Case Title: State v. Corliss

Citation: 168 Vt. 333, 721 A.2d 438

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1998-02-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Corliss  (96-035); 168 Vt. 333; 721 A.2d 438

[Opinion Filed 6-Feb-1998]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 15-Sep-1998 and 25-Sep-1998]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 96-035

                               MAY TERM, 1998

State of Vermont                     }       APPEALED FROM:
                                     }
                                     }
     v.                              }       District Court of Vermont,
                                     }       Unit No. 1, Windsor Circuit
Adam O. Corliss                      }
                                     }       DOCKET NO. 136-2-94Wrcr

       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Upon consideration of defendant's motion to reargue, the opinion
  issued February 6, 1998, in this case is amended by deleting the last
  sentence of the full paragraph on page 8 and the following paragraph, which
  ends on page 9, and substituting the following:

     Under the test enunciated in Geiger, a court should instruct a jury on
     a lesser-related offense when: (1) the lesser offense is closely related
     to that charged, (2) there is evidence of its commission, and (3)
     defendant's theory of the case is consistent with the lesser-related
     offense.  See id. at 1304; accord Moore, 776 P.2d  at 1239.

          We do not reach the question of whether it is ever appropriate
     to instruct the jury on a lesser-related offense because, even if we
     applied a standard permitting such instruction, defendant in this case
     would not be entitled to the instruction.  This case does not satisfy the
     three-prong Geiger test.  There was no evidence of the offense of
     compounding the felony presented at trial, nor was this offense
     consistent with defendant's theory of the case.

          The statute defendant relies upon requires that the person
     having knowledge of the commission of a felony take money "upon
     an agreement or understanding" to compound or conceal the felony.
     13 V.S.A. § 8.  "The agreement is essential" to the offense of
     compounding the felony at common law or under the typical
     compounding statute.  2 W. LaFave & A. Scott Jr., Substantive
     Criminal Law § 6.9(c), at 176 (1986).  In this case, defendant never
     claimed any agreement or understanding that the money was received
     as consideration for concealing the felony.  Rather, he testified that he
     did not realize that Durphy gave him money until after they had
     parted company.  Defendant's theory of the case and his testimony at
     trial was that he concealed Durphy's identity because Durphy
     threatened to kill defendant's girlfriend and her family.  Defendant
     testified repeatedly that he lied to the police because Durphy was
     threatening his girlfriend.

     Under defendant's theory, he committed no crime.  He
     concealed the felony under duress.  If the jury had believed his
     testimony, he would have been acquitted.  Neither the defense theory
     nor the evidence supported a charge for compounding the felony.
     See, e.g., People v. Boyd,