Case Title: Com. v. Chase

Citation: 365 Pa. Super. 572, 530 A.2d 458

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1987-08-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
365 Pa. Superior Ct. 572 (1987) 530 A.2d 458 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Theodore CHASE, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted March 19, 1987. Filed August 19, 1987. *573 Richard S. Levine, Assistant Public Defender, Pittsburgh, for appellant. Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy District Attorney, Pittsburgh, for Com., appellee. *574 Before ROWLEY, DEL SOLE and TAMILIA, JJ. ROWLEY, Judge: Appellant Theodore Chase takes this appeal from a judgment of sentence of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas. On December 5, 1986, appellant was charged with four counts of terroristic threats. On March 5, 1986, a jury found him guilty of three of the four counts. Appellant filed a timely, counseled post-trial motion on March 7, 1986 as well as a timely, uncounseled post-trial motion a few days later. The trial court denied both motions. At the sentencing hearing, the judge stated that the foreperson of the jury had been called on the day after the verdict had been rendered and a threatening message had been left on her telephone answering machine. Although the judge stated that he was not accusing appellant of the act, he proceeded to eliminate other possible persons connected with appellant who could have made such a call. He also characterized both appellant's conduct for which he was convicted and the telephone call as "bizarre." Appellant was sentenced to eleven and one-half to twenty-three months imprisonment for each of the three convictions, the sentences to run consecutively, and with a possibility of parole after each sentence. A motion to modify sentence was denied and this appeal followed. At all times relevant to the instant case, appellant was an inmate at Western State Correctional Institution in Pittsburgh, PA. The victim, Dr. Michael Gilberti, the medical director at the penitentiary, had been treating appellant for a hand injury for approximately two years. Three issues are presented for our consideration: (1) whether the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was sufficient to uphold appellant's conviction on three counts of terroristic threats; (2) whether the Commonwealth failed to establish the extreme fear of the victim and the requisite *575 intent of appellant necessary for a conviction of terroristic threats; and (3) whether the sentence imposed by the trial court is "illegal" due to the court's reliance on an impermissible factor. We find that issues one and two have been waived for failure to include them in either the counseled or the uncounseled posttrial motions. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 315 Pa.Super. 256, 461 A.2d 1268 (1983). Thus we do not consider or decide those issues. In his statement of questions presented, appellant claims that his sentencing issue raises a question of the legality of the sentence because the court relied upon an impermissible factor when imposing sentence. Yet in the argument section of his brief, appellant states that the issue involves the alleged abuse of the trial court's discretion. Because an appeal can be taken from a judgment of sentence as of right only when there is a question of the legality of the sentence, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781, we must first determine whether the issue raised in this case concerns the legality of the sentence or the exercise of the trial court's discretion. In this case, the sentence imposed was undeniably within the legal limits imposed by the legislature. Appellant's only contention is that the court considered an improper factor. Consideration of an improper factor does not make the sentence illegal, although it would render the sentence invalid and require that the sentence be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. Commonwealth v. Bethea, 474 Pa. 571, 379 A.2d 102 (1977).[1] We hold that *576 the appeal in this case challenges a discretionary aspect of appellant's sentence. Therefore, his appeal is not a matter of right. However, we shall consider appellant's notice of appeal as a "petition" for allowance of appeal. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b). In this case, the Commonwealth has not objected to appellant's failure to include a separate statement of reasons why permission to appeal should be granted as required by Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) and Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508, 522 A.2d 17 (1987). Therefore that requirement has been waived by the appellee. Commonwealth v. Rumbaugh, 365 Pa.Super. 388, 529 A.2d 1112. However, we still must determine whether appellant has presented a suitable "`statement of question' by `brief reasons' indicating a `substantial question'" is involved. Commonwealth v. Lapcevich, 364 Pa.Super. 151, 155 n. 2, 527 A.2d 572, 574 n. 2 (1987). Our examination of the statement of questions presented, and the summary of the argument contained in appellant's brief satisfies us that appellant has presented a substantial question that the sentence imposed is inappropriate under the Sentencing Code. We therefore will exercise our discretionary jurisdiction and grant appellant's petition to appeal. The sentencing judge spent a considerable amount of time introducing information concerning a telephone call made to the jury foreperson the day after the verdict was rendered. The pertinent part of the sentencing procedure follows: Our Supreme Court has held that "the correct inquiry in such a case as this is not whether the trial court considered legitimate factors in fixing sentence, but whether it considered only such factors. . . . Thus, a sentence based in part on an impermissible consideration is not made proper simply because the sentencing judge considers other permissible factors as well." Bethea, supra, 474 Pa. at 579-580, 379 A.2d at 106. *579 We are persuaded from our reading of the trial court's remarks prior to sentencing that the court may have considered the phone call in determining the sentence. In fact the entire discussion of the evidence concerning the phone call was brought up by the court sua sponte immediately before sentence was imposed. It is reasonable to assume, then, that the court considered conduct similar to the one for which appellant was convicted, but for which he was not charged. We have held that such action on the part of a sentencing judge is inappropriate. In Commonwealth v. Sypin, 341 Pa.Super. 506, 491 A.2d 1371 (1985), we vacated the sentence and remanded in a case where the appellant had been charged with deviate sexual intercourse and corruption of a nine year old boy. In sentencing, the trial court had referred to the disappearance or death of children for which the appellant not been charged. In our review of that sentencing procedure we stated: Id., 341 Pa.Superior Ct. at 508, 491 A.2d at 1372. When we apply the principles above to the instant case, we are persuaded that appellant's sentence must be vacated. *580 Accordingly, appellant's "petition" for allowance of an appeal from the discretionary aspects of his sentence is granted, the judgment of sentence is vacated and the case is remanded for resentencing. Jurisdiction relinquished. [1] We recognize that a panel of this Court has stated that consideration of an improper factor renders a sentence "illegal." Commonwealth v. Cowan, 275 Pa.Super. 341, 418 A.2d 753 (1980). However, the Court's authority for concluding such a sentence to be "illegal" was the Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Bethea, 474 Pa. 571, 379 A.2d 102 (1977). Bethea does not say that a sentence for which improper factors were considered is illegal; it only states that such a sentence is "invalid." Because Cowan provided no explanation for its deviation from Bethea, we are compelled to follow Bethea and find such a sentence to be invalid, but not illegal. See also Commonwealth v. Osborn, 364 Pa.Super. 505, 528 A.2d 623 (1986) in which appellant argued, inter alia, that the sentence was illegal because the trial court failed to consider relevant factors at sentencing. In Osborn, the court stated that: Although appellant characterizes these contentions as challenges to the legality of the sentence; we find that they are, in fact, predominately challenges to discretionary aspects of the sentence. Id., 364 Pa.Superior Ct. at ___, 528 A.2d at 630.