Case Title: State v. Lance R. Ward

Citation: 2000 WI 4

Docket Number: 1997AP002008-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2000-01-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
2000 WI 3 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Lance R. Ward,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  222 Wis. 2d 311, 588 N.W.2d 645 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998-Published) 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
January 19, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
September 10, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Rock 
 
JUDGE: 
James Welker 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
BRADLEY, J., joins; PROSSER, J., joins part 1. 
 
 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and BRADLEY, J., join. 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Stephen W. Kleinmaier, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by 
Daniel P. Dunn and Dunn Law Offices, Madison and oral argument by 
Daniel P. Dunn. 
 
 
 
Amicus Curiae brief and oral argument by Howard 
B. Eisenberg, Milwaukee for The Wisconsin Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers. 
 
 
2000 WI 3 
  
 
 
1 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 97-2008-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,  
 
 
v. 
 
Lance R. Ward, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   The State of Wisconsin 
(State) seeks review of a court of appeals’ decision that 
reversed a judgment of the circuit court convicting the 
defendant, Lance R. Ward (Ward), on his no-contest plea to two 
counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
deliver.  The court of appeals held that evidence seized during 
the search of Ward’s home should have been suppressed because 
the affidavit submitted to the warrant-issuing judge in support 
of the search warrant failed to provide a substantial basis for 
finding probable cause that evidence of criminal activity was 
likely be found at that site.  State v. Ward, 222 Wis. 2d 311, 
333, 588 N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1998). 
FILED 
 
JAN 19, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark Acting 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
2 
¶2 
Two issues are raised on review.  The first issue is 
whether the warrant to search for drugs at Ward’s home was 
supported by probable cause. We conclude that the warrant-
issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable 
cause to 
issue the warrant 
to search Ward’s 
home, and 
accordingly we reverse on that issue. 
¶3 
The second issue, not reached by the court of appeals, 
is whether the evidence should be suppressed because officers 
executed an unlawful no-knock entry into the Ward residence in 
violation of the rule of announcement.  At the time of entry, 
the police action was in conformance with then-existing law, 
subsequently changed by the United States Supreme Court.  We 
conclude that the evidence should be admitted because the police 
officers 
acted in 
good 
faith reliance on 
law 
that was 
controlling at the time of the search. 
¶4 
The facts underlying this action are these.  On 
December 4, 1996, Detective Douglas Anderson of the City of 
Beloit Police Department applied for a search warrant for the 
home of Lance R. Ward at 1663 Royce in Beloit.  Detective 
Anderson presented an affidavit to Rock County Circuit Court 
Judge James E. Welker in support of the search warrant.  The 
following facts were set forth in Anderson’s affidavit. 
¶5 
First, the affidavit stated that on November 27, 1996, 
Beloit police received a tip from a Crime Stopper that a second 
individual, Darrell Vance, “sells pounds of marijuana.”  The 
Crime Stopper told police that Vance would order marijuana and 
within a day or two distribute one to two pounds to each of his 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
3 
dealers.  On November 29, Beloit police executed a search 
warrant at the Vance home and recovered 3,311 grams of 
marijuana, over $11,000 in cash, .3 grams of crack cocaine and 
other items including tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) roaches and 
several scales.   
¶6 
On November 30, 1996, a Vance family member contacted 
Detective Anderson to report that Vance identified an individual 
named “Lance” as his marijuana supplier.  On December 2, Vance, 
in the custody of the Beloit police, contacted the police to 
make a deal.  Vance identified “‘Lance’ who lives on Royce” as 
his supplier.  The Beloit tax rolls listed property at 1663 
Royce as owned by Lance R. Ward.   
¶7 
Second, the affidavit stated that the confidential 
files maintained by the Beloit Police Department Special 
Operations 
Bureau 
contained 
four 
pieces 
of 
information 
indicating that Lance Ward is a drug dealer. 
¶8 
Third, the affidavit stated that based upon Detective 
Anderson’s training and experience, individuals engaged in 
criminal activity, including drug-related crimes, often arm 
themselves with firearms and attempt to destroy or conceal 
evidence if given time.  For these reasons, Detective Anderson 
requested the issuance of a no-knock search warrant. 
¶9 
Finally, the affidavit stated that Detective Anderson, 
based upon his training and experience, believed that when 
illegal drugs are bought and sold the parties commonly carry 
illegal drugs on their body. 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
4 
¶10 Judge Welker issued the search warrant.  The warrant 
authorized a no-knock entry. 
¶11 Officers executed the warrant on the evening of its 
issuance.  Although Ward was in his home watching television, 
the house appeared dark.  The police did not knock.  Officers 
used a battering ram to break down the door of Ward’s home.  The 
officer using the battering ram began swinging it as soon as a 
second officer yelled “Police.  Search Warrant.”  Officers 
seized 180.9 grams of cocaine, 2,578.6 grams of marijuana, two 
THC pipes, rolling papers, several scales, and other items.  
Although ammunition was seized, no weapons were found. 
¶12 Ward subsequently offered two motions to suppress the 
evidence seized at his home.  Judge Welker, who had authorized 
the search warrant, presided at the suppression hearing.   
¶13 First, Ward argued that the affidavit for the warrant 
did not allege sufficient sworn facts to establish probable 
cause to believe that evidence of criminal activity would be 
found at Ward’s home.  Judge Welker determined that the petition 
for a warrant contained sufficient facts to draw a reasonable 
inference that there was evidence of a crime at Ward’s Royce 
Street home.   
¶14 At the motion hearing, Ward’s defense counsel argued 
that the police did not present any facts in their affidavit 
from which it could be inferred that illegal drugs were kept at 
the Ward residence: 
 
 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
5 
THE COURT: What about my experience has (sic) 
been that in the last eight years, I have had numerous 
cases that deal with this kind of thing, and I can’t 
remember a time when somebody was dealing drugs when 
they weren’t being dealt out of the person’s house?  
Now, maybe there are different customs everywhere, but 
here in Beloit, that’s been every case that I have 
ever had. 
 
Defense Counsel: But are you allow– - you can 
make inferences based on reasonableness.  That’s what 
the Court says.  But don’t you think you need a 
factual basis to make the inference?  I mean, if Lance 
Ward lived on Royce Street – - 
 
THE COURT: Well, you seem to agree that there was 
sufficient information here to issue a warrant to 
arrest Mr. Ward. 
 
Defense 
Counsel: 
I 
think 
that 
there 
is 
information indicating he was the dealer.  I think 
that you probably could have issued a warrant for his 
arrest. 
 
THE COURT: All right.  Well, if that’s the case, 
if there is enough evidence- – if there is enough 
information to arrest his person, and if my experience 
is that drug dealers ordinarily deal drugs out of 
their houses, why isn’t there enough evidence then to 
search his house? 
 
Defense Counsel: Because nobody told you that 
 . . .  drug dealers deal out of their houses. 
 
THE COURT: You don’t think I can rely on my own 
experience? 
 
Defense Counsel: No.  . . .  I think you can rely 
on your own experience in making inferences from 
facts, 
but 
I 
don’t 
believe 
that 
you 
can 
make 
inferences in a search warrant based upon information 
that you know which is not supportive, at least by a 
factual allegation, within the four corners of a 
warrant. 
 . . .  
 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
6 
THE COURT:  I have had numerous, numerous 
experiences with respect to drug dealers in the Beloit 
community, and I do believe that I’m entitled to draw 
the inference that, when the police have established 
that there is a drug dealer who is dealing large 
amounts of drugs, I believe I am able to draw the 
inference that the high probability is that those 
drugs are being dealt out of his place of residence, 
and that’s based upon my experience, and I think that 
I can’t- – I don’t think that a magistrate is required 
to shut his eyes to that fact. 
Judge Welker subsequently denied this motion. 
¶15 Ward’s second motion was to suppress the physical 
evidence seized by police based upon of the violation of the 
rule of announcement.1  Judge Welker denied this motion. 
Thereafter, Ward pled no contest to two counts of possession of 
a controlled substance with intent to deliver. 
¶16 A sentencing hearing was scheduled for May 14, 1997.  
Prior to the hearing, the United States Supreme Court decided 
Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997).  In Richards, the 
Court disagreed with our rule permitting an exception to the 
rule of announcement when officers execute a search warrant in 
felony drug investigations.  Ward requested the reconsideration 
of his motions to suppress the seized evidence.  Both motions 
were denied.  In considering the impact of Richards, Judge 
Welker stated that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to 
                     
1 The rule of announcement requires “police to do three 
things before forcibly entering a home to execute a search 
warrant: 1) announce their identity; 2) announce their purpose; 
and 3) wait for either the occupants to refuse their admittance 
or, in the absence of an express refusal, allow the occupants 
time to open the door.”  State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 423, 
511 N.W.2d 591 (1994); State v. Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d 729, 734-35, 
576 N.W.2d 260 (1998). 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
7 
deter misconduct.  The judge concluded that this purpose would 
not be served in this situation, in which the officers relied 
upon a warrant that was issued in compliance with what was then 
the controlling law.  Ward appealed his conviction.   
¶17 The court of appeals reversed.  The court of appeals 
held that the affidavit presented to Judge Welker in support of 
a warrant to search the Ward residence did not provide a 
substantial basis for finding probable cause that evidence of 
drug dealing would likely be found at the Royce Street address. 
 Ward, 222 Wis. 2d at 333.  The court of appeals stated: 
 
Although we will defer to a magistrate’s conclusion 
whenever possible, and we will permit reasonable 
inferences to sustain the reliability and timeliness 
of information in a warrant application, neither the 
Fourth Amendment nor Article I, § 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution permits a magistrate to infer a link 
between evidence of drug dealing and the dealer’s 
residence when the application is devoid of any facts 
or information from which to infer such a link. 
Id. 
¶18 Having concluded that the warrant to search Ward’s 
home lacked probable cause, the court of appeals did not reach 
Ward’s motion to suppress for violation of the rule of 
announcement.  Id. at 335. 
¶19 The State filed a petition for review, which we 
granted. 
 
I 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
8 
¶20 The first issue we consider is whether the affidavit 
upon which the search warrant was based contained sufficient 
facts to support a finding of probable cause to believe that 
evidence of a crime would be found at Ward’s residence.  We 
conclude that the warrant-issuing judge had a substantial basis 
for finding that there was probable cause to issue the warrant 
to search the Ward residence. 
¶21 Search warrants may issue only upon “a finding of 
probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate.”  State v. 
Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d 978, 989, 471 N.W.2d 24 (1991) (citing 
State v. DeSmidt, 155 Wis. 2d 119, 131, 454 N.W.2d 780 (1990)). 
In reviewing whether there was probable cause for the issuance 
of a search 
warrant, 
we 
accord 
great deference to the 
determination made by the warrant-issuing magistrate.  Id.  The 
magistrate’s determination will stand unless the defendant 
establishes that the facts are clearly insufficient to support a 
probable cause finding.  Id.  It is the duty of the reviewing 
court to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis to 
conclude that the probable cause existed.  Id.   
¶22 Our deference to the magistrate’s probable cause 
determination supports the well-established preference under the 
Fourth Amendment that searches be conducted pursuant to a 
warrant.  Id. at 990 (quoting DeSmidt, 155 Wis. 2d at 133). 
¶23 A finding of probable cause is a common sense test.   
 
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a 
practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
9 
including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of 
persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime 
will be found in a particular place. 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
¶24 When 
a 
warrant-issuing 
judge’s 
determination 
of 
probable cause is doubtful or marginal, we examine it in light 
of this strong preference that law enforcement officers conduct 
searches pursuant to a warrant.  Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d at 
990. 
¶25 In this case, Ward asserts that Judge Welker did not 
confine his probable cause determination to the circumstances 
set forth in the affidavit.  Ward argues that Judge Welker 
supplied facts to the affidavit based upon his own experience 
and then made inferences from the facts he provided to establish 
probable cause. 
¶26 Whether there is probable cause to believe that 
evidence is located in a particular place is determined by 
examining the “totality of the circumstances.”  DeSmidt, 155 
Wis. 2d at 131 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238).  We agree with 
Ward that a probable cause determination must be based upon what 
a reasonable magistrate can infer from the information presented 
by the police.  “‘The issuing magistrate ordinarily considers 
only the facts set forth in supporting affidavits accompanying 
the warrant application.’”  United States v. Khounsavanh, 113 
F.3d 279, 283 n.1 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. 
Zayas-Diaz, 95 F.3d 105, 111 (1st Cir. 1996)). We therefore 
consider only the facts presented to the magistrate.  A 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
10
magistrate issuing a warrant must be neutral and independent and 
must act in a neutral and a detached manner.  State ex rel. 
Pflanz v. County Court, 36 Wis. 2d 550, 560, 153 N.W.2d 559 
(1967) (citations omitted).  The subjective experiences of the 
magistrate are not part of the probable cause determination. 
¶27 Therefore, 
we 
must 
consider 
whether 
objectively 
viewed, the record before the warrant-issuing judge provided 
“‘sufficient facts to excite an honest belief in a reasonable 
mind that the objects sought are linked with the commission of a 
crime, and that they will be found in the place to be 
searched.’”  State v. Kerr, 181 Wis. 2d 372, 378, 511 N.W.2d 586 
(1994) (quoting State v. Starke, 81 Wis. 2d 399, 408, 260 N.W.2d 
739 (1978)).  Ward contends that without Judge Welker’s reliance 
on his experience to infer that evidence of criminal activity 
would be found at Ward’s residence, Detective Anderson’s 
affidavit is insufficient because it contains no statement 
creating a nexus between the items sought and Ward’s residence 
on Royce Street.  However, our examination of the facts leads to 
the conclusion that the information presented to the warrant-
issuing judge was sufficient for a reasonable person to 
logically infer that evidence would be found at Ward’s home.  
DeSmidt, 155 Wis. 2d at 131-32, 135. 
¶28 The purpose behind the constitutional requirement of 
obtaining a search warrant is not to deny law enforcement 
officers the support of the usual inferences that reasonable 
individuals may draw from evidence.  Id. at 135 (quoting Starke, 
81 Wis. 2d at 409).  The Fourth Amendment simply requires that a 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
11
neutral and detached magistrate draw inferences instead of a law 
enforcement officer who is “‘engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime.’”  State v. Beal, 40 Wis. 2d 
607, 613, 162 N.W.2d 640 (1968)(quoting Johnson v. United 
States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)).  Thus, “[a]lthough the 
finding cannot be based on the affiant’s suspicions and 
conclusions, the magistrate may make the usual inferences 
reasonable persons would draw from the facts presented.”  Bast 
v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 689, 693, 275 N.W.2d 682 (1979). 
¶29 The facts supporting a finding of probable cause to 
search are as follows.  The affidavit states that Derrell Vance 
“sells pounds of marijuana.”  Vance distributes marijuana to his 
dealers.  A search of the Vance home turned up 3,311 grams of 
marijuana and over $11,000 in cash.  It can be reasonably 
inferred from these facts that Vance is himself a substantial 
dealer.   
¶30 Vance identifies his supplier as Lance who lives on 
Royce.  Vance supplies no other address or location.  We agree 
with the State that it can be inferred from this information 
that Vance obtained the marijuana from Lance where Lance lived, 
on Royce.  Given the large quantity of drugs involved, the link 
of a supplier of drugs and an address, plus the reasonable 
inference that Vance deals in a high volume of drugs and 
therefore “Lance” is an even bigger fish, leads us to conclude 
that the affidavit presents a substantial basis to find probable 
cause to believe that illegal items will be found at the home of 
Lance Ward on Royce.  The obvious and reasonable inference is 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
12
that Lance dealt drugs from his home.  It is not the only 
inference that can be drawn, but it is certainly a reasonable 
one.  The test is not whether the inference drawn is the only 
reasonable inference.  The test is whether the inference drawn 
is a reasonable one. 
¶31 Although Ward argues that this type of inference 
cannot be made without an explicit statement in the affidavit 
linking the illegal drugs to the Ward residence, we disagree.   
¶32 We have rejected taking an overly technical and 
formalistic approach to the contents of an affidavit.   
 
‘[A]ffidavits for search warrants, . . . must be 
tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a 
commonsense and realistic fashion.  They are normally 
drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a 
criminal investigation.  Technical requirements of 
elaborate specificity once exacted under common law 
pleadings have no proper place in this area.  A 
grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts 
toward 
warrants 
will 
tend 
to 
discourage 
police 
officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial 
officer before acting. 
 
Recital of some of the underlying circumstances 
in the affidavit is essential if the magistrate is to 
perform his detached function and not serve merely as 
a rubber stamp for the police.  However, where these 
circumstances are detailed, where reason for crediting 
the source of information is given, and when a 
magistrate has found probable cause, the courts should 
not 
invalidate 
the 
warrant 
by 
interpreting 
the 
affidavit 
in 
a 
hypertechnical, 
rather 
than 
a 
commonsense, manner . . . .’ 
Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d at 991-92 (quoting Starke, 81 Wis. 2d 
at 410). 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
13
¶33 Ward contends that had Detective Anderson inserted a 
sentence in his affidavit to the effect that Ward is a drug 
dealer and, based upon the detective’s experience, drug dealers 
keep drugs in their homes, the affidavit would have been 
satisfactory.  Ward makes a similar argument in distinguishing 
this case from State v. Bernth, 246 N.W.2d 600 (Neb. 1976).  In 
Bernth, the Nebraska Supreme Court considered whether a search 
warrant was supported by sufficient grounds to believe that 
marijuana was kept at the defendant’s residence.  Id. at 601.  
The affidavit offered by police stated that the defendant had 
told a police informant that he had “pounds of grass for sale,” 
and that the informant had identified the defendant’s place of 
residence.  Id.  The affiant also stated that he believed the 
controlled substance was situated at the residence.  Id.  Ward 
contends that this statement in Bernth by the affiant created a 
nexus between the items sought and the location.  We believe 
this level of formalism is not in keeping with the totality of 
the circumstances test.  As the Bernth court noted, “[s]eldom 
can an affiant seeking a search warrant state positively that a 
certain residence contains contraband.  Such a conclusion can 
only be arrived at by a magistrate on consideration of known 
facts and common-sense probabilities.”  Id. at 602. 
¶34 Our reasoning in State v. Tompkins, 144 Wis. 2d 116, 
423 N.W.2d 823 (1988), applies here.  Where there is evidence 
that would lead a reasonable person to conclude “that the 
evidence sought is likely to be in a particular location,” there 
is probable cause for a search of that location, even if it may 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
14
also be reasonable to conclude that the evidence may be in a 
second or third location as well.  Id. at 125.  We conclude that 
the warrant-issuing judge could reasonably infer that because 
Darrel Vance, himself a high volume dealer, identified “Lance on 
Royce” as his supplier, and that Lance Ward owned a home on 
Royce, there was probable cause to search the Ward residence. 
¶35 Finally, Ward contends that Vance, the informant, was 
inherently unreliable because Vance had no past record of 
reliability and was attempting to bargain his way out of jail.  
When considering this issue Judge Welker stated that Vance was 
making an inculpatory statement under circumstances where, if 
his statements were found to be untruthful, Vance would be in 
deeper trouble.  Under these circumstances, the judge found 
Vance to be reliable.  We find Judge Welker’s conclusion to be 
reasonable. 
¶36 In finding that the affidavit supplied sufficient 
facts from which to draw an inference of probable cause to 
search, we are not suggesting that when there is sufficient 
evidence to identify an individual as a drug dealer, as all the 
parties conclude there was, that there is sufficient evidence to 
search the suspect’s home.  In this case, the affidavit 
identifies one address in Beloit and two individuals who both 
deal drugs in volume.  Accordingly, we find sufficient facts in 
the affidavit to connect illegal drugs to the Ward residence and 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
15
therefore find a basis for finding probable cause to issue a 
search warrant.2 
II 
¶37 We turn then to Ward’s second basis for arguing that 
evidence seized by the Beloit police should be suppressed.  Ward 
argues that the evidence seized at his home is inadmissible 
because it was obtained as the result of an unconstitutional 
violation of the rule of announcement.  “‘Whether searches and 
seizures pass constitutional muster is a question of law, which 
this court reviews without deference to the lower courts.’”  
State v. Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d 729, 746, 576 N.W.2d 260 (1998) 
(quoting State v. Guy, 172 Wis. 2d 86, 93, 492 N.W.2d 311 
(1992)).   
¶38 For Fourth Amendment purposes, an entry that does not 
comply with the rule of announcement “is justified if police 
have 
a 
‘reasonable 
suspicion’ 
[under 
the 
particular 
circumstances] that knocking and announcing would be dangerous, 
futile, or destructive to the purposes of the investigation.”  
Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d at 749-50 (quoting United States v. Ramirez, 
523 U.S. 65, 67-68 (1998)).  Following the principles set forth 
by the Supreme Court, we have held that when there is no 
compliance with the rule there must exist particular facts to 
                     
2 Because we find the search warrant was supported by 
probable cause, we do not reach the State’s argument suggesting 
that the evidence seized at the Ward home is admissible under a 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
16
support 
an 
officer’s 
reasonable 
suspicion 
that 
exigent 
circumstances exist.  Id. at 751. 
¶39 The nature and structure of our federal system of 
government shape our analysis of the no-knock issue presented in 
this case.  In general, state courts exercise concurrent 
jurisdiction with the federal courts in cases arising under the 
Constitution of the United States.  “The two together form one 
system of jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of the land 
for the State . . . .”  Claflin v. Houseman, Assignee, 93 U.S. 
130, 137 (1876).  On federal questions, the determinations of 
the United States Supreme Court are binding upon state courts.  
State v. Mechtel, 176 Wis. 2d 87, 94, 499 N.W.2d 662 (1993).  
However, “‘[u]ntil the Supreme Court of the United States has 
spoken, state courts are not precluded from exercising their own 
judgment upon questions of federal law.’” Id. (quoting United 
States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1075 (7th Cir. 
1970)).  This court “has been designated by the constitution and 
the legislature as a law-declaring court.”  State ex rel. La 
Crosse Tribune v. Circuit Ct., 115 Wis. 2d 220, 230, 340 N.W.2d 
460 (1983).  Our decisions interpreting the United States 
Constitution are binding law in Wisconsin until this court or 
the United States Supreme Court declares a different opinion or 
rule. 
¶40 In 
Stevens, 
181 
Wis. 2d 
at 
424-25, 
this 
court 
initially adopted a rule providing that when the police have a 
search warrant, supported by probable cause, to search a 
residence for evidence of felony drug delivery or dealing, the 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
17
officers are justified in making a no-knock entry.  Subsequent 
to our decision in Stevens, the Supreme Court held that the rule 
of 
announcement 
forms 
part 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
reasonableness inquiry.  Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 
(1995).  In light of Wilson, we considered whether the Fourth 
Amendment allows a blanket exception to the general requirement 
of “knock and announce” for entries into premises pursuant to a 
search warrant for evidence of felonious drug delivery.  State 
v. Richards, 201 Wis. 2d 845, 549 N.W.2d 218 (June 12, 1996).  
In Richards we reaffirmed our rule that “exigent circumstances 
are always present in the execution of search warrants involving 
felonious drug delivery: an extremely high risk of serious if 
not deadly injury to the police as well as the potential for the 
disposal of drugs by the occupants prior to entry by the 
police.”  Id. at 847-48.   
¶41 Thus on December 4, 1996, when Judge Welker signed the 
search warrant and authorized a no-knock entry into the Ward 
residence, the law in Wisconsin for over two years, and as twice 
affirmed by this court, authorized police executing a search 
warrant for evidence of felonious drug activity to make a no- 
knock entry.  However, three months after the search of Ward’s 
home, 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
issued 
an 
opinion 
in 
apparent 
disagreement with our conclusion that the Fourth Amendment 
permits a per se exception to the rule of announcement when 
officers 
execute 
a 
search 
warrant 
in 
a 
felony 
drug 
investigation.  Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. at 388. 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
18
¶42 We review this chronology of events to emphasize that 
although the officers in this case did not comply with the rule 
of announcement, this was not due to negligence, a mistake of 
law, or willful or malicious misconduct by the officers.  All 
the parties relied upon a rule set forth as a matter of judicial 
discretion by this court in Stevens and State v. Richards.  We 
thus begin our analysis as one that requires this court to 
consider what is the appropriate remedy when evidence is seized 
in conformance with controlling law as articulated by this court 
which is subsequently reversed. 
¶43 To begin, we first consider whether the violation of 
the rule of announcement comes before us as a question to be 
considered under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution3, an issue arising under art. I, §  11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution4, or both.  We find that both the 
                     
3 Amendment IV of the United States Constitution states:   
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
 
4 Article I, §  11 of the Wisconsin Constitution states:   
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable searches 
and 
seizures 
shall 
not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause, 
supported 
by 
oath 
or 
affirmation, 
and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and 
the persons or things to be seized.  
 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
19
Wisconsin Constitution and the Fourth Amendment are properly 
before this court.   
¶44 The State asserts Ward’s motion to suppress evidence 
seized due to a violation of the rule of announcement arises 
only under the Fourth Amendment.  As a result, the State 
contends 
that 
this 
court 
should 
therefore 
limit 
its 
consideration of the issue to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  
As a matter of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the State argues 
that the evidence should be admitted under the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule.5  Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 
340 (1987).  Ward contends that his motion to suppress the 
physical evidence seized because of the violation of the rule of 
announcement was preserved on state and federal grounds.  We 
agree that both the Fourth Amendment and art. I, §  11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution are at issue here. 
¶45 Although it is the general rule that issues not raised 
or considered in the circuit court will not be considered for 
the first time on appeal, this rule is not absolute.  Apex 
Electronics Corp. v. Gee, 217 Wis. 2d 378, 384, 577 N.W.2d 23 
(1998); Wirth v. Ehly, 93 Wis. 2d 433, 443-44, 287 N.W.2d 140 
(1980).  “When an issue involves a question of law rather than 
of fact, when the question of law has been briefed by both 
parties and when the question of law is of sufficient public 
interest to merit a decision, this court may exercise its 
                     
5 For the purposes of this case we assume without deciding 
that the exclusionary rule is the proper remedy for a violation 
of the rule of announcement.  
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
20
discretion to address the issue.”  Apex Electronics Corp., 217 
Wis. 2d at 384.  Application of art. I, §  11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution is a question of law.  The parties briefed the 
issue of an exception to the exclusionary rule in their 
arguments regarding the first issue in this case, the validity 
of the search warrant.  Amici curiae also submitted a brief 
discussing 
the 
exclusionary 
rule 
as 
a 
matter 
of 
state 
constitutional law, to which the State filed an in-depth 
response.  In addition, at oral argument, counsel for Ward 
specifically discussed this issue.  In addition, although our 
decision in this case will affect only a narrow band of cases 
arising between our holding in State v. Richards and Richards, 
we consider the question of the application of the Wisconsin 
Constitution to this matter to be of sufficient public interest 
to merit our address.  Finally, a consolidated case decided 
today 
invokes 
both 
the 
Wisconsin 
and 
United 
States 
Constitutions.  State v. Orta, 2000 WI 4, ____ Wis. 2d _____, 
___ N.W.2d ___.6  Therefore, to the extent that there are any 
doubts on this point, we exercise our discretion and address the 
                     
6 In State v. Orta, 2000 WI 4, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d 
___, a consolidated case, officers executing a search warrant 
made a no-knock entry that was valid under our rule from State 
v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 511 N.W.2d 591 (1994) and State v. 
Richards, 201 Wis. 2d 845, 549 N.W.2d 218 (1996).  As in this 
case, the defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized by 
the police after the United States Supreme Court decided 
Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1996).  For the reasons set 
forth in this opinion, we held in Orta that the evidence seized 
in that case is admissible.  Orta, 2000 WI 4, ¶2. 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
21
Wisconsin constitutional issue as well as the Fourth Amendment 
issue presented in this case. 
¶46 The exclusionary rule bars evidence obtained in an 
illegal search and seizure from a criminal proceeding against 
the victim of the constitutional violation.7  Krull, 480 U.S. at 
347.  The Supreme Court has stated that “the [exclusionary] rule 
is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth 
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather 
than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.”  
United States v. Calendra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (footnote 
omitted).  Application of the rule “has been restricted to those 
areas 
where 
its 
remedial 
objectives 
are 
thought 
most 
efficaciously served.”  Id. at 348. 
¶47 “The [exclusionary] rule is calculated to prevent, not 
repair.”  Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).  
Although this remedial principle appears to be the sole pillar 
supporting 
the Supreme Court’s contemporary 
rationale for 
application of the exclusionary rule a second principle, 
judicial integrity, has been cited in the Court’s exclusionary 
rule jurisprudence: 
 
                     
7 The State argues that the exclusionary rule does not 
generally apply to evidence seized in the execution of a search 
warrant 
after 
a 
violation 
of 
the 
rule 
of 
announcement.  
According to the State, when a violation of the Fourth Amendment 
occurs, the court must find sufficient causal relationship 
between the violation and the discovery of evidence to support 
application of the exclusionary rule.  United States v. Ramirez, 
523 U.S. 65, 72 n.3 (1998).  Because we deny the motion to 
suppress on other grounds, we need not address this issue. 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
22
It was of this [judicial integrity] that Mr. Justice 
Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis so eloquently spoke in 
Olmstead v. United States.  . . . “For those who agree 
with me,” said Mr. Justice Holmes, “no distinction can 
 be taken between the Government as prosecutor and the 
Government as judge.”  . . .  “In a government of 
laws,” said Mr. Justice Brandeis, “existence of the 
government will be imperiled if it fails to observe 
the law scrupulously.  Our Government is the potent, 
the omnipresent teacher.  For good or for ill, it 
teaches the whole people by its example.  Crime is 
contagious.  If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, 
it breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man 
to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.  To 
declare that in the administration of the criminal law 
the end justifies the means—to declare that the 
Government may commit crimes in order to secure the 
conviction of a private criminal—would bring terrible 
retribution.  Against that pernicious doctrine this 
Court should resolutely set its face.”   
Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222-23 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 
277 U.S. 438, 470, 485 (1928)). 
¶48 Whether the purpose of the exclusionary rule is solely 
remedial or also a matter of judicial integrity, the Supreme 
Court has made clear that for Fourth Amendment purposes “the 
policies behind the exclusionary rule are not absolute.  Rather, 
they must be evaluated in light of competing policies.”  Stone 
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488 (1976).  In Powell the Supreme 
Court said:  
 
Although our decisions often have alluded to the 
‘imperative of judicial integrity,’ they demonstrate 
the 
limited 
role 
of 
this 
justification 
in 
the 
determination 
whether 
to 
apply 
the 
rule 
in 
a 
particular context.  . . . While courts, of course, 
must ever be concerned with preserving the integrity 
of the judicial process, this concern has limited 
force as a justification for the exclusion of highly 
probative evidence.   
 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
23
Id. at 485 (internal citation and footnotes omitted). 
¶49 In this case, we do not believe that excluding the 
evidence seized by the police will serve any remedial objective, 
or that judicial integrity is sullied by admission of the 
evidence. On December 4, 1996, the officers’ actions were in 
conformance with the law in Wisconsin, as articulated by this 
court, allowing for no-knock entries.  The greenest law student, 
the savviest defense counsel, and a roomful of law professors 
would have reached the same conclusion.  We find it impossible 
to say that under such facts and in consideration of binding 
federal precedent, the exclusionary rule should be applied to 
this violation of the rule of announcement.   
¶50 Our conclusion is supported by the rule articulated by 
the Supreme Court in Krull.  In Krull, police officers conducted 
a search pursuant to an Illinois statute authorizing warrantless 
administrative searches of certain premises licensed by the 
state.  Krull, 480 U.S. at 342-44.  The Illinois Supreme Court 
subsequently 
found 
that 
the 
statute 
violated 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment, and the evidence seized pursuant to the statute was 
suppressed.  Id. at 346.  The United States Supreme Court 
concluded that the evidence should be admitted under a good-
faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.  Id. 
at 346, 360.  The Court stated: 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
24
The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress 
evidence obtained by an officer acting in objectively 
reasonable reliance on a statute would have as little 
deterrent effect on the officer’s actions as would the 
exclusion 
of 
evidence 
when 
an 
officer 
acts 
in 
objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant.  Unless 
a statute is clearly unconstitutional, an officer 
cannot be expected to question the judgment of the 
legislature that passed the law.  If the statute is 
subsequently 
declared 
unconstitutional, 
excluding 
evidence obtained pursuant to it prior to such a 
judicial declaration will not deter future Fourth 
Amendment violations by an officer who has simply 
fulfilled his responsibility to enforce the statute as 
written. 
 
Krull at 349-50.   
¶51 The court in Krull indicated it was “concerned solely 
with whether the detective acted in good faith reliance upon an 
apparently valid statute.”  Id. at 357 n.13.  The Court found 
that he did.  Id. at 360.  In this case we are concerned solely 
with whether the officers acted in good faith reliance upon the 
pronouncements of this court.   
¶52 Execution of a no-knock entry in this case was founded 
upon a rule articulated by this court.  Having been obtained 
pursuant to the search and seizure principles we expounded, we 
cannot say now that the subsequent change in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence has somehow transformed the character of the 
evidence seized at the Ward home into something so tainted that 
it mars judicial integrity.  Nor will any remedial purpose be 
achieved through exclusion of the evidence when the officers and 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
25
magistrate followed, rather than defied, the rule of law.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence is admissible under 
the Fourth Amendment. 
¶53 We turn then to art. I, §  11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  We conclude that in this case, the Wisconsin 
Constitution does not require exclusion of the evidence seized 
at the Ward residence.   
¶54 Issues of federalism and sovereignty again shape our 
discussion. The holdings of the United States Supreme Court do 
“not affect the State’s power to impose higher standards on 
searches and seizures than required by the Federal Constitution 
if it chooses to do so.”  Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 
(1967).  We have also stated: 
This court . . . will not be bound by the minimums 
which are imposed by the Supreme Court of the United 
States if it is the judgment of this court that the 
Constitution of Wisconsin and the laws of this state 
require that greater protection of citizens’ liberties 
ought to be afforded. 
State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 172, 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977). 
¶55 The 
text 
of 
art. 
I, 
§  
11 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution and the text of the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution are essentially identical.  Tompkins, 144 
Wis. 2d at 131.  Our interpretation of the Wisconsin search and 
seizure 
provision 
has 
normally 
been 
consistent 
with 
the 
requirements of the United States Constitution as interpreted by 
the Supreme Court.  Id. at 133.  Therefore as an initial matter, 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
26
the rule of announcement is one part of the reasonableness 
inquiry under art. I, §  11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, in 
conformity with the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilson v. 
Arkansas, 514 U.S. at 930.   
¶56 Thus, we next consider whether the evidence seized at 
the Ward residence should be suppressed pursuant to the 
Wisconsin exclusionary rule adopted in Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 
407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923). 
¶57 We first 
consider 
whether 
the exclusionary 
rule 
adopted in Hoyer is merely a judge-made rule, as the State 
contends, or whether, as the defendant argues, it is a personal 
right under the Wisconsin Constitution.  We have decided this 
question and there is no need to revisit it.  When discussing 
the exclusionary rule in Tompkins, we stated: 
 
The protection of rights and the preservation of 
judicial integrity depend in reality on the deterrent 
effect of the exclusionary rule.  Unlawful police 
conduct 
is 
deterred 
when 
evidence 
recovered 
in 
unreasonable searches is not admissible in courts.  
The Wisconsin cases discussed in Hoyer and statements 
of that 
court all 
concerned judicial 
protection 
against police oppression.  That is, the exclusionary 
rule 
developed 
as 
a 
judicial 
remedy 
to 
deter 
unreasonable searches 
and 
seizures.  
The 
fourth 
amendment was and is a limit on the powers of 
government. 
 
Tompkins, 144 Wis. 2d at 133-34.   
¶58 We do not reexamine our conclusions in Tompkins that 
the exclusionary rule in Wisconsin is a judicial remedy.  
However, we concur with the views expressed by the Vermont 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
27
Supreme Court which stated that “[e]ven if our exclusionary rule 
were no more than a judicially created remedy, this Court would 
maintain the obligation to ensure that the remedy effectuates 
[state constitutional] rights.”  State v. Oakes, 598 A.2d 119, 
121 (Vt. 1991).  The Vermont Supreme Court further stated: 
 
By treating the federal exclusionary rule as a 
judicially created remedy rather than a constitutional 
right, the Supreme Court’s decision focuses, not on 
interpretation of the federal constitution, but on an 
attempted 
empirical assessment of 
the 
costs and 
benefits of creating a good faith exception to the 
federal exclusionary rule.  This empirical assessment 
can inform this Court’s decision on the good faith 
exception only to the extent that it is persuasive.  
If the assessment is flawed, this Court cannot simply 
accept the conclusion the Supreme Court draws from it. 
 To do so would be contrary to our obligation to 
ensure that our state exclusionary rule effectuates 
[the state constitutional] rights, and would disserve 
those rights.   
 
Id. 598 A.2d at 122.   
¶59 Although we generally conform art. 1, §  11 to Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, it would be a sad irony for this court 
to exhort magistrates to act as something more than “rubber 
stamps” when issuing warrants, and to then act as mere rubber 
stamps ourselves when interpreting our Wisconsin Constitution.  
It is our responsibility to examine the State Constitution 
independently.  This duty exists even though our conclusions in 
a given case may not differ from those reached by the Supreme 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
28
Court when it interprets the Fourth Amendment.  State v. Guzman, 
842 P.2d 660, 667 (Idaho 1992). 
¶60 In this case, because the police and magistrate relied 
upon our rule from State v. Richards, we conclude that the 
Wisconsin Constitution does not require suppression of the 
evidence. 
¶61 In 
determining 
whether 
this 
evidence 
should 
be 
excluded under the Wisconsin Constitution, we find persuasive 
the rational used in United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 
(1975).  In Peltier, Border Patrol agents stopped a vehicle 70 
air miles from the Mexican border.  Peltier, 422 U.S. at 533.  
The Border Patrol searched the vehicle and seized 270 pounds of 
marijuana from the trunk of the car.  Id. at 532.  Four months 
after this stop occurred, the United States Supreme Court “held 
that a warrantless automobile search, conducted approximately 25 
air miles from the Mexican border by Border Patrol agents, 
acting without probable cause, was unconstitutional under the 
Fourth Amendment.”  Id. at 532-33 (citing Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973)). Although the stop of 
Peltier was unconstitutional under the rule from Almeida-
Sanchez, the Supreme Court decided that the evidence should not 
be excluded.  The Supreme Court stated that the basis for the 
stop was founded upon the Border Patrol’s reliance upon a 
federal statute, administrative regulations implementing the 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
29
statute, and continuous judicial approval of the regulation. Id. 
at 540-41.  The Supreme Court stated: 
 
[u]nless 
we 
are 
to 
hold 
that 
parties 
may 
not 
reasonably rely upon any legal pronouncement emanating 
from sources other than this Court, we cannot regard 
as blameworthy those parties who conform their conduct 
to the prevailing statutory or constitutional norm.  
If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter 
unlawful police conduct then evidence obtained from a 
search should be suppressed only if it can be said 
that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may 
properly be charged with knowledge, that the search 
was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.   
 
Id. at 542 (internal citations and footnote omitted).   
¶62 Similarly, we believe that law enforcement officers 
and magistrates must be allowed to reasonably rely upon the 
pronouncements of this court.  Therefore, we hold that under the 
Wisconsin Constitution the evidence seized at the Ward residence 
is 
admissible. 
 
The 
officers 
acted 
in 
reliance 
upon 
pronouncements of this court.  That is the only issue before us 
and is the only issue we decide. 
¶63 In summary, we conclude that the warrant was issued 
with probable cause to search Ward’s residence.  In addition, 
the officers’ failure to comply with the rule of announcement 
violated the Fourth Amendment and art. I, §  11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
 
However, 
because 
the 
officers 
relied, 
in 
objective good faith, upon the pronouncements of this court we 
hold that exclusion of the evidence would serve no remedial 
No. 
97-2008-CR 
 
 
30
objective and, therefore, the evidence seized at the Ward 
residence should be admitted.  Finally, we hold that as a matter 
of state constitutional law the evidence is properly admissible.8 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded. 
 
                     
8 Having concluded that the evidence is admissible under the 
Wisconsin Constitution because the officers relied upon a rule 
established by this court, we need not consider the State’s 
alternative argument that the officers reasonably relied upon 
the no-knock search warrant.  
No. 97-2008.ssa 
 
1 
¶64 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting). I 
disagree with the majority opinion on two grounds:  
¶65 First, the majority opinion errs in refusing to 
suppress evidence seized by law enforcement officers in the 
defendant’s home.  I conclude there is no nexus in the warrant 
application in this case between the defendant’s home and the 
defendant’s drug-dealing activities to establish probable cause 
to search the home.9 
¶66 Second, the majority opinion errs in refusing to 
suppress evidence seized by law enforcement officers who failed 
to comply with the constitutionally based rule of announcement. 
 I would not adopt the majority opinion’s exception to the 
exclusionary rule. 
 
I 
¶67 I approach the question of probable cause to issue a 
search warrant for a drug dealer’s home with the following basic 
principles in mind. 
¶68 A moving force behind the enactment of the Fourth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
U.S. 
Constitution 
was 
to 
prohibit 
the 
                     
9 A number of courts confronted with facts similar to those 
presented in this case have concluded no nexus was established 
between the drug dealing and the defendant’s home.  These cases 
are discussed in the court of appeals thorough opinion.  See 
also State v. Thien, 977 P.2d 582, 588 (Wa. 1999) (en banc) 
(warrant authorizing the search of a drug dealer’s apartment 
must present specific evidence tying the residence to the 
illegal activity). 
No. 97-2008.ssa 
 
2 
government from conducting indiscriminate general searches.10  
Accordingly, a crucial element in evaluating a search warrant 
under the Fourth Amendment is whether it is reasonable to 
believe that the item to be seized will be found in the place to 
be searched, here a home.11  “Physical entry of the home is the 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is 
directed.”12  
¶69 Before 
issuing 
a 
warrant 
a 
magistrate 
must 
be 
"apprised of sufficient facts to excite an honest belief in a 
reasonable mind that the objects sought are linked with the 
commission of a crime, and that the objects sought will be found 
in the place to be searched."  State v. Higginbotham, 162 
Wis. 2d 978, 980, 471 N.W.2d 24 (1991) (internal quotations 
omitted).  Our duty as a reviewing court is to ensure that the 
magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable 
cause existed, giving deference to the magistrate’s conclusion 
and accepting reasonable inferences to sustain the issuance of a 
warrant.  Id.  "'[T]he fact that there is probable cause to 
believe 
that 
a 
person 
has 
committed 
a 
crime 
does 
not 
                     
10 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-84 and n.21 (1980) 
(describing historical circumstances leading to the enactment of 
the Fourth Amendment). 
11 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 n.6 (1978). 
12 State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 195-96, 577 N.W.2d 
794 (1998). 
No. 97-2008.ssa 
 
3 
automatically give the police probable cause to search his house 
for evidence of that crime'"13  
¶70 Applying these principles to the majority opinion, I 
conclude that, for big drug dealers, the majority has abandoned 
the rule that a magistrate must be apprised of sufficient facts 
to excite an honest belief in a reasonable mind that the objects 
sought would be found in the place to be searched.  The majority 
opinion has, instead, adopted a blanket general rule, a per se 
rule, that if a magistrate determines probable cause to believe 
that a person is a dealer in significant quantities of drugs14 
then it automatically follows there is probable cause to issue a 
warrant to search that person’s home. Majority op. at ¶36.15  
¶71 The State does not claim that the affidavit in support 
of the application for a search warrant in this case contained 
                     
13 State v. Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d 978, 995, 471 N.W.2d 
24 (1991), (quoting United States v. Freeman, 685 F.2d 942, 949 
(5th Cir. 1982)). 
14 The majority does not describe how to distinguish between 
“significant” and “insignificant” quantities of drugs.  
15 The majority appears to deny this holding.  It states at 
paragraph 36 that it is “not suggesting that when there is 
sufficient evidence to identify an individual as a drug 
dealer . . . that there is sufficient evidence to search the 
suspect’s house.”  It goes on to state: “In this case, the 
affidavit identifies one address in Beloit and two individuals 
who both deal drugs in volume.”  I do not understand how this 
cryptic sentence provides law enforcement officers, magistrates, 
circuit courts or the court of appeals with any guidance in 
deciding when an application to search the home of a drug dealer 
of significant quantities of drugs sufficiently connects the 
illegal activities to the home to be searched when the only 
information is that the person is a big drug dealer and lives on 
a specified street.   
No. 97-2008.ssa 
 
4 
any direct evidence that the defendant had sold drugs out of his 
home or that any illegal items had been spotted there.  The 
majority’s decision upholding the issuance of the warrant 
apparently rests on two pieces of evidence.  The first piece of 
evidence is that the defendant supplied drugs to other dealers. 
 From this fact, the majority opinion states that the magistrate 
could conclude that the defendant was probably a “big” drug 
dealer. 
¶72 The second piece of evidence is that an informant drug 
dealer referred to the defendant as “Lance on Royce.”  The city 
tax records, examined by a law enforcement officer, confirmed 
that Lance Ward owned a house at 1663 Royce Street.  Neither the 
informant’s reference to the street where the defendant lived or 
the city tax records giving the defendant’s exact home address  
suggest that drugs were sold from the defendant’s home. 
¶73 Thus the majority’s holding that there was probable 
cause to believe the drugs were in the defendant’s home does not 
rest on any specific evidence in the record tying the drugs to 
the home. 
 Rather the 
majority’s 
holding 
rests on the 
supposition that a magistrate may reasonably conclude, unless 
there is evidence to the contrary, that every drug dealer 
suspected of dealing in significant quantities of drugs keeps 
the drugs at home. 
¶74 I conclude that the majority’s holding is once again 
creating a drug exception to the Fourth Amendment "based on the 
'culture' surrounding a general category of criminal behavior," 
contrary to Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 392 (1997).  
No. 97-2008.ssa 
 
5 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Richards overturned this court’s 
blanket per se rule that all drug dealers may be presumed armed 
and that therefore no-knock entries to the home are justified in 
felony drug searches.  
¶75 The general per se drug exception the majority creates 
today, allowing searches of the homes of "big" drug dealers, is 
subject to the same two criticisms that the U.S. Supreme Court 
leveled against the generalization about drug dealers that this 
court adopted in Richards.  First, the majority opinion’s new 
rule  that "big" drug dealers keep drugs in their homes contains 
considerable overgeneralization.  The Richards case, 520 U.S. at 
393, condemned a similar generalization about drug dealers and 
arms.  While "big" drug dealers may frequently keep drugs (or 
arms) in their homes, not every "big" drug dealer does so. 
¶76 Second, the majority opinion’s categorical rule that 
"big" drug dealers keep drugs in their homes "can, relatively 
easily, be applied to others."  In Richards, 520 U.S. 394, the 
Supreme Court condemned this court’s categorical rule on drug 
dealers and arms on the grounds that the generalization could be 
applied to many crimes and thus undercut the Fourth Amendment 
requirement that individualized grounds to search a place be 
demonstrated.  
¶77 If we follow the majority opinion’s reasoning to its 
"common sense" conclusion, one can assume that, unless there is 
evidence to the contrary, every drug dealer (big, medium or 
small) and further everyone engaged in criminal activity (drugs 
or otherwise), keeps evidence of the criminal activity at home. 
No. 97-2008.ssa 
 
6 
 This "common sense" reasoning swallows the Fourth Amendment 
requirement that applications for warrants must demonstrate 
reasonable grounds to believe that the item to be seized will be 
found in the place specified to be searched.  "If a per se 
exception were allowed for each category," the Fourth Amendment 
requirement 
that 
a 
warrant 
application 
must 
demonstrate 
reasonable grounds to believe that the item to be seized will be 
found in the place to be searched "would be meaningless."  
Richards, 520 U.S. at 394. 
¶78 I do not join the majority opinion because it 
substitutes 
a 
generalization, 
a 
per 
se 
rule, 
for 
the 
constitutional requirement that a nexus must appear in the 
warrant application between the place to be searched and the 
drug-dealing activities to establish probable cause to search 
the place specified.  In sum, the majority opinion does not give 
adequate consideration to the Fourth Amendment’s protection of 
the home against indiscriminate general searches. 
 
II 
¶79 The majority opinion errs in adopting an exception to 
the exclusionary rule to refuse to suppress evidence seized by 
law 
enforcement 
officers 
who 
failed 
to 
comply 
with 
the 
constitutionally based rule of announcement. 
¶80 The exclusionary rule prevents evidence that has been 
seized in violation of an accused's statutory or constitutional 
rights from being admitted into evidence.  Illinois v. Krull, 
480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987). The U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a 
No. 97-2008.ssa 
 
7 
"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. United States 
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).  The Leon case held that the 
exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained by law 
enforcement officers acting on objectively reasonable reliance 
upon a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate when the 
warrant was ultimately found to be unsupported by probable 
cause.  468 U.S. at 926. 
¶81 The majority opinion does not adopt the Leon “good 
faith” exception to the exclusionary rule.  The Leon good faith 
exception has been strongly criticized by state courts and 
commentators.16  Indeed the majority opinion studiously avoids 
                     
16 In the fifteen years since the Leon case was decided, at 
least twelve states have rejected the good faith exception to 
the 
exclusionary 
rule 
as 
incompatible 
with 
their 
state 
constitutions. See, e.g., State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58 (Conn. 
1990); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660 (Idaho 1992); People v. 
Sellars, 394 N.W.2d 133 (Mich. App. 1986), appeal denied, 426 
Mich. 879 (1986); State v. Canelo, 653 A.2d 1097 (N.H. 1995); 
State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1987); State v. 
Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052 (N.M. 1993); People v. Bigelow, 488 
N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1985); State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 
1988); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991); State 
v. Taylor, 1987 WL 25417 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987); State v. 
Oakes, 598 A.2d 119 (Vt. 1991); State v. Crawley, 808 P.2d 773 
(Wash. App. 1991).  
The majority opinion discusses and relies on State v. Oakes 
and State v. Guzman (majority op. ¶58), but does not acknowledge 
that both these cases reject the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule. 
Another two states have rejected the good faith exception 
as impermissible under state statutory grounds.  Gary v. State, 
422 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. 1992); Imo v. State, 826 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1992). 
No. 97-2008.ssa 
 
8 
citing Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the leading good faith case, 
and even steers clear of using the words “good faith.”  The 
majority opinion uses the words “good faith” only nine times, in 
six instances referring to other writers use of the words,  
(twice referring to the State’s argument, twice referring to a 
U.S. Supreme Court holding,17 and twice quoting from a case from 
the Vermont Supreme Court).18    
¶82 Instead of relying on Leon, the majority opinion 
relies on Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), a “Leon-based 
decision.”19  In Krull, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
exclusionary rule would not apply to evidence seized by officers 
acting in objectively reasonable reliance upon a statute 
authorizing 
warrantless 
administrative 
searches; 
after 
the 
                                                                  
Several states have expressed reservations about the good 
faith 
exception, 
although 
their 
highest 
courts 
have 
not 
specifically rejected it.  See, e.g., State v. Rothman, 779 P.2d 
1, 8 (Haw. 1989) (Hawaii has not yet adopted good faith 
exception); State v. Martinez, 411 N.W.2d 209, 149 (Ct. App. 
Minn. 
1998) 
(Minnesota 
has 
not 
yet 
adopted 
good 
faith 
exception). 
Several state courts have adopted the good faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule under their own state constitutions.  
See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 641 So.2d 840 (Ala. 1994); Jackson 
v. State,  722 S.W.2d 831 (Ark. 1987); State v. Brown, 708 
S.W.2d 140 (Mo. 1986) (en banc). 
17 See majority op. ¶¶ 50-51 (referring to Illinois v. 
Krull, 480 U.S. at 346).  
18 See majority op. ¶58, quoting State v. Oakes, 598 A.2d 
119, 122, (Vt. 1991).  
19 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.3(h) at 97 (3rd 
ed. 1996). 
No. 97-2008.ssa 
 
9 
search 
and 
seizure 
in 
that 
case 
the 
statute 
was 
held 
unconstitutional as violating the Fourth Amendment. 
¶83 Krull sweeps broadly and authorizes the use of 
evidence seized in a whole class of unconstitutional searches, 
that is, those conducted pursuant to a statutory enactment which 
is later declared unconstitutional.  The Krull rule means that 
an appellate court need not review each case falling within the 
class.  In contrast, the Leon case deals with a single 
unconstitutional judicial authorization of a particular search 
under particular circumstances; an appellate court reviews each 
warrant to determine whether that case falls within the Leon 
“good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule.  Because of the 
sweeping reach of Krull, commentators and courts have found the 
 Krull rule more problematic than the Leon rule. 
¶84 Professor LaFave, for example, views the Krull case as 
even more objectionable than Leon.20   
¶85 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who agreed with Leon, 
dissented along with three of her colleagues in Krull (a 5-4 
decision).  The Illinois Supreme Court also rejected the Krull 
rule.  That court reasoned that the Krull rule provides a grace 
period in which constitutional rights may be violated with 
impunity; the grace period can last for several years and can 
affect large numbers of people.  The Illinois Supreme Court 
                     
20 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.3(h) at 98 (3d 
ed. 1996). 
No. 97-2008.ssa 
 
10
concluded that “this is simply too high a price for our citizens 
to pay.”21 
¶86 Neither Krull nor Leon confronts the fact situation 
presented 
in 
this 
case: 
an 
officer 
seizes 
evidence; 
an 
unconstitutional decision of a court authorizes the search.  The 
majority opinion thus extends an exception to the exclusionary 
rule beyond Krull and Leon.  I would not do so. 
¶87 This court should be more cautious in adopting 
exceptions to the exclusionary rule in light of the history of 
the exclusionary rule in this state.  The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court was one of the first in the nation to adopt the 
exclusionary rule.22  State v. Hoyer, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 
(1923), was decided almost 40 years before Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643 (1961), obliged this court to adopt the exclusionary 
rule.  This early adoption of the exclusionary rule demonstrates 
this state’s commitment to protecting the privacy of its 
citizens which this court should not rush to diminish.23  
                     
21 People v. Wright, 697 N.E.2d 693, 697 (Ill. 1998), 
quoting People v. Krueger 675 N.E.2d 604 (Ill. 1996). 
22 See State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506, 523, 210 N.W.2d 873 
(1973)(noting the court’s early adoption of the exclusionary 
rule). 
23 For a more developed discussion of State v. Hoyer and its 
implication for this court’s adoption of the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule, see Justice Prosser’s 
concurring opinion in State v. Orta, 2000 WI 4, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
___ N.W.2d ___, of even date.  I join that part of Justice 
Prosser’s concurrence in Orta relating to Hoyer and the good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 
No. 97-2008.ssa 
 
11
¶88 Although 
the 
majority 
opinion 
asserts 
that 
its 
“decision will affect only a narrow band of cases arising 
between State v. Richards and Richards [v. Wisconsin],” majority 
op. at ¶45, I fear that the majority opinion has broader 
implications.  The majority opinion applies to any published 
decision of the court of appeals or this court authorizing a 
search when the decision is later declared unconstitutional.  
The majority opinion rendered today also removes much of the 
incentive for an accused to challenge a search or seizure that 
is authorized by a published decision of this court or the court 
of appeals.  The accused would not get an effective remedy in 
the very case in which he or she successfully challenged a 
decision, because the evidence seized would be admissible under 
the exception adopted by the majority opinion today. 
¶89 What does this majority opinion mean for the future of 
the exclusionary rule in Wisconsin?  What is the status of the 
good faith exception in Wisconsin?  Who knows?  The majority 
isn’t telling.24 
¶90 For the reasons stated, I do not join the majority 
opinion’s extension of the Krull cases to the present case.  The 
majority opinion errs in refusing to suppress evidence seized by 
law 
enforcement 
officers 
who 
failed 
to 
comply 
with 
the 
constitutionally based rule of announcement. 
                     
24 I raise the issue of what constitutes reliance in 
objective good faith on a pronouncement of this court in my 
dissent in State v. Orta, 2000 WI 4, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d 
___, of even date. 
No. 97-2008.ssa 
 
12
¶91 I am authorized to state that JUSTICE ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent and JUSTICE DAVID T. PROSSER joins 
Part I of this dissent. 
 
97-2008-CR.dtp 
 
 
1 
 
¶92 DAVID T. PROSSER, J. (dissenting).   The liberties 
secured 
by 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution 
must 
not 
be 
compromised in society's struggle to combat illegal drugs.  The 
"horrors of drug trafficking" are real and substantial, but 
"under our Constitution only measures consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment may be employed by government to cure this evil."25 
¶93 Search warrants are an essential safeguard against 
government overreaching.  They protect privacy in persons, 
houses, papers, and effects by requiring a neutral magistrate to 
make an independent determination of probable cause before 
authorizing a government search.  Thus, the integrity of search 
warrants is vital, and it must not be impaired by government 
zeal to suppress drugs.  Because this decision seriously 
undermines the foundation for search warrants in drug cases, I 
respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶94 The State of Wisconsin petitioned the court to take 
this case to review several issues.  The first issue was stated 
as follows:  "In reviewing a search warrant affidavit, may the 
judge infer that evidence of drug dealing will be found at the 
suspect's 
residence 
when 
the 
affidavit 
provides 
facts 
identifying the suspect's residence and provides probable cause 
                     
25  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 290 (1983) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting, quoted with approval in the majority opinion of 
Justice Rehnquist at 241).   
97-2008-CR.dtp 
 
 
2 
that the suspect is a drug dealer?"26  The State's brief sets 
forth an affirmative answer to this question with two arguments. 
 First, the State contends that a judge may rely on the judge's 
personal experience to infer that evidence of drug dealing will 
be found at a suspected drug dealer's residence.  Second, it 
argues that for drug dealers, evidence is likely to be found 
where dealers live.  Hence, probable cause that a person is a 
drug dealer provides probable cause to search the person's 
residence. 
¶95 In justifying the issuance of the search warrant for 
Lance Ward's residence, Circuit Judge James Welker relied 
heavily on his own extensive experience in dealing with drug 
cases.  The majority opinion dismisses his analysis by stating 
that: "The subjective experiences of the magistrate are not part 
of the probable cause determination."  Majority op. at ¶26.  
This conclusion is consistent with prior decisions.  In State v. 
Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d 978, 989, 471 N.W.2d 24 (1991), the 
court said: "In reviewing whether there was probable cause for 
the issuance of a search warrant, we are confined to the record 
that was before the warrant-issuing judge."27  Allowing the 
personal experience of the magistrate to factor into the 
determination of whether probable cause exists to issue a search 
                     
26  Petition for Review and Appendix at 1. 
27 The court cited State v. DeSmidt, 155 Wis. 2d 119, 132, 
454 N.W.2d 780 (1990), and Bast v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 689, 692, 
275 N.W.2d 682 (1979).  See also State v. Benoit, 83 Wis. 2d 
389, 395, 265 N.W.2d 298 (1978). 
97-2008-CR.dtp 
 
 
3 
warrant would mean that probable cause was subjective, varying 
from 
magistrate 
to 
magistrate. 
 
A 
magistrate's 
personal 
experience would be difficult for an appellate court to review, 
and subjective determinations of probable cause would destroy 
uniformity in the law.   
¶96 On the other hand, by dismissing the State's first 
argument, the majority is forced to embrace a proposition 
allegedly grounded in universal experience:  that suspected drug 
dealers are so likely to keep drugs in their homes that the 
government will always have probable cause to search their 
residences, absent evidence that a specific dealer keeps drugs 
elsewhere.  This is precisely the position advocated by the 
State,28 and, for all practical purposes, it is the position 
adopted by this court. 
                     
28  The following colloquy occurred during the oral argument 
of this case: 
Chief Justice:  Is your position, counsel . . .  is 
the State's position that every time you have a drug 
dealer, that is, a charge of a drug dealer in the 
affidavit, that the inference can be made that there 
will be drugs in the home, in the residence, and 
therefore the search warrant can apply to the home? 
 
Assistant 
Attorney 
General: . . . [I]f 
that's 
justified by experience, yes.   
 
Chief Justice:  Well, whose experience? 
 
Assistant Attorney General:  I think it could be the 
judge as well as the  . . .  it could be the judge or 
the police officer.  If it's the police officer, he 
puts it in there and it's for the judge to review.  If 
it's the judge it's going to have to bethe State's 
position is that's a legitimate consideration for the 
97-2008-CR.dtp 
 
 
4 
¶97 In Section I of her dissenting opinion, Chief Justice 
Abrahamson admirably outlines her objection to the majority's 
ruling.  I join in Section I of her dissent and commend as well 
the scholarly analysis of the court of appeals.29 
II 
¶98 Our law strongly favors searches conducted pursuant to 
a warrant.  State v. Kerr, 181 Wis. 2d 372, 379, 511 N.W.2d 586 
                                                                  
judge to use when drawing the inference based on the 
information that's in there. 
 
Chief Justice:  Well, suppose we have a brand new 
judge on the bench in Rock County and [he or she] 
comes from the civil practice and you got this kind of 
a warrant. . . .   [A]nd the police searched the home. 
 [I]s it the State's position then that that search 
had no probable cause? 
 
Assistant Attorney General:  No, I think it would have 
to bein Fourth Amendment cases there's an objective 
standard applied. 
 
Chief Justice:  Well, that goes back to my question.  
 . . . [I]s it your position that as an objective 
standard in all cases in which the affidavit says it's 
a drug dealer, you can search the home?  It doesn't 
matter what the cop says in the affidavit or what the 
judge's past experience is because it's objective. 
 
Assistant Attorney General:  Well, yes, and that is 
the position that's been taken in several cases. 
 
Chief Justice:  That is . . . as a matter of law, 
there's probable cause to search the home.  Is that 
your position? 
 
Assistant Attorney General:  Yes. 
 
29  State v. Ward, 222 Wis. 2d 311, 319-333, 588 N.W.2d 645 
(1998). 
97-2008-CR.dtp 
 
 
5 
(1994).  The warrant process not only places a neutral and 
detached magistrate between government intrusion and the people 
but also obligates government officials to demonstrate to that 
magistrate a substantial basis for their proposed intrusive 
conduct.  In this process, neutral oversight is pointless if the 
magistrate 
merely 
rubberstamps 
an 
affidavit 
based 
on 
generalizations instead of particulars. 
¶99 In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983), the 
Supreme Court spelled out the role of the neutral magistrate in 
the warrant process: 
 
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a 
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all 
the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before 
him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' 
of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a 
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a 
crime will be found in a particular place.   
The magistrate is entitled to consider the totality of the 
circumstances before the court in making the probable cause 
determination of whether there are "sufficient facts to excite 
an honest belief in a reasonable mind that the objects sought 
are linked with the commission of a crime, and that the objects 
sought will be found in the place to be searched."  State v. 
Stark, 81 Wis. 2d 399, 408, 260 N.W.2d 739 (1978).30   
¶100 There is no dispute that a reviewing court will show 
great deference to the magistrate's decision.  Gates, 462 U.S. 
                     
30  This language is quoted in State v. DeSmidt, 155 Wis. 2d 
119, 131-32, 454 N.W.2d 780 (1990), and State v. Higginbotham, 
162 Wis. 2d 978, 989, 471 N.W.2d 24 (1991). 
97-2008-CR.dtp 
 
 
6 
at 236; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969).  
However, deference to the magistrate "is not boundless."  United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984).  A reviewing court 
will not defer to a warrant based on an affidavit that does not 
provide a substantial basis for determining the existence of 
probable cause.  Id. at 915. 
¶101 A magistrate considers many factors in passing upon an 
application for a warrant.  The warrant itself must describe 
with particularity the place to be searched and the things to be 
seized.31  Hence, the magistrate must review the particularity 
and find probable cause that the things sought are linked to 
criminal activity and will be found in the place to be 
searched.32  These factors may raise questions of scope.33  The 
totality of the circumstances in determining probable cause 
includes the "veracity" or reliability of persons supplying 
information, the "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying 
information,34 and the freshness or staleness of the information 
provided.35 
                     
31 Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution; 
Article I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution; Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.12(1)(2).  
32 State v. Benoit, 83 Wis. 2d 389, 394-95, 265 N.W.2d 298 
(1978). 
33 United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348, 1355 (9th Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987).  
34 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).  
35 State v. Ehnert, 160 Wis. 2d 464, 469-70, 466 N.W.2d 237 
(1991).  
97-2008-CR.dtp 
 
 
7 
¶102 The "particularity and probable cause requirements" 
are the only protections a person has against a general search. 
 State v. DeSmidt, 155 Wis. 2d 119, 130, 454 N.W.2d 780 (1990). 
 Arguably, these requirements may be relaxed somewhat if the 
situation is truly urgent.  For instance, in Franks v. Delaware, 
438 U.S. 154, 169 (1978), the Supreme Court observed that the 
"pre-search proceeding will frequently be marked by haste, 
because of the understandable desire to act before the evidence 
disappears."  In these circumstances, the magistrate may not 
have time to conduct an independent examination of the affiant 
and other witnesses.  In the normal situation, however, the 
Court has found it reasonable to require the officer applying 
for a warrant to exercise reasonable professional judgment in 
preparing the affidavit.  Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345-46 
(1986).   
¶103 The affidavit in this case raises several issues.  The 
full text of the affidavit is printed as an appendix to this 
dissent. 
A 
 
¶104 The affidavit supporting a warrant should establish 
probable cause that the warrant describes the correct place to 
be searched.  This affidavit provides probable cause that 
"'Lance' who lives on Royce" was supplying marijuana to Derrell 
Vance.  It also shows that Lance Ward owned property at 1663 
Royce.  It does not clearly establish, however, that the 
"'Lance' who lives on Royce" and Lance Ward who owns property on 
Royce are one and the same person.  Derrell Vance did not 
97-2008-CR.dtp 
 
 
8 
provide the last name or the street address of his supplier.  He 
did not indicate whether "Lance" owned property on Royce, as 
opposed to renting property or staying with friends.  The 
affidavit provides no basis for a reviewing court to determine 
the number of houses on Royce or whether there were other 
"Lances" living on Royce.  Conversely, it does not show whether 
police diligently examined tax rolls, city directories, or other 
documentary evidence to ensure that Lance Ward was the only 
known "Lance" on Royce.  If there were other "Lances" living on 
Royce, it would be a mockery of the Fourth Amendment to suggest 
that all their homes could be searched, and it would be 
deceitful not to disclose the existence of other "Lances" to the 
court.  The possibility of other "Lances" could have been 
systematically eliminated or at least reduced but was not. 
¶105 As a result, the critical information suggesting that 
the "'Lance' who lives on Royce" was in fact Lance Ward, was the 
following paragraph in the affidavit: 
 
2.)  Your affiant further states he is familiar with 
the confidential files kept by the Beloit Police 
Department Special Operations Bureau and as a result 
knows that the Beloit Police Department has received 
four pieces of intelligence indicating that Lance Ward 
is a drug dealer. 
¶106 The majority opinion wisely avoids any reliance on 
this paragraph in its discussion of the affidavit.  The 
affidavit provides no evidence that the information in the 
paragraph is worthy of belief.  The record does not indicate 
whether the allegations against Ward are anonymous or come from 
specific individuals.  It does not indicate the number of 
97-2008-CR.dtp 
 
 
9 
sources.  It does not indicate that the sources are "reliable." 
 It does not indicate their "basis of knowledge" or whether the 
pieces of intelligence are recent.  In sum, the affidavit does 
not incorporate anything to demonstrate that the four pieces of 
intelligence represent credible evidence.  This means that the 
affidavit did not show the magistrate that the police had the 
correct "Lance" and thus the correct house.  
B 
¶107 The Beloit police requested a premises warrant to 
search not only Lance Ward's house but also his "curtilage, 
outbuildings [a one car detached garage], and any and all 
vehicles pertaining to 1663 Royce on or near said premises."  
The resulting warrant authorized a search of Ward's body as well 
as the premises at 1663 Royce. 
¶108 This court has approved premises warrants.  They are 
discussed extensively in State v. Andrews, 201 Wis. 2d 383, 549 
N.W.2d 210 (1996).  In Andrews, the court held "that police can 
search all items found on the premises that are plausible 
repositories for objects named in the search warrant, except 
those worn by or in the physical possession of persons whose 
search is not authorized by the warrant."  201 Wis. 2d at 403.  
In State v. O'Brien, 223 Wis. 2d 303, 588 N.W.2d 8 (1999), we 
approved the search of a vehicle registered to the defendant 
that was located 200 feet away from the defendant's home, 
thereby enlarging the "premises."  Here, the warrant authorized 
a search of virtually everything related to 1663 Royce.  
Considering the broad scope of the warrant, the affidavit 
97-2008-CR.dtp 
 
 
10
supporting the warrant must have established some direct linkage 
between the things to be seized and the expansive premises to be 
searched.  Otherwise, the warrant represented little more than a 
license for the government to ransack Ward's property in the 
hope of uncovering evidence of crime.  See Frank v. Maryland, 
359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959). 
C 
¶109 Ward contends that the affidavit is "insufficient 
because it contains no statement creating a nexus between the 
items sought and Ward's residence on Royce."  Majority op. at 
¶27.  The majority responds with a blizzard of inferences: 
1) 
An informant alleges that Derrell Vance "sells pounds 
of marijuana."  Vance is apprehended with approximately 7.3 
pounds of marijuana.  The court infers from the evidence that 
Vance is "a substantial dealer."  Id. at ¶29. 
2) 
"Vance identifies his supplier as Lance who lives on 
Royce.  Vance supplies no other address or location.  . . . [I]t 
can be inferred from this information that Vance obtained the 
marijuana from Lance where Lance lived, on Royce." (emphasis 
added)  Id. 
3) 
"Given the large quantity of drugs involved" and the 
allegation that "Lance" supplied Derrell Vance, the court infers 
that Lance "is an even bigger fish" than Vance and that there is 
a substantial basis "that illegal items will be found at the home 
of Lance Ward on Royce.  The obvious and reasonable inference is 
that Lance dealt drugs from his home."  Id. at ¶30. 
97-2008-CR.dtp 
 
 
11
¶110 The 
court 
should 
not 
infer 
that 
Derrell 
Vance 
"obtained the marijuana from Lance where Lance lived" because 
that inference is speculative.  Vance was not quoted in the 
affidavit.  He was paraphrased.  He never spoke directly to the 
affiant.  Whatever he said about Royce may have come in response 
to a question about where Lance could be found.   
¶111 At the time the search warrant was sought, Derrell 
Vance was in custody and cooperating with the police.  There is 
no explanation why authorities did not obtain answers to simple 
questions like:  "If you don't know Lance's last name, can you 
describe what he looks like, his age, and where he lives?  Have 
you ever been to his house?  Did you see any drugs in his house? 
 When you purchased drugs from Lance, did you take possession of 
the drugs at the house?  If you didn't see drugs in the house or 
pick up drugs at the house, where did you take possession of the 
drugs?  Did Lance ever indicate where he keeps his drugs?  Do 
you know of anyone else who has bought drugs from Lance at his 
house or can place drugs in the house?" 
¶112 If there were evidence in the affidavit that Derrell 
Vance had bought drugs at Lance's house, or seen drugs at 
Lance's house, or had good reason to believe that Lance kept 
drugs at his house, there would be little reason to question the 
sufficiency of the affidavit on this point.  But the evidence is 
not there. 
¶113 The Ward affidavit reveals that in Derrell Vance's 
case, a Crime Stopper claimed that Vance sold pounds of 
marijuana and that he or she "had seen marijuana in the house of 
97-2008-CR.dtp 
 
 
12
Derrell Vance."  Why is the same affidavit unable to assert 
point blank that Derrell Vance said he had seen marijuana in the 
house of Lance on Royce?  The problem with the affidavit is not 
the reliability of what Vance said; the problem is the chasm 
left by what Vance did not say or what Vance told police that 
was omitted from the affidavit.  Judges are not entitled to use 
their imaginations to fill in these gaps. 
D 
 
¶114 The majority opinion insists that the court is "not 
suggesting that when there is sufficient evidence to identify an 
individual as a drug dealer . . . that there is sufficient 
evidence to search the suspect's home."  Majority op. at ¶36.  
It attempts to distinguish this case from the blanket rule 
advocated by the State on the basis that Lance Ward was a "high 
volume" drug dealer.  Id. at ¶¶30, 36.  The distinction is not 
persuasive. 
 
¶115 There was probable cause to believe that "'Lance' who 
lives on Royce" was a wholesale supplier of marijuana, and that 
he was "a bigger fish" than Derrell Vance.  However, these 
reasonable conclusions do not provide a substantial basis for an 
inference that Ward "dealt drugs from his home." 
 
¶116 If we were to undertake a statistical sampling of drug 
dealerslarge and smalland drug users, we might well find that 
majorities in each category keep drugs in their homes.  Such 
information would not supply probable cause to search the homes 
of all the suspected drug dealers and drug users in the United 
States.  More important, there is no evidence in this record 
97-2008-CR.dtp 
 
 
13
that supports the proposition that a "large" drug dealer is more 
likely to keep drugs in the home than a small drug dealer.  The 
affiant did not make such a claim. 
E 
 
¶117 Distinguishing this case from the broad rule advocated 
by the State relieves the majority of the burden of addressing a 
troublesome passage in United States v. Freeman, 685 F.2d 942, 
949 (5th Cir. 1982): 
 
[T]he fact that there is probable cause to believe 
that 
a 
person 
has 
committed 
a 
crime 
does 
not 
automatically give the police probable cause to search 
his house for evidence of that crime. 
This passage is important because it was quoted with approval in 
State v. Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d at 995. 
 
¶118 The majority asserts that "our examination of the 
facts leads to the conclusion that the information presented to 
the warrant-issuing judge was sufficient for a reasonable person 
to logically infer that evidence would be found at Ward's home." 
 Majority op. at ¶27.  It concludes that "[t]he obvious and 
reasonable inference is that Lance dealt drugs from his home."  
Id. at ¶30. 
¶119 What the majority fails to explain is how Lance Ward's 
situation is different from the situation of other drug dealers, 
so that the inference it draws is derived from the particular 
facts in this record.  The majority admits that the inference 
"is not the only inference that can be drawn, but it is 
certainly a reasonable one.  The test is not whether the 
97-2008-CR.dtp 
 
 
14
inference drawn is the only reasonable inference.  The test is 
whether the inference drawn is a reasonable one."  Id. 
 
¶120 Reasonable 
inferences 
were 
discussed 
recently 
in 
Belich v. Szymaszek, 224 Wis. 2d 419, 425, 592 N.W.2d 254 (Ct. 
App. 1999), in which the court said: 
 
An elementary principle is that an inferred fact is a 
logical, factual conclusion drawn from basic facts or 
historical evidence.  It is the probability that 
certain consequences can and do follow from basic 
events or conditions as dictated by logic and human 
experience. 
The court noted that a reasonable inference is a conclusion 
arrived at by a process of reasoning.  The "conclusion must be a 
rational 
and 
logical 
deduction 
from 
facts 
admitted 
or 
established by the evidence when such facts are viewed in the 
light of common knowledge or common experience."  Id. 
¶121 In Crowley v. Winans, the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit equated "permissive inference" with "permissive 
presumption," explaining that such an inference permits "the 
factfinder to infer the elemental fact from proof by the state 
of the basic fact, but does not require the factfinder to reach 
that conclusion and does not shift the burden to the defendant." 
920 F.2d 454, 456 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing County Court of Ulster 
County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979).  A presumption thus 
complies with due process requirements if "there is a 'rational 
connection' between the basic facts that the prosecution proved 
and the ultimate fact presumed, and the latter is 'more likely 
than not to flow from' the former."  Id. (quoting Ulster County, 
442 U.S. at 165). 
97-2008-CR.dtp 
 
 
15
¶122 The key phrase for me is "more likely than not."  The 
conclusion that Lance Ward "dealt drugs from his home" was not 
"more likely than not" to flow from his probable status as a 
dealer if one relied solely on information in the record.  The 
majority concedes that its inference is not the only inference 
that could be drawn.  In fact, the shrewd circuit judge did not 
draw that inference until he first factored in his own 
experience. 
III 
¶123 The affidavit in this case was deficient.  It left too 
many unanswered questions.  It did not establish probable cause. 
 The affidavit was not presented to the court in the throes of 
some desperate emergency.  Darrell Vance, the informant, was in 
policy custody, offering to cooperate.  Lance Ward, the target, 
had been suspected as a marijuana dealer over a period of time. 
 When the warrant was eventually executed, Ward was at home, 
unarmed, watching television.  There is no explanation in the 
record why the police could not have taken the time to prepare a 
proper affidavit.   
¶124 The affidavit printed in the appendix should not serve 
as a model to law enforcement in Wisconsin.  Expecting to get a 
warrant on the basis of this affidavit is like expecting to 
catch a big fish without baiting the hook.  The decision of the 
court of appeals should be affirmed. 
¶125 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and JUSTICE ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
97-2008-CR.dtp 
 
 
1 
APPENDIX 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
 
Douglas Anderson, being first duly sworn, on oath says that 
on the 4th day of December, 1996, in Rock County, in and upon 
certain premises in the City of Beloit, in Rock County, occupied 
by Lance Ward, and more particularly described as follows: 1663 
Royce is green with white trim, two story, single family 
dwelling.  1663 Royce is the fourth house south of Summitt on 
the east side of Royce.  1663 Royce has a one car detached 
garage in the northeast side of the lot.  Further to include 
curtilage, outbuildings and any and all vehicles pertaining to 
1663 Royce on or near said premises, there are now located and 
concealed certain things, to-wit: 
Marijuana 
and 
other 
controlled 
substances, 
scales, 
packaging 
materials, 
drug 
paraphernalia, 
drug 
ledgers, 
address/phone records, indicia of occupancy, opened or unopened 
financial documents relating to drug proceeds, U.S. currency, 
and any and all other instrumentalities, substances or documents 
which are in violation of Possession of Controlled Substance 
With Intent to Deliver-THC, contrary to Section 961.41(1m)(h)(1) 
of Wisconsin Statutes and prayed that a search warrant be issued 
to search said premises for said property. 
The facts tending to establish the grounds for issuing a 
Search Warrant are as follows: 
1). On 11-27-96, your Affiant received a call from a Crime 
Stopper who stated that Derrell Vance sells pounds of marijuana. 
97-2008-CR.dtp 
 
 
2 
 The Crime Stopper had seen marijuana in the house of Derrell 
Vance.  On 11-29-96 a search warrant was executed and the 
following items were recovered: 
 
 
3,311 grams of marijuana 
 
$11,171.00 U.S.C. 
 
.3 grams of crack cocaine 
 
Lettermate digital scale 
 
Postal scale 
 
Rolling papers 
 
Pipe 
 
THC roaches 
 
Indicia of occupancy for Derrell and Candy Vance 
The Crime Stopper stated that Derrell Vance would order his 
marijuana and have it distributed in a day or two.  Derrell 
Vance would re-order immediately or within a two week span.  
Derrell Vance would distribute one to two pounds to each of his 
dealers. 
On 11-30-96 a family member of Derrell Vance contacted your 
Affiant.  This family member was told by Derrell Vance that 
"Lance" was his supplier of marijuana.  Derrell Vance needed 
someone to make contact with "Lance" in order to get him out of 
jail. 
On 12-2-96, Derrell Vance contacted SLANT.  Inspector 
Kreitzmann of SLANT, told your Affiant that Derrell Vance wanted 
to make a deal to get out of jail.  Derrell Vance told SLANT 
that his supplier was "Lance" who lives on Royce.  These 
admissions to SLANT by Derrell Vance were prior to Derrell 
Vance's court initial appearance. 
The City of Beloit tax rolls shows 1663 Royce as property 
owned (sic) Lance R. Ward. 
97-2008-CR.dtp 
 
 
3 
2.) Your affiant further states he is familiar with the 
confidential files kept by the Beloit Police Department Special 
Operations Bureau and as a result knows that the Beloit Police 
Department has received four pieces of intelligence indicating 
that Lance Ward is a drug dealer. 
3.) Your affiant has been a police officer for 14 years 
and has participated in approximately 185 drug raids.  Affiant 
has been actively involved in the area of Special Weapons and 
Tactics since 1984.  Affiant is a State of Wisconsin Certified 
Instructor in the area of arrest and control procedures, both 
receiving and providing training.  Affiant is an Instructor in 
the area of Hostage Rescue and High Risk Warrant Service, both 
receiving and providing training.  Based on affiant's training, 
experience and associations with others in those fields, he is 
aware 
that 
persons 
involved 
in 
many 
illegal 
activities, 
including drug related crimes often arm themselves with weapons, 
including firearms and sometimes use those weapons against the 
police and others.  These persons will also destroy or conceal 
evidence 
if given 
time. 
 
Affiant, 
based 
on 
the 
stated 
experience, training and association, is aware that a very 
important factor in controlling persons and in particular, 
during drug raids, is surprise and speed.  Affiant is also aware 
that control reduces the likelihood of injury to all involved.  
Affiant is aware that announcement eliminates surprise and 
provides persons with a residence time to take actions that 
would require a reaction by officers.  For these reasons affiant 
requests that a NO KNOCK search warrant be issued.  Affiant, 
97-2008-CR.dtp 
 
 
4 
based on his training and experience with others in that field 
believes that where illegal drugs are sold by one person, they 
are purchased by others and are commonly carried on the persons 
of both.  It is also true of locations where drug use takes 
place, persons commonly carry illegal drugs on their body. 
Dated this 4th day of December, 1996. 
WHEREFORE, the said Affiant prays that a Search Warrant be 
issued to search such premises for the said property, and to 
bring the property, if found, and the person(s) in whose 
possession the property is found, before the Circuit Court for 
Rock County, to be dealt with according to law. 
 
 
 
 
 
[Signature of Douglas Anderson] 
 
[Subscription/Date] 
 
 
97-2008-CR.dtp 
 
 
1