Case Title: JAMES KOLAR V. R & P, INC.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0116

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
JAMES KOLAR V. R & P, INC.2009 WY 56205 P.3d 1041Case Number: S-08-0116Decided: 04/21/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
JAMES 
KOLAR,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.R & P, 
INC.,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Richard 
J. Mulligan of Mulligan Law Office, and Heather Noble, Jackson, Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Noble.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Stefan 
J. Fodor of Fodor Law Office, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, James 
Stanley Kolar (Kolar), was employed by Appellee, R & P, Inc. 
(R & P), from 1997 until 2004.  Kolar experienced some health problems 
and underwent several surgeries and their associated recuperative periods during 
that time.  Thereafter, Kolar was 
fired from his job.  According to 
R & P, that termination was premised on his poor performance as an 
assistant manager.  Kolar filed a 
claim with the Department of Employment Fair Employment Program (DEFEP) alleging 
that his discharge was based on R & P's perception that he was 
disabled.  DEFEP attempted to 
conciliate Kolar's claim and when that failed to produce a result, his case was 
referred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  On July 16, 2006, the EEOC issued a 
Notice of Right to Sue, and informed Kolar that it was ending its processing of 
the claim.  Kolar then filed the 
instant lawsuit in Teton County on September 22, 2006.  The district court declined to address 
Kolar's claim associated with his asserted disability on the basis that he had 
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.  Kolar appealed from that order.  We will affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Kolar presents 
these issues:

 
 
--When 
an employee sued his employer for wrongful discharge in violation of public 
policy, did the district court err in dismissing that claim on the ground that 
another remedy existed, even though the employee had filed a complaint with the 
State of Wyoming's Fair Employment Program, and that agency had determined that 
the employer had engaged in discrimination on the basis of disability, had 
attempted unsuccessfully to mediate settlement of the complaint and then had 
dismissed the matter for failure to conciliate?

 
 
--Does 
an alternate remedy exist to protect against job discrimination on the basis of 
disability by employers with less than 15 employees, when state law bars such 
discrimination by those employers, but the only remedy provided is an 
administrative process where the Wyoming Fair Employment Program investigates 
and then attempts to mediate a settlement, so that an employer can effectively 
bar the discharged employee from recovering anything through the administrative 
process simply by refusing to settle?

 
 
R & P 
queries:

 
 
            
Was the district court correct in dismissing employee's claim for tort in 
violation of discharge against public policy by finding that another remedy 
existed, thus barring the claim in tort?

 
 
            
Does the Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Act provide a sufficient 
remedy to protect employees from job discrimination such that the tort of 
wrongful termination in violation of public policy is not 
available?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      Kolar worked for 
R & P (which is the corporate name of the Ace Hardware Store in 
Jackson) from August of 1997 until September 25, 2004.  At that time he was terminated from his 
employment for poor performance.  He 
was given five weeks severance pay in connection with his termination.  However, in the years preceding his 
firing, Kolar had experienced a series of physical problems which required 
surgeries on both of his ankles and on his spine as the result of a condition 
known as "connective tissue disorder."  
Most of the time he was away from work he was on either sick leave or 
vacation leave, but near the end of his employment he asked to take time off 
without pay because he had no remaining sick or vacation time 
left.

 
 
[¶4]      In a document 
entitled Charge of Discrimination which was received by DEFEP on December 22, 
2004, Kolar asserted that his employer regarded him as disabled and that he was 
denied a reasonable accommodation.  
That charge was filed pursuant to the Wyoming Fair Employment Practices 
Act of 1965.  Under the provisions 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-9-105(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2007), "[i]t is a discriminatory 
or unfair employment practice[f]or an employer to refuse to hire, to discharge, 
to promote or demote, or to discriminate in matters of compensation or the 
terms, conditions or privileges of employment against, a qualified disabled 
person."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-9-105(d) provides:  "As used in 
this section qualified disabled person' means a disabled person who is capable 
of performing a particular job, or who would be capable of performing a 
particular job with reasonable accommodation to his disability."  That Act defines "employer" as "the 
state of Wyoming or any political subdivision or board, commission, department, 
institution or school district thereof, and every other person employing two (2) 
or more employees within the state; but it does not mean religious organizations 
or associations."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-9-102(b)(LexisNexis 2007).  
R & P employed 12 persons.1

 
 
[¶5]      Of particular 
importance in this case are the provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-9-106:

 
 
(a)  Any 
person claiming to be aggrieved by a discriminatory or unfair employment 
practice may, personally or through his attorney, make, sign and file with the 
department within six (6) months of the alleged violation a verified, written 
complaint in duplicate which shall state the name and address of the person, 
employer, employment agency or labor organization alleged to have committed the 
discriminatory or unfair employment practice, and which shall set forth the 
particulars of the claim and contain other information as shall be required by 
the department.  The department 
shall investigate to determine the validity of the charges and issue a 
determination thereupon.

                                    
(b)  through (j) Repealed by Laws 2001, ch. 162, § 
2.

(k)  If 
the employer, employment agency, labor organization or employee is aggrieved by 
the department's determination, the aggrieved party may request a fair 
hearing.  The fair hearing shall be 
conducted pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure 
Act.

(m)  The 
department shall issue an order within fourteen (14) days of the decision being 
rendered, requiring the employer, employment agency or labor organization to 
comply with the hearing officer's decision.  If the employer, employment agency or 
labor organization does not timely appeal or comply with the order within thirty 
(30) days, the department may petition the appropriate district court for 
enforcement of the order.

(n)  Where 
the hearing officer determines that the employer, employment agency or labor 
organization has engaged in any discriminatory or unfair employment practice as 
defined in this chapter, the hearing officer's decision 
may:

(i)  Require 
the employer, employment agency or labor organization to cease and desist from 
the discriminatory or unfair practice;

            
(ii)  Require remedial action which may include hiring, 
retaining, reinstating or upgrading of employees, referring of applications for 
employment by a respondent employment agency or the restoration to membership by 
a respondent labor organization;

            
(iii)  Require the posting of notices, the making of reports as 
to the manner of compliance and any other relief that the hearing officer deems 
necessary and appropriate to make the complainant whole;  or

            
(iv)  Require the employer, employment agency or labor 
organization to pay backpay or front pay.  
[Emphasis added.]

 
 
[¶6]      The proceedings 
before the DEFEP were conducted in accordance with the Rules and Regulations of 
the DEFEP.  3 Weil's Code of Wyoming Rules, 025 140 
003-1 through 003-3 (July 2006).  
Kolar's charge contained these details:

 
 
1.  I 
am a member of the protected groups, disabled and regarded as 
disabled.

2.  My 
disability substantially limits a major life activity.

3.  I 
am otherwise qualified for the job.

4.  My 
employer failed to make a reasonable accommodation for my disability when such 
accommodation would not have placed an undue hardship on my 
employer.

            
a)  I was employed as an assistant manager for my 
employer.

            
b)  On September 14, 2004 I asked the employer's owner if I 
could have temporary light duty.

            
c)  My employer gave me temporary light duty work for the time 
period of September 15-18, 2004.

5.  Despite 
my satisfactory job performance, I was discharged.

            
a)  On September 23, 2004 my employer discharged me for having, 
"too many health problems."

            
b)  On September 23, 2004, my employer's owner made the 
statement, "this job is killing you."

6.  After 
my discharge, the job remained available or was filled by someone not of my 
protected groups.

 
 
Attached 
to the Charge of Discrimination was Kolar's affidavit which set out information 
very similar to that quoted immediately above.

 
 
[¶7]      In a document 
entitled Response to Charge of Discrimination and Employer's Position Statement 
dated January 11, 2005, R & P denied the gravamen of Kolar's 
complaint and contended that his termination was brought about by Kolar's 
"inability to perform one or more essential functions of his job, his inability 
to work with other managers and floor personnel, and his inability to show up 
for work."

 
 
[¶8]      In a document 
entitled Complainant's Response to Respondent's Response to Charge and 
Employer's Position Statement, dated January 24, 2005, Kolar denied the 
assertions made in R & P's response and iterated his previous 
allegation of discrimination based on his employer's perception of him as being 
disabled.

 
 
[¶9]      In an eleven-page 
document entitled Determination, DEFEP addressed the merits of Kolar's charges 
in detail.  Citing from 42 U.S.C. § 
12111, DEFEP noted that a qualified person with a disability means:  "An individual with a disability who, 
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of 
the employment position that such individual holds or desires."  Continuing, DEFEP 
noted:

 
 
The 
Tenth Circuit [Court of Appeals], which governs employers in the State of 
Wyoming, has held that the prima 
facie elements under the ADA require an employee 
demonstrate:

 
 
1)  That 
s/he is disabled' within the meaning of the ADA;

2)  That 
s/he is qualified with or without reasonable accommodation; 
and

3)  That 
s/he was discriminated against because of his/her 
disability.

 
 
The 
ADA defines disability as:

 
 
1)  A 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major 
life activities of such individual:

2)  A 
record of such impairment; or

3)  Being 
regarded as having such impairment.  
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).

 
 
.

 
 
Evidence 
shows that [Kolar's] various medical impairments did not substantially impact 
his ability to perform household chores or care for himself.  Evidence indicates [Kolar] required 
minimal aid in preparing to shower following ankle surgery and some aid in tying 
his shoes and changing a dressing following neck surgery.  In all instances such aid was short 
lived as evidence indicates [Kolar] recovered from each successive surgery.  [Kolar] further indicates he is not 
presently substantially limited in a major life activity.

 
 
[¶10]   Although DEFEP determined that 
Kolar was not limited in any major life activity, it also concluded that 
R & P regarded him as substantially limited in the major life 
activity of working.  In addition, 
the DEFEP concluded that R & P's beliefs concerning Kolar did not 
appear to be based upon valid medical evidence, but upon vague doctor's notes 
and assumptions made by R & P after consulting with Kolar.  The DEFEP also concluded that the sorts 
of assumptions made by R & P can "stand as strong evidence that it 
engaged in discrimination."  
Continuing, the DEFEP found that Kolar presented a prima facie  case for being regarded as disabled by 
R & P, and that R & P's reasons for discharging 
Kolar lacked credibility and were pretextual in nature.  In concluding its thorough review of the 
evidence and the pertinent authorities, the DEFEP found:

 
 
            
1.  [R & P] regarded [Kolar] as 
disabled.

            
2.  [R & P] considered [Kolar] substantially 
limited in a major life activity.

            
3.  [R & P] failed to provide a reasonable 
accommodation where such an accommodation would not prove an undue hardship to 
[R & P].

            
4.  [R & P] discharged [Kolar] because of 
[R & P's] regard for [Kolar] as disabled.

 
 
[¶11]   On January 3, 2006, the Labor 
Standards Division of the Department of Employment sent Kolar a letter 
indicating there was reasonable cause to believe Kolar's charge to be true.  Attached to that letter was a 
Determination and Conciliation Agreement which purported to provide Kolar with 
full relief, although it was a "negotiable" agreement.  The parties were directed to submit 
"conciliation" offers by January 17, 2006.  
On January 24, 2006, the Labor Standards Division informed Kolar that the 
conciliation process had not been successful and his file was being forwarded to 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC] in Denver.  Included in that letter was this 
advisement:  "The EEOC has other 
options to consider under these procedures.  They may litigate on behalf of 
Complainant, allow Complainant to sue on his/her own behalf in Federal District 
Court, or they may attempt further conciliation."  Kolar was also informed in that letter 
that the matter had been closed as "a failure to 
conciliate."

 
 
[¶12]   On June 16, 2006, Kolar's attorney 
wrote to the EEOC indicating that previous correspondence had produced no 
response and asking what proceedings the EEOC contemplated on Kolar's 
behalf.  Under date of July 19, 
2006, the EEOC sent Kolar a Notice of Right to Sue (Issued on Request).  It informed Kolar:

 
 

Notice 
to Person Aggrieved:

Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and/or the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA):  This is your Notice of Right to Sue, 
issued under Title VII and/or the ADA based on the above-numbered charge.  It has been issued at your request.  Your lawsuit under Title VII or the ADA 
must be filed in federal or state court 
WITHIN 90 DAYS of your receipt of this Notice or your right to sue 
based on this charge will be lost.  
(The time limit for filing suit based on a state claim may be 
different.)

 
 
[¶13]   On September 22, 2006, Kolar filed 
his civil suit in the Ninth Judicial District.  The complaint stated two causes of 
action, one for breach of his employment contract, and a second for discharge in 
violation of public policy.  A trial 
was held before the district court on November 27-28, 2007.  In its Judgment entered on February 4, 
2008, the district court made detailed findings.  The district court found that Kolar was 
not an "at will" employee; however, it also concluded that Kolar was discharged 
in good faith.  Kolar does not 
challenge that aspect of the judgment.  
With respect to Kolar's claim that he was discharged contrary to public 
policy, the district court determined that Kolar had not exhausted his 
administrative remedies because "if there exists another remedy for violation of 
the social policy which resulted in the discharge of the employee, there is no 
need for a court-imposed separate tort action premised on public policy."  Hoflund v. Airport Golf Club, 2005 WY 
17, ¶ 14, 105 P.3d 1079, 1084 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277, 284 (Wyo. 1985)).  The district 
court held that prior to final agency action, it had no jurisdiction to hear an 
appeal, and because if another remedy existed, the tort of wrongful termination 
in violation of public policy was not available.

 
 
[¶14]   On February 8, 2008, Kolar filed a 
motion to amend the judgment, contending that the district court was compelled 
to find that Kolar had exhausted his administrative remedies and that the 
district court must reach the merits of his tort claim for discharge in 
violation of public policy.  In a 
document filed on February 14, 2008, R & P agreed that Kolar had 
exhausted his administrative remedies before filing the instant suit.  The district court considered those 
papers and iterated its original findings that there was an alternative 
administrative remedy in the form of a fair hearing before the DEFEP, from which 
an aggrieved party could seek review under the Administrative Procedures 
Act.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶15]   In Hoflund, we restated the law applicable 
to a circumstance such as that at hand:

 
 
In 
Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277 (Wyo.1985), this Court made it clear that if another remedy for 
violation of a social policy which resulted in the discharge of an employee 
exists, no separate court action will lie.  
Therein, we stated:

 
 
      A tort action 
premised on violation of public policy results from a recognition that allowing 
a discharge to go unredressed would leave a valuable social policy to go 
unvindicated.  If there exists 
another remedy for violation of the social policy which resulted in the 
discharge of the employee, there is no need for a court-imposed separate tort 
action premised on public policy.  
Viestenz v. Fleming Companies, 
Inc., 681 F.2d 699 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 972, 103 S. Ct. 303, 74 L.Ed.2d 284;  Mahoney v. Crocker National Bank, 571 F. Supp. 287, (D.C.Cal.1983).  As 
said in Wehr v. Burroughs 
Corporation, 438 F. Supp. 1052, 1055 (D.C.Pa.1977):

 
 
"It 
is clear then that the whole rationale undergirding the public policy exception 
is the vindication or the protection of certain strong policies of the 
community.  If these policies or 
goals are preserved by other remedies, then the public policy is sufficiently 
served.  Therefore, application of 
the public policy exception requires two factors:  (1) that the discharge violate some 
well-established public policy; and (2) that there be no remedy to protect the 
interest of the aggrieved employee or society."  (Footnote omitted.)  

 
 
The 
Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Act of 1965, § 27-9-101 et seq., W.S.1977 
(June 1983 Replacement), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.  (1982) provide appellants with a remedy 
for discharge based on sex discrimination.  

 
 
      As noted in Rompf v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, 
Inc.,[685 P.2d 25 (Wyo.1984),] we restricted our holding to the parameters of 
that case.  We do likewise 
here.  Counsel cite cases in which 
tort actions premised on violations of public policies have been upheld; e.g., 
Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975), discharge for serving on a jury; Hansen v. Harrah's, Nev., [100 Nev. 60] 675 P.2d 394 (1984); Frampton v. Central 
Indiana Gas Company, 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425, 63 A.L.R.3d 973 (1973), 
and Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee 
County Department of Labor Services, 6 Kan.App.2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981), 
discharge in retaliation for filing worker's compensation claims.  Such cases are not similar to this 
case.  The complaint in this case 
does not state a tort claim upon which relief could be granted against Safeway 
and Rock based on appellants' discharges from employment.

 
 

Allen, 
699 P.2d  at 284.  In Allen, the Allens argued that even 
though their employment was "at will," their discharge was in violation of 
public policy and, therefore, they could assert a tort claim for damages.  We concluded that both the Wyoming Fair 
Employment Practices Act (FEPA), Wyo. Stat.  §§ 27-9-101 et seq., and Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A.2000e et 
seq., provided the Allens with a remedy for discrimination on the basis of 
sex.  Thus, because these 
administrative processes set forth a specific procedure for processing the 
Allens' complaints and the Allens had not followed these procedures, the Allens 
could not recover through the courts.  
The same situation exists here.

 
 

Hoflund, 
¶ 14, 105 P.3d  at 1084.

 
 
[¶16]   DEFEP's statutory role and the 
broad range of relief which it is authorized to award to a complainant is set 
out above.  DEFEP has adopted rules 
and regulations in furtherance of its statutory authority.  Section 4(h) of those regulations 
provides that if a determination is made that the conciliation process has 
failed, either party may request that the complaint be referred to an 
independent hearing officer for a hearing.  
3 Weil's Code of Wyoming 
Rules, supra, 025 140 003-1 through 003-2.  Section 5 of the regulations describes 
more fully the "Fair Hearing" process.  
Id. at 003-3.  Kolar failed to avail himself of that 
"fair hearing process."

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶17]   We conclude the district court did 
not err in declining to address Kolar's claim based on violation of a 
well-recognized public policy  discrimination based on disability or the 
perception of disability  because Kolar had not exhausted his administrative 
remedies.  The Judgment of the 
district court is affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

142 U.S.C. §12111(5) defines "employer" as: "a person engaged in an 
industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in 
each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and 
any agent of such person, except that, for two years following the effective 
date of this subchapter, an employer means a person engaged in an industry 
affecting commerce who has 25 or more employees for each working day in each of 
20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year, and any agent of 
such person."