Case Title: Dobbins v. Wyoming

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0050

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-08-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
STEVE EDWARD DOBBINS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, STEVEN EDWARD DOBBINS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2012 WY 110Case Number: S-11-0050, S-11-0253Decided: 08/10/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
STEVE 
EDWARD DOBBINS,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).STEVEN EDWARD 
DOBBINS,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County
The 
Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge 
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender and Tina N. Olson, Appellate 
Counsel.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney 
General; and James M. Causey, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
HILL, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      Pursuant to a 
plea agreement, Steve Edward Dobbins pleaded no contest to one count of sexual 
assault in the first degree, a felony, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-302(a)(iii).  In this 
consolidated appeal, Dobbins contends that the district court should have 
permitted him to withdraw his plea, both before and after sentencing.1  Specifically, Dobbins complains that he 
should have been allowed to withdraw his plea of no contest prior to being sentenced because he did 
not have close assistance of counsel and that he had a fair and just reason to 
withdraw his plea.  Dobbins also 
argues that he should have been allowed to withdraw his plea of no contest after sentencing because the district 
court failed to properly advise him as required by W.R.Cr.P. 11, resulting in 
manifest injustice.  According to 
Dobbins, the district court abused its discretion in denying his pre-sentence 
and post-sentence motions to withdraw his no contest plea, and that the error of 
the district court was not harmless.  
We affirm the denial of both of Dobbins’ motions to withdraw his no 
contest plea, and we affirm the judgment and sentence.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      The issue, as 
phrased by Dobbins, is as follows:
 
Should 
[Dobbins] be allowed to withdraw his plea because (1) the trial court erred in 
its advisements to [him], at arraignment and at the change of plea hearing; and 
(2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying [Dobbins’] presentence 
motion to withdraw his plea?
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS
 
[¶3]      In an information 
filed in the circuit court on May 7, 2009, Dobbins was charged with one count of 
sexual assault in the first degree in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-302(a)(iii) and one count of sexual intrusion as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-301(a)(vii) with a descendant in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-402(a)(b).2  According to an affidavit of probable 
cause filed with the circuit court on May 7, 2009 (attached to and incorporated 
within the information), on July 23, 2008 while being detained in a detention 
center on a different matter, the victim, Dobbins’ daughter, alleged to a police 
sergeant that Dobbins had been having sexual intercourse with her and had been 
sexually assaulting her “for some time” and that the “last incident occurred 
three (3) to five (5) days ago.”  “A 
rape examination was not feasible at this time due to the interval between her 
report and the last incident.”  The 
victim was released from the detention center and moved in with an aunt, with 
whom she lived for approximately two weeks before leaving to move back in with 
Dobbins.
 
[¶4]      On August 15, 
2008 a deputy with the sheriff’s office responded to a report of sexual assault 
and during his interview with the victim, was informed that “at approximately 
0530 hours and again at approximately 1030 hours, while she was sleeping naked 
in the bed with [Dobbins] and being in the state of drunkenness, [Dobbins] 
engaged in sexual intercourse with her.”
 
[¶5]      Furthermore, the 
victim indicated “that she ha[d] been having sexual intercourse with [Dobbins] 
for approximately two (2) months,” and that “the sexual intercourse [was] not 
consensual; and [occurred] when she [was] in a state of drunkenness and she 
[was] unable to stop [Dobbins’] advances.”  
Following the interview, the victim was transported to a hospital 
emergency room and examined by a physician who subsequently performed a rape 
examination on her.
 
[¶6]      According to the 
affidavit of probable cause, on November 18, 2008 the testifying deputy received 
and reviewed the analysis of the August 15, 2008 rape examination samples from 
the victim “and learned that the samples revealed the presence of seminal fluid 
and sperm cells.”  On November 25, 
2008 a body intrusion search and seizure warrant was executed on the body of 
Dobbins, and on January 22, 2009 the testifying deputy learned that “the 
laboratory examination of the DNA evidence obtained in this investigation 
identified both DNA strands of [the victim] and Steve Dobbins.”  Additionally, forensic testing “had 
confirmed that the additional DNA present, in the form of male semen, found on 
the vaginal swabs taken from [the victim] was, in fact, a DNA match to Steve 
Dobbins” and that the forensic scientist who conducted the testing “concluded 
that Steve Dobbins had, in fact, had sexual intercourse with, i.e.: vaginal penetration, and had 
ejaculated within [the victim’s] vagina.”
 
[¶7]      Pursuant to 
warrant, Dobbins was arrested and charged with one count of first degree sexual 
assault and incest.  Dobbins 
requested and was appointed a public defense attorney.  After being rescheduled twice, a 
preliminary hearing was held on May 6, 2009 at which time the court determined 
that “probable cause exist[ed] to support the charges filed” and the case was 
transferred to the district court for further proceedings.
 
[¶8]      On May 26, 2009 
Dobbins was arraigned in the district court and entered pleas of not guilty to 
both charges.3  At the arraignment the following 
colloquy took place:
 
            
COURT:  The purpose of this arraignment is to advise you of the 
charges, the potential penalties, make sure you understand both of them, and 
then determine whether or not you are ready to enter a 
plea.
            
Your constitutional rights are as follows:
            
To these charges you may plead guilty; not guilty; not guilty by reason 
of mental illness or deficiency; or, with the consent of the Court, no contest 
or nolo 
contendere.
            
You are presumed to be innocent. That presumption followed you into this 
hearing, and it would remain with you throughout a trial. At a trial, the State 
has to prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  They can bring in witnesses and evidence 
to do so, and you have the right to confront and cross-examine those 
witnesses.  You have the right to 
bring in your own.  You have the 
right to use the subpoena power of the Court to compel their attendance.  You may testify if you wish, but you are 
not required to.
            
I’ll advise you not to incriminate yourself by answering any 
questions.  If you are asked any 
questions, please confer with [your attorney] before you provide any answers, 
because those answers can and may be used against you.
            
You have the right to a speedy and public jury trial within 180 days of 
today.
            
You have the right to legal representation at every stage of the 
proceedings, either at your own expense or the Court will appoint one for you if 
you wish.
            
And finally, you have the right to appeal all errors of 
law.
            
Those are your constitutional rights, sir.  Do you understand 
them?
            
DOBBINS:  I believe so.
            
COURT:  Do you have any questions at all about 
them?
            
DOBBINS:  Not really, no.
            
COURT:  Okay.  Have 
you seen the felony Information in your case?
            
DOBBINS:  Not – not all of it, no.  I mean, what I heard in the 
courtroom.
            
COURT:  All right.  
Have you had a chance to confer with [your 
attorney]?
            
DOBBINS:  I haven’t a lot.  I mean, I talked to him a little bit on 
the phone, yeah.
            
COURT:  All right.  
And are you satisfied with his representation of you thus 
far?
            
DOBBINS:  Yeah.
 
[¶9]      The court then 
asked the prosecutor to “go through what these charges [were] and the potential 
penalties.”  The prosecutor read the 
felony information pertaining to Counts I and II, including the minimum and 
maximum penalties provided by law for each charge.  The prosecutor 
continued:
 
            
If convicted of a felony, Mr. Dobbins would lose some of his civil 
rights.
            
In addition, he would be assessed a $150 crime victim compensation 
surcharge.  $75 public defender – 
or, excuse me -- $75 Addicted Offender Accountability Act assessment, as well as 
a Wyoming Supreme Court Automation Fee of $10.
 
[¶10]   The arraignment proceeding 
continued:
 
            
COURT:  All right. Thank you.
            
Mr. Dobbins, do you have any questions at all about the 
charges?
            
DOBBINS:  Basically, is it [sic] my understanding that I’m 
being accused of rape, two charges of rape? Or that’s the way I understand 
it.
            
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Your Honor, if I can address 
that.
            
Mr. Dobbins, the first count is one of first-degree sexual assault, which 
is oftentimes referred to as a rape charge.  The second count is one of incest, which 
is having sexual intercourse with a blood relative, basically.  Okay?  Do you understand the 
difference?
            
DOBBINS:  Yeah.  To 
some extent, yeah.
            
COURT:  Do you understand what the potential penalties 
are?
            
DOBBINS:  Yeah.
            
COURT:  All right.  
Do you have any questions at all?
            
DOBBINS:  No, no.
 
[¶11]   Dobbins proceeded to enter pleas of 
not guilty to both Count I and Count II.  
After which, the following discussion was held:
 
            
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Yes, Your Honor.  And I’d also like to, I guess, clarify 
the record on a couple of respects, just so it’s clear.
            
Mr. Dobbins, when the judge asked you earlier about your criminal 
Information, that is the document that I believe you received a copy of that 
sets forth what the charges are.
            
DOBBINS:  Oh.  
Oh.  The one – okay.  Yeah.  I guess I did get – yeah, the paperwork, 
yeah.
            
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  All 
right.  So you’ve read that and 
you’ve reviewed it?
            
DOBBINS:  
Yeah.
            
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  And, Mr. Dobbins, my investigator has met 
with you a couple of times; is that correct?
            
DOBBINS:  One time that I remember, but I mean, yeah, the one 
time.
 
[¶12]   Following the arraignment, a jury 
trial was scheduled to begin on September 28, 2009 but upon motion by Dobbins, 
the trial was vacated and reset for December 2, 2009.  Between the May 26, 2009 arraignment and 
December of 2009, Dobbins, through his defense counsel, filed five motions with 
the court including his Motion for Continuance; Motion for Disclosure or Rule 
404(b) Evidence and Motion for Exclusion of Same; Defendant’s Pretrial 
Memorandum; Motion for Daubert Hearing and/or Motion in Limine; and Motion for Change of Venue and/or 
Motion in Limine.
 
[¶13]   On November 20, 2009 at what was 
originally planned as a motion hearing, Dobbins came before the district court 
for a change of plea.  At the change 
of plea hearing and after swearing in Dobbins as a witness and determining that 
he was not under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or medication and that he did 
not have any type of mental or physical impairment that would affect his ability 
to understand the proceedings or otherwise participate in the hearing, the court 
and Dobbins had the following dialogue:
 
            
COURT:  Okay. Do you understand that when you change your plea, 
that you waive the rights that were explained to you at your arraignment?  Your constitutional right to a speedy 
and a public jury trial, to the State having the burden of proof, having to 
prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, your right to not testify if you 
wish, your right to appeal any errors of law to the Wyoming Supreme Court.  Do you understand 
that?
            
DOBBINS:  Yes, sir.
 
[¶14]   Dobbins, by and through his 
attorney, proceeded to inform the court that a plea agreement had been reached 
and that Dobbins would be entering a plea of no-contest to Count I of the felony 
information and that the State would be dismissing Count II with prejudice.  There was no agreement as to sentencing, 
so Dobbins would be allowed to present “any and all evidence in mitigation and 
argue sentencing at that time, as would the State.”
 
[¶15]   The court and Dobbins then had the 
following discussion:
 
            
COURT:  All right.  
Mr. Dobbins, is that your understanding as well?
            
DOBBINS:  Yes, 
sir.
            
COURT:  All right. And then, other than this agreement, has 
anybody promised you anything in order to change your 
plea?
            
DOBBINS:  No.
            
COURT:  Have you been threatened in any 
manner?
            
DOBBINS:   No.
            
COURT:  Have you been satisfied with [your attorney’s] 
representation of you in this matter?
            
DOBBINS:  To the best I understand it, 
yes.
            
COURT:  Pardon me?
            
DOBBINS:  The best I understand it, yes.
            
COURT:  Okay.  All 
right. Then, [defense counsel], is your client prepared to change his 
plea?
            
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  He is, Your Honor.
            
COURT:  And how would he plead?
            
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Your Honor, Mr. Dobbins will be entering a 
no-contest plea to Count I.
            
COURT:  All right.  
[Prosecutor], with respect to the factual basis?
            
PROSECUTOR:  Thank you, Your Honor.  Should this matter have gone to trial, 
the State would have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that on or between June 
19th, 2008, and August 15th, 2008, in Park County, Wyoming, Mr. Dobbins did 
have sex with a victim who was physically helpless due to intoxication; and that 
that sexual contact, sexual intrusion, was not consensual; and that all of the 
events would have occurred in Park County, Wyoming.  Thank you.
            
COURT:  All right.  
Thank you.  [Defense 
counsel]?
            
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Your Honor, that’s my understanding of the 
allegation being made.  And as 
[Prosecutor] has stated, that is what the State would have to prove at the time 
of trial.  Mr. Dobbins is aware of 
those allegations, and is pleading no contest to those allegations in that he 
agrees to some of the information contained in the felony Information but not 
all of the statements and allegations made, but he is pleading no contest to 
that charge.
            
COURT:  All right.  Then, Mr. Dobbins. You heard what 
[Prosecutor] said, so I was going to ask you again, you are pleading no contest 
to what the State has just said?
            
DOBBINS:  Yes, sir.
            
COURT:  All right.  
Thank you.  A PSI would be 
ordered, and we will come back for sentencing.
 
[¶16]   Dobbins’ sentencing hearing was set 
for January 20, 2010.  However, when 
the parties appeared before the district court on January 20th, at Dobbins’ request sentencing was postponed in 
order that Dobbins could undergo a psychosexual evaluation prior to 
sentencing.  At the January 
20th hearing, the following exchange 
occurred:
 
            
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Thank you, Your Honor.  Today was scheduled for sentencing.  And as was discussed in chambers, 
although this is somewhat a late request, I  - I think it would be important for the 
Court, [Prosecutor], I think, and Mr. Dobbins, too, to have some additional 
information before the Court to consider as part of his sentencing.  And that would be in the nature of some 
type of psychosexual evaluation for Mr. Dobbins.
            
. . . .
            
Your Honor, so what we’re asking for today is – and I’ve talked to Mr. Dobbins about this, and 
he’s anxious to get this behind him and to move forward, but he, too, agrees 
that this might be a helpful – some helpful information for the 
Court.
            
We would ask the Court to continue the sentencing in this case to allow 
for the arrangements to be made for an evaluation and submission to this Court 
and to counsel of that psychosexual evaluation for consideration in the 
sentencing.  I’ve discussed with Mr. Dobbins that 
the Court would likely request and require that he waive his sentencing today, 
and a speedy sentencing, and he is willing to do that.
            
So what we’re asking the Court for today is to continue his sentencing – 
we would waive speedy sentencing – and allow us some additional time to make 
those arrangements, hopefully, to get that evaluation done, put it on the – 
hopefully the fast burner, the quick burner here, and get it submitted to the 
Court as quickly as possible so that we can reschedule a sentencing 
hearing.
            
COURT:  Mr. Dobbins, is that your desire, 
sir?
            
DOBBINS:  Yes, sir.
            
COURT:  All right.  
And you feel like you’ve had 
adequate time to confer with [your defense counsel] regarding 
that?
            
DOBBINS:  Yeah.
            
COURT:  And you are 
pleased with his representation of you?
            
DOBBINS:  Yeah.  
[Emphasis added.]
 
[¶17]   On March 22, 2010 the district 
court received a letter from Dobbins’ mother indicating that the victim in this 
case had died on March 19, 2010 “of liver failure.”  On March 23, 2010 the district court 
received a handwritten letter from Dobbins requesting that he be allowed to go 
to the funeral and also indicating his intention to write to his defense counsel 
for assistance in changing his plea back to not guilty.  On March 25, 2010 the district court 
received a second handwritten letter from Dobbins, this time indicating that he 
had “dismissed” his lawyer and requesting that he be appointed another lawyer. 
 On March 31, 2010 Dobbins filed a 
handwritten motion to withdraw his plea of no contest and as grounds for his 
motion stated that he had insufficient counsel at the time he entered his plea 
of no contest.  The motion did not 
explain how his counsel had been insufficient.
 
[¶18]   On June 17, 2010 a notice of 
substitution of counsel was filed by another senior assistant public defender, 
and on June 25, 2010 Dobbins, through his new counsel, filed a more formal 
motion to withdraw guilty plea and attached as grounds for his motion the 
handwritten motion to withdraw his plea that was previously filed on March 31, 
2010.  The more formal motion did 
not expound on Dobbins’ previously filed handwritten 
motion.
 
[¶19]   On August 25, 2010 the district 
court heard argument on Dobbins’ motion to withdraw his plea.  At the proceedings, Dobbins’ new defense 
counsel told the court that just prior to entering his plea of no contest to 
Count I, Dobbins had asked his first defense counsel about “entering a 
not-guilty plea to Count I, the felony sexual intrusion charge, and enter a 
no-contest plea to Count II;” however, “he never got a straight answer from his 
counsel why that couldn’t be done.”  
“And in their discussions, he is told, 'Well, don’t worry about 
it.’”  Dobbins was then called to 
testify at the hearing and admitted that he had entered his plea of no contest 
to Count I voluntarily, but claimed he did so because he “didn’t know about the 
other option.”  He claimed: “I had 
to learn on my own that I had the option to plead no contest.  [My defense counsel] either said plead 
guilty or – plead guilty or plead not guilty.  I didn’t know I had even had the option 
of pleading no contest.”  Dobbins 
claimed he had later learned from the other inmates in jail that he could plead 
no contest.
 
[¶20]   On cross-examination, Dobbins 
admitted that he remembered having been told at the May 26, 2009 arraignment of 
the maximum and minimum penalties for the charges and having been advised of the 
ways he could plead to the charges.  
With regard to the November 20, 2009 hearing when he pleaded no contest 
to Count I, Dobbins admitted that he could recall the court having advised him 
of his rights again, that the prosecutor put the plea agreement on the record, 
that his counsel confirmed the plea agreement, and that the prosecutor provided 
the factual basis for the charge.
 
[¶21]   Following Dobbins’ sworn testimony, 
the district court heard argument from both the prosecutor and Dobbins’ defense 
counsel, including a discussion by the prosecutor of why Dobbins’ argument did 
not satisfy the seven factors set forth in Van Haele v. State, 90 P.3d 708 (Wyo. 
2004) that are generally used to guide a district court’s discretion as to 
whether or not the defendant wishing to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest 
prior to sentencing should be allowed to do so.4
 
[¶22]   The district court then addressed 
the parties, emphasized that while the November 20, 2009 change of plea hearing 
was “brief,” it was clear at that hearing that Dobbins was competent, that 
Dobbins understood the advisements including “the consequences of changing the 
plea and the rights that were waived,” and that the plea agreement was “simple 
enough to understand.”  The district 
court also pointed out that he had asked Dobbins at the change of plea hearing 
whether or not he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation of him and 
that Dobbins answered, “To the best I understand it.”  The court stated that he had been 
“puzzled by that answer” so he asked Dobbins, “Pardon me?” to which Dobbins 
responded, “The best I understand it, yes.”
 
[¶23]   The district court then ruled as 
follows:
 
            
So there are two separate questions on that occasion with respect to 
[defense counsel].  On both he 
responded that he did understand. So the Court believes that the advisements 
were proper, were thorough, and that this change of plea was entered on a 
voluntary basis with the defendant understanding that he had waived his rights, 
and he did so on a voluntary basis, not threatened in any manner, and clearly 
satisfied with counsel.
            
So with respect to the assertion that there was ineffective assistance of 
counsel, even if we – if the Court considers item five, whether assistance of 
counsel was present, as neutral, that the other factors, the other six factors 
have clearly been established in the State’s argument, and the Court adopts 
those positions as articulated by the State. And I don’t believe that it’s 
necessary to articulate each and every one of them, but the Court would simply 
say that I – the Court believes that, again finding factor five neutral – and 
the Court does not believe that five is neutral, but even if it were to find 
five neutral, that the other six have been satisfied. So the motion will be 
denied, and the Court would ask [prosecutor] to prepare an order to that effect. 

 
On 
August 27, 2010 the district court entered its Order Denying Defendant’s Motion 
to Withdraw No Contest Plea.
 
[¶24]   On November 17, 2010 the parties 
appeared in the district court for Dobbins’ sentencing hearing.  After the court determined that Dobbins 
was competent to proceed, the defense called three witnesses to testify and 
subsequently defense counsel offered argument.  Dobbins also read a statement under oath 
in which he indicated that he took “full responsibility for [his] actions.”  The prosecution offered only 
argument.  After considering the 
testimony and arguments of both parties, Dobbins was sentenced to 25 to 30 years 
imprisonment.  The district court’s 
sentence order was filed on November 23, 2010, and reflecting what the court 
ordered at the sentencing hearing, sentenced Dobbins to “be incarcerated in a 
State penal institution … for a period of not less than twenty-five (25) years 
and not more than thirty (30) years” with credit for time served, and he was 
also assessed a court automation fee of $20.00, a $150.00 surcharge for the 
Wyoming Crime Victim Compensation Fund, and a fee of $75.00 for an Addicted 
Offender Assessment.
 
[¶25]   On December 10, 2010 Dobbins filed 
his notice of appeal giving notice of his intention to appeal to this Court the 
judgment and sentence of the district court.  Meanwhile, while that case was awaiting 
briefing in this Court, on March 26, 2011 Dobbins filed his second Motion to Withdraw Plea in the 
district court.  In that motion, 
Dobbins cited W.R.Cr.P. 11 and argued that he “was never advised by the Court, as required by W.R.Cr.P. 
11(b)(1), of the general nature of the mandatory assessments which could be made 
against him.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  He 
maintained:
 
            
If a defendant is not advised of the general nature of the assessments by 
the Court, then the assessments cannot be imposed without affording the 
defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea. W.R.Cr.P. 11(b)(1)(B).  The assessments were imposed at 
sentencing, as reflected by the sentencing transcript and the sentencing 
order.  The sentencing transcript 
does not reflect that Defendant was ever afforded an opportunity to withdraw his 
plea based on these grounds.  
Therefore, he must be afforded the opportunity to do so 
now.
 
[¶26]   Dobbins also argued, generally, 
that the mandates of W.R.Cr.P. 11 were not met because the prosecutor read the 
information, as opposed to the court, and that even after the reading of the 
information, Dobbins “manifested confusion about the charges, and though the 
Court asked if he understood the penalties, the Court did not ask what his 
understanding consisted of.”
 
[¶27]   On July 29, 2011 the State filed 
its response to Dobbins’ second Motion to Withdraw No Contest Plea.  In that motion, generally, the 
prosecution argued that the court satisfied the mandates of W.R.Cr.P. 11, that 
any error by the district court was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” and 
that if what Dobbins was complaining of was the failure by the court to advise 
him of any assessments, the correct and proper procedure was for Dobbins to 
request relief through a motion for illegal sentence pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 35.5
 
[¶28]   On August 5, 2011 the district 
court heard oral arguments on Dobbins’ second motion to withdraw his no contest 
plea, and following the arguments the court denied the motion.  On August 15, 2011 the district court 
entered its Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw No Contest Plea.  On August 22, 2011 Dobbins filed his 
notice of appeal giving notice of his intent to appeal the district court’s 
order denying his motion.  Dobbins’ 
appeal of the order denying his second motion to withdraw was consolidated with 
his appeal from the district court’s sentence order entered on November 23, 
2010.  The consolidated appeals are 
now before this Court.
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶29]   “A district court’s ruling on a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea or a plea of nolo contendere is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the trial court.”  
McCard v. State, 2003 WY 142, 
¶ 6, 78 P.3d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 2003).
Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.  We will not overturn 
a district court’s discretionary decision unless the court acted in a manner 
exceeding the bounds of reason and could not rationally conclude as it 
did.
 
Van 
Haele, 
¶ 15, 90 P.3d  at 713 (internal citations omitted).
 
[¶30]   Additionally, “the findings of fact 
that led to denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea are subject to the 
clearly erroneous standard of review, while the decision to deny the motion is 
reversed only if it constituted an abuse of discretion.”  McCard, ¶ 8, 78 P.3d  at 1043.  Finally, “[f]or purposes of appellate 
review, a nolo contendere plea is 
functionally equivalent to a guilty plea.”  Major v. State, 2004 WY 4, ¶ 11, 83 P.3d 468, 472 (Wyo. 2004).
DISCUSSION
 
[¶31]   As articulated by Dobbins on 
appeal:  “Two motions to withdraw 
the no-contest plea are at issue here.  
The second motion was premised on the trial court’s failure to properly 
advise Mr. Dobbins; the first motion was premised on lack of close assistance of 
counsel before entry of the plea.”  For purposes of our discussion, we will 
first address Dobbins’ second 
(post-conviction) motion to withdraw his no contest plea, which is based 
upon the allegation that the district court failed to comply with W.R.Cr.P. 
11.  We do so because of the 
commonality of the role W.R.Cr.P. 11 plays in our decisions on both the 
pre-sentence and post-sentence motions.  
Specifically, Dobbins’ second motion to withdraw focuses exclusively 
on W.R.Cr.P 11, while the law governing 
our analysis of Dobbins’ first 
(pre-sentence) motion requires 
us to address the rule even though he did not do so.
 
A.  Dobbins’ Post-Sentence Motion to 
Withdraw Plea
 
[¶32]                           
W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) provides that if a motion to withdraw a plea is made after sentencing, a plea “may be set 
aside only to correct manifest 
injustice.”  “Manifest 
injustice” contemplates a “situation that is unmistakable or indisputable, was 
not foreseeable, and affects the substantial rights of a 
party.”
 
Browning 
v. State, 2001 
WY 93, ¶ 27, 32 P.3d 1061, 1069 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting McCarthy v. State, 945 P.2d 775, 777 
(Wyo. 1997)) (emphasis added).  “The 
party seeking to withdraw his plea bears the burden of demonstrating manifest 
injustice.”  Id.
 
Justification 
for this heightened standard for withdrawal of a plea after sentencing is based 
in the
'practical 
considerations important to the proper administration of justice.  Before sentencing, the inconvenience to 
the court and prosecution resulting from a change of plea is ordinarily slight 
as compared with the public interest in protecting the right of the accused to 
trial by jury.  But if a plea of 
guilty could be retracted with ease after sentence, the accused might be 
encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of potential punishment, and 
withdraw the plea if the sentence were unexpectedly severe.  The result would be to undermine respect 
for the courts and fritter away the time and painstaking effort devoted to the 
sentencing process.’
 
Browning, ¶ 27, 32 P.3d  at 1069-1070 
(quoting Hicklin v. State, 535 P.2d 743, 749 (Wyo. 1975) and Kadwell v. 
United States, 315 F.2d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1963)) (emphasis in 
original).
 
[¶33]   “The district court has discretion 
in determining whether a defendant has shown manifest injustice.  The discretion will not be disturbed on 
appeal unless the defendant proves the district court abused its 
discretion.”  McCarthy, 945 P.2d  at 776.  “Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.” Id. (quoting  Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 
1986)).
 
[¶34]   “A district court’s decision to 
deny a motion to withdraw a plea 'will not be reversed for an abuse of 
discretion so long as the district court reasonably could conclude as it 
did.’”  Browning, ¶ 28, 32 P.3d  at 1070 
(quoting State v. McDermott, 962 P.2d 136, 138 (Wyo. 1998)).
 
[¶35]   In this case, Dobbins raises two 
general criticisms.  First, and most 
central to his motion, Dobbins criticizes the court for “request[ing] the prosecutor to go through the charges and potential penalties, 
instead of doing it itself,” and failing to “'determine that the defendant 
[understood]’ his 'right to persist in 
[his not guilty] plea,’ as required by W.R.Cr.P. 11(b)(3).’”  (Emphasis added.)  Secondly, in keeping with his criticism 
that the court delegated part of the Rule 11 advisements to the prosecutor, he 
maintains that he “should have an absolute right to withdraw his plea … [because 
he] was never advised by the court, as required by W.R.Cr.P. 
11(b)(1) of the general nature of the 
mandatory assessments which could be made against him.”  (Emphasis added.)
 
[¶36]   W.R.Cr.P. 11 states in relevant part:
 
Rule 
11.  
Pleas.
            
. 
. . .
(b) Advice to Defendant. -- Except for 
forfeitures on citations (Rule 3.1) and pleas entered under Rule 43(c)(2), 
before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a felony or to a 
misdemeanor when the defendant is not represented by counsel, the court must 
address the defendant personally in open court and, unless the defendant has 
been previously advised by the court on the record and in the presence of 
counsel, inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, 
the following:
 
   (1) The 
nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty 
provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law and 
other sanctions which could attend a conviction including, when applicable, the 
general nature of any mandatory assessments (such as the surcharge for the Crime 
Victim Compensation Account), discretionary assessments (costs, attorney fees, 
restitution, etc.) and, in controlled substance offenses, the potential 
loss of entitlement to federal benefits. However:
 
(A) Disclosure 
of specific dollar amounts is not required;
 
(B) Failure 
to advise of assessments or possible entitlement forfeitures shall not 
invalidate a guilty plea, but assessments, the general nature of which were not 
disclosed to the defendant, may not be imposed upon the defendant unless the 
defendant is afforded an opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea; 
and
 
(C) If 
assessments or forfeitures are imposed without proper disclosure a request for 
relief shall be addressed to the trial court under Rule 35 before an appeal may 
be taken on that issue.
 
(2) The 
defendant has the right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the 
proceeding and, if necessary, one will be appointed to represent the 
defendant;
 
(3) The 
defendant has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has 
already been made, the right to be tried by a jury and at that trial the right 
to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses, the right to court process to obtain the testimony of other 
witnesses, and the right against compelled 
self-incrimination;
 
(4) If 
a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is accepted by the court there will not be a 
further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo contendere the 
defendant waives the right to a trial; and
 
(5) If 
the court intends to question the defendant under oath, on the record, and in 
the presence of counsel, about the offense to which the defendant has pleaded 
guilty, that the defendant's answers may later be used against the defendant in 
a prosecution for perjury or false statement.
            
. . . .
 
(d) Insuring that plea is voluntary. -- The 
court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first, by 
addressing the defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is 
voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a 
plea agreement. The court shall also inquire as to whether the defendant's 
willingness to plead guilty or nolo contendere results from prior discussions 
between the attorney for the state and the defendant or the defendant’s 
attorney.
. 
. . .
 
(h) Harmless error. -- Any variance from the 
procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall 
be disregarded.
 
[¶37]   In this case, there is no question 
that the district court addressed Dobbins personally and engaged him in dialogue 
at both the arraignment and change of plea hearing.  At the arraignment, the district court 
personally informed Dobbins of his constitutional right to a public and speedy 
trial; his right to plead guilty; not guilty; not guilty by reason of mental 
illness or deficiency; or, with permission of the court, no contest or nolo contendere; of the presumption of 
innocence and that the presumption would remain with him throughout trial; of 
the fact that at trial the State would have to prove his guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt; his right to be represented by counsel; his right to confront 
and cross-examine adverse witnesses; his right to bring his own witnesses and 
use the court’s subpoena power; his right to testify and to not testify; of his right to appeal all 
errors of law; and was advised not to incriminate himself and to confer with his 
attorney before answering any questions asked of him and his right against 
compelling self-incrimination.  And, 
following the prosecutor’s reading of the information, Dobbins was personally 
asked by the court if he understood the penalties, to which he responded, 
“[y]eah.”  The court also asked 
Dobbins if he had any questions, and 
Dobbins responded, “[n]o, no.”
 
[¶38]   At the change of plea hearing, the 
court also personally addressed Dobbins and inquired into whether or not Dobbins 
understood that by changing his plea he would be waiving all of the 
constitutional rights of which the court had previously informed him at the 
arraignment.  Specifically, he 
reminded and informed Dobbins that by pleading guilty or nolo contendere, he was waiving his 
constitutional right to a speedy and public trial, to the State having the 
burden of proof, having to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, his right 
not to testify, and his right to appeal any errors of law.  W.R.Cr.P. 11(b)(4).  On several occasions, the district court 
also personally addressed the issue of whether or not Dobbins had been satisfied 
with his counsel.6
 
[¶39]   The only issue, therefore, is 
whether or not the strictures of W.R.Cr.P. 11 were met concerning personal 
advisement by the court of the minimum and maximum penalties provided by law for 
the charge to which Dobbins was pleading no contest and the applicable mandatory 
assessments, as these subjects were covered by the prosecutor at the court’s 
request.
 
[¶40]   “We have stressed that '[s]trict 
compliance with the rule is required to ensure due process of law.’”  Thomas v. State, 2007 WY 186, ¶ 9, 170 P.3d 1254, 
1257 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting Ingalls v. 
State, 2002 WY 75, ¶ 11, 46 P.3d 856, 860 (Wyo. 2002)).  We 
recognize that the “general purpose of the rule is 'to assist the district judge 
in making the constitutionally required determination that a defendant’s guilty 
plea is truly voluntary.’” Sena v. 
State, 2010 WY 93, ¶ 9, 233 P.3d 993, 996 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting Britain v. State, 497 P.2d 543, 545 
(Wyo. 1972)).
 
[¶41]   We also note, however, that “Rule 
11 has been described as 'lengthy and complex,’ and a 'change of plea hearing 
[does] not take place in a vacuum.’”  Sena, ¶¶ 10 and 13, 233 P.3d  at 
996-97.  In prior cases before this 
Court in which we have considered the function of W.R.Cr.P. 11 (previously 
W.R.Cr.P. 15), “we have taken our lead from the federal interpretation of Rule 
11(c), F.R.Cr.P. noting that our Rule 15(c), W.R.Cr.P., is substantially similar 
to the federal rule.”  Gist v. State, 768 P.2d 1054, 1056 (Wyo. 
1989).
 
Comment 
(b) to the Uniform Rule of Criminal Procedure, which parallels our Rule 15(c), 
W.R.Cr.P., states that the goal of this part of the rule is to produce a record 
which will affirmatively show that a plea of guilty was intelligent and 
voluntary.  The rule is designed to 
establish that the defendant’s waiver of his rights to a jury trial, 
confrontation of witnesses, and the protection against self-incrimination is 
made with understanding of the effect of his act. … The American Bar Association 
Standards for Criminal Justice asserts the same goal and suggests that 'the 
court…take such other steps as may be necessary to assure itself that the guilty 
plea is entered with complete understanding of the consequences.’ The comment to 
that standard does note that the standard recognizes that '[a] court cannot be 
expected to explain to a defendant in detail all of the rights that are 
relinquished by pleading guilty[.]  
The 'critically important’ factor is that a plea of guilty must be 
intelligently entered.
            
… In McCarthy v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1969), the observation 
was made that 'the procedure embodied in Rule 11 has not been held to be 
constitutionally mandated.’ The court further says that 'it is designed to 
assist the district judge in making the constitutionally required determination 
that a defendant’s guilty plea is voluntary.’  … A further reason noted in McCarthy is the need to provide a 
complete record of the proceedings and, thereby, discourage frivolous 
post-conviction attacks on the voluntariness of pleas of 
guilty.”
 
Gist, 
768 P.2d  at 1056.
 
[¶42]   In prior cases before this Court in 
which we considered issues similar to the issues in this case, we have 
recognized that “[f]ederal courts, in considering compliance with Rule 11, 
F.R.Cr.P., have focused on the rationale for the rule.” Gist, 768 P.2d  at 1056 (emphasis added).  In United States v. Hamilton, 568 F.2d 1302 
(9th Cir. 1978), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was 
faced with an “appeal [that] squarely present[ed] the question of what 
procedures must be followed by a trial judge to satisfy the requirements of 
Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 governing acceptance of guilty pleas.”  Id. at 1304.  In that case (similar to this case), the 
defendant complained that the trial judge himself did not explain the potential 
penalties but instead relied on the prosecutor to inform him of possible 
penalties.  Id. at 1303, 1306.  That court concluded 
that:
 
            
Requiring the court to inform a defendant of penalties does not 
necessarily mean that the words must literally issue from the judge’s lips.  We conclude that a reasonable 
interpretation of Rule 11 is that it means a judge must insure that the 
defendant understands the possible penalties before his plea is 
accepted.
The 
court can, within certain limits, satisfy the requirement by directing that 
another advise the defendant in the court’s presence.  The crucial requirement is that the 
judge be satisfied that the defendant understands the possible sentences and 
that such understanding be apparent in the record.
 
Hamilton, 
568 F.2d 1302 at 1306.
 
[¶43]   The court 
continued:
 
Our 
conclusion conforms to McCarthy v. United 
States, [394 U.S. 459, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418, (1969)] which instructed federal judges to spread a 
defendant’s state of mind on the record at the time of the plea in order to 
avoid resort to after-the-fact speculation.  Furthermore, permitting partial 
delegation in a case such as this is supported by repeated admonitions that Rule 
11 not become the vehicle to transform plea hearings into ritualistic 
performances.
 
Hamilton, 
568 F.2d 1302 at 1306.
 
[¶44]   Similarly, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has stated:
 
            
As for the rule’s several injunctions that the trial judge personally 
address or inform the defendant of matters, a colloquy conducted exclusively by 
the judge is not required, although it is the best practice.  It will usually suffice, however, that 
the judge dominate the inquiry and involve himself personally in it…We do not 
think the spirit or the letter of the rule require that the judge be sole orator 
or lector, especially where multiple charges and defendants are concerned.  Judges, too, get sore 
throats.
The 
courts in general have been clear that Rule 11 'is not to be read as requiring a 
litany or other ritual which can be carried out only by word-for-word adherence 
to a set 'script.’’ Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, October 1981, p. 26 reprinted in 91 F.R.D. 289, 
326.  See also 1 Wright, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, § 178, at 673 “Just as 'mere ritual does not suffice for compliance 
with Rule 11,’ so too 'ritualistic compliance is not 
required.’”
 
United 
States v. Henry, 
113 F.3d 37, 41 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
 
[¶45]   While we are not prepared to 
abandon our long-standing directive that “[s]trict compliance with [Rule 11] is 
required to ensure due process of law,” (Ingalls ¶ 11, 46 P.3d at 860), we 
acknowledge, as previously stated, that the “change of plea hearing [does] not 
take place in a vacuum.” Sena, ¶ 13, 233 P.3d  at 997.  We also recognize that since W.R.Cr.P. 
11 is derived from its federal counterpart, we give weight to relevant federal 
procedure and specifically note that we, too, have indicated our reluctance to 
allow Rule 11 to turn into a mere ritualistic litany.  McCarty v. State, 883 P.2d 367, 373 
(Wyo. 1994).  See also Gist, 768 P.2d at 
1056-57:
 
In 
this instance, while the court did not comply with Rule 15(c), W.R.Cr.P., at the 
change of plea proceeding, a reading of all the proceedings relating to the 
initial plea and the change of plea affirmatively demonstrates that the trial 
court discharged its constitutional obligations and duties to Gist… [T]he 
constitutional right to which Gist was entitled was not simply the mechanical 
reading of Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P.  Gist’s constitutional right was the right 
not to be convicted except upon a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea… 
 We agree with the district court 
that he was not deprived of his constitutional rights.
 
[¶46]   For example, we have said that 
“[t]he language of W.R.Cr.P. 11(b) no longer requires the district court to 
perfunctorily repeat information on rights and consequences which has previously 
been conveyed during arraignment or during other on the record proceedings in 
the presence of counsel.”  McCarty, 883 P.2d  at 373.  In holding that the court did not err 
when it failed to advise a defendant during a change of plea proceeding of his 
right to persist in a not guilty plea (and other constitutional rights), we 
stated in McCarty that “[i]t may be 
appropriate to presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the 
nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he 
is being asked to admit,” and that “W.R.Cr.P. 11(b) incorporates the presumption 
that 'a defendant’s discussions with his counsel will include descriptions of 
the plea bargain and the elements of the offense.’”  Id. at 374 (internal quotes 
omitted).  Ultimately, this Court 
found that when it considered the “totality of the circumstances, … any error in 
failing to advise [defendant] … under W.R.Cr.P. 11(b)(3) was harmless.”  Id.
 
[¶47]   Similarly, when we consider the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding Dobbins’ motion to withdraw his no 
contest plea, including the fact that he was represented by competent counsel 
and entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily,7 that the district court engaged 
Dobbins in dialogue regarding various constitutional rights at both the 
arraignment and change of plea proceeding, that the information given to Dobbins 
by the prosecutor regarding the charges and penalties he faced if he pleaded no 
contest was correct in all aspects, and that Dobbins repeatedly indicated his 
understanding of his constitutional rights and of the plea agreements, we find that any variance by the district 
court from the procedures required by W.R.Cr.P. 11 did not affect Dobbins’ substantial rights and shall be 
disregarded.  W.R.Cr.P. 11(h).  
Any error by the district court in this case certainly did not rise to 
the level of manifest injustice, as is the required showing in order to withdraw 
a plea after sentencing.  When we 
review the totality of the circumstances, we do not find reversible error.  Accordingly, we affirm the district 
court’s denial of Dobbins’ post-sentence motion to withdraw his no contest 
plea.
 
[¶48]   Having determined that any error by 
the district court in this case was harmless error, we will only briefly address 
Dobbins’ specific argument that W.R.Cr.P. 11(b)(1)(B) regarding the imposition 
of monetary assessments mandates that this Court allow Dobbins to withdraw his 
plea.  Dobbins criticizes the 
district court for imposing monetary assessments at sentencing without 
personally advising him of the assessments at the time of his plea and argues 
that he must therefore be allowed to withdraw his plea at this juncture.  However, Dobbins completely ignores 
Section (b)(1)(C) of Rule 11, that states that “[i]f 
assessments or forfeitures are imposed without proper disclosure a request for 
relief shall be addressed to the trial court under Rule 35 before an appeal may 
be taken on that issue.”  W.R.Cr.P. 
11(b)(1)(C).  Instead of requesting 
relief through a motion for illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 35, however, 
Dobbins filed this motion to withdraw his plea entirely.  We agree with the State 
that
 
[i]t 
is apparent [that Dobbins’] intention is not to acquire relief for court imposed 
monetary obligations as contemplated by the rule or his dilemma could be solved 
with a request to remove the fees under the auspices of an illegal 
sentence.  Rather, [Dobbins] 
opportunistically seeks another avenue to appeal the issue of withdrawing his 
guilty plea for the purposes of standing trial.  The court record coincidentally reflects 
[that Dobbins] has been striving to withdraw his guilty plea since the victim of 
his crime tragically died.
 
[¶49]   Dobbins has not filed a Rule 35 
motion and, therefore, according to the plain language of W.R.Cr.P. 11(b)(1)(C), 
Dobbins may not now raise this issue on appeal.
 
B.           
Dobbins’ 
Pre-Sentence Motion to Withdraw No Contest Plea
 
[¶50]                           
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea, such as that filed here, is governed 
by W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) which provides that if a motion for withdrawal of a guilty 
plea is made before sentence is 
imposed, the court may permit withdrawal upon a showing by the defendant of 
any fair and just 
reason.
 
Frame, 
¶ 7, 29 P.3d 89 (emphasis added).  
It is the defendant’s burden to show “any fair and just reason” for 
withdrawal of his plea, and the burden only shifts to the State to demonstrate 
prejudice to its case if the defendant is first able to so demonstrate.  See McCard, ¶ 9, 78 P.3d  at 
1043.
A 
defendant does not enjoy an absolute right to withdraw a plea of guilty prior to 
the imposition of sentence.  The 
trial court is vested with discretion to determine whether to grant a motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty made prior to sentencing, and it does not abuse that 
discretion by denying the withdrawal of the plea so long as the requirements of 
W.R.Cr.P. 11 were complied with at the time the plea was accepted.  Even when the defendant provides a 
plausible or just and fair reason for withdrawal of the plea of guilty, the 
denial of the defendant’s motion does not amount to an abuse of discretion if 
the trial court conducted a careful hearing pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11 at which 
the defendant entered a plea or pleas of guilty that was knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent.
 
McCard, ¶ 6, 78 P.3d  at 1042 (quoting Stout v. State, 2001 WY 114, ¶ 8, 35 P.3d 1198 
(Wyo. 2001)) (internal citations omitted).
 
[¶51]   In this case, we are charged with 
determining whether or not the district court abused its discretion in denying 
Dobbins’ pre-sentence motion to withdraw his no contest plea.  Dobbins filed his pre-sentence motion to 
withdraw his no contest plea, first in handwritten form on March 31, 2010 and 
then more formally (by his new attorney) on June 25, 2010.  In both, Dobbins focused exclusively on his 
claim that he had “insufficient counsel.”  At the hearing on his motion on August 
25, 2010, Dobbins (in his sworn testimony) and Dobbins’ counsel again focused on 
Dobbins’ contention that he did not have sufficient counsel.  At no time did Dobbins or his counsel 
assert that the district court improperly advised him under W.R.Cr.P. 11 at the 
time that he was entering his plea.  
Dobbins relied solely upon his contention that he lacked close assistance 
of counsel and, as such, had a fair and just reason for withdrawal of his 
plea.
 
[¶52]   On appeal Dobbins expanded his 
argument slightly to contend, albeit indirectly and only in the context of his 
discussion of lack of “close assistance” of counsel, that the district court 
failed to comply with W.R.Cr.P. 11.  
Based upon our review of the record before this Court, we can discern 
that Dobbins is asserting that the lack of close assistance of counsel coupled 
with the district court’s alleged failure to strictly comply with W.R.Cr.P. 11 
rendered his plea involuntary, thus giving him a “fair and just reason” for 
withdrawal of his plea.  Dobbins 
also asserts, on appeal, that the “trial court abused its discretion in its analysis of the motion and in denying 
the motion.”  (Emphasis 
added.)
 
1.                    
The 
Frame 
Factors
 
[¶53]   “On review we must determine 
whether the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any 
facet of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious.”  Kruger v. State, 2012 WY 2, ¶ 26, 
268 P.3d 248, 254 (Wyo. 2012).  
“[T]he findings of fact that led to denial of a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review, while the 
decision to deny the motion is reversed only if it constituted an abuse of 
discretion.”  McCard, ¶ 8, 78 P.3d 1043.
 
Seven 
factors have been suggested as pertinent to the exercise of the court’s 
discretion: (1) Whether the defendant has asserted his innocence; (2) whether 
the government would suffer prejudice; (3) whether the defendant has delayed in 
filing his motion; (4) whether withdrawal would substantially inconvenience the 
court; (5) whether close assistance of counsel was present; (6) whether the 
original plea was knowing and voluntary; and (7) whether the withdrawal would 
waste judicial resources.
 
Frame, 
¶ 7, 29 P.3d  at 89.
 
Our 
intention in setting out the list of factors in Frame was to provide guidance to the 
trial courts in making the determination of whether a defendant has presented a 
fair and just reason in support of the motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  The factors were also intended to assist 
us in reviewing the district court’s decision. . . .  We emphasize, however, that the factors 
were offered in Frame as a guide to the considerations that 
may be relevant in determining a motion to withdraw and consideration on the record or each 
specific factor by the court is not mandatory.  No single factor is dispositive, and the 
ultimate determination on the motion is based upon whether the defendant has 
carried his burden of establishing a fair and just reason for 
withdrawal.
 
Major, 
¶ 14, 83 P.3d  at 473 (emphasis added).8
 
[¶54]   
In this case, despite the fact that it was his burden to show “any 
fair and just reason” before the district court was required to permit 
withdrawal of his no contest plea, Dobbins did not argue any of the Frame factors in either his written 
motion to withdraw or in his oral argument at the hearing on the motion other 
than factor five (whether close assistance of counsel was present).  Nevertheless, the State did address each of the seven factors, 
and in making its ruling on the motion, the district court also analyzed the 
motion under the seven factors set forth in Frame.  Ultimately, paying special attention to 
the only factor that Dobbins addressed in his motion (factor five) the district 
court decided that “even if [it] 
considers item five, whether assistance of counsel was present, as neutral, . . 
. and the Court does not believe that [it] is neutral,” that “the other six [factors] 
have [clearly been established in the State’s argument].”  (Emphasis added.)  In ruling to deny Dobbins’ motion, the 
court “adopt[ed] those positions as articulated by the 
State.”
 
[¶55]   For purposes of our review, “[w]e 
do not need to do an in-depth review using the factors set out in Frame” because Dobbins’ “motion was 
based upon his complaints regarding his counsel.”  Major, ¶ 25, 83 P.3d  at 479.  We will, however, take a closer look at 
factors five and six.
 
Factor 
five: Whether close assistance of counsel was 
present
 
[¶56]   As proof for his allegation that he 
did not have close assistance of counsel, Dobbins testified under oath at the 
hearing on his motion that his counsel effectively ignored him when he 
approached him with the question as to whether or not he could plead no contest 
to Count II (incest) instead of to 
Count I (rape).  Based upon a 
thorough review of the record in this case, however, we find that just as has 
been found in previous cases in which this issue has arisen, Dobbins’ 
allegations were “self-serving” and lacked credibility.  Frame, ¶ 8, 29 P.3d  at 89-90 (see 
also McCarty, 883 P.2d at 376:  “However, McCarty’s 'reasons’ for 
withdrawing his plea were merely conclusive statements.”).
 
[¶57]   Dobbins testified that he 
approached his counsel by way of letter and telephone call with the question of 
whether or not he could plead “not guilty to Count I and no contest to the Count 
II” prior to the November 20, 2009 
change of plea hearing.  This would 
assume then, that prior to the change of 
plea hearing, Dobbins had some 
idea that this may be an option to pursue.  
He then testified that his understanding when he came into court for the 
change of plea hearing was that “I didn’t have that option.  I mean, I wasn’t aware that I had that 
option to go that direction.”  
However, he then stated: “I had 
to learn on my own that I had the option to plead no contest.  He either said plead guilty or – plead 
guilty or plead not guilty.  I didn’t know I had even had the option of 
pleading no contest.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Nevertheless, when asked 
when it was that he found out that he could plead no contest, he answered, 
“Through other inmates in jail.”
 
[¶58]   This Court finds Dobbins’ testimony 
regarding this issue contradictory or inconsistent at best.  On one hand he contends that he asked 
his counsel about other ways of pleading prior to his change of plea hearing and 
that his counsel ignored his question. On the other hand, he would have had the 
district court and now this Court believe that it was not until after he pleaded no contest to Count I and 
went to jail to await sentencing that he learned from the other inmates that he 
could have pleaded differently.
 
[¶59]   Additionally, Dobbins was 
questioned directly by the district court on three separate occasions as to 
whether or not he was satisfied with his legal representation.  At the arraignment and at the hearing on 
his motion to continue sentencing, Dobbins’ answer to the court’s inquiry was an 
unequivocal “yeah.”  The third time 
he was asked (at the change of plea hearing), again personally and directly by 
the district court, as to whether or not he was satisfied with his legal 
representation, Dobbins answered: “To the best I understand it, 
yes.”
 
[¶60]   Furthermore, just as in Frame, “the record belies [his] direct 
allegations.”  Id. ¶ 8, 29 P.3d  at 89.  Dobbins’ counsel closely represented him 
at a contested preliminary hearing on May 6, 2009 at which time Dobbins’ counsel 
examined the victim in this case, whom Dobbins had subpoenaed.  Dobbins’ counsel appeared before the 
court with Dobbins at his May 26, 2009 arraignment as well as the November 20, 
2009 change of plea hearing.  Between the May 26, 2009 arraignment and 
December of 2009, Dobbins’ counsel filed five motions with the court including a 
Motion for Continuance, Motion for Disclosure of Rule 404(b) Evidence and Motion 
for Exclusion of Same, Defendant’s Pretrial Memorandum, Motion for Daubert 
Hearing and/or Motion in Limine, and Motion for Change of Venue 
and/or Motion in Limine.  Dobbins’ counsel also appeared with him 
before the court at the January 20, 2010 hearing, which was originally to be a 
sentencing hearing, but was, at Dobbins’ request, used for a hearing to request 
a psychosexual evaluation prior to sentencing.9
 
[¶61]   Finally, while perhaps not directly 
bearing on the issue of whether or not Dobbins had close assistance of counsel 
but rather bearing on the issue of Dobbins’ credibility, we find it compelling 
that the change of plea hearing was held on November 20, 2009.  Dobbins had all of December of 2009, all 
of January of 2010, all of February of 2010, and a portion of March of 2010 
during which time the record is silent as to Dobbins’ desire to withdraw his 
plea, including the January 20, 2010 
hearing – a time which would have been a perfect opportunity (insofar as he had 
the district court’s ear) for Dobbins to express his concern about the lack of 
close assistance of counsel and/or his concerns about the plea he entered in 
November.  However, as stated by the 
State, at no time during these three and a half months following his change of 
plea does he make a request to the court.
 
He 
makes no request to the Court.  He 
doesn’t say, 'Your Honor, I just learned from other inmates that I could do a 
no-contest plea to Count II.’ Or, 'Your Honor, boy, this is all screwy. That’s 
not what I intended to do.’  We have 
an extended period of time where we hear nothing from Mr. Dobbins, nothing at 
all, until the victim dies. And then we have the 'I want to change my plea’ 
argument.’
 
Factor 
six: Whether the original plea was knowing and 
voluntary
 
[¶62]               
Whether or not a plea was knowing and voluntary is determined by an 
analysis within the context of W.R.Cr.P. 11:
     W.R.Cr.P. 11(d) 
requires a district court to assure that a plea is voluntary and not the result 
of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement.  The purpose of this rule is to allow the 
judge to determine whether the defendant entered the plea voluntarily and with 
an understanding of the consequences of the plea.  This court looks to the totality of the 
circumstances to determine the voluntariness of a 
plea.
 
Major, ¶ 11, 83 P.3d  at 472 (internal 
citations omitted) (emphasis added).  
Furthermore,
 
[A] 
plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including 
the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his 
own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue 
improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable 
promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no 
proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g. bribes).
 
Id., ¶ 11, 83 P.3d  at 472 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 
755, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed. 2d 747(1970), quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 
572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957), rev’d on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26, 78 S. Ct. 563, 2 L. Ed. 2d 579 (1958)).
 
[¶63]   In this case there is absolutely no 
indication in the record that Dobbins’ plea of no contest was induced by 
threats, misrepresentation, or “promises that are by their nature improper as 
having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g., bribes).”  Major, ¶ 11, 83 P.3d  at 472.  As a result, Dobbins’ plea of no contest 
must stand if we determine that he entered his plea “fully aware of the direct 
consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the 
court, prosecutor, or his own counsel.”  
Id.
 
[¶64]   In this case, we believe (as did 
the district court) that Dobbins entered his plea of no contest “voluntarily and 
with an understanding of the consequences.”  Major, ¶ 11, 83 P.3d 472.  At Dobbins’ arraignment, the court 
personally informed Dobbins of his constitutional right to “plead guilty; not 
guilty; not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency; or, with the 
consent of the Court, no contest or nolo 
contendere.”
 
[¶65]   Next, Dobbins was advised of the 
charges and potential penalties, and the felony information, including the 
minimum and maximum penalties provided by law as to each charge being pursued by 
the State, was read.10  Dobbins was also advised of the 
additional penalties he would face, including monetary assessments.  While at this juncture in the 
proceedings when questioned personally by the court Dobbins expressed some 
uncertainty in what he was being charged with, and he ultimately (after defense 
counsel explained the counts and penalties further) indicated his understanding 
of both the charges against him as well as the penalties.
 
[¶66]   At the actual change of plea 
hearing at which time Dobbins pleaded no contest, Dobbins again expressed his 
understanding of his rights (including a right to speedy trial, right to having 
the State prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, his right to not 
testify, and his right to appeal any errors of law).  Dobbins’ attorney then proceeded to 
inform the court that a plea agreement had been reached and that Dobbins would 
be entering a plea of no contest to Count I of the felony information, that the 
State would be dismissing Count II, and that there was no agreement as to 
sentencing.  When addressed by the 
court regarding the plea agreement, Dobbins responded clearly that that was his 
understanding as well.
 
[¶67]   Following Dobbins’ plea, the Court 
determined that in addition to the fact that Dobbins had not been promised 
anything to change his plea or threatened, Dobbins was aware of and understood 
the factual basis for the charges, and that he was knowingly and voluntarily 
pleading no contest to Count I.
 
[¶68]   Moreover, at what was originally to 
be Dobbins’ sentencing hearing, but what turned out to be a request by Dobbins 
for a postponement in order to allow Dobbins to undergo a psychosexual 
evaluation prior to sentencing, Dobbins, through his counsel, indicated his 
willingness and “anxious[ness]” to “get this behind him and to move 
forward.”  At no time prior to his 
filing of his motion to withdraw his no contest plea did Dobbins express or 
indicate that he had entered his plea involuntarily or without knowing the 
consequences of the plea.
 
[¶69]   Furthermore, at the actual hearing 
on Dobbins’ motion to withdraw his no contest plea, Dobbins admitted on 
cross-examination that he remembered having been told at the arraignment of the 
maximum and minimum penalties for the charges and the ways he could plead to 
each.  Dobbins admitted that at the 
hearing when he pleaded no contest, he could recall the court having again 
advised him of his rights, of the prosecutor having put the plea agreement on 
the record, having had his own counsel confirm the plea agreement, and the 
prosecutor then providing the factual basis for the 
charge.
 
[¶70]   When looking at the “totality of 
the circumstances,” there is no question that Dobbins entered his plea “fully 
aware of the direct consequences.” Major, ¶ 11, 83 P.3d  at 
472.
 
[¶71]   We conclude that the district court 
properly analyzed Dobbins’ pre-sentence motion to withdraw, that it could have 
rationally concluded as it did, and that Dobbins did not present any “fair and 
just reason” to withdraw his no contest plea.  Dobbins failed to meet his burden.  He did not demonstrate lack of close 
assistance of counsel or that his plea was entered into involuntarily or 
unknowingly.  Also, in accordance 
with our thorough analysis of W.R.Cr.P. 11 in connection with Dobbins’ 
post-sentence motion to withdraw his plea, we find that any variation from the 
strictures of that rule by the district court in this case, under the specific 
facts of this case, did not deprive Dobbins of his constitutional rights and did 
not rise to the level of reversible error.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶72]   Having found that any error by the 
district court in its advisements under W.R.Cr.P. 11 did not affect Dobbins’ 
substantial rights and is, therefore, harmless pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11(h); 
having also found that Dobbins entered into his plea of no contest voluntarily 
and knowingly, and that at all times Dobbins had close assistance of counsel; we 
affirm the district court’s denial of both Dobbins’ pre-sentence and 
post-sentence motions to withdraw his no contest plea.  The judgment and sentence entered in 
this case is, therefore, also affirmed.
 
FOOTNOTES
 
  1The consolidated 
appeal stems from two orders of the district court: the Sentence Order, entered 
on November 23, 2010, and the Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw No 
Contest Plea, entered on August 15, 2011.
   2Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-302(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2011) provides:
 
§ 
6-2-302.  Sexual assault in the first degree.
(a) Any 
actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in the 
first degree if:
. 
. . . 
(iii) The 
victim is physically helpless, and the actor knows or reasonably should know 
that the victim is physically helpless and that the victim has not 
consented[.]
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-301(a)(vii) (LexisNexis 2011) provides:
 
§ 
6-2-301.  Definitions.
(a)   As 
used in this article:
. 
. . .
(vii) “Sexual 
intrusion” means:
(A) Any 
intrusion, however slight, by any object or any part of a person's body, except 
the mouth, tongue or penis, into the genital or anal opening of another person's 
body if that sexual intrusion can reasonably be construed as being for the 
purposes of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse; or
(B) Sexual 
intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus or anal intercourse with or 
without emission.
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-4-402(a)(b) (LexisNexis 2011) provides:
 
§ 
6-4-402.  Incest[.]
(a) A 
person is guilty of incest if he knowingly commits sexual intrusion, as defined 
by W.S. 
6-2-301(a)(vii), or sexual contact, as 
defined by W.S. 
6-2-301(a)(vi), with an ancestor or 
descendant or a brother or sister of the whole or half blood. The relationships 
referred to herein include relationships of:
(i) Parent 
and child by adoption;
(ii) Blood 
relationships without regard to legitimacy; and
(iii) Stepparent 
and stepchild.
(b) Incest 
is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than fifteen (15) years, a 
fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or 
both.
 

  3As noted by the 
prosecutor during the hearing on Dobbins’ second motion to withdraw no-contest 
plea, multiple defendants were present during this 
arraignment.
   4The seven 
factors listed in Van Haele v. State, 
2004 WY 59, 90 P.3d 708 (Wyo. 2004) are the factors set forth by the Fifth 
Circuit in United States v. Carr, 740 F.2d 339, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004, 85 L. Ed. 2d 159, 105 S. Ct. 1865 (1985), to be considered when determining what constitutes a 
“fair and just” reason for withdrawal of a plea.  The factors were adopted by the Tenth 
Circuit in United States v. Hickok, 
907 F.2d 983, 985-86 n.2 (10th Cir. 1990), and subsequently by this Court in Frame v. State, 2001 WY 72, ¶ 7, 29 P.3d 86, 89 (Wyo. 2001).  They are 
often referred to by this Court as “the Frame 
factors.”
  5Rule 35, Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, states:
 
Rule 
35. Corection or reduction of sentence.
 
   (a) Correction. -- The court may correct an 
illegal sentence at any time. Additionally the court may correct, reduce, or 
modify a sentence within the time and in the manner provided herein for the 
reduction of sentence.
 
   (b) Reduction. -- A motion to reduce a 
sentence may be made, or the court may reduce a sentence without motion, within 
one year after the sentence is imposed or probation is revoked, or within one 
year after receipt by the court of a mandate issued upon affirmance of the 
judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within one year after entry of any order 
or judgment of the Wyoming Supreme Court denying review of, or having the effect 
of upholding, a judgment of conviction or probation revocation. The court shall 
determine the motion within a reasonable time. Changing a sentence from a 
sentence of incarceration to a grant of probation shall constitute a permissible 
reduction of sentence under this subdivision. The court may determine the motion 
with or without a hearing.
  6The issue of 
whether or not Dobbins had close assistance of counsel is the subject of 
Dobbins’ pre-sentence motion to withdraw no contest plea and will be discussed 
in detail in our analysis of that motion.
  7See discussion 
on Dobbins’ pre-sentence motion to withdraw plea.
  8“When making an 
argument in favor of a motion to withdraw a plea before the district court, 
however, it would be to the defendant’s advantage to present any arguments 
relating to these specific factors, or any others that may arise, which favor 
granting the motion.”  Major v. State, 2004 WY 4, ¶ 14, 
n.4, 83 P.3d 468, 473 (Wyo. 2004).
  9Of particular interest given 
Dobbins’ allegations that his counsel failed to communicate with him at the 
January 20, 2010 hearing (at a time when Dobbins’ counsel would have no 
“ulterior motive to cover his tracks”) Dobbins’ counsel states in relevant part, 
“I’ve talked to Mr. Dobbins about this, 
and he’s anxious to get this behind him …, but he, too, agrees…” and “I’ve 
discussed with Mr. Dobbins that … he 
is willing to do that.”  (Emphasis added.)
   10The advisements 
of the charges and potential penalties were made by the prosecutor at the 
court’s request.  This Court 
recognizes that this is a major criticism by Dobbins in his appeal of his 
post-sentence motion to withdraw his plea.  
However, we fully analyzed the issue in our discussion of the 
post-sentence motion to withdraw and found no reversible error.