Case Title: Bass v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 990894

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2000-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton,1 Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, 
and Kinser, JJ. 
 
ROY BERGER BASS 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 990894            JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
 
March 3, 2000 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a police officer’s 
perception that a legal driving maneuver was made with the 
intent to evade a temporary traffic checkpoint is sufficient to 
give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver 
was involved in criminal wrongdoing, justifying an investigative 
stop of the driver’s vehicle.  
BACKGROUND 
 
On March 24, 1997, Chesterfield County police officer 
William Shane Wickham was assigned to participate along with 
other officers in a temporary traffic checkpoint.  The 
checkpoint was located on Cogbill Road between its intersections 
with Remuda and Tyrone Streets.  Tyrone Street intersects 
Cogbill Road at a distance of approximately 210 feet from the 
intersection of Jefferson Davis Highway and Cogbill Road.  
Remuda Street intersects Cogbill Road at a distance of 
                     
1Justice Compton participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on 
February 2, 2000. 
approximately 568 feet from Jefferson Davis Highway.  A gasoline 
station is located on the southwest corner of the intersection 
of Cogbill Road and Jefferson Davis Highway.  The traffic 
checkpoint was located approximately 500 feet from this 
intersection.2
 
Officer Wickham was assigned to a “chase vehicle” with 
instructions to stop any vehicle that attempted to evade the 
checkpoint.  From his position on Cogbill Road, nearer to Tyrone 
Street than Remuda Street, Officer Wickham observed a vehicle, 
subsequently determined to have been operated by Roy Berger 
Bass, turn left from the northbound lane of Jefferson Davis 
Highway onto Cogbill Road.  Officer Wickham further observed 
that after making this turn, the vehicle proceeded toward the 
traffic checkpoint, turned left into the parking lot of the 
gasoline station, traveled through the parking lot without 
stopping, and exited the parking lot into the southbound lane of 
Jefferson Davis Highway. 
 
After observing these turns, Officer Wickham decided to 
stop the vehicle because it was the policy of his police 
department to stop any vehicle being driven in a manner so as to 
                     
2The record does not pinpoint the exact distance between the 
checkpoint and this intersection.  However, the Commonwealth 
does not challenge Bass’ assertions on appeal that the trial 
court determined that this distance was approximately 500 feet. 
 
 
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evade a traffic checkpoint.  Officer Wickham testified that he 
believed that Bass was attempting to evade this particular 
traffic checkpoint because “[u]nlike any other vehicles that had 
pulled to the gas station [during the one hour that the 
checkpoint was in operation], Mr. Bass did not make any attempt 
to stop or check to see if the station was open, which, in fact, 
it was.  He continued to travel through the gas station and 
travel southbound [on Jefferson Davis Highway].”  Officer 
Wickham further testified that “to [his] knowledge, other than 
evading the checkpoint” Bass committed “no violation of any law” 
that Officer Wickham was able to observe prior to stopping Bass’ 
vehicle. 
 
On March 24, 1997, a warrant was issued charging Bass with 
a violation of Code § 18.2-266, driving a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated.  Ultimately in the trial court, the Circuit Court 
of Chesterfield County, Bass filed a motion to suppress all 
evidence obtained as a result of the stop of his vehicle, 
asserting that Officer Wickham did not have adequate grounds 
upon which to stop and detain Bass.  On October 22, 1997, prior 
to the commencement of trial, the motion to suppress was heard 
and denied.  At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case at 
trial, Bass’ motion to strike the evidence was overruled.  Bass 
then rested without presenting evidence and was found guilty. 
 
3
 
Bass subsequently appealed his conviction to the Court of 
Appeals.  In an unpublished opinion, Bass v. Commonwealth, 
Record No. 2535-97-2 (February 16, 1999), a divided panel of the 
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  The 
majority found that the stop of Bass did not violate his Fourth 
Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure.  The 
majority reasoned that “[t]he manner in which Bass made two 
quick turns, cutting through the parking lot without stopping at 
the [gasoline] station, reasonably supported Officer Wickham’s 
suspicion that Bass sought to evade the [checkpoint].  That 
suspicion legitimated the stop.”  The dissent concluded that 
Bass’ case is controlled by the Court of Appeals’ decision in 
Murphy v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 139, 384 S.E.2d 125 (1989).  
There, the Court held that “a driver’s action in making a legal 
turn within sight of a [traffic checkpoint] does not give a 
police officer a reasonable basis to suspect that the driver is 
involved in criminal wrong doing.”  Id. at 141, 384 S.E.2d at 
126.  On March 29, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied Bass’ 
petition for rehearing.  We awarded Bass this appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
 
Although we have not previously addressed the specific 
issue presented by this appeal, the issue is rooted in and must 
be resolved by well-established principles that need not be 
recited in detail here.  The undisputed facts establish that 
 
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Bass was subjected to an investigatory stop, a brief encounter 
between a citizen and a police officer, and it is ultimately to 
be determined whether that stop was consistent with Bass’ right 
protected by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States to be free from an unreasonable seizure.  A police 
officer may constitutionally conduct a brief, investigatory stop 
when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that 
criminal activity is afoot.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 
(1968).  A reasonable suspicion is more than an 
“unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’”  Id. at 27.  Reasonable 
suspicion, while requiring less of a showing than probable 
cause, requires at least a minimal level of objective 
justification for making the stop.  United States v. Sokolow, 
490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).  Accordingly, the stop of an automobile 
and the resulting detention of the driver is unreasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment absent a reasonable, articulable suspicion 
that the driver is unlicensed or that the automobile is not 
registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is 
otherwise subject to seizure for violation of the law.  Delaware 
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).  The court must consider 
the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a 
police officer had a particularized and objective basis for 
suspecting that a person stopped may be involved in criminal 
activity.  United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).  
 
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Our prior decisions, involving various factual circumstances, 
are in accord with these principles.  See, e.g., Ewell v. 
Commonwealth, 254 Va. 214, 491 S.E.2d 721 (1997); Zimmerman v. 
Commonwealth, 234 Va. 609, 363 S.E.2d 708 (1988); Leeth v. 
Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 288 S.E.2d 475 (1982). 
 
These well-established standards are to be applied under 
equally well-established principles of appellate review.  We 
consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly 
deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.  Reid v. 
Commonwealth, 256 Va. 561, 564, 506 S.E.2d 787, 789 (1998).  We 
apply the same standard when, as here, we review the trial 
court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress the 
evidence.  Ewell, 254 Va. at 217, 491 S.E.2d at 723.  However, 
determinations of reasonable suspicion in the context of a 
Fourth Amendment challenge involve questions of both law and 
fact and consequently are to be reviewed de novo on appeal.  In 
performing such a review we give deference to the factual 
determinations established in the record and independently 
determine whether under the established law those facts satisfy 
the constitutional standard.  Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 
690, 697-99 (1996).   
 
Bass contends that the totality of the circumstances in 
this case, as established by the undisputed evidence, did not 
 
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give rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion that he may have 
been involved in some form of criminal or otherwise unlawful 
activity.  He argues that none of his driving maneuvers in 
proximity to the checkpoint was unlawful and that, indeed, the 
avoidance of a checkpoint is not unlawful.  Thus, he contends 
that under such circumstances neither Officer Wickham nor any 
objectively reasonable police officer would believe that the 
pursuit and stop were appropriate. 
 
The Commonwealth responds with several different 
contentions.  Initially, the Commonwealth argues that Officer 
Wickham’s observation of Bass’ driving maneuvers supports the 
officer’s reasonable conclusion that Bass “was evading the 
traffic checkpoint and, consequently, was violating the law.”  
Although there is no specific statutory prohibition against the 
avoidance or evasion of a traffic checkpoint, the Commonwealth 
refers to Code § 46.2-817, which makes it unlawful for citizens 
to refuse to stop their vehicles when commanded to do so by the 
police, and contends that a traffic checkpoint is a command by 
the police for all those approaching to stop their vehicles.  
There is no merit to this contention.  Assuming, arguendo, that 
a checkpoint would constitute a police signal or command to 
stop, we are unwilling to construe this statute so that such 
command would extend over a distance of 500 feet and one street 
intersection beyond the checkpoint in question. 
 
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Next, the Commonwealth contends that even though Officer 
Wickham did not recognize that Bass was committing a traffic 
offense, the fact that Bass was guilty of such an offense 
nevertheless supports the objective reasonableness of the 
officer’s actions.  The Commonwealth identifies Code § 46.2-
833.1 as the statute that Bass violated.  Code § 46.2-833.1 
provides that: 
 
It shall be unlawful for the driver of any motor 
vehicle to drive off the roadway and onto or across 
any public or private property in order to evade any 
stop sign, yield sign, traffic light, or other traffic 
control device. 
 
 
The Commonwealth asserts that a traffic checkpoint falls 
within the category of “other traffic control device” in this 
statute.  We disagree.  A traffic checkpoint consists of police 
vehicles and police officers that are temporarily located and 
intended to discover unlawful activity.  To the extent that a 
checkpoint also “control[s]” traffic, it does so only for the 
previously stated purpose.  In contrast stop signs, yield signs, 
and traffic lights are intended for traffic safety and are 
generally not temporarily located.  They are obviously not 
intended to discover unlawful activity.  Because of this patent 
dissimilarity between the specific devices set forth in this 
statute and a traffic checkpoint, we conclude that the 
legislature did not intend to include traffic checkpoints within 
the scope of this statute.  In addition, under the doctrine 
 
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ejusdem generis, a traffic checkpoint does not fall under the 
statutory definition of “other traffic control device.”  See, 
e.g., Graybeal v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 736, 740, 324 S.E.2d 
698, 700 (1985).  Accordingly, Bass’ driving maneuvers did not 
constitute a violation of Code § 46.2-833.1, thus allowing the 
stop of his vehicle. 
 
Finally, the Commonwealth contends that even if Bass’ 
driving maneuvers did not constitute a traffic violation, they 
provided Officer Wickham with a reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that Bass was “either unlicensed or otherwise in 
violation of the law.”  In support of this contention, the 
Commonwealth relies upon several cases decided by the Court of 
Appeals, giving particular emphasis to Thomas v. Commonwealth, 
24 Va. App. 49, 480 S.E.2d 135 (1997)(en banc), and Stroud v. 
Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 633, 370 S.E.2d 721 (1988).  In 
addition, the Commonwealth argues that there is a factual 
distinction between the present case and Murphy, the Court of 
Appeals decision relied upon by the dissenting judge in the 
present case.  We are not persuaded by this contention.  Thomas, 
Stroud, and Murphy, while employing the appropriate analysis for 
the determination of reasonable suspicion to justify an 
investigative stop, are all necessarily fact specific.  Thus, 
these cases do not control our independent review of the 
totality of the circumstances in the present case.  Indeed, if 
 
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that were not so, Murphy, which more closely resembles the 
factual circumstances here, would be more on point than Thomas 
and Stroud. 
 
In the present case, Bass made a series of legal driving 
maneuvers the effect of which was to reverse the direction in 
which he was going.  These maneuvers also resulted in his not 
passing through the traffic checkpoint that was approximately 
500 feet away.  The fact that Bass did not stop in the parking 
lot of the gasoline station is entirely consistent with a motive 
to accomplish a “U-turn.”  The reasons for which a driver may 
reverse direction other than to evade a traffic checkpoint are 
legion in number and are a matter of common knowledge and 
experience.  Considering the totality of the circumstances and 
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the most that the Commonwealth’s evidence 
established in this case was a “hunch” that Bass chose to avoid 
the checkpoint.  This was not sufficient to give Officer Wickham 
the requisite suspicion needed to seize Bass.3
                     
3Contrary to the Commonwealth’s assertion, the evidence in 
this case does not support a reasonable suspicion that Bass’ 
maneuvers were conducted in such a manner as to constitute 
“headlong flight” from the police conducting the checkpoint.  
Accordingly, the recent decision of the United States Supreme 
Court in Illinois v. Wardlow, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 673 
(2000), is not implicated here. 
 
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CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we hold that Bass was seized in 
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.  Consequently, the 
trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence obtained 
as a result of that seizure, and the Court of Appeals erred in 
affirming the trial court’s judgment. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and enter final judgment vacating Bass’ conviction and 
dismissing the warrant. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
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