Case Title: P. v. Wright

Citation: 

Docket Number: S107900M

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2022-03-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 3/9/22 (unmodified opn. attached) 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF  
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
WILLIAM LEE WRIGHT, JR., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S107900 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
KA048285-01 
 
 
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND  
DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING 
 
THE COURT: 
 
The majority opinion in this case, filed on December 16, 
2021, and appearing at 12 Cal.5th 419, is modified as follows: 
 
1. 
On page 436, in the first sentence of the first full 
paragraph, the phrase “abused its discretion” is replaced with 
“erred,” so that the sentence begins:  
We first analyze whether the trial court erred . . . . 
2. 
On page 439, in the first sentence of the first full 
paragraph, the phrase “abuse its discretion” is replaced with 
“err,” so that the sentence begins:  
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
Under the totality of circumstances described in 
Lynch, the trial court did not err . . . . 
 
This modification does not affect the judgment. 
 
The petition for rehearing is denied. 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
WILLIAM LEE WRIGHT, JR., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S107900 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
KA048285-01 
 
 
December 16, 2021 (unmodified opinion) 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the Court, 
in which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and 
Lui* concurred. 
 
 
* 
Administrative Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, 
Second Appellate District, Division Two, assigned by the Chief 
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 
Constitution. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
S107900 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
A jury convicted defendant, William Lee Wright, Jr., of the 
first degree murder of Philip Curtis, and found true the special 
circumstance allegations that he committed the murder during 
the commission of a robbery and a burglary.  (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 
subd. (a) [murder], 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i) [robbery murder], 
190.2, subd. (a)(17) [burglary murder].)1  The jury also convicted 
defendant of the attempted murders of Julius Martin, Douglas 
Priest, Mario Ralph, and Willie Alexander (§ 664; § 187, 
subd. (a)) and of robbery against Martin (§ 211).  The jury found 
true several sentence enhancements connected to the additional 
charges.  The jury returned a death verdict, and the trial court 
sentenced defendant to death in 2002.  This appeal is automatic.  
(§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm the judgment in its entirety.  
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Prosecution Case 
a.  Long Beach Incident 
On February 17, 2000, at approximately 2:00 a.m., 
defendant visited the Long Beach apartment of Douglas Priest 
 
1  
All further undesignated statutory references are to the 
Penal Code. 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
and Julius Martin, and he knocked on the door.2  Priest had 
fallen asleep facedown on the living room floor after consuming 
approximately six beers and one or two shots of tequila.  He 
awoke from the knock but did not move.  Martin answered the 
door and let defendant inside.  Defendant indicated he was there 
to buy marijuana, which Priest and Martin sold from the 
apartment along with cocaine.  Martin told defendant that they 
had none.  Defendant asked when they would have drugs 
available, to which Martin replied, “Probably tomorrow.”  
Defendant stood up to leave and Martin followed him to 
the door.  Defendant turned around, pulled a knife from his right 
side and a gun from his left side and said, “This is a jack move.”  
Meanwhile, Priest could hear Martin and defendant talking but 
he did not move.  Although he could not identify all of what was 
said, the conversation made him uncomfortable.  Defendant said 
to Martin, “You think I’m bullshitting?”  Defendant then 
stabbed Priest in the back.  Defendant said to Martin, “Give it 
up,” and Martin produced $70 in cash from his pocket.  
Defendant asked, “Is that it?”  Martin replied, “Yeah.”  
Defendant ordered Martin to lie facedown on the ground and not 
look up.  Martin complied.  Defendant shot Martin twice in the 
back of the head.  Martin lost consciousness. 
After Priest heard the gunshots, he heard defendant open 
the door to leave and looked over his shoulder to see who had 
been in the apartment.  He the saw the man’s profile and 
recognized defendant based on his profile as well as his voice.  
 
2  
Julius Martin was unavailable to testify at trial.  The 
prosecution read into the record his preliminary hearing 
testimony. 
 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
3 
He knew defendant as “Mad,” a person who lived in a nearby 
building and frequently came to the apartment.  Priest testified 
that he had no doubt that defendant was the man who stabbed 
him, noting that defendant had a distinctive voice and he had 
known defendant for a few months prior to the incident. 
Once defendant left the apartment, Priest stood up, locked 
the door, and called 911.  He checked on Martin, who was 
bleeding profusely out of the top of his head.  Martin regained 
consciousness and responded to Priest calling his name.  The 
police and paramedics arrived, and both men were taken to the 
hospital. 
After he was admitted to the hospital, a detective 
attempted to ask Priest questions.  Priest did not cooperate.  He 
explained he was in pain at the time and on medication.  He also 
believed the police were treating him like a suspect, rather than 
a victim.  After they checked his hands for gunpowder residue 
he declined to speak with them further. 
Four or five days later, Long Beach Police Detective Philip 
Cloughesy interviewed Martin in the hospital.  Martin related 
that an individual he knew as “Mad” shot him, and that he knew 
“Mad” to be a member of the Crips street gang.  He told 
Cloughesy that “Mad” lived around the corner from him, and he 
had known “Mad” for about one year.  Martin said that Priest 
awoke after the individual had already left the apartment. 
About one month after the incident, Priest saw a picture 
of defendant on the television news.  He called Martin and said 
he saw “Mad” on the news being arrested by Ontario Police, put 
into a police car, and taken to jail in connection with a separate 
incident.  Martin turned on his television news and also 
recognized defendant.  He called the detective investigating his 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
4 
shooting and explained that he saw the man who shot him on 
the news.  
Priest subsequently identified defendant at a live lineup, 
at the preliminary hearing, and at trial.  Martin identified 
defendant at a live lineup and at the preliminary hearing.  
At the preliminary hearing, Martin acknowledged that on 
the night of the incident he did not tell officers that the man who 
shot him lived around the corner.  He further acknowledged not 
telling the officers that he gave defendant $70, nor that he sold 
marijuana out of his apartment.  At trial, Priest also 
acknowledged not telling officers that the man who stabbed him 
lived nearby, explaining that he had never been to defendant’s 
residence. 
b.  Pomona Incident 
Mario Ralph, Phillip Curtis, and Willie Alexander sold 
rock cocaine from a house in Pomona.  On March 21, 2000, 
between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., defendant went to the house 
and bought $50 of rock cocaine.  Curtis handled the transaction 
while Ralph was “on point” — meaning, Ralph would pat those 
who entered the house and then watch the person to make sure 
“things were straight.”  Ralph did not pat down defendant 
because he knew him; he had seen defendant approximately 
three times that week.  He knew defendant to be a member of 
the Duroc gang.  
After purchasing the $50 of rock cocaine, defendant sought 
to buy a larger quantity of drugs, but the men did not have more; 
Curtis asked defendant to come back at a later time.  Defendant 
returned about one hour later.  When defendant knocked on the 
door, Ralph was resting in one of the bedrooms.  Ralph heard a 
lot of cussing and then heard defendant say, “Mother fuckers.  
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
5 
Duroc.  Where is the dope at?”  Ralph then heard three gunshots.  
He ran into the front room to see Curtis and Alexander had each 
been shot.  Curtis was leaning over a table gasping for air and 
trying to pull a gun out of his pants pocket.  Alexander was 
sitting on the couch with his cell phone in his hand.   
Ralph saw defendant standing in the room.  He reached 
for the gun that Curtis had put on the table.  When Ralph’s back 
was turned to defendant, as his hand grabbed the gun, 
defendant shot Ralph twice in the back.  Ralph turned and tried 
to shoot defendant.  He fired two shots before running out of 
bullets.  Ralph briefly collapsed but managed to stand back up.  
He saw defendant run around the house and pick up the couch, 
asking, “Where’s the motherfucking dope?” 
Scared, Ralph ran toward the door to leave the house.  
Defendant ran toward the door at the same time.  Ralph made 
it through the front door first, but defendant ran past him and 
entered a waiting car.  Ralph briefly tried to run after the car.  
Ralph returned to the house.  He threw Curtis’s gun on to 
the roof and then, once inside the house, flushed the remaining 
rock cocaine down the toilet.  Ralph checked on Curtis, who said 
“What should I do?  He shot me in the heart.”  Ralph ran outside 
again and asked a neighbor to call 911.  At that point Ralph was 
having difficulty breathing and “everything was moving 
slow[ly].”  Alexander walked outside and sat with Ralph on the 
porch to wait for the police and paramedics to arrive.  Ralph 
thought he was going to die, so he sat there “trying to let it 
happen.” 
Sergeant Mark Warm was the first officer to arrive.  Ralph 
approached him screaming that he had been shot, and Warm 
called an ambulance.  Ralph gave Warm a description of the 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
6 
shooter.  At that time, Alexander walked toward Warm and 
Ralph.  Alexander appeared to be in shock and was unable to 
answer any questions.  Curtis was later found in the house and 
subsequently pronounced dead. 
When Ralph was in the hospital, his cousin brought him a 
local newspaper in which Ralph saw a photograph of defendant.  
Ralph called the detectives and explained that he saw a 
newspaper picture of the man who shot him.  Ralph 
subsequently identified defendant in a photographic lineup.  
Ralph also identified defendant at a live lineup, at the 
preliminary hearing, and at trial. 
As a result of being shot, Ralph had been hospitalized 
several times, lost a kidney and 100 feet of intestines, and used 
a colostomy bag.  Occasionally he had difficulty eating and 
drinking. 
c.  The Investigation  
In Long Beach, officers recovered a small amount of 
marijuana and a .357 caliber revolver from the apartment.  They 
also recovered a bullet fragment laying on Martin’s shirt, which 
had been left on the floor after paramedics treated him at the 
scene. 
Following the Pomona incident, a crime scene investigator 
recovered Curtis’s handgun, a .380 caliber semiautomatic, in a 
walkway area between the Pomona house and a neighboring 
house.  He also recovered two spent shell casings inside the 
house.  The investigator located, inside a bedroom closet, a 
bullet that he testified had been fired from the front of the house 
and gone through several walls before landing in the closet. 
The doctor who performed the autopsy on Curtis testified 
that he died from a single gunshot wound to the chest.  He 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
7 
recovered a .32 caliber bullet from Curtis’s vertebra.  The bullet 
entered the left side of the chest, went through the heart, and 
into the upper abdomen, where it lodged in a vertebra. 
On March 24, 2000, Ontario Police Officer Joseph Giallo 
arrested defendant in an Ontario apartment for an unrelated 
incident.  Defendant and his future wife, Janice Marrow-Wright, 
were the only people present in the apartment.  When Giallo 
searched the apartment in conjunction with the arrest, he 
located a dark-colored .32 caliber revolver under couch cushions.  
Defendant’s ex-wife, Toni Wright, testified that on March 22, 
2000, she had seen defendant in possession of a small dark-
colored handgun.  
Dale Higashi, a senior criminalist with the Los Angeles 
County Sheriff’s Department, studied the ballistics evidence.  
He examined Curtis’s .380 caliber semiautomatic handgun, 
which was found at the Pomona house, and the .32 caliber 
revolver found at the Ontario apartment where defendant was 
arrested.  Higashi also scrutinized the .32 caliber bullet 
recovered from Curtis’s body and the .32 caliber bullet recovered 
from the Pomona house closet, and he concluded they had both 
been fired from the dark-colored revolver found when defendant 
was arrested.  After examination, Higashi also concluded the 
bullet fragment recovered from the Long Beach apartment was 
fired by defendant’s revolver. 
Higashi additionally inspected the two shell casings found 
in the Pomona house and concluded they had been fired from 
Curtis’s .380 semiautomatic handgun.  
2.  Defense Case 
Long Beach Police Officer Joseph Seminara responded to 
the Long Beach apartment on February 17, 2000.  Seminara 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
8 
briefly questioned Priest and Martin at the apartment.  Priest 
told him that he was asleep on the floor and woke up to the 
sound of gunshots.  Priest said he had no idea how he had been 
stabbed and that the assailant had already fled the scene when 
he awoke.  Seminara testified that Priest was being treated by 
paramedics at the time he was being questioned and appeared 
to be in pain.  Martin told Seminara that he did not know how 
Priest had been stabbed.  It was clear to Seminara that Martin 
had been shot “several times” in the head and appeared to be in 
pain as paramedics were treating him.  Seminara and Martin 
spoke for less than 30 seconds. 
Alexander testified at trial for the defense.  He 
acknowledged being at the Pomona house on March 21, 2000, 
but claimed he did not remember who else was there with him.  
He denied knowing that narcotics were sold from the house.  
When defense counsel asked if defendant was the man who shot 
them, Alexander said, “I’m sorry, that’s not the person.  I ain’t 
never seen him before.”  He also denied at the preliminary 
hearing that defendant was the shooter. 
On cross-examination, Alexander admitted being arrested 
for selling rock cocaine in another drug house a few months after 
the Pomona shooting.  He was serving a six-year prison sentence 
on that charge and did not receive any benefit in that case for 
testifying in defendant’s trial.  Alexander agreed with the 
prosecutor’s statement that an inmate in prison “might have to 
pay a price” for cooperating with law enforcement and testifying 
in court.  Alexander acknowledged previously identifying 
defendant as the shooter in a live lineup but claimed he did not 
actually know who shot him and he “just chose anybody.”  
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
9 
Detective Gregg Guenther spoke with Ralph multiple 
times after the Pomona incident.  Ralph told Guenther that the 
shooter had used a small black semiautomatic pistol.  He also 
told the detective that he had seen the shooter approximately 10 
times before the incident.  He did not initially tell Guenther that 
he had fired shots with Curtis’s gun.  Guenther could not recall 
whether gunshot residue tests were performed on the hands of 
Alexander or Curtis and did not believe a residue test had been 
performed on Ralph. 
3.  Prosecution Rebuttal 
Detective 
Guenther 
testified 
that 
he 
interviewed 
Alexander in the hospital.  Alexander told him that he saw the 
man who had shot him, Curtis, and Ralph in a local newspaper 
and on television.  Guenther showed Alexander a photo lineup 
at the hospital, during which Alexander identified defendant as 
the person who shot the three men.  At a subsequent live lineup, 
Alexander again identified defendant as the assailant.  Shortly 
after Alexander was sent to prison on the cocaine charges, 
Guenther spoke with him to determine whether Alexander 
would still testify in defendant’s case.  He told the detective that 
now that he was in prison, he could not testify without facing 
retaliation. 
Prior to the preliminary hearing, Detective Guenther and 
his partner drove Alexander from prison to the city jail so that 
he could testify without having to ride on statewide 
transportation with other inmates.  During the drive, Alexander 
told Guenther that he could not testify against defendant out of 
concern for his own safety.  The night before the hearing, at the 
city jail, Alexander again expressed concern about his own 
safety if he were to testify. 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
10 
B.  Penalty Phase 
1.  Prosecution Case 
The prosecution introduced evidence of two prior felony 
convictions:  second degree robbery at a restaurant in 1989 and 
evading a police officer in 1999.  
The prosecution also introduced several acts or threats of 
violence:  (1) on June 23, 1992, defendant fired shots at a rival 
gang member’s residence; (2) on September 6, 1994, defendant 
attacked a fellow inmate in prison and refused to comply with 
officer commands; (3) on March 22, 2000, defendant shot his ex-
wife in her face; (4) on March 23–24, 2000, when officers tried to 
take him into custody, defendant barricaded himself and five 
hostages in the apartment, fired approximately 14 shots at 
police officers, and was eventually taken into custody after tear 
gas was deployed; (5) on June 28, 2001, a corrections officer 
found an inmate-manufactured spear in defendant’s jail cell; (6) 
on July 10, 2001, defendant threw bleach at a corrections 
officer’s face and was found in possession of razor blades, fishing 
line, and extra linens in his jail cell; and (7) on October 28, 2001, 
defendant threatened a corrections officer and then physically 
attacked him. 
2.  Defense Case 
Janice 
Marrow-Wright, 
defendant’s 
wife, 
testified 
regarding the hostage incident on March 23, 2000.  She stated 
that she, her mother, her three nephews, and defendant were 
present at her mother’s apartment that day.  She denied that 
defendant ever prevented her, her mother, or the children from 
leaving the house.  She said she did not release the children once 
hostage negotiations began because she did not trust the police.  
She asserted that defendant had never been disrespectful to 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
11 
anyone in her presence.  During cross-examination, Marrow-
Wright denied telling the police that she and her mother had 
been through a “traumatic experience” when speaking about the 
hostage situation and denied saying that defendant had 
previously abused her.  She also denied telling the police that 
defendant was a “gangster,” that she regretted meeting him, 
and that he had dangerous friends.  On cross-examination, 
Marrow-Wright testified that she married defendant in August 
2000, after he was already incarcerated.  She explained that 
there was no marriage certificate because it “was done as an 
agreement” as a “common law” marriage. 
Juanita Anderson testified that she was a friend of 
defendant’s family and had known him for 30 years.  She related 
that defendant was always respectful and kind to her and would 
call her weekly to check in on her.  
Donell Walls testified that he had known defendant from 
the time they met in elementary school.  Defendant was a 
generous person, a friend to him, and treated his family well.  
During cross-examination, he acknowledged that defendant 
may have had “psychological problems” when they were in high 
school and recalled that defendant had difficulty understanding 
some things while playing football.  
Melinda Mix testified that she had been friends with 
defendant for 15 years.  She knew him to be a good person and 
had never seen him be disrespectful to anyone.  During cross-
examination, she explained that they had dated, and she still 
considered herself to be his girlfriend.  She knew he was in a 
relationship with Marrow-Wright but was unaware that they 
had married. 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
12 
David Jimenez, a psychologist, evaluated defendant 
through three face-to-face interviews, communication with 
defendant’s parents, a review of relevant police reports, and a 
study of two prior psychological evaluations.  During their first 
interview, defendant complained of difficulty sleeping and the 
effects of the antipsychotic medication he was taking.  During 
their second interview, defendant was not compliant and 
refused to answer Dr. Jimenez’s questions.  During their third 
interview, 
Dr. 
Jimenez 
attempted 
to 
administer 
two 
psychological tests but did not believe defendant gave “his best 
efforts” and did not include the results from the tests in his 
report.  He attempted to see defendant for a fourth visit, but 
defendant declined to meet with him. 
Defendant told Dr. Jimenez that he joined the Duroc gang 
at the age of nine and that one of his “homeboys” died in his 
arms when he was 15 years old.  Defendant said that he had 
attempted suicide when he was 12 or 13 years old, but his 
parents told Dr. Jimenez that they “could not recall anything of 
that nature.”  Defendant also reported that he had used PCP on 
more than 100 occasions, liked rock cocaine and marijuana, and 
consumed alcohol daily. 
Dr. Jimenez testified that on at least two occasions, 
defendant attempted to fake a mental disorder or illness.  
Because defendant did not fully comply with the evaluations, 
partly because he was feigning mental illness, Dr. Jimenez could 
not rule out a mental disorder. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Counsel’s Representation  
Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible 
error when it denied his request for self-representation under 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
13 
Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta), made two 
days prior to the scheduled trial date.  He further contends the 
trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to 
substitute counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 
(Marsden). 
1.  Factual Background 
The parties first appeared before the assigned trial court 
in September 2001 and set a trial date of March 12, 2002.  At 
the next hearing on December 17, 2001, the parties confirmed 
they would be ready to proceed on March 12 and had no pending 
motions.  On March 4, 2002, defense counsel moved to continue 
the trial date.  He explained that he was still receiving discovery 
and had neither identified nor interviewed all potential 
witnesses.  At a hearing on March 12, counsel proposed to set 
March 26 for motions and April 29 for trial.  The prosecution 
and trial court agreed. 
On Monday, April 29, 2002, the parties met for a trial 
readiness conference.  The court set Wednesday, May 1, 2002, 
as the first day of trial and then asked the parties if there was 
anything to discuss.  Defense counsel stated that the previous 
Wednesday, defendant indicated that he was considering 
moving to represent himself.  When defense counsel followed up 
with defendant that morning, he confirmed it was his desire to 
proceed in propria persona.  The trial court asked defendant why 
he wanted to represent himself.  Defendant replied, “I have a 
right under Faretta, don’t I?”  The court said yes, but that the 
question was why he wanted to so proceed.  Defendant replied, 
“Conflict between me and my attorney.”  The court cleared the 
courtroom to conduct a Marsden hearing. 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
14 
The court asked defendant what conflict he had with 
counsel.  Defendant said, “I have a witness that has got some 
information, a witness to help me in my case.  And my attorney 
[is] refusing to call her back, or to call her to get this information.  
Plus, I don’t see where — where the defense is being put up on 
my behalf.”  Defense counsel explained that the witness 
defendant referred to was his girlfriend.  Counsel said he had 
spoken to defendant’s girlfriend “numerous times” throughout 
the case, but “it got to a position where I felt that she was what 
I refer to as an intermeddler in the case.  And I have indicated 
to Mr. Wright that . . . I am not discussing anything with her 
anymore.”  Counsel continued, “He did indicate that she had 
some information.  She said that all along.  Nothing helpful has 
come forward.  I had my investigator contact her.  She made 
some calls over to my investigator’s office and never gave us any 
information.  And as I refer to it, she is an officious intermeddler 
as far as I am concerned.  And I indicated to her if she [has] any 
information, she can give it to my investigator.  And that hasn’t 
happened, and I don’t have any faith that she has any 
information in regards to that.”  
The court asked defendant what information his girlfriend 
had.  He replied, “The addresses of the peoples that was — that 
supposed to had did one of these crimes, [sic] supposed to be a 
witness to come forth and bring up their names.  I don’t have 
them.”  The court asked why she had not given that information 
to defense counsel.  Defendant said, “She have called numerous 
times to the investigator and [defense counsel].  Nobody has 
returned her calls.”  The court offered to have defendant’s 
girlfriend come into court and give the information to defense 
counsel that way.  Defense counsel responded, “She could have 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
15 
given it to [defendant], your honor, and he could have given it 
the investigator.  That hasn’t happened either.” 
The court noted that defendant had a second concern and 
asked for him to elaborate.  Defendant said, “There is no defense 
being put up on my behalf.”  Defense counsel explained that he 
had discussed defense strategy with defendant numerous times 
and outlined that the defense would be “basically through cross-
examination of the witnesses.  And I pointed out to him what 
I thought would be helpful to us in the testimony and various 
witnesses, particularly Willie Alexander at the preliminary 
hearing testified on our behalf.  And that’s where I stand in 
regards to that.”  The court asked defendant if he had anything 
more to add; he declined.  The court brought the prosecutor back 
into the courtroom and resumed proceedings in open court. 
The trial court found there was insufficient conflict to 
warrant changing defense counsel and denied the Marsden 
motion.  The court continued, “The issue about representing 
yourself, you can always represent yourself.  I am required, as 
you know, to let you do that as long as you understand what you 
are getting yourself into.  And it is your belief that you can do a 
better job than your attorney on this?”  Defendant responded, 
“Yes.”  The court reminded defendant that trial was starting two 
days later, regardless of whether defendant proceeded by 
himself.  “We have set the date.  We have 200 jurors coming in.  
We have cleared this court’s calendar.  The witnesses have been 
subpoenaed for that particular date. . . .  We have set it on 
Wednesday so we can have the jurors actually present and give 
them the questionnaires that will be necessary in this case.  
There is no good cause to put the matter over.  If you wish to 
represent yourself, certainly at any stage you can do that.  And 
but [sic] you should understand you won’t even be in the pro. 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
16 
per. [housing] module by the time we start trial.  That won’t 
happen until the weekend.  You do understand all of this?”  
Defendant confirmed that he did.   
The court asked defendant if he understood that he would 
be treated as an attorney, would not receive any assistance from 
the court, and would be required “to do it all just like the 
prosecutor is on his own to do it all.”  Defendant replied, “Yes.  
I just need time to prepare for my case.”  The court told 
defendant he did not have more time because trial was set for 
Wednesday.  Defendant said he would not be ready by then, to 
which the court replied that if defendant was not prepared in 
two days, he could not represent himself.  Defendant stated that 
he had the right to represent himself.  The court explained, “You 
have the right to go to trial, and you also have the right to 
represent yourself.  And they are in conflict right now.  I am not 
putting the case over.  Why didn’t you bring this up before?”  
Defendant said, “Just really transpired when I talked to my 
lawyer to cross-examine one of the deputies.  I feel he wasn’t 
aggressive enough, and this is a death penalty case.”  The court 
asked defendant if he believed he could do a better job than 
counsel.  Defendant said yes, but he needed time to prepare his 
case.  The court asked defendant if he had represented himself 
before.  Defendant said, “No, I haven’t.  But I been in the courts 
long enough to know how to represent myself.” 
The judge reiterated that defendant could represent 
himself, but the trial date would not be continued.  Defendant 
again said that he could not be ready within two days.  The court 
asked defendant if he had previously discussed self-
representation with defense counsel.  Defendant said he first 
brought it up the previous Wednesday.  The court reminded 
defendant that the case had been ongoing for more than one 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
17 
year.  Defendant replied, “You put me in a position I am going 
to represent myself, but I am not going to be ready on 
Wednesday.”  The court said, “That is up to you.  The first thing 
I am going to do is allow you to fill in the pro. per. advisement 
form.  And I want you to think about this a little while because 
obviously you didn’t know I was going to say no [continuance].  
But now you know I am going to say no as far as a continuance 
is concerned.  We are going to trial Wednesday.  You can either 
do it by yourself, which I am telling you is a terrible mistake.  
I am not going to equivocate with you.  Or you can go to trial 
with [defense counsel].”  Defendant again said he would not be 
ready to go by Wednesday.  The trial court said, “But that is not 
the issue.  Those are your two choices.  Either going to trial by 
yourself Wednesday, or [defense counsel] represents you.  I want 
you to think about it while you fill in that piece of paper.”   
The court took a break and reconvened fifteen minutes 
later to review defendant’s self-representation advisement form.  
When the court asked defendant if he had any questions about 
anything on the form, defendant replied, “No.”  The court noted 
that defendant had not filled in the portion indicating what 
crimes he would be charged with, and asked defendant what 
crimes he was charged with.  Defendant replied, “Murder and 4 
counts of attempted murder and a robbery.”  The court then 
asked defendant, “And what kind of continuance are you asking 
for?”  Defendant said, “Some time to prepare for my case.”  The 
court asked again how much time he needed.  Defendant said, 
“I don’t know.  A month, two.” 
The trial court noted that defense counsel had represented 
defendant at the preliminary hearing, at which time defendant 
had a chance to evaluate counsel’s ability to cross-examine 
witnesses.  The court asked defendant why he did not raise the 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
18 
issue at that time.  Defendant said he did not notice an issue 
until recently.  Defendant continued, “If the court [is] going to 
deny me time to prepare for my case, I will proceed with 
[counsel].” 
The court denied defendant’s Faretta motion as untimely.  
In the course of noting the areas on the form that defendant 
failed to initial, the court further stated that it did not believe 
defendant thoroughly understood what he was trying to do.  The 
court opined that defense counsel “is doing a very good job for 
you.  He has filed and argued numerous motions on your behalf.  
He has been able to keep out some of the penalty phase evidence 
that the People, after being forced to review by [defense counsel], 
have decided not to bring forward.  The court denied the People’s 
request for one piece of penalty phase evidence.  So he is doing 
a good job.  His job is also to evaluate the evidence before putting 
it on.  And I think, again, he is doing a fine job.  He has 
experience in this area.  He knows what he is doing.  The court 
is going to deny the request for pro. per. status based on the fact 
that it is untimely.  And the defendant would clearly need time 
to prepare.” 
Voir dire commenced on Wednesday, May 1, 2002, as 
planned. 
2.  Motion for Self-Representation 
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that a 
criminal defendant has a federal constitutional right to 
represent himself if he voluntarily and intelligently so chooses.  
(Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 835–836.)  A trial court must 
grant a defendant’s request for self-representation if the request 
is made within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of 
trial, is unequivocal, and is made voluntarily, knowingly, and 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
19 
intelligently.  (People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 721 
(Lynch).)  If a self-representation motion is untimely, it is 
“within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine 
whether such a defendant may dismiss counsel and proceed pro 
se.”  (People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 124 (Windham).) 
We first analyze whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in finding the motion untimely under Lynch.  “We 
have long held that a Faretta motion is timely if it is made 
‘within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial.’ ”  
(People v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 499 (Johnson).)  “[T]he 
‘reasonable time’ requirement ‘must not be used as a means of 
limiting 
a 
defendant’s 
constitutional 
right 
of 
self-
representation,’ but rather to prevent the defendant from 
‘misus[ing] the Faretta mandate as a means to unjustifiably 
delay a scheduled trial or to obstruct the orderly administration 
of justice.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
We have routinely declined to identify a specific period in 
time at which a self-representation motion is untimely.  “[W]e 
have held on numerous occasions that Faretta motions made on 
the eve of trial are untimely.”  (Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at 
p. 722.)  In People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 742, we held 
that a motion for self-representation made two days before the 
set trial date was made on “the eve of trial” and thus untimely.  
In People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 99, we found a Faretta 
motion was untimely when it was made several days after the 
case had been continued day-to-day “in the expectation that the 
motions would be concluded and jury selection set to begin at 
any time.”  In People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 102, we held 
the Faretta motion “made moments before jury selection was set 
to begin” was untimely.  
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
20 
We also have held that Faretta motions “made long before 
trial were timely.”  (Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 723; see 
People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 932 [Faretta motion 
made nearly two years before trial was timely]; People v. Dent 
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 221 [Faretta motion made four months 
before trial was timely].)  “Nevertheless, our refusal to identify 
a single point in time at which a self-representation motion filed 
before trial is untimely indicates that outside these two extreme 
time periods, pertinent considerations may extend beyond a 
mere counting of the days between the motion and the scheduled 
trial date.”  (Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 723, fn. omitted.) 
In Lynch, we concluded that “a trial court may consider 
the totality of circumstances in determining whether a 
defendant’s pretrial motion for self-representation is timely.”  
(Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 726.)  We held that a trial court 
may properly consider “not only the time between the motion 
and the scheduled trial date, but also such factors as whether 
trial counsel is ready to proceed to trial, the number of witnesses 
and the reluctance or availability of crucial trial witnesses, the 
complexity of the case, any ongoing pretrial proceedings, and 
whether the defendant had earlier opportunities to assert his 
right of self-representation.”  (Ibid.)   
We have declined to articulate what standard a reviewing 
court should apply in determining whether a request for self-
representation is timely.  (Johnson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 501.)  
And yet defendant’s claim here fails under both de novo review 
and a more deferential standard.  
Defendant acknowledges that his request was made close 
in time to the scheduled trial start date.  He asserts, however, 
that under the totality of circumstances his request was 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
21 
nonetheless timely.  We disagree.  Defendant brought this 
motion two days before the scheduled trial date and conditioned 
his motion on the grant of a continuance, telling the court that 
if he did not have time to prepare, he would proceed with 
counsel.  Further, he could not identify with any degree of 
precision how much time he thought he would need, opining 
perhaps a month or maybe two.   
Defendant argues it is significant that at the time he made 
his motion, neither the prosecution nor defense counsel 
indicated readiness to proceed.  However, on April 11, 2002, the 
parties had stated that there were no witness issues to report, 
discussed evidence to be presented during trial, and confirmed 
that previous issues with discovery had been resolved.  On April 
15, 2002, the parties discussed the juror questionnaires and 
whether defendant would be shackled.  At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the parties confirmed there was nothing else to discuss 
before the trial readiness conference on April 29.  On April 29, 
the trial court stated, “Today was really a clean-up day.  Make 
sure we are ready to go, and that there are no problems.”  When 
the court asked if either party had anything to discuss, defense 
counsel explained, for the first time, that defendant wanted to 
represent himself.  Although neither party explicitly stated 
readiness to proceed, neither party stated otherwise when asked 
if there were any problems, and the record strongly supports a 
conclusion that the parties were prepared to proceed at that 
time and the court understood that each party was so prepared.  
Finally, the fact that trial started two days after defendant’s 
motion, as planned, further indicates that the parties were 
ready to proceed on time. 
Defendant argues he could not have asserted his right to 
represent himself sooner because his concerns had not arisen 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
22 
until right before he brought his motion, but the record does not 
support this.  Defendant informed the trial court on April 29 
that he had concerns about his lawyer cross-examining one of 
the deputies, and defendant now contends this was raised as 
soon as practicable after he had an opportunity to discuss this 
concern with counsel.  The hearing at which the cross-
examination occurred took place on April 11, 2002; defendant 
waited 18 days to assert his Faretta right.  Counsel told the trial 
court during the Marsden hearing that he had explained the 
trial strategy to defendant numerous times prior, not simply at 
their meeting four days prior when defendant first told counsel 
he was interested in representing himself.  When the court 
invited defendant to comment, he did not challenge counsel’s 
statement.  Defendant expressed additional concerns to the trial 
court regarding counsel’s alleged refusal to contact his girlfriend 
for information.  The record indicates that this was an ongoing 
issue between defendant and counsel and not something that 
arose just before defendant made his Faretta motion. 
Moreover, the trial court expressed skepticism concerning 
whether defendant intended to seriously represent himself or 
whether he merely sought to delay trial.  After defendant 
complained that counsel had not returned his girlfriend’s calls, 
the trial court offered to have her come to court to address 
counsel.  Defendant did not offer a response to the court’s 
invitation.  Later, the court asked defendant why he did not 
make his request sooner and stated that it would not continue 
the trial.  Defendant interrupted the court and challenged it by 
stating that the court could “either just deny me and I put it up 
for appeal, or grant me my motion to — .”  The court cut off 
defendant and said, “It seems to me you are setting up another 
issue for appeal that you are not really . . . taking to be serious.” 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
23 
In further support of his argument that his motion was 
timely under Lynch, defendant asserts the prosecution’s case 
was straightforward, and there had been only minimal 
discovery.  Yet he fails to persuasively articulate in what way 
this case, consisting of one murder and four attempted murders 
arising out of two separate incidents, was straightforward.  Nor 
does he address how a sudden switch to self-representation 
could have occurred without unduly disrupting the ongoing 
process. 
Defendant contends a continuance would not have 
impaired the prosecution’s ability to produce its witnesses.  A 
continuance, however, could have impaired the prosecution’s 
ability to produce Julius Martin, one of its key witnesses.  The 
prosecution had a right to present Martin’s live testimony as the 
preferred form of evidence.  (See People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 
217, 225 [“The fundamental purpose of the unavailability 
requirement is to ensure that prior testimony is substituted for 
live testimony, the generally preferred form of evidence, only 
when necessary”].)  As defendant acknowledges, Martin was 
suffering ongoing health issues as a result of the shooting.  
Martin was ultimately ruled unavailable to testify as a witness; 
the prosecution introduced his preliminary hearing transcript 
into the record.  Defendant argues that because Martin was able 
to testify live during the penalty phase, a continuance would 
have been favorable because Martin may have recovered enough 
to testify live during a later-held guilt phase trial as well.  This 
circumstance was unknown at the time, however, and the 
prosecution could rightly have had concerns regarding how 
Martin’s health would change if the trial was continued.   
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
24 
Under the totality of circumstances described in Lynch, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding defendant’s 
Faretta motion to be untimely.  
Defendant asserts that even if his request to represent 
himself was properly deemed untimely, the trial court 
nonetheless abused its discretion in denying the motion.  We 
analyze whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
an untimely motion under Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d 121, 
which states that once a trial court has ruled a Faretta motion 
untimely, it must exercise discretion in determining whether to 
grant or deny a defendant’s request for self-representation.  (Id. 
at p. 131.)  In Windham, we explained that when a defendant 
requests to represent himself in the middle of trial, the court 
must inquire into the specific factors underlying the request.  
(Id. at p. 128.)  Additionally, “other factors to be considered by 
the court in assessing such requests made after the 
commencement 
of 
trial 
are 
the 
quality 
of 
counsel’s 
representation of the defendant, the defendant’s prior proclivity 
to substitute counsel, the reasons for the request, the length and 
stage of the proceedings, and the disruption or delay which 
might reasonably be expected to follow the granting of such a 
motion.”  (Ibid.) 
We discern no abuse in the court’s decision to deny the 
motion.  The court found defense counsel was acting 
competently on defendant’s behalf, noting that he had filed and 
argued numerous motions and prevented the prosecution from 
introducing certain penalty phase evidence.  Although 
defendant exhibited no prior proclivity to substitute counsel, the 
court further found defendant’s reasons for his request to be 
inadequate, noting that defendant did not appear to fully 
understand what he was “getting [himself] into” by asking to 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
25 
represent himself.  Finally, the court found that granting 
defendant’s motion would cause disruption and delay in trial 
proceedings due to the accompanying request to continue.  
The Attorney General argues that defendant’s motion was 
equivocal in any event.  Because the trial court properly denied 
defendant’s motion to represent himself, we need not determine 
whether his request was equivocal.   
Finally, defendant challenges the constitutionality of the 
timeliness requirement.  We have repeatedly held that a Faretta 
motion may be denied if not made within a reasonable time prior 
to the commencement of trial.  (See Johnson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at 
p. 499 [a trial court has the discretion to deny an untimely 
motion for self-representation]; Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at 
pp. 721–722 [“ ‘the right of self-representation is not absolute’ ” 
and may be denied if the motion is deemed untimely]; People v. 
Hamilton (1988) 45 Cal.3d 351, 369 [a Faretta motion must be 
timely “for purposes of invoking an absolute right of self-
representation”]; Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 127–128 [“in 
order to invoke the constitutionally mandated unconditional 
right of self-representation a defendant in a criminal trial 
should make an unequivocal assertion of that right within a 
reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial”].)  Contrary 
to defendant’s argument, the timing of a Faretta motion is only 
one of several factors considered before a trial court can hold a 
motion untimely (Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 726), and we 
have never held that timeliness alone is a sufficient basis on 
which to deny a Faretta motion.  Defendant does not present a 
persuasive reason to revisit precedent on this matter. 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
26 
3.  Motion to Substitute Counsel 
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion 
when it denied his Marsden motion because the record showed 
counsel was constitutionally deficient.   
“ ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘When a defendant seeks to discharge his appointed 
counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate 
representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to 
explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific 
instances of the attorney’s inadequate performance.’ ” ’ ” ’ ”  
(People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 572; People v. Vines 
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 878.)  We review a trial court’s decision 
not to discharge appointed counsel under the deferential abuse-
of-discretion standard.  (People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 
1245.) 
Defendant acknowledges that after he requested the trial 
court relieve counsel, the court properly permitted him to 
explain the basis for his motion.  He asserts, however, that the 
court erred in failing to act on the information it received 
regarding counsel’s alleged failure to follow up with defendant’s 
girlfriend about alleged exculpatory information.  Counsel 
confirmed that he had contacted defendant’s girlfriend on 
several occasions but had not obtained information from her 
concerning a potential third-party culpability defense, nor was 
he investigating third-party culpability in defendant’s case.  
Defendant asserts that this in itself established that counsel’s 
performance was constitutionally inadequate, and hence the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion.  He 
further asserts the court did not conduct an adequate inquiry. 
First, defendant fails to establish the trial court’s inquiry 
was inadequate.  As observed earlier, the court heard 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
27 
defendant’s complaint regarding his attorney’s failure to obtain 
information from defendant’s girlfriend and requested that 
counsel respond.  Defense counsel explained to the court that he 
had spoken to defendant’s girlfriend several times, and she 
refused to provide any information to him.  He instructed her to 
contact his investigator if she had any information, which she 
did not do.  Defense counsel stated that, based on his 
interactions with defendant’s girlfriend, he did not believe she 
had any helpful information for the defense team.  When 
defendant mentioned he was also concerned about an alleged 
lack of a defense case, the court again asked counsel to respond.  
Counsel stated that he had gone over defense strategy with 
defendant “numerous times” and explained he would primarily 
focus on the cross-examination of witnesses.  The trial court 
provided defendant “full opportunity to air all of his complaints, 
and counsel to respond to them.”  (People v. Smith (2003) 
30 Cal.4th 581, 606; see People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 
488 [dismissing the defendant’s complaint that the trial court’s 
inquiry was insufficient when the court gave the defendant the 
chance to discuss his complaints and counsel the chance to 
respond].)  No more was necessary.  
Second, the court did not abuse its discretion when it 
denied the Marsden motion.  Defendant’s complaints regarding 
counsel’s investigation and trial strategy were “tactical 
disagreements, which do not by themselves constitute an 
‘irreconcilable conflict.’ ”  (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 
1192.)  Defendant presented no evidence that counsel’s 
performance was so deficient that constitutionally ineffective 
representation was likely to result.   
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
28 
B.  Asserted Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Defendant 
contends 
the 
prosecutor 
presented 
inadmissible and highly prejudicial evidence that severely 
biased the jury against him and led to a conviction based not on 
the evidence but on his perceived character and history.  He 
specifically challenges the introduction of two pieces of evidence:  
(1) that defendant’s ex-wife, Toni Wright, observed defendant 
point a gun at someone; and (2) a statement from an expert 
witness that defendant had been in prison for a “long, long time” 
prior to the trial. 
1.  Factual Background 
During the guilt phase, the prosecutor sought to introduce 
evidence that defendant shot his ex-wife, Toni Wright, in the 
head.  He argued that the evidence was relevant because 
defendant shot her with a small, dark-colored revolver within a 
day or two of the Pomona incident.  Experts linked bullets from 
the Long Beach and Pomona incidents to the revolver used to 
shoot Ms. Wright, and because defendant raised the issue of 
identity, the prosecutor argued that this incident was relevant 
to identity and intent with respect to the charged offenses.  
Defense counsel objected, arguing that there was no indication 
Ms. Wright could identify which gun was used against her.  He 
continued, “And this is the District Attorney’s effort to try to 
bootstrap some evidence that is tremendously prejudicial to my 
client and will have little or no probative value in regards to the 
charges that he is on trial for.”  The court ruled that Ms. Wright 
could testify that she knew defendant had a black handgun but 
could not testify about the shooting.  The court found that “the 
prejudice far outweighs any probative value or any relevance.  It 
is just — it is too much, quite frankly, for the amount of relevant 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
29 
material in there.  But she can come in and say she saw him 
hold a black handgun.” 
When the prosecutor called Ms. Wright, he asked, “On 
March the 22nd of the year 2000, did you see William Wright 
with a small, dark-colored handgun?”  She replied, “Yes.”  He 
continued, “Did you see him point that gun at somebody?”  She 
replied, “Yes.”  After asking Ms. Wright to identify defendant in 
the courtroom, the prosecutor asked, “When you saw him point 
the handgun at somebody, was that in the city of Ontario?”  At 
that point defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial.  He 
argued that the prosecutor’s question was prejudicial to 
defendant and against what the parties had previously agreed 
upon.  The prosecutor argued that his question was not in 
conflict with the court’s prior ruling.  He continued, “If it is, 
I didn’t ask who he pointed it at.” 
The trial court agreed that the prosecutor’s line of 
questioning had gone too far but found the error harmless.  The 
court noted that the prosecutor did not ask about how the gun 
was used, and the fact that it was pointed “just indicates to the 
jurors how she was able to see it.”  The court denied the motion 
for a mistrial.  When questioning resumed, the prosecutor asked 
Ms. Wright, “When you observed Mr. Wright with the gun, that 
was not in any kind of drug house, was it?”  She replied, “No.”  
The prosecutor asked her no more questions.  
The prosecutor also called David Bly, a Los Angeles 
County Sheriff’s Department detective, to testify as an expert 
witness on gangs.  Bly explained his knowledge of the Duroc 
Crips gang and asserted, based on his review of records in which 
defendant admitted he was a member and based on defendant’s 
tattoos, that defendant was a member of the gang.  During cross-
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
30 
examination, Bly confirmed that he had neither interviewed 
defendant nor had any personal contact with him.  Defense 
counsel asked Bly, “Now you indicated that you have met a 
number of Duroc gang members; is that correct?”  After Bly 
answered affirmatively, counsel asked approximately how 
many.  Bly replied, “Over a hundred, say a hundred to 200.”  
On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Bly, “Sir, if there 
is a particular member that is not in the community for a long, 
long time, you might not come in contact with him; is that 
correct?”  After Bly confirmed that was correct, the prosecutor 
continued:  “If he is living somewhere else or if he is incarcerated 
perhaps or something like that, you wouldn’t know; is that 
correct?” 
Defense counsel objected to this question, arguing that the 
prosecutor “is trying to give the insinuation that my client was 
in custody and I think that’s improper to put that off to the jury.”  
The prosecutor replied, “Judge, I never on direct asked this man 
if he had personal contact with [defendant].  Counsel on cross, 
for whatever reason, chose to ask that.  Once he asked that, 
I simply have a right to inquire of Mr. Bly, if someone is not in 
the community, I didn’t say simply in custody, I said if someone 
is not in the community, living someplace else or in custody, you 
wouldn’t be coming in contact with him?  That is clearly a 
permissible question based on what counsel asked.  I never 
asked that witness anything on direct plus the witness testified 
at the prelim so counsel cannot say he was in any way surprised 
by what he might or might not say.  And he cross-examined the 
witness at the prelim.  So I think, under those circumstances, 
it’s clearly, that limited question is clearly permissible.”  The 
trial court overruled the objection, finding the question was 
within the scope of cross-examination and permissible.  The 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
31 
court continued, “I don’t think that counsel is honing in and 
I will not permit counsel to hone in on that issue.  I think it was 
broad enough.  And it was a reasonable question, given the 
cross-examination.”   
2.  Discussion 
Defendant argues the prosecutor committed prejudicial 
misconduct by failing to abide by the court’s prohibition against 
soliciting evidence of defendant’s use of the handgun.  He also 
argues the prosecutor’s questions to Bly constituted an improper 
attempt to “rehabilitate” a witness who had, in fact, not been 
challenged in that respect on cross-examination.  
“ ‘The applicable federal and state standards regarding 
prosecutorial misconduct are well established.  “ ‘A prosecutor’s 
. . . intemperate behavior violates the federal Constitution when 
it comprises a pattern of conduct  “so egregious that it infects 
the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial 
of due process.” ’ ”  [Citations.]  Conduct by a prosecutor that 
does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is 
prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves 
“ ‘ “the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to 
persuade either the court or the jury.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.]”  (People v. 
Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819.) 
As an initial matter, we note that defendant has forfeited 
his prosecutorial misconduct allegation as to the questioning of 
Ms. Wright.  “ ‘To preserve for appeal a claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct, the defense must make a timely objection at trial 
and request an admonition; otherwise, the point is reviewable 
only if an admonition would not have cured the harm caused by 
the misconduct.’ ”  (People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 373.)  
Defense counsel did not request a curative admonition after the 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
32 
trial court agreed that the prosecutor’s questioning had gone too 
far.  Further, he cannot establish that an admonition would not 
have cured any alleged harm. 
In any event, we need not decide whether the prosecutor 
committed misconduct because any possible error was harmless.  
Defendant contends Ms. Wright’s testimony was prejudicial 
because it implied he was “the type of person who used guns 
against people,” and thus made it more likely for the jurors to 
believe he was the one who committed the charged offenses.  On 
this record, however, there were many facts that undermined 
the defense theory, regardless of the challenged line of 
questioning.  The jury heard evidence that defendant shot 
Martin, Curtis, Ralph, and Alexander.  The jury also heard 
testimony that the bullets recovered from Curtis’s body, and 
from the Pomona and Long Beach crime scenes, were fired from 
the gun found in defendant’s possession at the time of his arrest.  
Finally, we note that the prosecutor did not ask Ms. Wright how 
the gun was used.  In light of the other substantial and properly 
adduced evidence regarding defendant’s gun usage, testimony 
that Ms. Wright saw defendant pointing a gun did not render 
defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair under either federal or 
state standards. 
When examining Detective Bly, the prosecutor’s follow-up 
question suggesting incarceration as a hypothetical explanation 
for a gang member’s absence was improper.  The prosecutor’s 
question, 
however, 
did 
not 
render 
defendant’s 
trial 
fundamentally unfair.  In People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 
515, a police officer witness mentioned meeting the defendant at 
a parole office.  (Id. at p. 554.)  The prosecutor interrupted and 
clarified that he sought a physical address, not a description of 
the meeting place.  We affirmed the trial court’s denial of 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
33 
defendant’s motion for a mistrial, noting that it was “doubtful 
that any reasonable juror would infer from the fleeting reference 
to a parole office” that defendant had a prior conviction, and that 
the incident was not significant in the context of the entire guilt 
trial.  (Id at p. 555.)  In the present case, the prosecutor’s brief, 
hypothetical reference to incarceration was not significant given 
the overwhelming evidence presented against defendant during 
the trial.  (See also People v. Rolon (1967) 66 Cal.2d 690, 693 
[“[a]n improper reference to a prior conviction may be grounds 
for reversal in itself [citations] but is nonprejudicial ‘in the light 
of a record which points convincingly to guilt’ ”].)  It is not 
reasonably probable that the jury would have reached a result 
more favorable to defendant but for the prosecutor’s question. 
C.  Asserted Vouching for the Credibility of a 
Witness 
Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly vouched 
for the credibility of a witness when he elicited testimony from 
victim Mario Ralph that the prosecutor had introduced Ralph to 
the prosecutor’s own daughter.  Defendant further asserts the 
trial court abused its discretion when it denied his subsequent 
motion for a mistrial. 
During direct examination, the prosecutor asked Ralph, 
“You and I have talked about this case on several occasions; is 
that correct?”  Ralph confirmed that they had.  The prosecutor 
asked, “Have I ever allowed you to read the reports of any of the 
interviews you had with the police?”  Ralph replied, “No.”  The 
prosecutor continued, “Have I ever allowed you to read your 
preliminary hearing, your testimony at the preliminary 
hearing?  After Ralph said no, the prosecutor said, “But you and 
I have talked about the case?”  Ralph said, “Yes, we have.” 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
34 
Defense counsel followed up on that line of questioning 
during cross-examination.  Counsel confirmed that Ralph had 
not read any reports or the preliminary hearing transcript, and 
then counsel asked Ralph approximately how many times he 
had talked with the prosecutor.  Ralph said they spoke every 
time he went to court.  Defense counsel asked if they ever 
discussed Ralph’s testimony.  When Ralph said no, defense 
counsel asked what they did talk about.  Ralph explained, 
“Mainly how I was doing.  And sometimes I asked him certain 
things on, you know, what’s going on.  And I guess like 
sometimes I told him that I don’t want to be here involved with 
this.  I wished at the last testimony I told ya’ll, the last 
courtroom, ya’ll could have taken that and let me live my life.  
I don’t want to be doing this.”  Defense counsel asked Ralph if 
he remembered testifying at the preliminary hearing when the 
prosecutor “stopped the testimony, carried you out and talked to 
you and brought you back and put you back on the stand; did 
that happen?”  Ralph confirmed that it did. 
On redirect examination, the prosecutor revisited the 
subject.  He asked Ralph, “Now you were asked a number of 
questions about a conversation or some questions about 
conversations that we have had.  You have come to court a 
number of times; is that correct?”  Ralph answered 
affirmatively, and he also confirmed that he had testified twice 
before:  at the preliminary hearing and also in trial the previous 
day.  The prosecutor asked, “Now each time the case has been 
set, either in Pomona or before this judge or other judges in this 
building, you have come to court and the judge would tell you 
what day you would have to return; is that correct?”  Ralph 
replied, “Yes.”  The prosecutor said, “And I would be there on 
those occasions; is that correct?”  Ralph replied, “Yes.”  The 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
35 
prosecutor 
continued, 
“And 
we 
would 
have 
general 
conversations?”  After Ralph confirmed, the prosecutor said, 
“I asked you about your health?”  Ralph said yes.  The prosecutor 
continued, “How work is going, things like that?”  Ralph again 
said yes.  The prosecutor said, “On one occasion did I introduce 
you to my daughter?”  Ralph replied, “Yes, you did.” 
Defense counsel asked for a sidebar and moved for a 
mistrial.  He argued, “I think the District Attorney’s misconduct, 
turning this into a personal matter between him, his personal 
relationship between him and this witness I think is totally 
improper.”  The court denied the motion, ruling, “The questions 
on cross-examination went to the area of conversations between 
the prosecutor and the witness.  He is entitled to go into what 
the conversations were, whether they were innocent or whether 
they directed the witness to testify in a certain way.”  Defense 
counsel argued, “I’m having real difficulty what kind of 
relevancy his introduction of this particular witness has to do 
with anything other than trying to bolster this witness’ 
credibility by showing he would go so far as to introduce him to 
his family members.”  The court agreed that “in and of itself, 
that would be improper, but it’s an overlap area, and I think he 
is entitled to, on his effort to rehabilitate the witness, to go into 
every area that they discussed.  Otherwise the area, it’s open 
for, you know, any type of inference by the jury.  So the objection 
is overruled.” 
“A prosecutor is prohibited from vouching for the 
credibility of witnesses or otherwise bolstering the veracity of 
their testimony by referring to evidence outside the record.”  
(People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 971.)  Similarly, 
“ ‘[i]mpermissible “vouching” may occur where the prosecutor 
places the prestige of the government behind a witness through 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
36 
personal assurances of the witness’s veracity or suggests that 
information not presented to the jury supports the witness’s 
testimony.’ ”  (People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1329.)  
“However, so long as a prosecutor’s assurances regarding the 
apparent honesty or reliability of prosecution witnesses are 
based on the ‘facts of [the] record and the inferences reasonably 
drawn therefrom, rather than any purported personal 
knowledge or belief,’ [the prosecutor’s] comments cannot be 
characterized as improper vouching.”  (Frye, supra, at p. 971.) 
 “A court should grant a mistrial ‘ “only when a party’s 
chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably 
damaged.” ’  [Citation.]  This generally occurs when ‘ “ ‘ “the 
court is apprised of prejudice that it judges incurable by 
admonition or instruction.” ’ ” ’  [Citation.]  We review the trial 
court’s refusal to grant a mistrial for abuse of discretion.”  
(People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 581.) 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
defendant’s motion for a mistrial.  Importantly, defendant 
cannot establish prejudice.  The jury heard evidence that Ralph 
was a drug dealer who associated with gang members and that 
he attempted to destroy evidence by flushing drugs down the 
toilet and hiding Curtis’s gun.  The jury also heard that Ralph 
failed to tell investigating officers about the drugs or that he 
fired Curtis’s gun before trying to hide it. 
It is not reasonably likely that the jury was unduly 
influenced concerning Ralph’s credibility by the prosecutor’s 
comment.  (See People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 758.)  
Because the elicited testimony was not prejudicial, the trial 
court did not err when it denied defendant’s motion for a 
mistrial based on that brief question and Ralph’s response. 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
37 
D.  Asserted Erroneous Admission of Evidence 
Defendant contends the admission of assertedly irrelevant 
testimony about negative fingerprint evidence bolstered the 
prosecution’s case and denied him a fair trial. 
As the final witness in its case in chief, the prosecution 
called Peter Kergil, a forensic specialist employed by the Los 
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department.  Kergil explained that his 
expertise was fingerprint identification.  After Kergil testified 
that he had conducted no forensic work on the case, nor was he 
aware of any facts concerning the case, defense counsel objected 
to his testimony on relevancy grounds.  Counsel argued, “This 
witness has testified he did no work at all on this case.  And 
I don’t know if there has been any fingerprint evidence.  There 
has been nothing introduced in regard to fingerprint evidence in 
this case, and I would ask that his testimony be excluded.”  The 
prosecutor responded that he calls a “negative fingerprint 
expert” on every case he tries.  He explained that jurors watch a 
lot of crime shows and see fingerprints lifted off every surface 
“all the time,” but Kergil would explain that usable fingerprints 
are found on a firearm only rarely, in approximately eight to ten 
percent of cases.  The prosecutor continued, “The first thing that 
will happen when they go back to jury deliberation, Judge, is the 
jurors will start talking about fingerprint evidence.  Even 
though neither one of us mentioned the word, we did get into 
[gunshot residue] the other day, and they will say, ‘If 
[defendant] was in that apartment, they would have put 
evidence on [that] his fingerprints were on the gun.’  That is my 
experience in trying cases.” 
The trial court overruled the objection, commenting:  “The 
People are required to prove [their case] beyond a reasonable 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
38 
doubt.  And if they want to shut down any doors of concern by 
the jurors, I think that is fine.  Also, it seems to me, that if 
anybody is going to argue fingerprints, that this gives them a 
basis in fact to do that.” 
Kergil initially testified that as a general matter he can 
recover a fingerprint from items or surfaces approximately 
30 percent of the time when he examines such evidence.  He 
explained that there are several reasons why someone’s 
fingerprint might not be left on a surface after touching it.  The 
prosecutor asked, “Now, a firearm, for example, again, we watch 
TV.  We always see a firearm is collected in evidence, and it is 
immediately taken to a lab, and somebody lifts a print off the 
firearm, and that print is able to be identified to the person that 
committed the crime.”  The prosecutor asked Kergil how often 
an expert is able to lift a fingerprint from a firearm, to which 
Kergil replied approximately 8 to 10 percent. 
Only relevant evidence is admissible.  (Evid. Code, § 350.)  
Evidence is relevant if it has a “tendency in reason to prove or 
disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action.”  (Evid. Code, § 210.)  “The trial 
court has broad discretion to determine the relevance of 
evidence [citation], and we will not disturb the court’s exercise 
of that discretion unless it acted in an arbitrary, capricious or 
patently absurd manner [citation].”  (People v. Jones (2013) 
57 Cal.4th 899, 947.) 
Defendant contends the testimony about the absence of 
fingerprint evidence in this case was irrelevant because it did 
not address a disputed fact.  He argues that the absence of 
fingerprints was not an issue before the jury.  Defendant also 
argues the admission of irrelevant evidence violated his rights 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
39 
to due process and rendered his trial fundamentally unfair.  We 
are not persuaded. 
In United States v. Feldman (9th Cir. 1986) 788 F.2d 544, 
the federal appellate court held that testimony regarding the 
absence of fingerprint evidence on direct examination was 
proper.  (Id. at pp. 554–555.)  The court noted that it was 
“standard and proper litigation technique” to anticipate the 
opposing party’s argument and forestall it with one’s own 
presentation.  (Id. at p. 555; see also United States v. Christophe 
(9th Cir. 1987) 833 F.2d 1296, 1300 [trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in permitting FBI agent to testify regarding the lack 
of fingerprint evidence].)  The fact that the defense had not yet 
raised the issue of the absence of fingerprints, therefore, did not 
preclude the prosecution from introducing Kergil’s testimony. 
Further, defendant fails to show prejudice from admission 
of the evidence.  Despite defendant’s claim to the contrary, the 
testimony did not encourage the jury to speculate that there was 
fingerprint evidence connecting defendant to the crime scene 
that the jury did not hear.  The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting testimony about the absence of 
fingerprint evidence in this case.  Because the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion, admission of the evidence did not violate 
defendant’s right to due process, nor did it render his trial 
fundamentally unfair.  (See People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 
428, 439 [erroneous admission of evidence “results in a due 
process violation only if it makes the trial fundamentally 
unfair”].) 
E.  Asserted Instructional Errors 
Defendant raises several allegations of instructional error.  
We find no merit in his contentions. 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
40 
1.  Circumstantial Evidence 
Defendant asserts the trial court erred when instructing 
the jury regarding circumstantial evidence. 
In the course of discussing jury instructions with counsel, 
the trial court raised questions about the issue of circumstantial 
evidence.  The court noted that it had formerly instructed juries 
by using both CALJIC No. 2.01, “Sufficiency of Circumstantial 
Evidence — Generally,” and CALJIC No. 2.02, “Sufficiency of 
Circumstantial Evidence to Prove Specific Intent or Mental 
State.”  The court observed that recent case law clarified it was 
error to instruct with both, and that a court should give one or 
the other.  The court explained that it had tentatively included 
CALJIC No. 2.01 in the instruction packet because “there was 
quite a bit of circumstantial evidence.  Specifically the gun, the 
recovery of the gun and the bullets that were found at various 
locations and in the decedent’s body, according to the expert, 
matching the gun that it was fired from.  That and also 
assuming that they accept Mr. Priest’s testimony, essentially he 
said he saw, he heard the defendant.  And from that, 
circumstantially, he decided that it was defendant, although he 
glimpsed something from the back of the sides.  All that I think 
is circumstantial evidence, but I’m open to argument.” 
Defense counsel agreed with the trial court, expressing a 
preference for using CALJIC No. 2.01.  The prosecutor explained 
that he did not believe the case rested substantially on 
circumstantial evidence.  He argued that the matter was 
“basically an eyewitness identification case,” and asserted that 
CALJIC No. 2.01 would conflict with CALJIC No. 2.91 
concerning eyewitness identification.  He agreed that the 
firearm evidence was an important part of the prosecution’s case 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
41 
but noted that “if we rely just on the firearm evidence alone 
without the identification, the court probably wouldn’t let it go 
to the jury.”  The trial court said it was “on the fence” and was 
trying to determine whether the circumstantial evidence was 
incidental to, or corroborative of, the direct evidence. 
After considering the matter, the trial court explained, 
“I do believe that the circumstantial evidence is tangential or 
corroborative.  The main thrust of all of this is really whether 
they can believe the witnesses, eyewitness testimony.  And I do 
agree with the argument.  I hadn’t thought of it before that it 
seems somewhat inconsistent with the eyewitness identification 
instruction.”  The court stated that on reflection it would 
instruct the jury not with CALJIC No. 2.01, but with CALJIC 
No. 2.02.3 
 
3  
The trial court instructed the jury with a modified version 
of CALJIC No. 2.02, as follows (the modified portion is 
italicized):  “The specific intent or mental state with which an 
act is done may be shown by the circumstances surrounding the 
commission of the act.  However, a finding of guilt as to any 
crime or special circumstance or special allegation may not be 
based 
on 
circumstantial 
evidence 
unless 
the 
proved 
circumstances are not only (1) consistent with the theory that 
the defendant had the required specific intent or mental state 
but (2) cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion.  
Also, if the evidence as to any specific intent or mental state 
permits two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to 
the existence of the specific intent or mental state and the other 
to its absence, you must adopt that interpretation which points 
to its absence.  If, on the other hand, one interpretation of the 
evidence as to the specific intent or mental state appears to you 
to be reasonable and the other interpretation to be 
unreasonable, you must accept the reasonable interpretation 
and reject the unreasonable.”  The unmodified version read:  
 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
42 
Defendant asserts CALJIC No. 2.01 was appropriate and 
necessary because the evidence concerning counts 1 (attempted 
murder of Martin), 3 (attempted murder of Priest), 5 (attempted 
murder of Alexander), and 6 (murder of Curtis) was primarily 
circumstantial. 
“CALJIC No. 2.02 was designed to be used in place of 
CALJIC No. 2.01 when the defendant’s specific intent or mental 
state is the only element of the offense that rests substantially 
or entirely on circumstantial evidence.”  (People v. Honig (1996) 
48 Cal.App.4th 289, 341.)  “It should not be given where the 
evidence is either direct or, if circumstantial, is not equally 
consistent with a conclusion of innocence.”  (Ibid.) 
“An instruction on the principles contained in CALJIC 
No. 2.01 ‘must be given sua sponte when the prosecution 
substantially relies on circumstantial evidence to prove guilt.”  
(People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 885 (Rogers).)  The 
instruction should not be given “simply because the 
incriminating evidence is indirect . . . but is appropriate only 
when ‘guilt must be inferred from a pattern of incriminating 
circumstances.’ ”  (People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 
167.)  A trial court need not give the instruction “when 
circumstantial 
evidence 
is 
merely 
incidental 
to 
and 
corroborative of direct evidence, due to the ‘danger of misleading 
and confusing the jury where the inculpatory evidence consists 
wholly or largely of direct evidence of the crime.’ ”  (People v. 
McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 676 (McKinnon).) 
 
“However, you may not find the defendant guilty of the crime 
charged [in Count[s] . . . and], [or] [the crime[s] of . . . which [is 
a] [are] lesser crime[s]],] [or] [find the allegation to be true,] 
unless . . . .” 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
43 
As the prosecution argued, its case rested primarily on the 
eyewitness testimony from Martin, Priest, and Ralph.  Priest 
identified defendant as the person he heard speaking just before 
hearing 
gunshots 
fired 
from 
defendant’s location 
and 
subsequently finding Martin shot.  After he heard the gunshots, 
Priest looked over and recognized defendant’s profile as 
defendant walked out of the apartment.  Martin testified that 
defendant was the person who pulled out a gun, ordered him to 
lie on the floor, and then shot him.  He further identified 
defendant as the man who stabbed Priest in the back.  Ralph 
identified defendant as the individual who shot Alexander and 
Curtis.  He had heard defendant’s voice prior to hearing 
gunshots coming from defendant’s location, and after the 
shooting, he saw defendant holding a gun.   
Although he testified for the defense and disavowed his 
previous 
identifications, 
Alexander 
admitted 
on 
cross-
examination that he had identified defendant as the shooter 
during a live lineup.  At the hospital, he told a detective that he 
saw the man who shot him, Curtis, and Ralph, and he had seen 
a photo of that person in a newspaper and on television.  
Alexander identified defendant as the shooter in a photo lineup. 
In addition to testimony by the eyewitnesses, the 
prosecution presented circumstantial evidence in the form of 
ballistics evidence.  A criminalist with the Sheriff’s department 
testified that the bullets recovered at both scenes and from 
Curtis’s body were fired from the gun found in defendant’s 
possession. 
In Rogers, the defendant presented an argument similar 
to defendant’s here.  The trial court instructed the jury with 
CALJIC No. 2.02, rather than CALJIC No. 2.01, and we 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
44 
concluded the trial court erred in doing so.  (Rogers, supra, 
39 Cal.4th at p. 885.)  The prosecution’s case regarding the 
identity of the assailant rested on two pieces of circumstantial 
evidence:  the defendant’s possession of the murder weapon and 
his admission that he killed another victim under similar 
circumstances.  (Ibid.)  There was no direct evidence linking the 
defendant to the murder and no eyewitnesses saw the defendant 
with the victim.  We concluded the error was harmless, however, 
because the evidence supporting the jury’s guilt determination 
was strong.  (Id. at p. 886.)  Unlike Rogers, which lacked direct 
evidence, several eyewitnesses in the present case placed 
defendant at both the Long Beach scene and the Pomona scene.  
The jury also heard ballistics evidence linking defendant to the 
murder which bolstered the direct evidence presented.  
Although none of the eyewitnesses testified that they saw 
defendant pull the trigger of the gun that shot Alexander, 
Martin, and Curtis, Alexander did tell a detective that he saw 
the man who shot them and identified defendant as that person.  
At trial, Martin and Priest identified defendant as the sole 
perpetrator, placed him at the scene with a handgun, and 
described a robbery during which the three victims were shot. 
In McKinnon, the prosecution’s case rested on testimony 
from a witness that the defendant confessed to shooting the 
victim in the head.  (McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 676.)  
The circumstantial evidence presented related to defendant’s 
possession of the murder weapon one week after the crime.  We 
upheld the trial court’s decision not to instruct with CALJIC No. 
2.01, noting that while the incriminating effect of the 
circumstantial 
evidence 
“was 
indeed 
substantial, 
it 
complemented, and was merely corroborative of, defendant’s 
admissions.”  (Id. at p. 676.)  As discussed, here, defendant’s 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
45 
guilt was established primarily by direct witness testimony.  
Any circumstantial evidence was corroborative of the 
eyewitness testimony.  Because the prosecution presented to the 
jury ample direct evidence of defendant’s identity, the trial court 
did not err when it instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.02.  
2.  Witness Identification 
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously instructed 
the jury regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification, 
violating his right to due process. 
The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.92 
regarding factors to consider in proving identity by eyewitness 
testimony.  By this, the jury was directed to “consider the 
believability of the eyewitness as well as other factors which 
bear upon the accuracy of the witness’ identification,” including 
“[t]he extent to which the witness is either certain or uncertain 
of the identification.”  Defendant asserts that a witness’s 
certainty of his identification is irrelevant and does not indicate 
eyewitness reliability, and it was error for the jury to consider 
that as a factor. 
We recently addressed a jury instruction regarding an 
eyewitness’s level of certainty in People v. Lemcke (2021) 
11 Cal.5th 644 (Lemcke).  In Lemcke, the defendant and his 
girlfriend attacked a woman at a motel.  (Id. at p. 648.)  The 
victim identified the defendant in a photographic lineup later 
that day, and again approximately three months later.  (Id. at 
pp. 648–649.)  The defense called an expert witness who 
testified at length regarding the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications.  (Id. at 650–652.)  The trial court instructed the 
jury with CALCRIM No. 315, providing 15 factors the jury 
should consider when evaluating the credibility and accuracy of 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
46 
eyewitness identification evidence.  (Id. at 652.)  On appeal, the 
defendant argued that the certainty instruction violated his due 
process rights to a fair trial.  
Although Lemcke concerned a challenge to CALCRIM 
No. 315, we noted that CALJIC No. 2.92 is similarly worded and 
found no material distinction between the two instructions.  
(Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 656, fn. 6.)  We acknowledged 
research that has found eyewitness confidence to be an 
unreliable indicator of accuracy and referred to the Judicial 
Council and its Advisory Committee on Criminal Jury 
Instructions an evaluation of “whether or how the instruction 
might be modified to avoid juror confusion regarding the 
correlation between certainty and accuracy.”  (Id. at p. 647.)  We 
held, however, that the instruction did not violate the 
defendant’s due process rights.  (Id. at 661.)  We observed that 
the defense expert witness had testified that certainty is 
generally not predictive of accuracy, and defense counsel had 
cross-examined the victim and the investigating officers 
regarding her identifications and the procedures used.  (Id. at 
p. 660.) 
Although the defense below did not present an eyewitness 
identification expert as had occurred in Lemcke, defendant’s 
primary trial strategy was to discredit Ralph, Priest, and 
Martin, and to imply that the eyewitnesses were testifying 
falsely.  At no point did defendant argue that the witnesses 
mistook his identity.  This was in contrast to Lemcke, where the 
defense 
strategy 
focused 
on 
questioning 
the 
victim’s 
identification of the defendant.  (Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 
pp. 652–653.)  The instant case involved the identification of 
defendant by multiple witnesses, and, unlike in Lemcke, at least 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
47 
two of the witnesses had known defendant in some capacity 
prior to the attack.   
Further, here the trial court’s instructions as a whole 
properly instructed the jury how to evaluate the evidence 
presented.  The court also instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 
2.20 concerning the believability of a witness and CALJIC No. 
2.21.2 concerning a witness who is willfully false.  When 
considered “ ‘in the context of the instructions as a whole and 
the trial record’ ” (People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1335, 
italics omitted), the trial court’s use of CALJIC No. 2.92 did not 
violate defendant’s due process rights. 
3.  Felony Murder 
Defendant contends the court erroneously instructed the 
jury on felony murder and first degree murder in light of the fact 
that the information charged him with only second degree 
murder under section 187. 
The amended information charged defendant in count 6 
with murder as follows:  “On or about March 21, 2000, in the 
County of Los Angeles, the crime of murder, in violation of Penal 
Code section 187(a), a Felony, was committed by William Lee 
Wright, Jr., who did unlawfully and with malice aforethought, 
murder Phillip Curtis, a human being.”  Count 6 further alleged 
that defendant committed the murder while engaged in the 
commission of the crimes of robbery and burglary within the 
meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17). 
The trial court instructed the jury on felony murder with 
CALJIC No. 8.21 as follows:  “The unlawful killing of a human 
being, whether intentional, unintentional or accidental, which 
occurs during the commission or attempted commission of the 
crime of robbery or burglary is murder of the first degree when 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
48 
the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit that crime.  
The specific intent to commit robbery or burglary and the 
commission or attempted commission of such crime must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
The trial court properly instructed the jury on first degree 
murder.  We have previously held that “in instructing a jury on 
first degree murder when the information charged malice 
murder under section 187, a trial court does not violate a 
defendant’s federal constitutional rights to due process, notice, 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or a unanimous verdict.”  
(People v. Carey (2007) 41 Cal.4th 109, 132.)  The information 
charged defendant with a robbery and burglary special 
circumstance, sufficiently putting defendant on notice that the 
prosecution was proceeding on a felony-murder theory.  (See 
ibid.)  
Defendant further argues that because the information 
charged only second degree murder, the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to try him for first degree murder.  We have 
repeatedly rejected this jurisdictional argument.  (People v. 
Lopez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 339, 360 (Lopez); People v. Hughes (2002) 
27 Cal.4th 287, 369; People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 367; 
People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 394–395.)  Defendant 
offers no persuasive reason for us to revisit these holdings. 
4.  Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
Defendant contends several guilt phase instructions 
undermined the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.   
As observed earlier, the trial court instructed the jury by 
using a modified version of CALJIC No. 2.02 that discussed the 
relationship between the reasonable doubt requirement and 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
49 
circumstantial evidence.  (See ante, fn. 9.)  As relevant here, the 
instruction provided that if “one interpretation of the evidence 
as to the specific intent or mental state appears to you to be 
reasonable and the other interpretation to be unreasonable, you 
must accept the reasonable interpretation and reject the 
unreasonable.”  Defendant contends the instruction “informed 
the jurors that if appellant reasonably appeared to be guilty, 
they could find him guilty — even if they entertained a 
reasonable doubt as to guilt.”  We have previously rejected 
defendant’s contention, holding that such a direction “is entirely 
consistent with the rule of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
because an unreasonable inference pointing to innocence is, by 
definition, not grounds for a reasonable doubt.  The 
circumstantial evidence instructions are thus correct.”  (People 
v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1058.)  We need not revisit 
this conclusion now. 
Defendant next claims that four additional instructions 
individually and collectively conflicted with the reasonable 
doubt standard:  CALJIC Nos. 2.21.1 (Discrepancies in 
Testimony); 2.21.2 (Witness Willfully False); 2.22 (Weighing 
Conflicting Testimony); and 2.27 (Sufficiency of Testimony of 
One Witness).  He asserts these instructions “urged the jury to 
decide material issues by determining which side had presented 
relatively stronger evidence,” thus replacing the reasonable 
doubt standard with the preponderance of the evidence 
standard.  As defendant concedes, we have previously rejected 
his contention.  (See People v. Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 70; 
People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 697–698.)  Defendant 
provides no persuasive reason to revisit our prior holdings.   
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
50 
F.  Challenges to the Death Penalty Law 
Defendant presents several challenges to California’s 
death penalty law that our prior decisions have considered and 
rejected.  He provides no basis necessitating us to reexamine the 
following conclusions: 
“California’s death penalty law ‘adequately narrows the 
class of murderers subject to the death penalty’ and does not 
violate the Eighth Amendment.  [Citation.]  Section 190.2, which 
sets forth the circumstances in which the penalty of death may 
be imposed, is not impermissibly broad in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.”  (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 294.) 
The death penalty statute “is not invalid for failing to 
require (1) written findings or unanimity as to aggravating 
factors, (2) proof of all aggravating factors beyond a reasonable 
doubt, (3) findings that aggravation outweighs mitigation 
beyond a reasonable doubt, or (4) findings that death is the 
appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (People v. 
Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 126, fn. omitted (Snow).)  These 
conclusions are not altered by the United States Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 
or Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584.  (People v. Simon (2016) 
1 Cal.5th 98, 149.)  The high court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida 
(2016) 577 U.S. 92, which invalidated Florida’s capital 
sentencing scheme, does not invalidate California’s law because 
our sentencing scheme is “ ‘materially different from that in 
Florida.’ ”  (People v. Becerrada (2016) 2 Cal.5th 1009, 1038; see 
also People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1235, fn. 16.) 
“Allowing the jury to consider the circumstances of the 
crime (§ 190.3, factor (a)) does not lead to the imposition of the 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
51 
death penalty in an arbitrary or capricious manner.”  (People v. 
Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 641.) 
“CALJIC No. 8.88’s use of the words ‘so substantial,’ its 
use of the word ‘warrants’ instead of ‘appropriate,’ its failure to 
instruct the jury that a sentence of life is mandatory if 
mitigation outweighs aggravation, and its failure to instruct the 
jury on a ‘presumption of life’ does not render the instruction 
invalid.”  (People v. Rountree (2013) 56 Cal.4th 823, 862–863.) 
The death penalty statutory scheme is not invalid for 
failing to require written findings.  (Lopez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at 
p. 370.)  
A trial court “need not and should not instruct the jury as 
to any burden of proof or persuasion at the penalty phase.”  
(People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 753.) 
“The trial court has no obligation to delete from CALJIC 
No. 8.85 inapplicable mitigating factors, nor must it identify 
which factors are aggravating and which are mitigating.”  
(People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 618.)  
“The adjectives  ‘extreme’  and  ‘substantial’  in statutory 
mitigating factors (d) and (g) of section 190.3 do not prevent the 
jury from considering mitigating evidence.”  (People v. Leonard 
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1429 (Leonard).) 
“The trial court is not required to instruct the jury that 
statutory factors (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (j) in section 190.3 are 
relevant only as mitigating factors, not as aggravating factors.”  
(Leonard, at p. 1430.) 
“Comparative intercase proportionality review by the trial 
or appellate courts is not constitutionally required.”  (Snow, 
supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 126.) 
PEOPLE v. WRIGHT 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
52 
“The capital sentencing scheme does not violate equal 
protection by denying to capital defendants procedural 
safeguards that are available to noncapital defendants.”  (People 
v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 836 (Thomas).) 
California’s death penalty does not violate international 
law or international norms of decency.  (Thomas, supra, 
53 Cal.4th at p. 837.)  
G.  Cumulative Error 
Defendant contends reversal is warranted because of the 
cumulatively prejudicial effect of the guilt and penalty phase 
errors.  We have found one error and assumed one more, both in 
connection with defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct.  
Even aggregated, these errors are harmless under any standard.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
The judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
LUI, J. *
 
* 
Administrative Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, 
Second Appellate District, Division Two, assigned by the Chief 
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 
Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Wright 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal XX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S107900 
Date Filed:  December 16, 2021 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Los Angeles  
Judge:  Norman P. Tarle 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek and Mary K. McComb, State Public Defenders, 
under appointments by the Supreme Court, Kathleen M. Scheidel and 
Alison Bernstein, Assistant State Public Defenders, and Alyssa 
Mellott, Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, 
Dane R. Gillette and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys 
General, James William Bilderback II, Assistant Attorney General, 
Jaime L. Fuster and Kim Aarons, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Alyssa Mellott 
Deputy State Public Defender 
1111 Broadway, 10th Floor 
Oakland, CA 94607 
(510) 267-3300 
 
Kim Aarons 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 S. Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
(213) 269-6092