Case Title: Williams v. Baltimore

Citation: 359 Md. 101

Docket Number: 124/99

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2000-06-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case # 96311060/CL219635
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 124
September Term, 1999
MARY WILLIAMS et al.
v.
THE MAYOR & CITY COUNCIL OF
BALTIMORE et al.
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Bloom, Theodore G.
  (retired, specially assigned)
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Filed:    June 8, 2000
  The suit below was filed on behalf of Mary Williams, individually; Mary Williams, as next friend
1
and guardian of Myreq Watkins; Mary Williams, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Valerie
Williams; and Leroy Williams, father of Valerie Williams, individually.
  Specifically, on appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, petitioner contended:
2
1.
that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Officer Colbert
based on its finding that Officer Colbert was entitled to qualified immunity; and
2.
that the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore are subject to suit for the actions of
Baltimore City police officers under the Local Government Tort Claims Act.
Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 128 Md. App. 1, 6, 736 A.2d 1084, 1087 (1999).      
On November 6, 1996, petitioners, Mary Williams et al.,  brought this negligence action in the
1
Circuit Court for Baltimore City against the State of Maryland, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,
and Baltimore City Police Officer Edward Colbert, under the Maryland Tort Claims Act and the Local
Government Tort Claims Act.  The claim arose out of a domestic violence incident in which Gerald Watkins
shot and partially paralyzed Mary Williams, his girlfriend’s mother, shot and killed Valerie Williams, his
girlfriend and mother of his child, and then shot and killed himself.  On January 22, 1997, the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City dismissed the claims against the State and the City.  The case proceeded against Officer
Colbert until February 27, 1998, when another judge on the Circuit Court for Baltimore City entered
summary judgment in favor of the police officer.  Petitioners appealed to the Court of Special Appeals,
challenging the two orders issued by the judges.   In an opinion filed September 7, 1999, that court affirmed
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the judgments of the trial court.  Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 128 Md. App. 1, 736 A.2d 1084
(1999).  Petitioners presented three questions to this Court, for which we granted certiorari:
I.
Was [respondent] Officer Colbert divested of discretion and mandated by
[Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1999 Cum. Supp.),] Article 27, §
 The General Order is now codified as Baltimore City Police Department General Order G-11.
3
 We do not address the responsibilities of the City, if any, under Maryland Code (1973, 1998
4
Repl. Vol., 1999 Cum. Supp.), Title 5, subtitle 3 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (the Local
Government Tort Claims Act) for paying a judgment, if any, that might be rendered against Officer Colbert.
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798(B)(2) and [Baltimore City] Police Department General Order 10-93  to
[3]
protect [petitioners]?
II.
Did [respondent Officer] Colbert’s affirmative actions and specific promises of
protection to Mary and Valerie Williams, which were reasonably relied upon by
them, to their detriment, create a special relationship between [respondent] and
Mary and Valerie Williams which created a duty of protection on the part of
[respondent] Colbert?
III.
Were Officer Colbert’s actions at 622 Melville Avenue protected by either
statutory or common law immunity?
Petitioners did not present the dismissal of their complaint against the State or the City in their petition for
writ of certiorari to this Court; nor did they present the Court of Special Appeals’ decision affirming the
dismissal of their complaint against the City.  In the proceeding before us, they present only the claims
against Officer Colbert.   We resolve the issues presented in the context of the trial court’s granting of
4
Officer Colbert’s motion for summary judgment.  
I. Facts
The facts and circumstances of the present case are tragic.  By July of 1995, eighteen-year-old
Valerie Williams had been involved in an abusive relationship with Gerald Watkins for approximately four
years.  The record indicates that Watkins began beating Valerie Williams when she was around fourteen
years old and that the beatings continued while she was pregnant with his child.  On numerous occasions,
the Baltimore City Police Department was notified and responded to these incidents of domestic violence.
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On the morning of July 19, 1995, Mary Williams arrived at work as an office manager for Multi-
Specialty Health Care, at approximately 8:45 a.m.  Just before her lunch break, she received a frantic
telephone call from her daughter, Valerie Williams.  Mary Williams immediately left work and drove to her
home at 622 Melville Avenue, in Baltimore, where she found her daughter sitting on a sofa with a swollen
eye and holding a compress to her mouth.  After Valerie Williams told her that she had been beaten by
Watkins, Mary Williams telephoned the police via 911.  Officer Colbert responded to the call.
Upon arriving at the scene, Officer Colbert took statements from both Mary and Valerie Williams,
during which he was informed of the history of abuse suffered by Valerie at the hands of Watkins.  Valerie
proceeded to inform Officer Colbert that Watkins was a known drug dealer and provided the officer with
a photograph of Watkins and his home address.  While the officer was talking to the Williamses, Watkins
telephoned the household two separate times and talked with both Mary and Valerie.  Valerie answered
the first telephone call.  After she hung up, she told Mary, in the officer’s presence, that the call was from
Watkins and that he had threatened to come back to the house.  When Watkins called a second time, Mary
Williams answered the telephone.  Upon realizing that the caller was Watkins, Mary Williams briefly
expressed her anger to him and then hung up the telephone.  The Caller I.D. box indicated that he had
called from the Alameda Liquor Store.  She reported that fact to Officer Colbert, whereupon he requested
a police car to be dispatched to that location.  From this point forward, the parties’ versions of the events
diverge dramatically.  We review the depositions of both Mary Williams and Officer Colbert.
According to the deposition of Mary Williams, after Officer Colbert dispatched a police car to the
Alameda Liquor Store, he then stated to Valerie “You stay here, I’ve got to call for a camera, we have to
 Under Baltimore City Police Department procedure, it is required that photographs be taken of
5
alleged victims of domestic violence for future evidentiary purposes.
 Her grandson, Myreq Watkins, was her daughter Valerie’s son by Gerald Watkins.  
6
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wait for a camera.”   At this point, Mary had a brief conversation with Officer Colbert asking whether she
5
could pick up her grandson from a neighboring house.   With Officer Colbert’s approval, Mary left to
6
retrieve her grandson from the babysitter.  Upon returning home, she immediately noticed that Officer
Colbert was no longer in the house.  When she asked Valerie where he was, she replied, “[h]e said stay
here, he went out to the car.”  Mary Williams, carrying her grandson, then went out the front door of her
house and down the steps to the sidewalk where Officer Colbert was sitting in a police car.  She asked him,
“What’s next[?],” to which he replied, “I’ve got to write this report,” followed by “go in the house, I’m
going to be here, I’ve got to finish this report.”  According to Mary Williams, no further relevant information
was exchanged between them. 
Mary Williams returned to the house and did not lock the front door.  Approximately two to three
minutes later, Valerie informed Mary that Watkins had recently been threatening to kill her.  Upon hearing
this news, Mary panicked and went to the front door to tell Officer Colbert.  Mary arrived at the front door
to discover that Officer Colbert was no longer parked in front of her house.  Instead, she saw Gerald
Watkins running up the steps to her home.  She tried to shut the door and lock it but Watkins kicked the
door open.  Carrying her grandson, Mary made it past Watkins and started running down the steps in front
of her house.  Watkins shot her in the leg, which caused her to fall down the steps.  Watkins then put the
gun to Mary’s head, said “What have I ever done to you?” and pulled the trigger, shooting her again.
Watkins then shot and killed Valerie Williams before killing himself.  Mary Williams survived the attack but
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remains partially paralyzed.  Myreq Watkins was not injured in the course of the shooting. 
Officer Colbert’s version of the events is similar to Mary Williams’ up until when Mary Williams
came outside of her house and had a conversation with the police officer.  According to his deposition,
when she approached his police car and asked, “What’s next?,” the following events occurred:  
I told her I’m waiting to see if somebody is available to bring me a camera.  At that time
I called again.  There was nobody available to bring a camera.  I then told Ms. Williams
I have to go get the camera myself, and she said that was fine. 
According to Officer Colbert, it was only after this exchange that he drove off to go pick up a camera.  He
was approximately 6-7 blocks away when he received a call about a shooting at 622 Melville Avenue.
Upon his return he found Mary Williams laying face-down on the ground in front of her home and the
bodies of Valerie Williams and Gerald Watkins down the street. 
On November 6, 1996, petitioners filed a complaint based in negligence in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City against (1) the State of Maryland under Maryland Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.), Title 12,
subtitle 1, of the State Government Article (the Maryland Tort Claims Act); (2) the Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore City under Maryland Code (1973, 1998 Repl. Vol., 1999 Cum. Supp.), Title 5,
subtitle 3 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (the Local Government Tort Claims Act); and
Baltimore City Police Officer Edward Colbert.  The complaint specifically alleged that Baltimore City
Police Department General Order 10-93 divested Officer Colbert of any discretion in carrying out his
statutory duty to protect Valerie and Mary Williams and Myreq Watkins and mandated that he do so.  In
later pleadings, petitioners added that Maryland Code (1957, 1993 Repl. Vol., 1995 Cum. Supp.), Article
   Effective October 1, 1996, 1996 Maryland Laws, Chapter 585 transferred Maryland Code
7
(1957, 1993 Repl. Vol., 1995 Cum. Supp.), Article 27, section 11F to its current location, Maryland Code
(1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1999 Cum. Supp.), Article 27, section 798.  There were no substantive changes
made in the transfer.  Any future reference to Article 27, section 11F, is a reference to Maryland Code
(1957, 1993 Repl. Vol., 1995 Cum. Supp.), Article 27, section 11F, unless otherwise noted.
 Petitioners did not appeal the dismissal of their complaint against the State of Maryland to the
8
Court of Special Appeals.
  Any future reference to section 798(B)(2) is a reference to Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.
9
(continued...)
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27, section 11F,  also supported this argument.  The complaint also alleged that Officer Colbert, through
7
his actions and express promise of protection, had established a “special relationship” with petitioners that
imposed on him a duty of protection beyond that which he would ordinarily owe to citizens threatened by
crime.  An order dismissing the complaints against both the City and the State was issued on January 17,
1997, ruling that neither of those parties could be sued because of the provisions of the respective tort
claims acts.  On February 27, 1998, a different judge on the Circuit Court for Baltimore City entered
summary judgment in favor of the police officer.  The court ruled that, as a matter of law, Officer Colbert
was acting in a discretionary capacity, without malice, at the time of the incident and was therefore entitled
to qualified immunity as a government official.  
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Special Appeals challenging the orders of the circuit court.8
That court affirmed the holdings of the trial court in Williams, 128 Md. App. 1, 736 A.2d 1084.
Petitioners filed a petition for writ of certiorari to this Court which we granted to resolve the three issues.
As to the grant of summary judgment in respect to Officer Colbert, we hold that under the circumstances
of this case he was not mandated by Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1999 Cum. Supp.), Article
27, section 798(B)(2)  and Baltimore City Police Department General Order 10-93 to protect petitioners.
9
(...continued)
9
Vol., 1999 Cum. Supp.), Article 27, section 798(B)(2), unless stated otherwise.
-7-
Nevertheless, we hold that, viewing the deposition of Mary Williams in a light favorable to her, Officer
Colbert’s affirmative actions, directions, and specific promises of protection to Mary and Valerie Williams,
if they occurred and were reasonably relied upon by them, may have created a special relationship between
himself and the Williamses that would establish a duty of care on the part of Officer Colbert to protect
them; therefore, his actions at 622 Melville Avenue might not be protected by either statutory or common
law immunity.  Accordingly, there was, at the least, a dispute of a material fact.  We reverse the decision
of the Court of Special Appeals and remand with instructions to vacate the order of the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City granting Officer Colbert summary judgment.     
II.  Discussion
The threshold issue before this Court is whether respondent, Officer Colbert, was entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law.  In reviewing a grant of a summary judgment, we are first concerned
with whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists and then whether the movant is entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law.  Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn of Bethesda, Inc., 335 Md. 135, 144,
642 A.2d 219, 224 (1994); Gross v. Sussex, Inc., 332 Md. 247, 255, 630 A.2d 1156, 1160 (1993);
Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 737, 625 A.2d 1005, 1011 (1993); Arnold
Developer, Inc. v. Collins, 318 Md. 259, 262, 567 A.2d 949, 951 (1990); Bachmann v. Glazer
& Glazer, Inc., 316 Md. 405, 408, 559 A.2d 365, 366 (1989); King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 110-
11, 492 A.2d 608, 614 (1985).  “A material fact is a fact the resolution of which will somehow affect the
outcome of the case.”  King, 303 Md. at 111, 492 A.2d at 614 (citing Lynx, Inc. v. Ordinance
-8-
Prods., Inc., 273 Md. 1, 8, 327 A.2d 502, 509 (1974)).  “[A] dispute as to facts relating to grounds upon
which the decision is not rested is not a dispute with respect to a material fact and such dispute does not
prevent the entry of summary judgment.”  Salisbury Beauty Schs. v. State Bd. of Cosmetologists,
268 Md. 32, 40, 300 A.2d 367, 374 (1973).
This Court also has stated that “[t]he standard of review for a grant of summary judgment is
whether the trial court was legally correct.”  Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 343 Md. 185, 204, 680
A.2d 1067, 1076 (1996); see also Murphy v. Merzbacher, 346 Md. 525, 530-31, 697 A.2d 861,
864 (1997); Hartford Ins. Co., 335 Md. at 144, 642 A.2d at 224; Gross, 332 Md. at 255, 630 A.2d
at 1160; Heat & Power Corp. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 320 Md. 584, 592, 578 A.2d 1202,
1206 (1990).  As we have said:         
Concerning summary judgment, Maryland Rule 2-501(e) provides:  “The court
shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response
show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose
favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  In determining
whether a party is entitled to judgment under this rule, the court must view the facts,
including all inferences, in the light most favorable to the opposing party.  Beard v.
American Agency, 314 Md. 235, 246, 550 A.2d 677 (1988); Kramer v. Bally’s
Park Place, 311 Md. 387, 389, 535 A.2d 466 (1988); Liscombe v. Potomac
Edison Co., 303 Md. 619, 621-22, 495 A.2d 838 (1985).  The trial court will not
determine any disputed facts, but rather makes a ruling as a matter of law.  Scroggins v.
Dahne, 335 Md. 688, 691, 645 A.2d 1160 (1994); Southland Corp. v. Griffith,
332 Md. 704, 712, 633 A.2d 84 (1993); Beatty v. Trailmaster, 330 Md. 726, 737,
625 A.2d 1005 (1993).  The standard of appellate review, therefore, is whether the trial
court was legally correct.  See, e.g., Southland, supra, 332 Md. at 712, 633 A.2d 84.
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lane, 338 Md. 34, 42-43, 656 A.2d 307, 311 (1995); see also
Dobbins v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 338 Md. 341, 344-45, 658 A.2d 675, 676-
77 (1995).  As we said in Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 660 A.2d 447 (1995):
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In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, this Court must consider the facts
reflected in the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and affidavits in the light
most favorable to the non-moving parties, the plaintiffs.  Even if it appears that the relevant
facts are undisputed, “if those facts are susceptible to inferences supporting the position of
the party opposing summary judgment, then a grant of summary judgment is improper.”
Id. at 79, 660 A.2d at 452 (quoting Clea v. Mayor of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662, 677, 541 A.2d 1303,
1310 (1988)).
The purpose of the summary judgment procedure is not to try the case or to decide the factual
disputes, but to decide whether there is an issue of fact, which is sufficiently material to be tried.  See
Goodwich, 343 Md. at 205-06, 680 A.2d at 1077; Coffey v. Derby Steel Co., 291 Md. 241, 247,
434 A.2d 564, 567-68 (1981); Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 304, 413 A.2d 170, 171 (1980).  Thus,
once the moving party has provided the court with sufficient grounds for summary judgment, the non-
moving party must produce sufficient evidence to the trial court that a genuine dispute to a material fact
exists.  See, e.g., Hoffman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Washington County Nat’l Sav. Bank, 297 Md.
691, 712, 467 A.2d 758, 769 (1983).  With these considerations in mind, we turn to the instant case.   
       
A. Article 27, section 798(B)(2) and BCPD General Order 10-93
Petitioners allege that Officer Colbert was divested of discretion and mandated by Maryland Code
(1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1999 Cum. Supp.), Article 27, section 798 and Baltimore City Police Department
General Order 10-93 to protect Mary and Valerie Williams and Myreq Watkins.  We disagree.  
We commence our analysis of these two provisions by shedding light on the legislative intent behind
Article 27, section 798.  As we said in State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 720 A.2d 311(1998):   
We have said that “[t]he cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and
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effectuate the intention of the legislature.”  Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d
423, 429 (1995).  Legislative intent must be sought first in the actual language of the
statute.  Marriot Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346
Md. 437, 444-45, 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997); Stanford v. Maryland Police
Training & Correctional Comm’n, 346 Md. 374, 380, 697 A.2d 424,427 (1997)
(quoting Tidewater v. Mayor of Havre de Grace, 337 Md. 338, 344, 653 A.2d 468,
472 (1995)); Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 256, 674 A.2d 951, 957 (1996);
Romm v. Flax, 340 Md. 690, 693, 668 A.2d 1, 2 (1995); Oaks, 339 Md. at 35, 660
A.2d at 429; Mauzy v. Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84, 92, 400 A.2d 1091, 1096 (1979);
Board of Supervisors v. Weiss, 217 Md. 133, 136, 141 A.2d 734, 736 (1958).
Where the statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a definite and
simple meaning, courts normally do not look beyond the words of the statute to determine
legislative intent.  Marriot Employees, 346 Md. at 445, 697 A.2d at 458;
Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628, 633
(1987); Hunt v. Montgomery County, 248 Md. 403, 414, 237 A.2d 35, 41 (1968).
. . . .
This Court recently stated that “statutory language is not read in isolation, but ‘in
light of the full context in which [it] appear[s], and in light of external manifestations of intent
or general purpose available through other evidence.’”  Stanford v. Maryland Police
Training & Correctional Comm’n, 346 Md. 374, 380, 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997)
(alterations in original) (quoting Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 185, 567 A.2d
126, 127 (1989)).  To this end,
[w]hen we pursue the context of statutory language, we are not limited to
the words of the statute as they are printed. . . .  We may and often must consider
other “external manifestations” or “persuasive evidence,” including a bill’s title and
function paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it passed through the
legislature, its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation, and other material
that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal, which
becomes the context within which we read the particular language before us in a
given case.  
. . . [I]n State v. One 1983 Chevrolet Van, 309 Md. 327, 524 A.2d
51 (1987), . . . [a]lthough we did not describe any of the statutes involved in that
case as ambiguous or uncertain, we did search for legislative purpose or meaning
— what Judge Orth, writing for the Court, described as “the legislative scheme.”
[Id. at] 344-45, 524 A.2d at 59.  We identified that scheme or purpose after an
extensive review of the context of Ch. 549, Acts of 1984, which had effected
major changes in Art. 27, § 297.  That context included, among other things, a bill
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request form, prior legislation, a legislative committee report, a bill title, related
statutes and amendments to the bill.  See also Ogrinz v. James, 309 Md. 381,
524 A.2d 77 (1987), in which we considered legislative history (a committee
report) to assist in construing legislation that we did not identify as ambiguous or
of uncertain meaning. 
Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 514-15, 525 A.2d at 632-33 (some citations omitted).
Id. at 717-19, 720 A.2d at 315-16 (some alterations in original).
Section 798 was originally enacted in 1979 as Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol., 1981
Cum. Supp.), Article 27, section 11F.  The implementation of section 11F originated in 1979 Maryland
Laws, Chapter 307 (House Bill 53).  The original title to House Bill 53 outlined its purpose: 
[For] the purpose of establishing an emergency procedure available to victims of spousal
violence in order to inform them of services available, provide transportation, and provide
protection so that they may return safely to the family home in order to remove certain
necessary personal property; establish an emergency procedure for the protection of
children during incidents of spousal violence; coordinating certain statutory provisions;
defining certain terms; and relating generally to spousal violence.  
Throughout the bill file to House Bill 53 there were several letters and written testimony supporting the
passage of this bill.  The general theme of these documents is an intent by the sponsors and supporters of
this bill to alleviate the plight of the spousal assault victim by broadening both the obligation and the
authority of the police to intervene.  Nearly everyone involved acknowledged that in many instances of
spousal abuse, although the violent episode may have subsided prior to the arrival of the police, the situation
frequently remained a dangerous and possibly deadly situation. 
 
 Delegate (now Senator) Ida G. Ruben of Montgomery County, sponsor of House Bill 53, clearly
explained the purpose of the Bill:
When domestic violence occurs, the usual procedures available immediately after the fact
are not satisfactory for the victims, for the police or for the courts.  This bill is a result of
 At a later date, Delegate Ruben discussed the amendments made to House Bill 53:
10
[One amendment] is offered to make clear that the bill preserves such discretionary
authority as now applies to law enforcement agencies, while mandating that they offer
protection and transportation only as directed by a court order.
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my concern for a person who has been abused at home, thrown out of the home, or forced
to run from the home and who has no place to turn for help. . . . 
. . . . 
The purpose of this bill is to provide emergency protection in spousal violence cases so
that the victims are offered some real choices and so that the time spent on such matters
by police and courts can be spent more productively. . . . 
All this bill asks for is emergency assistance for such people to enter their
own homes and take a few of their personal belongings so that they can exist
for a short time elsewhere until a longer term resolution of their problems
can proceed in an orderly way. . . .  Most of these victims do not have money in their
pockets at the time of the crisis in order to go out and buy duplicates of their clothing and
other necessities.  They may have children with them for whom they need clothing,
medications or essential documents. [Emphasis added.]
 
[10]
A number of other people testified in favor of House Bill 53.  On February 22, 1979,  Katherine
Foss, of the Prince George’s County Department of Social Services, testified:  
The large majority [of women who participated in their emergency shelter program over
the last year] left home with nothing but the clothes on their backs.  In all cases the women
were extremely fearful.  They were fearful to return home and fearful that if they left home
all their possessions would be lost.  
In many cases, when the woman has returned home she has found that her clothes have
been ripped apart or thrown out.  In one case the husband set fire to the apartment; in
another case the husband removed his wife’s belongings from the house and burned them.
Many times she finds upon returning home that her husband has changed the locks to the
house or apartment and the landlord refuses to allow her entrance, even though her name
is on the lease and she may have been paying the rent.
. . . . 
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This destruction is particularly wasteful and costly in view of the fact that the Department
often must issue an emergency grant to provide such victims with basic necessities such as
clothing.  If a Public Assistance Grant is necessary, the application process is impeded by
her lack of verifying documents, birth certificates, rent receipts, etc.  
Cynthia Anderson, Supervisor of the Abused Persons Program in Montgomery County testified on
February 22, 1979:
Law enforcement officers are generally the first line of community intervention in
abusive domestic disputes.  They represent community authority and are often able to
temporarily diffuse the immediate crisis.   However, after they leave the home, the victim
is sometimes threatened again, or further abused because of the police intervention.  A
consistent mechanism is needed so that every victim of spousal abuse may have a choice
of remaining in the home or leaving by police escort to a safe place.  It is
appropriate, therefore, for law enforcement officials to be knowledgeable of shelter
services, be required to advise the victim of these alternatives, and be available to assist
the victim to such facilities.
In those cases where the victim has already fled the home — to the protection of
a neighbor or friend — it is equally urgent for them to have safe return into the
home to retrieve those necessary personal belongings that will enable them
to remain separate.  If a woman decides to live apart from the violent home, she may
need to apply for State services for financial aid, employment training, and legal services.
These State services, A.F.D.C. and JUDICARE, require proof for eligibility in the form
of bank statements, pay records, birth certificates.
Therefore, it becomes essential for the victim to be able to gather these documents
in addition to gathering personal effects that will enable them to constructively move
towards an independent living arrangement. [Emphasis added.]
 
Elizabeth Fischer, Executive Director of ASSISI, Inc., also testified on February 22, 1979: 
As a representative of ASSISI, I strongly urge your support for this bill for one
reason; the battered woman, and I ask you to try to put yourself in this woman’s shoes.
She has just been beaten.  She is scared.  She may need medical attention.  In most cases
she will not stop to get her purse, her clothes; it is usually night time; sometimes she is in
her nightgown, barefooted.  Where does she go?  Who does she go to?
When she gets to a police station she needs to be told where to get help.  But
then, what about her money, a change of clothes.  Doesn’t she have a right
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to her personal things?  Yes, you say and here, we all agree.  But almost always she
is afraid; afraid of being beaten again.  If she goes back alone, she is taking a risk of being
beaten again.  If she takes a family member or a friend, someone who is untrained, she is
exposing them to assault.  She needs a trained person to standby while she gets
her personal effects.
In 34% of the cases ASSISI has handled, women have had their clothes shredded
or disappear after an assault; their jewelry missing.  And think how vital toothpaste and
deod[o]rant would be to you if you had none and had no money, checks or identification.
In order to get Social Service assistance, she needs her birth certificate and identification.
This is all we are asking in this bill:
(1)  let the woman know what help is available and
(2) let her get the things she needs until pending further action. [Emphasis added.]
           
On April 4, 1979, Carol Lane, President of the Board of Directors of Citizens Against Spousal
Assault (CASA) of Howard County testified in support of House Bill 53:
Our continuing experience with victims of domestic violence indicates the need for passage
of a law that will provide these people with a measure of safety in the face of danger and
a sense of pride in the face of degradation — the degradation of needing not just to flee
one’s home but to flee without clothing, toothbrush or other personal belongings necessary
to reside elsewhere temporarily.  We have seen women bruised and beaten who have run
or have been chased from their homes, often in fear of their lives, without their personal
belongings, medication for themselves or the children in their care; they must “sneak” back,
in dread of harm, to retrieve a coat, a baby bottle, or other personal effects.   
. . . .
House Bill []53 as amended will have the effect of guaranteeing certain rights to our
citizens: protection from violence and the right to enter their own dwelling to
remove personal belongings without fear of additional harm. [Emphasis
added.]
In addition to the testimony outlined, supra, the bill file also included several letters that provide
us with further information presented to the Legislature when it was considering House Bill 53.  In a letter
dated February 16, 1979, Annette Flower, President of the Baltimore County Commission for Women,
  The Committee consisted of representatives from the legislative committees of the Maryland
11
Chiefs of Police Association, the Maryland Law-Enforcement Officers, Inc., the Maryland Sheriffs’
Association, and the Maryland Municipal League. 
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wrote to Delegate Joseph E. Owens, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, in support of House
Bill 53:
This bill would insure that victims of spousal violence receive protection in
removing necessary belongings from the family home, and that they are informed
of the availability of public or private support agencies in their locality. 
Domestic violence is a growing problem throughout Maryland, and indeed
throughout the country.  All too often, the victim of spousal violence is not only subjected
to physical and psychological abuse, but is forced to flee the home without adequate
clothing, perhaps even without identification, prescription medicines, eyeglasses, and other
necessary personal items.  By providing the protection of an law enforcement
agency for victims to retrieve such personal belongings, HB-53 will insure at
least minimal physical comfort during the period when the victim must remain away from
the family home.  Informing victims of available support agencies can be accomplished by
giving them a printed card or brochure . . . . [Emphasis added.]
As evidenced by the original title as well as the supporting testimony and letters, the initial goals of
House Bill 53 initially had a much greater scope than what was ultimately enacted by the Legislature.  This
is primarily due to the reaction of Maryland’s police organizations.  In response to the initial version of
House Bill 53, a Joint Police Committee  drafted a letter dated February 2, 1979, to Delegate Joseph E.
11
Owens, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, which demonstrated their general approval of the
bill along with their general recommendation that the police responsibility be scaled back:
The representatives present expressed a favorable view as to the need for this type [of]
assistance by [a] spouse who is a victim of violence and agreed with the general concept
of the bill. . . .  The Committee believed that the enactment of the bill in its present form
would result in a severe manpower drain on police departments, which might result to the
detriment of the general public in other matters urgently requiring police assistance.
Another practical difficulty the police envisioned would be that juvenile authorities and
social service agencies would not be available during the evening hours or weekends when
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action by these agencies would be necessary.  The Committee felt that police participation
in spousal violence situations is appropriate where violence exists, however, the remainder
of the problem is one for social agencies.  The Committee would approve the
concept of the bill but oppose some of the obligations imposed upon police
departments by the bill. [Emphasis added.] 
Subsequently, House Bill 53 was amended to scale back the list of police responsibilities.  The
original version of the bill provided that a law enforcement officer would: (1) advise the victim with respect
to available sources of shelter, medical care, counseling, and other services; (2) transport the victim to such
facilities where appropriate; and (3) accompany the victim back to the family home to retrieve clothing and
other personal effects.  However, the only provision that survived the amending process was that, upon
request, a police officer was to provide protection to a spouse who needed to return to the family home
for the exclusive purpose of retrieving necessary personal property.  In its final form, the title to House Bill
53 read as follows:
[For] the purpose of authorizing law enforcement officers to provide protection for victims
of spousal assault and assistance in removing certain personal property from the family
home; and providing immunity from liability for officers carrying out the provisions of this
Act.  
This final title clearly states the express purpose of House Bill 53 and limits its scope: to provide the
authorization for certain police activity that otherwise may well have been beyond the scope of traditional
police authority.  The Legislature made a conscious decision to amend House Bill 53 to limit its scope to
only two precise sets of circumstances.  The first was a duty already encompassed by a police officer’s
traditional role: to protect the victim of a crime occurring in the officer’s presence.  The second was newly
created by the statute.  In final form, the statute provided protection for victims of spousal assault and
assistance in removing certain personal property from the family home.
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As originally enacted Article 27, section 11F provided:
(a) Assistance to victim. — Any person who alleges to have been a victim of
spousal assault and who believes there is a danger of serious and immediate injury to
himself or herself may request the assistance of a local law enforcement agency.  A local
law enforcement officer responding to the request for assistance shall:
(1) Protect the complainant from harm when responding to the request;  and
(2) Accompany the complainant to the family home so that the complainant may
remove his or her personal clothing and effects and also the personal clothing and effects
of any children that may be in the care of the complainant.  The personal effects to be
removed shall be only those required for immediate needs.  
(b) Immunity of law enforcement officer from civil liability. — Any law
enforcement officer responding to such a request shall be immune from civil liability in
complying with the request as long as the officer acts in good faith and in a reasonable
manner.  
As indicated by both the express wording of the statute and the evolution of House Bill 53, as
initially enacted, the exclusive concern of Article 27, section 11F was to authorize a law enforcement officer
to render assistance to a victim of spousal abuse.  The Legislature was very precise in defining what the
“assistance” was limited to, because subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) expressly direct what the officer shall
do in “responding to the request for assistance.”  Section 11F clearly dealt with two very narrow and
limited situations.  As we have indicated, the first one protecting complainants from harm during the officer’s
response legislated what was always an obligation of the officer.  The second imposed a new obligation
on the officer, to protect the complainant who is returning to retrieve items from the home or attempting to
leave with such items, during that process.  This last function appears to have been the primary purpose
of the original statute. 
1994 Maryland Laws, Chapter 728 (the Domestic Violence Act of 1994) provided the first
 There have been two other relatively minor changes made to section 11F.  First, there was a
12
re-wording with respect to the “personal clothing” and “personal effects,” which the alleged victim was
permitted to remove from the family home.  Second, in 1979, section 11F expressly spelled out the
immunity provision, whereas by 1995 it simply made reference to § 5-326 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article.  Neither change affected the substance of section 11F.  
 This subtitle was changed to “Domestic Violence” by 1996 Maryland Laws, Chapter 585.
13
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significant change to Article 27, section 11F by expanding the class of persons who were entitled to the
assistance of the law enforcement officer.   As originally enacted, the law only extended special assistance
12
to a person who alleged that he or she had been “a victim of spousal assault.”  1994 Maryland Laws,
Chapter 728 broadened the class of persons entitled to assistance under section 11F to include “victim[s]
of abuse.”  During this expanding of the class of protected people, the Act modified the subtitle of section
11F from “Spousal Assault” to “Domestic Abuse.”   A “victim” was, in turn, defined as a “person eligible
13
for relief” under Maryland Code (1984, 1991 Repl. Vol., 1997 Cum. Supp.), section 4-501 of the Family
Law Article, which provides basic definitions in the context of domestic violence.  1997 Maryland Laws,
Chapter 315 further amended this section “[for] the purpose of clarifying that when a law enforcement
officer is required to accompany an alleged victim of domestic abuse to the family home so that the victim
may remove the personal effects of certain persons, the personal effects include certain medicines or
medical devices; authorizing the complainant to remove certain items regardless of who paid for the items;
and generally relating to domestic abuse and the duties of law enforcement officers.”  
Section 11F, now
codified as section 798 of Article 27, remains a statute with a very limited scope.  Its evolution over the
past two decades has only: (1) broadened the classification of people who warranted this protection and
(2) clarified the nature of the personal items allowed to be taken from the home.  As it is currently drafted,
Article 27, section 798, titled “Duties of law enforcement officers — domestic abuse” states in relevant
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part:
(b) Assistance to victim. — (1) Any person who alleges to have been a victim
of abuse and who believes there is a danger of serious and immediate injury to himself or
herself may request the assistance of a local law enforcement agency.
(2) A local law enforcement officer responding to the request for assistance shall:
(i) Protect the complainant from harm when responding to the request;  and
(ii) Accompany the complainant to the family home so that the complainant may
remove the following items, regardless of who paid for the items:
1. The personal clothing of the complainant and of any child in the care of the
complainant; and
2. The personal effects, including any medicine or medical devices, of the
complainant and of any child in the care of the complainant that are required for the
immediate needs of the complainant or the child.
(c) Immunity of law enforcement officer from civil liability. — Any law
enforcement officer responding to such a request shall have the immunity from liability
described under § 5-610 of the Courts Article.
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1999 Cum. Supp.), Art. 27, § 798.  There is nothing in the plain
language of the statute and nothing in its legislative history that evidences any intent by the Legislature to
mandate around-the-clock personal protection ad infinitum for persons who are complainants, i.e.,
victims, under that act.  In so stating, we do not mean to say that, given the experience of the courts with
the issue of domestic violence, such protection is not warranted in many cases.  Such a mandate, however,
must come, if it is to come, from the legislative or executive branches.  The other two departments are
better able to assess the problems and the costs of providing such extended protection.  It is clear to this
Court that the Legislature did not intend to create such a heightened level of protection in passing the statute
at issue in this case.  As we have said, the plain wording of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1999
-20-
Cum. Supp.), Article 27, section 798, supported by its legislative history, limits its applicability to a distinct
set of circumstances: a law enforcement officer must protect the alleged victim of domestic abuse from harm
when responding to a request to accompany the alleged victim of domestic abuse to the family home so
that he or she may recover personal clothing and personal effects, including any medicine or medical
devices. 
It is evident from reviewing the legislative history of section 798, that in the context of domestic
violence, two closely related sets of circumstances were of great concern with respect to the responsibility
of the police to take some action and the authority of the police to take action.  The two sets of
circumstances that were primarily addressed were: (1) when the feuding parties were still inside the family
home, but someone had called for assistance and (2) where one of the parties had left the family home and
re-entry was desired, but risked potential peril.  An officer, of course, could always make a warrantless
arrest for a crime, including an assault or abuse, committed in his presence.  Beyond that, however, the
police authority to intervene in a family fight was highly problematic.  Unless an officer had probable cause
to believe that a felony had been committed, once the violence had actually subsided, the aggrieved party,
out on the street or otherwise, was generally left with no recourse but to go to the District Court and apply
for a warrant of arrest.  The police officer was powerless to help.
The first mandate of section 798, as we have noted, simply authorized the police officer, under the
protection of immunity, to provide protection in a domestic violence situation where both parties are
present.  In the present case, Officer Colbert answered a domestic call at the victims’ home, the alleged
attacker was not present.  Thus, the first requirement of section 798 is inapplicable to the facts of the case
sub judice.  As we have said, it is clear that the intent of the Legislature in enacting section 798 clearly
  As noted by Judge Moylan in the Court of Special Appeals, 
14
[a] continuing victim protection program is clearly not provided by [section 798] and is
self-evidently not feasible.  How long would it last?  An hour?  A day?  A week?  A year?
Would it involve three shifts of police officers a day, even before provision is made for
weekend coverage?  Would it apply only at home?  Or at work?  Or in moving about the
city?  The concept is absurd.  The direction to “[p]rotect the complainant from harm” is
qualified by the temporal limitation “when responding to the request for assistance.”
Williams, 128 Md. App. at 25 n.6, 736 A.2d at 1097 n.6 (third alteration in original). 
 Under the appropriate set of facts, Valerie Williams could have been within the ambit of persons
15
entitled to police assistance in retrieving personal effects.  Prior to 1994, she would not have been so
entitled, for she was not and never had been the legal spouse of Gerald Watkins.  Her entitlement to such
assistance under the post-1994 expanded coverage would have only been by virtue of the fact that she
was, as of July 19, 1995, “an individual who ha[d] a child in common with” Gerald Watkins.  Maryland
Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol., 1999 Cum. Supp.),  § 4-501(i)(6) of the Family Law Article.
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was not to create a duty to protect the victim for an indefinite amount of time: it was only to provide
protection while responding to the request.  When Officer Colbert responded to the request for assistance,
he was not initially put in a situation where it was necessary to provide protection to Valerie Williams
because Gerald Watkins was not present at the time.  The argument that once Officer Colbert arrived on
the scene, he had an affirmative duty to protect Valerie Williams from all possible threats of domestic
violence for an indefinite period is incorrect, and not supported by the plain language of the statute or by
its legislative history.   Section 798 creates a duty to protect a victim of domestic violence only where a
14
clear, imminent threat exists during the officer’s response.  The second mandate of section 798 is equally
inapplicable to the facts of the present case.  It provides the police with the authority, and requires them,
to accompany and to protect the victim of abuse when returning to the family home for the limited purpose
of retrieving clothing and other personal effects required for immediate needs.   Clearly this mandate does
15
not apply to the facts of the case.  Valerie Williams was never forced from a home she shared with Watkins
-22-
nor did she need to re-enter premises where Gerald Watkins might be present.  She was in her parent’s
home, where she resided.  There was no need to recover any personal clothing or effects. 
 
It is clear from the statute that it is limited to an officer who is responding to a complaint of domestic
violence where the violence continues in the officer’s presence, and an officer who is accompanying a
person to recover personal effects.  Only in those two limited capacities is there a duty to protect created
by the statute at issue.  It was not the intent of the Legislature to create a permanent personal bodyguard
for any person who claims abuse.  Officer Colbert was neither divested of discretion nor was he mandated
by section 798 to protect petitioners forever.  Even looking in a light most favorable to Mrs. Williams,
section 798 is inapplicable to the facts of the present case.  Concerning this issue, there is no genuine
dispute of material fact; therefore the trial court’s granting of summary judgment as to petitioners’ claim
concerning section 798 was appropriate.       
Petitioners also contend that Baltimore City Police Department General Order 10-93 
divested Officer Colbert of discretion, and mandated that he protect petitioners.  We disagree with this
assertion as well.  Baltimore City Police Department General Order 10-93 states as in relevant part: 
Subject:
Domestic Incidents — Reporting/Arrest Criteria 
POLICY
It is the long-standing policy of the Baltimore Police Department to fully investigate
and accurately report all domestic incidents coming to our attention, specifically
domestic assaults; to arrest offenders where lawful and appropriate; and where
practicable, to inform involved parties of the various services that may be available to them
within the Criminal Justice System, from social service agencies and other community
resources.   
This directive was prepared in keeping with the values of the
department: Our Highest Commitment is Protecting Life (protecting victims
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of domestic violence); We are Committed to Provide High Quality Public
Service and We are Responsive to Community and Neighborhood Priorities
(resolving domestic complaints) . . . .    
RESPONSIBILITIES
 
. . . .
2.  Protect the victim of a domestic incident from physical harm.   
We view General Order 10-93 in the same light as section 798, supra, i.e., it does not apply to the facts
of the present case.  As we stated in our analysis of section 798, Officer Colbert has a duty to protect a
victim of domestic violence only from violence occurring in his presence.  To require a law enforcement
officer to protect a victim of domestic abuse from all potential future possibilities of domestic assault would
be absurd.  That could not have been the intention of the police department in drafting this order, and we
are not prepared to create such a duty.  Officer Colbert was neither divested of discretion nor was he
mandated by General Order 10-93 to protect petitioners beyond the duties expressed by Article 27,
section 798.  Even looking in a light most favorable to Mrs. Williams, General Order 10-93 is inapplicable
to the facts of the present case.  Concerning this issue, there is no dispute of material facts, therefore the
trial court’s granting of summary judgment pursuant to petitioners’ claims concerning General Order 10-93
was appropriate.  
B.  Immunity
For the sake of organization and clarity, we shall save our discussion of “the special relationship
exception,” until after we discuss statutory and common law immunity.  Therefore, we now jump ahead and
address petitioners’ third question: Were Officer Colbert’s actions at 622 Melville Avenue protected by
either statutory or common law immunity?
  The Court of Special Appeals defined what constitutes malice sufficient to defeat immunity in
16
Leese v. Baltimore County, 64 Md. App. 442, 480, 497 A.2d 159, 179, cert.  denied, 305 Md.
106, 501 A.2d 845 (1985), overruled on other grounds by Woodruff v. Trepel, 125 Md. App.
381, 725 A.2d 612 (1999):
The actual malice needed to defeat official immunity requires an act without legal
justification or excuse, but with an evil or rancorous motive influenced by hate, the purpose
being to deliberately and wilfully injure the plaintiff. [Quotation omitted.]  
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We start our analysis by addressing whether Officer Colbert’s actions were protected by statutory
immunity.  Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol.), section 5-511(b) of the Courts & Judicial
Proceedings Article codifies the immunity provision for Maryland public officials, including law enforcement
officers.  It states in relevant part:
(b) Immunity generally. — . . . [A]n official of a governmental entity, while
acting in a discretionary capacity, without malice, and within the scope of the official’s
authority is immune as an official or individual from civil liability for any act or omission. 
  
As we discuss, infra, Officer Colbert, as a law enforcement officer, was an official of a government entity
who, as we discussed, supra, was acting in the scope of his employment.  Petitioners present no evidence
that Officer Colbert acted with malice.   Generally, Officer Colbert, to the extent his actions were
16
discretionary and not ministerial, falls under the purview of section 5-511(b) and qualifies for immunity from
civil liability.     
Additionally, Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol.), section 5-610 of the Courts & Judicial
Proceedings Article, referenced in Article 27, section 798(c), see supra, states:
A law enforcement officer who responds to a request under Article 27, § 798 of
the Code for assistance by an individual who alleges to have been a victim of spousal
assault shall be immune from civil liability in complying with the request if the law
enforcement officer acts in good faith and in a reasonable manner.
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As we discussed, supra, section 798 was inapplicable to petitioners’ claim in the case sub judice;
however, section 5-610 is still relevant to our analysis as it demonstrates the Legislature’s intent to preserve
a law enforcement officer’s immunity under this new authorized duty.        
Turning our attention back to House Bill 53, it is evident that the Legislature intended to insure that
law enforcement officers would not lose their traditional immunity due to the new responsibility of
accompanying a victim of domestic violence back into the family home to recover personal effects.  By
clearly including language in section 11F, and ultimately section 798, that a police officer retained immunity
when acting in this capacity, the Legislature demonstrated a desire to preserve both the statutory immunity
granted by section 5-511(b) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article and the doctrine of common law
immunity that we discuss, infra.  The Legislature acted in an effort to quell the fear of state and local police
organizations that, if police officers found themselves acting beyond the scope of normal police authority,
non-traditional activity might divest them of the immunity ordinarily available to governmental officials acting
with conferred discretion in the course of their employment.  
On February 22, 1979, Baltimore County Assistant State’s Attorney Stephen Montanarelli,
testifying before the House Judiciary Committee in support of House Bill 53, specifically addressed the
problem that there was no legal basis at the time for the police to accompany a spouse back to the family
home and that such an action might, therefore, be beyond the scope of police authority:
[It is] discretionary for police in Baltimore County to accompany [a] spouse to get
[his or her] clothes.  This bill would give [the] spouse a right to have police accompany
[him or] her.  
[There is] [n]o legal basis for police to accompany [a] spouse now.  If [a]
woman says she was threatened, there is an assault.  An assault is a misdemeanor.  Police
cannot arrest for a misdemeanor unless [they] observe[] [a] misdemeanor.  Therefore, [the
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man or] woman must swear out [a] warrant. [Emphasis added.] 
The February 2, 1979 letter from the Joint Police Committee to Delegate Owens, Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee, similarly referred to the lack of statutory authority for the police to provide
certain types of assistance to spousal assault victims: “Some of the services set forth in the bill to be
performed by police are at the present time being performed despite the lack of specific statutory
authority.”  (Emphasis added.)
Similarly, in her February 22, 1979 testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, Katherine
Foss, of the Prince George’s County Department of Social Services stated:
Emergency Shelter staff find that the police are powerless to offer much assistance.  They
are reluctant to accompany the woman to her home, claiming lack of authority
or that it is not part of their job.  The police cannot arrest an abusing husband unless he
actually witnesses the abusive incident. [Emphasis added.]
We also note an important change in the title clause, and in House Bill 53 itself.  The original title
to the bill made no mention of the immunity provisions contained within the proposed legislation.  That
immunity provision would have cross-referenced another immunity statute already codified in Article 27:
“(e) The same provisions regarding immunity and costs under Article 27, § 35A shall apply to assistance
rendered to children or a victim of spousal violence pursuant to this statute.”  See 1979 Md. Laws, Chap.
307.  Apparently, after the law enforcement community expressed its concerns to the General Assembly,
proposed subsection (e) was stricken (along with the rest of the original proposed statute) and a new, self-
inclusive immunity provision added in subsection (b) of the new proposed statute.  In addition, the title was
amended to reference that immunity provision specifically: “[For] the purpose of . . . providing immunity
from liability for officers carrying out the provisions of this Act.”  From the start, this legislative history
-27-
reflects that, although the Legislature intended to expand police duties, it by no means intended to create
any statutorily based liability.  The changes made to the legislation indicate that the Legislature wanted to
make this point all the more clear.
We agree with Judge Moylan’s conclusion in the Court of Special Appeals opinion:
If the police were acting without statutory authority, there might arguably be some
cloud on their entitlement to public official immunity.  The double-barreled legislative
response was 1) to provide the statutory authority and 2) to make certain that there was
immunity.
We hold that in enacting the immunity provision of [1979 Maryland Laws,
Chapter] 307, it clearly was not the legislative intent to diminish or to curtail in any way the
qualified immunity otherwise enjoyed by a law enforcement officer as a governmental
official.  It was, rather, the clear and sole intent of that provision, probably redundantly, to
make doubly certain that police officers, called upon by the Act to perform an arguably
extraordinary function beyond the scope of their routine duties, would not unintentionally
be stripped of their accustomed immunity.  The mathematical function which the Legislature
intended to apply to public official immunity was addition, if necessary, and not subtraction.
Williams, 128 Md. App. at 28-29, 736 A.2d at 1098-99 (footnote omitted).   In keeping with this
conclusion, we hold that mere negligence, i.e., not acting in a reasonable manner, does not defeat public
official immunity in the context of section 798.
Because Officer Colbert has demonstrated that he is generally protected by statutory immunity for
his actions at 622 Melville Avenue, we now turn our attention to a discussion of the general immunity from
civil liability that police officers are granted by common law. 
This grant of immunity is often referred to as “the public duty doctrine,” “the no-duty rule,” or more
precisely as the “duty to all, duty to no one doctrine.”  See J.C. McMillan Jr., Government Liability
and the Public Duty Doctrine, 32 Vill. L. Rev. 505, 509 (1987); Police Liability for Negligent
Failure to Prevent Crime, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 821, 822 (1981).  This doctrine provides “that a
 “The breach alleged is, in substance, ‘that while Pottle was engaged about his lawful business,
17
certain evil-disposed persons came about him, hindered and prevented him, threatened his life, with force
of arms demanded of him a large sum of money, and imprisoned and detained him for the space of four
days; and until he paid them the sum of $2,500 for his enlargement.’”  Id. at 401.
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municipality’s duty to provide police protection ordinarily is one owed to the public-at-large and not to a
specific person or class.”  Kircher v. City of Jamestown, 74 N.Y.2d 251, 256, 543 N.E.2d 443, 445
(1989).  It applies to the discretionary actions of public officials.  It does not apply to public officials’
ministerial acts.   
As early as 1856, the United States Supreme Court, in a case on an official bond, recognized that,
although law enforcement officers have a general duty to protect the public as a whole, they are not liable
for failure to protect specific individuals.  See South v. Maryland ex rel. Pottle, 59 U.S. (18 How.)
396 (1856).  In that case, the initial plaintiff was allegedly imprisoned for a four-day period and not released
until he paid $2,500.00.   During his alleged captivity, plaintiff asked Daniel South, the Washington County
17
Sheriff, for assistance and protection.  The plaintiff sued Sheriff South in the United States District Court
in Maryland saying that the Sheriff’s failure to protect and relieve him was a breach of his duty to keep the
peace of the State of Maryland.  The Court noted:
This declaration . . . assumes as a postulate that every breach or neglect of a public
duty subjects the officer to a civil suit by any individual who, in consequence thereof, has
suffered loss or injury; and consequently, that the sheriff and his sureties are liable to this
suit on his bond, because he has not “executed and performed all the duties required of
and imposed on him by the laws of the State.”  
Id. at 401.  The trial court found for the plaintiff but the Supreme Court reversed, concluding:  
It is a public duty, for neglect of which [public officials are] amenable to the public, and
punishable by indictment only.
The history of the law for centuries proves this to be the case.  Actions against the
-29-
sheriff for a breach of his ministerial duties in the execution of process are to be found in
almost every book of reports.  But no instance can be found where a civil action has been
sustained against him for his default or misbehavior as conservator of the peace, by those
who have suffered injury to their property or persons through the violence of mobs, riots,
or insurrections.             
Id. at 403.
Maryland’s public duty doctrine also has its origins in the nineteenth century.  In 1898, this Court
first recognized the need to protect a law enforcement officer from civil liability where a negligence claim
arose out of the judgment and discretion needed to perform that job properly.  Cocking v. Wade, 87 Md.
529, 40 A. 104 (1898).  In that case, Joseph Cocking had been indicted by the grand jury of Charles
County for the murder of his wife and sister-in-law.  He was placed in the custody of Charles County
Sheriff George A. Wade.  Due to fear of mob violence against him, Cocking was moved several times, first
to a jail in Baltimore City, then back to Charles County into a dilapidated building, that had previously been
used as a jail.  Cocking’s request for a change of venue to St. Mary’s County was granted and caused an
increase in the civil unrest in Charles County.  Despite repeated requests by Cocking and his counsel,
Sheriff Wade refused to relocate the prisoner to a safer jail.  A short time later, a group of unknown men
attacked the jail, took Cocking from his cell, and hanged him.  Cocking’s children proclaimed their father’s
innocence and brought a claim against Sheriff Wade for his negligence in performing the basic duty of
protecting a prisoner.  We held that they did not have a cause of action.  Relying in large part on the
Supreme Court’s decision in South v. Maryland, we said:  
How [a sheriff shall perform his duties] may often be a matter of great difficulty, and one
calling for the exercise of much judgment and high degree of courage.  He will be required
to take careful account of all the circumstances that surround him; estimate, in cases of
outside attack the forces he must encounter, and compare them with his means of
defen[s]e, and after due deliberation determine what course is best for him to pursue.  If
 James was superseded in part by Prince George’s County v. Fitzhugh, 308 Md. 384,
18
519 A.2d 1285 (1987), due to an amendment to section 1013 of the Prince George’s County charter
concerning actions for which the county may be sued.  This superseding has no effect on the general rule
espoused in James, as relevant to this case.  See Fitzhugh, 308 Md. at 388-89, 519 A.2d at 1287.
-30-
he does this honestly, with a full purpose to perform his whole duty, even though he make
a mistake, whereby a prisoner is injured, it would be monstrous to hold him civilly
responsible for damages to such prisoner.  “A public officer is not liable to an
action, if he falls into error in a case where the act to be done is not merely
a ministerial one, but is one in relation to which it is his duty to exercise
judgment and discretion, even though an individual may suffer by his
mistake.  A contrary principle would indeed be pregnant with the greatest mischief.”
Kendall v. Stokes, 3 Howard 98; Sherman and Redfield on Negligence, sec. 156,
and authorities cited.  So also he must detain his prisoner in the common jail, unless some
necessity makes it proper to remove him; but it is his province to determine when such
necessity has arrived; and if in the honest exercise of his discretion, he fails to remove him
in time to avert a prospective danger, he cannot be held civilly responsible.
Id. at 541, 40 A. at 106 (emphasis added). 
This general rule has evolved into a standard, “which we have applied to tort claims against a
governmental representative is that the actor will be relieved of liability for his non-malicious acts where:
(1) he ‘is a public official rather than a mere government employee or agent; and (2) his tortious
conduct occurred while he was performing discretionary, as opposed to ministerial, acts in
furtherance of his official duties.’” Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 622, 510 A.2d
1078, 1080 (1986) (quoting James v. Prince George’s County, 288 Md. 315, 323, 418 A.2d 1173,
1178 (1980) (emphasis in original));  Robinson v. Board of County Comm’rs, 262 Md. 342,
18
346-47, 278 A.2d 71, 74 (1971); Duncan v. Koustenis, 260 Md. 98, 104, 271 A.2d 547, 550 (1970);
Clark v. Ferling, 220 Md. 109, 113-14, 151 A.2d 137, 139 (1959).  As we concluded in James, 288
Md. at 323-24, 418 A.2d at 1178:
-31-
Once it is established that the individual is a public official and the tort was committed
while performing a duty which involves the exercise of discretion, a qualified immunity
attaches; namely, in the absence of malice, the individual involved is free from liability.  The
rationale underlying this grant of immunity “is that a public purpose is served by protecting
officials when they act in an exercise of their discretion.”  [Citations omitted.] 
Maryland case law has affirmatively established that, while performing their duties, law enforcement officers
are public officials and, thus, fall within the scope of qualified immunity as to their discretionary acts.  They
have no immunity in respect to ministerial acts.  Clea v. Mayor of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662, 672, 541
A.2d 1303, 1308 (1988) (“In Maryland, a limited category of governmental personnel, including police
officers, are entitled under certain circumstances to qualified immunity from tort liability for their negligent
conduct.” (emphasis added)); Bradshaw v. Prince George’s County, 284 Md. 294, 302-03, 396
A.2d 255, 260-61 (1979) (“We have held that a police officer is a ‘public official’ when acting
within the scope of his law enforcement function.  As a ‘public official,’ a police officer is protected
by a qualified immunity against civil liability for non-malicious acts performed within the scope of his
authority.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); Cox v. Prince George’s County, 296 Md. 162, 168-
69, 460 A.2d 1038, 1041 (1983) (“[A] police officer would not be personally liable for negligent conduct
committed within the scope of employment due to his public-official immunity.”); Brewer v. Mele, 267
Md. 437, 444, 298 A.2d 156, 161 (1972) (“Some jurisdictions make the immunity of the law enforcement
officer absolute, provided only that he be acting within the scope of his official duties.  Others, including
Maryland, condition the immunity upon nonmalicious conduct.” (footnote omitted)), superseded by
statute on other grounds as stated in Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143, 725 A.2d 549 (1999);
Robinson, 262 Md. at 346-47, 278 A.2d at 74 (“In Maryland governmental immunity is extended to all
non-malicious acts of public officials * * * when acting in a discretionary * * * capacity . . . .  It is clear
-32-
that policemen are public officials.” (quotations omitted) (emphasis added)). 
The next issue we must address is whether Officer Colbert was acting in a discretionary manner.
As indicated by our analysis of section 798 and the Baltimore City Police Department General Order 10-
93, supra, he was not divested of discretion.  As we said in Ashburn, 306 Md. at 623, 510 A.2d at
1081:     
In addressing the difference between discretionary and ministerial actions, our
predecessors noted in Schneider v. Hawkins, 179 Md. 21, 25, 16 A.2d 861, 864
(1940):
The term “discretion” denotes freedom to act according to one’s judgment in the
absence of a hard and fast rule.  When applied to public officials, “discretion” is
the power conferred upon them by law to act officially under certain circumstances
according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience, and uncontrolled
by the judgment or conscience of others.  
Almost any action, however, may involve the use of discretion.  Thus, we noted in James,
supra, 288 Md. at 327, 418 A.2d at 1180:
When attempting to classify the particular actions of a public official, a
court should be careful not to let the mere fact that decisions are made in
performing the questioned task be determinative of whether liability attaches to
the conduct, for “[i]n a strict sense, every action of a government employee,
except perhaps a conditioned reflex action, involves the use of some degree of
discretion.”  Swanson v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 217, 219-20 (N.D.
Cal.1964).  Or as has been otherwise expressed: “it would be difficult to
conceive of any official act, no matter how directly ministerial, that did not admit
of some discretion in the manner of its performance, even if it involved only the
driving of a nail.”  Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 357, 73
Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968) (en banc).  Thus, an act falls within the
discretionary function of a public official if the decision which
involves an exercise of his personal judgment also includes, to more
than a minor degree, the manner in which the police power of the
State should be utilized.  [Emphasis supplied.]
 
Officer Colbert’s actions at 622 Melville Avenue on July 19, 1995 were discretionary in nature.  The
 We emphasize that the holdings of a long line of Maryland cases limit public official immunity to
19
discretionary acts.  Public official immunity does not, in the first instance, apply to ministerial acts.
-33-
record reflects that Officer Colbert’s actions while responding to the domestic violence complaint were in
conjunction with the standards required of a Baltimore Police Officer.  He took statements from both Mary
and Valerie Williams; upon learning of Gerald Watkins whereabouts, he requested that another police unit
be sent to that location; and he called for a camera to photograph Valerie Williams’ injuries.  Pursuant to
a separate mandate of Baltimore City Police Department General Order 10-93, one of the responsibilities
of a police officer responding to a domestic call is to “[h]ave the injuries photographed by the Mobile Crime
Lab in cases of serious or obvious injury to the victim.”  When no other police units brought the camera,
he decided to go to the station himself.  Ordinarily, he would have discretion to do so.  Having told them,
however, to go into the house and that he would remain, a duty may have existed to tell them that he was
leaving. 
To summarize, there are three prongs that must be satisfied in order for a government representative
to qualify for immunity: (1) he or must be a public official; and (2) his or her tortious conduct must have
occurred while performing discretionary acts in furtherance of official duties; and  (3) the acts must be
19
done without malice.  That being said we turn to the facts of the present case.  As Judge Moylan astutely
summarized for the Court of Special Appeals:
When Officer Colbert responded to the domestic violence call at 622 Melville
Avenue on July 19, 1995, he indisputedly was a government official exercising a portion of
the sovereign power of the State.  He indisputedly was acting within the scope of his
employment and, therefore, performing a discretionary act.  There was, moreover, no
remote suggestion that he was acting or failing to act with any sort of actual malice, with evil
or rancorous  motive influenced by hate, or with the purpose deliberately and wilfully to
injure [petitioners].         
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Williams, 128 Md. App. at 19, 736 A.2d at 1094. 
C. Special Relationship
Petitioners also contend that Officer Colbert’s affirmative actions and specific promises of
protection to Mary and Valerie Williams, which, they assert, were reasonably relied upon by them to their
detriment, created a special relationship between him and Mary and Valerie Williams that eliminates his
right to immunity.  We, at the very least, agree that under the peculiar circumstances testified to by Mary
Williams, there may be a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether a special relationship existed
between the two parties, thereby creating a duty of protection on the part of Officer Colbert.  Concerning
this issue, the granting of the summary judgment motion was inappropriate: the issue as to whether a special
relationship existed, when there is a dispute of material fact, is a decision for the finder of fact.  
It is important for us to remember that petitioners allege that Officer Colbert was negligent in the
performance of his duties in responding to this domestic complaint.  Under the circumstances of this case,
a claim for negligence will only stand if Officer Colbert actually owed petitioners a legal duty to protect,
which he breached.  As we noted in Ashburn, 306 Md. at 626-29, 510 A.2d at 1082-84:  
Judge McSherry stated for this Court over eighty years ago that:
there can be no negligence where there is no duty that is due; for negligence is the
breach of some duty that one person owes to another.  It is consequently relative
and can have no existence apart from some duty expressly or impliedly imposed.
In every instance, before negligence can be predicated of a given act, back of the
act must be sought and found a duty to the individual complaining, the observance
of which duty would have averted or avoided the injury. . . .  As the duty varies
with circumstances and with the relation to each other of the individuals concerned,
so the alleged negligence varies, and the act complained of never amounts to
negligence in law or in fact, if there has been no breach of duty.
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Judge McSherry’s comments remain viable today:  negligence is a breach of a duty owed
to one, and absent that duty, there can be no negligence.
  
“Duty” in negligence has been defined as “an obligation, to which the law will give
recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another.”
There is no set formula for this determination.  As Dean Prosser noted, “duty is not
sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of
policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.”  In
broad terms, these policies include: “convenience of administration, capacity of the parties
to bear the loss, a policy of preventing future injuries, [and] the moral blame attached to
the wrongdoer. . . .”  As one court suggested, there are a number of variables to be
considered in determining if a duty exists to another, such as:
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered the injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s
conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s
conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the
defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care
with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost and prevalence of
insurance for the risk involved.  
Perhaps among these the factor deemed most important is foreseeability.
However, “foreseeability” must not be confused with “duty.”  The fact that a result may be
foreseeable does not itself impose a duty in negligence terms.  This principle is apparent
in the acceptance by most jurisdictions and by this Court of the general rule that there is
no duty to control a third person’s conduct so as to prevent personal harm to another,
unless a “special relationship” exists either between the actor and the third person or
between the actor and the person injured.  
Thus, we recognize the general rule, as do most courts, that absent a “special
relationship” between police and victim, liability for failure to protect an individual citizen
against injury caused by another citizen does not lie against police officers.  Rather, the
“duty” owed by the police by virtue of their positions as officers is a duty to protect the
public, and the breach of that duty is most properly actionable by the public in the form of
criminal prosecution or administrative disposition.  As the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals stated in Morgan v. District of Columbia, supra, 468 A.2d [1306,] 1311
[(D.C. 1983)]:
public officials who act and react in the milieu of criminal activity where every
decision to deploy law enforcement personnel is fraught with uncertainty must have
broad discretion to proceed without fear of civil liability in the “unflinching
 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 315 (1965) states:
20
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing
physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person
which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct,
or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which
gives to the other a right to protection.
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discharge of their duties.”  As the Connecticut Supreme Court recognized the
public interest is not served “by allowing a jury of lay (persons) with the benefit of
20/20 hindsight to second-guess the exercise of a police [officer]’s discretionary
professional duty.  Such discretion is no discretion at all.” [Numerous citations
omitted.] [Some alterations in original.]   
As evidenced in the wording of Ashburn, Maryland recognizes that liability for failure to protect
an individual citizen against injury caused by another citizen, where the officer is performing a discretionary
act, does not lie against an officer, absent a “special relationship.”  In the presence of a “special
relationship” liability may lie and immunity may not survive.  Thus, “[t]he public duty doctrine . . . is not an
absolute bar to recovery.”  McMillan, supra, at 514.  As we continued in Ashburn:
A proper plaintiff, however, is not without recourse.  If he alleges sufficient facts
to show that the defendant policeman created a “special relationship” with him upon which
he relied, he may maintain his action in 
negligence.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315(b).
  This “special duty rule,”
[20]
as it has been termed by the courts, is nothing more than a modified application of the
principle that although generally there is no duty in negligence terms to act for the benefit
of any particular person, when one does indeed act for the benefit of another, he must act
in a reasonable manner.  See Scott v. Watson, supra, 278 Md. at 170-71, 359 A.2d
at 555; Penna R.R. Co. v. Yingling, 148 Md. 169, 129 A. 36 (1925).  In order for
a special relationship between police officer and victim to be found, it must
-37-
be shown that the local government or the police officer affirmatively acted
to protect the specific victim or a specific group of individuals like the victim,
thereby inducing the victim’s specific reliance upon the police protection.
See Williams v. State, 34 Cal.3d 18, 192 Cal. Rptr. 233, 664 P.2d 137, 140 (1983);
Morgan v. District of Columbia, supra, 468 A.2d at 1313-15; Florence v.
Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 196-97, 404 N.Y.S.2d 583, 587, 375 N.E.2d 763, 767
(1978); Morris v. Muser, supra, 478 A.2d at 940; Chambers-Castanes v. King
County, 100 Wash.2d 275, 669 P.2d 451, 458 (1983).
Ashburn, 306 Md at 630-31, 510 A.2d at 1085 (emphasis added).  
Maryland has considered what was meant by the term “special relationship” on several occasions.
In Ashburn, an Anne Arundel County police officer noticed an intoxicated man sitting behind the wheel
of a truck with its engine running, in the parking lot of a 7-11 convenience store.  The parties agreed that
the man was driving the vehicle and that the officer could have arrested the man for drunk driving.  Instead
of charging the man, the police officer told him to pull his car to the side of the lot and to stop driving for
the evening.  Once the officer left the scene, the man drove off and proceeded to hit a pedestrian, John F.
Ashburn, who lost his leg in the collision. Ashburn sued the Anne Arundel County Police Department
alleging that the officer had a special duty to protect Ashburn.  We disagreed, saying that Ashburn “alleged
no facts which show that [the police officer] affirmatively acted specifically for [Ashburn’s] benefit or that
[the officer’s] actions induced [Ashburn’s] reliance upon him.”  Ashburn, 306 Md. at 631-32, 510 A.2d
at 1085.  In other words, no special relationship ever existed between the officer and Ashburn. 
Prior to Ashburn, this Court considered whether a special relationship existed between the parents
of a child seriously injured by a drunk driver and the drunk driver’s probation officer who had failed to
report previous alcohol related driving offenses to the supervising court.  Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md.
236, 492 A.2d 1297 (1985).  In that case, the parents argued that the probation officer owed them a duty,
 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 319 provides:
21
One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to
cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care
to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm.
-38-
which he breached, under the theory that he had taken charge of an individual with dangerous propensities
and, therefore, had a duty to use reasonable care in preventing the individual from doing such harm.  See
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 319 (1965).   We held that no special relationship existed because the
21
probation officer never took charge of the individual in a manner that would create a duty to protect third
parties.  Id. at 253, 492 A.2d at 1306; see also Holson v. State, 99 Md. App. 411, 414, 637 A.2d
871, 872 (1994) (holding, in a case where a police officer took a drunk driver into custody, leaving a
passenger at the traffic stop, who then walked home and was struck by an automobile, that “[g]enerally,
there is no duty, or special relationship creating any such duty, requiring police officers to transport
intoxicated passengers of arrested drivers to their ultimate destination, or any destination.”); Jones v.
Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 82 Md. App. 314, 332, 571 A.2d 859,
868 (holding, in a case where a police officer failed to properly detain an intoxicated driver who fled the
scene and caused an accident, that “no ‘special relationship’ arises out of either an investigatory traffic stop
or its resulting brief detention.”), cert. denied, 320 Md. 351, 578 A.2d 191 (1990).                    
Looking at other jurisdictions, we have discovered that, although courts have found special
relationships under a variety of circumstances, a court is generally more likely to find such a relationship
when the police have taken some affirmative action.  A number of our sister states have developed a series
of questions in order to determine whether a special  relationship exists.
  New York also provides us with two cases, with facts similar to the present case, in which the
22
courts found a special relationship existed.  In Velez v. City of New York, 157 A.D.2d 370, 556
N.Y.S.2d 537, appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d 715, 565 N.E.2d 1269, 564 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1990), a
woman was shot and killed in her mother’s apartment by her ex-boyfriend while she was in the protection
of two New York City policemen.  In the hours before her death, Ms. Velez and her three-month-old baby
were abducted by her ex-boyfriend (and father of the child) from her mother’s apartment and taken to the
ex-boyfriend’s apartment.  There he tied her up and left his apartment.  While he was gone, she managed
to free herself from her bonds and call the police.  The police arrived, drove around the neighborhood
looking for the ex-boyfriend, and finally escorted Ms. Velez back to her mother’s house where her ex-
boyfriend lay in wait.  He shot and killed Ms. Velez and immediately shot and killed himself.  Concerning
evidence of the special relationship, that court said, “were we to review [the municipality’s] argument on
the merits, we would hold that the evidence of a special relationship was not insufficient as a matter of law.
Surely the requisite reliance on [Ms. Velez’s] part arguably existed for at least as long as she was in police
escort.”  Id. at 373, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 539.  
In DeLong v. County of Erie, 60 N.Y.2d 296, 457 N.E.2d 717 (1983), a special relationship
was found based on a caller’s reliance on promises of help from a 911 operator.  On the morning of
October 25, 1976, Amalia DeLong dialed 911 from her home in Kenmore, New York for emergency
police assistance because a burglar was breaking into her home.  She lived only blocks from the police
station and the 911 operator told her the police were on the way.  As a result of this assurance, Ms.
DeLong elected to remain in her home.  Unfortunately, the operator had misrecorded Ms. DeLong’s
address.  After officers informed the 911 operator that they could not locate the house, the 911 operator
told officers to disregard the request.  The perpetrator then broke into her home and brutally murdered Ms.
DeLong.  The Court held that a special relationship may have existed based on two factors: (1) that the
local government had encouraged her (and all victims of crime) to call 911 for emergency help; and (2) by
saying that police were on the way, the operator made a promise, upon which Ms. DeLong relied.  “Under
similar circumstances it has been held that a special relationship was created so as to require the
municipality to exercise ordinary care in the performance of a duty it has voluntarily assumed. . . .  Whether
a special duty has been breached is generally a question for the jury to decide.” Id. at 305-06, 457 N.E.2d
at 721-22.  These cases indicate that in circumstances when a person relies on the actions of a police
officer, a special relationship may be found that eliminates a law enforcement officer’s immunity and renders
him or her civilly liable.    
-39-
In 1987, the Court of Appeals of New York considered the special relationship exception to public
official immunity in Cuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 505 N.E.2d 937 (1987).   In that case,
22
Joseph and Eleanor Cuffy owned a two-family house.  They lived in the upstairs apartment with their family
and rented the downstairs to Joel and Barbara Aitkins for approximately a year.  The relationship between
-40-
the two parties was strained and the police had to intervene on several occasions.  Due to Joel Aitkins
making repeated threats to the Cuffy family, Joseph Cuffy went to the local police precinct requesting
protection.  The police assured Joseph Cuffy that protection would be supplied and something would be
done about the situation first thing in the morning.  The police took no further action and the next day a fight
broke out between the families in which Joel Aitkins struck the Cuffy’s son, Ralston, with a bat and Barbara
Aitkins attacked Eleanor Cuffy and their other son, Cyril, with a knife.  The family sued the police
department alleging that a special relationship had been created between the police and the family based
on the police officer’s assurance of protection.  Although the Court of Appeals of New York found no
special relationship, it outlined the elements for defining a special relationship as follows:
(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty
to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the
municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact
between the municipality’s agents and the injured party; and (4) that party’s justifiable
reliance on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking.
Id. at 260, 505 N.E.2d at 940.  
In 1983, the Superior Court for Pennsylvania similarly created a test for determining whether a
special relationship exists in Melendez v. City of Philadelphia, 320 Pa. Super. 59, 466 A.2d 1060
(1983).  In that case, a young boy was shot in the left eye by his neighbor during a racial confrontation.
The victim and his parents sued the City of Philadelphia alleging that a special relationship existed because
it had failed to protect sufficiently citizens from racial violence.  That court initially noted:
Generally, it is acknowledged that there is no duty resting on a . . . governmental body to
provide police protection to any particular person.  However, where the circumstances
establish a “special relationship” . . . then an exception to the general rule will be found and
an affirmative duty to act will be imposed. . . .
-41-
. . . A special relationship is generally found to exist only in cases in which an
individual is exposed to a special danger and the authorities have undertaken the
responsibility to provide adequate protection for him.  
Id. at 64, 466 A.2d at 1063.  Melendez had argued that the city had created such a special relationship
because it had given assurances of protection to the residents of the neighborhood.  The Pennsylvania court
rejected his contention and then noted:
[T]he rule almost universally recognized is that the individual claiming a “special
relationship” must demonstrate that the police were:  1) aware of the individual’s
particular situation or unique status, 2) had knowledge of the potential for
the particular harm which the individual suffered, and 3) voluntarily
assumed, in light of that knowledge, to protect the individual from the
precise harm which was occasioned.  
Id. at 65, 466 A.2d at 1063-64 (some emphasis added).
In Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 275, 669 P.2d 451 (1983), the
Supreme Court of Washington also outlined a set of questions designed to determine the existence of a
special relationship.  This case involved a police department’s failure to respond to repeated emergency
calls to 911 to report an assault in progress.  The court implemented the following test:    
In determining whether an act falls within the [special relationship] exception, the
court must consider the following four questions:
 (1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily involve a basic
governmental policy, program, or objective? (2) Is the questioned act, omission,
or decision essential to the realization or accomplishment of that policy, program,
or objective as opposed to one which would not change the course or direction
of the policy, program, or objective? (3) Does the act, omission, or decision
require the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part
of the governmental agency involved? (4) Does the governmental agency involved
possess the requisite constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or
make the challenged act, omission, or decision?     
Id. at 281 n.2, 669 P.2d at 456 n.2 (quoting Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67
-42-
Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965)).  
We believe that the intent of the “special relationship” doctrine is better addressed by our general
standard outlined in Ashburn: 
In order for a special relationship between police officer and victim to be found, it must be
shown that the local government or the police officer affirmatively acted to protect the
specific victim or a specific group of individuals like the victim, thereby inducing the victim’s
specific reliance upon the police protection. 
    
Ashburn, 306 Md. at 631, 510 A.2d at 1085.  Under Ashburn, a determination of whether a special
relationship exists is to be done on a case-by-case basis.  Because it is evident, when a dispute of material
fact exists, that the determination as to whether a special relationship exists lies with the trier of fact, we
refrain from resolving whether such a relationship exists in the present case.  We have, however,
determined that, in the case sub judice, there is a genuine dispute of a material fact.  Officer Colbert
stated in his deposition that he told Mary Williams that he was waiting to see if anybody was available to
bring him a camera, and that, at that time, he called again and learned that there was nobody available to
bring him one.  He stated in his deposition that he then told Mary Williams that he had to go get the camera
himself, and she responded by saying that was fine.  That is substantially different than Mary Williams’
account of what happened.  According to her deposition, Officer Colbert told her that he had to write his
report and that she was to go in the house, because he was going to remain outside.  While the officer may
have had no duty to remain, if in fact he told Mrs. Williams that he would remain to protect them, he may
have created a special relationship further creating a duty either to remain or to inform them that he was
leaving.  Whose story is more accurate is an issue of credibility and is a responsibility best left to the trier
of fact.  We do not mean to suggest an appropriate resolution of this dispute.  We merely acknowledge that
-43-
there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to the stories of the witnesses and based on those differences
a finder of fact could find that a special relationship did exist between the parties.  Therefore, the granting
of respondent’s summary judgment motion was inappropriate.  Accordingly, we reverse the holding of the
Court of Special Appeals, vacate the motion for summary judgment granted by the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City and remand this case back to that court for a trial.
III.  Conclusion
We hold that Officer Colbert was not divested of discretion nor mandated by Article 27, section
798(B)(2), and Baltimore City Police Department General Order 10-93 to protect petitioners under the
specific circumstances that evolved in this case.  We also hold that, generally, a police officer has immunity
from civil liability for negligence when he is performing a discretionary duty (although not while performing
a ministerial act), absent a special relationship; however, we hold that Officer Colbert’s affirmative actions
and specific promises of protection to Mary and Valerie Williams, if in fact they occurred, are sufficient to
have created a special relationship between himself and Mary and Valerie Williams.  This special
relationship, if it existed, may have created a duty of protection on the part of Officer Colbert.  If so, his
actions at 622 Melville Avenue may not warrant protection under either statutory or common law immunity.
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Special Appeals and remand to vacate the order of
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City granting Officer Colbert summary judgment.     
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AS
TO THE ISSUES INVOLVING OFFICER COLBERT
REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE
THE GRANTING OF OFFICER COLBERT’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TO REMAND THE
CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY
-44-
FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS
OPINION; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT
OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE MAYOR AND
CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE.
Williams v. The Mayor & City Council of Baltimore
No. 124, September Term, 1999
Headnote:
Under the circumstances of this case, a police officer was not divested of discretion, nor
mandated, by a domestic violence protection statute to continually protect the victims of
assault.  A police officer generally has immunity from civil liability absent a special
relationship.  The officer’s affirmative actions and specific promises of protection, if in fact
they occurred, may have created a special relationship between himself and the victims
subjecting the officer to general tort liability.