Case Title: Pacific Power and Light v. Parsons

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1984-12-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Pacific Power and Light v. Parsons1984 WY 113692 P.2d 226Case Number: 84-64, 84-102Decided: 12/11/1984PACIFIC POWER AND LIGHT, APPELLANT (EMPLOYER/DEFENDANT), 

v. 

RAY L. PARSONS, APPELLEE (EMPLOYEE/PLAINTIFF). 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION, APPELLANT (PETITIONER), 

PACIFIC POWER AND LIGHT, (EMPLOYER/DEFENDANT), 

v. 

RAY L. PARSONS, APPELLEE (EMPLOYEE/CLAIMANT).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
PACIFIC POWER AND LIGHT, 
APPELLANT (EMPLOYER/DEFENDANT), 

v. 

RAY L. PARSONS, APPELLEE 
(EMPLOYEE/PLAINTIFF). 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, EX REL. WYOMING WORKER'S 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, APPELLANT (PETITIONER), 

PACIFIC POWER AND LIGHT, 
(EMPLOYER/DEFENDANT), 

v. 

RAY L. PARSONS, APPELLEE 
(EMPLOYEE/CLAIMANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

 
 
Patrick J. 
Murphy of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, Casper, for appellant Pacific Power and 
Light.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Terry J. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellant Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Division.

Robert L. 
Bath of Bath & 
Tyler, Rock Springs, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The trial court awarded 
appellee, Ray L. Parsons, temporary total disability compensation although it 
was shown that he did some work and received some earnings during the period of 
time he claimed temporary total disability. Appellant Pacific Power and Light 
(hereinafter PP & L), the employer, appeals the compensation award order. 
Appellant, State of Wyoming, ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Division (hereinafter Worker's Compensation Division), appeals the trial court's 
order denying its petition to reopen appellee's compensation claim. We will 
affirm both orders.

[¶2.]     Appellee Parsons 
twisted his ankle while walking down a flight of stairs at PP & L's Jim 
Bridger plant, and aggravated a preexisting injury. Reconstructive surgery was 
performed on Parsons' right ankle, June 8, 1983, and he was discharged from the 
hospital June 13, 1983. Parsons returned to work at the Jim Bridger plant on 
November 28, 1983, upon being released for regular duty by his physician. It is 
not disputed that during a six-week period in the summer of 1983 appellee worked 
eight to ten hours a day in a sod and landscaping business owned by him and his 
wife. During this time Parsons laid sod and drove a 
tractor.

[¶3.]     PP & L filed 
objections to the award of worker's compensation benefits. The only part of the 
court's order awarding benefits that PP & L appeals is that of temporary 
total disability. PP & L contends that because of Parsons' work and money 
earned in the summer of 1983 it is clear that he was "not incapacitated from 
performing work at a gainful occupation for which he was suited by experience 
and training, and during which his earning capacity was substantially 
restored."

[¶4.]     After a hearing on PP 
& L's objections to the award, the trial court entered its order dated 
February 16, 1984, providing in part:

"That Ray L. Parsons is 
entitled to receive Worker's Compensation disability benefits from June 6, 1983, 
when he entered the hospital, until November 28, 1983, minus a six week period 
when he engaged in the operation of a sod and landscaping business owned by him 
under the name of D & R Contracting, together with the payment of all 
medical and hospital expenses related to said matter."

[¶5.]     Appellant Worker's 
Compensation Division petitioned the trial court to reopen appellee's 
compensation case. The petition was denied, and appellant appeals that order. 
The appeal of Worker's Compensation Division and the appeal of PP & L were 
consolidated for disposition in this court.

I

[¶6.]     The purpose of 
temporary disability compensation is to provide income for an employee during 
the time of healing from his injury and until his condition has stabilized. We 
have said that the worker's compensation law is to be liberally and reasonably 
construed so that the industry, not the worker, will bear the burden of injuries 
suffered. Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, Wyo., 566 P.2d 219 (1977); and Pease v. Pacific 
Power and Light Company, Wyo., 453 P.2d 887 (1969). This policy, 
however, has limitations, and we are not free under the guise of statutory 
construction to extend the intended coverage. Matter of Van 
Matre, Wyo., 657 P.2d 815 
(1983); and Alco of Wyoming v. Baker, Wyo., 651 P.2d 266 
(1982).

[¶7.]     Appellants contend that 
§ 27-12-402, W.S. 1977, does not authorize temporary total disability benefits 
under the facts of this case. The statute provides in 
part:

"(a) Temporary total 
disability means a compensable injury which temporarily incapacitates the 
employee from performing any work at any gainful occupation for which he is 
reasonably suited by experience or training for the time, but from which he may 
be able to resume work. * * *

"(b) * * * As soon as the 
recovery is so complete that the earning power of the employee at a gainful 
occupation for which he is reasonably suited by experience or training, is 
substantially restored, the payment shall cease. * * *"

[¶8.]     We have not had an 
occasion to address the effect of a compensation claimant working and earning 
money during the time he was medically determined to be temporarily totally 
disabled. Authority from other states is only marginally helpful because their 
worker's compensation schemes are different.

[¶9.]     In Entwistle Company v. Wilkins, Utah, 
626 P.2d 495 (1981), an injured claimaint worked in the business he and his son 
owned during a period when he claimed temporary, total disability compensation. 
The work the employee performed in the family business was substantially the 
same type of work he had done for his employer. In upholding the award of 
temporary, total disability compensation, the Utah court 
said:

"* * * `[T]otal 
disability' does not mean a state of abject helplessness or that the injured 
employee must be unable to do any work at all. The fact that an injured employee 
may be able to do some kinds of tasks to earn occasional wages does not 
necessarily preclude a finding of total disability to perform the work or follow 
the occupation in which he was injured. * * *

"* * * The fact that he 
did not remain completely idle, but spent some time in helping with the family 
business is not inconsistent with the finding that his injury temporarily 
prevented him from performing his usual line of work. * * *" Id., at p. 
498.

There may be 
times during the recuperative period when an injured employee can be employed 
without terminating the recovery period. Speigner v. McGhee, 55 Ala. App. 384, 316 So. 2d 215 (1975).

[¶10.]  In addressing earning capacity, 
generally, Professor Larson says:

"It is uniformly held, 
therefore, without regard to statutory variations in the phrasing of the test, 
that a finding of disability may stand even when there is evidence of some 
actual post-injury earnings equaling or exceeding those received before the 
accident. The position may be best summarized by saying that actual post-injury 
earnings will create a presumption of earning capacity commensurate with them, 
but the presumption may be rebutted by evidence independently showing incapacity 
or explaining away the post-injury earnings as an unreliable basis for 
estimating capacity. * * *" 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 57.21, p. 
10-79, et seq. (1983).

"The determination 
whether the period of temporary total disability has ended may also involve 
nonmedical facts touching claimant's employment situation. The disability period 
is not automatically terminated merely because claimant obtains some employment 
if maximum recovery had not been achieved at the time. * * *" 2 Larson, 
Workmen's Compensation Law, § 57.12, p. 10-17, et seq. 
(1983).

[¶11.]  Some occasional work and attempts to get 
work, during the healing period, do not justify denying temporary total 
benefits. Also, if a claimant is unable to perform remunerative work with 
reasonable consistency, without pain and discomfort, temporary disability is 
deemed total. Pyles v. Triple F. Feeds of 
Texas, Inc., 270 Ark. App. 729, 606 S.W.2d 146 (1980). The 
worker's compensation law should not, and does not encourage indolence by 
requiring that a worker be completely idle in order to remain eligible for 
temporary total disability compensation. If a person has enough ambition to try 
to work when he is disabled he should not automatically be deemed to have 
recovered from his disability. One person may be willing to work with pain and 
disability and another may not. Some workers try to obtain as much worker's 
compensation as they can get; yet, others go back to work as soon as they can, 
or before they should. Each case and each worker is 
different.

[¶12.]  The extent and duration of an employee's 
disability are questions of fact to be determined by the trial court. This court 
reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings, 
and when there is substantial evidence to support the facts found by the court, 
its order is not to be disturbed. Diamond 
Management Corporation v. Empire Gas Corporation, Wyo., 594 P.2d 964 
(1979).

[¶13.]  In the case before us the trial court had 
ample evidence to support its determination. Appellee's physician did not 
release him for regular duty until November 28, 1983. His work in the sod and 
landscaping business was for a short period of time. During that time he had 
limitations; he did not have to lift anything heavy, and he crawled to lay the 
sod. There is some vague testimony that appellee worked times other than the six 
weeks in the sod and landscaping business. However, there is no evidence that he 
received any compensation for this work.

[¶14.]  Appellants rely heavily on the fact that 
for six weeks appellee earned some money and conclude from that that his earning 
power had been restored.1 Standing alone, earning some money 
is not sufficient to show that earning power has been restored. The trial court 
disallowed appellee compensation for the time he worked in the sod and 
landscaping business. We make no determination whether or not the court should 
have disallowed compensation for this period as Parsons did not appeal the 
disallowance. 

[¶15.]  We hold that doing some work and earning 
some money during a period of temporary total disability does not automatically 
disqualify a worker from receiving disability benefits.

II

[¶16.]  Appellant Worker's Compensation Division 
appealed the court's order which denied reopening Parson's compensation award. 
Worker's Compensation Division contends that it is entitled to reopen the case 
to: a) present evidence not given at the original hearing, and b) have the court 
reconsider evidence produced at the original hearing. The state summarized the 
petition to reopen, alleging:

"1. That 
Appellee-Claimant was not temporarily totally disabled during any of the time 
period of July 8, 1983 through November 28, 1983, and that there existed 
evidence not given at the original hearing which establishes this 
fact;

"2. That by submitting 
claims for temporary total disability benefits while in fact not so disabled, 
Appellee-Claimant committed a fraud upon the Court, the Clerk of the District 
Court, the Employer-Defendant, and the Appellant-Petitioner * * 
*.

"3. That in the 
alternative, Appellee-Claimant was guilty of persisting in an unsanitary or 
injurious practice which tended to imperil or retard his recovery and that there 
existed evidence not given at the original hearing which establishes this 
fact."

Section 
27-12-614, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement), provides:

"The director may reopen 
any case in which an order of award has been made. He shall petition for the 
reopening of the case and file it with the court which granted the award within 
thirty (30) days after the date on which he received the order of award. The 
petition must show probable cause for error in the amount of the award, the 
character of the award, or the grounds on which the award was made, and may 
specify as a reason for reopening the case existing evidence not given in the 
original hearing, showing the general nature and effect of such evidence. Upon 
filing of a petition and the court finding that probable cause is shown thereby, 
the court shall stay the award, and upon reasonable notice to all parties reopen 
the case and set the case for a new hearing. The director or state treasurer may 
take such part in the hearing as he deems advisable and has every right and 
privilege of a party to the cause. * * *"

[¶17.]  In support of its petition to reopen, 
appellant relies on Wyoming State 
Treasurer ex rel. Worker's Compensation Division v. Svoboda, Wyo., 573 P.2d 417 (1978); In re Reed, Wyo., 444 P.2d 329 (1968); and Marsh v. Aljoe, 
41 Wyo. 220, 284 P. 260 (1930). In Svoboda a temporary total disability 
award was entered after an informal hearing, there being no objection to the 
claim by the employer. Follow-up claims were filed and certified, also without 
employer objection. After numerous awards were made, the Worker's Compensation 
Division petitioned to reopen the case alleging in its petition, "Evidence now 
available to the objector-defendant and not available at the time of the 
accident. * * *" (Worker's Compensation Division meant at the time of the award 
rather than "at the time of the accident.") The trial court ruled that probable 
cause to reopen had not been shown, and this court reversed and permitted the 
case to be reopened.

[¶18.]  The Svoboda case can be distinguished from 
the case before us, because in the instant case the director of Worker's 
Compensation Division was advised in advance of the time and place of trial and 
was in attendance.2 Here, the petition to reopen did 
not allege, as was done in Svoboda, 
that evidence was now available to the objector-defendant which was not 
available at the time of the award. In the cases of In re Reed, supra, and Marsh v. Aljoe, supra, we do not know 
details concerning the knowledge or participation of Worker's Compensation 
Division in the first hearing, nor do we know if the evidence not given at the 
original hearing was available at that time. Marsh and Reed are factually different from the 
case before us.

[¶19.]  Worker's Compensation Division does not 
contend that it was unaware of the issues before the court at the original 
hearing, nor does it contend it was unaware of the evidence that it now wishes 
to present to the court. Furthermore, Worker's Compensation Division has not 
asserted that it was in any way prohibited from presenting evidence or argument 
that it deemed appropriate at the original hearing.

[¶20.]  We do not believe the scheme for Worker's 
Compensation Division's participation contemplates that the employer, with 
Worker's Compensation Division's knowledge, proceed with one trial and present 
only part of the evidence, and if unsuccessful Worker's Compensation Division 
then enter the case with the rest of the evidence and have a second trial. We do 
not know why the evidence now proposed by Worker's Compensation Division was not 
offered in the first trial. We believe that Worker's Compensation Division had a 
duty to explain this to the trial court.

[¶21.]  Worker's Compensation Division also asks 
this court to reconsider the evidence presented at the original hearing and make 
a different determination. We held in part one of this opinion that there was 
ample evidence to support the trial court's ruling. Granted, reasonable minds 
might draw different conclusions from the evidence presented. We find that the 
trial court's conclusions are supported by the evidence, are rational and not 
contrary to the great weight of the evidence. See Severin v. Hayes, Wyo., 
372 P.2d 1017 (1962).

[¶22.]  We affirm both the trial court's order 
awarding compensation and the order denying petition to 
reopen.

1 Appellee received some 
remuneration while working the family business, but overall, suffered a 
substantial loss. Whether this unsuccessful venture was because of appellee's 
disability, inexperience, management or otherwise, we do not know. It is 
immaterial to the determination of this case.

2 "The director or his 
designee may for any reason appear in the district court and defend against any 
claim and shall in all respects have the same rights of defense as the employer. 
Failure to contest a claim does not constitute waiver by the director of his 
right to reopen an award where he does not appear and defend at the original 
trial." Section 27-12-608, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 
Replacement).

THOMAS, Justice, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part.

[¶23.]  I concur with the views of the majority 
in Case No. 84-64, Pacific Power and 
Light v. Parsons. On the basis of the record presented in that case that 
result is correct and proper.

[¶24.]  While in a sense my views with respect to 
Case No. 84-102, State ex rel. Worker's 
Compensation Division v. Parsons, may be perceived as antithetical to my 
joining in the affirmance in Case No. 84-64, I am compelled to dissent from the 
majority's affirmance in this latter case.

[¶25.]  The Petition to Reopen, which was filed 
by the State of Wyoming, alleges:

"COUNT 
ONE

"1. That evidence not 
given at the original January 26, 1984 hearing tends to indicate that 
Employee-Claimant was not temporarily totally disabled pursuant to Section 
27-12-402, W.S. 1977, during the entire time period of July 8, 1983 through 
November 28, 1983.

"2. That more 
specifically, evidence not given at the original hearing establishes that 
Employee-Claimant actually performed work for pecuniary gain during the months 
of September and October of 1983;

"3. That additionally, 
evidence given at the January 26, 1984 hearing tended to establish that 
Employee-Claimant performed work during `a six week period' to such an extent to 
indicate a substantial restoration of Employee-Claimant's earning power at a 
gainful occupation;

"4. That as a result of 
the above allegations, if taken as true, there exists probable cause for error 
in both the amount of the February 16, 1984 award and the grounds upon which 
such award was made. 

"COUNT 
TWO

"5. That Petitioner 
hereby realleges and incorporates any and all allegations contained in COUNT ONE 
for the purposes of this second count;

"6. That the pleadings 
filed in this matter indicate that Employee-Claimant had applied for temporary 
total disability benefits, pursuant to Section 27-12-402, W.S. 1977, for the 
entire period of May 27, 1983 through November 30, 1983;

"7. That by his own 
testimony, Employee-Claimant felt he was able to, and in fact did, work at his 
landscaping business up to 10-12 hours a day, for approximately six weeks during 
the period for which he applied for temporary total disability 
benefits;

"8. That such actions 
were both an attempted and constructive fraud upon this Court, the Clerk of the 
District Court for Sweetwater County, the Employer-Defendant, and the Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Division, such that Employee-Claimant should be denied 
benefits pursuant to Section 27-12-606, W.S. 1977;

"9. That as a result of 
the above allegations, if taken as true, there exists probable cause for error 
in the character of the February 16, 1984 award.

"COUNT 
THREE

"10. That Petitioner 
hereby realleges and incorporates any and all allegations contained in both 
COUNT ONE and COUNT TWO, for the purposes of this alternative third 
count;

"11. That should this 
Court uphold the temporary total award granted, there exists evidence not given 
at the original hearing which tends to indicate that Employee-Claimant was 
guilty of persisting in an unsanitary or injurious practice which tended to 
imperil or retard his recovery; more specifically, that Employee-Claimant's work 
performed during both the `six week period' and September and October of 1983, 
was in direct contravention and violation of his treating physician's order to 
abstain from work activities;

"12. That such practices 
are injurious pursuant to Section 27-12-412, W.S. 1977, and as such are grounds 
for a forfeiture by Employee-Claimant of any and all rights to Wyoming worker's 
compensation benefits;

"13. That as a result of 
the above allegations, if taken as true, there exists probable cause for error 
in both the amount of the award and the character of the 
award."

[¶26.]  The order of the district court recites 
that it considered the Petition to Reopen and was aware of the testimony and 
evidence presented in the case and the argument of counsel on the record which 
covered the issues set forth in the Petition to Reopen. It indicated that it 
perceived the Petition to Reopen as an appeal by the employer-defendant and 
ordered that the Petition to Reopen be denied. This order appears to have been 
entered without a separate hearing on the Petition to Reopen, and consequently 
the allegations of the petition, for purposes of review, must be accepted as 
true.

[¶27.]  Section 27-12-614, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 
Replacement), quoted in the majority opinion, provides 
that:

"* * * The petition must 
show probable cause for error in the amount of the award, the character of the 
award, or the grounds on which the award was made, and may specify as a reason 
for reopening the case existing evidence not given in the original hearing, 
showing the general nature and effect of such evidence. * * 
*"

While the 
majority opinion asserts that the Wyoming precedents construing this statute, Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Worker's 
Compensation Division v. Svoboda, Wyo., 573 P.2d 417 (1978); In re Reed, Wyo., 444 P.2d 329 (1968); 
and Marsh v. Aljoe, 41 Wyo. 220, 284 P. 260, 261 (1930), are distinguishable, I do not perceive them as being 
substantially distinguishable from this case. 

[¶28.]  In my judgment the allegations of the 
Petition to Reopen would be sufficient to demonstrate probable cause under the 
ratio decidendi of the cited Wyoming cases. It is noted that the order of 
the district court does not purport to determine the question of probable cause. 
It relies upon a factor, "the same being on appeal by the Employer-Defendant," 
which is not material in the application of the statute. The same may be said of 
the majority opinion, which relies upon the presence of the Director of the 
Worker's Compensation Division at the initial trial; suggests a requirement that 
the evidence sought to be injected was not available at the time of the original 
hearing; a requirement that the Worker's Compensation Division demonstrate it 
was unaware of the issues before the court at the initial hearing; and 
specifically suggests a construction of the statutory scheme antithetical to 
that adopted by this court in Marsh v. 
Aljoe, supra. These are factors which are not material to the application of 
the statute. In my judgment the ruling of the district court is erroneous in the 
light of the stated Wyoming precedents, and must be 
reversed.

[¶29.]  If the rationalization for the majority 
opinion is to stand, then this court should disavow and overrule the precedents 
which have construed the statute. I do not find that such action would be 
justifiable because it would have the effect, as pointed out in Marsh v. Aljoe, supra, of neutralizing 
the statute. Justice Blume, in writing for the court in Marsh v. Aljoe, supra, correctly noted 
the unique nature of the statute, the substantial interest of the State of 
Wyoming in 
such litigation, and commented upon the "right" of the State to have the case 
reopened.

[¶30.]  I am sure there exists an argument that 
the reopening of this case is an exercise in futility. I concede that 
possibility but I must point out that in the absence of a hearing, and perhaps 
even in the absence of reopening the case to receive evidence, no one can be 
assured that a further proceeding would be an exercise in futility. At this 
juncture the allegations of the State of Wyoming manifest probable cause under our 
precedents, and the action of the district court in dismissing the petition 
without a hearing must be regarded as error. I would reverse in Case No. 
84-102.