Case Title: Idaho v. Salinas

Citation: 

Docket Number: 44627

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Date: 2018-08-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 44627 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
           Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
JUAN SALINAS, JR., 
 
           Defendant-Appellant. 
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Boise, May 2018 Term 
 
Filed: August 1, 2018 
 
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Steven Hippler, District Judge. 
 
The district court’s judgment of conviction is affirmed. 
 
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Brian 
R. Dickson argued. 
 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Mark 
W. Olson argued. 
_____________________ 
 
BRODY, Justice 
This case addresses whether the district court erred in its application of Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 404(b). Juan Salinas was charged with the crime of attempted lewd conduct with a 
minor under sixteen. He engaged in online conversations with a detective posing as an adult. He 
discussed entering a sexual relationship with the fictitious adult and her minor daughter, and was 
arrested when he later drove to a hotel where he and the detective had agreed to meet. The State 
sought to admit evidence of similar conversations that Mr. Salinas had with others, as well as 
sexual pictures of a fifteen-year-old and four-year-old girl, not part of the State’s fictitious 
scenario. The district court admitted all the challenged evidence except the picture of the fifteen-
year-old, which the court found was propensity evidence and prohibited under the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence. The district court found Salinas guilty of attempted lewd conduct after a bench trial. 
Mr. Salinas appeals the judgment of conviction, contending that the challenged evidence should 
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have been excluded as inadmissible propensity evidence. We conclude the district court did not 
err in admitting the challenged evidence and affirm the judgment of conviction. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
The State and Mr. Salinas agree on the relevant facts in this case. On December 15, 2015, 
an Ada County Sheriff’s Office detective observed a Craigslist advertisement entitled “Taboo 
Moms Only.” The ad was created on December 14, 2015, and ostensibly sought a sexual 
encounter with a mother and daughter, stating “[a]ge not an issue.” The detective determined that 
Salinas posted the ad based on the email address associated with the account. The detective then 
used the fictitious persona of a 34-year-old single mother named Jill with a 9-year-old daughter 
named Chloe to engage Salinas in conversations—initially by email, then by text message. After 
several weeks of sexually explicit exchanges, Salinas requested to meet Jill and Chloe. The 
detective (posing as Jill) set up a meeting at a nearby hotel. Salinas was arrested upon showing 
up at the hotel, and the State charged him with attempted lewd conduct with a minor under 
sixteen years old. 
 
The State filed a notice of intent to use in its case in chief certain evidence of Salinas’ 
other acts to establish or prove motive or intent, in accordance with Rule 404(b) of the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence. The State sought to use evidence that (1) Salinas emailed himself a nude 
picture of an approximately four-year-old girl in a sexually-suggestive position; (2) Salinas 
requested and received a nearly-nude picture of a girl who responded to a separate sexual 
advertisement and who claimed to be fifteen years old; and (3) Salinas engaged in two additional 
conversations with women with young daughters who answered his “Taboo Moms Only” 
advertisement, using sexually explicit language regarding the daughters. Salinas objected, and 
the court held a hearing on the State’s motion on July 29, 2016. The trial judge ruled all evidence 
except the picture of the fifteen-year-old girl admissible as relevant to motive. 
 
Salinas proceeded to a bench trial on August 16–18, 2016. The court found him guilty of 
the charged conduct and sentenced him to fifteen years, with four-and-a-half years fixed and ten-
and-a-half years indeterminate. Salinas timely appealed, claiming the court erred in admitting the 
challenged evidence as relevant to motive. We now affirm. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
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without the evidence.” I.R.E. 401. “Whether evidence is relevant is an issue of law” that this 
Court reviews de novo. State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 219, 16 P.3d 890, 895 (2000). Idaho courts 
employ a two-step analysis to determine the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b). State v. 
Russo, 157 Idaho 299, 308, 336 P.3d 232, 241 (2014) (citing State v. Pepcorn, 152 Idaho 678, 
688, 273 P.3d 1271, 1281 (2012)). “First, the evidence ‘must be sufficiently established as fact 
and relevant as a matter of law to a material and disputed issue other than the character or 
criminal propensity of the defendant.’” Id. (quoting Pepcorn, 152 Idaho at 688, 273 P.3d at 
1281). Second, the court must conduct a Rule 403 analysis to ensure that the evidence’s 
probative value is not “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Id.; I.R.E. 
403. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The district court did not err in admitting the challenged evidence. 
 
Salinas’ only issue on appeal is whether the challenged evidence the trial court admitted 
in this case—the nude photo of the four-year-old girl and the two additional conversations 
regarding the “Taboo” ad—was relevant as a matter of law. Salinas contends that the admitted 
evidence is only relevant to the issue of propensity, and is thus inadmissible under Rule 404(b) 
of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. The State claims that the trial court properly admitted the 
evidence as relevant to Salinas’ motive, and that the evidence was also relevant to Salinas’ 
intent. The State contends that the relatively short timeframe of approximately one month during 
which Salinas acquired the picture of the four-year-old and engaged in sexually-graphic 
conversations with mothers—including the detective’s fictional persona—tended to demonstrate 
Salinas’ motive and intent in driving to the hotel to meet “Jill” and “Chloe” the day he was 
arrested. 
 
The relevant text of Rule 404(b) states: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character 
of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident . . . . 
I.R.E. 404(b). The policy underpinning the prohibition on character evidence is “the protection 
of the criminal defendant.” State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185, 1188 (2009). This 
Court has noted that character evidence prejudices defendants because “it induces the jury to 
believe the accused is more likely to have committed the crime on trial because he is a man of 
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criminal character.” Id. (quoting State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510, 584 P.2d 1231, 1235 
(1978)). “Evidence of uncharged misconduct may not be admitted pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) 
when its probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate the defendant’s 
propensity to engage in such behavior.” Id. at 54, 205 P.3d at 1190. 
 
However, Rule 404(b) also lists purposes under which a court may admit the evidence. 
The rule “represents one of inclusion which admits evidence of other crimes or acts relevant to 
an issue in the trial, except where it tends to prove only criminal disposition.” Russo, 157 Idaho 
at 308, 336 P.3d at 241 (quoting United States v. Brown, 562 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1977)). 
“Motive is a well-accepted method of proving the ultimate facts necessary to establish the 
commission of a crime, without reliance upon an impermissible inference of bad character.” Id. 
(quoting 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 439 (2008)). “Motive is generally defined as that which 
leads or tempts the mind to indulge in a particular act.” Pepcorn, 152 Idaho at 689, 273 P.3d at 
1282 (quoting State v. Stevens, 93 Idaho 48, 53, 454 P.2d 945, 950 (1969)). Intent “is the purpose 
to use a particular means to effect a certain result.” Stevens, 93 Idaho at 53, 454 P.2d at 950 
(citing People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 297 (N.Y. 1901)). 
 
As an initial matter, the district court determined that a factual basis existed for the 
challenged evidence and that the evidence survived a Rule 403 balancing test. The district court 
further determined that the challenged evidence in this case was relevant to motive. Specifically, 
the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Salinas attempted lewd conduct with a 
minor child when he drove to the hotel on the evening of January 20, 2016. 
 
Prior to this Court’s 2008 decision in Grist, the State could introduce “corroborating” 
evidence as relevant, “particularly in sex crime cases involving minor victims.” State v. Moore, 
120 Idaho 743, 745, 819 P.2d 1143, 1145 (1991). In Grist, this Court disallowed corroboration 
evidence if that evidence served to merely repackage propensity evidence under a different 
name. 147 Idaho at 54, 205 P.3d at 1190. In other words, the State could no longer admit 
evidence of another sex act solely to demonstrate an increased probability for the act for which a 
defendant was charged, and thus “corroborating” the victim’s testimony while increasing the 
chance that the defendant committed the crime. Id. 
 
In 2014, this Court in Russo affirmed a district court’s decision to admit a defendant’s 
fantasies involving sexual assault into evidence as relevant to motive in the crime of rape. 157 
Idaho at 308, 336 P.3d at 241. The defendant claimed this was propensity evidence not personal 
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to the victim, and thus not relevant to motive. Id. We disagreed and noted “[t]here is no 
requirement that evidence must show that the motive for committing the crime was personal to 
the victim.” Id. We further held “that the evidence of Defendant’s fantasies and his collecting 
pornography that was consistent with those fantasies was relevant to his motive in this case.” Id. 
 
In support of his challenge, Salinas would have this Court rely on a 2014 Idaho Court of 
Appeals decision, State v. Folk, 157 Idaho 869, 341 P.3d 586 (Ct. App. 2014), to vacate the 
judgment of conviction. The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court erred by admitting 
into evidence two prior convictions for child molestation—one in 1992 and one in 1999—at the 
defendant’s 2012 trial. Id. at 878, 341 P.3d at 595. The Court of Appeals stated, “[u]nlike Russo, 
where Russo’s fantasies and collections of pornography consistent with his fantasies were 
relevant to Russo’s motive—that which leads or tempts the mind to indulge in a particular act—
the prior convictions in this case are not relevant to prove motive.” Id. (citation omitted). The 
Folk court also discussed intent, however, noting that “intent was not a materially disputed issue” 
to the defendant’s completed sexual act, and thus the prior convictions were not relevant to prove 
intent. Id. at 879, 341 P.3d at 596. 
 
In this case, the district court did not err in admitting the challenged evidence because it 
was relevant to proving Salinas’ intent. This was an attempt case, and is thus distinguishable 
from Folk. The challenged evidence that the district court admitted was not simply an instance 
where Salinas’ possession of child pornography and explicit online conversations made him 
more likely to be the type to engage in lewd conduct with a child. Rather, the sexually-charged 
prepubescent photograph combined with the explicit conversations regarding the “Taboo” ad—
all occurring in a short window of time leading up to his arrest—were directly relevant to 
Salinas’ intent. Because this is an attempt case with no completed sex act, the State needed to 
prove the explicit conversations were not mere fantasies upon which Salinas would never act, 
and that Salinas was not simply seeking a sexual tryst with an adult. The State had to prove he 
attempted to engage in lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. The challenged evidence was 
relevant to the State’s required proof regarding Salinas’ intent when he arrived at the hotel that 
night. In other words, the challenged evidence went directly to the issue of whether he intended 
to consummate a sexual act involving a prepubescent child. Because this Court finds the district 
court did not err when it admitted the challenged evidence since it was relevant to a non-
propensity purpose, we need not consider the other Rule 404(b) exceptions. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court affirms the district court’s judgment of conviction. 
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices HORTON, BEVAN, and Justice Pro Tem WILDMAN 
CONCUR.