Case Title: State v. Lane

Citation: 

Docket Number: S52697

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2006-10-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: October 5, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
ISSAC JEROME LANE,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 02FE0143; CA A119122; SC S52697)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted May 9, 2006.
Jennifer S. Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.  With her
on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
Rebecca A. Dunn, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her
on the brief were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, and Peter
Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense Services.
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Carson, Gillette,
Durham, Riggs,** Balmer, and Kistler, Justices.
BALMER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
*Appeal from Crook County Circuit Court, Daniel Ahern, Judge. 198 Or App 173, 108 P3d 20 (2005).
** Riggs, J., retired September 30, 2006, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.
BALMER, J.
Defendant fled from a courtroom after the trial court
revoked his pretrial release status and remanded him to the
custody of the sheriff for transportation to the county jail.  As
we discuss below, a person who unlawfully flees from "custody"
commits the crime of third-degree escape, ORS 162.145(1), while a
person who unlawfully flees from a "correctional facility"
commits the crime of second-degree escape, ORS 162.155(1)(a). 
The state charged defendant with both second-degree escape and
the less serious crime of third-degree escape in connection with
the incident.  Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted
defendant of second-degree escape on the theory that the
courtroom was a "correctional facility."  The Court of Appeals
reversed on a different theory, holding that the state had failed
to prove that defendant had the requisite mental state to sustain
a conviction for escape from a correctional facility.  State v.
Lane, 198 Or App 173, 108 P3d 20 (2005).  We granted review and
now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the
judgment of the circuit court.
The facts are undisputed.  The police arrested
defendant and three others for burglary and placed them in the
Crook County Jail.  Defendant was released from jail pending
trial when he signed a release agreement requiring that he remain
in regular contact with his defense counsel.  Defendant's counsel
later moved to withdraw, however, because defendant had failed to
remain in contact with him as required by the release agreement. 
Shortly thereafter, defendant appeared at a status hearing before
Judge Thompson.  Also present at the hearing were two
codefendants, who continued to be held at the Crook County Jail. 
A deputy sheriff from the Crook County Jail escorted the
codefendants to court and remained in the courtroom during the
status hearing.
At the hearing, the state moved to revoke defendant's
release agreement on the ground that he had violated the
requirement that he remain in contact with his defense counsel. 
Judge Thompson allowed the motion, signed the order in
defendant's presence, told defendant that he had revoked
defendant's release, and informed him that he had been "reduced
to custody."  Shortly thereafter, defendant left the courtroom by
a side door.  As defendant was leaving, Judge Thompson reminded
him that he had been remanded to custody.  Court staff notified
the local police, and defendant was apprehended several blocks
from the courthouse.
Defendant's indictment charged him with escape in the
second degree, ORS 162.155, for escaping from a correctional
facility, and escape in the third degree, ORS 162.145, for
escaping from custody.  Following a bench trial, the trial court
found that defendant unlawfully had departed from a "correctional
facility" when he left the courtroom after being "reduced to
custody" by Judge Thompson.  The trial court reasoned that, after
Judge Thompson had revoked defendant's release and remanded him
to custody, the courtroom was, in effect, a place of confinement
for defendant.  The trial court also noted that the presence of
the deputy sheriff established that defendant was in the
constructive custody of a correctional facility, as of the time
that Judge Thompson had remanded him to custody.  The court
therefore found defendant guilty of second-degree escape and
dismissed the charge of third-degree escape.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that, for the
trial court to convict defendant of second-degree escape under
ORS 162.155(1)(c), the state had to prove that defendant knew
that he was escaping from a correctional facility.  The Court of
Appeals observed that "the state presented no evidence that
defendant knew, or circumstances existed under which he can be
held to have known, that he was escaping from a correctional
facility when he fled from the courtroom."  Lane, 198 Or App at
181.  The Court of Appeals therefore reversed the conviction for
second-degree escape and remanded the case for entry of judgment
of conviction for third-degree escape. (1)  The state sought
review, which we granted.
We first must determine whether, as the state argues,
the courtroom qualified as a correctional facility for purposes
of ORS 162.155(1)(c).  If it did, we then must decide whether
defendant possessed the requisite mental state to be convicted of
second-degree escape under that statute.  
ORS 162.155(1)(c) provides that "[a] person commits the
crime of escape in the second degree if * * * [t]he person
escapes from a correctional facility[.]"  Other statutes define
the key terms of ORS 162.155(1)(c).  "'Escape' means the unlawful
departure of a person from custody or a correctional facility." 
ORS 162.135(5).  "'Correctional facility' means any place used
for the confinement of persons charged with or convicted of a
crime or otherwise confined under a court order[.]"  ORS
162.135(2).
Previously, this court has suggested that a prisoner
serving a sentence may be within a correctional facility during a
court appearance, if the prisoner came to the courtroom from
prison and is returning to prison after that court appearance. 
In State v. Palaia, 289 Or 463, 468, 614 P2d 1120 (1980), the
defendant was an inmate of a correctional facility, but escaped
from custody before entering a vehicle to return to prison
following a court appearance.  The court stated in dictum that,
"[u]nder the facts of this case, the defendant could * * * have
been charged and convicted of escape from a correctional
facility."  289 Or at 469 (citing State v. Hutcheson, 251 Or 589,
447 P2d 92 (1968), in which convicted prisoner escaped from work
release program).  The defendant in Palaia was a prisoner both
before and after his court appearance, which made it easier for
the court to suggest that his escape while temporarily outside
the prison was from a correctional facility.  By that reasoning,
wherever the prisoner goes, even if it is outside the prison, the
prisoner still is deemed to be in a correctional facility.
Similarly, in State v. Smith, 277 Or 251, 257, 560 P2d
1066 (1977), this court stated in dictum:
"[T]he crime of 'escape' does not require that the
act of escape be done or completed at the physical
location of the jail, as in the case of a prisoner who
escapes while on a work release program; * * * a
prisoner is considered to be confined within a
'correctional facility' from the time of his original
commitment until his lawful discharge." (2)
Both Palaia and Smith suggest that, for purposes of the "escape"
statutes, a courtroom can be considered a correctional facility
when a convicted prisoner serving a sentence in a correctional
facility is transported to a courtroom or place of work
temporarily, with the expectation that the prisoner will be
returned to the correctional facility after the court appearance.
In contrast, third-degree escape consists merely of
escaping from custody.  ORS 162.145(1) ("A person commits the
crime of escape in the third degree if the person escapes from
custody"); see Palaia, 289 Or at 469 ("Escape from custody,
without more, supports a conviction only under ORS 162.145,
escape in the third degree.").  "'Custody' means the imposition
of actual or constructive restraint by a peace officer pursuant
to an arrest or court order[.]"  ORS 162.135(4).
Defendant, while conceding that he committed third-degree escape, argues that he did not commit second-degree escape
because the courtroom did not qualify as a correctional facility. 
Instead, he contends that he merely was in custody.  The state
counters that defendant was constructively in a correctional
facility once the trial court revoked his conditional release. 
The state emphasizes that defendant earlier had been in jail and
then had been conditionally released and that he was to be
returned to jail following the trial court's revocation of his
release.  In those circumstances, the state argues, the trial
court constructively had returned defendant to jail (although
defendant was physically in the courtroom) as soon as the trial
court had revoked his conditional release.  The state further
argues that the trial court, in revoking defendant's release,
established the courtroom as a place of "confinement" of
defendant -- a person charged with a crime -- and the courtroom
therefore was a correctional facility, as that term is defined in
ORS 162.135(2), quoted above.
The first issue is whether a courtroom qualifies as a
correctional facility for purposes of ORS 162.155(1)(c) when a
judge orders that a defendant, who is present in the courtroom
and had been on pretrial release, be remanded to the sheriff's
custody, as the judge did here.  For the reasons set out below,
we conclude that, when Judge Thompson stated that defendant had
been reduced to custody, he effectively established the courtroom
as a correctional facility for purposes of ORS 162.155(1)(c). 
Before being remanded to custody at the hearing, defendant had
enjoyed conditional release status and, during that period, he
was neither in custody nor in a correctional facility.  At the
hearing, however, Judge Thompson informed defendant that he was
"reduced to custody."  In other words, Judge Thompson effectively
told defendant that his pretrial release status had been revoked,
that he was not free to leave the courtroom, and that he was
required to go to the county jail pending trial.  
Previous decisions by this court have stated that a
person who is incarcerated following a conviction is
constructively within a "correctional facility" even when he is
not within the walls of the prison.  Rather, as this court noted
in Smith, such a person "is considered to be confined in a
correctional facility from the time of his original commitment
until his lawful discharge."  277 Or at 257.  Here, defendant's
incarceration, conditional release, and revocation of release all
occurred before trial, rather than after conviction, as in Smith. 
In our view, however, that factual distinction is irrelevant to
the interpretation and application of ORS 162.155(1)(c), which
applies to any escape from a "correctional facility," whether the
defendant is incarcerated before trial or following conviction. 
Defendant was confined at the time of his "original commitment";
after Judge Thompson revoked his conditional release, he returned
to his former status.  Defendant can hardly argue that, at that
point, he had been "lawfully discharged" as this court used those
words in Smith.  Accordingly, when Judge Thompson ordered
defendant's release revoked and that he be returned to jail, that
order plainly "confined" defendant to the courtroom, under the
authority of the deputy sheriff, thus constituting the courtroom
a "correctional facility" for purposes of the second-degree
escape statute.  See ORS 162.135(2) ("Correctional facility"
defined as "any place used for the confinement of persons * * *
confined under a court order.").  
In that respect, we note an additional fact that
removes the issue from doubt: the presence of the deputy sheriff
who had brought the codefendants to court.  Those two
codefendants clearly remained in constructive custody, and the
sheriff was the symbol of that status.  Judge Thompson's order
placed defendant directly under the authority of the deputy
sheriff, i.e., placed defendant in the same position as his two
codefendants.  And that position was, as we have noted,
constructive custody in a correctional facility.  We conclude
that defendant, when he left the courtroom, escaped from a
correctional facility under ORS 162.155(1)(c).
The second issue is whether the state proved that
defendant had the necessary mental state regarding the element of
"escaping from a correctional facility."  Defendant argued, and
the Court of Appeals agreed, that defendant's conviction for
second-degree escape was invalid because ORS 162.155(1)(c)
requires the state to prove that defendant "knowingly" escaped
from a correctional facility, and the state failed to do so.  We
disagree, because the trial court correctly found that the
evidence proved that defendant had possessed the appropriate
mental state respecting that element of the crime.
The indictment in this case charged defendant with
"knowingly" escaping from a correctional facility.  Generally, "a
person is not guilty of an offense unless the person acts with a
culpable mental state with respect to each material element of
the offense that necessarily requires a culpable mental state." 
ORS 161.095(2).  Having alleged that defendant acted knowingly,
the state was required to prove defendant's knowledge.
Sufficient evidence exists in this record from which
the trial court could have concluded that defendant knowingly
escaped from a correctional facility.  At the earlier proceeding,
Judge Thompson had allowed the state's motion to revoke
defendant's release status, signed the order in defendant's
presence, and told defendant that he had revoked defendant's
release.  To clarify the effect of his order, Judge Thompson
repeatedly informed defendant that he had been "reduced to
custody."  It was clear from the judge's words that defendant was
being returned to jail.  And, in a behavioral acknowledgment of
the fact that defendant realized that he was being returned to
jail, he fled.  The state was not required to prove that
defendant understood the statutory definitions contained in ORS
162.155(1)(c) or the specific differences between escape from
"custody" and escape from a "correctional institution." 
Defendant knew that he previously had been lodged in the Crook
County Jail and that, based on the judge's order, the deputy
sheriff from the jail, who was present in the courtroom, would
transport defendant back to the jail immediately after the
hearing.  That evidence was sufficient to prove that the
defendant knew that he was escaping from a location that was
deemed to be a correctional facility.
We conclude that the courtroom from which defendant
fled was a correctional facility within the meaning of ORS
162.155(1)(c) and that Judge Thompson in effect made the
courtroom a correctional facility by directing that defendant be
reduced to custody.  We also are satisfied that, when defendant
escaped, he was aware that he was escaping from what
constructively was a correctional facility.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
1. Defendant conceded that he was guilty of third-degree escape under ORS 162.145(1).
2. The legislature has specified that failing to return to a state Department of Corrections
correctional facility from a work release program "[c]onstitutes an escape from a correctional
facility under ORS 162.155."  ORS 144.500(2)(b).