Case Title: Robert E. Maddox v. State Of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC03-2110

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2006-01-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC03-2110 
____________ 
 
ROBERT E. MADDOX,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[January 12, 2006] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review the decision in Maddox v. State, 862 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2003), which certified conflict with the decision in Dixon v. State, 812 So. 
2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. 
Const.1  For the reasons more fully expressed below, we disapprove the decision of 
                                          
 
 
1.  The State requests that this Court revisit its decision to grant jurisdiction 
in the instant matter.  The State alleges that the decision below is distinguishable 
from Dixon because the forged traffic citations at issue in Dixon were determined 
to have been “issued,” 812 So. 2d at 595, whereas the district court below 
determined that the citations at issue in the instant matter had been withdrawn by 
the issuing officer after he discovered that they had been issued in the name of 
Maddox’s brother.  Maddox, 862 So. 2d at 784.  While the State’s assertion may be 
true, we conclude that this is a distinction without a material difference.  The heart 
of the conflict revolves around the differences in the district courts’ interpretations 
 
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the First District Court of Appeal in Dixon, and approve the result reached by the 
Second District Court of Appeal in Maddox. 
Facts 
The instant action arises from the Second District Court of Appeal’s decision 
in Maddox v. State, 862 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), affirming the circuit 
court’s conviction of the petitioner (Maddox) and certifying conflict with the First 
District Court of Appeal’s decision in Dixon v. State, 812 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 2002).  The facts of the instant case, summarized in Judge Davis’s opinion 
below, are as follows: 
A Polk County Deputy Sheriff stopped Maddox for an improper 
lane change.  Upon being asked for his driver’s license and proof of 
insurance, Maddox advised the deputy that he did not have his license 
or proof of insurance with him.  The deputy then asked for his name 
and date of birth, in response to which Maddox said his name was 
Nathaniel Lewis Maddox and his date of birth was November 1, 1980.  
Based on this information, the deputy issued two citations in the name 
of Nathaniel Lewis Maddox––one for improper lane change and the 
other for failure to produce proof of insurance.  When Maddox was 
hesitant to sign the citations, the deputy advised that failure to sign 
was a criminal offense.  Maddox then signed the citations. 
During the traffic stop, a second deputy arrived on the scene.  
The owner of the car, who had been riding in the front passenger seat, 
gave permission for the deputies to search the vehicle.  During the 
search, the second deputy found an identification card that identified 
Maddox as Robert Edwin Maddox.  A license check for Robert Edwin 
Maddox showed that his driver’s license was suspended.  The deputy 
retained possession of the two traffic citations issued to Nathaniel 
                                                                                                                                        
of the scope of section 316.650(9) of the Florida Statutes (2001).  Therefore, we 
adhere to our initial decision to accept jurisdiction in the instant matter to resolve 
the conflict presented. 
 
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Maddox and issued a citation to Maddox charging him with driving 
while his licensed was suspended.  Maddox initially refused to sign 
this citation but agreed to after the deputy issued him a subsequent 
citation for refusing to sign a citation.  Later, while in custody, 
Maddox volunteered that Nathaniel Maddox was his brother.  
Accordingly, Maddox was charged with two counts of forgery for 
signing the citations issued in the name of Nathaniel and two counts 
of uttering a forged instrument. 
Maddox went to trial on the forgery and uttering counts, as well 
as on one count of giving false information to a police officer and one 
count of driving while license suspended.  He was found guilty as 
charged. 
Maddox, 862 So. 2d at 783-84.  Maddox appealed his convictions to the Second 
District Court of Appeal.   
The Second District affirmed Maddox’s convictions and sentences without 
comment but wrote to specifically address his contention that the forged traffic 
citations were inadmissible pursuant to section 316.650(9) of the Florida Statutes 
(2001).  See id. at 783.  The district court determined that the trial court did not err 
in allowing the forged traffic citations into evidence.  See id. at 784.  In support of 
its holding, the district court noted that “the purpose of the statute is to protect the 
person to whom the citation is issued.”  Id.  The district court stated that the person 
to whom the citations were actually issued in the present case, Nathaniel Maddox 
(Maddox’s brother), was not on trial for either of the infractions underlying those 
forged traffic citations, nor was Maddox himself on trial for those violations.  See 
id.  Further, the district court found that when the deputy issuing the citation 
learned that Maddox was not Nathaniel Maddox the deputy “withdrew the charges 
 
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. . . and retained the documents as evidence of the criminal offense of forgery.”  Id.  
Therefore, the district court determined that the charges were no longer pending 
against anyone and, as a result, the documents relating to those charges “were not 
‘citations’ as contemplated by the statute, but rather were documentary evidence of 
Maddox’s criminal conduct.”  Id.  Accordingly, the district court held that section 
316.650(9) of the Florida Statutes did not apply to the present case and certified 
conflict with the First District’s decision in Dixon.  See Maddox, 862 So. 2d at 
784. 
Analysis 
In analyzing the conflict that exists between the decision here and that of the 
First District in Dixon, it is helpful to consider a brief summary of the material 
facts presented to the First District in Dixon.  The factual predicate in Dixon was 
essentially identical to that in the present case: 
 
Upon being stopped by a police officer following the 
commission of several traffic infractions, [Dixon] provided a false 
name to the officer.  That name was placed on the traffic citation, 
which [Dixon] signed using the false name.  When it was learned that 
[Dixon] gave a false name, he was charged with forgery under section 
831.01 and driving without a valid driver’s license. 
812 So. 2d at 595-96.  However, contrary to the decision of the district court in the 
present case, the First District in Dixon determined that the language of section 
 
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316.650(9) of the Florida Statutes (2000),2 was unambiguous and for that reason 
was not subject to any judicial interpretation or construction whatsoever.  See id. at 
596.  Therefore, the district court in Dixon simply determined without elaboration 
that the language contained in section 316.650(9)––that “traffic citation[s] ‘shall 
not be admissible evidence in any trial’”––required the exclusion of forged 
citations in the State’s prosecution for forgery.  Id. (quoting § 316.350(9), Fla. Stat. 
(2000)). 
 
Maddox urges this Court to approve and adopt the First District’s approach 
and decision in Dixon and hold that the First District appropriately applied section 
316.650(9) of the Florida Statutes (2000), when it concluded that the language of 
the section is unambiguous and, therefore, not subject to judicial interpretation.  
Maddox continues that the plain meaning of the particular section makes it 
absolutely clear that citations simply should not be admissible in any trial under 
any circumstance.  The outcome of this case necessarily turns on the application of 
principles of statutory construction with regard to section 316.650(9) of the Florida 
Statutes.  Turning to these principles, we note that we have previously held that 
“[i]t is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that where a statute is 
plain and unambiguous there is no occasion for judicial interpretation.”  Golf 
                                          
 
 
2.  The language of the version of section 316.650(9) that was at issue in 
Dixon was identical to the language found in the version of the statute that is at 
issue in the instant matter. 
 
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Channel v. Jenkins, 752 So. 2d 561, 564 (Fla. 2000) (alteration in the original) 
(quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 
454 (Fla. 1992)).  However, this Court has  
also stated that related statutory provisions should be read together to 
determine legislative intent, so that “if from a view of the whole law, 
or from other laws in pari materia the evident intent is different from 
the literal import of the terms employed to express it in a particular 
part of the law, that intent should prevail, for that, in fact is the will of 
the Legislature.”  
Id. (quoting Forsythe, 604 So. 2d at 454); see also McGhee v. Volusia County, 679 
So. 2d 729, 730 n.1 (Fla. 1996) (“The doctrine of in pari materia requires the courts 
to construe related statutes together so that they illuminate each other and are 
harmonized.”).  Moreover, “a literal interpretation of the language of a statute need 
not be given when to do so would lead to an unreasonable or ridiculous 
conclusion.”  Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984). 
 
The statute at issue here is found within chapter 316 of the Florida Statutes 
entitled “Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law.”  § 316.001, Fla. Stat. (2001) 
(emphasis supplied).  The stated purpose of this chapter of the Florida Statutes was 
outlined by the Legislature in section 316.002: 
 
It is the legislative intent in the adoption of this chapter to make 
uniform traffic laws to apply throughout the state and its several 
counties and uniform traffic ordinances to apply in all municipalities. 
 
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§ 316.002, Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis supplied).  Additionally, when section 
316.650 was originally enacted by the Legislature in 1971, the description of the 
bill expressly stated that it was  
AN ACT relating to the regulation of traffic on highways; . . . to 
provide for a uniform traffic citation; requiring its statewide use; 
prescribing duties of traffic officers and chief administrative officers 
in connection with the issuance, distribution and maintenance of 
records . . . . 
Ch. 71-321, preamble, at 1501, Laws of Fla. (emphasis supplied).  When section 
316.650 is read in the context within the chapter in which it is found, its related 
statutory provisions, and the legislative history surrounding its passage, it is clear 
that a strict literal reading of the phrase “any trial,” as suggested by Maddox and 
endorsed by the First District in Dixon, would inappropriately extend the effects of 
this statutory provision far beyond the scope of that which was intended by the 
Legislature when it originally enacted this section.  It would extend far beyond 
cases in which the operation, maintenance or use of a vehicle was an issue in 
controversy.  In addition, we agree with Second District that the purpose of this 
statutory provision is to protect the person to whom the citation is issued which in 
this case was Nathaniel Maddox, the appellant’s brother, who is not even a party in 
this matter.  See Maddox, 862 So. 2d at 784.  We further conclude that the statute 
was intended to apply only in connection with matters directly associated with the 
substance of the charge upon which the citation is issued––a traffic infraction. 
 
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Another principle of statutory construction that compels our conclusion that 
the Second District appropriately determined that section 316.650 is inapplicable to 
the instant matter is the rule which recognizes that “[t]he legislative use of different 
terms in different portions of the same statute is strong evidence that different 
meanings were intended.”  State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So. 2d 533, 541 (Fla. 
1997) (quoting Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So. 2d 515, 518 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1984)); see also Beach v. Great W. Bank, 692 So. 2d 146, 152 (Fla. 1997) 
(quoting Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc., 654 So. 2d 911, 914 (Fla. 
1995) (“When the legislature has used a term . . . in one section of the statute but 
omits it in another section of the same statute, we will not imply it where it has 
been excluded.”)).  Tellingly, in section 316.066(4) of the Florida Statutes (2001), 
located in the same chapter as the statutory provision at issue in this case, the 
Legislature enacted a provision that mandates that neither a crash report nor a 
statement made in connection with such a report “shall be used as evidence in any 
trial, civil or criminal.”  § 316.066(4), Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis supplied).  The 
Legislature’s use of the language “civil or criminal” in section 316.066(4) to 
modify the phrase “any trial,” and the exclusion of those same modifiers in the 
statutory provision under review here, compels us to conclude that the Legislature 
intended different meanings of the term “any trial” in each statute.  If the 
Legislature had intended section 316.650(9) to include “any trial, civil or 
 
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criminal,” then the Legislature would have included that language within its 
enactment, as it did in section 316.066(4).  However, the Legislature chose not to 
include these modifying terms in section 316.650(9), and we conclude that it 
would not be proper for us to imply this missing language where the Legislature 
has obviously intended that it be omitted.  See State v. Bradford, 787 So. 2d 811, 
819 (Fla. 2001); Beach, 692 So. 2d at 152 (quoting Leisure Resorts, Inc., 654 So. 
2d at 914).  Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the Legislature 
intended that the phrase “any trial” in section 316.650(9) should not be interpreted 
to mean “any trial, civil or criminal,” but instead that the phrase “any trial” in 
section 316.650(9), consistent with the statutory chapter in which that statutory 
provision is found, was intended to refer to the use of traffic citations in 
proceedings in which the manner or method of the operation, maintenance or use 
of a vehicle is the issue in controversy. 
 
Moreover, contrary to the dictates of this Court in Auld, if we were to agree 
with the view of the dissent and approve of the First District’s interpretation of the 
phrase “any trial” and conclude that this phrase was intended to absolutely 
encompass all proceedings in a court of law, we would in essence be sanctioning a 
construction of this statutory provision that would lead to “unreasonable or 
ridiculous” results.  Auld, 450 So. 2d at 219.  An example of the absurd results that 
could follow if we were to approve the First District’s decision in Dixon was 
 
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outlined by Chief Judge Altenbernd in his dissenting opinion in State v. Veilleux,  
859 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).  He reasoned: 
Hypothetically, if Mr. Veilleux had been charged with first-degree 
murder and he wished to introduce a traffic citation as alibi evidence 
to establish that he was receiving a traffic ticket in another county at 
the time of the murder, it is inconceivable to me that a court could 
constitutionally prohibit him from introducing this document as 
evidence.  Yet, if read literally, this statute would prevent anyone 
from introducing the traffic citation in any court proceeding. 
Id. at 1231 (Altenbernd, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied).  In a similar manner, 
under the dissenting opinion’s view, a citation found at the scene of the murder of 
a police officer would be inadmissible to show the last person having contact with 
the officer when the substance of the particular citation was in no way in 
controversy.     
We find further support for our conclusion in this matter when recognizing 
that the First District’s interpretation of section 316.650(9) essentially eradicates 
all prosecutions for forgery of a traffic citation.  Under Florida’s statutory scheme, 
to obtain a conviction for forgery the State must demonstrate that the alleged 
document forged falls within the classes of documents specified in section 831.01 
of the Florida Statutes (2005).  See State v. Escobedo, 404 So. 2d 760, 764 (Fla. 
1981) (“Our forgery statute . . . makes whoever ‘forges’ documents of specified 
classes ‘with intent to injure or defraud any person’ liable to a maximum of [five] 
years’ imprisonment.”) (quoting Green v. State, 76 So. 2d 645, 646 (Fla. 1954)).  
 
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To accomplish this, the State must specifically prove that the allegedly forged 
document is in fact a “public document” and is therefore actionable under the 
statute.  Such could never be accomplished in the context of the instant matter if 
the traffic citation could not be admitted into evidence.  The dissent expresses 
concern that allowing traffic citations into evidence could be unduly prejudicial to 
defendants due to the potential that the citation may contain “unflattering, legally 
irrelevant information recorded on the citation,” and that a citation will “invariably 
. . . proclaim the officer’s judgment that the defendant committed an offense other 
than forgery.”  Dissenting op. at 14-15.  However, the dissent’s concerns could be 
alleviated by merely redacting the portions of the citation that do not relate to the 
forgery charge and that could potentially prejudice a defendant, a practice that is 
used by trial courts throughout Florida when a critical piece of probative evidence 
also contains prejudicial information.  When the First District’s construction of 
section 316.650(9) is considered in light of the above, it is clear to us that the 
Legislature surely did not intend for the phrase “any trial” to be construed so 
literally to exclude the use of traffic citations in all judicial proceedings––including 
proceedings other than those involving traffic control and related motor vehicle 
operation matters such as civil litigation flowing from motor vehicle operation. 
 
In summary, although the strict meaning of the words in the abstract 
employed by the Legislature when it drafted section 316.650(9) may admittedly 
 
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support the outcome of the First District’s opinion in Dixon v. State, 812 So. 2d 
595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), such a sterile literal interpretation should not be adhered 
to when it would lead to absurd results.  See Parker v. State, 406 So. 2d 1089, 1091 
(Fla. 1981).  When section 316.650 is read in the context in which it is found and 
in conjunction with related statutory provisions, the reasonable construction of this 
statutory provision is that the Legislature intended only to exclude traffic citations 
in a more limited fashion in matters with issues related to the operation, 
maintenance or use of the motor vehicle.  To hold otherwise would expand the 
scope of this statute unreasonably and lead to absurd results.  Accordingly, we 
disapprove the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Dixon v. State, 812 
So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), and approve the result reached by the Second 
District Court of Appeal in Maddox v. State, 862 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) 
for the reasons stated herein. 
It is so ordered. 
WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, and BELL, JJ., concur. 
CANTERO, J., dissents with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, C.J., and  
QUINCE, J., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
 
 
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CANTERO, J., dissenting. 
 
I would apply the plain meaning of the statute, which prohibits the 
introduction of traffic citations “in any trial.”  Contrary to the majority, I agree 
with the First District Court of Appeal’s conclusion in Dixon v. State, 812 So. 2d 
595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), that the statute at issue is unambiguous and therefore 
must be applied as written.  I do not believe that we can, or should, circumvent the 
statute’s plain language.  Its directive that traffic “citations shall not be admissible 
evidence in any trial,” § 316.650(9), Fla. Stat. (2001), is simple and clear.  “Any 
trial” means literally any trial. 
 
The majority instead interprets the statute as excluding citations from 
evidence only in trials “related to the operation, maintenance or use of the motor 
vehicle.”  Majority op. at 12.  In other words, according to the majority, “any trial” 
must mean “any traffic-related trial.”  I do not agree that we must construe the 
statute in such a way to avoid an absurd result.  I am not prepared to declare it 
absurd for the Legislature to make citations inadmissible in all cases.  As I explain 
below, the Legislature could have a rational basis for excluding them, such as 
preventing undue prejudice to defendants.  Because I believe the plain meaning of 
section 316.650(9) prohibits the introduction of traffic citations in any trial, and 
that such a reading does not lead to an absurd result, I must dissent. 
 
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In the following discussion, I will (A) analyze the plain meaning of the 
statute, (B) summarize the absurdity doctrine, and (C) explain why the plain 
meaning of the statute cannot be considered absurd.  
A.  Plain Meaning 
Florida is one of “[m]any states [that] have shown great reluctance to admit 
traffic citations into evidence.”  Hadley v. Maxwell, 27 P.3d 600, 604 (Wash. 
2001) (citing Martin v. Hackworth, 896 P.2d 976, 978 (Idaho 1995), and Ruthardt 
v. Tennant, 215 So. 2d 805, 808 (La. 1968)).  Some states have made citations 
inadmissible where they carry the greatest risk of prejudice, such as in civil trials 
arising from the cited traffic offense.  See, e.g., Ingrum v. Tucson Yellow Cab Co., 
642 P.2d 868, 872 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); Townsend v. Brantley, 296 S.E.2d 186, 
187 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); Ferreira v. Gen. Motors Corp., 657 P.2d 1066, 1069 
(Haw. Ct. App. 1983); Hood v. Oakley, 519 So. 2d 1236, 1239 (Miss. 1988); 
Cotton v. Pyle, 400 S.W.2d 72, 75 (Mo. 1966); Frias v. Valle, 698 P.2d 875, 876 
(Nev. 1985); Isaacs v. Plains Transp. Co., 367 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tex. 1963).  
Other states have rejected “a rule of blanket exclusion” in favor of a case-by-case 
approach.  Getchell v. Lodge, 65 P.3d 50, 58 (Alaska 2003). 
Florida has done the opposite.  Until recently, our traffic citation statute 
broadly provided that “citations shall not be admissible evidence in any trial.”  
 
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§ 316.650(9), Fla. Stat. (2001).3  The question in this case is whether “any trial” 
really means any trial. 
The first step in interpreting the statute is to scrutinize its text.  As we have 
long held, “[w]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and 
conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules 
of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and 
obvious meaning.”  Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (quoting A.R. 
Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 1931)).  This rule respects the 
statutory text as the most reliable and authoritative expression of legislative intent.  
Therefore, “[e]ven where a court is convinced that the legislature really meant and 
intended something not expressed in the phraseology of the act, it will not deem 
itself authorized to depart from the plain meaning of the language which is free 
from ambiguity.”  St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So. 2d 1071, 
1073 (Fla. 1982) (quoting Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 78 So. 693, 694 (Fla. 1918)). 
Section 316.650(9) is as clear, definite, and unambiguous as statutory 
language gets.  It states firmly and without exception that citations “shall not be 
admissible evidence in any trial.”  § 316.650(9), Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphases 
                                          
 
3.  After we granted review, the Legislature amended section 316.650(9) to 
include an explicit exception for citations “when used as evidence of falsification, 
forgery, uttering, fraud or perjury, or when used as physical evidence resulting 
from a forensic examination of the citation.”  Ch. 2005-164, § 42, Laws of Fla.  
The amendment leaves no doubt that a traffic citation may now be admitted as 
evidence of forgery.  
 
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added).  That, of course, includes forgery trials.  The First District concluded as 
much, holding that “section 316.650(9) unambiguously provides that traffic 
citations are not admissible in any trial” and “contains no exceptions to this clear 
and unambiguous prohibition.”  Dixon, 812 So. 2d at 595-96.  Before this case, 
two separate panels of the Second District had reached the same conclusion.  See 
State v. Veilleux, 859 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), review denied, 880 So. 2d 
1212 (Fla. 2004); State v. Martinez, 870 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).4 
The majority, on the other hand, construes the words “in any trial” as 
referring only to “proceedings in which the manner or method of the operation, 
maintenance or use of a vehicle is the issue in controversy.”  Majority op. at 9.  
The majority attributes this narrow construction to two contextual clues: the stated 
purpose of Florida’s traffic laws, and the slightly different language used to 
prohibit the admissibility of crash reports.  I cannot agree that either factor is 
sufficient to allow us to infer a legislative intent that “any trial” in section 
316.650(9) means something less than that.  I address each in turn. 
First, the majority notes that section 316.650(9) appears in the Florida 
Uniform Traffic Control Law, whose opening provision expresses a “legislative 
intent . . . to make uniform traffic laws to apply throughout the state,” § 316.002, 
                                          
 
4.  The panel in this case, also from the Second District, distinguished 
Veilleux and Martinez, noting that those cases involved certiorari review of non-
final orders, which are subject to a more deferential standard of review.  Maddox v. 
State, 862 So. 2d 783, 785 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). 
 
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Fla. Stat. (2001), and whose original preamble focused on “the regulation of traffic 
on highways.”  Ch. 71-321, Laws of Fla.  Highlighting the recurring word 
“traffic,” the majority reasons that section 316.650(9) must have been intended to 
exclude citations only in traffic-related trials.  This reasoning, however, is 
undermined by the crash report provision, contained in the same Uniform Traffic 
Control Law and furthering the same legislative intent.  See § 316.066(4), Fla. Stat. 
(2001).  As the majority acknowledges, that provision excludes crash reports even 
in trials unrelated to motor vehicle operation.  It provides as follows: 
Except as specified in this subsection, each crash report made by a 
person involved in a crash and any statement made by such person to 
a law enforcement officer for the purpose of completing a crash report 
required by this section shall be without prejudice to the individual so 
reporting.  No such report or statement shall be used as evidence in 
any trial, civil or criminal. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
Thus, notwithstanding the Legislature’s stated goal of making “uniform 
traffic laws,” it prohibited the introduction of crash reports in any trial, even those 
unrelated to traffic violations (specifically including civil or criminal trials).  The 
Legislature obviously felt that the uniform exclusion of such reports was 
compatible with its creation of uniform traffic laws.  Therefore, the exclusion of 
traffic citations from evidence in any trial must also be compatible with the general 
goal of creating uniform traffic laws, as well as with the more specific one of 
 
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“provid[ing] for a uniform traffic citation; requiring its statewide use.”  Ch. 71-
321, Laws of Fla. 
 
The majority nevertheless concludes that the crash report provision supports 
its interpretation because the provision addresses admissibility in slightly different 
language than the provision at issue (using “any trial, civil or criminal” instead of 
simply “any trial”).  The majority interprets the modifier “civil or criminal” as 
indicating that crash reports must be excluded from literally “any trial,” whereas 
the omission of that modifier from the traffic citation provision indicates that 
citations need only be excluded from traffic-related trials.  The majority claims that 
to conclude otherwise would be “to imply this missing language where the 
Legislature has obviously intended that it be omitted.”  Majority op. at 9.   
I disagree that such a conclusion necessarily follows.  One need not imply 
missing language to interpret the phrase “any trial” as encompassing all trials, 
including those unrelated to motor vehicle operation.  The phrase is already as 
expansive as possible.  Adding the modifier “civil or criminal,” as the Legislature 
did in the crash report provision, would serve only to emphasize—or perhaps even 
restrict—the provision’s scope.  In fact, the Department of Highway Safety and 
Motor Vehicles has argued that the modifier “civil or criminal” renders the crash 
report provision inapplicable to administrative proceedings, such as license 
suspension hearings, that are neither civil nor criminal.  This case does not require 
 
- 19 -
us to address that argument, which the district courts have consistently rejected.  
See Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Corbin, 527 So. 2d 868, 872 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (holding that “to narrowly interpret the accident report 
privilege as being applicable only in criminal and civil ‘trials,’ in the literal sense 
of these terms, but not in administrative proceedings, would be to substantially 
diminish its effectiveness”); see also Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles 
v. Perry, 702 So. 2d 294, 295 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (holding that “the Corbin case 
is controlling” and therefore the crash report “statute must also be applied to 
administrative proceedings”); Nelson v. State Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor 
Vehicles, 757 So. 2d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (citing Perry for the 
proposition that the crash report provision “is applicable to administrative 
proceedings”).  Suffice it for these purposes to say that the modifier “civil or 
criminal” does not expand the scope of the phrase “any trial.” 
The majority itself adds language to section 316.650(9) to support its 
narrower construction, qualifying the phrase “in any trial” with the phrase, “in 
which the manner or method of the operation, maintenance or use of a vehicle is 
the issue in controversy.”  Majority op. at 9.  According to the majority, the 
absence of the phrase “civil or criminal” in section 316.650(9) implicitly limits the 
provision to traffic-related trials.  However, the civil/criminal distinction is not the 
same as the traffic/non-traffic distinction.  A traffic offense can result in either civil 
 
- 20 -
or criminal proceedings.  See, e.g., § 318.12, Fla. Stat. (2001) (expressing “the 
legislative intent . . . to decriminalize certain violations” of the Uniform Traffic 
Control Law).  Also, as I mentioned, some traffic offenses can result in 
administrative proceedings, which are neither civil nor criminal.  Whether section 
316.650(9) applies to civil or criminal trials is thus an entirely separate question 
from whether it applies to traffic-related trials. 
Based on this analysis, I continue to believe that the plain meaning of 
section 316.650(9) is that traffic citations may not be admitted as evidence in any 
trial, even a forgery trial.  Nothing in the statutory context casts doubt on this plain 
meaning. 
B.  The Absurdity Doctrine 
As the majority notes, and I agree, we will deviate from a statute’s plain 
language when necessary to avoid an absurd result.  As we explained many years 
ago, “no literal interpretation should be given that lends to an unreasonable or 
ridiculous conclusion.”  State v. Sullivan, 116 So. 255, 261 (Fla. 1928); see also 
State v. Burris, 875 So. 2d 408, 414 (Fla. 2004) (stating, more recently, that “[a] 
statute’s plain and ordinary meaning controls only if it does not lead to an 
unreasonable result”).  However, to prevent the appearance that we are merely 
substituting our own judgment for the Legislature’s, we must invoke the exception 
 
- 21 -
only when absolutely necessary—that is, when otherwise the result truly would be 
absurd or patently unreasonable. 
This canon of statutory construction has been one of the “fixed points” in 
American law, John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 
2389 (2003), and has guided this Court’s jurisprudence from the very beginning.  
See White v. Camp, 1 Fla. 94, 109 (1846) (Baltzell, J., dissenting) (stating, in the 
first volume of the Florida Reports, that “the reason and intention of the law giver 
will control the strict letter of the law, when the latter would lead to palpable 
injustice, contradiction and absurdity”) (quoting Plowden’s digest of English cases 
from the sixteenth century).  
 
Yet the absurdity exception to the plain meaning rule is intended to be 
narrow.  The Supreme Court, for example, “rarely invokes such a test to override 
unambiguous legislation.”  Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 459 
(2002).  In fact, the Court has come “to connect its absurdity analysis to the more 
forgiving standards of rationality review,” Manning, supra, at 2452, meaning that it 
will enforce a statute’s plain meaning as long as it can hypothesize a rational basis 
to support the textual policy.  Id. at 2452 n.244 (citing examples). 
The absurdity doctrine should be reserved for cases where applying the plain 
meaning would border on irrationality.  Only then can we be sure that a textual 
interpretation would yield “an absurd result totally incongruous with the will of the 
 
- 22 -
people.”  Plante v. Smathers, 372 So. 2d 933, 937 (Fla. 1979).  If expanded beyond 
rational basis review, the absurdity exception would threaten to undermine the 
separation of powers by allowing judges to substitute their own views of wise 
public policy for the compromises struck by legislators.  As one scholar recently 
explained: 
The legislative process is untidy, and the particular wording of a 
statute may have been, for unknowable reasons, essential to its 
passage.  Thus, rather than identifying genuine legislative intent, 
application of the absurdity doctrine to disturb a clear statutory text 
risks displacing whatever bargain legislators actually reached through 
the complex and path-dependent legislative process.  
Manning, supra, at 2486.  In other words, there is a fine line between a judicious 
policy and a judicially imposed one.  Unless we can say with absolute confidence 
that no reasonable legislature would have intended for the statute to carry its plain 
meaning, we should “presume that [our] legislature says in a statute what it means 
and means in a statute what it says there.”  BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 
U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (plurality opinion) (quoting Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. 
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)).  The exception to the plain meaning rule 
should not be used to avoid an unintended result, only an absurd or patently 
unreasonable one. 
 
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C.  Excluding Citations from Forgery Trials is not Truly Absurd 
The majority claims it would be absurd to prohibit the admission of traffic 
citations as evidence of forgery.  I am not so sure.  While citations certainly have 
greater probative value in forgery trials than in ordinary traffic trials, they still pose 
a substantial risk of prejudice to the defendant.  That the Legislature would decide 
that the costs of admitting citations outweigh the benefits, even in forgery trials, 
cannot be considered “unreasonable or ridiculous.”  Sullivan, 116 So. at 261.  To 
explain this point, I first examine why the Legislature has excluded traffic citations 
in ordinary traffic trials.  Then I demonstrate that the same rationales may justify 
their exclusion in forgery trials. 
All traffic citations have potential value as evidence.  They contain a 
contemporaneous record of what the officer observed, as well as a signature 
confirming the defendant’s presence at the scene.  Therefore, they could verify, 
refute, or supplement the testimony at trial.  Also, they could be admitted as 
business records even without the officer’s testimony, provided that a records 
custodian could verify their authenticity and that their admission would not violate 
the right to confrontation.  See § 90.803(6), Fla. Stat. (2001); see also Veilleux, 
859 So. 2d at 1230 (Alternbernd, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that, in the absence 
of other statutory restrictions, citations could be introduced as business records).   
 
- 24 -
The Legislature, however, has prohibited citations from playing a 
substantive role by prohibiting their admission as evidence.  Instead, they serve 
three procedural purposes.  First, they document the traffic encounter.  The statute 
requires citations to be issued in quintuplicate, § 316.650(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001), 
and meticulously explains where the copies must be sent and how long they must 
be kept.  Id. § 316.650(3)-(8).  Second, they give the accused notice to appear.  Id. 
§ 316.650(1)(a).  The statute provides that the accused “must sign and accept a 
citation indicating a promise to appear.”  Id. § 318.14(2).  Finally, they can serve 
as charging documents before the traffic court.  See Fla. R. Traf. Ct. 6.165(a); 
Hurley v. State, 322 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 1975). 
While the Legislature has not stated its reasons for relegating citations to a 
purely procedural role, I can think of three.  First, excluding citations from 
evidence ensures that the officer who witnessed the alleged traffic offense will 
actually appear in court and offer firsthand testimony, rather than defer to what is 
written on the ticket.  As a result, the defendant can confront the officer and expose 
any weaknesses in the testimony.  The theory behind this policy is that factfinders 
can assess the credibility of firsthand, confrontational testimony more accurately 
than they can assess the credibility of an officer’s written report.  See Sheryl L. 
Musgrove & David W. Gross, Use of a Traffic Citation in a Subsequent Related 
Civil Proceeding, 33 Idaho L. Rev. 135, 144-45 (1996) (warning that “the jury may 
 
- 25 -
give undue credence to the decision of the investigating officer to issue the 
citation”).   
Another reason for excluding citations from evidence is to ensure that 
officers will testify only about the facts they witnessed, rather than their legal 
relevance.  As the Idaho Supreme Court explained in holding that citations may not 
be admitted as evidence in traffic-related civil trials, “[a] citation constitutes a 
police officer’s conclusion that a driver has violated a statute or an ordinance.  
While a police officer may testify about the observations which led the officer to 
issue the citation, it is improper for the officer to testify that the driver violated the 
law.”  Martin, 896 P.2d at 978; see also Getchell, 65 P.3d at 57-58 (noting that the 
exclusion of traffic citations in negligence cases is generally “based in part on the 
rationale that such testimony amounts to an opinion on an ultimate issue that is for 
the trier of fact to decide . . . and in part on the undue weight concerns”).  In 
Florida, too, citations express legal judgments.  They contain various boxes that 
officers must check when they believe that a listed offense has been committed.  
See, e.g., § 316.650(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001) (requiring a special box for “aggressive 
careless driving as defined in s. 316.1923”). 
A third reason for excluding citations is to protect defendants in traffic trials, 
and subsequent civil suits, from the prejudice caused by unflattering, legally 
irrelevant information recorded on the citation.  For example, the uniform citation 
 
- 26 -
used in this case included a space for “[o]ther violations or comments pertaining to 
the offense.”  What the officer deems factually pertinent, however, can differ from 
what a court will deem legally relevant.  A blanket rule against the admission of 
citations frees officers to record any information they find helpful, without 
exposing defendants to undue prejudice.  
  
The majority apparently accepts these rationales as applied to traffic-related 
cases, but concludes they do not justify the exclusion of citations as evidence of 
forgery.  I agree that in forgery trials the balance changes.  Because the citation is 
the document on which the alleged forgery occurred, it assumes greater probative 
value.  If admitted into evidence, it would become the centerpiece of the State’s 
case.  Conversely, excluding citations from evidence “will make convictions for 
forgery of a traffic citation more difficult.”  Dixon, 812 So. 2d at 596.  Indeed, one 
district court has speculated they will be “all but impossible” to obtain, Martinez, 
870 So. 2d at 20, although perhaps “the State can bring in evidence from the 
officer who issued the citation and witnessed the false signature, as well as other 
evidence of the defendant’s identity and intent.”  Veilleux, 859 So. 2d at 1227. 
Despite their probative value in forgery trials, citations still pose a 
substantial risk of prejudice.  Invariably, the citation will proclaim the officer’s 
judgment that the defendant committed an offense other than forgery.  Sometimes 
the alleged offense will be relatively minor, but at other times it may be quite 
 
- 27 -
serious (for example, drunk driving or aggressive careless driving).  If the citation 
is admitted as evidence of forgery, in deciding whether the forgery was proved the 
factfinder may be influenced by the unproven traffic charge.  The factfinder also 
may be influenced by any other negative observations in the citation, even if they 
have no legal bearing on the forgery charge.  Finally, to the extent the State relies 
on the written citation rather than firsthand testimony, the context of the alleged 
forgery may not be fully explored.  
None of this discussion is to suggest that traffic citations should be excluded 
from forgery trials.  The only issue is whether it would be absurd to exclude them.  
I conclude it would not be.  Whether the probative value of admitting citations in 
forgery trials outweighs the risk of prejudice to defendants is, in my view, a policy 
decision for the Legislature.  Earlier this year, the Legislature amended section 
316.650(9) to allow the admission of traffic citations to prove forgery.  This policy 
is sensible and should make it easier to prosecute citation forgery cases.  Another 
sensible policy, which the majority suggests, would be to admit the citation into 
evidence but “merely redact[] the portions . . . that do not relate to the forgery 
charge and that could potentially prejudice a defendant.”  Majority op. at 11.  This 
policy would also be more convenient for prosecutors than the one in the statute at 
issue.  But the Legislature is not required to make prosecutions as easy as possible.  
Sometimes what is easiest for prosecutors may be too hard on defendants.  The 
 
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Legislature must strike the balance it deems appropriate, within constitutional 
limits.  
Here, the Legislature reasonably could have decided to accept fewer forgery 
convictions to prevent undue prejudice to defendants, knowing that most drivers 
who forge citations can also be charged with other crimes of misrepresentation that 
do not require the admission of unduly prejudicial documents.  In this case, for 
example, the defendant faced additional charges of giving a false name or 
identification to a law enforcement officer and driving with a suspended or 
revoked license.  Maddox, 862 So. 2d at 783.  Similarly, in the conflict case, the 
defendant faced a charge of driving without a valid license.  Dixon, 812 So. 2d at 
595-96.  Other charges might include misuse of a license, § 322.32, Fla. Stat. 
(2001), giving false oral reports under the traffic laws, id. § 316.067, or obstructing 
an officer, id. § 843.02.  
Because the Legislature could have a rational basis for deciding that the 
costs of admitting traffic tickets in forgery trials outweigh the benefits, applying 
the plain meaning of section 316.650(9) cannot be considered absurd.5  In the 
                                          
 
5.  The majority claims it would be absurd to apply the statute’s plain 
meaning in two other contexts: (1) where the citation is alibi evidence in a murder 
trial; and (2) where it is evidence of the last driver stopped by a murdered police 
officer.  Majority op. at 10.  As I explained earlier, however, the absurdity 
exception to the plain meaning rule is intended to be narrow.  We should depart 
from the statutory text only to the extent necessary to avoid absurd results.  Thus, 
even assuming it would be absurd to apply the statute’s plain meaning in certain 
 
- 29 -
absence of absurdity, we have a responsibility to the Legislature, which carefully 
selected the words, and to defendants, whose liberty possibly hinges upon them, to 
enforce the statute as written. 
D.  Conclusion 
I conclude from the plain meaning of section 316.650(9), Florida Statutes 
(2001), that traffic citations may not be admitted as evidence in any trial.  This 
necessarily includes criminal trials for forgery of a traffic citation.  I also conclude 
that such a result is not absurd and therefore the statute’s plain language cannot be 
avoided. 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and QUINCE, J., concur. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
murder trials––an issue on which I would reserve judgment until those unusual 
circumstances actually arise––that would not be a justification for departing from 
the statute in forgery trials, where the plain meaning does not produce absurd 
results.  The majority suggests that the statute’s plain meaning might be 
unconstitutional as applied to the first situation above.  However, constitutionality 
is a separate issue from absurdity. 
 
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Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D02-4143 
 
 
(Polk County) 
 
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender and Anthony c. Musto, Special Assistant 
Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Robert J. Krauss, 
Chief-Assistant Attorney General, Bureau Chief, Tampa Criminal Appeals and 
Donna S. Koch, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent