Case Title: URBIGKIT v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-05-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
URBIGKIT v. STATE2003 WY 5767 P.3d 1207Case Number: 01-208Decided: 05/07/2003
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

SAMUEL 
THOMAS URBIGKIT,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Tina 
N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel  

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Georgia L. Tibbetts, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General  

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
KITE, Justice.

 

[¶1]      Samuel Thomas 
Urbigkit appeals from his conviction on multiple counts of aggravated assault 
and attempted first-degree murder as well as one count each for being a felon in 
possession of a firearm, possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, 
conspiring to possess methamphetamine with intent to deliver, and possession of 
marijuana.  Mr. Urbigkit alleges 
numerous points of error by the trial court, including the denial of his motion 
to suppress evidence seized on search warrants, denial of his right to a fair 
trial by being forced to wear shackles in the courtroom, denial of his motion 
for change of venue, interference in his attorney-client relationship, exclusion 
of a witness statement, instructing the jury that the prosecution did not have 
to prove all theories contained in the aggravated assault instructions, 
insufficiency of the evidence, double jeopardy violations, and cumulative 
error.  We reverse four of the 
aggravated assault convictions on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence 
to support both of the state's alternative theories.  Finding no other error, we affirm the 
convictions on all remaining counts.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Mr. Urbigkit 
presents the following issues for our review:

 

            
I.  Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's motion to 
suppress evidence?

 

            
II.  Did the trial court err in ordering Appellant to be 
shackled in the presence of the jury, and while 
testifying?

 

            
III.  Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's motion to 
change venue?

 

            
IV.  Did the failure to swear in the jury prior to the receipt 
of evidence and testimony constitute reversible error?

 

            
V.  Was Appellant unable to adequately participate in his own 
defense due to the state interference into his attorney-client 
relationship?

 

            
VI.  Did the trial court err in excluding the statement of 
Joleen Summers?

 

            
VII.  Did fundamental error occur when the trial court 
instructed the jury that the state did not have to prove all theories contained 
in the aggravated assault charges?

 

            
VIII.  Was there insufficient evidence to convict Appellant of 
the aggravated assault charges?

 

            
IX.  Should the convictions for aggravated assault and 
attempted first degree murder merge for sentencing purposes; or, has Appellant's 
right to be free from double jeopardy been violated?

 

            
X.  Did the trial court commit plain error and deny Appellant 
his constitutional right to a fair trial by failing to give all instructions to 
the jury before the closing argument began, in violation of W.R.Cr.P. 30 and 
W.S. § 7-11-201?

 

            
XI.  Did the trial court exceed its statutory authority in 
imposing multiple and consecutive life sentences on 
Appellant?

 

            
XII.  Does cumulative error warrant reversal of Appellant's 
convictions?

 

The 
state restates the issues as follows:

 

            
I.  Did the district court err in denying Appellant's motion to 
suppress?

 

            
II.  Was Appellant denied a fair trial or the opportunity to 
participate in his defense because of the security measures employed during 
trial?

 

            
III.  Did the district court err in denying Appellant's motion 
for a change of venue?

 

            
IV.  Did the district court commit reversible error in failing 
to swear in the jury prior to the receipt of testimony or in instructing the 
jury?

 

            
V.  Did the district court err in excluding the statements of 
Joleen Summers?

 

            
VI.  Was Appellant properly convicted on the six counts of 
aggravated assault?

 

            
VII.  Did the district court properly sentence 
Appellant?

 

            
VIII.  Was Appellant denied a fair trial due to the cumulative 
effect of the alleged trial errors?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      On January 25, 
2001, Casper police, who had a search warrant for John Logan's vehicle, saw the 
vehicle traveling on CY Avenue.  
They stopped it and found an ounce of methamphetamine during their search 
of the truck.  Mr. Logan told the 
officers he purchased the methamphetamine from Mr. Urbigkit.  Mr. Logan subsequently informed law 
enforcement officials he had purchased methamphetamine from Mr. Urbigkit several 
times at different locations, including Mr. Urbigkit's shop, and Mr. Urbigkit 
was always armed, had a number of weapons in his possession, and was violent and 
dangerous.  Law enforcement 
investigated and conducted surveillance for several days before obtaining search 
warrants for Mr. Urbigkit's apartment, shop, vehicle, and 
person.

 

[¶4]      On February 7, 
2001, law enforcement attempted to execute the warrants at Mr. Urbigkit's 
shop.  Among the law enforcement 
personnel involved that morning were Department of Criminal Investigation (DCI) 
Drug Task Force Agents Steve McFarland and Brad Wnuk, DCI Agent Lonnie TeBeest, 
Natrona County Sheriff's Department Deputies Jim Arnold and Gus Holbrook, 
Wyoming Highway Patrolman Rick Dye, and Officer Chuck Adkins of the Mills Police 
Department.  As they arrived at the 
designated meeting place near Mr. Urbigkit's shop, Mr. Urbigkit came out of the 
building and got into his already running vehicle.  They immediately moved in and positioned 
themselves at various locations around the premises in an attempt to prevent Mr. 
Urbigkit from leaving the area.  As 
he attempted to maneuver around them and drive off the premises by way of 
various access roads, DCI Agent Tim Hill and Agents McFarland and TeBeest tried 
to block his path with their vehicles.  
Thinking Mr. Urbigkit would have to surrender his efforts to escape, 
Agent Wnuk, a passenger in Agent Hill's truck, got out of the truck and walked 
toward Mr. Urbigkit's vehicle.  As 
Agent Wnuk approached, Mr. Urbigkit accelerated and made a hard turn to the 
right, causing the back end of his car to spin around toward Agent Hill's truck 
and Agent Wnuk, who attempted to leap out of the way.  Agent Wnuk's hand was struck by the 
vehicle as it spun away, and his left knee was injured when he hit the 
ground.  Mr. Urbigkit's car came 
nose to nose with Agent TeBeest's vehicle.  
Agent TeBeest got out, drew his gun, and pointed it at Mr. Urbigkit.  Mr. Urbigkit again accelerated and drove 
straight toward Agent TeBeest, who jumped up on the hood in order to avoid being 
hit.  He clung to the hood as Mr. 
Urbigkit continued to accelerate, now heading directly for Agent McFarland's 
vehicle. As Mr. Urbigkit turned and veered around Agent McFarland, Agent TeBeest 
let go and rolled off onto the ground.  
Mr. Urbigkit continued to accelerate, and Agent McFarland fired his gun 
at him.  Agent Wnuk also fired two 
shots.  Mr. Urbigkit drove through a 
barbed wire fence and into a field to the southwest of the shop area where his 
car became stuck.  He got out of the 
car and ran across the field.  
Deputy Arnold and Deputy Holbrook arrived on the scene and, upon sighting 
Mr. Urbigkit, directed him to put up his hands and drop his weapon. Mr. Urbigkit 
pointed his gun at them and started firing.  They sought cover and returned his 
fire.  Mr. Urbigkit continued to 
fire at the deputies as he moved north across the field.  By this time, Patrolman Dye and Officer 
Adkins were also at the scene.  
Patrolman Dye retrieved his rifle and returned Mr. Urbigkit's fire.  He fired once and missed, and Mr. 
Urbigkit began shooting at him and the other officers.  Patrolman Dye fired again, and Mr. 
Urbigkit went down.  After a moment, 
he came up again and fired more shots.  
Patrolman Dye fired a third shot, and Mr. Urbigkit flopped down 
again.  The officers heard three 
more shots from where Mr. Urbigkit had fallen and then saw his gun fly up in the 
air.  Law enforcement approached Mr. 
Urbigkit, handcuffed him, and took him into custody.  

 

[¶5]      Later, law 
enforcement executed the warrants and found firearms, ammunition, marijuana, 
methamphetamine, and other drug paraphernalia.  Mr. Urbigkit was charged with seven 
counts of aggravated assault, four counts of attempted first-degree murder, and 
one count each of felon in possession of a firearm, possession of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine) with intent to deliver, conspiracy to possess with 
intent to deliver a controlled substance (methamphetamine), and felony 
possession of a controlled substance (marijuana).  After a trial to a jury, Mr. Urbigkit 
was convicted on all but one count of aggravated assault.  In a separate proceeding, Mr. Urbigkit 
was also found to be a habitual criminal.  
He was sentenced to terms of life for each conviction of aggravated 
assault and attempted first-degree murder, two to three years for being a felon 
in possession of a firearm, and eighteen to twenty years each for the 
convictions of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, conspiracy 
to possess methamphetamine with intent to deliver, and felony possession of 
marijuana. 

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

A.        
Suppression of Evidence Seized Pursuant to Search Warrant    

 

[¶6]      Prior to trial, 
Mr. Urbigkit filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the 
search warrants issued on February 6, 2001, contending the affidavits supporting 
the warrant requests were insufficient to establish probable cause because the 
information contained in them came from an unreliable sourceMr. Logan.  Mr. Urbigkit contended Mr. Logan was 
unreliable because, while acting as a confidential informant after his arrest, 
he provided false information to law enforcement concerning where Mr. Urbigkit 
would most likely be found for purposes of carrying out a controlled buy.  Specifically, Mr. Logan allowed law 
enforcement to believe Mr. Urbigkit was staying at his own apartment when he 
knew Mr. Urbigkit was at the apartment of his girlfriend, Johanna Winder.  He also provided misinformation 
concerning Ms. Winder, including telling law enforcement that she was a former 
girlfriend, he had not spoken to her for months, he did not have a telephone 
number for Mr. Urbigkit's current girlfriend, and he had been in an apartment on 
Honeysuckle Street with Mr. Urbigkit where he bought an ounce of methamphetamine 
but did not know whose apartment it was.  
When law enforcement discovered a recently called number on Mr. Logan's 
cellular telephone was that of Mr. Urbigkit's girlfriend and confronted Mr. 
Logan, he admitted lying concerning the telephone number, the apartment, and how 
to contact Mr. Urbigkit.  Mr. Logan 
was terminated as an informant.  

 

[¶7]      The gist of Mr. 
Urbigkit's argument in his motion to suppress was that the only information law 
enforcement had of illegal activity on his part came from Mr. Logan, who had 
proven himself to be unreliable, and such unreliable information was 
insufficient to establish probable cause for purposes of obtaining search 
warrants. Mr. Urbigkit further argued law enforcement failed to adequately 
investigate Mr. Logan's assertions to obtain corroborating evidence of illegal 
activity on the part of Mr. Urbigkit.  

 

[¶8]      The trial court 
denied the motion to suppress, holding the search warrants were valid and a 
reasonably cautious or prudent person would believe from the affidavits that a 
crime was being or had been committed justifying issuance of the warrants.  With respect to the claim that there was 
insufficient corroboration of Mr. Logan's statements, the trial court 
stated:

 

There 
was corroboration of Mr. Urbigkit's existence.  There was corroboration of his contact 
with the Grandview and Honeysuckle residences and with the shop on Foster 
Road.  There was corroboration of 
his possession of the two vehicles, the gold-colored car and the blue Chevy 
pickup.  There was indication from 
Mr. Logan that [Mr. Urbigkit] had firearms, and this was corroborated by his 
previous violent history.  And those 
two seem to be consistent to me.  
There was corroboration of the association with persons who had a history 
of drug use, which corroborates the sale -- or the statement that he sold 
drugs.

 

 [¶9]     We review the denial of 
a motion to suppress under an abuse of discretion standard, which means the core 
of our inquiry focuses upon the reasonableness of the trial court's 
decision.  Vaughn v. State, 
962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998).  
Traditionally, we have applied a de novo review when considering 
the sufficiency of an affidavit to support the issuance of a search warrant 
under Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.  Cordova v. State, 2001 WY 96, 
¶10, 33 P.3d 142, ¶10 (Wyo. 2001).  
We also have cited federal authority stating that the issuing 
magistrate's determination of probable cause should be given great 
deference.  Id. at ¶11.  This deference places the burden of 
establishing a constitutional violation by a preponderance of the evidence on 
the party claiming his rights were violated.  Id.  However, we have said such deference 
is

 

"not 
to be employed to blindly sustain the actions of the magis­trate or to place 
any reviewing court in a position that it may refuse to examine the factual 
basis for such issuance.  To refuse 
or to fail to do so could result in serious erosion of one of our most valuable 
constitutional rights, and unless there is factual basis for determination of 
probable cause this court would be evading its responsibility by failing to 
declare this to be the case."

  

Id. 
(quoting Smith v. State, 557 P.2d 130, 133 (Wyo. 
1976)).

 

[¶10]   Judicial officers issuing search 
warrants "must have a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause 
exists."  Id. at ¶12.  

 

[T]hey 
must make a two-fold finding to justify the issuance of a search warrant.  First, the factual situation must be 
sufficient to warrant a reasonably cautious or prudent man to believe that a 
crime was being committed or that one had been committed.  Second, there must be a showing that the 
fruits of the crime or the evidence thereof are in the area or structure sought 
to be searched.

 

Id.  

 

[¶11]   In the context of an affidavit 
containing hearsay from "informants," sufficient facts must be presented such 
that the judicial issuing officer can make an independent judgment as to the 
informant's credibility, veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge in 
determining probable cause exists.  
Id. at ¶10.  For a 
judge to issue a search warrant, the affidavit of probable cause must contain 
sufficient information for an independent determination of the reliability of 
the statements made therein, which shall include sufficient identification of 
the source of the information.  
Hixson v. State, 2001 WY 99, ¶12, 33 P.3d 154, ¶12 (Wyo. 
2001).

 

The 
affidavit presented to support the issuance of a search warrant is presumed to 
be valid.  It is the affidavit that 
articulates the facts to supply probable cause, and it must include more than 
bare conclusions from the affiant.  
It must demonstrate corroboration of information from a confidential 
informant and contain verifiable facts.

 

Lee 
v. State, 
2 P.3d 517, 523 (Wyo. 2000) (citations omitted).

 

[¶12]   Applying these standards, we 
conclude the search warrants in this case properly issued.  Law enforcement submitted three 
identical affidavits in support of the requests for issuance of warrants to 
search Mr. Urbigkit's apartment and shop and his girlfriend's apartment.  The affidavits contained thirty-two 
paragraphs.  The first paragraph set 
out the investigating agent's qualifications and experience.  The second through the tenth paragraphs 
described Mr. Urbigkit's criminal history, including a prior conviction for 
aggravated assault with a weapon, an arrest for possession of a concealed 
weapon, a prior conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and 
two prior convictions for aggravated assault and battery causing injury.  The eleventh through the twenty-eighth 
paragraphs stated:

 

On 
January 25, 2001, your affiant was conducting a drug investigation.  Your affiant made contact with John 
Logan.  Logan was found to be in 
possession of an ounce of methamphetamine.

 

Logan 
told your affiant that this methamphetamine came from Samuel T. Urbigkit.  Logan explained that he has bought 
methamphetamine from Urbigkit on at least three [o]cc[a]sions.  Each time, Urbigkit sold Logan an ounce 
of methamphetamine for twelve hundred dollars ($1,200).  Logan explained to your affiant that 
Logan has bought drugs at Urbigkit's apartment, Urbigkit's shop, and Urbigkit 
has brought the drugs over to Logan's house.

 

Furthermore, 
Logan told your affiant substantially the following.  He considered Urbigkit a very dangerous 
person, who was very cautious to avoid police detection.  Urbigkit was normally armed, at all 
times with a firearm.  He saw an 
assault style rifle, which he thought Urbigkit called an AK-47.  He saw this gun in Urbigkit's apartment 
on Grandview Place.  He saw this gun 
around Christmas of 2000.  Urbigkit 
told him that this gun was "full auto."  
He saw several guns at both Urbigkit's shop and apartment.  Logan described seeing: a Glock handgun, 
a "stub nosed" .22 revolver, a 9 mm handgun.  Urbigkit had also made several 
statements about using the guns on people.  
He saw that Urbigkit kept one or more handguns, on his person, usually in 
the pocket of a coat.  On January 
25, 2001, while at Urbigkit's shop (980 Foster RD), he saw a rifle leaning up 
against the wall, and a .22 caliber revolver, which was lying on the desk of the 
shop.  The shop was located by the 
new jail, and across from the bus garage.  
On this property were two buildings.  Urbigkit's shop was located on the 
South, West corner of the South building.  
Logan also stated that in January of 2001, when he had bought other 
ounces of methamphetamine from Urbigkit, he saw Urbigkit in possession of the 
above described handguns.  He saw 
these guns at Urbigkit's apartment.

 

Urbigkit 
lived in an apartment on Grandview Place, Casper, Wyoming.  He drove a gold car and a blue pick 
up.  His shop was behind the Natrona 
County School bus garage, by the jail.

 

Following 
this interview, your affiant and Agent Wnuk drove to the area where it was 
believed Urbigkit had a shop.  
Agents confirmed Logan's information, in that there were two business 
type buildings located across from the school bus garage.  Your affiant noticed that at 
. . . 980 Foster Rd, (one of the business rental units), there was a 
blue Chevy pick up, with Wyoming plates, 1-374BP.  Your affiant checked the registration of 
this pick up, and found that it was registered to Amuel Urbigkit (possibly a 
typographical error for Samuel) on a blue 1986 Chevy Pickup, at 2261 W. 41 St., 
Casper, WY.  Your affiant checked 
CPD computer records, and found that 2261 W. 41 St[.], is the home of Urbigkit's 
parents.

 

On 
January 26, 2001, at the direction of your affiant, Logan came to the DCI office 
and an unsuccessful recorded phone call was made to Urbigkit.  (There was no answer).  Logan told your affiant substantially 
the following.  Urbigkit had a 
girlfriend.  This girlfriend had a 
first name of "Johna" or something similar.  Logan described her as a white female, 
about 5'4, [c]urly blonde hair, in her thirties, good looking, lived somewhere 
in Paradise Valley, and drove a silver car, possibly a 
Mazda.

 

Agent 
Wnuk and your affiant checked the records of the Casper Police Department and 
found that Urbigkit had an address at 2405 Grandview Place, #35.  CPD records also indicated that in 
December of 2000, Urbigkit was involved in an argument with two females, Teddi 
and Jeni Grace.  CPD officers were 
dispatched to 2405 Grandview Place #35, where they spoke with Jeni Grace and Sam 
Urbigkit.

 

On 
February 1, 2001, Logan again came to the Casper DCI office.  Your affiant asked Logan if he knew any 
way of getting a hold of Urbigkit.  
Logan stated that he did not.  
Your affiant assisted Logan in making another recorded phone call to 
Urbigkit's apartment on Grandview.  
Again, there was no answer.  
Your affiant then placed a recording device on Logan and had him go to 
Urbigkit's apartment, 2405 Grandview Place #35.  Prior to leaving the DCI parking lot, 
your affiant searched both Logan and his pick up for drugs or weapons.  Your affiant found a red Nokia cell 
phone in Logan's pick up.  No drugs 
or weapons were found.  Logan went 
to Urbigkit's apartment and knocked on the door.  No one answered.  Logan then returned to the DCI 
office.

 

            
Your affiant wrote down the numbers stored in "the phone book," as well 
as the numbers in the "call log" in the Nokia cell phone.  Your affiant noted one of the entries as 
"Sam  Girl" with the number 234-5719.  
Your affiant also noted that this number was logged as number that had 
been dialed by this phone.  Your 
affiant then asked Logan about the name and number.  Logan stated that the number was "Sam's 
old girlfriend, Lisa Costalez."  
Logan then stated that he had not spoken to Costalez for several 
months.  Your affiant then asked 
Logan again, if he knew any way to get a hold of Urbigkit, or his girlfriend 
"Johna."  Logan said that he thought 
that Johna had a cell phone, but that he did not have the number.  Logan also told your affiant that he had 
seen Urbigkit at an apartment on Honeysuckle, by the Mini-Mart in Paradise 
Valley.  Logan said that he had been 
to . . . this apartment, and drew a map of the apartment building 
for agents.  The apartment that 
Urbigkit was in, was located on the second floor, on the West side, of the 
building.  He said that he had been 
in this apartment with Urbigkit, and had bought an ounce of 
methamphetamine.  He told agents 
that he was not sure whose apartment it was.

 

            
Your affiant then met with his supervisor, Tim Hill and explained the 
above situation.  Hill called U.S. 
West and received information on the phone number 234-5719 (the number in the 
red cell phone for "Sam  Girl").  
The number came back to Johanna Holbrook, 272 Honeysuckle, Casper, 
Wyoming.

 

            
Your affiant then confronted Logan with the above information.  Logan told your affiant substantially 
the following.  He had lied to your 
affiant.  This number did belong to 
Urbigkit's girlfriend, and he had called her earlier that day.  She had told him that Urbigkit would not 
be back until after 4:00 p.m.  The 
reason he had not given this information earlier was that he was scared.  He had also been dishonest by not 
telling agents earlier that Urbigkit could have been at this apartment on 
Honeysuckle.

 

            
Based on the above false information, Logan was terminated as a DCI 
informant.  Logan was booked into 
the Natrona County Jail for the drugs he possessed on January 25, 
2001.

 

            
On February 1, 2001, at about 6:30 p.m., your affiant drove to 272 
Honeysuckle.  Your affiant noted 
that this building is an apartment building, yellow and brick.  It is located on the West side of the 
street and has a parking lot on the East side.  Your affiant noted that there was a gold 
colored Ford sedan in this driveway with the license plate 1-340DW (registered 
to Urbigkit).

 

            
On February 5, 2001, your affiant again drove by 272 Honeysuckle.  Again, your affiant noticed that the 
gold colored Ford was there, as well as a small silver colored car, with Wyoming 
license plate, 1-757DF.  Your 
affiant found this car registered to Johanna Winder, 1617 Westridge Court, on a 
silver 1988 Mazda.

 

            
On February 5, 2001, through investigation your affiant learned the 
following.  There was no one listed 
in the Casper Police Department records, as Johanna Holbrook.  Johanna Winder was listed in the CPD 
records.  She had a contact with 
officers that was drug related in 1997.  
Winder was listed in CPD records as being a white, 22 year old female, 
5'4, 120, blonde hair and blue eyes.

 

            
On February 5, 2001, at about 1:20 p.m., your affiant contacted Kevin 
Whitman, with Probation and Parole.  
Whitman confirmed that Urbigkit was on parole.  Whitman told your affiant that he had 
not had any problems with Urbigkit.  
He added that Urbigkit had passed all his urine analysis tests.  Whitman had not done any home searches 
of Urbigkit however.

 

            
On February 5, 2001, at about 1:30 p.m., your affiant did further 
investigation to attempt to confirm information provided by Logan.  Your affiant attempted to contact Teddi 
Grace, but was unable to.  Your 
affiant then called the number listed for Jeni Grace.  A woman answered the phone who 
identified herself to your affiant as Lindee Szewczyk.  She told your affiant the 
following.  Her husband used to be 
married to Jeni Grace.  
Approximately 2 months ago, Jeni's sister Teddi called her.  Teddi told her that Jeni was using a lot 
of methamphetamine, and was very strung out.  Furthermore, Jeni was living with "some 
bad people" and it would not be prudent to take Jeni's 8 year old son 
there.  She understood that the name 
of the man who Jeni lived with was "Sam."

 

            
Your affiant has confirmed the following information provided to him by 
Logan.  The person, Samuel T. 
Urbigkit (12/26/62) does exist.  
Urbigkit lives at an apartment on Grandview.  Urbigkit is associated with a girl named 
Johanna Winder, who seems to be living at 272 Honeysuckle.  Johanna Winder has a history of drug 
use.  Urbigkit is on parole.  Urbigkit has a propensity towards 
possessing firearms.  Urbigkit has 
behaved in a violent, dangerous manner.  
Urbigkit has a gold colored car and a blue [C]hevy pick up.  This pick up was parked at 980 Foster 
Rd, which is indeed a business rental unit, consistent with being a 
"shop."

 

[¶13]   From these affidavits submitted by 
a trained and experienced law enforcement officer, the issuing judge learned 
that, upon being arrested with methamphetamine in his possession, Mr. Logan 
admitted, against his penal interest, purchasing methamphetamine from Mr. 
Urbigkit.  He further admitted 
purchasing methamphetamine from the same supplier on at least two other 
occasions.  He provided details 
based upon firsthand observation concerning the quantity purchased and the 
amount paid on each occasion.  He 
identified the location of Mr. Urbigkit's apartment and shop where the buys 
occurred and identified the individual building in which Mr. Urbigkit's shop was 
located.  He also identified the 
vehicles owned by Mr. Urbigkit.  He 
very specifically identified the various firearms in Mr. Urbigkit's possession 
and described the locations where he had seen them.  Mr. Logan also gave a detailed 
description of Mr. Urbigkit's girlfriend and her vehicle and ultimately 
identified the location of her apartment where Mr. Urbigkit could be found.  

 

[¶14]   The law enforcement officer 
corroborated much of the information provided by Mr. Logan, including the 
location of the buildings where he met with Mr. Urbigkit, saw the weapons, and 
purchased methamphetamine.  The 
officer also corroborated the location, make, and model of the vehicles owned by 
Mr. Urbigkit and the information concerning Mr. Urbigkit's girlfriend.  Additionally, the law enforcement 
official confirmed Mr. Urbigkit's association with people involved with 
controlled substances.  He also 
checked Mr. Urbigkit's criminal history, which revealed a prior arrest for 
reckless endangering and possession of a concealed firearm by a convicted felon, 
two prior convictions for aggravated assault and battery causing injuries, and a 
prior conviction for aggravated assault with a weapon.  Viewing the documents in their totality 
and giving deference to the judicial issuing officer, we conclude the affidavits 
were adequate to support a finding of probable cause sufficient for the issuance 
of the warrants.  

 

[¶15]   Responding specifically to the 
contention that probable cause did not exist because Mr. Logan was not reliable, 
we have said an "informant's description of criminal activity along with 
firsthand knowledge of the events entitles his information to carry greater 
weight than it might otherwise."  
Cordova, 2001 WY 96, ¶24.  
Moreover, an admission against penal interest carries its "own indicia of 
credibility."  Id.  The affidavits in this case reflected 
that, in following up on the information provided by Mr. Logan, the 
investigating agent was able to confirm many of the details he provided.  It is true he did not verify every piece 
of information Mr. Logan supplied, but he is not required to go to those 
lengths.  Lee, 2 P.3d  at 
523-24.  Given the specific details 
furnished by Mr. Logan, his firsthand knowledge and statement against his penal 
interests, and the verification that the agent did accomplish, we hold there was 
ample probable cause to issue the warrants.  See Lee for a similar 
result.  We find this to be true 
even though Mr. Logan at one point provided false information to law 
enforcement.  When confronted by the 
investigating agent, Mr. Logan admitted the information was false and provided 
new information which law enforcement proceeded to verify.  Under these circumstances, we are 
satisfied the information provided was reasonably trustworthy. 

 

B.        
Shackling

 

[¶16]   Mr. Urbigkit contends he was denied 
his right to a fair trial by being forced to wear shackles in the courtroom 
during trial.  The record is less 
than clear with respect to this issue.  
The parties' briefs are no more helpful.  Mr. Urbigkit asserts "[i]t appears 
clearly on the face of the record that [he] was shackled" but offers no record 
cites to support the assertion.  The 
state "assumes that [Mr. Urbigkit] was shackled while testifying" but asserts 
"the record is unclear that such was the case."  Despite the state of the record, we are 
able to piece together the following events of significance to our 
review.

 

[¶17]   Prior to trial, Mr. Urbigkit filed 
motions requesting that his hands be free of restraint during trial and 
courtroom procedures be established to prevent the jury from seeing him 
shackled.  The state responded to 
Mr. Urbigkit's motions in relevant part as follows:  "The State would defer to the Court and 
its security personnel as to what restraints are appropriate . . . . In doing 
so, the Court should consider the defendant's long history of violence and 
apparent willingness to use that violence to escape responsibility."  Without hearing argument, the trial 
court deferred ruling on the defense motion until trial and after consultation 
with the bailiff.

 

[¶18]   At some point thereafter, but prior 
to the commencement of trial, the trial court ruled off the record that it would 
"accede to the sheriff's request that [Mr. Urbigkit] have his right hand free 
but his other hand be shackled and he have leg chains."  There is no indication from the record 
how or when this off-the-record ruling occurred so we do not know whether the 
parties had the opportunity to present argument prior to the ruling, nor do we 
know the factors considered or reasoning relied upon by the court.  Mr. Urbigkit does not challenge the 
off-the-record ruling as a violation of W.R.Cr.P. 12(h), and we, therefore, do 
not consider that issue. 

 

[¶19]   On the first day of trial prior to 
voir dire, Mr. Urbigkit raised the shackling issue again.  This time, the state actively argued 
against the motion on the basis of Mr. Urbigkit's history of violence, the 
nature of the charges against him, and letters he wrote while in jail awaiting 
trial allegedly reflecting violent tendencies on his part and containing 
references to possible opportunities to escape.1  The letters contained in the record on 
appeal do not reflect the statements referenced by the state in its argument; 
however, other letters which are part of the record reflect what can be fairly 
characterized as Mr. Urbigkit's enjoyment of being an "outlaw" and tangling with 
law enforcement. Following the arguments of counsel, the trial court stuck by 
its earlier off-the-record ruling requiring Mr. Urbigkit's left arm and legs to 
be shackled during trial.  There is 
nothing in the record to indicate the trial court departed from this ruling, and 
it appears Mr. Urbigkit was shackled in this manner throughout voir dire, 
opening statements, and the state's presentation of evidence.  

            

[¶20]   At the close of the prosecution's 
case, prior to Mr. Urbigkit taking the stand, defense counsel asked for 
clarification on whether he would be required to testify in shackles.  A brief discussion followed concerning 
whether it was preferable for Mr. Urbigkit to testify in shackles or be 
unshackled and have three officers stand near him as he testified.  It appears the trial court considered 
these alternatives and gave Mr. Urbigkit the choice of testifying in shackles or 
being surrounded by three law enforcement officials.  It also appears Mr. Urbigkit took the 
stand in shackles and was sworn outside the presence of the jury, the jury was 
then seated, and Mr. Urbigkit testified before the jury in shackles from the 
witness stand.

 

[¶21]   At some point during this time 
frame, an off-the-record discussion took place outside the presence of the jury 
among the trial court, the state, defense counsel, and Mr. Urbigkit concerning 
Mr. Urbigkit standing before the jury away from the witness stand and testifying 
with the aid of an exhibit.  
Apparently, the trial court arrived at some rules concerning this 
testimony and conveyed those to Mr. Urbigkit off the record, including that his 
legs would remain shackled and he was not to move.  Again the record is not clear in this 
regard, but it appears his hands were free during this part of his 
testimony.

 

[¶22]   With these events in mind, we turn 
to an examination of the law relating to the shackling of a criminal defendant 
in the presence of a jury.  We 
addressed the issue most recently in Asch v. State, 2003 WY 18, ¶62, 62 P.3d 945, ¶62 (Wyo. 2003) (some citations omitted), a case published after Mr. 
Urbigkit's trial where we held:

 

[I]n 
future cases, defendants shall not be shackled or otherwise physically 
restrained in the courtroom during a jury trial, nor shall other exceptional 
security measures be utilized, unless the State has first moved that such 
measures be utilized, the court has heard such motion, and after allowing the 
defendant an opportunity to contest the motion, the court has stated on the 
record the compelling reasons justifying the measures.  At such hearing, the State has the 
burden of establishing the necessity for particular restraints and that such 
restraints are the least drastic effective measures available.  The trial court must consider 
alternatives, and may not rely blindly on the judgment of correctional 
officers.  In exercising its 
discretion, the court should consider at least the following factors:  "[T]he seriousness of the present 
charge against the defendant; defendant's temperament and character; his age and 
physical attributes, his past record; past escapes or attempted escapes, and 
evidence of a present plan to escape; threats to harm others or cause a 
disturbance; self-destructive tendencies; the risk of mob violence or of 
attempted revenge by others; the possibility of rescue by other offenders still 
at large; the size and the mood of the audience; the nature and physical 
security of the courtroom; and the adequacy and availability of alternative 
remedies.'"  [State v.] 
Finch, 975 P.2d [967,] 1002 [(Wash. 1999)] (quoting State v. Hartzog, 
96 Wash. 2d 383, 400, 635 P.2d 694 (1981)).

 

Applying 
these principles, we held the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the 
defendant to be shackled in the courtroom throughout his trial without first 
requiring the state to justify such restraints on the record.  Of significance in applying that holding 
to this case is that the defendant was charged with felony possession of 
methamphetamine and misdemeanor interference with a peace officer (for lying 
about his identity).  There is 
nothing in Asch to indicate violent behavior or use of a deadly weapon 
justifying the use of restraints, which clearly distinguishes it from the 
present case.  With this distinction 
in mind, we turn to application of the Asch holding to the facts before 
us.  

            

[¶23]   While noting again that Mr. 
Urbigkit's trial occurred before the Asch opinion was issued, we conclude 
that what occurred here comes uncomfortably close to violating the standards 
enunciated in Asch in two respects.  
First, the trial court made its initial ruling off the record leaving us 
to speculate as to its reasoning.  
Then, when it later announced its decision to adhere to its earlier 
ruling, the trial court gave only a cursory explanation of its reasoning.  Second, there are indications in the 
record that the trial court relied heavily (although perhaps not "blindly") on 
the judgment of law enforcement.  
What we hoped to accomplish in Asch is for trial courts to conduct 
a thorough, independent, case-by-case review of whether restraints are necessary 
rather than allowing law enforcement to establish a procedure which is followed 
by rote in criminal cases.  While 
the record before us does not indicate as clearly as we would like that the 
trial court considered the issue thoroughly and independently, we conclude the 
manner in which the shackling issue was resolved generally complied with the 
spirit of Asch.  

 

[¶24]   The state presented argument that 
restraints were necessary given Mr. Urbigkit was charged with seven counts of 
aggravated assault and four counts of attempted first-degree murder.  The state further argued that Mr. 
Urbigkit's history of violence, which included three prior convictions for 
aggravated assault and battery and one prior conviction for possession of a 
firearm, made restraints necessary.  
Finally, the state argued that letters written by Mr. Urbigkit while 
incarcerated and awaiting trial indicated a propensity for violence and a desire 
to escape.  Again, the letters 
included in the record do not contain the statements referenced by the state, 
but they do demonstrate Mr. Urbigkit's clear disdain for law enforcement and law 
and order in general.  The trial 
court heard the state's arguments for using restraints in open court just prior 
to trial.  Mr. Urbigkit had an 
opportunity to respond, and then the trial court stated on the record that there 
were sufficient security concerns to justify the use of restraints.  It is apparent from the record that the 
trial court felt compelling reasons existed for the use of restraints.  There is no question Mr. Urbigkit's 
history and the conduct leading to the charges in this case demonstrate a 
pattern of violent behavior.  It is also apparent 
the trial court considered alternative measures, including having additional law 
enforcement personnel in the courtroom during Mr. Urbigkit's testimony.  Although we 
continue to urge trial courts and counsel in the future to insure the record 
demonstrates the standards in Asch were followed, in 
this case, we find the state adequately justified the use of restraints on the 
record and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring Mr. 
Urbigkit to be shackled in the courtroom throughout his trial.  

 

C.        Motion 
for Change of Venue

 

[¶25]   Prior to trial, Mr. Urbigkit moved for 
a change of venue on the ground that extensive pretrial publicity made it 
impossible for him to receive a fair trial in Natrona County.  He also argued that 
publicity implicating him in a homicide investigation created the risk that he 
would be convicted on a charge not yet filed.  At a pretrial hearing, the trial court denied 
the motion without prejudice, reserving Mr. Urbigkit's right to renew the motion 
following voir dire.  When defense counsel renewed the motion after 
voir dire, the trial court again denied it.  

 

[¶26]   We review the denial of a motion for 
change of venue under an abuse of discretion standard, meaning we will not 
interfere with the trial court's decision unless the trial court acted in a 
manner exceeding the bounds of reason under the circumstances.  Nixon v. State, 994 P.2d 324, 326-27 (Wyo. 1999).  The party moving 
for change of venue has the burden of showing actual prejudice in the minds of 
the jurors so great that a fair trial cannot be obtained.  Id. at 327.

 

[¶27]   We have summarized the law in Wyoming 
relating to change of venue as follows:

 

Criminal defendants in Wyoming have a constitutional right 
to a trial by an impartial jury.  Wyoming's constitutional provision grants the 
right to trial "by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed."  Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10.  The legislative 
provision mirroring the constitution requires "[e]very criminal case shall be 
tried in the county in which the indictment or offense charged is found, except 
as otherwise provided by law."  Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 1-7-102(a) (LEXIS 1999).  Trial proceedings 
are transferred to another county "only if the court is satisfied that there 
exists within the county where the prosecution is pending so great a prejudice 
against the defendant that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial 
trial in that county."  W.R.Cr.P. 21(a).

 

This Court has adopted a two-part test for determining 
whether a change of venue should be granted after voir 
dire because of pre-trial publicity:  "First, the nature and extent of the 
publicity must be considered; second, the difficulty or ease in selecting a jury 
must be considered along with the amount of prejudice which actually appears 
during voir dire examination.'"  Sides[ v. State], 963 P.2d 
[227,] 231 [(Wyo. 1998)] (quoting Murry[ v. State], 713 P.2d [202,] 208 [(Wyo. 1986)]).

 

Id. (citation omitted).

 

[¶28]   Regarding the first prong of the test, 
Mr. Urbigkit provided the trial court with twelve articles from the local 
newspaper referencing the circumstances of his arrest, the charges filed against 
him in this case, other persons facing similar charges with whom he allegedly 
had ties, and a homicide being investigated by local police.  Several of the 
articles also referenced Mr. Urbigkit in relation to the homicide 
investigation.  
While the press coverage was not insignificant2 in the months 
of February and March of 2001, the last article appearing in the record is dated 
April 5, 2001, approximately three months before trial.  The articles are 
generally factual in nature, reporting information obtained from court 
documents, and we do not find them to be sensational, inflammatory, or grossly 
prejudicial.  
Neither the nature nor the extent of the news coverage justifies a 
finding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion under 
the first prong of the test for determining whether a change of venue was 
appropriate. 

 

[¶29]   As for the second prong of the test, 
the difficulty or ease of jury selection or the amount of prejudice appearing 
during voir dire, we likewise see nothing in the 
record requiring reversal.  Only five of the forty-eight prospective 
jurors expressed concern about their ability to be fair and impartial because of 
the pretrial publicity.  None of the five remained on the jury.  There is simply no 
indication in the record that the pretrial publicity in this case made jury 
selection more difficult or created such prejudice that a change of venue was 
appropriate.  
We affirm the trial court's order denying the motion for a change of 
venue.  

 

D.        Failure 
to Swear Jury

 

[¶30]   On the afternoon of the second day of 
trial, it came to the trial court's attention that the jury had not been sworn 
in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-107 (LexisNexis 2001), which 
provides:

 

As soon as the jury is selected an oath or affirmation 
shall be administered to the jurors providing, in substance, that they and each 
of them will well and truly try the matter in issue between the state of 
Wyoming, plaintiff, and the named defendant, and render a true verdict according 
to the evidence.

 

The trial court excused the jury, informed the parties of 
what had happened, and recessed early to allow them an opportunity to research 
the issue and decide how they wished to proceed.  When court was reconvened the following 
morning, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing the statute is mandatory, 
not permissive, and prejudice to Mr. Urbigkit was inherent.  The trial court 
denied the motion, citing case law holding that error in failing to swear a jury 
is not reversible in the absence of actual prejudice where the error is 
discovered and corrected prior to commencement of deliberation.  The trial court 
informed the jury of the error and administered the oath.  The trial court 
also confirmed with the jury the importance of the oath, its duty to follow the 
court's instructions, and its duty to determine the facts from all the evidence 
presented and arrive at a verdict free from prejudice.

 

[¶31]   The question of whether it is 
reversible error to inadvertently fail to administer the oath to the jury is one 
of first impression in Wyoming.  Under the circumstances presented here, we 
agree with the holding in People v. Clouse, 859 P.2d 228, 233 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992), that the failure to administer the oath 
constituted harmless error.  The mistake was discovered in the afternoon 
of the second day of a seven-day trial after the testimony of only three of 
thirty-seven witnesses testifying for the state.  As in Clouse, the 
jury was sworn in long before deliberations, and the jury was informed it was to 
consider all the evidence presented, both before and after the oath, in the same 
manner.  
Finding no prejudice, we uphold the trial court's ruling in this regard. 

 

E.        
Interference in Attorney-Client Relationship

 

[¶32]   On the first day of trial, a deputy was 
seated near the defense table where Mr. Urbigkit and his attorneys were 
seated.  Prior 
to jury selection, defense counsel objected to the officer's presence on the 
basis that it would have a chilling effect on Mr. Urbigkit's ability to 
communicate with his attorneys and would give the jury the impression he was 
dangerous.  The 
trial court ruled that the deputy would remain where he was, stating as 
follows:

 

            
I would note for the record that the deputy has been advised that if he 
overhears any conversation between any of the defense counsel, including their 
intern, and Mr. Urbigkit, that he is not to reveal that to anyone.  He's indicated his 
understanding of that and indicated that he had previously been advised of that 
sacred requirement.

 

            
And in addition, for the record, the deputy is sitting in a chair along 
the wall and at midpoint, half point, between the prosecutor's table and defense 
table and as far as practicable as possible from Mr. Urbigkit, so he shouldn't 
overhear any conversations to start with.

 

Mr. Urbigkit claims on appeal that the deputy's presence 
denied him the right to effectively defend and participate in his defense 
guaranteed by the United States and Wyoming Constitutions.  U.S. Const. amends. 
V, VI; Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 6, 10.

 

[¶33]   It has long been recognized that, under 
some circumstances, a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights may be violated by the 
state's intrusion into the attorney-client relationship.  United States v. Morrison, 
449 U.S. 361 (1981); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977).  
The premise of cases recognizing this principle, however, is that "the 
constitutional infringement . . . has had or threatens some adverse 
effect upon the effectiveness of counsel's representation or has produced some 
other prejudice to the defendant."  Morrison, 449 U.S.  at 365.  
Where there is no demonstration of prejudice of any kind to the ability 
of defense counsel to provide adequate representation, there is no basis for 
invoking the Sixth Amendment to interfere with the criminal proceeding.  Id.     

 

[¶34]   Here, there is no evidence the deputy 
seated near defense counsel heard anything said by Mr. Urbigkit and his 
attorneys, nor is there an allegation of prejudice resulting from use of such 
information by the prosecution at trial.  Mr. Urbigkit also presents no evidence of 
prejudice in terms of conversations he would have had but did not have because 
of the deputy's presence, nor does he provide other specifics as to how his 
defense was different because of the seating arrangement.  Under these 
circumstances, we uphold the trial court's decision.  

 

F.         
Exclusion of Witness Statement

 

[¶35]   Approximately two and one-half hours 
after the shooting events of February 7, 2001, Steven Freel, a police officer, 
interviewed Joleen Summers, one of the passengers in Mr. Urbigkit's vehicle 
during the shooting, at the Natrona County Detention Center.  During that 
interview, Officer Freel asked Ms. Summers what happened that morning.  Ms. Summers 
responded as follows:

 

I was in the car and the next thing I know there's cars all 
around and there's a shot, we start getting shot at and it's there no, somebody 
says, get the hell out and I fell out of the car and I started walking and the 
cops said, put your hands up.  An investigator put me in handcuffs.

 

At trial, defense counsel sought to question Officer Freel 
about Ms. Summer's statement.  The state objected to testimony concerning 
Ms. Summer's statement on hearsay grounds.  Defense counsel responded that the statement 
fell within the excited utterance and the statement against interest exceptions 
to the hearsay rule.  
The trial court sustained the objection, precluding defense counsel from 
introducing the statement or eliciting testimony about it.

 

[¶36]   The trial court's decisions with 
respect to the admissibility of evidence are entitled to considerable deference, 
and, as long as there exists a legitimate basis for the trial court's ruling, we 
will not reverse that ruling on appeal.  Lawson v. State, 
994 P.2d 943, 947 (Wyo. 2000). 

 

[¶37]   W.R.E. 803(2) provides:

 

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even 
though the declarant is available as a witness:

 

            
. . . .

 

            
(2) Excited Utterance.  A statement relating to a startling event or 
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by 
the event or condition.

 

Citing this provision, Mr. Urbigkit argues the statement 
was admissible because, only a short time before, Ms. Summers had been in the 
midst of a gun battle, and Officer Freel testified she was nervous and excited 
when she made the statement.  Citing James v. 
State, 888 P.2d 200, 206 (Wyo. 1994), Mr. Urbigkit further argues that 
neither the lapse of approximately two and one-half hours between the gun battle 
and the utterance nor the fact that Ms. Summers made the statement in response 
to the question "what happened this morning" was dispositive of whether the 
exception in W.R.E. 803(2) applied.

 

[¶38]   Mr. Urbigkit's citations to James are correct as far as they go.  James sets out five factors to be considered in 
determining whether the excited utterance exception applies, which include the 
nature of the startling event, the declarant's physical manifestations of 
excitement, the declarant's age, the lapse of time between the event and the 
statement, and whether the statement was made in response to an inquiry.  James also held, as Mr. Urbigkit claims, that lapse of 
time and the fact a statement is made in response to an inquiry do not 
necessarily mean a statement is not an excited utterance.  However, as was 
said in James, the ultimate inquiry is whether the 
declarant's condition at the time was such that the statement was spontaneous, 
excited, or impulsive and the result of stress from the events witnessed rather 
than the product of reflection and deliberation.  888 P.2d  at 207.  On this basis, we 
upheld the admission of the statements at issue in James because there was ample evidence the declarant 
was hysterical at the time she made them fifteen to twenty minutes after 
observing the events.  

 

[¶39]   Rulings as to the admissibility of 
evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not 
disturb those rulings absent a clear abuse of that discretion.  Id. at 206.  We will not find an abuse of discretion as 
long as a legitimate basis exists for a ruling.  Dike v. State, 
990 P.2d 1012, 1020-21 (Wyo. 1999).  It is only when the trial court acted in a 
manner exceeding the bounds of reason that we find an abuse of discretion.  Id. at 1021.  Applying this standard, we are unable to say 
the trial court abused its discretion in precluding the statement of Ms. 
Summers.  While 
the event itself was no doubt startling, the record establishes that the 
statement was made by an adult in response to a police inquiry at the detention 
center approximately two and one-half hours after the event.  In that sense, it 
is not clear it was a spontaneous utterance in response to the event 
itself.  By 
itself, Officer Freel's testimony that Ms. Summers seemed excited or nervous at 
the time is not enough to bring the statement within W.R.E. 803(2).  

 

[¶40]   Mr. Urbigkit also contends the 
statement of Ms. Summers was admissible as a statement against interest under 
W.R.E. 804(b)(3), which provides:

 

(b) Hearsay Exceptions.  The following are not excluded by the hearsay 
rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:

 

            
. . . .

 

            
(3) Statement Against Interest.  A statement which was at the time of its 
making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or 
so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render 
invalid a claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in his position 
would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.  A statement tending 
to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the 
accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate 
the trustworthiness of the statement.

 

Defense counsel argued at trial that the statement "get the 
hell out" of the car was against Ms. Summers' interest because, at the time she 
made the statement, she was under arrest and subject to potential penalties for 
interfering with law enforcement.  Like the trial court, we fail to see how the 
words "get the hell out" of the car is a statement against interest.  We find the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in precluding the statement.

 

G.        
Instructing Jury That State Did Not Have to Prove All Theories on 
Aggravated Assault

 

[¶41]   Mr. Urbigkit contends plain error 
occurred when the trial court instructed the jury that the state did not have to 
prove every element of the crime charged when the word "or" appeared in the 
instruction.  
He refers to Instruction No. 9 which stated in pertinent part:

 

            
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the Information in 
this case provides in pertinent part as follows:

 

            
"COMES NOW . . . Assistant District Attorney, 
Seventh Judicial District, State of Wyoming, and in the name and by the 
authority of the State of Wyoming, informs the Court and gives the Court to 
understand

 

COUNT ONE

 

            
That Samuel Urbigkit late of the County aforesaid, on or about the 7th day of February, 2001, in the County of Natrona, 
in the State of Wyoming, did 
unlawfully and knowingly cause or attempt to cause bodily injury to another, 
namely:  Brad 
Wnuk, with a deadly 
weapon, namely a motor vehicle, or did threaten to use a drawn deadly weapon on 
another, in violation of W.S. 1977, §6-2-502[.]"

 

 (Emphasis added.)  Except for the name 
of the victim, the instruction contains the identical language for counts two 
and three.  
Counts four through seven are also identical except for the victim's name 
and the substitution of the words "namely a firearm" for "namely a motor 
vehicle."  The 
jury was given the further additional instruction with respect to each 
count:

 

            
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the elements of the 
crime of Aggravated Assault and Battery, as charged in Count One of this case, 
are:

 

1.  On or about the 7th day of February, 
2001

 

2.  In the County of Natrona, and State of 
Wyoming

 

3.  The Defendant, Samuel Urbigkit

 

4.  Attempted to cause or knowingly caused

 

5.  Bodily injury to another namely [victim's name]

 

6.  With a deadly weapon

 

                  
     OR

 

7.  Did threaten another namely [victim's name]

 

8.  With a drawn deadly weapon, to-wit a motor 
vehicle.

 

(Emphasis added.)  Mr. Urbigkit was convicted on six counts of 
aggravated assault and battery, two for using a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon 
and four for using a firearm as a deadly weapon.  He contends these convictions cannot stand 
because it is not clear on what ground the jury based its finding of 
guiltknowingly causing or attempting to cause 
bodily injury with a deadly weapon or threatening 
another with a deadly weapon.  Mr. Urbigkit asserts juror confusion was 
apparent because the jury asked the following question during 
deliberations:  
"Does the or' on count[s] 1-7 mean that 4-6 must be proved or 7-8 or 4-8 
must be proved Inclusive?"  He alleges plain error occurred when the 
trial court answered the question as follows:  "You are instructed that the word or' refers 
to two separate theories.  The State may prove either theory, but does 
not have to prove both."  We review the question for plain error 
because defense counsel did not object to the court's instruction.  Therefore, Mr. 
Urbigkit must prove that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a 
clear and obvious way resulting in denial of a substantial right and material 
prejudice.

 

[¶42]   In two recent cases, we addressed the 
issue of the state's failure to particularize which portions of a criminal 
statute it was relying upon for conviction.  May v. State, 
2003 WY 14, 62 P.3d 574 (Wyo. 2003); Tanner v. State, 2002 WY 170, 57 P.3d 1242 (Wyo. 2002).  Prior to those 
cases, we also addressed the issue in Bush v. State, 
908 P.2d 963, 966 (Wyo. 1995), wherein we held that a verdict must be set aside 
in cases where the verdict is supportable on one ground but not on another and 
it is impossible to tell which ground the jury selected.  As in the present 
case, all three of those prior casesBush, Tanner, and Mayinvolved 
charging documents and jury instructions which quoted language directly from a 
criminal statute containing alternative grounds for conviction of the crime 
charged.  Bush and Tanner concerned 
Wyoming's burglary statute while May involved 
aggravated burglary; in each case, however, the jury was instructed that the 
defendant was guilty of the crime charged if the evidence showed he entered a 
building without authority with the intent to commit larceny or the intent to commit a felony.  Because the 
evidence was not sufficient to show entry with the intent to commit both larceny and a felony, we reversed the burglary 
convictions in Bush and Tanner and the aggravated burglary conviction in May.  While those cases involved sufficiency of the 
evidence claims rather than error in instructing the jury as Mr. Urbigkit 
claims, they make it clear that, where a jury is instructed in the alternative 
and returns a general verdict of guilty, the evidence in the record must support 
the conviction on each alternative ground.

 

[¶43]   In the present case, Mr. Urbigkit 
claims error occurred when the trial court told the jury the state did not have 
to prove all theories set forth in the instructionscausing and attempting to cause injury and threatening to cause injury.  Under the foregoing 
cases, and a long line of cases before them, the trial court's instruction to 
the jury was not a correct statement of Wyoming law.  Under the plain 
error doctrine, Mr. Urbigkit has established that the instruction violated a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law in a clear and obvious way.  The question then 
becomes whether that violation resulted in the denial of a substantial right and 
material prejudice.  
The answer to that question turns upon whether there was substantial 
evidence to support a guilty verdict on both theories contained in the 
instructions.  
If there was substantial evidence supporting both theories, it is 
difficult to see how the trial court's instruction resulted in the denial of a 
substantial right or material prejudice.  If, however, substantial evidence did not 
support a finding of guilt on both theories, the instruction did result in the 
denial of a substantial right and material prejudice.     

 

H.        
Sufficiency of the Evidence on the Aggravated Assault Charges

            

[¶44]   Our standard for reviewing sufficiency 
of the evidence claims is well settled:

 

When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim in a 
criminal case, we must determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the 
essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  We do not consider 
conflicting evidence presented by the unsuccessful party, and afford every 
favorable inference which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from the successful 
party's evidence.  
We have consistently held that it is the jury's responsibility to resolve 
conflicts in the evidence.  "We will not substitute our judgment for that 
of the jury, . . . our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of 
reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same 
result as the jury actually did."  [Bloomquist v. 
State, 914 P.2d 812, 824 (Wyo. 1996)].

 

Williams v. State, 986 P.2d 855, 857 (Wyo. 1999) (some citations omitted); 
see also May, 2003 WY 
14, ¶11.

 

[¶45]   We turn to the question of whether 
there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions for aggravated assault 
and battery based upon the theories identified in the instructionsthat Mr. 
Urbigkit knowingly caused or attempted to cause 
bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon or 
threatened to use a deadly weapon on another.  Under the Bush 
line of cases, there must be sufficient evidence that Mr. Urbigkit caused 
injury, attempted to cause injury, and threatened to 
use a deadly weapon in order for the convictions to stand.  Under the 
particular facts of this case as they appear in the record, if there was 
sufficient evidence showing Mr. Urbigkit knowingly caused injury to the victims, 
the evidence likewise was sufficient to establish the attempt and the threat to 
cause injury.  
In order to uphold the jury verdict on the six counts of aggravated 
assault and battery, therefore, there must be sufficient evidence of an injury 
on each count.  

 

[¶46]   The evidence with regard to Mr. 
Urbigkit's use of his motor vehicle as a deadly weapon showed he turned his 
vehicle hard to the right, causing the back to swing around toward Agent Wnuk, 
who testified he would have been hit if he had not jumped out of the way.  Even so, Mr. 
Urbigkit's vehicle and Agent Wnuk's hand came into contact as the vehicle spun 
around.  Agent 
Wnuk injured his left knee in the course of trying to avoid being hit.  The evidence 
further showed Mr. Urbigkit drove his car directly at Agent TeBeest, 
accelerating as he went and forcing Agent TeBeest to jump onto the hood of the 
car to avoid being hit.  Mr. Urbigkit testified he had no thought of 
stopping his vehicle when Agent TeBeest was up on his hood.  Instead, he 
continued to accelerate, scaring Agent TeBeest and causing him to let go and 
roll off the hood.

 

[¶47]   With respect to the aggravated assault 
charges arising out of his use of a firearm, the evidence showed Mr. Urbigkit 
fired his gun multiple times at Deputy Arnold, Deputy Holbrook, Patrolman Dye, 
and Officer Adkins.  
Mr. Urbigkit testified he knew he was threatening the officers' 
well-being when he fired his gun at them and that was exactly what he wanted to 
do.  The 
evidence was that Mr. Urbigkit aimed directly at the officers and the bullets 
came so close to the officers that they could hear them going by their 
heads.  The 
officers testified that, while Mr. Urbigkit was firing at them, they felt their 
lives were in danger.  

 

[¶48]   Giving this evidence every favorable 
inference which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from it and leaving out of 
consideration conflicting evidence, we hold that a quorum of reasonable and 
rational individuals could have concluded from the evidence presented that, when 
Mr. Urbigkit drove his motor vehicle directly at Agents Wnuk and TeBeest, he 
injured and attempted to injure them with a deadly 
weapon and threatened use of a deadly weapon.  The convictions on 
those two counts of aggravated assault and battery, therefore, are upheld.  However, with 
regard to the other four convictions of aggravated assault and battery, there is 
no evidence that Deputy Arnold, Deputy Holbrook, Patrolman Dye, or Officer 
Adkins was injured when Mr. Urbigkit fired his gun at them.  Absent evidence 
that Mr. Urbigkit injured them and attempted to 
injure them and threatened them with a deadly 
weapon, we cannot uphold the jury verdict on those counts.  Rather, we must 
reverse Mr. Urbigkit's convictions for aggravated assault and battery on counts 
four through seven and remand with directions to the trial court to enter a 
judgment of acquittal on those counts.  May, 2003 WY 14, 
¶25.  

 

[¶49]   As we said in May 
and Tanner, it is with frustration that we reverse 
the convictions as to these counts because the error was so easily avoidable by 
the state.  All 
that is required is the drafting of more specific charging documents to begin 
with; amendment of those documents once discovery and investigation clarify the 
allegations; or, in those cases where the state chooses to present alternative 
theories, presentation of sufficient evidence of both or inclusion of a special 
interrogatory verdict form requiring the jury to indicate which theory formed 
the basis for the conviction.  May, 2003 WY 14, 
¶¶26-28.

 

I.          
Merger of Sentences for Aggravated Assault and Attempted First-Degree 
Murder

 

[¶50]   Mr. Urbigkit claims the sentences for 
aggravated assault and attempted first-degree murder against Deputy Holbrook, 
Deputy Arnold, Patrolman Dye, and Officer Adkins must merge because the facts 
reveal a single criminal act rather than multiple or distinct offenses.  Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 254 (Wyo. 2000).  Having already 
reversed the aggravated assault and battery convictions arising out of the acts 
committed against those law enforcement officials, we do not address Mr. 
Urbigkit's merger claim. 

 

J.         
Failure to Give All Jury Instructions Before Closing Arguments

 

[¶51]   At the beginning of the trial, the 
trial court read Instruction Nos. 1 through 7 to the jury.  At the close of the 
evidence, the trial court did not reread those instructions but read only 
Instruction Nos. 8 through 46.  Citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-201 (LexisNexis 
2001) and W.R.Cr.P. 30, Mr. Urbigkit claims it was error for the trial court not 
to read all the instructions after the close of the evidence.  Because no 
objection was made, the plain error doctrine appliesMr. Urbigkit must 
demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and 
obvious way and he was denied a substantial right or materially prejudiced as a 
result.  

 

[¶52]   Section 7-11-201(a)(vi) provides in 
relevant part as follows:

 

(a) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial 
shall proceed in the following order:

 

            
. . .

 

            
(vi) Before the argument of the case is begun, the court shall 
immediately, and before proceeding with other business, charge the jury.

 

W.R.Cr.P. 30 provides in part as follows:

 

(a)  . . . Before the argument of 
the case to the jury has begun, the court shall give to the jury such 
instructions on the law as may be necessary . . . .

 

            
(b)  . . . Before opening statements, the court 
shall provide jurors with any general and case-specific instructions that would 
seem likely to help jurors understand their function during trial, and the 
issues that they will be required to decide. These preliminary instructions 
should include any pertinent case-specific instructions that the court 
anticipates including in the final jury instructions, if the court concludes 
that it would be helpful to jurors to receive the instructions both at the 
beginning of the case and again before closing arguments.

 

Mr. Urbigkit argues these provisions required the trial 
court to give all the instructions at the close of the evidence, even those 
previously given before opening statements.  Given the language of the provisions, he 
cannot show that the trial court violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law in 
a clear and obvious way.  

 

[¶53]   Section 7-11-201(a)(vi) provides only 
that the trial court must charge the jury before argument of the case 
begins.  It 
does not preclude the court from giving some instructions before opening 
statements or require that all instructions be given again just before closing 
arguments.  
W.R.Cr.P. 30 likewise requires the court to give instructions before 
closing arguments but does not prevent the court from reading some instructions 
before opening statements.  In fact, the rule expressly authorizes the 
court to give preliminary instructions likely to help the jury understand its 
function before opening statements.  Under both the statute and the rule, it was 
well within the trial court's discretion to give the presumption of innocence 
instruction before opening statements.  While it may be advisable to also give the 
instruction again before closing arguments, it was not plain error for the trial 
court not to reread the instruction. The instruction was read before opening 
statements, defense counsel  had the opportunity to remind the jury of the 
instruction during closing arguments, and the instruction was given to the jury 
along with the other instructions when it retired to the jury room to deliberate 
so it had the opportunity to review it.  We find no reversible error on this 
issue.  

 

K.        
Imposition of Multiple and Consecutive Life Sentences

 

[¶54]   Mr. Urbigkit claims the habitual 
criminal statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201 (LexisNexis 2001), provides for 
punishment by imprisonment for "life," not life for each conviction.  On this basis, he 
asserts the trial court exceeded its statutory authority when it imposed 
multiple sentences of life in prison.  

 

[¶55]   When a criminal sentence is within the 
parameters set by the legislature, it will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 
discretion.  Dodge v. State, 951 P.2d 383, 385 (Wyo. 1997).  Section 6-10-201 
(emphasis added) provides:

 

(a)  A person is [a] habitual criminal if:

 

            
(i)  He is convicted of a violent felony; and

 

(ii)  He has been convicted of a felony on two 
(2) or more previous charges separately brought and tried which arose out of 
separate occurrences in this state or elsewhere.

 

            
(b)  [A] habitual criminal shall be punished by imprisonment 
for:

 

(i)  Not less than ten (10) years nor more than 
fifty (50) years, if he has two (2) previous convictions;

 

(ii)  Life, if he has three (3) or more previous 
convictions. 

 

In Lacey v. State, 803 P.2d 1364, 1372 (Wyo. 1990) (citation omitted), we said:

 

            
The purpose of the habitual criminal statute is to provide additional 
punishment for people who have not been deterred by previous penalties.  That purpose 
applies regardless of whether the habitual criminal commits more than one felony 
during a single occurrence or more than one felony in separate occurrences.  We hold that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion when it enhanced two sentences for 
two convictions arising out of a single occurrence.

 

For the same reasons, we hold that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion when it enhanced each sentence for each conviction of a 
violent felony arising out of the February 7, 2001, occurrence. 

 

[¶56]   Mr. Urbigkit also contends the trial 
court violated his right to be free from double jeopardy when it used prior 
convictions in 1983, 1987, and 1997 to enhance each of his aggravated assault 
convictions.  
In Kearns v. 
State, 2002 WY 97, ¶24, 48 P.3d 1090, ¶24 (Wyo. 2002), we 
said:

 

The intent behind Wyoming's habitual criminal statute is to 
provide enhanced punishment to an individual who has engaged in a pattern of 
violent criminal conduct.  For that reason, the fact that some prior 
crimes have already been used to enhance a sentence does not preclude the use of 
the same crimes to enhance a later sentence. . . . 
". . . A habitual criminal statute does not punish a defendant 
for his previous offenses but for his persistence in crime, and it has been said 
that to be a habitual criminal involves a status rather than the commission of a 
separate offense.'"  
Evans[ v. State], 
655 P.2d [1214,] 1220-21 [(Wyo. 1982)] (quoting 39 Am. Jur. 2d, Habitual Criminals and Subsequent Offenders, § 2, pp. 
308-310 (1968)).

 

Thus, the use of Mr. Urbigkit's prior convictions to 
enhance his aggravated assault convictions did not violate his right against 
double jeopardy.

 

L.         
Cumulative Error

 

[¶57]   Finally, Mr. Urbigkit claims his 
convictions must be reversed on the basis that cumulative error occurred at 
trial.  Having 
rejected all but one of his claims of error, we find no cumulative error 
warranting reversal.

 

[¶58]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded.

 

FOOTNOTES

1The state described the letters to the trial court as 
follows:

 

Just Thursday night, we seized a series of letters from the 
home of Johanna Winder; and just a few quotes, I think, are pertinent to the 
record.

 

He's talking about fighting.  Got to get back in fighting fit as soon as 
possible.  
Never know when the chance will come.

 

He's made comments to the nurses in the jail that he -- if 
they have to pull him off the fence, that he would try it.

 

Another comment, if he gets convicted, he thought he could 
get a commutation in 15 years, stating, ["]But I'm not going to be hanging 
around that long.["]

 

He -- there's a number of comments through here that he 
says, ["]You never know when your chance might come.["]

 

And he talks about if the 
van crashed, that would be a chance; that he would take a chance even if it was 
a long one.

 

2The attachments to Mr. 
Urbigkit's motion for a change of venue reflect that over the eight-week period 
between February 9, 2001, and April 5, 2001, the local newspaper printed twelve 
articles mentioning Mr. Urbigkit and the events of February 7, 2001.