Case Title: Goshen Irr. Dist. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Control

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Goshen Irr. Dist. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Control1996 WY 144926 P.2d 943Case Number: 95-162Decided: 10/31/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
GOSHEN IRRIGATION DISTRICT,

 Appellant 
(Petitioner),

v.

The WYOMING STATE BOARD 
OF CONTROL and Basin Electric Power Cooperative, 

Appellees 
(Respondents),

and

BASIN ELECTRIC POWER 
COOPERATIVE,

 Appellant 
(Petitioner),

v.

GOSHEN IRRIGATION 
DISTRICT and The Wyoming State Board of Control,

 Appellees (Respondents).

Appeal from District 
Court, Goshen County, Keith G. Kautz, J.

Kate M. Fox 
(argued) and Kim D. Cannon of Davis and Cannon, Cheyenne, for Goshen 
Irrigation District.

Rex E. Johnson 
and Stephen N. Sherard (argued) of Sherard, Sherard & Johnson, Wheatland, 
for Basin Electric Power Cooperative.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; Thomas J. Davidson, Deputy Attorney General; S. Jane Caton, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Frederick E. Chemay, Special Assistant 
Attorney General (argued), for Wyoming State Board of Control. 

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN* and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

LEHMAN, Justice.

[¶1]      Goshen Irrigation 
District (GID) seeks review of a decision by the Wyoming State Board of Control 
declaring that 66 c.f.s. of GID's 100 c.f.s. supplemental water right in the 
Laramie River had been abandoned. Conversely, Basin Electric Power Cooperative 
(Basin) also seeks review of that decision contending that the evidence 
demonstrated that GID had abandoned 75 c.f.s.

[¶2]      We affirm in part 
and reverse in part.

[¶3]      GID presents the 
following issues for review:

1.         
Whether Basin is benefitted or injured sufficiently to have standing to 
bring this partial abandonment action.

2.         
Whether, in making the determination of benefit or injury, the Board of 
Control erred in considering unauthorized releases made from the Grayrocks 
Reservoir by Basin.

3.         If 
the Board of Control has jurisdiction to consider and decide upon equitable 
matters, whether the Board's decision that it is statutorily precluded from 
considering such matters is contrary to law.

4.         If 
the Board of Control does not have jurisdiction to consider and decide upon 
equitable matters, whether GID is entitled to a trial de novo on these issues in 
the District Court.

5.         
Whether the Board of Control's declaration of partial abandonment of an 
appropriation for irrigation use is contrary to law (Wyo. Stat. § 41-3-401(f)) 
and policy where the appropriator had used all the water available to it at some 
time during the five years immediately preceding the filing of the 
action.

6.         
Whether Hofeldt v. Eyre, 849 P.2d 1295 (Wyo. 1993), the case which held 
for the first time that supplemental supply rights are subject to abandonment, 
should be applied retroactively to partial abandonment actions.

7.         
Whether the Wyoming legislature's clear expression of intent to support 
and fund GID's Laramie River pump station must be reconciled with other 
legislative enactments to modify or otherwise limit the retroactive application 
of Wyo. Stat. § 41-3-401 et seq. partial abandonment of a supplementary water 
right.

Basin, on its 
claim that the Board should have declared an additional 9 c.f.s. abandoned, 
offers two issues in the form of statements:

1.         The 
evidence relied upon by the Board to find that 34 c.f.s. was pumped by GID on 
April 1, 1994 * * * was insufficient, speculative, improper and lacked 
foundation.

2.         The 
test pumping performed by GID on April 1, 1994 did not constitute the required 
beneficial use of water which will prevent an abandonment under Wyoming Statute 
41-3-401(a).

The State Board 
of Control also filed a brief but contented itself with addressing the issues as 
presented by the parties.

FACTS

[¶4]      GID is an 
irrigation district located in Goshen County. GID is the owner of a 100 c.f.s. 
supplemental water supply right on the Laramie River with a 1932 priority date. 
This supply is available whenever GID is in priority and its main appropriation 
rights on the North Platte River are insufficient.

[¶5]      Basin operates 
the Laramie River Station power plant near Wheatland, Wyoming. Basin's water 
permit allows it to store 104,109.6 acre feet of water per year from the Laramie 
River in the Greyrocks Reservoir. That permit carries a priority date of April 
24, 1973 and is junior to GID's supplemental permit.

[¶6]      In 1992, the 
Wyoming Legislature authorized the construction of a new pump station for GID 
located downstream from Greyrocks Reservoir. The station was designed to house 
two pumps, each capable of pumping 34 c.f.s., for a total capacity of 68 c.f.s. 
The first pump was installed in November of 1993. On April 1, 1994, the pump was 
used to divert water from the Laramie River. The second pump has yet to be 
installed.

[¶7]      Concerned that 
the new pumping station might impact the operation of their power facility, 
Basin sought reassurance from GID. Initially, Basin relied upon a 1975 agreement 
between GID and Basin on the use of GID's supplemental water right. In that 
agreement, GID agreed to limit the use of its supplemental supply depending upon 
the amount of water in the Laramie River. Basin, in turn, agreed not to contest 
the relocation of GID's point of diversion on the Laramie River. GID, however, 
informed Basin on May 26, 1992, that the agreement was not binding since the 
State Engineer and the Board of Control had never approved it. Basin attempted 
to negotiate an agreement with GID through early 1994, but the parties were 
unable to find common ground.

[¶8]      Basin filed a 
Petition for Declaration of Partial Abandonment with the Board of Control on 
April 7, 1994. The parties stipulated that GID's use of its supplemental water 
supply during the five previous years was limited to seventeen days in August 
and September 1990 and that the rate of diversion did not exceed 25 c.f.s. It 
was also stipulated that GID utilized the new pump with a 34 c.f.s. capacity in 
November 1993 after its installation and again on April 1, 1994.

[¶9]      After a hearing, 
the Board of Control concluded that there were times when GID was entitled to 
use its supplemental supply and there was water available but GID did not divert 
it. The Board also concluded that the April 1, 1994 diversion was done at the 
pump's full capacity of 34 c.f.s. Consequently, the Board held that there had 
been partial abandonment of all but 34 c.f.s. of GID's supplemental water right 
on the Laramie River.

[¶10]   Both parties have petitioned this 
court to review that decision.

DISCUSSION

1. 
Standing

[¶11]   GID initially contends that Basin 
lacked standing to bring an abandonment action because Basin could not 
demonstrate any injury or benefit.1 GID argues that if its supplemental 
water right was not abandoned, Basin would not be injured in any way as there 
have historically been sufficient flows in the Laramie River to meet its needs. 
Similarly, GID argues that the abandonment of its water right did not benefit 
Basin.

[¶12]   Standing is "a jurisprudential rule 
of jurisdictional magnitude." Schulthess v. Carollo, 832 P.2d 552, 556 (Wyo. 
1992). A party will have standing to pursue a litigation when they have a 
"personal stake in the outcome of the controversy" which has further been 
described in our case law as a "tangible interest." Id., at 557. In the context 
of a petition for abandonment of a water right, the petitioner must allege and 
prove three facts:

(1) that he possesses a 
valid water right of equal or junior status to the water right sought to 
be abandoned; (2) that the water right relied upon by the petitioner and the 
water right for which a declaration of abandonment is sought are from the 
same source of supply; and (3) that the petitioner stands to benefit from 
a declaration of abandonment or to sustain injury by reactivation of the 
contested water right.

Id. See also 
W.S. 41-3-401(b) (Repl. 1995). We also held that the Board of Control must make 
corresponding findings of fact, with support, in order to conclude that a 
petitioner has standing. 832 P.2d  at 557.

[¶13]   In this case, there is no dispute 
that the first two conditions are met; we are solely concerned with whether the 
abandonment of GID's supplemental right would confer a benefit on or prevent an 
injury to Basin. The Board of Control made the following findings of fact 
regarding benefit or injury: 

20.       THAT the parties 
offered a number of computer simulations of the operation of the Greyrocks 
Reservoir and the lower Laramie River * * *. Each exhibit is a simulation 
representing the results of a water accounting model of the Greyrocks Reservoir 
operation and resulting downstream Laramie River flows, each being based on 
different assumed values of parameters such as the order of use of the various 
water rights involved, the amount of use by GID under [its supplemental water 
right], and whether Basin's agreement flow releases would be protected [see fn. 
1], among others.

21.       THAT the Board 
found that the most useful of these simulations are found in Exhibits I and M. 
Those simulations are based on assumed use by GID in the amounts of 100 and 35 
c.f.s., respectively, with Basin's agreement releases not protected. Of all the 
simulations offered as evidence, these simulations incorporate assumptions which 
most closely approximate the recent operating conditions on the Laramie River at 
and below Greyrocks Reservoir.

22.       THAT the 
potential injury to Basin's storage which could result from the utilization of 
GID's supplemental supply right to its full extent of 100 c.f.s., is exhibited 
by a comparison of the results of the model simulations for 100 c.f.s. and 35 
c.f.s. diversions by GID, with Basin's agreement flows not protected, as set 
forth in Exhibits I and M, respectively. * * * Because the potential injury need 
not be a certainty, but only one that is not too remote or speculative, the 
results representing the averages for the 60-year period studied in the 
simulations, * * * are accepted to present a relatively likely end result. * * 
*

23.       THAT the results 
depicted in Finding of Fact No. 22, tend to show that if GID diverts 35 c.f.s. 
under its supplemental supply right rather than 100 c.f.s., greater amounts of 
permanent storage and end-of-month storage could be available to the Laramie 
River Station in those months in which GID is most likely to be entitled to use 
its supplemental supply right, June through September. Even though the 
simulations performed by GID only allow a comparison of 100 c.f.s. and 68 c.f.s. 
flows for its supplemental supply right and produced results significantly lower 
than Basin's simulations, their results also suggest an increase in permanent 
storage available to the Laramie River Station and end-of-month reservoir 
storage. Regarding the results of Basin's simulations as an upper limit and the 
results of GID's simulations as a lower limit, the Board finds that the probable 
effect upon Greyrocks Reservoir from the utilization of GID's supplemental 
supply right to its full permitted amount of 100 c.f.s. would lie somewhere 
between those estimates.

24.       THAT Basin has 
carried its burden of showing that it might be injured by the utilization of 
GID's supplemental supply right under Permit No. 4883 Enl. to its full extent if 
that right is not declared partially abandoned.

The foregoing 
clearly demonstrates that the record supports the determination that Basin 
possessed standing to pursue abandonment proceedings against GID's supplemental 
water supply.

2. 
Equitable defenses

[¶14]   At the hearing, GID sought to 
interpose the equitable defenses of estoppel and laches to defeat Basin's 
petition. The Board took evidence and heard arguments but, in its final order, 
it declared that while it had authority to entertain equitable defenses in 
contested cases, it would not exercise its equitable jurisdiction in this 
particular case for reasons of "public policy." The Board reasoned that the 
policy embodied by W.S. 41-3-401 in allowing for abandonment and the consequent 
freeing up for appropriation of idle water rights would be hindered if a user 
could defeat a petition for abandonment based on estoppel or laches. GID 
counters that the Board erred in not considering its equitable defenses. In 
essence, GID's position is predicated upon its belief that the policy reasons 
underlying estoppel and laches outweigh those policy reasons contained in the 
abandonment statute. Based on a review of the record, we need not decide whether 
the Board's decision was correct, as we conclude that even if a consideration of 
GID's equitable defenses was merited, GID would not prevail.

[¶15]   GID's equitable estoppel claim 
relies on the existence of Basin's agreement with the State of Nebraska and its 
alleged illegality. We have already held that Basin has standing grounded in 
facts apart from any consideration of the Nebraska agreement. Consequently, 
since Basin will suffer an injury to its water right if GID resumes full use of 
its supplemental right, we see no reason why the existence of that agreement 
should have any effect on Basin's ability to bring an abandonment 
action.

[¶16]   GID also argues that Basin should 
be barred by the doctrine of laches. GID contends that Basin had full knowledge 
for at least two years that there were plans to expand its pumping facilities. 
By waiting until after the pumping station had been completed and one pump 
installed at considerable expense, Basin's inexcusable delay in bringing this 
action resulted in substantial prejudice to GID.

[¶17]   The defense of laches "is a form of 
equitable estoppel based on a[n] unreasonable delay by a party in asserting a 
right." Squaw Mountain Cattle Co. v. Bowen, 804 P.2d 1292, 1297 (Wyo. 1991); see 
also Murphy v. Stevens, 645 P.2d 82, 91 (Wyo. 1982). What GID fails to 
acknowledge is that throughout the period in question, including right up to the 
time of the test pump in April of 1994, Basin attempted to negotiate a 
settlement of their differences with GID. "Laches does not depend on the passage 
of time alone; the plaintiff must be chargeable with lack of diligence in 
failing to proceed more promptly." Golden v. Oahe Enterprises, Inc., 90 S.D. 
263, 240 N.W.2d 102, 110 (1976); see also Finlay v. Finlay, 18 Kan. App. 2d 479, 
856 P.2d 183, 191 (1993). The record shows that Basin negotiated with the intent 
of seeking a settlement; laches is unavailable under these circumstances. See 
New Hampshire Donuts, Inc. v. Skipitaris, 129 N.H. 774, 533 A.2d 351, 357 (1987) 
(laches is not available where plaintiff engaged in good faith negotiations to 
settle dispute).

3. W.S. 
41-3-401: Partial Abandonment

[¶18]   Finally, GID makes several 
arguments that the partial abandonment statute, W.S. 41-3-401, is inapplicable 
under the circumstances of this case. Initially, it contends that our decision 
in Hofeldt v. Eyre, 849 P.2d 1295 (Wyo. 1993), which held that supplemental 
water supply rights were subject to abandonment, should not be applied 
retroactively.

[¶19]   We answered that question, at least 
implicitly, in our Hofeldt opinion, where our decision was applied to the 
parties in that case. 849 P.2d  at 1298. As the specially concurring justice 
noted:

The general rule from 
time immemorial is that the ruling of a court is deemed to state the true nature 
of the law both retrospectively and prospectively. In civil cases, at least, 
constitutional law neither requires nor prohibits retroactive operation of an 
overruling decision, but in the vast majority of cases a decision is effective 
both prospectively and retrospectively, even an overruling decision. Whether the 
general rule should be departed from depends on whether a substantial 
injustice would otherwise occur.

849 P.2d  at 1298 
(Cardine, J., specially concurring) (quoting Harvey By and Through Harvey v. 
General Motors Corp., 739 P.2d 763, 765 (Wyo. 1987) and Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 676 (Utah 1984)) (emphasis added). GID has failed to explain to our 
satisfaction how a substantial injustice would befall it when it had notice that 
its supplemental right might be subject to abandonment for at least a year after 
our Hofeldt decision and, yet, it took no preventive measures to ensure the 
safety of its water right.

[¶20]   Next, GID contends that partial 
abandonment of its supplemental supply is statutorily prohibited. GID relies on 
W.S. 41-3-401(f) as providing an exception to the general abandonment statute, 
applicable to the situation at hand and rendering the Board's decision in 
error.

[¶21]   The statute at issue, W.S. 
41-3-401(f), provides:

An appropriation for 
irrigation use is not subject to partial abandonment for failure of the 
appropriator to irrigate part of the lands described in his permit or 
certificate of appropriation during the successive five (5) year period 
if:

(i)         
Facilities to divert the water and to apply it to beneficial use upon the 
lands which were not irrigated existed in usable form during the period of 
nonuse; and

(ii)        There was 
not a sufficient supply of water available, because of regulation for prior 
water rights or because shortage of supply resulted in insufficient water to 
satisfy the appropriation in full, to irrigate the lands for which abandonment 
is sought provided that a diligent effort was made to use the supply which was 
available.

[¶22]   Contrary to GID's expectations, we 
find that -401(f) is inapplicable to the instant situation. The statute clearly 
and unambiguously requires the appropriator to have the facilities in place to 
make its diversion. We agree with the Board of Control that under the plain 
language of the statute this means that in order to take advantage of the 
exception contained within the statute, an appropriator must have facilities 
capable of diverting their entire appropriation. The intent of the statute is to 
protect against "partial abandonments" when an appropriator has the facilities 
in place to make his appropriation but, through factors beyond his control - 
regulation of the source for prior users or a shortage in supply - a full 
appropriation is impossible. If an appropriator is protected against partial 
abandonment even though he does not have the facilities in place to utilize his 
full appropriation, then a user could simply install a small pump to protect his 
supply without ever having to divert the remaining portion of his appropriation. 
This is anathema to Wyoming's statutory water use scheme. See W.S. 41-3-101 
(nature of rights and beneficial uses).

[¶23]   Finally, GID attempts to show, by 
way of legislative appropriations for its two new pumps, that the legislature 
did not intend for an interpretation of the law to effect an abandonment of 
GID's supplemental right. At its heart, GID's argument is that the legislature's 
appropriations implicitly repealed the abandonment statute. Repeals by 
implication are not favored. State v. Sodergren, 686 P.2d 521, 525 (Wyo. 1984). 
Our task is to determine if the statutes can stand together or if they are 
repugnant to one another. Sodergren, 686 P.2d  at 526 (quoting Bartlett v. State, 
569 P.2d 1235, 1241 (Wyo. 1977)). "Where it is evident that a subsequent act 
seeks to revise the entire subject matter, embracing all that was intended to be 
preserved in the old and omitting what was not so intended, the last act 
supersedes the former and repeals it by implication." Blount v. City of Laramie, 
510 P.2d 294, 296 (Wyo. 1973).

[¶24]   We conclude that the legislature 
did not intend to repeal the abandonment statute. The United States Supreme 
Court has spoken persuasively on this issue:

The doctrine disfavoring 
repeals by implication "applies with full vigor when * * * the subsequent 
legislation is an appropriations measure." Committee for Nuclear Responsibility 
v. Seaborg, 149 U.S.App.D.C. 380, 382, 463 F.2d 783, 785 (1971) (emphasis 
added); Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 355 (C.A.8 1972). 
This is perhaps an understatement since it would be more accurate to say that 
the policy applies with even greater force when the claimed repeal rests solely 
on an Appropriations Act. We recognize that both substantive enactments and 
appropriations measures are "Acts of Congress," but the latter have the limited 
and specific purpose of providing funds for authorized programs. When voting on 
appropriations measures, legislators are entitled to operate under the 
assumption that the funds will be devoted to purposes which are lawful and not 
for any purpose forbidden. Without such an assurance, every appropriations 
measure would be pregnant with prospects of altering substantive legislation, 
repealing by implication any prior statute which might prohibit the expenditure. 
[This would] lead to the absurd result of requiring Members to review 
exhaustively the background of every authorization before voting on an 
appropriation[.]

 

Tennessee Valley 
Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190, 98 S. Ct. 2279, 2300, 57 L. Ed. 2d 117 
(1978). GID has not presented us with any evidence that the legislature was even 
aware that its supplemental supply was in a state where abandonment proceedings 
could be brought, let alone that the legislature intended to prevent such a 
proceeding by its appropriations measures. Under these circumstances, we cannot 
find an intent by the legislature to repeal a substantive statute through the 
vehicle of an appropriations bill.

4. 
Substantial evidence

[¶25]   The final issue is raised by Basin, 
which claims that the decision of the Board of Control to order abandonment of 
GID's supplemental supply to 34 c.f.s. rather than 25 c.f.s. is not supported in 
the record by substantial evidence. The basis for the Board's finding of 34 
c.f.s. was the April 1, 1994 test of the new pump. Basin asserts that there is 
no evidence in the record which definitively discloses the amount of water that 
was pumped on that day as GID did not use any measuring device. Alternatively, 
Basin argues that the pumping on that day, since it was only a test, was not a 
beneficial use and only water that is used beneficially is not 
abandoned.

[¶26]   We agree that the record does not 
support the Board's finding and will reverse and remand that portion of the 
Board's order to require a further reduction of GID's supplemental right to 25 
c.f.s.

We review an 
administrative agency's findings of fact by applying the substantial evidence 
standard. Our task is to examine the entire record to determine whether 
substantial evidence supports the [Board's] findings. We will not substitute our 
judgment for that of the [Board] when substantial evidence supports [its] 
decision. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind 
might accept in support of the agency's conclusions.

Amoco Production 
Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 899 P.2d 855, 857 (Wyo. 1995).

[¶27]   In making the determination as to 
how much of GID's supplemental supply was utilized, the Board found the 
following:

42. THAT the amount of 
water pumped on April 1, 1994, was not measured with a Hoff meter or other 
measuring device.

43. THAT the record 
contains: (a) testimony that on April 1, 1994, GID's new Peerless pump was 
running at full r.p.m.; (b) testimony by the hydrographer, Brian Pugsley, that 
he estimated that GID's new Peerless pump could have been operating at a rate 
ranging from 30 c.f.s. to 34 c.f.s. during the pumping on April 1, 1994; (c) 
videotape evidence of the pumping on that date; (d) a stipulation that the 
capacity of the new Peerless pump is 34 c.f.s.; (e) evidence of subsequent 
pumping rates experienced by GID in operating that pump; and (f) testimony by 
Basin's pump expert, Don Brosz, that he had no reason to believe that the 
Peerless pump did not operate at its maximum rated capacity of 34 c.f.s. on 
April 1, 1994.

44. THAT based on the 
evidence identified in Finding of Fact No. 43, the Board finds that GID diverted 
34 c.f.s. from the Laramie River on April 1, 1994, under its supplemental supply 
right, Permit No. 4883 Enl.

The evidence 
cited by the Board is insufficient to support a finding that the April 1, 1994, 
pumping was at 34 c.f.s. First, as the Board explicitly acknowledges, the 
pumping was not measured in any way. Second, the hydrographer did testify that 
the pump could have been operating in a 30 c.f.s. to 34 c.f.s. range. However, 
he also testified that: (1) he did not consider himself a pump expert; (2) his 
original estimate of the flow was greater than the pump's designed capacity; and 
(3) he stated that his estimate of the rate of flow was "speculation." Third, 
there is no other evidence in the record from which it can be established what 
the rate of flow was on April 1, 1994 from that pump.

[¶28]   For evidence to be sufficient to 
allow a "reasonable mind" to accept an agency's conclusion, there must appear in 
the record evidence which allows either a definitive conclusion or a reasonable 
extrapolation based on the surrounding circumstances. In this case, there is 
nothing other than "speculation" on which one could form a conclusion as to the 
amount of water that was pumped on April 1, 1994. Therefore, the use of the 
April 1, 1994 pumping as a basis for the determination of the amount of 
supplemental supply used in the preceding five-year period was error. The 
maximum figure supported in the record is the 25 c.f.s. to which the parties 
stipulated that GID diverted in August/September of 1990. Accordingly, the Board 
erred in not ordering GID's supplemental right abandoned to 25 
c.f.s.

CONCLUSION

[¶29]   We find no error in the Board of 
Control's decision to order a partial abandonment of GID's Laramie River 
supplemental water right. However, we conclude that the Board's decision to 
order abandonment to 34 c.f.s. was unsupported by substantial evidence in the 
record. We reverse that portion of the Board's Order with instructions to reduce 
GID's supplemental water right to 25 c.f.s.

FOOTNOTE

1 GID contends that the 
only way Basin could show an injury or benefit is if it relied upon an agreement 
between Basin and the State of Nebraska allowing for certain releases from 
Greyrocks to provide a minimum flow of water from the Laramie River into the 
North Platte River to help preserve habitat for migratory cranes. GID alleges 
that the agreement is in violation of Wyoming law and, consequently, cannot be 
the basis of an injury or benefit for standing purposes. We have resolved the 
issue of standing without consideration of the agreement and express no view as 
to its validity.