Case Title: Collins v. Hinton

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-02-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Bryan Hank COLLINS v. Florida HINTON

96-171                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 3, 1997


1.   Witnesses -- admissibility of expert testimony -- burden of
     proof. -- The admissibility of expert testimony rests largely
     within the broad discretion of the trial court; the appellant
     bears the burdensome task of demonstrating that the trial
     court abused its discretion.

2.   Witnesses -- expert witnesses -- what opinion may be based
     upon. -- Rule 703 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence provides
     that an expert witness may base his opinion on facts or data
     in evidence, which may otherwise be inadmissible, if they are
     of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
     field; the test is whether the expert's reliance on such
     information is reasonable; the requirement of personal
     knowledge has no application to an expert witness who is, in
     many instances, testifying to an opinion based entirely on
     assumed facts; when an expert's testimony is based on hearsay,
     the lack of personal knowledge on the part of the expert does
     not mandate the exclusion of the testimony; rather, it
     presents a jury question as to the weight of the testimony;
     the burden is placed upon the opponent of the testimony to
     show that the expert's conclusion lacks adequate support in
     order for the testimony to be subject to being stricken by the
     trial court.  
3.   Witnesses -- physician's testimony was exception to hearsay
     rule -- no abuse of discretion found in trial court's allowing
     testimony. -- The challenged information given by a doctor
     qualified as an exception to the hearsay rule found in
     Arkansas Rule of Evidence 803(4) where the doctor was a
     treating physician for purposes of testifying as to the
     nature, extent, and cause of appellee's injuries, and his
     expert testimony was not sought by appellee or her attorney
     for the purpose of testifying at trial; appellant failed to
     demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion by
     permitting the witness to testify or that he was unfairly
     prejudiced by the doctor's testimony, especially in light of
     the fact that another doctor had also testified as to the
     cause or aggravation of appellee's injuries; furthermore,
     appellant conducted extensive cross-examination of the doctor;
     the fact that the jury chose to believe the testimony of the
     doctor was insufficient to meet appellant's burden on appeal. 
     
4.   Witnesses -- testimony properly allowed -- no error found. --
     Appellant's contention that the doctor should not have been
     permitted to testify as to appellee's need for knee-
     replacement surgery because she had since suffered a stroke
     was without merit; such an argument should more properly be
     directed toward the weight to be attached to the evidence,
     rather than its admissibility; the trial court's ruling was
     not in error. 

5.   Appeal & error -- testimony excluded or permitted -- standard
     of review. -- The standard of appellate review of decisions by
     the trial court to exclude or permit the testimony of any
     witness at trial is whether the trial court abused its
     discretion. 

6.   Witnesses -- witness's testimony properly excluded -- no abuse
     of discretion found. -- Where appellant's counsel stated that
     the reason that he had not called opposing counsel to inform
     him of the witness's name and address as soon as he had
     learned of the information (some two days before trial) was
     because he was getting ready for trial, yet appellant's
     counsel did have time to have the clerk's office issue a trial
     subpoena for the witness on the day before trial, the trial
     court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the witness's
     testimony.    

7.   Damages -- allegation damages excessive -- factors on review.
     -- When an award of damages is alleged to be excessive, the
     court reviews the proof and all reasonable inferences most
     favorably to the appellee and determines whether the verdict
     is so great as to shock the conscience of the court or to
     demonstrate passion or prejudice on the part of the trier of
     fact; in determining whether the amount of damages is so great
     as to shock the conscience, elements such as past and future
     medical expenses, permanent injury, loss of earning capacity,
     scars resulting in disfigurement, and pain, suffering, and
     mental anguish are considered; such a determination is made on
     a case-by-case basis, with the understanding that a jury has
     much discretion in awarding damages in personal-injury cases.

8.   Damages -- damages did not shock conscience of the court --
     judgment affirmed. -- Where appellee, who was seventy-two
     years old, was dragged backwards for some fifty feet upon
     being hit by appellant's car, had no medical insurance to
     cover any of the recommended treatments for her injuries, was
     active for her age and got around well before the accident but
     was in constant pain and had to wear a knee brace and walked
     with the assistance of a cane after the accident; where there
     was medical evidence that the pain in appellee's lower back
     and knee would continue into the future; and where, moreover,
     the actual medical expenses presented to the jury exceeded
     $20,000, appellee's average life expectancy exceeded eleven
     years, and there was no indication whatsoever that appellee
     would not recover from her stroke and walk again, the damages
     awarded by the jury were not unfairly prompted by the jurors'
     compassion for appellee, who was confined to a wheelchair, nor
     was the sum of $150,000 so great as to shock the conscience or
     demonstrate passion or prejudice on the part of the trier of
     fact.


     Appeal from St. Francis Circuit Court; Harvey L. Yates, Judge;
affirmed.
     Butler, Hicky & Long, by:  Phil Hicky and Rita Reed Harris,
for appellant.
     Easley, Hicky, Cline, & Hudson, by:  B. Michael Easley, for
appellee.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     Appellant Bryan Hank Collins appeals the jury's verdict
awarding damages of $150,000 to Appellee Florida Hinton from the
St. Francis County Circuit Court.  Because this case involves a
question concerning the law of torts, this court has jurisdiction
of the appeal pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(15) (as amended
by per curiam July 15, 1996).  Appellant raises four points on
appeal, two of which are components of one argument:  (1) The trial
court erred in allowing Dr. Raymon Lopez to give expert testimony
concerning Appellee's injuries; (2) the trial court erred in
excluding the testimony of one of Appellant's witnesses; and (3)
the damages awarded by the jury are excessive.  Because we find no
merit to any of Appellant's arguments, we affirm.
     This case involves an automobile accident that occurred on
December 10, 1992.  According to the facts presented at trial,
Appellee had just left the home of Mrs. Betty Proctor, where she
worked in a domestic capacity, and had walked across the street to
her car.  As she began to get into her car, her car was struck from
behind by Appellant's truck.  As a result of the impact of the
collision, Appellee's car was forced forward approximately forty-
eight feet from where it had been originally parked, dragging
Appellee with it.  Appellee was taken to the hospital emergency
room where she was treated and ultimately hospitalized overnight. 
     The emergency-room diagnosis revealed that Appellee had a
hematoma to the right thigh as well as various abrasions and
contusions.  Appellee also complained of pain in her right hip. 
The x-rays taken at the hospital revealed that Appellee had
degenerative arthritis in some of her joints.  In January of 1993,
Appellee consulted a chiropractor, Dr. Xavier Haymer, and began
receiving regular treatments from him.  According to Dr. Haymer,
Appellee complained about pain in her lower back, her right hip and
thigh area, and her right knee.  Additionally, Dr. Haymer observed
that Appellee's right knee and ankle were swollen.  Appellee stated
to Dr. Haymer that the pain in her knee had resulted from the
accident and that she had not had any pain in her knee before that
time.  Dr. Haymer continued to treat Appellee for just over a year,
at which time he referred her to an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Raymon
Lopez, concerning the injury to her knee.   
     After reviewing the information supplied to him by Dr. Haymer
and taking a patient history from Appellee, Dr. Lopez examined
Appellee's knee.  Appellee informed Dr. Lopez that she began
experiencing pain in her knee after being involved in the
automobile accident.  As a result of his examination and the other
pertinent information, Dr. Lopez recommended that Appellee undergo
surgery to replace her knee.  In an affidavit filed with the trial
court, Appellee confirmed that she wished to undergo the knee
surgery, but that she did not have insurance and that Medicare
would not cover the procedure.  
     Appellee filed suit against Appellant in September of 1993
alleging that he was negligent in the operation of his vehicle and
that she was injured as a result.  Trial was conducted on June 28
and 29, 1995.  Subsequent to her examination by Dr. Lopez but
before trial in this matter had begun, Appellee suffered a stroke,
and was confined to a wheelchair and unable to talk for the
duration of the trial.  Appellee was only able to testify through
a deposition taken before her stroke.  At the conclusion of the
case, the jury returned with a verdict finding Appellant negligent
and awarding compensatory damages to Appellee in the amount of
$150,000.  This appeal followed.
                   I.  Testimony of Dr. Lopez
     Appellant argues on appeal that it was error for the trial
court to allow Dr. Lopez to testify as an expert witness on two
grounds:  (1) His opinion and evaluation were based in part on the
hearsay statement of Appellee concerning the cause of her knee
injury; and (2) the doctor's examination and recommendation of knee
surgery, which preceded Appellee's stroke, may have no longer been
valid because there was no indication that Appellee would ever walk
again after the stroke.
     In the present case, Appellee was referred by her chiropractor
to seek an evaluation of her injuries by Dr. Lopez.  Dr. Lopez
testified that in reaching his conclusion that Appellee needed to
undergo knee-replacement surgery, he relied upon the patient
history given by Appellee, as well as his physical examination of
her and the information provided to him by Dr. Haymer.  Dr. Lopez
testified further that it was common practice for a physician to
rely at least in part on the patient's history of the injuries. 
Dr. Lopez related that as to the symptoms of pain experienced by
Appellee in her back and knee, Appellee stated the symptoms started
after a motor vehicle accident that she had been involved in about
a year prior to seeing Dr. Lopez.  Specifically, Appellee told
Dr. Lopez that she was experiencing pain, swelling, and stiffness
in her right knee. 
     Appellant argues that Dr. Lopez's opinion as to the cause or
aggravation of Appellee's knee injury was based entirely on
Appellee's statement, and that such a statement was hearsay and not
included as an exception to the hearsay rule found in A.R.E. Rule
803(4) because it was made to the doctor after litigation had begun
and was, therefore, self-serving.  Appellee responds that
Dr. Lopez's testimony, including statements made to him by
Appellee, was admissible under A.R.E. Rule 703 and that there is no
provision in Rule 803(4) that prohibits statements given after
litigation has begun.  Appellee responds further that Appellant's
objection to Dr. Lopez's testimony goes to the weight of the
evidence, rather than its admissibility, and that there was no
evidence presented at trial indicating that Appellee would never be
able to walk again.  We find no error in the trial court's decision
to permit Dr. Lopez to testify on either ground raised by
Appellant.  
     This court has long recognized that the admissibility of
expert testimony rests largely within the broad discretion of the
trial court and the appellant bears the burdensome task of
demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion.  See,
e.g., Sims v. Safeway Trails, Inc., 297 Ark. 588,