Case Title: People v. Burgener

Citation: 

Docket Number: S179181

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2016-08-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 8/11/16 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S179181 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Riverside County 
MICHAEL RAY BURGENER, 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CR 18088 
 
) 
 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
In 1981, Michael Ray Burgener was convicted of murdering William Arias during 
a convenience store robbery and sentenced to death.  We affirmed the guilt judgment but 
reversed the penalty verdict because defense counsel at Burgener‘s request ―deliberately 
refrained from introducing any evidence in support of a lesser penalty than death, though 
such evidence was available.‖  (People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 542 (Burgener 
I), disapproved on another ground in People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743; but cf. 
People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1228, fn. 9 (Bloom) [disapproving the rule that 
―failure to present mitigating evidence in and of itself is sufficient to make a death 
judgment unreliable‖].) 
At the penalty retrial, a jury again sentenced Burgener to death, but the trial court 
modified the sentence from death to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  
(See Pen. Code, § 190.4, subd. (e) (hereafter section 190.4(e)); all undesignated statutory 
references are to the Penal Code.)  The Court of Appeal reversed on the ground that the 
trial court, in ruling on the section 190.4(e) motion to modify the verdict, had considered 
2 
several impermissible factors.  (People v. Burgener (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 427, 430 
(Burgener II).)  The case was remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of the 
section 190.4(e) motion. 
On remand, the judge who had presided over the penalty retrial, Judge Mortland, 
had retired.  So the case was assigned to Judge Heumann, who proceeded to deny the 
motion to modify the verdict.  On appeal, we held that Judge Heumann, in reviewing the 
jury‘s sentencing decision, mistakenly applied a deferential standard of review instead of 
exercising ―his duty to independently reweigh the evidence and make an independent 
determination whether the evidence supported the verdict of death.‖  (People v. Burgener 
(2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 891 (Burgener III).)  We therefore vacated the death judgment 
and remanded for another hearing on Burgener‘s application to modify the verdict.  (Id. at 
p. 892.) 
On remand, the trial court granted Burgener‘s request to represent himself at the 
section 190.4(e) hearing but ultimately denied his application to modify the verdict and 
reinstated the death judgment.  On appeal, we found that the trial court did not adequately 
warn Burgener of the risks of self-representation.  (People v. Burgener (2009) 46 Cal.4th 
231, 241–243 (Burgener IV).)  Because we could not ―conclude that defendant‘s waiver 
of counsel was knowing and intelligent,‖ we vacated the death judgment and remanded 
―for yet another hearing on the application for modification of the death penalty verdict.‖  
(Id. at pp. 243, 245.)  We observed that ―[b]ecause Judge Heumann has since passed 
away, the motion shall be heard before another judge of the same court.‖  (Id. at p. 245.) 
On remand, the case was assigned to Judge Riemer, who granted Burgener‘s 
request to represent himself but denied his application to modify the verdict.  Before us 
now is the automatic appeal from this latest denial of Burgener‘s application to modify 
the verdict.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the death 
judgment. 
3 
I. 
Burgener contends that the trial court erred in granting his request to represent 
himself because his request was equivocal and because the court inadequately warned 
him of the risks of self-representation. 
As noted, the last time Burgener was before this court, we held that the trial court 
granted his motion for self-representation without adequately warning him of its risks.  
(Burgener IV, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 243.)  We reaffirmed that ― ‗ ―[n]o particular form 
of words is required in admonishing a defendant who seeks to waive counsel and elect 
self-representation.‖ ‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 241.)  But we observed that ―the trial court not only 
failed to advise defendant that the district attorney would be both experienced and 
prepared, that defendant would receive no special consideration or assistance from the 
court and would be treated like any other attorney, that he would have no right to standby 
or advisory counsel, or that he would be barred from challenging on appeal the adequacy 
of his representation, but instead actively encouraged defendant to represent himself.‖  
(Id. at p. 243.)  This time the colloquy on self-representation proceeded as follows: 
―THE COURT:  [T]he first order of business today is to determine whether Mr. 
Burgener still wishes to represent himself or whether he is going to accept the services of 
the Public Defender‘s Office to represent him. 
―So Mr. Burgener, what do you wish to do today? 
―THE DEFENDANT:  For the purposes of the hearing I‘m down here for, I wish 
to represent myself. 
―THE COURT:  All right.  Sir, have you ever studied law before? 
―THE DEFENDANT:  No. 
―THE COURT:  Have you, other than those proceedings in front of Judge 
Heumann which ultimately were reversed by the Supreme Court, have you ever 
represented yourself in a criminal action? 
―THE DEFENDANT:  Just — no. 
4 
―THE COURT:  Do you understand the issues that are present in this motion to 
modify the judgment? 
―THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, I do. 
―THE COURT:  And to your understanding, what are those issues? 
―THE DEFENDANT:  The issues that I‘m down here for? 
―THE COURT:  Yes. 
―THE DEFENDANT:  I‘m down here for the automatic motion to modify the 
penalty from death to life. 
―THE COURT:  Right.  But what are the legal issues that are to be decided in 
whether I grant that motion or whether I deny that motion?  Do you understand that? 
―THE DEFENDANT:  You‘re to weigh the mitigating, aggravating circumstances 
against each other and determine whether the jury‘s findings were enough to give me 
death. 
―THE COURT:  Okay. 
―THE DEFENDANT:  Or whether you should overturn it to life without. 
―THE COURT:  Do you realize that if you do represent yourself that you will be 
going up against one of the most experienced prosecutors in the Riverside County 
District Attorney‘s Office? 
―THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
―THE COURT:  Do you realize that I cannot give you any advice? 
―THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, or any help, yes, I do. 
―THE COURT:  And do you realize that you‘re going to basically not be cut any 
slack just because you‘re representing yourself as opposed to being represented by an 
attorney? 
―THE DEFENDANT:  I realize that whether I have the top criminal defense 
attorney in the world or myself, what was going to happen — what is going to happen is 
going to happen regardless.  I realize that. 
5 
―THE COURT:  What do you mean by that, sir? 
―THE DEFENDANT:  I mean what I‘m down here for, the limited scope of what 
you‘re to determine is going to be determined the same way that it‘s been determined all 
along. 
―THE COURT:  It‘s been determined two different ways.  One judge granted it, 
another judge denied it. 
―THE DEFENDANT:  The judge who granted it was the judge who actually set at 
the penalty phase and heard the witnesses, heard all the evidence.  What you‘re going to 
rule on is going to be by the record, what you read. 
―You haven‘t heard the witnesses.  You didn‘t sit into the penalty phase.  You‘re 
only going to go by the record.  So by the record, I‘m going to be given the same 
sentence.  I realize that.  I know what the record is, and the mitigating — I mean the 
aggravating circumstances do outweigh the mitigating circumstances, but, again, you‘re 
not going to be able to hear the witnesses.  You‘re not going to be able to make the 
determination that Judge Mortland made. 
―THE COURT:  I see.  There is a common saying in legal circles that a person 
who represents themselves has a fool for a client.  What that means — 
―THE DEFENDANT:  I understand what that means. 
―THE COURT:  What that means is that — or what that saying is a reflection of is 
an understanding by judges and lawyers alike, that it is a bad idea, even for a lawyer to 
represent himself.  It is a particularly bad idea for a — for a layperson, someone who is 
not schooled in the law, to attempt to represent themselves. 
―You have — what I hear you saying is it‘s not going to make any difference.  I‘m 
confident what the ruling is going to be, therefore, I prefer to represent myself. 
―Let me ask you, the — if the decision is going to be the same in your mind either 
way, what is the downside of accepting Mr. Kersee‘s representation? 
6 
―THE DEFENDANT:  The downside is the length of time that it‘s going to take.  
My case has been in the State courts for — well, you know the number of years it‘s been 
in the State court. 
―I can‘t sit here before you or anybody else or let anybody — I‘ve had no say in 
what‘s happened here throughout this case.  All the lawyers I‘ve had have always done 
what they wanted to do.  Take the penalty phase, for instance, I can‘t in good conscience, 
try to mitigate a sentence when I‘m claiming I‘m innocent. 
―How can I let an attorney do the things that they do to try to mitigate a sentence 
of death?  To me, a sentence of life without is worse than death, actually, to me right now 
where my case is in the courts.  I want to get this hearing over with, and, you know, get 
my case in through the courts before I die of old age. 
―THE COURT:  Understandable.  You understand that whether you represent 
yourself or not, there is not going to be any ruling made today? 
―THE DEFENDANT:  I understand that. 
―THE COURT:  I have hundreds of thousands of pages of reading to do between 
now and whenever I make that ruling. 
―THE DEFENDANT:  You just have to read the transcripts from the penalty 
phase, correct? 
―THE COURT:  That‘s my understanding. 
―THE DEFENDANT:  So that shouldn‘t take too long, but I don‘t know how long 
it‘s going to take.  I understand what you‘re saying, I guess. 
―THE COURT:  I want to make sure that your motion was not based on the 
assumption, if I represent myself, this ruling will be made today, and if I accept — 
―THE DEFENDANT:  I understand that.  It‘s just that I could do — I can do for 
me just as much as an attorney can do for me.  In other words, what can be done for me is 
not much at this point for the limited scope of this hearing. 
7 
―THE COURT:  All right, sir.  Sir, do you also understand that if you represent 
yourself, you‘re not going — if you change your mind midway through the hearing, 
there‘s not going to be any other attorney waiting in the wings or sitting at your elbow 
waiting to take over for you?  You might change your mind after the hearing is over, but 
for purposes of this hearing, your decision is going to be irrevocable.  It‘s either go with 
an attorney for the entire hearing or ruling or go without an attorney for the entire ruling 
or hearing. 
―THE DEFENDANT:  I understand that. 
―THE COURT:  If the ruling is contrary to you, as you expect it to be, and if that 
ruling is appealed, then you cannot raise a common argument on appeal that appellants 
often raise which is my attorney was ineffective.  My attorney did not do the reasonably 
minimum expectable job that an attorney would do for me. 
―THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, I understand that. 
―THE COURT:  All right, sir.  I have no stake in this case.  In fact, I am, until this 
week, I was entirely new to this case.  I have done very little with respect to this case 
other than read the latest opinion from the California Supreme Court.  I have no vested 
interest one way or the other. 
―My advice to you is that you accept Mr. Kersee‘s representation.  He is an 
excellent attorney.  If there is anything that can be done, Mr. Kersee is in an excellent 
position to make sure that everything that can be done is done. 
―I recognize that you think that‘s a waste of time.  I recognize that you think it‘s a 
futile effort and the result is going to be the same, but what you think is possible from 
your review of the record and from what a very experienced criminal trial attorney, one 
very experienced in death penalty cases, thinks is possible might be two different things.  
Lightening [sic] does strike.  So if you are — it appears to the Court, and the Court will 
find that you understand the risks. 
8 
―You are competent to make this decision, and if it is your desire to make this — 
to choose to represent yourself, I will grant that, but I advise you against it. 
―THE DEFENDANT:  Your Honor, let me just say this.  The very best that can 
come of this hearing that I‘m down here for is that I be given life without the possibility 
of parole.  To me, that‘s the very worst thing that can happen, therefore, I do wish to 
represent myself. 
―THE COURT:  Mr. Kersee, anything before I rule on this request? 
―MR. KERSEE [defense counsel]:  No.  In fact I should, for the record, note that I 
have had long conversations with Mr. Burgener regarding his position, regarding what he 
wants to do considering the 190.4[(e) hearing].  I have spoken with appellate — both 
state and federal appellate attorneys who have represented Mr. Burgener and discussed 
the issues with them.  After I discussed the issues with them, I went back and spoke with 
Mr. Burgener again regarding his decision.  I am satisfied that Mr. Burgener is well 
aware of the legal principles involved. 
―He is aware of the scope of the hearing.  He is aware of the duties, obligations of 
your Honor with respect to this case, and I acknowledge his Constitutional right to 
represent himself. 
―THE COURT:  Miss Carter, any further inquiry you like to make in order to 
confirm that the defendant‘s decision is knowing and voluntary? 
―MS. CARTER [speaking for the prosecution]:  No.  I would just note for the 
record, just because nobody said it, from the cold record, Mr. Burgener‘s words make 
sense, but I watched him have a discussion with the Court.  He seems bright.  He seems 
lucid.  He doesn‘t seem to be strange in any way and he seems to be a rather intelligent 
man.  So making no judgments about those, I would just indicate for the record that those 
are my observations about the — not only the words that were said, but the nature in 
which the discussion was undertaken between the Court and the defendant. 
9 
―THE COURT:  And Court would confirm those observations.  Mr. Burgener 
appears to have thought this issue out in a careful and rational manner and has made his 
choice.  It‘s not the choice that I would make, but it does appear to be a rational choice 
from his point of view. 
―All right, sir, Court will grant your request.  The Court finds that you have made 
a knowing and voluntary choice with full understanding of the risks and consequences 
involved in representing yourself.‖   
Burgener argues that his request for self-representation was equivocal, and 
therefore should not have been granted by Judge Riemer, because it was borne of 
frustration with his case‘s slow progress and his fatalistic attitude toward the 
section 190.4(e) hearing‘s ultimate outcome.  (See People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 
390, 453 [―a request for self-representation must be unequivocal‖]; People v. Marshall 
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 23 [―A motion for self-representation made in passing anger or 
frustration, an ambivalent motion, or one made for the purpose of delay or to frustrate the 
orderly administration of justice may be denied.‖].)  Where a trial court has granted a 
defendant‘s request for self-representation, the question on appeal is ―whether the 
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel.‖  (Burgener IV, supra, 
46 Cal.4th at p. 241.)  We examine Burgener‘s claim that his request was equivocal as 
part of the inquiry into whether he affirmatively made a knowing and intelligent waiver 
of his right to counsel.  We ―must indulge every reasonable inference against waiver of 
the right of counsel.‖  (Marshall, at p. 20.) 
It is true that Burgener expressed frustration with the progress of his case (―I want 
to get this hearing over with, and, you know, get my case in through the courts before I 
die of old age‖) as well as resignation that ―I‘m going to be given the same sentence‖ 
whether or not represented by counsel.  But these sentiments do not suggest equivocation 
in Burgener‘s desire to represent himself.  Burgener had directed his attorney not to 
oppose the death penalty during his original penalty trial (Burgener I, supra, 41 Cal.3d at 
10 
p. 541), and he had asked to represent himself at the previous section 190.4(e) hearing 
more than a decade ago (see Burgener IV, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 234).  After this court 
overturned that hearing‘s outcome, Burgener again asked to represent himself because he 
wanted to move his case along more quickly, because he objected to his lawyers 
presenting mitigating evidence (―I can‘t in good conscience, try to mitigate a sentence 
when I‘m claiming I‘m innocent.  [¶] How can I let an attorney do the things that they do 
to try to mitigate a sentence of death?‖), and because he believed ―I can do for me just as 
much as an attorney can do for me.‖  The trial court told Burgener that ―[i]t is a 
particularly bad idea . . . for a layperson, someone who is not schooled in the law, to 
attempt to represent themselves‖ and that ―[m]y advice to you is that you accept Mr. 
Kersee‘s representation.‖  Yet Burgener remained resolute, and at the end of the 
colloquy, the trial court, prosecutor, and defense counsel all agreed, based on their direct 
observations, that Burgener had made a careful and informed judgment.  The record 
shows that Burgener knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel and 
affirmatively chose to represent himself. 
In addition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Burgener‘s 
request in the face of his expressed desire to present no mitigating evidence and leave the 
death verdict intact.  Burgener now contends that his ―request for self-representation here 
was clearly made to frustrate the orderly administration of justice by making the 
proceedings non-adversarial.‖  But in Bloom, we held that a trial court did not abuse its 
discretion ―by granting a competent defendant‘s midtrial motion for self-representation, 
when the motion is made for the announced purpose of seeking a verdict of death.‖  
(Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1220.)  We explained that although the ―defendant‘s 
midtrial motion for self-representation did not have a constitutional basis [citation], the 
United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Faretta v. California [(1975) 422 U.S. 806], 
recognizing a Sixth Amendment right of self-representation, is nonetheless instructive on 
the point raised by defendant.  The basic teaching of Faretta is ‗that the state may not 
11 
constitutionally prevent a defendant charged with commission of a criminal offense from 
controlling his own fate by forcing on him counsel who may present a case which is not 
consistent with the actual wishes of the defendant.‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  ―Given the importance 
which the decisions of both this court and the United States Supreme Court have attached 
to an accused‘s ability to control his or her own destiny and to make fundamental 
decisions affecting trial of the action, and given this court‘s recognition that it is not 
irrational to prefer the death penalty to life imprisonment without parole,‖ we concluded 
that ―it would be incongruous to hold that a trial court lacked power to grant a midtrial 
motion for self-representation in a capital case merely because the accused stated an 
intention to seek a death verdict.‖  (Id. at pp. 1222–1223.) 
Applying this reasoning here, we cannot say that Burgener sought to frustrate the 
orderly administration of justice by taking control of his defense, even though his refusal 
to argue for mitigation and his desire for a swift resolution might have increased the 
likelihood that he would receive a death sentence.  The fact that Burgener had convinced 
himself that ―by the record, I‘m going to be given the same sentence‖ does not suggest 
that his request to represent himself was ambivalent or intended to undermine the 
proceedings.  Burgener apparently believed he was making the best of the situation by 
seeking to expedite a process whose outcome was predetermined.  Judge Riemer sought 
to convince Burgener otherwise by saying:  ―I have no stake in this case. . . .  I have no 
vested interest one way or the other.  [¶] . . .  [¶] I recognize that you think [accepting 
counsel is] a futile effort and the result is going to be the same, but what you think is 
possible from your review of the record and from what a very experienced criminal trial 
attorney, one very experienced in death penalty cases, thinks is possible might be two 
different things.  Lightening [sic] does strike.‖  But Burgener was unconvinced because 
Judge Riemer had not heard the penalty phase witnesses and Burgener believed the 
―aggravating circumstances do outweigh the mitigating circumstances‖ on the written 
record alone.  In persisting with his request to represent himself despite Judge Riemer‘s 
12 
contrary advice, Burgener made clear he was seeking ―to control his . . . own destiny‖ 
(Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1222), not to frustrate the orderly administration of justice.  
We likewise reject Burgener‘s contention that Judge Riemer failed to fully apprise 
him of the dangers of self-representation.  ―No particular form of words is required in 
admonishing a defendant who seeks to waive counsel and elect self-representation; the 
test is whether the record as a whole demonstrates that the defendant understood the 
disadvantages of self-representation, including the risks and complexities of the particular 
case.‖  (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1070.)  Judge Riemer actively 
counseled Burgener against self-representation, warning Burgener that he was ―going up 
against one of the most experienced prosecutors in the Riverside County District 
Attorney‘s Office‖; that he would ―not be cut any slack‖ as a self-represented defendant; 
that his self-representation decision ―is going to be irrevocable‖ for purposes of the 
section 190.4(e) hearing; and that he was forgoing his right to later assert any claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  In light of the deficiencies we noted in the trial court‘s 
warnings concerning self-representation at Burgener‘s previous section 190.4(e) hearing, 
it is not surprising that Judge Riemer, who said he had ―read the latest opinion from the 
California Supreme Court [i.e., Burgener IV],‖ gave the specific warnings that he did.  
(See Burgener IV, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 243 [trial court ―failed to advise defendant that 
the district attorney would be both experienced and prepared, that defendant would 
receive no special consideration or assistance from the court and would be treated like 
any other attorney, that he would have no right to standby or advisory counsel, or that he 
would be barred from challenging on appeal the adequacy of his representation‖].)  
Further, unlike Judge Heumann, who had ―actively encouraged defendant to represent 
himself‖ (ibid.), Judge Riemer expressly advised Burgener to accept representation by 
counsel. 
Burgener argues that Judge Riemer did not specifically warn him of the 
complexities of a section 190.4(e) hearing.  The only complexity Burgener identifies is 
13 
the necessity of objecting when appropriate in order to preserve claims of error for 
appeal.  But such a rule is not unique to a section 190.4(e) hearing, and it is no more 
complex than the rules of evidence and procedure that a defendant who represents 
himself at trial is expected to follow without any specific admonition beforehand.  As we 
said in Burgener IV, a section 190.4(e) ―proceeding differs markedly from a trial on the 
merits, which involves voir dire of potential jurors, the examination and cross-
examination of witnesses, and jury instructions.  [Citation.]  Indeed, an application for 
modification of the death penalty verdict is based only on evidence that has already been 
presented to the jury . . . .‖  (Burgener IV, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 242.)  Judge Riemer‘s 
careful colloquy with Burgener was adequate to warn Burgener of the ―risks or 
disadvantages‖ of self-representation in the section 190.4(e) hearing.  (Burgener IV, at 
p. 242.) 
Finally, Burgener contends that he had no federal constitutional right to represent 
himself in the section 190.4(e) hearing, that Judge Riemer had no discretion to allow 
Burgener to represent himself, and that even if Judge Riemer did have such discretion, 
that discretion was abused on this record.  In Burgener IV, our analysis of Burgener‘s 
request to represent himself appeared to assume that Faretta applies to a section 190.4(e) 
hearing.  (See Burgener IV, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 240–241, citing Faretta v. 
California, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 835–836 (Faretta).)  Yet in Bloom, we explained that a 
motion for self-representation made ―after trial has commenced‖ — the motion there was 
made at the penalty phase, after the verdicts on guilt had been returned — ―is ‗based on 
nonconstitutional grounds‘ [citation] and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial 
court.‖  (Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1220.)  Further, we said ―[t]he rule against invited 
error generally precludes a defendant from obtaining reversal of a judgment by asserting 
error in the granting of the defendant‘s own motion.‖  (Ibid.)   
Burgener argues that Judge Riemer did not have discretion to allow him to 
represent himself because section 686.1 says that ―the defendant in a capital case shall be 
14 
represented in court by counsel at all stages of the preliminary and trial proceedings.‖  
Under People v. Johnson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 519, 526 (Johnson), section 686.1‘s mandate 
applies to the extent it is not inconsistent with Faretta.  Burgener reasons that if Faretta 
does not apply to a section 190.4(e) hearing and section 686.1‘s requirement of 
representation by counsel does, then we must conclude that the trial court erred in 
granting his request for self-representation. 
We need not decide whether Burgener had a Sixth Amendment right to self-
representation at the section 190.4(e) hearing; even if had no such right, his claim of error 
cannot succeed because section 686.1 does not apply to such a hearing.  (See People v. 
Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131, 1161 [―a statute must be construed, if reasonably 
possible, in a manner that avoids a serious constitutional question‖].)  The requirement of 
section 686.1 applies ―at all stages of the preliminary and trial proceedings,‖ and a 
section 190.4(e) hearing is not a trial proceeding in the usual sense.  As noted, a section 
190.4(e) hearing is qualitatively different and less procedurally complex than a trial on 
the merits.  (See Burgener IV, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 242 [―Such a proceeding differs 
markedly from a trial on the merits, which involves voir dire of potential jurors, the 
examination and cross-examination of witnesses, and jury instructions.  [Citation.]  
Indeed, an application for modification of the death penalty verdict is based only on 
evidence that has already been presented to the jury . . . .‖].) 
In Johnson, we quoted the Legislature‘s finding, when it enacted section 686.1, 
that ― ‗persons representing themselves cause unnecessary delays in the trials of charges 
against them; that trials are extended by such persons representing themselves; and that 
orderly trial procedures are disrupted.  Self-representation places a heavy burden upon 
the administration of criminal justice without any advantages accruing to those persons 
who desire to represent themselves.‘  (Stats. 1971, ch. 1800, § 6, p. 3898; [citation].)‖  
(Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 526.)  None of these concerns has salience in a section 
190.4(e) hearing; there are few opportunities for a self-represented defendant to disrupt or 
15 
delay the administration of justice.  The only burden that could be placed upon the 
administration of justice is what happened here:  A defendant does not submit any 
arguments at the section 190.4(e) hearing.  Although that may be unhelpful to the trial 
court‘s legal analysis, we have said that ―failure to present mitigating evidence generally 
does not make a death judgment unreliable in a constitutional sense in the absence of 
misleading or erroneous instructions and argument.‖  (Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at 
p. 1228, fn. 9.)  We thus conclude that section 190.4(e) hearings are not ―trial 
proceedings‖ within the meaning of section 686.1. 
Thus, even assuming Burgener had no constitutional right to represent himself, we 
conclude in light of Bloom that the trial court had discretion to consider Burgener‘s 
request and did not abuse its discretion in granting his request.  Here, as in Bloom, ―the 
defendant‘s stated intention to incur the death penalty does not in and of itself establish 
an abuse of discretion in the granting of the self-representation motion.‖  (Bloom, supra, 
48 Cal.3d at p. 1220.)  Moreover, the trial court took adequate steps to ensure that 
Burgener‘s decision was informed, considered, and not impulsive, equivocal, or designed 
to frustrate the orderly administration of justice. 
II. 
Burgener‘s remaining contention is that the trial court improperly refused to 
consider Judge Mortland‘s factual findings in the course of independently reviewing the 
record under section 190.4(e).  As noted, Judge Mortland presided over the penalty retrial 
and, after the jury sentenced Burgener to death, modified the sentence to life 
imprisonment without parole in a section 190.4(e) ruling later reversed by the Court of 
Appeal.  (Burgener II, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 430.)  In his colloquy with Judge 
Riemer, Burgener suggested that Judge Mortland‘s decision to modify the sentence was 
informed by direct observation of the witnesses at the penalty retrial and that Judge 
Riemer, without the benefit of such observation, would not ―be able to make the 
determination that Judge Mortland made.‖ 
16 
The record reveals that Burgener has forfeited this claim.  Before ruling on 
Burgener‘s motion to modify the verdict, Judge Riemer prepared a list of written 
questions for the Attorney General, including whether it was the Attorney General‘s 
position that the court was ―bound in part‖ by the factual findings of the judge who 
presided over Burgener‘s original guilt and penalty trial, and whether the court‘s review 
of a ―cold written record‖ in any way affected its duty to ―independently evaluate the 
credibility of the witnesses.‖  Citing People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822 (Crew), the 
Attorney General responded that Judge Riemer was not bound by the findings of any 
judge who had previously ruled on a motion to modify the verdict.  And citing People v. 
Lewis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 214 (Lewis), the Attorney General further responded that Judge 
Riemer was required only to evaluate the credibility of witnesses as best he could from 
the written record.  Judge Riemer offered Burgener the opportunity to address the 
Attorney General‘s responses, but Burgener declined.  In denying the motion to modify 
the verdict, Judge Riemer said that he had no obligation to ―consider the factual findings 
made by the judge who issued the prior ruling‖ and that ―any attempt to do so would be 
inconsistent with this court‘s duty to conduct its own independent review of the 
evidence.‖  Again, Burgener did not object.  By not objecting at the hearing to the 
Attorney General‘s responses or to the trial court‘s reasons for its ruling, Burgener 
forfeited this claim.  (See People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1064.) 
As to the merits, section 190.4(e) states that the judge hearing an application to 
modify the verdict ―shall review the evidence, consider, take into account, and be guided 
by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in Section 190.3, and shall 
make a determination as to whether the jury‘s findings and verdicts that the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to law or the evidence 
presented.‖  In Crew, the judge who presided over the defendant‘s trial, Judge Schatz, 
granted the defendant‘s motion to modify the verdict under section 190.4(e), but the 
ruling was reversed on appeal.  On remand to redetermine the section 190.4(e) motion, 
17 
Judge Schatz was unavailable, so the matter was assigned to Judge Ahern, who denied 
the motion.  The defendant ―fault[ed] Judge Ahern‘s ruling for not taking into 
consideration Judge Schatz‘s previous findings in the prior ruling on the automatic 
motion to modify.‖  (Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 859.)  But we found ―no error,‖ 
explaining that section 190.4(e) requires the judge ―to review the evidence and to take 
into account and be guided by the statutory aggravating and mitigating evidence.  Judge 
Ahern did so.‖  (Crew, at p. 859.) 
Similarly, in Lewis, the judge hearing a section 190.4(e) motion, Judge Charvat, 
was not the same judge who presided over the penalty trial.  The defendant ―sought to 
present the guilt and penalty phase evidence to Judge Charvat through live testimony on 
the ground that he had not personally observed the witnesses testify and therefore would 
be unable to evaluate their credibility in reweighing the evidence.‖  (Lewis, supra, 33 
Cal.4th at p. 224.)  Judge Charvat declined to allow such testimony, and we found no 
error.  (Ibid.)  We explained that section 190.4(e) requires the judge to evaluate ― ‗the 
evidence presented‘ ‖ and that ―a re-presentation of evidence is not ‗the evidence 
presented.‘ ‖  (Lewis, at p. 224; see id. at p. 225 [―[A] modification application hearing 
‗is limited to review of the evidence that was before the jury . . . .  [Citations.]  Any 
attempt to recreate the evidence would conflict with this mandate.‖].)  We rejected the 
contention that ―in every case in which the original trial judge is replaced prior to a 
modification application, the defendant is in effect automatically entitled to a new trial 
because the replacement judge‘s ability to assess the credibility of witnesses is 
necessarily limited.‖  (Id. at p. 225.)  ―[W]hen the original trial judge is unavailable, 
necessity requires the replacement judge to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses as 
best he or she can from the written record.  We find no constitutional obligation to 
provide more.‖  (Id. at p. 226.) 
Crew and Lewis make clear that Judge Riemer had no obligation to consider the 
findings made by any judge who previously presided over this case.  As required by 
18 
section 190.4(e), Judge Riemer reviewed the transcripts of the proceedings, reweighed 
the evidence presented to the jury, and stated on the record the reasons for his findings.  
However, Burgener‘s claim is not that Judge Riemer was obligated to consider Judge 
Mortland‘s findings.  Instead, Burgener‘s claim is that ―Judge Riemer was wrong in 
concluding that he could not consider Judge Mortland‘s findings because to do so would 
be inconsistent with the exercise of his independent judgment.‖  (Italics added.)  As the 
record shows, Judge Riemer apparently believed he was prohibited from doing so when 
he said that ―any attempt to do so would be inconsistent with this court‘s duty to conduct 
its own independent review of the evidence.‖   
Although our cases establish that a judge deciding a section 190.4(e) motion has 
no obligation to consider a prior judge‘s findings, we have not had occasion to consider 
whether a replacement judge is required to ignore such findings.  The purpose of section 
190.4(e) is to provide ―an additional safeguard against arbitrary and capricious imposition 
of the death penalty in California.‖  (Lewis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 226.)  Burgener argues 
that this purpose of ensuring accuracy and reliability in capital sentencing would be 
served, not undermined, by allowing a judge who must evaluate witness credibility in the 
course of ―review[ing] the evidence‖ (§ 190.4(e)) to consider ―the written findings of the 
trial judge who was ideally situated to make the ruling in the first instance.‖  According 
to Burgener, allowing Judge Riemer the discretion to consider Judge Mortland‘s findings 
would not have been ―incompatible or inconsistent with Judge Riemer‘s ultimate 
responsibility to conduct an independent review‖ because Judge Riemer was not 
obligated to consider those findings, the findings were not binding on Judge Riemer in 
any event, and ―the last call was Judge Riemer‘s to make.‖  ―[N]o good reason appears to 
deprive him of the eyes and ears of Judge Mortland, who was present at the critical time 
of trial.  To the contrary, to the extent that Judge Riemer was able to avail himself of 
those findings, the accuracy of his determination was likely to be enhanced.  That check 
19 
on arbitrariness, after all, was the underlying purpose of the section 190.4, subdivision 
(e), proceeding itself.‖ 
We need not decide the merits of Burgener‘s claim because there is no reasonable 
possibility that Judge Riemer would have reached a different result even if he had 
believed he could consider Judge Mortland‘s findings.  As an initial matter, it is uncertain 
whether Judge Riemer would have actually exercised his discretion to consider those 
findings or what weight he would have given them.  Moreover, even if Judge Riemer had 
considered and credited Judge Mortland‘s findings, we see no reasonable possibility that 
Judge Riemer would have made a different ruling. 
Burgener argues that Judge Mortland‘s findings as to the lack of credibility of 
prosecution witnesses Joseph DeYoung and Nola England would have aided ―a theory of 
lingering doubt‖ as a mitigating factor.  (See Burgener III, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 848–
851 [describing Burgener‘s lingering-doubt defense].)  In essence, Burgener contends he 
was framed by DeYoung and England for Arias‘s murder.  Although England was 
engaged to Burgener, she had also been romantically involved with DeYoung, who 
continued to pursue her after her engagement to Burgener.  DeYoung admitted he was 
jealous of Burgener and initially called the police to report Burgener‘s crimes.  DeYoung 
also facilitated Burgener‘s arrest by arranging an exchange of guns, whereby Burgener 
would trade a .22-caliber handgun (the apparent murder weapon) for another weapon 
supplied by DeYoung, and then informing the police of the time and place of the 
exchange.  DeYoung, a convicted felon, received $10,000 from the owner of the 
convenience store where Arias was killed, and the district attorney reduced felony drug 
charges pending against DeYoung to a misdemeanor at the time of the preliminary 
hearing. 
England initially denied any knowledge of the murder.  But after the police 
threatened to charge her with perjury and take away her children, she admitted to the 
police that Burgener had told her he committed the robbery murder.  She later regretted 
20 
inculpating Burgener and, in a letter to Burgener that she hoped the police would read, 
tried to make amends by claiming DeYoung was at fault.  At Burgener‘s first trial, 
England claimed a lack of memory and implicated DeYoung.  At the 1988 penalty retrial, 
however, England gave a detailed account of Burgener‘s admission.  England also made 
a taped statement declaring Burgener‘s innocence, but the tape apparently disappeared. 
Burgener asks us to take judicial notice of the record in Burgener II, where Judge 
Mortland said he was ―not thrilled with the prosecution witnesses‖ because they ― ‗were 
persons who took drugs [and] committed various violations of the law.‘ ‖  (Burgener II, 
supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 432.)  Although we grant Burgener‘s request (Evid. Code, 
§ 452, subd. (d)), Judge Riemer independently determined that ―Nola England was not a 
credible witness,‖ so his consideration of Judge Mortland‘s similar assessment would not 
have added anything to his own analysis.  As to DeYoung, Judge Riemer determined that 
―the weight of the evidence‖ did not support the contention that ―Joseph DeYoung had 
the motive and opportunity to, and did in fact, frame the defendant for the crime.‖  In 
Judge Mortland‘s view, DeYoung gave ― ‗crucial testimony to [Burgener‘s] conviction‘ ‖ 
but lacked credibility.  (Burgener II, at p. 432.)  But the possibility that DeYoung had 
substantial motives (other than a desire to tell the truth) to pin blame on Burgener is 
apparent from the written record:  he was jealous of Burgener‘s relationship with 
England, he was a convicted felon facing felony drug charges and wanted leniency, and 
he received significant payments from the convenience store owner.  In addition, because 
the murder involved a gun that originally belonged to DeYoung, it is possible that 
DeYoung wanted to negate any inference of his own involvement in the crime.  We have 
no reason to believe Judge Riemer did not consider these circumstances in his 
independent review of the evidence.  Based on that independent review, Judge Riemer 
concluded that ―the evidence of guilt, although circumstantial, is compelling.  While 
there is a possibility that the defendant was framed, it is not a realistic possibility.  The 
Court does not find that any doubt in the defendant‘s guilt is strong enough to mitigate 
21 
against a death penalty.‖  We see no reasonable possibility that Judge Riemer would have 
reached a different conclusion if he had considered and credited Judge Mortland‘s doubt 
about DeYoung‘s credibility. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above, we affirm the judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Burgener 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S179181 
Date Filed: August 11, 2016 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Riverside 
Judge: Craig G. Riemer 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Harry Gruber and 
Elias Batchelder, Deputy State Public Defenders, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, 
Assistant Attorney General, Holly D. Wilkens, Robin Urbanski and Meredith S. White, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Elias Batchelder 
Deputy State Public Defender 
1111 Broadway, 10th Floor 
Oakland, CA  94607-4139 
(510) 267-3300 
 
Meredith S. White 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2297