Case Title: Feeney v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 85-200

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Feeney v. State1986 WY 55714 P.2d 1229Case Number: 85-200Decided: 03/03/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOHN J. FEENEY, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), 

 
 
v. 

 
 
STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, AlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Bernard E. Cole of Cole 
& Moench, Cheyenne.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

A.G. McClintock, Atty. 
Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. Atty. 
Gen., Cheyenne and Elizabeth R. Walsh, Asst. Albany Co. Atty., 
Laramie.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ.

 
 

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant claims 
prejudicial error occurred during his trial before a judge on charges of driving 
while under the influence of alcoholic beverages. Evidence of his refusal to 
submit to a sobriety test was inadvertently introduced, and appellant moved for 
a mistrial. The trial judge stated that she would disregard the inadmissible 
evidence, denied the motion for mistrial, and convicted the 
appellant.

 
 

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     This appeal presents 
one primary question:

 
 

[¶4.]     Did the trial court 
commit prejudicial error in denying a motion for a mistrial when, in a trial to 
the court, questionable evidence was elicited and later 
stricken?

 
 

[¶5.]     On the night of January 
16, 1985, AlbanyCounty sheriff's officers received a phone call 
regarding a vehicle which was supposedly transporting an injured person from 
Centennial to Laramie. Three officers responded to the call, 
and observed appellant Feeney's vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed. The 
officers stopped Feeney, and detected a strong smell of alcohol on his breath. 
As Feeney stepped out of the pickup, the officers observed that he stumbled and 
was unsteady, was swaying back and forth, and was having difficulty speaking in 
complete sentences. Because it was an extremely cold and windy night, officers 
waited to administer a sobriety test until they had returned to Laramie. Feeney was then 
advised of his Miranda rights and was placed under arrest. 

 
 

[¶6.]     After the arrest, 
Feeney was taken to Laramie, where he refused to take a sobriety 
test 

on the basis that he was 
already under arrest. At his trial before a county court judge on charges of 
driving while under the influence of alcohol pursuant to § 31-5-233, W.S. 1977 
(1984 Replacement), evidence that Feeney refused the test was revealed by one of 
the State's witnesses. Feeney's lawyer objected and moved for a mistrial. 
Similar evidence was also introduced in defendant's examination by his own 
counsel. The trial judge announced that she would disregard the questioned 
evidence, denied the motion for a mistrial and found the defendant guilty of 
driving while under the influence. The district court affirmed the county court 
as we now do.

 
 

[¶7.]     Appellant's brief fails 
to cite any Wyoming cases which would support his appeal 
by some sufficient legal principle. We have on numerous occasions reaffirmed our 
support for the general rule that

 
 
"* * * where there is 
sufficient competent evidence to sustain a finding in a case tried by the court 
without a jury, admission or exclusion of incompetent evidence is not a ground 
for reversal." Herman v. Speed King 
Manufacturing Company, Wyo., 675 P.2d 1271, 1279 
(1984).

 
 
See also In Re Shreve, Wyo., 432 P.2d 271 at 273 (1967); Arnold v. 
Jennings, 75 Wyo. 463, 296 P.2d 989 (1956); 
Macy v. Billings, 74 Wyo. 404, 289 P.2d 422 (1955); Miracle v. Barker, 59 Wyo. 92, 136 P.2d 678 (1943); Alaska Development Co. v. Brannan, 40 
Wyo. 106, 275 P. 115 (1929).

 
 

[¶8.]     On appeal it is 
presumed, in cases tried by a court without a jury, that the court in reaching 
its decision disregarded improperly admitted evidence unless the record 
affirmatively shows that the trial court's decision was influenced by improperly 
admitted evidence.1 X v. Y, Wyo., 482 P.2d 688 
(1971).

 
 

[¶9.]     The reason behind the 
rule is amply explained in Yount v. 
Strickland, 17 Wyo. 526, 101 P. 942, 944 (1909), which held that, since a 
trial judge can "sift the wheat from the chaff," in a case tried by a court 
without a jury, the admission of incompetent evidence is not presumed to be 
prejudicial. Cooley v. Frank, 68 
Wyo. 436, 235 P.2d 446 (1951); Russell v. Curran, 66 Wyo. 173, 206 P.2d 1159 (1949); Williams v. Yocum, 37 Wyo. 432, 263 P. 607 
(1928).

 
 

[¶10.]  This is the general rule as also 
expressed in 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1564(5), and 5A C.J.S. Appeal and Error 
§ 1728.

 
 

[¶11.]  Thus, the rule presumes that the judge 
will disregard the inadmissible evidence in making a decision. In this case, the 
trial judge even acknowledged on the record that the evidence that appellant 
refused to take a field sobriety test would be disregarded when making a 
decision. There is sufficient evidence in the record absent the evidence that 
Feeney refused the test for proper conviction of driving while under the 
influence, and therefore no error was committed. Herman v. Speed King Manufacturing 
Company, supra.2

 
 
ERROR CURED BY 
DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY

 
 

[¶12.]  The State correctly points out that if 
error did occur when evidence that Feeney refused to take a sobriety test was 
admitted, then the error was cured when Feeney also testified to the same effect 
during his direct examination.

 
 

[¶13.]  Here, again, Wyoming follows the 
general rule that:

 
 
"Error in admitting 
evidence which has been presented by or on behalf of one party is cured where 
practically the same evidence or evidence having essentially the same probative 
effect is afterward introduced by the adverse or objecting party or is elicited 
on cross examination or redirect examination." 5A C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 
1735(b).

 
 

[¶14.]  In Mullin v. State, Wyo. 505 P.2d 305 
(1973), this court held that, if an error was made in admitting into evidence 
defendant's statement to the police, the error was harmless where defendant 
later testified on direct examination to all pertinent matters in the statement. 
See also Russell v. State, 19 
Wyo. 272, 116 P. 451 (1911).

 
 

[¶15.]  In defendant's trial on charges of rape 
in State v. Holm, 67 Wyo. 360, 224 P.2d 500 
(1950), Justice Blume wrote:

 
 
"* * * We are inclined to 
believe that the testimony related to a detail of the offense and the testimony 
should have been stricken. But it does not follow that the error was 
prejudicial. [Citations.] The evidence in this case is unanimous, including the 
testimony of the defendant himself, that three boys actually took out the 
complainant on the evening of July 28, 1948, the time of the alleged offense 
herein. So we cannot see how the error of the court could have been 
prejudicial." 224 P.2d  at 502-503.

 
 

[¶16.]  In Brown v. Wyoming Butane Gas Co., Inc., 
66 Wyo. 67, 
205 P.2d 116 (1949), we said:

 
 
"Evidence of the alleged 
custom was, under the circumstances shown by the record, quite immaterial. 
However, both parties without objection submitted evidence in regard to the 
matter. The error if error there was, was harmless." 205 P.2d  at 
123.

 
 

[¶17.]  During Feeney's direct examination by his 
attorney, the following dialogue occurred:

 
 
"Q. Did you have any 
difficult time in communicating or speaking to the officers in any 
way?

 
 
"A. None at all really. 
There wasn't a whole lot of words talked. Except at the police station, when he 
asked me to do a sobriety test which I said, you already arrest me and I won't 
do it."

 
 

[¶18.]  Consequently, any contended error in the 
evidence admission by the State would be absolved by the subsequent introduction 
of the similar testimony by defendant.

 
 

[¶19.]  We conclude that the trial court 
correctly disregarded the questioned evidence in announcing that that testimony 
would not be considered. There was sufficient evidence introduced to support the 
conviction, and the defendant cured any error by his presentation of the 
evidence which he had earlier claimed to be inadmissible. We need not reach the 
Fifth Amendment question raised by appellant in his brief in affirming the 
conviction. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. City of Riverton, Fremont 
County, 70 Wyo. 84, 247 P.2d 660 (1952).

 
 

[¶20.]  Affirmed.

1 We neither consider nor 
decide admissibility of the evidence of refusal to take the sobriety test after 
arrest in accordance with the implied-consent law, § 31-6-101, et seq., W.S. 
1977 (1984 Replacement), and for the same reason do not undertake the 
constitutional inquiry raised by the Fifth Amendment 
question.

2 We will not pursue the 
academic inquiry as to what occurs (or what it means) if the court in a nonjury 
trial should declare a mistrial for his improper admission of 
evidence.