Case Title: Sliney v. Previte

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11844

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-12-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11844 
 
ROSANNE SLINEY  vs.  DOMENIC A. PREVITE, JR., & others.1 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     October 8, 2015. - December 9, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
 
Child Abuse.  Limitations, Statute of.  Due Process of Law, 
Child abuse, Statute of limitations, Retroactive 
application of statute.  Practice, Civil, Statute of 
limitations.  Statute, Retroactive application. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
January 30, 2012. 
 
 
The case was heard by Thomas R. Murtagh, J., on a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings.  
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.  
 
 
 
Carmen L. Durso (Mark F. Itzkowitz with him) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
Sylvia Katsenes for the defendant. 
 
Marci A. Hamilton, of Pennsylvania, & Erin K. Olson, for 
National Center for Victims of Crime & others, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
                     
 
1 Michael Moe Nos. 1-10. 
2 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  Until June, 2014, civil actions alleging 
sexual abuse of a minor, which may be brought pursuant to G. L. 
c. 260, § 4C (§ 4C), were governed by a three-year statute of 
limitations.  G. L. c. 260, § 4C, as amended through St. 2011, 
c. 178, § 19.  Section 4C was amended effective June 26, 2014, 
to extend the limitations period from three years to thirty-five 
years; the amending act contained a retroactivity provision, and 
an emergency preamble.  St. 2014, c. 145, §§ 5, 8.  The 
plaintiff, Rosanne Sliney, filed an action in 2012 alleging that 
her uncle, the defendant Domenic A. Previte, Jr., had sexually 
abused her between 1968 and 1977, when she was a child.  
Judgment entered in the Superior Court in June, 2012, dismissing 
the complaint on statute of limitations grounds.  We consider 
here two questions:  whether, in the circumstances presented, 
§ 4C's extended statute of limitations applies to the 
plaintiff's case, and, if so, whether the retroactive 
application is constitutional.  We answer both questions yes 
and, as a consequence, vacate the Superior Court judgment.2 
 
Background.  1.  Factual background.  In the Superior 
Court, this case was decided on Previte's motion for judgment on 
the pleadings.  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (c), 365 Mass. 754 
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the National 
Center for Victims of Crime, Massachusetts Citizens for 
Children, BishopAccountability.org, Survivors Network of those 
Abused by Priests, Child Justice, Foundation to Abolish Child 
Sex Abuse, Horace Mann Action Coalition, and MaleSurvivor.   
3 
 
(1974).  We recite here the facts alleged in Sliney's complaint 
and for purposes of this appeal we assume the facts to be true.  
Jarosz v. Palmer, 436 Mass. 526, 529-530 (2002) (motion for 
judgment on pleadings filed by defendant is essentially motion 
to dismiss).  From the time she was five years old in 1968 until 
she was fourteen years old in 1977, Sliney was sexually abused 
many times by Previte, her uncle.  She required psychiatric 
treatment to deal with issues related to the abuse, and was 
hospitalized on numerous occasions for the same reason, 
beginning when she was approximately twenty-four years old.   
 
Sliney began to recall some of the abuse by Previte 
beginning in 1988, and confided in her relatives.  Thereafter, 
Previte wrote a letter of apology to Sliney and asked for her 
forgiveness.  Sliney was under family pressure to forgive 
Previte, and in March of 1991, Sliney was coerced into signing a 
document that purportedly released Previte from all claims in 
exchange for a payment of $26,500; Sliney's mental state was 
such at the time that she did not understand the nature of this 
document.  Thereafter, she continued to require mental health 
hospitalizations.  At some point in 2011, Sliney began to recall 
new, different memories that Previte, in addition to committing 
4 
 
acts of sexual abuse himself, had forced her to engage in sexual 
acts with other men who were unknown to her.3   
 
On January 30, 2012, Sliney filed this action in the 
Superior Court.  The complaint named Previte and Michael Moe 
Nos. 1–104 as defendants and alleged the facts just summarized.  
Previte answered the complaint and filed a motion for judgment 
on the pleadings that sought dismissal of the complaint on the 
grounds that (1) the statute of limitations had already run 
before Sliney filed her complaint, and (2) the release executed 
by Sliney in 1991 foreclosed her from raising her claims against 
Previte.  In response, Sliney argued in part that the abuse she 
suffered as a result of being forced by Previte to engage in 
sexual activities with other men was distinct from the acts of 
sexual abuse committed directly by Previte and she reasonably 
could not have discovered that abuse until 2011 -- i.e., within 
the limitations period of three years.  She also contended that 
the release she signed was invalid.  In June, 2012, a judge in 
the Superior Court allowed Previte's motion and entered judgment 
dismissing the complaint against him on the basis that the 
action was filed after the three-year statute of limitations 
                     
 
3 The complaint does not specifically identify the time 
period in which Previte allegedly forced Sliney to engage in 
sexual activity with these other men.   
 
 
4 Michael Moe Nos. 1-10 are the men with whom Sliney alleges 
she was forced to engage in sexual activities by Previte.   
5 
 
that had been prescribed by § 4C had expired.5  The motion judge 
concluded that Sliney knew of the sexual abuse by Previte as of 
1988, and the fact that she remembered additional incidents did 
not extend the limitations period beyond the three-year period 
ending in 1991.  The motion judge did not address the validity 
of the release.  Sliney filed a timely appeal in the Appeals 
Court, which, on December 31, 2013, affirmed the Superior Court 
judgment on statute of limitations grounds in a decision issued 
pursuant to its rule 1:28.   
 
In January, 2014, Sliney filed a petition for rehearing in 
the Appeals Court and thereafter an application for further 
appellate review in this court.  See Mass. R. A. P. 27, as 
amended, 410 Mass. 1602 (1991); Mass. R. A. P. 27.1, as amended, 
441 Mass. 1601 (2004).  On June 26, 2014, while the petition and 
application were still pending in the respective courts, the 
Legislature enacted St. 2014, c. 145 (act), enlarging the 
limitations period in § 4C for civil actions alleging sexual 
abuse of a minor from three years to thirty-five years.  Section 
8 of the act contains a retroactivity provision.  St. 2014, 
c. 145, § 8.  After the act's passage, Sliney filed a variety of 
motions in the Appeals Court, seeking relief based on the 
                     
 
5 On July 10, 2012, an amended judgment entered that 
dismissed the complaint as to Michael Moe Nos. 1-10 as well as 
Previte.   
6 
 
provisions of the act.6  These motions were denied.7  In August, 
2014, Sliney filed in this court a second application for 
further appellate review.  We allowed both of Sliney's 
applications.   
 
2.  Statutory Background.  As originally enacted in 1993, 
§ 4C provided that "[a]ctions for assault and battery alleging 
the defendant sexually abused a minor shall be commenced within 
three years of the acts alleged to have caused an injury or 
condition" or three years from when the victim reasonably 
discovered the injury was caused by the acts, although the time 
for a child to commence an action under the statute was tolled 
until the child turned eighteen.  G. L. c. 260, § 4C, inserted 
by St. 1993, c. 307.  The act substantially enlarged the 
                     
 
6 In Sliney's case, according to the facts alleged in the 
complaint, the abuse by Previte ended in 1977, and she filed her 
complaint in the Superior Court in January of 2012.  Also 
according to the complaint, Sliney would have turned eighteen in 
1981.  Therefore, accepting the complaint's alleged facts as 
true, Sliney's allegations of abuse may fall within the amended 
statute of limitations in St. 2014, c. 145 (act); at least an 
issue is presented for the fact finder.   
 
 
7 In the Appeals Court, Sliney filed a motion to stay the 
appeal and for leave to file a motion for relief from judgment 
pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 Mass. 828 (1974), in 
the Superior Court; a motion to reconsider; and a motion for 
full court review by the Appeals Court pursuant to G. L. 
c. 211A, § 11.  Sliney also filed a motion in this court to stay 
the action on her application for further appellate review and 
for leave to file a motion for relief from judgment in the 
Superior Court, which was referred to a single justice, and 
ultimately denied.   
 
7 
 
limitations period, and also replaced the phrase "actions for 
assault and battery," with "actions of tort."8  St. 2014, c. 145, 
§ 4.  As amended by the act, the first paragraph of § 4C 
provides:   
"Actions of tort alleging the defendant sexually abused a 
minor shall be commenced within [thirty-five] years of the 
acts alleged to have caused an injury or condition or 
within [seven] years of the time the victim discovered or 
reasonably should have discovered that an emotional or 
psychological injury or condition was caused by said act, 
whichever period expires later; provided, however, that the 
time limit for commencement of an action under this section 
is tolled for a child until the child reaches eighteen 
years of age."9   
 
G. L. c. 260, § 4C, as amended through St. 2014, c. 145, §§ 4-6.  
Section 8 of the act defines the act's retroactive effect.  It 
provides in relevant part that the act's amendments to § 4C 
"shall apply regardless of when any such action or claim shall 
have accrued or been filed and regardless of whether it may have 
lapsed or otherwise be barred by time under the law of the 
                     
 
8 The act was not the first time that G. L. c. 260, § 4C 
(§ 4C), was amended following its enactment in 1993.  The 
Legislature amended § 4C in 2010 and 2011, but those amendments 
did not make any changes to the three-year limitation periods 
covering alleged acts of abuse and discovery of injury related 
to such acts.  See St. 2010, c. 267, §§ 49–51; St. 2011, c. 178, 
§ 19. 
 
9 The second paragraph of § 4C provides that for purposes of 
§ 4C, "'sexual abuse' . . . mean[s] the commission of any act 
against a minor as set forth in" a number of criminal statutes 
that are listed at the end of the paragraph.   
 
8 
 
commonwealth."10  St. 2014, c. 145, § 8.  The act also contains 
an emergency preamble that states, "Whereas, [t]he deferred 
operation of this act would tend to defeat its purpose, which is 
to increase forthwith the statute of limitations in civil child 
sexual abuse cases, therefore it is hereby declared to be an 
emergency law, necessary for the immediate preservation of the 
public safety."  Accordingly, the act's enlargement of § 4C's 
statute of limitations was effective on the date of the act's 
approval, June 26, 2014.   
 
Discussion.  1.  Application of the act.  Whether a statute 
applies to events occurring prior to the date on which the 
statute takes effect is in the first instance a question of 
legislative intent.  Smith v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 
                     
 
10 The act also enacted G. L. c. 260, § 4C½, which provides:   
 
"An action of tort alleging that the defendant negligently 
supervised a person who sexually abused a minor or that the 
defendant's conduct caused or contributed to the sexual 
abuse of a minor by another person shall be commenced 
within the later to expire of:  (i) [thirty-five] years of 
the acts alleged to have caused an injury or condition to 
such minor; or (ii) [seven] years of the time the victim 
discovered or reasonably should have discovered that an 
emotional or psychological injury or condition was caused 
by such act; provided, however, that the time limit for 
commencement of such an action under this section shall be 
tolled for a child until the child reaches [eighteen] years 
of age."   
 
There is no claim raised by either party in this case that § 4C½ 
applies to any of the claims raised in Sliney's complaint.  We 
do not consider in this opinion any question relating to § 4C½ 
or the retroactivity provisions in § 8 of the act that apply to 
§ 4C½.   
9 
 
462 Mass. 370, 372 (2012).  If "the language of a statute is 
plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to legislative 
intent."  Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC, 452 Mass. 436, 444 (2008).  
Where there is no express legislative directive, this court 
generally applies the rule of interpretation that statutes 
operate prospectively.  See Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Nunez, 
460 Mass. 511, 516 (2011) (Nunez), and cases cited.  
Nevertheless, a statute will be applied retroactively if "it 
appears by necessary implication from the words, context or 
objects of [the amendments] that the Legislature intended [them] 
to be retroactive in operation" and the retroactive intention is 
"unequivocally clear" (quotations omitted).  Smith, supra at 
376-377.  See Nunez, supra.  Here, we deal with a statute that 
regulates practice and procedure and affects remedies, but far 
more to the point, the Legislature has made its intention about 
retroactive operation both clear and unequivocal:  § 8 of the 
act expressly states that the act's expansion of the limitation 
periods in § 4C is to apply "regardless of when any such action 
or claim [relating to sexual abuse of a child] shall have 
accrued or been filed and regardless of whether it may have 
lapsed or otherwise be barred by time" (emphasis added).   
 
Previte does not dispute that the Legislature intended the 
act's new limitations period to apply retroactively, but argues 
that the act does not apply to this case for two reasons.  
10 
 
First, he contends that even where a statutory amendment is 
procedural in nature -- as is the case with an alteration of a 
statutory limitations period, see generally Boston v. Keene 
Corp., 406 Mass. 301, 312 (1989) (Keene Corp.) –- the amendment 
applies only if the case has not yet gone beyond the procedural 
stage to which the amendment pertains.  His second point is 
that, in any event, retroactive legislation does not apply to 
judgments that are final and, in this case, there was a final 
judgment.   
 
Both of Previte's arguments fail.  With respect to the 
first, this court has recognized the principle that "statutes 
regulating practice, procedure and evidence, in short, those 
relating to remedies and not affecting substantive rights . . . 
commonly are treated as operating retroactively, and as applying 
to pending actions or causes of action."  Fontaine v. Ebtec 
Corp., 415 Mass. 309, 318 (1993), quoting City Council of 
Waltham v. Vinciullo, 364 Mass. 624, 626 (1974) (Vinciullo).  In 
that context, as Previte states, we generally apply the 
interpretive rule that a statute will be construed to apply to a 
pending case only if the point in the proceedings to which the 
statute is relevant has not yet passed.  See Vinciullo, supra at 
628.  See also Porter v. Clerk of the Superior Court, 368 Mass. 
116, 118 (1975).  However, that rule applies only where the 
Legislature has not expressly indicated whether the statute in 
11 
 
question is to be applied retroactively.  Our task is to 
interpret the Legislature's intention on this subject.  See, 
e.g., Vinciullo, supra at 626-629.  See also Leibovich v. 
Antonellis, 410 Mass. 568, 576 n.6 (1991).  Where the 
Legislature has "expressly stated" that the statute should be 
applied retroactively, we follow the legislative directive.  Id. 
at 576.  That is the case here; the Legislature has specified in 
§ 8 of the act that the expanded limitations period is to apply 
to cases "regardless of when any such action or claim shall have 
. . . been filed," rendering the point of the proceeding no 
longer relevant.   
 
Previte's second argument is that the act cannot apply to 
this case because (1) at the time that judgment entered in the 
Superior Court and was affirmed thereafter by the Appeals Court, 
the applicable statute of limitations was three years; (2) both 
courts were correct in concluding that the three-year 
limitations period had already run when Sliney filed her 
complaint in 2012, given that the complaint alleges Sliney 
became aware of the abuse in 1988 when she was twenty-four; and 
(3) where the Superior Court judgment was correct based on the 
law in effect at the time it was entered -- especially where the 
correctness was confirmed by a decision of the Appeals Court -- 
the Superior Court judgment was "final" and not subject to being 
12 
 
altered based on a change in the law enacted thereafter.11  For 
purposes of considering Previte's argument, we will assume 
without deciding that the act's enlargement of the statute of 
limitations could not be applied to a case on which final 
judgment has entered and in which all avenues of appeal had been 
exhausted or were no longer available.  See Vinciullo, 364 Mass. 
at 627.  But this assumption does not assist Previte here 
because even if the Superior Court judgment and affirmance by 
the Appeals Court were correct at the time they entered,12 
Sliney's timely filed petition for rehearing and first 
application for further appellate review were both pending on 
the act's effective date on June 26, 2014.  Therefore, for the 
reasons we next explain, the judgment in Sliney's case was not 
"final" by the effective date.   
 
A judgment is not final simply by virtue of the fact that 
judgment entered in the Superior Court, even when the judgment 
was legally correct, nor is it final when affirmed by the 
                     
11 Previte has not cited any case or other authority, and we 
have found none, to support such an approach to finality, which 
appears to treat separately the individual stages of the appeals 
process and also to consider the substantive merits of the case.   
 
 
12 Sliney contests this point.  As previously noted, she 
argues that her allegations of abuse at the hands of other men 
with whom Previte allegedly forced her to engage in sexual 
activities were distinct acts of abuse that she reasonably could 
not have discovered until 2011, and therefore the statute of 
limitations had not run when she filed the complaint in 2012.  
See Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 243-244, 246-247 (1991).   
 
13 
 
Appeals Court.  Rather, a judgment becomes final and the case is 
closed only when all appeals are resolved or the time for appeal 
has expired.  See Reporters' Notes to Rule 54 (a) (1973), Mass. 
Ann. Laws Court Rules, Rules of Civil Procedure, at 896 
(LexisNexis 2012) ("Under the [r]ules [of civil procedure], 
'judgment' is merely the final adjudicating act of the trial 
court, and starts the timetable for appellate review").13  See 
also Foxworth v. St. Amand, 457 Mass. 200, 206 (2010) (end of 
appellate process is issuance of rescript to trial court, which 
does not occur while petition for rehearing or application for 
further review is pending); Verizon New England Inc. v. Board of 
Assessors of Newton, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 457, 461-462 & n.9 
(2012).  Cf. Hanover Ins. Co. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1503, 
1509 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1023 (1990) 
(Federal Tax Court decision is final when time for filing 
petition for rehearing after denial of petition for writ of 
certiorari has passed).14  Section 8 of the act states that the 
                     
13 Other rules of procedure reinforce this point.  See Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 62 (a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1409 (1996) ("Except as 
stated herein, no execution shall issue upon a judgment nor 
shall proceedings be taken for its enforcement until the time 
for appeal from the judgment has expired"); Mass. R. Civ. P. 
62 (d), 365 Mass. 829 (1974) ("Except as otherwise provided in 
these rules, the taking of an appeal from a judgment shall stay 
execution upon the judgment during the pendency of the appeal").   
 
 
14 Cf. Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) (in 
context of Federal habeas corpus review, State conviction and 
"sentence become final for purposes of retroactivity analysis 
14 
 
extended statute of limitations applies to any action or claim 
regardless of when it was filed, signifying at the very least 
that the act applies to any action that was pending at the time 
of enactment.  Given the posture of this case before the Appeals 
Court and this court on the effective date of the act, Sliney's 
case was still pending.  The act's retroactive enlargement of 
the statute of limitations applicable to claims brought under 
§ 4C applies to this case.   
 
2.  Constitutionality of the act's retroactivity provision.  
Previte claims that if the act's revised limitations period does 
apply to Sliney's action, the act is unconstitutional as applied 
to him.  In particular, he argues that (1) the act interferes 
with his substantive, "vested" right in the Superior Court 
judgment dismissing Sliney's action on statute of limitation 
grounds; (2) the act violates his rights to procedural due 
process because the passage of time since 1991, when the statute 
of limitations originally ran in this case, will make it 
virtually impossible for him to defend himself against Sliney's 
claims; and (3) the act, by reaching back in time as far as it 
                                                                  
when the availability of direct appeal to the [S]tate courts has 
been exhausted and the time for filing a petition for a writ of 
certiorari has elapsed or a timely filed petition has been 
finally denied"); Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 
(2003) (in postconviction context, "finality has a long-
recognized, clear meaning:  Finality attaches when this Court 
affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a 
petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a 
certiorari petition expires").   
15 
 
does (a minimum of thirty-five years), fails the required test 
of reasonableness -- a test that asks "whether it is equitable 
to apply the retroactive statute" in a particular case.  See 
American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 374 Mass. 
181, 191 (1978).  Accord Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 8725 
v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 450 Mass. 780, 788 (2008) (Doe No. 
8725).   
 
"We must apply every rational presumption in favor of the 
[act's] constitutionality," Anderson v. BNY Mellon, N.A., 463 
Mass. 299, 308 (2012), and Previte, in challenging it, "bears a 
heavy burden" of showing otherwise.  St. Germaine v. Pendergast, 
416 Mass. 698, 703 (1993).  See Keene Corp., 406 Mass. at 305 
(challenge to constitutionality of statute expanding limitations 
period governing certain asbestos-related claims; "[t]he sole 
issue is whether the statute falls within the legislative power 
to enact, not whether it comports with a court's idea of wise or 
efficient legislation").  Because Previte's first two 
constitutional arguments may appropriately be considered as part 
of our evaluation of Previte's third claim, we turn to that 
third claim.   
 
In evaluating the reasonableness of applying a statute 
retroactively, there are three principal factors that we 
examine:  the public interest that motivated the Legislature to 
enact the statute, the nature of the rights affected by the 
16 
 
retroactivity, and the scope of the impact of the statute on 
those rights.  See Anderson v. BNY Mellon, N.A., 463 Mass. at 
308.   
 
The purpose of the act, as reflected in its preamble, and 
reinforced by legislative history,15 is to preserve public safety 
and protect children who have been abused by enabling them to 
seek a remedy for severe injuries that they did not appreciate 
for long periods of time due to the abuse.16  See Riley v. 
Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 246-247 (1991).  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Dockham, 405 Mass. 618, 628-630 (1989) (permitting expert 
testimony to explain that delayed or gradual disclosure are 
commonly recognized clinical phenomena related to child sexual 
abuse).  This is unquestionably an important public purpose; 
there is a strong interest and a "well-established community 
consensus in favor of protecting children from abuse."  Roe 
No. 1 v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 469 Mass. 710, 718 (2014).  
Victims often suffer injuries for decades after the physical 
                     
15 See Remarks of Senator William N. Brownsberger, 2014 
Senate J. 16.  See also 2014 House J. 1520.  The act passed both 
legislative branches unanimously.  See St. 2014, c. 145; 2014 
House Doc. No. 4126; 2014 Senate Doc. No. 633.   
 
 
16 The discovery limitations period provides one avenue of 
achieving this important goal.  We need not inquire why the 
Legislature also extended the statute of limitations to thirty-
five years of the sexual abuse alleged; however, one compelling 
explanation may be to reduce the litigation over when a victim 
discovered or reasonably should have discovered the alleged 
cause of action.   
17 
 
acts of abuse occurred, and the extended statute of limitations 
provides the victim appropriate time to recall past acts and 
face the traumatic childhood events before he or she must take 
action.  See Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 317 
Conn. 357, 419-420 (2015) (upholding constitutionality of 
retroactive application of statutory amendment increasing to 
thirty years statute of limitations applicable to civil actions 
for child abuse); Sheehan v. Oblates of St. Francis de Sales, 15 
A.3d 1247, 1258-1260 (Del. 2011) (holding constitutional statute 
abolishing statute of limitations for claims of childhood sexual 
abuse and creating two-year window for revived claims); Deutsch 
v. Masonic Homes of Cal., Inc., 164 Cal. App. 4th 748, 752, 759 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (statute extending statute of limitations 
from one to eight years and creating window for revival of 
otherwise time-barred claims arising out of childhood sexual 
abuse held constitutional).   
 
We next consider the rights affected by § 8 of the act.  
Previte asserts that he has a vested property right in having 
Sliney's action dismissed, and application of the act to him 
deprives him of this right.  We previously have rejected a claim 
that a defendant has a protected right to avoid legal claims 
being brought against him by virtue of the running of a statute 
of limitations.  See Keene Corp., 406 Mass. at 312-313 ("the 
defendants' interest in the limitations defense is procedural 
18 
 
rather than substantive. . . .  [I]n cases not involving claims 
to real property, the running of the applicable limitations 
period bars only the legal remedy, while leaving the underlying 
cause of action unaffected").  The United States Supreme Court 
has reached a similar conclusion.  See Campbell v. Holt, 115 
U.S. 620, 628 (1885) ("We certainly do not understand that a 
right to defeat a just debt by the statute of limitations is a 
vested right . . .").  See also Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 
325 U.S. 304, 316 (1945) ("lifting the bar of a statute of 
limitation so as to restore a remedy lost through mere lapse of 
time" is not violation of Fourteenth Amendment unless defendant 
can show it creates hardship and oppression).  Previte further 
argues he has a vested interest in the Superior Court's correct-
at-the-time judgment of dismissal.  But Previte could not have a 
vested interest in either the Superior Court's decision or the 
Appeals Court's affirmance of that decision, because the 
judgment could still be overturned on rehearing in the Appeals 
Court or further appellate review.  See American Steel Foundries 
v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 201 (1921) 
(plaintiff had no "vested right" in decree entered by District 
Court while it was subject to review).  This court has long 
recognized that if "the object and operation" of a legislative 
measure is to "confirm and enforce rights, and to provide 
adequate and suitable remedies for the violation of them," the 
19 
 
retroactive application does not impair any vested right of one 
against whom such rights are enforced.  Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 
Mass. 245, 269, 273-274 (1819) (upholding retroactive 
application of statute requiring all corporations, including 
those previously organized, to continue in existence for three 
years beyond time established in organizational charters, for 
purpose of suing and being sued and settling business 
obligations).   
 
Previte claims that the act interferes with his procedural 
due process right to be able to defend himself adequately 
against a claim of sexual abuse alleged to have occurred long 
ago.  He mentions, for example, the inability to gather evidence 
and locate witnesses due to the passage of time.  We agree that 
a defendant has a legitimate interest in protecting himself from 
the obligation to defend against stale claims and the inherent 
difficulties involved in seeking to do so.  See Doe v. Hartford 
Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 317 Conn. at 422.  See also Chase 
Sec. Corp., 325 U.S. at 314 (statutes of limitation are 
"pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale 
claims, and the citizen from being put to his defense after 
memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and 
evidence has been lost").  However, Previte's interest must be 
balanced against the public interest that the act seeks to 
20 
 
protect and advance.  We consider this balance in connection 
with the third factor, to which we now turn.   
 
The third factor is the extent to which the act abrogates 
or interferes with Previte's settled rights.  See Anderson, 463 
Mass. at 312.  As just discussed, Previte has a legitimate 
interest in protecting against having to defend against stale 
claims, but he does not have a significant right to maintain a 
particular statute of limitations that was earlier in effect.  
See Keene Corp., 406 Mass. at 313 ("the running of the 
limitations period . . . does not create a vested right which 
cannot constitutionally be taken away by subsequent statutory 
revival of the barred remedy").   
 
That being said, in reviewing Previte's challenge to the 
retroactive operation of the act, it nonetheless is necessary to 
return to the essential requirement that a retroactive statute's 
burden must be "reasonable in scope and extent."  Doe No. 8725, 
450 Mass. at 792.  "Only those statutes which, on a balancing of 
opposing considerations, are deemed to be unreasonable, are held 
to be unconstitutional."  American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 374 
Mass. at 189-190.  Among the factors we weigh in assessing 
reasonableness are the duration of the burden imposed by the 
retroactive statute and "whether the scope of the statute is 
narrowly drawn to treat the problem perceived by the 
legislature."  Doe No. 8725, supra at 793.   
21 
 
 
Here, there is no question that the limitations period has 
been very substantially expanded; although the enlargement is 
not of "infinite duration," see id., thirty-five years is 
unquestionably a great deal longer than three.17  The extensive 
expansion of the statute of limitations undoubtedly affects a 
defendant's (and similarly a plaintiff's) ability to present 
evidence.  On the other hand, the extent of the expansion 
appears to be tied directly to the compelling legislative 
purpose underlying the act, and in particular, the apparent 
recognition that in many cases, victims of child abuse are not 
able to appreciate the extent or the cause of harm they 
experience as a result of sexual abuse perpetrated on them for 
many years after the abuse has ended.  See Remarks of Senator 
William N. Brownsberger, 2014 Senate J. 16.  Further, the act 
does not create a new liability; there can be no claim here that 
acts of sexual abuse committed on a child were permissible 
during the time that Sliney alleges she was sexually abused by 
Previte.  Cf. Leibovich, 410 Mass. at 578-579 ("The new statute 
in no way alters the standards for determining what kind of 
                     
 
17 The expansion of the so-called discovery period -- i.e., 
the period of time following a person's discovery that he or she 
suffered abuse and in which she must commence the legal action -
- from three to seven years -- is also significant, especially 
because the discovery period could expand the limitations period 
beyond thirty-five years if the alleged acts of abuse are 
discovered more than twenty-eight years after they are alleged 
to have occurred.   
22 
 
behavior constitutes negligence.  The defendant always had the 
obligation to drive in a non-negligent manner, and this 
obligation was not affected by [new statute creating right in 
parent to bring claim of loss of consortium of child]").  
Contrast Pielech v. Massossoit Greyhound, Inc., 441 Mass. 188, 
194 (2004) (where statute previously covered discrimination 
based on beliefs only of organized religions, amendment 
permitting discrimination claim based on sincerely held 
religious beliefs [whether derived from organized religion or 
not] would not be applied retroactively; under amendment, "the 
defendant will be held to an obligation that the law did not 
require of it at the time of the incident").  Nor does the act 
predetermine the defendant's liability; it only removes a 
procedural defense.  See Keene Corp., 406 Mass. at 313.  The 
balance of interests here supports the validity of the act and 
its application to Sliney's action in particular.   
 
Finally, Previte argues that § 8 violates the "standing 
laws" provision of art. 10 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.18  Article 10 prohibits "the enactment of special 
legislation that singl[es] out any [individual] for special 
                     
 
18 The first sentence of art. 10 provides:  "Each individual 
of the society has a right to be protected by it in the 
enjoyment of his life, liberty and property, according to 
standing laws."  We have interpreted "standing laws" to mean 
enacted legislation of general application.  See Commissioner of 
Pub. Health v. Bessie M. Burke Memorial Hosp., 366 Mass. 734, 
742 (1975).   
23 
 
privileges or advantages at the expense of the rights of 
another" (quotation and footnote omitted).  Kienzler v. Dalkon 
Shield Claimants Trust, 426 Mass. 87, 89 (1997).  Previte's 
challenge places a heavy burden on him to rebut the presumption 
in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment.  
Id.   
 
Previte has failed to show that the act, and specifically 
its retroactivity provision in § 8, singles out certain 
individuals for special advantages and thereby violates art. 10.  
In Keene Corp., 406 Mass. at 306-311, this court considered a 
similar argument that the statute in question there, which 
extended the limitations period for certain asbestos-related 
claims that could be brought by the Commonwealth and its 
political subdivisions, violated the standing laws guarantee of 
art. 10.  We concluded that there was no violation.  Id. at 311.  
Even though private parties were excluded from taking advantage 
of the limitations period expansion the statute provided, the 
statute still benefited a relatively large group, as compared to 
other cases challenging statutes that benefited only a single 
named individual, and in which a violation of art. 10's standing 
laws provision had been found to exist.  See, e.g., Holden v. 
James, 11 Mass. 396, 401, 403-405 (1814); Paddock v. Brookline, 
347 Mass. 230, 231, 236-237 (1964); St. Germaine, 416 Mass. at 
703-704.  While Previte may be correct that there is no 
24 
 
certainty in the number of persons who will benefit from the 
act's retroactive application, this is not decisive; neither § 8 
nor any other provision in the act singles out a small group of 
individuals to benefit.   
 
3.  Validity of the release.  Finally, Previte argues that 
even if the act is constitutional and applies here, the release 
that Sliney signed in 1991 bars her from bringing this action or 
asserting any claims against Previte related to alleged sexual 
abuse by him.  Neither the motion judge in the Superior Court 
nor the Appeals Court addressed this claim, and we are not in a 
position to do so on the basis of the record before us.  
Sliney's complaint appears to raise factual issues concerning 
the validity of the release.  However, this case was decided 
below on a motion for judgment on the pleadings and it may well 
be that no discovery between the parties has taken place.  
Because we have concluded that the act validly applies to 
Sliney's claims against Previte, the Superior Court judgment of 
dismissal must be vacated and the case remanded to that court.  
On remand, Previte may pursue his claim that the release bars 
Sliney from pursuing her case.   
 
Conclusion.  We vacate the judgment of the Superior Court 
and remand the case to that court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.