Case Title: Reed v. Hunter

Citation: 

Docket Number: 5813

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-05-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Reed v. Hunter1983 WY 54663 P.2d 513Case Number: 5813, 5814Case Number: 5813, 5814Decided: 05/20/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
DONALD DWIGHT REED, LOIS I. REED, DONALD DWIGHT REED II, 
D/B/A DOWNING REED AGENCY, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS), UNITED FIRE & CASUALTY, 
AN IOWA CORPORATION, (DEFENDANT),

v.

LLOYD E. HUNTER AND 
KATHLEEN HUNTER, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

UNITED FIRE & 
CASUALTY, AN IOWA CORPORATION, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), DONALD DWIGHT REED, LOIS 
I. REED, DONALD DWIGHT REED II, D/B/A DOWNING REED AGENCY, 
(DEFENDANTS),

v.

LLOYD E. HUNTER AND 
KATHLEEN HUNTER, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS). Nos. 5813, 5814

Appeal from the District Court,GoshenCounty, George P. Sawyer, 
J.

A. Joseph 
Williams of Guy, Williams, White & Argeris, Cheyenne, for appellants in No. 
5813.

Raymond B. 
Hunkins of Jones, Jones, Vines & Hunkins, Wheatland, for 
appellees.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE and 
BROWN, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This case raises issues 
with respect to the qualifications of an expert witness and the scope of his 
testimony in the context of an action brought to recover damages based upon a 
breach of an oral binder or contract to obtain fire insurance coverage on a 
dwelling or for negligence in failing to effect coverage. The district court 
recognized the qualification of the proffered witness as an expert with respect 
to the role of an agent in the insurance business. The witness then was 
permitted to testify in substance that the appellants had violated a duty which 
they owed to the appellees. This appeal is taken from a judgment which awarded 
appellees damages in the amount attributable to a fire in their recently 
purchased home for which the appellants had not obtained insurance coverage. We 
shall affirm the judgment and the rulings of the district 
court.

[¶2.]     The appellants phrase 
the issue in their brief as follows:

"The issue presented for 
appeal is whether the trial court committed prejudicial error in permitting 
appellees/plaintiffs' expert to testify as to his opinion and in refusing to 
strike his testimony."

The appellants 
urge in presenting this issue that the expert witness was not properly qualified 
because he did not possess adequate knowledge of the practice of other insurance 
agents in Wheatland where his business was located. Proceeding, then, with 
arguments against his testimony, the appellants urge that he should have been 
restricted in giving his opinion to reliance upon other evidence presented in 
the court room, and that he was permitted to testify with respect to the 
ultimate issue for the jury to decide when he gave his opinion. The appellants 
contend that this error had an impact upon the verdict for breach of contract, 
as well as the verdict for negligence.

[¶3.]     In their answering 
brief the appellees state the question thusly:

"The sole issue presented 
in this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in permitting an 
expert witness to express his opinion on the issue of negligence and, later, in 
refusing to strike that witness' testimony."

In answering the 
contentions of the appellants, the appellees contend that the witness properly 
was permitted to testify as an expert within the discretion of the district 
judge, and that his testimony was not improper in light of the Wyoming Rules of 
Evidence as well as case authority.

[¶4.]     The Hunters had 
successfully bid on a home located in Torrington, Wyoming, and offered for sale at an estate 
auction. Mr. Hunter recently had retired, and the Hunters planned to move to the 
home in Torrington, which was to be their retirement 
home. Before the sale was closed with the estate an employee of the Downing Reed 
Agency telephoned the Hunters about homeowner's insurance on their newly 
acquired home. Downing Reed Agency is an insurance business operated by a 
partnership composed of the individual appellants. The homeowner's insurance on 
the house had been carried by United Fire and Casualty prior to the sale by the 
estate. The policy had been written by Downing Reed Agency, and the employee who 
called the Hunters was familiar with the coverage.

[¶5.]     The Downing Reed Agency 
employee had been acquainted with the Hunters for a number of years and called 
them at the request of the elder Mr. Reed. The employee told Mrs. Hunter that 
Downing Reed Agency carried the insurance on the home they were planning to buy 
from the estate and asked whether they wanted to continue the insurance after 
the transaction had been closed. Mrs. Hunter informed the employee of Downing 
Reed Agency that they did want to continue the coverage, and the employee then 
advised that in her opinion the coverage limits were not adequate. Mrs. Hunter 
then handed the telephone to Mr. Hunter to discuss the desired amount of 
insurance coverage.

[¶6.]     With respect to this 
aspect of the telephone conversation, Mr. Hunter testified that an agreement was 
reached over the telephone to continue the insurance coverage on the house. He 
further concluded that the property was under-insured at the figure of $37,000, 
and requested that the coverage be increased to $50,000, which was in accordance 
with the Downing Reed Agency employee's recommendation. Mr. Hunter told the 
employee of Downing Reed Agency that the sale was to be closed the following 
weekend, and that he would plan to pay the insurance premium as soon as possible 
after closing.

[¶7.]     The sale of the house 
was closed with the estate on Saturday October 10, 1981. On the following 
Monday, which was October 12, 1981, Mr. Hunter drove to Torrington to begin 
moving some of the family possessions into the Torrington home and also to 
commence some minor repairs. He drove by the Downing Reed Agency, planning to 
pay them for the insurance premium, but the offices appeared to him to be empty. 
He concluded that the agency was closed because of the Columbus Day Holiday, and 
he did not stop, but continued on his way back to the town of Lingle, where he and his 
wife then were living. At about midnight that night a fire occurred which caused 
severe damage to the home in Torrington.

[¶8.]     The following morning 
the Hunters went to the Downing Reed Agency to tell the insurer of their loss 
due to fire. At that time no question was raised with respect to whether the 
house was insured as a result of the earlier telephone conversation. On 
Wednesday October 14, 1981, Mr. Hunter presented the agency with a check for the 
insurance premium. United Fire and Casualty later denied liability for the loss 
caused by the fire, claiming that there was no coverage in effect. The action 
which is the subject of this appeal then was commenced by the appellees to 
enforce their claim of coverage and breach of the insurance contract, or 
alternatively their claim for negligence on the part of Downing Reed Agency in 
failing to obtain coverage.1

[¶9.]     Discovery was conducted 
in the action, and a motion for summary judgment submitted on behalf of United 
Fire and Casualty was denied by the district court. The parties then stipulated 
that the appellants and United Fire and Casualty would be allowed to file 
cross-claims against each other for indemnity in the event that either might be 
found liable to the Hunters on their complaint. Those cross-claims are not a 
part of this appeal. They were disposed of following the judgment in favor of 
the Hunters in a separate hearing in which only the appellants and United Fire 
and Casualty participated. Although United Fire and Casualty filed a notice of 
appeal, it apparently concluded to abandon that appeal following the granting to 
it of a judgment against the Reeds for indemnity. United Fire and Casualty did 
not file a brief or present oral argument, and pursuant to Rule 5.11, W.R.A.P., 
its appeal is deemed dismissed for want of prosecution.

[¶10.]  The suit by the Hunters proceeded to 
trial on August 10, 1982, and a verdict was returned by the jury in favor of the 
Hunters and against the appellants on August 13, 1982. The jury found for the 
Hunters on both the issues of negligence and breach of contract. After judgment 
was entered on the verdict by the district court, United Fire and Casualty filed 
a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial, which was 
denied, and this appeal then was taken by the Reeds.

[¶11.]  The issues posed arise from the 
presentation during the trial of testimony of an insurance agent from Wheatland, Wyoming, tendered as an expert witness by the 
Hunters on the practice of telephone solicitation of homeowner's insurance 
coverage. The district court found this witness was qualified to testify as an 
expert and permitted him to state his opinion, over objection of the appellants, 
on the issue of whether proper procedures were followed with respect to the 
insurance coverage in the case. Very succinctly, when asked his opinion as to 
whether proper procedures were followed in this case, the witness testified that 
the appellants "blew it" with respect to the Hunter's insurance 
coverage.

[¶12.]  In the course of cross-examination 
counsel for the appellants endeavored to limit the basis for the expert's 
opinion to only that evidence which had been presented during the trial. The 
witness, who had reviewed discovery materials, responded that he was not able to 
give his opinion solely on that basis because he had relied on other information 
disclosed to him prior to the trial. A motion then was made to strike his 
testimony, but the motion was denied. These facts present the record background 
for the position of the appellants before this court. They argue abuse of 
discretion in permitting the witness to testify as an expert and error in 
refusing to strike his testimony because the opinion was not properly based only 
upon other evidence presented in court.

[¶13.]  While the appellants eschew the Wyoming 
Rules of Evidence, adopted for practice in Wyoming effective January 1, 1978, and instead 
premise their position upon case authority, we must treat with cases such as 
this under the Wyoming Rules of Evidence. Rule 702, W.R.E., pertains to the 
appellants' claim that the district court should not have permitted the witness 
to testify as an expert. It provides:

"If scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."

The appellants 
do not argue that expert testimony on the subject of telephone solicitation of 
homeowner's insurance policies does not come within the scope of this rule, but 
rather their position is that this witness was not sufficiently qualified by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to be an expert. Whether a 
witness such as this is so qualified is a matter vested within the discretion of 
the trial court, and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on 
appeal unless it is clearly and prejudicially erroneous, and then only in 
extreme cases. Coronado Oil Company v. 
Grieves, Wyo., 642 P.2d 423 (1982); Ferris v. Myers, Wyo., 
625 P.2d 199 (1981). See   
Taylor v. 
MacDonald, Wyo., 409 P.2d 762 (1966); Macy v. Billings, 74 Wyo. 404, 
289 P.2d 422 (1955); and Morrison v. 
Cottonwood Development Co., 38 Wyo. 190, 266 P. 117 
(1928).

[¶14.]  The record in this case demonstrates that 
this witness had considerable training and experience in the business of selling 
homeowner's insurance. It further shows that he was familiar with the practices 
followed by others in his occupation in telephone solicitation of potential 
customers. The witness had worked in the insurance business as an insurance 
agent for six years in the community of Wheatland, Wyoming, the county seat of 
neighboring Platte County, and approximately 30 percent of his business involved 
the writing of homeowner's insurance. The trial court allowed extensive voir 
dire examination such as that approved in Ferris v. Myers, supra, 625 P.2d  at 204, 
to test the adequacy of the qualification of the expert and the foundation for 
his opinion. We conclude that a proper foundation was presented to justify the 
recognition of the witness as an expert by the trial court and that it did not 
abuse its discretion in permitting him to testify as an 
expert.

[¶15.]  The appellants, however, contend that 
even if it were proper to permit the witness to testify as an expert the trial 
court should have stricken his testimony because by his admission it was not 
based solely upon other testimony or evidence admitted during the trial, and 
further because it embraced the ultimate issue of liability, which was to be 
decided by the jury. In presenting this argument the appellants also eschew the 
Wyoming Rules of Evidence. We quote pertinent sections of those 
rules:

"Rule 703. Bases of 
opinion testimony by experts.

"The facts or data in the 
particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those 
perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in 
evidence."

"Rule 704. Opinion on 
ultimate issue.

"Testimony in the form of 
an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it 
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of 
fact."

"Rule 705. Disclosure of 
facts or data underlying expert opinion.

"The expert may testify 
in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons therefor without prior 
disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. 
The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data 
on cross-examination."

[¶16.]  As this court noted in Krahn v. Pierce, Wyo., 485 P.2d 1021 
(1971), the purpose of the identical counterparts in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence was not to provide for blanket admissibility of expert opinion 
testimony. The trial court remains vested with discretion in deciding whether to 
exclude such testimony because it is deemed unnecessary or not helpful to the 
trier of the factual issues in reaching an independent conclusion as to the 
facts. The adequacy of any foundation for such opinion testimony is subject to 
scrutiny through cross-examination. Wilhelm v. Lake, Wyo., 630 P.2d 499 (1981); Chrysler Corporation v. 
Todorovich, Wyo., 
580 P.2d 1123 (1978). The trier of fact must decide what weight is to be given 
to expert testimony, and it still remains the duty of the trier of the factual 
issues, whether jury or judge, to determine the credibility of all witnesses, 
including expert witnesses, and to evaluate the testimony of each in reaching 
its verdict. Creek v. Town of Hulett, Wyo., 
657 P.2d 353 (1983). See Mitchell v. Vondra, Wyo., 448 P.2d 313 (1968); and Ward v. Yoder, 
Wyo., 355 P.2d 371, reh. denied 357 P.2d 180 
(1960).

[¶17.]  We do pause to comment upon what is 
perceived to be a shift in philosophy with respect to expert testimony under the 
Rules of Evidence as adopted in Wyoming. Commentators indicate that the 
philosophical approach represented by the Rules of Evidence is to facilitate the 
availability of information to the trier of fact. The exclusion of expert 
testimony is indicated only when it will not be helpful to the trier of fact. 3 
Louisell and Mueller, Federal Evidence, § 380 (1979; 3 Weinstein's Evidence, ¶ 
702[01] (1982).

[¶18.]  In this instance we are unable to say 
that there was any abuse of discretion by the trial court in permitting this 
expert witness to state his opinion with respect to an area in which he was by 
training and experience possessed of special knowledge. This was of assistance 
to the jury in understanding the evidence and in making the determinations which 
it was charged to make. Rule 703, W.R.E., specifically permits an expert to rely 
upon information other than that produced at trial in reaching his opinion. 
Prior disclosure of the facts or data upon which the opinion is based is not 
required under Rule 705, W.R.E., unless there is a specific requirement imposed 
by the trial court. The extent of the expert witness' knowledge and the basis of 
his opinion are subjected to scrutiny during the cross-examination of the 
witness.

[¶19.]  In this case full opportunity was 
afforded the appellants to test the sufficiency of this witness' expertise and 
the underlying basis for the opinion. The trial court must assume the function 
of determining relevancy and admissibility of such testimony, and its exercise 
of its discretion with respect to that rule is not shown by this record to have 
been abused. Madison v. Marlatt, Wyo., 619 P.2d 708 (1980); Chavez v. State, 
Wyo., 604 P.2d 1341 (1979), cert. denied 446 U.S. 984, 100 S. Ct. 2967, 64 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1980). 
Finally, although the expression of the ultimate opinion was in a rather 
dramatic form in this instance, the Rules of Evidence do not require such 
testimony to be stricken simply because it embraces the ultimate issue. Rule 
704, W.R.E., is expressly contrary to the appellant's position and abolishes the 
"ultimate issue" objection. 3 Louisell and Mueller, Federal Evidence, § 394 
(1979); 3 Weinstein's Evidence, ¶ 704[01] (1982).

[¶20.]  The judgment is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The bases for the 
substantive liability of the appellants in such an instance are set forth in 
Hursh Agency v. Wigwam Homes, Wyo., ___ P.2d 
___ (No. 5827, decided May 19, 1983.)