Case Title: Bonilla v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 63/14

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2015-05-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Tommy Garcia Bonilla v. State of Maryland, No. 63, September Term, 2014, Opinion by 
Adkins, J. 
  
SENTENCING — MARYLAND RULES 4-243(c)(3) AND 4-345(a) — SENTENCES 
BELOW A BINDING PLEA AGREEMENT — ILLEGAL SENTENCES: Maryland 
Rule 4-243(c)(3) provides that when a sentencing court approves a plea agreement, it must 
sentence the defendant in accordance with the terms of the agreement.  If the sentencing 
court imposes a sentence below what the parties agreed to, and the State does not consent, 
the sentence is inherently illegal and subject to correction under Maryland Rule 4-345(a).        
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County 
Case No.: CT89-1205B 
Argued: March 9, 2015 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 63  
September Term, 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TOMMY GARCIA BONILLA 
v. 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Harrell 
Battaglia 
Greene 
Adkins 
McDonald 
Watts,  
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired,  
 
Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by Adkins, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: May 22, 2015 
 
In Maryland, “[a]n illegal sentence is a sentence ‘not permitted by law.’”  State v. 
Wilkins, 393 Md. 269, 273, 900 A.2d 765, 767–68 (2006) (citation omitted).  Pursuant to 
Maryland Rule 4-345(a), a “court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.”  This Court 
has “held that a sentence that exceeds the sentence to which the parties agreed as part of a 
plea agreement is an illegal sentence within the meaning of Rule 4-345(a).”  Cuffley v. 
State, 416 Md. 568, 575 n.1, 7 A.3d 557, 561 n.1 (2010) (emphasis added) (citing Dotson 
v. State, 321 Md. 515, 521–22, 583 A.2d 710, 713 (1991)).  In this case, we consider 
whether a sentence is illegal under Rule 4-345(a) when a sentencing court imposes a 
sentence below the sentence agreed to in a binding plea agreement1 without the State’s 
consent. 
FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
In 1989, a Prince George’s County grand jury indicted Petitioner, Tommy Garcia 
Bonilla, on two counts of first degree murder and several other serious crimes.  Count I of 
the indictment charged Bonilla with the first degree murder of Jose Lozano, and Count III 
charged Bonilla with the first degree murder of Ruth Vasquez. 
At an August 28, 1990 hearing in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, 
Bonilla pleaded guilty to Counts I and III pursuant to a binding plea agreement with the 
State.2  This agreement provided that Bonilla would, if called by the State, testify truthfully 
against one of his co-defendants, Freddy DeLeon, and would plead guilty to Counts I and 
                                              
1 Throughout this Opinion, we use “binding plea agreement” to refer to a plea 
agreement the court has approved pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-243(c). 
 
2 We shall refer to Bonilla and the State collectively as the “Parties.” 
2 
 
III.  In exchange, the State agreed that Bonilla would receive a sentence of life 
imprisonment on Count III with a consecutive sentence of life imprisonment, with all but 
20 years suspended, on Count I.  The State further agreed that it would withdraw its notice 
of intent to seek a sentence of life without the possibility of parole and would enter a nolle 
prosequi to the remaining counts in the indictment.  This was presented to the judge as a 
proposed binding plea agreement.  After a proffer of facts by the State,3 the hearing judge 
determined that Bonilla was knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty and accepted his 
guilty pleas.  The hearing judge then approved the plea agreement—stating on the record 
that he was “bound” by its terms—and postponed sentencing until after DeLeon’s trial. 
On February 20, 1991, having fulfilled his obligation to testify truthfully against 
DeLeon, Bonilla appeared before the Circuit Court for sentencing.  When outlining the 
sentencing terms of the plea agreement, defense counsel reversed the terms—incorrectly 
stating that the Parties agreed to a sentence of life imprisonment on Count I and a 
                                              
3 The Court of Special Appeals summarized the proffered facts to which Bonilla 
admitted: 
1) [A]bout one month before the murders of Mr. Lozano and 
Ms. Vasquez, [Bonilla] and [DeLeon] formed a plan; 2) the 
plan was to enter apartment No. 508, located at 1802 Metzerott 
Road, in Prince George’s County, to kill whomever they found 
there and to steal cocaine that they believed to be in the 
apartment; 3) on April 14, 1989, Bonilla and DeLeon entered 
apartment 508, ransacked it, and stole the cocaine and jewelry 
they found in the apartment; 4) while in the apartment, 
DeLeon, using a 9 mm handgun, shot Jose Lozano once in the 
back of the head, killing him instantly; and 5) after Mr. Lozano 
was killed, Bonilla, using a 38 caliber handgun, killed Ruth 
Vasquez by shooting her once in the chest. 
Bonilla v. State, 217 Md. App. 299, 301, 92 A.3d 595, 596 (2014), cert. granted, 440 Md. 
114, 99 A.3d 778 (2014). 
3 
 
consecutive sentence of life imprisonment, with all but 20 years suspended, on Count III.  
The State did not recognize this error and agreed with the sentence presented by defense 
counsel.  Consistent with the Parties’ representations, the court sentenced Bonilla to life 
imprisonment on Count I and a consecutive sentence of life imprisonment, with all but 20 
years suspended, on Count III. 
Over two decades later, on November 7, 2011, Bonilla filed a Motion to Correct 
Illegal Sentence and Motion for Credit Against Time Spent in Custody, arguing that his 
sentence on Count I was illegal because it “exceed[ed] the sentence agreed upon by the 
parties under the terms of the binding plea agreement.”  In response, the State filed a 
Motion to Correct the Entire Sentence, contending that the sentences on Count I and Count 
III were illegal because they deviated from the binding plea agreement.  On February 7, 
2012, the Circuit Court issued a Memorandum and Order, concluding that the sentences on 
both counts were illegal and ordering a resentencing “in accordance with the original plea 
agreement.”  At the resentencing hearing, the Circuit Court resentenced Bonilla to life 
imprisonment on Count III and a consecutive sentence of life imprisonment, with all but 
20 years suspended, on Count I.  Bonilla appealed. 
In a reported opinion authored by Judge Salmon, the Court of Special Appeals 
affirmed the judgment of the sentencing court, agreeing that Bonilla’s original sentence on 
Count III was illegal because it was below the binding plea agreement.  Bonilla v. State, 
217 Md. App. 299, 92 A.3d 595 (2014), cert. granted, 440 Md. 114, 99 A.3d 778 (2014).  
Bonilla petitioned for writ of certiorari, which this Court granted to answer the following 
question: 
4 
 
Did the Court of Special Appeals err by affirming the Circuit 
Court’s judgment that a sentence below a binding plea 
agreement constitutes an illegal sentence [within the meaning 
of Rule 4-345(a)]? 
 
Because we answer no, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
We review the legal issue of the sentencing in this case as a matter of law.  See 
Cuffley, 416 Md. at 581, 7 A.3d at 564 (“Whether a trial court has violated the terms of a 
plea agreement is a question of law, which we review de novo.”); Blickenstaff v. State, 393 
Md. 680, 683, 904 A.2d 443, 445 (2006) (“We shall address the legal issue of the 
sentencing in the case at bar under a de novo standard of review.”). 
DISCUSSION 
 
Whether A Sentence Below A Binding Plea Agreement Is “Inherently Illegal” 
Within The Meaning Of Rule 4-345(a)? 
 
We begin by briefly defining what constitutes an illegal sentence under Rule 4-
345(a).  For a sentence to be illegal within the meaning of Rule 4-345(a) “the illegality 
must inhere in the sentence itself, rather than stem from trial court error during the 
sentencing proceeding.”  Matthews v. State, 424 Md. 503, 512, 36 A.3d 499, 505 (2012).  
Accordingly, “we have denied relief pursuant to Rule 4-345(a) because the sentences 
imposed were not inherently illegal, despite some form of error or alleged injustice.”  Id. 
at 513, 36 A.3d at 505 (emphasis added). 
Bonilla argues that his original sentence on Count III was legal under Rule 4-345(a) 
because it was the product of an “error in pronouncement” and was not inherently illegal.  
The State, concurring there was error, disagrees that the sentence was legal, arguing that 
5 
 
“any sentence imposed in violation of a binding plea agreement constitutes an inherently 
illegal sentence, whether a sentence exceeds or falls below the plea agreement.”  To resolve 
this dispute, we turn first to Maryland Rule 4-243(c)(3)—the Rule that governs a 
sentencing court’s obligations when imposing a sentence pursuant to a binding plea 
agreement. 
Rule 4-243(c)(3) now provides, as it did in 1991 when Bonilla was first sentenced, 
that when “[a] plea agreement is approved, the judge shall embody in the judgment the 
agreed sentence, disposition, or other judicial action encompassed in the agreement or, 
with the consent of the parties, a disposition more favorable to the defendant than that 
provided for in the agreement.”  (Emphasis added.)  In this case, Rule 4-243(c)(3) required 
the sentencing court to impose the sentencing terms in the binding plea agreement, and the 
Parties had agreed to a sentence of life imprisonment on Count III—not the lower sentence 
of life imprisonment, with all but 20 years suspended, that the sentencing court imposed.  
The State never consented to this lower sentence.4  Because the Maryland Rules “have the 
                                              
4 During the sentencing hearing, the State made it clear that it would not consent to 
a sentence below the binding plea agreement: 
 
This is a[ binding] plea and I want to make the record clear.  
There has been no discussion nor any agreement by the State 
of any reconsideration. 
 
The law in 24 states, as it stands right now, is that if the Court, 
the defendant, and State enter into a[ binding plea] agreement 
that sentence will not be changed unless there’s consent by all 
three parties. 
 
The State does not consent to that nor does it expect to. 
6 
 
force of law,” Dotson, 321 Md. at 523, 583 A.2d at 714 (citation omitted), the sentencing 
court committed legal error when it deviated from the plea agreement by imposing a lower 
sentence on Count III.  This does not end our inquiry, however, because in order to 
determine whether the original sentence on Count III was illegal under Rule 4-345(a), we 
must resolve whether the sentencing court’s error rendered the sentence inherently illegal. 
In Dotson and Cuffley, we considered whether a sentence is inherently illegal within 
the meaning of Rule 4-345(a) when a sentencing court violates Rule 4-243(c)(3) by 
imposing a sentence that exceeds the binding plea agreement.  In Dotson, the defendant 
pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual offense in the second degree, and the trial court, 
pursuant to a plea agreement that it approved, sentenced him to concurrent sentences of 15 
years imprisonment for each conviction.  321 Md. at 519–20, 583 A.2d at 712.  The 
defendant moved for reconsideration of his sentence by a review panel.  Id. at 520, 583 
A.2d at 712.  The panel vacated the trial court’s sentence and imposed a sentence of 15 
years on each conviction to run consecutively rather than concurrently—thereby increasing 
the sentence from 15 to 30 years.  Id. at 521, 583 A.2d at 713.  The defendant appealed, 
arguing that the sentence imposed by the review panel was illegal.  Id. 
We agreed that the review panel’s sentence was illegal, emphasizing that Rule 4-
243(c)(3) required the trial judge to sentence the defendant in accordance with the plea 
                                              
(Emphasis added.)  The State only requested a sentence of life imprisonment, with all but 
20 years suspended, on Count III because that was the sentence defense counsel mistakenly 
requested at the beginning of the sentencing hearing.  The language quoted above 
demonstrates that the State never consented to a sentence below the binding plea 
agreement. 
7 
 
agreement: “When the judge accepted the pleas, the agreement as to punishment came into 
full bloom; it stood approved by the judge.  Thereafter, the agreement was inviolate, and 
the judge was required under the dictate of Rule 4-243(c)(3) to embody in the judgment 
the agreed sentence.”  Id. at 523, 583 A.2d at 714.  Because “[o]ur rules have the force of 
law,” we determined that Rule 4-243(c)(3) dictated that the 15-year sentence provided in 
the plea agreement was the maximum sentence “allowable by law.”  Id. (citation omitted).  
Thus, we reasoned, the review panel’s sentence was inherently illegal because it exceeded 
the plea agreement.5  Id. at 524, 583 A.2d at 714. 
Over a decade later, in Cuffley, we again considered whether a sentence that exceeds 
the terms of a binding plea agreement is illegal.  Cuffley pleaded guilty to robbery pursuant 
to a plea agreement under which the State agreed to a guidelines sentence of four to eight 
years.  Cuffley, 416 Md. at 573–74, 7 A.3d at 560.  After ensuring that Cuffley was 
knowingly and voluntarily entering the plea, the hearing court accepted the plea agreement 
pursuant to Rule 4-243(c) and bound itself to its terms.  Id. at 574, 7 A.3d at 560.  At the 
ensuing sentencing hearing, the court imposed a sentence of 15 years imprisonment with 
all but six years suspended.  Id. 
                                              
5 Although Dotson did not explicitly address Rule 4-345(a), in Cuffley v. State, we 
confirmed that Dotson stands for the proposition that when a sentencing court violates Rule 
4-243(c)(3) by imposing a sentence that exceeds a binding plea agreement, the sentence is 
inherently illegal under Rule 4-345(a).  See 416 Md. 568, 575 n.1, 7 A.3d 557, 561 n.1 
(2010) (“We have held that a sentence that exceeds the sentence to which the parties agreed 
as part of a plea agreement is an illegal sentence within the meaning of Rule 4-345(a).”  
(citing Dotson v. State, 321 Md. 515, 521–22, 583 A.2d 710, 713 (1991))). 
8 
 
Cuffley filed a Rule 4-345(a) motion, contending that his sentence was illegal 
because it exceeded the maximum sentence of eight years to which the court had bound 
itself.  Id. at 574–75, 7 A.3d at 561.  The sentencing court denied the motion, concluding 
that it had discretion to suspend time, this discretionary power was “alluded to” at the plea 
hearing, and Cuffley “got exactly what he bargained for.”  Id. at 576, 7 A.3d at 561.  We 
disagreed.  After emphasizing that Rule 4-243(c)(3) “mandates that the court, upon 
accepting and approving the agreement, ‘shall embody in the judgment the agreed 
sentence,’” id. at 581, 7 A.3d at 565 (emphasis in original), we explained that “by its 
express terms, Rule 4-243 requires strict compliance with its provisions,” id. at 582, 7 A.3d 
at 565.  We then applied Rule 4-243(c)(3) to Cuffley’s plea agreement to conclude that 
because the sentencing court “breached the agreement by imposing a sentence that 
exceeded a total of eight years’ incarceration[,] [t]he sentence [was] illegal.”  Id. at 586, 7 
A.3d at 567. 
Two years after Cuffley, in Matthews v. State, we further elaborated on our 
conclusions in Cuffley.  We explained that “Cuffley adhered to our precedent limiting relief 
pursuant to Rule 4-345(a) to challenges to inherently illegal sentences.”  Matthews, 424 
Md. at 517, 36 A.3d at 508 (emphasis added).  We emphasized that because Cuffley’s 
sentence varied from the sentence the court was required to impose pursuant to Rule 4-
243(c)(3), “the sentence was not merely the product of procedural error; rather it was 
inherently illegal and thereby subject to correction under Rule 4-345(a).”  Id. at 518, 36 
A.3d at 508 (emphasis added); see also id. at 517, 36 A.3d at 507 (“We viewed the illegality 
[of Cuffley’s sentence] as inhering in the sentence itself; the sentence, in other words, was 
9 
 
not merely the product of procedural or trial court error.” (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted)). 
As Bonilla recognizes, the sentences this Court declared inherently illegal in Dotson 
and Cuffley exceeded the plea agreements.  Neither our reasoning nor our holdings in those 
cases, however, suggest that striking a sentence as illegal can only occur when a sentence 
exceeds the terms of a binding plea agreement.  In both cases, we determined that the 
sentences were illegal because the sentencing courts violated Rule 4-243(c)(3) by deviating 
from the binding plea agreements.  See Dotson, 321 Md. at 523, 583 A.2d at 714 (“[T]he 
judge was required under the dictate of Rule 4-243(c)(3) to embody in the judgment the 
agreed sentence.”); Cuffley, 416 Md. at 581–82, 7 A.3d at 565 (Rule 4-243(c)(3) mandates 
that after accepting a plea agreement, the court “shall embody in the judgment the agreed 
sentence” and “Rule 4-243 requires strict compliance” (emphasis in original)). 
Chertkov v. State, 335 Md. 161, 642 A.2d 232 (1994) is also instructive because it 
not only bolsters our broad reading of Dotson, but also addresses whether a sentence is 
inherently illegal under Rule 4-345(a) when a sentencing court violates Rule 4-243(c)(3) 
by imposing a sentence below a binding plea agreement.  In that case, the defendant 
negotiated a plea agreement with the State that provided for concurrent three-year terms of 
incarceration with all but 179 days suspended.  Id. at 164, 642 A.2d at 233.  The Circuit 
Court for Montgomery County approved the plea agreement and sentenced the defendant 
in accordance with its terms.  Id. at 165, 642 A.2d at 234.  The defendant filed a motion 
for reconsideration of the sentence, requesting that the sentencing court strike the findings 
of guilt and impose probation before verdict pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl. 
10 
 
Vol.), Article 27, §641.  Id.  Over the State’s objection, the court granted the relief 
requested, and the State appealed.  Id.  The Court of Special Appeals reversed the Circuit 
Court, concluding that the State was entitled to appeal and determining that a trial court 
had no authority to modify a sentence imposed pursuant to a binding plea agreement.  Id. 
at 165–66, 642 A.2d at 234. 
We dismissed the appeal, concluding that the State had no right to appeal the trial 
court’s modification of the sentence.  Id. at 163, 175, 642 A.2d at 233, 239.  Although we 
recognized that our decision to dismiss the appeal would ordinarily end our inquiry, we 
stated that because “[p]lea bargaining is a significant, if not critical, component of the 
criminal justice system,” id. at 170–71, 642 A.2d at 237 (citation omitted), we would 
“express our views concerning whether a binding plea agreement precludes a trial court 
from modifying a sentence imposed pursuant to it,” id. at 171, 642 A.2d at 237.  After 
reciting the pertinent provisions of Rule 4-243 and reviewing our decision in Dotson, we 
concluded that Rule 4-243(c)(3) prohibits a sentencing court from imposing a sentence 
below a binding plea agreement if the parties do not agree to the deviation: 
Subsection (c)(2)[6] makes clear that until the trial judge 
approves a plea agreement, it is not binding on the court.  
Conversely, and necessarily, when the court does approve a 
plea agreement, because it is required that the sentence or 
disposition it contemplates must be embodied in the court’s 
                                              
6 Maryland Rule 4-243(c)(2) provides, as it did at the time of our decision in 
Chertkov: 
Not Binding on the Court. The agreement of the State’s 
Attorney relating to a particular sentence, disposition, or other 
judicial action is not binding on the court unless the judge to 
whom the agreement is presented approves it. 
See also Chertkov v. State, 335 Md. 161, 171, 642 A.2d 232, 237 (1994). 
11 
 
judgment, it is.  Indeed, the court may impose a disposition 
more favorable to the defendant only if the parties agree.  
 
Id. at 172, 642 A.2d at 237 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).  We determined 
that Dotson supports the conclusion that sentences below binding plea agreements are 
illegal: 
From Dotson and Rule 4-243(c)(3), it is clear that a court that 
binds itself to fulfill the plea agreement thereby relinquishes 
his or her right to modify the sentence, thereby imposed, absent 
the consent of the parties, and, in particular, in the case of 
reducing the sentence, absent the consent of the State. 
 
Id. at 174–75, 642 A.2d at 239 (emphasis added). 
Considering Dotson, Cuffley, Matthews, and Chertkov, we conclude that when a 
sentencing court violates Rule 4-243(c)(3) by imposing, without consent, a sentence that 
falls below a binding plea agreement, the resulting sentence is inherently illegal under Rule 
4-345(a).  Thus, in this case, because the original sentence on Count III was below the 
binding plea agreement and the State did not consent to this deviation, the sentence was 
inherently illegal and subject to correction under Rule 4-345(a). 
Preserving Fairness, Equity, And Certainty 
 
Sound policy also supports our foregoing conclusion.  Bonilla argues that 
“[b]ecause Rule 4-345(a) permits the correction of an illegal sentence at any time, the 
definition of an illegal sentence [should be] construed narrowly in the interests of 
predictability, finality, and judicial economy.”  We do not agree that narrowly construing 
Rule 4-345(a) to conclude that sentences below binding plea agreements are legal would 
12 
 
advance judicial economy.  Such interpretation, moreover, would require us to ignore the 
principles of fairness and equity and undermine the certainty that plea agreements provide. 
In Cuffley, we confirmed that “fairness and equity govern the enforcement of plea 
agreements.”  416 Md. at 580, 7 A.3d at 564 (citing State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 698, 
357 A.2d 376, 383 (1976)).  As such, when the State and a defendant have entered a binding 
plea agreement, each party is entitled to the benefit of its bargain.  Concluding that 
sentences below binding plea agreements are legal under Rule 4-345(a) would be unfair to 
the State by depriving it of the benefit of its bargain.  For example, in this case, the State 
agreed to withdraw its notice of intent to seek a sentence of life without the possibility of 
parole7 and enter a nolle prosequi to several counts on the indictment.  In exchange, Bonilla 
agreed, among other actions, to plead guilty to Count III and accept a sentence of life 
imprisonment.  It would be unfair and inequitable to prevent the State from challenging the 
original, overly low, sentence on Count III when it bargained for a higher sentence, 
particularly after Bonilla had sought and obtained a reduction of the overly high sentence 
on Count I. 
For us to conclude that sentences below binding plea agreements are legal would 
undermine the certainty that plea agreements provide.  “It is well documented that plea 
[agreements] play a crucial role in the system of criminal justice in Maryland and 
throughout the United States.”  Cuffley, 416 Md. at 577, 7 A.3d at 562.  Plea agreements 
                                              
7 During the sentencing hearing, the State explained that agreeing not to pursue a 
sentence of life without the possibility of parole represented a large “break” for Bonilla 
because first degree murder “is the type of crime . . . that merits that kind of punishment.” 
13 
 
play a crucial role in our criminal justice system because they provide certainty.  See 
Dotson, 321 Md. at 518, 583 A.2d at 711 (citation omitted).  In Dotson, we explained that 
determining that the review panel’s sentence, which exceeded the plea agreement, was 
legal would “violate the sanctity of the plea agreement process” and undermine the 
certainty that plea agreements provide.  Id. at 524, 583 A.2d at 714 (citation omitted).  
Concluding that a sentence below a binding plea agreement is legal would also undermine 
this certainty. 
The State and defendants would be discouraged from entering plea agreements if 
they could not be certain that sentencing courts will comply with binding plea agreements.  
In Dotson, we warned that “[i]f a defendant could not rely upon the plea bargain, the 
chilling effect upon the very institution of plea bargaining would be devastating.”  Id.  This 
“chilling effect” is not limited to violations of plea agreements that prejudice the defendant: 
Just as a defendant would be loathe to participate in plea 
bargaining if he or she could not be certain that the bargain that 
he or she made would be fulfilled, so too would the State.  
There would be no incentive for the State to engage in plea 
bargaining if it were possible for a defendant to enter into 
a binding plea agreement only to have the sentence 
contemplated by that agreement modified a short time 
later. 
 
Chertkov, 335 Md. at 174, 642 A.2d at 238–39 (emphasis added); see also Sweetwine v. 
State, 42 Md. App. 1, 12, 398 A.2d 1262, 1269 (1979) (“If the prosecutor cannot rely upon 
the plea bargain, the potential ‘chilling effect’ upon the very institution of plea bargaining 
could be devastating.”), aff’d, 288 Md. 199, 421 A.2d 60 (1980). 
14 
 
Discouraging the State or the defendant from entering plea agreements would have 
wide-ranging adverse effects because by promoting finality, certainty, and judicial 
economy, “plea agreements benefit the courts, the prosecution, the defendant, the victim, 
and the general public.”  Dotson, 321 Md. at 518, 583 A.2d at 711.  Because “plea 
agreements account for the disposition of an overwhelming percentage of all criminal 
cases,” they “prevent[], or at least reliev[e], the overcrowding of our courts.”  Id. at 517, 
583 A.2d at 710–11 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  By terminating 
charges, plea agreements  
lead[] to [the] prompt and largely final disposition of most 
criminal cases; . . . avoid[] much of the corrosive impact of 
enforced idleness during pretrial confinement for those who 
are denied release pending trial; . . . protect[] the public from 
those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal 
conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the 
time between charge and disposition, . . . enhance[] whatever 
may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are 
ultimately imprisoned. 
 
Id. at 517, 583 A.2d at 711 (second alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Moreover, “plea agreements eliminate many of the risks, uncertainties 
and practical burdens of trial, permit the judiciary and prosecution to concentrate their 
resources on those cases in which they are most needed, and further law enforcement by 
permitting the State to exchange leniency for information and assistance.”  Id. 
Plea agreements are so beneficial that “within reason, [they] should be encouraged.”  
Id.  Concluding that sentences below binding plea agreements are legal would have the 
opposite effect—it would discourage plea agreements by reducing the incentive for the 
State to enter them.  This result should be avoided. 
15 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, we hold that when a sentencing court violates Rule 4-243(c)(3) by 
imposing a sentence below a binding plea agreement without the State’s consent, the 
sentence is inherently illegal and subject to correction under Rule 4-345(a).  Accordingly, 
we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. 
COSTS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY 
PETITIONER.