Case Title: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Sutula

Citation: 2010-Ohio-2468

Docket Number: 20092243

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Sutula, Slip Opinion No. 2010-
Ohio-2468.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-2468 
MORGAN STANLEY DEAN WITTER COMMERCIAL FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., 
ET AL., APPELLEES, v. SUTULA, JUDGE, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc. v. 
Sutula, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2468.] 
Arbitration — R.C. 2711.02(B) — Claims stayed for arbitration remain pending 
before court — Civil procedure — Voluntary dismissal — Civ.R. 41(A)(1). 
(No. 2009-2243 — Submitted May 26, 2010 — Decided June 9, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 93156,  
185 Ohio App.3d 152, 2009-Ohio-6109. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga 
County granting a writ of prohibition to prevent appellant, Cuyahoga County 
Court of Common Pleas Judge John Sutula, from proceeding on an employment-
discrimination claim in Marks v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Commercial Fin. 
Servs., Inc., Cuyahoga Cty. C.P. case No. CV-502459, a case in which appellees, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Commercial Financial Services, Inc., Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc., Linda Cain, Timothy Adkins, George Kolar, and Cindy Deleo, are 
defendants. 
{¶ 2} “[W]hen a trial court unconditionally dismisses a case or a case has 
been voluntarily dismissed under Civ.R. 41(A)(1), the trial court patently and 
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed, and a writ of prohibition will issue 
to prevent the exercise of jurisdiction.”  State ex rel. Hummel v. Sadler, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 84, 2002-Ohio-3605, 771 N.E.2d 853, ¶ 22. 
{¶ 3} “Civ.R. 41(A) allows for a dismissal of all claims against 
particular defendants,” and not individual claims.  (Emphasis added.)  Pattison v. 
W.W. Grainger, Inc., 120 Ohio St.3d 142, 2008-Ohio-5276, 897 N.E.2d 126, ¶ 
19-20.  Notwithstanding the court of appeals’ conclusion that its decision in a 
previous appeal1 had left only an employment-discrimination claim against 
appellees pending, that case merely held that the plaintiff’s remaining claims were 
subject to arbitration.  Arbitration does not normally require dismissal of the 
claims referable to arbitration; it warrants only a stay of those claims pending 
arbitration.  See R.C. 2711.02(B) (“If any action is brought upon any issue 
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for arbitration, the court in 
which the action is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in the 
action is referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for arbitration, 
shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until the 
arbitration of the issue has been had in accordance with the agreement, provided 
the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with arbitration”).  There 
is no indication in the record that Judge Sutula dismissed the remaining claims.  
Because the purported notice of dismissal filed in this case specifically referred to 
                                                 
1.  See Marks v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc., Cuyahoga App. No. 
88948, 2008-Ohio-1820, ¶ 91 (all claims raised by plaintiffs except their employment-
discrimination claim were subject to arbitration). 
January Term, 2010 
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dismissal of the employment-discrimination claim but made no reference to the 
other claims that have yet to be dismissed, it failed to dismiss “all claims” for 
purposes of Civ.R. 41(A). 
{¶ 4} Therefore, because not all of plaintiff’s case was dismissed when 
the plaintiff attempted to voluntarily dismiss his employment-discrimination 
claim against appellees, the court of appeals erred in holding that Judge Sutula 
patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to proceed in the underlying case 
pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a). 
Judgment reversed. 
 
BROWN, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Ulmer & Berne, L.L.P., Ronald H. Isroff, and Natalie M. Hostacky, for 
appellees. 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles 
E. Hannan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
______________________