Case Title: PATRICIA MICHAELIS v. STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 04-73

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-07-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
PATRICIA MICHAELIS v. STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 80115 P.3d 1098Case Number: 04-73Decided: 07/15/2005
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
PATRICIA 
MICHAELIS,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCarbonCounty

The 
Honorable Kenneth E. Stebner, Judge, Retired

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Ryan 
R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Roden.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric Johnson, Director, Prosecution 
Assistance Program; and Joseph D. Findley, Student Intern.  Argument by Mr. 
Findley.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, VOIGT and BURKE, JJ., and KAUTZ, 
D.J.

  
            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Patricia 
Michaelis (Michaelis) challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain her 
conviction for involuntary manslaughter.  
Upon review of the record, we affirm.

 
 

[¶2]      The sole issue in 
this appeal is whether sufficient evidence exists to uphold Michaelis' 
conviction. 

 
 

[¶3]      Our recitation of 
the factual background of this case is set forth within the context of our 
standard of review.  When reviewing 
sufficiency of the evidence issues, "[w]e assess whether all the evidence 
presented is adequate to form the basis for an inference of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt to be drawn by a finder of fact when that evidence is viewed in 
the light most favorable to the State."  
Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 28, ¶16, 86 P.3d 851, ¶16 (Wyo. 2004) 
(quoting Estrada-Sanchez v. State, 2003 WY 45, ¶6, 66 P.3d 703, ¶6 (Wyo. 
2003)).

 
 
We leave out of consideration the 
evidence presented by the unsuccessful party which conflicts with the successful 
party's evidence and afford every favorable inference to the successful party's 
evidence which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from that evidence.  Even though it is possible to draw other 
inferences from the evidence presented, the jury has the responsibility to 
resolve conflicts in the evidence.  
We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury when we are 
applying this rule; our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable 
and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as 
the jury actually did.

 
 

Id. 

 
 

[¶4]      Michaelis gave 
birth to a daughter, Aubrey, six weeks prematurely on December 24, 2002.  Close to midnight on March 5, 2003, 
Michaelis put Aubrey to bed using two electric blankets, one red and one 
green.  Michaelis had gotten the 
blankets from her mother, Patsy Michaelis (Patsy) who had used the blankets with 
her own children.  Patsy knew that 
the red blanket got hot, "like it was malfunctioning or something."  Michaelis was aware that the controller 
on the red blanket was "very touchy" and moved easily from a low temperature to 
a high one.

 
 
[¶5]      On the morning of 
March 6, Michaelis missed an appointment and failed to respond to knocks on her 
apartment door or phone calls.  
Patsy let herself in and found Michaelis sleeping in the bedroom with a 
blanket over the window and Aubrey beside her.  It was too dark for Patsy to see, so 
Michaelis got up and removed the blanket from the window.  Patsy could observe a purplish color to 
Aubrey's face and when Michaelis picked her up, she could see that the purplish 
color ran down the child's back.  
Patsy said, "Oh, my God, I think she's dead, I'm calling 911."  While Patsy called 911, Michaelis began 
administering CPR on Aubrey.

 
 
[¶6]      The police and 
emergency personnel quickly responded, and Aubrey was transported to the 
hospital.  Aubrey, however, was 
"obviously lifeless," and resuscitation efforts ended shortly after her 
arrival.  An examination of Aubrey's 
body revealed spots on her forehead and back that appeared to have been blisters 
that had burst.  It was not 
possible, however, to determine whether the spots were caused by thermal 
blistering or sloughing of the skin due to decomposition.  The discoloration on Aubrey's back was 
lividity, which was where the blood pooled after it was no longer 
circulating.  Aubrey also had long, 
linear white pressure marks on her back as if something had been pressed against 
her body inhibiting the blood from pooling there.  Fibers from the red electric blanket 
were found in her hands and mouth.  
An autopsy determined that the cause of death was 
hyperthermia.

 
 
[¶7]      The police officer 
and emergency personnel who observed Michaelis at her apartment and at the 
hospital considered her behavior unusual.  Michaelis was described as "flat," 
"unemotional," and "easily agitated and irritable."  She had difficulty 
understanding instructions, and her conversations were fragmented.  A police officer 
believed that Michaelis seemed to be more worried about brushing her hair and 
finding her shoes than getting to the hospital.  A nurse felt that Michaelis appeared angrier 
about the situation than distraught.  That witness believed that Michaelis behaved 
like someone on amphetamines.

 
 
[¶8]      While at the 
hospital, Michaelis acceded to a request from the police for blood and urine 
samples.  The 
blood draw was negative but the urine sample returned positive for marijuana and 
methamphetamine.  
Later at trial, the State offered the testimony of Duwayne Skansberg, an 
addictions therapist with experience treating methamphetamine addicts.  Skansberg testified 
that methamphetamine is a highly addictive drug that causes an extreme high or 
rush.  He noted 
that a tolerance is built up to the drug that requires a user to consume more 
and more of it to attain the high.  He stated that the tolerance is built up 
quickly.  
Skansberg testified that when the high or rush starts to wear off, a user 
"crashes."  
When crashing, methamphetamine users display symptoms characteristic of 
paranoid schizophrenics, and they will take steps to avoid being observed, such 
as nailing blankets over windows.  He also noted that people crashing from a 
methamphetamine high would be easily agitated and irritated and have trouble 
staying on topic and maintaining a conversation.  According to Skansberg, experienced users of 
methamphetamine are well aware of the effects of a "crash" and will take alcohol 
and marijuana to cushion its effects.  He opined that novice users usually do not 
mix drugs.  
Ultimately, Skansberg testified that a "crash" induces an exhaustive 
sleep from which it is difficult to awaken the person.

 
 
[¶9]      The electric blankets 
were sent to the Wyoming State Crime Laboratory for testing.  A series of 
experiments were conducted using the blankets with a two-liter plastic bottle 
that was filled with water at human body temperature.  In one scenario, 
the bottle was placed on top of the green blanket with the red blanket draped 
loosely over the bottle.  The controller on the green blanket was set 
on medium while the controller on the red blanket was set on high.  The temperature in 
the bottle rose to 105-106 degrees in an eight-hour period.  In the second 
scenario, the red blanket was wrapped around the bottle with the temperature 
control set on medium.  The temperature inside the bottle reached 108 
degrees within two hours.  After eight hours, the bottle's temperature 
was 138 degrees.  
The red blanket got warm to the touch but never hot enough to burn.

 
 
[¶10]   Michaelis was charged with involuntary 
manslaughter in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-105(a)(ii) and (b) 
(LexisNexis 2005)1 for the death of her daughter, Aubrey. At 
trial, the State's theory was that Michaelis wrapped Aubrey in an overheating 
electric blanket while Michaelis entered into a methamphetamine "crash" induced 
exhaustive sleep rendering her incapable of responding to her child's struggles 
as the blanket caused the child's temperature to rise to the point where death 
was caused by hyperthermia. 

 
 
[¶11]   Michaelis countered that Aubrey's death 
was a tragic accident.  The conclusion that hyperthermia was the 
cause of death was attacked in cross-examination of the medical examiner and the 
attending emergency room physician by attempting to establish the possibility 
that Aubrey died of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS).  Michaelis and her 
mother testified at trial that Aubrey was not wrapped in the red electric 
blanket; they claimed that Aubrey was laid on top of the green electric blanket, 
and that the red one was then draped over her, like a sheet.  Michaelis admitted 
to smoking marijuana two days before Aubrey's death but denied ever using 
methamphetamine.

 
 
[¶12]   The jury was instructed on the 
involuntary manslaughter charge and the lesser-included charge of criminally 
negligent homicide.2  After deliberations, the jury returned a 
verdict of guilty on the involuntary manslaughter charge.  Michaelis was 
subsequently sentenced to a term in the penitentiary of not less than 10 years 
and not more than 15 years.  Additional facts will be set forth as 
necessary in the discussion that follows.

 
 

 
 
[¶13]   The jury was given the following 
instruction regarding the elements of the crime of involuntary manslaughter, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-105(a)(ii):

 
 
The elements of the crime of Manslaughter, as charged in 
this case are:

 
 

1.      That Defendant, Patricia Michaelis;

2.      On or about March 6, 2003;

3.      In CarbonCounty, State of Wyoming;

4.      Unlawfully killed Aubrey Michaelis;

5.      Involuntarily, but;

6.      Recklessly.

 
 
Michaelis argues that the State failed to present 
sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she unlawfully 
killed Aubrey Michaelis or that she acted recklessly. 

 
 

 
 
[¶14]   In challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence that she unlawfully killed Aubrey, Michaelis contends that the State 
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the cause of death was 
hyperthermia.  
Specifically, Michaelis argues that SIDS was not conclusively eliminated 
as a potential cause of death.  Michaelis claims that the State's expert 
medical witnesses agreed that SIDS might have been the cause of death.  Since SIDS could 
not be ruled out as a cause of death, Michaelis argues that the State's evidence 
fell well short of what was needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt its theory 
that Aubrey died of hyperthermia.

 
 
[¶15]   The State sought to establish the cause 
of death as hyperthermia through the testimony of Dr. Stephen Cina, a medical 
examiner who performed the autopsy on Aubrey, and Dr. Duane Abels, the attending 
physician when Aubrey was brought into the emergency room on March 6, 2003.  On direct 
examination, Dr. Cina testified as follows:

 
 
Q: Starting at the upper body cavities, the cardiovascular 
system, did you find anything abnormal there?

 
 
A: No. The heart and the big vessels seemed to be in the 
normal hematonic relationships. Looking at the lungs and thymus, which is an 
organism in the mid part of the chest, there were little pinpoint hemorrhages on 
the surfaces of the lungs and on the thymus, which is the only remarkable 
finding.

 
 
Q: What is that finding indicative of?

 
 
A: It's really controversial. It's a very common finding in 
the Sudden Infant Death Syndrome. Some people say that it's related to terminal 
stress, others aren't sure why it happens. It doesn't kill you, it's just 
something that we see sometimes. I've seen in it [sic] clinic cases of Sudden 
Infant Death, but I've seen cases of Sudden Infant Death that do not have 
petechiae. I've seen kids that have been in trauma and infected that have 
petechiae. In this case, which was hyperthermia, this 
kid had great petechiae, but it's not indicative of Sudden Infant Death 
Syndrome. So it's just something that you make note of. If you see it, you 
write it. If it is Sudden Infant Death Syndrome, it's 
supportive evidence, but it's not diagnostic in and of itself.

 
 
. . . .

 
 
Q: You say it is not indicative in this case of Sudden 
Infant Death Syndrome. Why do you say that?

 
 
A: The definition of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome involves 
complete autopsy, including microscopic analysis, looking at all of the organs, 
a toxicological analysis, blood cultures, and correlating all of this for the 
circumstances of death. In this case, clearly the kid 
had a body temperature of 108 degrees very close to the time of discovery. With 
a circumstance like that, there is no way I could call this a sudden infant 
death.  
[Emphasis added.] 

 
 
In cross-examination, defense counsel focused on the 
possibility of SIDS as a cause of death:

 
 
Q: I want to first start with your report here. And I guess 
the thing that stuck out to me is that you had found some anatomical findings of 
SIDS, and you had explained that that was some puncture wounds  or not wounds 
but punctures in the lungs; is that correct?

 
 
A: As I said, they are not specific findings that you see 
in SIDS cases, which are pinpoint hemorrhages on the thymus and the surface of 
the lungs. They're not diagnostic of SIDS, but it's a 
common finding in SIDS.

 
 
Q: Is this the only information that you have that relates 
to a possible SIDS diagnosis?

 
 
A: There are other circumstances that support a diagnosis 
of SIDS. The vast majority of children who die of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome 
are found face down, often in a type of blanket or pillow that allows 
rebreathing of exhaled air. And I have no evidence that that was the case in 
this scenario.

 
 
Q: Okay. Now, it's true that there are some babies laying 
on their back that have died of SIDS?

 
 
A: That's true. SIDS is actually a collection of several 
diseases which medicine has not yet split apart. So certainly, some of these 
subtypes could die on their back, but most die face down.

 
 
Q: Okay. I was on the National Association of Pediatrics 
web site, and I was looking at their site about SIDS. They indicate, and tell me 
if this is true, that most SIDS cases occur in the winter time?

 
 
A: More than the usual number happen in the winter 
time.

 
 
Q: Okay. And they also indicate that one of the factors 
that they found common among SIDS was overheating?

 
 
A: I'm not aware of that being a risk factor. To me, overheating would be exclusionary of SIDS, according 
to the pathology literature.

 
 
Q: Okay. But the pediatric  Would you agree that the 
pediatrics may have made that conclusion?

 
 
A: I don't see actually how pediatricians could say that 
overheating was a part of the diagnosis of SIDS. The medical examiner community 
and the other communities have had some major disagreement with some of the 
pediatric stance in this area.

 
 
Q: We are not talking necessarily about hyperthermia, but 
over placing the child in more blankets than necessary, sleepers and stuff like 
that that may not be necessary under the normal room temperatures.

 
 
A: Well, if you're talking about the fact that these kids 
who die of SIDS are often in heavy blankets or those thick nylon fluffy kind of 
comforters, I don't think that's an overheating mechanism, those things tend to 
trap carbon dioxide as kids exhale and then the kids tend to rebreathe that. So 
if you're talk [sic] about the type of bedding used, there tends to be heavier 
types of bedding in SIDS cases, but it's a breathing rather than a heating 
cause.

 
 
Q: That's what you, as a pathologist, agree with, not 
necessarily what the pediatricians agree with, correct?

 
 
A: Even most pediatricians, including the ones at UCSD who 
have done a lot of research, think rebreathing is a factor in SIDS.

 
 
Q: No, they don't. I mean, the pediatrician site says that, 
but they also include the overheating, making the baby too warm.

 
 
A: Once again, to me that would be exclusionary to most of 
the people who I've trained with. If there is a 
significant component, more than a degree or two, I think I would have to 
exclude SIDS. 

 
 
Q: Okay. Now, with the  It's possible that this baby died 
of SIDS?

 
 
A: Well, it would be theoretically 
possible that the kid died of SIDS if these circumstances, as reported to me, 
are untrue.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
In her brief, Michaelis points to several aspects of the 
State's medical experts' testimony that she claims undermines their opinions on 
causation.  
Specifically, she points to the marks on Aubrey's skin and argues that 
the experts' inability to determine whether they were blisters caused by a 
thermal source or sloughing of the skin due to accelerated decomposition meant 
that they could not eliminate the possibility that Aubrey died of SIDS and then 
had her internal body temperature raised to the level of her surrounding 
environment  i.e., the temperature of the electric blanket that was draped over 
her body.  Dr. 
Cina discussed both of these points during cross:

 
 
Q: So the evidence that was given to you was that the baby 
had reached 108 degrees, that the baby was wrapped in an electric blanket?

 
 
A: That's correct.

 
 
Q: Okay. And is that the only thing that you based your  
or accelerated decomposition?

 
 
A: Accelerated decomposition fit 
with those circumstances in that excessive heating will accelerate 
decomposition. So it did explain that finding.

 
 
Q: Making the assumption that the baby may have died of 
SIDS, could the baby be heated up to a temperature of 108?

 
 
A: A body will go to whatever the impeding temperature is 
around it. Usually that involves cooling of the body. But if you die in the 
desert in Arizona, your body is going to go 
up to 110 or 115, whatever the temperature is around you. If this child died in 
a 74 degree room exposed to air, the child would be 74 degrees. If this child 
was in an open environment that's 110 degrees, eventually the body temperature 
would go to 110 degrees.

 
 
Q: Okay. And if the electric blanket, as has been indicated 
by that report that you received from the crime lab, had been laying over the 
baby and it dies of SIDS, would the temperature raise [sic] to meet the 
temperature of the electric blanket?

 
 
A: It wouldn't necessarily meet the temperature of the 
electric blanket. I think experimental data would have to show just how hot 
laying [sic] a blanket might get on an area could make that local environment. 
We've seen some of Mr. Crivello's [of the Wyoming State Crime Laboratory] data 
that laying a blanket on a bottle doesn't significantly raise the temperature, 
putting a bottle on top of a blanket doesn't really raise the temperature, but 
wrapping a blanket around the water bottle will raise the temperature. 

 
 
Q: I want to show a copy of Mr. Crivello's report  a page 
of it, rather. That portion of the experiment was done with the red blanket 
laying on top of the bottle; is that correct?

 
 
A: That's correct.

 
 
Q: And what was the ultimate temperature on the 
external?

 
 
A: The external eventually reached 42.5 degrees 
Celsius.

 
 
Q: And that would be what, about 108 degrees, would it 
not?

 
 
A: 108 and a half. But this took eight hours to reach that 
temperature. So it was a very, very, very slow 
incline.

 
 
Q: But if the baby had died and stuff, there would be no 
resistance with the baby to try to control the outside elements. Like we would 
sweat, correct, to try to control overheating?

 
 
A: Yes. We have physiological mechanisms, such as sweating, 
and brain controls and dilation of your blood vessels would not be in effect. However, the resistance of skin and the fat surrounding the 
baby would be in effect still. So it would take a while to heat up a 
baby.  
[Emphasis added.]

 
 
Thus, Dr. Cina concluded that the marks on Aubrey's body 
were consistent with hyperthermia regardless of whether or not they were 
evidence of blisters and/or accelerated decomposition since both require the 
presence of an outside thermal source.  Based upon the testing done on the blankets 
at the Wyoming State Crime Laboratory, Dr. Cina discounted Michaelis' theory 
that the blanket raised Aubrey's body temperature after her death because there 
simply was not enough time for the blanket to reach that temperature if it had 
been draped over Aubrey's body as Michaelis contended.  Contrary to 
Michaelis' representations, Dr. Cina opined that SIDS could not have been the 
cause of death under the circumstances of this case.  Dr. Cina allowed 
SIDS as a possibility only in response to theoretical questions from defense 
counsel that stripped away the context of Aubrey's death.  The testimony of 
Dr. Abels parallels that offered by Dr. Cina.  Recognizing this, Michaelis attacks the 
evidence of the circumstances relied upon by the State's medical experts in the 
formation of their opinions that the cause of death was hyperthermia:  the temperature 
reading of 108 degrees taken from Aubrey's body at the emergency room, the 
validity of the testing on the electric blankets by the Wyoming State Crime 
Laboratory, and the contention that Aubrey was "wrapped" in the red electric 
blanket.  Michaelis argues that the evidence underlying 
each of these was unreliable, and that Drs. Cina's and Abels' reliance upon them 
as the basis for their opinions on the causation of Aubrey's death rendered 
those opinions unreliable to an extent that a reasonable doubt as to the cause 
of death was raised. 

 
 
[¶16]   First, Michaelis takes issue with the 
testimony of Kathleen Karczewski, an EMT who took the temperature reading of 108 
degrees from Aubrey's body after she had been declared dead at the 
hospital.  On 
cross-examination, Karczewski admitted that she did not know the accuracy of the 
digital thermometer that was used.  She acknowledged that digital thermometers 
might have inherent inaccuracies in them and that they would have to be serviced 
at times to ensure accuracy.  Karczewski did not know the service history 
of the thermometer she used.  Michaelis argues that this testimony renders 
the temperature reading unreliable. 

 
 
[¶17]   Our review of the record shows the 
following:  
Officer Travis King testified that when he collected the red electric 
blanket, it "seemed extremely warm" and that after handling it, he noticed that 
his latex gloves had been scorched to the point that they turned brown; Officer 
King noted that the controls of both blankets were set on "high;" everyone who 
handled Aubrey's body that morning noted that it felt very warm; and the marks 
on Aubrey's body  whether blisters or sloughing  were indicative of a heated 
environment around the child.  The inference could be drawn from the 
circumstantial evidence that the thermometer's reading was reasonably 
accurate.  
Furthermore, the testimony of Drs. Cina and Abels makes it clear that 
their opinions were not based on the 108-degree reading per se.  Dr. Cina noted that 
he would have excluded SIDS as a cause of death if the child's temperature 
reading had been "a degree or two" above normal. Similarly, Dr. Abels expanded 
on this point:

 
 
SIDS deaths are often determined by the fact you have 
cardio pulmonary arrest for reasons unknown. I have attended several SIDS 
deaths, less now since parents put their kids in the right position and other 
things to reduce the risk of SIDS deaths, I see a lot less than I used to. But 
the SIDS deaths I have seen before have all been very cold patients. Their 
temperatures were never above average, in fact, most of them were well below 
average.

 
 
. . . .

 
 
My clinical diagnosis, based on my examination, was with 
the elevated core temperature, the accelerated smell of decomposition compared 
to the time frames that were reported to me when the baby was fed at 4:00 a.m. 
Father told me he heard the baby crying in the background at 10:30 p.m.

 
 
That decomposition did not make any sense in those time 
frames. That's why I felt the death was due to hyperthermia.

 
 
It was not the 108-degree temperature itself that underlay 
the experts' opinions on causation; rather, it was the overheating of Aubrey in 
general.

 
 
[¶18]   Next, Michaelis complains about the 
tests done on the electric blankets at the Wyoming State Crime Laboratory by 
Richard L. Crivello.  
She questions the reliability of the test results given that there was no 
check of the blankets' controls to determine if they were functioning 
properly.  
Michaelis claims that Crivello's testimony regarding whether the red 
electric blanket could have caused Aubrey's death was "rather confusing and 
contradictory."  
Our review of Crivello's testimony does not comport with Michaelis' 
claim. 

 
 
[¶19]   In order to test the blankets' capacity 
to convey heat, Crivello filled a two-liter plastic bottle with water.  A stopper was 
placed in the opening with a thermometer attached so that it was suspended in 
the middle of the bottle.  Two experiments relevant to the factual 
situation at issue in this case were conducted.  In the first, the bottle was wrapped in the 
red blanket and laid on top of the green.  Both blankets had the controls set on "5" or 
medium.  After 
eight hours, the temperature in the bottle was 138 degrees and still 
rising.  
Crivello acknowledged that water absorbs heat easier than the human body, 
which meant that the experiment showed that being wrapped in the red electric 
blanket for eight hours on the high temperature setting would result in an 
equivalent temperature of 124 degrees in a baby.  In the second experiment, Crivello laid the 
bottle on top of the green blanket and then draped the red blanket over the 
bottle.  The 
green blanket was left on medium while the red blanket was set on high.  The temperature in 
the bottle rose to 105 to 106 degrees in eight hours.  Crivello testified 
that he monitored the controls to ensure that they remained on the same 
temperature settings throughout the test.  He also stated that he checked the 
controllers for frayed cords or other signs of defects and did not observe any. 

 
 
[¶20]   We find nothing "confusing or 
contradictory" about Crivello's testimony. Undeniably, the import of the 
testimony supports the State's theory of the case that hyperthermia was induced 
by Michaelis wrapping the red blanket around Aubrey. Michaelis' argument on this 
point is properly characterized as a challenge to the weight and credibility 
that should have been assigned to it.  That function, however, is one for the jury, 
not us.  Daniel v. State, 2003 WY 132, ¶23, 78 P.3d 205, ¶23 (Wyo. 
2003). 

 
 
[¶21]   Finally, Michaelis contends that there 
was no evidence that Aubrey was wrapped in the red electric blanket.  At trial, Michaelis 
and her mother Patsy testified that the red blanket had been laid on top of 
Aubrey "like a sheet."  Michaelis argues that since they were the 
only eyewitnesses and that there was no other evidence to contradict them, their 
testimony must be accepted as definitive.  Michaelis concludes that the State failed to 
prove that she wrapped Aubrey in the red electric blanket.  Without such proof, 
Michaelis contends that the State's experts could not establish hyperthermia as 
the cause of death beyond a reasonable doubt.

 
 
[¶22]   Our review of the record shows that 
there is sufficient circumstantial evidence upon which the jury could conclude 
that Michaelis wrapped Aubrey in the red electric blanket.  While Michaelis and 
Patsy did testify that the red electric blanket was draped over Aubrey like a 
sheet, there are contradictions in their testimony that call into question their 
credibility.  
Both Michaelis and Patsy used the term "wrapped" when describing the 
scene at the time Aubrey's body was discovered before correcting themselves to 
indicate that the blanket was draped.  Michaelis granted an interview with the 
police the day after Aubrey's death wherein she stated the following:

 
 
A: She was covered a little bit. I mean, kinda loosely 
covered, and I thought that was kind of odd so I put the blanket over, I 
unwrapped it.

 
 
Q: What blanket?

 
 
A: The red electric blanket.

 
 
Q: She was wrapped in it?

 
 
A: Well, it was loosely over, you know, just like you lay a 
sheet over.

 
 
Patsy gave similarly contradictory testimony at trial:

                        
Q: And could you see the rest of Aubrey?

 
 
A: No. She was wrapped over with a blanket, and she had a 
diaper on.3

 
 
. . . .

 
 
Q: You indicated today that the baby was partially covered; 
is that correct?

 
 
A: I call it wrapped the blanket.  It was like this, 
over like this.  
This part was not wrapped, it was just over  from here down.

 
 
Q: From like the stomach down?

 
 
A: Yes.

 
 
. . . .

 
 
Q: Okay.  So I want to get the facts straight. In the 
report it says the baby wasn't covered, but on your examination here today you 
said the baby was partially covered?

 
 
A: [Michaelis] was laying on the bed like this, Aubrey was 
laying like this up next to her, and the blanket was like this.  It was folded from 
the bottom.  It 
was over and over real loosely, and Aubrey's upper part was able to be seen.

 
 
Detective Troy Palmer testified that Patsy told him at one 
point that Aubrey "may have been wrapped in that blanket."  It was the jury's 
prerogative to weigh this testimony and determine what, if any, credibility 
should be given to it.  Belden v. State, 
2003 WY 89, ¶19, 73 P.3d 1041, ¶19 (Wyo. 
2003). 

 
 
[¶23]   Furthermore, Michaelis' claim that the 
blanket was "draped" over Aubrey cannot account for the heating of her 
body.  
According to Michaelis, Aubrey had a feeding at 4 a.m. on March 6, and 
she was then put back to bed at 5 a.m.  Aubrey's body was discovered about 11 
a.m.  The tests 
by the Crime Lab demonstrated that draping the blankets over a water bottle 
would result in a temperature of 105 to 106 degrees after eight hours.  The evidence showed 
that a human absorbs heat at a slower rate than water so the temperature of a 
body under those conditions would be even lower than that.  There simply was 
not enough time under the conditions alleged by Michaelis to account for the 
heating of Aubrey's body that was observed only approximately six hours after 
she was last seen alive according to Michaelis. 

 
 
[¶24]   Only in the scenario in which Aubrey 
was wrapped in the red electric blanket is the heating of her body adequately 
explained.  It 
would also account for the marks on Aubrey's body whether they were caused by 
thermal blistering or sloughing of skin owing to accelerated decomposition 
associated with high temperatures.  In her brief, Michaelis characterizes SIDS as 
a "quiet death" and claims that there was no evidence of a struggle by 
Aubrey.  Dr. 
Abels testified that fibers from the red blanket were found in Aubrey's hands 
and mouth and concluded that for "a child at that age to grasp and pull fibers 
out would require a great deal of effort on that child's part" beyond the "usual 
grasp reflex of a child."  Considering all of the circumstantial 
evidence, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Aubrey 
died of hyperthermia and not SIDS.

 
 

 
 
[¶25]   The element of "recklessly" was defined 
in an instruction to the jury:

 
 
"Recklessly" is defined as the following conduct: A person 
acts recklessly when she consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that the harm she is accused of causing will occur, and the harm 
results.  The 
risk shall be of such nature and degree that disregarding it constituted a gross 
deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in 
the situation.

 
 
Michaelis contends that the State failed to prove that she 
acted "recklessly," as defined in the cited jury instruction, because it did not 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she "consciously disregarded," as opposed 
to mistakenly, inadvertently, or subconsciously, "a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the harm she [was] accused of causing [would] occur, and 
the harm [resulted]."  
In particular, Michaelis alleges that the State did not prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that she knew or was aware that an electric blanket could harm, 
or even kill, Aubrey. Michaelis argues that the testimony at trial established 
that she was raised in a household that used electric blankets with infants, 
including herself, and that she had used the same electric blankets on her first 
two children and had never experienced anything that would cause her to consider 
them a risk or danger.  Michaelis criticizes the testimony of 
Catherine Harshbarger, the director of nursing at the hospital where Aubrey was 
born, to the effect that the mothers of all newborns were instructed on safety 
issues, including a warning not to use electric blankets.  She notes that 
Harshbarger admitted that she had no personal knowledge of whether or not 
Michaelis had been so instructed during her stay when Aubrey was born.  In her testimony, 
Michaelis denied receiving any such warnings, and so she concludes that 
Harshbarger's testimony was nothing more than "pure speculation and assumption." 

 
 
[¶26]   Michaelis also contends that the State 
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she ingested methamphetamine, or 
if she did, that she ingested so much methamphetamine that she rendered herself 
incapable of caring for Aubrey or that she was aware that ingesting that amount 
of methamphetamine would cause that harm and result.  As part of her 
argument, Michaelis launches a two-pronged attack on the test results from the 
urine sample that was taken from her the day Aubrey died.  In her testimony, 
Michaelis admitted that she had smoked marijuana two days before Aubrey's death; 
however, she denied consuming any methamphetamine.  Michaelis admitted 
that the marijuana may have been laced without her knowledge but testified that 
she did not feel any abnormal affects.  Additionally, Michaelis suggests that some 
confusion exists as to whether the urine that was tested was actually hers or 
someone else's because the tubes containing the urine sample were not properly 
labeled when the State Crime Lab received them.  Michaelis further insists that the questioned 
urine sample would, at most, establish that she had used methamphetamine once 
and did not establish that she knew anything about the risks associated with 
methamphetamine use including the fact that consumption of the drug could cause 
a "crash" rendering her unable to care for her daughter.  Michaelis dismisses 
the testimony of the State's expert, Duwayne Skansberg, on the basis that he 
only testified about generalizations regarding methamphetamine users, which had 
no application to Michaelis in particular because he had no knowledge of her, 
her life, behaviors or if she was a drug addict or had ever used drugs 
before.  
Michaelis concludes that even if the State had proven that she was a 
frequent user of methamphetamine that that, by itself, was an insufficient basis 
from which to infer that she knew of the specific risks associated with the use 
of the drug.

 
 
[¶27]   We begin with the questions surrounding 
the urine sample taken from Michaelis. The general rule on chain of custody of 
evidence is that an object is authenticated "so long as enough testimony is 
presented to permit a reasonable inference that the object offered is what the 
proponent claims it to be."  Robinson v. State, 716 P.2d 364, 369 
(Wyo. 1986) (quoting 5 D. Louisell 
& C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 515 at 88 (1981)).  If the party 
opposing the admission of the evidence claims that it was altered, they must 
support that charge with something more than speculation.  Robinson, at id.; Ostrowski v. State, 665 P.2d 471, 490 
(Wyo. 1983).  Speculation is all 
that Michaelis offers.  Under the circumstances, it is difficult to 
see how a urine sample belonging to another person could have been substituted 
for Michaelis' sample.  An EMT accompanied Michaelis into the 
restroom while Harshbarger and Palmer stood outside the door.  After the sample 
was taken, it was handed over to Harshbarger who gave it to Palmer.  In the presence of 
Harshbarger, Palmer placed the urine sample in the same box as the blood sample 
and sealed the box.  
Michaelis does not dispute that the blood sample is hers and the urine 
sample had the same serial numbers on it as the blood sample.  The crime lab 
technician who tested the samples testified that the box arrived at the lab 
sealed and that he confirmed the serial numbers on the samples.  The jury could 
reasonably infer that the urine sample was Michaelis'.

 
 
[¶28]   We cannot agree with Michaelis' 
characterization of the testimony of the State's expert Duwayne Skansberg as 
irrelevant and unhelpful.  In addition to the generalizations regarding 
methamphetamine and user behavior noted above in our factual recitation, 
Skansberg also testified regarding specifics related to this case.  He noted that 
Michaelis' urine sample contained 5,553.1 nanograms of methamphetamine per 
milliliter, which he described as "extremely high"  the highest, in fact, that 
he had ever seen.  
Skansberg opined that such a dosage could be fatal to a novice user.  Based on 
Skansberg's testimony, several inferences could be drawn:

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 
Clearly, there is a basis here for the jury to conclude 
that Michaelis not only used methamphetamine, but that she was an experienced 
user who was well aware that her actions in consuming methamphetamine were 
reckless  Michaelis deliberately placed herself in a condition which she knew 
could render her unable to properly care for her infant daughter. 

 
 
[¶29]   We also do not agree with Michaelis' 
contention that there was no basis upon which the jury could conclude that she 
was not consciously aware of any risk associated with the use of electric 
blankets.  
Nurse Harshbarger testified that it was the routine practice of the 
hospital to caution mothers of all new infants of the hazards attendant with the 
use of electric blankets and that they were to avoid using them.4  Michaelis testified that she was not given 
those warnings.  
The jury obviously did not find Michaelis to be a credible witness.  What is more, 
Michaelis admitted that she knew that the red electric blanket posed a 
risk.  During 
her interview with the police, she stated:

 
 
To me [the red electric blanket] gets a little too hot at 
times.  I try 
to adjust the control to the right body temperature.  The knob is very 
touchy.  I've 
always been leery about itI could sweat in that electric blanket.

 
 
Michaelis reiterated that she knew the blanket got "very 
hot" and that its controller was "touchy" so that "you could barely touch it 
with your finger to move from a low temperature to a high" in her testimony at 
trial.  Despite 
that knowledge, Michaelis elected to wrap her prematurely born infant in the 
blanket at a time when she had rendered herself incapable of properly caring for 
the child due to her drug consumption.  Under the circumstances, we have little 
trouble in concluding that there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's 
conclusion that Michaelis acted recklessly.

 
 

 
 
[¶30]   The record contains sufficient evidence 
to support Michaelis' conviction for involuntary manslaughter.  The judgment and 
sentence is affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

  1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-105  provides in relevant part:

 
 

(a)     A person is guilty of manslaughter if he unlawfully kills 
any human being without malice expressed or implied[.]

. . . .

            
(ii) Involuntarily, but recklessly .

(b) Manslaughter is a felony punishable by 
imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years.

 
 
  2Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-107 (LexisNexis 2005) 
provides:

 
 

(a)     Except under circumstances constituting a violation of W.S. 
6-2-106, a person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide if he causes the 
death of another person by conduct amounting to criminal negligence.

(b)     Criminally negligent homicide is a misdemeanor punishable 
by imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, a fine of not more than two 
thousand dollars ($2,000.00), or both.

 
 
The jury was instructed that "criminal negligence" was 
defined as the following conduct:

 
 
A person acts with criminal negligence when, through 
a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would 
exercise, she fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
harm she is accused of causing will occur, and the harm results. The risk shall 
be of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in 
the situation.

 
 
  3Patsy 
testified that she could see that Aubrey was in a diaper as she lay in the 
blanket.  
However, emergency personnel testified that she was in a sleeper.  Photographs taken 
at the emergency room show Aubrey lying on a sleeper.  This discrepancy 
was not explored at trial.

  4See 
Wyoming Rule of Evidence 406, which 
provides:

 
 
     Evidence of the habit 
of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated 
or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that 
the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in 
conformity with the habit or routine practice.