Case Title: State v. Zuniga

Citation: 348 N.C. 214

Docket Number: 156A85-3

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1998-05-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 156A85-3
FILED: 8 MAY 1998
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
BERNARDINO ZUNIGA
Appeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from
a judgment imposing a sentence of death entered by Albright, J.,
at the 11 September 1995 Special Session of Superior Court,
Davidson County.  Heard in the Supreme Court 14 October 1997.  
The defendant was indicted for the murder and rape of
April Lee Sweet on or about 13 July 1982.  In February of 1985,
he was tried capitally and found guilty of first-degree murder
and first-degree rape.  He received a death sentence for the
murder conviction and a consecutive term of life imprisonment for
the rape conviction.  We affirmed the conviction and the death
sentence in State v. Zuniga, 320 N.C. 233, 357 S.E.2d 898, cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 959, 98 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1987).  
The defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief in
the Superior Court, Davidson County.  That motion was denied on
20 July 1991.  This Court allowed the defendant’s petition for a
writ of certiorari and in State v. Zuniga, 336 N.C. 508, 444
S.E.2d 443 (1994), vacated the death sentence and remanded for a
new sentencing proceeding on the grounds that the jury
instructions were unconstitutional under McKoy v. North Carolina,
494 U.S. 433, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990).  
-2-
At the new sentencing proceeding, Dr. Antonio Puente,
an expert in psychology, testified for the defendant.  Dr. Puente
testified that he gave the defendant several psychological tests
and that the results of each of the tests showed the defendant
was in the impaired range.  Dr. Puente concluded that the
defendant suffered from mild to moderate mental retardation, with
an intellectual age of seven, and organic brain syndrome of
moderate range.  Dr. Puente testified that the defendant’s
intellectual age of seven means he functions like an average
seven-year-old.  Organic brain syndrome indicates there is
something wrong with the brain and that, as a consequence, the
defendant’s behavior is abnormal.  The defendant scored a 56 on
an IQ test.  Dr. Puente also testified that the defendant had
very low impulse control.  He said that he felt the defendant’s
ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and his
ability to conform to the requirements of law were impaired.
Dr. Patricio Lara, a forensic psychiatrist, testified
that he had examined the defendant and that, in his opinion, the
defendant’s abstract thinking process was very limited, as were
his judgment and self-awareness.  In his opinion, the defendant
is mentally retarded, suffers from organic brain damage, and is
significantly restricted in his ability to conform his actions to
the limits established by law.  The defendant scored 64 on an IQ
test administered by Dr. Lara.
Other evidence presented at the sentencing proceeding
is unnecessary to recite to have an understanding of this
opinion.
-3-
The jury found one aggravating circumstance, that the
murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the
commission of first-degree rape.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(5)
(1997).  The jury found two statutory and two nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances.  The defendant did not request and the
court did not submit the mitigating circumstance, “The age of the
defendant at the time of the crime.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(7). 
The jury found that the mitigating circumstances did not outweigh
the aggravating circumstances and recommended the death penalty,
which was imposed.
The defendant appealed.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Barry S.
McNeill, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the
State.
Ann B. Petersen for the defendant-appellant.
WEBB, Justice.
The defendant assigns error to the court’s failure to
submit the (f)(7) mitigator, “The age of the defendant at the
time of the crime.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(7).  The court was
required to submit to the jury any statutory mitigating
circumstances which the evidence would support regardless of
whether the defendant objects to it or requests it.  State v.
Lloyd, 321 N.C. 301, 312, 364 S.E.2d 316, 324, sentence vacated
on other grounds, 488 U.S. 807, 102 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1988).
In interpreting the (f)(7) mitigator, we have held that
chronological age is not the determinative factor.  We have said
age is a flexible and relative concept.  “The defendant’s
-4-
immaturity, youthfulness, or lack of emotional or intellectual
development at the time of the crime must also be considered.” 
State v. Bowie, 340 N.C. 199, 203, 456 S.E.2d 771, 773, cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 994, 133 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1995); see State v.
Johnson, 317 N.C. 343, 393, 346 S.E.2d 596, 624 (1986); State v.
Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 372, 307 S.E.2d 304, 333 (1983).
In State v. Holden, 338 N.C. 394, 450 S.E.2d 878
(1994), we held that the age circumstance should have been
submitted to the jury where there was substantial evidence
showing that despite the defendant’s being thirty years old, his
mental age was ten years and his problem-solving skills were
closer to those of a ten-year-old.  Id. at 407-08, 450 S.E.2d at
885.
In this case, the defendant presented evidence from Dr.
Puente and Dr. Lara that was at least as substantial as that
offered in Holden.  Dr. Puente testified that the defendant has a
history of mild to moderate mental retardation and organic brain
syndrome of moderate range.  On one IQ test administered by Dr.
Puente, the defendant scored a 56, signifying an intellectual age
of 7.4 years.  He administered numerous other tests, all of which
indicated that the defendant is impaired.  Dr. Puente was of the
opinion that the defendant was impaired at the time he committed
the murder and rape and that the defendant’s ability to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct and his ability to
conform to the requirements of the law were impaired at the time
of the crime.  
-5-
Dr. Puente’s testimony was supported by Dr. Lara’s
testimony, who testified that the defendant suffered from mild
mental retardation and that his performance on tests indicated
evidence of chronic brain damage.  The defendant scored a 64 on
an IQ test administered by Dr. Lara.  Dr. Lara concluded that the
defendant’s mental condition significantly restricted his ability
to conform his actions to the limits established by the law.
The testimony of Dr. Puente and Dr. Lara constitutes
substantial evidence that would support a finding by the jury
that the defendant’s age at the time of the crime was mitigating. 
Therefore, the trial court was required to submit the (f)(7)
statutory mitigating circumstance to the jury.  See id. at 407,
450 S.E.2d at 885.
This Court has repeatedly held that the failure to
submit to the jury a statutory mitigating circumstance that is
supported by the evidence is reversible error, unless the State
can prove the failure to submit was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.  State v. Wilson, 322 N.C. 117, 145, 367 S.E.2d 589, 605
(1988).  The State argues that the jury considered the evidence
concerning the defendant’s mental age when it weighed the (f)(2),
(f)(6), and the nonstatutory mental retardation mitigating
circumstances, and that it is clear that the jury would still
have returned a sentence of death.  We disagree.  The State’s
argument ignores the fact that each statutory mitigating
circumstance must be given individual weight, if found to exist. 
See State v. Greene, 329 N.C. 771, 776-77, 408 S.E.2d 185, 187
(1991).  Furthermore, the submission of nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances that parallel statutory mitigating circumstances
does not satisfy the State’s burden of showing harmlessness
beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury was not required to
give mitigating value to the nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances.  See State v. Quick, 337 N.C. 359, 364, 446 S.E.2d
535, 538 (1994).  Thus, the failure to submit the (f)(7)
mitigating circumstance was prejudicial error.  
The defendant made several other assignments of error
which we do not discuss because the questions they raise may not
recur at a new sentencing proceeding.
For the reasons stated above, the defendant is entitled
to a new capital sentencing proceeding.
NEW SENTENCING PROCEEDING.
==========================
Justice LAKE dissenting.
I believe that the trial court’s failure to submit to
the jury the statutory mitigating circumstance of the defendant’s
age was not error which requires that defendant receive a new
sentencing hearing, his third.  Furthermore, even assuming
arguendo that the trial court erred in failing to submit the age
statutory mitigating circumstance ex mero motu, the trial court’s
failure to do so was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. 
For this reason, I respectfully dissent.
The majority in this case holds, based on State v.
Holden, 338 N.C. 394, 407-08, 450 S.E.2d 878, 885 (1994), that
defendant is entitled to a new sentencing proceeding because the
-7-
trial court failed to submit the (f)(7) mitigating circumstance
of defendant’s age to the jury.
I believe the majority opinion represents an overly
technical and strained, if not incorrect, interpretation of the
facts and application of the law.  In light of the history and
particular circumstances of this case, I find State v. Spruill,
338 N.C. 612, 452 S.E.2d 279 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 834,
133 L. Ed. 2d 63 (1995), to be much closer to the instant case
factually and procedurally, and thus it, rather than Holden,
should control the outcome here.  As in Spruill, in the instant
case the evidence reveals an individual quite functional in
society, though borderline intellectually, and, as a result of
such evidence, a defendant who, the second time around, elected
not to request submission of the (f)(7) mitigator.  Under such
circumstances, this Court should not render a decision which even
infers a trial court must be held in error if it does not submit
such mitigator ex mero motu.
This case involves the brutal rape and murder of a
seven-year-old girl by the twenty-seven-year-old defendant.  The
plain facts are that on 14 July 1982, the defendant raped and
then proceeded to stab and suffocate April Sweet to death,
leaving her body under a sourwood tree in the woods.  The sheriff
found April’s body lying on its right side, with blood around her
throat and flowing from between her legs.  April’s underwear was
lying on the ground nearby, and her tank-top shirt was pulled up
over her head.
-8-
As the majority opinion reflects, defendant has already
been found guilty of first-degree murder and first-degree rape in
this case, and he has twice been sentenced to death upon the
recommendation of two separate juries.  This Court found no error
and affirmed the conviction and the death sentence in State v.
Zuniga, 320 N.C. 233, 357 S.E.2d 898, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 959,
98 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1987).  On the basis of the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S.
433, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990), this Court then vacated the death
sentence and remanded for a new capital sentencing proceeding. 
State v. Zuniga, 336 N.C. 508, 444 S.E.2d 443 (1994). 
Thereafter, defendant was sentenced to death upon the
recommendation of the jury, and he has again appealed to this
Court.
In Spruill, this Court held that the failure of the
trial court to submit the (f)(7) mitigating circumstance was not
error where Spruill, a thirty-one year old at the time of the
murder, had worked as an automobile mechanic and in a shipyard,
had moved on to a better position, had attended church and had
functioned quite well in the community even though Spruill was an
immature, dependent person who had borderline intelligence. 
Spruill, 338 N.C. at 660, 452 S.E.2d at 305.
The evidence in this case shows that Dr. Patricio Lara,
the forensic psychiatrist relied on in part by the majority,
found defendant to be “quite normal” at the time of his arrest,
with no evidence of acute impairment, intoxication or confusion;
that defendant appeared to understand the seriousness and
-9-
criminality of the charges against him; and that defendant
understood right from wrong and was therefore competent to stand
trial.  Dr. Antonio Puente, another of defendant’s psychiatrists,
testified that defendant was “somewhat functional” in society. 
Dr. Lara additionally testified that after the crimes, defendant
attempted to hide the mail containing his address and changed his
bloodstained pants, indicating a conscious and calculating
attempt to avoid detection.  Evidence presented at trial further
indicated that defendant had previously maintained employment in
each of the locations where he resided.  This included employment
as a veterinary assistant, a cooking assistant, an exterminator,
and work in furniture manufacturing and tobacco.  Defendant
functioned well enough in society to be able to endorse and cash
checks, obtain identification cards, set up a post-office box,
and engage in relationships; he could and did read the newspaper. 
While in prison, defendant took several classes through Wake
Technical Community College, including basic education classes
and classes toward his high school equivalency or GED.  Defendant
also received diplomas for completing a six-month religious
leadership and development course.  
This Court has held that “‘[t]he trial court is not
required to instruct upon a statutory mitigating circumstance
unless substantial evidence has been presented to the jury which
would support a reasonable finding by the jury of the existence
of the circumstance.’”  State v. DeCastro, 342 N.C. 667, 692, 467
S.E.2d 653, 666, (quoting State v. Laws, 325 N.C. 81, 110, 381
S.E.2d 609, 626 (1989), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494
-10-
U.S. 1022, 108 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1990)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
136 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1996).  The chronological age of a defendant
is not the determinative factor under N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(7)
in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to submit the
(f)(7) mitigating circumstance to the jury.  State v. Oliver, 309
N.C. 326, 372, 307 S.E.2d 304, 333 (1983).  In State v. Johnson,
317 N.C. 343, 346 S.E.2d 596 (1986), this Court reiterated that
the statutory mitigating circumstance of age is based on a
“flexible and relative concept of age.”  Id. at 393, 346 S.E.2d
at 624.  Nevertheless, evidence showing emotional immaturity is
not viewed in isolation, particularly where other evidence shows
“more mature qualities and characteristics.”  Id.  While we have
held that chronological age is not the determinative factor on
this mitigator, we do not fail to consider and weigh
chronological age and the life experiences embodied in it.  Thus,
consistent with our determination in Spruill, I would conclude
that the indistinct evidence of this defendant’s limited
intellectual development is counterbalanced by his chronological
age of twenty-seven years, his relative academic achievement, his
work history and his generally normal social skills, such that
the “trial court [was] not required to submit the mitigating
circumstance of age.”  Spruill, 338 N.C. at 660, 452 S.E.2d at
305.
In this regard, it is significant that in Spruill, this
Court specifically considered defendant’s failure to submit the
(f)(7) mitigating circumstance in determining whether the trial
court erred in not submitting (f)(7) to the jury ex mero motu. 
-11-
Id.  In the instance case, it should be noted that in defendant’s
first sentencing proceeding, in 1985, his attorneys requested and
the trial court submitted the (f)(7) mitigating circumstance to
the jury, but the jury refused to find it.  Upon review of this
issue, this Court stated:
By requesting an instruction that the
“age” mitigating circumstance may include
mental as well as chronological age, the
defendant was apparently arguing that the
defendant’s mental age was below his
chronological age of twenty-seven years. 
However, we find no evidence in the record to
support such an instruction and thus nothing
which would entitle defendant to the
submission of this factor.
Zuniga, 320 N.C. at 272-73, 357 S.E.2d at 922.  With this
background, in defendant’s 1995 resentencing proceeding, his
attorneys apparently decided not to submit the (f)(7) mitigating
circumstance, even in light of the presumed “enhanced” evidence
of mental impairment.
However, notwithstanding the question of sufficiency of
the evidence to submit, and assuming arguendo the trial court
erred in failing to submit the (f)(7) mitigating circumstance to
the jury ex mero motu, the defendant is not entitled to a third
resentencing proceeding because this error is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.  The trial court’s asserted error here “is
prejudicial unless the State can demonstrate on appeal that it
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Quick, 337
N.C. 359, 363, 446 S.E.2d 535, 538 (1994).  The State has clearly
done so in this case.  Although the (f)(7) mitigator was not
submitted to the jury, the trial court did submit a list of
thirteen mitigating circumstances for the jury’s consideration. 
-12-
The jury found four of these, including:  (1) the capital felony
was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
mental or emotional disturbance, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(2); (2)
the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law
was impaired, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(6); (3) the defendant is
mentally retarded; and (4) the facts and circumstances of the
defendant’s birth, childhood and adolescence in Mexico. 
Therefore, the jury did find two statutory mitigating
circumstances, (f)(2) and (f)(6), and two nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances, three of which bear directly on the subject of
defendant’s mental or emotional maturity or capacity.  The jury
thus clearly found, considered and weighed all possible
circumstances (“mental disturbance,” “impaired capacity” and
“mental retardation”) which the majority now holds should have
been considered under the (f)(7) mitigator. 
Accordingly, based on these four mitigating
circumstances which the jury found, it is as certain as anything
can be in this process that even “‘had this statutory mitigating
circumstance been found and balanced against the aggravating
circumstances, the jury would still have returned a sentence of
death.’”  Quick, 337 N.C. at 363, 446 S.E.2d at 538 (quoting
State v. Mahaley, 332 N.C. 583, 599, 423 S.E.2d 58, 67-68 (1992),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1089, 130 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1995)).
The defendant received a fair trial and a second fair
sentencing proceeding, free from any prejudicial error.  He is
entitled to nothing more from the courts of this State.
-13-
Justice Parker joins in this dissenting opinion.