Case Title: Giant of Maryland v. Enger

Citation: 

Docket Number: 981171

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1999-04-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
GIANT OF MARYLAND, INC. 
 
 
            OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 981171 
April 16, 1999 
 
CHARLOTTE ENGER 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Michael P. McWeeny, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal of a judgment in a tort action, we 
consider whether the circuit court erred in instructing the 
jury on the doctrine of respondeat superior. 
 
The plaintiff, Charlotte H. Enger, filed her amended 
motion for judgment against Geo Asfaw, Giant Food Stores, 
Inc., and Giant of Maryland, Inc.  She alleged, among other 
things, that she incurred personal injuries when she was 
attacked by Asfaw, an employee of Giant of Maryland, Inc.  The 
plaintiff nonsuited her claims against Asfaw and Giant Foods, 
Inc., and at the conclusion of a trial, the jury returned a 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $137,000.  
The circuit court entered a judgment confirming the verdict, 
and Giant of Maryland appeals. 
 
Applying established principles of appellate review, we 
shall summarize the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff, who comes to this Court armed with a jury 
verdict confirmed by the circuit court. 
 
The plaintiff went to the defendant's store to purchase 
some groceries.  She proceeded to the store's produce section 
to select some bananas.  While the plaintiff was in the store, 
Kenneth M. Brown, the store's manager, saw a piece of celery 
that had fallen on the floor in the produce area, and he 
directed Asfaw, a produce clerk, to pick up the celery.  Asfaw 
refused to do so, walked toward Brown, stood within an inch of 
Brown's face, and stated:  "You don't know who I am.  I'm the 
devil.  I'm going to burn you."  Brown stepped back, and he 
"motioned" to Julio Rivera, a store employee, "to come over 
. . . [t]o witness what [Asfaw] had said . . . ." 
 
Rivera approached Asfaw from behind, touched him on the 
shoulder, and said, "[h]ey, man."  Asfaw pushed Rivera and 
assaulted him with karate kicks and punches.  As Asfaw was 
attacking Rivera, Asfaw's foot almost hit the plaintiff in her 
face.  She testified:  "I walked to the bananas and picked up 
two bananas and started to turn and put them in the 
basket. . . .  [W]hen all of a sudden a man's foot and leg 
. . . that's all I saw was this foot and leg come kicking 
right in front of my face with great force.  It was such a 
shock . . . I could even feel it as it just missed me." 
 
After Asfaw finished attacking Rivera, Asfaw decided to 
leave the store, and he began to walk toward the door.  While 
leaving, he began to remove a name tag that was affixed to a 
 
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red jacket that store employees were required to wear.  The 
plaintiff testified:  "And I thought, well, he's going to try 
to leave.  And I said [to Asfaw], where are you going?  What 
is your name?  Why are you taking — and he just looked at me.  
And I said, why are you taking off your name tag?  And then he 
slugged me, just power.  Just reached around and I went flying 
across the floor."  Asfaw attacked the plaintiff by delivering 
a "karate type of blow" to her chest.  As a result of the 
impact from the blow, the plaintiff sustained injuries to her 
foot and ankle. 
 
At trial, the trial court granted the following jury 
instruction over the defendant's objection: 
 
"An act is within the scope of employment if it 
is incidental to the employer's business and is done 
to further the employer's interest.  If an employee 
departs so far from his duties that his acts are no 
longer for his employer's benefit, then his acts are 
not within the scope of his employment.  However, if 
the tortious act of the employee arose out of an 
activity which was within the employee's scope of 
employment or within the ordinary course of 
business, then that act may be considered to be 
within the scope of employment." 
 
 
The defendant argues that the last sentence of this 
instruction is an incorrect statement of law because it 
attempts to make the employer liable for any tort committed 
while "at work," even though the employee's acts may have been 
committed outside the scope of employment.  Responding, the 
plaintiff argues that the challenged jury instruction is a 
 
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correct statement of law and that the trial court did not err 
by granting it.  We disagree with the plaintiff. 
 
Initially, we observe that pursuant to the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the tortious 
acts of its employee if that employee was performing the 
employer's business and acting within the scope of the 
employment when the tortious acts were committed.  Plummer v. 
Center Psychiatrists, Ltd., 252 Va. 233, 235, 476 S.E.2d 172, 
173 (1996); Kensington Assocs. v. West, 234 Va. 430, 432, 362 
S.E.2d 900, 901 (1987); McNeill v. Spindler, 191 Va. 685, 694-
95, 62 S.E.2d 13, 17 (1950).  Even though the doctrine of 
respondeat superior is firmly established in Virginia, 
difficulties often arise in the application of the doctrine to 
particular facts.  Generally, the inferences to be drawn from 
the established facts are within the province of a jury.  
Commercial Bus. Sys. v. BellSouth Servs., Inc., 249 Va. 39, 
44, 453 S.E.2d 261, 265 (1995); Tri-State Coach Corp. v. 
Walsh, 188 Va. 299, 308, 49 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1948). 
 
In Davis v. Merrill, 133 Va. 69, 77-78, 112 S.E. 628, 631 
(1922), we established the following test to determine whether 
an employee acted within the scope of his employment: 
"[T]he test of the liability of the master for the 
tortious act of the servant, is not whether the 
tortious act itself is a transaction within the 
ordinary course of the business of the master, or 
within the scope of the servant's authority, but 
 
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whether the service itself, in which the tortious 
act was done, was within the ordinary course of such 
business or within the scope of such authority." 
 
We have consistently applied this test in our jurisprudence.  
See Commercial Bus. Sys., 249 Va. at 44, 453 S.E.2d at 265; 
United Brotherhood v. Humphreys, 203 Va. 781, 786, 127 S.E.2d 
98, 102 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 954 (1963).  Accord 
Tri-State Coach Corp., 188 Va. at 305-06, 49 S.E.2d at 366. 
 
A comparison of our established test with the challenged 
jury instruction compels us to conclude that the jury 
instruction is erroneous.  Under our aforementioned test, an 
employer is responsible for an employee's tortious act if that 
act was within the scope of the duties of the employment and 
in the execution of the service for which the employee was 
engaged.  Accord Tri-State Coach Corp., 188 Va. at 306, 49 
S.E.2d at 367.  The challenged jury instruction differs from 
the test that we have consistently applied because the 
instruction allows the jury to find the employer liable for 
any tort committed during the employee's employment, even if 
the service that the employee was performing when he committed 
the tortious acts was not within the ordinary course of the 
employer's business or not within the scope of the employee's 
authority. 
 
We reject the plaintiff's contention that the defendant's 
objection to the instruction is merely a matter of "an 
 
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elevation of style over substance."  Rather, the jury 
instruction requires that the jury impose a different test 
than the test this Court has consistently approved. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the circuit 
court, and we will remand the case for a new trial.  In view 
of our disposition of this case, we need not consider the 
litigants' remaining arguments. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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