Case Title: Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Taylor

Citation: 

Docket Number: 090845

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2009-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn and Millette, JJ., 
and Carrico and Russell, S.JJ. 
 
JUDICIAL INQUIRY AND REVIEW 
COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA 
 OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 090845 
 
JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
November 5, 2009 
 
RAMONA D. TAYLOR, JUDGE OF 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
 
 
The Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission (“the 
Commission”) filed the present complaint against Ramona D. 
Taylor, Judge of the Second Judicial District, pursuant to the 
original jurisdiction of this Court set forth in Article VI, 
§ 10 of the Constitution of Virginia and Code § 17.1-902.  The 
Commission asserted that its charges against Judge Taylor for 
allegedly violating the Canons of Judicial Conduct (“the 
Canons”) are well founded in fact and are of sufficient 
gravity to constitute the basis for censure by this Court. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
On January 13, 2009, the Commission issued a Notice 
establishing formal charges against Judge Taylor that she had 
engaged in misconduct or engaged in conduct prejudicial to the 
proper administration of justice while serving as a judge in 
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court for the 
City of Virginia Beach (“the juvenile and domestic relations 
court”).  Judge Taylor was charged with alleged violations of 
Canons 1, 2, 2A, and 3B(2). 
The Commission alleged that on May 2, 2007, at the 
conclusion of an adjudicatory hearing on a misdemeanor assault 
charge against a 15 year old defendant (“K.M.”), who was not 
then in custody, Judge Taylor found K.M. guilty following his 
plea of “not innocent.”  During the adjudicatory hearing, the 
Commission alleged, “someone in the courtroom audience blurted 
out that [K.M] had used a racial epithet toward the victim of 
the assault,” and Judge Taylor called witnesses to the stand 
to testify about the use of the racial epithet.  According to 
the Commission, Judge Taylor found that K.M. represented a 
risk of harm to the community, and remanded him to custody 
pending a sentencing hearing scheduled for May 24, 2007. 
The Commission further alleged that Judge Taylor denied 
K.M.’s request for immediate sentencing so that an appeal 
could be noted, and ordered that a social history be compiled 
for the sentencing hearing.  In addition, the Commission 
alleged that Judge Taylor denied K.M.’s May 2, 2007 written 
motion for bond and release pending the sentencing hearing by 
order entered on May 3, 2007 that expressly stated it was “an 
interlocutory, non-appealable order” (“May 3rd order”). 
The Commission further contended that, by letter from his 
counsel dated May 4, 2007, K.M. sought reconsideration of the 
 
2
May 3rd order.  The Commission alleged that K.M.’s four-page 
letter outlined K.M.’s factual and legal argument in support 
of bond, his appeal of the denial of bond to the next higher 
court, and his request for an immediate sentencing so that he 
could immediately appeal, because otherwise denying bail and 
imposing incarceration would make K.M.’s right to a de novo 
appeal meaningless.  However, according to the Commission, 
Judge Taylor denied reconsideration by an order in which she 
maintained her position that the denial of K.M.’s motion for 
bond and release was interlocutory and non-appealable (“May 
8th order”).1  The Commission alleged that when K.M. attempted 
to appeal his case, the clerk of the juvenile and domestic 
relations court (“the clerk of court” or “clerk”) refused to 
process the appeal, and K.M. filed a petition for writ of 
mandamus against the clerk in the Circuit Court for the City 
of Virginia Beach (“the circuit court”).  The writ of 
mandamus, which was granted by order dated May 11, 2007, 
directed the clerk of court to process an appeal of Judge 
Taylor’s order.  After a bond hearing also conducted on May 
11th, the circuit court released K.M. to the custody of his 
parents. 
                     
1 Judge Taylor entered a “Corrective Order” containing the 
same language that “[t]his order is an interlocutory, 
nonappealable order” on May 8, 2007 nunc pro tunc May 3, 2007. 
 
3
In Judge Taylor’s answer to the Notice of formal charges, 
she maintained that she did not recall whether K.M.’s counsel 
requested an immediate sentencing.  Judge Taylor admitted that 
she entered the May 3rd order denying K.M.’s motion for bond 
and release pending the sentencing hearing, and that K.M. 
requested reconsideration of that order.  However, Judge 
Taylor denied that K.M.’s counsel cited to authority that 
clearly gave K.M. the right to appeal the decision denying 
bail and asserted that the authority cited by K.M.’s counsel 
is “subject to contrary legal interpretations with regard to 
its applicability to juvenile defendants detained post-
adjudication and pre-disposition.” 
Judge Taylor admitted that at the mandamus hearing, the 
attorney for the clerk of court asserted that the clerk was 
“under a direct order by [Judge Taylor] as the Chief Judge not 
to process the defendant’s appeal,” but averred that the 
attorney incorrectly stated the capacity in which Judge Taylor 
served when she advised the clerk regarding the appealability 
of the May 3rd order.  Judge Taylor asserted that she was 
functioning as the presiding judge, not as the chief judge, at 
all times when addressing the clerk regarding the 
appealability of the May 3rd order.  Judge Taylor therefore 
requested that the formal charges asserted in the Commission’s 
Notice be dismissed. 
 
4
On March 10, 2009, the Commission conducted an 
evidentiary hearing on the charges, at which time Judge Taylor 
was present and represented by counsel.  The Commission 
members voted unanimously to bifurcate the hearing as follows:  
(1) evidence about a violation of the Canons, and if the 
Commission found a violation, then (2) other evidence 
regarding the appropriate sanction, if any. 
As part of the evidence before the Commission, the 
parties stipulated that when K.M.’s counsel tried to file a 
notice of appeal to the May 3rd order, the deputy clerk 
advised Judge Taylor that K.M.’s counsel was attempting to 
file a notice of appeal and Judge Taylor “confirmed that the 
order by its express terms was not appealable, but did not 
state to the deputy clerk that the notice of appeal should not 
be accepted.”  The parties further stipulated that “[t]he 
deputy clerk then informed [K.M.’s counsel] that the order was 
not appealable and, therefore, the notice of appeal would not 
be accepted.” 
Judge Taylor testified that at the conclusion of the May 
2, 2007 hearing on K.M.’s misdemeanor assault charge, she 
ordered K.M. securely detained “in order to safeguard the 
community” and ordered a social history, which is a complete 
background investigation on K.M.  Judge Taylor testified that 
 
5
she did not recall K.M.’s counsel’s request for a final 
appealable order. 
Judge Taylor testified that in ruling on K.M.’s motion 
for reconsideration, she said to his counsel: 
[W]hat I’m going to do is I’m going 
to put all of my authority [in the order] 
to make sure that . . . just in case you 
get a Circuit Court judge who we were 
talking about, you know, perhaps a Circuit 
Court judge shooting from the hip, and 
that was the expression that I had used, 
thinking that a lot of times they were 
busy, they had a very hectic docket, and 
because we deal with these juvenile codes 
so frequently, I wanted to make sure that 
the Circuit Court judge was aware I was 
relying upon the Juvenile Code. 
 
Judge Taylor stated that when the deputy clerk asked her 
whether the May 3rd order was appealable, she “may have said 
something like, Well, I’ve already addressed that in my order, 
and that was the end of it.”  Later in the hearing, Judge 
Taylor testified that when the deputy clerk asked her if the 
 
6
order was appealable, Judge Taylor said, “[a]s my order 
states, no.  I don’t believe it’s appealable.” 
When Judge Taylor was asked at the hearing if it was 
apparent to her that the deputy clerk inquired into the May 
3rd order’s appealability because the deputy clerk was trying 
to decide whether to process the appeal, Judge Taylor replied, 
“[y]es.”  Nevertheless, Judge Taylor testified that it was the 
deputy clerk’s responsibility to consult the clerk of court on 
how to proceed, and if doubt remained, it was the clerk’s 
office’s responsibility to call this Court to obtain guidance 
on the matter.2  Judge Taylor testified that she would not 
                     
2 Although Judge Taylor repeatedly asserted that the 
clerk’s office should have contacted the Supreme Court of 
Virginia to obtain guidance, she was presumably referring to 
the Office of the Executive Secretary (OES), which would be 
the appropriate administrative department of this Court to 
contact under these circumstances.  OES provides 
administrative support for all of the courts and magistrate 
offices within the Commonwealth.  Office of the Executive 
Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia, The Official 
Website for the Supreme Court of Virginia, Court 
Administration—Office of the Executive Secretary (OES), 
http://www.courts.state.va.us/courtadmin/aoc/oes/home.html 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2009).  Within the OES, the Department 
of Judicial Services (DJS) serves as the liaison between the 
judiciary’s administrative offices and the courts throughout 
the Commonwealth, providing administrative services through 
publications, trainings, field visits, and the research and 
support of various programs.  Id. (follow “Judicial Services” 
hyperlink to 
http://www.courts.state.va.us/courtadmin/aoc/djs/home.html 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2009)).  The Juvenile and Domestic 
Relations District Court Services division of the DJS provides 
guidance and assistance to juvenile and domestic relations 
 
7
instruct the clerk’s office on what measures to take, as “that 
is not [her] function as the judge” and “frankly, as the 
judge, [she does not] get involved in the mechanics of 
appeals.”  Judge Taylor reiterated her position by stating:  
“What I have stated and what I sincerely believe is that my 
duties as the presiding judge were to decide the case; my 
duties were finished.”  In Judge Taylor’s opinion, the clerk’s 
office had  
 
the responsibility, independent of the language in the May 3rd 
order, to accept or deny K.M.’s appeal, depending on the 
guidelines the clerk’s office received from this Court [OES]. 
Judge Taylor described her May 8th order denying K.M.’s 
motion to rehear as merely a way to “red flag that there was 
an appealability problem” for the circuit court.  Judge Taylor 
stated, “I don’t believe that the legislators, for whatever 
reason, intended juveniles to be included within the appeal 
provisions for bond determinations under 19.2-124.”  Judge 
Taylor continued, “[s]o for whatever reason, juveniles, I 
believe, are treated separately,” as she believed Code 
§§ 19.2-124 and 19.2-319 are inapplicable to juvenile 
                                                                
district court judges and clerks on caseflow management and 
case processing, among other things.  Id.  We therefore 
 
8
detention.  Judge Taylor testified that “[a]s the judge 
interpreting the statute, what [she] indicated to [K.M.’s] 
attorney was that [she] did not believe that with regard to 
where [K.M.] was in the proceeding, that he had a right to 
appeal his detention status.”  According to Judge Taylor, 
“[i]t was a legal determination that because of his status, 
post-adjudication/pre-disposition, that he didn’t have the 
right to appeal.” 
Judge Taylor maintained that when she entered the May 3rd 
order she “fully expected” K.M.’s counsel to appeal it.  For 
that reason, Judge Taylor contended that she was merely 
“flagging” the issue of the appealability of the order for the 
circuit court, but did not “rule” on that issue.  Judge Taylor 
explained: 
I wanted the Circuit Court judge to know I 
had a concern about it.  So by saying this 
order is an interlocutory, non-appealable 
order, that wasn’t a ruling because that was 
really for the Circuit Court to look at and to 
decide whether this case should be properly 
appealed to that court. 
                                                                
reference OES in brackets when Judge Taylor refers to this 
Court in relevant portions of her argument. 
 
9
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
After the hearing, the Commission determined that Judge 
Taylor violated Canons 1, 2A, and 3B(2), and “that the charges 
set forth in the Notice were well-founded and of sufficient 
gravity to constitute the basis for censure.”  The Commission 
made an express finding by clear and convincing evidence that 
Judge Taylor had acted intentionally to thwart K.M.’s attempt 
to appeal from the order that denied his request for bail. 
The Commission then considered additional evidence and 
argument regarding the appropriate sanction.  In determining 
whether to file a formal complaint in this Court pursuant to 
Article VI, § 10 of the Constitution of Virginia and Code 
§ 17.1-902, the Commission considered two exhibits pertaining 
to Judge Taylor’s two prior informal contacts with the 
Commission.  Judge Taylor’s counsel objected to the exhibits, 
because (1) the informal contacts had resulted in dismissals, 
arguing that dismissals are inappropriate for consideration by 
the Commission, and (2) the exhibits were irrelevant and more 
prejudicial than probative.  The Commission received the 
exhibits into evidence “for the purpose of final disposition.”  
Upon deliberation, the Commission decided that the charges of 
violations of the Canons were well founded and of sufficient 
 
10
gravity to constitute the basis for censure and filed a 
complaint against Judge Taylor in this Court. 
Judge Taylor filed a post-hearing motion to dismiss and 
for other relief, seeking reconsideration and dismissal of the 
complaint on the basis that the evidence at the hearing 
revealed “nothing more tha[n] mere legal errors which cannot 
support a finding that any of the pertinent Canons of Judicial 
Conduct were violated.”  Judge Taylor asserted that there was 
“no evidence in the record” that she “knowingly and/or 
willingly violated any statutes or legal rights,” and that 
“she did not knowingly and/or willingly commit any legal 
errors.” 
Judge Taylor also requested that the Commission 
reconsider the admission and use of documents relating to 
“prior contacts” between Judge Taylor and the Commission, 
contending that there is no legal basis for the use of such 
documents.  Judge Taylor argued that any slight probative 
value of the documents is substantially outweighed by their 
prejudicial effect, the use of such documents violates her 
right of confidentiality in the Commission’s review process, 
 
11
and denies her equal protection and due process rights under 
the United States and Virginia Constitutions.3 
Judge Taylor also asserted that an email written by the 
chairman of the Commission, Judge Larry D. Willis, Jr., to the 
juvenile and domestic relations court appeared to have 
“prompted and/or played a role” in one of Judge Taylor’s prior 
informal contacts with the Commission.  Therefore, Judge 
Taylor argued that Judge Willis should have recused himself. 
Additionally, Judge Taylor argued that as applied to the 
facts of the complaint against her, the Canons are 
unconstitutionally vague and without appropriately definite 
standards, resulting in an arbitrary and capricious process. 
The Commission denied Judge Taylor’s motion by order 
dated April 14, 2009.  In an accompanying letter, which 
addressed the admission of documents relating to prior 
contacts, the Commission stated that, pursuant to Code § 17.1-
913, whatever record the Commission files with its complaint 
in this Court becomes public.  The Commission also maintained 
that certain exhibits would not be sealed because they, or the 
information they contained, had already become public as part 
of the circuit court file. 
                     
3 Judge Taylor has abandoned her equal protection argument 
in this Court. 
 
12
On April 28, 2009, the Commission filed its complaint 
with this Court.  In her answer to the Commission’s complaint, 
Judge Taylor alleged that the evidence in the record was 
insufficient to establish that she “knowingly and/or willingly 
violated any statutes, legal rights and/or [the] [C]anons.”  
In addition, Judge Taylor alleged that there is no factual 
basis for any findings against her, that her motion to dismiss 
and for other relief is well-founded, and that there is 
insufficient basis for a censure. 
II. CANONS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
 
The relevant portions of the Canons at issue in this case 
are: 
 
Canon 1. A Judge Should Uphold the 
Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary. 
 
 
A. An independent and honorable 
judiciary is indispensable to justice in 
our society.  A judge should participate in 
establishing, maintaining and enforcing 
high standards of conduct, and shall 
personally observe those standards so that 
the integrity and independence of the 
judiciary will be preserved.  The 
provisions of these Canons are to be 
 
13
construed and applied to further that 
objective. 
 
Canon 2. A Judge Shall Avoid 
Impropriety and the Appearance of 
Impropriety in All of the Judge’s 
Activities. 
 
A. A judge shall respect and comply 
with the law and shall act at all times in 
a manner that promotes public confidence in 
the integrity and impartiality of the 
judiciary. 
 
. . . . 
 
Canon 3. A Judge Shall Perform the 
Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and 
Diligently. 
 
. . . . 
 
B. Adjudicative Responsibilities.–  
 
. . . . 
 
(2) A judge shall be faithful to 
the law and maintain professional 
competence in it. . . . 
 
 
14
Va. Sup. Ct. R., Part 6, § III, Canons 1, 2, and 3. 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
The Commission’s filing of a formal complaint in this 
Court triggered our duty to conduct a hearing in open court 
for the purpose of determining whether Judge Taylor “engaged 
in misconduct while in office, or . . . has engaged in conduct 
prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.”  Va. 
Const. art. VI, § 10. 
In conducting the hearing on the formal 
complaint filed by the Commission, this Court 
considers the evidence and makes factual 
determinations de novo.  The Commission must 
prove its charges in this Court by clear and 
convincing evidence.  The term “clear and 
convincing evidence” has been defined as “that 
measure or degree of proof which will produce 
in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief 
or conviction as to the allegations sought to 
be established.  It is intermediate, being more 
than a mere preponderance, but not to the 
extent of such certainty as is required beyond 
 
15
a reasonable doubt in criminal cases.  It does 
not mean clear and unequivocal.” 
 
Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm’n v. Lewis, 264 Va. 401, 
405, 568 S.E.2d 687, 689 (2002) (citations omitted).  Factual 
determinations, findings and opinions of the Commission are 
not accorded any particular weight nor deference.  Judicial 
Inquiry & Review Comm’n v. Peatross, 269 Va. 428, 444, 611 
S.E.2d 392, 400 (2005).  If after conducting a de novo review 
of the record and hearing argument of counsel, we find clear 
and convincing evidence that the judge has engaged in 
misconduct while in office or has engaged in conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice, we shall censure 
the judge or remove the judge from office.  Va. Const. art. 
VI, § 10; Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm’n v. Shull, 274 Va. 
657, 670, 651 S.E.2d 648, 656 (2007). 
Judge Taylor presents us with four issues to consider: 
(1) Whether the record proves by clear and convincing 
evidence that Judge Taylor engaged in misconduct while 
in office or engaged in conduct prejudicial to the 
proper administration of justice sufficient to prove 
the charged violations of the Canons; 
 
16
(2) Whether the Canons, as applied to Judge Taylor and the 
record in this case, are sufficiently definite and 
certain for purposes of due process; 
(3) Whether it was lawful for the Commission to consider 
evidence of Judge Taylor’s “prior contacts” with the 
Commission; and  
(4) Whether Judge Taylor is entitled to any relief based on 
the conflict/recusal issue addressed in her post-
hearing motion to dismiss. 
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
 
The Commission argues that the record proves by 
clear and convincing evidence that Judge Taylor engaged in 
misconduct while in office or in conduct prejudicial to the 
proper administration of justice.  As an initial matter, the 
Commission asserts that K.M. had the right to appeal Judge 
Taylor’s denial of bail.  The Commission maintains that “it is 
a fundamental precept of Virginia criminal procedure that all 
decisions denying bail are appealable by the defendant, at 
least until such appeals reach this Court.”  The Commission 
contends that all criminal cases involve either pretrial bail, 
the denial of which is appealable pursuant to Code § 19.2-124, 
or post-conviction bail in circuit court, the denial of which 
is appealable pursuant to Code § 19.2-319.  The Commission 
 
17
further argues that because appeals from a district court 
conviction are de novo, a defendant remains in pretrial status 
for bail purposes throughout the district court proceedings.  
The Commission cites Code § 19.2-120(A) and (E), which state: 
A. A person who is held in custody pending 
trial or hearing for an offense, civil or 
criminal contempt, or otherwise shall be 
admitted to bail by a judicial officer, unless 
there is probable cause to believe that: 
 
1. He will not appear for trial or hearing 
or at such other time and place as may be 
directed, or 
 
2. His liberty will constitute an 
unreasonable danger to himself or the public. 
 
. . . . 
 
E. The judicial officer shall inform 
the person of his right to appeal from the 
order denying bail or fixing terms of bond 
or recognizance consistent with § 19.2-
124. 
 
18
 
(Emphasis added.)  Furthermore, the Commission points out 
that Code § 19.2-124(A) provides that 
[i]f a judicial officer denies bail 
to a person, requires excessive bond, or 
fixes unreasonable terms of a recognizance 
under this article, the person may appeal 
therefrom successively to the next higher 
court or judge thereof, up to and 
including the Supreme Court of Virginia or 
any justice thereof where permitted by 
law. 
 
According to the Commission, these statutes when read 
together make it clear that K.M. had a right to appeal Judge 
Taylor’s denial of bond, as he remained within the status of 
“[a] person who is held in custody pending . . . hearing . . . 
or otherwise.”  Code § 19.2-120(A).  The Commission asserts 
that K.M. falls within the definition of “person” contained in 
Code § 19.2-119:  “ ‘Person’ means any accused, or any 
juvenile taken into custody pursuant to § 16.1-246.”  The 
Commission argues that nothing in the Code justified the 
exception Judge Taylor carved out for a juvenile held “post-
adjudication/pre-disposition.”  The Commission contends there 
 
19
is no plausible support in Virginia law for Judge Taylor’s 
conclusion that a “no appeal zone” exists in the juvenile and 
domestic relations court when a juvenile is first taken into 
custody at the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing and bail 
is denied pending a final disposition hearing. 
The Commission argues that even if this Court determines 
Judge Taylor’s actions were “mere legal error,” this Court 
should not excuse the manner in which she “arrogated to 
herself the power to rule that her own decision was immune 
from appellate review.”  At oral argument, the Commission 
asserted, “there’s a difference between wrongly concluding 
that [the May 3rd order] wasn’t appealable and ruling, putting 
in your order that it’s not appealable and then taking action 
subsequent[ly] that effectively blocked the appeal.”  
Additionally, the Commission contends this Court should not 
excuse Judge Taylor’s refusal to retreat from her untenable 
position when given ample opportunity to do so.  The 
Commission avers that Judge Taylor violated the Canons by her 
clear misappropriation of judicial power, which constituted 
“conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.”  
Va. Const. art. VI, § 10. 
The Commission asserts that this Court should reject 
Judge Taylor’s contention that she did not “rule” that her 
order could not be appealed and that she included the 
 
20
“nonappealable” language in the May 3rd order only to “flag” 
the issue for the circuit court.  As support for this 
argument, the Commission points out that Judge Taylor referred 
to her action as a ruling in an email to her fellow juvenile 
and domestic relations court judges, in which Judge Taylor 
wrote: 
I found after an adjudicatory hearing that 
[K.M.] posed a substantial risk of harm to the 
community and ordered him to be securely 
detained pending disposition.  [K.M.’s counsel] 
filed a motion the next day requesting that 
[K.M.] be released on bond.  I denied that 
request and ruled that the order was 
interlocutory and nonappealable. . . . I ruled 
that the order was not appealable . . . . 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Also, the Commission asserts that in 
Judge Taylor’s answer to the Notice of formal charges, she did 
not deny ruling that the order was nonappealable and did not 
at that time state that she merely flagged the issue for the 
circuit court. 
The Commission argues that the clerk of court believed 
that the clerk’s office of the juvenile and domestic relations 
court was compelled by the May 3rd order to reject K.M.’s 
 
21
notice of appeal, because the order stated it was “an 
interlocutory, nonappealable order.”  The Commission asserts 
that when the deputy clerk consulted Judge Taylor about 
whether the May 3rd order was appealable, Judge Taylor’s only 
response of directing the deputy clerk to the order was 
tantamount to insuring that the clerk’s office would decline 
to process the notice of appeal.  The Commission contends that 
Judge Taylor violated the Canons by directly thwarting an 
appeal by ruling that her own decision was not subject to 
appeal and by advising the deputy clerk that the order was not 
appealable, when Judge Taylor knew the clerk was faced with 
the decision whether to accept a notice of appeal from K.M.’s 
attorney. 
Judge Taylor contends that nothing in the record supports 
the Commission’s assertion that she violated any of the 
subject Canons.  Rather, Judge Taylor argues, the record shows 
that she attempted to apply the law exactly as it is written 
and the Commission offered no plausible theory to support its 
assertion that she committed a clear misappropriation of 
judicial power. 
Judge Taylor maintains that a post-adjudication, pre-
disposition detention pursuant to Code § 16.1-248.1(G) does 
not implicate Code § 19.2-124 bail appeal rights because the 
proceeding is no longer in the pretrial stage.  Furthermore, 
 
22
Judge Taylor asserts that Code § 19.2-120 distinguishes “bail” 
from “detention,” and subsection E of that statute directs a 
judicial officer to “inform the person of his right to appeal 
from the order denying bail or fixing the terms of bond or 
recognizance,” but does not mention “detention.”  According to 
Judge Taylor, “[g]iving due consideration to the words 
actually used by the General Assembly in the subject statutes, 
[her] reading of the provisions is correct or, at a minimum, 
plausible and supportable.” 
Judge Taylor reiterated that the language in the May 3rd 
order that it was an “interlocutory, nonappealable” order was 
included to flag the order for the circuit court to ensure 
that the appealability issue would be addressed.  Judge Taylor 
contends that this Court’s prior opinions addressing 
complaints brought by the Commission support dismissal of the 
complaint against her.  Judge Taylor asserts that her case is 
distinguishable from Lewis, as there is no allegation nor 
evidence that she defied or disrespected an order of any 
higher court.  264 Va. at 406, 568 S.E.2d at 690.  Moreover, 
according to Judge Taylor, the statutes at issue leave room 
for a difference of opinion, and she argues that several of 
her fellow judges on the juvenile and domestic relations court 
agreed with her analysis.  She acknowledged, however, that her 
legal interpretations could be mistaken.  In this manner, 
 
23
Judge Taylor contends that her case is similar to Peatross, as 
the record in this matter reveals, at worst, mistakes of law, 
which alone do not warrant discipline.  269 Va. at 447-48, 611 
S.E.2d at 402-03. 
As an initial matter, we note that it is difficult to 
understand Judge Taylor’s position that the General Assembly 
intended to create a “no appeal zone” for juveniles held post-
adjudication, pre-disposition.  The weakness of Judge Taylor’s 
argument can be demonstrated by one example, which in essence 
was delineated in K.M.’s May 4, 2007 letter to Judge Taylor.  
If a juvenile and domestic relations judge has the authority 
to detain a juvenile in secure detention pending disposition 
without review by the circuit court, the judge, by extending 
the date of disposition, can effectively require the juvenile 
to be detained indefinitely which would make the juvenile’s 
right of appeal to the circuit court for de novo trial 
meaningless.  Such a result is not only inconsistent with 
Virginia’s statutory scheme providing for trial de novo for 
appeals from district courts to circuit courts, it also flies 
in the face of our commitment to allowing persons accused of 
crimes to challenge the denial of bond successively to the 
next higher court, and the statutory requirement that the 
judicial officer denying bail inform the defendant of his or 
her right to appeal. 
 
24
However, the real issue in this case is not whether Judge 
Taylor made a legal error in denying K.M. the right to appeal 
his secured detention and denial of bail.  The issue at the 
heart of this case is whether Judge Taylor thwarted K.M.’s 
right to have her ruling reviewed and, if she did thwart the 
appeal of her ruling, whether that is a violation of the 
Canons. 
We conclude the Commission has met its burden of proving 
by clear and convincing evidence that Judge Taylor committed 
the violations of the Canons charged in the Notice of the 
Commission dated January 13, 2009.  Although the relevant 
statutes support a finding that Judge Taylor erred in her 
interpretation of the law, her actions rose to a level beyond 
a mistake of law when she affirmatively blocked K.M.’s 
attempted appeal to the circuit court. 
Judge Taylor’s ethical violations began when she ruled 
that her May 3rd order was interlocutory and nonappealable.  
It is undisputed that when K.M.’s counsel attempted to file a 
notice of appeal at the clerk’s office, Judge Taylor directed 
the deputy clerk to the “interlocutory, nonappealable” 
language appearing on the order when the deputy clerk sought 
guidance on whether to process the notice of appeal. 
On May 4, 2007, K.M.’s counsel sought reconsideration of 
Judge Taylor’s ruling by letter stating: 
 
25
I would respectfully ask that you 
reconsider your ruling as represented by the 
attached Order entered May 3, 2007 in this 
case.  Please understand that I have the utmost 
respect for the Court and it is because of that 
I am asking this Court to reconsider its ruling 
in light of what I feel to be clear authority 
that would allow my client an appeal from your 
denial of his request for a bond pending the 
sentencing hearing in this matter, and also 
your denial of our request of the Clerk to 
appeal your ruling. 
 
K.M.’s counsel cited Code §§ 19.2-120 and 19.2-124 in 
support of his contention that K.M. was entitled to bail and, 
if denied by the juvenile and domestic relations court, 
entitled to an appeal to the circuit court.  K.M. asserted, 
through counsel, that Judge Taylor’s rulings, while 
interlocutory, were appealable both as to the denial of bond 
and as to Judge Taylor’s ruling that “[t]his order is [a] 
. . . nonappealable order,” which denied K.M.’s right to 
appeal.  K.M.’s counsel also stated that he had “previewed” 
the issue briefly with the circuit court and that the circuit 
court “certainly felt that [Judge Taylor’s] denial of [K.M.’s] 
 
26
right to appeal on the motion for a bond is an appealable 
order.”  Judge Taylor did not respond to the letter. 
K.M.’s counsel also wrote a letter dated May 4, 2007 to 
the clerk of court stating that K.M. wished to appeal the May 
3rd order as well as Judge Taylor’s determination that the 
order was not appealable, and requested that the clerk’s 
office “forthwith today prepare appropriate appeal notices.”  
K.M.’s counsel stated that if the clerk’s office did not 
prepare the appeal notices, he would have no alternative but 
to proceed with a writ of mandamus.  The clerk responded by 
letter dated May 7, 2007 to K.M.’s counsel, stating:  “Please 
be advised that I am compelled to follow the ruling entered on 
May 3rd, 2007 by Judge Ramona D. Taylor, which states the 
order is interlocutory and non-appealable.”  A copy of the 
clerk’s May 7th letter was sent to Judge Taylor.  Judge 
Taylor’s only apparent response was to enter her May 8th 
“corrective order” nunc pro tunc to May 3, 2007, containing 
the same language ruling, “this order is an interlocutory, 
nonappealable order.” 
Judge Taylor’s testimony at the Commission hearing 
further indicates her intention to thwart K.M.’s appeal.  
Judge Taylor admitted she knew that when the deputy clerk 
inquired into the order’s appealability, the clerk was trying 
to decide whether to process the appeal.  At the hearing, 
 
27
Judge Taylor repeatedly stated her belief that it was not her 
function as a judge to get involved in the processing of 
appeals and that her duties ended when she decided the case.  
Judge Taylor put the onus on the deputy clerk to consult her 
supervisor and on the clerk’s office to consult this Court 
[OES] to obtain guidance on the appealability of the order 
irrespective of the language of the order.  However, Judge 
Taylor never provided direction to either the deputy clerk or 
the clerk of court to contact this Court [OES].  Despite 
denying responsibility for what occurred after she entered the 
May 3rd order, Judge Taylor admitted to the Commission that 
she was the chief judge at the time and in that capacity, she 
had the authority to direct the clerk what to do.4 
Judge Taylor does not deny that the clerk’s office may 
have felt compelled to refuse K.M.’s appeal as a result of 
Judge Taylor’s instruction to refer back to the language of 
the order.  Judge Taylor also gave no indication of any 
attempt on her part to correct what she now claims was the 
clerk’s mistaken belief that she was compelled by Judge Taylor 
to refuse to process the appeal.  Only four days after the 
                     
4 Judge Taylor became chief judge of the juvenile and 
domestic relations court on July 1, 2006.  Her term was for 
two years. 
 
28
order was entered, Judge Taylor was sent a copy of the letter 
from the clerk of court, which clearly stated that the clerk 
was “compelled” to follow Judge Taylor’s ruling that the order 
was nonappealable.  Even at oral argument, when Judge Taylor’s 
counsel was asked, “when [Judge Taylor] said to the clerk that 
the order by express terms is not appealable, wasn’t she at 
least implicitly directing the clerk what to do with the 
paperwork?,” her counsel responded:  “I think it’s fair to say 
that one could walk away with that message.” 
It is clear from the record that Judge Taylor was well 
aware of K.M.’s counsel’s efforts to secure K.M.’s release 
either through an appeal of the denial of bond or an appeal of 
Judge Taylor’s order that the denial of bond was 
nonappealable, or by an appeal de novo of K.M.’s case to the 
circuit court.  However, Judge Taylor did not seek to clarify 
what she now argues was her position that she: (1) did not 
rule the May 3rd order was not appealable; (2) did not direct 
the clerk’s office to refuse K.M.’s notice of appeal; and (3) 
believed the clerk’s office should contact this Court [OES] 
for guidance on processing the notice of appeal.  In addition, 
Judge Taylor had knowledge of the writ of mandamus filed 
against the clerk of court and did no more to address the 
matter than send an email to fellow judges explaining her 
ruling and informing them that K.M.’s attorney had filed a 
 
29
writ of mandamus “to compel the filing of an appeal from [the 
May 3rd order],” and stated that she “ruled that the order was 
not appealable.”  Judge Taylor subsequently sent another email 
informing her fellow judges that the writ of mandamus had been 
granted, and thanking the clerk “for holding up so well under 
the pressure of this litigation and for keeping [Judge Taylor] 
so well informed.” 
Judge Taylor’s argument that she did not rule that her 
May 3rd order was not appealable is implausible.  Judge Taylor 
described her action as a “ruling” in her email to her fellow 
judges.  Thus, when the deputy clerk asked whether the order 
was appealable, Judge Taylor reinforced the effect of her 
ruling by directing the clerk to the “nonappealable” language 
that Judge Taylor herself typed on the order.  In addition, 
Judge Taylor’s argument that her ruling that the order was 
interlocutory and nonappealable was merely a “red flag” for 
the circuit court is equally implausible.  Judge Taylor has 
produced no other examples of ruling an order nonappealable 
for use as a “red flag” to the circuit court.  Finally, what 
makes her “flagging” argument most implausible is that her 
actions prevented the order from ever reaching the circuit 
court where it could purportedly serve as a “red flag.”  If 
the interlocutory and nonappealable language was truly 
intended as a “red flag,” Judge Taylor should have promptly 
 
30
advised the deputy clerk to process the appeal so that the 
circuit court could rule. 
A judge may not prevent the appeal of his or her own 
decisions.  More than a century ago, we recognized the basic 
principle that a court cannot prevent its own decision from 
being reviewed on appeal by refusing to certify the facts 
proved and the evidence in the case.  Powell v. Tarry, 77 Va. 
250, 264 (1883).  Therefore, it is clear that a court cannot 
expressly rule that its own decision is not subject to 
appellate review, by ruling the order is interlocutory and 
nonappealable. 
We do not agree with Judge Taylor’s argument that she did 
not thwart K.M.’s appeal because once she made her ruling, the 
case was out of her hands.  It is disingenuous of Judge Taylor 
to claim that when she responded to the clerk who asked her 
whether the appeal should be processed, Judge Taylor was not 
in a supervisory position over that clerk.  Her argument that 
she was acting as the presiding judge and not the chief judge 
with supervisory authority over the clerk’s office was 
certainly never made clear to the deputy clerk or the clerk of 
court.  What is clear is Judge Taylor knew that when she 
pointed the deputy clerk to the language of her ruling that 
the deputy clerk was not going to process the appeal.  Judge 
Taylor also knew in the days following that the clerk of court 
 
31
had refused to process the appeal because the clerk felt 
compelled by Judge Taylor’s order not to process it. 
Judge Taylor’s argument that she believed the clerk’s 
office should contact this Court [OES] for guidance on 
processing the appeal is equally disingenuous.  Although she 
now states that processing the appeal is in the nature of a 
ministerial act under the supervision of the clerk, she never 
made that statement to the deputy clerk when the deputy clerk 
asked about processing the appeal.  Furthermore, Judge 
Taylor’s position that the clerk should have brought any 
questions to this Court [OES] was never communicated to the 
clerk, despite K.M.’s concerted efforts to obtain review by a 
higher court in order to secure his release from custody.  
Finally, Judge Taylor’s argument that she had nothing more to 
do with whether the case was appealed after her entry of the 
May 3rd order is belied by her entry of the corrective order 
on May 8, 2007 nunc pro tunc to May 3, 2007 amidst the threat 
of a pending writ of mandamus. 
Judge Taylor’s actions in thwarting K.M.’s appeal of the 
denial of bond and even of his appeal of her interlocutory and 
purportedly nonappealable ruling violated the law.  When K.M. 
and his family were prevented by Judge Taylor’s actions from 
obtaining appellate review of her rulings, public confidence 
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary was 
 
32
diminished.  Judge Taylor violated Canons 1, 2A, and 3B(2) and 
these violations constituted conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice. 
B. Due Process 
 
Judge Taylor asserts that the Canons are 
unconstitutionally vague and without appropriately definite 
standards as applied to the facts in the complaint against 
her, and that vague and indefinite laws and regulations offend 
due process rights.  Judge Taylor argues that “[a] close 
reading of the subject Judicial Canons reveals that they are a 
mix of clear standards and vague aspirational statements.”  
According to Judge Taylor, Canon 1’s requirement that a judge 
“shall personally observe [high standards of conduct] so that 
the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be 
preserved” does not describe a meaningful standard of conduct 
for purposes of a disciplinary case.  Judge Taylor argues that 
Canon 2’s requirement that a judge act “at all times in a 
manner that promotes public confidence” likewise sets forth no 
particular standards or guidelines.  Lastly, Judge Taylor 
contends that Canon 3’s requirement to “be faithful to the 
law” is “far more aspirational than measurable.”  Therefore, 
Judge Taylor maintains that the subject Canons are 
 
33
unconstitutionally vague and insufficiently definite to 
satisfy due process rights in a disciplinary matter. 
The Commission asserts that Judge Taylor cites no 
authority holding that the Canons violate due process because 
they are impermissibly vague.  According to the Commission, 
courts in other jurisdictions have rejected due process 
challenges to codes of judicial conduct, and thus it urges 
this court to likewise reject Judge Taylor’s vagueness due 
process argument. 
We hold that the Canons are sufficiently definite and 
certain to withstand Judge Taylor’s due process challenge.  
“The procedural due process requirements of the Constitution 
of Virginia compel the Commission, and this Court, to 
recognize the balance that must be struck between protecting 
the integrity of the judiciary and the rights of individual 
judges.”  Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm’n v. Elliott, 272 Va. 
97, 114, 630 S.E.2d 485, 493 (2006). 
Courts in other jurisdictions that have considered 
whether canons of judicial conduct violate “due process” 
because they are impermissibly vague have rejected such 
claims.  See In re Assad, 185 P.3d 1044, 1052 (Nev. 2008) 
(Canon 2A not vague); In re McGuire, 685 N.W.2d 748, 762 (N.D. 
2004) (“courts in other jurisdictions appear to have routinely 
rejected vagueness challenges to codes of judicial conduct”); 
 
34
In re Hill, 8 S.W.3d 578, 582-83 (Mo. 2000) (rejecting 
“vagueness” challenge to Canons 2A and 2B, holding that 
“[n]either absolute certainty nor impossible standards of 
specificity are required,” and that “[t]his is especially true 
in judicial discipline.”); Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. 
Spencer, 725 So.2d 171, 176 (Miss. 1998) (rejecting 
“vagueness” challenge to Canons 1, 2A, 2B, and 3B, holding 
that “the Canons are sufficient to put [persons] of common 
intelligence on notice of what type of conduct is 
prohibited.”); In re Young, 522 N.E.2d 386, 387-88 (Ind. 1988) 
(rejecting “vagueness” challenge to Canons 1 and 2, holding 
that “a greater degree of flexibility and breadth is permitted 
with respect to judicial disciplinary rules and statutes than 
is allowed in criminal statutes.”). 
“The test for determining whether the Canons are vague is 
whether they convey to a judge a sufficiently definite warning 
of the proscribed conduct when measured by common 
understanding and practice.”  In re Hill, 8 S.W.3d at 582.  As 
relevant to the issues in this case, all three Canons which 
the Commission alleges Judge Taylor violated require a judge 
to comply with the law so that there will be public confidence 
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 
The Canons for the Commonwealth of Virginia contain a 
Preamble, which provides in relevant part that 
 
35
[t]he Canons of Judicial Conduct are 
intended to establish standards for ethical 
conduct of judges.  They consist of broad 
statements called Canons, specific rules set 
forth in Sections under each Canon and 
Commentary.  The text of the Canons and the 
Sections is authoritative.  Each Commentary, by 
explanation and example, is advisory and 
provides guidance with respect to the purpose 
and meaning of the Canons and Sections.  The 
Commentary is not intended as a statement of 
additional rules. 
 
Va. Sup. Ct. R., Part 6, § III, Preamble. 
 
The Commentary to Canon 1 includes the following 
language:  “Although judges should be independent, they must 
comply with the law . . . . [V]iolation of this Canon 
diminishes public confidence in the judiciary and thereby does 
injury to the system of government under law.”  Canon 2A 
requires a judge to comply with the law in a manner that 
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality 
of the judiciary.  Canon 3B(2) requires a judge to be faithful 
to the law. 
 
36
The Commission has alleged that Judge Taylor’s thwarting 
of K.M.’s appeal was a violation of law which diminished 
public confidence in the judiciary, an allegation that we have 
concluded has been established by clear and convincing 
evidence.  The relevant Canons clearly prohibit a judge’s 
failure to follow the law in such a manner as to fail to 
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of 
the judiciary.  There can be no “vagueness” in the application 
of the relevant Canons to the conduct in question. 
C. The Commission’s Consideration of “Prior Contacts” 
 
Judge Taylor cites Code § 17.1-913 to support her 
argument that it was improper for the Commission to admit and 
consider evidence of Judge Taylor’s prior contacts with the 
Commission.  Specifically, she notes that the statute provides 
that all prior contacts “not filed with the Supreme Court in 
connection with a formal complaint filed with that tribunal, 
shall be kept in the confidential files of the Commission.”  
Code § 17.1-913(A). 
Judge Taylor contends that Rule 16 of the Rules of the 
Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission applies and requires 
that the records of a proceeding concluded “without an adverse 
finding by the Commission against a judge . . . be maintained 
in the Commission’s confidential files.”  15 VAC § 10-10-10.  
 
37
Judge Taylor asserts that neither Code § 17.1-913 nor 
Commission Rule 16 allow for the removal of the 
confidentiality of records of complaints that were not deemed 
“well founded,” and the 2002 and 2006 prior contacts were not 
determined to be well founded. 
Additionally, Judge Taylor argues that unlike Shull, in 
which Judge Shull’s demeanor was discussed in a prior informal 
proceeding and that proceeding was later considered by this 
Court for purposes of disposition, the “prior contacts” Judge 
Taylor had with the Commission were not “directly relevant” to 
the issues now before the Court.  Rather, Judge Taylor states 
they are irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative of any 
issue in dispute.  The prior contacts, Judge Taylor contends, 
are irrelevant because the 2002 contact related to an in 
camera interview and the 2006 contact related to a complaint 
about starting court late, and both were resolved in her 
favor.  Judge Taylor asks this Court to disregard the prior 
contacts evidence when determining whether she committed any 
violation during the 2007 events at issue. 
The Commission relies on Shull to support its argument 
that consideration of Judge Taylor’s prior contacts with the 
Commission was appropriate.  274 Va. at 676-77, 651 S.E.2d at 
659.  According to the Commission, this Court expressly 
referred to and relied upon evidence of prior contacts in its 
 
38
decision to remove Judge Shull from office.  The Commission 
maintains that with regards to the issue of disposition, this 
Court should be presented with evidence regarding a judge’s 
past contacts with the Commission.  The Commission cites Rule 
13(B) of the Rules of the Judicial Inquiry and Review 
Commission, which provides that any “material [and] relevant” 
evidence may be admitted.  15 VAC § 10-10-10. 
Additionally, the Commission contends that evidence 
surrounding Judge Taylor’s 2002 informal contact with the 
Commission was relevant to show whether she was amenable to 
discipline by the Commission or whether the matter needed to 
be referred to this Court.  The Commission maintains that Code 
§ 17.1-913, regarding confidentiality of the record sent by 
the Commission to this Court in support of a complaint, and 
Commission Rule 16, regarding preservation of files at the 
Commission, are not relevant to the admissibility of evidence 
of prior contacts at the evidentiary hearing. 
We hold that the evidence regarding Judge Taylor’s prior 
contacts with the Commission was properly admitted by the 
Commission and is now properly before us for review.  At the 
outset of the Commission hearing, counsel for the Commission 
stated that “the exhibits are all in the red binder there on 
the witness desk. . . . But the sides are in agreement that 
there’s no objection to the admission of any of the exhibits.”  
 
39
Counsel for Judge Taylor acknowledged the agreement as to the 
exhibits contained in the binder.  The binder, which is part 
of the record before this Court, contains the Commission’s 
exhibits described as “[c]orrespondence related to judge’s 
2001-02 informal contact with JIRC,” “[r]edacted annotated 
agenda from JIRC meeting 4-19-02,” “[t]ranscript of judge’s 
informal meeting with JIRC dated 5-21-02,” and 
“[c]orrespondence related to judge’s 2006 informal contact 
with JIRC.”  Judge Taylor’s agreement to the Commission’s 
admission of the exhibits is fatal to her argument that the 
Commission erred in admitting those same exhibits.  Rule 5:25. 
D. Recusal of Commission Chairman 
Judge Taylor argues that the Commission’s chairman, Judge 
Willis of the Chesapeake Juvenile and Domestic Relations 
District Court, should have recused himself due to his status 
as complainant in a prior contact with the Commission.  
According to Judge Taylor, Canon 3E requires disqualification 
of the judge from any proceeding in which his or her 
“impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” including 
instances in which the judge has “personal knowledge of 
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding,” is a 
“party to the proceeding,” or is likely “to be a material 
witness.”  Judge Taylor contends that the proceedings before 
 
40
the Commission were tainted by Judge Willis’ involvement and 
therefore seeks dismissal of the complaint. 
The Commission maintains that it can be reasonably 
inferred that Judge Taylor was aware of Judge Willis’ 
involvement in a prior informal contact since 2006 and 
therefore knew of the purported grounds for Judge Willis’ 
recusal at the outset of the Commission’s evidentiary hearing 
in 2009, but failed to timely object to his participation.  
Judge Willis’ role in Judge Taylor’s 2006 prior contact with 
the Commission is reflected by an email dated January 26, 2006 
from Judge Willis to Judge Deborah M. Paxson, who at the time 
was the chief judge of the Virginia Beach Juvenile and 
Domestic Relations District Court, regarding an issue of 
delays in that court which adversely affected proceedings in 
the Chesapeake Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court.  
The email did not name any judge responsible for the delays 
and expressly stated:  “I do not want any information about 
who the judge was . . .”  However, Judge Willis requested in 
his email that Judge Paxson notify the judges of the juvenile 
and domestic relations court of its contents.  The Commission 
argues that it may be inferred that Judge Paxson did notify 
the judges, including Judge Taylor, of Judge Willis’ complaint 
in 2006. 
 
41
We agree with the Commission’s waiver argument, and hold 
that Judge Taylor did not timely object to Judge Willis’ 
participation in the present proceedings.  “A motion for 
disqualification [of a judge] must be made when the movant 
learns the grounds upon which the motion is based; thereafter, 
the motion comes too late.”  Mason v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 
1091, 1098, 254 S.E.2d 116, 120 (1979).  We therefore will not 
consider this issue.  Rule 5:25. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
In considering the record before us, we note letters from 
attorneys who have appeared before Judge Taylor.  These 
letters offer testaments to Judge Taylor’s professionalism as 
an attorney and as a judge of the juvenile and domestic 
relations court.  We have reviewed those submissions as part 
of our consideration of the proper disposition of this case. 
Addressing the issue of disposition, Judge Taylor asks us 
to compare the facts in four published opinions by this Court 
addressing complaints brought by the Commission, and conclude 
that the record in this case supports a dismissal of this 
Complaint.  In addition, Judge Taylor argues that her “prior 
contacts” with the Commission should not be construed as a 
lack of amenability to informal discipline on her part, but 
rather, a lack of courtesy on the part of the Commission. 
 
42
The Commission also directs us to a comparison of prior 
disciplinary complaints brought by the Commission and 
specifically, to the case of Judicial Inquiry & Review 
Commission v. Lewis.  In addition, the Commission asks us to 
consider Judge Taylor’s prior experience with the Commission 
as an indication of her lack of amenability to informal 
discipline. 
We agree with the Commission that this case is very 
comparable to Lewis, in which we censured a district court 
judge.  Id. at 407, 568 S.E.2d at 690.  As in Lewis, Judge 
Taylor violated the Canons by improper conduct in a single 
case.  Id. at 405-07, 568 S.E.2d at 689-90.  In both cases, 
the judges involved violated Canons 1, 2A, and 3B(2).  In 
Lewis, the judge enforced a contempt order that he knew had 
been stayed by the circuit court.  Id. at 403-04, 568 S.E.2d 
at 688.  Here, Judge Taylor thwarted any review of her secure 
detention order by the circuit court through appeal of her 
denial of bond and appeal of her order denying appeal. 
In Lewis, the direct harm caused by the judge’s ethical 
violation was a father’s incarceration for several hours in 
disregard of a circuit court’s stay order.  Id. at 404, 568 
S.E.2d at 688.  In this case, Judge Taylor’s ethical violation 
blocked appellate review of her rulings and forced K.M. to 
remain in secure detention for nine days before his writ of 
 
43
mandamus was reviewed by the circuit court and he was released 
to the custody of his parents. 
Judge Lewis was censured with no evidence of prior 
disciplinary contacts with the Commission.  In this case, we 
do not believe it is necessary to consider Judge Taylor’s 
disputed prior disciplinary record to conclude that censure as 
sought by the Commission is the appropriate remedy. 
In Lewis, we stated that “[p]ublic confidence in the 
judiciary and the administration of our legal system depends 
upon faithful adherence to the law . . . . Courts cannot 
reasonably expect citizens to comply with their orders if the 
courts themselves do not yield to the orders of higher 
courts.”  Id. at 406, 568 S.E.2d at 690.  Although Judge 
Taylor was not faced with an order from the circuit court 
reviewing her decision and compelling K.M.’s release, she did 
impermissibly shield her ruling from any review.  Judge 
Taylor’s actions, which prevented K.M.’s attorney from seeking 
his release from secured detention by means authorized by law, 
impair public confidence in the judiciary and the 
administration of our legal system.  Unless citizens can trust 
that judges will follow the law, our courts will lose the 
public’s respect and confidence upon which our legal system 
depends. 
 
44
Accordingly, we order that Judge Taylor be, and hereby 
is, censured for engaging in “conduct prejudicial to the 
proper administration of justice.”  Va. Const. art. VI, § 10; 
Code § 17.1-906. 
Censure ordered. 
 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, with whom JUSTICE GOODWYN joins, dissenting. 
 
 
I respectfully dissent.  In my view, upon a de novo 
review, the evidence in this case falls short of clear and 
convincing evidence that Judge Ramona D. Taylor, a judge of 
the City of Virginia Beach Juvenile and Domestic Relations 
District Court, violated the Canons of Judicial Conduct.  I 
therefore do not agree that censure of Judge Taylor by this 
Court is warranted under Article VI, Section 10 of the 
Constitution of Virginia. 
 
Many of the historical and procedural facts which 
ultimately led to the charges against Judge Taylor by the 
Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission (“the Commission”) are 
not in dispute.  On May 2, 2007, Judge Taylor conducted an 
adjudicatory hearing on a misdemeanor assault charge against a 
fifteen year old juvenile (“K.M.”).  K.M. was represented by 
counsel at that hearing.  Upon K.M.’s plea of “no contest” and 
the evidence presented, Judge Taylor found K.M. guilty of that 
charge.  K.M. had previously been before Judge Taylor on 
 
45
February 5, 2007 regarding a child in need of services 
petition (“CHINS petition”) filed by his parents.  With regard 
to the CHINS petition, Judge Taylor had ordered, among other 
things, that K.M. be on good behavior and to refrain from 
illegal substance abuse.  At the conclusion of the 
adjudicatory hearing on the assault charge, Judge Taylor, as 
authorized by Code § 16.1-273, ordered that a “social 
history,” which she described as a “full background 
investigation,” be prepared and set the matter for final 
disposition on May 24, 2007. 
 
Finding that K.M. posed “a substantial risk of harm to 
the community based upon the egregious nature of the assault,”  
Judge Taylor remanded him to secure custody pending the 
dispositional hearing scheduled for May 24, 2007.  K.M.’s 
counsel requested Judge Taylor either to enter a final 
disposition or to release K.M. on bond pending the hearing 
scheduled for May 24, 2007.  In an order entered on May 3, 
2007, and subsequently amended nunc pro tunc on May 8, 2007, 
Judge Taylor denied K.M.’s request for bond pending the May 
24, 2007 hearing.  In Judge Taylor’s order, she stated her 
reasons for denying the request for bond in the following way: 
Section 19.2-120 of the Virginia Code addresses the 
factors a judge should consider in determining the 
bond of a person “held in custody pending trial or 
hearing.”  The defendant in this case is being held 
post-trial and pre-disposition pursuant to § 16.1-
 
46
248.1(G) of the Virginia Code.  The right to appeal 
a pre-trial bond determination provided in section 
19.2-120(E) of the Virginia Code does not apply to a 
juvenile held post-adjudication/pre-disposition. 
 
The order further states that “[t]his order is an 
interlocutory, nonappealable order.” 
 
Given the fact that K.M. had assaulted a younger boy to 
the extent that the victim required medical attention and the 
fact that Judge Taylor was aware K.M. had not responded 
favorably to the conditions previously imposed upon him as a 
result of the CHINS petition, the Commission concedes that 
Judge Taylor acted within her authority in finding K.M. guilty 
of the assault charge and in finding that he posed a risk of 
harm to the community.  Additionally, the Commission does not 
contest that Judge Taylor was authorized by statute to deny 
K.M.’s request for the immediate disposition of the assault 
charge without having the benefit of a social history to guide 
that disposition.  Moreover, the Commission also concedes that 
Judge Taylor did not act improperly in denying K.M. a bond.  
Rather, the Commission’s claim of misconduct is based on the 
allegation that Judge Taylor intentionally “thwarted” K.M.’s 
attempt to appeal the order denying his request for bond to 
the circuit court. 
 
As to that allegation, the undisputed material facts and 
the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts 
 
47
do not establish, in my view, that Judge Taylor intentionally 
thwarted K.M.’s attempt to appeal the order denying his 
request for bond pending the scheduled dispositional hearing 
on May 24, 2007.  It is undisputed that a number of Judge 
Taylor’s colleagues on the City of Virginia Beach Juvenile and 
Domestic Relations District Court shared her view that an 
order such as the order at issue in K.M.’s case was 
interlocutory and nonappealable.  Code § 16.1-248.1(G) 
provides, in pertinent part, that:  “The court is authorized 
to detain a juvenile . . . at any time after a delinquency 
petition has been filed, both prior to adjudication and after 
adjudication pending final disposition subject to the time 
limitations set forth in [Code] § 16.1-277.1.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  The latter Code section establishes a time limitation 
of thirty days for the completion of the dispositional hearing 
in a case involving a juvenile held in secure detention.  
However, with reference to the issue of bond, Code § 19.2-119 
defines, for purposes of Code § 19.2-120, a “Person” to mean 
“any accused, or any juvenile taken into custody pursuant to 
§ 16.1-246.”  The provisions for bail contained in Code 
§ 19.2-120(A) reference “[a] person who is held in custody 
pending trial or hearing for an offense.” 
 
These statutory provisions were the basis upon which 
Judge Taylor and her colleagues concluded that a juvenile held 
 
48
in secure detention following an adjudicatory hearing and 
prior to a final dispositional hearing was not entitled to 
rely upon the appeal provisions of Code § 19.2-120.  In a 
prior opinion, however, this Court has made it clear that 
mistakes of law alone do not warrant discipline.  Judicial 
Inquiry & Review Comm’n v. Peatross, 269 Va. 428, 447-48, 611 
S.E.2d 392, 402-03 (2005).  These statutory provisions are not 
so readily apparent in their application to the circumstances 
of K.M.’s case as to be totally inconsistent with Judge 
Taylor’s assertion that she “sincerely believed” that her 
order denying bail was interlocutory and nonappealable. 
 
As suggested by the majority, the issue at the heart of 
this case is whether Judge Taylor’s actions rose to a level 
beyond a mistake of law.  The focus of that issue rests 
principally upon Judge Taylor’s response to the deputy clerk’s 
inquiry regarding whether K.M.’s notice of appeal of the 
denial of bond should be accepted and processed.  By 
stipulation, Judge Taylor and the Commission agree that the 
deputy clerk went to Judge Taylor and advised her that K.M.’s 
counsel was at the clerk’s office to file a notice of appeal.  
“Judge Taylor confirmed that the order by its express terms 
was not appealable, but did not state to the deputy clerk that 
the notice of appeal should not be accepted.”  The deputy 
clerk did not accept the notice of appeal.  As a result, 
 
49
counsel for K.M. successfully obtained a writ of mandamus from 
the circuit court and K.M. was released on bond from 
detention. 
 
Beyond question, the deputy clerk’s refusal to accept and 
process K.M.’s appeal resulted from Judge Taylor’s response to 
the deputy clerk’s inquiry.  In my view, it is equally clear 
that Judge Taylor’s response was based upon a sincere belief 
that her order concerning bail was interlocutory and 
nonappealable.  Several undisputed facts readily support that 
conclusion.  At the time of her ruling, Judge Taylor orally 
explained to K.M.’s counsel her rationale for believing that 
her bond ruling was interlocutory and nonappealable and she 
wrote that rationale in her order. 
 
The majority reasons that the issue is “whether Judge 
Taylor thwarted K.M.’s right to have her ruling reviewed and, 
if she did thwart the appeal of her ruling, whether that is a 
violation of the Canons.”  Unlike the majority, I am of 
opinion that the Commission has not shown by clear and 
convincing evidence that Judge Taylor’s actions were knowingly 
improper, and that this difference in the interpretation of 
the evidence presented is especially relevant to the 
determination of whether she “has engaged in conduct 
prejudicial to the proper administration of justice” as 
contemplated by Article VI, Section 10 of the Constitution of 
 
50
Virginia.  In this case, the Commission argues that, if this 
Court determines Judge Taylor’s action were “mere legal 
error,” she “arrogated to herself the power to rule that her 
own decision was immune from appellate review.”  This argument 
is unpersuasive because the evidence establishes that, while 
legally in error, Judge Taylor was merely following the law as 
she and her colleagues understood it to be. 
In Peatross, this Court declined to censure a jurist for 
legal errors.  269 Va. at 449-50, 611 S.E.2d at 403-04.  This 
Court stated that certain errors and omissions committed by 
Judge Peatross were errors of law, “not violations of the 
Canons.”  Id. at 447, 611 S.E.2d at 402.  This Court cited 
with approval cases from Illinois and California that stated 
that mere legal error should not be the subject of discipline.  
Id.; see Oberholzer v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 975 
P.2d 663, 680 (Cal. 1999); Harrod v. Illinois Courts Comm’n, 
372 N.E.2d 53, 65 (Ill. 1977); see also In re Inquiry 
Concerning a Judge, No. 207 (Tucker), 501 S.E.2d 67, 71 (N.C. 
1998).  We stated that not punishing a judge for legal errors 
is important in order to maintain the independence of the 
judiciary.  See Peatross, 269 Va. at 447, 611 S.E.2d at 402 
(citing Harrod, 372 N.E.2d at 65) (stating that in order to 
maintain an independent judiciary, errors of law should not be 
the subject of discipline)). 
 
51
 
In my view Peatross is controlling in this case because 
there is insufficient evidence to establish that the legal 
error committed by Judge Taylor was accompanied by bias, abuse 
of authority, or intentional disregard of the law.  It is 
noteworthy in that regard that the orders and actions of Judge 
Taylor occurred in May 2007, and the present proceedings were 
conducted before the Commission in March 2009.  To the extent 
that the majority finds degrees of conflict in Judge Taylor’s 
testimony as expressed in its opinion, such is readily 
understandable with the lapse of time involved.  Moreover, 
these conflicts do not establish a violation of the Canons 
under the clear and convincing standard required to establish 
such a violation. 
 
Judge Taylor’s actions do not rise to the level of 
judicial misconduct, particularly in light of this Court’s 
precedents.  Unlike the circumstances in Judicial Inquiry & 
Review Comm’n v. Lewis, 264 Va. 401, 406, 568 S.E.2d 687, 690 
(2002), Judge Taylor did not defy a superior court’s order.  
Unlike the circumstances in Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm’n 
v. Shull, 274 Va. 657, 676-77, 651 S.E.2d 648, 659-60 (2007), 
Judge Taylor did not demean litigants and bring discredit to 
the judiciary.  In the absence of clear and convincing 
evidence that Judge Taylor acted intentionally to thwart the 
appeal, rather than merely erred in failing to direct the 
 
52
deputy clerk to perform the ministerial duty of accepting and 
processing the notice of appeal of her order, I cannot agree 
with the majority that her actions violated the Canons of 
Judicial Conduct. 
 
The censure of a judge for misconduct has obvious and 
drastic consequences for the judge both professionally and 
personally.  Judges make errors of law, but such errors do not 
constitute misconduct unless, for example, the judge 
purposefully deprives a litigant of rights that the judge 
knows a litigant is entitled to by law.  Without such a high 
standard, the independence of the judiciary will be constantly 
in question. 
 
For these reasons, I would dismiss the complaint filed in 
this case by the Commission against Judge Taylor. 
 
53