Case Title: FMC, a Wyoming Corporation v. SHERRY K. LANE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-05-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
FMC, a Wyoming Corporation v. SHERRY K. LANE1989 WY 106773 P.2d 163Case Number: 88-262Decided: 05/11/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
FMC, A WYOMING 
CORPORATION, PETITIONER,

v.

SHERRY K. 
LANE, 
RESPONDENT.

Gary M. 
Greenhalgh, Greenhalgh, Bussart, West & Rosetti, Rock Springs, for petitioner.

George Santini, 
Graves, Santini & Villemez, P.C., Cheyenne, for respondent.

Before THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and 
LANGDON, District Judge.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The question that the 
court must resolve in this case is how the contested case procedure adopted by 
the legislature for disposing of claims for workers' compensation benefits that 
are objected to1 blends into the existing body of 
substantive law and the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act2. In their respective briefs, the 
parties suggest a number of issues relating both to procedure and disposition on 
the merits.3 We conclude, however, that the 
failure of the independent hearing officer to couch his findings of fact in the 
manner required by statute and prior decisions of this court prevents 
appropriate judicial review of the issues claimed by the parties. We hold 
unlawful and set aside the agency action, findings, and conclusions because of a 
failure to observe the procedure required by law. We reverse and remand the case 
to the independent hearing officer for proceedings to be conducted in accordance 
with this opinion. 

[¶2.]     The threshold question, 
which turns out to be dispositive, is whether the independent hearing officer 
was faithful to the statutory charge found in § 16-3-110, W.S. 1977, as that 
provision has been interpreted by this court. Section 16-3-110, W.S. 1977, 
provides as follows:

"A final decision or 
order adverse to a party in a contested case shall be in writing or dictated 
into the record. The final decision shall include findings of fact and 
conclusions of law separately stated. Findings of fact if set forth in statutory 
language, shall be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the 
underlying facts supporting the findings. Parties shall be notified either 
personally or by mail of any decision or order. A copy of the decision and order 
shall be delivered or mailed forthwith to each party or to his attorney of 
record."

This court has 
ruled consistently that this provision wisely requires the administrative agency 
in any contested case to encompass in its final decision findings of fact and 
conclusions of law separately stated. This requirement demands findings of basic 
facts upon all of the material issues in the proceeding and upon which the 
ultimate findings of fact or conclusions are based. Each ultimate fact or 
conclusion is to be thoroughly explained in order for the reviewing court to 
determine the basis upon which the ultimate fact or conclusion was reached. 
Geraud v. Schrader, 531 P.2d 872 (Wyo. 1975), 
cert. denied, sub nom. Wind River Indian Education Association, Inc. v. Ward, 
423 U.S. 904, 96 S. Ct. 205, 46 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1975). Without compliance with this provision, which is designed to aid the 
reviewing court in the performance of the functions assigned by § 16-3-114(c), 
W.S. 1977, there can be no rational basis for judicial review. Holding's Little 
America v. Board of CountyCommissioners of LaramieCounty, 670 P.2d 699 (Wyo. 1983). See Campbell County v. Wyoming 
Community College Commission, 731 P.2d 1174 (Wyo. 1987); Mountain Fuel Supply 
Co. v. Public Service Commission of Wyoming, 662 P.2d 878 (Wyo. 1983); Larsen v. 
Wyoming Oil & Gas Conservation Commission, 569 P.2d 87 (Wyo. 1977); Powell 
v. Board of Trustees of Crook County School Dist. No. 1, 550 P.2d 1112 (Wyo. 
1976); Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Wyoming Oil & Gas Conservation 
Commission, 446 P.2d 550 (Wyo. 1968). Cf. Foremost Life Insurance Company v. 
Langdon, 633 P.2d 938 (Wyo. 1981).

[¶3.]     The record in this case 
discloses that, on November 15, 1984, Sherry K. Lane (Lane) was awarded 
$11,900.12 as a permanent partial disability for 20% impairment of the whole 
person because of a back injury suffered while working for FMC Corporation 
(FMC). She continued to experience difficulties which apparently were not 
relieved by a back fusion operation performed in 1985, and she subsequently was 
subjected to another surgical procedure to achieve fusion of her back at the 
area of the affected vertebrae. She then filed a claim for modification of her 
disability benefits seeking an award of benefits for total permanent disability. 
She alleged in her petition that, subsequent to the initial award, she had 
"suffered an increase of incapacity due solely to original injury." FMC objected 
to the petition for permanent total disability benefits.

[¶4.]     Subsequently, an effort 
was made to secure interim disability payments, but that request was denied. 
Lane also filed a claim for a permanent partial disability increasing the award 
from the original 20% of the whole body to 30% of the whole body. That claim was 
disapproved by FMC. The parties then pursued discovery including the deposition 
of the surgeon who performed the latest surgery. An independent medical 
examination also was obtained. Various other pleadings were presented by the 
parties, including a request for a change of venue, and the matter then was 
heard, on November 9, 1987, by the independent hearing 
officer.

[¶5.]     From that point on the 
record becomes somewhat complex. On November 18, 1987, the independent hearing 
officer provided counsel with a decision letter. The product of that letter was 
that the Lane case was reopened and her benefits were modified to provide for an 
increase from 20% permanent partial disability to "a permanent total disability 
award of thirty percent (30%) with the vocational disability component included 
therein, * * *." Some dialogue then occurred among counsel and the independent 
hearing officer, and another decision letter was furnished, on December 30, 
1987, that set aside the earlier decision letter and awarded "the sum of 
$62,000.00 as a permanent partial disability award, * * *." An Order Granting 
Modification then was entered based upon the December 30, 1987 decision letter. 
The State of Wyoming, ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division then filed a Petition to Reopen for Modification of Award which was 
premised upon the proposition that the aggregate of the original award and the 
most recent award exceeded the amount permitted by statute. In the meantime, a 
Petition for Review was filed by FMC in the district court. Subsequent to the 
Petition for Review, the independent hearing officer entered a new order which 
concluded that the earlier award had been entered because of a mistake and 
awarded to Lane "ninety-nine percent (99%) of the whole body for her permanent 
partial disability, which computes to $58,905.63, less the twenty percent (20%) 
permanent partial disability [Lane] was previously awarded in April, 1986, of 
$11,900.12, for a final total award of $47,005.51." FMC filed a Supplemental 
Petition for Review. Lane then filed a Motion for Certification Pursuant to Rule 
12.09, Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure. That motion was denied but, after 
briefs were filed in the district court, the district court did enter its Order 
Certifying Case to the Wyoming Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 12.09, W.R.A.P. In 
the meantime, various awards of attorney fees and costs and expenses of 
litigation were made in favor of Lane which, according to the several orders, 
were to affect the employer's experience rating of FMC.

[¶6.]     Lane's Petition for 
Permanent Total Disability Benefits did not specifically invoke § 27-14-605, 
W.S. 1977, but that is the pertinent provision. That section 
provides:

"Where an award of 
compensation has been made in favor of or on behalf of an employee for benefits 
under this act, an application may be made to the clerk of court by any party 
within four (4) years from the date of the last award, or at any time during 
which monthly payments under an award are being made, for additional benefits of 
any type or nature or for a modification of the amount of the award on the 
ground of increase or decrease of incapacity due solely to the injury, or upon 
grounds of mistake or fraud."

That provision 
was not changed in the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act from prior law. It 
uniformly has been construed to require the employee to assume the burden of 
demonstrating the statutory ground for reopening the workers' compensation case. 
Lehman v. State, ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 752 P.2d 422 
(Wyo. 1988); Deroche v. R.L. Manning Company, 737 P.2d 332 (Wyo. 1987); Woodman 
v. Grace Bomac Drilling, 736 P.2d 313 (Wyo. 1987); Matter of Injury to Loveday, 
711 P.2d 396 (Wyo. 1985); Hunteman v. Ward Transport, Inc., 706 P.2d 1126 (Wyo. 
1985); House v. State, ex rel. Worker's Compensation Division, 701 P.2d 1162 
(Wyo. 1985); Matter of Abas, 701 P.2d 1153 (Wyo. 1985); Conn v. Ed Wederski 
Construction Company, 668 P.2d 649 (Wyo. 1983). Our authorities hold that it is 
the obligation of the injured employee to plead the statutory ground for 
reopening, which Lane did do in this instance. Herring v. Welltech, Inc., 715 P.2d 553 (Wyo. 
1986).

[¶7.]     Our conclusion is that 
this body of substantive law transfers to the proceedings before an independent 
hearing officer, but with this difference. Because of the specific requirements 
of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act found in § 16-3-110, quoted above, 
as it has been construed, the reviewing court is not permitted any presumption 
relative to any general finding.4 The scrutiny of this record, 
particularly the court's decision letter of December 30, 1987, and the Order 
Granting Modification discloses no finding with respect to whether Lane suffered 
an increase of incapacity due solely to the injury as required by § 27-14-605. 
Neither is there any finding of any mistake in connection with the initial 
award, although it appears that Lane did urge that proposition. The only 
language that approaches this issue is found under the Conclusions of Law where 
it is stated:

"The employee has 
sustained the burden of proving that she is entitled to a permanent partial 
disability award under the provisions of the `Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act' 
* * *."

Consequently, 
this court is unable to discern from the record whether the independent hearing 
officer even considered the requirements of Conn, 668 P.2d 649, and its progeny in 
addressing Lane's petition. Certainly, it made no finding of fact in that 
regard, and one inference from the absence of such a finding is that the 
evidence would not support the finding. The Order Granting Modification fails to 
comply with § 16-3-110, W.S. 1977, and other precedent.

[¶8.]     Our cases demonstrate 
that the existence of a statutory basis to reopen a workers' compensation case 
is a threshold proposition, which must be resolved prior to a consideration of a 
claim for additional benefits on the merits. Given this record, we are forced to 
conclude that the action of the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, as 
incorporated into the decision and order of the independent hearing officer, was 
entered without observance of the procedure required by law and, for that 
reason, must be held unlawful and set aside. In accordance with § 16-3-114(c), 
W.S. 1977, the decision of the independent hearing officer is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of the 
court in this case.

[¶9.]     Reversed and 
remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1 The contested case 
procedure for workers' compensation claims now is set forth in §§ 27-14-601 to 
-605, W.S. 1977.

2 The Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act is found in §§ 16-3-101 to -115, W.S. 
1977.

3 In the brief of 
Appellant FMC Corporation, the issues presented for review are stated to 
be:

"I. Whether an 
administrative law judge has authority to modify an order awarding worker's 
compensation benefits after a party has petitioned the district court to review 
the initial order?

"II. Whether 
employee-claimant had grounds for modification of a prior award of permanent 
partial disability?

"III. Whether 
employee-claimant proved her claim of permanent total 
disability?

"IV. Whether the award of 
$62,000.00 Was supported by law and substantial evidence?

"V. Whether court costs 
and attorney fees may be charged against the employer's experience rating during 
appeal of an award of additional permanent partial disability benefits to an 
employee who filed a claim for permanent total 
disability?"

In the Brief of 
Respondent-Appellee the issues are stated in this way:

"1. Did the 
Administrative Law Judge have jurisdiction to correct his February 8, 1988 Order 
Granting Modification upon motion of the State Worker's Compensation Division to 
correct an apparent error of law?

"2. Is there substantial 
evidence to support the Findings and Conclusions of the Administrative Law 
Judge?

"3. Was the Appellant the 
prevailing party below for purposes of § 27-14-602(d), W.S. 1977 (1987 
Cum.Supp.)?"

In the Reply 
Brief of Appellant FMC Corporation, no new issues are stated, but the following 
arguments are articulated:

"The law in Wyoming, and in a 
majority of federal courts, does not permit an administrative hearing officer to 
use rule 60(b) of the rules of civil procedure to affect substantive portions of 
a judgment or decree to correct errors of law made by the hearing officer. "It 
was error for the hearing officer to award either $62,000 or 99% permanent 
partial disability without making specific findings of basic facts in support of 
the award, and when the award was not supported by substantial 
evidence.

"The administrative 
hearing officer abused his discretion by ordering payment of court costs and 
attorney fees to be charged against the employer's experience rating while 
appeal was pending."

4 In a trial to the court, 
unless one of the parties requests special findings of fact pursuant to Rule 
52(a), W.R.C.P., a general finding incorporated in the judgment carries with it 
every finding of fact that is supported by the evidence. Deroche v. R.L. Manning 
Company, 737 P.2d 332 (Wyo. 1987); Brug v. 
Case, 600 P.2d 710 (Wyo. 1979); Zitterkopf v. 
Roussalis, 546 P.2d 436 (Wyo. 1976); 
Hendrickson v. Heinze, 541 P.2d 1133 (Wyo. 1975). Section 16-3-110, W.S. 1977, does 
not accommodate to such a rule with respect to administrative 
proceedings.