Case Title: Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection District

Citation: 

Docket Number: S242250

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2019-07-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
REBECCA MEGAN QUIGLEY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
GARDEN VALLEY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
S242250 
 
Third Appellate District 
C079270 
 
Plumas County Superior Court 
CV1000225 
 
 
July 15, 2019 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, and Groban concurred.  
 
1 
QUIGLEY v. GARDEN VALLEY FIRE PROTECTION 
DISTRICT 
S242250 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
  
The Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.) 
authorizes plaintiffs to bring certain tort claims against public 
entities, while also immunizing public entities from liability in 
particular circumstances.  One of the act’s immunity provisions 
bars any statutory liability that might otherwise exist for 
injuries resulting from the condition of firefighting equipment 
or facilities.  (Id., § 850.4.)  The question presented is whether 
this immunity provision constitutes an affirmative defense that 
may be forfeited if not timely raised or instead serves as a 
limitation on the fundamental jurisdiction of the courts, such 
that the issue can never be forfeited or waived.  We conclude 
that Government Code section 850.4 immunity does not deprive 
a court of fundamental jurisdiction but rather operates as an 
affirmative defense to liability. 
I. 
A. 
 
Enacted in 1963, the Government Claims Act (GCA or Act) 
is a comprehensive statutory scheme governing the liabilities 
and immunities of public entities and public employees for torts.  
(Kiser v. County of San Mateo (1991) 53 Cal.3d 139, 145.)  For 
many decades before the Act, tort liability for public entity 
defendants was barred by a common law rule of governmental 
immunity.  Over time, however, the common law rule became 
QUIGLEY v. GARDEN VALLEY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
2 
“riddled with exceptions,” both legislative and judge-made, and 
in 1961 this court abolished the rule altogether.  (Muskopf v. 
Corning Hospital Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 211, 216 (Muskopf).)  In 
response to Muskopf, the Legislature temporarily suspended the 
decision’s effect (Stats. 1961, ch. 1404, pp. 3209–3210) and 
directed the California Law Revision Commission to complete a 
study of the issue it had begun some years earlier (see Assem. 
Conc. Res. No. 22, Stats. 1957 (1956-1957 Reg. Sess.) res. 
ch. 202, p. 4590; Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice 
(Cont.Ed.Bar 4th ed. 1999) Legislative Response:  Government 
Claims Act, § 1.40; DeMoully, Fact Finding for Legislation:  A 
Case Study (1964) 50 A.B.A. J. 285).  The end product of the 
commission’s study was a series of recommendations (see, e.g., 
Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity, No. 1—Tort 
Liability of Public Entities and Public Employees (Jan. 1963) 4 
Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1963) p. 801), on which the 
Legislature relied in enacting the GCA (see DeMoully, at 
p. 286).1   
 
The basic architecture of the Act is encapsulated in 
Government Code section 815.  Subdivision (a) of that section 
makes clear that under the GCA, there is no such thing as 
common law tort liability for public entities; a public entity is 
not liable for an injury “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by 
statute.”  (Gov. Code, § 815; see Guzman v. County of Monterey 
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 887, 897.)  The GCA provides several grounds 
                                        
1 
When first enacted, the statute was known as the Tort 
Claims Act; the Legislature later retitled it the Government 
Claims Act.  (Stats. 2012, ch. 759, § 5; see also Recommendation:  
Statutory Cross-References to “Tort Claims Act” (June 2011) 41 
Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (2011) p. 285; City of Stockton v. 
Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 740–742.)  
QUIGLEY v. GARDEN VALLEY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
3 
for public entity liability, including, as relevant here, for injuries 
caused “by a dangerous condition of [a public entity’s] property” 
that was created through an employee’s negligence.  (Gov. Code, 
§ 835, subd. (a).) 
 
But even when there are statutory grounds for imposing 
liability, subdivision (b) of section 815 provides that a public 
entity’s liability is “subject to any immunity of the public entity 
provided by statute.”  (Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (b).)  Government 
Code section 850.4 (section 850.4), the provision at issue in this 
case, establishes one such immunity:  “Neither a public entity, 
nor a public employee acting in the scope of his employment, is 
liable for any injury resulting from the condition of fire 
protection or firefighting equipment or facilities or,” with the 
exception of certain motor vehicle accidents, “for any injury 
caused in fighting fires.”  Section 850.4 was enacted at the 
recommendation of the Law Revision Commission.  The 
commission’s report to the Legislature explained section 850.4’s 
purpose as follows:  “There are adequate incentives to careful 
maintenance of fire equipment without imposing tort liability; 
and firemen should not be deterred from any action they may 
desire to take in combatting fires by a fear that liability might 
be imposed if a jury believes such action to be unreasonable.”  (4 
Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., supra, at p. 862; see Heieck and 
Moran v. City of Modesto (1966) 64 Cal.2d 229, 233, fn. 3 (Heieck 
and Moran).)2 
                                        
2  
The Assembly and Senate Committee reports largely 
adopted the commission’s commentary, noting that the 
commission’s comments generally “reflect the intent” of the 
committees in approving the provisions.  (Assem. Com. on Ways 
 
QUIGLEY v. GARDEN VALLEY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
4 
B. 
In September 2009, a wildfire known as the Silver Fire 
broke out in the Plumas National Forest.  Employees of two local 
fire protection districts managed a base camp set up at a local 
fairground for the firefighting response.  The base camp 
management team allowed firefighters resting in between 
firefighting shifts to sleep in tents and sleeping bags near a 
portable shower unit.  Plaintiff Rebecca Megan Quigley, a 
United States Forest Service firefighter, was sleeping in this 
area when she was run over by a water truck servicing the 
shower unit.  She sustained serious and permanent injuries. 
Quigley sued three base camp managers—the facility unit 
leader, logistics chief, and camp safety officer—as well as their 
employers, the Chester Fire Protection District and the Garden 
Valley Fire Protection District.3  She alleged that defendants 
were negligent in permitting firefighters to sleep in the area 
where she was run over, without roping the area off or posting 
signs forbidding vehicles from entering.  She claimed defendants 
had thereby created a “dangerous condition” of public property, 
for which public entities may be held liable under section 835 of 
the Government Code.  
In their answer, defendants alleged 38 affirmative 
defenses, including 11 defenses asserting immunity under 17 
                                        
& Means, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 42 (1963 Reg. Sess.) 3 Assem. J. 
(1963 Reg. Sess.) p. 5440; Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Sen. 
Bill No. 42 (1963 Reg. Sess.) 2 Sen. J. (1963 Reg. Sess.) p. 1885.) 
3  
Although defendants initially contended that the three 
base camp managers were federal employees, they later 
stipulated that these individuals were employees of the local fire 
protection districts. 
QUIGLEY v. GARDEN VALLEY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
5 
individually cited sections of the GCA.  These individually cited 
defenses ranged from property inspection immunity (Gov. Code, 
§ 818.6) to discretionary act immunity (id., § 820.2).  Defendants 
did not allege the immunity conferred by section 850.4.  They 
did, however, raise a fifteenth affirmative defense that cited 
inclusively to all immunities under the GCA:  “A public entity 
and its employees are immune from liability for damages alleged 
in the complaint and Defendants assert all defenses and rights 
granted to them by the provisions of Government Code sections 
810 through 996.6, inclusive.”  
Trial began more than four years after the complaint was 
filed.  After Quigley’s counsel completed his opening statement, 
defense counsel presented a written motion for nonsuit, in which 
defendants for the first time invoked section 850.4.  Quigley 
objected on the ground that defendants had waived any 
argument they might have under section 850.4 by failing to 
invoke the immunity in their answer.  (See Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 430.80, subd. (a).)4 
                                        
4  
The parties’ use of the term “waiver” tracks the language 
of section 430.80, subdivision (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure:  
“If the party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has 
been filed fails to object to the pleading, either by demurrer or 
answer, that party is deemed to have waived the objection,” 
subject to certain exceptions.  The statute’s use of the term 
“waiver” differs from the way we generally use this term:  “As 
we have explained in various contexts, ‘ “waiver” means the 
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’  
. . .  [¶]  . . .  [Waiver] differs from the related concept of 
forfeiture, which results when a party fails to preserve a claim 
by raising a timely objection.”  (Lynch v. California Coastal Com. 
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 470, 475–476.)  Nonetheless, because the 
relevant statute uses the term “waiver,” we use it here as well. 
QUIGLEY v. GARDEN VALLEY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
6 
The trial court overruled Quigley’s objection, reasoning 
that defendants could not have waived section 850.4 immunity 
because “governmental immunity is jurisdictional and can’t be 
waived.”  On the merits, the trial court agreed with defendants 
that Quigley’s cause of action sought recovery for injuries caused 
by a condition of firefighting facilities—namely, the base camp—
and was thus barred by section 850.4 immunity.  
Quigley later renewed her objection in a motion for a new 
trial, which the court denied.  In ruling on that motion, the court 
offered a different rationale for entertaining defendants’ late-
raised section 850.4 argument.  It held that defendants did not 
waive section 850.4 immunity because defendants’ “general 
allegation [in the fifteenth affirmative defense] that [they] were 
immune from liability as public entities and public employees is 
sufficient to assert governmental immunity under section 
850.4.”    
On appeal, Quigley again renewed her objection to 
defendants’ belated invocation of section 850.4 immunity.  The 
Court of Appeal rejected the argument.  Without addressing 
whether defendants’ omnibus pleading of the entire GCA was 
adequate to preserve defendants’ section 850.4 argument, the 
Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that defendants 
could not have waived the issue because section 850.4 is 
“jurisdictional” and therefore may be raised “at any time.”  
Proceeding to the merits, the Court of Appeal also agreed with 
the trial court that section 850.4 immunity applies to injuries 
QUIGLEY v. GARDEN VALLEY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
7 
resulting from the condition of a firefighting base camp, and 
thus affirmed the award of nonsuit to defendants.5 
The Court of Appeal recognized that its jurisdictional 
ruling created a conflict with McMahan’s of Santa Monica v. 
City of Santa Monica (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 683.  In McMahan’s, 
a corroded city water main broke, spewing water that damaged 
the plaintiff’s store.  The city argued for the first time on appeal 
that it was immune from the plaintiff’s damages claim under 
section 850.4, because the water pipe was “fire protection 
equipment.”  The appellate court declined to consider the 
argument, taking the view that section 850.4 provides an 
affirmative defense that the city waived by failing to plead and 
prove it before the trial court. 
The Court of Appeal criticized McMahan’s for failing to 
distinguish between those sections of the GCA that provide 
“qualified” immunity and those that provide “absolute” 
immunity.  The Court of Appeal reasoned that the first kind of 
immunity provision creates an affirmative defense because the 
public entity must make some sort of affirmative showing to 
establish the immunity applies.  The court pointed to De La Rosa 
v. City of San Bernardino (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 739, on which 
McMahan’s had relied, as one example of a qualified immunity 
in action.  De La Rosa did not concern immunity under section 
850.4, 
but 
instead 
concerned 
design 
immunity 
under 
Government Code section 830.6; to invoke that immunity, a 
                                        
5  
Whether the Court of Appeal was correct to hold that 
Quigley’s alleged injuries “result[ed] from the condition of fire 
protection or firefighting equipment or facilities” within the 
meaning of section 850.4 is a question that falls outside of the 
scope of our grant of review, and we do not address it here.  
QUIGLEY v. GARDEN VALLEY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
8 
public entity must show that it has maintained public property 
in conformity with an approved plan or design.   
The Court of Appeal observed that section 850.4 imposes 
no similar requirement.  The court instead likened section 850.4 
to the governmental immunity at issue in Hata v. Los Angeles 
County Harbor/UCLA Medical Center (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 
1791 (Hata), which concerned the immunity of public entities for 
injuries to inpatients of mental institutions (Gov. Code, § 854.8, 
subd. (a)(2)).  In Hata, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial 
court’s ruling that the county defendant waived this immunity 
by failing to raise it before trial.  Among the many reasons the 
court gave for this conclusion, the Hata court explained that 
because 
the 
inpatient 
immunity 
statute 
contains 
“no 
requirement the public entity make any type of affirmative 
showing” (Hata, at p. 1804), the immunity it provides is 
“absolute” (id. at p. 1803), and therefore is “jurisdictional and 
may be raised at any time” (id. at p. 1804).  Agreeing with Hata 
on this point, the Court of Appeal in this case concluded that 
because section 850.4 requires no affirmative showing on the 
part of defendants, it could be raised at any time and was not 
waived.  
We granted review to resolve the conflict between the 
Court of Appeal’s decision and McMahan’s about whether the 
governmental immunity set forth in section 850.4 is 
jurisdictional or instead may be forfeited if not timely raised. 
 
 
QUIGLEY v. GARDEN VALLEY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
9 
II. 
A. 
We begin with a necessary note about terminology.  As we 
have long recognized, the term “jurisdiction” has “many 
different meanings.”  (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal 
(1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 287 (Abelleira).)  Here we are concerned 
with jurisdiction in what we typically refer to as its 
“fundamental sense”:  specifically, the power of the court over 
the subject matter of the case.  (Id. at p. 288; see Varian Medical 
Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 196.)  A lack of 
fundamental jurisdiction is the “ ‘ “ ‘entire absence of power to 
hear or determine the case.’ ” ’ ”  (Kabran v. Sharp Memorial 
Hospital (2017) 2 Cal.5th 330, 339 (Kabran).)  Because it 
concerns the basic power of a court to act, the parties to a case 
cannot confer fundamental jurisdiction upon a court by waiver, 
estoppel, consent, or forfeiture.  (Ibid.)  Defects in fundamental 
jurisdiction therefore “may be raised at any point in a 
proceeding, including for the first time on appeal,” or, for that 
matter, in the context of a collateral attack on a final judgment.  
(People v. Chavez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 771, 780.)  By contrast, other 
sorts of objections a defendant might have on the merits—
including an objection that liability is barred by an affirmative 
defense—are ordinarily deemed “waived” if the defendant does 
not raise them in its demurrer or answer to the complaint.  
(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.80, subd. (a).) 
Quigley argues that the statutory immunities under the 
GCA do not deprive a court of fundamental jurisdiction to hear 
a tort case against a government entity, but instead operate as 
affirmative defenses that must be pleaded and proved or are 
deemed waived.  Defendants, for their part, urge that section 
QUIGLEY v. GARDEN VALLEY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
10 
850.4 deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction where it 
applies, such that it may be raised at any time—indeed, even 
after judgment has become final. 
In evaluating these competing claims, we begin with the 
usual presumption that statutes do not limit the courts’ 
fundamental jurisdiction absent a clear indication of legislative 
intent to do so.  (E.g., Kabran, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 342–343.)  
California’s superior courts are courts of general jurisdiction, 
which means they are generally empowered to resolve the legal 
disputes that are brought to them.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, §§ 1, 10; 
see generally 20 Am.Jur.2d (2015) Courts, § 66, p. 464 [“Courts 
of general jurisdiction have the power to hear and determine all 
matters, legal and equitable, except insofar as these powers 
have been expressly denied.”].)  Although the Legislature may 
impose reasonable restrictions on the fundamental jurisdiction 
of the courts, our cases reflect “a preference for the resolution of 
litigation and the underlying conflicts on their merits by the 
judiciary.”  (Kabran, at pp. 342–343.)  The power of the courts to 
resolve cases is the essential underpinning of the judiciary’s 
ability to “ ‘effectively . . . function as a separate department of 
government.’ ”  (Id. at p. 343.)  “ ‘Consequently an intent to 
defeat the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction will not be supplied 
by implication.’ ”  (Ibid.)  If the Legislature means to withdraw 
a class of cases from state court jurisdiction, we expect it will 
make that intention clear.  (See, e.g., International Assn. of Fire 
Fighters, Local 188, AFL-CIO v. Public Employment Relations 
Bd. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 259, 270 [“This court will not infer a 
legislative intent to entirely deprive the superior courts of 
judicial authority in a particular area; the Legislature must 
have expressly so provided or otherwise clearly indicated such 
an intent.”].) 
QUIGLEY v. GARDEN VALLEY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
11 
On its face, section 850.4 contains no clear indication of a 
legislative intent to limit the fundamental jurisdiction of the 
courts.  Section 850.4 provides, as relevant here:  “Neither a 
public entity, nor a public employee acting in the scope of his 
employment, is liable for any injury resulting from the condition 
of fire protection or firefighting equipment or facilities[.]”  
Nothing in the language of this provision suggests it was 
intended to withdraw a class of cases from the courts’ power to 
adjudicate.  Unlike some other provisions that have been 
understood to have such an effect, section 850.4 makes no 
reference to the jurisdiction of the courts, nor does it otherwise 
speak to the courts’ power to decide a particular category of 
cases.  (Cf., e.g., Pub. Util. Code, § 1759, subd. (a) [“No court of 
this state, except the Supreme Court and the court of appeal, to 
the extent specified in this article, shall have jurisdiction to 
review, reverse, correct, or annul any order or decision of the 
[Public Utilities Commission][.]”], discussed in San Diego Gas & 
Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 916; Bus. 
& Prof. Code, § 6100 [“For any of the causes provided in this 
article, arising after an attorney’s admission to practice, he or 
she may be disbarred or suspended by the Supreme Court.”], 
discussed in Jacobs v. State Bar (1977) 20 Cal.3d 191, 196.) 
Section 850.4 instead reads as a substantive bar to tort 
liability, much like other privileges or immunities provisions 
that shield particular actors or activities from otherwise 
applicable liability for tortious conduct.  Quigley sued under 
Government Code section 835, which makes public entities 
liable for injuries arising from a dangerous condition of public 
property.  Section 850.4 provides a justification or excuse from 
liability that would otherwise exist under section 835, based on 
considerations of policy.  (See Heieck and Moran, supra, 64 
QUIGLEY v. GARDEN VALLEY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
12 
Cal.2d at p. 233, fn. 3.)  As a general rule, such matters must “be 
pleaded and proved by one who seeks thereby to destroy the 
seemingly tortious character of his conduct, and so protect 
himself from being subject to liability.”  (Rest.2d Torts, § 10, 
com. c, pp. 17–18.) 
Consistent with this understanding, we have previously 
described other GCA statutory immunities as affirmative 
defenses to liability.  Government Code section 830.6, for 
example, immunizes public entities for injuries caused by a 
properly approved plan or design of public property.  We have 
explained that this design immunity is a “defense” that a public 
entity should “raise[] . . . by appropriate pleadings.”  (Teall v. 
City of Cudahy (1963) 60 Cal.2d 431, 435; see also Cornette v. 
Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 66 [“[A] 
public entity may avoid [section 835] liability by raising the 
affirmative defense of design immunity.”  (Italics omitted.)].)  
Similarly, Government Code section 835.4 absolves a public 
entity of liability for a dangerous condition under Government 
Code section 835 where the act or omission that created the 
condition was “reasonable.”  We have held that this immunity, 
too, “clearly creates an affirmative defense.”  (Metcalf v. County 
of San Joaquin (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1138; see also Hibbs v. 
Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 
166, 172.) 
It is true, as the Court of Appeal observed, that section 
850.4 differs from these other immunity provisions in that it 
creates an “absolute,” rather than “qualified,” immunity—that 
is to say, the immunity is not conditioned on a showing that the 
defendant acted in a reasonable or procedurally proper manner, 
or any similar requirement.  But absolute privileges and 
immunities, too, ordinarily apply only if the defendant invokes 
QUIGLEY v. GARDEN VALLEY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
13 
them.  Courts have held, for example, that the absolute 
litigation privilege in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b)—a 
provision that operates “as a limitation on liability, precluding 
use of . . . protected communications and statements as the basis 
for a tort action other than for malicious prosecution” (Moore v. 
Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 638, fn. 1, italics omitted)—is an 
affirmative defense subject to principles of forfeiture and waiver 
(Stevens v. Snow (1923) 191 Cal. 58, 64; see also, e.g., Cruey v. 
Gannett Co. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 356, 367).  Or to take another 
example, the common law has long granted judges absolute 
immunity from liability for their judicial acts.  (Soliz v. Williams 
(1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 577, 585–586; see also, e.g., Pierson v. Ray 
(1967) 386 U.S. 547, 554 [similarly describing the common law 
immunity].)  This immunity, too, generally has been understood 
to constitute an affirmative defense, not a limitation on court 
jurisdiction.  (E.g., Boyd v. Carroll (5th Cir. 1980) 624 F.2d 730, 
732–733; Plyer v. Burns (S.C. 2007) 647 S.E.2d 188, 194–195; 
Dallas County v. Halsey (Tex. 2002) 87 S.W.3d 552, 553; BCL 
Enterprises v. Dept. of Liquor Control (Ohio 1997) 675 N.E.2d 1, 
4.)6   
                                        
6  
Even were it otherwise—that is, even if it were the 
plaintiff’s burden to plead around an absolute immunity, rather 
than the defendant’s burden to invoke the immunity as an 
affirmative defense—that would not necessarily mean the 
immunity is jurisdictional in nature, as the Court of Appeal in 
this case reasoned.  The GCA’s provision requiring plaintiffs to 
have timely filed a claim for money or damages with a public 
entity as a prerequisite to bringing suit (Gov. Code, § 945.4) is a 
case in point:  In State of California v. Superior Court (Bodde) 
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239, we held that a plaintiff’s “failure 
to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the 
 
QUIGLEY v. GARDEN VALLEY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
14 
Notwithstanding section 850.4’s resemblance to other 
affirmative defenses, defendants argue that the GCA’s roots in 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity support affixing the 
jurisdictional label instead.  As noted, the GCA was enacted 
after this court abolished the common law rule of governmental 
immunity in Muskopf, supra, 55 Cal.2d 211.  Defendants reason 
that because the Legislature enacted the GCA to restore 
governmental immunity from liability as “the overarching rule,” 
subject only to those exceptions created by statute, courts must 
lack power to hear a tort claim against a public entity where an 
immunity provision like section 850.4 applies. 
Defendants’ argument assumes that the Legislature’s 
evident intent to limit the tort liability of public entities in the 
GCA (even when there is an applicable statutory basis for 
liability, as Government Code section 835 provides here) means 
the Legislature must also have intended to withdraw a class of 
tort cases from the fundamental jurisdiction of the courts.  This 
assumption is unfounded, for reasons Muskopf itself made clear:  
California law has long distinguished between limitations on 
the substantive liability of public entities, on the one hand, and 
limitations on the power of the courts to hear cases involving 
public entities, on the other.  (See Muskopf, supra, 55 Cal.2d at 
pp. 217–218.) 
Granted, for some time in our history, the distinction 
between these two kinds of limitations had little practical 
                                        
[GCA’s] claim presentation requirement subjects a claim 
against a public entity to a demurrer for failure to state a cause 
of action.”  But even so, we explicitly rejected the notion that a 
plaintiff’s failure to allege compliance “divests the court of 
jurisdiction over a cause of action against a public entity.”  (Id. 
at p. 1239, fn. 7.) 
QUIGLEY v. GARDEN VALLEY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
15 
relevance.  At common law, the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
had two strands:  a procedural immunity from suit without the 
government’s consent and a substantive immunity from liability 
for the conduct of government.  (State Dept. of State Hospitals v. 
Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 339, 347.)  Combined, the effect 
of these two features was to close California courts to 
individuals injured by the negligence of public entities and 
employees.  (See Welsbach Co. v. State of California (1929) 206 
Cal. 556, 558.)  For individuals injured by state employees, for 
example, the only possible remedy was payment via a private 
appropriation bill enacted by the Legislature.  (Ibid.; see 
generally Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability:  Judicial 
Lawmaking in a Statutory Milieu (1963) 15 Stan. L.Rev. 163, 
168–169.)  
But as Muskopf explained, various legal developments 
would disentangle the two strands of sovereign immunity 
doctrine in California.  (See Muskopf, supra, 55 Cal.2d at 
pp. 217–218.)  In 1885, the Legislature passed an act permitting 
certain named individuals to “institute an action against the 
State of California in any Court of competent jurisdiction” for 
property damages that the individuals sustained from the 
state’s construction of a new canal.  (Stats. 1885, ch. 123, § 1, 
p. 107, discussed in Green v. State (1887) 73 Cal. 29 (Green).)  
The Legislature followed this narrow authorization to file suit 
with a broader one, authorizing “[a]ll persons who have, or shall 
hereafter have, claims on contract or for negligence against the 
State not allowed by the State Board of Examiners . . . to bring 
suit thereon against the State in any of the Courts of this State 
of competent jurisdiction[.]”  (Stats. 1893, ch. 45, § 1, p. 57, 
discussed in Denning v. State (1899) 123 Cal. 316 (Denning).) 
QUIGLEY v. GARDEN VALLEY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
16 
In subsequent cases interpreting these statutes, this court 
held that the statutes eliminated the state’s procedural 
immunity to suit, thus opening the courts to the adjudication of 
the specified claims.  (Green, supra, 73 Cal. at pp. 32–33; 
Denning, supra, 123 Cal. at p. 319.)  But we rejected the idea 
that the Legislature, by offering the state’s consent to suit, also 
intended to eliminate the state’s substantive immunity from 
liability.  (Green, at p. 33; Denning, at p. 319; see also Melvin v. 
State (1898) 121 Cal. 16, 22–23; Chapman v. State (1894) 104 
Cal. 690, 693–694.)  Instead, we held, the state could rely on the 
common law principles that states are immune from liability for 
damages caused by the negligence or misfeasance of their 
employees (Denning, at p. 324) and that states are not liable for 
remote and consequential damages to property stemming from 
public works (Green, at pp. 34–39).   
By the time of Muskopf, similar provisions granting 
legislative consent to suit were not uncommon.  As Muskopf 
noted, the California Constitution itself contemplates the 
granting of such consent in suits against the state (Cal. Const., 
art. III, § 5, former art. XX, § 6), and the Legislature had enacted 
a “ ‘sue and be sued’ ” statute applicable to hospital districts, the 
subject of the particular controversy in Muskopf.  (Muskopf, 
supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 217, citing Health & Saf. Code, § 32121, 
subd. (b).)  But Muskopf acknowledged that such provisions did 
not displace common law limitations on the substantive liability 
of the relevant public entities.  The court explained that 
“[p]revious cases . . . have differentiated between the state’s 
consenting to be sued and its substantive liability, and have held 
that the language used in [Health and Safety Code] section 
32121, subdivision (b), and in article [III], section [5], gives only 
QUIGLEY v. GARDEN VALLEY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
17 
the state’s consent to be sued and does not waive any defenses 
or immunities.”  (Muskopf, at p. 217.) 
The Muskopf court therefore held that, notwithstanding 
an applicable grant of legislative consent to bring suit against a 
public entity, it was a separate question whether the common 
law barred courts from imposing substantive liability.  
Ultimately it answered the latter question in the negative, 
discarding the common law rule of “governmental immunity 
from tort liability” as “mistaken and unjust” insofar as it 
operated to deny compensation to individuals harmed by a 
public entity’s wrongs.  (Muskopf, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 213; see 
id. at pp. 216–217.) 
When the California Law Revision Commission made its 
recommendations about legislative responses to Muskopf, it 
likewise focused primarily on questions of substantive public 
entity liability, and it dealt separately with questions 
concerning the amenability of public entities to suits in state 
courts.  The commission proposed what ultimately became 
Government Code section 945, which provides simply:  “A public 
entity may sue and be sued.”  The commission’s comment on the 
proposed section explains:  “Section 945 is new.  This section will 
eliminate any doubt that might otherwise exist as to whether a 
tort action might be defeated on the technical ground that a 
particular local public entity is not subject to suit.  The section 
does not, however, impose substantive liability; some other 
statute 
must 
be 
found 
that 
imposes 
such 
liability.”  
(Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity, No. 2—
Claims, Actions and Judgments Against Public Entities and 
Employees (Jan. 1963) 4 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1963) 
p. 1042.)   
QUIGLEY v. GARDEN VALLEY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
18 
In sum, the history indicates that the GCA’s liability and 
special immunity provisions, like section 850.4, were addressed 
to questions of substantive liability.  As for the separate 
question whether public entities are amenable to suit in state 
courts, it appears the Legislature sought to put any doubts to 
rest when it broadly waived common law immunity from suit for 
all public entities in Government Code section 945. 
Given this background, there is little basis for defendants’ 
assumption that the Legislature intended the immunity 
conferred by section 850.4 to function as a partial withdrawal of 
the state’s consent to suit when a plaintiff brings a claim under 
a liability-providing section of the Act.  In the absence of clearer 
indication that such was the Legislature’s intent, we presume 
the opposite:  that is, that the Legislature did not intend to limit 
the fundamental power of the courts to hear the legal disputes 
that are brought to them.  (Kabran, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 342–
343.)7 
B. 
In arguing that section 850.4 creates a jurisdictional bar, 
defendants rely heavily on a series of cases that generally 
describe governmental tort immunity as “jurisdictional.”  These 
cases, however, appear to conflate lack of fundamental 
jurisdiction with acts in excess of jurisdiction.  “ ‘Even when a 
court has fundamental jurisdiction . . . the Constitution, a 
                                        
7  
The parties present competing arguments about the 
nature of sovereign, or governmental, immunity based on semi-
analogous law from other jurisdictions.  We are not bound by 
any of these approaches in interpreting our own law, and the 
unique features and history of the GCA and the state’s sovereign 
immunity in our courts temper the conclusions we may draw 
from these arguments.  
QUIGLEY v. GARDEN VALLEY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
19 
statute, or relevant case law may constrain the court to act only 
in a particular manner, or subject to certain limitations.’  
[Citation.]  We have described courts that violate procedural 
requirements, order relief that is unauthorized by statute or 
common law, or otherwise ‘ “fail[] to conduct [themselves] in the 
manner 
prescribed” ’ 
by 
law 
as 
acting 
‘ “in excess of 
jurisdiction.” ’ ”  (Kabran, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 339–340.)  
Attending to this “distinction is important because the remedies 
are different.”  (People v. Lara (2010) 48 Cal.4th 216, 225.)  
Again, when a court lacks fundamental jurisdiction, it has no 
power to hear or determine the case, and the parties cannot cure 
that fundamental absence of power.  But so long as a court 
possesses fundamental jurisdiction, an act that it takes in excess 
of jurisdiction is “ ‘valid until set aside, and parties may be 
precluded from setting it aside by such things as waiver, 
estoppel, or the passage of time.’ ”  (Kabran, at p.  340.)  
The cases on which defendants rely do not acknowledge 
this distinction or explain why the application of a statutory 
immunity ought to rank as jurisdictional in the fundamental 
sense.  Each case simply cites the last for the proposition that 
governmental immunity is jurisdictional and thus cannot be 
waived and may be raised for the first time on appeal.  (Paterson 
v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1404, fn. 5 
[“Appellants contend that this defense was waived because it 
was not sufficiently asserted in the answer.  Governmental 
immunity is a jurisdictional question [citation], and thus is not 
subject to the rule that failure to raise a defense by demurrer or 
answer waives that defense.”]; Richardson-Tunnell v. Schools 
Ins. Program for Employees (SIPE) (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 
1056, 1061 [“Government tort immunity is jurisdictional and 
may be raised for the first time on appeal.”]; Inland Empire 
QUIGLEY v. GARDEN VALLEY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
20 
Health Plan v. Superior Court (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 588, 592 
[“[G]overnmental immunity from liability is a jurisdictional 
matter that can be raised for the first time on appellate 
review.”]; 
Hata, 
supra, 
31 
Cal.App.4th 
at 
p. 
1795 
[“[G]overnmental tort immunity . . . is a jurisdictional issue that 
may be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal.”]; 
Hooper v. City of Chula Vista (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 442, 454, 
fn. 11 [reasoning that a GCA immunity raises “a jurisdictional 
question subject to judicial determination” that “may be reached 
on appeal even if not adequately asserted in the trial court”]; 
Kemmerer v. County of Fresno (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1426, 1435 
[“[G]overnmental immunity is a jurisdictional question and may 
be raised on appeal even though not used as a basis for the 
general demurrer in the lower court.”]; Buford v. State of 
California (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 811, 826 [“[T]wo defects of 
substance—lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a cause of 
action—are not waived by a failure to demur and may be raised 
for the first time on appeal.  [Citations.]  Since governmental 
immunity is jurisdictional [citation] and can properly preclude 
a cause of action, we can appropriately address the applicability 
of section 854.8.”].)  
The apparent root of this doctrinal branch is State of 
California v. Superior Court (Rodenhuis) (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 
396, a case decided soon after the enactment of the GCA.  There, 
the court considered a petition for a writ of prohibition filed by 
the State of California, which sought to restrain the superior 
court from proceeding to trial on a claim seeking damages for 
personal injuries sustained on a state beach.  The state argued 
that it was immune from liability because the plaintiff’s 
evidence could not establish the requisite elements of a 
dangerous condition of public property claim under Government 
QUIGLEY v. GARDEN VALLEY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
21 
Code section 835.  Before considering the merits of the state’s 
argument, the Court of Appeal first addressed the plaintiff’s 
preliminary contention that prohibition was inappropriate to 
address this issue and that the state should instead be required 
to raise the issue on appeal.  (Rodenhuis, at p. 398.)  In rejecting 
this argument, the Rodenhuis court reasoned that “[i]t is well 
established that the defense of sovereign immunity presents a 
jurisdictional question properly raised by prohibition.”  (Ibid.)  
For that proposition, it relied on this court’s decision in People 
v. Superior Court (Pierpont) (1947) 29 Cal.2d 754, a case 
preceding both Muskopf and the GCA, in which we held that the 
defense of common law sovereign immunity “presents a 
jurisdictional question” properly addressed by prohibition.  
(Pierpont, at p. 756; Rodenhuis, at p. 398.) 
Whatever the merits of Rodenhuis’s reasoning, its 
conclusion did not amount to a holding that sovereign immunity 
deprives a 
court 
of 
fundamental 
jurisdiction, 
because 
prohibition is proper to address judicial action taken either 
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.  (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1102; Abelleira, supra, 17 Cal.2d at pp. 287–291 [explaining 
that prohibition lies to restrain judicial acts taken in excess of 
jurisdiction and without jurisdiction, but not to correct mere 
errors of law].)  In deciding that the state could raise its defense 
of sovereign immunity by application for writ of prohibition, the 
Rodenhuis court had no need or occasion to determine whether 
governmental immunity divests a court of fundamental 
jurisdiction. 
The Courts of Appeal that have held that statutory 
immunities in the GCA are jurisdictional in the fundamental 
sense have done so only by removing Rodenhuis’s statement 
about the jurisdictional nature of governmental immunity from 
QUIGLEY v. GARDEN VALLEY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
22 
its proper context.  Rodenhuis did not hold that GCA immunities 
are jurisdictional in the fundamental sense, such that they 
cannot be waived or forfeited, and for the reasons given above, 
we reject that conclusion.8  
III. 
Having determined that section 850.4 immunity operates 
as an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional bar, the 
question remains whether defendants in this case adequately 
invoked the immunity in their answer and, if they did not, 
whether the defense should be deemed waived or forfeited. 
Defendants maintain that they raised the immunity in 
their answer, when, in their fifteenth affirmative defense, they 
claimed to “assert all defenses and rights granted to them by the 
provisions of Government Code sections 810 through 996.6, 
inclusive.”  They suggest that this citation to the entire GCA was 
sufficient to raise section 850.4 as an affirmative defense and 
put Quigley on notice that they intended to rely on it.  In denying 
Quigley’s motion for a new trial, the trial court accepted this 
argument, ruling that defendants’ “general allegation that 
[they] were immune from liability as public entities and public 
employees” in their answer was sufficient to assert section 
                                        
8  
We disapprove of Paterson v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 
174 Cal.App.4th 1393, Richardson-Tunnell v. Schools Ins. 
Program for Employees (SIPE), supra, 157 Cal.App.4th 1056, 
Inland Empire Health Plan v. Superior Court, supra, 108 
Cal.App.4th 588, Hata v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA 
Medical Center, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th 1791, Hooper v. City of 
Chula Vista, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d 442, Kemmerer v. County of 
Fresno, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d 1426, and Buford v. State of 
California, supra, 104 Cal.App.3d 811, to the extent they 
suggest that statutory immunities in the GCA deprive courts of 
fundamental jurisdiction. 
QUIGLEY v. GARDEN VALLEY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
23 
850.4.  Quigley counters that “[t]he primary function of a 
pleading is to give the other party notice so that it may prepare 
its case” (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 
240), and she argues that defendants’ whole-act pleading 
provided insufficient notice that defendants intended to rely on 
the affirmative defense provided by section 850.4, given the 50-
plus immunity provisions contained in the Act. 
The Court of Appeal has yet to consider these arguments, 
as it upheld the trial court’s decision to entertain defendants’ 
assertion of section 850.4 immunity solely on the basis that the 
immunity is jurisdictional and may be raised at any time.  
Having rejected that conclusion, we will remand the case so the 
Court of Appeal may address the parties’ remaining arguments 
in the first instance.  Specifically, assuming the issue is 
adequately preserved, the court must determine whether 
defendants’ whole-act pleading in the fifteenth affirmative 
defense sufficiently raised the defense provided by section 850.4, 
in light of the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 
431.30, subdivision (g) and the general notice purposes of our 
pleading rules.  If the Court of Appeal determines that section 
850.4 immunity was not adequately raised in defendants’ 
answer, the case should be remanded to permit the trial court to 
decide whether to exercise its discretion to allow the belated 
assertion of the defense after the commencement of the trial.  
(See Moss Estate Co. v. Adler (1953) 41 Cal.2d 581, 585 
[“[W]hether the filing of an amended pleading should be allowed 
at the time of trial is ordinarily committed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court.”].) 
 
 
QUIGLEY v. GARDEN VALLEY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
24 
IV. 
 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KRUGER, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection District 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 10 Cal.App.5th 1135 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S242250 
Date Filed: July 15, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Plumas 
Judge: Janet Hilde 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Jay-Allen Eisen Law Corporation, Downey Brand, Jay-Allen Eisen; Law Offices of Reiner & Slaughter, 
Reiner, Slaughter, McCartney & Frankel, Russell Reiner, Todd E. Slaughter and April K. Gesberg for 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Alan Charles Dell’Ario for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
 
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Joseph A. Salazar, Jr., Jeffry A. Miller, Lann G. McIntyre and Jonna D. 
Lothyan for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Pollak, Vida & Barer and Daniel P. Barer for League of California Cities, California State Association of 
Counties, California Association of Joint Powers Authorities, California Special Districts Association and 
International Municipal Lawyers Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Jay-Allen Eisen 
Downey Brand 
621 Capitol Mall, 18th Floor 
Sacramento, CA  95814-4731 
(916) 444-1000 
 
Jeffry A. Miller 
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith 
701 B Street, Suite 1900 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 699-4971