Case Title: State v. G.S. Blodgett Co.

Citation: 163 Vt 175, 656 A.2d 984

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1995-01-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE_V_GS_BLODGETT_CO.94-004; 163 Vt 175; 656 A.2d 984

[Filed 20-Jan-1995]


NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press. 


                                 No. 94-004


State of Vermont et al.                           Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
     v.                                            Chittenden Superior Court

G.S. Blodgett Company                             October Term, 1994


Matthew I. Katz, J.

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Seth A. Steinzor, Assistant
Attorney General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellant State of Vermont 

John D. Shullenberger of Mickenberg, Dunn, Sirotkin & Dorsch, Burlington, for
plaintiff- appellant Beauchemin 

Robert B. Hemley and Lucy T. Brown of Gravel and Shea, and Christopher R.
Gannon,  Burlington, for defendant-appellee 


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ., and Peck, J. (Ret.),
          Specially Assigned 


     ALLEN, C.J.   Plaintiffs, Joan Beauchemin and the State of Vermont,
appeal from summary judgment dismissing their handicapped discrimination
claim against Beauchemin's former employer, defendant G.S. Blodgett Company. 
We affirm. 

     Defendant manufactures ovens at its Burlington, Vermont facility where
Beauchemin was employed full-time as a general helper from 1978 until 1983. 
According to defendant's written job description, a general helper is a
floater whose responsibilities change with the demands of the factory. 
Beauchemin, who was one of approximately eight general helpers, did welding,
cut insulation, worked on drill presses, and assembled, tested and repaired
parts in various departments. 

     During the latter part of her tenure, Beauchemin's ability to perform
the full range of routine tasks was substantially and adversely affected by
multiple sclerosis. Beauchemin's work 

 

assignments were restructured to accommodate her deteriorating condition. 
She spent the majority of her time in the wiring department, sorting and
cutting various wires with a large cutting machine.  The wires were then
affixed to motor mounts for installation in the ovens. Defendant provided
Beauchemin with a stool so she would not have to stand and had other
employees lift the wire spools.  In November 1983, Beauchemin was placed on
medical leave of absence. 

     Beauchemin was diagnosed with relapsing remitting multiple sclerosis. 
As explained by her neurologists, the disease is unpredictable and the
symptoms vary in intensity and duration. Beauchemin suffered from muscle
weakness, fatigue, incontinence, and slurred speech.  Her ability to
concentrate, balance, lift heavy objects or stand for extended periods of
time was significantly impaired.  She responded well to medical treatment and
was able to manage some symptoms by controlling the room climate and resting
intermittently.  Plaintiffs  acknowledged, however, that periods of
alleviation were interspersed with periods of exacerbation which, at worst,
required hospitalization. 

     Shortly after Beauchemin went on leave, defendant introduced a new oven,
which required defendant to redesign its production regimen.  To save space,
improve efficiencies, and reduce costs, defendant hired two independent
contractors to perform the wiring and motor mount operations.  One of the
contractors was a sheltered workshop employing disabled workers.  The
contractors picked up supplies from defendant, performed the work as
necessary, and returned the finished parts.  Each contractor supplied the
needed machines, tools, supervisory staff and insurance coverage. 

     In February 1984, Beauchemin contacted personnel manager, Robert Morris,
about reentry and retraining.  Morris told Beauchemin that reentry would
depend on her physical condition, and he would rely heavily on her
physician's reports in making judgments about her abilities.  From 1984
through 1985, Beauchemin regularly submitted her doctor's reports to Morris. 
In March 1984, her treating neurologist wrote Morris, concluding that
Beauchemin's 

 

"rapid progression of multiple sclerosis presents a sufficiently poor
prognosis as to make further regular employment unlikely."  Morris encouraged
Beauchemin to get a second opinion. Beauchemin began diagnostic and
therapeutic treatment at the University Health Center of Vermont in May 1984.

     By her own admission and her doctors' advice, she could not work at all
during 1984 and 1985.  While her doctors noted improvement in late 1985, they
opined that she was unable to perform the usual duties of her occupation, but
could work approximately four hours per day in a sedentary position.  They
specifically advised against work involving lifting, frequent walking,
prolonged standing, or any situation requiring intense concentration, such as
heights, with loud noise or with dangerous machinery.  Early in 1986, her
doctors reported that Beauchemin was stable and asymptomatic. 

     In April 1986, Beauchemin renewed discussions with defendant about the
possibility of being reinstated.  She spoke with several managers, including
James Clucas, plant manager, about working at home because she could not
tolerate the factory environment.  She suggested relocating the nine foot by
four foot wiring machine to her garage.  Beauchemin hypothesized that she
could do wiring in her insulated garage because it would provide a climate
controlled environment and opportunities to rest.  She suggested this idea
after learning that most of the work that she had been doing prior to her
medical leave had been contracted to a sheltered workshop.  Shortly after
discussing this option with defendant, Beauchemin received a letter from
defendant notifying her that her health benefits would be terminated because
her absence from work would exceed two and one-half years. 

     Beauchemin called Clucas and reiterated her interest in performing
wiring in her garage. She followed up with a letter requesting that she be
reinstated in her old capacity (as a wirer), but at home.  She noted that "I
am able to do the type of work that I was primarily engaged in prior to my
illness.  However, I can no longer tolerate the environment of the plant
given the lack of climate control and the danger that fatigue or loss of
balance could place myself and/or 

 

others in danger."  Beauchemin also recommended that Clucas contact a
vocational rehabilitation expert to assist in fashioning a solution.  Clucas
did not review Beauchemin's medical records or contact the vocational expert.
 He did, however, discuss with several Blodgett managers the viability of
performing the wiring function in Beauchemin's garage.  Because of safety,
monetary, logistical and legal issues, they decided it was impractical.  At
this time, there was only one general helper still employed by Blodgett. 
That person was not doing any wiring or motor mount assembly because of the
subcontract arrangement. 

     Beauchemin, with the State of Vermont, filed a complaint alleging that
defendant discriminated against Beauchemin on the basis of her handicap in
violation of  495(a)(1) of Vermont's Fair Employment Practices Act (VFEPA),
21 V.S.A.  495-496.  Plaintiffs maintained that Beauchemin was qualified
to work as a general helper with reasonable accommodations, and that
defendant was obligated to provide her with a reasonable accommodation when
she requested reemployment in April 1986.  Plaintiffs sought money damages,
including civil fines, and Beauchemin's reinstatement in her former position.

     Following extensive discovery, defendant successfully moved for summary
judgment. The court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to establish that
Beauchemin could perform the essential functions of general helper because
she could not meet its physical demands, and that plaintiff had failed to
present evidence that a particular accommodation was reasonable, while
defendant had satisfied its burden of proving that setting up a mini-factory
in Beauchemin's garage was not a reasonable accommodation.  In reaching its
conclusions, the court relied on sworn statements Beauchemin made on her
application for Social Security benefits.(FN1)

 

     On appeal, plaintiffs argue that summary judgment was improper because
the trial court ignored material evidentiary conflicts in determining that
Beauchemin was not a qualified handicapped individual.  Plaintiffs also argue
that, regardless of the outcome on the merits, defendant should be liable
because it failed to conduct an adequate individualized inquiry into
Beauchemin's qualifications prior to making its adverse employment decision. 

     The standard of review of a motion for summary judgment is the same as
that used by the trial court.  Hodgdon v. Mt. Mansfield Co., 160 Vt. 150,
158-59,