Case Title: Morrisey v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 632, 2012

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2013-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
NORMAN E. MORRISEY, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 632, 2012 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and  
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 91006237DI 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: March 22, 2013 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
June 11, 2013 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices.  
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 11th day of June 2013, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs 
and the Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Norman E. Morrisey (“Morrisey”), filed this 
appeal from the Superior Court’s November 2, 2012 denial of his third 
motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We 
conclude there is no merit to the appeal and affirm the Superior Court’s 
judgment. 
(2) 
Morrisey was indicted in 1991 on twelve counts of Unlawful 
Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree (“USI”) and other offenses.  The USI 
charges arose from two incidents in May and June 1991 when Morrisey was 
2 
 
alleged to have forced two different couples, with what appeared to be a 
handgun, to accompany him to isolated locations, disrobe, and perform sex 
acts. 
(3) 
Morrisey’s criminal liability for the USI charges was predicated 
on the “innocent intermediary” provision of title 11, section 271(1) of the 
Delaware Code.1  In a “motion to dismiss or merge,” which was denied by 
the Superior Court, Morrisey sought dismissal of the USI charges on the 
basis that criminal liability for USI could not be predicated upon the conduct 
of an innocent intermediary (hereinafter “the § 271 claim”).  In the 
alternative, Morrisey sought merger of the USI charges based upon 
constitutional principles of multiplicity (hereinafter “the multiplicity 
claim”). 
(4) 
Following his 1992 jury trial, Morrisey was convicted on the 
twelve counts of USI as well as other charges and was sentenced to a total of 
180 years in prison.  On direct appeal, Morrissey argued both the § 271 
claim and the multiplicity claim.  We rejected Morrisey’s arguments and 
affirmed his conviction.2 
                                          
 
1 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 271(1) (2010) (providing that a person is guilty of an 
offense committed by another person when, acting with the state of mind that is sufficient 
for commission of the offense, the person causes an innocent person to engage in conduct 
constituting the offense). 
2 Morrisey v. State, 620 A.2d 207 (Del. 1993). 
3 
 
(5) 
In his first motion for postconviction relief, filed in November 
1993, Morrisey claimed that his convictions on the twelve counts USI 
violated double jeopardy and were not supported by “sufficient identification 
evidence.”  By order dated December 3, 1993, the Superior Court denied the 
motion on the basis that the double jeopardy claim was a reiteration of the 
formerly adjudicated multiplicity claim, and that the insufficient evidence 
claim was procedurally defaulted and without merit.3  Morrisey’s appeal 
from that decision was dismissed as untimely filed.4 
(6) 
In his second postconviction motion, filed in February 2010, 
Morrisey again raised the § 271 claim.  By order dated March 10, 2010, the 
Superior Court denied the motion as procedurally barred.  By Order dated 
August 10, 2010, we affirmed the Superior Court judgment, noting that in 
our reported Opinion on direct appeal, the Court had “engaged in an 
extensive analysis of the statutory language in determining that [section 
271(1)] was properly applied to establish Morrisey’s guilt.5 
(7) 
In September 2012, Morrisey filed his third motion for 
postconviction relief.  In that motion and now in this appeal from its denial, 
Morrisey claims that the separate sentences imposed for the USI convictions 
                                          
 
3 State v. Morrisey, 1993 WL 1617677 (Del. Super. Ct.).  
4 Morrisey v. State, 1994 WL 91159 (Del. March 3, 1994).   
5 Morrisey v. State, 2010 WL 3181333 (Del. Aug. 11, 2010). 
4 
 
violated double jeopardy, and that his trial counsel was ineffective when 
representing him on the § 271 claim.  Morrisey further asserts that the 
retroactive application of Martinez v. Ryan, a recent United States Supreme 
Court decision, requires that we consider the merit of his claim that his trial 
counsel was ineffective when representing him on the § 271 claim.6 
(8) 
We reject Morris’ assertion that, under Martinez v. Ryan, we 
are required to consider the merit of his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.  Martinez v. Ryan permits a federal court to review a “substantial” 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim on federal habeas review.7  It has no 
apparent application or relevance in this case. 
(9) 
Having carefully considered the parties’ briefs on appeal, we 
conclude that the Superior Court’s denial of Morrisey’s third postconviction 
motion should be affirmed.  It is clear to the Court that Morrisey’s claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel and double jeopardy in sentencing are 
based upon the § 271 claim and the multiplicity claim, both of which 
received substantive resolution twenty years ago on direct appeal.  Those 
claims continue to be barred as untimely, repetitive, and formerly 
adjudicated, and their reconsideration is neither required nor warranted “in 
                                          
 
6 Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). 
7 Id. at 1318-19. 
5 
 
the interest of justice,” because of “a miscarriage of justice,” or on the basis 
of a newly-recognized “retroactively applicable right.”8 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                          
 
8 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (listing procedural bars to postconviction relief 
and exceptions to those bars).