Case Title: Brooks v. Henderson & Parole Board Members

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92, 2023

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2023-10-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ALAN T. BROOKS, 
 
Petitioner Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DAVID HENDERSON & PAROLE 
BOARD MEMBERS, ET AL. 
 
Respondents Below, 
Appellees. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 92, 2023 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  C.A. N22M-08-002 
§  
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: August 25, 2023 
Decided: 
October 16, 2023 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; LEGROW and GRIFFITHS, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Alan T. Brooks, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus 
challenging the revocation of his parole.  The Superior Court granted the 
respondents’ motion to dismiss the petition and denied Brooks’s motion for 
reargument.  Brooks has appealed to this Court.  For the reasons discussed below, 
we remand to the Superior Court for further proceedings. 
(2) 
In 1987, Brooks was convicted of numerous felonies, including first-
degree murder.1  The Superior Court sentenced him to life imprisonment for the 
 
1 Skinner v. State, 575 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1990). 
 
2 
murder conviction and to a total of fifty-two years of incarceration for the other 
offenses.2  In September 2018, Brooks was granted parole.   
(3) 
On October 10, 2020, Brooks was arrested on assault and cocaine-
possession (Tier III) charges.  On November 2, 2020, the Board of Parole (the 
“Board”) presented Brooks with a “Notice of Probable Cause Hearing for an 
Interstate Violation of Probation/Parole” (the “Preliminary Hearing Notice”).3  
Brooks appears to have signed a “Waiver of Probable Cause Hearing” form 
(“Waiver Form”) on that same day, indicating that he waived his right to the 
preliminary hearing.  In addition to waiving the preliminary hearing, the Waiver 
Form states that Brooks admitted to violating condition numbers 1 and 7 of his 
parole.4  Condition number 1 required Brooks not to commit a new criminal offense.  
The Waiver Form identified the alleged violation of condition number 1 as “Assault 
 
2 Brooks v. State, 2010 WL 2197622 (Del. June 2, 2010). 
3 We refer to this notice as the “Preliminary Hearing Notice” because the document appears to 
give notice of the preliminary hearing required by Board of Parole Rule 19.  Rule 19 requires that 
the Board hold a preliminary hearing “within approximately ten (10) working days after the 
Hearing Officer receives the violation report to determine whether probable cause exists to 
conclude that the offender has violated the conditions of release on ‘technical’ grounds.”  DEL. 
BD. OF PAROLE R. 19, available at https://boardofparole.delaware.gov/rules; see also Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1972) (examining the “process that is due” before revoking parole, 
and identifying “two important stages in the typical process of parole revocation,” including “an 
inquiry . . . in the nature of a ‘preliminary hearing’ to determine whether there is probable cause 
or reasonable ground to believe that the arrested parole has committed acts that would constitute a 
violation of parole conditions”).  Rule 19 also provides that the offender may waive the preliminary 
hearing.  DEL. BD. OF PAROLE R. 19.  We note that although the Preliminary Hearing Notice in this 
case purports to give notice of a hearing, it does not include any information about when such 
hearing would occur. 
4 We do not opine on the voluntariness or effect of any such admission under the circumstances. 
 
3 
2d, Possession Tier 3.”  Condition number 7 required Brooks not to possess or 
consume a controlled substance unless lawfully prescribed.  The Waiver Form 
identified the alleged violation of condition number 7 as “Found in possession of 
22.7 grams of crack cocaine.” 
(4) 
On May 18, 2021, the Board held a hearing, by videoconference, after 
which the Board (i) found Brooks guilty of violating conditions 1 and 7 of his 
parole;5 (ii) revoked his parole; (iii) advised Brooks that he would lose his previously 
earned good-time credit; and (iv) advised him that he would serve the balance of his 
original sentence, subject to his eligibility to reapply for parole consideration in 
thirty-six months (May 2024). 
(5) 
In the new criminal case, on March 16, 2021, before the parole-
revocation hearing, the State dismissed the assault charge.  The Tier III cocaine 
possession charge remained pending at the time of the Board’s revocation hearing 
in May 2021.  Later, on March 14, 2022, Brooks pleaded guilty to possession of 
cocaine, a Class B misdemeanor, as a lesser-included offense of the Tier III 
possession charge.  The Superior Court sentenced him to six months of incarceration 
suspended for one year of probation.   
 
5 The record does not reflect the basis for the Board’s finding—specifically, the record does not 
reflect whether the Board relied solely on Brooks’s signing of the Waiver Form or whether it based 
its decision on other evidence of the violation. 
 
4 
(6) 
On August 2, 2022, Brooks filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in 
the Superior Court.  The petition alleged that the Board revoked his parole based on 
charges for escape after conviction and motor-vehicle offenses, with which he had 
not been charged.  The petition further alleged that the Board’s procedures did not 
satisfy the minimum requirements of due process—specifically, the right to appear 
in person, to receive advance written notice of the time and place of the hearing and 
written notice of the alleged violations, and the right to appear with counsel. The 
petition asked the Superior Court to compel the Board to perform its duties in 
accordance with 11 Del. C. § 4352 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  The petition further asked the Superior Court to require the 
Board to rescind its May 18, 2021 order revoking his parole and restore his good-
time credit; it also requested that his punishment for the misdemeanor conviction be 
limited to the sentence imposed in the criminal case. 
(7) 
The Superior Court granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss.  The 
court determined that Brooks had failed to establish entitlement to mandamus relief 
because he had not established that he had a clear legal right to the performance of 
a duty that the respondents had failed to perform.  The court also concluded that 
Brooks had an alternative legal remedy available in the form of an action in federal 
court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Brooks moved for reargument.  Citing Randolph v. 
 
5 
State6 and White v. State,7 he argued that the court had erred by dismissing the 
petition without ensuring that the Board’s procedures comported with the minimum 
requirements of due process.  The Superior Court denied the motion for reargument.  
The court held that Brooks had not shown that the court had misapprehended any 
law or fact that would change its conclusion that Brooks had not established a clear 
legal right to the performance of a duty or the unavailability of another adequate 
legal remedy. 
(8) 
On appeal, Brooks argues that the Superior Court erroneously 
concluded that he had failed to establish a clear legal right to the performance of a 
duty.  He contends that the Board had a duty to afford him the minimum 
requirements of due process and that it failed to do so by holding the parole-
revocation hearing by videoconference, not providing him with advance written 
notice of the time and place of the hearing, not giving him proper written notice of 
the alleged violations, and not allowing him to have private or appointed counsel.  
As he did in the Superior Court, Brooks also asserts that the Board revoked his parole 
based on escape and motor-vehicle charges that he did not incur and of which he did 
not receive notice.8  In response, the State concedes that the record lacks sufficient 
 
6 2017 WL 512471 (Del. Feb. 6, 2017). 
7 2007 WL 1138470 (Del. Apr. 18, 2007). 
8 This particular allegation appears to be based on a misapprehension of the Board’s letter 
regarding the revocation of his parole. 
 
6 
information to determine whether the parole-revocation process satisfied the 
minimum requirements of due process.  But the State argues that the Superior Court 
nevertheless correctly dismissed the petition for failure to establish that Brooks had 
a clear right to the performance of a duty by the Board and that no other adequate 
legal remedy was available. 
(9) 
“A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that the Superior 
Court may issue to a state agency or official to compel the performance of a non-
discretionary duty to which the petitioner has established a clear legal right.”9  “In 
cases involving the Board of Parole, the Superior Court has an obligation to ensure 
that the process afforded to the parolee comports with the minimum requirements of 
due process,”10 as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Morrissey v. 
Brewer.11  In Morrissey, the Court held that the revocation of parole involves a 
deprivation of conditional liberty interests and that the minimum requirements of 
due process therefore must be satisfied before parole may be revoked.12  In addition 
to requiring a probable-cause determination, and certain procedures relating to that 
 
9 Randolph, 2017 WL 512471, at *2 (citing 10 Del. C. § 564 and Clough v. State, 686 A.2d 158, 
159 (Del. 1996)). 
10 Id. at *2; see also White, 2007 WL 1138470, at *1 (“In cases involving the Board of Parole, the 
court must ensure that the Board followed the procedures set out in the parole statutes and the 
Board’s regulations.”); Bradley v. Del. Parole Bd., 460 A.2d 532, 534 (Del. 1983) (“In that the 
granting of parole is a matter of discretion with the Board, our task on review [of dismissal of a 
writ of mandamus] is to determine whether the Board followed the procedures set forth in the 
parole statutes and in its own regulations.”). 
11 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
12 Id. at 480-84. 
 
7 
determination, Morrissey set forth the following minimum requirements of due 
process for the revocation of parole:  (i) written notice of the claimed violations; (ii) 
disclosure to the parolee of the evidence against him; (iii) opportunity to be heard in 
person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (iv) the right to confront 
and cross-examine adverse witnesses; (v) a neutral and detached hearing body; and 
(f) a written statement by the factfinders of the evidence relied on and reasons for 
revoking parole.13   
(10) Delaware law authorizes the Board to revoke parole for “violation of 
any of the conditions of release.”14  The statute provides that, after a parolee is 
arrested for an alleged violation of parole, the Board “shall cause the person to be 
brought promptly before it for a hearing on the violation charge, under such rules 
and regulations as the Board may adopt.”15  The Board’s rules provide as follows 
with respect to revocation hearings: 
19. REVOCATION HEARINGS: The Board’s standards pertaining to 
hearings for revocation of parole or mandatory release are adopted from 
those prescribed by the 1972 Supreme Court decision on [sic] 
Morris[s]ey v. Brewer.  Essentially, the Court prescribed two 
hearings—the preliminary and revocation (or final) hearings—in cases 
where the offender has been alleged to have committed a “technical” 
 
13 Id. at 489. 
14 See 11 Del. C. § 4352(a), (d) (providing that parole may be revoked for a violation of the 
conditions of release if the violation is established at a hearing). 
15 Id. § 4352(c); see also id. § 4343(2) (providing that the Board shall “[e]stablish rules and 
regulations for the conduct of its own proceedings, and rules of procedure for the effective 
enforcement of this Chapter”). 
 
8 
violation of the conditions of release.  In cases where the offender has 
been already convicted, a preliminary hearing is not held. 
1. Preliminary Hearing: In accordance with procedures 
adopted by the Department, a preliminary hearing should 
be held within approximately ten (10) working days after 
the Hearing Officer receives the violation report to 
determine whether probable cause exists to conclude that 
the offender has violated the conditions of release on 
“technical” grounds. The offender, however, has the right 
to waive this hearing. 
2. Final Revocation Hearing: The final revocation hearing 
is an informal process structured to assure that the findings 
of a parole hearing will be based on facts and that the 
decision will be based upon an accurate knowledge of the 
parolee’s behavior (Morris[s]ey v. Brewer). The Board 
will attempt to conduct the final revocation hearing within 
two (2) months of receipt of the report alleging a new 
conviction or two (2) months of receipt of the results of 
the preliminary hearing alleging a “technical” violation, 
whichever is relevant. The offender is entitled to rights as 
follows: 
1. advance written notice of the time and place of 
the hearing, and of specific parole violations; 
2. a written copy of charges; 
3. presence of counsel of choice or to have counsel 
appointed; 
4. an opportunity to be heard in person and to 
present evidence and/or witnesses and for a limited 
right to cross-examine witnesses; 
5. a timely, written decision 
The testimony of witnesses must be relevant to the alleged violation 
and not cumulative. If there is any question about the nature of the 
testimony, the Board may require a written summary before the 
hearing. The written summary shall state how the testimony is relevant 
to the alleged violation. The offender has the right to confront and 
cross-examine adverse witnesses unless there is good cause (e.g., risk 
 
9 
of harm to the witness) for not allowing this confrontation. At the 
request of the offender, the Board will postpone the hearing until the 
offender can have counsel present.16 
 
(11) The State correctly observes that the Board’s “final decision to revoke 
or continue parole is . . . entirely discretionary and is not subject to mandamus 
relief.”17  But Brooks did not merely challenge the Board’s discretionary decision.  
Rather, he alleged that the Board did not conduct its proceedings in accordance with 
the minimum requirements of due process and sought to require the Board to do so.  
In mandamus actions involving the Board of Parole, the Superior Court must ensure 
that “the Board followed the procedures set out in the parole statutes and the Board’s 
regulations”18 and “that the process afforded to the parolee comports with the 
minimum requirements of due process set forth in Morrissey.”19  The State concedes 
that the record lacks sufficient information to determine whether Brooks’s parole-
revocation hearing satisfied the minimum requirements of due process or whether 
the Superior Court considered that question.  We therefore conclude that the 
 
16 DEL. BD. OF PAROLE R. 19, available at https://boardofparole.delaware.gov/rules. 
17 See Randolph, 2017 WL 512471, at *2; White, 2007 WL 1138470, at *1 (“[M]andamus relief 
will not lie to review the Board of Parole’s discretionary decision.”).  Cf. Semick v. Dep’t of 
Corrections, 477 A.2d 707, 708 (Del. 1984) (stating, in appeal from denial of writ of mandamus, 
that mandamus “does not lie in this case due to the discretionary nature of the Parole Board’s 
action,” but “deem[ing] the case to be in this Court as though on a Writ of Certiorari” because of 
“the serious nature of the issues raised”). 
18 White, 2017 WL 1138470, at *1; Bradley, 460 A.2d at 534. 
19 Randolph, 2017 WL 512471, at *2; see also White, 2017 WL 1138470, at *1 (“Having 
determined that there were no procedural defects, mandamus relief will not lie to review the Board 
of Parole’s discretionary decision.”) (emphasis added). 
 
10 
Superior Court erroneously dismissed the petition on the grounds that Brooks had 
not established a clear legal right to the performance of a duty that the respondents 
had failed to perform. 
(12) The State also argues that the Superior Court correctly determined that 
Brooks had an adequate legal remedy in the form of a Section 1983 action that he 
filed in federal court.  The State does not identify any decision that has held that 
mandamus relief is not available to a parolee asserting due-process claims arising 
under Morrissey because the parolee could assert those claims in federal civil rights 
litigation.  Indeed, the State’s position is contrary to this Court’s decisions stating 
that in a mandamus case involving the Board of Parole, the Superior Court has a 
duty to ensure that the Board followed the minimum requirements of due process. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that this matter is REMANDED to 
the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this order.  Jurisdiction is 
not retained. 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice