Case Title: ESTATE OF ELSIE M. JEDRZEJEWSKI, by and through the Personal Representative, DAVID G. SEVERN V. JANET L. BIERMA

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0268

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
ESTATE OF ELSIE M. JEDRZEJEWSKI, by and through the Personal Representative, DAVID G. SEVERN V. JANET L. BIERMA2008 WY 151197 P.3d 1254Case Number: S-07-0268Decided: 12/18/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
ESTATE 
OF ELSIE M. JEDRZEJEWSKI, by and through the Personal Representative, DAVID G. 
SEVERN,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.JANET L. 
BIERMA,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Susan 
L. Feinman and Laura J. Jackson of Long Reimer Winegar LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Alexander 
K. Davison of Patton & Davison, Cheyenne, Wyoming; William D. Bagley of 
Bagley, Karpan, Rose & White LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming 

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Elsie 
Jedrzejewski, through her estate, is appealing the district court's decision 
upholding a deed of her residence in favor of Janet Bierma.  Jedrzejewski alleges Bierma obtained her 
signature on the deed by wrongful act.  
She also claims the deed is unenforceable due to lack of consideration 
and lack of proper notarization.  
Finding no error in the district court's decision, we 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Jedrzejewski 
presents three issues for review:

 
 

A.                 
Did 
the District Court err when it declared as a matter of law that the Appellant 
[sic] holds title to the property described in the 1997 deed purportedly signed 
by the Appellant in favor of the Appellee ("purported deed") despite the lack of 
acknowledgement or of proper acknowledgement pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
§34-1-113?

 
 

B.                 
Did 
the District Court err when it concluded as a matter of law that the purported 
deed is a valid contract between the Appellant and the Appellee despite the lack 
of consideration paid by the Appellee to the Appellant for the 
property?

 
 

C.                
Did 
the District Court err when it concluded as a matter of law that the purported 
deed is a valid contract between the Appellant and the Appellee despite evidence 
that the Appellee obtained the Appellant's signature on the purported deed 
through a wrongful act?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Bierma is 
Jedrzejewski's stepdaughter.  
Jedrzejewski married Bierma's father in the early 1980's.  Bierma's father died a few years 
later.  After his death, 
Jedrzejewski and Bierma maintained a close relationship.  Jedrzejewski spent holidays with Bierma 
and went on vacations with her.  
When Bierma moved to Wyoming, Jedrzejewski followed to remain close 
to her.  Upon arrival in Wyoming in 1995, 
Jedrzejewski bought the house at issue in this case.  

 
 
[¶4]      In March of 1997, 
Jedrzejewski underwent successful surgery to remove a benign brain tumor.  In May 1997, Jedrzejewski, with Bierma's 
help, reviewed and updated her estate plan.  This included updating her will. 
Jedrzejewski also signed the title of her automobile over to Bierma.  The will was signed by Jedrzejewski and 
purportedly notarized on May 29, 1997.  
The automobile title was signed by Jedrzejewski and purportedly notarized 
on May 22, 1997.  

 
 
[¶5]      Also on May 22, 
1997, a general power of attorney and a warranty deed from Jedrzejewski to 
Bierma were signed and purportedly notarized.  Jedrzejewski testified she never signed 
either document.  She thought her 
signature might have been forged by Bierma.  Bierma, on the other hand, testified 
Jedrzejewski was concerned about potential future creditors attaching her 
property.  In order to avoid this, 
Jedrzejewski, of her own volition, decided to deed her house to Bierma.  Bierma understood that deeding the house 
to her was only an estate planning mechanism.  Jedrzejewski would maintain possession 
of the house and pay all related bills until her death.  Bierma paid no consideration for the 
deed and Jedrzejewski did, in fact, remain in the house, paying all 
bills.

 
 
[¶6]      Bierma testified 
Jedrzejewski signed all three documents  the power of attorney, warranty deed 
to the house, and title to the automobile  in her presence and in the presence 
of a notary on May 22, 1997.  These 
three documents, along with Jedrzejewski's will dated May 29, 1997, were 
purportedly notarized by a notarial officer whose notary commission had expired 
in November 1995.  

 
 
[¶7]      Jedrzejewski 
testified she first discovered the deed to her house was in Bierma's name in 
2001.  She did not, however, 
confront Bierma about this. According to Jedrzejewski's testimony, she and 
Bierma maintained a friendly and trusting relationship.  Their relationship changed, however, in 
March 2002 when they stopped speaking.  
According to Jedrzejewski's testimony, nothing untoward happened.  According to Bierma's testimony, 
Jedrzejewski became upset because Bierma's adult son was staying with her but 
was not helping with any household expenses.  Bierma had told Jedrzejewski from the 
beginning not to let her son move in with her.  An argument ensued, and Jedrzejewski 
stopped talking to Bierma, refusing to return Bierma's telephone calls. 

 
 
[¶8]      This action was 
begun in May 2006 when Jedrzejewski filed a complaint requesting the district 
court quiet title to her house in her name.  After a bench trial, the district court 
ruled against Jedrzejewski.  After 
the decision letter was issued, but before the final order was entered, 
Jedrzejewski passed away.  Her 
estate was substituted as the complaining party.  The estate now appeals the district 
court's ruling.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶9]      This Court 
applies a clearly erroneous standard when reviewing findings of fact made by the 
district court after a bench trial.  
A finding is clearly erroneous when, even though substantial evidence 
supports it, the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake was made.  

 
 
We 
do not substitute ourselves for the trial court as a finder of facts; instead, 
we defer to the trial court's findings unless they are unsupported by the record 
or erroneous as a matter of law.  
Although the factual findings of a trial court are not entitled to the 
limited review afforded a jury verdict, the findings are presumptively 
correct.  

            

            
This Court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the 
record, but we do not reweigh the evidence.  Due regard is given to the opportunity 
of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses.  We accept the prevailing party's evidence 
as true and give to that evidence every favorable inference which may fairly and 
reasonably be drawn from it.  
Findings may not be set aside because we would have reached a different 
result.  

 
 

Snelling 
v. Roman, 2007 
WY 49, ¶¶ 7-8, 154 P.3d 341, 345 (Wyo. 2007) (citations omitted).  See also Garrison v. CC Builders, Inc., 
2008 WY 34, ¶ 22, 179 P.3d 867, 873-74 (Wyo. 2008).  We review legal conclusions de 
novo.  Campbell County School Dist. v. State, 
2008 WY 2, ¶ 10, 181 P.3d 43, 49 (Wyo. 2008); Mullinnix LLC v. HKB Royalty Trust, 2006 
WY 14, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 909, 916 (Wyo. 2006).  

 
 
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 
 
[¶10]   Because Jedrzejewski relies upon 
her version of the facts to support her arguments in her other two issues, we 
will review the district court's factual determinations first.  Jedrzejewski argues she had no intention 
of conveying the property to Bierma and Bierma must have forged the deed or 
otherwise committed fraud to obtain the deed.  The district court ruled otherwise.  The district court expressly found "the 
conveyance of Elsie M. Jedrzejewski's residence to Janet L. Bierma was not 
induced by fraud or undue influence."  
This factual finding is presumptively correct.  

 
 
[¶11]   In reviewing Jedrzejewski's 
appellate argument in light of the record, we are unconvinced that this finding 
is clearly erroneous.  Jedrzejewski 
and Bierma offered almost diametrically opposed testimony.  The factual findings therefore came down 
to a determination of credibility.  
The district court was in the best position to make this 
determination.  Given the trial 
testimony and other evidence, we have no reason to question the district court's 
implicit credibility determination and subsequent evidentiary 
ruling.

 
 
Lack 
of Proper Acknowledgment

 
 
[¶12]   Jedrzejewski earnestly argues the 
lack of proper acknowledgment renders the deed void ab initio.  She bases her argument on Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 34-1-113, which in part requires the execution of all deeds be 
acknowledged by the party or parties executing the same before a notarial 
officer.  There is no question the 
instant deed was not acknowledged by an authorized notarial officer.  The pertinent inquiry, therefore, 
regards the consequence of the lack of proper notarization, i.e., whether the deed really is void ab 
initio as argued by Jedrzejewski.  

 
 
[¶13]   Dating back to 1882, the precursors 
to the current statute always have required some form of acknowledgment.1  In construing the respective statutory 
language, this Court has consistently held an improperly executed interest in 
real property is not void ab initio.  
The lack of proper acknowledgement prevents the instrument from being 
recorded, thereby protecting third parties who afterwards may acquire an 
interest in the property.  The 
instrument is valid, however, as between the parties to the 
instrument:

 
 
The 
trust deed in question was defectively executed, and was not entitled to 
record.  Although recorded, the 
record was not constructive notice to any one of its contents.  It is not a legal mortgage, but is 
effective between the parties as an equitable mortgage.  The informality in the execution of the 
trust deed in question is that there is no subscribing witness, as required by 
statute, and that the acknowledgment is by the president alone, whereas the 
acknowledgment of the secretary is also necessary, as one of the parties 
authorized by the resolution of the board of trustees of the company to execute 
the trust deed, and as the party having custody of the corporate seal.  As between the parties, the following 
seems to be a correct and comprehensive statement of the law applicable to such 
cases:  "A mortgage or trust deed 
which cannot be enforced by a sale under the power, or by a judgment of 
foreclosure, on account of some informality [in a matter] requisite to a 
complete mortgage or deed of trust, will nevertheless be regarded as an 
equitable mortgage, and the lien will be enforced by special proceedings in 
equity.  The attempt to create a 
security in legal form upon specific property having failed, effect is given to 
the intention of the parties, and the lien enforced as an equitable 
mortgage.  Any agreement between the 
parties in interest that shows an intention to create a lien may be, in equity, 
a mortgage.  As stated by Judge 
Story, If a transaction resolve itself into a security, whatever may be its 
form, and whatever name the parties may choose to give it, it is, in equity, a 
mortgage.  Effect has been given in 
this way to a deed of trust in which the name of the trustee was accidentally 
omitted; to one from which a seal was omitted by mistake; to one sealed in fact, 
but not expressed to be sealed; to one imperfectly acknowledged, or not 
acknowledged at all, or not witnessed as a deed of real estate is required to 
be.  But it seems effect will not be 
given to a mortgage witnessed, acknowledged, and recorded, but not signed by the 
mortgagor."'  Jones, Mortg. § 
168.  

 
 

Frank 
v. Hicks, 
4 Wyo. 502, 
513-14, 35 P. 475, 477 (1894).  

 
 
[¶14]   This holding has been followed over 
the years in such cases as Conradt v. 
Lepper, 13 Wyo. 473, 485, 81 P. 307, 308 (1905) (the requirements of a 
witness and acknowledgement "is necessary to admit the instrument to record, but 
does not affect its validity as between the parties"); Huber v. Glenrock State Bank, 32 Wyo. 
357, 374, 231 P. 63, 69 (1925) (even if unwitnessed, "[t]he deed would in any 
event be good between the parties"); and Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyoming Agency, 63 Wyo. 
187, 200, 179 P.2d 773, 776 (1947) (the validity of an improperly witnessed deed 
is "not an open question in this state;" it is valid as between the 
parties).  We have carefully 
reviewed Jedrzejewski's arguments, but are not persuaded to alter the current 
and long-standing state of the law.  
The lack of proper acknowledgement is no bar to the enforcement of the 
deed as between Jedrzejewski and Bierma.2  

 
 
Lack 
of Consideration

 
 
[¶15]   Regarding lack of consideration, 
the rule is that a deed is good without consideration, in the absence of some 
wrongful act on the part of the grantee, such as fraud or undue influence.  Strom v. Felton, 706 Wyo. 370, 385, 302 P.2d 917, 922 (1956) (citing 26 C.J.S., Deeds, § 16, pp. 189, 190).  See Wayt v. Urbigkit, 2007 WY 34, ¶ 20, 152 P.3d 1057, 1062 (Wyo. 2007); Walsh v. 
Walsh, 841 P.2d 831, 837 (Wyo. 1992); Maurer v. Ballou, 440 P.2d 126, 128 
(Wyo. 
1968).  Predictably, Jedrzejewski 
argues her evidence supports a finding of wrongdoing on the part of Bierma.  We have already disposed of this 
argument.  Consequently, the deed is 
good as between Jedrzejewski and Bierma despite the lack of consideration. 

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶16]   We find no error in the district 
court's decision.  Under the facts 
and circumstances of this case, we find the factual decision by the district 
court that Bierma did not engage in any wrongdoing in the initiation and 
execution of the deed is not clearly erroneous.  Since there was no wrongdoing, the deed 
is valid as between Jedrzejewski and Bierma despite the lack of proper 
acknowledgment and the lack of consideration.

 
 
[¶17]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Compare 1882 
Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 1, § 8: 

            
Deeds, mortgages or conveyances of lands or any interest in lands, 
executed within this Territory, shall be executed in the presence of one witness 
who shall subscribe the same as such, and the person executing such deed, 
mortgage or conveyance, shall acknowledge the execution thereof before any judge 
or clerk of a court of record, or before any county clerk, justice of the peace 
or notary public within the Territory, and the officer taking such 
acknowledgment shall endorse thereon a certificate of the acknowledgement 
thereof, and the true date of making the same, under his hand, and seal of 
office, if there be one.

 
 
 with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-113 (LexisNexis 2007): 

            
Execution of deeds, mortgages or other conveyances of lands, or any 
interest in lands, shall be acknowledged by the party or parties executing same, 
before any judge or clerk of a court of record, or before any United States 
magistrate appointed under and by authority of the laws of the United States, or 
any county clerk, district court commissioner, notary public, or other officer 
authorized under the laws of the state of Wyoming to take such acknowledgments, 
and the officer taking such acknowledgment shall endorse thereon a certificate 
of the acknowledgment thereof, and the true date of making the same, under his 
hand and seal of office, if there be one.

 
 
Section 
34-1-113 was amended in 2008 to read: "Execution of deeds, mortgages or other 
conveyances of lands, or any interest in lands, shall be acknowledged by the 
party or parties executing same, before any notarial officer.  The notarial officer taking such 
acknowledgment shall comply with the requirements of W.S. 
34-26-107."

 
 

2In a separate issue not 
identified in the Statement of Issues, Jedrzejewski contends the rule regarding 
acknowledgment does not apply because she did not intend to convey the property 
to Bierma.  She asserts the deed, 
therefore, is unenforceable on a contractual basis.  This argument is of no avail since it 
runs counter to the facts as found by the district 
court.