Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Faber

Citation: 373 Md. 173

Docket Number: 21ag/02

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2003-02-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 24-C-02-002649
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 21
September Term, 2002
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
MARK ANDREW FABER
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Raker, J.
 
Filed:   February 21, 2003               
1Maryland Rule 1.1 (Competence) provides as follows:  
“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.”
2Maryland Rule 1.2 (Scope of representation) provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
“(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning
the objectives of representation, subject to paragraphs (c), (d)
and (e), and, when appropriate, shall consult with the client as
to the means by which they are to be pursued.  A lawyer shall
abide by a client’s decision whether to accept an offer of
settlement of a matter.  In a criminal case, the lawyer shall
abide by the client’s decision, after consultation with the
lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial
and whether the client will testify.”
3Maryland Rule 1.3 (Diligence) provides as follows:  
“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness
in representing a client.”
4Maryland Rule 1.4 (Communication) provides as follows:  
“(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about
the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable
requests for information.  
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.”
5Maryland Rule 1.16 (Declining or terminating representation) provides, in
pertinent part, as follows:  
The Attorney Grievance Commission, acting through Bar Counsel, filed a petition
with this Court for disciplinary action against Mark Andrew Faber, respondent, alleging
violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1 (Competence),1 1.2 (Scope
of representation),2 1.3 (Diligence),3 1.4 (Communication),4 and 1.16 (Declining or
terminating representation).5  Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-752(a), we referred the matter
“(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not
represent a client or, where representation has commenced,
shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:
“(1) the representation will result in violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct or other law; 
“(2) the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materially
impairs the lawyer’s ability to represent the client; or
“(3) the lawyer is discharged.
***
“(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take
steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s
interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client,
allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering
papers and property to which the client is entitled and
refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been
earned.  The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to
the extent permitted by other law.”
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to Judge Kaye A. Allison of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to make findings of fact
and conclusions of law.  Judge Allison concluded that respondent violated Rules 1.1, 1.2,
1.3, 1.4, and 1.16.  
The Circuit Court entered an Order of Default against respondent.  The facts, as
found by Judge Allison, are as follows.  Sterling H. Fletcher, an investigator with the
Attorney Grievance Commission, attempted to serve respondent with the Petition for
Disciplinary or Remedial Action on May 22 and May 28, 2002.  He was unsuccessful.  The
Petition was also sent by certified mail to respondent’s Maryland residence on June 4, 2002.
On June 27, 2002, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-753, Bar Counsel served the Treasurer of
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the Client Protection Fund with the Petition, the Writ of Summons, and a copy of the Order
of this Court.  The Treasurer of the Client Protection Fund, on July 1, 2002, sent copies of
the documents via certified and regular mail to respondent’s Maryland residence and office
as listed with the Fund.  When the envelopes returned unopened and unclaimed, the
Treasurer sent the documents via certified and regular mail to the Las Vegas, Nevada post
office box that appeared as the forwarding address on one of the previously returned
envelopes.  Respondent did not file a response to the charges against him. 
On July 29, 2002, Bar Counsel filed a Motion for Order of Default, alleging that
pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-613, an Order of Default be entered against respondent for
failure to file a response to the charges.  On August 2, 2002, the default order was entered
by a Circuit Court judge not designated by this Court to hear this matter, and, as a result, the
Circuit Court vacated the Order on August 7, 2002.  The clerk sent notice of the Order of
Default to respondent at each of his three addresses.  Thereafter, Judge Allison, the judge
specially assigned to this matter, reentered the Order of Default on August 8, 2002, and the
clerk again sent notice to respondent’s three addresses, advising respondent that he could
move to vacate the order within thirty days.  On September 10, 2002, respondent filed an
untimely Motion to Vacate Order of Default, which Judge Allison denied on October 3,
2002. 
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I.
Judge Allison held an evidentiary hearing on September 23, 2002.  Respondent did
not appear.  Bar Counsel represented the Attorney Grievance Commission.  Sterling
Fletcher, Attorney Grievance Commission Investigator, was called as a witness to testify
to his attempts to serve respondent with pleadings in this case.  He also testified to his
investigation in the matter.  Judge Allison made the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, by clear and convincing evidence. 
“On February 11, 2001, Leon Reginald Haines paid
$650.00 to the Respondent, Mark Andrew Faber, for a
bankruptcy case.  Mr. Haines is disabled and the Respondent
met with Mr. Haines at his home.  Mr. Haines advised the
Attorney Grievance Commission on October 10, 2001, that
since the time he retained Mr. Faber, Mr. Faber had failed to
communicate with him by telephone or mail and ignored his
pages and Mr. Faber was unaware of the progress of his legal
matter.  Mr. Haines further alleged that sometime in July 2001,
his daughter spoke with Mr. Faber who advised that the filing
of the bankruptcy had been delayed because the court had been
closed due to a problem in the Harbor Street Tunnel incident.
Finally, in August 2001, Mr. Faber communicated with Mr.
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Haines and subsequently met with him at which time Mr.
Haines signed some additional documents provided to him by
Mr. Faber.  Additional communication between the
Complainant’s daughter and Mr. Faber took place in September
and Mr. Faber at that time advised that the federal court had
been closed because of the terrorist attacks in New York on
September 11, 2001.  Investigation revealed that as of
November 2001, no bankruptcy petition had been filed by the
Respondent or Mr. Haines. 
“Mr. Faber was obligated to either complete the matter
for his client or withdraw as permitted by the Maryland Rules
of Professional Conduct.
“The Court therefore finds that Mark Andrew Faber, the
Respondent, in connection with the complaint of Leon Reginald
Haines violated Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1,
1.2, 1.3, 1.4 and 1.16 as set forth in the Petition for Disciplinary
and Remedial Action.
“Tosha Lydia Griffith filed a complaint with the
Attorney Grievance Commission on October 17, 2001, in which
she alleged that she met with the Respondent, Mark Andrew
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Faber, on January 18, 2001 about a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
proceeding.  In February 2001, she paid Mr. Faber the sum of
$325.00 and supplied him with a detailed and organized file of
her bills.  She alleged that Mr. Faber was to make sure that her
wages were not garnished but despite that promise her wages
were garnished for more than $800.00.  Ms. Griffith alleged that
Mr. Faber indicated he had filed a bankruptcy petition and the
problem was with the court.  On September 6, 2001, Ms.
Griffith personally visited the Clerk’s office for the Bankruptcy
Court and was advised that her case had not been filed.
Investigation revealed that on October 26, 2001, Ms. Griffith’s
bankruptcy had been filed, not by the Respondent, but by
another attorney on her behalf.  Once again, in connection with
this client, Mr. Faber failed to make reasonable efforts to
conclude the client’s legal matter including regular
communication and failed to withdraw from representation as
permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct.  The Court
therefore finds that the Respondent violated the following Rules
of Professional Conduct by a clear and convincing evidence
standard:  Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 1.16.”
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II.  
Respondent did not appear at the hearing before this Court.  He did, however, file an
exception with this Court alleging that he was not served properly in these proceedings and
that this lack of notice denied him due process.  Respondent’s exception is without merit.
Respondent maintains that he never was served with the charges against him, notice
of the hearing, the orders of default, or the final order of the hearing court.  He contends that
the only documents he received were an order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
vacating the Order of Default entered on August 2, 2002 and Bar Counsel’s request to
reinstate the Order of Default. 
By failing to appear before this Court, respondent presented no argument in support
of his exception.  “Failure to present argument in support of an exception is a sufficient basis
on which to overrule the exception or, at least, not consider it.”  Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Barneys, 370 Md. 566, 577, 805 A.2d 1040, 1046 (2002).  Respondent also
presented no evidence to support his claim that he was denied due process.  An attorney in
a disciplinary hearing must establish factual matters in defense of his or her position by a
preponderance of the evidence.  See Maryland Rule 16-759; Attorney Grievance Comm’n
v. Fezell, 361 Md. 234, 254, 760 A.2d 1108, 1118 (2000).  Respondent failed to carry his
burden by not producing any evidence to support his exception.  See Fezell, 361 Md. at 254,
760 A.2d at 1118. 
Judge Allison found that Bar Counsel and the court made repeated efforts to serve
6In his Motion to Vacate Order of Default filed in the Circuit Court, respondent
stated:
“[T]he first time that I knew that such a proceeding had been
commenced was when I received an order signed by the
Honorable Judge Glynn vacating the Order of default
previously entered, an order which I did not know existed. 
The next piece of mail that was received indicated that the
Order had been reentered on August 8, 2002.”
In his Exceptions and Recommendation filed in this Court, respondent stated:
“That at no time was I ever served with . . . anything else
connected with this case with the exception of a copy of an
Order signed by Judge Glynn of the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City vacating the Order of Default, which I also did
not know was entered.  The next thing that I received was a
copy of a pleading sent to yet another judge, obviously more
friendly, asking to reinstate the Order of Default.  I have
never received the Order reinstating it.”  
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respondent with all documents pertinent to the proceedings, including the Petition for
Disciplinary or Remedial Action, the Writ of Summons, the Order of the Court of Appeals,
and the Motion for Default.  Judge Allison detailed the investigator’s attempts to serve
respondent and Bar Counsel’s service upon the Client Protection Fund Treasurer.  In
addition, respondent’s inconsistent statements regarding the documents he had received
indicate that he misrepresented the facts relating to service in this matter.6  The hearing
court’s findings are prima facie correct and will not be disturbed unless they are shown to
be clearly erroneous.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Culver, 371 Md. 265, 273-74, 808
A.2d 1251, 1256 (2002).  The record supports the hearing judge’s findings regarding notice.
Judge Allison’s findings are not clearly erroneous, and we overrule respondent’s exception.
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III.
We turn now to the appropriate sanction to be imposed.  In so doing, we are mindful
that the purpose of disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public rather than to punish the
errant attorney.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Powell, 369 Md. 462, 474, 800 A.2d
782, 789 (2002).  The severity of the sanction imposed depends on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case, including consideration of any mitigating factors or prior
grievance history.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Angst, 369 Md. 404, 416-18, 800
A.2d 747, 755 (2002).
Respondent has violated Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 1.16.  Petitioner recommends
that respondent be disbarred.  Respondent represented in his pleading filed before this Court
that he does not oppose any sanction to remove his name from the rolls of practicing
attorneys.  He states that he has closed his law office and has no intention of ever practicing
law.  He “prays this Honorable Court issue an Order . . . [a]llowing him to resign, or consent
to a permanent removal from the practicing rolls, with the proviso that no article in the
[Baltimore Sun or the Jeffersonian] be placed.” 
This Court consistently has regarded neglect of client needs and failure to
communicate with clients to be violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct warranting
the imposition of some disciplinary sanction.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Manning,
318 Md. 697, 703, 569 A.2d 1250, 1253 (1990) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Gallagher, 306 Md. 107, 115, 507 A.2d 625, 629 (1986)).  We previously have found
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disbarment to be appropriate when attorneys repeatedly neglect client affairs.  See Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Wallace, 368 Md. 277, 290, 293, 793 A.2d 535, 543, 545 (2002);
Manning, 318 Md. at 705, 569 A.2d at 1254; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Montgomery,
318 Md. 154, 165-66, 567 A.2d 112, 117-18 (1989); Maryland State Bar Ass’n v. Phoebus,
276 Md. 353, 365-66, 347 A.2d 556, 562-63 (1975).  
In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Wallace, this Court disbarred an attorney who, in
light of six separate complaints against him, demonstrated a lack of diligence and a failure
to communicate with his clients.  368 Md. at 278, 293, 793 A.2d at 536, 545.  Wallace failed
to perform work as promised.  He did not respond to client requests for information or for
the return of files and payments.  Wallace had no prior disciplinary actions, but we
nonetheless concluded that the “volume and severity” of the complaints against him and his
“pattern” of misconduct called for disbarment.  Id. at 293, 793 A.2d at 545.  We stated:
“[Wallace’s] lack of diligence, his lack of preparation, his
failure to communicate with his clients, his charging
unreasonable fees, his failure to account for and return monies,
his misrepresentations, and his failure to comply with Bar
Counsel’s requests all lead to the most severe sanction of
disbarment.”
Id., 793 A.2d at 545.  
In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Manning, this Court disbarred an attorney who
neglected the needs of his clients, failed to communicate with his clients, and who
previously had been suspended for similar violations.  318 Md. at 699-705, 569 A.2d at
1251-54.  We noted:
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“In recent years, however, we have noticed too many instances
when lawyers have agreed to represent clients and accepted
fees, in part or in whole, only to completely neglect these same
legal problems, causing the same clients emotional distress,
financial loss, or other varying kinds of inconvenience.  More
often than not, these situations have been exacerbated by the
lack of respect and attention extended to the courts as evidenced
by the failure to file timely pleadings or to make appearances as
scheduled before the court to enable proceedings to be
conducted.  It seems to us that this kind of persistent conduct is
evidence of a lawyer's disregard of his obligation.”
Id. at 704-05, 569 A.2d at 1254.  Manning’s continual neglect of client matters, evidenced
in part by his prior suspension on similar grounds, demonstrated a pattern warranting
disbarment.  See id. at 705, 569 A.2d at 1254.  
Similarly, in Maryland State Bar Ass’n v. Phoebus, we held that disbarment was the
appropriate sanction for an attorney who persistently neglected client matters and who
previously had been disciplined for analogous misconduct.  276 Md. at 365-66, 347 A.2d
at 562-63.  We emphasized that
“[b]ecause of the vital role an attorney, licensed to practice,
plays in the legal process, he must act with competence and
proper care in representing his clients.  His admission to the Bar
attests to the public that he has met the standards for admission
and is competent to discharge his duties toward his clients with
strictest fidelity.  Once retained he must carefully safeguard the
interests of his client, must be diligent in his representation of
the client’s interest, must give appropriate attention to his legal
work, and must observe the utmost good faith in his
professional relationship.”  
Id. at 361, 347 A.2d at 560-61.  Phoebus’ habitual neglect of client matters indicated that
the prior sanctions had been ineffective in curing his prior history of neglect.  See id. at 365,
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347 A.2d at 562-63.  This Court disbarred Phoebus, stating that “to order otherwise . . .
would convey to the public, implicitly, a misrepresentation that the respondent continues to
possess those basic attributes, required of all members of the bar, that they will act with
proper care in representing their clients and will, with strictest fidelity, diligently attend their
clients' interests.”  Id. at 366, 347 A.2d at 563.
Respondent’s conduct exhibits a similar pattern of neglect.  In the instant case,
respondent failed to complete two bankruptcy cases.  Following initial meetings with his
clients, respondent did not remain in contact with them and did not keep them apprised of
the status of their cases.  Months passed during which respondent ignored attempts to
contact him and made no progress on the matters under his care.  In Ms. Griffith’s case,
respondent told her that he had filed her bankruptcy petition when, in fact, nothing had been
filed; another attorney completed the filing.  Respondent’s conduct evidences an inexcusable
pattern of neglect of client matters, failure to communicate with clients, and failure to
terminate representation so as reasonably to protect client interests. 
Furthermore, respondent presented little or no mitigating evidence to this Court.
Although respondent alleges in his pleadings before this Court that he was under the care
of a psychiatrist for a suicide attempt, he never presented any evidence before the hearing
judge or this Court in support of this bald statement.  In aggravation, respondent has a record
of two prior disciplinary actions for lack of diligence.  On August 31, 1999, respondent was
7Maryland Rule 1.7(b) (Conflict of interest) provides as follows:
“(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation
of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer’s
responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the
lawyer’s own interests, unless:
“(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
be adversely affected; and
“(2) the client consents after consultation.”
8Maryland Rule 1.15 (Safekeeping property) provides as follows:
“ (a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons
that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a
representation separate from the lawyer's own property.
Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant
to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules. Other
property shall be identified as such and appropriately
safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and of
other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be
preserved for a period of five years after termination of the
representation.
“(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client
or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify
the client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or
otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a
lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any
funds or other property that the client or third person is
entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third
person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding
such property.
“(c) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in
possession of property in which both the lawyer and another
person claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by
the lawyer until there is an accounting and severance of their
interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective
interests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the
lawyer until the dispute is resolved.”
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suspended, by consent, for a period of thirty days for violating Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.7(b),7
and 1.158 in connection with three client complaints.  In April 2001, respondent received a
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public reprimand, by consent, for violating Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 because he allowed
a divorce case to languish for over four years while retaining the fee. 
We hold that disbarment is the appropriate sanction.  The name of Mark Andrew
Faber will be stricken from the rolls of those authorized to practice law in this State. 
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY
THE 
CLERK 
OF 
THIS 
COURT,
I N C L U D I N G  
C O S T S  
O F  
A LL
TRANSCRIPTS, 
P U R SUANT 
TO
MARYLAND RULE 16-761(B), FOR WHICH
SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR
OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION AGAINST MARK ANDREW
FABER.