Case Title: Castillo v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2007-11-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
CASTILLO v. STATE OF WYOMING2012 WY 3Case Number: S-11-0157Decided: 01/05/2012NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or othe formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
PAUL 
MARINO CASTILLO,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
Appellee 
(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County
The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate 
Counsel.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Stewart M. 
Young, Faculty Director, Prosecution Assistance Program, Joshua B. Taylor, 
Student Director, and Benjamin J. Sherman, Student Intern.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from a district court order reimposing sentence after the appellant’s probation 
was revoked.  Finding no abuse of 
discretion, we affirm.
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]      Did the district 
court abuse its discretion in reimposing sentence upon revocation of the 
appellant’s probation?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      The appellant was 
charged with three felony counts of interference with a peace officer.  He pled not guilty to all three counts 
at arraignment.  Subsequently, 
however, he entered into a plea agreement whereby two counts were dismissed, he 
pled guilty to the third count, and the State agreed to recommend suspension of 
incarceration in favor of supervised probation.  After receiving a Presentence 
Investigation Report, the district court held a sentencing hearing, at the end 
of which it sentenced the appellant to the custody of the Department of 
Corrections for incarceration for a period of not less than three years nor more 
than six years.  The prison sentence 
was suspended pursuant to the split sentencing provision of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-13-107 (LexisNexis 2011), and the appellant was ordered to serve 180 days in 
the county jail, to be followed by four years of supervised 
probation.
 
[¶4]      After the 
appellant served his jail sentence, and after he had been on supervised 
probation for some time, the State filed a Petition for Revocation of 
Probation.  The petition recited 
five alleged probation violations, four involving alcohol consumption and one 
based upon a larceny conviction.  
During a hearing on the petition, the appellant admitted the 
violations.  The district court 
heard from the appellant and counsel, and then reimposed the original sentence, 
giving credit for time served. 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶5]      We apply the 
following standard in reviewing a district court’s determination to revoke 
probation and to reimpose an original sentence:
 
            
The imposition as well as the revocation of probation lies within the 
sound discretion of the district court, and we will not reverse the actions of 
the district court unless that discretion is abused.  Therefore, the decision of a court to 
revoke probation and deny a sentence reduction motion in reimposing an original 
sentence is entitled to considerable deference by an appellate court.  We will not reverse the actions of the 
district court in sentence reduction, probation revocation, and sentence 
imposition cases unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.  Upon review, all that is necessary to 
uphold a district court’s decision to revoke probation is evidence that it made 
a conscientious judgment, after hearing the facts, that a condition of probation 
had been violated.
 
Trujillo 
v. State, 
2002 WY 56, ¶ 6, 44 P.3d 943, 945 (Wyo. 2002) (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted).  Where, as here, the 
question is not whether probation should be revoked, but whether the original 
sentence should be reimposed, we take the following 
approach:
 
            
The second portion of the proceeding, the dispositional phase, determines 
whether, in light of a proven violation, probation should be revoked.  Gailey v. State, 882 P.2d 888, 891-92 
(Wyo. 1994).  This portion of the 
proceeding excludes the rules of evidence, and while general due process 
protections continue to attach during this phase, “[t]he sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain an order revoking probation is a matter within the sound 
discretion of the trial court.”  Id., at 892 (citation omitted).  A conscientious judgment after hearing 
the facts is adequate.
 
Howard 
v. State, 
2011 WY 43, ¶ 12, 249 P.3d 230, 233 (Wyo. 2011).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶6]      In the “Argument” 
section of his appellate brief, the appellant notes that probation revocation 
proceedings are governed by W.R.Cr.P. 39, but he does not suggest that any 
provisions of that rule were violated in this instance.  Further, he does not cite to a single 
case or other authority in which the procedures followed by the district court 
in this case have been identified as being defective.  The gist of his appellate argument can 
be summed up in these two sentences from his brief:
 
It 
is Mr. Castillo’s belief that the district court abused its discretion when it 
refused to place him on ISP (Intensive Supervised Probation) following his 
admission of the allegations contained in the petition. . . 
.
 
. 
. . By not giving full consideration to placement on ISP, it is Mr. Castillo’s 
position that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed the term of 
incarceration.
 
[¶7]      We will affirm 
because the record reflects the district court’s exercise of “conscientious 
judgment” in rejecting placement of the appellant in ISP.  During the dispositional phase of the 
revocation hearing, the district court allowed the appellant to voice, at 
length, his desire for probation, his desire for alcohol treatment, and his 
intent to “stay out of trouble.”  
Next, he listened to defense counsel’s plea that the appellant be 
returned to supervised probation, with inpatient or outpatient alcohol 
treatment.  The probation agent told 
the court that positions were available in the local ISP program.  The prosecutor opposed ISP on the ground 
that the appellant’s present arguments were the same arguments he made to the 
court when he was first sentenced, and that experience revealed that the 
appellant only seemed to be aware of his problems when he was incarcerated.  The district court then reviewed the 
promises the appellant made when he was first given the split sentence, noted 
the probationary violations, which included a criminal conviction, and concluded 
as follows:
 
ISP 
is not an option, as far as I’m concerned.  
I see no point in wasting the State’s time and resources on a 
probationary situation that you and I both know is not going to succeed and you 
will be back here again.  So [it is] 
time to go get it over with.
 
Finally, 
in showing that it had considered the appellant’s contention that alcohol abuse 
played a role in his societal failures, the district court added to the 
reimposition of sentence a recommendation that the appellant be allowed to 
participate in the penitentiary’s Intensive Treatment 
Unit.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶8]      After admitting 
five separate violations of his probationary conditions, the appellant wanted 
the district court to return him to supervised probation, in the ISP 
program.  In rejecting that request, 
the district court exercised its conscientious judgment by considering the 
factual and procedural history of the case, by considering the probation 
violations, by comparing the appellant’s present situation with his situation 
when he was first sentenced, and by listening to the ISP recommendation.  Finding no abuse of discretion, we 
affirm.