Case Title: State v. Simpson

Citation: 2020-Ohio-6719

Docket Number: 2019-1769

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2020-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Simpson, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6719.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-6719 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SIMPSON, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Simpson, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6719.] 
App.R. 26(B)—Two-pronged standard articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 
adopted in Ohio in State v. Reed, applies to applications for reopening 
under App.R. 26(B)—Court of appeals’ judgment affirmed. 
(No. 2019-1769—Submitted August 18, 2020—Decided December 18, 2020.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Butler County, No. CA2018-06-121. 
_________________ 
FRENCH, J. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Roger Simpson, asks this court to revisit the standard that 
Ohio courts of appeals must apply when considering App.R. 26(B) applications for 
reopening.  He asks that we require appellate courts to apply the factors set out in 
Mapes v. Tate, 388 F.3d 187, 191 (6th Cir.2004) (“Mapes II”), when they consider 
whether to grant an application for reopening.  We decline to do so.  We reaffirm 
that the standard set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), which we adopted in State v. Reed, 74 Ohio St.3d 
534, 535, 660 N.E.2d 456 (1996), applies to applications for reopening under 
App.R. 26(B).  We reaffirm that courts of appeals should grant an application for 
reopening if the defendant shows a genuine issue as to whether he has a colorable 
claim that his appellate counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient 
performance caused him prejudice.  Because the Twelfth District Court of Appeals 
applied the correct standard when it considered Simpson’s App.R. 26(B) 
application for reopening, we affirm its judgment. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
{¶ 2} Simpson was charged with 23 felonies related to the rape of a woman 
in Oxford, Ohio, in 2017.  He was charged with ten counts of rape, five counts of 
sexual battery, two counts of kidnapping, four counts of complicity to rape, and two 
counts of complicity to sexual battery.  Two other men were also indicted.  
Codefendant Elijah Mincy was charged with 23 felony counts for his involvement 
in the rape, and codefendant Rodney Gibson II was charged with 26 felony counts 
for his involvement. 
{¶ 3} A jury found Simpson guilty on all charges.  The trial court merged 
many of the counts.  It sentenced him on five counts of rape, one count of 
kidnapping, and two counts of complicity to rape.  The court imposed consecutive 
sentences on all the rape and kidnapping counts, for an aggregate total of 51 years.  
The court also sentenced Simpson to seven years on each of the complicity counts, 
but it ordered those sentences to run concurrently with the other sentences. 
{¶ 4} After Simpson’s trial, Gibson and Mincy accepted plea bargains.  
Gibson pleaded guilty to one count of complicity to kidnapping.  He received a 
five-year sentence.  Mincy pleaded guilty to one count of rape and one count of 
kidnapping.  He received an eight-year sentence. 
 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
3
A.  Direct Appeal 
{¶ 5} Simpson appealed his convictions and sentences, raising two 
assignments of error.  First, Simpson argued that the trial court should have merged 
more counts.  Second, he argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
cross-examine the state’s expert witnesses, failing to allow Simpson to testify in his 
own defense, and failing to oppose the state’s sentencing memorandum on allied 
offenses.  The court of appeals rejected both assignments of error. 
B.  Application for Reopening 
{¶ 6} Simpson then filed an application to reopen his appeal under App.R. 
26(B).  He argued that his original appellate counsel had failed to obtain his case 
file to review it for potential errors and that counsel had raised two errors that were 
meritless when she could have raised three additional errors that had merit: (1) the 
trial court’s admission of out-of-court statements; (2) Simpson’s aggregate 51-year 
prison term as compared to the aggregate eight-year and five-year terms his 
codefendants received; and (3) the trial court’s failure to record a hearing on 
evidence protected by Ohio’s rape-shield law or file the exhibit Simpson’s counsel 
proffered containing that evidence. 
{¶ 7} Simpson supported his application for reopening with an affidavit 
executed by his lead trial counsel, Don LeRoy.  LeRoy supported Simpson’s claim 
that his original appellate counsel had never reviewed Simpson’s case file, which 
LeRoy kept at his office.  LeRoy also represented that Simpson’s counsel did not 
raise meritorious arguments on direct appeal. 
{¶ 8} LeRoy addressed the items he believed should have been raised in 
Simpson’s direct appeal.  LeRoy said that the proceedings concerning the state’s 
argument that certain evidence was excluded by the rape-shield law occurred in 
chambers without a court reporter and that the docket does not contain an entry 
reflecting the court’s adjudication of those proceedings.  He represented that he 
proffered an exhibit containing the evidence at issue but that his proffered exhibit 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
is not in the clerk’s official file.  LeRoy also summarized the contents of the 
proffered exhibit.  Furthermore, LeRoy identified two issues that he felt Simpson’s 
appellate counsel should have raised on direct appeal: the state’s repeated use of 
codefendant Gibson’s out-of-court statements and the disparity between the 
aggregate sentence Simpson received and the sentences his codefendants received. 
{¶ 9} The court of appeals denied the application.  It applied the Strickland 
standard and concluded that Simpson failed to meet either part of that test.  The 
court considered each of the errors that Simpson argued his original appellate 
counsel should have raised.  It determined that there was no indication that the trial 
court would have excluded the out-of-court statements as inadmissible hearsay had 
Simpson’s trial counsel objected to their admission, because they were not offered 
for their truth but rather for their effect on the listener.  Further, the court of appeals 
held that Simpson could not show that it would have sustained a challenge to his 
sentence, because the trial court “properly considered the relevant sentencing 
guidelines and requirements” and there was no indication that the trial court acted 
vindictively.  Finally, the court held that Simpson failed to show that the evidence 
his trial counsel proffered during the in-chambers hearing was admissible under 
Ohio’s rape-shield law. 
{¶ 10} We accepted Simpson’s appeal and his sole proposition of law:  
 
Appellate ineffectiveness is measured in the application and 
reopening by comparing the presented arguments on direct appeal 
with omitted ones, by applying the Sixth Circuit’s Mapes factors to 
weigh the strengths, weaknesses, and viability of those omitted 
arguments, and by evaluating postconviction facts about appellate 
counsel’s preparedness and tactics. 
 
See 158 Ohio St.3d 1430, 2020-Ohio-748, 141 N.E.3d 236. 
January Term, 2020 
 
5
II.  ANALYSIS 
{¶ 11} Indigent criminal defendants generally have a right to appellate 
counsel in their first appeal of right.  Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755, 111 
S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991).  Like trial counsel, appellate counsel must 
provide reasonably effective assistance.  Id., citing Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 
396, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, citing Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 151-152 (2d 
Cir.1983). 
A.  App.R. 26(B) 
{¶ 12} App.R. 26(B) allows a criminal defendant to apply to reopen his 
direct appeal based on a claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective.  It creates 
a two-step process.  First, the applicant must apply to have his appeal reopened 
following the procedure set out in App.R. 26(B)(2) through (4).  The initial 
application is limited to ten pages, and no oral argument is permitted.  App.R. 
26(B)(4).  It must include a sworn statement explaining how appellate counsel’s 
representation was deficient and how that deficiency “prejudicially affected the 
outcome of the appeal.”  App.R. 26(B)(2)(d).  The application “shall be granted if 
there is a genuine issue as to whether the applicant was deprived of the effective 
assistance of counsel on appeal.”  App.R. 26(B)(5).  We have said that the applicant 
must show that there is a “ ‘genuine issue’ as to whether he has a ‘colorable claim’ 
of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal.”  State v. Spivey, 84 Ohio St.3d 24, 
25, 701 N.E.2d 696 (1998). 
{¶ 13} If the application is granted, it proceeds to the second step.  The case 
is then treated as if it were an initial direct appeal, with briefs and oral argument.  
App.R. 26(B)(7); see App.R. 21(A).  Unlike an initial appeal, though, the court of 
appeals may order an evidentiary hearing if it determines one is necessary.  App.R. 
26(B)(8). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
B.  A defendant must meet Strickland’s two-pronged standard to prevail on a 
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
{¶ 14} In Reed, 74 Ohio St.3d at 535, 660 N.E.2d 456, this court adopted 
the two-pronged analysis set out in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 
L.Ed.2d 674, for considering applications for reopening.  Under that standard, an 
appellant must show that his appellate counsel’s performance was deficient and that 
the deficient performance prejudiced him.  Strickland at 687; see Reed at 535-536; 
see also App.R. 26(B)(9).  Appellate counsel’s performance must have been 
objectively unreasonable, and there must be a reasonable probability that the result 
of the appeal would have been different but for counsel’s errors.  Strickland at 688, 
694; see Reed at 535.  Under Strickland, a reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceedings.  Strickland 
at 694. 
{¶ 15} Simpson now asks that we adopt a number of other factors for 
appellate courts to consider when deciding whether to grant an application for 
reopening.  Those factors were first outlined in a federal-court opinion, Mapes v. 
Coyle, 171 F.3d 408, 427-428 (6th Cir.1999) (“Mapes I”).  In that case, the Sixth 
Circuit considered whether the district court properly granted Mapes’s petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus, barring the state from carrying out his death sentence, 
because Mapes’s appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise certain errors 
on appeal.  The Sixth Circuit recognized that Strickland’s two-pronged analysis 
applies to a claim alleging that appellate counsel was ineffective.  Mapes I at 425.  
Applying that standard, the Sixth Circuit said that Mapes would not be able to show 
that he had been prejudiced during the guilt phase of his trial because there was 
overwhelming evidence that he was guilty.  Appellate counsel’s failure to raise 
errors related to the mitigation phase and the jury’s death-sentence 
recommendation, though, was “almost inexplicable.”  Id. at 427.  The court drew 
from other circuit courts and compiled a list of questions that it found helpful for 
January Term, 2020 
 
7
determining whether Mapes’s appellate counsel performed reasonably competently 
despite failing to raise arguments concerning those phases of the proceedings: 
 
(1) Were the omitted issues “significant and obvious”? 
(2) Was there arguably contrary authority on the omitted 
issues? 
(3) Were the omitted issues clearly stronger than those 
presented? 
(4) Were the omitted issues objected to at trial? 
(5) Were the trial court’s rulings subject to deference on 
appeal? 
(6) Did appellate counsel testify in a collateral proceeding 
as to his appeal strategy and, if so, were the justifications 
reasonable? 
(7) What was appellate counsel’s level of experience and 
expertise? 
(8) Did the petitioner and appellate counsel meet and go 
over possible issues? 
(9) Is there evidence that counsel reviewed all the facts? 
(10) Were the omitted issues dealt with in other 
assignments of error? 
(11) Was the decision to omit an issue an unreasonable one 
which only an incompetent attorney would adopt? 
 
Id. at 427-428.  The court cautioned that its list is not exhaustive and must not be 
used to “produce a ‘correct score.’ ”  Id. at 428.  The factors merely guide the 
consideration. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
{¶ 16} Considering those factors, the Sixth Circuit concluded that there was 
a strong possibility that Mapes’s appellate counsel was ineffective and there was a 
reasonable probability that Mapes was prejudiced.  Id. at 429.  The court remanded 
the matter to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to consider whether 
Mapes’s appellate counsel was ineffective.  On remand, the district court adopted 
the magistrate’s recommendation to vacate Mapes’s death sentence (unless the 
Ohio courts granted another review of Mapes’s sentence within 90 days) because 
his appellate counsel was ineffective.  When the case came before the Sixth Circuit 
on an appeal from that decision, the court referred to the 11 factors it outlined in 
Mapes I.  Mapes II, 388 F.3d at 191.  It then concluded that Mapes’s appellate 
counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the trial court’s refusal to allow the 
jury to consider certain mitigating evidence.  It affirmed the district court’s 
judgment. 
{¶ 17} Simpson argues that we should adopt the Mapes factors so that there 
is a standard against which his appellate counsel’s performance can be evaluated 
and so that Ohio aligns with federal law to provide a predictable and uniform 
standard for ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims.  But there is 
already a predictable and uniform standard to evaluate appellate counsel’s 
performance, and it is outlined in Strickland.  And as we discuss below, both Ohio 
and federal courts have adopted Strickland as the standard for evaluating appellate 
counsel’s performance.  See Reed, 74 Ohio St.3d at 535, 660 N.E.2d 456; Smith v. 
Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000). 
{¶ 18} As we have stated, under Strickland, in order to prevail on a claim 
that counsel was ineffective, a criminal defendant must show (1) that his counsel’s 
performance was deficient and (2) that that performance prejudiced him.  See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  Strickland also 
established a standard for evaluating whether counsel’s performance was deficient.  
In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that courts must be 
January Term, 2020 
 
9
highly deferential in reviewing counsel’s performance.  Id. at 689.  It said that “the 
proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance.”  
Id. at 687.  A defendant who claims his counsel was ineffective must show that, 
considering all the circumstances, his counsel’s performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.  See id. 
at 687-688.  The court cautioned that “[m]ore specific guidelines” for counsel’s 
performance “are not appropriate.”  Id. at 688.  The court listed some generally 
accepted basic duties that “neither exhaustively define” counsel’s obligations “nor 
form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance.”  Id.  Those 
general duties include assisting the defendant, advocating for the defendant’s cause, 
communicating with the defendant, and using the attorney’s skill and knowledge to 
ensure a reliable adversarial process.  Id.  But still, the court recognized that it is 
not appropriate to develop a set list of factors for evaluating counsel’s performance 
because “[n]o particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can 
satisfactorily” account for all the variables that a court must consider.  Id. at 688-
689. 
{¶ 19} Although Strickland involved a claim of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel, both this court and the United States Supreme Court have recognized 
that the Strickland standard also applies to claims asserting ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel.  See Smith at 285 (“the proper standard for evaluating [a] claim 
that appellate counsel was ineffective * * * is that enunciated in Strickland”); Reed, 
74 Ohio St.3d at 535, 660 N.E.2d 456.  Contrary to appellant’s assertion, Ohio law 
is, therefore, already aligned with federal law on the standard for evaluating 
appellate counsel’s performance. 
{¶ 20} As a final matter, we note that even the Sixth Circuit itself has not 
adopted the Mapes factors uniformly.  See, e.g., Haliym v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680, 
694-696 (6th Cir.2007) (applying the Strickland standard alone, without 
mentioning the Mapes factors, and finding that appellate counsel was not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
ineffective); Ceasor v. Ocwieja, 655 Fed.Appx. 263, 277-278 (6th Cir.2016) 
(applying the Strickland standard without mentioning the Mapes factors, finding 
that appellate counsel’s performance was deficient, and remanding to the district 
court to determine the prejudice prong).  Although the Mapes factors may provide 
helpful guidance for appellate courts as they evaluate appellate counsel’s 
performance, mandating consideration of those factors is not appropriate. 
{¶ 21} Today, we reaffirm that a defendant must show a genuine issue as to 
whether he has a colorable claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective in order 
to have his appeal reopened.  The Twelfth District applied the correct standard 
when it reviewed Simpson’s application for reopening and concluded that Simpson 
failed to show a genuine issue that he has a colorable claim of ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel.  We therefore affirm the decision of the Twelfth District. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 22} Today, we reaffirm that the two-pronged standard articulated in 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, applies to App.R. 
26(B) applications for reopening.  Courts of appeals should grant an application for 
reopening if the defendant shows a genuine issue that he has a colorable claim that 
his appellate counsel’s performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by 
the deficient performance.  Appellate counsel’s performance was deficient if, 
considering all the circumstances, it fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.  Id. at 688.  The Twelfth 
District Court of Appeals applied this standard, and we affirm its judgment. 
Judgment affirmed. 
KENNEDY and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs, with an opinion. 
FISCHER, J., concurs, with an opinion. 
DONNELLY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by STEWART, J. 
_________________ 
January Term, 2020 
 
11 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurring. 
{¶ 23} I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the two-pronged standard 
articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674 (1984), applies to App.R. 26(B) applications for reopening.  I nevertheless 
write separately because I share the dissent’s outrage at appellate counsel’s 
performance in this case.  Applying Strickland, I would conclude that appellant, 
Roger Simpson, presented a colorable claim that his appellate counsel’s 
performance was deficient and that Simpson was prejudiced as a result.  However, 
because Simpson challenged only the applicable standard to App.R. 26(B) 
applications and failed to challenge his appellate counsel’s performance under 
Strickland, I can offer only an advisory assessment of counsel’s performance. 
{¶ 24} Applying the first prong of Strickland, I find it difficult to conceive 
of a more appropriate example of performance that falls below “an objective 
standard of reasonableness,” id. at 688, than that of appellate counsel failing to even 
review the case file of a defendant who was convicted following a jury trial.  See 
also Storey v. Vasbinder, 657 F.3d 372, 389 (6th Cir.2011) (Clay, J., dissenting) 
(“There is no scenario under which a complete failure to investigate a case or to 
review available discovery can be assumed to be reasoned trial strategy or 
otherwise excused.”).  In his affidavit, Simpson’s lead trial counsel explained that 
he kept the case file at his home office and intended to discuss the case with 
appellate counsel once he provided her with the file.  But appellate counsel never 
obtained, nor attempted to obtain, the file, meaning she never reviewed the bill-of-
information, the counsel-only discovery, work product from experts and 
investigators, or trial counsel’s work product.  Nor did she ever discuss the issues 
in the case with trial counsel.  As a result, appellate counsel was not aware of two 
issues that trial counsel believed had merit and should have been raised on direct 
appeal. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
{¶ 25} More specifically, appellate counsel failed to raise on direct appeal 
a glaring issue regarding the disparity between Simpson’s sentence and his 
codefendants’ sentences.  In contrast to Simpson’s 51-year sentence, his 
codefendants received 8- and 5-year sentences.  Despite similarities in both their 
conduct and the charges all three men faced, Simpson received a sentence more 
than six times longer than his codefendants’ sentences.  Paired with the fact that 
Simpson, unlike his codefendants, exercised his constitutional right to a jury trial, 
the relative severity of his sentence resembles a trial tax.  This issue was clearly 
stronger than the merger issue raised in Simpson’s direct appeal, especially when 
the state and Simpson’s trial counsel had agreed as to the offenses that were allied 
for merger below.  To me, appellate counsel’s failures demonstrate at least a 
genuine issue as to whether Simpson has a colorable claim that his counsel’s 
performance was deficient. 
{¶ 26} Turning to the second prong of Strickland, appellate counsel’s 
failures also demonstrate a reasonable probability that counsel’s deficient 
performance prejudiced Simpson.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
80 L.Ed.2d 674.  Because appellate counsel failed to raise the disproportionate-
sentencing issue, the court of appeals could not address this significant issue in 
Simpson’s direct appeal.  Indeed, similar arguments involving disproportionate 
sentences and trial taxes have persuaded courts of appeals to reverse and remand 
for more appropriate sentences.  See State v. Moore, 2012-Ohio-1958, 970 N.E.2d 
1098 (8th Dist.) (defendant successfully contended that his sentence was 
disproportionate to that of his codefendant’s and a punishment for exercising his 
constitutional right to trial); State v. Beverly, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2011-CA-64, 2013-
Ohio-1365, rev’d on other grounds, 143 Ohio St.3d 258, 2015-Ohio-219, 37 N.E.3d 
116 (concluding that the evidence in the record did not support the more than 50-
year disparity between defendant’s and codefendant’s sentences).  There is a 
reasonable probability that had appellate counsel raised this disproportionate-
January Term, 2020 
 
13 
sentencing issue, the court of appeals would have reversed Simpson’s sentence and 
remanded for resentencing, carrying with it the potential of a reduced sentence.  
Accordingly, I would also conclude that a genuine issue exists as to whether 
Simpson has a colorable claim that he was prejudiced by his appellate counsel’s 
deficient performance. 
{¶ 27} While I believe Simpson demonstrated a colorable claim that his 
appellate counsel was ineffective under Strickland, and therefore, met his burden 
under App.R. 26(B) to reopen his appeal, I nevertheless join the majority opinion 
in light of the narrow scope of this appeal. 
_________________ 
FISCHER, J., concurring. 
{¶ 28} I concur with the majority opinion.  The standard set forth in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 
(1984), is the appropriate standard by which appellate courts should review 
applications for reopening under App.R. 26(B).  I write separately to emphasize 
that appellate courts, in analyzing the prejudice prong of Strickland, should look to 
determine whether, but for appellate counsel’s deficient performance, there is a 
reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.  
Under longstanding Ohio law, a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.  State v. Davis, 159 Ohio St.3d 31, 2020-
Ohio-309, 146 N.E.3d 560, ¶ 10; State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 142, 538 
N.E.2d 373 (1989); Strickland at 694.  The analysis does not demand the certainty 
of success. 
{¶ 29} I also write separately to express my concern with a matter that was 
raised in this appeal but that could not be fully considered due to the narrow scope 
of the issue before us.  The Office of the Ohio Public Defender, in its amicus brief, 
identifies that review of applications for reopening under App.R. 26(B) has evolved 
from reviewing for genuine issues that could have been argued on appeal to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
reviewing the merits of those issues.  See State v. Fain, 188 Ohio App.3d 531, 2010-
Ohio-2455, 936 N.E.2d 93, ¶ 34 (1st Dist.) (Cunningham, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (writing that the majority in that case, while correct in 
determining that a genuine issue existed, erred in deciding the merits of the 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based solely on the application for 
reopening rather than ordering briefing on the issue as is required under App.R. 
26(B)(6)-(9)).  While that issue is beyond the scope of this appeal, I agree that 
appellate courts are likely in need of further guidance from this court on that issue.  
Thus, moving forward, I would encourage my colleagues on this court to accept for 
review cases pertaining to applications to reopen an appeal under App.R. 26(B). 
_________________ 
DONNELLY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 30} In this case, appellant, Roger Simpson, invites us to supplement the 
two-part test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), with the factors set forth in Mapes v. Tate, 388 F.3d 
187, 191 (6th Cir.2004), when considering applications for reopening under App.R. 
26(B).  The majority opinion rejects this invitation; I would accept it because the 
Mapes factors provide enhanced guidance to courts that the more limited Strickland 
test does not. 
{¶ 31} This case deserves meaningful review because appellate counsel 
below failed many of the factors listed in Mapes to determine whether “appellate 
counsel performed reasonably competently despite failing to raise arguments 
* * *,” majority opinion at ¶ 15.  According to Simpson’s brief,  
 
Simpson’s lead counsel kept the case file at his home office 
because he intended to discuss the issues with appellate counsel 
when he transferred the file to her.  But appellate counsel only 
emailed once about the case, never obtained the file, and never had 
January Term, 2020 
 
15 
a substantive discussion about the case.  Which means appellate 
counsel never reviewed the bill-of-information, the discovery, the 
counsel-only discovery, the work product of experts and the 
investigator, and the notes. 
 
{¶ 32} The brief also states:  
 
Appellate counsel failed to argue that Simpson’s 51-year 
sentence was unsupported by the record, disproportionate with his 
co-defendants’ sentences, and involved an unconstitutional trial tax.  
The discrepancy between Simpson’s 51-year term and [codefendant 
Elijah] Mincy’s and [codefendant Rodney] Gibson’s 8- and 5-year 
terms was a significant and obvious issue—more so given that 
Simpson and Mincy committed the same acts, where each faced 23 
counts, and therefore shared culpability and blameworthiness. 
 
The majority opinion concludes that these deficiencies are basically irrelevant 
because Simpson was not prejudiced. 
{¶ 33} Any appellate attorney in Ohio worth his or her salt would have 
recognized the vitality and importance of the disproportion between Simpson’s 
sentence and the sentences received by his codefendants.  That issue should have 
been Simpson’s first proposition of law.  Still, the majority opinion concludes that 
Simpson has not set forth “a colorable claim that his appellate counsel was 
ineffective in order to have his appeal reopened.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 21.  It can 
only be because the second prong of Strickland is not satisfied—i.e., that Simpson 
could not have prevailed even with competent counsel—though that is not directly 
stated. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
{¶ 34} It is clear to me, in analyzing the Mapes factors, that Simpson’s 
appellate counsel was deficient.  The disproportionate-sentence issue was 
“significant and obvious,” was clearly stronger than those issues that were 
presented, and was not otherwise raised by appellate counsel; the decision to omit 
the issue was “one which only an incompetent attorney would adopt.”  Mapes, 388 
F.3d at 191.  Moreover, appellate counsel did not meet with Simpson or his trial 
counsel, did not review the case record, and did not defend her decision to omit the 
disproportionate-sentence issue.  See id.  I believe that Simpson was prejudiced by 
counsel’s deficient performance, because competent advocacy could have 
convinced the court of appeals that the sentence imposed was excessive and 
disproportionate, see State v. Hawley, 2020-Ohio-1270, 153 N.E.3d 714 (8th Dist.) 
(defendant successfully argued that his sentence was disproportionate and 
excessive). 
{¶ 35} If failure to review the record below and failure to argue the 
disproportion of a sentence more than six times longer than a codefendant’s do not 
present a colorable claim of ineffective assistance, then we might never reopen a 
case pursuant to App.R. 26(B).  Of the 836 applications for reopening that this court 
has received in the last ten years, zero have been granted.  We must ask ourselves 
whether we are providing meaningful review or just a mirage.  I dissent. 
 
STEWART, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, and John C. 
Heinkel, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Repper-Pagan Law, Ltd., and Christopher J. Pagan, for appellant. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, and 
Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General. 
January Term, 2020 
 
17 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Patrick T. Clark, Charlyn 
Bohland, and Rachel Troutman, Assistant Public Defenders, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae Office of the Ohio Public Defender. 
_________________