Case Title: In re Estate of Adams

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1989-11-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 88-120


In re Estate of Bertha Mae Adams             Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
                                             Rutland Superior Court

                                             November Term, 1989

Hilton H. Dier, Jr., J.

Deborah S. McCoy of Keyser, Crowley, Banse & Facey, Rutland, for appellant

John F. Evers, Susan M. Murray and R. Brandon Johnson, Law Clerk (On the
   Brief) of Langrock Sperry Parker & Wool, Middlebury, for appellee

R. Clarke Smith of Ryan Smith & Carbine, Ltd., Rutland, for executor-
   appellee


PRESENT:  Peck, Dooley and Morse, JJ., Barney, C.J. (Ret.), and Springer,
          D.J., (Ret.), Specially Assigned



     PECK, J.  Appellant Caryl T. Adams, a residuary legatee of the estate
of decedent, Bertha Mae Adams, appeals from a superior court judgment order
disposing of certain assets of the estate and granting the executor a fee
greater than the statutory amount.  We affirm.
     Appellant argues that three bank accounts should have been included in
the estate because there was no clear and convincing evidence that the
accounts were joint accounts with rights of survivorship, otherwise known as
absolute joint accounts.  He also argues that a fourth account should have
been included in the estate because it did not constitute a valid trust.
Finally, appellant challenges the trial court's conclusion that the estate
was one of unusual difficulty and responsibility which entitled the
executor to fees in excess of the statutory amount.
     Bertha Mae Adams died in August of 1982.  Passbooks and certificates
of deposit were found among her possessions.  Albert Wilson, the executor of
the estate, initially included all of the bank accounts in an inventory
taken in November of 1982.  In February of 1985, the executor moved to amend
the inventory to exclude the accounts from the estate because they were
jointly owned by the decedent and one or the other of her two children,
Caryl Adams and Evelyn Lindquist.  The probate court granted the executor's
motion, and Caryl Adams appealed to the Rutland Superior Court.
     At the time of her death, decedent's name was on seven bank accounts:
five savings accounts and two certificates of deposit.  The superior court
permitted the removal of all but one of the accounts from the probate
estate.  The court also affirmed the probate court's determination that the
estate was one of unusual difficulty and responsibility, and that the
executor accordingly was entitled to more than the statutory per diem fee.
The matter was returned to the probate court which issued a final
disposition in accordance with the superior court's opinion.  This appeal
followed.
                                    I.
     Appellant contends that the superior court erred in affirming the
probate court's decision to exclude from the estate three joint accounts.
We disagree.
     8 V.S.A. { 908 states, in part, that
            [w]hen a deposit has been made in a bank in the names
          of two or more persons, payable to any one of them, or
          payable to the survivors or any one of the survivors,
          such deposit or any part thereof, or any interest or
          dividend thereon may be paid to any one of such persons,
          whether the others are living or not . . . .

8 V.S.A. {909 states, in part, that
          the words "payable to either or to the survivor" or
          words of like effect in the order creating such account
          and signed by the person or persons who furnish the
          funds for such deposit shall be conclusive evidence, as
          between the payees and their legal representatives, of
          the creation of an absolute joint account.

     The superior court found that the three accounts in issue "all contain
in the deposit book clear indication that the account was established as a
joint deposit as defined in Title 8 V.S.A. { 908 and { 909 . . . ."  This
conclusion cannot be sustained under the Section 909 method of proving the
existence of an absolute joint account.  Mrs. Lindquist was not able to
produce for the three accounts an order creating the account, signed by
decedent and bearing the recital of the words "payable to either or to the
survivor" or words to the like effect.  Also, Mrs. Lindquist did not
introduce evidence showing that such an order must have existed but was
lost.
     Under prior law, since Section 909 does not apply, the court's
conclusion could only be sustained if Mrs. Lindquist established the
elements of valid inter vivos gifts with respect to the accounts.  See
Tucker v. Colburn, 140 Vt. 186, 189, 436 A.2d 1095, 1097 (1981); Tucker v.
Merchants Bank, 135 Vt. 597, 600,