Case Title: Lutz v. Schmillen

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94-5

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Lutz v. Schmillen1995 WY 110899 P.2d 861Case Number: 94-5Decided: 07/18/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
Kennis LUTZ, Marsha Lutz, 
Loren Lutz and Marion Lutz d/b/a Elk Track Ranch and Sheriden Trails, and Elk 
Track, Inc., a Wyoming business corporation, 

Appellants 
(Defendants),

v.

Scott SCHMILLEN and 
Josephine Schmillen, 

Appellees 
(Plaintiffs).

Appeal from District 
Court of Teton County, D. Terry Rogers, J.

Lawrence B. 
Hartnett, Jackson, for appellants.

Andrew L. 
Breffeilh, Jackson, for appellees.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellants Kennis 
Lutz, Marsha Lutz, Loren Lutz, Marion Lutz, and Elk Track, Inc. appeal from the 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for accounting and appointing 
master; from the district court's judgment; and from the master's final report 
which was adopted in the district court's judgment.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

Issues

[¶3]      Appellants 
present five issues for our review:

A. The trial court erred 
in finding that the Goosewing Ranch was an asset of the partnership.

B. In the alternative, 
assuming that the Goosewing Ranch is partnership property, the trial court erred 
in adopting the finding of the master that the appellees were entitled to 
one-half of the profits of the post dissolution sale of the Goosewing Ranch, 
rather than the right to elect to receive one-half of the profits, if any, 
derived from the use of the appellees' interest in the Goosewing Ranch in 
operation of the partnership business, in lieu of interest.

C. Assuming that the 
appellees are entitled to one-half of the post-dissolution profit from the sale 
of the Goosewing Ranch, the trial court erred in adopting the findings of the 
master as to the amount of such profit, as the master ignored the clear 
undisputed evidence regarding the liabilities of the partnership in determining 
the amount of any such profit.

D. The trial court erred 
in not finding that the value of the appellants' capital contributions to the 
partnership was $540,000.00 and by not requiring the master to determine the 
value of appellees' interest in the partnership on October 31, 1989.

E. The trial court erred 
in adopting the findings of the master that the amount of the capital 
contribution of the appellees was $270,000.00

Facts

[¶4]      Loren Lutz and 
Marion Lutz, husband and wife, owned Elk Track Ranch, Inc. They formed that 
corporation when they acquired the title to the Elk Track Ranch located in Teton 
County.

[¶5]      At all times 
relevant to this appeal, another Wyoming corporation existed which was known as 
Elk Track Ranch Outfitters, Inc. and which conducted a hunting and outfitting 
business at the Elk Track Ranch. Loren owned fifty-one percent of the Elk Track 
Ranch Outfitters shares, and Kennis Lutz, Loren's and Marion's son, owned the 
remaining forty-nine percent of the corporation shares. Kennis had the authority 
to bind Loren, Elk Track Ranch, Inc., and Elk Track Ranch Outfitters, Inc. in 
the transaction with the Schmillens.

[¶6]      Scott Schmillen 
and Josephine Schmillen, husband and wife, met Kennis at a sports show in 
Anaheim, California, where Kennis was promoting the hunting business operated at 
the Elk Track Ranch. Thereafter, the Schmillens saw Kennis every year at the 
sports show, and they became friends.

[¶7]      Sometime in 1985, 
the Schmillens told the Lutzes that they might be interested in investing in 
some manner in the Elk Track Ranch operation. In January 1986, Loren and Kennis 
met with the Schmillens at the Schmillens' home in Long Beach, California. At 
that meeting, the parties more seriously discussed the possibility of the 
Schmillens becoming investors. The Schmillens said that they could not make an 
immediate commitment because Josephine had just accepted a new position at Dean 
Witter Reynolds and wanted to work in this position for the experience but that 
they could commit to moving to Wyoming in two years. Kennis wanted the 
Schmillens to give him a monetary commitment in the amount of $25,000, which the 
Schmillens agreed to do. 

[¶8]      In July 1986, the 
Schmillens again met with the Lutzes. The parties agreed that the Schmillens 
would contribute $270,000 in return for one-half of the interest in five acres 
of the Elk Track Ranch along with various buildings located thereon, the total 
of which was valued at $540,000. Josephine drafted a document which contained 
the parties' agreement on the basis of their discussions at this meeting. Kennis 
and the Schmillens signed this document.

[¶9]      In May 1988, the 
Schmillens moved to Jackson. The parties agreed that, because of Josephine's 
experience with Dean Witter Reynolds, she would keep the books for the 
partnership. Kennis and Scott began to work at the Elk Track Ranch.

[¶10]   By September 1988, virtually all 
the money had been spent, and the improvements which the parties had planned for 
the Elk Track Ranch in order to make it operable had not been completed. At 
about this time, Loren learned that the Goosewing Ranch was for sale at a 
reduced price. The Goosewing Ranch was located about five miles from the Elk 
Track Ranch and was a fully operational facility. The parties thought that the 
acquisition of the Goosewing Ranch could help the economic situation at the Elk 
Track Ranch because they could use some of the income derived from the Goosewing 
Ranch to further improve the Elk Track Ranch.

[¶11]   The Schmillens and the Lutzes 
attempted to find investors to enable them to acquire the Goosewing Ranch. 
Kennis was ultimately successful in raising the money which was needed to buy 
the Goosewing Ranch. Kennis and Marsha closed on the Goosewing Ranch purchase in 
May 1989. Later that month, the Schmillens met with Loren and Kennis. Kennis 
proposed that they determine the value of the Schmillens' interest in the Elk 
Track Ranch and use that value to calculate their proportionate share of the 
combined value of the Elk Track Ranch and the Goosewing Ranch, which would 
result in the Schmillens having a smaller ownership interest in the combined 
properties. The Schmillens rejected this proposal.

[¶12]   Later that year, the Schmillens 
informed the Lutzes that they wanted to sell their interest to the remaining 
partners, but the parties could not agree on how their affairs should be 
settled. The Schmillens filed this lawsuit on December 29, 1989, and the Lutzes 
sold the Goosewing Ranch in April 1991.

[¶13]   After holding a bench trial, the 
district judge entered his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order 
for accounting and appointed a master. The district judge found that, even 
though "the agreement [did] not mention the word `partnership[,'] . . . the 
testimony at the trial [was] uncontroverted that the parties intended to form a 
partnership and did form a partnership." He determined what the parties' 
agreements were with respect to their partnership and ordered the master to wind 
up the partnership affairs. The master filed his final report on October 29, 
1993, and the district judge simultaneously filed his judgment in which he 
adopted the master's final report in its entirety and granted a money judgment 
in favor of the Schmillens. This appeal followed.

Standard of 
Review

[¶14]   In resolving the questions 
presented by the Lutzes, we must determine whether sufficient admissible 
evidence supported the findings made by the district court and the special 
master. We assume that the evidence in favor of the successful party is true. We 
leave out of consideration entirely the evidence presented by the unsuccessful 
party which conflicts with the successful party's evidence, and we afford every 
favorable inference to the successful party's evidence which may be reasonably 
and fairly drawn from that evidence. Sannerud v. Brantz, 879 P.2d 341, 344 (Wyo. 
1994). "The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, 
shall be considered as the findings of the court." W.R.C.P. 52(a).

In accordance with 
W.R.C.P. 52(a), this Court will not set aside a district court's findings of 
fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, 
Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 538 (Wyo. 1993). "`A finding is "clearly erroneous" when[,] 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.'" Id. (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S. Ct. 525, 542, 92 L. Ed. 746 (1948)). Stated alternatively: "[A] 
determination that a finding is against the great weight of the evidence means a 
finding will be set aside even if supported by substantial evidence." Id. See 
also Samuel v. Zwerin, 868 P.2d 265, 267 (Wyo. 1994). We review a district 
court's conclusions of law de novo on appeal. Hopper, 861 P.2d  at 
538.

McNeiley v. 
Ayres Jewelry Co., 886 P.2d 595, 597 (Wyo. 1994).

Status of Goosewing 
Ranch

[¶15]   The Lutzes contend that the 
district court erred by finding that the Goosewing Ranch was a partnership 
asset. The Schmillens argue that the Lutzes have failed to show that the 
district court's finding was clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight 
of the evidence. We agree with the Schmillens.

[¶16]   Courts have generally found that, 
when they are deciding whether property is partnership property, they must 
determine the parties' intent. King v. Evans, 791 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1990); Shumway v. Shumway, 679 P.2d 1133, 1139 (Idaho 1984); Gorger v. Gorger, 
276 Or. 267, 555 P.2d 1, 9 (1976). The courts may consider the partners' acts 
and course of conduct in determining the partners' intention with regard to 
specific property. State Automobile and Casualty Underwriters v. Johnson, 766 S.W.2d 113, 122 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Sneed v. Kanelos, 150 Cal. App. 2d 684, 310 P.2d 706, 709 (1957). The courts may also consider the use which has been made 
of the property. In re Estate of Kruse, 19 Wn. App. 242, 574 P.2d 744, 747 
(1978). Finally, the courts can consider whether, at the time the property was 
acquired, the reason for the acquisition was to devote the property to 
partnership purposes. Price v. McFee, 196 Md. 443, 77 A.2d 11, 13 
(1950).

[¶17]   "The courts universally recognize 
the fiduciary relationship of partners and impose on them obligations of the 
utmost good faith and integrity in their dealings with one another in 
partnership affairs." 59A AM.JUR.2D Partnership § 420 at 453 (1987). See 
Claughton v. Johnson, 47 Wyo. 447, 458-59, 38 P.2d 612 (1934); Steeby v. Fial, 
765 P.2d 1081, 1083 (Colo.Ct.App. 1988); Hooper v. Yoder, 737 P.2d 852, 859 
(Colo. 1987) (en banc); see also WYO. STAT. § 17-13-404(a) (1989) (repealed 
1993).1

Each partner is the agent 
of the partnership as to all matters coming within the scope of the 
relationship. Each occupies a fiduciary relationship to the others in all 
matters pertaining to the partnership enterprise, and the utmost good faith is 
required of each in their relations with each other. In fact it has been said 
that "the authorities unanimously agree that there is scarcely any relation in 
life which calls for more absolute good faith than the relationship of 
partners." Stem v. Warren, 96 Misc. 362, 161 N.Y.S. 247.

Claughton, 47 
Wyo. at 458-59, 38 P.2d 612 (some citations omitted).

[¶18]   When a partner acquires property 
contrary to his fiduciary duty, he is held to be a trustee of the property for 
the partnership's benefit. 47 Wyo. at 459, 38 P.2d 612; Thomas v. Schmelzer, 118 
Idaho 353, 796 P.2d 1026, 1032-33 (1990); see also § 17-13-404(a). In Claughton, 
we held:

"A partner may not 
purchase, for his own benefit, property of any kind in which the partnership is 
interested, nor lease property when the firm is entitled to the benefit of such 
lease, nor secure a valuable contract for himself which it was his duty to 
procure for the firm. If he does, he holds in trust for the benefit of the 
partnership the property so purchased or leased or the contract he has obtained 
and must account to the firm for the profits of the transaction, unless it 
appears that the co-partner consented to the transaction."

47 Wyo. at 459, 
38 P.2d 612 (quoting 47 C.J. 800). See also Smith, Keller & Associates v. 
Dorr & Associates, 875 P.2d 1258, 1266 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶19]   While it is acknowledged that the 
partnership relationship does not preclude a partner's procurement of realty 
interests in his own right and with his own funds, the partner can do so only as 
long as the partnership does not suffer any disadvantage and the partner who is 
making the purchase does not reap any individual advantage from his position as 
a partner. Liggett v. Lester, 237 Or. 52, 390 P.2d 351, 354 (1964); In re Estate 
of Wilson, 50 Wn.2d 840, 315 P.2d 287, 292 (1957).

[¶20]   When a partner obtains financing 
for the development of real property in the course of a plan which had been 
originally pursued by the partnership for the same purpose, excluding other 
partners from participating further in the originally intended project, the 
partner has intercepted a partnership opportunity in breach of his fiduciary 
duty to the partnership. Wright v. Ogle, 283 Or. 505, 584 P.2d 737, 740 
(1978).

[¶21]   In accordance with the above 
articulated rules, we seek to determine whether sufficient admissible evidence 
supported the district court's finding that the Goosewing Ranch was partnership 
property. We are not persuaded by the Lutzes' argument that, since they acquired 
the financing and the title to the Goosewing Ranch, the ranch was their separate 
property rather than a partnership asset.

[¶22]   Josephine testified that her 
understanding of the relationship of the Goosewing Ranch to the partnership was 
as follows:

A. The Goosewing Ranch 
was a fully operational ranch that had several cabins and a main lodge, kitchen, 
et cetera, that was all turnkey, as you'll use the term. It means all ready and 
prepared for guests to show up. They needed no more improvements or changes to 
the property to accommodate guests.

And if we were to 
purchase that property it would be added to the assets of the partnership; we 
would use both pieces of property to enhance one another. One piece of property 
would serve one purpose. The Elk Track would be used for hunting still because 
it had the outfitters license and so forth, and because Goosewing was a fully 
operational ranch, monies that were earned from that ranch could help cover 
debts for the Elk Track Ranch improvements and so forth.

Q. So it was your 
understanding that the Goosewing Ranch was going to be purchased as an asset of 
the partnership?

A. Yes.

. . . .

Q. Did [Kennis] ever 
transfer the title of Goosewing Ranch from Kennis and Marsha Lutz to your 
partnership?

A. No.

Q. Did you ask that he do 
so?

A. It was understood in 
the very beginning that this piece of property was to be an asset to our 
partnership.

Q. Okay. Now, did Kennis 
Lutz call you at home to tell you when he had purchased the Goosewing 
Ranch?

A. Yes, he 
did.

Q. What did he 
say?

A. He said, "I'm back in 
town. We're the proud or the new owners of Goosewing Ranch. Give me a call." And 
that was left on our answering machine.

Q. Did you ever do any 
promotions for the Goosewing Ranch?

A. Yes, I 
did.

Q. When was 
that?

A. It was in the January 
1989 sports show in Anaheim, California.

Q. And what were you 
doing there?

A. We had set up a booth 
designated as Goosewing Ranch, and we had brochures and name and address slips 
for people that were interested in getting further information on the ranch so 
they could come up for the summer or winter season.

Q. And did you get name 
tags issued by the Anaheim sports show for that purpose?

A. Yes, we 
did.

Q. And what is 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 22?

A. These are the name 
tags that Scott Schmillen and myself wore designating that we represented the 
Goosewing Ranch as an exhibitor.

[¶23]   While she was promoting the 
Goosewing Ranch at the sports show, Josephine met her former brother-in-law, 
John Wagner, who had been her long time friend. The Schmillens went to dinner 
with Wagner and asked him if he would be interested in becoming an investor in 
the Goosewing Ranch. Although he did not ultimately invest in the Goosewing 
Ranch venture, Wagner was interested at that point in time and traveled to 
Jackson where he met with Scott and Kennis, discussed the possibility of 
investing, and inspected the property. He subsequently had several conversations 
with Loren. When he was asked about the subject of those discussions, Wagner 
testified as follows:

A. Kennis indicated that 
he and Scott were interested in purchasing the Goosewing Ranch; that in order to 
do that they needed additional investors and asked me whether I would be 
interested in becoming a partner with them in a joint grouping, as it were, of 
Elk Track Ranch. I assumed they meant the dude ranch because that's what they 
were in partners with, and so -

[¶24]   The Lutzes acknowledge that "[t]he 
only thing that can be said with certainty is that the Lutz[e]s told the 
Schmillens that they would be a `part' of the Goosewing Ranch if the Lutz[e]s 
were able to acquire it." The Lutzes further acknowledge that they intended "to 
acquire the Goosewing Ranch to combine it with the Elk Track Ranch in some 
fashion, in an attempt to salvage the partnership and protect the Schmillens['] 
investment."

[¶25]   Both the Lutzes and the Schmillens 
attempted to find investors for the Goosewing Ranch venture. They agreed that 
both the Goosewing Ranch and the Elk Track Ranch properties were necessary for 
the operations which they ultimately wanted to pursue. Their plan was for the 
properties to enhance one another: The Elk Track Ranch would be used in the 
hunting aspect of the business, and the Goosewing Ranch would be used for 
lodging and to generate money for improving the Elk Track Ranch. The fact that 
Kennis was ultimately successful in obtaining the financing is not important. He 
owed a fiduciary duty to the Schmillens which prohibited him from retaining the 
benefits which were derived from the partnership without their knowledge and 
consent. The partnership originally pursued the plan to acquire the Goosewing 
Ranch in order to combine it with the existing partnership property. Kennis 
intercepted the partnership's opportunity when he obtained the financing and the 
title to the property, excluding the Schmillens in violation of his fiduciary 
duty to them.

[¶26]   We hold that the district court's 
finding that the Goosewing Ranch was a partnership asset was not clearly 
erroneous or contrary to the great weight of the evidence because sufficient 
admissible evidence supported that finding.

Amount of Profits from 
Sale of Goosewing Ranch

[¶27]   The Lutzes claim that, even 
assuming that the Goosewing Ranch was partnership property, the district court 
erred in finding that the Schmillens were entitled to receive one-half of the 
profits from the post-dissolution sale of the Goosewing Ranch. They admit that 
the Schmillens had the right to receive either one-half of the profits derived 
from the use of the Schmillens' interest in the Goosewing Ranch for the 
operation of the partnership business or interest calculated on the Schmillens' 
share of the partnership from the date of its dissolution, but they argue that 
the post-dissolution gain on the sale of the Goosewing Ranch did not constitute 
post-dissolution profits in which the Schmillens would have the right to share. 
The Lutzes also dispute the amount which the master determined was the profit 
from the Goosewing Ranch sale. The Schmillens argue that the Lutzes have failed 
to show that the district court's findings were clearly erroneous or contrary to 
the great weight of the evidence. We agree with the Schmillens.

[¶28]   When any partner retires and the 
business is continued, the partner

may have the value of his 
interest at the date of dissolution ascertained, and shall receive as an 
ordinary creditor an amount equal to the value of his interest in the dissolved 
partnership with interest, or, at his option . . ., in lieu of interest, the 
profits attributable to the use of his right in the property of the dissolved 
partnership. . . .

WYO. STAT. § 
17-13-614 (1989) (repealed 1993). See Weisbrod v. Ely, 767 P.2d 171, 174 (Wyo. 
1989); see also Smith, Keller & Associates, 875 P.2d  at 1264. The right to 
share in the profits exists until the final accounting has been made so that 
those who are continuing the business will work quickly to get the affairs 
settled among the partners. Lange v. Bartlett, 121 Wis.2d 599, 360 N.W.2d 702, 
704 (1984).

[¶29]   The Lutzes assert that the 
Schmillens are not entitled to receive any of the profits which was derived from 
the Goosewing Ranch sale because that sale occurred after the date on which the 
partnership dissolved.2 They maintain that the correct way 
to account for the Goosewing Ranch would be to determine the value of the 
Goosewing Ranch as of October 31, 1989, and then add any profits which were 
realized on the Schmillens' interest in the use of, but not the sale of, the 
Goosewing Ranch since the nature of the partnership business was not the 
purchase and sale of real property.

[¶30]   In making this argument, the Lutzes 
rely upon Weisbrod. In that case, the trial court found that no post-dissolution 
profits were attributable to Weisbrod's rights in the partnership property. 767 P.2d  at 175. The facts of that case, however, are distinguishable from those in 
the case at bar. In Weisbrod, the partnership agreement provided that Ely, who 
owned eighty percent of the partnership interest, was to be the sole managing 
partner, conducting the day-to-day business, while Weisbrod's role was limited 
to sharing in the profits and losses. 767 P.2d  at 173. The partners' initial 
contributions were used to acquire furniture, fixtures, and a truck for the 
business. 767 P.2d  at 175. Since this business managed property, all the 
post-dissolution profits were the result of Ely's personal skill and services, 
and none of the post-dissolution profits was attributable to Weisbrod's interest 
in the partnership property. Id.

[¶31]   Weisbrod's interest in the 
partnership property, however, was not ignored. Rather, the trial court 
accounted for it in determining Weisbrod's share in the partnership, and the 
trial court also gave Weisbrod the interest which had been calculated on the 
value of his share in the partnership. 767 P.2d  at 173. Had the partnership 
assets been sold for a profit in that case, Weisbrod would have been entitled to 
receive his twenty percent interest in the profit. See Swann v. Mitchell, 435 So. 2d 797, 799 (Fla. 1983) (finding that it was proper to include the increment 
in the value of capital assets in determining profits); see also King, 791 S.W.2d  at 535 (explaining that the election provision of the Texas Uniform 
Partnership Act was intended to give the noncontinuing partner the benefit of 
asset appreciation). In the case currently before us, the profits at issue were 
the result of an increase in the value of a partnership asset, specifically the 
Goosewing Ranch. The Schmillens were, therefore, entitled to share in those 
profits.3

[¶32]   The district court required the 
Lutzes to conduct a full and complete accounting of all partnership assets and 
transactions. The district court also required that this accounting be audited 
and verified. The Lutzes, however, did not provide an audited and verified 
accounting as was ordered by the district court. The Lutzes' accounting did not 
account for any of the real or personal assets of the partnership, nor did it 
result in a "bottom line" number as to the Schmillens' interest in the 
partnership. The Lutzes failed to provide either a valuation of the Schmillens' 
interest at the time of the partnership's dissolution or an accounting of the 
profits which were attributable to the Schmillens' interest after the 
partnership had been dissolved. The Schmillens, on the other hand, presented 
evidence with regard to the profits on the Goosewing Ranch sale by introducing 
evidence of the ranch's purchase price and its sale price.

[¶33]   The district court's findings were 
not clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Accepting 
the admissible evidence in favor of the Schmillens as being true, we hold that 
sufficient evidence supported the master's finding that "[e]ach party is 
entitled to the sum of $122,631.50 for [his] share of the sale of the Goosewing 
Ranch." Since this gain was obtained after the partnership had been dissolved 
but before the Lutzes conducted the accounting and made a final distribution to 
the Schmillens, the master did not err in finding that the sale proceeds 
constituted post-dissolution profits.

Amount of Each Party's 
Capital Contribution

[¶34]   The Lutzes claim that the district 
court erred in adopting the master's findings with regard to the amount of each 
party's initial capital contribution. The Schmillens argue that the parties 
orally agreed that, by virtue of their capital contributions, the Schmillens 
were entitled to have a fifty percent interest in the partnership and to share 
in fifty percent of the profits and the losses realized by the 
partnership.

[¶35]   WYO. STAT. § 17-13-401(a)(i) (1989) 
(repealed 1993), which was in effect during the existence of the partnership in 
this case, provided that, subject to any agreement among themselves, "[e]ach 
partner shall be repaid his contributions, whether by way of capital or advances 
to the partnership property and share equally in the profits." The courts will 
presume that the partners possess equal interests in the partnership unless the 
partners have an agreement to the contrary. Shumway, 679 P.2d  at 1139; 
Yarborough v. Kilbee, 307 So. 2d 223, 227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).

[¶36]   A determination of the partners' 
capital contributions had to be made before the partnership accounts could be 
settled after a dissolution occurred because the Uniform Partnership Act 
required that a partner's capital contributions had to be paid before the 
profits could be divided. WYO. STAT. § 17-13-612(a)(ii) (1989) (repealed 
1993).

[¶37]   The district court found that the 
parties had entered into a written contract. That contract provided in pertinent 
part:

Kennis & Marsha Lutz 
and Dr. Loren Lutz agree to sell 50% of Elk Track Ranch to Scott & Jo 
Schmillen.

The sale price will be 
$270,000.00 which will consist of five acres, buildings and business 
transactions on the property, excluding the new barn. Additional property may be 
purchased at a later date as financing dictates.

. . . .

If at the time the second 
and final payments are due, the payments cannot be met, Kennis Lutz and Dr. 
Loren Lutz may buy out Scott & Jo Schmillen or sell the remaining percentage 
at their discretion.

The Schmillens 
and Kennis Lutz signed this agreement.

[¶38]   The district court also found: "The 
parties orally agreed that by virtue of their capital contribution to the 
partnership, [the Schmillens] were entitled to a 50% interest in the 
partnership, and to share in 50% of the profits and 50% of the losses of the 
partnership."

[¶39]   After collecting two days' worth of 
evidence from the parties and relying on Wyoming's partnership act as well as 
the district court's findings which are outlined above, the master found that 
the parties' initial capital contributions were of equal value.

[¶40]   We will not substitute our judgment 
for that of the trier of fact. PR (Parental Rights to TR) v. Shannon, 777 P.2d 1106, 1111 (Wyo. 1989). The Lutzes received their capital contribution of the 
Elk Track Ranch property, and the Schmillens should receive the amount which 
they contributed as capital. In analyzing the parties' written contract in 
addition to the trial testimony, we conclude that the parties intended for the 
Schmillens to acquire a fifty percent interest in the partnership. We hold, 
therefore, that sufficient admissible evidence supported the findings that the 
parties were equal partners and that their initial capital contributions were 
equal. 

Conclusion

[¶41]   We have not found any reversible 
error in the issues raised by the appellants.

[¶42]   Affirmed.

GOLDEN, Chief 
Justice.

ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING AS UNTIMELY FILED

[¶43]   This matter came before the Court 
upon the appellants' petition for rehearing. A petition for rehearing must be 
filed within 15 days of the date on which the opinion is rendered. WYO.R.APP.P. 
9.07. In this instance, the opinion was rendered on July 18, 1995. A petition 
for rehearing was, therefore, due not later than August 2, 1995. The petition 
for rehearing was filed on August 7, 1995. WYO.R.CIV.P. 6(d) does not apply in 
this circumstance. The petition for rehearing was not timely filed and the Court 
finds it should be denied for that reason. It is therefore,

[¶44]   ORDERED that the petition 
for rehearing be, and hereby is, denied for the reason that it was not timely 
filed.

 

 FOONOTES

1           
The partnership act which was in effect in Wyoming during the life of the 
partnership in this case, WYO. STAT. § 17-13-101 to -615 (1989), was repealed by 
1993 WYO. SESS. LAWS ch. 194, § 2. Wyoming's current partnership act can be 
found at WYO. STAT. § 17-21-101 to -1003 (Supp. 1994).

2           
The district court found that the partnership dissolved on October 31, 
1989. Kennis and Marsha sold the Goosewing Ranch in April 1991.

3           
The Lutzes also argue that, under Weisbrod, compensation owed to Kennis 
and Marsha for the personal services which they had rendered in operating the 
business should have been deducted from the amount of the profit attributable to 
the Schmillens. In reviewing the record, however, we do not detect any evidence 
which shows what this value might be. We, therefore, are unable to consider this 
argument.