Case Title: Schelling v. Humphrey

Citation: 2009-Ohio-4175

Docket Number: 20072202

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-08-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Schelling v. Humphrey, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-4175.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2009-OHIO-4175 
SCHELLING ET AL., APPELLEES, v. HUMPHREY; COMMUNITY HOSPITAL OF 
WILLIAMS COUNTY, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Schelling v. Humphrey, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-4175.] 
Negligent credentialing — Medical malpractice — Bifurcation of claims — 
Plaintiffs may pursue negligent-credentialing claim against hospital when 
doctor is no longer amenable to suit for medical malpractice because of 
bankruptcy. 
(No. 2007-2202 — Submitted October 7, 2008 — Decided August 26, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Williams County, No. WM-07-001, 
2007-Ohio-5469. 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} This case presents the issue of whether a plaintiff can pursue a 
negligent-credentialing claim against a hospital without a prior finding that the 
plaintiff’s injury was caused by the negligence of an independent-contractor 
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physician, when the physician who is the subject of the negligent-credentialing 
claim has filed for bankruptcy protection. 
{¶ 2} Plaintiffs, Loretta and Brent Schelling, sued Dr. Stephen 
Humphrey for medical malpractice arising out of two surgeries he performed on 
Loretta Schelling’s feet at the Community Hospital of Williams County. The 
Schellings also sued the hospital for negligently granting staff privileges to 
Humphrey. 
{¶ 3} After Humphrey filed a petition in bankruptcy, the Schellings 
dismissed their claims against him without prejudice. The hospital then moved to 
dismiss the negligent-credentialing claim, arguing that to prevail upon such a 
claim, the Schellings must first show that Loretta Schelling’s injury was caused 
by Humphrey’s negligence. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, but the 
Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed. The appellate court held that the element 
of the doctor’s negligence could be proven without the doctor being named as a 
party in the case. The hospital sought review in this court, and we accepted the 
hospital’s appeal. 
{¶ 4} Because the physician’s bankruptcy filing impeded the Schellings 
from pursuing their claim against the physician through no fault of their own, we 
conclude that in the unusual circumstances of this case, the Schellings may pursue 
their negligent-credentialing claim against the hospital by first proving that 
Humphrey was negligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of 
Loretta Schelling’s injury. 
I 
A 
{¶ 5} Loretta Schelling saw defendant Humphrey for foot pain. To 
address her foot pain, he performed two tarsal tunnel release surgeries on her 
heels, one on January 23, 2003, and the other on February 20, 2003, at defendant-
appellant hospital. Schelling alleged that she has continued to experience foot 
January Term, 2009 
3 
 
pain and has suffered a permanent and partially disabling condition. The 
Schellings sued Humphrey and the hospital, alleging that Loretta Schelling’s 
ongoing foot pain was the result of complications from the two surgeries 
Humphrey had performed, and that Humphrey committed malpractice in those 
surgeries. Brent Schelling also alleged a claim of loss of consortium. 
{¶ 6} The Schellings then amended their complaint to assert a negligent-
credentialing claim against the Community Hospital of Williams County. The 
Schellings alleged that the hospital failed to adequately review and evaluate 
Humphrey’s education, character, and fitness to practice medicine and his past 
performance as a doctor, and that the hospital’s negligent granting of staff 
privileges to Humphrey caused Loretta Schelling’s injuries. 
{¶ 7} Humphrey and the hospital denied the allegations. The hospital 
moved to bifurcate the negligent-credentialing claim and the Schellings’ medical-
malpractice claim against the doctor. The hospital argued that the negligent-
credentialing claim did not become ripe until the doctor’s negligence was 
determined, so the trial should be bifurcated and the negligent-credentialing claim 
stayed until after the Schellings obtained a finding of negligence against the 
doctor. The trial court granted the motion to bifurcate the trial over the Schellings’ 
opposition but denied the motion to stay the negligent-credentialing claim. 
{¶ 8} Humphrey then filed a petition for bankruptcy. Upon receiving 
notice of that petition, the trial court stayed the proceedings in this case in 
accordance with the automatic stay of claims in a pending bankruptcy case 
required by Section 362(a), Title 11, U.S.Code. Thereafter, the Schellings 
dismissed their action against Humphrey without prejudice on October 30, 2006. 
(No document reflecting the terms of any settlement of the claim against 
Humphrey with the bankruptcy trustee was filed in this case, although the 
Schellings acknowledged that a “settlement has been reached to some extent with 
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the Bankruptcy Trustee for Dr. Humphrey.”1) The Schellings then requested that 
the stay of the common pleas court action be lifted, given the dismissal of 
Humphrey from the case, and the trial court granted the motion. The bankruptcy 
court later granted Humphrey a discharge in bankruptcy. By that order, any 
attempt to collect a discharged debt from Humphrey was prohibited. See generally 
Section 524(a)(2),  Title 11, U.S.Code. (The parties do not dispute that the 
discharge applied to the Schellings’ claims against Humphrey.)  
{¶ 9} After the stay was lifted in the trial court, the hospital moved to 
dismiss the negligent-credentialing claim. The hospital argued that, to its 
knowledge, the bankruptcy court had not found that Humphrey was negligent in 
his treatment of Loretta Schelling and that Humphrey had not admitted 
negligence, and without such a finding, the negligent-credentialing claim could 
not be established. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that 
without a finding or an admission that the doctor was negligent, the Schellings 
could not proceed on the negligent-credentialing claim. The Schellings appealed. 
B 
{¶ 10} The Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed. That court concluded 
that the Schellings were not precluded from maintaining their negligent-
credentialing claim because they could establish the element of the doctor’s 
negligence even if the doctor was not a party to the case. Schelling v. Humphrey, 
6th Dist. No. WM-07-001, 2007-Ohio-5469, ¶ 16-17. The court of appeals 
rejected the hospital’s argument that a finding of the doctor’s negligence is a legal 
prerequisite to a negligent-credentialing claim. Id. at ¶ 18.  The hospital appealed 
to this court, and we granted review. 117 Ohio St.3d 1423, 2008-Ohio-969, 882 
N.E.2d 444. 
II 
                                                 
1.  No issue of contribution or indemnity is before us in this case.  
January Term, 2009 
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{¶ 11} The issue in this case is whether a plaintiff can proceed on a 
negligent-credentialing claim against a hospital without a prior finding, either by 
adjudication or stipulation, that the plaintiff’s injury was caused by the 
physician’s malpractice. 
A 
{¶ 12} This issue requires us to review the general principles in our cases 
involving the relationship between an independent doctor and the hospital where 
the doctor has been granted staff privileges. The parties do not dispute that 
Humphrey was an independent-contractor, not an employee of the hospital. 
{¶ 13} Doctors with staff privileges generally have the right to admit and 
discharge their own private patients to the hospital and the right to use the 
hospital’s facilities. Albain v. Flower Hosp. (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 251, 256, 553 
N.E.2d 1038, fn. 5, citing Classen, Hospital Liability for Independent Contractors: 
Where Do We Go From Here? (1987), 40 Ark.L.Rev. 469, 478, fn. 44, overruled 
in part on other grounds by Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Ctr. (1994), 68 
Ohio St.3d 435, 628 N.E.2d 46. While the hospital has the power to grant and 
revoke staff privileges and establish policies and procedures regarding patient 
care, “accredited hospitals must allow their staff physicians ‘to provide patient 
care services independently within the scope of their clinical privileges.’ ” Albain, 
50 Ohio St.3d at 256, 55 N.E.2d 1038, quoting Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Hospitals, Accreditation Manual for Hospitals: 1986 Edition 
(1985) 101. 
{¶ 14} Ohio law requires hospitals to set standards and procedures to be 
applied. See R.C. 3701.351(A). But “only licensed physicians, not hospitals, are 
permitted to practice medicine or surgery in this state.” Albain, 50 Ohio St.3d at 
259, 553 N.E.2d 1038, citing R.C. 4731.41. 
{¶ 15} A hospital does not need “to constantly supervise and second-
guess the  activities  of its  physicians,” or to “ ‘pass upon the efficacy of 
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treatment’ ” or “ ‘decide for a doctor whether an operation is necessary.’ ”  Id. at 
259, 553 N.E.2d 1038, quoting Hendrickson v. Hodkin (1937), 250 App.Div. 619, 
621, 294 N.Y.S. 982, 984-985 (Lazansky, J., dissenting), reversed (1937), 276 
N.Y. 252, 11 N.E.2d 899. Nor is a hospital an insurer of the skills of the private 
doctors to whom it has granted staff privileges. Id. at paragraph two of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 16} This court’s jurisprudence recognizes generally that an employer is 
not vicariously liable for the negligence of an independent contractor, since the 
employer has no right to control the mode and manner used by the independent 
contractor to perform the work. Clark, 68 Ohio St.3d at 438, 628 N.E.2d 46; see 
also Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185, 2005-Ohio-4559, 833 N.E.2d 712, ¶ 18. 
Accordingly, a hospital’s mere granting of privileges to a doctor, which the 
hospital may later revoke under its procedures, does not permit a court to hold the 
hospital liable for the doctor’s negligent acts under a theory of respondeat 
superior, or vicarious liability. Albain, 50 Ohio St.3d 251, 553 N.E.2d 1038, 
paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 17} However, we also have held that a hospital has a direct duty to 
grant and continue staff privileges only to competent doctors. Id. at paragraph two 
of the syllabus. Thus, a hospital has a duty to remove “a known incompetent.” Id. 
at 258. 
{¶ 18} To prove a negligent-credentialing claim, a plaintiff injured by the 
negligence of a staff doctor must show that but for the lack of care in the selection 
or retention of the doctor, the doctor would not have been granted staff privileges 
and the plaintiff would not have been injured. Albain, 50 Ohio St.3d 251, 553 
N.E.2d 1038, paragraph two of the syllabus.2  
                                                 
2.  This case arose before the April 9, 2003 effective date of Sub.S.B. No. 179, 149 Ohio Laws, 
Part II, 3596, 3602, which amended former R.C. 2305.25, now R.C. 2305.251, to provide for 
January Term, 2009 
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{¶ 19} The parties to this case do not dispute that to recover against a 
hospital on a negligent-credentialing claim, the plaintiff must establish the 
underlying medical malpractice of the doctor. The required element of the 
plaintiff’s injury having been caused by the doctor’s malpractice goes to the 
question of whether the hospital’s alleged negligent credentialing of the doctor 
proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury. “Although medical malpractice claims 
against the doctor and negligent credentialing claims against the hospital are 
separate causes of action, * * * both causes of action fail without proof that the 
physician’s failure to abide by ordinary standards of care proximately caused the 
patient’s harm.” Browning v. Burt (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 544, 566, 613 N.E.2d 
993 (Moyer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
B 
{¶ 20} The parties sharply dispute when a doctor’s malpractice must be 
determined in regard to a negligent-credentialing claim. The hospital contends 
that the doctor must be found negligent before a negligent-credentialing claim can 
proceed against the hospital. The Schellings argue that the doctor’s negligence 
may be proved in the same case and at the same time as the negligent-
credentialing claim against the hospital—a case within a case. The parties also 
dispute whether the hospital should be required to defend against an allegation 
that an independent-contractor doctor committed malpractice when the doctor is 
not (and cannot be made) a party to the case. Compare Schelling v. Humphrey, 6th 
Dist. No. WM-07-001, 2007-Ohio-5469, ¶ 18 (“Determining that staff physician 
negligence must be proven as an element of a negligent-credentialing claim 
against an employer does not interpose a legal requirement to name the staff 
physician as a defendant and prove the negligence claim in the same complaint”) 
and Davis v. Immediate Med. Servs., Inc. (Dec. 12, 1995), 5th Dist. No. 94 CA 
                                                                                                                                     
rebuttable presumptions applicable to negligent-credentialing claims against a hospital. The 
amended statute is not before us. 
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0253, 1995 WL 809478, *7, reversed in part on other grounds (1997), 80 Ohio 
St.3d 10, 684 N.E.2d 292 (finding no abuse of discretion in bifurcating medical-
malpractice issue and the negligent-credentialing issue at trial when doctors and 
hospital were named parties, reasoning that “the matter * * * did not become ripe 
as to the issue of negligent credentialing until and if medical negligence was 
found on behalf of appellee [doctor]”[emphasis added]). 
 
1. 
{¶ 21} The hospital contends that the trial court properly dismissed this 
case on the basis that a prior finding of negligence is a legal prerequisite to 
maintaining a negligent-credentialing claim. The hospital relies in part on Chief 
Justice Moyer’s partial dissent in Browning, 66 Ohio St.3d at 566, 613 N.E.2d 
993, in which he opined that “Albain requires that the underlying malpractice of 
the physician be proven before the plaintiff can recover damages against the 
hospital for its own negligence [in credentialing the physician].” 
{¶ 22} But Browning did not address the issue we are called upon to 
decide in this case—whether a doctor’s medical malpractice must be determined 
before a hospital may be called upon to defend against a negligent-credentialing 
claim. In Browning, the plaintiffs sued two doctors for medical malpractice and a 
hospital for the negligent credentialing of the doctors. 66 Ohio St.3d at 545, 613 
N.E.2d 993. The plaintiffs obtained a default judgment—i.e., a previous finding 
of malpractice—against one doctor but the other doctor remained a party. Id. at 
554, 613 N.E.2d 993, fn. 10. We held that an action against a hospital for bodily 
injury arising out of the negligent credentialing of a doctor is subject to the two-
year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.10 rather than the one-year statute in R.C. 
2305.11 that is applicable to medical-malpractice actions. Id. at paragraphs three 
and four of the syllabus. Chief Justice Moyer dissented in part, reasoning that 
“[w]ithout an underlying harm to the hospital’s patient through medical 
malpractice, an action against the hospital for negligent credentialing will never 
January Term, 2009 
9 
 
arise.” Id. at 566. The Chief Justice thus opined that a negligent-credentialing 
claim was subject to the same one-year statute of limitations as a medical claim, 
not the two-year statute of limitations as a bodily-injury claim. The ruling in 
Browning regarding the statute of limitations for a negligent-credentialing claim 
does not answer the question of when a finding that a plaintiff’s injury was caused 
by a doctor’s medical malpractice must be made in regard to the negligent-
credentialing claim. 
{¶ 23} Nor did Browning hold that a negligent-credentialing claim can be 
established without the doctor being a party in the case, as the court of appeals in 
this case determined. Schelling, 2007-Ohio-5469 at ¶ 14. As noted above, in 
Browning, one of the doctors was still a party, and a default judgment had been 
issued against the other doctor on the plaintiffs’ medical-malpractice claim. 66 
Ohio St.3d at 554, 613 N.E.2d 993, fn. 10. Thus, Browning does not answer the 
question here—whether the Schellings can establish the independent-contractor 
doctor’s malpractice, for the purposes of a negligent-credentialing claim, without 
the doctor remaining a party in the action and without a prior finding of the 
doctor’s negligence. 
{¶ 24} The hospital argues that it would be inappropriate to require 
hospitals to defend against an independent-contractor doctor’s negligence when 
there has been no prior finding of malpractice and when the doctor is not a party 
to the case. The hospital claims that such a requirement would be inconsistent 
with Comer and Albain. Comer held that agency by estoppel imposes vicarious 
liability on a hospital only when the independent-contractor physician has been 
found liable. Albain held that a hospital may not be held vicariously liable under 
respondeat superior for a doctor’s negligence merely because the hospital granted 
privileges to the doctor. But the only claim against the hospital in this case is for 
negligent credentialing, not agency by estoppel. The Schellings are not arguing 
that the hospital is vicariously liable for the doctor’s negligence. 
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{¶ 25} The hospital (and its amici) also contend that the effect of the court 
of appeals’ ruling, which allowed the Schellings to proceed with their negligent-
credentialing claim without the physician being a named party, is to require the 
hospital to defend the medical-negligence claim against Humphrey even though 
the hospital did not direct or control his treatment of Schelling. Cf. Albain, 50 
Ohio St.3d at 259, 553 N.E.2d 1038. The hospital asserts that it is inequitable to 
require it to defend against Humphrey’s negligence because he is no longer a 
party to the case and has no incentive to cooperate in the defense.3  
 
2. 
{¶ 26} In a negligent-credentialing case, when the doctor is or has been 
amenable to suit, the doctor ordinarily either will have been found liable for 
medical malpractice  in a prior proceeding, or the claim against the doctor for 
medical malpractice will be joined to the claim against the hospital for negligent 
credentialing. Thus, the hospital would not be required to defend against a 
negligent-credentialing claim before the physician’s malpractice has been 
determined, either in a prior proceeding, or as the first part of the case against 
both the doctor and the hospital. 
{¶ 27} The bifurcation of a negligent-credentialing claim and the 
underlying medical-malpractice claim avoids the problems of jury confusion or 
prejudice that may result from admitting evidence of prior acts of malpractice in a 
combined trial on both claims. Evidence of prior acts of malpractice by the doctor 
may be relevant to a negligent-credentialing claim, see Albain, 50 Ohio St.3d at 
258, 553 N.E.2d 1038, but presents the risk of unfair prejudice in determining 
whether the doctor committed malpractice. See Evid.R. 403(A). 
                                                 
3.  The hospital asserts that due to the expiration of the statute of limitations to sue for medical 
malpractice, Humphrey can no longer be sued. That issue is not before us today. The hospital also 
asserts that Humphrey no longer practices medicine, a matter which does not appear in the record 
of this case. 
January Term, 2009 
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{¶ 28} Bifurcation also allows a negligent-credentialing claim against a 
hospital to be dismissed if the plaintiff does not prevail on the malpractice claim 
against the doctor. If the fact-finder determines that negligence of the doctor was 
not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury, then a hospital’s grant of staff 
privileges to a doctor is not the cause of the plaintiff’s injury, as required by 
Albain. 50 Ohio St.3d 251, 553 N.E.2d 1038, paragraph two of the syllabus (“a 
plaintiff injured by the negligence of a staff physician must demonstrate that but 
for the lack of care in the selection or the retention of the physician, the physician 
would not have been granted staff privileges, and the plaintiff would not have 
been injured” [emphasis added]). 
 
3. 
{¶ 29} This case presents an unusual fact pattern in which the doctor 
(Humphrey) is no longer amenable to suit and the Schellings were prohibited 
from pursuing a claim against him shortly after they sued him, initially because of 
the automatic stay in place after he filed his bankruptcy petition. See Section 
362(a), Title 11, U.S.Code (generally barring commencement or continuation of 
actions against the bankruptcy debtor). The bankruptcy court’s order discharging 
Humphrey’s debts also notified claimants that they could not attempt to collect 
any debts that had been discharged. The Schellings did not present any document 
memorializing a settlement with the bankruptcy trustee of the Schellings’ 
malpractice claim against Humphrey, but their lawyer represented at oral 
argument that the trustee paid them a percentage of the bankruptcy estate. The 
parties do not dispute that there was no finding in the bankruptcy proceeding that 
Humphrey was negligent in treating Loretta Schelling, nor did they dispute that 
Humphrey did not contest the Schellings’ claim of medical malpractice in the 
bankruptcy proceeding. 
{¶ 30} Under the unusual circumstances of this case, where the 
bankruptcy proceedings impeded the Schellings from joining the physician as a 
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party, we conclude that the Schellings should be permitted to prove that 
Humphrey committed medical malpractice and that the alleged malpractice 
caused the Schellings’ injury, as an element of their negligent-credentialing claim 
against the hospital. We have held that a negligent-credentialing claim against a 
hospital is not one for vicarious (or secondary) liability for the doctor’s (primary) 
liability for medical malpractice, and that it stems from a hospital’s direct duty to 
grant and continue staff privileges only to competent doctors. Albain, 50 Ohio 
St.3d 251, 553 N.E.2d 1038, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus; Browning, 
66 Ohio St.3d at 556, 613 N.E.2d 993. Thus, Humphrey’s present lack of 
amenability to suit does not in and of itself extinguish the Schellings’ negligent-
credentialing claim against the hospital. Accordingly, the Schellings should be 
permitted to present their claim that the hospital’s alleged negligent credentialing 
of Humphrey caused their injuries. 
{¶ 31} Consistent with our analysis in this opinion, however, bifurcating 
the determination of whether Humphrey committed medical malpractice and the 
Schellings’ negligent-credentialing claim against the hospital would appropriately 
allow the fact-finder to determine whether Humphrey was negligent in his 
medical treatment of Loretta Schelling before the hospital must defend the rest of 
the negligent-credentialing claim at trial. Only if the Schellings prevail on the 
issue of Humphrey’s alleged malpractice should the rest of their negligent-
credentialing claim against the hospital proceed. 
III 
{¶ 32} Accordingly, in the usual case either a plaintiff must obtain a prior 
determination that a doctor committed medical malpractice and that the 
malpractice proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury, or the doctor will be a party 
to the case that includes the negligent-credentialing claim against the hospital. 
However, in the unusual circumstances of this case, Humphrey, the doctor, is no 
longer amenable to suit because of the bankruptcy stay and discharge, and the 
January Term, 2009 
13 
 
plaintiffs, through no fault of their own, cannot maintain their malpractice claim 
against him. Therefore, the Schellings are permitted to pursue their negligent-
credentialing claim against the hospital, as discussed above. 
{¶ 33} For the reasons stated in this opinion, the judgment of the court of 
appeals is affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 34} I respectfully dissent.  I believe that the majority is making an 
exception to the law merely because of the “unusual fact pattern” of this case, i.e., 
the allegedly negligent doctor is no longer amenable to suit because any debt to 
these plaintiffs has been discharged in bankruptcy.  Consequently, the hospital is 
burdened with defending against an allegation of negligence against a doctor who 
is not a hospital employee, but rather a nonparty with no stake in the outcome and 
no duty to cooperate or participate in the defense of the case. 
{¶ 35} Furthermore, the majority ordered bifurcation — a tacit 
acknowledgement that a finding of the doctor’s negligence, or lack thereof, must 
be made prior to proceeding on the remaining elements of the negligent-
credentialing claim.  As a result, the hospital is forced to defend a separate, albeit 
related, allegation of negligence against a nonparty doctor before the negligent-
credentialing claim is ripe.  I believe such an outcome requires the hospital to 
become an insurer of the doctor, a result that is contrary to Albain v. Flower Hosp. 
(1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 251, 553 N.E.2d 1038, overruled in part on other grounds, 
Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Ctr. (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 435,628 N.E.2d 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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46, in which we held that a hospital is not an insurer of the skills of a private 
physician. 
{¶ 36} The plaintiffs dismissed the doctor in this action.  Unfortunately, 
he is no longer amenable to a suit because of the bankruptcy discharge.  I believe 
that, in the absence of a prior determination that he committed medical 
malpractice that proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury, the plaintiff is unable to 
maintain a negligent-credentialing claim against the hospital.  The unusual facts 
of this case do not justify creating an exception to the law for these plaintiffs and 
placing a burden, not authorized by law, upon the hospital to defend an action 
against a nonparty so that the plaintiffs may pursue their action against the 
hospital. 
{¶ 37} Consequently, I dissent. 
 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Reminger Co., L.P.A., and Jeanne M. Mullin, for appellant. 
 
Williams DeClark Tuschman Co., L.P.A., Chad M. Tuschman, and Peter 
O. DeClark, for appellees. 
 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Catherine M. Ballard, and Anne Marie Sferra, 
urging reversal for amici curiae, Ohio Hospital Association and Ohio Osteopathic 
Hospital Association. 
______________________