Case Title: Horner v. Dept. of Mental Health

Citation: 

Docket Number: 031475

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Compton, S.J. 
 
WALTER H. HORNER 
             OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
  v.   Record No. 031475  
           June 10, 2004 
 
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, 
MENTAL RETARDATION AND SUBSTANCE 
ABUSE SERVICES, WESTERN STATE HOSPITAL 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
This is an employment dispute involving an agency of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia and one of the agency's employees.  
The decision of the appeal turns upon interpretation of the 
clear terms of the applicable statute. 
 
In 2001, appellant Walter H. Horner, a physician, worked 
as an internist on the staff of Western State Hospital for 
appellee Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and 
Substance Abuse Services (the Department).  On May 15, 2001, 
the Hospital's Medical Director issued the employee two 
notices for so-called "Group II" offenses.  He was charged 
with failure to follow a supervisor's instructions and 
violation of state policy regarding personnel records 
disclosure.  Issuance of the notices resulted in the 
employee's immediate termination.  The employee contested the 
dismissal under the Commonwealth's statutory grievance 
procedure. 
 
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According to the procedure, which deals with the 
Commonwealth's program of employee relations management, the 
Department of Employment Dispute Resolution (DEDR) developed a 
grievance procedure, which the applicable statute required to 
include "not more than three successively higher grievance 
resolution steps and a formal hearing."  Code § 2.2-3003(A).∗ 
 
At the first level of management review, the employee's 
immediate supervisor (the so-called "first-step respondent") 
determined that he supported "the complete reversal" of the 
disciplinary actions and supported the employee's 
"reinstatement with back pay and restoration of all his fringe  
benefits."  The employee's response to this ruling was to 
conclude his grievance. 
 
However, management proceeded to the "second-step 
respondent" and the "third-step respondent" (the Medical 
Director and the Hospital Director, respectively), who both 
disagreed with the first-step respondent, and ruled that the 
employee should be denied the relief he sought.  The matters 
then were considered by a DEDR hearing officer who "affirmed" 
both notices, denying the employee relief. 
 
After the hearing officer, upon reconsideration, upheld 
the termination, the employee appealed to the DEDR, which 
                     
∗ Effective in 2001, after this grievance commenced, the 
relevant statutes were recodified.  Acts 2001, ch. 844.  We 
 
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upheld the hearing officer.  The employee also appealed to the 
Department of Human Resource Management, which upheld the 
hearing officer. 
 
After exhausting these administrative appeals of the 
hearing officer's decisions, the employee appealed to the 
Circuit Court of the City of Staunton pursuant to the 
provisions of Code § 2.2-3006(B), which permits an appeal of 
the hearing officer's final decision "on the grounds that the 
determination is contradictory to law."  Upon review, the 
circuit court "may affirm the decision or may reverse or 
modify the decision."  Id. 
 
In the circuit court, the employee asserted, inter alia, 
that Virginia's statutory grievance procedure requires that 
the remedy provided by the employee's first-level respondent 
be given effect. 
 
Although subsequently amended in 2003, Code § 2.2-
3003(D), the focus of this appeal, provided, at the time of 
the grievance and circuit court decision in this case, for 
management review of the employee's complaint.  The statute 
read:  "Each level of management review shall have the 
authority to provide the employee with a remedy." 
 
Interpreting the statute, the circuit court ruled that 
the General Assembly's explicit use of the term "remedy" means 
                                                                
shall refer to the numbers of current sections. 
 
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that the first-level respondent's decision was not a mere 
recommendation, as the Attorney General implicitly had argued, 
but that the respondent had the authority to provide the 
employee with a remedy, according to that term's accepted 
definition.  Thus, the court found that the decisions of the 
hearing officer were "contradictory to law," and reinstated 
the remedies of the first-step respondent. 
 
Upon review, addressing only the issue that is the focus 
of this appeal, the Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the 
circuit court's judgment.  Department of Mental Health v. 
Horner, 40 Va. App. 338, 579 S.E.2d 372 (2003).  The court 
ruled the circuit court erroneously decided that the 
Department was bound by the determination of the first-level 
respondent and precluded from pursuing the matter to the next 
levels of management review.  Id. at 340, 579 S.E.2d at 373. 
 
The Court of Appeals said that such an interpretation of 
the statute, and the policy and procedure manuals promulgated 
under the state's statutory grievance procedures, "would 
essentially allow an immediate, lower-level supervisor to make 
a final, conclusive determination and would provide the lower-
level supervisor with more authority on disciplinary matters 
than an agency director."  Id. at 342, 579 S.E.2d at 374. 
 
Continuing, the court stated:  "A system which provides 
such disparate remedies and which allows only the employee to 
 
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proceed to subsequent resolution steps would hardly be 'fair.'  
More importantly, such an interpretation of the statute and 
the procedure is absurd and irrational."  Id. 
 
We awarded the employee this appeal, because the case 
involves a matter of significant precedential value.  See Code 
§ 17.1-410(B). 
 
Settled principles apply here.  Statutory interpretation 
presents a pure question of law subject to de novo review by 
this Court.  Ainslie v. Inman, 265 Va. 347, 352, 577 S.E.2d 
246, 248 (2003). 
 
While interpreting statutes, courts must ascertain and 
give effect to the legislature's intention, which is to be 
deduced from the words used, unless a literal interpretation 
would result in a manifest absurdity.  When, as here, the 
General Assembly uses words that are clear and unambiguous, 
courts may not interpret them in a way that amounts to a 
holding that the legislature did not mean what it actually has 
expressed.  Watkins v. Hall, 161 Va. 924, 930, 172 S.E. 445, 
447 (1934).  Accord Abbott v. Willey, 253 Va. 88, 91, 479 
S.E.2d 528, 530 (1997).  In other words, courts are bound by 
the plain meaning of clear statutory language.  Earley v. 
Landsidle, 257 Va. 365, 370, 514 S.E.2d 153, 155 (1999). 
 
Guided by these controlling principles, we hold that the 
Court of Appeals erred.  In clear language, the General 
 
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Assembly mandated in Code § 2.2-3003(D):  "Each level of 
management review shall have authority to provide the employee 
with a remedy."  The noun "remedy" is defined as "[t]he means 
of enforcing a right or preventing or redressing a wrong; 
legal or equitable relief."  Black's Law Dictionary 1296 (7th 
ed. 1999). 
 
Plainly, the legislature provided the employee with the 
substantive right to be afforded a remedy by the first-level 
respondent.  Once the employee accepted the remedy, the 
statutory scheme existing at the time precluded management 
from contesting the first-level decision.  A contrary ruling, 
embracing the Court of Appeals' view, would reduce the first-
level respondent's decision to a mere recommendation that 
could either be followed or be ignored.  That idea effectively 
renders the disputed language meaningless. 
 
In this appeal, the Attorney General echoes the Court of 
Appeals' view that it is not "fair" to the Commonwealth to 
permit an employee to accept the remedy provided him at the 
first step, and that the employee's interpretation of the 
statute is "absurd."  We disagree. 
 
Even though one may argue from a policy standpoint that 
the enactment was unwise, there is nothing unfair or absurd 
about it.  The Commonwealth will not be heard to complain of 
fairness when it, through the General Assembly and DEDR, 
 
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created the system.  And, to allow an employee a remedy at the 
first stage of review is not absurd.  Whether an enactment is 
wise, and matters of policy, are questions for the legislative 
branch of government, and not the judicial branch.  See City 
of Portsmouth v. City of Chesapeake, 232 Va. 158, 163, 349 
S.E.2d 351, 353 (1986). 
 
The Attorney General also argues that a recent amendment 
to the statutory sentence at issue supports the Commonwealth's 
view, viz., that the General Assembly intended the authority 
granted the first-level respondent to be subject to the 
statutory authority granted the other respondents and the 
hearing officer. 
 
Effective in 2003, as a part of the amendment and 
reenactment of Code § 2.2-3003 (Cum. Supp. 2003), the General 
Assembly added language to the sentence.  Acts 2003, ch. 252.  
The sentence now reads (italics supplied):  "Each level of 
management review shall have the authority to provide the 
employee with a remedy, subject to the agency head's 
approval."  As we have said, this legislative action occurred 
after the circuit court's decision in this case. 
 
The Attorney General contends the amendment clarifies the 
legislative intent and explains the meaning of the law as it 
existed before the amendment, relying on Boyd v. Commonwealth, 
 
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216 Va. 16, 215 S.E.2d 915 (1975).  We disagree.  Actually the 
amendment supports a contrary view. 
 
"Legislation is presumed to effect a change in the law 
unless there is a clear indication that the General Assembly 
intended that the legislation declare or explain existing 
law."  Chappell v. Perkins, 266 Va. 413, 420, 587 S.E.2d 584, 
587-88 (2003), citing Boyd.  Nothing in the 2003 amendment, 
such as the words "declaratory of existing law," indicates 
that the General Assembly enacted the amendment as a 
clarification of existing law.  Therefore, applying the 
presumption, we conclude that a change in the law, not a 
clarification, was intended by the amendment. 
 
And, Boyd is inapposite.  There, an exception was applied 
to the rule that a change in the law is intended when new 
provisions are added to prior legislation by amendment.  
Unlike the present case, the amendments in Boyd were changes 
in form, which merely interpreted the existing law and made it 
more specific.  The changes "were not changes of substance, 
which add rights to, or withdraw existing rights from, an 
original act."  216 Va. at 20, 215 S.E.2d at 918.  Here, in 
contrast, the amendatory change was substantive, withdrawing 
existing rights.  Prior to the amendment, an employee had a 
right to accept the remedy provided by the first-level 
 
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respondent.  After the amendment, that right is now "subject 
to the agency head's approval." 
 
Finally, we have considered the additional issues the 
Attorney General has presented here, some of which also were 
raised in the courts below and not ruled upon there.  These 
arguments are either substantively meritless or are 
procedurally barred in this appeal as not being based on any 
assignments of cross-error.  Only one issue merits further 
discussion. 
 
The Attorney General contends the circuit court lacked 
"jurisdiction" to hear the matter, because the employee failed 
to ensure that his grievance appeal was heard in a timely 
fashion, as required by Code § 2.2-3006(B).  Acknowledging the 
time limit had not been met, the circuit court nevertheless 
denied a motion to dismiss filed on this basis, and the Court 
of Appeals did not address this issue, although it was raised 
there by the Attorney General. 
 
Code § 2.2-3006(B) provides, in part, that:  "Within 30 
days of receipt of the grievance record, the court, sitting 
without a jury, shall hear the appeal on the record."  This 
provision is directory and procedural rather than mandatory 
and jurisdictional, because it merely directs the mode of 
proceeding by the circuit court.  Jamborsky v. Baskins, 247 
Va. 506, 511, 442 S.E.2d 636, 638 (1994) (use of "shall" in 
 
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statute requiring action by public official is directory 
unless statute manifests contrary intent).  See Welding, Inc. 
v. Bland County Serv. Auth., 261 Va. 218, 225, 541 S.E.2d 909, 
912-13 (2001). 
 
And, this issue has not been properly preserved by an 
assignment of cross-error for review by this Court.  Rule 
5:18(b) (cross-error not assigned in brief in opposition not 
to be noticed). 
 
The Court of Appeals did not rule in favor of the 
Department on the issue of the circuit court's lack of 
jurisdiction.  In order to preserve that issue for our review, 
an assignment of cross-error citing the Court of Appeals' 
failure to so rule was necessary.  Wells v. Shoosmith, 245 Va. 
386, 388 n.1, 428 S.E.2d 909, 910 n.1 (1993). 
 
Consequently, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 
favor of the Department will be reversed, and the order of the 
Circuit Court of the City of Staunton dated September 5, 2002 
shall be reinstated and affirmed.  The case will be remanded 
to the Court of Appeals with direction that the matter be 
remanded to the said circuit court. 
 
Upon remand, the circuit court shall consider, in view of 
these appeals, only its award of reasonable attorneys' fees 
and costs pursuant to Code § 2.2-3006(E). 
Reversed and remanded.