Case Title: Dane County v. Kenneth R. McGrew

Citation: 2005 WI 130

Docket Number: 2003AP001794

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2005-07-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
2005 WI 130 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP1794 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Dane County,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Kenneth R. McGrew,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  272 Wis. 2d 856, 679 N.W.2d 927 
(Ct. App. 2004-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 19, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 10, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
C. William Foust   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and CROOKS, J., join the 
concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
BUTLER, JR., J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Rex R. Anderegg and Anderegg & Mutschler, LLP, Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Rex Anderegg. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by Jason J. Hanson, assistant district attorney. 
 
A brief was filed by the State of Wisconsin by Aaron R. 
O’Neil, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
 
2005 WI 130 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP1794   
(L.C. No. 
02 TR 8507) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Dane County,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Kenneth R. McGrew,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 19, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, Dane County v. 
McGrew, No. 2003AP1794, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 
25, 2004), affirming a judgment and order of the circuit court 
for Dane County, C. William Foust, Judge.  We granted review to 
determine whether Wis. Stat. § 345.43 (2001-02),1 which mandates 
six-person 
juries 
in 
civil 
forfeiture 
trials, 
is 
unconstitutional in Dane County's prosecution of Kenneth McGrew 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 edition unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
2 
 
(McGrew) for speeding pursuant to Dane County Ordinance § 69.01 
and Wis. Stat. § 346.57(4)(h).   
¶2 
McGrew argues that under Article I, § 5 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, which provides that the right of trial 
by jury "shall remain inviolate," he is entitled to a jury of 
12, and therefore Wis. Stat. § 345.43 is unconstitutional. 
¶3 
Applying the test we set forth in Village Food & 
Liquor Mart v. H&S Petroleum, Inc., 2002 WI 92, 254 Wis. 2d 478, 
647 N.W.2d 177, we conclude that the cause of action created by 
Wis. Stat. § 346.57(4)(h) did not exist at common law at the 
time of the adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution in 1848.  We 
therefore conclude that McGrew has no constitutional right to a 
jury trial.2   
I. BACKGROUND 
¶4 
On May 2, 2002, Dane County Deputy Sheriff Eric 
Novotny stopped McGrew for speeding.  Novotny later testified 
that he "paced" McGrew's vehicle at a speed of approximately 80 
miles per hour (MPH) in a 55 MPH zone.  Novotny issued McGrew a 
citation in the amount of $175.80 with an assessment of six 
demerit "points"3 to McGrew's driver's license.  The citation 
                                                 
2 However, the four concurring and dissenting justices, 
although split on the number of jurors to which McGrew is 
entitled, conclude that McGrew has a constitutional right to a 
jury trial and form a majority on that issue.  See Justice 
Bradley's concurrence, ¶70 n.1. 
3 A motorist assessed with 12 or more demerit points in any 
12-month 
period 
suffers 
the 
penalty 
of 
driver's 
license 
suspension.  Wis. Admin. Code § Trans. 101.04(3) (Jan. 2002).   
No. 2003AP1794  
 
3 
 
accused McGrew of exceeding the applicable speed limit by 24 
MPH, in violation of Dane County ordinance 69.01,4 which adopts 
all the state traffic laws.  The particular statute at issue is 
Wis. Stat. § 346.57(4)(h).5  McGrew decided to contest the 
citation in Dane County Circuit Court.  McGrew fought the 
citation tooth and nail, fully exercising his rights.  He filed 
an extensive discovery request, asking for 25 items including 
Deputy Novotny's training records, various information about 
Novotny's 
vehicle, 
and 
the 
traffic 
engineering 
study 
establishing the speed limit on the stretch of highway on which 
Novotny stopped him.  He also filed several pretrial motions, 
and demanded a trial by jury under Wis. Stat. § 345.436:   
                                                 
4 "The statutory provisions prescribing and defining the 
proper 
handling, 
equipping 
and 
registration 
of 
motor 
vehicles . . . contained in chapters 341 through 348 . . . are 
hereby adopted by reference and made a part of this section to 
the full extent permitted by . . . the Wisconsin Statutes."  
Dane County Ord. § 69.01.   
5 " . . . [N]o person shall drive a vehicle at a speed in 
excess of the following limits unless different limits are 
indicated by official traffic signs: 
. . . .  
(h) In the absence of any other fixed limits or the posting 
of limits as required or authorized by law, 55 miles per hour."  
Wis. Stat. § 346.57(4)(h). 
6  
If . . . either party files a written demand for 
a jury trial within 10 days after the defendant enters 
a plea of not guilty under s. 345.34 and immediately 
pays the fee prescribed in s. 814.61(4), the court 
shall place the case on the jury calendar of the 
circuit court.  The number of jurors shall be 6.  If 
no party demands a trial by jury, the right to trial 
by jury is permanently waived.   
No. 2003AP1794  
 
4 
 
The Defendant hereby motions the court for a jury of 
12, as opposed to six persons.  Though the appeals 
court, in an unpublished opinion, has ruled against 
the right to a jury of 12 persons in forfeiture cases, 
this issue has not been settled by the Supreme Court.  
The Defendant raises this motion for the sake of 
preserving the record should it be necessary to appeal 
to the Supreme Court. 
McGrew submitted $36 with his request, an amount sufficient to 
cover a six-person jury.7 
¶5 
On June 18, 2002, the County moved the court for 
permission to amend the citation to reflect a charge of 
exceeding the speed limit by 25 MPH instead of 24 MPH.  The 
court allowed this amendment over the defendant's objection.  
According to McGrew, the amendment "dramatically raised the 
stakes for fighting the ticket," because it subjected McGrew to 
a potential 15-day suspension of his operating license.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 343.30(1n) ("A court shall suspend the operating 
privilege of a person for a period of 15 days upon the person's 
conviction by the court of exceeding the applicable speed 
limit . . . by 25 or more miles per hour."). 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wis. Stat. § 345.43(1). 
7  
For 
a 
jury 
in 
all 
civil 
actions . . . a 
nonrefundable fee of $6 per juror demanded to hear the 
case to be paid by the party demanding a jury within 
the time permitted to demand a jury trial.  If the 
jury fee is not paid, no jury may be called in the 
action, and the action may be tried to the court 
without a jury.   
Wis. Stat. § 814.61(4). 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
5 
 
 
¶6 
On September 27, 2002, the court held a motion hearing 
to consider McGrew's request.  The following exchange occurred 
regarding McGrew's request for a 12-person jury: 
THE COURT:  . . . [Y]ou want a jury of 12 rather than 
six. 
MR. MCGREW: The——I don't know that Your Honor could 
even rule in my favor on that matter, because the 
appeals court in our area does not believe you[] 
hav[e] a right to a 12-person jury.  I raise that only 
for the sake of establishing it in case I [go to] the 
Supreme Court later on.  I'm only [p]reserving that 
for the record, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yeah.  It seems to me that the——we went in 
misdemeanors from 12 to six and that was ruled 
unconstitutional.  The Legislature then went from six 
to 12 but left the forfeiture juries at six.  And I 
don't think there is the history of jury size 
importance in forfeiture cases that there is in 
criminal cases.  And I think the Legislature can do as 
they wish. 
And so, your record is preserved, but your motion is 
denied. 
 
¶7 
After a one-day trial held May 20, 2003, a six-person 
jury convicted McGrew of violating the ordinance.  The court 
entered judgment on the verdict in the amount of a $200 
forfeiture plus costs, and a 15-day suspension of McGrew's 
operating license.  McGrew appealed on several grounds, and the 
court of appeals affirmed.  Dane County v. McGrew, No. 
2003AP1794, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2004).  
The court of appeals rejected all of McGrew's claims of error, 
but did not specifically address McGrew's claim that he was 
entitled to a 12-person jury, because "McGrew tacitly admits we 
have no power to address this topic, and he states he is raising 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
6 
 
the issue '[s]olely to preserve [it] for a possible petition for 
review to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.'"  Id., ¶29.  We granted 
McGrew's petition for review.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶8 
McGrew argues that Wis. Stat. § 345.43 violates the 
constitutional guarantee that the right of trial by jury "shall 
remain inviolate" because it provides that "[t]he number of 
jurors shall be 6" in civil forfeiture actions.  Any attack on 
the constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law 
subject to de novo review.  Czapinski v. St. Francis Hosp., 2000 
WI 80, ¶12, 236 Wis. 2d 316, 613 N.W.2d 120.  The party 
challenging the statute bears the heavy burden of proving that 
the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  
State v. 
Laxton, 
2002 WI 
82, ¶8, 
254 Wis. 2d 185, 647 
N.W.2d 784.  This court will presume that the statute is 
constitutional, id., indulge "every presumption to sustain the 
law if at all possible," State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶11, 264 
Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328, and resolve any doubt in favor of 
the constitutionality of the statute.  See Dane County DHS v. 
P.P., 2005 WI 32, ¶17, 279 Wis. 2d 169, 694 N.W.2d 344.  We are 
not concerned with "the wisdom of the legislative enactment," 
only 
with 
whether 
the 
statute 
clearly 
contravenes 
some 
constitutional provision.  State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 
Wis. 2d 391, 413, 208 N.W.2d 780 (1973). 
 
 
 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
7 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶9 
McGrew 
challenges 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 345.43(1), which provides that when a jury is 
demanded in traffic cases, "[t]he number of jurors shall be 6." 
¶10 McGrew concedes that in light of Williams v. Florida, 
399 U.S. 78 (1970), the United States Constitution does not 
afford him the right to a 12-person jury.  The Supreme Court 
stated, "We hold that the 12-man panel is not a necessary 
ingredient of 'trial by jury' . . . ."  Id. at 86.  Thus, we 
restrict our analysis to whether the Wisconsin Constitution 
guarantees such a right. 
¶11 Two potential sections of the state constitution are 
implicated: Article I, § 5, which preserves the right of trial 
by jury, and Article I, § 7, which assures certain rights to 
criminal defendants.  McGrew concedes that this is a civil 
action.  See City of Waukesha v. Schessler, 239 Wis. 82, 85-86, 
300 N.W. 498 (1941) ("By no process of reasoning . . . can any 
action except one prosecuted by the state be considered a 
criminal action.   . . .  [A] multitude of cases might be cited 
wherein it is directly held that actions under ordinances are 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
8 
 
civil actions to recover forfeitures.").  At all relevant times, 
an ordinance violation for speeding has been so classified.8 
¶12 Accordingly, McGrew's right (or lack thereof) to a 12-
person jury trial will rise or fall based on Article I, § 5 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution,9 which preserves "inviolate" the 
right to trial by jury: 
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and 
shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the 
amount in controversy; but a jury trial may be waived 
by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed 
by law.  Provided, however, that the legislature may, 
from time to time, by statute provide that a valid 
verdict, in civil cases, may be based on the votes of 
                                                 
8 Currently, a person who violates Wis. Stat. § 346.57 is 
subject to a civil forfeiture and a possible license suspension.  
Wis. Stat. §§ 343.30(1n), 346.60(2)-(3m); 
see 
also 
Wis. Stat. § 939.12 ("A crime is conduct which is prohibited by 
state law and punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.  
Conduct punishable only by a forfeiture is not a crime.").  
McGrew seeks to analogize this forfeiture to a violation of the 
1849 "laws of the road."  In the 1849 edition of the statutes, 
"crimes" were codified in Chapters 132 through 141, while the 
laws of the road were set out in Chapter 33.  Citizens violating 
the law of the road "forfeit[ed] a sum not exceeding twenty 
dollars."  Wis. Stat. ch. 33, § 2 (1849).  
It is true that in 1957, when the legislature created the 
"Vehicle Code" and included a 55 MPH speed limit, violation of 
the statute was punishable by fine or imprisonment, and thus 
qualified as a crime.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 346.60(2), 939.12 
(1959).  However, as McGrew conceded at oral argument, the 
temporary criminal status of the action does not affect our 
analysis comparing the action as it is known today with actions 
known at the time of the Constitution's enactment. 
9 In State v. Graf, 72 Wis. 2d 179, 184, 240 N.W.2d 387 
(1976), this court recognized that Article I, § 5 applies to 
civil forfeiture actions.  See also State ex rel. Prentice v. 
County Court of Milwaukee County, 70 Wis. 2d 230, 239-40, 234 
N.W.2d 283 (1975). 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
9 
 
a specified number of the jury, not less than five-
sixths thereof. 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 5 (emphasis added). 
 
¶13 Historically, Article I, § 5 has been interpreted as 
preserving a right to trial by jury in civil cases.  For 
instance, in Bennett v. State, 57 Wis. 69, 74 (1883), the court 
stated: 
It is evident that sec. 5 . . . was intended to secure 
the right of trial by jury in civil and not in 
criminal actions.  The words in the section, "and 
shall extend to all cases at law, without regard to 
the 
amount 
in 
controversy," 
clearly 
limit 
the 
provisions of that section to civil actions at law, 
and exclude the idea that it was intended to apply to 
criminal actions.  The provision in said section that 
"a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all 
cases, in the manner prescribed by law," confirms this 
construction of the section. 
A line of cases supports this construction.10 
 
¶14 Nonetheless, there are also cases from this court that 
borrow concepts from Article I, § 5 and attempt to apply them to 
the jury trial right in criminal cases protected by Article I, 
§ 7.11 
                                                 
10 State v. Lehman, 108 Wis. 2d 291, 298 n.3, 321 N.W.2d 212 
(1982); State ex rel. Sauk County Dist. Attorney v. Gollmar, 32 
Wis. 2d 406, 410, 145 N.W.2d 620 (1966); State v. Smith, 184 
Wis. 664, 669, 200 N.W. 638 (1924).  See also State v. Ledger, 
175 Wis. 2d 116, 499 N.W.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1993) (Anderson, J., 
dissenting). 
11 State v. Norman, 2003 WI 72, ¶58, 262 Wis. 2d 506, 664 
N.W.2d 97; State v. Johnson, 2001 WI 52, ¶11, 243 Wis. 2d 365, 
627 N.W.2d 455; State v. Seymour, 183 Wis. 2d 683, 694, 515 
N.W.2d 874 (1994); State v. Lomagro, 113 Wis. 2d 582, 590-91, 
335 N.W.2d 583 (1983); Manson v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 413, 417, 
304 N.W.2d 729 (1981); Holland v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 134, 138, 
280 N.W.2d 288 (1979). 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
10 
 
 
¶15 Interpreting Article I, § 5 inevitably requires the 
court to deal with the meaning of the phrase "the right of trial 
by jury shall remain inviolate."  The maxim that is often 
repeated is that "The right to trial by jury preserved by the 
constitution is the right as it existed at the time of the 
adoption of the constitution in 1848."  Town of Burke v. City of 
Madison, 17 Wis. 2d 623, 635, 117 N.W.2d 580 (1962). 
 
¶16 Through the years, this maxim has sometimes been 
embellished: "The language of sec. 5, art. I., Const., that 'the 
right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate,' means that it 
shall remain as full and perfect as it was when the constitution 
was adopted and shall extend to all cases where the right 
existed at that time."  State ex rel. Schumacher v. Markham, 160 
Wis. 431, 436, 152 N.W. 161 (1915).  One of the first 
formulations came from Gaston v. Babcock, 6 Wis. 490 [*503], 494 
[*506] (1857), where the court observed: "We suppose this 
expression must have reference to the state of the law as it 
existed at the formation of the constitution, and means that 
this right shall continue as it was at the time of the formation 
and adoption of the constitution . . . ." 
 
¶17 This formulation presents two distinct questions.  
First, when is there a constitutional "right" to a jury trial in 
a civil case?  Second, when there is a "right" to a jury trial 
in a civil case, how, if at all, may the form and features of 
that jury trial be different from the form and features in 1848? 
 
¶18 This court dealt with the first question recently in 
Village Food and concluded that "a party has a constitutional 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
11 
 
right to have a statutory claim tried to a jury when: (1) the 
cause of action created by the statute existed, was known, or 
was recognized at common law at the time of the adoption of the 
Wisconsin Constitution in 1848[;] and (2) the action was 
regarded at law[12] in 1848."13  Village Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, 
¶11.  We explained this conclusion, saying that the language in 
the constitution that the right to jury trial "shall remain 
inviolate," "clearly indicates that non-statutory[14] causes of 
action at law, where a jury trial was guaranteed before the 
passage of the state constitution, would continue to have a 
guaranteed right to a jury trial attached even after the passage 
                                                 
12 Actions recognized in 1848 but remedied through writs of 
quo warranto, mandamus, or other equitable actions——not legal 
actions——do not pass this test.  Village Food & Liquor Mart v. 
H&S Petroleum, Inc., 2002 WI 92, ¶15, 254 Wis. 2d 478, 647 
N.W.2d 177; see also Upper Lakes Shipping, Ltd. v. Seafarers' 
Int'l Union, 23 Wis. 2d 494, 503, 128 N.W.2d 73 (1964) ("The 
scope of [Article I, § 5] is further limited to actions 'at law' 
at the time of the adoption of the original constitution"); 
Norwest Bank Wisconsin Eau Claire, N.A. v. Plourde, 185 
Wis. 2d 377, 386, 518 N.W.2d 265 (Ct. App. 1994) ("It is well 
settled that the right to a jury trial does not extend to 
equitable actions . . . ."). 
13 In adopting this conclusion, we modified slightly a test 
proposed by the court of appeals in State v. Ameritech Corp., 
185 Wis. 2d 686, 517 N.W.2d 705 (Ct. App. 1994).  Village Food, 
254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶11. 
14 We then clarified that our holding also applied to some 
statutory 
causes 
of 
action: 
"It 
certainly 
follows 
then 
that . . . a cause of action created by statute after 1848 will 
have a constitutionally guaranteed right to a jury trial 
attached if that statute codifies a claim that existed in the 
common law before the adoption of the constitution."  Village 
Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶11. 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
12 
 
of the constitution."  Id., ¶10 (citing Gaston, 6 Wis. at 494 
[*506]).  This test is consistent with our past cases.15   
¶19 The easiest way to resolve the issue in this case is 
to determine whether the violation for speeding "existed, was 
known, or was recognized at common law at the time of the 
adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution in 1848."  Id., ¶11.  
                                                 
15 See, e.g., State v. Hezzie R., 219 Wis. 2d 848, 868, 580 
N.W.2d 660 (1998) (There is no right to a jury trial in a 
juvenile proceeding, because "the rights preserved in Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 5 are only those rights that existed at the 
time the Wisconsin Constitution was adopted in 1848." (citing 
N.E. v. DHSS, 122 Wis. 2d 198, 203, 361 N.W.2d 693 (1985))); 
Gen. Drivers & Helpers Union, Local 662 v. WERB, 21 Wis. 2d 242, 
252, 124 N.W.2d 123 (1963) (No form of unfair labor law was in 
existence at the time that the Wisconsin Constitution was 
enacted, and accordingly "there is no constitutional obligation 
to afford a jury trial in such proceedings"); Bekkedal v. City 
of Viroqua, 183 Wis. 176, 192, 196 N.W. 879 (1924) ("From an 
early day it was held that the constitutional provision 
preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury preserves that 
right inviolate as it existed at the time of the adoption of the 
constitution. 
 
The 
matter 
of 
special 
assessments 
and 
reassessments is purely a statutory proceeding, relates to 
taxation, and there was at common law no right of jury trial.  
Therefore, unless the statute itself makes provision for a jury 
trial, the parties are not entitled thereto in a proceeding of 
the kind now before us"); Mead v. Walker, 17 Wis. 195 [*189], 
197 
[*190] 
(1863) 
("[O]ur 
constitution . . . has 
been 
interpreted as designed to secure only the right of trial by 
jury in all cases where it could by law have been claimed as a 
matter of right at the time the constitution was adopted"); 
Stilwell v. Kellogg, 14 Wis. 499 [*461], 504 [*465] (1861) ("The 
constitution provides that the 'right of trial by jury shall 
remain 
inviolate,' 
which 
evidently 
had 
reference 
to 
the 
condition of the law as it existed when the constitution was 
adopted.  It, therefore, did not preserve it as a matter of 
right, in those cases which, by the law and practice then 
existing, were submitted entirely to the judgment of the court." 
(internal citation omitted)); Gaston v. Babcock, 6 Wis. 490 
[*503], 494 [*506] (1857). 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
13 
 
Before we analyze the law as it existed in 1848, however, we 
must define the scope of our inquiry.  McGrew argues that we 
should broadly frame the question, either as whether civil 
forfeiture 
actions 
existed 
at 
the 
relevant 
time, 
or 
alternatively as whether any "laws of the road" existed.  The 
County, on the other hand, argues that we should narrowly frame 
our inquiry as whether a cause of action for motor vehicle 
speeding existed in 1848.   
¶20 For 
guidance, 
we 
look 
to 
our 
recent 
decisions 
interpreting this constitutional provision.  In Village Food, we 
investigated whether a statutory cause of action created by the 
Unfair Sales Act, Wis. Stat. § 100.30, existed in 1848.  First, 
we rejected the defendant's claim that the action was analogous 
to broad classes of 1848 actions, such as "business fraud, and 
torts such as cheating, fraud, deceit, and business slander."  
Id., 
¶23. 
 
We 
were 
persuaded, 
however, 
by 
entries 
in 
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England describing the 
common law offenses of forestalling the market, regrating, and 
engrossing.  Id., ¶27.  We noted that "these causes of action 
are of the same 'nature' as the present cause of action . . . ."  
Id.  We additionally remarked, 
[t]he fact that the type of unfair trade practice 
prohibited at common law differs slightly in its means 
from the unfair trade practice prohibited under the 
Unfair Sales Act is, we conclude, an insufficient 
distinguishing characteristic to restrict a jury trial 
in this case.  They are essentially 'counterpart[s]' 
in combating unfair trade practices. 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
14 
 
Id., ¶28 (emphasis added).16 
 
¶21 Accordingly, we conclude that in order to deem the 
Village Food test satisfied, we need not find specific identity 
between the speeding violation at bar and an 1848 cause of 
action, so long as there was an 1848 action that only "differs 
slightly" and is "essentially [a] counterpart" to the current 
cause.  Id.  With this framework in mind, we turn to the 
specific cause of action at issue. 
¶22 The County prosecuted McGrew under its ordinance 
adopting, 
among 
others, 
Wis. Stat. § 346.57(4)(h), 
which 
provides: 
(4) . . . [N]o person shall drive a vehicle at a speed 
in excess of the following limits: 
 
. . . .  
                                                 
16 Wisconsin appellate courts have addressed this question 
in several factual settings.   
In N.E. and Hezzie R., this court rejected the argument 
that juvenile delinquents have a right to a jury trial, because 
"[j]uvenile delinquency proceedings did not exist at the time 
the constitution was adopted . . . ."  N.E., 122 Wis. 2d at 203.  
However, because the entire class of juvenile proceedings did 
not exist in 1848, the N.E. and Hezzie R. courts did not need to 
elaborate on whether specific identity is required, or whether 
any 
analogous 
1848 
cause 
of 
action 
will 
satisfy 
the 
constitutional requirements. 
Similarly, in Town of Burke v. City of Madison, 17 
Wis. 2d 623, 635, 117 N.W.2d 580 (1962), this court held that no 
right to a jury trial in an election contest existed because no 
such right existed at the time the constitution was adopted.  
See also State ex rel. Allis v. Wiesner, 187 Wis. 384, 395, 204 
N.W. 589 (1925) (No right to trial by jury in eminent domain 
cases). 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
15 
 
(h) In the absence of any other fixed limits or the 
posting of limits as required or authorized by law, 55 
miles per hour. 
Wis. Stat. § 346.57(4)(h). 
 
In 
turn, 
the 
statutes 
define 
"vehicle" as "every device in, upon, or by which any person or 
property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, 
except railroad trains."  Wis. Stat. § 340.01(74).17   
 
¶23 We must decide whether this cause of action was 
cognizable in 1848.18  At first glance, it might appear that this 
is a simple question, because the automobile was not mass-
produced in the United States until the late 1890s.19  However, 
we note that Wis. Stat. § 346.57(4) does not apply solely to 
"motor vehicles."  The broad statutory definition of "vehicle" 
does not mandate such a narrow construction, and in addition 
"motor 
vehicle" 
is 
defined 
separately.  
Wis. Stat. § 340.01(35).20   
                                                 
17 The definitions in § 340.01 apply to chapter 346 unless 
otherwise specified.  Wis. Stat. § 346.01. 
18 Our past cases have drawn from a variety of sources to 
determine whether an action was cognizable in 1848.  For 
example, several of our cases have referenced Blackstone's 
Commentaries 
on 
the 
Laws 
of 
England 
(1778) 
(hereinafter 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England) to determine 
whether an action was recognized prior to statehood.  Village 
Food, 
254 
Wis. 2d 478, 
¶¶26-27; 
State 
v. 
Hansford, 
219 
Wis. 2d 226, 237, 580 N.W.2d 171 (1998); Norval v. Rice, 2 Wis. 
17 [*22], 20 [*27] (1853).  We also must examine the 1849 
statutes, because they were intended to "collate and revise all 
the public acts of the state of a general and permanent nature," 
as of July 1848."  Revised Statutes of Wisconsin (1849) at iii.   
19 James J. Flink, The Automobile Age 6-7 (M.I.T. Press 
2001). 
20 "'Motor vehicle' means a vehicle . . . which is self-
propelled . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 340.01(35). 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
16 
 
 
¶24 As to sources of law existent in 1848, Blackstone made 
no reference to provisions specifically analogous to a "law of 
the road," at least as far as driving is concerned.  However, 
Blackstone noted the existence of "common nuisances."  Among 
these are  
[a]nnoyances in highways, bridges, and public rivers, 
by rendering the same inconvenient or dangerous to 
pass, either positively, by actual obstructions, or 
negatively, by want of reparations.  For both of 
these, the person so obstructing, or such individuals 
as are bound to repair and cleanse them, or (in 
default of these last) the parish at large, may be 
indicted, distrained to repair and mend them, and in 
some cases fined.  And a presentment thereof by a 
judge of assize, etc., or a justice of the peace, 
shall be in all respects equivalent to an indictment.   
4 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 167 (1778).21 
¶25 McGrew 
argues 
that 
we 
should 
analogize 
the 
Blackstonian recognition of "nuisances" to his speeding ticket.  
We decline to do so.  Applying the standards we have reiterated, 
we view the class of actions categorized as "nuisances" as 
simply too broad to be analogized to a speeding violation.  
McGrew has provided no authority for calling a speeding ticket a 
public "nuisance," and in our view the two are more than 
"slightly different"; they are not "essentially counterparts."  
See Village Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶28.  Accordingly, the causes 
                                                 
21 Blackstone also notes that certain "disorderly offences, 
such as common swearing, drunkenness, vagrancy, idleness, and a 
vast variety of others" were triable by "summary conviction" 
without a jury.  4 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England at 280-81.  It is unclear whether "common nuisances" 
such as highway obstructions were included in this category. 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
17 
 
of action recognized in Blackstone's Commentaries are not 
sufficient to show that an action for speeding existed in 1848.  
We continue our examination of pre-statehood law. 
¶26 No specific offense, let alone any action analogous to 
speeding, is mentioned in the 1787 ordinance establishing the 
Northwest Territory, from which Wisconsin was eventually formed.  
The same is true of the 1836 ordinance establishing the 
territorial government of Wisconsin.  McGrew cannot depend on 
these enactments. 
¶27 McGrew's final arguments are based on the 1849 edition 
of the Wisconsin Statutes.  This edition was intended to 
"collate and revise all the public acts of the state of a 
general and permanent nature," as of July 1848.22  Wis. Rev. 
Stat. at iii (1849). 
¶28 To the extent that the 1849 statutes recognize broad 
causes 
of 
action 
for 
civil 
forfeitures, 
they 
are 
also 
insufficient to support McGrew's demands.  As we have noted, 
such broad classifications are not sufficiently analogous to the 
cause of action at issue here, speeding.  McGrew's analysis 
would lead to a jury trial in virtually every forfeiture case. 
¶29 Examining the 1849 Statutes more closely, we observe 
that they contain provisions concerning obstruction of highways.  
Wis. Stat. ch. 16, § 86 (1849).  The forfeiture for such an 
offense was not to exceed twenty-five dollars.  Id.  This cause 
                                                 
22 Wisconsin joined the Union on May 29, 1848, as the 30th 
state.  2003-04 Wisconsin Blue Book at 684. 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
18 
 
of action is very similar to that described in Blackstone, and 
for similar reasons we reject it as too different from the cause 
of action at bar. 
¶30 The 1849 Statutes also contained an entire chapter 
entitled, "Of the Law of the Road, and the Regulation of Public 
Carriages."  Wis. Stat. ch. 33 (1849).23  Close examination of 
                                                 
23 Chapter 33 of the 1849 Statutes ("Of the Law of the Road, 
and the Regulation of Public Carriages") provided in full: 
Section 1.  Whenever any persons shall meet each 
other 
on 
any 
bridge 
or 
road, 
travelling 
with 
carriages, waggons, sleds, sleighs, or other vehicles, 
each person shall seasonably drive his carriage or 
other vehicle to the right of the middle of the 
travelled part of such bridge or road, so that the 
respective carriages, or other vehicles aforesaid, may 
pass each other without interference. 
Sec. 2.  Every person offending against the 
provisions of the preceding section, shall for each 
offence forfeit a sum not exceeding twenty dollars, 
and shall also be liable to the party injured for all 
damages sustained by reason of such offence. 
Sec. 3.  No person owning, or having the 
direction or control of any coach, or other vehicle, 
running or travelling upon any road in this state, for 
the 
conveyance 
of 
passengers, 
shall 
employ, 
or 
continue in employment, any person to drive such coach 
or other vehicle, who is addicted to drunkenness, or 
to the excessive use of intoxicating liquors; and if 
any such person shall violate the provisions of this 
section, he shall forfeit at the rate of five dollars 
per day for all the time during which he shall have 
kept such driver in such employment. 
Sec. 4.  If any driver, whilst actually employed 
in driving such coach or vehicle, shall be guilty of 
intoxication, it shall be the duty of the owner or 
person having the charge or control of such coach or 
other vehicle, on receiving written notice of the 
fact, signed by any passenger who witnessed the same, 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
19 
 
the plain language of these provisions leads to the conclusion 
that Sections 1 and 2 apply to all "vehicle" operators, while 
Sections 3 through 6 pertain to owners and operators of vehicles 
"for hire."  As McGrew was driving a private vehicle, not a 
vehicle for hire, we focus on the first two sections.  These 
sections mandate that a vehicle keep to the right side of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
and 
certified 
by 
him 
under 
oath, 
forthwith 
to 
discharge such driver from such employment, and every 
person who shall retain or have in such service, 
within six months after the receipt of such notice, 
any driver who shall have been so intoxicated, shall 
forfeit five dollars per day for all the time during 
which he shall keep any such driver in such employment 
after receiving such notice. 
Sec. 5.  It shall not be lawful for the driver of 
any carriage, or other vehicle used for the conveyance 
of passengers for hire, to leave the horses attached 
thereto, while any passenger remains in or upon the 
same, 
without 
making 
such 
horses 
fast 
with 
a 
sufficient halter, rope, or chain, or without some 
suitable person to take the charge and guidance of 
them, so as to prevent their running; and if any such 
driver shall violate the provisions of this section, 
he 
and 
his 
employer 
or 
employers, 
jointly 
and 
severally, shall forfeit a sum not exceeding twenty 
dollars; 
but 
no 
prosecution 
shall 
be 
commenced 
therefor after the expiration of three months from the 
time of committing the offence. 
Sec. 6. The owners of every carriage or other 
vehicle, running or travelling upon any road or public 
highway, for the conveyance of passengers for hire, 
shall be liable, jointly and severally, to the party 
injured, in all cases, for all injuries and damages 
done by any person in the employment of such owners as 
a driver, while driving such carriage, to any person, 
or to the property of any person, whether the act 
occasioning 
such 
injury 
or 
damage 
be 
wilful, 
negligent, or otherwise, in the same manner as such 
driver would be liable. 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
20 
 
road.  We conclude that this cause of action is not akin to 
McGrew's speeding violation.   
¶31 To give context to this conclusion, we briefly review 
the development of Wisconsin's traffic code.  After statehood, 
the legislature slowly modernized Wisconsin's "laws of the 
road."  In 1869 the legislature enacted a law allowing towns to 
collect suitable penalties "for the riding or driving faster 
than a walk on any bridges within the limits of their 
towns . . . ."  § 1, ch. 70, Laws of 1869 (codified at ch. 19, 
§ 153 (1871)).  This statute was codified with other statutes 
relating to the maintenance and operation of highways and 
bridges, not with the rules of the road. 
¶32 In 1905 the legislature passed Wisconsin's first true 
speed limit for automobiles: 
Speed limit; rules of road to be observed.  Section 3.  
No person or persons shall use, operate ride or drive 
any automobile or other similar motor vehicle along or 
upon any public highway of this state within the 
corporate limits of any city or village at a speed 
exceeding twelve miles per hour, nor on any of the 
public highways outside the corporate limits of a city 
or village at a speed exceeding twenty-five miles per 
hour; provided that in turning corners, in going 
around curves, at sharp declines, at the intersection 
of any cross road, and where, for any cause, the view 
in the direction in which the vehicle is proceeding, 
shall be obstructed, the speed shall be reduced to 
such a rate as will tend to avoid danger of accident; 
the operator, when such vehicle is in motion, shall 
observe the rules of the road. 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
21 
 
§ 3, ch. 305, Laws of 1905 (codified at ch. 73a, § 1636-49 
(1905)).24  Violation of the speeding provision was punishable by 
"a fine of not less than ten dollars and not more than twenty-
five dollars."  § 8, ch. 305, Laws of 1905. 
 
¶33 Construing this statute "in view of the well-known 
need for regulation of the operations of the dangerous modern 
road machine," this court stated: "The manifest purpose of the 
                                                 
24 This section was revised in 1911, ch. 600, Laws of 1911, 
and revised again and renumbered as § 85.08 in 1923.  § 178, ch. 
108, Laws of 1923.  The revised law included an age limit to 
operate certain types of vehicles.  Id.  The relevant part of 
the new law provided: 
No person shall operate a motor vehicle recklessly or 
at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and 
proper with regard to the width, traffic and use of 
the highways and the rules of the road, or so as to 
endanger the property, life or limb of any person, and 
no person shall operate any such vehicle along any 
highway in any city or village or through any hamlet 
which contains more than ten houses and places of 
business at a rate of speed exceeding fifteen miles 
per hour, except where the houses and places of 
business shall average more than two hundred feet 
apart, where a safe rate of speed not exceeding twenty 
miles an hour may be used; nor elsewhere on any public 
highway at a speed exceeding thirty miles per hour; 
and no person shall operate such motor vehicle through 
any cemetery or county or state hospital or poor farm 
grounds or any park or in passing any school grounds 
at a speed exceeding twelve miles per hour.  In 
turning corners and going around curves, at sharp 
declines, at the intersection of any street or 
crossroad and where the view in the direction in which 
the vehicle is proceeding shall be obstructed, the 
driver shall so limit the speed of such vehicle as 
shall tend to avoid accidents. 
§ 178, ch. 108, Laws of 1923 (codified at Wis. Stat. § 85.08 
(1923)). 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
22 
 
law was to protect travelers upon public ways from being 
subjected to the peril created by unduly speeding automobiles 
thereon."  Weirich v. State, 140 Wis. 98, 103, 121 N.W. 652 
(1909).   
 
¶34 In 1913 the legislature added additional provisions 
regarding vehicle passing speed.  § 1, ch. 138, Laws of 1913.  
It restricted the permissible passing speed to ten miles per 
hour.  Id. 
¶35 By 1921 the statutes contained directions for passing 
a horse, 
signals 
required 
to be 
used on 
roadways, and 
requirements that automobiles be equipped with brakes, signaling 
devices, and lights.  See Wis. Stat. ch. 76l, §§ 1636-50-52a 
(1921).  In 1929 the legislature substantially rewrote the laws 
of the road, adding 78 new sections to the statutes.  See § 3, 
ch. 
454, 
Laws 
of 
1929. 
 
One 
of 
these, 
codified 
at 
Wis. Stat. § 85.40(1) (1929) provided: 
UNLAWFUL OPERATION OF VEHICLES.  It shall be unlawful 
for any person to operate any vehicle upon a highway 
carelessly 
and heedlessly, in willful 
or 
wanton 
disregard of the rights or safety of others, or 
without due caution and circumspection or at speeds 
greater than those specified in this section or in a 
manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger the 
property, life, or limb of any person, or without due 
regard to the traffic, surface, width of the highway, 
and any other condition of whatever nature then 
existing.   
§ 3, ch. 454, Laws of 1929 (emphasis added). 
Other provisions in § 85.40 dealt with special situations such 
as speed limits in school zones, speed limits on curves and 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
23 
 
grades, 
and 
speed 
limits 
for 
heavy 
vehicles 
and 
buses.  
Wis. Stat. § 85.40(2)-(12).   
¶36 In 1957 the legislature once again substantially 
amended the laws of the road, creating Chapters 340 through 349 
of the statutes as the "Vehicle Code."  Chapter 260, Laws of 
1957.  Wisconsin Stat. § 346.57(4)(h) (1957) provided:  
4. 
 . . . [N]o person shall drive a vehicle at a 
speed in excess of the following limits unless 
different limits are indicated by official traffic 
signs:   
. . . .  
(h) In the absence of any other fixed limits or 
the posting of limits as required or authorized by 
law, 55 miles per hour during hours of darkness and 65 
miles per hour at other times. 
¶37 Because the cause of action for speeding did not exist 
until at least 1905, McGrew has not satisfied the Village Food 
test.25  Even though we do not demand specific identity between a 
current cause of action and one recognized in 1848, we will 
adhere to the Village Food requirement that the actions be only 
"slightly different" or "counterparts."  We see no such 
relationship here.   
¶38 Even if we were to analogize the 1849 "laws of the 
road" to a speeding offense, we note that the maximum penalty 
for 
a 
violation 
of 
Section 
1 
was 
"twenty 
dollars."  
                                                 
25 The word "speeding" did not appear in a Wisconsin case 
until 1888, see Porter v. Day, 71 Wis. 296, 302, 37 N.W. 259 
(1888), and that reference involved horse racing.  In all 
likelihood, there was no way to measure the "speed" of a vehicle 
accurately in 1848. 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
24 
 
Wis. Stat. ch. 33, § 2 (1849).  Accordingly, as of 1849, sole 
jurisdiction for a prosecution of this offense rested in courts 
of the justices of the peace.  Wis. Stat. ch. 88, § 5(5) (1849) 
("Every 
such 
justice 
shall 
have 
jurisdiction 
over . . . [a]ctions for a penalty not exceeding one hundred 
dollars, gived by any statute of this state . . . .").  In civil 
cases 
tried 
before 
a 
justice 
of 
the 
peace, 
"either 
party . . . may demand that the cause be tried by a jury of six 
men."  Wis. Stat. ch. 88, § 80 (1849).  In fact, the parties had 
the option to settle on "six, or any less number of jurors to 
try the cause."  Wis. Stat. ch. 88, § 86 (1849).  Appeals from 
the justice of the peace courts were taken to the county courts.  
Wis. Stat. ch. 86, § 2 (1849).  In the county court, each party 
had a right to a trial "by a jury to consist of not more than 
six persons . . . ."  Wis. Stat. ch. 86, § 16 (1849).26   
¶39 Thus, even to the extent that McGrew's speeding 
violation could be analogized to the "laws of the road" of 1849, 
                                                 
26 This provision was declared unconstitutional in Norval, 
discussed infra in greater detail. 
Under some circumstances, it appears that the county court 
originally may have had the power to decide a case without a 
jury.  Wis. Stat. ch. 88, § 238 (1849) ("[I]f . . . the nature 
and circumstances of the case . . . are such as not to require a 
trial by jury, the county court shall have power to . . . give 
such judgment, or make such order in the case, as law and 
justice between the parties shall require.").  The decision in 
Norval made the constitutionality of this statute uncertain.  As 
the legislature has currently provided for a jury of six, we 
need not address the issues potentially raised by Wis. Stat. ch. 
88, § 238 (1849). 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
25 
 
he would have had a right to a jury of six, not 12, before a 
justice of the peace.   
¶40 McGrew points to our decisions in Norval v. Rice, 2 
Wis. 17 [*22] (1853), and State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 
580 N.W.2d 171 (1998), in an attempt to invalidate this 
analysis.  
¶41 Hansford can be distinguished.  It deals exclusively 
with criminal cases and declares that Article I, § 7 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution provides a right to a jury of 12 persons 
in all criminal cases.  The court did not rely on Article I, 
§ 5.  In fact, it cited Bennett v. State, 57 Wis. 69, 14 N.W. 
912 (1883), to the effect that the right to trial by jury in 
criminal cases is based on Article I, § 7.  Hansford, 219 
Wis. 2d at 239.  The court also cited Article XIV, § 13: "Such 
parts of the common law as are now in force in the territory of 
Wisconsin, not inconsistent with this constitution, shall be and 
continue part of the law of this state until altered or 
suspended by the legislature."  The court stated: "Although the 
legislature has the authority to alter common law, it may not do 
so contrary to the provisions set forth in the Wisconsin 
Constitution."  Id. at 235 n.10. 
¶42 Norval presents a more difficult problem.  In Norval, 
decided in 1853, this court held that  
it is certain that when our Constitution was adopted, 
we had no court of record in existence in Wisconsin, 
in which the number of the jury for trials of facts in 
any case, except by consent, could be less than 
twelve; so that it cannot be said that when a trial by 
jury, in a court of record such as the County Court, 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
26 
 
must be by a jury of six persons and no more, the 
trial by jury in a court of record which has been 
enjoyed before the adoption of the Constitution, 
remains inviolate. 
Norval, 2 Wis. at 23 [*30] (emphasis added; "remains inviolate" 
emphasized in original).   
 
¶43 It is possible to distinguish Norval by emphasizing 
that the cause of action here did not exist in 1848, and by 
pointing to the justice of the peace court in which the cause 
would have been tried if it had existed.  But this would be 
little better than sleight of hand.  We think for several 
reasons that the Norval court might not have reached the same 
decision today. 
 
¶44 Justice Samuel Crawford posed this question in 1853: 
"The principal question involved in this case is whether, under 
the Constitution, the defendant . . . was entitled to a trial of 
the issue . . . by a jury of twelve men, when he demanded the 
same, and paid the usual jury fee into court."  2 Wis. at 19 
[*25].  The court quoted Lord Coke: "[A] trial [of facts] by 
twelve men is the most frequent and common[,]" id at 20 [*26], 
and Blackstone: "[T]he court awards a writ . . . commanding the 
sheriff that he cause to come here on such a day, twelve free 
and lawful men . . . of the body of his county, by whom the 
truth of the matter may be better known."  Id. at 20 [*27]. 
 
¶45 These statements reveal an outdated concept of the 
jury.  For instance, there are times when a jury will not be 
drawn from a party's "county" because such a jury might be 
biased, and the whole process of jury selection and voir dire is 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
27 
 
radically different today from the process in 1848.27  Thus, the 
Norval court's statement that the right of trial by jury "shall 
continue as it was at the time of the formation and adoption of 
the Constitution by the people of the State," 2 Wis. at 22 
[*29], cannot be taken literally.  If it were, modern procedural 
tools such as summary judgment could not be applied in civil 
cases, just as they are not applied in criminal cases.  Plainly, 
                                                 
27 In justice of the peace courts, jury selection occurred 
as follows: 
 
Sec. 82.  Upon such demand of a jury, the justice 
shall direct the sheriff, or any constable of the 
county who may be present, to write down the names of 
eighteen persons of the county qualified to serve as 
jurors in courts of record, who shall be in no wise of 
kin to the plaintiff or defendant, nor interested in 
the suit. 
 
. . . .  
 
Sec. 84.  From such list of names, each party, 
commencing with the party demanding such jury, may 
strike out alternately six names, and in case of the 
absence of either party, or his refusal to strike out, 
the justice shall appoint some other person to strike 
out six names. 
 
Sec. 85.  The justice shall issue a venire, 
requiring the officer to summon the six persons whose 
names remain upon the said list of names to appear at 
the time and place mentioned therein, to make a jury 
for the trial of the action between the parties in the 
venire mentioned. 
Wis. Stat. ch. 88, §§ 82, 84, 85 (1849).  There could not 
have been any "voir dire" as that term is currently understood, 
because none of the jurors were present in the courtroom as the 
parties selected the jurors.  A similar procedure applied in 
county court.  Wis. Stat. ch. 86, § 17 (1849). 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
28 
 
there have been enormous changes in the form and features of 
jury trials since 1848. 
 
¶46 The Norval court acknowledged that six-person juries 
existed in the Wisconsin Territory.  Id. at 23 [*29-30].  It 
acknowledged six-person juries in justice courts and said: "So 
far as the restriction of the jury before a justice of the peace 
is concerned, we do not feel at liberty to inquire at this time, 
but may remark that the party aggrieved by the decision before 
the justice, might, in certain cases, remove the case by appeal 
to the District Court, where a trial by jury of twelve men would 
be available."  Id. [*30].  The court artfully dodged the 
constitutionality of six-person justice juries by pointing to a 
right to appeal to a court of record, but Article I, § 5 says 
nothing about juries in courts of record.  Moreover, the court 
accorded 
the 
six-person 
jury 
statute 
it 
struck 
down 
no 
presumption of constitutionality. 
¶47 The Norval court did not have the benefit of 150 years 
of six-person juries in Wisconsin or the Supreme Court's 
decision in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
¶48 By depriving the legislature of the authority to 
modify trials by jury in civil cases except in those cases in 
which a party has no right to a jury, Norval has forced 
appellate courts to engage in judicial gamesmanship.  For 
example, in Ogden v. City of Madison, 111 Wis. 413, 429-30, 87 
N.W. 568 (1901), the court refused to require a jury trial of 
any size for the violation of a municipal ordinance.  To justify 
this result, the court explained: 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
29 
 
When the peace and dignity of the state are being 
vindicated the constitution says the accused may have 
a jury trial.  When some local municipal by-law has 
been invaded the constitutional guaranty does not 
apply.  . . . "[W]e are not now prepared to inaugurate 
the revolution that must follow the announcement of 
the doctrine that a jury trial is an indispensable 
requisite." 
Id. at 429-30 (quoting McInerney v. City of Denver, 29 P. 516, 
519 (Colo. 1892)) (emphasis added).  The Ogden court defended 
its decision by distinguishing an ordinance violation from a 
state civil forfeiture (which ought not to make a difference if 
the cause of action were recognized at common law), and by 
relying on the fact that ordinance cases can be appealed to a 
court of record where a litigant could get a jury trial.  
Circumstances have changed.  We think it makes more sense to 
liberally recognize a right to a jury of six than narrowly 
recognize a right to a jury of 12. 
 
¶49 We 
make 
these 
observations 
because, 
although 
"speeding" was not a cause of action recognized at common law in 
1848, other traffic violations such as driving outside one's 
lane cannot be so easily distinguished.  It makes little sense 
to us to scrutinize whether each individual traffic violation 
was recognized at common law so as to determine whether a 
violator is entitled to a six- or 12-person jury. 
 
¶50 In any event, in this case, the decision is clear: 
speeding violations were not "known to the common law and to the 
court of the territory of Wisconsin before the state was 
organized."  Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d at 239 (citing Bennett, 57 
No. 2003AP1794  
 
30 
 
Wis. at 75).  Accordingly, McGrew has no right to a 12-person 
jury. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶51 We conclude that McGrew has not satisfied the heavy 
burden of showing that Wis. Stat. § 345.43 is unconstitutional.  
Because he cannot show that the cause of action for a speeding 
violation existed at the time the Wisconsin Constitution was 
enacted, he has no constitutional right to a trial by a jury of 
12.  See Village Food, 254 Wis. 2d 478, ¶11.  As such a right is 
not constitutionally mandated, the legislature is free to fix 
the number of jurors at six, as it has done.   
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2003AP1794.awb 
 
1 
 
¶52 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  Unlike the lead 
opinion, I recognize that McGrew has a constitutional right to a 
jury trial for this civil forfeiture action.   Based upon the 
law at the time the Wisconsin Constitution was enacted, I 
determine that the constitutional right is for a six-person 
jury.  Because McGrew exercised his right to a six-person jury 
here, I conclude that there was no error.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully concur. 
¶53 In Village Food & Liquor Mart v. H&S Petroleum, Inc., 
2002 WI 92, ¶11, 254 Wis. 2d 478, 647 N.W.2d 177, this court 
determined that "a party has a constitutional right to have a 
statutory claim tried to a jury when:  (1) the cause of action 
created by the statute existed, was known, or was recognized at 
common law at the time of the adoption of the Wisconsin 
Constitution in 1848[;] and (2) the action was regarded at law 
in 1848."  
¶54 Applying this test, the lead opinion determines that 
the charge of speeding "did not exist at common law at the time 
of the adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution in 1848."  Lead 
op., ¶3.  After examining the relevant violations known at 
common law, it concludes that "McGrew has no constitutional 
right to a jury trial."  Id.   
¶55 The lead opinion's analysis, however, presents a 
conundrum.  After acknowledging that certain rules of the road 
did exist at common law at the time the Constitution was 
enacted, the lead opinion's analysis leaves some traffic 
violations with a statutory right to a six-person jury and 
No.  2003AP1794.awb 
 
2 
 
others with a constitutional right to a 12-person jury.  Id., 
¶49.  We are thus left with a constitutional hodgepodge. 
¶56 The lead opinion errs when it narrowly focuses on 
McGrew's speeding violation.  The error of its ways is made 
evident by its recognition that it "makes little sense for us to 
scrutinize 
whether 
each 
individual 
traffic 
violation 
was 
recognized at common law so as to determine whether a violator 
is entitled to a six- or 12-person jury."  Id.  
¶57 The scope of the lead opinion's focus thrusts it into 
the dilemma that it encounters.  Rather than narrowly focusing 
on each individual violation, the lead opinion should broaden 
its lens to focus on violations of the "rules of the road."  
This change in focus is more than a technical nuance; it is 
outcome determinative.  Significantly, it produces an outcome 
that avoids the constitutional hodgepodge and makes sense.   
¶58 Thus, the question we should address is not whether a 
violation for speeding existed at the time the Wisconsin 
Constitution was enacted.  Rather, the question more broadly 
stated is whether "rules of the road" existed at common law at 
the time the Wisconsin Constitution was enacted in 1848.  To 
help resolve this broader question, we look to "the earliest 
interpretation of the [rules of the road] by the legislature as 
manifested in the first law passed following adoption" of the 
Wisconsin Constitution in 1848.  Thompson v. Craney, 199 
Wis. 2d 674, 680, 546 N.W.2d 123 (1996). 
¶59 It is evident that "rules of the road" did exist in 
1848.  Chapter 33 of the 1849 statutes is entitled "Of the Law 
No.  2003AP1794.awb 
 
3 
 
of the Road, and the Regulation of Public Carriages."  Set forth 
in this chapter are several rules governing traffic violations.  
For example, a forfeiture of $20 was imposed for a violation for 
operating "to the right of the middle of the travelled part of 
such bridge or road . . . ."  Wis. Rev. Stat. ch. 33, § 2 
(1849).  A forfeiture of $5 was imposed against public carriage 
owners who employed "persons addicted to drunkenness."  Wis. 
Rev. Stat. ch. 33, § 3 (1849).    
¶60 The "laws of the road" violations recognized at common 
law in 1848 are the predecessors to the "rules of the road" 
violations recognized today.  Included in the "rules of the 
road" violations is a civil forfeiture action for speeding.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 346.60 (2003-04). 
¶61 Having recognized the existence of "laws of the road" 
at the time the Constitution was enacted, I turn next to how 
violations of these rules were dealt with in 1848.  Our history 
shows that causes of action for such violations were tried by 
justice of the peace courts, where it was customary for the 
penalty to be a minor forfeiture and where the alleged violator 
had a right to a six-person jury.   
¶62 Justice of the peace courts had jurisdiction to hear 
actions for the recovery of forfeitures of less than $100.  Wis. 
Rev. Stat. ch. 88, § 5(5) (1849).  All of the "laws of the road" 
violations fell comfortably within that limit.  See Wis. Rev. 
Stat. ch. 33 (1849).  Thus, all such cases alleging "laws of the 
road" violations were tried before justice of the peace courts. 
No.  2003AP1794.awb 
 
4 
 
 
¶63 Section 80 of Chapter 88 clearly provides for a right 
to a six-person jury trial in a justice of the peace court.  It 
states:  "either party, on first paying to the justice the jury 
fees in advance, which shall be taxed against the losing party, 
may demand that the cause be tried by a jury of six men."  
Applying the Village Food test, I conclude that a defendant has 
a constitutional right for a six-person jury trial in forfeiture 
actions asserting violation of the "rules of the road." 
 
¶64 Unlike the dissent, I do not interpret the case of 
Norval v. Rice, 2 Wis. 17,[*22] (1853) as altering this analysis 
or conclusion.  In that case the court struck down a statute 
providing for six-person juries in county court civil cases, 
i.e. courts of record.  Id. at 23,[*30].  The court determined 
that Article I, § 5, of the Wisconsin Constitution preserved the 
right to a 12-person jury trial in a court of record.  Id.  
However, it explicitly declined to address the constitutionality 
of statutes providing for six-person juries in justice of the 
peace courts, which are at issue here.   The court stated: 
 
So far as the restriction of the jury before a justice 
of the peace is concerned, we do not feel at liberty 
to inquire at this time, but may remark that the party 
aggrieved by the decision before the justice, might, 
in certain cases, remove the case by appeal to the 
District Court, where a trial by a jury of twelve men 
would be available. 
Id. 
 
¶65 Despite Norval's silence on the issue, the dissent 
interprets the decision as mandating a 12-person jury trial in 
all civil cases, including the cases involving "laws of the 
road" forfeiture actions tried in justice of the peace courts.  
No.  2003AP1794.awb 
 
5 
 
The premise behind this conclusion is that an offender charged 
with violating the laws of the road could appeal a judgment from 
the justice of the peace courts to the county courts and receive 
a jury of 12 persons.  Dissent, ¶89.  According to the dissent, 
"it is not coincidence that [the Norval] court allayed its 
concerns regarding the six-person juries in justice of the peace 
courts (which it chose not to decide) by noting that 12-person 
juries could eventually be obtained in a court of record."  Id., 
¶92. 
 
¶66 I conclude that the dissent's reliance on Norval is 
misplaced.  To begin, the Norval court never indicated that all 
aggrieved parties in justice of peace courts could appeal their 
case to county courts for a 12-person trial.  Rather, it merely 
recognized that some parties "might, in certain cases" have the 
ability to do so.   
¶67 Such a qualification highlights the faulty premise of 
the dissent and its resulting flawed interpretation of Norval.  
The right to an appeal from the justice of the peace courts was 
strictly controlled by statute.  See, e.g., Pelton v. Town of 
Blooming Grove, 3 Wis. 279,[*310], 281,[*312] (1854); Clark & 
Rice v. Bowers, 2 Wis. 92,[*123], 96,[*127] (1853); Mitchell v. 
Kennedy, 1 Wis. 511, 512 (1853).  When not provided for by 
statute, the right to appeal did not exist.  Mitchell, 1 Wis. at 
440,[*512].  If the statutory requirements were not met, then 
review was by certiorari.  Adler v. Gee, 3 Wis. 681,[*742] 
(1854).  Some of the "laws of the road" violations had a 
No.  2003AP1794.awb 
 
6 
 
forfeiture of $5, and as such, the review for those cases was by 
certiorari review in county court. 
 
¶68 The relevant statutes regarding appeal were ch. 88, §§ 
226 and 227.  Section 226 authorized an appeal where the 
recovery at issue exceeded $15.  It provided: 
Any party to a final judgment rendered by a justice of 
the peace, where the recovery shall exceed fifteen 
dollars, except judgment of nonsuit, exclusive of 
costs, 
conceiving 
himself 
aggrieved 
thereby, 
may 
appeal therefrom to the county court of the county 
where the same was rendered, in the following cases:  
1.  Where the judgment was rendered upon an issue of 
fact joined between the parties; 2. Where it was 
rendered on an issue of fact joined between the 
parties, whether the defendant was present at trial or 
not. 
Wis. Rev. Stat. ch. 88, § 226 (1849).   
¶69 Section 227, meanwhile, authorized several limited 
exceptions for parties to appeal when the judgment was less than 
$15.  It provided: 
A party may appeal from the judgment of a justice 
where the judgment is less than fifteen dollars, in 
the following cases.  1.  Where the claim of either 
party, as proved at trial, shall exceed fifty dollars; 
2. Where the defendant did not appear and plead, and 
final judgment was rendered for the plaintiff on the 
merits of his claim. 
Wis. Rev. Stat. ch. 88, § 227 (1849).  Given these parameters, I 
cannot join the dissent's broad reading of Norval.   
¶70 In sum, taking into account the 1849 statutes that 
show the existence of forfeiture actions for "laws of the road" 
violations, the cause of action against McGrew satisfies the 
controlling Village Food test.  It was the custom for the 
defendants to have a jury of only six persons when forfeiture 
No.  2003AP1794.awb 
 
7 
 
actions were tried by jury in justice of the peace courts.  
Because McGrew is constitutionally entitled to only a six-person 
jury at the trial of his civil forfeiture, and he was tried by a 
six-person jury here, I conclude that there was no error.28 
¶71 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice N. PATRICK CROOKS join this concurrence. 
 
                                                 
28 Applying the Village Food test, there are four justices 
of the court that conclude that McGrew has a constitutional 
right to a jury.  However, there is a split as to whether the 
right is to a six- or 12-person jury.  Nevertheless, this 
opinion, together with the dissent, form a majority on the 
constitutional issue that such a right exists and, at a minimum, 
it is to a six-person jury. 
This decision is not to be read, however, that there is a 
constitutional right to a six-person jury trial in municipal 
court.  Rather, the right is exercised when upon appeal there is 
a jury trial in circuit court.  See Ogden v. City of Madison, 
111 Wis. 413, 87 N.W. 568 (1901) (the constitutional right to 
trial by jury does not extend to a prosecution for a violation 
of a city ordinance in municipal court). 
No.  2003AP1794.lbb 
 
1 
 
¶72 LOUIS 
B. 
BUTLER, 
JR., J. 
 
 (dissenting).  I 
respectfully dissent.  The resolution of this case was decided 
over 150 years ago in Norval v. Rice, 2 Wis. 17, [*22], 23, 
[*30] (1853).  Because I see no reason to abandon Norval, I 
would conclude that McGrew is constitutionally entitled to a 
jury of 12 persons. 
I 
¶73 Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides that "[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard 
to the amount in controversy."  As McGrew's case concerns money 
damages (a civil forfeiture penalty), this is a case "at law."  
See Village Food & Liquor Mart v. H&S Petroleum, Inc., 2002 WI 
92, ¶33, 254 Wis. 2d 478, 647 N.W.2d 177; Farr v. Spain, 67 Wis. 
631, 632, 31 N.W. 21 (1887); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 
412, 422-25 (1987).  The constitutional right to a trial by 
jury, however, must be gleaned from the common law as it was at 
the time of the formation and adoption of the constitution.  
Norval, 2 Wis. at 22, [*29].  That is because of the 
"peculiarity of the language" of Article I, Section 5, which 
provides that the right shall "remain" inviolate.  Id.  We must 
therefore determine whether the then-existing common law of 1849 
provides McGrew with a constitutional right to a trial by jury.  
If McGrew is entitled to a trial by jury, we must then determine 
the requisite number of jurors.   
 
 
No.  2003AP1794.lbb 
 
2 
 
A 
¶74 While there were few "laws of the road" that existed 
during this state's formative years, there were still laws of 
the road.  See Lead op., ¶30 n.23 (quoting Wis. Rev. Stat. ch. 
33 (1849)).  Those laws regulated public carriages and vehicular 
travel on the roadways and highways of this state.  Id.    I 
would conclude that the laws of the road that existed in 1849 
are "essential counterpart[s]" of today's "rules of the road"29 
embodied in our current traffic laws, as the modern rules also 
regulate public carriages and vehicular travel on the roadways 
and highways of this state.  Compare Village Food, 254 
Wis. 2d 478, ¶28.  I am thus in complete agreement with the lead 
opinion's sentiment that "[i]t makes little sense to us to 
scrutinize 
whether 
each 
individual 
traffic 
violation 
was 
recognized at common law so as to determine whether a violator 
is entitled to a six- or 12-person jury."  Lead op., ¶49.  
Because the right to a jury trial is a fundamental right,30 I 
conclude that the rules of the road represent the seedling for 
the modern traffic laws and that that satisfies that prong of 
the Village Food test. 
¶75 As a predicate for this conclusion, a closer reading 
of the laws of the road reveal that there was an antedated 
"essential counterpart" to the specific offense of speeding.  
Wisconsin Stat. ch. 33, § 1 stated: 
                                                 
29 Wis. Stat. ch. 346 (2003-04). 
30 Krueger v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 272, 280, 267 N.W.2d 602 
(1978) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 874 (1978). 
No.  2003AP1794.lbb 
 
3 
 
Whenever any persons shall meet each other on any 
bridge or road, traveling with carriages, wagons, 
sleds, sleighs or other vehicles, each person shall 
seasonably drive his carriage or other vehicle to the 
right of the middle of the travelled part of such 
bridge or road, so that the respective carriages, or 
other vehicles aforesaid, may pass each other without 
interference. 
In 1849, "seasonably" was understood as meaning not done rashly 
or in haste.  Bagnall v. Ableman, 4 Wis. 184 [*163], 200 [*178] 
(1855).31  A synonym for haste is "speed."  Webster's Third New 
Int'l Dictionary 1037 (unabr. 1986).  Thus, in 1849, when a 
person in a vehicle met another vehicle on the road, each driver 
had to drive on the right side of the road not in haste, that 
is, without speeding in order to avoid interfering with each 
other.   
¶76 Requiring drivers to drive their vehicles "seasonably" 
under 
certain 
circumstances 
undoubtedly 
represents 
the 
"forerunners" of modern speeding laws.  See Village Foods, 254 
Wis. 2d 478, ¶27.  The fact that this offense differs slightly 
in its means from modern day speeding, in that the 1849 offense 
did not regulate speed of its own accord, is an insufficient 
distinguishing characteristic that does not restrict the right 
to a jury trial.  See id., ¶28.  A fair reading of the antedated 
offense leads me to the conclusion that it was an essential 
                                                 
31 The common understanding of "seasonably" directs us to 
"seasonable."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2049 (unabr. 
1986).  "Seasonable" means "1:  occurring in good or proper 
time . . . .  2:  suitable to or in keeping with the season or 
circumstances."  Id.  According to Black's Law Dictionary, 
"seasonable" means "[w]ithin the time agreed on; within a 
reasonable time."  Black's Law Dictionary, 1353 (7th ed. 1999). 
No.  2003AP1794.lbb 
 
4 
 
"counterpart;" indeed, it represents an origin of modern day 
regulations of motor vehicles' speed.  
B 
¶77 The next step is to figure out whether a person 
challenging a law of the road violation had a right to a jury at 
all.  Given that the laws of the road offenses were punishable 
by nominal monetary fines, these offenses would have been tried 
in justice of the peace courts.  See Wis. Stat. ch. 33 (1849);32 
Wis. Stat. ch. 88, § 5(5).33  In a justice of the peace court, a 
defendant had a right to up to a six-person jury.  Wis. Stat. 
ch. 88, § 80.34   
                                                 
32 See Lead op., ¶30 n.23.  All references to the Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 1849 version unless otherwise indicated. 
33 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 
88, § 5(5) 
stated: 
 
"Every 
such 
justice shall have jurisdiction over and cognizance of the 
following actions and proceedings:  . . . Actions for a penalty 
not exceeding one hundred dollars, gived by any statute of this 
state." 
34 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 88, § 80 stated: 
In every civil cause brought before a justice of the 
peace, after issue joined, and before the justice 
shall proceed to an examination of the testimony, or 
to inquire into the merits of the cause, either party, 
on first paying to the justice the jury fees in 
advance, which shall be taxed against the losing 
party, may demand that the cause be tried by a jury of 
six men. 
 
The parties could agree on a jury comprised of less than six 
jurors, however.  Wis. Stat. ch. 88, § 86 ("The parties may 
agree upon six, or any less number of jurors to try the 
cause . . . ."). 
No.  2003AP1794.lbb 
 
5 
 
¶78 Furthermore, in some situations, a defendant convicted 
in a justice of the peace court could appeal to the county 
courts.  Wis. Stat. ch. 88, § 226;35 Wis. Stat. ch. 86, § 2;36 
                                                 
35 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 88, § 226 provided: 
Any party to a final judgment rendered by a justice of 
the peace, where the recovery shall exceed fifteen 
dollars, except judgment of non-suit, exclusive of 
costs, 
conceiving 
himself 
aggrieved 
thereby, 
may 
appeal therefrom to the county court of the county, 
where the same was rendered, in the following cases: 
1. Where the judgment was rendered upon an issue of 
law joined between the parties: 
2. Where it was rendered on an issue of fact joined 
between the parties, whether the defendant was present 
at trial or not. 
Wis. Stat. ch. 88, § 227 also dealt with appeals from 
justice of the peace courts where the judgment was less than 
fifteen dollars.  That section stated: 
A party may appeal from a judgment of a justice, where 
the judgment is less than fifteen dollars, in the 
following cases: 
1. Where the claim of either party, as proved at the 
trial shall exceed fifty dollars: 
2. Where the defendant did not appear and plead, and 
final judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, on the 
merits of his claim.  
Some of the violations of the laws of the road, including 
the forerunner for our modern day speeding laws, allowed for 
forfeitures of more than $15.  Wis. Stat. ch. 33, §§ 1 and 2 
($20 forfeiture for failing to seasonably drive carriage or 
vehicle on the right side of the road when persons meet on 
road); ch. 33, § 5 ($20 forfeiture for failure to fasten horses 
when passengers remain in horse drawn vehicle). 
Some were for $5 per day of violation.  ch. 33, § 3 ($5 
forfeiture each day a person employs drunken drivers); ch. 33, 
§ 4 ($5 forfeiture each day for employer's failure to fire 
intoxicated driver).   
No.  2003AP1794.lbb 
 
6 
 
Wis. Stat. ch. 86, § 29.37  Violating the antedated essential 
counterpart of speeding, Wis. Stat. ch. 33, § 1, constituted one 
of the offenses that could be appealed.  See Wis. Stat. ch. 88, 
§ 226 (appeals to county courts if judgment exceeds $15); 
Wis. Stat. ch. 33, § 2 (establishing fine of not more than $20 
for violating Wis. Stat. ch. 33, § 1).  As opposed to justice of 
the 
peace 
courts, 
county 
courts 
were 
courts 
of 
record.  
Wis. Stat. ch. 86, § 2 ("The county court shall be a court of 
record . . . .").  While in the county courts, the defendant 
could request a jury trial on issues of fact.  Wis. Stat. ch. 
86, § 16.38   
                                                                                                                                                             
One other law of the road carried no specific monetary 
forfeiture.  Chapter 33, § 6 (owners of vehicles carrying 
passengers for hire are jointly and severally liable for all 
injuries and damages done by drivers). 
36 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 86, § 2 stated in pertinent part:  
"The county court . . . shall have . . . exclusive appellate 
jurisdiction of all cases of appeal . . . from justices of the 
peace . . . ." 
37 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 86, § 29 provided: 
From and after such county courts shall be organized, 
all cases hereafter required by law to be removed from 
justices of the peace to the circuit court, whether by 
appeal or otherwise, shall be removed to the county 
courts, and the like proceedings therein shall be had 
in the county court as is by law required in the 
circuit court.  And all laws providing for taking 
cases to the circuit court from justices' courts, 
shall from thenceforth be construed to mean and read, 
to the county court, instead of the circuit court. 
38 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 86, § 16 read: 
If an issue of law be made in the cause, it shall be 
tried by the court; if an issue of fact, it shall on 
demand of either party, as hereinafter provided, be 
tried by a jury to consist of not more than six 
No.  2003AP1794.lbb 
 
7 
 
¶79 The fact that defendants could obtain a jury either in 
the justice of the peace courts or, in some instances, in the 
county courts shortly after the adoption of the constitution 
satisfies me that there was a right to a trial by jury at the 
time 
of 
the 
constitution's 
adoption. 
 
Accordingly, 
a 
constitutional right to trial by jury existed for violations of 
the laws of the road in general, and for the essential 
counterpart to speeding in particular.     
C 
¶80 The next question, then, is how large did the jury 
have to be?  As noted above, a party in the justice of the peace 
court could request a jury of up to six persons.  Wis. Stat. ch. 
88, § 80.  Whether a jury of six, rather than a jury of 12, 
persons in the justice of the peace courts was constitutional, 
however, was never tested.  See Norval, 2 Wis. at 23, [*30].  
Norval explicitly left this question unanswered.  Id.  
¶81 Assuming that the legislature could constitutionally 
limit the size of the juries in justice of the peace courts to 
six people, it does not follow that the answer to the question 
of how large the jury had to be must be six persons.  As noted, 
a defendant may have been able to appeal from a judgment of the 
justice of the peace court to the county courts.  Id.   
¶82 With regard to the size of the jury in county courts, 
Wis. Stat. ch. 86, § 16 
provided 
that 
the 
jury 
could 
be 
comprised of "not more than six persons."  However, in 1853, 
                                                                                                                                                             
persons; and if no jury be demanded by either party, 
the issue shall be tried by the court. 
No.  2003AP1794.lbb 
 
8 
 
this court declared this statute unconstitutional as violating 
Article I, Section 5.  Norval, 2 Wis. at 23, [*30].  The Norval 
decision reveals why McGrew should be entitled to a jury of 12. 
1 
¶83 At issue in Norval was whether the limitation on the 
number of jurors to six in county courts by virtue of 
Wis. Stat. ch. 86, § 16 violated Article I, Section 5.  The 
Norval court framed the issue as whether a jury of six persons 
constituted "such a trial by jury as is contemplated by section 
5 of article 1 of the Constitution?"  Norval, 2 Wis. at 19, 
[*25] (emphasis in original).   
¶84 The 
Norval 
court 
laid 
down 
the 
core 
doctrinal 
principle that Article I, Section 5 secured the right to "trial 
by jury" as it existed "at the time of the formation and 
adoption of the Constitution by the people of this State."  Id. 
at 
22 
[*29]. 
 
After 
undergoing 
an 
extensive 
historical 
examination of the common law practices regarding juries, this 
court concluded that the common law revealed that "trial by 
jury" meant that a jury was to be comprised of 12 persons.  See 
id. at 20-23, [*26-*30].  Thus, this court held: 
In our view of the provisions of the Revised Statutes 
concerning County Courts, where they restrict the jury 
to six persons, they conflict with the enjoyment of a 
constitutional 
right, 
secured 
to 
every 
citizen, 
namely, the right of trial by a jury of twelve men[.] 
Id.  at 23, [*30] (emphasis in original).  Therefore, because 
Wis. Stat. ch. 86, § 16's limitation on the number of jurors to 
six 
persons 
in 
county 
court 
was 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
No.  2003AP1794.lbb 
 
9 
 
constitution, this court declared the statute unconstitutional.  
Id.   
¶85 Aside from this holding, it is noteworthy that part of 
this court's historical examination recognized that prior to the 
formation of the Wisconsin Constitution, the judiciary system 
was comprised of the following: 
[A] Supreme Court, in which no questions of fact were 
tried by a jury; District Courts, in which grand and 
petit juries were empanneled, the latter consisting of 
twelve men; Courts of Probate, wherein a jury was not 
used; and courts of justices of the peace, in which, 
in actions of forcible entry and detainer, a jury of 
twelve, and in all other cases of trial, of six only, 
was allowed. 
Id. at 23 [*29-30].  This court recognized that certain actions 
in justice of the peace courts required 12 person juries but 
others did not.  Id.  While the Norval court recognized this, it 
explicitly did not pass on whether such practices would pass 
constitutional scrutiny.  Id. at 23 [*30].    
¶86 However, the Norval court did make two observations 
regarding this pre-constitutional judiciary system that are 
particularly relevant here.  First, the court remarked that "the 
party aggrieved by the decision before the justice [of the peace 
court], might, in certain cases, remove the case by appeal to 
the District Court, where a trial by jury of twelve men would be 
available."  Id.   
¶87 Second, the court noted that justice of the peace 
courts were not "courts of record."  See id.  Regarding all of 
the courts that were courts of record, the Norval court 
specifically observed that the trial by jury meant that a jury 
No.  2003AP1794.lbb 
 
10 
 
would be comprised of 12 persons, and that right "remains 
inviolate":    
[W]hen our Constitution was adopted, we had no court 
of record in existence in Wisconsin, in which the 
number of the jury for trials of facts in any case, 
except by consent, could be less than twelve; so that 
it cannot be said that when a trial by jury, in a 
court of record such as the County Court, must be by a 
jury of six persons and no more, the trial by jury in 
a court of record which has been enjoyed before the 
adoption of the Constitution, remains inviolate. 
Id. (emphasis in original).  
2 
¶88 Under Norval, McGrew is entitled to a 12-person jury 
for at least two reasons. 
a 
¶89 First, under Norval, when an offender charged with 
violating the laws of the road in general, and Wis. Stat. ch. 
33, § 1 in particular, could appeal a judgment from the justice 
of the peace courts to the county courts, that person would 
receive a jury of 12 persons.  County courts existed up until 
the creation of Wisconsin's unified court system in the late 
1970s.  See 1 Edwin E. Bryant, Wisconsin Pleading & Practice, 
§ 2.64 at 129 (4th ed. 2002).  "With the institution of the 
single-level trial courts, the county courts were abolished and 
matters formerly heard by them now are heard by the circuit 
courts."  Id.   
¶90 Contrary to the assertions of the concurrence, my view 
of the Norval decision does not merely focus on the fact that an 
aggrieved party could have appealed to county court.  See 
Bradley, J., concurring, ¶¶66-69.  Norval instead makes it clear 
No.  2003AP1794.lbb 
 
11 
 
that where there was a constitutional right to a trial by jury, 
the number of jurors depended on whether the trial was in county 
court.  Because an offender was entitled to a jury trial of 12 
in county courts (regardless of whether that action was 
commenced there or was on appeal) for laws of the road 
violations, and because rules of the road can now be heard in 
circuit courts, I would conclude that a defendant today should 
have the same right to a 12 person jury in the circuit courts. 
b 
¶91 Second, Norval's historical evaluation reveals that 
its conclusion that "trial by jury" meant a jury of 12 persons 
stemmed from the fact that county courts were courts of record.  
Norval, 2 Wis. at 23 [*30].  The circuit courts of today are 
also courts of record.  See Malinowski v. Moss, 196 Wis. 292, 
220 N.W. 197 (1928);39 Wis. Stat. § 753.05 (2003-04) (seals); 
                                                 
39 In Malinowski v. Moss, 196 Wis. 292, 296, 220 N.W. 197 
(1928), this court defined a "court of record" as follows: 
A court of record has been defined as a court where 
the acts and judicial proceedings are enrolled in 
parchment for a perpetual memorial and testimony, and 
which has power to fine and imprison for contempt of 
its authority; a court that is bound to keep a record 
of its proceedings, and that may fine or imprison; a 
court whose proceedings are enrolled for a perpetual 
memorial and testimony, which rolls are called the 
records of the court, and are of such high and super-
eminent authority that their truth is not to be called 
in question; a judicial, organized tribunal having 
attributes and exercising functions independently of 
the person of the magistrate designated generally to 
hold it, and proceeding according to the course of the 
common law; and a court having a seal. 
No.  2003AP1794.lbb 
 
12 
 
Wis. Stat. § 753.26 (court records); Wis. Stat. § 753.30 (2003-
04) (clerk of circuit court).40   
¶92 From this, I read Norval as suggesting that what may 
have been ultimately important was where the offense was tried.41  
Part of Norval's reason for not assessing whether justice of the 
peace courts could constitutionally limit the size of the jury 
to six was its observations that an aggrieved party from a 
justice of the peace court could appeal to a court of record 
(which, before the constitution was enacted was appealed to the 
District Courts and after the constitution was enacted was 
appealed to the county courts) and receive a jury of 12 persons 
there.  To me, it is not coincidence that this court allayed its 
concerns regarding the six-person juries in justice of the peace 
                                                 
40 Compare Wis. Stat. § 88.13(2) (2003-04) ("Notwithstanding 
sub. (1), a municipal court is not a court of record."). 
41 So that my position will not be over read, I make the 
following two points. 
First, I agree that there were offenses at common law that 
would have been tried in a summary manner, without the right to 
a jury at all.  Here, however, we are concerned with an offense 
that at least secured the right to trial by jury.  Once that 
right attaches, I would conclude that the right to "trial by 
jury" means that the jury is composed of 12 persons in circuit 
court. 
Second, I recognize that not all judgments for offenses 
tried before justice of the peace courts could be appealed to 
county courts.  For those offenses that could not be appealed, 
then the question is whether it was constitutional for justice 
of the peace courts to sit with six-person juries.  I express no 
opinion on that matter here, other than agree with the 
concurrence that the constitution required at least that.  See 
Bradley, J., concurring, ¶52. 
No.  2003AP1794.lbb 
 
13 
 
courts (which it chose not to decide) by noting that 12-person 
juries could eventually be obtained in a court of record.   
¶93 Because the former laws of the road violations could 
be tried in the county courts that were courts of record, and 
because the current speeding violations are tried in the circuit 
courts which are courts of record, I would conclude that McGrew 
is entitled to a jury of 12 persons.  
D 
¶94 Unlike the lead opinion, I see no legitimate reason 
for abandoning Norval.  I do not agree with the lead opinion's 
sentiment that Norval would be decided differently today based 
on the lead opinion's exceedingly superficial distinctions.  See 
Lead op., ¶¶45-46.   
¶95 That Norval proclaimed in various places that the jury 
was to be comprised of men is irrelevant to the ultimate issue 
of the size of the jury or the nature of the right to "trial by 
jury."  See Lead op., ¶45.  Although the common law practices at 
the time disgracefully curbed women's abilities to participate 
in civic affairs, Milwaukee delegate Charles H. Lakin made the 
following statement in his speech during the constitutional 
convention regarding Article I, Section 5: "Erect within your 
temples 
of 
justice 
twelve 
hollow, 
graven, 
brazen 
images . . . [A]nd if you will, you may call this, trial by 
jury."  State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 236, 580 N.W.2d 171 
(1998) (quoting Journal of the Convention to form a Constitution 
for the State of Wisconsin, 124 (1848)(emphasis in original)).  
Notwithstanding common law practices, the emphasis at the time 
No.  2003AP1794.lbb 
 
14 
 
of the constitutional convention was then on the number, not the 
gender of the jurors.42  Id.   
¶96 The same can be said for where the jury was to be 
collected from and the procedures for how the jury was to be 
selected.  See Lead op., ¶45.  In my view, these are meaningless 
distinctions that do not detract from Norval's clear holding:  
"trial by jury" necessarily means a jury of 12. 
¶97 That Norval did not accord the six-person jury statute 
a presumption of constitutionality is nothing more than a ploy.  
No amount of presumption could have saved the statute.  The 
Norval analysis made clear that the statute was at odds with the 
practices that the constitution protected.  The legislature 
cannot achieve by statute what the constitution forbids.  See 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
¶98 Finally, that the United States Supreme Court has 
concluded in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), that the 
                                                 
42 It was not until 1921 that it was recognized that women 
had the legal right to sit on jury panels.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 6.015 (1921) stated in relevant part: 
Women shall have the same rights and privileges under 
the law as men in the exercise of suffrage, freedom of 
contract, choice of residences for voting purposes, 
jury service, holding office, holding and conveying 
property, care and custody of children, and in all 
other respects. 
 
In 1975, for the first time, the United States Supreme 
Court concluded that under the Sixth Amendment, "it is no longer 
tenable to hold that women as a class may be excluded or given 
automatic exemptions based solely on sex."  Taylor v. Louisiana, 
419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975).  See Taylor for an interesting 
discussion of the history of gender bias in jury selection.  
No.  2003AP1794.lbb 
 
15 
 
Sixth Amendment did not require that a jury be comprised of 12 
persons has limited import on what the Wisconsin Constitution 
secures.  See State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, __ Wis. 2d, __, __ 
N.W.2d __; State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, __ Wis. 2d, __, __ 
N.W.2d __.  Besides, this court in Hansford specifically 
rejected the holding in Williams with respect to Article I, 
Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.43  Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 
at 242-43.   
II  
¶99 In sum, consistent with Norval, I would conclude that 
"trial by jury" in Article I, Section 5 necessarily means a jury 
of 12 persons.  Because McGrew is entitled to a trial by jury 
here for his alleged violation of the rules of the road, I would 
conclude that he is entitled to a jury of 12 persons.  
¶100 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.  
 
 
 
                                                 
43 Hansford's analysis relied in part on Article I, Section 
5 and the Norval v. Rice, 2 Wis. 17, [*22] (1853) decision. 
State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 242-43, 580 N.W.2d (1998). 
No.  2003AP1794.lbb 
 
 
 
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