Case Title: State v. Christian

Citation: 2020-Ohio-828

Docket Number: 2017-1691

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2020-03-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Christian, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-828.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-828 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. CHRISTIAN, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Christian, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-828.] 
Criminal law—Resentencing—When a portion of a defendant’s sentence has been 
vacated on direct appeal, the trial court has the authority to resentence the 
defendant de novo on any of the vacated sentences—Court of appeals’ 
judgment reversed and cause remanded. 
(No. 2017-1691—Submitted March 26, 2019—Decided March 10, 2020.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County No. 27236, 
2017-Ohio-8249. 
________________ 
 
FISCHER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we consider whether a trial court may resentence a 
defendant on a specific count after the sentence related to that count has been 
vacated on direct appeal and the defendant has been confined for the length of the 
original prison term that had been attached to that count.  We hold that because a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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defendant in these circumstances has no expectation of finality in the original 
sentence once it has been vacated on direct appeal, the trial court has the ability to 
resentence the defendant de novo. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} Appellee, Eva Christian, was found guilty of five charges related to 
an insurance-fraud scheme.  In June 2012, Christian was sentenced as follows: 
 
Count One—insurance fraud, a violation of R.C. 2913.47(B)(1) and a 
fourth-degree felony: 18 months; 
 
Count Two—insurance fraud, a violation of R.C. 2913.47(B)(1) and a third-
degree felony: 36 months; 
 
Count Three—making false alarms, a violation of R.C. 2917.32(A)(3) and 
a fourth-degree felony: 18 months; 
 
Count Four—making false alarms, a violation of R.C. 2917.32(A)(3) and a 
fifth-degree felony: 12 months; 
 
Count Five—engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, a violation of R.C. 
2923.32(A)(1) and a first-degree felony: 9 years. 
The trial court ordered Count One through Count Four to run consecutively to each 
other and concurrently to Count Five, for an aggregate prison term of nine years. 
A.  Christian I 
{¶ 3} On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeals reversed Christian’s 
conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity after concluding that the 
state presented insufficient evidence of an “enterprise” to sustain that conviction.  
State v. Christian, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25256, 2014-Ohio-2672, ¶ 80 
(“Christian I”).  The court also modified Christian’s convictions for Count Two 
and Count Three to reflect lower degrees of the offenses pursuant to 2011 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 86, effective September 30, 2011 (“H.B. 86”).  Id. at ¶ 178.  (H.B. 
86, which took effect after Christian was indicted but before she was sentenced, 
January Term, 2020 
 
3
made changes to the manner in which the degrees of certain criminal offenses are 
to be determined.) 
{¶ 4} The Second District certified a conflict between its decision in 
Christian I and a Ninth District decision regarding what evidence the state must 
present in order to prove the existence of an “enterprise” in a trial for engaging in 
a pattern of corrupt activity.  2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25256 (Aug. 26, 2014).  
This court determined that a conflict existed, 140 Ohio St.3d 1465, 2014-Ohio-
4629, 18 N.E.3d 445, accepted the state’s discretionary appeal on that same issue, 
140 Ohio St.3d 1466, 2014-Ohio-4629, 18 N.E.3d 445, and consolidated those 
causes and held them for this court’s decision in State v. Beverly, 143 Ohio St.3d 
258, 2015-Ohio-219, 37 N.E.3d 116.  After the announcement of the decision in 
Beverly, this court vacated the judgment of the Second District and remanded the 
cause to that court to consider whether sufficient evidence of an enterprise existed 
in light of Beverly.  143 Ohio St.3d 417, 2015-Ohio-3374, 38 N.E.3d 888, ¶ 1. 
B.  Christian II 
{¶ 5} On remand, the Second District held that in light of this court’s 
interpretation of the statutory definition of “enterprise” in Beverly, Christian’s 
conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity was supported by sufficient 
evidence.  2016-Ohio-516, 56 N.E.3d 391, ¶ 16, 22 (2d Dist.) (“Christian II”).  The 
Second District accordingly reinstated Christian’s conviction for that offense, but 
it also reduced the degree level of the offense from a first-degree felony to a second-
degree felony because the degree level of the underlying predicate offense was 
reduced in Christian I in accordance with H.B. 86.  Id. at ¶ 24.  The court then 
remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing on Counts Two, Three, and 
Five.  Id. at ¶ 37. 
{¶ 6} On remand from Christian II, the trial court resentenced Christian as 
follows: 
• 
Count Two: 12 months (24 months shorter than the original sentence); 
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• 
Count Three: 180 days (12 months shorter than the original sentence); 
• 
Count Five: 8 years (1 year shorter than the original sentence). 
While the concurrent and consecutive nature of the majority of Christian’s 
sentences remained the same, the trial court did modify Count Two from being 
served concurrently to Count Five to being served consecutively to Count Five.  
Thus, with Counts Two and Five running consecutively to each other, Christian’s 
aggregate sentence after the remand was the same as her original aggregate 
sentence: nine years. 
C.  Christian III 
{¶ 7} Christian appealed and raised one assignment of error—that the trial 
court abused its discretion during resentencing when, without any new facts having 
been presented, it made the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings pertaining to the 
imposition of consecutive sentences, which had not been made during Christian’s 
original sentencing hearing.  In other words, Christian asserted that the trial court 
erred when it ordered Count Two to run consecutively to Count Five because no 
new facts had been presented at Christian’s resentencing hearing that would have 
warranted the trial court to diverge from its initial order, which imposed Count Two 
concurrently with Count Five.  The Second District sua sponte asked the parties to 
be prepared to discuss at oral argument the issue whether Christian had completed 
her sentence on Count Two prior to the trial court’s resentencing. 
{¶ 8} The court ultimately declined to address Christian’s assignment of 
error and instead reversed the case based upon its holding that, by the time that 
Christian was resentenced in 2016, she had already served the original prison terms 
that had been imposed for Count One through Count Four.  2017-Ohio-8249, 99 
N.E.3d 887, ¶ 15, 28-30 (2d Dist.).  Applying this court’s holding in State v. 
Holdcroft, 137 Ohio St.3d 526, 2013-Ohio-5014, 1 N.E.3d 382, and expressing 
double-jeopardy concerns, the court of appeals concluded that because a trial court 
may not resentence a defendant for an offense once that defendant has completed 
January Term, 2020 
 
5
the sanction that had been attached to that finding of guilt, Christian could not be 
resentenced on Count Two, regardless of the fact that she still had not completed 
her sentence for Count Five.  Id. at ¶ 15-16, 28. 
{¶ 9} We accepted jurisdiction over the state’s proposition of law: “After a 
state appellate court voids a defendant’s sentence, the original sentence is a nullity 
and re-sentencing is de novo as to the affected charge.”  See 152 Ohio St.3d 1442, 
2018-Ohio-1600, 96 N.E.3d 298. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
{¶ 10} The state argues that when Christian’s sentences were vacated on 
direct appeal in Christian II, those sentences were rendered nullities, and the trial 
court had the ability to resentence her de novo for those counts.  It adds that 
Holdcroft does not apply to this case because that decision involved the direct 
review of a postrelease-control hearing that occurred pursuant to R.C. 2929.191.  
Christian’s case involves a resentencing hearing that was ordered as a consequence 
of the direct review of her convictions.  The state continues, arguing that because 
there is no expectation of finality in a sentence until either the appeal involving that 
sentence has concluded or the time to appeal that sentence has expired, Christian 
could not have completed her sentence for Count Two by the time of her 
resentencing hearing.  Finally, the state argues that there are no double-jeopardy 
implications in this case because the guarantee against double jeopardy imposes no 
restrictions on the length of a sentence that is imposed after a defendant has been 
reconvicted or resentenced due to the de novo nature of the resentencing hearing. 
{¶ 11} Christian responds that Holdcroft, 137 Ohio St.3d 526, 2013-Ohio-
5014, 1 N.E.3d 382, stands for the proposition that when a defendant serves the 
entirety of his or her prison sentence, the defendant’s interest in the finality of that 
sentence prevails, and the trial court may no longer modify that sentence.  
Therefore, she concludes that she could not be resentenced on Count Two because 
she had served that sentence in its entirety before the resentencing hearing occurred. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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A.  State v. Holdcroft 
{¶ 12} In considering the issues before us in this case, we first review our 
decision in Holdcroft.  In that case, the defendant was convicted of aggravated arson 
and arson.  The trial court imposed a ten-year prison term for the aggravated-arson 
offense and a consecutive, five-year prison term for the arson offense.  Holdcroft 
at ¶ 2.  The trial court failed to properly impose postrelease control for either 
offense.  After the defendant had completed his prison term for aggravated arson, 
the trial court held a new sentencing hearing to correct its errors in imposing 
postrelease control.  Id. at ¶ 3.  The trial court reimposed both prison terms and then 
imposed a mandatory, five-year postrelease-control term for the aggravated-arson 
offense and a discretionary postrelease-control term of up to three years for the 
arson offense.  Id. 
{¶ 13} We held that “[a] trial court does not have the authority to resentence 
a defendant for the purpose of adding a term of postrelease control as a sanction for 
a particular offense after the defendant has already served the prison term for that 
offense.”  Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus.  In applying that holding to the 
case, we explained that, because the defendant had completed his prison term for 
the aggravated-arson offense, the trial court was not authorized to impose a 
postrelease-control term for that offense, despite the fact that the defendant was still 
serving a prison term for another offense.  Id. at ¶ 19. 
{¶ 14} We further explained that “so long as a timely appeal is filed from 
the sentence imposed, the defendant and the state may challenge any aspect of the 
sentence and sentencing hearing, and the appellate court is authorized to modify the 
sentence or remand for resentencing to fix whatever has been successfully 
challenged.”  Holdcroft, 137 Ohio St.3d 526, 2013-Ohio-5014, 1 N.E.3d 382, at 
¶ 9.  However, “absent a timely appeal, res judicata generally allows only [for] the 
correction of a void sanction.”  Id.  We added that “we have consistently held that 
once an offender has been released from prison, he cannot be subjected to another 
January Term, 2020 
 
7
sentencing to correct the trial court’s flawed imposition of postrelease control.”  Id. 
at ¶ 11.  Because the defendant in Holdcroft had served the entirety of his prison 
sanction for aggravated arson at the time he was resentenced, we concluded that he 
“had a legitimate expectation of finality in the sentence that he had fully served.”  
Id. at ¶ 12. 
{¶ 15} Of particular significance to this case, we set forth the following 
three principles in Holdcroft to provide a framework for future cases: 
 
First, when a sentence is subject to direct review, it may be 
modified; second, when the prison-sanction portion of a sentence 
that also includes a void sanction has not been completely served, 
the void sanction may be modified; and third, when the entirety of a 
prison sanction has been served, the defendant’s expectation in 
finality in his sentence becomes paramount, and his sentence for that 
crime may no longer be modified. 
 
Id. at ¶ 18.  We also emphasized that “either the defendant or the state may 
challenge any aspect of a sentence so long as a timely appeal is filed” and noted 
that “once the time for filing an appeal has run, Ohio courts are limited to correcting 
a void sanction.”  Id. 
B.  Pursuant to Holdcroft, the trial court had the authority to resentence 
Christian after portions of her original sentence had been 
vacated on direct appeal 
{¶ 16} In its decision below, the Second District failed to apply this court’s 
repeated statements in Holdcroft that, on a direct appeal of a criminal conviction, 
any aspect of a defendant’s sentence may be challenged, and any part of that 
sentence that has been successfully challenged may be corrected.  Because 
Christian successfully challenged her sentence in the direct appeal from her 
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criminal convictions in Christian II, 2016-Ohio-516, 56 N.E.3d 391, the court of 
appeals properly remanded her case for resentencing and the trial court had the 
authority to properly sentence Christian on that remand. 
{¶ 17} The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a defendant 
“has no expectation of finality in his sentence until the appeal is concluded or the 
time to appeal has expired.”  United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136, 101 
S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980).  In applying DiFrancesco, this court has stated 
that “when the legislature has provided the government with a statutory right of 
appeal, ‘[t]he defendant * * * is charged with knowledge of the statute and its 
appeal provisions, and has no expectation of finality in his sentence until the appeal 
is concluded or the time to appeal has expired.’ ”  (Brackets and ellipsis sic.)  State 
v. Roberts, 119 Ohio St.3d 294, 2008-Ohio-3835, 893 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16, quoting 
DiFrancesco at 136. 
{¶ 18} In this case, the relevant portions of Christian’s sentence were 
vacated on direct appeal and ultimately the case was remanded to the trial court 
with the specific instruction to resentence Christian on Counts Two, Three, and 
Five.  Because Christian’s sentences on those counts were subject to correction 
pursuant to DiFrancesco and Roberts, Christian had no expectation of finality in 
those portions of her original sentence, and the trial court had the ability and 
obligation to resentence her on those counts on remand. 
C.  Christian’s resentencing did not violate her protections 
from double jeopardy 
{¶ 19} The Second District raised a concern that nullifying Christian’s 
original sentence could violate her double-jeopardy protections. 
{¶ 20} The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that 
no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life 
or limb.”  Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution provides that “[n]o person 
shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.” 
January Term, 2020 
 
9
{¶ 21} This court has explained that “[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause protects 
persons from (1) ‘a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal,’ (2) ‘a 
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction,’ and (3) ‘multiple 
punishments for the same offense.’ ”  Roberts, 119 Ohio St.3d 294, 2008-Ohio-
3835, 893 N.E.2d 818, at ¶ 11, quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 
717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969).  Relevant to this case is whether 
resentencing constitutes multiple punishments for the same offense.  This court has 
stated that jeopardy does not attach to a sentence that has been invalidated and, 
therefore, a trial court’s imposition of a new sentence does not constitute double 
jeopardy.  See State v. Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d 74, 75, 471 N.E.2d 774 (1984). 
{¶ 22} This appeal stems from Christian’s direct appeal, in which the 
appellate court properly invalidated portions of Christian’s sentence.  As we have 
explained, Christian had no expectation of finality in her original sentence.  It is 
also notable that it was Christian who, when she appealed her sentence, opened the 
door for the trial court’s revisiting of her sentence on remand.  The fact that 
Christian actively sought to have her sentence altered supports the conclusion that 
she had no expectation of finality in that sentence.  See United States v. Harrison, 
237 Fed.Appx. 911, 913 (5th Cir.2005).  This is not a situation in which Christian 
is being punished twice.  Instead, her resentencing represents a correction or 
clarification of her first, and only, sentence, and she is being punished only once.  
Accordingly, there is no double-jeopardy concern here. 
D.  Christian is entitled to credit for the time she was confined while her 
appeals were pending 
{¶ 23} The Second District also raised a concern that if Christian’s original 
sentences are treated as having been vacated rather than completed, then the time 
she served on those counts would be subject to “being twice served.”  2017-Ohio-
8249, 99 N.E.3d 887, at ¶ 27. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
{¶ 24} Under Pearce, 395 U.S. at 718, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, when 
imposing a new sentence for an offense on remand, a trial court must order that a 
defendant receive full credit for any punishment that the defendant previously 
served for that offense.  This is because “the constitutional guarantee against 
multiple punishments for the same offense absolutely requires that punishment 
already exacted must be fully ‘credited’ in imposing sentence upon a new 
conviction for the same offense.”  Id. at 718-719.  In this case, the trial court 
originally ordered Christian to serve the sentences for Counts Two and Three 
concurrently to the sentence for Count Five.  On remand, the trial court ordered 
Christian to serve the sentence for Count Two consecutively to the sentence for 
Count Five.  Because Christian served prison time on those counts simultaneously, 
she is entitled to have that time credited toward both of her new sentences on those 
counts. 
E.  Allowing resentencing on counts for which a sentence has been vacated on 
direct appeal does not violate any fairness concerns 
{¶ 25} Christian also raises a fairness argument involving general concepts 
of due process. 
{¶ 26} This court has made it clear that all sentences are subject to 
correction on direct appeal.  Both this court and the United States Supreme Court 
have emphasized that there is no expectation of finality in a sentence until the 
appeals process has run.  See Agee v. Russell, 92 Ohio St.3d 540, 543, 751 N.E.2d 
1043 (2001), citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 295, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 
334 (1989).  There is no compelling reason to depart from that rule. 
{¶ 27} Significantly, many of the due-process concerns raised by Christian 
about resentencing hearings should be addressed in an appeal from the resentencing 
hearing.  For example, if a defendant’s sentence is increased, the defendant is free 
to challenge the new sentence on the ground that the trial court vindictively 
increased the defendant’s sentence or that the increased sentence was the result of 
January Term, 2020 
 
11 
improper sentence packaging.  Indeed, in her appeal from her resentencing, 
Christian challenged the trial court’s decision to impose her sentence for Count 
Two consecutively to her sentence for Count Five.  She argued that the trial court 
improperly reconsidered its initial decision to run those sentences concurrently 
without any new factual basis for doing so.  This argument—which the court of 
appeals declined to address below—may be analyzed on remand.  Whenever a 
defendant is resentenced in a case like this, that new sentence is subject to 
correction on direct appeal if it is contrary to Ohio’s sentencing statutes or if it 
violates the federal or state constitutions. 
{¶ 28} Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court had the authority to 
resentence Christian de novo on Count Two.  We therefore reverse the decision of 
the Second District Court of Appeals and remand this cause to that court to consider 
the assignment of error raised by Christian in her appeal from her resentencing. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 29} We hold that when a portion of a defendant’s sentence has been 
vacated on direct appeal, the trial court has the authority to resentence the defendant 
de novo on any counts for which the original sentence was vacated.  We further 
note that because Christian served prison time simultaneously on Count Two and 
Count Five before her original sentence was vacated, she is entitled to have that 
time credited toward both of her new sentences on those counts.  We reverse the 
decision of the Second District Court of Appeals and remand the cause to that court 
for consideration of Christian’s assignment of error. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
DONNELLY, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
STEWART, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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DONNELLY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 30} Respectfully, I concur with Justice Stewart’s dissenting opinion.  
Personally, I have doubts that State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 
846 N.E.2d 824, provides a full picture of Ohio’s statutory scheme governing 
felony sentencing in Ohio or the policies behind it.  I believe that Saxon’s rejection 
of the sentencing-package doctrine fails to account for “real-world considerations,” 
id. at ¶ 31 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting), such as the reality that sentencing courts routinely 
incorporate elements of sentence packaging when assembling an aggregate prison 
term for a criminal defendant.  But regardless, unless the majority is prepared to 
overturn or modify Saxon, it should share Justice Stewart’s view that jeopardy 
attached to Christian’s individual “sentence” on Count Two when she finished 
serving the maximum prison term that could have been imposed for that offense.  
Even if the majority is correct that it is proper to resentence a defendant de novo on 
prison terms for sentences that have been completely served but were vacated on 
direct appeal, the record indicates that appellee, Eva Christian, did not receive a 
true de novo resentencing hearing.  Instead, the trial court recreated the sentence 
that was previously imposed under the old, defunct law. 
{¶ 31} The main charge against Christian was engaging in a pattern of 
corrupt activity in violation of R.C. 2923.32(A)(1), charged in Count Five of her 
indictment.  Her lower-level predicate offenses charged in Counts One through 
Four of her indictment were two counts of insurance fraud in violation of R.C. 
2913.47(B)(1), and two counts of making false alarms in violation of R.C. 
2917.32(A)(3).  Pursuant to the law in effect at the time that Christian was 
indicted—which was prior to the legislature’s enactment of 2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 
86, effective September 30, 2011 (“H.B. 86”)—Count Five was a first-degree 
felony, allowing a trial court to impose a prison sentence of up to ten years, see 
former R.C. 2929.14(A)(1),  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136, 
7464 (providing for a maximum prison term of ten years for a first-degree felony).  
January Term, 2020 
 
13 
Prior to Christian’s original sentencing hearing, H.B. 86 went into effect.  The new 
law reduced the felony levels and resulting sanctions for various offenses, including 
the offenses identified in Counts Two, Three, and Five in Christian’s indictment.  
Most pertinently, Count Five became a second-degree felony, which allowed for 
the imposition of a prison sentence of no more than eight years.  R.C. 
2923.32(B)(1); former R.C. 2929.14(A)(2). 
{¶ 32} At Christian’s original sentencing hearing, the trial court applied the 
law that was in effect when Christian had been indicted, imposing a nine-year 
prison term on Count Five.  The trial court determined that the sentence for Count 
Five should run concurrently with all the sentences for the predicate offenses in 
Counts One through Four, resulting in a total sentence of nine years.  Among the 
Second District’s reasons for reversing Christian’s original sentence was the trial 
court’s failure to apply the lesser felony levels and sanctions required by the 
amendments in H.B. 86.  State v. Christian, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25256, 2014-
Ohio-2672, ¶ 149-151, vacated on other grounds by State v. Christian, 143 Ohio 
St.3d 417, 2015-Ohio-3374, 38 N.E.3d 888. 
{¶ 33} During Christian’s resentencing hearing, the court indicated that its 
original sentencing decision had little to do with the considerations for running each 
of the sentences concurrently or consecutively pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), and 
instead was based upon the court’s goal of once again imposing a nine-year 
aggregate sentence:  
 
[Y]ou [defense counsel] mentioned something about when I 
sentenced Ms. Christian approximately four years ago, finding 
concurrent sentences were appropriate.  Actually, what I decided 
four years ago, what I determined four years ago, is that nine years 
was an appropriate sentence under the facts of this case. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
And in looking at it again and calling back memories of the 
case, I believe nine years is the appropriate number and it’s a number 
I can come to within the ranges of what is before me. 
 
{¶ 34} The trial court stated that it was going to configure Christian’s 
sentences so that it could “get to nine years.”  In other words, the trial court 
determined that Christian should receive a package sentence of nine years no matter 
what changes the legislature made, and the court adjusted its previous decision and 
imposed Count Two consecutively with Count Five for the stated purpose of 
recreating that sentence. 
{¶ 35} The trial court also dismissed Christian’s claims that she had 
bettered herself since the original sentencing hearing, and concluded: “I’m going 
to impose the sentence I imposed back then.”  After explaining the same factors 
that led to the trial court’s original sentencing decision, the trial court stated: 
“That’s why I gave you the nine-year sentence then.  * * * That’s why I’m giving 
you the nine-year sentence again.” 
{¶ 36} Despite being faced with identical facts and providing an identical 
analysis, the trial court changed its previous decision to impose less than the 
maximum sentence for Count Five and instead decided that Christian should 
receive the maximum possible punishment allowable under former R.C. 
2929.14(A)(2).  The trial court also decided that concurrent sentences were no 
longer appropriate for Counts Two and Five, and instead imposed those sentences 
consecutively to each other.  The foregoing new determinations resulted in an 
aggregate sentence of nine years. 
{¶ 37} In a true de novo resentencing hearing, a trial court should certainly 
be able to reconsider the concurrent and consecutive nature of a defendant’s 
sentences based upon any new factual circumstances that have developed since the 
prior sentencing hearing.  The only change that was relevant to Christian’s prison 
January Term, 2020 
 
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terms, however, was that the legislature decided that lesser punishments should 
apply to her offenses. 
{¶ 38} “It has long been recognized in this state that the General Assembly 
has the plenary power to prescribe crimes and fix penalties.”  State v. Morris, 55 
Ohio St.2d 101, 112, 378 N.E.2d 708 (1978).  A trial court has no inherent power 
to sentence, and instead must impose penalties that the legislature has provided.  
State v. Anderson, 143 Ohio St.3d 173, 2015-Ohio-2089, 35 N.E.3d 512, ¶ 10.  It 
is well within the legislature’s purview to exercise its power by reducing felony 
levels and prison terms.  See Morris at 112.  To say that a change in law constitutes 
a change in circumstances in the context of Christian’s case would be to say that 
the legislature has chosen a punishment that is disproportionate to the forbidden 
conduct or does not adequately protect the public.  Such a finding would be 
antithetical to the proper constitutional roles of the legislature and judiciary in Ohio. 
{¶ 39} In order to justify the conclusion that Christian’s convictions for 
Counts Two and Five require consecutive rather than concurrent sentences pursuant 
to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), there needs to be something other than the legislature’s 
choice to assign a lesser sanction to Christian’s offenses.  But the only new evidence 
at the resentencing hearing was Christian’s explanation of her efforts to better 
herself and her expression of remorse.  The trial court doubted Christian’s 
credibility and found her statements to have no mitigating effect, which was well 
within the trial court’s discretion.  But more importantly, the trial court concluded 
that nothing in Christian’s factual circumstances had changed. 
{¶ 40} If the “record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under 
* * * division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14 * * * of the Revised Code,” 
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a), then an appellate court must take corrective action by either 
modifying or vacating and remanding the matter for resentencing, R.C. 
2953.08(G)(2).  With an admission by the trial court that there were no new facts 
to support its decision to impose the sentence from Count Two consecutively with 
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the sentence from Count Five under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), the court’s findings are 
unsupported by the record.  Reversal is manifestly necessary under the statutory 
standard, rendering it unnecessary to tangle with the felony-sentencing metaphysics 
presented in the sole proposition of law before this court. 
{¶ 41} The true problem in this case is that the trial court failed to heed the 
mandate of the legislature and misapplied R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) to justify its decision.  
I hope that the Second District will correct this clear error on remand when 
addressing the merits of Christian’s previously mooted assignment of error. 
_________________ 
 
STEWART, J., dissenting. 
 
{¶ 42} Appellee, Eva Christian, had her first sentencing hearing on June 6, 
2012.  By the time she had her resentencing hearing on July 27, 2016, four years 
had passed.  Within that time frame, Christian had served the entirety of her 18-
month sentence for Count One and had served 31 months of the originally imposed, 
36-month prison term for Count Two.  However, when Christian was resentenced, 
the maximum prison term that she could have received for Count Two was 18 
months.  Because Christian had already served in excess of those 18 months on 
Count Two by the time she was resentenced, I would find that the trial court violated 
Christian’s constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy when the court 
ordered the newly imposed 12-month prison term on that count to be served 
consecutively to Count Five.  By doing this, the court effectively ordered a prison 
term, which had been fully served, to be served once again after she finished serving 
another term.  Therefore, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that no double-
jeopardy violation occurred. 
Double Jeopardy and Credit for Time Served 
{¶ 43} “The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution protects against the imposition of multiple criminal 
punishments for the same offense in successive proceedings.”  State v. Raber, 134 
January Term, 2020 
 
17 
Ohio St.3d 350, 2012-Ohio-5636, 982 N.E.2d 684, paragraph two of the syllabus, 
citing Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997).  
Relying on United States Supreme Court opinions, this court has interpreted the 
prohibition against multiple punishments to essentially mean two things: (1) that a 
court may not modify a sentence in a way that increases the severity of the sentence 
once the defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality in her sentence, id. at 
¶ 24, and (2) that even when a defendant has no legitimate expectation of finality, 
he may not receive a total punishment that is greater than what has been authorized 
by the legislature, State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 
N.E.2d 568, ¶ 33, superseded by statute as stated in State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio 
St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958, ¶ 23, citing United States v. Halper, 
490 U.S. 435, 450, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d. 487 (1989).  Although both 
principles require this court’s consideration when determining the double-jeopardy 
issue before this court, the majority opinion focuses on the first principle—even 
though it is the second principle on which the Second District’s decision ultimately 
turned. 
{¶ 44} At the heart of the second principle lies the fundamental 
understanding that the Double Jeopardy Clause “absolutely requires that 
punishment already exacted * * * be fully ‘credited’ in imposing [a] sentence upon 
a new conviction for the same offense.”  (Emphasis added.)  North Carolina v. 
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718-719, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), overruled 
on other grounds, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 801, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 
L.Ed.2d 865 (1989); see also United States v. Lominac, 144 F.3d 308, 317 (4th 
Cir.1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause the interest protected by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause’s prohibition against multiple punishments for the same offense ‘ensur[es] 
that the total punishment d[oes] not exceed that authorized by the legislature,’  
Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (1989), credit 
must be given not only when a defendant is resentenced following a new conviction 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
but also when he is resentenced after a successful challenge to his original 
sentence”), abrogated by Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 702-703, 120 
S.Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000). 
The Second District’s Decision 
{¶ 45} In her supplemental brief to the Second District Court of Appeals, 
Christian argued that, by the time of her resentencing hearing, she had already 
served 31 months in prison on Count Two, which exceeded both the 18-month 
maximum prison term she could have received on Count Two at the resentencing 
hearing and the actual sentence of 12 months that was imposed at the resentencing 
hearing.  Consequently, as Christian argued in her brief, the trial court could not 
modify the nature of that sentence by ordering that it be served consecutively to 
another count, because she had already served any amount of time that could have 
been imposed as punishment for that offense.  In contrast, the state argued that 
Christian had not completed her prison term on Count Two by the time she was 
resentenced because her sentence on Count Two was vacated by the court of 
appeals along with her sentences for Counts Three and Five.  According to the state, 
Christian could not have served a prison term on a vacated sentence because no 
sentence or term was in place to be served. 
{¶ 46} Ultimately agreeing with Christian, the appellate court concluded 
that “the trial court could not order that Count [Two]’s twelve month sentence, 
which had already been served, be served after completion of the modified eight 
year term in Count [Five].”  2017-Ohio-8249, 99 N.E.3d 887, ¶ 28.  In doing so, 
the court rejected the state’s argument that Christian did not serve any time on the 
vacated sentences.  Specifically, the court stated: 
 
The voiding of an original conviction does not render time 
served under that conviction a nullity.  We reject the conceptual 
fiction that a complete but voided sentence has no legal existence.  
January Term, 2020 
 
19 
Otherwise, years served on such counts would be subject to being 
twice served.  Furthermore, we cannot embrace a sentence nullity 
argument which offends the double jeopardy clause. See generally 
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 716-717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 
L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Alabama v. Smith, 
490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989).  The U.S. 
and Ohio Constitutions require that punishment already exacted 
must be fully credited in imposing [a] sentence upon reversal and 
remand. 
 
Id. at ¶ 27. 
{¶ 47} This is the relevant issue before this court today—whether jeopardy 
attached to the sentence on Count Two once Christian served the maximum 
punishment allowable for that count.  That the appellate court mistakenly relied on 
State v. Holdcroft, 137 Ohio St.3d 526, 2013-Ohio-5014, 1 N.E.3d 382, to support 
its decision is of little importance when it is clear that the appellate court otherwise 
correctly applied fundamental double-jeopardy principles to reach its conclusion.  
In short, what the appellate court concluded was that once credited with the time 
she previously served as punishment for Count Two, there was nothing left for 
Christian to serve on Count Two consecutively to another count.  Thus, the trial 
court’s order of consecutive sentences served to impose a second punishment when 
Christian had already served the maximum punishment allowable by statute. 
{¶ 48} The majority’s reliance on State v. Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d 74, 471 
N.E.2d 774 (1984), is inapposite because that opinion does not address the specific 
double-jeopardy concern at issue in this case.  In Beasley, this court held that a void 
sentence may be corrected on remand without violating double-jeopardy 
protections.  Id. at 76.  Here, it is evident from the appellate court’s remand orders 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
that it understood that Christian would be resentenced on her vacated sentences.1  
What concerned the appellate court was that instead of simply imposing a prison 
term on Count Two that fell within the allowable range for a fourth-degree felony, 
the trial court entered a term of imprisonment within the new range but then ordered 
that sentence—which, after applying time served, would have been fully satisfied—
to be served consecutively with Count Five.  2017-Ohio-8249, 99 N.E.2d 887 at 
¶ 26.  This was not, as the majority characterizes, a mere “correction” of Christian’s 
original sentence.  Majority opinion at ¶ 18.  Had the trial court merely corrected 
the defects in Christian’s original sentence, it would have imposed terms of 
imprisonment for Counts Two, Three, and Five within the ranges for the reduced 
classifications and stopped there.  Instead, by ordering Count Two to be served 
consecutively, the court also changed the nature of Christian’s sentences, resulting 
in Christian serving additional time on a count for which she had already served the 
maximum punishment allowed. 
{¶ 49} Noticeably, the majority avoids any discussion of whether Christian 
had fully served the maximum punishment she could have received on Count Two.  
Instead, it focuses on an aspect of double jeopardy that is immaterial to this case, 
cites to Beasley, and proclaims that “[t]his is not a situation in which Christian is 
being punished twice.” Majority opinion at ¶ 22.  But to hold that Christian has not 
been punished twice without taking a critical look at the time she has already served 
in prison for Count Two, runs contrary to Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 
L.Ed.2d 656, and fails to recognize that once Christian is credited for the time she 
                                                     
 
1. The proposition of law, as accepted by this court, refers to the Second District’s judgment as 
having the effect of “voiding” Christian’s sentences on Counts Two, Three, and Five.  Further, in 
the parties’ briefs and at oral argument, both the state and Christian refer to her original sentences 
as either “void” or having been “voided.”  At this juncture, it is not necessary to decide whether 
Christian’s original sentences on these counts were in fact void, as there is no dispute that the 
sentences were properly vacated on appeal because they fell outside the applicable sentence ranges 
for the offense classifications. 
January Term, 2020 
 
21 
has served, there is nothing left for her to serve—consecutively or concurrently—
to another count, id. at 721. 
{¶ 50} In Pearce, a habeas petitioner who had succeeded in having his 
conviction set aside after serving over two years on a ten-year sentence was retried 
and reconvicted.  When he was sentenced for the second time, he was not given 
credit for the time he spent in prison on the original, vacated conviction.  In 
reversing the trial court’s sentencing order that failed to apply time served, the 
Supreme Court stated: 
 
 
We think it is clear that this basic constitutional guarantee 
[against being put in jeopardy of life or limb twice or more] is 
violated when punishment already exacted for an offense is not fully 
“credited” in imposing [a] sentence upon a new conviction for the 
same offense.  The constitutional violation is flagrantly apparent in 
a case involving the imposition of a maximum sentence after 
reconviction.  Suppose, for example, in a jurisdiction where the 
maximum allowable sentence for larceny is 10 years’ imprisonment, 
a man succeeds in getting his larceny conviction set aside after 
serving three years in prison.  If, upon reconviction, he is given a 
10-year sentence, then, quite clearly, he will have received multiple 
punishments for the same offense.  For he will have been compelled 
to serve separate prison terms of three years and 10 years, although 
the maximum single punishment for the offense is 10 years’ 
imprisonment.  Though not so dramatically evident, the same 
principle obviously holds true whenever punishment already 
endured is not fully subtracted from any new sentence imposed. 
 
We hold that the constitutional guarantee against multiple 
punishments for the same offense absolutely requires that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
punishment already exacted must be fully “credited” in imposing [a] 
sentence upon a new conviction for the same offense.  If, upon a 
new trial, the defendant is acquitted, there is no way the years he 
spent in prison can be returned to him.  But if he is reconvicted, those 
years can and must be returned—by subtracting them from whatever 
new sentence is imposed. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at 718-19. 
{¶ 51} Here, Christian never completed a valid sentence on Count Two and 
because of this, she could not have had an expectation of finality in her sentence.  
Accordingly, the trial court could resentence her on that count without violating the 
first principle of double jeopardy.  And in having the ability to resentence Christian 
on Count Two, the court could have even increased her sentence on that count 
without violating the prohibition against double jeopardy had there been any 
additional punishment available that the court could have imposed.  See Pearce at 
720. 
{¶ 52} The problem here is that there was no additional punishment that 
could have been imposed.  Christian endured a punishment on Count Two, as 
reflected by the 31 months she spent in prison on that count before being 
resentenced.2  And that amount of time exceeded the maximum prison term she 
                                                     
 
2.  The state contends that the time Christian spent in prison before being resentenced should be 
categorized as presentence confinement and not as time served for her vacated sentences.  This 
argument is not supported by the facts or our precedent.  Following the Second District’s decision 
in State v. Christian, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25256, 2014-Ohio-2672, we granted the state’s 
request to stay the appellate court’s reversal of the original sentencing order while the state perfected 
its appeal to this court.  See State v. Christian, 140 Ohio St.3d 1437, 2014-Ohio-4160, 16 N.E.3d 
681.  When a stay is in place, it “ ‘preserves the status quo of the litigation pending appellate review 
and suspends the power of the lower court to issue execution of the judgment or sentence.’ ”  
(Emphasis added in Roberts.)  State v. Roberts, 119 Ohio St.3d 294, 2008-Ohio-3835, 893 N.E.2d 
818, ¶ 24, quoting Loeb v. State, 387 So.2d 433, 435-436 (Fla.App. 1980).  During that stay, 
Christian’s original sentence remained in effect and she continued to serve it.  See id.  Consequently, 
and despite the state’s protestations otherwise, Christian did continue to serve her original prison 
January Term, 2020 
 
23 
could have received—18 months.  See R.C. 2929.14(A)(4).  Pursuant to Pearce, 
395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, Christian was entitled to have the 
time she served on Count Two credited back to that count.  Had the trial court 
properly credited Christian with time served when it had imposed the corrected 12-
month term, it would have been evident that the individual term had been fully 
satisfied.  See State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 
824, ¶ 9 (when sentencing an offender on multiple offenses, trial courts must 
“consider each offense individually and impose a separate sentence for each 
offense,” only after imposing specific prison terms for each offense, may a court, 
in its discretion, order some or all of those terms to be served consecutively).  A 
trial court cannot order a prison term that has already been fully served to be served 
again—this time consecutively to another count—without violating the prohibition 
against double jeopardy.  See Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 
L.Ed.2d 322 (1989), syllabus (“In the multiple punishments context, the Double 
Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing 
greater punishment than the legislature intended”). 
Credit for Time Served 
{¶ 53} The state argues that the trial court’s order of consecutive sentences 
was not a double-jeopardy violation because, once applied, Ohio’s jail-time-credit 
statute, R.C. 2967.191, prevents the time that Christian already served as 
punishment for Count Two under the original invalid sentence from being served 
again.  Although it may technically be true that Christian will receive credit against 
her aggregate sentence for the time she spent in confinement prior to her 
resentencing, applying R.C. 2967.191 does not remedy a double-jeopardy violation 
on these facts. 
                                                     
 
terms during the pendency of her original direct appeal and the state’s subsequent appeal from that 
decision to this court.  
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
{¶ 54} The crediting principle announced in Pearce requires sentencing 
courts to credit an offender with any time she had served from an original, vacated 
sentence against any new sentence imposed for the same offense.  See id. at 718-
719; see also State v. Larson, 56 Wash.App. 323, 332-333, 783 P.2d 1093 (1989) 
(“The guaranty against double jeopardy requires * * * that time served on the 
previous * * * sentence be fully credited toward the revised * * * sentence”).  
However, R.C. 2967.191 does not apply credit for time served for one offense back 
to that same offense.  Rather, R.C. 2967.191 applies confinement time to the 
aggregate sentence when a court orders a combination of consecutive and 
concurrent service on multiple prison terms.  See R.C. 2967.191(A) (mandating that 
the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction reduce an offender’s stated 
prison term by the amount of time she previously spent in confinement); see also 
R.C. 2929.01(FF)(1) (defining a “ ‘[s]tated prison term’ ” as the “combination of 
all prison terms * * * imposed”); R.C. 5145.01 (“If sentenced consecutively, * * * 
the prisoner shall be held to be serving one continuous term of imprisonment”); 
Ohio Adm.Code 5120-2-03.1(F) (“When consecutive stated prison terms are 
imposed, the term to be served is the aggregate of all of the stated prison terms so 
imposed”). 
{¶ 55} Despite the Supreme Court’s clear directive in Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 
89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, that a trial court must credit the time that a person 
has served under a vacated sentence to any new sentence for that same offense, in 
some instances, courts have found that the spirit of Pearce permits the application 
of time served against an overall aggregate prison term.  Courts that have reached 
this conclusion have done so because the particular jurisdiction in which the court 
sits adheres to the sentencing-package doctrine.  See United States v. Rozier, 485 
Fed.Appx. 352, 359 (11th Cir.2012) (“even though Rozier is correct in that time 
already served under an old sentence must be credited against a new sentence, under 
a ‘sentencing package’ approach, any time served would be credited against the 
January Term, 2020 
 
25 
new total sentence, not the individual sentences on each count of conviction”); State 
v. Martin, 185 Vt. 286, 291, 973 A.2d 56 (2009) (“It is the aggregate sentence that 
is of constitutional import in sentencing-package cases” [emphasis sic]). 
{¶ 56} Unlike the federal system and certain other states, Ohio’s sentencing 
statutes do not permit sentencing packages.  State v. Paige, 153 Ohio St.3d 214, 
2018-Ohio-813, 103 N.E.3d 800, ¶ 8  (“We have been clear that the ‘sentencing 
package’ doctrine, by which federal courts may consider multiple offenses as a 
whole and impose an overarching sentence, is not applicable in Ohio’s state 
courts”); see also Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 824, at 
¶ 8 (“Ohio’s felony-sentencing scheme is clearly designed to focus the judge’s 
attention on one offense at a time”).  Accordingly, because Ohio’s sentencing laws 
require that time served on a vacated sentence be credited back to the specific prison 
term for the individual offense rather than the aggregate term, applying Ohio’s jail-
time-credit statute to situations like this one does not prevent a double-jeopardy 
violation from occurring.3  
{¶ 57} For unknown reasons, the majority’s opinion does not discuss the 
state’s argument that applying Ohio’s jail-time-credit statute prevents a double-
jeopardy violation.  It does, however, agree that Christian is entitled to have the 
time she previously spent incarcerated on Counts Two and Five credited toward the 
new sentences on those counts.  See majority opinion at ¶ 24.  But Christian did not 
                                                     
 
3.  This is not to say that time served on a vacated sentence for one charge may never be applied as 
credit for another sentence on a different charge.  See McNary v. Green, 12 Ohio St.2d 10, 12,  230 
N.E.2d 649 (1967) (concluding that “time served under a conviction which is subsequently vacated 
and not reimposed should be credited to a prior existing sentence which was not running during the 
period the accused was in custody under the vacated sentence”); see also State ex rel. Moon v. Ohio 
Adult Parole Auth., 22 Ohio St.2d 29, 31, 257 N.E.2d 740 (1970) (noting that this state is disinclined 
“to permit a [person] to be incarcerated for a period of time for which he receives no credit”).  In 
this context, double jeopardy protects only a person’s right not to be punished in excess of what is 
authorized by the legislature.  See Saxon at ¶ 9 (“a judge sentencing a defendant pursuant to Ohio 
law must consider each offense individually and impose a separate sentence for each offense”).  Due 
process and other fairness principles may still require that time served on one offense be credited 
against another. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
actually receive credit for time served for Count Two.  Had the trial court properly 
credited Christian with time served, her aggregate sentence would total eight years.  
This is because, when crediting back to Count Two the 31 months that Christian 
spent in prison under her original sentence for that count, the newly imposed, 
consecutive 12-month prison term for that count is fully served.  What is left is the 
newly imposed, concurrent eight-year term on Count Five.  Thus, her overall 
aggregate term should be eight years, and she would still be entitled to have Count 
Five credited with the time she previously spent in prison on that count under the 
original sentence. 
{¶ 58} Accordingly, to the extent that the majority agrees that Christian is 
entitled to have the time she previously spent incarcerated on Counts Two and Five 
credited back to the newly imposed sentences on those counts, there is no reason to 
order that this case be remanded to the court of appeals for further consideration of 
Christian’s original assignment of error.  Instead, this case should either be 
remanded to the trial court with instructions to properly apply the credit or, pursuant 
to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), this court itself should modify Christian’s sentence to eight 
years. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 59} For the foregoing reasons, I find that the trial court violated 
Christian’s constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy when it ordered her 
to serve the 12-month prison term for Count Two consecutively to the eight-year 
prison term for Count Five after she had already served the maximum punishment 
allowed for Count Two.  Further, I find that Ohio’s jail-time-credit statute does not 
remedy the double-jeopardy violation because, in a situation like this one, the 
statute credits Christian’s new sentence with the time she spent in prison on Count 
Two in a manner consistent with the sentencing-package doctrine, and fails to 
remedy the fact that the court imposed another prison term after the maximum term 
allowed had been fully served. 
January Term, 2020 
 
27 
{¶ 60} In order to remedy the double-jeopardy violation, the trial court must 
credit the time Christian previously served on Counts Two and Five back to the 
new sentences imposed on those counts.  Had the trial court done this, Christian’s 
aggregate sentence would amount to no more than eight years in prison.  
Accordingly, I would affirm the Second District’s judgment and remand this cause 
to the trial court with instructions to properly credit Christian with time served. 
_________________ 
 
Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Heather N. Jans and Andrew T. French, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for 
appellant. 
 
Brock A. Schoenlein, for appellee. 
_________________