Case Title: Lee v. Sage Creek Refining Co., Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-06-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Lee v. Sage Creek Refining Co., Inc.1994 WY 69876 P.2d 997Case Number: 93-128Decided: 06/24/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Gene 
LEE and Georgine Lee, Husband and Wife,

Appellants 
(Defendants),

v.

SAGE 
CREEK REFINING CO., INC., a Wyoming corporation,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Fremont County, Elizabeth Kail, 
J.

 

Representing 
Appellants:

Joel 
M. Vincent of Vincent & Vincent, Riverton.

Representing 
Appellee:

Vance 
Countryman and David B. Hooper of Hooper Law Offices, 
Riverton.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Gene and Georgine 
Lee (Lees) appeal from an entry of default and order denying their motion to set 
aside the default, claiming the district court abused its discretion. We 
conclude that an entry of default is not a final order and dismiss the 
appeal.

[¶2]      An appealable 
order is:

(a) 
An order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, 
determines the action and prevents a judgment; or

(b) 
An order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding; 
or

(c) 
An order made upon a summary application in an action after judgment; 
or

(d) 
An order, including a conditional order, granting a new trial on the grounds 
stated in Rule 59(a)(4) and (5), W.R.C.P.; if an appeal is taken from such an 
order, the judgment shall remain final and in effect for the purposes of appeal 
by another party; or

(e) 
Interlocutory orders and decrees of the district courts 
which:

(1) 
Grant, continue, or modify injunctions, or dissolve injunctions, or refuse to 
dissolve or modify injunctions; or

(2) 
Appoint receivers, or issue orders to wind up receiverships, or to take steps to 
accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing sales or other disposition of 
property.

W.R.A.P. 
1.05.

[¶3]      An order denying 
a motion to set aside an entry of default does not fit within any of the 
definitions in Rule 1.05 as an appealable order. See Thynes v. Lloyd, 294 
S.C. 152, 363 S.E.2d 122 (App. 1987) (order denying motion to grant relief from 
entry of default is not appealable); First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. R 
& G Const. Co., 24 N.C. App. 131, 210 S.E.2d 97 (1974) (same); 
Sevenprop Assoc. v. Harrison, 295 Ark. 35, 746 S.W.2d 51 (1988) (same); 
Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rowan, 107 Nev. 362, 812 P.2d 350 
(1991) (same). Some courts allow appeal of a denial of a motion to set aside an 
entry of default but do so under the authority of a statute that specifically 
provides for such appeals. See Sullivan & Brugnatelli Advertising Co., 
Inc. v. Century Capital Corp., 153 Ariz. 78, 734 P.2d 1034 (App. 1986) 
(appealable as a special order pursuant to ARS § 12-2101(C)); Tunis v. 
Barrow, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1069, 229 Cal. Rptr. 389 (2 Dist. 1986) (appealable 
pursuant to West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. § 473.5).

[¶4]      An entry of 
default is not a final disposition of the controversy required by W.R.A.P. 1.05. 
It is simply a clerical act performed by the clerk of court which determines 
liability but not relief. Spitzer v. Spitzer, 777 P.2d 587, 592 (Wyo. 
1989). Therefore, an entry of default or a denial of a motion to vacate an entry 
is not a final appealable order.

[¶5]            
Appeal dismissed.