Case Title: Adams v. State

Citation: 415 Md. 585

Docket Number: 13/09

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2010-09-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
HEADNOTE:
Tracy Wendell Adams v. State of Maryland, No. 13, September Term 2009
CRIMINAL LAW - JURY REVIEW OF EVIDENCE - MARYLAND RULE 4-326
When evidence, which the trial judge, prior to the beginning of deliberations, indicated
would be sent to the jury room, is not sent and the jury, after deliberations have started,
requests to view that evidence, Maryland Rule 4-326 (b), rather than (c), applies.  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 13
September Term, 2009
TRACY WENDELL ADAMS,
v. 
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Eldridge, John C. (Retired,
specially assigned),
         
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
Harrell and Adkins, JJ., dissent.
Filed:   September 3, 2010
I.
Tracy Wendell Adams, the petitioner, was charged both with possessing cocaine and
distributing it to a Salisbury Police Department police officer, who was working undercover,
in Salisbury, Wicomico County.  The  drug transaction was video recorded, although, because
he never went to the passenger side of the undercover vehicle, where the video camera was
situated, only the voice, and not the image, of the seller was reflected on the videotape.  The
petitioner was tried by jury in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County. Officer Drewer, the
undercover officer, testified as to the authenticity and the contents of the videotape and, upon
his sponsorship, the videotape was admitted into evidence.  With regard to the petitioner’s
involvement in the drug transaction, he testified that the petitioner, whom he identified by
description, in court and by photographic array, was the person who sold him the cocaine. 
After all the evidence was in, the jury had been instructed and just before it was
excused to begin deliberating, a juror inquired, “Judge Truitt, can we take the evidence with
us?”  The trial judge responded: “I’m going to send it in there.”   The jury retired to deliberate.
Twenty-four minutes after the jury retired to begin deliberations, “the jury sent a note
requesting to see the videotape that had been admitted as [an] [e]xhibit,”  Adams v. State, 183
Md. App. 188, 201, 960 A.2d 1215, 1222 (2008), prompting the following colloquy:   
“THE COURT:  Mr. [Bailiff], you say you have a note.
“[BAILIFF]:  They want to see the video.
“THE COURT:  No.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  No?
“THE COURT:  No.
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“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, if the video is part of the evidence --
“THE COURT:  That’s right.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  You didn’t want to let them look at it again?
“THE COURT:  You want them to take all the witnesses in there and hear from
them again?  What’s the difference?  Hearing none.  Tell them they will have
to recall or you can bring them in and I’ll tell them.
“[BAILIFF]:  Bring them out?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, that’s like saying you can’t look at a
document again.  It’s been admitted.
“THE COURT:  It’s singling out testimony....
(Whereupon the jury returned to the courtroom.)
“THE COURT: [Jury Foreman], what was the question?
“[JUROR FOREMAN]:  If we could view the tape again.
“THE COURT:  You’ll just have to recall -- 
“[JUROR FOREMAN]:  Okay.
“THE COURT:  -- what you saw. 
“[JUROR FOREMAN]:  Okay, that’s fine.
“THE COURT:  I can’t single out any testimony.  Then I’d have to let each
witness come in.
“[JUROR FOREMAN]:  Oh, I see.  Okay.”
The petitioner was found guilty and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment.  On
appeal,  the Court of  Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court,  concluding
that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion because the “trial court articulated an
3
acceptable reason for refusing the jury’s request.”  Adams, 183 Md. App. at 206, 960 A.2d
at 1225.  The intermediate appellate court elaborated:
“[T]he trial court made a discretionary determination that allowing the jury to
have the videotape of the alleged incident would overemphasize it .... [W]e are
not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in making that
determination.”
Id. at 205, 960 A.2d at 1225.  We granted the petitioner’s petition for writ of certiorari, Adams
v. State, 407 Md. 529, 967 A.2d 182 (2009), to answer the question: whether the trial judge
erred in refusing to permit the jury to review the videotape of an alleged drug transaction
which had been admitted into evidence.  We shall answer that question in the affirmative and,
thus, hold that, where, as here, evidence has been admitted and the trial judge has not made
a good cause determination as to its appropriateness to be taken into the jury room, the trial
judge abuses his or her discretion when he or she thereafter denies the jury the right to review
that evidence in the jury room.   Accordingly, we shall reverse.
II.
The  issue to be resolved in this case is which section of Rule 4-326, “Jury - Review
of Evidence - Communications,” applies when the jury asks to review an exhibit, which has
been admitted into evidence, but has not been, although the court indicated to the jury that it
would be, sent to the jury room.  The question thus presented is one of Rule construction, the
precepts of which are well established: 
“The primary goal of statutory interpretation is ‘to ascertain and effectuate the
intention of the legislature.’  Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423,
1 In 2007, Maryland Rule 4-326 was amended, and “the December 4, 2007 Order,
effective January 1, 2008,” made the following changes: “in (a) [the Court] substituted
‘sworn jurors, including any alternates’ for ‘jurors’ in the first sentence and made minor
linguistic changes, deleted ‘juror’s’ before ‘notes’ or variants in the second and third
sentences, substituted ‘author’ for ‘juror’ in the third sentence, and added ‘sworn’ in the
fourth sentence; in (b) [the Court] added ‘Sworn’ at the beginning and made linguistic
changes in the second and fourth sentences.”  See Md. Rule 4-326, “Effect of
amendments.”  
4
429 (1995).  The familiar point of departure for statutory interpretation is the
plain language of the statute itself.  Stanford v. Maryland Police Training &
Correctional Comm’n, 346 Md. 374, 380, 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997).  When
construing a statutory provision within a single statutory scheme, we must
consider the statutory scheme as a whole to determine the legislative intent.
See Marsheck v. Board of Trustees of the Fire & Police Employees’ Retirement
System of the City of Baltimore, 358 Md. 393, 403, 749 A.2d 774, 779 (2000);
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm’r, 332 Md. 124, 131-32,
630 A.2d 713, 717 (1993); In re: Stephen K., 289 Md. 294, 298, 424 A.2d 153,
155 (1981).  The same principles which are applied in statutory interpretation
apply with equal force to our interpretation of the Maryland Rules.  See
Johnson v. State, 360 Md. 250, 264, 757 A.2d 796, 804 (2000).”   
In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 711, 782 A.2d 332, 346 (2001). 
At the time of trial, Maryland Rule Section 4-326 provided1:
“(a) Jurors' notes.  The court may, and upon request of any party shall, provide
paper notepads for use by jurors during trial and deliberations.  The court shall
maintain control over the jurors’ notes during the trial and promptly destroy the
jurors’ notes after the trial.  A juror’s notes may not be reviewed or relied upon
for any purpose by any person other than the juror.  If a juror is unable to use
a notepad because of a disability, the court shall provide a reasonable
accommodation.
“(b)  Items taken to jury room.  Jurors may take their notes with them when
they retire for deliberation.  Unless the court for good cause orders otherwise,
the jury may also take the charging document and exhibits which have been
admitted into evidence, except that a deposition may not be taken into the jury
room without the agreement of all parties and the consent of the court.
Electronically recorded instructions or oral instructions reduced to writing may
5
be taken into the jury room only with the permission of the court.  On request
of a party or on the court’s own initiative, the charging documents shall reflect
only those charges on which the jury is to deliberate.  The court may impose
safeguards for the preservation of the exhibits and the safety of the jurors.
“(c)   Jury request to review evidence.  The court, after notice to the parties,
may make available to the jury testimony or other evidence requested by it.  In
order that undue prominence not be given to the evidence requested, the court
may also make available additional evidence relating to the same factual issue.
“(d)   Communications with jury. The court shall notify the defendant and the
State's Attorney of the receipt of any communication from the jury pertaining
to the action as promptly as practicable and in any event before responding to
the communication. All such communications between the court and the jury
shall be on the record in open court or shall be in writing and filed in the action.
The clerk or the court shall note on a written communication the date and time
it was received from the jury.”
Although section (d) certainly is relevant to the question we are called upon to answer
and, indeed, was in play in this case, as it prescribes the manner in which jury
communications are to be handled, it does not address either what the jury may take to the
jury room during deliberations, what it is privileged to review without court permission or
when it must seek court permission to review evidence.   Section (a) is not implicated by the
issue presented in this case; it involves a discrete matter, juror notes, their control and use, that
is in no way pertinent to its resolution.   Thus, the sections relevant to the issue we are to
address are sections (b) and (c).
Section (b) covers what the jury is permitted to have in the jury room when
deliberating.  With the exception of juror notes, for which there is no condition, the
determination of what will accompany the jury when it retires for that purpose is entrusted to
the trial judge.  Thus, the charging document and, with the exception of depositions, exhibits
2  We have  defined “good cause” as: 
‘“Substantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse.  Legally sufficient
ground or reason.  Phrase “good cause” depends upon circumstances of
individual case, and finding of its existence lies largely in discretion of
officer or court to which decision is committed.... “Good cause” is a relative
and highly abstract term, and its meaning must be determined not only by
verbal context of statute in which term is employed but also by context of
action and procedures involved in [the] type of case presented.”’
In Re Robert G., 296 Md. 175, 179, 461 A.2d 1, 4 (1983) (quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary, 623 (5th ed. 1979)). 
6
admitted into evidence may be taken into the jury room during deliberations, “[u]nless the
court for good cause[2] orders otherwise.”  Depositions require “agreement of all parties and
the consent of the court.” “[O]nly with the permission of the court,” may a jury have
“electronically recorded instructions or oral instructions reduced to writing...taken into the
jury room.”  
Section (c) applies to requests by the jury to review evidence to which it does not have
access.  Such evidence would include “testimony,” specifically identified in the Rule, and
“other evidence.”    The latter reference necessarily suggests that it contemplates and refers
to evidence that was not admitted into evidence as an exhibit, i.e.,  evidence that was not
allowed to be taken to the jury room pursuant to section (b).  
We think it important to discuss the history of the Rule.  The Maryland Rule which
governs what may accompany a jury once it begins to deliberate derives from common law.
The predecessor to Rule 4-326 was Rule 757, promulgated by this Court, on recommendation
of the Rules Committee, on September 15, 1961, to take  effect, January 1, 1962.  See
7
Twentieth Report Rules Order (Sept. 1, 1961).   Rule 757 did not  expressly address what the
jury may take to the jury room; instead, for that purpose, it referred to Rule 558, its civil
equivalent.    Rule 757 provided: “The provisions of Rule 558 (Jury Room - What May Be
Taken to) shall apply to a criminal case.”   Therefore, we must start our historical review with
the history of Rule 558.  
Rule 558 was enacted in 1956 and took effect January 1, 1957.  See Twelfth Report
Rules Order (July 18, 1956).  “Prior to the adoption of Rule 558, the case law in Maryland left
to the trial court’s discretion the question of what the jury was permitted to take with them
upon retiring for their deliberation.” See Rule 558 - What The Jury May Take To The Jury
Room, 17 Md. L. Rev, 172, 172 (1957).  See, e.g., Nichols v. Meyer, 139 Md. 450, 115 A.
786 (1921), Fleischmann v. Clark, 137 Md. 171, 111 A. 851 (1920), Cahill v. Baltimore, 129
Md. 17, 98 A. 235 (1916), Moore v. McDonald, 68 Md. 321, 12 A. 117 (1888).   The same
approach was applied also to criminal cases.  See  Bell v. State, 200 Md. 223, 88 A.2d 567
(1952).   In Bell, “after the jury retired, they returned and asked for all the exhibits in the
case.”  Id. at 227, 88 A.2d at 569.  The trial judge, with the exception of the search warrant,
and over the defendant’s objection, “allowed all the exhibits to go to the jury.”  Id.   On
review, this Court relied on the Cahill v. Baltimore decision.  In Cahill, the Court held that:
“[I]n the absence of a statute, whenever it is desired that papers shall be given
to the jury, without the consent first had of the other side, the question is one
left exclusively to the discretion of the trial court.  It is said in 38 Cyc. 1832:
‘Whether or not permission shall be given to the jury to take out books, papers
or documents, and the determination as to what papers shall be taken out by the
jury, is very generally held to be a matter resting in the sound discretion of the
court, which is not reviewable except where there has been an abuse of such
8
discretion.’”
Id. at 25-26, 98 A. at 238; see also Bell, 200 Md. at 228, 88 A.2d at 569.  The Court of
Appeals, in Bell, thus, applied the long standing rule that the matter of what papers or objects
the jury could take with them upon retiring rested in the sound discretion of the trial court and
was not reviewable except where there has been a clear abuse of such discretion.  
In 1957, as we have seen, the common law rule was codified as Rule 558.  Captioned,
“Jury Room - What May Be Taken to,” it provided, in relevant part: 
“a. In Court’s Discretion.
“Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them into the jury room
such of the pleadings, granted prayers or written instructions, and exhibits
which have been received in evidence, as the court may deem necessary for a
proper consideration of the case.
“b. As of Right - Notes.
“The jury may also take with them notes of the testimony or other proceedings
taken by themselves but none taken by any other person.
“c. Return to Clerk.
“All such papers or exhibits, except the notes mentioned in section b hereof,
shall be returned to the clerk before the jury is discharged.
“d. Exception. 
“A deposition may not be taken into the jury room, except by agreement of all
parties and with  consent of the court.”
According to the “Editor’s note,” “[t]his Rule [was] new.  However, much of section[] a...is
existing case law.”  Thus, “[t]he new Rule substantially follow[ed] the doctrine enunciated
in the Bell case[,] that it is within the sound discretion of the trial court what objects and
3  Rule 558 remained the same until it was revised in 1984.
4The Rules Committee had earlier considered proposing to amend Rule 757 to
address those instances in which the jury requested to review evidence, after deliberations
had commenced.  See Minutes of the Criminal Rules Committee Meeting (March 14 and
15, 1975).  The amendment proposed to Rule 757 was:
“c. Jury Request to Review Evidence.”
“Whenever the jury makes a request for a review of any testimony or other
evidence the court, after notice to the parties, may have the requested parts
of the testimony communicated to the jury and may permit the jury to re-
examine materials admitted into evidence.  The court need not submit
evidence to the jury for review beyond that specifically requested by the
jury, but in its discretion the court may have the jury review other evidence
relating to the same factual issue so as not to give undue prominence to the
evidence requested.”  
Id.
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papers may be taken by the jury into the jury room.” Rule 558 - What The Jury May Take To
The Jury Room, 17 Md. L. Rev. at 173.  See also Jimmy’s Cab, Inc. v. Isennock, 225 Md. 1,
10, 169 A.2d 425, 429 (1961) (“The adoption of this rule was merely a restatement of the
practice in this State.”). 
Neither Rule 558 nor 757 provided for those instances in which the jury, after
deliberations had commenced, made a request to review evidence.  On December 29, 1975,
the Rules Committee, in the Fifty-Third Report of the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, “recommend[ed] adoption of” its “proposed Maryland and Maryland
District Rules, Chapter 700, (Criminal Causes).”3  This was to be a major revision of the
Chapter 700 Rules.  Upon adoption, Rule 758 would replace what had been Rule 757.4   The
proposed Rule 758 provided:
5 During oral arguments there was an issue as to what the Rules Committee meant
when it added the language “other evidence” under Rule 4-326(c).  It is apparent that
“other evidence” means that evidence which the trial judge did not permit the jury to take
with it to the jury room. 
  
10
“Jury-Review of Evidence - Communications.”
“(a) Items Taken to Jury Room. Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may
take into the jury room all exhibits which have been admitted into evidence and
charging documents which reflect only the charges upon which the jury is to
deliberate, subject only to such safeguards imposed by the court for the
preservation of the exhibits and the safety of the jurors. 
“(b) Notes.  Jurors may take notes regarding the evidence which they may keep
with them when they retire for their deliberations. 
“(c) Jury Request to Review Evidence.  Whenever the jury makes a request for
a review of any testimony or other evidence[5], the court, after notice to the
parties, may submit the testimony or evidence requested by the jury.  The court
also may submit other evidence relating to the same factual issue on which the
jury requested testimony or evidence in order that undue prominence not be
given to the evidence requested.” 
On January 31, 1977, the Court filed a Rules Order which provided for the rescission
of all Rules in Chapter 700 (Criminal Causes) of the Maryland Rules of Procedure  and the
promulgation of new Rules, effective July 1, 1977.  See Fifty-Third Report Rules Order (Jan.
31, 1977).  In the final version, the Rules adopted by the Court contained changes to Rule 758
as proposed by the Rules Committee.  Id.  The Court deleted, from section (a), the provision
that the jury “may take into the jury room all exhibits which have been admitted into
evidence,” and added that the jury may take exhibits into the jury room, but only with the
court’s approval (emphasis added).  The Rule stated: 
11
   
“(a) Items Taken to Jury Room.  Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may,
with the approval of the court, take into the jury room the exhibits which have
been admitted into evidence and the charging documents.  Upon the request of
a party or upon the court’s own motion, the charging documents shall reflect
only those charges upon which the jury is to deliberate.  The court may impose
safeguards for the preservation of the exhibits and the safety of the jurors.”
(emphasis added). 
Section (c) was also amended to read:
“(c) Jury Request to Review Evidence.  Whenever the jury makes a request for
a review of any testimony or other evidence, the court, after notice to the
parties, may submit the testimony or evidence requested by the jury.  The court
also may submit other evidence relating to the same factual issue on which the
jury requested testimony or evidence in order that undue prominence not be
given to the evidence requested.”
That is how the Rule remained until 1984, when the Court, in adopting the Reorganization of
the Rules, recommended by the Eighty-Seventh Report of the Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure, amended Section (a) to its present form. See Rules Order (April
6, 1984). 
The history of the latter change began in April of 1981, when  Judge McAuliffe,
formerly a member of this Court, but then a member of the Court of Appeals Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, presented, as a part of the Reorganization
process, Rule 2-525, the civil equivalent of Rule 758.   As presented, it read: 
"What May Be Taken To Jury Room."
"Jurors may take notes regarding the evidence and they may keep the notes with
them when they retire for their deliberation.  Unless the court for good cause
shown orders otherwise, the jury may also take exhibits which have been
received in evidence except that a deposition may not be taken into the jury
room without the agreement of all parties and consent of the court.  Written
instructions may be taken into the jury room only when the court, in its
12
discretion, so permits."  
See Minutes, Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
41-42 (April 21, 1981).  The Rule was accompanied with an explanatory note: 
"Reorganization Rule 2-525 differs from present Maryland practice in two
respects.  First, the proposed Rule, unlike current Rule 558, does not permit
pleadings to be taken into the jury room.  Second, exhibits other than
depositions may be taken into the jury room unless the court for good cause
orders otherwise.  Current Rule 558 a permits the jury to take only those
exhibits which the court may deem necessary for a proper consideration of the
case." 
Id. at 42.  The Rules Committee subsequently voted to adopt the "good cause" language for
the then proposed replacement to Rule 758, Rule 4-326 (a).  The adoption of that phrase
largely was due to the Committee's policy recommendation to permit the jury to take the
charging document with it as it deliberated.  This is reflected in a February 16, 1984 letter to
Judge Chasanow, formerly a member of this Court, but then an associate judge of the Seventh
Judicial Circuit of Maryland.  Judge Chasanow had expressed concerns about sending the
charging document in with the jury during deliberations.  The Rules Committee explained:
"The shift from ‘with the approval of the court' to ‘unless the court for good
cause orders otherwise' in section (a) of [Rule 4-326] is based on a policy
decision that the charging document should be available to the jury during its
deliberations unless it contains harmfully misleading information that justifies
its exclusion."
See The Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Letter
to the Honorable Howard S. Chasnow (Feb. 16, 1984). 
III.
In this case, during the trial, the videotape was marked as an exhibit, offered into
13
evidence and admitted into evidence.   After the case had concluded and, as the jury was
being released to begin deliberations, the trial judge, in response to an inquiry by the jury with
regard to whether it could "take the evidence,"  indicated that he would "send it in there." 
Viewed in context and logically, we take the exchange to mean that the exhibits admitted in
to evidence were going to be sent into the jury room for its use by the jury during
deliberations.   Moreover, exhibits sent in with the jury may be used, and, therefore, viewed
by the jury as it determines to be appropriate; it may review such evidence at anytime. 
The videotape, since it was an exhibit admitted into evidence, would have been
included in the "evidence," as to which the jury inquired and to which the judge referred, that
was going to be sent back to the jury.  As the Rule provides for the taking of the exhibits to
the jury room "unless the court for good cause orders otherwise," without a good cause order,
based on a finding that, for some reason, an exhibit should not be taken into the jury room,
all of the exhibits should have been permitted to be taken.   To have been excluded from jury
consideration during deliberations, the videotape would have had to be excluded for good
cause,  prior to the evidence being given to the jury.  The record does not reveal any
discussion of the need to exclude any exhibits and there certainly is not an order, express or
implied, to that effect.   So far as the record is concerned, no good cause existed for excluding
the videotape and, in fact, just the opposite, the videotape was expected to accompany the jury
as it retired to deliberate and to remain with it in the jury room during those deliberations. 
The petitioner argues that the trial judge exercised his discretion, applying the wrong
section of Rule 4-326, section (c),  rather than section (b).  According to the petitioner, the
14
videotape was an exhibit admitted into evidence, as contemplated by section (b), and not
witness testimony or "other evidence" to which section (c) refers.  Thus, he says, when the
trial judge informed the jury that he could not "single out...testimony," necessarily he was
relying on section (c), and not section (b), the relevant subsection.   
The State argues that the trial judge correctly made his ruling - denial of the jury's
request to review the videotape - under the proper section of the Rule, reasoning that  Rule
4-326 (b)  "addresses only the transmission of items to the jury room before the jury begins
deliberation," and that any request thereafter falls within section (c).   Alternatively, the State
submits that the "concern about giving the videotape undue prominence satisfied the ‘good
cause' standard of subsection (b)."   
We agree with the  petitioner.  The relevant section is (b) and, thus, it was an abuse of
discretion for the trial judge to refuse the jury the opportunity to review the videotape as it
deliberated. 
We construe Rule 4-326 (b) as meaning precisely what it says: that, "unless the court
for good cause orders otherwise," exhibits admitted into evidence may be taken to the jury
room by the jury while it deliberates.  For the Rule to have meaning apart from section (c),
the "good cause" order must relate to specific exhibits and be made as to it or them prior to
the jury being excused to deliberate.  Applying this Rule to the instant case, at the very least,
the trial judge had to have issued a  "good cause" order excluding the subject videotape from
the evidence that the jury was permitted to take to the jury room as it deliberated.  No such
order was issued in this case.   In fact, it seems that, if not apparent, objectively viewed, the
15
trial judge intended that the videotape, which was introduced and marked as an exhibit, was
to accompany the jury into the deliberation room.  The record supports that interpretation.
When asked by the jury if  it could “take the evidence,” which we interpret to mean, the
"exhibits admitted into evidence," the trial judge replied, without making any exception,
certainly not for the videotape, that he was "going to send [the evidence] in there."  As
indicated, the videotape, having been marked as an exhibit and admitted into evidence,
qualified as "evidence" and, accordingly, would, and should, be understood as being included
in what the trial judge stated would be sent “in there.”   It follows from this analysis that,
pursuant to section (b), the videotape should have been sent to the jury room for use by the
jury during  deliberations.   But for the trial judge's error in not doing what he said he would
do, the jury would not have had to request the videotape.  In context and logically, the jury
was simply asking for something that it should have had in the first place. 
We are not dealing here with section (c).  Consequently, the test required by that
section is inapposite and irrelevant.  Section (c)  applies only where the request by the jury
is for "testimony" or "other evidence," not admitted as an exhibit, and not therefore permitted
to accompany the jury to the jury room. The State simply  is wrong when it argues that this
Court, when it adopted the recommendation of the Rules Committee, intended that there
would be two standards governing exhibits, whether or not the trial court makes a good cause
determination that an exhibit should be excluded, one applicable, per section (b), if the
exhibit, admitted into evidence, makes its way to the jury room, and another, pursuant to
section (c), if it does not.   Under the State's view of the case, once the jury has retired to
16
deliberate, the undue prominence test applies to any evidence, including exhibits admitted into
evidence that have not been ordered excluded from the jury room by a good cause finding
made by the court.  This Court intended no such dichotomy when it adopted Rule 4-326.  
The common practice is that the trial judge determines,  prior to the jury retiring to
deliberate, what evidence will accompany it to the jury room.  In Raimondi v. State, 265 Md.
229, 230, 288 A.2d 882, 883 (1972), the petitioner argued that the trial court committed error
"when it permitted transcripts of electronic recordings to be taken into the jury room."  The
electronic recordings were transcribed because the recordings, at times, were inaudible.  Id.
The transcripts were admitted in evidence.  Id. at 230, 288 A.2d at 883-84.  "At the conclusion
of the case, the jury was permitted to take the transcripts to the jury room, over [the
petitioner's] objection."  Id. at 230, 288 A.2d at 884.  The petitioner argued "that the trial court
erred in permitting the transcripts to go to the jury room because the action was not sanctioned
by Maryland Rule 558...."  Id.  In holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when
it allowed the jury to take the transcripts with it during deliberations, this Court stated: 
"What these arguments overlook is that the transcripts were neither the notes
of another nor depositions, but exhibits, which Rule 558 a permits to be taken
to the jury room, in the discretion of the trial judge."
Id. at 231, 288 A.2d at 884.   Now, such exhibits are allowed in the jury room unless ordered
otherwise, for good cause.  And if allowed in the jury room because no good cause for
excluding them has been found, the jury has the right to use them.  This standard does not
change the right of the jury to have access to the evidence simply because the trial judge
inadvertently fails to provide it to the jury when it left to deliberate.  In this case, as we have
17
seen, the court agreed to send the "evidence," which included the videotape, to the jury as it
deliberated, rendering an application of a standard other than that prescribed in Rule 4-326
(b) even more illogical.
No good cause was found, as section (b) of the Rule required, for excluding access by
the  jury to the videotape for review.  The videotape was, as we have explained, an exhibit that
had been admitted into evidence; it was not “testimony or other evidence,” as contemplated
by section (c).   Therefore, the trial court erred in treating it as such.  Exhibits admitted into
evidence may go to the jury room absent some specific reason, i.e., good cause, to exclude
them.
Lastly, it cannot be argued that the trial judge's error was harmless.  We do not, and
cannot, know, nor can we  assume, what effect the omission of the videotape had on the jury
as it deliberated or what effect it would have had, had the jury been able to view the videotape
as it wished.  See Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976) (where a
“reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the record, is [un]able to declare a
belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict, such error
cannot be deemed ‘harmless’ and a reversal is mandated”); see also State v. Blackwell, 408
Md. 677, 698, 971 A.2d 296, 308 (2009); Parker v. State, 408 Md. 428, 446, 970 A.2d 320,
331 (2009); Tucker v. State, 407 Md. 368, 383, 965 A.2d 900, 908-09 (2009).
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED
TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
18
REVERSE THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
WICOMICO COUNTY AND REMAND FOR
NEW TRIAL.  COSTS IN THIS COURT AND
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO
BE PAID BY WICOMICO COUNTY.
In the Circuit Court for Wicomico County
Case No. 22-K-06-000124
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 13
September Term, 2009
TRACY WENDELL ADAMS
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Eldridge, John C.
(Retired, Specially Assigned)
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Adkins, J.,
which Harrell, J., joins.
Filed:     September 3, 2010
Adkins, J., dissenting.
Judge J. Frederick Sharer, long-time trial and then appellate judge, writing for the
Court of Special Appeals in this case, emphasized the importance of deferring to the trial
court’s discretion in matters like this one:
This Court discussed the discretionary nature of items taken into
the jury room in Jackson v. State, 164 Md. App. 679, 884 A.2d
694 (2005).  In that case, the jury asked to hear the testimony of
a witness again.  The trial court refused the request because the
court reporter would have had to transcribe the testimony, which
the trial court believed would take too long.  Jackson claimed
that the trial court “had ‘the discretion to have the court reporter
read [the] requested trial testimony to the jury.’”  Id. at 725, 884
A.2d 694 (citing Veney v. State, 251 Md. 159, 173, 246 A.2d
608 (1968)).  The Jackson Court iterated the discretionary
nature of the trial court's decision not to allow the jury to hear
the witness's testimony again, and the deference to which the
trial court's determination is entitled:
Appellate courts are highly deferential to a trial
judge's discretionary determinations.  Even in
cases in which the appellate court might have
deemed it wiser or fairer to have ruled otherwise,
it will not presume to substitute its judgment for
that of the trial court except in the rare case in
which the trial judge has literally abused his
discretion.  To rule differently than the appellate
court might have ruled is not, ipso facto, such
abuse.
Jackson, supra, 164 Md. App. at 725-26, 884 A.2d 694.
Adams, 183 Md. App. at 204, 960 A.2d at 1224.
The Court of Special Appeals compared the discretionary decision here to a case in
which a trial court refused to permit a videotape of a lineup into the jury room:
The question presented here is similar to that in Wright v. State,
72 Md.App. 215, 528 A.2d 498 (1987), in which the trial court
2
had refused to permit a videotape to be taken into the jury room
during deliberations.  The tape in that case showed “several
different line-up sessions,” of which one session was pertinent
to Wright’s case.  Id. at 218, 528 A.2d 498.  The trial court
reasoned that “to allow the jury to view the tape again and again
would unduly emphasize that evidence.”  Id.  This Court
perceived no error:
[Wright] relies on the provision in Md. Rule
4-326(a) (which says, among other things) that
“[U]nless the court for good cause shown orders
otherwise, the jury may also take . . . exhibits
which have been admitted into evidence . . .” into
the jury room.  As we see it, the “good cause”
mentioned in that rule encompasses the reasons
articulated by the trial court. We are not
persuaded that the trial court was clearly wrong.
Id.
Adams, 183 Md. App. at 204-05, 960 A.2d at 1224.  Judge Sharer also pointed out that
[w]hat constitutes “good cause” is a matter entrusted to the
discretion of the trial court.  See State v. Price, 385 Md. 261,
276-77, 868 A.2d 252 (2005) (dealing with good cause for a
postponement of  trial); . . . Johnson v. State, 348 Md. 337,
345-56, 703 A.2d 1267 (1998) (whether to permit filing of a
belated insanity plea). 
Id. at 205, 960 A.2d at 1224-25 (one citation omitted).
  I agree with the majority that subpart (b) of Rule 4-326 applies, and so there must
be “good cause” to exclude particular evidence from the jury room.  See Majority Op. at 14-
17.  But videotapes are a special kind of evidence, and certainly replaying one in the jury
room runs the risk of overemphasis.  See Wright, 72 Md. App. at 218, 528 A.2d. at 500; see
also Brooks v. Holtz, 661 N.W.2d 526, 532 (Iowa 2003) (holding that a trial court’s
3
determination that additional viewing of a videotape of an accident scene would
overemphasize that such evidence was reasonable, and that the court acted within its
discretion in refusing to allow the videotape to go into the jury room during deliberations);
State v. Frazier, 661 P.2d 126, 131 (Wash. 1983) (recognizing potential for prejudice arising
from undue emphasis on a tape recording by repetitive playing).
The majority creates a rule that a trial court must state on the record that a specific
videotape will not go into the jury room, and explain its “good cause” reason for that
decision, regardless of whether a party or the jurors have inquired.  I question whether this
is a good rule, or whether it places an unnecessary requirement on already overburdened trial
courts.  Regardless, application of this rule should not control the outcome on appeal.  The
jury raised the question, the court answered it, and stated its reasoning on the record.  As I
indicated above, a concern about overemphasizing what is shown (or not shown) on a
videotape if it is replayed before the jury is a legitimate reason to exclude the videotape from
the jury room.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in so ruling.  Accordingly, I would
affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
Judge Harrell authorizes me to state that he joins in the views expressed in this
opinion.