Case Title: Wright-Jones v. Nasheed

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC92621

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2012-06-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
ROBIN WRIGHT-JONES,  
 
 
) 
 
                                                                     
) 
 
Respondent,  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) SC92621 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  
  
JAMILAH NASHEED,  
 
 
 
)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Appellant.        
 
 
 
)  
 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ST LOUIS 
The Honorable Joan L. Moriarity, Judge 
 
Opinion issued June 19, 2012 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
Jamilah Nasheed appeals from the trial court’s judgment in favor of Robin Wright-Jones 
on her petition challenging the qualifications of Nasheed to run for election in the Democratic 
Party primary for state senator for the 5th district. The trial court found the residency 
requirement of art. III, sec. 6 of the Missouri Constitution was ambiguous and Nasheed did not 
satisfy that requirement to run in the 5th district.  This Court holds that Nasheed is eligible to 
run in the Democratic primary for the 5th district because an exception in art. III, sec. 6 does 
not require Nasheed to live within the boundaries of the reapportioned senate district she seeks 
to represent.  The exception provides that if the 
reapportionment of the districts is less than one year before the general election, 
candidates may reside in any district from which a portion was incorporated into the new 
district where the candidate seeks office, even if the candidate does not reside in that 
incorporated portion. The judgment of the trial court is reversed.1  
FACTS 
The facts in this case are not in dispute.  Wright-Jones and Nasheed both filed 
declarations as candidates for nomination by the Democratic Party in the 5th senate 
district.  The Missouri Senate Reapportionment Commission filed a senate district 
reapportionment plan on March 12, 2012, 2 changing the boundaries of the old 5th 
district to include areas previously located within other old state senatorial districts, 
including the old 4th district.  At all times relevant, Wright-Jones resided, and continues 
to reside, in the new 5th district. 
                                                
Prior to the reapportionment plan, and at all times relevant, Nasheed resided in the 
old 4th senate district.  Following reapportionment, her residence remained within the 
boundaries of the old 4th district, but not in an area that was incorporated in the new 5th 
district as a result of reapportionment. 
Wright-Jones filed suit under section 115.526, RSMo 2000, challenging Nasheed’s 
qualifications to seek the nomination of the Democratic Party to run for election in the 
5th district.  Wright-Jones asserted that art. III, sec. 6 requires a candidate for state senate 
 
1 This Court transferred the case after a majority opinion by the court of appeals authored by the Honorable Kurt 
Odenwald, and a dissent authored by the Honorable Clifford Ahrens.  Portions of those opinions are used without 
further attribution.  This Court has jurisdiction.  Mo. Const. art.V, sec.10. 
2 This date reflects that the reapportionment plan will be on file less than one year before the November 6, 2012 
election. 
to have resided for one year in the relevant legislative district.  Wright-Jones 
acknowledged that the new 5th district will not be established for one year prior to the 
general election.  She argued, however, that art. III, sec. 6 requires that candidates for 
state senate must have resided within the district as defined after reapportionment.  
Because Nasheed does not reside within the boundaries of the new 5th district, Wright-
Jones contends that Nasheed does not satisfy the constitutional residency requirements to 
be eligible to seek nomination to run for state senate in the 5th District.   
 
Nasheed countered that she satisfied all constitutional requirements because art. 
III, sec. 6 provides an exception to the requirement of in-district residency when 
reapportionment occurs less than one year prior to a general election, as is the case here.  
She argued that in this circumstance, art. III, sec. 6 allows a candidate to seek election in 
any senate district in which the candidate does not reside when any part of the senate 
district in which the candidate does reside is incorporated within the boundaries of the 
senate district the candidate seeks to represent, provided the candidate has lived 
anywhere within the senate district in which he or she currently resides for one year.   
 
In its judgment, the trial court noted the parties’ opposing constructions of the 
relevant constitutional provision. The trial court found the one year residency 
requirement of art. III, sec. 6 ambiguous as it relates to senate districts following 
reapportionment when the general election is scheduled to take place less than one year 
after reapportionment.   The trial court held that art. III, sec. 6 requires that a candidate 
must have resided for one year within the senate district the candidate seeks to represent 
as it is defined following reapportionment.  Accordingly, the trial court held that Nasheed 
 
 
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did not satisfy the residency requirement to run for senator for the 5th District.  Nasheed 
appeals. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews the trial court’s interpretation of the Missouri Constitution de 
novo.  State v. Biggs, 333 S.W. 3d 472, 477 (2011).   
ANALYSIS 
This case presents a question regarding the construction of art. III, sec. 6 in the 
context of residency requirements after a reapportionment of a state senate district.  
Article III, section 6 states: 
Each senator shall be thirty years of age, and next before the day of his 
election shall have been a qualified voter of the state for three years and a 
resident of the district which he is chosen to represent for one year, if such 
district shall have been so long established, and if not, then of the district or 
districts from which the same shall have been taken. (emphasis added). 
 
Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 6. 
 
The issue before this Court is whether, in the context of reapportionment within 
one year of a general election, art. III, sec. 6 requires a candidate for state senate to reside 
for one year within the new district created by reapportionment; or whether a candidate 
satisfies the one year residency requirement by residing in any district from which a 
portion was incorporated into the new district where the candidate seeks office, even if 
the candidate does not reside in that portion. 
Wright-Jones does not dispute that Nasheed is at least 30 years of age and that she 
has been a qualified voter in Missouri for at least three years.  Wright-Jones asserts, 
however, that Nasheed does not meet the residency requirement as it applies to new 
 
 
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districts.  Article III, section 6, must be construed to determine whether Nasheed is “a 
resident of the district or districts from which the same shall have been taken.”  Simply 
put, is she a resident of any district from which the new 5th district was created?  Yes.  
Nasheed currently resides in the old 4th district, which is one of the districts from which 
the new 5th district was created.  As such, she satisfies the constitutional residency 
requirement for the 2012 election.  
Words used in constitutional provisions are interpreted to give effect to their plain, 
ordinary, and natural meaning.  Buechner v. Bond, 650 S.W.2d 611, 613 (Mo. banc 
1983).  The plain and ordinary meaning of the words “the district or districts” is broad 
and unrestrictive and, hence, includes any part of such district(s).  Had the drafters of the 
constitution wished to limit eligibility to candidates residing only in those parts of the old 
districts that were absorbed into the new one, they could have crafted narrowing language 
to that effect.  They did not, and, given the clear and unambiguous language of the clause 
this Court need not speculate as to their intent.  
Wright-Jones's interpretation obliges this Court to read words into the clause that 
are not there.  The language of this clause is susceptible to a clear and unambiguous 
interpretation based only on the plain and ordinary meaning of the words. A court may 
not add words by implication when the plain language is clear and unambiguous. State ex 
rel. Young v. Wood, 254 S.W.3d 871, 873 (Mo. banc 2008).3 
                                                 
3 Although State ex rel. Young v. Wood cited this rule as it applies to interpretation of a statute, the same 
rules of construction apply when examining a constitutional provision.  Thompson v. Committee on 
Legislative Research, 932 S.W.2d 392, 395 n. 4 (Mo. banc 1996).   
 
 
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Additionally, Wright-Jones suggests that Nasheed's literal interpretation would 
produce the unintended result that a candidate could continue to reside outside the district 
she represents for the duration of her term.  This concern is wholly unfounded as this 
interpretation has been historically followed for decades.4  Although not binding, the 
interpretations by the attorney general, historically and currently, support this position.  
Mo. Atty. Gen. Ops. 104-67 (Anderson, 1967) and 56-82 (Ashcroft, 1982); Amicus 
Curiae Brief 5 (Koster, 2012).  Further, the secretary of state has advised potential 
candidates throughout the years accordingly. 
 
The trial court's judgment is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All concur. 
 
4 Even if a non-resident candidate would achieve victory in a new district, the new senator would still be subject to 
the one-year residency requirement in a subsequent election, and, prior to the next primary, must have resided in the 
new district for at least one year.