fur-lined handcuffs, two containers containing 
Kama Sutra Oil of Love, some vanilla cream, some raspberry kiss cream, a black 
leather whipping strap, black nylon eye cover mask, pornographic material, men's 
and women's underwear, and sex toys.  The district court also permitted one adult 
female witness to testify, in vivid detail, that Wilde had exposed himself to 
her in the process of showing his tattoos and body piercings.

 

[¶25]   We conclude that this sort of 
inadmissible, and/or irrelevant, and/or excessively prejudicial 
"lifestyle"/character evidence so permeated the trial as to be reversible 
error.

 

 

[¶26]   Because we reverse on the grounds more 
fully set out above, we devote only passing attention to the other issues raised 
by Wilde.  Wilde 
also contends that the prosecutor violated the trial court's liminal order 
during trial, in closing argument, and at sentencing, and those acts constitute 
prosecutorial misconduct.  We have already concluded that the prosecutor 
committed errors that require reversal, and we will not replow that ground.  Wilde contends that 
the prosecutor exhorted the jury to find Wilde guilty "for [AM]."  While exhortations 
for a jury to do its duty, which suggest that the only proper way for the jury 
to do its duty is to find the defendant guilty, are improper, we do not view 
this isolated instance as an independent ground for reversal, although such 
exhortations are certainly discouraged.  In addition, Wilde calls to our attention that 
at sentencing the prosecutor announced that she had "two crates" of "child 
pornography" in her office and that the pornographic material proved Wilde was 
"an opportunistic pedophile."  The defense countered that it had examined all 
of the evidence the prosecution claimed that it had in the "two crates" and that 
none of it was child pornography.  Moreover, Wilde claims there was no evidence 
presented to the trial court to establish that he was "an opportunistic 
pedophile."

 

[¶27]   For purposes of advancing ethical 
practices by prosecutors, we will simply add here that it is misconduct to 
deliberately ignore a trial court's liminal orders, to deliberately ignore a 
trial court's admonitions and the sustaining of defense objections, to argue 
evidence that has not been admitted in the proceedings whether that is done at 
trial or at sentencing, and to attempt to convict a defendant, whether patently 
guilty or not, using techniques that pander to the potential biases or 
prejudices of jurors.  
See, e.g., ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: 
Prosecution Function and Defense Function (3rd ed. 1993) at 
§§ 3-5.6 (prohibiting knowing use of inadmissible evidence or asking 
legally objectionable questions, or making impermissible comments), 3-5.7 
(improper interrogation of witnesses prohibited), 3-5.8 (no intentional 
misstatement of evidence in argument to jury), and 3-5.9 (no intentional use of 
facts outside record).

 

[¶28]   Finally, Wilde contends that the 
district court erred by commenting in front of the jury that the victim's 
appearance on the witness stand was an "ordeal" that he wanted completed on the 
one day she appeared at trial.  No objection was made at the time, and the 
comment was fleeting.  
We find no reversible error here.

 

 

[¶29]   Whenever a case involving the alleged 
commission of a very serious crime comes before this Court, we attempt to be 
vigilant in balancing the roles of trial judge, jury, prosecutor, and defense 
counsel, with that played by this Court in the appellate process.  In this case, 
virtually none of the errors committed by the prosecution called into play the 
plain error doctrine.  
Not only did the trial court grant defense counsel's motion in limine 
with respect to many of the issues that appear in this case, but also timely and 
repeated objections were made by defense counsel and were often sustained by the 
district court.  
Nonetheless, the prosecution persisted in crossing the line into the 
territory of reversible error.

 

[¶30]   With respect to harmless error, we note 
that application of that rule requires us to be able to conclude that the error 
did not affect a substantial right of the accused, that it was not prejudicial 
to the defendant, and that there is not a reasonable possibility that the 
verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant had the error not 
occurred.  Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶¶18-21, 49 P.3d 975, ¶¶18-21 (Wyo. 
2002).  It was 
crucial in this case that there be no "meddling" with the jury's role in 
determining the truth.  
We can only conclude that the repetition of very prejudicial hearsay 
evidence, the vouching for the credibility of the victim, and the admission of 
evidence designed to inflame the jury against Wilde deprived him of a fair 
trial, and the errors simply cannot be viewed as harmless or nonprejudicial.

 

[¶31]   We will make brief mention of the 
concept of cumulative error because it might have played a role in this case, 
were it not for the seriousness of the individual errors.  In Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724, 745 (Wyo. 
1986), a plurality of this Court relied on an accumulation of errors that 
deprived the defendant of a fair trial as the basis for reversal of that 
defendant's conviction.  It is not uncommon for an argument based on 
cumulative error to be made in this Court, but it is uncommon for us to apply it 
as the sole basis for reversal of a conviction in a criminal case.  We need not cross 
that bridge today, but we view with a great deal of concern the number of 
criminal cases which come before this Court with multiple errors such as those 
we resolve here.  
We include this brief discussion of cumulative error to make clear that 
the doctrine is, indeed, an available tool to address prosecutorial excess. 

 

 

[¶32]   For the reasons set out above, the 
judgment and sentence of the district court are reversed, and the matter is 
remanded to the district court for new trial.

GOLDEN, J., specially concurring.

 

[¶33]       I agree that Wilde's conviction must be reversed; however, I 
depart with the majority on its resolution of the prior consistent statements 
issue.   
After reciting the Stephens rule that prior 
consistent statements are nonhearsay and admissible as either substantive 
evidence or for rehabilitative purposes, the majority decides that the trial 
court erred in admitting "hearsay testimony during the State's 
case-in-chief."  
The majority holds that the trial court abused its discretion by 
admitting hearsay testimony by the mother, sister, police officer, physician, 
nurse, and forensic interviewer that repeated the victim's allegedly fabricated 
story and holds that the abuse of discretion is reversible error because the 
repetition was highly prejudicial.  A careful review of precedent shows that this 
Court has long held that, as a general rule, these kinds of statements are not 
hearsay, it is not an abuse of discretion to admit them when the defense has 
challenged the victim's credibility, and repetition is not reversible 
error.  

 

[¶34]       In a long line of cases, we have rejected the notion that 
W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) requires that the motive to fabricate must come after the 
hearsay statements in order for those statements to be admissible as prior 
consistent statements.  
Cook v. State, 7 P.3d 53, 58 (Wyo. 2000); 
Dike v. State, 990 P.2d 1012, 1024 (Wyo. 
1999); Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741, 751 (Wyo. 
1993); Montoya v. State, 822 P.2d 363, 367 (Wyo. 1991); Stephens v. State, 
774 P.2d 60, 71 (Wyo. 
1989); Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877, 881 (Wyo. 
1987); Makinen v. State, 737 P.2d 345, 349 (Wyo. 
1987).  Most 
recently, we rejected the reasoning followed by the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 165, 115 S. Ct. 696, 130 L. Ed. 2d 574 (1995), which held that a 
temporal requirement did apply under the federal rule.  Cook, 7 P.3d  at 58; Dike, 990 P.2d  at 1024. We have also established that the 
charge of fabrication can arise by defense's pretrial assertions about its 
defense theory.  
Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶18, 43 P.3d 80, ¶18 (Wyo. 
2002); Alicea v. State, 13 P.3d 693, 698-99 (Wyo. 
2000); Humphrey v. State, 962 P.2d 866, 872 (Wyo. 
1998).  

 

[¶35]       This considerable history illustrates this Court's comfort 
with interpreting Rule 801(d)(1)(B) as allowing consistent statements when 
credibility is at issue because of allegations of improper influence or recent 
fabrication.  The precise rule was articulated in Stephens and was upheld as recently as our decision in 
Dike when eight witnesses repeated the victim's story 
as prior consistent statements and no limiting instruction was given to the 
jury.  Stephens, 774 P.2d at 71-72; Dike, 990 P.2d  at 1024.  When this precedent is applied to the 
statements at issue in this case, I do not see how any conclusion can be drawn 
but that they, too, are postmotive prior consistent statements that are 
admissible nonhearsay statements.

 

[¶36]       Nor do I see how the admission of these statements during 
the State's case-in-chief should now be significant in determining error 
occurred when previously we have paid little attention to that fact.  In Lancaster, a videotape was admitted during the State's 
case-in-chief, Lancaster, ¶10, and no discussion was 
given to that fact in this Court's opinion.  Alicea denied that 
any error occurred when the State presented prior consistent statements in its 
case-in-chief although the defense went to great lengths to prevent any 
justification for such admission by waiving opening statements and 
cross-examination.  
13 P.3d  at 698.  
Alicea found no error upon determining that 
the defense's theory would focus upon an express charge of recent fabrication or 
improper influence or motive.  Id. at 698-99.   Humphrey did find that it was error for the State to 
present a prior consistent statement during its case-in-chief before fabrication 
was alleged but ruled that the error was de minimis and resulted in no 
prejudice. 962 P.2d  at 872.  The majority attempts to distinguish Alicea based on whether the statements were made before 
reporting to authorities.  However, that distinction is irrelevant 
because any temporal concern relates only to whether the statement may be 
offered as substantive evidence or whether the defense, if it requested, would 
be entitled to an instruction limiting the evidence for the purpose of 
evaluating credibility.

 

[¶37]       In this case, the defense claimed that a motive to fabricate 
arose well before trial when the mother attempted to extort a vehicle from 
Wilde.  The 
statements here are  
therefore postmotive and consistent with the victim's testimony at 
trial.  
Accordingly, the statements were admissible as nonhearsay under Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) as rebuttal evidence.  Humphrey, 962 P.2d  
at 872.  
Although the statements were admitted without limitation and then 
repeated by six witnesses, Dike has decided that 
occurrence is not reversible error.  The majority has, however, decided that this 
occurrence is highly prejudicial and reversible error and the district court 
will be left to wonder what difference permits these two different results.

  

[¶38]       We are all aware that the lack of a temporal requirement can 
lead to misuse, and we have all noted a pattern arising in child sexual assault 
cases where victims are interviewed by authority figures each of whom then 
repeat the victim's story at trial.  This pattern raises two questions: whether 
interviews are arranged just to create "prior consistent statements" for 
presentation at trial, and, if so, whether these interviews constitute a misuse 
of the rule.  
Our precedent warns against this type of trial strategy, Baum, 745 P.2d  at 882 (Cardine, J., dissenting), while 
at the same time recognizing that repetition is of so little probative value it 
may not be prejudicial.  Stephens, 774 P.2d  
at 72.   I 
am not adverse to addressing whether the misuse that our precedent has long 
warned us of has now come to pass and requires action on our part.

 

[¶39]       If the majority has decided that admission of postmotive 
consistent statements made before the declarant's testimony produced a 
fundamentally unfair trial for Wilde, then the majority should articulate that 
basis for its decision.  If, however, the majority has decided that 
these circumstances require that stare decisis should 
give way, then imposition of a temporal requirement must be discussed.  Until that reasoning 
is presented, I must disagree with the majority's decision to depart from 
precedent without analysis.

 

[¶40]       I must also question why the majority would find that AN was 
competent to testify but may have been coached about what she had seen at the 
time that AM alleges Wilde was sexually assaulting her.  We have previously 
held that when taint is alleged, a competency hearing must determine whether a 
suggestive interview or coaching occurred and, if it did, whether that coaching 
has infected the witness' ability to independently recall events to such an 
extent that her testimony would be too unreliable to admit at trial.  English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 145-46 (Wyo. 
1999).  If the 
trial court failed to properly conduct the competency hearing, the majority errs 
in stating that "[w]e do not question in any way the trial court's decision that 
the victim was competent to testify."  The appropriate resolution is to remand the 
reliability issue for rehearing upon retrial. 

 

FOOTNOTES

  1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302 (LexisNexis 2003) provides:

§ 6-2-302.  Sexual assault in the first 
degree.

            
(a)  Any actor who inflicts sexual 
intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in the first degree if:

(i)  The actor 
causes submission of the victim through the actual application, reasonably 
calculated to cause submission of the victim, of physical force or forcible 
confinement;

(ii)  The actor causes submission of the victim by 
threat of death, serious bodily injury, extreme physical pain or kidnapping to 
be inflicted on anyone and the victim reasonably believes that the actor has the 
present ability to execute these threats;

(iii)  The victim 
is physically helpless, and the actor knows or reasonably should know that the 
victim is physically helpless and that the victim has not consented; or

(iv)  The actor 
knows or reasonably should know that the victim through a mental illness, mental 
deficiency or developmental disability is incapable of appraising the nature of 
the victim's conduct.  
[Emphasis added.]