Case Title: Pinkney Carter v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC06-156

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2008-02-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-156 
____________ 
 
PINKNEY CARTER,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[February 14, 2008] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
Pinkney Carter appeals his three convictions for first-degree premeditated 
and felony murder as well as his two death sentences.  We have jurisdiction.  See 
art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm 
Carter’s convictions and sentences. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Carter and Elizabeth Reed dated on and off for approximately four years, 
during which time Carter periodically lived with Reed and her four children.  
During the course of their relationship, Carter helped Reed purchase a house on 
Barkwood Drive in Jacksonville and assisted her financially when she fell behind 
on her mortgage payments.  At one point in early 2002, Carter proposed marriage, 
and Reed accepted.  However, the engagement was soon called off and Carter 
moved out.  Yet, according to Carter, he and Reed continued to date and were 
intimate.   
By the summer of 2002, Carter learned that Reed had been seeing Glenn 
Pafford, who managed the Publix Supermarket where she worked.  Around this 
time, neighbors spotted Carter lurking suspiciously near Reed’s home and noticed 
his red Dodge pickup truck in the neighborhood.   
On Sunday, July 21, 2002, Reed visited Carter’s apartment, where he was 
staying with his mother and his brother.  Carter testified that Reed gave him some 
of her prescription pills for depression, and the two made plans to meet on Tuesday 
night.  When Reed did not show up, Carter drove by her house and saw Pafford’s 
truck in her driveway.  From there, Carter drove home and spent several hours 
thinking about his relationship with Reed.  He took three of the antidepressant pills 
Reed had given him and drank four to five glasses of whiskey.  Around 11:30 p.m., 
Carter telephoned Reed.  Her fourteen-year-old son Richard answered and told 
Carter that Reed was not home.   
In the predawn hours of the following day, Carter returned to Reed’s home. 
He parked in her front yard, retrieved his loaded .22 caliber rifle from the back seat 
 
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of his truck, and began walking toward the house.1  As Carter approached Reed’s 
home, Pafford walked out and Reed stood in the doorway.  Concealing his rifle at 
his side, Carter confronted the couple and asked why Reed was still seeing him if 
she was seeing Pafford.  Pafford asked Reed if she was still seeing Carter, and 
Reed responded that she was not.  Pafford then asked Reed if she wanted him to 
stay, but Reed said that she wanted both men to leave.  Carter responded that he 
was not leaving until he got some answers.  According to Carter, Reed opened the 
door wider, and the three entered and stood in Reed’s living room.   
Once inside, Carter yelled at Reed, “I can’t believe you’re going to lie 
straight to the man’s face like that.”  Then, according to Carter, Reed noticed the 
gun concealed at his side and grabbed for it.  Reed began struggling with Carter in 
an attempt to take the gun away from him.  Carter’s finger was on the trigger and 
Reed had both hands on the barrel.  Hearing the commotion, Reed’s eldest 
daughter, Courtney Smith, ran into the living room, saw the gun, and then ran back 
toward her room.  At that moment, according to Carter, the gun discharged, 
                                          
 
1.  There was some dispute as to whether Carter procured his rifle from his 
mother’s house the night of the murders or whether the rifle was already stored in 
his truck for some other reason.  According to Carter, the rifle had been in the 
truck for approximately three weeks because he had been out at target practice in 
Callahan, Georgia, three weeks prior to the murders.  However, Carter’s brother, 
Steven Carter, testified that Carter normally kept his guns in the upstairs apartment 
where he lived with his mother and was not aware of Carter storing his rifle in his 
truck unless he was hunting.   
 
 
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shooting Smith once in the head.  Carter testified that Reed immediately let go of 
the gun and screamed, “Oh my God, dial 911!”  As Reed ran toward her daughter, 
Carter aimed and shot Reed twice in the head.  Immediately thereafter, Carter 
turned toward Pafford, aimed, and shot him three times in the head.  Carter then 
fled the premises.  The noise of the gunshots woke Richard, who came from his 
bedroom to find Pafford and Reed dead and Smith critically injured.  Smith later 
died from her injuries.  Reed’s two other children, Rebecca and Brian, ages eight 
and six respectively, were also home at the time of the shooting.   
 
Following the murders, Carter drove to his brother’s house where he wrote 
notes to his mother and his sister.  He then drove to Valdosta, Georgia, stole a 
Georgia state license plate from his friend’s vehicle and placed it on his red Dodge 
pickup truck.  From there, Carter drove to Starr County, Texas, where he 
abandoned his truck on the bank of the Rio Grande and swam across, entering 
Mexico illegally.  While swimming, Carter abandoned his rifle, which was later 
recovered by the Mission County, Texas, Fire Rescue dive team.  Upon entering 
Mexico, Carter was detained by the Mexican Military Police but was later released.  
Carter then traveled to Central America before returning to the United States to 
find work.  He worked in both Illinois and Kentucky under the aliases Chris Cruse 
and Rodney Vonthun.  Then, on January 6, 2004, while working in Kentucky as a 
 
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roofer, Carter was identified by the Kentucky State Police and arrested for the 
murders of Pafford, Reed, and Smith. 
On January 15, 2004, a grand jury indicted Carter for three counts of first-
degree murder with a firearm.  Following several continuances, a trial was 
conducted.  By special verdict, the jury unanimously found Carter guilty of both 
premeditated and felony murder for each of the three killings.  This special verdict 
also showed that the jury determined the murders were committed in the course of 
a burglary.  In the penalty phase, the jury recommended death for the murder of 
Pafford by a vote of nine to three, death for the murder of Reed by a vote of eight 
to four, and life imprisonment for the murder of Smith.   
In its sentencing order, the trial court followed the jury’s recommendation 
and imposed a life sentence for the murder of Smith and death sentences for the 
murders of Pafford and Reed.  The court found three statutory aggravators and 
assigned great weight to each:  (1) that Carter was previously convicted of a capital 
offense (the other two contemporaneous murders); (2) that the murders were 
committed while engaged in the commission of a burglary; and (3) that the 
murders were cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP).  The court found no 
statutory mitigators and seventeen nonstatutory mitigators:  (1) Carter was raised in 
a broken home; (2) Carter was an above-average achiever in high school and 
college; (3) Carter was president of a club that helped others at Oklahoma State 
 
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University; (4) Carter had a distinguished military record in the United States Air 
Force for almost four years; (5) Carter was a good employee with supervising 
responsibilities and had a consistent work record from a young age; (6) Carter was 
a good son with the strength to reconcile with his father, who abandoned him; (7) 
Carter was a good brother who protected his sister during her early years; (8) 
Carter saved a child’s life while working as a lifeguard; (9) Carter was a loyal 
friend who made friends easily; (10) Carter had a close relationship with his 
nephew, Jacob; (11) Carter worked for a living in Kentucky while avoiding the 
police; (12) Carter demonstrated potential to be a productive inmate while in Duval 
County Jail; (13) Carter had the support of family and friends; (14) society can be 
protected by life sentences without parole; (15) Carter offered to plead guilty for 
three consecutive life sentences; (16) Carter resisted adopting the racist traits of his 
father and has had positive race relations throughout his life; and (17) Carter had a 
good relationship with Reed and her children prior to the murders.  The court 
accorded all of these nonstatutory mitigators “some” weight.  Ultimately, the trial 
court found that the “aggravating circumstances in this case far outweigh[ed] the 
mitigating circumstances,” and that “any of the considered aggravating 
circumstances found in this case, standing alone, would be sufficient to outweigh 
the mitigation in total presented regarding the murders of Glenn Pafford and 
Elizabeth Reed.”   
 
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GUILT PHASE 
 
Regarding the guilt phase, Carter claims that the statute abolishing the 
voluntary intoxication defense is unconstitutional.  In addition, we independently 
determine whether sufficient evidence supports Carter’s convictions. 
A.  Voluntary Intoxication Defense 
Carter argues that section 775.051, Florida Statutes (2002), which prevented 
him from asserting a defense of voluntary intoxication,2 is constitutionally invalid 
because it operates as an evidentiary proscription rather than a redefinition of mens 
rea.  As we recently held in Troy v. State, 948 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 2006), cert. denied, 
127 S. Ct. 2981 (2007), this claim is meritless.  See id. at 643-45 (holding that 
section 775.051 did not violate due process or equal protection).   
 
                                          
 
2.  Section 775.051 provides:  
 
Voluntary intoxication resulting from the consumption, 
injection, or other use of alcohol or other controlled substance as 
described in chapter 893 is not a defense to any offense proscribed by 
law.  Evidence of a defendant’s voluntary intoxication is not 
admissible to show that the defendant lacked the specific intent to 
commit an offense and is not admissible to show that the defendant 
was insane at the time of the offense, except when the consumption, 
injection, or use of a controlled substance under chapter 893 was 
pursuant to a lawful prescription issued to the defendant by a 
practitioner as defined in s. 893.02.  
§ 775.051, Fla. Stat. (2002).   
 
 
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B.  Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting Carter’s Convictions 
Although not argued by Carter, we independently review the record to 
determine whether sufficient evidence exists to support Carter’s first-degree 
murder convictions.  See Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(i); Davis v. State, 859 So. 2d 465, 
480 (Fla. 2003).  Upon review of the record, we find that competent, substantial 
evidence exists to support Carter’s convictions.  Carter admitted killing Reed, 
Pafford, and Smith, and his trial testimony and the events surrounding the murders 
are supported by the direct testimony of those involved in this case.  For example, 
Richard Smith testified that he answered the telephone call Carter made to Reed 
earlier in the evening and heard the gunshots before discovering the bodies of 
Reed, Pafford, and Smith.  Also, Christian Carter testified that he observed Carter 
behaving suspiciously in the neighborhood of the Reed residence in the weeks 
prior to the murders.  No competent evidence was presented to dispute the 
evidence in support of Carter’s convictions. 
PENALTY PHASE 
 
As to the penalty phase, Carter claims that this Court should vacate his death 
sentences for the murders of Pafford and Reed because:  (1) the trial court erred in 
finding the burglary and CCP aggravators; (2) the trial court erred in giving great 
weight to the burglary and prior violent felony aggravators; (3) the trial court erred 
in issuing a sentencing order that lacks clarity; (4) the trial court erred in refusing 
 
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to require the State to follow the promise it made to the government of Mexico that 
it would not seek a death sentence if Carter were released into the State’s custody; 
(5) Carter’s death sentence is illegal under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 
(2002); and (6) the trial court erred in giving standard jury instructions which 
diminished the jury’s sense of responsibility for sentencing.  In addition to these 
claims, we independently determine whether Carter’s death sentences are 
proportionate. 
A.  Burglary and CCP Aggravators 
Carter first claims that the trial court erred in finding that the murders of 
Pafford and Reed were committed during the course of a burglary and in a cold, 
calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal 
justification.3  When evaluating claims alleging error in the application of 
aggravating factors, this Court does not reweigh the evidence to determine whether 
the State proved each factor beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Alston v. State, 723 
So. 2d 148, 160 (Fla. 1998).  Rather, “[o]ur review of a trial court’s finding of an 
aggravating factor is limited to determining whether the trial court applied the right 
rule of law and, if so, whether competent, substantial evidence supports its 
finding.”  Hutchinson v. State, 882 So. 2d 943, 958 (Fla. 2004).  “When there is a 
legal basis to support finding an aggravating factor, we will not substitute our 
                                          
 
3.  See § 921.141(5)(d), (i), Fla. Stat. (2002). 
 
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judgment for that of the trial court . . . .”  Occhicone v. State, 570 So. 2d 902, 905 
(Fla. 1990). 
Carter argues that the trial court’s application of the burglary aggravator was 
erroneous because the 2001 revision of the burglary statute has such an expansive 
reach that using it as a justification for imposing death no longer “genuinely 
narrows” the class of capital defendants eligible for a death sentence.  See Zant v. 
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983) (“[A]n aggravating circumstance must 
genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must 
reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant 
compared to others found guilty of murder.”).  We disagree.  The 2001 amendment 
to the burglary statute was intended to repudiate this Court’s decision in Delgado 
v. State, 776 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 2000), and to clarify, not broaden, the definition of 
burglary.  See § 810.015(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (2002); ch. 2001-58, § 1, Laws of Fla.4  
Moreover, competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s and the jury’s 
conclusion that the murders of Pafford and Reed were committed in the course of a 
                                          
 
4.  Prior to 2001, section 810.02, Florida Statutes, defined burglary as 
“entering or remaining in a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to 
commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or 
the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain.”  § 810.02, Fla. Stat. (2000).  
In Delgado, this Court limited the “remaining in” language to situations where the 
remaining in was done surreptitiously.  776 So. 2d at 240 (Fla. 2000).  In response, 
the Legislature amended sections 810.015 and 810.02 to abrogate Delgado.  See 
ch. 2001-58, §§ 1-2, Laws of Fla.; ch. 2004-93, § 1, Laws of Fla.   
 
 
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burglary.  Carter either entered Reed’s home uninvited with the intent to commit 
murder therein, or, notwithstanding an invitation, remained in her home to commit 
or attempt to commit a forcible felony.  See § 810.02(1)(b)(1), (2)(c).   
Carter’s challenge to the trial court’s CCP finding is likewise meritless.  As 
the trial court found, “[t]he trial testimony in the guilt phase of this case proves 
beyond all reasonable doubt the existence of this aggravating circumstance.”  In its 
sentencing order, the trial court supported its conclusion with the following record 
facts: 
Christian Carter, Ms. Reed’s neighbor, testified that he encountered 
the Defendant in his side yard sometime between 9:00 p.m. and 10:00 
p.m. ten days to two weeks prior to the instant murders.  Christian 
Carter testified that the Defendant appeared to be coming from his 
backyard which abutted Ms. Reed’s backyard.  Christian Carter 
testified that when he began to use a telephone the Defendant became 
nervous and ran toward a red truck parked across the street from Mr. 
Carter’s home and drove away.  Terry Booth, Christian Carter’s 
neighbor, testified that he also saw a red Dodge truck parked on his 
street and a man walking between neighbors’ houses the Friday before 
the instant murders occurred.  Mr. Booth testified that he saw the man 
look in his direction then look at a telephone pole, and after about five 
minutes, the man walked back to the truck and drove away.  Mr. 
Booth testified that the next day, he saw the same red Dodge truck 
parked on his street.  Finally, Mr. Booth testified that the man in the 
truck looked like the suspect the police were looking for regarding the 
instant murders.   
 
At trial, the Defendant admitted that he had indeed been in 
Christian Carter’s yard a couple of weeks before the murders.  The 
Defendant testified that he was in the yard because he was jealous that 
Ms. Reed was seeing Glenn Pafford and wanted to confirm if Mr. 
Pafford was at Ms. Reed’s home.  The Defendant stated he conducted 
this surveillance because he was jealous that Ms. Reed was seeing Mr. 
Pafford.  The Defendant admitted he drove past Ms. Reed’s home at 
 
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approximately 9:00 p.m. on July 23, 2002, and saw both Ms. Reed’s 
and Ms. Smith’s cars along with Mr. Pafford’s truck in the driveway.  
The Defendant admitted that he then drove home and called Ms. 
Reed’s home around 11:15 p.m.  The Defendant testified that he 
spoke to Rick Smith, Ms. Reed’s son.  Rick Smith told the Defendant 
that Ms. Reed was not home.  This testimony was corroborated by 
Rick Smith who testified that the Defendant called Ms. Reed’s home 
between 11:00 and 11:30 p.m. on July 23, 2002, and because Ms. 
Reed did not want to speak with the Defendant, he told the Defendant 
that his mother was not home.  The Defendant’s and Rick Smith’s 
testimony was further corroborated by Jack Harley of BellSouth, who 
testified that the Defendant’s telephone records showed a telephone 
call to Ms. Reed’s home at 11:24 p.m. on July 23, 2002. 
 
The Defendant admitted driving to Ms. Reed’s home with a 
fully loaded .22 caliber rifle in his truck and when he arrived at her 
home he got out of his truck carrying the rifle.  The Defendant 
admitted he took the rifle to prevent Ms. Reed from saying that she 
was not going to talk to him and to ensure that she answered his 
questions regarding their relationship.  The Defendant testified that 
when he entered Ms. Reed’s home, he concealed the rifle against his 
leg so that no one would see it.  The Defendant also testified that his 
finger was on the trigger.  The Defendant testified that he told Ms. 
Reed and Mr. Pafford that he was not going to leave Ms. Reed’s home 
until he had answers to his questions regarding his relationship with 
Ms. Reed.  The Defendant testified that when Ms. Reed saw the rifle, 
she grabbed for it.  The Defendant and Ms. Reed struggled over the 
rifle, and during the struggle, the rifle discharged striking Courtney 
Smith once in the head.  The Defendant admitted that he then 
intentionally shot Ms. Reed twice in the head and then intentionally 
shot Glenn Pafford three times in the head, including one shot at point 
blank range.  The Defendant further admitted that he was a “good 
shot” and that all of his shots hit their intended targets.  However, he 
testified that he did not intentionally aim at Courtney Smith when she 
was shot once in the head.  The Defendant testified that after shooting 
Glenn Pafford, Elizabeth Reed and Courtney Smith, he walked, rifle 
in hand, to his pickup truck and drove away.   
In addition, the trial court cited the testimony of Dr. Margarita Arruza, a forensic 
pathologist, who described the gunshot wounds suffered by Pafford and Reed.  
 
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Arruza concluded that both victims were shot multiple times in the head at close 
range.  These findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence and 
support the trial court’s conclusion that the murders of Pafford and Reed were 
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of 
moral or legal justification.  See Swafford v. State, 533 So. 2d 270, 277 (Fla. 1988) 
(holding that cold, calculated, and premeditated murder can be indicated by 
circumstances showing such facts as advance procurement of a weapon, lack of 
resistance or provocation, and the appearance of a killing carried out as a matter of 
course) (citing Burr v. State, 466 So. 2d 1051, 1054 (Fla. 1985); Eutzy v. State, 
458 So. 2d 755, 757 (Fla. 1984)).5 
 
Even if we were to assume that the trial court erred in finding either or both 
of these aggravators, such error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
The trial court concluded that “any of the considered aggravating circumstances 
found in this case, standing alone, would be sufficient to outweigh the mitigation in 
total presented regarding the murders of Glenn Pafford and Elizabeth Reed.”  We 
agree.  Any of the aggravators found in this case would outweigh Carter’s 
                                          
 
5.  Carter also argues that the trial court should have organized its findings to 
show evidentiary support for each of the elements “cold,” “calculated,” 
“premeditated,” and “without any pretense of moral or legal justification.”  See 
Jackson v. State, 648 So. 2d 85, 89 (Fla. 1994).  While we encourage trial judges to 
independently address each Jackson factor in their sentencing orders, we find that 
the trial court in this case sufficiently detailed the facts supporting the CCP 
aggravator as applied to the murders of Pafford and Reed. 
 
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mitigation.  See Green v. State, 641 So. 2d 391, 396 (Fla. 1994) (citing State v. 
DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1139 (Fla. 1986)). 
B.  Weight of Aggravators 
Next, Carter argues that the trial court’s assignment of great weight to the 
burglary and prior violent felony aggravators was erroneous because the jury 
considered the same aggravators as they applied to the death of Smith and 
recommended a life sentence.  We disagree.  The weight to be given aggravating 
factors is within the discretion of the trial court and is subject to the abuse of 
discretion standard.  Sexton v. State, 775 So. 2d 923, 934 (Fla. 2000).  Here, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the aggravators.  Under section 
921.141(3), Florida Statutes (2002), the trial court must independently determine 
the existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the weight to be 
given each.  See State v. Steele, 921 So. 2d 538, 546 (Fla. 2005) (“Our current 
system fosters independence because the trial court alone must make detailed 
findings about the existence and weight of aggravating circumstances; it has no 
jury findings on which to rely.”); Blackwelder v. State, 851 So. 2d 650, 653 (Fla. 
2003); Bouie v. State, 559 So. 2d 1113, 1116 (Fla. 1990).  The court did not abuse 
its discretion in giving the prior violent felony conviction aggravator more weight 
as applied to the murders of Pafford and Reed because one of the convictions 
supporting this aggravator was the contemporaneous murder of Smith, a sixteen-
 
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year-old child.  Similarly, it was not an abuse of discretion to attach more weight to 
the burglary aggravator as applied to Pafford and Reed because they were Carter’s 
apparent targets.  In other words, Carter’s motive for unlawfully entering Reed’s 
home was to commit a forcible felony against Pafford and Reed.  He apparently 
did not form the intent to kill Smith until she came from her bedroom into the 
living room.  Moreover, the weight given to these aggravators reflects the trial 
court’s obligation to give great weight to the jury’s life recommendation for the 
murder of Smith as well as its death recommendation for the murders of Pafford 
and Reed.   
C.  Clarity of the Trial Court’s Sentencing Order 
Carter next argues that the trial court erred because its sentencing order lacks 
clarity.  Specifically, Carter claims that the court abused its discretion by not 
expressly considering the jury’s recommendation of life for the murder of Smith 
when sentencing Carter to death for the murders of Pafford and Reed.  We 
disagree.  Under section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (2002), the trial court is 
required to make independent findings on aggravation, mitigation, and weight, 
“supported by specific written findings of fact.”  § 921.141(3), Fla. Stat. (2002).  
Here, there was no abuse of discretion because the trial court thoroughly 
considered the aggravating and mitigating circumstances at issue and supported 
each with specific written findings of fact.  Dennis v. State, 817 So. 2d 741, 763 
 
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(Fla. 2002).  Moreover, the trial court’s sentencing order was consistent with the 
jury’s recommendations.  See Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975) (“A 
jury recommendation under our trifurcated death penalty statute should be given 
great weight.”).   
D.  The State’s Promise to Mexican Government 
Carter next claims that the State is bound by its letter to Mexican officials 
offering to forego the death penalty if the Mexican government returned him to the 
United States.  He argues that the State must adhere to its offer under contract 
principles and the doctrine of judicial estoppel.  This claim is meritless.  First, 
under contract principles, the State did not receive the benefit of the bargain.  
There was no quid pro quo.  Cf. State v. Swett, 772 So. 2d 48, 52 (Fla. 5th DCA 
2000) (“[T]he plea was part of a deal whereby the prosecutor reduced the murder 
charge to second degree murder in exchange for the plea.  The sentence was part of 
a quid pro quo and the defendant cannot accept the benefit of the bargain without 
accepting its burden.”).  The State’s promise was conditioned upon the Mexican 
government’s return of Carter.  That condition was never fulfilled because the  
Mexican government released Carter before the State’s letter reached the 
appropriate officials.  He was subsequently arrested in Kentucky with no help or 
assistance from the government of Mexico.  Therefore, the State is not bound by its 
offer.   
 
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Second, the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply.  “Judicial estoppel 
is an equitable doctrine that is used to prevent litigants from taking totally 
inconsistent positions in separate judicial, including quasi-judicial, proceedings.”  
Blumberg v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 790 So. 2d 1061, 1066 (Fla. 2001) (quoting 
Smith v. Avatar Properties, Inc., 714 So. 2d 1103, 1107 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)).  
The doctrine prevents parties from “making a mockery of justice by inconsistent 
pleadings,” American Nat’l Bank v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 710 F.2d 1528, 
1536 (11th Cir. 1983), and “playing fast and loose with the courts.”  Russell v. 
Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1990).  In this case, the State has not taken 
inconsistent positions in any relevant judicial proceeding.  The letter at issue was a 
communication between the State and the Mexican government while Carter was 
confined in Mexico.  Mexico released Carter from custody prior to receiving the 
letter and did not turn him over to the State of Florida.  Carter was apprehended in 
Kentucky months later.  The State’s ultimate decision to seek the death penalty 
does not impair the integrity of the courts of Florida.   
E.  Ring v. Arizona Claim   
Next, Carter argues that his sentence is unconstitutional under the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).  
We disagree.  The three contemporaneous murders were charged in the indictment, 
and Carter was convicted on each count by a unanimous jury.  See Doorbal v. 
 
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State, 837 So. 2d 940, 963 (Fla. 2003).  These convictions formed the basis for the 
trial court’s finding of the prior violent felony conviction aggravator.  See Overton 
v. State, 32 Fla. L. Weekly S775 (Fla. Nov. 29, 2007) (rejecting Ring claim where 
one of the aggravating circumstances was defendant’s prior convictions for 
contemporaneous murders); Hannon v. State, 941 So. 2d 1109, 1147 (Fla. 2006); 
Patton v. State, 878 So. 2d 368, 377 (Fla. 2004); see also Jones v. State, 855 So. 2d 
611, 619 (Fla. 2003) (holding that the prior violent felony conviction aggravator is 
“a factor which under Apprendi and Ring need not be found by the jury”). 
F.  Jury Instructions 
Next, Carter claims that the trial court erred in giving standard jury 
instructions which diminished the jury’s sense of responsibility for sentencing.  As 
we have found on numerous prior occasions, this claim lacks merit.  See Rodriguez 
v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252, 1280 (Fla. 2005); Thomas v. State, 838 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 
2003); Burns v. State, 699 So. 2d 646, 654 (Fla. 1997); Sochor v. State, 619 So. 2d 
285, 291-92 (Fla. 1993). 
G.  Proportionality 
Carter does not raise the issue of proportionality.  However, “this Court 
conducts a review of each death sentence for proportionality, regardless of whether 
the issue is raised on appeal.”  England v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 407 (Fla. 2006); 
Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990) (“Because death is a unique 
 
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punishment, it is necessary in each case to engage in a thoughtful, deliberate 
proportionality review to consider the totality of circumstances in a case, and to 
compare it with other capital cases.”); Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(6) (“In death 
penalty cases, whether or not insufficiency of the evidence or proportionality is an 
issue presented for review, the court shall review these issues and, if necessary, 
remand for the appropriate relief.”).  Domestic situations are evaluated in the same 
manner as other cases.  See, e.g., Butler v. State, 842 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2003); 
Lynch v. State, 841 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 2003).   
The circumstances of this case are similar to those in Porter.  George Porter 
was sentenced to death for the murders of his ex-live-in lover, Evelyn Williams, 
and her new boyfriend, Walter Burrows.  Porter, 564 So. 2d at 1061-62.  In the two 
days immediately preceding the murder, Porter was seen driving past Williams’ 
house.  Id. at 1061.  The night before the murder, Porter visited Williams, who 
called the police because she was afraid of him.  Porter then went to two cocktail 
lounges and consumed alcohol.  Around 5:30 a.m. the next morning, Williams’ 
daughter, Amber, awoke to gunshots, ran down the hallway, and saw Porter 
standing over her mother’s body.  Id. at 1062.  Amber testified that Porter came 
toward her, pointed a gun at her head, and said, “Boom, boom, you’re going to 
die.”  Id.  Burrows then came into the room, struggled with Porter, and forced him 
outside.  Williams’ son, John, who lived next door, testified that he heard gunshot 
 
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blasts, ran outside, and saw Burrows lying face down in the front lawn.  Both 
Williams and Burrows were dead by the time police arrived on the scene.  On 
appeal, this Court held that the imposition of the death penalty was not 
disproportionate to other cases decided by the Court.  Id. at 1065 (citing Turner v. 
State, 530 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1987)).  After we struck the heinous, atrocious, or cruel 
(HAC) aggravator and upheld the CCP aggravator, the remaining aggravators 
were:  (1) prior violent felony conviction (contemporaneous murders); (2) in the 
course of a burglary; and (3) CCP.  Although our opinion did not list the mitigating 
circumstances found, we stated that “[t]he circumstances of this case depict a cold-
blooded, premeditated double murder.”  Id. at 1064. 
Similarly, in Dennis v. State, 817 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 2002), Labrant Dennis 
was sentenced to death for beating his former girlfriend, Timwanika Lumpkins, 
and her new boyfriend, Marlin Barnes, to death with the blunt end of a shotgun.  
The evidence showed that prior to the murders, Dennis procured a shotgun and 
ammunition, borrowed a friend’s vehicle, and went to a club where he observed the 
victims together hugging and kissing.  Dennis thereafter slashed Barnes’ vehicle’s 
tires and waited across the street as it was loaded onto a flatbed to be towed to 
Barnes’ apartment complex.  Once the victims returned to Barnes’ apartment, 
Dennis broke in and killed them.  Id. at 746-48.  In sentencing Dennis to death, the 
trial judge found four aggravating circumstances:  (1) prior violent felony 
 
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conviction (the contemporaneous murder); (2) in the course of a burglary; (3) 
HAC; and (4) CCP.  In mitigation, the court found:  (1) that the defendant was 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (2) a catchall 
category of mitigation, including the defendant’s kindness to others and love and 
affection towards his family; and (3) good demeanor at trial.  Id. at 750.  On 
appeal, we held that Dennis’s death sentences were proportionate because the trial 
court’s findings in support of the CCP aggravator refuted his claim that the 
murders were committed in the heat of a domestic dispute.  Id. at 767.  
Further, in Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 906 (Fla. 2000), Fred Lewis Way 
murdered his wife Carol and their fifteen-year-old daughter Adrienne with a 
hammer and set them on fire.  The jury convicted Way of second-degree murder 
for killing Carol and first-degree murder for killing Adrienne.  Id. at 907.  In 
sentencing Way to death for the murder of Adrienne, the trial court found three 
aggravating circumstances:  (1) prior violent felony conviction (the 
contemporaneous second-degree murder of Carol); (2) that the murder was 
committed while engaged in the commission of arson; and (3) HAC.  Id. at 908 
n.5.  The trial court also found that the murder was cold, calculated, and 
premeditated, but did not rely on that finding because the State did not allege that 
the CCP aggravator was applicable.  In mitigation, the trial court found two 
statutory mitigators:  (1) no significant history of prior criminal activity; and (2) 
 
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Way’s age at the time of the crime (thirty-eight).  Id. at 908 n.6.  The court also 
found six nonstatutory mitigators:  (1) difficult childhood; (2) service in the Air 
Force and Air Force Reserve; (3) successful employment with the Federal Aviation 
Administration; (4) reputation for peacefulness and hard work; (5) hearing and 
mental impairments; and (6) good behavior in prison.  Id. at 908 n.7.  This Court 
found that the death penalty was proportionate, noting that in contrast to other 
cases, there was no significant mental mitigation.  Id. at 921. 
Like the death sentences in Porter, Dennis, and Way, Carter’s death 
sentences are proportionate.  As in Porter, “[t]he circumstances of this case depict a 
cold-blooded, premeditated [triple] murder.”  564 So. 2d at 1064.  The aggravation 
in this case was substantial and included the same three aggravators found in 
Porter.  Further, as in Way, there was no statutory or mental mitigation, and the 
nonstatutory mitigation included factors such as difficult childhood, service in the 
Air Force, good employment record, and good prison record.  All four cases 
involved multiple domestic murders, but as in Dennis, evidence of Carter’s 
heightened premeditation negates any claim that the murders were committed in 
the heat of a domestic dispute.   
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Carter’s convictions and death 
sentences. 
 
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It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
WELLS, J., concurs as to the conviction and concurs in result only as to the 
sentence. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,  
Lance M. Day, Judge - Case No. 04-730 CFA 
 
Nancy Daniels, Public Defender, and David A. Davis, Assistant Public Defender, 
Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee