Case Title: George v. Courtney

Citation: 

Docket Number: S055663

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2008-02-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: February 2, 2008
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
LARRY GEORGE,
individually and in his capacity as Oregon State Senator
and a member of the 74th Legislative Assembly,
and TED ABRAM, individually,

Appellants,
v.
PETER COURTNEY, 
in his capacity as President, 
Oregon State Senate,
JEFF MERKLEY,
in his capacity as Speaker,
Oregon House of Representatives,
THEODORE KULONGOSKI,
in his capacity as Governor, State of Oregon,
and BILL BRADBURY,
in his capacity as Oregon Secretary of State,
Respondents.
(CC 07C-23988; SC S055663)
En Banc
On order accepting certified appeal from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted February 1, 2008.
James M. Brown, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellants. 
Anna M. Joyce, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for
respondents.  With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
GILLETTE,  J.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

*Order accepting certified appeal dated January 29, 2008, from Marion County
Circuit Court, Paul J. Lipscomb, Judge.
GILLETTE,  J.
This is a case involving a challenge to the basis on which the Legislative
Assembly has called itself into session for a special session scheduled to begin on
Monday, February 4, 2008. (1)  Plaintiffs, one of whom is a state Senator, are two
Oregon citizens.  Defendants are the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Governor, and the Secretary of State (hereafter collectively referred
to as "the state").  
The facts are undisputed.  At the beginning of the 2007 regular legislative
session, the Legislative Assembly adopted Senate Concurrent Resolution 1 (SCR 1). 
Among other things, the preamble of SCR 1 recited that the Public Commission on the
Oregon Legislature, (3) a commission created by the Legislative Assembly in 2005, had
found after receiving testimony and reviewing documents on the frequency, length, and
timing of Oregon's legislative sessions, that
"the current structure of the legislative sessions does not provide sufficient
predictability or certainty for the citizens of Oregon; and
"* * * even-year sessions will improve the legislature's handling of
complex policy issues and related fiscal matters[.]"
After resolving, in the first two sections of SCR 1, that the Legislative Assembly would 
adhere to certain schedules, timelines, and rules during the 2007 session, the resolution
concluded with a final section addressing the findings noted in the preamble:
"Pursuant to the declarations made in the preamble of this resolution,
the Seventy-fourth Legislative Assembly declares that an emergency exists
and will continue through February 2008, and the members agree as
follows:
"(a) In January 2008 the presiding officers shall provide notice to the
Legislative Administrator of the intent to invoke ORS 171.015(1) so as to
ensure that [a] special session shall convene on February 4, 2008.
"(b) The Legislative Administrator shall follow the special session
protocol set forth in ORS 171.015.
"(c) Upon receipt of the notice described in ORS 171.015(1), so as to
convene the special session on February 4, 2008, the presiding officers shall
invoke the provisions of section 10a, Article IV[,] of the Oregon
Constitution.
"(d) Upon convening the 2008 special session, the presiding officers
shall ensure that the 2008 special session adjourns sine die no later than
February 29, 2008, and that the special session is limited to consideration of
the most pressing fiscal and policy issues."
In December 2007, plaintiffs initiated this action.  Specifically, plaintiffs
sought a declaration that, as framed by SCR 1, the emergency session of the Oregon State
Legislature then proposed for early February 2008 violated Article IV, Section 10, of the
Oregon Constitution. (4)  Plaintiffs also sought a temporary injunction restraining (1)
the President and the Speaker from convening their respective bodies for the session; (2)
the Governor from signing any legislation passed during the session; and (3) the Secretary
of State from receiving and recording any legislation enacted during the session.  
In a memorandum of law supporting their injunction request, plaintiffs
acknowledged that Article IV, Section 10a, of the Oregon Constitution -- a constitutional
amendment referred to and approved by Oregon voters in 1976 -- authorizes the
legislature to convene itself "[i]n the event of an emergency."  Plaintiffs asserted,
however, that the phrase, "event of an emergency," means a specific, urgent circumstance,
exigency, or pressing necessity that requires an immediate response -- a situation,
plaintiffs contended, that was not present in this case.  They argued that,
"[w]hile the Legislative Assembly's authority to decide what constitutes an
'emergency' necessitating a special session may be broad, the 'event of an
emergency' language of Article IV, Section 10(a) is not devoid of meaning. 
If the voters intended that the 'in the event of an emergency' language of
Article IV, Section 10(a) would have no objective meaning at all, then the
provisions of Article IV, Section 10 limiting the Legislative Assembly to
biennial sessions have been rendered meaningless.  That conclusion would
be contrary to the fundamental canons of constitutional construction and
heretofore unbroken history of the history of [sic] legislative power in
Oregon.  The voters did not intend to abrogate Article IV, Section 10 when
they voted to approve Article IV, Section 10(a).  The Legislative Assembly
may not schedule, one year in advance, an 'event of emergency' upon which
to schedule a Supplemental Session." 
On January 18, 2008 -- shortly before the scheduled trial date for plaintiffs'
action -- the President and the Speaker began the process to convene an emergency
legislative session, as set out in ORS 171.015. (5)  As a required part of that statutory
procedure, the President and the Speaker submitted the following statement of
justification for the session to their legislative colleagues:
"The Legislative Assembly, through the adoption of Senate
Concurrent Resolution 1 (2007), determined that the structure of convening
the Legislative Assembly in session every odd-numbered year does not
provide sufficient predictability or certainty for the citizens of Oregon, and
further determined that an even-numbered year session will improve the
legislature's handling of complex policy issues and related fiscal matters.  In
addition, interim committees of the Legislative Assembly have identified
specific budget and policy issues that need resolution without delay.  We
find that these matters constitute an emergency warranting immediate
attention by the Legislative Assembly."
Thereafter, the members of the Legislative Assembly were advised of the statement by the
President and the Speaker, and were asked whether they wished to convene a session of
the assembly.  The requisite number of members of each house voted to hold a special
session.  The President and the Speaker then announced the convening of the special
session in a proclamation dated February 1, 2008.
In the trial court, the state argued, in part, that the text, context, and history
of Article IV, Section 10a, underscored a clear intent to vest the legislature with the sole
discretion and authority to determine the existence of an emergency for convening a
special session under that provision.  The trial court agreed, concluding that such a
decision "should be, in nearly all instances, one for the legislature alone to determine." 
The trial court went on to opine that the identification of "specific budget and policy
issues that need resolution without delay" as part of the justification for the special
session, although vague, nevertheless was sufficient to meet the threshold requirements of
Article IV, Section 10a.  Based on that view, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs'
complaint.  This appeal followed.

Three provisions of the Oregon Constitution address the scheduling of state
legislative sessions.  One provision, Article IV, section 10, provides:
"The sessions of the Legislative Assembly shall be held biennially at
the Capitol of the State commencing on the second Monday of September,
in the year eighteen hundred and fifty eight, and on the same day of every
second year thereafter, unless a different day shall have been appointed by
law." (6)
The Governor also has authority to call the Legislative Assembly into session under 
Article V, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution, which provides:
"[The Governor] may on extraordinary occasions convene the
Legislative Assembly by proclamation, and shall state to both houses when
assembled, the purpose for which they shall have been convened."
Finally, Article IV, Section 10a, allows the legislature to convene itself, "[i]n the event of
an emergency," and pursuant to the written request of a majority of the members of each house:
"In the event of an emergency the Legislative Assembly shall be
convened by the presiding officers of both Houses at the Capitol of the
State at times other than required by section 10 of this Article upon the
written request of the majority of the members of each House to commence
within five days after receipt of the minimum requisite number of requests."
This case concerns the meaning of Article IV, section 10a, an issue raised for the first
time in the present proceeding.
Plaintiffs focus their challenge to the legislature's proposed session 
primarily on the use of the term "emergency" in the text of Article IV, Section 10a.  They 
posit that the word refers to specific circumstances that give rise to the need for an
immediate response, so that the legislature cannot convene itself in an "emergency"
session unless those circumstances are present.  Implicit in that proposition is the idea that
an "emergency" is an objectively discernable event or series of events and, therefore, that 
whether such an emergency exists is a question amenable to judicial scrutiny.  The state,
for its part, focuses on the requirement in Article IV, Section 10a, that majorities in both
legislative houses must request an emergency session before such a session can be
convened.  Under the state's interpretation, and regardless of the particular circumstances,
an "emergency" exists whenever majorities in both legislative houses so declare.  From
that premise, the state argues that the question whether an "emergency" exists is reserved
for the Legislative Assembly alone and, thus, is beyond the permissible scope of judicial
scrutiny.  Alternatively, the state agues that, even if the Legislative Assembly's
declaration that an emergency exists is amenable to judicial scrutiny, this court should
give the greatest possible deference to the Legislative Assembly's determination.
Article IV, section 10a, was adopted by the voters pursuant to a legislative
referendum, rather than being enacted as a part of the original Oregon Constitution.  In
such cases, this court  applies the interpretive methodology set out in Ecumenical
Ministries v. Oregon State Lottery Comm., 318 Or 551, 871 P2d 106 (1994).  See
Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or 38, 57, 11 P3d 228 (2000) (identifying that case as
the appropriate paradigm for such interpretations).  Under Ecumenical Ministries, this
court's task in examining constitutional provisions referred to the people for their
approval is to discern the voters' intent in adopting a particular provision.  318 Or at 559.  
The best evidence of the voters' intent in adopting a particular constitutional
provision is the text of the provision itself.  Id.  The context of the provision may also be
considered, and includes the text of the ballot measure that gave rise to the provision, id.,
the text of related ballot measures submitted to voters during the same election, id., and
related constitutional provisions that were in place when the provision in question was
adopted.  Stranahan, 331 Or at 62 n 15; see also Comeaux v. Water Wonderland
Improvement Dist., 315 Or 562, 569, 847 P2d 841 (1993) (considering such context when
interpreting voter-initiated constitutional amendment).  If the voters' intent is clear from 
the text and context of the constitutional provision at issue, this court will not inquire
further.  Ecumenical Ministries, 318 Or at 559.  If, however, the voters' intent is not clear
after that inquiry, this court will turn to the provision's history.  Id.  See also Flavorland
Foods v. Washington County Assessor, 334 Or 562, 575, 54 P3d 582 (2002) (illustrating
proposition).
We first examine the text of Article IV, Section 10a.  As noted, that
constitutional provision conditions the Legislative Assembly's ability to convene itself on
"the event of an emergency."  In examining the text of constitutional provisions adopted
by initiative or legislative referral, this court typically gives words of common usage their
plain, natural, and ordinary meaning.  Coultas v. City of Sutherlin, 318 Or 584, 588-89,
871 P2d 465 (1994).  
The word "emergency," by its plain and ordinary meaning, connotes 
"an unforseen combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls
for immediate action * * * as a : a pressing need : EXIGENCY * * * c : a
usu. distressing event or condition that can often be anticipated or prepared
for but seldom exactly foreseen[.]"
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 741 (unabridged ed 2002).  In light of the broad
range of tasks that confront legislatures every day, we have no basis for assuming that the
voters meant to use the term "emergency" narrowly, e.g., to address, for example,
unforseen emergencies, but not pressing needs.  And, if that is true, then the scope of
authority granted to the Legislative Assembly seems to us to be plain from the wording of
the provision itself:  Article IV, Section 10a, of the Oregon Constitution authorizes the
Legislative Assembly to convene itself in special session at any time other than during a
regular session if, in the opinion of the requisite number of legislators, a combination of
circumstances has resulted in a need for immediate action, there appears to be a pressing
need to convene (whatever the nature and source of that need), or a distressing event or
condition has arisen, even if the possibility of that event or condition had been
anticipated.  
Nothing in the text of Article IV, section 10a, requires the legislators to 
consult each other, agree on, or give notice of the circumstances that constitute the
emergency.  We note, however, that, rather than rely on that broad reading of its power
under Article IV, section 10a, the Legislative Assembly has enacted self-limiting
legislation that, among other things, addresses those matters.  
Specifically, ORS 171.015 sets out the procedures to be followed in
requesting a special session.  Section (2) of that statute requires that a written notice of
intent to invoke Article IV, section 10a, signed by at least one member of each house, be
filed with the Legislative Administrator, and that the filing contain "a written statement
giving justification of the need for a special session."  Section (3) then requires the
Legislative Administrator to send to each member of the Legislative Assembly a form
allowing the member to declare whether the member does or does not wish to have a
special session convened.  That form must contain the statement of justification described
in subsection (2).  The member then indicates on the form whether or not the members
wishes to have a special session convened, and return the form to the Legislative
Administrator.  Section (4) provides that each form, when returned, constitutes the
signing member's irrevocable commitment either to request or not to request a special
session.  A sufficient number of those requests from each house triggers the calling of a
special session.  
Plaintiffs do not assert that the procedures set out in either Article IV,
Section 10a, or in its implementing statute, ORS 171.015, were not followed.  And, in
light of the fact that the Legislative Assembly has chosen to create more transparency in
convening a special session than is required by the wording of Article IV, section 10a, it
would seem to follow that the legislature's undisputed conformance with ORS 171.015
more than satisfies any constitutional requirement.  Plaintiffs, however, argue otherwise. 
We address their arguments briefly.
Plaintiffs assert, first, that SCR 1, which plaintiffs claim discloses the real
reason that the special session was called, is constitutionally insufficient to serve as the
basis upon which the Legislative Assembly may convene itself.  That argument is not
relevant to the central issue in this case, because the special session is not being called as
a legal consequence of SCR 1. (7)  Rather, it is being called on the basis of the contents
of the January 18, 2008, notices mailed to each member of the Legislative Assembly and
their votes in response to those notices.  SCR 1 may have encouraged the leaders of the
two houses to file their notice of intent to invoke Article IV, section 10a, but it did not
require them to do so, or restrict them regarding the grounds that they thought might
justify the special session.  Put more directly:  For the purposes of this proceeding, the
existence and wording of SCR 1 are irrelevant; even had there been no SCR 1, the same
legislators could have filed the same notice, with the same justification, and their
colleagues could have agreed that a special session should be called.
Plaintiffs argue in the alternative that the reasons advanced by the President 
and the Speaker in their notice to the Legislative Administrator were insufficient because
they lacked adequate specificity.  Plaintiffs assert that "the voters are entitled to know the
specific reasons asserted by legislators" in convening a special session.  That argument
also fails.  The declaration by the President and the Speaker stated, inter alia, that
"interim committees of the Legislative Assembly have identified specific budget and
policy issues that need resolution without delay."  That statement meets two definitions of
"emergency" -- it demonstrates "an unforseen combination of circumstances or the
resulting state that calls for immediate action," and "a pressing need."  Article IV, Section
10a, of the Oregon Constitution requires no more than the statute.  Certainly, nothing in
Article IV, Section 10a, requires anything like further specificity in the notice of reasons
that plaintiffs demand, and there is no basis for this court to insert such a requirement into
that provision.  Plaintiffs have not shown a violation of the constitution in that respect. 
Finally, plaintiffs respond that this court should not focus on that single
sentence referring to the existence of budget and policy issues.  More specifically, they
assert that this court should not assume that that sentence, even if sufficient standing
alone, states the true reason that the members of the Legislative Assembly decided to
convene in special session.  In other words, plaintiffs ask us to look behind the acts of the
legislators to weigh and assess the motives behind those acts.  Such an exercise of power
by this court would be an improper invasion by the judicial branch into the very thought
processes of members of a coordinate branch of government.  We have not, and we do
not, claim such power.  Plaintiffs' final argument is not well taken.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
APPENDIX
ORS 171.015 provides:
"(1) When a majority of the members of each house of the
Legislative Assembly has cause to believe that an emergency exists and so
notifies the presiding officers of each house in the manner described in this
section, the presiding officers shall invoke section 10a, Article IV of the
Oregon Constitution.
"(2) Members of the Legislative Assembly may give notice of intent
to invoke the provisions of subsection (1) of this section by filing written
notice thereof with the Legislative Administrator.  The notice shall be
accompanied by a written statement giving justification of the need for a
special session.  The filing may be signed by more than one member of each
house but must be signed by at least one member of each house.
"(3) Upon receipt of a properly signed notice and statement
described in subsection (2) of this section, the Legislative Administrator
shall send to each member of the Legislative Assembly a form to be signed
and returned by the member indicating whether the member requests a
special session or does not so request.  The form shall be as prescribed by
the Legislative Administration Committee and shall contain the text of this
section, the names of the members who filed the notice, and the text of the
accompanying statement.  The form shall be dated and shall bear the date
14 days later, computed as provided in subsection (7) of this section, by 5
p.m. on which date the form must be returned to the Secretary of the Senate
or the Chief Clerk of the House of Representatives, respectively, or the
person designated to serve in that capacity in order to be counted in
determining whether the minimum requisite number of signatures
requesting a special session has been obtained.  The form sent to the
members shall be sent by certified mail, addressee only, return receipt
requested.
"(4) The return of the signed form by a member to the Secretary of
the Senate or the Chief Clerk of the House of Representatives or person
designated to serve in that capacity constitutes an irrevocable request for or
refusal of the special session requested by the members filing under
subsection (2) of this section and described in the form.
"(5) The Secretary of the Senate and the Chief Clerk of the House of
Representatives, respectively, or the person designated to serve in that
capacity shall verify the signatures in the return form and tally the requests
and refusals, note the date and time of the receipt of each returned form. 
When each receives the requisite minimum number of signed forms
agreeing to the special session from members of the house of which the
person is an officer, each immediately shall notify the presiding officer of
each house.
"(6) Upon receiving notice from the Secretary of the Senate and the
Chief Clerk of the House of Representatives or the person designated to
serve in that capacity that the minimum requisite number of signed requests
for a special session has been received and verified for both houses, the
presiding officers jointly shall convene the Legislative Assembly into
emergency session by joint proclamation, fixing the date thereof.  The date
must be within five days after receipt by the presiding officers of the notice
from the Secretary of the Senate and Chief Clerk of the House of
Representatives.  The original of the proclamations shall be filed with the
Secretary of State.
"(7) The period of time for purposes of subsection (3) of this section
shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last day
unless the last day falls on any legal holiday or on Saturday, in which case
the last day is also excluded. The period of time for purposes of subsection
(6) of this section shall be computed by beginning on the day after which
the presiding officers receive the notice described in subsection (6) of this
section and ending five days later, regardless of legal holidays or
Saturdays."
1. We have endeavored to hear and decide this case on an accelerated basis to prevent a
needless special session, if plaintiffs' challenge to that session is successful, or to assure
the members of the Legislative Assembly that the special session is a valid one, if the
plaintiffs' challenge is unsuccessful.
2. ORS 19.405(1) provides:
"When the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of an appeal, the court,
through the Chief Judge and pursuant to appellate rules, may certify the
appeal to the Supreme Court in lieu of disposition by the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals shall provide notice of certification to the parties to
the appeal." 
3. The Commission was established by the Legislative Assembly to
4. Both Article IV, Section 10, and Article IV, section 10a, are set out in full below.
5. 
The full text of ORS 171.015 is set out in the Appendix following this opinion.
6. 
A different day has since been "appointed by law":  The Legislative Assembly now
convenes on "the second Monday in January of each odd-numbered year."  ORS 171.010.
7. 
We note that, if the passage of SCR 1 were the relevant event, then plaintiffs' failure
to challenge the resolution until eleven months after its enactment  would raise serious
concerns respecting the possible applicability of the doctrine of laches.