Case Title: Doherty v. Diving Unlimited International, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12707

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12707 
 
MARGARET C. DOHERTY, personal representative,1  vs.  DIVING 
UNLIMITED INTERNATIONAL, INC., & others.2 
 
 
 
Essex.      October 4, 2019. - February 27, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Wrongful Death.  Negligence, Wrongful death.  Waiver. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
May 5, 2015. 
 
 
The case was heard by Janice W. Howe, J., on a motion for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Neil Rossman for the plaintiff. 
 
Martin K. DeMagistris for John Golbranson. 
 
Jennifer A. Creedon, for Massachusetts Defense Lawyers 
Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
John J. Barter, for Professional Liability Foundation, 
Ltd., amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
                     
 
1 Of the estate of Gregg C. O'Brien. 
 
 
2 Nicholas Fazah, EC Divers, Inc., and John Golbranson. 
2 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  Following a fatal scuba diving accident involving 
the plaintiff's decedent in May 2014, the plaintiff, as personal 
representative of the decedent's estate, brought a wrongful 
death action under G. L. c. 229, § 2 against the manufacturer of 
the "dry suit" that the decedent used on his dive, the 
individual who supplied the decedent his diving equipment and 
outfitted him, the company that owned and rented that equipment, 
and the dive leader, John Golbranson.  After the plaintiff had 
settled with all defendants other than Golbranson, a judge of 
the Superior Court granted summary judgment in his favor based 
on the release from liability and covenant not to sue that the 
decedent signed just before his death.  The plaintiff appealed, 
claiming that the statutory beneficiaries have an independent 
right to a wrongful death action that the decedent could not 
have waived.  We transferred this case from the Appeals Court on 
our own motion. 
 
As explained in our opinion in GGNSC Admin. Servs., LLC v. 
Schrader, 484 Mass.    ,     (2020) (GGNSC), released today, we 
conclude that the beneficiaries of a wrongful death action have 
rights that are derivative of, rather than independent from, any 
claim the decedent could have brought for the injuries causing 
his death.  Therefore, the waivers the decedent signed control 
all claims for his wrongful death.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
grant of summary judgment. 
3 
 
 
 
1. Background.  a.  Facts.  "In reviewing a motion for 
summary judgment, we view the evidence in the record in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party."  Meyer v. Veolia 
Energy N. Am., 482 Mass. 208, 209 (2019).  Here, where the 
plaintiff does not contest on appeal the judge's determination 
that the waivers were valid, or that Golbranson was acting as an 
agent for Diving Unlimited International, Inc. (DUI), the 
manufacturer of the dry suit that the decedent wore on his dive, 
we present only the essential facts. 
 
The decedent, who was a certified open-water scuba diver, 
drowned while participating in a promotional diving equipment 
event that was sponsored by DUI and held in Gloucester.  At this 
event, where local divers tested DUI's dry suit, Golbranson was 
the leader of the dive, overseeing some of the participants. 
 
Prior to participating in the event, the decedent signed 
two documents.  The first was a release from liability which had 
several subsections that were set forth in all capital letters 
and underlined, including "effect of agreement," "assumption of 
risk," "full release," "covenant not to sue," "indemnity 
agreement," and "arbitration."  In capital letters under the 
subsection titled "effect of agreement," it said, "Diver gives 
up valuable rights, including the right to sue for injuries or 
death."  It also told the decedent to read the agreement 
carefully and not to sign it "unless or until you understand."   
4 
 
 
The subsection titled "full release" stated that the decedent 
"fully release[d] DUI from any liability whatsoever resulting 
from diving or associated activities," and the subsection titled 
"covenant not to sue" stated that the decedent agreed "not to 
sue DUI for personal injury arising from scuba diving or its 
associated activities," and that the decedent's "heirs or 
executors may not sue DUI for death arising from scuba diving or 
its associated activities." 
 
The decedent also signed an equipment rental agreement 
which stated, "This agreement is a release of the [decedent's] 
rights to sue for injuries or death resulting from the rental 
and/or use of this equipment.  The [decedent] expressly assumes 
all risks of skin and/or scuba diving related in any way to the 
rental and/or use of this equipment." 
 
Golbranson led a group comprised of the decedent and two 
other divers.  During their dive, one of the divers experienced 
a depleted air supply.  Golbranson signaled for the group to 
surface and to swim back to shore on the surface.  Only the 
decedent resisted, emphasizing his desire to keep diving, thus 
separating himself from the group that was returning to shore.  
Shortly thereafter, the decedent surfaced and called for help.  
The decedent died at the hospital from "scuba drowning after 
unequal weight belt distribution." 
5 
 
 
b.  Procedural history.  In her capacity as the decedent's 
personal representative, the plaintiff sued for the benefit of 
the decedent's statutory beneficiaries.   The second amended 
complaint alleged two counts against Golbranson resulting from 
his negligence:  (1) conscious pain and suffering; and (2) the 
decedent's wrongful death under G. L. c. 229, § 2.  Golbranson 
moved for summary judgment, claiming that the release from 
liability and the equipment rental agreement (collectively 
waivers) protected him, as an agent of DUI, against any 
negligence suit or liability.  The plaintiff opposed summary 
judgment, asserting that the waivers did not apply to Golbranson 
when he was negligent in his individual capacity and that 
neither waiver would prevent the decedent's statutory 
beneficiaries from recovering damages for wrongful death. 
The judge determined, and the plaintiff does not contest on 
appeal, that Golbranson acted as DUI's agent during the dive.  
The judge also concluded that the two waivers that the decedent 
signed prohibited the plaintiff from bringing an action for 
negligence against Golbranson.3 
                     
 
3 As to the conscious pain and suffering claim, the judge 
found that the waivers negated the plaintiff's ability to 
recover, because the decedent clearly had the authority to waive 
those rights. 
 
6 
 
 
As to the wrongful death claim, the judge concluded that 
G. L. c. 229, § 2, created a right to recovery that is 
derivative of the decedent's own cause of action.4  In addition, 
she concluded that the agreements were valid and, thus, 
precluded any recovery on behalf of the decedent's statutory 
beneficiaries, who had no rights independent of the decedent's 
cause of action, which was waived. 
 
2.  Discussion.  We review "a grant of summary judgment de 
novo . . . to determine whether . . . all material facts have 
been established and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law" (quotation and citation omitted).  Boston Globe 
Media Partners, LLC v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 482 Mass. 427, 431 
(2019). 
 
Given that the plaintiff does not contest the judge's 
determinations that the release from liability and the equipment 
rental agreement are valid and that those waivers covered 
Golbranson as an agent of DUI, the only issue before the court 
is whether the statutory beneficiaries in the action for 
wrongful death have a right to recover damages that is 
independent of the decedent's own cause of action.  See G. L. 
c. 229, §§ 1, 2.  In GGNSC, 484 Mass. at    , we have resolved 
                     
 
4 In her analysis, the judge relied on a decision by a judge 
of the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts that underlay our opinion in GGNSC.  See GGNSC, 
484 Mass. at    . 
7 
 
 
that issue:  our wrongful death statute creates a derivative 
right of recovery for the statutory beneficiaries listed in 
G. L. c. 229, § 1.  Therefore, we hold that here, the valid 
waivers signed by the decedent preclude the plaintiff, as his 
"executor or personal representative," from bringing a lawsuit 
under G. L. c. 229, § 2, for the benefit of the statutory 
beneficiaries.5 
 
3.  Conclusion.  We affirm the judgment of the Superior 
Court granting Golbranson's motion for summary judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
5 Golbranson devotes much time arguing that the release from 
liability and the equipment rental agreement negate any duty he 
may have had to the decedent.  We note that the release from 
liability was limited to "claims concern[ing] ordinary 
negligence," Sharon v. Newton, 437 Mass. 99, 110 n.12 (2002), 
and Golbranson does not contend that the waivers would have 
applied to other forms of malfeasance, such as gross negligence, 
or willful, wanton, or reckless acts.  We have "consistently 
recognized that there is a certain core duty -- a certain 
irreducible minimum duty of care, owed to all persons -- that as 
a matter of public policy cannot be abrogated:  that is, the 
duty not to intentionally or recklessly cause harm to others."  
Rafferty v. Merck & Co., 479 Mass. 141, 155 (2018).  
Specifically, "'while a party may contract against liability for 
harm caused by its negligence, it may not do so with respect to 
its gross negligence' or, for that matter, its reckless or 
intentional conduct."  Id., quoting Maryland Cas. Co. v. NSTAR 
Elec. Co., 471 Mass. 416, 422 (2015). Nonetheless, only the 
decedent's executor or administrator has the right to bring a 
cause of action for gross negligence, not the statutory 
beneficiaries.