Case Title: BURTON v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 00-281

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-05-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
BURTON v. STATE2002 WY 7146 P.3d 309Case Number: 00-281Decided: 05/14/2002

April Term, A.D. 2002

JUAN 
BURTON 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County:

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
Koski, Public Defender; Donna Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Tina Kerin, Assistant 
Appellate Counsel; Diane E. Courselle, Director, Defender Aid Program; Kimberly 
Grosshuesch, Student Intern; and Amanda Wilson, Student Intern.  Argument by Ms. 
Wilson.

Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Devon O'Connell Coleman, Interim Faculty Director, 
Prosecution Assistance Clinic; and Denise A. Timmermans, Student Intern.  Argument by Ms. 
Timmermans.

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ. 

LEHMAN, 
C.J., 
delivered the opinion of the court.  
VOIGT, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which GOLDEN, J., 
joined.

  

LEHMAN, 
Chief Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant 
Juan Burton appeals from his conviction for taking indecent liberties with a 
child, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105 (LexisNexis 2001).  He claims that he is entitled to have 
his conviction reversed because the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in his 
closing argument and elicited improper opinion testimony from a detective who 
investigated the case.  In addition, 
Burton claims that the trial court erred by allowing the State to amend the 
information just prior to the trial to change the date of the charged 
offenses.  

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Burton presents 
the following issues on appeal:

 

I.  Did plain error occur when the trial 
court allowed the prosecutor's closing arguments to prey upon jury passion and 
prejudice, mislead the jury as to the facts and the law, introduce issues 
outside of the charges, use bad character evidence, attack defense counsel's 
trial strategy, and vouch for the witnesses' credibility; the trial court also 
abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Burton's motion for a new trial in 
spite of the highly prejudicial prosecutorial comments made in closing 
argument?

 

II.  Did the trial court err when it 
permitted the prosecution to elicit opinions from the State's witness about the 
credibility of another witness?

 

III.  Did the [trial] court abuse its 
discretion by allowing an untimely amendment of the information to change the 
date of the charged crime, which resulted in prejudice to Mr. 
Burton?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      Eighteen-year-old 
Kara Jess moved to Casper during the summer of 1998.  She initially lived with a friend but 
moved out of their shared apartment after a disagreement and began living in her 
car.  Jess met Burton and moved into 
his apartment.  Burton was 
thirty-six years old at the time.  
Shortly thereafter, Jess became acquainted with the victim, who was a 
sixteen-year-old female high school student.  Jess introduced the victim to 
Burton.  

 

[¶5]      On August 28, 
1998, Jess picked the victim up at school, and they went to Burton's 
apartment.  Burton, Jess, and the 
victim listened to music and used illegal drugs.  Later in the day, Jess and the victim 
went to Lucas Edwards' apartment, which was located in the same apartment 
complex.  Jess, Edwards, and the 
victim spent the evening drinking alcoholic beverages, listening to music, and 
watching movies.  The victim 
eventually passed out on a blow-up couch in Edwards' living room.  She later moved to a nearby bed to 
sleep.  

 

[¶6]      According to the 
victim, Burton came to Edward's apartment and told her that she could sleep at 
his apartment.  The victim went to 
Burton's apartment, alone, and lay down to sleep on the floor in a large closet, 
which was where Burton usually slept.  
The victim testified that, sometime during the night, Burton returned to 
the apartment and lay down beside her in the closet.  She awoke later to find Burton's hand on 
her stomach.  The victim told Burton 
to leave and went back to sleep.  
Throughout the night, the victim floated in and out of 
consciousness.  Each time she awoke, 
she found Burton making increasingly more invasive sexual contact with her.  The victim resisted by telling Burton 
that she was not interested in his advances, rolling away from him, and pushing 
his hand away.  According to her 
testimony, he eventually engaged in sexual intercourse with her.  

 

[¶7]      The next morning, 
the victim returned to Edward's apartment and spoke to Jess and Edwards.  She told them that Burton "was trying to 
do stuff with her" and that she thought that she had been raped.  Edwards testified that he confronted 
Burton about the victim's claim and Burton denied that he had raped her, but 
admitted that he had touched her genitals.  

 

[¶8]      A few weeks 
later, the victim and her mother had an argument about the victim's rebellious 
behavior.  During that argument, the 
victim's mother asked her why she was behaving badly and the victim told her 
mother that she had been raped.  Her 
mother called the police and reported the incident.  

 

[¶9]      Burton was 
charged with first degree sexual assault and taking indecent liberties with a 
child.  Burton pled not guilty, and 
the trial court held a jury trial in September of 1999.  At the conclusion of the trial, the jury 
returned a verdict finding Burton not guilty of first-degree sexual assault and 
guilty of taking indecent liberties with a child.  Burton filed a motion for judgment of 
acquittal and a motion for a new trial.  
He claimed, in his motion for a new trial, that he had not received a 
fair trial because certain comments made by the prosecutor during his closing 
argument were improper and prejudicial.  
The trial court denied Burton's motions and, subsequently, entered a 
judgment and sentence against him.  
Burton appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court.  Additional facts relevant to specific 
issues will be set forth in our discussion of those issues.  

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

A.  Prosecutorial 
Misconduct in Closing Argument

 

[¶10]   
Burton contends that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to 
make various improper comments during his closing argument.  The State insists that the prosecutor's 
comments were appropriate and that, in any event, Burton was not prejudiced by 
the remarks. 

 

            
1.  Standard of 
Review

 

[¶11]   In reviewing a claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument, the court looks at the entire 
record to determine whether the defendant's case was so prejudiced by the 
improper comments as to result in the denial of a fair trial.  Capshaw v. State, 10 P.3d 560, 
567 (Wyo. 2000); Metzger v. State, 4 P.3d 901, 910 (Wyo. 2000).  The challenged comments are judged in 
the context of the prosecutor's entire argument, considering the context of the 
statements and comparing them with the evidence produced at the trial.  Helm v. State, 1 P.3d 635, 639 
(Wyo. 2000).  

 

[¶12]   Appellant objected to the first 
statement addressed herein, and the trial court sustained his objection.  Appellant also renewed his objection 
after the trial by filing a motion for a new trial.  When an objection is launched to a 
statement made in closing argument, we defer to the trial court's ruling in the 
absence of a clear or patent abuse of discretion.  Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 
860 (Wyo. 1998). Even then, reversal is not warranted unless a reasonable 
probability exists, absent the error, that the appellant may have enjoyed a more 
favorable verdict.  Gayler, 
at 860.  See also 
Metzger, 4 P.3d  at 910.  
Similarly, the Wyoming Supreme Court reviews a trial court's decision to 
deny a motion for a new trial by applying the abuse of discretion standard.  Marquez v. State, 12 P.3d 711, 
718 (Wyo. 2000).   

 

[¶13]   Burton did not object to the 
remainder of the challenged statements at trial; consequently, we review his 
claims by applying the plain error standard.  Lane v. State, 12 P.3d 1057, 1064 
(Wyo. 2000).  To 
demonstrate plain error, Burton "must show that the record clearly shows an 
error that transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law which adversely 
affected a substantial right."  
Taylor v. State, 2001 WY 13, ¶16, 17 P.3d 715, ¶16 (Wyo. 
2001).  Reversal of a conviction on the basis of 
prosecutorial misconduct, which was not challenged in the trial court, is 
appropriate only when there is "a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice." 
Capshaw, 10 P.3d  at 567 (quoting Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379, 384 
(Wyo. 1992)).

 

2.  Comments Emphasizing 
Burton's Drug Use and Appealing to Community Sentiment

 

[¶14]   Burton claims that the prosecutor 
improperly emphasized his drug involvement and appealed to community sentiment 
in the following exchange:

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  Ladies and gentlemen, the 
State understands that we have just introduced to you a completely 
andhopefully, an unknown world that's going on out there right here in your 
community.  It's the drug 
world.

 

            
You heard a lot of testimony about these young kids and the behavior that 
they were involved with.  But ask 
yourself, ladies and gentlemen, would they ever get the opportunity to be doing 
these kinds of things if not for the likes of the Juan Burtons of the 
world?

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I'm going to object to that.  I think that's 
objectionable.

 

            
THE COURT:  I think it is, 
and it's extremely improper.  I'll 
sustain the objection.  The jury 
should disregard that.

 

[¶15]   In closing argument, counsel may 
reflect upon the evidence admitted at trial and draw reasonable inferences from 
that evidence.  Gayler, 957 
at 861; Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106, 1116 (Wyo.1992).  Arguments which are calculated to appeal 
to the jury's prejudice or passion are improper because they pose a risk that 
the accused may be convicted for reasons wholly irrelevant to his guilt or 
innocence.  Gayler, 957 P.2d  
at 861; Armstrong, 826 P.2d  at 1116.  Accordingly, 
it is improper for a prosecutor to encourage the jury to convict a defendant in 
order to protect the community rather than upon the evidence presented at 
trial.  See e.g., Gayler, 
957 P.2d  at 860-62.  

 

[¶16]   In this case, the prosecutor stated 
that the jury had heard evidence about the drug world in Casper.  The victim, Kara Jess, and Lucas Edwards 
all testified about various drug-related activities in which they were 
involved.  The prosecutor's comment 
was, therefore, appropriate because it was a reasonable restatement of the 
evidence presented at trial.  

 

[¶17]   The prosecutor's remark suggesting 
that the kids would not have access to drugs if it were not for the "Juan 
Burtons" of the world is another matter.  
The trial judge apparently believed that the prosecutor's comment was 
improper because he sustained defense counsel's objection and instructed the 
jury to disregard the statement.  
Nevertheless, the trial court judge denied Burton's motion for a new 
trial.  In denying Burton's motion, 
the trial judge noted that the comment was isolated and that he had sustained 
Burton's objection to the comment and instructed the jury to disregard it.  The trial judge also stated that Burton 
had not shown that he was prejudiced by the comment.   

 

[¶18]   Pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 33, the trial 
court may grant a new trial if it is "required in the interest of justice."  Even if we assume that the prosecutor's 
comment was improper, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when it denied Burton's motion for a new trial.  The trial court properly sustained 
defense counsel's objection and instructed the jury to disregard the improper 
argument.  In the absence of any 
indication to the contrary, "[w]e must assume that the jury followed the court's 
curative instruction."  Marquez, 
12 P.3d  at 717 (quoting Burke v. State, 746 P.2d 852, 857 (Wyo.  1987)).  The prosecutor respected the trial 
court's ruling and did not return to the inappropriate line of argument.  Thus, the prosecutor's conduct was not 
so egregious as to require a new trial in the interests of justice, and the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant Burton's motion 
for a new trial.  

 

[¶19]   On a related matter, Burton argues 
that the prosecutor made an improper appeal to community sentiment when he 
stated:  "You ladies and gentlemen 
have the opportunity, the power to say that we are going to protect kids like 
[the victim] in our community."  
Burton did not, however, object to this comment; consequently, we will 
apply our plain error standard in reviewing his claim on appeal.  

 

[¶20]   As we stated, supra, it is 
inappropriate for a prosecutor to appeal to the jury's passion and prejudice and 
encourage the jury to convict to protect the community rather than upon the 
evidence presented at trial.  See 
e.g., Gayler, 957 P.2d  at 860-62.  A prosecutor may, however, remark that 
conviction of the accused will have the incidental effect of protecting the 
community if he does not urge the jury to convict on a basis other than the 
evidence against the accused.  
See Hodgins v. State, 962 P.2d 153, 158 (Wyo. 1998).  

 

[¶21]   The challenged comment was part of 
a larger point being advanced by the prosecutor:

 

You 
ladies and gentleman have the opportunity, the power to say that we are going to 
protect kids like [the victim] in our community.  The State wishes that we could have 
introduced to you a victim that was on the honor roll, that was the best athlete 
on the volleyball team, and that was the A-1 American kid of the world.  

 

            
But we are never going to see those kind of kids testifying to the things 
that [the victim] had to testify to.  Because those aren't the kind of kids that 
find themselves in that situation.

 

[¶22]   When reviewed in context, it is 
apparent that the prosecutor was not asking the jury to convict Burton on any 
basis other than the specific evidence that he sexually assaulted the 
victim.  The 
prosecutor was simply pointing out that the victim was, because of her 
lifestyle, especially susceptible to Burton's inappropriate advances and that 
children in her situation are in need of protection.  This argument was 
not an improper appeal to community sentiment.   Burton has not, therefore, satisfied 
the second prong of the plain error analysis because he has not shown a 
transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law.

 

            
3.  Description 
of the Crime of Taking Indecent Liberties with a Child

 
[¶23]   Burton claims that the prosecutor 
committed misconduct in his closing statement when he incorrectly described the 
crime of indecent liberties and improperly equated drug use with taking indecent 
liberties with a child under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105 (LexisNexis 
2001).  The 
prosecutor stated:

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  Ladies and Gentlemen, before you 
go back into that room and deliberate, take a long, hard look at the defendant, 
Juan Burton, and mentally place him next to Kara Jess, [the victim], and Lucas 
Edwards and ask yourself:  What was he doing with these kids?

  

Is it a man who is just providing drugs for them?  Or is it a man 
who's trying to totally control them?  And does he have improper, immoral and 
indecent motives by being involved with these young kids? 

 

Burton also asserts that the prosecutor committed further 
misconduct and attempted to inject issues, other than the issue of his guilt or 
innocence, into the trial when he made the following statements:

 

[Burton] is the adult with the responsibility in not 
providing [the minors] a place to do drugs, not providing them with the 
drugs.  He is 
the adult, ladies and gentlemen, that is not supposed to take indecent liberties 
with a child.

 

[¶24]   The crime of taking indecent liberties 
with a child is set out in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a) (LexisNexis 
2001):

 

(a)  Except under circumstance constituting 
sexual assault in the first, second or third degree as defined by W.S. 6-2-302 
through 6-2-304, any person knowingly taking immodest, immoral or indecent 
liberties with any child or knowingly causing or encouraging any child to cause 
or encourage another child to commit with him any immoral or indecent act is 
guilty of a felony.  
Except as provided by subsection (b) of this section, a person convicted 
under this section shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) 
nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or imprisoned in the penitentiary 
not more than ten (10) years, or both.

 

The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of the 
crime of taking indecent liberties with a child in accordance with § 
14-3-105(a).  
Burton suggests that the court should have defined the phrase "immodest, 
immoral or indecent liberties" for the jury.  This court has, however, repeatedly refused 
to precisely define the phrase "immodest, immoral or indecent liberties."  See e.g., Chapman v. State, 
2001 WY 25, ¶28, 18 P.3d 1164, ¶28 (Wyo. 2001); Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 1034-35 (Wyo. 
1979).  
Instead, the jury is allowed to apply its common sense by looking at the 
totality of the circumstances pertaining to the culpability of the accused's 
conduct.  Chapman, at ¶28.  

 

[¶25]   In this case, the trial court properly 
instructed the jury on the elements of taking indecent liberties with a minor, 
without providing a definition of the phrase "immodest, immoral or indecent 
liberties."  It 
is, however, clear that the indecent liberties statute punishes inappropriate 
sexual conduct with children.  Chapman, at 
¶28.  Consequently, a statement suggesting that 
providing drugs to children violates § 14-3-105 would be incorrect.  "[W]here a 
prosecutor repeatedly misstates the law to a jury, and thereby plants an 
erroneous conception which prejudices the defendant, a fair trial may, under 
certain circumstances, have been denied."  Jones v. State, 
580 P.2d 1150, 1154 (Wyo. 1978).

 

[¶26]   After carefully reviewing the entire 
closing argument, we are not convinced that the prosecutor was informing the 
jury that providing children with drugs and a place to do drugs was a violation 
of the indecent liberties statute.  In addition, we do not believe that the 
prosecutor was attempting to inject tangential issues, beyond the issue of 
Burton's guilt or innocence, into the case.  In other portions of his argument, the 
prosecutor made it very clear that Burton was not on trial for his drug 
activities.  
The prosecutor stated, further, that sexual contact between the victim 
and Burton would constitute immoral and indecent liberties.  In addition, the 
trial court appropriately instructed the jury on the elements of the 
offense.  
Consequently, we cannot say that Burton has shown a violation of a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law or that he was prejudiced by the comment.  

 

 

            
4.  Character 
Evidence

 

[¶27]   Burton next complains that the prosecutor asked the jury to 
convict him for his bad character rather than on the evidence presented against 
him.  The 
prosecutor stated:

 

Now, I know you're probably thinking right now, well, the 
defendant is not on trial for furnishing drugs to these minors and to these 
kids.  But it 
has a lot to say about his character.  Character has a lot to say about what a 
personwhat a man will try and not try to get away with.  

 

Burton apparently asserts that the evidence of his drug 
activities was evidence of bad character.  He does not, however, contend that the 
evidence of his drug activities was inadmissible.  Burton argues, instead, that the prosecutor 
violated W.R.E. 404(b) when he asked the jury to infer that Burton acted in 
conformity with his bad character, which was evidenced by his drug activities, 
by trying to "get away with" taking indecent liberties with the victim.  

 

[¶28]               
Wyoming Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits use of evidence of other bad 
acts to prove a person's character for the purpose of showing that he acted in 
conformity with his bad character.  Brower v. State, 
1 P.3d 1210, 1213 (Wyo. 2000).   That rule provides:

 

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible 
to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith.  It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident.

 

W.R.E. 404(b).  

 

[¶29]   The prosecutor's choice of language was 
not artful.  He 
was, obviously, courting an objection when he used the term "character."  Nevertheless, when 
the prosecutor's comment is reviewed in the context of his entire closing 
argument, it is clear that he was not asking the jury to infer that Burton had 
committed the charged crimes simply because he had committed other bad acts by 
supplying minors with drugs and a place to use them.  Considering the 
entire record on appeal, we cannot say that Burton has shown a violation of a 
clear and unequivocal error of law that substantially prejudiced him.   

 

            
5.  Attack on 
Defense Counsel

 
[¶30]   Burton maintains that the prosecutor 
improperly attacked defense counsel's trial tactics when he made the following 
remarks in the rebuttal portion of his closing argument:

 

Doesn't it make you a little bit angry, ladies and 
gentlemen, that [defense counsel] basically makes reference to Alexa Kidd, their 
only witness, as being the most credible witness that testified in the last two 
days?  And then 
he wants to refer to Lucas Edwards and Kara Jess as the State's witnesses.

 

. . .

 

So don't be angry.  Don't let [defense counsel] conjure up anger 
in your mind that the State is trying to rely on these witnesses as our 
witnesses, as our friends.  They're friends of the defendant.  

 

[¶31]   A prosecutor may not launch personal 
attacks against defense counsel to inflame the passions and prejudices of the 
jury.  Leiker v. State, 994 P.2d 917, 920 (Wyo. 1999); English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 148 (Wyo. 1999).  The general rule 
was articulated by the United States Supreme in United 
States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 10, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 1043, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1 
(1985):

 

It is firmly established that the lawyer should abstain 
from any allusion to the personal peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of opposing 
counsel.  A 
personal attack by the prosecutor on defense counsel is improper, and the duty 
to abstain from such attacks is obviously reciprocal.

 

Young, 470 U.S.  at 10, 105 S. Ct.  at 1043 (quoting ABA Standards 
for Criminal Justice 4-7.8, p. 4.97).  See also English, 982 P.2d  at 148 (Wyo. 1999).  

 

[¶32]   In his own closing argument, defense 
counsel repeatedly stated that the testimony given by the State's witnesses, 
including Jess, Edwards, and the victim, was inconsistent and unreliable.  Defense counsel 
also argued that defense's alibi witness, Alexa Kidd, was truthful in her 
testimony.  The 
prosecutor's comments in rebuttal were obviously aimed at countering defense 
counsel's suggestions that Kidd was credible and the State's witnesses were 
not.  Moreover, 
he was trying to emphasize that the witnesses called by the State were Burton's 
friends rather than friends of the State.  Taken in context, the prosecutor's comments 
cannot be classified as personal attacks on defense counsel, and there is no 
indication that the prosecutor intended to improperly inflame the passions and 
prejudices of the jury against Burton or defense counsel.  

 

            
6.  Vouching 
for Credibility of Witnesses

 

[¶33]   Burton claims that the prosecutor 
improperly vouched for the credibility of the State's witnesses when he made the 
following statement in the rebuttal portion of his closing argument:

 

But [the State's witnesses] were blatantly honest with you 
about  lot of 
things.  They 
had to admit they were doing drugs. . . . That's a hard thing to 
admit.

 

[¶34]   A prosecutor may not, even when 
responding to defense arguments, personally vouch for the credibility of the 
State's witnesses.  Lane v. State, 12 P.3d 1057, 1065 (Wyo. 
2000); Harper v. State, 970 P.2d 400, 403 
(Wyo.1998).  

 

When the prosecutor asserts his credibility or personal 
belief, an additional factor is injected into the case.  This additional 
factor is that counsel may be perceived by the jury as an authority whose 
opinion carries greater weight than their own opinion:  that members of the 
jury might be persuaded not by the evidence, but rather by a perception that 
counsel's opinions are correct because of his position as prosecutor, an 
important state official entrusted with enforcing the criminal laws of a 
sovereign state.  
While the prosecutor is expected to be an advocate, he may not exploit 
his position to induce a jury to disregard the evidence or misapply the law.

 

Lane, 12 P.3d  at 
1065 (quoting Barela v. State, 787 P.2d 82, 83-84 
(Wyo. 1990)).  

 

[¶35]   In this case, the comments made by the 
prosecutor were not improper.  He did not personally vouch for the 
credibility of the witnesses. The prosecutor was simply pointing out that the 
witnesses had been forthright about their drug use notwithstanding the fact that 
it was difficult to discuss those matters in a public forum.  He drew a 
reasonable inference from the evidence that the witnesses would have no motive 
to lie by confessing their drug use because use of drugs is illegal and is not 
accepted by general society. The prosecutor's comment was not improper.  

 

7.  Misrepresentation of 
Facts

 

[¶36]   Burton asserts 
that the prosecutor committed misconduct by misrepresenting a fact in the 
rebuttal portion of his closing argument.  He claims that the prosecutor suggested that 
Burton was a "convicted felon" even though there was no evidence in the record 
to support that statement.  The relevant portion of the trial transcript 
states:

 

[PROSECUTOR:]  You're going to have to throw all 
[the States' witnesses'] testimony out, ladies and gentleman, if you're going to 
believe this Alexa Kidd and that she was the one that spent the night in the 
closet.  

 

            
[Kidd is] the one that says [she and Burton are] just friends, but yet 
she loves the defendant and doesn't even know the defendant's age, a convicted 
felon for distributing illegal drugs.  And they're asking you to believe her 
testimony over these other kids.

 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  Your Honor, what is this 
convicted felon?  
Who are you referring to?

 

[PROSECUTOR:]  I'm referring to the witness.

 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  That's entirely 
improper.  

 

THE COURT:  I think it is.  And I'll strike the 
last comment, Counsel.  I don't believe that was in evidence.  I think it was 
highly inappropriate.

 

You may continue.

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor, I was justobject to 
that in that I do recall that evidence testified to by their witness.  And I guess we can 
look on the record.

 

THE COURT:  I believe there was a reference to 
charges.  But 
as to convictions, I don't know.  I'm not sure.

 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, perhaps [the 
prosecutor] was referring to Ms. Kidd's admission that she had been convicted of 
a drug felony.

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  That's what I'm referring to, 
Judge.

 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I thought he was referring to 
the defendant, Your Honor.

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  No. I was referring to their 
witness, Alexa Kidd, Your Honor.  She testified.

 

THE COURT:  Okay.  With that clarification, I'll overrule any 
objection.  I 
don't know that that was clear as to where the reference was being made at that 
point in time.  
I apologize if I did not hear it correctly.  And I'll leave it 
to the jury to recall specifically what counsel's reference was to.  

 

            
To the extent that it was a reference to Ms. Kidd and her testimony, then 
I'll set my ruling aside.

 

            
You may proceed.

 

[PROSECUTOR]:  Point being, ladies and gentlemen, 
that they want you to believe Alexa Kiddshe was the one that I was referring 
toover all of the other witnesses in trying to provide an alibi for the 
defendant, somebody that she's indicated that she loves. 

 

[¶37]   A prosecutor 
may not misrepresent the evidentiary facts in his closing argument.  See generally Miller v. State, 
830 P.2d 419, 426 (Wyo. 1992).  Our review of the entire passage quoted above 
reveals that the prosecutor did not intentionally misrepresent any fact.  Although the 
prosecutor's comment about the "convicted felon" was not articulated very 
clearly, the matter was clarified during the ensuing colloquy among the 
prosecutor, defense counsel, and the court.  Their exchange, which took place in front of 
the jury, made it very clear that the prosecutor was referring to Alexa Kidd, 
and not Burton, as being a "convicted felon."  That reference was entirely in keeping with 
the evidence presented at the trial.  Kidd testified on direct, as follows:

 

Q.  Now, you've told us that you've done quite a 
few drugs.

 

A.  Yes, sir.

 

Q.  That eventually got you in some trouble, 
didn't it?

 

A.  Yes.  I got felony with intent to deliver on April 
6th.

 

Q.  Okay.  And you pled guilty to that?

 

A.  Yeah.

 

The trial court did not commit any error in resolving this 
matter at trial.   

 

B.  Opinion Testimony

[¶38]   Burton claims that the trial court erred when it permitted 
the State to elicit testimony from Detective Kirkendall concerning his opinion 
of the victim's credibility.  The jury has the responsibility to resolve 
the factual issues, judge the credibility of witnesses, and ultimately determine 
whether the accused is guilty or innocent.  Newport v. State, 
983 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Wyo. 1999); Gayler, 957 P.2d  at 860; Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357, 362 (Wyo. 
1988).  
Testimony by an expert witness, concerning his belief that the defendant 
is guilty of the offense invades the province of the jury and generally mandates 
reversal of the conviction.  See Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 67-68 (Wyo. 1989); see also Newport, at 
1215-16.  
Therefore, the general rule under Wyoming law is that it is error per se 
for the State to elicit testimony from an expert witness concerning his opinion 
of the guilt of the accused.  Stephens, at 68; 
see also Metzger v. State, 
4 P.3d  at 905.  
We do not, however, apply the error per se standard in reviewing a claim 
that a witness improperly vouched for the credibility of another witness.  Instead, when the 
defendant did not object at trial to the testimony, we apply the plain error 
standard to review assertions that one witness vouched for the credibility of 
another.  Newport, 983 P.2d  at 1215. 
 

 

[¶39]   The State 
called Detective Kirkendall to testify at Burton's trial.  The detective 
investigated the victim's report that Burton had sexually assaulted her.  The State elicited 
the following testimony from Detective Kirkendall on direct examination:

 

Q.  Okay.  How did you begin your investigation?

 

A.  I contacted [the victim] on October 20th of 98 and asked her to come down for an 
interview.  I 
took a taped-transcribed statement as far as her recollection of the facts and 
what had occurred there.

 

Q.  Okay.  And that was a taped interview, correct?

 

A.  Yes, it was.

 

Q.  And you heard her testify today?

 

A.  Yes.

 

Q.  Okay.  WhatWas her testimony consistent with the 
information she provided you back on October 20th?

 

A.  Yes.  There was additional testimony that came out 
today.  The 
other times that she indicated today on the stand that she awoke, it was the 
first I heard of that.

 

Q.  Okay.  But generally as to what happened to her with 
the sexual assault, was that the same?

 

A.  Yes. 

 

[¶40]   In his 
redirect questioning of Detective Kirkendall, the prosecutor elicited the 
following testimony:

 

BY 
[PROSECUTOR]:

 

Q.  You would say, Detective Kirkendall, that 
[the victim] elaborated a lot more today than when you spoke to her and 
tape-recorded her conversation back in October?

 

A.  Yes.

 

Q.  Okay.  Would you say that I asked a lot more 
specific and detailed questions than you did in your interview?

 

A.  She's been taken through the interview 
process several times now.  Perhaps that's helped her recollection.  She appears to be 
out from under the influence of the narcotics that she was then.  Perhaps she has a 
clearer head.

 

Q.  You didn't find her statements to be 
inaccurate compared to the statements she provided you back in October, though, 
did you?

 

A.  No.

 

Q.  She just added more information?

 

A.  Correct.  

 

[¶41]   Burton claims 
that, by testifying that the victim's testimony at trial was consistent with the 
statement she provided during the investigation, Detective Kirkendall 
impermissibly vouched for the credibility of the victim and gave the impression 
that he believed Burton was guilty of the sexual assault.  We disagree with 
Burton's interpretation of the detective's testimony.  The detective 
merely stated that the victim's rendition of the events at trial was in harmony 
with her earlier statements.  He did not state that he believed the 
victim's version of the events or that he believed Burton was guilty of the 
offenses.  Even 
though the detective's testimony may have had the incidental effect of 
bolstering the victim's credibility, the trial court did not violate a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law when it allowed the testimony into evidence at 
trial.  Curl v. State, 898 P.2d 369, 374 (Wyo. 1995); Newport, 983 P.2d  at 1215.

 

C.  Amendment of Information

 

[¶42]   Burton maintains that the trial court 
erred by granting the State's motion to amend the information shortly before the 
trial commenced.  
He claims that the amendment prejudiced his ability to present a 
defense.  On 
September 17, 1999, the State filed a motion to amend the information to change 
the date of the sexual assault from "on or about September 5, 1998" to "on or 
about August 28, 1998."  Just prior to the commencement of the trial 
on September 20, 1999, the trial court heard arguments on the motion.  The State asserted 
that there had been confusion over the date of the alleged assault since the 
beginning of the investigation and that, while preparing the case, the State 
discovered that August 28, 1998, was the date of the assault.  Defense counsel 
objected to the amendment, claiming that the amendment would prejudice the 
defense.  
Defense counsel asserted that the defense had an alibi witness to present 
and that the change of the date may "skew" the case.  Defense counsel did 
not, however, elaborate on how the amendment would "skew" Burton's case.  The district court 
referred to Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 3 and ruled that amending the 
information to change the date of the alleged offenses would not result in 
substantial prejudice to the defendant.  

 

[¶43]   Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 3(e) 
governs amendments of information.  That rule states:

 

(e)       Amendment of Information or Citation.  Without leave of 
the court, the attorney for the state may amend an information or citation until 
five days before a preliminary examination in a case required to be tried in 
district court or until five days before trial for a case not required to be 
tried in district court.  The court may permit an information or 
citation to be amended:

(1)       With the 
defendant's consent, at any time before sentencing.

 

(2)       Whether or not 
the defendant consents:

 

(A)     At any time before trial if 
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.

 

(B)       At any time 
before verdict or finding if no additional or different offense is charged and 
if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.

 

W.R.Cr.P. 3(e).

 

[¶44]   Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 3(e) 
grants discretion to a trial judge in deciding whether or not a motion brought 
by the State to amend the information just prior to trial should be 
granted.  
Consequently, we review the trial court's decision by applying our abuse 
of discretion standard.  See generally 
W.R.Cr.P. 3(e).  
In deciding whether or not the trial court abused its discretion, 
this court must "determine whether the trial court could 
reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its ruling was arbitrary 
or capricious."  
Cook v. State, 7 P.3d 53, 58-59 (Wyo. 2000) 
(quoting Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 152 (Wyo. 
1998)).

 

[¶45]   Burton has made no showing that he was 
prejudiced by the amendment to the information.  He presented his alibi witness, Alexis Kidd, 
at the trial.  
Although she could not identify the exact date, Kidd testified that she 
recalled a night at the end of August of 1998, when the victim spent the night 
in the apartment complex where Burton resided.  In contrast to the victim's testimony, Kidd 
testified that the victim stayed in Lucas Edwards' apartment rather than at 
Burton's apartment.  
Kidd also testified, in relevant part, as follows:

 

PROSECUTOR:  Okay.  Now, going back to the end of August of 1998, 
I was confused.  
Do you know what day of the week August 28th is?

 

[JESS]:  No.  I just know that, when she was there, it was 
closeIt was like Friday or Saturday.  It was on the weekend.

 

Q:  Okay.  And your testimony is [the victim] did or did 
not spend the night at [Burton's] apartment?

 

A.  She did not.

 

Q.  She never spent the night there?

 

A.  No, not to myNo.

 

Q.  Now, are you telling us that you spent every 
night with [Burton]  

 

A.  Yes.

 

Q.  back in August of 1998?

 

A.  Yes.  I lived there.  And if I wasn't there, he was with me at my 
mother's.

 

Q.  So he was constantly with you?

 

A.  Yes.  

 

There is no indication that Kidd would have been able to 
pinpoint the date any more precisely if the information had not been 
amended.   
The charge of  
"on or about August 28, 1998" did not hinder Burton's ability to present 
his alibi defense.  

 

[¶46]   Burton claims that the amended 
information also interfered with his ability to cross-examine the victim's 
mother regarding the date of the offense.  The record does not, however, bear out 
Burton's assertion.  
The victim testified that her parents were "out of town" when the offense 
occurred.  The 
defense was able to elicit testimony from the victim's mother that she and her 
husband were "in town" on the weekend of August 28, 1998.  The defense was 
able, therefore, through its cross-examination of the victim's mother, to show 
inconsistencies between the testimony of the victim and her mother.  The defense was not 
hindered in its ability to impeach the State's witnesses, and Burton has not 
shown that he was substantially prejudiced by the amendment.  

 

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶47]   The prosecutor 
did not commit misconduct in his closing argument because his statements were 
appropriate and they did not prejudice Burton.  Moreover, Detective Kirkendall's testimony 
did not include an improper statement concerning his opinion as to the 
credibility of the victim or Burton's guilt.  Finally, the trial court did not err by 
allowing the State to amend the information prior to the trial.  

 

[¶48]   We affirm Burton's conviction.

  

            
VOIGT, Justice, dissenting, with 
which GOLDEN, Justice, joins. 

[¶49]   I would reverse because the 
prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument was simply too egregious and too 
filled with potential prejudice to allow this conviction to stand.  While I agree with 
the majority's recitation of the standard of review, I would reach a different 
result through its application.  The prosecutorial misconduct in this case 
created a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice.

 

[¶50]   We have repeatedly recognized the 
"great latitude'" allowed counsel in closing argument.  Helm v. State, 1 P.3d 635, 639 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Montoya v. State, 971 P.2d 134, 136 (Wyo. 
1998)).  At the same time, we have cautioned that 
argument must be kept within the evidence, and that "[s]tatements calculated to 
inflame, prejudice or mislead the jury are not permitted.'"  Helm, 1 P.3d  at 639-40 (quoting 
Montoya, 971 P.2d at 136).  And while prosecutors are no more limited in 
closing than are defense counsel, prosecutors have the additional duty to seek 
justice, not just to seek a conviction.  Browder v. State, 
639 P.2d 889, 893 (Wyo. 1982).  In particular, a prosecutor may not appeal to 
the jury's sense of duty to help law enforcement by convicting the defendant nor 
may he appeal to the jury's passion and prejudice.  Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 861 (Wyo. 
1998).  A prosecutor's closing argument must not 
inject issues into the trial that are broader than the guilt or innocence of the 
accused under the controlling law, thereby diverting the jury from its duty to 
decide the case on the evidence.  Jeschke v. State, 
642 P.2d 1298, 1302 (Wyo. 1982).  A prosecutor "is not allowed to urge the jury 
to convict an accused on any basis other than that the evidence shows guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt."  Gayler, 957 P.2d  
at 861.

 

[¶51]   The central theme of these admonitions 
is that closing arguments must be premised upon the evidence.  McLaughlin v. State, 780 P.2d 964, 970 (Wyo. 1989) (quoting Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724, 742 (Wyo. 
1986)).  The purpose of closing argument is to allow 
counsel to review the evidence and to suggest to the jury reasonable inferences 
that can be drawn from that evidence.  McLaughlin, 780 P.2d  at 970 (quoting Schmunk, 714 P.2d at 742); Leiker v. State, 994 P.2d 917, 919 (Wyo. 
1999).

 

[¶52]   Despite these clear principles of law, 
the prosecutor in the instant case began his closing argument with the following 
statements:

 

Ladies and gentlemen, the State understands that we have 
just introduced to you a completely and  hopefully, an unknown world that's 
going on out there right here in our community.  It's the drug world.

 

            
You heard a lot of testimony about these young kids and the behavior that 
they were involved with.  But ask yourself, ladies and gentlemen, would 
they ever get the opportunity to be doing these kinds of things if not for the 
likes of the Juan Burtons of the world?

 

[¶53]   This argument was a direct invitation 
to the jury to convict the appellant, not because the elements of the crimes had 
been proved, but because the community needed to be protected from people like 
the appellant.  
The impropriety of this argument was then magnified when, shortly 
thereafter, the prosecutor added the following equally troublesome 
statement:

 

Now, I know you're probably thinking right now, well, the 
defendant is not on trial for furnishing drugs to these minors and to these 
kids.  But it 
has a lot to say about his character.  Character has a lot to say about what a 
person  what a man will try and not try to get away with.

 

[¶54]   W.R.E. 404(a) provides that "[e]vidence 
of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the 
purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion[.]"  
The purpose of this rule is to prevent the jury from convicting a 
defendant based on the assumption that he must have acted in conformity with his 
"bad character,'" rather than on proof of the elements of the crime.  Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 28, 30 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting Brown v. State, 953 P.2d 1170, 1175-76 (Wyo. 1998)).  Character evidence is only admissible if it 
falls within one of the exceptions found in W.R.E. 404that is, if it tends to 
prove something other than propensity to commit the charged crimeand if its 
relevancy outweighs the risk of prejudice.  Solis, 981 P.2d  
at 30 (quoting Brown, 
953 P.2d at 1175-76).  
Surely, what a prosecutor cannot accomplish with the introduction of 
evidence, he cannot accomplish through closing argument.

 

[¶55]   The charged crimes in this case were 
first-degree sexual assault and indecent liberties with a minor.  While the 
prosecutor had the right to alert the jury to proper inferences that could be 
drawn from the circumstances surrounding the alleged crimes, including the 
temporally related drug activities of the defendant and the victim, he did not 
have the right to ask the jury to convict the appellant (1) to help eradicate 
the "drug world," or (2) because of the appellant's character.  In the context of 
the prosecutor's entire closing argument, especially including the other 
portions of that closing argument quoted in the majority opinion, I would 
conclude that this was an attempt to convict the appellant for reasons other 
than commission of the charged crimes.

 

[¶56]   Finally, I would reverse because there 
is a reasonable possibility that the verdict may have been more favorable to the 
appellant had these improper arguments not been made.  See Gayler, 957 P.2d at 862 and Browder, 639 P.2d  at 895.  There was no physical evidence of the alleged 
crimes and the testimony varied greatly from one witness to the next.  The jury found the 
appellant not guilty of first-degree sexual assault, but guilty of indecent 
liberties with a minor.  While such a verdict is not necessarily 
inconsistent, it raises a red flag in the instant case because of the 
prosecutor's tendency in closing argument to blur the line between indecent 
liberties and providing drugs to minors.

 

[¶57]   We have recently described the factors 
to be considered when evaluating claims of prosecutorial misconduct:

 

            
Among the factors to be considered are the nature and gravity of the 
error, the prosecutor's duty to do justice and refrain from improper methods, 
the likely impact on the average juror, the quality of the prosecution's case, 
and the closeness of the case.

 

Warner v. State, 2001 WY 67, ¶ 23, 28 P.3d 21, 29 (Wyo. 2001) (citing Earll v. State, 2001 WY 66, ¶ 16, 29 P.3d 787, 792 
(Wyo. 2001)).  In the present case, all of these factors 
tend to support reversal of the conviction.  In such case, we cannot hide behind our 
inability to know for certain that the misconduct influenced the verdict.

 

            
"If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did 
not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the 
judgment should stand, except perhaps where the departure is from a 
constitutional norm or a specific command of Congress.  But if one cannot 
say, with fair assurance after pondering all that happened without stripping the 
erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed 
by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not 
affected.  The 
inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart 
from the phase affected by the error.  It is rather, even so, whether the error 
itself had substantial influence.  If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the 
conviction cannot stand."

 

Warner, 2001 WY 67, ¶ 22, 28 P.3d at 28 (quoting Kotteakos v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 763-65, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 1247-48, 90 L. Ed. 1557 
(1946)).

 

[¶58]   The appellant's right to a fair trial 
was prejudiced and his conviction should be reversed.