Case Title: State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Cave

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0126

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-09-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE OF WYOMING ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION v. SHANNON CAVE2011 WY 133Case Number: No. S-10-0126Decided: 09/20/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
STATE 
OF WYOMING ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS’ SAFETY AND COMPENSATION 
DIVISION,Appellant (Respondent/Objector),v.SHANNON 
CAVE,Appellee (Petitioner/Employee).
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sublette County
The 
Honorable Marvin L. Tyler, Judge 
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney 
General; James Michael Causey, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Donna 
D. Domonkos, Cheyenne, Wyoming
 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
GOLDEN, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      Appellee Shannon 
Cave suffered a work-related injury in November 2007 and was awarded temporary 
total disability (TTD) benefits during her recovery.  In September 2008, Cave received an 
offer of temporary light duty work from her employer, which she rejected.  As a result of her refusal to accept 
what the Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division (Division) deemed a 
bona fide offer of light duty work, the Division reduced Cave’s TTD benefits in 
accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-404(j) (LexisNexis 2011) to one-third of 
the previously authorized amount.  
The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the reduction of TTD 
benefits.  On review, the district 
court reversed the OAH decision, and the Division appealed to this Court.  Finding that the OAH decision is 
supported by substantial evidence and not contrary to law, we reverse the 
district court’s order.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      The Division 
presents the following issue for our review:
 
Was 
the Hearing Examiner’s determination that [Cave] had rejected a bona fide light 
duty offer and, therefore, had to receive a reduction in her temporary total 
disability benefits supported by substantial evidence?
 
Cave 
responds with essentially the same issue and raises this additional 
issue:
 
Whether 
the Office of Administrative Hearings’ decision is arbitrary, capricious or 
otherwise not in accordance with the law. 
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      In November 2007, 
Cave was employed as an assistant manager at the Loaf 'N Jug convenience store 
in Marbleton, Wyoming.  While 
stocking and arranging soda in the store, Cave fell from a ladder and injured 
her low back.  The Division found 
Cave’s injury to be compensable and awarded TTD benefits.  
 
[¶4]      From November 14, 
2007, through October 9, 2008, Cave received full TTD benefits. During this 
time, several things occurred that ultimately affected Cave’s continued receipt 
of full benefits.  In July 2008, an 
apparent dispute arose between Cave and the store manager, Larry Ridley, 
relating to Cave’s return to work.  
On July 7, 2008, Cave’s treating physician, Dr. Geoffrey Skene, released 
her to return to light duty work, with restrictions of no bending and lifting 
more than twenty pounds.  After 
being informed of the release, Ridley placed Cave on the work schedule and 
assigned her stocking duties which Cave believed was beyond her physical 
capabilities and contrary to Dr. Skene’s release.  Cave reported to Dr. Skene that her 
employer was not honoring her light duty restrictions.  At Cave’s request, Dr. Skene issued a 
new, more detailed release that permitted Cave to return to her prior managerial 
job duties, but did not clear her to perform floor duties involving stocking, 
bending, or lifting more than twenty pounds.  
 
[¶5]      In addition to 
contacting Dr. Skene, Cave wrote a letter to her claims analyst at the 
Division.  Among other things, Cave 
complained that Ridley had assigned her job duties which exceeded her physical 
limitations, and that he was unfairly refusing to reinstate her to the position 
of assistant manager, with the duties attendant to that position.  Cave also reported that she had been 
informed by fellow employees and customers of Loaf 'N Jug that Ridley had 
threatened to do anything he could to get her to quit when she returned to 
work.  Cave did not go back to work 
in July and continued to receive full disability benefits.  
 
[¶6]      The Division 
subsequently notified Cave’s corporate employer, Mini Mart, Inc., of the 
provisions of temporary light duty employment and the requirements of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-4-404(j) in a letter addressed to its risk manager, Harry 
Hollifield.  After receiving the 
letter, Hollifield began working with Ridley to develop a plan to bring Cave 
back to work.  On August 22, 2008, 
Hollifield sent a letter to Dr. Skene regarding Cave’s potential return to light 
duty employment.  Along with the 
letter, Hollifield sent an Agreement for Temporary Light Duty/Restricted Work 
and asked the doctor to review the job offer and approve it concerning the scope 
of the duties requested and Cave’s physical limitations.1  The Agreement was on a form provided by 
the Division and contained the following specifics:  1) Cave would work 2-5 days per week; 2) 
Cave would work 8 hours per day; 3) Cave would be paid $13.00 per hour;2 4) the position would begin on 
September 16, 2008, and continue until Cave’s light duty restrictions were 
lifted; 5) the duties of the position would be to assist with cashier duties, 
scan vendors, scan off bad merchandise, work back stock within restrictions, and 
assist with office duties; 6) Cave would be restricted from performing duties 
requiring bending, twisting, and lifting anything over twenty pounds.  Dr. Skene signed the Agreement on 
September 5, 2008, authorizing Cave’s return to light duty work in accordance 
with the job duties and restrictions stated therein.  
 
[¶7]      Hollifield 
forwarded the Agreement to Cave on September 11, 2008, with a request that she 
promptly respond to the job offer.  
Approximately three weeks later, on October 2, Cave returned the 
Agreement to Hollifield, stating she was refusing the light duty 
employment.  Cave attached a lengthy 
statement setting forth her reasons for rejecting the job offer.  Primarily, Cave refused the offer 
because she was fearful of retribution from Ridley if she returned to work under 
his management.  Cave also claimed 
she was unable to read the middle line of the offer and noted it did not 
specifically state she would be reinstated to the position of assistant manager 
or receive a pay increase allegedly promised her upon her return.  
 
[¶8]      On October 15, 
2008, the Division issued a Final Determination notifying Cave that it was 
reducing her TTD benefits to one-third of the previously determined rate because 
of her refusal of the offer of light duty work.  Cave objected to the reduction in 
benefits and requested a hearing, again noting her concern of retribution from 
Ridley and complaining of discriminatory treatment by Loaf 'N Jug.  The Division promptly referred the 
matter to OAH for a hearing.  

 
[¶9]      During a 
contested case hearing held in April 2009, Cave presented evidence focusing 
extensively on Ridley, his supervisory shortcomings and misdeeds at the store,3 and his alleged threat toward her 
in an effort to prove that any offer of light duty work under Ridley’s 
supervision, including the instant offer, was illusory and not bona fide.  Cave acknowledged at the hearing that 
she could have, and would have, performed the duties set forth in the Agreement 
for temporary light duty work but for Ridley’s managerial oversight at the 
store. She also acknowledged that she never further pursued light duty 
employment with Loaf 'N Jug despite Ridley’s termination as manager in November 
2008.  
 
[¶10]   The OAH ultimately concluded that 
Cave had refused a bona fide offer of light duty employment that met all 
statutory requirements and was within her physical limitations as set forth by 
her treating physician.  
Accordingly, the OAH upheld the Division’s reduction in Cave’s TTD 
benefits.  Cave appealed this 
determination to the district court and, on April 13, 2010, the district court 
reversed the OAH’s decision.  The 
Division timely appealed the district court’s order.
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶11]   When an appeal is taken from a 
district court’s review of an administrative agency’s decision, we consider the 
case as if it had come directly from the agency without giving any deference to 
the district court’s decision.  Torres v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2011 WY 93, ¶ 17, 253 P.3d 175, 179 (Wyo. 2011); Dale 
v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 84, ¶ 8, 188 P.3d 554, 557 (Wyo. 
2008).  Our review of the agency’s 
decision is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2011), which 
requires in pertinent part that a reviewing court:
 
(i) 
Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and
 
(ii) 
Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:
 
(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law;
 
* 
* * *
 
(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.
 
[¶12]   We explained the proper application 
of these standards in Dale, ¶¶ 20-26, 
188 P.3d  at 560-62.  In short, we 
review the agency’s findings of fact by applying the substantial evidence 
standard.  Id., ¶ 22, 188 P.3d  at 561.  We have described that standard as 
follows:
 
When 
the burdened party prevailed before the agency, we will determine if substantial 
evidence exists to support the finding for that party by considering whether 
there is relevant evidence in the entire record which a reasonable mind might 
accept in support of the agency’s conclusions. If the hearing examiner 
determines that the burdened party failed to meet his burden of proof, we will 
decide whether there is substantial evidence to support the agency’s decision to 
reject the evidence offered by the burdened party by considering whether that 
conclusion was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence in the record 
as a whole. See, Wyo. Consumer Group v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Wyo., 882 P.2d 858, 860–61 (Wyo. 1994); [Board of Trustees, Laramie County School Dist. 
No. 1 v.] Spiegel, 549 P.2d [1161,] 1178 [(Wyo. 1976)] (discussing 
the definition of substantial evidence as “contrary to the overwhelming weight 
of the evidence”). If, in the course of its decision making process, the agency 
disregards certain evidence and explains its reasons for doing so based upon 
determinations of credibility or other factors contained in the record, its 
decision will be sustainable under the substantial evidence test. Importantly, 
our review of any particular decision turns not on whether we agree with the 
outcome, but on whether the agency could reasonably conclude as it did, based on 
all the evidence before it.
 
Dale, 
¶ 22, 188 P.3d  at 561.  We review an 
agency’s conclusions of law de novo 
and will affirm only if the agency’s conclusions are in accordance with the 
law.  Torres, ¶ 18, 253 P.3d  at 179; 
Dale, ¶ 26, 188 P.3d  at 561-62.
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶13]   Generally, TTD benefits are 
governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-404.  
Relevant to the present case is subsection (j), which provides in 
part:
 
(j)         
An employer may make a written offer of temporary light duty work to an 
employee receiving temporary total disability under subsection (a) of this 
section.  The offer shall be a bona 
fide offer on a form supplied by the division, stating with specificity the 
proposed hours of employment, starting date, wage and physical or other 
functional capacity requirements of the light duty work.  If the employee accepts the offer, the 
temporary total disability award shall cease and the employee shall receive a 
temporary light duty award, subject to the following terms and 
conditions:
 
(i)         
After notice to the employer, the health care provider who certified 
temporary total disability has certified on the light duty work agreement that 
the employee is released to perform the light duty work described in the 
agreement;
 
(ii)        All 
periods of light duty work may not exceed one (1) year cumulatively for any one 
(1) injury;
 
(iii)       The 
temporary light duty assignment commences not less than fourteen (14) days 
following the written offer;
 
* 
* * *
 
(v)        The 
employer shall provide the division before commencement of the light duty work 
with a copy of the light duty work agreement signed by the employer and the 
employee, and shall report to the division by the fifteenth of each month the 
employee’s hours and rate of pay for the previous month;
 
(vi)       The 
temporary total disability award of any employee refusing a bona fide written 
offer of temporary light duty work pursuant to this subsection shall be reduced 
by two-thirds (2/3) unless the employee provides written proof to the employer 
and the division of enrollment by the employee in any collegiate, vocational 
retraining, general education development or other program approved by the 
division which is designed to retrain the employee for employment in an 
occupation other than that previously offered by the 
employer[.]
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-404(j) (LexisNexis 2011). The statute does not define what a 
bona fide offer is other than to list certain terms that must be included in the 
written offer, such as wage and start date.  It is the meaning of the term “bona fide 
offer” that is the primary point of contention in this 
appeal.
 
[¶14]   Cave has taken the position that 
the evidence concerning the actions and statements by Ridley should have 
compelled the hearing examiner to conclude that the offer of light duty work 
extended by Hollifield was not bona fide.  
Cave acknowledges that, on the surface, the light duty job offer appears 
to be bona fide in that it took into consideration every physical limitation she 
had and accommodated those limitations.  
However, she claims the offer was based on incomplete information 
regarding Ridley’s prior threats and actions, as well as his criminal activity, 
and, therefore, the offer was fundamentally unfair and not bona fide.  On the other hand, the Division has 
taken the position that the non-medical factors cited by Cave are irrelevant and 
that the hearing examiner properly determined, given the evidence, that the 
offer tendered by Hollifield was bona fide.
 
[¶15]   In considering whether Cave had 
received and rejected a bona fide offer of light duty work, the OAH hearing 
examiner concluded:4
 
56.       Given that 
the written offer of light duty work extended by Hollifield to Cave met all the 
statutory requirements with respect to listing the pay, hours etc. this Hearing 
Examiner is left to decide if it is bona fide in light of the testimony and 
evidence regarding Ridley’s treatment of employees and threats to Cave.  In that regard, based upon the foregoing 
facts, this Hearing Examiner finds and concludes that,
 
a)         
Hollifield extended a bona fide offer on behalf of the employer, which 
was within Cave’s limitations.  It 
is noted however, and Hollifield acknowledged, that Ridley was the one who would 
be responsible for Cave’s work assignments.
 
b)         
Given his prior response to Cave’s releases to return to work and the 
undisputed testimony regarding Ridley’s threats, Cave may have had reason for 
concern about returning to work.
 
c)         
Cave’s concerns were somewhat speculative however in that while 
responsibility for the books was taken away from those who suspected Ridley of 
theft, there is no evidence he actually terminated any such employees.  More importantly there was no evidence 
that Ridley ever actually required any employees to exceed physical limitations 
or caused any employees physical harm.
 
d)         
In any event, Cave’s concerns had little if anything to do with her work 
related injuries and her physical limitations and mostly related to nonmedical 
issues of being set up or losing her job to keep her from shedding further light 
on Ridley’s misdeeds.
 
57.       The only 
case that this Hearing Officer is aware of which addresses a similar issue is Block v. State of Wyoming, ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division, [2009] WY 34[, 202 P.3d 1064] 
(2009).  At issue was an employer’s 
offer to rehire Block in his prior position with appropriate accommodations for 
his impairment or disability.  Block 
refused the offer of employment and was denied permanent partial disability 
benefits.  The Supreme Court 
indicated that there were “several problems” with the finding that the job offer 
from the employee [sic] was a “bona fide” offer.  First, the Court noted that the offer 
was based on lack of personal knowledge by the offeror of the job duties Block 
would be performing and that she had referred to[] Block’s prior position as a 
light duty position when it was heavy duty.  See Block, at ¶16.  The Court noted that the particular 
employee offering the job to Block had assumed that Block could perform 95% of 
the job duties of his prior position and only minor accommodations would be 
necessary for him to hold the job.  
Id.  The Court went on to note that the offer 
made by the employer in Block was one 
that “necessarily created ambiguity” because the only certain term in the offer 
was the job title, with Block’s tasks and exact wage unstated and was to be 
determined on information the employer did not have in it’s [sic] 
possession.  Likewise, there was no 
indication as to what accommodations the employer would make in the offer.  Perhaps most importantly, the Court 
stated, “In short, the written offer was devoid of information necessary for a 
reasonable person to be able to seriously consider the offer.”  Block, supra at 
¶19.
 
58.       The matter 
at hand is distinguishable from Block 
as Block was limited to discussions 
regarding the terms of employment, ie. wage and job duties, medical issues and 
whether or not the offer met the employee’s physical limitations.  That is not the problem in this 
case.  This case turns almost 
exclusively on the interplay of non medical issues and the 
offer.
 
59.       In 
attempting to determine whether such non medical considerations would preclude 
the offer from being considered bona fide, this Hearing Examiner must not only 
consider the plain meaning of the words but the context in which they are 
used.  The plain meaning of the 
words [“]bona fide” is described in Black’s Law Dictionary as 
follows,
 
“In 
or with good faith; honestly, openly, and sincerely; without deceit or 
fraud.  Truly; actually; without 
simulation or pretense.  Innocently 
in the attitude of trust and confidence; without notice of fraud, etc. real, 
actual, genuine and not feigned.”  
Bona fide is closely associated with the term “good faith”.  Blacks Law Dictionary, 5[th] Edition, 
(1979).
 
60.       In the 
context of the workers compensation matter, the offer extended by Hollifield was 
bona fide as it honestly met Cave’s physical limitations as set forth by her 
physician.
 
61.       With 
respect to the context, consideration must be given to the purpose of and the 
statutory scheme for temporary disability payments.  Paravecchio v. Memorial Hosp. of Laramie 
County, 742 P.2d 1276 (Wyo. 1987), cert denied, 485 U.S. 915, 108 S. Ct. 1088, 99 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1988) (holding that statutes relating to the same subject 
matter should be read together to effectuate the legislature’s intent).  A review of the statutes and case law 
shows that payment of TTD benefits is dependent upon the work related injury and 
how the injury affects the employee’s ability to work.  Temporary total disability payments are 
not generally based upon other non medical factors that may affect the 
employee’s ability to work.
 
62.       At the 
onset, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-404 (LexisNexis 2005) reads in pertinent part as 
follows:
 
(a)       If after a 
compensable injury is sustained and as a 
result of the injury the employee is subject to temporary total disability 
as defined under W.S. 27-14-102(a)(xviii), the injured employee is entitled to 
receive a temporary total disability award for the period of temporary total 
disability as provided by W.S. 27-14-403(c). . . . [(Emphasis added.)] 

 
63.       Further, 
the purpose of temporary total disability benefits is to “provide income for an 
employee during the time of healing from his injury and until his condition has 
stabilized.”  Phillips v. TIC – The Indus. Co of 
Wyoming, [2005 WY 40, ¶ 27,] 109 P.3d 520, 5[32] (Wyo. 
2005).
 
64.       Finally it 
has been determined that “the legislature intended for workers who are 
temporarily injury [sic] to be compensated until their earning power is 
substantially restored.  State ex Rel. Wyoming. Workers Comp. Div v. 
Ohnstad, 802 P.2d 865[, 867] (Wyo. 199[0]) at [¶8]. The statute does however 
not require actual employment, only that the earning power is substantially 
restored.  Shassetz v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ 
Safety & Comp Div., 920 P.2d 1246[, 1250-51] (Wyo. 1996) at 
¶13.
 
65.       In Wyoming Worker’s Comp Div. v. Taylor, 
1987 WY 77, 737 P.2d 1063, it was recognized that during the healing period non 
medical factors may be considered.  
The Court relied upon Pacific 
Power and Light v. Parsons, Wy. 692 P.2d 226, but in that case a combination 
of the medical and non medical factors led to the determination of whether or 
not the employee[’]s earning capacity had been substantially 
restored.
 
66.       In the case 
at hand, it seems clear that Cave rejected the offer due almost exclusively to 
non medical reasons.  Despite the 
earlier concerns that Cave was scheduled to stock upon her first release to 
return to work, Cave acknowledged that the subsequent written offer was within 
her limitations and that she could have and would have accepted the job so long 
as the manager was not out to get her for her role in proving he was 
embezzling.
 
67.       Based upon 
the statutory scheme and the case law, this Hearing Officer is of the opinion 
that the law was not intended to nor designed to take into consideration non 
medical reasons in this context.  
Even if there are legitimate concerns for discrimination, whistle blowing 
or other work related matters, the workers compensation scheme is not intended, 
designed or the proper place to address those concerns.
 
[¶16]   After careful review, we cannot say 
the hearing examiner’s legal conclusions were erroneous as a matter of law.  Nor can we say from our review of the 
record that the hearing examiner’s determination was contrary to the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence, as Cave maintains.  Therefore, we have no trouble concluding 
that the hearing examiner properly determined that the offer of light duty 
employment tendered to Cave was bona fide.
 
[¶17]   As a final matter, Cave contends, 
as the district court found, that the OAH’s decision is not in accordance with 
the law because the hearing examiner failed to consider the principles of 
contract law, specifically the doctrine of “anticipatory repudiation.”  However, Cave’s reliance on that 
doctrine in this case is misplaced.  
Anticipatory repudiation concerns a renouncement of a contractual 
obligation or duty, which necessarily requires the existence of a contract.  Roussalis v. Wyoming Medical Center, 
Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 254 (Wyo. 2000); see also 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 722 (2004).  Here, Cave did not accept her employer’s 
offer of light duty employment and, consequently, no contract or contractual 
obligation was created which could be repudiated.  Cave’s contention of error in this 
regard is simply without merit.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶18]   The district court improperly 
substituted its judgment for that of the hearing examiner when it reversed the 
OAH decision reducing Cave’s TTD benefits.  
The OAH decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not 
otherwise arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.  Consequently, we reverse and remand to 
the district court with directions the case be returned to the OAH for 
reinstatement of the order reducing Cave’s TTD benefits.
 
 
FOOTNOTES
 
1Hollifield testified that he relied on input from Dr. Skene and Ridley, 
as well as his twenty-four years of experience with the company, in formulating 
the job duties to be performed under the offer.  
 
2This is the hourly wage Cave was earning at the time of her injury.  
 
3Documents introduced during the hearing showed that Ridley was convicted 
of felony larceny resulting from the theft of more than $10,000.00 in cash 
receipts from the store between October 11 and November 10, 2008.  Ridley was terminated from his 
employment at Loaf 'N Jug in November 2008. 
 
4We have chosen not to correct all of the various grammatical, 
punctuation, and citation errors.