Case Title: State v. Swope

Citation: 270 P.2d 708, 58 N.M. 296

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1954-03-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
270 P.2d 708 (1954) 58 N.M. 296 STATE ex rel. CARDENAS v. SWOPE. No. 5747. Supreme Court of New Mexico. March 24, 1954. Rehearing Denied June 8, 1954. *709 Joseph L. Smith, Lorenzo A. Chavez and Arturo G. Ortega, Albuquerque, for petitioner. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Mims & Akin, Albuquerque, for respondent. McGHEE, Chief Justice. The petitioner invokes the original jurisdiction of this court for the granting of a writ of mandamus compelling the respondent to set down for jury trial in Valencia county a workman's compensation case, the claim in such case having been filed in said county, and respondent having granted motion for defendants, the employer and insurer, that jury trial be had upon the cause in Bernalillo county. By § 26-105, 1941 Comp., it is provided, as at common law, the writ of mandamus shall not issue in any case where there is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus our first concern is whether petitioner has such other remedy available. Section 57-916, 1941 Comp., provides, inter alia: But, recognizing he could seek review of the order granting change of venue under this provision, petitioner asserts such remedy will result in great delay and expense if the writ be refused, the case tried to a jury in Bernalillo county, and the final judgment there entered reversed here upon appeal with direction for a new trial before a jury in Valencia county. On the other side, respondent argues petitioner cannot know whether he will be aggrieved by such final judgment entered, and that even if he should be so aggrieved, method of appeal is provided where review could be had, with provision the cause shall be advanced on the appellate calendar and disposed of promptly. While we recognize there is much to be said for respondent's position, and it is supported by the older authorities, if the change of venue was in fact made without authority, we believe the weight of the argument for the use of the writ in this instance is heavily in favor of petitioner. As was said in State ex rel. Security State Bank of Waldorf v. District Court, 1921, 150 Minn. 498, 185 N.W. 1019, 1020: See, also, 35 Am.Jur. (Mandamus) § 271; 55 C.J.S., Mandamus, § 79; Hale v. Barker, *710 1927, 70 Utah 284, 259 P. 928; State ex rel. T.L. Smith Co. v. Superior Court, 1920, 170 Wis. 385, 175 N.W. 927; Head v. Waldrup, 1944, 197 Ga. 500, 29 S.E.2d 561. We conclude if the nature of the act sought to be compelled lies within the provisions of § 26-104, 1941 Comp., the writ should lie. That section provides: In support of the granting of the writ of mandamus petitioner relies upon the provisions of § 57-915, 1941 Comp., as amended, Laws 1943, ch. 15, § 1, the pertinent portion of which reads: The section continues with provision if the claimant elects to file his claim outside the district in which he was injured, a general appearance by all of the defendants in the action shall be considered and treated as a waiver of venue and confer upon the court full and complete jurisdiction in the matter, and concludes with a provision for the giving of notice of the filing of the claim. In resistance of the writ, respondent relies upon the provisions of § 57-913, 1941 Comp., re-enacted and amended in part, Laws 1953, ch. 145, § 1. After setting forth provision for payment of compensation in installments, notice of injury and filing of claims under the act, the section continues: At the outset of our determination it must be stated the provisions regarding venue in general civil actions have no application to venue in workmen's compensation cases. Rule 1, Rules of Civil Procedure; Guthrie v. Threlkeld Co., 1948, 52 N.M. 93, 192 P.2d 307. And, of course, nothing said herein shall have application to matters of venue in general civil matters. In this case at the time of the accident the defendant employer had on file with the clerk of the district court of Bernalillo county a bond with Western Casualty & Surety Co., as insurer. It is petitioner's contention that as the bond was on file in one of the counties of the second judicial district, he might elect to bring his claim in any one of the counties comprising that district under the italicized provision of § 57-915, supra, and that once he had so elected and the venue was properly laid under such section, the court had no authority to change the venue and set the case down for jury trial in any other county and that such action was wholly without warrant under the provisions of the act. The respondent argues that under the italicized provision of § 57-913, supra, he has general authority to designate a time and place for the hearing of such cause upon application by "employer, insurer, guarantor or surety". He concedes the venue was proper where originally laid, but asserts under § 57-913 the defendants are given the right, after answer, to apply for a change of venue when the claim is filed in a county other than where the injury occurred. It is also argued if this section is in conflict with the provisions of § 57-915, § 57-913 must prevail for it was originally passed in 1929 and has been re-enacted twice since then, the last time being in 1953, while § 57-915 was originally passed in 1929 and was amended in 1943, many years before the effective date of the last enactment of § 57-913. It is unnecessary to consider this latter argument as in our opinion the two provisions do not conflict with one another. In making the argument the defendants in the compensation case have the right to have the venue changed to the county where the injury occurred after their answer to the claim of the petitioner, the respondent would have us consider the italicized portion of § 57-913 as if it stood alone, thereby ignoring the portions of the statute disclosing the proper circumstances under which such "hearing upon request" at a "time and place to be fixed by order *712 of the court, in the county where the injury occurred or upon agreement of the parties at some other place in the district" shall be had. In our view this provision for such hearing must be read together with the sentence preceding it making provision for summary judgment against an employer or other defendant who has filed no answer to the claim within the time allowed, or whose answer contains no denial or substantial defense to such claim. For convenience we again set out the sentence referred to: Immediately following this sentence it is provided: "Any such insurer, guarantor, or surety shall be entitled to file an answer" etc., and "before the rendition of any such judgment, any such employer, insurer," etc., shall be allowed a "hearing" thereon. (Emphasis supplied.) It is readily apparent the sentence in question is, by the use of the descriptive term, such, made solely applicable to those instances where summary judgment is proposed, and that this is the correct meaning is also borne out by the fact provision is made for a hearing, not for a change of venue. It is conceded by all, and clear under the statute, § 57-915, venue was properly laid in Valencia county where the claim was filed. There is no authority under § 57-913 to change the venue of the action, but simply a provision where summary judgment is proposed to be entered a defendant so requesting (or a plaintiff) shall be allowed a hearing at a time and place fixed by the court either in the county where the injury occurred or at some other place in the district as agreed upon by the parties. No other section of our Workmen's Compensation Act is pointed to as affording any warrant under the circumstances of this case for the court to order a change of venue, and by the terms of § 57-915 the claimant is explicitly given the right to elect where the venue shall be laid. As we said in Peisker v. Chavez, 1942, 46 N.M. 159, 123 P.2d 726, 727: We should not leave this case without taking notice of the practical issue before us. As pointed out by respondent, at the time of injury the petitioner resided and was employed in Bernalillo county; he never resided in Valencia county; his employer, Lopez Lumber Co., Inc., had its only place of business in Albuquerque, Bernalillo county, and the occupation in which petitioner was employed was carried on solely in Bernalillo county; all of the material witnesses in the case except the petitioner and possibly members of his immediate family reside in Bernalillo county and the petitioner now lives in California; and the attorneys for the parties reside and have their offices in Albuquerque. It is obvious the petitioner wants to avail himself of what he hopes will be the very liberal award of a Valencia county jury made in his favor; while it is equally apparent the defendants in the compensation case wish trial before a Bernalillo county jury in the hope of a verdict in their favor, or at least one giving the claimant only a modest recovery. However, despite the tactical advantage the petitioner may feel he is gaining over his adversaries in the compensation case, we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the legislature, or *713 fall into the error of trimming the statute to fit a condition which may exist in only one of the judicial districts of this state. The legislature has said these claims must be given precedence on the trial court docket and here, §§ 57-913, 57-916, to the end an injured workman may receive prompt compensation for his injury. To force the claimant to try his case in Bernalillo county and then in the event he received less than he felt proper, or nothing at all, bring the case here would result in needless expense and delay, for as we construe the applicable statutes, a reversal would necessarily follow, with direction to try the case in Valencia county. Such a course is not in accord with the speedy administration of the law, and it is out of just such situations the modern rule of granting the writ has grown. It was the simple ministerial task of the respondent to set the case down for jury trial in Valencia county and writ of mandamus will be made permanent directing the performance of such act. It is so ordered. SADLER, COMPTON, LUJAN, and SEYMOUR, JJ., concur.