Case Title: Gordon v. Cheskin

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2013-12-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2013 ME 113 
Docket: 
Wal-13-125 
Submitted 
  On Briefs: 
October 31, 2013 
Decided: 
December 24, 2013 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, and JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
KRISTIN L. GORDON 
 
v. 
 
JEFFREY M. CHESKIN 
 
SILVER, J. 
 
[¶1]  Jeffrey M. Cheskin appeals from a judgment of the District Court 
(Belfast, Worth, J.) granting Kristin L. Gordon’s motion to modify the custody 
order concerning the parties’ two minor daughters.  The effect of the order was to 
deprive Cheskin of overnight visitation with the girls.  Cheskin argues that several 
of the court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous, and that the court erred by 
adopting every term of Gordon’s proposed order.  Gordon concedes that the trial 
court’s finding that Cheskin had been convicted of a crime was clear error, but 
asserts that this error was harmless.  We affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  Cheskin and Gordon divorced in Pennsylvania in 2005.  They have two 
daughters, who were ages nine and twelve at the time of the hearing in this case.  A 
custody order issued in Pennsylvania on March 16, 2005, was superseded by the 
 
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parties’ agreement to a second custody order, dated May 4, 2006.  The second 
custody order permitted Gordon to move to Maine with the girls in the summer of 
2006 and to maintain primary physical custody; it modified Cheskin’s visitation 
schedule accordingly.  The parties maintained shared parental rights and 
responsibilities, or “joint legal custody,” of the girls.1 
 
[¶3]  Cheskin remarried in August 2006.  He had a son with his second wife 
in November 2007.  Cheskin and his second wife divorced in 2009.  In 2011, 
Cheskin was charged in Delaware with offensive touching2 and endangering the 
welfare of a child.  The charges arose from an incident where, in response to being 
kicked while trying to change his three-year-old son into a swimming diaper, 
Cheskin grabbed his son’s leg hard enough to leave a pink mark.  Cheskin pleaded 
guilty to offensive touching.  He was placed on probation with the condition that, if 
he successfully met the terms of his probation, the charge would be dismissed 
without a finding of guilt pursuant to the Domestic Violence First Offenders 
                                         
1  Pursuant to Pennsylvania law, “legal custody” means “[t]he right to make major decisions on behalf 
of the child, including, but not limited to, medical, religious and educational decisions.”  23 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann.  § 5322(a) (West 2011).  
 
2  Pursuant to Delaware law, a person is guilty of offensive touching when the person: 
 
Intentionally touches another person either with a member of his or her body or with any 
instrument, knowing that the person is thereby likely to cause offense or alarm to such 
other person[.] 
 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 601(a)(1) (West 2013). 
 
 
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Diversion Program in New Castle County, Delaware.3  The charge of endangering 
the welfare of a child was not prosecuted. 
 
[¶4]  Also in 2011, Cheskin’s ex-wife⎯his son’s mother⎯filed a complaint 
for protection from abuse against Cheskin.  A protection from abuse order, which 
was issued by agreement, remained in effect from May 2011 until May 2012.  
During that time, Cheskin had only supervised visits with his son.  At Gordon’s 
insistence, Cheskin agreed that his visits with his daughters would be supervised 
during that time period as well.  Gordon supervised those visits herself. 
 
[¶5]  Gordon filed a motion to modify the custody order in April 2012.4  
Cheskin’s unsupervised visits with the girls resumed in the summer of 2012.  In 
July 2012, the Delaware Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their 
Families opened another investigation following an incident between Cheskin and 
his son, which the girls witnessed.  This incident involved Cheskin grabbing his 
son, who was misbehaving at an indoor play facility, and pushing him against a 
wall. 
                                         
3  See Del. Code Ann. Tit. 10, § 1024 (West 2013).  Maine employs a similar procedural device, 
commonly referred to as a “deferred disposition,” 17-A M.R.S. §§ 1348 to 1348-C (2012), although it is 
available to any person who pleads guilty to any Class C, Class D, or Class E crime, id. § 1348. 
 
4  Gordon registered the Pennsylvania custody order with the Maine District Court in Belfast pursuant 
to 19-A M.R.S. § 1765(1) (2012) on August 1, 2011.  The District Court had jurisdiction to modify the 
order pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, 19-A M.R.S. 
§ 1731-1783 (2012), because Maine had become the children’s home state and neither of the parties 
continued to reside in Pennsylvania, id. §§ 1745, 1747. 
 
4 
 
[¶6]  After the visit in the summer of 2012, both girls began to display 
symptoms of anxiety, including nail biting and crying.  One daughter had 
nighttime episodes of shaking so hard that her teeth would chatter; the other began 
to have problems with bedwetting.  Both girls began seeing a counselor in the 
summer of 2012. 
 
[¶7] A hearing on Gordon’s motion to modify the custody order was held 
before the Maine District Court in Belfast on January 16, 2013.  Gordon was 
concerned that the girls were not being properly fed or bathed while in Cheskin’s 
care.  Both Gordon and her sister, the girls’ aunt, testified that the girls would often 
return home hungry and head straight to the kitchen to eat upon returning from 
visits with Cheskin.  Cheskin admitted that he often deferred to the girls’ decisions 
about when they wanted to bathe.  One daughter’s asthma seemed to be aggravated 
after certain visits with Cheskin.  On one occasion, he took her on a hayride, even 
though she was allergic to hay. 
 
[¶8]  The girls also frequently returned from visits with their father with 
unexplained bruises and scratches.  Gordon and her sister testified that, on one 
occasion, one of the girls returned from a visit with a split lip.  During the 2012 
Thanksgiving visit, a cousin repeatedly struck the younger daughter in the face 
while the two children were playing without adult supervision.  Cheskin testified 
that he had spanked the girls in the past, but that as a result of the parenting and 
 
5 
domestic violence courses he was required to attend as part of his probation, he 
now believes that physical discipline is inappropriate. 
 
[¶9]  Gordon provided the court with a proposed order that provided that 
when the children visited Cheskin in Delaware he would be required to drop them 
off at the nearby home of Gordon’s sister every evening by 6:30 p.m.  The 
proposed order provided that Cheskin could have visitation with the girls in Maine 
over the Columbus Day and Martin Luther King holiday weekends, but only from 
9:00 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. on Saturday and Sunday, and from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on 
Monday of those weekends.  It also provided that he could have five days of 
visitation during the girls’ April vacation and fourteen days during July, subject to 
the same daily time restrictions.  Finally, it provided that Cheskin could have 
similar contact in Delaware with the girls during Thanksgiving through the 
following Saturday in even-numbered years, and from December 27 through 
December 31 in odd-numbered years.  Cheskin did not submit a proposed order.  
The only aspect of Gordon’s proposed order that he challenged was that he would 
no longer be permitted to have overnight visits with the girls. 
 
[¶10]  The court’s order, dated January 24, 2013, included all of the terms 
Gordon proposed, including the elimination of Cheskin’s overnight visits with the 
girls.  It also contained four pages of the court’s own factual findings, which 
included a statement that Cheskin “was convicted” of offensive touching following 
 
6 
his guilty plea.  The factual findings emphasized that the children appeared to be 
under-fed when they returned from visiting their father, that their hygiene was 
poor, and that they received unexplained bruises and other minor injuries.  The 
order highlighted that Cheskin downplayed his problems with disciplining all three 
of his children, pointing out that he “disparaged [his son’s] mother and said she 
was being vindictive against him” and that he “minimized his actions” when he 
testified at the hearing.  The court expressed doubt that the domestic violence 
classes had changed Cheskin for the better, and concluded that he “lacks insight.” 
 
[¶11]  Cheskin did not request further findings, nor did he file a motion to 
alter or amend the judgment.  Instead, he filed this timely appeal. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶12]  A trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and they 
must stand if they are supported by any competent evidence in the record.  Harmon 
v. Emerson, 425 A.2d 978, 981 (Me. 1981).  Factual findings should not be 
overturned in an appellate proceeding “simply because an alternative finding also 
finds support in the evidence.”  Id. at 982.  We defer to the trial court’s 
determination of witnesses’ credibility and its resolution of conflicts in testimony.  
Blackmer v. Williams, 437 A.2d 858, 863 (Me. 1981).  A court’s misstatement of 
fact should be disregarded if it does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.  
Sanders v. Sanders, 1998 ME 100, ¶ 17, 711 A.2d 124; M.R. Civ. P. 61. 
 
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[¶13]  We review the trial court’s decision concerning custody for an abuse 
of discretion.  Harmon v. Emerson, 425 A.2d 978, 983 (Me. 1981).  Generally, a 
trial court’s verbatim adoption of a party’s proposed order is disfavored.  Jarvis v. 
Jarvis, 2003 ME 53, ¶ 14, 832 A.2d 775; In re Allison H., 1999 ME 176, ¶ 7, 740 
A.2d 997.  The key question on review, however, is whether the findings and order 
reflect the application of the court’s independent judgment.  Jarvis, 2003 ME 53, 
¶ 15, 832 A.2d 775. 
 
[¶14]  Cheskin argues that the court’s findings that the girls were 
inadequately fed and that he failed to take one daughter’s asthma seriously were 
clearly erroneous.  However, competent evidence in the record supports each of 
these findings.  Although, as Cheskin points out, there was no direct evidence 
concerning the frequency with which he actually fed his daughters while they were 
in his care, Gordon testified that she believed that the girls were getting 
inconsistent meals when they visited Cheskin.  Gordon’s sister also testified that 
the girls would run to the kitchen immediately after being dropped off by Cheskin, 
and that they seemed hungry.  Although Cheskin contends that it is not uncommon 
for children to be hungry, Gordon’s testimony that the girls were not hungry when 
they were with her suggests that their behavior upon returning from visits with 
their father was, for them, unusual.  This evidence supports the trial court’s 
finding; thus, we will not disturb it. 
 
8 
 
[¶15]  Similarly, there is evidence in the record to support the court’s finding 
that Cheskin did not take his daughter’s asthma seriously.  Contrary to Cheskin’s 
assertions, Gordon’s testimony constitutes competent evidence.  Gordon testified 
that her daughter’s asthma is often aggravated after she visits with Cheskin, and 
that Cheskin took her on a hayride, even though she is allergic to hay.  The trial 
court evidently found this testimony to be credible; its finding on this point is not 
clearly erroneous. 
 
[¶16]  Cheskin also contends that the court committed clear error by finding 
that he had been “convicted” of offensive touching.  This statement in the court’s 
order is factually incorrect.  Cheskin pleaded guilty to offensive touching.  The 
Delaware court consequently ordered him to serve one year of probation, and to 
attend both anger management and parenting classes.  In exchange for the guilty 
plea, the charge was eventually dismissed, with prejudice, without a finding of 
guilt. The application to participate in the Domestic Violence First Offenders 
Diversion Program states that a defendant’s application constitutes “an admission 
of guilt in connection with the charge(s) in question.”  However, this disposition is 
explicitly described as “not a conviction for purposes of disqualification or 
disabilities imposed by law upon conviction of a crime.”  See Del. Code Ann. Tit. 
10, § 1024(g) (West 2013).  The court’s order therefore misstates the consequence 
of Cheskin’s guilty plea. 
 
9 
 
[¶17]  Here, the court’s misstatement does not appear to have affected 
Cheskin’s rights in any way.  Cheskin suggests that the trial court made a finding 
of domestic abuse, thus implicating 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(6) (2012) concerning 
conditions of parent-child contact in cases involving domestic abuse.  Under the 
facts of this case, however, whether Cheskin was actually convicted of the crime 
with which he was charged⎯and to which he pleaded guilty⎯would not have 
affected the court’s decision. 
 
[¶18]  A parent’s conviction or adjudication for certain sex offenses gives 
rise to a presumption that any contact with that parent is not in the best interest of 
the child.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(6-B).  However, convictions for other types of 
offenses do not give rise to a similar presumption.  The court must consider as 
primary the safety and well-being of the child when evaluating the best interest of 
the child for purposes of making an award of parental rights and responsibilities.  
19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3).  To that end, the court must consider a number of factors; 
specifically, the court must consider the existence of any history of child abuse by 
a parent.  19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3)(M) (emphasis added).  This consideration is not 
limited to formal convictions for domestic violence offenses. 
 
[¶19]  Deferred dispositions allow defendants in criminal matters to avoid 
some of the negative consequences of a criminal conviction.  In exchange, 
however, defendants must openly acknowledge and take responsibility for their 
 
10 
conduct.  The dismissal of the charge after completion of the deferred disposition 
does not cast a blanket of confidentiality over the course of the proceedings up to 
that point.  Although a defendant will not be subjected to the automatic collateral 
consequences of a criminal conviction, a court in a later proceeding is not 
precluded from considering the defendant’s admission of guilt in open court.  An 
admission to specific behavior may be considered in a later proceeding, if that 
behavior is relevant to the matter before the court.  See M.R. Evid. 402, 
801(d)(2)(A). 
 
[¶20]  Here, not only had Cheskin previously admitted that he was guilty of 
a criminal offense; he also testified at the hearing in this case and gave his own 
account of the events that resulted in the criminal charges being brought against 
him.  The court was free to consider both Cheskin’s behavior and his earlier guilty 
plea in conjunction with all of the other evidence to determine how to best serve 
the best interest of the children.  Thus, the misstatement in the court’s order was 
harmless. 
 
[¶21]  Cheskin also challenges the court’s use of Gordon’s proposed order, 
arguing that it shows that the court did not use its independent judgment in 
fashioning the provisions of the order.  Although a court must exercise independent 
judgment, it is good practice for the court to request input from the parties.  One 
way to accomplish this is to seek and review proposed orders.  When used 
 
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appropriately, draft orders can aid in the fact-finding and decision-making process.  
See Jarvis, 2003 ME 53, ¶ 15, 832 A.2d 775.  Here, the trial court made detailed 
factual findings summarizing its view of the evidence and testimony presented at 
the hearing.  Neither party submitted proposed findings; the court’s findings, which 
spanned several pages, were entirely its own.  The court’s findings indicate a 
careful review of the evidence, as well as the application of independent judgment.  
Under these circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion by adopting the 
terms of child contact contained in Gordon’s proposed order. 
 
[¶22]  We are similarly unpersuaded by Cheskin’s assertion that the court 
provided insufficient findings to support its decision to eliminate overnight 
visitation.  Contrary to Cheskin’s assertions, the trial court was not required to 
make a finding of domestic abuse, explicit or otherwise, in order to terminate 
Cheskin’s overnight visitation.  The court may prohibit overnight parent-child 
contact in cases involving domestic abuse.  19-A M.R.S. § 1653(6)(B)(6).  
However, nothing in the statute prohibits the court from limiting contact to daytime 
visits even in cases where domestic abuse is not present, if it finds that to do so is 
in the best interest of the children.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3).  Gordon testified 
that she was requesting that the children spend the night with her or her sister so 
that she could ensure that the children were fed, bathed, and unharmed.  The trial 
 
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court’s findings suggest that the court, after hearing all of the evidence, shared her 
concerns; they are sufficient to support the result in this case. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
Lisa J. Lattes, Esq., Camden, for appellant Jeffrey M. Cheskin 
Kristin A. Gustafson, Esq., Gustafson Family Law, Augusta, 
for appellee Kristin L. Gordon 
 
 
 
Belfast District Court docket number FM-2011-150 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY