Case Title: In Re Estate of Barr

Citation: 455 P.2d 585, 76 Wash. 2d 59

Docket Number: 

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1969-05-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
76 Wn.2d 59 (1969) 455 P.2d 585 In the Matter of the Estate of HARVEY SCOTT BARR, Deceased. HARVEY SCOTT BARR, JR., Appellant, v. LENORA (BARR) TORGESON, Individually and as Executrix, et al., Respondents.[*] No. 39654. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department One. May 22, 1969. William C. Harrison, for appellant. Paine, Lowe, Coffin, Herman & O'Kelly, by Horton Herman and Lawrence R. Small, Evans C. Bunker, and Lawrence Hickman, for respondents. WEAVER, J. Plaintiff commenced two actions: the first contesting his father's will; the second for an accounting and recovery of certain real property. Plaintiff appeals from an order granting defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing the actions with prejudice. The record discloses the following: In 1931, plaintiff and his brother, Henry Clay Barr, who is named as a defendant in the actions, entered into an oral partnership agreement with their father, Harvey S. *60 Barr, and their stepmother, Lenora Barr. The partnership flourished. In 1943, the partnership agreement was modified when the father and stepmother moved from the ranch to Colfax, Washington, leaving the livestock and farm machinery to plaintiff and his brother and agreeing that the brothers could farm the partnership lands as long as they chose. The gross proceeds of the farms were to be divided 75 per cent to plaintiff and his brother and 25 per cent to Harvey S. Barr and his wife. The 25 per cent to Harvey S. Barr and his wife was to be paid to the survivor until death, at which time the real property was to vest in plaintiff and his brother in equal shares. Plaintiff alleges that in December, 1948, Harvey S. Barr and his wife breached the partnership agreement by ordering him and his brother from the partnership lands; that there was no partnership accounting; that Harvey S. Barr died March 16, 1961, possessed of the partnership assets and the rents and profits accruing therefrom during the period. March 24, 1961, Harvey S. Barr's 1952 will and codicil were admitted to probate. The will provided that "my living children ... Harvey Scott Barr [plaintiff] and Henry Clay Barr shall receive no benefit under this My Last Will and Testament." "Notice to Heirs" was mailed to all parties involved, including plaintiff, on March 24, 1961. "Notice to Creditors" was published March 31, 1961. June 22, 1966, the executrix filed her "Final Account, Report, and Petition for Distribution." Plaintiff did not appear in the probate until August 5, 1966, the day set for hearing on the final account. On that day, plaintiff filed his petition contesting will and objecting to petition for distribution. September 16, 1966, plaintiff filed his summons and complaint, the one in the probate proceeding being considered amendatory to the petition filed August 5, 1966. Each of the defendants appearing pleaded the appropriate statute of limitations and laches. RCW 11.24.010 provides in part: It is beyond dispute that plaintiff's petition contesting the will of his father was not timely filed in accordance with RCW 11.24.010. We agree with the statement of the trial court: That portion of the order dismissing plaintiff's petition contesting the will is affirmed. In the civil action, as distinguished from the claim in probate, plaintiff's complaint is essentially one for an accounting of rents, profits, and for the recovery of real property in an alleged partnership entered into in 1931, orally modified in 1943, and violated by decedent and his wife in 1948. In an attempt to escape the effect of the applicable statutes of limitations[1] and the doctrine of laches, *62 plaintiff argues that a constructive trust arose in 1948 when decedent and his wife ousted plaintiff and his brother from the farm lands. [1] Assuming that a constructive trust relationship arose when the plaintiff was ousted from the farms, possession of the property by the constructive trustee became critically important in determining when the statutes of limitation commenced to run. The general rule is well stated in 55 A.L.R.2d 231 (1957): The trial judge recognized this principle when he said: We do not find it necessary to discuss the application of the doctrine of laches. The 10-year statute of limitation against actions for the recovery of real property, and the 6-year statute for the recovery of rents, profits, or for the use and occupancy of real estate are dispositive of the instant case. See Pilcher v. Lotzgesell, 57 Wash. 471, 107 P. *63 340 (1910); In re Estate of Neisz, 152 Wash. 336, 277 P. 849 (1929); See also, Arneman v. Arneman, 43 Wn.2d 787, 264 P.2d 256, 45 A.L.R.2d 370 (1953). Finally, plaintiff argues that the motion for judgment on the pleadings should not have been granted because he did not have an opportunity to make a reply or amend his complaint rebutting the bar of the statute of limitations. [2] Plaintiff admits that he did not tender a reply; and there is nothing in the record to support a conclusion that he requested the right to amend. The question not having been presented to the trial court, it cannot be considered for the first time on appeal. The judgment is affirmed. ROSELLINI, HALE, and McGOVERN, JJ., and STAFFORD, J. Pro Tem., concur. [*] Reported in 455 P.2d 585. [1] RCW 4.16.020: "Actions to be commenced within ten years. The period prescribed in RCW 4.16.010 for the commencement of actions shall be as follows: "Within ten years: "Actions for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of the possession thereof; and no action shall be maintained for such recovery unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor or grantor was seized or possessed of the premises in question within ten years before the commencement of the action." RCW 4.16.040: "Actions limited to six years. Within six years: "... "(3) An action for the rents and profits or for the use and occupation of real estate."