Case Title: State v. Bean

Citation: 171 Vt. 290, 762 A.2d 1259

Docket Number: 96-642

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2000-10-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Bean (96-642); 171 Vt. 290; 762 A.2d 1259 

[Filed 20-Oct-2000]

  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
  40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions, Vermont Supreme
  Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any  errors in
  order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

                                 No. 96-642

State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 1, Rutland Circuit

Ronald Matthew Bean	                         March Term, 1999

Francis B. McCaffrey, J.

Peter R. Neary, Rutland County Deputy State's Attorney, Rutland, for 
  Plaintiff-Appellee.

Charles S. Martin of Martin & Associates, Barre, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and Jenkins, Supr. J., 
          Specially Assigned

       DOOLEY, J.   Defendant, Ronald Bean, appeals from a conviction for
  kidnapping and  violation of an abuse prevention order, arising out of an
  incident on February 18, 1993 in which he  restrained, Judith Bean, his
  mother, in her home and threatened to kill her.  He argues that the trial 
  court erred in failing to find him incompetent to stand trial and to allow
  him to represent himself.   We agree that in order to prevent assertion of
  an insanity defense defendant should have been able to  represent himself.
  We reverse and remand.

       To evaluate defendant's claims on appeal, we begin with a history of
  the lengthy proceedings  below. On February 18, 1993, Rutland City Police
  arrested defendant for violation of an abuse  prevention order protecting
  his mother.  At the initial appearance on February 22, 1993, the State 

 

  charged defendant with violation of the prevention order and kidnapping. 
  Defendant indicated to the  court that he wished to proceed pro se until he
  could consult with an out-of-state attorney, and then  attempted to enter a
  guilty plea to both charges.  The court refused to accept the pleas and
  assigned  defendant a public defender until his competency to waive his
  right to counsel could be evaluated.

       In the months after the initial appearance, defendant continued to
  insist that he be allowed to  represent himself.  He underwent several
  psychiatric evaluations.  In a competency hearing in  September 1993, the
  court found defendant competent to stand trial.  The examining psychiatrist 
  testified that defendant is "gamey" and has a "manipulative flair," making
  statements that he is Jesus  Christ or God, for example, for shock value,
  and tries to manipulate the system in what he perceives  to be his own
  interests.  The psychiatrist also testified that defendant's failure to
  cooperate with  defense counsel was due to his own calculated choice, and
  not the result of delusional thoughts or  emotional disturbance.  He
  explained that defendant did not want to use an insanity defense because 
  he did not want to be in a mental hospital.  He called this a calculated
  choice "not based on any  problem in his thinking, delusional thoughts or a
  mood such as a depression."

       In the course of the hearing, the psychiatrist requested that he be
  given access to defendant's  past treatment files.  Defendant interjected:

    I object to him receiving such information . . . .  I don't want
    to be  found insane.  I don't want this man having that
    information that  could possibly have me found insane.  Your
    honor, I broke my neck  to get out of a mental institution.  I am
    not going to go through the  chance of having that happen again. 
    I'd rather be in jail, even it is for  the rest of my life.

  At the conclusion of the hearing the court ruled orally that defendant was
  competent.  At that time  defendant indicated that he wished to be
  represented by the court-appointed public defender after 

 

  all, and the court granted that request.

       In July 1994, the assigned public defender moved to withdraw as
  counsel citing  "irreconcilable differences" between counsel and defendant. 
  The motion was granted, and new  counsel was assigned.  The court also
  granted defendant's motion to suppress statements he made at  the initial
  appearance, a motion filed by the original defense counsel.  An
  interlocutory appeal of that  ruling to this Court resulted in an
  affirmance of the suppression order, see State v. Bean, 163 Vt. 457,