Case Title: State v. Ives

Citation: 162 Vt. 131, 648 A.2d 129

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1994-05-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE_V_IVES.91-571; 162 Vt. 131; 648 A.2d 129

[Opinion Filed May 27, 1994]


 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 91-571


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 1, Windsor Circuit

 Bruce Ives                                   November Term, 1992


 David T. Suntag, J. (suppression hearing & competency hearing)

 Paul F. Hudson, J. (trial)

 M. Patricia Zimmerman, Windsor County State's Attorney, White River
   Junction, for plaintiff-appellee

 Charles Martin and Edward Wayland, Law Clerk, of Martin & Paolini, Barre,
   for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      ALLEN, C.J.   Defendant appeals his conviction for sexual assault, 13
 V.S.A. { 3252(a)(1), alleging three errors.  First, defendant contends that
 the trial court erred in holding that he was capable, notwithstanding his
 low IQ, of a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.  Second,
 defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motions for an
 additional competency hearing, a psychological evaluation and a continuance.
 Finally, defendant alleges that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay
 evidence as excited utterances.  We affirm.
      On January 12, 1990, the victim was sexually assaulted and identified
 defendant, a person known to her, as her assailant.  The victim identified

 

 defendant to her father over the telephone, to the examining physician at
 the hospital, to the trooper who met her at the hospital, and, finally, to
 the detective who also came to the emergency room.  The victim later
 identified defendant in a photographic lineup.  Defendant was arrested and
 taken into custody.  After explaining the Miranda rights to defendant and
 obtaining a waiver, a detective interviewed him.  During this interview,
 defendant did not confess to the assault but admitted being in the victim's
 store on the day of the assault.
      Defendant moved to suppress his statements, arguing that he could not
 have knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights because he
 exhibited difficulty understanding the Miranda warnings.  This motion was
 denied.  Subsequently, it was discovered that defendant had a full scale IQ
 of 72, indicating he is borderline to being retarded.  Defendant renewed his
 motion to suppress, and the trial court again denied the motion.
      The trial court did, however, order a psychiatric evaluation and
 competency hearing, after which the court determined that defendant was
 competent to stand trial.  Nearly five months later, on July 17, 1991,
 defense counsel moved for a continuance and an psychological evaluation of
 defendant's competence to stand trial.  The court held a hearing on the
 motions the following day.  Regarding the motion for a second competency
 evaluation, the court noted that Dr. Theodore Robbins, who performed the
 first competency evaluation, had examined defendant three days before on
 July 15.  Dr. Robbins had communicated to the court that he still believed
 defendant was competent to stand trial, and the court agreed.  The court
 denied both motions without taking evidence.  Defendant was subsequently
 tried and convicted.

 

                                     I.
      Defendant moved twice, unsuccessfully, to suppress his statements to
 police, alleging that he had not knowingly and intelligently waived his
 rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel.  Because he was
 given the required Miranda warnings before interrogation ensued, a valid
 waiver depends on two findings.

           First, the relinquishment of the right must have been
           voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free
           and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coer-
           cion, or deception.  Second, the waiver must have been
           made with a full awareness of both the nature of the
           right being abandoned and the consequences of the
           decision to abandon it.  Only if the "totality of the
           circumstances surrounding the interrogation" reveals
           both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of
           comprehension may a court properly conclude that the
           Miranda rights have been waived.

 Moran v. Burbine,