Case Title: Hall v. Freeman

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-02-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Tod HALL v. Doug FREEMAN

96-179                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 3, 1997


1.   Parent & child -- children born of marriage presumed
     legitimate child of parties to marriage. --  There is a legal
     presumption that a child born during marriage is the
     legitimate child of the parties to that marriage. 

2.   Parent & child -- statutes creating paternity action in
     harmony with presumption of legitimacy -- chancellor erred in
     permitting paternity action to be pursued on behalf of the
     child. -- Where the petition for establishment of paternity
     could not be filed by the child whose paternity was presumed
     under the categories providing for such petitions found in
     Ark. Code Ann.  9-10-104 (Repl. 1993), and nothing in the
     statutes creating the paternity action purported to do away
     with the presumption of legitimacy of a child born during
     marriage, it was error for the chancellor to permit the
     paternity action to be pursued on behalf of the child; the
     case was reversed.


     Appeal from Pulaski Chancery Court, Juvenile Division; Rita
Gruber, Chancellor; reversed and remanded.
     Melinda R. Gilbert, for appellant.
     Randell Templeton, for appellee Doug C. Freeman.

     David Newbern, Justice. 
     In 1994, almost six years after being divorced from his ex-
wife, Jamie McFall, Doug Freeman sued her and Tod Hall.  The
complaint alleged that Tod Hall was the father of Stuart Freeman,
a child conceived and born during the marriage of Doug Freeman and
Jamie McFall.  A guardian ad litem was appointed to represent
Stuart's interests.  The guardian moved, along with Mr. Freeman,
for blood (DNA) tests to determine the paternity of the child.  The
Chancellor held Mr. Freeman's complaint was barred due to the res
judicata effect of the divorce decree which recited the child was
"born of this marriage."  She held, however, that Stuart was not
barred, so the paternity action could be pursued on his behalf. 
Based on the DNA evidence, Mr. Hall was held to be the father of
Stuart.  The order changed the child's name from Freeman to Hall,
relieved Mr. Freeman of the support obligation, and required Mr.
Hall to assume it.  We reverse and remand because a child conceived
and born of a marriage, and thus presumed to be the child of the
marital partners, has no standing to bring a paternity action.
     Mr. Freeman and Ms. McFall were married in 1983.  Stuart was
born in 1987.  At the hearing on Mr. Freeman's petition there was
ample evidence that Mr. Hall and Ms. McFall (then Freeman) engaged
in sexual intercourse during the time Stuart was conceived.  Ms.
McFall testified that she and Mr. Freeman did not engage in sexual
intercourse at that time.  She further testified, as did Mr. Hall,
that Mr. Hall was made aware that he was the father of Stuart
shortly after Ms. McFall learned she was pregnant.  Mr. Freeman was
told that Mr. Hall was the father of Stuart some three or four
months after Stuart's birth; thus he knew of it well in advance of
filing his divorce complaint in which he pleaded that "The parties
have one minor child, Stuart D. Freeman."  
     Evidence of the DNA test presented at the paternity hearing
excluded Mr. Freeman as the father and concluded there was a 99.97%
probability that Mr. Hall was Stuart's father.
     Mr. Hall presents many arguments in favor of reversal.  As we
reverse solely on the standing issue, we need not address the other
contentions.  Mr. Freeman has not cross-appealed the Chancellor's
decision barring his claim on the basis of the res judicata effect
of the divorce decree.
     In her order, the Chancellor cited cases from other
jurisdictions to the effect that a child is not barred from
bringing a paternity suit even though a prior divorce decree had
described the child as being "of the marriage."  State ex rel.
Cline v. Pentasuglia, 457 S.E.2d (W.Va. 1955).  See also People in
re: M.C.,