Case Title: In re Marriage of Burgess

Citation: 

Docket Number: 86974

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-02-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Opinion filed February 17, 2000.
JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
The issue presented in this case is whether the plenary guardian of a 
disabled adult has standing to proceed with a dissolution of marriage action 
filed by the ward prior to the adjudication of the ward's disability. We hold 
that a plenary guardian may continue a dissolution action on behalf of a ward in 
these circumstances.
BACKGROUND
The relevant facts in this case are undisputed. Donald Burgess and Sharron 
Burgess were married in 1978. In April 1996, Donald filed a petition for 
dissolution of their marriage. In addition, he filed a petition for an emergency 
order of protection against Sharron, which the circuit court granted.
In May 1997, Donald's sister, Virginia Cronk (Cronk), filed a petition for 
appointment of guardian for a disabled person, in which she alleged that Donald 
was incapable of making or communicating decisions regarding the care of his 
person and that he was unable to manage his financial affairs. Cronk requested 
that the circuit court adjudge Donald a disabled person and that she be 
appointed guardian of his person and estate. In June 1997, the circuit court 
appointed Cronk guardian of Donald's person and estate.
In July 1997, Sharron filed a motion to dismiss Donald's dissolution action 
on the ground that Cronk had no standing to continue this action on behalf of 
Donald. The circuit court denied her motion but, pursuant to Sharron's request, 
certified the following question for review by the appellate court under Supreme 
Court Rule 308(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 308(a)): "Can a disabled adult's plenary 
guardian (a guardian of both the individual's estate and person) continue a 
dissolution of marriage action originally filed by the disabled adult prior to 
the filing of a petition for guardianship and prior to a finding of disability?" 
302 Ill. App. 3d 807, 808.
The appellate court answered the certified question in the negative. 
302 Ill. App. 3d at 812. The appellate court found that its holding was 
mandated by this court's decision in In re Marriage of Drews, 115 Ill. 2d 201 (1986). According to the appellate court, Drews held that, 
absent a specific statute authorizing a guardian to initiate or maintain a 
dissolution of marriage proceeding for a ward, a guardian is without standing to 
do so. The appellate court found no such statutory authority and, therefore, 
concluded that Cronk was without standing to prosecute Donald's dissolution 
action. We granted Donald's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 
315.
ANALYSIS
Section 11a-18 of the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/11a-18 (West 1996)) 
sets forth the powers of a guardian of the estate. The powers of a guardian of 
the person are contained in section 11a-17 of the Probate Act (755 ILCS 5/11a-17 
(West 1996)), which describes the guardian's authority to make personal 
decisions on behalf of a ward as follows:
Donald argues that the appellate court erred in holding that a guardian has 
no standing to continue a ward's action for dissolution of marriage because the 
authority to do so is implicit in the language of section 11a-17. Sharron 
responds that, under this court's decision in Drews, a guardian may not 
initiate or continue a ward's dissolution proceeding unless that power is 
specifically enumerated in a statute. Sharron asserts that, because neither 
section 11a-17 nor any other statute expressly authorizes a guardian to continue 
a dissolution action previously filed by a ward, the appellate court was correct 
in denying Cronk standing to pursue Donald's dissolution action.
Therefore, our initial inquiry in this case is whether an express grant of 
statutory authority is necessary for a guardian to continue a ward's dissolution 
action. In other cases involving guardians' authority to make personal decisions 
on behalf of a ward, Illinois courts have held that the guardians may make such 
decisions under section 11a-17 even though the power to do so is not 
specifically enunciated. For example, courts have held that guardians may decide 
on behalf of a ward to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration (see In 
re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 45-46 (1989); In re Estate of 
Greenspan, 137 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (1990)), may consent to an adult ward's 
adoption (In re Adoption of Savory, 102 Ill. App. 3d 276, 277-78 
(1981)), and may consent to an abortion on behalf of a disabled ward (In re 
Estate of D.W., 134 Ill. App. 3d 788, 791 (1985)).
In Drews, however, this court decided that, with respect to the 
decision to initiate dissolution of marriage proceedings, a guardian must have 
specific statutory authority. The ward's mother in Drews was named 
guardian of her son's person and estate after her son became disabled as the 
result of a severe head injury. Following her appointment as guardian, the 
mother filed a dissolution of marriage action on her son's behalf. The son's 
wife filed a motion to dismiss the action on the basis that the mother did not 
have standing to bring the action. Drews, 115 Ill. 2d  at 202-03.
In determining whether the mother had standing to initiate a proceeding for 
dissolution of her son's marriage, the Drews court examined case law 
from other jurisdictions. The court found that a majority of jurisdictions which 
had considered the issue had held that, "absent statutory authorization, a 
guardian cannot maintain an action, on behalf of a ward, for the dissolution of 
a ward's marriage." Drews, 115 Ill. 2d  at 203. This court observed 
that, in previous cases involving different issues, it had recited this majority 
rule with approval. Drews, 115 Ill. 2d  at 204, citing Pyott v. 
Pyott, 191 Ill. 280, 288 (1901) (guardian seeking annulment of a ward's 
marriage); Iago v. Iago, 168 Ill. 339, 341-42 (1897) (guardian 
defending dissolution of marriage proceedings). The court concluded that 
Illinois follows the majority rule that, "absent statutory authorization, a 
guardian cannot institute an action, on behalf of a ward, for the dissolution of 
the ward's marriage." Drews, 115 Ill. 2d  at 205.
The Drews court then examined sections 11a-17 and 11a-18 of the 
Probate Act to determine whether there is statutory authority for a guardian to 
bring a dissolution action. The court found no such authority in section 11a-18 
of the Probate Act because this provision grants guardians standing to represent 
a ward only with respect to legal proceedings concerning the ward's estate. 
Likewise, there is nothing in section 11a-17 that "grants the guardian standing 
to maintain or defend any legal proceeding." (Emphasis in original.) 
Drews, 115 Ill. 2d  at 206. This court then concluded in Drews 
that, given the absence of statutory authority, the mother lacked standing to 
"maintain an action for the dissolution of her ward's marriage." Drews, 
115 Ill. 2d  at 207.
Although the issue in the instant case may be similar to that in 
Drews, we find that the strict rule adopted in Drews, 
requiring express statutory authority for a guardian to act, should not be 
applied in this case. Donald correctly argues that Drews is factually 
distinguishable from his case. In addition, the policy reasons underlying the 
Drews holding do not support mandating specific statutory authority for 
a guardian to continue a dissolution proceeding, rather than initiate a 
dissolution proceeding on behalf of a ward.
The issue presented in the case currently before us was not decided in 
Drews. Whereas Drews involved a guardian's power to 
initiate dissolution of marriage proceedings on behalf of a ward, 
Donald's case concerns a guardian's authority to continue a ward's 
dissolution of marriage action. Based on references in Drews to 
"maintaining" a dissolution action, Sharron and the appellate court interpret 
Drews as holding that a guardian may not institute or continue 
a dissolution action without express statutory authority. To "maintain" a legal 
action may mean either "to commence" or "to continue" the action. See Black's 
Law Dictionary 953 (6th ed. 1990); Amman Food & Liquor, Inc. v. Heritage 
Insurance Co., 65 Ill. App. 3d 140, 146 (1978). In Drews, this 
court used the words "initiate" and "maintain" interchangeably. In the factual 
context of Drews, however, it is clear that the holding in that case is 
limited to a guardian's authority to commence a dissolution action on behalf of 
a ward.
The factual differences between Drews and the instant case are 
important because the policy reasons underlying the Drews holding are 
particular to the facts in that case and are inapposite in the circumstances 
presented by the instant case. In Drews, this court adopted the strict 
rule, followed by a majority of jurisdictions, that express statutory authority 
is necessary for a guardian to initiate dissolution proceedings on behalf of a 
ward. Although the rationale for this rule is not discussed in Drews, 
it is explained by other courts deciding cases involving this rule. According to 
these courts, the need for express statutory authority is based on policy 
reasons. These policy reasons are primarily premised on the personal nature of 
the decision to terminate a marriage (see, e.g., In re 
Jennings, 187 N.J. Super. 55, 59, 453 A.2d 572, 574 (1981); Mohrman v. 
Kob, 291 N.Y. 181, 188, 51 N.E.2d 921, 924 (1943) and the inability to 
determine with certainty that the ward would have wanted to end the marriage 
(see Jennings, 187 N.J. Super. at 59, 453 A.2d  at 574; Boyd v. 
Edwards, 4 Ohio App. 3d 142, 146, 446 N.E.2d 1151, 1156 (1982). In In 
re Marriage of Drews, 139 Ill. App. 3d 763, 775-76 (1985), the court noted 
the absence of any facts indicating that the ward would have wanted to seek a 
dissolution of his marriage. As one court observed, "majority jurisdictions 
choose an absolute bar as the lesser of two evils, protecting the possibility 
that the incompetent spouse might elect to remain married if competent, even if 
it effectively prevents the incompetent spouse from ending the marriage while 
under the adjudication of incompetency." Nelson v. Nelson, 118 N.M. 
117, 120, 878 P.2d 335, 338 (App. 1994).
While the risk that a guardian may be acting contrary to a ward's wishes may 
support the rule that a guardian's power to initiate a dissolution proceeding 
must be specified by the legislature, this policy consideration does not justify 
requiring express statutory authority for a guardian to continue a ward's 
dissolution proceeding. When the ward has filed an action for dissolution of his 
or her marriage, the ward's desire and intention to end the marriage is clear. 
In the case at bar, the record reflects that Donald filed a petition to dissolve 
his marriage 14 months prior to his being adjudicated incompetent. Thus, the 
added protection afforded by the rule requiring specific statutory authority for 
a guardian to represent a ward in a dissolution proceeding is not necessary. 
Because the facts and analysis in Drews demonstrate that it is 
inapplicable to the circumstances of the instant case, we determine that 
Drews does not prohibit a guardian from continuing a ward's dissolution 
proceeding absent specific statutory authorization.
Courts in other jurisdictions have also refused to require that a guardian's 
power to continue a dissolution action filed by a ward be enumerated in a 
statute. Instead, our research indicates that those courts that have considered 
this issue have held that a guardian's authority to continue a dissolution 
action on behalf of a ward may be implied from state statute. See, 
e.g., In re Parmer, 755 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. App. 1988); In re 
Ballard, 93 Or. App. 463, 466, 762 P.2d 1051, 1052 (1988); Wahlenmaier 
v. Wahlenmaier, 750 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). For example, in 
Wahlenmaier, the court held that a guardian could continue a 
dissolution action on behalf of a ward based on a state statute that gave 
mentally ill individuals the same constitutional and statutory rights as the 
nondisabled. The Wahlenmaier court concluded that
Similarly, the court in Ballard relied on a general statute that 
provided that, in any court proceeding in which an incapacitated person was a 
party, that person should appear by his or her conservator or guardian. The 
Ballard court decided that, because no different procedure is specified 
for dissolution proceedings, a guardian has the authority to continue a 
dissolution proceeding on behalf of a ward. Ballard, 93 Or. App. at 
465, 762 P.2d  at 1052.
Like the courts in Ballard and Wahlenmaier, we find in the 
case at bar that a guardian's authority to continue a dissolution action on 
behalf of a ward may be implied from section 11a-17. In construing a statute, we 
must ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. See 
Zekman v. Direct American Marketers, Inc., 182 Ill. 2d 359, 368 (1998). 
In performing this inquiry, we begin with the language of the statute. See 
Texaco-Cities Service Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d 262, 270 
(1998).
Section 11a-17 of the Probate Act authorizes a guardian to provide for the 
"support, care, comfort, health, education and maintenance" of a ward and 
requires the guardian to "assist the ward in the development of maximum 
self-reliance and independence." 755 ILCS 5/11a-17(a) (West 1996). Under this 
language, guardians have been permitted to make very personal decisions for 
wards. See, e.g., In re Estate of D.W., 134 Ill. App. 3d 788, 
791 (1985) (guardian has authority to consent to abortion on behalf of ward); 
In re Adoption of Savory, 102 Ill. App. 3d 276, 277-78 (1981) (guardian 
has authority to consent to adoption of adult ward). We find that a guardian's 
authority to continue a dissolution proceeding on behalf of a ward is also 
encompassed within this broad description of a guardian's powers. The status of 
a ward's marriage impacts the ward's support, care, comfort, and development of 
self-reliance and independence. These are areas in which a guardian may be 
empowered to act under subsection (a).
The language of a 1997 amendment to section 11a-17 also indicates that the 
legislature intended a guardian to have the authority to continue a dissolution 
proceeding filed by a ward prior to an adjudication of disability. This 
amendment requires guardians to make decisions on behalf of a ward in accordance 
with the ward's previously expressed wishes:
By requiring guardians to act in accordance with their wards' desires in 
making personal decisions, subsection (e) contemplates that a guardian will have 
the authority to carry out the ward's wishes, including those expressed by a 
ward who filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. Based on the legislative 
intent contained in section 11a-17, we find that this statute authorizes a 
guardian to continue a dissolution of marriage action on behalf of a ward.
Our interpretation of section 11a-17 is supported by recent decisions in 
which Illinois courts have held that guardians must make personal decisions for 
their wards in accordance with the wards' wishes. In In re Estate of 
Greenspan, 137 Ill. 2d 1 (1990), for example, the guardian petitioned the 
court for permission to withdraw life-sustaining artificial nutrition and 
hydration being administered to the ward. This court stated that the ward had a 
right to refuse such life-sustaining medical treatment and that the guardian 
could exercise this right on the ward's behalf. Greenspan, 137 Ill. 2d  
at 16; see also In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 45-46 (1989). 
In addition, this court held that the guardian's exercise of the ward's right 
should be governed by the ward's previously expressed wishes on the subject. The 
Greenspan court stated that, generally, a guardian is required to act 
in the ward's best interests. If, however, there is clear and convincing proof 
that the ward would have chosen to have life-support withdrawn, the guardian 
must act in accordance with these wishes, irrespective of the guardian's own 
judgment as to the ward's best interests. Greenspan, 137 Ill. 2d  at 
17-18. To do otherwise, the Greenspan court explained, would be to 
elevate "other parties' assessments of the meaning and value of life-or, at 
least, their assessments of what a reasonable individual would choose-over the 
affected individual's own common law right to refuse medical treatment." 
Greenspan, 137 Ill. 2d  at 18; see also, e.g., In re 
C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200 (1994) (a guardian may consent to the administration 
of psychotropic medication on behalf of a ward if a court finds, after 
considering the wishes of the recipient, that there is clear and convincing 
proof that the administration of the medicine outweighs its potential harmful 
effects); In re Estate of Austwick, 275 Ill. App. 3d 769 (1995) (a 
guardian may authorize the administration of electroconvulsive therapy to a ward 
upon a clear and convincing showing that the ward would have wanted this 
treatment).
Our decision in Greenspan supports Cronk's standing to continue 
Donald's dissolution action in this case. Like the decision to withdraw 
life-sustaining nutrition and hydration, a spouse's decision to terminate a 
marriage is intensely personal. By filing a petition for dissolution of marriage 
14 months prior to his being adjudicated a disabled person, Donald made a clear 
and convincing showing of his choice to end his marriage. Greenspan 
requires that, when there is such proof of the ward's preferences, a guardian 
must act in accordance with those preferences. To deny Cronk standing to 
continue Donald's dissolution action would be to elevate other parties' 
assessments as to the value of Donald's marriage over his own expressed desire 
to end that marriage. Based on section 11a-17 and Illinois case law involving 
the scope of a guardian's authority, we hold that Cronk has standing to continue 
Donald's action to dissolve his marriage.
We observe that our holding is consistent with an amendment to section 11a-17 
that became effective while this appeal was pending. After the appellate court 
issued its opinion in this case, the legislature amended section 11a-17 to 
specifically permit a guardian to continue a dissolution of marriage action on 
behalf of a ward in the circumstances presented here. Section 11a-17 now 
provides:
Neither party has argued, however, that this new section should have any 
application to the facts before us. Accordingly, we do not address whether 
amended section 11a-17 would apply to the instant case. See Reed v. Farmers 
Insurance Group, 188 Ill. 2d 168, 172-73 (1999); Schirmer v. Bear, 
174 Ill. 2d 63, 69 n.1 (1996).
Finally, we emphasize the limited nature of our holding. We decide only that 
Cronk has standing to continue a dissolution of marriage proceeding filed by 
Donald. Under section 11a-17, her actions are still subject to the supervision 
of the circuit court. See 755 ILCS 5/11a-17(a) (West 1996); see also In re 
Estate of Wellman, 174 Ill. 2d 335, 347 (1996) ("guardian only acts as the 
hand of the court and is at all times subject to the court's direction in the 
manner in which the guardian provides for the care and support of the disabled 
person"). In addition, we express no opinion as to the merits of Donald's action 
for dissolution of marriage. Whether a dissolution should be granted is a matter 
for the circuit court to determine after appropriate proceedings under the 
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/101 et 
seq. (West 1996)).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a guardian has standing to pursue a 
dissolution of marriage action on behalf of a ward when the ward has filed the 
action prior to being adjudicated disabled. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment 
of the appellate court and remand the cause to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
cause remanded.JUSTICE RATHJE, specially concurring:
I agree with the majority that a plenary guardian of a disabled adult has 
standing to proceed with a dissolution of marriage action filed by the ward 
prior to the adjudication of the ward's disability. I cannot, however, join the 
majority's analysis, which is wholly unnecessary and irrelevant.
The majority spends 24 paragraphs resolving a simple issue that already has 
been decided. The molehill beneath the majority's mountain is section 
11a-17(a-5) of the Probate Act of 1975 (Pub. Act 91-139, eff. January 1, 2000 
(amending 755 ILCS 5/11a-17 (West 1998)), which provides that:
This amendment was added by the legislature while this appeal was pending. 
The provision has an effective date of January 1, 2000. When the legislature 
changes the law while an appeal is pending, a reviewing court will apply the new 
law unless to do so would interfere with a vested right. First of America 
Trust Co. v. Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d 282, 289 (1996); see also Dardeen v. 
Heartland Manor, Inc., 186 Ill. 2d 291, 295 (1999) (McMorrow, J., writing). 
Vested rights are interests protected from legislative interference by the due 
process clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 
289. A right has not vested until it is "so far perfected that it cannot be 
taken away by legislation," and so "complete and unconditional" that it "may be 
equated with a property interest." Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d  at 290-91.
Clearly, no vested right is impaired by application of the amended statute. 
The legislature merely clarified that the scope of a guardian's powers includes 
maintaining dissolution suits that were filed before the ward became disabled. 
Donald had a valid dissolution action pending against Sharron for over a year 
before he was adjudicated disabled. The legislation simply allows Donald's 
guardian to continue this action. Further, Sharron has not identified any vested 
right with which application of the new statute would interfere. Although the 
statute was not yet effective when the parties filed their appellate briefs, 
Donald noted in his brief that the legislature had proposed amendments to the 
statute and that applying the new statute would not interfere with a vested 
right. Sharron could have addressed this argument in her response brief but 
chose to ignore it. Sharron has not argued that a vested right would be impaired 
by application of the current law, and I am unable to discern one.
Nor is this the situation presented in In re Marriage of Cohn, 93 Ill. 2d 190 (1982), where the legislature violated separation of powers 
principles by passing legislation to overrule a decision of a reviewing court. 
In Cohn, we explained that, although the legislature may change the law 
as interpreted by the courts prospectively, it cannot retroactively alter a 
statute in such a way that the statute itself overrules a decision of a 
reviewing court. In that case, the legislature sought to validate a bifurcated 
judgment in a divorce case by passing a statute allowing for such judgments. The 
statute was passed following the appellate court's decision vacating the 
judgment and included a provision that said, " 'All judgments for 
dissolution of marriage reserving any such questions entered prior to the 
effective date of this amendatory Act of 1981 are declared to be valid as of the 
date of entry.' " Cohn, 93 Ill. 2d  at 201, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 
1981, ch. 40, par. 401(3). Thus, the legislation itself would have changed the 
appellate court's decision. This court held that the legislature "invaded the 
province of the judiciary by retroactively overruling a decision of a reviewing 
court." Cohn, 93 Ill. 2d  at 204.
Here, by contrast, the legislature did not attempt to change the decision of 
the appellate court. Although the amendment might have been proposed in response 
to the appellate court's decision, the legislature made no attempt to apply the 
statute to pending cases and gave the statute an effective date of January 1, 
2000. In Cohn, we reiterated that the legislature can enact legislation 
for prospective application in pending cases so long as it does not attempt to 
tell a court how to apply the new law to the facts of a particular case. 
Cohn, 93 Ill. 2d  at 205-06. What the legislature cannot do is attempt 
"to attribute to a statute, at the time of the reviewing court's opinion, a 
meaning different than that declared in the opinion." Cohn, 93 Ill. 2d  
at 206.
This case was argued at the September 1999 term of court. If the opinion had 
been issued before the end of the year, the new statute would not have been 
applicable. The case was not decided until January 2000, and by that time the 
new statute was in effect. The legislature did not try to attempt to alter the 
meaning of the statute at the time the appellate court's opinion was issued and 
did not try to dictate to the courts how to apply the new law to pending cases. 
Accordingly, there is no separation of powers problem in applying the current 
law.
The majority's only reason for failing to apply the current law is that 
"Neither party has argued *** that this new section should have any application 
to the facts before us." Slip op. at 10. I am unaware of any rule which holds 
that this state's highest court can apply the controlling law only if the 
parties cite it in their briefs. There never has been, and hopefully never will 
be, such a rule.
In sum, I concur with the majority's conclusion that a plenary guardian of a 
disabled adult has standing to maintain a dissolution action filed by the ward 
prior to the adjudication of the ward's disability. I do so not for the reasons 
stated in the majority opinion, but because a controlling statute specifically 
answers this question.