Case Title: State of Missouri, Respondent v. Jacob R. Pribble, Appellant

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC89473

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2009-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI,   
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Respondent,  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  
No. SC89473 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
JACOB R. PRIBBLE, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY 
The Honorable Steven H. Goldman, Judge 
 
Jacob Pribble ("Defendant") challenges the constitutional validity of section 
566.151, RSMo Supp. 2008,1 pursuant to which he was convicted of attempted 
enticement of a child.  He was sentenced to six years imprisonment.  He argues that the 
statute is unconstitutional because it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, is vague, 
encroaches on protected speech, and went into effect pursuant to an invalid emergency 
clause.   
                                             
 
1 All statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2008. 
This Court has exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3, of the 
Missouri Constitution in that Defendant challenges the constitutional validity of a 
Missouri statute.  Because Defendant's constitutional challenges to the statute are without 
merit, this Court affirms the judgment. 
I. Background 
 
The Maryland Heights Police Department conducted an undercover investigation 
online by having an officer enter chat rooms and pose as a 14-year-old female.  
Defendant initiated contact with the undercover officer's persona and began an online 
exchange lasting more than an hour.  The exchange included Defendant's sending the 
officer explicit pictures of himself and suggesting that they could perform particular 
sexual acts together.  A week later, Defendant again contacted the officer and told her he 
would like to see her nude and have her touch his penis.  He made specific arrangements 
regarding where to rendezvous and where to perform the acts.  At the designated time and 
place in a park, Defendant arrived, got out of his car, and was taken into custody by the 
awaiting officers.  He then waived his Miranda rights and made a written statement.  
Among other admissions, he stated that he believed he was meeting a 14-year-old female 
and was hoping "to teach someone something new."  He does not challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence.   
 
Defendant was charged with violating section 566.151, as amended in 2006, for 
attempted enticement of a child.  Under this statute, it is a crime for a person over the age 
of 21 years to lure, solicit, or entice, through words or actions, any person under the age 
of 15 years for the purpose of engaging in sexual conduct.  Section 566.151's 2006 
 
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amendments changed the penalty provisions of the statute, making both enticement and 
attempted enticement of a child an unclassified felony with a minimum prison term of 
five years with no eligibility for parole, probation, or conditional release.2  As amended, 
the statute states,  
1. A person at least twenty-one years of age or older commits 
the crime of enticement of a child if that person persuades, 
solicits, coaxes, entices, or lures whether by words, actions or 
through communication via the Internet or any electronic 
communication, any person who is less than fifteen years of 
age for the purpose of engaging in sexual conduct. 
 
2. It is not an affirmative defense to a prosecution for a 
violation of this section that the other person was a peace 
officer masquerading as a minor. 
 
3. Enticement of a child or an attempt to commit enticement 
of a child is a felony for which the authorized term of 
imprisonment shall be not less than five years and not more 
than thirty years.  No person convicted under this section 
shall be eligible for parole, probation, conditional release, or 
suspended imposition or execution of sentence for a period of 
five calendar years. 
 
 
The General Assembly invoked an emergency provision of the Missouri 
Constitution, article III, section 29, which allowed the new, increased penalties to go into 
effect immediately when signed by the governor on June 5, 2006.   
II. Analysis 
 
This Court reviews de novo whether a statute is constitutional.  City of Arnold v. 
Tourkakis, 249 S.W.3d 202, 204 (Mo. banc 2008).  A statute is presumed constitutional 
                                             
 
2 Previously, attempted enticement was a class D felony, and enticement was a class C felony.  
Also, prior to the amendments, both crimes were permitted probation and had no special 
restrictions on parole or conditional release.   
 
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and will be found unconstitutional only if it clearly contravenes a specific constitutional 
provision.  Id.   
A. The penalty is not grossly disproportionate to the offense 
 
Defendant argues that section 566.151's mandatory five-year prison sentence 
without the possibility of probation or parole violates the prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment.  U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Mo. Const. art. I, sec. 21.3  He asserts that 
the statute's punishment is "grossly disproportionate" on its face when considered in light 
of the crime.   
 
Substantial deference is due to the legislature's determination of proper 
punishment.  See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983).  This Court follows the 
approach announced in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), which clarified that 
reviewing courts are to determine, as a threshold matter, whether a sentence is "grossly 
disproportionate."  See State v. Lee, 841 S.W.2d 648, 654 (Mo. banc 1992) (finding that a 
life sentence for robbery in the first degree was not disproportionate).  In making this 
determination, this Court considers the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the 
penalty.  Id.  If a sentence is not grossly disproportionate, then additional comparisons to 
sentences given to other defendants for the same or similar crimes are irrelevant.4  Id.  
  
                                             
 
3 Defendant does not argue that the Missouri Constitution offers protections in addition to the 
United States Constitution in any of his points.     
4 Only in the rare case that an inference of a grossly disproportionate sentence is present does a 
reviewing court then compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction 
and the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.  See Lee, 841 
S.W.2d at 654 (noting the three-prong test from Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-92, that Harmelin later 
narrowed).  Even if these additional comparisons were considered here, though, it would appear 
that they provide little support for Defendant's position.     
 
4
 
Section 566.151.3's penalty requires a sentence from five to 30 years without 
eligibility for parole, probation, conditional release, or suspended imposition or execution 
of sentence for five years.  The nature and the potential social harm of this crime – an 
adult of at least 21 years attempting to lure a child under 15 years for the purpose of 
engaging in sexual acts – is indeed serious and alarming.  Comparing this to the 
punishment, it is apparent that such a serious crime may carry with it a serious penalty 
without running afoul of cruel and unusual punishment.  See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 
1002-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding a mandatory life sentence for cocaine 
possession was constitutional and noting that a 40-year sentence for marijuana possession 
with the intent to distribute previously was found constitutional); State v. Bell, 719 
S.W.2d 763, 766 (Mo. banc 1986) (stating that a sentence's duration is not cruel and 
unusual unless it is so disproportionate that it shocks the moral sense of reasonable 
people).   
 
In light of this crime's seriousness, the minimum sentence of five years with no 
possibility of parole cannot be said to be disproportionate, much less grossly 
disproportionate.  The same also must be said for Defendant's actual sentence of six years 
for acts that included soliciting, planning, and then attempting to carry out the plan to 
engage in sexual activities with a minor.  This Court will not question the General 
Assembly's determination beyond this narrow inquiry, as matching prison terms with 
particular crimes is, as a general matter, the legislature's province.  See Harmelin, 501 
U.S. at 998 (Kennedy, J., concurring).       
 
 
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B.  Section 566.151 is not void for vagueness 
 
Defendant next claims that section 566.151's penalty provision is 
unconstitutionally vague in that its use of the word "convicted" would be confusing to a 
person of ordinary intelligence.  Defendant suggests that this vagueness stems from the 
fact that a person who receives a suspended imposition of sentence has not been 
convicted in the technical legal sense.  See Yale v. City of Independence, 846 S.W.2d 193, 
194 (Mo. banc 1993) (stating that the term "conviction" requires a final judgment and a 
suspended imposition of sentence is not a final judgment).  Given this, he asserts that a 
person cannot determine whether a suspended imposition of sentence would trigger the 
language forbidding parole and other forms of release for five years.  He further points 
out that, "[w]here there is ambiguity, the rule of lenity requires that the court strictly 
construe a criminal statute against the state."  State v. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d 144, 
168 (Mo. banc 2008). 
 
The challenged language appears in section 566.151.3, which states, 
Enticement of a child or an attempt to commit enticement of a 
child is a felony for which the authorized term of 
imprisonment shall be not less than five years and not more 
than thirty years.  No person convicted under this section shall 
be eligible for parole, probation, conditional release, or 
suspended imposition or execution of sentence for a period of 
five calendar years. 
 
(emphasis added). 
 
The void for vagueness doctrine ensures that laws give fair and adequate notice of 
proscribed conduct and protects against arbitrary enforcement.  State ex rel. Nixon v. 
Peterson, 253 S.W.3d 77, 81 (Mo. banc 2008).  The doctrine applies not only to laws that 
 
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proscribe conduct, but it also may apply to standardless penalties.  See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 44 (1991).  "The test in enforcing the doctrine is whether the 
language conveys to a person of ordinary intelligence a sufficiently definite warning as to 
the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices."  Id.  
This Court will give the law effect if it is amenable to a reasonable and practical 
construction.  Harjoe v. Herz Fin., 108 S.W.3d 653, 655 (Mo. banc 2003).   
 
Defendant does not allege that the statute is vague in its prohibited conduct, but 
rather he asserts that the penalty is vague because a person given a suspended imposition 
of sentence does not receive a conviction.  However, reading the statutory sentence in its 
entirety removes any confusion.  It clearly states that a suspended imposition of sentence 
is not available for this crime.  Section 566.151.3 ("No person … shall be eligible for … 
suspended imposition or execution of sentence for a period of five calendar years.").  As 
such, the only meaning that section 566.151.3 could possibly have is that a person found 
guilty of this offense is to receive a minimum sentence of five years with no possibility of 
parole, probation, conditional release, or a suspended imposition or execution of his 
sentence.  Defendant's vagueness argument has no merit.  
C.  Section 566.151 does not infringe on protected speech 
 
Defendant argues that section 566.151 violates the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and article I, section 8, of the Missouri Constitution because it 
impermissibly regulates speech related to sexual fantasies. 
 
 
 
 
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Section 566.151.1 states,  
A person at least twenty-one years of age or older commits 
the crime of enticement of a child if that person persuades, 
solicits, coaxes, entices, or lures whether by words, actions or 
through communication via the Internet or any electronic 
communication, any person who is less than fifteen years of 
age for the purpose of engaging in sexual conduct. 
 
 
 
The First Amendment and the Missouri Constitution both protect the freedom of 
speech, but it has long been recognized that these protections are not absolute.  See State 
v. Smith, 422 S.W.2d 50, 55 (Mo. banc 1967) (stating that free speech is not an absolute 
right under all circumstances and is subject to the state's inherent police power).  The 
United States Supreme Court has stated that "[o]ffers to engage in illegal transactions are 
categorically excluded from First Amendment protection."  See United States v. Williams, 
128 S.Ct. 1830, 1841 (2008) (finding a prohibition on offers to provide or requests to 
obtain child pornography well within constitutional bounds even if no one involved 
actually had any child pornography).  This Court has made similar assertions, previously 
upholding the validity of a prostitution-related statute that made it illegal to engage not 
only in the physical sexual acts but also in the negotiations.  See State v. Roberts, 779 
S.W.2d 576, 579 (Mo. banc 1989).  This Court reasoned that, "[b]ecause the words 
uttered as an integral part of the prostitution transaction do not have a lawful objective, 
they are not entitled to constitutional protection."  Id.  
 
Reading the elements of the crime in section 566.151 in total, it is apparent that 
this statute does not criminalize mere fantasy or other speech entitled to constitutional 
protection.  Rather, the statue requires an act of persuasion, solicitation, or enticement 
 
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"for the purpose of engaging in sexual conduct."  Section 566.151.1.  In other words, a 
defendant cannot be convicted under this statute for mere fantasy, which, by definition, is 
not for the purpose of actually engaging in the imagined conduct.  Neither does the 
statute's language cover scenarios where a speaker is advocating the merits of sexual 
relations with children.  See Williams, 128 S.Ct. at 1842 (distinguishing advocacy in 
support of child pornography from constitutionally unprotected offers to provide it or 
requests to obtain it).  Rather, the words uttered here are "an integral part" of the attempt 
to lure a child for the purpose of engaging in sexual activity; unquestionably, this is not a 
lawful objective.  See Roberts, 779 S.W.2d at 579; see also United States v. Bailey, 228 
F.3d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying a similar federal law and stating that a defendant 
"simply does not have a First Amendment right to attempt to persuade minors to engage 
in illegal sex acts").     
 
Defendant's overbreadth argument fails for similar reasons.  The overbreadth 
doctrine may apply when criminal statutes "make unlawful a substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected conduct … even if they also have legitimate application."  State 
v. Moore, 90 S.W.3d 64, 66 (Mo. banc 2002) (citation omitted).  As discussed above, 
Defendant does not show that this statute makes any protected conduct unlawful.     
D. The amendment to section 566.151 was validly enacted as an emergency measure 
 
Defendant argues that the General Assembly did not enact the amendment to 
section 566.151 properly as an emergency measure.  He points out that the default 
effective date was August 28, 2006, 90 days after the adjournment of the session.  This 
date would have been after the date of his offense on August 17, 2006.  In turn, he asserts 
 
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that the new law violates the prohibition against ex post facto or retrospective laws 
regarding his actions.5   
 
The Missouri Constitution sets out the default effective date for enacted laws and 
also provides that the date may differ for emergencies:  
No law passed by the general assembly, except an 
appropriation act, shall take effect until ninety days after the 
adjournment of the session in either odd-numbered or even-
numbered years at which it was enacted.  However, in case of 
an emergency which must be expressed in the preamble or in 
the body of the act, the general assembly by a two-thirds vote 
of the members elected to each house, taken by yeas and nays 
may otherwise direct.   
 
Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 29 (emphasis added). 
 
 
Intending to invoke this emergency clause here, the legislature stated: 
Because of the need to protect Missouri citizens from sexual 
offenders, section A of this act is deemed necessary for the 
immediate preservation of the public health, welfare, peace 
and safety, and is hereby declared to be an emergency act 
within the meaning of the constitution, and section A of this 
act shall be in full force and effect upon its passage and 
approval. 
 
 
This Court has stated that "a legislative declaration stating an act to be an 
emergency measure is entitled to great weight," but it is not conclusive, as the courts 
make the final determination of whether an emergency in fact exists.  Padberg v. Roos, 
404 S.W.2d 161, 170 (Mo. banc 1966).  In making this determination, "the test is whether 
the factual situation is such that there is actually a crisis or emergency which requires 
immediate or quick legislative action for the preservation of the public peace, property, 
                                             
 
5 See U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 10; Mo. Const. art. I, sec. 13. 
 
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health, safety or morals."  State ex rel. Tyler v. Davis, 443 S.W.2d 625, 631 (Mo. banc 
1969).   
 
In its emergency clause, the legislature did not give a detailed explanation of the 
emergency, but it is not required to do so under the Missouri Constitution, which merely 
requires "an emergency which must be expressed."  See Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 29; Bd. 
of Regents for Ne. Mo. State Teachers Coll. v. Palmer, 204 S.W.2d 291, 294-95 (Mo. 
1947) (addressing an argument that a bill's emergency clause was "merely a conclusion" 
and holding that the brief emergency statement was valid where it recited an immediate 
need for increased funding to schools after World War II in the interests of public peace, 
health, and safety).  This may be contrasted with an emergency clause that both fails to 
state an emergency and contains nothing in its subject matter that suggests an emergency.  
See, e.g., Padberg, 404 S.W.2d at 168-69 (finding an ordinance's provision changing 
employees' status invalid in these circumstances).  Here, consistent with Palmer, the 
emergency clause expresses an immediate need for protection from sexual offenders for 
the public health, welfare, peace, and safety.   
 
As such, this Court need determine only if an actual emergency existed, giving 
great weight to the legislature's initial determination.  There are many reasons that would 
support an emergency here.  The legislature may have believed that, prior to this 
amendment, many of those found guilty of enticement were receiving relatively light 
penalties, such as suspended execution of sentences or probation.  Or, the legislature may 
have wanted to put this increased penalty in place immediately with the hope of deterring 
even one more instance of this dangerous crime that is becoming more prevalent with 
 
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children's increased use of the Internet.  In light of these justifications, this Court gives 
the determination of the legislature great weight and finds no reason to question it here.   
III. Conclusion 
 
The circuit court's judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
_____________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mary R. Russell, Judge 
 
All concur. 
 
 
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