Case Title: Porth v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-02-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Porth v. State1994 WY 9868 P.2d 236Case Number: 92-263Decided: 02/03/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming

Kevin 
Charles PORTH, a/k/a Steven Joseph Eger, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District Court, Albany County, Arthur 
T. Hanscum, J.

Public Defender Program, 
Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Deborah Cornia, Appellate Counsel, 
Cheyenne, for 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., 
Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Barbara L. Boyer, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Mary 
Beth Wolff, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and 
TAYLOR, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Kevin 
Porth was convicted by a jury for conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery 
pursuant to WYO. STAT. §§ 6-2-401(c)(ii) and 6-1-303(a)(1988). He was sentenced 
to no less than seventeen years and no longer than twenty-five years at the 
state penitentiary. His appeal raises issues concerning co-conspirator 
testimony, warrantless arrest and sufficiency of 
evidence.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant 
presents the following issues on appeal:

I. Did the trial court err when it required a witness 
whom the trial court and prosecution knew would exercise his fifth amendment 
right to remain silent to take the stand and have the jury observe that 
invocation?

II. Did the prosecution's disclosure during trial 
that the co-conspirator had been adjudicated guilty for the same offense as 
appellant, constitute reversible error?

III. Did the trial court err when it ruled that the 
proposed testimony of the private investigator was inadmissible hearsay? 

IV. Did the trial court err by refusing to grant 
witness immunity to a material defense witness?

V. Did the trial court err when it denied appellant's 
motion to suppress all evidence obtained after the warrantless arrest of the 
appellant when the arrest was made without probable cause?

VI. Was sufficient evidence produced at trial by the 
prosecutor to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime of 
conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery?

[¶4]      The state 
rephrases the issues as:

I. Whether the trial court properly allowed the 
testimony of the co-conspirator, Troy Marker, and properly found Mr. Marker 
available as a witness?

II. Whether appellant's arrest was based on 
sufficient probable cause?

III. Whether sufficient evidence was presented to 
sustain appellant's conviction?

FACTS

[¶5]      At about nine 
o'clock on the evening of May 26, 1992, two men wearing ski masks entered the 
Village Inn Restaurant in Laramie, Wyoming. One man carried a shotgun and the 
other carried a knife. Only two employees were in the restaurant at the time. 
Later, each described one of the men as large, muscular, with long dark hair 
which hung below the bottom of a dark ski mask, and wearing a dark t-shirt. Each 
described the other man as shorter, stout, also with long hair, wearing a yellow 
or orange ski mask and a reddish t-shirt.

[¶6]      The cashier was 
ordered by the larger robber to show him a safe located in the office. She was 
unable to open the safe and no money was taken. While the larger robber was in 
the office, the other robber warned the other employee not to go out the back 
door because she would be shot by another individual at the back door. The two 
men then took money from the cash register drawer and 
fled.

[¶7]      The police were 
called and a description was issued over the radio to officers in the area. 
Within minutes of the robbery, police were searching the area for two 
young-sounding, long-haired suspects armed with a sawed-off shotgun and a knife. 
The cashier reported that although it was raining heavily at the time, both 
robbers were dry. Neither employee heard nor saw a car either before the robbery 
or after the robbers fled.

[¶8]      The Travel Inn, a 
motel, is located next to the restaurant. There is a sidewalk from the motel to 
the front door of the restaurant which is protected by an awning. Since the 
robbers were dry and a car was not observed, the police contacted the manager of 
the motel and asked if anyone matching the robbers' general description was 
staying there. The manager confirmed that two young men matching the description 
had checked in at about 2:00 p.m. that day. Their registration card was signed 
Jim and Jesse James. It had an incomplete address and an incorrect car license 
number. The manager had corrected the license number and police confirmed it was 
registered to a Steven Eger, not to a James. Mr. Eger is also known as Kevin 
Porth.

[¶9]      The police went 
to the James' motel room and knocked. They observed someone look at them from 
the front window, but there was no answer. The police continued knocking for 
over fifteen minutes before two men emerged. The two were arrested immediately. 
One was not wearing a shirt and was permitted to reenter the room and put on a 
shirt. At that time police observed several knives. The men refused to permit a 
search, and officers closed the door to the room. A search warrant was obtained 
and executed.

[¶10]   Police recovered five knives, a 
sawed-off shotgun, shotgun shells, a green and black t-shirt, a purple shirt, a 
torn dark blue ski mask and a torn yellowish-orange ski mask, three gloves, a 
box of sunglasses, a driver's license and a birth certificate issued to a Mr. 
Porth, and a driver's license and a birth certificate issued to a Mr. Eger. 
Pieces of the ski masks were found in the toilet. A fingerprint was lifted from 
the chamber of the shotgun and later matched to Porth's 
fingerprints.

[¶11]   The two men were identified as Troy 
Marker and Kevin Porth a/k/a Steve Eger. Both men were charged with aggravated 
robbery. This charge was later amended to conspiracy to commit aggravated 
robbery. Marker pleaded nolo contendere to the charge. Appellant proceeded to a 
jury trial and called Marker to testify that appellant had not been involved in 
the robbery.

[¶12]   Appellant's first four issues arise 
from the circumstances surrounding the testimony of his co-conspirator, Troy 
Marker. The day before trial appellant was informed that Marker would assert his 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination if called as a witness 
because he had been advised his testimony could result in prosecution for the 
underlying aggravated robbery charge. Appellant requested that Marker's 
testimony be taken in court chambers out of the jury's presence. The prosecution 
objected, and the request was denied.

[¶13]   At trial, after the prosecution had 
presented its case, appellant then called Marker to the witness stand and 
although Marker asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege to almost all questions, 
he did answer four questions by appellant's defense counsel, his testimony being 
that appellant had not been involved in the robbery. Marker, however, did not 
relate all exculpatory testimony which he had previously told to a defense 
investigator. When cross-examined by the prosecution, Marker invoked his Fifth 
Amendment privilege.

[¶14]   Appellant requested that Marker be 
declared "unavailable" and the investigator's testimony be admitted under the 
hearsay exception of Wyo.R.Evid. 804(a)(5). The court found that Marker could 
not be declared unavailable since he had answered questions. Appellant had 
requested that the court grant Marker witness immunity. Observing that the court 
did not have this power, the court denied this request. Appellant was convicted 
and this appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

CO-CONSPIRATOR TESTIMONY

[¶15]   Appellant argues reversible error 
occurred when the trial court permitted Troy Marker to take the stand knowing 
the jury would observe Marker invoke his right to remain silent. Although it was 
appellant who called Mr. Marker, appellant now claims the prosecutor's 
cross-examination questions improperly prejudiced him by inviting the jury to 
draw adverse inferences from Marker's refusal to testify.

[¶16]   In support of this argument, 
appellant relies upon two United States Supreme Court opinions1 and three opinions of this court.2 These opinions are not particularly 
applicable to the issue at hand because they address a situation in which the 
prosecutor calls as a witness in his case-in-chief one who was involved with the 
accused in the criminal activity in question and who, the prosecutor knows, will 
invoke his right to remain silent. The evil of such prosecutorial conduct is 
that the jury will draw from the witness's refusal to testify adverse inferences 
that the witness and the accused are guilty. The issue at hand with which we are 
concerned, however, is not the same. Rather, here it was the accused's counsel, 
not the prosecutor, who knowingly called to the stand in the accused's 
case-in-chief the accused's associate to elicit favorable testimony that the 
accused was not involved in the criminal activity for which the associate had 
already been adjudged guilty.

[¶17]   Appellant claims that the 
application of the four criteria3 identified in Jones requires a 
reversal of his conviction. We disagree. The first criterion is whether the 
prosecutor called the witness so that the jury would draw the adverse inference 
of guilt from the witness's refusal to testify. Appellant ignores the essential 
feature of this factor, viz., the prosecutor must call the witness. Here, 
appellant, not the prosecutor, called the witness. Since this essential feature 
is missing, the four-criteria analysis set forth in Jones need not be made 
here.

[¶18]   Although Wyoming has only addressed 
this issue when the prosecutor has called the witness, neither the state nor 
appellant discussed case law from other jurisdictions when the issue involved a 
defense witness who refused to testify. Our own research indicates some 
jurisdictions prohibit the defense from calling a witness the counsel knows will 
invoke the privilege. People v. Dikeman, 192 Colo. 1, 555 P.2d 519, 520 (1976); 
People v. Myers, 35 Ill. 2d 311, 220 N.E.2d 297, 310-11 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1019, 87 S. Ct. 752, 17 L. Ed. 2d 557 (1967); State v. Nunez, 209 N.J. Super. 
127, 506 A.2d 1295, 1298 (A.D. 1986); Commonwealth v. Greene, 445 Pa. 228, 285 A.2d 865, 867 (1971); Horner v. State, 508 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974). 
Other jurisdictions permit the defense to call these witnesses subject to the 
rules of relevancy - 401 to 403. People v. Dyer, 140 Mich. App. 343, 364 N.W.2d 330, 333 (1985); People v. Thomas, 51 N.Y.2d 466, 434 N.Y.S.2d 941, 943-44, 415 N.E.2d 931, 933-34 (1980). All of the case law, however, is clear that the 
defense may not call a witness for the sole purpose of having the witness invoke 
his privilege against self-incrimination before a jury. There is little 
probative value in a witness's refusal to testify and a danger the jury will 
infer that it was the witness who committed the crime rather than the defendant. 
Dikeman, 555 P.2d  at 520; Nunez, 506 A.2d  at 1298; People v. Patrk, 191 A.D.2d 718, 595 N.Y.S.2d 798, 799 (1993).

[¶19]   We hold that the trial court has 
discretion to allow or disallow the defendant to call a witness to the stand who 
the court knows will invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination in the presence of the jury. See United States v. Martin, 526 F.2d 485, 487 (10th Cir. 1975); and Patrk, 595 N.Y.S.2d  at 799. The accused's 
right to present his theory of the case is well established. The state's right 
to cross-examination is required for the accurate determination of guilt or 
innocence, and the scope of cross-examination is a matter within the discretion 
of the trial court. Haworth v. State, 840 P.2d 912, 917-18 (Wyo. 1992); see also 
Stauffer Chemical Co. v. Curry, 778 P.2d 1083, 1102 (Wyo. 1989). The parameters 
of cross-examination will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been an 
abuse of discretion. Loomer v. State, 768 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Wyo. 1989); Amin v. 
State, 695 P.2d 1021, 1027 (Wyo. 1985). To show an abuse of discretion, the 
defendant must show how he was prejudiced by the abuse. 
Id.

[¶20]   As noted earlier, it was the 
accused who called Marker. When Marker refused to answer the first few questions 
by the accused, it was the prosecutor who objected and was overruled. Following 
this objection, defense counsel continued to ask Marker questions, and Marker 
did answer four questions which presented the defense's theory of the 
case:

Q. Mr. Marker, specifically was Kevin Porth involved 
in the robbery at the Village Inn?

A. No, he was not.

Q. Where was, if you know, Kevin Porth during the 
commission of the robbery at the Village Inn?

A. Refuse to answer that 
question.

Q. Do you know whether or not Kevin Porth has got 
problems with a knee?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Could you describe, to the best of your ability, 
the ailment Kevin Porth has with his knee?

A. I don't know exactly. All I know is he is not able 
to really run, stuff like that. That's all I know. I don't know what happened to 
his knee or anything.

Q. Would that have been the case on May 26th of 
1992?

A. Yes, it was.

At that point, Marker 
resumed refusing to answer questions. He declined to answer all 
cross-examination questions by the prosecutor.

[¶21]   Appellant argues that under Jones, 
the content of the prosecutor's cross-examination questions was impermissible 
and constituted reversible error. However, we hold that, because the accused 
called Marker in his case-in-chief and Marker selectively answered questions 
which supported the defense's theory that Porth was not involved in the robbery, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the cross-examination latitude 
it allowed the prosecution. The prosecution was entitled to cross-examine on the 
subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility 
of the witness, and the court limited the cross-examination to its proper 
bounds. Wyo.R.Evid. 611(b).

[¶22]   Appellant also argues it was 
prejudicial and reversible error for the prosecutor to disclose during trial 
that the co-conspirator, Marker, had been adjudicated guilty for the same 
offense for which appellant was standing trial. Appellant relies on Kwallek v. 
State, 596 P.2d 1372 (Wyo. 1979). The concern in Kwallek was whether a plea of 
guilty by another participant to a charge arising out of the same incident could 
be introduced as evidence of the defendant's guilt. This court in Kwallek held 
that it was error to permit the use of such evidence in the prosecution's case 
in chief because of its irrelevance, and that such error was prejudicial. 
Kwallek is distinguishable from this case, and we hold that no error was 
committed in allowing the testimony.

[¶23]   Defense counsel introduced Marker's 
co-conspirator status to the jury in his opening statement, referred again to 
Marker's co-conspirator status during direct examination, and elicited later 
testimony supporting appellant's defense that appellant was not involved in the 
robbery. However, appellant now argues that a single question by the prosecutor 
on cross-examination requires reversal. The prosecutor's single question 
was:

Q. Mr. Marker, are you a convicted felon, adjudicated 
felon in regard to a conspiracy offense that was committed at the Village Inn on 
May 26th, 1992?

A. I decline to answer that 
question.

[¶24]   Where the defense has invited the 
guilty plea testimony by its own introduction, there will only be reversible 
error if the prosecutor's use was not for the permissible limited evidentiary 
purpose of impeaching trial testimony or to reflect on a witness's credibility. 
See United States v. Hernandez, 921 F.2d 1569, 1582 (11th Cir. 1991) cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 2271, 114 L. Ed. 2d 722. The court should look to 
all of the facts and circumstances of the case in their proper context to 
determine whether the use is permissible. Id.

[¶25]   In this case, the co-conspirator 
was testifying for appellant, not against him. The defense informed the jury 
during opening statement that Marker had been sentenced and invited the 
admission of the plea during direct examination by asking Marker if he had also 
been charged in the case. In his closing argument, appellant summarized Marker's 
testimony and articulated how the jury should interpret 
it:

Troy Marker has been sentenced for this. You think if 
Kevin Porth was in on it with him he would want Kevin Porth to go with him. He 
wants to go, you know, have Kevin Porth to go to prison with him. Nope. He 
didn't take that approach. As short as his testimony was, I believe that * * * 
Troy Marker's testimony was credible.

[¶26]   The defense placed Marker's 
credibility in issue and invited the cross-examination testimony. The prosecutor 
questioned the witness for the proper purpose of impeachment. Wyo.R.Evid. 609. 
After its single question, the prosecutor did not refer again to the plea in 
further examination or summation. We conclude the prosecutor did not improperly 
attempt to use Marker's conviction as substantive evidence of appellant's guilt 
by emphasizing the matter or urging the jury to consider it. The prosecutor's 
single question upon cross-examination was proper and there was no error on this 
point. Hernandez, 921 F.2d  at 1583; and see United States v. Chilcote, 724 F.2d 1498, 1503 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1218, 104 S. Ct. 2665, 81 L. Ed. 2d 370; State v. Fendler, 127 Ariz. 464, 622 P.2d 23, 43 (App. 1980), cert. 
denied, 452 U.S. 961, 101 S. Ct. 3108, 69 L. Ed. 2d 971 
(1981).

[¶27]   Appellant next claims that under 
Wyo.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B), Marker's prior consistent statements to a defense 
investigator should have been admitted as nonhearsay. Because appellant argued 
for admission under a different rule, Wyo.R.Evid. 103 requires this court to 
review whether the exclusion of this evidence was plain error which affected the 
substantial rights of appellant. Auclair v. State, 660 P.2d 1156, 1158-59 (Wyo. 
1983). This court has repeated plain error exists when:

1) The record is clear as to the incident which is 
alleged as error;

2) there was a transgression of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law;

3) the party claiming the error proves that a 
substantial right has been denied to him; and

4) the denial of the substantial right materially 
prejudiced him.

Auclair, 660 P.2d  at 1159 
(citation omitted).

[¶28]   First, the record is clear as to 
the incident which is alleged as error because appellant's offer of proof 
reflects the nature of the excluded evidence. However, the second requirement is 
not met.

[¶29]   In pertinent part, Wyo.R.Evid. 
801(d)(1) states:

(d) Statements 
which are not hearsay. - A statement is not hearsay 
if:

(1) Prior statement by witness - the declarant 
testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross examination concerning 
the statement, and the statement is * * *

(B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to 
rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper 
influence or motive * * *.

[¶30]   The language of the rule clearly 
requires a declarant to be subject to cross-examination. The United States 
Supreme Court has determined that a witness who asserts his privilege may not be 
subject to cross-examination as intended by the Federal Rules of 
Evidence:

Ordinarily a witness is regarded as "subject to 
cross-examination" when he is placed on the stand, under oath, and responds 
willingly to questions. Just as with the constitutional prohibitions, 
limitations on the scope of examination by the trial court or assertions of 
privilege by the witness may undermine the process to such a degree that 
meaningful cross-examination within the intent of the Rule no longer 
exists.

United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 561-62, 108 S. Ct. 838, 844, 98 L. Ed. 2d 951, 959 (1988). We agree with 
this analysis as applied to the Wyoming Rules of Evidence. Marker's refusal to 
respond to any cross-examination questions undermined this process to a degree 
which precluded meaningful cross-examination. He was not subject to 
cross-examination as required by Wyo. R.Evid. 801(d)(1) and the rule could not 
apply. There was not plain error.

[¶31]   Appellant next asserts that both 
the trial court and the prosecution had the inherent authority to grant witness 
immunity to Marker and the Sixth Amendment's compulsory process clause of the 
United States Constitution required that it be granted. In Hall v. State, 851 P.2d 1262 (Wyo. 1993), this court determined that a prosecutor does not have 
authority to grant witness immunity unless he is specifically authorized by 
statute. Id. at 1266. The Wyoming legislature has authorized statutory immunity 
in a number of situations, but does not give the judiciary general authority to 
immunize witnesses. Id. Appellant does not cite, and we do not find, authority 
holding that a Wyoming court has inherent authority to immunize. The grant or 
denial of witness immunity is a function of the executive branch of government. 
Id. at 1266, 1267.

[¶32]   Appellant's argument that a Sixth 
Amendment right to witness immunity exists is derived from United States Supreme 
Court cases which held that a defendant has a constitutional right to present 
evidence and his theory of the defense. He cites Washington v. State of Texas, 
388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 1923, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019, 1023 (1967); and Kastigar 
v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S. Ct. 1653, 32 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1972). Appellant 
relies on law review articles as authority for extending those cases as he 
suggests. Peter W. Tague, The Fifth Amendment: If an Aid to the Guilty 
Defendant, an Impediment to the Innocent One, 78 Geo.L.J. 1 (1989); Note, The 
Sixth Amendment Right to Have Use Immunity Granted to Defense Witnesses, 91 
HARV.L.REV. 1266 (1978); Donald Koblitz, Note, "The Public Has a Claim to Every 
Man's Evidence:" The Defendant's Constitutional Right to Witness Immunity, 30 
Stan.L.Rev. 1211 (1978).

[¶33]   Federal courts have considered, 
however, whether in the aftermath of Kastigar they have the inherent judicial 
power to grant immunity. See United States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144, 147-48 (3d 
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972, 99 S. Ct. 1537, 59 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1979). 
The Tenth Circuit considered whether a constitutional due process right existed 
which empowered federal courts to grant immunity and concluded that most federal 
courts have uniformly rejected the argument. United States v. Hunter, 672 F.2d 815, 818 (10th Cir. 1982). Our research indicates this conclusion remains 
accurate. United States v. Capozzi, 883 F.2d 608, 613-14 (8th Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Herrera-Medina, 853 F.2d 564, 568 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. 
Tindle, 808 F.2d 319, 325 n. 5 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114, 109 S. Ct. 3176, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1038 (1989); Mattheson v. King, 751 F.2d 1432, 1443 (5th 
Cir. 1985); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 527 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S. Ct. 906, 83 L. Ed. 2d 921 (1985); Hunter, 672 F.2d  at 
818; United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. 
Richardson, 588 F.2d 1235, 1241 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 947, 99 S. Ct. 1426, 59 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1979), cert. denied sub nom. United States v. 
Bradford, 441 U.S. 931, 99 S. Ct. 2049, 60 L. Ed. 2d 658 (1979). Absent 
extraordinary circumstances denying a defendant a fair trial, which are not 
presented here, we agree with Hunter's holding that there is no inherent 
judicial power to confer witness immunity because it is solely an executive 
function as legislatively authorized. Hunter, 672 F.2d  at 
818.

WARRANTLESS ARREST

[¶34]   Appellant next contends the trial 
court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because his warrantless 
arrest was not based on sufficient probable cause. A peace officer's arrest 
without a warrant will be upheld upon review if the officer had reasonable 
probable cause based on the evidence in the record. Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 478, 481 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶35]   In this case, the totality of the 
particular circumstances of the robbery and the collective knowledge of the 
involved officers constituted probable cause. See Jandro v. State, 781 P.2d 512, 
518 (Wyo. 1989); and Williams v. State, 557 P.2d 135, 137 (Wyo. 1976). It was 
mainly the officers' knowledge that the robbers were dry although a car was not 
seen or heard which led to the motel manager's information that a Jim and Jesse 
James had registered there. Their car was registered in a different name. 
Appellant and Marker then refused to answer the door although police had seen 
them looking out of the motel window and announced they were police officers. 
Appellant and Marker both matched the robbers' descriptions. This information 
was sufficient to cause a reasonably cautious or prudent police officer to 
believe that the two men had been involved in the armed robbery of the adjacent 
restaurant. There was no error.

SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE

[¶36]   Appellant contends that a rational 
trier of fact could not have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without 
resorting to speculation and conjecture in his case. We have a well-established 
standard for reviewing whether a verdict is supported by sufficient evidence. We 
review the record to examine all of the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the state. Burk v. State, 848 P.2d 225, 235 (1993). This court then determines 
if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crime to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Wehr v. State, 841 P.2d 104, 110 (Wyo. 1992).

[¶37]   Appellant was charged with 
conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery in violation of Wyo. Stat. §§ 
6-2-401(c)(ii) and 6-1-303(a). The elements of the crime of aggravated robbery 
are (1) if in the course of committing the crime of robbery the person (2) uses 
or exhibits a deadly weapon or a simulated deadly weapon. Wyo. Stat. § 
6-2-401(c)(ii). The elements for the crime of conspiracy are (1) an agreement 
with one or more persons that they or one or more of them will commit a crime 
and (2) one or more of them does an overt act to effect the objective of the 
agreement. Burk, 848 P.2d  at 235. "Circumstantial evidence may be relied upon to 
establish a conspiracy due to the covert nature of the crime." Wehr, 841 P.2d  at 
110. A prima facie case of conspiracy is established by evidence of any overt 
act that establishes the criminal agreement was acted upon in some way. Burk, 
848 P.2d  at 235. The criminal agreement necessary for conspiracy is a mere tacit 
understanding. Id.

[¶38]   An examination of the conspiracy 
evidence against appellant shows sufficient evidence for the jury to rationally 
conclude he and Marker were co-conspirators in the aggravated robbery of the 
restaurant. The jury heard two eyewitnesses describe the robbers as armed with a 
shotgun and knife, wearing ski masks and t-shirts, and carrying a bag which they 
filled with money.

[¶39]   The robbers were dry despite a 
heavy rain, yet a car was not seen or heard. Police officers testified that 
information caused them to check with the manager of the motel which is next 
door to the restaurant. The manager told the police that two individuals meeting 
the general descriptions had checked in that day under the names Jesse and Jim 
James. The motel manager testified that the pictures taken at the police station 
the night of the robbery were accurate depictions of appellant and Marker's 
appearance at the time. She identified appellant as the individual who signed 
the registration card as "Jesse James."

[¶40]   The police testified that the 
manager's information caused them to go to the James' room and knock on the 
door. The two men who waited a considerable amount of time to come out of the 
room matched the general description of the robbers and were arrested. A knife 
which matched the description given by the eyewitnesses was plainly viewed 
during a protective sweep of the motel room. A later search of the room revealed 
a sawed-off shotgun, ski masks which had been cut up, knives, t-shirts and a 
bag.

[¶41]   From all of this evidence it is 
clear the jury could rationally conclude that appellant and Marker agreed to rob 
the restaurant and overtly acted to effectuate the agreement because the crime 
was completed.

[¶42]   The judgment and sentence is 
affirmed.

 

Footnotes
 

1 Douglas v. State of Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1965); and Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 83 S. Ct. 1151, 10 L. Ed. 2d 278 (1963).

2 Jones v. State, 777 P.2d 54 (Wyo. 
1989); Prime v. State, 767 P.2d 149 (Wyo. 1989); and Haselhuhn v. State, 727 P.2d 280 (Wyo. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1098, 107 S. Ct. 1321, 94 L. Ed. 2d 174.

3 Jones established these four 
criteria:

1) whether the 
prosecutor called the witness for the purpose of drawing adverse inferences from 
the witness's refusal to testify;

2) whether the 
prosecutor was certain that the witness could and, in fact, intended to invoke 
the Fifth Amendment privilege;

3) whether the 
prosecutor made further conscious use of any adverse inferences from the 
witness's refusal to testify in the presentation of his case; 
and

4) whether the 
use of those inferences added critical weight to the prosecution's 
case.

Jones, 777 P.2d  
at 58.