Case Title: Talley v. Mustafa

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015AP002356

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2018-05-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
2018 WI 47 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP2356 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Archie A. Talley, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Mustafa Mustafa, d/b/a Burleigh Liquor, a/k/a 
Burleigh Food Market and Adams Foods, LLC, 
          Defendants, 
Auto Owners Insurance Company, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 375 Wis. 2d 757, 897 N.W.2d 55 
PDC No:  2017 WI App 31 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 11, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 9, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel A. Noonan 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J., dissents, joined by 
ABRAHAMSON, J., and KELLY, J. (opinion filed). 
KELLY, J., dissents, joined by ABRAHAMSON, J., 
and A.W. BRADLEY, J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Justin F. Wallace, William R. Wick, and Nash, Spindler, 
Grimstad, & McCracken, LLP, Manitowoc.  There was an oral 
argument by Justin F. Wallace. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
George E. Chaparas and Carlson, Blau & Clemens, S.C., Milwaukee.  
There was an oral argument by George E. Chaparas. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of The Wisconsin 
Insurance Alliance by James A. Friedman, Mark W. Hancock, and 
Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison. 
 
 
 
 
2018 WI 47
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP2356 
(L.C. No. 
2012CV7847) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Archie A. Talley, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Mustafa Mustafa, d/b/a Burleigh Liquor, a/k/a 
Burleigh Food Market and Adams Foods, LLC, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Auto-Owners Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 11, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
J.   In 
this 
insurance 
coverage 
dispute, 
we 
consider 
whether 
a 
business-owners 
liability policy covers a negligent supervision claim arising 
out of an alleged employee's1 intentional act of physically 
                                                 
1 We acknowledge the parties disagree as to the status of 
the man who punched the customer.  Archie A. Talley insists the 
man was an employee.  Mustafa Mustafa says the man was not an 
employee, and there are no paychecks or documentation to refute 
Mustafa's representation.  For the purpose of our review, 
viewing the allegations in the complaint in a light most 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
2 
 
punching a customer in the face.  We hold that this insurance 
policy does not provide coverage under these circumstances.  
When the negligent supervision claim pled rests solely on an 
employee's intentional and unlawful act without any separate 
basis for a negligence claim against the employer, no coverage 
exists.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals,2 which reversed the circuit court's3 grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Auto-Owners Insurance Company (Auto-Owners) 
on the coverage issue.  The circuit court correctly concluded 
that there is no coverage under this business liability 
insurance policy for either the employee's intentional act or 
the negligent supervision claim against the employer arising 
solely out of the employee's intentional act.4 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
favorable to the non-moving party, we assume without deciding, 
that the puncher was an employee.  See Summers v. Touchpoint 
Health Plan, Inc., 2008 WI 45, ¶15, 309 Wis. 2d 78, 749 
N.W.2d 182.  Our assumption shall have no effect on the pending 
but stayed trial on the merits; the factfinder must resolve this 
dispute. 
2 See Talley v. Mustafa, 2017 WI App 31, 375 Wis. 2d 757, 
897 N.W.2d 55. 
3 The Honorable Daniel A. Noonan, Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court, presiding. 
4 Talley did not appeal the circuit court's ruling that the 
Auto-Owners policy does not provide any insurance coverage to 
the employee based on the allegations that the employee 
intentionally punched Talley in the face. 
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
3 
 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶2 
The insurance coverage issue in this case arises from 
an incident that occurred in July 2009 at a neighborhood 
convenience store, Burleigh Food Market.  Mustafa Mustafa owned 
and 
operated 
the 
store, 
and 
at 
the 
time 
carried 
a 
"Businessowners' Liability Policy" with Auto-Owners.5 
¶3 
The provisions in the business liability insurance 
policy provide, as material: 
A. COVERAGES 
1. 
Business Liability We will pay those sums that the 
insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages 
because of "bodily injury" . . . to which this 
insurance applies.  No other obligation or liability 
to pay sums or perform acts or services is covered 
unless 
explicitly 
provided 
for 
under 
COVERAGE 
EXTENSION SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS. 
   a.  This insurance applies only:[6] 
 
  (1) To "bodily injury" or "property damage": 
 
                                                 
5 Mustafa 
is 
the 
sole 
member, 
owner, 
officer, 
and 
shareholder of Adams Foods, LLC, which is the business that owns 
Burleigh Food Market.  The caption in this case lists the 
defendants as:  "Mustafa Mustafa, d/b/a Burleigh Liquor, a/k/a 
Burleigh Food Market, Adams Foods, LLC" and Auto-Owners.  
Although the insurance policy's declaration page lists "Burleigh 
Food Mart" as the insured, the parties and the record refer to 
the store as "Burleigh Food Market."  There is no dispute that 
these are one in the same. 
6 This section indicates it also applies to "personal 
injury" caused by an "offense," but an amendment to the policy 
deletes this language and instead defines "personal injury" as 
"injury, other than 'bodily injury', arising out of" a list of 
offenses, none of which are applicable. 
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
4 
 
(a)  That occurs during the policy period; 
and 
 
(b)  That is caused by an "occurrence".  The 
"occurrence" must take place in the 
"coverage territory". 
 
 
 . . . . 
 
 
B.  EXCLUSIONS 
 
 
1.  Applicable to Business Liability Coverage –  
 
This insurance does not apply to: 
 
a. 
"Bodily 
injury" 
or 
"property 
damage" 
expected or intended from the standpoint of the 
insured.  This exclusion does not apply to 
"bodily injury" resulting from the use of 
reasonable 
force 
to 
protect 
persons 
or 
property. 
 
 
 . . . . 
 
 
C.  WHO IS AN INSURED 
 
1.  If you are designated in the Declarations as: 
 
a. An individual, you and your spouse are 
insureds, but only with respect to the conduct 
of a business of which you are the sole owner. 
 
b. A partnership or joint venture, you are an 
insured.  Your members, your partners and their 
spouses are also insureds, but only with 
respect to the conduct of your business. 
 
c. An organization other than a partnership or 
joint venture, you are an insured.  Your 
executive officers and directors are insureds, 
but only with respect to their duties as your 
officers or directors.  Your stockholders are 
also insureds, but only with respect to their 
liability as stockholders. 
 
  
2.  Each of the following is also an insured: 
 
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
5 
 
a. Your employees, other than your executive 
officers, but only for acts within the scope of 
their employment by you. 
 
 . . . . 
 
 
F.  LIABILITY AND MEDICAL EXPENSES DEFINITIONS 
 
 . . . . 
 
3. "Bodily injury" means bodily injury, sickness 
or disease sustained by a person, including 
death resulting from any of these at any time. 
 
 . . . . 
 
9. "Occurrence" 
means 
an 
accident, 
including 
continuous 
or 
repeated 
exposure 
to 
substantially 
the 
same 
general 
harmful 
conditions. 
(Some formatting altered). 
¶4 
On July 24, 2009, Archie A. Talley walked into 
Mustafa's store to buy beer.  Talley claims that while he was 
inside the store, Mustafa's security guard, Keith Scott, punched 
him in the face twice.  Talley left the store and called police 
to report the assault.  Talley was taken to the hospital where 
he was treated for a broken jaw. 
¶5 
On July 17, 2012, Talley filed suit against Mustafa, 
Keith Scott,7 and Mustafa's insurer, Auto-Owners.  The complaint 
alleged, as material: 
 "[Keith Scott] was a[n] employee, security guard and/or 
customer of the defendant, Mustafa Mustafa." 
                                                 
7 Talley did not identify Keith Scott until after filing 
suit.  The complaint identified Scott as "JOHN DOE, a fictitious 
individual (address unknown)." 
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
6 
 
 "Auto-Owners . . . issued a policy of liability insurance 
wherein it agreed, among other things, to pay up to the 
limits of its policy any and all damages sustained as a 
result of negligence in the ownership and/or maintenance 
of . . . Burleigh Food Market." 
 As Talley entered the store, "the alleged security guard 
on the premises, began a verbal altercation with" Talley.  
Talley, "while walking in the premises was then struck by 
the security guard twice, fracturing his jaw." 
 "The defendants had a duty to properly train and 
supervise their employees and have a duty to exercise the 
highest degree of care for the safety of their customers 
from any harm that might befall them by reason of the 
actions and/or conduct of their employees." 
 "The defendants failed to provide adequate or proper 
security 
for 
their 
customers, 
and 
further 
said 
defendants, their agents, employees, or representatives, 
were the parties who attacked the plaintiff.  A videotape 
viewed by officers of the Milwaukee Police Department 
from the defendants' own security system, showed the 
assault." 
¶6 
Auto-Owners hired counsel to represent Mustafa.  Auto-
Owners filed an Answer and conducted discovery, which revealed 
issues related to coverage.  In January 2014, Auto-Owners 
notified the insured that it was defending the case under a 
reservation of rights letter.  In October 2014, Auto-Owners 
filed a motion to bifurcate the issues of coverage and liability 
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
7 
 
and stay the proceedings on the latter so that the coverage 
issue could be decided before the liability issues were tried. 
¶7 
The circuit court granted the motion to bifurcate and 
stayed the trial on the merits to "allow the defendant to seek a 
declaratory judgment with regard to insurance coverage issues."  
Mustafa hired his own lawyer to represent him on the coverage 
issue.  In February 2015, Auto-Owners filed its motion for 
declaratory and summary judgment, asking the circuit court to 
declare that the insurance policy does not provide coverage, and 
to grant summary judgment dismissing Auto-Owners from the 
lawsuit.  Auto-Owners asserted that no coverage existed under 
the policy because:  (1) Scott was not Mustafa's employee, and 
therefore not an insured; (2) even if a factual dispute about 
Scott's status exists, Mustafa did not believe Scott was an 
employee; (3) an intentional assault——punching someone in the 
face——is not an "occurrence" under the insurance policy and 
excluded by the intentional acts exclusion; (4) there can be no 
coverage for a negligent supervision claim based on an assault, 
and no negligent supervision claim exists because Scott was not 
an employee. 
¶8 
The circuit court held two hearings on the motion and 
both times concluded the Auto-Owners insurance policy did not 
provide coverage for Scott or for Mustafa.  The circuit court 
addressed the intentional act at the May 2015 hearing and held: 
 "So if it's an intentional act, those things are clearly 
not 
covered 
under 
Wisconsin 
law. 
 
It 
wasn't 
an 
occurrence." 
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
8 
 
 Attorneys trying to get coverage for an intentional act 
will "try to shoehorn in [a] negligence claim" to make 
the intentional act an occurrence.  "[T]his is not 
anything other than an intentional tort.  It doesn't fall 
within the definition of an accident that's covered by 
the policy." 
 Auto-Owners "has aptly pointed out in [its] brief of what 
an occurrence is under Wisconsin law.  And intentional 
acts are simply not covered because they are not 
accidents." 
 "And that's the ruling of the Court, and there's no 
coverage." 
¶9 
The circuit court held a second hearing in September 
2015 to address whether coverage existed for the negligent 
supervision claim, which was not discussed at the May 2015 
hearing.  The circuit court held: 
 "Punching somebody is not a negligent act." 
 Talley says "Scott used unreasonable force" so the 
exception in the policy that permits reasonable force 
does not apply.  "[Talley] state[s] unequivocally that it 
was unreasonable force."  "[T]he pure undisputed facts as 
asserted by the plaintiff with no doubt regardless of 
employment is that this force was unreasonable." 
 Insurance polices do not cover the unreasonable use of 
force regardless of employment. 
 Talley did not have any facts separate from the punch in 
the face to support the negligent supervision claim.  
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
9 
 
"You've got to tell me exactly how some employer is 
supposed to supervise or train somebody to do what?  To 
commit acts of unreasonable force."  "You have to tell 
this Court just what it is that would make somebody 
negligently supervised." 
 "There's only one act that caused an injury here."  "And 
that's an unreasonable force as undisputed by the 
plaintiff." 
¶10 The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Auto-
Owners and dismissed the insurer from the case.  Talley 
appealed.  The court of appeals reversed in a split decision, 
with Judge Paul F. Reilly in dissent.  See Talley v. Mustafa, 
2017 WI App 31, 375 Wis. 2d 757, 897 N.W.2d 55.  The majority of 
the court of appeals held that a reasonable insured would expect 
coverage for the negligent supervision claim alleged in the 
complaint, and that a disputed issue of material fact existed 
"as to whether Scott was an employee of Mustafa or otherwise had 
a special relationship with him such that Mustafa had a duty to 
train and supervise Scott with due care."  Id., ¶2.  Judge 
Reilly concluded that no coverage existed under the policy 
because the intentional "attack/assault" alleged could not be an 
"occurrence" since it was not an accident.  Id., ¶¶39-40 
(Reilly, J., dissenting). 
¶11 Auto-Owners petitioned this court for review, and we 
granted the petition. 
 
 
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
10 
 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶12 "We independently review a grant of summary judgment 
using the same methodology of the circuit court and the court of 
appeals."  Water Well Sols. Serv. Grp., Inc. v. Consol. Ins. 
Co., 2016 WI 54, ¶11, 369 Wis. 2d 607, 881 N.W.2d 285.  "Summary 
judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law."  Id.; Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2)(2015-16).8 
¶13 Whether to grant "a declaratory judgment is addressed 
to the circuit court's discretion."  Olson v. Farrar, 2012 WI 3, 
¶24, 338 Wis. 2d 215, 809 N.W.2d 1.  When the exercise of 
discretion turns on a question of law, however, our review is de 
novo.  Id.  This case presents an insurance coverage question, 
which requires the interpretation of an insurance policy; this 
is a question of law we review de novo.  Water Well Sols. Serv. 
Grp., Inc., 369 Wis. 2d 607, ¶12.  Therefore, we review the 
circuit court's grant of declaratory judgment de novo. 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶14  The issue before us is whether the insurance contract 
between Auto-Owners and Mustafa provides coverage for Talley's 
negligent supervision claim against Mustafa.  Auto-Owners argues 
that only an "occurrence" triggers coverage and under the facts 
here, there was no occurrence.  It insists that Talley's 
attempts to bootstrap negligence into the case as a separate 
                                                 
8 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
11 
 
tortious act by alleging Mustafa was negligent in training and 
supervising Scott should be rejected.  Auto-Owners further 
contends that agreement by both parties to the insurance 
contract——here Mustafa and Auto-Owners——that the policy does not 
provide coverage should be determinative of the coverage 
question.9  Talley insists that his negligent supervision cause 
of action against Mustafa involves a separate act of negligence 
that should be covered under the Auto-Owners insurance policy.  
In an amicus brief, the Wisconsin Insurance Alliance contends 
that commercial general liability policies do not cover the 
                                                 
9 Auto-Owners also asks us to correct the "troublesome" 
language in the court of appeals opinion suggesting that a 
negligent supervision claim can exist against an employer absent 
an employee-employer relationship.  See Talley, 375 Wis. 2d 757, 
¶36 (directing that "a jury could reasonably infer Scott worked 
for or had a special relationship with Mustafa which obligated 
Mustafa to train and supervise Scott with due care").  This 
court recognized the tort of negligent hiring, training, or 
supervision as a valid cause of action against an employer when 
the negligence of the employer is "connected to the act of the 
employee." 
 
See 
Miller 
v. 
Wal-Mart 
Stores, 
Inc., 
219 
Wis. 2d 250, 262, 580 N.W.2d 233 (1998).  Miller involved 
employees, not an individual who may have a special relationship 
with an employer.  Id. at 257-58, 262.  We reserve the question 
of whether Scott was an employee of Mustafa for the factfinder, 
see supra note 1, because resolving that factual dispute is not 
necessary to our disposition.  The issue of whether the tort of 
negligent supervision may be extended to a situation involving 
an actor who is not an employee but has a special relationship 
with an employer is also not dispositive here; therefore, we do 
not decide it.  Water Well Sols. Serv. Grp., Inc. v. Consol. 
Ins. Co., 2016 WI 54, ¶33 n.18, 369 Wis. 2d 607, 881 N.W.2d 285 
(cases should be decided on the narrowest possible grounds).  
However, because we reverse the court of appeals decision, its 
statement has no precedential effect.  See Blum v. 1st Auto & 
Cas. Ins. Co., 2010 WI 78, ¶42, 326 Wis. 2d 729, 786 N.W.2d 78. 
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
12 
 
intentional act of assault and battery, and an injured party 
cannot obtain coverage by creatively pleading a cause of action 
for negligent supervision against the insured employer. 
¶15 This is the first time we have been asked to decide 
whether coverage exists based on an allegation that the employer 
should have trained the employee not to punch a customer in the 
face.  Courts in other jurisdictions have decided whether an 
allegation of negligent supervision by an employer can trigger 
coverage when an employee causes injuries to another by 
intentionally violating the criminal law.  See, e.g., U.S. 
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Val-Blue Corp., 647 N.E.2d 1342, 1344 
(N.Y. 1995) (holding no coverage for employer based on negligent 
supervision claim when employee security guard shot a person who 
entered the nightclub) (applying assault and battery exclusion); 
Smith v. Animal Urgent Care, Inc., 542 S.E.2d 827, 831-32 
(W. Va. 2000) (holding no coverage for employer when employee 
sexually harassed another employee).  And, courts are rejecting 
plaintiffs' attempts to create coverage under commercial general 
liability policies by simply inserting negligence claims into 
complaints when employees' intentional acts cause the injuries 
giving rise to lawsuits.  See, e.g., Mt. Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Dobbs, 873 F. Supp. 2d 762, 766 (N.D. W. Va. 2012) (agreeing 
that plaintiff "cannot mischaracterize intentional acts as 
negligence claims in order to avoid the exclusions contained 
within the insurance policy"). 
¶16 We reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
hold that there is no coverage under the Auto-Owners insurance 
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
13 
 
policy.  This policy applies only to bodily injury caused by an 
"occurrence," which is defined as an accident.  Intentionally 
punching someone in the face two times is not an accident under 
any definition.  Accordingly, the negligent supervision claim 
against Mustafa can qualify as an occurrence only if facts exist 
showing that Mustafa's own conduct accidentally caused Talley's 
injuries.  Because there are no facts in Talley's complaint (or 
in any extrinsic evidence) alleging any specific separate acts 
by Mustafa that caused Talley's injuries, there is no occurrence 
triggering coverage for the negligent supervision claim.  The 
only specific assertion Talley made in this regard is that 
Mustafa should have trained Scott not to hit people.  We hold 
that when a negligent supervision claim is based entirely on an 
allegation that an employer should have trained an employee not 
to intentionally punch a customer in the face, no coverage 
exists. 
A. 
Wisconsin Case Law 
¶17 Before comparing Talley's factual allegations with the 
language of the Auto-Owners insurance policy, we look to several 
insurance coverage cases, which although not directly on point, 
provide helpful general principles.  This court has decided two 
coverage cases involving plaintiffs who were punched in the 
face:  (1) Schinner v. Gundrum, 2013 WI 71, 349 Wis. 2d 529, 833 
N.W.2d 685; and (2) Estate of Sustache v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. 
Co., 2008 WI 87, 311 Wis. 2d 548, 751 N.W.2d 845.  In Schinner, 
the insured held an underage-drinking party.  349 Wis. 2d 529, 
¶¶17-21.  One of the guests suffered serious injury after 
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
14 
 
another guest punched him twice in the face and then kicked him 
in the head.  Id., ¶¶2, 24.  The injured guest sued the insured 
and his insurer.  Id., ¶2.  We held that a homeowner's liability 
policy does not provide coverage when the insured's actions were 
entirely volitional and a substantial factor in causing the 
plaintiff's bodily injuries.  Id., ¶¶66-69.  We emphasized that 
in determining whether the facts alleged satisfy the policy's 
requirement that bodily injury be caused by an accident, the 
focus was on ascertaining "what is the injury-causing event."  
Id., ¶66.  Only if the facts alleged show that the injury-
causing event is an accident is the policy's initial grant of 
coverage triggered.  Id., ¶¶66-69, 81. 
¶18 Estate of Sustache also involved an underage-drinking 
party where one guest punched another guest, who fell and 
sustained fatal injuries.  Estate of Sustache, 311 Wis. 2d 548, 
¶5.  The deceased's estate sued the puncher, his parent, and 
their homeowner's insurer.  Id., ¶2.  The complaint alleged both 
a negligence claim against the puncher (Count 2); an intentional 
battery claim against the puncher (Count 3); and a vicarious 
liability claim against the puncher's parent (Count 4).  Id., 
¶6.  This court, after an exhaustive review of cases defining 
"accident," concluded that the negligence claim did not create 
coverage because the puncher's "volitional act," which caused 
the harm, was not "accidental, and, thus, did not give rise to 
an 'occurrence.'"  Id., ¶¶30-56 ("One cannot 'accidentally' 
intentionally cause bodily harm.").  We did not discuss the 
vicarious liability claim because it was dependent upon Count 3, 
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
15 
 
the intentional battery claim.  Id., ¶6 n.6.  Estate of Sustache 
clarifies that it is the act that caused the harm that is 
important in determining whether the insurance policy provides 
coverage.  If the act that caused the harm was not an accident, 
then there was no occurrence to trigger coverage.10 
¶19 There is only one insurance case from this court 
resolving a coverage dispute involving a claim for negligent 
supervision against an employer based on the intentional acts of 
its employees——Doyle v. Engelke, 219 Wis. 2d 277, 580 N.W.2d 245 
(1998).  In Doyle, this court concluded the comprehensive 
                                                 
10 In Estate of Sustache, we cited 9 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. 
Segalla, Couch on Insurance § 127:21, 127——54-55 (3d ed. 2000), 
noting: 
In order to constitute an "accident" or "occurrence" 
under a policy of liability of insurance, an event 
must be unforeseen, unexpected, or unanticipated.  The 
nature of an assault is such that the event itself is 
typically intentional in nature.  On their face, 
therefore, assaults would appear to inherently fall 
outside of the coverage provided in a liability 
policy . . . .If the insured is also the assailant, 
the result is that there is no coverage for the 
assault because the act was intentionally committed by 
the insured. 
Estate of Sustache v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 87, ¶53 
n.13, 
311 
Wis. 2d 548, 
751 
N.W.2d 845 
(emphasis 
added; 
formatting altered).  It is important to clarify that although 
the emphasized sentence is true, its converse is not universally 
true.  In other words, when an insured is not the assailant, 
this excerpt does not automatically mean coverage exists.  As we 
see in this case, Mustafa is the insured and was not the 
assailant, but no coverage exists because Talley does not 
sufficiently 
allege 
his 
bodily 
injuries 
were 
caused 
by 
accidental separate acts by Mustafa. 
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
16 
 
general liability (CGL) policy of Wisconsin Voice of Christian 
Youth, Inc. (WVCY) covered the plaintiff's claim for negligent 
supervision against WVCY as the employer of two employees who 
filed 
false 
legal 
documents 
to 
intentionally 
harass 
the 
plaintiff.  Id. at 281-82.  The plaintiff alleged the employees' 
actions caused her severe emotional distress and that WVCY was 
negligent in failing to supervise its employees.  Id. at 287.  
After concluding that the plaintiff's injuries met the insurance 
policy's definition of "bodily injury," id. at 288, this court 
addressed "whether WVCY's negligent supervision of its employees 
constitutes an 'event' for coverage purposes," id. at 289.  The 
CGL policy insuring WVCY covered bodily injury "caused by an 
event," and "event" was defined as "an accident, including 
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same 
general harmful conditions."  Id. at 287-89.  The Doyle court 
concluded that the plaintiff alleged an "event" that led to her 
damages 
because 
both 
"accident" 
and 
"negligence" 
have 
definitions that "center on an unintentional occurrence leading 
to undesirable results," and a reasonable insured would expect 
that an "event" includes negligent acts.  Id. at 289-90.  
Concluding that an "event" existed, this court then turned to 
the policy's intentional act exclusion to see if it negated 
coverage.  Id. at 290-91.  The intentional acts exclusion in the 
policy said the insurer would not "cover bodily injury or 
property damage that's expected or intended by the protected 
person."  Id. at 290.  Although there was no dispute that this 
exclusion prevented WVCY's employees from being covered by the 
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
17 
 
policy, this court held that because the negligent supervision 
claim did not allege that WVCY itself acted intentionally, 
coverage was trigged by the policy.  Id. at 291-92. 
¶20 It is unclear from Doyle whether the plaintiff alleged 
specific separate acts of negligence by WVCY that caused the 
plaintiff's injuries beyond the general allegation of negligent 
supervision.  There is no analysis of alleged specific acts by 
WVCY 
being 
compared 
to 
the 
insurance 
policy's 
language.  
Instead, the Doyle court relied on similar definitions of 
accident and negligence, together with a general allegation of 
negligent supervision, to discern the existence of an "event."  
This is problematic because in determining whether an event or 
an occurrence took place, courts "must focus on the incident or 
injury that gives rise to the claim, not the plaintiff's theory 
of liability."  Stuart v. Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc., 
2008 WI 86, ¶36, 311 Wis. 2d 492, 753 N.W.2d 448 (noting that 
insurance policies insure against occurrences, not "theories of 
liability" (citations and quoted source omitted)); see also Am. 
Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶¶5, 37-49, 
268 Wis. 2d 16, 673 N.W.2d 65 (focusing on the cause of the 
property damage in determining whether there was an occurrence 
for insurance coverage).  Like in Schinner and Estate of 
Sustache, our analysis in Doyle should have focused on whether 
the specific factual allegations against WVCY constituted the 
injury-causing event.  In other words, a plaintiff cannot simply 
add the word "negligence" to a complaint and expect that a 
supervision claim against an employer will create an accident 
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
18 
 
out of the employee's intentional assault and battery.  A court 
must look to see whether the plaintiff alleges specific facts 
that show the bodily injury was caused by an occurrence——an 
accident.  We did not do that in Doyle.  We said that because 
the plaintiff alleged negligent supervision against the employer 
and negligence means accident, an "event" occurred for purposes 
of coverage.  Doyle, 219 Wis. 2d at 289-90. 
¶21 Doyle also contains two legally incorrect statements.  
Paragraph 37 says "insurance coverage is based solely on the 
policy as applied to the allegations within the plaintiff's 
complaint" and footnote 3 says coverage determinations must be 
confined "to the four corners of the complaint."  Id. at 294, 
284 n.3.  Although Doyle speaks in terms of coverage, the "four 
corners" rule applies solely to analyzing an insurer's duty to 
defend.  See Olson, 338 Wis. 2d 215, ¶¶33-39 (four corners rule 
applies in duty to defend cases).  When an insurer follows one 
of the judicially-preferred approaches and moves to bifurcate 
the coverage determination from a trial on the merits, courts 
may look beyond the four corners of the complaint to determine 
whether the claims alleged are covered by the insurance policy.  
Id. 
¶22 The incorrect statements this court made in Doyle, 
which have already been impliedly overruled by this court's 
multiple 
insurance 
cases11 
decided 
since 
Doyle, 
are 
now 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Estate of Sustache, 311 Wis. 2d 548, ¶¶27-29. 
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
19 
 
explicitly overruled.  Further, we clarify that our analysis on 
the negligent supervision coverage claim fell short in Doyle.  
In analyzing whether a claim of negligent supervision is covered 
under an insurance policy, courts must compare the specific 
facts alleged against the employer with the language of the 
insurance policy to ascertain whether the incident or injury 
that gave rise to the claim satisfies the definition of 
occurrence. 
¶23 Having set forth the existing law, we now apply it to 
the particular facts and insurance policy in the matter before 
us. 
B.  Whether the Auto-Owners Insurance Policy Provides Coverage 
¶24 The issue presented here is limited to whether the 
Auto-Owners insurance policy provides coverage for the negligent 
supervision claim Talley asserts against Mustafa.  Our focus is 
on coverage, not on the duty to defend, because Auto-Owners 
followed a judicially-preferred approach when it received 
Talley's complaint:  it provided an initial defense to its 
insured and filed a motion to bifurcate the coverage issue from 
the liability trial.  See Water Well Sols. Serv. Grp., Inc., 369 
Wis. 2d 607, ¶27. 
¶25 To determine if coverage exists, we first compare the 
allegations in the plaintiff's complaint, as supplemented by the 
extrinsic evidence submitted, with the language of the policy to 
decide whether the facts allege an occurrence.  See Estate of 
Sustache, 311 Wis. 2d 548, ¶¶30-31.  If there is no occurrence, 
our analysis ends because no coverage exists; the claims do not 
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
20 
 
fall within the initial grant of coverage.  Id., ¶¶57-58.  If we 
conclude the facts allege an occurrence, we next examine the 
exclusions in the policy to determine whether any exclusion 
precludes coverage.  Id., ¶57.  Finally, if an exclusion 
applies, we examine the policy to see if any exceptions to the 
applicable exclusion restore coverage.  See Wis. Pharmacal Co., 
LLC v. Neb. Cultures of Cal., Inc., 2016 WI 14, ¶22, 367 
Wis. 2d 221, 876 N.W.2d 72.  "[W]e must not rewrite the 
insurance policy to bind an insurer to a risk [] the insurer did 
not contemplate and for which it has not been paid."  Everson v. 
Lorenz, 2005 WI 51, ¶14, 280 Wis. 2d 1, 695 N.W.2d 298. 
¶26 The Auto-Owners insurance policy applies only to 
bodily injury "caused by an 'occurrence'" and "'[o]ccurrence' 
means an accident."  Accident is not defined in the policy, but 
no one in this matter contends that Scott's act of intentionally 
punching Talley in the face was an accident.  One cannot 
"accidentally" intentionally punch someone in the face.  Talley 
does not argue otherwise.  Rather, he insists that Mustafa 
negligently trained and supervised Scott by failing to tell him 
not to hit people.  Talley asserts that Mustafa's conduct is an 
occurrence separate and distinct from Scott's intentional act.  
We disagree. 
¶27 Our focus is "'on the incident or injury that gives 
rise to the claim, not the plaintiff's theory of liability.'"  
Stuart, 311 Wis. 2d 492, ¶36 (quoted source omitted).  Our 
analysis focuses on the "injury-causing event."  Schinner, 349 
Wis. 2d 529, ¶66.  In other words, we consider whether Talley 
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
21 
 
alleged facts against Mustafa that show Talley's bodily injury 
was caused by an accident, which would be an "occurrence" 
triggering insurance coverage.  Simply inserting the word 
"negligence" into a complaint does not create coverage if the 
complaint fails to allege specific facts to establish an 
occurrence. 
¶28 Talley's complaint alleges only that the "defendants" 
were negligent in failing to "train and supervise their 
employees" and "failed to provide adequate or proper security" 
because the "employees" "were the parties who attacked the 
plaintiff." 
 
Talley's 
extrinsic 
evidence 
adds 
only 
that 
Mustafa's act of "not telling Mr. Scott to not hit anyone" 
should trigger coverage.12  In other words, the occurrence, in 
Talley's view, is Mustafa's failure to tell Scott not to punch 
customers in the face.  Typically, an employee's training and 
subsequent supervision does not include a segment on how to 
refrain from punching others because the assault and battery 
criminal statutes already prohibit such conduct.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 940.19-.208. 
¶29 Talley's allegations asserting negligent supervision 
are entirely dependent upon the intentional act giving rise to 
the injury——the punching.  The factual allegations say the 
punching caused Talley's injury.  It is the only injury-causing 
                                                 
12 Talley also rephrases the language from the complaint, 
arguing that Mustafa failed "to properly train, manage and/or 
supervise his employee." 
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
22 
 
event.  There are no factual allegations that Mustafa knew or 
should have known that Scott was likely to punch customers in 
the face.  There are no facts alleging that Mustafa himself 
acted in a specific way that led Scott to commit the act causing 
the injury.  Because Talley does not present any separate basis 
for Mustafa's negligence——any independent act by Mustafa that 
accidentally caused Talley's injury——no coverage exists. 
¶30 This is not to say that a negligent supervision claim 
will never trigger insurance coverage.  When a plaintiff alleges 
facts independent from the intentional act giving rise to the 
injury, coverage may exist.  For example, in QBE Ins. Corp. v. 
M & S Landis Corp., 915 A.2d 1222 (Pa. Super. 2007), a court 
held the insurer had the duty to defend (and indemnify if the 
jury found in plaintiff's favor) its insured——Fat Daddy's Night 
Club——on the plaintiff's claim that the employer was negligent 
in failing to properly train its bouncer employees on how to 
safely evict unruly patrons from the club and how to render 
first aid.  Id., ¶¶11-15.  After removing a patron from the 
nightclub, the bouncers threw the man on the ground, forced him 
to lay face down and laid on top of him for so long that the man 
suffocated.  Id., ¶11.  The QBE court identified specific 
factual allegations in the complaint of negligence against the 
nightclub, 
separate 
from 
the 
bouncers' 
intentional 
acts, 
sufficient to conclude that the negligence claims "can be 
considered an 'accident' triggering an occurrence under [the] 
policy."  Id., ¶12.  The specific factual allegations separate 
from the bouncers' intentional acts included the failure of the 
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
23 
 
nightclub to properly teach the bouncers how to eject patrons, 
use the correct amount of restraint, and render first aid.  Id., 
¶¶11-12.  That is, had the employer in QBE taught its bouncers 
how to safely restrain and remove a patron and how to render 
first aid, the man in QBE may not have been injured.  See also 
Vandenberg v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 2001 WI 85, 244 Wis. 2d 802, 628 
N.W.2d 876 (holding coverage existed for daycare provider's 
negligent supervision of her child, who placed pillows on top of 
a sleeping infant that caused infant to suffocate). 
C.  Courts Reject Plaintiffs' Attempts at Creative Pleading 
¶31 In contrast, when the injury giving rise to the suit 
is caused by an employee intentionally choosing to commit a 
criminal act, courts reject a plaintiff's attempt to secure 
coverage by alleging negligence against an employer.  For 
example, in Smith v. Animal Urgent Care, 542 S.E.2d at 828, the 
plaintiff filed suit against Animal Urgent Care and one of its 
veterinarians, Dr. Karl E. Yurko.  The plaintiff alleged that 
Yurko sexually harassed her, causing her injury.  Id.  The West 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that including a 
negligence claim against Animal Urgent Care in the complaint 
"does not alter the essence of the claim for purposes of 
determining the availability of insurance coverage.  Sexual 
harassment, and its inherently non-accidental nature, remain the 
crux of the case regardless of whether negligence is alleged 
against [the employer]."  Id. at 832.  See also United Nat'l 
Ins. Co. v. Entm't Grp., Inc., 945 F.2d 210, 211, 214 (7th Cir. 
1991) (holding no coverage for plaintiff's claim alleging 
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
24 
 
negligence against theatre owner for injuries caused by sexual 
assault in theatre washroom) (applying the policy's assault and 
battery exclusion); U.S. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Val-Blue 
Corp., 647 N.E.2d at 1344 (holding no coverage for plaintiff's 
claim alleging negligent supervision against nightclub for 
injuries caused when nightclub's security guard shot plaintiff) 
(applying the policy's assault and battery exclusion); Terra 
Nova Ins. Co. v. Thee Kandy Store, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 476, 478 
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding no coverage for plaintiff's claim that 
employer failed to prevent assault and battery committed by 
employee) (applying the policy's assault and battery exclusion); 
Terra Nova Ins. Co. v. N.C. Ted, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 688, 691-92 
(E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding no coverage for negligence where cause 
of injury was assault and battery, which is not an accident and 
therefore not an occurrence). 
¶32 Merely inserting negligence into a complaint that 
alleges only injuries caused by an intentional assault and 
battery will not create an occurrence (defined as an accident) 
under an insurance policy.  See Mt. Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Dobbs, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 765-66 (explaining that "[a]lthough 
the word 'negligently' is present, the complaint describes an 
intentional assault"; thus, no coverage exists on plaintiff's 
complaint alleging negligence against business whose agents 
caused injuries when they "hit, kicked, and punched" plaintiff). 
¶33 A plaintiff's attempt to reconfigure a claim of 
assault and battery as a claim of negligence will not transform 
an intentional act into an accidental one.  See United Nat'l 
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
25 
 
Ins. Co. v. Tunnel, Inc., 988 F.2d 351, 352-55 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(holding no coverage where plaintiff alleged a nightclub's 
negligent hiring of a bouncer caused injuries when the bouncer's 
intentional assault on the plaintiff fractured his skull and put 
him in a coma for two weeks; plaintiff's amending of complaint 
pretending an assault and battery never occurred will not change 
the substance of the claim).  Talley's complaint asserts an 
intentional assault and battery.  He fails to provide any 
specific facts separate from the assault and battery to show any 
accidental actions by Mustafa that caused Talley's broken jaw.  
Accordingly, there is no coverage for the negligent supervision 
claim under Auto-Owners policy. 
 
D.  Whether Mustafa's Belief Regarding Coverage Controls 
¶34 From the beginning, Mustafa has taken the position 
that 
there 
is 
no 
insurance 
coverage 
for 
the 
negligent 
supervision claim against him.  Auto-Owners asserts that when 
the insured and insurer agree that an insurance policy does not 
provide 
coverage, 
their 
agreement 
controls 
the 
coverage 
determination.  In other words, the injured party, who is not a 
party to the insurance contract, should not be able to fight for 
coverage when the insured concedes none exists. 
¶35 The scenario Auto-Owners posits is not common.  An 
insured is often the party fighting for insurance coverage.  
And, as Auto-Owners points out, insurance policies are contracts 
to which courts apply the same rules of law applicable to other 
contracts.  See Garriguenc v. Love, 67 Wis. 2d 130, 134-35, 226 
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
26 
 
N.W.2d 414 (1975).  We interpret the language of an insurance 
contract from the position of a reasonable person in the 
position of the insured.  Id.  Auto-Owners asks us to hold that 
if the parties to the contract agree as to its interpretation, 
neither the injured party nor the court should be able to 
disregard that agreement. 
¶36 We reject the bright-line rule Auto-Owners requests.  
While an insured's belief that no coverage exists may be 
considered, 
courts 
follow 
established 
principles 
of 
law 
applicable to insurance coverage determinations.  These settled 
rules are objective, based on the insurance policy's language 
compared to the specific factual allegations, and applied on a 
case-by-case basis.  See K.A.G. by Carson v. Stanford, 148 
Wis. 2d 158, 165, 434 N.W.2d 790 (Ct. App. 1988).  Unlike 
coverage 
determinations 
based 
on 
an 
insured's 
subjective 
understanding of an insurance contract, the rules courts apply 
in interpreting a policy's provisions are not subject to unknown 
pressures, lack of knowledge, or manipulation.  A neutral and 
detached court of law, tasked with determining whether an 
insurance policy provides coverage, engages in an objective 
application of the policy terms and conditions to the facts of 
the case, ensuring consistent coverage determinations grounded 
in the text of the insurance contract.  Leaving the coverage 
determination to an insured——who may be unfamiliar with the law 
or have personal reasons for taking the position that the 
insurance policy does not provide coverage——would replace the 
rule 
of 
law 
with 
subjective 
and 
therefore 
unpredictable 
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
27 
 
outcomes.  Accordingly, we decline to adopt a rule that would 
allow the insured's assessment of coverage to supplant the 
actual words of the insurance policy. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶37 The court of appeals erred in reversing the circuit 
court's grant of summary and declaratory judgment.  The circuit 
court correctly concluded that the Auto-Owners insurance policy 
does not provide coverage to Mustafa for Talley's claim of 
negligent supervision.  In comparing Talley's complaint, along 
with the extrinsic evidence obtained through discovery, to the 
language of the policy, we conclude that this policy does not 
provide coverage under these circumstances.  The policy covers 
bodily injury caused by an occurrence, which is defined as an 
accident.  There is no dispute that Scott acted intentionally 
when he punched Talley in the face.13  The punching was not an 
accident and it is the punching that caused Talley's injuries.  
Talley failed to allege specific acts by Mustafa that caused 
Talley's injuries.  When a negligent supervision claim rests 
solely on an employee's intentional act of assault and battery 
without any separate basis for a negligence claim against the 
employer, no coverage exists. 
¶38 In addition, we reject Auto-Owners' request that we 
allow an insured's agreement with its insurer to control the 
                                                 
13 Scott's position that the incident never occurred at all 
has no impact on our analysis because Scott is not a party to 
this appeal. 
No. 
2015AP2356   
 
28 
 
coverage determination.  Instead, we continue to base coverage 
determinations on the language of insurance contracts, applying 
established principles of law to the facts presented in each 
case. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
No.  2015AP2356.awb 
 
1 
 
¶39 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The issue 
presented is 
whether 
Mustafa Mustafa's business liability 
insurance policy covers Talley's claim that Mustafa negligently 
supervised his security guard.  That is, assuming Talley proved 
his negligent supervision claim against Mustafa, would the 
insurance policy require Auto-Owners to indemnify Mustafa for 
the damages caused by Mustafa's negligence?  See Estate of 
Sustache v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 2008 WI 87, ¶29, 311 
Wis. 2d 548, 751 N.W.2d 845 (court is to assume plaintiff will 
prove his case in determining whether the insured has coverage). 
¶40 Under the guise of answering the coverage question, 
the majority instead scrutinizes the merits and perceived 
weaknesses 
of 
Talley's 
negligent 
supervision 
claim. 
 
It 
concludes that the insurance policy does not provide coverage 
for Talley's negligent supervision claim against Mustafa because 
the claim cannot succeed. 
¶41 In reaching its conclusion, the majority errs in two 
distinct ways.  First, the majority fails to analyze the 
accident 
from 
the 
standpoint 
of 
the 
insured, 
thereby 
misconstruing the injury-causing events alleged in Talley's 
complaint.  Second, it misunderstands the court's task at a 
coverage trial. 
¶42 I determine that when correctly viewed from the 
standpoint of the insured and when the court properly adheres to 
its task at a coverage trial, the insurance policy provides 
coverage for Talley's negligent supervision claim against 
Mustafa.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
No.  2015AP2356.awb 
 
2 
 
I 
¶43 Archie Talley alleges that he suffered damages as a 
result of Mustafa's negligent failure to properly supervise a 
security guard employed at Mustafa's liquor store and food 
market.  The complaint alleges that after initiating a verbal 
altercation with Talley as Talley entered Mustafa's store, the 
security guard punched Talley twice in the face.  At the time of 
the assault, Mustafa carried a business liability insurance 
policy with Auto-Owners Insurance Company that covered bodily 
injuries caused by accidents (e.g. negligent acts).  See Doyle 
v. Engelke, 219 Wis. 2d 277, ¶¶23-24, 580 N.W.2d 245 (1998) 
(explaining that negligent acts constitute "accidents"). 
¶44 Specifically, the policy covers bodily injury or 
property damage caused by an "occurrence."  See majority op., 
¶3.  The policy defines an "occurrence" as "an accident[.]" An 
exclusion to the liability coverage provides that:  "This 
insurance does not apply to:  a. 'Bodily injury' or 'property 
damage' expected or intended from the standpoint of the 
insured."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶45 The majority rests its determination of no coverage  
on the conclusion that there is no "occurrence" covered by the 
policy.  It arrives at this conclusion because, in its view, 
Mustafa cannot be liable for negligent supervision given that 
"[i]ntentionally punching someone in the face two times is not 
an accident under any definition."  Majority op., ¶16.  Further, 
it reasons that the law does not require Mustafa "to tell [the 
security guard] not to punch customers in the face."  Id., ¶28. 
No.  2015AP2356.awb 
 
3 
 
¶46 Of course, intentionally punching someone in the face 
is not an accident from the standpoint of the assailant.  And, 
of course the law does not require Mustafa to say to the 
security guard, "do not punch customers in the face."  Such 
conclusions are obvious and do not require legal analysis.  It 
is in its faulty legal analysis where the majority stumbles. 
II 
¶47 The majority's legal analysis suffers from tunnel 
vision.  It focuses on the assault by the security guard, 
thereby misconstruing the injury-causing event alleged in the 
negligent supervision claim. 
¶48 Talley certainly alleges that the actual physical 
assault caused him injury, but that is not the only injury-
causing event he alleges.  Additionally, he alleges as an 
injury-causing event that Mustafa failed to properly supervise 
his store's security guard. 
¶49 Assuming Talley is successful in proving his negligent 
supervision claim against Mustafa, he will have proven that 
Mustafa was negligent by breaching a duty of care owed to 
Talley; the security guard's assault was a cause-in-fact of 
Talley's injury; and Mustafa's failure to properly train or 
supervise his security guard was the cause-in-fact of the 
assault.  That is, Talley will have proven that Mustafa's 
negligent failure to properly supervise his security guard was a 
cause-in-fact of the assault. 
¶50 "[T]he 
determination 
of 
whether 
an 
injury 
is 
accidental under a liability insurance policy should be viewed 
No.  2015AP2356.awb 
 
4 
 
from the standpoint of the insured."  Schinner v. Gundrum, 2013 
WI 71, ¶52, 349 Wis. 2d 529, 833 N.W.2d 685.  Whether the 
assailant acted intentionally has no bearing on this question.  
Indeed, 
Talley 
concedes 
that 
the 
assault 
itself 
was 
an 
intentional act, which is not covered by the Auto-Owners policy.1  
Thus, our focus should be on the negligent supervision claim 
against Mustafa only. 
¶51 Insurance contracts are interpreted as they would be 
understood by a reasonable person in the position of the 
insured.  Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, 
¶23, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 673 N.W.2d 65.  Mustafa's insurance policy 
covers bodily injuries caused by his negligent acts.  A 
reasonable insured would understand this to cover damages caused 
by the insured's negligent failure to properly supervise and 
train his security guard. 
¶52 Further, a reasonable insured would not understand 
that the policy's intentional-act exclusion precluded coverage 
for a negligent supervision claim.  See id., ¶24 (if the claim 
triggers an initial grant of coverage, the court then determines 
whether any exclusions preclude coverage of the claim).  There 
is nothing in the record to indicate that Mustafa intended the 
assault.  Thus from the standpoint of the insured, the assault 
was unintended and therefore an accident, constituting an 
"occurrence" under the policy. 
                                                 
1 See Resp. Br. at 22. 
No.  2015AP2356.awb 
 
5 
 
III 
¶53 The 
majority 
additionally 
errs 
by 
impermissibly 
relying 
on 
the 
perceived 
weakness 
of 
Talley's 
negligent 
supervision claim to determine that the insurance policy does 
not provide coverage for that claim.  In the majority's view, 
there can be no coverage for Talley's negligent supervision 
claim because the claim cannot succeed.  See majority op., ¶¶28-
29. 
¶54 This line of reasoning reflects a misunderstanding of 
the court's task at a coverage trial.  At a coverage trial, the 
court's task is to determine if the language of the policy 
requires the insurance company to indemnify its insured if the 
plaintiff's claims against the insured are successful.  See 
Estate of Sustache, 311 Wis. 2d 548, ¶29 (court is to assume 
plaintiff will prove his case in determining whether the insured 
has coverage); see also Olson v. Farrar, 2012 WI 3, ¶38, 338 
Wis. 2d 215, 809 N.W.2d 1 (quoting Estate of Sustache, 311 
Wis. 2d 548, ¶29).  In completing this task, the court should 
not focus on the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the 
merits.  Instead, the court should concern itself only with 
whether coverage is required by the language of the policy, 
assuming the plaintiff's claims are successful. 
¶55 There are good reasons why the court should not 
entertain merit-based arguments made during the course of a 
coverage trial.  Such a practice places the insured in a very 
awkward position.  When the insurance company argues that 
coverage does not exist because the plaintiff's claims are too 
No.  2015AP2356.awb 
 
6 
 
weak to succeed, what is the insured to do?  Should the insured 
argue that the claims against him lack merit?  Or the insured 
could 
argue 
that 
the 
plaintiff's 
claims 
are 
capable 
of 
succeeding, and thus coverage would be afforded under the 
language of the policy assuming that the plaintiff would prove 
the case against the insured. 
¶56 It appears that each possibility presents the insured 
with a catch-22.  If the insured argues that the claims brought 
against the insured are strong enough to proceed to trial (thus 
strengthening the insured's argument that coverage should be 
afforded), he undermines his argument at the liability phase 
that the plaintiff's claim lacks merit.  On the other hand, if 
the insured instead asserts that the claims against the insured 
are too weak to proceed to trial in order to avoid undermining 
the insured's merit-based arguments against the plaintiff's 
claims, he argues against his own interest in the coverage 
dispute and risks losing the benefit of insurance coverage. 
¶57 This untenable choice can be avoided by courts simply 
adhering to the task at hand in a coverage dispute:  determining 
whether the language of the policy would require the insurance 
company to indemnify the insured for damages arising out of a 
particular claim assuming that the plaintiff is successful in 
proving that claim at trial. 
¶58 The majority's failure to understand the court's task 
at a coverage trial likewise portends to undercut the well 
established procedure that when coverage is disputed, coverage 
and liability issues are bifurcated at trial.  See, e.g., Marks 
No.  2015AP2356.awb 
 
7 
 
v. Houston Cas. Co., 2016 WI 53, ¶63, 369 Wis. 2d 547, 881 
N.W.2d 309 (quoting Prof'l Office Bldgs., Inc. v. Royal Indem. 
Co., 145 Wis. 2d 573, 585, 427 N.W.2d 427 ("Where coverage is an 
issue, bifurcated trials are the norm."); Elliott v. Donahue, 
169 Wis. 2d 310, 318, 485 N.W.2d 403 (1992) (explaining that 
"the insurer should not only request a bifurcated trial on the 
issues of coverage and liability, but it should also move to 
stay any proceedings on liability until the issue of coverage is 
resolved"). 
¶59 A motion to bifurcate the coverage and liability 
trials was made and granted in this case.  Yet, if coverage is 
denied on the basis that the claim at issue cannot succeed on 
the merits, why would the circuit court need to bifurcate the 
issues of liability and coverage in the first instance?  If it 
is truly proper to raise merit-based arguments against a claim 
in the context of a coverage dispute, there seems to be little, 
if any, need to bifurcate the issues of coverage and liability 
because the argument against coverage is also an argument 
against liability. 
IV 
¶60 The 
majority 
opinion 
misunderstands 
both 
the 
allegations in the complaint and the applicable law regarding 
coverage trials.  It ignores Talley's claim that Mustafa's 
negligent supervision of his security guard was a cause-in-fact 
of the assault, and mistakenly engages in an analysis of the 
merits of Talley's negligent supervision claim.  It instead 
should cabin its analysis to whether coverage would be afforded 
No.  2015AP2356.awb 
 
8 
 
under the language of the policy assuming Talley succeeds in 
proving his negligent supervision claim. 
¶61 I conclude that the policy provides coverage for 
Talley's 
claim 
of 
negligent 
supervision 
against 
Mustafa.  
Properly viewed from Mustafa's standpoint, the security guard's 
punch of Talley was an accident and therefore a covered 
"occurrence." 
¶62 For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶63 I am authorized to state that Justices SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and DANIEL KELLY join this dissent. 
 
No.  2015AP2356.dk 
 
1 
 
¶64 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (dissenting).  In the broadest 
sense, there are three relevant analytical phases in this case.  
The first inquires into whether the plaintiff's complaint states 
a cause of action upon which relief can be granted (the 
pleadings phase).  The second addresses whether the defendant's 
commercial general liability insurance policy provides coverage 
for the claimed damages (the coverage phase).  And the third is 
the trial on the merits of the plaintiff's cause (the merits 
phase).  This case required us to focus on the coverage phase.  
That is, we were supposed to be reviewing whether Mr. Mustafa's 
insurance policy provided coverage for Mr. Talley's damages.  
However, we allowed a mélange of insurance provisions, pleading 
disputes, and policy questions to divert us into the first and 
third phases.  And there we foundered. 
¶65 The 
circuit 
court 
wisely 
bifurcated 
the 
trial 
proceedings in this case so that the parties could determine 
whether the policy provides coverage for the alleged tort (the 
coverage 
phase) 
prior 
to 
litigating 
the 
merits 
of 
the 
plaintiff's complaint (the merits phase).  The coverage phase 
calls upon the court to answer one——and only one——question:  If 
the plaintiff should prevail in the merits phase, would the 
insurance policy cover the damages?  If not, the court dismisses 
the insurer; otherwise, the insurer remains for the duration. 
¶66 The purpose of the coverage phase is not to decide 
whether the plaintiff has stated a good cause of action (the 
pleading phase), nor is it to try the merits of the plaintiff's 
claim (the merits phase).  The purpose of the coverage phase is 
No.  2015AP2356.dk 
 
2 
 
to do nothing but authoritatively construe the insurance 
contract.  That is to say, the court takes as its starting point 
that the plaintiff will win his case, and based on that 
assumption, it determines whether the policy provides coverage.  
Estate of Sustache v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 87, ¶29, 
311 Wis. 2d 548, 751 N.W.2d 845 ("The insurer's duty to continue 
to defend is contingent upon the court's determination that the 
insured has coverage if the plaintiff proves his case.").  
Instead of focusing on the coverage-phase question, the court's 
opinion dwelled sometimes on the pleading phase, sometimes on 
the merits phase.  But it gave little attention to the actual 
coverage question before us. 
I.  THE PLEADINGS PHASE 
¶67 The portion of the court's opinion spent on the 
pleadings phase improperly required Mr. Talley's negligent 
supervision 
claim 
to 
satisfy 
a 
standard 
of 
pleading 
we 
traditionally require only of matters sounding in fraud.1  A 
plaintiff may succeed with such a claim if, as a factual matter, 
                                                 
1 Compare 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 802.03(2) 
(2015-16) 
("In 
all 
averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting 
fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity."), and John 
Doe 1 v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2007 WI 95, ¶39, 303 
Wis. 2d 34, 734 N.W.2d 827 ("We have interpreted this statute to 
require that 'allegations of fraud must specify the particular 
individuals 
involved, 
where 
and 
when 
misrepresentations 
occurred, and to whom misrepresentations were made.'" (quoting 
Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶21, 283 
Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d 205)), with majority op., ¶16 ("Because 
there are no facts in Talley's complaint (or in any extrinsic 
evidence) alleging any specific separate acts by Mustafa that 
caused Talley's injuries, there is no occurrence triggering 
coverage for the negligent supervision claim."). 
No.  2015AP2356.dk 
 
3 
 
the defendant's breach of its duty to train and supervise its 
employee was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's actual damages.2  
We have never required a heightened pleading standard for this 
cause of action, and the court identifies nothing to suggest 
otherwise. 
¶68 And yet the court's analysis unmistakably demanded of 
Mr. Talley something more than notice-pleading.3  The court 
observed 
that 
"Talley's 
complaint 
alleges 
only 
that 
the 
'defendants' were negligent in failing to 'train and supervise 
their employees' and 'failed to provide adequate or proper 
security' because the 'employees' 'were the parties who attacked 
the plaintiff.'"  Majority op., ¶28.  This, the court concluded, 
was insufficient.  "[T]he negligent supervision claim against 
Mustafa can qualify as an occurrence only if facts exist showing 
that 
Mustafa's 
own 
conduct 
accidentally 
caused 
Talley's 
injuries."  Id., ¶16. 
                                                 
2 John Doe 1, 303 Wis. 2d 34, ¶16 ("A claim for negligent 
supervision of an employee requires a plaintiff to plead and 
prove all of the following: (1) the employer had a duty of care 
owed to the plaintiff; (2) the employer breached its duty; (3) a 
wrongful act or omission of an employee was a cause-in-fact of 
the plaintiff's injury; and (4) an act or omission of the 
employer was a cause-in-fact of the wrongful act of the 
employee."). 
3 "As a notice pleading state, Wisconsin law requires only 
that a complaint 'set forth the basic facts giving rise to the 
claims.'"  United Concrete & Constr., Inc. v. Red-D-Mix 
Concrete, Inc., 2013 WI 72, ¶21, 349 Wis. 2d 587, 836 N.W.2d 807 
(quoted source omitted).  "The purpose of a complaint in a 
notice pleading jurisdiction is to provide 'sufficient detail' 
such 'that the defendant, and the court, can obtain a fair idea 
of what the plaintiff is complaining, and can see that there is 
some basis for recovery.'"  Id. (quoted source omitted). 
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4 
 
¶69 Why wouldn't Mr. Talley's allegations be enough?  We 
are still a notice-pleading state, so to the extent the court 
was considering whether the complaint was sufficient, Mr. Talley 
didn't have to do very much at all.  He needed to allege that 
Mr. Mustafa had a duty, he breached it, and his breach caused 
actual damages.  That's all.  He didn't need to identify the 
nature of training Mr. Mustafa should have provided to his 
employee, or how it was deficient, or when the training should 
have been done, or how frequently.4  That is to say, he had 
absolutely no obligation to fill his complaint with discrete 
facts capable of proving Mr. Mustafa's negligence and the causal 
connection to his damages. 
¶70 So the nature of the court's analysis is odd because 
there is no precedent for a heightened standard of pleading for 
negligent supervision claims.  But it is also odd because the 
court should not have been conducting this analysis at all.  We 
were not asked to review whether the circuit court should have 
dismissed this case for failing to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted.  We were asked to determine whether the 
insurance policy provides coverage, which assumes an adequately 
pled cause of action. 
                                                 
4 The court says "the occurrence, in Talley's view, is 
Mustafa's failure to tell Scott not to punch customers in the 
face."  Majority op., ¶28.  That's one way of putting it, I 
suppose.  A less patronizing way would be to say Mr. Talley's 
view is that Mr. Mustafa failed to teach Mr. Scott how to de-
escalate tense situations so that verbal confrontations would 
not turn physical.  That seems like a worthy subject of 
training, yes?  Especially for an employee (if employee he was) 
with customer-facing responsibilities? 
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5 
 
II.  THE MERITS PHASE 
¶71 The court then leapfrogged from the pleading phase all 
the way to the merits phase to opine on whether Mr. Talley would 
prevail on his claim.  But our opinion on that question is 
pretty much the definition of irrelevant.  Maybe Mr. Talley 
won't prevail.  If he doesn't, that won't say a thing about 
whether the insurance policy covered the claim.  And that is 
because the coverage phase assumes not just an adequately-pled 
cause of action, but a successful one.  Estate of Sustache, 311 
Wis. 2d 548, ¶22 ("[T]he insurer is under an obligation to 
defend only if it could be held bound to indemnify the insured, 
assuming that the injured person proved the allegations of the 
complaint, regardless of the actual outcome of the case." 
(quoting Grieb v. Citizens Cas. Co. of New York, 33 Wis. 2d 552, 
558, 148 N.W.2d 103 (1967)). 
¶72 The court erred not just because it had no business 
addressing the merits of Mr. Talley's case, but also in the 
substance of its analysis.  Specifically, the court made no 
allowance for the nature of a negligent supervision claim, which 
always involves concurrent causation.  Instead, it required a 
separate and distinct line of causation between Mr. Mustafa and 
Mr. Talley.  The court said coverage will only exist "[w]hen a 
plaintiff alleges [actionable] facts independent from the 
intentional act giving rise to the injury."  Majority op., ¶30.  
That is to say, "the negligent supervision claim against Mustafa 
can qualify as an occurrence only if facts exist showing that 
Mustafa's own conduct accidentally caused Talley's injuries."  
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6 
 
Id., ¶16.  It then concluded that "when a negligent supervision 
claim is based entirely on an allegation that an employer should 
have trained an employee not to intentionally punch a customer 
in the face, no coverage exists."  Id.; see also id., ¶29 
("Because Talley does not present any separate basis for 
Mustafa's negligence——any independent act by Mustafa that 
accidentally caused Talley's injury——no coverage exists."). 
¶73 This 
entirely 
misses 
the 
fact 
that 
negligent 
supervision claims never involve a separate line of causation 
between the employer and the victim.  To the contrary, the 
causal line always, every single time, goes from the employer, 
through the employee, to (in this case) Mr. Talley's face.  We 
succinctly described the proper analysis in Miller:  "With 
respect to a cause of action for negligent hiring, training or 
supervision, we determine that the causal question is whether 
the failure of the employer to exercise due care was a cause-in-
fact of the wrongful act of the employee that in turn caused the 
plaintiff's injury."  Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 219 
Wis. 2d 250, 262, 580 N.W.2d 233 (1998).  This, we said, 
"requires two questions with respect to causation.  The first is 
whether the wrongful act of the employee was a cause-in-fact of 
the plaintiff's injury.  The second question is whether the 
negligence of the employer was a cause-in-fact of the wrongful 
act of the employee."  Id.  There is no separate causal pathway 
from Mr. Mustafa to Mr. Talley.  It must go through Mr. Scott, 
or there is no causality at all. 
No.  2015AP2356.dk 
 
7 
 
¶74 The facts the court faults Mr. Talley for not 
presenting are, to the extent he has them, those that will 
support the two jury questions described in Miller.  The court 
hasn't seen them, naturally, because we haven't yet arrived at 
the merits phase.  Mr. Talley will need to be concerned if he 
can't marshal them once the trial commences.  But not now.  So, 
in concluding there is no coverage because Mr. Talley hasn't 
sufficiently supported his claim, the court jumped the gun.  And 
if incorporating the merits inquiry into the coverage analysis 
is not jumping the gun, there was hardly any reason to bifurcate 
the proceedings in the first place, was there? 
III.  THE COVERAGE PHASE 
¶75 If we had narrowed our attention to the proper phase 
under consideration, the question we are resolving would be of 
little moment.  We have previously held that a commercial 
general liability insurance policy with terms functionally 
identical to the ones we review today provides coverage for an 
employer's negligent training or supervision.  See Doyle v. 
Engelke, 219 Wis. 2d 277, ¶¶16-17, 19, 580 N.W.2d 245 (1998).  
And the court agrees, at least in theory, that this is so.  
Majority op., ¶30 ("This is not to say that a negligent 
supervision claim will never trigger insurance coverage.").  So 
maybe the point of this case is to overrule Doyle's holding that 
negligent supervision of an employee qualifies as an occurrence 
within the meaning of CGL policies like the one at issue here.  
If that is what we are doing, we should just say so.  Otherwise, 
this case presents nothing conceptually distinct from Doyle, a 
No.  2015AP2356.dk 
 
8 
 
case we decided twenty years ago.  Perhaps insurers should be 
protected from claims of this nature.  The answer to that 
question, however, is beyond both my ken and our authority.  But 
I do know there has been nothing in the last two decades that 
has prevented insurers from protecting themselves through an 
appropriately-drafted exclusion from coverage. 
* 
¶76 But perhaps this was not really about insurance 
coverage at all, and we were looking for an opportunity to 
declare that negligent supervision claims do not lie when the 
employee's conduct is covered by criminal statutes.  See 
majority op., ¶28 ("Typically, an employee's training and 
subsequent supervision does not include a segment on how to 
refrain from punching others because the assault and battery 
statutes already prohibit such conduct.").  If this is what we 
were about, we should have said so and given our reasons for 
restricting the scope of this tort.  Maybe that would even be a 
good policy choice.  But I would prefer to leave that question 
to the legislature. 
¶77 Additionally, if we have restricted the scope of this 
tort, we should recognize the effect of that ruling.  If we 
really meant what we said in paragraph 28, then Mr. Talley has 
no meritorious claim against Mr. Mustafa.  And if that is so, 
our mandate should include dismissal of the case.  That would be 
quite a curiosity——Mr. Talley lost on the merits of his cause 
while the merits phase of his case was still stayed.  On the 
No.  2015AP2356.dk 
 
9 
 
other hand, perhaps that odd result is a hint that we have 
gotten ahead of ourselves. 
¶78 I believe the court of appeals got this case exactly 
right.  For the reasons expressed in that opinion, and the 
reasons I have given above, I respectfully dissent. 
¶79 I am authorized to state that Justices SHIRLEY S. 
AMBRAHAMSON and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
 
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