Case Title: Miller v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 492, 2008

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2009-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JOHN E. MILLER, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 492, 2008 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 0607013529 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: January 16, 2009 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
April 7, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices.  
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 7th day of April 2009, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties and 
the Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, John E. Miller, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s August 27, 2008 denial of his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(“Rule 61”).  We conclude that there is no merit to 
Miller’s appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. 
 
(2) 
In December 2006, Miller pled guilty to two counts of misuse of mail 
and one count of terroristic threatening.  In March 2007, Miller was sentenced as a 
habitual offender to a total of seven years at Level V suspended after five years for 
 
2
one year at Level IV.  In exchange for Miller’s guilty plea, the State dismissed nine 
other counts of misuse of prisoner mail and one count of terroristic threatening. 
 
(3) 
On direct appeal, Miller represented himself, claiming that he was 
sentenced improperly.  Miller also claimed to know the details of an alleged 
terrorist plot.  Miller offered to share the alleged terrorist plot information with the 
Court in exchange for an investigation into a claim that he was framed for robbery 
in 1998. 
 
 
(4) 
By order dated December 12, 2007, the Court affirmed Miller’s guilty 
plea and sentence.1  The Court determined that there was no merit to Miller’s 
sentencing claim.  The Court further determined that Miller’s offer to provide 
information about an alleged terrorist plot was not a claim cognizable on appeal.2 
 
(5) 
In his postconviction motion and now on appeal, Miller alleges that 
his guilty plea was coerced.  In his opening brief, Miller contends that he was 
afraid to raise the claim on direct appeal, and he urges the Court to expand the 
record.3  Miller also repeats his offer to provide the Court with information about 
an alleged terrorist plot. 
                                          
 
1 Miller v. State, 2007 WL 4336198 (Del. Supr.). 
2 Id. 
3 Miller seeks to expand the record to include copies of documents that he attached to his 
postconviction motion and/or are filed in the Superior Court record, including letters that he 
wrote to his defense counsel, to two Superior Court judges and to the prison law library. 
 
3
 
(6) 
When denying Miller’s postconviction motion, the Superior Court 
determined that Miller’s claim of involuntary guilty plea was procedurally barred 
pursuant to Rule 61(i)(3).4  The Superior Court further determined that Miller’s 
offer to provide information about an alleged terrorist plot was procedurally barred 
pursuant to Rule 61(i)(4).5   
 
(7) 
Having carefully reviewed the parties’ positions on appeal and the 
Superior Court record, including Miller’s former defense counsel’s affidavit, we 
conclude that the Superior Court did not err when determining that Miller’s 
postconviction claims were procedurally barred.  Miller could have, but did not, 
raise his claim of involuntary guilty plea on direct appeal.  As a result, that claim is 
barred pursuant to Rule 61(i)(3) as Miller has provided no basis to excuse the 
procedural default.6  Conversely, Miller’s offer to provide the Court with 
information about an alleged terrorist plot was considered by the Court on direct 
appeal and was rejected.  As a result, that claim is properly barred as formerly 
                                          
 
4 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3) (providing that any ground for relief that that was not 
asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction or on direct appeal is 
procedurally barred unless the movant demonstrates “cause for relief from the procedural 
default” and “prejudice” arising from the alleged grievance). 
5 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4) (barring formerly adjudicated claims). 
6 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (providing that the procedural bar of Rule 61(i)(3) shall 
not apply to a claim that the Court lacked jurisdiction or to a colorable claim that there was a 
miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation). 
 
4
adjudicated pursuant to Rule 61(i)(4) as Miller has not demonstrated why the claim 
should be reconsidered in the interest of justice.7 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                          
 
7 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4) (barring formerly adjudicated claims unless 
reconsideration is warranted in the interest of justice).