Case Title: State ex rel. McDonald v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio

Citation: 2023-Ohio-1620

Docket Number: 2022-0143

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2023-05-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. McDonald v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-1620.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-1620 
THE STATE EX REL. MCDONALD [DECEASED], C/O CARPENTER 
(DEPENDENT), APPELLEE, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLANT, 
ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. McDonald v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 
2023-Ohio-1620.] 
Workers’ 
compensation—R.C. 
4123.59(D)—Death 
benefits—Industrial 
Commission must determine whether a claimant who was not married to 
the deceased employee at the time of the injury that resulted in the 
employee’s death but who seeks workers’ compensation death benefits was 
a member of the deceased employee’s family under R.C. 4123.59(D) and, if 
so, the extent of the claimant’s dependency—Judgment affirmed. 
(No. 2022-0143—Submitted January 10, 2023—Decided May 17, 2023.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 20AP-386, 2021-Ohio-4494. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
2 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellee, Amanda Carpenter, filed a request for death benefits after 
her fiancé, Christopher R. McDonald, died in an industrial accident.  Appellant, the 
Industrial Commission of Ohio, denied Carpenter’s request because she was not 
McDonald’s surviving spouse.  Carpenter brought this action in McDonald’s name, 
asking the Tenth District Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus ordering the 
commission to reverse its decision.  The Tenth District concluded that although she 
was not McDonald’s surviving spouse, Carpenter could potentially qualify for 
death benefits as a member of McDonald’s family.  The court issued a limited writ 
directing the commission to vacate its order and to determine whether Carpenter 
was a member of McDonald’s family under R.C. 4123.59(D) and, if so, the extent 
of her dependency.  The commission appealed.  We affirm the Tenth District’s 
judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} McDonald died in April 2019 in a ditch collapse while working for J 
& J Schlaegel, Inc.  Carpenter, the mother of McDonald’s two minor children, 
applied to the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation for death benefits on behalf of the 
children and herself.  Carpenter identified herself on the application as McDonald’s 
fiancée.  She also submitted an affidavit in which she averred the following: she 
had been in a relationship with McDonald for 11 years; she is the mother of his two 
children; she and McDonald had owned real property jointly with a right of 
survivorship; they had been jointly responsible for the mortgage on the real 
property; they had been jointly liable for several credit-card accounts and vehicle 
leases or payments; they each had life-insurance policies naming the other as the 
sole beneficiary; she worked part-time, roughly eight hours per week; McDonald 
had provided the primary financial support for her and for their children; and they 
had been “engaged to be married and had every intention of being married if not 
for this accident.” 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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{¶ 3} R.C. 4123.59 provides that workers’ compensation death benefits are 
payable to persons who were dependent for their support—in whole or in part—on 
a deceased employee.  The statute identifies who is “presumed to be wholly 
dependent,” including a “surviving spouse who was living with the employee at the 
time of death,” and who may be considered a “prospective dependent,” including a 
surviving spouse who is not presumed to have been dependent.  R.C. 4123.59(D).  
The question of dependency in all other cases—i.e., cases in which dependency is 
neither presumed nor prospective—“shall be determined in accordance with the 
facts in each particular case * * *, but no person shall be considered as dependent 
unless such person is a member of the family of the deceased employee, or bears to 
the deceased employee the relation of surviving spouse, lineal descendant, ancestor, 
or brother or sister.”  Id. 
{¶ 4} In this case, a district hearing officer awarded death benefits to the 
children but denied them to Carpenter.  Carpenter appealed, and a staff hearing 
officer (“SHO”) awarded her death benefits as well.  The SHO found that “despite 
not being entitled to the presumption of dependency” as a surviving spouse, 
Carpenter had “met her burden of proving that she was actually wholly dependent 
upon the Decedent for support * * * because she was a ‘member of the family of 
the deceased employee’ based upon the * * * specific facts of this case.”  The 
bureau appealed. 
{¶ 5} The commission vacated the SHO’s order and denied death benefits 
to Carpenter.  The commission found that Carpenter was not dependent on 
McDonald as a surviving spouse, because she and McDonald were never married 
and because common-law marriage has been abolished in Ohio since 1991.  The 
commission also stated that “case law has not extended the language of R.C. 
4123.59(D)(2) to an unmarried person in a relationship with a decedent, such as is 
present in this claim.  Consideration of Blair v. Keller, 16 Ohio Misc. 157, 241 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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N.E.2d 767 (C.P.1968) does not compel a contrary result, as the facts in that case 
are distinguishable.”1 
{¶ 6} Carpenter filed this mandamus action, asking the Tenth District for a 
writ ordering the commission to reverse its decision and award her death benefits.  
The Tenth District concluded that because the last paragraph of R.C. 4123.59(D) 
says that a dependent can be “a member of the family of the deceased employee” 
or a person that “bears to the deceased employee the relation of surviving spouse, 
lineal descendant, ancestor, or brother or sister,” Carpenter could potentially 
qualify for death benefits as a member of McDonald’s family, even though she was 
not his surviving spouse.  2021-Ohio-4494, 182 N.E.3d 482, ¶ 17-19, 31.  The Tenth 
District granted a limited writ, directing the commission to vacate its order and 
issue a new order determining “whether under the particular facts of this case 
Carpenter has established that she is a member of the family pursuant to R.C. 
4123.59(D) and 4123.95,2 and if so, the extent of dependency in whole or in part.”  
(Footnote added.)  Id. at ¶ 33.  The commission appealed.3 
II.  LEGAL STANDARDS 
A.  Mandamus 
{¶ 7} On direct appeal of a mandamus action originating in the court of 
appeals, we review the judgment as if the action had been originally filed here.  
State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 631 (1967), 
paragraph ten of the syllabus.  The commission’s denial of death benefits based on 
its determination that the claimant was not a dependent of a deceased employee 
 
1. In Blair, a common pleas court held that the deceased employee’s unadopted stepchildren were 
entitled to death benefits as members of the decedent’s family under the last paragraph of R.C. 
4123.59(D).  Blair at 159-160. 
 
2. R.C. 4123.95 provides that the Workers’ Compensation Act “shall be liberally construed in favor 
of employees and the dependents of deceased employees.” 
 
3. J & J Schlaegel, Inc., filed a “Brief of Appellee.”  Its position, however, is aligned with that of 
the commission. 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
5 
does not “concern[] the causal connection between injury, disease, or death and 
employment” and, as such, is not appealable.  See State ex rel. Liposchak v. Indus. 
Comm., 90 Ohio St.3d 276, 281, 737 N.E.2d 519 (2000); R.C. 4123.512(A).  
Because she has no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, Carpenter 
is entitled to a writ of mandamus if she shows by clear and convincing evidence 
that she has a clear legal right to the requested relief and that the commission has a 
clear legal duty to provide it.  See State ex rel. Zarbana Industries, Inc. v. Indus. 
Comm., 166 Ohio St.3d 216, 2021-Ohio-3669, 184 N.E.3d 81, ¶ 10.  To do so, 
Carpenter must demonstrate that the commission “abused its discretion in carrying 
out its duties.”  See State ex rel. Sheppard v. Indus. Comm., 139 Ohio St.3d 223, 
2014-Ohio-1904, 11 N.E.3d 231, ¶ 12.  Carpenter maintains that the commission’s 
application of R.C. 4123.59(D) was an abuse of discretion. 
B.  R.C. 4123.59(D) 
{¶ 8} The commission may grant or deny death benefits based on a 
claimant’s dependent status as outlined in R.C. 4123.59(D), which provides: 
 
The following persons are presumed to be wholly dependent 
for their support upon a deceased employee: 
(1) A surviving spouse who was living with the employee at 
the time of death or a surviving spouse who was separated from the 
employee at the time of death because of the aggression of the 
employee; 
(2) A child under the age of eighteen years, or twenty-five 
years if pursuing a full-time educational program while enrolled in 
an accredited educational institution and program, or over said age 
if physically or mentally incapacitated from earning * * *. 
It is presumed that there is sufficient dependency to entitle a 
surviving natural parent or surviving natural parents, share and share 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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alike, with whom the decedent was living at the time of the 
decedent’s death * * *. 
The administrator may take into consideration any 
circumstances which, at the time of the death of the decedent, clearly 
indicate prospective dependency on the part of the claimant and 
potential support on the part of the decedent.  No person shall be 
considered a prospective dependent unless such person is a member 
of the family of the deceased employee and bears to the deceased 
employee the relation of surviving spouse, lineal descendant, 
ancestor, or brother or sister.  * * * 
In all other cases, the question of dependency, in whole or 
in part, shall be determined in accordance with the facts in each 
particular case existing at the time of the injury resulting in the death 
of such employee, but no person shall be considered as dependent 
unless such person is a member of the family of the deceased 
employee, or bears to the deceased employee the relation of 
surviving spouse, lineal descendant, ancestor, or brother or sister. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
III.  ANALYSIS 
{¶ 9} The last paragraph of R.C. 4123.59(D) applies to claims for death 
benefits brought by persons who are not entitled to a presumption of dependency.  
For example, even a surviving spouse may not be presumed wholly dependent if, 
at the time of the employee’s death, the surviving spouse was not living with the 
employee and was not separated from the employee because of the employee’s 
aggression.  See R.C. 4123.59(D)(1).  For persons who are not entitled to the 
presumption of dependency, the last paragraph of R.C. 4123.59(D) instructs that 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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actual dependency, in whole or in part, must be determined according to the facts 
that existed at the time of the injury that resulted in the employee’s death. 
{¶ 10} The last paragraph of R.C. 4123.59(D) sets forth two categories of 
potential dependents: (1) “a member of the family of the deceased employee” or 
(2) a person who “bears to the deceased employee the relation of surviving spouse, 
lineal descendent, ancestor, or brother or sister.”  Id.  The legislature conspicuously 
used the disjunctive “or” instead of the conjunctive “and,” which it used in the 
nearly identical sentence in the immediately preceding paragraph regarding 
prospective dependency.  Thus, marital status is not determinative of whether a 
person is eligible to receive death benefits under the last paragraph of R.C. 
4123.59(D)—any person may be eligible if it is determined that the person is “a 
member of the family of the deceased employee” under the facts of the particular 
case.  However, the phrase “member of the family” is not defined in the Workers’ 
Compensation Act. 
{¶ 11} In denying death benefits to Carpenter, the commission did not 
consider or determine whether she was a member of McDonald’s family.  Relying 
on the fact that Carpenter is not a surviving spouse, the commission stated that 
“case law has not extended the language of R.C. 4123.59(D)[] to an unmarried 
person [who was] in a relationship with [the deceased employee].”  The 
commission argues that for over 80 years, the law in Ohio has been that a legal 
marriage is required.  The commission also emphasizes that common-law marriage 
is no longer recognized under Ohio law.  See R.C. 3105.12(B)(1). 
{¶ 12} In support of its position, the commission relies on two opinions that 
were decided early in the history of Ohio’s workers’ compensation system: Indus. 
Comm. v. Dell, 104 Ohio St. 389, 135 N.E. 669 (1922), and Evans v. Indus. Comm., 
166 Ohio St. 413, 143 N.E.2d 705 (1957).  Both cases involved acts of bigamy: the 
deceased employees had married, abandoned their spouses, and then married 
another person without divorcing their first spouses.  Dell at 390-392; Evans at 413.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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This court concluded that the party claiming the validity of the second marriage 
must overcome the presumption that a lawful first marriage continues.  Dell at 
paragraph three of the syllabus; Evans at 414.  Because the second wife in each of 
these cases did not overcome that presumption, she was not entitled to death 
benefits as a surviving spouse under R.C. 4123.59 (or its nearly identical General 
Code precursor, former G.C. 1465-82).  Dell at 403-405; Evans at 414. 
{¶ 13} In Dell, motivated by the “much-discussed divorce evil,” this court 
declared that it should not “encourage marriage between comparative strangers 
without any inquiry by either into the past life or antecedents of the other.”  Dell at 
404-405.  In Evans, this court pronounced that “ ‘dependency’ under the 
Workmen’s Compensation Act [does] not encompass[] relationships not 
recognized by law,” relying primarily on cases that refused to classify children as 
dependents when born to a person who was not legally married to the deceased 
employee.  Evans at 414.  For instance, Evans pointed to Staker v. Indus. Comm., 
127 Ohio St. 13, 186 N.E. 616 (1933), paragraph one of the syllabus, in which this 
court held that “[a]n illegitimate, posthumous child, unacknowledged by its 
putative father, is not a dependent child” under the Workers’ Compensation Act. 
{¶ 14} The considerations discussed in Dell and Evans of legitimacy and 
“divorce evil” do not derive from the statutory language, however, and this court 
did not apply the language of the last paragraph in R.C. 4123.59(D) pertaining to 
“a member of the family.”  Therefore, neither case speaks to or controls the question 
at hand.  Instead, contrary to the commission, we find the analysis in Blair, 16 Ohio 
Misc. 157, 241 N.E.2d 767, relevant and persuasive. 
{¶ 15} In Blair, a common pleas court found that four stepchildren of the 
deceased employee were “members of his family” who were entitled to death 
benefits.  Id. at 159-160.  Although the deceased employee had never adopted his 
stepchildren, they had “been fully supported by the deceased since the time of the 
marriage of the deceased to the mother of the children.  They lived in the same 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
9 
house with the deceased and their mother, ate at the table of the deceased and 
enjoyed the privileges of the deceased and his wife.”  Id. at 159.  The court noted 
the legislature’s use of a comma and the word “or” in the last paragraph of R.C. 
4123.59(D), and it reasoned that to qualify as a dependent under that statutory 
provision, “a person need not be in any way related to the deceased” and “need not 
bear the relation to the deceased of ‘husband or widow, lineal descendant, ancestor, 
or brother or sister.’ ”  Id.  Instead, the court observed that the legislature may have 
“intended that any person, adult or child, who lived with the decedent and was 
dependent upon him for support and a member of his family, such as a [person with 
a physical or intellectual disability or an elderly] person taken in by the deceased, 
* * * would be entitled to participate in the Workmen’s Compensation funds.”  Id. 
{¶ 16} Nearly 30 years before Blair, the Second District Court of Appeals 
reached the same conclusion when applying former G.C. 1465-82, which contained 
language nearly identical to the last paragraph of R.C. 4123.59(D).  See Kloker v. 
Indus. Comm., 31 Ohio Law Abs. 628 (2d Dist.1940).  The deceased employee in 
Kloker also had not adopted his stepchild.  Id. at 629.  Nevertheless, the court found 
that the stepchild was “a member of the family” because the stepchild had lived 
with his mother and the deceased employee since the time of their marriage and the 
deceased employee had at all times provided for the stepchild.  Id.  The Second 
District further recognized that the use of “or” permits “a member of the family” to 
be “one other than a lineal descendant of the deceased employee” and that “[t]he 
liberal construction that a stepchild and others than blood relatives may be 
considered a member of the family has been adopted many times in jurisdictions 
outside of the State of Ohio.”  Id. at 629-630. 
{¶ 17} Similarly here, the commission could determine that an unmarried 
person who was in a relationship with a deceased employee was “a member of the 
family of the deceased employee,” depending on the facts of that particular case.  
Granted, under a certain definition of “family,” Carpenter is precluded from being 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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considered “a member of the family of the deceased employee” under R.C. 
4123.95(D).  “Family” can be defined as “a group of persons connected by blood, 
by affinity, or by law.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 747 (11th Ed.2019).  “Affinity” 
means “the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse.”  
Id. at 73.  Under this definition of “family,” it’s hard to see how Carpenter could be 
considered part of McDonald’s family. 
{¶ 18} But “family” can also be defined as “a group consisting of parents 
and their children.”  Id. at 747.  Or it may be defined as “a group of people who live 
together and usu[ally] have a shared commitment to a domestic relationship.”  Id.  
And recall that R.C. 4123.95 calls for the Workers’ Compensation Act to be 
“liberally construed in favor of * * * the dependents of deceased employees.”  
Accordingly—as these definitions show—it is very well possible that Carpenter 
could qualify as a “member of the family of the deceased employee” under R.C. 
4123.59(D). 
{¶ 19} Whether Carpenter actually qualifies as a “member of the family of 
the deceased employee” under the particular facts of this case is a question that the 
commission will have to address.  The commission did not address this question, 
however, given its view that Carpenter could not possibly qualify as a dependent 
because she was not McDonald’s surviving spouse.  This was an incomplete and 
incorrect application of the statute. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 20} Carpenter has a clear legal right to have the commission apply R.C. 
4123.59(D) correctly to her claim for death benefits, and the commission has a clear 
legal duty to do so.  Accordingly, a writ of mandamus is appropriate to compel the 
commission to exercise its discretion in determining, in the first instance, whether 
Carpenter was a member of McDonald’s family at the time of the injury that 
resulted in his death.  We therefore affirm the Tenth District Court of Appeals’ 
judgment granting a limited writ directing the commission to vacate its order and 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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to consider and determine whether Carpenter was a member of McDonald’s family 
under R.C. 4123.59(D) and, if so, the extent of her dependency. 
Judgment affirmed. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, 
and DETERS, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Graham & Graham Co., L.P.A., and Robert G. McClelland, for appellee 
Amanda Carpenter. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and John Smart, Assistant Attorney General, 
for appellant. 
Hahn, Loeser & Parks, L.L.P., Steven E. Seasly, and Andrew J. Wolf, for 
J & J Schlaegel, Inc. 
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