Case Title: William David Nichols v. Alabama State Bar

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1041641

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel. 06/22/2007
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
____________________
1041641
____________________
William David Nichols
v.
Alabama State Bar
Appeal from the Board of Disciplinary
 Appeals of the Alabama State Bar 
(No. 04-03)
PARKER, Justice.
On September 9, 2004, the Disciplinary Board of the
Alabama State Bar ("the Disciplinary Board") denied William
1041641
2
David Nichols's petition for reinstatement to the practice of
law.  He appealed the Disciplinary Board's decision, and on 
July 15, 2005, the Board of Disciplinary Appeals of the
Alabama State Bar denied his appeal.  He now appeals the
decision of the Board of Disciplinary Appeals.
Rule 28(c), Ala. R. Disc. P., provides, in part:
"At the hearing [on the petition for reinstatement]
the 
petitioner 
shall 
have 
the 
burden 
of
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that
he or she has the moral qualifications to practice
law in this State and that his or her resumption of
the practice of law within the State will not be
detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Bar
or the administration of justice, and will not be
subversive to the public interest.  Proof of
compliance with the provisions of Rule 26 of these
Rules shall be a condition precedent to the
consideration of a petition for reinstatement."
Rule 5.1(d), Ala. R. Disc. P., establishes the standard
of review the Board of Disciplinary Appeals shall apply when
reviewing an appeal from a decision of the Disciplinary Board.
It provides in pertinent part:
"When proceedings before the Board of Disciplinary
Appeals are conducted, the Board of Disciplinary
Appeals shall affirm the decision under review
unless it determines that, based on the record as a
whole, the findings of fact are clearly erroneous
...."
1041641
3
When an attorney who has been suspended from the practice
of law appeals a decision of the Board of Disciplinary Appeals
to this Court, the standard of review employed by this Court
is as follows:
"We conclude that whether the Board of Appeals
properly applied the 'clearly erroneous' standard of
review to the Disciplinary Board's findings of fact
is a question of law.  Likewise, all other legal
conclusions in the final order of the Board of
Appeals present questions of law to us.  This Court
reviews questions of law de novo.  National Ins.
Ass'n v. Sockwell, 829 So. 2d 111 (Ala. 2002); Moss
v. Williams, 822 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2001); and Reed v.
Board of Trustees of Alabama State Univ., 778 So. 2d
7901 (Ala. 2000).  Such a de novo review results in
this Court's applying the same standard the Board of
Appeals applied as to all questions of law,
including the application by the Board of Appeals of
the 'clearly erroneous' standard to the Disciplinary
Board's findings of fact."
Tipler v. Alabama State Bar, 866 So. 2d 1126, 1137 (Ala.
2003).
In denying Nichols's petition for reinstatement, the
Disciplinary Board concluded:
"The evidence was considered and it is the
opinion of the Board that the petitioner failed to
meet his burden of demonstrating by clear and
convincing 
evidence 
that 
he 
has 
the 
moral
qualifications to practice law in this state and
that his resumption of the practice of law will not
be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the
Bar or the administration of justice, and will not
be subversive to the public interest."
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4
We conclude that the Disciplinary Board's determination was
not clearly erroneous; therefore, we affirm the decision of
the Board of Disciplinary Appeals denying Nichols's appeal.
We emphasize that the Disciplinary Board concluded that
as of September 9, 2004, Nichols had failed to demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that he should be reinstated.
The Disciplinary Board did not conclude that Nichols should
never be reinstated.  Nichols may apply for reinstatement
annually (Rule 28(h), Ala. R. Disc. P.), and we reach no
conclusion as to whether, on a different record, his petition
for reinstatement should be granted.
Nichols argues that 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), is applicable to this
case.  The Bar concedes the applicability of the ADA to
attorney-discipline proceedings in general, but disputes its
application to this proceeding.  We need not, however, address
that question today in the light of the procedural posture of
this case.  We note that the Bar imposed the suspension
against Nichols pursuant to Rule 8, Ala. R. Disc. P., on the
basis that he had committed professional misconduct.  The Bar
did not take any action against Nichols pursuant to Rule 27,
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5
Ala. R. Disc. P., the rule that sets forth procedures to be
followed for cases involving a lawyer who is mentally ill, nor
did Nichols ever request that he be placed in disability
inactive status in accordance with Rule 27.  Had this case
been handled pursuant to Rule 27, then Rule 27(g), rather than
Rule 28, would have governed reinstatement proceedings.  Rule
27(g) provides that a lawyer on disability inactive status
shall be reinstated to the practice of law "upon a showing by
clear and convincing evidence that the lawyer's disability has
been removed and that he or she is fit to resume the practice
of law."
Nichols argues that, at the time he was suspended from
the practice of law, neither he nor the Bar realized that the
professional misconduct that formed the basis for his
suspension may have been caused by chronic depression and/or
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD"), which, he
argues, would have allowed him to be placed on disability
inactive status rather than suspended.  His depression and
ADHD were discovered only after his suspension, when the Bar
referred him to mental-health professionals associated with
the Alabama Lawyers Assistance Program ("ALAP").  Therefore,
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he argues, it is unrealistic for the Bar to expect or insist
that he should have taken steps to ensure that these
proceedings were conducted pursuant to Rule 27, because at the
time of his suspension his disability was unknown.  However,
after Nichols had been diagnosed as suffering from chronic
depression and/or ADHD, he could have petitioned to be
transferred to disability inactive status pursuant to Rule 27,
but he did not do so.
We 
note 
with 
approval 
Nichols's 
progress 
toward
rehabilitation, as evidenced by his own testimony, the
testimony of character witnesses, and the unanimous testimony
of the ALAP mental-health professionals to whom the Bar
referred Nichols.  But the burden was on Nichols to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he was, at the time of the
hearing on his petition for reinstatement, fit to practice
law.  The Disciplinary Board's conclusion that he has failed
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was at that
time fit to practice law was not clearly erroneous based on
the record before the Disciplinary Board at that time, and we
must 
therefore 
affirm 
the 
decision 
of 
the 
Board 
of
Disciplinary Appeals. 
1041641
7
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Lyons, and Stuart, JJ., and
Patterson, Special Justice,* concur.
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.
Woodall, Smith, and Bolin, JJ., recuse themselves.
*Retired Court of Criminal Appeals Judge John Patterson
was appointed March 5, 2007, to be a Special Justice in regard
to this appeal.