Case Title: Alston v. City of Camden

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-34-00

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2001-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Zazzali, J., writing for a majority of the Court. This matter implicates anew the question of whether and under what circumstances the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3, affords immunity to a police officer and his public-entity employer. Defendant Ron Conley, a Camden City police officer, responded to a call that a female was selling drugs in an alley at approximately 2:00 p.m. on July 3, 1993. Conley observed a woman near the location engage in what appeared to be a drug sale with two men. After Conley exited his vehicle and identified himself as a police officer, the woman ran away. Conley pursued her on foot. He testified that as he was running, he felt his gun beginning to dislodge from his holster. Conley tried to grab the gun, but it dropped and hit the ground and discharged. Conley said he heard a commotion behind him, saw plaintiff on the ground moaning and realized he had been shot. Conley discontinued the pursuit, called an ambulance, and tended to plaintiff. Conley emphasized that he was not seeking to draw his gun, but that the weapon merely dislodged from his holster. Conley further testified that the weapon's safety device was on the fire position, instead of the usual non-fire position. He explained that this was because he had drawn his gun earlier in the day during the course of an unrelated police encounter with pit bulls, after which he inadvertently failed to return the safety device to the non-fire position. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Conley, the City of Camden, and the Camden Police Department. The matter was tried to a jury. At the close of trial, the court instructed the jury that under the pursuit immunity provision of the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:5-2b(2), defendants were entitled to immunity during the course of a police pursuit unless the jury determined that Conley's conduct rose to the level of willful misconduct. It defined willful misconduct in part as requiring a knowing violation by an officer of a standing order that would subject the officer to discipline. The jury returned a verdict for defendants. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the pursuit immunity applied only in motor vehicle chases. The Appellate Division held that the doctrine of pursuit immunity does not apply where the negligent conduct of the police officer involves the use and handling of a police firearm. It also held that the good faith immunity does not apply where a police officer's unintentional or negligent discharge of a weapon causes injuries to an innocent third party. The Appellate Division directed that on remand, Conley's liability is to be determined to the same extent as a private person. The Supreme Court granted defendants' petition for certification. HELD: The pursuit immunity and good faith immunity provisions of the Tort Claims Act apply to shield defendants from liability to plaintiff. 1. The pursuit immunity provision, N.J.S.A. 59:5-2, relieves a police officer and the public entity of any liability that would otherwise attach for the officer's negligent conduct in connection with a pursuit. The policy underlying the immunity is that police officers not be impeded in the vigorous enforcement of laws by the threat of civil liability. The Legislature did not intend to limit pursuit immunity to vehicle pursuits, as argued by plaintiff. For pursuit immunity to apply, the negligence simply must be connected to the pursuit in a significant manner. Even if Conley was negligent in failing to ensure that the gun switch was in safety mode before commencing the pursuit, the pursuit substantially contributed to the discharge of the weapon. (Pp. 6-17) 3. Defendants are also entitled to immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:3-3, which provides that a public employee is not liable if he acts in good faith in the execution or enforcement of any law. Good faith immunity has two components. The public employee either must demonstrate objective reasonableness or that he behaved with subjective good faith. Conley's conduct here in the pursuit of a suspect under exigent circumstances was both objectively and subjectively reasonable. Thus, defendants are also insulated from liability by Conley's good faith. (Pp. 21-25) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the judgment of the Law Division is reinstated. JUSTICE LONG, dissenting, is of the view that pursuit immunity does not apply here because the negligent conduct was Conley's holstering of his weapon with the safety off, and there is no logical nexus between that conduct and the later pursuit. In addition, Justice Long notes that the good faith immunity provision applies only where an officer is engaged in the execution or enforcement of the law. She is of the view that Conley's negligent conduct in the handling of his weapon was unrelated to a law enforcement or execution initiative. JUSTICES STEIN, VERNIERO, and LaVECCHIA join in JUSTICE ZAZZALI's opinion. JUSTICE LONG has filed a separate, dissenting opinion, in which CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICE COLEMAN join. ROBERT ALSTON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CITY OF CAMDEN, CAMDEN POLICE DEPARTMENT and OFFICER RON CONLEY, Defendants-Appellants. Argued March 26, 2001 -- Decided June 28, 2001 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 332 N.J. Super. 240 (2000). Terrence L. Lavy, Assistant City Attorney, argued the cause for appellants (John A. Misci, Jr., City Attorney, attorney). Mario A. Iavicoli argued the cause for respondent. The opinion of the Court was delivered by ZAZZALI, J. This matter implicates anew the question of whether and under what circumstances the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3, affords immunity to a police officer and his public-entity employer. Defendant Ron Conley, a Camden City police officer, was pursuing a drug suspect on foot when his firearm discharged, resulting in plaintiff Robert Alston, an innocent bystander, being struck in the hip by a bullet. Plaintiff sued Conley, the City of Camden, and the Camden Police Department. The trial court held that the pursuit immunity and good faith immunity provisions of the Tort Claims Act applied to the circumstances and that defendants could be liable only if they had engaged in willful misconduct. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the Legislature did not intend immunity to apply when the officer's negligent discharge of a firearm causes injury to an innocent third party. We reverse and reinstate the judgment of the Law Division. [Id. at 365.] Those policy concerns support an interpretation of pursuit immunity that immuniz[es] both the employee and the entity for all acts of negligence related to the injuries caused by the escape, whether those of the employee or the entity, and whether independent or not. Ibid. It makes no difference if the injuries caused to third parties in vehicular pursuits are caused by the pursued, as in Tice, or by the pursuer. In Fielder v. Stonack, 141 N.J. 101 (1995), decided two years after Tice, it was the police car that hit a vehicle not involved in the pursuit. This Court rejected a distinction based on whether the car involved in the actual collision is the police car or the escaping vehicle as contrary to tort law concerning automobile negligence because liability ordinarily depends on negligence and causation, not on which cars were involved in the actual collision. Id. at 111. The critical issue was not which vehicle was involved in the collision, but whether the injury was caused by the escaping person. Id. at 112. This Court noted that the policy decision that officers not be impeded in the vigorous enforcement of laws by the threat of civil liability evinces the Legislature's intent that immunity be conferred without regard to which vehicle was actually involved in the collision giving rise to the negligence claim. Id. at 120. As with Tice, policy was the polestar in Fielder: Creating an exception to the general rule of immunity, depending on whether the officer is involved in the accident, would swallow the rule of immunity, deterring the officer not from acting negligently but from pursuing at all, subordinating doing what is right to doing what is most insulated from liability. [Ibid.] In 1997, the Legislature essentially codified Tice and Fielder by amending N.J.S.A. 59:5-2 to provide that, in addition to the immunity under subsection b(2), public employees are immune from liability for any injury resulting from or caused by a law enforcement officer's pursuit of a person. L. 1997, c. 423, 2 (codified at N.J.S.A. 59:5-2c). Immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:5-2b(2) is also available when the injury is caused by something other than the instrument of the pursuit. In Blunt v. Klapproth, 309 N.J. Super. 493 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 387 (1998), the police attempted to apprehend a man with two outstanding summonses who fled away on foot to his apartment. Two civilian crisis intervention specialists, one of whom was the plaintiff, were called to the scene. Id. at 498-99. The plaintiff was shot after one of the police officers and the plaintiff attempted to enter the apartment. Id. at 500. The Appellate Division concluded that immunity was available to the police under Section 5-2b(2) because the plaintiff's injury was caused by a person avoiding apprehension as a result of a police chase. Id. at 503. Blunt thus established that Section 5-2b immunity is potentially available in a case where injuries result from the pursuit of an escaping person even though a vehicle or other instrumentality of pursuit is not involved. Cf. Torres v. City of Perth Amboy, 329 N.J. Super. 404 (App. Div. 2000) (finding no pursuit where speeding vehicle not attempting to flee police). In this appeal, plaintiff contends that the application of Tice and Fielder is circumscribed because those cases considered the pursuit immunity statute strictly in the context of motor vehicle pursuits. Plaintiff maintains that where injury caused by the pursuit results from a gun shooting, rather than a vehicular pursuit, the immunity conferred by section 5-2b(2) has no application. And finally, willful misconduct is a definition which is _ does not include and is above what you might understand to be gross negligence or recklessness. Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that willful misconduct does not include and is above what you might understand to be gross negligence or recklessness. Citing Fielder, supra, 141 N.J. at 124, plaintiff argues that this Court has long recognized that one who acts with the knowledge that injury will likely or probably result from his conduct, and with reckless indifference to the consequences, commits an act of willful misconduct. In Fielder, supra, this Court held that in the context of a police officer's enforcement of the law, including the pursuit of a fleeing vehicle, willful misconduct is ordinarily limited to a knowing violation of a specific command by a superior, or a standing order, that would subject that officer to discipline. 141 N.J. at 125. More particularly, willful misconduct in a police vehicular chase has two elements: 1) disobeying either a specific lawful command of a superior or a specific lawful standing order and 2) knowing of the command or standing order, knowing that it is being violated and, intending to violate it. Id. at 126. This Court was careful to note that it did not presume to define willful misconduct in any context other than police vehicular pursuit under 5-2b(2). Id. at 125. That is because [l]ike many legal characterizations, willful misconduct is not immutably defined but takes its meaning from the context and purpose of its use. Id. at 124. This Court did note, however, that [p]rior decisions have suggested that willful misconduct is the equivalent of reckless disregard for safety. Ibid. It is more than an absence of 'good faith.' Ibid. (quoting Marley v. Borough of Palmyra, 193 N.J. Super. 271, 294-95 (Law Div. 1983)). We conclude that the trial court's instruction that willful misconduct required something between simple negligence and the intentional infliction of harm was not improper. It is clear that willful misconduct requires much more than mere negligence. Fielder, supra, 141 N.J. at 124. It also is clear that willful misconduct will fall somewhere on the continuum between simple negligence and the intentional infliction of harm. Id. at 123 (citing Foldi v. Jeffries, 93 N.J. 533, 549 (1983)). What is not clear, however, is where on the scale willful misconduct should fall in a case such as this. In Fielder, supra, this Court noted that [p]rior decisions have suggested that willful misconduct is the equivalent of reckless disregard for safety. 141 N.J. at 124 (citing McLaughlin v. Rova Farms, Inc., 56 N.J. 288, 305 (1970)). However, McLaughlin also may be interpreted to suggest that reckless applies only to the indifference to the consequences aspect of its holding: [I]n order to recover for injuries allegedly produced by willful and wanton misconduct, it must appear that the defendant with knowledge of existing conditions, and conscious from such knowledge that injury will likely or probably result from his conduct, and with reckless indifference to the consequences, consciously and intentionally does some wrongful act or omits to discharge some duty which produces the injurious result. [McLaughlin, supra, 56 N.J. at 305.] Based on the language in McLaughlin, supra, the trial court's instructions are not erroneous. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 34 September Term 2000 ROBERT ALSTON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CITY OF CAMDEN, CAMDEN POLICE DEPARTMENT and OFFICER RON CONLEY, Defendants-Appellants. _____________________________ LONG, J., dissenting My difference with the majority is a fundamental one arising from its failure to differentiate between the two distinct types of conduct presented in this case: Officer Conley's volitional choice to begin his shift by improperly holstering a weapon with the safety off and his later pursuit of a person engaged in criminal conduct. Unlike a public entity, liability of a public employee is the rule rather than the exception. N.J.S.A. 59:3- 1a. By blurring the line between the two types of conduct, the majority has swept under the blanket of pursuit immunity, N.J.S.A. 59:5-2b(2), acts the Legislature never intended to insulate from liability. This case is no different from one in which an officer chooses to begin his shift in a vehicle that he knows has bald tires and no brakes. Under those circumstances, his later victimization of an innocent third party during the pursuit of a felon is surely not within the contemplation of N.J.S.A. 59:5-2b(2). The issue is not whether guns are intrinsically different for immunity purposes. They are not. See Blunt v. Klapproth, 309 N.J. Super. 493, 503 (App. Div.) (finding pursuit immunity applicable where third party is shot and injured by person avoiding apprehension), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 387 (1998). An officer's use of a gun during a legitimate pursuit is insulated from liability by N.J.S.A. 59:5-2b(2) in the absence of willful misconduct. Tice v. Cramer, 133 N.J. 347, 356 (1993). What is not immunized from liability by the happenstance of a pursuit, is an earlier decision to begin a shift with an improperly holstered gun with the safety off. There is no logical nexus between that conduct and the later pursuit. The injury caused by Officer Conley could just as easily have occurred while exiting his vehicle during his shift or entering a restaurant for lunch. To insulate such conduct from liability to an innocent victim by invoking pursuit immunity violates the letter and spirit of that provision. Moreover, as a matter of policy, allowing the application of pursuit immunity here will not advance the Legislature's desire that police vigorously enforce the law without fear of liability. This case does not implicate an officer's split second decision to engage in pursuit. What is at stake is whether the officer was at fault in his earlier handling of his firearm. Although there can be no argument but that Conley's conduct was the cause of Alston's injuries, that conduct was unrelated to the pursuit. In Fielder v. Stonack, 141 N.J. 101, 123 (1995), we held that [w]hether the negligent conduct involves the initiation, continuation, or conduct of the pursuit makes no difference: it is immune. Conley's wrongful conduct long preceded the initiation, continuation and conduct of the pursuit, and thus falls outside the immunity provided in N.J.S.A. 59:5-2b(2). The majority's opinion overreads the protection of the statute in a way that insulates from liability conduct that is unrelated to a pursuit. That is unfair to innocent third parties. Thus, I would affirm the Appellate Division's conclusion that pursuit immunity is inapplicable in this case. Regarding the alternative of good faith immunity, I agree with the majority that N.J.S.A. 59:3-3, as a theoretical matter, applies to a police officer engaged in a pursuit. Fielder, supra, 141 N.J. at 130-33. The reason for its applicability is obvious: he or she is acting in the execution or enforcement of any law. N.J.S.A. 59:3-3. However, because I continue to distinguish, as a matter of law and fact, Officer Conley's earlier improper handling of his gun from the pursuit, I believe that any good faith analysis would have to focus on that earlier conduct. The problem presented is that N.J.S.A. 59:3-3 only applies where acts are actually done in execution or enforcement of the law. Harry A. Margolis & Robert Novack, Claims Against Public Entities, Comment to N.J.S.A. 59:3-3, (Gann 2001); Bombace v. City of Newark, 125 N.J. 361, 367 (1991). Officer Conley's negligent conduct in the handling of his weapon earlier in his shift was preliminary behavior unrelated to a law enforcement or execution initiative. The immunity conferred by N.J.S.A. 59:3-3 is limited, and its dimensions are narrower than the scope of a police officer's employment or the performance of his official duties and functions. Not every act or omission by a police officer while on duty is immunized by N.J.S.A. 59:3-3. Instead, a police officer is granted immunity only when he is negligent while actually engaged in the enforcement or execution of a law. Generally, the determination of whether an officer is executing or enforcing a law is a question that must be determined by the trier of fact in light of the circumstances. However, the issue may be decided as a matter of law where the evidence is either undisputed or susceptible of only one possible interpretation. That is the case here. Officer Conley's mishandling of his weapon at an earlier point in his shift is simply not the kind of act in the execution or enforcement of any law that the Legislature meant to insulate in N.J.S.A. 59:3-3 in contravention of the general rule regarding the liability of public employees. I would thus affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division and reverse and remand the case for trial at which neither pursuit immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:5-2b(2) nor good faith immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:3-3 may be invoked by defendants. Chief Justice Poritz and Justice Coleman join in this opinion. NO. A-34 ROBERT ALSTON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CITY OF CAMDEN, CAMDEN POLICE DEPARTMENT and OFFICER RON CONLEY, Defendants-Appellants. DECIDED June 28, 2001 Chief Justice Poritz