Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V DENNIS L NICKENS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 123992

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2004-07-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 20, 2004 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 123992 
DENNIS L. NICKENS, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
CAVANAGH, J.  
Defendant was charged with criminal sexual conduct in 
the first degree (CSC-I) involving personal injury and the 
use of force or coercion to accomplish sexual penetration, 
MCL 750.520b(1)(f). Over defendant’s objections, the trial 
court additionally instructed the jury on assault with 
intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration, MCL 
750.520g(1). 
The jury acquitted defendant of the CSC-I 
charge, but found him guilty of assault with intent to 
commit CSC. 
We granted leave to appeal to consider whether assault 
with intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration, MCL 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
750.520g(1), is included within the offense of first-degree 
CSC involving personal injury and the use of force or 
coercion 
to 
accomplish 
sexual 
penetration, 
MCL 
750.520b(1)(f).1  The Court of Appeals held that because MCL 
750.520g(1) was not a necessarily lesser included offense 
of MCL 750.520b(1)(f), the trial court erred by instructing 
the jury on the assault offense.2  We hold that the trial 
court did not err in its instruction to the jury because 
the assault offense is a necessarily lesser included 
offense of first-degree CSC involving personal injury and 
the 
use 
of 
force 
or 
coercion 
to 
accomplish 
sexual 
penetration. 
Therefore, we reverse the decision of the 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
and 
reinstate 
defendant’s 
assault 
conviction. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
We adopt as our own the following facts set forth by 
the Court of Appeals: 
Defendant’s 
conviction 
arises 
from 
allegations that he sexually assaulted his former
girlfriend. 
The complainant and defendant dated
intermittently for several years and had two 
children. 
At some point, the complainant began
dating another man named Frank. According to the
complainant, defendant did not accept this new
relationship. 
When the complainant ultimately 
1 469 Mich 949 (2003). 
2 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 24, 2003
(Docket No. 237794). 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ended her relationship with Frank in August 2000,
she discussed the possibility of reconciling with
defendant. 
On September 9, 2000, at approximately 4:30
a.m., 
the 
complainant 
claimed 
that 
Frank 
unexpectedly came to her home and stayed for half
an hour. According to the complainant, defendant
called during this time and “exchanged some 
words” with Frank over the telephone. Later that 
day, 
the 
complainant 
stated 
that 
defendant 
visited 
her 
house. 
The 
complainant
testified . . . that defendant straddled her,
tore her clothes, and pulled down her pants.
Throughout the assault, the complainant asserted
that defendant accused her of being intimate with
Frank, called her derogatory names, and punched
her repeatedly in the head. 
The complainant indicated that defendant 
subsequently dragged her into her bedroom, pushed
her over a chair, and punched her in the stomach.
Defendant then told her to stand up, pushed her
backwards, and said, “[s]uck my [penis], bit--.”
The complainant claimed that when she attempted
to stand up, defendant punched her in the stomach
again and caused her to regurgitate. 
Defendant 
ultimately pulled her head up, placed his penis
on the side of her mouth, and ejaculated “all
over” her. 
As a result of defendant’s actions,
the complainant stated that she suffered a blood
clot in her stomach, bruising on her chest and
left eye, and a swollen left cheek. On September
14th, the complainant reported the sexual assault
to the police. 
She later obtained a personal
protective order against defendant. 
Defendant 
was 
charged 
with 
CSC-I 
under 
MCL 
750.520b(1)(f). 
A 
jury 
trial 
was 
held 
and, 
over 
defendant’s 
objections, 
the 
trial 
court 
additionally 
instructed the jury on assault with intent to commit CSC 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
involving sexual penetration, MCL 750.520g(1).3
 The jury 
acquitted defendant of the CSC-I charge, but found him 
guilty of assault with intent to commit CSC. 
On appeal, 
the Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that under this 
Court’s decision in People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335, 357; 
646 NW2d 127 (2002), the trial court erred by instructing 
the jury on the lesser offense because MCL 750.520g(1) is 
not 
a 
necessarily 
lesser 
included 
offense 
of 
MCL 
750.520b(1)(f). 
We granted the prosecution’s application 
for leave to appeal. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether assault with intent to commit CSC involving 
sexual penetration is included within the offense of CSC-I 
involving personal injury and the use of force or coercion 
to accomplish sexual penetration is a question of law, 
which this Court reviews de novo. 
People v Mendoza, 468 
Mich 527, 531; 664 NW2d 685 (2003). 
3 The trial court also instructed the jury on the
offense of aggravated assault, MCL 750.81a(1). 
However,
the jury did not find defendant guilty of this offense and,
thus, we express no opinion on the validity of the trial
court’s instruction on this offense. 
4  
 
 
 
 
    
                                                 
 
 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Cornell and MCL 768.32 
In Cornell, supra at 357, this Court held that, under 
MCL 768.32,4 a lesser offense instruction is appropriate 
only if the lesser offense is necessarily included in the 
greater offense. “Necessarily included lesser offenses are 
offenses in which the elements of the lesser offense are 
completely subsumed in the greater offense.” 
Mendoza, 
supra at 532 n 3. Thus, an instruction on a lesser offense 
is proper where “all the elements of the lesser offense are 
included in the greater offense, and a rational view of the 
evidence would support such an instruction.” Id. at 533.5 
Further, in Cornell this Court expressly stated that 
the decision in that case would apply “to those cases 
pending on appeal in which the issue has been raised and 
4 MCL 768.32(1) provides in pertinent part: 
[U]pon 
an 
indictment 
for 
an 
offense,
consisting of different degrees, as prescribed in
this chapter, the jury, or the judge in a trial
without a jury, may find the accused not guilty
of the offense in the degree charged in the
indictment and may find the accused person guilty
of a degree of that offense inferior to that
charged in the indictment, or of an attempt to
commit that offense. 
5 I remain committed to my position in People v 
Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 548-556 (CAVANAGH, J., concurring).
Nonetheless, this Court’s decisions in Cornell and Mendoza 
are the current law in the state of Michigan. 
5  
 
 
 
 
  
preserved.” 
Cornell, supra at 367. Here, defense counsel 
objected to the trial court giving the lesser offense 
instructions. 
Moreover, neither the prosecution nor 
defendant asserts that the issue is unpreserved. 
Because 
defendant’s case was pending on appeal and the alleged 
error was raised and preserved for review, our decision, by 
the express directive in Cornell, applies to this case. 
Thus, the instruction on assault with intent to commit CSC 
involving sexual penetration was appropriate if such an 
offense is a necessarily lesser included offense of CSC-I 
involving personal injury and the use of force or coercion 
to accomplish sexual penetration. 
B. The Elements of Assault with Intent to Commit CSC 
Involving Sexual Penetration 
MCL 750.520g(1) states, “Assault with intent to commit 
criminal sexual conduct involving sexual penetration shall 
be a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 
years.” 
This Court has not had occasion to formally 
delineate the elements of this particular offense. Relying 
on its own case law, however, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that the elements of assault with intent to 
commit CSC involving sexual penetration are as follows: 
“(1) an assault; (2) with an improper sexual purpose or 
intent; 
(3) 
an 
intent 
to 
commit 
an 
act 
involving 
penetration; and (4) an aggravating circumstance.” Slip op 
6  
 
 
 
 
at 2 n 2. 
Because we believe that the Court of Appeals 
misinterprets MCL 750.520g(1), we reject its definition of 
that offense. 
We hold that the elements of assault with intent to 
commit CSC involving penetration are simply (1) an assault, 
and 
(2) 
an 
intent 
to 
commit 
CSC 
involving 
sexual 
penetration. 
Nothing in MCL 750.520g(1) requires the 
existence of an aggravating circumstance or that the 
assault is made with an improper sexual purpose or intent. 
Further, “[w]hen a statute sets forth a crime and its 
punishment without designating its elements, courts must 
look to the common law for guidance.” People v Langworthy, 
416 Mich 630, 643 n 22; 331 NW2d 171 (1982). 
An assault “’is made out from either an attempt to 
commit a battery or an unlawful act which places another in 
reasonable 
apprehension 
of 
receiving 
an 
immediate 
battery.’” 
People v Johnson, 407 Mich 196, 210; 284 NW2d 
718 (1979), quoting People v Sanford, 402 Mich 460, 479; 
265 NW2d 1 (1978). 
The first type is referred to as an 
“attempted-battery assault,” whereas the second is referred 
to as an “apprehension-type assault.” People v Reeves, 458 
Mich 236, 244; 580 NW2d 433 (1998). 
As such, an assault 
can occur in one of two ways. 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, a “battery is an intentional, unconsented 
and harmful or offensive touching of the person of another, 
or of something closely connected with the person.” Id. at 
240 n 4. 
Therefore, a battery is the successful 
accomplishment of an attempted-battery assault. 
See 
Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed, 1982), p 151 
(“[W]hen we speak of an assault we usually have in mind a 
battery which was attempted or threatened. The attempt may 
have failed or it may have succeeded. 
If it failed it 
constitutes an assault only. 
If it succeeded it is an 
assault and battery.”); see also MCL 750.81. 
Stated 
differently, an attempted-battery assault is a necessarily 
lesser included offense of a completed battery because it 
is impossible to commit a battery without first committing 
an attempted-battery assault. 
C. The Elements of First-Degree CSC Involving Personal 
Injury and the Use of Force or Coercion to Accomplish 
Sexual Penetration  
MCL 750.520b provides in pertinent part: 
(1) A person is guilty of criminal sexual
conduct in the first degree if he or she engages
in sexual penetration with another person and if
any of the following circumstances exists: 
* * * 
(f) The actor causes personal injury to the
victim 
and 
force 
or 
coercion 
is 
used 
to 
accomplish 
penetration. 
Force 
or 
coercion 
includes but is not limited to any of the 
following circumstances: 
8  
 
 
 
 
(i) When the actor overcomes the victim 
through the actual application of physical force
or physical violence. 
(ii) When the actor coerces the victim to 
submit by threatening to use force or violence on
the victim, and the victim believes that the
actor has the present ability to execute these 
threats. 
(iii) When the actor coerces the victim to 
submit by threatening to retaliate in the future
against the victim, or any other person, and the
victim believes that the actor has the ability to
execute 
this 
threat. 
As 
used 
in 
this 
subdivision, “to retaliate” includes threats of
physical punishment, kidnapping, or extortion. 
(iv) When the actor engages in the medical
treatment or examination of the victim in a 
manner or for purposes which are medically
recognized as unethical or unacceptable. 
(v) When the actor, through concealment or
by the element of surprise, is able to overcome
the victim. 
Thus, 
an 
actor 
may 
be 
found 
guilty 
under 
MCL 
750.520b(1)(f) if the actor (1) causes personal injury to 
the victim, (2) engages in sexual penetration with the 
victim, and (3) uses force or coercion to accomplish the 
sexual penetration. 
D. “Assault With Intent to Commit CSC Involving Sexual 
Penetration” is a Necessarily Lesser Included Offense of 
CSC-I Involving Personal Injury and the Use of Force or 
Coercion to Accomplish Sexual Penetration  
The issue for this Court to resolve is whether CSC-I, 
under MCL 750.520b(1)(f), always includes an “assault with 
intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration,” MCL 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
750.520g(1). 
In other words, are all the elements of MCL 
750.520g(1) subsumed into MCL 750.520b(1)(f) such that one 
cannot commit CSC-I involving personal injury and the use 
of force or coercion to accomplish sexual penetration 
without first committing an assault with intent to commit 
CSC involving sexual penetration? 
We hold that the 
elements are subsumed and, therefore, MCL 750.520g(1) is a 
necessarily lesser included offense of MCL 750.520b(1)(f). 
In every instance where an actor commits CSC-I 
involving personal injury and uses force or coercion to 
accomplish sexual penetration, the actor first commits an 
attempted-battery assault with the intent to commit CSC 
involving 
sexual 
penetration. 
The 
term 
“force 
or 
coercion,” as contained in MCL 750.520b(1)(f), necessarily 
contemplates a situation in which an assault has occurred. 
If, 
for 
example, 
the 
actor 
uses 
physical 
force 
to 
accomplish sexual penetration, a nonconsensual and harmful 
touching has occurred. 
Because a battery includes an 
attempted-battery assault, an assault has also occurred. 
Likewise, if the actor overcomes the victim by 
coercion, 
a 
nonconsensual 
and 
harmful 
touching 
has 
occurred. 
“The application of force to the person of 
another is not unlawful,—and, therefore, not a battery—if 
the recipient consents to what is done, provided this 
10  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
consent (1) is not coerced or obtained by fraud, (2) is 
given by one legally capable of consenting to such a deed, 
and (3) does not relate to a matter as to which consent 
will not be recognized as a matter of law.” 
Perkins & 
Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed, 1982), p 154 (emphasis added). 
As such, the criminal law views coerced consent as no 
consent at all.6
 Thus, if the victim is coerced into 
agreeing to sexual penetration, the victim cannot be said 
to have lawfully consented and, thus, a battery has 
occurred. 
Because a battery includes an attempted-battery 
assault, an assault has also occurred. 
In sum, nonconsensual sexual penetration with another 
is, in and of itself, an attempted-battery assault and a 
battery. 
As such, the first prong of MCL 750.520g(1), an 
assault, is always satisfied when the actor commits CSC-I 
under MCL 750.520b(1)(f). 
Moreover, we also believe that 
the second prong of MCL 750.520g(1), an intent to commit 
CSC involving sexual penetration, is always satisfied when 
the actor commits CSC-I under MCL 750.520b(1)(f). 
6 “Submission under fear is not ‘consent’ as the word 
is used in the law. 
If a man said, ‘I consent to be
slapped,’ at the point of a pistol and in fear of instant
death if he did not say so, this would be no real consent
to the slapping and the blow would constitute a battery.”
Id. at 155 
11  
 
 
     
                                                 
 
 
 
  
We can envision no circumstance in which an actor 
could unintentionally or accidentally use force or coercion 
to sexually penetrate his victim and, therefore, lacked the 
necessary 
mens 
rea 
under 
MCL 
750.520g(1) 
or 
MCL 
750.520b(1)(f). 
We acknowledge that CSC-I is a general 
intent crime. 
Langworthy, supra at 645. 
We are further 
cognizant that assault with intent to commit CSC involving 
sexual penetration may be viewed as a specific intent 
crime. 
Under these circumstances, however, this is a 
distinction without a difference.7 
7 This Court has recently noted that “the enactment of
MCL 768.37, which abolished the defense of voluntary
intoxication 
except 
in 
one 
narrow 
circumstance, 
has 
significantly diminished the need to categorize crimes as
being either ‘specific’ or ‘general’ intent crimes.” 
People v Maynor, 470 Mich __, __; __ NW2d __ (2004)
(opinion by Taylor, J.). 
Additionally, we find this Court’s reasoning in 
Langworthy persuasive in this particular case.  Although
the issue in Langworthy was whether CSC-I was a general or
specific intent crime, this Court made the following
observations: 
[W]e reject defendant’s argument that if an
applicable lesser included offense of a criminal
sexual conduct offense requires specific intent,
it necessarily follows that the greater offense
also requires proof of specific intent. . . .
We concur with the United States Court of 
Appeals, writing in United States v Thornton, 162
US App DC 207, 210-211; 498 F2d 749 (1974): 
“Actually, 
as 
has 
been 
stated, 
‘[A]ll
attempts require specific intent’; so if it were
to follow appellant’s logic of superimposing the
(continued…) 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
E. Application 
The trial court properly instructed the jury on the 
lesser offense of assault with intent to commit CSC 
involving sexual penetration. 
An instruction on a lesser 
offense is proper where “all the elements of the lesser 
offense are included in the greater offense, and a rational 
view of the evidence would support such an instruction.” 
Mendoza, supra at 533. 
First, MCL 750.520g(1) is a 
necessarily lesser included offense of MCL 750.520b(1)(f). 
Additionally, a rational view of the evidence indicates 
that there was sufficient support for the instruction on 
MCL 
750.520g(1). 
The 
testimony 
of 
the 
complainant 
presented at trial indicates that defendant tore off the 
(…continued)
specific intent of an included crime upon the
greater offense, a specific intent would be 
required for practically every crime. This could 
not be the law. 
The differing requirements for
lesser 
offenses 
result 
principally 
from 
the 
differing nature of the crimes and from their
historical and legislative definitions. 
The 
requirement of a specific intent for lesser 
crimes exists because of a desire to protect the
individual against conviction on slight evidence.
The 
same 
protection 
is 
unnecessary 
where 
substantial overt acts are committed and fully
consummated offenses are provable. 
There is no 
rule of law that crimes which carry greater
punishment require the proof of greater, or even 
the same, criminal intent as included or related 
crimes which carry lesser punishment. . . .” 
[Langworthy, supra at 644-645 (emphasis added).] 
13  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
complainant’s clothes; repeatedly beat her; stated, “[s]uck 
my [penis], bit--;” placed his penis on the side of the 
complainant’s mouth; and ejaculated on the complainant.8 
Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err by 
instructing the jury on assault with intent to commit CSC 
involving sexual penetration. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We conclude that assault with intent to commit CSC 
involving 
sexual 
penetration, 
MCL 
750.520g(1), 
is 
a 
necessarily lesser included offense of CSC-I involving 
personal injury and the use of force or coercion to 
accomplish 
sexual 
penetration, 
MCL 
750.520b(1)(f). 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of 
Appeals and reinstate defendant’s assault conviction. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
8 Because MCL 750.520g(1) is a necessarily lesser
included 
offense 
of 
MCL 
750.520b(1)(f)—i.e., 
it 
is 
impossible to commit the latter without first committing 
the former—and the facts alleged supported the lesser 
instruction, defendant was on notice of the included 
offense and was not prejudiced by the instruction. 
See, 
e.g., People v Adams, 389 Mich 222, 242-244; 205 NW2d 415
(1973); see also Schmuck v United States, 489 US 705, 717­
719; 109 S Ct 1443; 103 L Ed 2d 734 (1989). 
14