Case Title: Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Cleary

Citation: 2001-Ohio-1326

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-09-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Cleary, 93 Ohio St.3d 191, 2001-
Ohio-1326] 
 
 
CLEVELAND BAR ASSOCIATION v. CLEARY. 
[Cite as Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Cleary (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 191.] 
Judges — Misconduct — Six-month suspension — Extending a sentencing quid 
pro quo to a pregnant defendant based on judge’s opposition to abortion 
— Judge acts in a manner “prejudicial to the administration of justice” 
within meaning of DR 1-102(A)(5), when. 
(No. 01-412 — Submitted May 30, 2001 — Decided September 19, 2001.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 00-22. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A judge acts in a manner “prejudicial to the administration of justice” within the 
meaning of DR 1-102(A)(5) when the judge engages in conduct that 
would appear to an objective observer to be unjudicial and prejudicial to 
the public esteem for the judicial office. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J.  The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
(“board”) of the Supreme Court has filed a certified report recommending that this 
court sanction the respondent, Patricia A. Cleary, Attorney Registration No. 
0024286, for acts of professional misconduct committed while Cleary was a 
sitting judge on the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.  For the reasons 
that follow, we adopt the board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
suspend Cleary from the practice of law for six months. 
I 
 
In August 1998, twenty-one-year-old Yuriko Kawaguchi appeared before 
Cleary and entered a guilty plea to one count of fifth-degree felony forgery 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
stemming from her use of a counterfeit credit card to purchase thousands of 
dollars worth of merchandise from Cleveland-area electronics stores.  Kawaguchi, 
a California resident and Japanese citizen, had traveled to Cleveland with two 
companions as part of a scheme to purchase electronics equipment with 
counterfeit credit cards from several stores nationwide.  In exchange for 
Kawaguchi’s guilty plea and her agreement to testify against her co-conspirators, 
the state nolled the remaining counts of its indictment against her.  The state had 
originally charged Kawaguchi with twenty-seven felony counts, including 
numerous theft counts and one count of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity.  
Cleary accepted Kawaguchi’s plea and scheduled the matter for sentencing at a 
later date. 
 
About two weeks before her sentencing hearing, Kawaguchi wrote a letter 
to Judge Cleary from the Cuyahoga County Jail.  In the letter, Kawaguchi 
revealed that she was pregnant, a fact she had learned two months after her arrest, 
and expressed a desire to obtain an abortion.  In the letter, she begged Judge 
Cleary either to “grant me probation and let me go home to have the abortion or 
let me bond out to have the procedure done in Cleveland.” 
 
On October 6, 1998, Kawaguchi appeared at her sentencing hearing with 
her attorney, Anthony Vegh.  In light of Kawaguchi’s lack of a prior criminal 
record and Kawaguchi’s compliance with the terms of her plea agreement, Vegh 
asked the court to “place her on probation and allow her to transfer that probation 
to California.”1  Neither Vegh nor Kawaguchi, who spoke on her own behalf, 
mentioned Kawaguchi’s pregnancy.  Following Kawaguchi’s statement to the 
court, however, Judge Cleary steered the hearing to the subject of Kawaguchi’s 
pregnancy and engaged in the following discussion with Kawaguchi and Vegh: 
                                                          
 
1. 
Effective July 1, 1996, “community control sanctions” replaced what had formerly been 
known as “probation” as a possible sentence under Ohio’s felony sentencing law.  Compare R.C. 
2929.15 with former R.C. 2951.02.  Vegh and Cleary testified during the hearing that attorneys 
and judges still use the term “probation” as a shorthand for community control sanctions. 
January Term, 2001 
3 
 
“THE COURT:  And would you be placing your child—if I place you on 
probation, there’s the problem of you serving probation here in the state of Ohio. 
 
“You also represent a flight risk, too, on the west coast, and you are not an 
American citizen. 
 
“Would you be placing your child up for adoption here in the state of Ohio 
or in California? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  At this time, I would be staying in the state of Ohio 
temporarily at a friend’s house.  I do hope that in the future I could go back and 
transfer back to California. 
 
“THE COURT:  With regard to your child, though, would you be placing 
your child or keeping your child? 
 
“I think you indicated in some of your letters to me, when you discussed 
this subject, what you would be doing with your child. 
 
“Would you be placing the child up for adoption here in Ohio? 
 
“I’m trying to work out my time frame if I would place you on probation. 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Well, honestly, your Honor, I’m pretty much 
fighting time right now. 
 
“THE COURT:  You are pretty much what? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  I’m fighting time right now.  This was an 
unwanted pregnancy. 
 
“THE COURT:  I understand that, but it happened. 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  Right.  Right.  And I have talked to the doctors, 
and I have talked to the social workers, and if I am released, I will be trying to 
have a procedure done. 
 
“THE COURT:  But if that doesn’t happen, if you are sentenced to an 
institution, or if you [are] placed on a term of probation, and it’s too late for you 
to have an abortion, what I am asking you is this: What are your plans in that 
regard? 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  It would be in the state of Ohio. 
 
“THE COURT:  Would you be placing the child up for adoption here in 
this state or would you be trying to keep your child? 
 
“THE DEFENDANT:  I would be giving it up for adoption. 
 
“THE COURT:  All right.  What I am going to do at this time, I’m 
sentencing you to the Ohio State Reformatory for Women at Marysville for six 
months, credit for time served, and costs are imposed in this case. 
 
“If you want to tell me that you would like to serve a term of probation up 
here in Cuyahoga County and that you have got someplace to stay, and you can 
sign up for Welfare and receive Medicare and place your child, if you would 
rather work that out, I’ll consider that as well. 
 
“So why don’t you discuss that with your lawyer and let me know what 
you want to do.  You can go in the lockup. 
 
“MR. VEGH:  Your Honor, I want to understand what you are suggesting. 
 
“THE COURT:  I’m saying that she is not having a second term abortion. 
 
“MR. VEGH:  You are making that contingent upon— 
 
“THE COURT:  It’s not contingent upon anything.  It’s based on all the 
factors before me as far as releasing her and as far as security. 
 
“MR. VEGH:  Your Honor, I don’t think that’s a valid term of— 
 
“THE COURT:  You are not in a position to criticize me. 
 
“MR. VEGH:  I’m not criticizing the Court.  I’m objecting. 
 
“THE COURT:  Which has no bearing on this case. 
 
“So go talk to your client or I’ll assign another counsel. 
 
“MR. VEGH:  I would like another counsel. 
 
“THE COURT:  You are removed from representation.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
After removing Vegh as counsel of record, Cleary summoned attorney 
Robert Steely, who was in the courtroom for a different matter, to step forward 
January Term, 2001 
5 
and represent Kawaguchi.  Based on what had just transpired, both Vegh and 
Steely understood Cleary to be offering a sentencing “quid pro quo.”  That is, if 
Kawaguchi agreed to have her baby, Cleary would sentence her to probation; if, 
however, Kawaguchi insisted on pursuing an abortion, Cleary would sentence her 
to a six-month prison term.  Steely confirmed his understanding of Judge Cleary’s 
intent during off-the-record discussions with her.  According to Steely, Cleary 
told him that she “cannot condone an abortion.”  Steely memorialized his 
understanding of the events at Kawaguchi’s sentencing in a memorandum he 
prepared for his file about two days after the sentencing hearing. 
 
The events of Kawaguchi’s sentencing hearing came to the attention of 
attorneys with the Ohio chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union.  
Kawaguchi met with ACLU attorneys and agreed to have them represent her in 
efforts to secure her release from incarceration.  On October 9, 1998, ACLU 
lawyers filed a motion in Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court to stay 
execution of Kawaguchi’s sentence so that Kawaguchi could be released from 
custody pending an appeal of her sentence.  As the judge assigned to Kawaguchi’s 
case, Cleary would have ordinarily heard the motion.  See Loc.R. 15(B) of the 
Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, General Division.  Cleary, 
however, was not in the courthouse on October 9, 1998, and the matter was 
therefore heard by Judge Lillian J. Greene, who was the acting administrative 
judge on that day. 
 
Before hearing the motion, Judge Greene asked Assistant Prosecuting 
Attorney William Caine to contact Cleary’s chambers and confirm Cleary’s 
unavailability.  Caine telephoned Cleary’s bailiff, Margaret Mazzeo, and asked 
whether Cleary was available for “a matter of some urgency.”  Mazzeo informed 
Caine that Cleary was unavailable that day and could not be reached.  Judge 
Greene then proceeded with a hearing on Kawaguchi’s motion.  After hearing the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
arguments of counsel, Judge Greene granted Kawaguchi’s motion and journalized 
an entry setting appellate bond in the amount of $15,000. 
 
On the afternoon of October 9, 1998, Mazzeo learned of Judge Greene’s 
order and contacted Cleary by telephone.  Cleary instructed Mazzeo to draft an 
order revoking Judge Greene’s entry and to sign Cleary’s name to it.  Cleary had 
never before asked Mazzeo (or anyone else) to sign Cleary’s name to any order.  
Mazzeo followed Cleary’s instructions and filed an entry revoking the bond that 
Judge Greene had previously granted.  The entry also set a new bond hearing for 
October 13, 1998. 
 
The bond hearing specified in Cleary’s entry never took place.  Before the 
scheduled hearing time, Cleary filed an entry denying Kawaguchi’s motion for 
bond pending appeal.  The entry stated that her decision was “based upon 
presentence report information indicating defendant is at risk of fleeing.”  In fact, 
the PSI contained no such information and instead suggested that Kawaguchi was 
a “good candidate” for probation.  Kawaguchi immediately petitioned the Eighth 
District Court of Appeals for an order granting bond pending appeal.  The court of 
appeals granted this motion and Kawaguchi was released from jail on the 
afternoon of October 13, 1998.  Kawaguchi looked into obtaining an abortion in 
the days following her release, only to learn that her pregnancy was too far 
advanced for legal abortion in Ohio.  Kawaguchi ultimately gave birth to a 
daughter in February 1999. 
 
In January 1999, while Kawaguchi’s appeal of her sentence was pending, 
Cleary accepted an invitation to speak in front of the congregation at the Church 
on the Rise in Westlake.  Cleary devoted much of the speech to discussing the 
Kawaguchi case and her sentencing decision.  Many of the details she revealed 
were misleading.  For example, Cleary told her audience that she “could have 
given [Kawaguchi] a few more years’ time if I had seen fit,” when, in fact, the 
maximum prison sentence she could have imposed for Kawaguchi’s fifth-degree 
January Term, 2001 
7 
felony was twelve months.  See R.C. 2929.14(A)(5).  She also told the 
congregation that, following the sentencing hearing, Vegh “immediately went to 
the Plain Dealer reporter * * * who I’m not on the best of terms with” even 
though she later admitted having no knowledge that Vegh had done so.  At yet 
another point in the speech, Cleary inaccurately blamed the ACLU attorneys for 
delaying Kawaguchi’s eventual release on appellate bond: 
 
“So, of course, they went to federal court, which was not legally 
appropriate.  This caused a week’s delay in time in having Ms. Kawaguchi 
released.  I’m just going over this time line to let you know that God works in 
very interesting ways and through a variety of people, including incompetence by 
lawyers.” 
 
While Kawaguchi’s lawyers did, in fact, seek habeas corpus relief in 
federal court before filing their motion for bond in state court, Cleary’s assertion 
that the federal filing caused “a week’s delay” was highly misleading.  
Kawaguchi’s attorneys filed the federal action on October 8, 1998, just one day 
before they filed the motion for appellate bond in state court (which Judge Greene 
granted).  Thus, Kawaguchi could have been released just one day after her 
attorneys filed (properly or not) in federal court but for Cleary’s later entry 
revoking Judge Greene’s order. 
 
In addition to telling a misleading version of the events surrounding 
Kawaguchi’s sentencing, Cleary talked at length about her struggle with 
Kawaguchi’s case and how she prayed for God to save “just this one baby.”  She 
also denigrated the ACLU lawyers representing Kawaguchi, referring to them in 
derogatory terms and equating them with “evil” forces: 
 
“Now, again, this is a 21-year old girl.  She’s got a couple of old harpies [2] 
from the ACLU that she’s living with, and they’re on her day in and day out.  So, 
                                                          
 
2. 
A “harpy” is “a predatory monster in chiefly classical mythology represented as having a 
woman’s head and the body and claws of a vulture and as being an instrument of divine 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
they—I know what’s happening, that they’re working on this girl and 
browbeating her into changing her mind or to steer her toward having an abortion. 
 
“That weekend I went to church, and I was so downhearted, and I’m 
already in the mindset of forgiving God for not pulling through on my request to 
save this child, and I’m telling God that I understand that the forces of evil in this 
world are strong. 
 
“And, I do believe in Satan, and I’ve had some of his workers in my 
courtroom, at least a few thoroughly evil, wicked people.  So, that has reinforced 
not only my belief in God but my belief in Satan.  I mean, that force is a real 
presence.” 
 
On April 17, 2000, the relator, Cleveland Bar Association, filed a four-
count disciplinary complaint against Cleary.  Count I alleged that Cleary’s 
behavior in sentencing Kawaguchi violated Canons 3(B)(5) (a judge shall perform 
duties without bias and prejudice) and 3(E)(1) (a judge shall disqualify himself or 
herself when the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned) of the Code 
of Judicial Conduct.  In Count II, the relator alleged that Cleary violated Canon 
3(B)(9) (judge shall not make any public comment on pending matter that may 
affect its outcome or impair its fairness) by talking publicly about the Kawaguchi 
case in her speech at the Church on the Rise.  Count III charged violations of 
Canons 3(B)(4) (judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous when performing 
official duties) and 3(B)(5) for Cleary’s on-the-record exchange with attorney 
Vegh at Kawaguchi’s sentencing hearing.  Finally, Count IV charged Cleary with 
a violation of Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) (duty to cooperate) for allegedly misleading 
members of the relator’s grievance committee during an investigation of her 
conduct. 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
vengeance.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986) 1035.  The term also refers to 
a shrewish woman or predatory person.  Id. 
January Term, 2001 
9 
 
A three-member panel of the board held an evidentiary hearing and, at the 
close of the relator’s evidence, dismissed Counts II, III, and IV on Cleary’s 
motion.  The panel denied Cleary’s motion to dismiss Count I, however, and also 
determined, without objection, that it would consider whether the conduct alleged 
in that count violated DR 1-102(A)(5) (conduct prejudicial to the administration 
of justice).  See Regulation 1(A), Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline. 
 
The panel concluded that Cleary’s conduct in sentencing Kawaguchi 
violated Canons 3(B)(5) and 3(E)(1) as charged in Count I of relator’s complaint.  
The panel specifically found that Cleary’s sentencing of Kawaguchi “was, in part, 
motivated by her personal beliefs regarding abortion, which rendered her unable 
to objectively apply the standards which she was required to follow in sentencing 
her.”  The panel also concluded that Cleary had violated DR 1-102(A)(5) by 
virtue of her conduct in the aftermath of Judge Greene’s order granting bond to 
Kawaguchi.  In mitigation, the panel noted that Cleary lacked any prior record of 
discipline and possessed no dishonest or selfish motive.  The panel acknowledged 
Cleary’s character and reputation as mitigating evidence and also noted in 
mitigation that Cleary had lost her judicial position in the November 2000 
election.  The panel determined, however, that these mitigating factors were 
outweighed by the harm caused to Kawaguchi, Cleary’s failure to acknowledge 
the wrongful nature of her conduct, and the panel’s finding that Cleary “made 
false and deceptive statements in her testimony before this panel in an attempt to 
exculpate herself from responsibility for her misconduct.”  Accordingly, the panel 
recommended a six-month suspension from the practice of law. 
 
The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.  It 
recommended, however, that Cleary be suspended for two years, with one year 
stayed, “in light of the damage done to the justice system and the panel’s finding 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
that this judicial officer did not tell the truth under oath.”  Cleary objects to the 
board’s findings and to the board’s recommended sanction. 
II 
 
Cleary complains that “[t]he Board’s findings * * *, which consistently 
ignore record evidence and isolate details from their broader context, cannot 
satisfy the ‘clear and convincing’ standard.”  Cleary emphasizes that the sentence 
she imposed for Kawaguchi’s crime (six months’ imprisonment with credit for 
time served) was a legal and reasonable sentence for a fifth-degree felony.  
Moreover, Cleary argues that the board’s theory for discipline—that she offered 
Kawaguchi a sentencing quid pro quo—is unsupported by the record and actually 
contradicted by evidence “ignored” by the board.  Cleary contends that the board 
disregarded considerable evidence that she intended to sentence Kawaguchi to 
prison all along and that any mention of “probation” at the sentencing hearing 
meant only that she would entertain a motion for “shock probation” after 
Kawaguchi had served thirty days in the penitentiary.3  Cleary also insists that the 
board should not have credited testimony from Vegh and Steely that they 
understood Cleary to be offering Kawaguchi a sentencing quid pro quo. 
                                                          
 
3. 
As a technical matter, we note that there was no such thing as “shock probation” at the 
time of Kawaguchi’s sentencing.  “Shock probation” existed under former R.C. 2947.061 and 
allowed the trial court, upon a defendant’s motion, to suspend further execution of a defendant’s 
sentence and place the defendant on probation after the defendant had served a statutorily 
prescribed period of time.  See 146 Ohio Laws, Part I, 116-117.  The General Assembly repealed 
the shock probation statute in Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136, 7809; shock 
probation is therefore not available for any offenses committed after July 1, 1996.  See State v. 
Coffman (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 125, 126, 742 N.E.2d 644, 646.  A “modification” of former R.C. 
2947.061 exists, however, at R.C. 2929.20, which allows a convicted defendant to file a motion 
for “judicial release.”  State v. Perry (Sept. 1, 2000), Hamilton App. Nos. C-000121, B-9704966, 
unreported, 2000 WL 1235949.  Under R.C. 2929.20(B), an eligible offender may ask the trial 
court for release from prison after serving part of his or her prison sentence (at least thirty days if 
the prison term was imposed for a fourth- or fifth-degree felony).  If the trial court grants the 
defendant’s motion, it orders the defendant released and imposes a community control sanction.  
R.C. 2929.20(I).  Although “judicial release” under R.C. 2929.20 is different from “shock 
probation” under former R.C. 2947.061, Cleary used these terms interchangeably. 
January Term, 2001 
11 
 
In disciplinary proceedings, the relator bears the burden of proving by 
clear and convincing evidence that the respondent has committed misconduct.  
Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Reid (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 327, 708 N.E.2d 193, 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  This court has defined “clear and convincing 
evidence” as “that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere 
‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty as is 
required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in 
the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be 
established.” Cross v. Ledford (1954), 161 Ohio St. 469, 53 O.O. 361, 120 N.E.2d 
118, paragraph three of the syllabus.  Cleary’s argument here appears to be that 
the panel and board should have believed her side of the story rather than the 
version told by the relator’s witnesses.  As this court has previously noted, 
however, “it is of no consequence that the board’s findings of fact are in 
contravention of the respondent’s or any other witness’s testimony.  ‘Where the 
evidence is in conflict, the trier of facts may determine what should be accepted 
as the truth and what should be rejected as false.’ “  Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Zingarelli (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 210, 217, 729 N.E.2d 1167, 1174, quoting Cross, 
161 Ohio St. at 478, 53 O.O. at 365, 120 N.E.2d at 123-124.  While this court is 
not bound by the findings of fact of the board and panel, see Reid at paragraph 
one of the syllabus, we give them some deference in light of the reality that the 
panel observed the witnesses firsthand.  See Zingarelli, 89 Ohio St.3d at 218, 729 
N.E.2d at 1174.  Although we will disregard the panel’s findings when the record 
weighs heavily against them, see Findlay/Hancock Cty. Bar Assn. v. Filkins 
(2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 1, 734 N.E.2d 764, this is not such a case. 
 
Despite Cleary’s arguments to the contrary, the sentencing hearing 
transcript supports the panel’s finding that Cleary offered an improper sentencing 
quid pro quo based on her moral opposition to abortion.  Cleary expressly stated 
on the record that probation was a possibility if Kawaguchi chose to place the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
baby for adoption.  Nowhere in the sentencing transcript, however, does Cleary 
give any other alternative for avoiding prison time.  And Cleary, when asked by 
Vegh for an explanation of the sentencing options, stated bluntly, “I’m saying that 
she is not having a second term abortion.”  Although Cleary testified that she 
meant by this comment only to emphasize that Kawaguchi would be going to 
prison, and therefore not have the opportunity to obtain an abortion, the statement 
strongly connotes a sentencing quid pro quo, particularly when considered in the 
context in which she said it. 
 
Steely’s testimony about his off-the-record discussions with Cleary 
following the sentencing hearing provides further evidence that Cleary meant 
exactly what she said at the sentencing hearing: that Kawaguchi could receive 
probation if she chose to have her baby but would go to prison if she wanted to 
obtain an abortion.  In one of these conversations, Cleary confirmed Steely’s 
understanding of Kawaguchi’s sentencing options when “the Judge reiterated to 
me that the young lady, if she insisted on having an abortion, was going to prison, 
and if she would give the child up for adoption, probation was available.”  Steely 
also testified that, in a separate conversation, Cleary told him that, because of her 
background, she “cannot condone an abortion.” 
 
Cleary makes much of the fact that the panel gave considerable weight to 
Vegh’s 
and 
Steely’s 
hearing 
testimony, 
while 
ignoring 
Steely’s 
“contemporaneous” memorandum dictated two days after the sentencing hearing.  
Cleary complains that Steely’s memorandum contains no reference to any off-the-
record statement about a quid pro quo.  Because of this inconsistency, Cleary 
claims that any reliance on Steely’s testimony is inherently suspect.  We are 
unpersuaded by Cleary’s assertion because we see no logical inconsistency 
between Steely’s memorandum and his testimony.  Steely testified at the hearing 
that Judge Cleary told him off the record that if Kawaguchi “insisted on having an 
abortion, [she] was going to go to prison, and if she would give the child up for 
January Term, 2001 
13 
adoptions [sic], probation was available.”  In his memorandum, Steely stated, “I 
explained to Yuriko that the Judge had indicated that if she would agree to carry 
the child and put it up for adoption, the Judge would put her on probation, the 
probation could be here or in California, and she would not have to go to prison.”  
While the memorandum does not explicitly refer to an off-the-record discussion 
with Cleary, the panel may have quite reasonably concluded that it implicitly did 
so.  Thus, we find no merit to Cleary’s assertion that the panel gave undue weight 
to Steely’s testimony. 
 
The panel had further basis for rejecting Cleary’s explanation that she was 
inviting Kawaguchi to file a motion for “shock probation” during her prison term 
and not offering a quid pro quo.  Nowhere in the record does the phrase “shock 
probation” appear, despite the fact that Cleary, an experienced common pleas 
judge, was well aware of the difference between so-called “shock probation” and 
ordinary probation (i.e., community control sanctions).  And neither Vegh nor 
Steely, both of whom are experienced in criminal practice, understood Cleary to 
be referring to shock probation.  Steely testified that Cleary made no specific 
reference to “shock probation” until an off-the-record discussion that took place 
only after Cleary had imposed the prison sentence.  Moreover, Cleary’s own 
bailiff, Mazzeo, did not corroborate her explanation.  Mazzeo testified that she 
usually recorded a notation in her file whenever Cleary instructed defense counsel 
that she would consider a motion for shock probation.  She made no such notation 
relating to Kawaguchi’s sentencing. 
 
Cleary also emphasizes one line of the sentencing hearing transcript, in 
which she told Kawaguchi, “I’m trying to work out my time frame if I would 
place you on probation.”  Cleary contends that her use of the phrase “time frame” 
can only be a reference to shock probation, fatally undermining the board’s 
finding of a sentencing quid pro quo.  We cannot conclude, however, that this one 
phrase renders the board’s findings defective when so much of Cleary’s conduct 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
clearly and convincingly demonstrates that she did, in fact, offer Kawaguchi a 
sentencing quid pro quo.  The mention of a “time frame” comes in the context of 
Cleary’s asking Kawaguchi whether she would keep her child or place the child 
for adoption in Ohio.  At best, it is unclear what Cleary means.  But rather than 
indicating an offer of shock probation, Cleary’s statement that she is “trying to 
work out my time frame” is more reasonably construed as an inquiry about when 
she could expect Kawaguchi to give birth. 
 
In light of the evidence in the record supporting the allegation that Cleary 
extended a sentencing quid pro quo, we reject Cleary’s claim that the board’s 
findings are not supported by clear and convincing evidence.  We accordingly 
adopt the board’s findings of fact. 
III 
 
Cleary argues that, even if she was motivated by her moral opposition to 
abortion in sentencing Kawaguchi, the board’s conclusion that she committed 
misconduct as alleged in Count I is still incorrect.  Specifically, Cleary contends 
that (1) the board has not shown “bias or prejudice” within the meaning of Canon 
3(B)(5), (2) she was not required to disqualify herself under Canon 3(E)(1), and 
(3) she did not engage in any conduct “prejudicial to the administration of justice” 
within the meaning of DR 1-102(A)(5).  We find no merit to Cleary’s arguments. 
Canon 3(B)(5) 
 
Canon 3(B)(5) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides: 
 
“A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice.  A judge 
shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias 
or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, 
gender, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or 
socioeconomic status, and shall not permit staff, court officials, and others subject 
to the judge’s direction and control to do so.” 
January Term, 2001 
15 
 
The term “bias or prejudice,” when used in reference to a judge, “implies a 
hostile feeling or spirit of ill will or undue friendship or favoritism toward one of 
the litigants or his attorney, with the formation of a fixed anticipatory judgment 
on the part of the judge, as contradistinguished from an open state of mind which 
will be governed by the law and the facts.”  State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt 
(1956), 164 Ohio St. 463, 58 O.O. 315, 132 N.E.2d 191, paragraph four of the 
syllabus; see, also, In re Disqualification of Cleary (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 1220, 
1222-1223, 723 N.E.2d 1106, 1108.  That a judge has a general opinion about a 
legal or social matter relating to a pending case does not automatically render a 
judge biased or prejudiced within the meaning of the judicial canons.  Shaman, 
Lubet & Alfini, Judicial Conduct and Ethics (3 Ed.2000) 113, Section 4.04.  A 
judge is free to hold his or her own personal beliefs, so long as those attitudes, 
prejudices, or beliefs are not translated into action or inaction that results in a 
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct or of law.  In re Inquiry Concerning a 
Judge (Fla.1978), 357 So.2d 172, 177-178. 
 
We agree with the board that Cleary violated Canon 3(B)(5) by offering 
Kawaguchi an improper sentencing quid pro quo.  Cleary’s statements at the 
sentencing hearing about granting probation displayed partiality toward certain 
conduct that Cleary thought morally appropriate.  Cleary made clear that 
Kawaguchi would not receive probation if she intended to terminate her 
pregnancy, a possibility that Kawaguchi revealed during the sentencing hearing 
and in a previous letter to Cleary.  Thus, Cleary exhibited partiality in her 
sentencing choice based on whether Kawaguchi acted in accordance with Cleary’s 
personal views.  Such display of partiality toward certain conduct injected a bias 
and prejudice in Kawaguchi’s sentencing proceeding that should not be tolerated.  
Cf. Pa. Supreme Court Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd. v. Fink (1987), 516 Pa. 
208, 228-231, 532 A.2d 358, 368-369 (imposing discipline on a judge for 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
favoring parties based on their statements of religious belief, creating an 
appearance of religiously biased treatment in court). 
 
Cleary presents a number of arguments in support of her claim that her 
conduct in sentencing Kawaguchi cannot be bias or prejudice warranting 
discipline under the Code of Judicial Conduct.  Cleary first emphasizes that 
Kawaguchi’s six-month prison sentence was appropriate based on factors in the 
record and was therefore an appropriate exercise of judicial discretion.  But the 
fact that Kawaguchi’s prison sentence fell within the statutory range for fifth-
degree felonies and is objectively reasonable in relation to the facts of 
Kawaguchi’s case does not automatically legitimize Cleary’s conduct.4  See, e.g., 
In re Graham (Fla.1993), 620 So.2d 1273, 1275 (although sentence imposed was 
within legal range, the judge’s conduct in imposing it was improper when the 
record showed that judge was motivated by his own perception that defendant 
took advantage of political favoritism in the sheriff’s office); In re King (1991), 
409 Mass. 590, 601-602, 568 N.E.2d 588, 594 (even though bail decisions are 
within trial court’s discretion, discipline was warranted when judge set high bail 
for four black defendants as retaliation for black voters’ having overwhelmingly 
rejected judge’s brother in a gubernatorial primary election).  Even if we accept 
the notion that a six-month sentence was an appropriate punishment for 
Kawaguchi’s crime, Cleary remains subject to discipline for offering an 
inappropriate sentencing quid pro quo to Kawaguchi. 
 
Cleary next argues that she cannot be disciplined for being biased or 
prejudiced because there has been no showing that any bias or prejudice she 
                                                          
 
4. 
The sentence Cleary handed down was not “legal” in the true sense.  The Eighth District 
Court of Appeals, in a split decision, vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, finding 
that Cleary had not followed relevant sections of the felony sentencing statutes.  State v. 
Kawaguchi (2000), 137 Ohio App.3d 597, 739 N.E.2d 392.  Specifically, the court of appeals 
found that “the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to meet the statutory mandate 
of R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(a) by providing a finding that gives its reasons for the imposition of a term 
of incarceration for a felony of the fifth degree.”  Id. at 609, 739 N.E.2d at 400. 
January Term, 2001 
17 
harbored was “extrajudicial.”  Under this so-called “extrajudicial source” 
doctrine, the only “bias” recognized as improper is that which stems from a 
source outside the judicial proceedings giving rise to the claim of bias.  Liteky v. 
United States (1994), 510 U.S. 540, 550-551, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1155, 127 L.Ed.2d 
474, 487-488; see, also, United States v. Grinnell Corp. (1966), 384 U.S. 563, 
583, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 1710, 16 L.Ed.2d 778, 793.  Cleary’s extrajudicial source 
argument is also meritless.  The allegations of bias in this case are premised upon 
Cleary’s improper extension of a sentencing quid pro quo, which was based on 
her personal moral stand against abortion.  A trial ruling, such as the sentencing 
decision in Kawaguchi’s case, may be considered to be the product of judicial 
bias if based on improper extrajudicial motives or if “it is so extreme as to display 
clear inability to render fair judgment.”  Liteky, 510 U.S. at 545, 551, 114 S.Ct. at 
1152, 1155, 127 L.Ed.2d at 484-485, 488. 
 
Cleary also invokes this court’s decision in State v. Arnett (2000), 88 Ohio 
St.3d 208, 724 N.E.2d 793, as support for the proposition that her sentencing 
decision is unworthy of discipline.  In Arnett, this court decided whether a trial 
judge’s reference to Biblical text rendered a criminal defendant’s sentence 
improper.  The trial judge in Arnett stated during the defendant’s sentencing 
hearing that she had consulted a passage from the Book of Matthew in helping her 
decide the appropriate sentence for pandering obscenity and multiple counts of 
child rape.  This court did not find that the trial judge’s reference to the Bible 
warranted reversal of the defendant’s sentence.  We held that the judge’s 
reference to the Bible “constituted a permissible exercise of her discretion” 
because the judge merely used the Biblical passage to guide her on how much 
weight she accorded to a statutory sentencing factor, i.e., the age of the victim.  
Id. at 216, 724 N.E.2d at 800; see, also, R.C. 2929.12(B)(1).  We also found no 
due process violation in the trial judge’s consideration of the Bible in her 
sentencing decision because the record failed to show that the judge’s personal 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
religious principles were the primary basis for the sentencing decision.  88 Ohio 
St.3d at 221-222, 724 N.E.2d at 803-804.  Rather, “[t]he Bible was but one factor, 
among many, that supported this judge’s legally unremarkable decision to assign 
significant weight to the seriousness of Arnett’s offenses against young victims.”  
Id. at 221-222, 724 N.E.2d at 804. 
 
Cleary equates her conduct with that of the trial judge in Arnett, 
contending, “Consistent with the law (which did not require otherwise) and her 
personal beliefs, Cleary did not take Kawaguchi’s desire for an abortion into 
account as an overriding mitigating factor.”  She therefore argues that her 
decision should be “treated no differently” than the Arnett judge’s decision. 
 
Cleary’s reliance on Arnett is misplaced for a number of reasons.  First, 
Cleary’s method of framing the issue misses the point.  We are not sanctioning 
Cleary for failing to consider Kawaguchi’s desire for an abortion a “mitigating 
factor”; rather, we are imposing discipline for Cleary’s improper extension of a 
sentencing quid pro quo, which conditioned the possibility of probation on 
Kawaguchi choosing to have her child rather than obtain an abortion.  If Cleary 
had, in good faith, concluded from her judicial deliberations that prison was an 
appropriate sentence, then Canon 3(B)(5) would not have been implicated by her 
decision to sentence Kawaguchi to a prison term.  But Cleary’s offer of probation 
as an inducement for Kawaguchi to give birth reflected a partiality toward persons 
choosing to act in accordance with Cleary’s personal beliefs regarding abortion.  
Moreover, Cleary’s method of framing the issue, i.e., in terms of whether she was 
required to treat Kawaguchi’s desire for an abortion as a “mitigating factor,” finds 
no support in the record.  There was no mention at the sentencing hearing of 
either Kawaguchi’s pregnancy or desire for an abortion until Cleary herself 
brought up the subject.  The events of the sentencing hearing belie any claim that 
Kawaguchi or her counsel tried to use Kawaguchi’s desire to obtain an abortion as 
a mitigating factor in sentencing. 
January Term, 2001 
19 
 
Apart from Cleary’s inaccurate characterization of the issue, her reliance 
on Arnett is further misplaced because Arnett is not the dispositive force she 
claims it to be.  For one thing, Arnett was not a disciplinary matter and did not 
decide whether a judge’s use of personal beliefs in sentencing a defendant could 
constitute bias or prejudice under the Code of Judicial Conduct.  And although we 
cited Canon 3(B)(5) as a “cautionary reminder” to courts, we did not imply the 
presence or absence of a disciplinary violation in that case.  Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 
at 222, 724 N.E.2d at 804.  For another thing, Arnett is readily distinguishable as a 
matter of substantive law.  In Arnett, the trial judge was required under the felony 
sentencing law to consider the age of the victim as a factor in deciding the 
appropriate sentence.  Id. at 214, 724 N.E.2d at 798.  The judge in Arnett used a 
passage of Biblical verse to guide her in a determination of how much weight to 
give to this statutory factor.  Id. at 215, 724 N.E.2d at 799.  In this case, however, 
clear and convincing evidence establishes that Cleary used a nonstatutory 
sentencing factor—her antiabortion beliefs—as a reason for offering Kawaguchi a 
sentencing quid pro quo.  The only option Cleary gave Kawaguchi to avoid prison 
was an agreement to have the child rather than obtain an abortion, exhibiting 
Cleary’s inclination to alter the sentence she would otherwise give based on her 
antiabortion bias. 
 
We accordingly adopt the board’s finding that Cleary’s conduct in 
sentencing Kawaguchi violated Canon 3(B)(5). 
Canon 3(E)(1) 
 
Cleary also objects to the board’s conclusion that she violated Canon 
3(E)(1), which states that “[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a 
proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”   
Cleary contends that her personal antiabortion beliefs do not provide a sufficient 
basis upon which to question her impartiality in presiding over Kawaguchi’s case.  
See, e.g., United States v. Norton (C.A.6, 1983), 700 F.2d 1072, 1076 (judge’s  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
general statements reflecting prevailing societal attitudes did not require 
disqualification).  We reject Cleary’s contention, however, because we are 
convinced that Cleary should have at least disqualified herself from ruling upon 
Kawaguchi’s postsentencing motion for bond. 
 
The episode at the sentencing hearing, in which Cleary offered probation 
if Kawaguchi had her baby, gave the appearance that Cleary had sentenced 
Kawaguchi to prison to prevent her from having an abortion.  Indeed, this was 
how Attorney Steely, a disinterested observer until Cleary summoned him 
forward to replace Attorney Vegh, interpreted Cleary’s behavior during 
Kawaguchi’s sentencing.  “A judge’s mode of articulating a basis for decision 
may exhibit such a degree of antagonism or other offensive conduct that a single 
incident would indicate that impartial judgment is not reasonably possible.”  In re 
Hocking (1996), 451 Mich. 1, 13, 546 N.W.2d 234, 240.  Here, Cleary’s conduct 
at sentencing raised a genuine question about her impartiality in ruling upon 
Kawaguchi’s motion for bond. 
 
Cleary’s behavior on the day she countermanded Judge Greene’s order 
granting bond raised further questions about her impartiality.  By all accounts, 
Cleary was away from the courthouse and had declared herself unavailable on the 
day Kawaguchi filed her motion for bond pending appeal.  Yet Cleary, in an 
action she admits was unprecedented during her tenure on the bench, instructed 
Mazzeo by telephone to prepare an order countermanding Judge Greene’s order 
and to sign Cleary’s name to it.  By acting in this admittedly extraordinary 
manner, Cleary appeared to give Kawaguchi’s case special scrutiny, motivated by 
a personal desire to prevent Kawaguchi from obtaining an abortion upon being 
released on bond. 
 
Cleary justifies her action by emphasizing that the assistant prosecutor 
who inquired as to her availability on the day of the bond motion did not 
specifically mention the Kawaguchi matter.  She further notes that she specifically 
January Term, 2001 
21 
instructed Mazzeo to keep her apprised of anything happening in the Kawaguchi 
case.  But these purported justifications actually support the board’s conclusion 
that Cleary violated Canon 3(E)(1).  By insisting that she was available to deny 
Kawaguchi’s motion for appellate bond when she was otherwise unavailable for 
any other matters that may have come before her that day, Cleary brought her 
impartiality into question. 
 
We therefore adopt the board’s finding that Cleary violated Canon 
3(E)(1). 
DR 1-102(A)(5) 
 
Cleary challenges the board’s finding that she violated DR 1-102(A)(5) by 
her actions following Judge Greene’s order granting Kawaguchi’s motion for 
appellate bond.  Cleary notes that this court has not precisely defined “conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.”  She contends, however, that this 
court has generally limited DR 1-102(A)(5) “to truly extraordinary conduct that 
violates clear, well-established statutes or rules and directly impedes a court 
proceeding.”  Cleary argues that none of her acts following Judge Greene’s order 
qualifies under this standard.  We reject Cleary’s arguments and adopt the board’s 
findings. 
 
Cleary errs in saying that we have limited DR 1-102(A)(5) to 
extraordinary illegal conduct.  In two cases, for example, this court found that 
judges violated DR 1-102(A)(5) for conduct that was improper but not necessarily 
of the venal, dishonest, or illegal nature focused on by Cleary.  See Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Ferreri (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 456, 727 N.E.2d 908 (judge violated DR 
1-102[A][5] by making improper ex parte contact); Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Mestemaker (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 92, 676 N.E.2d 870 (judge violated DR 1-
102[A][5] by making derogatory remarks based on litigant’s national origin and 
by other instances of poor judicial temperament).  We therefore reject any claim 
that we should limit our application of DR 1-102(A)(5) as Cleary suggests. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
Cleary correctly asserts that this court has not precisely defined “conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice” for purposes of DR 1-102(A)(5).  As 
the Supreme Court of Minnesota has observed, however, DR 1-102(A)(5) is 
sufficiently well defined because it “do[es] no more than reflect the fundamental 
principle of professional responsibility that an attorney * * * has a duty to deal 
fairly with the court and the client.”  In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct 
Against N.P. (Minn.1985), 361 N.W.2d 386, 395; see, also, State v. Nelson 
(1972), 210 Kan. 637, 640, 504 P.2d 211, 214 (“It cannot be seriously contended 
that ‘prejudicial’ does not sufficiently define the degree of conduct which is 
expected of an attorney”).  As applied to our judiciary, we find it beyond dispute 
that a judge has a similar duty under DR 1-102(A)(5) to deal fairly with attorneys 
and litigants who come before the court.  Accordingly, we hold that a judge acts 
in a manner “prejudicial to the administration of justice” within the meaning of 
DR 1-102(A)(5) when the judge engages in conduct that would appear to an 
objective observer to be unjudicial and prejudicial to the public esteem for the 
judicial office.  See Broadman v. Comm. on Judicial Performance (1998), 18 
Cal.4th 1079, 1092, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 415, 959 P.2d 715, 722; In re Kelly 
(1987), 225 Neb. 583, 591, 407 N.W.2d 182, 187; In re Wright (1985), 313 N.C. 
495, 329 S.E.2d 668. 
 
Against this standard, Cleary’s conduct following Judge Greene’s order 
granting Kawaguchi bond pending appeal violates DR 1-102(A)(5).  By her own 
admission, Cleary took extraordinary action to countermand an entry of the acting 
administrative judge, despite having declared herself to be otherwise unavailable 
for judicial duty.  To an objective observer, Cleary appeared to go out of her way 
to hamper Kawaguchi’s efforts to obtain legal relief, in the form of an appellate 
bond, which may have allowed Kawaguchi to terminate her pregnancy.  
Moreover, even though the board did not find expressly that Cleary’s extension of 
a sentencing quid pro quo itself violated DR 1-102(A)(5), we find that Cleary’s 
January Term, 2001 
23 
conduct in that respect also constituted conduct prejudicial to the administration 
of justice.  Cleary’s behavior at the sentencing hearing, particularly when viewed 
in conjunction with her comments in her Church on the Rise speech, exhibited a 
bias unrelated to the merits of Kawaguchi’s case and was therefore damaging to 
the integrity of the judiciary. 
 
We accordingly adopt the conclusion of the board that Cleary’s actions 
violated DR 1-102(A)(5). 
IV 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we adopt the board’s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.  We also adopt the board’s findings in aggravation and 
mitigation.  We depart, however, from the board’s recommendation of the 
appropriate sanction for Cleary’s conduct.  Even though the panel deemed a six-
month suspension appropriate, the board recommended that Cleary be suspended 
from the practice of law for two years, with one year stayed.  We consider the 
board’s recommendation unduly harsh and instead adopt the sanction 
recommended by the panel. 
 
We find Cleary’s conduct comparable to that of the respondent in 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoague (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 321, 725 N.E.2d 1108.  In 
Hoague, we imposed a six-month suspension, with the entire six months stayed, 
against a municipal court judge who “misused the authority of his judicial office 
in an attempt to achieve his personal goal of reprimanding persons he believed 
were guilty of reckless driving.”  Id. at 323, 725 N.E.2d at 1110.  Similarly, in this 
case, it is apparent from the record that Cleary misused her judicial office in an 
attempt to achieve her personal goal of ensuring that Kawaguchi did not obtain an 
abortion.  Accordingly, as in Hoague, we find a six-month suspension from the 
practice of law to be the appropriate sanction.  Unlike in Hoague, however, we 
decline to stay any part of Cleary’s suspension in light of the board’s finding that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
Cleary made false and deceptive statements to the panel in an attempt to exculpate 
herself. 
 
Cleary is hereby suspended from the practice of law for six months.  Costs 
are taxed to the respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J., dissenting.  Respectfully, I dissent.  This 
disciplinary action stems from respondent’s handling of the sentencing and 
postsentencing activities involved in the Kawaguchi criminal proceedings.  The 
board found that during these proceedings, respondent offered defendant 
Kawaguchi an improper sentencing quid pro quo—prison if she sought an 
abortion, probation if she did not have an abortion.  Based in large part upon this 
finding, the majority concludes that respondent has violated Canon 3(B)(5) (by 
acting with bias or prejudice), Canon 3(E)(1) (by not disqualifying herself where 
her impartiality could reasonably be questioned), and DR 1-102(A)(5) (by acting 
in a manner prejudicial to the administration of justice). 
 
Contrary to the majority, I do not believe the relator has proven that there 
was a sentencing quid pro quo or that respondent’s personal beliefs caused her to 
be biased or partial in overseeing the Kawaguchi proceedings.  Even though I 
would find that respondent has violated one of the three charges, namely DR 1-
102(A)(5), in my opinion, the facts of this case do not warrant a six-month 
suspension.  Instead, I believe the more appropriate sanction would be a public 
reprimand. 
 
It is fundamental that in disciplinary proceedings, the relator must prove 
the facts necessary to establish an ethical violation by clear and convincing 
evidence.  Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Reid (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 327, 708 N.E.2d 
January Term, 2001 
25 
193, paragraph two of the syllabus.  Under this stringent standard, the relator must 
produce sufficient evidence to establish in the mind of the trier of fact a “firm 
belief or conviction of the facts sought to be established.”  Cross v. Ledford 
(1954), 161 Ohio St. 469, 53 O.O. 361, 120 N.E.2d 118, paragraph three of the 
syllabus.  I do not believe the relator has satisfied this burden with respect to 
proving a violation of Canon 3(B)(5) or 3(E)(1). 
 
Canon 3(B)(5) provides that a judge shall perform judicial duties without 
bias or prejudice.  The panel found that respondent violated this Canon because 
her sentencing of Kawaguchi “was, in part, motivated by her personal beliefs 
regarding abortion, which rendered her unable to objectively apply the standards 
which she was required to follow in sentencing her.”  The majority agreed with 
this conclusion, finding that respondent’s antiabortion beliefs caused her to offer 
Kawaguchi an improper sentencing quid pro quo.  However, in my opinion, the 
record is insufficient to provide clear and convincing evidence to support this 
finding or the conclusion that respondent’s bias against abortion caused her to 
impose an unfair sentence on Kawaguchi. 
 
With respect to the issue of whether respondent offered Kawaguchi a 
sentencing quid pro quo, respondent has been adamant in her position that she 
never intended to offer Kawaguchi immediate probation in exchange for her 
assurance that she would not seek an abortion.  While conceding that she could 
have done a better job with the terminology she used at the sentencing hearing, 
respondent insists that she always intended to impose a custodial sentence on 
Kawaguchi.  Even at the sentencing hearing, respondent stated emphatically that 
the sentence she was imposing was not contingent upon anything but was based 
on all the factors before her, including her perception of Kawaguchi as a flight 
risk. 
 
Nevertheless, in upholding the board’s finding of a sentencing quid pro 
quo, the majority rejects this explanation and instead relies on certain testimony, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
while ignoring other vital portions of the sentencing transcript and record.  When 
the entire record is read, it becomes evident to me that the words used by 
respondent are subject to varying interpretations and that the explanations given 
by respondent are reasonable. 
 
The sentencing transcript itself is replete with ambiguities.  In several 
instances, respondent said things that could be easily interpreted in her favor.  For 
instance, the parties dispute what respondent meant when she told Kawaguchi at 
the sentencing hearing, “I’m trying to work out my time frame if I would place 
you on probation.”  Respondent explained that when she made this remark, she 
was trying to work out dates in her mind to determine whether she could grant 
Kawaguchi shock probation so that her child would not have to be born in the 
penitentiary.  Although respondent did not use the word “shock” when she 
referred to probation, she testified that this was her intent.  Kawaguchi’s attorney, 
Anthony Vegh, testified that he did not understand what respondent meant by this 
remark.  The majority also acknowledges that “it is unclear what Cleary means” 
by this statement.  Nevertheless, the majority somehow concludes that “rather 
than indicating an offer of shock probation, Cleary’s statement that she is ‘trying 
to work out my time frame’ is more reasonably construed as an inquiry about 
when she could expect Kawaguchi to give birth.”  The majority’s conclusion on 
this point is weak and is based on evidence that is certainly not sufficient to 
satisfy the clear and convincing standard. 
 
Another ambiguous remark the majority relies on as further proof of a 
sentencing quid quo pro is respondent’s statement “I’m saying that she is not 
having a second term abortion.”  When read in context, this remark, albeit a blunt 
one, could very well be interpreted to mean what respondent suggests—that she 
was not going to reduce the sentence simply because Kawaguchi was pregnant. 
 
The majority also places great weight on the testimony of attorney Robert 
Steely to support its quid-pro-quo theory and as proof of respondent’s bias and 
January Term, 2001 
27 
partiality.  Steely testified before the panel that he had an off-the-record 
discussion with respondent in which she offered Kawaguchi a sentencing quid pro 
quo.  However, this testimony, which was given twenty-six months after the 
sentencing hearing, is called into question by Steely’s own memorandum written 
two days after the hearing.  Although this memorandum refers to a possible 
sentencing quid pro quo, it merely reflects Steely’s subjective understanding of 
what respondent meant at the sentencing hearing, rather than what respondent 
expressly stated.  The memorandum contains no explicit reference to an off-the-
record offer of a sentencing quid pro quo.  To the contrary, the memorandum is 
consistent with respondent’s position that she was simply proposing shock 
probation.  According to the memorandum, when Kawaguchi was in lockup, 
Steely was told that the original sentence would stand but that shock probation 
would be granted if Steely filed a motion. 
 
The majority acknowledges that the memorandum does not explicitly refer 
to any off-the-record discussion.  Nevertheless, the majority concludes that “the 
panel may have quite reasonably concluded that it implicitly did so.”  This 
conclusion is a weak one and is simply not supported by the memorandum itself. 
 
Thus, based on the entire record, I do not believe that there was proof by 
clear and convincing evidence of a sentencing quid pro quo.  Therefore, I would 
also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that respondent was biased in 
sentencing Kawaguchi.  The parties stipulated that the sentence imposed was 
within the bounds of law.  In fact, respondent sentenced Kawaguchi to the 
minimum six-month term of imprisonment, whereas her accomplices were 
sentenced to six years in prison.  Thus, the sentence itself was fundamentally fair. 
 
Although the remarks made by respondent may be considered intemperate, 
in my opinion there is no showing that the fairness of the proceeding was 
undermined by respondent’s personal beliefs.  Although respondent may have 
been emotional during the sentencing of Kawaguchi, I do not believe that her 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
reaction proves that the sentence she imposed was based in part on her being 
biased or prejudiced.  As stated by one court, “the mere fact a judge has an 
emotional reaction does not demonstrate that the judge is biased or prejudiced.”  
Cook v. Indiana (Ind.App.1993), 612 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (trial judge who cried 
during sentencing hearing found not to be biased). 
 
Furthermore, contrary to the majority, I believe that State v. Arnett (2000), 
88 Ohio St.3d 208, 724 N.E.2d 793, supports respondent’s position.  Although the 
Arnett decision was not a disciplinary action, its rationale is persuasive in this 
case.  In Arnett, we held that the judge’s reference to the Bible did not add an 
impermissible factor to her sentencing decision.  Id. at 215, 724 N.E.2d at 799.  
Likewise, in this case, I do not believe that respondent’s antiabortion statements 
showed that she was motivated to impose the six-month sentence on Kawaguchi.  
Consequently, for all the above reasons, I would not find a violation of Canon 
3(B)(5). 
 
Nor would I find that relator has proven by clear and convincing evidence 
that respondent has violated Canon 3(E)(1), requiring judicial disqualification 
when impartiality might reasonably be questioned.  The majority believes that 
because of her antiabortion beliefs, respondent should have disqualified herself 
from ruling upon the postsentencing motion for bond.  However, the fact that 
respondent countermanded an order made in a case she was assigned to is not 
tantamount to her acting with bias or prejudice.  It was well within respondent’s 
authority to countermand an order made in her absence in connection with a case 
assigned to her docket.  See Cuyahoga C.P. Loc.R. 15(B), which states:  “It shall 
be the duty of the assigned judge to handle all court activity, including motions, 
emergency matters, case management conferences, pretrials, trials, and any post 
trial matters associated with the cases assigned to the docket.”  Since I do not 
believe that respondent acted improperly or with partiality in this regard, I would 
reject the board’s finding that respondent violated Canon 3(E)(1). 
January Term, 2001 
29 
 
However, since respondent’s overall conduct could appear to an objective 
observer to be unjudicial, I would uphold the DR 1-102(A)(5) violation.  
Nevertheless, I believe that the appropriate sanction for this type of violation is a 
public reprimand. 
 
DOUGLAS and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in the foregoing 
dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Thomas P. Meaney, Jr. and Burt J. Fulton, for relator. 
 
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Robert C. Weber, Robert P. Ducatman, 
Geoffrey J. Ritts, Tracy K. Stratford and Matthew A. Kairis, for respondent. 
 
Christopher A. Ferrara, in support of respondent, for amicus curiae 
American Catholic Lawyers Association, Inc. 
__________________