Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Maignan

Citation: 

Docket Number: 23agx/10

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2011-10-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Peter Richard Maignan, Misc. Docket
AG No. 23, September Term, 2010.
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – DISBARMENT – PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT
– UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW DURING SUSPENSION:
The Respondent, Peter Richard Maignan, having been found to be in violation of the
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5(a), 5.5(a) and (b), and 8.4(a) through (d),
was disbarred.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 23
September Term, 2010
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND 
v. 
PETER RICHARD MAIGNAN
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
         *Murphy
Adkins
Barbera
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed: October 28, 2011
*Murphy, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while
an active member of this Court; after being
recalled pursuant to the Constitution,
Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated
in the decision and adoption of this opinion.
1
Rule 16-751 provides in relevant part:
(a) Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action.
(1) Upon approval or direction of  Commission.  Upon approval
or direction of the [Attorney Grievance] Commission, Bar
Counsel shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action
in the Court of Appeals.
2
Rule 1.5 provides in relevant part: 
(a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or
collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for
expenses. 
3
Rule 5.5 provides in relevant part: 
(a) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation
of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction . . .
. 
(b) A lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction
(continued...)
Peter Richard Maignan, Respondent, was admitted to the Bar of this State on
December 13, 1995 and was suspended indefinitely from the practice of law on December 22,
2005.  Attorney Grievance v. Maignan, 390 Md. 287, 888 A.2d 344 (2005) (Maignan I).  On
November 8, 2007, we again determined that Maignan had violated the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct (“Rules”) and continued his indefinite suspension.  Attorney Grievance
v. Maignan, 402 Md. 39, 935 A.2d 409 (2007) (Maignan II).
On July 28, 2010, the Attorney Grievance Commission (“Petitioner” or “Bar
Counsel”), acting pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751,1 filed a “Petition for Disciplinary or
Remedial Act” against Maignan, charging numerous violations of the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct, including Rule 1.5 (Fees),2 Rule 5.5 (Unauthorized Practice of Law),3
3(...continued)
shall not: 
(1) except as authorized by these Rules or other law, establish an office
or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the
practice of law; or
(2) hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is
admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction. 
4
Rule 8.4 provides in relevant part:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of
Professional Conduct . . . or do so through the acts of another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation; 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice; 
5
Rule 16-757 provides:
(a) Generally.  The hearing of a disciplinary or remedial action
is governed by the rules of evidence and procedure applicable to
a court trial in a civil action tried in a circuit court. Unless
extended by the Court of Appeals, the hearing shall be
completed within 120 days after service on the respondent of the
order designating a judge.  Before the conclusion of the hearing,
(continued...)
2
and Rule 8.4 (a), (b), (c), and (d) (Misconduct).4  According to the Petition, Maignan engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law during 2007 through March 2009, when he advised,
counseled, and drafted documents and pleadings for complainant Jeffrey G. Smith and
received at least $5,100 in legal fees from Mr. Smith.  In an Order dated July 29, 2010, this
Court referred the matter to Judge Albert Willis Northrop of the Circuit Court for Prince
George’s County for hearing, pursuant to Rule 16-757.5  
5(...continued)
the judge may permit any complainant to testify, subject to
cross-examination, regarding the effect of the alleged
misconduct.  A respondent attorney may offer, or the judge may
inquire regarding, evidence otherwise admissible of any
remedial action undertaken relevant to the allegations. Bar
Counsel may respond to any evidence of remedial action. 
(b) Burdens of proof. The petitioner has the burden of proving
the averments of the petition by clear and convincing evidence.
A respondent who asserts an affirmative defense or a matter of
mitigation or extenuation has the burden of proving the defense
or matter by a preponderance of the evidence. 
(c) Findings and conclusions.  The judge shall prepare and file
or dictate into the record a statement of the judge’s findings of
fact, including findings as to any evidence regarding remedial
action, and conclusions of law. If dictated into the record, the
statement shall be promptly transcribed. Unless the time is
extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed
statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record
no later than 45 days after the conclusion of the hearing. The
clerk shall mail a copy of the statement to each party. 
(d) Transcript. The petitioner shall cause a transcript of the
hearing to be prepared and included in the record. 
(e) Transmittal of record. Unless a different time is ordered by
the Court of Appeals, the clerk shall transmit the record to the
Court of Appeals within 15 days after the statement of findings
and conclusions is filed.  
6
Apparently, Maignan attempted to file an answer to Bar Counsel’s Petition
on January 4, 2011.  In a memorandum dated January 20, 2011, Judge Michael R.
Pearson of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County refused to accept Maignan’s
(continued...)
3
On November 3, 2010, Maignan was personally served with process, to which was
appended the Petition filed by Bar Counsel, Interrogatories, and Bar Counsel’s Request for
Admission of Fact and Genuineness of Documents.  Maignan did not respond, and Judge
Northrop entered an Order of Default on December 14, 2010.6
6(...continued)
answer because it failed to comply with Maryland Rule 2-323(a) and was untimely under
Maryland Rule 2-321.
4
At a hearing on February 4, 2011, Bar Counsel introduced the Admissions of Fact and
the documents underlying the complaint, and the complainant, Mr. Smith, testified.  Maignan
did appear at the hearing and was permitted to cross-examine Mr. Smith and testify on his
own behalf.
In an Opinion and Order dated February 24, 2011, Judge Northrop issued the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
* * *
The Respondent has been suspended from the practice of
law since December 22, 2005.  On January 29, 2007, Jeffrey
Smith, on behalf of Smith-Myers Mortgage Group of which he
is a principal, entered into a Client Representation and Fee
Agreement, ostensibly with the Law Offices of Herbert A.
Callihan, LLC.  That agreement, Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, sub-
exhibit 3, states that the firm will represent Mr. Smith’s company
in a civil action, Sherrill, et al. v. Lawson, et al., a Circuit Court
case in Prince Georges County.  Mr. Smith’s firm had been
named as a defendant in that case.  The agreement contains the
following recital (reproduced verbatim): 
a) Client is free to engaged HAC, and that
Client is not at this time obligated or has
employed by any other Lawyer and HAC
has obtained the services of PETER R.
MAIGNAN and/or his associates to be in
the Court for all proceedings; . . . 
Mr. Smith testified, and this court accepts as true, that he
never met Callihan; that the only contact he had with the Callihan
5
firm was with the Respondent; that the contacts with the
Respondent were at Mr. Smith’s office where Mr. Smith’s legal
problems were discussed; and that he understood, because of the
representations made by the Respondent, that the Respondent
was his (i.e., his company’s) lawyer.  On January 29, 2007, Mr.
Smith gave the Respondent a check for $8,000  (Petitioner’s
Exhibit 1, sub-exhibit 2.)  Those funds were the attorney’s fees
set forth in the agreement.  While the agreement originally called
for a $15,000 fixed and earned fee, Mr. Smith balked at paying
the fee and he and the Respondent agreed that the fee should be
$8,000.  That change is reflected in the agreement.  The check
was made out to the Respondent and only he endorsed it.
Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, sub-exhibit 2.  The Respondent thereby
took a legal fee for the work set forth in the agreement. 
In June 2008 through March 2009, the Respondent
provided legal representation to Mr. Smith and to other
defendants in a case filed in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, a court in which the Respondent was
not authorized to practice.  In the case of Robert Carroll, et al. v.
Fremont Investment, et al., Case No. 1:08-cv-00900 (HHK), the
Respondent drafted and filed Defendant Jeffrey Smith’s Answer
to Complaint (Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, sub-exhibit 4), Defendant
Jeffrey Smith’s Motion to Dismiss Amenmded [sic] Complaint
or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment (Petitioner’s Exhibit
1, sub-exhibit 5) and a Memorandum in support of the Motion
(Petitioner’s Exhibit 6).  Each of these pleadings were styled as
pro se, ostensibly signed by Mr. Smith.  The Respondent,
however, drafted, signed the pleadings in Mr. Smith’s name and
filed them in court.  Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, Admissions B 11, 12,
13, Testimony of Jeffrey Smith.
Mr. Smith testified that a default judgment was entered
against his interests in the Sherrill case and he was concerned
about Respondent’s apparent lack of attention which may have
been cause of that outcome.  The Respondent’s e-mail of March
30, 2009, ask Mr. Smith to e-mail him the case number of that
case where the judgment was improperly issued against you so
that I can file the motion to vacate.  Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, sub-
exhibit 8 (emphasis added).  Mr. Smith and the Respondent had
additional e-mail correspondence between January 1 and January
5, 2009, as is set forth in Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, sub-exhibit 7.  In
6
his e-mail of January 1, 2009, the Respondent discusses the fact
that he had not received Mr. Smith’s e-mail concerning opposing
counsel’s communication with Mr. Smith.  He asked Mr. Smith
to send it to me as soon as possible so that I can prepare your
response.  Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, sub-exhibit 7 (emphasis added).
Admission B 14, Testimony of Jeffrey Smith.  At one point, after
no one appeared in court to represent Mr. Smith, he made an
inquiry of the Respondent about the failure.  The Respondent
replied, “Everything is under control”.  Testimony of Jeffrey
Smith.  The Respondent’s communications with Mr. Smith
demonstrate that he was acting as an attorney; giving counsel,
drafting documents to be filed in court and holding himself out
as able to practice.  The e-mails from the Respondent have no
other party’s name and the checks, in evidence, written to the
Respondent, are all made payable to him individually.  (The
check dated January 4, 2008, for $650.00 contains a
memorandum that says attorney.)  Each of the six (6) checks in
Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, sub-exhibit 1, are for legal fees and they
total $5,150.00.  Admission B 6, 7, 8.  These were in addition to
the $8,000.00 legal fee discussed supra.
Although there came a time when the Respondent told Mr.
Smith that he had been suspended, he did so in a manner that did
not give Mr. Smith the essence of the problem and did not alert
Mr. Smith to his status at the commencement of the engagement
in 2007.  Instead, he gave the impression that with three letters of
recommendation, one of which was Mr. Smith’s, his readmission
would be approved.  The Respondent wrote the letter and it was
signed by Mr. Smith at Respondent’s request.  Petitioner’s
Exhibit 2, Testimony of Jeffrey Smith.  Subsequent to that letter
in May 2008, the Respondent continued to act as Mr. Smith’s
lawyer and no further discussion of the Respondent’s status took
place.  
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Respondent violated Rules 1.5(a), 5.5(a) and (b),
8.4(a) (b) (c) and (d) of the Maryland Rules of Professional
Conduct.  The Respondent’s fees were unreasonable as he was
not authorized to receive legal fees.  Mr. Smith paid for the
services of a lawyer, i.e., one licenced to practice.  The
Respondent’s deceit in connection with his entitlement to legal
7
fees is a compelling reason to determine violations of both this
Rule and Rule 8.4(c).  
The Respondent, while suspended, engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.  Section 10-101(h) of the Business
Occupations and Professions Article of the Maryland Code
defines the practice of law, inter alia, as to engage in giving legal
advice... preparing or helping in the preparation of any...
document that is filed in a court or affects a case that is or may be
filed in a court...giving advice about a case that is or may be filed
in a court.  The evidence demonstrates that the Respondent
engaged in these activities in his relationship with Mr. Smith.
The Court of Appeals has said that the practice of law includes
utilizing legal education, training and experience [to apply] the
special analysis of the profession to a client’s problem.  Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. James, 340 Md. 318, 324, 666 A.2d 1246,
1248 (1995) citing Kennedy v. Bar Ass’n of Montgomery County,
Inc, 316 Md. 646, 662, 561 A.2d 200, 208 (1989).  The
Respondent, under any definition, held himself out as able to
practice and he did practice law while he was suspended.  The
evidence of a violation of Rule 5.5(a) and (b) is overwhelming.
The Respondent’s deceit in failing to honestly inform Mr.
Smith and others that he was not permitted to practice law
violated Rule 8.4(c) and receipt of fees for his services without
such disclosures is dishonest as well.  His conduct in representing
Mr. Smith was prejudicial to the administration of justice and he
thereby violated Rule 8.4(d).  
The Respondent’s violations of the Rules set forth supra
lead to the conclusion that he violated Rule 8.4(a).  The
Respondent was permitted to testify on a limited basis at the
hearing in this matter in mitigation.  He offers that he took
general remedial classes in the District of Columbia and in
Maryland during his suspension.  He also notes that he was in the
midst of a divorce.  This court finds the Respondent did not
credibly demonstrate that any of his actions were mitigated
particularly in light of his assertion that he only worked “with”
attorneys and did not practice law, an assertion clearly
outweighed by the evidence.  
It is for the Court of Appeals to decide the appropriate
8
sanction in this case.  Given the fact that, in Bar Counsel’s
Complaint, the Respondent was already suspended, this court has
difficulty in finding any mitigating factor.
Bar Counsel has not filed any exceptions to the hearing judge’s Opinion and Order and
recommends disbarment.  Maignan also has not filed any exceptions; he failed to appear at
oral argument before this Court.  
After oral argument, a per curiam order disbarring Respondent was entered on
September 26, 2011. The order stated: 
For reasons to be stated in an opinion later to be filed, it
is this 26th day of September, 2011,
ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the
Respondent, Peter Richard Maignan be, and he is hereby,
disbarred, effective immediately, from the practice of law in this
State and his name as an attorney has been stricken from the
register of attorneys in this Court (Maryland Rule 16-713).
Respondent shall pay all costs as taxed by the Clerk of this Court,
including the costs of all transcripts, pursuant to Maryland Rule
16-761 for which sum judgment is entered in favor of the
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland against Peter
Richard Maignan. 
Accordingly, we now state the reasons for our previously-issued order. 
Standard of Review
This Court has “original and complete jurisdiction over attorney discipline proceedings
in Maryland.”  Attorney Grievance v. Nwadike, 416 Md. 180, 192, 6 A.3d 287, 294 (2010),
quoting Attorney Grievance v. Thomas, 409 Md. 121, 147, 973 A.2d 185, 200 (2009).  While
we conduct an independent review of the record, we “accept the hearing judge’s findings of
fact as prima facie correct unless shown to be clearly erroneous.”  Attorney Grievance v.
7 Maryland Rule 16-759 provides in pertinent part:
 
(b) Review by Court of Appeals. (1) Conclusions of law.  The
court of Appeals shall review de novo the circuit court judge’s
conclusions of law. 
(2) Findings of fact.  (A) If no exceptions are filed.  If no
exceptions are filed, the Court may treat the findings of fact as
established for the purpose of determining appropriate sanctions,
if any. 
9
Stern, 419 Md. 525, 556, 19 A.3d 904, 925 (2011), citing Attorney Grievance v. Palmer, 417
Md. 185, 205, 9 A.3d 37, 49 (2010).  Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-759,7 we may treat the
findings of fact as established for the purpose of determining the appropriate sanction, where
no exceptions have been filed, and independently review the hearing judge’s conclusions of
law.  Stern, 419 Md. at 556, 19 A.3d at 925. 
Discussion
We accept Judge Northrop’s findings of fact as established for the purpose of
determining the appropriate sanction, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(2)(A), because
no exceptions have been filed.
As to the conclusions of law, we agree that the findings of fact clearly establish
Maignan’s violations of  Rules 1.5(a), 5.5(a) and (b), and 8.4(a) through (d).  As to Rule
1.5(a), which prohibits the collection of an unreasonable fee, Maignan negotiated and
collected a fee from Mr. Smith for legal services while Maignan was suspended from the
practice of law.  An attorney’s suspension from the practice of law renders a legal fee paid by
a client unreasonable.  See Attorney Grievance v. Fallin, 371 Md. 237, 241-42, 808 A.2d 791,
794 (2002); see also Attorney Grievance v. Velasquez, 380 Md. 651, 656, 846 A.2d 422, 425
10
(2004) (“Combining the respondent’s lack of a license to practice law . . . with his failure to
render any meaningful services in connection with the representation he had undertaken and
noting the respondent’s collection and retention of a fee, the hearing judge found a violation
of Rule 1.5(a).”).
With respect to Rule 5.5(a), to determine the unauthorized practice of law, “the focus
of the inquiry should ‘be on whether the activity in question required legal knowledge and
skill in order to apply legal principles and precedent.’”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Hallmon, 343 Md. 390, 397, 681 A.2d 510, 514 (1996), quoting In re Discipio, 645 N.E.2d
906, 910 (Ill. 1994).  Although Mr. Smith’s Client Representation and Fee Agreement
ostensibly reflected the signature of Herbert A. Callihan of the Law Offices of Herbert A.
Callihan, LLC, it was Maignan alone who addressed Mr. Smith’s defense in the Sherrill case.
Maignan alone met with Mr. Smith to address legal problems.  When a default judgment was
entered against Mr. Smith’s interests in the Sherrill case, Maignan provided legal advice by
offering to file a motion to vacate.  Clearly, Maignan’s exercise of legal knowledge, skills and
education while suspended from the practice of law violated Rule 5.5(a).
Maignan’s failure to inform Mr. Smith of his suspension from the practice of law prior
to May 2008 also demonstrates a violation of Rule 5.5(a).  From January 2007 through May
2008, Maignan performed legal services for Mr. Smith without any reference to the fact that
he was indefinitely suspended.  Just as we concluded in Attorney Grievance v. Awuah, 374
Md. 505, 523-24, 823 A.2d 651, 661-62 (2003), Maignan’s failure to notify his client of the
suspension serves as a ground for a violation of Rule 5.5(a).
11
In May 2008, when Maignan disclosed his suspension to Mr. Smith, he misrepresented
that he could be reinstated upon the submission of letters of recommendation by Mr. Smith
and two others.  Maignan never told Mr. Smith that he continued to be suspended from the
practice of law.  Therefore, even after May 2008, Maignan violated Rule 5.5(a) because he
continued to distort his inability to practice law.  See Awuah, 374 Md. at 523-24, 823 A.2d
at 661-62.
Maignan’s misrepresentations of his ability to practice law also fall under the purview
of Rule 5.5(b), prohibiting a suspended attorney from holding out to the public that he or she
is able to practice law in Maryland.  See Attorney Grievance v. Shryock, 408 Md. 105, 109,
125, 968 A.2d 593, 596, 605 (2009) (concluding that the continued use of attorney trust
account, which identified Shryock as an attorney, following indefinite suspension violated
Rule 5.5(b)(2)).
We also conclude that Maignan’s conduct violated Rules 8.4(a) through (d).  Under
Rule 8.4(b), Maignan committed “a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer . . . .”  Section 10-601 of the Maryland Code
(1989, 2004 Repl. Vol.), Business Occupations & Professionals Article criminalizes the
unauthorized practice of law.  See also Md. Code, Bus. Occ. & Prof. Art. § 10-606(a)(3)
(1989, 2004 Rep. Vol.); Shryock, 408 Md. at 122-23, 968 A.2d at 603 (concluding that a
lawyer’s unauthorized practice of law while already suspended violated Rule 8.4(b)).
Maignan’s representation of Mr. Smith also constituted “conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation” under Rule 8.4(c).  Maignan accepted fees for legal work
12
when he was not entitled to and misrepresented his status throughout his representation of Mr.
Smith.  See Velasquez, 380 Md. at 657, 846 A.2d 426 (concluding that the respondent’s
practice of law without a license, failure to communicate that fact to his client, and acceptance
of fees for legal work that he could not perform demonstrated conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation under Rule 8.4(c)); Awuah, 374 Md. at 523-24; 823 A.2d
at 661-62; see also Shryock, 408 Md. at 124, 968 A.2d at 604 (concluding that Rule 8.4(c)
was violated by a suspended attorney’s filing of pleadings for another because “there was no
reasonable basis on which Shryock could have thought that his conduct was lawful”).
With regard to Rule 8.4(d), which defines professional misconduct as “engag[ing] in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice,” it is axiomatic when it is
discovered and made public that a person who represents by word and deed that he can
practice law when in fact he is under the disability of an indefinite suspension erodes the
public’s confidence in the practice of law.  Awuah, 374 Md. at 523-24, 823 A.2d at 662
(finding that a suspended attorney’s failure to communicate to his clients his inability to
practice law prejudiced the administration of justice under Rule 8.4(d)); Shryock, 408 Md. at
125, 968 A.2d at 604-05 (Violations of Rules 8.4(b) and (c) generally “constitute a violation
of [Rule] 8.4(d), in that the conduct that supports a violation of [Rule] 8.4(b) and (c) amounts
to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.”).
We also have previously determined that multiple Rule violations, such as found here,
may establish a violation of Rule 8.4(a).  Attorney Grievance v. Carithers, 421 Md. 28, 57,
25 A.3d 181, 198 (2011). 
13
Sanction
When disciplining an attorney, we have consistently observed that our primary goal
is to protect the public.  See Stern, 419 Md. at 559, 19 A.3d at 926.  To effectuate that goal,
we consider the following aggravating factors of Section 9.22 of the American Bar
Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions:  
(a) prior disciplinary offenses; 
(b) dishonest or selfish motive; 
(c) a pattern of misconduct; 
(d) multiple offenses; 
(e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by
intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the
disciplinary agency; 
(f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other
deceptive practices during the disciplinary process; 
(g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct;
(h) vulnerability of victim; 
(i) substantial experience in the practice of law; 
(j) indifference to making restitution.
Attorney Grievance v. Bleecker, 414 Md. 147, 176-77, 994 A.2d 928, 945-46 (2010).  Bar
Counsel has urged us to consider Maignan’s prior disciplinary offenses under factor (a).
With regard to factor (a), this is the third time in seven years that we have determined
that Maignan violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.  In 2005, Maignan was indefinitely
suspended from the practice of law for a trust account violation when he deposited a client’s
settlement funds into his operating account.  Maignan I, 390 Md. 287, at 296-98, 888 A.2d
344, 349-50.  In 2007, we determined that Maignan, prior to his suspension in 2005, failed
to deposit a retainer fee in his escrow account, and, following his suspension, engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law for appearing in court and representing to the court that he could
14
practice law in spite of his indefinite suspension.  Maignan II, 402 Md. 39, 46-58, 935 A.2d
409, 413-20.  In January of 2007, the same month that Maignan II complaints were filed with
this Court, Mr. Smith had signed the Client Representation and Fee Agreement and Maignan
had negotiated with Mr. Smith a legal fee of $8,000.  After we entered our decision in
Maignan II in November of 2007, Maignan continued to practice law and misrepresent his
ability to practice law to Mr. Smith.  Obviously, Maignan’s prior disciplinary offenses,
including the overlap in time between this Court’s determination in Maignan II and the
circumstances in the present case, warrant the gravest sanction of disbarment. 
When a member of the legal profession consistently violates the Rules of Professional
Conduct and continues to disregard repeated admonishments in derogation of the trust and
confidence of the public, disbarment is the only remedy. 
Accordingly, we have disbarred the respondent, Peter Richard Maignan.