Case Title: Dubose v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC10-2363

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2017-02-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
 No. SC10-2363 
____________ 
 
RASHEEM DIQUOINE DUBOSE, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[February 9, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
On January 3, 2007, Rasheem Dubose was charged by indictment in Duval 
County with first-degree murder for the killing of Drewshawna Washington-Davis 
and with shooting into a building.  The charge of one count of possession of a 
firearm by a convicted felon was later added.  The State sought the death penalty.  
The State originally tried Dubose along with his two brothers, who were charged 
with the same crimes stemming from the same incident.  Though the three brothers 
were tried together, Dubose had a separate jury.  Dubose’s first trial resulted in a 
hung jury and a mistrial was declared.  His brothers were convicted on all counts 
and sentenced to life in prison.   
 
 
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Dubose’s second trial began in February 2010.  The jury found Dubose 
guilty of both first-degree premeditated murder and felony murder, with burglary 
as the underlying felony.  He was also found guilty of shooting into a building.  
The jury voted for imposition of the death penalty by a vote of eight to four.  On 
December 9, 2010, the trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and 
sentenced Dubose to death.   
 
Dubose now appeals his convictions and sentences.  We have jurisdiction. 
See art. V § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm 
Dubose’s convictions and vacate his sentence of death.    
I.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE & FACTS 
On July 26, 2006, at approximately 4:00 p.m., Willie Davis, Jr., drove his 
girlfriend, Cinee Tinsley, to the home where she lived with her mother and 
siblings.  As Davis turned onto Tinsley’s street, he noticed Dubose’s younger 
brother walking in the street.  Davis swerved in an attempt to hit Dubose’s younger 
brother with the car, but was unsuccessful.  Dubose’s younger brother continued 
down the street, away from Tinsley’s home.  Dubose had been on Tinsley’s porch 
with Tinsley’s brother and had witnessed the incident.  When Davis pulled into 
Tinsley’s yard, Dubose walked toward the car, speaking to Davis through the car 
window.  Davis got out of the car and argued with Dubose for approximately one 
minute and then returned to the car.  Davis quickly drove away from Tinsley’s 
 
 
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home with Tinsley still inside the car.  Davis drove to his father’s house, retrieved 
a gun, and drove back toward Tinsley’s home.  On the way back to Tinsley’s 
home, Davis told Tinsley “I’m going to make him get naked in the street.” 
Davis returned to Tinsley’s home and saw Dubose still in the front yard with 
Tinsley’s older brother.  Davis got out of the car, grabbed Dubose by his shirt, 
pushed him against a wall, put the gun to the back of his head, and screamed at him 
to empty his pockets.  Dubose complied and emptied his pockets as commanded, 
after which Davis ridiculed him for not having any money in his pockets.  Davis 
then ordered Dubose to pull his pants down; again, Dubose complied.  Tinsley’s 
mother came out of the house and asked Davis to stop what he was doing.  He 
stopped, but Dubose said something that caused Davis to re-engage with him.  
Tinsley’s mother grabbed Dubose and pulled him into her home.  Davis and 
Tinsley left the scene in Davis’s car.  Dubose left the Tinsley home a short time 
later on foot. 
 
Dubose went home and told his two younger brothers that Davis had 
attempted to rob him.  After Dubose made a phone call, he threw and shattered his 
brother’s phone and said, “I’m going to kill this nigger.”   Dubose left his home 
shortly thereafter.  Dubose’s younger brother continuously made phone calls to 
Maxie Wilson, the brothers’ cousin, who is a known drug dealer.  That day, Maxie 
Wilson was driving a white Impala rental car, with his friend Sherman Eley in the 
 
 
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passenger seat.  After finally answering the phone and speaking with Dubose’s 
younger brother, Maxie Wilson drove to the home of the Dubose brothers.  Upon 
arrival, Dubose’s brothers got into the back seat of Wilson’s car.  One of them was 
armed with a nine-millimeter firearm.  Maxie Wilson drove around the corner 
where Dubose was standing in front of a house.  Dubose got into the back seat of 
the car. 
 
Then, Dubose instructed Maxie Wilson to drive around the corner to where 
Davis’s mother lived.  Once they arrived at the house, they saw Davis’s car parked 
in the front yard.  One of the brothers initially prepared to shoot at Davis’s car, but 
was instructed not to by Sherman Eley.  The brothers circled the house again and 
pulled onto a dirt road behind the house.  Maxie Wilson parked the car near the 
backyard fence line of the victim’s house and provided the brothers with two more 
guns, a .45 caliber pistol and a Glock-nine with an extended magazine, which were 
both in the car with him prior to the incident.  Dubose’s brothers armed themselves 
with the nine-millimeter gun and the .45 caliber gun.  Dubose armed himself with 
the Glock-nine.  The Dubose brothers exited the vehicle then jumped a fence to 
enter Davis’s mother’s backyard.    
Davis and Tinsley had gone to his mother’s house after the incident.  When 
they arrived, Davis’s mother and stepfather were in the dining area of the 
residence.  Davis was seated on a couch by the window on the side of the house.  
 
 
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Three children, including Davis’s eight-year-old niece, Drewshawna, were in the 
bedroom.  When the gunfire began, the initial shots were sporadic and then became 
more continuous.  Immediately after the shooting stopped, Tinsley ran to the 
bedroom to check on the welfare of the children.  Drewshawna, who had been shot 
in the back, lay on top of her younger cousins in a protective position.    
 
After the shooting, the Dubose brothers returned to Maxie Wilson’s white 
Impala.  During the car ride, one of the brothers received a phone call that a child 
had been killed in the shooting.  With Sherman Eley still in the passenger seat, 
Maxie Wilson drove the brothers to a house owned by David Craighton in a 
secluded, wooded area.  Maxie Wilson had previously requested permission to 
reside at Craighton’s home, under the auspices that he needed a place to live with 
his girlfriend and young child.  While at the house, the brothers gave their clothing 
and weapons to Maxie Williams.  Maxie Williams left the brothers at the house, 
drove Sherman Eley back to his car, which had been parked at an apartment 
complex in a different neighborhood, and disposed of the clothes and weapons in a 
dumpster at that apartment complex.  The firearms were never recovered.  On the 
evening of July 30, 2006, Craighton came to his house to find the Dubose brothers 
occupying it.  Craighton used a large stick to hold the brothers in the house until 
the police arrived and arrested them.   
 
 
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Reconstruction of the bullet trajectories revealed that twenty-nine bullets 
struck the residence, some from the side and some from the rear.  Twenty-three of 
these shots were fired from Dubose’s Glock-nine, including the gunshot that killed 
Drewshawna.  The fatal bullet entered the residence through the window on the 
side of the house, traveled through at least two walls, and entered the bedroom.  
Someone looking through this window would not have seen the victim in the 
bedroom, but possibly would have seen someone sitting on the couch near the 
dining area. 
Penalty Phase: State’s Witnesses 
 
The penalty phase began on March 9, 2010.  The State offered victim impact 
statements from the victim’s grandmothers, the victim’s aunt, and the victim’s 
third-grade teacher.  The State also offered testimony from Officer Scott Medlock, 
the officer involved in Dubose’s conviction for resisting arrest with violence.  
Officer Medlock explained his pursuit and subsequent physical altercation with 
Dubose after he fled following a suspicious person stop. The officer also explained 
that Dubose apologized and stated that he was not attempting to harm the officer, 
he just wanted to be free.  The officer testified that in hindsight he believed that the 
defendant was not attempting to harm him, but that belief does not, however, 
lessen the seriousness of Dubose’s actions.    
Penalty Phase: Defense Witnesses 
 
 
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In addition to Dubose’s family members, who testified on his behalf, 
Clinical Psychologist and Neurologist, Dr. Hyman Eisenstein, testified as an 
expert.  Dr. Eisenstein testified that Dubose’s results on the Comprehensive Test of 
Basic Skills (CTBS) from first through eighth grade indicate that he scored 
between the 2nd and 18th percentile (on the low end, 98 percent of the population 
scored better than him, and on the high end, 82 percent of the population scored 
better than him).  He testified Dubose had academic impairment disability from the 
first grade through the ninth grade.  The doctor also testified that Dubose quit 
school in the ninth grade but prior to that may have been promoted through special 
programs or simply promoted despite the fact that he had been failing.  Dr. 
Eisenstein stated there was no indication at all that Dubose was malingering.   
Dr. Eisenstein indicated that at the age of 25 years and 11 months, Dubose 
received an IQ Score of 73 on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary, which is 
equivalent to a ten year old child.  He also testified that Dubose received a grade 
equivalent to a four year old on the WRAT4 (Wide Range Achievement Test, 
Fourth Edition); he scored in the sixty-ninth percentile on the reading 
comprehension portion, with anything below the seventieth percentile being 
considered mild mental retardation.  Dubose’s verbal comprehension scores on the 
WAIS-IV (Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Fourth Edition) equaled 70.  A new 
feature of the WAIS-IV is the GAI (general ability index), upon which the 
 
 
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defendant scored a 75, in the borderline range.  Dr. Eisenstein concluded that 
Dubose’s full scale IQ score was 82, which placed him in the low average range.  
A PET scan was not conducted, but Dr. Eisenstein stated that other factors present 
in Dubose’s life indicated the possibility that he has sustained some brain damage.  
Dr. Eisenstein assumed that Dubose has frontal lobe damage, which may have 
made it difficult for him to get over being humiliated by Davis.  On cross-
examination, Dr. Eisenstein acknowledged that Dubose actually began the tenth 
grade before he dropped out, and that there were various behavior problem reports 
in elementary school.  On redirect, Dr. Eisenstein opined that Dubose’s three-year 
participation in football and his participation in boxing could have caused brain 
impairment.   
 
Dr. Alan Fox, professor at Northeastern University, also testified as an 
expert for the defense.  Dr. Fox explained that poor neighborhoods such as the one 
where Dubose was raised sometimes have a “code,” which is the idea of being 
respected and important, despite the lack of education or employment.  He further 
explained that in this type of environment, “violence is seen as an appropriate, 
virtually a required response to being disrespected, being humiliated.”  Dr. Fox 
reviewed the thirteen DCF reports which contained information that Dubose’s 
father was arrested for abuse; he determined that Dubose always tried to protect the 
rest of the family from their father.  Dr. Fox testified that because Dubose had no 
 
 
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positive role models in his life and because his grandmother worked so much, he 
modeled himself after other young men in the neighborhood.  Associating himself 
with the people in his neighborhood, opined Dr. Fox, is what taught Dubose the 
necessity of fighting.   
 
On cross-examination, Dr. Fox acknowledged that on the date of the 
shooting, Dubose knew right from wrong, he knew that killing was wrong, and that 
at every step in the events of the day, he could have made different decisions.  He 
also explained that the code of the street may have a different definition of right 
from wrong than the conventional meaning.  Dr. Fox further acknowledged that 
persons who grow up in rough neighborhoods, may have a better appreciation for 
the consequences of violence.  Dr. Fox stated that the combination of the risk 
factors in Dubose’s life were “tremendous.”  Dr. Fox opined that the message 
Dubose may have intended to send was one of deterrence, “Don’t mess with us. 
We’re not weak.  We won’t take it lying down[,]” as opposed to retribution which 
could have been accomplished by finding Davis and doing something to him 
personally, one-on-one.  Dr. Fox acknowledged that he met with Dubose for a total 
of forty-five minutes to an hour. 
Spencer Hearing 
 
At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury recommended by a vote of 
eight to four that Dubose be sentenced to death for the murder of Drewshawna.  
 
 
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Prior to sentencing, the court held a Spencer hearing on November 10, 2010.  In 
consideration of the time between the penalty phase and the Spencer hearing, some 
of the witnesses repeated their testimony from the penalty phase.  Multiple family 
members and mental health experts testified at the Spencer hearing, including Dr. 
Eisenstein and Dr. Waldman.   
 
Dr. Eisenstein and Dr. Waldman restated their conclusions that Dubose 
suffered from frontal lobe damage that significantly impaired his ability to control 
his impulses.  As further mitigation, the defense offered a report that evaluated the 
results of Dubose’s PET scan.  Dubose was administered the PET scan in 
anticipation of the Spencer hearing.  Dr. Ruben C. Gur, who evaluated the results 
and wrote the report that was admitted into evidence, concluded that Dubose 
suffered abnormalities in regions of the brain that play a significant role in 
regulating behavior.  
II.  ANALYSIS 
Juror Misconduct 
 
Dubose argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial 
based on juror misconduct.  On April 23, 2010, Dubose filed a motion for a 
mistrial based on alleged juror misconduct.  Attached to the motion was an 
affidavit from a juror.  The motion alleged that the jurors had conducted internet 
research regarding the meaning of the defendant’s facial tattoo during the penalty 
 
 
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phase deliberations.  Also attached were numerous articles regarding the meaning 
and definition of a teardrop tattoo.1  The juror’s affidavit also stated that the jurors 
used their cell phones to Google “tear drop tattoos on gang members” to find out 
what that tattoo meant.  Allegedly, they learned that the tattoo is what gang 
members receive after they kill someone.  In addition, the juror alleged that racial 
references were also made during the deliberations. 
 
The trial judge held a hearing during which he questioned the juror about 
some of the allegations made in her affidavit.  Much of the testimony that the 
affiant juror provided was related to unauthorized cell phone usage during the trial.  
She stated that she did not observe anyone using a cell phone during the guilt phase 
deliberations, but recalled the jury foreperson using his cell phone on breaks and 
during sidebars, although she could not see what he was doing on his cell phone.  
The affiant juror also observed the foreperson on the phone during the penalty 
phase, but she could not hear his conversation.  She also admitted that she used her 
iPod touch device during the breaks, but she stated that she only played games on 
it because she could not access the internet in the courthouse.   
The affiant juror told the judge that no one appeared to be conducting 
internet research during deliberations.  She also testified that another juror, whom 
                                          
 
1.  Dubose’s motion informed the trial court that Dubose’s facial tattoo was 
actually a dollar sign, not a tear drop. 
 
 
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she identified by seat and physical description, used his phone during penalty 
phase deliberations, but was not observed making a phone call.  She further alleged 
that the jury was not reminded that they were not allowed to have their cell phones 
during the penalty phase deliberations, and that the phones were not confiscated 
prior to deliberations.   
When questioned regarding her statement that other jurors conducted 
internet research regarding the meaning of Dubose’s facial tattoo, the affiant juror 
explained that the discussion of Dubose’s tattoo occurred during a break and 
resulted from the defendant cutting his dreadlocks after the guilt phase, thereby 
making his facial tattoo more visible in the penalty phase.  Further, in 
consideration of the juror’s testimony that she could not see what the two jurors 
who had used their phones were actually doing, the court found her not to be 
credible on this issue. 
When questioned regarding her responses during the polling of the jury in 
the guilt and penalty phases, the affiant juror inquired as to whether she could be 
subjected to perjury charges, and ultimately refused to state whether she agreed 
that the announced verdict reflected her vote.  She stated that she did not have a 
problem with the answer that she gave to the polling question during the guilt 
phase, but that her answer during the penalty phase bothered her.  She explained 
that she went along with the verdict because she has three children and she did not 
 
 
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want to be singled out in a courtroom filled with spectators and media.  She further 
expressed some concern for her children because gang members were involved.  
She stated that after the guilt phase, but before the penalty phase, she 
attempted to contact the trial judge by email, because she did not want to address 
her concerns in front of the other jury members.  She admitted that her emails did 
not mention that she was a juror in the case and did not state her name or the 
purpose of her request for an appointment with the judge.  She admitted to 
contacting the Public Defender’s Office, a private attorney, and Dubose’s defense 
counsel, claiming to be a friend of a juror in the Dubose case.  She was unclear as 
to who drafted the finalized affidavit that was presented to the trial court.  She 
explained that a private attorney helped her draft her affidavit, typed it, and 
emailed it to her.  She then explained that she spoke on the phone with Dubose’s 
counsel and ultimately met him for lunch to discuss what she perceived to be juror 
misconduct.  Following this initial meeting, she briefly met Dubose’s counsel in a 
parking lot to sign the affidavit that had already been printed and notarized.  When 
the trial judge attempted to gain some clarity on the drafting of the affidavit, the 
juror refused to answer any more questions.      
After the juror interview, the defense made additional arguments in support 
of a new trial.  The trial court entered a written order denying a mistrial and a 
request for a new trial.  The trial court determined that allegations in the juror’s 
 
 
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affidavit and the defense counsel’s motions were contradicted by the information 
that the juror provided at the hearing.  The trial court compared the allegations set 
forth in the juror’s affidavit, those raised in the defendant’s motions, and the 
testimony provided by the juror at the hearing, and ultimately found, based in part 
on the juror’s demeanor, that the juror was biased in favor of the defendant and 
unreliable.2    
This Court heard oral argument in this case on October 8, 2013.  Thereafter, 
we remanded the case to the trial court for further inquiry of the remaining jurors 
on the juror misconduct issue, specifically regarding allegations of racial remarks 
made by jurors; jurors’ knowledge of the victim’s great-grandmother’s burned 
down house; and cell phone/internet research conducted by the jurors.  The trial 
court subpoenaed the twelve jurors and two alternates.  Twelve of the fourteen 
jurors responded by appearing and giving testimony.  One juror had relocated to 
Georgia and was unable to be served.  The affiant juror is the only juror who was 
served and refused to appear.  A significant portion of the proceedings on remand 
was used to coordinate a date, time and method to interview the affiant juror.  The 
                                          
 
 
2.  At the hearing, the juror was not questioned concerning her allegations of 
racial references and that the video of the defendant’s police interview needed 
subtitles in order for the jury to understand Dubose’s English.   
 
 
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trial court offered to interview her in person, by telephone, and by video; she 
refused all methods.  
Consistent with its initial denial of a mistrial and the request for a new trial, 
the trial court ultimately found that the affiant juror was not credible and that the 
examination of the other jurors did not support the allegations made in the motions 
and the affidavit.  Additionally, the trial judge found that the affidavit submitted to 
the court alleging juror misconduct was not drafted by the juror, but was drafted by 
Dubose’s counsel and that following Dubose’s second trial, which is the subject of 
this appeal, Dubose’s attorney formed an attorney-client relationship with the 
affiant juror.  There is competent, substantial evidence in the record to support the 
trial court’s finding, and we, therefore, deny relief on this issue.  
 
 The evidence from the jurors interviewed supports the conclusion that some 
of the jurors had cell phones and tablet devices during the guilt and penalty phases 
and during breaks, but not during deliberations.  None of the interviewed jurors 
testified that any of the jurors actually used their electronic devices to conduct 
research related to the case or made disparaging racial remarks about the 
defendant.  There is evidence that the complaining juror improperly used her 
electronic device to contact Assistant Public Defender Fred Gazaleh, apparently 
while court was in session.  Gazaleh testified that he assumed that court was in 
session, based on the time of day that he received the messages, and therefore did 
 
 
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not feel comfortable responding to the messages.  Despite the misconduct on the 
part of the complaining juror, there is no evidence that the use of the electronic 
devices contributed to the jury verdict.   
At the hearing on remand from this Court, none of the jurors recalled any 
racial remarks or any remarks about the defendant’s hair.  Some of the jurors had 
some knowledge of someone involved in the case or the victim’s great-
grandmother’s housing burning down.  Others said they had no knowledge of this 
event or anyone involved in the case.  None of the jurors saw any other juror 
conducting internet research, although several of the jurors had cell phones and 
other electronic devices.  Several of the jurors indicated that remarks were made 
about the quality of the video and that the defendant’s voice was mumbled as he 
did not speak clearly into the microphone.  The testimony on remand did produce 
evidence that during the penalty phase, one member of the jury stated that a 
teardrop tattoo indicated that someone had been to jail or was remembering 
somebody who died.  This was not evidence adduced at trial.  Furthermore, the 
evidence indicates that this remark was not made during the course of deliberations 
nor to the entire jury panel.    
Following the trial court’s decision on remand, Dubose filed a motion in this 
Court for additional briefing, alleging that the trial judge had asked the jurors 
improper questions regarding how the juror misconduct allegations affected their 
 
 
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individual verdicts.  Although the trial court indeed conducted an improper inquiry 
as to matters that inhere to the jury verdict, we find that this error was harmless. 
In State v. Hamilton, 574 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1991), this Court agreed with the 
test formulated by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals3 and adopted by the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals 4 that when questioning jurors regarding allegations of 
juror misconduct, a judge or counsel is to limit the inquiry to an “objective 
demonstration of extrinsic factual matter disclosed in the jury room,” and “must 
not inquire into matters relating to the jurors’ thought processes.”  Id. at 129.  
“Having determined the precise quality of the jury breach, if any, the [trial] court 
must then determine whether there was a reasonable possibility that the breach was 
prejudicial to the defendant.”  Id. (quoting United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 
869 (5th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added)).  This test was reiterated by this Court in 
Keen v. State, 639 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1994).   
During the inquiry of the jurors in Keen, the trial judge asked them whether 
an article concerning the tactics of defense attorneys in criminal cases found in the 
jury room influenced their decisions; the jurors stated that it did not.  Id. at 599.  
The trial judge denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial, but this Court 
reversed.  Id. at 599-600.  We found that the trial judge erred in questioning jurors 
                                          
 
3.  See United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 
4 . See United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 
 
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about the items which factored into their decision-making process.  Id. at 599.  We 
also found that we could not say beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court 
error was harmless, and we concluded that the defendant was entitled to a new 
trial.  Id. at 600 (citing State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1139 (Fla. 1986)); see 
also Devoney v. State, 717 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1998). 
The trial judge in this case also made an inquiry into matters that factored 
into the jury’s decision-making process; such an inquiry was error.  Nonetheless, it 
does not appear that the trial court relied on the improper inquiry to deny the 
motions for mistrial and for a new trial on remand.  The trial judge instead found 
that none of the other jurors committed juror misconduct, and he denied the 
motions on this basis.  Therefore, the asking of the improper question was not the 
basis of the denial of the motions.  Under the circumstances of this case, the trial 
court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 
1139. 
Additionally, regarding any allegation that racial remarks, unauthorized 
materials, or outside research affected the verdict, relief is not warranted.  No juror 
testified that any racial remarks were made.  While the evidence from the jurors 
interviewed supports the conclusion that some of the jurors had cell phones and 
tablet devices during breaks and lunch in the guilt and penalty phases, no juror 
recalled anyone’s use of electronic devices during deliberations.  Further, each of 
 
 
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the jurors denied using his or her cell phone to access the internet or to conduct 
outside research.  To the extent that cell phones were inside the jury room and 
could be considered unauthorized materials in the jury room, based on the evidence 
in this case, “it is not reasonable to assume that jurors derived any prejudicial legal 
or factual conclusions” from these devices.  Hamilton, 574 So. 2d at 130-31.   
Assuming that one juror educated the other jurors on the meaning of a 
teardrop tattoo during the penalty phase after observing a tattoo on the defendant’s 
face—which apparently was not a teardrop—there was conflicting testimony as to 
the brevity of the discussion and the source of the juror’s knowledge is unclear.  
Whether or not it could be considered to be improper discussion and not a matter 
inhering in the verdict, there is no reasonable probability that this breach was 
prejudicial during the penalty phase of his trial.  See id.  Dubose had already been 
convicted of murder and during the penalty phase, the jury was informed that 
Dubose had a prior violent felony.  In addition, through the testimony of Dubose’s 
own witness, the jury learned that Dubose had been incarcerated awaiting the trial 
of this case. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
The evidence in a capital case is judged to be sufficient when it is both 
competent and substantial.  See Phillips v. State, 39 So. 3d 296, 308 (Fla. 2010).  
In conducting its review, this Court looks at the evidence in the light most 
 
 
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favorable to the State to determine if a rational trier of fact could find the elements 
of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Rodgers v. State, 948 
So. 2d 655, 674 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 
2001)).  Furthermore, when a general verdict is rendered by the jury after the jury 
was instructed on both premeditated first-degree murder and first-degree felony 
murder, this Court will affirm the conviction if either form of first-degree murder 
is supported by competent, substantial evidence.  See Crain v. State, 894 So. 2d 59, 
73 (Fla. 2004).  Here, the jury was instructed on both first-degree premeditated 
murder and first-degree felony murder, with burglary being the underlying felony.  
The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder under either theory.5  
First, there is sufficient evidence in this case to support a conviction for first-
degree premeditated murder.  This Court has stated that  
Premeditation is defined as more than a mere intent to kill; it is a fully 
formed conscious purpose to kill.  This purpose may be formed a 
moment before the act but must exist for a sufficient length of time to 
permit reflection as to the nature of the act to be committed and the 
probable result of that act.  
 
Bradley, 787 So. 2d at 738 (quoting Woods v. State, 733 So. 2d 980, 985 (Fla. 
1999)).  Premeditation may be inferred from such facts as “the nature of the 
weapon used, the presence or absence of adequate provocation, previous 
                                          
 
5.  The jury additionally found that the defendant discharged a firearm 
causing death or great bodily harm during the commission of the offense. 
 
 
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difficulties between the parties, the manner in which the homicide was committed, 
and the nature and manner of the wounds inflicted.”  Id. (quoting Norton v. State, 
709 So. 2d 87, 92 (Fla. 1997)).  
The State introduced competent, substantial evidence of Dubose’s guilt.  The 
State proved that the Dubose brothers stealthily drove around the back of Vonnie 
Frazier’s home, jumped a fence to get closer to the house and stood in the yard 
while relentlessly spraying the house with bullets.  Dubose’s premeditated design 
to kill is evidenced by the fact that he armed himself with a weapon, went to the 
victim’s home with the weapon displayed, and shot that weapon, a Glock-nine with 
the capability to travel through at least two walls, into an open window of an 
occupied home.  One of these bullets ultimately killed Drewshawna.  Therefore, 
we find that the facts of this case provide competent, substantial evidence to 
support Dubose’s first-degree premeditated murder conviction.  
Additionally, the State presented sufficient evidence to support the first-
degree felony murder conviction.  The jury found Dubose guilty of first-degree 
felony murder, with burglary as the underlying felony.  Burglary is a qualifying 
felony that supports a conviction for first-degree felony murder.  See § 
782.04(1)(a)2.e., Fla. Stat. (2006).  As discussed below, the State’s evidence 
demonstrated that the Dubose brothers unlawfully entered the curtilage of Vonnie 
Frazier’s home, committing burglary, when they shot Drewshawna.  Therefore, 
 
 
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because we find that Dubose had premeditated intent to kill, and that he committed 
a burglary during the shooting, we affirm his conviction for first-degree murder. 
Burglary 
Dubose argues that the underlying felony, burglary, was not proven at trial, 
and he therefore cannot be convicted of felony murder.  In Dubose’s first trial, 
defense counsel filed a motion in limine with a memorandum of law to prohibit the 
State from arguing felony murder on the theory of burglary, arguing that the gap in 
the fence allowing for the driveway prevents the yard from being considered 
curtilage under this Court’s decision in State v. Hamilton, 660 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 
1995).  This motion was denied.  The defense renewed this motion at the beginning 
of the second trial.  The trial court once again denied this motion.  Therefore, this 
claim was preserved.  See Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332, 338 (Fla.1982) (“in 
order for an argument to be cognizable on appeal, it must be the specific contention 
asserted as legal ground for the objection, exception, or motion below.”) (emphasis 
added). 
During the jury charge conference, the State moved the trial court to add a 
sentence to the verdict form at the end of the definition of a structure, to read: “The 
space of ground immediately surrounding the structure does not have to be totally 
 
 
- 23 - 
enclosed.”6  In objecting to the State’s motion, defense counsel argued the standard 
jury instruction is sufficient.  Defense counsel then generally argued that the 
victim’s home did not have a gate and was not capable of being totally enclosed.  
Relying on this Court’s decision in Hamilton, the trial court denied the State’s 
motion. 
Dubose’s brother raised this same argument in his appeal to the First District 
Court of Appeal.  Dubose v. State, 75 So. 3d 383, 384-85 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).  In 
finding that “the fencing around the residential yard in the instant case . . . satisfies 
the enclosure requirement in Hamilton[,]” the First District stated: 
The area surrounding a dwelling or structure must lie within “some 
form of an enclosure” to be considered part of the curtilage.  State v. 
Hamilton, 660 So. 2d 1038, 1044-45 (Fla. 1995).  In this case, the 
yard of the home Appellant and his brothers fired upon had a chain 
link fence around it, with an opening in front for the driveway.  This 
court recently held that the enclosure “need not be continuous[,] and 
an ungated opening for ingress and egress does not preclude a 
determination that the yard is included in the curtilage of the house.”  
Id. at 385.  We approve the reasoning and decision of the First District in Dubose, 
and find that the trial court did not commit reversible error by allowing the 
instruction on felony murder based on burglary to go to the jury.      
                                          
 
6.  Based on the statements of the prosecutors, two previous juries had asked 
this same question.  It is not clear from the record whether the prosecutors are 
referring to the juries that found the other Dubose brothers guilty, or if one of the 
referenced juries includes the jury in Dubose’s first trial, where a mistrial was 
declared. 
 
 
- 24 - 
Motion for Change of Venue 
 
Dubose argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for change 
of venue.  We find that the trial judge did not err in denying Dubose’s motion.  
Section 47.121, Florida Statutes (2010), states that “[a] change of venue shall be 
granted when it appears impracticable to obtain a qualified jury in the county 
where the action is pending.”  This Court has determined that some knowledge of 
the case by potential jurors is not sufficient reason standing alone to require a 
change of venue.  In McCaskill v. State, 344 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 1977), we 
articulated the test as follows: 
Knowledge of the incident because of its notoriety is not, in and 
of itself, grounds for a change of venue.  The test for determining a 
change of venue is whether the general state of mind of the inhabitants 
of a community is so infected by knowledge of the incident and 
accompanying prejudice, bias, and preconceived opinions that jurors 
could not possibly put these matters out of their minds and try the case 
solely upon the evidence presented in the courtroom.  
 
Id. at 1278 (quoting Kelley v. State, 212 So. 2d 27, 28 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)); 
accord Manning v. State, 378 So. 2d 274, 276 (Fla. 1979).   
As this Court made clear in Rolling v. State, 695 So. 2d 278, 285 (Fla. 
1997), in ruling on a motion for a change of venue, the trial court should 
consider:  “(1) the extent and nature of any pretrial publicity; and (2) the difficulty 
encountered in actually selecting a jury.”  In evaluating the first prong,  
the trial court must consider numerous factors, such as: (1) the length 
of time that has passed from the crime to the trial and when, within 
 
 
- 25 - 
this time, the publicity occurred; (2) whether the publicity consisted of 
straight, factual news stories or inflammatory stories; (3) whether the 
news stories consisted of the police or prosecutor’s version of the 
offense to the exclusion of the defendant’s version; (4) the size of the 
community in question; and (5) whether the defendant exhausted all 
of his peremptory challenges. 
 
Id. at 285 (citations omitted).   
The first three factors of the first prong can best be addressed collectively.  
The shooting in this case occurred on July 26, 2006.  The first trial, involving all 
three defendants, occurred in January 2010.  Jury selection in the second trial 
began on February 8, 2010.  Prior to the first trial, the defense filed a pretrial 
motion to change venue, citing extensive pretrial publicity.  The defense attached a 
study regarding the effects of pretrial publicity on juror verdicts, along with 
numerous news articles addressing the story.  Most of the news articles attached to 
the defendant’s motion are dated the same week that the crime occurred and 
contained basic facts obtained as the story developed.  The major basis for many of 
the news articles was the fact that the Mayor of Jacksonville funded a task force to 
allow the Sheriff to pay police officers more overtime, in order to patrol “high 
risk” areas in Jacksonville, to deal with the widespread murders in the areas.  In 
these articles, the mayor and the sheriff urged the community to assist in 
decreasing the crime rate and generally warned all of the criminals that they would 
be caught.    
 
 
- 26 - 
The news articles published close in time to the crimes also provided 
information such as who the persons of interest were and the reason for the 
shooting, as alleged by neighbors.  Many of the news reports cited the basis for the 
shooting as a retaliatory or “respect shooting,” indicating that the suspects at that 
time shot into the house in retaliation for a robbery that occurred earlier that day.  
The news reports attached to the motion detail the court appearances of the 
brothers, as well as the person that the brothers were allegedly aiming for, Willie 
Davis, Jr.  On the one-year anniversary of the victim’s death, there was an article 
advertising a memorial service, which a few of the jurors remembered seeing.  
There were two articles attached, dated early February 2008, which detailed the 
disciplinary files of all three brothers since they were arrested for the crimes.   
In one of these articles, a representative of the Jacksonville Sheriff’s 
Department made multiple disparaging remarks about all three defendants, 
referring to them as “miscreants,” “a menace to society,” calling their behavior 
“despicable,” and stating that “they are in the right place.”  The articles attached 
that were written in 2009 (the latest dated May 2009) provided information about 
court hearings and indicated that the state sought to have separate trials, and seek 
the death penalty for Dubose and life sentences for the other two defendants.  The 
latest dated article attached to the motion was dated the same week as the trial, and 
 
 
- 27 - 
included a detailed timeline of events since the incident and a diagram of the home 
where the victim was shot.  
The attached articles do not indicate that the entire community was biased 
against Dubose in a manner that would make it impossible to choose an impartial 
jury.  Additionally, the attached articles do not exclude the defendants’ version of 
events; some of the articles even include excerpts from the police interrogation 
where the defendant denies any involvement in the crime.  Further, even 
considering the disparaging remarks made by the representative of the Sheriff’s 
Department, there was no indication that any of the jurors read that article, or 
adopted those views to the point that the jurors’ ability to be impartial was 
jeopardized.  Although the defense renewed its motion for a change of venue at the 
beginning of the second trial, there is no evidence that the defense supplemented 
the record with news reports that occurred after the first trial, but before the second 
trial.   
As to the fourth factor of the first prong, there were no arguments made that 
the defendants could not receive a fair trial in Duval County, based on the size of 
the county.  During the individual voir dire process, each juror indicated that, if 
chosen for the jury, he or she could be fair and impartial and only decide the case 
based on the evidence presented in the trial.  Finally, the defense used all ten of its 
 
 
- 28 - 
peremptory challenges, along with three additional challenges that were requested 
and granted.7  A fourth additional peremptory challenge was requested, but denied.  
As to the second prong, the defense and the State were able to agree on a 
jury panel and two alternates with approximately five jurors remaining who had 
not been stricken.  The defense counsel did not appear to have any difficulty in 
selecting jurors who indicated that they could be fair and impartial in this case.  In 
fact, even the potential jurors who had extensive prior knowledge of the case 
indicated that their knowledge did not result in any bias toward the defendant.  
This case is distinguishable from Manning v. State, 378 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 
1979), where this Court determined that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying the defendant’s motion to change the venue of the trial.  Manning was a 
young, Black male from a different county who was arrested in a rural county and 
charged with murdering two Caucasian sheriff’s deputies.  Id. at 276.  The pretrial 
                                          
 
7.  The defense raised a standing objection to any juror that had knowledge 
that there was a mistrial in Dubose’s previous trial.  The court consistently denied 
this motion, reasoning that the jurors are qualified as long as they do not share the 
information with another juror and as long as the juror states that the knowledge of 
the previous mistrial will not affect his or her impartiality.  The defense sought 
additional peremptory challenges, reasoning that it used at least three of its 
peremptory challenges on potential jurors that the defense argues should have been 
stricken for cause.  In recognizing that the trial court had the authority to grant the 
peremptory challenges “free and liberally,” the court granted both sides three 
additional peremptory challenges, following individual requests by the defense.  
The court denied the defense’s request for a fourth additional peremptory 
challenge. 
 
 
- 29 - 
publicity included information provided to the media regarding the version of 
events represented by the state attorney’s office and the local sheriff’s department, 
which contradicted the version of events given by the appellant shortly after his 
arrest.  Id. at 275.  Every person on Manning’s perspective jury “had prior 
knowledge of the alleged crimes through news media accounts and community 
discussion.”  Id.   
The defense attached various newspaper articles to the motion, as well 
as affidavits of fifteen persons, including the defendant, stating that 
because of bad feelings and prejudice against the defendant and 
because of the adverse publicity concerning the case, the affiants were 
convinced by reason of personal observations and knowledge of the 
conduct and statements by various persons in Columbia County that 
the defendant could not receive a fair and impartial trial in that 
county.  In addition, the defendant alleged that local police officers 
made various threats against his life, physically and verbally abused 
him, and harassed his mother when she came to visit him in jail. 
Id.  The jury found the appellant guilty and recommended imposition of the death 
penalty.   
In this case, the defendant lived in the same county where the crime 
occurred.  As expected, the death of an innocent child may draw just as much 
emotion and media attention as the killing of two police officers.  Here, fifty-three 
of the sixty-nine potential jurors admitted to seeing or hearing media coverage of 
the case.  The individual voir dire sessions revealed that while few potential jurors 
knew intricate details of the case or had followed the first trial, many of the 
potential jurors only read or heard from the media reports that a child was killed in 
 
 
- 30 - 
a “drive by” shooting, where she was not the target, which is essentially the same 
information that was provided to the potential jurors during the court’s summary at 
the beginning of jury selection.  One of the alternate jurors had the most 
information about the case, and was able to recite the basic facts and procedural 
posture of the case.   
Of the 53 jurors who admitted to previously hearing some information about 
the case, six were chosen to serve on the jury and two were chosen as alternates.  
The other six jurors indicated that they had not previously heard about the case 
before reporting for jury duty.  Although Dubose claims that the media attention 
surrounding the incident portrayed Dubose and his brothers in a very negative 
light, none of the potential or actual jurors indicated that the media attention 
caused them to view Dubose or his brothers with any preconceived bias or hostile 
feelings.  Therefore, the trial court properly denied Dubose’s motion for change of 
venue. 
Cumulative Error  
 
 
The defense argues that it was denied a fair trial based upon the trial court’s 
failure to grant its motion for change of venue and its motion for mistrial based on 
juror misconduct.  However, where the individual claims of error are without 
merit, the claim of cumulative error must fail.  Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 22 
(Fla. 2003).  It does not appear that the trial court committed error in denying the 
 
 
- 31 - 
defendant’s motions for change of venue and for mistrial.  Therefore, the defense is 
not entitled to relief on this claim.  
Constitutionality of the Sentencing Statute 
Dubose contends that his death sentence is unconstitutional under Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  During the pendency of Dubose’s direct appeal, the 
United States Supreme Court found Florida’s capital sentencing scheme 
unconstitutional in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.  Hurst v. 
Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016).  In Hurst v. State, we explained that the jury in 
a capital case must find the following facts unanimously: “the existence of the 
aggravating factors proven beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating factors 
are sufficient to impose death, and that the aggravating factors outweigh the 
mitigating circumstances.”  202 So. 3d 40, 53 (Fla. 2016).  We have determined 
that section 775.082(2), Florida Statutes, does not require us to remand all death 
penalty cases for the imposition of a life sentence.  See id. at 63-66.  See also 
Franklin v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S573 (Fla. Nov. 23, 2016).  We have also 
determined that in cases where the jury makes a non-unanimous recommendation 
of death, the Hurst error is not harmless.  See Id. at S575. 
Because the recommendation of death in this case was not unanimous, we 
cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to Dubose’s 
 
 
- 32 - 
sentence.  Accordingly, Dubose is entitled to relief, and we need not address the 
proportionality of his sentence or his other claims relating to the penalty phase.8   
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the above stated reasons, we affirm Dubose’s convictions, vacate 
Dubose’s death sentence, and remand for a new penalty phase proceeding. 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur as to the conviction but dissent as to the 
sentence. 
LAWSON, J., did not participate. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,  
Lawrence Page Haddock, Jr., Judge - Case No. 162006CF018285AXXXMA 
 
Richard Randall Kuritz, Jacksonville, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Carolyn Marie Snurkowski, Associate Deputy 
Attorney General, and Berdene Bevione Beckles, Assistant Attorney General, 
Tallahassee, Florida; and Lisa-Marie Krause Lerner, Assistant Attorney General, 
West Palm Beach, Florida, 
                                          
 
 
8.  Dubose also claimed the following related to his penalty phase: (1) trial 
court erred in refusing to consider as mitigation Dubose’s attempt to enter into a 
plea agreement; and (2) the trial court erred in denying Dubose’s motions for 
continuance based on the defense’s request for a PET scan amid suspicions of 
brain injuries and in denying a continuance of the Spencer hearing to allow a 
continuance to have testimony regarding the PET scan that was done between the 
penalty phase hearing and the Spencer hearing. 
 
 
- 33 - 
 
for Appellee