Case Title: The Florida Bar v. Jonathan Stephen Schwartz

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2022-02-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-1391 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
JONATHAN STEPHEN SCHWARTZ, 
Respondent. 
 
February 17, 2022 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
 
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that 
Respondent, Jonathan Stephen Schwartz, receive a ninety-day 
suspension following our disapproval of a prior referee’s report 
finding that Schwartz did not violate the Rules Regulating the 
Florida Bar (Bar Rules).  We have jurisdiction.1  The Florida Bar 
(Bar) sought review of the referee’s report, seeking a three-year 
suspension.  Having reviewed both the record and our prior case 
law, we agree with the Bar that a more severe sanction is 
 
 
1.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. 
 
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warranted, particularly in light of Schwartz’s prior disciplinary 
record.  Therefore, we disapprove the referee’s report recommending 
a nonrehabilitative sanction and instead impose a three-year 
suspension. 
BACKGROUND 
Schwartz, a criminal defense attorney who was admitted to the 
Bar in 1986, became the subject of the instant Bar proceedings 
based upon his use of two defense exhibits during a pretrial 
deposition.  While representing the defendant in State v. Virgil 
Woodson, Circuit Case No. 13-2013-CF-012946-0001-XX (Miami-
Dade County, Florida), Schwartz created the exhibits, two black and 
white photocopies of a police lineup.  In each, Schwartz altered the 
defendant’s picture.  In one exhibit, he replaced the defendant’s face 
with that of an individual whom witnesses other than the robbery 
victim had identified as the perpetrator.  In the other exhibit, 
Schwartz changed the defendant’s hairstyle.  However, the altered 
photocopies used at the deposition retained the victim’s 
identification of the defendant, including both her circle around 
what had been the defendant’s picture and her signature at the 
bottom of the lineup, as well as a police officer’s signature.  In a 
 
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complaint filed with the Court on July 27, 2017, the Bar alleged 
that Schwartz’s use of the exhibits, without disclosing that the 
photo lineups had been altered, violated Bar Rules 3-4.3 
(Misconduct and Minor Misconduct) and 4-8.4(c) (“A lawyer shall 
not . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation . . . .”).  We referred the matter to a referee for 
further proceedings. 
On review of a referee report recommending that Schwartz not 
be found guilty of any ethics violations, the Court, in an opinion 
dated November 7, 2019, disapproved the referee’s findings of fact 
and recommendation.  Fla. Bar v. Schwartz, 284 So. 3d 393, 394 
(Fla. 2019).  First, we held that the referee “improperly focused 
upon Schwartz’s asserted motive” to provide constitutionally 
effective assistance of counsel.  Id. at 396.  Rather, his subjective 
motive was not determinative.  Moreover, we concluded that it was 
an “undisputed fact that Schwartz knowingly and deliberately 
created the defense exhibits by altering photocopies of the police 
lineups and showing them to the victim at the deposition” and that 
the exhibits were “deceptive on their face.”  Id.  Thus, Schwartz’s 
intent to create what were deceptive exhibits in themselves led to 
 
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the inescapable conclusion that he violated Bar Rules 3-4.3 and 4-
8.4(c) as alleged.  Based upon our disposition upon the referee’s 
report on the issue of guilt, we remanded the case “to a newly 
appointed referee for a hearing limited to a determination of 
recommended discipline.”  Id. at 398. 
Following the appointment of a new referee and a sanctions 
hearing, the successor referee ultimately recommended that 
Schwartz receive a ninety-day suspension, to be followed by a one-
year term of probation.  The Bar sought review of the referee’s 
recommendation, arguing that a three-year, rehabilitative 
suspension is warranted.  For the reasons discussed below, we 
disapprove the referee’s report and instead impose a three-year 
suspension. 
The sanction hearing was held on August 21, 2020.2  In 
addition to testifying himself, Schwartz presented the testimony of 
family, friends, current employees, a former client, a judicial officer, 
 
 
2.  At the sanction hearing the referee also conducted a 
hearing in another pending Bar disciplinary case against Schwartz, 
Florida Bar v. Schwartz, No. SC19-983, pertaining to an alleged 
advertising violation.  Review of the referee’s report in that case is 
currently stayed pending the disposition of the instant case. 
 
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and a mental health professional.  Schwartz also presented 
numerous letters authored by friends and colleagues.  The Bar did 
not proffer any evidence, instead arguing case law in support of the 
request that the referee recommend a three-year suspension. 
REFEREE’S FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED SANCTION 
 
Having considered testimony and argument at the sanction 
hearing, the successor referee subsequently filed her report on 
October 16, 2020.  In determining the recommended sanction, the 
referee considered Schwartz’s personal history, prior discipline, and 
the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors pursuant to the 
Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (Standards).  The 
referee also considered existing case law. 
As found by the referee, Schwartz’s prior disciplinary history is 
as follows. 
In an order dated May 29, 2012, in case number SC11-2143, 
the Court suspended Schwartz for ninety days based upon a 
consent judgment.  Florida Bar v. Schwartz, 91 So. 3d 134 (Fla. 
2012) (table).  Schwartz admitted violating Bar Rules 4-1.8(a) 
(Conflict of Interest; Prohibited and Other Transactions; Business 
Transactions With or Acquiring Interest Adverse to Client), 4-
 
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3.3(a)(1) (Candor Toward the Tribunal; False Evidence; Duty to 
Disclose), 4-4.1(a) (Truthfulness in statements to others), 4-8.4(a) 
(“A lawyer shall not . . . violate or attempt to violate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct . . . .”), 4-8.4(b) (“A lawyer shall not . . . 
commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s 
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects . . 
. .”), and 4-8.4(c) (“A lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation . . . .”).  
According to the “Report of the Referee Accepting Consent 
Judgment” approved by the Court in that case, Schwartz twice 
notarized a Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act Affidavit and 
signed “JS for E. Ocampo” where his client, who was outside of the 
United States and unavailable to sign the affidavit, was required to 
sign.  Schwartz then filed each affidavit with the defective 
notarizations, thereby making knowing misrepresentations to the 
court. 
Previously, on June 20, 2002, the Court approved a consent 
judgment and imposed a public reprimand in case number 
SC02-787.  Schwartz violated Bar Rules 4-3.1 (Meritorious claims 
and contentions), 4-3.3(a)(1), 4-4.1(a), 4-4.4 (Respect for rights of 
 
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third persons), 4-5.6 (Restrictions on right to practice), 4-8.4(a), and 
4-8.4(c). 
And, on April 10, 1997, the Court issued its order in case 
number SC60-90204, approving a consent judgment and imposing 
a public reprimand for violations of Bar Rules 4-3.3(a), 4-3.4(c) 
(Fairness of Opposing Party and Counsel), 4-8.4(c), and 4-8.4(d) (“A 
lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct in connection with the 
practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice . . . 
.”). 
In addition, Schwartz received an admonishment for minor 
misconduct by the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Grievance Committee 
“B” on March 29, 1995, in The Florida Bar File No. 1994-
71,026(11B), for violation of Bar Rule 4-8.4(d).3 
With respect to mitigating factors under Standard 3.3, the 
referee found two, namely (b)(5) (“full and free disclosure to the bar 
 
 
3.  Schwartz also received admonishments for minor 
misconduct for violation of advertising rule requirements of the Bar 
Rules, on May 23, 2007, by the Second Judicial Circuit Grievance 
Committee “S”, in The Florida Bar File No. 2007-90,330(02S), and 
on December 19, 1996, by the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Grievance 
Committee “B”, in The Florida Bar File No. 1996-71,789(11B). 
 
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or cooperative attitude toward the proceedings”), and (b)(7) 
(“character or reputation”).  Further, the referee found the following 
two non-Standard matters as mitigating:  “The length of time this 
disciplinary case has been pending has extracted a considerable toll 
on Respondent [as ][h]e indicated that he has had difficulties and 
has spent sleepless nights, as a result [of] the case,” and 
“Respondent testified that he is trying to limit the number of cases 
and kind of cases as well attempting [to] solve problems before they 
arise.”  Turning to aggravating factors under Standard 3.2, the 
referee found three factors, namely (b)(1) (“prior disciplinary 
offenses”), (b)(3) (“a pattern of misconduct”), and (b)(9) (“substantial 
experience in the practice of law”). 
 
Finally, while acknowledging that this Court has imposed 
harsher sanctions more recently than those previously imposed, the 
referee distinguished the cases relied upon by the Bar and cited the 
following cases in support of a nonrehabilitative suspension.  See 
Fla. Bar v. MacNamara, 132 So. 3d 165, 171 (Fla. 2013) (lawyer 
suspended for ninety days based on his representation to the Bar 
pertaining to his filing estate tax return); Fla. Bar v. Cocalis, 959 So. 
2d 163 (Fla. 2007) (attorney’s handling of documents related to 
 
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personal injury lawsuit inadvertently mailed to him and phone call 
to adverse party’s treating physician warranted public reprimand); 
Fla. Bar v. Committe, 916 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 2005) (lawyer suspended 
for ninety days based on knowing failure to comply with discovery 
requests and having filed two frivolous lawsuits).  As discussed in 
our analysis below, we disapprove the referee’s recommended 
ninety-day nonrehabilitative suspension, and instead determine 
that a three-year suspension is appropriate under the facts of the 
case and existing case law. 
ANALYSIS 
In imposing a sanction in an attorney discipline case, the 
Court considers the following factors:  “(a) duties violated; (b) the 
lawyer’s mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury caused by 
the lawyer’s misconduct; [and] (d) the existence of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances.”  Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 1.1.  As 
we have often explained, in reviewing a referee’s recommended 
discipline, the Court’s scope of review is broader than that afforded 
to the referee’s findings of fact because, ultimately, it is the Court’s 
responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, 
 
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Fla. Const.  At the same time, the Court will generally not second-
guess the referee’s recommended discipline, as long as it has a 
reasonable basis in existing case law and the Standards.  See Fla. 
Bar v. Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999).  Significantly, 
however, the Court views cumulative misconduct more seriously 
than an isolated instance of misconduct, and cumulative 
misconduct of a similar nature warrants an even more severe 
sanction than might dissimilar conduct.  Fla. Bar v. Walkden, 950 
So. 2d 407, 410 (Fla. 2007).   
Therefore, we agree with the successor referee that Schwartz’s 
misconduct under the Standards warrants a suspension,4 while 
 
 
4.  See, e.g., Standards 5.1(b) (“Suspension is appropriate 
when a lawyer knowingly engages in criminal conduct which is not 
included elsewhere in this subdivision or other conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously 
adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice.”); 6.1(b) 
(“Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knows that false 
statements or documents are being submitted to the court or that 
material information is improperly being withheld and takes no 
remedial action.”); 7.1(b) (“Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer 
knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a 
professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the 
public, or the legal system.”); and 8.1(b) (“Suspension is appropriate 
when a lawyer has been publicly reprimanded for the same or 
similar conduct and engages in a further similar act of misconduct 
 
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“the length of the suspension imposed is guided by case law and the 
Court’s discretion.”  Fla. Bar v. Marcellus, 249 So. 3d 538, 545 (Fla. 
2018).  Based upon the record before us, we conclude that in 
recommending a nonrehabilitative suspension the referee did not 
give Schwartz’s prior misconduct proper consideration in light of 
existing case law. 
As the referee found, on three prior occasions, in case 
numbers SC11-2143, SC02-787, and SC60-90204, Schwartz 
violated numerous Bar Rules, which in each instance included 
those rule violations that the Court has held are considered the 
most serious.  Indeed, 
[i]n considering violations of rules 4–8.4(c) and 4–8.4(d), 
we have explicitly stated that “basic, fundamental 
dishonesty . . . is a serious flaw, which cannot be 
tolerated [because] ‘[d]ishonesty and a lack of candor 
cannot be tolerated by a profession that relies on the 
truthfulness of its members.’ ” 
 
Fla. Bar v. Berthiaume, 78 So. 3d 503, 510 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Fla. 
Bar v. Rotstein, 835 So. 2d 241, 246 (Fla. 2002)).  Further, the 
Court has made plain that “[d]ishonest conduct demonstrates the 
 
that cause injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal 
system, or the profession.”). 
 
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utmost disrespect for the court and is destructive to the legal 
system as a whole.”  Fla. Bar v. Head, 84 So. 3d 292, 302 (Fla. 
2012) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Head, 27 So. 3d 1, 8-9 (Fla. 2010)).  This 
cumulative misconduct by Schwartz, of the most egregious type 
(dishonesty) and where he has previously received the longest 
nonrehabilitative suspension permissible under the rules, see Rule 
Regulating the Florida Bar 3-5.1(e) (“A suspension of 90 days or less 
does not require proof of rehabilitation or passage of the Florida bar 
examination and the respondent will become eligible for all 
privileges of members of The Florida Bar on the expiration of the 
period of suspension.”), surely necessitates an escalated sanction 
by this Court for that same repeated type of misconduct. 
Furthermore, the cases distinguished by the referee actually 
provide a reasonable basis for a rehabilitative suspension, while the 
cases relied upon do not support the referee’s recommendation of a 
second ninety-day suspension. 
For example, in Florida Bar v. Hmielewski, 702 So. 2d 218 
(Fla. 1997), the Court held that a three-year suspension was 
warranted based on the lawyer’s deliberate misrepresentations in a 
medical malpractice action regarding the location of his client’s 
 
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deceased parent’s medical records.  The referee in this case 
distinguished Hmielewski on the basis that “records were not 
hidden in this case, and the prosecutor had access to the original 
line-up.”  However, only upon close inspection of the photocopied 
lineups are Schwartz’s alterations apparent, particularly since the 
exhibits retain the victim’s circled identification and the signature of 
both the victim and police officer, and Schwartz did not disclose to 
the prosecutor that the exhibits had been altered until confronted 
during the deposition. 
In Florida Bar v. Dupee, 160 So. 3d 838 (Fla. 2015), the Court 
imposed a one-year suspension, where the lawyer knowingly filed 
her client’s inaccurate financial statement in a marriage dissolution 
action, deliberately withheld financial documents, knowingly 
allowed the client to testify falsely at deposition, and failed to notify 
the husband’s counsel that the lawyer’s client had possession of 
disputed property.  Id. at 854.  The Court rejected the referee’s 
recommended ninety-day suspension, notwithstanding that there 
was no prior disciplinary record.  As with Hmielewski, we find the 
referee’s basis for distinguishing Dupee—that “the initial lineup and 
 
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the altered lineup were both available to the prosecutor at some 
point”—unavailing. 
The Bar also cited cases imposing one-year suspensions where 
the lawyers either withheld evidence or engaged in 
misrepresentations before the trial court.  See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. 
Dunne, No. SC18-1880, 2020 WL 257785 (Fla. Jan. 16, 2020) 
(uncontested consent judgment); Fla. Bar v. Whitney, 132 So. 3d 
1095 (Fla. 2013); Fla. Bar v. Cox, 794 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 2001).  The 
referee distinguished these cases, relying on factual differences.  
However, in each case, as with Schwartz’s conduct, the lawyers 
acted dishonestly. 
Lastly, the successor referee’s reliance upon case law imposing 
a public reprimand or nonrehabilitative suspension is inapposite.  
First, we observe that both Committe and Cocalis were decided more 
than a decade ago.  In addition, in Cocalis the referee recommended 
that the lawyer not be found to have violated a number of Bar rules, 
including Bar Rule 4-8.4, and the Court did not address whether 
that was erroneous, concluding “that Cocalis’s conduct violated 3-
4.3 and that his misconduct was more than ‘minor,’ making true 
diversion inappropriate.”  959 So. 2d at 166.  Similarly, in 
 
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Committe, the lawyer did not violate Bar Rule 4-8.4(c), and he had 
no prior disciplinary record.  916 So. 2d at 744.  Finally, in 
MacNamara, while the lawyer was found to have violated Bar Rule 
4-8.4(c) twice, he received the ninety-day suspension, as opposed to 
the referee’s recommended two-year probationary period, because 
he admitted his misrepresentations, did not have a disciplinary 
history, and the misconduct occurred six years prior to the filing of 
the Bar’s complaint.  132 So. 3d at 172-73. 
 
Finally, we reiterate that the requirement to provide zealous 
representation, as contemplated under our ethical rules, see Florida 
Bar v. Roberts, 689 So. 2d 1049, 1051 (Fla. 1997) (“Failing to 
represent one’s client zealously, failing to communicate effectively 
with one’s client, and failing to provide competent representation 
are all serious deficiencies, even when there is no evidence of 
intentional misrepresentation or fraud.”), does not excuse engaging 
in misconduct, irrespective of one’s intent to benefit the client.  As 
we have previously observed, “[w]e must never permit a cloak of 
purported zealous advocacy to conceal unethical behavior.”  Fla. 
Bar v. Buckle, 771 So. 2d 1131, 1133 (Fla. 2000).  At the same time, 
we have recognized that “ethical problems may arise from conflicts 
 
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between a lawyer’s responsibility to a client and the lawyer’s special 
obligations to society and the legal system. . . .  ‘Such issues must 
be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral 
judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the rules.’ ”  Id. 
at 1133-34 (quoting Fla. Bar v. Machini, 635 So. 2d 938, 940 (Fla. 
1994)).  In the instant case, we are of the opinion, in light of 
Schwartz’s history of repeated transgressions and the increasing 
egregiousness of each infraction, that he has been an overzealous 
advocate incapable of seeing the forest for the trees. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, Schwartz is hereby suspended from the practice 
of law for a period of three years, in addition to the term of 
probation and special conditions thereof identified by the referee, to 
be completed prior to seeking reinstatement.  The suspension will 
be effective thirty days from the filing of this opinion so that 
Schwartz can close out his practice and protect the interests of 
existing clients.  If Schwartz notifies this Court in writing that he is 
no longer practicing and does not need the thirty days to protect 
existing clients, this Court will enter an order making the three-year 
suspension effective immediately.  Schwartz shall fully comply with 
 
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Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-5.1(h).  Respondent shall also 
fully comply with Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-6.1, if 
applicable.  Further, Schwartz shall accept no new business from 
the date this opinion is filed until he is reinstated. 
 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson 
Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from 
Jonathan Stephen Schwartz in the amount of $7,540.50, for which 
sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, 
COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER 
THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION. 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, Patricia Ann Toro Savitz, Staff 
Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, and Jennifer R. 
Falcone, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Miami, Florida; and Chris 
W. Altenbernd of Banker Lopez Gassler, P.A., Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
Benedict P. Kuehne, Michael T. Davis, and Johan D. Dos Santos of 
Kuehne Davis Law, P.A., Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent