Case Title: State v. Cunningham

Citation: 

Docket Number: S50010

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2004-10-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  October 21, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
BRADLY MORRIS CUNNINGHAM, SR.,
Respondent on Review.
(No. C930434CR; CA A87792; SC S50010)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted May 4, 2004.
Robert M. Atkinson, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review. 
With him on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General. 
George Kelly, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the brief
for respondent on review. 
James E. Mountain, Jr., of Harrang Long Gary Rudnick, P.C.,
Portland, filed briefs on behalf of amicus curiae Garvey Schubert
Barer.  With him on the briefs were Robert C. Weaver, Jr., and
Garvey Schubert Barer.
Before Carson, C.J., and Gillette, Durham, Riggs, De Muniz,
and Balmer, JJ.**
BALMER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Washington County Circuit Court, Timothy Alexander, Judge. 179 Or App 359, 40 P3d 1065, adhered to on reconsideration,
184 Or App 292, 57 P3d 149 (2002).
**Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
BALMER, J.
The issue in this criminal case is whether the trial
court properly admitted certain testimony at defendant's trial
under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.  The
trial court concluded that statements that the victim had made to
her mother during a telephone call shortly before the victim's
death were admissible under OEC 803(2), which provides an
exception to the general rule that hearsay is inadmissible in
Oregon trials. (1)  A jury convicted defendant of murder, and
he appealed, alleging numerous assignments of error.  The Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court
had erred by admitting the testimony in question and that that
error was not harmless.  State v. Cunningham, 179 Or App 359, 40
P3d 1065 (Cunningham I), adh'd to on recons, 184 Or App 292, 57
P3d 149 (2002) (Cunningham II).  We allowed the state's petition
for review and now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Because the jury convicted defendant, we review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the state.  State v.
Barone, 329 Or 210, 212, 986 P2d 5 (1999), cert den, 528 US 1086
(2000).  We first recite the facts necessary to determine the
issue before us and later describe them in greater detail as
needed to address the parties' legal arguments.
On September 21, 1986, defendant's wife, Cheryl Keeton
Cunningham (the victim), was found beaten to death in her van on
Highway 26, near Portland.  She had died sometime between 8:00
p.m. and 8:30 p.m.  The relationship between the victim and
defendant had grown increasingly rancorous in the months leading
up to the victim's murder.  In February 1986, the victim had
filed for divorce, and the divorce trial was to begin in early
October.  Both parties had sought custody of their three sons,
and, pending the divorce proceeding, the victim and defendant had
shared custody of the children.  The victim had decided to seek
sole custody of the children following a bitter public argument
with defendant over which school one of the children should
attend.  Under the visitation schedule, defendant had custody of
the children from 7:00 p.m. Friday nights to 7:00 p.m. Sunday
nights.
On Friday, September 19, 1986, defendant had picked the
children up from the victim's house.  Defendant was angry at the
victim and accused her of having lied during depositions taken
during the previous week in preparation for the impending divorce
trial.  On Saturday, September 20, defendant took the children to
a soccer game in which the oldest son was playing.  The victim
also attended the game, but defendant, upon seeing her there,
became upset and took the children to the other side of the field
to prevent them from speaking to her.  That action upset the
victim, who told a friend at the game that defendant did not want
her there and that he had threatened her.
On Sunday, September 21, 1986, the victim telephoned
her mother at 7:11 p.m. and told her that defendant had called to
say that he could not return the children to her at 7:00 p.m. as
scheduled because he was having gas problems with his car.  The
victim also told her mother that defendant had refused to tell
her where he was.  At defendant's trial, the victim's mother
testified that the victim had been "hysterical" during their
conversation and had said that she might call the police.
At approximately 7:30 p.m. the victim had a telephone
conversation with her brother, Jim Karr, during which she was
upset and crying.  She told him that defendant had not brought
the children home yet and that he claimed to be having car
trouble, which she described as a "typical maneuver."  
At 7:59 p.m., the victim again called her mother.  At
trial, the victim's mother testified that 
"[the victim] was very stern and she said,
'Mother, I want you to remember this.  I'm going down
to the Mobil station by the IGA store, ah, down the
hill. * * * And I'm going to meet Brad and pick up the
children.  And I want you to remember this.'  And she
was real stern about it. * * * 
"I * * * told [Marvin Troseth (mother's boyfriend
at the time, whom she later married)] to come over by
the phone, and I repeated what she said to me.  And she
repeated it again, and I said it to him so he would
know where she was going. * * * 
"I said, 'Please, please don't go alone.  Please
wait and let us come up there and go with you.  We can
get there in 45 minutes or so.  We'll go with you.' 
* * * [The victim] said, 'No, I cannot leave the kids in the
car any longer.  I have to go pick up my kids.'  And that
was it."
In addition to the testimony regarding the telephone
calls, the state also introduced a piece of paper with notations
in the victim's handwriting that was found in her house and that
described the same events that the victim had discussed with her
mother, although not in the same detail.  The note stated:
"7:10 pm -- 'I'm having gas problems.'
 -- I asked where boys were & said I'd pick
them up.
 –- He says –'I'll handle it & hangs up.[']
"8:00SW Canyon Lane -- IGA mkt
-– at IGA -- at Mobil (though closed)"
Before trial, defendant moved in limine to exclude as
hearsay the victim's statements made during the two telephone
calls to her mother on the evening of her murder and the victim's
handwritten notes. (2)  The court held an omnibus hearing at
which the state argued that, although the victim's statements to
her mother during the two telephone calls were hearsay, those
statements were admissible either as evidence of the victim's
state of mind or as excited utterances.  Defendant claimed that
those statements did not satisfy the requirements of either
exception to the hearsay rule and therefore should be excluded at
trial.  The trial court denied defendant's motion and concluded
that all the statements that the victim had made during the
telephone calls, as well as her handwritten notes, were
admissible as excited utterances.  As noted, a jury convicted
defendant of murder.
On appeal, defendant assigned error to, inter alia, the
admission of that hearsay evidence. 
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court
correctly determined that evidence of the 7:11 p.m. telephone
call was admissible under OEC 803(2) as an excited utterance. 
Cunningham I, 179 Or App at 377, 378. (3)  The Court of Appeals
also held that the piece of paper containing the victim's
notations about the two telephone calls had been offered as a
single item of evidence.  Id. at 373-74.  The court then
determined that the first notation, written in close proximity to
the victim's 7:11 p.m. telephone call to her mother, was
admissible as an excited utterance.  Id. at 378.  Because
defendant had not objected separately to the second notation
regarding the later telephone call, the court held that the trial
court properly had admitted the entire note into evidence.  Id.
at 378-79.  Finally, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
trial court had erred in determining that the victim's statements
during the 7:59 p.m. telephone call to her mother qualified as an
excited utterance and therefore were admissible as an exception
to the hearsay rule under OEC 803(2).  Id. at 381.  After
determining that that error was not harmless, the court reversed
and remanded.  Id. at 383.  
The state petitioned for reconsideration on the ground
that, in analyzing the contents of the 7:59 p.m. telephone call,
the Court of Appeals had misconstrued and misapplied OEC 803(2). 
In the alternative, the state asserted that (1) the court should
have held that the victim's statements from the 7:59 p.m.
telephone call were admissible under OEC 803(3), the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule; and (2) any error in
admitting those statements was harmless because other
unchallenged testimony established the same inference as the
content of that telephone call, namely, that the victim was going
to meet defendant at the gas station.  The Court of Appeals,
without discussion, adhered to its original determination that
the victim's statements in the 7:59 p.m. telephone call did not
fall within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. 
Cunningham II, 184 Or App at 295.  The court also declined to
consider the merits of the state's argument regarding the
admissibility of those statements under the state-of-mind
exception, because it concluded that the state had not raised
that argument properly under ORAP 6.25(1).  Id.  Finally, the
court rejected the state's argument that the error was harmless. 
Id. at 308-09.
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE VICTIM'S HEARSAY STATEMENTS
On review, the state first contends that defendant
failed to preserve his objection to the hearsay evidence
regarding the victim's statements to her mother during the
second, 7:59 p.m., telephone call, because he did not object to
that evidence separately from the evidence regarding the first,
7:11 p.m., telephone call.  We have considered the state's
preservation argument, and we reject it.  The trial court
proceedings make it clear that defendant properly objected to the
hearsay testimony regarding the second telephone call.  We now
turn to that issue.
The critical question on review is whether the trial
court properly admitted the hearsay statements that the victim
made to her mother during the 7:59 p.m. telephone call under the
excited utterance exception of OEC 803(2).  As a general rule,
hearsay evidence is inadmissible in Oregon.  OEC 802.  Neither
party disagrees that the statements that the victim made to her
mother during the 7:59 p.m. telephone call were hearsay.  The
state offered the victim's out-of-court statements to her mother
to prove the truth of the matter asserted:  that the victim went
to meet defendant at a closed-down gas station located a short
distance from where she subsequently was found dead.  That was
hearsay.  See OEC 801(3).
Because the statements were hearsay, they were
inadmissible unless they fall within an exception to the hearsay
rule.  As stated above, OEC 803 provides, in part:
"The following are not excluded by [OEC 802], even
though the declarant is available as a witness:
"* * * * *
"(2) A statement relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress
of excitement caused by the event or condition."
In State v. Carlson, 311 Or 201, 808 P2d 1002 (1991),
this court discussed that so-called "excited utterance" exception
in detail and explained that, for statements to fall within its
scope, the trial court must conclude by a preponderance of the
evidence that three elements are satisfied:  (1) a startling
event or condition must have occurred; (2) the statement must
have been made while the declarant was under the stress of the
excitement caused by the event or condition; and (3) the
statement must relate to the startling event or condition.  311
Or at 209, 215 (citing Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence 533
(2d ed 1989)).  This court also noted that whether the evidence
satisfies those conditions is a preliminary question of fact for
the trial court to determine under OEC 104(1). (4)  Id. at 216. 
In Carlson, the trial court had admitted a hearsay
statement over the defendant's objection without making findings
on the preliminary questions of admissibility under OEC 104(1). 
Id. at 216.  This court therefore assumed that the trial court
had concluded that the evidence established the three predicate
facts -- that a startling event had occurred, that the declarant
had made the statement while under the stress of the excitement
caused by the event, and that the declarant's statement had
related to the event.  Id.  The court then considered whether
evidence existed in the record to support those facts, concluded
that it did, and accordingly held that the trial court had not
erred in admitting the testimony.  Id. at 218-19. 
Although Carlson outlined the requirements that
evidence must meet for admission under the excited utterance
exception to the hearsay rule, that case did not discuss
explicitly the standard that an appellate court should employ in
reviewing a trial court ruling that a statement constitutes an
excited utterance under OEC 803(2).  Because this court's prior
holdings on that issue are less clear than they might be, we
pause to consider that question before examining whether the
factual predicates identified in Carlson have been met in this
case.
This court has noted that some trial court evidentiary
determinations are reviewed for errors of law, while others are
reviewed to determine whether the trial court abused its
discretion.  In State v. Titus, 328 Or 475, 982 P2d 1133 (1999),
for example, this court held that a determination of relevance
under OEC 401 "can yield only one correct answer; evidence either
is relevant or it is not."  Id. at 481.  Because the trial court
has no discretion to label as irrelevant evidence that meets the
standard of relevance of OEC 401, appellate courts review
determinations of relevance for errors of law.  Id.  In contrast,
the question whether relevant evidence should be excluded under
OEC 403 because its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice or other factors is reserved to
the trial court's discretion.  Id.  "[I]n some cases, the record
may support either the admission or exclusion of otherwise
admissible evidence under OEC 403, and neither result legally
would be incorrect."  Id.  As to those evidentiary
determinations, an appellate court reviews the trial court
decision for abuse of discretion.  Id.  
In State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282, 4 P3d 1261 (2000), this
court again examined the distinction between trial court
evidentiary determinations that are reviewed for errors of law
and those that are reviewed for abuse of discretion.  At issue in
Rogers was the trial court's determination that the defendant's
expert witness, a neuropsychologist, was not qualified under OEC
702 to testify about possible causes of a frontal lobe
dysfunction that he had detected in the defendant's brain.  Id.
at 308-09.  Elaborating upon the discussion in Titus, this court
noted that, if the application of the proper principles of law
can lead to only one legally correct outcome, then an appellate
court reviews the trial court ruling without deference to the
trial court to determine whether the trial court erred; on the
other hand, if the application of those principles can lead to
more than one correct outcome, then the trial court ruling is
examined to determine whether the trial court abused its
discretion in choosing an outcome.  Id. at 312.  The court in
Rogers distinguished a trial court's legal ruling on the
admissibility of disputed evidence, which is reviewed under one
of the two standards just discussed, from the preliminary factual
determinations that a trial court may be required to make under
OEC 104(1) as predicates for its legal ruling.  Id. at 313 n 9. 
As to those factual determinations, the appellate court "reviews
the record to determine whether any evidence supports the trial
court's ruling."  Id.  Applying that analysis, this court in
Rogers concluded that an appellate court "reviews without
deference for errors of law whether a trial court properly
applied OEC 702 to decide whether an expert is qualified to give
testimony relative to a particular topic, because that
determination is a question of the application of law."  Id. at
315 (emphasis omitted). 
This court has not applied the analysis used in Titus
and Rogers explicitly to the excited utterance exception to the
hearsay rule.  However, this court's decision in Carlson, the
most recent discussion of OEC 803(2), is consistent with those
cases.  As noted previously, in Carlson, this court identified
three factual requirements that must be satisfied for a hearsay
statement to be admissible as an excited utterance.  This court
further held that, under OEC 104(1), the trial judge "must
determine whether the proponent of the evidence has established
that the three requirements * * * have been met."  311 Or at 216. 
In Carlson, this court reviewed the record to determine whether
there was evidence to support "the necessary predicate facts,"
id., and concluded that there was.  See 311 Or at 217-19
("evidence in the record" supported the conclusion that, more
likely than not, declarant had experienced a "startling event,"
her "accusatory statement was made while she was under the stress
of excitement caused by the event," and her "statement related to
the event").  Because evidence in the record supported those
required factual predicates, this court held that the trial court
had not erred in ruling that the declarant's statement was
admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay
rule.  Id.  
Implicit in this court's decision in Carlsonis the
conclusion that there is only one legally correct answer to the
question whether a statement is admissible as an excited
utterance.  The trial court finds the facts that underlie the
application of OEC 803(2), and those findings will not be
disturbed if evidence in the record supports them.  However, the
ultimate legal issue -- whether the requirements of OEC 803(2)
have been met and the hearsay statement is therefore admissible
as an excited utterance -- is a question of law as to which there
is only one legally correct outcome.  Like this court's holding
in Titus that evidence is either relevant or it is not, we
conclude that a statement is either an excited utterance under
OEC 803(2) or it is not.  It follows that an appellate court
reviews the trial court's legal conclusion that a statement is or
is not an excited utterance to determine whether that ruling was
an error of law. 
We recognize that some commentators assert that a
trial court determination that a statement is (or is not) an
excited utterance should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
See e.g., Clifford S. Fishman, 4 Jones on Evidence: Civil and
Criminal § 28:8, 620 (7th ed 2000) ("The appropriate standard of
appellate review of a judge's decision to admit a statement as an
excited utterance * * * is abuse of discretion.").  For the
reasons set out above, we disagree that that standard of review
applies to determinations under OEC 803(2).  We also note that
some of this court's cases that predate the adoption of the
Oregon Evidence Code, while rejecting the view that the trial
court has "absolute discretion" in ruling on the admissibility of
excited utterances, nevertheless state that "the trial judge must
be given considerable lee-way of decision."  Zeller v. Dahl, 262
Or 515, 518, 499 P2d 1316 (1972) (quoting Bosin v. Oak Lodge San.
Dist., 251 Or 554, 564, 447 P2d 285 (1968) (quoting McCormick on
Evidence § 272, 580)).  Our holding in this case appropriately
gives the trial court "considerable lee-way" in determining the
predicate facts under OEC 104(1), as to which our review is
limited to whether evidence in the record supports the trial
court's ruling.  See Rogers, 330 Or at 313 n 9 (applying that
standard as to factual predicates for determining qualifications
of expert witness under OEC 702).  That standard is consistent
with the traditional deference accorded to the trial court in
making factual determinations.  As stated above, however, and
consistent with the analysis in Titus and Rogers, that deference
does not extend to the trial court's legal conclusion that a
statement is or is not an excited utterance under OEC 803(2).  As
noted, we review that legal conclusion to determine whether the
trial court has made an error of law.
With that standard of review in mind, we turn to the
trial court's factual findings and legal ruling regarding the
disputed statements at issue in this case.  In contrast to
Carlson, in which the trial court made no specific findings as to
the preliminary questions of admissibility under OEC 104(1), in
this case we have the benefit of the trial court's findings as
set out in its order:
"I find that the decedent was under the stress of
excitement caused by the constantly escalating
dissolution proceedings.  Her conduct in the days and
weeks leading up to this event demonstrates a much
higher degree of stress and concern than is found even
in difficult dissolution cases.  Her emotional
condition had deteriorated significantly, and I am
satisfied the statements were made while Ms. Cunningham
was under that stress.
"Next, the State must have a triggering event or
incident just prior to the statements.  I find that the
sudden change in plans for delivery of the children
from visitation with defendant is sufficient evidence
of a triggering event.  The statements made during the
phone conversations and the notes written on the pad
are directly in response to defendant's phone
conversations with decedent that same day regarding the
children and provide the second element of the rule.
"Finally, the statements made to each relative and
the written notes relate to Ms. Cunningham's condition,
i.e., the stress from dealing with defendant and a
highly acrimonious custody dispute."
We must determine whether evidence in the record
supports the factual findings that the trial court made regarding
the victim's 7:59 p.m. telephone call to her mother.  As part of
that consideration, we view the record consistently with the
trial court's ruling that those statements constituted excited
utterances, accepting reasonable inferences and reasonable
credibility choices that the trial court could have made.  See
Carlson, 311 Or at 214 (citing State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 127,
806 P2d 92 (1991), and Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or 485, 487, 443 P2d
621 (1968)). 
The first requirement for a hearsay statement to
qualify as an excited utterance is the existence of a startling
event or condition. (5)  Here, the trial court found that
defendant's sudden change of plans for delivering the children
"triggered" the victim's statements in her telephone calls to her
mother and the notes that were written in her handwriting.  The
court did not specify whether it considered defendant's first
telephone call to the victim -- telling her that the children
would not be returned on time because his car was having gas
problems and refusing to tell the victim where he and the
children were -- or the second call, in which defendant asked the
victim to meet him at a nearby, closed-down gas station, or both
calls taken together, to be the startling event.  However,
viewing the record consistently with the trial court's ruling, we
conclude that that court found both of defendant's telephone
calls taken together to constitute the "startling event" for
purposes of the 7:59 p.m. telephone call.
In determining whether a particular event is
sufficiently startling, this court has stated that "the standard
is primarily subjective, i.e., the trial judge should look
primarily to the effect [of the event or condition] upon the
declarant."  Carlson, 311 Or at 217 (brackets in original;
internal quotation marks omitted).  In Carlson, this court noted
that, because the focus is on the effect of an event on an
individual declarant, the "fact that some individuals might not
have been excited by the incident does not bar admission under
the [excited utterance] exception."  Id. (quoting Paul R. Rice,
Evidence: Common Law and Federal Rules of Evidence 517 (2d ed
1990)).
As described above, the trial court found that the
victim had been under increasing and substantial stress in the
time period leading up to the night of her murder as a result of
her escalating divorce proceedings and that her emotional
condition had deteriorated significantly.  The evidence in the
record amply supports those findings.  The Court of Appeals
described many of the details of the acrimonious dissolution
proceedings and increasing hostility between the victim and
defendant.  Cunningham I, 179 Or App at 362-65.  Although those
ongoing stressful conditions did not, in themselves, constitute a
"triggering" event or condition, they do create a context for
evaluating the victim's mental and emotional state at the time
that she made the statements at issue.  That is relevant for
establishing whether the "triggering event" that the trial court
identified had a subjectively startling effect on the victim,
such that her subsequent comments qualified as excited
utterances. 
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals first decided
that, given the context of the custody dispute, defendant's
initial telephone call to the victim (refusing to reveal his and
the children's location, claiming gas problems, and changing the
meeting time) constituted a startling event for purposes of the
7:11 p.m. telephone conversation.  Cunningham I, 179 Or App at
375.  However, with respect to the victim's 7:59 p.m. telephone
call to her mother, the court apparently determined that
defendant's second telephone call to the victim (instructing her
to meet him at the closed-down station) had been the only
"startling event" before the victim's statements and concluded
that that call had been neither objectively nor subjectively
startling.  Id. at 379. 
We disagree with that analysis.  In our view, the trial
court's finding that the startling event had been the "sudden
change in plans for delivery of the children from visitation with
defendant" encompassed both defendant's first and second
telephone calls to the victim, because both telephone calls were
parts of the change in the original plan, that is, that defendant
would drop the children off at the victim's house at 7:00 p.m. 
Evidence in the record supports the conclusion that the startling
effect of defendant's first telephone call continued after the
victim had made the 7:11 p.m. telephone call to her mother.  For
example, during the 7:30 p.m. telephone call from the victim to
her brother, the victim was upset and crying.  She also described
defendant's claim that he was having car trouble as a "typical
maneuver," a comment that appears to express skepticism that
defendant's alleged car trouble was genuine.  The fact that
defendant then called back shortly before 8:00 p.m. and told the
victim to meet him at a closed-down gas station not far from her
house hardly would have had a reassuring effect on her in light
of the circumstances and in the overall context of the victim's
fear of defendant and his aggressive behavior towards her.  See
Cunningham I, 179 Or App at 363 (psychologist observed that
victim seemed intimidated by defendant and did not want to be
left alone with him and that defendant was "aggressive" and
"bombastic").
The Court of Appeals portrayed defendant's proposal
that the victim meet him at the gas station in a benign light,
stating that "the second call related that the children would be
returned shortly, albeit at a different place than originally
planned."  Id. at 380.  We do not think that that description
adequately captures the startling nature of that night's sequence
of events.  After calling the victim to tell her that he would
not deliver the children at the appointed hour, defendant, who
previously had threatened the victim, had called again to tell
her to meet him at a location where they almost certainly would
be alone -- a strange request in itself, given the close
proximity of the designated gas station to the victim's home and
the fact that, less than an hour earlier, defendant had claimed
to have car trouble.  We are satisfied that, under that set of
circumstances, and taking into account the victim's generally
stressed state and her deteriorated emotional condition, the
evidence supports the trial court's finding that the two
telephone calls from defendant, taken together, caused the stress
of excitement that precipitated the 7:59 p.m. telephone call to
the victim's mother.  Based on those findings and the trial court
record, we further conclude that the two telephone calls from
defendant to the victim constituted a subjectively and
objectively startling event.
Next, we must consider whether the victim was under the
stress of the excitement of that startling event at the time that
she made the disputed statements and whether that event caused
the victim's stress or excitement.  Carlson, 311 Or at 218.  As
this court explained in Carlson, the traditional rationale for
allowing excited utterances to be admitted over a hearsay
objection is that the "excitement caused by the startling event
or condition temporarily stills the capacity for reflection" and
thus is likely to produce "statements free of conscious
fabrication."  Id. at 215 (citing Legislative Commentary to
Oregon Evidence Code 154 (1981)).  In other words, the
spontaneity of a statement made under the stress of a startling
event is used as an indicator that the statement is reliable. 
See State v. Hutchinson, 222 Or 533, 537, 353 P2d 1047 (1960)
(stating same in regard to res gestae, doctrinal predecessor to
excited utterance exception).  Criteria that bear on the trial
court's determination of the spontaneity of the utterance include
"lapse of time, place, content of the utterance, physical or
mental condition of the declarant, whether made in response to an
inquiry, and presence or absence of a motive to fabricate." 
Carlson, 311 Or at 218 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the Court of Appeals characterized the victim's
demeanor during the 7:59 p.m. telephone call to her mother as
"deliberate," and therefore not spontaneous, although the court
admitted that "the only information we have about the declarant
victim's demeanor during her second telephone call to her mother
was that she was stern."  179 Or App at 380.  The court
continued, "[w]hile sternness is not necessarily inconsistent
with the stress of excitement, it also is not necessarily
indicative of the stress of excitement."  Although certainly
relevant, the victim's "stern" tone during the conversation at
issue does not preclude a finding that she made the statements
while under the stress of excitement.  See United States v.
Alexander, 331 F3d 116, 124 (DC Cir 2003) (trial court did not
abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of 911 call in which
declarant deviated only once from composed and monotone
voice). (6)  Indeed, defendant's tone was just as consistent
with her being terrified by the further change in plans that
defendant outlined to her in his second telephone call.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals' equivocal description
of the victim's demeanor highlights that court's error in holding
that the trial court should not have admitted the victim's
hearsay statement as an excited utterance.  As we discussed in
detail above, we review a trial court's legal conclusion that a
statement is admissible as an excited utterance to determine
whether it was legal error.  However, the trial court's factual
finding that the statement was made while under the stress of
excitement caused by a startling event and that it related to the
startling event is reviewed to determine whether evidence in the
record supported the trial court's determination.  Carlson, 311
Or at 219 (applying that standard of review).
Here, evidence in the record supports the trial court's
determination that the victim's statement was made under the
stress of excitement caused by the startling event.  First, very
little time elapsed between the event and the victim's
statements.  The victim called her mother almost immediately
after speaking with defendant the second time, and the victim's
two telephone conversations with defendant and her two telephone
conversations with her mother took place over the course of less
than an hour.  See State v. Moen, 309 Or 45, 59-60, 786 P2d 111
(1990) (statement made to physician more than a week after
startling event would have been admissible as excited utterance,
although not offered under that exception to hearsay rule);
Alexander, 331 F3d at 123-24 (upholding admission under excited
utterance exception of statements made during 911 telephone call
even though declarant called 15 to 20 minutes after startling
event and had called mother before calling 911).  Second, the
content of the utterance indicates that the victim was under
stress, in particular, her adamancy that she had to go get her
children immediately and her refusal to wait for her mother. 
Neither were her statements made in response to any inquiry from
her mother.  We already have discussed the victim's mental
condition, which the trial court described as being emotionally
deteriorated.  Finally, there was no evidence that the victim
possessed a motive to fabricate the statement.  Rather, the
victim appears to have been very interested in communicating the
truth to her mother, and, indeed, there would have been little
point in telling her mother of her plan to meet defendant had it
not been true. 
Based on those considerations, we conclude that
evidence in the record supports the trial court's determination
that the victim made the statements to her mother during the 7:59
p.m. telephone conversation while under the stress of excitement
caused by the defendant's change in plans for returning the
children.
The third and final prerequisite for the excited
utterance exception is that the hearsay statement must relate to
the startling event.  Again, evidence in the record supports the
trial court's findings on that issue.  The trial court stated
that the victim's statements to her mother related to her general
"stress from dealing with defendant and a highly acrimonious
custody dispute."  The trial court found that "[t]he statements
made during the phone conversations * * * [were] directly in
response to defendant's phone conversations with [the victim]
that same day regarding the children."  The hearsay statements
that the victim made to her mother during the 7:59 p.m. call
described what action the victim was planning to take in response
to the startling event, which consisted of both defendant's
initial change in plans for delivering the children and his new
plan to meet her at the gas station.  As a consequence, evidence
in the record supports the trial court's conclusion that the
statements were "related to" that event, thereby satisfying the
third condition of the excited utterance exception.
CONCLUSION
It follows from the foregoing discussion that the trial
court did not err in determining that the statements that the
victim made during her second telephone call to her mother on the
evening of her murder were admissible under OEC 803(2). (7)  As
a result, we must reverse the Court of Appeals decision to the
contrary and remand the case to that court for further
proceedings to consider defendant's remaining assignments of
error.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings. 
1. OEC 802 provides:
"Hearsay is not admissible except as provided in
[OEC 801 to 806] or as otherwise provided by law."
OEC 803(2) provides that the general prohibition
against hearsay in OEC 802 does not include:
"[a] statement relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress
of excitement caused by the event or condition."
2. The Court of Appeals provided a thorough description of
the procedural history of this case in Cunningham II, 184 Or App
at 295-97.
3. Defendant does not challenge the admissibility of the
7:11 p.m. call; consequently, that issue is not before this
court, and we do not address it. 
4. OEC 104(1) provides:
"Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the
existence of a privilege or the admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to
the provisions of subsection (2) of this section
[instructing court how to determine relevancy of
evidence that depends upon the fulfillment of a
condition of fact].  In making its determination the
court is not bound by the rules of evidence except
those with respect to privileges."
5. As discussed previously, Carlson holds that the
determination that a "startling event or condition" existed is a
question of fact, and our analysis here is consistent with
Carlson.  The existence of a "startling event," however, is
identified in OEC 803(2) as one requirement that must be met
before a court may conclude that a statement is an excited
utterance.  That conclusion, as we have noted, ultimately is a
question of law.  We recognize that a trial court could make
subsidiary findings of fact that are supported by the record and
nevertheless err in concluding that those facts demonstrate that
the statement in question qualifies as an excited utterance for
purposes of OEC 803(2).  That is not the case here.
6. OEC 803(2) is essentially identical to and is derived
from Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2), the federal excited
utterance exception.  It is, therefore, permissible to look to
federal cases in construing its Oregon counterpart.  See Carlson,
311 Or at 209 n 8 (stating same in regard to OEC 104(1) and FRE
104(a)); State v. Moen, 309 Or 45, 58, 786 P2d 111 (1990)
(looking to federal case law interpreting identical federal
evidentiary rule, FRE 803(4), in interpreting OEC 803(4)).
7. Following the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Crawford v. Washington, 541 US ___, 124 S Ct 1354, 158 L
Ed 2d 177 (2004), defendant filed a one-page memorandum asking
this court to "review" Crawford.  In Crawford, the Supreme Court
held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment barred
the state from using at trial a police interview with a witness
that was not available for cross-examination.  Although defendant
cited the Confrontation Clause in his brief in the Court of
Appeals, he did not argue that it barred the disputed evidence;
rather, he asserted only that, because the disputed testimony was
inadmissible hearsay, admitting it violated his constitutional
rights.  We agree with the Court of Appeals that "defendant does
not make any constitutional arguments in relation to this
assignment of error."  Cunningham I, 179 Or App at 381 n 11. 
Accordingly, we conclude that defendant failed to preserve any
constitutional challenges to the admissibility of the evidence at
issue here.