Case Title: Florida Dept. of Revenue v. American Business USA Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC14-2404

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2016-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-2404 
____________ 
 
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
AMERICAN BUSINESS USA CORP.,  
Appellee. 
 
[May 26, 2016] 
 
LABARGA, C.J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal in American Business USA Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 151 
So. 3d 67 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).  Because the district court expressly declared 
invalid a state statute, section 212.05(1)(l), Florida Statutes (2012), this Court has 
jurisdiction to review the decision.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the 
reasons we explain, we quash the decision of the Fourth District and hold section 
212.05(1)(l) constitutional. 
 
 
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This case commenced when the Florida Department of Revenue (“the 
Department”) issued a proposed tax assessment on American Business USA Corp. 
(“American Business”), doing business as 1Vende.com in Wellington, Florida, for 
taxes and interest on the company’s internet sales transactions between April 1, 
2008, and March 31, 2011.  American Business is a for-profit business 
incorporated in Florida and having its physical location and principal address in 
Florida.  All the company’s sales of flowers, gift baskets, and other items of 
tangible personal property were initiated online.  The company did not maintain 
any inventory of these items but would use florists that were local to the location of 
the delivery to fill the order.  The company charged its customers tax on flowers 
and other items delivered in Florida by local florists, but did not charge its 
customers sales tax on flowers and other items delivered outside of Florida.   
 
The tax assessment was issued by the Department to American Business 
pursuant to section 212.05(1)(l), Florida Statutes (2012), which provides in 
pertinent part: 
Florists located in this state are liable for sales tax on sales to retail 
customers regardless of where or by whom the items are to be 
delivered.  Florists located in this state are not liable for sales tax on 
payments received from other florists for items delivered to customers 
in this state.   
 
 
 
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Under Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.047(1), “[f]lorists are engaged in 
the business of selling tangible personal property at retail and their sales of 
flowers, wreaths, bouquets, potted plants and other such items of tangible personal 
property are taxable.”  The statute and rule were relied on by the Department in 
this case.   
After American Business filed a timely protest, a hearing was set before the 
Division of Administrative Hearings.  The administrative law judge issued a pre-
hearing order requiring the parties to stipulate to as many facts as possible.  
Accordingly, the parties filed a joint pre-hearing stipulation setting forth pertinent 
stipulated facts.1  After the administrative hearing, at which the co-owners of the 
business testified and the Department offered exhibits, the administrative law judge 
issued an order recommending that the Department uphold the tax assessment.  
The Department subsequently entered a final order adopting the administrative law 
                                          
 
 
1.  The parties stipulated as follows:  American Business USA Corp. is a 
Florida corporation doing business as 1Vende.com; American Business’s principal 
place of business and mailing address is in Wellington, Florida; all of American 
Business’s sales were initiated online; American Business specialized in the sale of 
flowers, gift baskets, and other items of tangible personal property; American 
Business did not maintain any inventory of flowers, gift baskets, and other items of 
tangible personal property; American Business used local florists to fill the orders 
it received for flowers, gift baskets, and other items of tangible personal property; 
American Business charged its customers sales tax on sales of flowers, gift 
baskets, and other items of tangible personal property delivered in Florida; 
American Business did not charge its customers sales tax on sales of flowers, gift 
baskets, and other items of tangible personal property delivered outside of Florida.   
 
 
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judge’s recommended order in full.  The order concluded that the tax required by 
section 212.05 is a tax on the privilege of engaging in business in Florida and is not 
a tax on the property sold.  The order also noted that American Business 
“stipulated that it specializes in selling flowers and markets itself to the public as a 
company that sells flowers,” rejecting the claim of American Business that, 
because of the manner in which it fills the orders, it is not a “florist” within the 
meaning of and subject to section 212.05(1)(l) or rule 12A-1.047.   
American Business appealed the Department’s final order to the Fourth 
District Court of Appeal where the company contended that the imposition of taxes 
on American Business for sales of flowers and other items of tangible personal 
property to be delivered out of state violated the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the “dormant Commerce Clause” emanating from 
article 1, section 8, of the United States Constitution.2   
As to the challenge to section 212.05(1)(l) imposing a tax on florists, the 
Fourth District held that the imposition of taxes on sales to out-of-state customers  
                                          
 
 
2.  “[T]he Constitution’s express grant to Congress of the power ‘to regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several states,’ Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, contains a ‘further 
negative command, known as the dormant Commerce Clause,’ . . . .  This negative 
command prevents a State from ‘jeopardizing the welfare of the Nation as a whole’ 
by ‘plac[ing] burdens on the flow of commerce across its borders that commerce 
wholly within those borders would not bear.’ ” Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Mich. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 433 (2005) (citations omitted).  
 
 
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for out-of-state flower and gift deliveries violates the dormant Commerce Clause; 
and that the tax is thus “unconstitutional as applied to [American Business’s] sales 
to out-of-state customers for out-of-state delivery.”  Am. Bus. USA, 151 So. 3d at 
70.  In so holding, the Fourth District recognized the factors necessary to evaluate 
whether a tax complies with the commerce clause: 
“The Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause impose 
distinct but parallel limitations on a State’s power to tax out-of-state 
activities.”  MeadWestvaco Corp. ex rel. Mead Corp. v. Ill. Dep’t of 
Revenue, 553 U.S. 16, 24 (2008).  When it comes to evaluating a tax 
regarding its compliance with the commerce clause, the decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court 
have considered not the formal language of the tax statute 
but rather its practical effect, and have sustained a tax 
against Commerce Clause challenge when the tax is 
applied to an [1] activity with a substantial nexus with 
the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not 
discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly 
related to the services provided by the State. 
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).  This 
has come to be known as the Complete Auto test.  If the state tax fails 
any prong of the four-part test, then the tax violates the dormant 
commerce clause.  Thus, if the taxing state is able to show only three 
of the four prongs under Complete Auto, the tax will not be sustained 
under a commerce clause challenge. 
 
Am. Bus. USA, 151 So. 3d at 71.  After applying the Complete Auto test to the 
facts of the case, and concluding the tax at issue here was an undue burden on 
interstate commerce, the district court stated, “Merely registering in a state does 
not give the taxing state the right to assess sales taxes on transactions without any 
other facts to constitute ‘substantial nexus.’ ”  Am. Bus. USA, 151 So. 3d at 73. 
 
 
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As to the Due Process Clause claim, the Fourth District, relying on the 
United States Supreme Court decision in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 
298 (1992), noted that a tax on a vendor may violate the Commerce Clause but not 
the Due Process Clause  
because “the two, the Due Process clause and the Commerce Clause 
are analytically distinct.”  [Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 305].  “[A] 
corporation may have the ‘minimum contacts’ with a taxing State as 
required by the Due Process Clause, and yet lack the ‘substantial 
nexus’ with that State as required by the Commerce Clause.” 
   
Am. Bus. USA, 151 So. 3d at 74 (quoting Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 313).  In finding 
that due process was not violated in this case because minimum contacts were 
present, the Fourth District explained that “traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice were not offended because the taxpayer’s company was 
registered in Florida and had a mailing address in Florida.”  Id. at 73.  In 
distinguishing claims under the Commerce Clause from Due Process claims, the 
Fourth District noted that “the Commerce Clause and its nexus requirement are 
informed not so much by concerns about fairness for the individual defendant as by 
structural concerns about the effects of state regulation on the national economy.”  
Id. at 74 (quoting Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 312).   
 
In sum, the Fourth District concluded that American Business had minimum 
contacts with the State of Florida such that no due process violation occurred, but 
that the business activities lacked a “substantial nexus” to Florida to allow tax on 
 
 
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sales involving out-of-state customers and out-of-state delivery of flowers, gift 
baskets, and tangible property that were never located in Florida.  For the reasons 
discussed below, we disagree that the tax on American Business violates the 
dormant Commerce Clause.   
ANALYSIS 
 
The issue before this Court is whether section 212.05(1)(l), Florida Statutes, 
is unconstitutional as applied to certain activities of American Business.  The 
constitutionality of a state statute is a pure question of law subject to de novo 
review.  City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So. 2d 143, 146 (Fla. 2002).  This applies 
to a review of the constitutionality of a tax statute.  See Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. 
New Sea Escape Cruises, Ltd., 894 So. 2d 954, 957 (Fla. 2005) (“[T]he 
interpretation of . . .  [a] tax statute . . . [is] subject to a de novo standard of 
review.”).  In this case, American Business brought a challenge to section 
212.05(1)(l), which, because it is an as-applied challenge, involves both a 
determination of law and a determination of the facts to which the law will be 
applied.  “[M]ixed questions of law and fact that ultimately determine 
constitutional rights should be reviewed by appellate courts using a two-step 
approach, deferring to the trial court on questions of historical fact but conducting 
a de novo review of the constitutional issue.”  Davis v. State, 142 So. 3d 867, 
871 (Fla. 2014) (quoting Henry v. State, 134 So. 3d 938, 946 (Fla. 2014)).  
 
 
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However, where, as here, “the facts are not in dispute, the only issue before the 
court is a reconciliation of the statutory provisions on which the parties 
respectively rely . . . . [and the] standard of review is de novo.”  Boca Airport, Inc. 
v. Fla. Dept. of Revenue, 56 So. 3d 140, 141-42 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).  Because the 
issue in this case is whether the tax statute is unconstitutional as applied to 
American Business, and because the operative facts are stipulated by the parties, 
the review by this Court remains de novo.   
As in all constitutional challenges, the statute comes to this Court clothed 
with the presumption of correctness and all reasonable doubts about the statute’s 
validity are to be resolved in favor of constitutionality.  “While we review 
decisions striking state statutes de novo, we are obligated to accord legislative acts 
a presumption of constitutionality and to construe challenged legislation to effect a 
constitutional outcome whenever possible.”  Crist v. Ervin, 56 So. 3d 745, 747 
(Fla. 2010) (quoting Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So. 2d 250, 
256 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Howard, 916 So. 2d 640, 642 
(Fla. 2005))).  With these standards in mind, we turn to the statute at issue. 
Section 212.05, Florida Statutes (2012), provides in pertinent part that 
“every person is exercising a taxable privilege who engages in the business of 
selling tangible personal property at retail in this state, including the business of 
making mail order sales, . . .”  The statute further provides that “[f]or the exercise 
 
 
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of such privilege, a tax is levied on each taxable transaction or incident.”  
§ 212.05(1), Fla. Stat. (2012) (emphasis added).  Thus, the administrative law 
judge and the Department are correct that the statute does not place a tax on the 
items sold, but on the sales transaction itself.  Subsection (1)(l) then makes clear 
that “[f]lorists located in this state are liable for sales tax on sales to retail 
customers regardless of where or by whom the items are to be delivered.”  
§ 212.05(1)(l), Fla. Stat. (2012)  We turn first to the issue of whether section 
212.05(1)(l) violates the dormant Commerce Clause as applied to American 
Business’s internet sales of flowers, gift baskets, and other tangible personal 
property. 
The Dormant Commerce Clause 
The relevant inquiry into a claim of violation of the dormant Commerce 
Clause begins with the Complete Auto test.  In Complete Auto, the United States 
Supreme Court addressed “ ‘the perennial problem of the validity of a state tax for 
the privilege of carrying on within a state, certain activities’ related to a 
corporation’s operation of an interstate business.”  430 U.S. at 274 (quoting 
Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 101 (1975)).  The Mississippi tax 
was to be levied on gross sales of any business within the state, and the law 
required that anyone liable for the tax is required to add it to the gross sales price 
and collect it at the time the sales price is collected.  Id. at 276.  The Supreme 
 
 
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Court upheld the tax, which was imposed on a motor carrier transporting vehicles 
manufactured outside the state and shipped into the state by a company that did 
business within the state.  The basis for affirmance announced in Complete Auto is 
the four-prong test that has come to be applied to determine if a taxing statute 
violates the dormant Commerce Clause.  The Supreme Court in Complete Auto 
upheld that tax because no claim or showing was “made that the activity is not 
sufficiently connected to the State to justify a tax, or that the tax is not fairly 
related to benefits provided the taxpayer, or that the tax discriminates against 
interstate commerce, or that the tax is not fairly apportioned.”  Id. at 287.   
 
The Supreme Court in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 
514 U.S. 175 (1995), later explained that the Court has “often applied, and 
somewhat refined, what has come to be known as Complete Auto’s four-part test.”  
Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 183.  As noted above, the Court explained the test as 
requiring in its first prong that “a sale of tangible goods has a sufficient nexus to 
the State in which the sale is consummated to be treated as a local transaction 
taxable by that State.”  Id. at 184. 
 
The second prong of the Complete Auto test, as interpreted in Jefferson 
Lines, looks at whether the tax is properly apportioned to ensure that each state 
taxes only its fair share of an interstate transaction.  Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 
184.  The Court explained that “[f]or over a decade now, we have assessed any 
 
 
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threat of malapportionment by asking whether the tax is ‘internally consistent’ and, 
if so, whether it is ‘externally consistent’ as well.”  Id. at 185 (quoting Goldberg v, 
Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 261 (1989)).  The first component of prong two, internal 
consistency, “is preserved when the imposition of a tax identical to the one in 
question by every other State would add no burden to interstate commerce that 
intrastate commerce would not also bear.”  Id.  The Supreme Court in Jefferson 
Lines concluded that the tax at issue was internally consistent because “[i]f every 
State were to impose a tax identical to Oklahoma’s, that is, a tax on ticket sales 
within the State for travel originating there, no sale would be subject to more than 
one State’s tax.”  Id.  The second component of prong two is external consistency, 
which looks “to the economic justification for the State’s claim upon the value 
taxed, to discover whether a State’s tax reaches beyond that portion of value that is 
fairly attributable to economic activity within the taxing State.”  Id.  “[T]he threat 
of real multiple taxation (though not by literally identical statutes) may indicate a 
State’s impermissible overreaching.”  Id.   
The third prong of the Complete Auto test, whether the tax discriminates 
against interstate commerce, looks at whether the tax provides a direct commercial 
advantage to local business.  Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 197.  As the Supreme 
Court in Jefferson Lines noted, such a discriminatory advantage was found in 
American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 285-86 (1987), where 
 
 
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the tax imposed a cost per mile on trucks operated by an interstate motor carrier 
that was five times as heavy as the cost per mile borne by local trucks.  Jefferson 
Lines, 514 U.S. at 197 (citing Am. Trucking, 483 U.S. at 269). 
Finally, the fourth prong of the Complete Auto test looks at whether the tax 
is fairly related to the services provided by the State.  Id.  The Supreme Court in 
Jefferson Lines explained that “the Commerce Clause demands a fair relation 
between a tax and the benefits conferred upon the taxpayer by the State.”  Id. at 
199.  However, “[t]he fair relation prong of Complete Auto requires no detailed 
accounting of the services provided to the taxpayer on account of the activity being 
taxed, nor, indeed, is a State limited to offsetting the public costs created by the 
taxed activity.”  Id.  The Court further noted that “police and fire protection, along 
with the usual and usually forgotten advantages conferred by the State’s 
maintenance of a civilized society, are justifications enough for the imposition of 
the tax.”  514 U.S. at 200 (citing Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 267).  The test “asks only 
that the measure of the tax be reasonably related to the taxpayer’s presence or 
activities in the State.”  Id. at 200.   
The Department of Revenue in this case contends that only prong one of the 
Complete Auto test—substantial nexus—is at issue because prongs two through 
four were not contested by American Business.  Even though American Business 
 
 
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does not dispute that contention, we review whether all four prongs of the test have 
been met, and discuss each in turn. 
(1)  There must be a “substantial nexus” with the State. 
The facts establish that American Business had more than a slight presence 
in Florida.  Its economic activities and transactions transpired from its principal 
place of business in Florida, in taking internet orders for flowers, gift baskets, and 
other tangible personal property and arranging for those items to be located and 
delivered out of state.  The Supreme Court in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. 
Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), held that the use tax in that case 
violated the dormant Commerce Clause because the taxing state lacked the 
required nexus to tax an out-of-state vendor under these circumstances.  That case 
presented the question of taxation on an out-of-state seller whose only connection 
with customers in the taxing state was by common carrier or mail.  Bellas Hess 
owned no tangible property in the taxing state, and had no representatives or 
solicitors there.  Orders were sent to a plant outside the taxing state.  In holding 
taxation was improper in that case, the Supreme Court in Bellas Hess distinguished 
between sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or property in the taxing state.  Id. at 
758.  Ten years later, in National Geographic Society v. California Board of 
Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977), the Supreme Court affirmed the continuing 
vitality of Bellas Hess’s “sharp distinction . . . between mail order sellers with 
 
 
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retail outlets, solicitors, or property within [the taxing] State, and those [like Bellas 
Hess] who do no more than communicate with customers in the State by mail or 
common carrier as part of a general interstate business.”  Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 
430 U.S. at 559 (quoting Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758).  In 1992, the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed the Bellas Hess distinction, for purposes of the Commerce 
Clause, between businesses that have a physical presence in the state and those 
whose only contacts with the state are by mail or common carrier.  See Quill Corp., 
504 U.S. at 314.  American Business falls into the first category, having a business 
location, business property, and business activities in Florida.   
This Court has applied the principle set forth in National Geographic, and 
the distinction discussed there concerning companies that only make sales in a 
state by mail or common carrier and have no physical presence in the state.  In 
Department of Revenue v. Share International, Inc., 676 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 1996), 
we held that a “slight[] presence” of a company in Florida by way of attending a 
chiropractic seminar for several days each year would be an insufficient nexus to 
enforce a use tax against the company that sold products by direct mail order to 
residents in Florida.  The Court cautioned, however, that “[i]f such a company has 
additional connections to the taxing state, then those connections must be analyzed 
under the ‘substantial nexus’ test.”  Id. at 1363 (emphasis omitted).  This Court 
reaffirmed the principle “that out-of-state mail order sales companies . . . which 
 
 
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have no physical presence in the taxing state, are immune from state sales or use 
tax liability.”  Dep’t of Banking & Fin., State of Fla. v. Credicorp, Inc., 684 So. 2d 
746, 751 (Fla. 1996) (citing Quill Corp., Nat’l Bellas Hess, and Share Int’l).   
Thus, the law is established that without any physical presence in Florida, 
the sales tax imposed on American Business in this case for its out-of-state sales to 
out-of-state customers would clearly be in violation of the dormant Commerce 
Clause.  However, the record shows that American Business does have a physical 
presence in Florida—it is headquartered in Wellington, Florida, and has been doing 
business in Florida since 2001.  From its Florida location, American Business 
accepts internet orders and arranges for delivery of out-of-state flowers and 
tangible personal property.  Based on the facts of this case, we find that the 
“substantial nexus” test is met.  We turn next to the second prong of the Complete 
Auto test. 
(2)  The tax must be fairly apportioned. 
The internal consistency test, one component of prong two of the Complete 
Auto test, helps courts identify tax schemes that, in operation and application, 
would discriminate against interstate commerce.  The test “looks to the structure of 
the tax at issue to see whether its identical application by every State in the Union 
would place interstate commerce at a disadvantage as compared with commerce 
intrastate.”  Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1802 
 
 
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(2015) (quoting Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 185).  “By hypothetically assuming 
that every State has the same tax structure, the internal consistency test allows 
courts to isolate the effect of a defendant State’s tax scheme.”  Id.  “[T]ax schemes 
that inherently discriminate against interstate commerce without regard to the tax 
policies of other States” are “typically unconstitutional.”  Id.  “[T]ax schemes that 
create disparate incentives to engage in interstate commerce (and sometimes result 
in double taxation) only as a result of the interaction of two different but 
nondiscriminatory and internally consistent schemes” are not typically 
unconstitutional.3  Id.   
In the present case, if all states taxed only the entity initially receiving the 
order for flowers, and not the florist to whom the flower order and delivery is 
referred, then no florist would be taxed twice.  Jefferson Lines also explained that a 
“failure of internal consistency shows as a matter of law that a State is attempting 
to take more than its fair share of taxes from the interstate transaction, since 
allowing such a tax in one State would place interstate commerce at the mercy of 
those remaining States that might impose an identical tax.”  514 U.S. at 185.  But, 
“[i]f every state were to impose [an identical tax] . . . no sale would be subject to 
                                          
 
 
3.  However, the Supreme Court also noted, “Our cases have held that tax 
schemes may be invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause even absent a 
showing of actual double taxation.”  Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1802 n.5.   
 
 
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more than one State’s tax.”  Id.  That principle applies equally to the tax at issue in 
this case.4 
We are also mindful of the principle discussed in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 
397 U.S. 137 (1970), that “[w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to 
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce 
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce 
is clearly excessive.”  Id. at 142.  Thus, the Supreme Court has allowed some 
incidental effect on interstate commerce if the statute generally operates in an 
even-handed and non-discriminatory manner and the state is not attempting to take 
                                          
 
 
4.  The tax, if enacted by all states in substantially the same form as 
Florida’s, would not present a serious risk of multiple taxation.  Amici cite the rare 
case where an out-of-state florist may travel into Florida to deliver the flower order 
it received in its home state and is determined under the statute to also be a florist 
“located in” Florida; or where a florist that has an out-of-state branch and a Florida 
branch, and is a registered dealer in both states, refers its out-of-state order to its 
Florida branch.  We do not consider arguments raised by amici curiae that were not 
raised by the parties.  See, e.g., Riechmann v. State, 966 So. 2d 298, 304 n.8 (Fla. 
2007).  Even if we consider such argument, instances of possible multiple taxation 
due only to the specific business model of certain businesses, which may subject 
those businesses to multiple taxation in rare circumstances, do not demonstrate that 
the Florida tax is placing interstate commerce at the mercy of states that might 
impose the same tax; and these examples do not show that Florida is attempting to 
garner more than its fair share of taxes.  Moreover, the facts upon which the as-
applied challenge operates do not fall into either of the two examples of possible 
multiple taxation cited by the amici. 
   
 
 
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more than its fair share of taxes.  We conclude the same can be said of the tax at 
issue in this case. 
As to the second component of prong two—external consistency—the 
Supreme Court explained in Jefferson Lines that “[e]xternal consistency . . . looks 
not to the logical consequences of cloning [the statute], but to the economic 
justification for the State’s claim upon the value taxed, to discover whether a 
State’s tax reaches beyond that portion of value that is fairly attributable to 
economic activity within the taxing State.”  514 U.S. at 185.   
American Business contends in this case—albeit in its argument concerning  
prong one of the Complete Auto test and not prong two—that it is being taxed on 
out-of-state sales that are not consummated until delivery is effected out of state, 
thus the Florida tax should not apply.  The Department responds that it is the 
transaction occurring in Florida that is being taxed in Florida, and that the 
transaction occurs in Florida where the business facilitated every stage of the 
transaction from advertising for customers, accepting their orders, receiving 
payment, and locating and transmitting the orders to third-party florists.  We agree 
with the Department that because the statute taxes the transaction that occurs in 
Florida by the business engaging in business here, and not on the items sold or the 
activities occurring out of state, prong two of the Complete Auto test is met. 
 
 
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(3)  The tax must not discriminate against interstate commerce. 
The Supreme Court in Jefferson Lines described a tax that discriminates 
against interstate commerce as one that provides a direct commercial advantage to 
local business.  514 U.S. at 197.  “States are barred from discriminating against 
foreign enterprises competing with local businesses . . . and from discriminating 
against commercial activity occurring outside the taxing State.”  Id. (internal 
citations omitted).  Section 212.05(1)(l), Florida Statutes, contains no provision 
that affords preferential treatment or any commercial advantage to a Florida 
business over an out-of-state business.  It simply requires that florists located in 
Florida are liable for sales taxes on sales transactions regardless of where or by 
whom the items are to be delivered.  The statute exempts from the tax florists 
located in Florida that receive payments from other florists for items delivered to 
customers in this state.  Thus, where a Florida florist receives an order and 
payment from another florist for delivery of flowers to customers in Florida, the 
Florida “delivering” florist will not pay the tax; and, if the other state has a statute 
similar to Florida’s, the “referring” florist in that other state will be the one that is 
liable to remit the tax in that state if similar tax provisions apply.  Similarly, where 
a Florida florist such as American Business sends an order for flowers or other 
items to an out-of-state florist to be delivered out of state, then the Florida florist is 
responsible for collecting and remitting the sales tax to the State of Florida.  
 
 
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Therefore, the statute does not discriminate against interstate commerce or provide 
a direct commercial advantage to local business.  Finally, we examine prong four 
of the Complete Auto test. 
(4)  The tax must be fairly related to the services provided by the state. 
 
The Department of Revenue contends that the tax in this case is fairly related 
to the services provided by the State because American Business, like other Florida 
residents or businesses, benefits from the state’s resources and services.  This 
inquiry is closely connected to the nexus prong and serves to ensure that a state’s 
tax burden is not placed on persons who do not benefit from services provided by 
the State.  See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 313 (“The first and fourth prongs, which 
require a substantial nexus and a relationship between the tax and state-provided 
services, limit the reach of state taxing authority so as to ensure that state taxation 
does not unduly burden interstate commerce.”).  As noted earlier, the Supreme 
Court in Jefferson Lines explained that “the Commerce Clause demands a fair 
relation between a tax and the benefits conferred upon the taxpayer by the State,” 
but “[t]he fair relation prong of Complete Auto requires no detailed accounting of 
the services provided to the taxpayer on account of the activity being taxed, nor, 
indeed, is a State limited to offsetting the public costs created by the taxed 
activity.”  514 U.S. at 199.  Also as we noted earlier, and as the Supreme Court 
explained in Jefferson Lines, “police and fire protection, along with the usual and 
 
 
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usually forgotten advantages conferred by the State’s maintenance of a civilized 
society, are justifications enough for the imposition of the tax.”  Id. at 200 (citing 
Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 267).  The test “asks only that the measure of the tax be 
reasonably related to the taxpayer’s presence or activities in the State.”  Id.  “[T]he 
constitutional power of a state to tax does not depend upon the enjoyment of the 
taxpayer of any special benefit from the use of the funds raised by taxation.”  Delta 
Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 455 So. 2d 317, 323 (Fla. 1984).  The 
“practical operation” of the tax allows the State of Florida to exert powers relative 
to “opportunities which it has given, to protection which it has afforded, to benefits 
which it has conferred by the fact of being an orderly, civilized society.”  Id. 
(quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940)). 
American Business is physically located in Wellington, Florida, and operates 
its business from that location.  It benefits from the public safety agencies of the 
state, as well as other infrastructure and public amenities paid for by state taxes.  It 
benefits from the orderly, civilized society that is afforded it by the State of 
Florida.  American Business has by its presence and transactions in Florida availed 
itself of the opportunities and protections made possible in part by the taxes 
imposed on its sales transactions.  Thus, there is a reasonable relationship between 
the company’s presence and activities in the state and the tax at issue.   
 
 
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For all the foregoing reasons, we find that all four prongs of the Complete 
Auto test have been satisfied and section 212.05(1)(l) does not violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause. 
Due Process Claim 
American Business also claims that the tax at issue is a violation of the Due 
Process Clause of the United States Constitution.  The district court found no 
violation of due process and we agree.  Due process requires only that there be 
some minimal connection between the State and the transaction it seeks to tax.  
The Supreme Court in Quill Corp., citing Bellas Hess, essentially found that “some 
sort of physical presence within the State” is sufficient, and necessary, for 
jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.  Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 307.   
 
In the present case, American Business has a physical presence and does 
business within the state.  We have concluded that American Business’s activities 
have a substantial nexus to Florida.  Thus, the minimum connection required to 
satisfy due process is also met.  No due process violation is present on the facts of 
this case.   
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, we quash the decision of the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal in American Business USA Corp. v. Department of Revenue to 
the extent that it holds that the assessment of sales tax on sales of flowers, gift 
 
 
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baskets, and other items of tangible personal property ordered by out-of-state 
customers for out-of-state delivery violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the 
United States Constitution. 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, CANADY, and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the District Court of Appeal – Statutory or Constitutional 
Invalidity 
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D13-1472 
 
 
(Broward County) 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Dikman, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General, and Rachel Erin Nordby, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Michael David Sloan, David Bedford Esau, and Dean Angelo Morande of Carlton 
Fields Jorden Burt, P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee 
 
James H. Sutton, Jr. of Moffa, Gainor, & Sutton, PA, Tampa, Florida, and Sydney 
S. Traum of the Law Offices of Sydney S. Traum, P.A., Miami Beach, Florida, 
 
for Amici Curiae American Association of Attorney – Certified Public 
Accountants, Inc. and Florida Association of Attorney – Certified Public 
Accountants, Inc.