Case Title: Indiana State Personnel Board v. Diggs

Citation: 272 N.E.2d 868

Docket Number: 970S212

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1971-09-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
272 N.E.2d 868 (1971)
INDIANA STATE PERSONNEL BOARD and Indiana School for the Blind, Appellants,
v.
Pearl L. DIGGS, Appellee.
No. 970S212.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
September 13, 1971.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Walter E. Bravard, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellants.
John F. Watkins, Albert W. Ewbank, Indianapolis, for appellee.
PRENTICE, Judge.
This matter is before us upon the motion of the plaintiff (appellee) entitled "Motion of Appellee for Court to Take Judicial Notice," filed July 30, 1971, directing our attention to our dismissal of Indiana State Personnel Board, etc. v. Wilson, Ind., 271 N.E.2d 448.
Plaintiff hereinbefore filed her motion to dismiss or affirm addressed to numerous deficiencies in the transcript and in Defendant's brief. The deficiencies pointed out related to rules designed primarily for the convenience of this Court, and, in lieu of granting said motion, on June 8, 1971 we granted to Appellants leave to withdraw the record of proceedings and to amend.
Thereafter, on July 26, 1971, we entered an order dismissing the appeal in the case of Indiana State Personnel Board, etc. v. Wilson (supra), because of Appellants' failure to file a "Motion to Correct Errors" as required by Trial Rule 59(G).
TR. 59(G) provides as follows:
As said in the Wilson case (supra):
A review of the transcript in the case before us reveals no motion to correct erors. Accordingly, this attempted appeal is dismissed.
ARTERBURN, C.J., and GIVAN and HUNTER, JJ., concur.
DeBRULER, J., dissents with opinion.
DeBRULER, Judge (Dissenting).
I request that the Court reconsider its position taken in Indiana State Personnel Board, etc. v. Wilson, Ind., 271 N.E.2d 448. Dismissal seems to me to be too severe a step under the circumstances of the Wilson case and this case.
On June 30, 1970, when appellant filed its Notice of Intention to Appeal in the trial court, in lieu of a motion to correct errors, it did so in reliance upon the following provisions of the Administrative Adjudication and Court Review Act, I.C. 1971, X-XX-X-XX, being Burns § 63-3019:
At the time appellant filed its Notice of Intention to Appeal in lieu of a motion to correct errors, our new TR. 59G, was in existence, had not been construed by the Court, and read as follows:
Appellant having both these provisions before it decided that their case was not an appropriate one in which a motion to correct errors was required. In making this choice, I believe they acted reasonably. It was reasonable to follow the statutory procedure because the statutory procedure had governed the trial of the case and was specific in its direction, while TR. 59(G) was very general and ambiguous and did not specifically require a motion to correct errors in appeals under the Administrative Adjudication and Court Review Act. It was reasonable because this Court had not yet interpreted TR. 59(G) to supercede the provision of the Act quoted above and certainly counsel should not be charged with the obligation of foreseeing the later interpretation given in the Wilson case. For the foregoing reasons I do not believe that appellant should suffer dismissal of its attempted appeal.