Case Title: Connie G. Powell v. Arlene M. Cooper

Citation: 2001 WI 10

Docket Number: 1998AP000012

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-02-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 10 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-0012 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Connie G. Powell,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Arlene M. Cooper and Calvin Stoudt,  
 
Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  230 Wis. 2d 185, 603 N.W.2d 748 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
February 16, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
September 6, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Paul B. Higginbotham 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-appellants-petitioners the 
cause was argued by Mary Batt, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by 
John E. Joyce, Menomonie, and oral argument by John E. Joyce. 
 
2001 WI 10 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-0012 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Connie G. Powell, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Arlene M. Cooper and Calvin Stoudt, 
 
 
Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part and cause remanded to the circuit court. 
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Dr. Arlene M. Cooper and Dr. Calvin 
Stoudt (Drs. Cooper and Stoudt), faculty at the University of 
Wisconsin-Stout, seek review of an unpublished decision of the 
court of appeals,1 affirming in part an order of the Circuit 
Court for Dane County, Paul B. Higginbotham, Judge.  The court 
of appeals held that Drs. Cooper and Stoudt were not entitled to 
dismissal of a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 19832 by Connie 
                     
1 Powell v. Cooper, No. 98-0012, 1999 WL 516756, 1999 Wisc. 
App. LEXIS 794 (Wis. Ct. App. July 22, 1999).   
2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in part:   
 
FILED 
 
FEB 16, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-0012 
 
 
2 
Powell (Powell).  Powell, who had been a graduate student at the 
Stout campus, alleged that actions taken by Drs. Cooper and 
Stoudt had deprived her of an interest protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  Drs. Cooper and Stoudt argue that Powell has not 
set forth a legally sufficient complaint alleging a deprivation 
of a constitutionally protected interest.  Alternatively, Drs. 
Cooper and Stoudt contended that they are entitled to qualified 
immunity.   
¶2 
In this review we reach two issues.  First, the court 
is evenly divided upon the question of whether Powell's 
complaint alleged the violation of a clearly established 
constitutionally protected property right such that defendants 
are not entitled to qualified immunity.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the court of appeals' conclusion that Drs. Cooper and Stoudt are 
not entitled to qualified immunity from Powell's § 1983 claim 
based upon a deprivation of a property interest in continuing a 
course of study.   
¶3 
Second, the court unanimously reverses the court of 
appeals' conclusion that Powell's complaint states a claim 
                                                                  
Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 
or Territory or District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other property proceeding for 
redress. . . .  
 
No. 
98-0012 
 
 
3 
asserting a liberty interest in refusing to unnecessarily 
disclose her mental health history.  In her complaint, Powell 
did not assert a claim based upon a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest.  Accordingly, we conclude that Powell waived 
an assertion of such a claim.   
¶4 
In addition to these two issues, we also address a 
procedural question relating to interlocutory appeal from a 
circuit court order denying a state official's claim of 
qualified immunity in a § 1983 action.  The court of appeals 
concluded that although it is required to grant such a petition 
when it is initiated in a timely manner following a motion for 
summary judgment, the court may, in its discretion, grant such 
petitions after a motion to dismiss.  Powell v. Cooper, No. 98-
0012, unpublished slip op. at 16 n.5 (Wis. Ct. App. July 22, 
1999).  We agree.  When a petition for interlocutory review is 
filed prior to the litigation reaching the summary judgment 
stage, the court of appeals may exercise its discretion in 
determining whether to grant review of the qualified immunity 
issue. 
I 
¶5 
On motion to dismiss, and for purposes of qualified 
immunity analysis, the facts set forth in the pleadings are 
accepted as true.  Penterman v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 211 
Wis. 2d 458, 463, 565 N.W.2d 521 (1997).  In her amended 
complaint, Powell asserts that in 1987 she matriculated into the 
graduate student program in guidance and counseling at the 
University of Wisconsin – Stout.  Powell told her academic 
No. 
98-0012 
 
 
4 
advisor, Dr. David Cook, that she suffered from a manic-
depressive disorder.  Dr. Cook advised Powell that her condition 
would not affect completing the program. 
¶6 
Powell fulfilled all the requirements to obtain her 
degree, except for completing a practicum and master's thesis.  
In December 1990 Powell spoke to Dr. Cooper about scheduling the 
practicum for the spring of 1991.  Powell informed Dr. Cooper of 
her 
manic-depressive 
disorder. 
 
Subsequently, 
Dr. 
Cooper 
declined to schedule Powell into the practicum program.   
¶7 
In January 1991 Powell met with Drs. Cooper and 
Stoudt.  At the meeting, Powell was informed that she would be 
permitted to undertake the practicum if she agreed to disclose 
her manic-depressive condition to the site supervisor.  Powell 
refused to make this disclosure.  As a result, she was not 
allowed to undertake the practicum and could not complete her 
course of study. 
¶8 
In January 1997 Powell filed suit against Drs. Cooper 
and Stoudt.  Powell asserted that the actions by Drs. Cooper and 
Stoudt had deprived her of an interest protected by both the 
procedural and substantive aspects of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The 
defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied by the 
circuit court.  The circuit court concluded that Drs. Cooper and 
Stoudt were not entitled to qualified immunity because in 
January 1991 the law was clearly established that Powell had a 
constitutionally protected property interest in continuing her 
graduate school program, which could not be denied without a 
No. 
98-0012 
 
 
5 
hearing.  In addition, the circuit court held that the actions 
by Drs. Cooper and Stoudt were arbitrary and capricious.   
¶9 
Subsequently, Drs. Cooper and Stoudt petitioned for 
interlocutory review.  The court of appeals granted the petition 
and affirmed the circuit court.  Drs. Cooper and Stoudt then 
petitioned this court to review the decision of the court of 
appeals, which was granted. 
II 
¶10 We begin by determining whether the court of appeals 
properly concluded that Powell had filed a complaint alleging a 
deprivation of both a constitutionally protected property and 
liberty interest.  Whether a complaint states a claim upon which 
relief can be granted is a question of law, which this court 
reviews without deference to lower courts.  Weber v. City of 
Cedarburg, 129 Wis. 2d 57, 64, 384 N.W.2d 333 (1986).  The court 
of appeals also concluded that Drs. Cooper and Stoudt were not 
entitled to qualified immunity.  Application of the doctrine of 
qualified immunity is also a question of law, which we decide 
independently.  Arneson v. Jezwinski, 225 Wis. 2d 371, 592 
N.W.2d 606 (1999).   
III 
¶11 The Fourteenth Amendment protects certain liberty and 
property interests.  In this case, the court of appeals 
determined that Powell's amended complaint alleged a clearly 
established property interest in continuing the course of study 
she had begun at the university.  Powell v. Cooper, No. 98-0012, 
unpublished slip op. at 9 (Wis. Ct. App. July 22, 1999).  In 
No. 
98-0012 
 
 
6 
addition, the court of appeals held that Powell had claimed a 
liberty interest, which it identified as a privacy right in 
avoiding unnecessary disclosure of her mental health history.  
Id. at 10.  The court of appeals concluded that Drs. Cooper and 
Stoudt were not entitled to qualified immunity because Powell's 
due process claims were grounded on clearly established property 
and liberty interests.  Id. at 19. 
¶12 We consider first Powell's assertion that she has a 
property interest in continuing her course of study begun at the 
university.  Drs. Cooper and Stoudt contend that there is no 
such constitutionally protected property right and, as a result, 
there can be no due process violation.  This court is equally 
divided on the question of whether Drs. Cooper and Stoudt are 
entitled to qualified immunity on this issue.  Justices Ann 
Walsh Bradley, N. Patrick Crooks and David T. Prosser would 
affirm the court of appeals' conclusion that such a property 
right existed at the time in question, was clearly established, 
and accordingly the defendants were not entitled to qualified 
immunity.  Justices William A. Bablitch, Jon P. Wilcox, and 
Diane S. Sykes would reverse, concluding that even assuming such 
property right existed at the time, it was not well established 
and therefore, the defendants were entitled to qualified 
immunity.  Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals 
concluding that there is a constitutionally protected property 
right in continuing her course of study, and that the defendants 
were not entitled to qualified immunity on that issue, is 
affirmed. 
No. 
98-0012 
 
 
7 
¶13 We turn next to consider the conclusion by the court 
of 
appeals 
that 
Powell 
sufficiently 
alleged 
a 
clearly 
established liberty interest in not unnecessarily disclosing her 
mental health history.  On this issue, we unanimously reverse.   
¶14 It is well established that pleadings are to be 
liberally construed.  Morgan v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 87 
Wis. 2d 723, 731, 275 N.W.2d 660 (1979).  A claim should not be 
dismissed unless it appears to a certainty that no relief can be 
granted under any set of facts that a plaintiff can prove in 
support of his or her allegations. Id.  The court of appeals 
construed Powell's complaint as asserting a liberty interest.  
However, Powell's complaint does not set forth any statement 
concerning a liberty interest, and at oral argument before this 
court, counsel for Powell stated that she did not plead a 
liberty interest.  Under these circumstances, we concluded that 
the court of appeals' finding of a clearly established liberty 
interest in refusing to unnecessarily disclose her mental health 
history must be reversed. 
¶15 Finally, the decision of the court of appeals presents 
an opportunity for this court to clarify the circumstances under 
which the court of appeals is required to grant a petition for 
interlocutory appeal from a circuit court order denying a state 
official's claim of qualified immunity in a § 1983 action.  The 
court of appeals concluded that under Arneson v. Jezwinski, 206 
Wis. 2d 217, 556 N.W.2d 721 (1996) (hereinafter Arneson I), as 
clarified in Penterman, that it is required to grant a petition 
for interlocutory review of a denial of qualified immunity when 
No. 
98-0012 
 
 
8 
it follows a summary judgment motion; however, on motion to 
dismiss the court may, in its discretion, grant such an appeal 
if it determines that review of the qualified immunity issue is 
not premature.  We agree. 
¶16 In Arneson I, we directed the court of appeals to 
grant every petition for interlocutory appeal from a circuit 
court order denying a state official's claim of qualified 
immunity in a § 1983 action "so long as the circuit court order 
is based on an issue of law, such as whether the federal right 
allegedly violated was clearly established at the time the 
action was taken . . . ."  Arneson I, 206 Wis. 2d at 220.  When 
qualified immunity is raised as an affirmative defense, the 
plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating by closely analogous 
case law that the defendant violated a clearly established 
constitutional right.  Penterman, 211 Wis. 2d at 469.  The 
question presented in such a case "is whether a reasonable state 
official could have believed his or her act was constitutional 
'in light of clearly established law and the information [he or 
she] 
possessed' 
at 
the 
time 
of 
the 
official's 
action."  
Penterman, 211 Wis. 2d at 470 (quoting Burkes v. Klauser, 185 
Wis. 2d 308, 326, 517 N.W.2d 503 (1994)).  This inquiry is fact 
specific and "focuses on the circumstances with which the 
official is confronted."  Id. at 471-72.   
¶17 For the reasons set forth in Arneson I, we continue to 
conclude, pursuant to the this court's superintending power over 
lower state courts in article VI, section 3 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, that the court of appeals should grant these 
No. 
98-0012 
 
 
9 
petitions when they arise from a summary judgment order that 
turns on an issue of law and denies a claim of qualified 
immunity.  However, when the interlocutory appeal arises on 
motion to dismiss, the court of appeals should exercise its 
sound discretion in determining whether or not to grant the 
petition.  In a given case the facts and circumstances 
confronting the state official may not be sufficiently developed 
on motion to dismiss for the reviewing court to reach any other 
conclusion than to affirm the circuit court's denial of a 
qualified immunity claim.   
¶18 The primary benefit of qualified immunity is immunity 
from suit.  Arneson I, 206 Wis. 2d at 226.  This benefit is lost 
if a case erroneously proceeds to trial.  However in the proper 
case, and under the sound discretion of the court of appeals, 
allowing the action to proceed from motion to dismiss to the 
summary judgment stage will continue to provide officials with 
the benefit of this affirmative defense.   
¶19 We conclude, therefore, that an interlocutory appeal 
from a circuit court's denial of qualified immunity shall be 
granted when it arises on motion for summary judgment, and is 
discretionary under the criteria set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.03(2) (1997-98) when it arises from a motion to dismiss. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause remanded to 
the circuit court. 
¶20 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J., did not participate. 
 
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No. 
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