Case Title: Carpenter v. Imbesi

Citation: 369 Md. 549

Docket Number: 117/01

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Carpenter Realty Corporation, et al. v. Dennis Michael Imbesi, Personal Representative of
the Estate of Thomas L. Imbesi, 
September Term, 2001,  No. 117
[Issue: When the original judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff is reversed on
appeal, but a subsequent judgment is entered in favor of the plaintiff, is the plaintiff entitled
to an award of post-judgment interest retroactive to the date of the original judgment.  Held:
Maryland Rule 2-604(b) and Maryland Code (1974, 1999 Repl. Vol.) Section 11-107(a) of
the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article prescribe that post-judgment interest shall be
awarded from the date of entry of a judgment; the reversal and remand of the original
judgment eviscerated the original judgment such that post-judgment interest must be
calculated from the date of entry of the subsequent judgment.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 117
September Term, 2001
CARPENTER REALTY
CORPORATION, et al.
v.
DENNIS MICHAEL IMBESI,
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE ESTATE OF THOMAS L. IMBESI
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed:   June 20, 2002
This case has had a long and circuitous history in the Maryland judicial system.  At
the conclusion of the motions hearing in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, on the last
leg of the case’s journey, the trial judge aptly mused, “Why do I think regardless [of] how
I decide this, Rowe Boulevard [has] not seen the last of [the] Imbesi case?”  In this appeal,
we must put to rest the question of whether the respondent, the Estate of Thomas L. Imbesi
(hereinafter “the Estate”) is entitled to post-judgment interest on a judgment entered against
petitioners, Carpenter Realty Corporation (hereinafter “Carpenter Realty”) and 7UP Bottling
Company of Baltimore, Inc. (hereinafter “7UP / Baltimore”), on a claim brought by the
Personal Representative of the Estate against the corporations for the unpaid balance of
money owed on a stock transaction between Mr. Imbesi and the petitioners. 
I.
Facts
On June 1, 1982, Thomas L. Imbesi entered into a Stock Redemption Agreement with
Carpenter Realty and 7UP / Baltimore, as well as several other 7UP entities (7UP Bottling
Company of Philadelphia, Inc., 7UP Bottling Company of Bridgeton, Inc., 7UP Bottling Co.
of Camden, Inc., 7UP Bottling Company of Salisbury, Inc., and 7UP Wilmington Company).
Pursuant to this agreement, the corporations redeemed Imbesi’s shares of stock in the
corporations for $500,000.00 plus 5 1/4% interest over a 120 month period and forgiveness
of a $137,158.00 debt owed by Imbesi to the corporations.  The payments to Imbesi were
made according to the Stock Redemption Agreement through April of 1991, at which time,
a corporate officer of 7UP / Baltimore requested an extension of the time for payment
because of financial difficulties.  After a payment in July, 1991, the corporation failed to
1
When Carpenter Realty initially set aside the funds on March 10, 1994, the money was
deposited into a non-interest bearing escrow account.  The money was subsequently
transferred to an interest bearing account on March 6, 1997.
2
Maryland Rule 2-331(a), concerning counterclaims filed against opposing parties
provides:
A party may assert as a counterclaim any claim that party has
against any opposing party, whether or not arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
-2-
make any additional payments under the Stock Redemption Agreement.
Thomas L. Imbesi died on March 10, 1992.  On March 7, 1994, Dennis Michael
Imbesi, who had been appointed as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Thomas L.
Imbesi, filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on behalf of the Estate
against Carpenter Realty and 7UP / Baltimore seeking recovery of the outstanding debt owed
to the Estate under the Stock Redemption Agreement.  On the same day, the Circuit Court
issued a Writ of Attachment Before Judgment upon the real property of Carpenter Realty at
6159 Edmondson Avenue, Baltimore County, Maryland 21228. The Circuit Court also
ordered Carpenter Realty to set aside $78,263.23 in an escrow account with the Clerk of the
Circuit Court as security to satisfy any potential judgment in favor of the Estate.1  
Thereafter, Carpenter Realty and 7UP / Baltimore filed a Counterclaim against the
Estate asserting that they had been assigned a Note under seal from the 7UP Bottling
Company of Philadelphia, Inc.  The Counterclaim alleged that the Note evidenced the
indebtedness of Thomas L. Imbesi to the companies, the assignees of the Note, in the amount
of $80,000.00 plus 6% interest. 2  The Note had become due and payable on October 23,
opposing party’s claim.  A counterclaim may or may not
diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party.
It may claim relief exceeding in amount or different in kind
from that sought in the pleading of the opposing party.
3
We have previously explained that “setoff means a diminution or a complete
counterbalancing of the adversary’s claim based upon circumstances arising out of a
transaction other than that on which the adversary’s claim is based; and counterclaim means
the assertion of a right to have an affirmative judgment against the adversary based upon a
setoff or a recoupment.”  Imbesi v. Carpenter Realty Corp. et al, 357 Md. 375, 380, 744 A.2d
549, 552 (2000)(internal quotations omitted).
4
The 1991 Replacement Volume of the Estates and Trusts Article was the relevant
version of the statute in effect at the time this litigation commenced.
-3-
1989, although the Counterclaim alleged that neither Imbesi nor his Estate had made any
payments under the Note. 
A bench trial commenced on March 22, 1995.  On April 10, 1995, the Circuit Court
issued its Opinion and Order entering a judgment for the Estate in the amount of $57,447.67,
the amount the parties had stipulated was the appropriate amount should the court enter a
judgment in the Estate’s favor.  The judgment did not include an award of pre-judgment
interest.  
The Circuit Court also concluded that Carpenter Realty had not met its burden of
proof to establish a right to set-off3 its liability to the Estate through its Counterclaim
concerning the Estate’s failure to make payments on the Note because the corporations did
not file a timely claim for payment against the Estate pursuant to Maryland Code (1974, 1991
Repl. Vol.) Section 8-103 of the Estates and Trusts Article.4  Carpenter Realty and 7UP /
Baltimore appealed the Circuit Court’s decision on the Counterclaim to the Court of Special
-4-
Appeals, asserting that the court erred in finding that they had not met their burden of proof
on the counterclaim.  In an unreported decision, the Court of Special Appeals held that
Carpenter Realty and 7UP / Baltimore established a prima facie case for entitlement to set-
off their liability to the Estate with the claim against the Estate on the Note by producing the
instrument to the trial court.  The court declined to determine whether the statute of
limitations period set forth in Section 8-103 of the Estates and Trusts Article barred the
petitioner’s claim for set-off.  Thus, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the Circuit
Court’s judgment in favor of the Estate and remanded the case to the Circuit Court for a
rehearing on whether the $80,000 Note could be used to set-off the amount owed to the
Estate under the Stock Redemption Agreement.  In providing guidance to the Circuit Court
on remand, the Court of Special Appeals stated in dicta:
By its terms, the nonclaim statute, ET § 8-103, would prevent
appellants from recovering any monies from the Estate, because
they failed to assert the Note as a claim against the Estate within
the statutory period.  However, whether appellants can utilize
the Note to recover monies from the Estate at this juncture is a
far different issue than whether they can now assert the Note to
prevent the Estate from recovering from them under the
Agreement.  We note, in passing, that allowing a debt to be used
as a setoff will not thwart the chief purpose behind the nonclaim
statute – the prompt administration and closing of estates – in
that a setoff will only be asserted, as here, as a defense or in
response to a claim made by an estate, and not in a separate
proceeding.
On November 18, 1996 the Circuit Court held a hearing on the merits of Carpenter
Realty and 7UP / Baltimore’s claim for set-off.  On January 14, 1998, the court entered an
-5-
order, stating:
This matter comes before the Court on remand from the Court
of Special Appeals pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-604(d)(1).  The
Court of Special Appeals has asked this Court to determine
whether the indebtedness to the Defendant evidenced by the
existence of an Eighty Thousand Dollar ($80,000) Note may be
allowed to be used as a defensive set-off to the amount owed to
the Estate by the Defendants under a Stock Redemption
Agreement, thereby extinguishing the Plaintiff’s Complaint for
Fifty-Seven Thousand, Four Hundred and Seventy-Seven
Dollars and Sixty-Seven Cents ($57,477.67).
Noting the issue to be one of first impression in Maryland, the
Court of Special Appeals makes clear that under Maryland’s
Non-claim Statute (Estates and Trusts § 8-103), the Appellant
would be precluded from recovering monies from the Estate
because they failed to assert the claim within the statute of
limitations.  If the Note in question may not be utilized as a
“sword,” may it be utilized as a “shield” despite the running of
limitations?  This Court believes that it may indeed.
The Court of Special Appeals made it a point to specifically
mention that using the Note as a set-off does not offend the
chief purpose behind the Non-claim Statute – the prompt
administration and closing of estates. Additionally, the
Defendants refer to numerous cases from other jurisdictions that
deem it proper and equitable to allow the defensive set-off.  This
Court is persuaded by the reasoning contained in those cases and
the direction provided by the Court of Special Appeals that the
set-off should be permitted.
Therefore, the court ordered the entry of judgment in favor of Carpenter Realty and 7UP /
Baltimore, with costs to be paid by the Estate.
The Estate appealed the Circuit Court’s decision to the Court of Special Appeals,
emphasizing that the set-off against Carpenter’s $57,447.67 obligation was invalid because
5
The Estate’s Petition for Costs, Interest, and Release of Funds Held in Escrow to
Plaintiff requested fees and awards as follows:
-6-
the Note was stale when assigned.  On April 2, 1999, however, the Court of Special Appeals
affirmed the Circuit Court’s judgment permitting the set-off.  See Imbesi v. Carpenter Realty
Corp., 125 Md. App. 676, 682, 726 A.2d 854, 857 (1999) (stating that, “[t]he operative
language of the nonclaim statute does not expressly prevent a defendant from using an
unpresented claim as a defensive set-off to a claim asserted affirmatively by an
estate”)(emphasis in original).
On January 19, 2000, this Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Special
Appeals.  See Imbesi v. Carpenter Realty Corp. et al., 357 Md. 375, 391, 744 A.2d 549, 558
(2000)(construing Section 8-103(a) of the Estates and Trusts Article as barring “a claim that
has not been timely presented and that arises out of a transaction separate from that on which
the estate claims”).  We remanded the case to the Court of Special Appeals with instructions
to reverse the decision of the Circuit Court and remand the matter for further proceedings
consistent with our opinion. 
On March 1, 2000, the Estate petitioned the Circuit Court for entry of judgment in the
Estate’s favor in the amount of $57,447.67, seeking pre-judgment interest in the amount of
$3,588.51, at the rate of 6% from the date of the filing of the original Complaint through the
original trial on March 22, 1995, and post-judgment interest at the rate of 10% in the amount
of $30,518.09 for the period of March 22, 1995 through March 22, 2000.5  Carpenter Realty
9.
Plaintiff [Estate] herein requests that the award of costs
be incorporated and added to the Judgment in this case.
The Plaintiff also requests that this Court calculate the
pre-judgment and post-judgment interest due for
incorporation into the final judgment.  Finally, the
Plaintiff requests that all sums held in this Court’s
interest bearing escrow account be released to Plaintiff to
satisfy part of the judgment due and owing to Plaintiff.
10.
Plaintiff calculates the pre-judgment interest due as
follows:
6% for 1 year and 15 days = $3588.51,which sum
should be added to the principal judgment due for a total
of $61,036.18, before calculation of post-judgment
interest and costs.  I.W. Berman Prop. v. Porter Bros.,
Inc., 276 Md. 1, 344 A.2d 65, 79 (1975).
11.
Plaintiff calculates the post-judgment interest due as
follows:
10% per year (simple interest) on $61,036.18 =
$6103.62 per year from March 22, 1995 to date.
Through March 22, 2000, the post-judgment interest will
be $30,518.09.  The per diem rate thereafter will be
$16.722246.  Brown v. Medical Mut. Liab. Ins. Soc., 90
Md. App. 18, 599 A.2d 1201, cert. denied, 326 Md. 366,
605 A.2d 101 (1992).
The Estate also sought to recover the costs of the appeal to this Court in the amount of
$335.60 and the costs of the second appeal to the Court of Special Appeals in the amount of
$1,323.60.  The costs of the first appeal to the Court of Special Appeals had been charged
to the Estate.
-7-
and 7UP / Baltimore responded to the Estate’s Petition for Costs and filed a Cross-Petition
for Release of Funds, wherein they conceded that the Estate was entitled to entry of judgment
in the amount of $57,477.67 plus the costs of the second appeal to the Court of Special
Appeals reduced by the costs owed by the Estate for the first appeal for a judgment totaling
6
This figure represents the difference between the costs in subsequent proceeding
offset by the amount of costs awarded to Carpenter Realty in the prior action and appeal to
-8-
$57,971.27.  The corporations asserted, however, that the Estate was not entitled to any pre-
judgment or post-judgment interest and that the balance of the amount of money held in the
interest bearing account by the Clerk of the Circuit Court after satisfaction of the $57,971.27
judgment for the Estate should be returned to them.
The Circuit Court held a motions hearing on September 5, 2000, to consider the
parties’ contentions.  On September 13, 2000, the court issued an opinion which stated, in
part:
The interest on the judgment in this case is interesting.  The
Plaintiff’s averments are intellectually stimulating but must fail
on the basis of legal logic.  This Court notes that the Defendants
originally deposited a stipulated amount of $57,477.67 with the
Registry of the Clerk’s Office.  These funds were deposited in
a non-interest bearing account . . . . Several years later, upon the
request of counsel as the appeal in this case progressed, the
funds were transferred to an interest bearing account paying a
meager 2% interest per annum.
This Court does not feel, in light of the litigation track of this
controversy, that the Plaintiff should receive pre-judgment
interest in excess of the interest accumulated by the Clerk’s
Office on the original $57,477.67.
Although the issue had been raised and argued by both parties, the opinion made no mention
of an award of post-judgment interest.  The court noted that as of August 30, 2000, the
money held in the escrow account, which had accrued interest, totaled $84,238.92.  Thus, the
Circuit Court awarded costs to the Estate in the amount of $523.60,6 damages in the amount
the Court of Special Appeals.
-9-
of $57,477.67 plus accrued interest of $4,356.16, and ordered that a judgment in keeping
therewith be entered.  The balance of the escrow account funds plus the interest accrued on
the account through August 30, 2000 was ordered to be paid to the corporations.  The
remaining balance of interest earned on the account from August 30, 2000 through October
19, 2000 was to be paid 73.4% to the Estate and 26.6% to the corporations. 
The Estate appealed to the Court of Special Appeals asserting that the Circuit Court
erred in concluding that the Estate was not entitled to pre-judgment or post-judgment interest.
In an unreported decision, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the Circuit Court did
not abuse its discretion by not awarding pre-judgment interest to the Estate.  The Court of
Special Appeals concluded that the Estate was entitled to receive 10% post-judgment interest
on the damages award of $57,447.67 commencing on April 4, 1995, which was the date of
the judgment entered in favor of the Estate after the first trial.
Carpenter Realty filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which we granted, Carpenter
Realty Corp. v. Imbesi, 367 Md. 722, 790 A.2d 673 (2002), to consider the following
question:
After a judgment in favor of a plaintiff is reversed and the action
remanded for rehearing, is that plaintiff entitled to post-
judgment interest on a subsequent judgment in his favor, dating
from the original judgment?
For the reasons set forth below, we answer that question in the negative.
-10-
II.
Discussion
As a preliminary matter, we consider the statutory provisions governing post-judgment
interest.  Maryland Code (1974, 1999 Repl. Vol.) Section 11-107(a) of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article provides as follows:
(a) Legal rate of interest on judgments. – Except as provided in
§ 11-106 of this article, the legal rate of interest on a judgment
shall be at the rate of 10 percent per annum on the amount of
judgment.
Maryland Rule 2-604(b), further provides that “[a] money judgment shall bear interest at the
rate prescribed by law from the date of entry.”  Pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-601(b), the
effective date of entry of a judgment is the date on which the clerk of the court prepares a
written record of the judgment.  See Medical Mut. Liab. Ins. Soc’y. of Maryland v. Davis,
365 Md. 477, 481, 781 A.2d 781, 783 (2001); Maxima Corp. v. 6933 Arlington Dev. Ltd.
Partnership, 100 Md. App. 441, 464, 641 A.2d 977, 988 (1994)(stating that “a judgment is
not entered until the ministerial act of entering judgment on a file jacket, a docket, or docket
sheet, according to the court’s practice, is complete”); see also Md. Rule 8-202(f)(For actions
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, entry of the judgment “occurs on the day when the
clerk of the lower court first makes a record in writing of the judgment, notice, or order on
the file jacket, on a docket within the file, or in a docket book, according to the practice of
that court, and records the actual date of the entry.”); Md. Rule 8-302(d)(For actions before
the Court of Appeals, entry of the judgment “occurs on the day when the clerk of the lower
court first makes a record in writing of the judgment, notice, or order on the file jacket, on
-11-
a docket within the file, or in a docket book, according to the practice of that court, and
records the actual date of the entry.”) 
We have explained the purpose of post-judgment interest as follows:
The purpose of post-judgment interest is obviously to
compensate the successful suitor for the same loss of the use of
the monies represented by the judgment in its favor, and the loss
of income thereon, between the time of the entry of the
judgment . . . – when there is a judicial determination of the
monies owed it – and the satisfaction of the judgment by
payment.
I.W. Berman Prop. v. Porter Bros, Inc., 276 Md. 1, 24, 344 A.2d 65, 79 (1975); see King v.
State Roads Comm’n of the State Highway Admin., 298 Md. 80, 85, 467 A.2d 1032, 1034
(1983)(explaining that in a condemnation action, the property owner “is entitled to receive
post-judgment interest on the award at the legal rate from the date of entry of the judgment
. . . [until] the date the award is actually paid”).  Just when was there a judicial determination
of monies owed to the Estate in this circuitous legal scenario?
In the present matter, we must discern what constitutes the date of entry of a judgment
where the first judgment in the action was reversed and remanded by the Court of Special
Appeals, and subsequent judgments were entered on the record.  Petitioners argue that the
Court of Special Appeals’s reversal of the Circuit Court judgment in its first unreported
decision in this case vitiated the original judgment in favor of the Estate.  The Estate asserts,
however, that the Court of Special Appeals correctly held that it should receive post-
judgment interest retroactive to April 4, 1995, which was the date of the first judgment in
7
Maryland Rule 8-606 concerning the force and effect of mandates provides:
(a) To evidence order of the Court.  Any disposition of an
appeal, including a voluntary dismissal, shall be evidenced by
the mandate of the Court, which shall be certified by the Clerk
under the seal of the Court and shall constitute the judgment of
the Court.
(b) Issuance of mandate.  Upon a voluntary dismissal, the
Clerk shall issue the mandate immediately.  In all other cases,
unless a motion for reconsideration has been filed or the Court
orders otherwise, the Clerk shall issue the mandate upon the
expiration of 30 days after the filing of the Court’s opinion or
entry of the Court’s order.
(c) To contain statement of costs.  The mandate shall
contain a statement of the order of the Court assessing costs and
the amount of the costs taxable to each party.
(d) Transmission – Mandate and record.  Upon issuance
of the mandate, the Clerk shall transmit it to the appropriate
lower court.  Unless the appellate court orders otherwise, the
original papers comprising the record shall be transmitted with
the mandate.
-12-
favor of the Estate.  Thus, we must determine when a legal liability attached against
Carpenter Realty and 7UP / Baltimore in the form of a judgment which would trigger the
accrual of post-judgment interest.
Both this Court and the Court of Special Appeals have the ability to dispose of an
appeal by dismissing the action, affirming the judgment, vacating or reversing the judgment,
modifying the judgment, remanding the action to a lower court for further consideration, or
any combination thereof.  See Md. Rule 8-604(a).  Furthermore, Maryland Rule 8-604(e)
states, “[i]n reversing or modifying a judgment in whole or in part, the Court may enter an
appropriate judgment directly or may order the lower court to do so.”7  We have held that
(e) Effect of mandate.  Upon receipt of the mandate, the
clerk of the lower court shall enter it promptly on the docket and
the lower court shall proceed in accordance with its terms.
Except as otherwise provided in Rule 8-611(b), the assessment
of costs in the mandate shall not be recorded and indexed as
provided by Rule 2-601(c).
-13-
where our mandate specifically directs the entry of a judgment after remand, post-judgment
interest on the award runs from the date of the issuance of the mandate.  See Andrulis v.
Levin Construction Corp., 331 Md. 354, 378, 628 A.2d 197, 209 (1993)(increasing the circuit
court’s judgment by $27,812 and specifying that post-judgment interest on this additional
amount would run only from the date the mandate issued).  In the absence of a specific
instruction from this Court to the trial court that the court must award post-judgment interest
dating back to the entry of the original judgment, such an award should rest with the sound
discretion of the trial court.  Thus, we must trace the path of this case from the entry of the
original judgment through the subsequent mandates issued on appeal to ascertain when a
judgment was entered against the corporations from which post-judgment interest would
accrue.  
The Circuit Court’s order dated April 10, 1995 entering judgment in favor of the
Estate was a final judgment for purposes of appellate review.  See Montgomery County v.
Revere Nat’l Corp., 341 Md. 366, 378, 671 A.2d 1, 7 (1996)(explaining that “an order
entered on the docket pursuant to [Maryland] Rule 2-601, and having the effect of
terminating the case in the circuit court, is a final judgment”).  In the first appeal, the Court
-14-
of Special Appeals reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court and remanded the matter.  The
mandate expressly  did not limit the reversal solely to the issue of the corporations’ claim for
set-off against the Estate.
We have explained that “[w]here a mandate is ambiguous, one must look to the
opinion and other surrounding circumstances to determine the intent of the court.”  Balducci
v. Eberly, 304 Md. 664, 670, 500 A.2d 1042, 1045 (1985).  A reversal is defined as “the
annulling or setting aside by an appellate court of a decision of a lower court,”  Litman v.
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 825 F.2d 1506, 1514 n. 11 (11th Cir. 1987), while the
provision governing the remand of civil cases from an appellate court states:
If the Court concludes that the substantial merits of a case will
not be determined by affirming, reversing or modifying the
judgment, or that justice will be served by permitting further
proceedings, the Court may remand the case to a lower court.
In the order remanding a case, the appellate court shall state the
purpose for the remand.  The order of remand and the opinion
upon which the order is based are conclusive as to the points
decided.  Upon remand, the lower court shall conduct any
further proceedings necessary to determine the action in
accordance with the opinion and order of the appellate court.
Md. Rule 8-604(d)(1) (emphasis added).  
“It has been held that the effect of a general and unqualified reversal of a judgment,
order or decree is to nullify it completely and to leave the case standing as if such judgment,
order or decree had never been rendered, except as restricted by the opinion of the appellate
court.”  Balducci, 304 Md. at 671 n. 8, 500 A.2d at 1046 n. 8.  The Court of Special
Appeals’s opinion and mandate of August 6, 1996 which reversed the original judgment and
8
Rule 2-534 provides:
In an action decided by the court, on motion of any party filed
within ten days after entry of judgment, the court may open the
judgment to receive additional evidence, may amend its findings
or its statement of reasons for the decision, may set forth
additional findings or reasons, may enter new findings or new
reasons, may amend the judgment, or may enter a new
judgment.  A motion to alter or amend a judgment may be joined
-15-
remanded the case to the Circuit Court did not contain any language restricting the effect of
the reversal so as to leave the original judgment in place.  Accordingly, when this matter
made its earlier appearance before us, Judge Rodowsky described the path of the case as
follows:
This action was tried twice in the circuit court.  A bench trial in
March 1995 resulted in a judgment in favor of the Estate for
$57,447.67 on the complaint and a judgment for the Estate as
counterclaim defendant.  On appeal to the Court of Special
Appeals those judgements were reversed, in an unreported
opinion, on grounds relating to the burden of proving the
authenticity of the 1979 note.  
Imbesi, 357 Md. at 379, 744 A.2 at 551 (emphasis added).   Neither our mandate disposing
of that appeal, nor the text of the opinion as a secondary source specified any intention to
have post-judgment interest accrue from the date of the original judgment.  Therefore, the
first judgment entered in favor of the Estate on April 10, 1995 was eliminated by the Court
of Special Appeals’s reversal.
Any party can clarify the scope of a mandate or order by filing a motion to alter,
amend, or revise the judgment.  See Md. Rule 2-534 (motions to alter or amend judgments);8
with a motion for new trial.
9
Rule 2-535 provides, in relevant part:
(a) Generally.  On motion of any party filed within 30
days after entry of judgment, the court may exercise revisory
power and control over the judgment and, if the action was tried
before the court, may take any action that it could have taken
under Rule 2-534.
(b) Fraud, mistake, irregularity.  On motion of any party
filed at any time, the court may exercise revisory power and
control over the judgment in case of fraud, mistake, or
irregularity.
* * *
(d) Clerical mistakes.  Clerical mistakes in judgments,
orders, or other parts of the record may be corrected by the court
at any time on its own initiative, or on motion of any party after
such notice, if any, as the court orders.  During the pendency of
an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal
is docketed by the appellate court, and thereafter with leave of
the appellate court.
10
Maryland Rule 8-431 concerning motions made to the Court of Appeals or Court of
Special Appeals provides:
(a) Generally.  An application to the Court for an order
shall be by motion.  The motion shall state briefly and clearly
the facts upon which it is based, and if other parties to the appeal
have agreed not to oppose the motion, it shall so state.  The
motion shall be accompanied by a proposed order.
(b) Response.  Except as provided in Rule 8-605(a), any
party may file a response to the motion.  Unless a different time
is fixed by order of the Court, the response shall be filed within
five days after service of the motion.
(c) Affidavit.  A motion or a response to a motion that is
based on facts not contained in the record or papers on file in the
-16-
Md. Rule 2-535 (motions to revise judgments);9 Md. Rule 8-431 (general motions to the
Court of Appeals or Court of Special Appeals).10  In the present matter, neither party took
proceeding shall be supported by affidavit and accompanied by
any papers on which it is based.
(d) Statement of grounds and authorities.  A motion
and any response shall state with particularity the grounds and
the authorities in support of each ground.
(e) Filing; copies.  The original of a motion and any
response shall be filed with the Clerk.  It shall be accompanied
by (1) seven copies when filed in the Court of Appeals and (2)
four copies when filed in the Court of Special Appeals, except
as otherwise provided in these rules.
(f) Emergency order.  In an emergency, the Court may
rule on a party’s motion before expiration of the time for a
response.  The party requesting emergency relief shall file the
certification required by Rule 1-351.
(g) Hearing.  Except as otherwise provided in these
rules, a motion may be acted on without a hearing or may be set
for hearing at the time and place and on the notice the Court
prescribes.
-17-
such an action. 
In reaching its determination that the Estate should receive post-judgment interest
from the entry of the original judgment on April 4, 1995, the Court of Special Appeals
misconstrued our decision in Medical Mut. Liability Ins. Soc. v. Davis, supra.  Indeed, the
facts and circumstances in the case at bar are distinguishable from those at issue in Davis,
where our consideration was limited to determining “when post-judgment interest begins to
accrue on a money judgment for tort damages, based on a jury verdict, when the judgment
is subsequently reduced, via a remittitur, by the trial court.”  Id. at 478, 781 A.2d at 781.  In
Davis, we held that the plaintiffs were entitled to post-judgment interest from the date of the
original judgment in the action.  Id. at 485, 781 A.2d at 785.  We reasoned that although the
-18-
original judgment lost its finality for purposes of appeal by virtue of the defendant’s filing
of post-judgment motions, the original judgment had not disappeared.  Id.  Furthermore, the
defendant in Davis had the benefit of the use of the money owed to the plaintiff during the
pendency of the remittitur proceedings and presumably earned interest on that sum during
the ten-month period which elapsed between entry of the original judgment and entry of the
judgment after the plaintiff’s acceptance of the remittitur, whereas the corporations in the
instant case did not.  Id.  It is important to note, however, that we explicitly limited the scope
of the Davis decision:
We do not, however, intend to suggest that post-judgment
interest always begins to accrue whenever a money judgment is
entered and is final at the time of entry.  Rule 2-604(b) must be
applied to various situations in accordance with the purpose of
post-judgment interest and the considerable case-law governing
the running of post-judgment interest.
Id. at 484, 781 A.2d at 785.
Furthermore, the post trial proceedings at issue in Davis are readily distinguishable
from the appellate procedure and rehearings involved in the instant case.  A remittitur simply
reduces the amount of an award owed pursuant to a jury verdict which is determined by the
court to be excessive although the judgment remains in force.  While a counterclaim for set-
off may also reduce the amount of damages owed from one party to another, the viability of
a set-off claim involves a separate and distinct determination of liability before adjusting the
amount of the judgment.  See Imbesi, 357 Md. at 382, 744 A.2d at 553 (explaining that
resolution of the counterclaim for set-off requires “consideration of the facts and
-19-
circumstances of a separate transaction and consideration of any defenses that an estate might
have against a finding of indebtedness by the estate arising out of that separate transaction”).
Therefore, our holding in Davis simply cannot be interposed to resolve this matter in favor
of the Estate.
The Estate also  relies on the Court of Special Appeals’s decision in Brown v. Medical
Mut. Liab. Ins. Soc’y, 90 Md. App. 18, 599 A.2d 1201, cert. denied, 326 Md. 366, 605 A.2d
101 (1992), in support of its proposition that the post-judgment interest must be calculated
from the date of the original judgment.  In Brown, the Court of Special Appeals held that
where the plaintiffs had been successful at trial, and where the trial court’s grant of j.n.o.v.
in favor of the defendant had been reversed on appeal, the plaintiffs were entitled to receive
post-judgment interest dating from the entry of the original judgment on the verdict  to the
date that the defendant satisfied the underlying judgment.  Id. at 21, 599 A.2d at 1202.  The
court explained that “[a] reversal on appeal of a j.n.o.v. is, in effect, a finding that plaintiff’s
original judgment always existed.”  Id. at 25, 599 A.2d at 1204.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Special Appeals emphasized in its earlier
mandate which reversed the grant of j.n.o.v. and remanded the case to the circuit court, that
it specifically stated that the judgment was entered for the Browns “on the verdict of the
jury.”  Id. at 26, 599 A.2d at 1205.  In the present matter, the mandate issuing from our
opinion dated January 19, 2000 contained no express provision granting post-judgment
interest from the date of the original judgment.  Thus, the reasoning applied by the Court of
-20-
Special Appeals in its decision in Brown is inapplicable to the case at bar.
Petitioners assert that our decision in Cook v. Toney, 245 Md. 42, 224 A.2d 857
(1966) is dispositive of the issue before us.  The procedural history of Cook is similar, albeit
not identical, to the lengthy procedural history of the case sub judice.  The case involved a
lawsuit brought by Cook against Toney and his co-defendants, the Perrys, for personal
injuries caused in an automobile accident.  Id. at 44, 224 A.2d at 858.  At the original trial
held in March of 1960, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of Mrs. Perry.  Id. at 45, 224
A.2d at 858.  The jury rendered a verdict against Mr. Perry and Toney in the amount of
$5,000; however, the trial court granted Toney a new trial.  Id. At the second trial, the court
entered a directed verdict in favor of Toney.  Id.  Cook appealed the trial court’s decision to
this Court, and we reversed and remanded the case for a new trial.  See Tates v. Toney, 231
Md. 9, 14, 188 A.2d 283, 286 (1963).  At the conclusion of the third trial, the jury rendered
a verdict in favor of Toney, but the trial court granted a new trial in favor of Cook.  See
Cook, 245 Md. at 45-46, 224 A.2d at 859.  At the fourth and final trial, the jury rendered a
verdict in favor of Cook and on September 23, 1965, the trial court entered judgment against
Toney.  Id. at 46, 224 A.2d at 859.  A few days later, Toney paid the $5,000 damage award
into the registry of the trial court pending a decision as to whether Cook was entitled to an
award of post-judgment interest dating back to the entry of the original judgment on April
2, 1960.  Id. at 46, 224 A.2d at 859.
The predecessor post-judgment interest rule effective at the time of our decision in
-21-
Cook provided in relevant part, “[a] judgment on verdict shall be so entered as to carry
interest from the date on which the verdict was rendered.”  Md. Rule 642 (1965).  We
reasoned  that because Toney had been granted a new trial, the original jury verdict rendered
on March 29, 1960 and the judgment therefrom had been eliminated “as if they had never
been entered.”  245 Md. at 50, 224 A.2d at 861.  Therefore, we concluded that because “the
first and only verdict in legal contemplation against Toney” had not been rendered until
September 20, 1965, Toney’s payment obligation did not attach until that date.  Id. at 51, 224
A.2d at 862.  
Similarly, the first judgment entered in favor of the Estate in the present case was
eliminated by the Court of Special Appeals’s first mandate ordering the reversal of the
judgment.  Petitioners cannot be expected to pay interest retroactive to the date of the first
judgment just because the amount of the award entered in the final judgment which triggered
the corporations’ liability for payment is the same amount which had been entered in favor
of the Estate in the first judgment.  
We conclude, therefore, that for purposes of calculating post-judgment interest,
Carpenter Realty and 7UP / Baltimore were not under any obligation to the Estate until the
Circuit Court entered its judgment on October 19, 2000.
We further agree with the corporations’ assertion that post-judgment interest need not
be awarded at all in this matter because the judgment in favor of the Estate was immediately
satisfied through payment from the escrow account upon entry of the judgment on October
11
The Estate poses the equitable argument that it should receive post-judgment interest
on the $ 57,477.67 award dating back to April 4, 1995, because it was deprived of the use
and benefit of that money during the pendency of the various and assorted appeals.  What the
Estate overlooks, however, is that in this case both parties were deprived of the use of the
$78,263.23 which Carpenter Realty and 7UP / Baltimore had been ordered to set aside with
the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County to satisfy any potential judgment.  In
Bailey v. Chattem, Inc., 838 F.2d 149 (6 th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059, 108 S. Ct. 2831,
100 L. Ed. 2d 931 (1988), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied equitable
principles to determine whether post-judgment interest ran from the date of the first judgment
in a trial or on a subsequent judgment following a retrial limited to the issue of damages.  Id.
at 154.  The court examined several factors, including “the nature of the initial judgment, the
action of the appellate court, the subsequent events upon remand, and the relationship
between the first judgment and the modified judgment.”  Id.  Thus, under equitable
principles, and in the absence of a specific instruction to the contrary as explicated in the
mandate issuing from the appellate court, the trial court may exercise its discretion to award
post-judgment interest from the date of the original judgment.  See Boyd v. Bulala, 751 F.
Supp. 576, 579-80 (W. D. Va. 1990).  In the present matter, the transcript of the hearing
before the Circuit Court held on September 5, 2000 and the trial court’s subsequent order
denying pre-judgment and post-judgment interest reflects that the trial court balanced the
respective interests of the parties, weighed the nuances of the protracted litigation and
appeals process, and arrived at an equitable conclusion.
-22-
19, 2000.  Thus, the corporations’ prompt payment of the judgment alleviated the need for
an award of post-judgment interest.11  Therefore, we conclude that the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County properly denied the Estate’s request for post-judgment interest.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED
TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
WITH DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM THE
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY. COSTS IN
THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY
RESPONDENT.