Case Title: Commonwealth v. Paquette

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12028

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-10-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12028 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RAYMOND ZACHARY PAQUETTE. 
 
 
 
Hampshire.     April 4, 2016. - October 27, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
Hines, JJ.1 
 
 
Misleading a Police Officer.  Practice, Criminal, Instructions 
to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 24, 2014. 
 
 
The cases were tried before C. Jeffrey Kinder, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Thomas D. Frothingham for the defendant. 
 
Steven E. Gagne, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Yale Yechiel N. Robinson, pro se, amicus curiae, submitted 
a brief. 
 
 
                     
 
1 Justices Spina, Cordy, and Duffly participated in the 
deliberation on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  This case considers whether any lie to police 
during a criminal investigation "misleads" police in violation 
of G. L. c. 268, § 13B, the witness intimidation statute.  The 
statute prohibits, as relevant here, "willfully . . . 
mislead[ing] . . . [a] police officer."  The defendant was 
convicted by a Superior Court jury on two indictments charging 
violations of that prohibition, at two separate interviews with 
police, during their investigation of a fight at a party he 
hosted in May, 2014.  On direct appellate review, the defendant 
argues primarily that the jury were not instructed correctly 
regarding the elements of § 13B, and that his motions for 
required findings of not guilty should have been allowed.  We 
conclude that the instruction regarding the "mislead[ing]" 
element of § 13B was incorrect.  We further conclude that, if 
the jury had been instructed correctly, the evidence would have 
been sufficient to allow the jury to find the defendant guilty 
of violating § 13B at the first interview, but not at the second 
interview.  Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand the 
matter to the Superior Court for entry of a required finding of 
not guilty on the second indictment, alleging that the defendant 
misled police at the second interview.2  The defendant may be 
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Yale Yechiel 
N. Robinson. 
3 
 
 
retried on the first indictment, concerning statements he made 
to police during the first interview. 
 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts the jury could have 
found, reserving certain details for later discussion.  On the 
night of May 3, 2014, the defendant and his sister hosted a 
party at their father's house in Westhampton.  Two of the 
guests, Patrick Bousquet and Tyler Spath, became involved in an 
argument in the kitchen after a remark by Spath that Bousquet 
perceived as an insult to his girl friend.  The argument turned 
violent when Bousquet hit Spath over the head with a glass 
bottle, shattering the bottle and slicing open Spath's head and 
neck.  A larger fight erupted, involving multiple other guests.  
Soon afterwards, the defendant announced that the party was 
over, and urged everyone to go home.  As the bleeding Spath left 
to go to the hospital, the defendant said to him, "[Y]ou weren't 
here, don't tell anyone you were here, nothing happened." 
 
State police troopers interviewed the defendant twice in 
the course of the ensuing investigation.  The first interview 
took place at about noon on May 4, 2014, approximately ten hours 
after the party ended.  The defendant told the troopers that he 
had hosted the party, and he provided them with the names of a 
few friends who had attended.  Believing that the defendant knew 
more than he was saying, however, one of the troopers urged him 
to be more forthcoming.  The defendant then explained that he 
4 
 
 
was outside "picking up beer cans" at the time of the fight.  He 
claimed he "saw a bunch of commotion" and ran inside after the 
fight had ended. 
 
The defendant recalled seeing Spath and several other 
people in the kitchen after the fight, but only identified one 
person, a friend of Spath's, by name.  He provided physical 
descriptions of three other men who were in the kitchen and who, 
he believed, might have been involved in the fight, and he noted 
that Spath's girl friend also might have been present.  He 
emphasized, however, that these individuals were not his 
friends, and that he only interacted with them "after the fact," 
while telling partygoers to leave.  He added, "As far as I'm 
concerned, if people are going to start fighting in my house, I 
don't need anything to get broken.  I don't -- I don't need, you 
know, police officers coming to my house and doing this." 
 
The troopers did not think the defendant's account 
credible -- they believed that he was friends with some of the 
people involved in the fight, and did not want to incriminate 
those people.  One of the troopers explained to the defendant 
that they did not "want people impeding an investigation," 
noting that "there's all kinds of charges that are involved with 
that."  The interview ended shortly thereafter. 
 
Subsequent interviews during the investigation reinforced 
the troopers' suspicions:  five guests, including Spath, 
5 
 
 
specifically placed the defendant in the kitchen at the time of 
the fight.  Those interviews indicated that the defendant sought 
unsuccessfully to mediate the verbal argument between Bousquet 
and Spath before it came to blows.  The interviews also led 
police to identify Bousquet as the person who hit Spath.  By the 
third week of May, 2014, Bousquet had been arrested and charged 
in connection with the incident.3 
 
The second interview of the defendant took place on the 
afternoon of May 29, 2014, after Bousquet had been charged.  The 
troopers (one of whom had been at the previous interview) told 
the defendant that they had spoken with other people who were 
present during the fight, and sought to "clear the air like 
adults."  They asked him to tell them again what he saw on the 
night of the party.  The defendant then revealed the names of 
additional guests beyond those he had mentioned during his first 
interview.  He did not, however, name Bousquet or others police 
understood had been present.  One of the troopers warned the 
defendant that if he continued to withhold information from 
them, he was heading down a "bad road." 
 
The defendant insisted that he had not noted who, aside 
from Spath, had been present.  He elaborated that he was on 
                     
 
3 The record does not contain the date or dates on which 
Bousquet was arrested and charged, or the specific charges 
against him.  In December, 2014, he pleaded guilty to two counts 
of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon resulting 
in serious bodily injury, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15A. 
6 
 
 
sleep medication and "blackout drunk" during the party, and 
reiterated his account from the first interview that he was 
outside collecting cans at the time of the fight.  Eventually, 
however, the defendant stated that he had heard secondhand that 
"Pat," an acquaintance of his, "got in a fight with somebody and 
hit [him] with a bottle." 
 
Over the course of the second interview, the troopers 
repeatedly warned the defendant that he could face criminal 
liability if he misled them in their investigation.  
Nonetheless, the defendant maintained that he was not present 
during the fight.  The troopers informed the defendant that they 
would be forwarding the recording of their interview to the 
district attorney for "further review." 
 
2.  Procedural posture.  On June 24, 2014, a grand jury 
returned two indictments charging the defendant with misleading 
a police officer, one for each interview, in violation of G. L. 
c. 268, § 13B.  The case was tried before a Superior Court jury 
in March, 2015.  The Commonwealth played audio recordings of 
both of the defendant's interviews,4 and called a number of 
witnesses who contradicted the defendant's account that he was 
outside when the fight broke out. 
                     
 
4 Both interviews were audiorecorded using a hand-held 
digital recording device.  The defendant did not object to the 
recording.  The audio recording of the second interview was 
incomplete, as the recording device reached its storage capacity 
before the interview ended. 
7 
 
 
 
The defendant's theory of the case was that the 
Commonwealth's witnesses misremembered his location at the time 
of the fight because they had been drunk, and were otherwise not 
credible.  A friend of the defendant testified on his behalf, 
stating that he had been outside with the defendant at the time 
of the fight.  The defendant did not testify. 
 
The defendant's motions for required findings of not 
guilty, at the close of the Commonwealth's case and at the close 
of all the evidence, were denied.  On March 11, 2015, the jury 
found the defendant guilty of both charges.  The judge imposed a 
sentence of two and one-half years in a house of correction, 
suspended on specific conditions of probation.  The defendant 
appealed, and we granted his application for direct appellate 
review. 
 
3.  Discussion.  Witnesses ordinarily have no obligation to 
disclose information to police.  See Commonwealth v. Hart, 455 
Mass. 230, 238 (2009).  When a witness does choose to speak with 
police, however, § 13B makes it criminal to "mislead[]" them in 
certain circumstances.  The section provides, in relevant part: 
 
"Whoever, directly or indirectly, willfully . . . 
misleads . . .[a] police officer . . . with the intent to 
impede, obstruct, delay, harm, punish or otherwise 
interfere thereby . . . with . . . a [criminal] proceeding 
shall be punished."   
 
G. L. c. 268, § 13B (1) (c) (iii), (v).  The offense essentially 
comprises four elements:  (1) wilfully misleading, directly or 
8 
 
 
indirectly, (2) a police officer (3) with the intent to impede, 
obstruct, delay, harm, punish, or otherwise interfere thereby 
with5 (4) a criminal investigation.  See id.  The defendant 
argues that the jury were not instructed properly regarding two 
of these elements:  wilfully misleading conduct (misleading 
element), and the specific intent to impede, obstruct, delay, 
harm, punish, or otherwise interfere with (impeding element).6  
He further argues that the evidence was not sufficient to 
establish these elements with respect to his statements at 
either the first or the second interview.  In addition, the 
defendant argues that his convictions were impermissibly 
duplicative.7 
 
a.  Jury instructions.  The jury were instructed largely in 
accordance with the model jury instructions regarding the 
                     
 
5 A defendant's reckless disregard of the possibility that 
his or her conduct might interfere with the proceeding at issue 
also is sufficient to establish this element of the statute.  
See G. L. c. 268, § 13B (1) (c) (v).  The indictments in this 
case, however, only alleged that the defendant acted with 
specific intent, not reckless disregard.  See Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 4 (a), 378 Mass. 849 (1979) ("An indictment . . . shall 
contain . . . a plain, concise description of the act which 
constitutes the crime or an appropriate legal term descriptive 
thereof"). 
 
 
6 The defendant does not contest that the statements at 
issue in this case were made to a police officer, and that they 
were made during a criminal investigation. 
 
7 Because we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish that the defendant misled police at the second 
interview, we do not address this argument. 
 
9 
 
 
elements of misleading a police officer that were in effect at 
the time of his trial, Instruction 7.360 of the Criminal Model 
Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court (rev. May 2014).8  
                     
 
8 With respect to the offenses charged, the jury were 
instructed: 
 
 
"Now, let me turn to the specific charges in this 
case.  The defendant is charged with two counts of 
misleading a police officer; one on May 4, 2014, and one on 
May 29, 2014. 
 
 
"In order for you to find the defendant guilty of this 
offense, the Commonwealth must prove the following three 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt.  First, that the 
defendant directly or indirectly [misled] another person.  
Second, that the other person was a police officer 
conducting a criminal investigation.  And third, that the 
defendant did so with the specific intent to impede, 
obstruct, delay or otherwise interfere with that criminal 
investigation. 
 
 
"To mislead means to knowingly make a false statement, 
to intentionally omit information from a statement causing 
a portion of that statement to be misleading, or to 
intentionally conceal a material fact and thereby create a 
false impression.  However, objectively misleading conduct 
alone is not enough.  The Commonwealth must also 
prove . . . the specific intent to impede, obstruct, or 
interfere with a criminal investigation.  To prove this 
third element the Commonwealth, as I said, must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant specifically 
intended to impede, obstruct, delay, or otherwise interfere 
with a criminal investigation.  That is, it must prove the 
purpose or objective of the defendant. 
 
 
"Obviously, it is impossible to look directly into the 
defendant's mind, but in our everyday affairs, we often 
decide from the actions of others what their state of mind 
is.  In this case you may examine the defendant's actions 
or/and words and all of the surrounding circumstances to 
help you determine his intent at the time. 
 
10 
 
 
The defendant argues that the instructions inaccurately 
described both the misleading and the impeding elements of 
§ 13B. 
 
i.  Misleading element.  The defendant argues for the first 
time on appeal that the jury were not instructed properly 
regarding the misleading element of § 13B.9  The jury were 
instructed that "[t]o mislead means to knowingly make a false 
statement, to intentionally omit information from a statement 
causing a portion of that statement to be misleading, or to 
intentionally conceal a material fact and thereby create a false 
impression."  The judge added, "Bear in mind that the 
Commonwealth need not prove that the defendant was successful in 
misleading the police, so long as you are satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant made a false statement or 
willfully omitted material information in his statement . . . ."  
                                                                  
 
"Bear in mind that the Commonwealth need not prove 
that the defendant was successful in misleading the police, 
so long as you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant made a false statement or willfully omitted 
material information in his statement to the police with 
the specific intent to impede, obstruct, delay, or 
interfere with the criminal investigation." 
 
 
9 In his written request for a jury instruction, the 
defendant argued, "The [d]efendant requests that he be permitted 
to argue that a mere denial of his presence in the kitchen while 
the fight was happening, whether true or false is nothing more 
than an attempt to exculpate himself and not an elaborate ruse 
to induce action by someone else."  The specific language that 
he requested, however, addressed only the impeding element of 
G. L. c. 268, § 13B. 
11 
 
 
The defendant argues that that instruction incorrectly allowed 
the jury to find any knowingly false statement "misleading" 
within the scope of § 13B.  Because the defendant did not raise 
this argument at trial, we review the challenged instruction for 
a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 13 (1999). 
 
In our few prior cases involving § 13B, we adopted a 
working definition of "misleads" from the description of 
"misleading conduct" in 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(3), which defines 
that term for purposes of the Federal witness tampering statute, 
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b).  See Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 464 Mass. 
365, 372 (2013).  "Misleading conduct" under the Federal 
statutory scheme includes 
"(A) knowingly making a false statement; (B) intentionally 
omitting information from a statement and thereby causing a 
portion of such statement to be misleading, or 
intentionally concealing a material fact, and thereby 
creating a false impression by such statement; (C) with 
intent to mislead, knowingly submitting or inviting 
reliance on a writing or recording that is false, forged, 
altered, or otherwise lacking in authenticity; (D) with 
intent to mislead, knowingly submitting or inviting 
reliance on a sample, specimen, map, photograph, boundary 
mark, or other object that is misleading in a material 
respect; or (E) knowingly using a trick, scheme, or device 
with intent to mislead." 
 
Id., quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(3).  This definition heretofore 
generally has been adequate to the task of determining whether 
defendants have "misled" investigators in violation of § 13B.  
Yet it also is somewhat circular -- apart from "knowingly making 
12 
 
 
a false statement," each of the enumerated categories is 
described using the word "mislead" or "misleading."  Because of 
the definition's inherent limitations, we take this opportunity 
to clarify further the meaning of "misleads" as it appears in 
§ 13B. 
 
"When a statute does not define its words we give them 
their usual and accepted meanings, as long as these meanings are 
consistent with the statutory purpose" (citation omitted).  
Bayless v. TTS Trio Corp., 474 Mass. 215, 219 (2016).  
Dictionaries have defined "mislead" as "[t]o lead in the wrong 
direction."  The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 1124 (4th ed. 2006), and "to lead or guide wrongly; 
lead astray," Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 1230 
(2003).  These definitions indicate that to "mislead[]" 
principally entails sending a person on a proverbial "wild goose 
chase," by inducing the person to go somewhere materially 
different from where he or she otherwise would have gone. 
 
Our cases similarly have focused implicitly on whether, 
given the information known to police at the time of the 
defendant's alleged statements, the statements reasonably could 
have led police astray, i.e., caused them to pursue a course of 
investigation materially different from the course they 
otherwise would have pursued.  In Figueroa, 464 Mass. at 372-
373, for example, we affirmed a defendant's conviction under 
13 
 
 
§ 13B where the evidence indicated that the defendant, a 
parolee, had presented a detailed false alibi to his parole 
officer during her investigation into possible violations of the 
conditions of his parole.10  Although that conduct did not 
actually mislead the parole officer, we concluded that it 
reasonably could have done so.  See id. at 373.  The Appeals 
Court likewise has affirmed a conviction under § 13B of a 
defendant who, after being shot, falsely told police that the 
shooter had been a considerable distance away, although forensic 
evidence indicated that the shooter had been within feet of him.  
See Commonwealth v. Fortuna, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 45, 47, 50-51 
(2011).  The court noted specifically that "the statements that 
the defendant made to the initial officer on the scene 
were . . . sufficient to mislead a reasonable person in his 
position."  Id. at 51.11  In Commonwealth v. Morse, 468 Mass. 
360, 361, 364, 372-373 (2014) (Morse), by contrast, we concluded 
                     
 
10 The conditions of the defendant's parole in that case 
included "not go[ing] to areas where children under eighteen 
years of age would congregate," and "not enter[ing] into a 
relationship with someone who had children without informing his 
parole officer."  Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 464 Mass. 365, 366 
(2013).  The defendant told the officer that he had been at an 
Alcoholics Anonymous meeting and that his global positioning 
system monitor was broken, when in fact he had been trick-or-
treating with the children of a woman whom he secretly had been 
dating.  Id. at 372-373. 
 
11 See also Commonwealth v. Occhiuto, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 489, 
506 (2015) (noting in dicta that defendant's false claim to 
police that he had acquired money from drug theft by working as 
fisherman would have violated G. L. c. 268, § 13B, if statement 
had been made during enumerated criminal proceeding). 
14 
 
 
that a suspect's answer of "No" in response to a police 
officer's question whether he had consumed any substances in 
addition to alcohol before a boating accident "that could've 
impaired [his] ability to . . . be aware of what was going on 
around [him]" was not "misleading" within the meaning of § 13B, 
because the answer was a subjective assessment of the suspect's 
response to an intoxicating substance, and therefore did not 
"rise to the level of a knowingly false statement or an 
intentional omission of a material fact." 
 
In Morse, supra at 372, we observed that each aspect of the 
working definition of "misleads" suggests "a knowing or 
intentional act calculated to lead another person astray."  We 
further observed that "intimidat[ing]" and "harass[ing]" 
conduct, both of which are prohibited under the same subsection 
of § 13B as "mislead[ing]" conduct, similarly involve "malicious 
acts calculated to produce certain effects on a third party."  
See id. at 375, citing G. L. c. 168, § 13B (1) (c).  The Appeals 
Court likewise has defined "intimidating conduct" for purposes 
of § 13B as "acts or words that would instill fear in a 
reasonable person."  See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 76 Mass. App. 
Ct. 530, 535 (2010).  Given this, it seems evident that whether 
a statement is "mislead[ing]" for purposes of § 13B depends on 
whether it reasonably could lead investigators to pursue a 
course of investigation materially different from the course 
15 
 
 
they otherwise would have pursued.12  In short, "He went that 
way" may well be misleading, but "I don't know" likely is not.13 
 
Understanding the definition of "misleads" to include only 
those lies that reasonably could lead investigators to pursue a 
materially different course of investigation is in keeping with 
the statutory purpose of § 13B.14  In Morse, supra at 367-370, we 
examined in detail the statutory history of § 13B and its 
relationship to other crimes against public justice.  We 
concluded that § 13B is targeted specifically at "countering the 
effect of witness intimidation on the successful prosecution of 
                     
 
12 Federal courts have interpreted the definition of 
"misleading conduct" under 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(3) similarly to 
entail conduct that reasonably could lead someone astray in a 
material way.  See, e.g., United States v. Kulcyzk, 931 F.2d 
542, 548 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The statute . . . appears to require 
that the defendant mislead the witness as to the substance of 
his testimony" [emphasis added]); United States v. King, 762 
F.2d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[T]he evidence failed totally to 
support any inference that [government witness] was, or even 
could have been, misled"). 
 
 
13 Cf. Commonwealth v. D'Amour, 428 Mass. 725, 744 (1999), 
citing Commonwealth v. Giles, 350 Mass. 102, 111 (1966) (noting 
in perjury context that "test for materiality is not whether 
testimony did in fact influence pertinent determination, but 
whether it had a reasonable and natural tendency to do so"). 
 
 
14 See Commonwealth v. One 1987 Mercury Cougar Auto., 413 
Mass. 534, 537-38 (1992) ("While courts should look to 
dictionary definitions and accepted meanings in other legal 
contexts, . . . their interpretations must remain faithful to 
the purpose and construction of the statute as a whole" 
[citation omitted]). 
 
16 
 
 
criminals."  See id. at 367.15  The prohibition against 
misleading conduct in § 13B advances that purpose by 
criminalizing conduct that reasonably could affect in a material 
way the investigation culminating in such a prosecution. 
 
The judge understandably instructed the jury in accordance 
with the definition of "misleading conduct" that we adopted in 
Figueroa, 464 Mass. at 372.  That instruction, however, 
indicated incorrectly that a defendant "misleads" police if he 
or she knowingly makes any false statement to police, or omits 
or conceals material information with the intent to mislead 
police or give them a false impression.16  Because the 
instruction allowed the jury to conclude that the defendant 
"misled" police even if his false or incomplete statements could 
not reasonably have led police to pursue a materially different 
course of investigation, it created a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice.17  See Alphas, 430 Mass. at 13. 
 
ii.  Impeding element.  The defendant also argues that the 
jury were not properly instructed regarding the impeding element 
of § 13B.  Only some of the defendant's requested language 
                     
 
15 Although G. L. c. 268, § 13B, originally was enacted in 
1969, the prohibition on misleading conduct first was added in 
2006.  See St. 2006, c. 48, § 3; St. 1969, c. 460. 
 
 
16 The Commonwealth likewise suggested incorrectly during 
closing argument that the defendant had violated the statute 
simply because "he lied to the police." 
 
17 The verdict slip did not ask the jury to specify what 
kind of "misleading conduct" they found. 
17 
 
 
concerning this element was incorporated in the final jury 
instruction:  the jury were instructed that "objectively 
misleading conduct alone is not enough" to establish the 
offense, and that the Commonwealth also must prove "that the 
defendant specifically intended to impede, obstruct, delay, or 
otherwise interfere with a criminal investigation."  They were 
instructed further that they could "examine the defendant's 
actions or/and words and all of the surrounding circumstances to 
help [them] determine his intent at the time."  Over the 
defendant's objection, however, the judge declined to include 
language to the effect that "when an individual denies his 
guilt, either falsely or truthfully, without otherwise making 
any affirmative misrepresentations or attempting to shift the 
blame onto a third party, it generally would be in aid of 
exculpating himself from liability, rather than of inducing 
action by someone else."  See Morse, supra at 375. 
 
The judge's decision to omit such language was not 
prejudicial error.  See Commonwealth v. Kaeppeler, 473 Mass. 
396, 406 (2015).  It is possible that the defendant in this 
case, like the defendant in Morse, supra at 374, intended only 
to minimize his involvement in the events being investigated by 
police out of concern that he might be exposed to criminal 
liability, either for his involvement, however minimal, in the 
circumstances surrounding the assault on Spath, or for his 
18 
 
 
involvement in other criminal activity that was not the primary 
focus of the investigation by police, such as underage 
drinking.18  Nonetheless, it was not necessary to instruct the 
jury specifically regarding other intentions that the defendant 
might have had during his conversations with police.  In Morse, 
supra at 374, we chiefly considered whether a suspect's short 
exculpatory denial, on its own, allowed for an inference of 
specific intent to interfere with the police's investigation.  
We concluded the denial did not allow for such an inference, 
because, unlike "a content-laden fabrication designed to send 
police off course, thereby interfering with their 
investigation," it left police "in the same position they would 
have been in had the [suspect] instead remained silent."  Id. 
 
Here, by contrast, the defendant's statements were more 
extensive than a simple exculpatory "No," and in any event were 
not the only evidence of his intent to interfere in some way 
with the police's investigation.  Other evidence included the 
defendant's exhortations to Spath as he left the party not to 
tell anyone that he had been at the party, and his suggestion to 
police during the first interview that he had told partygoers to 
leave after the fight in order to avoid a police investigation 
                     
 
18 The defendant was twenty-one years old at the time of the 
party; not all of the guests, however, were of legal drinking 
age.  See G. L. c. 138, § 34 (criminalizing furnishing of 
alcohol to minors). 
19 
 
 
into what had happened.  Accordingly, a specific instruction 
regarding the inferences that could be drawn from a short 
exculpatory denial would not have been appropriate.  It was 
sufficient for the jury to be instructed, as they were, that the 
defendant's mens rea could be inferred from circumstantial 
evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Stewart, 454 Mass. 527, 535 
(2009).  See also Commonwealth v. Robinson, 449 Mass. 1, 8 
(2007) ("A judge need not use any particular words in 
instructing the jury as long as the legal concepts are properly 
described"). 
 
b.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  Although the jury were 
not instructed correctly regarding the misleading element of 
§ 13B, we consider whether, had a correct instruction been 
given, the evidence would have been insufficient to allow the 
jury to convict on either indictment.  See Commonwealth v. 
Lapage, 435 Mass. 480, 486 (2001).  "[W]e apply the well-settled 
and familiar Latimore standard:  that is, viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we ask whether 
the evidence and the inferences that reasonably could be drawn 
from it were 'of sufficient force to bring minds of ordinary 
intelligence and sagacity to the persuasion of [guilt] beyond a 
reasonable doubt.'"  Commonwealth v. Scott, 472 Mass. 815, 820 
(2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676–677 
(1979). 
20 
 
 
 
The evidence presented might have allowed a correctly 
instructed jury to conclude that the defendant's statements at 
the first interview violated § 13B.  Although the Commonwealth 
did not present any direct evidence of the effect of the 
defendant's statements at that interview on the investigation by 
police,19 the statements were made while the investigation still 
was in its early stages.  Accordingly, the jury might have 
inferred that the defendant "misled" police within the meaning 
of § 13B by lying about his location at the time of the fight, 
or by misrepresenting that he did not know the identities of 
certain people involved, if they found that such statements 
reasonably could have influenced the investigation in a material 
way.  The jury also might have inferred from circumstantial 
evidence that the defendant specifically intended to impede, 
obstruct, delay, or otherwise interfere with the investigation. 
 
By contrast, even if the jury had been instructed 
correctly, no view of the evidence would have allowed them to 
conclude that the defendant violated § 13B at the second 
interview.  As noted, statements are not misleading within the 
meaning of § 13B unless, given the information known to police 
at the time the statements were made, the statements reasonably 
could have led police to pursue a materially different course of 
                     
 
19 Contrast Commonwealth v. Morse, 468 Mass. 360, 374-375 
(2014) (summarizing evidence regarding alleged effect of 
defendant's statements on course of investigation). 
21 
 
 
investigation.  The Commonwealth presented no direct evidence, 
however, that the defendant's statements at the second interview 
reasonably could have led police astray in this manner.  Nor was 
the evidence that was presented sufficient to allow for an 
inference to that effect.  By the time of the second interview, 
police already had conducted an extensive investigation, and 
Bousquet had been arrested and charged.  Furthermore, once 
police asked the defendant to "clear the air," they presented 
him with the unenviable choice between admitting that he had 
lied and omitted information at his first interview, and 
repeating his misstatements from the first interview, either of 
which could expose him to potential criminal liability under 
§ 13B.  Given the timing of the defendant's statements and what 
police already knew, and in the absence of other evidence 
indicating that the statements reasonably could have affected 
the police investigation in a material way, the evidence was not 
sufficient to allow for the conclusion that the defendant 
"misled" police, within the meaning of § 13B, at the second 
interview.  See Scott, 472 Mass. at 820.  Therefore, the 
defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty with 
respect to the second indictment, pertaining to the second 
interview, should have been allowed. 
 
4.  Conclusion.  The judgments of conviction are vacated 
and set aside.  The matter is remanded to the Superior Court for 
22 
 
 
entry of a required finding of not guilty with respect to the 
second indictment, alleging that the defendant misled police at 
the second interview, and further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.