Case Title: Armata v. Target Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12448

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12448 
 
DEBRA ARMATA  vs.  TARGET CORPORATION & another.1 
 
 
 
Hampden.     March 6, 2018. - June 25, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Consumer Protection Act, Collection of debt, Unfair or deceptive 
act.  Debt.  Telephone.  Regulation. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
July 20, 2015. 
 
 
The case was heard by John S. Ferrara, J., on motions for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Sergei Lemberg for the plaintiff. 
 
Brian Melendez, of Minnesota (Alan E. Brown also present) 
for the defendants. 
 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, & Benjamin K. Golden & Max 
Weinstein, Assistant Attorneys General, for the Attorney 
General, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
                     
 
1 Target Enterprises, Inc., doing business as Target 
Corporate Services, Inc. 
2 
 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  In this case, we construe the revised 
Massachusetts debt collection regulations, which limit how often 
a creditor may attempt to contact a debtor via telephone in 
order to collect a debt.  Title 940 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 7.04(1)(f) (2012) (regulation), implementing G. L. c. 93A, 
§ 2, prohibits creditors from "[i]nitiating a communication with 
any debtor via telephone, either in person or via text messaging 
or recorded audio message, in excess of two such communications 
in each seven-day period."  Creditors are exempt under the 
regulation when they are "truly unable to reach the debtor or to 
leave a message for the debtor."  Office of the Attorney 
General, Guidance with Respect to Debt Collection Regulations 
(2013) (http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/government/debt-collection-
guidance-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4Q8-Y39E]) (Attorney 
General's guidance).  We must decide whether the regulation 
applies to creditors, such as the defendants, who use automatic 
dialing devices or voluntarily decide not to leave voicemail 
messages.  We conclude that it does. 
 
Debra Armata commenced an action in the Superior Court 
against Target Corporation and Target Enterprises, Inc., doing 
business as Target Corporate Services, Inc. (collectively, 
Target), alleging that Target violated the regulation by 
telephoning her more than two times in a seven-day period in 
3 
 
 
order to collect a debt.  A Superior Court judge granted 
Target's motion for summary judgment and denied Armata's cross-
motion for summary judgment regarding liability under the 
regulation, and Armata appealed.  Target does not deny that it 
telephoned Armata more than twice in a seven-day period in order 
to collect a debt.  Rather, Target maintains that it did not 
"initiate" any communications within the meaning of the 
regulation because it telephoned Armata with an automatic 
dialing device, which only plays the prerecorded message after 
the call is answered and no live Target representative is 
available.  Target also contends that the majority of telephone 
calls, which Armata did not answer, did not constitute 
"communications" within the meaning of the regulation because 
they did not convey any information, given that Target did not 
leave voicemail messages.  In the alternative, Target claims 
that it was exempt from the regulation because, although it was 
able to reach Armata, it could not, as a practical matter, leave 
her voicemail messages without violating State and Federal law. 
 
Target's proffered interpretation of the regulation is 
inconsistent with its plain meaning and the Attorney General's 
guidance, and is contrary to the regulation's purpose of 
preventing creditors from harassing, oppressing, or abusing 
debtors.  The regulation applies to any attempted telephonic 
communication by a creditor to a debtor in an effort to collect 
4 
 
 
a debt, so long as, as here, the creditor is able to reach the 
debtor or to leave a voicemail message for the debtor.  Further, 
Target was not exempt from the regulation, because it was not 
actually precluded from leaving Armata voicemail messages under 
State or Federal law.  Accordingly, Armata is entitled to 
summary judgment on the issue of liability. 
 
1.  Background.  The material facts are not in dispute.  In 
May, 2013, Armata applied for a Target-branded debit card.  She 
then incurred a debt to Target; the debt at issue was more than 
thirty days past due, and was incurred for personal purposes.  
Target telephoned Armata numerous times beginning on January 23, 
2015, in order to collect the debt.2  There were times when 
Target telephoned Armata concerning the debt more than twice in 
a seven-day period.3 
                     
 
2 Target also telephoned Armata in 2014.  Target asserts, 
and Armata disputes, that the telephone calls in 2014 were from 
Target's pharmacy, and thus did not concern the debt.  This 
dispute is not material to the issue of liability, however, 
because the parties agree that Target called Armata numerous 
times in 2015 to in order to collect a debt. 
 
3 There is some discrepancy as to the precise number of 
telephone calls that Armata received.  For example, Armata 
claims that Target telephoned her six times between February 12 
and February 18, 2015; six times between February 16 and 
February 20, 2015; and six times between April 13 and April 18, 
2015.  Target maintains that it telephoned her only five times 
between February 16 and February 20, 2015, and four times 
between April 13 and April 18, 2015.  This dispute is immaterial 
for purposes of determining liability, as the parties agree that 
 
5 
 
 
 
No person physically placed the telephone calls to Armata; 
rather, Target telephoned her using a "predictive dialer," which 
is an automatic dialing device.  When Target cardholders answer 
the telephone calls placed by Target's predictive dialer, a live 
representative is on the line ninety-five per cent of the time.  
For the other five per cent of telephone calls, a recorded 
message is played; the recorded message does not start until the 
predictive dialer detects that someone has answered the 
telephone call and only if a live representative is unavailable. 
 
When Armata did answer the telephone calls from Target, she 
heard a prerecorded message requesting that she contact Target.  
The record is silent as to whether she heard such a message more 
than twice in any given week.  Armata was never connected with a 
live person.  Although Target was able to leave Armata voicemail 
messages, it chose not to, based on an internal policy not to 
leave voicemail messages. 
 
Armata commenced an action in the Superior Court, alleging 
that Target violated the regulation by placing more than two 
debt collection calls to her cellular telephone within a seven-
day period.  See 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.04(1)(f).  Target 
                                                                  
there were times when Target telephoned Armata concerning the 
debt more than twice in a seven-day period. 
 
 
Target's policy with respect to the number of telephone 
calls placed is to refrain from telephoning consumers more than 
four times per day. 
6 
 
 
moved for summary judgment, and Armata cross-moved for summary 
judgment as to liability.  Reasoning that Target's unsuccessful 
attempts to speak to Armata via telephone did not constitute 
"communications" as defined by the regulations, and that there 
was no indication that Armata heard a prerecorded message from 
Target more than twice in a given week, a Superior Court judge 
denied Armata's motion and allowed Target's motion.  Armata 
appealed, and we transferred the case from the Appeals Court to 
this court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  "The standard of 
review of a grant of summary judgment is whether, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all 
material facts have been established and the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Augat, Inc. v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991).  "In a case 
like this one where both parties have moved for summary 
judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to 
the party against whom judgment [has entered]" (citation 
omitted).  Boazova v. Safety Ins. Co., 462 Mass. 346, 350 
(2012).  "Because our review is de novo, we accord no deference 
to the decision of the motion judge."  DeWolfe v. Hingham Ctr., 
Ltd., 464 Mass. 795, 799 (2013). 
 
b.  Statutory and regulatory framework.  General Laws 
c. 93A, § 2 (a), prohibits "[u]nfair methods of competition and 
7 
 
 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any 
trade or commerce."  The Attorney General may implement rules 
and regulations interpreting this provision.  G. L. c. 93A, 
§ 2 (c).  In 2012, the Attorney General amended the regulation, 
940 Code Mass. Regs. 7.04(1)(f), which now provides: 
"It shall constitute an unfair or deceptive act or 
practice for a creditor to contact a debtor . . . [by] 
[i]nitiating a communication with any debtor via 
telephone, either in person or via text messaging or 
recorded audio message, in excess of two such 
communications in each seven-day period to either the 
debtor's residence, cellular telephone, or other 
telephone number provided by the debtor as his or her 
personal telephone number . . ." [emphasis added]. 
 
 
In 2013, in response to public inquiries, the Attorney 
General issued "Guidance With Respect to Debt Collection 
Regulations."  This guidance explained: 
"The goal of this provision is to not only limit the 
number of times a creditor can communicate with a 
debtor via telephone to try to collect a debt, but to 
also limit the fees that a creditor can impose on a 
debtor (thereby limiting voicemails and text messages 
to twice in a seven day period).  Accordingly, 
unsuccessful attempts by a creditor to reach a debtor 
via telephone may not constitute initiation of 
communication if the creditor is truly unable to reach 
the debtor or to leave a message for the debtor.  
Notwithstanding this interpretation, the Office of the 
Attorney General may still consider enforcement action 
against any conduct, including initiation of 
communication via telephone, the natural consequence 
of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse a debtor" 
(emphasis added). 
 
8 
 
 
See Attorney General's guidance, supra at 1.4 
 
c.  Analysis.  The parties agree that, for purposes of the 
regulation, Target was a creditor and Armata was a debtor.  See 
940 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.03 (2012).  It also is undisputed that, 
at times in 2015, Target telephoned Armata more than twice in a 
seven-day period in an effort to collect a debt.  The only 
dispute is whether, in telephoning Armata, Target was 
"[i]nitiating a communication . . . via telephone, either in 
person or via text messaging or recorded audio message" within 
the meaning of the regulation.5  See 940 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 7.04(1)(f). 
 
"We interpret a regulation in the same manner as a statute, 
and according to traditional rules of construction."  Warcewicz 
v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 410 Mass. 548, 550 (1991).  
                     
 
4 In addition to the guidance, discussed infra, the Attorney 
General submitted a post-argument amicus letter in this case 
expressing her view that, pursuant to the regulation, "a 
creditor violates [G. L. c.] 93A if it initiates more than two 
telephone calls to a debtor's home, cell[ular], or personal 
telephone number in a seven-day period, even if the creditor 
uses a predictive dialer or voluntarily chooses not to leave a 
message."  This explanation was not published or otherwise 
publicly available prior to oral argument in this case, and we 
do not consider it.  To the extent the Attorney General seeks to 
clarify the meaning of the regulation, she is free to publish 
additional guidance or amend the regulation as needed. 
 
5 Target does not challenge the regulation as being 
inconsistent with General Laws c. 93A, § 2.  The only issue is 
whether the regulation, as written, encompasses Target's 
telephone calls to Armata. 
9 
 
 
"Thus, we accord the words of a regulation their usual and 
ordinary meaning."  Id. 
 
The regulation does not define "initiating."  Webster's 
dictionary defines the term "initiate" as "to begin or set 
going," to "make a beginning of," or to "perform or facilitate 
the first actions, steps, or stages of."  Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 1164 (1993).  See Commonwealth v. 
Samuel S., 476 Mass. 497, 501 (2017) ("we look to dictionary 
definitions as a guide to a term's plain or ordinary meaning").   
The current language of the regulation was the result of the 
Attorney General's revisions in 2012.  The prior version 
prohibited creditors from "[e]ngaging any debtor in 
communication via telephone, initiated by the creditor, in 
excess of two calls in each seven-day period at a debtor's 
residence and two calls in each 30-day period . . ." [emphasis 
added].  See 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.04(1)(f) (1993).  By 
contrast, the current version makes no mention whether the 
creditor and the debtor need actually "engage" in a 
communication.  See 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.04(1)(f).  The use 
of the word "initiating" thus indicates that a creditor need not 
be successful in reaching a debtor for the regulation to apply.  
As discussed, infra, this is reinforced by the Attorney 
General's guidance. 
10 
 
 
 
The regulation defines "communication" as "conveying 
information directly or indirectly to any person through any 
medium."6  See 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.03.  The regulation also 
specifies that this communication may be "in person," via "text 
messaging,"7 or via "recorded audio message."  940 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 7.04(1)(f).  A creditor therefore "initiat[es] a 
communication . . . via telephone" under the regulation every 
time it attempts to contact a debtor's telephone to convey 
information, unless the creditor is exempted, as discussed 
infra.  The regulation applies regardless of whether the 
telephonic communication is live, via text message, or via 
recorded audio message. 
 
The Attorney General's guidance carves out an exemption 
under the revised regulation, namely, that "unsuccessful 
attempts by a creditor to reach a debtor via telephone may not 
constitute initiation of communication if the creditor is truly 
unable to reach the debtor or to leave a message for the debtor" 
                     
 
6 The definition of "communication or communicating" in the 
regulation explicitly excludes "nonidentifying communications," 
which, in turn, are defined as "any communication with any 
person other than the debtor in which the creditor does not 
convey any information except the name of the creditor and in 
which the creditor makes no inquiry other than to determine a 
convenient time and place to contact the debtor" (emphasis 
added).  940 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.03. 
 
7 It is undisputed that Target never sent Armata text 
messages concerning the debt. 
11 
 
 
(emphasis added).  See Attorney General's guidance, supra at 1.  
We construe the Attorney General's guidance to mean that 
attempts by a creditor to reach a debtor via telephone do 
constitute initiation of communication if the creditor is able 
to reach the debtor or leave a voicemail message for the debtor. 
 
As it is not "arbitrary, unreasonable or inconsistent with 
the plain terms of the regulation itself," the Attorney 
General's interpretation is entitled to "substantial deference."  
See Biogen IDEC MA, Inc. v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 454 Mass. 
174, 184 (2009).  The Attorney General's guidance ensures that 
creditors are not penalized for attempting to reach a debtor 
when it is actually impossible to do so; for example, when 
debtors do not answer and their voicemail or answering system is 
not set up, their mailbox is full, or their telephones have been 
disconnected.8  In such circumstances, penalizing the creditor 
would not further the purpose of the regulation, which was 
designed to prevent creditors from engaging in practices that 
would "harass, oppress, or abuse a debtor."  See Attorney 
General's guidance, supra at 1.  See also Attorney General, 
                     
 
8 We need not define all the ways in which a creditor would 
be "truly unable" to reach a debtor.  Target does not contend 
that it was truly unable to reach Armata.  Nor would such an 
argument be credible in this case, since Armata did occasionally 
answer Target's telephone calls.  Additionally, there is no 
dispute that Target had Armata's correct telephone number, which 
Target had obtained Armata's prior consent to telephone. 
12 
 
 
Press Release, Updated Debt Regulations Provide Stronger 
Protections (Mar. 1, 2012), (http://www.mass.gov/ago 
/news-and-updates/press-releases/2012/2012-03-01-debt-
collection-regulations.html [https://perma.cc/F656-9NE3]) 
(regulation was "designed to provide stronger consumer 
protections by addressing changing technology," and to "ensure 
that the playing field is level for both creditors and consumers 
so that all parties are better protected"). 
 
Target nonetheless contends that it did not violate the 
regulation for several reasons.  Target argues that it did not 
"initiate" communications within the meaning of the regulation 
because it used a predictive dialer to place the calls.  Target 
also contends that most of its telephone calls to Armata were 
not "communications" because they did not convey information, 
given that Armata did not answer them and Target did not leave 
any voicemail messages.  In the alternative, Target argues that 
its telephone calls to Armata were exempt under the Attorney 
General's guidance, because, as a practical matter, it could not 
leave her voicemail messages without running the risk of 
violating State and Federal law.  Each of these arguments is 
unavailing. 
 
First, Target insists that the regulation does not apply to 
"all calls" but, rather, only to those calls that are 
"initiat[ed] . . . either in person or via text messaging or 
13 
 
 
recorded audio message."  This interpretation is based on 
Target's incorrect premise that the phrase "either in person or 
via text messaging or recorded audio message" modifies the word 
"initiating," rather than "communication . . . via telephone."9  
Relying on this interpretation, Target maintains that its 
telephone calls to Armata are not covered by the regulation 
because they were not "initiat[ed] . . . via . . . recorded 
audio message," but with a predictive dialer.  Target's use of a 
predictive dialer ensured that a live representative was waiting 
on the line most of the time, and, if a recorded message was 
used, it did not start playing until the dialer detected a 
connection and a live representative was unavailable.  Target 
believes that these features of a predictive dialer immunize it 
from the regulation, which Target contends is aimed at "true 
robocalls,[10] where a recorded message always, automatically, and 
                     
 
9 See 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.04(1)(f) (2012) (prohibiting 
creditors from "[i]nitiating a communication with any debtor via 
telephone, either in person or via text messaging or recorded 
audio message, in excess of two such communications in each 
seven-day period"). 
 
 
10 Target's use of the term "robocalls" is unsupported.  
Nothing in the language of the regulation or in the Attorney 
General's guidance mentions "robocalls," let alone suggests a 
meaningful distinction between "robocalls" and telephone calls 
from a predictive dialer.  See 940 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 7.04(1)(f); Attorney General's guidance, supra. 
14 
 
 
immediately plays as soon as the call is answered, and no human 
representative is even available." 
 
Target's argument that the use of a predictive dialer 
shields it from liability contradicts the plain meaning of the 
regulation as well as its purpose.  As explained, supra, the 
phrase "either in person or via text messaging or recorded audio 
message" modifies "communication . . . via telephone," which 
immediately precedes it.  See Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. 
Spencer Press, Inc., 398 Mass. 118, 123 (1986) (general rule of 
grammatical construction is that "a modifying clause is confined 
to the last antecedent" [citation omitted]).  Target counters 
that if the phrase "either in person or via text messaging or 
recorded audio message" modifies "communication . . . via 
telephone," then it is superfluous.  In fact, the phrase 
underscores that the regulation is not limited to traditional 
telephone calls placed by a live person; it applies regardless 
of whether the initiated telephonic communication takes place 
via a live person or a recorded audio message, or whether the 
initiated communication takes the form of text messages.11 
                     
 
11 In support of its position that the regulation was not 
intended to cover calls placed with a predictive dialer, Target 
points out that autodialed calls are heavily regulated under the 
Federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).  See 47 U.S.C. 
§ 227.  This argument is unconvincing.  The TCPA does not 
regulate the frequency of creditor calls, which is the primary 
concern of the regulation at issue in this case.  See generally 
 
15 
 
 
 
Moreover, the regulation is not concerned with the specific 
technology a creditor uses to contact a debtor; it seeks to 
limit how often a creditor attempts to reach a debtor's 
telephone and causes the debtor to incur fees.12  See Attorney 
General's guidance, supra at 1.  Target's reading would create a 
loophole so large as to swallow the rule, such that nearly every 
creditor would be able to evade the limits imposed by the 
regulation simply by changing its dialing technology.  The 
potential for harassment stems in large part from the volume of 
initiated communications; it makes no difference what technology 
a creditor uses to dial the debtor's telephone or at what point 
a prerecorded message begins playing. 
                                                                  
id.  Rather, the TCPA prohibits, inter alia, using automated 
telephone equipment to telephone certain numbers at any time, 
and for any reason, without prior express consent.  47 U.S.C. 
§ 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), (b)(1)(B).  For the same reason, Target's 
reliance on Ybarra v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 807 F.3d 635 (5th 
Cir. 2015), is misplaced.  In that case, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that, to be liable 
under the "artificial or prerecorded voice" section of the TCPA, 
"a defendant must make a call and an artificial or prerecorded 
voice must actually play."  Id. at 640.  The court in Ybarra 
reasoned that the TCPA regulates "using" an artificial or 
prerecorded voice, so it is not sufficient that the voice be "on 
standby as the call was placed."  Id. at 641.  By contrast, the 
regulation in this case does not contain any type of blanket ban 
on the "use" of automated telephone equipment. 
 
12 Such fees presumably would be imposed on debtors by their 
cellular telephone providers when, for example, debtors receive 
text messages sent by creditors. 
16 
 
 
 
Second, Target contends that most of its telephone calls to 
Armata, which went unanswered, were not "communications" within 
the meaning of the regulation.  The regulation defines 
"communication" as "conveying information directly or indirectly 
to any person through any medium" (emphasis added).  See 940 
Code Mass. Regs. § 7.03.  Target essentially argues that most of 
its telephone calls did not "convey[] information" because 
Armata did not answer them and Target did not leave voicemail 
messages.  This argument is unavailing because it reads the word 
"communication" in isolation.  The regulation does not limit 
"communication[s]," but, rather, the initiation of 
communications.  See 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.04(1)(f).  The 
fact that Target did not successfully directly convey 
information to Armata is unimportant, because Target 
nevertheless initiated the process of conveying information to 
Armata via telephone.13 
 
Target is again overlooking the purpose of the regulation.  
A creditor can "harass, oppress, or abuse" a debtor with its 
telephone practices by calling incessantly, even if it does not 
leave voicemail messages notwithstanding being able to do so.  
                     
 
13 Even without the use of voicemail messages, a creditor 
can convey indirectly that it seeks payment from a debtor by 
calling and hanging up repeatedly, as underscored by the 
regulation's antiharassment purpose.  See Attorney General's 
guidance, supra at 1. 
17 
 
 
See Attorney General's guidance, supra at 1.  Under Target's 
reading, a creditor would be permitted to telephone a debtor 
unremittingly so long as it chose not to leave voicemail 
messages.  In such a scheme, a "communication" would occur only 
if the debtor answered the call.  Target's interpretation 
undermines the purpose of the regulation by essentially 
requiring debtors to answer calls from creditors twice per week 
in order to compel the creditors to stop calling that week. 
 
Third, Target seeks refuge in the exemption outlined by the 
Attorney General's guidance for creditors who are unable to 
leave debtors voicemail messages.14  Target essentially argues 
that it was caught between a proverbial rock and a hard place:  
although it was physically possible to leave Armata voicemail 
messages, as a practical matter, Target could not do so because 
it risked violating the Attorney General's other debt collection 
regulations and the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act 
(FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692-1692p.  This argument is unpersuasive, 
                     
 
14 The Attorney General's guidance provides no exemption for 
those who voluntarily choose not to leave voicemail messages.  
See Attorney General's guidance.  Indeed, in 2016, the Attorney 
General entered into an "assurance of discontinuance" with a 
company that "did not consider outgoing calls where its 
collectors decided not to leave a message" to constitute 
"communications" under the regulation.  See In re Ditech 
Financial LLC, Suffolk Superior Court, No. 16-2437E, slip op. at 
4 (Aug. 4, 2016).  The company thereafter agreed to discontinue 
this practice in lieu of the Attorney General commencing suit.  
Id. 
18 
 
 
both because the Massachusetts regulations are not as 
restrictive as Target contends, and because Target does not fall 
within the purview of the FDCPA. 
 
On the one hand, the Massachusetts debt collection 
regulations prohibit creditors from "[c]ommunicat[ing] by 
telephone without disclosure of the name of the business or 
company of the creditor and without disclosure of the first and 
last name of the individual making such communication or a first 
name and a personal identifier for such individual such as a 
code or alias."  940 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.04(d).  At the same 
time, 940 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 7.05(2) and 7.06(1)(a) (2012)15 
prohibit a creditor from implying "the fact of a debt" to anyone 
who is not the debtor.  Target reasons that, because it may not 
leave a voicemail message without identifying itself, and 
because it cannot know who will listen to a voicemail message, 
it cannot leave such a message without violating these other 
regulations.  See 940 Mass. Code Regs. § 7.05(1) ("A creditor 
may assume that all contacts directed to the debtor's household 
are received either by the debtor or persons residing in the 
                     
 
15 Title 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.05(2) (2012) prohibits 
creditors from implying the fact of a debt specifically to 
persons who reside in the debtor's household, while 940 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 7.06(1)(a) prohibits creditors from implying the 
fact of the debt to anyone other than the debtor. 
19 
 
 
household of the debtor unless the creditor knows or should know 
information to the contrary"). 
 
We do not interpret the regulatory scheme as prohibiting 
Target from leaving a voicemail message that simply states the 
caller's name, that the call was on behalf of Target, and that 
the recipient should return the call, so long as the message 
does not mention or in any way imply that the call concerns the 
collection of a debt.  See 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.05(2) ("It 
shall constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice for a 
creditor to imply the fact of a debt, orally or in writing, to 
persons who reside in the household of a debtor, other than the 
debtor" [emphasis added]); id. at § 7.06(1)(a) ("It shall 
constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice for a creditor 
to contact or threaten to contact persons [other than the debtor 
or those residing in the household of a debtor] in connection 
with a debt in any of the following ways: . . . Implying the 
fact of the debt to any such person" [emphasis added]).  The 
regulation simply requires that, when attempting to contact a 
debtor, a creditor affirmatively identify the caller and the 
company.  940 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 7.04(d).  Accordingly, Target 
was not prevented under the Massachusetts debt collection 
regulations from leaving Armata voicemail messages, so long as 
Target refrained from implying that the telephone call concerned 
a debt. 
20 
 
 
 
Nor was Target barred from leaving Armata voicemail 
messages under the FDCPA, which also contains a provision 
prohibiting debt collectors from communicating with third 
parties about a debt.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).  Unlike the 
Massachusetts regulation, the FDCPA explicitly requires debt 
collectors to disclose that any "communication is from a debt 
collector," 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11), so a debt collector would 
have to include such information in its voicemail messages.  
Target was not prevented from leaving Armata voicemail messages 
under the FDCPA, however, because Target does not fall within 
the statute's definition of a debt collector.  See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692a(6).16  Target was calling Armata to collect a debt on its 
own behalf, which exempts it from the FDCPA.17  See id. 
                     
 
16 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) ("The term 'debt collector' 
means any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate 
commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of 
which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects 
or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or 
due or asserted to be owed or due another"; Chiang v. Verizon 
New England, Inc., 595 F.3d 26, 41 (1st Cir. 2010) ("Creditors 
collecting on their own accounts are generally excluded from the 
[FDCPA's] reach" unless they use "any name other than [their] 
own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or 
attempting to collect such debts"). 
 
17 As to creditors that are debt collectors bound by the 
FDCPA, we invite the Attorney General to provide guidance as to 
how such creditors should conduct their telephonic debt 
collection practices in light of the stricter FDCPA 
requirements. 
21 
 
 
 
Accordingly, at times when Target was able to reach Armata 
or leave a voicemail message for her, Target initiated telephone 
communications within the meaning of the regulation.  Target 
initiated such telephone communications to collect a debt more 
than twice in a seven-day period.  Because the meaning of the 
regulation is a question of law, as to which there are no 
material facts in dispute, Armata is entitled to summary 
judgment on the issue of liability.  Armata's request for 
damages, costs, and injunctive relief requires further 
proceedings in the Superior Court. 
 
Conclusion.  The order allowing Target's motion for summary 
judgment and denying Armata's cross motion for summary judgment 
is vacated and set aside.  The matter is remanded to the 
Superior Court, where an order shall enter granting summary 
judgment for Armata, and for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.