Case Title: Waterman Family Ltd. Partnership v. Boomer

Citation: 

Docket Number: 18/17

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2017-11-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Waterman Family Limited Partnership, et al v. Kathleen B. Boomer, et al. 
No. 18, September Term 2017 
 
Local Government Law – Code Home Rule Counties – Repeal or Rescission of 
Previously Enacted Measure.  Under Maryland Code, Local Government Article §4-416, 
a municipality that annexes land may not allow development of that land for a use 
“substantially different” than permitted by the previous county zoning for a period of five 
years,  unless the county expressly approves the rezoning.  A code home rule county has 
authority to repeal a resolution that gave the county’s assent, for purposes of §4-416, to a 
municipality’s rezoning of recently annexed land, unless third party rights in the rezoning 
have already vested. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County 
Case Nos. 17-C-15-019608, 17-C-15-019683 
Argument:  October 11, 2017 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 18 
 
September Term, 2017 
 
 
WATERMAN FAMILY LIMITED  
PARTNERSHIP, ET AL. 
 
V. 
 
KATHLEEN B. BOOMER, ET AL. 
 
_____________________________________ 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
 
 
Greene 
 
 
Adkins 
 
 
McDonald 
 
 
Watts 
 
 
Hotten 
 
 
Rodowsky, Lawrence F. 
 
 
(Senior Judge, Specially  
 
 
 
Assigned), 
 
 
 
 
 
JJ. 
 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by McDonald, J. 
 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed:   November 20, 2017
 
Among the powers conferred on a Maryland municipality by the General Assembly 
pursuant to the State Constitution are the power to zone land within the municipality’s 
boundaries and the power to enlarge those boundaries by annexing contiguous land.  
However, when a municipality exercises those powers together, there is a constraint.  A 
State statute delays for five years the rezoning of annexed land for a use “substantially 
different” from that allowed by the land’s prior county zoning classification – unless the 
county approves the municipality’s reclassification of the annexed property before the 
expiration of the five-year period. 
Petitioner Waterman Family Limited Partnership (“Waterman”) asked the Town 
Commissioners of Queenstown (“the Town”), also a Petitioner, to annex farm land owned 
by Waterman adjacent to Queenstown in Queen Anne’s County.  At the same time, 
Waterman asked the Town to rezone the annexed land for purposes of a long planned 
development.  The Town acceded to those requests.  In order to make the new zoning 
effective sooner rather than later, the Town sought the County’s approval of the new zoning 
classification.  Certain nearby property owners, including Respondents Kathleen B. 
Boomer, Marie J. McNurlan, Paul A. McNurlan, Stacy L. Swartwood, and the Queen 
Anne’s Conservation Association (collectively “QACA”), opposed the effort to obtain the 
County’s approval of the new zoning. 
At the same time, the County government happened to be in a period of transition 
as a result of the November 2014 election.  The outgoing Board of County Commissioners 
– the County’s governing body – narrowly approved the Town’s rezoning in late November
2 
 
 2014.  Two weeks later, the newly installed Board of County Commissioners rescinded 
that approval. 
Disappointed, Waterman and the Town instituted legal action against the County.  
QACA joined the fray in defense of the County’s rescission of its initial approval.  
Waterman’s challenge raised a question of first impression:  May a county rescind its 
approval of a municipality’s rezoning of annexed land?   
The Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County said “no.”  The Court of Special 
Appeals said “yes.”  For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we agree with the Court of 
Special Appeals. 
I 
Background 
A.  
Rezoning Land After Municipal Annexation 
1. Municipal Zoning 
 
The General Assembly has authorized municipalities in Maryland to exercise 
zoning authority over land within their respective jurisdictions.  Maryland Code, Local 
Government Article (“LG”) §5-213; see also Maryland Code, Land Use Article (“LU”), 
§1-101(g) (definition of “legislative body” includes governing body of municipality), §4-
101 et seq. (authorizing legislative body to exercise zoning powers). 
2. Municipal Annexation 
 
State law allows a municipality to annex unincorporated land contiguous to the 
municipality’s boundaries if certain procedures are followed.  LG §4-401 et seq.  A 
3 
 
proposal to annex land may be initiated by the legislative body of the municipality or by 
residents or owners of the land in question.  LG §§4-403, 4-404. 
3. Rezoning of Annexed Land 
It is generally the case that unincorporated land annexed by a municipality will 
already have been subject to county zoning.  State law temporarily limits the rezoning and 
development of such land after annexation by a municipality.  In particular, for a period of 
time the county retains some say over whether and when the land may be rezoned or 
developed in a way that allows for a substantially higher density or different use than that 
allowed by the county zoning classification that applied to the land prior to annexation.  
That constraint is set forth in LG §4-416, which provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Existing municipal authority. – (1) Notwithstanding [a provision of the 
Local Government Article that limits the extent of municipal authority 
over planning, subdivision, and zoning] . . . if an area is annexed to a 
municipality that has planning and zoning authority at the time of 
annexation, the municipality shall have exclusive jurisdiction over 
planning, subdivision control, and zoning in the area annexed. 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
(b) Different land use or density. – Without the express approval of the 
county commissioners or county council of the county in which the 
municipality is located, for 5 years after an annexation by a 
municipality, the municipality may not allow development of the 
annexed land for land uses substantially different than the authorized 
use, or at a substantially higher density, not exceeding 50%, than could 
be granted for the proposed development, in accordance with the 
zoning classification of the county applicable at the time of the 
annexation. 
 
(c) County approval of zoning classification. – Notwithstanding [a 
provision of the Land Use Article concerning amendment or repeal of 
a zoning classification] and if the county expressly approves, the 
municipality may place the annexed land in a zoning classification that 
4 
 
allows a land use or density different from the land use or density 
specified in the zoning classification of the county or agency with 
planning and zoning jurisdiction over the land prior to its annexation 
applicable at the time of the annexation. 
 
4. Summary 
 
The principles incorporated in the statute can be summarized as follows: 
 
●  Municipality’s exclusive jurisdiction – As a general rule, a municipality that has 
planning and zoning authority has exclusive jurisdiction over planning, zoning and 
subdivision control in any area that the municipality annexes. 
 
●  Five-year delay of rezoning – The exclusive authority of the municipality is 
subject to the proviso that, for a period of five years after annexation, the municipality may 
not allow development of the annexed land for uses “substantially different” from that 
authorized under the county zoning applicable to the property prior to annexation.  In sum, 
municipal rezoning of annexed land may be subject to a five-year delay.   
 
●  County waiver of delay – That proviso, however, is subject to a further proviso.  
The county – i.e., the county commissioners or the county council, as the case may be – 
may give “express approval” for the new municipal zoning before the five-year period 
expires.  This approval is sometimes referred to as a county “waiver” of the five-year delay.  
 
This case raises the question whether a county that waives the five-year delay by 
giving express approval may rescind that waiver before any development has been 
undertaken in the annexed area. 
 
 
5 
 
B. 
Facts and Legal Proceedings 
1. The Property 
 
Waterman owns approximately 148 acres of land, known as Wheatlands Farm, 
located immediately south of Route 50 in Queen Anne’s County.  The property is across 
Route 50 from a commercial development known as the Queenstown Outlets.  Before the 
events that gave rise to this case, the property was zoned CS (“Countryside”) by the County 
– a designation that permits agricultural and low density residential uses. 
2. Annexation and Town Rezoning of the Property 
 
On June 25, 2014, Waterman submitted a petition to the Town to annex the 
Wheatlands Farm property to the Town.  At the same time, Waterman asked the Town to 
zone the property PRC (“Planned Regional Commercial”) under the Town zoning 
ordinance.  A month later, on July 23, 2014, a proposed annexation resolution and a 
proposed zoning ordinance were introduced before the Town Commissioners.  The 
Commissioners referred both proposals to the Town’s Planning Commission for its 
recommendations.   
 
The Town Planning Commission held two public hearings, concluded that the 
annexation and proposed zoning were consistent with the Town plan, and recommended 
approval to the Town Commissioners.1   
                                              
1 The annexation of this property to the Town and the PRC zoning classification 
were contemplated in the comprehensive plans of both the Town and the County. 
6 
 
 
Following a public hearing on the proposals on September 24, 2014, the Town 
Commissioners voted unanimously to annex the property.  A month later, on October 22, 
2014, they held a second hearing on the rezoning proposal.  On November 12, 2014, the 
Town Commissioners approved the rezoning. 
 
It is undisputed that the Town’s PRC zoning classification is “substantially 
different” from the County CS classification and allows for a “substantially higher density” 
than the CS classification.  Accordingly, under LG §4-416(b), the property could not be 
developed with that higher density within five years after annexation, unless the County 
gave its express approval to the new zoning classification.  In light of this requirement, the 
Town Commissioners made the effectiveness of the rezoning ordinance contingent in part 
on the County’s approval of the rezoning.2  
3. County Resolutions Related to the Rezoning 
 
During the summer of 2014, while the annexation and rezoning proposals were 
pending in the Town, the Town Commissioners asked the County Commissioners to grant 
express approval of the Town’s rezoning of the property upon annexation.  The County 
Commissioners referred the request to the County Planning Commission, which 
recommended approval. 
                                              
2 The ordinance provided that the PRC zoning designation of the Waterman property 
would become effective as of the earlier of (1) the County’s approval of the rezoning or (2) 
five years from the date of the Town’s annexation of the property. 
7 
 
 
In the meantime, as a result of the election held on November 4, 2014, there was a 
significant turnover in the composition of the County governing body, with four of the five 
seats to be occupied by new Commissioners.   
On November 25, 2014, the outgoing County Commissioners conducted a brief 
hearing and passed, by a 3-2 vote, County Resolution 14-31, which gave express approval 
for the Town’s rezoning of the annexed Waterman property. 
On December 2, 2014, the newly elected County Commissioners took office.  One 
week later, on December 9, the newly elected County Commissioners conducted a hearing 
and passed County Resolution 14-33, rescinding the resolution that their predecessors had 
passed two weeks earlier to approve the rezoning.  The rescinding resolution noted that no 
site plan or other indication of the intended development had been provided to the County 
and stated that the County Commissioners wished to review the planned development of 
the property and its impact “in terms of traffic, population growth, infrastructure, schools, 
and the environment….” 
4. Litigation over County Resolution 14-33 
One month later, on January 7, 2015, in response to County Resolution 14-33 
rescinding the County’s approval of the rezoning, Waterman filed an action styled as a 
“Petition for Judicial Review and Writ of Administrative Mandamus” in the Circuit Court 
for Queen Anne’s County.  Waterman thus invoked alternative routes of judicial review of 
administrative action pursuant to Maryland Rule 7-201 et seq. and Maryland Rule 7-401 et 
seq.  The Town subsequently joined that petition.  QACA filed a notice of its intention to 
8 
 
participate in the judicial review proceeding.3  Waterman later also filed a declaratory 
judgment action against the County in which it asked the Circuit Court to declare County 
Resolution 14-33 – the resolution rescinding approval – to be void.  Waterman’s two 
actions were consolidated in the Circuit Court. 
Waterman, the Town, and the County pursued an effort to settle the case without 
success (QACA was apparently excluded from those discussions).  The parties then filed 
cross motions for summary judgment.   
After hearing legal argument, the Circuit Court held that the County Commissioners 
had “no statutory right of reconsideration” once the County had granted express approval 
waiving the five-year delay under LG §4-416.  On July 23, 2015, the Circuit Court issued 
a declaratory judgment that County Resolution 14-33 – the resolution rescinding approval 
– had “no legal force and effect.”4  The Circuit Court denied the County’s motion for 
reconsideration, which QACA had joined. 
                                              
3 In the Circuit Court, QACA indicated that it had planned to file an action 
challenging the County Resolution 14-31 – the first resolution approving the rezoning – 
but decided not to pursue such an action after the newly elected County Commissioners 
rescinded that resolution before the deadline for QACA to file such an action had expired.  
4 The Circuit Court ultimately also issued an order granting the relief sought in 
Waterman’s petition for judicial review and administrative mandamus and denying the 
contrary requests for relief made by QACA.  In its opinion, the Circuit Court noted that the 
parties disputed whether the court had authority to resolve the case as a matter of judicial 
review of administrative action, but opined that it clearly had authority to assess the validity 
of the second County resolution under the Declaratory Judgments Act, Maryland Code, 
Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, §3-401 et seq.  Before us, the parties have treated 
the matter as a declaratory judgment action rather than as judicial review of administrative 
action.  We shall do the same. 
9 
 
 
QACA and the County appealed.5  The Court of Special Appeals reversed the 
Circuit Court’s judgment.  Boomer v. Waterman Family LP, 232 Md. App. 1 (2017).  The 
intermediate appellate court held that, while LG §4-416 itself does not explicitly provide 
that a county may rescind approval of a new zoning classification of land recently annexed 
by a municipality, the Maryland Constitution generally authorizes the county 
commissioners of a code home rule county to repeal a public local law by resolution, as 
occurred here, and that a county ordinarily has inherent authority to rescind a measure, 
absent the vesting of rights based on that measure.  
 
Waterman and the Town filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted 
to consider whether the County had authority to rescind the initial resolution approving the 
rezoning. 
II 
Discussion 
A.  
Standard of Review 
The Circuit Court issued its decision on the basis of cross motions for summary 
judgment.  A case may be resolved on summary judgment when there is no dispute of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Maryland 
Rule 2-501(f).  There is general agreement in this case that no material facts are in dispute 
and that the issue before us is purely legal.  Accordingly, we review that legal issue without 
                                              
5 The County later dismissed its own appeal.   
10 
 
according any special deference to the conclusions of the Circuit Court or the Court of 
Special Appeals.  See Mathews v. Cassidy Turley Maryland, Inc., 435 Md. 584, 598 (2013).  
B.   
Whether a County May Rescind a Resolution Approving Municipal Rezoning of
 
Annexed Land 
 
Waterman and the Town contend that the County, having given its express approval 
to the rezoning of the tract in County Resolution 14-31 on November 25, 2014, lacked 
authority to rescind that approval two weeks later.  There is no contention that Waterman 
or the Town took any action in reliance on County Resolution 14-31 during the two week 
interval before the new Board of County Commissioners rescinded it.  Thus, the question 
is whether the County generally has the power to rescind such an action.6 
LG §4-416 
As Waterman and the Town point out, nothing in LG §4-416 authorizes a county to 
rescind its approval once it is given.  It is true that the statute does not explicitly address 
whether a county may withdraw its approval of a municipal rezoning of recently-annexed 
land.  It is equally true, however, that the statute does not address whether a county that 
initially denies approval may later reverse that determination and grant approval.  
Waterman and the Town take the position that a county may do the latter – that is, approve 
                                              
6 If Waterman had taken action to develop the property in accordance with the new 
zoning classification during the interval between the approving resolution (County 
Resolution 14-31) and the rescinding resolution (County Resolution 14-33) there might be 
an issue as to whether Waterman had acquired vested rights in the new zoning classification 
and whether the County would be constitutionally barred from rescinding its approval.  See 
Prince George’s County v. Sunrise Development Limited Partnership, 330 Md. 297 (1993).    
That question is not before us. 
11 
 
a rezoning after initially declining to do so.  In their view, the statute is a one-way ratchet:  
Approval, once given, may not be withdrawn.  Once denied, however, it may later be given.  
But the text of the statute provides no support for this view.7  It is simply silent. 
A review of the extant legislative history of the statute is unenlightening on this 
question.  The key provisions of the statute were enacted before the General Assembly 
began to retain bill files in 1976 and thus we do not have the benefit of the types of 
legislative materials that are available for more recent legislation.  In Mayor and Council 
of Rockville v. Rylyns Enterprises, Inc., 372 Md. 514, 548-61 (2002), Judge Harrell 
provided a comprehensive history of the enactment of the key provisions that now make 
up LG §4-416, prior to their 2013 recodification in the Local Government Article.  We 
need not repeat all of that analysis, but note only the critical junctures in the development 
of the statute that relate to the question before us. 
                                              
7 Waterman and the Town argue that allowing a County to rescind approval of a 
rezoning would offend the “exclusive jurisdiction” over planning, subdivision control, and 
zoning that subsection (a) of the statute confers on the municipality.  They suggest that 
such exclusive jurisdiction is triggered by county approval of the rezoning and, once 
triggered, cannot be retracted.  This is a misreading of the statute.  Under the statute, the 
“exclusive jurisdiction” of the municipality is not activated by county action.  Rather, it is 
a consequence of the municipality’s action in annexing the land.  But it is also qualified by 
subsections (b) and (c) of the statute for a five-year period following annexation. 
Waterman and the Town suggest that allowing a County to rescind approval is an 
“illogical” reading of the statute because rescission could effectively change the zoning of 
the property after a developer had obtained certain approvals for the development (but 
presumably before acquiring vested rights in the zoning classification).  But it is no more 
illogical than the authority that the Town itself has to change the zoning classification 
before the developer has acquired a vested right in the zoning. 
12 
 
In 1954, the State Constitution was amended to provide for municipal home rule.  
Chapter 53, Laws of Maryland 1954, ratified November 2, 1954 (adding Article XI-E to 
the Maryland Constitution).  To implement municipal home rule, the General Assembly 
enacted various provisions the following year that were codified in Article 23A of the 
Maryland Code.  Chapter 423, Laws of Maryland 1955.  Included among those enactments 
were certain provisions concerning annexation and municipal zoning that appeared in §§9 
and 19 of Article 23A.  Two years later, the General Assembly provided that if a 
municipality had zoning power – not all municipalities had such power at that time – the 
municipality would have exclusive zoning authority over land that it annexed.  Chapter 
197, Laws of Maryland 1957.  In Rylyns, Judge Harrell referred to this as the “highwater 
mark” of municipal power “with respect to the initial zoning of annexed lands.”  Rylyns, 
372 Md. at 557; see also Prince George’s County v. Mayor and City Council of Laurel, 
262 Md. 171, 182-83 (1971); Beshore v. Town of Bel Air, 237 Md. 398, 410-11 (1965).   
The tide receded from that highwater mark 14 years later when the Legislature 
decided that a municipality should temporarily share with the county its otherwise 
exclusive zoning authority over annexed land.  In 1971, the General Assembly amended 
Article 23A, §9(c) to delay the effectiveness of municipal rezoning of annexed land for a 
period of five years when the new zoning classification would permit a land use 
“substantially different” from that specified in the county plan prior to annexation.  Chapter 
116, Laws of Maryland 1971.  As a result, municipal “autonomy [with respect to the initial 
zoning of annexed land] ceased.”  Rylyns, 372 Md. at 557; see also Northeast Plaza 
Associates v. Town of North East, 310 Md. 20, 28-29 (1987).  A major objective of this 
13 
 
provision was to “preserve the integrity” of the county master plan by delaying a substantial 
change in zoning for the annexed area that “might well be disruptive to the planning for 
the surrounding areas.”  Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission v. 
Mayor and Council of Rockville, 272 Md. 550, 561 (1974) (upholding constitutionality of 
law enacting the five-year delay). 
Four years later, the Legislature decided to add some flexibility to the statute.  In 
1975, the General Assembly again amended Article 23A, §9(c), this time to allow the five-
year delay to be truncated with the county’s assent.  The amendment provided that a county 
could waive the five-year delay by expressly approving the new municipal zoning before 
the expiration of the five-year period.  Chapter 613, Laws of Maryland 1975.   
The Legislature subsequently modified these provisions in various respects, but the 
key components of the statute for our purposes – placing exclusive zoning power in the 
municipality, making new zoning that allows a substantially different use subject to a five-
year delay, and allowing for a county waiver of that delay – have remained essentially 
unchanged since the mid-1970s.  As is evident, this history does not reveal a legislative 
intent as to whether or not county approval, once given, may be rescinded.8  In 2013, these 
                                              
8 Waterman and the Town argue that a 2006 amendment of the predecessor statute 
somehow supports their view of LG §4-416.  Chapter 381, Laws of Maryland 2006.  
Among other things, the 2006 amendment amended Article 23A, §9(c) to provide a more 
specific description of the kind of “substantially different use” permitted by a new 
municipal zoning classification that would trigger the five-year delay under the statute.  
Nothing in that amendment, or its legislative history, supports the idea that the statute 
operates as a one-way ratchet under which a county may grant approval previously 
withheld, but not rescind approval previously given. 
14 
 
provisions were recodified without substantive change as §4-416 of the new Local 
Government Article.  Chapter 119, Laws of Maryland 2013.   
Thus, neither the text of LG §4-416, nor its legislative history, indicates that the 
General Assembly intended to preclude a county from exercising whatever authority the 
county may have under existing law to rescind an action taken by its governing body.  To 
decide whether a county may withdraw approval of municipal rezoning of annexed land, 
we thus consider the general authority of a county governing body to reconsider its actions. 
Common Law Authority 
As a general rule, the governing body of a local government “has the right to 
reconsider its actions and ordinances, and adopt a measure or ordinance that has previously 
been defeated or rescind one that has been previously adopted before the rights of third 
parties have vested.”  Del Maso v. Board of County Commissioners, 182 Md. 200, 206-7 
(1943);9 see also 4 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, §§13.70, 13.72.  This general 
principle is related to the idea that a legislative body ordinarily lacks authority to restrict 
the legislative activities of its successors.  State v. Fisher, 204 Md. 307, 315 (1953) (“One 
legislature cannot prohibit repeal or modification by its successors, even where it purports 
to do so”); see also Nordheimer v. Montgomery County, 307 Md. 85, 101 (1986).  Were it 
                                              
9 Waterman and the Town attempt to distinguish Dal Maso, arguing that it 
concerned a “zoning action” by a local government while, in their view, the County 
resolutions in this case do not.  However, as noted in the text, the principle stated in Dal 
Maso is longstanding and widely applicable in the law regardless of whether or not the 
particular legislative action is called a “zoning action.” 
15 
 
otherwise, legislative action would be frozen in time with local officials unable to react to 
changed circumstances or to pursue policies presently preferred over those previously 
adopted.  The general power of a governing body to rescind a prior law or policy on a 
matter subject to its jurisdiction may be constrained in particular circumstances, as when a 
party has acquired a vested right in the governing body’s prior policy decision.10  Absent 
such circumstances, the governing body retains the option of changing its mind. 
Thus, a county would ordinarily have authority to rescind its action giving assent – 
or one denying assent – for a municipality’s rezoning of recently annexed land.  That is 
true regardless of whether that authority is explicitly reiterated in LG §4-416.  As indicated 
above, there is no indication in the statute that the General Assembly intended to trump the 
general principle that a county governing body may rescind a prior action. 
Article XI-F of the Maryland Constitution 
The parties have focused much of their attention in this case on certain provisions 
of Article XI-F of the Maryland Constitution, which authorizes counties to adopt code 
home rule.  Those provisions authorize a code home rule county, such as Queen Anne’s 
County, to “enact, amend, or repeal a public local law of that county by a resolution of the 
board of county commissioners.”  Maryland Constitution, Article XI-F, §6;11 see also 
                                              
10 See footnote 6 above. 
11 That section further authorizes the General Assembly to “amplify [its] provisions 
by general law in any manner not inconsistent with … Article [XI-F].”  Maryland 
Constitution, Article XI-F, §6.  None of the parties has suggested that the General 
16 
 
Article XI-F, §3 (“a code county may enact, amend, or repeal a public local law of that 
county…”); §10 (later enacted public local law prevails over previously enacted public 
local law).  To the extent that they concern amendment or repeal of a public local law, these 
provisions simply reiterate the common law principle described in the previous section in 
the particular context of a county that has transitioned to code home rule.  In doing so, these 
provisions of the State Constitution make clear that the governing body of a county that 
has adopted code home rule has authority not only to repeal or amend its own enactments, 
but also to modify or repeal public local laws enacted for that county prior to adoption of 
home rule by a different legislative body – the General Assembly.  See 62 Opinions of the 
Attorney General 275 (1977). 
Much of the debate in this case has focused on whether County Resolution 14-31 
granting express approval to the rezoning was a “public local law” of Queen Anne’s 
County that falls within the purview of Article XI-F, §6.  In distinguishing public local 
laws of a county from public general laws, this Court has focused on the substance of the 
law more than its form.  Cole v. Secretary of State, 249 Md. 425, 433 (1968).  Necessarily, 
a public local law of a county applies only in that county, although the fact that a measure 
applies only in a single county is not by itself determinative; a law that applies in a single 
county may nonetheless be a public general law when it “affects the interests of the whole 
state.”  Tyma v. Montgomery County, 369 Md. 497, 507 (2002); see also Kent Island 
                                              
Assembly has “amplified” the procedures for rescission by a code county in a way pertinent 
to this case. 
17 
 
Defense League, LLC v. Queen Anne’s County Board of Elections, 145 Md. App. 684, 693-
94 (2002) (county ordinance classifying areas for purposes of State Chesapeake Bay 
Critical Area Law was not a public local law as its actions “were affected by, and had an 
effect on, the entire State Critical Area Program.”).  The distinction between a public local 
law and a public general law is based on whether the provision “pertains only to a subject 
of local import” or rather deals with a subject “of significant interest not just to any one 
county, but rather to more than one geographical subdivision, or even to the entire state.”  
Tyma, 369 Md. at 507-8 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Waterman and the Town suggest that the two resolutions do not qualify as public 
local laws because they affect more than one political subdivision – i.e., the County and 
the Town. 12  However, in distinguishing public local laws of a county from public general 
laws, the State Constitution generally regards counties (and Baltimore City) as the relevant 
local jurisdictions.  Cf. Maryland Constitution, Article XI-A, §4 (distinguishing “public 
local law” of charter home rule county from a public general law and defining 
“geographical sub-division” to mean a county or Baltimore City).  Moreover, in this 
particular context, the General Assembly has, by means of LG §4-416, made the timing 
                                              
12 In their brief, Waterman and the Town also argue that the two resolutions do not 
qualify as public local laws because the County failed to follow certain procedures set forth 
in LG §9-301 et seq.  As best we can tell, this argument was not raised before either of the 
courts below and the record does not otherwise address this issue.  We decline to attempt 
to resolve this question at this juncture. 
18 
 
and effectiveness of a municipal zoning classification explicitly contingent on the assent 
of the county within which the annexed land lies. 
Finally, Waterman and the Town argue that we should interpret “public local law” 
for purposes of Article XI-F differently from other contexts because Article XI-F contains 
its own definition of that phrase.  “Public local law” is defined as “a law applicable to the 
incorporation, organization, or government of a code county and contained in the county’s 
code of public local laws.”  Article XI-F, §1.13  While this has been characterized as a 
“unique” definition of “public local law,” detailed examinations of the history of the code 
home rule provisions of the Constitution have concluded that those provisions were 
designed to provide a broad grant of legislative power to code home rule counties 
concerning all matters of local concern.  See 62 Opinions of the Attorney General, 275, 
277, 290-94 (1977); M. Peter Moser, County Home Rule – Sharing the State’s Legislative 
Power with Maryland Counties, 28 Md. L. Rev. 327, 336-38 & n. 34 (1968). 
Resolution 14-31 applied to Wheatlands Farm, land wholly within Queen Anne’s 
County; the resolution did not concern any other county.  As a law concerning the timetable 
for a change of zoning of that land, Resolution 14-31 concerned a matter of local import to 
Queen Anne’s County.  Thus, were it necessary to decide this question to resolve this case, 
                                              
13 Specifically excluded from this definition are “(i) the charters of municipal 
corporations under Article 11E of this Constitution, (ii) the laws or charters of counties 
under Article 11A of this Constitution, (iii) laws, whether or not Statewide in application, 
in the code of public general laws, (iv) laws which apply to more than one county, and (v) 
ordinances and resolutions of the county government enacted under public local laws.”  
Article XI-F, §1.  No contention is made that any of these specific exclusions apply here. 
19 
 
we would be inclined to agree with the Court of Special Appeals that County Resolution 
14-31 was a public local law of Queen Anne’s County. 
In any event, whether or not the resolutions fit the definition of “public local law” 
under Article XI-F, the County Commissioners had common law authority to rescind 
County Resolution 14-31.  Moreover, nothing in the State Constitution precludes the 
County Commissioners from rescinding a resolution previously adopted by that body or 
abrogates the common law principle. 
Summary 
Under the common law, the County Commissioners had authority to rescind their 
resolution assenting to the Town’s rezoning of the recently annexed land before rights 
vested in that zoning classification.  Nothing in LG §4-416 abrogated that authority.  
Moreover, consistent with this common law authority, the Maryland Constitution explicitly 
confers authority on a code home rule county like Queen Anne’s County to repeal a public 
local law.  
III 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons set forth above, the County had authority to rescind its assent to the 
Town’s rezoning of Wheatlands Farm in conjunction with the Town’s annexation of that 
property.  Accordingly, under LG §4-416(b), as well as the Town rezoning ordinance itself, 
the new zoning classification will not become effective until five years after annexation, 
unless the County should approve the rezoning in the interim. 
20 
 
 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS 
AFFIRMED.  CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH 
DIRECTIONS TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT 
COURT OF QUEEN ANNE’S COUNTY FOR ENTRY OF A 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CONSISTENT WITH THIS 
OPINION.  COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONERS.