Case Title: Springer v. Nohl Electric Products Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015AP000829

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2018-05-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
2018 WI 48 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP829 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Penny L. Springer, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Nohl Electric Products Corporation, General 
Refractories Company, Dana Sealing Products, 
LLC, John Crane, Inc., Union Carbide 
Corporation, Rockbestos Surprenant Cable  
Corporation a/k/a Rockbestos Products Corp and 
RSCC Wire & Cable, Inc., Garlock Sealing 
Technologies LLC, Anchor Packing Company, Inc., 
Gaskets, Inc., Cincinnati Valve Company, Leslie 
Controls, Inc. and Trac Regulator Company, Inc., 
          Defendants, 
Powers Holdings, Inc. and Fire Brick Engineers 
Company, Inc., 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners, 
Secure Horizons by United Health Care Insurance 
Company, 
          Subrogated Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 370 Wis. 2d 787, 882 N.W.2d 870 
(2016 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 15, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 2, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Jefferson 
 
JUDGE: 
William F. Hue 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J., dissents, joined by A.W. 
BRADLEY, J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
defendants-respondents-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs by George S. Peek, Eric D. Carlson, Benjamin A. Sparks, 
 
 
2 
and Crivello Carlson, S.C., Milwaukee.  There was an oral 
argument by Eric D. Carlson. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief by Kathryn 
A. Keppel and Gimbel, Reilly, Guerin & Brown LLP, Milwaukee, 
with whom on the brief was Ronald G. Tays and Tays Law Office, 
Milwaukee.  There was an oral argument by Ronald G. Tays. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2018 WI 48
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2015AP829   
(L.C. No. 
2010CV622) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Penny L. Springer, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Nohl Electric Products Corporation, General 
Refractories Company, Dana Sealing Products, 
LLC, John Crane, Inc., Union Carbide 
Corporation, Rockbestos Surprenant Cable 
Corporation a/k/a Rockbestos Products Corp and 
RSCC Wire & Cable, Inc., Garlock Sealing 
Technologies LLC, Anchor Packing Company, Inc., 
Gaskets, Inc., Cincinnati Valve Company, Leslie 
Controls, Inc. and Trac Regulator Company, 
Inc., 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Powers Holdings, Inc. and Fire Brick Engineers 
Company, Inc., 
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
Secure Horizons by United Health Care Insurance 
Company, 
 
          Subrogated Defendant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 15, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.   Reversed. 
 
No. 
  2015AP829 
 
2 
 
¶1 
DANIEL KELLY, J.   When one company purchases the 
assets of another, our law normally does not make the former 
responsible for the latter's liabilities.  There are exceptions 
to that rule, however, such as when the parties use the 
transaction to fraudulently escape responsibility for those 
liabilities.  Notwithstanding the great age of this common-law 
exception to successor non-liability, we have had scant occasion 
to provide guidance on how to recognize such transactions.  We 
take the opportunity to do so today.1  Specifically, we conclude 
that the Wisconsin Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act does not 
govern the "fraudulent transaction" exception to the rule of 
successor non-liability, and so we reverse the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
Penny 
Springer's 
husband 
died 
in 
2007 
from 
mesothelioma.  She believes his exposure to asbestos-containing 
products during his employment between 1963 and 1969 contributed 
to his sickness and eventual death.  She sued several companies, 
including 
Fire 
Brick 
Engineers 
Company, 
Inc. 
and 
Powers 
Holdings, 
Inc., 
alleging 
they 
were 
negligent 
in 
mining, 
merchandising, 
manufacturing, 
supplying, 
installing, 
                                                 
1 This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court 
of appeals, Springer v. Nohl Elec. Prods. Corp., No. 2015AP829, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. June 23, 2016) (per curiam). 
No. 
  2015AP829 
 
3 
 
distributing, or selling the asbestos products to which Mr. 
Springer was exposed.2 
¶3 
The complaint identified Powers Holdings, Inc. as the 
successor to Fire Brick Engineers Company, Inc.  But the 
relevant history of these companies actually goes back much 
further.  In the 1940s, Harry J. Schofield formed a company that 
came to be known as Fire Brick Engineers Company.  The business 
manufactured and distributed, inter alia, asbestos-containing 
refractory and foundry supplies.  Several successors to this 
company contained some variation of "Fire Brick Engineers" in 
their names, so we will refer to the original as "FBE1."  In 
1983, a group of investors (including attorneys who had 
previously provided legal representation to FBE1) formed a 
company that would come to be known as Fire Brick Engineers 
Company, Inc. ("FBE2") for the purpose of acquiring FBE1's 
assets.  FBE2 accepted some, but not all, of FBE1's liabilities.  
Several years later, FBE2 merged with Curtis Industries, Inc., 
and adopted the name Powers Holdings, Inc.  Powers Holdings, 
Inc. currently does business under the name "Fire Brick 
Engineers Company," but to avoid confusion, we will refer to it 
only as "Powers."  And because FBE2 was merged into Curtis, and 
therefore no longer exists as a separate entity, our references 
to "Powers" will include FBE2 unless we indicate otherwise.   
                                                 
2 Mrs. Springer filed her complaint on February 8, 2010, and 
an amended complaint four days later.  Unless the context 
requires otherwise, when we refer to the "complaint," we will be 
referring to the amended complaint. 
No. 
  2015AP829 
 
4 
 
¶4 
The record does not reflect that either FBE2 or Powers 
has 
ever 
manufactured 
or 
distributed 
asbestos-containing 
products.  FBE2 acquired FBE1 via an asset purchase agreement 
(the "Agreement"), which is a common method of acquiring a 
business while limiting exposure to its liabilities.3  The 
Agreement provided that the only liabilities FBE2 would assume 
in the transaction would be a promissory note, trade accounts-
payable, open inventory purchase orders, loans against certain 
life insurance policies, and FBE1's lease obligations with 
respect to two properties.  The Agreement disclaimed the 
assumption of any other liabilities:  "Buyer [FBE2] does not, by 
this Agreement or otherwise, assume or agree to pay or perform 
any other liabilities or obligations of Seller [FBE1] of any 
kind, whether or not related to the Subjects' Business, all of 
which liabilities and obligations remain the sole responsibility 
of Seller." 
¶5 
Therefore, 
Powers' 
answer 
to 
the 
complaint 
affirmatively asserted that Mrs. Springer had sued the wrong 
company:  "[T]he Plaintiff has brought an action against the 
wrong entity insofar as Powers Holdings, Inc. is not liable for 
the torts of its predecessor corporations based upon corporate 
                                                 
3 The "rule of non-liability for asset acquisitions is 
frequently the reason why parties choose that option in 
acquiring a business, as opposed to a merger or stock 
acquisition, 
in 
which 
the 
predecessor's 
obligations 
and 
liabilities continue in the surviving entity."  Columbia 
Propane, L.P. v. Wis. Gas Co., 2003 WI 38, ¶23, 261 Wis. 2d 70, 
661 N.W.2d 776 (internal marks and quoted source omitted). 
No. 
  2015AP829 
 
5 
 
successor liability defenses."  Neither the original nor the 
amended complaint named FBE1 as a party.  Nothing in the 
pleadings recognized that FBE2 had been created long after the 
period of time during which Mrs. Springer says her husband was 
exposed 
to 
asbestos 
products, 
or 
that 
Powers 
has 
never 
commercially dealt with asbestos-containing products.  And the 
pleadings asserted no facts or legal theories by which FBE2 or 
Powers could be held responsible for FBE1's liabilities. 
¶6 
Powers eventually moved for summary judgment.  It 
argued, in part, that "there is no basis to impose liability on 
Powers Holding, Inc. as a successor to Fire Brick Engineers 
Company [FBE1]."  Mrs. Springer responded that Powers is liable 
to her as successor to FBE1 under the "mere continuation" and 
"de facto merger" exceptions to the successor non-liability 
rule.  The circuit court suspended summary judgment proceedings 
so the parties could engage in further discovery.  Powers then 
amended its motion, in response to which Mrs. Springer asserted, 
for the first time, that the "fraudulent transaction" exception 
to the successor non-liability rule should apply.  The circuit 
court, the Honorable William F. Hue presiding, granted Powers' 
motion and dismissed FBE2 and Powers from the case. 
¶7 
Mrs. Springer appealed.  Her primary argument was that 
undisputed evidence proved the Agreement between FBE1 and FBE2 
had the purpose of fraudulently escaping liability for FBE1's 
obligations. She also argued that the circuit court erred in 
granting summary judgment because there was a genuine factual 
dispute as to whether the "mere continuation" and "de facto 
No. 
  2015AP829 
 
6 
 
merger" exceptions to the rule of successor non-liability 
applied to Powers.  The court of appeals addressed only the 
"fraudulent transaction" exception.  Although it noted that Mrs. 
Springer did not adequately explain how a court is supposed to 
determine whether there has been such a fraudulent transaction, 
it 
concluded 
that 
"the 
question 
of 
whether 
a 
transfer 
transaction was entered into fraudulently must be answered in 
the context of Wisconsin's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act [Wis. 
Stat. ch. 242]."  Springer v. Nohl Elec. Prods. Corp., No. 
2015AP829, unpublished slip op., ¶16 (Wis. Ct. App. June 23, 
2016) (per curiam).  So the court of appeals reversed and 
remanded the cause to the circuit court for a trial in which the 
jury would apply the "badges of fraud" contained in Wis. Stat. 
§ 242.04 (2015-16)4 to determine whether Powers should be held 
responsible for the liabilities of its predecessor company, 
FBE1. 
¶8 
We granted Powers' petition for review, and now 
reverse the court of appeals. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶9 
We review the disposition of a motion for summary 
judgment de novo, applying the same methodology the circuit 
courts apply.  Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 
315, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987); Borek Cranberry Marsh, Inc. v. 
Jackson Cty., 2010 WI 95, ¶11, 328 Wis. 2d 613, 785 N.W.2d 615 
                                                 
4 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2015-
16 version unless otherwise specified. 
No. 
  2015AP829 
 
7 
 
("We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de 
novo . . . ."). 
¶10 "The first step of that methodology requires the court 
to examine the pleadings to determine whether a claim for relief 
has been stated."  Green Spring Farms, 136 Wis. 2d at 315.  "In 
testing the sufficiency of a complaint, we take all facts 
pleaded by plaintiff[] and all inferences which can reasonably 
be derived from those facts as true."  Id. at 317.  And we 
liberally construe pleadings "with a view toward substantial 
justice to the parties."  Id. (citing Wis. Stat. § 802.02(6)).  
"The complaint should be dismissed as legally insufficient only 
if it is quite clear that under no circumstances can plaintiff[] 
recover."  Id. 
¶11 Under the second step of this methodology, "[i]f a 
claim for relief has been stated, the inquiry then shifts to 
whether any factual issues exist."  Id. at 315.  Summary 
judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2); see also 
Columbia Propane, L.P. v. Wis. Gas Co., 2003 WI 38, ¶11, 261 
Wis. 2d 70, 661 N.W.2d 776 (citing and applying Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2)). 
III.  DISCUSSION 
¶12 The question before us is a narrow one, to wit, 
whether the Wisconsin Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act governs 
No. 
  2015AP829 
 
8 
 
the "fraudulent transaction" exception to the rule of successor 
non-liability.  After resolving that question, we will then 
determine 
whether 
further 
proceedings 
in 
this 
case 
are 
necessary. 
A.  The Rule of Successor Non-Liability 
¶13 In determining whether the fraudulent transaction 
exception to the rule of successor non-liability should apply in 
this case, the court of appeals relied on the Wisconsin Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act (Wis. Stat. ch. 242 (the "WUFTA")) for 
the standard by which to identify fraud in the transfer of 
assets from FBE1 to FBE2.  We hold today that the WUFTA does not 
control the analysis of the fraudulent transaction exception.  
Our opinion will first address the basic principles undergirding 
the rule of successor non-liability.  Then, we will explain why 
the WUFTA does not control the disposition of this case. 
1.  The Basics of Successor Non-Liability 
¶14 Our common law provides that "a corporation which 
purchases the assets of another corporation does not succeed to 
the liabilities of the selling corporation."  Fish v. Amsted 
Indus., Inc., 126 Wis. 2d 293, 298, 376 N.W.2d 820 (1985) 
(quoting Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439 (7th 
Cir. 1977)).  In Wisconsin, this rule dates back to the late 
nineteenth century.  See Wright v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 
25 Wis. 46, 52 (1869) (stating that a corporation does not "by 
selling a portion of its property, or even the whole of it, 
impose upon the purchaser any liability for its general debts"). 
No. 
  2015AP829 
 
9 
 
¶15 There are very practical justifications for this rule.  
It "protect[s] a bona fide purchaser from liabilities caused by 
a predecessor corporation of which the bona fide purchaser was 
unaware at the time of acquisition."  Columbia Propane, L.P., 
261 
Wis. 2d 70, 
¶23 
(quoting 
Eva 
M. 
Fromm, 
Allocating 
Environmental Liabilities in Acquisitions, 22 J. Corp. L. 429, 
441 (1997)).  Without such a rule, assets would become 
unmarketable: 
If the liabilities always went with the assets, it 
would 
be 
difficult 
to 
sell 
assets 
because 
the 
purchaser would not know what he was getting.  He 
might be "buying" a lawsuit the expected cost of which 
exceeded the value of the asset purchased, yet it 
would be too late for him to back out of the sale or 
renegotiate the price. 
Chaveriat v. Williams Pipe Line Co., 11 F.3d 1420, 1424 (7th 
Cir. 1993) (applying Illinois law).  This is no less true in the 
context of products liability cases, such as this one.  Here's 
why: 
[T]he successor corporation did not create the risk 
nor did it directly profit from the predecessor's sale 
of the defective product; it did not solicit the use 
of the defective product nor make any representations 
as to its safety; nor is it able to enhance the safety 
of a product that is already on the market[.] 
Fish, 126 Wis. 2d at 307 (citing Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 
So. 2d 1047, 1050 (Fla. 1982); Domine v. Fulton Iron Works, 395 
N.E.2d 19, 23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Jones v. Johnson Mach. & 
No. 
  2015AP829 
 
10 
 
Press Co. of Elkhart, Ind., 320 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Neb. 1982); 
Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 479 A.2d 126, 127 (Vt. 1984)).5 
¶16 But this rule of successor non-liability is not 
absolute; there are four well-recognized circumstances in which 
it does not apply: 
(1) when 
the 
purchasing 
corporation 
expressly 
or 
impliedly agreed to assume the selling corporation's 
liability; (2) when the transaction amounts to a 
consolidation or merger of the purchaser and seller 
corporations; (3) when the purchaser corporation is 
merely a continuation of the seller corporation; or 
(4) when the transaction is entered into fraudulently 
to escape liability for such obligations. 
Fish, 126 Wis. 2d at 298 (quoting Leannais, 565 F.2d at 439). 
¶17 We are interested here in the fourth exception.  Even 
though it is over a century old, it has received only sporadic 
attention. 
 
"There 
are 
few 
cases 
under 
the 
fraud 
exception, . . . partly because creditors prefer to cast these 
cases 
as 
suits 
to 
set 
aside 
a 
fraudulent 
conveyance."  
Chaveriat, 11 F.3d at 1425.  The scarcity is particularly 
evident when the claim sounds in tort.  See, e.g., Restatement 
(Third) of Torts:  Products Liability § 12 cmt. e (Am. Law Inst. 
1998) (stating that the fraudulent transfer exception "has 
rarely been used to impose successor liability for products 
                                                 
5 The rule applies regardless of the legal form of the 
businesses involved:  "[This] rule and its exceptions are 
applicable, irrespective of whether a prior organization was a 
corporation or a different form of business organization."  Tift 
v. Forage King Indus., Inc., 108 Wis. 2d 72, 77, 322 N.W.2d 14 
(1982). 
No. 
  2015AP829 
 
11 
 
liability claims"); Timothy J. Murphy, Comment, A Policy 
Analysis 
of 
a 
Successor 
Corporation's 
Liability 
for 
its 
Predecessor's Defective Products When the Successor Has Acquired 
the Predecessor's Assets for Cash, 71 Marq. L. Rev. 815, 819 
(1988) (stating that "the fraudulent transaction exception is 
usually 
not 
successfully 
invoked 
by 
products 
liability 
plaintiffs"). 
¶18 We learn from the few available cases that the 
justification for the fraudulent transfer exception is that such 
transactions can leave aggrieved parties with no remedy: 
This is clearest in the case where after the sale of 
all its assets a corporate seller distributes the 
proceeds 
of 
the 
sale 
to 
the 
shareholders 
and 
dissolves.  If the purchaser is not liable, the 
transaction will have externalized the costs of the 
seller's acts that gave rise to liability. 
Chavariat, 11 F.3d at 1425; see also Ed Peters Jewelry Co. v. C 
& J Jewelry Co., 124 F.3d 252, 266 (1st Cir. 1997) (applying 
Rhode Island law) ("But since a rigid nonassumption rule can be 
bent to evade valid claims, the successor liability doctrine was 
devised to safeguard disadvantaged creditors of a divesting 
corporation in four circumstances."). 
¶19 The 
bare 
desire 
for 
a 
remedy, 
however, 
is 
an 
insufficient rationale for imposing liability on an entity that 
had no relationship with the culpable company until after the 
risk was created.  Therefore, the mechanism by which liability 
transfers from the predecessor to the successor must reflect 
culpability:  "To impose liability on the successor corporation 
[under the fraudulent transfer exception], the law in every 
No. 
  2015AP829 
 
12 
 
jurisdiction . . . requires 
a 
finding 
that 
the 
corporate 
transfer of assets 'is for the fraudulent purpose of escaping 
liability.'"  Raytech Corp. v. White, 54 F.3d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 
1995) (applying Oregon law) (quoting 15 William M. Fletcher, 
Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 7122 
at 232);6 see also United States ex rel. Bunk v. Gov't Logistics 
N.V., 842 F.3d 261, 276 (4th Cir. 2016) ("The fraudulent 
transaction theory turns on the intention underlying the 
transfer of assets to [the successor], i.e., whether it was made 
with 
an 
actual 
intention 
to 
hinder, 
delay, 
or 
defraud 
creditors.") (applying Virginia law); Cashman v. Hitchcock, 293 
F. 958, 962 (1st Cir. 1923) ("When a corporation receives in 
good 
faith 
the 
transfer 
of 
all 
the 
assets 
of 
another 
corporation, and pays the selling corporation full consideration 
therefor, 
the 
transfer 
is 
not 
fraudulent," 
unless 
there 
is "proof that it was made with the intention to defraud 
creditors, and the grantee had knowledge of such intention."). 
¶20 To help us understand the circumstances that would be 
sufficient to engage the fraudulent transaction exception to the 
rule of successor non-liability, we turn to our common law 
experience with fraudulent conveyances. 
                                                 
6 "Under 
Fletcher's 
articulation 
of 
the 
exception, 
transferring corporate assets for the purpose, or with the 
intention, of escaping liability is, by definition, a transfer 
of assets with fraudulent purpose."  Raytech Corp. v. White, 54 
F.3d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 1995). 
No. 
  2015AP829 
 
13 
 
2.  Common-Law Fraudulent Conveyances 
¶21 The law of fraudulent conveyances originated in 
England to protect against debtors' creative efforts to put 
assets beyond the reach of creditors: 
Until the seventeenth century, England had certain 
sanctuaries into which the King's writ could not 
enter.  A sanctuary was not merely the interior of a 
church, but certain precincts defined by custom or 
royal grant.  Debtors could take sanctuary in one of 
these precincts, live in relative comfort, and be 
immune from execution by their creditors.  It was 
thought that debtors usually removed themselves to one 
of these precincts only after selling their property 
to friends and relatives for a nominal sum with the 
tacit understanding that the debtors would reclaim 
their property after their creditors gave up or 
compromised their claims. 
Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law 
and Its Proper Domain, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 829, 829 (1985). 
¶22 In response to this perceived problem, Parliament 
adopted what has come to be known as the Statute of 13 Elizabeth 
in 1571, which voided any conveyance that a debtor "devised and 
contrived of malice, fraud, covin, collusion, or guile to the 
end purpose and intent to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors 
and others of their just and lawful actions."  See An Act 
Against Fraudulent Deeds, Gifts, and Alienations, 13 Eliz. c. 5, 
No. 
  2015AP829 
 
14 
 
§ 1 (1571) (translated into modern English).7  The eminent 
jurist, Lord Edward Coke, then set about identifying the methods 
by which a plaintiff might prove that the conveyance was made 
for a fraudulent purpose.  He listed some in the famous Twyne's 
Case: 
1st. That this gift had the signs and marks of fraud, 
because the gift is general, without exception of his 
apparel, or any thing of necessity; for it is commonly 
said, quod dolus versatur in generalibus.[8] 
2nd. The donor continued in possession, and used them 
as his own; and by reason thereof he traded and 
trafficked with others, and defrauded and deceived 
them. 
                                                 
7 In the original English, the text said that a conveyance 
was void if a debtor "devysed & contryved of Malyce Fraude 
Covyne Collusion or Guyle, to Thend Purpose and Intent to delaye 
hynder or defraude Creditors and others of theyr juste and 
lawfull Actions."  An Acte agaynst fraudulent Deedes Gyftes 
Alienations, &c., 13 Eliz. c. 5, § 1 (1571).  "Covyne" (or 
"covin," as we now spell it) is "[a] secret conspiracy or 
agreement between two or more persons to injure or defraud 
another."  Black's Law Dictionary 446 (Bryan A. Garner, ed., 
10th ed. 2014); see also The Oxford English Dictionary 1079 
(John A. Simpson & Edmund S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989) 
(identifying "covyne" as an alternative form of "covin"). 
Moreover, although the 1571 Parliament designed this 
statute to be penal in nature, the 1623 Parliament gave it a 
civil application.  Bruce A. Markell, Toward True and Plain 
Dealing: A Theory of Fraudulent Transfers Involving Unreasonably 
Small Capital, 21 Ind. L. Rev. 469, 473 (1988) (citing 13 Eliz. 
c. 5, § 1 (1571) and 21 Jac. 1, c. 19, § 7 (1623)). 
8 "Dolosus versatur in generalibus" means "[a] person 
intending to deceive deals in general terms."  Henry Campbell 
Black, A Law Dictionary Containing Definitions of the Terms and 
Phrases of American and English Jurisprudence, Ancient and 
Modern 387 (2d ed. 1910). 
No. 
  2015AP829 
 
15 
 
3rd. It was made in secret, et dona clandestina sunt 
semper suspiciosa.[9] 
4th. It was made pending the writ. 
5th. Here was a trust between the parties, for the 
donor possessed all, and used them as his proper 
goods, and fraud is always apparelled and clad with a 
trust, and a trust is the cover of fraud. 
6th. The deed contains, that the gift was made 
honestly, 
truly, 
and 
bona 
fide: 
 
et 
clausulae 
inconsuet' semper inducunt suspicionem.[10] 
Twyne's Case (1607) 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 812-14; 3 Co. Rep. 80b, 
80b-81a 
(Star 
Chamber) 
(footnotes 
omitted). 
 
The 
courts 
developed and refined the means of proving fraud over the 
ensuing 
centuries. 
 
See 
generally 
Robert 
J. 
Rosenberg, 
Intercorporate Guaranties and the Law of Fraudulent Conveyances:  
Lender Beware, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 235, 248 n.33 (1976). 
¶23 We adopted this ancient history as our own from the 
very beginning:  "[T]he principles of the English statutes 
amending the common law and existing at the time of our 
Revolution, suitable to our condition and in harmony with our 
constitution and statutes, are a part of the common law of this 
country."  Harrigan v. Gilchrist, 121 Wis. 127, 219, 99 N.W. 909 
(1904); accord Glinka v. Bank of Vt. (In re Kelton Motors, 
                                                 
9 "Dona 
clandestina 
sunt 
semper 
suspiciosa" 
means 
"[c]landestine gifts are always suspicious."  Lorna Marie, The 
Judges and Lawyers' Companion, Latin Maxims and Phrases 107 
(2018). 
10 "Clausulae inconsuetae semper inducunt suspicionem" means 
"[u]nusual clauses always excite suspicion." 1 Stewart Rapalje & 
Robert L. Lawrence, A Dictionary of American and English Law 217 
(1888). 
No. 
  2015AP829 
 
16 
 
Inc.), 130 B.R. 170, 177-78 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1991) ("The Statute 
of 13 Elizabeth has since served as the model for common law and 
modern American fraudulent conveyance laws.").  Indeed, at least 
one court has observed that this common law background is the 
basis for the fraudulent transfer exception to the rule against 
successor non-liability.  Chaveriat, 11 F.3d at 1426 ("It has 
been suggested, indeed, that the fraud exception to the 
nonliability of successors is merely an application of the law 
of fraudulent conveyances.").  Consequently, we may find 
reasonable guidance from that body of law. 
¶24 American courts have continued their English cousins' 
tradition of inquiring into the types of circumstances that may 
indicate a fraudulent intent behind an asset conveyance.  One of 
the most common indicia of fraudulent intent is the inadequate 
consideration paid for the acquired assets.  See, e.g., Welco 
Indus., Inc. v. Applied Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1129, 1134 (Ohio 1993) 
("Indicia of fraud include inadequate consideration and lack of 
good faith."); Eagle Pac. Ins. Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht 
Corp., 959 P.2d 1052, 1056 (Wash. 1998) (en banc) ("Adequate 
consideration for a transfer of assets between a buying and 
selling corporation is an important element when determining 
whether to impose successor liability."). 
¶25 The 
unusual 
nature 
of 
business 
activities 
and 
arrangements surrounding a transaction have also assisted courts 
in identifying fraud.  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in 
determining 
whether 
the 
fraudulent 
transaction 
exception 
applied, inquired into factors such as (1) "[i]nadequacy of 
No. 
  2015AP829 
 
17 
 
consideration," (2) "[t]ransactions that are different from the 
usual method of transacting business," (3) "[t]ransactions in 
anticipation of suit or execution," and (4) "[t]ransactions 
through which the debtor retains benefits."  Bunk, 842 F.3d 
at 277.  The Kansas Supreme Court, in Avery v. Safeway Cab, 
Transfer & Storage Co., concluded that transferring all assets 
to a new entity was a fraud because (1) "[t]here was not a 
formal sale of the assets . . . at a fixed price," because 
(2) "[n]o formal arrangements were made to care for the other 
debts of the [predecessor]," and because (3) "the negotiators 
deliberately disabled it from any possible further exercise of 
its corporate functions."  80 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Kan. 1938). 
¶26 Long experience has taught us that these types of 
circumstances 
frequently 
accompany 
fraudulent 
transactions.  
However, as distillations of experience, they should not be 
understood as definitive, nor comprehensive.  The purpose of the 
fraudulent transaction inquiry is to discover the actual intent 
of those who engineered the transfer of assets from the old 
company to the new——this is not a question of negligence or 
strict liability.  The finder of fact must consider all 
circumstances tending to illuminate whether the transfer was 
entered into for the fraudulent purpose of escaping liability 
for the transferor's obligations. 
3.  The Wisconsin Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act 
¶27 The WUFTA exists independently from this common law 
history, and fulfills a purpose quite separate from that of the 
No. 
  2015AP829 
 
18 
 
fraudulent transaction exception to the rule of successor non-
liability.  The Act is an important, but limited, tool.  Whereas 
the WUFTA is designed to assist creditors in collecting on 
claims that may be frustrated by recent asset transfers, the 
fraudulent transaction exception is a doctrine that prevents 
successor companies from avoiding obligations incurred by their 
predecessors.  This difference in purpose is reflected in two of 
the Act's specifics.  First, the statute of limitations for 
claims under the Act can be as short as one year after learning 
the asset was transferred.  Wis. Stat. § 242.09; Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.425.  As such, the Act is incapable of ensuring that 
liability continues to reside in the proper entity, especially 
when the injuries are latent and discovered years after the 
corporation is known to have restructured.  And second, the 
remedies available under the Act center on the fraudulently 
conveyed asset, rather than the successor company.  The Act 
allows the creditor to avoid the transfer to the extent 
necessary to satisfy its claim (Wis. Stat. § 242.07(1)(a)), 
attach 
the 
asset 
in 
the 
hands 
of 
the 
transferee 
(§ 242.07(1)(b)), obtain an injunction or appointment of a 
receiver to prevent loss of the asset (§ 242.07(1)(c)), or levy 
execution on the asset or its proceeds in the hands of the 
transferee (§ 242.07(2)).  So, whereas the Act focuses on 
recovering the asset or its value, the fraudulent transaction 
exception focuses on the business entity itself and its 
liability for its predecessor's obligations. 
No. 
  2015AP829 
 
19 
 
¶28 Because the WUFTA is asset-focused, it does not 
account for the legislative policies and priorities embodied in 
our business-related statutes.  It does not address the 
limitation of liability afforded to such business entities as 
corporations 
(Wis. 
Stat. 
ch. 180), 
and 
limited 
liability 
companies (Wis. Stat. ch. 183).  The fraudulent transaction 
exception to the rule of successor non-liability, on the other 
hand, developed as an organic response to corporate law.  See 
George W. Kuney, A Taxonomy and Evaluation of Successor 
Liability, 6 Fla. St. U. Bus. L. Rev. 9, 12 (2007) ("[S]uccessor 
liability law is a product of the rise of corporate law in the 
last half of the 19th century and early part of the 20th 
century.  In fact, it appears to have developed because of, and 
in reaction to, the rise of corporate law."). 
¶29 We agree with the United States Supreme Court's 
observation that "the failure of the statute to speak to a 
matter as fundamental as the liability implications of corporate 
ownership demands application of the rule that '[i]n order to 
abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must speak directly 
to the question addressed by the common law.'"  United States v. 
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 (1998) (quoting United States v. 
Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993)).  Therefore, we conclude that 
chapter 242 has not supplanted the common-law fraudulent 
transaction exception to the rule of successor non-liability. 
B.  Dismissal of Powers 
¶30 We must now determine whether there is anything left 
for the court of appeals or circuit court to resolve with 
No. 
  2015AP829 
 
20 
 
respect to Powers.  The court of appeals said that "[Mrs.] 
Springer filed the present action against the respondents, 
seeking to hold them liable under the theory of successor 
liability for damages stemming from the death of Springer's 
husband."  Springer, No. 2015AP829, unpublished slip op., ¶1.  
That is certainly what Mrs. Springer argued in the court of 
appeals, but it does not describe the case she pursued in the 
circuit court.  What Mrs. Springer actually did in the circuit 
court was "alleg[e] that the respondents are liable under 
theories of negligence and strict liability."  Id., ¶4.  Because 
she pled the latter and not the former, Powers was properly 
dismissed from the case upon its motion for summary judgment. 
¶31 Sometime between the joining of issue in this case and 
resolution of the motion for summary judgment, the nature of 
Mrs. Springer's claim against Powers changed substantially.  The 
issue the parties joined was whether Powers culpably engaged in 
activity that resulted in Mr. Springer's exposure to asbestos.  
By the time Powers moved for summary judgment, however, it had 
become apparent that this claim could not succeed because FBE2 
had not come into existence until many years after the period of 
Mr. Springer's alleged exposure, and Powers had never engaged in 
commerce with asbestos-containing products.11 
                                                 
11 Our review of the record confirms that it contains no 
evidence that FBE2 or Powers had ever engaged in commerce with 
asbestos-containing products. 
No. 
  2015AP829 
 
21 
 
¶32 Consequently, in response to the motion for summary 
judgment, Mrs. Springer introduced an entirely new reason for 
holding Powers liable.  She tacitly acknowledged that the 
relevant timeline made it impossible for FBE2 or Powers to have 
been part of the causal chain between the asbestos-containing 
products and her husband's death.  So she instead argued Powers 
should be liable to her because (1) FBE1 had transferred all of 
its assets to Powers with the fraudulent purpose of escaping any 
future 
asbestos-related 
liability, 
(2) Powers 
was 
a 
mere 
continuation of FBE1, or (3) Powers was the product of a de 
facto merger with FBE1. 
¶33 However, Mrs. Springer never made a claim out of any 
of these arguments; they were never more than a response to 
Powers' motion for summary judgment.  Her pleadings never 
mentioned FBE1, either explicitly or implicitly.  In neither her 
original nor her amended complaint are there allegations from 
which one could infer that she sought to hold Powers responsible 
for FBE1's torts.  She certainly had opportunity and reason to 
amend her complaint to make such allegations——Powers' answer put 
her on notice that she had named the wrong company:  "[T]he 
Plaintiff has brought an action against the wrong entity insofar 
as Powers Holdings, Inc. is not liable for the torts of its 
predecessor 
corporations 
based 
upon 
corporate 
successor 
liability defenses." 
¶34 We review the disposition of a motion for summary 
judgment using the same methodology as the circuit court in the 
first instance.  Green Spring Farms, 136 Wis. 2d at 315.  We 
No. 
  2015AP829 
 
22 
 
begin by "examin[ing] the pleadings to determine whether a claim 
for relief has been stated."  Id.  When Powers filed its motion, 
it was seeking judgment on Mrs. Springer's claim that it was 
causally responsible for her husband's exposure to asbestos.  We 
will assume, without deciding, that Mrs. Springer adequately 
alleged that Powers was in the causal chain of events that led 
to her husband's death, and pled the necessary elements of 
negligence and strict product liability.  The next step requires 
us 
to 
review 
"the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any," to determine whether we can conclude "that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. 
Stat. § 802.08(2).  Summary judgment for FBE2 and Powers was 
appropriate because the record shows the parties do not dispute 
that FBE2 and Powers could not have been in the causal chain of 
events inasmuch as FBE2 did not exist until after Mr. Springer's 
alleged exposure to asbestos, and Powers has never bought or 
sold asbestos-containing products. 
¶35 That leaves the question of whether Mrs. Springer has 
a viable claim against Powers based on successor liability.  
This inquiry requires that we return to an examination of the 
pleadings in search of allegations adequate to make out a claim 
of successor liability against FBE2 and Powers.  To state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted, the plaintiff's 
allegations must be informed by the theory of liability:  "In 
sum, Twombly makes clear the sufficiency of a complaint depends 
No. 
  2015AP829 
 
23 
 
on substantive law that underlies the claim made because it is 
the substantive law that drives what facts must be pled.  
Plaintiffs must allege facts that plausibly suggest they are 
entitled to relief."  Data Key Partners v. Permira Advisers LLC, 
2014 WI 86, ¶31, 356 Wis. 2d 665, 849 N.W.2d 693. 
¶36 A claim that a company is liable for the torts of a 
predecessor company is not the same as a claim of liability for 
the torts themselves.  Tort claims comprise the familiar 
elements of duty, breach, causation, and damage.  A claim that a 
successor company bears responsibility for the torts of its 
predecessor is entirely different.  As a separate legal entity, 
Powers enjoys the presumption that it is not liable for the 
misdeeds of its predecessor, even when it has succeeded to all 
of its assets.  See Fish, 126 Wis. 2d at 298 ("[A] corporation 
which purchases the assets of another corporation does not 
succeed to the liabilities of the selling corporation." (quoting  
Leannais, 565 F.2d at 439)); Wright, 25 Wis. at 52 (stating that 
a corporation does not "by selling a portion of its property, or 
even the whole of it, impose upon the purchaser any liability 
for its general debts"). 
¶37 A claim of successor liability, as distinct from a 
claim based on the underlying tort, puts on the plaintiff the 
burden of establishing one of the exceptions to the rule of non-
No. 
  2015AP829 
 
24 
 
liability.12  Because the substantive theory of liability drives 
the facts a plaintiff must plead, see Data Key Partners, 356 
Wis. 2d 665, ¶31, Mrs. Springer had the burden of alleging facts 
sufficient to reveal that she was pursuing Powers not as the 
tortfeasor itself, but as the successor to the tortfeasor.  
Exceptions to the rule of successor non-liability focus almost 
exclusively on the nature of the transaction by which the latter 
obtained the former's assets.  They have little to no 
relationship 
with 
the 
facts 
supporting 
the 
tortfeasor's 
liability.  Consequently, facts that are sufficient to support a 
claim against the tortfeasor are unlikely to be sufficient to 
support a claim of successor liability.13 
                                                 
12 State v. Big John, 146 Wis. 2d 741, 756, 432 N.W.2d 576 
(1988) ("[O]ne who relies on an exception to a general rule or 
statute has the burden of proving that the case falls within the 
exception."); see also Call Center Techs., Inc. v. Grand 
Adventures Tour & Travel Pub. Corp., 635 F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 
2011) ("Because the 'general rule' is that a purchaser of assets 
does not assume the predecessor's liability, it follows that the 
proponent of successor liability must offer proof that one of 
the aforementioned exceptions to the general rule applies."); 
Dayton v. Peck, Stow and Wilcox Co. (Pexto), 739 F.2d 690, 692 
(1st Cir. 1984) (stating that the proponent of successor 
liability has the burden of proof regarding facts bringing 
defendants within one of the exceptions to successor non-
liability). 
13 In Pennison v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co., 
a successor liability case, we concluded the complaint failed to 
state a claim against the successor because its allegations did 
not make out a claim of successor liability.  See 93 Wis. 344, 
346-347, 67 N.W. 702 (1896).  We noted:  "The remedy of the 
plaintiff, if any, is against the Milwaukee & Northern Railroad 
Company.  Upon the allegations of the complaint, he has none 
against the defendant company [the successor]."  Id. at 347. 
No. 
  2015AP829 
 
25 
 
¶38 That is the case here.  Mrs. Springer says she did not 
know about the existence of FBE1 until after Powers had moved 
for summary judgment.  We are not persuaded this should make any 
difference to our conclusion.  Powers' answer put Mrs. Springer 
on notice that FBE2 and Powers were not the tortfeasors she 
claimed they were.  And there was a nearly two-year hiatus 
between the original and amended motions for summary judgment——
the specific purpose of which was to allow for additional 
discovery into Powers' corporate history.  Mrs. Springer had 
ample opportunity to amend her complaint to assert that the 
circumstances under which Powers succeeded to FBE1's assets were 
such that they should make Powers liable pursuant to one of the 
exceptions to the rule of successor non-liability.  The 
complaint does not mention successor liability at all (except 
cryptically as between FBE2 and Powers, which is not at issue 
here).  Nor does it even acknowledge the existence of FBE1.  It 
necessarily follows that the complaint alleges nothing with 
respect to the asset transfer between FBE1 and its successors, 
the very thing that could potentially make Powers liable.  So 
Mrs. Springer's pleadings are silent on the only theory of 
liability she now advances in her case. 
¶39 Therefore, her complaint fails to "allege facts that 
plausibly suggest [she is] entitled to relief" as against 
Powers. 
 
See 
Data 
Key 
Partners, 
356 
Wis. 2d 665, 
¶31.  
Accordingly, we need not address the second step of the summary 
judgment methodology.  See Green Spring Farms, 136 Wis. 2d 
at 318 (noting that because a viable claim had not been stated, 
No. 
  2015AP829 
 
26 
 
"we need not proceed to the next step of the summary judgment 
methodology under section 802.08(2), Stats.").  Powers was 
entitled to summary judgment. 
¶40 The dissent believes it is improper for us to address 
whether Mrs. Springer adequately pled a claim of successor 
liability against Powers.  It worries that we raised this sua 
sponte, without giving the parties an opportunity to address the 
issue.  It says we "reached beyond the issues presented to [the 
court] to decide issues not presented or addressed by the 
parties," and in doing so, surprised the parties as well as the 
bench and bar.  Dissent, ¶50.  These are, conceptually, 
legitimate concerns, and the court must always be careful not to 
gratuitously address issues unnecessary to the resolution of the 
matter before us.  But that is not the case here. 
¶41 As explained above, we are reviewing the disposition 
of a motion for summary judgment.  The bench and bar are aware 
that in conducting such a review, the methodology we use here is 
exactly what the circuit court uses.  And the first step in that 
methodology is "to examine the pleadings to determine whether a 
claim for relief has been stated."  Green Spring Farms, 136 
Wis. 2d at 315.  The parties assist the court in making that 
determination, but they cannot confine the court's analysis to 
the arguments they choose to make.  See Saenz v. Murphy, 162 
Wis. 2d 54, 57 n.2, 469 N.W.2d 611 (1991) ("[T]his court is not 
bound by the issues as they are framed by the parties."), 
overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. Anderson-El v. 
Cooke, 2010 WI 40, ¶¶28-31, 234 Wis. 2d 626, 610 N.W.2d 821.  If 
No. 
  2015AP829 
 
27 
 
the plaintiff's pleading is deficient as a matter of law, the 
court may not pretend otherwise simply because the parties 
failed to say so.  Naturally, the court must be quite certain of 
its footing when it makes a conclusion of law in such 
circumstances.  But when the deficiency is manifest, the court 
must not shirk its duty.  Here, not only is the deficiency 
manifest, it was conceded.  During oral arguments before this 
court, counsel for Mrs. Springer acknowledged that "we did not 
plead a common law fraud claim" against Powers.  Our decision 
should surprise no one. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶42 The Wisconsin Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act does not 
apply to the "fraudulent transaction" exception to the rule of 
successor non-liability.  Because we conclude that FBE2 and 
Powers were entitled to summary judgment, there is no need for a 
remand.  The court of appeals is reversed.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  2015AP829.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶43 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  I write 
separately to make two points.   
¶44 First, the majority confusingly muddles what does and 
does not constitute indicia of fraud for purposes of the 
fraudulent transfer exception to the general rule against 
successor liability.  I conclude that courts may consult the 
badges of fraud listed in the Wisconsin Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act (WUFTA) as indicative of a fraudulent transfer.  
The unique facts of each case inform the court's search for 
objective manifestations of fraud. 
¶45 Second, unlike the majority, I would not dismiss 
Springer's amended complaint.  Neither Fire Brick Engineers 
Company, 
Inc. 
nor 
Powers 
Holding, 
Inc. 
(collectively 
"defendants") has ever challenged the sufficiency of Springer's 
amended complaint on the issue of successor liability.  Neither 
the circuit court nor the court of appeals addressed the 
sufficiency of Springer's amended complaint on the issue of 
successor liability.   
¶46 The majority sua sponte raises and decides this issue 
without affording Springer an opportunity to address the issue 
or seek leave to amend her complaint. 
¶47 The majority justifies its summary dismissal of 
Springer's amended complaint by stating that Springer "had 
opportunity and reason to amend her complaint" to allege 
successor liability.  Majority op., ¶33.   
¶48 Springer's adversaries, however, never claimed that 
the pleadings were deficient after being put on notice in 
No.  2015AP829.ssa 
 
2 
 
Springer's opposition to the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment that she was pursuing a theory of successor liability.  
Springer did not move to amend her complaint because there was 
no adversarial challenge to the sufficiency of her pleadings 
after the defendants were put on notice of her theory of 
successor liability.  If the defendants believed that Springer 
had not adequately pleaded her theory of successor liability, 
they could have so argued.  They did not. 
¶49 The issues of whether Springer's complaint adequately 
pleads successor liability, and if not, whether Springer should 
be granted leave to amend her complaint, are not issues properly 
before this court.  The parties should be given notice the court 
is concerned about these issues and should be given an 
opportunity to address these issues.   
¶50 The court has once again reached beyond the issues 
presented to it to decide issues not presented or addressed by 
the parties.  The majority, again, surprises the parties, the 
bench, and the bar.       
¶51 The frequency and cavalier attitude with which this 
court surprisingly decides an issue without providing parties 
notice of the issue or an opportunity to address the issue is 
troubling.  Due process requires (at a minimum) notice and an 
opportunity to be heard.  Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 
U.S. 208, 212 (1962); State v. Nelson, 2014 WI 70, ¶19, 355 
Wis. 2d 722, 849 N.W.2d 317; Jensen v. Wis. Elections Bd., 2002 
WI 13, ¶22, 249 Wis. 2d 706, 639 N.W.2d 537.   
No.  2015AP829.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶52 For cases decided this term that illustrate the 
court's growing bad habit of addressing issues without giving 
parties notice and the opportunity to address the issue (in 
violation of due process), see Manitowoc Company, Inc. v. 
Lanning, 2018 WI 6, 379 Wis. 2d 189, 906 N.W.2d 130 (overruling 
Heyde Cos., Inc. v. Dove Healthcare, LLC, 2002 WI 131, 258 
Wis. 2d 28, 654 N.W.2d 830, without providing parties notice or 
opportunity to brief the issue of Heyde's continuing validity 
and when doing so was unnecessary to the court's resolution of 
the case); Sands v. Menard, 2017 WI 110, 379 Wis. 2d 1, 904 
N.W.2d 789 
(dismissing 
unjust 
enrichment 
claim 
for 
being 
inadequately pleaded despite the pleading issue never being 
raised at any point during litigation).1 
                                                 
1 In contrast with the cases described above in which the 
court decides issues not addressed or argued by the parties, 
State v. Reyes Fuerte, 2017 WI 104, 378 Wis. 2d 504, 904 
N.W.2d 773, is an example of the court and the parties 
essentially ignoring the issue presented and discussed in the 
petition for review that induced the court to grant the petition 
and addressing a new, different issue the parties present.    
In Reyes Fuerte, the petition for review phrased the issue 
presented as follows:  
Now that criminal defense attorneys are obligated to 
advise 
their 
clients 
about 
the 
immigration 
consequences of their pleas, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 
U.S. 356 (2010), should the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
overturn its decision in State v. Douangmala, 2002 WI 
62, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1, and reinstate the 
harmless error rule to prohibit a defendant who was 
aware of the potential immigration consequences of his 
plea from being able to withdraw the plea just because 
the 
circuit 
court 
failed 
to 
give 
a 
statutory 
immigration warning that complied with Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(c)?  
(continued) 
No.  2015AP829.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶53 I am concerned that this court's erosion of due 
process rights will continue unabated until the people of this 
state are left with nothing but a faint shadow of what once was 
a constitutionally protected right. 
¶54 I dissent.    
¶55 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Given the articulation of the issue presented for review in 
Reyes Fuerte, one might expect that an analysis of Padilla would 
be front and center in the briefs filed in this court.  It is 
not.  Padilla did not drive the parties' analyses.      
The court errs when it allows and condones parties' 
phrasing an issue one way in the petition for review (thus 
inducing the court to grant the petition) and then fundamentally 
changing the issue presented when the case is actually being 
litigated and argued in this court.  This practice allows the 
parties and the court to violate court rules and is unfair to 
litigants who attempt to follow the rules the court has adopted. 
United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia (joined 
by Justice Elena Kagan) made this point as follows: 
I would not encourage future litigants to seek review 
premised on arguments they never plan to press, secure 
in the knowledge that once they find a toehold on this 
Court's docket, we will consider whatever workaday 
arguments they choose to present in their merits 
briefs. 
City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1779 
(2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).      
No.  2015AP829.ssa 
 
 
 
1