Case Title: Commonwealth v. Amaral

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12244

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12244 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JEREMY AMARAL. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     April 5, 2019. - June 26, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement.  Evidence, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Hearsay, Verbal 
completeness, Expert opinion, Photograph.  Practice, 
Criminal, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of 
statement, Instructions to jury, New trial, Capital case, 
Jury and jurors, Examination of jurors, Voir dire, Argument 
by counsel, Assistance of counsel.  Jury and Jurors. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on May 2 and June 27, 2013. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Renee 
P. Dupuis, J; the cases were tried before Gary A. Nickerson, J., 
and a motion for a new trial, filed on December 29, 2017, was 
considered by him. 
 
 
 
Susan J. Baronoff for the defendant. 
 
Erica G. Sylvia, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  Following a jury trial, the defendant, Jeremy 
Amaral, was convicted of murder in the first degree on the 
2 
 
 
theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, and felony-murder (with armed robbery as the predicate 
offense) in connection with the death of Tiffany Durfee.1  In 
this consolidated appeal from his convictions and from the 
denial of his motion for a new trial, the defendant challenges 
the denial of his motion to suppress his statements to police, 
instructions given to the jury, and the improper exclusion of 
certain hearsay evidence.  The defendant further argues that the 
judge improperly denied him an evidentiary hearing on his motion 
for a new trial.  Alternatively, the defendant requests that we 
exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
We affirm the defendant's convictions and the order denying 
his motion for a new trial.  Further, after a review of the 
entire record, we decline to reduce the verdict of murder in the 
first degree to a lesser degree of guilt or to set aside the 
defendant's convictions under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Factual background.  We summarize the facts as the jury 
could have found them, reserving certain details for discussion 
of specific issues. 
 
On the afternoon of March 13, 2013, the victim was found 
dead in her living room with her throat cut.  Her two young 
                     
1 The defendant also was convicted of misleading a police 
officer. 
3 
 
 
children were found unharmed in their bedroom.  A flat screen 
television was missing from her home. 
Based on telephone records, investigators learned that 
several calls were made between the victim's and the defendant's 
cellular telephones (cell phones) beginning at approximately 11 
P.M. on March 12 and continuing into the early morning of March 
13.  On March 14, after learning that police were looking for 
him, the defendant appeared at the police station.  With him was 
Michael Garcia, a close childhood friend.  The two were 
interviewed separately and gave similar accounts of being at the 
victim's home in the early morning hours of March 13.  Both told 
police that they took one of the victim's televisions (with her 
consent) to exchange it for cash and "crack" cocaine.  The two 
claimed that after smoking the cocaine with the victim, they 
then invited another individual, whom we shall call David, to 
the apartment to purchase the victim's second television.  The 
defendant and Garcia told police that they left David alone with 
the victim and implicated David in the victim's death. 
 
After confirming that David had an alibi, investigators 
spoke again to the defendant, and learned that the defendant 
sold the victim's television to an individual named Jason 
McCarthy.  McCarthy testified that when the defendant arrived at 
his home with the television, the defendant's sweatshirt was 
stained red.  When McCarthy asked the defendant what happened, 
4 
 
 
he replied, "I just murdered somebody . . . .  No.  I was 
painting."  When police confiscated the television, it was 
smeared with red-brown stains that tested positive for the 
presence of blood. 
The defendant and Garcia subsequently were arrested and 
charged with misleading the police.  When Garcia learned that 
the television was stained with blood, he admitted to police 
that he had lied about having been with the defendant in the 
victim's apartment.  Rather, Garcia said that the defendant had 
telephoned Garcia from the victim's home at approximately 2 or 3 
A.M. to ask for a ride so that the defendant could bring the 
television to McCarthy. 
As part of the investigation, the defendant and Garcia's 
hands were swabbed; the defendant's hands tested positive for 
the presence of blood.  Investigators recovered a bloody T-shirt 
found in a trash can in McCarthy's yard, and a bloody sweatshirt 
and bloodstained shoes from a second location based on a lead 
from Garcia.  Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing of the blood 
stains on the clothing and shoes did not exclude the victim as 
the source.  Tests on samples containing DNA from more than one 
person also did not exclude the defendant and the victim, 
although they did exclude Garcia, David, and McCarthy, among 
others.  Further, the soles of the shoes were consistent with 
footprint impressions found in blood in the victim's apartment. 
5 
 
 
 
The defendant, who testified at trial, claimed that 
although he was present, it was Garcia who killed the victim 
during an argument over cocaine.  The defendant further 
testified that the story he told police in his first interview 
was made up to protect Garcia. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Statements made to investigators.  The 
defendant claims that the motion judge erred by declining to 
suppress the videotaped statements he made to investigators 
because he was not provided with a recitation of the Miranda 
warnings prior to questioning and because his statements were 
made involuntarily.  "'When reviewing the denial of a motion to 
suppress, we accept the [motion] judge's findings of fact . . . 
absent clear error,' but we independently determine 'the 
correctness of the judge's application of constitutional 
principles to the facts as found.'"  Commonwealth v. Molina, 467 
Mass. 65, 72 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. 
199, 205 (2011).  In light of the deference owed the judge's 
findings, and on our own review of the record, we affirm the 
order denying the defendant's motion to suppress. 
 
We summarize the detailed findings of fact made by the 
motion judge.  The defendant and Garcia voluntarily appeared at 
the police station with Garcia at approximately 4 P.M. on 
March 14, 2013, to be interviewed.  The two were escorted to 
separate interview rooms, but they could converse freely prior 
6 
 
 
to the start of the interviews.  The defendant also placed 
telephone calls before the interview began, and he telephoned 
his mother during a break in the questioning to make dinner 
plans.  The defendant told investigators at the start of the 
interview that he had to "get straight" prior to speaking with 
police, which was interpreted to mean that he had ingested drugs 
before arriving at the station.  However, he did not smell of 
alcohol, slur his speech, or otherwise appear to be under the 
influence of an intoxicating substance.  He was "coherent, lucid 
and talkative."  He "clearly manifested an understanding of the 
conversation" and answered questions appropriately.  At some 
points he expressed wariness of supplying some information for 
fear of being labeled a "rat"; at others, he attempted to 
leverage his willingness to cooperate for "consideration" in 
connection with a pending probation matter. 
 
The tone of the interview was "cordial, polite, 
nonaggressive, and heavily influenced and controlled by the 
defendant."  The defendant, a college graduate, had had previous 
experience with police prior to the interview and had waived his 
Miranda rights before speaking to police.  Early on, 
investigators informed the defendant that he was not a suspect 
in the murder, but that they were attempting to piece together a 
timeline of the victim's death.  The defendant was cooperative 
with the investigators:  he voluntarily gave them his cell phone 
7 
 
 
and signed a consent form to allow them to search it.  He also 
allowed police to photograph the absence of injuries on his 
hands and to swab him for blood residue. 
 
The defendant never was told that he was in custody or that 
he could not leave the station.  Although one of the officers 
conducted a quick pat-down of the defendant at one point, that 
officer did so only when the officers observed the defendant 
scratching himself, which the defendant explained as a 
manifestation of his heroin addiction.  During two breaks, the 
defendant was escorted to the bathroom and outside to have a 
cigarette. 
 
After one break, the investigators told the defendant that 
Garcia had given them more information than the defendant had 
provided and suggested that he was not telling them the complete 
truth.  It was then that the defendant indicated that David was 
the last person to see the victim alive.  The defendant further 
offered to "set up a drug deal" so that investigators could 
investigate David.  The investigators agreed and the defendant 
left the station to complete the controlled drug purchase with 
David. 
 
After the controlled drug purchase, the defendant 
accompanied police back to the station and again was seated in 
the meeting room, but he was not told that he could not leave 
the station.  Shortly after 9 P.M., police held a second 
8 
 
 
interview with the defendant, in which he told them that the 
first television had been sold to Jason McCarthy.  The second 
interview lasted for a few minutes.  Police confirmed David's 
alibi for the night of the murder.  They also learned from 
McCarthy that the first television had blood on it and that 
McCarthy had seen the defendant with blood on him when he 
delivered it.  After police received this information, a third 
interview with the defendant was conducted.  At the start of 
that interview, the defendant invoked his right to counsel, and 
he was arrested. 
 
a.  Miranda warnings.  Miranda warnings are required only 
when a suspect is subject to custodial interrogation.  
Commonwealth v. Jung, 420 Mass. 675, 688 (1995).  The defendant 
bears the burden of proving that he was in custody for the 
purposes being entitled to a recitation of Miranda warnings 
prior to questioning.  Commonwealth v. Girouard, 436 Mass. 657, 
665 (2002). 
 
An interview is custodial where "a reasonable person in the 
suspect's shoes would experience the environment in which the 
interrogation took place as coercive" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Cawthron, 479 Mass. 612, 617 (2018).  Four 
factors are considered in determining whether a person is in 
custody: 
9 
 
 
"(1) the place of the interrogation; (2) whether the 
officers have conveyed to the person being questioned any 
belief or opinion that the person is a suspect; (3) the 
nature of the interrogation, including whether the 
interview was aggressive or, instead, informal and 
influenced in its contours by the person being interviewed; 
and (4) whether, at the time the incriminating statement 
was made, the person was free to end the interview by 
leaving the locus of the interrogation or by asking the 
interrogator to leave, as evidenced by whether the 
interview terminated with an arrest." 
 
Commonwealth v. Groome, 435 Mass. 201, 211-212 (2001).  We 
address these factors in turn. 
 
i.  The location of the interview.  The defendant was 
interviewed at the police station, a location that may be 
considered coercive; however, he arrived of his own volition.  
See Commonwealth v. Sparks, 433 Mass. 654, 657 (2001) (interview 
that took place at police station was not custodial where 
defendant arrived and left voluntarily).  The defendant argues 
that the fact that police were attempting to locate him prior to 
his appearing at the station for an interview put pressure on 
him to appear.  Assuming this is true, it does not alter the 
objective circumstances of the interview discussed infra.  See 
Groome, supra at 212.  See also Commonwealth v. Brum, 438 Mass. 
103, 112 (2002). 
 
ii.  Whether the police conveyed a belief that the 
defendant was a suspect.  Investigators indicated to the 
defendant that he was a witness, rather than a suspect, until 
the third interview, at which point the defendant invoked his 
10 
 
 
right to counsel and questioning stopped.  Even after speaking 
with Garcia and confronting the defendant about his not being 
completely forthcoming, investigators did not tell the defendant 
that there was any incriminating evidence against him, or that 
he was under suspicion.  The officers only communicated that 
they wanted to know more about the events leading up to the 
victim's death.  See Commonwealth v. Morse, 427 Mass. 117, 123-
124 (1998) (investigator's suspicions concerning interviewee 
immaterial unless they influence objective conditions of 
interrogation). 
 
iii.  The nature of the interview.  The interview was 
conducted in a calm and cordial manner, and the defendant 
heavily influenced its direction.  The defendant apparently felt 
comfortable enough with the investigators to ask them to put in 
a good word with his probation officer, and later to suggest 
that police conduct a controlled drug purchase in which he would 
participate in order for the officers to investigate David.  We 
conclude, as the motion judge did, that the environment was not 
one in which a reasonable person in the defendant's position 
would not feel free to leave.2 
                     
 
2 The defendant's argument that the motion judge 
impermissibly relied on the defendant's subjective intent and 
motivation misses the mark.  A motion judge is not forbidden 
from taking subjective facts into account, especially to the 
extent that those facts influenced the objective conditions of 
an interrogation.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Groome, 435 Mass. 
11 
 
 
 
iv.  Freedom to leave.  Until the point at which he was 
arrested, the defendant never was told he was in custody, and in 
fact he made dinner plans during a telephone conversation with 
his mother.  Further, he left the station without a police 
escort to participate in a controlled drug purchase. 
 
Considering the above factors in total, we agree with the 
motion judge that the defendant was not in custody during the 
questioning, and thus providing the defendant with Miranda 
warnings before he was interviewed was not mandated. 
 
b.  Voluntariness.  The right to due process under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution requires that admissions be voluntarily made, 
without coercion, to be admissible.  Commonwealth v. Magee, 423 
Mass. 381, 387-388 (1996).  Commonwealth v. Brady, 380 Mass. 44, 
48, 52 (1980).  The Commonwealth has the burden to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that, "'in light of the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, the will 
of the defendant was [not] overborne,' but rather that the 
statement was 'the result of a free and voluntary act.'"  
Commonwealth v. Baye, 462 Mass. 246, 256 (2012), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Durand, 457 Mass. 574, 595-596 (2010), S.C., 475 
Mass. 657 (2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 259 (2017). 
                     
201, 212-213 (2001); Commonwealth v. Morse, 427 Mass. 117, 124 
(1998). 
12 
 
 
 
In considering whether a statement was made voluntarily, 
relevant factors include "conduct of the defendant, the 
defendant's age, education, intelligence, and emotional 
stability, experience with and in the criminal justice system, 
[and] physical and mental condition" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 661 (2018).  Here the 
defendant is a college graduate and previously had been exposed 
to police questioning in a different context.  Although the 
defendant apparently had ingested heroin prior to the interview, 
he was alert and oriented, and he did not appear to be under the 
influence of any intoxicating substances.  See Commonwealth v. 
Silanskas, 433 Mass. 678, 685 (2001) (consumption of 
intoxicating substances without more does not render statement 
involuntary); Commonwealth v. Ward, 426 Mass. 290, 294 (1997) 
(same).  The defendant answered questions appropriately, and his 
responses indicated that he was rational and in control of his 
faculties. 
 
The defendant demonstrated his understanding by providing 
information to exculpate himself and inculpate another.  See 
Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 472 (2010) (in finding 
voluntariness of statements, judge was entitled to consider fact 
that defendant attempted "to talk his way out of his 
predicament"), and cases cited.  He also suggested, and then 
participated in, a controlled drug purchase.  Based upon the 
13 
 
 
record before us, we agree with the motion judge that the 
defendant's statements were voluntarily made. 
Because the defendant's statements to the investigators 
were not made in violation of any of his constitutional rights, 
we do not find that the motion judge erred in declining to 
suppress them. 
 
2.  Exclusion of hearsay evidence.  At trial, the 
defendant's mother testified that, on the night of the killing, 
the defendant telephoned her to ask if she would buy a 
television.  On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited 
further testimony about this conversation.  The defendant's 
mother stated, "He wanted to know if I wanted to buy [the 
television], and I said 'Jeremy, I told you not to call me about 
anything, especially if it's stolen.'"  She continued, "[I]n the 
background somebody's -- ," at which point the Commonwealth 
objected on hearsay grounds. 
 
The judge sustained the objection.  At sidebar, defense 
counsel proffered that the defendant's mother would testify that 
she heard a female voice in the background saying, "No, it's not 
stolen; it's my TV," and argued that this statement was 
admissible under the doctrine of verbal completeness.  The judge 
ruled that the doctrine of verbal completeness was not 
applicable and did not permit the witness to testify as to the 
substance of any statements by the voice in the background. 
14 
 
 
 
On appeal, the defendant reiterates that the hearsay 
statement from an unidentified third party should have been 
admitted, and that its exclusion constituted prejudicial error.  
We disagree. 
 
Under the doctrine of verbal completeness, when a party 
introduces a portion of a statement, "a judge has discretion to 
allow admission of other relevant portions of the same statement 
or writing which serve to clarify the context of the admitted 
portion" (quotations, citation, and alteration omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 246 (2014).  The 
doctrine allows an adverse party to offer an additional 
statement to contextualize the one already admitted.  
Commonwealth v. Aviles, 461 Mass. 60, 75-76 (2011).  For a 
hearsay statement to be admitted under the doctrine, an adverse 
party must show that the additional statements are "(1) on the 
same subject as the admitted statement; (2) part of the same 
conversation as the admitted statement; and (3) necessary to the 
understanding of the admitted statement."  Crayton, supra at 
247, quoting Aviles, supra at 75.  See Commonwealth v. Clark, 
432 Mass. 1, 15 n.8 (2000) (portions of statement sought to be 
introduced must "qualify or explain" segments previously 
introduced).  Relevance alone is insufficient to support 
admission.  See Commonwealth v. Eugene, 438 Mass. 343, 351 
(2003); Mass. G. Evid. § 106 (2018).  The doctrine aims to 
15 
 
 
prevent one party from presenting "a fragmented or misleading 
version of events" to the fact finder.  Crayton, supra at 246, 
quoting Aviles, supra. 
 
The proffered statement must meet each component of the 
doctrine of verbal completeness to be admissible.  Crayton, 470 
Mass. at 247.  Concerning the first inquiry here, because all of 
the statements involved the television, the first requirement 
was met. 
 
Concerning the second inquiry, here, it was unclear whether 
the proffered statement was part of the same conversation as 
that between the defendant and his mother.  The defendant did 
not make an offer of proof as to any other details about the 
telephone call -- such as the identity of the third party -- and 
there was no indication that either the defendant or his mother 
ever addressed the third party.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 103(a)(2) 
(2018). 
 
Finally, concerning the inquiry whether the proffered 
statement was necessary to the full understanding of the 
admitted statements, Crayton, 470 Mass. at 247, relevance by 
itself does not provide a sufficient basis for admissibility 
under the doctrine of verbal completeness.  Eugene, 438 Mass. at 
351.  Instead, the statement must "serve to clarify the context 
of the admitted portion."  Clark, 432 Mass. at 14.  See Crayton, 
supra at 247 n.3; Commonwealth v. Watson, 377 Mass. 814, 833 
16 
 
 
(1979), S.C., 409 Mass. 110 (1991).  Here, the defendant argues 
that the third-party statement, "No, it's not stolen; it's my 
TV," was necessary to explain and qualify the defendant's offer 
to sell the television because it tends to show the owner's 
consent to the sale.  The defendant also argues that without 
admitting the statement in question, the jury might have 
inferred that his silence was an implied, adoptive admission 
that the television was, in fact, stolen.  See Crayton, supra at 
247. 
 
In Crayton, 470 Mass. at 246-247, we held that given the 
admission of the defendant's acknowledgement that he used a 
certain computer, it was an abuse of discretion under the 
doctrine of verbal completeness to exclude the defendant's 
denial that he used the computer to view child pornography.    
In that case, the denial was necessary to understand the 
admitted statements because, without it, a reasonable jury 
"might have understood the other statements the defendant made 
to the detectives as an implied admission to having viewed the 
child pornography."  Id. at 247. 
 
However, here, the denial of wrongdoing was made by an 
unidentified third party.  See id. at 247-248 (further 
statements admitted from same person to contextualize that 
person's previously admitted testimony).  See also Aviles, supra 
at 75 (same).  Although the doctrine of verbal completeness does 
17 
 
 
not require that a proffered statement be from the same speaker 
as the admitted statement, a trial judge nonetheless reasonably 
could find that the unprompted comment by the third party did 
not shed light on any statement attributed to either the 
defendant or his mother. 
 
Moreover, without any evidence as to the identity of the 
third party declarant, the proffered statement is especially 
vulnerable to the foundational problems associated with hearsay 
-- that is, questionable reliability and the speaker's 
unavailability for cross-examination.  See Commonwealth v. Del 
Valle, 351 Mass. 489, 491 (1966), S.C., 353 Mass. 684 (1968) 
(theory underlying exclusion of hearsay is that "the trier of 
fact is forced to rely upon the declarant's memory, 
truthfulness, perception, and use of language not subject to 
cross examination"); 2 McCormick on Evidence § 245 (K.S. Broun 
ed., 7th ed. 2013) (hearsay disfavored because value of 
testimony depends on "perception, memory, narration, and 
sincerity" of witness, which are difficult to evaluate with 
unavailable declarant). 
 
Thus, because the defendant was unable to demonstrate 
either that the proffered statement was part of the same 
conversation as the admitted statement or that it was necessary 
to the understanding of the admitted statement, the judge did 
not abuse his discretion by excluding it.  See Commonwealth v. 
18 
 
 
Morin, 478 Mass. 415, 432 (2017) (judge did not abuse discretion 
"in finding that there was an inadequate foundation to permit 
the introduction of this [hearsay] evidence"). 
 
3.  Jury instructions.  The defendant contends that the 
judge erred by declining to give a humane practice instruction 
sua sponte, and by declining to provide the jury with complete 
instructions on joint venture. 
 
a.  Humane practice instruction.  Where the voluntariness 
of a defendant's admission is in question, under the humane 
practice rule, the judge will instruct the jury that the 
prosecution must prove that the defendant's statements were 
voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Commonwealth v. 
Gallett, 481 Mass. 662, 686 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Sunahara, 455 Mass. 832, 835 (2010). 
 
Here, prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the 
statements he made to police partially based on grounds of 
voluntariness:  he claimed to have been under the influence of 
narcotics at the time of the interrogation.  Although, in 
denying the defendant's motion to suppress, the motion judge 
found that the defendant's statements were voluntary, the 
defendant argues that the jury could have found otherwise, and 
now asks us to conclude that the trial judge's failure to give 
19 
 
 
the instruction sua sponte resulted in reversible error.3  This 
we cannot do. 
 
A humane practice instruction is required when the 
voluntariness of a confession or admission is a live issue at 
trial, even in the absence of a request from defense counsel. 
Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 478 Mass. 189, 198-199 (2017). 
However, a judge does not have an obligation to instruct on 
humane practice unless voluntariness actually "is made a live 
issue at trial."  See Commonwealth v. Alicea, 376 Mass. 506, 523 
(1978). 
 
There was no indication that voluntariness was part of his 
defense at trial.  Trial counsel did not present voluntariness 
as an issue in his opening statement, did not ask the defendant 
about the voluntariness of his statements during the defendant's 
direct examination, and did not raise the question of 
voluntariness during the closing argument.  See Alicea, 376 
Mass. at 523.  To the contrary, trial counsel made clear that 
voluntariness was not in play.  At two points during the trial, 
the judge asked defense counsel whether voluntariness was an 
issue as it pertained to the humane practice rule.  The first 
                     
 
3 Because trial counsel did not request a humane practice 
instruction (in fact, he specifically declined one), any error 
would be reviewed for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice.  Commonwealth v. Dykens, 438 Mass. 827, 831 (2003).  
As discussed infra, we perceive no error. 
20 
 
 
time the judge inquired was prior to the Commonwealth's 
presentation of the video recording of the defendant's statement 
to investigators; the second time was during the charge 
conference.  Each time, trial counsel responded in the negative. 
 
As the defendant did not make the voluntariness of his 
statement to police a live issue at trial, and, in fact, 
indicated that it was not a live issue, the judge did not err by 
declining to give a humane practice instruction sua sponte.  See 
Commonwealth v. Nieves, 429 Mass. 763, 769-770 (1999) (despite 
evidence of defendant's drug use or drug withdrawal prior to 
arrest and confessions, "the issue of voluntariness was not 
raised with sufficient point to require an express admonition to 
the jury by the Court" [citation and quotations omitted]). 
 
b.  Joint venture instruction.  At trial, defense counsel 
included a joint venture instruction in a written request for 
jury instructions.  However, at the charge conference, he did 
not ask for the instruction.  The defendant now claims that he 
was entitled to such an instruction.  This argument lacks merit. 
First, there was no evidence presented at trial of a joint 
venture.  See Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 467 (2009) 
(joint venture instruction appropriate "[w]hen there is evidence 
that more than one person may have participated in the 
commission of the crime").  The Commonwealth's theory of the 
case was that the defendant killed the victim alone.  The 
21 
 
 
defendant's theory of the case was that, although he was present 
when the victim died, it was Garcia who killed her and that the 
defendant had attempted to intervene.  Because joint venture was 
not raised, no joint venture instruction was warranted.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gulla, 476 Mass. 743, 748 (2017) (judge need not 
instruct jury sua sponte on defense theory that defense counsel 
had made tactical decision not to pursue and where there is "a 
paucity of evidence to support such a defense"). 
Second, the concerns that the defendant raises on appeal 
were actually addressed by the instructions that the judge gave.  
The defendant argues that although the judge instructed that 
mere presence and knowledge of the crime are not enough to 
convict, the instruction did not go far enough because it did 
not inform the jury that in order to demonstrate a joint 
venture, the Commonwealth had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant knowingly participated in committing the 
crime with the requisite intent, and that mere association 
before and after the crime or a failure to prevent the crime is 
not sufficient to prove joint venture.4 
                     
4 The instruction with which the defendant finds fault was 
as follows: 
 
"Before I launch into the various elements of murder, let 
me state something quite clearly.  Mere presence at a crime 
scene is never enough to convict someone.  Presence at a 
crime scene and knowledge of the crime is not enough to 
22 
 
 
In fact, the judge instructed the jury that, in order to 
find the defendant guilty, they had to find that there was 
evidence of each element of murder in the first degree beyond a 
reasonable doubt, including intent.  The judge also explained 
the intent requirements for each theory of murder in the first 
degree that was presented to them.  There was no question from 
the judge's instructions that the jury had to have found beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the requisite intent 
to commit murder in order to find him guilty of that crime.  
Conversely, the judge made clear that if the jury did not find 
each element of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt, then 
they should acquit the defendant of that offense.  Further, the 
judge also repeatedly reminded the jury that it was the 
defendant's actions, and not the actions of another, that they 
were to assess. 
 
Finally, a joint venture instruction would not have 
benefited the defendant; to the contrary, it would have provided 
the jury with an alternative basis on which to convict him.  See 
Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 470, cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 881 (1979) ("The theory underlying joint enterprise is that 
one who aids, commands, counsels, or encourages commission of a 
crime while sharing with the principal the mental state required 
                     
convict.  To convict, you have to satisfy the elements of 
the particular offense that you are considering." 
23 
 
 
for the crime is guilty as a principal").  The joint venture 
instruction from the Zanetti decision is not given in lieu of an 
instruction on the principal offense, but is instead 
incorporated into the principal offense instruction.  Indeed, 
the purpose of the Zanetti instruction is to allow a jury to 
convict where it "unanimously finds that the defendant 
participated in the crime charged with the required intent but 
are divided as to the defendant's precise role in the commission 
of the crime."  See Zanetti, 454 Mass. at 467.  If the jury were 
instructed that they could convict based on a theory of joint 
venture, and they found that the elements of joint venture were 
present, then they could have convicted the defendant of the 
principal offense.  See id. at 466-467.  Omitting the 
instruction was not error. 
 
4.  Motion for a new trial.  While his direct appeal was 
pending, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial with this 
court, claiming that the Commonwealth allegedly withheld 
evidence from defense counsel.  Alternatively, he argued that if 
defense counsel received the evidence and ignored it, he 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel.  The motion was 
considered by the trial judge, who denied it without an 
evidentiary hearing.  The defendant now contends that the motion 
judge abused his discretion by declining to hold an evidentiary 
24 
 
 
hearing prior to ruling on the motion for a new trial.  We 
disagree. 
A judge may decide a motion for a new trial without holding 
an evidentiary hearing if "no substantial issue is raised by the 
motion or affidavits."  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (3), as 
appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  On appeal, we review a 
decision not to hold such a hearing for an abuse of discretion.  
Commonwealth v. Denis, 442 Mass. 617, 628 (2004).  "[W]here, as 
here, the motion judge was also the trial judge, the judge's 
finding that the defendant's motion and affidavit did not raise 
a substantial issue is entitled to substantial deference, . . . 
and the judge could properly use his knowledge and evaluation of 
the evidence at trial in determining whether to decide the 
motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Wallis, 440 Mass. 589, 596 (2003).  
See Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 458 Mass. 791, 803 (2011) 
("Reversal is particularly rare where the judge who acted on the 
motion was also the trial judge"). 
Here, the defendant alleged that the Commonwealth withheld 
exculpatory evidence by failing to disclose a taped interview of 
the victim's son (the child), conducted within days of the 
killing.  The child, who was four years old at the time of his 
25 
 
 
mother's death, was in a bedroom when the victim was killed.5  
The judge reviewed the interview and accurately set forth the 
salient facts, which the defendant does not challenge. The child 
told an investigator that "the guy that killed mommy took the TV 
in her room."  When asked how he knew, he responded, "Cause when 
I woke up it wasn't there."  He went on, however, to deny having 
seen someone take the television, and to deny seeing anyone in 
the apartment when he was going to sleep or when he awoke.  In 
response to leading questions, the child reported that he saw 
the man's eyes, nose and mouth.  The child first indicated that 
he did not see the color of the man's skin; however, when the 
interviewer pressed by asking, "Was it brown?  Was it black?  
Was it white?"  The child said, "It was -- " and after a long 
pause, added "black."  Through similar questioning, the child 
reported that the man had no hair, no glasses, and was medium in 
size.  This description did not match that of the defendant, who 
is Caucasian and wears glasses. 
In his affidavit that accompanied the motion, the defendant 
claimed that had he had this information, he might have altered 
his trial strategy.  In particular, the defendant claimed that 
he might not have testified in his own defense and that he might 
have called the child as a witness instead. 
                     
 
5 The child, who was seven years old at the time of the 
defendant's trial, did not testify. 
26 
 
 
In denying the defendant's motion, the motion judge ruled 
that no evidentiary hearing was necessary because the 
defendant's motion and supporting materials did not raise a 
substantial issue.  See Denis, 442 Mass. at 628.  The motion 
judge concluded that even if the prosecution had failed to 
disclose the recorded interview, the defendant had not 
demonstrated that such nondisclosure created a substantial risk 
that the jury would have reached a different conclusion had the 
evidence been admitted at trial.  See Commonwealth v. Murray, 
461 Mass. 10, 21 (2011) (question is "whether the new evidence 
would probably have been a real factor in the jury's 
deliberations" [citation omitted]).6  The motion judge also 
concluded that there was no indication that the defendant had 
been deprived of an otherwise available, substantive ground of 
defense.  See Commonwealth v. Epps, 474 Mass. 743, 757 (2016).  
We agree. 
 
The motion judge first noted potential issues with the 
competence of the child witness.  Although a child is not per se 
incompetent by reason of age, a judge who reviews a recorded 
interview of the child would be "well aware of the age and 
                     
 
6 Neither the defendant nor his trial counsel allege that 
they specifically requested the evidence at issue here, which 
would have required that we apply a standard more favorable to 
the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 481 Mass. 641, 650 
(2019). 
27 
 
 
corresponding limitations of the child."  Commonwealth v. 
Patton, 458 Mass. 119, 135 (2010).  As the motion judge 
observed, the child here gave contradictory accounts of the 
incident, stating initially that he saw and heard nothing on the 
night of his mother's murder.  Upon further prompting from the 
interviewer, the child then stated that he saw the person who 
took the television from his room; the child described this 
person as a male adult with black skin, no hair, and no glasses.  
Even had such testimony been found to be competent, the 
discrepancies in the recorded interview would have significantly 
diminished its weight and credibility. 
 
Moreover, at trial, the child's testimony would have been 
pitted against that of Garcia and McCarthy, among others, and 
the forensic evidence of the defendant's guilt.  In Commonwealth 
v. Lykus, 451 Mass. 310, 328-329 (2008), we considered a 
previously undisclosed Federal Bureau of Investigation report 
indicating that voice spectrogram analysis could not identify 
the defendant's voice on a recording.  See id.  We concluded 
that, because multiple lay witnesses had positively identified 
the voice as that of the defendant, there was no prejudice.  See 
id.  Here, we agree with the motion judge that the defendant 
failed to carry his burden in showing a "substantial basis for 
claiming prejudice."  Commonwealth v. Watkins, 473 Mass. 222, 
231 (2015).  Therefore, an evidentiary hearing to determine 
28 
 
 
whether the exculpatory evidence was, in fact, withheld from the 
defendant, or whether instead trial counsel performed in a 
constitutionally deficient manner, was not required.7 
 
5.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant 
additionally asks us to exercise our extraordinary power to 
grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, based on any one of a 
number of factors.  Two such factors, alleged faulty jury 
instructions and the alleged failure to turn over the child's 
statement, have been addressed supra.  We here address the 
remaining issues raised by the defendant under § 33E. 
 
First, the defendant claims that, because the victim had a 
prosthetic leg, prospective jurors should have been asked in 
voir dire about their attitudes toward people with disabilities.8  
                     
7 The defendant further argues that, in evaluating 
prejudice, the motion judge erroneously considered the effect of 
his testimony at the trial (in which the defendant accused 
Garcia of the killing) on any subsequent trial.  Where there is 
a claim that exculpatory evidence was withheld or counsel was 
ineffective, prejudice analysis looks to what would have 
occurred but for the error -- not what might occur at a 
prospective new trial.  See generally Commonwealth v. Epps, 474 
Mass. 743, 757 (2016); Commonwealth v. Murray, 461 Mass. 10, 21 
(2011).  Here, regardless of the discussion about the impact of 
prior testimony on subsequent trials, the motion judge's 
conclusions relating to prejudice rested on the weight of the 
evidence presented at the trial.  There was no error. 
 
 
8 The defendant does not present this argument as a basis 
for ineffective assistance of counsel.  Nonetheless, we conclude 
that counsel was not ineffective here for not seeking individual 
voir dire of prospective jurors regarding their ability to be 
impartial in light of the victim's disability.  Commonwealth v. 
Companonio, 445 Mass. 39, 52-53 (2005) (defendant's trial 
29 
 
 
"The scope of voir dire rests in the sound discretion of the 
trial judge, and a determination by the judge that a jury are 
impartial will not be overturned on appeal in the absence of a 
clear showing of abuse of discretion or that the finding was 
clearly erroneous" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Bell, 
460 Mass. 294, 303 (2011), S.C., 473 Mass. 131 (2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 2467 (2016).  Here, in addition to asking 
specific questions about certain potential biases potential 
jurors might harbor, the judge asked the entire venire whether 
there was any reason why they might not be able to be fair and 
impartial, and asked follow-up questions of each person who 
responded affirmatively.  Each juror who comprised the jury that 
ultimately convicted the defendant was found to be indifferent.9  
There was no error. 
                     
counsel not ineffective by failing to request that prospective 
jurors be asked about bias toward Cubans where no suggestion in 
record that ethnicity had any particular significance in 
killing). 
 
 
9 We note that a member of the venire and, later, a member 
of the deliberating jury, both of whom worked with disabled 
individuals, were excused.  With regard to the latter, the issue 
was flagged during deliberations when the juror raised with the 
court the possibility that she had met the victim a few years 
prior.  During a colloquy with the juror, defense counsel noted 
that the juror worked at a rehabilitation center and requested 
that the judge inquire whether the juror's place of employment 
would affect her ability to be fair.  The juror indicated that 
her occupation would not affect her views on the case.  She also 
told the parties and the judge that she had not said anything to 
the other jurors about the possibility that she knew the victim.  
Although the judge concluded after the colloquy that there was 
30 
 
 
 
Second, the defendant points to a statement made by trial 
counsel during closing argument in which counsel conceded that 
the jury could convict the defendant of murder as long as they 
"buy one hundred percent the testimony of Michael Garcia . . . 
[and] of Jason McCarthy."  The defendant does not identify, nor 
can we discern, any impropriety or ineffectiveness in trial 
counsel's statement.  Furthermore, the statement is taken out of 
context.  Before counsel made the statement the defendant 
complains of, he spent considerable time explaining why Garcia 
and McCarthy were not credible witnesses. 
 
Third, the defendant takes issue with trial counsel's 
admittedly tactical decision not to challenge the forensic 
evidence, and claims that he was prejudiced by "bloody images" 
shown to the jury.  The admissibility of expert testimony based 
on scientific knowledge is based on the reliability of the 
theory or process underlying the expert's testimony.  
Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 24 (1994).  The admission 
of such evidence is within the discretion of the trial judge.  
Commonwealth v. Camblin, 478 Mass. 469, 475 (2017).  As for the 
                     
no reason to discharge the juror, in an abundance of caution, 
the judge excused her at the defendant's request.  See G. L. 
c. 234A, § 39 ("The court shall have the discretionary authority 
to dismiss a juror at any time in the best interests of 
justice").  At the time he did so, there was no indication that 
the deliberations were at an impasse or were otherwise 
contentious. 
31 
 
 
jury's exposure to photographs of the victim and the crime 
scene, "[t]he weighing of the prejudicial effect and probative 
value of evidence is [also] within the sound discretion of the 
trial judge, the exercise of which we will not overturn unless 
we find palpable error." Commonwealth v. Bonds, 445 Mass. 821, 
831 (2006).  There was no error in the admission or presentation 
of this evidence. 
 
We have considered the defendant's other arguments 
regarding the weight of the evidence and conclude that they are 
similarly without merit.  Further, we have reviewed the entire 
record in accordance with our duties under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
and we conclude that the interests of justice do not require a 
new trial or a reduction of the verdict of murder in the first 
degree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.