Case Title: WYMO Fuels, Inc. v. Edwards

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-08-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
WYMO Fuels, Inc. v. Edwards1986 WY 161723 P.2d 1230Case Number: 85-227, 85-228Decided: 08/14/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
WYMO 
FUELS, INC., Appellant (Respondent), Environmental Quality Council, Department 
of Environmental Quality, (Respondents)

 
 
v.

 
 
Guy 
W. EDWARDS, Ruth A. Edwards, Clarke K. Mills, and Doris I. Mills, Appellees 
(Petitioners)

 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY COUNCIL, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, Appellants (Respondents), 
WYMO Fuels, Inc., (Respondent),

 
 
v.

 
 
Guy 
W. EDWARDS, Ruth A. Edwards, Clarke K. Mills, and Doris I. Mills, Appellees 
(Petitioners)

 
 
Alan 
B. Minier and Thomas A. Nicholas, Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, for Appellant 
WYMO.

 
 
A. 
G. McClintock, Attorney General, and Steven R. Shanahan, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General, Cheyenne, for Appellants Wyoming Environmental Quality Council 
and Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality.

 
 
Tom 
C. Toner, Redle, Yonkee & Arney, Sheridan, for Appellees 
Edwards.

 
 
Rebecca 
W. Thomson and Richard M. Davis, Jr., Burgess & Davis, Sheridan, for 
Appellees Mills. 

 
 
Before 
Thomas, C.J., and Brown, Cardine, Urbigkit and Macy, JJ. 

 
 
Thomas, 
Chief Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     The issue to be 
resolved in this case is whether condemnation of a way of necessity for a 
railroad spur track and a mine truck haul road, according to statute, dispenses 
with the statutory requirement that a resident or agricultural landowner or a 
surface landowner consent to mining operations, or an order in lieu of such 
consent in the case of the latter kind of ownership, be included in an 
application for a mining permit. The Department of Environmental Quality ruled 
that the resident or agricultural or surface landowner consent was not required 
because if it were, the right acquired pursuant to the eminent domain proceeding 
would be defeated. The district court held that an owner of land which had been 
condemned for such an easement was a surface owner for purposes of the mining 
permit statute and that consent, or, if appropriate, an order in lieu thereof, 
still must be included in the mining permit application after the condemnation 
order was entered. Other incidental issues are asserted by the parties, but 
essentially the dispute is resolved by our determination of this primary issue. 
We hold that after condemnation of such an easement the owner of the servient 
estate is not a surface owner for purposes of the mining permit application 
statute, and we reverse the order of the district court.

 
 

[¶2.]     The several parties in 
these cases have submitted detailed statements of the issues.1 The cases are resolved, however, by 
disposition of these issues as presented by the parties:

 
 
Appellant 
WYMO Fuels, Inc.:

 
 
"A. 
DID THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY COUNCIL ERR IN REFUSING TO REQUIRE EVIDENCEOF 
SURFACE OWNER CONSENT OBTAINED FROM APPELLEES MILLS OR EDWARDS PURSUANT TO W.S. 
1977, § 35-11-406(b)(xi)?"

 
 
Appellants 
Department of Environmental Quality and Environmental Quality 
Council:

 
 
"I. 
DID THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY COUNCIL ERR IN REFUSING TO REQUIRE A COAL MINE 
APPLICANT TO SHOW EVIDENCE OF CONSENT FROM SURFACE LANDOWNERS ADJACENT TO THE 
LAND TO BE MINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH W.S. 
35-11-406(b)(xi)?"

 
 
Appellees 
Mills:

 
 
"3. 
Does the fact that Mills' property was condemned by WYMO for part of its mine 
permit area negate the statutory requirement for landowner consent to the mine 
and reclamation plan?"

 
 
Appellees 
Edwards:

 
 
"3. 
Does a condemnation order granting an applicant for a mining permit an easement 
to use a landowner's property for a coal haul road and a railroad spur line 
dispense with the surface owner consent requirements of the Wyoming 
Environmental Quality Act?"

 
 
As 
a preliminary matter, we also will address the question raised by the appellees 
Edwards as to whether a final, appealable order or judgment was entered by the 
district court.

 
 

[¶3.]     WYMO Fuels, Inc. 
(hereafter WYMO) proposed to mine coal under lands owned by the State of Wyoming 
in the Powder River Basin. Processing facilities were to be located on lands 
owned by WYMO. On October 7, 1980, WYMO filed an application for a mining permit 
with the Land Quality Division of the Department of Environmental Quality. The 
Edwards and the Mills are sheep ranchers who own lands adjoining the lands to be 
mined by WYMO. Both the mine truck haul road and the railroad spur track 
contemplated by the permit application as necessary for the mining operations 
would traverse the lands of both the Mills and the Edwards. The application for 
the mining permit was rejected because it did not include the landowner consents 
according to the statute.

 
 

[¶4.]     Section 35-11-406(b), 
406(b)(xi) and (xii), W.S. 1977, provides in pertinent 
part:

 
 
 "(b) The application shall be accompanied 
by * * * *

"(xi) 
* * * * An instrument of consent from the resident or agricultural landowner, if 
different from the owner of the mineral estate, granting the applicant 
permission to enter and commence surface mining operation, and also written 
approval of the applicant's mining and reclamation plan. As used in this 
paragraph, 'resident or agricultural landowner' means a natural person or 
persons who, or a corporation of which the majority stockholder or 
stockholders:

 
 
"(A) 
Hold legal or equitable title to the land surface * * * * acquired prior to 
January 1, 1970, * * * *

"(B) 
Have their principal place of residence on the land, or personally conduct * * * 
* ranching operations upon a * * * * ranch unit to be affected by the surface 
mining operation, * * * *.

 
 
"(xii) 
* * * * An instrument of consent from the surface landowner * * * * to the 
mining and reclamation plan. If consent cannot be obtained as to the mining plan 
or reclamation plan or both, the applicant may request a hearing before the 
environmental quality council. The council shall issue an order in lieu of 
consent if it finds:

 
 
"(A) 
That the mining plan and reclamation plan have been submitted to the surface 
owner for approval;

"(B) 
That the mining plan and the reclamation plan is detailed so as to illustrate 
the full proposed surface use including proposed routes of egress and 
ingress;

"(C) 
That the use does not substantially prohibit the operations of the surface 
owner;

"(D) 
The proposed plan reclaims the surface to its approved future use, in segments 
if circumstances permit, as soon as feasibly possible."

. 
. . . 

 
 
The 
Mills and the Edwards had refused to negotiate with WYMO for easements across 
their lands. Apparently their position was mandated by 20-year leases of surface 
rights to their lands which they previously had entered into with Neil Butte 
Company. When landowner consent for the railroad spur track and the mine truck 
haul road was sought from the Mills and the Edwards, WYMO was referred to Neil 
Butte Company, and it was not successful in obtaining that consent. The 
circumstances indicate that Neil Butte Company preferred to preserve its 
competitive position with respect to mining coal, although it never has obtained 
a mining permit.

 
 

[¶5.]     Frustrated by the 
apparent refusal of the Mills, the Edwards, and Neil Butte Company to negotiate 
and agree to an easement for the railroad spur track and the mine truck haul 
road, WYMO proceeded in the United States District Court for the District of 
Wyoming to condemn the necessary easements pursuant to § 1-26-401, W.S. 1977, 
[since repealed by S.L. of Wyoming 1981, ch. 174, § 3, and now appearing at § 
1-26-815, W.S. 1977 (1986 Cum.Supp.); S.L. of Wyoming 1981, ch. 174, § 1]. The 
statute pursuant to which WYMO Fuels proceeded provides in pertinent 
part:

 
 
"(a) 
Any person * * * * or corporation authorized to do business in this state may 
appropriate by condemnation a way of necessity over, across or on so much of the 
lands or real property of others as necessary for the location, construction, 
maintenance and use of * * * * electric power transmission lines, * * * * spur 
tracks * * * * or mine truck haul roads required in the course of their business 
for * * * * mining * * * * purposes, or for the transportation of coal from any 
coal mine * * * *.

"(b) 
The right of condemnation may be exercised for the purpose 
of:

 
 
"(i) 
Acquiring new ways of necessity;

. 
. . .

 
 
"(d) 
A way of necessity for a mine truck haul road shall not be granted except where 
no other reasonable and practicable way is available. The petitioner for a mine 
truck haul road way of necessity shall show that his petition is made in  good faith, that no other reasonable and 
practical way is available and that the mining operation is economically 
feasible * * * *.

. 
. . .

"(f) 
* * * * The way of necessity appropriated is for a surface easement or 
right-of-way only, and shall not include * * * * the underlying minerals or 
mineral estate. * * * * Compensation shall not be awarded for * * * * the * * * 
* mineral estate, but only for the actual rights and property claimed and 
appropriated."

 
 

[¶6.]     In December of 1980, 
the United States District Court granted the relief requested by WYMO. The Order 
Granting Immediate Possession recited in pertinent part 
that:

 
 
"* 
* * * Plaintiff * * * * is hereby granted leave to enter upon and take 
possession of a permanent right-of-way easement to lay, maintain, inspect, 
replace, erect, operate and remove a railroad spur track and mine truck haul 
road, and appurtenances, over, through, upon, and across the real property 
described in the Plaintiff's Complaint for Condemnation immediately upon the 
Plaintiff's obtaining a mining permit from the Department of Environmental 
Quality of the State of Wyoming."

 
 

[¶7.]     WYMO then included the 
order of the United States District Court for condemnation of the railroad spur 
track, mine truck haul road and appurtenances as a part of its application for a 
mining permit. The director of the Department of Environmental Quality issued 
WYMO a mining permit on September 28, 1981, but on December 21, 1981, the Mills 
and the Edwards filed their formal objections to this permit 
acquisition.

 
 

[¶8.]     The Environmental 
Quality Council held a hearing on the objections filed by the Mills and the 
Edwards at the end of March, 1982. The Mills and the Edwards relied upon their 
status as resident or agricultural landowners as well as their status as surface 
landowners. On October 1, 1982, the Environmental Quality Council entered its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law which upheld the issuance of the permit. 
The order of the Environmental Quality Council states in pertinent part 
that:

 
 
"FINDINGS 
OF FACT

. 
. . .

"13. 
The United States District Court, District of Wyoming, The Honorable Clarence 
Brimmer, after a trial with Protestants issued an Order pursuant to Wyoming 
Statutes 1-26-401 granting the right of eminent domain to WYMO Fuels over 
portions of land owned by Protestants Mills and Edwards. The Order granted a 
permanent easement to the Applicant. The Land Quality Division accepted this 
Order in lieu of Land Owner Consent. The Order provided that appropriation was 
dependent upon just compensation being provided to the 
protestant.

. 
. . .

"CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW

. 
. . .

"15. 
The record does not contain sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that 
the application for the proposed operation is not accurate and complete as 
required by the Environmental Quality Act.

. 
. . 

"17. 
The record does not contain sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that 
any of the Protestants are resident or agricultural landowners in that there is 
not a sufficient showing on the record that any of the Protestants have held 
legal or equitable title to the land surface directly or through stockholdings 
since before January 1, 1970, or have been acquired through descent, inheritance 
or by gift or conveyance from a member of the immediate family of such 
owner.

"18. 
Landowner consent to disturbance of the access is not required in this case in 
that the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, in accordance 
with Wyoming law, has ordered the  
appropriation by the applicant of such lands subject to landowner consent 
upon the payment of just compensation for such appropriation, and in that the 
landowners' consent would defeat the right acquired in the eminent domain 
proceeding."

. 
. . 

 
 

[¶9.]     The Mills and the 
Edwards filed a petition for review in the district court, pursuant to the 
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act ( §§ 16-3-101 et seq., W.S. 1977) and Rule 
12, W.R.A.P., in November of 1982. On August 13, 1985, the district court issued 
an opinion letter which indicated its intention to reverse the decision of the 
Environmental Quality Council and remand the case back to the Council. That 
letter recited in pertinent part:

 
 
"* 
* * * Petitioners are clearly surface owners and have not consented to the 
mining and reclamation plans (and the council has not made the findings in lieu 
of consent).

 
 
"The 
Council decided petitioner's consent was not necessary. In the Council's view 
they are no longer surface owners because WYMO obtained a rail and haul road 
easement across their lands by right of Eminent Domain in Federal District Court 
* * * *. That conclusion cannot stand if the Environmental Quality Act (EQA) is 
to be given a fair reading."

. 
. . 

 
 

[¶10.]  The order which was entered by the trial 
court on August 30, 1985, declared:

 
 
"IT 
IS, THEREFORE, HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that for the 
reasons stated in the Court's letter opinion of August 13, 1985, the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order entered by the Environmental Quality Council 
on October 1, 1982 be, and the same is, hereby reversed and remanded for a new 
hearing."

 
 
WYMO, 
the Environmental Quality Council, and the Department of Environmental Quality 
have taken their respective appeals from this order of the district 
court.

 
 

[¶11.]  As a preliminary matter we briefly 
address the contention of the Edwards as appellees that the order appealed from 
is not a final, appealable order or judgment. This issue was raised earlier by a 
Motion to Dismiss the appeal pursuant to Rule 1.05, W.R.A.P. At that time, the 
court entered an Order Denying Motion to Dismiss Appeal, but the order denying 
the motion was made without prejudice to the right of the Edwards to renew the 
issue at oral argument. The court has considered this argument a second time, 
and we are persuaded that the order of the district court does affect a 
substantial right of the Environmental Quality Council, the Department of 
Environmental Quality, and WYMO. In the absence of that order, the issuance of a 
mining permit by the Department of Environmental Quality to WYMO would be 
effective, and if the district court were wrong in its ruling with respect to 
the law, those parties are entitled to test the legal validity of that rule. The 
order prevents a judgment in favor of the issuance of the permit and therefore 
is a final appealable order under Rule 1.05(1), W.R.A.P.  Big Horn County Commissioners v. 
Hinckley, Wyo., 593 P.2d 573 (1979).

 
 

[¶12.]  The essential claim of the Mills and the 
Edwards is that even though a way of necessity has been obtained across their 
lands by virtue of the condemnation proceedings in the United States District 
Court, they still have the status of surface owners with respect to the lands 
crossed by the easement. They insist that because of the provisions of § 
35-11-406(b)(xi) and (xii), W.S. 1977, they, in effect, have a veto over the 
permit process because the permit cannot be granted in the absence of their 
consent. The decree of the United States District Court granted WYMO the right 
to "enter upon and take possession of a permanent right-of-way easement" for 
certain purposes. Succinctly stated, the question is, whether after the 
condemnation the Mills and the Edwards or WYMO held the rights of the surface 
owner under the statute.

 
 

[¶13.]  There can be little argument that 
historically the owner of a mineral estate was permitted to make reasonable use 
of the surface for the purpose of mineral development.  Sanford v. Arjay Oil Co., Wyo., 
686 P.2d 566 (1984); 4 Summers Oil and Gas § 652 (1962). See Brimmer, The 
Rancher's Subservient Surface Estate, V Land & Water L. Rev. 49 (1970). 
A right of access to the land under which minerals were owned was secured by the 
Constitution and by statute. Article 1, § 32 of the Constitution of the State of 
Wyoming; § 1-26-401, W.S. 1977, and previous similar enactments. At one time the 
Wyoming statute permitted the taking of a fee interest for such a way of 
necessity. Section 49-46, W.C.S.1920, discussed in Meyer v. Colorado Central 
Coal Company, 39 Wyo. 355, 271 P. 212 (1928), reh. denied, 39 Wyo. 371, 274 P. 1074 (1929). The statute in vogue at the time of the condemnation by WYMO 
provided that "* * * * the way of necessity appropriated is for a surface 
easement for right-of-way only * * * *. Compensation shall not be awarded for * 
* * * the * * * * mineral estate, but only for the actual rights and property 
claimed and appropriated." Section 1-26-401(f), W.S. 1977, S.L. of Wyoming 1907, 
ch. 52, § 1, as amended.

 
 

[¶14.]  We have said that the owner of the 
surface estate and the owner of an easement each possess rights.  Wallis v. Luman, Wyo., 625 P.2d 759 (1981); Bard Ranch Company v. Weber, Wyo., 557 P.2d 722 (1976). See 
also Lingle Water Users' Association v. Occidental Building & Loan 
Association, 43 Wyo. 41, 297 P. 385 (1931). We have, however, accepted the 
proposition that the rights of the owner of the easement are paramount to the 
extent of the easement and include all rights incident or necessary to its 
proper enjoyment. The owner of the servient estate retains only such incidents 
of ownership as are not inconsistent with the easement. Bard Ranch Company v. 
Weber, supra. This case might well be decided by simply pointing out that 
the rights afforded by the provisions previously quoted from the Environmental 
Quality Act are inconsistent with the proper enjoyment of the easement obtained 
by condemnation and, therefore, were not retained by the Mills and the 
Edwards.

 
 

[¶15.]  We also note the rule which we have 
espoused that statutes relating to the same subject should be harmonized where 
possible.  Department of Revenue 
and Taxation v. Irvine, Wyo., 589 P.2d 1295 (1979). The condemnation statute 
( § 1-26-401, W.S. 1977, now § 1-26-815, W.S. 1977 (1986 Cum.Supp.)) and § 
35-11-406, W.S. 1977, a part of the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act, both 
relate to the respective rights of WYMO, the owner of the easement, and the 
Mills and the Edwards, the landowners. The provisions of § 35-11-406(b)(xi) and 
(xii), W.S. 1977, apparently extend a surface owner the right to prevent 
unreasonable use of the surface by a mineral owner so that the surface owner is 
afforded an opportunity to protect his interests in advance of any development 
by the mineral owner. On the other hand, the condemnation statute represents a 
policy of assuring access for the development of mineral lands. We harmonize 
these two statutes in the context of this case by our holding that the Mills and 
the Edwards are not surface owners after the condemnation judgment. The ruling 
of the district court afforded paramount efficacy to the Wyoming Environmental 
Quality Act, and in net effect permitted the owners of the servient estates to 
foreclose the use of the WYMO easement, perhaps even more effectively than if 
they had erected bars across the easement. Our holding affords efficacy to the 
condemnation statute, and at the same time permits the invocation of the Wyoming 
Environmental Quality Act when appropriate to protect the interests of a 
resident or agricultural landowner or surface owner.

 
 

[¶16.]  In this instance the Mills and the 
Edwards were left with no interest which required protection pursuant to the 
Wyoming Environmental Quality Act. We call attention to Energy Transportation 
Systems, Inc. v. Mackey, Wyo., 650 P.2d 1152 (1982), and Coronado Oil 
Company v. Grieves, Wyo., 603 P.2d 406 (1979). In  both cases this court assumed the 
propriety of the eminent domain statutes and the authority conferred by them to 
appropriate private property for public use without consent. In Snell v. 
Ruppert, Wyo., 541 P.2d 1042 (1975), we held that the whole concept of 
eminent domain is the taking of private property without the owner's consent. 
Such taking, however, requires that just compensation be paid to the landowner. 
That compensation is the difference in value of the entire parcel of land before 
the taking and after the taking. Conceptually that amount would be the same 
amount as required to compensate the owner of the surface estate for damages 
caused by unreasonable use of the surface in the development of the mineral 
estate. In theory then, the Mills and the Edwards have been compensated for 
whatever damage the construction of the railroad spur track and the mine truck 
haul road would inflict upon their lands. They could recover no more for damages 
after use by the owner of a mineral estate which caused damage beyond that 
reasonably necessary for development. The net effect is that the Mills and the 
Edwards had no interest left which required the protection of the Wyoming 
Environmental Quality Act, and, therefore, they should not be afforded the 
rights of surface owners under that statute.

 
 

[¶17.]  This was the approach taken by the 
Department of Environmental Quality and the Environmental Quality Council. The 
construction of a statute by an agency charged with its execution is entitled to 
consideration in a case in which the application and construction is an issue 
for the courts.  Demos v. Board 
of County Commissioners of Natrona County, Wyo., 571 P.2d 980 (1977). In 
this instance the Wyoming Environmental Quality Council correctly construed the 
statute, and its order granting the mining permit should be upheld. The order of 
the district court which reversed the order of the Environmental Quality Council 
upholding the issuance of a coal mining permit to WYMO and which remanded the 
case to the Council for further hearings is reversed. The order of the 
Environmental Quality Council is reinstated.

 
 

[¶18.]  Our holding with respect to the issue of 
whether the Mills and the Edwards still possess the right of resident or 
agricultural or surface owners to insist upon their consent to the permit 
disposes of the burden of proof issue argued by the parties. It is moot. The 
parties also expressed concern about whether the condemnation judgment entered 
by the United States District Court would afford authority to construct electric 
utility lines within the easement. The order specifically encompasses 
"appurtenances," and were we specifically charged with construction of the 
federal judgment we would conclude that the easement possessed by WYMO would 
encompass that use. Nothing would be accomplished by any insistence that the 
utility company bring a separate eminent domain proceeding to condemn the right 
to use the easement for utility lines.

 
 

[¶19.]  The judgment of the district court is 
reversed and the order of the Environmental Quality Council is 
reinstated.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The parties set forth the issues in their respective briefs as 
follows:

 
 
Appellant WYMO Fuels, Inc.:

 
 
"A. DID THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY COUNCIL ERR IN REFUSING TO REQUIRE 
EVIDENCE OF SURFACE OWNER CONSENT OBTAINED FROM APPELLEES MILLS OR EDWARDS 
PURSUANT TO W.S. 1977, § 35-11-406(b)(xi)?

"B. DID THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY COUNCIL MAKE ITS DECISION ON THE PERMIT 
APPLICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL PROCEDURES AND STANDARDS REQUIRED BY 
LAW?"

 
 
Appellants Department of Environmental Quality and Environmental Quality 
Council:

 
 
"I. DID THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY COUNCIL ERR IN REFUSING TO REQUIRE A 
COAL MINE APPLICANT TO SHOW EVIDENCE OF CONSENT FROM SURFACE LANDOWNERS ADJACENT 
TO THE LAND TO BE MINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH W.S. 
35-11-406(b)(xi)?

"II. WAS THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY COUNCIL'S DECISION TO REQUIRE THE 
APPELLEES TO MAKE A PRIMA FACIE CASE ON THEIR OBJECTIONS TO A COAL MINE PERMIT 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH ACCEPTABLE PROCEDURES AND STANDARDS REQUIRED BY 
LAW?"

 
 
Appellees Mills:

 
 
"1. Is Mills a resident or agricultural landowner or a surface owner 
under the terms of the landowner consent statute, § 
35-11-406(b)(xi)(xii)?

"2. Was the decision of the Council that Mills was not a resident or 
agricultural landowner supported by substantial 
evidence?

"3. Does the fact that Mills' property was condemned by WYMO for part of 
its mine permit area negate the statutory requirement for landowner consent to 
the mine and reclamation plan?

"4. Does the fact that the utility power line corridors, built solely to 
service the WYMO mine, is owned by Tri-County Electric exempt it from the 
landowner consent provisions, § 
35-11-406(b)(xi)(xii)?

"5. Did the Council observe the procedures required by law when it 
shifted the burden of proof from the Appellant WYMO to the 
Appellees?"

 
 
Appellees Edwards:

 
 
"1. Is the order of the District Court reversing and remanding the 
decision of the Environmental Quality Council for a new hearing a final, 
appealable order or judgment?

"2. Do the surface consent requirements of the Wyoming Environmental 
Quality Act apply to all lands within the permit area upon which surface mining 
operations are to be conducted or only to the lands which will be 
mined?

"3. Does a condemnation order granting an applicant for a mining permit 
an easement to use a landowner's property for a coal haul road and a railroad 
spur line dispense with the surface owner consent requirements of the Wyoming 
Environmental Quality Act?

"4. Has WYMO met the surface owner consent requirements of the Wyoming 
Environmental Quality Act for its power lines and utility corridors which are 
required to be in the permit area but for which WYMO does not have landowner 
consent for such utilities and does not have a condemnation order granting WYMO 
the right to place such utilities on Appellees' 
lands?

"5. Did the Environmental Quality Council improperly shift the burden of 
proof in the contested case hearing from the Appellant WYMO, who is the 
applicant for the mining permit, to the Appellees, who are the 
landowners?"