Case Title: State v. Platt

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1992-02-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 91-357


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

 David A. Platt, Jr.                          February Term, 1992


 Robert Grussing III, J.

 Dan M. Davis, Windham County State's Attorney, Karen R. Carroll, Deputy
   State's Attorney, and Diane L. Shapiro, Legal Intern, Brattleboro, for
   plaintiff-appellee

 David G. Reid, Brattleboro, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.   Defendant, who is HIV positive, pled no contest to a
 charge of accessory after the fact to a felony, and the district court
 sentenced him to a three-to-five-year prison term.  He appeals the court's
 denial, after hearing, of his motion for sentence reconsideration.  His
 principal argument is that promises of medical treatment which induced his
 plea have not been kept.  He also argues that the court allowed evidence of
 and considered charges not brought against him in determining his sentence,
 that he was compelled to testify at the sentence reconsideration hearing in
 violation of his constitutional rights, and that he was improperly denied
 credit for time spent under conditions of release prior to his sentencing
 and incarceration.  We affirm.
      In December 1985, Christopher Fauber was murdered by a blow to the back
 of his head with a blunt instrument.  His body was wrapped in plastic and
 taken to New Hampshire, where it was dumped over the bank of a highway rest
 area.  Defendant was charged with the murder, and he pled not guilty.
 Later, in part because of weaknesses in its case against defendant, the
 State agreed to reduce the charge to accessory after the fact to the murder.
 In return, defendant agreed to plead guilty to that charge.  The amended
 information read:
         . . . [defendant] was a person not standing in relation
         . . . to an offender, to wit; Michael Guerrera, who,
         after the commission of a felony, to wit; murder,
         assisted such offender, to wit; helped in the trans-
         portation and concealment of the victim's body with
         intent that Guerrera avoid arrest or punishment there-
         fore . . . .
 The maximum penalty for acting as an accessory after the fact to a felony is
 seven years in prison or a $1,000 fine, or both.  13 V.S.A. { 5.
      On September 5, 1990, counsel for both parties appeared before the
 court and explained the terms of the plea agreement.  Counsel for defendant
 expressed his client's concern about the medical treatment that defendant
 would receive while incarcerated if he was sentenced to prison.  Defendant
 specifically sought the court's assurances with respect to the availability
 of certain medications and a special dietary program, and that he be
 provided with out-of-state transportation for respiratory therapy.  The
 court agreed to inquire of the Department of Corrections (DOC) whether
 defendant's concerns could be met, and expressed its willingness to
 incorporate the substance of the needs expressed by defendant in an order to
 DOC.  The court stated:

           They [the DOC] are hard and fast in maintaining their
           prerogative as to services and programming of inmates
           that a judge can't tell them what to do, in very plain
           English.  So I, one, can assure you that I would make
           every effort to make such a proper order and, two, would
           try to at least get a weather report from Corrections as
           to whether this would be in the realm of possibility.
           And I suspect that's the best I will be able to get
           from them.

 After speaking with a DOC official, the court indicated that, in principle,
 DOC objected only to transporting defendant out of state for treatment.  The
 court agreed to order the Department to do a medical staffing in consulta-
 tion with defendant's doctors and to issue a case plan before sentencing.
 The court further promised defendant that it would not impose a sentence
 greater than the four-to-seven-year term recommended by the State.
 Defendant then pled no contest to the charge contained in the amended
 information.  A sentencing hearing was held November 15-16, 1990, and the
 court sentenced defendant to a term of three-to-five years in prison.  He
 was incarcerated the following month.  In February, 1991, defendant filed a
 motion for review of his sentence under 13 V.S.A. { 7042(a) and V.R.Cr.P.
 35.  After hearings in May 1991, the court denied the motion.
      Before we address defendant's specific claims, we must emphasize that
 only certain issues may be raised in a sentence reconsideration proceeding.
 Sentence reconsideration can be used to correct an illegal sentence or one
 "imposed in an illegal manner."  V.R.Cr.P. 35(a); see State v. Davis, 155
 Vt. 417, 418, 584 A.2d 1146, 1147 (1990).  More often it is used to modify a
 lawful sentence.  V.R.Cr.P. 35(b),(c).  We recently said:
           "The purpose of sentence reconsideration is to allow a
           second look at the sentencing decision absent the heat
           of trial pressures and in calm reflection to determine
           that it is correct, fair, and serves the ends of
           justice.  [13 V.S.A. { 7042(a)] allows modification of a
           sentence which, upon reflection and in the presence of
           unchanged circumstances, might be shown to be unwise or
           unjust.  In making these determinations, the trial court
           has wide discretion to consider such factors as it
           believes are relevant."

 State v. Hance, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 596 A.2d 365, 367 (1991) (quoting State v.
 Dean, 148 Vt. 510, 513,