Case Title: Summerfield v. St. Luke's McCall

Citation: 

Docket Number: 47946

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2021-08-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 47946 
 
MICHAEL SUMMERFIELD, 
 
     Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
ST. LUKE'S McCALL, LTD.,  
 
     Defendants-Respondents, 
 
and 
 
JOHN/JANE DOES I-X, whose true identities 
are presently unknown, 
 
     Defendants. 
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Boise, June 2021 Term 
 
Opinion filed: August 31, 2021 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk  
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Valley County. Jason D. Scott, District Judge. 
 
The decision of the district court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded. 
 
Johnson & Monteleone, LLP, Boise, for Appellant. Jason Monteleone argued. 
 
Brassey Crawford, Boise, for Respondents. Andrew Brassey argued. 
                     _______________________________________________ 
 
MOELLER, Justice. 
 
Michael Summerfield brought a medical malpractice suit against St. Luke’s McCall, Ltd. 
(St. Luke’s), following the surgical removal of his gallbladder. During surgery, the attending 
surgeon, who was employed by St. Luke’s, unknowingly spilled and left a gallstone in 
Summerfield’s peritoneal cavity. When it was later determined that the gallstone was not in the 
removed gallbladder, the surgeon failed to inform Summerfield of the incident, warn him of any 
potential complications, or properly document the incident in his medical records.  
St. Luke’s moved for summary judgment, challenging the admissibility of the opinions 
offered by Summerfield’s expert witness. St. Luke’s asserted that Summerfield’s expert, as an 
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emergency medicine and wound care physician, was unable to establish the requisite knowledge 
of the applicable standards of care and breaches thereof by St. Luke’s and the attending surgeon. 
The district court initially agreed with St. Luke’s and granted its motion for summary judgment. 
Summerfield then filed a motion for reconsideration and attached a supplemental declaration 
from his expert witness that established the requisite foundation. The district court considered 
this additional evidence and granted Summerfield’s motion. However, the district court later 
reversed itself, relying on Ciccarello v. Davies, 166 Idaho 153, 456 P.3d 519 (2019), which held 
that a trial court is afforded discretion in determining whether to consider new declarations 
accompanying a motion for reconsideration if they were untimely for consideration at summary 
judgment. Summerfield appealed to this Court and contends the district court’s sua sponte 
reversal of itself was in error and contrary to previous decisions issued by this Court.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Michael Summerfield had a large gallstone in his gallbladder. On August 31, 2015, Dr. 
Amy Ocmand, an employee of St. Luke’s, performed a laparoscopic cholecystectomy to remove 
Summerfield’s gallbladder. Following the procedure, Dr. Ocmand sent the removed gallbladder 
off for examination, but no gallstone was found. Unknown to Dr. Ocmand, the gallstone had 
spilled out of the gallbladder during surgery and was left inside Summerfield’s peritoneal cavity. 
After learning that the gallstone had been left inside Summerfield, Dr. Ocmand chose not to 
inform him of that fact. Dr. Ocmand also did not make any notation in Summerfield’s medical 
chart to reflect the retained stone. Summerfield saw Dr. Ocmand two more times on September 
15, 2015, and December 2, 2015, and Dr. Ocmand did not inform him of the missing gallstone.  
The retained gallstone unknowingly began to cause health problems for Summerfield. 
From January of 2016 through March of 2016, Summerfield saw Dr. Ostermiller for right flank 
pain and shoulder pain. Summerfield underwent a urinalysis, an ultrasound of his kidney, and 
acupuncture to relieve the pain. In April of 2016, Summerfield received medical care for a 
cough, fever, and congestion. In June of 2016, he received more medical care for a cough, 
achiness, and a fever. Summerfield also had an unexplained weight loss of six pounds. The 
following month Summerfield saw Dr. Ostermiller again with a cough, right lower back pain, 
and upper quadrant abdominal pain. Summerfield had lost an additional 12 pounds from the 
previous month. Dr. Ostermiller noted a large mass on Summerfield’s right flank. The doctor 
speculated that it could be cancer. Summerfield underwent a CT scan of the chest, abdomen, and 
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pelvis. The CT scan revealed a “multiloculated peripherally enhancing fluid collection involving 
the right posterior flank and retroperitoneal space.” Summerfield was referred to a surgeon who 
opined that it was a “chronic intraabdominal abscess with a retained gallstone.” In late July, 
Summerfield underwent surgery to drain the abscess and remove the gallstone. However, “the 
gallstone was so invested in vital structures by then that it could not be safely removed.” 
Initially, the abscess improved; but then it required additional drainage the following month. The 
abscess recurred again in September of 2016. Finally, the abscess was able to be drained and the 
gallstone removed in an additional surgery. The final surgery required lengthy use of a wound 
vacuum to close the large “defect” that was left.  
Summerfield brought suit against St. Luke’s on a respondeat superior theory. 
Summerfield alleged that Dr. Ocmand, an employee of St. Luke’s, negligently failed to (1) notice 
the spilled gallstone during surgery, (2) retrieve it, (3) inform him of the spilled gallstone or 
potential health complications, (4) conduct imaging afterward to identify the spilled gallstone’s 
location, and (5) make a notation of the spilled gallstone on his medical chart.  
Pursuant to discovery, Summerfield disclosed Dr. Julie Madsen as his expert witness. 
Summerfield’s disclosure stated that Dr. Madsen was familiar with the standard of care because 
she had been “practicing medicine at St. Luke’s at the time relevant to this action” and “was 
actively engaged in the practice of medicine in both Boise and McCall in August 2015 and 
September 2015.”  
Trial was scheduled for November 19, 2019, and the deadline for Summerfield’s expert 
witness disclosure was set for June 24, 2019. On June 26, 2019, two days after the deadline, 
Summerfield disclosed Dr. Madsen as his sole expert witness, and attached her curriculum vitae 
and a report summarizing her findings. Dr. Madsen is board-certified in emergency medicine and 
has practiced in wound care for the previous eight years. Dr. Madsen’s experience did not 
include the performance of any laparoscopic cholecystectomies. While Dr. Madsen’s report 
referenced what is expected of general surgeons, it failed to state the particular standard of care 
when it comes to board-certified surgeons performing laparoscopic cholecystectomies. 
Additionally, Dr. Madsen did not detail any inquiries she conducted of other physicians who 
perform laparoscopic cholecystectomies.  
St. Luke’s filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that Summerfield could not 
establish a foundation for his claim because Dr. Madsen was not familiar with the standard of 
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care required of general surgeons who perform laparoscopic cholecystectomies. Summerfield 
responded by filing an affidavit from Dr. Madsen in an attempt to address St. Luke’s contentions 
(the “first affidavit”). Dr. Madsen expanded on her experience with laparoscopic 
cholecystectomies by stating that as an Emergency Medicine Physician-Specialist, she routinely 
evaluates patients with gallbladder disease and refers them to surgery. Further, she regularly 
manages complications of gallbladder surgery, including wound infection, retained or spilled 
gallstones, and other related complications. Dr. Madsen listed many surgical standards in her 
affidavit that applied to laparoscopic cholecystectomies but most were very broad surgical 
standards, such as “obtain informed consent from the patient.” Again, Dr. Madsen did not detail 
any inquiries she conducted of other physicians who perform laparoscopic cholecystectomies.  
After the district court heard argument on St. Luke’s motion for summary judgment, it 
granted Summerfield leave to submit a supplemental affidavit regarding the names of the 
surgeons with whom Dr. Madsen had spoken in order to familiarize herself with the applicable 
standard of care. The district court also requested the publication of the American College of 
Surgeons to which Dr. Madsen had cited when listing the surgical standards in her prior 
affidavit.  
Dr. Madsen’s supplemental affidavit (the “second affidavit”) provided the publication for 
her list of surgical standards. The second affidavit also detailed her discussion with two general 
surgeons from Wyoming who had worked at St. Luke’s on a locum tenens1 basis. Dr. Madsen 
stated, “in discussing the details of performing general surgery at St. Luke’s McCall in 2015, 
these two locum tenens physicians . . . verified for me that the [standards of care] that applied to 
them were the same as the national [standards of care].” This discussion, however, occurred in 
late 2014 or into the middle of 2015, predating Summerfield’s surgery on August 31, 2015 and 
his post-operative complications. Dr. Madsen went on to further detail a conversation with other 
physicians:  
Specifically, I spoke to Jon Getz, M.D., and Johnny Green, M.D., who are Boise-
based general, abdominal surgeons, relative to the [standards of care] applicable 
to general, abdominal surgeons in McCall, Idaho, also in the late 2014 or into the 
middle of 2015 time frame. Both Drs. Getz and Green confirmed for me that my 
understanding of the [standards of care] applicable in this case regarding Mr. 
Summerfield was, in fact, correct and accurate and also that the national 
[standards of care] controlled. 
                                                 
1 A doctor taking the place of another or temporarily filling an open position. 
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Dr. Madsen’s second affidavit also alleged that Dr. Ocmand violated the applicable standards of 
care when she failed to inform Summerfield of the spilled gallstone and by failing to make any 
notation concerning it in his medical chart.  
The district court granted St. Luke’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Dr. 
Madsen could not establish familiarity with the applicable standard of care to maintain 
Summerfield’s action. The district court noted that, as a matter of law in a medical malpractice 
case, the plaintiff must offer expert testimony that the defendant negligently failed to meet the 
applicable standard of care. The expert witness’s opinions and testimony must be supported by 
the following foundation:  
(a) that such an opinion is actually held by the expert witness, (b) that the said 
opinion can be testified to with reasonable medical certainty, and (c) that such 
expert witness possesses professional knowledge and expertise coupled with 
actual knowledge of the applicable said community standard to which his or her 
expert opinion testimony is addressed[.] 
I.C. § 6-1013. 
 
Initially, the district court noted that Dr. Ocmand is a board-certified general surgeon and 
Dr. Madsen is not. The standard of care for board-certified specialists is the national standard of 
care. Because Dr. Madsen is not board-certified, the district court reasoned that she could not be 
presumed to know that standard. However, Dr. Madsen could still demonstrate her knowledge of 
the applicable standard of care through her experience or study of the specialty of the defendant 
physician. Nevertheless, the district court determined she also failed to meet this burden. Dr. 
Madsen described her experience as managing complications of gallbladder surgery, evaluating 
patients with gallbladder disease, and referring patients for laparoscopic cholecystectomies. Her 
experience never described actually performing laparoscopic cholecystectomies. 
The district court found that Dr. Madsen’s affidavits only referenced general knowledge 
of what is expected of general surgeons, not particular knowledge of board-certified physicians 
performing laparoscopic cholecystectomies. Additionally, Dr. Madsen did not perform any 
pertinent inquiries of other physicians. For example, she spoke with two unidentified surgeons 
from Wyoming who told her the national standard of care applies to general surgeons. She also 
spoke with two general surgeons who practice in Boise, Dr. Getz and Dr. Green, who told her the 
same information. Dr. Madsen alleged she had specific conversations with Dr. Getz and Dr. 
Green that “confirmed for me that my understanding of the [standards of care] applicable in this 
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case regarding Mr. Summerfield, was, in fact, correct and accurate.” However, she spoke to them 
well before Summerfield’s post-operative complications began. The district court remained 
unconvinced: “[l]eft unsaid is precisely what ‘understanding’ of Dr. Madsen’s was ‘confirmed’ 
by Drs. Getz and Green. That’s one reason Dr. Madsen’s description of these conversations isn’t 
convincing evidence that she learned from them the standard of care applicable to general 
surgeons in connection with laparoscopic cholecystectomies.”  
The district court further noted that Dr. Madsen failed to demonstrate her knowledge of 
the applicable standard of care through study of authoritative texts or articles.2 Even though Dr. 
Madsen listed the surgical standards from the American College of Surgeons’ website, the 
website specifically qualified that the list “does not constitute a standard of care.” The district 
court concluded: “Relying on a statement that expressly disclaims being a standard of care to try 
to demonstrate knowledge of the standard of care suggests Dr. Madsen doesn’t know where to 
look to learn the standard of care.”  
In sum, the district court held that Dr. Madsen did not show knowledge of the applicable 
standards of care, either through her professional experience or study. Without such knowledge, 
the district court reasoned that there was no foundation for Dr. Madsen’s opinions regarding Dr. 
Ocmand’s alleged breaches of those standards. Therefore, the district court could not consider 
Dr. Madsen’s opinion at summary judgment and Summerfield otherwise had no evidence to 
establish any breach of the applicable standards of care.  
Summerfield then filed a motion for reconsideration of the district court’s decision on 
summary judgment and attached a third affidavit from Dr. Madsen (the “third affidavit”). 
Summerfield argued that Dr. Madsen’s third affidavit clearly demonstrates that she has 
knowledge and is familiar with the applicable standards of care. Dr. Madsen’s third affidavit 
stated that ten days after the entry of judgment dismissing Summerfield’s case on summary 
judgment, she called Dr. Matthew Macha—a Boise general surgeon who performs laparoscopic 
cholecystectomies—to discuss the standard of care for laparoscopic cholecystectomies. Although 
the district court stated, “before this conversation, Dr. Madsen hadn’t—according to the record in 
this case—made a bona fide effort to learn the applicable standard of care for laparoscopic 
cholecystectomies from someone with knowledge of it,” it decided to consider Dr. Madsen’s 
                                                 
2 The district court noted that Dr. Madsen did additional reading to try to learn the applicable standard of care and 
then cited several articles on spilled gallstones. Nevertheless, these articles were not part of the record in front of the 
district court and their content was unclear to the district court, so they were not considered.  
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third affidavit. The district court noted that Dr. Madsen’s third affidavit supplied the foundation 
that was missing when summary judgment was granted. St. Luke’s contended that the district 
court should not consider the late affidavit; the district court disregarded St. Luke’s assertions 
and considered Dr. Madsen’s third affidavit, recognizing that “case law dictates considering new 
evidence in connection with Rule 11.2(b) motions.”  
As the district court later noted, at the time it made this ruling it was under the impression 
that it must consider new evidence on a motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, upon 
consideration of Dr. Madsen’s third affidavit, the district court granted Summerfield’s motion for 
reconsideration and vacated the prior order granting summary judgment to St. Luke’s. However, 
the district court ordered a monetary sanction against Summerfield for the late filing in lieu of 
excluding Dr. Madsen’s third affidavit.  
Then, 28 days later, the district court sua sponte rescinded its order granting 
Summerfield’s motion for reconsideration and reinstated judgment in favor of St. Luke’s. The 
district court explained its reasons for reversing itself: 
[T]he [district court’s] choice of sanction was influenced by case law requiring 
the trial courts to consider new evidence submitted with a motion to reconsider.    
. . . That case law seemed to put the Idaho Supreme Court’s thumb on the scale in 
favor of considering new evidence, despite the movant’s failure to submit the 
evidence when the movant should’ve submitted it. . . . That perception contributed 
to the [district court’s] decision to elevate—above the fairness and judicial-
economy concerns involved in letting the movant escape the natural consequences 
of missed deadlines—the aim of an adjudication made on the fullest factual 
record.”  
The district court further noted that it did not take notice of this Court’s recent decision in 
Ciccarello v. Davies, 166 Idaho 153, 456 P.3d 519 (2019), before making its initial decision.3 In 
Ciccarello, this Court held that a district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider 
new evidence on reconsideration when the declarations were untimely for consideration at 
summary judgment, thereby clarifying the case law on a lower court’s obligation to consider new 
evidence submitted with a motion for reconsideration:  
While this Court has explained that when considering a motion for 
reconsideration the trial court should take into account any new facts presented by 
the moving party that bear on the correctness of the order, this rule was not 
designed to allow parties to bypass timing rules or fail to conduct due diligence 
                                                 
3 Cicarrello was decided after the parties briefed the issue but before the district court’s order granting 
Summerfield’s motion for reconsideration.  
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prior to a court’s ruling. Rather, the purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to 
reexamine the correctness of an order.  
166 Idaho at 162, 456 P.3d at 528 (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). The 
district court stated that had it been aware of Ciccarello, it would have made a different decision. 
The district court then reversed itself, reasoning:  
Reevaluating the issues in light of Ciccarello, the [district court] no longer 
considers forgiving Summerfield’s missed deadlines and considering Dr. 
Madsen’s third affidavit to be the best exercise of its discretion. Instead, the best 
exercise of the [district court’s] discretion is to decline to consider that affidavit. It 
was submitted after Summerfield’s deadline for filing opposition papers on 
summary judgment, and it evidences a post-judgment effort to render Dr. Madsen 
qualified to render her opinions on the applicable standard of care, when that 
effort should’ve occurred much earlier—by the time of Summerfield’s expert 
disclosures and, if not then, not later than when his opposition papers came due.    
. . . Alternatively, the [district court] simply declines to consider that affidavit, as 
Ciccarello allows, because it wasn’t filed within the time allowed by I.R.C.P. 
56(b)(2) and there is no good excuse for Summerfield’s failure to develop and 
present the necessary foundation for Dr. Madsen’s opinions until after a decision 
was rendered on summary judgment.  
 
Summerfield timely appealed the district court’s order on summary judgment and the 
district court’s order reinstating judgment for St. Luke’s.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“This Court exercises de novo review of a grant of summary judgment and the ‘standard 
of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on the motion for summary 
judgment.’ ” AED, Inc. v. KDC Invest, LLC, 155 Idaho 159, 163, 307 P.3d 176, 180 (2013) 
(quoting Stonebrook Const., LLC v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 152 Idaho 927, 929, 277 P.3d 374, 
376 (2012)). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 
I.R.C.P. 56(a). A material fact exists when a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-
moving party based on the evidence presented. Marek v. Hecla, Ltd., 161 Idaho 211, 220, 384 
P.3d 975, 984 (2016). “This Court liberally construes the record in favor of the party opposing 
the motion for summary judgment and draws any reasonable inferences and conclusions in that 
party’s favor.” Robinson v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 209, 76 P.3d 951, 953, (2003).    
“The admissibility of expert testimony, however, is a threshold matter that is distinct 
from whether the testimony raises genuine issues of material fact sufficient to preclude summary 
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judgment.” Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801, 804, 291 P.3d 1000, 1003 (2012) (internal 
citation omitted). The “liberal construction and reasonable inferences standard does not apply” 
when determining the admissibility of expert testimony; instead, “the trial court must look at the 
witness’ affidavit or deposition testimony and determine whether it alleges facts which, if taken 
as true, would render the testimony of that witness admissible.” Mattox v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., 
Inc., 157 Idaho 468, 473, 337 P.3d 627, 632 (2014).  
This Court reviews a district court’s decision on a motion for reconsideration using the 
same standard of review the lower court used when deciding the motion. Monitor Finance, L.C. 
v. Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, 164 Idaho 555, 433 P.3d 183 (2019). When this Court reviews a 
trial court’s discretionary decision, it applies a four-prong test to determine whether there was an 
abuse of discretion: whether the trial court “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; 
(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the specific choice available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the 
exercise of reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 867, 421 P.3d 187, 198 (2018). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to St. Luke’s is affirmed in 
part and reversed in part. 
 
Summerfield contends that the district court erred in granting St. Luke’s motion for 
summary judgment based on its finding Dr. Madsen failed to lay a proper foundation to testify to 
the applicable standard of care and the breaches thereof by Dr. Ocmand. Summerfield asserts 
that Dr. Madsen’s second affidavit laid a sufficient foundation to testify that Dr. Ocmand 
breached the applicable standard of care by: (1) failing to notice and retrieve the spilled 
gallstone; (2) failing to inform Summerfield of the spilled gallstone; and, (3) failing to make a 
notation in Summerfield’s medical record of the spilled gallstone. We agree in part and conclude 
Dr. Madsen, through her education, training, and practice at St. Luke’s, as set forth in the first 
and second affidavits, could offer an expert opinion regarding the latter two alleged breaches of 
care: the failure to inform and the failure to note the incident in Summerfield’s medical records. 
Therefore, the district court erred when it granted summary judgment for St. Luke’s and 
dismissed Summerfield’s case entirely.     
1. Establishing the applicable standard of care. 
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Idaho Code section 6-1012 requires that a plaintiff who brings a medical malpractice 
claim must provide expert testimony establishing that the healthcare provider did not meet the 
applicable standard of healthcare practice. Fisk v. McDonald, 167 Idaho 870, 880, 477 P.3d 924, 
934 (2020). Idaho Code section 6-1012 provides in part:  
In any case, claim or action for damages due to injury to or death of any person, 
brought against any physician and surgeon or other provider of health care, 
including . . . any . . . nurse practitioner, registered nurse, . . . hospital, . . . or any 
person vicariously liable for the negligence of them . . . such claimant or plaintiff 
must, as an essential part of his or her case in chief, affirmatively prove by direct 
expert testimony and by a preponderance of all the competent evidence, that such 
defendant then and there negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of 
health care practice of the community in which such care allegedly was or should 
have been provided, as such standard existed at the time and place of the alleged 
negligence . . . with respect to the class of health care provider that such defendant 
then and there belonged to and in which capacity he, she or it was functioning. 
I.C. § 6-1012.  
 
An expert must have actual knowledge of the community standard of care at the time and 
place of the alleged malpractice in order to testify. Fisk, 167 Idaho at 880, 477 P.3d at 934. The 
expert can demonstrate knowledge of the community standard of care provided by Idaho Code 
section 6-1013:  
The applicable standard of practice and such a defendant’s failure to meet said 
standard must be established in such cases by such a plaintiff by testimony of one 
(1) or more knowledgeable, competent expert witnesses, and such expert 
testimony may only be admitted in evidence if the foundation therefore is first 
laid, establishing (a) that such an opinion is actually held by the expert witness, 
(b) that the said opinion can be testified to with reasonable medical certainty, and 
(c) that such expert witness possesses professional knowledge and expertise 
coupled with actual knowledge of the applicable said community standard to 
which his or her expert opinion testimony is addressed; provided, this section 
shall not be construed to prohibit or otherwise preclude a competent expert 
witness who resides elsewhere from adequately familiarizing himself with the 
standards and practices of (a particular) such area and thereafter giving opinion 
testimony in such a trial. 
I.C. § 6-1013. The district court’s holding below focused on the third requirement—that Dr. 
Madsen did not possess the actual knowledge of the applicable community standard of care.  
 
Dr. Madsen can establish that she has “actual knowledge” of the applicable standard of 
care under Idaho Code section 6-1013 by being a “provider[] of the same class in the same 
community, taking into account [the defendant provider’s] training, experience, and fields of 
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medical specialization.” I.C. § 6-1012. In the alternative, Dr. Madsen can “ ‘demonstrate a 
knowledge acquired from experience or study of the standards of the specialty of the defendant 
physician sufficient to enable [her] to give an expert opinion as to the conformity of the 
defendant’s conduct to those particular standards.’ ” Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 
137 Idaho 160, 168, 45 P.3d 816, 824 (2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Clarke v. Prenger, 114 
Idaho 766, 769, 760 P.2d 1182, 1185 (1988)).  
2. Dr. Madsen did not establish a foundation to give expert testimony regarding 
whether, under the applicable standard of care, Dr. Ocmand should have noticed 
and retrieved the spilled gallstone during the surgery. 
 
Regarding the first alleged breach of a standard of care, Dr. Madsen’s first and second 
affidavits did not sufficiently establish a foundation to give expert testimony concerning whether 
Dr. Ocmand should have noticed the spilled gallstone and retrieved it. Dr. Madsen is not a 
provider of the “same class in the same community” when considering Dr. Ocmand’s 
specializations. Dr. Ocmand is a board-certified general surgeon. Dr. Madsen is not. “For board-
certified specialists, the local standard of care is equivalent to the national standard of care.” 
Samples v. Hanson, 161 Idaho 179, 184, 384 P.3d 943, 948 (quoting Buck v. St. Clair, 108 Idaho 
743, 745, 702 P.2d 781, 783 (1985)). Dr. Madsen’s experience is in emergency medicine and in 
wound care. Her affidavits failed to describe any experience relating to laparoscopic 
cholecystectomies—she had never witnessed the procedure, nor has she performed one. In 
addition, Dr. Madsen did not describe any experience dealing with spilled gallstones or 
retrieving spilled gallstones during a laparoscopic cholecystectomy. She detailed her experience 
as evaluating patients with gallbladder disease, referring them for surgery, and managing post-
operative wound infections from gallbladder surgery. Her experience as a physician did not 
include Dr. Ocmand’s specializations as a board-certified general surgeon who regularly 
performs laparoscopic cholecystectomies. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s conclusion  
that Dr. Madsen is not a “provider[] of the same class in the same community, taking into 
account [the defendant provider’s] training, experience, and fields of medical specialization” in 
order for her to give expert testimony relating to the complications of a spilled or retained 
gallstone during a laparoscopic cholecystectomy. I.C. § 6-1012. 
 
Additionally, we also affirm the district court’s conclusion that Dr. Madsen failed to        
“ ‘demonstrate a knowledge acquired from experience or study’ ” of the applicable standard of 
care. Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 168, 45 P.3d at 824 (emphasis added) (quoting Clarke, 114 Idaho at 
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769, 760 P.2d at 1185). In her expert disclosure, Dr. Madsen merely referenced the care expected 
of general surgeons; she failed to come close to stating the particular standard of care when it 
comes to board-certified surgeons performing laparoscopic cholecystectomies. In her first 
affidavit filed in response to St. Luke’s motion for summary judgment, Dr. Madsen listed 
surgical standards obtained from the American College of Surgeons’ website. However, upon 
closer examination, the district court noted that the website clearly stated the surgical standards 
“do[] not constitute a standard of care.”   
 
In her second affidavit, Dr. Madsen stated that she had a discussion with two general 
surgeons from Wyoming who worked at St. Luke’s McCall on a locum tenens basis. During that 
discussion, Dr. Madsen claimed “these two . . . physicians . . . verified for me that the [standards 
of care] that applied to them were the same as the national [standards of care].” However, she 
still failed to detail what the standards of care are. Furthermore, by Dr. Madsen’s own admission, 
this discussion occurred in late 2014 or into the middle of 2015. Considering that Summerfield 
did not undergo gallbladder surgery until August 31, 2015, and his complications did not occur 
immediately after surgery, it would be impossible to presume that Dr. Madsen discussed this 
specific case—or even laparoscopic cholecystectomies generally—with the two Wyoming 
surgeons.  
 
Dr. Madsen also stated that she had a discussion with two other doctors, Dr. Getz and Dr. 
Green, who are Boise-area abdominal surgeons. According to Dr. Madsen, they discussed the 
relative standards of care applicable to general abdominal surgeons. Even though Dr. Madsen 
declared that these doctors “confirmed for me that my understanding of the [standards of care] 
applicable in this case regarding Mr. Summerfield, was, in fact, correct and accurate,” there is no 
indication that Dr. Madsen discussed laparoscopic cholecystectomies with them. As the district 
court properly noted, “[l]eft unsaid is precisely what ‘understanding’ of Dr. Madsen’s was 
‘confirmed’ by Drs. Getz and Green. That’s one reason Dr. Madsen’s description of these 
conversations isn’t convincing evidence that she learned from them the standard of care 
applicable to general surgeons in connection with laparoscopic cholecystectomies.” Dr. Madsen 
provided no foundation to provide an expert testimony regarding spilled or retained gallstones—
whether physicians performing laparoscopic cholecystectomies should notice a spilled stone 
during surgery or whether a physician should attempt to retrieve a spilled stone. Accordingly, we 
conclude that the district court properly determined that Dr. Madsen did not demonstrate 
13 
 
knowledge of the applicable standard of care through professional experience or study. 
Therefore, her opinion lacked foundation and was inadmissible. Her testimony, on that basis, 
was correctly not considered by the district court. Without admissible expert testimony, 
Summerfield had no evidence to establish his first breach of care claim against Dr. Ocmand—
that she should have noticed and retrieved the spilled gallstone. Thus, summary judgment on that 
ground was properly granted by the district court.  
3.  Due to her training and experience, Dr. Madsen could offer an expert opinion on 
whether, under the applicable standard of care, Dr. Ocmand should have timely 
informed Summerfield of the spilled gallstone and whether Dr. Ocmand should have 
made a notation in Summerfield’s medical chart regarding the spilled gallstone.  
 
Although we affirmed the district court as to the first alleged breach of the standard of 
care, we must reverse its ruling as it pertains to the remaining two alleged breaches of the 
standard of care: (1) Dr. Ocmand’s failure to notify Summerfield of the spilled stone and (2) Dr. 
Ocmand’s failure to make a notation in Summerfield’s medical chart. The standard of care for 
these two claims are of such a general nature that Dr. Madsen was qualified to give an expert 
opinion on them.  
Dr. Madsen is a physician with consulting privileges at St. Luke’s. She had consulting 
privileges during Summerfield’s surgery. Part of Dr. Madsen’s work experience was to manage 
complications of gallbladder surgery, including spilled gallstones. Dr. Madsen’s second affidavit 
clarified that as a board-certified emergency medicine physician, Dr. Madsen is knowledgeable 
and aware of the ethical obligation to disclose surgical errors and inform patients of potential 
harm of those errors. Furthermore, Dr. Madsen noted that St. Luke’s By-Laws contain guidelines 
on error disclosure and set the standard of care for physicians at St. Luke’s.  
 
Dr. Madsen opined that Dr. Ocmand breached the applicable standard of care when the 
pathology report showed the absence of a gallstone, meaning the gallstone had been spilled and 
remained inside of Summerfield. At that point, Dr. Ocmand should have informed Summerfield 
of the retained stone, but she did not. Moreover, Dr. Ocmand should have made a notation in 
Summerfield’s medical chart regarding the spilled stone; but she did not do this either. Dr. 
Madsen testified that during this time there was no difference at St. Luke’s between how a 
surgeon reviews a pathology report and how physicians handle post-operative care. Dr. Madsen 
did not need to match the specific training and expertise of Dr. Ocmand in order to testify to 
these opinions; they are of such a general nature that Dr. Madsen’s experience, board-
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certification, and consulting privileges at the same facility are sufficient to meet the foundational 
requirements. As to these two claims, the district court erred by placing undue emphasis on Dr. 
Madsen’s lack of experience in laparoscopic cholecystectomies. She did not need experience 
performing laparoscopic cholecystectomies in order to give an expert opinion that Summerfield 
should have been notified of the spilled gallstone and a notation should have been made in his 
medical chart. We conclude that Dr. Madsen demonstrated the requisite knowledge to offer these 
opinions. Therefore, the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of St. Luke’s 
and the case is remanded for further proceedings.  
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion by rescinding its order granting 
Summerfield’s motion for reconsideration and reinstating its order on summary 
judgment in favor of St. Luke’s.  
Summerfield contends the district court erred by sua sponte rescinding its order on 
reconsideration and reinstating summary judgment for St. Luke’s. Because we have reversed, in 
part, the district court’s ruling on summary judgment as it pertained to the latter two alleged 
breaches of the standard of care, we will only address whether the district court erred by 
rescinding its order on Summerfield’s motion for reconsideration as to the first alleged breach of 
the standard of care—failure to notice and remove the spilled gallstone.  
Summerfield asserts the district court erred by solely relying on Ciccarello and ignoring 
this Court’s opinions in Fisk, 167 Idaho 870, 477 P.3d 924, Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 
158 P.3d 937 (2007), and Shane v. Blair, 139 Idaho 126, 75 P.3d 180 (2003). Regarding Fisk, 
Summerfield argues, “[t]his Court held that Idaho’s trial courts have no discretion to decide 
whether to entertain a motion for [re]consideration and that they must consider any new 
admissible evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of its orders.” (Emphasis added). In 
Fisk, the defendant was a board-certified neurological surgeon who performed an outpatient 
cervical spine fusion surgery on the plaintiff. 167 Idaho at 877, 477 P.3d at 931. The following 
day, before the plaintiff was released from the hospital, the plaintiff developed severe abdominal 
pain and began vomiting profusely. Her condition continued to worsen. Eventually, the plaintiff 
underwent an exploratory laparotomy, which led another doctor to discover that the plaintiff 
developed mesenteric artery ischemia—or a loss of blood supply to the small intestines. Id. at 
877–78, 477 P.3d at 931–32. Doctors removed a significant amount of the plaintiff’s small and 
large intestines. She recovered, but with serious ongoing repercussions. The plaintiff brought suit 
against the defendant and disclosed six retained expert witnesses. The defendant filed a motion 
15 
 
to strike the plaintiff’s expert witness disclosures and a motion for summary judgment because 
the plaintiff failed to provide admissible evidence of the applicable standard of care or breach of 
that standard of care. Id. at 878, 477 P.3d at 32. 
The district court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding none of the 
plaintiff’s disclosed expert witnesses had “actual knowledge” of the applicable community 
standard of care. Id. The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration and provided additional 
declarations from her retained expert witnesses. Id. at 878-79, 477 P.3d 932-33. The motion was 
denied. The plaintiff appealed the district court’s denial of her motion for reconsideration, among 
other alleged errors. Id. at 879, 477 P.3d at 933. When addressing the plaintiff’s appeal of the 
district court’s denial of reconsideration, this Court stated:  
The district court has no discretion to decide whether to entertain a motion for 
reconsideration. Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 
(2012). In addition, the district court ‘must consider any new admissible evidence 
or authority bearing on the correctness of [the] order.’ Jackson v. Crow, 164 Idaho 
806, 811, 436 P.3d 627, 632 (2019) (quoting Fragnella, 153 Idaho at 276, 281 
P.3d at 113).  
Id. at 892, 477 P.3d at 946.  
Fisk is not quite on point with the case at hand because the district court in Fisk 
considered the plaintiff’s additional expert declarations filed with the motion for reconsideration, 
but still denied the motion. The Court in Fisk was not asked to decide whether the district court 
should have considered the additional declarations but whether the district court’s denial of the 
motion was proper. Id. In the case before us, the district court exercised its discretion and 
decided not to consider Summerfield’s third affidavit from Dr. Madsen—and that is what 
Summerfield alleges was erroneous.  
Similarly, Puckett does not support Summerfield’s contention that a district court has no 
choice but to consider additional evidence submitted with a motion for reconsideration. In 
Puckett, this Court noted that a “decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration rests in 
the sound discretion of the trial court.” 144 Idaho at 166, 158 P.3d at 942. It further stated, 
“when reviewing a motion for reconsideration, the district court ‘should take into account any 
new facts presented by the moving party that bear on the correctness of the interlocutory order. 
The burden is on the moving party to bring the trial court’s attention to the new facts.’ ” Id. 
(emphasis added) (quoting Coeur d’Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat’l Bank, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 
800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990)). Puckett implies that consideration of additional evidence or facts 
16 
 
accompanying a motion for reconsideration rests with the discretion of the district court, rather 
than a mandatory obligation.  
 Shane, on the other hand, is a closer call. There, the plaintiff filed suit against a doctor 
the plaintiff alleged negligently breached the standard of care in operating on his spine. 139 
Idaho at 127, 75 P.3d at 181. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which the 
district court granted, finding the plaintiff did not establish that his expert witness had knowledge 
of the relevant standard of care. Id. at 128, 75 P.3d at 182. The plaintiff filed a motion for 
reconsideration and submitted a fourth affidavit from his expert witness and another expert 
witness. Id. The district court struck both supplemental affidavits and denied the motion for 
reconsideration. Id. On appeal, this Court held that the district court erred in striking the 
supplemental affidavits. Id. at 130, 75 P.3d at 184. However, the Court’s analysis was rather 
short and did not state that the district court was required to consider the new affidavits, or that it 
abused its discretion by not considering them. Id. Moreover, Shane, the oldest of the cases cited 
by Summerfield, is less indicative of this Court’s recent jurisprudence on this issue.  
We find Ciccarello is directly on point here and reaffirm its holding. The district court 
had the discretion to refuse to consider Dr. Madsen’s untimely third affidavit filed with 
Summerfield’s motion for reconsideration. In Ciccarello, the plaintiff brought suit against his 
attorney for negligence and legal malpractice for his attorney’s alleged defective drafting of a 
company sales contract that was adverse to plaintiff’s interests and a breach of the applicable 
standard of care under the rules of professional conduct. 166 Idaho at 156–57, 456 P.3d at 522–
23. The plaintiff made his expert witness disclosure and then the defendant moved for summary 
judgment arguing the plaintiff had not proffered expert testimony establishing that the defendant 
failed to meet the standard of care. Id. After the district court took the matter under advisement, 
the plaintiff submitted a “rebuttal expert disclosure” affidavit from his retained expert. Id. at 158, 
456 P.3d at 524. The next day, the district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment. Id. The plaintiff moved for reconsideration and filed an additional declaration from his 
proposed expert. Id. The district court denied the motion, noting that the plaintiff did not provide 
sufficient expert testimony at the time of the summary judgment motion. Id.  
On appeal to this Court, we affirmed the district court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion 
for reconsideration. Id. at 161–62, 456 P.3d at 527–28. We held:  
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As indicated by the district court, because the declarations provided by 
[the plaintiff’s] experts were untimely for consideration at summary judgment per 
Idaho Rule [of] Civil Procedure 56(b)(2), it was not required to consider them in 
ruling on the motion for reconsideration. While this Court has explained that 
when considering a motion for reconsideration ‘the trial court should take into 
account any new facts presented by the moving party that bear on the correctness 
of the order,’ Int’l Real Estate Solutions, Inc., v. Arave, 157 Idaho 816, 819, 340 
P.3d 465, 468 (2014), this rule was not designed to allow parties to bypass timing 
rules or fail to conduct due diligence prior to a court’s ruling. Rather, ‘[t]he 
purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to reexamine the correctness of an 
order.’ Id.  
Id. at 162, 456 P.3d at 528 (emphasis added). This Court went on further to hold that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider the plaintiff’s additional expert 
declarations after summary judgment. Id. The plaintiff’s opposition brief and supporting 
documents were supposed to be filed at least fourteen days before the hearing, yet they were 
filed fifty days after that date. Id. Therefore, the district court exercised its discretion reasonably. 
Id.  
 
Ciccarello held that the district court is afforded discretion on whether to consider 
untimely declarations of fact accompanying a motion for reconsideration. Ciccarello’s reasoning 
is applicable here, too. The trial court should have the discretion to determine whether it will 
consider additional evidence in support of a motion for reconsideration, if it is submitted late. 
Without such discretion, “parties [can] bypass timing rules or fail to conduct due diligence prior 
to a court’s ruling” because the trial court must consider any additional evidence. Id. at 162, 456 
P.3d at 528. When addressing a motion for reconsideration, Ciccarello still requires a trial court 
to consider evidence touching on the “correctness” of its original order. For example, if the trial 
court’s ruling was based on a misunderstanding of the record, or if there was material evidence 
in the record that either side failed to present to the court on summary judgment, the court must 
consider such evidence on reconsideration if it would affect the correctness of its original 
decision. However, Ciccarello allows the court discretion to not consider evidence which 
reasonably should have been made a part of the record sooner, but was not. In short, while a 
motion for reconsideration is a safety valve to protect against legal and factual errors, it is not 
intended to be a mechanism that encourages tactical brinkmanship or a lack of diligence.   
On Summerfield’s motion for reconsideration, the district court was initially unaware of 
the broad discretion it had been granted under Ciccarello. The district court’s order implies that 
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it was under the impression that it was required to consider the additional evidence. That is not 
what Ciccarello states. Once the district court realized its mistake, it then exercised its discretion 
to correct its error. We find the district court did not abuse its discretion by reversing its decision 
to grant Summerfield’s motion for reconsideration and reinstating judgment for St. Luke’s.   
It is clear Dr. Madsen was retained at least six months before St. Luke’s filed a motion 
for summary judgment, as Summerfield identified Dr. Madsen as his sole expert witness in 
response to St. Luke’s interrogatory. The district court held that Dr. Madsen’s initial expert 
witness disclosure, her first affidavit in response to summary judgment, and her second affidavit 
permitted by leave of the district court all failed to establish her knowledge of the applicable 
standard of care. Dr. Madsen’s third affidavit, attached to Summerfield’s motion for 
reconsideration, was filed long past the expert disclosure deadline and well after the filing of his 
briefs and affidavits in opposition to St. Luke’s motion for summary judgment. Moreover, Dr. 
Madsen’s third affidavit consisted of knowledge obtained about the applicable standard of care 
after the summary judgment motion had already been ruled on by the district court. Dr. 
Madsen’s third affidavit detailed her phone call with Dr. Macha, a Boise general surgeon who 
performs laparoscopic cholecystectomies, to discuss the standard of care 10 days after judgment 
had been entered against Summerfield. Dr. Madsen had not spoken with a general surgeon who 
performs laparoscopic cholecystectomies before this point. As the district court noted, “there is 
no good excuse for Summerfield’s failure to develop and present the necessary foundation for 
Dr. Madsen’s opinions until after a decision was rendered on summary judgment.”  
While we acknowledge that this may be a harsh outcome for Summerfield, the discretion 
rested with the district court to disregard the late affidavit, which consisted of evidence obtained 
after the summary judgment motion had been decided. The district court properly recognized the 
issue as one of discretion, acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion, applied the correct 
legal principles, and reached its decision by the exercise of reason. We cannot conclude the 
district court abused its discretion in light of the lack of diligence demonstrated by the record. 
Thus, we affirm the district court’s order rescinding its order granting Summerfield’s motion for 
reconsideration and reinstating judgment for St. Luke’s. Consistent with our opinion above, this 
holding only applies to Summerfield’s allegation that Dr. Ocmand breached the standard of care 
by failing to notice and retrieve the spilled gallstone. 
19 
 
C. St. Luke’s is not entitled to attorney fees or costs on appeal. Summerfield is entitled to 
his costs.  
 
St. Luke’s requests attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121 or Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54(e)(2). Both award attorney fees to the prevailing party if a case or appeal was 
brought frivolously or without foundation. I.C. §12-121; I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2). Because we have 
concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to St. Luke’s on two of the 
three grounds, Summerfield was the overall prevailing party and Summerfield’s appeal was 
clearly not frivolous. Accordingly, we deny St. Luke’s request for attorney fees.  
St. Luke’s also requests costs under Idaho Appellate Rule 40. Costs under Idaho 
Appellate Rule 40 are awarded as a matter of course to the prevailing party. Because St. Luke’s 
is not the prevailing party, it is not entitled to costs on appeal; however, Summerfield, as the 
prevailing party, is entitled to costs on appeal.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The district court’s summary judgment decision is affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
We affirm the district court’s decision to grant St. Luke’s motion for summary judgment on 
Summerfield’s claim that Dr. Ocmand breached the standard of care for not noticing the spilled 
gallstone and not retrieving it because Dr. Madsen did not establish a sufficient foundation to 
testify as to the appropriate standard of care. We also affirm the district court’s sua sponte 
decision to reverse itself and not consider Dr. Madsen’s third affidavit and reinstate judgment for 
St. Luke’s on this same ground. However, we reverse the district court’s decision to grant St. 
Luke’s motion for summary judgment as to Summerfield’s claims that Dr. Ocmand breached the 
standard of care by failing to inform Summerfield of the spilled gallstone and by failing to note 
the spilled gallstone in Summerfield’s medical chart because Dr. Madsen laid a sufficient 
foundation to testify as to these matters.   
Summerfield is awarded his costs on appeal as the prevailing party. The case is remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices BRODY, STEGNER and BURDICK CONCUR.