Case Title: State v. Adams

Citation: 2004-Ohio-5845

Docket Number: 20012072

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845.] 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. ADAMS, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder —  Death penalty upheld, when. 
(No. 2001-2072 — Submitted August 17, 2004 — Decided November 17, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Common Pleas Court of Trumbull County, No. 00-CR-700. 
_______________________ 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶ 1} Shortly before midnight on October 11, 1999, defendant-appellant, 
Stanley T. (“Ted”) Adams, entered the home of Esther Cook and her 12-year-old 
daughter, Ashley Dawn Cook, in Warren, Ohio.  Once inside, Adams killed them 
by beating and stabbing Esther, and by beating, raping, and strangling Ashley.  A 
jury convicted Adams of the aggravated murders of Esther and Ashley as well as 
aggravated burglary, kidnapping, and two counts of rape.  The jury recommended 
the death penalty, and the trial court sentenced Adams to death.  Adams now 
appeals his convictions and death sentence directly to us as a matter of right. 
{¶ 2} State’s evidence   From Christmas 1998 until March 1999, Adams 
and his girlfriend, Janelle (“Nelly”) Hartle, lived with Esther and Ashley on 
Dickey Avenue in Warren.  After March 1999, and at the time of the murders, 
Adams and Janelle and their infant daughter lived on Mahoning Avenue in 
Champion, Ohio.  James Hartle, who sometimes lived with Esther, was the father 
of Ashley and Janelle, who were half-sisters. 
{¶ 3} On the afternoon of October 11, 1999, Adams borrowed a blue 
1991 Chevrolet Cavalier, Ohio license number BAB 2830, from his neighbors, 
Mike and Kelly Henry.  Adams then drove to James Hartle’s house, where he 
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asked to borrow $300 from Hartle to buy a car.  Hartle declined to give Adams 
any money. 
{¶ 4} Later that evening, Adams attended a drug party at the apartment 
of his friend, Mallory (“Stacie”) Jackson.  In addition to Adams, guests included 
Renee Smith, Patricia Litsinger, and Derwin (“Stormin’ ”) Norman.  That night 
Adams was wearing a white T-shirt, blue pants, and white tennis shoes.  When 
Smith saw Adams, whom she had known for five years, he had $40 “and bought 
crack cocaine with it.”  Later, Adams told Litsinger that he was “broke,” but he 
offered cocaine to her in exchange for oral sex.  Litsinger refused. 
{¶ 5} After that, Adams left and told Smith that he was leaving “to get 
some more money.”  Smith reported that Adams was gone a long time.  By the 
time Litsinger left, around 11:15 p.m., Adams had already left by himself in his 
search for more money. 
{¶ 6} That same night, October 11, Luetta Simmons, who lived across 
the street from Esther and Ashley, noticed that a dark-colored car pulled into 
Esther’s driveway at 11:45 p.m., and that the car left around 12:15 a.m.  The 
taillights on this car resembled the taillights on a Chevrolet Cavalier that 
Simmons had once owned.  Simmons later noticed that neighborhood dogs were 
barking in an unusually “loud and obnoxious” manner. 
{¶ 7} Adams returned to Jackson’s apartment.  According to Smith, 
Adams “had blood all over his hands; * * * on his shirt, on his pants, and on the 
tip of his shoes,” and some of the blood appeared wet.  In his pocket, Adams had 
“[m]oney with a whole bunch of blood on it.”  Litsinger also observed that after 
Adams returned, he had blood on his hands and on his jeans. 
{¶ 8} At some point after he returned, Adams took his bloody shirt off.  
Norman recalled seeing Adams at the apartment when he “didn’t have a shirt on,” 
had “blood on him,” and had a roll of money, some of which had blood on it. 
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{¶ 9} Later, Adams again left the apartment, but this time he left with 
Jackson and Norman to get more drugs.  Adams, driving a blue Cavalier, dropped 
Norman off to buy the drugs.  Around 2:00 a.m., while Adams was driving around 
the block, Warren Police Sergeant Robert Massucci pulled Adams over because 
the Cavalier had only one headlight.  Sgt. Massucci noticed that although the 
weather was cold, Adams was not wearing a shirt, and that Adams had blood on 
his pants, including a spot approximately four inches by six inches. 
{¶ 10} Warren Police Officer Jeff Miller, who stopped to assist Massucci, 
frisked Adams and discovered that “his pants were all wet and sticky, * * * 
gooey.”  With the aid of his flashlight, Miller discovered that Adams had blood on 
his hands, right arm, and pants, and Miller reported that the amount of blood 
suggested that Adams had “field dressed a deer.”  Adams told Miller that he had 
cut his hand, but Miller looked and saw no cuts.  In the back of the Cavalier, 
Miller noticed tools and toolboxes. 
{¶ 11} Adams told Sgt. Massucci that he lived on Dickey Avenue, 
although his driver’s license listed a different address.  The officers then let 
Adams go with a warning about the headlight.  Later, Janelle recalled that Adams 
had come home “in the middle of the night.” 
{¶ 12} Around noon on October 12, 1999, Esther’s friend, Donna 
Frederick, found Esther’s “cold” body inside the front door of Esther’s home.  
Frederick called police.  A neighbor reported that she had seen Esther and Ashley 
alive the previous afternoon around 5:30 p.m. 
{¶ 13} Police found Esther’s body lying face-down in a pool of blood at 
the bottom of the stairs.  On the stairs and stairwell walls, police found blood 
drops and smears.  Police found Ashley’s body in an upstairs bedroom.  Dr. 
Humphrey Germaniuk, a forensic pathologist, arrived at the crime scene around 
1:00 p.m. that day and estimated that Esther and Ashley had been dead “eight, ten, 
12 hours at least.” 
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{¶ 14} Dr. Germaniuk, who later performed an autopsy on Esther, 
concluded that she died as a result of “[m]ultiple blunt force traumatic injuries 
and multiple sharp force traumatic injuries” with “at least four distinct stab 
wounds involving the neck and head.”  Although police found pieces of a broken 
broom near the bodies of Ashley and Esther, police found no weapon that might 
have caused Esther’s injuries.  Dr. Germaniuk concluded that in inflicting the 
puncture wounds on Esther, the killer used “some type of tool that has an acute 
angle” and two prongs, such as a certain type of crowbar. 
{¶ 15} Ashley’s body lay upstairs on a bedroom floor next to the bed.  Her 
body was nude and posed, with her legs spread apart.  An electric cord had been 
wrapped five times around her neck, and one end of the cord was in her hand.  A 
bracelet and two earrings had been placed on Ashley’s lower abdomen.  After an 
autopsy, Dr. Germaniuk concluded that Ashley had died as a result of 
“strangulation associated with blunt force trauma to the head.”  Ashley’s body 
also revealed multiple injuries and bruises to the genitalia as well as brain 
swelling, contusions to the head, and lacerations to the mouth. 
{¶ 16} Dr. Germaniuk also completed a rape kit examination during his 
autopsy of Ashley and obtained swab samples from her body cavities.  Forensic 
Scientist Steve Wiechman, from the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and 
Investigation (“BCI”), concluded that rectal, vaginal, and oral swabs from 
Ashley’s body tested positive for semen. 
{¶ 17} After later tests, Meghan Clement, an expert in DNA analysis at 
LabCorp, an independent testing laboratory, conducted polymerase chain reaction 
(“PCR”) analysis of DNA on the oral and vaginal swabs from Ashley’s body and 
concluded that they contained a DNA mixture.  Adams and Ashley could have 
both contributed DNA to the mixture, and nothing in the analysis suggested that 
anyone else had contributed DNA to these specimens.  The rectal swab, while 
January Term, 2004 
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testing positive for semen, was insufficient to yield a DNA result other than 
Ashley’s DNA. 
{¶ 18} Dr. P. Michael Conneally, a Distinguished Professor of Medical 
and Molecular Genetics at Indiana University Medical Center, who is an expert 
on genetic statistics, agreed that genetic markers for the secondary DNA 
contributor in the vaginal swab matched Adams, who is Caucasian.  A similar 
DNA profile occurs only once in 77,000 Caucasians, once in 2.3 million African-
Americans, and once in 128,000 Hispanics. 
{¶ 19} At the crime scene, police found no money in the house.  The 
bedroom where Ashley’s body was found was in disarray, as if it had been 
ransacked.  Two dressers were overturned, and blood spatters were found on the 
ceiling, floor, and on dresser contents.  BCI Forensic Scientist Wiechman 
subjected two bloody sheets from the bedroom to forensic analysis.  Wiechman 
found 17 presumptive semen stains on different parts of one sheet, tested six of 
them, and confirmed that three of these were semen stains. 
{¶ 20} Jennifer Duvall, an Ohio BCI forensic scientist, found DNA from 
semen stains in several areas on the same sheet.  Adams could not be excluded as 
a contributor to the DNA in these stains, and his DNA was consistent with DNA 
in the stains.  Duvall testified that DNA found at one particular site, which was 
identical to Adams’s DNA, would be found only once in 21.1 million Caucasians 
and once in 1.9 million African-Americans.  When Adams and Janelle lived with 
Esther and Ashley seven months previously, they slept in a downstairs bedroom 
and never used any of the upstairs bedrooms. 
{¶ 21} On October 13, police seized the blue Cavalier that Adams had 
driven on October 11 and 12, which Mike Henry had loaned him.  Forensic 
testing disclosed that the steering wheel, one of the floor pedals, and the headlight 
lever in the Cavalier tested positive for blood, but the quantity was insufficient for 
analysis.  On October 19, Mike Henry asked Adams why police had found blood 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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in Henry’s car after Adams had borrowed it.  During this conversation, Adams 
denied any responsibility for the murders. 
{¶ 22} On October 20, police interviewed Adams after fully advising him 
of his Miranda rights.  Adams waived those rights and gave both an audiotaped 
and videotaped statement of his activities on October 11 and 12.  In these 
interviews, Adams initially denied any knowledge of the murders.  After 
continued questioning, Adams admitted that he had stopped at Esther’s house the 
night she was killed and that he had briefly entered the residence.  Adams claimed 
that he had fallen over Esther’s body and had then gone upstairs and found 
Ashley’s body.  He quickly departed, and he did not tell anyone what he had 
found.  Adams admitted that on October 12, he had burned his bloody tennis 
shoes and trousers.  In Adams’s backyard, police found a pile of ashes that 
contained a belt buckle and shoe eyelets. 
{¶ 23} In addition to the police, Adams told others that he had discovered 
the bodies on the night of October 11 but had not notified authorities.  On October 
26, he was “on the verge of crying” when he told his friend, Kevin Clements, that 
he had found the bodies and had “tripped over Esther.”  He also told his 
girlfriend, Janelle, and his sister, Tina Maus, that he had tripped over Esther’s 
body in the house that night.  Later, he admitted to Tina that he had also found 
Ashley’s body. 
{¶ 24} Defense case  The defense moved for acquittal under Crim.R. 29, 
and the trial court denied the motion.  The defense then recalled Detective Jeffrey 
Hoolihan, one of the investigating detectives.  Detective Hoolihan agreed that 
police did not take certain investigative steps, such as examining an open window 
or a jewelry box for fingerprints, searching the neighborhood for weapons, or 
pursuing James Hartle as a murder suspect. 
{¶ 25} Procedural history  The grand jury indicted Adams on three 
counts of aggravated murder involving the deaths of Ashley Cook and Esther 
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Cook, aggravated burglary, kidnapping of Ashley, and three counts that he had 
raped Ashley. 
{¶ 26} Counts 1 and 2, relating to the aggravated murder of Ashley, 
included seven identical death-penalty specifications alleging murder (1) as part 
of a “course of conduct,” R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), (2) while committing aggravated 
burglary, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), (3) while committing a kidnapping, R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7), (4) while committing vaginal rape, (5) anal rape, and (6) fellatio 
rape, all in violation of R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), and (7) of a child under 13 years of 
age, R.C. 2929.04(A)(9).  Count 3, charging the aggravated murder of Esther, 
listed three specifications, namely, murder (1) as part of a course of conduct, (2) 
during an aggravated burglary, and (3) during a kidnapping. 
{¶ 27} The jury acquitted Adams of anal rape, as charged in Count 7 and 
in specification 5 of Counts 1 and 2, but convicted him of all remaining charges 
and specifications.  Count 2 (child murder) was dismissed on motion of the state.  
Following a penalty-phase hearing, the jury recommended the death penalty for 
the murder of each victim, and the trial court sentenced Adams to death. 
{¶ 28} In his direct appeal to our court, Adams presents 17 propositions of 
law.  We find merit in proposition of law VI.  Hence, we set aside the conviction 
of Adams for kidnapping and the findings of guilt relating to the R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) specifications charging murder in the course of a kidnapping.  We 
find that his other propositions of law lack merit, and we affirm the findings of 
guilt.  We have also independently weighed the aggravating circumstances against 
the mitigating factors as to each murder victim and have considered the 
proportionality of the death sentence.  For the reasons that follow, we otherwise 
affirm the judgment of the trial court and the death sentences imposed against 
Adams. 
Pretrial Issues (I, III, IV, V, X) 
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{¶ 29} Pretrial suppression — ineffective assistance  In proposition of 
law I, Adams argues that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to 
file a motion to suppress pretrial statements that Adams made to the Warren 
police on October 20, 1999.  In those audiotaped and videotaped statements, 
Adams admitted that he had discovered the bodies of Esther and Ashley, but he 
denied any responsibility for their deaths. 
{¶ 30} For Adams to obtain a reversal of a conviction or sentence based 
on ineffective assistance of counsel, he must prove (a) deficient performance 
(“errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed 
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment”) and (b) prejudice (“errors  * * * so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable”).  
Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674.  Accord State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373. 
{¶ 31} We conclude, however, that Adams’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel lacks merit.  First, Adams has not demonstrated deficient 
performance.  Trial counsel cannot be second-guessed as to trial strategy 
decisions.  In fact, the “ ‘[f]ailure to file a suppression motion does not constitute 
per se ineffective assistance of counsel.’ ”  State v. Madrigal (2000), 87 Ohio 
St.3d 378, 389, 721 N.E.2d 52, quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison (1986), 477 U.S. 
365, 384, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305.  “Representation is an art, and an act or 
omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in 
another.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  
Moreover, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”  Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. 
{¶ 32} In this case, counsel for Adams appear to have made a tactical 
judgment that the best way to defend Adams would be to permit his strong claims 
of innocence to be admitted into evidence.  In these October 20 statements, 
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Adams persistently denied any thefts from the house, any sexual contact with the 
victims, and any responsibility for their deaths. 
{¶ 33} Counsel’s trial strategy took advantage of the fact that Adams 
strongly proclaimed to police before trial that he was innocent of these charges.  
To illustrate this strategy, defense counsel in his opening statement noted that two 
“trained, experienced police officers” subjected Adams to “an intense 
interrogation * * * for almost three hours.”  Counsel further noted “[t]here are no 
less than * * * 50 accusations of assaults, beatings, on these two decedents, and 
there are just as many explained denials by Stanley that, ‘I did not do this, I did 
not have anything to do with this.’ ”  In closing argument, counsel resumed this 
strategy by stressing Adams’s protestations of innocence, e.g., “Stanley does not 
waiver [sic], and his statement remains the same,  I didn’t do this.” 
{¶ 34} By deciding not to attempt to suppress these pretrial statements, 
counsel had the benefit of having Adams’s exculpatory explanation of events in 
evidence, without the risk of having Adams take the stand in his own defense.  By 
not testifying, Adams never had to face a prosecutor’s cross-examination.  
Further, Adams never had to face devastating impeachment by means of his prior 
felony convictions, which included a recent murder conviction.  See, e.g., State v. 
Beckett (May 11, 2001), Holmes App. No. 00CA008, 2001 WL 520970 (“[b]y 
allowing the admission of [pretrial] statements to police * * *, counsel was able to 
present this defense * * * without putting appellant on the witness stand”); People 
v. Newman (Mich.App.2000), 2000 WL 33522090 (allowing into evidence a 
voluntary, exculpatory pretrial statement is a matter of trial strategy, not 
ineffective assistance). 
{¶ 35} Second, in order to demonstrate deficient performance, Adams 
must establish that a basis existed to suppress his pretrial statements.  See, e.g., 
State v. Tibbetts (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 146, 165-166, 749 N.E.2d 226 (where the 
record contains no evidence justifying a motion to suppress, defendant has not 
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met his burden of proving that his attorney violated an essential duty by failing to 
file the motion). 
{¶ 36} In fact, the record strongly indicates that counsel would have been 
unsuccessful in attempting to suppress Adams’s pretrial statements.  Police 
advised Adams of his Miranda rights by reading the form to him, and Adams 
freely signed a waiver of those rights.  Adams said that he understood his rights, 
and the record shows that his Miranda waiver and ensuing statements were 
voluntary.  The audiotaped and videotaped statements reveal that Adams 
remained in control of himself throughout the interview by persistently and 
strongly claiming his innocence.  Police never threatened or coerced Adams, and 
Adams never asked for a lawyer or expressed reluctance to talk with police.  
Moreover, at the time of the offense, Adams was 33 years old and experienced in 
the criminal justice system. 
{¶ 37} Under the totality-of-circumstances test, the facts show that Adams 
understood and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and that his pretrial 
statements to police in which he proclaimed his innocence were voluntary and 
admissible.  See State v. Edwards (1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 3 O.O.3d 18, 358 
N.E.2d 1051, paragraph two of the syllabus.  See, also, State v. Green (2000), 90 
Ohio St.3d 352, 366, 738 N.E.2d 1208; State v. Eley (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 174, 
178, 672 N.E.2d 640; State v. Brewer (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 50, 57-58, 549 
N.E.2d 491. 
{¶ 38} Third, counsel for Adams could also have decided that any motion 
to suppress Adams’s statements to the police would have been pointless.  Adams 
told several others, including a friend, his sister, and his former girlfriend, that he 
had discovered one or both of the bodies on the night of October 11. 
{¶ 39} Finally, Adams has not established that any prejudice resulted from 
the admission into evidence of his pretrial statements to police.  “To show that a 
defendant has been prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance, the defendant 
January Term, 2004 
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must prove that there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel’s 
errors, the result of the trial would have been different.” State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio 
St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph three of the syllabus.  In this case, the 
conviction of Adams did not hinge on evidence of his exculpatory pretrial 
statements because compelling evidence established his guilt.  Thus, we reject 
proposition of law I. 
{¶ 40} Asserted venire-person misconduct   In proposition of law III, 
Adams argues that because of asserted misconduct by an unknown member of the 
venire, he was denied a fair trial by an impartial jury.  Adams cites an incident 
that occurred in a jury waiting room during voir dire.  Prospective jurors were 
standing in line to sign a list of those who had heard or read about the case.  
While in line, a prospective juror, Harriet Dickerson, heard someone behind her 
comment, “I know we’re not supposed to talk about this, but I believe he’s guilty.  
When I looked at the newspaper this morning, I was afraid that I was going to 
have to be on this case.” 
{¶ 41} Dickerson could not identify the person who made this remark.  
Dickerson testified that another prospective juror reportedly had heard the 
comment and said that she “couldn’t believe” that someone had said that.  During 
individual voir dire, Dickerson disclosed the incident to the trial court.  After 
briefly questioning Dickerson, defense counsel did not pursue the matter.  
Although Dickerson was not challenged for cause, she did not sit on the jury. 
{¶ 42} Admittedly, “[d]ue process means a jury capable and willing to 
decide the case solely on the evidence before it.”  Smith v. Phillips (1982), 455 
U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78.  However, Smith holds that the party 
complaining about juror misconduct must establish prejudice.  Id. at 215-217, 102 
S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78.  See United States v. Zelinka (C.A.6, 1988), 862 F.2d 
92, 95. 
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{¶ 43} We reject the defense claim of prejudicial error for several reasons.  
First, counsel could reasonably decide that this casual remark in a jury waiting 
room was innocuous and that no purpose would be served by further inquiry.  We 
do not second-guess trial strategy decisions such as those made by counsel during 
voir dire.  See State v. Mason (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 157, 694 N.E.2d 932.  
We also reject Adams’s claim that the trial court should have, sua sponte, 
conducted a further inquiry.  See State v. Hessler (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 108, 115-
116, 734 N.E.2d 1237 (on juror misconduct, “we show deference to the trial 
judge, who sees and hears the events and thus is in a better position to accurately 
evaluate the situation and determine the appropriate scope of inquiry”). 
{¶ 44} Second, no misconduct by an actual juror occurred in this case.  
Instead, an unknown prospective juror made a casual comment in a jury-selection 
waiting room suggesting a preconceived opinion.  When this unknown person 
made this remark, no jury had been seated or sworn, nor had the court instructed 
jurors on their obligations. 
{¶ 45} Third, Adams has not established prejudice because the person 
who made the remark, or anyone who heard it, may never have sat on the jury that 
tried Adams.  “A claim of juror misconduct must focus on the jurors who were 
actually seated and not those excused.”  State v. Williams (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 1, 
4, 679 N.E.2d 646, citing Ross v. Oklahoma (1988), 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 
101 L.Ed.2d 80.  We have a “ ‘long-standing rule * * * not [to] reverse a 
judgment because of the misconduct of a juror unless prejudice * * * is shown.’ ”  
State v. Hipkins (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 80, 83, 23 O.O.3d 123, 430 N.E.2d 943, 
quoting State v. Kehn (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 11, 19, 4 O.O.3d 74, 361 N.E.2d 
1330.  Accord State v. Keith (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 526, 684 N.E.2d 47.  
Further, under Crim.R. 33(A), juror misconduct justifies a new trial only if it 
materially affected an accused’s substantial rights.  See, also, R.C. 2945.79(B). 
January Term, 2004 
13 
{¶ 46} Finally, the trial court and counsel in this case thoroughly and 
individually voir dired all prospective jurors in order to uncover any bias, 
prejudice, or preconceived opinions based on pretrial publicity or out-of-court 
discussions.  This extensive voir dire lasted for 11 days, and the court and counsel 
readily agreed on those who should be excused.  In fact, over 30 prospective 
jurors were excused because of pretrial publicity or knowledge of the case.  
Moreover, the trial court thoroughly instructed the jury to avoid pretrial publicity, 
not to discuss the case, and to decide the issues only on the evidence presented in 
court.  Hence, we reject proposition III. 
{¶ 47} Change of venue  In proposition of law IV, Adams contends that 
because of pervasive pretrial publicity, the trial court erred in refusing to change 
venue. 
{¶ 48} “[T]he right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a 
fair trial by a panel of impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors.”  Irvin v. Dowd (1961), 366 
U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751.  However, “pretrial publicity — 
even pervasive, adverse publicity — does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial.”  
Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart (1976), 427 U.S. 539, 554, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 
L.Ed.2d 683. 
{¶ 49} Changes in venue help protect fair-trial rights.  A trial court can 
change venue “when it appears that a fair and impartial trial cannot be held” in 
that court.  Crim.R. 18(B); R.C. 2901.12(K).  “A change of venue rests largely 
in the discretion of the trial court.”  State v. Fairbanks (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 34, 
37, 61 O.O.2d 241, 289 N.E.2d 352.  Accord State v. Montgomery (1991), 61 
Ohio St.3d 410, 413, 575 N.E.2d 167.  Moreover, we have held that “ ‘a careful 
and searching voir dire provides the best test of whether prejudicial pretrial 
publicity has prevented obtaining a fair and impartial jury from the locality.’ ”  
State v. Davis (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 107, 111, 666 N.E.2d 1099, quoting State 
v. Bayless (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 73, 98, 2 O.O.3d 249, 357 N.E.2d 1035.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Accord State v. Lundgren (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 474, 479, 653 N.E.2d 304; 
State v. Landrum (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 117, 559 N.E.2d 710. 
{¶ 50} Under Crim.R. 18(B), counsel filed a pretrial motion to change 
venue, renewed the motion during voir dire, and later renewed the motion after 
the jury’s guilty verdict.  A few of the newspaper articles submitted in support 
of the motion definitely disparaged Adams, while others simply described the 
fact that a jury was being empanelled.  For example, a Warren Tribune 
Chronicle article, dated September 9, 2001, “Portrait of a Killer,” described in 
depth Adams’s background and criminal record, including details of his prior 
murder conviction, and indicated that he was a suspect in other unsolved 
murders.  Publicity continued after the guilty verdicts, but before the October 3 
penalty verdict.  An article on September 27, 2001, notes that Adams was found 
guilty and “was a suspect in a number of unsolved homicides and ‘may be a 
serial murderer.’ ”  An editorial on September 30, 2001, discusses the question 
“Is Adams a serial killer?”   
{¶ 51} In spite of the publicity before and during the trial, Adams has 
not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion 
for a change of venue.  The trial court conducted extensive individual voir dire 
of prospective jurors to ensure that they were not prejudiced by publicity about 
the case.  During individual voir dire, the judge cautioned each juror not to 
discuss the case or read or listen to media reports.  On September 11, 2001, just 
before the final jury was selected, the trial court again individually voir dired 
each remaining prospective juror to ensure that they were still not contaminated 
by media reports.  The record reflects that six sitting jurors had not read or 
heard anything about the case. 
{¶ 52} Nonetheless, Adams contends that six of the jurors may have 
been adversely affected by pretrial publicity: Jurors Fonce, Eucker, Kuzmaul, 
DePalma, Griffin, and Jagiella.  Yet, Adams did not challenge any of these six 
January Term, 2004 
15 
jurors for cause, which indicated that he was satisfied with those individuals 
when they were seated as jurors.  See State v. Lynch, 98 Ohio St.3d 514, 2003-
Ohio-2284, 787 N.E.2d 1185, at ¶ 37; State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 
239, 252, 268, 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768. 
{¶ 53} Moreover, the record affirmatively reflects that pretrial publicity 
never adversely influenced any of those six jurors.  Juror Rhonda Fonce thought 
that she “remember[ed] reading something in the newspaper” about the case, 
but recalled no details, had formed no opinion, and said that she would decide 
the case only on the evidence.  When later questioned on September 11, Fonce 
continued to assert that she had not read media reports.  In initial voir dire, Juror 
Edward Jagiella agreed that he had read about the case in newspapers.  But he 
said that he would decide the case on the evidence before him: “That is my 
philosophy.  I want to know all of the evidence.”  Later, he reported that all he 
could remember was “something about a girl being killed and a child.” 
{¶ 54} Juror Gerald Eucker had read about the case a long time before 
trial and recalled that it involved a mother and daughter.  Eucker also believed 
that Adams had been “associated” with another woman’s murder, but he did not 
“know whether he [had] been convicted or [was] just a suspect” and had “no 
idea” whether Adams had anything to do with that case.  Eucker agreed to 
decide this case only on the evidence at trial.  Later, Eucker reported that he had 
“very little knowledge about this case,” but recalled that the victims were killed 
on Dickey Avenue.  When questioned on September 11, Eucker agreed that he 
had seen Adams’s picture in the weekend paper and had seen the headline, 
“Portrait of a Murderer,” but he did not read the article or form any opinion. 
{¶ 55} Juror Deborah Kuzmaul heard “news that there was an upcoming 
trial.”  But she does not read the newspapers, knew only that a man was being 
tried for murder, did not know anything about the facts, and had no opinion about 
the case.  At the initial voir dire, Juror Joseph DePalma asserted that he had no 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
independent recollection of the case from the media.  When questioned on 
September 11, DePalma agreed that he had seen Adams’s picture in a weekend 
paper but said that that photograph had no impact on him and he had not read the 
article.  Because he had the paper with him, he surrendered it, except for the 
sports section.  In initial voir dire, Juror Kenneth Griffin reported that he knew 
nothing about the case.  On September 11, Griffin noted that he received the 
weekend paper, but he had never read or listened to any media reports about the 
case. 
{¶ 56} In sum, extensive voir dire demonstrated that each of the six 
jurors who had been subjected to media exposure knew very few details, if any, 
had no opinion about the responsibility of Adams, and agreed to decide the case 
only on the evidence at trial.  Thus, Adams has not shown that any juror was 
biased.  “A defendant claiming that pretrial publicity has denied him a fair trial 
must show that one or more jurors were actually biased.  Only in rare cases may 
prejudice be presumed.”  (Citation omitted.)  State v. Lynch, 98 Ohio St.3d 514, 
2003-Ohio-2284, 787 N.E.2d 1185, at ¶ 35.  Also, at the end of the trial, the trial 
court noted that once trial had commenced, “there is absolutely no evidence 
whatsoever that any of the articles * * * have come to the attention of the jury.” 
{¶ 57} Therefore, we conclude that the trial court’s careful, individual, 
and sequestered voir dire of each juror on two separate occasions showed that 
six jurors had no knowledge of the case.  Six remaining jurors recalled only 
sketchy details, if any, from media exposure.  Further, the trial court 
individually cautioned each juror not to read or listen to media reports, and 
collectively advised the jury on that point many times. 
{¶ 58} Under these circumstances, we hold that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion by declining to change venue.  State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 
121, 2002-Ohio-5524, 776 N.E.2d 1061, at ¶ 30 (“the trial court took effective 
steps to protect the defendant’s rights”); State v. White (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 
January Term, 2004 
17 
16, 21, 693 N.E.2d 772 (“[i]t is rare for a court to presume that a jury is 
prejudiced by pretrial publicity”); State v. Bies (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 320, 324, 
658 N.E.2d 754.  We reject proposition IV. 
{¶ 59} Incomplete voir dire — ineffective assistance  In proposition of 
law V, Adams asserts that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by 
conducting an incomplete voir dire examination of prospective jurors.  As we 
noted, reversal of a conviction or sentence based on ineffective assistance requires 
finding both deficient performance and prejudice.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 
538 N.E.2d 373. 
{¶ 60} We reject this claim for several reasons.  First, Adams has not 
shown deficient performance by counsel during voir dire.  In fact, defense 
counsel, along with the court and prosecutor, conducted an extensive voir dire for 
11 days.  Voir dire eliminated those who were biased and those who would not be 
fair jurors in a death-penalty case. 
{¶ 61} Nonetheless, Adams argues that his counsel did not adequately 
question jurors Eucker, Jagiella, and Griffin about their death-penalty views.  But 
“[t]he conduct of voir dire by defense counsel does not have to take a particular 
form, nor do specific questions have to be asked.”  State v. Evans (1992), 63 Ohio 
St.3d 231, 247, 586 N.E.2d 1042.  Accord State v. Seiber (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 4, 
12, 564 N.E.2d 408.  We “will not second-guess trial strategy decisions” such as 
those made during voir dire.  State v. Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d at 157, 694 N.E.2d 
932. 
{¶ 62} In fact, the court and counsel fully questioned these particular 
jurors about their death-penalty views.  For example, the death-qualification voir 
dire for Eucker took over 30 pages of transcript.  Eucker expressed “no problem” 
with the death penalty, thought that it “has a place in our society,” but had “never 
given [it] a lot of thought.”  He understood that taking a life does not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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automatically result in the death penalty, and he was open to both the death 
penalty and life imprisonment.  He would do only “what the law and the evidence 
requires” and would “listen to the instructions and set aside [his] own personal 
opinions.”  He would decide on death only if the aggravating circumstances 
outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  Defense counsel 
did not challenge Eucker for cause. 
{¶ 63} Counsel and the court also extensively questioned Kenneth Griffin 
about his death-penalty views.  Griffin believed that the death penalty was “there 
for a reason.”  But when asked if he had strong views, he responded, “No, not 
really.”  As possible mitigating factors, Griffin mentioned mental problems or the 
influence of drugs or alcohol.  He agreed to follow the court’s instructions, and 
believed that “if the mitigating factors * * * outweigh the aggravating 
circumstances, then that is where the sentencing should be.”  He would not 
“automatically head for a death penalty” if the defendant was convicted.  Again, 
neither side challenged this juror. 
{¶ 64} Counsel and the court also extensively questioned Edward Jagiella.  
Jagiella believed that if it is proved “beyond a shadow of a doubt” that a person 
killed somebody “with malice,” and “they’re not mentally ill,” that person 
“deserve[s] the death penalty.”  But Jagiella stated that he could set aside his 
opinions and follow the court’s instructions.  He agreed that society would be 
protected either by a killer’s execution or by a life sentence.  Jagiella agreed to 
consider all mitigating factors, including “Adams’s character, the way he was 
brought up, and * * * [whether] he was mentally ill.”  He would “listen to all of 
the facts,” consider the credibility of witnesses, and “reserve judgment on 
everything until everything is in.”  Again, neither counsel challenged Jagiella for 
cause. 
January Term, 2004 
19 
{¶ 65} Adams also complains about counsel’s voir dire of alternate juror 
Jamie Nezbeth.  But Nezbeth never sat as a juror and was excused for unrelated 
reasons during the mitigation hearing. 
{¶ 66} We conclude that the questioning of all jurors, including the three 
named by Adams, was thorough and meaningful.  Thus, Adams has not shown 
deficient performance.  Counsel “need not repeat questions about topics already 
covered by * * * opposing counsel, or the judge.”  State v. Watson (1991), 61 
Ohio St.3d 1, 13, 572 N.E.2d 97.  Further, “[c]ounsel were present for voir dire 
and could see and hear the jurors answer questions.  [They] were in a much better 
position” to judge such issues.  State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at 143, 538 N.E.2d 
373.  We have previously rejected similar challenges to the manner in which 
counsel questioned jurors during voir dire.  See, e.g., State v. Goodwin (1999), 84 
Ohio St.3d 331, 335, 703 N.E.2d 1251 (counsel’s decision “not to question jurors 
further” about their death-penalty views was an “exercise of their discretionary 
judgment”); State v. Evans, 63 Ohio St.3d at 247, 586 N.E.2d 1042 (ineffective 
assistance not established by the fact that counsel in general voir dire only briefly 
asked jurors about their attitude concerning the death penalty). 
{¶ 67} Finally, Adams has not established that prejudice resulted from the 
manner in which counsel voir dired Eucker, Jagiella, and Griffin.  To establish 
prejudice requires proving that “a reasonable probability [exists] that, were it not 
for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been different.”  State v. 
Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph three of the syllabus.  
Adams has not even attempted to demonstrate that more extensive questioning of 
Eucker, Griffin, and Jagiella would have created a “reasonable probability” of a 
different trial result.  Accordingly, we reject proposition V. 
{¶ 68} Competence to stand trial   In proposition of law X, Adams argues 
that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to adequately challenge 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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at trial the competence of Adams to stand trial when a good-faith basis existed to 
do so. 
{¶ 69} Before trial, counsel requested a determination of competency.  
The court selected clinical psychologist Dr. Stanley J. Palumbo, the defense 
selected psychologist Dr. Douglas C. Darnall, and the prosecutor selected a 
psychiatrist, Dr. Steven J. Zuchowski.  After interviewing Adams and examining 
relevant records, each expert found Adams competent to stand trial.  At a pretrial 
conference, the parties stipulated to the competency-evaluation reports and agreed 
that each expert would testify as his report indicated.  The court then found 
Adams competent to stand trial. 
{¶ 70} Admittedly, a person who “lacks the capacity to understand the 
nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to 
assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.”  Drope v. Missouri 
(1975), 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103.  “Fundamental 
principles of due process” prohibit trial of a criminal defendant who is legally 
incompetent.  State v. Berry (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 354, 359, 650 N.E.2d 433, 
citing Pate v. Robinson (1966), 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815. 
{¶ 71} Although Adams suggests that he was not competent to stand trial, 
he primarily argues that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by not 
pursuing the issue.  Nonetheless, we find that Adams has not established deficient 
performance.  Counsel’s decision to stipulate to the content of three competency 
evaluations and not cross-examine these experts or otherwise challenge the 
competence of Adams was grounded on a reasoned tactical judgment. 
{¶ 72} First, the record reflects no basis to challenge the reports.  The 
competency reports were comprehensive and satisfied the statutory requirements 
for competency evaluations.  See R.C. 2945.371(G).  Each expert explained in 
detail why Adams was competent to stand trial.  For example, Dr. Palumbo 
interviewed Adams for two hours and reviewed other relevant records such as his 
January Term, 2004 
21 
own September 1996 evaluation of Adams.  After reviewing relevant history, Dr. 
Palumbo articulated detailed reasons for concluding, “with reasonable scientific 
certainty, [that] Stanley Adams is presently able to understand the nature and 
objective of the proceedings against him and to presently assist in his defense.”  
According to Dr. Palumbo, Adams understood and described the charges against 
him, the role of witnesses, the judge, the jury, the prosecutor, and the defense 
counsel, as well as his role as the defendant.  Adams also understood types of 
pleas, the plea-bargain process, and the potential penalties. 
{¶ 73} Dr. Darnall, the expert selected by Adams, also explained in detail 
why he could “find no evidence of a significant mental disorder that would hinder 
[Adams’s] capacity to understand the judicial process or to contribute to his own 
defense.”  Dr. Zuchowski detailed five reasons why he found that Adams 
understood the nature and objective of the proceedings against him and eight 
specific reasons why Adams could assist his lawyers.  Although all three experts 
reported that Adams had abused drugs and alcohol, no one diagnosed any 
psychosis or mental limitations that would affect the competence of Adams to 
stand trial. 
{¶ 74} Under R.C. 2945.37(G), “[a] defendant is presumed to be 
competent to stand trial.”  This presumption remains valid under R.C. 2945.37(G) 
unless “after a hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence” that 
the defendant is not competent.  Faced with these strong conclusions that Adams 
was competent to be tried, counsel reasonably decided to stipulate to their 
testimony and not challenge the presumption of competency.  When judging 
professional decisions of counsel, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that 
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance.”  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 
L.Ed.2d 674. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
{¶ 75} Second, counsel knew their client and could best determine if he 
understood the trial process and was able to assist them in the defense.  Counsel 
could also decide if cross-examination of the experts or further evaluations were 
needed.  See State v. Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 439, 2003-Ohio-4164, 793 N.E.2d 
446, at ¶ 63; State v. Spivey (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 405, 410-411, 692 N.E.2d 151.  
We grant deference on these issues to those “who see and hear what goes on in 
the courtroom.”  State v. Cowans (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 68, 84, 717 N.E.2d 298. 
{¶ 76} Third, later events at trial vindicated counsel’s decision not to 
challenge the competence of Adams.  During the trial, Adams made a pro se 
request for witnesses to be recalled, personally asked for an additional DNA test, 
and argued about a polygraph examination.  These personal requests by Adams 
demonstrated his understanding of the trial process and his ability to assist his 
defense.  In addition, the fact that Adams at times complained about tactical 
decisions that his lawyers made also established that Adams understood the trial 
process and was fully engaged in his defense. 
{¶ 77} Further, Adams “displayed no outrageous, irrational behavior 
during trial, and counsel never complained about his lack of cooperation.”  State 
v. Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 439, 2003-Ohio-4164, 793 N.E.2d 446, at ¶ 63.  “[I]t is 
noteworthy that nobody on the spot thought [that the defendant’s] behavior raised 
any question as to his competence.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State v. Cowans, 87 Ohio 
St.3d at 84, 717 N.E.2d 298.  Cf. State v. Thomas, 97 Ohio St.3d 309, 316, 779 
N.E.2d 1017; State v. Vrabel, 99 Ohio St.3d 184, 2003-Ohio-3193, 790 N.E.2d 
303, ¶ 29-32; State v. Carter (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 593, 603-605, 734 N.E.2d 
345. 
{¶ 78} Finally, nothing in the record suggests prejudice, which Strickland 
requires.  The record fails to reflect any reasonable probability that if counsel had 
cross-examined the experts or requested further evaluations, the trial court’s 
decision that Adams was competent would have been different.  See State v. 
January Term, 2004 
23 
Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph three of the syllabus.  
Accord State v. Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 439, 2003-Ohio-4164, 793 N.E.2d 446, at 
¶ 66.  Thus, we overrule proposition X. 
Trial issues 
{¶ 79} DNA evidence   In proposition of law II, Adams challenges the 
DNA evidence by claiming that the trial court’s admission of scientific or expert 
testimony and evidence without a preliminary determination of the reliability of 
the conclusions to be presented violated his fair-trial rights.  Adams complains 
that “the trial court regarded DNA [evidence] as nothing novel” and allowed 
“junk” testimony to come into evidence.  Adams essentially challenges DNA 
testimony as if trial courts had never accepted DNA evidence before.  See Evid.R. 
702(C); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), 509 U.S. 579, 
589-590, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469. 
{¶ 80} However, we hold that the trial court was not required to conduct a 
preliminary hearing under Evid.R. 104 to accept the scientific reliability of DNA 
evidence.  DNA evidence is not “novel” to Ohio courts as Adams claims.  In State 
v. Pierce (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 490, 597 N.E.2d 107, at paragraph one of the 
syllabus, we held that “DNA evidence may be relevant evidence which will assist 
the trier of fact in determining a fact in issue, and may be admissible.”  In Pierce, 
we recognized that “the theory and procedures used in DNA typing are generally 
accepted within the scientific community.”  64 Ohio St.3d at 497, 597 N.E.2d 
107.  Further, we held in Pierce that “questions regarding the reliability of DNA 
evidence in a given case go to the weight of the evidence rather than its 
admissibility.  No pretrial evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine the 
reliability of the DNA evidence.  The trier of fact * * * can determine whether 
DNA evidence is reliable.”  Pierce, 64 Ohio St.3d at 501, 597 N.E.2d 107.  
(Emphasis added.)  Accord State v. Nicholas (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 431, 437, 613 
N.E.2d 225 (“DNA results constitute reliable evidence”). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
{¶ 81} To support his claims, Adams cites a variety of studies suggesting 
limitations on DNA evidence.  For example, Adams argues that the court should 
have excluded DNA evidence because of controversy over (1) “the statistical 
estimates being offered for Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) tests”; (2) “the 
reliability of the methods used * * * for collecting, handling, processing, and 
testing crime scene samples”; and (3) “coincidental match probabilities and false 
error rates.” 
{¶ 82} However, the issues that Adams now raises “go to the weight of 
the evidence rather than its admissibility.”  Pierce, 64 Ohio St.3d 490, 597 N.E.2d 
107, paragraph two of the syllabus.  In Pierce, we found that the trial court 
properly admitted calculations as to the frequency probability of DNA samples.  
Id. at 501, 597 N.E.2d 107.  In Pierce, we also recognized that “[g]iven the 
human element involved in their design and process, all scientific procedures and 
analyses have incidents of error.”  Id. at 498, 597 N.E.2d 107.  Further, “[t]he jury 
was free to reject the DNA evidence if it concluded that the evidence was 
unreliable or misleading.”  Id. at 501, 597 N.E.2d 107. 
{¶ 83} Although Evid.R. 702 was amended after Pierce to state the 
reliability requirement, the Staff Note to Evid.R. 702 indicates that “[t]he 
amendment is intended to clarify the circumstances in which expert testimony is 
admissible. * * * [N]o substantive change from prior law is intended.  In 
particular, there is no intention to change existing Ohio law regarding the 
reliability of expert testimony.” 
{¶ 84} Further, we have recognized since Evid.R. 702 was amended that 
“[r]elevant evidence based on valid principles will satisfy the threshold reliability 
standard for the admission of expert testimony.  The credibility to be afforded 
these principles and the expert’s conclusions remain[s] a matter for the trier of 
fact.  The reliability requirement in Evid.R. 702 is a threshold determination that 
should focus on a particular type of scientific evidence, not the truth or falsity of 
January Term, 2004 
25 
an alleged scientific fact or truth.”  State v. Nemeth (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 202, 
211, 694 N.E.2d 1332. 
{¶ 85} In Miller v. Bike Athletic Co. (1998), 80 Ohio St.3d 607, 611, 687 
N.E.2d 735, we also emphasized that the reliability inquiry relates to the validity 
of the underlying scientific principles, not the correctness of the expert’s 
conclusions.  See, also, Gerald J. Todaro, The Admissibility of Medical 
Testimony in Ohio: Daubert, Joiner and Ohio’s Relevance-Reliability Standard 
(1998), 46 Cleve.St.L.Rev. 319, 335 (Nemeth “ultimately continues the relaxed 
standard imposed by the relevance/reliability approach”). 
{¶ 86} As we recognized in Pierce over 12 years ago, DNA evidence, 
premised on valid scientific principles, has been widely accepted as reliable and 
admissible evidence.  Pierce, 64 Ohio St.3d at 494, 597 N.E.2d 107.  “[T]he use 
of nuclear DNA analysis as a forensic tool has been found to be scientifically 
reliable by the scientific community for more than a decade.”  United States v. 
Beverly (C.A.6, 2004), 369 F.3d 516, 528.  Courts throughout the nation and in 
Ohio routinely accept DNA evidence.  See George Bundy Smith & Janet A. 
Gordon, The Admission of DNA Evidence in State and Federal Courts (1997), 65 
Fordham L.Rev. 2465, 2482-2483, 2488.  See, also, State v. Satta, Marion App. 
No. 9-01-38, 2002-Ohio-5049, 2002 WL 31114690, ¶ 44 (“the credibility of the 
D.N.A. testing * * * is a matter to [be] determined by the trier of fact”); State v. 
Martin (Aug. 14, 2000), Brown App. No. CA99-09-026, 2000 WL 1145465 
(“Questions regarding the reliability of DNA evidence * * *, including alleged 
defects or limitations of DNA population frequency statistics, go to weight of the 
evidence rather than its admissibility”); State v. Honzu (June 1, 1995), Franklin 
App. No. 94AP07-1011, 1995 WL 326214, *8 (questions regarding DNA testing 
procedures go to weight not admissibility).  See, also, Smith & Gordon, 65 
Cleve.St.L.Rev. at 2470 (PCR analysis [one of several DNA typing techniques] 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
“has received overwhelming acceptance in the scientific community and the 
courts”). 
{¶ 87} At trial, Adams offered no evidence challenging the DNA evidence 
or the manner in which the samples were collected or tested, preferring to rely 
upon cross-examination of the experts.  Although counsel cross-examined the 
experts at length, counsel did not establish any basis to question the admissibility 
or the reliability of the DNA evidence in this case.  Moreover, counsel for Adams 
specifically asserted that for strategic reasons, they did not want additional DNA 
testing because it would not help their client. 
{¶ 88} Finally, as we have long recognized, the admission of expert 
testimony is within the trial court’s discretion.  State v. Williams (1983), 4 Ohio 
St.3d 53, 58, 4 OBR 144, 446 N.E.2d 444.  In this case, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion by allowing the DNA experts to testify as such during the 
trial.  Each expert was qualified under Evid.R. 702, and each explained the 
scientific procedures used.  Meghan Clement holds a master’s degree in forensic 
science, had performed thousands of DNA tests, and had testified over 200 times 
in courts in 24 states.  Dr. P. Michael Conneally, a Distinguished Professor of 
Medical and Molecular Genetics, is a charter member of HUGO, the Human 
Genome Organization, had published 275 scientific articles, and had testified as 
an expert witness in 26 states on genetics and DNA subjects.  Jennifer Duvall has 
a bachelor of science degree in biology, had completed an eight-month Ohio 
DNA training program, had completed analyses of over 1,000 DNA samples, and 
had testified as an expert witness 15 times.  We find no merit in the claim made 
by Adams that the trial court erred in failing to hold a preliminary hearing on the 
admissibility of DNA evidence.  Hence, we reject proposition II. 
{¶ 89} Conviction of allied offenses  In proposition of law VI, Adams 
argues that his separate convictions for kidnapping and rape constituted “allied 
offenses of similar import” under R.C. 2941.25.  Adams argues that no separate 
January Term, 2004 
27 
animus existed for kidnapping and that he cannot constitutionally be convicted 
and sentenced separately for these two offenses.  Trial counsel preserved the issue 
by raising the lack of proof of a separate animus for kidnapping in a Crim.R. 29 
motion at trial. 
{¶ 90} In State v. Logan (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 14 O.O.3d 373, 397 
N.E.2d 1345, we established guidelines to determine whether kidnapping and rape 
are committed with a separate animus so as to permit separate punishment under 
R.C. 2941.25(B).  We held in Logan that “[w]here the restraint or movement of 
the victim is merely incidental to a separate underlying crime, there exists no 
separate animus sufficient to sustain separate convictions; however, where the 
restraint is prolonged, the confinement is secretive, or the movement is substantial 
so as to demonstrate a significance independent of the other offense, there exists a 
separate animus as to each offense sufficient to support separate convictions.” Id. 
at paragraph (a) of the syllabus.  Conversely, the Logan court recognized that 
where the asportation or restraint “subjects the victim to a substantial increase in 
risk of harm separate and apart from * * * the underlying crime, there exists a 
separate animus.”  Id., 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 14 O.O.3d 373, 397 N.E.2d 1345, at 
paragraph (b) of the syllabus.  In Logan, we also noted that where murder is the 
underlying crime, a kidnapping in facilitation thereof would generally constitute a 
separately cognizable offense.  Id. at 135, 14 O.O.3d 373, 397 N.E.2d 1345. 
{¶ 91} In Logan, we found no separate animus to sustain separate 
convictions for rape and kidnapping.  In Logan, after the victim refused to accept 
some pills, the “defendant produced a knife, held it to her throat, and forced her 
into an alley.  Under such duress, she accompanied him down the alley, around a 
corner, and down a flight of stairs, where he raped her at knifepoint.”  Id. at 127, 
397 N.E.2d 1345, 14 O.O.3d 373.  In State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 
197, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264, citing Logan, we found that charging two 
aggravating circumstances under R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) (robbery and kidnapping) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
was “unnecessarily cumulative.”  In the course of a bank robbery, Jenkins aimed 
his firearm at certain individuals and ordered others in the bank to move to the 
rear of the building, but “such restraint or movement of the victims was 
incidental” to the robbery.  Id. at 198, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264. 
{¶ 92} We have found that a separate animus existed, pursuant to Logan, 
in a variety of kidnapping and aggravated murder cases.  In State v. Lynch, 98 
Ohio St.3d 514, 2003-Ohio-2284, 787 N.E.2d 1185, at ¶ 135, the defendant lured 
the six-year-old victim into his apartment and kept her there long enough to show 
her some videos before raping and killing her.  In State v. Hartman (2001), 93 
Ohio St.3d 274, 280-281, 754 N.E.2d 1150, “the [d]efendant tied [the victim] to 
the bed, gagged her, stabbed her one hundred thirty-eight times, slit her throat, 
and strangled her to death.”  In State v. Simko (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 483, 489, 644 
N.E.2d 345, the defendant “restrained and terrorized” the victim for 
approximately one-half hour before shooting her when she tried to escape.  In 
State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 595 N.E.2d 884, the defendant forced the 
12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a secluded, wooded area, where the 
victim was repeatedly beaten, raped, and then strangled and set on fire.  See, also, 
State v. Seiber, 56 Ohio St.3d 4, 564 N.E.2d 408 (kidnapping found when 
defendant and accomplice terrorized and held bar patrons at gunpoint for 20 to 30 
minutes, preventing them from leaving); State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 
255, 261–262, 552 N.E.2d 191 (kidnapping upheld when defendant lured a child 
from her home to fourth floor of nearby building where he attempted to rape her 
and ultimately killed her by throwing her from the window). 
{¶ 93} Nonetheless, each of the foregoing cases is distinguishable from 
this case.  In contrast to the facts established in those cases, the state presented no 
evidence in this case that Adams moved Ashley to or from the bedroom where she 
was killed or that he tied her up or restrained her in any way other than what was 
necessary to rape and kill her.  No evidence exists in the record of substantial 
January Term, 2004 
29 
movement, prolonged restraint, or secretive confinement.  Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 
126, 14 O.O.3d 373, 397 N.E.2d 1345, at syllabus.  In fact, no evidence exists that 
Ashley was moved at all.  Nor did a “kidnapping in facilitation” of a murder 
occur.  Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d at 135, 14 O.O.3d 373, 397 N.E.2d 1345.  Further, 
the evidence indicates that Adams was in the house no more than 30 minutes.  
The pathologist reported that the attack on Ashley and Esther “could have 
happened very quickly,” “in a matter of minutes.” 
{¶ 94} In sum, we hold that the evidence is insufficient, under Logan, to 
establish the separate animus required to separately convict Adams for kidnapping 
Ashley.  See State v. Donald (1979), 57 Ohio St.2d 73, 11 O.O.3d 242, 386 
N.E.2d 1341, syllabus (kidnapping is an offense of similar import to rape); 
Logan; Jenkins; State v. Fears (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 329, 344, 715 N.E.2d 136 
(no separate animus for death-penalty specifications alleging robbery and 
kidnapping without prolonged restraint, significant asportation, or secret 
confinement). 
{¶ 95} Accordingly, the conviction for kidnapping in Count 5, as well as 
the findings of guilty to the R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) specifications for murder during a 
kidnapping in Count 1 and Count 3, is vacated.  Count 5 and those specifications 
are dismissed.  The separate sentence for count 5 is set aside. 
{¶ 96} Jury Instructions   In proposition of law XI, Adams argues that 
the trial court erred by referring to “Ashley Dawn Cook, Age 12,” in the 
instructions on Count 2 and in death-penalty specification 7 in Counts 1 and 2.  
Adams points out that Ashley’s age was an element of these offenses and an issue 
of fact for the jury.  Her age was also relevant as an issue of fact in Count 5. 
{¶ 97} Due process requires the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
every element of the charged offense.  In re Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 364, 
90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368.  Jury instructions that effectively relieve the state 
of its burden of persuasion violate a defendant’s due process rights.  Sandstrom v. 
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Montana (1979), 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39; Rose v. Clark 
(1986), 478 U.S. 570, 580, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460. 
{¶ 98} In this case, the trial court’s initial trial-phase instructions, which 
concerned Counts 5 through 8, the kidnapping and rape charges, did not list 
Ashley’s age as 12 years.  For those charges, the court instructed that whether 
Ashley was “under 13 years of age” or “under the age of 13” was an issue of fact 
for the jury.  Adams does not complain about that part of the instructions. 
{¶ 99} 
Later, the court instructed the jury on the elements of death-
penalty specification 7, murder of a child under 13 in violation of R.C. 
2929.04(A)(9), in Counts 1 and 2.  On those specifications, the court instructed 
the jury that to “find the Defendant guilty * * * you must find that the State has 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant * * * did purposely cause 
the death of Ashley Dawn Cook, age 12, who was under 13 years of age at the 
time of the [murder].”  Adams now argues that the trial judge in effect instructed 
the jury that Ashley was in fact 12 years old, when the jury had the responsibility 
to make a finding of fact on that issue. 
{¶ 100} Nonetheless, we conclude that Adams waived this claim by not 
objecting in a timely manner to any ambiguity in the instruction relating to 
Ashley’s age.  See State v. Underwood (1983), 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 
N.E.2d 1332, syllabus.  In this case, the objection was not timely.  Counsel had 
received the instructions and verdict forms two days previously, but counsel did 
not raise any objection until after the jury was instructed.  Untimely objections are 
reviewed “using a plain-error analysis pursuant to Crim.R. 52(B).”  State v. 
Johnson (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 96, 102, 545 N.E.2d 636. 
{¶ 101} Further, we conclude that the instruction did not foreclose the 
jury’s role.  The reference to Ashley as “age 12” came in the context of the trial 
court’s instructions to the jury as to the charge as stated in the indictment.  The 
court then properly instructed the jury that the state had to prove the victim’s age.  
January Term, 2004 
31 
When considered in the context of the entire instructions, the jury would not have 
understood the instruction as requiring it to accept that Ashley was 12 years old, 
without making the required factual finding.  See Estelle v. McGuire (1991), 502 
U.S. 62, 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385. 
{¶ 102} At worst, the instruction was ambiguous and did not constitute 
plain error, because the outcome of the trial was not affected by the reference to 
Ashley’s age.  State v. Underwood, 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 
1332, syllabus.  Compelling evidence, including Ashley’s death certificate, as 
well as testimony at trial, proved that Ashley was 12 years old when she was 
murdered.  No evidence at trial contradicted that fact.  Accordingly, we regard the 
issue raised in proposition XI waived. 
{¶ 103} Restraints during trial   In proposition of law XII, Adams argues 
that the trial court improperly authorized the use of an electronic restraint on him, 
a “Band-It” belt that could be activated to produce an electric shock if Adams was 
disruptive in court.  Adams argues that the trial court violated his right to a fair 
trial because the court authorized fitting the device on him without a factual basis 
for doing so. 
{¶ 104} With respect to customary physical restraints such as handcuffs 
or leg shackles, we have long recognized that “no one should be tried while 
shackled, absent unusual circumstances.”  State v. Kidder (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 
279, 285, 513 N.E.2d 311.  “However, shackling is left to the trial court’s sound 
discretion.”  State v. Richey (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 353, 358, 595 N.E.2d 915, 
citing State v. Woodards (1966), 6 Ohio St.2d 14, 23, 35 O.O.2d 8, 215 N.E.2d 
568.  The trial court must exercise its own discretion and not leave the issue up to 
security personnel.  See, e.g., Woodards v. Cardwell (C.A.6, 1970), 430 F.2d 978, 
981-982.  Accord State v. Cassano, 96 Ohio St.3d 94, 2002-Ohio-3751, 772 
N.E.2d 81, ¶ 54.  Courts have upheld restraints in trials of defendants with a 
documented history of violence or escape attempts.  See, e.g., Harrell v. Israel 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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(C.A.7, 1982), 672 F.2d 632, 636; Kennedy v. Cardwell (C.A.6, 1973), 487 F.2d 
101, 105, fn. 5. 
{¶ 105} Courts elsewhere have upheld the use of electronic stun belts 
when specifically justified.  See, e.g., State v. Powell (2002), 274 Kan. 618, 56 
P.3d 189 (factors justifying use include serious nature of charges, history of 
institutional violence, history of verbal or physical assaults); United States v. 
McKissick (C.A.10, 2000), 204 F.3d 1282, 1299 (without evidence that jury knew 
that defendants were wearing stun belts, court will not presume prejudice).  
Accord Scieszka v. State (2003), 259 Ga.App. 486, 578 S.E.2d 149 (where no 
prejudice is shown, use of stun belt not abuse of discretion); Simms v. State 
(Tex.App.2004), 127 S.W.3d 924.  Other courts have reversed when stun belts 
have not been amply justified on the record. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Pliler (C.A.9, 
2003), 341 F.3d 897; People v. Mar (2002), 28 Cal.4th 1201, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 161, 
52 P.3d 95; United States v. Durham (C.A.11, 2002), 287 F.3d 1297.  Further, the 
Supreme Court of Indiana has flatly declared that “stun belts may not be used on 
defendants in the courtrooms of this State.”  Wrinkles v. State (Ind.2001), 749 
N.E.2d 1179, 1194.  In Ohio, this device has been used previously in some capital 
cases.  See, e.g., State v. Filiaggi (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 230, 238, 714 N.E.2d 867. 
{¶ 106} In this case, the trial court conducted a hearing on September 6, 
2001, and heard arguments of counsel and statements from security personnel 
before authorizing the use of this security device.  Further, the record shows that 
the trial court had a factual basis for authorizing the device. 
{¶ 107} First, Chief Deputy Cook of the Sheriff’s Office explained, at the 
hearing, that the Band-It device would produce an electric shock only “if the 
Defendant embarks on an escape attempt, an assault, or other violent behavior.”  
Further, Cook explained that the device is “non-lethal, it’s short-term and it 
incapacitates.”  There is also “an audible alert tone that actually tells the 
Defendant it’s going to go off, so he’s got some discretion on whether to pull 
January Term, 2004 
33 
back.”  The trial court noted that it “does absolutely zero harm” when not 
activated.  Although Adams suffers from epilepsy, no medical evidence indicated 
that he was at additional risk if the device was activated.  Nor did evidence 
establish that his ability to assist counsel was impaired. 
{¶ 108} Second, because Adams was wearing clothing over the device, 
the device was not visible to the jury and, unless it was activated, the jury would 
not know that it was being worn.  The record does not reflect that it was activated 
in this trial.  In contrast, leg irons or shackles always present a risk that jurors will 
inadvertently discover the restraints and possibly be influenced in deliberations.  
See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen (1970), 397 U.S. 337, 344, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 
353.  In this case, the jury learned about the device only when Adams personally 
complained about having to wear it when he made an unsworn statement during 
the penalty phase. 
{¶ 109} Third, the trial court explained its decision to authorize the Band-
It device in an entry.  The court explained that in November 2000, Adams had 
been convicted of an unrelated murder and rape and had been sentenced to 25 
years to life.  Adams also had a “lengthy criminal record and [had] been 
imprisoned on at least four (4) prior occasions.”  The trial court found that based 
on jail reports, Adams “may pose a risk of escape.”  Also, according to Dr. 
Darnall, Adams had “difficulty in adequately controlling his frustration and 
anger.”  Adams told Dr. Darnall, “[I]f I get close to it, I am gonna sucker [punch] 
them [his previous attorneys]. * * * I am going to get the satisfaction and knock 
the f* * *ing shit out of him.”  According to Dr. Zuchowski, Adams could control 
his behavior, but “his personality traits, particularly impulsivity and irritability, 
make courtroom outbursts a possibility.” 
{¶ 110} On the foregoing basis, we conclude that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in authorizing this device to be used on Adams during his 
trial.  Cf. State v. Franklin, 97 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-5304, 776 N.E.2d 26, at ¶ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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81 (defendant’s past violent behavior and psychologist’s description of him as a 
“time bomb” justified shackling in penalty phase); State v. Cassano, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 94, 2002-Ohio-3751, 772 N.E.2d 81, at ¶ 55 (convicted violent felon, 
murder occurred in prison).  Accordingly, we overrule proposition XII. 
{¶ 111} Gruesome photographs   In proposition of law XVI, Adams 
argues that the trial court’s decision to admit certain “shocking and gruesome” 
photographs deprived him of a fair trial. 
{¶ 112} In capital cases, nonrepetitive photographs, even if gruesome, are 
admissible if relevant, as long as the probative value of each photograph 
outweighs the danger of material prejudice to an accused.  State v. Maurer, 15 
Ohio St.3d 239, 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768, paragraph seven of the syllabus; 
State v. Morales (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 252, 257, 513 N.E.2d 267.  Decisions on 
the admissibility of photographs are “left to the sound discretion of the trial 
court.”  State v. Slagle (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 601, 605 N.E.2d 916; State v. 
Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d at 264, 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768. 
{¶ 113} As to many photographs and slides that Adams now complains 
about, he did not object at trial and thus waived all but plain error.  No outcome-
determinative plain error resulted from the admission of these exhibits because 
they portray relevant subjects and were of probative value. 
{¶ 114} As to crime-scene photographs to which an objection was made, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting these exhibits.  Several 
prosecution exhibits are four-inch-by-six-inch crime-scene photographs of the 
victims.  One exhibit portrays the head and neck injuries that Esther suffered, and 
other exhibits, taken from different angles, portray the injuries to Ashley, her 
posed body, and the body’s relationship to the surroundings. 
{¶ 115} The photographs were limited in number and noncumulative, and 
each had substantial probative value.  For example, these photographs illustrated 
the testimony of detectives who described the crime scene and helped to establish 
January Term, 2004 
35 
the killer’s intent.  See State v. Goodwin, 84 Ohio St.3d at 342, 703 N.E.2d 1251; 
State v. Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d at 158, 694 N.E.2d 932.  These photographs also 
gave the jury an “appreciation of the nature and circumstances of the crimes.”  
State v. Evans, 63 Ohio St.3d at 251, 586 N.E.2d 1042.  In other cases involving 
even more-gruesome photographs, the court has found no abuse of discretion.  
See, e.g., State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 108-109, 684 N.E.2d 668; State 
v. Biros (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 443, 678 N.E.2d 891. 
{¶ 116} The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting 
photographs of the victims when they were alive.  Adams has failed to 
demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the admission of these photographs. 
{¶ 117} Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting many 
slides that the pathologist used to illustrate his testimony.  Some slides were 
crime-scene views that illustrated the pathologist’s description of the crime scene, 
portrayed the victims and their injuries in relation to the surroundings, helped to 
establish the killer’s intentions, and corroborated testimony of detectives.  A few 
did not portray bodies and hence were not gruesome.  Other slides taken during 
the autopsy exactly portray Ashley’s injuries, and their admission did not 
constitute an abuse of discretion.  Other slides depict Esther’s different injuries.  
Cf. State v. Smith, 97 Ohio St.3d 367, 2002-Ohio-6659, 780 N.E.2d 221, at ¶ 32-
37; State v. Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d at 289, 754 N.E.2d 1150.  Thus, we reject 
proposition XVI. 
{¶ 118} Cumulative error   In proposition of law XVII, Adams argues 
that the cumulative effect of errors during his trial denied him due process and a 
fair trial.  However, we have rejected Adams’s claims of error as explained in 
connection with other propositions. See our discussion on voir dire (III, V), 
refusal to change venue (IV), the admission of DNA evidence (II), and restraints 
during trial (XII).  The trial court adequately protected the fair-trial and due-
process rights of Adams. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 119} Nor did the prosecutor commit misconduct, as Adams suggests, 
when the pathologist displayed, for demonstrative purposes, an exhibit, which 
was not admitted, of the type of weapon that may have caused Esther’s injuries.  
The prosecutor did not err by presenting evidence as to french fries found in 
Adams’s car.  That fact related to other evidence in the case indicating that 
Ashley had eaten french fries before her death.  Evidence that a steak knife was 
found in the Chevy Cavalier was inconsequential. 
{¶ 120} We find that multiple errors did not occur in this case.  See State 
v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d at 397-398, 721 N.E.2d 52; State v. Garner (1995), 74 
Ohio St.3d 49, 64, 656 N.E.2d 623.  In our view, the failure to prove a separate 
animus as to the kidnapping did not affect the other convictions.  See discussion 
on proposition VI.  We find no other errors that prejudiced the substantial rights 
of Adams.  Hence, we reject proposition XVII. 
Penalty issues 
{¶ 121} Duplicative aggravating circumstances   In proposition of law 
VII, Adams asserts that his rights were violated because duplicative death 
specifications were submitted for the jury to weigh and consider against 
mitigation evidence. 
{¶ 122} Duplicative death-penalty specifications should be merged when 
they “arise from the same act or indivisible course of conduct.”  State v. Jenkins, 
15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264, paragraph five of the syllabus.  
However, when the offenses illustrate a separate animus and do not show an 
indivisible course of conduct, merger is not required. See, e.g., State v. Robb 
(2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 59, 85, 723 N.E.2d 1019 (court need not merge 
2929.04[A][4], [A][5] or [A][7] specifications); State v. Williams (1996), 74 Ohio 
St.3d 569, 579, 660 N.E.2d 724 (offenses in [A][7] and [A][5] death 
specifications are not duplicative in that case). 
January Term, 2004 
37 
{¶ 123} As we have discussed in connection with proposition VI, no 
separate animus existed as to the asserted kidnapping of Ashley, and we have 
vacated the findings of guilt as to the death-penalty kidnapping specifications in 
Counts 1 and 3.  We will consider that failure of proof in our independent 
assessment of the penalty.  See State v. Mitts (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 223, 232, 690 
N.E.2d 522; State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d at 53, 656 N.E.2d 623; State v. Cook 
(1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 527, 605 N.E.2d 70. 
{¶ 124} In other particulars, however, we conclude that Adams’s 
complaint about duplicative death-penalty specifications lacks merit.  First, 
counsel failed to object and thus waived the issue.  State v. Underwood, 3 Ohio 
St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332, syllabus. 
{¶ 125} Second, the specifications were not duplicative for punishment 
purposes, and counsel were not ineffective for not raising the issue.  Murder while 
committing a felony, such as aggravated burglary, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), and during 
a course of conduct of purposeful killing, R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), as charged in 
Count 1 and Count 3, are not duplicative.  See, e.g., State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 
at 116, 684 N.E.2d 668; State v. Williams, 74 Ohio St.3d at 579, 660 N.E.2d 724. 
{¶ 126} Third, murder of a person specifically protected because of 
status, such as a child, is not duplicative of other death specifications.  See State v. 
Bryan, 101 Ohio St.3d 272, 2004-Ohio-971, 804 N.E.2d 433, ¶ 199-200 (“course 
of conduct,” [A][5], and murder of police officer, [A][6], are not duplicative); 
State v. Lynch, 98 Ohio St.3d 514, 2003-Ohio-2284, 787 N.E.2d 1185, at ¶ 141 
(death of a child, [A][9], is not duplicative of [A][3] or [A][7]).  Further, rape by 
fellatio and vaginal rape are separate offenses under R.C. 2941.25(B), even when 
one is “followed immediately by” the other.  State v. Barnes (1981), 68 Ohio 
St.2d 13, 14, 22 O.O.3d 126, 427 N.E.2d 517.  Accord State v. Jones (1997), 78 
Ohio St.3d 12, 676 N.E.2d 80. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 127} Ineffective assistance on penalty-phase jury instructions   In 
proposition of law VIII, Adams argues that his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by not requesting “fact-specific mitigation instructions” that would 
elaborate on “other factors” specified in R.C. 2929.04(B)(7). 
{¶ 128} However, counsel’s decision not to request the trial court to 
explain how the evidence relates to mitigating “other factors” does not reflect 
deficient performance.  Counsel may have believed that doing so would limit his 
argument, and thus his decision “falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674.  Moreover, the trial court need not explain or elaborate on “other factors” in 
instructions.  State v. Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d at 122, 559 N.E.2d 710: State v. 
Robb, 88 Ohio St.3d at 84–85, 723 N.E.2d 1019.  The trial court, by referring to 
“other factors” in the instructions, never “precluded [the jury] from considering 
any evidence as mitigating.”  State v. Mitts, 81 Ohio St.3d at 234, 690 N.E.2d 
522. 
{¶ 129} Second, Adams has not established prejudice from the absence of 
such an instruction.  Thus, Adams has not provided any basis to believe that 
“there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel’s errors, the 
result of the trial would have been different.” State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 
538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph three of the syllabus.  Accordingly, we reject 
proposition VIII. 
Settled issues 
{¶ 130} Constitutionality  We summarily reject proposition IX, which 
argues that Adams’s counsel provided ineffective assistance by not filing pretrial 
motions challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty.  See State v. 
Cornwell (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 560, 569, 715 N.E.2d 1144; State v. Davis 
(1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 326, 349, 581 N.E.2d 1362.  See, also, State v. Carter, 89 
January Term, 2004 
39 
Ohio St.3d at 607, 734 N.E.2d 345; State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 
520 N.E.2d 568, syllabus. 
{¶ 131} Lethal injection  In proposition of law XIII, Adams challenges 
the constitutionality of lethal injection to carry out the death penalty.  However, 
we have previously rejected similar arguments.  See State v. Carter, 89 Ohio 
St.3d at 608, 734 N.E.2d 345.  Adams’s challenge to electrocution is moot 
because Ohio law no longer authorizes electrocution to carry out the death 
penalty.  See R.C. 2949.22. 
{¶ 132} Peremptory challenges  We summarily reject proposition XIV, 
which argues that Adams was entitled to 12 peremptory challenges.  State v. 
Vrabel, 99 Ohio St.3d 184, 2003-Ohio-3193, 790 N.E.2d 303, at ¶ 66-67; State v. 
Greer (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 236, 530 N.E.2d 382, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 133} Reference to jury recommendation   In proposition of law XV, 
Adams complains that the trial court’s reference to the jury verdict as a 
recommendation, over his objection, affected the reliability of the jury’s verdict.  
In fact, the trial court never used the term “recommendation,” and the use of the 
term in the verdict forms accurately reflected Ohio law, did not diminish the 
jury’s sense of its sentencing responsibility, and did not constitute error.  We 
summarily reject proposition XV.  State v. Hughbanks, 99 Ohio St.3d 365, 2003-
Ohio-4121, 792 N.E.2d 1081, ¶ 102; State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 
101, 656 N.E.2d 643. 
INDEPENDENT SENTENCE EVALUATION 
{¶ 134} Penalty-phase evidence  At the penalty phase, Adams presented 
testimony about his history and background from a psychologist, a psychiatrist, 
his former girlfriend, and his brother. 
{¶ 135} Dr. Sandra McPherson, a psychologist, interviewed Adams, 
consulted others, and examined various records relating to Adams.  According to 
Dr. McPherson, Adams’s IQ is 77, or in the low average to borderline range and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
40 
in the lowest 12 percent of the population.  His personality test suggests 
“significant maladjustment,” and Adams has a “personality disorder not otherwise 
specified.”  He is depressed and periodically suicidal.  Adams started drinking at 
age five or six and has “been involved with multiple substances, amphetamines, 
marijuana, [and] cocaine, as well as alcohol.”  Substance abuse has reduced his 
capacity for effective cognitive functioning. 
{¶ 136} In his early life, Adams suffered from a chaotic upbringing.  His 
father “was a brutal and seriously disturbed personality,” who beat Adams’s 
mother and his children regularly and sexually abused his sons and daughters.  At 
one point, his father took the children and hid them for six months.  Adams’s 
history “is certainly at the worst end of * * * disruptive families.”  Adams was 
then raised in various foster homes.  As an adult, Adams had a few paying jobs 
but was not regularly employed.  He did odd jobs but primarily lived on social 
security. 
{¶ 137} Dr. Steven Zuchowski, a psychiatrist, corroborated Dr. 
McPherson’s evaluation and the fact that Adams suffered from a “personality 
disorder, not otherwise specified,” with “borderline” and “anti-social” elements.  
Adams reportedly also suffered abuse in various foster homes.  Adams does not 
have a mental disease or defect, and no medication or therapy is available to treat 
him.  Adams declined to discuss with Dr. Zuchowski his drug abuse or the 
charged crimes. 
{¶ 138} Jeffrey Adams, the defendant’s older brother, confirmed details 
about the family and the chaotic upbringing that the nine Adams children had.  
Six siblings are still living.  Jeffrey noted that their alcoholic father regularly beat 
their mother and the children and also raped several children, including Stanley. 
{¶ 139} Loretta Stanford, a former girlfriend, lived with Adams for nine 
years, and they had two sons, Stanley, age 12, and William, age ten.  When they 
lived together, Adams was not mean or abusive, but he used crack cocaine and 
January Term, 2004 
41 
drank too much.  But Adams had a “very nice relationship” with his sons; they 
played baseball, rode minibikes, and went fishing.  He loved them and they loved 
their father. 
{¶ 140} In an unsworn statement, Adams complained about the Band-It 
electronic device he was forced to wear, advising the jury that he was “under a 
constant threat of being zapped.”  He also complained about the prosecutors and 
the trial, especially the DNA evidence, since he “didn’t rape little Ashley, let 
alone kill her.”  He said he was sorry that the jury had found him guilty but that 
he was innocent and “could never, never take the life of anybody, especially a 
kid.”  Then he stated, “My son asked me to ask you not to kill his dad.  Don’t kill 
me, please.” 
{¶ 141} Sentence evaluation   After independent assessment, we find 
that the evidence proves the aggravating circumstances of which Adams was 
convicted, i.e., murder as part of a “course of conduct involving the purposeful 
killing” of two or more persons, R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), and murder during an 
aggravated burglary, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  As to Ashley, the evidence also proved 
the additional death specifications including murder during rape, both vaginal and 
fellatio, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), and murder of a child under 13 years of age, R.C. 
2929.04(A)(9).  We have dismissed the murder-during-kidnapping specifications, 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), and will consider that fact during our independent 
reassessment of the sentence. 
{¶ 142} As to mitigating factors, we find nothing in the nature and 
circumstances of the offenses to be mitigating.  But we do find that the history 
and background of Adams provides mitigating features.  Adams had a horrific 
upbringing and an extremely abusive father.  Adams lacked the care and nurturing 
of a loving family while growing up and was raised in numerous foster homes.  
This factor undoubtedly contributed to his present and past difficulties.  But we 
find nothing in his character to be mitigating. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
42 
{¶ 143} We find the following statutory mitigating factors not to be 
applicable: R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) (“victim inducement”); (B)(2) (“duress, coercion, 
or strong provocation”); (B)(3) (“mental disease or defect”); (B)(4) (“youth”); 
(B)(5) (“lack of criminal record”); and (B)(6) (“not the principal offender”).  
Adams was 33 years old at the time of the offenses. 
{¶ 144} We regard as mitigating “other factors,” R.C. 2929.04(B)(7), the 
fact that Adams has a psychological personality disorder and substance-abuse 
problems.  The fact that Adams has children who love him is also a mitigating 
“other factor,” but we find no other mitigating factor under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7). 
{¶ 145} As to the aggravated murder of Esther Cook, we find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances of murder during a burglary 
and as a course of conduct outweigh the mitigation presented in this case.  Adams 
feloniously entered Esther’s home and savagely and brutally beat her to death, 
and he did so as a part of a course of conduct involving Esther’s murder and the 
murder of her 12-year-old daughter. 
{¶ 146} When considering Ashley’s murder, we also find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the multiple aggravating circumstances, murder during a 
course of conduct, R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), and murder during a burglary and during 
rape, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), as well as murder of a child, R.C. 2929.04(A)(9), 
outweigh the mitigating features that Adams presented.  Adams chose to rape and 
murder an innocent 12-year-old child, who was the half-sister of his own 
girlfriend.  His acts clearly demonstrate that the death penalty is appropriate. 
{¶ 147} We find that the death penalty for the aggravated murder of 
Esther Cook and the death penalty for the aggravated murder of Ashley Cook are 
proportionate when compared with other “course of conduct” murders.  See, e.g., 
State v. Vrabel, 99 Ohio St.3d 184, 2003-Ohio-3193, 790 N.E.2d 303;  State v. 
Braden, 98 Ohio St.3d 354, 2003-Ohio-1325, 785 N.E.2d 439; State v. Cornwell, 
86 Ohio St.3d 560, 715 N.E.2d 1144; State v. Clemons (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 438, 
January Term, 2004 
43 
696 N.E.2d 1009; State v. Keith, 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 684 N.E.2d 47; State v. 
Awkal (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 324, 667 N.E.2d 960; State v. Allard (1996), 75 
Ohio St.3d 482, 663 N.E.2d 1277; and State v. Combs (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 278, 
581 N.E.2d 1071.  We find that the death sentence is also proportionate when 
compared with other cases involving “course of conduct” murders committed 
during a burglary.  See, e.g., State v. Hughbanks, 99 Ohio St.3d 365, 2003-Ohio-
4121, 792 N.E.2d 1081; State v. Hessler, 90 Ohio St.3d 108, 734 N.E.2d 1237. 
{¶ 148} Additionally, we find that the death penalty for the murder of 
Ashley is neither excessive nor disproportionate when compared with similar 
felony-murder cases involving rape of a child victim, implicating both R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) and (A)(9).  See, e.g., State v. Lynch, 98 Ohio St.3d 514, 2003-
Ohio-2284, 787 N.E.2d 1185; State v. Smith, 97 Ohio St.3d 367, 2002-Ohio-6659, 
780 N.E.2d 221. 
{¶ 149} Accordingly, the conviction for kidnapping in Count 5, as well as 
the findings of guilty in counts 1 and 3 as to the R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) (murder 
during a kidnapping), are vacated, and Count 5 and those specifications are 
dismissed.  Otherwise, the judgment of the trial court and the convictions, 
including the sentences of death, are affirmed. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and 
O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
________________________ 
 
Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecuting Attorney, and LuWayne 
Annos, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Mary Jane Stephens and John B. Juhasz, for appellant. 
________________________