Case Title: Brennon B. v. Superior Court

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2022-08-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
BRENNON B., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, 
Respondent; 
WEST CONTRA COSTA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., 
Real Parties in Interest. 
 
S266254 
 
First Appellate District, Division One 
A157026 
 
Contra Costa County Superior Court 
MSC1601005 
 
 
August 4, 2022 
 
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Kruger, Jenkins, and Guerrero concurred. 
 
 
1 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
S266254 
 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
Brennon B. is a young man with developmental 
disabilities; when he was a teenager, he was a special-education 
student at De Anza High School in the West Contra Costa 
Unified School District (the District).  Brennon alleges that 
during his time there, he was repeatedly sexually assaulted by 
other students and by a school-district staff member.  In 2016, 
his guardian sued the District on his behalf, asserting various 
claims arising out of Brennon’s experiences at De Anza High 
School; those claims included allegations the District had 
violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51; the Unruh 
Civil Rights Act or the Act).   
The question before us is whether a plaintiff who asserts 
such claims can hold a public school district liable under the Act 
and thus avail him- or herself of the enhanced remedies — 
particularly statutory penalties and attorney fees — it makes 
available.  For the reasons set forth below, we hold that Unruh 
Civil Rights Act liability is not available in such circumstances.  
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeal denying 
Brennon’s petition for writ of mandate is affirmed. 
The statutory text of the Act, its purpose and history, and 
our prior caselaw all indicate that public schools, as 
governmental entities engaged in the provision of a free and 
public education, are not “business establishments” within the 
meaning of the Act.  (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b).)  To the contrary, 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
2 
they make clear that the Act was not enacted to reach this type 
of state action.  Accordingly, we conclude that the District was 
not a “business establishment” for purposes of the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act under the circumstances alleged here.   
We must also reject Brennon’s alternative argument that 
he can nonetheless avail himself of the Act’s enhanced remedies 
either because of a 1992 amendment to the Unruh Civil Rights 
Act or because of a 1998 amendment to the Education Code.  
First, Brennon contends that public school districts can be sued 
under the Unruh Civil Rights Act because violations of the 
federal Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA) were made 
actionable pursuant to the 1992 amendment.  This contention is 
foreclosed by the language and legislative history of the 1992 
amendment, which contains no indication that incorporation of 
the ADA was intended to broaden the reach of the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act in the way Brennon contends.  The argument is also 
at odds with our prior decisions and in tension with the 
structure of other antidiscrimination statutes.  Second, there is 
nothing in the language or legislative history of the 1998 
Education Code amendment to suggest that it entitles Brennon 
to relief under the Unruh Civil Rights Act.  We do not believe 
the Legislature — in either instance — would have made such a 
significant change to the scope of the Act without clear language 
in the statutory text and without any discussion of such a 
change in the legislative history.   
As we have done previously, “[w]e emphasize . . . that our 
resolution of the legal issue[s] before us does not turn upon our 
personal views as to the wisdom or morality of the [laws and 
policies at issue in this case].  Instead, our task involves . . . 
question[s] of statutory interpretation.”  (Warfield v. Peninsula 
Golf & Country Club (1995) 10 Cal.4th 594, 598 (Warfield); see 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
3 
also Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts (1998) 
17 Cal.4th 670, 672 (Curran) [similar].)  Discrimination in 
schools is pernicious, and its elimination requires the 
availability of legal tools that are both practical and powerful.  
At the same time — through the Education Code, the 
antidiscrimination components of the Government Code, and 
various other constitutional and statutory provisions — the 
Legislature has enacted laws that prohibit discrimination and 
make remedies available to those whose rights have been 
violated.  (See, e.g., Ed. Code, § 200 et seq.; Gov. Code, § 11135; 
42 U.S.C. § 1983; 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et 
seq.)   
The dispute here is not about whether Brennon and other 
plaintiffs who prove discrimination are entitled to relief — they 
clearly are.  (See Brennon B. v. Superior Court (2020) 
57 Cal.App.5th 
367, 
370 
(Brennon 
B.) 
[discussing 
antidiscrimination laws to which public school districts are 
subject].)  This case is about whether Brennon and other 
putative plaintiffs are entitled to pursue the specific remedies 
made available under the Unruh Civil Rights Act.  Brennon and 
supporting amici curiae argue that the availability of such relief 
is important because it entitles successful plaintiffs to statutory 
penalties for each and every discriminatory offense — up to a 
maximum of three times the amount of actual damage and in no 
case less than $4,000.1  It would also entitle plaintiffs to attorney 
fees, which, in matters of this degree of complexity, can be 
considerable.  Brennon and several amici curiae also argue that 
 
1  
The District argues that even if the Unruh Civil Rights 
Act applies, treble damages would not be available against a 
public-entity defendant.  We need not decide that issue here. 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
4 
these heightened penalties are — for policy reasons — the most 
effective means of vindicating the rights of disabled students in 
California.  They assert that these remedies encourage disabled 
people to assert their rights, deter institutions from engaging in 
discrimination, and help to incentivize lawyers to litigate 
discrimination claims.  In response, the District and its 
supporting amici curiae assert that subjecting public school 
districts to the heightened remedies made available by the Act 
would — in light of school districts’ already strained and limited 
budgets — undermine districts’ ability to deliver high quality 
education for their students.  The District also underscores that, 
even without Unruh Civil Rights Act protection, there are many 
other statutes prohibiting discrimination that enable students 
to obtain appropriate relief. 
Again, the policy question of whether to make the Act’s 
enhanced remedies available in this context, and how to weigh 
the various competing interests at stake, is a decision that only 
the Legislature can make.  The task before us today is one of 
statutory interpretation.   
I. 
 
A.  
Brennon has autism, low verbal skills, and mental and 
cognitive impairment.  Throughout the time in question (during 
which Brennon was a teenager), his mental and emotional 
capacity was equivalent to that of a six- to seven-year-old child.2  
 
2  
Because this action arises from a writ petition challenging 
the trial court’s order sustaining a demurrer, we take the facts 
as they are stated in Brennon’s second amended complaint.  
(Beacon Residential Community Assn. v. Skidmore, Owings & 
Merrill LLP (2014) 59 Cal.4th 568, 571.) 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
5 
From 2012 to 2016, he was enrolled at De Anza High School in 
the West Contra Costa Unified School District as a special-
education student with an individualized education plan (IEP).  
While there, he required a heightened level of supervision to 
protect him from sexual assault.   
In 2012, Brennon was sexually assaulted in the school 
restroom by another student; that student was unsupervised at 
the time of the assault despite the fact his own IEP required he 
be supervised while in the restroom.  Thereafter, Brennon’s IEP 
was amended to require continuous supervision while on 
campus.  Brennon sued the District as a result of this incident 
and obtained a judgment against it.  In 2013, Brennon reported 
that he had been kissed while on the school bus by another 
student, and Brennon’s IEP was again amended to require 
supervision on the bus.  Despite this requirement, in 2014, 
Brennon was again forcibly kissed by the same student after 
Brennon’s assigned supervisor left him unsupervised on the bus.   
Additionally, an aide assigned by the District to supervise 
Brennon at school sexually assaulted Brennon on at least four 
occasions between 2012 and 2014.  On these occasions, the aide 
forced Brennon to orally copulate him.  The aide ultimately 
confessed to police and was charged with multiple felonies.  In 
2015, Brennon was sexually and physically assaulted by fellow 
students on three occasions when he was left unsupervised on 
campus.   
In July 2015, Brenda B. — Brennon’s guardian — filed a 
claim on his behalf under Government Code sections 900 to 
915.4, the statutes authorizing claims against public entities.  
The District denied the claim, and shortly thereafter, Brennon 
commenced the instant litigation against the District and 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
6 
several individual staff members.  The operative complaint 
alleges causes of action for: negligence; negligent hiring and 
supervision; intentional infliction of emotional distress; 
violation of the right to petition; and violation of the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act.  As is relevant here, the District demurred to the 
Unruh Civil Rights Act cause of action on the ground that the 
District was not a “business establishment” within the meaning 
of the Act.  The trial court agreed and sustained the District’s 
demurrer to that cause of action without leave to amend.   
Brennon filed an original petition for writ of mandate in 
the Court of Appeal.  The court issued an order to show cause.  
After the matter was set for oral argument, Brennon informed 
the Court of Appeal that the case had settled and requested 
dismissal of the petition.  That request was denied, and the 
matter proceeded to argument.  Thereafter, the Court of Appeal 
issued a published opinion, concluding that the trial court had 
not erred; it denied the petition for writ of mandate, and 
Brennon petitioned this court for review.  Despite the fact that 
the parties had already settled, we granted review to decide two 
issues of continued statewide importance:  (1) whether a public 
school district is a “business establishment” for purposes of the 
Unruh Civil Rights Act (or, if not, whether Unruh Civil Rights 
Act remedies are still available because they have been 
incorporated into the relevant provisions of the Education 
Code); and (2) even if a school district is not a business 
establishment, whether it can nevertheless be sued under the 
Unruh Civil Rights Act where the alleged discriminatory 
conduct is actionable under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.).   
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
7 
B.  
As noted above, the Unruh Civil Rights Act is codified at 
section 51 of the Civil Code.3  (See Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (a).)  
The questions raised by this case implicate two of its provisions.  
First, subdivision (b) of section 51 reads:  “All persons within the 
jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what 
their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, 
disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital 
status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or 
immigration status are entitled to the full and equal 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in 
all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.”  (Id. § 51, 
subd. (b), italics added.)  Second, subdivision (f) of section 51 
states:  “A violation of the right of any individual under the 
federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-
336) shall also constitute a violation of this section.”  (Id. § 51, 
subd. (f).)  Brennon contends that the phrase “business 
establishments” in subdivision (b) encompasses public school 
districts, and that — even if it does not — the addition of 
subdivision (f) makes public school districts liable under the 
Unruh Civil Rights Act when they violate the ADA. 
As discussed below, the Unruh Civil Rights Act was 
enacted by the Legislature in 1959 in “response to a number of 
appellate court decisions that had concluded that the then-
existing public accommodation statute did not apply to” various 
private businesses.  (Curran, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 687.)  The 
new legislation was intended “to revise and expand the scope of 
the then-existing version of section 51.”  (Ibid.)  The Act has 
 
3  
All further unspecified citations are to the Civil Code.   
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
8 
been amended several times since then, most notably — for 
purposes of this case — in 1992, when “the Legislature amended 
section 51 to, among other changes, add the paragraph that 
became subdivision (f), specifying that ‘[a] violation of the right 
of any individual under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990 (Public Law 101-336) shall also constitute a violation of 
this section.’ ”  (Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 661, 
668 (Munson), citing Stats. 1992, ch. 913, § 3, p. 4284; Stats. 
2000, ch. 1049, § 2.) 
In addition, Brennon contends this case also implicates a 
provision of the Education Code, specifically subdivision (g) of 
section 201.  Section 201 of the Education Code was first enacted 
in 1982.  It was later amended in 1998, when the Legislature 
added — among other things — subdivision (g), a paragraph 
explaining the Legislature’s preferred interpretation of the 
statute.  (See Stats. 1998, ch. 914, § 5, subd. (g).)  Subdivision 
(g) of Education Code section 201 provides:  “It is the intent of 
the Legislature that this chapter shall be interpreted as 
consistent with . . . the Unruh Civil Rights Act . . . , except 
where this chapter may grant more protections or impose 
additional obligations, and that the remedies provided herein 
shall not be the exclusive remedies, but may be combined with 
remedies that may be provided by the above statutes.”  (Ed. 
Code, § 201, subd. (g).)  Brennon contends that — even if he 
cannot hold the District liable under the Unruh Civil Rights Act 
itself — he can seek the Act’s enhanced remedies because 
subdivision (g) of Education Code section 201 makes those 
remedies available for violations of the Education Code. 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
9 
II. 
 
A.  
“ ‘When we interpret a statute, “[o]ur fundamental task 
. . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate 
the law’s purpose.  We first examine the statutory language, 
giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. . . .  If the language 
is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a 
literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the 
Legislature did not intend.  If the statutory language permits 
more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider 
other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and 
public policy.”  [Citation.]  “Furthermore, we consider portions 
of a statute in the context of the entire statute and the statutory 
scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to every word, 
phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the 
legislative purpose.” ’ ” (City of San Jose v. Superior 
Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 616–617 (City of San Jose), quoting 
Sierra Club v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 157, 165–166.) 
1. 
With respect to Brennon’s primary argument, the 
statutory text at issue is the phrase “all business establishments 
of every kind whatsoever” as it appears in the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act.  (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b).)  As noted above, we begin 
by giving this phrase its “ ‘plain and commonsense meaning’ ” 
as it is understood “ ‘in the context of the statutory framework 
as a whole.’ ”  (City of San Jose, supra, 2 Cal.5th 608 at p. 616.)   
We find that Brennon’s proposed reading does not fit 
easily with the statutory text.  The everyday meaning of 
“business establishments” — even with the statute’s expansive 
“of every kind whatsoever” clause — conveys reference to 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
10 
commercial entities, those whose principal mission is the 
transactional sale of goods or services.  The Oxford English 
Dictionary identifies “the most common sense” of “business” as 
“[t]rade and all activity relating to it, esp. considered in terms of 
volume or profitability; commercial transactions, engagements, 
and undertakings regarded collectively; an instance of this.”  
(Oxford English Dict. (3d ed. 2022)  [as of June 21, 2022].4)  Merriam-Webster 
defines “business” as “a usu. commercial or mercantile activity 
engaged in as a means of livelihood”; “a commercial or 
sometimes an industrial enterprise”; “dealings or transactions 
esp. of an economic nature.”  (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 
Dict. (11th ed. 2014) p. 167.)  A public school district engaged in 
the task of educating its students does not easily fit within these 
definitions.  We do not dispute that a school district provides a 
service to members of the public, as Brennon argues, but a 
school district’s provision of public education is not generally 
understood as being carried out in the commercial, transactional 
manner that is characteristic of a “business establishment.” 
Nonetheless, our prior cases counsel that “the reach 
of section 51 cannot be determined invariably by reference to the 
apparent ‘plain meaning’ of the term ‘business establishment.’ ”  
(Warfield, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 616; see also Curran, supra, 
17 Cal.4th at p. 693 [quoting Warfield].)  Instead, some entities 
that would not ordinarily “be thought of as . . . ‘traditional’ 
business establishment[s]” should be considered business 
establishments for purposes of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.  
(Warfield, at p. 616.)  And more generally, whether or not an 
 
4 This internet citation is archived by year, docket number and 
case name at . 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
11 
entity is “generally thought of as a traditional business 
establishment is not, in itself, necessarily determinative of 
whether such an entity falls within the aegis of the act.”  (Ibid.)  
Thus, our precedent urges us to look beyond the statutory 
language to “the purpose and history of section 51” in order to 
determine whether “the Legislature intended the statute to 
apply to the conduct of the entit[y] at issue” here.  (Ibid.)   
2. 
The purpose and legislative history of the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act — and its predecessor statute — make clear that the 
focus of the Act is the conduct of private business establishments.  
These laws were originally enacted in response to limitations 
placed by the U.S. Supreme Court on the federal government’s 
ability to pass laws targeting the conduct of private entities; the 
actions of state actors were not the focus of the state’s first public 
accommodations laws or of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.   
With respect to coverage of public school districts 
specifically, during the legislative process that led to the 
enactment of the Act, the Legislature progressively narrowed 
the kinds of schools to which it might have applied and 
eventually eliminated any reference to schools altogether; 
viewed in the context of the legislative history as a whole, this 
evolution suggests the Legislature did not intend the Act to 
subject public school districts to liability for claims such as those 
raised here.  Instead, the catchall phrase appearing in the final 
version of the legislation — “all business establishments of 
every kind whatsoever” — covers entities engaged in the kinds 
of 
commercial 
transactions 
characteristic 
of 
“business 
establishments”; it cannot be stretched to reach a state actor 
“carry[ing] out the state’s constitutionally mandated duty to 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
12 
provide a system of public education.”  (Wells v. One2One 
Learning Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164, 1195 (Wells).) 
The roots of the modern-day Unruh Civil Rights Act go 
back to the late 1800s.  (Warfield, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 607–
608.)  In 1883, the U.S. Supreme Court “invalidated the first 
federal public accommodation statute.”  (Id. at p. 607.)  That 
statute had prohibited private entities from discriminating on 
the basis of race when operating “accommodations, advantages, 
facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or 
water, theatres, and other places of public amusement.”  (Civil 
Rights Cases (1883) 109 U.S. 3, 9.)  The court held the statute 
was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment because it 
targeted the actions of private persons, rather than state actors.  
(Id. at pp. 10–11.)  The court explained:  “It is State action of a 
particular character that is prohibited.  Individual invasion of 
individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [Fourteenth 
Amendment].”  (Id. at p. 11.)  It was therefore for state 
legislatures, not Congress, to enact laws regulating the conduct 
of non-state actors.  (Id. at p. 13.)  In response to the Supreme 
Court’s decision, “California joined a number of other states in 
enacting its own initial public accommodation statute, the 
statutory predecessor of . . . section 51 [of the Civil Code]” 
(Warfield, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 607–608, citing Stats. 1897, 
ch. 108, § 2, p. 137), which applied to all “places of public 
accommodation or amusement” (id. at p. 608).   
As the Court of Appeal below noted after reviewing this 
history, “nothing in the historical context from which the Unruh 
Act emerged suggests the state’s earlier public accommodation 
statutes were enacted to reach ‘state action.’  And there is 
[substantial] authority to the contrary — that these statutes 
were enacted to secure within our state law the prohibition 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
13 
against discrimination by privately owned services and 
enterprises the United States Supreme Court referenced in 
the Civil Rights Cases and which the common law had already 
begun to recognize through the public service doctrine.”  
(Brennon B., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 372, citing Curran, 
supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 686–687; Warfield, supra, 10 Cal.4th at 
pp. 607–608; Horowitz, The 1959 California Equal Rights in 
“Business Establishments” Statute — A Problem in Statutory 
Application (1960) 33 So.Cal. L.Rev. 260, 281 (hereafter 
Horowitz) [“[i]t was clear that in [former] [Civil Code] Sections 
51 and 52 the Legislature enacted a principle creating a right 
not to be discriminated against on grounds of race in some, but 
not all, relationships between private persons”].)   
As time went on, however, the efficacy of California’s early 
public accommodations law was curtailed by “lower appellate 
courts [that] used the principle ejusdem generis to limit the law’s 
reach.”  (Isbister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc. (1985) 
40 Cal.3d 72, 78 (Isbister).)  Following a series of restrictive 
judicial decisions in the 1950s (which occurred despite ongoing 
legislative expansion of the law’s coverage), the Legislature 
enacted the Unruh Civil Rights Act in 1959 “out of concern that 
the courts were construing the . . . public accommodations 
statute [of that time] too strictly.”  (Ibid.; see also id. at pp. 78–
79 [noting legislative “additions to the list of covered facilities” 
and citing Reed v. Hollywood Professional School (1959) 
169 Cal.App.2d Supp. 887, 890 [private school not covered]; 
Coleman v. Middlestaff (1957) 147 Cal.App.2d Supp. 833, 834–
836 [dentist’s office not covered]; Long v. Mountain View 
Cemetery Assn. (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 328, 329 [private 
cemetery not covered]].)  The intention behind the 1959 
legislation was “to revise and expand the scope of the then-
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
14 
existing version of section 51.”  (Warfield, supra, 10 Cal.4th at 
p. 608.)   
The bill that ultimately became the Unruh Civil Rights 
Act was introduced in January 1959.  (Assem. Bill No. 594 (1959 
Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 594), as introduced Jan. 21, 1959.)  As 
initially drafted, Assembly Bill 594 mentioned schools as one of 
the numerous entities covered by the bill.  (Ibid.)  However, as 
chronicled by the Court of Appeal below, the bill subsequently 
underwent a series of amendments, which ultimately 
eliminated reference to schools altogether.  (Brennon B., supra, 
57 Cal.App.5th at pp. 375–377; see also Curran, supra, 
17 Cal.4th at p. 687, fn. 13; Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal. L.Rev. 
at pp. 265–270 [tracing the progression of the amendments and 
describing the legislation’s “narrowing”].)   
More specifically, the language in the first version of the 
bill included “schools” without any qualification of that word.  
(Brennon B., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 374.)  However, each 
subsequent amendment narrowed the group of schools to which 
the law would apply.  (Id. at pp. 375–377.)  “Schools” first 
became “all schools of every kind whatsoever, except those 
schools organized for the purpose of, and which practice, the 
furthering of a specific sectarian religious belief” (id. at p. 375), 
which then became “all schools of every kind whatsoever, except 
those schools organized for the purpose of, and which practice, 
the furthering of a specific sectarian religious belief, insofar as 
the facilities of any such school so organized and following such 
practice are made available primarily to persons who subscribe 
to such belief” (id. at p. 376, italics omitted), which in turn 
became “all schools which primarily offer business or vocational 
training” (ibid.).  In the final version of the bill, any reference to 
schools was removed, and the legislation simply referred to “all 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
15 
business establishments of every kind whatsoever.”  (Id. at 
p. 377, citing Horowitz, supra, 33 So.Cal. L.Rev. at pp. 269–270 
& fn. 37.) 
Brennon contends the breadth of the phrase “all business 
establishments of every kind whatsoever” (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. 
(b)) indicates the Legislature intended the Act to cover public 
schools, despite removal of the reference to schools in the final 
version of the bill.  However, a better reading of the bill’s 
legislative history is that the Legislature ultimately decided not 
to include school districts — which are not typically understood 
as “business establishments” — within the ambit of the 
legislation.  Our reading is supported by the fact that “the prior 
versions of the bill reflect a progressive narrowing of the 
legislation’s applicability to ‘schools’ ” before the reference to 
schools was completely eliminated.  (Brennon B., supra, 
57 Cal.App.5th at p. 378.)  In fact, “the category of schools to 
which the penultimate version of the legislation applied would 
not have included any public grammar schools or even public 
secondary schools.”  (Ibid.)  Moreover, these changes to potential 
coverage of schools continued, all while the phrase “all business 
establishments of every kind whatsoever” remained untouched.  
We conclude that this history, on the whole, is at odds with 
Brennon’s preferred interpretation.   
Brennon’s argument is not salvaged by the fact that the 
phrase “business establishments” should be understood “in the 
broadest sense reasonably possible.”  (Burks v. Poppy 
Construction Co. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 463, 468 (Burks).)  We have 
previously explained that the Unruh Civil Rights Act applies 
only where an entity’s “activities reasonably could be found to 
constitute a business establishment.”  (Warfield, supra, 
10 Cal.4th at p. 615, italics added.)  Nothing “suggests that the 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
16 
term ‘all business establishments of every kind whatsoever’ was 
intended to encompass all of the entities or activities listed in 
the initial bill.”  (Ibid.)  While the phrase “all business 
establishments of every kind whatsoever” must be interpreted 
as broadly as reasonably possible, its scope remains limited to 
entities acting as private business establishments.   
In addition, the Legislature is capable of bringing 
government entities within the scope of specific legislation when 
it intends to do so, and it has done so with other 
antidiscrimination legislation.  (See, e.g., Wells, supra, 
39 Cal.4th at pp. 1190–1191 [discussing application of the Fair 
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) to public entities].)  In 
the context of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, however, “the 
statutory list of [covered entities] contains no words or phrases 
most commonly used to signify public school districts, or, for that 
matter, any other public entities or governmental agencies.”  (Id. 
at p. 1190.)  The Act does not — as does FEHA, for example — 
define the covered entities to include “the state or any political 
or civil subdivision of the state, and cities.”  (Gov. Code, § 12926, 
subd. (d).)  As we have previously explained, “[t]he specific 
enumeration of state and local governmental entities in one 
context [such as the Fair Employment and Housing Act], but not 
in the other [here, the Unruh Civil Rights Act], weighs heavily 
against a conclusion” that the coverage provisions should be 
understood as identical.  (Wells, at p. 1190.)  That is especially 
true where, as here, the statutes’ coverage provisions were 
drafted by the very same Legislature during the same legislative 
session; the legislative history is, thus, strong evidence that the 
Legislature crafted language for FEHA to explicitly cover 
governmental entities, while simultaneously crafting language 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
17 
for the Unruh Civil Rights Act that sets forth different 
coverage.5   
This history shows that the Unruh Civil Rights Act is 
focused on the actions of private actors.  Its predecessor statute 
was enacted in response to the curtailment of the federal 
government’s ability to legislate on the conduct of private 
entities, and we find nothing in the legislative history of the Act 
to indicate that it drastically expanded California’s public 
accommodation law by imposing liability on public entities, such 
that it would cover the conduct challenged here.  For the reasons 
discussed above, we reject the contention that the mere 
inclusion of “schools” in earlier versions of the bill establishes 
that public schools are business establishments under the Act.  
To the contrary, we conclude that, in passing the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act, the Legislature enacted a law directed at entities 
operating as private businesses.6   
 
5  
Although not drafted during the same legislative session 
as the Unruh Civil Rights Act and FEHA, other statutes further 
demonstrate that the Legislature knows how to use language to 
specifically prohibit discrimination by public schools.  (See, e.g., 
Ed. Code, § 200 [noting that “[i]t is the policy of the State of 
California to afford all persons in public schools . . . equal 
rights, and opportunities in the educational institutions of the 
state”]; Gov. Code, § 11135, subd. (a) [“[n]o person in the State 
of California shall . . . be unlawfully subjected to discrimination 
under . . . any program or activity that is conducted, operated, 
or administered by the state or by any state agency, is funded 
directly by the state, or receives any financial assistance from 
the state”].) 
6  
Amici curiae on behalf of Brennon contend that a 2015 law 
shows that the Unruh Civil Rights Act does cover public schools.  
That year, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 302, which 
 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
18 
3. 
The conclusion urged by the legislative history — that the 
Legislature did not intend for the Unruh Civil Rights Act to 
cover public school districts through its use of the phrase 
“business establishments” — is further underscored by the 
reasoning and principles set forth in our prior cases.  Although 
these cases do not directly resolve the issues presented here 
(because all involved private, rather than public, entities), what 
they ultimately make clear is that — in order to be a “business 
establishment” under the Act — an entity must operate as a 
business or commercial enterprise when it discriminates. 
In Burks, the court held that a developer and seller of tract 
houses was subject to the Act because “[t]he word ‘business’ 
embraces everything about which one can be employed, and it is 
often synonymous with ‘calling, occupation, or trade, engaged in 
for the purpose of making a livelihood or gain,’ ” and “[t]he word 
‘establishment’ . . . includes not only a fixed location, such as the 
‘place where one is permanently fixed for residence or business,’ 
 
requires schools to provide lactation accommodations to 
students.  (Assem. Bill No. 302 (2015–2016 Reg. Sess.), Stats. 
2015, ch. 690, § 2, codified at Educ. Code. § 222.)  In uncodified 
findings 
and 
declarations 
accompanying 
the 
law, 
the 
Legislature stated:  “The Unruh Civil Rights Act (Section 51 of 
the Civil Code) prohibits businesses, including public schools, 
from discriminating based on sex, which includes discrimination 
on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or medical conditions 
related to pregnancy or childbirth.”  (Stats. 2015, ch. 690, § 1.)  
However, nothing in Education Code section 222 or the bill’s 
legislative history ever mentioned the Unruh Civil Rights Act; 
thus, the reference to the Act in the uncodified legislative 
findings and declarations of Assembly Bill 302 adds little — or 
nothing — to our analysis of whether public school districts are 
covered by the Unruh Civil Rights Act.   
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
19 
but also a permanent ‘commercial force or organization.’ ”  
(Burks, supra, 57 Cal.2d at p. 468.)   
In O’Connor v. Village Green Owners Association, the 
court concluded that a nonprofit homeowners association was 
subject to the Act because “the [homeowners] association 
performs all the customary business functions [e.g., employing a 
property management firm, obtaining insurance, collecting 
assessments, and enforcing rules] which in the traditional 
landlord-tenant relationship rest on the landlord’s shoulders . . . 
[and because the HOA’s] overall function is to protect and 
enhance the project’s economic value.”  (O’Connor v. Village 
Green Owners Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 790, 796, italics added 
(O’Connor).)   
In Isbister, the defendant (a nonprofit recreational club 
that prohibited girls from using its facilities) argued that it was 
not a business establishment for purposes of the Act.  (Isbister, 
supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 78.)  The Isbister court began its opinion 
by stating:  “Absent the principle it codifies, thousands of 
facilities in private ownership, but otherwise open to the public, 
would be free under state law to exclude people for invidious 
reasons like sex, religion, age, and even race.”  (Id. at p. 75, 
italics added.)  It went on to observe that, despite its nonprofit 
status, the club was “functional[ly] similar[] to a commercial 
business” (id. at p. 83, fn. omitted) and was therefore covered by 
the Act (id. at p. 82).   
In Warfield, the court held that a nonprofit golf and 
country 
club 
(that 
excluded 
women 
from 
proprietary 
membership) came within the purview of the Act.  In reaching 
that conclusion, the court noted “the business transactions that 
are conducted regularly on the club’s premises with persons who 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
20 
are not members of the club are sufficient in themselves to bring 
the club within the reach of section 51’s broad reference to ‘all 
business establishments of every kind whatsoever.’ ”  (Warfield, 
supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 621, original italics.)  Specifically, the 
court found that the club “appear[ed] to have been operating in 
a capacity that is the functional equivalent of a commercial 
enterprise.”  (Id. at p. 622; see also id. at pp. 621, 622 [describing 
the club’s semi-public catering and event-hosting services as 
well as its public golf and tennis shops].)   
By contrast, in Curran, supra, 17 Cal.4th 670, the court 
held that — on the specific facts of the case — a regional council 
of the Boy Scouts of America was not subject to the Act because 
the Act did not reach “the membership decisions of a charitable, 
expressive, and social organization . . . whose formation and 
activities are unrelated to the promotion or advancement of the 
economic or business interests of its members.”  (Id. at p. 697.)  
Nonetheless, the court also concluded the Act “would apply to, 
and would prohibit discrimination in, the actual business 
transactions with nonmembers engaged in by the Boy Scouts in 
its retail stores.”  (Id. at p. 700; but see id. at p. 731 (conc. opn. 
of Werdegar, J.) [criticizing this “function-by-function,” 
“piecemeal mode of analysis”].)   
Consistent with the legislative history, these prior cases 
tend to suggest that the Unruh Civil Rights Act, like its 
predecessor statutes, is not directed at school districts when 
they are acting to fulfill their educational role.  In parsing the 
boundaries of what constitutes a “business establishment,” our 
cases have focused on attributes — performing business 
functions, protecting economic value, operating as the 
functional equivalent of a commercial enterprise, etc. — that are 
not shared by public school districts engaged in the work of 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
21 
educating students.  When acting in their core educational 
capacity, public school districts do not perform “customary 
business functions,” nor is their “overall function . . . to protect 
and enhance . . . economic value.”  (O’Connor, supra, 33 Cal.3d 
at p. 796, italics added.)  The task of educating students does not 
involve regularly conducting business transactions with the 
public, or receiving “financial benefits from regular business 
transactions”; nor does it involve “operating in a capacity that is 
the functional equivalent of a commercial enterprise.”  
(Warfield, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 621, 622.)   
Educating students is a task that is fundamentally 
different from what could fairly be described as “regular 
business transactions” (Warfield, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 621); 
public school districts are responsible for the provision of free 
and public education pursuant to a state constitutional mandate 
(Cal. Const., art. IX, § 5).  “[A]lthough administered through 
local districts created by the Legislature,” the State’s system of 
public schools “is ‘one system . . . applicable to all the common 
schools.’ ”  (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 680, 
quoting Kennedy v. Miller (1893) 97 Cal. 429, 432.)  “[T]he 
management and control of the public schools [is] a matter of 
state care and supervision” (Kennedy, at p. 431), and “[l]ocal 
districts are the State’s agents for local operation of the common 
school system” (Butt, at p. 681).  This is a far cry from the typical 
operation of a “business establishment,” the protection of 
economic 
value, 
the 
nature 
of 
a 
traditional 
public 
accommodation, or the equivalent of a commercial enterprise.  
For all of these reasons, our case law underscores what the 
legislative history makes clear:  the Unruh Civil Rights Act does 
not reach public school districts engaged in the provision of a 
free and public education to students.   
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
22 
4. 
In examining decisions both from the Courts of Appeal and 
by the federal courts, we find nothing that persuades us that the 
outcome urged by the legislative history and favored by our prior 
cases should be rejected.  Instead, such cases further indicate 
that to be a “business establishment” under the Act an entity 
must effectively operate as a business or a commercial 
enterprise or “engage[] in behavior involving sufficient 
‘businesslike attributes.’ ” (Carter v. City of Los Angeles (2014) 
224 Cal.App.4th 808, 825 (Carter), quoting Qualified Patients 
Assn v. City of Anaheim (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 734, 764–765 
(Qualified Patients).)  Generally speaking, public school districts 
do not fit within this definition.   
We turn first to the decisions from California Courts of 
Appeal.  Several have concluded that government bodies do not 
function as “business establishments” when they enact 
legislation.  (See, e.g., Harrison v. City of Rancho Mirage (2015) 
243 Cal.App.4th 162, 175 [“Here, the City was not acting as a 
business establishment.  It was amending an already existing 
municipal code section to increase the minimum age of a 
responsible person from the age of 21 years to 30”]; Qualified 
Patients, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 764 [“Because a city 
enacting legislation is not functioning as a ‘business 
establishment[],’ we conclude the [Unruh Civil Rights Act] does 
not embrace plaintiffs’ claims against the city”]; Burnett v. San 
Francisco Police Department (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1191–
1192 [“Nothing in the Act precludes legislative bodies from 
enacting ordinances which make age distinctions among 
adults”].)  However, these cases do not address whether a state 
entity might, in other contexts, function as a business 
establishment for purposes of the Act.   
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
23 
A small number of decisions by our Courts of Appeal have 
suggested the Act could apply to public entities.  In one of those 
cases, the public entity did not challenge the application of the 
Act, and the court never faced the question directly.  (See 
Mackey v. Trustees of California State University (2019) 
31 Cal.App.5th 640 [reversing a grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the state university on an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim 
by Black athletes].)  In another case, the court did not extend 
the Act to public entities, but it briefly indicated approval of a 
potential rationale for doing so.  (See Gatto v. County of Sonoma 
(2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 744, 769 [reversing judgment for the 
plaintiff — to the extent judgment was based on the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act — on the ground he was not a member of any 
relevant protected class, and discussing the potential 
applicability of the Act to a county fair].)   
Other Courts of Appeal have considered the issue of 
public-entity defendants and suggested the Act would not apply 
to them, but, here too, none ruled on the issue definitively.  (See, 
e.g., Carter, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at pp. 814, 825 [refusing to 
approve release of plaintiffs’ Unruh Civil Rights Act claims in a 
class action against the City of Los Angeles because plaintiffs 
“deserve[d] to litigate the merits of th[ose] claims” even though 
it was “ ‘highly questionable’ ” a California court would 
“consider a municipal entity to be liable under the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act”]; Doe v. California Lutheran High School Assn. 
(2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 828, 839 [concluding that a private, 
religious high school was not a business establishment because 
it was a nonprofit that lacked any “significant resemblance to 
an ordinary for-profit business” and suggesting that the same 
reasoning would apply to public schools]; see also id. at p. 841.) 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
24 
Neither the holdings nor the reasoning in any of these 
cases counsels in favor of disturbing the conclusion that is 
compelled by the legislative history of the Act and consistent 
with our prior cases.  These cases simply indicate that a 
government body enacting legislation is not subject to the Act, 
and they reveal that some courts dealing with the Act have 
suggested it might apply to public entities, while others have 
rejected (or expressed skepticism about) application of the Act 
to such entities.  Again, nothing in these cases unsettles the 
conclusion reached above.   
We turn next to the federal cases, which have directly 
addressed the question presented here, although “ ‘federal 
decisional authority is neither binding nor controlling in 
matters involving state law.’ ”  (Nagel v. Twin Laboratories, Inc. 
(2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 39, 55, quoting Howard Contracting, 
Inc. v. G.A. MacDonald Construction Co. (1998) 71 Cal.App.4th 
38, 52.)  
As the Court of Appeal in this case noted, “federal courts 
have split on the question” of whether public school districts are 
business establishments under the Unruh Civil Rights Act 
(Brennon B., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 391), with the majority 
concluding that public school districts are subject to the Act (see, 
e.g., Z. T. Santa Rosa City Sch. (N.D.Cal., Oct. 5, 2017, No. C 
17-01452 WHA) 2017 WL 4418864, at *6 (Z.T.) [noting, prior to 
the recent emergence of a federal split, that “[e]very California 
district court decision to reach the question has answered it in 
the affirmative, frequently referencing the California Supreme 
Court’s admonition that the Unruh Act be interpreted ‘in the 
broadest sense reasonably possible,’ ” quoting Isbister, supra, 
40 Cal.3d at p. 76]).  However, most of those federal cases rely 
principally on Sullivan ex rel. Sullivan v. Vallejo City Unified 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
25 
School Dist. (E.D.Cal. 1990) 731 F.Supp. 947, which — prior to 
our decision in Warfield — concluded that “since public schools 
were among those organizations listed in the original version of 
the Unruh Act, it must follow that for purposes of the Act they 
are business establishments as well.”  (Sullivan, at p. 953, fn. 
omitted.)  Importantly, as discussed earlier, in Warfield we 
expressly rejected the idea that the mere mention of a particular 
entity in the initial version of the Unruh Civil Rights Act 
legislation brings that entity within the ambit of the Act.  (See 
Warfield, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 615.)  Thus, contrary to 
Sullivan’s reasoning, the mere mention of “schools” in the 
original version of the Act does not mean that public school 
districts are business establishments.  With that basis for its 
conclusion gone, there is little left in Sullivan to support the 
conclusion it reached. 
And because we disagree with the conclusion reached in 
Sullivan, we are also unpersuaded by the body of cases that rely 
on it cursorily to conclude that public school districts are 
business establishments for purposes of the Act.  (See, e.g., 
Nicole M. ex rel. Jacqueline M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist. 
(N.D.Cal. 1997) 964 F.Supp. 1369, 1388; Walsh v. Tehachapi 
Unified Sch. Dist. (E.D.Cal. 2011) 827 F.Supp.2d 1107, 1123.)7   
 
7  
Several other federal cases go beyond mere reliance on 
Sullivan, but we agree with the Court of Appeal’s conclusion 
that these cases do not adequately examine “the historical 
genesis of the [Unruh Civil Rights Act], its legislative history, 
scholarly commentary, and the decisions of our high court.”  
(Brennon B., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 393, citing Whooley v. 
Tamalpais Union High School Dist. (N.D.Cal. 2019) 399 
F.Supp.3d 986 and Yates v. East Side Union High School 
District (N.D.Cal., Feb. 20, 2019, No. 18-CV-02966-JD) 2019 WL 
721313; see also, e.g., Z. T., supra, 2017 WL 4418864, at *6.) 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
26 
By contrast, Zuccaro v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist. 
(N.D.Cal., Sept. 27, 2016, No. 16-CV-02709-EDL) 2016 WL 
10807692, was decided after our decision in Warfield, and it 
concluded that a public school district is not a business 
establishment under the Unruh Civil Rights Act.8  We think 
Zuccaro has the better view.  Unlike other district court cases, 
the Zuccaro court carefully examined our decision in Curran and 
found it made clear that “the entity at issue [must] resemble an 
ordinary for-profit business,” and that a public school “is 
practically the antithesis of a for-profit enterprise.”  (Zuccaro, at 
*12.)  The Zuccaro court concluded that “a public elementary 
school, particularly in its capacity of providing a free education 
to a” preschooler with disabilities, is “acting as a public servant 
rather than a commercial enterprise and is therefore not subject 
to the Unruh Act.”  (Id. at *13.)   
As with the cases from California Courts of Appeal, our 
examination of the federal cases that have grappled with this 
 
8  
While Zuccaro may be the only federal case to conclude 
that public school districts are not business establishments 
under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, several district courts have 
declined to apply the Act to other governmental entities and 
have sometimes noted it is not clear whether governmental 
entities may be held liable under the statute.  (See, e.g., 
Anderson v. County of Siskiyou (N.D.Cal., Sept. 13, 2010, No. C 
10-01428 SBA) 2010 WL 3619821, at *6 [jails are not covered by 
the Act]; Romstad v. Contra Costa County (9th Cir. 2002) 41 
Fed.App’x. 43, 46 [county social services department not covered 
by the Act]; Taormina v. California Department of Corrections 
(S.D.Cal. 1996) 946 F.Supp. 829 [state prison does not qualify as 
a business establishment]; Goodfellow v. Ahren (N.D.Cal., Mar. 
26, 2014, No. 13-04726 RS) 2014 WL 1248238, at *8 [questioning 
“the extent to which governmental entities may be held liable 
under the [Act]”].)  
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
27 
issue does not compel a different conclusion from the one 
compelled by the legislative history of the Unruh Civil Rights 
Act and supported by our prior cases.  Accordingly, for all of the 
reasons discussed above, we conclude that — under subdivision 
(b) — the District was not a “business establishment” for 
purposes of the Act when it provided educational services to 
Brennon. 
B.  
Brennon contends that, even if the District is not a 
business establishment under subdivision (b) of section 51, it 
can still be sued for discrimination by virtue of subdivision (f) of 
that section.9  Added to the Unruh Civil Rights Act by a 1992 
amendment, subdivision (f) makes a violation of the federal 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336) 
actionable under the Unruh Civil Rights Act.  As the Court of 
Appeal explained, Brennon “reads this subdivision to mean any 
violation of the ADA by any person or entity is also a violation 
of the Act.”  (Brennon B., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at pp. 397–398.)  
By contrast, the District reads subdivision (f) to mean that “any 
violation of the ADA by a business establishment is also a 
violation of the [Unruh Civil Rights Act].”  (Id. at p. 398.)   
The District is correct.  Neither the language of the 
subdivision nor its legislative history indicates it was intended 
 
9  
Brennon’s argument with respect to subdivision (f) of 
section 51 is not always clear.  At times, he appears to contend 
that subdivision (f) subjects public school districts to liability 
even if they are not business establishments.  Other times, he 
appears to contend that, after the enactment of subdivision (f), 
the phrase “business establishments” must be read to include all 
entities subject to the ADA.  However, our analysis and ultimate 
conclusion would remain the same under either framing. 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
28 
to bring about the monumental change suggested by Brennon:  
that any entity (public or private) that violates the ADA could 
be held liable under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (for acts of 
discrimination based on disability, but not other protected 
classes).  And we do not think the Legislature — especially after 
more than three decades of history to the contrary (and almost 
a century of contrary history since the enactment of the Act’s 
predecessor statute) — would have made such an enormous 
change to the reach of the Unruh Civil Rights Act in the absence 
of clear statutory language and without any discussion of such 
a modification in the legislative history.  (See, e.g., Riverside 
County Sheriff’s Dept. v. Stiglitz (2014) 60 Cal.4th 624, 647 [“It 
is doubtful that the Legislature would have instituted such a 
significant change through silence”].)   
“In 1992, . . . the Legislature amended section 51 to, 
among other changes, add the paragraph that became 
subdivision (f), specifying that ‘[a] violation of the right of any 
individual under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(Public Law 101-336) shall also constitute a violation of this 
section.’ ”  (Munson, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 668, quoting Stats. 
1992, ch. 913, § 3, p. 4284; see also Stats. 2000, ch. 1049, § 2 
[adding 
subdivision 
designations].) 
 
To 
ascertain 
the 
Legislature’s intent as to this amendment, “ ‘ “[w]e first examine 
the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense 
meaning.” ’ ”  (City of San Jose, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 616.)   
We find that both Brennon and the District offer plausible 
interpretations of the text of subdivision (f), which turn on the 
meaning of the word “violation.”  Brennon understands this 
word as referring to a completed violation.  In other words, when 
all elements of an ADA violation have been established, the 
plaintiff will also have proven — automatically — a violation of 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
29 
the Unruh Civil Rights Act.  Conversely, the District reads the 
word “violation” to mean “violative conduct,” such that conduct 
that violates the ADA also satisfies the discriminatory conduct 
element of an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim.  Under this view, 
proof of an ADA violation establishes that the defendant has 
committed discrimination prohibited by the Unruh Civil Rights 
Act, but it does not excuse the plaintiff from having to prove the 
other required elements of an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim — 
including that the discrimination was committed by a party that 
is subject to the Act.  Although we find the District’s 
interpretation to be the more convincing of the two, we find that 
neither is definitive and both are reasonable; accordingly, we 
resort to other tools of statutory interpretation.  (See City of San 
Jose, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 616.)   
As we have previously explained:  “This amendment was 
but one part of a broad enactment, originating as Assembly Bill 
No. 1077 (1991–1992 Reg. Sess.) [Assembly Bill 1077], that 
sought to conform many aspects of California law relating to 
disability discrimination (in employment, government services, 
transportation, and communications, as well as public 
accommodations) to the recently enacted ADA, which was soon 
to go into effect.”  (Munson, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 668–669.)  
Ultimately, the amendment added or amended nearly fifty 
sections across twelve codes.  (See Stats. 1992, ch. 913, § 1; see 
also Brennon B., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 401 [discussing the 
amendment of “numerous provisions of the FEHA”].)   
As we observed in Munson, the Legislature explained that 
the general intent of Assembly Bill 1077 was “ ‘to strengthen 
California law in areas where it is weaker than the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336) and to retain 
California law when it provides more protection for individuals 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
30 
with disabilities than the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990.’ ” (Munson, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 669, quoting Stats. 
1992, ch. 913, § 1, p. 4282.)  As is relevant here, in addition to 
adding “persons with mental disabilities” to the classes of 
individuals protected by the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Assembly 
Bill 1077 — through the addition of subdivision (f) — made 
available a private right of action for ADA violations.  However, 
the addition of subdivision (f) was not intended to effectuate a 
sea change in the operation of the Act by subjecting a vastly 
expanded set of entities to liability for the first time in the law’s 
history.  The Act retained, as it always had, the limitation that 
the law applied to the acts of “business establishments” — the 
amendment did not eliminate that provision from the Act.  Such 
a modification would have far exceeded the goal of conforming 
the Unruh Civil Rights Act to the ADA and, as discussed below, 
would have rendered the Legislature’s amendment of other civil 
rights statutes superfluous.   
Shortly after its introduction in March 1991, Assembly 
Bill 1077 was revised to include language that would amend the 
Unruh Civil Rights Act; as of April 18, 1991, the bill proposed to 
add the following text to section 51 of the Civil Code:  “A 
violation of the right of any individual under the Americans 
With Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336) with respect 
to public accommodations subject thereto shall also constitute a 
violation of this section.”  (Assem. Bill No. 1077 (1991–1992 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended Apr. 18, 1991, § 2, italics added.)  The 
Legislative Counsel’s Digest explained that part of the bill, 
containing the new Unruh Civil Rights Act language, as follows:  
“Existing provisions of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, with certain 
exceptions, prohibit various types of discrimination by business 
establishments.  [¶]  This bill would make a violation of the 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
31 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, with respect to public 
accommodations, also a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.”  
(Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 1077 (1991 –1992 Reg. 
Sess.), italics added.)  Following this early modification, the 
bill’s language — containing the phrase “with respect to public 
accommodations subject thereto” — remained unchanged 
almost until the final passage of the bill (which occurred in 
August 1992), when it was amended once more in July 1992.  
(See Brennon B., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 399.)  At that time, 
“the language was shortened to read as it [still] does:  ‘A 
violation of the right of any individual under the Americans with 
Disability Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336) shall also constitute 
a violation of this section.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting Assem. Bill No. 1077 
(1991–1992 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 6, 1992, § 3.)   
However, despite the bill’s revised wording, “[t]he 
description of the language in committee reports and bill 
analyses also remained exactly as before.”  (Brennon B., supra, 
57 Cal.App.5th at p. 399, citing Conc. in Sen. Amends., Assem. 
Bill No. 1077 (1991–1992 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 29, 1992, 
p. 1; Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading 
analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1077 (1991–1992 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended Aug. 29, 1992, p. 2; State and Consumer Services 
Agency, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1077 (1991–1992 
Reg. Sess.) p. 2.)  In other words, descriptions of the bill 
continued to refer to its purpose as making a violation of the 
ADA “with respect to public accommodations” also a violation of 
the Unruh Civil Rights Act.  (Brennon B., at p. 398, italics 
added.)   
In addition, the changes made to the bill’s language by the 
July amendment were described by one committee as “ ‘mostly 
technical.’ ”  (Brennon B., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 399, 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
32 
quoting Business, Transportation & Housing Agency, Supp. 
Analysis on Assem. Bill No. 1077 (1991–1992 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended July 6, 1992, p. 1.)  There is no indication that 
substantive changes were effectuated by this “technical” change 
in the bill’s language.  Throughout the entire legislative history 
of Assembly Bill 1077, the bill was understood as dealing with 
“discrimination by business establishments” and violations of the 
law “with respect to public accommodations.”  (Legis. Counsel’s 
Dig., Assem. Bill No. 1077 (1991 –1992 Reg. Sess.), italics 
added.)  There is no suggestion that removal of the phrase “with 
respect to public accommodations subject thereto” shortly before 
the bill was enacted was intended to make the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act broadly applicable to all entities capable of violating 
the ADA or to make violations of the ADA by any person or entity 
a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.  Such a change would 
have been a monumental one, not merely a “technical” one.   
Thus, the Court of Appeal was correct to conclude that 
subdivision (f) makes “any violation of the ADA by a business 
establishment” a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.  
(Brennon B., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 398.)  If the Legislature 
had intended to change the meaning of the bill’s text through 
the July revisions, it would be odd for the legislative history to 
obscure — rather than clarify — that fact by failing to reflect 
such a change in subsequent committee reports and bill 
analyses.  (See, e.g., Gong v. City of Rosemead (2014) 226 
Cal.App.4th 363, 375 [“We submit that if the Legislature desired 
to enact such a major change . . . , it would have clearly stated 
so”].)  And it would be odder still to describe such monumental 
changes as “mostly technical.”  If the Legislature had intended 
to allow — for the first time in the more than thirty years since 
the Unruh Civil Rights Act was first enacted — a vastly 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
33 
expanded set of entities to be sued for disability discrimination 
(but not any other kind of discrimination, such as race- or 
gender-based discrimination), we would have expected at least 
some discussion of that change in the legislative history.  But 
there is none.   
Moreover, even looking beyond the July modifications to 
Assembly Bill 1077, we find no mention anywhere in the 
legislative history of an intention to subject state actors to new 
liability under the Unruh Civil Rights Act.  For example, there 
are numerous fiscal analyses contained in the bill’s legislative 
history, but none indicated increased financial liabilities for 
public entities under the Act.  (See, e.g., Dept. of Finance, 
Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1077 (1991–1992 Reg. 
Sess.) prepared for Governor Wilson (Sept. 11, 1992) p. 2 
[discussing many changes that would have a fiscal impact, but 
not mentioning liability for public entities under the Act].)  
Again, we do not expect the Legislature to make such significant 
changes to the law “without a single comment or any 
explanation” in the legislative history.  (Presbyterian Camp & 
Conference Centers, Inc. v. Superior Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 493, 
511 (Presbyterian Camp); see also People v. Raybon (2021) 
11 Cal.5th 1056, 1068 [“if the drafters had intended to so 
dramatically change the law[] . . . , we would expect them to 
have been more explicit about their goals”].)   
That conclusion is further supported by the fact that the 
legislative history describes other changes effectuated by the 
law (such as the addition of “persons with mental disabilities” to 
the classes of individuals protected by the Unruh Civil Rights 
Act and the provision of a private right of action for ADA 
violations), but does not mention the dramatic one argued by 
Brennon.  (Cf. Presbyterian Camp, at p. 511.)  As the Court of 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
34 
Appeal summarized:  “We thus see no indication the Legislature 
intended, as to disability discrimination only, to transform the 
[Unruh Civil Rights Act] into a general antidiscrimination 
statute making any violation of the ADA by any person or entity 
a violation of the Act.”  (Brennon B., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 400.) 
As with our analysis of subdivision (b), we find that the 
conclusion compelled by the legislative history of subdivision (f) 
draws additional support from our prior caselaw.  In cases since 
the 1992 amendment, we have continued to describe the Unruh 
Civil Rights Act — even when specifically examining the 
relationship between it and the ADA — as intended to “ ‘create 
and preserve a nondiscriminatory environment in California 
business establishments.’ ”  (Munson, supra, 46 Cal.4th at 
p. 673, quoting Angelucci v. Century Supper Club (2007) 
41 Cal.4th 160, 167.)   
To the extent Brennon contends Munson stated that 
subdivision (f) made any violation of the ADA — whether 
committed by a business establishment or another entity — a 
violation of the Act, we reject this contention.  Munson 
addressed the discrete issue of whether a plaintiff seeking 
Unruh Civil Rights Act damages premised on a violation of the 
ADA must show intentional discrimination.  (Id. at p. 665.)  
Brennon focuses on language in Munson that states:  “By adding 
subdivision (f) to section 51, making all ADA violations . . . 
violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act as well, the Legislature 
included ADA violations in the category of ‘discrimination’ 
contrary to section 51.”  (Id. at p. 672.)  However, when read in 
the broader context of the opinion, it is clear that Munson did 
not understand subdivision (f) as reading the “business 
establishments” limitation out of existence.  For example, the 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
35 
court went on to explain:  “The ADA, as explained above, permits 
a disabled individual denied access to public accommodations to 
recover damages in a government enforcement action only, not 
through a private action by the aggrieved person.  But by 
incorporating the ADA into the Unruh Civil Rights Act, 
California’s 
own 
civil 
rights 
law 
covering 
public 
accommodations, which does provide for such a private damages 
action, the Legislature has afforded this remedy to persons 
injured by a violation of the ADA.”  (Id. at p. 673, italics added.)   
As this passage makes clear, in Munson, the court was 
speaking about only one title of the ADA (title III, which governs 
public accommodations and which is separate from title II, 
governing state and government actors) and was articulating 
rules about discrimination by business establishments.  It was 
not purporting to do away with the “business establishments” 
limitation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.  (See also, e.g., Jankey 
v. Lee (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1038, 1044 [continuing to describe the 
Act as a law that “broadly outlaws arbitrary discrimination in 
public accommodations”].)  Again, we agree with the Court of 
Appeal below that “the Act has always been, and remains, a 
business establishment statute, and that it is violations of the 
ADA by business establishments (or, as denominated by the 
ADA, ‘public accommodations’) that are actionable as violations 
of the [Unruh Civil Rights Act] under Civil Code section 51, 
subdivision (f).”  (Brennon B., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 404.)  
None of our prior cases, including Munson, have read this 
requirement out of the law.   
Furthermore, we have also previously held that “the 
Unruh Civil Rights Act has no application to employment 
discrimination.”  (Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 77 (Rojo), 
citing Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 500 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
36 
(Alcorn) [“there is no indication that the Legislature intended to 
broaden the scope of section 51 to include discriminations other 
than those made by a ‘business establishment’ in the course of 
furnishing goods, services or facilities to its clients, patrons or 
customers”]; see also Isbister, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 83, fn. 12 
[“the employer-employee relationship was not covered by the 
Act”].)  Title I of the ADA covers employment discrimination.  
(42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq.)  Accordingly, if Brennon is correct 
and all ADA violations are also violations of the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act without qualification, then the Unruh Civil Rights 
Act would necessarily apply to employment discrimination, 
contrary to what we have previously held.  Thus, Assembly Bill 
1077 either abrogated these prior holdings by making violations 
of title I of the ADA actionable under the Unruh Civil Rights 
Act, or the cases remain good law and refute the contention “that 
any violation of the ADA is also a violation the [Unruh Civil 
Rights Act].”  (Brennon B., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 402.)   
We conclude that Assembly Bill 1077 did not silently 
abrogate Alcorn and Rojo.  We agree with the Court of Appeal’s 
conclusion that Brennon’s argument on this point “would 
effectively render superfluous amendments made by this same 
legislation to . . . FEHA.”  (Brennon B., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 401.)  If any violation of the ADA were a violation of the Unruh 
Civil Rights Act, a violation of title I of the ADA, which prohibits 
disability discrimination in employment, would also violate the 
Unruh Civil Rights Act.  But the Legislature went out of its way 
to incorporate title I of the ADA into FEHA; if Brennon’s 
interpretation were correct, those changes to FEHA would be 
rendered “meaningless surplusage.”  (Ibid.; see also Bass v. 
County of Butte (9th Cir. 2006) 458 F.3d 978, 982 (Bass) [noting 
that this argument “would create a significant disharmony” 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
37 
between the Unruh Civil Rights Act and FEHA and “create an 
end-run around the administrative procedures of FEHA solely 
for disability discrimination claimants”].)  We seek to avoid 
“interpretations that render any language surplusage.”  
(Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley (2015) 60 
Cal.4th 1086, 1097.)  Accordingly, we reject the idea that “any 
violation of the ADA by any person or entity is also a violation 
of the [Unruh] Act.”  (Brennon B., at p. 398.)   
Brennon and amici curiae highlight several federal cases 
that have concluded that “the Unruh Act has adopted the full 
expanse of the ADA.”  (Presta v. Peninsula Corridor Joint 
Powers Bd. (N.D.Cal. 1998) 16 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1135.)  But once 
again, these federal cases fail to persuade, in light of what is 
compelled by the legislative history and reinforced by our prior 
cases.  The federal cases cited by Brennon and the amici curiae 
who support his position engage in no — or very little — 
analysis of the relationship between the Unruh Civil Rights Act 
and the ADA, the legislative history of Assembly Bill 1077, or 
our prior caselaw.  (See, e.g., Lentini v. California Center for the 
Arts, Escondido (9th Cir. 2004) 370 F.3d 837, 847 [concluding 
that “the Unruh Act has adopted the full expanse of the ADA”]; 
K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist. (9th Cir. 2013) 
725 F.3d 1088, 1094, fn.1 [“[u]nder California law, ‘a violation of 
the ADA is, per se, a violation of the Unruh Act,’ ” quoting 
Lentini]; Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc. (9th Cir. 2007) 481 F.3d 724, 
731 [noting, without any analysis, that “[a]ny violation of the 
ADA necessarily constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act”]; 
Cohen v. City of Culver City (9th Cir. 2014) 754 F.3d 690, 701 [“a 
violation of the ADA constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act”]; 
Presta, at p. 1135 [concluding that “all violations of the ADA are 
actionable under the Unruh Act” and citing an unpublished 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
38 
district court case as support for that proposition]; R.N. v. Travis 
Unified Sch. Dist. (E.D.Cal., Dec. 8, 2020, No. 2:20-CV-00562-
KJM-JDP) 2020 WL 7227561, at *10.)   
Notably, the federal case that did “undert[ake] a thorough 
examination” (Brennon B., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 407) of 
the legislative history of Assembly Bill 1077 and our prior 
decisions, also rejected the argument that Assembly Bill 1077 
incorporated the complete expanse of the ADA (see Bass, supra, 
458 F.3d at p. 983 [reading the amendment “in the context of 
California’s overall scheme of statutory protections against 
discrimination” and noting “the absence of any express 
indication by the state legislature that it intended . . . to 
drastically expand the [statute’s] subject matter,” to conclude 
that the Unruh Civil Rights Act includes “only those provisions 
of the ADA that are germane to [its] original subject matter”]).  
Like the Court of Appeal, we conclude that Bass “correctly 
analyzed Civil Code section 51, subdivision (f)” and rightly 
concluded “that it expressly makes any violation of the ADA by 
a business establishment a violation of the [Unruh Civil Rights 
Act].”  (Brennon B., at p. 408.) 
Accordingly, we reject the contention that — even if it is 
not acting as a business establishment under subdivision (b) of 
section 51 — a school district can still be sued for discrimination 
by virtue of subdivision (f) of that section, which makes 
violations of the ADA violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.  
Instead, subdivision (f) means that “any violation of the ADA by 
a business establishment is also a violation of the [Unruh Civil 
Rights Act].”  (Brennon B., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 398.)   
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
39 
C.  
Brennon asks the court to consider whether Unruh Civil 
Rights Act remedies have been incorporated into the relevant 
provisions of the Education Code, such that he is entitled to the 
Act’s enhanced penalties, even if the District is not subject to 
liability as a business establishment.  He asserts that a 1998 
Education Code amendment, stating that Education Code 
remedies “may be combined” with certain other statutory 
remedies (Ed. Code, § 201, subd. (g)), means that schools subject 
to the Education Code are also subject to the enhanced penalties 
made available under the Unruh Civil Rights Act.  In this way, 
Brennon argues that the 1998 Education Code amendment 
essentially incorporated the Act’s penalties into the Education 
Code.  The District contends this question is beyond the scope of 
review.   
The Court of Appeal below did not address the Education 
Code argument Brennon now asserts (that Unruh Civil Rights 
Act remedies have been incorporated into the Education Code), 
but it did analyze a different Education Code argument he 
asserted below:  whether the 1998 Education Code amendment 
“demonstrates California public school districts are business 
establishments under the Act.”  (Brennon B., supra, 57 
Cal.App.5th at p. 393.)  In other words, below, Brennon asserted 
that the language of Education Code section 201, subdivision (g) 
indicated the Legislature intended to treat public school 
districts as “business establishments” under the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act; now, he asserts that — even if the District is not 
subject to Unruh Civil Rights Act liability as a business 
establishment — he can nonetheless seek the Act’s enhanced 
remedies because those remedies have been incorporated into 
the Education Code.   
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
40 
We agree with the Court of Appeal that the amended 
language of Education Code section 201 “does not say public 
school districts are business establishments under the Unruh 
Act.”  (Brennon B., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 396.)  Like the 
court below, we find that bringing public school districts within 
the ambit of the Unruh Civil Rights Act would have exceeded 
the stated intention behind the 1998 amendment and been in 
tension with the Legislature’s professed goal of mitigating 
litigation costs for schools.10  (Id. at pp. 393–397.)  Additionally, 
we are not persuaded — in light of the mootness of this case in 
which no Education Code claim was pleaded — to reach the 
 
10  
Numerous legislative committees noted that the 1998 
amendment “d[id] not redefine or expand existing non-
discrimination statutes.”  (Sen. Appropriations Com., Fiscal 
Summary, Assem. Bill No. 499 (1997–1998 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended July 22, 1998, p. 1; see also, e.g., Assem. 
Appropriations Com., Fiscal Summary, Assem. Bill No. 499 
(1997–1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 22, 1998, p. 1 [same].)  
In addition, there was little or no discussion of potential 
financial liabilities for public entities in any of the fiscal 
analyses of the amendment available in the bill’s legislative 
history.  (See, e.g., Dept. of Finance, Enrolled Bill Report on 
Assem. Bill No. 499 (1997–1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 22, 
1998, p. 1 [“No fiscal impact.  Potential savings to educational 
institutions if they are able to resolve problems administratively 
during the waiting period”].)  This is notable because the fiscal 
impact of Brennon’s proposed interpretation — that the 
amendment to the Education Code would have allowed public 
school districts to be sued under the Unruh Civil Rights Act for 
the first time — would have been significant.  Moreover, 
Brennon’s argument on this point is even less convincing than 
it was in the context of subdivision (f) of section 51, as this 
argument would make school districts liable for all forms of 
discrimination (not just disability discrimination), without any 
discussion of such a sweeping change anywhere in the 
legislative history. 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
41 
remedy-incorporation theory Brennon now raises for the first 
time. 
D.  
Brennon asks us to decide whether his second amended 
complaint can be amended to state a cause of action under the 
Unruh Civil Rights Act or Education Code.  However, as he 
concedes, because “the parties hav[e] settled, the question may 
be moot as to them.”  The question of whether Brennon could 
have amended a complaint that has since been dismissed is 
entirely theoretical at this juncture.  Accordingly, the court does 
not decide this issue.  (See People ex rel. Lynch v. Superior 
Court (1970) 1 Cal.3d 910, 912, citing Cal. Const., art. III, § 1; 
art. VI, §§ 10, 11 [“The rendering of advisory opinions falls 
within neither the functions nor the jurisdiction of this court”].)   
E. 
We again emphasize that our resolution of the legal issues 
before us does not turn upon our personal views about the 
wisdom of the statutes at issue or the question of whether they 
provide sufficient protection to those who suffer discrimination; 
instead we are tasked with resolving a question of statutory 
interpretation.  (See, e.g., Warfield, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 598.)  
As the parties and the amici curiae make clear, there are 
exceedingly 
compelling, 
yet 
competing, 
policy 
concerns 
implicated by this case.  Policy arguments, no matter how 
persuasive, cannot overcome a clear legislative intent derived 
from statutory text and appropriate extrinsic sources.  
Nevertheless, we briefly address some of the arguments here, 
given the extensive emphasis placed on them in the briefing. 
Brennon asserts that including public school districts 
within the category of “business establishments” would help to 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
42 
vindicate students’ rights, support the state’s policy against 
discrimination, promote the full integration of people with 
disabilities into public life, and ensure the safety of students in 
California’s public schools.  (See Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. 
(a)(7) [students “have the right to be safe and secure in their 
persons”]; see also C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School 
Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 870, fn. 3 [noting “the fundamental 
public policy favoring measures to ensure the safety of 
California’s public school students”].)  We acknowledge that 
discrimination in California, including within public schools, 
continues to be a cause for considerable concern and attention, 
and its elimination remains a key policy focus.  (See City of 
Moorpark v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1143, 1161 
[“discrimination based on disability . . . violates a ‘substantial 
and fundamental’ public policy”].)   
Brennon further argues that because the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act is one of the few statutes to provide for the recovery 
of both damages and attorney fees, it is uniquely well equipped 
to make private enforcement actions feasible.  (See Woodland 
Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 
933 [“without some mechanism authorizing the award of 
attorney fees, private actions to enforce such important public 
policies will as a practical matter frequently be infeasible”].)  He 
contends that, compared to other antidiscrimination laws, the 
remedies available under the Act are significant; Brennon 
argues that a successful plaintiff can aggregate statutory 
penalties for each and every offense, recovering treble damages 
for each one (a proposition the District disputes); that the Act 
imposes a statutory damage floor of $4,000 (even if actual 
damages are less); and that the Act allows only the prevailing 
plaintiff (but not prevailing defendants) to recover attorney fees.   
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
43 
Amici curiae supporting Brennon’s position also note that 
advocates have often used the possibility of having to pay 
damages and attorney fees to encourage school districts to 
institute systemic changes — prior to any litigation — by 
amending or eliminating harmful school policies and practices.  
And amici curiae argue that the inability to pursue statutory 
penalties and attorney fees will make discrimination cases too 
costly (and therefore too risky), such that attorneys will be 
unwilling to handle many of these kinds of cases.  In light of the 
fact that, according to amici curiae, California public schools 
serve 749,295 students with disabilities (meaning one in eight 
California public school students has a disability), and the fact 
that, according to amici curiae, those children face increased 
rates of assault, bullying and harassment, high rates of 
segregation from other students, and heightened rates of 
excessive use of force by law enforcement and school authorities, 
the importance of these considerations cannot be overstated.   
For its part, the District argues, invoking Wells, that “in 
light of the stringent revenue, appropriations, and budget 
restraints under which all California governmental entities 
operate” (Wells, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1193), subjecting public 
school districts to financial liabilities does not come without 
significant drawbacks and doing so could impede the ability of 
local governments (and the state) to provide free public 
education.11  As evinced by the passage of Assembly Bill 499, 
 
11  
The District’s point about the significant fiscal impact of 
Brennon’s position is further underscored by the fact that 
several of the policy arguments advanced by Brennon and the 
amici supporting him extend well beyond the public education 
context and seemingly apply to all public entity defendants.  
 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
44 
which imposed a 60-day cooling-off period before civil remedies 
may be pursued against a school district, the Legislature has 
expressed concern about — and acted to reduce — litigation 
costs for public schools.  In addition, public entities like school 
districts remain subject to other antidiscrimination laws.  (See, 
e.g., Brennon B., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 370 [noting “the 
panoply of antidiscrimination statutes” to which public school 
districts are subject, including those in the Education Code (Ed. 
Code, § 200 et seq.), the Government Code (Gov. Code, § 11135), 
and various federal laws (42 U.S.C. § 1983; 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et 
seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.)].)  Although — as amici curiae 
point out — those laws may not afford the same remedies made 
available by the Unruh Civil Rights Act and may be more 
difficult to litigate,12 “that circumstance cannot justify 
extending the scope of the Unruh Civil Rights Act further than 
its language reasonably will bear.”  (Curran, supra, 17 Cal.4th 
at p. 701; cf. Wells, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 1195–1196 [“The 
Legislature is aware of the stringent revenue, budget, and 
 
Taken to their rational endpoint, such arguments would 
significantly expand the scope of the Act’s coverage provision 
and undermine the “business establishments” limitation 
written into the statutory text — a limitation we are not 
permitted to read out of the statute in response to policy 
arguments.   
12  
For example, pursuant to subdivision (f) of section 51,  a 
plaintiff may recover statutory damages under the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act without proving that the defendant’s discrimination 
was intentional, while under title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must 
succeed in proving intentional discrimination to recover 
monetary damages.  (Compare Munson, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 
670 [explaining recovery under the Unruh Civil Rights Act] with 
Duvall v. County of Kitsap (9th Cir. 2001) 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 
[explaining recovery under title II of the ADA].) 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
45 
appropriations 
limitations 
affecting 
all 
agencies 
of 
government — and public school districts in particular.  Given 
these conditions, we cannot lightly presume an intent to [subject 
these entities to large financial liabilities].  Such a diversion of 
limited taxpayer funds would interfere significantly with 
government agencies’ fiscal ability to carry out their public 
missions,” fn. omitted].)   
The proper balancing of these competing priorities is 
ultimately and unquestionably “a policy issue that lies within 
the province of the legislative, rather than the judicial, branch.”  
(Curran, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 701.)  As we have noted before, 
subject to constitutional constraints, the Legislature may 
“extend the provisions of the Unruh Civil Rights Act to 
additional entities” or “enact new legislative measures to 
address any gaps or inadequacies that it finds in the current 
statutory provisions.”  (Ibid.)  It may also decide that it is 
preferable to maintain existing limitations on the liability of 
public entities.  Some states have decided to include schools and 
public 
school 
districts 
in 
their 
definitions 
of 
public 
accommodations,13 while others have continued to exclude 
them14 — it appears, however, that the several states that have 
 
13  
See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-5(l) (including “any 
kindergarten, primary and secondary school, trade or business 
school, high school, academy, college and university” in its 
definition of public accommodation).  
14  
See, e.g., Whitman-Singh v. Comm’n on Human Rights 
and Opportunities (Conn.Super.Ct., Nov. 22, 2021, No. 
HHBCV206061006S) 2021 WL 5912321, at *1 (concluding that 
“a public school is not a place of public accommodation” because 
“the phrase ‘place of public accommodation’ has a long-settled 
meaning” that “refers to private establishments, enterprises and 
 
BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
46 
recognized public schools or public entities as public 
accommodations have done so expressly via statute, not through 
court decisions.  As described above (see fn. 6, ante), the 
Legislature 
recently 
enacted 
new 
accommodation 
and 
antidiscrimination protections for certain groups of public 
school students, and it is free to enact additional protections 
against discrimination in the future.  But we conclude that the 
Unruh Civil Rights Act as currently written cannot reasonably 
be interpreted to encompass public school districts in situations 
such as this one. 
III. 
 
For the reasons discussed above, neither subdivision (b) 
nor subdivision (f) of section 51 enables Brennon to proceed 
against the District under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, nor does 
the reference to the Act in the Education Code.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal denying the petition 
for writ of mandate. 
GROBAN, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
GUERRERO, J. 
 
organizations that cater or offer their services and facilities to 
the general public” and “does not include government entities”); 
Gandy v. Howard County Bd. of Educ. (D.Md. Sept. 1, 2021. 
GLR-20-3436) 2021 WL 3911892, at *10  (concluding that a 
Maryland public school is not a place of public accommodation).   
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Brennon B. v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 57 Cal.App.5th 367 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S266254 
Date Filed:  August 4, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Contra Costa  
Judge:  Charles S. Treat 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Liberty Law Office, Micha Star Liberty; and Alan Charles Dell’Ario for 
Petitioner. 
 
The Arkin Law Firm, Sharon J. Arkin; Law Offices of Charles S. 
Roseman & Associates, Charles S. Roseman, Richard D. Prager; Law 
Offices Of Frank M. Nunes and Frank M. Nunes for Consumer 
Attorneys of California, Thomas Emmanuel Akande, Anahi Alfaro, 
Maria "Nikki" Cantos, Jasmine Castaneda, Taylor Chumley, Omar 
Estrada, Annadina Garcia, Gabriel Garcia, Diego Guzman, Bao Her, 
Ana Landeros, Helizabela Lee, Caitlyn Lindley, Alexis Lopez, Jorge 
Lopez-Pardo, Bailey Matney, Bolivar Quezadas, Abdiel Rosales, Myra 
Rubio, Rina Saengkeo, Arianna Singh, Narinderp Al Singh, Oleksandr 
Volyk and Amy Zendejas as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
Linda D. Kilb and Claudia Center for Disability Rights Education & 
Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
 
 
Jinny Kim and Alexis Alvarez for AIDS Legal Referral Panel, Arc of 
California, Association on Higher Education and Disability, California 
Association for Parent-Child Advocacy, Civil Rights Education and 
Enforcement Center, Communication First, Disability Rights 
Advocates, Disability Rights California, Disability Rights Legal 
Center, Impact Fund, Legal Aid at Work, Mental Health Advocacy 
Services and Public Law Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Petitioner. 
 
Victor Leung, Ana Mendoza, Ariana Rodriguez; Brandon Greene, 
Linnea Nelson, Grayce Zelphin; and Melissa DeLeon for American 
Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, American Civil Liberties 
Union of Northern California, American Civil Liberties Union of San 
Diego and Imperial Counties, Alliance for Children’s Rights, California 
Rural Legal Assistance, Collective for Liberatory Lawyering, East Bay 
Community Law Center, Equal Justice Society, Law Foundation of 
Silicon Valley, Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights of the San 
Francisco Bay Area, Learning Rights Law Center, National Center for 
Youth Law, Neighborhood Legal Services of Los Angeles County, 
Public Advocates, Public Counsel and Youth Justice Education 
Clinic—Loyola Law School as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Edrington, Schirmer & Murphy, Timothy P. Murphy, Cody Lee Saal; 
Clyde & Co US, Douglas J. Collodel and Alison K. Beanum for Real 
Parties in Interest. 
 
Dannis Woliver Kelley, Sue Ann Salmon Evans, David A. Obrand; 
Keith J. Bray and Robert Tuerck for Education Legal Alliance of the 
California School Boards Association and the California Association of 
Joint Power Authorities as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in 
Interest West Contra Costa Unified School District.  
 
Richard S. Linkert and Madison M. Simmons for Schools Insurance 
Authority as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest West 
Contra Costa Unified School District.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Alan Charles Dell’Ario 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 359 
Napa, CA 94559 
(707) 666-5351 
 
Cody Lee Saal 
Edrington, Schirmer & Murphy, LLP 
2300 Contra Costa Boulevard, Suite 450 
Pleasant Hill, CA 94523 
(925) 827-3300