Case Title: People v. Clark

Citation: 2019 IL 122891

Docket Number: 122891

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2019-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
2019 IL 122891 
 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
 
 
 
(Docket No. 122891) 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.  
ELIZABETH M. CLARK, Appellee. 
 
 
Opinion filed June 6, 2019. 
 
 
JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
 
Justices Thomas, Kilbride, and Garman concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
 
Justice Burke dissented, with opinion, joined by Chief Justice Karmeier and 
Justice Theis. 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
Defendant, Elizabeth M. Clark, pled guilty to charges of burglary and unlawful 
use of a credit card and was released on bond pending the imposition of sentence. 
While awaiting sentencing, defendant was found guilty by the circuit court of 
violating section 31-6(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 
 
 
 
 
 
- 2 - 
5/31-6(a) (West 2014)) for knowingly failing to report to the Whiteside County 
Jail, as required by her bail bond. 
¶ 2 
 
The appellate court found that defendant’s failure to report did not constitute an 
escape because she was not in custody while on bond awaiting sentencing. 2017 IL 
App (3d) 140987, ¶ 11. The appellate court reversed the circuit court, and we 
granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Nov. 1, 
2017)). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court 
and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
 
¶ 3 
 
 
 
 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶ 4 
 
The record contains the following uncontested facts. On October 31, 2012, 
defendant, who has a history of alcohol and substance abuse, pled guilty in the 
circuit court of Whiteside County to one count each of burglary and unlawful use of 
a debit card. While awaiting sentencing, defendant was released on bond so she 
could seek and receive substance abuse treatment. Defendant was sentenced to 90 
days in jail, with credit for time served, followed by a term of 30 months’ 
probation. As conditions of her probation, defendant was ordered to satisfactorily 
complete substance abuse evaluation and treatment, refrain from possessing or 
consuming alcohol or other prohibited substances, submit to periodic urine tests, 
and pay certain fees and fines. 
¶ 5 
 
In January 2013, the State filed a petition alleging violation of probation. 
Defendant was taken into custody, and the court found that defendant violated the 
terms of her probation. In February 2013 she was released on a $50,000 
recognizance bond to receive treatment. On April 19, 2013, defendant’s probation 
was revoked, and she was resentenced to 74 days in jail, time served, and a new 
probation term of 30 months.  
¶ 6 
 
In July 2013, the State filed another petition alleging violation of probation, and 
in September 2013, the court found that defendant violated the terms of her 
probation. In December 2013, defendant was taken into custody. On January 9, 
2014, the circuit court released defendant on a temporary recognizance bond of 
$50,000. The court released defendant into the custody of her father for 
 
 
 
 
 
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transportation directly to the White Oaks treatment center for inpatient substance 
abuse treatment. 
¶ 7 
 
Defendant successfully completed inpatient treatment at White Oaks, and 
thereafter, on February 25, 2014, the circuit court entered an order modifying the 
conditions of her bond. Defendant’s bond was modified to require her to directly 
enter into the Margaret Stutsman Lodge, which is a halfway house featuring an 
extended residential care program for persons recovering from drug and alcohol 
addiction. Defendant was allowed to leave the halfway house for purposes of 
employment, medical needs, and 12-step program meetings. The modified bond 
condition also required that upon her release or discharge from the lodge, “for 
whatever reason (including but not limited to withdrawal, discharge, or successful 
completion of treatment), the Defendant must immediately return to the custody of 
Whiteside County Jail using the most direct route of travel and without delay or 
departure therefrom.” 
¶ 8 
 
On June 5, 2014, defendant left the halfway house but failed to report to the 
Whiteside County Jail. That same day, the State filed an application to increase 
defendant’s bond, and the circuit court issued an arrest warrant. On June 17, 2014, 
at the close of a hearing, defendant’s April 2013 sentence of probation was 
revoked, and she was resentenced on her original offenses. On the burglary 
conviction, defendant was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment with 281 days’ 
credit and two years of mandatory supervised release. On the debit card conviction, 
she was concurrently sentenced to one year of imprisonment with 281 days’ credit 
and one year of mandatory supervised release. 
¶ 9 
 
On the day defendant failed to report to the county jail, the State also filed an 
information charging defendant with the offense of escape in violation of section 
31-6(a) of the Criminal Code, which is divided into two independent clauses: one 
clause containing an escape from custody provision and the other clause containing 
a knowing failure to report provision. 720 ILCS 5/31-6(a) (West 2014). The State 
charged that “defendant, having been convicted of the felony offense of Burglary 
and Unlawful Use of Debit Card, knowingly failed to report to the Whiteside 
County Jail as required on June 6, 2014, in accordance with the terms and 
conditions of her Temporary Recognizance Bond.” Defendant surrendered herself 
to the Whiteside County Jail on June 14, 2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 10 
 
The circuit court conducted a stipulated bench trial on September 23, 2014, in 
which the court accepted the above-recited stipulated facts. In the stipulation, 
defendant admitted that after she left the Margaret Stutsman Lodge she did not 
report directly to the county jail and acknowledged that the conditions of her bond 
required her to do so. 
¶ 11 
 
Seeking acquittal, defense counsel argued, inter alia, that because defendant 
was out on bond and was not serving a prison sentence at the time she failed to 
report to the county jail, this failure amounted to a violation of her bond, rather than 
an escape. Counsel asserted that escape is the unauthorized departure from custody 
and, since a defendant who is free on bond is not in custody, there is no custody 
from which to escape. 
¶ 12 
 
The prosecutor argued that the plain language of the knowing failure to report 
provision does not require that a defendant be “in custody.” According to the 
prosecutor, a convicted felon who knowingly fails to report to a penal institution 
has committed the offense. The prosecutor further argued that, because both of 
those elements were satisfied in defendant’s case, she was guilty of violating 
section 31-6(a) despite the fact that she had been released on bond. 
¶ 13 
 
The circuit court found defendant guilty of escape. In so doing, the court noted 
that defendant had been convicted of two felony charges and was awaiting 
sentencing for those convictions. Further, the court observed that the terms of her 
recognizance bond required her to return immediately to the Whiteside County Jail 
after her discharge from the halfway house. The circuit court determined that 
defendant’s knowing failure to report to the county jail after leaving the halfway 
house constituted a violation of section 31-6(a). Accordingly, the court found that 
the State had satisfied its evidentiary burden, and the court convicted defendant of 
the offense of escape. After denying defendant’s motion for a new trial, the circuit 
court sentenced defendant to 30 months’ probation, to be served consecutively to 
the prison term she received for her original convictions of burglary and unlawful 
use of a debit card. 
¶ 14 
 
On direct review, the appellate court reversed defendant’s conviction for 
escape. 2017 IL App (3d) 140987, ¶¶ 16-19. Relying on this court’s holding in 
People v. Campa, 217 Ill. 2d 243, 259 (2005), the appellate court determined that, 
in order for a convicted felon to commit the offense of escape, he or she must first 
 
 
 
 
 
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be in custody. 2017 IL App (3d) 140987, ¶ 11. The appellate court drew a 
distinction between bail and custody and focused its analysis on whether defendant 
was in custody when she failed to report to the county jail after leaving the halfway 
house. The court stated that a “defendant released on bail or a recognizance bond is 
not considered to be in ‘custody’ per the Corrections Code.” Id.  
¶ 15 
 
The appellate court determined that defendant was not in “custody” for 
purposes of the escape statute at the time she violated the terms of her bond by 
failing to report to the county jail after leaving the halfway house. The court 
observed that, during the time defendant was out on bail, she was no longer under 
the authority of the sheriff or the Illinois Department of Corrections but rather was 
under the authority of the circuit court. The appellate court also observed that there 
was no requirement that personnel from either the county jail or the circuit court 
transport her to the county jail. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. The appellate court held: “Because the 
State could not establish that [defendant] was in custody, a requirement inherent in 
the offense of escape, it could not prove she was guilty of escape beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” Id. ¶ 16. The State appeals. 
 
¶ 16 
 
 
 
 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
¶ 17 
 
The issue presented in this case is whether the State is required to show that a 
convicted felon was in “custody” in order to prove that he or she violated the failure 
to report provision in the second clause of section 31-6(a) of the Criminal Code. 
720 ILCS 5/31-6(a) (West 2014). Resolution of this issue involves statutory 
interpretation, which presents a question of law and is subject to de novo review. 
People v. Smith, 2016 IL 119659, ¶ 15. For the following reasons, we hold that the 
statute does not require the State to make such a showing. 
¶ 18 
 
The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to 
the true intent of the legislature. All other canons and rules of statutory construction 
are subordinate to this cardinal principle. People v. Jamison, 229 Ill. 2d 184, 188 
(2008); People ex rel. Director of Corrections v. Booth, 215 Ill. 2d 416, 423 (2005); 
People v. Botruff, 212 Ill. 2d 166, 174 (2004); In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 
Ill. 2d 300, 307 (2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 19 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Plain Language 
¶ 20 
 
The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute, 
given its plain and ordinary meaning. A court must view the statute as a whole, 
construing words and phrases in light of other relevant statutory provisions and not 
in isolation. Each word, clause, and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable 
meaning, if possible, and should not be rendered superfluous. The court may 
consider the reason for the law, the problems sought to be remedied, the purposes to 
be achieved, and the consequences of construing the statute one way or another. 
Also, a court presumes that the General Assembly did not intend absurdity, 
inconvenience, or injustice in enacting legislation. In re Appointment of Special 
Prosecutor, 2019 IL 122949, ¶ 23; People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 36; Botruff, 
212 Ill. 2d at 174-75. 
¶ 21 
 
Section 31-6 of the Criminal Code provides in part as follows: 
 
“§ 31-6. Escape; failure to report to a penal institution or to report for 
periodic imprisonment. 
 
(a) A person convicted of a felony or charged with the commission of a 
felony, *** who intentionally escapes from any penal institution or from the 
custody of an employee of that institution commits a Class 2 felony; 
however, a person convicted of a felony *** who knowingly fails to report 
to a penal institution or to report for periodic imprisonment at any time or 
knowingly fails to return from furlough or from work and day release or 
who knowingly fails to abide by the terms of home confinement is guilty of 
a Class 3 felony. 
 
(b) A person convicted of a misdemeanor or charged with the 
commission of a misdemeanor, *** who intentionally escapes from any 
penal institution or from the custody of an employee of that institution 
commits a Class A misdemeanor; however, a person convicted of a 
misdemeanor *** who knowingly fails to report to a penal institution or to 
report for periodic imprisonment at any time or knowingly fails to return 
from furlough or from work and day release or who knowingly fails to abide 
by the terms of home confinement is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor. 
 
 
 
 
 
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(b-1) A person in the custody of the Department of Human Services 
under the provisions of the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act 
under a detention order, commitment order, conditional release order, or 
other court order who intentionally escapes from any secure residential 
facility or from a Department employee or any of its agents commits a Class 
2 felony. 
 
(c) A person in the lawful custody of a peace officer for the alleged 
commission of a felony offense *** and who intentionally escapes from 
custody commits a Class 2 felony; however, a person in the lawful custody 
of a peace officer for the alleged commission of a misdemeanor offense *** 
who intentionally escapes from custody commits a Class A misdemeanor. 
 
(c-5) A person in the lawful custody of a peace officer for an alleged 
violation of a term or condition of probation, conditional discharge, parole, 
aftercare release, or mandatory supervised release for a felony *** who 
intentionally escapes from custody is guilty of a Class 2 felony. 
 
(c-6) A person in the lawful custody of a peace officer for an alleged 
violation of a term or condition of supervision, probation, or conditional 
discharge for a misdemeanor *** who intentionally escapes from custody is 
guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. 
 
(d) A person who violates this Section while armed with a dangerous 
weapon commits a Class 1 felony.” 720 ILCS 5/31-6 (West 2014). 
¶ 22 
 
“The legislature has the power to declare and define conduct constituting a 
crime and to determine the nature and extent of punishment for it.” People v. 
Simmons, 145 Ill. 2d 264, 269 (1991); accord People v. Miller, 171 Ill. 2d 330, 333 
(1996) (observing that “the legislature has wide discretion in defining crimes and 
prescribing penalties for those crimes”). Here, it is clear from the plain language of 
section 31-6 that the legislature has forged a single offense of escape that can be 
committed in a number of ways. The several subsections of section 31-6 target 
distinct conduct and contain distinct elements. See, e.g., People v. Price, 221 Ill. 2d 
182, 189 (2006); People v. Graves, 207 Ill. 2d 478, 484-85 (2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 23 
 
As earlier noted, section 31-6(a) is divided into two independent clauses 
separated by a semicolon, with the second clause beginning with the word 
“however.” The first clause contains an escape from custody provision, and the 
second clause includes a knowing failure to report provision. The word “custody” 
appears only in the first provision, which involves escape from the custody of a 
penal institution or its employee. The word “custody” is absent from the failure to 
report provision. “When the legislature includes particular language in one section 
of a statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, courts presume that 
the legislature acted intentionally and purposely in the inclusion or exclusion 
[citations], and that the legislature intended different meanings and results 
[citations].” Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Board of Education of the 
City of Chicago, 2012 IL 112566, ¶ 24; see People v. Goossens, 2015 IL 118347, 
¶ 12 (“It is well settled that when the legislature uses certain language in one 
instance of a statute and different language in another part, we assume different 
meanings were intended.”); People v. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d 181, 193 (2008) (same). 
A court must not depart from a statute’s plain language by reading into it 
exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express. People v. 
Witherspoon, 2019 IL 123092, ¶ 24; People v. Casas, 2017 IL 120797, ¶ 18; 
Vincent v. Alden-Park Strathmoor, Inc., 241 Ill. 2d 495, 506 (2011). 
¶ 24 
 
Because the plain and unambiguous language of the knowing failure to report 
provision of section 31-6(a) does not contain a “custody” element, we will not 
presume that the legislature intended to include such an element therein. We will 
not assign the same meaning to these two provisions of section 31-6(a) or engraft 
the custody element of the escape from custody provision onto the failure to report 
provision. See, e.g., Cassidy v. China Vitamins, LLC, 2018 IL 122873, ¶¶ 21-22; 
People v. Smith, 2016 IL 119659, ¶¶ 29-30; In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d 393, 409 
(2002). 
¶ 25 
 
In the case at bar, each of the two clauses of section 31-6(a), separated by a 
semicolon, targets distinct conduct and contains different elements. The first clause 
criminalizes the actual escape from the “custody” of a penal institution or its 
employee. The second clause includes a provision that criminalizes the knowing 
failure to report to a penal institution or for periodic imprisonment. Because the 
legislature used the word “custody” in the first clause of section 31-6(a) but did not 
use the word “custody” in the knowing failure to report provision of the second 
 
 
 
 
 
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clause, we conclude that the legislature did not intend to require the State to prove 
that a convicted felon was in custody before it could establish that he or she violated 
the knowing failure to report provision of section 31-6(a).  
¶ 26 
 
The plain language of the knowing failure to report provision of the escape 
statute makes clear that the statute is violated when two elements are proved: 
(1) “[a] person is convicted of a felony,” and (2) the person “knowingly fails to 
report to a penal institution or to report for periodic imprisonment.” 720 ILCS 
5/31-6(a) (West 2014). We hold that the State is only required to prove these 
elements.1 Unless the language of a statute is ambiguous, a court should not resort 
to further aids of construction and must apply the statute as written. People v. 
Cherry, 2016 IL 118728, ¶ 13; LaSalle Bank National Ass’n v. Cypress Creek 1, 
LP, 242 Ill. 2d 231, 237 (2011); Burrell v. Southern Truss, 176 Ill. 2d 171, 174 
(1997). 
 
¶ 27 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Legislative History 
¶ 28 
 
However, defendant argues that “a close look at how the legislature has 
amended [section 31-6(a)] over time shows that the intended target of either clause 
of [section 31-6(a)] are those individuals in custody.” We disagree. Although the 
plain language of section 31-6(a) renders discussion of its legislative history 
unnecessary, the legislative history actually supports our construction. 
¶ 29 
 
Section 31-6 originally provided that an escape occurred only when (a) a person 
convicted of or charged with a felony intentionally escaped from the custody of any 
penal institution or its employee, (b) a person convicted of or charged with a 
misdemeanor intentionally escaped from the custody of any penal institution or its 
employee, or (c) a person in the lawful custody of a peace officer who intentionally 
escaped from custody. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 38, ¶ 31-6. Each subsection 
prescribed a specific penalty. Id. The 1970 revised Committee Comments to 
section 31-6 explain as follows: 
                                                 
 
1Actually, Illinois courts already apply the statute as written by way of jury instructions that do 
not include custody as an element of escape by failure to report. See Illinois Pattern Jury 
Instructions, Criminal, Nos. 22.25 (definition), 22.26 (issues) (approved Apr. 29, 2016); Illinois 
Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal Nos. 22.25, 22.26 (4th ed. 2000) (same). 
 
 
 
 
 
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“Section 31-6 combines in logical sequence, with appropriate penalties 
which are substantially the same as now provided, the unrelated provisions 
found in [section 2807 of chapter 23 on] escape and intent to escape from State 
Reformatory for Women, [section 121 of chapter 108 on] escape and attempt to 
escape from Illinois State Penitentiary, and [section 228b of chapter 38 on] 
escape and intent to escape from county jail. However, instead of relating the 
offense to the place of confinement only, section 31-6 uses the term ‘penal 
institution’ *** and then relates the penalty to the seriousness of the offense of 
which the escapee has been convicted or charged.” 720 ILCS Ann. 5/31-6, 
Committee Comments-1970, at 419 (Smith-Hurd 2010). 
Section 31-6 remained substantially unchanged for many years. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 
1977, ch. 38, ¶ 31-6; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, ¶ 31-6. 
¶ 30 
 
This court was required to construe section 31-6(a) as it then existed in People 
v. Simmons, 88 Ill. 2d 270 (1981). Simmons was committed to the Illinois 
Department of Corrections for several felonies. He was transferred from prison to 
the Peoria Community Correctional Center. One day he was allowed six hours of 
“independent day release” to go shopping. A correctional center employee drove 
Simmons to a local shopping center and left him unaccompanied. Simmons was 
required to phone in periodically, and his brother was going to drive him back to the 
correctional center. Simmons never returned from his shopping trip, and he was 
eventually arrested in Davenport, Iowa. Id. at 271. 
¶ 31 
 
Simmons was convicted of escape in violation of section 31-6 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 
1977, ch. 38, ¶ 31-6(a)) as described above. Before this court, Simmons argued that 
he did not violate section 31-6 because he did not commit an “ ‘escape,’ ” which is 
prohibited, but rather only a “ ‘failure to return,’ ” which is not. He also argued that 
the correctional center was not a “ ‘penal institution’ ” within the meaning of the 
statute. Simmons, 88 Ill. 2d at 272. This court rejected both arguments. 
¶ 32 
 
We held that defendant escaped from the custody of the correctional center. We 
attributed a broad meaning to the word “escape” consistent with its legal and 
ordinary usage. Id. at 273. We reasoned: 
 
“The defendant was committed to the Department of Corrections and sent 
to the Peoria Community Correctional Center. However much the limits of his 
 
 
 
 
 
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confinement were temporarily enlarged, or the restrictions on his conduct 
temporarily lessened, he was still legally in the custody of the Center, and had a 
legal duty to submit to that custody. When he exceeded the lawful limits of his 
liberty, whether by stepping across the invisible boundary around the shopping 
center or by standing still while the boundary, with the passage of time, shrank 
to the physical confines of the Peoria Community Correctional Center itself, he 
escaped from the Center.” (Emphases added.) Id. at 273-74. 
This court also held that the correctional center was a “penal institution” within the 
meaning of section 31-6(a). Id. at 274-75. 
¶ 33 
 
This court revisited the issue of escape from a penal institution in two 
consolidated cases. People v. Marble, 91 Ill. 2d 242 (1982). Defendant Marble was 
sentenced to imprisonment at the Cook County Jail with a provision for work 
release at the jail’s work release center. He was allowed to leave the jail on work 
release but had to return by 8 p.m. One day he failed to return. Defendant Cole was 
sentenced to work release at the Peoria Community Correctional Center. One day 
he violated the conditions of his work release and failed to return. Each defendant 
was subsequently apprehended and found guilty of escape in violation of section 
31-6(a) as it then existed. Id. at 245-46. Following the reasoning of Simmons, this 
court held that each defendant was sentenced to a penal institution and that “a 
failure to return from a temporary release may violate section 31-6(a).” Id. at 247. 
¶ 34 
 
Shortly after Simmons and Marble, the legislature amended section 31-6 to 
codify that the failure to return from furlough or from work and day release 
constitutes escape. People v. Campa, 217 Ill. 2d 243, 258 (2005); Ill. Rev. Stat. 
1983, ch. 38, ¶ 31-6. 
¶ 35 
 
However, as amended in 1983, section 31-6(a) did not prohibit the knowing 
failure to report. Two years later, the legislature addressed this gap. Introduced as 
House Bill 332, Public Act 84-1083 (eff. Dec. 2, 1985) amended section 31-6(a) to 
add the failure to report provisions. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, ¶ 31-6. During the 
legislative debates, Representative Koehler observed that the statute permitted law 
enforcement officers to apprehend persons who failed to return from furlough. 
However, she explained: “But the law did not provide that that person who did not 
show up for the first time of periodic imprisonment, there was no mechanism 
whereby that individual could... could be charged with an offense for simply not 
 
 
 
 
 
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showing up.” (Emphasis added.) 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, Mar. 
13, 1985, at 32 (statements of Representative Koehler). Representative Cullerton 
likewise observed that if someone who was sentenced to periodic imprisonment 
“showed up the first day but didn’t come back the second day, it would be an 
escape.” 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, Mar. 13, 1985, at 33 
(statements of Representative Cullerton). He explained: “The purpose of the Bill 
was to provide that if someone was sentenced to periodic imprisonment and they 
didn’t show up for the first day that they were suppose[d] to appear that we deem 
that the offense of escape.” Id. 
¶ 36 
 
During the Senate’s consideration of House Bill 332, Senator Smith explained: 
“House Bill 332 covers a gap. [It] amends the Criminal Code for failure to 
report for periodic imprisonment. Someone who has received a sentence of 
periodic imprisonment and if they fail to report to begin their sentence, they 
have committed a crime ***. Nothing in the law presently makes it a crime for 
not showing up for the first day.” (Emphases added.) 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., 
Senate Proceedings, June 5, 1985, at 17 (statements of Senator Smith). 
¶ 37 
 
The evolution of section 31-6 makes clear the intent of the legislature that 
subsection (a) provides for distinct situations. The original situation, escape from 
custody, is addressed in the first clause of subsection (a). Other situations, such as 
failure to return to custody from furlough or work and day release, are addressed in 
the second clause of subsection (a).  
¶ 38 
 
Yet another situation, at issue here, is failure to report, which is also addressed 
in the second clause of subsection (a). The statements of Representative Koehler 
and Senator Smith indicate that the legislature addressed a distinct and specific gap 
in then-existing law. Further, the statements of Representative Cullerton and 
Senator Smith indicate the legislature’s discrete response: if (1) a person is 
sentenced to periodic imprisonment and (2) if that person fails to report to begin the 
sentence, then that person has committed a crime, denominated as escape. Custody 
is simply not an element in the distinct situation of failing to report, based on the 
plain language of section 31-6(a) and expressly confirmed in the legislative 
debates. Therefore, rather than supporting defendant’s argument, the legislative 
history of section 31-6 actually confirms the statute’s plain and ordinary meaning, 
that custody is irrelevant to the crime of failing to report. 
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 39 
 
Relying on language from this court in Campa, 217 Ill. 2d 243, the appellate 
court determined that, in order for a convicted felon to commit the offense of 
escape, he or she must first be in custody. 2017 IL App (3d) 140987, ¶ 11. In 
Campa, this court was required to construe the term “custody” within the meaning 
of the speedy-trial provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 
5/103-5(a) (West 2000)). Campa, 217 Ill. 2d at 254. This court concluded that “the 
legislature did not intend that the term ‘custody,’ as it is used in the speedy-trial 
statute, be equated to confinement. Rather, we believe that the legislature intended 
the term ‘custody’ to have a broad meaning and encompass lesser forms of restraint 
than confinement.” Id.  
¶ 40 
 
As support for this construction of the speedy-trial statute, this court in Campa 
discussed the Simmons and Marble decisions, as well as the subsequent 
amendments to section 31-6. We concluded as follows: 
 
“Since escape is the unauthorized departure from custody (Simmons, 88 Ill. 
2d at 272-73), a defendant cannot escape unless he is first in custody. *** The 
escape statute shows that the legislature intended the crime of escape to evolve 
with the changing terms of detention used as part of the programs at our 
correctional institutions. A defendant must necessarily be in ‘custody’ while 
participating in these programs if he is to be held accountable for ‘escape’ for 
failure to comply with the terms of the programs.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 259. 
¶ 41 
 
Our analysis of the plain language of section 31-6, confirmed by its legislative 
history, clearly supports the second and third above-quoted sentences. “Custody” is 
an essential element in failing to return to custody from furlough or work and day 
release. However, our analysis clearly shows that escape by failure to report does 
not contain a custody element. Therefore, the emphasized sentence was an 
overstatement, and we hereby abrogate it to the extent it effectively nullifies the 
failure to report provision in section 31-6. Consequently, the appellate court’s 
reliance thereon was erroneous.  
¶ 42 
 
Proceeding under the premise that escape by failure to report contains a custody 
element, the appellate court discussed case law construing “custody” as it relates to 
other statutes. 2017 IL App (3d) 140987, ¶¶ 11-14. Particularly, relying on this 
court’s statement that “defendants released on bail or on their own recognizance are 
no longer in the custody of law enforcement” (People v. Hunt, 234 Ill. 2d 49, 63 
 
 
 
 
 
- 14 - 
(2009)), the appellate court concluded that defendant, who was released on bond, 
was not in custody and could not be charged with failure to report. 2017 IL App 
(3d) 140987, ¶¶ 14-15. Likewise, we are invited to consider the meaning of 
“custody” in the context of statutes pertaining to bail (725 ILCS 5/110-1 et seq. 
(West 2014)), violation of bail bond (720 ILCS 5/32-10 (West 2014)), speedy trial 
(725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2014)), and presentence credit (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(b) 
(West 2014)). 
¶ 43 
 
We decline the invitation. We have held that custody is not an element of the 
offense of escape by failure to report based on its clear and unambiguous language. 
“When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be given effect 
without resort to other tools of construction.” People v. Christopherson, 231 Ill. 2d 
449, 454-55 (2008). Therefore, we need not and do not consider whether defendant 
was or was not “in custody” pursuant to other statutes. 
 
¶ 44 
 
 
 
 
 
C. “Constructive” Custody 
¶ 45 
 
In support of the appellate court’s decision, defendant argues that each of the 
situations covered in the second clause of section 31-6(a) “is a type of detention 
involving constructive custody. Thus, even though the exact word ‘custody’ is not 
contained in that subsection, under the statute’s plain language, it only applies 
when an individual fails to return or report from constructive custody.” We reject 
this argument.  
¶ 46 
 
This court has construed the word “custody” within the meaning of other 
statutes. We have recognized that the word “custody” is very elastic and expansive 
and encompasses not only actual physical custody but also “constructive” custody, 
which denotes control by legal authority. People v. Beachem, 229 Ill. 2d 237, 
245-46 (2008) (construing 730 ILCS 5/5-8-7(b) (West 2004) (presentence credit)); 
Campa, 217 Ill. 2d at 253-54 (construing 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2000) 
(speedy trial)).  
¶ 47 
 
However expansive the concept of “custody,” the plain language of the failure 
to report provision of section 31-6(a), as confirmed by its legislative history, makes 
clear that custody is not an element of the offense. The legislature addressed a gap 
in section 31-6(a) that lacked a mechanism of enforcement. “Nothing in the law” 
 
 
 
 
 
- 15 - 
made it a crime to fail to report for the first day to a penal institution or to periodic 
imprisonment. Rather than invoke “constructive custody,” the legislature 
proscribed conduct that heretofore was not illegal. The legislature simply created 
another means of committing the offense of escape that does not include custody as 
an element. See 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, June 5, 1985, at 17 
(statements of Senator Smith). This court may not “constructively” add a 
requirement to a statute that the legislature plainly chose not to include. See, e.g., 
Witherspoon, 2019 IL 123092, ¶ 24; People v. Johnson, 2013 IL 114639, ¶ 12; 
People v. Lewis, 223 Ill. 2d 393, 402-03 (2006). “No rule of construction authorizes 
this court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the 
statute imports, nor may we rewrite a statute to add provisions or limitations the 
legislature did not include.” Smith, 2016 IL 119659, ¶ 28; accord People v. 
Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443 (1997). 
¶ 48 
 
Construing the plain and unambiguous language of the knowing failure to 
report provision of section 31-6(a) of the Criminal Code, we hold that custody is 
not an element of the offense. The knowing failure to report provision applies to 
defendant’s conduct because she failed to report to the Whiteside County Jail after 
leaving the halfway house as required by her bail bond. Therefore, the State 
established that defendant violated the escape statute when it proved that defendant, 
a convicted felon, knowingly failed to report to a penal institution as required by the 
conditions of her bail bond. 
 
¶ 49 
 
 
 
 
 
D. Prosecutorial Discretion: Failure to Report 
 
 
 
 
 
or Violation of Bail Bond 
¶ 50 
 
Thus, it was ultimately within the discretion of the prosecutor to charge 
defendant with either violation of bail bond (720 ILCS 5/32-10 (West 2014)) or 
escape by failure to report (id. § 31-6(a)). At trial, the parties disagreed as to which 
crime was more appropriate for defendant to be charged with.  
¶ 51 
 
A court may not order the state’s attorney to file a particular charge against a 
defendant. In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (1991); People ex rel. Daley v. Moran, 94 Ill. 
2d 41, 46 (1983). Rather, the state’s attorney has the exclusive discretion to decide 
which of several charges shall be brought or whether to prosecute at all. People v. 
Jamison, 197 Ill. 2d 135, 161 (2001) (collecting cases); People v. Pankey, 94 Ill. 2d 
 
 
 
 
 
- 16 - 
12, 16 (1983). It is also quite established that “the State has the discretion to 
prosecute under either of two statutes where a defendant’s conduct violates both 
statutes and the statutes contain different elements.” People v. Buffalo 
Confectionery Co., 78 Ill. 2d 447, 458 (1980) (collecting cases); see Jamison, 197 
Ill. 2d at 162.  
¶ 52 
 
We have held that a person commits the offense of escape by failure to report, 
as provided by section 31-6(a), when he or she is convicted of a felony and fails to 
report to a penal institution or for periodic confinement. 720 ILCS 5/31-6(a) (West 
2014). In contrast, a person commits the offense of violation of bail bond when he 
or she has forfeited bail and wilfully failed to surrender within 30 days after the 
forfeiture. Id. § 32-10(a); People v. Ratliff, 65 Ill. 2d 314, 318 (1976) (stating 
elements); People v. Costa, 2013 IL App (1st) 090833, ¶ 20 (same). 
¶ 53 
 
In the case at bar, given defendant’s probation record, it was entirely reasonable 
for the prosecutor to charge defendant with escape by failure to report to jail upon 
her departure from the halfway house, rather than wait for 30 days to charge 
defendant with violation of bail bond. Probation is a type of judgment after the 
defendant has been found guilty. People v. Allegri, 109 Ill. 2d 309, 314 (1985). 
Probation simultaneously serves as a form of punishment and a method of 
rehabilitation. People v. Meyer, 176 Ill. 2d 372, 379 (1997). The purpose of 
probation is to benefit society by restoring a defendant to useful citizenship, rather 
than allowing a defendant to become a burden as a habitual offender. Id. “It is 
employed when the defendant’s continued presence in society would not be 
threatening and the defendant’s rehabilitation would be enhanced.” Allegri, 109 Ill. 
2d at 314. A court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over a defendant on probation lasts 
only for the duration of the probation (People v. Carter, 165 Ill. App. 3d 169, 172 
(1988)) and ends with the probation expiration date (People v. Wilson, 293 Ill. App. 
3d 339, 31 (1997)). “Once the probation period ends,” “probation is terminated and 
there is nothing left to revoke or modify.” Id.  
¶ 54 
 
Here, through probation, the circuit court retained jurisdiction over defendant to 
provide her with the opportunity to receive treatment. See, e.g., People v. 
Neckopulos, 284 Ill. App. 3d 660, 663-64 (1996). However, she repeatedly violated 
the terms of her probation. On April 19, 2013, the circuit court revoked defendant’s 
original sentence of probation and resentenced her to a 30-month probation term. In 
 
 
 
 
 
- 17 - 
September 2013 the court found that defendant violated the terms of her probation. 
However, it is noteworthy that the court did not revoke the April 2013 probation 
order. Rather, the court released her for inpatient substance abuse treatment and 
subsequently for an extended residential care program at a halfway house. Thus, 
the April 2013 probation order was in effect in June 2014 when defendant was 
charged with escape for failing to report to jail after leaving the halfway house and 
remained in effect until June 17, 2014, when that order was revoked and defendant 
was resentenced to imprisonment on her original offenses. Indeed, the court’s 
retention of jurisdiction over defendant shows that the court was striving to 
enhance her rehabilitation. We hold that it was within the discretion of the 
prosecutor to charge defendant with failure to report to jail upon her departure from 
the halfway house, rather than to wait for 30 days in order to charge her with 
violation of bond. 
 
¶ 55 
 
 
 
 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶ 56 
 
“Where, as here, a statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be enforced as 
written.” Booth, 215 Ill. 2d at 426. If our construction of section 31-6(a) is not what 
the General Assembly intended, we invite that body to review this statutory scheme 
and revise it for purposes of clarity. See, e.g., People v. Pearse, 2017 IL 121072, 
¶ 48. 
¶ 57 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the appellate court’s judgment and affirm 
the circuit court’s judgment finding defendant guilty of escape in violation of 
section 31-6(a) of the Criminal Code. We remand the matter to the circuit court for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
¶ 58 
 
Appellate court judgment reversed.  
¶ 59 
 
Circuit court judgment affirmed.  
¶ 60 
 
Cause remanded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 18 - 
¶ 61 
 
JUSTICE BURKE, dissenting: 
¶ 62 
 
The majority states the issue in this case as “whether the State is required to 
show that a convicted felon was in ‘custody’ in order to prove that he or she 
violated” the portion of the escape statute that makes it a felony offense to 
knowingly fail to report to a penal institution. Supra ¶ 17; see 720 ILCS 5/31-6(a) 
(West 2014). This question could have been answered easily by reference to our 
long-standing case law. As this court has held, escape is the unauthorized departure 
from custody (People v. Simmons, 88 Ill. 2d 270, 272-73 (1981)), and therefore, 
“ ‘defendant cannot escape unless he is first in custody.’ ” People v. Beachem, 229 
Ill. 2d 237, 254 (2008) (quoting People v. Campa, 217 Ill. 2d 243, 259 (2005)). 
Nevertheless, the majority concludes, in direct contravention to our case law, that 
custody is not an element of this offense.  
¶ 63 
 
I disagree with the majority and would hold, in accord with our case law, that a 
defendant must necessarily be in custody to be held accountable for escape. 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
¶ 64 
 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 65 
 
On October 31, 2012, the defendant, Elizabeth M. Clark, pled guilty to charges 
of burglary and unlawful use of a credit card in the circuit court of Whiteside 
County. She was sentenced to 30 months’ probation, with the conditions that she 
not possess or consume alcohol, that she submit to a weekly urine test, and that she 
complete an evaluation and obtain treatment for substance abuse.  
¶ 66 
 
On January 15, 2013, the State filed a petition alleging that defendant failed to 
comply with the conditions of her probation. Defendant was taken into custody on 
January 18, 2013, and at a hearing on January 25, 2013, the court found defendant 
had violated her probation. Thereafter, on April 19, 2013, a sentencing hearing was 
held, and defendant was resentenced to a new term of 30 months’ probation with 
substantially the same conditions as her previous sentence.2  
                                                 
 
2Neither of defendant’s probation orders are contained in the record. The descriptions of the 
conditions imposed in the probation orders are taken from the presentence investigation report 
prepared for defendant’s sentencing in her escape trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 19 - 
¶ 67 
 
On July 29, 2013, the State filed a second petition alleging that defendant failed 
to comply with the conditions of her probation. At a September 6, 2013, hearing, 
the circuit court accepted a written admission prepared by defendant and found her 
in violation of probation. A presentencing report was ordered, and the matter was 
continued for resentencing at a later date. With defendant in custody, a hearing was 
held on January 3, 2014, at which time the circuit court agreed to release defendant 
on a $50,000 recognizance bond3 if and when inpatient treatment for substance 
abuse became available. The court also continued the matter for sentencing to 
February 7, 2014. 
¶ 68 
 
On January 9, 2014, while defendant was still awaiting resentencing for 
violation of probation, an order was entered pursuant to the court’s ruling on 
January 3, releasing defendant on a $50,000 recognizance bond so that she could 
participate in inpatient substance abuse treatment at the White Oaks treatment 
center. Among other conditions, the bond included a requirement that, upon her 
release or discharge from the program at White Oaks, defendant “immediately 
return to the custody of the Whiteside County Jail, using the most direct route of 
travel and without delay or departure therefrom.” The bond also stated that 
defendant understood and “is on notice that if she fails to appear at the Whiteside 
County Jail or in court when required by the Court *** sentencing could proceed in 
her absence” and that “any violation of the conditions of this bond may result in 
[defendant] being subject to re-arrest and confinement.” The bond did not inform 
defendant that her failure to return to the jail could result in her arrest for the 
offense of escape. 
¶ 69 
 
On February 25, 2014, the circuit court modified defendant’s recognizance 
bond to permit her to reside at a halfway house known as Margaret Stutsman Lodge 
                                                 
 
3Section 110-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110-2 (West 2016)) 
provides:  
“When from all the circumstances the court is of the opinion that the defendant will appear as 
required either before or after conviction and the defendant will not pose a danger to any person 
or the community and that the defendant will comply with all conditions of bond, *** the 
defendant may be released on his or her own recognizance. *** A failure to appear as required 
by such recognizance shall constitute an offense subject to the penalty provided in Section 
32-10 of the Criminal Code of 2012 [(720 ILCS 5/32-10 (West 2016))] for violation of the bail 
bond, and any obligated sum fixed in the recognizance shall be forfeited and collected in 
accordance with subsection (g) of Section 110-7 of this Code.”  
 
 
 
 
 
- 20 - 
upon her release from White Oaks in order to receive “aftercare” treatment. The 
modified bond order continued to require defendant to “immediately return” to the 
Whiteside County Jail upon her release or discharge from the halfway house. 
¶ 70 
 
Defendant successfully completed the inpatient treatment program at White 
Oaks and was discharged on March 5, 2014, at which time she began residing at 
Margaret Stutsman Lodge. Importantly, at this time, defendant still had not been 
resentenced following the court’s September 6, 2013, finding that she had violated 
probation. Rather, she remained released on a $50,000 recognizance bond while 
awaiting resentencing. And, because defendant was not yet sentenced to any term 
of incarceration, the Whiteside County Jail had no lawful authority to detain 
defendant or control her movements. Instead, the legal authority to control 
defendant’s movements and defendant’s legal obligation to return to the jail 
stemmed solely from the circuit court’s modified bond order.  
¶ 71 
 
On June 5, 2014, defendant was discharged from Margaret Stutsman Lodge. 
Although the facility advised defendant that she was obligated by the terms of her 
bond to travel directly to the Whiteside County Jail upon her discharge, defendant 
did not do so. As a result, that same day the State filed an application to increase 
bond.4 After hearing testimony from Whiteside County Court Services, the court 
issued a warrant for defendant’s arrest. Defendant surrendered herself to the jail 
nine days later, on June 14, 2014, at which time the warrant was served, returned, 
and filed.  
¶ 72 
 
On June 6, 2014, the day after the State filed its application to increase bond, 
the State charged defendant by information with committing “the offense of 
ESCAPE,” in violation of section 31-6(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 
5/31-6(a) (West 2014)). This provision provides, in relevant part, that a person 
commits the felony offense of escape if he or she “knowingly fails to report to a 
penal institution.” Id. The State alleged in the information that defendant 
“knowingly failed to report” to the Whiteside County Jail as required “in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of her Temporary Recognizance Bond.”  
                                                 
 
4An application to increase bond may be filed by the State pursuant to section 110-6 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110-6 (West 2014)). Section 110-6(b) provides that a 
violation of “any special conditions of bail as ordered by the court shall constitute grounds for the 
court” to increase the amount of bail, alter the conditions of bail, or, in some instances, revoke bail. 
Id. § 110-6(b). 
 
 
 
 
 
- 21 - 
¶ 73 
 
A stipulated bench trial was held on September 23, 2014.5 Defense counsel 
argued to the court that defendant was not guilty of escape under section 31-6(a). 
Counsel observed that the portion of the statute that defines escape as “fail[ing] to 
report to a penal institution” applies only when the defendant has been “convicted 
of a felony.” Counsel maintained that the failure to report provision has to “relate” 
to this felony. That is, according to counsel, a defendant is only guilty of failing to 
report to a penal institution under the escape statute if he or she fails to report for 
service of the sentence imposed for the felony. By way of example, counsel 
explained that if a defendant, after being convicted of a felony and sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment, is “given a stayed mittimus and they don’t show up, that is 
an escape.” If “a person doesn’t comply with the condition of [a] bond, that is not 
an escape.”  
¶ 74 
 
Counsel argued this had to be the correct understanding of the statute because 
otherwise the provision making it a felony offense to fail to report to a penal 
institution would apply to every defendant with a previous felony conviction. This 
would mean that every pretrial detainee with a felony conviction from a previous, 
unrelated offense, who is released on bond and who then violates the bond by 
failing to report, would be guilty of escape rather than a bond violation. Counsel 
contended this would be an absurd result and could not be what the legislature 
intended. 
¶ 75 
 
Turning to the facts of this case, defense counsel noted that defendant’s 
obligation to report to the jail did not stem from any sentence imposed. Rather, the 
obligation stemmed solely from the terms of the recognizance bond. Therefore, 
according to defense counsel, while defendant failed to comply with the terms of 
her recognizance bond, her failure to return to the Whiteside County Jail was not a 
failure to report for service of sentence and, thus, was not an escape. 
¶ 76 
 
In response to this argument, the court asked the prosecutor why defendant, 
who had not yet been sentenced and was released on a recognizance bond, was 
                                                 
 
5Prior to her trial for escape, on June 17, 2014, defendant’s probation was revoked, and she was 
sentenced to three years’ imprisonment and two years’ mandatory supervised release for the original 
burglary offense and a concurrent, one-year term of imprisonment and one year mandatory 
supervised release for unlawful use of a credit card. See 730 ILCS 5/5-6-4(e) (West 2014) (when 
probation is revoked, the circuit court “may impose any other sentence that was available *** at the 
time of initial sentencing”).  
 
 
 
 
 
- 22 - 
charged with escape, while in other cases where a defendant is admitted to bail 
while awaiting sentencing, the failure to appear is simply a violation of the bail 
bond. The court asked why these identical situations were being treated differently. 
The prosecutor responded that she believed the escape statute applies in all 
situations where a defendant has previously been convicted of a felony and a bail 
bond requires the defendant to report to jail. The prosecutor “couldn’t say why” it 
was sometimes charged as escape and sometimes not. The circuit court, after a brief 
recess, entered its ruling, finding defendant guilty of escape. 
¶ 77 
 
On appeal, the appellate court reversed defendant’s conviction. The appellate 
court began its analysis by noting that failing to report to a penal institution under 
section 31-6(a) is an escape and that this court has long held that “[t]o commit the 
offense of escape, a defendant must first be in custody.” 2017 IL App (3d) 140987, 
¶ 11 (citing Campa, 217 Ill. 2d at 259). From this, the appellate court went on to 
explain that defendant could not have escaped from the Whiteside County Jail 
when she failed to report on June 5, 2014, because she was not in the custody of the 
jail at that time. 
¶ 78 
 
The appellate court noted that “custody” has been defined broadly by this court 
to include both physical and constructive custody. Id. Constructive custody means 
“ ‘custody of a person (such as a parolee or probationer) whose freedom is 
controlled by legal authority but who is not under direct physical control.’ ” 
Beachem, 229 Ill. 2d at 245 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 412 (8th ed. 2004)). 
Thus, a defendant who fails to report to a prison to serve a sentence defies the legal 
authority granted the prison by the sentencing order and, therefore, escapes from 
the prison’s constructive custody. In this case, however, the appellate court 
recognized that when defendant was released on bond from the Whiteside County 
Jail, the jail had no legal authority of any sort, whether in the form of a sentencing 
order, mittimus or order of commitment, that would have permitted the jail to 
detain defendant or control her movements. 2017 IL App (3d) 140987, ¶ 13. For 
this reason, defendant could not, and did not, disobey or defy any legal authority 
that the jail possessed over her when she failed to report back. Instead, the legal 
authority defendant violated was the circuit court’s bond order—a violation the jail 
had no way of knowing occurred. Therefore, the appellate court concluded, 
defendant was not in the custody of the jail (either physical or constructive) and 
could not have escaped from that penal institution when she failed to report. Rather, 
 
 
 
 
 
- 23 - 
she committed a bond violation. This appeal followed. 
 
¶ 79 
 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 80 
 
 
 
 
 
I 
¶ 81 
 
The question before this court is whether defendant’s knowing failure to report 
to the Whiteside County Jail as required by the terms of her recognizance bond 
constitutes an escape as defined under section 31-6(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 
(720 ILCS 5/31-6(a) (West 2014)). Section 31-6(a) provides: 
 
“(a) A person convicted of a felony or charged with the commission of a 
felony *** who intentionally escapes from any penal institution or from the 
custody of an employee of that institution commits a Class 2 felony; however, a 
person convicted of a felony *** who knowingly fails to report to a penal 
institution or to report for periodic imprisonment at any time or knowingly fails 
to return from furlough or from work and day release or who knowingly fails to 
abide by the terms of home confinement is guilty of a Class 3 felony.” Id. 
¶ 82 
 
The State contends the appellate court erred in reversing defendant’s 
conviction. According to the State, the plain language of the escape statute requires 
only that the State prove the defendant knowingly failed to report to a penal 
institution, regardless of why or how the obligation to report was imposed. In other 
words, in the State’s view, any and all failures to report to a penal institution are 
made felony offenses by the escape statute, regardless of whether the defendant is 
in the constructive custody of the penal institution. In so arguing, the State takes a 
dictionary approach to statutory interpretation. The word “report” means “to 
present oneself.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1925 (1993). 
Defendant did not present herself to the Whiteside County Jail on the day of her 
discharge from the Margaret Stutsman Lodge. According to the State, “that should 
be the end of the inquiry.” 
¶ 83 
 
Defendant, in response, argues for a contextual reading of the term “fails to 
report to a penal institution.” Defendant maintains that, when read in context, it is 
clear that the term “fails to report to a penal institution” is meant to apply only in 
those instances when a convicted defendant fails to report to the penal institution 
 
 
 
 
 
- 24 - 
for service of his or her sentence. This might occur, for example, when a 
defendant’s sentence of incarceration is stayed by the circuit court for a short time 
so that the defendant may attend to a personal or family matter before beginning to 
serve the sentence imposed and the defendant is ordered to report to prison 
sometime later. If the defendant does not report, then he or she will have escaped 
from the lawful authority of the prison to detain and control the defendant granted 
by the sentencing order, i.e., the defendant will have escaped from the constructive 
custody of the prison. Defendant maintains that it is only in this situation that the 
failure to report to a penal institution under section 31-6(a) constitutes an escape. I 
agree. 
¶ 84 
 
Determining the meaning of the term “fails to report to a penal institution” in 
section 31-6(a) presents an issue of statutory interpretation. The fundamental rule 
of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. 
People v. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d 317, 324 (2005). The best indicator of legislative intent 
is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. 
Alexander, 204 Ill. 2d 472, 485 (2003). Where the language is clear and 
unambiguous, it is given effect as written without resort to other aids of statutory 
interpretation. Peterson v. Wallach, 198 Ill. 2d 439, 445 (2002). 
¶ 85 
 
Contrary to the State’s contentions, determining whether a statutory “term is 
unambiguous *** does not turn solely on dictionary definitions of its component 
words.” Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081 (2015). 
Instead, “[t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined [not 
only] by reference to the language itself, [but also by] the specific context in which 
that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson 
v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997). In other words, the plain meaning rule 
requires that statutory terms always be considered in context. As the United States 
Supreme Court has stated, it is a “fundamental principle of statutory construction 
(and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in 
isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used. [Citations.]” Deal 
v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993). 
¶ 86 
 
Corbett v. County of Lake, 2017 IL 121536, illustrates this point. In Corbett this 
court rejected a dictionary definition of the word “trail.” Based on the context of the 
statute at issue, we concluded that the word “trail” meant “primitive, rustic, or 
 
 
 
 
 
- 25 - 
unimproved trail,” despite the fact that the words primitive, rustic, and unimproved 
did not appear in the statute. In so holding, we emphasized that “dissecting an 
individual word or phrase from a statutory provision and mechanically applying to 
it a dictionary definition is clearly not the best way of ascertaining legislative 
intent.” Id. ¶ 28; see also, e.g., Yates, 574 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1087 (holding, 
based on statutory context, that the term “tangible object” does not include fish); 
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995) (based on statutory context, the 
term “any communication” means only public communication); United States v. 
Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 358 (1994) (based on statutory context, the term 
“arrest or other detention” means only an arrest or detention for a violation of 
federal law).  
¶ 87 
 
When the term “fails to report to a penal institution” is read in context of the 
escape statute, as it must be, it is clear that defendant’s interpretation of the term is 
correct. First, and foremost, failing to report to a penal institution is, by definition, a 
type of escape. For almost 40 years, since Simmons, 88 Ill. 2d 270, this court has 
held that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “escape,” as employed in the 
escape statute, means an intentional and unauthorized absence of a committed 
person from either physical or constructive custody. 
¶ 88 
 
In Simmons, this court considered whether a defendant who fails to return from 
an unaccompanied day release from a penal institution may be prosecuted for the 
offense of escape under section 31-6(a). The defendant in Simmons was committed 
to the Department of Corrections after being sentenced on several felonies. Id. at 
271. He was eventually transferred to the Peoria Community Correctional Center 
and, on one occasion, was allowed six hours of “independent day release” to go 
shopping. Id. The defendant never returned from his shopping trip and was 
thereafter charged and convicted of escape under section 31-6(a). Id. This court 
affirmed. Id. at 279. 
¶ 89 
 
At the time of the defendant’s offense in Simmons, paragraph (a) of the escape 
statute contained only the first portion of the current statute. That is, the statute 
provided only that “ ‘(a) A person convicted of a felony, or charged with the 
commission of a felony who intentionally escapes from any penal institution 
commits a Class 2 felony.’ ” Id. at 272 (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, 
¶ 31-6(a)). Thus, to determine whether the defendant was properly found guilty, 
 
 
 
 
 
- 26 - 
this court had to define the meaning of the term “escape.” This court held that 
“escape,” as used in section 31-6(a), should be given a “broad meaning.” Id. at 273. 
Borrowing a definition taken from the Unified Code of Corrections, this court held 
that “escape” means an “ ‘intentional and unauthorized absence’ of a committed 
person from the custody” of a penal institution. Id. at 272 (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 
1977, ch. 38, ¶ 1003-1-2(i)).  
¶ 90 
 
This court then went on to hold that the defendant had been committed to the 
Peoria Community Correctional Center, a penal institution, and that he escaped 
from the custody of that institution when he failed to return from his shopping trip. 
The court explained:  
“However much the limits of his confinement were temporarily enlarged, or the 
restrictions on his conduct temporarily lessened, he was still legally in the 
custody of the Center, and had a legal duty to submit to that custody. When he 
exceeded the lawful limits of his liberty, whether by stepping across the 
invisible boundary around the shopping center or by standing still while the 
boundary, with the passage of time, shrank to the physical confines of the 
Peoria Community Correctional Center itself, he escaped from the Center.” 
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 273-74. 
The Simmons court recognized that the defendant, because he was still serving a 
sentence of incarceration, had a legal duty to submit to the authority of the Peoria 
Community Correctional Center, even if at times he was not physically within the 
confines of the center. This principle is known as constructive custody. Beachem, 
229 Ill. 2d at 245.  
¶ 91 
 
Simmons expressly held that a failure to return is an escape from custody and, in 
so doing, adopted a straightforward principle: When a defendant is committed to a 
penal institution by virtue of a sentencing order, that order gives the institution the 
legal right to physically detain and control the defendant until the conclusion of his 
sentence. If, while serving his sentence, the defendant is temporarily released from 
physical custody and then fails to return to the institution, he has escaped from the 
institution’s lawful authority, i.e., escaped from constructive custody. As the 
Simmons court stated, when a defendant in these circumstances fails to return, he is 
doing nothing less than “evading his punishment” and is, therefore, guilty of 
escape. Simmons, 88 Ill. 2d at 278. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 27 - 
¶ 92 
 
Since Simmons, this court has repeatedly reaffirmed that, to be guilty of escape 
under section 31-6(a), a defendant must absent himself from physical or 
constructive custody. In People v. Marble, 91 Ill. 2d 242 (1982), this court repeated 
the definition of escape adopted in Simmons and held that a defendant serving a 
term of imprisonment who fails to return from work release and a defendant serving 
a term of imprisonment who fails to return from an unescorted furlough are both 
guilty of escaping from the custody of a penal institution and are, therefore, guilty 
of escape under section 31-6(a).6 
¶ 93 
 
In Campa, 217 Ill. 2d 243, this court again confirmed that escape is defined as 
an unauthorized absence from physical or constructive custody. In Campa, this 
court addressed whether a defendant in a county sheriff’s day reporting program 
was in custody for purposes of the speedy trial statute. In holding that he was, we 
relied heavily on the reasoning of Simmons and Marble. Id. at 255-59. We also 
examined the legislative history of the escape statute in detail—including the 
provision that defines escape as a failure to report to a penal institution—and 
expressly reaffirmed “that the failure to report for imprisonment constitutes 
escape.” Id. at 259. We then stated the following: 
 
“Since escape is the unauthorized departure from custody (Simmons, 88 Ill. 
2d at 272-73), a defendant cannot escape unless he is first in custody. Thus, 
reference to the escape provision of the Criminal Code, and the amendments 
thereto, supports our construction of the term ‘custody’ as used in the 
speedy-trial statute. The escape statute shows that the legislature intended the 
crime of escape to evolve with the changing terms of detention used as part of 
the programs at our correctional institutions. A defendant must necessarily be 
in ‘custody’ while participating in these programs if he is to be held accountable 
for ‘escape’ for failure to comply with the terms of the programs.” Id. 
This understanding of the escape statute was confirmed yet again in Beachem 
where, once more, this court unanimously held that a “ ‘defendant cannot escape 
unless he is first in custody’ ” (Beachem, 229 Ill. 2d at 253 (quoting Campa, 217 Ill. 
2d at 259)) and once more reaffirmed that escape from custody, whether physical or 
                                                 
 
6In 1983, shortly after Simmons and Marble were decided, the General Assembly added 
language to the escape statute that codified the decisions in those cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 28 - 
constructive, is the unifying principle that underlies all the forms of escape set forth 
in section 31-6(a). 
¶ 94 
 
For almost 40 years, this court has held that the plain and ordinary meaning of 
escape under section 31-6(a) means an intentional, unauthorized departure from 
physical or constructive custody. Failing to report to a penal institution is a type of 
escape. Thus, the State’s contention that this provision has nothing to do with 
constructive custody cannot be reconciled with this court’s long-standing holdings 
regarding the plain meaning of the term “escape” as used in the escape statute. This 
alone is reason to reject the State’s interpretation of section 31-6(a). 
¶ 95 
 
And there are additional concerns with the State’s statutory analysis—it is also 
at odds with the principle of noscitur a sociis (a word is known by the company it 
keeps). When considering statutory context, we rely on this principle to “avoid 
ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its 
accompanying words, thus giving unintended breadth” to legislative enactments. 
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 575; see also Misch v. 
Russell, 136 Ill. 22, 25 (1891) (“general and specific words which are capable of an 
analogous meaning being associated together, take color from each other, so that 
the general words are restricted to a sense analogous to the less general”).  
¶ 96 
 
Here, the second portion of section 36-1(a) (the portion after the semicolon) 
lists several other situations, in addition to failing to report to a penal institution, in 
which the failure to report or return is deemed an escape. These are sentences of 
periodic imprisonment (730 ILCS 5/5-7-1 (West 2014)), furloughs (id. § 3-11-1), 
work and day releases (id. § 13-1 to 13-6), and terms of home confinement (id. 
§ 5-6-3(b)(10)). All these statutory provisions address instances where a 
defendant’s failure to return or report would constitute a violation of a sentence 
and, thus, a breach of constructive custody. If, for example, a defendant is 
sentenced to a term of periodic imprisonment but then fails to report for the first 
required day of custody, then she has escaped from the lawful authority of the penal 
institution to control her movements granted by the circuit court’s sentencing order. 
In other words, just as in Simmons and Marble, she has escaped from the 
constructive custody of the penal institution. Simmons, 88 Ill. 2d 270; Marble, 91 
Ill. 2d 242. The same is also true of furloughs, work and day release, and home 
confinement.  
 
 
 
 
 
- 29 - 
¶ 97 
 
Given the context in which it appears, it is apparent the legislature intended the 
term “fails to report to a penal institution” to apply only when a defendant has been 
sentenced on a felony conviction and then fails to report to the penal institution for 
service of that sentence. In this situation, as in the other situations listed after the 
semicolon in the statute, the defendant would be in breach of constructive custody 
and, therefore, would be guilty of escape. To hold otherwise would require us to 
ignore the principle of noscitur a sociis and disregard the context in which the term 
“fails to report to a penal institution” appears. This would give an “unintended 
breadth” (Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 575) to the term that the legislature could not 
reasonably have intended.  
¶ 98 
 
Legislative history further confirms that the term “fails to report to a penal 
institution” applies only when a defendant fails to report for service of his sentence. 
In 1985, in Public Act 84-1083 (eff. Dec. 2, 1985), the General Assembly amended 
section 31-6(a) of the escape statute to add both the failure to report to a penal 
institution and the failure to report for periodic imprisonment provisions. Public 
Act 84-1083 began its life as House Bill 332. This bill added the language making it 
an offense to fail to report for periodic imprisonment. Representative Cullerton 
explained: 
“Right. I just thought I’d try to clarify if there’s any confusion with regard to the 
Amendment. The purpose of the Bill was to provide that if someone was 
sentenced to periodic imprisonment and they didn’t show up for the first day 
that they were suppose[d] to appear that we deem that the offense of escape.” 
(Emphasis added.) 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, Mar. 13, 1985, at 
33 (statements of Representative Cullerton).  
¶ 99 
 
Senator Smith offered similar statements: 
“House Bill 332 covers a gap. [It] amends the Criminal Code for failure to 
report for periodic imprisonment. Someone who has received a sentence of 
periodic imprisonment and if they fail to report to begin their sentence, they 
have committed a crime ***. Nothing in the law presently makes it a crime for 
not showing up for the first day.” (Emphases added.) 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., 
Senate Proceedings, June 5, 1985, at 17 (statements of Senator Smith). 
 
 
 
 
 
- 30 - 
¶ 100 
 
Subsequently, House Bill 332 was substituted with another, identical bill, 
Senate Bill 844. That bill was adopted by both houses and sent to then-Governor 
Thompson, who exercised his amendatory veto. In his veto message, Governor 
Thompson expressed full agreement with Senate Bill 844 but recommended that 
the legislature add to the bill the language “fails to report to a penal institution.” 
Journal of the Senate of the 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., at 7162; see I Final Legislative 
Synopsis and Digest of the 84th Ill. Gen. Assem. (No. 20), at 537. This 
recommendation was approved by both houses. Senator Dudycz explained the 
Governor’s recommendation when it was presented to the Senate: 
 
“Thank you Mr. President. The Governor’s recommendation adds into the 
escape offense the failure to report to jail after being sentenced. I ask for a 
favorable vote on the motion to accept the Governor’s recommendations for 
change.” (Emphasis added.) 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, Oct. 
16, 1985, at 78 (statements of Senator Dudycz).  
¶ 101 
 
We presume that the legislature amends a statute with knowledge of judicial 
decisions interpreting the statute. Hubble v. Bi-State Development Agency of the 
Illinois-Missouri Metropolitan District, 238 Ill. 2d 262, 273 (2010). Moreover, 
once “ ‘this court has construed a statute, that construction becomes, in effect, a 
part of the statute’ ” until the General Assembly changes it. Village of Vernon Hills 
v. Heelan, 2015 IL 118170, ¶ 19 (quoting Mitchell v. Mahin, 51 Ill. 2d 452, 456 
(1972)). Clearly, at the time both of the failure to report provisions were added to 
section 31-6(a) of the escape statute, it was understood by the General Assembly 
that escape means an intentional and unauthorized absence of a committed person 
from either physical or constructive custody. And clearly, it was also understood by 
the General Assembly that the failure to report provisions were forms of escape, 
based on the failure of the defendant to comply with the authority granted a penal 
institution by a sentencing order. Accordingly, the General Assembly knew, as 
explained in Simmons and Marble, that the failure to report, like the failure to 
return, is a breach of constructive custody. Indeed, Senator Dudycz’s comments 
eliminate any doubt on this point.  
¶ 102 
 
And there is additional support for defendant’s construction of the term “fails to 
report to a penal institution.” This term only applies to those defendants who have 
been “convicted” of a felony. 720 ILCS 5/31-6(a) (West 2014). The word 
 
 
 
 
 
- 31 - 
“convicted” does not have a fixed meaning. Depending on the context, it may refer 
to an adjudication of guilt or an adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence. 
People v. Woods, 193 Ill. 2d 483, 487-88 (2000). The Criminal Code of 2012 itself 
defines the term “conviction” as “a judgment of conviction or sentence entered 
upon a plea of guilty or upon a verdict or finding of guilty of an offense, rendered 
by a legally constituted jury or by a court of competent jurisdiction authorized to try 
the case without a jury.” (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/2-5 (West 2014). The word 
“judgment,” in turn, is defined as “an adjudication by the court that the defendant is 
guilty or not guilty and if the adjudication is that the defendant is guilty it includes 
the sentence pronounced by the court.” (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/102-14 
(West 2014). 
¶ 103 
 
Nothing in the context of the escape statute suggests that the legislature 
intended to depart from the statutory definitions of the words “convicted” and 
“judgment,” and nothing suggests that the word “convicted” as used in the escape 
statute means only an adjudication of guilt. Thus, the term “fails to report to a penal 
institution” applies only to those defendants who have been “convicted” of a 
felony, i.e., adjudicated guilty and sentenced to a term of incarceration. Further 
underscoring this point is the fact that the first portion of section 31-6(a) (which 
addresses the physical escape from the four walls of a penal institution) states that it 
applies to those persons who have been “convicted of a felony or charged with the 
commission of a felony.” 720 ILCS 5/31-6(a) (West 2014). The statutory meaning 
is apparent. The first portion of section 31-6(a) applies both to (1) those persons 
who are in a penal institution because they have been charged with a felony offense 
and are awaiting trial and to (2) those who are in a penal institution to serve a 
sentence. However, the second portion of section 31-6(a) applies only to those 
persons who have been sentenced to a term of incarceration. At the time she failed 
to return to the Whiteside County Jail, defendant in this case had not been 
sentenced to a term of incarceration, and the jail had no legal authority to detain her 
or control her movements. Accordingly, she was not “convicted” within the 
meaning of the escape statute and could not be guilty of failing to report.  
¶ 104 
 
The State’s interpretation of the term “fails to report to a penal institution” also 
omits any consideration of section 110-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 
1963 (725 ILCS 5/110-2 (West 2014)). This provision governs recognizance 
bonds, the type of bond under which defendant was released, and provides explicit 
 
 
 
 
 
- 32 - 
instructions on how to proceed if the defendant fails to appear as required by the 
bond. Section 110-2 states: 
“A failure to appear as required by such recognizance shall constitute an 
offense subject to the penalty provided in Section 32-10 of the Criminal Code 
of 2012 [(720 ILCS 5/32-10 (West 2014))] for violation of the bail bond, and 
any obligated sum fixed in the recognizance shall be forfeited and collected in 
accordance with subsection (g) of Section 110-7 of this Code [(725 ILCS 
5/110-7(g) (West 2014))].” Id.  
¶ 105 
 
Subsection (g) of section 110-7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 
states that an order declaring the bail to be forfeited shall be entered by the court if 
the defendant does not comply with the conditions of the bail bond. Importantly, 
however, no monetary judgment may be entered for the State until 30 days have 
elapsed. Id.§ 110-7(g). Similarly, section 32-10 of the Criminal Code of 2012, 
which is the statute that defines the criminal offense of “violation of bail bond,” 
states that any person who has been admitted to bail and has incurred a forfeiture of 
the bail commits the offense of violation of bail bond but only if the person “fails to 
surrender himself or herself within 30 days following the date of the forfeiture.” 
720 ILCS 5/32-10(a) (West 2014). 
¶ 106 
 
Through its incorporation of section 32-10, section 110-2 provides a defendant 
who is released on a recognizance bond with a 30-day grace period after the return 
date set forth in the bond before the failure to return becomes a criminal offense. 
See People v. Costa, 2013 IL App (1st) 090833. Stated simply, a defendant has not 
committed a crime if she appears within 30 days of the return date. Defendant in 
this case was released on a recognizance bond and appeared nine days after the 
return date on the bond. According to section 110-2, she was entitled to a 30-day 
grace period and, thus, under the plain terms of that provision, was not guilty of any 
criminal offense. 
¶ 107 
 
In light of the grace period provided in section 110-2, it is apparent that failing 
to limit the failure to report provision to situations involving constructive custody, 
and applying it in all situations where a defendant is released on a recognizance 
bond, would create a statutory conflict: On the one hand, the legislature has stated 
in section 110-2 that a defendant who fails to appear on the due date of a 
recognizance bond has a 30-day grace period and that returning 9 days past the due 
 
 
 
 
 
- 33 - 
date is not a criminal offense. Yet, on the other hand, according to the State, the 
legislature has also stated in the escape statute that a defendant who fails to appear 
on her due date does not have a 30-day grace period and that returning even 1 day 
past the due date is an immediate, felony offense. 
¶ 108 
 
This is not a minor problem. To avoid due process concerns, criminal statutes 
must give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what 
conduct is prohibited so that he or she may act accordingly. People v. Howard, 
2017 IL 120443, ¶ 25. The construction of the statute proposed by the State raises 
serious due process concerns because, under that construction, it is unclear whether 
defendant’s conduct is actually criminal. See, e.g., State v. McKown, 461 N.W.2d 
720 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).7  
¶ 109 
 
Furthermore, as defendant’s trial counsel observed in the circuit court, the 
State’s construction of the term “fails to report to a penal institution” leads to overly 
broad results. In the State’s view, the term applies to every defendant who violates 
his bond by failing to report to a penal institution and who has a previous felony 
conviction. This means, according to the State, that every pretrial detainee with a 
felony conviction from a previous, unrelated offense who is released on bond and 
who then violates the bond by failing to report back to jail, would be guilty of 
escape rather than a bond violation. This would effectively nullify the violation of 
bond statute for pretrial detainees with a prior felony conviction. This cannot 
reasonably have been what the legislature intended. 
¶ 110 
 
We have an obligation, where reasonably possible, to construe statutes in such a 
way so as to affirm their constitutionality and avoid absurd results. Howard, 2017 
IL 120443, ¶ 24. Limiting the term “fails to report to a penal institution” to 
situations involving constructive custody removes any concern regarding 
constitutional infirmity or absurd results and explains the relationship between the 
escape statute and section 110-2. The escape statute does not contain a 30-day 
grace period but, instead, treats failing to report to a penal institution as an 
                                                 
 
7Defendant was never informed by any authority that her failure to return to the Whiteside 
County Jail could be prosecuted as an escape. In a letter written to the circuit court before her trial 
for escape, defendant stated that she knew she was violating her bond when she did not return to the 
jail and apologized for her actions. However, she stated that she “didn’t realize I was committing 
another offense, especially escape.” 
 
 
 
 
 
- 34 - 
immediate, felony offense. It does this because the statute applies only to those 
defendants who escape from the constructive custody of a penal institution after 
being committed to the institution following sentencing. In short, failing to report 
for service of sentence is a more serious offense than simply failing to report as 
required by a recognizance bond and, logically, is treated more seriously. 
¶ 111 
 
Finally, the State’s contention that the term “fails to report to a penal 
institution” should be given the broadest construction disregards the rule of lenity. 
This rule provides that, when “a reasonable doubt persists about a statute’s intended 
scope even after resort to ‘the language and structure, legislative history, and 
motivating policies’ of the statute” (emphasis in original) (Moskal v. United 
States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (quoting Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 
387 (1980))), we must resolve that doubt in favor of the defendant rather than 
imputing to the General Assembly an “ ‘undeclared will’ ” to criminalize conduct 
(United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 515 (2008) (quoting Bell v. United 
States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955))). See People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130, 140 (2002) 
(“where a criminal statute is capable of two constructions, courts must adopt the 
one that operates in favor of the accused”). The rule of lenity ensures that criminal 
statutes will provide fair warning of what constitutes criminal conduct, minimizes 
the risk of arbitrary enforcement, and strikes the appropriate balance between the 
legislature and the judicial branch in defining criminal liability. Yates, 574 U.S. at 
___, 135 S. Ct. at 1088. 
¶ 112 
 
At a minimum, the points I have outlined above raise an objectively reasonable 
question as to whether a narrow or broad construction should be given to the term 
“fails to report to a penal institution” in the escape statute. Accordingly, the rule of 
lenity compels the conclusion that the term should be construed narrowly in favor 
of defendant.  
¶ 113 
 
In my view, the legislature’s intent is clear. The term “fails to report to a penal 
institution” in the escape statute applies only when a convicted person escapes from 
constructive custody. This means the provision applies only when the person fails 
to report to the penal institution for service of sentence and not otherwise. In this 
case, defendant was ordered to return to the Whiteside County Jail by the terms of 
her recognizance bond, not a sentencing order. Defendant did not escape from the 
constructive custody of the jail. The judgment of the appellate court should, 
 
 
 
 
 
- 35 - 
therefore, be affirmed. 
 
¶ 114 
 
 
 
 
 
II 
¶ 115 
 
The majority, however, reverses the judgment of the appellate court. In so 
holding, the majority explains that 
“section 31-6(a) is divided into two independent clauses separated by a 
semicolon, with the second clause beginning with the word ‘however.’ The first 
clause contains an escape from custody provision, and the second clause 
includes a knowing failure to report provision. The word ‘custody’ appears 
only in the first provision, which involves escape from the custody of a penal 
institution or its employee. The word ‘custody’ is absent from the failure to 
report provision.” Supra ¶ 23. 
¶ 116 
 
The majority then observes that, “ ‘[w]hen the legislature includes particular 
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same 
statute, courts presume that the legislature acted intentionally and purposely in the 
inclusion or exclusion [citations] and that the legislature intended different 
meanings and results [citations].’ ” Supra ¶ 23 (quoting Chicago Teachers Union, 
Local No. 1 v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 2012 IL 112566, ¶ 24). 
From this, the majority concludes that it cannot “presume that the legislature 
intended to include” an element of custody in the definitions of escape that appear 
after the semicolon in section 31-6(a). Supra ¶ 24. The majority states that it “will 
not assign the same meaning to these two provisions of section 31-6(a) or engraft 
the custody element of the escape from custody provision onto the failure to report 
provision.” Supra ¶ 24. In short, according to the majority, custody plays no role in 
any of the versions of escape that appear in the second portion of section 31-6(a) 
and, thus, is not an element of the offense at issue here. I disagree. 
¶ 117 
 
The concept of custody, specifically constructive custody, is inherent in each of 
the offenses listed after the semicolon in section 31-6(a). Apart from failing to 
report to a penal institution, the offenses listed are failing to report for a sentence of 
periodic imprisonment (730 ILCS 5/5-7-1 (West 2014)), failing to return from a 
furlough (id. § 3-11-1), failing to return from work or day release (id. §§ 13-1 to 
12-6), and failing to abide by the terms of home confinement (id. § 5-6-3(b)(10)). 
 
 
 
 
 
- 36 - 
In each of these situations, a sentence has been imposed on the defendant. In each 
of these situations, the defendant’s failure to return or report would constitute a 
violation of a sentence and, thus, by definition would amount to a breach of 
constructive custody. This was the point that was made in Simmons. If a defendant 
is sentenced to a term of periodic imprisonment, this means she has “a legal duty to 
submit to that custody.” Simmons, 88 Ill. 2d at 273. If she fails to report for the first 
required day of custody, then she has escaped from the lawful authority of the penal 
institution to control her movements granted by the circuit court’s sentencing order. 
That is, she has escaped from the constructive custody of the penal institution. 
Simmons, 88 Ill. 2d 270; Marble, 91 Ill. 2d 242. The same analysis also applies to 
furloughs, work and day release, and home confinement. Thus to state, as the 
majority does, that custody is not a part of any of the offenses listed in the second 
part of section 31-6(a) is plainly incorrect.  
¶ 118 
 
To be sure, the General Assembly has divided section 31-6(a) into two sections, 
separated by a semicolon. But this is not because the offenses listed after the 
semicolon are completely unrelated offenses that have nothing to do with 
long-standing concepts of custody or escape. Rather, these offenses are set off by a 
semicolon because they have been given a lesser penalty. Breaches of constructive 
custody, such as failing to return from a furlough or failing to report for periodic 
imprisonment, are inherently less dangerous acts than breaking out of the physical 
confines of a prison. It is therefore entirely appropriate and logical that the General 
Assembly would separate the two types of escape and penalize breaches of 
constructive custody as Class 3 felonies while penalizing breaches of physical 
custody as Class 2 felonies. See, e.g., 83rd Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, 
June 21, 1983, at 201 (statements of Representative Cullerton) (noting that it 
“makes sense” to provide a lesser penalty for someone who fails to return from 
work release than for someone who escapes from prison). 
¶ 119 
 
The majority fundamentally misconstrues the meaning of constructive custody 
and, therefore, incorrectly disregards the context of section 31-6(a). The term “fails 
to report to a penal institution” appears on a list that contains nothing but offenses 
that involve escape from constructive custody. There is no reason why the offense 
of failing to report to a penal institution should be interpreted any differently. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 37 - 
¶ 120 
 
Other aspects of the majority’s reasoning are equally unpersuasive. The 
majority agrees that, in section 31-6, “the legislature has forged a single offense of 
escape.” Supra ¶ 22. Nor is there any dispute that this court has held, for close to 40 
years, that the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “escape” means an 
intentional, unauthorized departure from either physical or constructive custody. 
Yet, with respect to the offenses of failing to report to a penal institution and failing 
to report for periodic imprisonment, the majority concludes that the “offense of 
escape *** does not include custody as an element.” Supra ¶ 47. In other words, 
according to the majority, with respect to these provisions, “escape” does not mean 
“escape.”  
¶ 121 
 
Recognizing this problem, the majority takes the exceptional step of 
“abrogat[ing]” a sentence from Campa that defines escape as the unauthorized 
departure from custody. Supra ¶ 41. This is problematic for several reasons. First, 
the definition set forth in Campa was taken from our earlier decision in Simmons, 
and the analysis and holding of Simmons rest on that understanding of escape. 
Simmons, 88 Ill. 2d at 272-73. Thus, the majority is not simply “abrogating” a 
sentence in a single opinion of this court, it is overruling long-standing precedent. 
The majority makes no mention of stare decisis and makes no attempt to justify its 
actions under that doctrine. Further, at the same time the majority abrogates Campa 
and overrules Simmons, it leaves in place Marble and Beachem, two cases that also 
hold that escape is the unauthorized departure from custody. Thus, the majority’s 
abrogation of Campa, instead of providing clarity, leaves the law of escape in a 
state of considerable confusion. 
¶ 122 
 
The majority takes extraordinary measures to reach the conclusion that the 
offense of failing to report to a penal institution does not contain a custody element. 
The majority unnecessarily overturns long-standing case law when, properly 
understood, our case law and section 31-6(a) are completely consistent.  
¶ 123 
 
The majority also points to legislative history to support its conclusion that 
custody is not a part of the offense of failing to report to a penal institution. Here, 
too, the majority errs. The majority quotes the following statement from Senator 
Smith: 
“House Bill 332 covers a gap. [It] amends the Criminal Code for failure to 
report for periodic imprisonment. Someone who has received a sentence of 
 
 
 
 
 
- 38 - 
periodic imprisonment and if they fail to report to begin their sentence, they 
have committed a crime ***. Nothing in the law presently makes it a crime for 
not showing up for the first day.” 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, 
June 5, 1985, at 17 (statements of Senator Smith).  
See supra ¶ 36. According to the majority, this statement shows the intent of the 
legislature to establish an offense called “escape” that has nothing to do with 
custody. Supra ¶¶ 36-43. However, the opposite is true. As Senator Smith stated, 
periodic imprisonment is a sentence. A person who fails to report for periodic 
imprisonment has, therefore, violated the terms of his or her sentence and evaded 
the lawful authority of the penal institution. This is the definition of a breach of 
constructive custody.  
¶ 124 
 
Further, the legislative history quoted by the majority addresses only the 
offense of failing to report for periodic imprisonment, not failing to report to a 
penal institution, the offense at issue here. And that leads to a troubling aspect of 
the majority opinion. There is one statement in the legislative record that relates 
directly to the offense of failing to report to a penal institution. After then-Governor 
Thompson proposed adding the language setting out the offense, Senator Dudycz 
stated the following: 
 
“Thank you Mr. President. The Governor’s recommendation adds into the 
escape offense the failure to report to jail after being sentenced. I ask for a 
favorable vote on the motion to accept the Governor’s recommendations for 
change.” (Emphasis added.) 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, Oct. 
16, 1985, at 78 (statements of Senator Dudycz).  
This statement should eliminate any doubt that the term “fails to report to a penal 
institution” means “fails to report for service of sentence.” Yet the majority chooses 
not to mention this quote. There is no justification for this. 
¶ 125 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
¶ 126 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE KARMEIER and JUSTICE THEIS join in this dissent.