Case Title: P. v. Stewart

Citation: 

Docket Number: S020803

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2004-07-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed 7/15/04 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S020803 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
   
RICHARD BERT STEWART, 
) 
 
 
) 
Contra Costa County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 900175-1 
__________________________________ ) 
 
 
 
 
Defendant Richard Bert Stewart appeals from a judgment of the Contra Costa 
County Superior Court imposing a sentence of death following his conviction of three 
counts of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187),1 possession of a concealable firearm by 
a felon (§ 12021), and attempted arson (§ 455).  The jury found true a multiple-murder 
special-circumstance allegation.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3).)  The jury also found true the 
allegations that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the offenses.  
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a).)  Defendant thereafter admitted two separate prior prison term 
allegations.  (§ 667.5, subd. (b). 
 
In addition to imposing a judgment of death on each murder conviction, the trial 
court declared that if for any reason the death sentence should not be carried out, 
defendant would serve a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole.  The 
court then imposed and stayed a consecutive sentence of seven years and eight months on 
                                             
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.   
2 
the various remaining counts and enhancements.  Defendant’s appeal is automatic.  
(§ 1239, subd. (b).)   
 
We shall affirm the judgment as to guilt and the special circumstance finding, but 
because of errors in the jury selection process we are compelled by controlling decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court to reverse the judgment of death and to remand the 
matter for a new penalty trial before a properly selected jury.  (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 
469 U.S. 412, 424 (Witt); Davis v. Georgia (1976) 429 U.S. 122, 123; Gray v. 
Mississippi (1987) 481 U.S. 648, 659-667 (opn. of the court); id., at pp. 667-668 (plur. 
opn.); id., at p. 672 (conc. opn. of Powell, J.).)   
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A.  Prosecution Evidence 
 
Defendant blamed his mother, Gloria Pillow, and his stepfather, Weldon Ardell 
Pillow (Ardell), for his confinement in state prison.  In 1989, a few months after being 
paroled, defendant shot to death Ardell and Gloria, along with Murray Lucas, a boarder 
who then was living with them.  We set forth the relevant events leading to and following 
the commission of these crimes as reflected in the record before us.   
 
Upon being paroled from prison, defendant moved in with his girlfriend Donna 
Guthrie, who lived at the Atchison Village in Richmond, California.  In late June 1989, 
defendant obtained a .22-caliber semiautomatic Jennings handgun from Frank Walker.   
 
Defendant’s cousin, Gary Beach, resided at a house owned by defendant’s 
stepfather Ardell, located on Harbor Way in Richmond.  In mid-to-late June 1989, 
defendant and his girlfriend Donna visited that house, and while in the back yard 
defendant, holding a small gun wrapped in a handkerchief, fired a practice shot into an 
exterior garage wall.  Rory Pillow — a half brother of defendant who lived in a trailer 
behind the Harbor Way house — saw and heard defendant fire the shot.  After Rory 
objected to the gunfire, defendant placed the gun, still wrapped in a handkerchief, in his 
back pocket.   
3 
 
During the evening of July 3, 1989, defendant visited the home of Shane Powell 
and Mary Perron, the next door neighbors of Ardell and Gloria, at 18th Street in 
Richmond.  Defendant was upset and disturbed; Powell testified that defendant remarked 
that having been jailed made him “what he is today, and he’s not responsible for his 
actions, whatever they may be,” and that “society would just have to deal with that.”  He 
complained to Perron and Powell that Ardell and Gloria were alcoholics who treated him 
like an outcast and embarrassed him, and that Gloria was responsible for his most recent 
commitment to prison, which resulted from his having been “caught in possession of a 
gun,” a violation of his “probation.”  After approximately 20 minutes, defendant 
departed.  
 
Powell and Peron retired for bed about midnight and thereafter heard numerous 
explosions of early Fourth of July firecrackers.  In the midst of those sounds of exploding 
firecrackers, Powell awoke at 2:00 or 3:00 a.m. to the sound of gunshots.  He heard 
arguing voices coming from the Pillow home, and then heard Gloria scream, “No, 
Richard, no.”  Within seconds, Powell heard two more gunshots, and then silence.  
Peron’s recollection was substantially similar.  She remembered being awakened by a 
“blood curdling scream,” heard two shots, and then heard three more somewhat muffled 
shots.  Powell and Peron discussed the matter and decided not to call the police, but 
instead to go back to sleep.   
 
When Perron and Powell arose the next morning at approximately 10:00 a.m., they 
noticed that the Pillow residence next door was unusually quiet.  Eventually, Perron and 
Powell went to the back door of the Pillow home, where another neighbor, Phillip Smith, 
opened the unlocked back door.  They smelled gas.  Powell entered the house and closed 
the four open burners of the kitchen stove.  Powell found Gloria’s body in a bedroom, 
and Powell and Smith left the house.  Powell told Perron to call the police. 
4 
 
The police and the fire department soon arrived and ventilated the house by 
opening the doors and windows — all of which, except the back door, had been locked.  
There were no signs of forced entry. 
 
The police found the body of Murray Lucas face down on the floor of a bedroom 
near the kitchen.  He had been shot in the head.  In a bedroom near the living room, the 
police found Ardell’s body lying facedown, half off a bed, with his knees on the floor.  
He had been shot three times in the head.  Ardell’s bloody and badly broken metal 
eyeglasses were found on the bed.  There were numerous lacerations near his nose and 
left eye, and the bone at the top of the left eye was fractured.  Dr. Louis Daugherty, a 
forensic pathologist, testified that Ardell might have been struck in the face before being 
shot.  A pair of scissors was in his left hand.  Gloria’s body was found curled in a corner 
of the bedroom.  She had been shot once in the head, and a pair of eyeglasses was near 
her right hand.  Dr. Daugherty also found that an examination of Gloria’s blood reflected 
a blood-alcohol level of .25 percent — more than three times the limit for driving under 
the influence of alcohol.   
 
Gunpowder “stippling” — small fragments of gunpowder caused by the near 
proximity of a discharged firearm — was evident on each of the three victims (the single 
wounds of Murray Lucas and Gloria, and one of Ardell’s three wounds).  Based upon the 
characteristics of the firearm and the stippling on each victim, Dr. Daugherty estimated 
that each of the three stippled shots was fired from a distance of three feet or less, with 
the shot into Murray Lucas being fired from the farthest distance, the shot into Gloria 
being the second farthest, and the shot (one of three) into Ardell being the closest.   
 
In the living room, officers found the family’s dog, apparently strangled to death.  
Also in that room the police found charred newspapers arranged around an oil lamp, 
forming a chain leading to the cushion of a chair.  No bullet casings were found.  An 
evidence technician testified that if a Jennings semiautomatic pistol had been fired in the 
5 
house, one would expect to find bullet casings nearby, unless they had been picked up 
(by someone other than the police). 
 
Richmond Police Officer Socorro Moreno, who was assigned the task of 
conducting a “neighborhood check” of local residents, met Terry Lynn Guillory.  
Guillory initially identified himself by using only his first and middle names.  Guillory 
told Moreno that about 1:00 a.m. on July 4, 1989, he heard approximately five 
consecutive gunshots and ran to look out the street from his living room window.  
Guillory explained that he saw a White male whom he knew as “Richard” peeking out 
from the front door of the Pillow home, 546 18th Street.  At that point, according to what 
Guillory related to Moreno, Richard appeared to be panicked, said “Oh shit” or 
something to that effect, and retreated into the Pillow home.2   
 
Eventually, in response to a telephone call from Richmond Detective Darrell 
Kimura, Guillory agreed to provide a tape-recorded statement concerning his 
observations.  Subsequently, at trial, Guillory testified he had met defendant in the weeks 
preceding July 1989.  Guillory then confirmed his earlier account to Richmond officers, 
explaining that in the early morning hours of July 4, 1989, he heard five gunshots and 
proceeded to the front of his house, where he had a view of the Pillow home, which was 
about 90-110 feet away, on the other side of the street.  Guillory related that he saw, in 
the porch light or the street light, defendant’s head and shoulders emerge from the front 
door of the Pillow home, and that he saw defendant look up and down the street.  
Guillory explained he believed that he and defendant made eye contact, at which point 
                                             
 
2  
Mary Perron gave a similar account in a statement to Richmond Detective Darrell 
Kimura, the primary investigator of the case.  She related that her neighbor “Terry” told 
her that he heard gunshots and then saw defendant peek out of the Pillow home.  At trial, 
Perron identified a photograph of Terry Guillory as the neighbor who had related seeing 
defendant peek out from the Pillow home after the shootings.   
6 
defendant uttered something to the effect of “oh, shit,” and retreated back inside the 
Pillow home.  Guillory then went back to bed.   
 
When Guillory the next morning learned of the killings, he was concerned that 
Donna Guthrie, defendant’s girlfriend, and Donna’s mother, Maxine Corey, might be in 
danger.  Guillory telephoned the Guthrie home at 11:00 a.m. to warn them that if 
defendant were there, they should make him leave.   
 
Guillory explained at trial that he had been reluctant to become involved in this 
case, but did so because Donna Guthrie told him she was afraid she would be falsely 
implicated in the shootings, and because Donna’s daughter, Cindy, was a friend of his.  
Guillory assured Donna he would be able to testify, truthfully, that he had not seen 
Donna’s car at the Pillow house at the time of the shootings.  Guillory also admitted, 
however, that shortly after the shootings, he had attempted to collect $50 that, he 
claimed, he previously had lent to Donna.  Guillory recounted that when he went to her 
home to collect the money, he found Alan Sjostrand (an inspector with the Contra Costa 
County District Attorney’s Office) and a civilian named Maurice Solvang at the Guthrie 
home — and that both Sjostrand and Solvang “jumped in [his] face” when he asked 
Donna for the money.  Guillory never did collect the sum.   
 
Guillory confirmed he had identified defendant in an array of photographs shown 
to him by the police.  Guillory also explained that on the morning after commission of the 
homicides (and contrary to his own testimony at the preliminary hearing), defendant had 
telephoned him.  Guillory conceded that in this respect, he had lied at the preliminary 
hearing.   
 
On cross-examination, Guillory conceded that he had related to Inspector 
Sjostrand having heard “talk on the street” to the effect that both Maurice Solvang and 
Donna Guthrie had been inside the Pillow home on the night of the murders, but that he 
had refused to tell Inspector Sjostrand where, or from whom, he had heard this 
information. 
7 
 
Guillory also testified he had been told by “Pat” — a person who had lived with 
Donna Guthrie — that there had been a plan to induce Guillory to take Donna Guthrie’s 
daughter Cindy, and Cindy’s friend, to Sacramento, at which time, according to Pat, 
Guillory was supposed to have been “hit” and made to end up “floating” in the 
Sacramento River. 
 
At the time of his trial testimony, Guillory was in jail, having been arrested 
approximately one week earlier by Inspector Sjostrand on driving under the influence 
charges.  One of those charges had been pending prior to the commission of the murders 
underlying the present case.  When he was arrested, Guillory reconfirmed to Sjostrand 
that he had seen defendant peek out from his house after the shootings and utter an 
obscenity upon seeing him, but threatened to deny having seen and heard defendant. 
 
At trial, as at the preliminary hearing, Guillory was provided use immunity for his 
testimony relating to two questions:  Whether he previously had purchased an “8-ball” 
(meaning an eighth of an ounce of methamphetamine) from defendant, and whether he 
had made such a purchase from Donna Guthrie.  Guillory answered that he had made one 
such purchase from each person but that he had not been using drugs on July 3 or 4, 
1989.  Guillory further testified that no promises had been made to him by any member 
of the prosecution or any police agency in exchange for his trial testimony.   
 
Richard Schorr, a criminalist employed by the Contra Costa County Sheriff’s 
Office, testified that .22-caliber bullet fragments retrieved from the three victims were 
consistent with ballistic evidence retrieved by officers from the garage at the Harbor Bar 
residence, where, as noted above, defendant had test-fired a handgun.  Because he had 
only bullet fragments with which to make a comparison, Schorr could not be positive that 
all of the bullets had been fired from the same gun. 
 
Gloria’s funeral was held on July 9, 1989.  Defendant, who was not then in 
custody, did not attend.  Defendant was arrested on July 11, 1989.  Thereafter, Rory 
Pillow (Ardell’s son) found, in a closet of the Harbor Way house, letters that defendant 
8 
had sent to his mother, Gloria, while he was in prison.  Similarly, Louis Alimonti, 
Gloria’s son and defendant’s half brother, found in a dresser in the Pillow house on 18th 
Street additional letters that defendant had written to Gloria when defendant was in 
prison.   
 
Prior to the preliminary hearing on December 6, 1989, defendant made numerous 
attempts to place collect telephone calls to his cousin Gary Beach.  Finally Beach 
accepted a call, and defendant asked Beach to testify that the gun that defendant had test-
fired at the Harbor Way house had been a .25- or .32-caliber weapon — and not a .22-
caliber firearm.  Although defendant told Beach that this testimony could mean “life or 
death” for him, Beach replied that he would have to “let him know,” and did not promise 
to so testify.  Defendant thereafter made numerous additional attempts to contact Beach 
by collect telephone calls, but Beach would not accept any further calls.   
 
Donna Guthrie, defendant’s girlfriend, subsequently supplied to Inspector 
Sjostrand approximately 25 letters that defendant had written to her after his arrest in 
mid-July 1989.  One of those letters, postmarked November 10, 1989, was introduced 
and read to the jury.  It stated in part:  “ ‘I’m just waiting like a lion, ready to pounce.  
I’ve read all the Evidence Code and a lot of law material, and have more books coming.  
Remind me when I talk to you to explain to you how one little mess can be cleaned. . . .  
As far as the “cookie” is concerned, he’s practically begging them to let him help to hang 
me.  He’s a fucking punk.  But I’m not going to trip up. . . .  So take care of things.  You 
know the rules!’ ”  (The reference here to “cookie” — and elsewhere to “Oreo” — is a 
pejorative term that defendant used to describe Guillory, who is of mixed race.)  
Consistent with the suggestion in defendant’s letter, defendant attempted to suppress the 
testimony of Terry Guillory through a circuitous series of events, as follows.   
 
After his arrest, defendant befriended Jacqueline Coghlan — then the long-term 
girlfriend of Rick Alimonti, another half brother of defendant’s.  Soon, Coghlan ended 
her relationship with Alimonti, and defendant began to telephone Coghlan.  She accepted 
9 
collect calls from him on a daily basis from September to December 1989.  Finally, in 
late November 1989, defendant arranged for Coghlan to visit defendant’s father’s home 
in order to collect a check for $1,000.   
 
Defendant told his father that the money would be used for legal services that 
Coghlan needed in order to settle a property claim involving her former boyfriend.  
Coghlan retrieved the check from defendant’s father on Thanksgiving Day, 1989, cashed 
it the next day, and, as instructed by defendant, made plans to deliver the funds to a 
person whom she came to know as Maurice, and whom she assumed was a drug dealer 
and user.  Maurice, however, failed to show up at the appointed meeting time.  Coghlan 
meanwhile decided to remove $200 from the $1,000 proceeds for her own use, in part 
because she thought that Maurice was a “person who takes drugs and deals drugs” and 
that giving him so much money “was a waste because I felt I could have used it” better. 
 
After learning of the failed attempt to transfer the funds to Maurice, defendant 
directed Coghlan to make a second attempt.  At defendant’s instructions, Coghlan went to 
a home in El Sobrante, where defendant (from jail) called Coghlan and further instructed 
her to place a telephone call to a certain number and speak to a man.  Coghlan did so and 
spoke with someone who told her he had arrived late for the prior appointment.  They 
made plans to meet at a nearby Foster’s Freeze restaurant.  Coghlan drove there and was 
approached by a man as she sat in her car.  She handed him an empty pack of cigarettes, 
with $800 inside.  Coghlan later learned that the man was named Maurice. 
 
Subsequently — on December 5, 1989, the day before commencement of the 
preliminary hearing in defendant’s case — the prosecutor and Inspector Sjostrand went to 
the home of defendant’s girlfriend, Donna Guthrie, in order to interview her.  There they 
also found Maurice Solvang, whom Inspector Sjostrand interviewed as well.  During 
those interviews, Sjostrand learned that Guthrie and Solvang anticipated receiving a 
telephone call from defendant, and Sjostrand made plans to listen in and record the 
conversation on the phone’s answering machine.  
10 
 
Eventually a collect call from someone identified as “Richard” was received and 
accepted.  After initial remarks, the caller reported that he was “[g]etting ready for my 
little court in the morning.”  Maurice asked, “How you doing?”  The caller responded:  
“Okay.  Anything ever work out?”  Maurice replied, “Oh, yeah.  I think so.  I mean — 
um — along which lines?”  The caller responded:  “Huh?”  The conversation soon 
became unintelligible, and the line disconnected.  Later that day, while conducting a 
second and more extensive interview of Solvang, the prosecution learned of a plot by 
defendant to prevent Terry Guillory from testifying.  The prosecutor and Sjostrand 
subsequently went to Guillory’s residence to notify him of this plot, but did not find him 
at home.  
 
The following day — December 6, 1989 — Inspector Sjostrand interviewed 
Coghlan during a break in defendant’s preliminary hearing.  Eventually, Coghlan 
admitted that the money was designed to persuade the person whom she knew as “the 
Oreo” — Terry Guillory — not to testify concerning his having seen defendant at the 
Pillow home on the night of the killings.  Coghlan stated, however, that she did not 
believe there had been a plan to have Guillory killed.  After this interview, Sjostrand 
placed Coghlan under arrest.  Coghlan subsequently testified at defendant’s trial, as set 
out above, under a grant of limited immunity from prosecution for the offense of 
attempting to dissuade a witness from testifying or being an accessory after the fact.  
B.  Defense Evidence 
 
After the prosecution rested, the defense presented the following evidence.  
William Glass, a private attorney, testified that in the days after the killings he met with 
defendant and Donna Guthrie and agreed to help arrange defendant’s surrender to the 
Richmond police.  The plan was for Glass to meet with defendant at defendant’s father’s 
home, and then drive from there, with defendant, to police headquarters.  But that plan 
went awry after Glass telephoned the Richmond police to ask where to surrender 
11 
defendant.  By the time Glass arrived at defendant’s father’s home, he found seven or 
eight patrol cars already on the scene and saw that defendant had been arrested. 
 
Contra Costa County Deputy Public Defender Anthony Thompson testified on 
defendant’s behalf that he previously had represented defendant’s mother, Gloria, on 
criminal charges, and that he also had represented defendant in an earlier matter in which 
defendant had been charged with stealing a gun and some coins from Ardell.  Thompson 
stated that Gloria had attended defendant’s various court proceedings, and that in those 
circumstances she and defendant had been “very” friendly to each other.  In addition, 
Thompson testified that during the earlier proceedings defendant repeatedly expressed a 
desire to transfer ownership of his vehicle to his mother (apparently to make up for the 
value of the lost gun and coins).  On cross-examination of Thompson, however, the 
prosecution read excerpts from two letters that defendant had written to his mother while 
in custody following these earlier proceedings, demonstrating that defendant in fact 
blamed his mother and Ardell for his conviction.  The first letter read:  “ ‘Now, let me say 
something.  It hurts and pisses me off that you would say something like you did, that if I 
wouldn’t sign [the vehicle] over, you’d — you and Ardell — would go to court and try to 
get me in all kinds of trouble.  I’ve been up all night here in prison, mad over it, and the 
more I think, the madder I get.  That fucking husband of yours coins weren’t worth no 
fucking $2,000, and neither is his two-bit gun or any Visa trips which bitch Billie ran 
up.’ ”  The second letter read:  “ ‘How the hell does a person feel when their own parents 
tell them not to come to their house or act mistrustful of them?  Well, why then should 
the person care what they do?  They aren’t loved or trusted anyway.  They hurt and 
become mean and bitter.’ ” 
 
Defendant’s father, Richard Stewart, Sr., testified that defendant visited him and 
his wife in the early evening of July 3, 1989, for approximately 45 minutes.  Richard, Sr., 
recounted that defendant seemed normal, that no apparent problems occurred, but that 
petitioner was slightly upset that the person who had dropped him off at his father’s home 
12 
had driven away immediately instead of coming in or waiting for defendant.  Richard, 
Sr., gave defendant $6, and defendant then left. 
 
Craig Rock, a special investigator for the Public Defender’s Office, testified 
concerning his interview with Terry Guillory.  Rock stated that the window from which 
Guillory claimed to have looked out and seen defendant provided a view of the Pillow 
home’s front door (which was 90 to 110 feet away) but that the view “could be partially 
obscured by a telephone pole” if one looked out of the window from a certain position.  
Rock also reported that nearby trees would partially block light from streetlights, thereby 
reducing the light that would illuminate the Pillow house.  On cross-examination, 
however, Rock conceded that a light fixture on the Pillows’ front porch, and light from 
within that residence, would illuminate a person of average height standing in the 
doorway, and that additional light from within the structure also may have illuminated a 
person standing at that location.  Finally, Rock testified that Guillory told him that he 
hoped defendant never would be released from custody because “[h]e’s got my name 
now.” 
 
At the conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial, the jury convicted defendant of the 
charged offenses and found true the allegations and special circumstance indicated above.   
C.  Penalty Phase Proceedings 
 
Prior to commencement of the penalty phase of the trial, defendant moved to 
dismiss his trial counsel, Public Defender Charles James, and represent himself.  The trial 
court required defendant to reconsider the matter overnight, but when he renewed the 
motion the following day the court granted his request to represent himself and 
reappointed James as advisory counsel. 
 
At the penalty phase, the prosecution introduced the following evidence of prior 
violent crimes committed by defendant as evidence in aggravation:  (1) a March 1981 
robbery at knifepoint on the campus of the University of California at Berkeley; (2) an 
October 1981 armed robbery in El Cerrito; (3) an October 1981 violent home invasion 
13 
and attempted robbery in San Pablo; (4) a mid-1989 stabbing of Vincent Trillo, who then 
was living with Rory Pillow in the trailer behind the house on Harbor Way; (5) a late 
June 1989 robbery of Frank Walker, from whom defendant stole the .22-caliber Jennings 
semi-automatic pistol apparently used in the killings; (6) an April 7, 1990, telephone 
threat to “reach out and touch” Walker “real hard” if he were to testify against defendant 
at the penalty phase of the trial; and (7) a late July 1990 stabbing of a fellow jail inmate 
in the throat with a pencil.   
 
In his own behalf, defendant made a very brief opening statement and then 
immediately rested without presenting any evidence.  Two days later, both parties 
presented closing arguments and the jury was instructed.  As noted above, the jury 
returned a verdict of death.  
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Excusal of prospective jurors for cause 
 
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously excused five prospective jurors for 
cause, based solely upon their written answers to a jury questionnaire concerning their 
views relating to the death penalty, and without any opportunity for follow-up 
questioning during which the court and counsel might have been able to clarify the 
responses and determine whether, in fact, the prospective jurors were disqualified from 
service.   
 
As we observed in People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926 (Cunningham), 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court and this court establish that “[a] 
prospective juror may be challenged for cause based upon his or her views regarding 
capital punishment only if those views would ‘ “prevent or substantially impair” ’ the 
performance of the juror’s duties as defined by the court’s instructions and the juror’s 
oath.  (Wainwright v. Witt [supra] 469 U.S. 412, 424; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 
14 
Cal.4th 83, 121; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 456.)[3]  ‘ “ ‘ A prospective 
juror is properly excluded if he or she is unable to conscientiously consider all of the 
sentencing alternatives, including the death penalty where appropriate.’  [Citation.]”  
[Citation.]  In addition, “ ‘[o]n appeal, we will uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is fairly 
supported by the record, accepting as binding the trial court’s determination as to the 
prospective juror’s true state of mind when the prospective juror has made statements that 
are conflicting or ambiguous.’  [Citations.]” ’  [Citation.]”  (Cunningham, supra, 25 
Cal.4th 926, 975; see also People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 958 (Heard).)   
 
Applying these standards in this case, we conclude, for the reasons set forth 
below, that the trial court erred in excusing five prospective jurors for cause based solely 
upon their checked responses and written answers on a jury questionnaire.   
 
The trial court, with input from counsel, prepared a 13-page written questionnaire 
for completion by the prospective jurors.  Before distributing the questionnaire, the court 
orally advised the assembled prospective jurors concerning “essential . . . background . . . 
on the case and the procedure to be followed.”  The court explained that the prospective 
jurors would be asked “some questions regarding the death penalty” because the death 
penalty was a possibility in the case, and the court was obligated to determine whether 
each prospective juror could be “be fair to both the prosecution and to the defendant 
concerning the question of punishment, if we get to that decision.”4  The court proceeded 
                                             
 
[3]  
Specifically, as the court stated in Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at page 424, the relevant 
question is whether a prospective juror’s “views on capital punishment . . . would 
‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance 
with his instructions and his oath.’ ”   
4  
The court repeatedly stressed that “the fact that I mention this subject at this point 
by asking the questions in the questionnaire, I’m not suggesting — I’m not implying — 
not intimating in any way that the jury that is ultimately selected here is going to actually 
be called upon to make this determination as to choice of penalty.” 
15 
to explain that the case would proceed with a guilt phase — at which the jury would be 
asked to determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant is guilty of the 
charged offenses, and whether any defined special circumstance is true.  The court 
explained that only if the jury found guilt, and found an alleged special-circumstance 
allegation true, would the jury address a second, or penalty, phase of the trial, at which 
point the jury would be “asked to select — to choose — between two possible penalties: 
the death penalty or life [imprisonment] without possibility of parole.”  The court 
explained that the prosecution at a penalty phase might offer aggravating evidence5 and 
the defendant might offer mitigating evidence,6 and continued:  “Now, the jury, in the 
penalty phase, is not asked simply to do a mechanical weighing of these aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances.  It’s not putting them on an imaginary scale and seeing which 
way it tips.  The jury is free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value it deems 
appropriate to each and all of the various factors that it is allowed to consider in the 
choice of penalty decision.”7  The court then asked each prospective juror to complete a 
questionnaire and leave it with the court’s bailiff.  
                                             
 
5  
The court defined such evidence as factors that tend to increase a crime’s “guilt or 
enormity,” or “add[] to the injurious consequences . . . above and beyond the elements of 
the crime itself.” 
6  
The court defined such evidence as factors that might not justify or excuse a 
crime, but that may extenuate the circumstances of a crime in determining the appropriate 
penalty. 
7  
The court continued:  “In deciding the question of penalty, in weighing the various 
circumstances, the jury determines, under the relevant evidence, which penalty is justified 
. . . .  Each juror must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial 
in comparison with mitigating circumstances that it warrants the death penalty instead of 
life [imprisonment] without the possibility of parole.  Even if the jury should decide that 
the aggravating evidence does not substantially outweigh the mitigating evidence, the 
jury may return a verdict of death, but is not required to.” 
16 
 
Question No. 35 — the only question that focused on prospective jurors’ views 
concerning the death penalty — read in relevant part as follows:   
 
“As explained during the orientation, the Court is asking questions regarding your 
opinions about the death penalty because one of the possible sentences for a person 
convicted of the charges the prosecution has filed is the penalty of death.  Thus, the Court 
must determine whether you could be fair to both the prosecution and the defendant if 
you should ever be called upon to make a decision as to the choice of penalty in this case.   
 
“By asking these questions, the Court is not suggesting in any way that the charges 
are true and that the only question the jury will have to decide is whether the penalty is to 
be life imprisonment without parole or death in the gas chamber.  It is only because the 
case could involve such a decision, that the Court must ask you about your opinions on 
this subject even though it may never be required in this trial.  With these comments in 
mind, please answer the following questions.  If you don’t understand the question, 
please so indicate.   
 
“(1)  Do you have a conscientious opinion or belief about the death penalty which 
would prevent or make it very difficult for you:   
 
 
“(a) 
To find the defendant guilty of first degree murder regardless of  
 
 
 
what the evidence might prove? 
 
(   )  Yes 
(   )  No 
 
 
“(b) 
To find a special circumstance to be true, regardless of what the  
 
 
 
evidence might prove?  
 
 
(   )  Yes 
(   )  No 
 
 
“(c) 
To ever vote to impose the death penalty? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(   )  Yes 
(   )  No 
 
“If your answer to (a), (b) or (c) is ‘Yes,’ please explain [in the space provided].”8 
                                             
 
8  
Question No. 35 continued:   
 
“(2)  Are your opinions or beliefs about the death penalty of such a nature that you 
would:   
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
17 
 
After the prospective jurors completed their questionnaires and the results were 
shared with the court and counsel for both parties, the court met with counsel, out of the 
presence of the prospective jurors, to rule on a number of stipulated challenges for 
cause — that is, the elimination of those prospective jurors who both counsel agreed 
should be excused for cause.  At the outset, the prosecutor asked for clarification that 
“[t]he court is anticipating making at least some rulings with respect to cause based upon 
exclusively the — what would be fairly characterized as ‘unambiguous’ answers in the 
questionnaire.”9  The court confirmed that intention but commented that an ambiguous 
response “would have to be cleared up” by questioning the prospective juror.  Defense 
counsel, expressing no objection to this general plan, concurred in the court’s assertion 
that “the ambiguous ones . . . — they’re going to have to be done individually.”  A short 
while later, the court reiterated its plan, stating that, with regard to prospective jurors as 
to whom the questionnaires showed “ambiguous responses, those persons can either be 
deferred to our afternoon or tomorrow’s session . . . .’ ”10   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
 
(a) 
Vote for first degree murder regardless of what the evidence proved 
 
 
 
so that the death penalty could be imposed?  (   )  Yes (   )  No   
 
 
(b) 
In all cases vote for the death penalty if there is a verdict finding the 
 
 
 
defendant guilty of first degree murder and a special circumstance to 
 
 
 
be true regardless of what mitigating evidence might be presented?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     (   )  Yes (   )  No   
 
“If your answer to (a) or (b) is ‘Yes,’ please explain [in the space provided].” 
9  
As defendant observes, the court earlier had stated:  “[I]f it’s unmistakably clear 
that based upon the [prospective juror’s] written response to the juror questionnaire, 
under penalty of perjury, I would — could not contemplate excusing those people 
without further oral examination.”  (Italics added.)  Based upon the trial court’s 
subsequent comments and actual practice described below, however, it may be that the 
italicized word was spoken in error or was mistranscribed.   
10  
This stated plan was consistent with numerous comments made previously by the 
trial court and defense counsel.  For example, early in the discussions concerning use of a 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
18 
 
The court proceeded to grant 17 stipulated challenges for cause, based solely upon 
each prospective juror’s written responses to the questionnaires.11  The court deferred 
ruling on three prospective jurors whom defendant wished to challenge for cause, 
commenting that “the answers in the questionnaire do not on their face give rise to a 
challenge for cause” and that “we’re just going to have to see what they say when we talk 
to them.”  The court then turned its attention to the prospective jurors whom the 
prosecutor, alone, wished to challenge for cause.   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
juror questionnaire, defense counsel suggested that the court might ask jurors to answer 
four questions concerning death qualification, but that if a juror’s responses to the 
questions suggested that the juror “could not follow the law,” such a juror would be 
further “questioned privately or whatever” by the court.  Defense counsel repeatedly 
expressed his expectation that there would be oral “judicial voir dire” of these jurors.  
The court assured counsel that this would, in fact, occur, commenting:  “[T]here’s going 
to be a mixture here” — meaning a mixture of written and oral questions.  Subsequently, 
when defense counsel submitted proposed written death-qualification questions for use in 
the court’s planned juror questionnaire, counsel made clear his understanding that the 
trial court would conduct oral follow-up questioning of jurors who expressed difficulty or 
reluctance to “follow the law,” and, for that purpose, went so far as to propose draft 
“Admonitions for the Court when addressing prospective jurors in oral voir dire.”  The 
prosecutor similarly made clear his understanding that the trial court would, after 
considering the questionnaire answers, conduct oral voir dire of prospective jurors.  
Later, the court noted its authority to conduct individualized voir dire, if necessary, and 
defense counsel reiterated his understanding that some prospective jurors would “be 
privately dealt with” through questioning by the court, outside the presence of the other 
prospective jurors. 
11  
Many of the responses to those questionnaires revealed unambiguous and 
entrenched support for or opposition to the death penalty.  For example, one juror who 
both parties stipulated should be excused checked “No” to each inquiry in question 
No. 35(1)(a)-(c), and wrote:  “As the Bible says, ‘[A]n eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.’  
Or in this case a life for a life.”  Another juror who both parties stipulated should be 
excused checked “Yes” to each inquiry in question 35(1)(a)-(b), and wrote:  “I believe 
that the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment and is imposed disproportionately 
on Blacks and other minorities.  Furthermore, I do not believe that it is an effective 
deterrent to the commission of capital offenses.” 
19 
 
The prosecutor challenged Juror No. 8 “for cause based upon the questionnaire.”  
That prospective juror had checked “No” in response to question No. 35(1)(a) and (b), 
thereby indicating that he or she did not “have a conscientious opinion or belief about the 
death penalty which would prevent or make it very difficult” to find defendant guilty of 
first degree murder, or to find a special circumstance to be true, “regardless of what the 
evidence might prove.”  But Prospective Juror No. 8 also had checked “Yes” with regard 
to question 35(1)(c) — thereby indicating that he or she had a “conscientious opinion or 
belief about the death penalty which would prevent or make it very difficult” to “ever 
vote to impose the death penalty.”  In addition, in response to the questionnaire’s 
direction to “explain” any “Yes” answer, Prospective Juror No. 8 had written, “I do not 
believe a person should take a person’s life.  I do believe in life without parole.”   
 
The court asked to hear the view of defense counsel, who objected to excusal for 
cause on the basis that “because of the global nature of the [question 35](1)(c) inquiry,” 
coupled with the written response, there existed ambiguity as to whether the prospective 
juror would be able to serve and “follow the instructions of the court.”  The court 
summarily dismissed these concerns, ruling immediately as follows:  “All right.  I’m 
satisfied that this is an unambiguous expression of opinion here especially with the added 
handwritten portion that says, ‘I do not believe a person should take a person’s life.’ ” 
 
Thereafter the prosecutor also challenged juror Nos. 53, 59, 93, and 122, each of 
whom, like Prospective Juror No. 8, had checked “No” in response to question 35(1)(a) 
and (b), and had checked “Yes” with regard to question 35(1)(c).  In response to the 
direction to “explain” any “Yes” answer, Prospective Juror No. 53 wrote: “I am opposed 
to the death penalty.”  Prospective Juror No. 59 wrote:  “I do not believe in capit[a]l 
punishment.”  Prospective Juror No. 93 wrote:  “In the past, I supported legislation 
banning the death penalty.”  Prospective Juror No. 122 wrote:  “I don’t believe in 
irrevers[i]ble penalties.  A prisoner can be released if new information is found.” 
20 
 
Again, defense counsel objected to each of the prosecutor’s motions for excusal 
for cause on the ground that the checked answers and brief written comments left 
ambiguity as to whether each prospective juror would be able to serve and follow the 
instructions of the court, notwithstanding his or her personal opposition to the death 
penalty.  As to each objection, the court found the juror’s checked answer and brief 
written response to be clear and unambiguous, and granted the challenge for cause. 
 
On appeal, defendant asserts that each of the trial court’s rulings granting the 
prosecution’s five for cause challenges was erroneous.  We agree that the trial court erred 
in excluding these prospective jurors on the basis of their questionnaire responses alone.   
 
Before granting a challenge for cause concerning a prospective juror, over the 
objection of another party, a trial court must have sufficient information regarding the 
prospective juror’s state of mind to permit a reliable determination as to whether the 
juror’s views would “prevent or substantially impair” the performance of his or her duties 
(as defined by the court’s instructions and the juror’s oath) (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 
424) “ ‘ “ ‘in the case before the juror’ ” ’ ” (People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 431 
(italics omitted)).   
 
The prosecution, as the moving party, bore the burden of demonstrating to the trial 
court that this standard was satisfied as to each of the challenged jurors.  (Witt, supra, 469 
U.S. 412, 423 [“As with any other trial situation where an adversary wishes to exclude a 
juror because of bias, . . . it is the adversary seeking exclusion who must demonstrate, 
through questioning, that the potential juror lacks impartiality . . . .  It is then the trial 
judge’s duty to determine whether the challenge is proper.”].)  In resting its motion solely 
upon the prospective jurors’ checked answers and brief written comments on the juror 
questionnaire, the prosecution apparently acted on the premise that those answers and 
comments were fully adequate, standing alone, to support a determination by the court 
that each prospective juror’s views would prevent or substantially impair the performance 
21 
of his or her duties as a juror in the case before the juror.  As we shall explain, this 
premise was mistaken.   
 
As noted above, question No. 35(1)(c) asked each prospective juror whether his or 
her conscientious opinions or beliefs concerning the death penalty would either “prevent 
or make it very difficult” for the prospective juror “to ever vote to impose the death 
penalty.”  (Italics added.)  In light of the gravity of that punishment, for many members 
of society their personal and conscientious views concerning the death penalty would 
make it “very difficult” ever to vote to impose the death penalty.  As explained below, 
however, a prospective juror who simply would find it “very difficult” ever to impose the 
death penalty, is entitled — indeed, duty-bound — to sit on a capital jury, unless his or 
her personal views actually would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his 
or her duties as a juror.   
 
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court and of this court make it clear that a 
prospective juror’s personal conscientious objection to the death penalty is not a 
sufficient basis for excluding that person from jury service in a capital case under Witt, 
supra, 469 U.S. 412.  In Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 176 (Lockhart), the 
high court observed that “[n]ot all those who oppose the death penalty are subject to 
removal for cause in capital cases; those who firmly believe that the death penalty is 
unjust may nevertheless serve as jurors in capital cases so long as they clearly state that 
they are willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law.”  
Similarly, in People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 699 (Kaurish), we observed:  
“Neither Witherspoon[ v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510] nor Witt, [supra, 469 U.S. 412,] 
nor any of our cases, requires that jurors be automatically excused if they merely express 
personal opposition to the death penalty.  The real question is whether the juror’s attitude 
will ‘ “ prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in 
accordance with his instructions and his oath.” ’  (Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at 
p. 424, fn. omitted.)  A prospective juror personally opposed to the death penalty may 
22 
nonetheless be capable of following his oath and the law.  A juror whose personal 
opposition toward the death penalty may predispose him to assign greater than average 
weight to the mitigating factors presented at the penalty phase may not be excluded, 
unless that predilection would actually preclude him from engaging in the weighing 
process and returning a capital verdict.”  (Italics added.)   
 
Kaurish, supra, 52 Cal.3d 648, recognizes that a prospective juror may not be 
excluded for cause simply because his or her conscientious views relating to the death 
penalty would lead the juror to impose a higher threshold before concluding that the 
death penalty is appropriate or because such views would make it very difficult for the 
juror ever to impose the death penalty.  Because the California death penalty sentencing 
process contemplates that jurors will take into account their own values in determining 
whether aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors such that the death penalty is 
warranted, the circumstance that a juror’s conscientious opinions or beliefs concerning 
the death penalty would make it very difficult for the juror ever to impose the death 
penalty is not equivalent to a determination that such beliefs will “substantially impair the 
performance of his [or her] duties as a juror” under Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412.  In other 
words, the question as phrased in the juror questionnaire did not directly address the 
pertinent constitutional issue.  A juror might find it very difficult to vote to impose the 
death penalty, and yet such a juror’s performance still would not be substantially 
impaired under Witt, unless he or she were unwilling or unable to follow the trial court’s 
instructions by weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the case and 
determining whether death is the appropriate penalty under the law. 
 
It follows that a qualified juror might well answer “Yes” to the inquiry posed in 
question No. 35(1)(c), and yet, in response to brief follow-up questioning, persuasively 
demonstrate an ability to put aside personal reservations, properly weigh and consider the 
aggravating and mitigating evidence, and make that very difficult determination 
concerning the appropriateness of a death sentence.  Such a prospective juror would not 
23 
be substantially impaired in performing his or her duties as a juror.  The record here, 
however, suggests that the trial court erroneously equated (i) the nondisqualifying 
concept of a very difficult decision by a juror to impose a death sentence, with (ii) the 
disqualifying concept of substantial impairment of a juror’s performance of his or her 
legal duty, and failed to recognize that question No. 35(1)(c), standing alone, did not 
elicit sufficient information from which the court properly could determine whether a 
particular prospective juror suffered from a disqualifying bias under Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 
412, 424.12   
 
Nor did the brief written answers supplied by the five prospective jurors, 
considered in conjunction with their checked answers to question No. 35, provide an 
adequate basis upon which to dismiss any of those jurors for cause.   
 
As noted, Prospective Juror No. 8 wrote, “I do not believe a person should take a 
person’s life.  I do believe in life without parole.”  We understand these two sentences as 
stating a generalized opposition to the death penalty, and approval of the sentence of life 
                                             
 
12  
We are unaware of any prior juror questionnaire that has employed the phrasing, 
“prevent or make it very difficult,” used in this case.  See, for example, California Center 
for Judicial Education and Research, California Continuing Judicial Studies Program, 
Death Penalty Trials (Aug. 2002) pages 91-95, 115-119 [providing two sample juror 
questionnaires for capital cases, neither of which employs such language].)  The relevant 
language of the first sample questionnaire asks, “Would you, because of any views that 
you may have concerning capital punishment, automatically refuse to vote in favor of the 
penalty of death and automatically vote for a penalty of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole, without considering any of the evidence of any of the aggravating 
and mitigating factors (to which you will be instructed) regarding the facts of the crime 
and the background and character of the defendant?  [At this point the questionnaire 
provides lined space for comments].  (Id., at p. 93.)  The relevant language of the second 
sample questionnaire asks, “Do you have feelings against the death penalty which are so 
strong that you would always vote against the death penalty?  YES  NO  [¶]  Please 
explain:  [At this point the questionnaire provides lined space for comments].”  (Id., at p. 
118.)  
24 
in prison without possibility of parole.  But as noted above, Lockhart, supra, 476 U.S. 
162, 176, and Kaurish, supra, 52 Cal.3d 648, 699, make clear that many members of 
society — and thus many prospective jurors — may share those exact same sentiments, 
and yet remain qualified to sit as a juror under the standard set out in Witt, supra, 469 
U.S. 412, 424.   
 
To be sure, Prospective Juror No. 8’s checked answer to question No. 35(1)(c) and 
written comment quoted above provided a preliminary indication that the prospective 
juror might prove, upon further examination, to be subject to a challenge for cause.  
Absent clarifying follow-up examination by the court or counsel, however — during 
which the court would be able to further explain the role of jurors in the judicial system, 
examine the prospective juror’s demeanor, and make an assessment of that person’s 
ability to weigh a death penalty decision — the bare written response was not by itself, or 
considered in conjunction with the checked answer, sufficient to establish a basis for 
exclusion for cause.   
 
We reach the same conclusion with respect to the four other prospective jurors 
who were excused over defense objection.  Prospective Juror 53 wrote: “I am opposed to 
the death penalty.”  But the same general opposition might be stated by many jurors who 
are properly qualified to sit on a death penalty jury, and is not disqualifying in and of 
itself, or considered in conjunction with the checked answer.  (Lockhart, supra, 476 U.S. 
162, 176; Kaurish, supra, 52 Cal.3d 648, 699.)  Prospective Juror No. 59 wrote:  “I do 
not believe in capit[a]l punishment.”  That same juror, however, also wrote “I don’t 
know” in response to question No. 35(2), which (as observed above (ante, fn. 8)) probed 
personal opinions or beliefs favoring the death penalty.  At a minimum, this juror’s 
written responses suggested ambiguity and a need for clarification on oral voir dire; at 
most, this juror, like those addressed above, expressed a general opposition to the death 
penalty that is not, by itself or considered in conjunction with the checked answer, 
disqualifying.  Prospective Juror No. 93 wrote:  “In the past, I supported legislation 
25 
banning the death penalty.”  Again, the same might be said by many jurors who are 
properly qualified to sit on a death penalty jury.  Disagreement with the current state of 
the law is not disqualifying by itself or considered in conjunction with the checked 
answers.  Finally, Prospective Juror No. 122 explained, “I don’t believe in irrevers[i]ble 
penalties.  A prisoner can be released if new information is found.”  This explanation, 
reflecting a concern regarding the risk of error in the criminal justice process, is not 
disqualifying by itself or considered in conjunction with the checked answers.   
 
As with Prospective Juror No. 8, the combination of checked answers and written 
responses of these other four potential jurors (Nos. 53, 59, 93, and 122) provided a 
preliminary indication that each juror might prove, upon further examination, to be 
subject to a challenge for cause.  Again, however, absent clarifying follow-up 
examination, during which the court may have (i) further explained the role of jurors, 
(ii) probed, among other issues, whether each prospective juror could undertake the 
decision described in question No. 35(1)(c) if he or she were personally satisfied beyond 
a reasonable doubt concerning defendant’s guilt, and (iii) assessed each person’s ability 
to faithfully and impartially weigh a death penalty decision, the bare checked answers 
and brief written comments were insufficient to establish substantial impairment of these 
prospective jurors.   
 
In concluding that all five prospective jurors (Nos. 8, 53, 59, 93, and 122) were 
erroneously excused for cause based solely upon the combination of their checked 
answers to question No. 35(1)(c) and their brief written comments, we need not and do 
not hold that a trial court never may properly grant a motion for excusal for cause over 
defense objection based solely upon a prospective juror’s checked answers and written 
responses contained in a juror questionnaire.13  We are, however, unaware of any 
                                             
 
13  
Although the People cite Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, for the 
proposition that “a single death-qualification question may justifiably lead to dismissal 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
26 
authority upholding such a practice.14  In United States v. Chanthadra (10th Cir. 2000) 
230 F.3d 1237 (Chanthadra), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit — 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
for cause,” that case is plainly distinguishable.  The question in that case was asked by 
the trial court on oral voir dire, and the prospective juror — a retired former employee of 
a seminary — answered in person, in front of the judge.  (Id., at p. 178.)  The high court 
observed in Darden that in making its assessment of “substantial impairment” under Witt, 
supra, 496 U.S. 412, 424, “[t]he trial court, ‘aided as it undoubtedly was by its 
assessment of [the potential juror’s] demeanor,’ ” “could take account of the fact that [the 
prospective juror] was present throughout an entire series of questions [posed orally by 
the court to other prospective jurors] that made the purpose and meaning of the Witt 
inquiry  absolutely clear.”  (477 U.S. at p. 178, citation omitted.)  In addition, the high 
court observed, “[n]o specific objection was made to the excusal of [the prospective 
juror] by defense counsel. . . .”  (Ibid.)  None of those circumstances applies in the 
present case. 
14  
The People suggest that such a practice was employed or endorsed in People v. 
Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 824, and People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 
353-354.  We find no such indication in either case.   
 
In Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th 946, 966, footnote 9, we noted and listed “numerous 
. . . publications that exist to assist [trial courts] in properly conducting voir dire in capital 
cases.”  We have not found in any of those listed resources any suggestion that the 
procedure employed by the trial court here in granting challenges for cause over defense 
objection — involving exclusive reliance upon checked answers to questions and brief 
written comments — is permissible or adequate.  Instead, those sources proceed on the 
assumption that, except for prospective jurors who both parties stipulate should be 
excused for cause (see People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 73-74, 78), a juror 
questionnaire will not obviate the need for oral voir dire, but instead merely will shorten 
the time necessary to be spent on oral voir dire.  (See Cal. Center for Judicial Education 
and Research (CJER), Death Penalty Benchguide 98:  Pretrial and Guilt Phase (2001) 
§ 98.24(1), p. 98-27 [“[U]se of a jury questionnaire substantially shortens the jury 
selection process . . . .  Oral voir dire, whether by judge or counsel, may be largely 
limited to clarifying unclear or incomplete questionnaire responses”]; id., § 98.35, p. 98-
35 [“[T]he court should follow up on ambiguous answers or give counsel an opportunity 
to do so”].) 
 
The People also asserted at oral argument that under People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 
Cal.4th 1046, a trial court has discretion to deny all questioning by counsel concerning a 
prospective juror who has given “unequivocally disqualifying” responses.  (Id., at pp. 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
27 
while explicitly reserving judgment on the broad question of whether a trial court always 
has an obligation “to voir dire prospective jurors before removing them for cause based 
on their views on the death penalty” (id., at p. 1269) — found it necessary to reverse a 
death penalty judgment after the trial court, over objection, excused nine jurors for cause, 
based solely upon the jurors’ responses to a juror questionnaire.  The court in 
Chanthadra, reviewing the record with respect to only one of those prospective jurors, 
found that the prospective juror’s written responses, in and of themselves, did not 
establish that the juror was disqualified to serve under the standard set forth in Witt, 
supra, 469 U.S. at page 424 (id., at pp. 1270-1272) and thus found that the trial court 
erred by granting the challenge.  (Id., at p. 1272; cf. State v. Anderson (Ariz. 2000) 4 P.3d 
369, 372-379 (Anderson) [finding error in excusing three jurors over objection for cause 
based solely upon each juror’s responses to a juror questionnaire].)   
 
Like the court in Chanthadra, supra, 230 F.3d 1237, 1272, we do not suggest that 
all or indeed any of the prospective jurors at issue in this case eventually would have 
withstood a properly adjudicated challenge for cause.  We simply do not know how these 
potential jurors would have responded to appropriate clarifying questions posed to them 
by the trial court.  Had the trial court conducted a follow-up examination of each 
prospective juror and thereafter determined (in light of the questionnaire responses, oral 
responses, and its own assessment of demeanor and credibility) that the prospective 
juror’s views would substantially impair the performance of his or her duties as a juror in 
this case, the court’s determination would have been entitled to deference.  (Witt, supra, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
1084-1085.)  Putting aside the question of the circumstances under which defense 
counsel has a right to rehabilitate a prospective juror — an issue we do not address here 
— we observe that in the case before us the questionnaire answers of the prospective 
jurors simply were not “unequivocally disqualifying.”   
28 
469 U.S. 412, 426-430; see, e.g., People v. Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th 48, 70-71 [deferring 
to trial court’s finding, based upon voir dire responses and prospective jurors’ demeanor, 
that prospective jurors had demonstrated inability to impose death penalty]; Chanthadra, 
supra, 230 F.3d 1237, 1269-1270.)   
 
In according deference on appeal to trial court rulings on motions to exclude for 
cause, appellate courts recognize that a trial judge who observes and speaks with a 
prospective juror and hears that person’s responses (noting, among other things, the 
person’s tone of voice, apparent level of confidence, and demeanor), gleans valuable 
information that simply does not appear on the record.  (Chanthadra, supra, 230 F.3d 
1237, 1270.)  As the high court observed in Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 428, “the question 
whether a venireman is biased has traditionally been determined through voir dire 
culminating in a finding by the trial judge concerning the venireman’s state of mind . . . 
based upon determinations of demeanor and credibility that are peculiarly within a trial 
judge’s province.”  Indeed, as the high court noted in Witt, “ ‘[T]he manner of the juror 
while testifying is oftentimes more indicative of the real character of his opinion than his 
words.  That is seen below, but cannot always be spread upon the record.  Care should, 
therefore, be taken in the reviewing court not to reverse the ruling below upon such a 
question of fact, except in a clear case.’ ”  (Id., at p. 428, fn. 9, quoting Reynolds v. 
United States (1879) 98 U.S. 145, 156-157.)   
 
In the present matter, however, the trial court’s determination was informed by no 
more information than the cold record of the five prospective jurors’ check marks and 
brief handwritten comments — the exact same information that we have before us now.  
(Accord, Chanthadra, supra, 230 F.3d 1237, 1270.)  As explained above, that 
information was insufficient to support an assessment, required by Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 
412, 424, that any of the five prospective jurors would be unable faithfully to perform the 
duties required of a juror by the law.  Accordingly, we conclude that, on the record 
before the trial court (and before us), the trial court erred in dismissing the five 
29 
prospective jurors for cause without first conducting any follow-up questioning.  Indeed, 
although the poor phrasing of the juror questionnaire used in this case contributes to our 
conclusion that the prospective jurors were excused in violation of Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 
412, 424, we note that even if the questionnaire had tracked the “prevent or substantially 
impair” language of Witt, we still would find that the prospective jurors could not 
properly be excused for cause without any follow-up oral voir dire by the court. 
 
In opposing this conclusion, the People raise a number of arguments, none of 
which we find persuasive.   
 
The People assert that defendant waived any objection to “use of a juror 
questionnaire for the purpose of death qualification.”  To the extent the People assert that 
defendant waived objection to the use of a questionnaire in which death qualification 
questions may be asked, we find it unnecessary to resolve that issue, because 
undoubtedly it was proper for the court to employ a juror questionnaire, and defendant 
had no right to prevent the use of a juror questionnaire that included death qualification 
questions.  But to the extent the People assert that defendant waived objection to the trial 
court’s decision to resolve the prosecution’s five motions for excusal based solely upon 
each prospective juror’s checked answers and brief written comments, we disagree.  Our 
review of the record discloses no indication that defendant, explicitly or implicitly, 
conceded the propriety of that course of action.  Indeed, as explained above, the record 
discloses that the court clearly assured both counsel that it would conduct oral voir dire in 
order to address any ambiguous responses (see ante, fn. 10), and thereafter defense 
counsel repeatedly objected to each of the five excusals here at issue on the ground that 
the questionnaire’s checked answers and brief written responses did not afford sufficient 
grounds for excusal under the standard set out in Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 424.   
 
The People also assert that defendant waived any objection to the trial court’s use 
of the phrase “prevent or make it very difficult” (italics added) instead of Witt’s language, 
“prevent or substantially impair,” in question No. 35(1).  As the People observe, the trial 
30 
court, apparently without objection, inserted the italicized term into its own proposed 
formulation of question No. 35(1) after having read a similar phrase (“very hard — if not 
impossible”) in one of four questions that defendant had submitted in response to the trial 
court’s specific request for proposed juror questionnaire language.   
 
The People’s argument appears to be one of invited error, not waiver.  In any 
event, as explained below, the People’s assertion — however characterized — lacks 
merit.   
 
In response to the trial court’s request for proposed juror questionnaire language, 
defense counsel submitted four death qualification questions, the last of which employed 
the phase, “very hard — if not impossible.”15  But the context in which that phase was 
suggested by defense counsel to the trial court was significantly different from the 
context in which the trial court’s revised phrasing, “prevent or make it very difficult,” 
ultimately was employed.  It is clear that the prospective jurors’ answers to written 
questions — however phrased — never were intended by defense counsel to provide the 
sole information upon which the trial court would base its determination of contested 
                                             
 
15  
Defense counsel’s proposed questions read: 
 
“12.  If the Court instructs you to consider all the evidence and to weigh both the 
aggravating and mitigating evidence before deciding on penalty, would you be able to set 
aside your personal views on the death penalty? 
“Yes (  ) 
No 
(  ) 
 
“13.  In all honesty, is your opinion on the death penalty such that it would prevent 
or substantially impair your performance as a fair and unbiased juror in this case? 
“Yes (  ) 
No 
(  ) 
 
“14.  Would your views about the death penalty prevent or substantially impair 
your ability to follow the law and the judge’s instructions in this case? 
“Yes (  ) 
No 
(  ) 
 
“15.  Would your personal views on the death penalty make it very hard  if not 
impossible  for you to consider all the evidence and follow the Court’s instructions to 
weigh the evidence before deciding on punishment in a penalty trial? 
“Yes (  ) 
No 
(  )”  (Underscoring omitted.)   
31 
challenges for cause.  Indeed, as noted above, the trial court repeatedly had confirmed 
during pretrial discussions that it would undertake appropriate oral voir dire of jurors 
who were challenged for cause.  In suggesting questionnaire language at the trial court’s 
specific behest, there is no indication that defense counsel contemplated that the trial 
court subsequently would rely solely upon the juror questionnaires and refuse to conduct 
any oral voir dire before ruling on the People’s five contested for-cause challenges.16   
 
Accordingly, we perceive no basis upon which to conclude that defendant is 
procedurally barred from raising the claim that the trial court erred by granting the 
People’s contested challenges for cause, based solely upon the prospective jurors’ 
answers to question No. 35(1)(c) as phrased, and their brief written responses.   
 
The People also assert that “[i]n any event, the prospective jurors who were 
excused here, to a person, made it clear that a death verdict would be more than ‘very 
difficult.’  [Citations.]  Their explanations were emphatic.  If there was any impropriety 
in . . . the questionnaire’s not calling for a more emphatic answer than whether the jurors 
might find it ‘very difficult’ to apply the state’s death penalty law, any shortcomings 
were cured by the uniform strength of the excused jurors’ unequivocal responses.”  As 
explained above, although the checked answers of the prospective jurors to the question 
as posed (and their brief written comments) may well have contributed support to a 
                                             
 
16  
Furthermore, defense counsel’s suggested question, from which the trial court 
adopted its phrase, “very difficult,” was directed at the decision-making process — that 
is, whether prospective jurors who leaned either for or against the death penalty could 
“consider all the evidence and follow the Court’s instructions to weigh the evidence 
before deciding on punishment.”  As a tool offered to glean preliminary information 
about the views of prospective jurors, preparatory to follow-up questioning by the court 
or counsel, this question and phrasing would have been unobjectionable.  As revised and 
employed by the court, however, the question was directed only to those who held 
reservations concerning the death penalty, and inquired not about the decision-making 
process, but whether the prospective jurors could reach the ultimate decision to impose 
the death penalty.   
32 
subsequent determination that the trial court might have reached  after oral voir dire 
and an opportunity to observe the demeanor and assess the credibility of each prospective 
juror  that each was subject to challenge for cause under Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 
424, the bare checked answers and brief written comments, in themselves, were 
insufficient to support such a challenge.  (Accord, Chanthadra, supra, 230 F.3d 1237, 
1270-1272; Anderson, supra, 4 P.3d 369, 373-374.) 
 
Finally, citing portions of the record in which the trial court inquired of counsel 
whether they wished to submit follow-up questions to prospective jurors, the People 
assert that there was in fact substantial opportunity for follow-up questioning of these 
jurors.  But because the People’s cited examples of opportunities for follow-up 
questioning occurred after the trial court had granted the prosecution’s contested 
challenges for cause — and long after those prospective jurors were excused from 
service — those opportunities did not serve to address or cure the court’s error in 
granting the contested for-cause challenges here at issue.   
 
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the record does not support the 
trial court’s excusals for cause under the governing legal standard (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 
412, 424), and that under the compulsion of United States Supreme Court cases this error 
requires reversal of defendant’s death sentence, without inquiry into prejudice.  (See 
Davis v. Georgia, supra, 429 U.S. 122, 123; Gray v. Mississippi, supra, 481 U.S. 648, 
659-667 (opn. of the court); id., at pp. 667-668 (plur. opn.); id., at p. 672 (conc. opn. of 
Powell, J.); People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 962; accord, Chanthadra, supra, 
230 F.3d 1237, 1272-1273, 1275.)   
 
As in another recent case (Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th 946), we are troubled by this 
result because the error here at issue easily could have been avoided.  In essence, the 
penalty judgment in this matter was doomed from the inception, merely because the trial 
court failed to take the extra few minutes that would have been required to clarify the 
ambiguity inherent in the questionnaire responses of the five excused prospective jurors.  
33 
(Id., at p. 968.)  Such an outcome should be avoided in future trials, not only through the 
conduct of the trial court, but also through the proper involvement of counsel, who have 
since 2001 enjoyed expanded rights to participate in oral voir dire.  (See Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 223, as amended by Stats. 2000, ch. 192, § 1.)17 
 
Although the penalty judgment must be reversed on this basis, past decisions make 
it clear, contrary to defendant’s assertions, that error under Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 
424, does not require reversal of the guilt judgment or special circumstance finding.  
(Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th 946, 972-982 [reversing penalty phase judgment for erroneous 
exclusion of prospective juror for cause, but affirming guilt judgment and special 
circumstance findings]; see Lockhart, supra, 476 U.S. 162, 173-184 [rejecting assertion 
that exclusion of “guilt phase includables” at the guilt phase of a bifurcated capital trial 
offends constitutional “fair-cross-section” or “impartial jury” guarantees]; People v. 
Ashmus, supra, 54 Cal.3d 932, 956-957 [same, under both federal and state law].)  
Defendant has not provided any persuasive basis upon which to reconsider that authority 
or view the trial court’s error as a “structural defect” that impugned the entire proceeding 
below.  Accordingly, we proceed to consider defendant’s remaining claims relating to the 
guilt judgment and the special circumstance finding.   
B.  Claims related to Code of Civil 
Procedure, section 223 
 
Code of Civil Procedure section 223, as amended by section 7 of Proposition 115 
(approved by the electorate effective June 6, 1990), provided at the time of trial in this 
                                             
 
17  
As observed post, part II.B, at the time of trial in the present case, Code of Civil 
Procedure section 223 provided for court-conducted voir dire, with participation from the 
parties only upon a showing of “good cause.”  As amended effective in 2001, section 223 
now provides in relevant part:  “Upon completion of the court’s initial examination, 
counsel for each party shall have the right to examine, by oral and direct questioning, any 
or all of the prospective jurors. . . .”  (See Stats. 2000, ch. 192, § 1.) 
34 
matter:  “In a criminal case, the court shall conduct the examination of prospective jurors.  
However, the court may permit the parties, upon a showing of good cause, to supplement 
the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper, or shall itself submit to the 
prospective jurors upon such a showing, such additional questions by the parties as it 
deems proper.  Voir dire of any prospective jurors shall, where practicable, occur in the 
presence of the other jurors in all criminal cases, including death cases.[18]  [¶]  
Examination of prospective jurors shall be conducted only in aid of the exercise of 
challenges for cause.  [¶]  The trial court’s exercise of its discretion in the manner in 
which voir dire is conducted shall not cause any conviction to be reversed unless the 
exercise of that discretion has resulted in a miscarriage of justice, as specified in Section 
13 of Article VI of the California Constitution.”   
 
Defendant argues that the trial court’s use of a juror questionnaire violated Code 
of Civil Procedure section 223, because the prospective jurors who completed the 
questionnaire did not do so “in the presence of [the] other [prospective] jurors.”  In 
People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826 (Earp), however, we characterized the use of such 
questionnaires as being “[c]onsistent with” Code of Civil Procedure section 223.  (Earp, 
supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 851, italics added.)19  As noted, Code of Civil Procedure section 
223 requires that voir dire be conducted in the presence of all other prospective jurors 
“where practicable.”  It would be neither practicable nor particularly useful to require that 
prospective jurors provide answers to juror questionnaires in the presence of other jurors.  
As we implied in Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th 826, 851, a trial court retains discretion to 
                                             
 
18  
As amended effective in 2001, this statute now confers upon counsel for the 
parties a limited right to examine prospective jurors, following the court’s initial 
examination.  (See ante, fn. 17.) 
19  
As defendant concedes, statutory authority for use of juror questionnaires is 
provided by Code of Civil Procedure, section 205, subdivisions (c) and (d).   
35 
employ juror questionnaires as an aspect of the jury selection process, and the trial court 
properly did so in this case, consistent with Code of Civil Procedure section 223.   
 
Defendant also argues that the actual juror questionnaire employed in this case 
violated Code of Civil Procedure section 223, because it included questions that were not 
“in aid of the exercise of challenges for cause.”  The questionnaire asked each 
prospective juror to provide information concerning the prospective juror’s full name, 
and other names used; marital status; employment status; employment status of 
household members and children; education and subjects of study; education and areas of 
study of household members; military service; health problems; medication taken; 
connections with law enforcement; unpleasant or pleasant experiences with law 
enforcement; experience with victimization by crime; arrests for or commission of 
crimes; opinions formed concerning prosecuting or defense counsel; membership in 
anticrime organizations; training in the law; prior jury or grand jury service; prior 
knowledge of the case or persons involved in the case; willingness to follow the court’s 
instructions; exposure to media coverage; attitudes toward gun possession; and (as 
described ante, pt. II.A) attitudes concerning the death penalty.  The trial court below 
concluded that these and similar questions were in aid of discovering bases for challenges 
for cause, in that they help to “shed more light on the question of whether they are 
vulnerable to a challenge for cause.”  We agree and find no error.   
 
Finally, defendant asserts that use of the questionnaire denied him his right to an 
impartial jury, because the prosecution thereby obtained information upon which to base 
its peremptory challenges.  Of course, the questionnaire answers also provided defense 
counsel with information upon which to base his own peremptory challenges.  We 
perceive no denial of defendant’s right to an impartial jury on this ground.  (See Earp, 
supra, 20 Cal.4th 826, 853 [“the trial court’s voir dire procedure fully satisfied the 
requirements of the state and federal Constitutions that a fair and impartial jury determine 
36 
questions of guilt and penalty”].)  Nor do we perceive any miscarriage of justice on this 
ground.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 223, par. 3.)   
C.  General adequacy of the jury selection voir dire 
 
Defendant asserts the trial court deprived him of his state and federal 
constitutional rights to a fair and impartial jury because it failed to conduct an adequate 
voir dire inquiry into various topics about which, defendant claims, the court should have 
been aware on the basis of the case file.  These topics include the prospective jurors’ 
attitudes concerning:  (i) defendant’s prior criminal record and status as a felon; (ii) the 
content of letters that defendant wrote while in prison referring, for example, to his “near 
continuous incarceration since the age of sixteen”; (iii) defendant’s past drug use; 
(iv) defendant’s apparent racial bias (he is White) against Blacks, and his repeated 
references to Terry Guillory (who is of both White and Black racial heritage) as “cookie” 
or “Oreo”; (v) defendant’s use of a swastika to decorate two of his letter signatures; 
(vi) defendant’s offer, in a letter, to perform oral sex on Donna Guthrie; (vii) defendant’s 
general minimization of his own personal responsibility for his past crimes; (viii) the 
effect that gruesome crime-scene photographs might have on prospective jurors; (ix) the 
attitudes of prospective jurors concerning the killing of animals (as it related to the killing 
of the victims’ dog); and (x) defendant’s various social and political views, such as his 
support for the Chinese students’ uprising at Tiananmen Square, and his criticism of 
governmental policies concerning confiscation of private property, interference with 
sexual relations, punishment of so-called victimless crimes, and inadequate compensation 
of prison laborers.  In addition, defendant asserts that his trial counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective for having failed to request, or undertake, supplemental voir 
dire on these subjects.   
 
Contrary to defendant’s view, we do not agree that the trial court erred by failing, 
on its own motion, to pose voir dire questions addressed to these specific topics.  As 
37 
explained above, the trial court conducted voir dire by having the prospective jurors 
complete a 10-page questionnaire that probed a number of issues relating to potential 
bias.  Although the trial court did not conduct follow-up oral voir dire with respect to the 
five prospective jurors discussed in part II.A, ante, it did undertake significant follow-up 
voir dire examination as to other prospective jurors (including the jurors who actually sat 
on the case), consisting of individual examination of various jurors who asked for a 
private session, preinstructions to groups of prospective jurors, and examination, in open 
court, of numerous prospective jurors.  Moreover, as to these jurors and prospective 
jurors, the court expressly invited follow-up voir dire examination by counsel for both 
parties.  Viewing the voir dire record as a whole, we cannot say that the voir dire was 
inadequate and that the resulting trial was fundamentally unfair.  (People v. Holt (1997) 
15 Cal.4th 619, 661.)  We agree that many of the areas of inquiry proposed for the first 
time in defendant’s appellate briefs, if reduced to questions on voir dire, might have 
assisted defense counsel in exercising challenges.  But, as the high court observed in 
Mu’Min v. Virginia (1991) 500 U.S. 415, 425-426 “[t]o be constitutionally compelled, 
. . . it is not enough that such questions be helpful.  Rather, the trial court’s failure to ask 
these questions must render the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.” 
 
Defendant, quoting Turner v. Murray (1986) 476 U.S. 28 (Turner), notes that 
“[b]ecause of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital sentencing hearing, 
there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate but remain undetected.”  (Id., 
at p. 35 (opn. of White, J.).)  As an initial matter, we observe that Turner, like other cases 
relied upon by defendant, is distinguishable in that it involved a trial court’s refusal  
upon request by defense counsel  to probe possible race-related bias.  (Id., at pp. 30-
31.)  In the present case, by contrast, there was no such request, and defendant cites no 
authority for the proposition that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to probe such a 
matter on its own.  We also note that defendant and his victims were of the same race 
(Caucasian), and that, unlike the situation focused upon in Turner, supra, 476 U.S. 28 — 
38 
that is, an effort to expose racial biases that prospective jurors may harbor due to the race 
of the victim or defendant — here defendant’s concern appears to be related to how 
prospective jurors would react to his bigotry and use of a swastika.  In any event, because 
the penalty judgment must be reversed for the reasons set out in part II.A, Turner 
provides no basis for additional relief inasmuch as that decision expressly does not 
implicate the remaining guilt and special circumstance determinations.  (See Turner, 
supra, 487 U.S. at pp. 37-38 [vacating the penalty judgment but not the guilt judgment].)   
 
The trial court acted within its discretion by channeling the voir dire examination 
of the jurors within reasonable bounds and in a manner designed to expedite the jury 
selection process.  (People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 419.)  Trial counsel for 
defendant was given an opportunity to submit or ask additional voir questions of the 
prospective jurors who had not been excused for cause over objection, and yet declined 
to do so.  Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in failing to ask, on its 
own motion, the more probing questions that defendant now advances.   
 
Nor do we agree that trial counsel performed in a constitutionally inadequate 
manner by failing to probe the issues framed by defendant’s appellate counsel.  (See 
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-696 (Strickland); People v. Ledesma 
(1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215-218 (Ledesma).)   
 
First, as we have long observed, if the record does not preclude a satisfactory 
explanation for counsel’s actions, we will not, on appeal, find that trial counsel acted 
deficiently.  (See People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266 (Mendoza Tello) 
[“ ‘ “[i]f the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the 
manner challenged[,] . . . unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to 
provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation,” the claim on 
appeal must be rejected’ ”], quoting People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 936; and 
People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426 (Pope).)  On the record before us, we have no 
reason to question that counsel pursued a reasonable tactical choice by declining to 
39 
highlight immediately to the prospective jurors the various unsympathetic aspects of 
defendant’s personality and character described above, and by relying instead upon the 
subsequent voir dire that was conducted (including the court’s extensive preinstructions, 
advising that each juror would be required to “retain and keep your neutrality,” make his 
or her determination based upon the evidence only, without the influence of “passion and 
prejudice,” and be impartial) and upon the court’s subsequent instructions to the jury, 
limiting each juror’s consideration to the evidence and precluding the jurors from being 
swayed by speculation, passion, prejudice, or conjecture, and directing each juror to 
focus upon whether there was proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of the 
crimes and special circumstance charged.  Defendant fails to establish deficient 
performance under an objective standard of professional reasonableness.  (Strickland, 
supra, 466 U.S. 668, 687-691; Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-217.)  
 
Second, defendant also fails to establish prejudice, that is, a reasonable probability 
of a more favorable outcome in the absence of the assertedly deficient performance.  
(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 691-696; Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d 171, 217-218.)  As 
the court observed in Strickland, “[a] reasonable probability [of a more favorable 
outcome in the absence of the assertedly deficient performance] is a probability sufficient 
to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.)   
 
The evidence of defendant’s guilt was very strong.  He test-fired a gun shortly 
before the killings; the bullet fired from that gun bore markings consistent with the 
bullets taken from the victims.  Defendant’s letters from prison showed his alienation, 
anger, and despondency over the role played by his mother and Ardell in causing him to 
be sent back to prison.  Defendant visited Shane Powell and Mary Perron shortly before 
the killings, complaining of the treatment by his family and asserting that having been 
jailed made him “what he is today, and he’s not responsible for his actions, whatever they 
may be,” and that “society would just have to deal with that.”  Powell and Perron heard 
the scream, “No, Richard, no” at the same time they heard the gunshots.  Soon after the 
40 
gunshots were fired, Terry Guillory saw defendant peek out from the front door of the 
Pillow home and make eye contact with him, heard defendant say something to the effect 
of “Oh shit,” and then saw defendant shut the door and retreat into the Pillow home.  
Defendant thereafter was missing for several days and did not attend his mother’s 
funeral.  After defendant was incarcerated following his arrest, defendant attempted to 
convince his cousin, Gary Beach, to alter his testimony concerning the type of gun 
defendant had test-fired, and defendant also attempted to keep Terry Guillory from 
testifying by having Jacqueline Coghlan transfer $1,000 to Maurice Solvang.   
 
In addition to this strong evidence of identity and motive, the prosecution 
presented strong evidence concerning the mental elements of the crimes.  The close range 
and placement of the shots; the selection of the early morning of July Fourth (when 
gunshots in the neighborhood might be masked or made less noticeable by firecrackers or 
other “celebratory” gunshots) as the date for the crimes; the apparent effort to rid the 
crime scene of bullet cartridges; the killing of the dog (possibly to silence it); and the 
attempt to burn the house and the evidence it contained — all provide strong evidence of 
malice, premeditation, and deliberation.   
 
On the record before us, it is not reasonably probable that, had trial counsel probed 
the prospective jurors concerning the matters listed above, the jury selected would have 
entertained a reasonable doubt concerning defendant’s guilt or would have concluded 
that the special circumstance allegation was not true.  Counsel’s alleged failings in this 
regard are insufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.   
D.  Alleged withholding of evidence at the preliminary hearing and  
deprivation of the right to a “continuous” preliminary hearing 
 
As noted above, the prosecutor learned on the evening of December 5, 1989 (the 
day before the preliminary hearing began), from interviews with Donna Guthrie and 
Maurice Solvang, of a plot to prevent Terry Guillory from testifying.  Defendant asserts 
the prosecutor committed misconduct by failing immediately to disclose that and related 
41 
information20 to the court and to defense counsel at or prior to the start of the preliminary 
hearing on the morning of December 6, 1989, and instead delaying disclosure until the 
noon recess on that date (following Guillory’s testimony on direct examination that he 
heard gunshots, saw defendant peek out from the door of the Pillow home, and heard 
defendant “cuss” upon being observed by Guillory).21  Defendant also asserts that this 
claimed misconduct in turn tainted his personal waiver of his right to a “continuous 
preliminary examination,” which he had given at the start of the hearing, and 
subsequently forced him and his counsel to accept and seek later continuances (ultimately 
until January 21, 1990), all thereby violating his rights under section 861, subdivision 
(a).22   
                                             
 
20  
Solvang’s detailed statement, which implicated defendant in the underlying 
killings, also asserted that Solvang himself had no intention of “killing” Terry Guillory, 
even though Solvang understood that defendant possibly was asking Solvang to do so.  
Solvang never testified at trial, however.   
21  
The prosecutor asserted at the preliminary hearing, and the People claim on 
appeal, that the delay was necessary in order to protect the personal safety of Terry 
Guillory.  But it is unclear how disclosure on the morning of December 6, at the 
commencement of the preliminary hearing, might have frustrated that goal.  Indeed, it 
appears that the prosecution actually may have had a less altruistic motive, namely to 
elicit Guillory’s incriminating statements for the record, prior to disclosing the plot 
information, out of fear that Guillory — already a reluctant witness — once aware of the 
plot, might refuse to testify or cooperate with the prosecution.  Thus, the prosecutor, 
while simultaneously asserting that his delayed disclosure was “solely for the purpose of 
protecting [Guillory’s] life,” also candidly told the court:  “I have a very great concern 
about Terry Guillory and his willingness and ability to appear in court to testify, and I, 
therefore, made the judgment that to protect that witness . . . after his direct examination 
we would then disclose to the defense the information that we now know about the 
defendant’s efforts to suppress the testimony of Terry Guillory.”  (Italics added.)   
22  
Defendant also asserts as an additional irregularity that a subsequent continuance, 
ordered because of the illness of the magistrate assigned to preside over the preliminary 
hearing, was improper because that judge failed to provide an affidavit attesting to his 
illness, in violation of the requirement set out in Penal Code section 861, subdivision (a), 
of “good cause shown by affidavit.”   
42 
 
Assuming for purposes of analysis only that the prosecutor committed misconduct 
by failing to disclose this newly discovered information concerning the plot at the 
commencement of the preliminary hearing in the morning rather than during the noon 
recess and that the continuance violated defendant’s right to a continuous preliminary 
hearing, defendant has not demonstrated entitlement to relief.  As we held in People v. 
Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519 (Pompa-Ortiz), when a defendant presents, by way of 
a pretrial writ petition, claims that establish irregularities in preliminary hearing 
procedures, the court will grant relief — for example, dismissal and remand for a new, 
properly conducted preliminary hearing — “without any showing of prejudice.”  (Id., at 
p. 529.)  But when such claims are presented for the first time on appeal, “irregularities 
. . . which are not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense shall be reviewed under the 
appropriate standard of prejudicial error and shall require reversal only if the defendant 
can show that he was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice as a result of 
the error at the preliminary examination.”  (Ibid., italics added.)  We observed that such 
an approach “is consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s treatment of 
constitutional error at the preliminary examination.  Thus, even in a situation as extreme 
as the denial of counsel, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the harmless error rule is 
applicable.”  (Id., at p. 530, citing Coleman v. Alabama (1970) 399 U.S. 1, 11.)  We held 
that although the defendant’s statutory right to a public preliminary hearing had been 
violated — and the resulting commitment had been “rendered unlawful within the 
meaning of Penal Code section 995” (Pompa-Ortiz, supra, 27 Cal.3d 519, 522, italics 
added) — the defendant was not entitled to relief, because he failed to show that he was 
subsequently deprived of a fair trial or was otherwise prejudiced by reason of the error.  
(27 Cal.3d at p. 530.)   
 
As defendant concedes, he presented none of his current challenges to the 
preliminary hearing procedures by way of a pretrial writ petition.  Nor does he make any 
meaningful attempt to establish that he subsequently was deprived of a fair trial or 
43 
otherwise suffered prejudice, as required by Pompa-Ortiz, supra, 27 Cal.3d 519.  Instead, 
defendant asserts that the prosecutor’s failure to earlier disclose the newly discovered 
evidence “amounted to deliberate, thoughtfully conceived, misconduct” that “should be 
treated as structural error,” entitling him to relief without any showing of prejudice and 
without regard to whether the ultimate trial was fair.  
 
As the high court held in Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, although 
most trial errors (including the denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing) are subject to 
harmless error analysis (id., at pp. 306-308), some errors — those amounting to a 
“structural defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than 
simply an error in the trial process itself” (id., at p. 310)  are reversible per se, without 
inquiry into prejudice.  Structural defects identified in Arizona v. Fulminante include:  
(i) “total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial”; (ii) trial by a “judge who was not 
impartial”; (iii) “unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant’s race from the grand 
jury”; (iv) denial of the right to self-representation at trial; and (v) denial of the right to a 
public trial.  (Id., at pp. 309-310.)  
 
Defendant offers no authority for the proposition that the errors or irregularities 
claimed here constitute structural defects warranting reversal per se, and we decline to 
endorse that position.  Because defendant has failed to argue, much less demonstrate, that 
he subsequently was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice as a result of 
the asserted misconduct and asserted errors at the preliminary examination, he is not 
entitled to relief on appeal.   
 
We reject for the same reasons defendant’s related claim, asserted in cursory 
fashion in his reply brief, that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to 
seek pretrial writ review concerning the “continuous preliminary examination” claim.   
 
The record on appeal does not preclude a satisfactory explanation for counsel’s 
actions, and hence provides no basis upon which to find deficient performance by trial 
counsel.  (See Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th 264, 266; Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d 412, 
44 
426.)  Moreover, even assuming deficient performance under an objective standard of 
professional reasonableness (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 687-691; Ledesma, supra, 
43 Cal.3d 171, 216-217), as suggested above defendant has not established prejudice, that 
is, a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome in the absence of the assertedly 
deficient performance.  (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 691-696; Ledesma, supra, 43 
Cal.3d 171, 217-218.)  On the record before us, any assumed error by defense counsel in 
failing to seek writ review is insufficient to undermine confidence in the judgment. 
E.  Denial of court-ordered immunity for Maurice Solvang 
 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion (made 
during trial) seeking immunity for Maurice Solvang, thereby violating defendant’s 
federal and state constitutional rights to a fair trial.   
 
1.  Facts underlying defendant’s motion 
 
As noted above, on December 5, 1989 — a day before the preliminary hearing 
began — the prosecutor and Inspector Sjostrand interviewed Donna Guthrie at her home 
and, finding Maurice Solvang there, briefly interviewed him at that time as well.  Later 
that day, Solvang agreed to accompany the prosecutor and Sjostrand to the Richmond 
Office of the District Attorney, where Solvang submitted to a tape-recorded interview for 
approximately 90 minutes.  In that interview, which was transcribed and made available 
to defendant (and was subsequently referred to and extensively quoted in defendant’s 
midtrial motion seeking immunity for Solvang), Solvang described his contacts with 
defendant in the days prior to and after the killings.  We set out below a summary of that 
interview.   
 
At numerous times during the interview, Solvang recounted that, prior to the 
killings, defendant told him he hated his mother and his stepfather for sending him to 
prison and that, in retribution, he planned to kill them.  Solvang stated that on June 30, 
1989 — three days before the killings — Solvang advised defendant concerning how one 
45 
would go about committing such homicides, including the killer’s need to make sure that 
he was not seen by any witness, the need to dispose of any evidence, and the procedures 
necessary to create a gas leak in order to burn the home of his intended victims.  In the 
course of this recitation, Solvang volunteered that in making such recommendations to 
defendant he was neither encouraging nor dissuading defendant, because he (Solvang) 
was “an impartial party” who reasoned, “if you’re going to be stupid and do it, do it the 
smart way.”  He also asserted, however, that he did not believe that defendant actually 
would commit the planned crimes. 
 
Solvang proceeded to explain that defendant told him how defendant obtained the 
gun used in the killings; that at Solvang’s own recommendation, the two of them test-
fired the gun; and that on July 2 — two days before the crimes — Solvang went with 
defendant to purchase a box of bullets.  
 
Solvang related that on July 5 — the day after the killings — he and Donna 
Guthrie spent approximately four hours with defendant in a park, at which time defendant 
spoke to Solvang about the homicides and told him how he had killed each of the 
victims.  Solvang stated he was uncertain as to of the number of bullets defendant said 
had been fired.  Solvang recounted that defendant reported strangling the family dog with 
a vacuum hose because it would not stop barking after the gunfire ended, and that 
defendant had described looking out the front door and being noticed by Terry Guillory. 
 
Solvang, revealing his and defendant’s ingestion of drugs and alcohol for three 
days prior to the killings, described defendant’s demeanor on July 5 as alternating 
between euphoria (at having killed Ardell) and depression (at the prospect of having no 
place to live), but showing no remorse.  Solvang twice emphasized that while he and 
Donna Guthrie sat with defendant in the park, listening to him recount the crimes, he 
feared that defendant, who still was armed, also might kill him and Donna.  Solvang 
speculated that defendant was “in a cloud of ecstasy” at the time he committed the crimes 
and did not know right from wrong.  
46 
 
Solvang related that he advised defendant to shed the clothing he had worn during 
the killings and drove with defendant and Donna to a store where defendant purchased 
new clothing.  Solvang explained that while they were waiting for defendant to try on the 
new clothing, Donna told him (Solvang) that on July 3, defendant had telephoned her 
numerous times from the Pillow home, last calling at about 11:30 p.m. and pleading, 
“ ‘[i]f you don’t come pick me up you’ll read about it in the newspapers.  I hope you feel 
great ‘cause this is all your fault, it’s your trip.’ ”   
 
Solvang conceded having helped defendant discard his shoes and the gun, both of 
which, he claimed, defendant threw into a deep reservoir in his presence.  
 
Solvang also admitted speaking with defendant by telephone numerous times in 
the months after defendant’s arrest, and related that defendant had “made me several 
offers for Terry Guillory’s life.”  Solvang explained that, in this regard, he had accepted 
from defendant a “$1,000 retainer” that was delivered to him in a cigarette box at a Foster 
Freeze in El Sobrante.  Solvang stated that although defendant did not specifically ask 
that Guillory be killed, it was clear to Solvang that defendant wanted Guillory’s 
“termination,” which Solvang assumed meant that Guillory was to be killed.  Solvang, 
however, asserted that he never intended to kill Guillory, but instead viewed the retainer 
as “free money,” which he used to purchase gifts and food for Donna Guthrie (who, by 
this time, was Solvang’s girlfriend — and who, further complicating matters, also had a 
“long-standing relationship” with Terry Guillory). 
 
During the interview, Solvang expressed concern that he might be prosecuted for 
his involvement in the events he was relating.  Inspector Sjostrand replied that if Solvang 
in fact had destroyed evidence or assisted defendant after the killings, “that’s something 
you’re going to have to address.”  Finally, Solvang acknowledged having suffered three 
prison terms for numerous crimes, including smuggling narcotics, shooting a dog, and (in 
his words) “robberies, robberies, robberies, robberies.”   
47 
 
Evidence adduced at the hearing on defendant’s motion for court-ordered 
immunity for Solvang revealed the following.   
 
Approximately one month prior to the December 5, 1989, interview described 
above (on November 4, 1989), Solvang had been charged with a misdemeanor, 
brandishing a firearm.  On December 7, 1989, a police officer reviewing the original 
November report obtained Solvang’s criminal records and on that basis modified the 
charges to include the additional felony charge of “felon in possession of a firearm.”  
There is no indication that the modification was made at the behest of the District 
Attorney’s office.  A subsequent police report entry in February 1990 indicated that the 
police would “take this case to D.A. review.”  Still later, a police report entry stated:  
“This case has been reviewed by the D.A. and a felony complaint issued.” 
 
Solvang had been subpoenaed by the prosecution to testify at defendant’s 
preliminary hearing, which commenced on December 6, 1989.  But thereafter Solvang 
was provided appointed counsel who advised him concerning his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination.  Solvang was not subsequently called to testify at the 
preliminary hearing, apparently because he had demanded “transactional immunity,” 
which, the prosecutor later explained at a February 1990 hearing, he was “not prepared to 
offer.”   
 
Counsel for defendant learned of Solvang’s December 5, 1989, interview shortly 
after noon on December 6.  Soon thereafter, Craig Rock, the defense investigator, 
attempted at various times to interview Solvang.  Ultimately Solvang agreed to an 
interview with Rock on July 26, 1990.  At that interview, Solvang first stated that he 
“knew he had AIDS.”  Solvang also stated he had been subpoenaed by the prosecution to 
testify at defendant’s trial and would do so if he received “user immunity from the D.A.”  
Solvang further asserted he “would state that his previous statement to the D.A. regarding 
[defendant’s] involvement in the killings was a lie” and that defendant “was an innocent 
witness to a robbery and the killings.”  Rock testified:  “When I asked him how he knew 
48 
this, was he present at the killings, he said ‘possibly.’  I then asked him if he did the 
shootings to which he again said ‘possibly.’  I asked him if he knew about a bracelet that 
was left at the crime scene.  He asked me if I meant the one belonging to Donna.  He then 
said we should check for her fingerprints on the wine bottle and on a pair of sunglasses.  
[¶]  [Solvang] said that he and Donna had gone their separate ways” and that in the past 
he had had “a sexual relationship with Donna but not while [defendant] was going out 
with her.” 
 
Later, Solvang agreed to another interview with Rock, held on September 12, 
1990.  While Rock was driving Solvang to the office of defendant’s counsel for that 
interview, and as they neared that office, Solvang noticed the prosecution investigator, 
Sjostrand, traveling in the opposite direction, and shared that observation with Rock.  At 
the September 12 interview with Rock and defense counsel, counsel began by telling 
Solvang he “wanted to know what really happened on the night of the killings.”  Solvang 
responded he would demand immunity in order to testify at defendant’s trial.  Solvang 
asserted that the prosecution had told him that “somebody else must be involved [in the 
killings] because these victims didn’t wait in line to be shot” and that if Solvang helped 
the prosecution, Donna would not be prosecuted, nor would he “unless he did the actual 
killings.”  Solvang asked defense counsel whether the public defender’s office would 
represent him (Solvang) if the weight of the evidence shifted to him, and counsel 
responded that in that circumstance a conflict would be declared and Solvang would 
receive another court-appointed attorney.  Solvang asked “why should a person be 
punished for something he didn’t do?,”  adding “I don’t want to see [defendant] get what 
they, the D.A.. wanted him to get.”  Solvang then mused:  “If me and two friends go to a 
house and I see valuable items and things get out of hand you got to terminate certain 
people.  People with you have to decide whether they’re going to be a witness against the 
person.” 
49 
 
Later, Rock testified, Solvang mentioned that he “ ‘never saw this lady [Gloria 
Pillow] until . . . .’ ”  Rock explained that Solvang did not finish the sentence.  Rock 
further stated Solvang told him that after the killings, “Donna was going around telling 
people that [Solvang] was the one who did the killings.”  Solvang also said that he saw 
Terry Guillory with a $1,000 check, apparently from a newspaper’s witness reward 
program, provided for having “turned in” defendant, and that Guillory had purchased 
drugs from Donna with that money.  Solvang further stated that he also had given Donna 
the $800 he had received from the cigarette package delivered by defendant’s friend 
Jackie.  Solvang explained that Donna “has a way of wrapping men around her finger.”  
Finally, Solvang asserted that at one point Guillory demanded that Donna share the $800 
with Guillory, and that Inspector Sjostrand happened to have arrived while Guillory was 
making this demand.  After the September 12 interview, Rock served Solvang with a 
subpoena to testify for the defense at defendant’s trial.   
 
Immediately after Solvang’s September 12 interview, when Rock returned 
Solvang to his home, Donna  — who at that time resided at the same location — angrily 
confronted Solvang, claiming Solvang was “out to get” her.  Donna then telephoned the 
police to report a charge of “disturbing the peace,” a violation of Penal Code section 415.  
The San Pablo police responded.  Upon interviewing Solvang, the investigating officer 
discovered that Solvang had two outstanding warrants.  Based upon those warrants, 
Solvang was transported to the San Pablo Police Department, booked, and then 
transported to the Contra Costa County Jail. 
 
Investigator Rock testified that, within two weeks of March 1991 (just prior to the 
beginning of jury selection in defendant’s trial) he was led to believe by the prosecution 
that it planned to call Solvang as a witness at defendant’s trial and that the prosecution 
had secured a “removal” order for the transportation of Solvang from the prison where he 
was then confined.  But, Rock testified, when he checked he found that the prosecution in 
fact had not sought a removal order.  Accordingly, defense counsel was required to seek 
50 
such an order for Solvang’s removal.  Rock also testified that during defendant’s trial — 
on March 27, 1991, the day before the immunity motion at issue was filed and heard — 
Rock spoke to Solvang, who advised him that he (Solvang) would exercise his Fifth 
Amendment privilege to decline to testify at defendant’s trial.  Rock did not ask Solvang 
why he would elect to exercise that privilege, and Solvang did not indicate why he had 
made that decision. 
 
The parties stipulated that if called to the stand at defendant’s trial, Solvang would 
assert his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and would refuse to 
testify “absent a grant of immunity from the District Attorney.”   
 
2.  Defendant’s motion for court-ordered immunity 
 
On March 28, 1991, during the presentation of the defense case at trial, defendant 
requested that the trial court grant immunity to Solvang.  Citing People v. Hunter (1987) 
49 Cal.3d 957, 974 (Hunter), In re Martin (1987) 44 Cal.3d 1, 29 (Martin), and 
Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith (3rd Cir. 1980) 615 F.2d 964, 972 (Smith), 
defendant asserted in his motion that the court should grant Solvang immunity in order to 
redress the prosecution’s asserted interference with defendant’s right to present 
exculpatory evidence in his defense and to ensure defendant’s right to a fair trial.   
 
The trial court, in denying the motion, observed that many courts — including this 
court (see Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d 957, 973) — have recognized that the power to 
confer immunity is granted by statute to the executive, that is, to the prosecution (see 
§ 1324), and have questioned whether a trial court possesses inherent authority to grant 
such immunity.  Indeed, addressing this question in People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 
415, our court characterized as “doubtful” the “proposition that the trial court has 
inherent authority to grant immunity.”  (Id., at 460; see also, e.g., Carter v. United States 
(D.C. 1996) 684 A.2d 331, 338-339 [citing and agreeing with “the overwhelming number 
of courts . . . that have rejected the concept of judicially imposed immunity,” and noting 
51 
that “ ‘there is considerable force to the Government’s apprehension that defense witness 
immunity could create opportunities for undermining the administration of justice by 
inviting cooperative perjury among law violators’ ”].)  Nevertheless, in Lucas as in 
Hunter and other cases (In re Williams (1994) 7 Cal.4th 572, 610 (Williams); People v. 
Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 619 (Cudjo)), we proceeded to assume that such inherent 
judicial authority exists and to address whether the defendant met the stringent 
requirements described in Hunter and Smith under which such relief conceivably might 
be warranted.  The trial court in the present case undertook this same approach in 
considering (and ultimately denying) defendant’s motion for court-ordered immunity.  
Following that same approach here, we conclude that assuming the trial court possessed 
authority to order transactional or use immunity for Solvang, the court did not err in 
failing to do so on the facts of this case.   
 
We acknowledged in Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d 957, that it was “possible to 
hypothesize cases” in which “a judicially conferred use immunity might possibly be 
necessary to vindicate a criminal defendant’s rights to compulsory process and a fair 
trial.”  (Id., at p. 974.)  We reviewed “the one case which has clearly recognized” such 
authority — Smith, supra, 615 F.2d 964 — and highlighted two “ ‘clearly limited’ ” 
circumstances (both articulated in Smith) in which judicially conferred use immunity 
might be constitutionally necessary.  (Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 974.) 
 
The first of the two tests outlined in Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d 957, would 
recognize the authority of a trial court to confer immunity upon a witness when each of 
the following three elements is met:  (1) “the proffered testimony [is] clearly exculpatory; 
[(2)] the testimony [is] essential; and [(3)] there [is] no strong governmental interest[] 
52 
which countervail[s] against a grant of immunity.”  (Id. at p. 974, citing Smith, supra, 615 
F.2d 964, 972.)23   
 
The trial court declined to make an express finding on the first element of this test, 
but, the People assert, necessarily made implied negative findings on either the second or 
third elements (or both) of this test.  Upon review, we conclude that defendant has failed 
to carry his burden of establishing the third element of this first test outlined in Hunter, 
supra, 49 Cal.3d 957.  (See Williams, supra, 7 Cal.4th 572, 603 [defendant has burden of 
establishing alleged interference with his right to compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses].)   
 
The evidence presented at the hearing on the motion suggested that Solvang had 
given directly contradictory statements to the police and to the defense investigator 
regarding the events of the crime.  His statements to the defense suggested that Solvang 
himself may have been the killer — and if that were true, there certainly would have been 
a strong governmental interest in not granting Solvang immunity (either “transactional” 
or “use”) from prosecution.  Moreover, even under the version of the facts related in 
Solvang’s statement to the police, Solvang himself may have been guilty as an aider and 
abettor of the homicides, in that he admitted that, prior to the killings, he had given 
advice to defendant that would facilitate the commission of the murders.  Under these 
circumstances, the prosecution reasonably would have been skeptical concerning which 
(if either) of Solvang’s versions of the events was true.   
                                             
 
23  
The court in Smith cautioned:  “[T]he defendant must make a convincing showing 
sufficient to satisfy the court that the testimony which will be forthcoming is both clearly 
exculpatory and essential to the defendant’s case.  Immunity will be denied if the 
proffered testimony is found to be ambiguous, not clearly exculpatory, cumulative or it is 
found to relate only to the credibility of the government’s witnesses.”  (Smith, supra, 615 
F.2d 964, 972.)   
53 
 
Contrary to defendant’s assertions, even a grant of use immunity would have 
substantially burdened the People.  Had such immunity been conferred, at any later 
prosecution of Solvang in connection with the homicides at issue in this case the district 
attorney would have been forced to prove that the evidence offered was not obtained or 
derived from Solvang’s immunized testimony at defendant’s trial.  (See People v. Cooke 
(1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1361, 1370.)  Moreover, conferral of such immunity would have 
facilitated perjury by Solvang, who had shown himself to be of questionable veracity (id., 
at p. 1371), and at the same time it would have substantially limited the prosecution’s 
ability to conduct a full and free-ranging cross-examination of Solvang at defendant’s 
trial (so as to narrow the scope of testimony that Solvang later might claim had tainted 
any subsequent prosecution).  Based upon these considerations, and given Solvang’s 
apparent complicity and culpability, the prosecution clearly had a strong governmental 
countervailing interest in not granting him either use or transactional immunity.   
 
The second of the two tests referred to in Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d 957, as 
authorizing a trial court to grant immunity to a defense witness, would recognize such 
authority when “the prosecutor intentionally refused to grant immunity to a key defense 
witness for the purpose of suppressing essential, noncumulative exculpatory evidence,” 
thereby distorting the judicial factfinding process.  (Id., at p. 975; see Smith, supra, 615 
F.2d 964, 969 [inquiring whether prosecution acted “with the deliberate intention of 
distorting the factfinding process”]; see also United States v. Westerdahl (9th Cir. 1991) 
945 F.2d 1083, 1086-1087 (Westerdahl) [defense-requested immunity should be granted 
when the defense witness would provide relevant testimony and the prosecution 
intentionally has distorted the factfinding process, which may be shown when the 
government relies heavily upon the immunized testimony of a government witness while 
denying immunity to a defense witness whose testimony would directly contradict that of 
the government witness].)  The trial court implicitly found that this test was not met here.   
54 
 
There is no doubt that Solvang’s testimony would have been relevant.  But 
defendant has not met his burden of establishing that the prosecution’s treatment of 
Solvang constituted an intentional distortion of the factfinding process with reference to: 
(i) the upgrading, at the recommendation of the Richmond police, of Solvang’s 
November 4, 1989, misdemeanor firearm charge to a felony charge; (ii) the arrest, by the 
San Pablo police, of Solvang on outstanding warrants shortly after his September 12, 
1990, interview with the defense team; and (iii) the prosecution’s refusal to grant 
immunity to Solvang, while granting limited immunity to other witnesses.   
 
Contrary to defendant’s speculation that the prosecution orchestrated the 
upgrading of the November 4, 1989, firearms charge against Solvang two days after 
obtaining a detailed statement from Solvang largely incriminating defendant, there is no 
evidence that the prosecution prompted the Richmond police to reevaluate and upgrade 
the November 4, 1989 misdemeanor firearms charge.  The record reveals instead that a 
Richmond detective sergeant, while “reviewing reports that had been submitted to him 
. . . recognized the name of Maurice Solvang as a person who may have been a convicted 
felon and . . . did some checking to determine that in fact . . . Solvang was a convicted 
felon and . . . on that basis he modified the charges . . . to reflect . . . the additional charge 
of felon in possession of a firearm.”  
 
Also, contrary to defendant’s speculation that the prosecution arranged to have 
Solvang arrested in retaliation for his September 12, 1990, interview with the defense 
team, the evidence presented at the hearing on the immunity motion neither established 
nor reasonably implied any such connection, and suggested instead that Solvang’s arrest 
immediately following his September 12 interview was the direct result of Donna 
Guthrie’s disturbing the peace complaint, the investigation of which, by the San Pablo 
police, disclosed the existence of two warrants for Solvang’s arrest.   
 
Finally, contrary to defendant’s speculation that the prosecution sought to pressure 
and punish Solvang after learning of his September 12, 1990, interview with the defense 
55 
by refusing to grant him immunity while granting immunity to other witnesses, the record 
shows that beginning at the December 6, 1989, preliminary hearing, the prosecution 
consistently had declined to grant Solvang immunity.  Although the prosecution granted 
very limited use immunity to witnesses Coghlan and Guillory, the People did not rely 
“heavily” upon immunized testimony (cf. Westerdahl, supra, 945 F.2d 1083, 1087) in 
proving their case.  We find no support for the hypothesis that the prosecution changed 
its position concerning the propriety of immunity for Solvang in response to his 
September 12, 1990, interview with the defense team.   
 
Accordingly, we conclude that defendant has failed to satisfy the second test 
referred to in Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d 957, 975, which potentially authorizes a trial court 
to grant immunity to a defense witness when the prosecution has acted with the deliberate 
intention of distorting the factfinding process.  (See Smith, supra, 615 F.2d 964, 969; 
Westerdahl, supra, 945 F.2d 1083, 1086-1087.)   
 
Defendant also asserts a general claim of interference with his right to compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses.  (See Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1, 29-32; Williams, supra, 
7 Cal.4th 572, 603-609.)  To demonstrate such a violation, defendant is required to 
establish, among other things, (i) prosecutorial misconduct — that is, “activity that was 
wholly unnecessary to the proper performance of [the prosecution’s] duties and was of 
such a character as ‘to transform [a defense witness] from a willing witness to one who 
would refuse to testify,’ ” and (ii) interference with the fact-finding process — that is, “a 
causal link between the misconduct and [the defendant’s] inability to present witnesses 
on his own behalf.”  (Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 31; Williams, supra, 7 Cal.4th at 
p. 603.)   
 
In this regard, the trial court stated:  “I’m not persuaded that there has been 
anything that the District Attorney or the police agencies have done which constitutes 
misconduct; that is to say, a governmental interference with the defendant’s [Sixth] 
Amendment right to produce witnesses.  [¶]  This is not a situation where Solvang was 
56 
some kind of a willing defense witness who was transformed into one who has refused to 
testify.  It’s not a situation where a witness has been arrested outside of the courtroom in 
the presence of other witnesses.  There simply has been no showing that prosecution 
intimidation was a substantial cause of Solvang’s present refusal [to testify on Fifth 
Amendment grounds].”  The trial court then speculated that perhaps Solvang presently 
was refusing to testify because he himself was fearful of retaliation by defendant.24  The 
court concluded that, in any event, “there’s been no connection between what may have 
been revealed to [the defense team] on July 26, 1990, and September 12th, 1990, no 
showing that [the] prosecution was aware of any of that, that might somehow provide the 
basis for an inference that Solvang’s arrest was an effort to threaten or intimidate him.”   
 
We find the trial court’s conclusions adequately supported by the record.  The trial 
court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for court-ordered immunity.   
F.  Refusal to instruct the jury as to Solvang’s invocation of 
his Fifth Amendment privilege, or the prosecutor’s 
sole authority to grant immunity 
 
As noted above, Solvang’s name frequently was mentioned in the course of 
evidence that properly came before the jury:  The record showed that Solvang collected 
$800 that apparently was designed to deter Terry Guillory from testifying, and that 
Solvang was present at Donna Guthrie’s home on the evening prior to the preliminary 
hearing and spoke with defendant, who asked Solvang, “Anything ever work out?” — an 
apparent reference to the status of the effort to prevent Guillory’s testimony.  In addition, 
Inspector Sjostrand testified that, based upon information supplied by Solvang, the 
                                             
 
24  
Contrary to defendant’s suggestion, this speculation by the trial court does not 
conflict with the parties’ stipulation that, if called to testify, Solvang would refuse to do 
so based upon his Fifth Amendment privilege.  As the People observe, “a refusal to 
testify based upon the Fifth Amendment privilege is not mutually exclusive of a refusal 
for fear of [defendant].”  
57 
prosecution searched unsuccessfully in a deep reservoir or pond for defendant’s blood-
stained shoes and the murder weapon.   
 
Also as noted above, the parties stipulated, outside the presence of the jury, that if 
Solvang were called to testify he would exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege to 
decline to do so.  Defendant expressed concern that because of Solvang’s assertedly high 
profile in the prosecution’s case against him, the jury might infer from Solvang’s absence 
at trial that if Solvang were to testify, he would provide further evidence unhelpful to 
defendant.  Accordingly, defendant made a motion requesting the trial court to instruct 
the jury that it should draw no inference from Solvang’s invocation of the privilege 
against self-incrimination.25  Defendant relied upon Evidence Code section 913, which 
provides:  “(a) If in the instant proceeding or on a prior occasion a privilege is or was 
exercised not to testify with respect to any matter, or to refuse to disclose or to prevent 
another from disclosing any matter, neither the presiding officer nor counsel may 
comment thereon, no presumption shall arise because of the exercise of the privilege, and 
the trier of fact may not draw any inference therefrom as to the credibility of the witness 
or as to any matter at issue in the proceeding.  [¶]  (b) The court, at the request of a party 
who may be adversely affected because an unfavorable inference may be drawn by the 
jury because a privilege has been exercised, shall instruct the jury that no presumption 
arises because of the exercise of the privilege and that the jury may not draw any 
inference therefrom as to the credibility of the witness or as to any matter at issue in the 
proceeding.”   
                                             
 
25  
Alternatively, defendant asked that the following stipulation be made in the 
presence of the jury:  “It is stipulated that the defendant in this case called Maurice 
Solvang as a witness.  Mr. Solvang refused to testify to any matter, relying on the 
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.  You must not draw from the exercise 
of such privilege any inference as to the believability of the witness or as to the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant.”  
58 
 
The trial court denied defendant’s motion, concluding that because there was no 
evidence before the jury that Solvang had exercised his Fifth Amendment privilege, and 
because the jury would be instructed, pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.11, that “[n]either side is 
required to call as a witness all persons who may have been present at any of the events 
disclosed by the evidence or who may appear to have some knowledge of these events,” 
defendant had no right to the proposed instruction.   
 
Defendant acknowledges in his reply brief that we have held in previous decisions 
that no error results from a trial court’s refusal to advise a jury that an individual’s failure 
to testify was due to his or her invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.  (See, e.g., Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th 585, 619-620, and cases cited.)  
Although defendant asserts those decisions “should be revisited,” we see no reason to do 
so.   
 
The prosecutor, arguing against defendant’s motion, aptly observed that defendant 
essentially was asking that the jury be told, “Here’s something irrelevant [under Evidence 
Code, section 913, subdivision (a)] . . . .  Now that I’ve told you about, it, don’t consider 
it.”  On appeal, the People assert, “[i]f the jury has never been told [or observed] that the 
privilege has been exercised, then there is no possibility that an ‘unfavorable inference 
may be drawn by the jury because a privilege has been exercised.’ ”  We agree that under 
the circumstances presented, Evidence Code section 913, subdivision (b) did not afford 
defendant a right to the instruction he sought.   
 
In any event, there is no reasonable probability that the result in this case would 
have been different had the requested neutralizing instruction been given.  As recounted 
above (pt. II.C), the evidence of defendant’s guilt was very strong.  On this record, we 
agree with the People that “even if the jury were to speculate why the defense did not call 
Solvang as a witness and to speculate further that the defense had failed to call him 
because he might provide further damaging evidence to [defendant], such speculation 
would [have been] only consistent with the uncontradicted affirmative evidence of record 
59 
that Solvang was involved with [defendant’s] plot to suppress Guillory’s testimony and 
that Solvang had other information about tangible evidence that might be damaging to 
[defendant].” 
 
Defendant also asserts that even if no instruction pursuant to Evidence Code 
section 913, subdivision (b) was required, comments made by the prosecutor during 
closing argument required the court to instruct the jury that only the prosecution 
possessed the power to confer immunity in order to compel the testimony of a witness.  
For the reasons set forth below, we again disagree.   
 
During the defense closing argument, defense counsel questioned Terry Guillory’s 
testimony that Guillory had seen defendant peek out from the Pillow home on the night 
of the killings.  In the process of making that point, counsel referred to “Kennie Bryant.”  
Guillory claimed he had spoken to Bryant on July 4, 1989, and had told him that he had 
seen defendant at the Pillow home on the previous day.  Counsel asked:  “Kennie Bryant, 
where’s Kennie Bryant?  If there’s any question about the veracity of Terry Guillory . . . 
then bring in Kennie Bryant.”  
 
In response to this defense argument that the prosecution had failed to call 
“Kennie Bryant” as a witness, the prosecution subsequently asserted in its rebuttal 
argument:  “And by the way, folks, it’s not a one way street.  If there was anything there 
that defense counsel suggests was inconsistent in the statements of those witnesses made 
to the police officers on the Fourth of July, they can call them.  If Kenneth Bryant — if 
the defense thinks that Kenneth Bryant is going to impact on this testimony — .”  At that 
point defense counsel objected “in light of the record in this case.”  The court noted the 
objection, and the prosecutor continued:  “[I]f Kenneth Bryant has anything to offer that 
in any way contradicts what Terry Guillory said, he’s available to the defense as much as 
he is to us.”  Shortly thereafter, defense counsel interjected, “Your Honor, I’m going to 
have to ask the Court to instruct on who grants immunity.”  The court responded that it 
would consider that request later, prior to instructing the jury.  The prosecutor continued 
60 
with his argument:  “If Kenneth Bryant is available — he’s as much available to the 
defense as he is to us, make no mistake of it.  So you can’t infer from the suggestions of 
defense counsel that somehow because a witness wasn’t called, that means the People 
have something to hide.  Because not only is that not fair, it’s not accurate.”  
 
At the subsequent hearing on the defense motion for an instruction advising the 
jury that the prosecution possessed the sole authority to confer immunity, the prosecutor 
asserted that his challenged comments concerning Kenneth Bryant did not warrant such 
an instruction, because those comments had been “very specifically directed to a very 
specific suggestion by defense counsel [as to] why the People didn’t call Kenneth Bryant 
since this was the first [person to whom] Terry Guillory said he saw [defendant peeking] 
out the door.  I very specifically responded [that] Ken Bryant was as much available to 
the defense as he was to the prosecution.  My comment went no further than that.”  The 
court agreed, noting “I’m not aware of any claim of privilege by that person [Kenneth 
Bryant].”  Indeed, defense counsel conceded that there was no such claim concerning 
Bryant, but suggested nevertheless that an instruction specifying the prosecution’s sole 
authority to confer immunity would “clear up misapprehension in the minds of the 
jurors.”  The Court responded that it had understood counsel’s argument, but that it 
would not further instruct concerning the power to confer immunity.   
 
Defendant now claims that the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument was designed to, 
and was likely to, mislead the jury into believing that defendant easily could have 
produced Solvang’s testimony if defendant thought that doing so would assist him, and 
that the absence of defendant’s requested instruction invited the jury to speculate that 
Solvang’s testimony would only harm defendant, by confirming that indeed he had 
accepted money to keep Terry Guillory from testifying.  But neither the language used by 
the prosecutor, nor the context in which the words were uttered (a response to specific 
charges made by defense counsel concerning Kenneth Bryant) suggests any attempt by 
the prosecutor to imply that the defense could have called Solvang as a witness and 
61 
compelled him to testify.  Moreover, as noted above, the properly admitted evidence — 
(i) from witness Jacqueline Coghlan, concerning the cash delivery from defendant to 
Solvang; (ii) concerning the telephone conversation that Inspector Sjostrand recorded on 
the eve of the preliminary hearing, in which defendant asked Solvang, “Anything ever 
work out?”; (iii) concerning defendant’s letter to Donna in which he referred to “the 
cookie” (a reference to Guillory) and told Donna to “[r]emind me when I talk to you to 
explain to you how one little mess can be cleaned”; and (iv) from Inspector Sjostrand, 
concerning Solvang’s tip relating to the possible location of the murder weapon — 
considered as a whole, provided the jury with an ample basis upon which to infer that 
Solvang in fact had accepted money as part of a plot to silence Terry Guillory, and that 
Solvang learned of the disposal of the murder weapon from his contacts with defendant.  
Accordingly, even if the jury were to have speculated from Solvang’s absence that his 
testimony might have been unfavorable to defendant in these respects, the evidence 
properly before the jury already provided an independent and strong basis for the jurors 
to reach these same conclusions.  We agree with the trial court’s determination that no 
special instruction concerning the prosecution’s exclusive authority to confer immunity 
was required under these circumstances, and further conclude that, in any event, there is 
no reasonable probability that the result in this case would have been different had the 
requested instruction been given.   
 
Finally, we also reject defendant’s cursory argument, presented in a footnote, that 
his federal constitutional rights to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him 
were violated by the trial court’s refusal of the requested instructions.  Relying upon 
Namet v. United States (1963) 373 U.S. 179, defendant asserts that such a constitutional 
violation occurred because, he claims, “critical weight” was added “to the prosecution’s 
case in a form not subject to cross-examination.”  (Id., at p. 187.)  In Namet, however, the 
high court did not adopt or endorse such a test.  (Ibid.)  Indeed, Namet expressly 
concerned only “a claim of evidentiary trial error” and “[n]o constitutional issues of any 
62 
kind.”  (Id., at p. 185.)  In any event, we cannot conclude that any inference that the jury 
may have drawn from Solvang’s failure to testify added “critical weight” to the 
prosecution’s case because, as explained above, the facts that the jury might have inferred 
from Solvang’s failure to testify — for example, that indeed he had participated in a plan 
created by defendant to prevent Terry Guillory’s testimony, and that he had knowledge, 
gained from defendant, concerning the location of the murder weapon — were already 
the subject of independent and strong evidence at trial, and hence any inference drawn 
from Solvang’s failure to testify did not provide “critical weight” to the prosecution’s 
case.   
G.  Proof of defendant’s status as a felon 
 
Count 4 of the information charged defendant with being a felon in possession of a 
firearm (§ 12021), specifically identifying the applicable prior felony convictions as 
attempted robbery, automobile theft, receiving stolen property, forgery, and possession of 
a firearm by a felon.26  In response to defendant’s objections to the court’s plan to read to 
the jury the multiple prior felony convictions alleged in count 4, and defendant’s offer to 
“stipulate to a conviction of receiving stolen property,” the prosecution at first argued 
that it should be permitted to offer evidence of all prior felony convictions incurred by 
defendant, in order to guard against the possibility that the jury might find that one or 
more of these convictions were not properly proved.  Ultimately, however, the 
prosecution offered to stipulate that (i) on July 4, 1989, defendant was “a convicted 
felon,” or that (ii) defendant “had previously been convicted of a felony, as of July 4, 
1989.”  
                                             
 
26  
At the time of the offense, section 12021 prohibited a felon from possessing a 
concealable firearm, but the section now prohibits a felon from possessing any firearm, 
concealable or not.  (See Stats. 1989, ch. 254, § 1, p. 1298.)  This element of the offense 
is not relevant to any issue raised on appeal, and thus, for convenience, we shall refer to 
the offense simply as possession of a firearm by a felon. 
63 
 
Defense counsel rejected both proposed stipulations and stated that, rather than 
leaving the jury with the impression that defendant previously had been convicted of an 
“[e]gregious” felony or an unspecified felony “without explanation,” counsel would 
prefer that the jury hear that defendant previously had been convicted of the specific 
felonies listed in count 4.  The prosecution responded that it intended to introduce several 
letters that defendant had written to his mother while he was in prison in order to show 
defendant’s motive for killing his mother and Ardell, and noted that these letters referred 
to defendant’s having been sent to prison for a theft-related offense and for having been a 
felon in possession of a firearm; hence, the prosecution asserted, much of the information 
identifying defendant’s prior conviction properly would come to the jury’s attention in 
any event.   
 
In the absence of a stipulation, the trial court ruled that count 4 would be read to 
the jury, listing the five felonies, and the court thereafter read that count to the jury.  At 
trial, the prosecution introduced evidence, contained in two abstracts of judgment, of 
defendant’s conviction of three nonviolent felonies alleged in count 4.  The abstracts 
showed that defendant was sentenced to prison for receiving stolen property, fraudulent 
use of a credit card (forgery), and for being a felon in possession of a firearm.  Defendant 
objected to introduction of the abstracts and a related packet of certified prison 
documents (a fingerprint card, a mug shot, and a chronological history), asserting that 
these latter documents contained irrelevant and unduly prejudicial information.  
Overruling the objections, the court admitted the two abstracts of judgment and the 
challenged certified prison records.  
 
On appeal, defendant initially asserts that the trial court erred in two respects:  
(1) by failing to force the prosecution to accept defense counsel’s offer to stipulate that 
defendant had been convicted of the prior felony of receiving stolen property, thereby 
obviating the need for proof of the prior felony element of the charged offense of felon in 
64 
possession of a firearm, and (2) by failing to confine the evidence of defendant’s prior 
felony status to only one of the prior felonies listed in count 4.   
 
Defendant concedes that under California Constitution article I, section 28 and 
People v. Valentine (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 173, a jury must be advised of a defendant’s 
felon status when that status is (as under section 12021) an element of the current charge.  
We noted in Valentine that when a defendant stipulates to his or her felon status, 
“evidence of the nature of his prior convictions . . . may and should be withheld from the 
jury” because “such evidence is irrelevant” to the issue of one’s status as a felon.  (42 
Cal.3d at p. 173; accord, Old Chief v. United States (1997) 519 U.S. 172 [defendant’s 
offer to stipulate to felon status in prosecution for being a felon in possession of a firearm 
must be accepted by trial court].)  Here, however, defense counsel refused to stipulate 
generally to his client’s felon status, out of concern that the jury might assume that the 
unspecified felony was considerably more egregious than the convictions that defendant 
actually had suffered.  For this reason, the present case is distinguishable from both 
Valentine and Old Chief.  Indeed, counsel went so far as to state that instead of 
stipulating to unspecified felon status, he would prefer that the jury hear the actual list of 
“all” prior felonies alleged in count 4 — which is exactly what ultimately occurred in this 
case.   
 
On this record, we do not perceive any error on the part of the trial court.  Even if 
we were to assume that the trial court did err, however, any such error was plainly 
nonprejudicial.  As the prosecutor noted early in the hearing on defendant’s motion, some 
of the circumstances related to defendant’s prior felony convictions — specifically, the 
fact that defendant had been imprisoned for a theft-related offense (involving coins and a 
gun belonging to Ardell) and for being a felon in possession of a firearm — would have 
been disclosed to the jury in any event, through other evidence (namely, defendant’s 
letters to his mother, introduced to establish motive, and defendant’s admission to Mary 
Perron that he had been caught with a gun, a violation of his probation).  Most of the 
65 
felonies listed in count 4 were nonviolent crimes (as noted, all three of the proved prior 
felony convictions were nonviolent) — and all paled in comparison with the crimes and 
facts underlying the charges in the present case.  Finally, a limiting instruction (CALJIC 
No. 2.50) cautioned the jury not to consider the other-crimes evidence except as that 
evidence related to intent, identity, and motive — an admonition that the prosecution 
underscored at closing argument.  Viewing the record as a whole, no reasonable 
probability exists that the verdict would have been different had the jury not been 
informed, as a basis for making its finding on the section 12021 charge, that defendant 
had suffered the felony convictions listed in count 4.  (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 
818, 836.)   
 
Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to limit the 
prosecution’s proof of his felony status to the abstracts of judgment, and in instead 
allowing introduction of defendant’s mug shot, fingerprint card, and chronological 
history contained in his state prison file.   
 
The People assert, reasonably, that this information was relevant to establish 
defendant’s identity as the same Richard Bert Stewart who had suffered the prior felony 
convictions described in the two abstracts of judgment.  The chronological history set out 
in the prison documents was relevant to corroborate evidence contained in the letters sent 
by defendant from prison to his mother, by placing in perspective the timing of the letters 
and corroborating defendant’s statements to the Pillows’ neighbors (Perron and Powell) 
concerning defendant’s motives for committing the crimes.  In any event, for the reasons 
set out above, any error in this regard was nonprejudicial.   
 
Finally, defendant asserts that his trial counsel performed in a constitutionally 
deficient manner by failing to reconsider and accept the prosecutor’s proposed stipulation 
(that defendant “had previously been convicted of a felony, as of July 4, 1989”) after 
defense counsel’s own proposed stipulation (that defendant had been convicted of the 
felony of receiving stolen property) was rejected.  The record makes it clear that in trial 
66 
counsel’s judgment there was a risk that the jury, if told only that defendant had suffered 
an unspecified prior felony conviction, might speculate that the prior felony was 
substantially more serious than the five felonies listed in count 4, three of which — all 
nonviolent — the prosecutor eventually established through the two abstracts of 
judgment.  Because the record on appeal does not preclude a satisfactory explanation for 
defense counsel’s actions (Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th 264, 266), we cannot 
conclude he made an unreasonable tactical choice and we shall not second-guess his 
decision.  (Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d 412, 426.)  Accordingly, we conclude that defendant 
has failed to establish deficient performance under an objective standard of professional 
reasonableness.  (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 687-691; Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d 
171, 216-217.)   
 
In any event, for the reasons set out above, defendant also has failed to establish 
prejudice, that is, a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome in the absence of 
counsel’s assertedly deficient performance.  (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 691-696; 
Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d 171, 217-218.)   
H.  Introduction of photographs 
 
Immediately after the jury selection process was completed, defendant moved to 
exclude a number of relatively small (3 by 5 inches) color photographs contained in 
People’s exhibits 2 and 3, which the prosecution planned to introduce at the guilt phase 
of the trial.  People’s exhibit 2 was a collection of 32 photographs fixed to a placard, 
showing the crime scene and the three bodies and the dog found dead at the scene.  
People’s exhibit 3-A consisted of three autopsy photos of Gloria Pillow; People’s exhibit 
3-B consisted of six autopsy photos of Ardell Pillow; and People’s exhibit 3-C consisted 
of four autopsy photos of Murray Lucas.  Defense counsel objected to all of the autopsy 
photos set out in People’s exhibit 3-A, B, and C, and most of the crime scene photos set 
out in People’s exhibit 2.   
67 
 
The trial court stated that it had “carefully examined each of the numbered 
photograph[]s” in the two exhibits, and found each of them relevant to show defendant’s 
“state of mind, premeditation, deliberation[], [and] intent to kill.”  The court agreed with 
defendant that three of the photos — one each in People’s exhibits 3-A, B, and C — 
substantially replicated the same or a very similar photograph found in People’s exhibit 
2, and excluded those three photographs.  The court concluded that the remaining 
photographs in the two sets of exhibits each had probative value that outweighed the 
potential for prejudice, and noted, “[t]hey are not terribly grotesque.  They are, to be sure, 
not pleasant ones for viewing, but homicide cases don’t lend themselves to pleasantness, 
and the objection will be overruled as to all except [the three redundant photos originally 
set forth in People’s exhibits 3-A, B, and C].”  
 
Defendant now asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting most 
of the photographs described above, on the ground that they were gruesome, 
inflammatory, cumulative of each other or of testimony, and that he should have been 
allowed to stipulate to facts so as to avoid the presentation of photographs.  Defendant 
also asserts that the probative value of the photos was outweighed by their prejudicial 
effect (Evid. Code, § 352), and that two of the photos set out in People’s exhibit 2 
depicting the dead dog were irrelevant and hence were admitted in violation of Evidence 
Code section 351.  In sum, defendant claims, these asserted evidentiary errors violated 
his federal constitutional rights to due process of law and a fair trial.   
 
We have reviewed the challenged photographs, and although we agree with the 
trial court that many of them are unpleasant, most are, given the subject matter, quite 
unexceptional.  The least pleasant among them are no more unpalatable than photographs 
whose admission we have approved in other capital cases.  (See, e.g., People v. Hughes 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 336-337; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 134.)  We 
agree with the trial court that each of the challenged photographs had probative value in 
proving contested issues at trial such as defendant’s use of a gun, state of mind, 
68 
premeditation, and motive, and we perceive no basis upon which to conclude that the trial 
court abused its discretion in failing to exclude these photographs under Evidence Code 
section 352.  (People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 18 [trial court’s determination under 
section 352 will not be reversed “ ‘unless the probative value of the photographs clearly 
is outweighed by their prejudicial effect’ ”]; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 
133-134.)   
 
Even if we were to agree with defendant that some of the challenged photographs 
were of limited probative value and should have been excluded by the trial court, any 
error in this regard clearly would be harmless.  (See People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 
1222, 1258.)  As detailed above, the circumstantial evidence of defendant’s guilt — the 
evidence linking him to the crimes, his motive for the killings, and his attempts, after 
committing the crimes, to alter and prevent testimony — made the case against him very 
strong.  The challenged photographs admitted into evidence were in a small format and, 
in comparison with exhibits we have seen and approved in other cases, not unduly 
shocking or inflammatory.  Under the circumstances, it is not reasonably probable that 
the jury would have reached a different result had the challenged photographs been 
excluded.  (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)   
I.  Introduction of unredacted letters 
written by defendant 
 
When defendant was imprisoned on two occasions prior to the killings in this case, 
he wrote letters, some to his mother and others to both his mother and his stepfather, 
Ardell.  At trial, the People offered seven of those letters, and they were admitted into 
evidence without objection, along with a stipulation that defendant wrote them.  
Defendant also wrote numerous letters to Donna Guthrie after the killings in this case, 
while he was in jail awaiting trial on the murder charges.  The People offered one of 
those letters into evidence and, again without objection, it was admitted.   
69 
 
The seven letters detailed the deep distress and anger directed by defendant toward 
his mother and Ardell for their role in defendant’s having been committed to prison, as 
well as his frustration with society — which, defendant repeatedly claimed, made him 
what he is.  At the same time, the letters contained many expressions of defendant’s love 
for his mother and Ardell, asked for their forgiveness, and expressed optimism and hope 
for his reformation.  Viewed as a whole, the letters served the prosecution’s purpose of 
documenting defendant’s motive for the killings and his effort to silence Terry Guillory, 
but also served the interests of the defense, by humanizing defendant and showing him to 
be a fairly articulate, philosophical, and loving person at times.  
 
Defendant asserts these unredacted letters contained “mostly irrelevant, 
inadmissible material that should never have been introduced to the jury.”  Defendant 
argues that although the letters sent to his mother and Ardell were offered to establish his 
motive for the killings, and the letter to Donna was offered to establish the plot to prevent 
Terry Guillory from testifying, numerous passages and aspects of the letters were 
irrelevant for those purposes and only could have harmed defendant — and hence the 
letters should have been redacted.   
 
Defendant cites various references contained in the letters to other crimes — 
including stealing Ardell’s coins; fraudulent use of a VISA credit card; “appropriating 
someone’s lost $300 check to make a down payment on a Cadillac”; alleged theft of a 
microwave oven; being “locked up” for various crimes since the age of 16 years or for 
“5 out of the past 8 years”; and defendant’s “outlaw” past and “hundred dollar a day drug 
habit.”  Defendant also cites as irrelevant and prejudicial the following matters appearing 
in his letters:  (i) a small swastika on one of the letters to his mother; (ii) references to 
defendant’s “death wish” for his cousin, Gary Beach (who refused to perjure himself by 
testifying that defendant had not test-fired a .22-caliber gun); (iii) references to his 
girlfriend, “Billie,” having been featured in a “smut film” and also having fraudulently 
used Ardell’s VISA credit card; (iv) defendant’s alleged adoption of his father’s cold 
70 
moral code, “[t]he heart is just a liquid pump”; and (v) references to defendant’s 
“controversial political views” that the jury might have inferred from defendant’s 
discussion of property confiscation, interference with sexual freedoms, imprisonment for 
“victimless crimes,” society’s responsibility for crime, the ills of divorce, the need for 
birth control, and exploitation of prison labor.  Finally, regarding the letter to Donna 
Guthrie, defendant cites as irrelevant and prejudicial his promise to engage in oral sex 
with Donna, defendant’s reference to his study of the law, and again the small swastika 
appearing in his signature.   
 
To the extent defendant asserts the trial court erred in failing to excise the passages 
that defendant now characterizes as either irrelevant or unduly prejudicial, the claim 
cannot properly be raised on appeal; defense counsel made no such objection at trial and 
instead stated he had no objection to admission of the letters.   
 
Recognizing his trial counsel’s failure to object, defendant asserts that counsel 
afforded him constitutionally deficient performance in this regard.  As defendant 
concedes, much of the material in the letters — for example, his repeatedly professed 
love for his mother and Ardell, his asking for forgiveness, his promises to reform, and his 
philosophical musings — served to humanize defendant and paint a more complete 
picture of the emotionally tumultuous relationship between him, his mother, and his 
stepfather, Ardell.  Indeed, and apparently for that reason, defense counsel, during his 
closing guilt-phase argument to the jury, repeatedly invited the jury to read all of 
defendant’s letters and criticized the prosecutor for failing to acknowledge one of the 
letters in which defendant expressed love for his mother.  We therefore disagree with 
defendant’s assertion that there could not have been any tactical explanation for trial 
counsel’s failure to seek redaction of the letters.  Reasonable counsel might well have 
concluded that in this case, in which defendant did not testify, allowing the jury to review 
the letters in their entirety, without certain passages blacked out (with redaction perhaps 
leading the jury to speculate that information especially harmful to defendant had been 
71 
excised), conveyed to the jury an unvarnished and honest description that, on balance, 
might serve defendant well.  Accordingly, because the appellate record does not preclude 
a satisfactory explanation for counsel’s actions, we cannot find that counsel acted 
deficiently.  (Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th 264, 266; Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d 412, 
426.)  Instead, we conclude that defendant has failed to establish deficient performance 
under an objective standard of professional reasonableness.  (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. 
668, 687-691; Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-217.)   
 
Defendant insists that defense counsel at least should have sought to eliminate 
from the letter to Donna Guthrie his offer of oral sex, and from that letter (and one other 
letter to his mother) the use of small swastikas to decorate his name.  It is not apparent 
that, had the requests been made, the trial court would have abused its discretion had it 
declined to redact in the manner defendant now claims should have been done.  The 
People assert that the reference to oral sex in the letter to Donna Guthrie was relevant and 
probative in that it served to demonstrate the intimate relationship between defendant and 
Guthrie, and hence show why he would confide in her concerning the details of his plan 
to prevent the testimony of Terry Guillory.  The People also assert that the swastikas set 
out in the letter to Donna Guthrie were relevant and probative in explaining and placing 
in perspective defendant’s apparent hatred of Guillory (who, as noted, is of mixed race), 
and defendant’s disparaging references to Guillory as “the Oreo” or “cookie.”   
 
But even assuming that in one or both of these limited respects trial counsel 
performed deficiently by failing to request excision of the references to oral sex and to 
the swastikas, defendant fails to establish prejudice, that is, a reasonable probability of a 
more favorable outcome in the absence of the assertedly deficient performance.  
(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 691-696; Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d 171, 217-218.)  
On the record before us, it is not reasonably probable that, had trial counsel prevailed 
upon the trial court to excise the reference to oral sex or the two small swastikas that 
adorned two of defendant’s letters, the jury would have entertained a reasonable doubt 
72 
concerning his guilt, or would have concluded that the special circumstance allegation 
was not true.  Counsel’s alleged failings in this regard were wholly insufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.   
 
Finally, defendant asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct by referring at 
closing argument in the guilt phase of the trial to various aspects of the letters.  For 
example, the prosecutor pointed out that while defendant was making sexual overtures to 
Donna Guthrie, whom he involved in his plan to eliminate the testimony of Terry 
Guillory, defendant was promising marriage to Jacqueline Coghlan, whom he also had 
enlisted in his plan concerning Guillory.27  The prosecutor concluded that the jury 
should, based upon these circumstances, infer that defendant was manipulative.  The 
prosecutor also drew attention to defendant’s use of the swastikas in two of his letters, 
noting that it was a “universal sign of hatred.”  Referring to the passages showing 
defendant’s anger at his mother and Ardell, the prosecutor commented that they 
suggested “just about the kind of state of mind you need to shoot three people in the 
head,” and then remarked:  “But if you are brought up  — and people give you advice 
that you adopt — that the heart is nothing more than a liquid pump, then [killing three 
people is] not so tough; is it?”  Referring to passages in the letters concerning defendant’s 
discussion of “natural law” and various societal failings, the prosecutor commented, “It’s 
all our fault, folks.”  Finally, referring to defendant’s complaints concerning “victimless 
crimes,” the prosecutor interjected, “Since when is grand theft [of Ardell’s coins] a 
victimless crime?”  
 
Defendant asserts that these comments disclose a pattern of prosecutorial 
“intemperate behavior” that deprived him of due process of law and a fair trial under the 
                                             
 
27  
The prosecutor also observed that “[e]rotica from people in jail is not unusual and 
you certainly can’t use anything like that as somehow suggesting that [defendant] is more 
likely guilty than not because he writes something like that and it’s not offered for that.” 
73 
federal Constitution (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819 (Hill)) or that, under state 
law, amounted to the “ ‘ “ ‘ “use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to 
persuade either the court or the jury.” ’ ” ’ ”  (Ibid.; People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th 
795, 841.)  Defendant asserts that the prosecutor’s comments invited the jury to conclude 
that he was a “bad person,” a racial bigot, and a “manipulator” of women and the legal 
system, and “therefore likely to have committed multiple murder.”  Defendant asserts that 
these comments violated accepted professional standards governing the conduct of 
prosecuting attorneys, and thus require reversal.   
 
As defendant concedes, he failed to object to the challenged comments or to 
request curative admonitions, and we repeatedly have held that such failure bars 
presentation of a misconduct claim on appeal.  (People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 34 
(Green).)  Contrary to defendant’s view, we believe that a timely admonition, if 
appropriate, would have cured any perceived harm, and that a request for an admonition 
would not have been futile.  But in any event, as a general matter the prosecutor’s 
statements were within acceptable bounds.  (Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th 800, 819.)  Defendant 
was shown by the evidence to be a manipulator (who in large part blamed society for his 
failings), and it was clear as well that, at least at times, he was indeed quite hateful — an 
attribute that, under the circumstances, was highly relevant to defendant’s motive and 
intent to kill.  The challenged comments, viewed singly or cumulatively, did not amount 
to a miscarriage of justice.  (Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 34.)   
J.  Evidence of a contract or plan to “kill” 
Terry Guillory 
 
The prosecution presented substantial evidence to establish that defendant plotted 
to prevent Terry Guillory from testifying.  That evidence consisted of (i) the testimony of 
Jacqueline Coghlan, who explained how defendant had arranged for her to deliver $1,000 
to Solvang, and that this money was designed to ensure that the person whom she knew 
as “the Oreo”  (Guillory) would not testify concerning his having seen defendant at the 
74 
Pillow home on the night of the killings; (ii) the testimony of Inspector Sjostrand, who 
described the tape-recorded telephone call made to Solvang from “Richard,” in which the 
caller asked Solvang, “Anything ever work out?”; and (iii) defendant’s letter to Donna 
Guthrie, mentioning that “the cookie” (Guillory) was “practically begging them to let him 
help try to hang me” but that Donna should “[r]emind me when I talk to you to explain to 
you how one little mess can be cleaned.”   
 
Although Coghlan stressed that the money was designed to “persuade” Guillory 
not to testify, or to “prevent” his testimony, she also asserted there was no plan to have 
Guillory killed.  Nor was there any other evidence admitted to establish that the purpose 
of defendant’s plot was to kill Guillory, rather than merely silence him by other means in 
order to ensure that he did not testify he had seen defendant peek out from the Pillow 
home on the evening of the killings.   
 
Nevertheless, during the course of Guillory’s testimony, a number of references 
were made, by the witness and by the prosecutor, to a contract or plan to “hit” (that is, 
kill) Guillory.   
 
1.  References to a contract or plan to kill Terry Guillory 
 
The first such reference occurred during defense counsel’s cross-examination of 
Guillory when, in response to a question by counsel, Guillory explained that he had been 
“pissed at them [the prosecution team] because they didn’t tell me [earlier] that Richard” 
(defendant), had, from jail, “put a contract on my head.”  Subsequently, during the 
prosecution’s redirect examination of Guillory, the following exchange occurred:   
“[PROSECUTOR]:  I think [it is] apparent to everybody in here you’re not very 
happy this morning; are you? 
“A.  No, I hadn’t had much sleep. 
“Q.  And you weren’t real happy at the time you testified at the preliminary 
hearing, were you, either?  Were you? 
75 
“A.  No, I wasn’t. 
“Q.  And during the time you were testifying at the preliminary hearing we, 
meaning myself and Mr. Sjostrand, disclosed something to you for the first time; 
didn’t we? 
“A.  Yes, you did. 
“Q.  And what did we disclose to you? 
“A.  That there was a contract out on my head. 
“Q.  Put out by who? 
“A.  By Richard from the jail. 
“Q.  And did we explain to you who was involved in the putting out of that 
contract? 
“A.  I believe you did. 
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, the jury should be admonished . . . that 
the questions are not evidence because we haven’t, you know, it’s a question of 
misleading the jury as to whether or not these facts are true or not. 
“THE WITNESS:  They’re true. 
“THE COURT:  Counsel, instructions already [have] been given.  Certainly if you 
wish a more focused instruction at a later point I’ll entertain it. 
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Thank you. 
“[PROSECUTOR]:  Was the name Maurice Solvang brought up at that time? 
“A.  Yes, it was. 
“Q.  Were you informed by myself and Mr. Sjostrand that we had information that 
[defendant] had paid over a thousand dollars using his then girlfriend Jacqueline 
Coghlan for the purpose of making sure you didn’t testify at the preliminary 
hearing? 
“A.  Yes. 
“Q.  And how did that make you feel? 
76 
“A.  Very angry. 
“Q.  And who were you angry with? 
“A.  Everybody. 
“Q.  In fact you had a few choice words to say to me and Mr. Sjostrand; did you 
not? 
“A.  I sure did. 
“Q.  You felt that we didn’t tell you soon enough; is that right? 
“A.  Yep.” 
 
A short while later, while Guillory continued to testify, defendant’s plot to keep 
Guillory from testifying was described to the jury again as not merely a plan to keep 
Guillory off the witness stand, but also a scheme to kill him.  The following exchange 
occurred:   
 
“[PROSECUTOR]:  Now, did you also describe for Mr. Sjostrand what your 
understanding had been in talking to a woman by the name of Pam who lived with 
Donna —  
“A.  Pat. 
“Q. — at the time you were testifying at the preliminary hearing? 
“A.  Pat. 
“Q.  Pat, okay.  And did you indicate to Mr. Sjostrand that it had been your 
understanding based upon your conversation with Pat that —  
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  This is hearsay unless it’s for state of mind, whatever. 
“[PROSECUTOR]:  Goes to the state of mind of this witness and can be limited to 
that. 
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Okay. 
“THE WITNESS:  When you guys came around Pat used the name of Donna.  
That’s why Mr. Sjostrand didn’t remember her name. 
77 
“[PROSECUTOR]:  And what did Pat indicate to you about what your 
understanding was with respect to what was supposed to happen to you before you 
testified at the preliminary hearing? 
“A.  Um, rephrase that for me again please or say it again.  What did Pat tell me? 
“Q.  Yes. 
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Hearsay. 
“THE WITNESS:  Well, Pat told me — . . . .  
“[PROSECUTOR]:  State of mind of the witness. 
“THE COURT:  Overruled. 
“THE WITNESS:  Pat told me that, uh, I was supposed to get hit.  She asked me 
not to take Donna’s daughter to Sacramento because I was supposed to be 
swimming in the river.  Be set to be — I was being set up to go swimming in the 
river. 
“[PROSECUTOR]:  And by swimming in the river that meant what? 
“A.  Sacramento. 
“Q.  Swimming or floating? 
“A.  Floating.  Nobody brought up Pat’s name.  She asked everybody to keep her 
out of it.  Or she was staying with Donna for awhile and didn’t want to talk about 
much but more — well, she didn’t want to say everything she knew because she 
didn’t want to get involved.   
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  This is all hearsay.  This is beyond. 
“THE COURT:  The last volunteered answer will go out.  Next question, Mr. 
[prosecutor]. 
“[PROSECUTOR]:  Mr. Guillory, did you ask to be a witness in this case?   
“A.  No, I did not. 
“Q.  Before the 4th of July 1989, was there any reason for you to provide some 
kind of damaging information against [defendant]?   
78 
“A.  No. 
“Q.  Did you have any prior animosity towards him or any reason to do him 
wrong? 
“A.  No.  Before he got out of jail I had never knew him.  I really don’t know him 
now, I didn’t know him then.   
“A.  But before you talked to Officer Socorro Moreno on the 4th of July, was there 
anything about anything that you did know about [defendant] that would cause 
you to make any of this up —  
“A.  No. 
“Q.  — to make him look bad in some way? 
“A.  No. 
“Q.  How about the same thing with Donna Guthrie.  Did you have any bad blood 
between you and Donna or her daughter to cause you to —  
“A.  No. 
“Q.  — to do her or friends of hers wrong? 
“A.  No. 
“Q.  And the first time that you learned that [defendant] had put a contract out on 
your life was just before you testified at the preliminary hearing, is that right?   
“A.  Yes. 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Thank you.  Nothing further. 
“THE WITNESS:  Well, actually it was just after I testified, started to testify, and 
they called a recess.   
“[PROSECUTOR]:  Okay.  You were in the middle of your testimony at the 
preliminary hearing in fact?   
“A.  Before I found out. 
“Q.  Then you were brought back to the District Attorney’s Office and did Mr. 
Sjostrand indicate to you that that information was communicated to you based 
79 
upon a conversation that he had had with Jacqueline Coghlan the night before?  
The night before the preliminary hearing?   
“A.  That’s right 
“Q.  So it was told to you at that time a member of the District Attorney’s Office 
learned — you learned about this information to eliminate you the night you were 
to testify? 
“A.  Yes, sir. 
“Q.  And you — you were told the next day? 
“A.  That’s right. 
“Q.  And didn’t make you very happy; did it? 
“A.  Didn’t make me very happy with anybody. 
“Q.  And I take it those sentiments you carry with you today as well?  Yes? 
“A.  Yes. 
“[PROSECUTOR]:  Nothing further. 
“THE WITNESS:  That and the fact I’m still being threatened.” 
 
Thereafter, on recross-examination, by posing questions to Guillory, defense 
counsel probed the details of what Guillory had heard about the plot to kill him, asking 
whether Donna Guthrie, or her daughter Cindy, or another person was supposed to have 
performed the “contract” to “kill” him.  In this regard, defense counsel read from a report 
authored by Inspector Sjostrand, to the effect that “part of the set up to kill him [Guillory] 
was to have Cindy, Donna’s daughter, tell him she had missed her bus in Richmond and 
needed a ride to Sacramento.  She was to ask him to take her to Sacramento and he was 
supposed to go end up dead floating in the river somewhere along the way.”  Defense 
counsel asked Guillory whether he had provided this information to Sjostrand, to which 
Guillory responded:  “Not in so many words.”  
80 
 
2.  Claims of misconduct and trial court error 
 
Defendant asserts the prosecution committed misconduct by “manufacturing” 
evidence — namely, telling Guillory that he had been the subject of a contract to kill, and 
then having Guillory parrot back that same assertion from the witness stand.  As the 
People observe, defendant did not raise this claim of prosecutorial misconduct below 
(and accordingly the prosecution had no incentive to make a record on this point), and 
hence the claim has not properly been preserved for appeal.  (Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 
34.)  But in any event, we find no indication in the record that the prosecution 
manufactured this evidence.  Based upon the combination of the testimony of Jacqueline 
Coghlan (concerning the transfer of $1,000 from defendant to Solvang), the testimony of 
Inspector Sjostrand (concerning the intercepted December 5, 1989, telephone call from 
“Richard” to Solvang), and defendant’s reference in his letter to Donna Guthrie to “the 
cookie” and “how one little mess can be cleaned,” the existence of a contract to kill 
Guillory was a potential inference that reasonably could be drawn from the evidence.  
And, based upon Guillory’s description of what he had been told by Pat, it appears that 
Guillory could well have reached, on his own, the conclusion that there was a plot to kill 
him.  We conclude that the record does not establish that the prosecution “manufactured” 
evidence of a contract or plan to kill Guillory.   
 
Defendant also asserts that the prosecution, by asking Guillory questions that led 
to the testimony concerning the statements by Pat relating to the alleged plan to leave 
Guillory floating in the Sacramento River, committed misconduct by assuming a critical 
fact not in evidence — namely, the existence of a plan or contract to kill Guillory.  
Again, defendant did not raise this claim of prosecutorial misconduct below, and hence 
the claim has not properly been preserved for appeal.  (Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 34.)  
Moreover, as noted above, the initial reference before the jury to a plan to terminate 
Guillory’s life was made by Guillory in response to a question not from the prosecution, 
but from defense counsel on cross-examination — and, at that point, defense counsel 
81 
voiced no objection to Guillory’s statement and did not move to strike the response.  In 
addition, as noted above, given the testimony of Jacqueline Coghlan and Inspector 
Sjostrand, the existence of a contract to kill Guillory was at least a logical inference that 
reasonably could be drawn from the evidence.  This inference also was consistent with 
what Guillory testified he had heard elsewhere (apparently prior to the preliminary 
examination on December 6, 1989) from Pat.  On this record, we cannot conclude that 
the prosecution committed misconduct in its follow-up questions by assuming facts not in 
evidence.   
 
Defendant further argues that the prosecution should not have elicited, and the trial 
court should not have admitted, Guillory’s testimony about what Pat earlier had told him, 
namely that Guillory was supposed to “get hit” and should not travel to Sacramento 
because he was being “set up” and might end up “floating” in the river.  Although 
defendant asserts this testimony was inadmissible hearsay, as noted above the trial court 
admitted the testimony under an exception to the hearsay rule, as relevant to establish the 
“state of mind” of the witness, Terry Guillory.   
 
As suggested above, Guillory was (at least initially) a reluctant witness.  
Moreover, throughout his entire testimony Guillory was shown frequently to be angry, 
rude, and coarse.  On cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to show that Guillory 
was manipulative and untrustworthy.  Accordingly, on redirect examination, the 
prosecution attempted to demonstrate that Guillory’s demeanor was based in part upon 
his belief that he had been the subject of a death contract instigated by defendant (and 
that he still feared retaliation by defendant)28 and also was based in part on the 
                                             
 
28  
In this sense, the People assert, Guillory’s state of mind was relevant — in part 
because, as has been observed, “[a] witness who testifies despite fear of recrimination of 
any kind by anyone is more credible because of his or her personal stake in the 
testimony.”  (People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1368.)  The court in Olguin 
went on to observe:  “Just as the fact a witness expects to receive something in exchange 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
82 
circumstance that Guillory was angry at the prosecution for failing to inform him earlier 
of the potential threat to his safety.  In other words, the People attempted to show that 
Guillory was angry with both parties, and hence the jury should not view Guillory’s 
demeanor as simply reflecting a bias against or animosity toward defendant.   
 
Defendant asserts this testimony should have been excluded under Evidence Code 
section 352 as more prejudicial than probative.  But he made no such objection at trial, 
and hence that issue is waived.  (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).)  In any event, on this 
record, for the reasons alluded to above, we conclude that the jury properly was made 
aware of what Guillory had been told by Pat.   
 
Defendant insists that the trial court erred by failing to give the jury a 
contemporaneous (or indeed any) limiting instruction, which would have advised that 
references in Guillory’s testimony and counsel’s questions to a contract or plan to kill 
Guillory and to Pat’s statements were to be used only to illuminate Guillory’s state of 
mind and not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, that is, to prove that defendant 
actually had instigated a plan to kill Guillory in Sacramento.   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
for testimony may be considered in evaluating his or her credibility (Calvert v. State Bar 
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 765, 777), the fact a witness is testifying despite fear of recrimination is 
important to fully evaluating his or her credibility.  For this purpose, it matters not the 
source of the threat.  It could come from a friend of the defendant, or it could come from 
a stranger who merely approves of the defendant’s conduct or disapproves of the victim.  
It could come from a person who perceives a social or political agenda to have been 
advanced by the defendant’s actions.  It could come from a member of the witness’s 
profession, religion, or subculture, who disapproves of the witness’s involvement for 
some reason.  It could come from a zealot of any stripe, large groups of whom seem 
ready to rally to virtually any cause these days.  [¶]  Regardless of its source, the jury 
would be entitled to evaluate the witness’s testimony knowing it was given under such 
circumstances.  And they would be entitled to know not just that the witness was afraid, 
but also, within the limits of Evidence Code section 352, those facts which would enable 
them to evaluate the witness’s fear.”  (Id., at pp. 1368-1369.)   
83 
 
When defense counsel first objected on redirect examination to Guillory’s 
references to the contract or plan to kill him, counsel asked that the jury be admonished 
that “questions are not evidence” and complained, “it’s a question of misleading the jury 
as to whether or not these facts are true or not.”  The trial court observed that it had given 
instructions on that subject prior to presentation of the evidence29 (and indeed such 
instructions were given again after the close of the case)30 and that if defendant wanted 
“a more focused instruction at a later point I’ll entertain it.”  Trial counsel, however, 
never reasserted the issue of a “more focused instruction” and did not press then, or later 
during Guillory’s testimony concerning Pat’s statements to him, for a contemporaneous 
limiting instruction.   
 
Defendant asserts that in light of the limited use for which Guillory’s testimony 
concerning a plot to kill him (rather than merely prevent his testimony by other means) 
was admitted into evidence, and because the claimed plot to kill Guillory assertedly 
“became such a dominant part of the prosecution’s evidence of guilt,” the trial court erred 
by refusing to provide an immediate limiting instruction upon request and also bore a sua 
sponte duty to instruct the jury subsequently concerning the limited admissibility of that 
evidence.  Viewing the record as a whole, we disagree with defendant’s premise that the 
claimed plot to kill Guillory became a dominant part of the prosecution’s evidence of 
guilt.  The challenged aspect of Guillory’s testimony was only briefly and obliquely 
                                             
 
29  
Prior to the opening statements of the parties and the introduction of evidence, the 
trial court instructed the jurors that statements of the attorneys are not evidence and that a 
question, in and of itself, is not evidence and should be considered only to the extent it 
supplies meaning to the answer given.  
30  
During closing instructions the jury was informed (pursuant to CALJIC No. 1.02) 
that statements of the attorneys are not evidence, and that the jurors should not assume to 
be true any insinuations suggested by a question asked of a witness, that a question is not 
evidence, and that a question may be considered only as it enables jurors to understand 
the answer. 
84 
referred to during the prosecutor’s closing argument to the jury, and was not mentioned at 
all in the prosecution’s rebuttal argument.31  Under these circumstances, we believe it is 
clear the trial court did not err by failing on its own motion to give the additional limiting 
instructions to which defendant now asserts he was entitled.   
 
In any event, if we were to assume that the trial court erred in this regard, any such 
error would have been harmless.  The truly dominant aspect of the prosecution’s 
evidence of guilt did not focus upon the brief references to an alleged plot to prevent 
Guillory’s testimony and also kill him.  Instead, as recounted ante, part II.C, the 
prosecution’s case focused upon the strong evidence of defendant’s guilt of the three 
killings with which he was charged.  In view of all of this evidence, it is not reasonably 
probable that Guillory’s various statements of his belief that he was the subject of a plot 
                                             
 
31  
At closing argument, the prosecutor commented:  “Murray Lucas — I forgot about 
Murray Lucas — but [defendant] certainly didn’t — Murray Lucas was a loose end.  
Murray Lucas was a witness.  There was no animosity.  There was no heart.  There was 
no revenge with Murray Lucas.  Murray Lucas was just there.  He was the evidence of 
the crime that had just been committed, and he had to be eliminated.  And that’s exactly 
what happened to Murray Lucas; nothing more, nothing less.  And exactly that.  The 
most cold-blooded kind of killing that you could imagine is the killing of a witness to 
prevent them from saying what they saw.  [¶]  Kind of brings Terry Guillory to mind too; 
doesn’t it?” 
 
Although the prosecution made no further reference to any plot to kill Guillory, 
defense counsel referred to a “hit” and a “hit man” during closing argument:  “You know, 
[the prosecutor] wasn’t a witness to this case.  I wasn’t a witness to this case. . . .  And he 
talks about a hit — a hit man.  He calls Officer Sjostrand to establish the hit, and he read 
you the tape this morning.  This is Officer Sjostrand on the stand.  We didn’t hear the 
tape; did we?  It’s reviewed over in police headquarters.”  Defense counsel then quoted 
from the tape-recorded conversation, and asked:  “What’s that?  Is that evidence of a 
contract?  That’s pretty convincing evidence, you know, where the evidence of this 
contract came.  Officer Sjostrand told Terry Guillory there was evidence of a contract, 
then they introduced this taped statement through Officer Sjostrand — not the taped 
statement but his testimony.  [¶]  Then Terry Guillory says:  ‘I was told by Officer 
Sjostrand there was a contract.’  [¶]  Therefore there’s a contract[?]”  Defense counsel 
proceeded to question whether any contract existed.  
85 
by defendant to kill him affected the result in this case.  (People v. Watson, supra, 46 
Cal.2d 818, 836.)   
 
3.  Asserted ineffective assistance of defense counsel 
 
Defendant asserts trial counsel performed deficiently by (i) failing to object earlier 
than he did to references to a contract or plan to kill Guillory; (ii) failing to challenge the 
admissibility of Pat’s statement to establish Guillory’s state of mind; (iii) failing to object 
to the reference to Pat’s statement to Guillory as being unduly prejudicial under Evidence 
Code section 352; (iv) eliciting, on recross-examination, additional details concerning the 
asserted plan to kill Guillory; and (v) failing to object to instructions concerning “other 
crimes” evidence and to request additional limiting instructions concerning other crimes. 
 
As to most if not all of these five areas, it is questionable whether defendant can 
establish deficient performance under an objective standard of professional 
reasonableness.  (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 687-691; Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d 
171, 216-217.)  First, as noted above, when the appellate record does not preclude a 
satisfactory explanation for counsel’s actions, we will not find that trial counsel acted 
deficiently.  (See People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th 264, 266; Pope, supra, 23 
Cal.3d 412, 425-426.)  But we need not dwell on the question whether defendant can 
establish deficient performance by his trial counsel, because in any event, for the reasons 
set out above, defendant has not established prejudice, that is, a reasonable probability of 
a more favorable outcome in the absence of the assertedly deficient performance.  
(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 691-696; Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 217-218.)  
On the record before us, any assumed failings by defense counsel in this regard would be 
insufficient to undermine confidence in the judgment of guilt or the special circumstance 
finding.   
86 
K.  Sufficiency of evidence to prove premeditation and deliberation 
in the killing of Murray Lucas 
 
Defendant asserts that although the record supports findings of premeditation and 
deliberation with respect to the killings of defendant’s mother and Ardell, it does not 
reflect sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation with respect to the killing of 
Murray Lucas, the boarder who resided with them.   
 
The test on appeal is whether a rational juror could, on the evidence presented, 
find the essential elements of the crime  — here including premeditation and 
deliberation — beyond a reasonable doubt.  (People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 31-
32, and cases cited.)  We conclude that evidence of (i) the manner of killing, and (ii) the 
planning activity, both support the jury’s finding of premeditation and deliberation in the 
killing of Murray Lucas.  (See id., at pp. 32-33; People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 
26-27.)  The killing was accomplished by a single execution-style shot fired from close 
range into the victim’s forehead, in circumstances showing no evidence of a struggle.  
This plainly supports a finding of premeditation and deliberation.  Moreover, it is clear 
that defendant carefully planned the killing of his parents, and that avoidance of detection 
was a major aspect of his planning.  The evidence shows that after test-firing his .22-
caliber gun, defendant proceeded to his mother’s home late at night and employed that 
same weapon at a time when the firing of shots might be disguised by the ambient sound 
of firecrackers set off during early Fourth of July celebrations.  Defendant attempted to 
conceal the cause of death of his victims by carefully disposing of the ejected cartridges 
and attempting to set fire to the house.  In this setting, the jury reasonably could have 
concluded that defendant’s killing of the boarder, Murray Lucas, was part of defendant’s 
overall plan to avoid detection.  That defendant may have formulated this particular 
aspect of his plan (the killing of Murray) at the scene, and perhaps quickly, does not 
preclude a finding of premeditation.  As we observed in Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th 1, 34, 
“ ‘ “The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of reflection.  
87 
Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may 
be arrived at quickly . . . .” ’ ”  Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim of insufficiency 
of evidence.   
L.  Challenges to the admission of other testimony given 
by Terry Guillory and Gary Beach 
 
Defendant asserts that the admission of various portions of the testimony of Terry 
Guillory and Gary Beach, elicited by the prosecutor on redirect examination, was 
improper and violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the 
federal Constitution and article I, section 15, of the California Constitution.   
 
Defendant focuses upon Guillory’s testimony that he spoke with Donna Guthrie 
on the morning after the killings and asked whether she wished him to send the police to 
remove defendant from her house.  Guillory recounted that Donna replied that “she’d get 
him out of the house herself” and “[a]way from her mom.”  Defendant asserts that this 
testimony improperly implied that Donna was afraid for her safety during the time she 
was with defendant shortly after the killings, and believed him guilty.  In addition, 
defendant repeats the substance of the claim discussed above concerning Guillory’s 
testimony about information he obtained from Pat.   
 
For the reasons set out ante, part II.J.3, we determine that the admission of Pat’s 
statements to Guillory was not error, and even if it had been error, would not have been 
prejudicial.  We reach the same determinations concerning Guillory’s brief testimony 
from which defendant asserts the jury might have inferred that Donna was afraid of 
defendant following the killings and believed him guilty.  The People assert that defense 
counsel opened the door to such questioning through cross-examination, during which 
Guillory testified he wanted to “warn Donna, so she could get the maniac away from her 
mom.”  Relying upon Dutton v. Evans (1970) 400 U.S. 74, 88 (opn. by Stewart, J.), the 
88 
People assert that no error occurs when a witness’s testimony is used merely to prove that 
a statement was made.32  Although it is questionable whether the admission of the 
challenged statements was error, we conclude that in any event such error would have 
been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the strong and wholly independent 
evidence demonstrating that defendant was in fact guilty of the crimes charged.   
 
We reach the same conclusions with respect to defendant’s claims concerning the 
testimony of defendant’s cousin, Gary Beach.  Upon examination, Beach stated that (i) he 
was told by Rory Pillow that defendant claimed that when he test-fired his gun in the 
backyard of the Harbor Way house, he was using blanks; and that (ii) defendant had 
made numerous attempts to complete collect telephone calls to Beach’s home prior to the 
preliminary hearing.  Defendant claims that in both respects the testimony was 
inadmissible hearsay, and that in the latter respect the testimony improperly implied that 
members of defendant’s own family had refused his collect telephone calls because they 
believed him guilty of the charged crimes.   
 
As the People observe, Gary Beach’s statement that Rory Pillow had told him that 
defendant had stated he had fired blanks was not offered for its truth — and indeed was 
contrary to the prosecution’s theory that defendant had test-fired a live round into the 
garage door at the Harbor Way home.  The statement appears to have been introduced to 
show defendant’s consciousness of guilt.  In any event, even assuming an evidentiary 
violation, any error was harmless.  This minor evidence of defendant’s consciousness of 
guilt certainly would have been overshadowed in any reasonable juror’s mind by the 
                                             
 
32  
The plurality opinion in Dutton v. Evans observed that “[t]he hearsay rule does not 
prevent a witness from testifying to what he has heard . . . .  From the viewpoint of the 
Confrontation Clause, a witness under oath, subject to cross-examination, and whose 
demeanor can be observed by the trier of fact, is a reliable informant not only as to what 
he has seen but also as to what he has heard.”  (Dutton v. Evans, supra, 400 U.S. 74, 88.)   
89 
additional ample evidence of defendant’s consciousness of guilt — especially his plot to 
keep Terry Guillory from testifying, and the properly admitted testimony of Gary Beach, 
recounting defendant’s attempt to persuade Beach to testify falsely that defendant had 
test-fired a .25- or .32-caliber gun rather than the .22-caliber weapon actually used.  That, 
and the other properly admitted evidence demonstrating defendant’s guilt, rendered 
admission of the challenged testimony, assuming it was erroneous, harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.   
 
As defendant notes, Beach also testified that defendant, while awaiting the 
preliminary hearing in this case, attempted to make “dozens” of collect phone calls to 
him from the jail, and that all but one of these attempted calls were refused by Beach or 
other members of his household.  Even assuming that defendant’s hearsay objection to at 
least some of this testimony should have been sustained, in light of the record in this case 
any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  As the People correctly observe, far 
more probative and damaging was the properly admitted evidence that on the one 
occasion when Beach did accept defendant’s collect telephone call, defendant attempted 
to persuade Beach to perjure himself by testifying that the gun that defendant had test-
fired was a .25-  or .32-caliber weapon, and not a .22-caliber weapon (the type of firearm 
used in the killings).  This evidence, together with the other properly admitted evidence 
admitted at trial (showing defendant’s motive, presence at the crime scene, and 
consciousness of guilt), strongly demonstrated defendant’s guilt of the charged offenses.   
M.  Asserted prosecutorial misconduct 
at the guilt phase of the trial 
 
Defendant asserts that in 11 respects — some of which have been alluded to 
earlier — the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct at the guilt phase of the trial.  
As explained below, most of these subclaims have been forfeited by trial counsel’s 
failure to object below; in any event, we find little if any evidence of misconduct, and no 
reversible misconduct.   
90 
 
1.  Expression of personal belief in defendant’s guilt 
 
Defendant observes that at one point during closing argument, the prosecutor 
commented:  “That’s the only reason we brought [these charges], is because they’re 
true.”  Defendant asserts that this “declaration of personal opinion” amounted to 
“flagrant” misconduct and a violation of professional norms.  (See, e.g., United States v. 
Young (1984) 470 U.S. 1, 7-8; People v. Kirkes (1952) 39 Cal.2d 719, 726-727.)   
 
As the People observe, because the statement was not objected to below, and 
because a timely admonition would have cured any harm, this claim may not be asserted 
on appeal.  (Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 34.)  Moreover, we perceive no misconduct.  
What defendant fails to acknowledge, in this instance and many others discussed below, 
is the context in which the challenged phrase was uttered.  The prosecutor’s argument 
proceeded as follows:  “There’s absolutely a lot of detail in this case.  There’s quite a bit 
of evidence.  I tried to, fairly and accurately, represent to you what I think the evidence in 
this case has shown.  But what I fully expect, as I indicated at the outset, to put the 
People to your test.  You test these charges.  We need you to do that.  We have no 
expectation that you’re going to return a verdict of ‘guilty,’ unless you’re convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty that [defendant], in fact, on July 
[Fourth], 1989 — that he killed these three people.  That’s the only reason we brought 
them, is because they’re true.  And the evidence has demonstrated that beyond any 
reasonable doubt.  [¶]  But I have never asked you to take my word for it.  You take a 
look at the evidence in this case, ladies and gentlemen.  And there is but one reasonable 
interpretation.  We didn’t hear another reasonable interpretation.  It was conspicuous in 
its absence; wasn’t it?  But the fact it wasn’t mentioned, doesn’t mean our burden is over.  
You put the People to test.  You do that after deliberating with the other eleven members 
of the panel.  And once you do that, there is but one reasonable interpretation of all of 
this evidence:  [Defendant] is guilty as charged.”  (Italics added.) 
91 
 
In context, it is clear that the prosecutor’s message was that the jury should 
examine the evidence and conclude for itself whether defendant was or was not guilty — 
and the prosecutor urged that the evidence was reasonably susceptible of only a 
determination of guilt.  We discern no misconduct.  But even assuming misconduct, there 
would have been no prejudice.  The trial court repeatedly instructed the jury that the 
arguments of counsel were not evidence and that the jury was required to decide the case 
based upon the evidence adduced at trial.  In light of the evidence and the instructions 
under which the jury was directed to deliberate, the prosecutor’s brief remark, 
accompanied as it was by proper comments concerning the evidence and the jury’s role 
as fact finder, resulted in “no miscarriage of justice within the meaning of the 
Constitution.”  (Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 34.)   
 
 
2.  Asserted repeated vouching for the credibility of prosecution witnesses   
 
Defendant highlights seven transcript passages in which, he asserts, the prosecutor 
vouched for the credibility of his witnesses.  As we held in People v. Frye (1998) 18 
Cal.4th 894 (Frye), “[a] prosecutor is prohibited from vouching for the credibility of 
witnesses or otherwise bolstering the veracity of their testimony by referring to evidence 
outside the record.  [Citations.]  Nor is a prosecutor permitted to place the prestige of [his 
or] her office behind a witness by offering the impression that [he or] she has taken steps 
to assure a witness’s truthfulness at trial.  [Citation.]  However, so long as a prosecutor’s 
assurances regarding the apparent honesty or reliability of prosecution witnesses are 
based on the ‘facts of [the] record and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, 
rather than any purported personal knowledge or belief,’ [the prosecutor’s] comments 
cannot be characterized as improper vouching.”  (Id., at p. 971, italics added.)   
 
Defendant cites as misconduct (improper vouching) the following italicized 
passages of the prosecutor’s comments to the jury:   
92 
 
First, during opening statements, the prosecutor commented:  “You may hear 
vernacular, you may hear profanity — we’re going to tell you the way it is, we’re not 
going to sugarcoat things — the witnesses from whom you’re going to hear do not look 
like you folks look — you all, every single one of you, are cleanly, nicely dressed, with 
varying degrees of attire from casual to formal.  The witnesses in this case are not going 
to be like that, but they’re going to tell you what happened, and they’re going to tell you 
truthfully.  And there may be some ‘motherfuckers’ and ‘bullshits’ mixed in there 
someplace, but that’s what this case — that’s part of what this case is.  And so, 
understand that that’s part of the truth of this — these lives — and that’s what we’re 
going to try to bring to you during the course of this trial.”  (Italics added.) 
 
Second, concerning the testimony of Shane Powell, Mary Perron, and Terry 
Guillory, the prosecutor commented during closing argument at the guilt phase of the 
trial:  “So you can see when you’re talking honesty, you have to go deeper than 
appearance.  Because I tell you right now — and I submit to you — true honesty doesn’t 
come from the mind, it comes from the heart.  And you heard from some people who 
may not be the most educated of people, but when it came to the things that they told you 
about, the things they related to police officers within 12 hours of the time they 
happened, they were just trying to tell it the way they knew.  They had no axe to grind; 
they had no motive; they had no bias against one person or the other.  [¶]  They had these 
perceptions that became relevant when three bodies were found, and they made those 
perceptions known to the police very soon after these events occurred.  And that’s the 
very probity of the reliability of those statements they made.”  (Italics added.) 
 
Third, in discussing Terry Guillory’s testimony during closing argument at the 
guilt phase of the trial, the prosecutor commented:  “You have to get over Terry Guillory 
calling defense counsel a ‘prick’ and talking about having to ‘pee’ just before he 
concluded his testimony, and that’s a little uncomfortable to listen to; isn’t it?  And you 
may have a few bad things to think about Terry Guillory because he’s got a demeanor in 
93 
the Superior Court that we would think would be unbecoming a witness.  I’ve got some 
news for you; in point of fact, maybe for one reason — because what he was doing.  
Terry Guillory was probably the most honest witness you heard.  He told it like it was.  
He hasn’t the social mores that most of us would have.  He was saying the things that a 
lot of other witnesses, like Mary Perron and Shane Powell, were saying — thinking — 
when they went under examination.  So you have to go through those hurdles.  But 
remember — consider the content.”  (Italics added.) 
 
Fourth, again discussing the testimony of Shane Powell, Mary Perron, and Terry 
Guillory, the prosecutor commented:  “The witnesses from whom you heard — the 
citizen witnesses — may not have been pretty, but there was a lot of truth there.  There 
was a lot of honesty there.  There was a lot of people who were just doing what they had 
to do because the circumstances demanded it of them.  And I would hope — and I would 
think — that when you analyze and you go through all of this evidence, that truth will 
become starkly clear in your mind, because that’s what this case is all about.  It is the 
clarity of the minds of the people who made the observations when they did, and who 
related those observations within 12 hours of the time that they made them, when they 
had absolutely no motive to do anything other than tell the truth, when their observations 
were as clear in their mind as they possibly could be, and when they related, time and 
time and time again, under the rigors of a heated cross-examination, as well as direct 
examination, the same thing — essentially, it was the same thing.  Their stories didn’t 
change, because they were remembering something that happened.”  (Italics added.) 
 
Fifth, again discussing the testimony of Terry Guillory, the prosecutor focused the 
jury’s recollection upon the evidence in the case — the demeanor and expressions of 
Guillory when he testified:  “[I]t’s that demeanor thing that’s very difficult to focus in on.  
But I don’t know if you remember the look of Rory Pillow when he was listening to the 
question he was asked.  I submit his thoughts were not dissimilar from the expressions 
made by Terry Guillory.  He just had a little more maturity and was able to reserve 
94 
himself.  Remember that when you think about the testimony of Terry Guillory that 
the — what he said was not dishonest.  It was unpleasant.”  (Italics added.) 
 
Sixth, after explaining the manner in which Shane Powell’s testimony — 
including the circumstance that he heard five gunshots, and heard the scream, “no 
Richard no!” — was consistent with both the physical evidence and with Mary Perron’s 
testimony, and with Powell’s earlier statements to the police on the Fourth of July and at 
the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor commented:  “Shane Powell is a credible witness.  
Shane Powell is credible on the [Fourth] of July, Shane Powell was credible at the time 
of the preliminary hearing, Shane Powell was credible here.”  (Italics added.) 
 
Finally, once again discussing the testimony of Shane Powell, the prosecutor 
commented:  “And the most compelling statement of all, you heard me say it a couple 
times, I can’t, I’m sure, even come close to approximating the shrill and the voice, the 
fear and despair.  I don’t know.  I — I think there’s no way really to know other than to 
have experienced that which is, one, another reason by the way you ought to know what 
Shane Powell tells you is true.  I would venture to say [‘]no Richard no[’] is forever 
engrained in the recesses of Shane Powell’s mind and he’ll never be able to forget it.  
He’ll be able to testify ten years from now as he did here in this trial in the middle of the 
[week].  That’s how momentous it was.”  (Italics added.) 
 
Defendant failed to object at trial to any of these comments.  Because timely 
admonitions would have cured any harm, the claims of misconduct may not now be 
asserted on appeal.  (Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 34.)  Moreover, we perceive no 
misconduct.  As a general matter, the challenged statements by the prosecutor, when 
viewed in the context of the prosecutor’s preceding and subsequent remarks, constitute 
permissible comment on the state of the evidence — in other words, conclusions that the 
prosecutor was drawing from the evidence and from reasonable inferences based on the 
evidence.  Defendant has failed to “show a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or 
applied the complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous manner.”  (Frye, supra, 
95 
18 Cal.4th at p. 970.)  In any event, there was no prejudice.  As noted previously, the trial 
court repeatedly instructed the jury that the arguments of counsel were not evidence and 
that the jury was required to decide the case based upon the evidence adduced at trial.  In 
light of the evidence and the instructions to the jury, the prosecutor’s brief remarks could 
not have resulted in a “miscarriage of justice within the meaning of the Constitution.”  
(Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 34.)   
 
 
3.  Asserted “constant disparagement” of defense counsel and defendant   
 
Defendant asserts that on numerous occasions throughout the trial the 
prosecutor — by his language, facial expressions, tone of voice, and accusatory speaking 
objections — disparaged the character and integrity of defendant and defense counsel in 
front of the jury.  For example, defendant cites (i) defense counsel’s closing argument to 
the jury, in which counsel told the jury that the prosecutor had glared and pointed at his 
client during trial; (ii) the prosecutor’s comment, “Don’t direct your questions to me, 
Counselor,” in response to defense counsel’s question during the cross-examination of 
Shane Powell; (iii) the prosecutor’s assertion that defense counsel’s questions of Powell 
were “obviously calculated to prejudice this jury”; (iv) the prosecutor’s assertedly 
sarcastic tone, as exemplified in his statement made in response to a court order to show 
defense counsel all items to be handled by any witness:  “Here.  Let me comply with 
defense counsel’s request”; and (v) the prosecutor’s assertions, during closing argument, 
that the defense tactic would be one of “character assassination.” 
 
Many of defendant’s cited examples, by his own admission, “appear innocuous if 
viewed in isolation.”  Indeed, we find most of the cited passages to be innocuous, even 
viewed in combination, when considered in the context of the surrounding testimony and 
circumstances.  In any event, defendant failed to object at trial to any of these challenged 
comments.  Because timely admonitions would have cured any harm, claims based upon 
these comments may not now be asserted on appeal.  (Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 34.)  
96 
Defense counsel, however, did object at trial to two additional matters, which he now 
asserts as error.   
 
During an in limine hearing prior to the introduction of any evidence, defense 
counsel complained to the court that the prosecutor had been glaring at defendant 
“hatefully, with a lot of tension,” and asked the trial court to order the prosecutor to cease 
such conduct.  The prosecutor acknowledged looking at defendant but denied any 
improper conduct.  The trial court concluded that it could not rule on the request because 
it had not noticed any such conduct.  We conclude that even if the prosecutor did on 
occasion glare at defendant in the manner complained of, the record does not establish or 
support a pattern of conduct so egregious as to infect the trial with anything approaching 
the level of fundamental unfairness that would constitute a denial of due process under 
the federal Constitution.  (See People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 820 (Espinoza); 
Donnelly v. DeChristophoro (1974) 416 U.S. 637, 642-643 (DeChristophoro).)   
 
Defense counsel also voiced exception after the prosecutor at one point made a 
speaking objection in which he asserted that a question posed by defense counsel to Terry 
Guillory — asking whether Guillory recalled telling the prosecutor of “talk on the street” 
that Maurice Solvang and Donna Guthrie “were involved in this” — was “the most 
outrageous question I have ever heard” and that “[defense counsel] is in contempt of 
court because of that question.”  As defendant observes, the trial court eventually 
overruled the prosecutor’s objection.  But again, even assuming that in this and other 
instances the prosecutor at times was intemperate, the record does not establish a pattern 
of conduct so egregious as to reflect the level of fundamental unfairness that would 
constitute a denial of due process under the federal Constitution.   
 
Although it is apparent from the record that the relations between defense counsel 
and the prosecutor at trial often were acrimonious, we find apt our observation in 
Espinoza, supra, 3 Cal.4th 806:  “None of the instances that defendant characterizes as 
prosecutorial misconduct appears to have been either intended or likely to deceive the 
97 
jury on any material issue.  Moreover, it is not reasonably likely that the jury would have 
understood the prosecutor’s bickering with defense counsel, or his use of facial 
expressions or gestures to express dismay or disbelief, to be a personal attack on defense 
counsel’s integrity.  In all likelihood, the jury viewed such behavior as expressing merely 
a clash of personalities.  Thus, it is not reasonably probable that the prosecutor’s 
occasional intemperate behavior affected the jury’s evaluation of the evidence or the 
rendering of its verdict.”  (Id., at pp. 820-821.)   
 
4.  Deliberate and repeated refusal to comply promptly with court orders, making 
frequent and dubious objections, and contesting objections before the jury   
 
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor engaged in “chronic foot-dragging” with 
respect to discovery and other court-ordered matters, was guilty of irritating, annoying, 
and disrespectful conduct, and contentiously argued objections before the jury.  For 
example, defendant asserts that (i) on the eve of trial the prosecutor furnished defense 
counsel with more than 400 pages of previously undisclosed telephone records; (ii) failed 
to disclose addresses of prospective witnesses in a timely manner; (iii) repeatedly failed 
to disclose until each evening recess the identity of the next day’s witnesses; (iv) asked, 
and then withdrew, a “completely improper” question concerning threats made by 
“[defendant’s] friends” against Guillory while in jail; (v) frequently failed to show 
defense counsel writings or exhibits before handing them to witnesses; and 
(vi) frequently interrupted defense counsel’s examination with “frivolous or marginally 
meritorious” objections, and then argued with defense counsel rather than awaiting a 
ruling by the court. 
 
Once again, because defendant failed to object at trial to any of these challenged 
comments or asserted actions, and because timely admonitions would have cured any 
harm, claims based upon these comments and alleged conduct may not now be asserted 
on appeal.  (Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 34.)  Furthermore, on the merits, we find the cited 
98 
passages, when viewed in the context of the surrounding testimony and circumstances, to 
be innocuous.   
 
Defense counsel did object at trial, on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct, to two 
other matters of which he now complains — (i) the claim that the prosecutor, at the 
preliminary hearing, wrongfully withheld evidence of defendant’s plot to keep Terry 
Guillory from testifying, and (ii) the claim that the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
stating during cross-examination of Guillory that defense counsel’s question concerning 
“street talk” was “the most outrageous question I’ve ever heard” and was contemptuous.  
But with regard to both circumstances, we previously have determined that no prejudice 
requiring reversal resulted (see ante, pts. II.D & II.M.3), and we reach the same 
conclusion in this context.   
 
The trial court observed that at various stages of the trial, both counsel failed to 
exhibit “professional courtesies.”  The record, however, does not support defendant’s 
suggestion that the resulting trial was fundamentally unfair or amounted to a denial of 
due process of law under the federal Constitution.  (Espinoza, supra, 3 Cal.4th 806, 820; 
DeChristophoro, supra, 416 U.S. 637, 642-643.)   
 
 
5.  Claimed Griffin error 
 
Defendant asserts that during closing argument the prosecutor improperly 
commented upon defendant’s failure to testify, in violation of Griffin v. California (1965) 
380 U.S. 609, 615 (Griffin).   
 
In the course of arguing to the jury concerning the meaning of “reasonable doubt,” 
the prosecutor explained that the jury would be instructed that if circumstantial evidence 
is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which appears reasonable and the other 
unreasonable, the jury must reject the unreasonable interpretation and accept the 
reasonable.  (See CALJIC No. 2.01.)  Thereafter, the prosecutor  argued as follows:  “I 
challenge defense counsel to talk about the evidence in this case, and to tell you — give 
99 
you — let us all listen very carefully to see if he does it — a reasonable interpretation of 
this evidence that says that Richard Bert Stewart is not guilty. . . .  [¶]  Now, if he doesn’t 
do that, are you done?  No.  He doesn’t have to say anything at all.  Even if he doesn’t 
offer you a reasonable interpretation of this evidence, you have an independent obligation 
to put the People to our proof as you find it.” 
 
Later, in closing, the prosecutor commented:  “And there is but one reasonable 
interpretation.  We didn’t hear another reasonable interpretation.  It was conspicuous in 
its absence wasn’t it?  But the fact that it wasn’t mentioned, doesn’t mean our burden is 
over.  You put the People to the test. . . .” 
 
Although defendant now asserts that these statements constituted comment upon 
his failure to testify, in violation of Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. 609, 615, he failed to object 
at trial to any of them.  Defendant claims that the trial court “took virtually no action to 
reign [in the prosecutor]” and hence any objection would have been futile.  The record 
discloses, however, that the trial court in fact did take numerous steps to control the 
frequent bickering between counsel and that defense counsel continued to make 
objections during the course of the trial, through the closing arguments — and hence 
dispels the notion that defense counsel considered objections to be futile.  We conclude 
that because defendant failed to make a timely objection in this instance, he has no right 
to complain on appeal of the challenged statements.  (People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 
1027, 1050-1051.)   
 
In any event, we find the prosecutor’s comments unobjectionable under Griffin, 
supra, 380 U.S. 609.  Although “ ‘Griffin forbids either direct or indirect comment upon 
the failure of the defendant to take the witness stand,’ ” the prohibition “ ‘does not extend 
to comments on the state of the evidence. . . .’ ”  (People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 
572.)  In the first passage quoted above, the prosecutor merely anticipated the failure of 
defense counsel — not defendant — to provide to the jury a reasonable explanation 
consistent with defendant’s innocence.  In the second passage quoted, the prosecutor 
100 
commented on defense counsel’s argument as having failed to suggest to the jury such an 
interpretation of the evidence.  This was permissible argument based on the state of the 
evidence, and we conclude there was no reasonable likelihood the jury would have 
construed or applied the prosecutor’s remarks as focusing upon defendant’s silence or 
failure to take the witness stand.   
 
6.  Asking assertedly improper questions 
 
Defendant claims that in three respects, the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
asking improper questions.   
 
When the prosecutor asked Terry Guillory whether any member of the district 
attorney’s office, or of any law enforcement agency, had threatened him in order to make 
him testify, Guillory responded, “No, not by the District Attorney’s Office or any police 
agency.”  The prosecutor then asked “was — were there threats made to you by 
somebody?” — to which Guillory responded, “Yes, they were.”  The prosecutor asked 
who had made those threats, and Guillory responded:  “[Defendant’s] friends.  They’ve 
been threatening me in jail for the last three days.  I got a note underneath my door.”  At 
that point, defense counsel objected that he had not received any information concerning 
such threats, and in response the prosecutor stated that he would “withdraw the 
question” — to which defense counsel simply stated, “Thank you.”  Defendant now 
asserts that “withdrawal was ineffective to cure the harm.”   
 
Second, defendant claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct by asking 
Detective Kimura why he attended Gloria Pillow’s funeral.  In response, the detective 
gave a partial answer:  “There was a possibility — and a concern by the family of Ms. 
Pillow — .”  Defense counsel interrupted before the witness could finish, and the 
prosecutor immediately said he would “reask the question:  Did you see [defendant] at 
Gloria Pillow’s funeral?”  The detective responded that he did not. 
101 
 
Finally, defendant reasserts the essence of a subclaim addressed and rejected 
above (see ante, pt. II.L), that the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony from Guillory 
concerning his telephone conversation, on the morning after the killings, with Donna 
Guthrie — testimony that implied Guthrie’s fear of defendant following the killings.   
 
Defense counsel did not object on misconduct grounds to the “threats” or “Pillow 
family concern” in the questions described above.  Because a timely admonition would 
have cured any resulting harm, defendant cannot now complain of this asserted 
misconduct on appeal.  (Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 34.)   
 
In any event, on the facts of this case, any misconduct that occurred would be 
harmless.  We already have explained that, even assuming misconduct in the prosecutor’s 
question that elicited Guillory’s testimony implying that Donna Guthrie feared defendant 
after the killings, any such misconduct was nonprejudicial in light of the properly 
introduced evidence at trial.  (See ante, pt. II.L.)  We reach the same conclusion with 
respect to that same subclaim here, as well as with respect to the asserted misconduct 
concerning the prosecutor’s follow-up question about threats made to Guillory while he 
was in jail and Detective Kimura’s assertion that he attended the funeral because of 
“concern by the family of Ms. Pillow — .”  In light of the strong and independent 
evidence demonstrating that defendant was in fact guilty of the crimes charged, any 
assumed misconduct was nonprejudicial.   
 
7.  Alleged misstatement of the burden of proof 
 
Defendant asserts that during closing argument the prosecutor misled the jury by 
confusing circumstantial evidence rules with the reasonable doubt requirement, thereby 
creating a substantial likelihood one or more jurors would place the burden on defendant 
to affirmatively raise a reasonable doubt in order to gain an acquittal.   
 
The challenged comments of the prosecutor were as follows:  “Now, we’re 
starting to get a little better sense of what ‘burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt’ 
102 
means.  It means:  Is there a reasonable interpretation of this evidence other than Richard 
Bert Stewart killed three people?  The answer to that question is no.  And, ladies and 
gentlemen, I’ll do it right now.  I challenge defense counsel to talk about the evidence in 
this case, and tell you — give you — let us all listen very carefully to see if he does it — 
a reasonable interpretation of this evidence that says that [defendant] is not guilty. . . .” 
 
Once again, defense counsel did not object to this passage, and because a timely 
admonition would have cured any resulting harm, defendant cannot now complain of this 
asserted misconduct on appeal.  (Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 34.)  In any event, on the 
facts of this case, any misconduct would be harmless.  The statement was plainly an 
attempt to elaborate on the interaction between the concepts of reasonable and 
unreasonable doubt, and the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  It is highly 
questionable whether a reasonable juror, hearing only the quoted language, would 
understand that the prosecutor was advising that defendant bore the burden of 
establishing reasonable doubt.  But as explained below, the jury did not hear only the 
quoted language — and indeed, in light of the rest of the prosecutor’s comments, it is 
plain that no reasonable juror would have understood or believed that defendant bore the 
burden of establishing reasonable doubt.   
 
The prosecutor did not previously or thereafter argue that defendant’s failure to 
offer an adequate explanation of the killings itself warranted a guilty verdict.  Prior to the 
challenged comments, the prosecutor twice explicitly acknowledged that the People bore 
the burden of proving their case beyond a reasonable doubt.  Indeed, as noted ante, part 
II.M.5, immediately after making the challenged comments, the prosecutor explicitly 
posed the question to the jury whether, if defense counsel failed to provide a reasonable 
interpretation of the evidence showing defendant to be not guilty, “[A]re you done?  No.  
He doesn’t have to say anything at all.  Even if he doesn’t offer you a reasonable 
interpretation of this evidence, you have an independent obligation to put the People to 
our proof as you find it.”  The prosecutor continued:  “Where is the reasonable 
103 
interpretation of this evidence which points to anything other than the guilt of 
[defendant]?  It doesn’t exist.  That is what the burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is all about.   And that’s why the instruction says the defendant is entitled to a 
reasonable doubt.  He is not entitled to an unreasonable doubt.”  Subsequently, the 
prosecutor reiterated that even though defense counsel had not given the jury any 
reasonable explanation of defendant’s role in the killings, that “doesn’t mean our burden 
is over.  You put the People to the test. . . .”   
 
We conclude that when viewed in their entirety, the prosecutor’s statements were 
not likely to mislead a reasonable juror into believing that defendant bore the burden of 
establishing a reasonable doubt, and did not constitute misconduct.   
 
8.  Reiterated claims of asserted misconduct 
 
Defendant reiterates four claims of asserted misconduct that we have discussed 
and rejected earlier — (i) alleged misconduct in withholding material evidence until after 
commencement of the preliminary hearing (ante, pt. II.D); (ii) alleged misconduct in 
causing Maurice Solvang to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege and in refusing to grant 
him immunity (ante, pt. II.E.2); (iii) alleged misconduct in offering portions of 
defendant’s letters from prison and jail as “bad character” evidence (see ante, pt. II.I.); 
and (iv) alleged misconduct in asking questions that assumed facts not in evidence, and in 
eliciting hearsay concerning an alleged contract to kill Terry Guillory (ante, pt. II.J.2).  
We again reject these claims in this context.    
 
9.  Asserted ineffective assistance of defense counsel related to alleged misconduct  
 
Finally, defendant asserts that to the extent trial counsel failed to object to the 
foregoing instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct or to request curative 
admonitions, defense counsel’s legal representation was constitutionally ineffective.  We 
disagree.  In each of the circumstances described above, reasonable counsel may well 
have determined that an objection would be unwise, either because the challenged 
104 
conduct was not improper or because an objection (and possibly an admonition as well) 
likely would have served to highlight matter that might be unfavorable to defendant.  
Accordingly, the appellate record does not preclude a satisfactory explanation for 
counsel’s action, and hence we shall not find that counsel acted deficiently.  (See 
Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th 264, 266; Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d 412, 426.)  Defendant 
has failed to establish deficient performance under an objective standard of professional 
reasonableness.  (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 687-691; Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d 
171, 216-217.)  In any event, for the reasons previously recounted ante, part II.C, 
defendant also has failed to establish prejudice, that is, a reasonable probability of a more 
favorable outcome in the absence of the assertedly deficient performance.  (Strickland, 
supra, 466 U.S. 668, 691-696; Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d 171, 217-218.)  On the record 
before us, it is not reasonably probable that, had trial counsel made the objections or 
sought the admonitions the absence of which defendant now characterizes as error, the 
jury’s verdict of guilt or special circumstance finding would have been different.  In other 
words, trial counsel’s alleged failings in this regard are insufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome of the trial.  (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.)   
N.  Denial of defendant’s motion for a new guilt 
and special circumstance phase trial, 
based upon asserted juror misconduct 
 
In support of a motion for new trial filed after the jury returned its penalty verdict, 
defendant submitted an affidavit sworn and signed by defendant’s former girlfriend 
Jacqueline Coghlan, as follows:  “My testimony as a witness was interrupted by a break 
for lunch.  While in the restroom, Juror No. 2 made the following statement to me:  [¶]  
‘We’re not supposed to have any contact but I just wanted to tell you that you’re a very 
beautiful woman.’  [¶]  I replied, ‘I don’t feel so beautiful right now.’ ”  
 
The People filed a response to the motion in which the prosecution addressed the 
misconduct allegation and appended a declaration from the juror who had spoken to 
105 
Jacqueline Coghlan.  (As defendant acknowledges, the juror in question was actually 
Juror No. 5, who was a woman, not Juror No. 2, who was a man.)  In that declaration, 
Juror 5 first stated that she was a juror “in the number five position” in the case and then 
asserted:  “2.  During a break in the testimony of witness Jackie Coghlan, I saw Ms. 
Coghlan in the ladies restroom;  [¶]  3.  While in the restroom, I said to Ms. Coghlan 
something to the effect of [¶] ‘I know we’re not suppose[d] to have any contact but I just 
wanted to tell you’re a very nice looking (or attractive) lady.’  [¶]  4.  I have no idea what 
she said after that because I walked out the door.  I know she said something back but I 
didn’t hear it because I went out the door.  [¶]  5.  This brief contact did not in any way 
affect my ability to be fair and impartial in this case.” 
 
The trial court concluded that assuming there was misconduct, it was “clearly of a 
trifling nature and [did] not warrant the granting of a new trial.”  
 
We agree with defendant that Juror No. 5 committed misconduct.  (People v. 
Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 273, 310; Pen. Code, § 1122, subds. (a) & (b) [forbidding 
conversations between jurors and “anyone else on any subject connected with the trial”].)  
In speaking to Coghlan, Juror No. 5 violated the trial court’s repeated and explicit 
admonitions to avoid contact with all other persons — including witnesses — associated 
with the case.  
 
As we observed in another capital case, however, when misconduct is “ ‘ “of such 
a trifling nature that it could not in the nature of things have been prejudicial to the 
moving party and where it appears that the fairness of the trial has been in no way 
affected by such impropriety, the verdict will not be disturbed.” ’ ”  (People v. Miranda 
(1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 117-118.)  The “trifling” misconduct at issue in Miranda, which we 
found to be nonprejudicial, consisted of a juror approaching the defendant’s girlfriend 
(who attended the trial as a spectator) and thereafter, while the trial continued, engaging 
in extensive conversations with her, displaying an obvious romantic interest.  Manifestly, 
the facts set out in the declarations in this case demonstrate a lesser degree of misconduct 
106 
than that at issue in Miranda, and do not appear to have involved anything of substance 
concerning the merits of the case.   
 
The trial court did not err in denying a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct.  
As we have explained, “[a]ny presumption of prejudice is rebutted, and the verdict will 
not be disturbed, if the entire record in the particular case, including the nature of the 
misconduct or other event, and the surrounding circumstances, indicates there is no 
reasonable probability of prejudice, i.e., no substantial likelihood that one or more jurors 
were actually biased against the defendant.  (E.g., [People v.] Carpenter [(1995)] 
9 Cal.4th 634, 653 . . . .)”  (In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 296.)  Disregarding, 
under Evidence Code section 1150, Juror No. 5’s assertion that the event did not affect 
her ability to be fair and impartial in the case, the remaining aspects of the declarations, 
viewed together with the entire record in this case, do not establish any substantial 
likelihood that Juror No. 5 actually was biased against defendant.  Nor was the 
interaction “inherently and substantially likely to have influenced the juror.”  (People v. 
Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 653.) 
O.  Interference with defendant’s right to counsel 
and to self-representation 
 
Defendant asserts that, after completion of the preliminary hearing, arraignment, 
and subsequent pretrial proceedings (during the entirety of which he was represented by 
the Contra Costa County Public Defender, Mr. Charles James), defendant improperly was 
permitted to waive his right to counsel (and hence improperly to represent himself).  
During the ensuing nine months of pretrial proceedings from May 1990 until February 
1991, James served as advisory counsel.  Defendant further asserts that his right to self-
representation improperly was interfered with by the limitations that the court placed 
upon James’s role as advisory counsel, and that this ultimately resulted in defendant’s 
determination to abandon self-representation in February 1991 (at which time James was 
reappointed to represent defendant for the remaining pretrial proceedings and trial).  
107 
Defendant appears to suggest that the alleged error in allowing him to waive counsel for 
nine months of the pretrial period per se requires reversal of the ensuing judgment that 
was rendered after trial.  Defendant also asserts that the alleged violation of his right to 
self-representation (by the limitations placed upon James’s role as advisory counsel) 
requires reversal of the judgment without a showing of prejudice.  As explained below, 
we conclude that no error occurred in either respect, and accordingly reject the arguments 
for reversal predicated on those grounds.   
 
1.  Procedural background 
 
After completion of the preliminary hearing and the arraignment in this case, 
defendant sought to discharge his appointed counsel, James, and to represent himself.  At 
a May 1990 hearing held by Judge Richard Arnason, defendant was questioned at length 
and ultimately was permitted to represent himself.  At defendant’s request, James was 
appointed to act in a limited role as advisory counsel.  Judge Arnason admonished 
defendant that should he find self-representation to be too difficult or unworkable, 
defendant should inform the court well before trial. 
 
Defendant’s case subsequently was assigned to Judge (now Justice) Patricia 
Sepulveda, who stated in a September 1990 hearing that she had read defendant’s waiver 
of counsel taken by Judge Arnason.  Judge Sepulveda then conducted a further inquiry of 
defendant.  The court, aware of defendant’s then-recent stabbing of a fellow jail inmate in 
the neck with a sharpened pencil, advised defendant that further violence might interfere 
with his ability to prepare for trial.  Defendant responded that he understood.  The judge 
reconfirmed that James’s role would be a limited one, and defendant reaffirmed his desire 
to represent himself with James acting as advisory counsel.  
 
Five months later, in February 1991, defendant appeared before Judge 
(subsequently Justice) Michael Phelan, before whom the case ultimately was tried.  
Defendant moved to reappoint James as his counsel, but stated he would want to return to 
108 
self-representation if the case reached the penalty phase of trial.  The court advised 
defendant that if James were reappointed, he would be counsel for “all purposes,” and 
that if defendant wished to discharge appointed counsel and return to self-representation 
at a later time, the court would address that question then, by determining, among other 
things, whether defendant was then capable of representing himself.  In response, 
defendant withdrew his motion to reappoint James.  A week later, however, defendant 
renewed his request to reappoint James, but reiterated his intention to seek self-
representation should a penalty phase be necessary.  The court repeated that it could not 
make any commitment concerning defendant’s right to self-representation at a penalty 
phase of the trial, but granted defendant’s motion to reappoint James.  
 
Defendant was represented by James at the guilt and special circumstance phase of 
the trial, and, upon conviction and the true finding of a special circumstance, moved to 
represent himself at the penalty phase of the trial.  The next day — after being told by the 
court to reconsider that request overnight — defendant observed that he believed James 
had done “a fine job” of defending him and explained that his decision was “just more of 
a personal issue.”  The court explained that because the trial was ongoing, the decision 
whether to grant defendant’s request was a matter for the court’s discretion.  (See People 
v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 128.)  In response to the court’s inquiry concerning 
whether defendant planned to introduce evidence in mitigation at the penalty phase of the 
trial, defendant answered that he would make that decision later.  Defendant explained 
that he had elected to accept James at the guilt phase of the trial for tactical reasons — for 
example, defendant said he would not have felt effective had he personally cross-
examined Jacqueline Coghlan, among other witnesses.  Defendant also noted that he had 
long expressed a desire to represent himself at the penalty phase of the trial, and argued:  
“So I don’t feel this is untimely.  I was found competent by two Superior Court judges.  
There has been no change since.  I’m not suffering any mental problems or emotional 
problems. . . .”  Judge Phelan further inquired of defendant concerning, among other 
109 
things, his right to counsel and to self-representation, and then granted defendant’s 
motion, appointing James as advisory counsel.  Defendant represented himself in all 
subsequent trial court proceedings, through sentencing.   
 
2.  Asserted error in allowing defendant to waive counsel during nine months of 
pretrial proceedings 
 
Defendant asserts that Judges Arnason and Sepulveda erred by granting his 
request for self-representation in May and September of 1990, because he was 
incompetent to waive his right to counsel.  Accordingly, defendant urges, he was denied 
his right to counsel during the pretrial period from May 1990 to February 1991.  Indeed, 
defendant further suggests that the record shows there was, during this time, substantial 
evidence of his mental incompetence to stand trial or waive counsel, and that Judges 
Arnason and Sepulveda erred under section 1367 in failing, on their own motion, to order 
and conduct a competency hearing pursuant to section 1368.   
 
As the United States Supreme Court clarified in Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 
U.S. 389 (Godinez), in order to represent oneself at trial, (1) a defendant must be 
competent to waive his or her right to counsel (id., at p. 399) — a determination that 
must be made, the court held, under the same test that applies to competence to stand 
trial, that is, the defendant must have a “ ‘ sufficient present ability to consult with his 
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ and . . . ‘a rational as well as 
factual understanding of the proceedings against him’ ” (id., at p. 396); and (2) the waiver 
of counsel must be knowing and voluntary — that is, the defendant must “actually . . . 
understand the significance and consequences” of the decision, and the decision must be 
110 
“uncoerced” (id., at p. 401, fn. 12; see generally People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 
732; People v Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1363-1364.)33   
 
We turn first to the lengthy examination conducted at the May 1990 hearing by 
Judge Arnason. 
 
During that hearing defendant was advised of his right to counsel and was told that 
if he represented himself he would have no right to an attorney who would work for him 
or be under his control, and that his access to a law library would be less than that 
available to an attorney appointed to represent him.  Defendant was advised that he 
would be expected to know and follow applicable evidentiary and legal rules and to 
behave in court as would an attorney.  He was told that the prosecutor would be an 
experienced professional, that self-representation “is almost always unwise,” and that by 
representing himself he might do “more harm than good” to his defense.  Defendant 
replied that he understood, but still wished to represent himself.  He explained that he had 
received a high school G.E.D., had an underwater diving certification, was 12 units short 
of an A.A. degree, had read “a thousand books” (including the Evidence Code and much 
of the Penal Code), had “[g]reat comprehension,” and understood trials and the legal 
system.  Finally, defendant stated that he understood the consequences — including 
being subject to the death penalty — should he be convicted.  Defendant was informed, 
and acknowledged, that by representing himself he would be giving up “one of the most 
common bas[e]s for appeal,” namely asserted ineffectiveness of trial counsel.  Invoking 
his experience as a certified diver, defendant asserted that he could handle the pressure of 
a trial.   
                                             
 
33  
The high court explained:  “In this sense, there is a ‘heightened’ standard for . . . 
waiving the right to counsel, but it is not a heightened standard of competence.”  
(Godinez, supra, 509 U.S. at pp. 400-401.)   
111 
 
Judge Arnason concluded:  “Well, [defendant] impresses me as being an 
individual who is certainly competent to make this decision under the Faretta doctrine 
[(Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806].)  He obviously has some background in 
dealing with situations where pressure could be applied. . . .  [¶]  Being a licensed deep 
sea diver is not the easiest thing in the world to acquire . . . .  And your education is 
sufficient for me to find that you are able to understand the English language, to read, 
understand the documents fully.  [¶]  And I’m satisfied that this defendant therefore is 
entitled to from this time forward . . . be his own lawyer.”  
 
Defendant asserts that because, at the time he brought his motion before Judge 
Arnason, he had been accused of threatening potentially adverse witnesses and of 
arranging for a payment of $1,000 to keep Terry Guillory from testifying, Judge Arnason 
was required to find him incompetent to stand trial and hence incompetent to waive 
counsel.  We disagree.  The circumstance that defendant was accused of such misconduct 
did not provide a basis for questioning his competence either to stand trial or waive 
counsel, and defendant provides no authority to support his assertion.34   
 
We turn next to the follow-up inquiry conducted at the September 1990 hearing by 
Judge Sepulveda — to whom, at that time, defendant’s case had been assigned for trial.  
Judge Sepulveda explained that from her reading of the transcript of the prior hearing, it 
appeared that defendant was legally entitled to represent himself.  Judge Sepulveda asked 
defendant whether he was experiencing any problems, and whether he wanted to 
                                             
 
34  
We observe that during the colloquy with Judge Arnason, counsel were asked 
whether there was “any indication” of a “question as to [defendant’s] mental condition or 
psychological condition.”  Defense counsel responded. “I make no comment, your 
Honor.”  At that point the court asked the lead prosecutor:  “Has there been anything that 
would have been conveyed to you, . . . in your role as the attorney handling this case for 
the People, that this defendant has any psychological or psychiatric impediment which 
would affect his capacity to properly evaluate, understand, and participate in the 
proceedings?”  The lead prosecutor responded:  “With that limitation; no, your Honor.”   
112 
continue to represent himself.  Defendant (who by that time had filed motions for pretrial 
discovery, change of venue, dismissal, and expanded telephone use, as well as a motion 
to declare the use of cyanide gas as a means of execution to be illegal) responded that he 
was having difficulty obtaining compliance with discovery requests and that his assigned 
investigator was overburdened with other cases.  Defendant also mentioned that he had 
been authorized to incur $5,000 in expenses for a “venue study” to support his change of 
venue motion, and that he had been told that expenses for that study would amount to 
$10,000 — but he added that he might submit the venue motion without the supporting 
documentation, because “I don’t feel the venue study is going to tell me anything 
different than you all know, to be honest.”  On the whole, defendant asserted, he 
remained comfortable with the prospect of self-representation.  
 
Judge Sepulveda then discussed with defendant various scheduling matters, such 
as when defendant planned to file future motions, and whether he could meet the then-
target date for trial in November 1990.  The court again admonished defendant that by 
representing himself, he would forgo his ability to assert, on appeal, ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel as a basis for relief, and that it would be difficult for defendant to prepare 
his own case from the jail, especially if he continued to have disciplinary problems in 
custody.  In this regard, the court stated that it had become aware that defendant had been 
accused of stabbing a fellow inmate in the neck with a pencil.  
 
Finally, Judge Sepulveda reiterated that James’ role as advisory counsel would be 
a “limited” one.  The court stated:  “He can advise you.  He can help you write your 
motions.  He can talk to you.  He’ll be sitting there next to you if you want to have him 
there during the trial, during motions, but . . . he would not be questioning the witnesses, 
asking questions of potential jurors, arguing the motions.  In other words, he won’t be 
speaking for you.  Now as I say, he may convince me otherwise or you may convince me 
otherwise.  If you even want him to do something like that later on, but the reason for 
telling you that is as it might impact on your decision to stay in a pro per status.  I don’t 
113 
want you to have a frame of mind where you think that you and Mr. James are co-
counsel, and that you’re going to be trying this case together.  I just want you to 
understand that, okay?”  (Italics added.)  Defendant responded that he understood and 
still wished to represent himself, with James as advisory counsel.   
 
Defendant asserts that despite this record, because Judge Sepulveda (i) knew he 
had stabbed a jail inmate with a pencil, and (ii) had been told by defendant that he might 
submit his venue motion without a supporting study, and because (iii) Maurice Solvang 
had asserted, in his unsworn December 5, 1989, interview, that defendant had acted 
strangely shortly before and after the killings, Judge Sepulveda should have harbored 
doubt concerning defendant’s competence to stand trial and hence to waive his right to 
counsel.  We disagree.   
 
The stabbing incident surely suggested defendant’s potential for violence (as of 
course did the charged killings themselves), but violent tendencies do not by themselves 
suggest incompetence to stand trial or waive counsel.  The stabbing certainly did not 
suggest any absence of “ ‘ sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding’ ” or “ ‘a rational as well as factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ”  (Godinez, supra, 509 U.S. at p. 396.)  
Nor did defendant’s stated plan (which he eventually undertook) to submit his venue 
motion without supporting documentation establish or suggest incompetence to stand 
trial or waive counsel.  Defendant submitted numerous other motions, some successful, 
and ably argued them.  That he submitted his venue motion without a supporting study 
may suggest, as defendant implied at the September 1990 hearing before Judge 
Sepulveda, that he did not believe the study was crucial to, or would add much to, the 
motion — but the circumstance that defendant held that view would not suggest 
incompetence to stand trial or waive counsel.   
 
Moreover, the unsworn December 5, 1989, statement by Maurice Solvang, which 
defendant asserts should have alerted the court that defendant was incompetent to stand 
114 
trial or waive counsel, was not before either Judge Arnason or Judge Sepulveda — and, 
indeed, was not introduced until after the trial had commenced.  Accordingly, there is no 
reason for the information contained in the transcript of that interview to have informed 
the understanding of either Judge Arnason or Judge Sepulveda concerning defendant’s 
competence to stand trial or waive counsel.  Moreover, the assertedly relevant contents of 
the interview concerned defendant’s demeanor on July 5, 1989 — which was 10 months 
before the May 1990 hearing, and 14 months before the September 1990 hearing at 
which defendant asserts the court should have declared a doubt concerning his then-
present ability to stand trial or waive counsel; hence this interview was of questionable 
relevance to defendant’s then-present ability to stand trial or waive counsel.  Finally, the 
description of defendant’s mental condition set forth in the interview — disclosing 
Solvang’s impression that defendant was “jumpy” after having taken drugs and appeared 
a few days before the killings “like a volcano that was building to the point of 
exploding,” and that defendant was very irritated, agitated, scary, and distraught after the 
killings on July 5, 1989 — does not suggest incompetence to stand trial or waive counsel 
many months later.  Thus, even if knowledge of the contents of Solvang’s December 5, 
1989, statement properly could be attributed to Judge Arnason or to Judge Sepulveda, 
these judges would not have had any substantial reason to doubt defendant’s ability to 
stand trial or waive counsel.   
 
We conclude that the record supports the conclusion of Judges Arnason and 
Sepulveda that defendant was competent to waive his right to counsel, and that his waiver 
was knowing and voluntary.  Defendant’s responses demonstrated, with regard to the 
question of competence to waive counsel, that he had “ ‘ sufficient present ability to 
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ and . . . ‘a 
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ”  (Godinez, 
supra, 509 U.S. at p. 396.)  Defendant responded in an appropriate manner to questions 
posed to him, fully demonstrating his awareness of the circumstances he faced and the 
115 
proceedings against him.  He explained that he had consulted with his counsel, James, 
concerning his decision, and wished James — whom he considered “a very good 
attorney” — to remain available to him as advisory counsel.  The record also clearly 
supports the determination that defendant’s waiver was knowing and intelligent, in the 
sense he understood the significance and consequences of his decision, and that his 
decision was uncoerced.  It follows that neither judge erred in accepting defendant’s 
waiver of counsel.   
 
3.  Asserted interference with right to self-representation 
 
Defendant asserts that assuming his waiver of counsel was proper and that he 
correctly was permitted to represent himself during nine months of pretrial proceedings, 
he thereafter was “coerced” by improper limitations placed upon the scope of his 
advisory counsel’s authority, and as a consequence his right to self-representation was 
violated.  Specifically, defendant argues that advisory counsel should have been given 
authority to question witnesses on defendant’s behalf, and that the refusal of Judges 
Arnason and Sepulveda to permit such participation by James in turn “forced” defendant 
to forgo self-representation.  Defendant also asserts that because capital defendants who 
are represented by counsel in complex cases may, in the trial court’s discretion, be 
entitled to the appointment of second counsel (Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 
Cal.3d 424 (Keenan)), he was constitutionally entitled both to represent himself and to 
have counsel appointed to assist him as a second, fully participating counsel.   
 
We held in People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194 (Bloom):  “[A] defendant who 
elects representation by counsel does not have a constitutionally protected right to appear 
as cocounsel [citations] and a defendant who elects self-representation ‘does not have a 
constitutional right to choreograph special appearances by counsel’ (McKaskle v. Wiggins 
(1984) 465 U.S. 168, 183).  Thus none of the ‘hybrid’ forms of representation, whether 
labeled ‘cocounsel,’ ‘advisory counsel,’ or ‘standby counsel,’ is in any sense 
116 
constitutionally guaranteed.  [¶]  As the courts of other jurisdictions have expressly 
recognized [citations], the powers and responsibilities which attend the representation of 
a criminally accused person should never be conferred jointly and equally on the accused 
and the attorney.  Rather, in all cases of shared or divided representation, either the 
accused or the attorney must be in charge.  Stated otherwise, at all times the record 
should be clear that the accused is either self-represented or represented by counsel; the 
accused cannot be both at once. . . .  [A] self-represented defendant who wishes to obtain 
the assistance of an attorney in an advisory or other limited capacity, but without 
surrendering effective control over the presentation of the defense case, may do so only 
with the court’s permission and upon a proper showing.”  (Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 
1218-1219.)   
 
As is disclosed by the record set out above, defendant did not object to the 
challenged limitations at the time they were imposed, nor later when he claims to have 
been “coerced” into relinquishing his self-representation.  Nor did defendant ever request 
or attempt to justify appointment of second counsel under — or by analogy to — Keenan, 
supra, 31 Cal.3d 424.  Moreover, as the September 1990 transcript reveals, Judge 
Sepulveda expressly advised defendant that the court might reconsider the challenged 
limitations — including the bar against advisory counsel’s participation in witness 
examination — upon request by defendant or counsel (“Now as I say, he may convince 
me otherwise or you may convince me otherwise.  If you even want him to do something 
like that later on. . . .”).  Defendant did not resubmit the request at a later time or present 
a showing of a need for expanded participation by advisory counsel.   
 
In the absence of an objection or request at trial, defendant may not raise the 
present claims on appeal.  In any event, on the present record, the lower courts did not err 
in restricting the role of advisory counsel by precluding examination or cross-
examination by advisory counsel.   
117 
P.  Defendant’s asserted incompetence to admit the 
two prior prison term enhancements 
 
After the verdict of guilt was returned (and one day before the trial court granted 
defendant’s request to return to self-representation for the penalty phase of the trial), 
defendant waived his right to trial on the two prior prison term enhancements charged 
under section 667.5, subdivision (b) (establishing a one-year enhancement for “each prior 
separate prison term served for any felony” unless the defendant for five years had 
remained free from custody and from any new felony conviction).  Defendant now 
asserts that the trial court erred in accepting his waiver and at that time should have 
entertained, and declared, a good faith doubt concerning defendant’s continued 
competence to stand trial and to waive trial on the prior prison term enhancements.   
 
In support, appellate counsel asserts that defendant had been acting “erratically” 
during the pretrial period by improperly attempting to suppress evidence that might be 
offered against him and by stabbing a fellow jail inmate in the neck with a sharpened 
pencil, and that defendant continued to engage in inappropriate conduct at trial by twice 
“audibly commenting” during the prosecutor’s closing arguments, “And you hid Maurice 
Solvang” and “What about Maurice Solvang.”  Appellate counsel asserts that thereafter, 
in response to the trial court’s advisements concerning defendant’s waiver of rights 
relating to the charged enhancements, defendant was “nonresponsive and argumentative.”   
 
The record does not reveal any substantial evidence of incompetence to stand trial 
or waive any of defendant’s rights concerning the charged enhancements.  The 
circumstance that defendant attempted to suppress evidence against him prior to trial 
suggests that defendant understood fully the charges against him and the possible 
consequences he faced; it does not suggest mental incompetence in any relevant respect.  
The stabbing incident, which had occurred approximately eight months prior to the 
waivers at issue, did not suggest any present incompetence to waive trial or the 
corresponding rights related to determination of the prior prison term allegations.  The 
118 
two minor interjections made by defendant during the prosecutor’s closing argument, 
although inappropriate as a matter of courtroom decorum, actually were quite logical 
when viewed in context — for example, regarding the second comment, defendant was 
reacting to the prosecutor’s argument that the failure to present the testimony of a 
particular witness did not “mean[] that the People have something to hide.”  The 
response, “What about Maurice Solvang,” far from suggesting mental incompetence, 
suggests instead that defendant was attentive, adept, and involved in the proceedings, and 
wished to point out to the jury a perceived inconsistency between the prosecutor’s 
comments and conduct.   
 
The transcript passages, concerning the waiver of which defendant now 
complains, do not support a different conclusion with regard to defendant’s competence 
to stand trial.  When asked by the court whether he understood that his waiver of trial 
also would waive his right to cross-examine witnesses, defendant replied:  “Well.  I don’t 
really understand that I have the right to confront all witnesses against me, when a case is 
built around a witness such as Maurice Solvang, that was given — that took the Fifth 
Amendment.  [¶]  [The prosecutor] refused to give him immunity from prosecution when 
he very likely is the killer, and they hide him from the jury.  So I understand what the law 
is, and what you’re saying; but I don’t understand that it works quite that way.  [¶]  But I 
understand what you’re saying; yes, sir.”  
 
Thereafter, following defendant’s express waiver of his right to confrontation and 
cross-examination, the court addressed defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination, 
inquiring, “Do you give up that right, sir?”  Defendant responded:  “Well, sir, I do as far 
as I have — I was in prison before, and now I’m not going to remain free for five years 
[as required by section 667.7, subdivision (b)] — but not as far as the reason for being in 
prison at this time.  That much is true, so, yes.”  The court clarified that it was simply 
asking whether defendant was prepared to admit that the prior prison term allegations 
were true, in which event defendant would be incriminating himself.  The court explained 
119 
that it had “to be satisfied [that] you give up your right to do that.”  After defendant 
conferred with counsel, he clarified that he did indeed understand and waive his privilege 
against self-incrimination.  
 
The court next inquired whether any threats or promises had been made to procure 
defendant’s admission of the prior prison term enhancements.  Defendant responded:  
“Yes.  The threat of death by the State of California.  The threat of life imprisonment.  I 
don’t see where my admitting or not admitting one or two years is going to make a 
difference, since I’m already convicted of something I didn’t commit.  There’s no sense 
in me arguing with this.  But no, sir, no — no threats have been made.” 
 
Viewed as a whole, we do not perceive in this colloquy, or elsewhere in the related 
transcript, evidence suggesting mental incompetence to waive rights associated with 
proof of the charged enhancements.  Indeed, far from suggesting that defendant was 
“nonresponsive” throughout the waiver process, the record reveals instead that defendant 
was attentive and was reacting to both (i) the jury’s verdict of guilt and (ii) what he 
perceived as an ironic inconsistency between the trial court’s advisement that by waiving 
his right to trial he was giving up his right to confront witnesses against him, and his own 
assertion that he had been denied the right to confront witnesses by the prosecution’s 
refusal to grant immunity to Maurice Solvang.  Likewise, defendant’s brief riff 
concerning “threats” made against him, as related to his admission of the enhancements, 
displayed an understanding of the proceedings and the general question posed, as well as 
an accurate perception of reality:  given the minimum sentence of life in prison without 
possibility of parole that ensued from the jury’s verdict of guilt and special circumstance 
finding, the sentence enhancements of two additional years were not a matter of great 
concern to defendant.  Finally, the circumstance that defendant’s responses concerning 
waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination initially were halting or disjointed does 
not detract from the subsequent waiver, nor does it suggest, as defendant now implies, a 
120 
general mental incompetence to waive his rights.  We conclude that the trial court did not 
err in accepting defendant’s waiver of trial as to the two sentence enhancements.   
Q.  Denial of effective assistance of defense 
counsel at the guilt phase of the trial 
 
Defendant brings together under one global claim the disparate allegations of 
asserted ineffective assistance of trial counsel, advanced above under various claims and 
subclaims.  As noted above, in most respects we have concluded that the record does not 
preclude a satisfactory explanation for counsel’s actions, and hence we do not find that 
counsel acted deficiently.  (Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th 264, 266; Pope, supra, 23 
Cal.3d 412, 426.)  Defendant has failed to establish deficient performance under an 
objective standard of professional reasonableness.  (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 687-
691; Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-217.)  In any event, for the reasons recounted 
ante, part II.C, defendant also has failed to establish prejudice, that is, a reasonable 
probability of a more favorable outcome in the absence of counsel’s assertedly deficient 
performance.  (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 691-696; Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d 171, 
217-218.)  As we have noted above, on the record before us it is not reasonably probable 
that, had trial counsel performed in a manner different from what defendant now 
challenges, the jury’s verdict of guilt or special circumstance finding would have been 
different.  We conclude that trial counsel’s alleged failings, viewed singly or 
cumulatively, are insufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.  (Strickland, 
supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.)   
R.  Asserted constitutional invalidity of 
CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 2.02, and 8.83.1 
 
Defendant asserts that CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 2.02, and 8.83.1 — each of which 
instructed the jury that if one interpretation is reasonable and the other unreasonable, 
“you must accept the reasonable interpretation and reject the unreasonable”  together 
operated to create an unconstitutional mandatory presumption and lessen the 
121 
prosecution’s burden of proof.  We have rejected this same argument in numerous prior 
cases (see, e.g., People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 160) and do so here as well.   
S.  Cumulative effect of asserted errors committed at the 
preliminary hearing and the guilt phase of the trial 
 
Defendant realleges many of the asserted errors described above, claiming that 
even if these alleged errors are individually harmless, they are cumulatively prejudicial.  
As explained above, however, most of the alleged errors are either noncognizable on 
appeal, or did not amount to error.  Assuming some errors, however, as we have 
observed, “[e]ven when his life is at stake, ‘ “[a] defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not 
a perfect one.” ’ ”  (People v. Hamilton (1988) 46 Cal.3d 123, 156.)  We conclude that 
defendant received a fair trial, and perceive no prejudice, cumulative or otherwise.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
The judgment is reversed as to penalty for the reasons set forth ante, part II.A.  In 
all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
122 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Stewart 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S020803 
Date Filed: July 15, 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Contra Costa 
Judge: Michael J. Phelan 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Melissa Hill, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Ronald A. Bass, Assistant Attorneys General, Ross C. 
Moody and Mark S. Howell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
123 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Melissa Hill 
P.O. Box 2758 
Corrales, New Mexico  87048 
(505) 898-2977 
 
Mark S. Howell 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102 
(415) 703-5969