Case Title: State v. Hogan

Citation: 2015 WI 76

Docket Number: 2013AP000430-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2015-07-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
2015 WI 76 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP430-CR    
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Patrick I. Hogan, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 354 Wis. 2d 622, 848 N.W.2d 903) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 10, 2105 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 4, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Grant 
 
JUDGE: 
Craig R. Day 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J., concurs. (Opinion Filed)   
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: BRADLEY, ABRAHAMSON, J.J., dissent. (Opinion 
Filed.)   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Nicholas J. Passe and Moen Sheehan Meyer, Ltd., La Crosse, 
and oral argument by Nicholas J. Passe. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Tiffany M. Winter, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.  
 
 
 
2015 WI 76
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2013AP430-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2012CF147) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Patrick I. Hogan, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 10, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals,1 which affirmed a 
judgment convicting Patrick I. Hogan (Hogan) of possession of 
methamphetamine and child neglect.  Hogan pled no contest to 
these charges after the Grant County Circuit Court2 denied 
Hogan's motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of 
his truck. 
                                                 
1 State v. Hogan, No. 2013AP430-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. May 15, 2014). 
2 Craig R. Day, Judge. 
No. 
  2013AP430-CR 
 
2 
 
¶2 
This fact-intensive case focuses on the reasonableness 
of police conduct after a lawful traffic stop.  After a 
sheriff's 
deputy 
stopped 
the 
defendant 
for 
a 
seat 
belt 
violation, the deputy observed what he believed to be indicia of 
the defendant's drug use.  With this in mind, he called for 
backup.  He then wrote out seat belt citations for the defendant 
and the defendant's wife, who was not wearing her seat belt 
properly.  Before the deputy had finished the citations, a local 
officer who knew of the defendant arrived on the scene. 
¶3 
The officer reported that his department had received 
tips that the defendant had "961 issues" and was a "shake and 
bake" methamphetamine cooker. 
¶4 
With his suspicions about the defendant somewhat 
confirmed, the deputy asked the defendant to perform a series of 
field sobriety tests.  When the defendant passed all tests, he 
was told he was free to leave.  At this point about 24 minutes 
had elapsed from the time the deputy initiated the traffic stop. 
¶5 
Approximately 
16 
seconds 
later, 
the 
deputy 
re-
approached the defendant and asked several questions, including 
whether the defendant would consent to a search of his truck.  
The defendant consented and the officers found methamphetamine, 
equipment 
and 
supplies 
commonly 
used 
to 
manufacture 
methamphetamine, and two loaded handguns.  One gun was close to 
the defendant's two-year-old daughter, who was sitting in a 
child's car seat behind her mother in the back of the truck. 
¶6 
The 
defendant 
sought 
to 
suppress 
this 
evidence.  
Suppression hinges on the answer to three questions.  First, did 
No. 
  2013AP430-CR 
 
3 
 
the deputy have reasonable suspicion to extend a lawful traffic 
stop about seat belts to investigate whether the defendant was 
under the influence of drugs in the operation of his vehicle by 
having the defendant perform field sobriety tests?  Second, if 
the traffic stop was not lawfully extended to investigate drug 
use by the defendant, was the defendant's subsequent consent to 
search his truck tainted by prior illegality, so that the 
evidence seized was inadmissible?  Third, was the defendant 
constructively seized without reasonable suspicion when the 
deputy re-approached the defendant's vehicle to request consent 
to search? 
¶7 
The defendant argues that the deputy lacked reasonable 
suspicion to ask that the defendant perform field sobriety 
tests.  He contends that there were innocent explanations for 
the observations that the deputy made, and that the deputy was 
acting on nothing more than a hunch and unsubstantiated 
information from a fellow law enforcement officer.  The 
defendant further argues that the taint of an illegal extension 
affected the deputy's request for consent to search, rendering 
the consent invalid and all evidence obtained in the search 
inadmissible.  Finally, the defendant argues that he was 
constructively seized without reasonable suspicion when the 
deputy re-approached his vehicle to ask for consent to search. 
¶8 
The State counters that possible innocent explanations 
do not render the deputy's observations meaningless in analyzing 
the basis for reasonable suspicion.  The State also argues that, 
even if the extension was illegal, the stop ended when the 
No. 
  2013AP430-CR 
 
4 
 
deputy told the defendant he was free to leave.  The State 
argues the defendant was not seized within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment when the deputy asked him for consent to search 
his truck, and the defendant's consent was therefore valid.  
Alternatively, the State contends that any illegality was so 
attenuated from the defendant's consent that the taint of the 
illegality had dissipated by the time the defendant gave 
consent. 
¶9 
Although the question of whether the deputy had 
reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop to administer 
field sobriety tests is a close one, we conclude that the 
extension 
was 
unlawful 
based 
on 
the 
evidence 
presented.  
However, the defendant's subsequent consent to search his 
vehicle came after the traffic stop had ended and the defendant 
was told he was free to leave.  Because the police did not 
exploit the unlawful extension of the stop in order to gain 
Hogan's consent to search his vehicle, attenuation analysis is 
unnecessary 
in 
this 
case. 
 
Furthermore, 
Hogan 
was 
not 
constructively seized when he gave consent to search his truck.  
We therefore conclude that the defendant's consent was valid and 
that it was not error for the circuit court to deny the 
defendant's motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his 
truck. 
¶10 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
No. 
  2013AP430-CR 
 
5 
 
¶11 On May 12, 2012, Deputy Andrew Smith of the Grant 
County Sheriff's Department was driving his squad car north on 
Wisconsin Avenue in the City of Boscobel.  It was about 6:10 
p.m.  Deputy Smith stopped at the corner of Wisconsin Avenue and 
Oak Street.  He saw a Chevrolet truck pass in front of him 
traveling east.  The driver, Patrick Hogan, was not wearing a 
seat belt.  Deputy Smith turned right and activated his 
emergency lights.  The truck promptly pulled to a stop in front 
of the Blaine Theatre. 
¶12 When Deputy Smith approached the truck, he saw Hogan's 
wife in the front passenger seat.  She was wearing her seat belt 
improperly with the shoulder strap underneath her arm.  He also 
saw the couple's two-year-old child seated directly behind Mrs. 
Hogan in a child safety seat. 
¶13 As soon as Deputy Smith began speaking with Hogan, he 
noticed that Hogan was "very nervous," "real nervous," and 
"shaking real bad" with upper body tremors.  He also noticed 
that Hogan's "pupils were restricted," which he believed was "an 
indicator of drug use."  Deputy Smith acknowledged later that he 
was not a drug recognition "expert" but said he based his 
observations on his 12-1/2 years experience as a deputy and his 
frequent review of a "pupilometer," which he described as "a 
little card that has different size black marks" which are 
"measured in millimeters."  The card was provided to him in 
connection with his field sobriety training. 
¶14 Deputy Smith collected the licenses of both Mr. and 
Mrs. Hogan and returned to his squad.  He immediately requested 
No. 
  2013AP430-CR 
 
6 
 
backup from Boscobel police and stressed his observations about 
Hogan's extreme nervousness and constricted pupils. 
¶15 Shortly thereafter, the audio portion of the squad car 
video reflects a repeated announcement, "Warning, potential 
hit."  The record does not explain whether this announcement 
pertained to Hogan, who was on probation for second-degree 
reckless injury and had a number of other criminal convictions. 
¶16 Before Deputy Smith completed the citations, he was 
joined by Boscobel Police Officer Travis Dregne.  Upon learning 
of Hogan's identity, Officer Dregne immediately remarked that 
Hogan had "961 issues," referring to the Wisconsin statutory 
chapter on controlled substances.  Officer Dregne also told 
Deputy Smith that "he received tips that Mr. Hogan's a shake and 
bake methamphetamine cooker."3  Deputy Smith then requested a 
police K9 unit via radio. 
¶17 Upon learning that the K9 unit was unavailable, Deputy 
Smith determined that he would ask Hogan to perform field 
sobriety tests.  Approximately three minutes later, he completed 
the citations and printed them out.  A total of approximately 13 
minutes had passed since Deputy Smith initiated the stop. 
¶18 Deputy Smith then approached Hogan and asked him to 
step out of the truck.  He explained to Hogan that he had made 
observations that he thought were consistent with drug use.  
                                                 
3 "Shake and bake" or "one pot" methamphetamine production 
is a manufacturing process used to produce small amounts of 
methamphetamine, often for personal use.  See Raphael S. Nemes, 
Note, Shake and Bake: The Meth Threat and the Need to Rethink 21 
U.S.C. § 841(C)(2), 88 Wash. U. L. Rev. 993, 999 (2011). 
No. 
  2013AP430-CR 
 
7 
 
Hogan's quick response was "I don't use drugs."  He then 
suggested that Deputy Smith's observations might be due to 
Hogan's 
use 
of 
Adderall, 
for 
which 
he 
said 
he 
had 
a 
prescription.  Deputy Smith replied that Adderall does not cause 
the symptoms he was observing, and he asked Hogan if he would 
perform a series of field sobriety tests.  Hogan complied. 
¶19 Deputy Smith had Hogan perform four tests: the 
horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the walk and turn, the one leg 
stand, and the alphabet test.  These tests took approximately 
eight minutes.  Deputy Smith determined that Hogan did not show 
any signs of impairment and informed Hogan he was free to leave. 
¶20 Hogan got back into his vehicle and closed the door 
but did not start the truck and leave, even though his house was 
across the street.  Deputy Smith returned to his squad car and 
spoke with Officer Dregne.  They discussed asking for a consent 
search.  Approximately 16 seconds after Deputy Smith told Hogan 
he could leave, he returned to Hogan's stationary vehicle and 
said, "Hey, sir, can I talk to you again?" 
¶21 Hogan got out of his truck.  Deputy Smith asked Hogan 
if there were any weapons or drugs in the truck.  Hogan replied 
that there were not.  Deputy Smith then asked Hogan if he could 
search the vehicle.  Hogan assented to Deputy Smith's request, 
motioning for Deputy Smith to take a look.  Deputy Smith asked 
for verbal confirmation of Hogan's consent and Hogan replied 
"Why not.  Yeah.  Go ahead." 
¶22 Deputy Smith and Officer Dregne searched Hogan's 
truck.  Hogan's wife disclosed to Officer Dregne that she had a 
No. 
  2013AP430-CR 
 
8 
 
handgun in her purse, but did not have a concealed carry permit.  
In addition to that gun——a .380 caliber Taurus semi-automatic 
pistol——they found a loaded Walther .22 caliber pistol behind 
the passenger seat near the couple's child. 
¶23 Deputy 
Smith 
and 
Officer 
Dregne 
also 
recovered 
muriatic acid, two glass bottles containing clear liquids, and a 
medicine bottle bearing Hogan's name that contained a substance 
later 
identified 
as 
methamphetamine. 
 
The 
officers 
also 
recovered paraphernalia used to manufacture methamphetamine, 
including coffee filters, syringes, rubber gloves, and a heating 
canister.  These items, including the loaded .22 pistol, were 
stored approximately one foot from the child. 
¶24 On May 14, 2012, Hogan was charged with possession of 
methamphetamine, manufacturing methamphetamine, possession of a 
firearm by a felon, and child neglect.4 
¶25 On June 12, 2012, Hogan filed a motion to suppress 
evidence from the search.  He argued that any evidence recovered 
after Deputy Smith told him he could leave was illegally 
obtained because Deputy Smith seized Hogan for a second time 
when he re-approached Hogan's vehicle even though he lacked 
reasonable suspicion to do so.  On the same day, Hogan filed a 
                                                 
4 Contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(3g)(g), 961.41(1)(e1), 
941.29(2)(a), and 948.21(1)(a).  All subsequent references to 
the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011-12 version unless 
otherwise indicated. 
No. 
  2013AP430-CR 
 
9 
 
motion to dismiss, arguing that the State failed to preserve 
evidence material to his guilt or innocence.5 
¶26 On June 21, 2012, Hogan filed another motion to 
suppress, this time arguing that the traffic stop was illegally 
extended when Deputy Smith required Hogan to perform field 
sobriety tests.  Hogan based this contention on the premise that 
Deputy Smith lacked reasonable suspicion that Hogan was under 
the influence of drugs. 
¶27 That same day, the circuit court denied Hogan's 
original motion to suppress the evidence from his truck.  The 
court reasoned that Hogan had freely consented to a search of 
his vehicle and therefore it was not an unlawful extension of 
the stop.  However, the court expressed uncertainty about 
whether the field sobriety tests were a lawful extension of the 
original stop, and requested informal briefing on the matter. 
¶28 The circuit court denied Hogan's second motion on July 
10, 2012.  Although the court determined that Deputy Smith 
illegally extended the stop when he administered the field 
sobriety tests, it concluded that Hogan's subsequent consent 
sufficiently tempered the illegality of the extension and that 
suppression was not necessary. 
¶29 On July 27, 2012, Hogan pled no contest to possession 
of methamphetamine and child neglect.  As part of the plea 
agreement, the State dismissed the charges for manufacturing 
                                                 
5 This issue has not been argued before this court, and we 
do not address it. 
No. 
  2013AP430-CR 
 
10 
 
methamphetamine, possession of a firearm by a felon, and the 
seat belt citation.  The court found Hogan guilty and entered a 
judgment of conviction on September 27. 
¶30 On October 12, 2012, Hogan gave notice of his intent 
to seek postconviction relief from the orders denying his 
motions to dismiss and suppress.  On May 15, 2014, the court of 
appeals affirmed the conviction and the circuit court's denial 
of the motions.  State v. Hogan, No. 2013AP430-CR, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 15, 2014).  The court reasoned that 
Hogan was not constructively seized when Deputy Smith conducted 
a search of his vehicle.  Id., ¶12.  The court also affirmed the 
circuit court's ruling that Hogan's consent "was sufficiently 
attenuated from the taint of the illegal detention."  Id., ¶19. 
¶31 On June 16, 2014, Hogan filed a petition for review 
with this court, which we granted on November 13, 2014. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶32 Whether a defendant's constitutional rights, including 
his rights under the Fourth Amendment, have been violated is a 
question of constitutional fact.  Resolving questions of 
constitutional fact is a two-step process.  State v. Martwick, 
2000 WI 5, ¶17, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552.  We first 
uphold the circuit court's findings of historical fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous.  Id., ¶18.  We then independently 
apply constitutional principles to those facts.  Id. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶33 This case requires us to analyze different segments of 
an extended traffic stop.  The evidence that the defendant seeks 
No. 
  2013AP430-CR 
 
11 
 
to suppress was not acquired until a third distinct period of 
the stop about 28 minutes after its initiation. 
A. Extension of the Stop 
¶34 The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects 
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.  U.S. 
Const. amend. IV.  "There is no question that a police officer 
may stop a vehicle when he or she reasonably believes the driver 
is violating a traffic law . . . ."  State v. Betow, 226 
Wis. 2d 90, 93, 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing United 
States v. Johnson, 58 F.3d 356, 357 (8th Cir. 1995)).  However, 
"a traffic stop 'can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond 
the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission' of 
issuing a . . . ticket."  Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 
___, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614-15 (2015) (quoting Illinois v. 
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). 
¶35 After a justifiable stop is made, the officer may 
expand the scope of the inquiry only to investigate "additional 
suspicious factors [that] come to the officer's attention."  
Betow, 226 Wis. 2d at 94 (citing United States v. Perez, 37 F.3d 
510, 513 (9th Cir. 1994)).  See also State v. Gammons, 2001 WI 
App 36, ¶¶18-19, 214 Wis. 2d 296, 625 N.W.2d 623.  An expansion 
in the scope of the inquiry, when accompanied by an extension of 
time longer than would have been needed for the original stop, 
must be supported by reasonable suspicion.  See State v. 
Colstad, 2003 WI App 25, ¶13, 260 Wis. 2d 406, 659 N.W.2d 394.  
See also Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 
1687 (2014); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).  In this 
No. 
  2013AP430-CR 
 
12 
 
regard, the legal extension of a traffic stop is essentially a 
Terry investigatory stop.  State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶35, 311 
Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748. 
¶36 "The 
focus 
of 
an 
investigatory 
stop 
is 
on 
reasonableness, and the determination of reasonableness depends 
on the totality of circumstances . . . ."  State v. Richardson, 
156 Wis. 2d 128, 139, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990).  Although officers 
sometimes will be confronted with behavior that has a possible 
innocent explanation, a combination of behaviors——all of which 
may provide the possibility of innocent explanation——can give 
rise to reasonable suspicion.  See United States v. Arvizu, 534 
U.S. 266, 274-75 (2002). 
¶37 It follows that the legality of the extension of the 
traffic stop in this case turns on the presence of factors 
which, in the aggregate, amount to reasonable suspicion that 
Hogan committed a crime the investigation of which would be 
furthered by the defendant's performance of field sobriety 
tests.  See State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶10, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 
N.W.2d 634. 
¶38 In his incident report, Deputy Smith explained the 
basis for extending the stop: "Based upon Patrick shaking and 
his pupils being restricted, I asked him if he would be willing 
to attempt some field sobriety tests and he indicated he would." 
¶39 Hogan's 
post-arraignment 
motions 
challenged 
the 
sufficiency of this explanation as well as the sufficiency of 
the deputy's observations at the preliminary hearing——"he was 
very nervous, shaking, and his pupils were restricted"——as 
No. 
  2013AP430-CR 
 
13 
 
providing reasonable suspicion to extend the stop to perform 
field sobriety tests. 
¶40 At 
the 
subsequent 
motion 
hearing, 
Deputy 
Smith 
testified at greater length and the State's evidence included 
video of the entire incident taken from the deputy's squad car 
and audio of the deputy's statements and discussions with 
others.  At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Day asked for 
letter briefs. 
¶41 In his brief, the assistant district attorney did not 
emphasize reasonable suspicion for the field sobriety tests as 
much as he emphasized Hogan's consent to search, and he did not 
rely on information the Boscobel police officer gave to Deputy 
Smith about Hogan as an important element of the reasonable 
suspicion for the tests.  Hogan's attorney said a bit more about 
Officer Dregne's statements but he pointedly observed that 
"Officer Dregne . . . had heard (from some unknown source) that 
the defendant had a drug history."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶42 Judge Day concluded that the field sobriety tests were 
"an unlawful extension of the stop."  He attributed no "power or 
persuasive force to Deputy Smith's observation of [Hogan's] 
pupils," saying it "doesn't mean anything on this record."  He 
did not refer to the deputy's acquired information about Hogan's 
alleged 
"961 
issues" 
or 
his 
alleged 
involvement 
with 
methamphetamine. 
¶43 Upon careful examination of the record, we believe the 
State could have made a valid case that Deputy Smith had 
reasonable suspicion to pursue field sobriety tests with Patrick 
No. 
  2013AP430-CR 
 
14 
 
Hogan.  However, the case the State could have made in circuit 
court was not made, and, consequently, Judge Day's ruling on 
this point was not error. 
¶44 We review the totality of the circumstances to 
illustrate the problems. 
¶45 There was no evidence and no suspicion that Hogan was 
driving under the influence of alcohol.  There also was no 
evidence that Hogan's driving had been impaired by drugs.  The 
deputy's observations suggested that Hogan might have been using 
drugs and thus might have violated Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(am), 
which makes it illegal for a person to drive or operate a motor 
vehicle with "a detectable amount of a restricted controlled 
substance in his or her blood."  As a result, the issue 
presented to the circuit court was whether there was reasonable 
suspicion that Hogan had been using controlled substances 
recently enough that evidence of that use would be detected in 
his blood. 
¶46 Any order for a blood test would require probable 
cause.  State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶31, 359 Wis. 2d 421, 
857 N.W.2d 120.  Field sobriety tests were intended to secure 
evidence to establish probable cause. 
¶47 Deputy Smith was an experienced officer with 12-1/2 
years of service in the Grant County Sheriff's Department.  His 
experience should have been a plus.  State v. Meyer, 216 
Wis. 2d 729, 752-53, 576 N.W.2d 260 (1998).  His instincts were, 
in fact, correct.  However, Deputy Smith conceded that he was 
not a drug recognition expert and his testimony about restricted 
No. 
  2013AP430-CR 
 
15 
 
pupils undermined his credibility in the court's eyes.  The 
court heard the following testimony on cross-examination: 
Q: 
You also indicated that you observed his pupils 
to be restricted, right? 
A: 
Yes, sir. 
Q: 
Okay.  Was it sunny out that day? 
A: 
Yes, sir. 
Q: 
And pupils restrict when it's sunny? 
A: 
Yes, sir. 
Q: 
You're not a drug recognition expert, right? 
A: 
Correct. 
Q: 
What drugs cause pupil restrictions? 
A: 
Cocaine being one.  I'm sure there's others, but 
I'm not a drug recognition expert. 
Q: 
Do you know what methamphetamine does to pupils? 
A: 
No, sir. 
Q: 
Okay.  Approximately what size do you believe Mr. 
Hogan's pupils were? 
A: 
Three millimeters. 
 
. . . .  
Q: 
[D]o you know what the normal pupil size is for 
an adult male? 
A: 
Four to five millimeters, I believe. 
¶48 For a variety of reasons, the circuit court put no 
stock in the deputy's testimony about restricted pupils as a 
factor in establishing reasonable suspicion.  The deputy did not 
have definitive information at any point on how drug use might 
No. 
  2013AP430-CR 
 
16 
 
affect pupil size.6  He referred to his familiarity with a 
pupilometer card but he did not bring the card to substantiate 
or supplement his testimony. 
¶49 Consequently, the case for reasonable suspicion rests 
primarily on the deputy's observations that Hogan's upper body 
was shaking and "he appeared to be very nervous."  These points 
appear in his suppression hearing testimony and are even more 
prominent in the audio that accompanies the video. 
¶50 Nervousness, anxiety, and tremors are consistent with 
methamphetamine 
use. 
 
National 
Highway 
Traffic 
Safety 
Administration, Drugs and Human Performance Fact Sheets, Report 
No. DOT HS 809 725, at 63 (April 2014).  These characteristics, 
however, may also have innocent explanations.  The possibility 
that innocent explanations may exist for observed behavior does 
not preclude a finding of reasonable suspicion, but as a 
practical matter, police cannot expect to conduct field sobriety 
tests on every motorist who is shaking and nervous when stopped 
by an officer. 
¶51 Officer Dregne's comments that Hogan had "961 issues" 
and that Officer Dregne had "received tips that Mr. Hogan's a 
shake and bake methamphetamine cooker" undoubtedly influenced 
                                                 
6 In fact, during the course of the discussion about pupil 
size, 
Deputy 
Smith 
suggested 
that 
restricted 
pupils 
are 
consistent with cocaine use.  However, according to a source 
cited by the State, cocaine use may lead to dilated pupils, not 
restricted 
pupils. 
 
See 
National 
Highway 
Traffic 
Safety 
Administration, Drugs and Human Performance Fact Sheets, Report 
No. DOT HS 809 725, at 21 (April 2014). 
No. 
  2013AP430-CR 
 
17 
 
Deputy Smith's decision to proceed as he did.  At least some of 
Deputy 
Smith's 
observations 
meshed 
with 
Officer 
Dregne's 
information.  Ultimately, however, when a court is asked to rule 
on a suppression motion, the court must evaluate whether the 
information conveyed by a fellow officer, and relied upon in 
taking the action under review, was reliable information, 
because the officer conveying the information had either 
firsthand knowledge or a reliable informant.  No effort was made 
in this case to show that Officer Dregne's tips came from a 
reliable informant.7  Such an effort, if successful, would have 
made 
a 
substantial 
difference 
in 
establishing 
reasonable 
suspicion. 
¶52 The audio from the incident several times records an 
urgent announcement, perhaps from the squad computer: "Warning, 
potential hit."  These announcements are never referred to in 
the testimony or the argument, so that their import and 
                                                 
7 To assess the reliability of an anonymous tip, a totality 
of the circumstances test is used.  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 230-31 (1983).  Courts must take into account the quantity 
and quality of information received during this analysis.  
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).  The quantity and 
quality are inversely proportionate: if one is relatively low, 
the other must be relatively high for the tip to be deemed 
reliable.  Id.  Courts consider such factors as awareness of the 
informant's identity, an officer's past interactions with the 
informant, and predictive information offered in the tip.  See 
United States v. Am, 564 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2009); United States 
v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376, 1389 (9th Cir. 1985); State v. 
Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990). 
Officer Dregne's informant may not have been anonymous and 
may have been completely reliable, but any such facts are not in 
evidence. 
No. 
  2013AP430-CR 
 
18 
 
relationship to Hogan, if any, are unknown.  If either Deputy 
Smith or Officer Dregne had been shown to know of Hogan's 
criminal record, which included three felony convictions and a 
drug conviction as well as his probationary status, the case for 
reasonable suspicion would have been greatly strengthened.  
After all, Hogan's statement to Deputy Smith that "I don't do 
drugs" could have been challenged, and Hogan's immediate 
explanation that Deputy Smith's observations could be attributed 
to Hogan's use of prescription Adderall could have been viewed 
even more skeptically because of background information from 
reliable sources. 
¶53 Reasonable suspicion here is a close question.  But 
the State's failure to tie up loose ends in circuit court should 
not be rewarded just because the case is close.  As a result, we 
will not disturb the circuit court's conclusion that the 
extension of the stop for field sobriety tests was not lawful. 
B. Consent to Search 
¶54 Our determination that the extension of the traffic 
stop was not lawful, based on the record before us, does not 
resolve this case.  The somewhat unusual feature of the case is 
that the evidence Hogan seeks to suppress was not obtained as a 
result of the field sobriety tests but rather as a result of the 
consensual search of Hogan's vehicle. 
¶55 "Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment."  State v. Williams, 2002 WI 94, ¶18, 255 
Wis. 2d 1 (2002).  However, one of the "specifically established 
and well-delineated" exceptions to the warrant requirement is 
No. 
  2013AP430-CR 
 
19 
 
consent; if an individual freely gives consent for police to 
search his or her vehicle, the police may do so without a 
warrant.  Id. 
¶56 Hogan does not dispute that he gave his consent for 
Deputy Smith to search his truck.  Instead, Hogan argues that 
his illegal detention immediately prior to his consent tainted 
the consent and Deputy Smith was therefore not excused from 
obtaining a warrant to search Hogan's vehicle. 
¶57 Consent analysis proceeds under a distinct framework 
if consent was given following some illegal action by police.  
Consent, even when voluntary, is not valid when obtained through 
exploitation of an illegal action by police.  State v. Phillips, 
218 
Wis. 2d 180, 
204 
(1998). 
 
Stated 
differently, 
"[w]hen . . . consent to search is obtained after a Fourth 
Amendment violation, evidence seized as a result of that search 
must be suppressed as 'fruit of the poisonous tree' unless the 
State can show a sufficient break in the causal chain between 
the illegality and the seizure of evidence."  Id. 
¶58 Attenuation 
analysis 
examines 
three 
factors 
to 
determine 
whether 
consent 
is 
sufficiently 
attenuated 
from 
illegal action to be removed from the taint of illegality: "(1) 
the temporal proximity of the official misconduct and seizure of 
evidence; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) 
the 
purpose 
and 
flagrancy 
of 
the 
official 
misconduct."  
Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 206 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 
590, 603-04 (1975)).  The application of these factors will vary 
on a case-by-case basis.  Our focus here is determining whether 
No. 
  2013AP430-CR 
 
20 
 
these factors sufficiently safeguard constitutional protections 
when the illegal action is the unlawful extension of a traffic 
stop. 
¶59 Hogan suggests that the third factor is inappropriate 
in this analysis because the "subjective intent of . . . law 
enforcement officers is irrelevant to whether . . . officers are 
unfairly 
benefitting 
from 
the 
violation 
of . . . suspects' 
rights."  Hogan further contends that the focus in the 
attenuation analysis should be on why the individual gave 
consent.  He offers a hybrid test that combines the first two 
factors from Phillips with a constructive seizure analysis like 
that in Williams. 
¶60 Considering the closeness of this case with regard to 
reasonable suspicion, it is no surprise that Hogan downplays the 
importance of the third factor, i.e., the purpose and flagrancy 
of the official misconduct.  While flagrant violations of the 
law by police should weigh against the validity of any 
subsequent consent, see United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577 
(2d Cir. 1970), the mere failure to establish reasonable 
suspicion because the State did not submit all the evidence that 
it had available is a different matter. 
¶61 Hogan's desired focus on why a person gives consent 
implicates questions of voluntariness.  Involuntary consent is 
invalid, regardless of any prior illegality or attenuation 
therefrom.  See State v. Vorburger, 2002 WI 105, ¶89, 255 
Wis. 2d 537, 648 N.W.2d 829 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
412 U.S. 218 (1973)).  Attenuation analysis is not voluntariness 
No. 
  2013AP430-CR 
 
21 
 
analysis, and it is not meant to cure the involuntary waiver of 
rights.  Rather, attenuation analysis examines whether voluntary 
consent 
is 
tainted 
by 
prior 
illegality. 
 
Phillips, 
218 
Wis. 2d at 204-05. 
¶62 Viewed in this light, we conclude that the attenuation 
test laid out in Phillips is the proper test to apply for 
analyzing voluntary consent to search a vehicle when that 
consent comes after the illegal extension of a traffic stop.  
The three Phillips factors adequately protect the rights of 
motorists in such situations.  In many ways, the concept of 
constructive seizure——which Hogan argues should be included in 
the analysis——is already built into the Phillips attenuation 
test. 
¶63 We have held that a traffic stop ends when a 
reasonable person, under the totality of the circumstances, 
would feel free to leave.  Williams, 255 Wis. 2d 1, ¶35.  Given 
the wide range of possible "circumstances" in a traffic stop, it 
is not possible to expound a bright-line rule of when the 
reasonable driver would feel free to leave.  However, it is not 
uncommon for officers to tell drivers they are "free to leave," 
may be "on their way," or to "have a nice day" at the conclusion 
of a traffic stop. 
¶64 The end of a traffic stop is important to two of the 
factors in the attenuation analysis.  First, the circumstances 
giving rise to the end of a traffic stop will often (though 
perhaps 
not 
always) 
include 
the 
passage 
of 
time, 
which 
implicates the first attenuation factor.  Second, and more 
No. 
  2013AP430-CR 
 
22 
 
important, 
the 
end 
of 
a 
traffic 
stop 
is 
a 
significant 
intervening event for purposes of attenuation analysis. 
¶65 Thus, Hogan's proposed hybrid attenuation test is 
unnecessary because it would focus on improper factors while 
placing redundant value on other factors.  We see no reason to 
replace the Phillips attenuation analysis in this context. 
¶66 It is important to note that attenuation analysis may 
not be necessary in all cases.  "[A]ttenuation analysis is only 
appropriate where, as a threshold matter, courts determine that 
'the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal 
governmental activity.'"  New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 19 
(1990) (citation omitted).  If the unlawful police conduct was 
not a "but-for" cause of the search, attenuation analysis is 
unnecessary because the consent is not tainted by the unlawful 
conduct in such a case.  See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 
592 (2006). 
¶67 After a traffic stop has ended, police may interact 
with the driver as they would with any citizen on the street.  
See Williams, 255 Wis. 2d 1, ¶35.  That is, if a person is not 
seized, police may request consent to search even absent 
reasonable suspicion.  See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 
(1991).  In a sense, the end of a traffic stop places the 
officer and driver back on equal footing, with the driver free 
to leave if he wishes (because if the driver were not free to 
leave, the traffic stop would not in fact have ended). 
¶68 Given the myriad possible scenarios in which police 
and the public may interact on the side of the road, we cannot 
No. 
  2013AP430-CR 
 
23 
 
postulate that the end of a traffic stop will always render 
attenuation analysis unnecessary.  However, the end of the stop 
will be a significant factor in determining the necessity of 
attenuation analysis, at the very least. 
¶69 In this case, we conclude that the end of the traffic 
stop does render attenuation analysis unnecessary because it 
cannot be said that the extension of the stop was a but-for 
cause of Hogan's consent.  Deputy Smith told Hogan that he was 
free to leave, encouraged him to wear his seat belt, and advised 
him to get his windshield fixed.  He then returned to his squad 
car.  Deputy Smith waited approximately 16 seconds before re-
engaging Hogan.  When we compare these facts to the facts in 
Williams,8 we have little trouble concluding that Hogan was not 
constructively seized at the time Deputy Smith requested his 
consent to search the vehicle.  A reasonable person, under the 
totality of the circumstances, would have felt free to leave——to 
drive across the street to his home. 
                                                 
8 In Williams, a police officer stopped the defendant's 
vehicle for a traffic violation, for which the officer issued a 
warning.  The defendant signed the warning, the two shook hands, 
and the officer told the defendant in a conversational tone he 
could "get on [his] way."  State v. Williams, 2002 WI 94, ¶¶9-
12, 255 Wis. 2d 1, 646 N.W.2d 834.  After taking two steps 
toward his squad car, the officer asked for and was granted 
consent to search the vehicle, where the officer found heroin 
and a weapon.  Id., ¶12-13.  This court determined the officer's 
words 
and 
actions, 
considered 
as 
a 
whole, 
communicated 
permission to leave and, therefore, the defendant was no longer 
seized after the officer stated the defendant could "get on his 
way."  Id., ¶29.  Because a reasonable person would have felt 
able to leave the scene, the officer's subsequent questioning 
did not constitute a seizure for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment and the defendant's consent was valid.  Id., ¶28. 
No. 
  2013AP430-CR 
 
24 
 
¶70 It is true that the emergency lights on Deputy Smith's 
squad car remained on for the entire duration of the stop, 
including the time in which Deputy Smith re-engaged Hogan.  
However, that alone is not enough for us to conclude that the 
stop had not ended.  Police often may leave their emergency 
lights on for safety reasons when they and the motorist are 
pulling back onto the roadway after a traffic stop.  The 
continuing illumination of the emergency lights was not enough 
to create an ongoing——or new——seizure of Hogan. 
¶71 We therefore conclude that even though the extension 
of the traffic stop has been deemed illegal, the extension of 
the stop was not a but-for cause of the consent.  The traffic 
stop had concluded.  Hogan had returned to his truck and was 
free to leave.  He gave consent to search after Deputy Smith re-
approached him and asked for consent. 
¶72 Our conclusion that Hogan was not constructively 
seized when Deputy Smith requested consent to search Hogan's 
truck also resolves Hogan's argument that his consent was 
invalid because it occurred during a constructive seizure 
initiated without reasonable suspicion.  As discussed above, 
without a constructive seizure, police do not need reasonable 
suspicion to request consent to search.  See Bostick, 501 U.S. 
at 431. 
¶73 Because Hogan's rights were not violated, it was not 
error for the circuit court to deny his motions to suppress. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
No. 
  2013AP430-CR 
 
25 
 
¶74 Although the question of whether the deputy had 
reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop to administer 
field sobriety tests is a close one, we conclude that the 
extension 
was 
unlawful 
based 
on 
the 
evidence 
presented.  
However, the defendant's subsequent consent to search his 
vehicle came after the traffic stop had ended and the defendant 
was told he was free to leave.  Because the police did not 
exploit the unlawful extension of the stop in order to gain 
Hogan's consent to search his vehicle, attenuation analysis is 
unnecessary 
in 
this 
case. 
 
Furthermore, 
Hogan 
was 
not 
constructively seized when he gave consent to search his truck.  
We therefore conclude that the defendant's consent was valid and 
that it was not error for the circuit court to deny the 
defendant's motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his 
truck.   
¶75 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2013AP430-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶76 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion.  I write separately to note that, had the 
circuit court determined that the facts were as the State 
asserts, I would engage in the analysis that I put forth in my 
concurrence in State v. Blatterman.  See State v. Blatterman, 
2015 WI 46, 362 Wis. 2d 138, 864 N.W.2d 26 (Ziegler, J., 
concurring) 
(arguing 
that, 
because 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration violation under Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b) does not 
require proof of impairment, standard field sobriety tests are 
of limited value for determining whether a driver violated this 
statute).  
¶77 In the present case, Deputy Andrew Smith suspected 
Patrick Hogan of operating a motor vehicle with a detectable 
amount of a restricted controlled substance in his blood, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(am).  This offense does not 
require proof of impairment.  State v. Smet, 2005 WI App 263, 
¶23, 288 Wis. 2d 525, 709 N.W.2d 474.  This offense has two 
elements: (1) the defendant drove or operated a motor vehicle on 
a highway; and (2) the defendant had a detectable amount of a 
restricted controlled substance in his or her blood at the time 
the defendant drove or operated a motor vehicle.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(am); 
Wis. 
JI——Criminal 
2664B. 
 
Although 
poor 
performance on standard field sobriety tests would support a 
determination that there is probable cause to arrest someone who 
is suspected of violating § 346.63(1)(am), operators may violate 
this statute even though they are able to pass standard field 
sobriety tests.  Accordingly, whether a driver who violates this 
No.  2013AP430-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
statute is brought to justice might often depend on whether 
there is probable cause to arrest the driver and take him or her 
to a hospital for further testing, regardless of how he or she 
performs on standard field sobriety tests.  In the present case, 
the circuit court's findings of fact do not allow me to engage 
in this type of analysis. 
¶78 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.    
 
 
No.  2013AP430-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶79 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  I agree with 
the majority that "[c]onsent analysis proceeds under a distinct 
framework if consent was given following some illegal action by 
police.  Consent, even when voluntary, is not valid when 
obtained through exploitation of an illegal action by police."  
Majority op., ¶57.   
¶80 I also agree that "[w]hen . . . consent to search is 
obtained after a Fourth Amendment violation, evidence seized as 
a result of that search must be suppressed as 'fruit of the 
poisonous tree' unless the State can show a sufficient break in 
the causal chain between the illegality and the seizure of 
evidence."  Id. (quoting State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 
204, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998)) (alteration in majority). 
¶81 I part ways with the majority, however, when it comes 
to the necessity of conducting an attenuation analysis.  The 
majority concludes that it is unnecessary "[b]ecause the police 
did not exploit the unlawful extension . . . to gain Hogan's 
consent."  Majority op., ¶9.  Yet, the very purpose of an 
attenuation analysis is to determine whether the evidence 
objected to was obtained by exploitation of a prior police 
illegality.   
¶82 Contrary to the majority's assertions, this case 
presents the quintessential example of when an attenuation 
analysis is needed.  It is undisputed that the extension of the 
traffic stop was unconstitutional.  The deputy reengaged Hogan a 
mere 16 seconds later, seeking consent to search.   
No.  2013AP430-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
¶83 Where consent is obtained so closely on the heels of 
acknowledged police misconduct, attenuation analysis is the 
means by which we determine "whether the evidence objected to 
was obtained by exploitation of a prior police illegality or 
instead by means sufficiently attenuated so as to be purged of 
the taint."  State v. Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d 441, 447-48, 477 
N.W.2d 277 (1991). 
¶84 In this case an attenuation analysis reveals that the 
taint from the deputy's unconstitutional actions was not 
removed.  Therefore the evidence obtained from that search must 
be suppressed.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶85 The majority spends a substantial portion of its 
analysis attempting to re-litigate the facts of this case to 
determine whether the extension of the traffic stop was 
unconstitutional.  Majority op., ¶¶38-52.  Ultimately, it 
acquiesces, as it must, to the conclusion reached by the circuit 
court and the court of appeals——the extension of the stop was   
illegal.  Id., ¶53. 
¶86 Acknowledging that designating the extension unlawful 
does not resolve the case, the majority turns its focus to 
whether Hogan's consent for the search was tainted by the 
extension.  Id., ¶56.  It observes that consent "is not valid 
when obtained through exploitation of an illegal action by 
police."  Id., ¶57.  It then explains that "[a]ttenuation 
analysis examines three factors to determine whether consent is 
sufficiently attenuated from illegal action to be removed from 
No.  2013AP430-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
the taint of illegality."  Id., ¶58.  This statement is followed 
by a lengthy discussion of those three factors.  Id., ¶¶58-65. 
¶87 Abruptly shifting paths, the majority fails to apply 
the three factors.  Instead, it considers whether a person in 
Hogan's position would have felt free to leave after the 
unlawful extension of the traffic stop.  Id., ¶63.  It 
determines that a reasonable person would have felt free to 
leave due to the deputy's statement: "you're free to go."  See 
id., ¶69.  Based on this rationale, the majority sets aside the 
preceding illegality in the traffic stop and determines that an 
attenuation analysis is unnecessary.  It states: "[b]ecause the 
police did not exploit the unlawful extension of the stop in 
order to gain Hogan's consent to search his vehicle, attenuation 
analysis is unnecessary in this case."  Id., ¶9.  Without 
conducting an attenuation analysis, the majority ultimately 
concludes that Hogan's consent to the search was valid.  Id., 
¶¶69, 71.  
II 
¶88 In asserting a reasonable person would have felt free 
to leave after the unlawful extension of the traffic stop, the 
majority constructs a fiction. 
¶89 Hogan had been pulled over for not wearing his 
seatbelt.  After the deputy checked Hogan's license and 
registration, he asked Hogan to step out of his vehicle.  
Despite Hogan's clear agitation and expressed desire to go home, 
the deputy prolonged the stop to such an extent that it 
constituted an unconstitutional extension of the stop when he 
No.  2013AP430-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
asked Hogan to perform multiple sobriety tests.  After the tests 
were completed, the Deputy told Hogan he was free to leave.   
¶90 However, sixteen seconds after Hogan got back into his 
vehicle, with the lights on the patrol car still flashing, the 
deputy walked back to the defendant and reengaged.  After asking 
for and receiving Hogan's consent to search, the deputy found 
methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, and two loaded guns in 
Hogan's vehicle. 
¶91 Like United States Supreme Court Justice Souter, I 
have a hard time imagining that an average individual would 
believe that he has nothing to lose if he refuses to cooperate 
with the police or that he had any free choice to ignore the 
police altogether.  United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 212 
(2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("It is very hard to imagine 
that either [defendant] would have believed that he stood to 
lose nothing if he refused to cooperate with the police, or that 
he had any free choice to ignore the police altogether. No 
reasonable 
passenger 
could 
have 
believed 
that, 
only 
an 
uncomprehending one."). 
¶92 The reasonable person "free to leave" standard bears 
little relationship to what individuals actually believe:   
Courts and scholars have repeatedly noted that the 
free-to-leave test is a highly unrealistic judicial 
construct that stretches credulity to its limits in 
assuming that any reasonable person (young or old; 
guilty or innocent) would literally feel free to leave 
and 
ignore 
a 
police 
officer's 
questions 
without 
consequence.   
Jonathan S. Carter, You're Only as "Free to Leave" as You Feel: 
Police 
Encounters 
with 
Juveniles 
and 
the 
Trouble 
with 
No.  2013AP430-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
Differential Standards for Investigatory Stops In Re I.R.T., 88 
N.C. L. Rev. 1389, 1410-11 (2010); see also Cty. of Grant v. 
Vogt, 2014 WI 76, ¶31 n.14, 356 Wis. 2d 343, 850 N.W.2d 253 ("To 
some extent, the 'reasonable person' here is a legal fiction.  
That defendants often consent to searches of areas that reveal 
incriminating evidence demonstrates that people often do not 
feel free to decline an officer's request, even absent a 
manifest show of authority."). 
¶93 "[E]mpirical studies over the last several decades on 
the 
social 
psychology 
of 
compliance, 
conformity, 
social 
influence, and politeness have all converged on a single 
conclusion: the extent to which people feel free to refuse to 
comply 
is 
extremely 
limited 
under 
situationally 
induced 
pressures."  Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the 
Psychology of Coercion, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 153, 155.   As 
Professor LaFave has observed "only the most thick-skinned of 
suspects" would feel free to leave in some of the circumstances 
that the Court has found such a freedom.  Wayne R. LaFave, 
Pinguitudinous 
Police, 
Pachydermatous 
Prey: 
Whence 
Fourth 
Amendment "Seizures?", 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 729, 739-40. 
¶94 In the present case, the very nature of the stop was 
coercive.  The deputy necessarily displayed his power and the 
accoutrements of his authority in order to get Hogan to pull 
over his vehicle.  Once there, the deputy used his authority to 
require Hogan's compliance with unconstitutional sobriety tests, 
while another officer looked on.  There was no real break 
between this series of events and the deputy's request to search 
No.  2013AP430-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
Hogan's vehicle.  Although the deputy told Hogan he was free to 
leave, within a mere 16 seconds, he reengaged seeking consent to 
search Hogan's vehicle.  
III 
¶95 The majority's suggestion that Hogan's consent to 
search his vehicle was unrelated to the illegality is also 
unpersuasive.  Would a reasonable person in Hogan's situation, 
who is on probation and aware that there was methamphetamine, 
drug paraphernalia, and two loaded guns in his vehicle, blithely 
consent to a search of his vehicle absent the presence of 
coercion?  The answer is no.  The illegal extension of the 
traffic stop unquestionably played a role in Hogan's consent. 
¶96 An application of attenuation analysis demonstrates 
that the consent was not so attenuated from the illegality to 
render it free of the taint from the unconstitutional extension 
of the traffic stop. 
¶97  Attenuation 
analysis 
is 
well-established 
in 
our 
jurisprudence.  Originating in the United States Supreme Court, 
it was developed to help courts determine whether evidence 
obtained following illegal police activity must be excluded as 
the fruit of the poisonous tree.  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471, 488 (1963).  The Court set forth the relevant inquiry 
as follows: "whether, granting establishment of the primary 
illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has 
been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by 
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary 
taint."  Id. (quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959)). 
No.  2013AP430-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
¶98 In Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975), the 
Supreme Court declined to adopt a "but for" approach based on a 
causal connection, and announced instead three factors that 
courts 
should 
consider 
in 
determining 
if 
evidence 
was 
sufficiently attenuated from the initial illegality to purge it 
of the primary taint: temporal proximity, the presence of 
intervening circumstances, and the flagrancy of the misconduct.   
¶99 I address each factor in turn:   
¶100 The first factor, temporal proximity, requires a 
consideration of "both the amount of time between the illegal 
[act] and the consensual search and the conditions that existed 
during that time."  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 206.   
¶101 Sixteen seconds elapsed between the unconstitutional 
extension of the stop and the time the deputy reengaged Hogan 
seeking consent to search.  In assessing temporal proximity, we 
have previously determined that the timespan of a few minutes 
weighs against a consensual search.  Id.; see also United States 
v. Macias, 658 F.3d 509, 524 (5th Cir. 2011) (thirty-second 
interval between illegal extension of traffic stop and request 
for consent weighed against attenuation); United States v. 
Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 979-80 (10th Cir. 1996) (passage of less 
than a minute between return of driver's license and request to 
search not sufficient to purge the taint of an illegal stop); 
McGaughey v. State, 37 P.3d 130, 141 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001) 
(the fact that only a few minutes had passed between the illegal 
detention and the request for consent to search "weigh[ed] 
heavily against finding the taint cleansed").   
No.  2013AP430-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
¶102 The United Stated Supreme Court has stated that in 
some 
circumstances 
even 
a 
45-minute 
timespan 
would 
be 
insufficient to purge the taint.  Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 
98, 107 (1980).  Here, we are considering a mere 16 seconds that 
passed between the illegal extension of the stop and the 
deputy's 
reengagement, 
seeking 
consent 
to 
search 
Hogan's 
vehicle. 
 
Such 
an 
abbreviated 
timespan 
weighs 
against 
attenuation. 
¶103 In considering temporal proximity, courts take into 
account the conditions that existed.   Admittedly, in some 
circumstances, the existence of a congenial atmosphere may weigh 
in favor of attenuation.  See Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 109.  In 
this case it does not.  Although the atmosphere during the 
encounter was not overtly threatening, Hogan appeared agitated 
throughout the stop, expressing his desire to leave.  It was 
only the deputy's assertion of authority that kept him there.  
The extension of the stop further enhanced the unequal power 
dynamic between the deputy and Hogan.  Far from removing the 
taint of the illegality, the conditions of the illegal extension 
of the stop combined with the short time span between the 
extension and the consent suggest that the consent was tainted 
by the illegality. 
¶104 The second factor, intervening circumstances, refers 
to events occurring between the illegality and the consensual 
search.  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 208.  In this case, after the 
extension of the stop, the deputy told Hogan that he was free to 
leave and they both returned to their vehicles.  Although these 
No.  2013AP430-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
circumstances are significant as they could be viewed as an end 
of the traffic stop, they are not sufficient to wipe clean the 
slate such that the consent was untainted by the illegality.   
¶105 This court described what intervening circumstances 
would support a determination of attenuation in Phillips, 218 
Wis. 2d 180.  In that case, after illegally entering the 
defendant's home, officers had a short discussion with the 
defendant.  An officer informed the defendant that they had 
received information that the defendant had drug paraphernalia 
and marijuana and explained that they did not have a warrant to 
search his bedroom.  Id. at 209.  "This discussion was 
significant [] because it provided the defendant with sufficient 
information with which he could decide whether to freely consent 
to the search."  Id. at 208-09.   We stated that the discussion 
"illustrates that the defendant was not improperly surprised, 
frightened, or confused when he consented to the search of his 
bedroom," and thus concluded that the officers did not exploit 
their unlawful entry to obtain consent to search.  Id. at 209. 
¶106 The circumstances in Phillips are not present in this 
case.  At no time did the deputy give any indication that Hogan 
could decline the deputy's request to search his vehicle.  
Indeed, during the unlawful extension of the stop, Hogan 
expressed his belief that if he did not accede to the deputy's 
requests, it would be used against him.  Nothing in the deputy's 
request for consent to search the vehicle would have dispelled 
that belief.  The intervening circumstances do not remove the 
taint from the unlawful extension of the stop. 
No.  2013AP430-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
¶107  The third factor to consider is "the purpose and 
flagrancy of the official misconduct."  Id.  This factor 
considers whether the conduct of the officers rose "to the level 
of conscious or flagrant misconduct requiring prophylactic 
exclusion."  Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d at 451 (quoting Rawlings, 448 
U.S. at 110).   
¶108 The deputy's conduct indicates a conscious attempt to 
gain consent for the search.  His exchange with the other 
officer at the scene suggests that the entire purpose of 
extending the stop was to find a reason to search Hogan's 
vehicle.  Seeking consent to search is generally consistent with 
exemplary work of law enforcement.  Detaining a suspect longer 
than reasonably justified by the stop in order to obtain consent 
crosses the line.  I acknowledge, however, that the deputy may 
not have realized that the extension of the stop was unlawful.  
Thus, it is hard to conclude that his conduct was flagrant.  
Overall, this factor appears neutral in determining attenuation. 
¶109 Having considered the three traditional factors of an 
attenuation analysis, I conclude that on balance, they weigh 
against a determination of attenuation.  Although the third 
factor appears neutral, both the first and second factors weigh 
against it.  The facts of this case and the relevant case law 
reveal that there was no real break between the unconstitutional 
extension of the traffic stop and the deputy's request for 
consent to search Hogan's vehicle.   
IV 
No.  2013AP430-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
¶110 Although officers may conduct brief seizures when 
there is reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation, "the 
tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop 
context is determined by the seizure's 'mission'—to address the 
traffic violation that warranted the stop."  Rodriguez v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015).  As the majority 
acknowledges, an officer may not extend the stop without 
additional reasonable suspicion.  Majority op., ¶35.  Absent 
such reasonable suspicion, the prolonged detention becomes an 
unlawful seizure, intruding on the citizen's personal liberty. 
¶111 Here, consent to search Hogan's vehicle was sought 
only seconds after the illegal extension of the traffic stop.  
To conclude that consent obtained so closely on the heels of 
acknowledged police misconduct was valid would lend an air of 
legitimacy to questionable police tactics.  This is the classic 
example of when the exclusionary rule should apply.  See State 
v. Scull, 2015 WI 22, ¶22, 361 Wis. 2d 288, 862 N.W.2d 562 
(observing that the two rationales for the exclusionary rule are 
"assurance of judicial integrity and deterrence of unlawful 
police conduct").  The evidence should have been suppressed. 
¶112  Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, I 
respectfully dissent.   
¶113 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.  
       
 
 
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