Case Title: State ex rel. Young v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 1997-Ohio-162

Docket Number: 19950727

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-09-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE EX REL. YOUNG, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, 
APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Young v. Indus. Comm. (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 484.] 
Workers’ compensation — Industrial Commission does not abuse its discretion in 
denying claimant’s application for permanent total disability compensation, 
when. 
(No. 95-727 — Submitted August 26, 1997 — Decided September 24, 1997.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 94APD03-341. 
 
Appellant-claimant, Colleen J. Young, injured her low back in the course of 
and arising from her employment with the Franklin County Board of Mental 
Retardation and Developmental Disabilities.  Claimant’s workers’ compensation 
claim was allowed, and she eventually moved appellee Industrial Commission of 
Ohio for permanent total disability compensation. 
 
Among the evidence before the commission was the report of Dr. Kottil W. 
Rammohan.  He concluded: 
 
“Claimant is now 51 yrs. of age and sustained a back injury at 47 yrs. of age.  
This resulted in aggravation of a pre-existing back problem that resulted in 
radiculopathy [a]ffecting L4-5 areas requiring surgery.  The results after surgery 
have been disappointing and has [sic] been complicated by the discovery of 
carcinoma of the breast with metastasis.  Additional implications are related to the 
presence of underlying diabetes melitus [sic] requiring insulin.  She has 
retinopathy and neuropathy.  Examination identified significant discomfort and 
limitations of movement of the back. 
 
“Opinion:  Based on the findings of [sic] the history and my evaluation[,] as 
well as the review of her file, it is my opinion that this claimant has achieved 
maximum medical improvement of her injury to the back.  She suffers from an L4-
 
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5 radiculopathy by history and the limitations of motion identified at this 
examination are compatible with this injury.  Formal muscle testing was precluded 
by pain and discomfort.  The impairment is a direct consequence of the injury 
sustained by her on 5/12/89.  According to the guide to the evaluation of 
permanent impairment, revised third edition, from the AMA, I would consider her 
to have a type 2-B impairment of the back, constituting a 10% impairment of the 
whole person. * * * Additionally, it is appropriate to give her a 30% impairment 
for pain.  Using the combined values chart[,] this would give her a total 
impairment of 37% of the person as a whole.  Regarding the contusion of the back 
of the head and neck[,] I would consider her to have 0% impairment.  On the basis 
of the pain and limitations, I would consider her unsuitable for her previous 
occupation.  But she would be able to perform sedentary type of occupation 
requiring a maximum lifting of 10 lbs. and frequent lifting of less than 10 lbs.  In 
an 8 hr. day her standing and walking should be restricted to no more than 2 hrs.  
Bending, stooping, kneeling and crawling should be restricted.  Upper extremity 
functions are completely unrestricted. 
 
“Although from the physical limitations standpoint she would be capable of 
performing sedentary type[s] of occupation, factors other than the allowed 
conditions would influence her ability to work.  Specifically, I’m addressing the 
issue of cancer with metastasis and severe diabetes.  These would render her 
unsuitable for any occupation.” 
 
The commission denied permanent total disability compensation, writing: 
 
“* * * This order is based particularly upon the reports [sic] of Dr. 
Rammohan. 
 
“Claimant is 52 years of age.  She has a high school education and attended 
Columbus Technical Institute [f]or certification as a mental health technician.  
 
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Claimant’s past work experience is as a trainer of adult mentally retarded 
individuals, at which position she sustained her injury; as a hospital aide, and as a 
restaurant worker. 
 
“Claimant was injured when she fell on a wet floor while training 
individuals.  Claimant underwent a laminectomy at L4-5 in 1989.  On 5/4/93, 
claimant was examined by Dr. Kottil W. Rammohan, M.D., Orthopedist, at the 
Industrial Commission’s request.  Dr. Rammohan confined his examination to the 
condition allowed in claimant’s industrial injury.  Dr. Rammohan finds that 
claimant has a 37% impairment of the body as a result of his [sic] industrial injury 
and when only the allowed conditions are considered, claimant is capable of 
sedentary form[s] of employment, with standing and working restrictions to two 
hours per eight hour day, and bending, stooping, kneeling and crawling restricted.  
Claimant has full use of her upper extremities.  Dr. Rammohan goes on to state 
that claimant’s unrelated conditions of breast cancer with metastasis and severe 
diabetes are quite disabling, and as a result of these unrelated conditions, she is 
unsuitable for any occupation. 
 
“Claimant’s age of 52 years, her demonstrated academic proficiency and her 
past work experience all suggest that she has the ability to retrain for other typed 
[sic] of employment within the physical capacities enumerated by Dr. Rammohan.  
Claimant’s inability to work is not related to the allowed conditions.  For these 
reasons[,] claimant’s application must be denied.” 
 
Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in denying 
permanent total disability compensation.  The court of appeals disagreed and 
denied the writ. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
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__________________ 
 
Samuels & Northrop Co., L.P.A., and Joseph M. Reidy, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Yolanda V. Vorys, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  We are once again asked to determine whether the 
commission abused its discretion in denying claimant’s application for permanent 
total disability compensation.  For the reasons to follow, we find that the 
commission did not abuse its discretion and affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
 
Claimant initially asserts that there is no evidence supporting the 
commission’s conclusion that claimant is medically capable of sedentary work.  
She argues that Dr. Rammohan’s report is so internally inconsistent as to require 
its disqualification under State ex rel. Lopez v. Indus. Comm. (1994), 69 Ohio 
St.3d 445, 633 N.E.2d 528.  We disagree. 
 
Claimant initially suggests that Dr. Rammohan’s findings dictate a higher 
impairment percentage than the thirty-seven percent impairment he assessed.  
Claimant’s assertion, however, would require us to second-guess the medical 
expertise of Dr. Rammohan, which we decline to do. 
 
Claimant’s reliance on Lopez is also misplaced.  In Lopez, we determined 
that the commission could not reasonably rely on a physician’s report that, despite 
a fifty percent impairment rating, found the claimant capable of heavy foundry 
labor.  The present situation is not analogous.  Rather than a high degree of 
impairment, the present claimant’s impairment is more moderate at thirty-seven 
percent.  The present claimant, moreover, was not released to heavy employment, 
 
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which would arguably be inconsistent with her level of impairment.  Instead, she 
was limited to sedentary work.  No comparable inconsistency, therefore, exists. 
 
Claimant also alleges inconsistencies in Dr. Rammohan’s discussion of 
claimant’s cancer and in his assessment of capability for sedentary employment 
despite claimant’s use of a wheelchair.  As to the former, we find any alleged 
inconsistencies to be irrelevant to the central question before us — whether 
claimant’s allowed conditions prevent sustained remunerative employment.  As to 
the latter, we do not find sedentary employment to be irreconcilable with 
claimant’s occasional use of a wheelchair. 
 
We find that Dr. Rammohan’s report is evidence supporting the 
commission’s conclusion that claimant can do sedentary work.  Our analysis, 
therefore, turns to claimant’s second proposition of law — that the commission’s 
nonmedical analysis does not satisfy State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 57 
Ohio St.3d 203, 567 N.E.2d 245.  We find this argument to be unpersuasive as 
well. 
 
The commission did not abuse its discretion in finding that claimant’s age, 
education and work experience made her amenable to retraining or re-
employment.  State ex rel. Ellis v. McGraw Edison Co. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 92, 
609 N.E.2d 164.  While it would have been preferable for the commission to have 
discussed how claimant’s work history contributed to its conclusion, this 
deficiency does not compel vacation of the order, given the sufficiency of 
claimant’s other cited nonmedical factors to explain the commission’s conclusion.  
Thus, the commission’s analysis, while brief, meets Noll’s minimum criteria. 
 
The judgment of the court of appeals is accordingly affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
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MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
JJ., concur. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., dissents and would reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals.