Case Title: State v. Seagroves

Citation: 161 Vt. 309, 637 A.2d 1379

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1993-11-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE_V_SEAGROVES.92-287; 161 Vt. 309; 637 A.2d 1379

[Filed 28-Jan-1994]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-287


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 2, Franklin Circuit

 Christopher Seagroves                        October Term, 1993



 Edward J. Cashman, J.

 Howard VanBenthuysen, Franklin County State's Attorney, St. Albans, for
    plaintiff-appellee

 Robert Paolini of Martin & Paolini, Barre, for defendant-appellant



 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



      MORSE, J.   Defendant was convicted on several charges, including grand
 larceny, 13 V.S.A. { 2501, for stealing a $30,000 car that he rolled onto
 its roof in a high-speed crash.  On appeal, he claims the court should have
 granted his motion to dismiss the charges because the State had nol prossed
 them all at a jury drawing and then refiled them ten days later.  Defendant
 also contends he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecution
 commented on his right to remain silent and because the grand larceny
 instruction to the jury was erroneous.  We affirm.
      After work on May 18, 1989, defendant stole a Cadillac from his
 employer, the Handy automobile dealership, and went for a high-speed drive.

 

 A deputy sheriff on patrol in Fairfax clocked defendant at 122 miles per
 hour on Route 104 and pursued him.  Unable to keep pace with the speeding
 car, the deputy abandoned the chase.  A few minutes later he received a
 radio message concerning an accident on Route 104.  He eventually found the
 "steaming wreckage" of the Cadillac he had earlier pursued in a front yard
 off the road.  No one could be found at the accident scene, but a short time
 later the deputy located defendant being treated for injuries at a nearby
 hospital.  After the deputy issued defendant a speeding ticket, defendant
 asked him, "So, how fast was I going when you clocked me?"  Later defendant
 told another investigating officer that he had been hitchhiking and was
 picked up by an unknown man driving the Cadillac.  At trial, defendant did
 not testify, but called a friend, Darren Ransome, to testify that he had
 seen defendant hitchhiking on Route 104 on the evening in question.  The
 court allowed Ransome's testimony even though he had not been disclosed as a
 witness until the day of the jury drawing and was not produced for the
 State's deposition until late afternoon the day before trial.
                                     I.
      Approximately three years elapsed between the accident in May 1989 and
 the trial in early spring 1992.  In the interim, on July 17, 1990, the
 State dismissed ("nol prossed") the charges at a jury drawing after the
 court denied its motion to continue.  The State was not ready to proceed to
 trial at that time because it could not schedule some of its witnesses.
 Defendant did not object to the dismissal.  The charges were refiled on
 July 27, 1990, and defendant, without objection, entered not guilty pleas at
 his arraignment that day.  On December 6, 1991, we issued State v. Jones,

 

 157 Vt. 553, 601 A.2d 502 (1991), and, relying on that decision, defendant
 filed a motion to dismiss on February 25, 1992.  The motion was denied.
      The facts in Jones are almost identical to those in this case, except
 in Jones the defendant immediately objected to the State's request for
 dismissal of the charge "without prejudice" to a future prosecution.  The
 Jones court agreed with defendant and dismissed the charge with prejudice as
 serving "'the ends of justice and the effective administration of the
 court's business.'"  Id. at 555, 601 A.2d  at 503 (quoting V.R.Cr.P.
 48(b)(2)).
      Here, defendant did not contest either the State's use of nol pros to
 obtain a delay or its reinstatement of the proceedings against him until our
 decision in Jones offered him a theory to avoid prosecution altogether.
 Yet, in Jones we stated:
           [T]he sanction of dismissal with prejudice should be
           used only "sparingly," and ordinarily should follow a
           forewarning.  The forewarning requirement has been
           applied in cases where the prosecution does not go
           forward and present its case after it has been denied a
           continuance.  It ensures that the prosecution is able to
           choose between going to trial and taking the sanction of
           dismissal with prejudice.

 157 Vt. at 559-60, 601 A.2d  at 505 (citations omitted).
      At the time the State nol prossed this case, the State, absent speedy-
 trial and double-jeopardy considerations, could continue a case with a nol
 pros.  See Reporter's Notes to V.R.Cr.P. 48(a) ("State [has] an absolute
 right to nol pros prior to trial"); State v. Forbes, 147 Vt. 612, 616,