Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Bricker

Citation: 2013-Ohio-3998

Docket Number: 2012-1713

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-09-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Bricker, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-3998.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-3998 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. BRICKER. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Bricker,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-3998.] 
Attorney misconduct—Improper use of client trust account—Using client trust 
account to pay personal and business expenses—Failing to withdraw 
earned fees—Failing to have contingent-fee collection clients sign closing 
statements—Public reprimand. 
(No. 2012-1713—Submitted February 27, 2013—Decided September 18, 2013.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 11-104. 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Dale Elmer Bricker of Youngstown, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0004922, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1961.  
On December 3, 2007, we suspended Bricker’s license to practice law for his 
failure to register as an attorney for the 2007 to 2009 biennium.  In re Attorney 
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Registration Suspension of Bricker, 116 Ohio St.3d 1420, 2007-Ohio-6463, 877 
N.E.2d 305.  We granted his application for reinstatement four days later after he 
paid the applicable registration and reinstatement fees.  In re Reinstatement of 
Bricker, 116 Ohio St.3d 1498, 2008-Ohio-290, 880 N.E.2d 97.  On December 5, 
2011, a probable-cause panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline certified a complaint filed by relator, disciplinary counsel.  The 
complaint alleged that Bricker had committed multiple violations of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct by failing to prepare closing statements for a personal-
injury client and other clients for whom he had agreed to perform work on a 
contingent-fee basis, commingling personal and client funds in his client trust 
account, and using that account to pay some personal and operating expenses. 
{¶ 2} Bricker was served with the complaint and filed an answer.  A panel 
of the board conducted a hearing at which it received the parties’ stipulations of 
fact, stipulated exhibits, and stipulations as to some of the charged misconduct, as 
well as Bricker’s testimony.  The panel prepared written findings of fact and 
misconduct, purportedly dismissed an alleged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the 
lawyer’s fitness to practice law), and recommended that Bricker be publicly 
reprimanded for his misconduct.  The board adopted the panel’s findings and 
recommendation in toto. 
{¶ 3} Relator objects to the dismissal of the alleged violation of 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h), arguing that contrary to the panel and board’s findings, he 
has proven the violation by clear and convincing evidence.  He also contends that 
the recommended sanction is more lenient than the sanctions we have previously 
imposed for comparable misconduct.  For the reasons that follow, we overrule 
relator’s objections, adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct, and 
publicly reprimand Bricker. 
 
 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
Misconduct 
Improper Use and Maintenance of 
Client Trust Account 
{¶ 4} From 1961 to 1995, Bricker served as in-house counsel for the 
Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation.  Since 1995, he has been a self-employed solo 
practitioner practicing primarily in the areas of commercial and residential 
landlord-tenant litigation, real estate, general civil litigation, and collections.  
Occasionally, he represents plaintiffs in personal-injury matters. 
{¶ 5} Since August 25, 2010, Bricker has maintained a client trust account 
at PNC Bank that is designated as an Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts 
(“IOLTA”) account.  Bricker previously kept personal and client funds in a 
checking account that he designated as his “trust account” at Farmers National 
Bank, but he closed that account in 2009.  He maintains his law-office operating 
account at Farmers National Bank and a personal savings account at Huntington 
Bank, but he does not have a personal checking account. 
{¶ 6} On September 7, 2010, less than two weeks after Bricker opened his 
IOLTA account, he issued a check from the account to pay a $30 personal 
expense.  Bricker continued to issue checks and to authorize electronic payments 
from the account for his personal and business expenses until August 2011.  He 
also failed to maintain ledgers of the client funds held in his IOLTA account, and 
therefore, he did not reconcile his IOLTA account balance with ledger balances 
for each of his clients. 
{¶ 7} In response to a December 9, 2010 letter of inquiry from relator 
about an overdraft of his IOLTA account, Bricker explained that he had signed a 
five-year lease for a piece of office equipment and agreed to make the monthly 
lease payments from his IOLTA account.  He stated that unbeknownst to him, the 
vendor withdrew $573.73 to cover the sales tax for the entire five-year lease, 
thereby causing the overdraft.  Bricker advised relator that he had recognized his 
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mistake, that he had arranged to have the lease payments withdrawn from another 
bank account, and that he would use his IOLTA account only for client funds.  
Despite making these representations, he continued to use his IOLTA account to 
pay for personal and business expenses. 
{¶ 8} In preparation for his August 2011 deposition, Bricker thoroughly 
read the Rules of Professional Conduct, particularly Prof.Cond.R. 1.15.  During 
the deposition, relator and respondent discussed the proper use of an IOLTA 
account.  Bricker later stated that this was the first time he understood what the 
rules required of him. 
{¶ 9} The parties stipulated and the panel found that Bricker’s conduct 
with respect to his IOLTA account violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a) (requiring a 
lawyer to hold the property of clients in an interest-bearing client trust account, 
separate from the lawyer’s own property), 1.15(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to 
maintain a record for each client on whose behalf funds are held), and 1.15(a)(5) 
(requiring a lawyer to perform and retain a monthly reconciliation of the funds 
held in the lawyer’s client trust account) as charged in the complaint.  The panel, 
however, found that relator had not presented clear and convincing evidence that 
Bricker’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law) 
and purported to dismiss an alleged violation of that rule.  The board adopted the 
panel’s findings of fact and misconduct. 
Failure to Provide Closing Statements to 
Contingent-Fee Clients 
{¶ 10} Bricker handles a number of collection matters on a contingent-fee 
basis.  He stipulated that in those cases, he executes letters of representation that 
state that his fee will be one-third of the amount collected on behalf of his clients.  
He deposits funds he collects on behalf of some of those clients into his IOLTA 
account and disburses the client’s share of the proceeds, while retaining his 
January Term, 2013 
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contingent fee.  At the time of the panel hearing, however, his collections practice 
was limited almost exclusively to matters on behalf of the Ohio attorney general.  
He explained that in those cases, the debtors remit checks payable to the state 
treasurer.  Bricker then forwards the checks to the attorney general, who later 
pays his fee. 
{¶ 11} Relator charged Bricker with violating Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(c)(2) 
(requiring a lawyer entitled to compensation under a contingent-fee agreement to 
prepare a closing statement to be signed by the lawyer and the client, detailing the 
calculation of the lawyer’s compensation, any costs and expenses deducted from 
the judgment or settlement, and any division of fees with a lawyer not in the same 
firm) for failing to provide closing statements to his contingent-fee clients. 
{¶ 12} Bricker represented Gary Manchester in a personal-injury matter in 
exchange for a contingent fee of one-third of any recovery.  He settled the case for 
$7,158 and sent a letter to Manchester with a check from his IOLTA account 
explaining the distribution of the settlement check—a practice that he also 
followed with his collection clients.  But at no time did he have Manchester or 
any of his collection clients sign closing statements detailing the calculation of his 
compensation and the distribution of costs and expenses.  Although the parties 
stipulated to these facts, they did not stipulate that this conduct violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(c)(2). 
{¶ 13} In his testimony before the panel, Bricker questioned the 
application of the rule to collection matters, and in its report, the panel noted that 
one panel member believed that the rule applied only to tort cases.  The majority 
of the panel found, however, that the commentary to Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(c)(1) 
expresses the intent to expand upon previously aspirational goals to require all 
contingent-fee agreements to be reduced to writing and signed by the client and 
the lawyer, that Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(c)(2) directs that a lawyer shall provide a 
closing statement that discloses the manner in which the contingent compensation 
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was determined, and that the closing statement shall be signed by the client and 
the lawyer.  Therefore, a majority of the panel found that the rule applies to all 
contingent-fee cases and determined that Bricker’s failure to have his contingent-
fee collection clients and Manchester sign closing statements detailing the 
disbursements in their cases violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(c)(2).  The board adopted 
the panel’s findings of fact and misconduct with respect to this alleged violation. 
Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 14} In recommending a sanction, the panel and board considered the 
ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the sanctions imposed in similar cases.  
See Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 
N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  They also considered the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 15} The only aggravating factor advanced by relator is Bricker’s four-
day attorney-registration suspension in December 2007 for failure to timely 
submit his certificate of registration and pay the applicable registration fee.  See 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a).  The panel believed that this suspension resulted 
from an oversight rather than a deliberate violation of the rules and therefore gave 
it little weight as an aggravating factor. 
{¶ 16} As mitigating factors, the parties stipulated and the panel found that 
Bricker (1) did not act with a dishonest or selfish motive, (2) made a full and free 
disclosure to the board and demonstrated a cooperative attitude toward the 
disciplinary proceedings, and (3) presented letters from two judges, three 
attorneys, and his pastor, who attested to his good character and reputation.  See 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(b), (d), and (e).  The panel found that none of his 
clients were harmed, that he used earned fees that he had left in his IOLTA 
account to pay the personal expenses in question, and that he has fully 
acknowledged the wrongful nature of his conduct and shown remorse.  The panel 
January Term, 2013 
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also determined that Bricker had “kept scrupulous records for his collection 
accounts, although not in the format as required by the Rules of Professional 
Conduct.”  Moreover, the panel was impressed by Bricker’s long and 
distinguished career of more than 50 years, his active participation in his church, 
and his dedication to community service. 
{¶ 17} Relator recommended that Bricker be suspended from the practice 
of law for one year, fully stayed on the conditions that he serve one year of 
monitored probation, complete six hours of continuing legal education in trust 
accounts and office management, and commit no further misconduct.  Bricker 
argued that a public reprimand will adequately protect the public from future 
misconduct because he has come to appreciate his duties under the Rules of 
Professional Conduct during this disciplinary proceeding and has brought himself 
into compliance with those rules. 
{¶ 18} The panel considered a number of cases involving similar 
misconduct.  It noted, however, the substantial mitigating factors and unique 
circumstances of this case.  While acknowledging that after serving for more than 
30 years as in-house counsel, Bricker did not appreciate or comply with all the 
technical ethical responsibilities of a lawyer engaged in solo practice, the panel 
determined that he had not violated the spirit of those responsibilities because he 
had provided honest and competent service to his clients and maintained 
meticulous records, had not harmed any clients, and was extremely remorseful.  
Believing that his participation in the disciplinary process itself was a sufficient 
wake-up call, the panel recommended that he be publicly reprimanded for his 
misconduct.  The board adopted the panel’s findings and recommended sanction. 
 
 
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Relator’s Objections 
Objection to the Dismissal of the Alleged Violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) 
{¶ 19} In his first objection, relator challenges the panel’s purported 
dismissal1 of an alleged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h), which provides that it is 
professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in any other conduct that 
adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Relator argues that because he has presented clear and convincing evidence that 
Bricker kept his earned fees and client funds in his IOLTA account, he has 
necessarily proven a corresponding violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h). 
{¶ 20} Bricker argues that if this court were to adopt relator’s argument, 
every violation of a Rule of Professional Conduct will necessarily result in a 
violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h), thereby depriving the rule of any purpose or 
effect.  Instead, he argues that the rule is a catchall provision that should be used 
in just two circumstances—(1) situations in which a lawyer’s conduct in violation 
of other more specific rules is so egregious that it adversely reflects on his fitness 
to practice law and (2) cases in which there is no specific provision prohibiting a 
lawyer’s conduct, yet there is clear and convincing evidence that the conduct is 
                                                 
1 In its report, the panel stated its intention to dismiss the alleged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) 
based on the insufficiency of relator’s evidence.  Gov.Bar R. V(6)(G) permits a unanimous panel 
of the board to order the dismissal of a complaint or an individual count without referring it to the 
board or this court for review.  The rule, however, requires the panel to provide notice to counsel 
of record and certain interested parties, including disciplinary counsel, the certified grievance 
committee, and the local bar association of the county in which the respondent resides and 
maintains an office and the county from which the complaint arose, and the Ohio State Bar 
Association.  The record in this case does not establish that the panel complied with the notice 
requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(6)(G) when it stated its intention to dismiss the alleged violation of 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h).   Instead, the panel certified its findings of fact and recommendations to the 
board in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(6)(H) and (I).  Because the board did not order dismissal 
and provide the notices required by Gov.Bar R. V(6)(J), we treat the purported dismissal as a 
recommendation that the alleged violation be dismissed and address relator’s objection to that 
recommendation herein.  See, e.g., In re Complaint Against Harper, 77 Ohio St.3d 211, 216, 673 
N.E.2d 1253 (1996); Disciplinary Counsel v. Doellman, 127 Ohio St.3d 411, 2010-Ohio-5990, 
940 N.E.2d 928, ¶ 31-33.   
January Term, 2013 
9 
 
unethical and that it adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice.  We 
agree. 
{¶ 21} Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) is a catchall provision.  In order to find a 
violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h), there must be clear and convincing evidence that 
the lawyer has engaged in misconduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s 
fitness to practice law, even though that conduct is not specifically prohibited by 
the rules, or there must be proof that the conduct giving rise to a specific rule 
violation is so egregious as to warrant an additional finding that it adversely 
reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law. 
{¶ 22} This interpretation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) is evident in cases in 
which we adopted the board’s recommendation to dismiss alleged violations of 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) based on insufficient evidence to support a finding that the 
respondent had engaged in conduct adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice 
law despite finding other violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct when 
the violations were not of a particularly egregious nature.  See, e.g. Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Gallo, 131 Ohio St.3d 309, 2012-Ohio-758, 964 N.E.2d 1024 
(upholding dismissal of a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) when the respondent 
had not knowingly committed the disciplinary offense and was under considerable 
pressure from his employer when he committed the offense); and  Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Gerchak, 130 Ohio St.3d 143, 2011-Ohio-5075, 956 N.E.2d 292 
(upholding dismissal of a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) finding that the 
disciplinary offense was not motivated by malicious or selfish reasons). 
{¶ 23} On the other hand, the cases cited by relator involve lawyers who 
stipulated that they violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h).  See Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Johnston, 121 Ohio St.3d 403, 2009-Ohio-1432, 904 N.E.2d 892, ¶ 10; 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Murraine, 130 Ohio St.3d 397, 2011-Ohio-5795, 958 
N.E.2d 942, ¶ 6; and Disciplinary Counsel v. LaRue, 122 Ohio St.3d 445, 2009-
Ohio-3604, 912 N.E.2d 101, ¶ 5.  The egregious nature of their misconduct also 
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warranted the additional finding that they had engaged in conduct that adversely 
reflected on their fitness to practice law.  Murraine and LaRue actively deposited 
personal funds into their client trust accounts, and Johnston overdrew his trust 
account on 22 occasions, bounced a trust-account check issued to a client, and did 
not have any reliable recordkeeping system in place to account for client funds in 
his possession, let alone a system that complied with the requirements of 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.15.  Murraine at ¶ 4; LaRue at ¶ 3; and Johnston at ¶ 8-9. 
{¶ 24} Bricker, in contrast, left earned fees in his client trust account and 
paid some personal and business expenses directly from that account instead of 
issuing checks to himself and then paying his obligations from a personal or 
operating account.  And there is no evidence that he ever used client funds to pay 
those obligations, as Johnston did.  While we have determined that Bricker’s 
conduct violated more specific provisions of the rules, we do not find that this 
misconduct is so egregious as to constitute a separate violation of Prof.Cond.R. 
8.4(h).  Furthermore, relator does not argue that Bricker engaged in any additional 
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.  We therefore 
overrule relator’s first objection to the board report and dismiss the alleged 
violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h). 
Objection to the Board’s Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 25} In his second objection, relator contends that Bricker’s conduct 
warrants a six-month conditionally stayed suspension from the practice of law.  
He argues that we have imposed conditionally stayed suspensions of six months 
to one year for comparable misconduct.  See, e.g., Columbus Bar Assn. v. Watson, 
132 Ohio St.3d 496, 2012-Ohio-3830, 974 N.E.2d 103; Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Murraine, 130 Ohio St.3d 397, 2011-Ohio-5795, 958 N.E.2d 942; and 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Johnston, 121 Ohio St.3d 403, 2009-Ohio-1432; 904 
N.E.2d 892 (imposing one-year conditionally stayed suspensions); and 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Vivyan, 125 Ohio St.3d 12, 2010-Ohio-650, 925 N.E.2d 
January Term, 2013 
11 
 
947; Disciplinary Counsel v. LaRue, 122 Ohio St.3d 445, 2009-Ohio-3604, 912 
N.E.2d 101; and Disciplinary Counsel v. Fletcher, 122 Ohio St.3d 390, 2009-
Ohio-3480, 911 N.E.2d 897 (imposing six-month conditionally stayed 
suspensions). 
{¶ 26} These cases, however, are largely distinguishable from the case 
currently before us.  In Watson, we imposed a one-year suspension stayed on 
conditions on an attorney who deposited client funds into his operating account, 
deposited a $20,000 gift from his mother into his client trust account, and issued 
two checks from his client trust account to pay his rent.  Watson at ¶ 4-6.  
Notably, Watson had been diagnosed with depression and attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder, but he did not present sufficient evidence to support 
a finding that his condition was a mitigating factor pursuant to BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(g).  Id. at ¶ 9-12.  But given the ongoing nature of these mental-health 
conditions, their potential to impair Watson’s ability to competently, ethically, 
and professionally practice law, and a previous lapse in treatment, we found that a 
one-year suspension stayed on conditions, including participation in an evaluation 
by the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program and compliance with any treatment 
recommendations, would best protect the public from future misconduct.  Id. at 
¶ 14-15. 
{¶ 27} Murraine, LaRue, and Johnston are distinguishable because in each 
of those cases, the respondent deposited personal funds into his trust account and 
then withdrew funds to pay for personal or operating expenses.  Murraine at ¶ 4-
6;  LaRue at ¶ 3; and Johnston at ¶ 5-7.  In Vivyan, the respondent withdrew 
unearned funds from his client trust account for his personal use.  Vivyan at ¶ 5.  
In contrast, Bricker’s commingling resulted from his failure to timely withdraw 
fees from his client trust account as they were earned, and his payment of 
personal expenses directly from his client trust account was more in the nature of 
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a distribution of those earned fees.  Moreover, there is no suggestion that he ever 
misappropriated client funds, either purposely or negligently. 
{¶ 28} Of all the cases cited by relator, the facts surrounding the misuse of 
the trust account in Fletcher are most similar to the present case.  Fletcher failed 
to maintain records to document the identity of client funds in his client trust 
account for at least 11 years and failed to maintain records of disbursements and 
balances for each client for at least one year.  Fletcher, 122 Ohio St.3d 390, 2009-
Ohio-3480, 911 N.E.2d 897, at ¶ 4.  He also failed to maintain an operating 
account for at least five years, opting instead to commingle personal and client 
funds in his client trust account and to use that account to pay personal and 
business expenses.  Id. at ¶ 5-6.  But in addition to this misconduct, Fletcher also 
violated DR 5-103(B)(3) (a lawyer shall not provide financial assistance in 
connection with litigation unrelated to court costs or litigation expenses) when he 
loaned money to a client for the client’s personal expenses. 
{¶ 29} The two cases cited by the board in support of its recommendation 
of a public reprimand are more compelling than the cases cited by relator—
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Seibel, 132 Ohio St.3d 411, 2012-Ohio-3234, 972 N.E.2d 
594, and Medina Cty. Bar Assn. v. Piszczek, 115 Ohio St.3d 228, 2007-Ohio-
4946, 874 N.E.2d 783.  Seibel failed to memorialize a contingent-fee agreement 
in writing, treated his client’s retainer and deposit for litigation costs as a 
nonrefundable retainer and deposited it into his operating account without 
advising the client that she might be entitled to a refund if Seibel did not complete 
the representation, failed to maintain the client’s retainer and fees in an interest-
bearing client trust account separate from his own funds, and failed to promptly 
deliver the client’s funds and file to her upon the termination of his employment.  
Seibel at ¶ 5-8.  The board—and this court—rejected the parties’ stipulated 
sanction of a six-month stayed suspension in favor of a public reprimand, noting 
that Seibel did not have a prior disciplinary record, did not act with a dishonest or 
January Term, 2013 
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selfish motive, accepted responsibility for his misconduct, and made restitution.  
Id. at ¶ 11-12, 16. 
{¶ 30} In Piszczek, we publicly reprimanded an attorney who entrusted the 
day-to-day management of his client trust account to an associate attorney and 
failed to monitor the account activity.  His lack of oversight allowed his associate 
to issue payments to clients who did not have funds in the client trust account and 
overpayments to clients who did have money in the account, actions that resulted 
in an overdraft of more than $7,000.  Piszczek at ¶ 4.  Piszczek also commingled 
personal and client funds by leaving earned fees in his client trust account and 
withdrawing them without documenting which client the fees should be attributed 
to.  Id. at ¶ 5.  No aggravating factors were present.  Piszczek engaged in an 
account audit, reconciled all of the discovered irregularities, made timely 
restitution, ceased his associate’s use of the account, and instituted an effective 
office accounting system.  He also fully cooperated in the disciplinary proceeding 
and presented evidence of his good character and reputation in the legal 
community.  Id. at ¶ 6. 
{¶ 31} We are mindful that the primary purpose of the disciplinary process 
is not to punish the offender but to protect the public from lawyers who are 
unworthy of the trust and confidence essential to the attorney-client relationship.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Agopian, 112 Ohio St.3d 103, 2006-Ohio-6510, 858 
N.E.2d 368.  Here, the board recognized that Bricker had practiced as in-house 
counsel for more than 30 years before commencing his solo practice and that he 
had practiced law for more than 50 years—with only a brief, four-day suspension 
for his failure to timely complete his attorney registration in 2007.  It also 
recognized his honest and competent service to his clients, the absence of harm to 
any client, and his genuine remorse for his violations of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct.  On these facts, and in light of Seibel and Piszczek, in which we publicly 
reprimanded the attorneys despite the fact that their conduct involved the actual 
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misuse of client funds, the board has recommended that we publicly reprimand 
Bricker for his conduct in this case. 
{¶ 32} Having considered Bricker’s misconduct, the applicable mitigating 
factors, and the sanctions imposed for comparable misconduct, we believe that a 
public reprimand will adequately protect the public from future harm.  Therefore, 
we overrule relator’s objection and adopt the board’s recommended sanction. 
{¶ 33} Accordingly, we publicly reprimand Dale Elmer Bricker for his 
improper handling of his client trust account.  Costs are taxed to Bricker. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, FRENCH, and 
O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents and would impose a six-month suspension, stayed. 
____________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Joseph M. Caligiuri, 
Chief Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
John B. Juhasz, for respondent. 
________________________