Case Title: Commonwealth v. Shepherd

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12405

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2024-02-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12405 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RASHAD SHEPHERD. 
 
 
 
Essex.     November 7, 2023. - February 22, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, & Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Retroactivity of Judicial 
Holding.  Practice, Criminal, Retroactivity of judicial 
holding, Instructions to jury, Argument by prosecutor, 
Questioning of witness by judge, Assistance of counsel, 
Capital case.  Constitutional Law, Equal protection of 
laws.  Evidence, Argument by prosecutor, Questioning of 
witness by judge, Hypothetical question.  Jury and Jurors.  
Cellular Telephone.   
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 18, 2014. 
 
 
The case was tried before Richard E. Welch, III, J.; a 
motion for a new trial, filed on March 15, 2019, was considered 
by Timothy Q. Feeley, J.; a second motion for a new trial, filed 
on September 10, 2020, was heard by Kathleen M. McCarthy-Neyman, 
J.; and a third motion for a new trial, filed on February 7, 
2022, was considered by her. 
 
 
Claudia L. Bolgen for the defendant. 
Kathryn L. Janssen, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Duke K. McCall, III, & Kayla Stachniak Kaplan, of the 
District of Columbia, Caitlin Glass, Joshua M. Daniels, & 
Vanessa M. Brown, for Boston University Center for Antiracist 
Research & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
2 
 
Jessie J. Rossman & Isabel Burlingame, for American Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted 
a brief. 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  In August 2014, Terrence Tyler, Monique 
Jones, and the defendant, Rashad Shepherd, hatched a plan to rob 
the victim, Wilner Parisse.  The scheme involved Jones, who had 
a sexual relationship with the victim and frequently purchased 
marijuana from him, proposing a sexual tryst as a ruse to lure 
the victim into a vulnerable position, allowing Tyler and the 
defendant to enter the victim's apartment and to take the stash 
of marijuana they knew he kept in his bedroom closet.  But in 
the early morning of August 16, 2014, when the three coventurers 
set their plot in motion, the victim was not the "easy mark" 
they had anticipated; he fought back.  In the ensuing melee, the 
victim was shot once in the chest and killed.  Based on the 
bullet's trajectory and Jones's retelling of the events, the 
prosecution theorized that the defendant was the shooter.  
Following a jury trial in April 2016, at which Jones testified 
pursuant to a cooperation agreement, the defendant was convicted 
of murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder, 
with attempted unarmed robbery as the predicate felony.  He was 
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. 
 
In this consolidated appeal, the defendant contends that 
our decision in Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805 (2017), 
3 
 
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018), in which we abolished 
felony-murder as an independent theory of liability for murder 
in the first and second degrees, should extend to the 
defendant's case retroactively, despite our determination in 
Brown to apply our holding only prospectively -- a conclusion we 
have reaffirmed eight times.  The defendant maintains that the 
determination to apply Brown only prospectively violates the 
equal protection principles of arts. 1 and 10 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights because the data show, inter 
alia, that use of felony-murder as an independent theory of 
liability for murder in the first degree disproportionately 
resulted in the incarceration of Black persons and that, as a 
result, more Black persons than white persons currently are 
serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for 
felony-murder.  The defendant further urges that the trial judge 
gave erroneous jury instructions, that the judge's questioning 
of, and interactions with, certain witnesses biased the jury, 
and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Finally, the defendant asks this court to exercise its 
extraordinary authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
grant him a new trial or to reduce the conviction to a lesser 
degree of guilt.  Having carefully examined the record and 
4 
 
considered the defendant's arguments, we conclude that there is 
no reversible error and find no reason to disturb the verdict.1 
1.  Facts.  a.  The Commonwealth's case.  The following 
facts are supported by the evidence presented at trial.   
i.  Background.  The victim shared an apartment on the 
second floor of a three-story apartment building in Lynn with 
his roommate and their two dogs.  The victim sold marijuana from 
the apartment, including to Jones.  The relationship between the 
victim and Jones had become sexual approximately six months 
prior to the shooting.  The victim sold marijuana to Jones at a 
discount, and occasionally, Jones, who was unemployed, resold 
the marijuana at a profit.   
Jones and Tyler had known each other for at least a decade.  
They had previously dated and remained very close.2   
In early August 2014, prior to the killing, Tyler had 
accompanied Jones to the victim's apartment; Tyler remained in 
 
1 We acknowledge the briefs of amici curiae Boston 
University Center for Antiracist Research, Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Families for Justice as 
Healing, Felony Murder Elimination Project, Fred T. Korematsu 
Center for Law and Equality, National Council for Incarcerated 
and Formerly Incarcerated Women and Girls, Kat Albrecht, and The 
Sentencing Project; and American Civil Liberties Union of 
Massachusetts, Inc. 
 
2 At the time of the shooting, Jones was dating Tyler's 
brother "D."  Jones's sister had previously dated another of 
Tyler's brothers, Reginald Tyler, who was deceased when the 
shooting occurred.   
 
5 
 
Jones's vehicle while she purchased marijuana.  After the sale, 
Tyler remarked that the victim would be "easy to rob," but Jones 
"brushed off" the comment.  Tyler pressed the idea of robbing 
the victim several times thereafter, disclosing to Jones that 
Tyler had robbed the victim several years earlier.   
ii.  The night before the shooting.  At around 5 or 6 P.M. 
on August 15, 2014, the day preceding the shooting, Jones began 
drinking alcohol with a friend, who arrived at Jones's home in 
Lynn already intoxicated.3     
Tyler called Jones to "hang out," and at approximately 11 
P.M., Jones, accompanied by her friend, drove a rental vehicle 
to pick up Tyler and the defendant.  Tyler and the defendant 
were friends.  Jones had known the defendant for about four or 
five years, but she was not as close with the defendant as with 
Tyler.   
The four went to a restaurant in Lynn, where they would 
remain until approximately 1 A.M.  When they arrived, Jones's 
friend went inside the restaurant, leaving Jones, Tyler, and the 
defendant in the vehicle.  Tyler again broached the topic of 
 
3 Jones also had smoked marijuana and later that evening 
would consume a few Percocet pills. 
 
6 
 
robbing the victim, emphasizing that it would be an "easy job"; 
this time, Jones agreed.4   
Tyler suggested exploiting Jones's sexual history with the 
victim.  They agreed that Jones would propose that she meet the 
victim at his apartment for a promised sexual tryst.  Then, 
while the victim was in a vulnerable position, Tyler and the 
defendant would enter the apartment and take the victim's 
marijuana cache, which Jones knew he kept in his bedroom closet.  
The defendant was present during the formation of the scheme, 
but he remained silent.   
As agreed, Jones contacted the victim by text message, and 
she exchanged a series of text messages with him between 11:04 
P.M and 1:03 A.M.  Some of these text messages were drafted by 
Tyler, pretending to be Jones.  Jones, or Tyler on her behalf, 
proposed a sex act, and the victim invited her to his apartment.5   
Surveillance video footage from the restaurant shows the 
three coventurers there that evening; the defendant did not 
dispute that he was at the restaurant.  The footage captures 
 
4 Jones explained that she was "having a bad day," and was 
"aggravated" and "stressed" because several of her friends had 
been arrested and she had been blamed. 
 
5 Previously that evening, the victim, his roommate, and the 
roommate's six year old son were at the apartment, playing a 
board game until approximately 10 or 11 P.M.  The roommate and 
his son retired into the roommate's bedroom and fell asleep 
shortly thereafter. 
7 
 
Tyler, who wore his hair in long dreadlocks, entering the 
restaurant just prior to 12:15 A.M.  The defendant, who wore a 
baseball cap, a light-colored hooded sweatshirt, darker pants, 
and light-colored sneakers, entered the restaurant shortly after 
Tyler.   
Jones entered the restaurant at approximately 12:26 A.M., 
and at 12:35 A.M., the defendant and Jones engaged in a 
conversation.  The footage shows Jones and the defendant walking 
away from the restaurant together at 12:39 A.M.  The prosecution 
introduced cell site location information (CSLI) data, which 
indicated that, at 12:42 A.M., the defendant's cellular 
telephone connected to a cellular tower covering an area that 
included the restaurant. 
Telephone records show that the victim sent Jones a text 
message at 1:03 A.M., apparently perturbed that Jones had not 
yet arrived.  In response, the defendant and Jones called Tyler 
four times between 1:08 and 1:12 A.M.  Shortly thereafter, Tyler 
rejoined the defendant and Jones, and the three coventurers, 
along with Jones's friend, got into Jones's vehicle.   
iii.  The botched robbery.  After leaving the restaurant, 
Jones, Tyler, Jones's friend, and the defendant drove to the 
victim's apartment and parked nearby.  While Jones's friend, who 
was intoxicated, was asleep in the front passenger seat, the 
three coventurers rehashed the plan. 
8 
 
After exchanging telephone calls with the victim at 1:15 
and 1:22 A.M., Jones then left Tyler, the defendant, and her 
slumbering friend in the vehicle.  Tyler and the defendant had 
planned to wait in the vehicle for twenty minutes to allow Jones 
time to execute the first stage of their plot.  Jones entered 
the exterior door of the victim's apartment building.  She 
climbed the back staircase leading to the back door of the 
victim's apartment, which led to the kitchen.  She left the 
doors unlocked.   
To her surprise, she found the victim already partially 
undressed in his bedroom, which was located off the kitchen.  
She stalled to give Tyler and the defendant time to execute the 
next stage of the plan.  Jones excused herself to the bathroom, 
which was located adjacent to the kitchen.  Call logs show that 
she placed a telephone call to Tyler at approximately 1:32 A.M.; 
Tyler told Jones that he and the defendant were on their way.   
The surveillance video footage, while grainy, appears to 
capture two men, dressed like the defendant and Tyler had been 
in the restaurant surveillance video footage, waiting outside a 
vehicle.6  It also shows that, at approximately 1:35 A.M., the 
 
6 One man, inferably the defendant, is wearing a bulky 
light-colored top, light-colored shoes, and darker pants.  The 
other man, inferably Tyler, has longer hair, light-colored 
shoes, and patterned pants.  The appearance of the two men is 
consistent with the appearance of the defendant and Tyler in the 
restaurant footage.   
9 
 
two men cross the street in the direction of the victim's 
apartment, consistent with Jones's testimony concerning the 
scheme and its execution.  The footage shows the defendant 
making movements that the prosecutor suggested indicated that he 
was "securing a gun in his waistband."  
Meanwhile, in the apartment, Jones returned to the bedroom.  
The victim locked the bedroom door behind her.  Realizing the 
locked door would stymie the plan to take the victim's marijuana 
stashed in his bedroom closet, at 1:36 A.M. Jones sent Tyler a 
text message:  "He just locked the door.  So I'm[] [g]oing to 
act like [I] have a play[.]  Wait."  Jones asked the victim to 
get her a drink, and when he opened the bedroom door, he 
encountered Tyler. 
Tyler and the victim immediately began fighting in the 
kitchen.  The defendant stood at the threshold of the back door, 
watching.  Grappling and exchanging blows with the victim, Tyler 
pushed the victim back into the bedroom, and they crashed into a 
dresser.7  The victim grabbed a baseball bat and swung it at 
Tyler, who retreated to the kitchen, as the victim advanced.  In 
the kitchen, Tyler charged the victim, tackling him to the 
floor.  In the ensuing scrum, the victim bit Tyler's finger, and 
Tyler screamed for the defendant to help.   
 
7 Jones was sitting on the bed at this time. 
 
10 
 
Jones grabbed her clothes and pocketbook and ran from the 
bedroom, past the men fighting in the kitchen, and into the 
bathroom.  Moments later, she heard "one or two" gunshots.8   
Leaving the bathroom, Jones found the victim lying on the 
kitchen floor; he was bleeding.  She saw Tyler fleeing out the 
back door.  At trial, based on the bullet's trajectory and 
Jones's testimony that the defendant had been standing by the 
back door, the Commonwealth's theory was that the defendant had 
fired the gun, killing the victim.   
Jones also fled.  She gathered her belongings and ran to 
her vehicle; in her panic, however, she left her cellular 
telephone on the victim's bed.  She drove some distance, and 
then stopped.  She evicted her friend9 from the vehicle.   
At that time, Tyler approached Jones's vehicle; his hand 
was bleeding from the bite wound the victim had inflicted.  The 
two fled to Boston.  Tyler's blood, confirmed by 
deoxyribonucleic acid analysis, subsequently was found on the 
 
8 Physical evidence showed that the victim died of wounds 
from a single bullet, and officers recovered only one bullet and 
shell casing.  See discussion infra. 
 
9 By then, the friend had finally roused from her stupor and 
asked Jones what had transpired.   
 
The friend, whom Jones had testified was intoxicated during 
the relevant events, could not be located and did not testify. 
 
11 
 
exterior handle of the rear passenger's side door and on the 
interior driver's side door frame of the vehicle. 
 
Call logs show that the defendant spoke with Tyler by 
cellular telephone at approximately 1:44 A.M., shortly after the 
shooting.  CSLI data indicated that the defendant's telephone 
connected to a cellular tower covering an area that included the 
victim's residence when he placed this call to Tyler.  In the 
next two hours, as call logs show, the defendant placed three 
unsuccessful telephone calls to Jones, whose cellular telephone 
was still at the victim's apartment.  He also placed several 
calls to Jones's friend and to Tyler. 
iv.  The aftermath and investigation.  At around 1:45 A.M., 
the victim's neighbor placed a 911 call, reporting a shooting, 
and Lynn police department officers were dispatched to the area.  
Around this time, the victim's roommate awoke to the sound of 
his and the victim's dogs10 barking.  He found the victim lying 
in a pool of blood on the kitchen floor and flagged down one of 
the responding officers.  Officers entered the apartment and 
unsuccessfully administered first aid to the victim.  Minutes 
later, responding emergency medical technicians pronounced the 
victim dead.   
 
10 The victim and the roommate kept their two dogs in a 
spare bedroom when they entertained guests. 
12 
 
Officers located Jones's cellular telephone on the victim's 
bed, which at 1:51 A.M. showed an incoming call from a caller 
identified as "City," the defendant's nickname.     
Officers identified a spent cartridge casing in the hallway 
by the back door of the victim's apartment, the location where, 
according to Jones, the defendant had been standing just prior 
to the shooting.  A bullet also was recovered; subsequent 
analysis showed that the bullet had passed through the victim's 
chest, aorta, and left lung, killing him within seconds.  The 
bullet then exited the victim's body, crossed the kitchen, 
passed through a window screen, and lodged into a neighboring 
building.  The bullet's path was consistent with the firearm 
being discharged from the back door where Jones had testified 
the defendant was standing.  No identifiable prints were 
recovered from the scene or from the cartridge casing, and the 
firearm was not recovered. 
By 8 P.M. that day, August 16, Jones had learned that 
officers wanted to interview her; she complied, arriving 
intoxicated at the police station.  She told officers that she 
had been in bed with the victim when three masked white men had 
entered and shot the victim.  When it became apparent to Jones 
13 
 
that the officers found her story to be not credible, she 
terminated the interview.11   
By early September 2014, Jones retained counsel and 
recanted her story.  She reported instead that she, Tyler, and 
the defendant had conspired to rob the victim.  She entered into 
a cooperation agreement in which she agreed, inter alia, to 
testify at the defendant's trial;12 in exchange, prosecutors 
agreed to recommend that she receive a sentence of from five to 
seven years for her role in the victim's killing.  In October, 
the defendant was arrested in Boston, and later Tyler was 
apprehended in Florida.13   
b.  The defendant's case.  The defense centered on 
attacking Jones's credibility and intimating that the third 
coventurer was not the defendant.  The defendant did not 
testify; instead, the defense relied primarily on cross-
examination, casting Jones as a "coldhearted killer," 
 
11 Later, she told Tyler that she thought the officers did 
not believe her tale. 
 
12 She also agreed to testify before the grand jury and at 
Tyler's trial.   
 
13 On a recorded call that the defendant placed to his then 
girlfriend from jail on October 30, 2014, the defendant learned 
of Tyler's arrest.  The defendant told the girlfriend that Jones 
and Tyler were going "to blame this whole shit on me," and that 
"[Tyler] shouldn't have even went on the run in the first 
place." 
 
14 
 
"unemployed . . . drug dealer," and unreliable narrator who 
needed to rob the victim to fund her "lifestyle."14  The defense 
also maintained that because Jones and Tyler were much closer 
with each other than with the defendant, he was too far removed 
from them to be brought into their scheme and that Jones 
concocted the defendant's involvement to secure a deal, which 
itself gave Jones a motive to lie in exchange for a lighter 
sentence.  See note 15, infra.  The defense additionally 
attempted to undermine the prosecution's forensic evidence, in 
particular the CSLI analysis, emphasizing the limitations of the 
technology to locate precisely a cellular telephone.  
The defense also presented testimony from one of the 
victim's neighbors.  The neighbor testified that, on the night 
of the shooting, he heard arguing between a man and a woman in 
the victim's apartment, and one or two gunshots; thereafter, he 
saw a woman fleeing the scene but did not see the defendant. 
2.  Procedural history.  In December 2014, a grand jury 
indicted the defendant on charges of murder in the first degree, 
G. L. c. 265, § 1; home invasion, G. L. c. 265, § 18C; and armed 
 
14 The defense elicited testimony that Jones had no income 
but had substantial expenses.  The defense used this information 
to paint Jones as a drug dealer with a motive to rob the victim 
and also to suggest that she was the shooter. 
 
15 
 
assault with intent to rob, G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b).15  Following 
a jury trial in April 2016, the defendant was convicted of 
felony-murder in the first degree with attempted unarmed robbery 
as the predicate felony; he was acquitted of the other charges.  
The trial occurred prior to our September 2017 decision in 
Brown.  
 
In March 2019, the defendant filed a motion for a new 
trial, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  The defendant did not provide an affidavit from trial 
counsel.  He presented an affidavit from a CSLI expert, who 
raised questions regarding the reliability of the CSLI evidence 
presented at trial.16  The motion was denied in October 2019 by a 
judge (second judge) who was not the trial judge, the trial 
judge having retired. 
 
In September 2020, the defendant filed a second motion for 
a new trial, claiming, inter alia, ineffective assistance of 
counsel because trial counsel did not use certain information to 
impeach Jones's credibility.  Again, the defendant did not 
 
15 Following a separate jury trial, Tyler was convicted of 
felony-murder in the first degree in March 2016, and received a 
mandatory sentence of life in prison.  His appeal is pending 
before this court.  See Commonwealth vs. Tyler, SJC-12836.  
Jones received a sentence of from five to seven years as part of 
her cooperation agreement.  
 
16 The defendant also submitted his own affidavit and an 
affidavit from the defendant's original appellate counsel.   
16 
 
submit an affidavit from trial counsel.  Following a 
nonevidentiary hearing, the motion was denied in June 2021 by a 
third judge.  
 
In February 2022, the defendant filed a third motion for a 
new trial, arguing, inter alia, that the decision not to apply 
Brown retroactively violated equal protection principles.  In 
August 2022, the third judge denied this motion. 
The defendant's timely appeals from the denials of his 
motions were consolidated with his direct appeal.   
 
3.  Discussion.  In this consolidated appeal, the defendant 
raises four categories of claimed errors, which we address in 
turn.  "We review the defendant's consolidated appeal pursuant 
to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, assessing preserved issues according to 
the appropriate constitutional or common-law standard and 
unpreserved issues for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice."  Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 492 Mass. 469, 474 
(2023).  In analyzing the denial of a motion for a new trial, we 
examine the motion judge's conclusions "to determine whether 
there has been a significant error of law or other abuse of 
discretion" (citation omitted).  Id. at 474-475.  Where, as 
here, the motion judges did not preside at trial and did not 
conduct evidentiary hearings, "we regard ourselves in as good a 
position as the motion judge[s] to assess the trial record" 
17 
 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Kirkland, 491 Mass. 339, 
346 (2023).   
a.  Retroactive application of Brown.  On appeal, the 
defendant first maintains that principles of equal protection 
embodied in the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights require that 
our decision in Brown, in which we abolished felony-murder as an 
independent theory of criminal liability, be applied to his 
conviction retroactively.17   
i.  Brief background of felony-murder.  Until 2017, 
Massachusetts recognized the doctrine of felony-murder as "an 
independent theory of liability for murder," permitting a 
defendant to be convicted of murder in the first or second 
degree without requiring that the jury also find that the 
defendant acted with malice.  See Brown, 477 Mass. at 807-808.  
Instead, the felony-murder doctrine imposed "criminal liability 
'on all participants in a certain common criminal enterprise if 
a death occurred in the course of that enterprise.'"  Id., at 
822, quoting Commonwealth v. Watkins, 375 Mass. 472, 486 (1978), 
 
17 The defendant does not assert arguments under the Federal 
Constitution.  "Our 'review of an equal protection claim under 
the Massachusetts Constitution is generally the same as the 
review of a Federal equal protection claim, . . . although we 
have recognized that the Massachusetts Constitution is, if 
anything, more protective of individual liberty and equality 
than the Federal Constitution.'"  Commonwealth v. Roman, 489 
Mass. 81, 86 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Freeman, 472 Mass. 
503, 505 n.5, (2015). 
18 
 
S.C., 486 Mass. 801 (2021).  "'The effect of the felony-murder 
rule,' both for principals and accomplices, '[was] to substitute 
the intent to commit the underlying felony for the malice 
aforethought required for murder.'"  Brown, supra at 822-823, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Hanright, 466 Mass. 303, 307 (2013). 
In Brown, we abrogated felony-murder as an independent 
theory of liability.  Although the felony-murder rule was 
constitutional, Brown, 477 Mass. at 807, a majority of the court 
concluded that the doctrine was of "questionable" historical 
provenance, that developments in our joint venture and 
constructive malice jurisprudence had undermined the common-law 
pillars of the doctrine, and that the doctrine "erode[d] 'the 
relation between criminal liability and moral culpability,'"18 
id. at 826-833 (Gants, C.J., concurring), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 503 n.12, 507 (1982).  After Brown, 
a felony-murder conviction requires proof of actual malice;19 
 
18 We limited felony-murder to its "statutory role under 
G. L. c. 265, § 1, as an aggravating element of murder, 
permitting a jury to find a defendant guilty of murder in the 
first degree where the murder was neither premeditated nor 
committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty but was committed in 
the course of a felony punishable by life imprisonment."  Brown, 
477 Mass. at 825 (Gants, C.J., concurring).  In this opinion, we 
use the term "felony-murder" to refer to the pre-Brown, 
independent theory of liability unless otherwise indicated.  
 
19 The Commonwealth must now show "one of the three prongs 
of malice:  that [the defendant] intended to kill or to cause 
grievous bodily harm, or intended to do an act which, in the 
circumstances known to the defendant, a reasonable person would 
19 
 
constructive malice inferred from commission of the predicate 
felony no longer suffices.  See Brown, supra at 825 (Gants, 
C.J., concurring).   
The new rule, we determined, would apply only to trials 
commenced after our decision in Brown, recognizing that "a 
felony-murder case might have been tried very differently if the 
prosecutor had known that liability for murder would need to 
rest on proof of actual malice."  Brown, 477 Mass. at 834 
(Gants, C.J., concurring).20  Since then, we have declined to 
apply our decision retroactively on at least eight occasions, 
including once in the face of an equal protection challenge.  
See Commonwealth v. Pfeiffer, 492 Mass. 440, 453-454 (2023); 
Commonwealth v. Cheng Sun, 490 Mass. 196, 224 (2022); 
Commonwealth v. Duke, 489 Mass. 649, 658 n.5 (2022); 
Commonwealth v. Tate, 486 Mass. 663, 674 (2021); Commonwealth v. 
Chesko, 486 Mass. 314, 326-327 (2020); Commonwealth v. Martin, 
484 Mass. 634, 644-646 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1519 
(2021) (equal protection); Commonwealth v. Bin, 480 Mass. 665, 
 
have known created a plain and strong likelihood that death 
would result."  Brown, 477 Mass. at 825 (Gants, C.J., 
concurring). 
 
20 In Brown, we also exercised our discretion, pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the defendant's conviction to 
murder in the second degree because he was involved in only the 
"remote outer fringes" of the crime.  Brown, 477 Mass. at 824, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Rolon, 438 Mass. 808, 824 (2003).   
 
20 
 
681 (2018); Commonwealth v. Phap Buth, 480 Mass. 113, 120, cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 607 (2018). 
ii.  Equal protection.  Because the defendant was tried 
prior to our decision in Brown, its holding did not apply to 
him; instead, his trial proceeded under the felony-murder rule, 
which as we stated supra, was constitutional.  See Brown, 477 
Mass. at 807.  He asks us to revisit our decision to apply Brown 
only prospectively, contending that the court's decision not to 
apply Brown retroactively offends the guarantees of equal 
protection.   
In support of his argument, the defendant, who is Black, 
relies on the racial and ethnic demographics of individuals 
currently serving life without the possibility of parole for 
felony-murder.21  Specifically, he asserts that Black persons are 
overrepresented in the population of those serving life without 
the possibility of parole for felony-murder when compared to the 
population of white persons serving the same sentence.  
According to the data collected by the defendant's appellate 
counsel,22 of the 108 inmates currently incarcerated for murder 
in the first degree on a felony-murder theory, 59.25 percent are 
 
21 The Commonwealth does not "take issue with the tenor or 
the accuracy of the defendant's statistics per se," although it 
points to several methodological flaws.   
 
22 These data are from December 1, 2021. 
 
21 
 
Black, while 17.59 percent are white.  By contrast, the data 
show that 32.51 percent of those serving life without the 
possibility of parole for murder based on a malice theory are 
Black persons, while 43.65 percent are white persons.  Thus, the 
defendant calculates that "more than three times as many Black 
people . . . are sentenced to first-degree felony murder as 
compared to [w]hite people," while "[r]oughly 1.34 times as many 
[w]hite people . . . are sentenced to first-degree malice murder 
as compared to Black people."    
The data further show that, of all Black persons serving 
life without the possibility of parole, eighteen percent are 
doing so because of a conviction of murder in the first degree 
on a theory of felony-murder; by comparison, of all white 
persons serving life without the possibility of parole, only 4.6 
percent are doing so for murder in the first degree on a theory 
of felony-murder.  And, while Black persons comprise 29.9 
percent of the total population serving any sentence at 
Department of Correction (DOC) facilities,23 they comprise 59.25 
percent of those serving life without the possibility of parole 
for felony-murder; by comparison, white persons comprise forty 
percent of the total DOC population and 17.5 percent of those 
 
23 These data, supplied by the defendant, on the total 
"criminally sentenced persons" are from May 1, 2022. 
 
22 
 
serving life without the possibility of parole for felony-
murder.24   
The data, the defendant contends, evince structural racism, 
racial disparities in prosecutors' use of discretion in charging 
decisions and plea offers, and implicit bias.  He urges us to 
apply the decision in Brown to his case to correct these 
societal and prosecutorial ills.  
We review the defendant's constitutional challenge de novo.  
See Fernandes, 492 Mass. at 479.  To begin, the decision in 
Brown comports with equal protection's essential mandate that 
 
24 The defendant also presents data that show that 82.4 
percent of those serving life without the possibility of parole 
for felony-murder are people from historically disadvantaged 
racial and ethnic groups.  Additionally, 56.34 percent of those 
serving life without the possibility of parole for murder based 
on a malice theory are from historically disadvantaged racial 
and ethnic groups.  From these data, the defendant concludes 
that "people of color" are roughly 1.5 times overrepresented in 
the felony-murder population serving life without the 
possibility of parole as compared to the demographic percentage 
breakdown of the malice murder population serving life without 
the possibility of parole.  He also compares the racial and 
ethnic makeup of those serving life without the possibility of 
parole for felony-murder with that of the over-all population of 
incarcerated persons, of whom sixty percent are from 
historically disadvantaged groups; 29.9 percent are Black, and 
forty percent are white.  We have noted that such "lump[ing] 
together" of members of various racial and ethnic groups is not 
proper when conducting an equal protection analysis (citation 
omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Lopes, 478 Mass. 593, 600 n.5 
(2018).  See also Commonwealth v Prunty, 462 Mass. 295, 307 n.17 
(2012); Gray v. Brady, 592 F.3d 296, 305-306 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 561 U.S. 1015 (2010) ("minorities," "African Americans," 
and "Hispanic" jurors not same "cognizable group").  The 
defendant presents no argument to deviate from our prior 
jurisprudence in this regard. 
23 
 
"all persons similarly situated should be treated alike."  Moore 
v. Executive Office of the Trial Court, 487 Mass. 839, 848 
(2021), quoting Doe v. Acton-Boxborough Regional Sch. Dist., 468 
Mass. 64, 75 (2014).  This is because our decision to apply 
Brown only prospectively treated all persons serving life 
without the possibility of parole for felony-murder alike -- 
that is, regardless of race or ethnicity (or other suspect 
classification) none of those incarcerated for felony-murder 
received the benefit of our abolishment of the felony-murder 
doctrine.   
Such a "neutral" decision, even if it "'has a 
disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minority[,]' is 
unconstitutional 'only if that impact can be traced to a 
discriminatory purpose.'"  Commonwealth v. Grier, 490 Mass. 455, 
469 (2022), quoting Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 
256, 272 (1979).  Discriminatory purpose requires that the State 
"selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least 
in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse 
effects upon an identifiable group."  Feeney, supra at 279.   
No such discriminatory purpose underlies the decision to 
apply Brown only prospectively.  More specifically, in Brown, we 
recognized that the abolition of the felony-murder doctrine 
"clearly involved a change in the common law of felony-murder."  
Martin, 484 Mass. at 645.  We also affirmed that the pre-Brown 
24 
 
felony-murder rule itself was constitutional.  See Brown, 477 
Mass. at 807.  Accordingly, as we have explained, because there 
was no constitutional requirement that the new rule be applied 
retroactively, "we [were] free to declare that our new 
substantive law shall be applied prospectively."  Martin, supra.  
Cf. Commonwealth v. Galvin, 466 Mass. 286, 290 (2013), 
superseded on other grounds as recognized by Commonwealth v. 
Beverly, 485 Mass. 1, 5 (2020) (newly enacted penal statute is 
presumptively prospective and repeal of statute shall not affect 
any punishment incurred before repeal takes effect).  And, as 
discussed infra, the decision was not arbitrary. 
Nor did our decision to apply Brown only prospectively 
burden a fundamental right.  The defendant has no right, 
fundamental or otherwise, to retroactive application of new 
common-law rules, so long as the rule pursuant to which he was 
convicted was, as here, constitutional.  See Martin, 484 Mass. 
at 645.  And, while in some sense the decision not to apply 
Brown retroactively touches on a liberty interest (to be free of 
the physical constraint of incarceration), a fundamental right 
is burdened "only where State action significantly interfere[s] 
with the fundamental right at issue, not simply where State 
action involves a fundamental right" (quotations and citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Roman, 489 Mass. 81, 86 (2022) 
(concluding fundamental right to be free from physical restraint 
25 
 
implicated but not interfered with where statute granted 
criminal defendants in District Court procedural defenses not 
available to defendants in Superior Court). 
We may prospectively change "our substantive common law of 
murder . . . much like the Legislature may do when it revises 
substantive criminal statutes."  Martin, 484 Mass. at 645.  "All 
prospective [law making] must have a beginning date, and . . . 
[t]he mere fact that some persons were at some later date 
governed by a law more favorable to them than the law which 
applied to the defendant is insufficient to strike down an 
otherwise valid [law]" (quotations and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Freeman, 472 Mass. 503, 507 (2015).  To conclude 
otherwise "would be either to eradicate all new [laws] or to 
make them all retroactive."  Commonwealth v. Purdy, 408 Mass. 
681, 685 (1990). 
Because the determination to apply Brown only prospectively 
was not borne out of discriminatory animus and neither 
implicates a fundamental right nor draws a suspect 
classification, it would violate equal protection only if it 
were not "rationally related to the furtherance of a legitimate 
[S]tate interest" (citation omitted).  Roman, 489 Mass. at 86.  
Our decision to apply Brown only prospectively readily passes 
rational basis review.  We reasoned that prosecutors might have 
tried felony-murder cases very differently if proof of actual 
26 
 
malice were then a required element.  See Brown, 477 Mass. at 
834 (Gants, C.J., concurring).  See also Pfeiffer, 492 Mass. at 
453; Martin, 484 Mass. at 645-646 (reaffirming wisdom of 
prospective application of Brown and noting unfairness of 
retroactive application where defendant was shooter and jury 
were not instructed that they had to find malice, but "likely 
would have found that the defendant acted with malice").  For 
this reason, and because the pre-Brown rule was constitutional, 
we determined not to apply Brown retroactively.  Such reasoning 
continues to be valid.   
To be sure, the data show that the existing population of 
persons serving life without the possibility of parole for 
felony-murder convictions is comprised of more Black persons 
than white persons.  Perforce, any prospective narrowing of the 
crime's scope would leave a population of inmates that was 
comprised of more Black persons than persons who are white.  The 
defendant does not allege that we made our decision in Brown 
prospective because of this effect. 
Nonetheless, the defendant urges us to revisit our equal 
protection jurisprudence to allow for "disparate impact alone" 
to constitute an equal protection violation.  The defendant 
calls on us to correct structural racism, prosecutorial 
discretion in charging decisions, and implicit bias that the 
defendant contends results in more Black persons than white 
27 
 
persons serving life without the possibility of parole for 
felony-murder by reversing course and applying Brown 
retroactively.  He urges:  "This [c]ourt has the opportunity to 
redress part of the systemic racism and implicit bias within the 
court system that has resulted in the egregious racial disparity 
in persons serving felony murder [life without the possibility 
of parole]."  In other words, the defendant urges us to apply 
Brown retroactively because of race.   
Far from showing that our decision resulted in disparate 
racial treatment, however, the data demonstrate that our 
decision eliminated a theory of first-degree murder that may 
have disproportionately affected Black persons.25  Given the 
 
25 Notably, the data are not supported by analysis from an 
expert, such as a statistician, who might provide the court with 
an assessment of the data's statistical significance.  See, 
e.g., Lopez v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 696, 712 n.20 (2012), 
quoting Tinkham, The Uses and Misuses of Statistical Proof in 
Age Discrimination Claims, 27 Hofstra Lab. & Employment L.J. 
357, 358 (2010) ("Standard statistical analysis in 
discrimination cases generally takes the unprotected group and 
compares the treatment of that group to the treatment of the 
protected group to determine whether there is a statistically 
significant difference. . . .  Differences, if any, can be 
measured in terms of absolute numbers, standard deviations or 
percentages"); Jones v. Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 43-45 (1st Cir. 
2014) (noting explanatory power of expert analysis of 
statistical significance and standard deviations in employment 
disparate impact case); McReynolds v. Sodexho Marriott Servs., 
Inc., 349 F. Supp. 2d 1, 21-22 (D.D.C. 2004) (noting usefulness 
of regression analyses).  See also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & 
Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 996-997 (1988) (sampling types of 
infirmities that may emerge when "facially plausible statistical 
evidence" is scrutinized, including small or incomplete data 
sets, inadequate techniques, and unsuitable control groups). 
28 
 
disparities in incarcerated persons relative to the over-all 
population of such persons within the Commonwealth, the same 
data underlying the defendant's argument here could be 
marshalled for nearly any change in the law that result in more 
defendant-friendly rules.26  There being no supportable 
distinction between any such changes and the defendant's present 
claim, we decline his invitation to employ race (or ethnicity) 
in this manner in our decision making as to whether to apply a 
new criminal rule retroactively.  
At bottom, although couched as an equal protection claim 
based on our decision in Brown, the defendant's actual objection 
is a claim of selective prosecution.  Under the tripartite 
selective prosecution test, however,  
 
  
26 See Massachusetts Sentencing Commission, Selected Race 
Statistics 2 (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.mass.gov/files 
/documents/2016/09/tu/selected-race-statistics.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/3TAF-2VUE] (in 2014, Massachusetts incarcerated 
people who are Black at 7.9 times the rate of people who are 
white).  See also E.T. Bishop, B. Hopkins, C. Obiofuma, & F. 
Owusu, Criminal Justice Policy Program, Harvard Law School, 
Racial Disparities in the Massachusetts Criminal System 1 (Sept. 
2020), https://hls.harvard.edu/content/uploads/2020/11 
/Massachusetts-Racial-Disparity-Report-FINAL.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/W5KA-MX3R] (same). 
 
As of 2020, according to the data presented by amicus 
American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Inc., the 
Commonwealth's population was sixty-nine percent white and 6.8 
percent Black; overall, thirty-one percent of the Commonwealth’s 
population identified as nonwhite. 
 
29 
 
"the defendant bears the initial burden to 'present 
evidence which raises at least a reasonable inference of 
impermissible discrimination, including evidence that a 
broader class of persons than those prosecuted violated the 
law, . . . that failure to prosecute was either consistent 
or deliberate, . . . and that the decision not to prosecute 
was based on an impermissible classification such as race, 
religion, or sex'" (quotations omitted). 
  
Commonwealth v. Bernardo B., 453 Mass. 158, 168 (2009), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Franklin, 376 Mass. 885, 894 (1978).  If a 
defendant makes this prima facie showing, "the Commonwealth must 
rebut that inference of discrimination."  Commonwealth v. 
Robinson-Van Rader, 492 Mass. 1, 17 (2023).   
"Because a claim of selective prosecution is a collateral 
attack on prosecutorial decision-making, a degree of rigor is 
demanded to balance such claims against the presumption of 
prosecutorial regularity."  Bernardo B., 453 Mass. at 168.  
Here, the defendant, in essence, asks us to sidestep this 
required rigor by crafting a new standard for retroactive 
application of new rules to target essentially the same conduct 
that the selective prosecution framework already addresses.  We 
decline to do so. 
b.  Jury instructions.  The defendant next contends that 
certain jury instructions were erroneous.  In giving 
instructions, "[a] trial judge has the duty to state the 
applicable law clearly and correctly."  Commonwealth v. Wall, 
469 Mass. 652, 670 (2014).  "In assessing the sufficiency of the 
30 
 
jury instructions, we consider the charge in its entirety, to 
determine the 'probable impact, appraised realistically . . . 
upon the jury's factfinding function.'"27  Id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Batchelder, 407 Mass. 752, 759 (1990).  See 
Commonwealth v. Denis, 442 Mass. 617, 621 (2004) ("In examining 
a claim of error in jury instructions, we do not look at 
individual phrases taken out of context; rather, we consider the 
instructions viewed as a whole").  
i.  Cooperating witness instruction.  The defendant asserts 
that the judge's instruction concerning the jury's evaluation of 
the testimony of a cooperating witness did not comply with the 
requirements of Commonwealth v. Ciampa, 406 Mass. 257, 266 
(1989).  Because trial counsel timely objected,28 we examine 
whether any error was prejudicial.  See Commonwealth v. 
 
27 We have encouraged trial judges to follow the model jury 
instructions.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bonner, 489 Mass. 268, 
285 (2022); Commonwealth v. Howard, 479 Mass. 52, 61 (2018).  
But we also have affirmed that a judge need not use particular 
words in giving an instruction "so long as the charge, as a 
whole, adequately covers the issue."  Commonwealth v. McGee, 467 
Mass. 141, 154 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Daye, 411 Mass. 
719, 739 (1992). 
   
28 Contrary to the Commonwealth's contention, trial 
counsel's request to "re-instruct on the model jury instruction 
on the cooperating witness" because the trial judge "narrowed or 
diminished some of the instructions to the detriment of the 
defense" sufficiently highlighted the nature of the objection, 
and the judge considered and rejected the request.  See 
Commonwealth v. Costa, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 750, 754 n.6 (2015) 
(objection preserved where "the trial judge considered the 
objection fully").  
31 
 
Teixeira, 490 Mass. 733, 742 (2022); Commonwealth v. Meuse, 423 
Mass. 831, 832 (1996).   
"When a prosecution witness testifies pursuant to a plea 
agreement containing a promise to tell the truth, and the jury 
are aware of the promise, the judge should warn the jury that 
the government does not know whether the witness is telling the 
truth."  Meuse, 423 Mass. at 832.  The judge should also 
"specifically and forcefully tell the jury to study the 
witness's credibility with particular care."  Ciampa, 406 Mass. 
at 266.  "[I]f the prosecutor has vouched for that witness's 
credibility, such a failure to instruct is reversible error."  
Meuse, supra.  "Vouching can occur if an attorney expresses a 
personal belief in the credibility of a witness . . . or if an 
attorney indicates that [the attorney] has knowledge independent 
of the evidence before the jury verifying a witness's 
credibility."  Ciampa, supra at 265. 
 
Here, the Commonwealth's key witness, Jones, testified 
pursuant to a cooperation agreement.  The prosecutor briefly 
elicited on direct examination that Jones entered into a 
cooperation agreement and was receiving a reduced sentence in 
exchange for her testimony against the defendant.  The 
prosecutor did not elicit that the agreement was contingent on 
Jones telling the truth; nor did the prosecution admit a copy of 
the agreement in evidence.  The prosecutor neither expressed her 
32 
 
personal belief in Jones's credibility nor suggested that she 
possessed special knowledge of Jones's truthfulness.  Instead, 
in her closing argument, the prosecutor urged the jury to 
believe Jones based on specific evidence that corroborated her 
testimony.  Contrast Commonwealth v. Meuse, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 
772, 774 (1995), S.C., 423 Mass. 831 (1996) (prosecutor 
emphasized in closing argument that if cooperating witness was 
"not telling the truth, we have an army of police that can go 
out and corroborate every detail he is giving us.  If he gives 
us one wrong detail . . . we will not show up for sentencing.  
That’s the leverage we have . . .").   
However, on cross-examination, after trial counsel 
suggested that Jones was being untruthful to secure her deal, 
Jones responded:  "I wouldn't make up a story.  It was an 
agreement to be honest a hundred percent or there's no agreement 
in place."  Cf. Commonwealth v. Chaleumphong, 434 Mass. 70, 74-
75 (2001) (officer's testimony about methods of confirming 
truthfulness of cooperating witness was not vouching where 
testimony was extracted by defense's cross-examination).   
After the close of evidence, the judge instructed the jury 
that it should "treat [Jones's] testimony with particular care 
because you know she has received a benefit from the 
Commonwealth."  While the judge did not caution that the 
Commonwealth "could not know whether [Jones] was telling the 
33 
 
truth," see Meuse, 423 Mass. at 832, he emphasized that the jury 
were the sole ultimate arbiters of witnesses' credibility, and 
that in evaluating credibility, they could take into account 
bias and whether "a witness has something to win or lose by 
their testimony."  See Ciampa, 406 Mass. at 266.  See also 
Commonwealth v. Grenier, 415 Mass. 680, 687 (1993) ("The judge's 
instruction on credibility, including references to witnesses' 
interests in the outcome of the case and to their possible bias, 
was sufficient in the circumstances").  Although, in view of 
Jones's characterization of her obligation to tell the truth 
under the cooperation agreement, it may have been preferable for 
the judge also to specify that the prosecution had no special 
method of determining Jones's truthfulness, these circumstances, 
combined with the vigorous cross-examination of Jones that 
elicited her prior inconsistent statements, lead us to conclude 
with fair assurance that the omission did not sway the jury's 
decision.  See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 591 (2005). 
ii.  "Lifestyle" commentary.  The defendant additionally 
challenges the instruction to the jury that "[w]e're not here to 
judge someone's lifestyle; be it the alleged victim . . . be it 
a witness, be it anybody involved here" (emphasis added).  He 
asserts that the instruction impermissibly bolstered Jones's 
credibility and was prejudicial because the defense relied on 
attacking Jones's lavish lifestyle relative to her income.   
34 
 
In conducting a trial, a judge may not "express an opinion 
on the credibility of particular witnesses," or "instruct the 
jury that they must draw particular inferences from the 
evidence."  Commonwealth v. Sneed, 376 Mass. 867, 870 (1978).  
Here, the instruction neither conveyed the judge's views of 
Jones's credibility nor ordered the jury to ignore evidence 
linked to her lifestyle when evaluating credibility.  Rather, 
the judge was clear that instead of "judg[ing] someone's 
lifestyle," the jury must "coolly and calmly sift through 
evidence" and "draw reasonable inferences.""29  Furthermore, the 
judge repeatedly reaffirmed that the jury were the ultimate 
arbiters of credibility determinations.  Although it may have 
been prudent to avoid altogether the use of the defense's chosen 
phrase, "lifestyle," the judge did not err. 
 
iii.  Hypotheticals.  The defendant also maintains that the 
trial judge gave hypotheticals that too closely tracked the 
facts of the case or that aligned the judge with the victim and 
prosecution.  A judge generally may employ hypotheticals to 
 
29 In this regard, the judge's instruction conveyed the 
essence of the model instructions on the role of the jury, which 
state that jurors "must be completely fair and unbiased" and 
should "not let [their] emotions, any kind of prejudice, or 
[their] personal likes or dislikes influence [them] in any way."  
Superior Court Model Jury Instructions, Final Charge Script 5 
(Nov. 2023).  See Instruction 2.120 of the Criminal Model Jury 
Instructions for Use in the District Court (Sept. 2022) (jurors 
should not "allow bias . . . to interfere with [their] ability 
to fairly evaluate the evidence"). 
35 
 
explain concepts to the jury.  See, e.g., Denis, 442 Mass. at 
621-622, 624-625; Commonwealth v. Moses, 436 Mass. 598, 604-605 
(2002).  But in doing so, the judge must "not improperly comment 
on the . . . evidence or offer his opinion regarding the 
defendant's guilt."  Moses, supra at 605.  Additionally, a judge 
should not offer a "hypothetical that too closely tracks the 
facts of the defendant's case."  Commonwealth v. Gumkowski, 487 
Mass. 314, 331 (2021).  We further have discouraged "examples in 
which hypothetical individuals commit crimes" (citation 
omitted).  Id.   
 
Here, immediately prior to the introduction of a recording 
of a telephone call made by the defendant from jail, see note 
13, supra, the judge cautioned the jury not to let the 
defendant's pretrial detention bias them.  The judge then stated 
that if he were arrested, he "would hope [his] wife would come 
. . . make [his] bail," and that "people with means" can 
generally "make bail."  The judge added "just because someone 
can't make bail, you can't hold that against them. . . .  [T]hat 
would be very unfair."  While the judge's reference to his 
wife's assistance was better left unsaid, the instruction, as a 
whole, was not error.30   
 
30 Similarly, the defense complains that in explaining the 
unarmed robbery charge, the judge used himself as an example 
victim, thereby equating himself with the victim, and thus the 
36 
 
 
Additionally, after instructing the jury to weigh Jones's 
testimony with "particular care" in view of her cooperation 
agreement, see part 3.b.i, supra, the judge gave one example of 
how the jury could assess credibility.  He told the jury that if 
he said, "what a miserable, wet rainy day," but they could see 
that it was sunny, the jury could conclude that he is "crazy" 
because they have "contrary evidence."  The defendant contends 
that this statement instructed the jury to disbelieve Jones's 
testimony only if they had direct contrary evidence.  But the 
judge did not convey that only direct evidence can lead the jury 
to disbelieve testimony.  Rather, he gave it as one example of 
how the jury could assess credibility; he urged them to use 
their "common sense" and to draw "reasonable inferences." 
 
The defendant also asserts that the judge erred in 
connection with a hypothetical the judge employed to illustrate 
joint venture liability.  In it, the judge and his "crazy" and 
"dumb" brother-in-law conspired to rob a bank.  Contrary to the 
defendant's contention, the outlandish hypothetical did not 
"closely mirror[] the circumstances of the defendant's case" or 
"emphasize the prosecution's theory of the case" -- a death 
 
prosecution.  This claim is too attenuated and speculative to 
constitute error. 
 
37 
 
resulting from a botched drug heist.31  See Gumkowski, 487 Mass. 
at 332.  The judge made clear that he was using a hypothetical 
illustratively and emphasized that the jurors were the sole 
arbiters of the facts.  See Moses, 436 Mass. at 605.  No 
reasonable juror would have been misled by the judge's example.  
 
c.  Trial judge's conduct.  The defendant additionally 
claims that the trial judge prejudicially injected himself into 
the proceedings.   
i.  Questioning of witnesses.  The defendant first points 
to the judge's questioning of witnesses.32  "A judge may properly 
question a witness, even where to do so may 'reinforce the 
Commonwealth's case, so long as the examination is not partisan 
in nature, biased, or a display of belief in the defendant's 
guilt.'"  Commonwealth v. Carter, 475 Mass. 512, 525 (2016), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Festa, 369 Mass. 419, 422 (1976).  
Although we have expressed concerns with an "overspeaking 
judge," see Commonwealth v. Campbell, 371 Mass. 40, 45 (1976), 
"[t]here exists no quantitative test for determining whether the 
 
31 The defendant also argues that the example highlighted 
the defendant's decision not to testify and suggested that the 
defendant was "dumb" or "crazy."  We disagree.  Indeed, the 
judge specifically instructed the jury to draw no inferences 
from the defendant not testifying and not to take cues from the 
judge.  
 
32 Here, the defendant complains that the judge asked 
witnesses a total of 146 questions, including sixty to Jones.   
38 
 
judge has gone beyond the bounds which the law imposes," 
Commonwealth v. Dias, 373 Mass. 412, 416 (1977), S.C., 402 Mass. 
645 (1988).  The judge's actions are to "considered in the 
context of the entire trial."  Festa, supra at 423.   
 
Here, the judge's questioning did not interfere "with 
counsel's ability to put on a full defense."  See Commonwealth 
v. Sylvester, 388 Mass. 749, 751-752 (1983).  And, while some of 
the questions clarified facts that, in turn, benefited the 
Commonwealth, none showed bias or favor toward the prosecution; 
rather, the judge's questions were directed either to clarifying 
information or to mitigating the risk of the jury making 
unfairly prejudicial inferences.  In the circumstances, while it 
would have been better for the judge to interject his questions 
less frequently, we discern no error in the questions he asked.  
 
ii.  Banter with witnesses.  The defendant also argues that 
the judge improperly engaged in extraneous social conversation 
with Commonwealth witnesses, which, he contends, enhanced those 
witnesses' likability and demonstrated partiality to the 
Commonwealth.  In particular, the judge bantered with the 
victim's roommate about a board game, asked about a forensics 
witness's broken leg, and thanked the telephone records 
custodian for traveling from afar.33   
 
33 Additionally, the defendant complains that the judge 
"plac[ed] his finger on the scales of justice in favor of the 
39 
 
"Although we discourage gratuitous remarks by judges," 
Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 375, 392 (1995), the judge's 
"folksy" mannerism, even if error, did not result in a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, see 
Commonwealth v. Lucien, 440 Mass. 658, 664-665 (2004).  None of 
the remarks displayed partiality toward the prosecution or the 
witnesses beyond the normal bounds of affability and courtesy.  
Indeed, the judge displayed a similar chattiness with jurors 
during voir dire but had little opportunity to do the same with 
defense witnesses, as the defense called only one witness.  
Moreover, the judge instructed the jury not to take any cues 
from him in assessing credibility.  See id.; Mello, supra. 
d.  Ineffectiveness of counsel.  The defendant also asserts 
that the motion judges abused their discretion in denying his 
motions for a new trial because trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance.  "When evaluating ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims in connection with the direct appeal of a 
conviction of murder in the first degree, 'we review for a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice . . . .'"  
Kirkland, 491 Mass. at 346, quoting Commonwealth v. Don, 483 
 
Commonwealth" by asking the prosecutor to help display a jury 
instruction chalk -- rather than asking a court officer -- and 
by asking the prosecutor for her opinion on the instructions.  
These actions do not alter our conclusion. 
40 
 
Mass. 697, 704 (2019).34  "In conducting this review, we accord 
tactical decisions of trial counsel due deference" and reverse 
only if counsel's decisions were "manifestly unreasonable" 
(quotation and citations omitted).  Kirkland, supra.  "'[O]nly 
strategy and tactics which lawyers of ordinary training and 
skill in the criminal law would not consider competent' rise to 
the level of manifestly unreasonable."  Id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 674 (2015), S.C., 478 
Mass. 189 (2017).35    
i.  Lack of CSLI expert.  The defendant argues that trial 
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to retain a 
CSLI expert.  "There is no requirement that trial counsel always 
present expert or documentary evidence to support an argument, 
especially where other evidence is presented to support it." 
Commonwealth v. Hensley, 454 Mass. 721, 736 (2009).  Here, trial 
 
34 This is because the "statutory standard of [G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E,] is more favorable to a defendant than is the 
constitutional standard for determining the ineffectiveness of 
counsel" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 Mass. 
291, 316 (2014). 
 
35 Where a claim asks us to speculate on the strategic 
decision-making of trial counsel, the absence of an affidavit 
from trial counsel is significant.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Gonzalez, 443 Mass. 799, 809 n.10 (2005) ("It is significant 
that there is no affidavit from trial counsel to inform us of 
his strategic reasons for these decisions"); Commonwealth v. 
Vasquez, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 523, 533 (2002) ("Conspicuously 
absent in these circumstances is an affidavit from defense trial 
counsel"). 
 
41 
 
counsel made a strategic decision to rely on cross-examination 
of the Commonwealth's expert.  See Commonwealth v. Sena, 441 
Mass. 822, 827-829 (2004) (no ineffective assistance for not 
calling expert where counsel effectively cross-examined 
Commonwealth's expert).36 
On cross-examination, trial counsel effectively elicited 
that the Commonwealth's CSLI evidence could provide no more than 
an approximate location of the defendant's cellular telephone; 
counsel evoked that the cellular telephone plausibly could have 
connected to cellular towers further from the telephone's 
location based on any number of factors, including call volume 
and physical obstructions.37     
 
36 The defendant also maintains that trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance because, in her opening statement, she 
told the jury that cellular telephone records would exculpate 
the defendant.  Although a failure to deliver on a promise of 
key evidence may constitute ineffective assistance, see 
Commonwealth v. Duran, 435 Mass. 97, 109 (2001), here, counsel 
delivered on her promise.  The telephone records were admitted 
in evidence through the Commonwealth's cellular telephone 
records custodian witness.  And, in closing argument, trial 
counsel argued that because the defendant called Jones near the 
time of the shooting, this indicated that the defendant was not 
with Jones and therefore was not the third coventurer.  This was 
not a manifestly unreasonable tactic.  See Fernandes, 492 Mass. 
at 492 (defense counsel reasonably suggested that calls between 
defendant and codefendant showed that they were not together). 
 
37 The affidavit submitted by the defendant's posttrial 
expert showed, at most, that the possible area from which the 
call could have been placed was somewhat larger than the already 
sizable area the Commonwealth's expert proffered; significantly, 
the larger area still encompassed the victim's home.  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Baker, 440 Mass. 519, 528-529 (2003) (counsel 
42 
 
ii.  Telephone records custodian's testimony.  The 
defendant also contends that trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by not objecting to the cellular telephone records 
custodian's qualifications to testify regarding how cellular 
telephone towers function.  Assuming, arguendo, that the expert 
was unqualified as to that subject matter, the error does not 
raise a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  As 
discussed supra, the CSLI data merely corroborated an otherwise 
strong case against the defendant, which also included 
surveillance video footage that placed the defendant close to 
the victim's home shortly before the shooting, as well as call 
logs indicating that the defendant was in communication with 
Jones and Tyler.   
iii.  CSLI exhibits.  The defendant next faults trial 
counsel for not objecting to the admission of two maps derived 
from CSLI data that placed the defendant's cellular telephone in 
the vicinity of the victim's home and the restaurant.  Such 
charts derived from CSLI data, for which a proper foundation is 
laid, are admissible.  See Bin, 480 Mass. at 679-680 (judge did 
not abuse discretion in admitting computer-generated map police 
officer created to plot CSLI data).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Carnes, 457 Mass. 812, 825 (2010) ("Summaries of testimony are 
 
failed to introduce expert who would have rebutted "the only 
physical evidence used by the Commonwealth to link" defendant). 
43 
 
admissible, provided that the underlying records have been 
admitted in evidence and that the summaries accurately reflect 
the records").  Therefore, counsel's lack of objection was not 
manifestly unreasonable.  
iv.  Murder in the second degree instruction.  The 
defendant asserts that trial counsel should have sought an 
instruction on felony-murder in the second degree.  Where "the 
defendant's trial strategy was to present an all-or-nothing 
choice to the jury," not requesting an instruction on an 
available lesser included crime is not manifestly unreasonable.  
Commonwealth v. Roberts, 407 Mass. 731, 737-739 (1990).  Here, 
the primary defense was that the defendant did not participate 
in the robbery and that Jones fabricated her testimony.  The 
choice to forgo the instruction on second degree murder was not 
manifestly unreasonable. 
v.  Adequacy of preparation.  The defendant argues that his 
trial counsel inadequately prepared for trial.  Among the duties 
of counsel are the duties "to consult with the defendant on 
important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of 
important developments in the course of the prosecution."  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).38  Counsel 
 
38 Prior to trial, the defendant met with trial counsel in 
person at least six times and was able to speak with her by 
telephone "numerous times through [his] incarceration."  Without 
more, the defendant's claim of a failure to communicate is 
44 
 
also has a duty to conduct an independent investigation of the 
facts.  Commonwealth v. Duran, 435 Mass. 97, 102 (2001).  See 
Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).  To establish 
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must identify 
with particularity how any investigation that counsel failed to 
conduct would have benefited the defense.  Duran, supra at 103.  
"Speculation, without more, is not a sufficient basis to 
establish ineffective representation."  Id. 
The defendant contends that trial counsel failed to give 
him certain discovery materials in a timely manner, causing him 
to underestimate the strength of the Commonwealth's case.  The 
defendant does not explain how earlier access to discovery 
material would have altered his strategy.   
The defendant further maintains that trial counsel failed 
to contact, call, and prepare two neighbors (one of whom 
testified), as well as Jones's friend and Tyler.  He does not 
identify any noncumulative, material exculpatory testimony that 
the two neighbors could have supplied; Jones's friend was 
unavailable to testify; and Tyler was himself a defendant in a 
parallel case for the same crime, see note 15, supra.  In the 
absence of an affidavit from trial counsel, we reject the claim 
 
unsupported.  See Martin, 484 Mass. at 643-644 (no ineffective 
assistance where counsel visited defendant six times and 
defendant failed to articulate how more contact would have 
affected strategy or verdict). 
45 
 
that a failure to call these witnesses was not a strategic 
choice.  Nor will we speculate as to what these witnesses might 
have said.39   
vi.  Firearm and drugs seized from Jones's home.  The 
defendant also argues that trial counsel failed to seek to 
introduce information that shortly before the shooting, police 
officers had seized a firearm and "crack" cocaine from Jones's 
apartment and had arrested her boyfriend.  "[I]mpeachment of a 
witness is, by its very nature, fraught with a host of strategic 
considerations to which we will, even on [G. L. c. 278, § 33E,] 
review, still show deference" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth 
v. Valentin, 470 Mass. 186, 190 (2014).  Therefore, "a claim of 
ineffective assistance based on failure to use particular 
impeachment methods is difficult to establish."  Commonwealth v. 
Fisher, 433 Mass. 340, 357 (2001).  "This is particularly so 
where [trial counsel] conducted a thorough impeachment . . . ."  
Valentin, supra at 191.  
The crux of the defense was that the defendant was not 
involved in the robbery; Jones's motivation for the robbery and 
her prior involvement with drugs and firearms have little 
 
39 See Commonwealth v. McWilliams, 473 Mass. 606, 621 (2016) 
("[A] motion judge may reject a defendant's self-serving 
affidavit as not credible" [citation omitted]); Commonwealth v. 
Rice, 441 Mass. 291, 304 (2004) (without affidavit from trial 
counsel, defendant's assertions are speculative). 
46 
 
bearing on whether the defendant also participated in the 
robbery.  Moreover, trial counsel vigorously cross-examined 
Jones; she raised serious questions regarding Jones's version of 
events and elicited that Jones initially had lied about the 
robbery, that Jones needed money, and that Jones had an 
incentive to testify against the defendant.  Further expounding 
on Jones's motivation for the robbery was unlikely to have 
influenced the jury's decision.40 
e.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant also 
asks us to apply Brown retroactively to his case as a matter of 
fairness pursuant to review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.41  Unlike 
in Brown, however, the defendant here was not in the "remote 
outer fringes" of the scheme that led to the victim's death.  
See Brown, 477 Mass. at 824 (reducing felony-murder verdict from 
first degree to second degree where defendant's involvement was 
limited to supplying firearm and clothing used in robbery).  We 
discern no error warranting relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.   
 
40 The defendant also contends that Jones's posttrial arrest 
in November 2021 for possessing an illegal firearm showed that 
the pretrial firearm seizure was critical to the defense.  
However, this posttrial development has no bearing on decisions 
trial counsel made at trial. 
 
41 The defendant contends that he preserved the issue of 
whether felony-murder continued to provide an independent theory 
to liability.  
47 
 
4.  Conclusion.  The defendant's conviction of murder in 
the first degree is affirmed.  The orders denying the 
defendant's first, second, and third motions for a new trial are 
also affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.