Case Title: State v. McDougal

Citation: 120 Wash. 2d 334, 841 P.2d 1232

Docket Number: 58437-1

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1992-12-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
120 Wn.2d 334 (1992) 841 P.2d 1232 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Petitioner, v. SAMUEL J. McDOUGAL, Respondent. No. 58437-1. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. December 10, 1992. Jeffrey C. Sullivan, Prosecuting Attorney, and John C. Monter, Deputy, for petitioner. *336 Louis Daniel Fessler of Department of Assigned Counsel, for respondent. Donald C. Brockett, Prosecuting Attorney for Spokane County, and Kevin M. Korsmo, Deputy; C. Danny Clem, Prosecuting Attorney for Kitsap County, and Pamela B. Loginsky, Deputy, on behalf of Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, amicus curiae for petitioner. Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Attorney General, and John M. Jones, Assistant, amicus curiae for petitioner. Michael Spearman on behalf of Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae for respondent. SMITH, J. The State of Washington seeks discretionary review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, Division Three, vacating a Yakima County Superior Court order modifying Respondent Samuel J. McDougal's sentence for possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) and remanding the case to the trial court for resentencing for violation of conditions of the court's sentencing order. We granted review. We reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court. Two principal questions are raised by this case: (1) whether RCW 9.94A.200(2)(b) authorizes a separate 60-day term for each violation of a condition of a sentence or authorizes only a maximum 60-day term for all violations proved in one hearing; and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences of 45 days for each of 10 violations of sentencing conditions, for a total of 450 days, thus exceeding the defendant's standard upper sentencing range of 90 days for the underlying offense calculated under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981. On November 17, 1987, Samuel J. McDougal (Respondent) was charged by information in the Yakima County Superior Court with a class "C" felony,[1] possession of a controlled substance, *337 cocaine.[2] On December 3, 1987, he pleaded "guilty" to the charge.[3] The maximum sentence for the offense under RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(i) is 10 years.[4] The standard range for Respondent's sentence under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), RCW 9.94A, was 0 to 90 days, based on his offender score of zero (0).[5] Following his plea, Respondent was sentenced by the Honorable Walter A. Stauffacher on December 3, 1987, to confinement for 30 days and community supervision for 1 year.[6] The community supervision section of the judgment and sentence, with blanks filled in (underlined portions) and selected provisions checked, provided:[7] (Italics ours.) At sentencing, Respondent was given a document entitled "Standard Conditions and Sentence Requirements", with selected provisions checked, which provided: On April 29, 1988, Respondent was charged with violating conditions of his sentence by failing to report to Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime (TASC), a local drug/alcohol evaluation and treatment facility, for urinalysis.[8] After a hearing, he was sentenced on November 11, 1988, *339 by the Honorable Stephen M. Brown to an additional 8 days of confinement.[9] The court determined that 8 months of Respondent's community supervision had been tolled and his community supervision was extended for an additional 8 months.[10] This would have extended it to August 4, 1989. On October 4, 1989, the Yakima County Prosecuting Attorney petitioned the Superior Court to modify the sentence previously imposed on Respondent, alleging 10 violations of its conditions.[11] The alleged violations were: 1. Using marijuana on March 31, 1989. 2. Using marijuana on April 14, 1989. 3. Using marijuana on April 28, 1989. 4. Using Darvon on May 12, 1989. 5. Using Darvon on May 31, 1989. 6. Failing to report for UA's[12] on June 9, 1989. 7. Failing to report for UA's on June 23, 1989. 8. Failing to report for UA's on July 14, 1989. 9. Moving from his residence on 48th Avenue to an unknown residence on or about June 15, 1989. 10. Failing to report to assigned CCO on July 3, 1989, as ordered.[13] On January 19, 1990, a supplemental probation violation report was filed, alleging two additional violations: On February 22, 1990, after a hearing, the trial court determined that Respondent had committed violations 1 and 2, but that he did not commit violation 3.[15] Respondent admitted violations 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11. At that time both counsel and the court apparently construed the supplemental probation violation report as an amendment to the petition to modify the original sentence, thus resulting in 12 alleged violations. No finding was made on violation 12. The State of Washington (Petitioner) recommended 60 days for each violation. Respondent McDougal objected, asserting that the State unfairly accumulated violations over a period of months to achieve a sentence totaling 600 days in prison which was grossly disproportionate to the standard range of 0 to 90 days for the underlying felony.[16] The court ordered Respondent to serve 45 days in the Department of Corrections for each violation, to be served consecutively, for a total of 450 days.[17] In its oral decision, the court observed: On March 16, 1990, Respondent McDougal filed a notice of appeal. The appeal was filed in the Court of Appeals, Division Three, on August 16, 1990. On July 11, 1991, the opinion of the Court of Appeals (Shields, J.) was filed. It *341 vacated the order of the Superior Court modifying Respondent's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.[19] On November 6, 1991, this court granted the State's petition for review. The Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys filed a brief amicus curiae in support of the Petitioner. The Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers filed a brief amicus curiae in support of the Respondent. Petitioner argues that RCW 9.94A.200(1) and (2), authorizing a maximum 60-day penalty for each violation of a condition of a sentence, are clear and unambiguous.[20] Petitioner further contends that the statute complies with due process requirements and that "there is nothing `exceptional' about sentences of up to 60 days per violation."[21] Respondent McDougal argues that RCW 9.94 A. 200 should be interpreted as authorizing only 60 days' confinement for each violation proceeding because the statute is ambiguous and should be interpreted in favor of the defendant.[22] He contends that this interpretation advances the legislative purpose of the SRA and that a contrary interpretation would violate "other substantive policies and provisions of the SRA."[23] Respondent asserts that if RCW 9.94 A. 200 is interpreted to allow the imposition of consecutive 60-day penalties in one proceeding, then such penalties may not exceed the offender's underlying standard range.[24] He further claims that if the statute is interpreted to allow the "imposition of consecutive 60 day penalties in one proceeding, then such *342 penalties may not ... exceed 12 months", and the term of confinement should not be "ordered served in a state prison."[25] Respondent also claims that if the statute is determined to be clear and unambiguous, then it violates the due process provisions of the United States Constitution.[26] Additionally, he asserts that if the statute is not "invalidated", then imposition by the trial court of a sentence of 450 days' confinement is an abuse of discretion.[27] The Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys in its brief amicus curiae underscores claims made by Petitioner State.[28] The Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in its brief amicus curiae recites claims made by Respondent and also argues that a literal interpretation of the statute "defeats the goal of proportionality",[29] citing RCW 9.94 A. 010 which provides that the purpose of the SRA is to "[e]nsure that the punishment for a criminal offense is proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the offender's criminal history" and that punishment should "[b]e commensurate with the punishment imposed on others committing similar offenses". Respondent was required to comply with specific conditions of his sentence. He maintains that he was not sentenced as a first-time offender; thus, the sentencing court *343 could "only have imposed `crime related prohibitions' against him and could not impose a condition directing that he `affirmatively participate in rehabilitative programs or otherwise perform affirmative conduct.'"[30] At the time of Respondent McDougal's sentence on February 22, 1990, RCW 9.94A.030(17)(a) defined a "first-time offender" as follows: The record indicates that when the judgment and sentence was entered on December 3, 1987, Respondent McDougal had no prior felony convictions. There is nothing in the record to indicate that he had participated in a program of deferred prosecution for a felony offense.[31] Sentences imposed for first-time offenders under RCW 9.94 A. 030 are similar, but not identical, to those imposed under prior statutes as conditions of deferred or suspended sentences.[32] As one of six requirements, a first-time offender may be ordered to undergo available outpatient treatment or inpatient treatment not to exceed the standard range of confinement for the offense.[33] The authority of superior courts to defer or suspend sentences was abolished by RCW 9.94 A. 130, effective July 1, 1984, except for offenders sentenced under the special sexual offender alternative under former RCW 9.94A.120(7)(a). *344 Professor David Boerner in his treatise notes that in "creating the first-time offender option," the Legislature retained the concept of a rehabilitative ideal, "albeit in a modified form." He states that: RCW 69.50.401, under which Respondent McDougal was charged, provides, in relevant part, that: The "judgment and sentence" indicated that the maximum penalty for the crime was 5 years. Instead of imposing the 10-year maximum sentence specified under RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(i), the trial court imposed the 5-year maximum sentence specified under RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii). Although no reference was made to the first-time offender statute, this is consistent with its application. Petitioner State argues that RCW 9.94 A. 200 is "incapable of meaning anything other than what it says on its face" and that the Court of Appeals "had no authority, through statutory construction, to rewrite the statute...." Former RCW 9.94A.200(1) and (2)(b), applicable to this case, provided that: (Italics ours.) In State v. Taplin, 55 Wn. App. 668, 779 P.2d 1151 (1989) the Court of Appeals, Division One, in a per curiam opinion concluded that "RCW 9.94 A. 200 is not ambiguous."[37] Yet, in the same case the court also stated that "at best, RCW 9.94 A. 200 is ambiguous."[38] The court then concluded that the rule of lenity requires that in a criminal case any ambiguity *346 in a statute must be resolved in favor of the defendant.[39]Taplin aids neither party in this case. This court in State v. Shove[40] commented briefly on RCW 9.94A.200(2)(b), and while not specifically addressing extension of duration of an offender's commitment, stated that: [1] Application of the statute, RCW 9.94A.200(2)(b), in this case, because of the harsh result reached, at least suggests an ambiguity. We thus look to legislative history for clarification. The Legislature in bills before it in 1984[42] and in 1988[43] did not change the language of RCW 9.94A.200(2)(b) imposing a period "not to exceed sixty days for each violation" of the conditions of supervision. During legislative committee hearings, the Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys filed a paper entitled "Justice in Sentencing", suggesting more flexibility at the community supervision/jail level.[44] Additionally, counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee made this recommendation for wording of the statutory provision: (Italics ours.) The language in that recommendation is quite similar to and consistent with the language in RCW 9.94A.200(2)(b). The recommendation uses the words "may be confined for a sixty day period for each violation". The statute uses the words "to be confined for a period not to exceed sixty days for each violation". Professor Boerner, in discussing noncompliance with requirements or conditions of sentence,[46] explains that: (Footnotes omitted.) In another sentencing context, the Legislature in 1986 in the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 limited the number of days for violations proved at each hearing by amending RCW 13.40.200(3)(a). Prior to the amendment, the statute did not contain a provision for multiple violations.[47] It now states that "[p]enalties for multiple violations occurring prior to the hearing shall not be aggregated to exceed thirty days' confinement." The SRA contains no such limitation, either in RCW 9.94A.200(2)(b) or in the parallel provision governing violations of conditions of postsupervision release, RCW 9.94 A. 175. This latter provision requires the court to hold a hearing in the same manner as provided in RCW 9.94 A. 200 to determine whether the alleged violation occurred. RCW 9.94 A. 175 provides that: "[a]fter the hearing, the court may order the offender to be confined for up to sixty days per violation in the county jail...." (Italics ours.) [2] The provisions of both RCW 9.94 A. 200 (the court "may order the offender to be confined for a period not to exceed sixty days for each violation") and RCW 9.94 A. 175 (the court "may order the offender to be confined for up to sixty days per violation in the county jail") are consistent and use almost identical language. This suggests only one interpretation: the Legislature intended that the 60-day penalty limitation apply to each violation proved. In this case, after determining sentencing violations, the trial court imposed a sentence of 450 days, which exceeded the 1-year limit on confinement in the county jail under RCW 9.94A.190(1). The "order modifying sentence/revoking sentence/order of confinement/warrant confinement" signed *349 by Judge Stephen M. Brown on February 22, 1990, provided, in part:[48] The court FINDS that: DEFENDANT SHALL BE CONFINED AS FOLLOWS: It is apparent from the order signed by the trial court that the court deliberately sentenced Respondent McDougal to confinement in the State Department of Corrections instead of in the Yakima County Jail. This is consistent with RCW 9.94A.190(1). After determining that Respondent McDougal had violated the conditions of his sentence in 10 specific instances, the court modified Respondent's original sentence and ordered his confinement to the Department of Corrections for 450 days, representing 10 sentences of 45 days each, to be served consecutively.[49] In the report of proceedings of the sentence violation hearing on February 22, 1990, the trial court, after asking for Respondent's plea to each specified *350 violation, at which time Respondent admitted to only nine violations, stated:[50] It is apparent from the report of proceedings that the Respondent pleaded "guilty" to only nine violations and the trial court incorrectly calculated the number of violations of sentence conditions. The total number of violations found was 9 and not 10.[51] With the court-imposed penalty of 45 days for each violation, the total would be 405 days instead of 450 days. However, the order signed by the court on February 22, 1990, enumerated 10 specific violations found by the court. The order is controlling on the number of violations. [3, 4] In resorting to statutory interpretation, this court first looks to the plain meaning of words used in a statute.[52] A nontechnical statutory term may be given its dictionary meaning.[53] Statutes should be construed to effect their purpose. Unlikely, absurd or strained consequences resulting from a literal reading should be avoided.[54] A literal interpretation of former and current RCW 9.94A.200(2)(b) can lead to a result, as occurred in this case, where an offender, after violation of sentencing conditions, may receive a sentence greatly in excess of the offender's allowable sentence in the upper range under the SRA. *351 It seems apparent that the Legislature intended this result since the language "confined for a period not to exceed sixty days for each violation" was retained through several revisions of RCW 9.94 A. 200. A reading of RCW 9.94A.200(2)(b) alone does not suggest an ambiguity. The next step, then, leads to statutory interpretation because the result achieved might initially be considered "unjust and absurd". Sutherland Statutory Construction provides some advice on this point: [5] Although RCW 9.94A.200(2)(b) is not ambiguous, the sentencing result in this case might arguably be considered "harsh, unjust and absurd". The Respondent's standard range sentence under the SRA was 0 to 90 days based on an offender score of 0, even though the maximum penalty for the offense was 5 years. The trial court, after the hearing on sentence *352 violations, ordered him to serve 45 days consecutively in the Department of Corrections for each of 10 violations, for a total of 450 days. Comparing the maximum of 90 days imposed for the underlying offense to the 450 days imposed for sentence violations, one reasonably could conclude that the result is harsh, unjust and absurd. But comparing the maximum of 5 years (60 months or 1,800 days) to the 450 days imposed, the result would not be harsh, unjust and absurd. By violating the terms of his sentence, the Respondent moved outside the initial protections of the SRA and subjected himself to other statutory penalties, including the maximum penalty for the underlying offense. "Statutes should be construed to effect their purpose and unlikely, absurd or strained consequences should be avoided."[57] In this case, the trial court applied an unambiguous statute. The maximum sentence for Respondent's underlying offense was 5 years. Although the range calculated for Respondent under the SRA was 0 to 90 days, the court at the original sentencing conceivably might have imposed the maximum term of 5 years as an exceptional sentence. The court did not do so, but upon violation by Respondent of conditions of his sentence, the court could also have ordered confinement up to the maximum term of 5 years if the number of sentence violations at 60 days per violation had totaled 1,800 days. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case by imposing a total of 450 days for 10 violations at 45 days for each violation. RCW 9.94A.200(2)(b) authorizes a 60-day term for each violation of a sentence condition. Respondent McDougal was found guilty of 10 violations. The court imposed 45 days for each violation. This results in a sentence of 450 days, which is not a harsh, unjust or absurd result because the maximum penalty for the underlying offense is 5 years, which totals 1,800 days. *353 We reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court. I dissent. The trial court abused its discretion when it imposed a 450-day prison term. McDougal committed a level 2 offense and his offender score at the time was 0. The standard range for his offense under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA) was only 0 to 90 days in jail. The majority ignores the legislative purposes behind the SRA in failing to find an abuse of discretion in this case. McDougal's 450-day sentence is contrary to the SRA's purpose of ensuring an offender's punishment is "proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the offender's criminal history". RCW 9.94A.010(1). In affirming this sentence, the majority undermines the SRA's goal of ensuring punishment that is "commensurate with the punishment imposed on others committing similar offenses". RCW 9.94A.010(3). McDougal's sentence is so excessive it is contrary to the SRA's purpose of "[p]romot[ing] respect for the law" because it does not "provid[e] punishment which is just". RCW 9.94A.010(2). Finally, the sentence of over 1 year in the state penitentiary is contrary to the SRA's purpose of "[m]ak[ing] frugal use of the state's resources". RCW 9.94A.010(6). I would affirm the Court of Appeals because the trial court abused its discretion in this case. When a defendant violates the terms and conditions of a sentence, the court "may order the offender to be confined for a period not to exceed sixty days for each violation...." (Italics mine.) RCW 9.94A.200(2)(b). This statute gives the trial court a discretionary range from 0 to 60 days for imposing additional time for each sentence violation. I agree the Court of Appeals erred in holding that this statute is ambiguous. However, a sentencing court's decision to impose additional time under this statute remains subject to abuse of *354 discretion review. A trial court abuses its discretion when its discretionary determination is "manifestly unreasonable". In re Schuoler, 106 Wn.2d 500, 512, 723 P.2d 1103 (1986) (quoting State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971)). A 450-day prison sentence is manifestly unreasonable in this case. The Legislature designed the SRA to "[e]nsure that the punishment for a criminal offense is proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the offender's criminal history". (Italics mine.) RCW 9.94A.010(1). McDougal's 450-day prison sentence is not proportionate to the seriousness of his level 2 offense or to his offender score of 0. A defendant with an offender score of 0 would face a 450-day standard range sentence only if he or she were found guilty of killing another with a car, burglarizing a home while armed with a deadly weapon, or molesting a 12-year-old child, all level 7 offenses. See RCW 9.94 A. 320 (vehicular homicide, first degree robbery and second degree child molestation). The Legislature has determined that McDougal's crime carries a seriousness level of only 2, not 7. His sentence, in all fairness, should reflect this fact. The basic purpose behind the SRA is to structure, but not eliminate, trial court discretion in sentencing matters. RCW 9.94A.010(1). To further this purpose, the court has "always interpreted the SRA in a manner that ensures the structuring of trial court discretion". State v. Shove, 113 Wn.2d 83, 89, 776 P.2d 132 (1989). The majority ignores this principle in finding no abuse of discretion in this case. Under the majority's holding, a sentencing court could add anywhere from 0 to 600 days, a range of 20 months, to the defendant's sentence without abusing its discretion. The maximum disparity allowed between the top and bottom of the standard range for committing a level 2 offense is only 14 months, and this 14-month disparity is reserved only for persons with offender scores of 9 or more. RCW 9.94 A. 310. The SRA was designed to structure trial court discretion in sentencing matters in order to make the criminal justice system *355 accountable to the public. RCW 9.94 A. 010. The 20-month disparity the majority allows in this case frustrates this purpose. Nothing in the SRA indicates a trial court's structured discretion under the SRA suddenly becomes unstructured when a defendant violates the terms and conditions of his or her original sentence. Moreover, this 20-month range of unstructured discretion undermines the SRA's goal of imposing punishment "commensurate with the punishment imposed on others committing similar offenses". RCW 9.94A.010(3). Under the majority's holding, a defendant similarly situated with McDougal could receive anywhere from 0 to 450 to 600 days of incarceration. Similarly situated defendants could thus receive vastly unequal terms of punishment pursuant to the majority's broad grant of unstructured discretion in this case. The majority also affirms the 450-day sentence contrary to the SRA's purpose of "[m]ak[ing] frugal use of the state's resources". RCW 9.94A.010(6). The Legislature determined McDougal's original offense merited a sentence of 0 to 90 days in the county jail. A sentence of 0 to 90 days constitutes an appropriate and frugal use of the state's resources. A sentence of 450 days in the state penitentiary does not. McDougal committed no new crime under the laws of this state. His violations were all technical in nature. These violations do merit additional incarceration. However, a 450-day prison sentence in this case is a poor use of the State's resources. These prison resources are better spent on criminals who, because of the seriousness of their crimes and their criminal histories, merit legislatively determined sentences of 1 year or more. These resources are wasted in this case. The Sentencing Guidelines Commission noted: *356 (Italics mine.) Washington Sentencing Guidelines Comm'n, Sentencing Guidelines Implementation Manual § 9.94 A. 200 comment, at II-39 (1990). I agree with the Court of Appeals that this comment should guide our application of RCW 9.94 A. 200. See State v. McDougal, 61 Wn. App. 847, 854, 812 P.2d 877 (1991). However, it is also important to recognize that under certain circumstances, a defendant's sentence should logically be modified to exceed his or her standard range. For example, a defendant should not be able to violate the terms and conditions of a sentence without the possibility of facing additional time just because the trial court originally imposed a sentence at the top of the standard range. Moreover, a defendant such as McDougal should not be free to commit repeated violations of the terms of his sentence once the top of the standard range has been imposed in his case. Concerns such as these necessitate flexibility and discretion in modifying sentences pursuant to RCW 9.94A.200(2)(b). However, this discretion remains structured pursuant to the legislative purposes behind the SRA. See RCW 9.94 A. 010. I would affirm the Court of Appeals because the trial court in this case abused its discretion. This case should be remanded for resentencing. Upon remand, I would require the sentencing court to impose a sentence that is proportionate both to McDougal's crime and to his offender score of 0. Such a sentence would "provid[e] punishment which is just" and would comply with the SRA's purpose of "[m]ak[ing] frugal use of the state's resources". See RCW 9.94A.010(2), (6). McDougal's 450-day sentence in the state penitentiary is both unjust and a waste of the State's resources. I accordingly dissent. DORE, C.J., and UTTER, J., concur with JOHNSON, J. Reconsideration denied February 10, 1993. [1] RCW 69.50.401 does not designate a classification for possession of a controlled substance, cocaine, a schedule 2 offense, RCW 69.50.206(b)(5). However, in State v. Smith, 93 Wn.2d 329, 342, 610 P.2d 869, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 873 (1980), this court, in discussing the statute as it applied to possession or delivery of marijuana, a schedule 1 offense, RCW 69.50.204(d)(13), for crimes committed before July 1, 1984, stated that: The statute does not expressly designate the offense a felony, but rather calls it a "crime." The punishment prescribed is provided in RCW 9 A. 20.020 for class C felonies, and this offense should be regarded as such. RCW 9 A. 20.021 applies to crimes committed after July 1, 1984. It applies to this case. RCW 9 A. 20.021(1)(c) provides in relevant part that: No person convicted of a classified felony shall be punished by confinement or fine exceeding the following: ... For a class C felony, by confinement in a state correctional institution for five years, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of ten thousand dollars, or by both such confinement and fine. [2] Clerk's Papers, at 24. [3] Clerk's Papers, at 20. [4] Respondent was charged under RCW 69.50.401, but the information indicated that the maximum penalty was 5 years. [5] The "Judgment and Sentence" indicates an offense score of 2, apparently referring to offense level. Clerk's Papers, at 20. [6] Clerk's Papers, at 20. [7] Clerk's Papers, at 20. [8] Clerk's Papers, at 11-13. [9] Clerk's Papers, at 14. [10] Clerk's Papers, at 15. [11] This is 2 months beyond the supervision time of August 4, 1989, extended by the trial court's order dated November 17, 1988. However, Respondent has not raised this as an issue. His community corrections officer, in a report dated December 28, 1989, recommended further tolling of Respondent's community service by 2 months. This would reach October 4, 1989. There is no record in the file of an order to that effect. [12] Urinalysis. [13] Clerk's Papers, at 12. [14] Clerk's Papers, at 8. [15] Clerk's Papers, at 6-7. [16] Report of Proceedings, at 43. [17] Clerk's Papers, at 6-7. [18] Report of Proceedings, at 50. [19] State v. McDougal, 61 Wn. App. 847, 858, 812 P.2d 877 (1991). [20] Supplemental Brief of Petitioner, at 3. [21] Brief of Respondent (Petitioner in this court), at 8. [22] Brief of Appellant (Respondent in this court), at 24. [23] Brief of Appellant (Respondent in this court), at 24. [24] Brief of Appellant (Respondent in this court), at 33. [25] Brief of Appellant (Respondent in this court), at 36 (citing RCW 9.94 A. 190 providing for place of confinement for sentences of more than 1 year or less than 1 year). [26] Brief of Appellant (Respondent in this court), at 39. [27] Brief of Appellant (Respondent in this court), at 46 (citing State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971)). [28] Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys. [29] Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, at 6. [30] Brief of Appellant (Respondent in this court), at 46. See Clerk's Papers, at 6, 7, 20, 21. [31] Clerk's Papers, at 20. [32] D. Boerner, Sentencing in Washington § 7.7, at 7-9 (1985). [33] D. Boerner § 7.7(3)(b), at 7-9. [34] (Footnote omitted.) D. Boerner § 7.8(b), at 7-12. [35] RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(i), (ii). Cocaine is classified as a schedule 2 narcotic drug under RCW 69.50.206(b)(5). Although Respondent was charged merely with possession of a controlled substance and not with intent to manufacture or deliver, RCW 69.50.401 was cited in the information for his alleged violation. [36] Since July 1, 1990 (after the sentencing date in this case), RCW 9.94A.200(2)(b), as amended, still in language identical to its predecessor, provides: "The state has the burden of showing noncompliance [with any requirements or conditions of a sentence] by a preponderance of the evidence. If the court finds that the violation has occurred, it may order the offender to be confined for a period not to exceed sixty days for each violation, and may (i) convert a term of partial confinement to total confinement, (ii) convert community service obligation to total or partial confinement, or (iii) convert monetary obligations, except restitution and the crime victim penalty assessment, to community service hours at the rate of the state minimum wage as established in RCW 49.46.020 for each hour of community service. Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing on noncompliance shall be credited against any confinement order by the court...." (Italics ours.) [37] Taplin, at 670. [38] Taplin, at 671. [39] Taplin, at 671. See also State ex rel. McDonald v. Whatcom Cy. Dist. Court, 92 Wn.2d 35, 37-38, 593 P.2d 546 (1979) (citing State v. Grant, 89 Wn.2d 678, 575 P.2d 210 (1978); State v. Arndt, 87 Wn.2d 374, 553 P.2d 1328 (1976); Seattle v. Green, 51 Wn.2d 871, 322 P.2d 842 (1958); State v. Thompson, 38 Wn.2d 774, 232 P.2d 87 (1951)). [40] 113 Wn.2d 83, 86, 776 P.2d 132 (1989). [41] (Citation omitted.) Shove, at 86. [42] 2SHB 440, 48th Legislature (1984). [43] SHB 1429, 50th Legislature (1988). [44] From Washington State Archives documents on legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981. [45] Memorandum to the Senate Judiciary Committee from Tina Boothman, counsel (re SHB 440, enacting the sentencing reform act (Apr. 3, 1981)). [46] D. Boerner § 10.14, at 10-14 through 10-15. [47] Laws of 1986, ch. 288, § 5(3)(a), p. 1249; RCW 13.40.200. [48] Clerk's Papers, at 6-7. [49] Report of Proceedings, at 31-33, 42. [50] Report of Proceedings, at 31-33, 42. [51] Report of Proceedings, at 31-33, 42. [52] State v. Fjermestad, 114 Wn.2d 828, 835, 791 P.2d 897 (1990). [53] Fjermestad, at 835 (citing State v. Olson, 47 Wn. App. 514, 516-17, 735 P.2d 1362 (1987)). [54] Fjermestad, at 835 (citing State v. Stannard, 109 Wn.2d 29, 742 P.2d 1244 (1987)). See also State v. Keller, 98 Wn.2d 725, 728, 657 P.2d 1384 (1983). [55] (Footnotes omitted.) 2A N. Singer, Statutory Construction § 45.12 (4th ed. 1984). [56] (Footnotes omitted.) 2A N. Singer § 46.01. [57] State v. Stannard, 109 Wn.2d 29, 36, 742 P.2d 1244 (1987) (citing State v. Richardson, 81 Wn.2d 111, 499 P.2d 1264 (1972)).