Case Title: In re Q.P.W.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 475A19

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2021-03-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-12 
No. 475A19 
Filed 12 March 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF: Q.P.W. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 16 
September 2019 by Judge Tonia A. Cutchin in District Court, Guilford County. Heard 
in the Supreme Court on 13 January 2021.  
 
Mercedes O. Chut for petitioner-appellee Guilford County Department of Health 
and Human Services. 
 
Christopher S. Edwards, for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Wendy C. Sotolongo, Parent Defender, by Annick I. Lenoir-Peek, Deputy Parent 
Defender, for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
 
HUDSON, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Respondent-mother appeals from the trial court’s orders terminating her 
parental rights to Q.P.W. (Quentin).1 After careful review, we affirm. 
I. 
Factual and Procedural History 
¶ 2 
 
Respondent-mother was the victim of a crime that left her pregnant at the age 
of thirteen. Respondent-mother was later placed in the custody of Guilford County 
Department of Social Services (DSS) pursuant to a juvenile dependency petition. 
                                            
1 A pseudonym is used in this opinion to protect the juvenile’s identity and for ease of 
reading. 
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Quentin was born to respondent-mother on 8 March 2014. Shortly after he was born, 
respondent-mother left Quentin in the hospital for two days without informing 
hospital staff that she was leaving.  
¶ 3 
 
On 20 May 2014, Quentin was adjudicated to be a dependent juvenile after the 
trial court found that respondent-mother was too young to provide proper care for 
herself and Quentin, that respondent-mother had left Quentin in the hospital, and 
that respondent-mother was in DSS custody herself. Respondent-mother and 
Quentin were placed in the same foster home and remained in a joint placement, with 
only brief interruptions, from May 2014 to November 2017.  
¶ 4 
 
Respondent-mother entered into a case plan with DSS on 5 June 2014. 
Pursuant to her case plan at that time, respondent-mother was required to attend 
school, complete parenting education and training, attend Quentin’s medical 
appointments, abide by the rules of her placement to avoid disruption, and participate 
in individual therapy. Quentin’s primary permanent plan at that time was 
reunification. Initially, respondent-mother engaged in her case plan by attending 
school, participating in therapy, participating in parent education programs, and 
attending medical appointments with her son.  
¶ 5 
 
However, respondent-mother also disobeyed the rules of her placements and 
ran away from her placements causing several disruptions to her joint placement 
with Quentin from 2014 to 2016. Eventually, respondent-mother refused to 
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participate in additional parenting classes, stopped attending school, stopped 
participating in therapy, and continued to disrupt her placement. 
¶ 6 
 
On 2 June 2017, the trial court entered an order warning respondent-mother 
that her failure to comply with her case plan could result in a change to Quentin’s 
primary permanent plan. By then, Quentin had been in over twelve placements. 
¶ 7 
 
Respondent-mother turned eighteen in November 2017 and was no longer 
eligible to continue placement with DSS because she was neither working nor 
attending school. As a result, her joint placement with Quentin was disrupted. From 
November 2017 through August 2018, respondent-mother had some contact with 
Quentin. On 10 August 2018, respondent-mother had her last visit with Quentin, and 
she failed to confirm a single subsequent visit as required by her case plan.  
¶ 8 
 
On 30 August 2018, DSS updated respondent-mother’s case plan and identified 
areas for improvement including obtaining employment, improving her parenting 
skills, and obtaining stable housing. In October 2018, DSS identified respondent-
mother’s failure to address her mental health issues, her lack of stable housing, her 
failure to consistently visit with Quentin, her failure to comply with the 
recommendations from her parenting evaluation, and her failure to address her 
parenting deficits by completing parenting classes as barriers to achieving 
reunification.  
¶ 9 
 
On 16 November 2018, the trial court noted that respondent-mother had failed 
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to comply with requests for drug screenings, was not in appropriate housing, had 
failed to show up to work the previous week, had not attended any of Quentin’s 
medical appointments since the last court date, had failed to attend therapy since 1 
August 2018, and she had missed 21 visits with Quentin. The trial court found that 
respondent-mother was not actively participating in or cooperating with her case plan 
and found that she was not making adequate progress.  
¶ 10 
 
On 23 January 2019, the trial court terminated respondent-mother’s visits 
with Quentin and named several barriers to reunification including respondent-
mother’s failure to participate in parenting classes, complete a psychological 
assessment and address her mental health needs, find safe and appropriate housing, 
and visit Quentin consistently. The primary plan for Quentin was changed to 
adoption. On 24 May 2019, the trial court found that respondent-mother was still not 
in compliance with the housing, parenting, and substance abuse portions of her case 
plan, and was not making adequate progress within a reasonable period of time.  
¶ 11 
 
In April 2019 DSS petitioned the trial court to terminate respondent-mother’s 
parental rights (TPR petition) alleging that termination was appropriate under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), (3), (6), and (7). A hearing on the TPR petition was held 
on 13 and 14 August 2019. On 16 September 2019 the trial court entered an order 
terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1), (2), (3), (6), and (7) (TPR order). Respondent-mother filed a notice of 
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appeal on 18 September 2019.  
II. 
Standard of Review 
¶ 12 
 
We have previously explained the standard of review for termination of 
parental rights appeals as follows: 
Proceedings to terminate parental rights consist of an 
adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage. At the 
adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of 
proving by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that one 
or more grounds for termination exist under section 7B-
1111(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes. We review 
a trial court’s adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109 to 
determine whether the findings are supported by clear, 
cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support 
the conclusions of law. The trial court’s conclusions of law 
are reviewable de novo on appeal. 
In re K.H., 375 N.C. 610, 612 (2020) (cleaned up). 
III. 
Analysis 
¶ 13 
 
In this case, the trial court determined that grounds existed to terminate 
respondent-mother’s parental rights based on neglect, willful failure to make 
reasonable progress, willful failure to pay a reasonable portion of her child’s cost of 
care, dependency, and willful abandonment. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(3), (6)–(7) 
(2019). Respondent mother has not contested any findings of fact,2 and thus, they are 
binding on appeal. In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407 (2019) (“Findings of fact not 
                                            
2 Respondent-mother discusses findings 19 and 26 in her brief, but her only argument 
is that these findings include irrelevant information. She makes no argument that these 
findings are not supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Furthermore, we do not 
rely on either of these findings in reaching our disposition. 
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challenged by respondent are deemed supported by competent evidence and are 
binding on appeal.”). 
¶ 14 
 
We begin our review of the TPR order to determine whether the trial court’s 
findings of fact support its conclusion that there were grounds to terminate 
respondent-mother’s parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), which 
provides as follows: 
The parent has willfully left the juvenile in foster care or 
placement outside the home for more than 12 months 
without showing to the satisfaction of the court that 
reasonable progress under the circumstances has been 
made in correcting those conditions which led to the 
removal of the juvenile. No parental rights, however, shall 
be terminated for the sole reason that the parents are 
unable to care for the juvenile on account of their poverty. 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). 
¶ 15 
 
We have previously explained that: 
[t]ermination under this ground requires the trial court to 
perform a two-step analysis where it must determine by 
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence whether (1) a child 
has been willfully left by the parent in foster care or 
placement outside the home for over twelve months, and 
(2) the parent has not made reasonable progress under the 
circumstances to correct the conditions which led to the 
removal of the child.  
In re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. 88, 95–96 (2020).  
¶ 16 
 
First, we review whether the findings support the conclusion that Quentin had 
been willfully left in foster care or placement outside the home for more than twelve 
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months. “[T]he twelve-month period begins when a child is left in foster care or 
placement outside the home pursuant to a court order, and ends when the motion or 
petition for termination of parental rights is filed.” In re K.H., 375 N.C. at 613 
(quoting In re J.G.B., 177 N.C. App. 375, 383 (2006)). Here, DSS filed its TPR petition 
in April 2019. Therefore, the relevant twelve-month period is from April 2018 to April 
2019. 
¶ 17 
 
The trial court made the following relevant findings of fact: 
14. . . . [Respondent-mother] reached the age of majority on 
November 30, 2017. . . .  
 
 . . .  
c. . . . [Respondent-mother] left her placement . . . 
after reaching the age of majority. . . .  
 . . .  
25. . . .  
a. The juvenile has been placed in foster care 
continuously since March 19, 2014.  
These findings demonstrate that Quentin was in foster care and was not sharing a 
placement with his mother beginning in December 2017—more than twelve months 
before DSS filed the TPR petition.  
¶ 18 
 
Respondent-mother’s willfulness can be established by evidence that she 
possessed the ability to make reasonable progress but was unwilling to make an 
effort. In re Baker, 158 N.C. App. 491, 494 (2003). The following portions of finding of 
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fact 14 are relevant to respondent-mother’s willfulness:  
b. . . . 
[Respondent-mother] was asked 
to 
continue 
parenting education, to address her decision making. 
Parenting education was offered to [respondent-mother], 
but she chose not to attend any parenting classes. 
[Respondent-mother] was referred to PATE on March 31, 
2017[.] . . . 
To 
date, 
[respondent-mother] 
has 
only 
completed one PATE class and has not made any contact 
with the facilitator to reengage in the program. 
. . .  
[Respondent-mother] 
refused 
to 
participate 
in 
a 
psychological evaluation and has indicated that she is tired 
of completing tasks for [DSS]. 
. . .  
. . . Since reaching the age of majority on November 30, 
2017, [respondent-mother] has not attended any medical 
appointments for the juvenile. . . . [Respondent-mother] 
has missed all her visits with the juvenile since August 10, 
2018, and has not contacted [DSS] to inquire about 
reinstating visitation. 
c. . . . [Respondent-mother] was advised that Section 8 had 
openings . . . by [DSS] and [respondent-mother] was urged 
to go apply for the opening immediately. Despite being 
given this resource, [respondent-mother] moved out of her 
grandmother’s home and is currently renting a room [in 
Greensboro]. . . . To-date [sic], [respondent-mother] has 
failed to demonstrate any stability with regard to her living 
situation, and she is not in compliance with this component 
of her case plan. 
d. . . . To date, [respondent-mother] has not completed a 
substance abuse assessment. 
¶ 19 
 
We determine that these findings support a conclusion of willfulness. 
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Therefore, the findings of fact in the TPR order support the conclusion that 
respondent-mother willfully left Quentin in foster care or placement outside the home 
for over twelve months prior to April 2019. 
¶ 20 
 
Next, we review whether the trial court’s findings of fact support its conclusion 
that respondent-mother has not made reasonable progress to correct the conditions 
which led to the removal of Quentin. Regarding the conditions that led to the removal 
of the juvenile, the trial court made the following finding of fact: 
The conditions that led to the juvenile coming into custody 
include [respondent-mother’s] inability to provide basic 
needs for herself and the juvenile due to [respondent-
mother’s] status as a minor child in the custody of [DSS]; 
[respondent-mother’s] inability to provide the required 
medical care for the juvenile; lack of an appropriate adult 
caregiver for the juvenile; [respondent-mother] leaving the 
juvenile at the hospital for two days without anyone to 
make decisions for the juvenile and paternity had not been 
established. 
Respondent-mother argues that the conditions that led to Quentin’s removal were all 
attributable to her own minor status. She argues that the requirements of her case 
plan did not have a sufficient nexus to that condition. We disagree.  
¶ 21 
 
Our Court has previously explained that our appellate case law 
reflects a consistent judicial recognition that parental 
compliance with a judicially adopted case plan is relevant 
in determining whether grounds for termination exist 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B –1111(a)(2) even when there is 
no direct and immediate relationship between the 
conditions 
addressed 
in 
the 
case 
plan 
and 
the 
circumstances that led to the initial governmental 
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intervention into the family’s life, as long as the objectives 
sought to be achieved by the case plan provision in question 
address issues that contributed to causing the problematic 
circumstances that led to the juvenile’s removal from the 
parental home. The adoption of a contrary approach would 
amount to turning a blind eye to the practical reality that 
a child’s removal from the parental home is rarely the 
result of a single, specific incident and is, instead, typically 
caused by the confluence of multiple factors, some of which 
are immediately apparent and some of which only become 
apparent in light of further investigation. 
In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 384–85 (2019).  
¶ 22 
 
Here, DSS modified respondent-mother’s case plan and reviewed it several 
times to adjust for her changing circumstances as more information came to light 
about the barriers to reunification. The case plan requirements were tied to 
respondent-mother’s need to demonstrate maturity and stability. For example, in 
order to care for Quentin, respondent-mother needed to learn parenting skills, 
demonstrate a commitment to Quentin on a sustained basis, and find stable housing 
and employment. We conclude that the case plan requirements were properly tied to 
alleviating the conditions which directly or indirectly contributed to the problematic 
circumstances that led to Quentin’s removal—namely, respondent-mother’s 
immaturity and instability.  
¶ 23 
 
Regarding respondent-mother’s failure to make reasonable progress, the trial 
court made the following relevant findings of fact: 
13. [Respondent-mother] has had the opportunity to correct 
the conditions that led to the juvenile’s removal from the 
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home, including but not limited to being offered and 
entering into, a service agreement with [DSS]. [DSS] 
identified needs arising out of the conditions that led to the 
removal of the juvenile and developed a service agreement 
to assist [respondent-mother] in addressing those needs. 
14. [Respondent-mother] . . . entered into the case plan on 
June 5, 2014. On March 26, 2018, . . . [respondent-
mother’s] 
case 
plan 
was 
updated. . . .The 
service 
agreement was reviewed on August 30, 2018, November 
13, 2018, and February 11, 2019. . . .  
 
. . . . 
b. Parenting Skills/Mental Health—[Respondent-
mother] has made minimal progress on the 
parenting 
component 
of 
her 
case 
plan. . . . 
[Respondent-mother] 
completed 
the 
parenting 
program at [her placement] in September 2014. 
Because [respondent-mother] continued to take the 
juvenile on unauthorized overnight stays with 
adults who were not authorized by [DSS], 
[respondent-mother] 
was 
asked 
to 
continue 
parenting education, to address her decision 
making. Parenting education was offered to 
[respondent-mother], but she chose not to attend any 
parenting 
classes. 
[Respondent-mother] 
was 
referred to PATE on March 31, 2017[.] . . . To date, 
[respondent-mother] has only completed one PATE 
class and has not made any contact with the 
facilitator to reengage in the program. 
[Respondent-mother] 
completed 
a 
parenting 
assessment with Dr. McColloch on June 15, 2017. 
Dr. McColloch recommended that [respondent-
mother] participate in a psychological evaluation, 
trauma focused therapy, individual counseling, and 
parenting classes. . . . [Respondent-mother] last 
attended 
therapy 
on 
August 
1, 
2018. . . . 
[Respondent-mother] refused to participate in a 
psychological evaluation and has indicated that she 
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is tired of completing tasks for [DSS]. 
. . . . 
. . . Since reaching the age of majority on November 
30, 2017, [respondent-mother] has not attended any 
medical appointments for the juvenile. When 
[respondent-mother] and the juvenile were no longer 
placed together, . . . [respondent-mother] was . . . 
allowed to have supervised visits with the juvenile 
at the foster home with the permission of the 
juvenile’s foster parent. On October 17, 2018, due to 
[respondent-mother] missing twenty-one (21) visits 
with the juvenile, visitation between [respondent-
mother] and the juvenile was reduced to one day per 
week 
for 
one 
hour. 
[Respondent-mother] 
subsequently failed to attend any of her scheduled 
visits with the juvenile, and her visits were 
suspended on January 9, 2019. [Respondent-
mother] has missed all her visits with the juvenile 
since August 10, 2018, and has not contacted [DSS] 
to inquire about reinstating visitation. [Respondent-
mother] is not in compliance with the parenting 
component of her case plan. 
c. Placement/Housing—At the commencement of the 
underlying 
case, 
[respondent-mother’s] 
only 
requirement under this component of her case plan 
was to comply with the rules and policies of her 
placement. . . . When [respondent-mother] has [sic] 
aged out of foster care the placement component of 
her case plan has [sic] changed to a requirement that 
[respondent-mother] obtain and maintain stable 
housing 
suitable 
for 
her 
and 
the 
juvenile. 
[Respondent-mother] has not made any progress on 
this component of her case plan. . . . On March 8, 
2018, [respondent-mother] reported that she had her 
own apartment, however, the lease she provided on 
April 5, 2018 stated that the lease term ended on 
April 1, 2018. On July 26, 2018, [respondent-mother] 
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again reported that she had her own two-bedroom 
apartment paying $375.00 per month in rent. 
[Respondent-mother] went on to state that she was 
sharing the apartment with her sister but since her 
sister moved out, the rent was taking up her entire 
check. On August 10, 2018, [respondent-mother] 
reported that she was living with her mother 
because her apartment complex made her move out 
due 
to 
safety 
concerns. 
[Respondent-mother] 
explained that a domestic violence incident occurred 
between her and her ex-boyfriend, and the ex-
boyfriend trashed her apartment. . . . On September 
18, 2018, [respondent-mother] reported that she was 
living with her grandmother. [Respondent-mother] 
was advised that Section 8 had openings . . . by 
[DSS] and [respondent-mother] was urged to go 
apply for the opening immediately. Despite being 
given this resource, [respondent-mother] moved out 
of her grandmother’s home and is currently renting 
a 
room 
[in 
Greensboro]. . . . 
To-date 
[sic], 
[respondent-mother] has failed to demonstrate any 
stability with regard to her living situation, and she 
is not in compliance with this component of her case 
plan. [Respondent-mother] entered into a Voluntary 
Placement Agreement on August 9, 2018. . . .  
When 
[respondent-mother] 
entered 
into 
the 
Voluntary Placement Agreement she was residing 
. . . in her own apartment, but she moved out due to 
safety concerns with her ex-boyfriend. On August 
30, 2018 [respondent-mother] reported that she was 
living with a friend [in Greensboro]. On September 
18, 2018 [respondent-mother] reported that she was 
staying 
with 
her 
grandmother 
and 
great 
grandmother. . . . She advised Social Worker Young 
and Social Worker Stewart that she could not stay 
with her friend anymore. [Respondent-mother] was 
advised that all moves need to be reported in order 
to get approval. On November 16, 2018 Social 
Worker Stewart met with [respondent-mother] who 
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stated that things weren’t going well and that she 
needed to be out of her grandmother’s home by the 
end of the month. Ms. Stewart provided [respondent-
mother] with housing resources. [Respondent-
mother] moved [to another house]. She was renting 
a room in this house with several others. She was 
paying $250 per month for rent and was responsible 
for the light bill. On January 11, 2019 SW Stewart 
spoke with [respondent-mother] who stated that she 
had to leave her previous placement and was now 
living with her father because she has no place else 
to go. She was advised that her VPA will be 
terminated because she was living with her father 
and that they would meet the next week to get VPA 
termination papers signed. On January 22, 2019 SW 
Stewart spoke with [respondent-mother] who stated 
that she was now living with a friend [in 
Greensboro]. As of March 18, 2019, [respondent-
mother] continue [sic] to reside at [that] address. 
She stated that she had put in an application for 
housing [elsewhere], however she still has an 
outstanding balance of $1000.00 on her housing 
record. [Respondent-mother] did advise [DSS] that 
she is currently living at another address but failed 
to provide the actual address. 
d. Substance Abuse—[Respondent-mother] has not 
made any progress in addressing her substance 
abuse needs. . . . On October 10, 2018, Social Worker 
Young referred [respondent-mother] for a substance 
abuse assessment. . . . To date, [respondent-mother] 
has not completed a substance abuse assessment. 
On August 31, 2018, [respondent-mother] was asked 
to comply with a drug screen by no later than 
September 4, 2018. [Respondent-mother] did not 
comply. [Respondent-mother] was also asked to 
submit to a drug screen on September 18, 2018, and 
she did not comply. On October 17, 2018, 
[respondent-mother] was ordered by the court to 
submit to a drug screen by the end of the day. 
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[Respondent-mother] submitted to a drug screen on 
October 18, 2018 and tested positive for marijuana. 
On November 13, 2018, the assigned social worker 
requested that [respondent-mother] submit to a 
random drug screen, and [respondent-mother] did 
not comply. As of the filing of the petition, 
[respondent-mother] has only submitted to one drug 
screen 
which 
was 
positive 
for 
marijuana. 
[Respondent-mother] is not in compliance with the 
substance abuse component of her case plan. 
 . . . . 
 
25. . . .  
 
 
. . . . 
 
b. The lack of reasonable progress under the 
circumstances is not due solely to the poverty of 
[respondent-mother] . . . but is the direct result of 
[her] failure to address the conditions that led to the 
removal of the juvenile, including [respondent-
mother’s] failure to maintain stable housing, failure 
to attend parenting classes, failure to cooperate with 
drug screens, [and] failure to attend visits . . . . 
We conclude that these findings support the trial court’s conclusion that respondent-
mother failed to make reasonable progress under the circumstances to correct the 
conditions which led to Quentin’s removal.3  
IV. 
Conclusion 
¶ 24 
 
We conclude that the trial court properly found that grounds existed to 
                                            
3 Respondent-mother argues that she has made reasonable progress, pointing to her 
participation in a DSS program for people transitioning out of foster care. However, her 
participation in that program alone is not sufficient to prevent or negate the conclusion that 
she has failed to make reasonable progress.  
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terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). The 
trial court’s conclusion that one statutory ground for termination existed is sufficient 
in and of itself to support termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights. In re 
E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 395 (2019). Therefore, we need not address respondent-mother’s 
arguments regarding N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (3), (6), and (7). Furthermore, 
respondent-mother does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that termination of 
her parental rights was in Quentin’s best interests. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019). 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating respondent-mother’s 
parental rights.  
AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice EARLS dissenting. 
 
¶ 25 
 
The result of the majority’s decision today is that a nineteen-year-old mother 
who became pregnant when she was sexually assaulted as a thirteen-year-old girl 
will permanently and unnecessarily lose her right to maintain any relationship with 
her child. The trial court’s findings of fact do not support the conclusion that 
petitioner has met its burden of “proving by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence 
the existence of one or more grounds for termination under section 7B-1111(a) of the 
General Statutes.” In re K.D.C., 375 N.C. 784, 788 (2020) (cleaned up). This decision 
is not compelled by North Carolina law and illustrates this Court’s continued refusal 
to accord sufficient respect to a parent’s fundamental constitutional-liberty interest 
in raising their child. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
V. 
Factual Background 
¶ 26 
 
The circumstances underlying the present case are highly distressing. 
Respondent’s own mother was convicted of aiding and abetting in the sexual assault 
perpetrated by a twenty-year-old man which led to respondent’s pregnancy. After the 
assault, respondent was first placed with her grandmother, who quickly realized that 
she was unable to provide respondent with adequate care. On 5 March 2014, 
respondent was adjudicated to be a dependent juvenile and placed into the custody of 
the Guilford County Department of Social Services (DSS). Three days later, 
respondent gave birth to her son, Quentin. Twelve days after Quentin was born, he 
was also adjudicated to be a dependent juvenile due to respondent’s “inability to care 
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Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
for herself, much less an infant child.”  
¶ 27 
 
Initially, respondent and Quentin were placed together in a foster home. 
Respondent entered into a case plan on 5 June 2014. Although respondent 
occasionally exhibited disruptive or inappropriate behaviors while in foster care, she 
substantially complied with her case plan and made continuous progress towards 
reunification over the next four years, despite experiencing frequent instability as 
she was moved between numerous foster care placements. There is no evidence in the 
record that respondent ever abused Quentin, nor is there evidence that her behaviors 
ever exposed Quentin to a significant risk of harm. Respondent aged out of the foster 
care system when she turned eighteen on 30 November 2017. Less than two years 
later, the trial court terminated her parental rights to Quentin.  
VI. 
Willful Failure to Make Reasonable Progress Under the Circumstances: 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) 
¶ 28 
 
In affirming the trial court’s order terminating respondent’s parental rights on 
the grounds that she has willfully failed to make reasonable progress towards 
correcting the conditions that led to Quentin’s removal, the majority ignores the 
myriad constraints on respondent’s ability to comply with her case plan imposed by 
respondent’s circumstances. This unwillingness to examine the realities of 
respondent’s situation—particularly her age and her recent experience attempting to 
transition out of the foster care system—is inconsistent with the “ongoing 
examination of the circumstances” we have previously deemed appropriate in 
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Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
assessing a respondent-parent’s reasonable progress under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). 
In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 382 (2019). Accordingly, I disagree with the majority’s 
approach and would instead hold that the trial court was required to consider 
respondent’s holistic circumstances in assessing both the willfulness of her conduct 
and the reasonableness of the progress she made towards correcting the conditions 
that led to Quentin’s removal.  
¶ 29 
 
Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), a court may terminate a respondent-
parent’s parental rights when the parent has “willfully left the juvenile in foster care 
or placement outside the home for more than 12 months without showing to the 
satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been 
made in correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1111(a)(2) (2019). We have previously explained that “[w]illfulness is 
established when the respondent had the ability to show reasonable progress, but 
was unwilling to make the effort.” In re S.M., 375 N.C. 673, 685 (2020) (quoting In re 
McMillon, 143 N.C. App. 402, 410, disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 218 (2001)); see also 
In re Matherly, 149 N.C. App. 452, 455 (2002) (“Evidence showing a parents’ ability, 
or capacity to acquire the ability, to overcome factors which resulted in their children 
being placed in foster care must be apparent for willfulness to attach.”). A trial court 
cannot fulfill its obligation to assess willfulness when it blinds itself to important 
context. The trial court must consider that context even if some of the relevant events 
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Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
occurred before the respondent-parent reached the age of majority. In this case, 
respondent’s experiences both within and immediately upon leaving the foster care 
system are relevant in assessing the willfulness of the conduct which forms the basis 
of DSS’s termination petition. See In re Pierce, 356 N.C. 68, 75 n.1 (2002) (“[T]here is 
no specified time frame that limits the admission of relevant evidence pertaining to 
a parent’s ‘reasonable progress’ or lack thereof.”).  
¶ 30 
 
For four years after giving birth to Quentin at the age of fourteen, respondent 
continued making progress towards reunification with her son to the repeated 
satisfaction of the trial court. She continued making progress even while she was 
moved across multiple placements and while dealing with all of the ordinary 
challenges of adolescence, compounded by the fact that she was a minor parent who 
was herself in DSS custody. Throughout this difficult period, respondent remained 
committed to learning to parent Quentin. She undeniably developed a meaningful 
bond with her child. Her persistence in the face of tremendous adversity suggests 
that her conduct which forms the basis of the underlying termination petition—
conduct which occurred during a short period of time immediately after the 
respondent reached the age of majority and while she was attempting to make the 
difficult transition from foster care to independent living—reflected difficulties 
inherent in her unique circumstances which would be resolved in time, rather than a 
willful failure to make reasonable progress within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-
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Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
1111(a)(2).1 Cf. Lecky v. Reed, 20 Va. App. 306, 312 (1995) (holding that termination 
of minor parent’s parental rights was warranted because “[n]othing in this record 
attributes mother’s parental deficiencies to her age or suggests that the mere passage 
of time would resolve her difficulties”).  
¶ 31 
 
The trial court’s and the majority’s steadfast refusal to fully consider 
respondent’s circumstances is also inconsistent with the realities of adolescent 
development. Although our legal system often draws a sharp distinction between 
“minors” and “adults,” this binary does not account for the fact that “psychological, 
social, and economic forces have shifted the way that people experience their late 
teens and early twenties.” Clare Ryan, The Law of Emerging Adults, 97 Wash. U. L. 
Rev. 1131, 1147 (2020). Scientific research has demonstrated that “the years from the 
late teens to the early twenties constitute a transitional period that bridges 
adolescence and mature adulthood” where “[d]evelopment is gradual, and the 
psychological boundaries between adolescence and adulthood are fuzzy.” Elizabeth S. 
Scott et al., Young Adulthood As a Transitional Legal Category: Science, Social 
Change, and Justice Policy, 85 Fordham L. Rev. 641, 645 (2016). The Court of Appeals 
has held that if a respondent-parent has not yet turned eighteen when DSS files its 
                                            
1 It is notable that in regard to respondent’s final foster care placement before reaching 
the age of majority, the trial court found that respondent “did very well in her placement with 
[the foster parent] as [the foster parent] provided strong support and guidance for respondent 
to learn parenting skills.” Respondent only left this placement when she aged out of the foster 
care system upon turning eighteen. 
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Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
termination petition, the trial court is required to “make specific findings of fact 
showing that a minor parent’s age-related limitations as to willfulness have been 
adequately considered.” In re Matherly, 149 N.C. App. at 455. I agree with the Court 
of Appeals and would hold trial courts to the same requirement when the respondent-
parent is a young adult, especially when, as here, many of the pertinent events 
occurred prior to the parent reaching the age of majority.2  
¶ 32 
 
We need not and should not adopt the fictitious presumption that everything 
respondent did after she turned eighteen was willful. Instead, we should examine her 
circumstances and capacities holistically, acknowledging “[r]ecent research in 
neuroscience and developmental psychology [which] indicates that individuals 
between the ages of 18 and 21 share many of the[  ] same characteristics” as minors. 
Pike v. Gross, 936 F.3d 372, 385 (6th Cir. 2019) (Stranch, J., concurring), cert. denied, 
207 L. Ed. 2d 171 (U.S. 2020). This research has particular implications for children 
in foster care who must immediately attempt to live independently at age eighteen.  
“It is now well established among social scientists that young adults who emancipate 
from foster care, when compared to their peers, are far more likely to suffer from 
                                            
2 Regardless, the trial court made numerous factual findings regarding incidents 
which occurred prior to respondent reaching the age of majority, including factual findings 
regarding her purported disruption of foster care placements. The trial court relied on these 
factual findings in arriving at its ultimate conclusion that respondent had willfully failed to 
make reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to Quentin’s removal. However, 
a legitimate question arises in this case of whether respondent’s conduct relating to 
correcting those conditions was willful during the period that she was in foster care.  The 
trial court’s factual findings do not address that question.   
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Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
homelessness, unemployment, unplanned pregnancy, lack of health care, and 
incarceration, among other problems.”  Bruce A. Boyer, Foster Care Reentry Laws:  
Mending the Safety Net for Emerging Adults in the Transition to Independence, 88 
Temp. L. Rev. 837, 837 (2016). As Boyer explains: 
Both social scientists and neurologists now recognize that 
true “adult” functioning, measured in terms of cognitive, 
behavioral, and social maturity, is not achieved for the 
majority of emerging adults until well into the third decade 
of life.  During this transitional phase, while most young 
people begin the process of separating from their families, 
few do so precipitously or without setbacks.  Studies 
generally place the median age at which adolescents first 
leave home in the early twenties, and many of those 
adolescents who leave home for the first time between the 
ages of eighteen and twenty-four return to live in their 
parental households at some time thereafter, even if only 
for a short time. One recent study found that 
approximately 55% of young men and 46% of young women 
between eighteen and twenty-four years old were living at 
home with one or both of their parents. Other studies have 
concluded that the average age at which children in the 
general population finally depart the home is twenty-eight.  
The staging of the transition to independence is 
particularly indispensable for youth from less well-off 
families seeking to balance work, school, and the 
achievement of the credentials needed to sustain 
independence.  
 
Id. at 840–41 (footnotes omitted). The failure to examine respondent’s progress in 
light of this context is a legal error because it reflects a failure to properly apply the 
statutory mandate to consider respondent’s reasonable progress “under the 
circumstances.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). 
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Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
¶ 33 
 
Therefore, in this case, the trial court’s findings do not support the conclusion 
that respondent “had the ability to show reasonable progress, but was unwilling to 
make the effort.” In re S.M., 375 N.C. at 685 (quoting In re McMillon, 143 N.C. App. 
at 410). The evidence instead only indicates that respondent failed to make more 
progress than she did due to her limited capacities as a very young parent who was 
attempting to live independently for the first time, without the benefit of adequate 
financial resources or a support network. Although the state maintains a substantial 
interest in the welfare of all children in North Carolina, including those born to minor 
parents, consideration of a young parent’s circumstances is consistent with the 
Juvenile Code’s goals of protecting juveniles “by means that respect both the right to 
family autonomy and the juveniles’ needs” while “preventing the unnecessary or 
inappropriate separation of juveniles from their parents.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-100(3)–(4) 
(2019). 
¶ 34 
 
Additionally, the majority misses the mark in summarily disregarding 
respondent’s “participation in a DSS program for people transitioning out of foster 
care.” Although respondent acknowledges that she did not fully comply with her case 
plan after reaching the age of majority, she argues that her engagement with the NC 
LINKS program—which provides services to young adults exiting the foster care 
system to help them attain education, employment, health, and housing stability—is 
relevant in assessing whether she made reasonable progress towards correcting the 
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Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
conditions which led to Quentin’s removal. In this case, as the majority notes, the 
requirements of respondent’s case plan “were tied to [her] need to demonstrate 
maturity and stability.” Certainly, respondent’s participation in a program designed 
to assist young adults in achieving positive life outcomes is a possible indicator of her 
increased maturity. Because participation in the NC LINKS program is entirely 
optional, respondent’s choice to seek out additional support could reflect an 
awareness of her own limitations and a recognition that she needed help in order to 
adequately care for herself and her son. Further, if respondent’s participation in the 
NC LINKS program helped her advance her education, obtain employment and 
housing, and improve her mental and physical health, then she would have made 
substantial progress towards addressing the material conditions which rendered her 
unable to parent Quentin.  
¶ 35 
 
We have never held that a respondent-parent’s compliance, or lack thereof, 
with a DSS case plan is dispositive in determining whether the requirements of 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) have been met. This statutory ground does not permit 
termination of parental rights merely on the basis that a respondent-parent has 
failed to comply with his or her case plan. In re E.C., 375 N.C. 581, 585 (2020) (“A 
trial court should refrain from finding that a parent has failed to make reasonable 
progress in correcting the conditions that led to the children’s removal ‘simply 
because of his or her failure to fully satisfy all elements of the case plan goals.’ ” 
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Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
(quoting In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. at 385)). Rather, it permits termination only when a 
parent has failed to make “reasonable progress under the circumstances” towards 
“correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(2). A parent’s compliance with a case plan is often evidence that he or she 
has made reasonable progress under the circumstances because case plans are 
typically developed to address the specific conditions which led to a child’s removal. 
See In re J.S., 374 N.C. 811, 815–16 (2020) (“[I]n order for a respondent’s 
noncompliance with her case plan to support the termination of her parental rights, 
there must be a nexus between the components of the court-approved case plan with 
which the respondent failed to comply and the conditions which led to the child’s 
removal from the parental home.” (cleaned up)). However, it is possible for a parent 
to make reasonable progress towards addressing the substantive conditions which 
led to a child’s removal from the parental home in a manner other than the one 
specified in a DSS-approved case plan. See, e.g., In re K.D.C., 375 N.C. at 792 (holding 
that petitioner had failed to prove grounds existed under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) 
where “respondent-mother failed to complete a parenting class as required by her 
case plan, . . . [but] completed a ‘Mothering’ class, which appears to be at least a 
plausible attempt by respondent-mother to complete her case plan and to improve 
her parenting skills”). Accordingly, the trial court erred in failing to consider 
respondent’s participation in the NC LINKS program as probative evidence of her 
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Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
progress towards addressing the conditions that led to Quentin’s removal. If 
respondent was able to address the substantive barriers preventing her from caring 
for Quentin through her participation in the NC LINKS program, then N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(2) does not supply a ground for terminating her parental rights.  
¶ 36 
 
Finally, the trial court erred in failing to assess whether respondent’s inability 
to meet the requirements of her case plan stemmed from her poverty, rather than her 
willful conduct. See In re M.A., 374 N.C. 865, 881 (2020) (“[P]arental rights are not 
subject to termination in the event that [a parent’s] inability to care for her children 
rested solely upon poverty-related considerations . . . .”). The trial court’s bare 
assertion that “[t]he lack of reasonable progress under the circumstances is not due 
solely to the poverty of [respondent], but is the direct result of [her] failure to address 
the conditions that led to the removal of the juvenile,” is puzzling given the evidence 
that respondent’s lack of financial resources caused her to be unable to meet the 
conditions of her case plan. For example, the trial court notes that respondent “had 
put in an application for housing” but that “she still ha[d] an outstanding balance of 
$1000.00 on her housing record.” The record discloses that respondent made 
numerous efforts to obtain housing after reaching the age of majority. Thus, there is 
evidence in the record indicating that respondent’s poverty, rather than a lack of 
effort, directly caused her continued inability to maintain stable housing. The trial 
court’s conclusory finding that respondent’s lack of progress was not due to poverty 
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Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
is insufficient to support the legal conclusion that respondent had the actual ability 
to comply with the conditions imposed by her case plan. Cf. In re McMillon, 143 N.C. 
App. at 412 (affirming order terminating parental rights despite respondent’s claim 
that he was impoverished because “[t]he components of the DSS plan did not require 
material resources”); In re A.W., 237 N.C. App. 209, 217 (2014) (affirming order 
terminating parental rights when “there was a sufficient basis in the record for 
terminating the Father’s parental rights that had nothing to do with poverty”). 
VII. 
Other Grounds 
¶ 37 
 
Having wrongfully affirmed the portion of the trial court’s order concluding 
that respondent willfully failed to make reasonable progress within the meaning of 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), the majority does not address any of the other grounds for 
terminating respondent’s parental rights adjudicated by the trial court. With regard 
to these other grounds, I would also hold that the trial court’s conclusions are not 
supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.  
¶ 38 
 
First, there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the conclusion that 
grounds exist to terminate respondent’s parental rights on the basis of neglect. The 
trial court’s sole conclusion of law supporting termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1) is that respondent was presently neglecting Quentin based on her failure 
to comply with her case plan. However, respondent’s failure to comply with her case 
plan cannot establish ongoing neglect in this case because respondent has not had 
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Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
custody of her son for many years. Because there is insufficient evidence that Quentin 
was a neglected child within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15), petitioner must 
prove that respondent previously neglected Quentin and that she is likely to do so 
again in the future. In re R.L.D., 375 N.C. 838, 841 n.3 (2020). The only evidence of 
prior neglect that petitioner can point to is respondent’s conduct in the immediate 
aftermath of giving birth to Quentin as a fourteen-year-old, when she left Quentin in 
the hospital for two days. There is no evidence that Quentin was in any way harmed 
by respondent’s brief absence. Accordingly, I would hold that the record does not 
support the conclusion that respondent’s parental rights may be terminated under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). 
¶ 39 
 
Second, the evidence presented at trial does not support the conclusion that 
respondent willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of caring for Quentin 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3). The evidence indicates that respondent made 
three child support payments during the six months preceding the filing of the 
termination petition. The evidence also indicates that the total amount paid by 
respondent was less than the total amount she owed during this period. This Court 
has not addressed whether the ground provided for in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3) is 
automatically triggered whenever a parent fails to pay the full amount of a valid child 
support obligation. Regardless, the evidence establishes that respondent did not fail 
to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care “for a continuous period of six months 
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Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
immediately preceding the filling of the petition” because she paid the full amount of 
child support owed for a monthly period on at least one occasion during these six 
months. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3) (emphasis added). Accordingly, I would hold that 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3) does not support the termination of respondent’s parental 
rights. 
¶ 40 
 
Third, the record evidence plainly does not support the conclusion that 
respondent is incapable of caring for Quentin within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(6). According to the trial court, this ground for termination has been met 
because respondent once tested positive for marijuana. However, as Quentin’s 
guardian ad litem rightly conceded in its brief, evidence that a parent uses drugs is 
insufficient to prove that the parent is incapable of caring for his or her child absent 
a finding that the parent’s drug use will “prevent the parent from providing [the child 
with] proper care and supervision.” In re D.T.N.A., 250 N.C. App. 582, 585 (2016). 
The record is bereft of any evidence suggesting that respondent’s purported substance 
abuse problem caused her to be “incapable of providing for the proper care and 
supervision of” Quentin. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6). Thus, the trial court erred in 
concluding that the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) had been met. 
¶ 41 
 
Finally, the record does not support the conclusion that respondent willfully 
abandoned Quentin within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). In order to 
establish willful abandonment, there must be evidence establishing that respondent 
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Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
evinced a “purposeful, deliberative and manifest willful determination to forego all 
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to [the child].” In re A.G.D., 374 
N.C. 317, 319 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 79 
(2019)). Here, respondent made multiple child support payments in the six months 
immediately preceding the filing of the termination petition. In addition, she enrolled 
in the NC LINKS program, purportedly in an effort to address the deficiencies which 
prevented her from providing for Quentin as his parent. These actions are 
inconsistent with the conclusion that respondent “deliberately eschewed . . . her 
parental responsibilities in their entirety.” In re E.B., 375 N.C. 310, 318 (2020). 
Accordingly, I would hold that petitioner has not met its burden of proving that 
respondent willfully abandoned Quentin pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). 
VIII. 
Conclusion 
¶ 42 
 
Simply put, neither the termination statutes nor our precedents endorse the 
blinkered approach the majority adopts in reviewing the trial court’s order 
terminating respondent’s parental rights. The majority’s analysis entirely ignores the 
likelihood that respondent’s behavior in the year subsequent to reaching the age of 
majority was substantially influenced by the conditions she lived in during the 
preceding years when she was in DSS custody. To the extent that respondent may 
have lacked the resources or capacity to parent Quentin immediately upon turning 
eighteen, then DSS itself bears a substantial share of the responsibility as her 
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Earls, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
caregiver. The outcome of the majority’s decision unfairly punishes a young mother 
who has exhibited remarkable fortitude in striving to raise her child under difficult 
circumstances. Accordingly, I would vacate the trial court’s order terminating 
respondent’s parental rights and remand for further factfinding which considers all 
of the relevant evidence, including her circumstances, financial resources, and 
participation in the NC LINKS program, in determining whether she willfully failed 
to make reasonable progress in correcting the conditions which led to Quentin’s 
removal.