Case Title: State v. Jeffrey

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC93172

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2013-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
No. SC93172 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
GENE MORRIS JEFFREY, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Appellant. 
 
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WARREN COUNTY 
The Honorable Gael D. Wood, Judge 
 
Opinion issued June 25, 2013 
 
The jury found Gene Jeffrey guilty of two counts of sexual misconduct involving a 
child under § 566.0831 and two counts of attempted sexual misconduct involving a child.  
The evidence was that Jeffrey knowingly exposed his genitals to girls less than 15 years 
of age from the front door or window of his home.  On appeal, Jeffrey argues that § 
566.083 is unconstitutionally overbroad because it infringes on activities protected by the 
First and Fourteenth amendments and is unconstitutional as applied to him.  In the 
alternative, Jeffrey argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his 
convictions.   
The record shows that Jeffrey stood nude in either his front doorway or a front 
window just as young girls passed his home.  Several witnesses testified that, when they 
                                             
 
1 All statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2010, unless otherwise noted. 
saw him, Jeffrey was facing the street.  Jeffrey has not demonstrated that § 566.083 is 
overbroad because he has failed to show how the statute serves to discourage the citizens 
of this State from engaging in protected speech.  This Court concludes, therefore, that     
§ 566.083 is not unconstitutionally overbroad, that it is constitutional as applied to 
Jeffrey, and that his conviction is supported by sufficient evidence.  The judgment of the 
circuit court is affirmed.   
Factual and Procedural History 
 
One afternoon in early January 2010, M.T., a 10-year-old girl, was walking home 
from school.  The girl frequently walked the approximate half-mile from the school to her 
home.  As she passed the home of Gene Jeffrey, M.T. saw Jeffrey standing behind the 
glass storm door of his home, facing the street.  Jeffrey was fully nude, and M.T. could 
see his whole body.  Frightened by the experience, M.T. did not initially tell anyone what 
she had seen.   
 
Later that month, on January 22, M.T. again was walking home from school.  She 
was joined by her friend and classmate, A.K.O., who was also 10 years old.  As the two 
girls approached Jeffrey's home, A.K.O. saw Jeffrey standing behind the glass storm door 
of his home facing the street.  Jeffrey was fully nude, and A.K.O. could see him from 
head to ankles.  A.K.O. looked away, and when she looked back, the front door was 
closed.  A.K.O. told M.T. what she had seen.  M.T. did not look but told her friend that 
she had seen a nude man at that house about a week before.  Upon arriving at A.K.O.'s 
home, the girls told A.K.O.'s mother about what had happened, and A.K.O.'s mother 
reported the incident to the police. 
 
In response to the report, Deputy Jenkins visited Jeffrey's home.  Deputy Jenkins 
told Jeffrey that two girls had seen a nude man through the glass storm door as they were 
walking home from school.  Jeffrey, who was in his early 70s, told Deputy Jenkins that 
he was retired and that he had taken a shower prior to going hunting around the time the 
girls reported seeing the nude man.  Jeffrey stated that he may have gone to the front door 
to shut it either before or after taking his shower.  He denied seeing the girls outside and 
questioned whether anyone could see into his house through the glass door. 
 
Ten months later, on November 10, 2010, A.K.O. again was walking home from 
school.  As she passed Jeffrey's home, she saw Jeffrey standing nude in front of a 
bedroom window with the blinds pulled up halfway.  Jeffrey was facing the street, and 
A.K.O. saw from his chest to his knees.  When she arrived home, A.K.O. told her mother 
about what she saw.  A.K.O.'s mother drove A.K.O. back to Jeffrey's house to "see what 
was going on."  A.K.O.'s mother noticed the blinds pulled up "unusually high."  She 
could see the furniture inside the house but did not see anyone inside.  As A.K.O.'s 
mother was driving up, she saw another girl, M.K.H., walking toward Jeffrey's house 
from the opposite direction.  When M.K.H. was almost directly in front of the house, 
Jeffrey appeared in front of the window, completely nude.  M.K.H. did not see Jeffrey.   
A.K.O.'s mother could see him from his knees to his chest and drove directly in front of 
the house to block M.K.H's view.  As soon as she stepped on the gas, Jeffrey stepped out 
of the window.  A.K.O.'s mother picked up M.K.H. and called the police. 
 
Several days later, Lieutenant Scott Schoenfeld went to Jeffrey's home to 
investigate.  Jeffrey told Lieutenant Schoenfeld that he had been hunting that day, and he 
 
3
had taken a shower around the time the girls would have been walking by his house.  
Jeffrey denied raising the blinds.  He also denied standing in the window, claiming 
instead he might have been sitting on the bed and might have been getting some clothes 
from the room after his shower.  Jeffrey stated that he did not see anyone looking his 
way.  When asked if anyone had ever said anything to him about people being able to see 
into his home, Jeffrey stated that no one had.  When asked if he remembered talking to 
Deputy Jenkins, Jeffrey stated that he did remember the conversation but that it had 
involved the front door.     
 
Jeffrey was charged with one count of sexual misconduct involving a child in 
violation of § 566.083 and one count of attempted sexual misconduct involving a child 
for the January 22 incident, and he was charged with one count of sexual misconduct 
involving a child and one count of attempted sexual misconduct involving a child for the 
November 10 incident.  Jeffrey was tried by a jury, which found him guilty of all four 
counts.  The jury recommended a sentence of 60 days for each of the first two counts and 
15 days and a fine for each of the second two counts.  The judge imposed the recommend 
sentences to run consecutively, ordered them executed, and released Jeffrey after giving 
him credit for time served. 
 
Jeffrey appealed his conviction arguing that § 566.083 is unconstitutionally 
overbroad and that his conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence.  This Court has 
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the validity of a statute.  Mo. Const. 
art. V, § 3.   
 
 
4
Section 566.083 is Not Overbroad 
Standard of Review 
 
Whether a statute is constitutional is an issue of law that this Court reviews de 
novo.  State v. Vaughn, 366 S.W.3d 513, 517 (Mo. banc. 2012).  "Statutes are presumed 
constitutional and will be found unconstitutional only if they clearly contravene a 
constitutional provision."  Id.  "The person challenging the validity of the statute has the 
burden of proving the act clearly and undoubtedly violates the constitutional limitations."  
Id.  
Analysis 
Jeffrey argues that § 566.083 is constitutionally overbroad because it potentially 
could be applied in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment right of privacy and First 
Amendment right of free speech.  Section 566.083.1(1) provides: 
1. A person commits the crime of sexual misconduct involving a child if the 
person: 
(1) Knowingly exposes his or her genitals to a child less than fifteen years 
of age under circumstances in which he or she knows that his or her 
conduct is likely to cause affront or alarm to the child[.] 
 
Jeffrey argues the statute is overbroad because it punishes innocent, protected conduct in 
addition to conduct the statute may lawfully prohibit.  Jeffrey asserts that he is being 
punished merely for being nude in his own home.   
 
The overbreadth doctrine was born in the First Amendment jurisprudence of the 
United States Supreme Court.  See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768 (1982).  The 
doctrine resulted from the Supreme Court's recognition that the right to free expression is 
of ultimate importance to a democratic government.  See id. at 768-69.  As a result, the 
 
5
Supreme Court has recognized—as has this Court—that it is better to invalidate laws that 
potentially could be construed to punish protected speech, even if those laws might be 
constitutionally applied, rather than to let such a law stand and chill protected speech.  
The Supreme Court has stated, "The doctrine is predicated on the sensitive nature of 
protected expression: 'persons whose expression is constitutionally protected may well 
refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions by a statute susceptible 
of application to protected expression.'"  Id.  
 
An overbreadth challenge is a facial challenge to a statute.  Generally, to prevail in 
a facial challenge, the party challenging the statute must demonstrate that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the statute may be constitutionally applied.  State v. 
Perry, 275 S.W.3d 237, 243 (Mo. banc 2009).  Thus, the general rule is that "a person to 
whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the 
ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not 
before the Court."  Ferber, 458 U.S. at 767.  "[I]t 'would indeed be undesirable for this 
Court to consider every conceivable situation which might possibly arise in the 
application of complex and comprehensive litigation.'"  United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 
17, 21 (1960).  By focusing on the case at hand, this Court avoids ruling on—and thereby 
forming constitutional rules on—hypothetical cases.   
The overbreadth doctrine provides an exception to this general rule.  
Acknowledging the importance of the right to free expression and the danger of statutes 
that chill protected speech, the overbreadth doctrine "allow[s] persons to attack overly 
broad statutes even though the conduct of the person making the attack is clearly 
 
6
unprotected and could be proscribed by a law drawn with the requisite specificity."  
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769.  Because of the potentially far-reaching effects of this doctrine, 
however, the United States Supreme Court has limited its use to the First Amendment 
context.  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) ("[W]e have not recognized 
an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment."); Schall v. 
Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 n.18 (1984) ("The Court will not sift through the entire class to 
determine whether the statute was constitutionally applied in each case.  And, outside the 
limited First Amendment context, a criminal statute may not be attacked as overbroad."). 
This Court has adopted the overbreadth doctrine and also limits its application to 
the First Amendment context.  State v. Richard, 298 S.W.3d 529, 531 (Mo. banc 2009).  
The fear of chilling conduct that is "protected" by amendments or statutes other than the 
First Amendment is not as pronounced as it is in the First Amendment context.  The 
application of the overbreadth doctrine solely to First Amendment cases, however, should 
not be taken to undermine the importance of the rights guaranteed by other constitutional 
provisions.  While these rights receive constitutional protection, statutes infringing on 
them may not be challenged on overbreadth grounds.  They may, however, be challenged 
on an as applied basis.  This gives the courts of this state the opportunity to examine the 
issues presented on a solid record without resort to hypothetical facts or situations. 
 
Despite this long line of precedent, Jeffrey argues that this Court previously has 
applied the overbreadth doctrine in situations other than First Amendment challenges 
and, therefore, should find that this statute is overbroad because it potentially could 
infringe on the right to privacy found in the penumbral rights of the United States 
 
7
Constitution.2  Jeffrey argues that this Court, in State v. Beine, 162 S.W.3d 483 (Mo. 
banc 2005), expanded the overbreadth doctrine to protect other rights.  Beine involved a 
challenge to a prior version of the statute at issue here.  Id. at 486.  This Court found that 
there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction under the statute.  Id.  It also 
found that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad.  Id.  at 486-87.   
This Court has previously rejected the argument that Beine extended the 
overbreadth doctrine outside of the First Amendment arena.  In State v. Richard, 298 
S.W.3d 529 (Mo. banc 2009), this Court held that:  
The constitutional analysis in Beine was unnecessary to resolve the case 
and, as a result, is dicta.  The dicta in Beine does not extend the long-
standing precedent that limits the overbreadth doctrine to cases implicating 
First Amendment concerns.  Richard's case does not involve a First 
Amendment issue.  Consequently, the overbreadth doctrine has no 
application, and there is no basis for holding that [the challenged statute] is 
facially unconstitutional.   
 
Id. at 531. 
 
 
Not only is Beine's expansion of the overbreadth doctrine dicta, but it is bad dicta. 
The two cases that the Beine dicta relied on when discussing the overbreadth doctrine 
beyond the First Amendment context do not support such a position.  In City of St. Louis 
v. Burton, 478 S.W.2d 320 (Mo. 1972), this Court held that a loitering ordinance was 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.  The ordinance in question made it illegal for a 
                                             
 
2 In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the United States Supreme Court invalidated 
a law forbidding the use of contraceptives because it violated the "right to privacy."  The Court 
held that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from 
those guarantees that help give them life and substance."  Id. at 484.  The Supreme Court found 
the "right to privacy" in these penumbral rights, relying largely on the protections of the Fourth 
and Fifth amendments, though also mentioning the First and Third amendments.  Id. at 484-85.        
 
8
prostitute or "lewd woman" to "wander about the streets in the nighttime."  Id. at 321-22.  
But Burton contains a misstatement of the law.  Burton asserts that the United States 
Supreme Court, in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), found a 
similar statute unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.  Id. at 322.  The decision in 
Papachristou, however, holds only that the statute is unconstitutionally vague.  
Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162 ("This ordinance is void for vagueness ….").  To the 
extent that Burton and Beine rely on Papachristou for the proposition that overbreadth 
applies outside of the First Amendment, those cases are incorrect.  
 
Beine also relied on Christian v. City of Kansas City, 710 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. App. 
1986).  In Christian, the court of appeals followed Burton and applied the overbreadth 
doctrine to a loitering statute that made it illegal to "loiter in or near any street or public 
place in a manner and under circumstances manifesting the purpose of inducing, enticing, 
soliciting or procuring another to commit an act of prostitution."  Id. at 12.  The 
ordinance specified circumstances that may be considered to determine whether a person 
was manifesting the requisite purpose which included: "That the person repeatedly 
beckons to, stops, or attempts to stop, or engages passersby in conversation" and "That 
the person repeatedly stops or attempts to stop motor vehicle operators by hailing them or 
gesturing to them."  Id.  Beine's reliance on Christian is misplaced.  Christian, and the 
cases it relied on, involved First Amendment issues. 3  Christian stated:  
                                             
 
3 It is also worth noting that Christian spoke more in the language of vagueness than 
overbreadth, despite its holding that the ordinance was overbroad.  For instance, the court of 
appeals stated, "Based on this ordinance, this court cannot permit the city to leave the task of 
differentiating between 'casual street encounters' from 'obvious' acts reflecting the state of mind 
 
9
By analogy in the free speech context, the Supreme Court in Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973), 
stated that “it has been the judgment of this court that the possible harm to 
society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is 
outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted 
and perceived grievances left to fester because of the possible inhibitory 
effects of overly broad statutes.”  The above proposition comfortably 
extends to the situation presented here. 
 
Id.  Furthermore, Christian found that behaviors such as repeatedly beckoning to 
passersby or hailing motor vehicles were constitutionally protected based on a federal 
district court holding to the same effect.  The federal district court found that such 
activities were protected by the First Amendment.  See Johnson v. Carson, 569 F. Supp. 
974, 978 (M.D. Fla. 1983) ("Also, anyone standing on the street corner repeatedly talking 
to passers-by, even if they are old friends, could be violating the ordinance. … Thus the 
circumstances enumerated in the Jacksonville ordinance which permit the finding that a 
loitering individual is manifesting the prohibited conduct forces persons to either curb 
their freedom of expression and association or face the risk of arrest.").   
 
Moreover, both of these cases involved ordinances that ran the risk of infringing 
on First Amendment rights.  Both ordinances sought to criminalize activities such as 
standing on street corners and speaking to people or attempting to speak to people.  These 
ordinances ran the risk of chilling protected speech by discouraging people from 
engaging in these protected activities.  To the extent that the Beine dicta relied on these 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
needed for solicitation to the law enforcement officers and the courts."  Christian, 710 S.W.2d at 
13.     
 
10
authorities to apply the overbreadth doctrine outside of the First Amendment context, it 
was incorrect.4   
Jeffrey's claim that § 566.083 is overbroad in violation of the First Amendment 
lacks merit.  Jeffrey has not demonstrated how § 566.083 will—or even might—have a 
chilling effect on protected speech.  Section 566.083 does not prohibit speech; it prohibits 
conduct.  Specifically, it prohibits a person from "[k]nowingly expos[ing] his or her 
genitals to a child less than fifteen years of age under circumstances in which he or she 
knows that his or her conduct is likely to cause affront or alarm to the child," a 
prohibition that is within the power of the state to enforce.  The Supreme Court has 
recognized that the overbreadth doctrine generally is not applicable when a statute 
regulates only conduct: 
[T]he plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth 
adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its 
function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected 
behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from 'pure speech' 
toward conduct and that conduct—even if expressive—falls within the 
scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests 
in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally 
unprotected conduct.  Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may 
deter protected speech to some unknown extent, there comes a point where 
that effect—at best a prediction—cannot, with confidence, justify 
invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing 
the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe. 
To put the matter another way, particularly where conduct and not merely 
speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not 
only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's 
plainly legitimate sweep. 
 
                                             
 
4 But this Court need not overrule Beine because this discussion was part of what this Court has 
previously declared dicta.  Richard, 298 S.W.3d at 531.   
 
11
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (citations omitted).  This Court, 
likewise, has recognized that when conduct is at issue, the overbreadth doctrine has a 
more limited application.  See State v. Moore, 90 S.W.3d 64, 66-67 (Mo. banc 2002); 
State v. Helgoth, 691 S.W.2d 281, 284-85 (Mo. banc 1985); Beine, 162 S.W.3d at 492 
(Stith, J., dissenting).      
Jeffrey has not demonstrated that § 566.083 is so substantially overbroad as to be 
invalid.  This Court cannot see how this statute, which makes it a crime for a person to 
"[k]nowingly expose[] his or her genitals to a child less than fifteen years of age under 
circumstances in which he or she knows that his or her conduct is likely to cause affront 
or alarm to the child," is likely to chill protected speech.  Therefore, any claim that this 
statute infringes on First Amendment rights must be addressed on a case-by-case basis 
and on the facts before the Court.  On the facts of this case, § 566.083 does not violate 
Jeffrey's First Amendment rights because he has conceded that his conduct was not 
expressive.  Therefore, § 566.083.1(1) is not overbroad and is not unconstitutional as 
applied.   
Section 566.083 Does Not Violate the Right to Privacy 
 
Jeffrey also argues that § 566.083 is overbroad because it infringes on the 
constitutionally protected right to privacy.  Because the overbreadth doctrine is only 
available in the First Amendment context, this claim is not colorable.  Jeffrey also argues 
that the statute, as applied to him, violated his right to privacy and punished him for 
engaging in innocent conduct.  While the overbreadth doctrine is unavailable in the 
Fourteenth Amendment context, this Court must resolve Jeffrey's as applied challenge. 
 
12
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees a right to privacy for "personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'"  Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 
65 (1973).  "This privacy right encompasses and protects the personal intimacies of the 
home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing."  Id.  The 
Supreme Court has found that certain privacy rights are fundamental, many of which 
inure to activities conducted in the home or decisions regarding childbirth and parentage.  
See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (recognizing the right of single people 
to use contraceptives); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (recognizing the right to 
possess obscene materials in the home); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
(recognizing married persons' right to contraceptives).  This right is not absolute, 
however, and activities are not protected from regulation simply because they occur in 
the home.     
 
Jeffrey argues that there are certain activities that a person must engage in while 
nude, such as bathing and changing clothes, and that those activities are fundamental 
rights that are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's right to privacy.  More 
specifically, Jeffrey argues that the nudity that is naturally a part of bathing and changing 
clothes is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.    
 
Even assuming that such activity constitutes a fundamental personal right 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, Jeffrey's conviction would not violate his 
rights.  Jeffrey is not being punished merely for walking around his home in the nude 
after showering.  Several witnesses testified they saw Jeffrey standing, fully nude, in 
 
13
either his front clear storm door or a bedroom window.  By standing in full view of the 
street, he eliminated any right to privacy to which he was entitled.  It is difficult to 
support an argument that protected activity continues to remain protected when thrust 
into view of the general public.  The right to privacy exists, in large part, to protect 
individuals from "unwarranted governmental intrusion" into a dwelling or other private 
places.  Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.  Once protected activity has been displayed to the 
public, governmental intrusion is no longer quite so "unwarranted."   
 
Moreover, under the language of § 566.083.1(1), Jeffrey could not be punished for 
an inadvertent exposure.  To violate § 566.083.1(1), a person must knowingly expose his 
or her genitals to a child less than 15 years of age under circumstances in which he or she 
knows that his or her conduct is likely to cause affront or alarm.  Section 562.016.3 
provides that a person acts knowingly:  
1) With respect to his conduct or to attendant circumstances when he is 
aware of the nature of his conduct or that those circumstances exist; or 
2) With respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct 
is practically certain to cause that result.   
 
The statute required that Jeffrey knowingly exposed his genitals to a person less than 15 
years of age.  Section 562.016.3(1) instructs that this meant Jeffrey must have been 
aware that he was exposing his genitals to a person less than 15 years of age.  The statute 
also required that he knew that such conduct was likely to cause affront or alarm.  Section 
562.016.3(2) instructs that this meant Jeffrey must have been "practically certain" that 
such "affront or alarm" would result.  If Jeffrey did not know the girls were there, or did 
not know that they could see him, he could not have knowingly exposed his genitals.  The 
 
14
act of merely walking from room to room in the nude without knowledge of who was, or 
might be, looking into the window of his home would be insufficient to demonstrate the 
requisite knowledge and insufficient to support a conviction under the statute.  Therefore, 
§ 566.083.1(1) did not punish Jeffrey for "innocent" or inadvertent conduct, did not 
violate his right to privacy, and is not unconstitutional as applied.     
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Standard of Review 
 
"Generally, this Court's review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to 
whether the State has introduced sufficient evidence for any reasonable juror to have 
been convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."  State v. Nash, 339 
S.W.3d 500, 508-09 (Mo. banc 2011).  "When judging the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support a conviction, appellate courts do not weigh the evidence but accept as true all 
evidence tending to prove guilt together with all reasonable inferences that support the 
verdict and ignore all contrary evidence and inferences."  State v. Wooden, 388 S.W.3d 
522, 527 (Mo. banc 2013).  "This is not an assessment of whether the Court believes that 
the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but rather a question of 
whether, in light of the evidence most favorable to the State, any rational fact-finder 
'could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'"  Nash, 
339 S.W.3d at 509.  "[T]his Court will not weigh the evidence anew since the fact-finder 
may believe all, some, or none of the testimony of a witness when considered with the 
facts, circumstances, and other testimony in the case."  Id.   
 
 
15
Analysis 
 
Jeffrey argues that, even if this Court finds § 566.083 is constitutionally valid, the 
evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction.  Section 566.083.1(1) has three 
elements: 1) the defendant knowingly exposes his or her genitals to a person, 2) he or she 
knows that the person is less than 15 years old, and 3) the defendant knows that such 
conduct is likely to cause affront or alarm.  Jeffrey concedes the second element but 
argues that the State failed to prove that he knowingly exposed his genitals or that he 
knew that the exposure would cause affront or alarm.   
Jeffrey argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support a 
finding that he knew he was exposing his genitals to the girls because the evidence did 
not demonstrate that he knew or was aware that children were present or that they could 
see him.  Jeffrey asserts that the evidence at trial supports an inference only that he 
recklessly exposed himself to passersby by being nude in his house with the blinds open.   
Jeffrey was charged with violating § 566.083.1(1) and attempting to violate the 
same statute on two separate occasions, January 22, 2010, and November 10, 2010.  The 
specific evidence for each instance will be discussed below in turn.  The jury heard 
evidence that Jeffrey was standing in front of either his door or window on four separate 
occasions.  In addition to the instances for which Jeffrey is charged, M.T. testified that 
she saw Jeffrey standing nude in his front doorway in early- to mid-January 2010.  
A.K.O. testified that she saw Jeffrey standing nude in his front doorway on January 22 
and in his window on November 10.  Also on November 10, A.K.O.'s mother testified 
that Jeffrey stepped in front of his window just as a third girl, M.K.H., was walking by 
 
16
Jeffrey's home.  The fact that Jeffrey continued to appear nude in either his doorway or 
his window creates the inference that Jeffrey's actions were no accident.  Evidence of past 
crimes, either charged or uncharged, may not be used to prove that the defendant has a 
propensity to commit crime but may be admitted at trial to show an absence of mistake.  
State v. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Mo. banc 1993); State v. Reese, 364 Mo. 1221, 274 
S.W.2d 304, 307 (banc 1954).  Jeffrey asserted at trial and argued to this Court that he 
was merely walking from room to room after a shower, and the girls happened to see him 
nude.  The evidence of repeated incidents of similar conduct undercuts this assertion and 
allowed the jury to infer that Jeffrey did not mistakenly or accidentally expose himself to 
the girls.   
Turning to the January 22, 2010, incident, the evidence was sufficient to allow a 
juror to reasonably infer that Jeffrey knowingly exposed himself to A.K.O.  The evidence 
showed that, when A.K.O. and M.T. passed Jeffrey's home he appeared fully nude behind 
the glass storm door of his home.  A.K.O. saw him, looked away, and when she looked 
back, Jeffrey's door was closed.  This supports the inference that Jeffrey waited for the 
girls to come by, stood in front of the door while they passed, and then quickly closed the 
door after he had exposed himself.  While the jury also might have inferred that Jeffrey 
was simply closing his door, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court will 
take all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict.  Wooden, 388 S.W.3d at 527.   
 
The evidence was likewise sufficient to allow a juror to reasonably infer that 
Jeffrey knew he was exposing himself to A.K.O. on November 10, 2010.  The evidence 
for that day showed that, when A.K.O. was walking home from school, she saw Jeffrey 
 
17
standing at a window in his home, facing the street, completely nude.  A.K.O.'s mother 
testified that, as she drove to Jeffrey's house to "see what was going on," she saw Jeffrey 
step into the window just as M.K.H. passed Jeffrey's home.  A.K.O.'s mother testified that 
Jeffrey was so close to the window that his toes had to have been touching the wall.  She 
also testified that as soon as she revved her engine to drive in front of Jeffrey's home and 
block M.K.H.'s view of the window, Jeffrey stepped out of sight.  Coupled with the 
evidence that this conduct had occurred on a number of occasions, the evidence was 
sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to infer that Jeffrey was aware that he was exposing 
himself to the girls.   
Jeffrey also argues that he was unaware that the girls could see into his door or his 
window.  No evidence suggested that the door or window had been treated in any fashion 
as to give Jeffrey the belief that people could not see him.  This supports a reasonable 
inference that Jeffrey could see the girls and that he knew the girls could see him.  
Moreover, the fact that Jeffrey appeared just as the girls were passing supports the 
inference that Jeffrey was waiting until the girls came by to expose his genitals.  
Additionally, Deputy Jenkins expressly told Jeffrey, prior to the November 10 offenses, 
that children walking past his house could see him naked through the glass door.  
Therefore, the jury reasonably could have inferred that, on both dates in question, Jeffrey 
knowingly exposed his genitals to a child less than 15 years old.      
 
Jeffrey also argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to show that he 
knew that his exposure would cause affront or alarm.  Jeffrey's argument in large part 
rehashes his argument concerning the first element of the crime.  He argues that he was 
 
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merely walking around his home in the nude and that such evidence is insufficient to 
show that he knew his nudity would cause affront or alarm.  He also argues that because 
he was not gesturing at himself or touching himself, there is no evidence that he knew his 
conduct was wrong.  Section 566.083 does not make gesturing to or touching the genitals 
an element of the offense.  The fact that the State did not show evidence that he was 
doing so is, therefore, probative of nothing. 
 
This Court, in State v. Moore, held that "the words 'affront or alarm' convey, 
respectively, a deliberate offense or a feeling of danger."  90 S.W.3d 64, 67 (Mo. banc 
2002).  Moore also described the conduct of exposing one's genitals to a child as 
"inherently criminal behavior" and found that a person is presumed to know that such 
criminal behavior is likely to cause affront or alarm.  Id. at 68.  The requirement that a 
defendant knows that his conduct will cause affront or alarm distinguishes the "criminal 
act of exposing oneself from conduct that is accidental, inadvertent, or otherwise done 
without intent to do harm."5  Id.  This requirement ensures that the statute criminalizes 
unwanted or offensive exposures while protecting conduct that is part of the normal 
activities of everyday life.6   
The evidence presented to the jury allowed for a reasonable inference that Jeffrey 
knowingly exposed himself or attempted to expose himself to young girls he did not 
                                             
 
5 While this phrase was dicta in Moore, its characterization of the statute is accurate.   
6 Such activities might include, as Jeffrey notes, changing in a locker room, a parent bathing with 
a young child, or parents drying off in their home with a bedroom door open such that their 
children can see them.  The nudity in such situations does not typically cause affront or alarm 
because it does not come with the sense of danger that inures to a stranger exposing his or her 
genitals to a young child.    
 
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know in a situation in which one would not ordinarily expect to be confronted by nudity.  
The girls were on their way home from school when Jeffrey appeared nude in his front 
storm door and window.  A reasonable adult who is a stranger to a group of girls walking 
down the street would know that exposing his genitals to the group is likely to cause 
affront or alarm.  Jeffrey's conduct of knowingly exposing himself to strangers is 
sufficient for the jury to infer that he knew his action would cause the girls affront and 
alarm.   
The final issue to address is whether the evidence was sufficient to support 
Jeffrey's attempt charges. 
A person is guilty of attempt to commit an offense when, with the purpose 
of committing the offense, he does any act which is a substantial step 
towards the commission of the offense.  A "substantial step" is conduct 
which is strongly corroborative of the firmness of the actor's purpose to 
complete the commission of the offense.   
 
Section 564.011.  On January 22, 2010, the evidence showed that A.K.O. and M.T. were 
both walking home from school when A.K.O. saw Jeffrey.  Jeffrey was charged with an 
attempted violation of § 566.083 by attempting to expose his genitals to M.T.  The only 
difference between Jeffrey's conduct with respect to M.T. and A.K.O. is that M.T. did not 
look at Jeffrey.  The evidence, therefore, was sufficient to find that Jeffrey, with the 
purpose of violating § 566.083, took a substantial step toward committing the offense.  
The only reason the offense was not committed was because M.T. refused to look.  
Jeffrey was also charged with attempted violation of § 566.083 for his attempt to 
expose his genitals to M.K.H. on January 22, 2010.  The evidence demonstrated that, 
when M.K.H. passed by Jeffrey's house, Jeffrey appeared nude in the window.  M.K.H. 
 
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did not see him, in part because A.K.O.'s mother drove her car in between M.K.H. and 
Jeffrey's window.  This evidence is sufficient to support a finding that Jeffrey had the 
purpose of violating § 566.083 and took a substantial step toward doing so.  Again, the 
only reason the full offense was not committed was because M.K.H. did not see Jeffrey.  
Reviewing all the evidence on the record, the evidence presented at trial was 
sufficient for a juror to reasonably find all of the elements necessary to convict Jeffrey of 
the crimes charged against him beyond a reasonable doubt. 
  
Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
 
All concur.