Case Title: Jesus Fuentes, as a Parent of a Disabled Child v. Board of Education of the City of New York

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-04-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 51  
Jesus Fuentes, as a Parent of a 
Disabled Child, 
            Appellant, 
        v. 
Board of Education of the City of 
New York, Barry Mastellone, 
Administrator of the HHVI of the 
Board of Education of the City of 
New York, and Denise Washington, 
Chief Administrator of the 
Impartial Hearing Office of the 
Board of Education of the City of 
New York, 
            Respondents.
David J. Lansner, for appellant.
Scott Shorr, for respondents.
JONES, J.:
In this certified question case, we are called upon to
decide whether a non-custodial parent retains the right to make
decisions regarding the child's education where the divorce
decree and custody order are silent on this issue.  The pertinent
facts of this case are recited below.
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Plaintiff Jesus Fuentes and his wife were divorced in
1996.  Family Court entered an order granting the wife exclusive
custody of the three children, including a son, M.F., who, due to
a genetic disorder, was legally blind.  M.F. attended public
school in New York City and received special education services
to accommodate his disability.  
In 2000, plaintiff believed that M.F.'s special
education services and accommodations were inadequate and
requested a reevaluation.  When the Committee on Special
Education for the Hearing, Handicapped, and Visually Impaired
responded that M.F's services were adequate, plaintiff requested
a hearing from the Impartial Hearing Office of the New York State
Department of Education to review that determination.  In 2001,
plaintiff's request for a hearing was denied based on his status
as the non-custodial parent of M.F.  The Office concluded that
because plaintiff was not the "person in parental relation"
(Education Law § 3212), he did not have the right to make
educational decisions pertaining to M.F. and, consequently, did
not have a right to request a hearing.
Plaintiff then commenced an action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York alleging,
among other things, that he was denied his right under the
federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) to a
hearing to review the determinations of the Board of Education. 
After a dismissal, appeal, and remand on issues not pertinent to
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the certified question, the district court dismissed plaintiff's
case for lack of standing under the IDEA.  On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that no
precedent from this Court directly addressed the dispositive
issue and certified the following question:
"Whether, under New York Law, the biological
and non-custodial parent of a child retains
the right to participate in decisions
pertaining to the education of the child
where (1) the custodial parent is granted
exclusive custody of the child and (2) the
divorce decree and custody order are silent
as to the right to control such decisions"
(Fuentes v Board of Educ of the City of New York, 540 F3d 145,
153 [2d Cir 2008]). 
The purpose of the IDEA is to provide "all children
with disabilities" with a "free appropriate public education" (20
USC § 1400 [d] [1] [A]).  Such an education must include "special
education and related services" designed to meet the particular
needs of the child (20 USC § 1401 [9]).  A qualifying child's
educational needs "and the services required to meet those needs
must be set forth at least annually in a written individualized
education plan ('IEP')" (M.C. ex rel. Mrs. C. v Voluntown Bd. of
Educ., 226 F3d 60, 62 [2d Cir 2000]).  A "parent" who is
dissatisfied with an IEP "may file a complaint with the state or
local educational agency," to be resolved through a due process
hearing (id. at 62-63).
The Second Circuit previously discussed a non-custodial
parent's rights under the IDEA in Taylor v Vermont Dept. of Educ.
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(313 F3d 768 [2d Cir 2002]).  In Taylor, a non-custodial parent
demanded a hearing under the IDEA even though her Vermont divorce
decree expressly provided that the custodial parent was
"allocate[d] all legal rights and physical rights regarding the
choice of schooling for the child" (id. at 772).  The Court
concluded that the federal statutory scheme required the courts
to turn to state law "to establish which potential parent has
authority to make special education decisions for the child" (id.
at 779).  Applying Vermont law, the Court held that the non-
custodial parent lacked standing to request a hearing under the
IDEA because her "parental right to participate in her daughter's
education has been revoked by a Vermont family court" (id. at
782).
This case presents an issue unanswered by Taylor --
namely, whether a non-custodial parent has the right to initiate
a hearing under the IDEA where the New York divorce decree and
custody order grant exclusive custody to the custodial parent but
are silent as to who has the authority to make decisions
concerning the child's education.  In Weiss v Weiss (52 NY2d 170
[1981]), a Judge of this Court first alluded to the principle
that a custodial parent has the right, absent controlling
contrary provisions in a separation agreement, to determine the
child's secular and religious education program (id. at 177
[Meyer, J. concurring]).  It is now well settled in the Appellate
Division that, absent specific provisions in a separation
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agreement, custody order, or divorce decree, the custodial parent
has sole decision-making authority with respect to practically
all aspects of the child's upbringing (see e.g., Fedash v
Neilsen, 211 AD2d 1003 [3d Dept 1995]; De Luca v De Luca, 202
AD2d 580 [2d Dept 1994]; De Beer v De Beer, 162 AD2d 165 [1st
Dept 1990]; Stevenot v Stevenot, 133 AD2d 820 [2d Dept 1987];
Bliss v Ach, 86 AD2d 575 [1st Dept 1982]).
In appropriate circumstances, courts routinely include
specific provisions in custody orders addressing decision-making
authority between the parents (see e.g., Wideman v Wideman, 38
AD3d 1381 [4th Dept 2007]; Chamberlain v Chamberlain, 24 AD3d 589
[2d Dept 2005]; Davis v Davis, 240 AD2d 928 [3d Dept 1997]). 
Plaintiff asks this Court to recognize an implied right of non-
custodial parents to exercise decision-making authority with
respect to their child's education notwithstanding the custody
order's silence on this subject.  We decline to do so and
emphasize the importance of parties determining these issues at
the time of separation or divorce. 
Finally, we note the distinction between a non-
custodial parent's right to "participate" in a child's education
and the right to "control" educational decisions.  Generally,
there is nothing which prevents a non-custodial parent (even one
without any decision making authority) from requesting
information about, keeping apprised of, or otherwise remaining
interested in the child's educational progress.  Such parental
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involvement is to be encouraged.  However, unless the custody
order expressly permits joint decision-making authority or
designates particular authority with respect to the child's
education, a non-custodial parent has no right to "control" such
decisions.  This authority properly belongs to the custodial
parent.  In light of our discussion, we see fit to reformulate
the certified question to read as follows:
Whether, under New York Law, the non-
custodial parent of a child retains decision-
making authority pertaining to the education
of the child where (1) the custodial parent
is granted exclusive custody of the child and
(2) the divorce decree and custody order are
silent as to the right to control such
decisions.
Accordingly, as reformulated, the certified question
should be answered in the negative. 
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   * 
Following certification of a question by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit and acceptance of the question
by this Court pursuant to section 500.27 of the Rules of Practice
of the New York State Court of Appeals, and after hearing
argument by counsel for the parties and consideration of the
briefs and the record submitted, certified question, as
reformulated, answered in the negative.  Opinion by Judge Jones.
Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith and Pigott concur.  Chief
Judge Lippman took no part.
Decided April 30, 2009