Case Title: Commonwealth v. White

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11919

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-10-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11919 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ROBERT E. WHITE. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     February 9, 2016. - October 19, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ.1 
 
 
Rape.  Limitations, Statute of.  Evidence, Indictment, 
Corroborative evidence, Prior misconduct.  Practice, 
Criminal, Indictment, Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 3, 2008. 
 
 
The case was tried before Richard J. Chin, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Kathryn Hayne Barnwell for the defendant. 
 
Robert C. Thompson, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  The defendant was convicted in 2014 of one count 
of rape of a child, G. L. c. 265, § 23.  The underlying 
                                                          
 
 
1 Justices Spina, Cordy, and Duffly participated in the 
deliberation on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
indictment, returned in 2008 and amended in 2014, alleged that 
he had raped his daughter on "diverse dates" between September 
29, 1979, and 1981, when she was between four and six years old.  
On appeal, the defendant chiefly raises two sets of claims, both 
of which concern the statute of limitations, G. L. c. 277, § 63.  
First, he argues that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden 
at trial of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
indictment was timely brought, and, in addition, that the trial 
judge incorrectly instructed the jury as to that issue.  Second, 
he maintains that, even if the indictment were timely brought, 
the Commonwealth failed to provide the requisite independent 
corroboration of any incidents of rape that occurred more than 
twenty-seven years before the indictment was returned.  See 
G. L. c. 277, § 63.  He maintains, in this regard, that the 
corroboration provided by the Commonwealth at trial -- 
consisting exclusively of evidence of uncharged sexual 
misconduct -- was insufficient.  He argues also that the judge 
failed to instruct the jury as to the corroboration requirement. 
 
We conclude, with respect to the first set of issues, that 
the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence from which the 
jury could determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
indictment was timely returned.  We also conclude, however, that 
the jury instruction concerning how to make this determination 
was incorrect, that the erroneous instruction precluded the jury 
3 
 
 
from properly ascertaining whether the indictment was timely, 
and that the incorrect instruction resulted in a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice.  Accordingly, on this basis 
alone, the defendant's conviction must be vacated and set aside. 
 
In considering the second set of claims, we construe for 
the first time the requirement that a conviction of certain sex 
offenses against children, if based on an indictment returned 
more than twenty-seven years after the offense, must be 
supported by independent, corroborating evidence.  See G. L. 
c. 277, § 63.  We conclude that the corroboration must relate to 
the specific criminal act or acts of which a defendant is 
accused, and that evidence of uncharged misconduct does not 
suffice.  Here, most -- although not all -- of the incidents of 
rape to which the victim testified took place more than twenty-
seven years before the indictment was returned, and therefore 
required corroboration.  Because there is a significant 
possibility that the jury's general verdict was based only on 
the incidents requiring corroboration, and because the 
Commonwealth's corroborative evidence -- consisting only of 
evidence of uncharged misconduct -- was insufficient as a matter 
of law, the defendant's conviction must be vacated on this basis 
as well.  On remand, should the Commonwealth decide to pursue a 
new trial, the defendant may be tried only for those incidents 
4 
 
 
that took place after October 3, 1981, for which corroboration 
was not required as a matter of law. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Abuse.  We recite the evidence 
presented at trial, reserving certain details for later 
discussion.  In 1974, the defendant married J.G.C., and adopted 
her four-year-old son, S.G.  The following year, the defendant 
and J.G.C. had a daughter, S.F.  Between the time of the 
marriage and October, 1981, the family lived together in eight 
different places, most in the general vicinity of Wareham.  The 
last three locations, which are relevant to this appeal, were in 
Wareham, where they moved toward the end of 1978 or the 
beginning of 1979; in West Wareham, where they moved sometime in 
1980; and in Onset, where they moved in September, 1981. 
 
S.F. testified that the defendant had sexually abused her 
on numerous occasions beginning in 1979, when the family lived 
in Wareham.  She stated that the defendant "would come into my 
room at night," and then "take off my pajamas and touch me down 
in my private areas" using his "fingers[ and] his mouth."  This 
happened "a few times a week."  When the family moved to West 
Wareham, sometime in 1980, the defendant would come into her 
bedroom and "do the same thing" "a few times a week."  S.F. 
added that "if I tried to stop him, he would smack me" and "tell 
5 
 
 
me that this is how a father shows his daughter love, that we 
have a secret and I can't tell."2 
In September, 1981, the family moved to Onset.  S.F. did 
not testify about any incidents of abuse at that location.  Her 
brother, however, testified that he was once walking past S.F's 
room at the Onset house, and "saw [the defendant] on top of her, 
his head in her lap, her on the bed"; S.F. was "laying back" and 
"her pants were down." 
Sometime in September or October, 1981, when S.F. was six 
years old and the family was living in Onset, J.G.C. was sitting 
outside the house when "all of a sudden [she] just had a feeling 
over [her] . . . dread almost."  She "ran in the house," opened 
the door to S.F.'s room, and saw the defendant inside the room 
with her.  The defendant said, "We're cleaning the room."  
J.G.C. had not previously seen the defendant help S.F. clean her 
room with the door closed.  J.G.C. then took S.F. "out for a car 
ride" for approximately "an hour."  S.F. testified that, during 
this ride, J.G.C. 
 
"was asking me . . . Do you have something to tell me? 
Is there something you would like to tell me?  And she 
would, you know, rephrase that particular question over and 
                                                          
 
 
2 S.F. also mentioned a "very prominent memory of" abuse at 
her "grandmother's house" in Wareham, which took place when she 
was "about four."  She said that the defendant followed her into 
an upstairs bathroom, "put me up onto the sink and . . . 
performed oral sex on me" by putting "his mouth on my vagina."  
Afterward, "he put my clothes back on and told me to go 
downstairs." 
6 
 
 
over.  And the only thing I ever wound up disclosing was 
that I had a secret with my father and I couldn't tell 
anybody." 
 
 
Shortly after this incident, in October, 1981, the 
defendant and J.G.C. separated and, ultimately, divorced.  The 
defendant moved to an apartment in Wareham, where he lived for 
"at least a couple of years."  S.F. testified that she visited 
the defendant there on a number of occasions, and that 
"[w]henever I was sleeping, he would come into the room," "take 
off my pants," and "touch my vagina" with "[h]is fingers or his 
tongue." 
 
Soon after moving to the Wareham apartment, the defendant 
began dating another woman.  This woman moved in with the 
defendant, and they eventually married.  The two left the 
Wareham apartment at some point in 1984 or 1985, moving first to 
Haverhill and then to New Hampshire.  Through 1988, S.F. and her 
brother would periodically visit the defendant in New Hampshire.  
In addition, when S.F. was "sixteen, seventeen," in 1991 and 
1992, she "started visiting [her] grandparents" in New Hampshire 
during "the summertime," and the defendant sometimes "came to 
the house" during those visits. 
 
b.  Disclosures and trial.  In April, 2008, when S.F. was 
thirty-two years old, she gave a statement to police alleging 
7 
 
 
that the defendant had abused her when she was a child.3  
Thereafter, a Plymouth County grand jury heard testimony from 
S.F. regarding the abuse, which was said to have taken place 
between 1977 and 1981.4  In addition, they heard testimony from 
her brother, who alleged that the defendant also had abused him 
on various occasions between 1973 and 1985.5  On October 3, 2008, 
a grand jury returned four indictments relating to the alleged 
abuse of S.F.,6  and eight related to the alleged abuse of the 
brother.7  Following a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis, 
                                                          
 
 
3 S.F. previously had disclosed the abuse to J.G.C.  This 
happened in 1988, when S.F. was approximately thirteen years 
old.  At that time, J.G.C. "asked her if she wanted to pursue it 
and [S.F.] said no." 
 
 
4 No accounts of the pre-1979 abuse, which was determined to 
be time barred, are in the record. 
 
 
5 The grand jury also heard testimony from the defendant's 
niece, who alleged that the defendant abused her on various 
occasions between 1972 and 1978, and from J.G.C., who alleged 
that the defendant had raped her sometime in 1974 or 1975, when 
she was married to him.  Indictments were returned on the basis 
of this testimony.  However, the indictment concerning the niece 
was dismissed as time barred before trial, and that concerning 
J.G.C. was dismissed as time barred during trial. 
 
 
6 These included one count of rape of a child by force, 
G. L. c. 265, § 22A, and three counts of indecent assault and 
battery, G. L. c. 265, § 13B. 
 
 
7 These included three counts of rape of a child by force, 
G. L. c. 265, § 22A; two counts of assault and battery on a 
person under fourteen years of age, G. L. c. 265, § 13B; one 
count of assault and battery, G. L. c. 265, § 13A; one count of 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. 
c. 265, § 15A (b); and one count of threatening to commit a 
crime, G. L. c. 275, § 2. 
8 
 
 
among other things, of the statute of limitations, a judge of 
the Superior Court dismissed as time barred three of the four 
indictments relating to abuse of S.F.  The judge denied the 
defendant's motion to dismiss a fourth count -- for rape of a 
child by force, G. L. c. 265, § 22A -- relating to abuse of 
S.F., and he also declined to dismiss the eight counts relating 
to abuse of the brother. 
 
In March, 2014, a trial on the remaining indictments was 
held before a Superior Court jury.  The Commonwealth presented 
testimony from S.F. regarding abuse that she suffered; from her 
brother, both regarding abuse that he suffered, and in 
corroboration of S.F.'s testimony; and from J.G.C., as the first 
complaint witness.8  Because the Commonwealth was required also 
to prove that the charges were not barred by the statute of 
limitations, see Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752, 781 
n.37 (2010) ("Commonwealth has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the indictments have been timely 
brought"), it presented evidence that the defendant resided 
outside of Massachusetts during the relevant limitations period,9 
                                                          
 
 
8 Pursuant to a separate indictment, J.G.C. testified about 
an incident in which the defendant raped her.  That indictment 
was, as mentioned, dismissed in the middle of the trial as time 
barred, and did not go to the jury. 
 
 
9 The relevant limitations period with respect to most of 
the acts in question was fifteen years, to run from the victim's 
9 
 
 
and that, accordingly, the statute had been tolled.  See G. L. 
c. 277, § 63 (statute tolled if defendant "not usually and 
publicly a resident" of Massachusetts).  This evidence consisted 
of testimony from S.F., S.G., and J.G.C. about the defendant 
residing in New Hampshire, and of a 2009 report from the New 
Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles, admitted over objection, 
showing that the defendant had a New Hampshire driver's license 
and maintained an address in that State. 
 
There were two theories of defense.  First, the defendant 
contended that S.F.'s memories of abuse were false, being the 
result of suggestive questioning by J.G.C.  In this regard, the 
defendant offered expert testimony from a psychiatrist who 
opined that, under certain circumstances, such as suggestive 
questioning by an adult, children may develop vivid memories of 
events they never actually experienced.  The defendant also 
presented a statement of stipulated facts regarding certain 
comments that S.F. made to a Department of Social Services 
(DSS)10 employee in 2004, which the defendant argued were 
inconsistent with S.F.'s testimony at trial.  The second theory 
of defense was that the Commonwealth had not met its burden of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
sixteenth birthday.  See G. L. c. 277, § 63, as amended by 
St. 1996, c. 26.  The victim turned sixteen in 1991. 
 
 
10 This was before the change of the department's name to 
the Department of Children and Families in 2008.  See St. 2008, 
c. 176, § 136. 
10 
 
 
demonstrating that the statute of limitations had been tolled 
and that the indictments were timely brought. 
 
The jury returned a guilty verdict on the single indictment 
relating to abuse of S.F., on the lesser included offense of 
rape of a child.  See G. L. c. 265, § 22A.  The jury returned 
verdicts of not guilty on the remaining indictments, which 
related to abuse of her brother. 
 
2.  Discussion.   On appeal, the defendant raises two sets 
of claims related to the statute of limitations, G. L. c. 277, 
§ 63.  First, the defendant contends that the Commonwealth did 
not present sufficient evidence that the indictment on which he 
was convicted was returned within the relevant limitations 
period.  He claims also that, even if the evidence on this point 
was sufficient, the jury were not instructed properly how to 
determine, on the basis of this evidence, whether the indictment 
was timely. 
 
Second, even if the indictment was timely brought, it is 
undisputed that the Commonwealth was required, pursuant to G. L. 
c. 277, § 63, to provide independent corroboration of any 
incidents of rape alleged to have occurred more than twenty-
seven years before the indictment was returned.  The defendant 
contends that the Commonwealth failed to provide sufficient 
corroboration of such alleged incidents, and, in addition, that 
the judge declined to instruct the jury, notwithstanding the 
11 
 
 
defendant's request, regarding the Commonwealth's obligation to 
provide this evidence. 
 
The defendant also raises four additional claims, three of 
which are evidentiary in nature, and one of which relates to 
whether the Commonwealth proved certain details listed in the 
indictment. 
 
a.  Timeliness of indictment.  At the time of the alleged 
offenses at issue, between 1979 and 1981, the statute of 
limitations for rape of a child was six years.  See R. L. 1902, 
c. 218, § 52.  The Legislature subsequently has lengthened the 
relevant limitations period several times.11  It is undisputed, 
except with regard to the last of these changes, that each 
modification occurred before the limitations clock had an 
opportunity to expire.  See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 
632 (2003) (under Constitution's ex post facto clause, 
limitations period may be lengthened retroactively, but not if 
already expired).  The contested issue in this case is whether 
the most recent modification, like the previous ones, took 
                                                          
 
 
11 Effective September 30, 1985, the limitations period was 
extended to ten years.  See St. 1985, c. 123.  In 1987, the 
statute was changed so that the ten-year period would begin to 
run only from the victim's sixteenth birthday.  St. 1987, 
c. 489.  In 1996, the limitations period was extended to fifteen 
years, to run from the victim's sixteenth birthday.  St. 1996, 
c. 26.  Effective December 20, 2006, the limitations period was 
lifted entirely.  St. 2006, c. 303, § 9 (no limitations, but 
indictment returned more than twenty-seven years after offense 
requires "independent evidence that corroborates the victim's 
allegation"). 
12 
 
 
effect before the limitations clock had an opportunity to 
expire.  See St. 2006, c. 303, § 9. 
 
Prior to December 20, 2006, the statute of limitations for 
rape of a child was fifteen years, to run from the victim's 
sixteenth birthday.  G. L. c. 277, § 63, as amended by St. 1996, 
c. 26.  Because the victim turned sixteen on August 19, 1991, 
that limitations period would have expired fifteen years later, 
on August 19, 2006.  This would have happened 123 days before 
December 20, 2006, when the Legislature entirely abolished the 
statute of limitations for rape of a child.  See St. 2006, 
c. 303, § 9.  The Commonwealth contends, however, that the 
limitations clock did not expire on August 19, 2006, because the 
defendant lived in New Hampshire during the period that the 
limitations clock was running, i.e., between August 19, 1991, 
and August 19, 2006, thereby tolling the statute.  See G. L. 
c. 277, § 63 ("period during which the defendant is not usually 
and publicly a resident within the commonwealth shall be 
excluded"). 
 
To prove this claim at trial, the Commonwealth was required 
to show beyond a reasonable doubt that, during the period that 
the statute was running (between August 19, 1991, and August 19, 
2006), the defendant was "not usually and publicly a resident" 
of Massachusetts for at least 123 days, i.e., for the length of 
time between the victim's birthday on August 19, 2006 (when the 
13 
 
 
limitations clock would have run under the old statute) and 
December 20, 2006 (when the Legislature abolished the 
limitations period).12  See Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 Mass. at 
781 n.37 (Commonwealth's burden to show indictment timely 
brought).  The defendant claims that the Commonwealth's evidence 
on this point was insufficient and amounted only to 
"speculation." 
 
This claim fails.  There was evidence that the defendant 
remarried, and that he moved with his new wife to New Hampshire 
sometime in the late 1980s.  There was evidence also that the 
defendant's parents moved to New Hampshire soon thereafter; that 
S.F. and her brother visited the defendant in New Hampshire at 
various times through 1988; that, in the summers of 1991 and 
1992, the defendant was seen stopping by his parents' house in 
New Hampshire when S.F. was there; and that, in 2009, he had a 
New Hampshire driver's license listing an address in that state.  
See Commonwealth v. George, 430 Mass. 276, 277 (1999) 
(limitations period tolled when defendant resided out of State).  
                                                          
 
 
12 We do not accept the defendant's claim that, because the 
trial judge erroneously instructed the jury that it needed to 
find 777 days of tolling, rather than four months, see infra, 
this higher number controls for purposes of our sufficiency 
review.  Commonwealth v. David, 365 Mass. 47, 55-56 (1974) 
(misstatement of burden in defendant's favor did not become "the 
law of the case" where "the judge made his ruling not at the 
close of the Commonwealth's case but at the close of all the 
evidence," and where, accordingly, there was no indication that 
defendant's strategy at trial was affected by this mistake). 
14 
 
 
Given this, the jury reasonably could have inferred that, after 
the defendant moved to New Hampshire in the 1980s, he continued 
to live there until at least the summer of 1992, which is, of 
course, more than 123 days after S.F.'s August 19, 1991 
birthday.13  See Commonwealth v. Mazariego, 474 Mass. 42, 46 
(2016) (inferences drawn by jury need only "be reasonable and 
possible" [citation omitted]).  Thus, the Commonwealth's 
evidence of tolling was sufficient. 
 
b.  Erroneous instruction on tolling.  The judge gave the 
following instruction on how to determine whether the indictment 
was timely brought: 
 
"[T]he statute of limitations began to run on 
August 19, 1991, and would have expired on August 19, 2006.  
However, our statute further provides that certain time may 
be excluded from this calculation and states:  any period 
during which the defendant is not usually and publicly a 
resident within the Commonwealth shall be excluded from 
determining this period.  Because those indictments were 
brought in 2008, 777 days after the expiration of the 
statute of limitations, the Commonwealth must prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that between August 19, 2006, and the 
date of the indictment, that the defendant was not a 
resident of Massachusetts for at least 777 days." 
                                                          
 
 
13 Our decision in Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752, 
780 (2010), is not to the contrary.  There, we held that the 
statute of limitations may be tolled only by a defendant's out-
of-State residence during the limitations period, and not by 
such residence before the limitations period begins or after it 
expires.  Id. at 779-780.  We did not say, however, as the 
defendant contends, that evidence of where a defendant lived 
before or after the limitations period is irrelevant to proving 
where he lived during the limitations period.  Id. at 778-780 
(evidence that defendant lived out of State beginning in 1990 
probative of where he lived when limitations clock began to run 
in September, 1993). 
15 
 
 
 
In other words, the jury were instructed to determine whether 
the defendant was "not usually and publicly a resident" of 
Massachusetts between S.F.'s birthday on August 19, 2006, and 
October 3, 2008, the date of the indictment.  See G. L. c. 277, 
§ 63.  Both parties agree that this was error, since, if tolling 
had not taken place by August 19, 2006, the limitations period 
would have run, and any tolling thereafter would be irrelevant.  
See Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 Mass. at 780  ("instruction 
should have focused the jury's attention only on the defendant's 
usual and public residence during the period" when the statute 
was running).  The defendant, however, did not object to this 
instruction, and we therefore must determine whether it resulted 
in a "substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice."  See 
Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 13 (1999). 
 
To decide whether an erroneous jury instruction created a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, "[w]e examine the 
jury instructions in their entirety 'to determine their probable 
impact on the jury's perception of the fact-finding function.'" 
Commonwealth v. Noble, 429 Mass. 44, 47 (1999), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Mejia, 407 Mass. 493, 495 (1990).  Here, the 
erroneous instruction was the jury's sole opportunity to hear an 
explanation of the statute of limitations, and, as given, it 
told the jury to focus on a period when the limitations clock 
16 
 
 
was not running and during which no tolling could have taken 
place.  Given this instruction, there was no way the jury could 
have made the necessary finding whether the statute of 
limitations was tolled during the interval between August 19, 
1991, and August 19, 2006.  In effect, the jury never had the 
opportunity to ascertain whether the indictment was timely.  
This "deprived [the defendant] of jury consideration of a 
substantial part of his defense"14 and "created a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice.15  See Commonwealth v. Noble, 
                                                          
 
 
14 The claim that the Commonwealth did not provide 
sufficient evidence of tolling was, as discussed supra, one of 
defendant's two primary theories of defense, and was argued at 
length by defense counsel during closing arguments.  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Shanley, supra at 782 (erroneous instruction on 
tolling did not require reversal where, among other things, 
issue not argued in closing by defense). 
 
 
15 The Commonwealth argues that the defendant's failure to 
object to the erroneous instruction was the result of a 
strategic decision, because the judge's error required the jury 
to find more days of tolling (777 days) than would have been 
required under a correct statement of the law (123 days).  See 
Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 13 (1999) (appellate court 
considers whether "counsel's failure to object was not simply a 
reasonable tactical decision" [citation omitted]).  There was no 
evidentiary hearing on the issue, and the record before us does 
not support this contention.  We note that the erroneous 
instruction would not necessarily be to the defendant's 
advantage, as it focused the jury's attention on a two-year 
window (2006-2008) close to 2009, when it was shown, via the 
defendant's New Hampshire driving record, that he maintained an 
address in that State.  Arguably, it would have been more to the 
defendant's advantage for the instruction to focus on the period 
between 1991 and 2006, during which there was no direct evidence 
that the defendant maintained a New Hampshire address.  In 
addition, the record suggests that both the judge and the 
parties found the issue of tolling to be difficult and 
17 
 
 
supra at 47 (instruction omitted on affirmative defense that was 
supported by evidence).  Accordingly, the defendant's conviction 
must be vacated. 
 
c.  Corroboration.  i.  Sufficiency of corroboration.  
General Laws c. 277, § 63, as amended by St. 2006, c. 303, § 9, 
provides that an indictment for rape of a child 
"may be found and filed at any time after the date of the 
commission of such offense; but any indictment or complaint 
found and filed more than [twenty-seven] years after the 
date of commission of such offense shall be supported by 
independent evidence that corroborates the victim's 
allegation.  Such independent evidence shall be admissible 
during trial and shall not consist exclusively of the 
opinions of mental health professionals" (emphasis 
supplied). 
 
Here, the defendant was convicted on the basis of an indictment 
returned on October 3, 2008.  Thus, pursuant to G. L. c. 277, 
§ 63, S.F.'s allegations with respect to any incidents taking 
place before October 3, 1981 -- i.e., more than twenty-seven 
years prior to indictment -- required corroboration by 
independent evidence.16 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
confusing.  It appears at least as likely that neither counsel 
realized that an error had been made.  Finally, there is 
evidence that the defendant objected to other parts of the jury 
instructions on the statute of limitations, and "[w]e can see no 
valid tactical reason for challenging some instructions but not 
others."  See Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 299 
(2002). 
 
 
16 As discussed infra, the judge did not give an instruction 
on the issue of corroboration. 
18 
 
 
 
At trial, S.F. testified to various incidents of rape, some 
occurring before October 3, 1981, and some after.17  The jury, 
however, returned a general verdict that did not specify whether 
the defendant was convicted on the basis of the pre-October 3, 
1981, incidents, which required corroboration, or those that 
took place later, for which corroboration was not necessary.  
Because we do not know the basis for the jury's verdict, the 
defendant's conviction may be affirmed only if there was 
corroboration of the pre-October 3, 1981, incidents, as those 
might have formed the sole basis for the jury's verdict.18,19  
                                                          
 
 
17 The incidents before October 3, 1981, were those in the 
family's homes in Wareham and West Wareham, as well as at the 
grandparents' house in Wareham.  The incidents after this date 
were those that took place in the Wareham apartment to which the 
defendant moved in October, 1981, after separating from J.G.C. 
 
 
18 The judge correctly instructed the jury that "[y]ou may 
find the defendant guilty only if you unanimously agree that the 
Commonwealth has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the offense on at least one specific 
occasion."  Thus, the jury might unanimously have agreed that 
the defendant committed rape on one specific occasion before 
October 3, 1981, and might not unanimously have agreed regarding 
other dates. 
 
 
19 The Commonwealth contends that this claim was waived.  
Even if this were so, most of the acts to which S.F. testified 
required corroboration, and, accordingly, there was a 
significant possibility that the jury convicted on the basis of 
those acts, resulting in a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice to the extent that the Commonwealth's corroboration was 
insufficient.  See Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 701 
(2015) (substantial risk of miscarriage of justice if, because 
of improper instruction, "there is any significant possibility  
that the jury may have based convictions" on impermissible 
factual grounds). 
19 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 405 Mass. 369, 382 (1989) (judgment 
vacated because "jury may well have convicted" on impermissible 
basis, despite presence of permissible basis [citation 
omitted]).  See also Commonwealth v. Petrillo, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 
104, 111 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1030 (2001). 
 
Accordingly, we must determine whether S.F.'s testimony 
with respect to the pre-October 3, 1981, acts was supported by 
"independent evidence that corroborates [her] allegation."  
G. L. c. 277, § 63.  In support of its assertion that there was 
independent corroboration, the Commonwealth points to the 
testimony of S.F.'s brother that, sometime in September, 1981, 
when the family lived in Onset, he once saw the defendant 
reclining next to S.F. with his head in her lap, while she lay 
on her bed with "her pants . . . down."  The question before us 
is whether this was sufficient corroboration within the meaning 
of the statute.  In answering this question, we construe for the 
first time the phrase "independent evidence that corroborates 
the victim's allegation."  Id. 
 
The issue presented by the brother's account, as both 
parties recognize, is that it did not coincide precisely with 
any of the incidents to which the victim testified:  S.F.'s 
testimony with respect to the pre-October 3, 1981, acts spoke of 
abuse that took place when the family lived in Wareham and West 
Wareham, while her brother described an incident that happened 
20 
 
 
later, when the family lived in Onset.20  In this way, the 
brother's testimony presented evidence of uncharged sexual 
misconduct.21  The Commonwealth argues that the statute's 
corroboration requirement may be satisfied by such evidence, 
which, in its view, "tends to support the conclusion that the 
crime described . . . actually occurred."  The defendant, on the 
other hand, argues that proof of uncharged misconduct does not 
suffice because there must be evidence "corroborating each 
specific allegation" made by the victim.  For the reasons that 
follow, we conclude that the Commonwealth must present 
corroborating evidence that relates to the specific criminal act 
at issue.  Consequently, evidence of uncharged misconduct, such 
as that presented by the brother, does not itself suffice. 
 
As with all statutes, G. L. c. 277, § 63, "must be 
interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature 
ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and 
approved usage of the language, considered in connection with 
the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be 
                                                          
 
 
20 These locations are not elements of the crime.  
Nonetheless, in conjunction with evidence of when the family 
lived in these locations, they allow for a determination of the 
approximate time that the incidents of rape took place. 
 
 
21 There is no contention that the brother's testimony 
formed an independent basis for conviction, as it did not 
contain sufficient detail to demonstrate that the defendant 
committed rape of a child.  Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 217, 
222 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1216 (2006) (must be "some 
degree of penetration" by or of sexual organs). 
21 
 
 
remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that 
the purpose of its framers may be effectuated."  Commonwealth v. 
Clark, 472 Mass. 120, 129 (2015), quoting Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 
Mass. 444, 447 (1934). 
 
Based on the statutory language, it is clear that the 
victim's testimony alone is not enough to sustain a conviction. 
G. L. c. 277, § 63 (evidence must be "independent").  It also is 
clear that the required corroboration may not consist 
"exclusively of the opinions of mental health professionals" and 
that it must be of a sort "admissible during trial."  Id.  The 
Legislature, however, did not further define what it meant by 
the phrase "independent evidence that corroborates the victim's 
allegation," nor did it state whether evidence of uncharged 
sexual misconduct would suffice.  Id.  We therefore must look 
for guidance to the "purpose and legislative history of the 
statute."  See Commonwealth v. Ray, 435 Mass. 249, 252 (2001), 
quoting Massachusetts Hosp. Ass'n v. Department of Med. Sec., 
412 Mass. 340, 346 (1992). 
 
The provision at issue here was added by St. 2006, c. 303, 
"An Act increasing the statute of limitations for sexual crimes 
against children" (act).  By lengthening the limitations period, 
which previously had been fifteen years, see G. L. c. 277, § 63, 
as amended by St. 1996, c. 26, the Legislature sought "to give 
child victims of sexual abuse the time they need to heal, come 
22 
 
 
forward and still have their day in court."  See Executive 
Department Press Release, [Lieutenant Governor] Healey Signs 
Tougher Penalties for Sex Offenders into Law (September 21, 
2006). 
 
The text of the statute suggests that there also was 
concern that memories of childhood abuse, when recalled decades 
later, may not be sufficiently precise to serve as the sole 
basis for a criminal conviction.22  See G. L. c. 277, § 63 
(victim's childhood memories alone insufficient for conviction, 
even if bolstered by "opinions of mental health professionals"); 
Commonwealth v. Hatch, 438 Mass. 618, 622 (2003) ("primary 
source of insight into the intent of the Legislature is the 
language of the statute" [citation omitted]).  This is 
consistent with the act's sparse legislative history, which 
reflects the views of some members of the Legislature that 
extending the statute of limitations would impinge the 
defendant's right to a fair trial.  See State House News Service 
(July 26, 2006) (statement of Rep. Fagan expressing concern that 
extending or lifting statute of limitations might impinge right 
                                                          
 
 
22 See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 631 (2003), 
citing Holdsworth, Is It Repressed Memory with Delayed Recall or 
Is It False Memory Syndrome?  The Controversy and Its Potential 
Legal Implications, 22 Law & Psychol. Rev. 103, 103–104 (1998) 
("Memories fade, and witnesses can die or disappear. . . .  Such 
problems can plague child abuse cases, where recollection after 
so many years may be uncertain, and 'recovered' memories 
faulty"). 
23 
 
 
to "a fair trial" and would not "protect the innocent" 
defendant); id. (statement of Rep. Loscocco that "I don't know 
if I could remember where I [even] was" twenty-seven years ago).  
Thus, the act's provisions apparently were intended not only to 
protect the interests of victims, but to safeguard "the 
principles of a fair trial."  See id. (statement of Rep. Fagan).  
See also id. (statement of Rep. Grant  that bill is "a 
compromise that recognizes both sides of this" issue). 
 
Based on the above, it is evident that the act was intended 
to balance the aforementioned concerns by allowing prosecutions 
for such offenses to proceed at any time, while specifying that 
indictments returned more than twenty-seven years after the fact 
must be supported by "independent evidence that corroborates the 
victim's allegation," St. 2006, c. 303, § 9, such that a 
conviction cannot be based solely on the victim's recollections 
of abuse decades earlier.  In addition, the corroborative 
evidence "shall not consist exclusively of the opinions of 
mental health professionals," id., indicating that this evidence 
must do more than bolster a victim's credibility -- it must be a 
separate source of proof tending, in some way, to show the 
defendant's guilt.  See Healey Signs Tougher Penalties for Sex 
Offenders into Law, supra ("a new provision extends the statute 
of limitations 'to life' if independent admissible evidence, 
such as [deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)] samples, is available to 
24 
 
 
corroborate a victim's allegation" [emphasis supplied]).23  In 
sum, it appears that the act advances its aim of protecting "the 
principles of a fair trial," see State House News Service, supra 
(statement of Rep. Fagan), by requiring that a defendant not be 
convicted unless there is at least some evidence of guilt in 
addition to the victim's potentially imprecise memories. 
 
While the Legislature did not define specifically what form 
this additional evidence must take, the act was formulated 
against the backdrop of other corroboration requirements 
elsewhere in our statutory and common law.  See Commonwealth v. 
Clark, 446 Mass. 620, 625 (2006) (courts "look to preexisting 
common law as an aid to the construction of undefined terms in a 
statute"); Commonwealth v. McLeod, 437 Mass. 286, 290 (2002) 
("Where the language of a statute is inconclusive, courts must 
look to . . . analogous statutory material, and relevant case 
law"). 
 
A common thread running through our cases involving other 
corroboration requirements is that such evidence must relate to 
the specific criminal act at issue.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Noble, 417 Mass. 341, 345 (1994) (if "[prior inconsistent grand 
jury testimony] is the only source of support for the central 
                                                          
 
 
23 A bill introduced the previous year similarly would have 
allowed an indictment to "be found and filed at any time" "if a 
[deoxyribonucleic acid] sample . . . of the perpetrator is 
collected and stored."  See 2005 House Doc. No. 650. 
25 
 
 
allegations of the charge," [citation omitted], there must be 
evidence corroborating those central allegations; grand jury 
testimony that defendant joint venturer knew about murder and 
intended to participate was corroborated by evidence of 
defendant's interactions with shooter at time of murder); 
Commonwealth v. Costello, 411 Mass. 371, 375 (1991) ("alleged 
victim's testimony . . . does corroborate many elements of the 
defendant's [confession to rape of a child], [but it] does not 
corroborate any element of the crime except for the age of the 
alleged victim" and was therefore insufficient); Commonwealth v. 
Silva, 401 Mass. 318, 324-325 & n.7 (1987) (in perjury case, 
testimony that defendant lied must be "corroborat[ed by] 
evidence [that] 'tend[s] to establish the defendant's guilt'" 
and that is "inconsistent with the innocence of the defendant" 
[citation omitted]; testimony that defendant falsely denied 
making certain statements was corroborated by evidence that 
person who heard statements only could have obtained information 
in them from defendant); Commonwealth v. Forde, 392 Mass. 453, 
458 (1984) (there must "be some evidence, besides the 
confession, that the criminal act was committed by someone, that 
is, that the crime was real and not imaginary"; corroboration 
provided by victim's dead body); Commonwealth v. DeBrosky, 363 
Mass. 718, 728-730 (1973) (construing G. L. c. 244, § 20I, court 
stated that there must be some "corroborating evidence" "in 
26 
 
 
support of the testimony of an immunized witness on at least one 
element of proof essential to convict the defendant"; 
corroboration provided by two witnesses who saw person at scene 
of crime fitting defendant's description). 
 
We find particularly helpful the analysis in one such case, 
Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 215 (1986), in which, as 
here, the defendant was charged with a sexual crime ("drugging 
for unlawful sexual intercourse").  There, we stated that the 
Commonwealth was required by statute to prove the crime with 
evidence "corroborat[ing the victim's testimony] in a material 
particular."  Id. at 219 n.3, citing G. L. c. 272, § 11.  
Surveying our cases dealing with comparable corroboration 
requirements, we concluded that corroborating evidence must 
relate to the specific criminal act at issue, and, in 
particular, that it must consist of "some specific testimonial 
fact, which, in the context of the case, is probative on an 
element of the crime."  Id. at 219 (corroboration provided by 
testimony that drug used to subdue victim detected shortly 
thereafter in her blood stream, and that needle marks were found 
on her arm).  In that case, the "evidence . . . corroborate[d] a 
material particular of the [victim's] testimony -- that the 
defendant administered a drug to her" -- as the "defendant could 
not be convicted on the drugging charge without proof of the 
injection."  Id. at 219, 220.  Indeed, we cited as corroboration 
27 
 
 
only facts related to the act with which the defendant was 
charged, id. at 218-220, despite substantial evidence of prior 
sexual misconduct.24  Id. at 224-227. 
 
The standard articulated in Commonwealth v. Helfant is 
especially appropriate for defining the corroboration 
requirement in the statute at issue here, for several reasons.  
It distills our construction of comparable corroboration 
requirements, derives from the interpretation of a statute 
relating to sexual crimes, and furthers the statutory aim of 
ensuring that the occurrence of the criminal act alleged by a 
victim is proven, at least in part, by some source other than 
the victim's testimony.  Here, because the brother's testimony 
presented evidence only of uncharged misconduct, and did not 
provide "some specific testimonial fact," id. at 129, related to 
the particular incidents of rape described in the "victim's 
                                                          
 
 
24 Our decision in Commonwealth v. King, 387 Mass. 464, 470 
(1982) (uncharged sexual misconduct admissible to corroborate 
victim's testimony because such evidence "prove[s] an 
inclination to commit the [acts] charged"), is not to the 
contrary.  There, we held that the Commonwealth was permitted to 
present evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct; we did not say 
that such evidence would suffice where corroboration is 
required.  Id. But see People v. Yovanov, 69 Cal. App. 4th 392, 
404 (1999) (under similarly-worded statute mandating 
corroboration, "uncharged sexual misconduct . . . can be used to 
corroborate a victim's allegation of sexual abuse").  The 
California court's reasoning was based on legislative history 
suggesting that "evidence of any prior sexual offenses is [a] 
particularly probative" form of evidence.  Id.  We are unaware 
of any comparable legislative history concerning G. L. c. 277, 
§ 63. 
28 
 
 
allegation," the Commonwealth's proof fell short.  See G. L. 
c. 277, § 63. 
 
We recognize that, so construed, G. L. c. 277, § 63, sets a 
high bar for prosecuting sexual offenses against children that 
are alleged to have occurred many years before.  Nonetheless, 
our own cases suggest that this bar is not insuperable.25  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Feijoo, 419 Mass. 486, 496 (1995) (defendant 
recorded sexual acts with minors and preserved recordings); 
Commonwealth v. Abrahams, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 150, 151 (2014) 
(defendant charged with rape of child left DNA evidence); 
Commonwealth v. Villalta-Duarte, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 821, 822, 823 
(2002) (confession to rape of child corroborated by testimony 
that, around time of rape, victim "developed a 'serious' diaper 
rash in her vaginal area" and "small scratches on her face"). 
 
Accordingly, because the Commonwealth's corroboration of 
the pre-October 3, 1981, incidents fell short, and because the 
jury returned a general verdict that could have been based 
solely on those incidents, the defendant's conviction must be 
vacated.  At any new trial, the Commonwealth will be limited to 
proceeding on the basis of incidents for which sufficient 
evidence was introduced, i.e., incidents after October 3, 1981.  
Because the evidence was insufficient with respect to the 
                                                          
 
 
25 See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 59, 64-
65 (2009) (defendant's confession to rape of child corroborated 
by testimony of percipient witness). 
29 
 
 
incidents on or before October 3,1981, the defendant may not be 
retried for those incidents.26 
 
ii.  Lack of instruction on corroborating evidence.  The 
defendant maintains that, because independent corroboration was 
required for the incidents that occurred prior to October 3, 
1981, the jury should have been instructed regarding the 
Commonwealth's obligation to provide corroborating evidence.  We 
agree.27 
 
 "When a party makes a request legally correct and 
pertinent to the issues presented by the case, it is incumbent 
on the judge to instruct the jury in a manner which 
substantially covers the particular point in question."  
Commonwealth v. Dane Entertainment Servs., Inc., 19 Mass. App. 
Ct. 573, 578 (1985), S.C., 397 Mass. 197 (1986).  In other 
contexts where corroborating evidence is required, we have said 
that it is appropriate for a trial judge to instruct the jury 
                                                          
 
 
26 Accordingly, we need not address the defendant's argument 
that there was insufficient evidence that the incidents in West 
Wareham took place via "mouth on vagina," as alleged in the 
indictment, since those incidents took place before October 3, 
1981. 
 
 
27 Because the corroborative evidence offered by the 
Commonwealth was, as explained, insufficient as a matter of law, 
there will be no need for an instruction on this issue at any 
new trial, as the defendant may not be retried for acts for 
which corroboration was necessary, i.e., those on or before 
October 3, 1981.  We nevertheless choose to address the issue 
"in order to provide guidance" to judges and parties in future 
cases.  See Commonwealth v. Agosto, 428 Mass. 31, 35 n.6 (1998). 
30 
 
 
about the Commonwealth's obligation to provide such evidence.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dyous, 436 Mass. 719, 727 n.11 (2002) 
(approving judge's instruction on credibility of immunized 
witness, which included statement that "defendant cannot be 
convicted solely on the testimony of a person granted immunity" 
and that there must be "some corroboration" "on at least one 
element of proof essential to convict the defendant").  Cf. K.M. 
Tuttman, Massachusetts Superior Court Criminal Practice Jury 
Instructions § 4.18 (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 2d ed. 2013) ("You 
may convict a person of perjury based on the testimony of a 
single witness only if there is also evidence of a direct or 
clear and compelling character that will support no explanation 
that is consistent with the innocence of the defendant").  This 
is so because, while it is the judge's role to determine whether 
sufficient corroborative evidence has been presented, the jury 
must decide whether to credit that evidence.28 
                                                          
 
 
28 See Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 610 (1945) (in 
perjury case, "[t]wo elements must enter into a determination 
that corroborative evidence is sufficient:  (1) that the 
evidence, if true, substantiates the testimony . . . ; (2) that 
the corroborative evidence is trustworthy.  To resolve this 
latter question is to determine the credibility of the 
corroborative testimony, a function which belongs exclusively to 
the jury"); United States v. Bryant, 420 F.2d 1327, 1331 (D.C. 
Cir. 1969) ("The corroboration doctrines in this jurisdiction 
require not only the existence of evidence sufficient to avoid a 
directed verdict, but also that the case be sent to the jury 
with instructions . . . that it is their responsibility as 
jurors to determine whether evidence which they credit 
establishes such corroboration"). 
31 
 
 
 
Here, the defendant's proposed instruction was, in essence, 
"legally correct."29  See Commonwealth v. Dane Entertainment 
Servs., Inc., supra.  It was also "pertinent to the issues 
presented by the case," id., as the credibility of the 
corroborating evidence (i.e., the brother's testimony) was 
contested at trial.  This being so, the jury should have been 
instructed regarding the Commonwealth's obligation to provide 
independent evidence that related to the specific criminal acts 
at issue and that is probative on an element of the crime.30  See 
Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass. at 220. 
 
d.  Evidentiary issues.  We address briefly certain 
evidentiary issues raised by the defendant that may arise at any 
new trial. 
 
i.  New Hampshire driver's record.  The defendant's New 
Hampshire driver's record was admitted in evidence without 
having been disclosed during pretrial discovery, see Mass. R. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
29 The defendant requested an instruction that "you must 
determine whether the indictments, if brought [more than twenty-
seven] years [after] the alleged conduct, are supported by 
independent corroborating evidence."  While the judge was not 
obligated to give the instruction in exactly this form, see 
Commonwealth v. Johnston, 467 Mass. 674, 702 (2014), the 
defendant's request accurately reflected the law as stated in 
G. L. c. 277, § 63, and required that some instruction on the 
issue be given. 
 
 
30 Where appropriate, the jury should be instructed that 
this corroboration may not consist solely of the opinions of 
mental health professionals.  See G. L. c. 277, § 63.  The 
Commonwealth did not offer such evidence in this case. 
32 
 
 
Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (A) (vii), as amended, 444 Mass. 1501 
(2005), and without the "double certification" required by Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 40 (a) (1), 378 Mass. 917 (1979).  See Reporters' 
Notes to Rule 40, Mass. Ann. Laws, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
at 1739 (LexisNexis 2015).  This was error.31 
 
The defendant contends also that introduction of this 
record violated his confrontation rights, a claim that depends 
on whether the document was produced "under circumstances which 
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the 
[document] would be available for use at a later trial[.]"  
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 (2009), 
quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004).  We 
cannot determine from this record the circumstances under which 
the document was created.  Compare Commonwealth v. Parenteau, 
460 Mass. 1, 8, 9 (2011) ("registry [of motor vehicles] 
certificate was dated . . . nearly two months after the criminal 
complaint . . . had issued against the defendant.  As such, it 
plainly was made for use at the defendant's trial"; "business 
records are not admissible at trial 'if the regularly conducted 
business activity is the production of evidence for use at 
                                                          
 
 
31 Nevertheless, because there is a "reasonable prospect" 
that these deficiencies may be cured on retrial, we are not 
precluded from considering the driver's record in assessing 
whether the evidence of tolling was sufficient.  Commonwealth v. 
DiBenedetto, 414 Mass. 37, 46 n.14 (1992), S.C., 427 Mass. 414 
(1998). 
33 
 
 
trial'" [citation omitted]).  More information about the 
document's provenance must be elicited if it is to be admitted 
on retrial without accompanying testimony. 
 
ii.  Evidence from DSS investigation.  The defendant argues 
that his right to present a defense was impaired by the judge's 
ruling that he could not introduce evidence from a 2004 DSS 
investigation involving S.F.'s daughter.  Documentation from 
that investigation showed that J.G.C. urged S.F. to file an 
ultimately unsubstantiated report of abuse on behalf of her 
child.  The defendant argued in his motion to introduce portions 
of this report that it showed J.G.C.'s "bias in perceiving 
certain conduct as evidence of sexual abuse," and therefore 
supported the defendant's claim that J.G.C. implanted false 
memories in S.F. through suggestive questioning.  The judge 
ordered this evidence excluded as not "relevant." 
 
A "defendant is not necessarily deprived of the right to 
present his theory of defense simply because the judge excludes 
a piece of evidence supporting such theory."  Commonwealth v. 
Jones, 464 Mass. 16, 19 n.5 (2012).  "Here, exclusion of the 
proffered testimony did not prevent the defendant from 
presenting his theory" that J.G.C. engaged in suggestive 
questioning.  Id.  The defendant pursued this theory in his 
cross-examination of all three of the Commonwealth's witnesses -
- S.F., her brother, and J.G.C. -- and in his closing argument.  
34 
 
 
Indeed, J.G.C. herself agreed during questioning by defense 
counsel that, after discovering S.F. alone with the defendant in 
the victim's bedroom in Onset, she "badgered" S.F. about whether 
she had been abused. 
 
Given that the defendant was permitted to present his 
theory of defense, the question remains whether it was an abuse 
of discretion to exclude the proffered evidence on the ground 
that it was not relevant to that defense.  Commonwealth v. Dunn, 
407 Mass. 798, 807 (1990) ("Whether evidence is relevant in any 
particular instance" is a "question[] within the sound 
discretion of the [trial] judge").  It was not unreasonable for 
the judge to conclude that evidence of J.G.C.'s behavior in an 
unrelated 2004 DSS investigation was not relevant to whether she 
engaged in suggestive questioning twenty-five years earlier.  We 
discern no abuse of discretion. 
 
e.  Evidence of prior bad acts.  The defendant argues that 
the Commonwealth's evidence on the acts charged in the 
indictment was "overwhelmed" by evidence of prior bad acts, 
i.e., acts against S.F. prior to September 29, 1979, the date of 
the first act listed in the indictment.  He notes, in 
particular, that his family moved to Wareham in late 1978 or 
early 1979, and that the incidents alleged to have taken place 
35 
 
 
in Wareham might, therefore, have occurred before September 29, 
1979.32 
 
The general rule in "sexual assault cases[ is that] some 
evidence of uncharged conduct may be admissible," but that a 
"judge should . . . intervene[] to prevent the 'danger of 
overwhelming a case with such bad act evidence.'"  Commonwealth 
v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 128-129 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Roche, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 372, 380 (1998).  Here, however, the 
judge had no reason to intervene at the time the evidence was 
presented, because the date at issue -- September 29, 1979 -- 
was inserted into the indictment only after the close of all the 
evidence, in response to the defendant's argument that incidents 
before that date were time barred.33  After the date was 
inserted, the judge properly provided a forceful curative 
instruction that the jury was to disregard entirely evidence of 
acts from before September 29, 1979.34  "Jurors are presumed to 
follow such instructions."  Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 473 Mass. 
                                                          
 
 
32 The defendant notes also that the incident in the 
bathroom of the grandparents' house in Wareham took place when 
S.F. was "about four."  Given that S.F. turned four on August 
19, 1979, approximately one month before the period covered by 
the indictment, it is not clear whether this incident took place 
during the period covered by the indictment.  See note 2, supra. 
 
 
33 Previously, the indictment had alleged that the incidents 
of rape took place "on diverse dates between 1979 and 1981." 
 
 
34 The judge instructed that "you are only to consider 
conduct within th[e] periods [in the indictment].  You are not 
to consider any incident outside of that time period." 
36 
 
 
415, 427 (2015) ("the judge instructed the jury that they were 
to disregard the references and not to take them into account in 
any way"). 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgment of conviction is vacated and 
set aside, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for 
further proceedings, as required, consistent with this opinion.  
At any new trial, the defendant may be tried only for incidents 
alleged in the indictment which are alleged to have occurred 
after October 3, 1991. 
So ordered.