Case Title: Doe v. Worcester Public Schools

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12827

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-04-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12827 
 
JANE DOE1  vs.  WORCESTER PUBLIC SCHOOLS & others.2 
 
 
 
Worcester.     January 7, 2020. - April 28, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
School and School Committee, Enforcement of discipline, 
Superintendent of schools.  Injunction.  Practice, Civil, 
Preliminary injunction. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
December 17, 2018. 
 
 
A motion for a preliminary injunction was heard by J. Gavin 
Reardon, Jr., J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Paige L. Tobin (Elizabeth F. Toner also present) for the 
defendants. 
 
Amy DiDonna for the plaintiff. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
                     
 
1 A minor, by her parent and next friend.  The name is a 
pseudonym. 
 
 
2 Worcester school committee; superintendent and school 
safety director of Worcester public schools; and principal and 
assistant principal of Doherty Memorial High School. 
2 
 
 
 
Michael J. Long & Steven J. Finnegan for Massachusetts 
Association of School Superintendents, Inc., & another. 
 
Rhoda E. Schneider, Special Assistant Attorney General, 
& Iraida J. Álvarez for Department of Elementary and Secondary 
Education. 
 
Peter A. Hahn for Committee for Public Counsel Services. 
 
Sky Kochenour & Jenny C. Chou for Center for Law and 
Education, Inc., & another. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  The plaintiff, Jane Doe, a student at a public 
high school in Worcester, was suspended for 152 school days 
after an assistant principal found a small amount of marijuana 
and two makeshift pipes in the plaintiff's locker.  When the 
plaintiff appealed from her suspension to the superintendent, 
the district's school safety director, acting as the 
superintendent's designee, shortened the suspension to 112 
school days.  The plaintiff thereafter filed a complaint 
challenging the delegation of the superintendent's statutory 
authority to hear and decide the plaintiff's appeal.  The 
plaintiff also moved for a preliminary injunction seeking 
immediate reinstatement to school, which was granted. 
 
The defendants seek a reversal of that decision, arguing 
that the motion judge erred in concluding that the plaintiff is 
likely to succeed on the merits of her claim because the 
relevant statute, G. L. c. 71, § 37H (d), permits the 
superintendent to delegate responsibility for hearing and 
3 
 
 
deciding suspension appeals.  We disagree, and therefore affirm 
the judge's order.3 
Background and prior proceedings.  We summarize the facts 
as alleged in the motion for a preliminary injunction and 
attached affidavit.  See Doe v. Superintendent of Sch. of 
Weston, 461 Mass. 159, 160 (2011) (Weston).  The facts of the 
underlying offense are not contested.  In late September of 
2018, an assistant principal received reports that the area near 
the plaintiff's locker smelled strongly of marijuana.  The 
assistant principal accompanied the plaintiff to her locker, at 
which time the plaintiff admitted that she was storing items she 
was not allowed to have in school.  Searching the locker, the 
assistant principal found and confiscated a small amount of 
marijuana in a plastic container and two pipes made from plastic 
water bottles.  After holding an initial hearing, the school's 
principal determined that the plaintiff had committed a 
disciplinary offense and suspended her for the remainder of the 
                     
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Center for 
Law and Education, Inc., and Massachusetts Advocates for 
Children; the amicus brief submitted by Massachusetts 
Association of School Superintendents, Inc., and Massachusetts 
Association of School Committees, Inc.; the amicus brief 
submitted by the Committee for Public Counsel Services; and the 
amicus letter submitted by the Department of Elementary and 
Secondary Education. 
4 
 
 
school year -- 152 school days -- pursuant to the school's 
disciplinary rules and G. L. c. 71, § 37H (a).4 
The plaintiff exercised her right to appeal from what 
amounted to an expulsion5 to the district's superintendent under 
G. L. c. 71, § 37H (d).  The school safety director for the 
district, acting as the superintendent's designee, held the 
appeal hearing and reduced the expulsion from 152 to 112 school 
days, which allowed for the plaintiff's return to school at the 
end of the third marking period of the school year. 
Shortly after the appeal was decided, the plaintiff began 
attending the only alternative public school available to her.  
Prior to her expulsion, the plaintiff was an honors student with 
no high school disciplinary record.  She had been enrolled in a 
merit-based program at her school with additional weekly classes 
providing vocational training in nursing, her intended field.  
Although the plaintiff was able to earn credits at the 
alternative school to remain on track to advance to the next 
                     
4 General Laws c. 71, § 37H (a), provides in pertinent part:  
"Any student who is found on school premises . . . in possession 
of . . . a controlled substance as defined in [G. L. c. 94C], 
including, but not limited to, marijuana, . . . may be subject 
to expulsion from the school or school district by the 
principal." 
 
5 As discussed infra, the suspension of the plaintiff 
constituted an expulsion for purposes of G. L. c. 71, § 37H, 
because it was for longer than ninety school days.  See 603 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 53.02 (2015). 
5 
 
 
grade, the plaintiff's mother averred in an affidavit submitted 
to the court that the level of instruction was below her grade 
and ability level. 
In December 2018, the plaintiff commenced a civil action in 
the Superior Court against the Worcester public schools and 
others,6 alleging among other things that by delegating the 
appeal hearing and decision to the school safety director, the 
defendants failed to comply with the procedure for appealing 
from the expulsion set forth in G. L. c. 71, § 37H (d).  The 
plaintiff also filed an emergency motion for a preliminary 
injunction seeking immediate reinstatement to her high school.  
The judge granted the motion after a hearing, and the defendants 
appealed from the judge's order reinstating the plaintiff.  We 
transferred the appeal to this court on our own motion.7 
 
Discussion.  "A party seeking a preliminary injunction must 
show that success is likely on the merits; irreparable harm will 
result from denial of the injunction; and the risk of 
                     
 
6 The suit also named the Worcester school committee, the 
superintendent, the school safety director, the principal, and 
the assistant principal as defendants. 
 
7 The defendants represented at oral argument that the 
superintendent would not reinstate the plaintiff's suspension 
even if the preliminary injunction were overturned, rendering 
the matter moot as to this plaintiff.  We nevertheless address 
the question because "the situation presented is 'capable of 
repetition, yet evading review.'"  Boelter v. Selectmen of 
Wayland, 479 Mass. 233, 238 (2018), quoting Seney v. Morhy, 467 
Mass. 58, 61 (2014). 
6 
 
 
irreparable harm to the moving party outweighs any similar risk 
of harm to the opposing party."  Weston, 461 Mass. at 164, 
citing Packaging Indus. Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609, 
616-617 (1980) (Cheney).  In cases in which a public entity is a 
party, a judge may also weigh the risk of harm to the public 
interest in considering whether to grant a preliminary 
injunction.  Harris v. Commissioner of Correction, 409 Mass. 
472, 474 (1991), citing Brookline v. Goldstein, 388 Mass. 443, 
447 (1983).  In allowing the preliminary injunction, the judge 
adopted the plaintiff's reading of G. L. c. 71, § 37H (d), and 
concluded that the plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits 
of her claim.  He further concluded that the plaintiff would 
suffer irreparable harm if not allowed to return to her high 
school, and that such harm outweighed any risk of harm to the 
defendants.8 
"We review the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction 
to determine whether the [motion] judge abused his [or her] 
discretion, that is, whether the judge applied proper legal 
standards and whether there was reasonable support for his [or 
her] evaluation of factual questions."  Commonwealth v. Fremont 
                     
 
8 In challenging the judge's decision, the defendants point 
out that courts "have always accorded school officials 
substantial deference in matters of discipline."  Doe v. 
Superintendent of Sch. of Stoughton, 437 Mass. 1, 5 (2002).  
Although this is true, we note that the motion judge did not 
rule on the disciplinary action taken against the student. 
7 
 
 
Inv. & Loan, 452 Mass. 733, 741 (2008), citing Cheney, 380 Mass. 
at 615.  As the question of the plaintiff's likelihood of 
success turns on the judge's interpretation of G. L. c. 71, 
§ 37H (d), we review that portion of the judge's decision on a 
de novo basis.  See Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 531 (2015).  
See also Garcia v. Department of Hous. & Community Dev., 480 
Mass. 736, 747 (2018), quoting Fordyce v. Hanover, 457 Mass. 
248, 256 (2010) (in review of preliminary injunction, judge's 
conclusions of law "are subject to broad review and will be 
reversed if incorrect"). 
 
1.  Interpretation of G. L. c. 71, § 37H (d).  "Our primary 
goal in interpreting a statute is to effectuate the intent of 
the Legislature" (citation omitted).  Casseus v. Eastern Bus 
Co., 478 Mass. 786, 795 (2018).  Ordinarily, "[c]lear and 
unambiguous language is conclusive as to legislative intent."  
Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 475 Mass. 820, 821 (2016).  General 
Laws c. 71, § 37H (d), provides in pertinent part: 
"Any student who has been expelled from a school district 
pursuant to these provisions shall have the right to appeal 
to the superintendent.  The expelled student shall have ten 
days from the date of the expulsion in which to notify the 
superintendent of his appeal.  The student has the right to 
counsel at a hearing before the superintendent." 
 
The text of § 37H is clear:  expelled students have a right to 
appeal to, and have a hearing before, the superintendent.  
8 
 
 
Nowhere in § 37H does the Legislature indicate that the 
superintendent may designate another to hear expulsion appeals. 
The suspension of the plaintiff constituted an "expulsion" 
for purposes of G. L. c. 71, § 37H.  Although § 37H does not 
define "expulsion," the Department of Elementary and Secondary 
Education (department) has promulgated a regulation defining 
"expulsion" as "the removal of a student from the school 
premises, regular classroom activities, and school activities 
for more than [ninety] school days, indefinitely, or 
permanently, as permitted under [G. L. c. 71, § 37H or 
37H 1/2]."  603 Code Mass. Regs. § 53.02 (2015).  Because the 
principal initially imposed a suspension of 152 school days, the 
plaintiff was entitled under § 37H to appeal from her expulsion 
directly to the superintendent, not a designee of the 
superintendent. 
In contrast, a neighboring provision, G. L. c. 71, 
§ 37H 3/4, which allows for suspensions of up to ninety days for 
less serious offenses, provides for an appeal before the 
"superintendent or a designee" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 71, 
§ 37H 3/4 (a), (e), (f).  It is a well-established rule of 
statutory construction that "where the [L]egislature has 
carefully employed a term in one place and excluded it in 
another, it should not be implied where excluded."  Commonwealth 
v. Gagnon, 439 Mass. 826, 833 (2003), quoting 2A N.J. Singer, 
9 
 
 
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.06, at 194 (6th ed. rev. 
2000). 
Here the distinction makes sense.  The statutory framework 
provides for appeals directly to the superintendent as a matter 
of right for indefinite or permanent expulsions as a result of 
certain serious offenses, including the possession of dangerous 
weapons or controlled substances on school premises, § 37H (a); 
assaulting school staff, § 37H (b); and felony charges or 
convictions, § 37H 1/2.  However, for less serious offenses, and 
consequences, students are not guaranteed a hearing before the 
superintendent him- or herself.  G. L. c. 71, § 37H 3/4 (e).  It 
is logical and consonant with due process to afford students 
greater procedural protections, as evidenced here by providing 
for an appeal directly to the head of the school district rather 
than a designee, for the most serious disciplinary sanctions.  
See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) ("Longer suspensions 
or expulsions . . . may require more formal procedures"). 
The defendants contend that we should defer to the 
department, the agency charged with assisting school districts 
in developing and implementing public education programs.  The 
department has interpreted § 37H (d) to allow the superintendent 
of a school district to delegate the appeal function, including 
10 
 
 
a long-term suspension or expulsion hearing, to another properly 
designated school district official.9 
Although we defer to an agency's interpretation "where the 
statute is ambiguous and the interpretation is reasonable," 
Commonwealth v. Wimer, 480 Mass. 1, 5 (2018), that is not the 
circumstance here.  As discussed supra, § 37H (d) is not 
ambiguous.  Further, the department's interpretation would 
require the addition of the phrase "or a designee" to § 37H (d).  
See Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 459 Mass. 422, 435-436 (2011) ("as 
a matter of statutory construction, we cannot supply words the 
Legislature chose not to include"); Commonwealth v. McLeod, 437 
Mass. 286, 294 (2002) (same). 
 
The defendants additionally assert that requiring 
superintendents personally to handle appeals under § 37H would 
be impractical.  It is true that "we will not adopt a literal 
construction of a statute if the consequences of doing so are 
                     
9 The defendants also point to a department regulation that 
defines "superintendent" to mean "the chief executive officer 
employed by a school committee or board of trustees to 
administer a school system . . . or his or her designee 
appointed for purposes of conducting a student disciplinary 
hearing."  See 603 Code Mass. Regs. § 53.02.  However, the 
department regulation in which this definition appears is 
expressly limited in scope to "the minimum procedural 
requirements applicable to the suspension of a student for a 
disciplinary offense other than" the offenses and procedures 
listed in G. L. c. 71, § 37H (emphasis added).  See 603 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 53.01(2)(a) (2015). 
11 
 
 
absurd or unreasonable, such that it could not be what the 
Legislature intended" (quotation and citation omitted).  Ciani 
v. MacGrath, 481 Mass. 174, 178 (2019).  However, the defendants 
have not provided any evidence to support their contention that 
the plain meaning of the statutory text would create absurd or 
unreasonable consequences.10 
 
2.  Risks of harm.  Noting that the plaintiff's separation 
from the school already had spanned several months, the motion 
judge concluded that unless the preliminary injunction was 
granted, the plaintiff, an honors student who previously had 
been enrolled in a merit-based program and had no disciplinary 
record, would suffer irreparable harm.  The plaintiff's motion 
included an affidavit from the plaintiff's mother, who averred 
to all of the facts underlying this conclusion, as well as the 
fact that the only alternative school available to the plaintiff 
was well below her instructional level.11  Based on the record 
                     
 
10 The department presented data in its amicus letter 
showing that in the 2018-2019 school year, Boston public schools 
disciplined 147 students for weapons possession, 197 for 
controlled substance possession, and 146 for assault pursuant to 
§ 37H.  The department did not indicate, however, how many of 
those cases involved an expulsion or a suspension greater than 
ninety days, and of those cases, how many involved an appeal.  
Nor did the department provide data showing the amount of time 
and resources spent on an average appeal. 
 
 
11 The defendants did not dispute these facts in their 
opposition to the motion for a preliminary injunction or 
attached affidavits or at the motion hearing.  On appeal, the 
12 
 
 
before him, the judge had sufficient evidence for his 
conclusion.  Cf. Goss, 419 U.S. at 576, quoting Brown v. Board 
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("'education is perhaps the 
most important function of state and local governments,' . . . 
and the total exclusion from the educational process for more 
than a trivial period . . . is a serious event in the life of 
the suspended child"). 
 
Finally, the judge concluded that the risk of irreparable 
harm to the plaintiff outweighed any risk of harm to the 
defendants, who asserted in their opposition to the preliminary 
injunction that the school and its students would be harmed if 
the plaintiff were allowed to return because she likely was to 
reoffend.12  There was no abuse of discretion. 
                     
defendants contend for the first time that the plaintiff 
"offered no evidence whatsoever" that she was an honors student, 
that she participated in a merit-based program, and that she had 
no prior disciplinary record.  However, this argument ignores 
the fact that the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary 
injunction included an affidavit from the plaintiff's mother 
averring to each of these facts. 
 
 
12 We note that although the judge was not required to 
address specifically the public interest factor, the risk of 
harm to the public interest here did not weigh against granting 
the preliminary injunction.  See Harris v. Commissioner of 
Correction, 409 Mass. 472, 474 (1991).  Indeed, as discussed 
supra, ordering the plaintiff's reinstatement promoted the 
public interest, as embodied by the Legislature's intent in 
§ 37H, in affording expelled students enhanced procedural 
protections. 
13 
 
 
 
Conclusion.  A judgment is to be entered affirming the 
grant of the preliminary injunction and remanding the case to 
the Superior Court for further proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.