Case Title: Peterson v. Scorsine

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Peterson v. Scorsine1995 WY 104898 P.2d 382Case Number: 94-105Decided: 06/30/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

Karen 
S. PETERSON,

 Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

John M. SCORSINE,

 Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

Appeal 
from District Court of Sweetwater County, Keith G. Kautz, 
J.

Karen S. Peterson, Laramie, 
pro se.

Patrick J. Murphy of 
Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, for appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The primary issue 
to be resolved in this case is whether theories of recovery alleged by Karen S. 
Peterson (Peterson) against her attorney, John M. Scorsine (Scorsine), aside 
from a claim of legal malpractice, serve to avoid a summary judgment against 
her. Peterson's claims stem from Scorsine's representations of her during an 
ongoing dispute with her ex-husband over his failure to comply with certain 
provisions of their 1982 divorce decree. Her contentions are that Scorsine was 
subject to suit for negligence, breach of contract and breach of his fiduciary 
duties, all argued to be different theories from the traditional claim for legal 
malpractice. Peterson also asserts no expert witness was required to demonstrate 
attorney malpractice; the material presented by Scorsine was insufficient to 
sustain the trial court's grant of summary judgment; and she disputes the 
court's finding that she has suffered no damages. We agree with the trial court 
that this is a case seeking recovery for attorney malpractice, and Peterson's 
alternative theories are subsumed by the malpractice claim. It is controlled by 
Moore v. Lubnau, 855 P.2d 1245 (Wyo. 1993). The decision of the trial court is 
correct in this regard; there are no genuine issues of material fact; and the 
summary judgment is affirmed.

[¶2]      In the Brief of 
Appellant, Peterson presents the following issues for 
review:

A.        The trial 
court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment based on Moore v. 
Lubnau, 855 P.2d 1245 (Wyo. 1993) because:

a. 
        
Appellant's claims are based on breach of contract and breach of 
fiduciary duties, which are ethical duties owed clients, and not on a negligence 
theory of malpractice.

b. 
        
The specific duties in appellant's pleadings that she claims appellee 
handled negligently lie well within the lay person's common sense and experience 
sufficient to establish breach of appellee's fiduciary duties of competence and 
diligence. Appellant has not claimed appellee's negligence of these duties in 
order to establish a prima facie case for negligence.

c. 
        
Although appellant has found some authority in other jurisdictions that 
the fiduciary duty of competence may sometimes require expert witness testimony, 
neither of appellee's expert witnesses testified as to appellee's competence 
(skill, diligence or knowledge). Neither provided any statements of recognized 
standards for this duty or any other duty for attorneys who are practicing in 
the state. Appellant has documented considerable evidence with numerous examples 
of appellee's incompetence and lack of knowledge.

B.        The trial 
court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment because the 
record establishes ample evidence of breaches of appellee's ethical (fiduciary) 
duties of loyalty and his responsibility to keep appellant informed and to 
protect her right to make decisions. Not only has appellee failed to provide any 
evidence to indicate he has not breached these duties, but by his own statements 
under oath, he acknowledges his breaches of the duties of loyalty and his 
responsibility to protect appellant's right to make 
decisions.

C.        Breaches of 
a fiduciary relationship in any context comprise a special breed of cases that 
do not require strict adherence to proving the causation/damages connection 
inherent in negligence actions; therefore, speculation as to proximate causation 
is irrelevant.

D.        The trial 
court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment because the issue 
of "damages suffered" in its Finding # 8 is not essential for claims of breach 
of fiduciary duty. Its ruling, however, that "personal service is required to be 
made on a defendant in a domestic relations action filed subsequent to the 
decree of divorce" does not appear to be consistent with either the federal nor 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellant can find no case law to establish 
this "requirement." For her own and others' future edification in similar 
situations when attempting service on out-of-state defendants, appellant would 
appreciate a ruling on this part of the trial court's 
finding.

In the Brief of the 
Appellee, Scorsine states the issues to be:

1.         Did 
the district court correctly grant summary judgment to attorney John Scorsine 
where he supported his motion with expert testimony and appellant did not rebut 
Mr. Scorsine's summary judgment motion with any opposing expert 
testimony?

2.         Did 
the district court correctly grant summary judgment to attorney John Scorsine 
where plaintiff's evidence of proximate causation and damages was 
speculative?

3.         
Should summary judgment also be affirmed where plaintiff has made no 
effort to mitigate or avoid her alleged loss?

[¶3]      Peterson and her 
ex-husband, Stephen L. Peterson (Mr. Peterson), were divorced in August of 1982 
by a decree of divorce entered in Sweetwater County. Peterson was the plaintiff 
in the divorce action, and Mr. Peterson, although served with process in 
Virginia, did not appear in the Wyoming court, answer the complaint, or come to 
Wyoming for the hearing. The decree awarded Peterson custody of the two minor 
children of the marriage, and Mr. Peterson was ordered to pay $400 per month in 
child support for both children. In addition, the decree provided Mr. Peterson 
"should be awarded normal and reasonable visitation privileges," but it was not 
specific as to times or places for visitation.

[¶4]      The decree did 
not address division of the parties' real and personal property located in 
Virginia. The Wyoming court had jurisdiction over the res of the marriage 
situated in Wyoming. That included any property in Wyoming, the marriage 
relationship, and the children. The Wyoming court could have divided the 
Virginia real estate and personal property located in Virginia. Since Mr. 
Peterson had not appeared in the Wyoming court at the time of the divorce, 
however, any action to enforce the division of any property located in Virginia 
necessarily would be commenced and undertaken in Virginia. See Kane v. Kane, 577 P.2d 172, 175-76 (Wyo. 1978). We assume this to be the reason the Wyoming court 
made no division of the Virginia real or personal 
property.

[¶5]      After the 
divorce, Mr. Peterson failed to make any child support payments during the 
following year. In September of 1983, Peterson filed an Application for Child 
Support Services in Sweetwater County, and it was served on Mr. Peterson in 
Virginia. Both parties then employed Virginia attorneys to pursue the matter in 
the domestic relations court of Chesterfield County, Virginia. The parties' 
disputes never were adjudicated by the Virginia court and, by June of 1985, 
Peterson and Mr. Peterson still were arguing over $4,000 in back child support; 
disposition of the marital home and personal property in Virginia; the extent 
and expense of visitation; and whether Wyoming or Virginia was the appropriate 
jurisdiction to deal with these post-divorce issues.

[¶6]      In June of 1985, 
Mr. Peterson filed a Petition to Modify Divorce Decree in Sweetwater County. 
That petition asserted Mr. Peterson had been paying $500 per month in child 
support since February, 1984, and he asked the court to "provide specific times 
and conditions of reasonable visitation with his children." When she was served 
with Mr. Peterson's pleading, Peterson employed Scorsine to represent her. In an 
Answer and Counterclaim filed on behalf of Peterson, Scorsine requested a 
judgment in the amount of $6,000 for past-due child support; the posting of a 
bond by Mr. Peterson in that amount; and a requirement that Mr. Peterson provide 
adequate health insurance for both children.

[¶7]      Mr. Peterson came 
to Wyoming to be deposed on January 2, 1986, and Scorsine and Mr. Peterson's 
attorney discussed the possibility of settlement. Mr. Peterson was not deposed. 
Instead, Peterson and Mr. Peterson agreed to compromise and settle their 
differences. This settlement was memorialized in a ten-page Agreement and 
Stipulation dated January 31, 1986, which they executed and formally 
acknowledged. It was filed with the court on February 7, 1986 and, on June 26, 
1986, the court issued an Order Modifying Decree of Divorce, which expressly 
incorporated the provisions of the Agreement and 
Stipulation.

[¶8]      The court's order 
required Mr. Peterson to ship Peterson's remaining personal property to her; to 
pay $500 per month in child support; to continue this level of support for the 
children until they were twenty-one, provided that his relationship with them 
"normalized;" to pay $4,000 in overdue child support; to pay $5,000 to Peterson 
for her share of his profit-sharing plan; to pay Peterson $16,000 for her equity 
in the real property in Virginia; and to pay half of the medical expenses for 
the children that were not covered by insurance. Mr. Peterson was to pay 
Peterson $12,500 within thirty days of the execution of the agreement, and the 
remaining $12,500 within one year. The parties agreed that Peterson would place 
their daughter in counseling in an effort to establish normalcy in her 
relationship with her father; would have the daughter continue with the 
counseling until she reached majority or until the counselor concluded the 
counseling; would "not discourage the children from visiting with Mr. Peterson;" 
and would "foster reasonable visitation." The Agreement and Stipulation also 
provided that the Wyoming court had personal jurisdiction over Peterson and her 
husband, and a party breaching the agreement would be required to pay for the 
nonbreaching party's attorney fees necessary to enforce the order of the 
court.

[¶9]      Mr. Peterson did 
pay $25,000 to Peterson, which included the $5,000 owed on the profit-sharing 
plan, and he did make the monthly child support payments. Mr. Peterson, however, 
did not ship the personal property to Peterson; he stopped paying child support 
for the daughter on her eighteenth birthday;1 and he did not reimburse Peterson 
for one-half of the noninsured medical expenses incurred by the children during 
the years 1986 through 1990.

[¶10]   In 1989, Peterson again contacted 
Scorsine seeking representation in enforcing the provisions of the court order 
which Mr. Peterson was ignoring. She also sought Scorsine's representation to 
effect an increase in the monthly child support payments. After correspondence 
and negotiation with Mr. Peterson's attorney failed to resolve the remaining 
disputes between the parties, Scorsine filed a Petition for Order to Show Cause, 
Reduce Certain Matter to Judgment, and Modification of Support on March 2, 1990. 
Mr. Peterson avoided service of process in Virginia, and the hearing date on the 
petition Scorsine filed had to be rescheduled numerous times. Ultimately, a 
private investigator served Mr. Peterson with the pleading, and his Wyoming 
attorney then filed a response to the petition. The matter was set for hearing 
on December 21, 1990.

[¶11]   On the date set for the hearing, at 
Scorsine's request, he met with Mr. Peterson's attorney and the district judge 
in chambers to discuss their clients' contentions, and the evidence each side 
would offer. Neither of the Petersons was present during this dialogue. Scorsine 
and Mr. Peterson's attorney presented their arguments, and the judge then 
explained how he would rule upon the issues if the evidence presented were as it 
was represented. Those conclusions of the judge in chambers subsequently were 
incorporated in an Order on Petition to Show Cause, which was filed June 11, 
1991. That order required Mr. Peterson to pay back child support for the months 
until the daughter was nineteen; to pay an increase in the son's child support 
from $250 to $350 monthly, with an additional increase to $450 monthly, if the 
son should attend college; to pay $3,250 in back child support; to pay one-half 
of the undisputed medical bills without delay; and to ship, at his expense, 
Peterson's personal property to her. In addition, the order included specific 
grounds for deviating downward from the statutory child support guidelines;2 and subjected Peterson to a 
possible $1,000 sanction if she interfered with Mr. Peterson's exercise of his 
rights of visitation. The court, as a final matter, concluded Mr. Peterson's 
relationship with the daughter had not normalized and, thus, her child support 
would terminate on her nineteenth birthday. Sometime after the hearing date, but 
before the district court entered its order of June 11, 1991, Peterson 
terminated her attorney-client relationship with Scorsine.

[¶12]   Peterson filed her original 
complaint in this action on May 5, 1993. She alleged claims against Scorsine 
arising from the employment in 1986 and, again, in 1990. In an amended 
complaint, filed on December 20, 1993, Peterson appeared to seek damages only 
from the 1990 settlement negotiations.3 An examination of Peterson's 
amended complaint, which she endeavors to support in her brief on appeal, 
recalls Prime Minister Winston Churchill's quote captured in Bd. of Trustees, 
Laramie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Spiegel, 549 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Wyo. 1976), "a 
riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma * * *."

[¶13]   The amended complaint alleges 
Scorsine violated Peterson's right to due process because she was not able to 
testify at the December 21, 1990 hearing; that, in some way, Scorsine threatened 
her or fraudulently misrepresented facts to keep her from testifying at the 
hearing; Scorsine breached contractual duties in failing to perform work for her 
in a skillful and professional manner; Scorsine breached his fiduciary duties to 
her by converting monies owed to her; and Scorsine was generally negligent. In 
her allegations of negligence, Peterson claimed that Scorsine failed to file a 
breach of contract action on her behalf; his attempts at service of process were 
defective; he failed to complete proper discovery and was not competent or 
prepared to present her case at the December 21, 1990 hearing; he delayed taking 
action on her behalf in an unreasonable fashion; and when action was taken, it 
always was wrong. 

[¶14]   Scorsine filed a pleading entitled 
"Defendant Scorsine's Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Default Judgment," on 
March 14, 1994. A hearing was held on that motion on March 25, 1994, and both 
parties presented oral argument to the court. Scorsine also presented the 
depositions of two expert witnesses, Mr. Peterson's attorney and the district 
judge who handled the Peterson case, while Peterson offered only the affidavits 
of her two children to support her opposition to the summary judgment. On April 
8, 1994, the district court executed its Order Granting Summary Judgment, and it 
was entered on April 12, 1994. Peterson takes this appeal from that 
order.

[¶15]   To the extent the Amended Complaint 
alleges negligence, we are satisfied that aspect of the case is resolved by our 
opinion in Jackson State Bank v. King, 844 P.2d 1093 (Wyo. 1993), where, in 
response to a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit, we held the comparative negligence statute did not apply to 
require the reduction of a plaintiff's recovery in a legal malpractice action by 
his percentage of fault. In that case, we said:

We, therefore, hold that § 1-1-109(a) [1977] does not 
bar recovery by a plaintiff in a legal malpractice action, which necessarily is 
based on claims for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary 
duty.

Jackson State Bank, 844 P.2d  
at 1096.

[¶16]   The facts in this case are very 
comparable to those in Moore, 855 P.2d 1245. The Moores were divorced in 1989, 
and Mrs. Moore then sued Lubnau for legal malpractice because she was not 
awarded custody of her daughter, and she believed the distribution of the 
marital assets was not equitable. In particular, Moore urged that she would have 
been awarded custody if testimony concerning the sexual practices of Mr. Moore 
had been presented. Peterson contends testimony concerning her ex-husband's 
alleged "psychosis" at the hearing scheduled for December 21, 1990 would have 
demonstrated that he was incapable of a "normalized" relationship with his 
daughter. Peterson then builds on that claim by urging child support for the 
daughter would have continued after the daughter reached age nineteen, and her 
son would have received more support pursuant to the statutory child support 
guidelines if she had been able to demonstrate that her ex-husband was incapable 
of a normal relationship with his children.

[¶17]   This summary captures the essence 
of Peterson's claim of denial of due process, and it also seems to encompass her 
overriding complaint against Scorsine for malpractice. In making these 
assertions, Peterson ignores the 1986 Agreement and Stipulation by which she 
agreed to a provision terminating the daughter's support at age nineteen if the 
daughter's relationship with the father could not be normalized. She also gives 
no cognizance to the findings incorporated by the trial court in its Order on 
Petition to Show Cause which were invoked to justify deviation from the 
guidelines.

[¶18]   In Moore, 855 P.2d  at 1248, by 
quotation, we held the elements to be established for legal malpractice are the 
same as for medical malpractice. We summarized, quoting from Orcutt v. Miller, 
95 Nev. 408, 595 P.2d 1191, 1193 (1979), which was adopted for our state in 
Harris v. Grizzle, 625 P.2d 747, 751 (Wyo. 1981), for medical malpractice 
cases:

In a medical malpractice action a plaintiff 
confronted with a motion for summary judgment has the obligation to establish 
(1) the accepted standard of medical care or practice, (2) that the doctor's 
conduct departed from the standard, and (3) that his conduct was the legal cause 
of the injuries suffered.

It follows Peterson had to 
establish Scorsine's representation departed from the standard of care a 
reasonably prudent attorney would exercise under similar circumstances. As we 
also stated in Moore, 855 P.2d  at 1248, quoting Cook, Flanagan & Berst v. 
Clausing, 73 Wn.2d 393, 438 P.2d 865, 866-67 (1968):

We therefore hold that the correct standard to which 
the plaintiff is held in the performance of his professional services is that 
degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and exercised 
by a reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer in the practice of law in this 
jurisdiction.

[¶19]   To establish legal malpractice, a 
party normally must rely on expert testimony because it is not in the purview of 
lay persons to evaluate the propriety vel non of an attorney's actions in 
representing his client. The only exception to this requirement is the instance 
in which a lay person's background and common sense are sufficient to establish 
the appropriate standard of care. See Moore, 855 P.2d  at 1249. It was incumbent 
upon Scorsine, as the moving party, to demonstrate there was no genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether, in his representation of Peterson, he met or 
exceeded "that degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed 
and exercised by a reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer." The essence of 
Peterson's claims against Scorsine are for legal malpractice, and those claims 
must be addressed under our ruling in Moore.

[¶20]   Scorsine did present expert 
testimony on his behalf that establishes he represented Peterson as a 
reasonable, careful, and prudent attorney. On examination by Scorsine's 
attorney, the attorney who had represented Mr. Peterson testified as 
follows:

Q.        Are you 
familiar with the standards of care for practicing divorce and domestic 
relations lawyers in Wyoming?

A.        
Yes.

Q.        Do you have 
an opinion as to whether John Scorsine met or breached the standard of care for 
practicing domestic relations lawyers in A, the 1985-1986 modification matter, 
and B, the 1990-91 contempt matter?

A.        Yes and 
yes.

Q.        Okay. What 
is your opinion in both of those matters?

A.        Well, I - I 
had a client [Mr. Peterson] who hired me to increase his visitation. He ended up 
far worse off than if he never had gone to trial. I can only say he was well 
above the standard of care in both situations. I usually get much better results 
than that.

Q.        Would you 
agree that there are parameters in which lawyers practice and present their 
cases and still comply with the standard of care?

A.        
Yes.

Q.        Is it your 
opinion that Mr. Scorsine operated within those parameters in the 1985-86 
modification matter and the 1990-91 contempt matter?

A.        
Yes.

Q.        As the 
attorney that represented the ex-husband for both proceedings do you believe Mr. 
Scorsine acted prudently and in the best interest of his client in resolving 
both of those cases instead of proceeding to a full-blown trial in both 
cases?

A.        Prudent and 
vigorously especially the second proceeding. The first proceeding I think it was 
just a little more congenial but the second one he made - he definitely made a 
difference, I think.

Q.        Do you 
believe Mr. Scorsine complied with the applicable standards in resolving these 
cases pursuant to the terms and conditions contained in the final settlement 
agreement and related to the court orders?

A.        
Yes.

*           
*             
*           
*           
*          
*

Q.        Do you have 
an opinion as to whether or not Mr. Scorsine exercised reasonable judgment and 
tactical strategy to both of these cases?

A.        As I said 
he ended up with results better than he would have if he never touched the 
situation, so I think he did well.

[¶21]   The trial judge who had handled the 
Peterson case also testified that Scorsine acted in a reasonable, careful, and 
prudent manner:

Q.        Do you have 
an opinion, based on your review of the different file materials and your 
independent recollection, as to whether John Scorsine met or breached the legal 
standard of care for a practicing domestic relations lawyer with regard to this 
1990 contempt matter?

A.        I don't 
have any independent recollection of the case * * *. But based on the rather 
detailed Findings, it's my opinion that he did not breach his 
duty.

The trial judge also 
testified:

Q.        Mrs. 
Peterson has alleged in this legal malpractice case that John Scorsine should 
have insisted that the 1990 contempt proceeding be tried to you in the courtroom 
and not resolved in chambers or resolved in a settlement of some 
type.

My question is this: Given all of the evidence and 
the proffers of evidence and the circumstances that existed on December 21, 
1990, do you believe Mr. Scorsine's recommendation to resolve this case, 
pursuant to your Findings in chambers, falls within the category of trial 
tactics as to which the ordinary practicing attorney should exercise good faith 
judgment?

A.        Yes. I 
think he did the proper thing. And in looking at the Order it would appear that 
most of the Findings were in his favor. I'm talking about Mr. Scorsine and Mrs. 
Peterson.

[¶22]   This expert testimony, without 
refutation, serves to demonstrate there was no genuine issue of material fact as 
to whether Scorsine met the applicable standard of care in his representation of 
Peterson. Scorsine presented expert testimony demonstrating his conduct 
conformed to that of a reasonably prudent attorney, while Peterson failed to 
offer any expert testimony to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of 
material fact. We can affirm the summary judgment by applying 
Moore.

[¶23]   We will consider, however, the 
remaining contentions of Peterson even though we are satisfied the claims for 
breach of contract and fiduciary duty are subsumed by the legal malpractice 
claim which is governed by Moore. We find nothing in the record to suggest 
Scorsine coerced Peterson into not testifying or somehow misrepresented the 
facts concerning the settlement reached without a trial. The record discloses, 
conversely, that the good judgment of Mr. Peterson's attorney and Scorsine, on 
behalf of their clients, resulted in a settlement and the issuance of the 
court's order entered on the contempt petition filed by Scorsine. As the 
district court noted, the public policy in this state encourages the settlement 
of disputes, which is what occurred in this instance.

[¶24]   As we understand Peterson, she 
asserts Scorsine should have filed a breach of contract action based upon 
Peterson's failure to abide by the parties' 1986 Agreement and Stipulation, 
which was incorporated by reference into the court's order. She contends a cause 
of action for breach of that Agreement and Stipulation should have been filed in 
federal court invoking its diversity of jurisdiction. The Order Modifying Decree 
of Divorce in 1986 adopted the Agreement and Stipulation, which was merged into 
the order. The 1991 Order on the Petition to Show Cause for noncompliance with 
the 1986 order was intended to enforce the 1986 order and did not relate to the 
Agreement and Stipulation as a separate document. We are satisfied, since the 
agreement merged into the judgment, that it was appropriate to bring the action 
to enforce the order. Pauling v. Pauling, 837 P.2d 1073 (Wyo. 1992). Peterson's 
contention that an action for breach of contract should have been filed has no 
merit.

[¶25]   We understand the allegation that 
Scorsine breached his fiduciary duties relates to a radial arm saw. Mr. 
Peterson's attorney tendered a check to Scorsine from Mr. Peterson in the amount 
of $300 as payment for the saw, but Scorsine did not cash that check since 
Peterson was asking $450 for the saw. During his deposition, when asked by 
Peterson what had happened to the check, Mr. Peterson's attorney replied it 
could be in his file or he might have sent it back to Mr. Peterson. He stated he 
had tendered the check to Scorsine who either had refused it or sent it back. 
Scorsine's attorney continued with this topic with a hypothetical question 
addressed to the judge. The judge stated clearly it was not a breach of the 
standard of care to return a check marked "full payment" which was drawn for 
less than the amount demanded by the client. In response to a question as to 
whether returning the check amounted to a conversion, the judge stated he would 
have sent the check back under those circumstances. This testimony makes it 
clear Scorsine did not breach a fiduciary duty with respect to the $300 check 
but, instead, simply followed Peterson's directions to accept nothing less than 
$450 for the radial arm saw.

[¶26]   We further identify no valid 
criticism of the efforts by Scorsine to enforce the provisions of the 1986 
Agreement and Stipulation which were incorporated in the court's Order Modifying 
Decree of Divorce issued on June 26, 1986. Peterson appears to contend that, 
because Mr. Peterson was in contempt of the order entered in 1986 on a continual 
basis from 1986 to 1990, Scorsine should have taken enforcement measures during 
that period. Peterson's contention is unrealistic. Scorsine had no authority to 
act on Peterson's behalf until she came to him, retained his services once 
again, and advised him of the provisions of the 1986 order that were not being 
met. Then Scorsine would have had authority to undertake some specific action to 
enforce the order. Peterson did not do this until 1990, and we can identify no 
duty on the part of Scorsine to follow up with enforcement of the 1986 order 
until asked by his client to do so.

[¶27]   Scorsine closed Peterson's file 
after successfully negotiating the Agreement and Stipulation incorporated in the 
1986 order. He did not consider himself employed by Peterson until she came to 
him the second time in 1990. This was Scorsine's approach to his practice of law 
and representation of clients, and we find no fault with it. Peterson questioned 
one of Scorsine's expert witnesses, the attorney for her former husband, about 
this approach. The attorney replied it was fairly standard to consider the case 
completed once settlement was achieved. He testified it was typical practice to 
treat enforcement of the order based upon the settlement as a new action which 
required the rehiring of the attorney. This testimony is dispositive of the 
propriety of Scorsine's management of his legal practice.

[¶28]   We cannot identify material in the 
record which would serve as "ample" evidence that Scorsine breached any ethical 
duty of loyalty by failing to keep Peterson informed, or that he failed to 
protect her right to make decisions. The only evidence in this regard was 
presented by Peterson, and her testimony was uncorroborated. When asked by 
Scorsine's attorney what her main criticism was of Scorsine, Peterson 
stated:

A. Lack of communication, telling me what he's doing, 
or asking me how I feel, or what I want to do about it. He didn't tell me much 
of anything.

This criticism by Peterson 
of Scorsine is somewhat elusive. She cannot give concrete examples in her 
deposition of what information Scorsine failed to communicate or how she was 
damaged by the lack thereof. Her assertion does not offer a genuine issue of 
material fact that would preclude summary judgment.

[¶29]   As a final matter, there is no 
evidence in the record of improper discovery efforts on Scorsine's part and, 
certainly, the abortive attempts to serve process on Mr. Peterson in Virginia 
did not constitute malpractice. He was not responsible for the fact that process 
could not be served. Peterson suggests we should analyze whether "personal 
service is required to be made on a defendant in a domestic relations action 
filed subsequent to the decree of divorce." We decline an advisory opinion on 
this academic question that has no pertinence in our resolution of this 
case.

[¶30]   The district court's Order Granting 
Summary Judgment to Scorsine is affirmed in all respects.

FOOTNOTES

1 On her eighteenth birthday, the 
daughter was attending school in Arizona where eighteen is the age of majority. 
Mr. Peterson erroneously believed he could terminate the support payments under 
the order since the daughter was a resident of 
Arizona.

2 The grounds articulated 
were:

a. The costs to be incurred by the 
father in exercising visitation.

b. The ability of the father to provide 
health insurance for the child.

c. The violation of visitation 
provisions by Karen S. Peterson.

d. The relative income of the 
parties.

3 The thrust of the amended complaint 
seems consistent with recovery from the 1990 settlement negotiations, but Part 
C.i. of Peterson's amended complaint accuses Scorsine 
of:

Failing to take necessary and timely 
breach-of-contract action on various issues of a 1986 agreement for periods 
ranging from six months to nearly four years to not at all * * 
*.