Case Title: SELLERS AND SELLERS v. DOOLEY OIL TRANSPORT

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
SELLERS AND SELLERS v. DOOLEY OIL TRANSPORT2001 WY 4422 P.3d 307Case Number: 00-112Decided: 05/08/2001
 
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2001

                                                                                                            

DAVID 
SELLERS and MELONIE SELLERS,      

Appellants(Plaintiffs),

v.

DOOLEY 
OIL TRANSPORT and

GERALD 
D. HANSON,

Appellees(Defendants).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge 

Representing 
Appellant:

Carol K. 
Watson and Bernard Q. Phelan of Phelan-Watson Law Office, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Watson.

 Representing 
Appellee:

            
W. Henry Combs, III, of Murane & Bostwick, LLC, Casper, 
Wyoming.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., GOLDEN, KITE, JJ, and SPANGLER, D.J. 
(Retired).

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 [¶1]           
This 
appeal stems from a jury verdict in an automobile accident liability case.  The sole issue is the propriety of a 
certain given jury instruction.  The 
jury instruction was based upon Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-207 (Lexis 1999).  We hold that the trial court's 
instructing on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-207 under the facts of this case 
constituted prejudicial error and, therefore, reverse and remand for a new 
trial.

ISSUE

[¶2]           
Appellants 
David and Melonie Sellers phrase the issue as:

Whether 
the district court committed prejudicial error in instructing the jury on the 
law contained in Wyo. Stat. § 31-5-207 without also giving the exception thereto 
delineated in Wyo. Stat. § 31-5-201(a)(ii).

Appellees 
Dooley Oil Transport and Gerald D. Hanson rephrase the issue slightly 
as:

Should 
the district court have included Wyo. Stat. § 31-5-201(a)(ii) in Instruction No. 
16 which comprised Wyo. Stat. § 31-5-207(a) and (b).

FACTS

[¶3]           
This 
case arises from an automobile accident that occurred on I-80 between Laramie 
and Cheyenne.  At the time of the 
accident, David Sellers was driving his automobile east on I-80.  Melonie Sellers, his wife, was a 
passenger in the automobile.  
Appellee Hanson also was driving east on I-80.  Hanson, who worked for Appellee Dooley 
Oil Transport, was driving a Rocky Mountain doubles tanker.  The accident occurred on the portion of 
I-80 heading east from Laramie to the summit at Lincoln Monument, locally known 
as Telephone Canyon.

[¶4]           
In April 
1997, the time of the accident, the east-bound roadway of this section of I-80 
was under construction.  
Consequently, east-bound traffic was diverted for a short distance into 
the west-bound roadway and then channeled back again into the normal east-bound 
roadway.  The west-bound roadway had 
three lanes of traffic.  The 
diverted east-bound traffic had two lanes and west-bound traffic had one lane, 
with a concrete barrier separating opposing lanes of traffic. 

[¶5]           
The 
accident occurred in a transition zone where east-bound traffic was tapered from 
two lanes into one lane immediately before being shifted back to the east-bound 
roadway.  This transition zone 
included signs stating "do not pass" as well as signs reducing the speed limit 
and indicating right lane ending.  A 
sequential chevron marked the beginning of the tapering of two lanes into one 
lane, accomplished by orange barrels placed on the roadway that gradually 
blocked off the right lane.  The end 
result is that the right lane was dropped and the left lane continued 
through.

[¶6]           
Within 
this transition zone, Hanson shifted his tanker from the right lane into the 
left lane.  At that time, the 
Sellers' car was driving along-side Hanson and was caught between the tanker and 
the concrete barrier.  As a result 
of the impact with the tanker, the Sellers' car was jammed under the tanker and 
was caught there for a short distance before breaking free and eventually coming 
to rest next to the concrete barrier.  
Hanson stopped somewhat further down the highway.  Fortunately, none of the parties 
received any serious physical injuries. 

[¶7]           
At 
trial, Appellants claimed that Hanson was negligent by failing to see the 
Sellers' vehicle and yield to it before shifting into the left lane.  Appellees claimed Dave Sellers was 
negligent in attempting to pass Hanson in a no-passing zone.  Appellees offered a jury instruction 
based upon Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-207(a) and (b) which applies to no-passing 
zones.  Appellants objected to a 
partial instruction upon Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-207.   Appellants specifically requested 
subsection (c) of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-207 be included because the subsection 
contains certain exceptions to the no-passing statute.  The particular exception which the 
Appellants believe applies to the case is stated in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-5-201(a)(ii) to the effect that a driver can drive to the left of the center 
of the roadway if the driver's regular lane of travel is obstructed, but that 
driver must yield to traffic moving in the proper direction before moving 
left.  

[¶8]           
The 
trial judge agreed with Appellees and gave an instruction based upon Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 31-5-207(a) and (b) without any exception.  Appellants properly objected to such 
instruction.  The jury returned a 
verdict finding Appellant Dave Sellers 50% negligent, Appellant Melonie Sellers 
0% negligent and Appellee Hanson 50% negligent.  This timely appeal 
followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶9]           
When 
examining the propriety of jury instructions, we review all instructions as a 
whole.  "On review, this Court 
considers whether the instructions, taken as a whole, adequately and clearly 
advise the jury of the applicable law."  
Kemper Architects, P.C. v. McFall, Konkel & Kimball Consulting 
Engineers, Inc., 843 P.2d 1178, 1182 (Wyo. 1992).

We have 
said that the function of jury instructions is to give the jury guidance 
regarding the law of the case.  
Hursh Agency, Inc. v. Wigwam Homes, Inc., Wyo., 664 P.2d 27 
(1983).  The trial court is not 
obligated to give an instruction offered by a party as long as the jury is 
adequately instructed on the law as it pertains to that case.  Matter of MLM, Wyo., 682 P.2d 982 
(1984).  The trial court's ruling on 
an instruction will not constitute reversible error absent a showing of 
prejudice, and prejudice will not be said to result unless it is demonstrated 
that the instruction confused or misled the jury with respect to the proper 
principles of law.  Cervelli v. 
Graves, Wyo., 661 P.2d 1032 (1983).

DeJulio 
v. Foster, 715 P.2d 182, 186 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶10]       
In order 
to determine the law of the case, we must interpret the meaning of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 31-5-207 (Lexis 1999) and the exception found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-5-201(a)(ii) (Lexis 1999).  

Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law, so our standard of review is de 
novo. . . . If the conclusion of law is in accordance with the law, we 
affirm it; if it is not, we correct it.  
We endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with the Legislature's 
intent.  We begin by making an 
inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed 
according to their arrangement and connection.  We construe the statute as a whole, 
giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all 
parts of the statute in pari materia.

Cargill 
v. State, Dept. of Health, Div. of Health Care Financing, 967 P.2d 999, 1001 (Wyo. 1998) (citations and quotations 
omitted).

DISCUSSION

[¶11]       
The jury 
instruction objected to, Instruction No. 16, stated: 

You are instructed that Section 
31-5-207 of the Wyoming Statutes provides in part the 
following:

The superintendent and any local 
authorities may determine those portions of any highway under their respective 
jurisdictions where overtaking and passing or driving on the left of the roadway 
would be especially hazardous and may by appropriate signs or markings on the 
roadway indicate the beginning and end of such zones and when the signs or 
markings are in place and clearly visible to an ordinarily observant person 
every driver of a vehicle shall obey the directions 
thereof.

Where signs or markings are in place 
to define a no passing zone as set forth above, no driver shall drive on the 
left side of the roadway within a no passing zone or on the left side of any 
pavement striping designed to mark a no-passing zone throughout its length. 

[¶12]       
In 
comparison, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-207 (Lexis 1999) in its entirety 
states:

No-passing 
zones.

(a)               
The 
superintendent and local authorities may determine those portions of any highway 
under their respective jurisdictions where overtaking and passing or driving on 
the left of the roadway would be especially hazardous and may by appropriate 
signs or markings on the roadway indicate the beginning and end of such zones 
and when the signs or markings are in place and clearly visible to an ordinarily 
observant person every driver of a vehicle shall obey the directions 
thereof.

(b)               
Where 
signs or markings are in place to define a no-passing zone as set forth in 
subsection (a) of this section no driver shall drive on the left side of the 
roadway within a no-passing zone or on the left side of any pavement striping 
designed to mark a no-passing zone throughout its length.

(c)               
This 
section does not apply under the conditions described in W.S. 31-5-201(a)(ii) 
nor to the driver of a vehicle turning left into or from any alley, private road 
or driveway.

[¶13]       
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-5-201(a)(ii) (Lexis 1999) states:

(a)               
Upon all 
roadways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of 
the roadway, except as follows:

* * 
*

(ii)               
When a 
stationary obstruction exists making it necessary to drive to the left of the 
center of the highway but any person so doing shall yield the right-of-way to 
all vehicles traveling in the proper direction upon the unobstructed portion of 
the highway within such distance as to constitute an immediate 
hazard[.]

[¶14]       
Appellants 
requested an instruction that included the exception as found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 31-5-201(a)(ii).  In refusing the 
instruction as proffered by Appellants, the trial court reasoned that the 
exception in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-201(a)(ii) did not apply to the facts of 
this particular case.  Specifically, 
the trial judge ruled that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-201(a)(ii) applies only to 
situations where a driver is forced to enter a lane of opposing traffic in order 
to avoid an obstruction in his lane.  

[¶15]       
On this 
point we agree with the trial judge.  
The language in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-201(a)(ii) limits its application 
to situations where it is "necessary to drive to the left of the center of the 
highway."  The normal and ordinary 
interpretation of the "center of the highway" is the boundary line separating 
opposing lanes of traffic.  Thus, 
the language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-201(a)(ii) clearly limits its application 
to situations where a driver is forced to enter lanes of opposing traffic in 
order to circumvent some obstruction in his ordinary lane of traffic.  The exception does not apply to the 
facts of this case and was therefore correctly rejected by the trial judge as 
part of the jury instruction.1

[¶16]       
Our 
analysis, however, does not end here.  
Having reviewed Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-207, we hold that Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 31-5-207 in its entirety is inapplicable to the facts of this case.  As with the exception found in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-5-201(a)(ii), Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-207 only applies to 
situations involving two-way traffic on one roadway and does not apply in 
construction zones such as the one at issue here.

[¶17]       
The 
statute must be read as a whole.  
"We must give meaning to every word, clause and sentence of the statute 
and the statute should be construed so that no part will be inoperative or 
superfluous."  State Bd. of 
Equalization v. Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc., 611 P.2d 805, 809 (Wyo. 
1980).  Subparagraph (a) of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-5-207 authorizes the appropriate authorities to establish 
no-passing zones in especially hazardous sections of a roadway.  Subparagraph (b) of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§31-5-207 governs specifically the actions of drivers within the no-passing 
zone.  Subparagraph (b) states: "no 
driver shall drive on the left side of the roadway within a no-passing zone or 
on the left side of any pavement striping designed to mark a no-passing zone 
throughout its length."  

[¶18]       
Reading 
subparagraphs (a) and (b) together, the statute intends to cover situations 
where driving on the left side of the roadway is especially hazardous.  There is no hazard involved in driving 
on the left side of the roadway on a one-way roadway.  Indeed, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-205, 
entitled "Additional limitations on driving on the left; exceptions," 
specifically exempts one-way roadways from its prohibitions against driving on 
the left side of the roadway.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-5-205(b)(i) (Lexis 1999).  
Because of the restrictions on driving on the left side of the roadway, 
it is obvious that the hazard contemplated in subparagraph (a) of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 31-5-207 is the possibility of a head-on collision with on-coming 
traffic.  Thus, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-5-207, read as a whole, is intended to apply only to roadways on which 
traffic runs in two directions.  It 
is inapplicable to a multi-lane, one-way roadway.

[¶19]       
Further, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-5-207 is particularly inapplicable to the facts of this 
individual case, which involves an accident that occurred in a construction 
zone.  In a construction zone, the 
normal function of the roadway is suspended.  The statutes are intended to govern 
traffic under normal roadway conditions, not necessarily those conditions found 
in construction zones.  This case 
presents an example of a situation to which Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-207 does not 
apply.

[¶20]       
The language of 
subparagraph (b) of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-207 prohibits driving on the left 
side of the roadway in a no-passing zone.  
It is undisputed that the parties were in a no-passing zone at the time 
of the accident.  The no-passing 
zone was placed there because of a temporary hazard caused by conditions 
necessitated because of road construction.  
As part of the temporary traffic control for the construction zone, the 
parties were required to drive in the left lane in the no-passing zone because 
the right lane of travel was being dropped.  Thus, drivers were being instructed to, 
and at some point every driver had to, drive on the left side of the available 
roadway.  

[¶21]       
Jury Instruction 
No. 16, which specifically instructed the jury that "no driver shall drive on 
the left side of the roadway within a no-passing zone," is a misstatement of the 
law under the specific facts of this case.  
When the jury instructions are read in their entirety, we find this 
instruction to be prejudicial.  
Instruction No. 14 properly instructed the jury that violation of a 
statute is evidence of negligence.  
See generally, Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, 
Inc., 731 P.2d 1195 
(Wyo.1987).  Applying the language 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-207 to the particular facts of this case is confusing 
and misleading.  The instruction, as 
given, could have led the jury to believe that the very presence of Appellants 
in a left lane constituted evidence of negligence.  Under the particular facts of this case, 
that is not a true statement of law.  
Appellants would be quite correct in driving in the left lane in 
preparation for the right lane being dropped.  What Appellants were not allowed to do 
is use the left lane to pass another vehicle.  The statutory duty to not drive on the 
left side of the roadway in a no-passing zone simply does not apply to this 
case.

[¶22]       
Because we 
determine that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-207 does not apply to the facts of this 
case, and instructing the jury thereon constituted prejudicial error, we reverse 
and remand for a new trial.  

FOOTNOTES

1We note 
that jury Instruction No. 15, based upon Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-204, is equally 
inapplicable as it refers to avoiding oncoming traffic when driving to the left 
of center of the roadway to pass another vehicle.