Case Title: State v. Trinque (ICA Opinion)

Citation: 

Docket Number: caap-12-0001017

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2016-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-12-0001017
29-JAN-2016
10:30 AM
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

‘Trinque and Martinez were arrested by the police at night in a
Pasture where a large number of marijuana plants were being
grown. After his arrest, Trinque made three incriminating
statements to the police: (1) while being escorted out of the
Pasture (Statement 1); (2) outside the pasture while waiting to
be transported to the police station (Statement 2); and (3) at
the police station (Statement 3). The Circuit Court of the Fifth
Circuit (Circuit Court)Y suppressed all three statements.

Plaintiff-Appellant State of Hawai'i (State) appeals
from the Circuit Court's "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order Granting [Trinque's] Motion to Suppress Statements”
(Order Suppressing Statements) and the Circuit Court's "Order
Denying [the State's) Motion to Determine Voluntariness of
Statements" (Voluntariness Order). On appeal, the State argues
that the Circuit Court erred in suppressing Statements 2 and 3.
As explained below, we hold that the Circuit Court erred in
suppressing Statements 2 and 3. We vacate the Circuit Court's
Order Suppressing Statements and its Voluntariness Order with
respect to Statements 2 and 3, and we remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

BACKGROUND

After receiving information that marijuana was growing
in a pasture in the Kilauea area of Kaua'i, the Vice Division of
the Kaua'i Police Department initiated an investigation. Over a
thousand marijuana plants were apparently being cultivated in the
pasture. Officer Brian Silva (Officer Silva) was the officer in
charge of the investigation, and his supervisor, Officer Richard
Rosa (Officer Rosa), was also involved.

At night, while on surveillance in the pasture, Officer
Silva and other officers encountered Trinque and Martinez, who
were placed under arrest. Trinque was handcuffed. It was dark,
there was sugarcane and "grass everywhere," and the officers were
trying to figure out how to get out of the pasture. officer

 

Y the Honorable Kathis

 

29 LA. Watanabe presided.

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Silva or another officer escorting Trinque out of the pasture
asked Trinque how he had entered the field. Tringue responded
that he came over the fence by the banana tree using a ladder
that was still located by the fence and that he was caught red
handed (Statement 1).

After Trinque was taken from the pasture, he was
ordered to sit on a bench outside a residence. Officer Rosa was
assigned to watch Tringue. Officer Rosa had never met Trinque
before. However, Officer Rosa had previously worked on a case
involving Trinque's daughter. Officer Rosa, who was wearing his
badge, introduced himself to Tringue as a police officer.
Officer Rosa informed Tringue that he was the officer who had
worked on Trinque's daughter's case; that Trinque could talk to
his daughter if he did not believe officer Rosa; that Officer
Rosa would not lie to Trinque, would not "Jerk [Trinque's]
chain," and would be completely honest with Tringue. Officer
Rosa told Trinque not to make any statements until Tringue was
advised of his constitutional rights.” In response, Trinque
stated, "What for? You caught us red handed, there's nothing
left to say, times are hard and we needed the money" (Statement
2). Officer Rosa then told Trinque "not to make anymore
statements until we got to Lihue" (where the police station is
Located) .

Officers Silva and Rosa transported Trinque to the
Lihue police station. After he was booked, Trinque was taken to
an interview room where Officers Silva and Rosa were present.
Officer Silva advised Tringue of his constitutional rights, using
an advice of rights form. After he was advised of his Miranda”

 

¥ officer Rosa testitied that because of the tine and the conditions, he
told teingue "not to make any statements until we got back to the Lihue
{police station] where we could advise him of his fights: ‘waen

police could not have advised Tringve of his rights at the sot
explained that "at that time we were too

get hin to Lihue and iet him sit’ down and
forms

 

 

    
 
 

 

‘ust wanted to
ing ‘the

 

2 Micanda v, Arizona, 384 0.5. 436 (1966).
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rights, Tringue was asked whether he wanted to make a statement.
In response, Tringue stated that he did not want to make a
statement since he got caught red-handed and was going to jail
anyway (Statement 3).

‘Tringue filed a motion to suppress all three
statements. ‘The State opposed Trinque's suppression motion and
also filed a motion to determine the voluntariness of Trinque's
statements. ‘The Circuit Court held an evidentiary hearing on
both motions. The Circuit Court granted Trinque's motion to
‘suppress and denied the State's motion to determine
voluntariness. The Circuit Court entered its Order suppressing
Statements and its Voluntariness Order on October 30, 2012, and
this appeal followed.”

DISCUSSION

On appeal, the State challenges the Circuit Court's
suppression of Statements 2 and 3. The State does not appeal the
Circuit Court's decision to suppress Statement 1, Therefore, for
Purposes of this appeal, we assume, as found by the Circuit
Court, that Statement 1 was a statement made in response to
custodial interrogation by the police that was obtained in
violation of Tringue's Mixanda rights.

The State argues that the Circuit Court erred in
concluding that Statement 2 was the product of a custodial
interrogation and in suppressing Statement 2 on that basis. It

 

¥ tm Ate Order Suppressing Statenonts, the Circuit Court made findings
of tact end conclusions of law in support of ite decision to, grant Teinguels
Suppression motion and to suppress Statements 1, 2, and 3. The circuit Court
did’not provide any different. of independant resgone for denying the State's
Rotion to determine the voluntariness of Tringue’s statements, “The Circuit
Court's Voluntariness Order sinply states: "ihe Court having taken judicial
notice of the files and records herein and having heard evidence and argument
Sn the matter, rat

hereby ORDENS’ chat the state's Motion to Determine Volunterin
is 'hereby DENIED.” (Empha

Court relied on the ‘sam
deny the state's volunt this appeal, wo will treat
the ‘Circuit Court's grounds for granting Trinque's suppression notion as its
basis for denying the state's notion to determine the voluntariness of
Tringse's stavenents:

 

 

 

 

 

  
    

of Seatenents
that. the Cireuit
fon motion and to.

 

  

 
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

also argues that the Circuit Court erred in suppressing Statement
3 as the unlawful fruit of Statements 1 and 2.

We conclude that Statement 2, which was made in
response to Officer Rosa's telling Trinque not to make any
statements until Trinque was advised of his constitutional
rights, was not the product of interrogation. Therefore, the
State did not violate Trinque's Miranda rights in obtaining
Statement 2 and the Circuit Court erred in suppressing Statement
2 on Mizanda grounds. We further conclude that the police did
not exploit Statement 1 in obtaining Statement 2 or Statement 3,
and therefore, Statements 2 and 3 are not subject to suppression
as the unlawful fruit of Statement 1, Finally, because statement
2 was not obtained unlawfully, Statement 3 is not subject to
suppression as the unlawful fruit of Statement 2.

I.

"Voluntary confessions are not merely a proper element
in law enforcement, they are an unmitigated good, essential to
society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and
Punishing those who violate the law." Maryland v. Shatzer, 559
U.S. 98, 108 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted) .

‘The protection provided by both the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the
Hawai'i Constitution is directed at preventing the government
from compelling a criminal defendant to incriminate himself or
herself. The language of the two provisions is virtually
identical. The Fifth Amendment provides: "No person . . . shall
be compelled in any Criminal Case to be a witness against
himself," while Article I, Section 10 provides: "No person shall

+ + be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
oneself." (Emphases added). The Miranda requirements were
judicially created as a means of safeguarding a defendant's
constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.

See Bhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 297 (1980). Neither the
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constitutional provisions nor Miranda are designed to prevent the
government from using voluntary, non-compelled statements made by
a defendant.

Mixanda warnings are only required when a defendant is
subjected to custodial interrogation. See State v, Pashana, 66
Haw. 499, 503-04, 666 P.2d 592, 596 (1983). ‘There is no dispute
that Trinque was in custody after he was arrested, and thus the
custody requirement is not at issue in this case. With respect
to the interrogation requirement, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has
held that "the ultimate question becomes whether the police
officer should have known that his or her words or actions were
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
Person in custody." State v, Ketchum, 97 Hawai'i 107, 119, 34
P.3d 1006, 1018 (2001) (internal quotation marks, citation, and
brackets omitted).

Ir.

The State argues that Statement 2 was not the product
of a custodial interrogation. we agree.

Trinque made Statement 2 after Officer Rosa
specifically told Trinque not to make any statements until
‘Tringue was advised of his constitutional rights. It is
difficult to see how telling a defendant not to make a statement
can constitute "interrogation." Officer Rosa was not attempting
to elicit an incriminating response -- he told Trinque not to
make any statements. We conclude that there was no basis for the
Circuit Court to conclude that Officer Rosa should have known
that his words or actions in telling Trinque not to speak were
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.

‘The Circuit Court found that there wae "no legitimate
reason" for Officer Rosa to inform Trinque that he had worked on
‘Trinque's daughter's case and to tell Trinque that he would not
lie to Trinque and would be completely honest with Trinque, It
is not clear why it would be improper for Officer Rosa to provide
this information to Tringue or why Officer Rosa's apparent
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

attempt to develop rapport with Trinque should be viewed as
illegitimate. More importantly, such actions were not reasonably
Likely to elicit an incriminating response, especially where
Officer Rosa specifically directed Trinque not to make any
statements. Under these circumstances, we conclude that
Statement 2 was not the product of any police interrogation, and
therefore, the Circuit Court erred suppressing Statement 2 on
Mixanda grounds. See State v. Ikaika, 67 Haw. 563, 567-68, 689
P.2d 281, 284-85 (1985).

qr.

We further conclude that: (1) Statements 2 and 3 are
not subject to suppression as the unlawful fruit of Statement 1;
and (2) because Statement 2 was not obtained unlawfully,
Statement 3 is not subject to suppression as the unlawful fruit
of Statement 2.

Under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, "the
use of evidence at trial which comes to light as a result of the
exploitation of a previous illegal act of the police" is
prohibited. State v. Pukusaku, 85 Hawai'i 462, 475, 946 P.2d 32,
45 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

 

 

As applied to confessions, the "fruit of the poisonous ti
doctrine holds that where’ one confession or aduission is,
{legally ‘obtained ana subsequently the defendant sakes
further Gonfession, the second confeseion ie inadmissiole in
gvidence as a "fruit of the poisonous tree”

 

   

 

‘Where a confession nas been

illegally obtained, the government will not be allowed to
introduce into evidence s subsequent confession unless it
Elsee Gemonctratos that the etter wap not obeained by

 

State v. Joseph, 109 Hawai'i 482, 499, 128 P.3d 795, 812 (2006)
(emphasis added) .
A.
‘The record shows that Officer Rosa did not exploit
Statement 1 in order to obtain Statement 2. As we have
previously concluded, Statement 2 was not the product of

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FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

interrogation; rather, Trinque made Statement 2 despite officer
Rosa's directing Tringue not to make any statements. Under these
circumstances, Statement 2 did not come to light as the result of
the exploitation of Statement 1, and Statement 2 is not subject
to suppression as the unlawful fruit of Statement 1.

With respect to Statement 3, because we have determined
that Statement 2 was not obtained unlawfully, Statement 3 is not
subject to suppression as the unlawful fruit of statement 2. We
also conclude that Statement 3 was not the unlawful fruit of
Statement 1. Trinque made Statement 3 post-Miranda, after he was
advised of his Miranda rights and in response to'being asked
whether he wanted to make a statement. The police did not
exploit Statement 1 in order to obtain Statement 3. Tringue was
not being questioned about anything concerning his involvement in
any crime when he made Statement 3, Instead, after advising
‘Trinque of his Miranda rights, the police were attempting to
determine whether he wanted to waive those rights. The
incriminating portion of Statement 3 was Trinque's non-responsive
reply to the question of whether he wanted to make a statement.

Under these circumstances, we conclude that the police
did not exploit Statement 1 in obtaining Statement 3 and that
Statement 3 was not the unlawful fruit of Statement 1.

B.

‘Tringue cites State v. Eli, 126 Hawai'i 510, 273 P.3d
1197 (2012), in arguing that we should affirm the Circuit Court.
Eli, however, is distinguishable.

While Eli was in custody, a police detective told Eli
that he was under arrest for assaulting his daughter "and then
‘asked [Eli] if he wanted to give a statement,’ as it was ‘his
chance to give his side of the story.'" Eli, 126 Hawai'i at 522,
273 P.3d at 1208 (brackets omitted). The Hawaii Supreme Court
held that the police subjected Eli to interrogation and violated
Bli's Miranda rights by "asking [Eli] for his side of the story
and indicating that it was his chance to give that story" before
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advising E1i of his Miranda rights. Id. at 523, 273 P.3d at
1209. The court concluded that by subjecting Eli to a custodial
interrogation and obtaining his commitment to speak before
Miranda warnings were given, the police rendered Eli's subsequent
waiver of his Mizanda rights invalid. Id.

In applying the "fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine,
the court held that the police exploited its Miranda viclation
rand Bli's pre-Miranda statement (i.e., his agreement to make a
statement and tell his side of the story) in obtaining Eli's
post-Miranda statements. Id, at 524, 126 Hawaii at 1210. the
court ruled that "(Eli's] pre-Mixanda statement was ‘exploited’
in that [Eli] 'was subsequently questioned’ on the same matter he
had agreed to talk about before being informed of his Miranda
rights." Id, at 524-25, 273 P.3d at 1210-11. ‘The court
therefore held that Eli's post-Mizanda statements must be
‘suppressed as the fruit of the police's Mixanda violation and
Bli's pre-Miranda statement. Id. at 525, 273 P.3d at i211.

Unlike in Eli, the police in this case did not ask
Tringue to make a statement, and did not obtain Trinque's
conmitment to make @ statement, about Trinque's version of the
matter for which he had been arrested, before advising Trinque of
his Miranda rights. The police also did not exploit or even
refer to Statement 1 in obtaining Statements 2 and 3. The police
did not subsequently question Tringue about any matter he had
talked about in Statement 1, or about any matter he had agreed to
talk about in Statement 1. In obtaining Statement 2, the police
did not violate Trinque's Miranda rights or subject him to
interrogation. Trinque made Statement 3 after he was advised of
his Miranda rights, and the incriminating portion of Statement 3
was Trinque's non-responsive answer to the post-Miranda inquiry
regarding whether he wanted to waive his rights and make a
statement, We conclude that Eli is distinguishable and does not
control the decision in this case.

 
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—FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER _

concLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Circuit
Court erred in suppressing Statements 2 and 3. We vacate the
Order Suppressing Statements and the Voluntariness Order with
respect to Statements 2 and 3, and we remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

on the briefs:

tescy Msatant Bag A. Flabarmsc

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
County of Kauai

for Plaintiff-Appellant th fle
Jon N. Tkenaga <
Deputy Public Defender
for Defendant-Appellee

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Concurring Opinion by Ginoza, J

I agree with the majority opinion that, given the
circumstances in this case, Statements 2 and 3 should not have
been suppressed. However, in relation to the circumstances
surrounding Statement 2, I take a somewhat different view than
the majority in regard to Officer Richard Rosa's (Officer Rosa)
statements to Defendant-Appellee Rick Tringue (Tringue) .

officer Rosa was assigned to watch Trinque after
Trinque had been escorted out of the pasture and was being held
in a residential area. The relevant and uncontested findings by
the circuit court related to Statement 2 are as follow

 

34. Once [Tringue] and the officers arrived at the
the reaidence(,) (trinque} "was ordered co
a bench, and Officer Silva immediately directed
Gtficer’ Roa to watch over (Trinquel-

 

 

15. Prior to that date and time, officer Rosa had never
met or seen (Tringuel

as.

 

a.

 

identifies himself co (Teingue], telling
(trinquel that he was Sergeant Rosa from the Warcotics
Unie of the Kauai Police Bepartment.

28. Officer Rows then went on to tell (Tringuel that he
wasn't eure if Nr. Tringue knew who he was, but that
he wag the officer who worked on’ (rinque
daughter's case, that if (Tringue) did net believe
him; [Fringue} Could calk to (Fringue'e] daughter
about it, hat he would not Lie to (Sringuel, he would
hot “Jerk [tringue's) chain*, and phat he would be
Completely honest with [rringuel (11

 

 

19. officer Rosa then told (Pringue] not to make a
Statenent until (rrinque) was advised of his
Constitutional rights,

 

20. {eingue] then said, *what for? You caught us red
handed, there's nothing left to say, times are hard
and we needed the money(.1"

In determining whether Officer Rosa's interaction with

‘Trinque constituted interrogation, we consider the "totality of
the circumstances" and, ultimately, whether Officer Rosa should

+ paced on Officer Rosa's testimony at the suppression hearing, he had

ascioted Tringue'e daughter in s case where she wae having problene with
Certain individuals and she was concerned for Tringue because she was under
the inpression that the individuals were going to assault Tringue.
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

have known that his "words or actions were reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response" from Trinque. state v. Eli,
126 Hawai'i 510, 522, 273 P.3d 1196, 1208 (2012) (citation and
internal quotation mark omitted); State v, Naititi, 104 Hawai'i
224, 236, 87 P.3d 893, 905 (2004); State v, Ketchum, 97 Hawai'i
107, 119, 34 P.3d 1006, 1018 (2001). Because Officer Rosa
specifically told Tringue not to make a statement until Trinque
was advised of his rights, I agree with the majority that officer
Rosa's interaction with Tringue did not constitute interrogation.
However, I would not suggest, as the majority opinion apparently
does, that Officer Rosa's other statements to Trinque, made prior
to Miranda warnings,? were not potentially problematic.”
Although the "totality of the circumstances" in this case bear
out that there was no interrogation, it seems foreseeable that in
other circumstances, regardless of the intent of the officer,
words or actions such as those by Officer Rosa could start to
approach the line of interrogation. In other words, such
statements, along with other surrounding circumstances, could
become "words or actions [that are] reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response." Eli, 126 Hawai'i at 522, 273 P.3d at
1208; see also, State v. Juranek, 644 N.W.2d 791, 802 (Neb.
2024) (noting that "questions intended to build rapport with a
defendant can easily cross the line into interrogation") .

I respectfully concur

Se ui key

> ixanda v. arizona, 364 U.S. 436 (1966)

> im particular, with respect to Officer Rosa's statements that he had
worked on the case involving Tringue's daughter, that Officer Rosa would not,

Ife to Tringue, would not jerk Trinque's chain, and that Officer Bose would be
completely honest with trinque, the majority states: "it is not clear why ie
OF Officer hosa to provide this information to fringis oF

FORE attempt to develop rapport with tringue should be

 

     

2