Case Title: ACandS, Inc. v. Asner

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92d/95

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1996-10-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
NO. 92
SEPTEMBER TERM, 1995
___________________________________
ACandS, INC. et al.
V.
  IDA SARA MASKET ASNER 
                et al.
___________________________________
     Murphy, C.J. 
     Eldridge
     Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker,
    
JJ.
___________________________________
DISSENTING OPINION BY BELL, J.
___________________________________
        FILED:  October 11, 1996
The Court of Special Appeals, per Bishop, J., issued a
comprehensive, well-reasoned opinion in this case.  I agree both
with its analysis and its conclusions. Accordingly, I would affirm
the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
In reversing and remanding for a new trial on compensatory
liability, the majority rejects two of the intermediate appellate
court's conclusions, namely that the evidence relating to TLVs
offered by the petitioners was properly excluded and that the
evidence offered in support of punitive damages was sufficient
under the test enunciated in Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325
Md. 420, 462, 601 A.2d 633, 653-54, reh'g denied, 325 Md. 665, 602
A.2d 1182 (1992).  In neither instance is the rejection justified.
The intermediate appellate court pointed out that the
respondents did not rely, as the majority seems to insist had to be
done, on the state of the art evidence to prove the extent of the
petitioners' knowledge or what they should have known.  Instead,
they proved the petitioners' actual knowledge-- that the
petitioners were aware of the dangers of asbestos.  Consequently,
pointing out that "[i]t is not mandatory ... that knowledge, or
lack thereof, be established with state of the art evidence,"
ACandS v. Asner, 104 Md. App. 608, 638, 657 A.2d 379, 394_(1995),
citing and quoting Zenobia, 325 Md. at 433, 601 A.2d at 639,  the
court concluded, appropriately, I believe,  
once a defendant's actual knowledge is shown, state of
the art evidence is not necessary to show what the
defendant "should have known" or "could have known."  The
"should have known" component can make the heavy burden
2
     In stating the petitioner ACandS's position, the court
1
quoted from U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,
336 Md. 145, 188-89, 647 A.2d 405, 427 (1994), as follows:
"Evidence of a generalized knowledge that asbestos
poses a danger to a narrow class of unprotected persons
who are exposed during the application or removal of
asbestos-containing materials in buildings will not,
under the strict requirements for a submissible
punitive damages case, support an inference that
[defendants] had knowledge of a danger to the much
broader class of persons who were merely present in
such buildings at other times[.]"
(quoting Kansas City v. Keene Corp., 855 S.W.2d 360, 375
(Mo.1993) (en banc)).
placed on a plaintiff in a strict liability failure to
warn case less onerous.  If a plaintiff is successful,
however, in proving actual knowledge, it is axiomatic
that the plaintiff need not prove what the defendant
"should have known."
Id. at 639, 657 A.2d at 394.
The Court of Special Appeals was also correct in holding that
the punitive damages evidence was sufficient.  The contrary
argument proceeds on the premise that the petitioner ACandS did not
have actual knowledge because, even though they were exposed to the
same conditions at the same location, the respondents were "by-
standers," rather than insulators.  Rejecting that argument, the
intermediate appellate court reasoned:
In [U. S. Gypsum Co. v. Mayor & City
Council of Baltimore, 336 Md. 145, 188-89, 647
A.2d 405, 427 (1994)] ... the injured class of
persons, to which the Court referred in the
above quotation ], were ordinary building
[1
users exposed to an asbestos product after it
had already been installed in the building. 
The evidence actually introduced in Gypsum
3
     The majority finds admissible one of the three purchase
2
requisitions, from the Fairfield Shipyard directly to Johns
Mansville, that the petitioner Porter Hayden Company, Inc.
offered to show that the respondent Payne's exposure to Johns
Mansville products was not necessarily caused by it.  ___ Md.
___, ___, ___A.2d ___, ___, ___ (1996) [slip op. at 23-5]. I find
the Court of Special Appeals' resolution of the issue more
persuasive.
focussed solely upon hazards posed to industry
workers and workers in related trades, workers
such as Asner and Wilson, and not hazards
posed to building users.  Id. at 190, 647 A.2d
405. In Smith v. Celotex Corp., 387 Pa.Super.
340, 564 A.2d 209 (1989), also relied upon by
AC & S, the court made a justifiable risk
distinction between asbestos factory workers
handling raw asbestos and construction workers
handling the finished product at locations
with different working conditions.   Although
we agree with AC & S that risk distinctions
can exist between classes of persons exposed
to 
asbestos, 
depending 
on 
the 
degree,
frequency, and duration of exposure, the
evidence in the case sub judice supports the
conclusion that Asner and Wilson were exposed
to AC & S products in a comparable degree,
frequency, and duration as AC & S insulators.
Any risk distinction in the case sub judice
between AC & S insulators and Asner and
Wilson, as it relates to the "actual malice"
necessary for punitive damages is, therefore,
illusory.
Id. at 624-25, 657 A.2d at 387.   As previously stated, I am in
complete accord.2