Case Title: Naylor v. Cardinal Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn.

Citation: 1994-Ohio-22

Docket Number: 19922043

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1994-04-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Naylor, Appellant, v. Cardinal Local School District Board of                    
Education, Appellee.                                                             
[Cite as Naylor v. Cardinal Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn.                       
(1994),       Ohio St.3d      .]                                                 
Schools -- Teachers -- R.C. 3319.11 and 3319.111 must be                         
     liberally construed in favor of teachers -- R.C. 3319.111                   
     does not govern evaluation of teacher employed under a                      
     limited contract, when -- R.C. 3319.11(G)(2) requires                       
     board of education to provide a clear and substantive                       
     basis for its decision not to reemploy teacher --                           
     Requirements for adequate hearing pursuant to R.C.                          
     3319.11(G)(3), (4) and (5).                                                 
1.  R.C. 3319.11 and 3319.111 are remedial statutes that must be                 
         liberally construed in favor of teachers.                               
2.  Unless a collective bargaining agreement specifically pro-                   
         vides to the contrary, R.C. 3319.111 governs                            
         the evaluation of a teacher employed under a                            
         limited contract.                                                       
3.  R.C. 3319.11(G)(2) requires a board of education to provide                  
         a teacher under a limited contract a clear                              
         and substantive basis for its decision not                              
         to reemploy the teacher for the following                               
         school year.                                                            
4.  The hearing provided teachers under limited contracts pur-                   
         suant to R.C. 3319.11(G)(3), (4) and (5)                                
         necessarily includes the presentation of                                
         evidence, confrontation and examination of                              
         witnesses and the review of the arguments of                            
         the parties.                                                            
    (No. 92-2043 -- Submitted November 9, 1993 -- Decided April                  
27, 1994.)                                                                       
    Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Geauga County, No.                      
91-G-1629.                                                                       
    Plaintiff-appellant, Deborah P. Naylor, was employed for                     
three years as a ninth grade English and high school reading                     
teacher by defendant-appellee, Cardinal Local School District                    
Board of Education, under a limited teaching contract that                       
expired August 25, 1990.  At that time, plaintiff would have                     
been eligible for a continuing contract (i.e., tenure) as a                      
teacher.  On April 9, 1990, the defendant-board voted not to                     
reemploy plaintiff at the expiration of her 1989-1990                            
contract.  In a letter dated April 12, 1990, the board notified                  
plaintiff of its action by certified mail.  Consequently,                        
plaintiff's attorney requested a written statement, pursuant to                  
R.C. 3319.11(G)(1), describing the circumstances that led to                     
the board's decision not to reemploy plaintiff.  In a letter                     
dated April 26, 1990, the treasurer of the board wrote                           
plaintiff, on the board's behalf, in part as follows:                            
    "In reviewing the long term needs of the District, it was                    
concluded by the Superintendent and accepted by the Board, that                  
the District would be better served by not offering [you] a                      
continuing contract."                                                            
    Upon plaintiff's request pursuant to R.C. 3319.11(B)(3), a                   
hearing was held before the board in executive session on May                    
17, 1990.  Over the objections of plaintiff's counsel, however,                  
the board prohibited plaintiff from calling any witnesses to                     
testify on her behalf.  Subsequently, in an order dated May 25,                  
1990, the board affirmed its intention not to reemploy                           
plaintiff for the following school year.                                         
    Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant action in the court                  
of common pleas, alleging that the board had not complied with                   
the statutory evaluation procedures of R.C. 3319.111 prior to                    
its nonrenewal of her contract, or with the mandate of R.C.                      
3319.11(G)(2) in describing the circumstances leading to the                     
board's decision not to renew her teaching contract.  Plaintiff                  
further alleged that the board had not provided her with the                     
type of hearing contemplated by R.C. 3319.11.  In her prayer                     
for relief, plaintiff requested that she be awarded back pay                     
and ordered reemployed as a teacher for the following school                     
year.                                                                            
    In a judgment entry dated January 25, 1991, the trial court                  
held that while the evaluation procedures required by R.C.                       
3319.111(B) had not been adopted by the board, the procedures                    
actually followed did in fact comply with the statute.  The                      
court also held that the explanation given to plaintiff                          
regarding the circumstances leading to nonrenewal of her                         
contract was "sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the                      
statute," and that the hearing held before the board "did                        
comply with the terms of the statute as viewed in its                            
legislative history."                                                            
    Upon appeal, the court of appeals affirmed.  The appellate                   
court held that R.C. 3319.111(A) "was strictly followed by the                   
appellee board," and that the board's adherence to the                           
evaluation procedures set forth in the collective bargaining                     
agreement exceeded the evaluation requirements of R.C.                           
3319.111.  The court further held that the board had accorded                    
plaintiff the type of hearing contemplated by R.C. 3319.11.                      
    The cause is now before this court pursuant to the                           
allowance of a motion to certify the record.                                     
                                                                                 
    Green, Haines, Sgambati, Murphy & Macala Co., L.P.A.,                        
Ronald G. Macala, Cornelius J. Baasten and Anne Piero-Silagy,                    
for appellant.                                                                   
    Christley, Herington, Pierce, Silver & Habowski, Leigh E.                    
Herington and Susan S. McGown, for appellee.                                     
    Means, Bichimer, Burkholder & Baker Co., L.P.A., and                         
Kimball H. Carey, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio                      
School Boards Association.                                                       
                                                                                 
    A.William Sweeney, J.     In resolving the instant appeal,                   
we are guided by the standard that R.C. 3319.11 and 3319.111                     
are remedial statutes that must be liberally construed in favor                  
of teachers.  R.C. 1.11.  See, also, State ex rel. Luckey v.                     
Etheridge (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 404, 406, 583 N.E.2d 960, 962.                   
One of the issues presented in the instant cause has been                        
resolved by one of the two companion cases to this action,                       
Farmer v. Kelleys Island Bd. of Edn. (1994),     Ohio St. 3d                     
,     N.E.2d    .                                                                
    In Farmer, supra, this court held in the second and third                    
paragraphs of the syllabus that all of the evaluation                            
requirements of R.C. 3319.111(B) are incorporated in R.C.                        
3319.111(A), thus eliminating the argument that a school                         
board's violation of evaluation requirements in R.C.                             
3319.111(A) is redressable under R.C. 3319.11(G)(7), but that a                  
violation of evaluation requirements of R.C. 3319.111(B) is not.                 
    In the cause sub judice, plaintiff-appellant contends that                   
the defendant-appellee board of education failed to adopt the                    
evaluation procedures set forth in R.C. 3319.111(B), and that                    
in ratifying the evaluations given her, the board violated R.C.                  
3319.111(B)(3) in not providing plaintiff with specific                          
recommendations regarding any improvement she needed to make in                  
her performance as a teacher and means by which she could                        
obtain assistance in making such improvements.                                   
    The board counters plaintiff's arguments by pointing out                     
that the collective bargaining agreement in effect at the time                   
this action arose already provided nonrenewal and evaluation                     
procedures, and that by virtue of R.C. 4117.10 the provisions                    
of the agreement prevail over R.C. 3319.11 and 3319.111.  The                    
board also claims that its evaluations did comply with R.C.                      
3319.111.  The board contends that R.C. 3319.111(B) does not                     
require that a new set of evaluation procedures be adopted by a                  
board of education, so long as it adheres to evaluation                          
procedures set forth in a collective bargaining agreement that                   
provide as much protection to teachers.                                          
    In response to the board's argument, plaintiff asserts that                  
a board of education is bound to adopt and apply the statutory                   
evaluation procedures of R.C. 3319.111, as well as the                           
evaluation procedures set forth in the collective bargaining                     
agreement, unless the agreement specifically excludes or                         
negates statutory evaluation procedures.                                         
    With regard to whether the evaluation provisions of the                      
collective bargaining prevail over R.C. 3319.111, we note that                   
R.C. 4117.10 states in part:                                                     
    "(A) An agreement between a public employer and an                           
exclusive representative entered into pursuant to this chapter                   
governs the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of public                     
employment covered by the agreement.  ***   Where no agreement                   
exists or where an agreement makes no specification about a                      
matter, the public employer and public employees are subject to                  
all applicable state or local laws or ordinances pertaining to                   
the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment for                     
public employees.  *** [T]his chapter prevails over any and all                  
other conflicting laws, resolutions, provisions, present or                      
future, except as otherwise specified in this chapter or as                      
otherwise specified by the general assembly.  ***"  (Emphasis                    
added.)                                                                          
    This court has held that a provision in a collective                         
bargaining agreement prevails over a conflicting statute.                        
Cuyahoga Falls Edn. Assn. v. Cuyahoga Falls City School Dist.                    
Bd. of Edn. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 193, 574 N.E.2d 422; State ex                  
rel. Rollins v. Cleveland Hts.-Univ. Hts. Bd. of Edn. (1988),                    
40 Ohio St.3d 123, 532 N.E.2d 1289.                                              
    However, given the remedial nature of R.C. 3319.111 we hold                  
that unless a collective bargaining agreement specifically                       
provides to the contrary, R.C. 3319.111 governs the evaluation                   
of a teacher employed under a limited contract.  See State ex                    
rel. Clark v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth. (1990),                   
48 Ohio St.3d 19, 548 N.E.2d 940, where we held that a                           
collective bargaining agreement must specifically exclude                        
statutory rights in order to negate the application of those                     
rights.                                                                          
    The collective bargaining agreement was entered into prior                   
to the effective date of R.C. 3319.111, and therefore does not                   
specifically exclude or negate the rights contained in this                      
statute.  However, R.C. 3319.111(A) specifically states that a                   
school board which employs a teacher under a limited contract                    
"*** shall evaluate such a teacher in compliance with the                        
requirements of this section in any school year in which the                     
board may wish to declare its intention not to reemploy him                      
***."  Moreover, R.C. 3319.111(B) provides that "[a]ny board of                  
education evaluating a teacher pursuant to this section shall                    
adopt evaluation procedures that shall be applied each time a                    
teacher is evaluated pursuant to this section."  (Emphasis                       
added.)                                                                          
    Under these circumstances, we believe that while the board                   
was bound by the provisions of the collective bargaining                         
agreement, it was also bound by the statutory evaluation                         
procedures contained in R.C. 3319.111.  In failing to adopt the                  
evaluation procedures set forth in R.C. 3319.111, the school                     
board acted improperly in its decision not to reemploy                           
plaintiff.  Accordingly, we hold that the lower courts erred in                  
excusing the board from complying with R.C. 3319.111.                            
    With respect to the issue concerning the procedures that                     
were conducted in evaluating plaintiff's performance as a                        
teacher, the record indicates that plaintiff was evaluated,                      
among other times, on November 27, 1989, December 19, 1989 and                   
March 27, 1990.  In each of these evaluation reports, the                        
evaluator cited one or more areas in which plaintiff needed                      
improvement in her teaching performance.  While the evaluator                    
in these reports did in some areas provide adequate specific                     
recommendations for improvement and means to obtain assistance,                  
in other areas such as "encourages student participation" he                     
did not.  Similar to our holding in the third paragraph of the                   
syllabus in Farmer, supra, we hold that the failure of a board                   
of education to satisfy the requirements of R.C. 3319.111(B)(3)                  
constitutes a failure to comply with the evaluation                              
requirements of R.C. 3319.111(A), and such failure will permit                   
a reviewing court to order the board to reemploy the teacher                     
pursuant to R.C. 3319.11(G)(7). 1                                                
    An even more compelling argument raised by plaintiff                         
concerns the board's failure to comply with R.C. 3319.11(G) 2                    
by not providing plaintiff "a written statement describing the                   
circumstances that led to the board's intention not to                           
reemploy" her.  In response to plaintiff's timely written                        
demand for a written statement describing the circumstances                      
that led the board to decide not to reemploy her, the board                      
issued the following statement to plaintiff:                                     
    "According to the Ohio Revised Code, Section 4117 and the                    
terms of the teacher's Master Agreement, the Board of Education                  
cannot issue another limited teaching contract after a teacher                   
has taught three (3) continuous years at the Cardinal Schools                    
and holds a valid professional teaching certificate.  If Mrs.                    
Naylor were to receive another contract in the District, she                     
could only be offered a continuing contract.  In reviewing the                   
long term needs of the District, it was concluded by the                         
Superintendent and accepted by the Board, that the District                      
would be better served by not offering Mrs. Naylor a continuing                  
contract."                                                                       
    In our view, this statement by the board is totally                          
inadequate in satisfying what is required by the board under                     
R.C. 3319.11(G)(2).  The board's statement does not describe                     
any circumstances explaining how it arrived at its decision.                     
The board's statement is merely conclusory and leaves plaintiff                  
groping for answers as to why she was not offered a continuing                   
contract.  If R.C. 3319.11(G)(2) is to have any meaning                          
whatsoever, the written statement from the board must provide                    
the teacher with an explanation of why his or her employment                     
contract is not being renewed.  Therefore, we hold that R.C.                     
3319.11(G)(2) requires a board of education to provide a                         
teacher under a limited contract a clear and substantive basis                   
for its decision not to reemploy the teacher for the following                   
school year.  However, under the second paragraph of R.C.                        
3319.11(G)(7), the failure of the board to provide plaintiff                     
with a clear and substantive basis for its decision not to                       
reemploy her cannot be a ground for an order to reemploy her.                    
See Farmer, supra.  Such a failure can be remedied only by an                    
order to give a specific reason, so that a teacher can have a                    
statement of reasons on the record.                                              
    Last, plaintiff contends that the board did not provide her                  
with the type of hearing contemplated by R.C. 3319.11(G)(3),                     
(4) and (5). 3  It is plaintiff's argument that the term                         
"hearing" includes the presentation of evidence, confrontation                   
and examination of witnesses and the review of the arguments of                  
the parties.                                                                     
    The board responds that the hearing referred to in R.C.                      
3319.11(G)(5) is not a full evidentiary hearing such as that                     
provided for tenured teachers in R.C. 3319.16, and that, in any                  
event, it carefully followed the precise statutory procedures                    
set forth in R.C. 3319.11(G) in the hearing.                                     
    Additionally, the amicus curiae, Ohio School Boards                          
Association, argues that all Ohio courts that have addressed                     
the issue have unanimously held that a full evidentiary hearing                  
is not required by R.C. 3319.11(G)(5).  See, e.g., Gerner v.                     
Salem City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (May 16, 1991) Columbiana                    
C.P. No. 90-CIV-320, affirmed (Oct. 19, 1992), Columbiana App.                   
No. 91-C-33, unreported, 1992 WL 308372; Lavens v.                               
Gorham-Fayette Local School Bd. of Edn. (July 24, 1992), Fulton                  
App. No. 91FU000009, unreported.                                                 
    While we agree with the board that the type of hearing                       
described in R.C. 3319.11(G)(5) does not necessarily entail the                  
same procedures delineated in R.C. 3319.16, we find that the                     
General Assembly intended a more thorough and formal proceeding                  
than that which was accorded plaintiff.  If the General                          
Assembly had intended to restrict a nontenured teacher's right                   
to the simple recitation of a position statement, it could have                  
easily done so by use of another phrase, such as "presentation                   
of argument" or "oral argument."  In our view, the requirements                  
of R.C. 3319.11(G)(5) envision more than an informal session                     
between a school board and the teacher, where the teacher makes                  
a verbal presentation protesting nonrenewal of his or her                        
contract.  The General Assembly must have intended more in                       
light of the elaborate and comprehensive procedures appearing                    
in R.C. 3319.11, as amended.  R.C. 3319.11(G)(5) and (6) speak                   
of a "hearing" and an "order," words clearly suggesting a                        
proceeding that possesses some formality, especially in light                    
of the liberal construction standard which must be applied to                    
this remedial statutory scheme.                                                  
    In contrast to the hearing established in R.C. 3319.11(G)                    
for teachers under limited contracts, administrators are merely                  
accorded a "meeting" with the school board to "discuss reasons"                  
for nonrenewal under R.C. 3319.02(D).  State ex rel. Smith v.                    
Etheridge (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 501, 507, 605 N.E.2d 59, 64.                     
    We are also guided by the well-established principle that a                  
statute susceptible of either of two opposing interpretations                    
must be read in the manner which effectuates, rather than                        
frustrates, the major purpose of the General Assembly.  See                      
State v. Glass (1971), 27 Ohio App.2d 214, 219, 56 O.O.2d 391,                   
394, 273 N.E.2d 893, 897.                                                        
    Upon a careful review of the hearing transcript, we                          
determine that the hearing provided plaintiff was woefully                       
inadequate.  The inadequacy of the hearing, along with the fact                  
that the board failed to provide plaintiff a clear and                           
substantive basis for its decision not to reemploy her as                        
required by R.C. 3319.11(G)(2), leaves plaintiff at a loss to                    
address, explain or defend against the reasons for nonrenewal,                   
whether to the school board or to a prospective employer.                        
    Given the General Assembly's use of the term "hearing" in                    
R.C. 3319.11(G)(3), (4) and (5), we can only conclude that the                   
legislature intended the term to be given its ordinary meaning,                  
to provide some measure of security to the nontenured teacher                    
faced with the possibility of nonrenewal of his or her teaching                  
contract.  Our conclusion is further compelled by the remedial                   
nature of these provisions.  R.C. 1.11.  Therefore, we hold                      
that the hearing provided teachers under limited contracts by                    
R.C. 3319.11(G)(3), (4) and (5) necessarily includes the                         
presentation of evidence, confrontation and examination of                       
witnesses and the review of the arguments of the parties.                        
    Based on all of the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of                    
the court of appeals and order defendant board of education to                   
reinstate plaintiff to a one-year extended limited contract and                  
to award plaintiff all compensation and benefits that she lost                   
as a result of the board's unlawful action, in accordance with                   
the fourth paragraph of the syllabus in Farmer, supra.                           
                                    Judgment reversed.                           
    Douglas, F.E. Sweeney and Pfeifer, JJ., concur.                              
    Moyer, C.J., Wright and Deshler, JJ., dissent.                               
    Dana A. Deshler, Jr., J., of the Tenth Appellate District,                   
sitting for Resnick, J.                                                          
FOOTNOTES:                                                                       
    1  R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) provides in part:                                      
    "Notwithstanding section 2506.04 of the Revised Code, the                    
court in an appeal under this division is limited to the                         
determination of procedural errors and to ordering the                           
correction of procedural errors and shall have no jurisdiction                   
to order a board to reemploy a teacher, except that the court                    
may order a board to reemploy a teacher in compliance with the                   
requirements of division (B), (C)(3), (D), or (E) of this                        
section when the court determines that evaluation procedures                     
have not been complied with pursuant to division (A) of section                  
3319.111 of the Revised Code or the board has not given the                      
teacher written notice on or before the thirtieth day of April                   
of its intention not to reemploy the teacher pursuant to                         
division (B), (C)(3), (D), or (E) of this section."  (Emphasis                   
added.)                                                                          
    2  R.C. 3319.11(G) provides in relevant part as follows:                     
    "(1) Any teacher receiving written notice of the intention                   
of a board of education not to reemploy him pursuant to                          
division (B), (C)(3), (D), or (E) of this section may, within                    
ten days of the date on which he received the notice, file with                  
the treasurer of the board of education a written demand for a                   
written statement describing the circumstances that led to the                   
board's intention not to reemploy the teacher.                                   
    "(2)  The treasurer of a board of education, on behalf of                    
the board, shall, within ten days of the date on which he                        
receives a written demand for a written statement pursuant to                    
division (G)(1) of this section, provide to the teacher a                        
written statement describing the circumstances that led to the                   
board's intention not to reemploy the teacher."                                  
    3  R.C. 3319.11(G) provides in pertinent part:                               
    "(3) Any teacher receiving a written statement describing                    
the circumstances that led to the board's intention not to                       
reemploy the teacher pursuant to division (G)(2) of this                         
section may, within five days of the date on which he received                   
the statement, file with the treasurer of the board of                           
education a written demand for a hearing before the board of                     
education pursuant to divisions (G)(4) to (6) of this section.                   
    "(4) The treasurer of the board of education *** shall ***                   
provide to the teacher a written notice setting forth the time,                  
date, and place of the hearing.  The board shall schedule and                    
conclude the hearing within forty days of the date on which the                  
treasurer of the board receives a written demand for a hearing                   
pursuant to division (G)(3) of this section.                                     
    "(5) Any hearing conducted pursuant to this division shall                   
be conducted by a majority of the members of the board of                        
education.  The hearing shall be held in executive session of                    
the board of education unless the board and the teacher agree                    
to hold the hearing in public.  The superintendent, assistant                    
superintendent, the teacher, and any person designated by                        
either party to take a record of the hearing may be present at                   
the hearing.  The board may be represented by counsel and the                    
teacher may be represented by counsel or a designee.  A record                   
of the hearing may be taken by either party at the expense of                    
the party taking the record."                                                    
    Moyer, C.J., dissenting.      "[A]n unambiguous statute                      
means what it says."  Hakim v. Kosydar (1977), 49 Ohio St.2d                     
161, 164, 3 O.O.3d 211, 213, 359 N.E.2d 1371, 1373 (citing                       
Chope v. Collins [1976], 48 Ohio St.2d 297, 300, 2 O.O.3d 442,                   
444, 358 N.E.2d 573, 575, fn. 2).  This maxim leads me to                        
conclude that R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) permits the reinstatement of a                  
limited contract teacher only when a court finds a violation of                  
R.C. 3319.111(A).  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.                          
    R.C. 3319.11 and 3319.111 are remedial in nature and                         
entitled to a liberal interpretation.  Nevertheless, even the                    
liberal interpretation of a statute does not justify a court in                  
reading into it a result that the language does not reasonably                   
imply.  Szekely v. Young (1963), 174 Ohio St. 213, 22 O.O.2d                     
214, 188 N.E.2d 424, paragraph two of the syllabus.  R.C.                        
3319.11(G)(7) states in pertinent part: "[T]he court in an                       
appeal under this division *** shall have no jurisdiction to                     
order a board to reemploy a teacher, except *** when the court                   
determines that evaluation procedures have not been complied                     
with pursuant to division (A) of section 3319.111 of the                         
Revised Code."  R.C. 3319.111 enumerates the procedural                          
requirements that school boards must follow in separate                          
divisions, (A) and (B).  I believe this separation was                           
intentional.  The clear import of the above-quoted language is                   
that the General Assembly intended the remedy of reinstatement                   
to be available only for violations of division (A), not for                     
violations of division (B).                                                      
    If the General Assembly had intended reinstatement to be an                  
available remedy for violations of division (B), it could have                   
done so, quite clearly, in two ways.  It could have deleted the                  
words "division (A) of" from the above-quoted portion of R.C.                    
3319.11(G)(7).  Else, it could have added the words "or (B)" to                  
the same clause.  Either method would have unequivocally made                    
violations of division (B) grounds for reinstatement.                            
    A court must interpret a statute so as to give effect to                     
every word in it.  See, e.g., E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Pub. Util.                      
Comm. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 295, 530 N.E.2d 875; State ex rel.                   
Bohan v. Indus. Comm. (1946), 147 Ohio St. 249, 34 O.O. 151, 70                  
N.E.2d 888.  The majority's interpretation effectively reads                     
the words "division (A) of" out of R.C. 3319.11(G)(7).  If the                   
General Assembly had intended reinstatement to be a remedy for                   
violations of R.C. 3319.111(B), it would have expressly said                     
so.  Because it did not, I respectfully dissent.                                 
    Wright and Deshler, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting                  
opinion.