Case Title: State v. Anthony DiFrisco

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-30-01

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2002-08-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
DiFrisco pled guilty to the August 12, 1986 murder of Edward Potcher, the owner of Jack s Pizzeria in Maplewood. After being arrested in New York on unrelated charges, DiFrisco admitted committing the murder for a friend, Anthony Franciotti, who paid DiFrisco $2,500. DiFrisco met Franciotti in a New York prison approximately two years before the shooting, when DiFrisco was in his early twenties and Franciotti was in his fifties. The two remained friendly after their release from prison, with DiFrisco visiting Franciotti often and relying on Franciotti for narcotics to support his drug habit. One night in the summer of 1986, Franciotti told DiFrisco that someone was planning to accuse Franciotti and his associates of illegal drug activity, and that he wanted to have that person killed. Franciotti asked DiFrisco to commit the homicide. DiFrisco responded that he had never killed anyone before, but he would do what Franciotti asked. DiFrisco explained that he acceded to the request because he owed Franciotti money, Franciotti supplied his drugs, and he looked up to Franciotti. On the night of the murder, Franciotti picked up DiFrisco in the Bronx and took him to a bar for a few drinks. Because DiFrisco was nervous, Franciotti bought him some heroin. After ingesting the drug, DiFrisco felt better and told Franciotti he wanted to get it over with. Franciotti drove DiFrisco from New York to Jack s Pizzeria in Maplewood. DiFrisco went into the pizzeria while Franciotti waited in the car. DiFrisco ordered a whole pizza because Jack s did not sell slices, and took a few bites from one slice. After a delivery person left the store to make a delivery, DiFrisco asked Potcher for some water. As Potcher turned, DiFrisco shot him five times at close range, using a gun with a silencer. DiFrisco then returned to Franciotti s car. Potcher s murder remained unsolved until April 1, 1987, when New Jersey authorities were alerted to DiFrisco s confession to the crime. DiFrisco had been arrested in New York for car theft and other crimes, and told a New York detective that he wished to cooperate to get out of the charges. The detective suggested that DiFrisco provide information about a more serious crime, and DiFrisco admitted he had been hired to kill someone in a pizzeria in New Jersey. New Jersey authorities were brought in, and DiFrisco gave a taped statement and a signed confession implicating Franciotti. Arrangements were made for DiFrisco to make a recorded telephone call to Franciotti to connect Franciotti to the murder. DiFrisco, however, refused to cooperate, explaining that his father told him not to do so without the advice of paid counsel. DiFrisco was indicted for capital murder and weapons charges. He entered a guilty plea and waived a jury for his sentencing trial. The trial court found two aggravating factors, that DiFrisco was a hired killer, (4)(d), and that he killed to avoid detection of another, (4)(f), and that they outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court overturned the death sentence in 1990 and remanded for a new sentencing trial. On remand, DiFrisco expressed dissatisfaction with his privately retained attorney, Samuel DeLuca, and requested appointment of new counsel. DeLuca was allowed to withdraw from the case, and the trial court ordered the Public Defender to represent DiFrisco. The Public Defender s Office assigned Assistant Public Defenders Barbara Lapidus and Michelle Soto to the case. Lapidus, who was lead counsel, had no experience in capital cases but was a seasoned public defender. Soto also had no experience trying capital cases, and had only two years of experience trying criminal cases. Attorneys with previous capital experience were already engaged in other death penalty cases. Prior to the retrial, Lapidus and Soto filed two motions to withdraw DiFrisco s guilty plea. In one, they argued that the decision to plead was rendered involuntary by the erroneous assurances of DiFrisco s attorney, DeLuca, that DiFrisco would receive a life sentence. The second motion was based on the ground that DiFrisco s plea resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel. In support, counsel presented the testimony of DiFrisco and DeLuca. In essence, they argued that DeLuca did not develop mitigation evidence because he was convinced DiFrisco would not receive the death penalty. The trial court denied both motions, finding that DeLuca s decision not to investigate had been reasonable. The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the trial court determinations in both motions. Lapidus and Soto retained several experts to assist in their mitigation investigation. Dr. Silikovitz, a licensed psychologist, was retained initially to evaluate DiFrisco for purposes of withdrawing the guilty plea. Dr. Silikovitz met with DiFrisco for three hours and performed a number of tests. Although his report indicated that DiFrisco demonstrated guilt and remorse for his criminal and drug activity, Dr. Silikovitz also diagnosed DiFrisco with antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) and multiple drug dependencies. Soto believed that Silikovitz s report was harmful to DiFrisco s case, especially his diagnosis of ASPD. Joseph Krakora, who supervised Lapidus and Soto, agreed. Lapidus, however, felt that the diagnosis, viewed in conjunction with the entire report, was not too damaging. Notwithstanding Soto s and Krakora s doubts about Silikovitz, Lapidus also retained him to evaluate possible mitigating factors. After meeting with DiFrisco a second time, and interviewing family members and a former girlfriend, Silikovitz changed his diagnosis from APSD to Adult Antisocial Behavior. He prepared a report providing greater detail about DiFrisco s remorse; his broken home and his need for male role models, which were linked to his history of substance abuse; discussed at length DiFrisco s drug abuse and addiction; and included some of DiFrisco s positive character traits. Lapidus liked the revised report because it conveyed DiFrisco s remorse, his regard for Franciotti as a father figure, and his susceptibility to Franciotti s influence because of his drug addiction. Soto, however, was adamant that Dr. Silikovitz should not be called because of his original diagnosis of ASPD and his later diagnosis of Adult Antisocial Behavior. The two also disagreed about whether Dr. Silikovitz would be an effective witness. Lapidus believed that he was genuine and credible, and that those qualities would come across to the jury. Soto found him inarticulate and unclear. The defense team also retained Alfonso Associates, a consulting firm specializing in the collection and presentation of psychological mitigation evidence. Cessie Alfonso, who was in charge of the firm, was highly regarded in the Public Defender s Office. Counsel also asked Pam Cuevas, who had worked as an investigator for the Public Defender, to perform her own investigation of DiFrisco s background. With the exception of Cuevas, none of these experts were made aware of the other s reports. Alfonso testified that if she had seen Dr. Silikovitz s report, she would have conducted a more thorough investigation into DiFrisco s relationship with Franciotti, his drug abuse, and his remorse. Dr. Silikovitz testified that if he had received the school records contained in Alfonso s report, he would have conducted further testing because those records indicated DiFrisco suffered from a learning disability. In October 1992, Lapidus expressed dissatisfaction working with Soto. Their disagreement about Dr. Silikovitz was partly to blame. Krakora removed Soto from the case and assigned Peter Liquori, whose level of experience doing defense work was similar to Soto s. In November 1992, Alfonso advised counsel that she would be unable to testify because of health problems. She recommended a social worker with experience testifying in capital trials, to replace her. Also in November, approximately six weeks before the trial date, Lapidus resigned from the Public Defender s Office. Krakora, concerned because the presiding judge was strictly enforcing trial dates, asked Soto to resume work as the lead counsel because he wanted someone who knew the case. Soto decided to use Carmeta Albarus, one of Alfonso s associates, to testify in place of Alfonso. Although Albarus had no experience testifying, counsel believed that she was the more appropriate choice because she was more familiar with DiFrisco s case. Albarus did not have any contact with counsel until November 1992. Also, Soto decided not to call Dr. Silikovitz to testify, believing that any benefits from his testimony were outweighed by his diagnosis of ASPD and Adult Antisocial Behavior. Soto considered replacing Dr. Silikovitz, but ultimately rejected that idea because she could not be sure what another expert might say about ASPD. Instead, Soto called Dr. Peter Schiffman as an expert witness on drug abuse and its effects on a person s judgment. Soto believed she had to confine the scope of Dr. Schiffman s testimony to the effects of drug abuse in general so that the court would not disallow it entirely (the discovery deadlines had long passed), and because she had not uncovered sufficient evidence to corroborate DiFrisco s specific claim that he was using drugs at the time of the offense. The sentencing retrial lasted five days, one of which was devoted to DiFrisco s mitigation case. Albarus and Dr. Schiffman testified as experts, and members of DiFrisco s family testified about DiFrisco s unhappy home, his father s neglect, and his drug abuse. On cross-examination, the prosecutor brought out that Albarus had only an undergraduate degree that was not in psychology, and that Albarus had never testified before at trial. Soto viewed the testimony of Dr. Schiffman to be devastating to the defense. The testimony deviated from that anticipated by Soto and made DiFrisco appear to be a danger. Dr. Schiffman told the jury that heavy cocaine use could lead to paranoia and even psychosis. He also stated that a cocaine addict could be driven to hurting people to get his drugs. After both sides rested, DiFrisco made a brief statement to the jury asking them to spare his life. The jury found unanimously the existence of the first aggravating factor, murder for pecuniary gain, but did not find unanimously, and therefore rejected, the second aggravating factor, that the murder was committed to avoid detection for another. The jury unanimously found several mitigating factors: that DiFrisco suffered from his father s lack of love and attention and his mother s inability to discipline him; that his emotional maturity was stunted due to his early drug addiction, and that DiFrisco was vulnerable to and manipulated by Franciotti. By a vote of 11-1, the jury indicated it did not find that DiFrisco was remorseful for the murder of Potcher. The jury unanimously determined that the one aggravating factor outweighed all of the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, and DiFrisco was sentenced to death. DiFrisco filed his PCR petition in February 1997, alleging he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel and of experts. He sought an evidentiary hearing to present the testimony of newly retained experts and others, arguing that the new experts had conducted the thorough, competent investigation that should have been conducted by retrial counsel and the experts they retained. Two experts concluded that DiFrisco suffered from a learning disability, Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), which, combined with his drug use, explained DiFrisco s poor judgment and over-reliance on others. Another expert with expertise in drug abuse concluded that defendant s ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions was diminished due to his substance abuse and that his cognitive capacity was severely impaired at the time of his confession. DiFrisco sought to introduce the testimony of another mitigation specialist, who completed a comprehensive psychosocial history and found DiFrisco to be remorseful, a conclusion supported by her interview with a prison chaplain who met with DiFrisco many times. Finally, DiFrisco sought to introduce the expert report and testimony of David I. Bruck, an attorney with expertise in capital litigation. In his report, Bruck stated that his analysis of DiFrisco s case led him to conclude that retrial counsel s performance fell well below national standards for capital defense counsel. The PCR court accepted into evidence the written reports prepared by the new experts, with the exception of Bruck s report. The court declined to hear in-court testimony from any of those experts or their sources. Instead, the court heard testimony from DiFrisco s previous experts, and from the lawyers who represented him at his sentencing retrial and their supervisors. The court denied DiFrisco s PCR petition. As to all but one of DiFrisco s claims of ineffective assistance, the court found the performance of retrial counsel to be reasonable. The sole issue on which the court found deficient conduct was the second motion to withdraw the guilty plea. On that issue, however, the court held that DiFrisco had not been prejudiced by counsel s performance. DiFrisco also contended that he was deprived of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of experts, and that the death penalty is unconstitutional. The court ruled that both claims were beyond the scope of the PCR hearing. DiFrisco appeals to this Court as of right. HELD: The representation provided by DiFrisco s trial attorneys did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 1. New Jersey has adopted the two-prong Strickland test established by the United States Supreme Court for determining whether a criminal defendant has received effective assistance of counsel. First, counsel s performance must fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Second, there must be a reasonable probability that, but for counsel s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A capital defendant does not need to show that the result of the penalty phase would have been different, as in a non-capital proceeding, but rather that the omitted information would have substantially affected the jury s deliberations during the penalty phase. The probability that the jury s deliberations would have been substantially affected by counsel s error equates with a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. (Pp. 25-31) 2. In his first claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, DiFrisco argues that counsel failed to discover and present evidence of remorse. He contends that counsel was incompetent for not replacing Dr. Silikovitz with a new psychological expert and for not presenting the evidence in Dr. Silikovitz s report about DiFrisco s remorse. Although the Silikovitz report referred to DiFrisco s remorse, other aspects of the report, such as the diagnosis of APSD, would have devastated the mitigation case. Counsel also would have been reasonable in expecting that another expert would have rendered a similar diagnosis. DiFrisco therefore has not satisfied the first prong of Strickland. Even if the Court were to conclude otherwise, the Court is confident that DiFrisco has not met the second prong. Given the State s evidence reflecting the nature and brutality of the crime, it would have been extremely difficult to convince jurors of DiFrisco s contrition. (Pp. 31-37) 3. DiFrisco next argues that counsel failed to develop evidence of his psychological dependence on Franciotti. There is no dispute that retrial counsel presented evidence about DiFrisco s relationship with Franciotti, and that that relationship weighed heavily in DiFrisco s commission of the murder. Additionally, retrial counsel presented testimony of DiFrisco s difficult personal life and history of drug abuse, and portrayed DiFrisco as Franciotti s victim. While the case in mitigation suggested by PCR counsel may have been more thorough and more cohesive in its presentation, the Court is persuaded that DiFrisco received adequate representation on this issue. (Pp. 37-43) 4. Next, DiFrisco claims that retrial counsel failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of evidence about his positive character traits and rehabilitative potential. Retrial counsel made a reasonable, tactical decision to limit good character evidence to avoid the admission of DiFrisco s prior bad acts in rebuttal. The Court finds no deficient performance under Strickland s first prong and no prejudice under the second prong. (Pp. 43-47) 5. The Court is not persuaded by DiFrisco s other claims: that counsel failed to pursue his cooperation with the State; that counsel failed to present evidence of his deference to authority figures or his drug use in support of the motions to withdraw the guilty plea; and that the cumulative errors of counsel require a retrial. (Pp. 47-53) 6. Although it might have been preferable for the PCR court to permit DiFrisco s experts to testify, the written reports covered the subject matter about which they would have testified, and the PCR court was within its discretion to rely solely on the written submissions. The PCR court erred when it refused to consider the report of David Bruck, a lawyer who was offered as an expert in capital defense litigation. The field of capital defense litigation is a constantly evolving, specialized area of the law, and all judges, irrespective of their experience, can be informed by such information. In view of the Court s earlier conclusion that retrial counsel did not render ineffective assistance, the PCR court s error was harmless. And, because DiFrisco ultimately failed to satisfy the second prong of Strickland, Bruck s opinion would not alter the Court s disposition. (Pp. 53-58) 7. DiFrisco challenges the trial court s denial of his motion to interview jurors from the sentencing retrial. He sought this exceptional remedy based on statements of an alternate juror as conveyed through PCR counsel s affidavit. The PCR court denied the motion, reasoning that the alternate juror s statements were hearsay because she was not in the deliberating room; the information was stale, having been made to PCR counsel more than three years after the retrial; and the substance of the statements were not sufficient to overcome the presumption against interviewing jurors. The Court concludes that DiFrisco has not made the strong showing necessary to warrant the extraordinary procedure of post-trial interrogation of the retrial jurors. (Pp. 58-63) 8. DiFrisco seeks reversal of his death sentence on the ground that he was deprived of his right to effective assistance of experts at the sentencing retrial. The Court concludes that such a claim is not separately cognizable in the context of a PCR petition, and is subsumed under the auspices of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (Pp. 63-66) 9. Relying on its prior precedent, the Court disagrees with DiFrisco s remaining argument that the death penalty statute is unconstitutional under either the federal or State Constitution. (P. 66) The judgment of the Law Division denying DiFrisco s PCR petition is AFFIRMED. JUSTICE LONG, joined by JUSTICES STEIN and ZAZZALI (except with respect to Point IV which states that the Court should revisit the issue whether the death penalty is unconstitutional) has filed a separate, dissenting opinion, expressing the view that DiFrisco was provided inadequate representation at his sentencing retrial by counsel that was devoid of capital experience and whose presentation of the case in mitigation was incoherent, ill-conceived, and scattershot, betraying the internal disagreements, disregard of mentors advice, incompetent investigation, and a lack of preparation that took place behind the scenes. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES COLEMAN and LaVECCHIA join in JUSTICE VERNIERO s opinion. JUSTICE LONG, joined by JUSTICES STEIN and ZAZZALI (except with respect to Point IV), has filed a separate, dissenting opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 30 September Term 2001 Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANTHONY DIFRISCO, Defendant-Appellant. Argued March 26, 2002 Decided August 14, 2002 On appeal from the Superior Court, Law Division, Essex County. Lawrence S. Lustberg and Jean D. Barrett, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant (Peter A. Garcia, Acting Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Lustberg, Ms. Barrett and Jessica A. Roth, of counsel and on the briefs). Catherine A. Foddai, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Peter C. Harvey, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by VERNIERO, J. This is a capital case. This Court previously affirmed defendant s conviction for capital murder, State v. DiFrisco, 118 N.J. 253 (1990) (DiFrisco I), upheld his death sentence, State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434 (1994) (DiFrisco II), and determined that his sentence was not disproportionate when compared to similar cases, State v. DiFrisco, 142 N.J. 148 (1995) (DiFrisco III). Defendant now appeals the trial court s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) in which he asserts that he was denied effective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of trial. We affirm. (12) No (0) Yes b. The defendant s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired as the result of mental disease or defect or intoxication, but not to a degree sufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution[.] (12) No (0) Yes c. The defendant rendered substantial assistance to the State in the prosecution of another person for the crime of murder[.] (6) No (6) Yes d. The childhood and upbringing of Anthony DiFrisco. (0) No (12) Yes e. Anthony DiFrisco suffered from his father s lack of love, recognition and attention. (0) No (12) Yes f. Anthony DiFrisco s mother was unable to provide him with the discipline and guidance he needed while growing up. (0) No (12) Yes g. Anthony DiFrisco could not turn to his two older brothers for guidance and support because they were drug abusers. (0) No (12) Yes h. Anthony DiFrisco never developed any self-esteem. (0) No (12) Yes i. Anthony DiFrisco s emotional maturity level was stunted due to his early addiction to drugs. (0) No (12) Yes j. Anthony DiFrisco s excessive drug abuse affected his ability to make sound judgments. (8) No (4) Yes k. Anthony DiFrisco was vulnerable and susceptible to the older Franciotti because he looked up to him as a father figure. (0) No (12) Yes l. Anthony DiFrisco was dependent upon Franciotti for drugs. (11) No (1) Yes m. Anthony DiFrisco allowed himself to be manipulated by Anthony Franciotti. (0) No (12) Yes n. Anthony DiFrisco s motivation in confessing to the murder was remorse. (12) No (0) Yes o. Anthony DiFrisco remains remorseful about killing Edward Potcher. (11) No (1) Yes p. Edward Potcher s killing would have remained unsolved, if Anthony DiFrisco himself had not confessed. (0) No (12) Yes q. Any other factor which is relevant to the defendant s character or record or to the circumstances of the offense. (12) No (0) Yes As indicated, one or more jurors found thirteen of the mitigating factors. Of those thirteen, the jury found nine factors unanimously, including that defendant s emotional maturity level was stunted due to drug addiction, that defendant was vulnerable and susceptible to Franciotti, that defendant allowed himself to be manipulated by Franciotti, and that the murder itself would have remained unsolved had defendant not confessed. The jury concluded that it was unanimously satisfied that the one aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the trial court sentenced defendant to death. We agree. As a general principle, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. Martini, supra, 160 N.J. at 266 (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 695). Consistent with that duty, retrial counsel engaged the services of a psychologist, two psychiatrists, a mitigation specialist, and an investigator from the Public Defender s Office. Those professionals may have lacked specific experience with New Jersey s capital sentencing system, but they assisted counsel in exploring how to present a sympathetic portrait of defendant to the jury. That was a difficult task given the calculating, brutal nature of defendant s crime. Further, counsel argued remorse in both the opening argument and summation, and asked the retrial jury to consider two mitigating factors on remorse. Specifically, Soto argued to jurors that it was illogical to believe that defendant confessed to escape a short jail term for car theft; rather, he did it because the remorse is overwhelming. That s why he confessed. He had to get it off his chest. He had to clean the slate. In addition, counsel reached out to defendant s family and presented their testimony at the sentencing retrial. Based on the information generated through the experts and investigators on the case, retrial counsel made a reasonable, tactical decision not to call Dr. Silikovitz. To defendant s benefit, that decision shielded the jury from the diagnoses and other negative information that the Silikovitz reports revealed about defendant. That counsel decided not to replace Dr. Silikovitz with a new psychological expert is understandable given the fact that Dr. Silikovitz assured counsel that he had performed all the necessary tests and interviews on defendant. Dr. Silikovitz had diagnosed defendant with ASPD and then modified that to Adult Antisocial Behavior. Thus, counsel would have been reasonable in expecting that another expert would have arrived at a like conclusion. Although there may be an occasion when the choice not to replace an expert would indicate a fatally inadequate investigation, counsel s decision not to replace Dr. Silikovitz was within an appropriate range of discretion. See McDowell v. Calderon, 107 F.3d 1351, 1362 (9th Cir.), superceded in part on other grounds, 130 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1103, 118 S. Ct. 1575, 140 L. Ed. 2d 807 (1998) (finding no ineffective assistance when counsel chose not to call any mental health experts because one of three expert witnesses prepared report with extremely damaging information). Moreover, we are not persuaded that defendant s new experts could have avoided the admission of damaging information about defendant. The reports of the new experts, Dr. Goldstein and Dr. Smith, both indicate that defendant suffers from a personality disorder with antisocial traits. The Goldstein report recounts defendant s perspective on the murder, which reflects negatively on defendant: [Defendant] stated, Did I do it smartly? Yes; it was unsolved. Obviously I did it okay. Did I understand why? People don t understand this. . . . It s just not real, especially when he [the victim] looked at me and I m thinking I don t know him; he s a rat guy telling on Tony [Franciotti] and he s dealing drugs too and he wants to put us - Tony and the guys away - in my mind, I m not just walking in and killing an innocent person. He s doing what Tony is doing and he got caught and now wants to tell on Tony. According to [defendant], I m looking at him. He looks nice, but he s also a scumbag and he s selling drugs and he s telling on Tony and I m thinking about my mother - like a thousand times a minute. . . . . When asked whether he was struggling with his thoughts, [defendant] replied, I d be lying if I said my conscience but I didn t do anything like this before. I can t explain it. I felt nothing . . . blank; just had to shoot [him] to make my life easier. We are satisfied that had retrial counsel replaced Dr. Silikovitz, they would have been faced with the same or similar damaging information that led them to forego calling Dr. Silikovitz in the first instance. Defendant, therefore, has not satisfied the first prong of Strickland/Marshall. Even if we were to conclude otherwise, we are confident in our view that defendant has not met that test s second prong. The jury found the murder-for-hire aggravating factor based on evidence that reflected the nature and brutality of defendant s crime. Moreover, defendant remained silent about the murder for eight months, confessing only after he had been arrested on unrelated charges in a different state. Lastly, had Dr. Silikovitz been replaced by Dr. Goldstein, the jury would have been exposed to defendant s statements, reflected in the Goldstein report, that he considered Potcher to be a rat guy and scumbag and that he killed him to make my life easier. Those statements demonstrate how extremely difficult it would have been to convince jurors of defendant s purported contrition. Under those circumstances, we are satisfied that some greater portrayal of defendant s remorse would not have significantly affected the jury s deliberations. Fran DiFrisco, defendant s sister, testified that their father was a cold, hard man who did not know how to show love and who had no relationship with defendant. She believed that defendant began to use drugs to get her father s attention because their father only paid attention to his children when they did something wrong. In 1986, while Fran was living in New Mexico, defendant came out to visit her. He was dressed beautifully and really looked good. During his visit, defendant told her about Franciotti. He described Franciotti as wonderful, a man who believed in defendant as a person and was going to give him a good job in the construction industry in New York. Fred DiFrisco, defendant s brother, testified about his drug addiction, which he attributed to peer pressure and his non-nurturing family life. Fred claimed that while they were growing up, there was no constructive role model to lead the children into adulthood. As for defendant, Fred indicated that he got the shortest end of the stick because he had no real relationship with his father and his older brothers were unavailable to teach him positive things. Albarus also testified about defendant s home life, including how defendant s father abandoned the family to begin a relationship with a younger woman; how defendant s father provided no emotional support, including not showing up for a school concert where defendant performed; of defendant s feeling of abandonment when Fran, his surrogate mother, moved to California and his brothers also left; of defendant s dropping out of school when he was [13] and of defendant s disappointment when, having helped run the flower shop [his father s business] while his father was ill, being told to leave the shop by his father. Fran also described her father s affair and the negative impact it had on the family. She noted that when defendant was about 6 or 7, at an age when he wanted his father around, defendant s father had a new wife and daughter and had no relationship with defendant. She spoke of how defendant idolized his father and how he would cry and ask why his father did not love and want his children around him. Fran believed that defendant was very hurt by his father. Fran described the drug use in the family by her brothers and revealed an incident in which defendant saw Fred beat Fran up while Fred was high on drugs. Defendant s own drug use was catalogued. Finally, Fran talked about how, when she left home, defendant felt all alone and abandoned. Fred talked about his drug addiction, which began when he was about 12 and intensified when his father was incarcerated. He mentioned incidents in which both his brother, Richie, and he would use drugs and overdose in the house and be seen by defendant. Fred admitted that because of his drug addiction, he could not be a role model for his brother, as he tried being on drugs as much as he could be. During his teen years, defendant started getting involved with drugs, to stay numb and not feel anything. Once he kicked his drug habit, Fred tried to help defendant but defendant did not listen. When asked why, Fred answered: [d]rugs does something to you. It numbs you. It separates you from yourself. You don t hear it. You have to be in pain to get help. With regard to the traumatic losses that retrial counsel allegedly did not investigate, the record indicates that neither defendant s family nor defendant mentioned those losses in interviews with the defense team. Counsel cannot be faulted for failing to expend time or resources analyzing events about which they were never alerted. Fretwell v. Norris, 133 F.3d 621, 627 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 846, 119 S. Ct. 115, 142 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1998). The Court in Strickland, supra, observed along those same lines: The reasonableness of counsel s actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant s own statements or actions. Counsel s actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant. In particular, what investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on such information. For example, when the facts that support a certain potential line of defense are generally known to counsel because of what the defendant has said, the need for further investigation may be considerably diminished or eliminated altogether. [466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066, 80 L. Ed 2d at 695-96.] One event known to counsel presented its own problems. Counsel knew that defendant s friend had been shot and paralyzed in connection with a high-speed chase with police in Virginia when defendant was sixteen years old. Counsel reasonably chose not to present that tragic incident to the jury because it also involved defendant. Defendant had driven the car involved in the chase, with his friend as the passenger. Rather than support mitigation, that incident likely would have placed defendant in a negative light in the jurors minds. Counsel s adequate presentation of evidence regarding Franciotti is confirmed by the fact that the jury unanimously found the following mitigating factors: (1) that defendant suffered from his father s lack of love, recognition, and attention; (2) that defendant was vulnerable and susceptible to the older Franciotti, whom he looked up to as a father figure; (3) that defendant allowed himself to be manipulated by Franciotti; (4) that defendant s mother was unable to provide him with the guidance and discipline he needed while growing up; (5) that defendant could not turn to his two older brothers for guidance and support, because they were drug abusers; (6) that defendant never developed self-esteem; and (7) that defendant s emotional maturity level was stunted due to his early addiction to drugs. Additionally, four jurors found that defendant s excessive drug abuse affected his ability to make sound judgments. While the case for mitigation suggested by PCR counsel may have been more thorough and more cohesive in its presentation, we are persuaded that defendant received adequate representation on this issue. [Id. at 261-62 (internal citations omitted).] In arguing for a contrary conclusion, defendant cites Collier v. Turpin, 177 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 1999). In Collier, the defendant s sentencing-phase counsel failed to present evidence of the defendant s upbringing, gentle disposition, record of helping families in need, and displays of heroism and compassion. Id. at 1202. In addition, trial counsel failed to present evidence that the defendant was suffering from a diabetic seizure at the time of the crimes. Ibid. The court found that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel because the jury was given the impression that the witnesses knew little or nothing about the defendant, and that counsel had failed to humanize the defendant for the jury. Ibid. Collier, however, is distinguishable. In that case, trial counsel presented ten mitigation witnesses in a little more than one hour. Id. at 1201. Counsel conducted a cursory examination of the witnesses, a number of whom were questioned merely in respect of the defendant s reputation for truth and veracity. Ibid. In contrast, retrial counsel here presented witnesses who gave a detailed account of defendant s background and attempted to humanize defendant for the jury. Those efforts are demonstrated by the various mitigating factors the jury identified on its verdict form. Thus, in respect of defendant s character attributes and rehabilitative potential, we find no deficient performance under Strickland/Marshall s first prong and no prejudice under the second prong. Defendant asserts that his first attorney, DeLuca, Defendant next argues that retrial counsel s failure to pursue the possibility of defendant s cooperation with the State in the prosecution of Franciotti constituted deficient performance that prejudiced defendant. rejected the State s efforts to secure defendant s cooperation. Defendant contends that retrial counsel s subsequent refusal to explore the possibility of cooperation, even in the absence of an offer of a life sentence, compounded DeLuca s deficiency. The PCR court summarily dismissed this claim, finding that defendant had made no record to support it. The court noted that DeLuca was not called to testify as a witness at the PCR hearing, and therefore defendant did not meet his burden of proving his entitlement to relief. However, the PCR court did not directly address whether retrial counsel, not DeLuca, rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to pursue defendant s cooperation with the State. With regard to DeLuca, we have previously determined that his representation of defendant was not constitutionally deficient in relation to his advice that defendant plead guilty. DiFrisco II, supra, 137 N.J. at 459. We now find, as did the PCR court, that no evidence supports a claim that DeLuca rendered deficient representation with regard to defendant s cooperation with the State. With regard to retrial counsel, the record indicates that defendant repeatedly conveyed to Soto his concerns about being perceived as a snitch if he cooperated. The day before opening arguments in the sentencing retrial, Soto and Liguori met with the assistant prosecutor and made clear that defendant would not testify before the grand jury unless the State agreed to a life sentence. Counsel spoke to defendant about this subject before presenting their position to the prosecutor. We are satisfied that counsel had consulted defendant concerning possible cooperation with the State, and that retrial counsel s representation was neither deficient nor prejudicial. I know that there is now some difference of opinion as to what his true psychological condition was. And quite frankly, if we get past the first prong, [I] could accept that that s what your witnesses would say, and wouldn t need to hear from one of those witnesses. And I could still make a legal ruling. The point is, do I need them to repeat what I know they re going to say? You couldn t have been more thorough. . . . [I] don t necessarily know that I need to hear every single person come here and tell me what your best presentation would be. You have done a very, very thorough job on presenting to me what your best case would have looked like. In challenging the PCR court s ruling, defendant argues that the experts in-court testimony was necessary for the experts to explain that their findings were significantly different from those presented at the sentencing retrial. The State responds by arguing that, because of their detail, the reports obviated the need for in-court testimony. We agree with the State. Ordinarily, the necessity for and admissibility of expert testimony are matters to be determined within the sound exercise of discretion by the trial court. State v. Berry, 140 N.J. 280, 293 (1995) (citation omitted). Generally, a trial court will admit expert testimony if the subject matter at issue, or its specific application, is one with which an average fact finder might not be sufficiently familiar, or if the trial court determines that the expert testimony would assist it in understanding the evidence and determining facts in issue. Id. at 292-93. We are satisfied the PCR court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony. The experts were offered to show that their findings were significantly different from the findings of the experts at retrial. The PCR court recognized that the purpose of the new expert reports was to demonstrate that which the retrial experts failed to uncover. Dr. Goldstein s and Miller s reports explicitly state how the performance of the retrial experts allegedly was deficient. With respect to Dr. Silikovitz s evaluation of defendant, Dr. Goldstein expressed his view that Dr. Silikovitz had failed to administer a series of personality tests that are an essential element of a comprehensive forensic psychological evaluation conducted by the reasonably prudent professional. Similarly, Miller s report extensively details the asserted deficiencies of the Alfonso investigation, noting that [i]n addition to their failure to interview many potential sources of information, Alfonso Associates made mistakes in the interviews they did conduct, that resulted in their failure to obtain significant and valuable information. It might have been helpful to the PCR court to hear from the new experts on how their diagnoses and investigations differed from the former experts. In our view, to have permitted the experts to testify would have been preferable. That said, the differences between the new and former experts are clear from the written reports. Indeed, defense counsel acknowledged that the testimony would certainly be within the four corners of the reports, indicating that those reports covered the subject matter about which the experts would testify. Under those circumstances, the PCR court was within its discretion to rely solely on the experts written submissions. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 30 September Term 2001 Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANTHONY DIFRISCO, Defendant-Appellant. LONG, J. dissenting If we have learned anything from our review of capital cases, it is that juries often spare the lives of persons who have committed what society could legitimately characterize as the cruelest and most savage murders. That lenity is due, in great measure, if not completely, to the quality of the defense advanced on behalf of the accused. Those who have tried capital cases have found that the competent presentation of evidence often results in sentences less than death. But the right to have any of the diverse frailties of humankind taken into account is meaningless if the accused is not provided with counsel capable of finding and effectively presenting mitigating circumstances. However, in order to understand how poorly DiFrisco was represented throughout the proceedings that led to his death sentence, the circumstances surrounding that representation require fuller explication. A. Preliminary Matters On February 22, 1991, during a post-appeal hearing on DiFrisco s motion for a directed verdict, the trial court was informed that in August 1990, the prosecutor invited DiFrisco to cooperate in the State s investigation of Franciotti. His lawyer, Samuel DeLuca, told the court that he did not answer the State s letter because the offer did not include a waiver of the death penalty. In fact, DeLuca did not respond to the overture until March 20, 1991, when he wrote to the prosecutor that he viewed the offer as a bad faith attempt to buttress the State s case. The prosecutor replied that DeLuca s response was a further indication that DiFrisco was not, and never had been, interested in cooperating. DeLuca countered that it was the State that had refused to accept DiFrisco s cooperation by imposing conditions . In September 1991, DiFrisco wrote to the court requesting the appointment of new counsel. He enclosed a letter he had sent to DeLuca, expressing his dissatisfaction with DeLuca s representation. DiFrisco complained generally about DeLuca s failure to consult with him and particularly about DeLuca s failure to pursue his desire to cooperate with the State. The court allowed DeLuca to withdraw from the case, and the Office of the Public Defender was ordered to provide counsel to DiFrisco. On November 15, 1991, the court wrote to Patricia Kay, Deputy Public Defender in charge of the Essex County Regional Office, reminding her that no public defender had been assigned to represent DiFrisco. Kay delegated the assignment responsibility to Joseph Krakora, chief of the homicide division. Krakora assigned Barbara Lapidus, who had no capital experience, as lead counsel, because all of the attorneys with relevant experience were busy with other capital matters. He selected Michelle Soto, who also had no capital experience and only two years of general criminal defense experience in all, to assist with the writing of briefs. Although Lapidus was reluctant to take on a capital case, she acquiesced when Krakora convinced her she could do the job and assured her that Soto would do the necessary legal writing. Lapidus and Soto entered their appearances on November 21, 1991, at which time the court set a trial date of April 27, 1992. Lapidus told the court that she and Soto had full caseloads, including some ready trials and some murders, and requested more time to prepare for DiFrisco s trial. The court responded that the date gave defense counsel five, almost five-and-a-half months to get ready for this matter, and I think that s adequate time. The court later modified that schedule, ordering the defense to file expert reports by March 2, 1992 and the State by April 6, 1992, and requiring that all pretrial motions be filed by March 16, 1992. The court set a firm trial date of May 4, 1992. B. The Motion To Withdraw The Guilty Plea On February 14, 1992, less than two months before trial, the defense moved to vacate DiFrisco s plea of guilty to capital murder. They retained Ronald Silikovitz, a psychologist, to evaluate DiFrisco for the plea withdrawal application. At a March 2, 1992 hearing, they requested an adjournment of the May 4 retrial date on the ground that they had not yet prepared a mitigation case. Soto told the court a continuance was necessary because the defense need[ed] to have experts visit Mr. DiFrisco and complete reports as well as a complete investigation background of Mr. DiFrisco. When the court asked what defense counsel had been doing since they were assigned to the case four months earlier, Soto said their focus had been the withdrawal of the guilty plea and that the sole witness who had interviewed DiFrisco had done so with only that purpose in mind. The court denied the adjournment and refused to hear the merits of the motion. DiFrisco moved for leave to appeal. In its brief to the Appellate Division, the defense stated that an adjournment was necessary because defense counsel had strenuously focused on the motion to withdraw DiFrisco s guilty plea and was essentially unprepared for the penalty trial. The Appellate Division granted leave and reversed, remanding for a hearing on the motion and directing that the penalty retrial be held no earlier than September 8, 1992. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on DiFrisco s motion to withdraw his guilty plea on May 11, 1992. At the hearing, DiFrisco testified that DeLuca led him to believe that if he pleaded guilty and waived a jury for the sentencing phase, he would be sentenced to thirty years to life in prison. DiFrisco testified that had he known the death penalty was a realistic possibility he never would have entered a plea. DeLuca testified that he had advised DiFrisco that, in his opinion, it was extremely unlikely the court would impose a death sentence in his case. DeLuca also explained that he never developed mitigation evidence on behalf of DiFrisco because he believed the court would impose a life sentence. Defense counsel argued that DiFrisco should be allowed to withdraw his plea because it was involuntary in view of DeLuca s erroneous assurances that he would receive a life sentence. However, the defense made clear that its argument was not premised on ineffective assistance of counsel. On May 12, 1991, the trial court denied the motion, finding that DiFrisco knew the death penalty was a possible outcome when he agreed to plead. In so ruling, the court underscored the inconsistency between DiFrisco s argument that he was misinformed of the consequences of his plea and his failure to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. Retrial of the penalty phase was scheduled for September 14, 1992. The court ordered that all mitigating factors be filed within ten days and that expert reports be provided to the prosecutor s office within 30 days. The Appellate Division affirmed the court s decision. Counsel then moved before this Court for the opportunity to reopen the motion to withdraw the guilty plea on the ground that DiFrisco had been denied the effective assistance of counsel. This Court ordered the trial court to conduct an expedited hearing on DiFrisco s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. At the hearing, which took place over four days in August 1992, DeLuca testified, as he had previously, that he had advised DiFrisco to plead guilty and to waive a penalty-phase jury because he was certain the trial court would not impose a death sentence. DeLuca said that because of DiFrisco s confession, he believed the guilt case to be insurmountable. He could not remember how many times he consulted with DiFrisco before the guilty plea, but acknowledged that he had not done any investigation, gathered any mitigating evidence, or consulted any experts. DiFrisco testified that, in entering his plea, he relied entirely upon DeLuca s assurances that he would not receive a death sentence. The trial court again denied DiFrisco s motion to withdraw the guilty plea, finding that DeLuca did not make improper promises regarding DiFrisco s sentence and that DeLuca s decision not to investigate was reasonable. The defense moved for leave to appeal, which this Court denied on October 20, 1992. On November 20, 1992, the trial court informed counsel that jury selection would begin on January 11, 1993, and that a list of all possible witnesses should be produced by December 7, 1992. . . . In this psychologist s expert opinion, these feelings of quilt, remorse, and depression are genuine. They reflect the thought that Mr. DiFrisco has given over the past five years to the implication of his act to the decedent s family and to society. The crime was, in this psychologist s view, a somewhat traumatic event for Mr. DiFrisco. Silikovitz s second report summarized information about DiFrisco s childhood, in particular his lack of supervision and need for male role models, that had not been included in his first report. It also tethered those aspects of DiFrisco s childhood to his history of substance abuse: Mr. DiFrisco s father was not an adequate role model and Anthony was never emotionally close with his father. Consequently, he desperately sought the approval of his siblings, his peers and ultimately Mr. Franciotti, who was clearly a father figure. Mr. DiFrisco began to become involved with drugs, first on a casual basis and then on a heavy, addicted basis. He is a drug addict and has been dependent on both cocaine and heroin. Predisposed to substance abuse and criminal activity, increasingly susceptible to the influence of his peers, and desperately seeking approval, Mr. DiFrisco was particularly vulnerable at the time that Mr. Franciotti made the offer that he did. Silikovitz reiterated his conclusions about DiFrisco s remorse and his susceptibility to influence by others. Finally, the second report consistent with the first opined that DiFrisco was candid and sensitive, and that he had rehabilitative potential. Lapidus and Soto responded differently to Silikovitz s second report. Lapidus found the report useful, in part because it conveyed DiFrisco s remorse, which she considered to be the key to the mitigation case. She stated that when I first met Anthony, and had the opportunity to speak with him and interview him, it was apparent to me that he was clearly remorseful. Lapidus further believed that the report conveyed DiFrisco s regard for Franciotti as a father figure and his susceptibility to Franciotti s influence because of his drug dependency and need for a male role model. Finally, she approved of Silikovitz s recitation of DiFrisco s extensive drug use and linkage of the drug abuse to his crime. Soto, on the other hand, remained troubled by Silikovitz s original diagnosis of ASPD and the revised adult antisocial behavior diagnosis. She was adamant that Silikovitz not be called as a witness. Silikovitz believed he would testify as an expert witness at the trial. However, with the exception of one administrative phone call from investigator Pam Cuevas in October 1992, Silikovitz never heard from the defense team again. He learned that he had not been called to testify at trial only after the fact, when a member of his synagogue told him DiFrisco had been sentenced to death. As it turns out, Silikovitz was dropped from the defense team and was not replaced by another, more competent witness, because of a shift in DiFrisco s counsel. The letter stated that the substance of the report bore no significant changes and the themes and issues remain consistent with the June 9, 1992 report. The bulk of the additional investigation that Ms. Alfonso originally had identified as necessary to complete the mitigation investigation interviews of teachers, family members, and former girlfriends, review of parole records, and investigation of DiFrisco s drug addiction prior to the offense never was done. Sr. Elizabeth reported that Anthony has talked with her about his actions in the offense. She believes that he is genuinely remorseful. Sr. Elizabeth stated that Anthony has grown more reflective over the years and has matured. He has reflected on his own actions, including his mistakes. She stated that, in contrast to many others she sees, Anthony has always accepted responsibility for his mistakes and clearly understands the wrongfulness of his actions. Justices Stein and Zazzali join in this opinion, except with respect to Point IV. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-30 SEPTEMBER TERM 2001 ON APPEAL FROM Superior Court, Law Division, Essex County STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANTHONY DIFRISCO, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED August 14, 2002 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Verniero CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Long The essential feature of this disorder is a pattern of irresponsible and antisocial behavior beginning in childhood or early adolescence and continuing into adulthood. For this diagnosis to be given, the person must be at least 18 years of age and have a history of Conduct Disorder before age of 15. Lying, stealing, truancy, vandalism, initiating fights, running away from home, and physical cruelty are typical childhood signs. In adulthood the antisocial pattern continues, and may include failure to honor financial obligations, to function as a responsible parent or to plan ahead, and an inability to sustain consistent work behavior. These people fail to conform to social norms and repeatedly perform antisocial acts that are grounds for arrest, such as destroying property, harassing others, stealing, and having an illegal occupation. People with Antisocial Personality Disorder tend to be irritable and aggressive and to get repeatedly into physical fights and assaults, including spouse- or child-beating. Reckless behavior without regard to personal safety is common, as indicated by frequently driving while intoxicated or getting speeding tickets. Typically, these people are promiscuous (defined as never having sustained a monogamous relationship for more than a year). Finally, they generally have no remorse and the effects of their behavior on others; they may even feel justified in having hurt or mistreated others. After age 30, the more flagrantly antisocial behavior may diminish, particularly sexual promiscuity, fighting, and criminality. [American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 342 (3d ed. Revised 1987) (DSM-III-R).] [DSM-III-R, 359.]