Case Title: In re F.C.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12438

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-05-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12438 
 
IN THE MATTER OF F.C. 
 
 
May 17, 2018. 
 
 
Mental Health.  Practice, Civil, Commitment of mentally ill 
person, Moot case.  Moot Question. 
 
 
 
Following F.C.'s involuntary hospitalization at McLean 
Hospital, the hospital filed a petition for his commitment under 
G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8, and for other relief, pursuant G. L. 
c. 123, § 8B.  A judge in the District Court denied F.C.'s first 
and only request to continue the hearing date, and a hearing was 
held, which resulted in F.C.'s involuntary commitment and 
treatment.  F.C. appealed to the Appellate Division of the 
District Court.  His appeal was stayed pending this court's 
decision in Matter of N.L., 476 Mass. 632, 633 (2017) 
(dismissing appeal as moot, but concluding that first 
continuance request "is mandatory where a denial thereof is 
reasonably likely to prejudice [a patient's] ability to prepare 
a meaningful defense").  In the interim, F.C.'s condition 
improved, and he was discharged from the facility.  Citing 
Matter of N.L., supra, the Appellate Division summarily 
dismissed the appeal as moot.  F.C. now appeals from the order 
of the Appellate Division dismissing the appeal.   
 
 
We transferred the case from the Appeals Court on our own 
motion to clarify that nothing we stated in Matter of N.L., 
supra, was intended to require the dismissal of such appeals as 
moot, or otherwise to change the appellate process for appeals 
involving commitment, treatment, and other orders issued 
pursuant to G. L. c. 123, §§ 7, 8, and 8B, that have expired.  
In this case, the Appellate Division erred in summarily 
dismissing F.C.'s appeal as moot in reliance on Matter of N.L., 
2 
 
 
 
something that was neither raised nor decided in that case.1  See 
Seney v. Morhy, 467 Mass. 58, 61 (2014) (because of continuing 
interest at stake, appeals of expired harassment protection 
orders are not moot and should be reviewed on their merits).  
Contrast Allen v. Allen, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 403, 406-407 (2016) 
(in context of terminated order pursuant to G. L. c. 209A, 
appeal moot because "defendant has obtained all relief she could 
obtain by means of a successful appeal").   
 
 
Appeals from expired or terminated commitment and treatment 
orders under G. L. c. 123, §§ 7, 8, and 8B, like appeals from 
expired harassment prevention orders (G. L. c. 258E) or expired 
abuse prevention orders (G. L. 209A), "should not be dismissed 
as moot where the parties have a continuing interest in the 
case."  See Seney v. Morhy, 467 Mass. at 62.  At the very least, 
a person who has been wrongfully committed or treated 
involuntarily has "a surviving interest in establishing that the 
orders were not lawfully issued, thereby, to a limited extent, 
removing a stigma from his name and record."2 Id., quoting 
                                                          
 
 
1 In Matter of N.L., 476 Mass. 632 (2017), this court was 
not asked to decide whether N.L. had a continuing personal stake 
in the expired order.  The court observed only that appellate 
review of "[i]ssues involving the commitment and treatment of 
mentally ill persons are generally considered matters of public 
importance," and that such issues, even where moot, "present 
'classic examples' of issues that are capable of repetition, yet 
evading review." Id. at 635, quoting Newton-Wellesley Hosp. v. 
Magrini, 451 Mass. 777, 782 (2007).  Matter of N.L. should not 
be interpreted to require or permit dismissal of an appeal 
concerning the commitment and treatment of mentally ill persons 
without consideration of the merits of the appeal.   
  
 
2 The expired involuntary commitment order at issue in 
Matter of N.L. was entered prior to January 1, 2015, the 
effective date of G. L. c. 123, § 36C.  That statute now 
requires the transmission of certain identifying and nonclinical 
information about a person who has been involuntarily committed 
to the Department of Criminal Justice Information Services, 
which in turn submits to the United States Attorney General 
information required or permitted by Federal law to be included 
in the national instant criminal background check system.  G. L. 
c. 6, § 167A (h).  Although we conclude that a patient's 
continuing interest in removing stigma associated with an 
involuntary commitment is sufficient to require an appeal to be 
decided on its merits, we recognize that the statute itself may 
implicate ongoing Federal collateral consequences, providing an 
3 
 
 
 
Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 638 (1998) (abuse 
prevention order).  Although an expired or terminated order may 
no longer have operative effect, the appeal should not be 
dismissed without considering the merits of the underlying 
order.  See Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 
374 Mass. 271, 276 (1978) ("[m]ental illness does not carry the 
same stigma it once did, but we are not prepared to say that the 
stigma has entirely disappeared"). 
 
 
We therefore vacate the order of the Appellate Division 
dismissing the appeal as moot.  We remand the case to the 
Appellate Division for determination of the appeal on its 
merits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
Alice Whitehill Wiseberg, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services (Courtney A. Dunn Logan, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, also present) for F.C. 
 
 
Diane M. Geraghty Hall for S.L.R. 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
additional reason for needing to resolve the appeal on the 
merits.  See, e.g., In the Interest of B.A.C., 902 N.W.2d 767, 
770 (N.D. 2017) (actual controversy on appeal where Federal 
firearms restriction is collateral consequence of court's order 
of involuntary hospitalization).