Case Title: John Doe 67C v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee

Citation: 2005 WI 123

Docket Number: 2003AP001416

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2005-07-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
2005 WI 123 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
John Doe 67C, Jane Doe 67E, Jonathan Gillespie, 
John Doe 67D, and Jim Gillespie,  
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, St. John the 
Evangelist Church, Alias Insurance Company #1, 
and Alias Insurance Company #2,  
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
John Doe 67A, James Ahler,  
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
John Doe 67F,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
Gregory Hudon, and John Doe 67B,  
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, St. John the 
Evangelist Church, Alias Insurance Company #1, 
and Alias Insurance Company #2,  
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  276 Wis. 2d 309, 686 N.W.2d 455 
(Ct. App. 2004-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 13, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 12, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael Guolee   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J., join the 
concurrence. 
BUTLER, JR., J., concurs (opinion filed). 
CROOKS, J., joins the concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there were briefs by Jeffrey 
R. Anderson and Jeff Anderson & Associates, St. Paul, MN, and 
Marci A. Hamilton and Benjamin Cardozo School of Law, New York, 
NY, and James S. Smith and Steinhafel, Smith & Rowen SC, 
Brookfield, and oral argument by Marci A. Hamilton. 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief by John A. 
Rothstein, O. Thomas Armstrong, David P. Muth and Quarles & 
Brady LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by John A. Rothstein. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James A. Johnson and 
Johnson & Houlihan, S.C., Rhinelander, on behalf of the 
Leadership Council on Child Abuse & Interpersonal Violence. 
 
 
2005 WI 123
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417   
(L.C. No. 
02 CV 11791, 02 CV 11792, 02 CV 11793, 
02 CV 11794, 02 CV 11795, 03 CV 2219, 
03 CV 2220, 03 CV 2221, 03 CV 2222, 03 CV 2223 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
John Doe 67C, Jane Doe 67E,  
Jonathan Gillespie, John Doe 67D and  
Jim Gillespie, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, St. John the 
Evangelist Church, Alias Insurance  
Company #1 and Alias Insurance  
Company #2, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 13, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
John Doe 67A, James Ahler,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
John Doe 67F,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
Gregory Hudon, and John Doe 67B,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, St. John the  
Evangelist Church, Alias Insurance  
Company #1, and Alias Insurance Company  
#2,  
 
 
 
 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, John Doe 67A v. 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 
Nos. 2003AP1416 
and 
2003AP1417, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 30, 2004), affirming an 
order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County, Michael D. 
Guolee, Judge, dismissing plaintiff John Doe 67F's lawsuit 
against the Archdiocese of Milwaukee (the Archdiocese).  We are 
called upon to decide whether John Doe 67F's (Doe) complaint 
states a claim upon which relief can be granted.  We hold that 
it does not, and therefore affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
¶2 
Doe alleges that Father George Nuedling, a priest of 
the Archdiocese, sexually abused him during the years 1960-62, 
while Nuedling served at St. Rita Parish in West Allis, 
Wisconsin.  He alleges that because of the traumatic nature of 
Nuedling's abuse, he immediately repressed all memory of it.  
Doe claims that his memories surfaced in 2002, amid revelations 
by the Archdiocese that it knew about Nuedling's abusive 
tendencies as early as the 1980s.  Because Nuedling died in 
1994, Doe could not directly sue him; accordingly, he (and nine 
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
2
other 
plaintiffs 
alleging 
abuse 
by 
Nuedling) 
sued 
the 
Archdiocese, Nuedling's employer. 
 
¶3 
Doe's suit alleges three causes of action: negligence, 
"fiduciary fraud," and breach of fiduciary duty.  Under the 
first theory, Doe alleges that the Archdiocese negligently 
supervised its employee, Nuedling.  Under the second theory, Doe 
alleges that the Archdiocese both affirmatively misrepresented 
information about Nuedling and concealed information about 
Nuedling.  Under the third theory, Doe alleges that the 
Archdiocese concealed information about Nuedling despite its 
alleged fiduciary relationship with Doe.   
¶4 
The circuit court dismissed Doe's suit, relying on our 
decisions in John BBB Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 211 
Wis. 2d 312, 565 N.W.2d 94 (1997), L.L.N. v. Clauder, 209 
Wis. 2d 674, 563 N.W.2d 434 (1997), and Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese 
of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 302, 533 N.W.2d 780 (1995).  This 
appeal stems from that dismissal. 
¶5 
We note at the outset that all three causes of action 
require that at the time of Nuedling's alleged wrongful acts 
(1960-62), the Archdiocese had contemporaneous knowledge of 
Nuedling's abusive tendencies.  Doe's complaint broadly alleges 
that the Archdiocese "knew or should have known of Nuedling's 
problems . . . ."  It provides the basis for this claim by 
alleging that the Archdiocese had knowledge about Nuedling from 
events that occurred in 1980, 1986, 1987, 1993, 2001, and 2002.  
The complaint asserts nothing from which a person could infer 
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
3
that the Archdiocese had knowledge of Nuedling's misconduct 
before 1980. 
¶6 
We conclude that for any of Doe's claims to survive, 
he had to allege that the Archdiocese knew or had a basis for 
knowing that Nuedling was a child molester as of 1960-62.  His 
complaint makes no such allegations.  As we cannot add unpleaded 
facts to Doe's complaint, we affirm the circuit court's 
dismissal of his claims without reaching the other defenses the 
Archdiocese raises. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
¶7 
When analyzing the circuit court's order dismissing 
Doe's claim, we must assume that the Archdiocese has admitted 
all the facts alleged in the complaint.  Hermann v. Town of 
Delavan, 215 Wis. 2d 370, 378, 572 N.W.2d 855 (1998) (citing 
Evans v. Cameron, 121 Wis. 2d 421, 426, 360 N.W.2d 25 (1985)).  
Nuedling was ordained to the Roman Catholic priesthood on May 
29, 1948.  During his career, he worked at four parishes in the 
Archdiocese: St. Rita in West Allis (1948-64), St. Lawrence in 
Milwaukee (1964-67), St. Joseph in Grafton (1967-68), and St. 
John the Evangelist in Twin Lakes (1968-93).  Nuedling died in 
1994.  
¶8 
This appeal is a consolidation of ten lawsuits filed 
in Milwaukee County Circuit Court.  All ten plaintiffs alleged 
abuse by Nuedling at some point during his career. 
¶9 
The ten complaints are quite similar.  Doe's trial 
attorneys, Jeffrey R. Anderson and James S. Smith, represented 
all ten plaintiffs.  On December 6, 2002, Anderson and Smith 
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
4
filed the first five cases for plaintiffs John Doe 67C, John Doe 
67D, Jane Doe 67E, Jim Gillespie, and Jonathan Gillespie.  The 
five complaints are nearly identical.  All five plaintiffs 
alleged the same four causes of action: sexual battery, 
negligence, fiduciary fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty.  All 
five alleged that the abuse occurred while Nuedling was pastor 
at St. John the Evangelist Church.  The complaints contained the 
same number of paragraphs (52) and are textually identical 
except for minor details such as the names of the plaintiffs and 
the dates of the alleged abuse. 
¶10 These five cases were consolidated by circuit court 
orders dated January 4, 2003.  The Archdiocese filed a motion to 
dismiss the consolidated action on January 16, 2003. 
 
¶11 On March 6, 2003, Anderson and Smith filed a second 
set of five cases, this time on behalf of James Ahler, Gregory 
Hudon, John Doe 67A, John Doe 67B, and John Doe 67F.  Ahler, 
Hudon, Doe 67A, and Doe 67B alleged that the abuse occurred 
during Nuedling's tenure at St. John the Evangelist; the fifth 
plaintiff, John Doe 67F, alleged that the abuse occurred while 
Nuedling served at St. Rita in West Allis.  
¶12 Unlike the first group of plaintiffs, the second group 
did not allege sexual battery as a theory of liability; however, 
in all other respects their complaints were largely identical to 
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
5
the first group's.1  The second group alleged negligence, 
fiduciary fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty, as did the first 
group.   
 
¶13 On March 10, 2003, the circuit court held a hearing to 
consider the Archdiocese's motion to dismiss the first set of 
cases.  At this hearing, the plaintiffs' attorney voluntarily 
dismissed the sexual battery claims.  He also addressed the 
issue of the date the Archdiocese knew of Nuedling's abusive 
proclivities: 
And only this last year did [the plaintiffs] know that 
the church, the Archdiocese, the bishop and the 
archbishops knew that Nuedling had been a molester and 
had so known for 20 or more years, 20 or more years.   
. . . .  
And when do [the plaintiffs] first discover the 
[Archdiocese's] fraud?  Last year [2002] when it was 
made known for the first time at least to [the 
plaintiffs], as far as we know to anybody else besides 
the officials of the church, that they had known that 
                                                 
1 In the second set of complaints, the underlined words in 
the following text were added to the end of paragraph 19: 
"Plaintiff [name] therefore, experienced delayed discovery of 
his injuries and their causal relationship to the sexual 
exploitation, and/or Defendants' conduct, and did not know or 
have reason to know that he was injured or that his injuries 
were caused by the sexual exploitation and/or Defendants' 
conduct.  Additionally, not until recent events in the media did 
Plaintiff become aware of Defendants' acts upon which liability 
is based.  Therefore, Plaintiff's Complaint is timely."  
The second set of complaints did not allege the cause of 
action of sexual battery.   
As in the first group of five complaints, the second set of 
complaints contains minor textual differences such as the names 
of the plaintiffs and dates of the alleged abuse.   
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
6
Nuedling was a molester, unfit . . . .  And that they 
had received reports about him in the past for over 
two decades. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
¶14 When questioned by the court as to the adequacy of the 
first five complaints regarding the date of the Archdiocese's 
knowledge, counsel responded: 
[W]e plead the report of '86.  We plead the report in 
'87.  We plead the report of '93.  We plead the report 
in . . . July of 2001.  We plead the report at 
2002. . . .  They failed to disclose this information.   
(Emphasis added.)   
¶15 The argument before the circuit court centered on 
whether our decisions in BBB Doe, Pritzlaff, and Clauder, in 
combination, mandated dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims.  The 
Archdiocese argued that the instant claims are largely identical 
to the claims in John BBB Doe, while the plaintiffs attempted to 
distinguish all three cases.  Ultimately, the circuit court 
sided with the Archdiocese, stating: 
The plaintiff doesn't agree with the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court opinion[s] in Doe or Pritzlaff.  They try to 
distinguish this case from that, but I think they 
failed to do so.   
When you really read their Complaint and look at the 
case law, if they want to convince the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court to reverse the legal consideration or 
precedent that they have established, that is for the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court to do so. 
 . . .   As I indicated before, this Court is not in 
the position, nor does it have the authority to 
overrule a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision I believe 
is directly on point here.  No matter how we might try 
to embellish the arguments.  It is the law of this 
state, and this trial court is obligated and mandated 
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
7
to follow the rulings of the highest court of our 
state.   . . .  
. . . .  
Based on the law as I read it and based on this 
Complaint, I am forced to dismiss all these actions 
failing to state a cause of action under the statute 
of limitations that they can proceed. 
 
¶16 Both sides realized that the court's ruling dismissing 
the first group of claims was fatal to the second group, as the 
ten complaints were largely identical.2  Accordingly, the parties 
stipulated to dismissal with prejudice of the second group of 
claims. 
 
¶17 All ten plaintiffs appealed.  However, by the time the 
court of appeals rendered its decision, nine of the ten had 
voluntarily dismissed their appeals.  The court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the claims filed by 
the only remaining plaintiff, John Doe 67F, "because governing 
decisions by the Wisconsin Supreme Court require it."  John Doe 
67A v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, Nos. 2003AP1416 and 2003AP1417, 
unpublished slip op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. July 30, 2004).  The 
court of appeals expressed some discomfort with this holding, 
commenting that: "Were we writing on a clean slate, we might 
very well agree with appellants that they are entitled to an 
attempt to prove their contentions.  But we are not."  Id., ¶3. 
¶18 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
plainly 
acknowledged 
that 
"According to the appellants[] . . . , the only issue presented 
on this appeal is whether the 'discovery rule' applies."  Id., 
                                                 
2  See supra n.1. 
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
8
¶1.  It resolved that issue in favor of the Archdiocese: "[T]he 
discovery-rule tolling does not save appellants' direct claims 
against the Archdiocese and the Church."  Id., ¶5.  Although it 
thus resolved the "only issue presented," id., ¶1, the court of 
appeals did not end its opinion.  It continued on, explaining 
that 
"Additionally, 
negligent–supervision 
claims 
against 
a 
religious body are barred in Wisconsin by the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment."  Id., ¶6 (citing Pritzlaff, 194 
Wis. 2d at 325-31, and Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d at 686-98).  We 
granted Doe's petition for review. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶19 We review de novo the circuit court's dismissal of a 
complaint for failure to state a claim.  Nat'l Operating, L.P. 
v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York, 2001 WI 87, ¶28, 244 
Wis. 2d 839, 630 N.W.2d 116.  A motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim "tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint."  
BBB Doe, 211 Wis. 2d at 331.  A reviewing court "accept[s] the 
facts pled as true for purposes of [its] review, [but is] not 
required to assume as true legal conclusions pled by the 
plaintiffs."  Id.  Although the court must accept the facts 
pleaded as true, it cannot add facts in the process of liberally 
construing the complaint.  3 Jay E. Grenig, Wisconsin Practice: 
Civil 
Procedure 
§ 206.11 
at 
304 
(West, 
3d. 
ed. 
2003) 
(hereinafter Grenig, Civil Procedure).  Rather, "[i]t is the 
sufficiency 
of 
the 
facts 
alleged 
that 
control[s] 
the 
determination of whether a claim for relief" is properly pled.  
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
9
Strid v. Converse, 111 Wis. 2d 418, 422-423, 331 N.W.2d 350 
(1983) (emphasis added).   
¶20 The court should not draw unreasonable inferences from 
the pleadings.  Morgan v. Pa. Gen. Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 
731, 275 N.W.2d 660 (1979).  After liberally construing the 
complaint, a court should dismiss a plaintiff's claims if it is 
"quite clear" that there are no conditions under which that 
plaintiff could recover.  Id.; see also Prah v. Maretti, 108 
Wis. 2d 223, 229, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982) (both citing Charles D. 
Clausen & David P. Lowe, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Chapters 801-803, 59 Marq. L. Rev. 1, 54 (1976) 
(hereinafter 
Clausen, 
The 
New 
Wisconsin 
Rules 
of 
Civil 
Procedure)). 
 
In 
other 
words, 
"A 
claim 
should 
not 
be 
dismissed . . . unless it appears to a certainty that no relief 
can be granted under any set of facts that plaintiff can prove 
in support of his allegations."  Morgan, 87 Wis. 2d at 732. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. 
Background 
 
¶21 Doe's complaint alleges three causes of action against 
the Archdiocese.  The first is negligence.  In essence, Doe 
alleges that the Archdiocese committed the tort of negligent 
supervision because it "knew or should have known" that its 
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
10
employee, Nuedling, was in fact a notorious pedophile.3  Despite 
this knowledge, Doe claims, the Archdiocese did not remove 
Nuedling or restrict his activities.  Doe's second cause of 
action is "fiduciary fraud."  He alleges that the Archdiocese 
committed fraud both by making affirmative misrepresentations 
and by deliberately concealing information about Nuedling.  
Doe's third cause of action is breach of fiduciary duty.  He 
alleges that the Archdiocese possessed and did not disclose 
information in its possession to the effect that Nuedling was a 
serial child abuser.  He argues that by not disclosing this 
information, the Archdiocese simultaneously committed the torts 
of fiduciary fraud4 and breach of fiduciary duty. 
 
¶22 The Archdiocese makes several arguments in response.  
First, the Archdiocese argues that under BBB Doe, Doe's claims 
are barred by the statute of limitations.  Second, the 
Archdiocese argues that this state's public policy against stale 
                                                 
3 This court did not recognize the tort of "negligent 
supervision" until 1998.  Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 219 
Wis. 2d 250, 267-68, 580 N.W.2d 233 (1998).  Doe argues that 
because he did not discover his claims until 2002, four years 
after our decision in Miller, he can benefit from that holding 
despite the fact that the Archdiocese's allegedly wrongful 
conduct occurred in 1960-62.  Given our holding in this case, we 
need not address this argument. 
4 As 
we 
discuss 
below, 
fraud 
generally 
requires 
an 
intentional misrepresentation.  See State v. Jadowski, 2004 WI 
68, ¶1 n.2, 272 Wis. 2d 418, 680 N.W.2d 810 ("fraud" and 
"intentional misrepresentation" are synonymous).  Doe argues 
that because the Archdiocese owed him a fiduciary duty (another 
question we need not decide), it had a duty to disclose this 
information, and its failure to disclose constituted "fiduciary 
fraud."   
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
11
claims bars Doe's claims.  See BBB Doe, 211 Wis. 2d at 365, 
Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 322.  Third, the Archdiocese argues in 
passing that the First Amendment bars Doe's claims.  See 
Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d at 686 (First Amendment's Establishment 
Clause, applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, 
prohibits government from interpreting church law, policies, or 
practices, and thus becoming excessively entangled in religious 
doctrinal matters). 
B. 
Applicability of the Statute of Limitations 
 
¶23 Doe alleges that Nuedling abused him between 1960 and 
1962, i.e., between 43 and 45 years ago.  Ordinarily, such a 
claim would be barred by the present statute of limitations, 
Wis. Stat. § 893.54(1) (2001-02),5 which bars actions "to recover 
damages for injuries to the person" after three years.  Thus, 
ordinarily Doe's claims would have been barred as of 1965, at 
the latest.  However, Doe was a minor at the time of the alleged 
abuse, and so the limitation period would have been tolled by 
present Wis. Stat. § 893.16, "Person under disability."  That 
statute extends the limitation period applicable to a minor 
child's claim until a date two years after the child reaches the 
age of majority, 18.  Wis. Stat. § 893.16(1).  Prior to 1971, 
though, the age of majority was 21, not 18.  See § 5, ch. 213, 
Laws of 1971.  Doe alleges that he was 13 at the time the abuse 
began in 1960, meaning that he was born in 1946 or 1947.  Thus 
                                                 
5 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 edition unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
12
Doe would have turned 21 in 1967 or 1968, and his claim would 
have been barred by 1969 or 1970.6 
 
¶24 Doe acknowledges this, but argues that the limitations 
period applicable to his claim was further tolled by the 
"discovery rule" we recognized in Hansen v. A.H. Robins Co., 113 
Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983).  "In the interest of justice 
and fundamental fairness," the Hansen court held that tort 
claims "shall accrue on the date the injury is discovered or 
with reasonable diligence should be discovered, whichever occurs 
first."  Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d at 560.  The cause of injury does 
not accrue until the plaintiff discovers both the nature of his 
injury and the cause of his injury.  Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 
314-15 
(citing 
Borello 
v. 
United 
States 
Oil 
Co., 
130 
Wis. 2d 397, 406-07, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986)). 
 
¶25 In BBB Doe, this court answered the following question 
certified by the court of appeals: "Does the discovery rule save 
an otherwise untimely, non-incestuous, sexual assault claim 
against the individual alleged perpetrator when the alleged 
victim was a minor, and the alleged perpetrator was a person in 
a position of trust vis-à-vis the child/victim?"  BBB Doe, 211 
Wis. 2d at 318.  The court concluded  
that the plaintiffs' claims were not timely filed 
because each of the plaintiffs discovered, or in the 
exercise 
of 
reasonable 
diligence, 
should 
have 
discovered that he or she was injured at the time of 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.33(3) (1969-70) actually extended 
the time period for commencing an action only "one year after 
the disability [of "infancy"] ceases." 
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
13
the alleged assault(s) or by the last date of the 
alleged 
multiple 
assaults. 
 
Consequently, 
each 
plaintiff should have filed his or her action within 
the applicable statutory period of one or two years 
after reaching majority. 
Id. at 318-19.  As the court put it: "actionable injury flows 
immediately from a nonconsensual, intentional sexual touching.  
While the plaintiffs may not have known the extent of their 
injuries at the time of the sexual assaults, in Wisconsin 
accrual of an action is not dependent upon knowing the full 
extent of one's injuries."  Id. at 343-44 (citing Pritzlaff, 194 
Wis. 2d at 317).  The BBB Doe court thus concluded that the 
circuit court properly dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, even 
though some of the plaintiffs argued that they had repressed all 
memory of the assaults, as does Doe in the instant case.  Id. at 
319. 
 
¶26 Additionally, we concluded that there was no need to 
address the plaintiffs' claims based on "respondeat superior and 
negligent employment theories" because "[p]laintiffs' derivative 
causes of action against the Archdiocese and the churches 
accrued at the same time that the underlying intentional tort 
claims accrued, and similarly would be barred by the statute of 
limitations."  Id. at 366.   
¶27 Concurring in BBB Doe, Chief Justice Shirley S. 
Abrahamson stated, "This case is largely governed by and 
inexorably follows from [Pritzlaff]."  Id.  We now examine 
Pritzlaff. 
 
¶28 In Pritzlaff, the plaintiff alleged that, while she 
was a high school student, a priest used his position of 
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
14
authority to develop a friendly relationship between the two.  
Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 307-08.  Through the years, she 
alleged, the friendship escalated into a sexual relationship 
that caused her severe emotional distress and led to the breakup 
of her marriage.  Id.  Like the plaintiff in the instant case, 
Pritzlaff argued that she had not brought suit earlier because 
she "has suppressed and been unable to perceive the existence, 
nature 
or 
cause 
of 
her 
psychological 
and 
emotional 
injuries . . . ."  Id. at 315.  Pritzlaff admitted, though, that 
she could remember the sexual relations; she simply did not 
become aware of the full level of her emotional damage until 
later.  Id. at 317 n.5.  Accordingly, the court held, "Pritzlaff 
could have alleged a complete cause of action against [the 
priest] by the time the  . . . relationship ended.  That [she] 
was unaware of additional harm ("severe emotional distress") 
only created uncertainty as to the amount of damages and did not 
toll the period of limitations."  Id. at 317.   
 
¶29 The Pritzlaff court recognized that the discovery rule 
has limits: "the discovery rule will apply only when allowing 
meritorious claims outweighs the threat of stale or fraudulent 
actions."  Id. at 322 (citing Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d at 559).  The 
court recognized that Pritzlaff had no physical evidence to 
prove the coercive nature of the relationship, and observed that 
"'[w]hile some courts may have blind faith in all phases of 
psychiatry, this court does not.'"  Id. (quoting Steele v. 
State, 97 Wis. 2d 72, 97, 294 N.W.2d 2 (1980)).  In light of the 
lack of physical evidence and the extended period between the 
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
15
alleged wrongful acts and the lawsuit, "allowing what could be 
meritorious claims of this nature does not outweigh the threat 
of stale or fraudulent actions."  Id. at 323.   
 
¶30 The Pritzlaff court also held that the plaintiff's 
potential claims against the Archdiocese were barred.  Id. at 
330.  The court recognized that at the time, it had not yet 
recognized 
the 
tort 
of 
"negligent 
supervision." 
 
Id.  
Nevertheless, the court held that even if such a claim existed, 
it would be barred by the First Amendment's establishment 
clause.7  Id. 
 
¶31 Doe's arguments addressing BBB Doe and Pritzlaff have 
not been consistent.  At oral argument, Doe's counsel advised 
the court that we would have to overrule one or both of these 
cases in order to hold in Doe's favor.  In his briefs, however, 
Doe argues that both of these cases are simply not applicable.  
Doe argues that BBB Doe is distinguishable for several reasons.  
First, Doe argues that the principal holding of BBB Doe concerns 
a cause of action against the perpetrator, not the Archdiocese.  
Second, Doe argues that his claims against the Archdiocese are 
not derivative claims; they are direct claims against the 
Archdiocese for its own wrongful conduct.  Third, Doe argues 
                                                 
7 The 
interplay between 
the First 
Amendment and the 
Archdiocese's 
supervision 
of 
its 
priests 
was 
discussed 
extensively 
in 
L.L.N. 
v. 
Clauder, 
209 
Wis. 2d 674, 
563 
N.W.2d 434 (1997).  Doe argues that our holding in Clauder is 
distinguishable, or alternatively, that we should overrule 
Clauder.  Given our holding in this case, we need not address 
the issue. 
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
16
that because Wisconsin did not recognize the tort of negligent 
supervision by an employer at the time we decided BBB Doe, any 
language dismissing such a claim in that case is mere dicta.  
Doe argues that the BBB Doe court's reliance on Pritzlaff was 
misplaced because Pritzlaff concerned an adult victim, not a 
child.  Finally, he argues that the discovery rule preserves all 
his direct claims against the Archdiocese because those claims 
did not accrue until the Archdiocese revealed its allegedly 
wrongful conduct in 2002. 
 
¶32 For its part, the Archdiocese argues that our holdings 
in BBB Doe and Pritzlaff effectively bar Doe's claims here 
because those cases establish that the statute of limitations 
for derivative liability claims expires at the same time as the 
underlying tort claims.  Additionally, the Archdiocese argues 
that our recognition of the negligent supervision tort in Miller 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 250, 267-68, 580 N.W.2d 
233 (1998), should not be retroactively applied to its conduct 
in the 1960s.  Finally, the Archdiocese argues that this state's 
public policy against stale claims should preclude Doe's suit.8  
See BBB Doe, 211 Wis. 2d at 365; Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 322. 
                                                 
8 The Archdiocese asks us to recognize the public policy 
evident 
in 
the 
legislature's 
recent 
enactment 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 895.71, "Sexual exploitation by a member of the 
clergy."  Specifically, § 895.71(4) states that "An action under 
this section is subject to s. 893.587."  Section 893.587, which 
is in effect a statute of repose, provides that such actions 
"shall be commenced before the injured party reaches the age of 
35 years or be barred."  This statute did not take effect until 
May 2004, and therefore we need not consider its applicability 
to this case. 
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
17
C. 
Sufficiency of Doe's Complaint 
 
¶33 Before we consider the parties' competing arguments 
regarding BBB Doe, Pritzlaff, and Clauder, we must test the 
legal sufficiency of Doe's complaint.   
 
¶34 We 
must 
decide 
whether 
Doe 
has 
alleged 
facts 
sufficient to support the three causes of action stated in his 
complaint: negligence, fiduciary fraud, and breach of fiduciary 
duty.   
 
¶35 In 1975 this court adopted new rules of Wisconsin 
civil procedure.  67 Wis. 2d 585 (1975).  One of the "keystones 
of the new procedural system" was Wis. Stat. § 802.02 (1977-78), 
which signaled Wisconsin's 
adoption 
of 
"notice 
pleading."  
Wilson v. Cont'l Ins. Cos., 87 Wis. 2d 310, 316, 274 N.W.2d 679 
(1979); Clausen, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure at 
37.  Under § 802.02(1)(a), a complaint must simply contain "[a] 
short and plain statement of the claim, identifying the 
transaction 
or 
occurrence 
or 
series 
of 
transactions 
or 
occurrences out of which the claim arises and showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief."  These claims are to be 
liberally "construed [so] as to do substantial justice."  
Wis. Stat. § 802.02(6); Prah, 108 Wis. 2d at 229.   
¶36 However, a complaint cannot be completely devoid of 
factual allegations.  The notice pleading rule, while "intended 
to 
eliminate 
many 
technical 
requirements 
of 
pleading," 
nevertheless requires the plaintiff to set forth "a statement of 
circumstances, occurrences and events in support of the claim 
presented."  Clausen, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure 
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
18
at 38-39.  For example, "a claim in negligence must state 
general facts setting forth that the [defendant] had knowledge 
or should have had knowledge of a potential and unreasonable 
risk . . . ."  Wilson, 87 Wis. 2d at 318.  "[A] bare conclusion 
[does] not fulfill[] a plaintiff's duty of stating the elements 
of a claim in general terms."  Id. at 319.  In short, we will 
dismiss a complaint if, "[u]nder the guise of notice pleading, 
the complaint before us requires the court to indulge in too 
much speculation leaving too much to the imagination of the 
court."  Id. at 326-27.  It is not enough for the plaintiff to 
contend that the requisite facts will be "supplied by the 
discovery process."  Id. at 327.   
¶37 Accordingly, the first step in our analysis is an 
examination of the allegations in Doe's complaint to determine 
whether the alleged facts are sufficient or whether they leave 
"too much to the imagination of the court."  One of the grounds 
for the Archdiocese's motion to dismiss was that the complaint 
did not allege that the Archdiocese had knowledge about Nuedling 
as of 1960. 
¶38 Reviewing Doe's pleadings, we find the following 
allegations relating to the date of the Archdiocese's knowledge: 
9. 
On information and belief, Defendants knew 
or should have known of Nuedling's problems with 
alcohol abuse as well as his tendency and history of 
sexually abusing children.  Despite this Defendants 
Diocese and Church continued to allow Nuedling to have 
unsupervised contact with children. 
10. On information and belief, in approximately 
1980 an agent of Defendant Diocese witnessed Nuedling 
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
19
sexually abusing a boy in the sacristy of St. John the 
Evangelist Church. 
11. On information and belief, in November of 
1986 a man reported to Defendant Diocese that he was 
abused when he was a boy by Nuedling. 
12. On information and belief, in approximately 
1987 Nuedling admitted abusing a boy at St. Rita.  
Despite the report to Defendant Diocese and Nuedling's 
own admission of sexual abuse, Defendant Diocese 
allowed Nuedling to continue serving as a priest. 
13. On information and belief, in March of 1993 
another man reported to Defendant Diocese that he was 
abused by Nuedling when he was a boy. 
14. On information and belief, Defendant Diocese 
received 
additional 
reports 
of 
abuse 
by 
three 
different men in July of 2001, March of 2002 and May 
of 2002. 
15. Despite these numerous reports of abuse 
Defendants Diocese and Church failed to disclose 
information regarding Nuedling's abusive propensities 
until recently.   
. . . .  
23. Defendants Diocese and Church knew or should 
reasonabl[y] have known of Nuedling's dangerous and 
exploitative propensities as a child sexual exploiter 
and/or as an unfit agent and despite such knowledge, 
Defendants Diocese and Church negligently retained and 
failed to provide reasonable supervision of Nuedling. 
. . . .  
30. On 
information 
and 
belief, 
Defendants 
Diocese 
and 
Church 
had 
actual 
or 
constructive 
knowledge of Nuedling's inappropriate behavior, as 
discussed above. 
31. Defendants 
Diocese 
and 
Church 
misrepresented, concealed and/or failed to disclose 
information relating to sexual misconduct, and other 
inappropriate behavior of Nuedling. 
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
20
 
¶39 None of these paragraphs alleges that the Archdiocese 
knew of Doe's proclivities as of 1960-62.  Paragraph 9 alleges 
that the Archdiocese "knew or should have known" without giving 
a date.  The vague and general allegations in paragraph 9 are 
grounded in the facts set forth in subsequent paragraphs 
describing incidents that occurred between 1980 and 2002.  
Paragraphs 23, 30, and 31 similarly contain no allegation 
relating the date of the Archdiocese's knowledge. 
 
¶40 At oral argument before this court, Doe's counsel 
reiterated the allegation that the Archdiocese had knowledge as 
of 1980.  Counsel acknowledged that Doe had not specifically 
pleaded an allegation that the Archdiocese knew as of 1960, and 
asked us to assume prior knowledge based on the Archdiocese's 
recent revelations.  In effect, counsel argued that the 
nonspecific allegations of paragraph 9, "knew or should have 
known," are enough to sustain Doe's claim. 
 
¶41 These arguments echo the allegations Doe's counsel 
made before the circuit court regarding the date of the 
Archdiocese's knowledge of Nuedling's proclivities.  See supra 
¶¶13-14 (The Archdiocese, he said, had known about Nuedling "for 
twenty or more years" and had failed to disclose "this 
information.").  Doe has never specifically alleged, in his 
complaint before the circuit court, in his argument before the 
circuit court, in his brief to this court, or in his oral 
argument before this court, that the Archdiocese knew about 
Nuedling's misconduct in 1960-62, or had a basis for such 
knowledge before 1980. 
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
21
 
¶42 With this understanding, we examine the elements of 
each of the causes of action Doe alleged, to determine whether 
any of them may proceed despite Doe's failure to allege that the 
Archdiocese had knowledge at the time of the events in question. 
1. 
Negligence 
 
¶43 In the abstract, a plaintiff alleging "negligence" 
must show four elements: "(1) A duty of care on the part of the 
defendant; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection 
between the conduct and the injury; and (4) an actual loss or 
damage as a result of the injury."  Miller, 219 Wis.2d at 260 
(citing 
Rockweit 
v. 
Senecal, 
197 
Wis. 2d 409, 
418, 
541 
N.W.2d 742 (1995)).  We do not understand Doe to accuse the 
Archdiocese of "negligence" in this broad sense.  Rather, Doe 
alleges the more specific tort of "negligent supervision," which 
we recognized in 1998.  To state a claim for negligent 
supervision  
the plaintiff must show that the employer has a duty 
of care, that the employer breached that duty, that 
the act or omission of the employee was a cause-in-
fact of the plaintiff's injury, and that the act or 
omission of the employer was a cause-in-fact of the 
wrongful act of the employee.   
Miller, 219 Wis. 2d at 267-68. 
 
¶44 In sum, for a plaintiff to succeed in a negligent 
supervision claim, the jury must find a causal connection 
between the employer's negligence and the employee's wrongful 
act.  Id. at 264. 
 
¶45 We now compare Doe's complaint to the elements of this 
cause of action to determine whether it sufficiently alleges 
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
22
supporting facts.  For Doe to succeed on his claim of negligent 
supervision, Doe would have to prove at trial that the 
Archdiocese's conduct was a "cause-in-fact of the wrongful act 
of the employee."  Miller, 219 Wis. 2d at 267-68.  In other 
words, Doe's complaint must "state general facts setting forth 
that the [defendant] had knowledge or should have had knowledge 
of a potential and unreasonable risk . . . ."  Wilson, 87 
Wis. 2d at 318 (emphasis added).  If Doe's complaint did not 
"state general facts setting forth" that the Archdiocese knew or 
should have known of Nuedling's problems at the time of the 
abuse, then it would be impossible to conclude that its 
supervision was a "cause-in-fact" of the abuse. 
¶46 Doe did not allege any facts showing the Archdiocese's 
knowledge before 1980; the allegations in paragraph 9 of the 
complaint are "bare conclusion[s]" not sufficient to sustain the 
complaint.  Doe has not alleged "facts setting forth that the 
[defendant] had knowledge or should have had knowledge of a 
potential and unreasonable risk" posed by Nuedling at the time 
of Doe 67F's alleged abuse.  See Wilson, 87 Wis. 2d at 318.  For 
the purposes of this analysis, we cannot permit Doe to rely on 
hypothetical, speculative "facts" that might or might not be 
supplied by the discovery process.  Id. at 327.  Therefore, 
Doe's complaint insufficiently pleaded Doe's negligence cause of 
action.  Given the allegations in the complaint, Doe could not 
recover 
for 
negligent 
supervision 
under 
any 
set 
of 
circumstances. 
 
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
23
2. 
"Fiduciary Fraud" 
 
¶47 Doe's complaint artfully blends elements of his second 
and third causes of action.  He alleges in his claim of 
"fiduciary fraud" that: 
 
31. Defendants 
Diocese 
and 
Church 
misrepresented, concealed and/or failed to disclose 
information relating to sexual misconduct, and other 
inappropriate behavior of Nuedling. 
¶48 "Fiduciary fraud" has not been recognized as a 
separate tort in Wisconsin, and it is not entirely clear what 
the elements of such a tort would be that would make it 
different from "fraud" or "breach of fiduciary duty."  
¶49 "Fraud consists of a purposeful, volitional act on the 
part of the defrauding party."  Putnam v. Time Warner Cable, 
2002 WI 108, ¶27, 255 Wis. 2d 447, 649 N.W.2d 626 (citing 
Black's Law Dictionary 670 (7th ed. 1999)).  As a general rule, 
a "misrepresentation" is required to support a claim of fraud.  
Mackenzie 
v. 
Miller Brewing 
Co., 
2001 WI 
23, 
¶18, 241 
Wis. 2d 700, 623 N.W.2d 739.  "The general rule is that silence, 
a failure to disclose a fact, is not misrepresentation unless 
the nondisclosing party has a duty to disclose that fact."  
Lecic v. Lane Co., 104 Wis.2d 592, 604, 312 N.W.2d 773 (1981).   
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
24
 
¶50 If 
a 
fiduciary 
relationship 
exists 
between 
the 
parties,9 however, the failure to disclose may be actionable as 
both an intentional misrepresentation (fraud)10 and a breach of 
fiduciary duty.  For the purposes of analyzing the Archdiocese's 
motion to dismiss, we will assume without deciding that a 
fiduciary relationship existed.11  Using this analytic framework, 
we 
will 
separately 
analyze 
Doe's 
allegations 
that 
the 
Archdiocese 
misrepresented 
its 
knowledge 
(which 
we 
will 
denominate Doe's fraud cause of action)12 and Doe's allegations 
                                                 
9 The issue of whether Doe and the Archdiocese have a 
fiduciary relationship is an open question.  Although similar 
claims were raised in John BBB Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 
211 Wis. 2d 312, 565 N.W.2d 94 (1997), and Clauder, we did not 
reach their merits.  Other jurisdictions are divided on the 
issue.  See 1 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 258, at 688 (West 
2001). 
10 Doe 
alleges 
that 
"Defendants 
knew 
that 
they 
misrepresented, concealed, and/or failed to disclose information 
relating to sexual misconduct and other inappropriate behavior 
of Nuedling."  We therefore liberally construe this claim as 
alleging 
intentional 
misrepresentation, 
as 
"[w]e 
use 
'intentional 
misrepresentation,' 
and 
'fraudulent 
misrepresentation,' and 'fraud' interchangeably."  Jadowski, 272 
Wis. 2d 418, ¶1 n.2. 
11 This is a legal conclusion.  Therefore, we are not bound 
to assume that a fiduciary relationship existed.  See Morgan v. 
Pa. Gen. Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 731, 275 N.W.2d 660 (1979).  
Our holding rests on the fact that Doe did not assert any facts 
indicating that the Archdiocese had knowledge of Nuedling's 
proclivities as of 1960-62.  This conclusion would hold 
regardless of whether a fiduciary relationship existed, and 
therefore we may assume without deciding that one did. 
12 In his brief, Doe cites conventional fraud cases such as 
Mackenzie v. Miller Brewing Co., 2001 WI 23, 241 Wis. 2d 700, 
623 N.W.2d 739, which did not involve a fiduciary relationship. 
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
25
that the Archdiocese concealed and/or failed to disclose its 
knowledge (which we will denominate Doe's breach of fiduciary 
duty cause of action).  If either of these claims survives the 
Archdiocese's motion to dismiss, we must reverse the circuit 
court's order. 
 
¶51 According to Mackenzie, in order to survive the motion 
to dismiss, the portion of Doe's complaint alleging "fiduciary 
fraud" must therefore allege "(1) false representation; (2) 
intent to defraud; (3) reliance upon the false representation; 
and (4) damages."  Mackenzie, 241 Wis. 2d 700, ¶18. 
 
¶52 Special rules of pleading apply to fraud claims.  
Wis. Stat. § 802.03(2) ("In all averments of fraud or mistake, 
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated 
with particularity.").  Pleading with "particularity" means that 
the 
plaintiff's 
allegations 
must 
specify 
"the 
particular 
individuals who made the representations [and] the details of 
where and when the misrepresentations were made, and who the 
misrepresentations were made to."  Friends of Kenwood v. Green, 
2000 WI App 217, ¶16, 239 Wis. 2d 78, 619 N.W.2d 271.  "This 
detailed pleading protects persons from casual allegations of 
serious wrongdoing and puts defendants on notice 'so that they 
may prepare meaningful responses to the claim.'"  Putnam, 255 
Wis. 2d 447, ¶26 (quoting Rendler v. Markos, 154 Wis. 2d 420, 
428, 453 N.W.2d 202 (Ct. App. 1990)). 
¶53 Doe's pleading does not satisfy this requirement.  
Nothing in the complaint identifies particular individuals who 
made misrepresentations, the date of the misrepresentations, or 
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
26
the details of the misrepresentations.  Further, we note that if 
the Archdiocese had no knowledge of Nuedling's problem until 
after the time of the alleged abuse, then any misrepresentations 
it made could not have been intentional.  Accordingly, Doe's 
fraud claim based on affirmative misrepresentations must also be 
dismissed. 
¶54 Doe's allegations that the Archdiocese concealed or 
failed to disclose its knowledge are the substance of Doe's 
third cause of action. 
3. 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
 
¶55 "A 
fiduciary 
relationship 
arises 
from 
a 
formal 
commitment to act for the benefit of another . . . or from 
special circumstances from which the law will assume an 
obligation to act for another's benefit."  Merrill Lynch v. 
Boeck, 127 Wis. 2d 127, 136, 377 N.W.2d 605 (1985).  In 
determining whether a fiduciary relationship has arisen, courts 
consider a variety of factors, including whether there is 
dependence and inequality based on weakness of age or mental 
strength, lack of business intelligence, inferior knowledge of 
facts involved, or other conditions giving one side an advantage 
over the other.  Prod. Credit Ass'n of Lancaster v. Croft, 143 
Wis. 2d 746, 755-56, 423 N.W.2d 544 (Ct. App. 1988).  The 
Archdiocese has not conceded that it owed a fiduciary duty to 
Doe, and we need not assume that legal conclusion.  Morgan, 87 
Wis. 2d at 731.  However, for the purposes of this analysis we 
will assume without deciding that a fiduciary relationship 
existed.   
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
27
¶56 Doe's breach of fiduciary duty claim alleges that the 
Archdiocese 
concealed 
information 
regarding 
Nuedling's 
proclivities.  An affirmative duty of disclosure of material 
facts is imposed when the defendant owes a fiduciary duty to the 
plaintiff.  2 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 481, at 1375 
(West 2001).  We accept this fundamental principle.  However, if 
the Archdiocese did not possess such information at the time of 
the alleged abuse, then by definition it could not conceal it.  
Therefore, to sustain this claim, Doe must have alleged that the 
Archdiocese knew or should have known the material information 
as of 1960.  He has not.  Accordingly, this cause of action also 
must fail.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
¶57 We conclude that Doe has not alleged that the 
Archdiocese knew that Nuedling had a problem as of 1960.  Such 
knowledge is essential to all three causes of action Doe raised 
against the Archdiocese.  To make any of Doe's claims viable, we 
would have to add an unpleaded fact, ascribing knowledge to the 
Archdiocese "as of 1960," to paragraphs 9, 23, 30, and 31 of the 
complaint and have some basis for doing so.  This we cannot do.  
See Grenig, Civil Procedure § 206.11 at 304.  We therefore 
conclude that none of Doe's claims is properly pleaded. 
 
¶58 It is "quite clear" that Doe's pleadings fail to state 
a 
claim 
on 
which 
relief 
could 
be 
granted, 
see 
Wis. Stat. § 802.06(2)(a)6, and we affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals.  Given our decision that Doe's claim fails on 
the pleadings, we need not address the Archdiocese's arguments 
No. 2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417  
 
 
 
28
rooted in the statute of limitations, public policy, or the 
First Amendment.13 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 We note in passing that this court did not abolish the 
doctrine of charitable immunity until 1961.  See Kojis v. 
Doctors Hosp., 12 Wis. 2d 367, 372, 107 N.W.2d 131 (1961).  Two 
years later, we clarified that "the new rule abolishing immunity 
of religious institutions for negligence [is] prospective to 
July 1, 1963."  Widell v. Holy Trinity Catholic Church, 19 
Wis. 2d 648, 657, 121 N.W.2d 249 (1963) (citing Kojis).  The 
alleged abuse in this case occurred between 1960 and 1962. 
No.  2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417.awb 
 
1 
 
¶59 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
We 
have 
previously determined that negligent supervision claims against 
a religious body are barred in Wisconsin by the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment because of the threat of excessive 
entanglement between government and religion.  L.L.N. v. 
Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d 674, 686-98, 563 N.W.2d 434 (1997); 
Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 302, 325-331, 
533 N.W.2d 780 (1995).  We have also previously concluded that 
the discovery rule does not save intentional sexual assault 
claims in priest abuse cases from the applicable statute of 
limitations.  BBB Doe v. Archdiocese, 211 Wis. 2d 312, 366, 565 
N.W.2d 94 (1997). 
¶60 The issues of the Establishment Clause and the 
discovery rule are again before us, but in a different context.  
Our 
prior 
cases 
can 
be 
readily 
distinguished 
from 
the 
allegations made here. 
¶61 The petition for review in this case sets forth two 
questions:  (1) Whether a review of the Archdiocese's conduct 
for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, or fraud would require 
the 
court 
to 
become 
"excessively 
entangled" 
in 
solely 
ecclesiastical matters in violation of the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; and (2) Whether 
the discovery rule applies to save the plaintiff's claims 
against the defendants 
from 
the 
bar 
of 
the 
statute of 
limitations. 
¶62 Instead of answering the questions, however, the 
majority dodges them.  It decides this case in an error 
No.  2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417.awb 
 
2 
 
correcting fashion based on the sufficiency of particular 
allegations in an individual complaint.14 
¶63 As a result, the questions in this context remain 
open.  I believe that the court should have answered them 
because they were fully briefed and argued.  For the benefit of 
the lower courts and future litigants, I address the questions 
left unanswered by the majority. 
I. 
¶64 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof . . . "  U.S. Const. Amend. 1.  This constitutional 
guarantee 
is 
made 
applicable 
to 
the 
states 
through 
the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 
530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. 
v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 757 (1995). 
¶65 The 
Establishment 
Clause 
of 
the 
First 
Amendment 
involves the separation of church and state and prohibits the 
government from enacting laws that "aid one religion, aid all 
religions, or prefer one religion over another."  Abington Sch. 
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963) (quoting Everson v. 
Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)).  Although different in 
purpose than the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause 
                                                 
14 The court 
of appeals' primary 
function 
is 
error 
correcting.  Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 188, 560 N.W.2d 246 
(1997).  By contrast, this court's primary function is that of 
law defining and law development.  Id. at 189. 
No.  2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417.awb 
 
3 
 
shares the concept of neutrality as one of its central 
principles.  Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d at 687 n. 11. 
¶66 In 
Lemon 
v. 
Kurtzman, 
the 
U.S. 
Supreme 
Court 
articulated a three-part test to determine whether a neutral law 
violates the Establishment Clause:  (1) the law must have a 
secular purpose; (2) the primary or principal effect of the law 
must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) the law must 
not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.  
403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).15  There is no question that the tort 
laws at issue satisfy the first two prongs of Lemon.  Thus, the 
analysis necessarily centers on its third prong.  
¶67 In this case, there is no threat of excessive 
entanglement between government and religion.  After all, Doe is 
not asking the judicial branch to interpret church canons, 
church polices, or church practices in order to resolve this 
case.  Rather, he is asking it to help ascertain, through 
neutral tort principles, whether the church-employer took the 
necessary steps to prevent foreseeable harm to children.  This 
task is not beyond the capabilities of the courts.  Employers, 
including religious employers, must be subject to such laws if 
our children are to be made safe. 
                                                 
15 Several U.S. Supreme Court Justices have expressed 
dissatisfaction with the Lemon test, advocating alternative 
frameworks.  See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) 
(advocating and applying a coercion test); Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (advocating 
adoption of an endorsement test).  Until the Supreme Court 
reaches a consensus on its successor, however, Lemon remains a 
viable test. 
No.  2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417.awb 
 
4 
 
¶68 Nevertheless, the court of appeals here concluded that 
negligent supervision claims against a religious body are barred 
in 
Wisconsin 
by 
the 
Establishment 
Clause 
of 
the 
First 
Amendment.16 
 
Doe 
v. 
Archdiocese, 
Nos. 
03-1416, 
03-1417, 
unpublished slip op., ¶6 (Wis. Ct. App. July 30, 2004) (citing 
Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 325-31; Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d at 686-
98). 
 
It 
further 
determined 
that 
Pritzlaff 
and 
Clauder 
implicitly barred Doe's claims of breach of fiduciary duty and 
fraud.  Id.  I conclude that the court of appeals' reliance on 
Pritzlaff and Clauder is misplaced. 
                                                 
16 Such a conclusion would put Wisconsin in a distinct and 
diminishing minority.  Recently, the Florida Supreme Court 
joined the "majority of both state and federal jurisdictions 
that 
have 
found 
no 
First 
Amendment 
bar 
under 
similar 
circumstances."  See Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 351 (Fla. 
2002) (citing Bear Valley Church of Christ v. Debose, 928 P.2d 
1315, 1323 (Colo. 1996); Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 
310, 314-15 (Colo. 1993); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 
283-88 (Colo. 1988); Amato v. Greenquist, 679 N.E.2d 446, 450, 
454 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997); Bivin v. Wright, 656 N.E.2d 1121, 
1124-25 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995); Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 
456 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and 
Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806, 812 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); F.G. v. 
MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 702-03 (N.J. 1997); Kenneth R. v. Roman 
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791, 795-96 (1997); 
Smith v. Privette, 495 S.E.2d 395, 398 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); 
Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Oh. 1991); Erickson v. 
Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 386 (Or. Ct. App. 1989); Martinez v. 
Primera Asemblea de Dios, Inc., No. 05-96-01458, 1998 WL 242412, 
at *3 (Tex. Ct. App. May 15, 1998); C.J.C. v. Corporation of the 
Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 985 P.2d 262, 277 (Wash. 1999); 
Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan, 196 F.3d 409 
(2d Cir. 1999); Smith v. O'Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 80 (D.R.I. 
1997); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1431-32 (N.D. Iowa 
1997), rev'd on other grounds, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998); 
Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 898 F. Supp. 1169, 1175 
(N.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd, 134 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1998); Nutt v. 
Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 921 F.Supp. 66 (D. Conn. 1995); 
Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138, 1151 (E.D. Mich. 
1995)).   
No.  2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417.awb 
 
5 
 
¶69 The facts in both Pritzlaff and Clauder are readily 
distinguishable from the case at hand.  In those cases, this 
court considered a claim that the church negligently hired and 
retained a priest who engaged in consensual sexual conduct with 
an adult woman.  See Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 307-08; Clauder, 
209 Wis. 2d at 679.  The harm at issue would have required 
consideration and interpretation of church doctrines, including 
the vow of celibacy.  See Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 310; 
Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d at 696. 
¶70 By contrast, the harm alleged in the present case 
involved criminal sexual assault against a minor child.  Such 
facts do not warrant examination of church doctrine.  Indeed, 
this court in Clauder contemplated that such an action would 
survive a constitutional challenge.  Quoting with approval 
Roppolo v. Moore, 644 So. 2d 206, 208 (La. Ct. App. 1994), we 
stated:  "This is a secular court.  If sexual or other conduct 
of a priest violates secular standards, e.g., child molestation, 
this Court will impose whatever civil or criminal secular 
sanctions may be appropriate."  Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d at 696 
(emphasis added).  
¶71 This court should not allow church officials to be 
beyond reproach of the law.  As one court has recently warned, 
"to hold otherwise and immunize the Church Defendants could risk 
placing religious institutions in a preferred position over 
secular institutions, a concept both foreign and hostile to the 
First Amendment."  Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 365 (Fla. 
2002) 
No.  2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417.awb 
 
6 
 
¶72 I conclude these allegations emanating from alleged 
child sexual assault pose no threat of excessive entanglement 
between government and religion.  The Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment is not a bar here because secular, not 
religious, standards are implicated.  As the Clauder court 
instructed:  if conduct violates secular standards, this court 
will 
provide 
criminal 
sanctions 
and 
civil 
remedies 
as 
appropriate.  209 Wis. 2d at 696.  Accordingly, I would hold 
that in the context of cases involving child sexual assault, the 
Establishment Clause does not bar plaintiffs from pursuing these 
secular actions.   
II. 
 
¶73 Having addressed the First Amendment issue, I turn 
next to the Archdiocese's statute of limitations defense.  In 
this case, the Archdiocese maintains that all of Doe's claims 
are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.  Doe, 
meanwhile, asserts that the limitations period relevant to his 
claims was tolled until he discovered the nature of his claim 
and the cause of his injury.  He asserts that the "discovery 
rule" that we recognized in Hansen v. A.H. Robins Co., 113 
Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983), applies to save his claim 
from the bar of the statute of limitations.     
¶74 "In the interest of justice and fundamental fairness," 
the Hansen court held that tort claims "shall accrue on the date 
the injury is discovered or with reasonable diligence should be 
discovered, whichever occurs first."  Id. at 560.  The cause of 
injury does not accrue until the plaintiff discovers both the 
No.  2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417.awb 
 
7 
 
nature of his claim and the cause of his injury.  Pritzlaff, 194 
Wis. 2d at 314-15 (citing Borello v. United States Oil Co., 130 
Wis. 2d 397, 406-07, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986)). 
 
¶75 Here, the court of appeals resolved the statute of 
limitations dispute in favor of the Archdiocese.  Relying on BBB 
Doe, 211 Wis. 2d 312, it concluded that any derivative claim 
against the Archdiocese, because it is derivative, accrued at 
the same time the underlying intentional tort claims accrued.  
Doe v. Archdiocese, unpublished slip op. at ¶4.  Additionally, 
it observed that to the extent the plaintiff asserted any direct 
claims against the Archdiocese, those claims also would be tied 
to the accrual date of the underlying intentional tort of the 
perpetrator.  Id. at ¶5.  The court of appeals errs when it 
concludes that BBB Doe foreordains the result here.  
 
¶76 Like 
Pritzlaff 
and 
Clauder, 
BBB 
Doe 
can 
be 
distinguished from the case at hand.  The analysis of the court 
in BBB Doe focused on the claim against the perpetrator, not the 
Archdiocese.  The court stated that it was not addressing the 
negligent employment claims against the Archdiocese and assumed 
that all claims against the Archdiocese were derivative.  BBB 
Doe, 211 Wis. 2d at 366. 
 
¶77 Subsequent to BBB Doe, the law of negligent employment 
theories has evolved.  This court in Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. recognized the tort of negligent hiring, retention, and 
supervision.  219 Wis. 2d 250, 580 N.W.2d 233 (1998).  Also 
subsequent to BBB Doe, the nature of such claims has been 
clarified.  This court has acknowledged that these claims are 
No.  2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417.awb 
 
8 
 
not derivative.  Rather, the claims against the Archdiocese here 
are independent and direct. 
¶78 In Doyle v. Engelke, we determined, "While negligent 
supervision does require an underlying wrong to be committed by 
the employee as an element, the tort actually focuses on the 
tortious, i.e. negligent, conduct of the employer."  219 
Wis. 2d 277, 291 n. 6, 580 N.W.2d 245 (1998).  Likewise, in 
Clauder, we observed that in a cause of action for negligent 
supervision, "liability does not result solely because of the 
relationship of the employer and employee, but instead because 
of the independent negligence of the employer."  209 Wis. 2d at 
699.  Because these claims are no longer considered derivative, 
the underlying rationale for tying the accrual date of the claim 
against the Archdiocese to the accrual date of the intentional 
tort of the perpetrator no longer applies.   
 
¶79 In addition, our discovery rule jurisprudence has 
evolved since BBB Doe was decided.  Two years after the BBB Doe 
decision, this court addressed the application of the discovery 
rule in the context of false allegations of sexual abuse.   
¶80 In Sawyer v. Midelfort, the plaintiffs sued for 
injuries they sustained in 1985, when they alleged that their 
daughter made false allegations that her parents sexually abused 
her.  227 Wis. 2d 124, 595 N.W.2d 423 (1999).  The plaintiffs 
did not file their suit alleging negligence against the 
therapist until 1996 when they obtained access to their then 
deceased daughter's therapy records, which reflected a form of 
therapy known as repressed memory therapy.  The plaintiffs 
No.  2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417.awb 
 
9 
 
claimed that they did not know that the therapy was the cause of 
their daughter's false memories and their resulting injuries 
until they obtained the records.  The defendants argued that the 
plaintiffs' claim was barred by Wis. Stat. § 893.54, the three-
year statute of limitations governing injury to the person.  
¶81 In addressing the statute of limitations issue, the 
Sawyer court acknowledged that the Hansen discovery rule could 
be applied to benefit claims involving false allegations of 
sexual abuse.  Id. at 155-56.  Ultimately, the court concluded 
that it could not state as a matter of law that the Sawyers 
failed to exercise reasonable diligence in discovering the cause 
of their injury.  Id. at 158.  Accordingly, it remanded the 
matter to the circuit court for further fact-finding consistent 
with the discovery rule.  Id.    
¶82 In contrast to the Sawyer case, actual sexual abuse is 
alleged here.  It makes no sense to apply the discovery rule in 
cases involving false allegations of sexual abuse, but to deny 
its benefit in cases involving allegations of actual sexual 
abuse.  Such a distinction would be without a principled 
difference.  The benefit of the discovery rule should be applied 
to both. 
 
¶83 Because Doe's independent, direct claims against the 
Archdiocese involve different elements from any potential cause 
of action against Father Nuedling's estate, the discovery rule 
may still benefit Doe's claims even when the underlying claim 
against the perpetrator has already been time barred.  As 
counsel for Doe explained at oral argument, the allegations in 
No.  2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417.awb 
 
10 
 
this case "do not arise out of the moment of the sexual attack.  
They arise out of the secrecy of the Archdiocese, which we only 
could learn about as of 2002." 
 
¶84 Although the court of appeals suggests that Doe should 
have suspected the Archdiocese's role in the abuse sooner, there 
was no reason for him to do so.  Until the priest abuse scandals 
gained national attention, most victims had no basis for 
believing that the institutional church was involved.  Many of 
the child victims apparently believed that they were the only 
ones who were sexually abused.  Information regarding the number 
of additional victims and the Archdiocese's role in perpetuating 
child abuse would be in the exclusive possession of the 
Archdiocese. 
 
¶85 Failure to recognize the application of the discovery 
rule places Wisconsin victims of child molestation in an 
anomalous situation.  Courts in other states have allowed claims 
of similarly situated child victims of clergy abuse to proceed 
against the Archdiocese of Milwaukee.  See e.g., The Archdiocese 
of Milwaukee v. Superior Court of Orange County, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
154 (2003); cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2874; Delonga v. Diocese of 
Sioux Falls, et al, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (2004). 
 
¶86 In Delonga, the plaintiff brought an action in a 
federal district court in South Dakota against the Archdiocese 
of Milwaukee and others.  She alleged that between 1965 and 1970 
she was regularly and repeatedly sexually abused by a priest of 
the Diocese of Sioux Falls while he was serving on assignment as 
a priest in the Milwaukee Archdiocese.  Letters between the 
No.  2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417.awb 
 
11 
 
Bishops revealed that both were aware of the priest's past 
conduct of child molestation.  In a letter dated February 28, 
l965, the Bishop of Sioux Falls wrote to the Archdiocese of 
Milwaukee, asking "for any help you can give me and Father 
MacArthur in our present dilemma" and asked if an assignment 
could be found for him in the Milwaukee area.  Id. at 1094. 
 
¶87  The plaintiff alleged in her complaint that despite 
her 
exercise 
of 
due 
diligence, 
she 
was 
prevented 
from 
discovering her causes of action because of the defendant 
Dioceses' 
fraudulent 
concealment 
and 
representations 
about 
Father MacArthur.  The defendants contended that the plaintiff's 
claims were timed barred.  The Delonga court, applying the 
discovery rule, allowed the plaintiff to proceed.  Id. at 1104. 
 
¶88 I am mindful of the policy concerns against allowing 
Doe's claim here.  Yet, it is Doe who carries the burden of 
proof.  While the passage of time may make his claims more 
difficult to prove, for the reasons stated above, he should not 
be barred from his opportunity to do so.  Accordingly, I would 
hold that the discovery rule applies to save the plaintiff's 
claims against the defendants from the bar of the statute of 
limitations. 
III. 
¶89 In the end, the majority wastes a golden opportunity 
today to provide much needed guidance to this area of law 
regarding the Establishment Clause and the discovery rule.  
Because I believe that this court, in its law development 
No.  2003AP1416 & 2003AP1417.awb 
 
12 
 
capacity, should have reached these issues and concluded that 
they do not bar the plaintiff's claims, I respectfully concur. 
¶90 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this concurrence, and Justice PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK joins Part I of this concurrence.   
No.  2003AP1416.lbb 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶91 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion.  The majority correctly concludes that Doe 
does not allege that the Archdiocese knew that Nuedling had a 
problem as of 1960, and that such knowledge is essential to all 
three causes of action Doe raised against the Archdiocese.  
Majority 
op., 
¶57. 
Because 
of 
that 
conclusion, 
we 
have 
explicitly declined to address the Archdiocese's arguments 
rooted in the statute of limitations, public policy, or the 
First 
Amendment. 
Id., 
¶58. 
We 
do 
not 
normally 
decide 
constitutional questions if the case can be resolved on other 
grounds.  State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, ¶42, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 691 
N.W.2d 637; Labor & Farm Party v. Elections Bd., 117 Wis. 2d 
351, 354, 344 N.W.2d 177 (1984).  As such, these questions have 
not been resolved, and will have to be addressed in possible 
future litigation.   
¶92 I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK 
CROOKS joins this concurring opinion. 
 
 
 
No.  2003AP1416.lbb 
 
1