Case Title: Oregon v. McClure

Citation: 

Docket Number: S061434

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2014-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
704	
July 10, 2014	
No. 46
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
CURTIS DWAYNE McCLURE,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 090850307; CA A143705; SC S061434)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 11, 2014.
Jedediah Peterson, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, 
argued the case and filed the brief for the petitioner on 
review. With him on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief 
Defender.
Jona Maukonen, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, 
argued the case and filed the brief for the respondent on 
review. With her on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, 
Attorney General, and Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General.
WALTERS, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of 
the circuit court are affirmed.
Defendant petitioned for review of a Court of Appeals’ decision affirming the 
trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal and admission 
of evidence of defendant’s previous conviction for resisting arrest. The Court of 
Appeals held that an arrest for a parole violation qualifies as an “arrest” for the 
purposes of ORS 162.315. Held: The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
The trial court correctly denied defendant’s motion for acquittal. The phrase 
“resisting arrest” as used in ORS 162.315 means resisting “actual or constructive 
restraint” that is more than a stop, whether or not that restraint is imposed for 
the purpose of charging a person with an offense. Although the trial court erred 
in admitting evidence of defendant’s previous conviction, that error was harm-
less. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
______________
	
*  Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Leslie M. Roberts, Judge. 
256 Or App 200, 300 P3d 210 (2013).
Cite as 355 Or 704 (2014)	
705
	
WALTERS, J.
	
In this criminal case, defendant was convicted of 
resisting arrest for violating the terms of his parole. We 
conclude, as did the trial court and the Court of Appeals, 
that an arrest for a parole violation qualifies as an arrest 
for purposes of ORS 162.315—the resisting arrest statute—
and affirm.
	
Because the jury found defendant guilty, we pres-
ent the facts in the light most favorable to the state. State 
v. Lewis, 352 Or 626, 628, 290 P3d 288 (2012). In 2009, 
defendant was walking in Portland’s Old Town when two 
officers stopped him, engaged him in conversation, and 
asked for his name. Defendant complied, asked if he was 
free to leave, and, after receiving a positive response, did 
so. One officer followed defendant at a distance while the 
other officer conducted a warrant check, which revealed an 
outstanding warrant for defendant’s arrest for a parole vio-
lation.1 The officers then intercepted defendant, informed 
him that there was a warrant for his arrest, and began to 
restrain defendant. Defendant tightened his arms, grasped 
at one officer’s fingers, and, yelling and screaming, held 
onto a utility pole. The officers attempted a “hair hold take 
down,” and one officer struck defendant in the torso in 
an attempt to force defendant to the ground. The officers 
also repeatedly instructed defendant to “stop resisting.” 
Notwithstanding the officers’ actions and instructions, it 
was only with the assistance of private security officers 
that the officers were able to force defendant to the ground 
and handcuff him.
	
Defendant was charged with resisting arrest under 
ORS 162.315, which provides, in part:
	
“(1)  A person commits the crime of resisting arrest if 
the person intentionally resists a person known by the per-
son to be a peace officer or parole and probation officer in 
making an arrest.
	
1  It is not clear from the record whether the officers knew that the warrant 
was for a parole violation. The officers testified only that the computer indicated 
an “outstanding warrant.”
706	
State v. McClure
	
“(2)  As used in this section:
	
“(a)  ‘Arrest’ has the meaning given that term in ORS 
133.005 and includes, but is not limited to, the booking 
process.
	
“* 
* 
* 
* 
*
	
“(3)  It is no defense to a prosecution under this sec-
tion that the peace officer or parole and probation officer 
lacked legal authority to make the arrest or book the per-
son, provided the officer was acting under color of official 
authority.”
(Emphases added.) ORS 133.005 defines “arrest” as follows:
	
“As used in ORS 133.005 * 
* 
*, unless the context requires 
otherwise:
	
“(1)  ‘Arrest’ means to place a person under actual or 
constructive restraint or to take a person into custody for the 
purpose of charging that person with an offense. A ‘stop’ as 
authorized under ORS 131.605 to 131.625 is not an arrest.”
(Emphasis added.) Finally, an “offense” is defined in ORS 
161.505 as
“conduct for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment 
or to a fine is provided by any law of this state or by any 
law or ordinance of a political subdivision of this state. An 
offense is either a crime, as described in ORS 161.515, or a 
violation, as described in ORS 153.008.”
	
At trial, defendant filed a motion for acquittal rely-
ing on the italicized phrases in those statutes. Defendant 
cited a Court of Appeals case, State v. Pierce, 226 Or App 224, 
229, 203 P3d 290, rev den, 346 Or 213 (2009), for the prop-
osition that “arrest,” as used in ORS 162.315 and defined in 
ORS 133.005, requires that a person be restrained or placed 
in custody “for the purpose of charging that person with an 
offense.” Defendant argued that, because a parole violation 
is not an “offense” as defined in ORS 161.505 and because 
he was restrained for a parole violation, the officers had not 
placed him under restraint “for the purpose of charging 
him with an offense” and therefore had not “arrested” him 
within the meaning of ORS 162.315. The trial court denied 
defendant’s motion, concluding that a parole violation was a 
“part of the prosecution of the [underlying] offense.”
Cite as 355 Or 704 (2014)	
707
	
The jury convicted defendant and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed his conviction. State v. McClure, 256 Or 
App 200, 300 P3d 210 (2013). The court concluded that, 
although an arrest for a parole violation is not an arrest “for 
the purpose of charging [defendant] with an offense,” the 
legislature nonetheless intended that such an arrest qualify 
as an “arrest” for the purposes of ORS 162.315. Id. at 204. 
Judge Sercombe dissented. He viewed the majority’s inter-
pretation of ORS 162.315 as contrary to the text of the stat-
ute and would have held that ORS 162.315 does not apply 
unless the individual is being arrested for an “offense.” Id. 
at 211, 221 (Sercombe, J., dissenting).
	
In this court, defendant’s statutory argument is 
again straightforward. As noted, ORS 162.315(1) provides 
that a person resists “arrest” if that person “intentionally 
resists * 
* 
* a peace officer or parole and probation officer 
in making an arrest.” ORS 162.315(2)(a) defines “arrest” as 
having “the meaning given that term in ORS 133.005.” ORS 
133.005, in turn, provides that the term “arrest” means “to 
place a person under actual or constructive restraint or to 
take a person into custody for the purpose of charging that 
person with an offense.” As defendant argues and the state 
acknowledges, a probation violation is neither a crime nor a 
violation, and thus is not an offense. Therefore, defendant 
argues, because he was restrained for the purpose of revok-
ing his probation and not “for the purpose of charging [him] 
with an offense,” he did not resist “arrest” as that term is 
defined in ORS 133.005(1) and could not be convicted under 
ORS 162.315.
	
The state sees two points of vulnerability in defen-
dant’s analysis. First, the state takes issue with defendant’s 
construction of ORS 133.005(1). As noted, that statute 
defines “arrest” using two disjunctive clauses: (1) “to place 
a person under actual or constructive restraint,” or (2) “to 
take a person into custody.” Those clauses are followed by 
a qualifying phrase: “for the purpose of charging that per-
son with an offense.” The state argues that the qualifying 
phrase modifies only the second clause and therefore that 
an “arrest” may occur under ORS 133.005(1) when a per-
son is actually or constructively restrained, even if the pur-
pose of the restraint is not to charge the person with an 
708	
State v. McClure
offense. Alternatively, the state contends that ORS 133.005 
includes the introductory phrase “unless context requires 
otherwise.” Therefore, the state argues, the context of the 
resisting arrest statute requires that ORS 133.005(1) be 
interpreted to encompass arrest for a probation violation.
	
We begin our analysis with the text of ORS 133.005(1) 
and the state’s argument that, based on the “doctrine of 
the last antecedent,” the qualifying phrase “for the pur-
pose of charging that person with an offense” modifies only 
the immediately preceding clause “to take a person into 
custody.” That doctrine instructs that, “where no contrary 
intention appears,” referential and qualifying words and 
phrases refer solely to “ 
‘the last word, phrase, or clause that 
can be made an antecedent without impairing the meaning 
of the sentence.’ 
” State v. Webb, 324 Or 380, 386, 927 P2d 79 
(1996) (quoting Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory 
Construction §  47.33 at 270 (5th ed 1992)). In this case, 
because other evidence of legislative intent is available, we 
turn to the enactment history of the pertinent statutes.
	
The legislature enacted the resisting arrest statute, 
ORS 162.315, in 1971. Or Laws 1971, ch 743, § 206. At that 
time, the resisting arrest statute did not include a definition 
of “arrest.” However, two other statutes did define that term—
former ORS 133.210 and former ORS 133.250. In 1973, the 
legislature repealed those two statutes and adopted a new 
definition of “arrest” codified at ORS 133.005(1). Or Laws 
1973, ch 836, § 62. Then, in 1997, the legislature amended 
the resisting arrest statute to define the term “arrest” as 
used in that statute by reference to the definition of “arrest” 
in ORS 133.005(1). Or Laws 1997, ch  749, §  3. It is that 
definition that is the focus of our inquiry, and we therefore 
think it helpful to consider the text and transformation of its 
predecessors in greater detail.
	
The two predecessors to ORS 133.005—former ORS 
133.210 and former ORS 133.250—both date to the Deady 
Code. Former ORS 133.210 defined “arrest” as “the taking 
of a person into custody, that he may be held to answer for 
a crime.” General Laws of Oregon, Crim Code, ch XXXVI, 
§  360, p 504 (Deady 1845-1864); OCLA §  26-1522; ORS 
133.210 (1969). Former ORS 133.250 provided that “[a]n 
Cite as 355 Or 704 (2014)	
709
arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person of the 
defendant, or by his submission to the custody of the offi-
cer.” General Laws of Oregon, Crim Code, ch XXXVI, § 364, 
p 504; OCLA § 26-1526; ORS 133.250 (1969). Thus, former 
ORS 133.250 did not require that the officer’s restraint or 
the arrestee’s submission to custody be for any particular 
purpose. Only former ORS 133.210, which defined arrest as 
“the taking of a person into custody,” included the qualify-
ing phrase “that he may be held to answer for a crime.”
	
In 1973, the legislature repealed former ORS 
133.210 and former ORS 133.250 and replaced them with one 
statute—ORS 133.005. The Commentary to the Criminal 
Procedure Code provided: “ 
‘Arrest’ is derived, in part, from 
ORS 133.210 and 133.250, but specifically includes ‘construc-
tive’ restraint and, with respect to the purpose of custody, 
uses the phrase, ‘charging him with an offense’ in place of 
‘holding to answer for a crime.’ 
” Commentary to Criminal 
Law Revision Commission Proposed Oregon Criminal Proce- 
dure Code, Final Draft and Report § 89, 52 (November 1972) 
(Commentary to the Criminal Procedure Code).2 The leg-
islative purpose was not to change the substantive mean-
ing of the term “arrest,” but to make its definition “easier to 
understand.” See id. (“The single definition of ‘arrest’ should 
be easier to understand than the existing double definition 
found in the two separate statutes.”).
	
By 1997, when the legislature amended ORS 162.315 
to provide that “ 
‘arrest’ has the meaning given that term 
in ORS 133.005,” this court had discussed ORS 133.005(1) 
in two cases that we consider informative. See Liberty 
Northwest Ins. Corp., Inc. v. Watkins, 347 Or 687, 692, 227 
P3d 1134 (2010) (“As part of the first level of analysis, this 
court considers its prior interpretations of the statute.”).3 
The first of those cases was State v. Groda, 285 Or 321, 591 
P2d 1354 (1979). There, officers had detained and searched 
the defendant, taken his car keys, unlocked his car, removed 
	
2  “Legislative history includes the commentary to the Oregon Criminal Pro-
cedure Code.” State ex rel Turner v. Frankel, 322 Or 363, 374, 908 P2d 293 (1995).
	
3  The state argues that State v. Mendacino, 288 Or 231, 603 P2d 1376 (1980), 
also includes a pertinent discussion of ORS 133.005(1), but we agree with defen-
dant that the passing mention of the statute in that case is not helpful in this one.
710	
State v. McClure
and searched a briefcase, found drugs, and then had for-
mally arrested him. The question presented was whether 
the unwarranted search was lawful as a search incident to 
arrest, even though the formal arrest did not occur until 
after the search. The court acknowledged that, at the time 
of the search, the defendant had not been “formally arrested 
for the purpose of ‘charging him with an offense.’ 
” Id. at 
325. Nevertheless, the court held that the defendant had 
been arrested “as that word is defined in ORS 133.005(1),” 
because, “when the officers searched the defendant, they 
placed him ‘under actual * 
* 
* restraint.’ 
” Id. (ellipsis in orig- 
inal).
	
In reaching that result, the court quoted approv-
ingly from an earlier case that had reasoned that “ 
‘it is diffi-
cult to explain how the police can search an individual with-
out arresting him, since any substantial detention without 
his consent would fit the definition of an arrest found in such 
criminal cases as State v. Christensen, 151 Or 529 [1935].’ 
” 
Groda, 285 Or at 325 (quoting State v. Krogness, 238 Or 135, 
146-47, 388 P2d 120 (1964)). The definition of “arrest” to 
which the court referred in Christensen was that provided 
in former ORS 133.250: “an actual restraint of the person of 
the defendant, or * 
* 
* his submission to the custody of the 
officer.” Thus, in Groda, the court understood ORS 133.005 
to be consistent with former ORS 133.250 and to mean that 
an officer arrests a person both when the officer in fact sub-
stantially restrains that person’s liberty and when the offi-
cer formally informs the person that the person is under 
arrest.
	
Similarly, in State v. Heintz, 286 Or 239, 594 P2d 
385 (1979), the court held that the drawing of a defendant’s 
blood was a reasonable search incident to arrest even though 
the defendant was unconscious at the time of the blood draw 
and had not been formally arrested. The court cited Groda 
and ORS 133.005(1) in support of its conclusion that “an 
arrest includes the placing of a person ‘under actual or con-
structive restraint.’ 
” Id. at 248.
	
What we take away from the enactment history of 
the pertinent statutes and this court’s decisions in Groda 
and Heintz is that, under ORS 133.005(1), an “arrest” may 
Cite as 355 Or 704 (2014)	
711
occur in two distinct circumstances—when an officer for-
mally takes a person into custody or when an officer actu-
ally restrains a person. Our understanding is consistent 
with the state’s argument that the legislature intended the 
phrase “for the purpose of charging that person with an 
offense” to qualify only the former circumstance. However, 
the question remains whether that history also supports 
defendant’s contrary argument.
	
Defendant contends that the legislature used the 
qualifying phrase to modify both preceding clauses and 
to qualify both circumstances. ORS 133.005(1) specifi-
cally excludes “stop[s]” from its definition of “arrest,” and 
defendant argues that the legislature intended to define 
an “arrest” (as opposed to a “stop”) as a restraint that is 
“for the purpose of charging [a] person with an offense” to 
distinguish stops from arrests. Because an arrest requires 
probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is 
committing an offense, defendant argues that any restraint 
that constitutes an arrest must be made for the purpose of 
charging such an offense. After all, defendant points out, 
although officers may restrain and search a person and 
therefore “arrest” a person before they “formally arrest” 
that person, they must have probable cause to believe that 
an offense has been or is being committed. Heintz, 286 Or 
at 249; Groda, 285 Or at 326. Defendant argues that, to 
make the definition of “arrest” consistent with its exclusion 
of “stop[s],” an officer’s restraint, whether de facto or de jure, 
must be supported by probable cause and “for the purpose of 
charging that person with an offense.”
	
We are not persuaded. ORS 133.005(1) provides that 
a “stop” authorized under ORS 131.605 through 131.625 is 
not an “arrest.” ORS 131.605(7) defines a “stop” as “a tempo-
rary restraint of a person’s liberty by a peace officer.”4 ORS 
131.615(2) provides that a stop may extend for “no longer 
than a reasonable time.” Thus, for the purposes of ORS 
133.005(1), the key distinction between a stop and an arrest 
is not whether probable cause is required, but the duration 
	
4  At the time of defendant’s arrest, subsection (7) of ORS 131.605 was num-
bered as subsection (6); the statute was renumbered in 2011, Or Laws 2011, 
ch 506, § 6, but the substance of the subsection did not change.
712	
State v. McClure
of the restraint. Although defendant is correct that officers 
who make arrests must, and generally will, have probable 
cause to believe that an offense has been or is being commit-
ted, that does not mean that, in enacting ORS 133.005(1), 
the legislature did not intend to define “arrest” more broadly. 
This case—in which the officer restrained defendant for the 
purpose of charging him with a probation violation rather 
than an offense—is but one illustration of the circumstances 
in which an officer may restrain a person without probable 
cause or for a different purpose.
	
Subsection (3) of ORS 162.315 provides another illus- 
tration. Subsection (3) provides that an individual who 
resists an arrest is guilty of an offense, regardless of the 
legality of the arrest: “It is no defense to a prosecution under 
this section that the [arresting] officer lacked legal author-
ity to make the arrest * 
* 
*, provided the officer was acting 
under color of official authority.” The Commentary to the 
Criminal Code stated that that subsection “negatives the 
defense that the arrest resisted was unlawful, provided 
the peace officer is acting ‘under color of his official author-
ity.’ 
” Commentary to Criminal Law Revision Commission 
Proposed Oregon Criminal Code, Final Draft and Report 
§ 206, 204 (July 1970) (Commentary to the Criminal Code).5 
The Commentary noted that that provision “departs from 
common law and the American majority view governing the 
right to resist a lawful arrest.” Id. The Commentary described 
the “prevailing rule” as allowing “reasonable resistance to 
an unlawful arrest,” but contended that that rule was not a 
“desirable means of challenging arrests made under color of 
law,” because such resistance “threaten[s]” to create “[c]ivil 
disorder and disrespect for the law” and because resistance 
to even an unlawful arrest involves a “threat to society posed 
by violent street confrontations between private citizens and 
the police.” Id. The Commentary recommended, instead, 
that citizens who were unlawfully arrested have recourse 
to “traditional tort remedies, which today have been greatly 
liberalized in favor of the individual citizen.” Id. at 204-05. 
	
5  We consult the Commentary to the Criminal Code as part of our analysis 
of the legislative history of the statutes. See State v. Wolleat, 338 Or 469, 475-76, 
111 P3d 1131 (2005) (looking to Commentary to the Criminal Code as source of 
legislative history); State v. Garcia, 288 Or 413, 416, 605 P2d 671 (1980) (same). 
Cite as 355 Or 704 (2014)	
713
The Commentary concluded that, in “prohibiting by statute 
the forcible resistance of an arrest made under color of law, 
Oregon will enter the mainstream of progressive legisla-
tion.” Id. at 205.6
	
In enacting ORS 162.135(3), the legislature pro-
hibited resistance to arrest even if the arrest is unlawful. 
Thus, at that time, the legislature must have understood 
ORS 133.005(1) to define “arrest” to include unlawful 
restraint, such as arrest without probable cause. To con-
strue ORS 133.005(1) as inapplicable when an officer acts 
without the “purpose of charging [a] person with an offense” 
would be inconsistent with the legislature’s intent in enact-
ing subsection (3). If we instead interpret ORS 133.005(1) to 
define “arrest” to include all instances, other than stops, in 
which an officer places a person under actual or constructive 
restraint, our interpretation more closely aligns with ORS 
162.315(3).7
	
Thus, the text, context, and legislative history of 
ORS 133.005 convince us that the legislature did not intend 
the qualifying phrase “for the purpose of charging that 
	
6  Also in 1971, the legislature enacted ORS 161.260, which provides that a 
“person may not use physical force to resist an arrest by a peace officer who is 
known or reasonably appears to be a peace officer, whether the arrest is lawful or 
unlawful.” Or Laws 1971, ch 743, § 32. See State v. Oliphant, 347 Or 175, 192 n 15, 
218 P3d 1281 (2009) (noting that, prior to the enactment of ORS 161.260, “Oregon 
law gave a person the right to use force to resist an ‘unlawful’ arrest” and that the 
“primary concern of the drafters was to discourage people from engaging arrest-
ing officers in combat because of differences of opinion concerning the validity of 
an arrest”).
	
7  That interpretation also is more consistent with the legislative history of 
the resisting arrest statute. As noted, the Commentary to the Criminal Code 
stated that ORS 162.315 was intended to curtail the threat of “[c]ivil disorder 
and disrespect for the law” posed by resistance to officers acting under color of 
law. See Commentary to the Criminal Code at 204. By imposing criminal liability 
on those who resist even unlawful arrests, the legislature indicated that ORS 
162.315 was intended to sweep broadly to fulfill that purpose, an intent that is 
counter to defendant’s restrictive interpretation of ORS 133.005(1). Additional 
support for that view is found in the legislature’s most recent amendments to 
ORS 162.315. In 2005, the legislature provided that it is a crime to resist parole 
and probation officers, as well as police officers. See Or Laws 2005, ch 668, § 2 
(a person resists arrest by resisting “a person known by the person to be a peace 
officer or parole and probation officer in making an arrest”). Although that 
amendment changed the description of the persons who may make an arrest for 
purposes of the resisting arrest statute, not the definition of the term “arrest,” 
the amendment indicates a legislative intent to make the resisting arrest statute 
broadly applicable. 
714	
State v. McClure
person with an offense” to limit the clause “place a person 
under actual or constructive restraint.” We conclude that, as 
used in ORS 162.315, the legislature intended the phrase 
“resisting arrest” to mean resisting “actual or constructive 
restraint” that is more than a stop, whether or not that 
restraint is imposed for the purpose of charging a person 
with an offense.8 We therefore conclude that defendant was 
appropriately charged with resisting arrest and that the 
trial court correctly denied his motion for acquittal.9
	
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judg-
ment of the circuit court are affirmed.
	
8  We therefore need not reach the state’s alternative argument based on the 
introductory phrase to the definition of “arrest” in ORS 133.005—“unless context 
requires otherwise.” 
	
9  We also conclude, as the state concedes, that the trial court erred in admit-
ting evidence of defendant’s prior conviction for resisting arrest. See State v. 
Leistiko, 352 Or 172, 186, 282 P3d 857, adh’d to as modified on recons, 352 Or 
622, 292 P3d 522 (2012) (discussing State v. Johns, 301 Or 535, 555, 725 P2d 
312 (1986), and emphasizing that, to prove intent through a prior bad act, a 
“simple, unremarkable single instance of prior conduct probably will not qualify, 
but a complex act requiring several steps, particularly premeditated, may well 
qualify.”). However, on the particular facts of this case, we nevertheless affirm, 
because the trial court’s error was harmless. See State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 32, 
77 P3d 1111 (2003) (Oregon constitution requires affirmance despite error when 
there is little likelihood that the particular error affected the verdict).