Case Title: Shockley v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC96633

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2019-04-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc 
LANCE C. SHOCKLEY, 
) 
) 
Appellant, 
) 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC96633 
) 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
) 
) 
Respondent. 
) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CARTER COUNTY 
The Honorable Kelly W. Parker, Judge 
Lance Shockley (hereinafter, “Movant”) was found guilty by a jury of one count of 
first-degree 
murder 
for 
the 
death 
of 
Missouri 
highway 
patrolman 
Sergeant Carl DeWayne Graham, Jr. (hereinafter, “Victim”).  The jury found the facts 
required by law to impose a death sentence, but it was unable to agree whether to 
recommend a sentence of death or life imprisonment.  Pursuant to section 565.030.4, 
RSMo 2000,1 the circuit court conducted an independent review of the facts and imposed 
a death sentence.  This Court affirmed Movant’s conviction and sentence.  State v. 
Shockley, 410 S.W.3d 179 (Mo. banc 2013).   
1 All statutory references are to RSMo 2000 unless otherwise indicated. 
Opinion issued April 16, 2019
2 
 
Movant appeals the motion court’s judgment overruling his Rule 29.15 motion after 
an evidentiary hearing.  This Court has exclusive jurisdiction over this appeal because a 
death sentence was imposed.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10; see also Standing Order, June 16, 
1988 (effective July 1, 1988).  This Court affirms the motion court’s judgment. 
Factual and Procedural History2 
 
On November 26, 2004, Movant was involved in a motor vehicle accident resulting 
in the death of his passenger.  Over the next several months, Victim conducted the 
investigation of the accident, which criminally implicated Movant.    
 
On March 20, 2005, at approximately 12:20 p.m., Movant borrowed his 
grandmother’s red Pontiac Grand Am (hereinafter, “the red car”), which had a bright 
yellow sticker on the trunk near the driver’s side.  Between 1:45 p.m. and 4:15 p.m. that 
afternoon, various witnesses noticed a red car with a bright yellow sticker affixed to the 
driver’s side of the trunk parked on the wrong side of the road a few hundred feet from 
Victim’s residence.    
 
At 4:03 p.m. that day, Victim returned home, backed his patrol car into his driveway, 
and radioed dispatch he was ending his shift.  As Victim exited his vehicle, he was shot 
from behind with a high-powered rifle that penetrated his Kevlar vest.  The bullet severed 
Victim’s spinal cord at the neck, immediately paralyzing him.  Victim fell backward and 
suffered fractures to his skull and ribs upon impact with the pavement.  The killer then 
approached Victim, who was still alive, and shot him twice more with a shotgun into his 
                                              
2 This recitation incorporates portions of this Court’s prior opinion from Movant’s direct 
appeal without further attribution or citation. 
3 
face and shoulder.  The recovered rifle bullet was deformed, but ballistics experts 
determined it belonged to the .22 to .24 caliber class of ammunition that would fit a 
.243 caliber rifle.  Investigators later learned that, around 7 p.m. on the evening of Victim’s 
murder, Movant’s wife gave Movant’s uncle a box of .243 caliber bullets and stated, 
“[Movant] said you’d know what to do with them.” 
Movant returned the red car to his grandmother between 4:15 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. 
that same day.  Investigators calculated it took approximately eighteen minutes to drive 
from Movant’s grandmother’s house to the location where the red car with the yellow 
sticker had been parked near Victim’s home. 
 Two highway patrol investigators interviewed Movant at his residence that 
evening.  Movant immediately denied killing Victim and stated he spent all day working 
around his house with his neighbor, Sylvan Duncan (hereinafter, “Sylvan”).3  The next day, 
Movant again met with investigators and elaborated on the alibi.  Movant claimed he was 
visiting relatives, including his grandmother, and he watched from his living room as 
Sylvan pushed brush.  Movant stated he knew Victim was investigating him for the fatal 
accident and, without prompting, declared he did not know where Victim lived.     
Later that day, Movant visited his grandmother and instructed her to tell the police 
he had been home all day the day Victim was shot.  When his grandmother told Movant 
she would not lie for him, he put his finger over her mouth and said, “I was home all day.”   
3 Sylvan and his wife, Carol, will be referred to by their first names for ease of clarity.  
No disrespect is intended. 
4 
 
Police arrested Movant on March 23, 2005, for leaving the scene of the car accident 
that resulted in his passenger’s death.  The state subsequently charged Movant with leaving 
the scene of a motor vehicle accident, first-degree murder for Victim’s death, and armed 
criminal action.  The state proceeded to trial only on the first-degree murder charge and 
sought the death penalty.  Movant was represented initially by several public defenders, 
including Thomas Marshall (hereinafter, “Marshall” and, collectively, “the first trial 
team”).  Movant later obtained private counsel and was represented at trial by Brad Kessler 
(“hereinafter, “Kessler”), David Bruns (hereinafter, “Bruns”), and Mollyanne Henshaw 
(hereinafter, “Henshaw” and collectively, “trial counsel”).   
The state theorized Movant killed Victim to stop the fatal car accident investigation.  
Movant’s defense was it was ridiculous for him to believe, simply by killing Victim, law 
enforcement would halt its investigation into the accident.  Trial counsel also argued the 
police improperly directed all their investigative attention toward him rather than pursuing 
other possible perpetrators. 
 
After a five-day guilt phase proceeding, the jury found Movant guilty of first-degree 
murder.  During the penalty phase, the state submitted four statutory aggravators pursuant 
to section 565.032.2:  (1) Victim was a “peace officer” and the “murder was committed 
because of the exercise of his official duty;” (2) Movant was depraved of mind when he 
killed Victim and, “as a result thereof, the murder was outrageously and wantonly vile, 
horrible, and inhuman;” (3) Victim was murdered “for the purpose of avoiding ... or 
preventing a lawful arrest;” and (4) Victim was a “potential witness in [a] past or pending 
investigation ... and was killed as a result of his status as a ... potential witness.”   
5 
The jury found the first, third, and fourth statutory aggravators were proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  The jury did not find unanimously the circumstances in mitigation 
outweighed those in aggravation.  However, the jury was unable to agree which punishment 
to recommend.  After overruling Movant’s motion for new trial, the circuit court imposed 
a death sentence pursuant to section 565.034.4. 
Movant appealed and raised nine points of error.  This Court affirmed the circuit 
court’s judgment and conducted an independent proportionality review pursuant to 
section 565.035.3.  Movant filed a timely Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, 
alleging several claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.  After an 
evidentiary hearing, the motion court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, made 
credibility determinations, and denied Movant relief.  Movant now appeals, raising 
seventeen claims of error. 
Standard of Review 
This Court reviews the denial of post-conviction relief to determine whether the 
motion court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous.  Rule 29.15(k). 
“A judgment is clearly erroneous when, in light of the entire record, the court is left with 
the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made.”  Swallow v. State, 398 
S.W.3d 1, 3 (Mo. banc 2013).  The motion court’s findings are presumed correct. 
Johnson v. State, 406 S.W.3d 892, 898 (Mo. banc 2013).  “This Court defers to ‘the motion 
court’s superior opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses.’”  Barton v. State, 
432 S.W.3d 741, 760 (Mo. banc 2014) (quoting State v. Twenter, 818 S.W.2d 628, 635 
(Mo. banc 1991)). 
6 
 
 
To be entitled to post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
movant must show by a preponderance of the evidence his or her trial counsel failed to 
meet the Strickland test to prove his or her claims.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).  Under Strickland, Movant must 
demonstrate:  (1) trial counsel failed to exercise the level of skill and diligence reasonably 
competent trial counsel would in a similar situation, and (2) he was prejudiced by that 
failure.  Id. at 687. 
 
Movant must overcome the strong presumption trial counsel’s conduct was 
reasonable and effective.  Johnson, 406 S.W.3d at 899.  To overcome this presumption, a 
movant must identify “specific acts or omissions of counsel that, in light of all the 
circumstances, fell outside the wide range of professional competent assistance.”  Zink v. 
State, 278 S.W.3d 170, 176 (Mo. banc 2009).  Trial strategy decisions may be a basis for 
finding ineffective assistance of counsel only if that decision was unreasonable.  Id.  
“[S]trategic choices made after a thorough investigation of the law and the facts relevant 
to plausible opinions are virtually unchallengeable ….”  Dorsey v. State, 448 S.W.3d 276, 
287 (Mo. banc 2014) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). 
“To establish relief under Strickland, a movant must prove prejudice.”  Johnson, 
406 S.W.3d at 899.  Prejudice occurs when “there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  
Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 429 (Mo. banc 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).   
Prejudice in a death penalty case is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
deficient performance, the jury would have concluded the balance of aggravating and 
7 
 
mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.”  Forrest v. State, 290 S.W.3d 704, 708 
(Mo. banc 2009) (quoting State v. Kenley, 952 S.W.2d 250, 266 (Mo. banc 1997)).  
Movant’s points on appeal will be addressed out of order for clarity. 
Points I through IV – Juror 58 
 
 
Movant raises four points related to Juror 58’s conduct during voir dire and while 
serving on the jury.  Two months before serving on the jury, Juror 58 published a 184-page 
book, which he described as a fictionalized autobiography.  The book contains six pages 
chronicling the protagonist’s brutal and graphic revenge murder of a defendant who killed 
the protagonist’s wife in a drunken-driving accident.  The protagonist viewed the defendant 
as escaping justice in the court system because the defendant received only probation 
following his conviction.  The book’s front and back covers contain illustrations of blood 
spatter.  The back cover states the protagonist’s life changed forever when his wife was 
killed and her murderer was set free.  The cover states the protagonist “sought vengeance” 
and “seeks justice” and “knows he will die fighting the system.” 
Point I – Failure to Question Juror 58 during Voir Dire 
Movant argues the motion court clearly erred in denying his claim trial counsel were 
ineffective for failing to question Juror 58 when he volunteered he was a published author.  
Movant claims questioning Juror 58 about the book’s contents would have uncovered 
grounds to strike him for cause.  Movant claims he was prejudiced because the book’s 
contents demonstrated Juror 58 could not serve fairly and should have been struck for 
cause.   
8 
 
A defendant has a constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial.  U.S. Const. 
amends. VI, XIV; Mo. Const. art. I, sec. 18(a).  This right includes “adequate voir dire to 
identify unqualified jurors.”  Knese v. State, 85 S.W.3d 628, 632 (Mo. banc 2002).  
“[A] veniremember should be asked if he or she holds any prejudices or biases that would 
‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his [or her] duties as a juror in 
accordance with his [or her] instructions and his [or her] oath.’”  Id. at 632 (quoting Adams 
v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S. Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L. Ed. 2d 581, 589 (1980)).  “This 
inquiry is meant to reveal whether a juror can set aside any prejudices and impartially fulfill 
his [or her] obligations as a juror.”  Id.; Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 421-22, 
105 S. Ct. 844, 850, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 851 (1985).   
“A challenge for cause will be sustained if it appears that the venireperson cannot 
‘consider the entire range of punishment, apply the proper burden of proof, or otherwise 
follow the court’s instructions in a first degree murder case.’”  State v. Smith, 32 S.W.3d 
532, 544 (Mo. banc 2000) (quoting State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 839 (Mo. banc 
1998)).  “In cases in which the death penalty may be imposed, a person who cannot be 
impartial due to an improper predisposition is unfit to serve on the jury.”  Dorsey, 
448 S.W.3d at 299 (quoting Anderson v. State, 196 S.W.3d 28, 41 (Mo. banc 2006)).  The 
fitness of a juror is considered in the context of the entire examination of the juror and not 
by focusing on one response.  Middleton v. State, 103 S.W.3d 726, 734 (Mo. banc 2003).   
Failure to strike a juror who is unfit to serve because of an improper predisposition 
is structural error.  Anderson, 196 S.W.3d at 40.  When a “defendant is deprived of the 
right to a fair and impartial jury, prejudice therefrom is presumed.”  Strong v. State, 
9 
 
263 S.W.3d 636, 647 (Mo. banc 2008) (quoting Everage v. State, 229 S.W.3d 99, 102 
(Mo. App. W.D. 2007)).  “Nonetheless, in order to avail himself of this presumption, 
[Movant] must establish that the errors complained of resulted in his trial by a jury that was 
not fair and impartial.”  Id. 
During the death qualification voir dire, Juror 58 stated he could give meaningful 
consideration to returning any appropriate sentence if the jury reached that point in the 
proceedings.  Juror 58 approached the bench during a break to inform the circuit court he 
failed to mention his son was a Springfield police officer and he was a published author.  
When trial counsel asked the venire panel whether they had family members in law 
enforcement, Juror 58 spoke about his son but stated it would not affect his ability to be 
fair in this case.  Neither party questioned Juror 58 about being an author.   
Juror 58 was chosen for the jury and served as the foreman.  The jury returned a 
guilty verdict.  That evening, Movant’s aunt provided trial counsel with a copy of 
Juror 58’s book.  Kessler reviewed the book overnight and presented arguments concerning 
Juror 58’s fitness to serve as a juror the next day.   
Kessler read excerpts into the record and argued the excerpts demonstrated Juror 58 
was not truthful when he answered questions during voir dire.  Kessler asked the circuit 
court to question Juror 58 on the record about the book’s contents and his personal beliefs.  
Kessler also requested the circuit court question all of the jurors about any effect Juror 58’s 
personal beliefs and opinions had on jury deliberations.  The circuit court denied the request 
to question Juror 58 because it found no evidence of juror misconduct and believed 
questioning Juror 58 might improperly taint the whole jury.   Kessler then moved for a 
10 
 
mistrial, arguing he would have to concede ineffectiveness for failing to inquire about the 
book during voir dire.  The circuit court overruled the motion but advised Movant he could 
question the jurors, if necessary, after the trial.   Juror 58 later was removed from the jury 
by the consent of the parties and did not participate in the penalty phase.   
 
In his motion for new trial, Movant argued the circuit court erred in failing to declare 
a mistrial after the book’s contents were revealed.  Movant alleged Juror 58 failed to 
disclose he wrote a book about the criminal justice system.  Movant further alleged Juror 58 
failed to inform the circuit court during voir dire he believed the court system was weak 
and vigilante justice was an appropriate remedy.  Movant argued the book constituted 
evidence Juror 58 was not completely truthful about his views about the death penalty and 
his experiences with the criminal justice system.  The circuit court overruled Movant’s 
motion. 
 
On direct appeal, Movant argued the circuit court should have sustained his motion 
for a mistrial or motion for new trial because the book’s contents were so close to the facts 
of Movant’s case and revealed such an inherent bias it must have meant Juror 58 lied during 
voir dire when he stated he could be fair and impartial.  Shockley, 410 S.W.3d at 199.  
Movant further claimed Juror 58’s experiences and beliefs, as illuminated in his book, 
likely were influential upon the other jurors.  Id.  This Court found Movant’s argument 
without merit, first noting none of the parties asked Juror 58 any questions about his book 
during voir dire, even after Juror 58 volunteered he was a published author.  Id. at 200.  
Hence, Juror 58 could not have lied in response to a question he was not asked.  Id.   This 
Court further found: 
11 
While the nature of the novel’s subject matter caused the court concern, the 
court determined that nothing in the record demonstrated that Juror 58 lied 
when he said he could be fair and impartial or that he was willing but 
reluctant to impose the death penalty.  [Movant’s] argument to the contrary 
is premised on a degree of factual congruity between the novel and the facts 
of the trial that does not exist.  Further, [Movant’s] argument that Juror 58’s 
assurance of his impartiality was false is premised on the assumption that 
Juror 58 shared the views expressed by the protagonist in his novel and tried 
to hide that fact from the court and counsel so that he could be seated on the 
jury.  This is inconsistent with the fact that it was Juror 58 himself who 
brought his book, and his son’s police work, to the attention of the court and 
counsel so they could include these issues in their remaining line of 
questions. 
Id. at 200-01 (footnote omitted). 
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Juror 58 testified he was excited about 
having his first book published, and he brought at least four copies with him to the hotel. 
Juror 58 described the book as “a love story” with themes in which “[s]ome of them are 
very violent, some are heart rendering, some will make you laugh, some will make you cry 
and some will make you feel anger.”  Juror 58 admitted many of the chapters were filled 
with his own true life experiences or those of someone he served with in the military.  
Juror 58 described the book as a fictionalized autobiography, but he denied the graphic 
contents happened to him.  Juror 58 went into great detail outlining which plot points were 
based on his personal experience and which ones were fictionalized.  Juror 58 was 
questioned extensively about the book’s themes and disavowed he personally held any of 
those ideas because it was not his personal belief the court system was not good.  Further, 
he denied relating or expressing the book’s themes to other jurors.  Juror 58 was adamant 
the book had no bearing on his decision and no bearing on anyone else as far as he knew. 
Juror 58 said it became clear to him Movant was guilty only after his grandmother testified. 
12 
 
Bruns testified one of his concerns during voir dire was to weed out potential jurors 
who were so pro-law enforcement they could not be fair.  When Juror 58 mentioned his 
son was a police officer and he was a published author, Bruns’ attention was drawn to the 
fact he had a law enforcement family member.   
Kessler admitted Juror 58 was not asked any follow-up questions after he revealed 
he was a published author.  Kessler explained, “[O]ne of the reasons I didn’t ask any further 
questions at the time because, I mean, in 2008, ’09, ’10, self-publishing just sort of meant 
that … it was a vanity project” and the book was not distributed widely.4  Because the 
central issue concerned contradictory ballistics evidence, Kessler did not see a problem 
with Juror 58 being a self-published author or see a reason to question him about it.  Instead, 
Kessler testified he noticed Juror 58 had some military experience, his son was a police 
officer, and they both had knowledge about guns.  Kessler remembered conceding 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to follow up with Juror 58 after reading the 
book at trial and stated he never stated that on the record before.  Kessler explained he said 
                                              
4 This testimony refutes the dissenting opinion’s claim trial counsel had no valid strategic 
reason for failing to question Juror 58 about being an author.  Further, the dissenting 
opinion would have this Court adopt a rule that a potential juror’s employment as an author, 
standing alone, establishes the juror has “multiple sources of bias,” which must be explored 
for trial counsel to conduct an effective voir dire.  However, this proposed rule is based 
solely upon having the benefit of hindsight regarding the contents of Juror 58’s novel.  The 
dissenting opinion cannot point to any of Juror 58’s voir dire testimony that revealed 
“multiple sources of bias” simply from Juror 58’s status as a published author.  
Accordingly, there was nothing to prompt trial counsel’s further exploration, especially 
when also presented with Juror 58’s knowledge about guns and his son’s law enforcement 
background, which were germane to the case. 
 
 
    
13 
he was ineffective to try to force the circuit court to allow trial counsel to question Juror 58 
about the book or remove him from the jury.  Kessler testified had he asked follow-up 
questions about the book, he would have moved to strike Juror 58 for cause.     
The motion court found it was reasonable for trial counsel to focus their attention 
on Juror 58’s relationship with his police officer son and the impact that might have had 
on his ability to be a fair and impartial juror rather than on Juror 58’s participation in a 
hobby or profession that had no bearing on his suitability as a juror in this particular case.  
This Court agrees.   
Trial counsel articulated strategic reasons why they chose not to question Juror 58 
about being a published author.  Trial counsel explained the case involved the murder of a 
law enforcement officer and contradictory ballistics evidence.  Trial counsel questioned 
Juror 58 regarding his son being a police officer and his knowledge of guns, which were 
crucial parts of their trial strategy in selecting jurors and in presenting their theory of the 
case.  “It is not ineffective assistance of counsel for an attorney to pursue one reasonable 
trial strategy to the exclusion of another, even if the latter would also be a reasonable 
strategy.”  Clayton v. State, 63 S.W.3d 201, 207-08 (Mo. banc 2001).5   
5 Movant argues his case is akin to Knese, in which trial counsel was found ineffective after 
admitting he wholly failed to read the juror questionnaires revealing strong opinions about 
the death penalty prior to voir dire.  Knese, 85 S.W.3d at 632-33.  Knese does not aid 
Movant’s argument.  While trial counsel did not question Juror 58 about his book, trial 
counsel were aware of Juror 58’s status as an author but chose to forego that line of 
questioning in favor of implementing their reasonable trial strategy of uncovering pro-law 
enforcement bias and helpful knowledge about firearms.   
14 
 
Movant also attacks Juror 58’s veracity due to his characterization of the book as “a 
love story” in the face of its graphic nature criticizing the criminal justice system.  After 
careful review of the book, Juror 58 accurately described the overall storylines within the 
book as “[s]ome of them are very violent, some are heart rendering, some will make you 
laugh, some will make you cry and some will make you feel anger.”  However, even if this 
Court rejected Juror 58’s primary characterization of his book as “a love story,” mere 
authorship of a book expressing unfavorable views of the justice system over the course of 
six pages does not prove Juror 58 personally held the beliefs espoused in his book rendering 
him unfit to serve on the jury.  It is worth noting this Court found in Movant’s direct appeal 
“a degree of factual congruity between the novel and the facts of the trial [did] not exist.”  
Shockley, 410 S.W.3d at 200-01 (emphasis added).   
Although Kessler admitted he was ineffective for failing to question Juror 58 about 
being an author, the record does not support a finding that, had Kessler discovered the 
book’s contents and questioned Juror 58 about them that Juror 58 would have been struck 
for cause absent some showing the book reflected his personal beliefs.  Juror 58 stated 
during voir dire he could be fair and impartial in a case in which a law enforcement officer 
was killed because he “has his own mind” in listening to the facts.  At the evidentiary 
hearing, Juror 58 testified he did not hold the personal beliefs in the book.  Movant 
presented no evidence to contradict Juror 58’s testimony.  Hence, Movant cannot 
demonstrate he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to question Juror 58 about the 
book.  See Glass v. State, 227 S.W.3d 463, 474 (Mo. banc 2007) (holding although trial 
counsel testified it was a mistake to forego questioning the venire panel, the movant could 
15 
 
not prove prejudice because he made no showing the jurors were unable or unwilling to 
consider the evidence presented in light of their testimony they were willing to follow the 
circuit court’s instructions).  The motion court did not err in denying this claim. 
Point II – Failure to Present Witnesses at Motion for New Trial Hearing Regarding Alleged 
Juror Misconduct 
 
Movant alleges the motion court clearly erred in denying his claim trial counsel 
were ineffective for failing to call witnesses at the motion for new trial hearing to 
demonstrate how Juror 58’s actions constituted prejudicial juror misconduct and violated 
the circuit court’s directive regarding reading materials while sequestered.  Movant alleges 
trial counsel should have called jurors, court personnel, and the trial judge—after seeking 
his disqualification—when invited to do so by the circuit court to prove this allegation.   
Movant can prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial 
counsel’s alleged failure to investigate only if he can demonstrate:  (1) trial “counsel’s 
failure to investigate was unreasonable” and (2) Movant “was prejudiced as a result of 
[trial] counsel’s unreasonable failure to investigate.”  Barton, 432 S.W.3d at 759.  “In any 
ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for 
reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to 
counsel’s judgments.”  Collings v. State, 543 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Mo. banc 2018) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. 2052). 
On March 30, 2009, the circuit court entered an order, contemplating a hearing may 
be required to present additional testimony, evidence, and arguments by the parties 
regarding Juror 58’s conduct.  To avoid the appearance of impropriety, the circuit court 
16 
 
ordered “no member of the jury, including all alternates, shall discuss any matter regarding 
this case with any person, and no one shall be permitted to discuss any matter with them 
(all jurors and alternates).”   
On April 22, 2009, Movant filed his motion for new trial, which contained sixteen 
claims of trial court error.  The motion alleged the circuit court erred in refusing trial 
counsel’s request to hold a hearing to question Juror 58 about the book’s contents and his 
beliefs.  The motion further argued the circuit court erred in refusing trial counsel’s request 
to hold a hearing to question all of the jurors about the effect Juror 58’s personal beliefs 
and opinions had on the jury’s guilt phase deliberations.   
On April 29, 2009, the circuit court issued a letter to the attorneys stating, “I want 
to determine whether the state or [Movant] will be requesting (or subpoenaing) any juror 
in this case to testify about any issue raised at trial or in pending motions.”  The circuit 
court advised the attorneys to make arrangements for a conference if either side planned to 
question any juror at the post-trial hearing.  On May 22, 2009, the circuit court held the 
hearing on Movant’s motion for new trial.  Kessler stated the defense did not intend to call 
any additional witnesses, including Juror 58.   
On direct appeal, Movant argued the circuit court committed reversible error for 
failing to conduct its own inquiry sua sponte into whether extraneous information or 
prejudicial materials were part of the jury’s deliberations.  This Court found Movant’s 
claim without merit, stating, “Not only did neither counsel take the judge up on this offered 
opportunity to question Juror 58 about whether he had discussed his novel with other jurors, 
defense counsel specifically waived any right to such a hearing.”  Shockley, 410 S.W.3d at 
17 
 
201.  Because trial counsel affirmatively waived the opportunity to call witnesses, this 
Court refused to speculate whether Juror 58 shared his book’s themes or viewpoints with 
other jurors or whether he lied during voir dire about being fair and impartial.  Id. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Kessler testified he was not allowed to contact the jurors 
prior to filing the motion for new trial because of the March 30, 2009, order.  Bruns testified 
the circuit court indicated it would hold a conference and let trial counsel subpoena jurors, 
which they discussed but did not do.   
Even if this Court believes trial counsel should have taken up the circuit court’s 
invitation to hold a hearing on Juror 58’s alleged misconduct, this belief alone is 
insufficient to find trial counsel ineffective.  “The question in an ineffective assistance 
claim is not whether counsel could have or even, perhaps, should have made a different 
decision, but rather whether the decision made was reasonable under all the 
circumstances.”  Johnson, 406 S.W.3d at 901 (quoting Henderson v. State, 111 S.W.3d 
537, 540 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003)).  “Reasonable choices of trial strategy, no matter how ill-
fated they appear in hindsight, cannot serve as a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance.”  
Anderson, 196 S.W.3d at 33.  “Ineffective assistance of counsel will not lie where the 
conduct involves the attorney’s use of reasonable discretion in a matter of trial strategy, 
and it is the exceptional case where a court will hold a strategic choice unsound.”  State v. 
White, 798 S.W.2d 694, 698 (Mo. banc 1990).   
This case does not present the exceptional case requiring a finding trial counsel were 
ineffective in failing to present witnesses on this issue.  Trial counsel both testified, after 
the jury could not agree on punishment, they believed they were in a better position to 
18 
 
argue for a life sentence, which would be the ultimate goal for any reasonable trial counsel 
after the jury’s guilty verdict.  Kessler testified he considered it a victory that the jury could 
not agree on punishment in light of everything that transpired.  Bruns testified the trial 
judge had “been good” to them during the trial and believed—perhaps naively—that not 
“opening the can of worms” regarding the juror misconduct issue would inure to Movant’s 
benefit.  Finally, Kessler had significant trial experience and never had a trial judge impose 
a death sentence after the jury could not agree on punishment in cases he tried.  Even though 
trial counsel’s strategy failed in hindsight, the record clearly demonstrates trial counsel 
evaluated their options, drew upon their experience, and chose to forego “opening the can 
of worms” regarding Juror 58’s alleged misconduct in exchange for attempting to persuade 
the circuit court to impose a life sentence to save Movant’s life.  Trial counsel’s decisions 
were reasonable under all of the circumstances.  The motion court did not clearly err in 
denying this claim. 
Point III – Circuit Court’s Timely Disclosure Regarding Juror 58’s Book 
Movant argues the motion court clearly erred in denying his claim the circuit court 
failed to timely disclose Juror 58 brought his book to the sequestered jury.  Movant argues 
the circuit court had an affirmative duty to apprise trial counsel of Juror 58’s misconduct 
in a timely fashion.  By failing to apprise counsel timely, Movant argues he was deprived 
of an opportunity to demonstrate prejudice warranting a mistrial or ordering a new trial.   
In the April 29, 2009, letter, the circuit court informed the attorneys, “[R]egarding 
the ‘book’ referred to at trial, I have been advised that the same juror gave a copy of his 
book during the week of trial to the [sheriff].”  At the motion for new trial hearing, Kessler 
19 
 
stated the parties were unaware the circuit court had a copy of the book until he received 
the April 29, 2009, letter, which was after the motion for new trial was due.  The circuit 
court explained the sheriff brought in the book after the guilty verdict and gave it to his 
administrative assistant.  The circuit court stated, “At that time I didn’t know what the 
books was or its contents ….  It was after the argument that I realized that it was the same 
book.”  The circuit court later confirmed it did not receive the book until after the guilty 
verdict was returned.   
At the evidentiary hearing, the trial judge testified that, when the parties appeared 
the morning after the guilty verdict to discuss Juror 58’s book, he did not know if he told 
the attorneys he received a copy of the book.  The trial judge did not remember having a 
conversation with court personnel about the book.  The trial judge also did not remember 
if the April 29, 2009, letter was the first time he informed the parties he had received a 
copy of the book during the trial. 
Bruns and Kessler testified they did not know the trial judge had a copy of the book 
before they brought it to his attention, and they were told nothing until the April 29, 2009, 
letter.  Kessler stated this constituted another ground to examine Juror 58 because he 
violated the circuit court’s directive not to bring anything crime-related to the trial.  Kessler 
testified he would have included this allegation in the motion for new trial had he known 
the circuit court had a copy of the book.   
 
The motion court found Movant merely established the trial judge had the ability to 
know about the book prior to trial counsel addressing the issue.  The motion court found 
20 
Movant failed to prove any misconduct or prejudice from the trial judge’s actions in 
violation of his constitutional rights.   
Initially, this Court notes Movant’s point on appeal raises different legal arguments 
than those presented for the motion court’s consideration in his Rule 29.15 motion. 
Movant’s motion alleged the trial judge failed to disclose timely he learned before the guilt 
phase deliberations Juror 58 had given the book to the sheriff and the trial judge questioned 
the sheriff about the book.  Movant’s motion further accused the trial judge of: 
(1) considering information not on the record; (2) prejudging the issue by considering the
statements from the sheriff and other court personnel regarding the book; and (3) failing to 
recuse himself.  Movant’s motion does not allege the trial judge failed to disclose Juror 58 
brought his book to the sequestered jury. 
“In actions under Rule 29.15, any allegations or issues that are not raised in the 
Rule 29.15 motion are waived on appeal.”  Johnson v. State, 333 S.W.3d 459, 471 
(Mo. banc 2011) (quoting State v. Clay, 975 S.W.2d 121, 141-42 (Mo. banc 1998)).  
“Pleading defects cannot be remedied by the presentation of evidence and refinement of a 
claim on appeal.”  Id.  Moreover, “there is no plain error review in appeals from post-
conviction judgments for claims that were not presented in the post-conviction motion.”  
McLaughlin v. State, 378 S.W.3d 328, 340 (Mo. banc 2012).  To the extent Movant now 
claims the circuit court failed to timely disclose Juror 58 brought his book to the 
sequestered jury, his claim is not preserved for appeal, nor is it supported by the record.  
Movant does not raise any of the other grounds from his Rule 29.15 amended motion and 
21 
 
specifically disavows his claim concerns ex parte communications.6  The motion court did 
not clearly err in denying this claim. 
Point IV – Juror Misconduct by Violating the Circuit Court’s Directive 
 
Movant argues the motion court clearly erred in denying his claim Juror 58 
committed juror misconduct and violated the circuit court’s directive regarding bringing 
his book to the sequestered jury and sharing it with the other jurors.  Movant argues 
Juror 58’s book prejudiced his ability to receive a fair trial in that its violent storyline 
espoused the need for vengeance because the court system was “too lenient” with criminal 
defendants accused of homicide offenses.   
“Issues that could have been raised on direct appeal—even if constitutional 
claims—may not be raised in postconviction motions, except where fundamental fairness 
requires otherwise and only in rare and exceptional circumstances.”  State v. Tolliver, 
839 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Mo. banc 1992); State v. Carter, 955 S.W.2d 548, 555 (Mo. banc 
1997).  Generally, juror misconduct constitutes trial error and is outside the scope of post-
conviction relief proceedings.  Eye v. State, 551 S.W.3d 671, 677 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018).  
“[A] juror misconduct claim amounting to a constitutional error can only be raised in a 
Rule 29.15 motion when the factual basis of the juror misconduct was not discovered until 
after the trial.”  Id.   
                                              
6 Further, even if Movant’s point on appeal could be read to encompass this claim, the 
circuit court’s acts or omissions did not prohibit trial counsel from developing a record 
regarding Juror 58’s dissemination of his book to the other jurors.  The circuit court 
provided trial counsel with an opportunity to develop this evidence at the hearing on the 
motion for new trial.  Trial counsel chose to forego this line of inquiry in hopes of 
strengthening their argument for a life sentence for Movant.   
22 
 
 
Movant cites McQuarty v. State, 241 S.W.3d 446 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007), to support 
his argument this claim is cognizable because rare and exceptional circumstances require 
its review due to Movant’s fundamental right to a fair and impartial jury in a death penalty 
case.  In McQuarty, a juror intentionally failed to disclose a significant social relationship 
with the state’s principal witness, and the movant raised this claim for the first time in his 
Rule 29.15 motion.  Id. at 450.  The Western District found the movant had not been 
afforded an opportunity to litigate the claim and held, “Given the unique posture of this 
case, we conclude that [the movant’s] post-conviction motion establishes exceptional 
circumstances that have prevented him from asserting a claim of constitutional error that 
may have deprived him of a fair trial.”  Id. at 454.    
 
In this case, Movant had an opportunity to litigate this claim during the hearing on 
his motion for new trial.  However, trial counsel declined to raise the issue in hopes of 
strengthening their argument for a life sentence for Movant.  Further, Movant raised issues 
related to this claim on direct appeal, arguing he suffered prejudice because Juror 58 may 
have improperly influenced other jurors by speaking about the book’s contents, which he 
believed impacted the verdict.  Shockley, 410 S.W.3d at 199-200.  This Court found no 
basis for reversal was demonstrated because it would not speculate about Juror 58’s actions 
or influences when trial counsel declined to question Juror 58 at the hearing on Movant’s 
motion for new trial.  Id. at 201-02.   
 
While the state agrees Movant could have presented this claim in his direct appeal, 
it cites Jackson v. State, 538 S.W.3d 366 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018), as authority for this Court 
to deny Movant’s claim on the merits.  In Jackson, the Western District relied on McQuarty 
23 
 
to require the movant to demonstrate rare and exceptional circumstances exist justifying 
raising a claim of juror misconduct in a Rule 29.15 proceeding when the misconduct was 
not discovered until after the trial.  Id. at 370.  The court found the movant failed to allege 
facts demonstrating when the juror’s alleged misconduct was discovered, which would 
make his claim noncognizable.  Id. at 370-71.  Nevertheless, the Western District reviewed 
the claim on the merits, explaining, “[A]s the circuit court granted [the movant] an 
evidentiary hearing on the claim, denied the substantive claim, and this [c]ourt agrees that 
the substantive juror misconduct claim must also fail on the merits, we will also address 
the substance of [the movant’s] juror misconduct claim.”  Id. at 371.  Likewise, this Court 
will address the merits of Movant’s claim only because it presents the same procedural 
posture as Jackson in that the motion court heard evidence on the issue, denied the 
substantive claim, this Court agrees the claim fails on the merits, and it raises a challenge 
to the propriety of Movant’s capital murder guilty verdict. 
In this point, Movant alleges Juror 58 committed intentional juror misconduct and 
violated the circuit court’s directive about bringing his book to the sequestered jury and 
sharing it with the other jurors.  “This Court presumes bias and prejudice occurred if a juror 
intentionally withholds material information.  Accordingly, a finding of intentional 
nondisclosure of a material issue is tantamount to a per se rule mandating a new trial.”  
State v. Ess, 453 S.W.3d 196, 205 (Mo. banc 2015) (internal citation omitted). 
Movant incorporates and repeats many of the same arguments concerning Juror 58’s 
conduct he raised in his first three points.  The issue remains whether Juror 58 intentionally 
disregarded the circuit court’s directive concerning bringing certain personal materials 
24 
while sequestered and to what extent, if any, Juror 58’s conduct prejudiced Movant’s right 
to a fair trial. 
The jury was sequestered during trial.  The circuit court appointed a jury coordinator 
to assist the jurors during sequestration.  The jury coordinator prepared a jury information 
packet, which the parties were invited to review for any objectionable material.  Trial 
counsel requested the jury should not have “crime stories, CSI-kind of things that lead them 
to believe … we should have to come up with … these extraordinary defenses and alibis 
- - or that the [s]tate has to come up with this extraordinary scientific evidence.”  As part
of a lengthy discussion regarding what to expect during sequestration, the circuit court gave 
the following directive to the jury: 
You will be able to bring books with you, even movies with you, to trial.  The 
cautionary note on there, the only one the attorneys ask that I mention, avoid 
movies and books about trials, particularly periodicals or legal documents. 
That’s normally something, again, the law has to be supplied by the judge, 
not due to your independent research and investigation. So general movies, 
avoiding crime shows and issues of that nature. 
Movant offered testimony from several jurors and court personnel at the evidentiary 
hearing regarding their interactions with Juror 58 and his book.  Juror 3 testified Juror 58 
gave him his card, which stated Juror 58 was the book’s author.  Juror 3 asked Juror 58 
about being an author, and Juror 58 said he wrote a book and had it with him.  Juror 3 
looked at the book, read the back cover, and returned it.  Juror 3 never saw other jurors 
with a copy of the book or reading the book.   
25 
 
Juror 50 testified Juror 58 gave her a copy of his book.  Juror 50 read two or three 
pages but “there was something that made [her] think maybe [she] shouldn’t be reading 
this” and she returned the book to Juror 58.   
Juror 117 and her husband operated a gift shop specializing in Native American 
items.  Juror 58 visited their shop several weeks before the trial and spoke with Juror 117’s 
husband about possibly carrying the book in the shop.  After Juror 117 arrived at the 
courthouse to serve on the jury, her husband gave her a copy of Juror 58’s book.  Juror 117 
put the book in her backpack, and she pulled it out later that evening.  Juror 117 read the 
introduction, skimmed through the book, and put it away because she was too tired to read.  
Juror 117 testified she never looked at the book again during the trial.  Juror 117 stated, if 
she had read the back of the book before putting it in her backpack, she would not have 
brought it with her because she thought it fell under the circuit court’s directive not to bring 
books about trials or crimes.   
A Howell County sheriff testified he was the supervisor of court security for the 
courthouse where Movant’s trial took place.  After a day in court, Juror 58 approached the 
sheriff at the hotel, talked to him about writing a book, and asked the sheriff if he wanted 
to read it.  Juror 58 gave the sheriff a copy of the book.  The sheriff testified he either read 
or glanced at the forward.  The sheriff was concerned and brought the book’s contents to 
the circuit court’s attention through the court’s administrative assistant.  The sheriff 
testified the circuit court questioned him approximately an hour after he gave the book to 
the administrative assistant.  The sheriff did not see any other copies of the book.  The 
sheriff never heard the jurors talking about writing a book or publishing a book.   
26 
The administrative assistant testified she did not remember how the book came into 
the circuit court’s chambers, but the sheriff received the book from Juror 58.  The 
administrative assistant described the book as “fairly graphic in some of its content.”  
The jury coordinator testified that shortly after being chosen for the jury, Juror 58 
approached her and asked her if she liked to read.  Juror 58 told her he wrote a book and 
handed her a copy.  The jury coordinator noted Juror 58 was proud to have written the 
book, so she took a copy, put it in her bag, but never opened or read it.  The jury coordinator 
did not see other copies of the book during the week of the trial nor did she observe Juror 58 
give the book to anyone else.  The jury coordinator was called into the trial judge’s 
chambers after trial counsel raised the issue regarding the book’s dissemination to other 
jurors.  The trial judge spoke to her about the alternate jurors but did not question her about 
the book.   
The trial judge testified he did not see a copy of the book until after the jury reached 
its guilty verdict, and he believed his administrative assistant placed it on his desk before 
she left for the day.  The trial judge stated he glanced at the book, intended to return the 
book to Juror 58, and planned to speak to the trial attorneys about the book the next 
morning.  Trial counsel met in the trial judge’s chambers the next morning to discuss 
removing Juror 58.  The trial judge did not know if any of the attorneys saw the book on 
his desk.    
Juror 58 admitted he gave copies of his book to Juror 3, the sheriff, the jury 
coordinator, and possibly one other female juror.  Juror 58 handed the copies out at night 
after the jury returned to the hotel.  Juror 58 did not remember the circuit court telling them 
27 
to avoid bringing books about trial and crimes with them.  After being read the circuit 
court’s directive, Juror 58 felt he complied because his book was not about jury trials, but 
was “a love story” with only one chapter about the courts.   
The motion court found the circuit court’s directive did not have the same legal 
significance as a Missouri Approved Instruction (hereinafter, “MAI”).  The motion court 
further determined the evidence did not establish intentional misconduct but “at most a 
miscommunication about what the court intended.”  Movant argues these findings trivialize 
and demean the circuit court’s directive because it was intended to ensure the jurors 
complied with other MAIs related to the jury’s duty to determine the facts only from the 
evidence presented in court.   
The motion court found the trial court’s directive was similar to the informational 
pamphlet given to the jurors in State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886 (Mo. banc 1995).  In Storey, 
the defendant argued the circuit court plainly erred in distributing an information 
pamphlet—which he equated to jury instructions—to the jury and argued trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to it.   Id. at 892.  This Court explained the informational 
pamphlet was not an instruction because “[a] jury instruction is a ‘direction given by the 
judge to the jury concerning the law of the case.’”  Id. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 
856 (6th ed. 1990)).   
In this case, trial counsel sought the directive to prevent the jurors from being 
exposed to materials that would cause them to require the parties to put on “these 
extraordinary defenses and alibis -- or that the [s]tate has to come up with this extraordinary 
scientific evidence” instead of being guided by the evidence and instructions presented.  
28 
 
The circuit court’s lengthy discussion about how sequestration would work and its directive 
regarding what jurors could bring with them did not amount to formal jury instructions 
concerning the law of the case.  Moreover, even taking into account the very limited 
exposure three jurors had to the book, nothing in the book can be construed as requiring 
either of the parties to put on extraordinary defenses, alibis, or scientific evidence, and 
Movant does not argue as such.   
Movant argues it is irrelevant whether Juror 58’s conduct constituted intentional 
misconduct because Juror 58’s conduct and the book’s alleged influence over the other 
jurors is akin to those in State v. Post, 804 S.W.2d 862 (Mo. App. E.D. 1991) (overruled 
on other grounds by State v. Carter, 78 S.W.2d 786, 789 n.5 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002)).  In 
Post, the Eastern District reversed a first-degree murder conviction due to juror misconduct 
and law enforcement officers’ outrageous conduct.   Id. at 863.  The evidence adduced 
demonstrated:  (1) unauthorized deputies socialized with the sequestered jurors by playing 
cards, drinking beer, and one deputy commented about the case; (2) a police officer not 
assigned to or connected with the case socialized with the jurors and ate dinner with them 
while dressed in her uniform; (3) an unauthorized deputy had sexual contact with an 
alternate juror; and (4) a deputy assigned to the jury boasted to other members of the 
sheriff’s department he was having sex with a jury member.  Id. at 862-63.  The trial court 
found “the jury was denied the opportunity and ability to act as a sequestered jury [because 
the jurors] were distracted from ‘due and fair consideration of the facts’” and the verdict 
did not command confidence because it “was replete with suspicion of improper bias.”  Id. 
29 
at 863.  The Eastern District concluded, “No one should be on trial for any crime, much 
less murder, in such a lackadaisical atmosphere.”  Id.  
Movant’s assertion Juror 58’s conduct was more egregious than the jurors’ conduct 
in Post due to his book’s vengeance theme is unpersuasive.  Unlike the jurors in Post, three 
jurors had very fleeting exposure at best, to Juror 58’s book over the course of a week-long 
sequestration.  Juror 58 denied any discussion took place with any of the jurors about the 
book’s themes.  This testimony is corroborated by the other jurors and court personnel. 
None of the jurors read the book in its entirety.  Rather, the jurors testified they read a few 
pages from the introduction or skimmed the cover and refrained from any further exposure 
due to their belief it fell within the circuit court’s directive.  The sheriff and jury coordinator 
both testified they never saw any juror with the book or saw them reading or heard them 
discussing the book.  There was no evidence any of the jurors read the pertinent parts of 
the book concerning the criminal case, the defendant’s lenient sentencing, or the graphic 
description of how the protagonist avenged his wife’s murder.  Hence, there was no 
evidence the sequestered jury was distracted by the book to the point it could not give due 
and fair consideration of the facts, thus distinguishing this case from Post.   
“While every party is entitled to a fair trial, as a practical matter, our jury system 
cannot guarantee every party a perfect trial.”  Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 
304 S.W.3d 81, 87 (Mo. banc 2010).  While the circuit court’s directive did not amount to 
a formal jury instruction, this case illustrates how a lay juror may misunderstand or 
misinterpret the parameters of acceptable materials to bring while sequestered.  When trial 
counsel sought to question Juror 58 about his conduct, the circuit court denied the request 
30 
because it found no evidence of juror misconduct.  “As the trial court presides over the 
entirety of a trial, it is familiar with the circumstances surrounding a juror’s misconduct.  
Accordingly, it is in the best position to determine what effect, if any, juror misconduct 
may have had on a jury’s verdict.”  Smotherman v. Cass Reg’l Med. Ctr., 499 S.W.3d 709, 
710-11 (Mo. banc 2016).  Further, this Court determined on direct appeal Juror 58 did not
intend to conceal his status as an author or hide the contents of his book, as he explicitly 
brought this fact to the attention of the circuit court and trial counsel.  Shockley, 410 S.W.3d 
at 201.  The record supports the motion court’s finding Juror 58’s conduct amounted to a 
miscommunication about what was appropriate rather than intentional misconduct.   
Even if Movant’s trial was not perfect due to Juror 58 bringing his book to the 
sequestered jury, the motion court did not err in finding Movant suffered no prejudice.  On 
direct appeal, this Court found nothing in the trial record supported the argument Juror 58 
lied about being able to be fair and impartial, or he was willing but reluctant to impose the 
death penalty.  Shockley, 410 S.W.3d at 200.  Movant has not adduced any evidence 
contradicting this finding.  Further, this Court rejected the idea Juror 58’s assurances of 
impartiality were false because Movant assumed Juror 58 shared the views expressed by 
the protagonist in his book and tried to hide that fact from the court and trial counsel so he 
could be seated on the jury.  Id. at 201.  Juror 58 expressly disavowed he personally held 
the protagonist’s views, and again, Movant offered no evidence to the contrary.7   
7 The dissenting opinion does not analyze whether Juror 58 committed juror misconduct 
by merely bringing his book to the sequestered jury nor does it argue the motion court’s 
judgment was clearly erroneous in that regard.  The dissenting opinion further speculates 
Juror 58’s book “could have affected the jury’s inability to decide on punishment,” but it 
31 
 
Finally, when conducting proportionality review on direct appeal, this Court 
rejected Movant’s argument his death sentence was excessive because the underlying 
verdict was based on circumstantial evidence and the jury deadlocked on punishment.  This 
Court found when summarizing the evidence, the circumstantial evidence was strong and 
his sentence was proportionate.  Shockley, 410 S.W.3d at 203-04.  The record supports the 
motion court finding there was no evidence the jurors’ momentary exposure to Juror 58’s 
book had any influence on the individual jurors, their deliberations, or their verdict.  The 
motion court did not clearly err in denying this claim. 
Point XI – Failure to Strike Juror 3 
Movant claims the motion court clearly erred in denying his claim trial counsel were 
ineffective for failing to move to strike Juror 3, who Movant alleges was more inclined to 
impose a death sentence in a case involving the killing of a law enforcement officer.  
Movant contends Juror 3 was impaired substantially as to his ability to consider life and 
reasonably competent counsel would have moved to strike Juror 3 for cause.  Movant 
argues prejudice is presumed but further alleges he was prejudiced because he did not have 
a full panel of jurors who could consider a life sentence.   
“[A] person who cannot be impartial due to an improper predisposition is unfit to 
serve on the jury.”  Dorsey, 448 S.W.3d at 299 (citing Anderson, 196 S.W.3d at 41).  
“A prospective juror may be excluded for cause only if the juror’s views would prevent or 
                                              
fails to cite any evidence to support this supposition or to refute any of the testimony 
offered by all of the jurors that the book had no influence on their deliberations.   
 
32 
substantially impair the performance of his or her duties as a juror in accordance with the 
instructions and oath.”  Middleton, 103 S.W.3d at 734.  
During the death qualification voir dire, Juror 3 stated he would not consider 
sentencing until after the verdict.  Juror 3 was asked, “Does the fact [Victim] … has the 
status of a law enforcement officer then change your deliberation in the second stage? 
Would you say that you automatically would be more inclined to give the death penalty 
simply because it was the murder of a law enforcement officer?”  Juror 3 answered, “I 
probably would be more inclined.”  Kessler explained the state had to prove an aggravating 
circumstance existed beyond a reasonable doubt during the penalty phase and a finding 
Movant killed Victim would prove one aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Juror 3 stated, “I respect law officers and what they have to do.  I guess I would 
feel that’s more of a crime than just an average --.”  Kessler responded, “Okay.  And that’s 
fair.”     
Kessler later asked Juror 3 if he was “more inclined to say that the person deserves 
the death penalty, and, therefore, that’s the only punishment you’re going to give 
meaningful consideration to?”  Juror 3 answered, “I can’t say that I would be more inclined 
because it would bother me.  I respect law officers, but, I mean, I could be impartial.” 
Kessler reiterated, “You would consider that as an aggravating circumstance, but it 
wouldn’t automatically make you vote for the death penalty?” to which Juror 3 responded, 
“No, it would not.”  Juror 3 stated he would stand up to law enforcement or Victim’s family 
and friends and base the verdict on the evidence in this case.   
33 
 
 
Neither Bruns nor Kessler had any recollection of Juror 3 or why they chose not to 
strike him.  The motion court found no evidence in the record suggested a motion to strike 
Juror 3 would have been successful because his voir dire testimony was clear he could be 
impartial on the issue of punishment.   
 
When examining the entire context of Juror 3’s statements, this Court cannot say 
trial counsel were ineffective for failing to seek to strike him for cause.  While Juror 3 
initially stated he “would probably be more inclined” to vote for the death penalty, 
subsequent questioning revealed he could be impartial and would follow the circuit court’s 
instructions.  Juror 3 stated he would not only consider the death penalty for murdering a 
law enforcement officer, he could be impartial, and he would be able to stand up to law 
enforcement and Victim’s family if the verdict did not include the death penalty.  Hence, 
the record does not demonstrate Juror 3 would not consider the entire range of punishment, 
apply the proper burden of proof, or otherwise follow the circuit court’s instructions.  Trial 
counsel were not ineffective for failing to move to strike Juror 3.  The motion court did not 
clearly err in denying this claim. 
Point V – Failure to Call a Ballistics Expert 
 
 
Movant argues the motion court clearly erred in denying his claim trial counsel were 
ineffective for failing to call Steven Howard (hereinafter, “Howard”) to testify as a 
ballistics expert on his behalf.  Movant alleged Howard would have testified a Browning 
.243 rifle could not have fired the fatal shot that killed Victim, and the shotgun wadding 
recovered from the scene was from a 10-gauge shotgun, not a 12-gauge shotgun.  Movant 
34 
argues this testimony would have countered the state’s evidence he used a Browning .243 
rifle and a 12-gauge shotgun to shoot Victim. 
“Ordinarily the choice of witnesses is a matter of trial strategy and will support no 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”  Barton, 432 S.W.3d at 750 (quoting State v. 
Harris, 870 S.W.2d 798, 816 (Mo. banc 1994)).  “This is because ‘strategic choices made 
after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually 
unchallengeable.’”  Id. at 750-51.   
To prove ineffective assistance for failure to call a witness, the defendant 
must show that:  ‘(1) trial counsel knew or should have known of the 
existence of the witness; (2) the witness could be located through reasonable 
investigation; (3) the witness would testify; and (4) the witness’s testimony 
would have produced a viable defense.’ 
Glass, 227 S.W.3d at 468 (quoting Hutchison v. State, 150 S.W.3d 292, 304 (Mo. banc 
2004)).8
Trial counsel’s selection of which expert witnesses to call at trial generally is a 
question of trial strategy and is virtually unchallengeable.  Goodwin v. State, 191 S.W.3d 
20, 29 (Mo. banc 2006).  To show ineffective assistance of counsel based on failure to 
present an expert witness, a movant is required to show what the evidence would have been 
if the witness had been called.  Twenter, 818 S.W.2d at 636.  However, the “duty to 
investigate does not force defense lawyers to scour the globe on the off-chance something 
will turn up; reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good reason to 
8 Hutchison was overruled on other grounds by Mallow v. State, 439 S.W.3d 764, 770 n.3 
(Mo. banc 2014). 
35 
 
think further investigation would be a waste.”  Strong, 263 S.W.3d at 652 (quoting 
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 162 L. Ed. 2d 360 (2005)).  
Howard testified at the evidentiary hearing he was contacted by the first trial team 
to conduct a case evaluation, determine which firearm fired the bullet that killed Victim 
based on general rifling characteristics, and determine whether the bullet could have been 
fired from a Browning lever action rifle.  Howard’s expertise was not in firearm and 
toolmark identification.  Howard did not examine the evidence or bullets from this case 
independently.  Instead, Howard’s opinions were formed after reviewing the work of 
Jason Crafton (hereinafter, “Crafton”), a Missouri highway patrol ballistics expert who 
testified for the state at Movant’s trial.  Howard did not testify whether he examined the 
work of the other ballistics expert, John Dillon (hereinafter, “Dillon”), who testified for the 
state and disagreed with Crafton’s trial conclusions.  Howard offered no testimony 
regarding the shotgun wadding at the evidentiary hearing. 
At trial, Crafton testified the bullets recovered from Victim and Movant’s home 
were fired from the same gun, finding they shared the same class characteristics.  Crafton 
could not pinpoint a specific caliber but opined it was a range of .22 to .24 caliber.  Crafton 
further found the shotgun wadding components were consistent with a 10- to 12-gauge 
shotgun.  Crafton excluded all of the firearms recovered from Movant’s home as the murder 
weapon.   
 
Marshall testified Howard told the first trial team the shotgun wadding was “almost 
certainly a 10-gauge,” which was helpful to the defense because there was no evidence 
Movant ever owned a 10-gauge shotgun.  Marshall stated Howard told him a 
36 
Browning .243 rifle could not have fired the bullet recovered from Victim’s body.  The 
first trial team turned over its entire file to trial counsel, including Howard’s information. 
Bruns testified he and Kessler discussed whether to call their own ballistics expert, 
but after looking at the state’s experts, they decided against it.  Kessler testified he was 
responsible for preparing the ballistics evidence for trial.  Kessler admitted he did not 
contact Howard and never considered calling another ballistics expert to testify.  Kessler 
explained, because he had two expert witnesses testifying for the state who disagreed with 
one another, he planned to emphasis those differences during cross-examination.  Kessler 
noted even if Howard told him the toolmarks from the Browning .243 rifle were different 
from the toolmarks on the recovered bullets, he would not have considered calling Howard 
to testify.  Kessler stated he had bad experiences in the past with cross-examination of his 
own ballistic witnesses.  Kessler stated he would rather cross-examine two experts on the 
same side and get them to contradict each other than have his own “hired gun.”  The trial 
transcript reflects Kessler implemented this strategy of pointing out the contradictions 
between Crafton and Dillon during his cross-examination of both witnesses and throughout 
the trial. 
The motion court found trial counsel’s testimony that they reviewed the first trial 
team’s entire file was credible.  The motion court discounted the weight of Howard’s 
testimony concerning his certifications and found he was not as experienced or 
knowledgeable as the state’s ballistics experts.  The motion court also rejected Howard’s 
testimony excluding the Browning .243 rifle in lieu of Crafton’s trial testimony that no 
exact firearm can be excluded unless the individual firearm is tested specifically. 
37 
 
“This Court will not challenge the motion court’s determination of [an expert witness’s] 
credibility as it could make the best observation [of the witness] or trial counsel’s strategic 
decision not to call a witness.”  Forrest, 290 S.W.3d at 715 (internal citation omitted).  
Moreover, these findings refute the heart of Movant’s argument trial counsel’s strategy did 
not address the state’s theory a Browning .243 rifle was used to kill Victim.  Finally, 
Howard’s alleged testimony about the shotgun wadding was cumulative to Crafton’s trial 
testimony the wadding recovered was consistent with a 10- to 12-gauge shotgun. 
“Counsel may choose to call or not call almost any type of witness or to introduce 
or not introduce any kind of evidence for strategic considerations.”  Vaca v. State, 
314 S.W.3d 331, 337 (Mo. banc 2010).  The motion court determined trial counsel 
presented a sound trial strategy for failing to call Howard on Movant’s behalf.  Kessler 
provided strategic reasons for choosing to forego presenting his own ballistics expert and 
instead chose to exploit the inconsistencies between Crafton’s and Dillon’s testimony.  The 
motion court did not clearly err in denying this claim. 
Point VI – Failure to Refute Inheritance of a Browning .243 Rifle 
 
Movant argues the motion court clearly erred in denying his claim trial counsel were 
ineffective for failing to call his grandfather, Gerald Sanders (hereinafter, “Sanders”), to 
testify Movant did not inherit a Browning .243 rifle from his father.  Movant argues 
Sanders’ testimony would have refuted the state’s theory Movant disposed of this specific 
rifle only after shooting Victim. 
 
To prevail on a claim trial counsel failed to call a witness to testify, the movant must 
demonstrate the witness’ testimony would have provided a viable defense.  
38 
 
Glass, 227 S.W.3d at 468.  Sanders was not called during the guilt phase and offered no 
testimony regarding any Browning .243 rifle Movant allegedly inherited from his father.  
However, the state called other witnesses who knew Movant and testified he inherited a 
rifle from his father.   
Sanders testified at the evidentiary hearing he did not see Movant bring a 
Browning .243 rifle with him when Movant came to live with Sanders after Movant’s 
father died.  Sanders did not know what rifles Movant had at the time of the murder.  Bruns 
testified he prepared and presented mitigating evidence during the penalty phase.  Bruns 
stated it was “tenuous” whether they would have asked Sanders about Movant inheriting a 
Browning .243 rifle during his mitigation testimony.  Kessler testified he spent a lot of time 
with Sanders leading up to the trial, and the information about inheriting the rifle would 
not have come in during mitigation because it would have challenged the jury’s verdict.   
Movant correctly notes trial counsel did not testify specifically about their strategic 
reasons for failing to call Sanders during the guilt phase to rebut the state’s witnesses who 
testified Movant inherited a Browning .243 rifle.  However, Kessler testified if Movant 
would have taken the stand during the guilt phase, Movant was prepared to admit 
ownership of a .243 caliber rifle.  In anticipation of Movant testifying, Henshaw stated 
during her opening statement Movant “will acknowledge that at one time he owned a lever-
action .243 [rifle].”  Hence, trial counsel employed a trial strategy allowing for the 
possibility of Movant testifying on his own behalf and offering a viable defense.  By not 
calling Sanders, trial counsel were pursuing a defense strategy that would not undermine 
39 
Movant’s credibility if he chose to testify, which was reasonable.  The motion court did 
not clearly err in denying this claim. 
Point VII – Failure to Object to Use of a Demonstrative Exhibit 
Movant argues the motion court clearly erred in denying his claim trial counsel were 
ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor displaying a Browning .243 rifle as a 
demonstrative exhibit during the trial because it was not the gun used in the shooting. 
Movant claims he suffered prejudice by its admission because the prosecutor used the 
unrelated rifle while questioning witnesses and during closing argument.   
“The mere failure to make objections does not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel.”  Dorsey, 448 S.W.3d at 289 (quoting Ervin v. State, 80 S.W.3d 817, 822 
(Mo. banc 2002)).  “To obtain postconviction relief based on a failure to object, it ‘must 
have been of such character as to deprive the defendant substantially of his right to a fair 
trial.’”  Id. 
“Demonstrative evidence, including a weapon, is admissible if the evidence is both 
legally and logically relevant.”  State v. Brown, 337 S.W.3d 12, 15 (Mo. banc 2011).  
Logical relevance refers to the tendency “to make the existence of a material fact more or 
less probable.”  State v. Anderson, 306 S.W.3d 529, 538 (Mo. banc 2010).   Legal relevance 
refers to the assessment of probative value relative to the risk of “unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or 
cumulativeness.”  Id.  “Therefore, when assessing the relevance of demonstrative evidence, 
a court must ensure the evidence is a fair representation of what is being demonstrated and 
that it is not inflammatory, deceptive or misleading.”  Brown, 337 S.W.3d at 15. 
40 
 
 
The first trial team filed a motion in limine to exclude the prosecutor’s use of a 
Browning .243 rifle as a demonstrative exhibit during the trial.  The motion alleged the 
demonstrative exhibit had no probative value and would be highly prejudicial because no 
murder weapon was recovered.  The motion was not called up and was deemed overruled 
prior to trial.  Kessler testified he had no reason for failing to call up the motion.   
The motion court correctly found there was no basis in the evidence to support a 
finding the circuit court would have sustained an objection to using the Browning .243 rifle 
as a demonstrative exhibit.  Witnesses testified Movant had inherited a Browning .243 rifle 
from his father.  This rifle was never recovered from any of the searches of Movant’s home 
or property, which comported with the state’s theory that Movant disposed of the rifle after 
shooting Victim.  Both ballistics experts testified the bullet recovered from Victim 
belonged to the .22 to .24 caliber class of ammunition, which included a 
Browning .243 caliber rifle.  Finally, Kessler testified, if Movant would have taken the 
stand, Movant was prepared to admit ownership of a .243 caliber rifle, and this fact was 
mentioned in the defense’s opening statement.  Hence, any objection to the use of the 
demonstrative exhibit would not have been meritorious.  Trial counsel will not be held 
ineffective for failing to make a nonmeritorious objection.  Tisius v. State, 519 S.W.3d 413, 
429 (Mo. banc 2017).  The motion court did not clearly err in denying this claim. 
Points VIII and IX – Failure to Call Guilt Phase Witnesses 
Movant argues the motion court clearly erred in denying his claim trial counsel were 
ineffective for failing to call four witnesses who told police they saw Movant driving his 
pickup truck during the time he was alleged to be driving the red car observed waiting near 
41 
Victim’s home and fleeing Victim’s home after he was shot.  Movant argues these 
witnesses would have corroborated his defense he did not shoot Victim.   
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to call certain witnesses at trial, 
Movant must establish the witnesses’ testimony would have produced a viable defense.  
Collings, 543 S.W.3d at 18.  “When defense counsel believes a witness’ testimony would 
not unequivocally support his [or her] client’s position, it is a matter of trial strategy not to 
call him [or her], and the failure to call such witness does not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel.”  Winfield v. State, 93 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Mo. banc 2002).   
Sylvan and Carol Duncan 
Sylvan and his wife, Carol (hereinafter and, collectively, “the Duncans”), were 
questioned by police, deposed by the first trial team, and subpoenaed for trial.  The Duncans 
lived on the same road as Movant and his grandmother.  Carol and Movant’s grandmother 
had been friends for many years.  On the day of the murder, Movant was supposed to help 
Sylvan move some brush off of his property, but Movant did not show up.  Sylvan saw 
Movant’s truck at Movant’s home when he went to move the brush but saw Movant’s truck 
leave between 2 and 3 p.m.  Carol told police Movant’s grandmother’s red car was gone 
from her house around 12:45 p.m. or 1 p.m.  Carol stated she could see Movant’s 
grandmother’s driveway from her kitchen window and she saw the red car in the driveway 
“no more than three hours later.” 
At 4:30 p.m., the Duncans went for a walk for approximately thirty minutes. 
Movant was in his truck driving when the Duncans stopped and spoke to him.  Carol stated 
they spoke to Movant at approximately 4:45 p.m. and Sylvan stated it was 5:15 p.m.  
42 
Movant told Sylvan he was in his home taking a nap when he was supposed to help Sylvan 
move the brush.   
The next day, Movant spoke to the Duncans about Victim’s murder.  Movant told 
the Duncans Victim had been shot in the face and “I heard that you could just take the flap 
-- his face and just pull it back and then lay it back over.”  Carol told Movant someone 
would have had to have been “awfully close to do something like that,” to which Movant 
replied, “Not if you were using turkey loads.”   
During opening statements, Henshaw told the jury the Duncans would testify.  
Henshaw stated the Duncans would testify that, at the same time the state alleged Movant 
was in his grandmother’s red car parked near Victim’s home, they observed the red car 
through their kitchen window because it had been returned.  Henshaw stated the Duncans 
stopped and spoke to Movant later that afternoon, as Movant was driving home in his 
pickup truck at the same time the state alleged Movant was fleeing the scene.  However, 
when the defense rested, Kessler stated on the record they were not calling the Duncans to 
testify.   
The Duncans testified at the evidentiary hearing, largely repeating their deposition 
testimony.  Carol testified Movant’s grandmother told her Movant borrowed her red car 
that afternoon.  Carol conceded she did not see the red car leave or return and did not know 
who was driving it.  Carol repeated how Movant described Victim’s face after being shot.  
Bruns and Henshaw testified they knew the Duncans’ statements concerned the red 
car evidence, but neither articulated a reason why they failed to call the Duncans to testify 
43 
 
at trial.  Bruns explained, if the Duncans testified about Movant’s description of Victim’s 
face, they would not be good witnesses unless they were going to show actual innocence.   
Kessler testified Movant had input about whether to call the Duncans as witnesses.  
Kessler testified they discussed the pros and the cons of having the Duncans testify.  
Kessler and Henshaw visited the Duncans at their home to speak with them.  Kessler 
explained trial counsel concluded the Duncans offered Movant an imperfect alibi after 
speaking to them, reviewing the police reports, and reviewing their depositions.  Because 
there was a hole in the timeline, Kessler did not want to put on any witness who offered an 
imperfect alibi.  Kessler described Carol’s account as “unsure or she couldn’t be as sure” 
about the timeline, and he did not believe Sylvan would hold up under cross-examination.  
The motion court found trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to call the Duncans 
because their testimony would have harmed Movant and benefitted the state.   
Trial counsel conducted a thorough investigation regarding the Duncans’ testimony, 
including reviewing all of their pretrial statements and meeting with them in person.  Trial 
counsel determined the Duncans could, at best, provide an imperfect alibi, which Kessler 
explained trial counsel were not comfortable presenting.  Further, having the Duncans 
testify about Movant’s graphic description of Victim’s face after being shot would benefit 
the state to Movant’s detriment.  Trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to call the 
Duncans to testify at trial. 
James Chandler 
 
James Chandler (hereinafter, “Chandler”) was deposed prior to trial by the first trial 
team but was not called as a witness at trial.  Chandler testified at the evidentiary hearing 
44 
 
he saw Movant driving his truck near Chandler’s home at 2:30 p.m. on the afternoon of the 
murder.  Kessler testified Movant had input on whether to call Chandler as a witness.  
Kessler explained Chandler’s testimony would only highlight for the jury there was a 
timeframe in which something could have happened, as opposed to arguing Movant was 
not there at all, undermining their defense theory.   
The motion court found Chandler’s testimony would not have provided Movant a 
viable alibi defense.  This Court agrees.  Even if the jury believed Chandler’s testimony, it 
would not provide Movant with an alibi because Chandler’s testimony does not account 
for Movant’s whereabouts at the time Victim was shot.  See Winfield, 93 S.W.3d at 739.  
Trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to call Chandler to testify at trial. 
Mila Linn 
In claim 8(c) of his Rule 29.15 motion, Movant argued trial counsel were ineffective 
for failing to call Mila Linn (hereinafter, “Linn”) and her son to testify during the guilt 
phase that they saw a 1990s two-door red car in the area of Victim’s home at the time of 
the murder.  Linn gave statements to police and was deposed prior to trial.  Linn stated she 
lived approximately a half-mile north of Victim’s home.  On the day of the murder, Linn 
stated she saw an older red car with a loud muffler driving near the dumpster situated near 
Victim’s home.  Linn described the driver as a stranger with shaggy brown hair, a sunken 
face, and clean-shaven.  Linn was later shown a photo array that included Movant but she 
did not identify Movant as the driver.  Linn admitted Victim detained her for a driving 
while intoxicated charge a day or two before he was murdered.  Linn also conceded she 
45 
could not remember much from this time because she was a heavy drinker.  The first trial 
team provided these materials to trial counsel.   
Although Linn was not called as a witness at trial, a police officer testified he 
showed Linn a photo array and she did not identify Movant as the driver of the red car she 
observed near Victim’s home.  During closing argument, Kessler argued the state was 
hiding the ball because it did not present Linn’s testimony about observing the same red 
car as the other witnesses, but not identifying Movant as the driver.  Bruns testified trial 
counsel considered calling all potential witnesses, including Linn, but he could not 
remember why she was not called.  Bruns acknowledged avoiding impeachment would be 
a reason not to call a particular witness.  Bruns noted Kessler was free to use Linn’s 
statements during closing argument.   
The motion court found Movant failed to present any evidence to support his claim 
regarding Linn’s testimony, hence the claim was deemed abandoned.  At the outset of the 
evidentiary hearing, Movant formally waived claim 8(c) only with respect to presenting 
testimony from Linn’s son, not Linn herself.  Movant intended to depose Linn for the 
evidentiary hearing, but no post-conviction deposition was filed.  However, Linn’s pretrial 
deposition was offered as an exhibit and was before the motion court.   
Even if this Court found the motion court erred in finding this claim abandoned, 
Movant would not be entitled to relief because he was not prejudiced by this error.  When 
examining Linn’s pretrial deposition, it is clear her testimony would be undermined 
severely due to her admission her memory of the events was impaired by heavy drinking. 
Linn would be subjected to impeachment, which Bruns testified would be a reason not to 
46 
 
call her to testify.  Further, trial counsel were able to use the most helpful portion of Linn’s 
statement when questioning the police officer and during closing argument, while avoiding 
Linn’s impeachment.  Trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to call Linn to testify 
at trial.  The motion court did not clearly err in denying these claims. 
Point X – Failure to Impeach Guilt Phase Witness 
 
Movant alleges the motion court clearly erred in denying his claim trial counsel 
were ineffective for failing to impeach Lisa Hart’s (hereinafter, “Hart”) trial testimony that 
she did not know where the yellow sticker was located on the red car she saw near Victim’s 
home on the day of the murder.  Movant claims Hart’s deposition and written statements 
indicate she saw the yellow sticker from the front of the car when the sticker was located 
on the back of the vehicle.  Movant argues this impeachment was critical because the state’s 
theory was Movant borrowed his grandmother’s red car and Hart identified the car as the 
one she saw near Victim’s home.   
“Ordinarily, the failure to call a witness will not support an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim because the choice of witnesses is presumptively a matter of trial strategy.”  
Tisius, 519 S.W.3d at 427. This presumption applies to trial counsel’s decision not to 
impeach a witness.  McFadden v. State, 553 S.W.3d 289, 305 (Mo. banc 2018).  Movant 
“has the burden of showing that the impeachment would have provided [him] with a 
defense or would have changed the outcome at trial.”  Id. (quoting State v. Phillips, 940 
S.W.2d 512, 524 (Mo. banc 1997)).   
At trial, Hart testified she and her husband drove to view a home to purchase near 
Victim’s residence at approximately 1:45 p.m. on the day of the murder.  Hart testified she 
47 
 
saw a red car and “[f]or some unknown reason there was a yellow fist to softball-sized 
sticker that stuck out.”  Hart stated the red car was still on the street when she and her 
husband left between 3 and 3:30 p.m.  Hart later contacted the police after hearing about 
Victim’s murder and went to the command center to speak to an investigator.  When she 
arrived, she saw a red car with a yellow sticker on it and told her husband, “That’s it.”  Hart 
stated she was “100 percent sure” it was the “exact same car” she saw parked near Victim’s 
residence.  Hart’s pretrial deposition testimony and written statements indicated she saw 
the yellow sticker on the red car’s front end, when the yellow sticker was located on the 
back end of the car. 
Henshaw testified at the evidentiary hearing she was responsible for the red car 
evidence.  Henshaw had no recollection of Hart’s testimony or a reason why she did not 
impeach her testimony.  Henshaw could not articulate a strategic reason for failing to 
impeach Hart’s testimony, but she explained part of the strategy during opening statement 
was to concede Movant drove his grandmother’s red car that day.  Although trial counsel 
did not attempt to impeach Hart’s testimony with her previous statements, they attempted 
to bring out discrepancies in her testimony by calling her husband.  Kessler indicated “it 
did not go well.”  Hence, trial counsel made an attempt—albeit an unsuccessful one—to 
impeach Hart’s testimony.   
“Reasonable choices of trial strategy, no matter how ill-fated they appear in 
hindsight, cannot serve as a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance.”  Anderson, 
196 S.W.3d at 33.  Even if this Court found trial counsel’s unsuccessful attempt ineffective, 
Movant suffered no prejudice in light of the other witnesses who testified about the red car.  
48 
 
Moreover, impeachment would not undermine Hart’s trial testimony she was “100 percent 
sure” the red car she saw at the command center was the same red car she saw parked near 
Victim’s home, regardless of where the yellow sticker was placed.  Movant has not 
demonstrated the outcome of the trial would have been different had trial counsel 
impeached Hart’s testimony regarding the yellow sticker’s location.  The motion court did 
not clearly err in denying this claim. 
Point XIII – Failure to Object to Comment on Movant’s Right to Testify 
Movant argues the motion court clearly erred in denying his claim trial counsel were 
ineffective for failing to object, request a curative instruction, and request a mistrial when 
the prosecutor commented, “someone does” in response to Hart’s testimony she did not 
know why Movant’s grandmother’s red car was parked near Victim’s home.  Movant 
argues the prosecutor’s comment was a reference to his right to remain silent and 
implicated Movant knew why the red car was parked at Victim’s home.   
 
During Hart’s trial testimony, the prosecutor asked her, “Do you know why 
[Movant’s grandmother’s] car would be across from where [Victim] was murdered --?” to 
which Hart responded, “No.”  The prosecutor then commented, “Someone does.”  The 
circuit court stated, “Keep the comments to yourself.  I’ve already warned defense 
counsel.”  Trial counsel did not object to the comment, did not ask the jury to be instructed 
to disregard it, or request a mistrial.  The circuit court later instructed the jury Movant had 
the right not to testify and the jury could draw no adverse inference from his failure to do 
so. 
49 
 
Movant raised this claim in his direct appeal, arguing the circuit court committed 
plain error in not sua sponte granting Movant a mistrial because the words “someone does” 
constituted a direct comment about his failure to testify.  This Court rejected Movant’s 
claim, finding the comment was not a direct comment nor did it need to determine whether 
it was an indirect comment because Movant had “fallen far short” of showing his comment 
had a decisive effect on the jury.  Shockley, 410 S.W.3d at 189-190.  Henshaw did not 
recall the prosecutor’s statement or a reason why she failed to object or seek other relief.   
The motion court echoed this Court’s finding the statement was not a direct 
comment about Movant’s failure to testify, nor did Movant demonstrate the comment had 
a decisive effect on the jury.  This Court agrees.  Any objection to the comment would have 
drawn additional, unwanted attention to the statement; hence, it was reasonable for trial 
counsel to refrain from objecting.  Barton, 432 S.W.3d at 754.  Moreover, to obtain post-
conviction relief based on a failure to object, it “must have been of such character as to 
deprive the defendant substantially of his right to a fair trial.”  Dorsey, 448 S.W.3d at 289 
(quoting Ervin, 80 S.W.3d at 822).  Trial counsel’s attempt to obtain curative relief would 
not have been meritorious nor can Movant demonstrate had trial counsel objected, this 
Court would have ordered a new trial if this claim was presented as one for preserved error.  
Finally, Movant cannot demonstrate he suffered prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to 
object to this single comment when examining the entire trial.  The motion court did not 
clearly err in denying this claim. 
 
 
50 
Point XII – Failure to Object to State’s Penalty Phase Exhibits 
Movant claims the motion court clearly erred in denying his claim trial counsel were 
ineffective for failing to object to victim impact evidence exhibits admitted during the 
penalty phase, which included a funeral casket photograph, a video montage shown at 
Victim’s funeral, and a drawing by Victim’s son depicting what his son described as 
Movant shooting Victim.  Movant argues these victim impact exhibits individually and 
collectively were so inflammatory they injected passion, prejudice, and arbitrariness into 
the penalty phase.  Movant did not challenge the admission of the exhibits on direct appeal. 
“Victim impact evidence is simply another form or method of informing the 
sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in question, evidence of 
a general type long considered by sentencing authorities.”  State v. Storey, 40 S.W.3d 898, 
908 (Mo. banc 2001) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 
115 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1991)).  “As a general rule, the trial court has discretion during the 
punishment phase of trial to admit whatever evidence it deems helpful to the jury in 
assessing punishment.”  State v. Winfield, 5 S.W.3d 505, 515 (Mo. banc 1999) (quoting 
State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 331 (Mo. banc 1996)).     
Bruns testified the state had a right to present victim impact evidence and he does 
not object unless it goes “overboard.”  Bruns explained he generally tries not to object 
during the state’s presentation of aggravating circumstance evidence because he hopes the 
state will not object during the defense’s presentation of mitigating circumstance evidence.  
Bruns acknowledged the law concerning what is admissible is broad and very 
discretionary.  Bruns admitted he did not object to each of the complained of exhibits. 
51 
Regarding the funeral casket photograph, Bruns stated, “Out of everything that’s coming 
in I can’t imagine that that sort of photograph is the worst thing ….”  Regarding the video 
montage, Bruns explained, “My judgment at the time must have been they could do worse 
stuff to us quite frankly.”  Finally, regarding Victim’s son’s drawing, Bruns conceded the 
drawing was “terrible and terribly hurtful,” but it is “probably going to come in.”     
Movant argues this Court should apply the holding in State v. Hess, 23 A.3d 373 
(N.J. 2011), to find Bruns was ineffective for failing to object to showing the video montage 
from Victim’s funeral.  In Hess, the New Jersey Supreme Court vacated a guilty plea, in 
part, due to trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to object at sentencing to a seventeen-
minute victim impact video from the police officer victim’s funeral.  Id. at 394.  The video 
was scored to popular and religious music, professionally produced, included a television 
news segment about the victim’s funeral, had three poems scrolling over photographs, and 
ended with a photograph of the victim’s headstone.  Id. at 381.  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court explained: 
Undoubtedly, concerns over prejudicial victim-impact statements, including 
photographs and videos, are less pronounced when a judge rather than a jury 
is imposing sentence.  Nevertheless, judges, no less than jurors, are 
susceptible to the wide range of human emotions that may be affected by 
irrelevant and unduly prejudicial materials.  We are fully aware that judges, 
who are the gatekeepers of what is admissible at sentencing, will have viewed 
materials that they may deem non-probative or unduly prejudicial.  We have 
faith that our judges have the ability to put aside that which is ruled 
inadmissible.  However, both the bar and bench should know the general 
contours of what falls within the realm of an appropriate video of a victim’s 
life for sentencing purposes. 
Id. at 392 (internal citation omitted).  After examining several cases from other 
jurisdictions, the New Jersey Supreme Court held, “An overly lengthy video, baby 
52 
 
photographs of an adult victim, and a video scored to religious and pop music do not 
advance any legitimate objective ….”  Id. at 394.  The court also noted the photograph of 
the victim’s headstone and the television segment about the victim’s life did “not project 
anything meaningful about the victim’s life as it related to his family or others at the time 
of his death.”  Id.   
 
In this case, the video montage presented to the jury was compiled by Victim’s 
family, was four minutes in length, set to music, and contained photographs from Victim’s 
childhood through adulthood.  While there are some similarities to the video in Hess, 
Victim’s video was significantly shorter, not produced professionally, and did not contain 
photographs of Victim’s headstone, poems, a variety of music, or television news coverage.  
Hence, this Court declines Movant’s invitation to find Hess dispositive, especially given 
the New Jersey’s Supreme Court’s recognition it could not “set forth an exhaustive 
catalogue of what is and is not permissible in a video, other than to say how this video 
exceeded permissible bounds.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 
Bruns gave strategic reasons for not objecting to the victim impact evidence 
presented during the penalty phase.  Kessler testified in his experience it was not 
uncommon to play a funeral video during the penalty phase, and he did not think it was 
objectionable.  Kessler explained objecting would make it appear as if Movant were trying 
to hide someone’s grief, which would not be in anyone’s best interest.  Moreover, Movant 
cannot demonstrate the outcome of the trial would have been different had Bruns objected 
because any objection to the admissible exhibits would have been nonmeritorious.  The 
motion court did not clearly err in denying this claim.   
53 
Point XVI – Failure to Call Mitigation Witnesses 
Movant argues the motion court clearly erred in denying his claim trial counsel were 
ineffective for failing to call three mitigation witnesses to highlight Movant was a good 
father, was a hard worker, and had been impacted by his father’s death.  Movant believes 
he would have received a life sentence if these witnesses had testified during the penalty 
phase.   
Prevailing professional standards for capital defense work require trial counsel to 
“discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence.”  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 
524, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2537, 156 L. Ed. 2d 471 (2003); Johnson v. State, 388 S.W.3d 159, 
165 (Mo. banc 2012).  This evidence includes “medical history, educational history, 
employment and training history, family and social history, prior adult and juvenile 
correctional experience, and religious and cultural influences.”  Id.  Ordinarily, the failure 
to call a witness will not support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim because the 
choice of witnesses is presumptively a matter of trial strategy.  Davis v. State, 486 S.W.3d 
898, 909 (Mo. banc 2016).  Further, trial counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing 
to present cumulative evidence.  Deck v. State, 381 S.W.3d 339, 351 (Mo. banc 2012). 
 
Bruns presented three mitigation witnesses during the penalty phase.  Laura Smith 
(hereinafter, “Smith”), the mother of Movant’s children, testified about the importance of 
Movant having a relationship with his children, even if he were incarcerated.  Movant’s 
cousin testified about his character, their relationship, and Movant’s care of his 
grandparents.  Sanders testified extensively about Movant’s life, how Movant came to live 
54 
 
with Sanders after his father died, the help he provided Sanders in caring for him and his 
business, and how he loved Movant like one of his own children.   
Bruns described Sanders as a great witness who was well-liked in the community.  
Further, Bruns specifically testified, when presenting mitigating evidence, he generally 
tried to get the “best witnesses” to tell “really good stories” to establish for the jury the 
person’s life was meaningful.  Bruns stated they discussed mitigation witnesses with 
Movant, who had ideas and opinions about the witnesses and the evidence.  Kessler 
testified they did not call any additional witnesses after Sanders’ testimony because he was 
tearful on the stand and elicited an emotional response from the jurors.  Despite these 
witnesses, Movant believes additional testimony would have persuaded the jury to give 
him a life sentence. 
Velma Dowdy 
 
 
Velma Dowdy (hereinafter, “Dowdy”) testified at the evidentiary hearing she had 
known Movant his entire life.  Dowdy was Movant’s neighbor and Smith was her 
granddaughter.  Dowdy testified Movant was a good father, and she saw him at family 
events.  Marshall testified he did not remember Dowdy, but a casefile memorandum stated 
Movant indicated Dowdy was “crazy.”  Bruns testified he had no contact with Dowdy.   
The motion court found trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to call Dowdy 
to testify because Movant characterized her as “crazy” and, therefore, unreliable.  
Moreover, Dowdy’s testimony would have been cumulative to other witnesses’ testimony 
regarding Movant’s family life.  Trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to call Dowdy 
to testify. 
55 
Eugene Jackson 
Eugene Jackson (hereinafter, “Jackson”) testified at the evidentiary hearing he had 
been friends with Movant since childhood.  Jackson never saw Movant have problems with 
other people or get into physical fights with anyone.  Jackson testified Movant took in the 
daughter of a friend who was having issues.  Bruns testified he had no contact with Jackson. 
The record is unclear whether Movant or anyone else informed trial counsel Jackson was 
a potential witness.  To find trial counsel ineffective for failing to call a witness, Movant 
bears the burden of proving “trial counsel knew or should have known of the existence of 
the witness.”  Glass, 227 S.W.3d at 468 (quoting Hutchison, 150 S.W.3d at 304).  Hence, 
trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to call Jackson to testify. 
Clarence “Butch” Chilton 
Clarence “Butch” Chilton (hereinafter, “Chilton”) testified at the evidentiary 
hearing he was Movant’s little league coach and Smith’s uncle.  Chilton was good friends 
with Movant’s father before he died.  Chilton testified Movant took his father’s death hard. 
The motion court correctly found Chilton’s testimony cumulative to that of other witnesses 
who were familiar with Movant’s family.  Further, Chilton did not offer any recent and 
specific stories about his interaction with Movant.  Trial counsel were not ineffective for 
failing to call Chilton to testify.  The motion court did not clearly err in denying this claim. 
56 
 
Point XIV – Failure to Object to Police Presence during Trial and Sentencing and 
Failure to Object to Elected Circuit Judge Sentencing9 
 
Movant alleges the motion court clearly erred in denying his claim trial counsel 
were ineffective for failing to object to the visible police presence in and around the 
courthouse during the trial and sentencing because it sent a message to convict Movant 
based on Victim’s police affiliation and because Movant was an extremely dangerous 
person.  Movant must demonstrate trial counsel’s failure to object resulted in a substantial 
deprivation of his right to a fair trial.  Dorsey, 448 S.W.3d at 289. 
Police Presence during the Trial and Sentencing 
 
 
Movant’s aunt testified at the evidentiary hearing there were approximately fifty to 
sixty armed, uniformed officers outside the courthouse during voir dire in Carter County.  
When Movant’s trial was conducted in Howell County, Movant’s aunt observed armed 
officers in the courthouse square, on top of buildings, and at every door.  Movant’s aunt 
estimated there were seventy-five to one hundred police officers present each day.  
Movant’s aunt testified there were many people lined up in the square yelling things at 
Movant as he was escorted in and out of the courthouse. 
                                              
9 This point raises two distinct claims of error in violation of Rule 84.04(d).  Rule 84.04 is 
not merely an exhortation from a judicial catechism nor is it a suggestion of legal etiquette.  
Thummel v. King, 570 S.W.2d 679, 686 (Mo. banc 1978).  Appellate counsel should be 
mindful of the dictates of Rule 84.04 to avoid claims being dismissed for failure to comply. 
However, it is this Court’s policy to decide a death penalty case on its merits rather than 
on technical deficiencies in the brief.  Christeson v. State, 131 S.W.3d 796, 799 n.5 (Mo. 
banc 2004).   
 
 
 
57 
 
Kessler testified the circuit court excluded or prevented law enforcement officers 
from watching or participating in the trial while dressed in their uniforms.  As far as a large 
police presence outside the courtroom, Kessler had no specific recollection of anything 
other than seeing a newspaper article with a photograph of Movant in a bulletproof vest 
surrounded by people outside the courthouse.  Because the jury was sequestered, Kessler 
explained they did not come through “a phalanx of uniformed people” to get in and out of 
the courthouse.  Kessler saw rifles while Movant was transported, but he did not believe 
the jury saw this so he did not bring it to the circuit court’s attention.  There was never a 
time Kessler saw anyone with a gun around Movant while in the jury’s presence.   
 
Bruns and Henshaw testified there was a large police presence in Howell County 
when Movant was transported to trial.  Bruns testified “there were threats to everybody,” 
including lay people yelling and protesting about Movant’s trial.  Bruns stated there was a 
genuine concern someone would shoot Movant as he was transported.  Henshaw testified 
the large police presence was to protect Movant from different threats made against him, 
and he was transported in a bulletproof vest.  Several jurors testified at the evidentiary 
hearing, and none of them testified they observed a large police presence during the trial 
or it influenced their opinion of Movant or their verdict. 
 
Kessler estimated approximately thirty uniformed highway patrol officers attended 
Movant’s sentencing.  Kessler did not object because the circuit court knew they were 
officers regardless of how they were dressed.  Bruns testified the courtroom was full during 
Movant’s sentencing, but he did not object to the police presence because he did not believe 
their presence would affect the circuit court.   
58 
The motion court found the need for security in the courthouse and at the trial was 
important for the circuit court to consider.  Hence, the circuit court was in the best position 
to determine whether the police presence at the trial was distracting or had a prejudicial 
effect.  Further, there was no evidence any of the jurors came into contact with law 
enforcement officers inside or outside the courthouse during the trial.   
In Johnson, this Court rejected a similar claim when the evidence demonstrated the 
jurors were sequestered throughout the proceedings, they had no contact with any of the 
spectators at any point during the trial, and no officer present caused any disturbance to the 
proceedings.  Johnson, 406 S.W.3d at 903.  Further, the circuit court retains wide discretion 
in determining whether to take action to avoid an environment for trial in which there is 
not a “sense or appearance of neutrality.”  State v. Baumruk, 85 S.W.3d 644, 649-50 
(Mo. banc 2002).  Here, trial counsel testified they did not believe the large police presence 
impacted the jury’s decision.  Further, none of the jurors testified about observing a large 
police presence.  Trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to object to the large police 
presence at Movant’s trial and at sentencing. 
Elected Trial Judge Sentencing 
Movant further alleges trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the 
elected circuit judge imposing sentencing in the face of a large police presence.  Movant 
argues reasonable counsel would have objected to an elected circuit judge imposing a 
sentence due to “electoral pressures to impose death as evidenced by the police presence 
at sentencing.”  Movant argues he was prejudiced because he otherwise would not have 
received a death sentence. 
59 
The motion court held this claim was not cognizable in a Rule 29.15 action because 
it should have been raised on direct appeal in that it challenged the constitutional validity 
of the death penalty.  Assuming arguendo the claim was cognizable, the motion court found 
Movant did not demonstrate prejudice.   
This Court finds Movant failed to present any evidence regarding this claim at the 
evidentiary hearing.  “Allegations in a postconviction motion are not self-proving; rather, 
a movant bears the burden to prove his claim of ineffective assistance by a preponderance 
of the evidence.”  Gittemeier v. State, 527 S.W.3d 64, 71 (Mo. banc 2017).  “Failure to 
present evidence at a hearing in support of factual claims in a post-conviction motion 
constitutes abandonment of that claim.”  Id. (quoting State v. Nunley, 980 S.W.2d 290, 293 
(Mo. banc 1998)).  Trial counsel were not asked about their failure to object or offer any 
reason why an elected circuit court judge could not impose sentencing.  Alternatively, even 
if trial counsel’s testimony could be construed to include such a claim, Movant offers 
nothing more than conclusory arguments regarding the outcome of the case.  The motion 
court did not clearly err in denying these claims. 
Point XV – Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
Movant claims the motion court clearly erred in denying his claim appellate counsel 
was ineffective for combining arguments regarding character and propensity grounds 
concerning an officer’s testimony the police brought a S.W.A.T. team to apprehend him 
because of his violent history.  Movant argues competent appellate counsel would not have 
combined these claims, causing the claim to be reviewed for plain error only.   
60 
“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the movant 
must establish that counsel failed to raise a claim of error that was so obvious that a 
competent and effective lawyer would have recognized and asserted it.”  Williams v. State, 
168 S.W.3d 433, 444 (Mo. banc 2005).  Additionally, the movant must prove, “if counsel 
had raised the claims, there is a reasonable probability the outcome of the appeal would 
have been different.”  Taylor v. State, 262 S.W.3d 231, 253 (Mo. banc 2008). 
During the trial, an officer testified a S.W.A.T. team accompanied him to interview 
Movant on the night of Victim’s murder “due to [Movant’s] violent history.”  Kessler 
objected, stating, “I object to any introduction of his history.  This goes to character ….”  
The state countered the testimony would not go into Movant’s violent history but would 
be used to explain the officer’s actions and address Movant’s argument the police unfairly 
targeted him as a suspect.  The circuit court sustained the objection.  Kessler then asked 
the jury to be instructed to disregard the statement, and he requested a mistrial.  The circuit 
court instructed the jury to disregard the comment “regarding any character or reputation 
of [Movant]” but overruled Kessler’s motion for a mistrial.   
On direct appeal, Movant argued the circuit court erred in failing to sustain his 
motion for a mistrial because the reference to Movant’s violent history constituted 
impermissible propensity evidence.  The state argued this issue was not preserved and the 
reference did not constitute propensity evidence.  This Court engaged in a lengthy analysis 
of the objection raised, the arguments presented, and whether they were preserved, which 
will not be repeated here.  See Shockley, 410 S.W.3d at 191-96.  This Court found the 
argument on appeal attempted to merge the character and propensity evidence concepts, 
61 
 
which are distinct.  Id. at 193.  This Court concluded no plain error occurred because the 
comment was made to explain the police’s actions after Movant opened the door to the 
issue and there was other evidence presented in which Movant threatened police officers.  
Id. at 194.   
 
Michael Gross (hereinafter, “Gross”) represented Movant on appeal.  Gross testified 
he argued the comment was to impugn Movant’s character and to make the jurors more 
prone to find him guilty of the offense charged in this case because of a propensity to 
engage in violent criminal behavior.  Gross did not believe the issues were separate and 
based his argument on recent Court precedent that he interpreted to mean propensity 
evidence had evolved to fit into a character argument.  Gross admitted he would have 
argued the issue differently if he knew the Court would consider them separate issues. 
The motion court reviewed the trial transcript, trial counsel’s objection, and this 
Court’s analysis in rejecting this claim.  The motion court did not find the comment so 
egregious that it required a mistrial.  The motion court further found the curative instruction 
admonishing the jury to disregard the officer’s statement, combined with substantive 
evidence of guilt, supported a finding the single comment did not play a decisive role in 
the verdict.  This Court agrees.  Although this Court did not find the specific propensity 
argument preserved, the Court engaged in an extensive analysis regarding the comment 
and its impact on the trial, ultimately denying Movant relief.  Id. at 195-96.  Movant has 
not offered any additional evidence that, had Gross raised the issue differently, this Court 
would have reversed his conviction.  Taylor, 262 S.W.3d at 253.  The motion court did not 
clearly err in denying this claim. 
62 
Point XVII – Alleged Brady Violations 
Movant argues the motion court clearly erred in denying his claim regarding the 
state’s alleged violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 
2d 215 (1963), for failing to disclose data Victim possessed relating to other possible 
suspects.  Movant alleges an investigation regarding possible corruption of Carter County 
law enforcement would have produced evidence supporting someone other than Movant 
shot Victim.   
If the state suppresses evidence favorable to a defendant and material to either the 
guilt or penalty phase, due process is violated.  Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.   The state violates 
due process regardless of whether it withheld the evidence in good faith or in bad faith.  
Id.; Gill v. State, 300 S.W.3d 225, 231 (Mo. banc 2009).  A Brady violation contains three 
components:  “The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is 
exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the 
[s]tate, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.”  Johnson,
406 S.W.3d at 901 (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 
144 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1999)).  “Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability 
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different.” Id. (quoting Taylor, 262 S.W.3d at 240). 
While gathering discovery for the evidentiary hearing, post-conviction counsel 
indicated there was reason to believe Victim maintained investigative files related to 
criminal wrongdoing by Carter County law enforcement personnel.  Post-conviction 
counsel sought discovery of Victim’s computer drives.  While one drive was provided, the 
63 
parties later stipulated two of the hard drives were no longer accessible due to the passage 
of time and other factors.   
  At the evidentiary hearing, three witnesses testified Victim’s former fiancée told 
them Victim was investigating possible corruption by Carter County law enforcement 
officials before he was murdered.10  There was testimony adduced Victim kept these files 
at home on his personal computer.  Victim’s former fiancée testified and denied having 
told anyone Victim was conducting any investigation or that he kept the files at home on 
his personal computer.  Victim’s former fiancée stated she did not use or look at Victim’s 
personal computer, and she did not see Victim perform any work on his home computer. 
Because the parties stipulated the hard drives were no longer accessible, the motion 
court found there was no evidence the state withheld files on the hard drives.  The motion 
court discounted the three witnesses’ testimony about the home computer’s contents as 
“vague and speculative at best.”  The motion court further found Movant could not 
demonstrate prejudice because he could not present evidence beyond speculation and 
conjecture about the hard drives’ contents.  This Court agrees.  Movant cannot demonstrate 
the outcome of his trial would have been different if he had access to what is only vague 
and speculative information.  The motion court did not clearly err in denying this claim. 
10 The motion court heard this evidence only to determine whether the state’s failure to 
disclose this information violated Brady, not for the truth of the matter asserted.   
64 
Conclusion 
The motion court did not clearly err in overruling Movant’s Rule 29.15 motion for 
post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing.  The motion court’s judgment is 
affirmed. 
___________________________ 
GEORGE W. DRAPER III, JUDGE 
Fischer, C.J., Wilson, Russell, Powell, and Breckenridge, JJ., concur; Stith, J., dissents in 
part and in result in separate opinion filed. 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc 
LANCE C. SHOCKLEY, 
) 
) 
Appellant, 
) 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC96633 
) 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
) 
) 
Respondent. 
) 
OPINION DISSENTING IN PART AND IN RESULT 
I respectfully dissent from the portion of the principal  opinion holding counsel were 
not ineffective in failing to question Juror 58 during voir dire about the provocative novel 
he admitted writing and in failing to call other jurors in support of Mr. Shockley’s motion 
for new trial.  On direct appeal, this Court held, because of these failures, the record did 
not support Mr. Shockley’s claim that Juror 58 should have been stricken for cause or that 
the other jurors saw his book and it affected their deliberations.  State v. Shockley, 410 
S.W.3d 179, 201 (Mo. banc 2013).  Because the postconviction hearing demonstrates 
counsel had no valid strategic reason for failing to voir dire Juror 58 and for choosing not 
to question other jurors about when and how they were exposed to his violent novel, I 
would find both failures constituted ineffective assistance that may have affected the 
2 
outcome of the trial. 
In explaining why they did not question Juror 58 about his novel during voir dire, 
defense counsel stated at the postconviction hearing that they focused on Juror 58’s 
statements his son was a police officer and he had a knowledge of guns and therefore, did 
not further question Juror 58 regarding his novel.  Like the motion court, the principal 
opinion says this was not ineffective because this questioning was closely aligned with the 
counsel’s trial strategy, which the principal opinion explains as using voir dire to uncover 
pro-law enforcement bias and knowledge about firearms.  In support, the principal opinion 
cites Clayton v. State, 63 S.W.3d 201, 207-08 (Mo. banc 2001), for the proposition that “[i]t 
is not ineffective assistance of counsel for an attorney to pursue one reasonable trial 
strategy to the exclusion of another, even if the latter would also be a reasonable strategy.” 
Clayton does not support the principal opinion’s reasoning.  It holds merely that it 
was not unreasonable for counsel to put on evidence of both diminished capacity and 
reasonable doubt as to guilt, rather than focusing on just one defense.  Id. at 208.  In other 
words, in Clayton counsel had to choose whether it was better to pursue only one defense 
or whether it was wiser strategy to pursue two theoretically slightly inconsistent defenses 
at the same time.  Id. at 207.  
A similar strategic choice is not required when a potential juror reveals multiple 
sources of bias, however.  Counsel could, and should, examine the potential juror about all 
of the revealed biases.  It is not reasonable to pick only one disqualifying or biasing issue 
to examine further.  Yet, that is what counsel admitted they did here.  Because they wanted 
to follow up on Juror 58’s son’s employment as a police officer, they chose not to question 
3 
 
him about his novel.  This choice was unreasonable.   
 The principal opinion states that finding counsel’s voir dire ineffective would be 
equivalent to adopting a rule that “a potential juror’s employment as an author, standing 
alone, establishes the juror has ‘multiple sources of bias.’”  The dispositive fact here is not 
that Juror 58 was an author.  What is relevant here is that Juror 58, on his own initiative, 
approached the bench during a break to inform the court he had not revealed as yet during 
voir dire that he was a published author and he thought “maybe I should be coming out 
with fact [sic] as well.”  When a venireperson feels strongly enough that a piece of 
information may be relevant for consideration in voir dire that he himself suggests it to the 
court on his own initiative, defense counsel is ineffective in failing to investigate what 
made the venireperson believe the information needed to be disclosed .  For this reason, 
the principal opinion’s attempt to distinguish Knese v. State, 85 S.W.3d 628, 632 (Mo. banc 
2002), is unavailing. As in that case, the failure here to conduct a basic investigation of the 
juror’s bias was ineffective.      
This error was compounded by counsel’s rejection of the circuit court’s offer to 
allow counsel to call Juror 58 and other jurors during the hearing on the motion for new 
trial.  The failure to follow up during voir dire and by calling jurors in support of the motion 
for new trial meant the record before the circuit court and this Court on appeal did not 
support grant of a new trial, resulting in the conviction being affirmed on appeal. 
The principal opinion states the decision not to call jurors in support of the motion 
for new trial was reasonable in that counsel believed, because the jury was unable to agree 
whether to impose the death penalty, the trial judge was unlikely to impose death, as they 
4 
 
had never had a trial judge impose a death sentence when the jury could not agree on 
punishment.  In other words, counsel filed a motion for new trial but chose not to support 
it with testimony in the hopes the judge would give a favorable ruling on death.   
If counsel believed errors in the trial merited a new trial, they had a duty to file a 
proper and supported motion for new trial.  They failed to meet their duty by filing a motion 
they admittedly chose not to fully support with facts. Moreover, if what counsel wanted 
was to have the judge decide punishment while knowing the jury deadlocked, they could 
have requested the judge and State consent to doing just that even if a new trial were 
granted.   Failing to investigate juror misconduct, however, was not an option.  Yet counsel 
made the decision to forego any questioning of Juror 58 or the other jurors about whether 
they were exposed to Juror 58’s novel and the extent of that exposure.  
“[S]trategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable 
precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgment supports the limitations on 
investigation.”  State v. Butler, 951 S.W.2d 600, 608 (Mo. banc 1997) (internal quotations 
omitted) (alteration in original).  Defense counsel cannot make a strategic decision not to 
use evidence if counsel has not investigated the nature of that evidence.  Id. at 610.  “[A]n 
argument based on trial strategy or tactics is appropriate only if counsel is fully informed 
of facts which should have been discovered by investigation.”  Anderson v. State, 66 
S.W.3d 770, 776 (Mo. App. 2002) (quotation omitted) (emphasis added).   
While counsel may have believed the better chance of avoiding a death sentence lay 
in their hope the judge would continue to “be good” to them rather than in raising 
prejudicial juror misconduct from Juror 58’s deliberate exposure of the other jurors to his 
5 
 
novel, this belief was not reasonable as counsel had no idea of the seriousness of the 
exposure of the other jurors to the virulently anti-defendant violent rhetoric of the book.  
“The mere assertion that conduct of trial counsel was ‘trial strategy’ is not sufficient to 
preclude a movant from obtaining post-conviction relief.”  Wilkes v. State, 82 S.W.3d 925, 
930 (Mo. banc 2002).  Counsel does not have to choose between hoping for mercy from a 
judge or presenting valid claims in the client’s defense, and this Court should not excuse 
counsel’s failure to follow up here as trial strategy.   
The postconviction record reveals multiple instances of the jurors being exposed to 
the novel and to comments about it by Juror 58.  By that point they minimized their 
exposure to the novel, but this Court long has recognized, in the context of voir dire, a juror 
cannot be the judge of his or her own qualifications.  Beggs v. Universal C.I.T. Credit 
Corp., 387 S.W.2d 499, 503 (Mo. banc 1965); Theobold v. St. Louis Transit Co., 90 S.W. 
354, 359 (Mo. 1905).   
The same reasoning applies to the juror’s evaluation of the effects of exposure 
during deliberations to inappropriate influences such as Juror 58’s novel.  See Travis v. 
Stone, 66 S.W.3d 1, 4, 6 (Mo. banc 2002) (instructing “little weight be given to the 
offending juror’s assessment of the effect of this conduct” and noting prejudice cannot be 
cured by “statements of the juror tending to minimize the effect of this conduct”).  The 
difficulty in determining the effect on the jury of this novel and of Juror 58’s statements 
was exacerbated by the long delay before jurors finally were questioned.   
Counsel’s ineffectiveness may well have affected the decision to leave Juror 58 on 
the jury for the guilt phase and could well have affected the jury’s inability to decide on 
6 
punishment.  This Court should set aside the conviction and sentence of death. 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
________________________________ 
        LAURA DENVIR STITH, JUDGE