Case Title: CHRISTOPHER COPTY LUFTIG V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0101

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-04-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
CHRISTOPHER COPTY LUFTIG V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 43Case Number: S-09-0101Decided: 04/15/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
CHRISTOPHER 
COPTY LUFTIG,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Galen 
Woelk of Aron and Hennig, LLP, Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Smith.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice. 

 
 
[¶1]      Christopher Copty 
Luftig was convicted of burglary for entering a vehicle with intent to commit 
larceny.  He appeals, claiming the 
district court committed plain error by allowing the admission of improper 
testimony about a series of Colorado car thefts for which he pleaded guilty to 
one count of aggravated motor vehicle theft and that his trial counsel was 
ineffective.  

 
 
[¶2]      We conclude that, 
even though some of the testimony about the Colorado crimes was inadmissible, 
Mr. Luftig has failed to show prejudice to establish plain error.  Also, Mr. Luftig has not established 
that he was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of trial 
counsel.  Consequently, we 
affirm.   

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      Mr. Luftig 
presents the following issues on appeal:

 
 

1.    
Where 
the District Court properly permitted the introduction of limited 404(b) 
evidence:  Whether the admission of 
prejudicial, improper and objectionable evidence outside the scope of the 
District Court's 404(b) ruling was Plain Error.

 
 

2.    
Whether 
Defense Counsel's conduct was so deficient that Appellant's trial cannot be 
relied upon as having produced a just result. 

 
 
The 
State phrases the issues differently:

 
 

I.              
Did 
the State's direct examination of Officer Bruce conform with the District 
Court's pre-trial ruling on the admissibility of evidence related to appellant's 
Colorado guilty plea?

 
 

II.            
Did 
plain error occur when hearsay evidence was introduced without 
objection?

 
 

III.           
Did 
trial counsel's failure to object to certain evidence constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel?  

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      During the early 
morning hours of May 2, 2008, Officer Anthony Johnson of the University of 
Wyoming Police Department was conducting foot patrol of the UW campus.  Around 1:30 a.m., he walked by vehicles 
parked near a cafeteria and dorm area and noticed an individual inside a Honda 
Accord.  Looking in the passenger 
side window, Officer Johnson saw a man working in the area of the ignition with 
a tool.  He looked up at the 
officer, opened the driver's side door and fled.  As the man exited the vehicle, the 
officer noticed his height (between 5'11" and 6'0" tall), build (slender), hair 
(short, dark brown) and lack of facial hair.  He also observed that the man was 
wearing a waist-length tan jacket with a fleece collar. 

 
 
[¶5]      After his order 
to stop was ignored, Officer Johnson called for back-up and gave a description 
of the suspect.  A few minutes 
later, other officers apprehended Mr. Luftig a short distance away.  He claimed that he was simply walking 
home from the bar, but Officer Johnson identified him as the man in the 
car.  The officers examined the car 
and discovered the window looked like it had been tampered with and the ignition 
was broken.    

 
 
[¶6]      The State charged 
Mr. Luftig with burglary in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301(a) 
(LexisNexis 2009).1  Mr. Luftig defended on the basis that 
Officer Johnson had incorrectly identified him as the perpetrator.  The State gave notice that it intended 
to offer, pursuant to W.R.E. 404(b), evidence of other bad acts committed by Mr. 
Luftig to, among other reasons, establish his modus operandi, plan and identity.  In particular, the State sought 
admission of evidence that he broke into "at least two Hondas in Ft. Collins, 
Colorado" on November 6, 2005, and as a result of those activities eventually 
pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated motor vehicle theft.  The State maintained that the Colorado 
crimes were similar to the Laramie crime in that Mr. Luftig broke into Hondas by 
"jimmying" the windows and then stole the cars by "punching" the ignitions.     

 
 
[¶7]      The evidence 
offered included copies of the Stipulation and Consent to Deferred Sentence and 
Statement of Plea Disposition in the Colorado court, the police reports from the 
case, and testimony from a Fort Collins police officer regarding Mr. Luftig's 
prior criminal conduct.  The 
Statement of Plea Disposition indicated that, in exchange for pleading guilty to 
one count of felony aggravated motor vehicle theft and one count of misdemeanor 
theft, the prosecution dismissed three other felony counts.  Mr. Luftig objected to the evidence of 
the Colorado crimes.    

 
 
[¶8]      The district 
court held a hearing and ultimately ruled that the evidence of Mr. Luftig's 
Colorado conviction "under similar circumstances" was admissible to show Mr. 
Luftig's identity, modus operandi, 
and plan.  Its decision letter 
listed the similar circumstances as:  

 
 
[T]he 
same make of car (Honda) was broken into; the burglar used a tool or tools to 
damage/remove the ignition switch of the vehicle, thereby allowing for its theft 
(speaking in the vernacular, the ignition was "punched" in both cases); both 
crimes occurred at approximately 2:00 in the morning; and both involved the 
burglar entering the vehicle by means of "jimmying" the 
window.

 
 
The 
district court refused admission of the police reports on the basis of hearsay, 
but stated that the police officer could testify, "subject to other appropriate 
objections."    

 
 
[¶9]      At trial, the 
prosecution called Officer Jeff Bruce of the Fort Collins Police Department to 
testify about his investigation of a series of car thefts in Fort Collins, which 
led to Mr. Luftig's arrest and conviction.  
Officer Bruce testified, mostly without defense objection, about what he 
had learned from other police officers' reports.  In addition to the November 6, 2005, car 
thefts which led to Mr. Luftig's conviction, the officer testified about other 
car thefts and thefts of personal property from cars in Fort Collins.        

 
 
[¶10]   The jury returned a guilty verdict 
and, after he was sentenced, Mr. Luftig appealed.    

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 

A.           
Evidentiary 
Error

 
 
[¶11]   Mr. Luftig argues the district 
court erred by allowing admission of prior bad acts evidence in excess of that 
permitted by its pre-trial ruling.  
He also asserts that Officer Bruce's testimony was inadmissible in 
several other ways, including hearsay, insufficient foundation, etc.  Mr. Luftig acknowledges the plain error 
standard of review applies because no contemporaneous objections were lodged to 
the challenged testimony.  "Under 
the plain error standard, the appellant must show a clear and unequivocal rule 
of law was violated, the violation clearly appears in the record, and it 
resulted in denial of a substantial right to [the appellant's] material 
prejudice."  Granzer v. State, 2008 WY 118, ¶ 9, 193 P.3d 266, 269 
(Wyo. 2008). 

 
 
[¶12]   The State called Officer Bruce to 
testify in its case in chief.  He 
related that on November 8, 2005, he had been assigned to investigate a series 
of thefts of Honda automobiles in Fort Collins during the early morning hours of 
November 6, 2005.  He testified as 
to what he had learned about the case from other police officers' reports.  He stated that four males, including Mr. 
Luftig, had traveled from Laramie to attend a party in Fort Collins in a stolen 
tan Honda Accord.  He 
continued:  

 
 
            
Q.        And 
during the course of the evening, were there other vehicles involved in the 
investigation that were determined to be stolen?

            
A.        
Yes.  

Q.        Can 
you just describe a little bit about where those vehicles were and how they were 
stolen?

            
A.        
According to witnesses  . . . 
they noted a group of males who they recognized from the party.  They were standing next to the tan Honda 
Accord in the parking lot, and it appeared that they were moving items from the 
tan Honda Accord to a blue Honda Accord.  
[One of the witnesses] concluded that these parties were likely stealing 
a car as well as breaking into other cars and stealing items out of 
them.

            
Q.        
Okay.  And the tan Honda 
Accord, you said that the four individuals, which included Christopher Luftig, 
that vehicle was stolen?

            
A.        
Yes.

            
Q.        And 
that vehicle, did you have an opportunity to get a description of  of that 
vehicle[?] . . . .

            
A.        The 
vehicle [was] described in the police report as a tan Honda Accord with a ski 
rack, according to witnesses and later on Mr. Luftig's friends' statements, that 
vehicle was recovered by police and ultimately determined to have been stolen 
from Fort Collins in the previous month.

            
Q.        . . . 
.  Was it determined if that [the 
tan Honda Accord] was driven by Christopher Luftig and his three other friends 
from Laramie to Fort Collins?

            
A.        
Yes.

            
Q.        And 
did those friends make any statements about the ignition in 
it?

            
[Defense Counsel]: Objection, 
hearsay, Your Honor.

            
THE COURT:            
Sustained.

            
Q.        
Okay.  Let's go to the other 
vehicles that were in Fort Collins, actually.  Were you able to determine in your 
investigation the vehicles that actually had been stolen on that night, if there 
was any damage to those vehicles?

            
A.        After 
reviewing the police reports, I discovered that a blue Honda Accord had been 
stolen from that same parking lot in which Mr. Luftig and his friends were seen 
near a blue Honda Accord that was parked next to the tan Honda Accord at one 
time.  That same vehicle was located 
several blocks away that same evening by Fort Collins Police, as well as several 
stolen items that were found in the grass near that vehicle.  And those items were later determined to 
be stolen out of other vehicles in that same vicinity.  And as far as the condition of the blue 
Honda Accord, if memory serves, the ignition had been 
punched.

                                    
Q.        
Okay.  Was there any damage 
to the window?

                                    
A.        Not 
that I recall.

            
Q.        And 
the  just to make it clear for the jury, the relationship between that vehicle 
that you are just discussing that the ignition had been punched, what does that 
have to do with Mr. Luftig?

            
A.        The 
ignition being punched just indicates that the vehicle was stolen.  Mr. Luftig had been seen near a vehicle 
matching that description . . . by witnesses . . . .  And that same vehicle was later reported 
to have been stolen from the same parking lot . . . .

            
Q.        
Okay.  And were there any 
other vehicles that had been reported being stolen in Fort Collins on that same 
night that Mr. Luftig was a suspect in stealing?

            
A.        
Yes.  On that same evening, 
another Honda Accord was reported stolen . . . a very short distance away from . 
. . where the blue Honda Accord was recovered from.  And because of the short distance and 
the circumstances in totality, Mr. Luftig was considered a strong suspect in 
that case as well.

            
Q.        What 
was the condition of that vehicle that was recovered?

            
A.        I'm 
not sure about that particular vehicle.

            
Q.        
Okay.  So you are not sure if 
the ignition had been punched in that vehicle?

            
A.        Not 
in that specific vehicle.

            
Q.        All 
right.  Were there other vehicles 
that were stolen?

            
A.        
Yes.  On or about December 
1st of 2005, I learned that two Honda Accords had been recovered in 
the city of Fort Collins[.] . . . A citizen of Fort Collins, on September 
24th of this year, had reported his Honda stolen . . . and that 
particular vehicle was located and recovered . . . on December 
1st.  Coincidentally, 
another vehicle had been recovered in front of this same victim's house on that 
same day, and that vehicle had been reported stolen from Laramie, Wyoming. 

            
. . . .

            
Q.        
Okay.  And what was the 
condition of that vehicle?

            
A.        If 
memory serves, it had a punched ignition.

            
Q.        
Okay.  And when we are 
talking about a punched ignition, could you kind of describe how that  what 
we're talking about?

            
A.        
Generally speaking, when you have a vehicle, just for the sake of 
argument, if you are going to steal a vehicle you don't have a key for, it's 
common in auto theft circles to have a screwdriver or some sort of lever to 
force into the ignition that would allow you to turn it and allow you to have 
enough force to turn and break that ignition to make the electrical contact and 
start the engine.

            
Q.        
[Were] there any other vehicles that were in there that you investigated 
in this investigation?

            
A.        On 
the same evening on November 6th, 200[5], there were four car trespasses that 
were reported. . . . They were reported in the same area as was the stolen Honda 
. . . .  They were all Honda Accords 
and Honda Civics, same general type of vehicle.

            
Q.        And 
do you remember if they had any type of damage done to 
them?

            
A.        No 
appreciable damage, because they had just been entered, and it appeared someone 
may have pried the window or the door jam lightly open to gain 
entrance.

            
Q.        So 
the windows had been tampered with?

            
A.        
Slightly.  On one vehicle, if 
memory serves, one vehicle had a broken window.

            
Q.        And 
on these vehicles, were ignitions punched on these 
vehicles?

            
A.        I 
don't recall.  I don't think so. 

            
Q.        
Okay.  To recap, we have the 
first blue vehicle  or the tan vehicle that was driven down by the individuals 
from Laramie to Wyoming [sic] that had been reported 
stolen?

            
A.        And 
was recovered by the Fort Collins Police Department.

            
Q.        And 
that vehicle did not belong to Mr. Luftig?

            
A.        No. 

            
Q.        Or 
any of the other occupants of that vehicle 

            
A.        
No.

            
Q.        -- 
that was driven? And we also have a blue vehicle that witnesses saw Mr. Luftig 
as well as others transporting goods from one vehicle to 
another?

            
A.        Yes. 

            
. . . .

            
Q.        . . . 
. And that vehicle had been reported stolen as well?

            
A.        
Yes.

            
Q.        And 
then we have another vehicle that was recovered in Fort Collins that had been 
stolen from Laramie?

            
A.        
Yes.

            
Q.        Okay. 
 And how was that one tied to Mr. 
Luftig, to the defendant?

            
A.        That 
particular vehicle just had been dropped off in the same area where another 
previous auto theft victim lived and had his vehicle stolen from, which 
coincidentally, was a Honda Accord.  
The other vehicle . . .  
coincidentally, I learned that it had three parking citations after it 
was stolen from the University of Wyoming.

                        
Q.        That 
was four.  Is that 
all?

            
A.        
Yes.

            
Q.        
Okay.  All right.  And the similarity in these vehicles is, 
they're all Hondas? 

            
A.        
Yes.

            
Q.        
Okay.  And then some of them 
actually had the ignitions punched out?

            
A.        
Yes.

            
Q.        And 
during your investigation of the theft that occurred when you are first talking 
about the defendant driving down from Laramie to Fort Collins, about what time 
of day were those vehicles stolen?

            
A.        As 
memory serves  well, Fort Collins Police was dispatched to this call initially 
a little after 2:00 o'clock in the morning on November 6th, 2005, so I presume that this trip down to the 
party was within a few hours before that time.

            
Q.        So 
early morning hours?

            
A.        Early 
morning hours.  
Yes.

            
Q.        So 
did this investigation lead to any charges against the defendant in this 
case?

            
A.        
Yes.

            
Q.        Do 
you know what those charges were?

            
A.        
Aggravated motor vehicle theft.

            
. . . .

            
Q.        What 
I'm handing you is marked State's Exhibit No. 23.  Do you know what that 
is?

            
A.        It's 
titled the Stipulation [and] Consent to Defer[red] Sentence. . . .                     

            
Q.        
Okay.  And is this deferred 
sentence where this defendant pled guilty, is that connected to your 
investigation?

            
A.        Yes, 
it is.

            
Q.        So 
that says that he has pled guilty to aggravated motor vehicle 
theft?

            
A.        Yes. 

 
 
[¶13]   Mr. Luftig argues that Officer 
Bruce's testimony included evidence that was not admitted in the district 
court's pre-trial 404(b) ruling, including:  thefts of vehicles on dates other than 
November 6, 2005; multiple thefts of personal property from vehicles; 
transporting stolen vehicles across state lines; and traffic citations on the UW 
campus.  He also claims that much of 
Officer Bruce's testimony, including that which related evidence allowed by the 
Rule 404(b) ruling, was subject to objection for various reasons such as 
hearsay, insufficient foundation, etc.  

 
 
[¶14]   The State does not seriously 
contest Mr. Luftig's assertion that a good deal of Officer Bruce's testimony was 
inadmissible and, it seems obvious that, in many instances, his testimony 
consisted of inadmissible hearsay and some of the testimony exceeded the 
district court's 404(b) evidence ruling.  
The officer improperly mentioned automobile thefts Mr. Luftig was 
suspected of committing at times other than those charged in the Colorado case, 
i.e., involving cars recovered on December 1, 2005.  In addition, he testified about thefts 
of personal property and the UW traffic tickets which also were not included in 
the evidence the district court had ruled as admissible.  Moreover, much of Officer Bruce's 
testimony was hearsay because he specifically stated that he was repeating what 
he had learned from other officers' reports, etc.  This testimony violated a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law.  The error 
also clearly appears in the record.  
Consequently, our focus in determining whether the district court 
committed plain error is on whether Mr. Luftig was denied a substantial right to 
his material prejudice.  

 
 
[¶15]   We start with what was allowed by 
the district court's order, keeping in mind that Mr. Luftig does not contest the 
district court's original 404(b) ruling.   The district court ruled that 
evidence of Mr. Luftig's Colorado conviction for a felony which occurred on 
November 6, 2005, was admissible.2  The documents the district court ruled 
admissible included a recitation of three other felonies that were dismissed in 
exchange for his guilty plea to the one deferred felony.3  In addition, it ruled that the aspects 
of the Colorado crimes which were similar to the Laramie crime, including the 
facts that the stolen cars were Hondas, they were entered by "jimmying" the 
windows, the ignitions were punched in order to start the cars, and the crimes 
occurred in the early morning hours, were admissible.  The district court explained that the 
evidence was allowed under Rule 404(b) to show Mr. Luftig's identity, modus operandi, and plan and 
specifically stated that he would be entitled to a limiting instruction.     

 
 
[¶16]   We consider the prejudicial effect 
of allowing the inadmissible evidence to be heard by the jury in the context of 
the district court's uncontested pre-trial 404(b) ruling and the other trial 
evidence.  The trial evidence 
included:  Mr. Luftig was 
apprehended within a very short time after Officer Johnson witnessed the 
perpetrator in the car; he was apprehended in close proximity to the crime 
scene; there were many similarities between Mr. Luftig's appearance and Officer 
Johnson's description of the suspect when he called for backup; Officer Johnson 
positively identified Mr. Luftig as the perpetrator; Mr. Luftig's prior record 
of having been involved in automobile thefts in Fort Collins on November 6, 
2005, and a subsequent conviction of one count of aggravated automobile theft 
arising from those activities; and the Colorado crimes involved early morning 
break-ins through the car windows and theft of Hondas by "punching" the 
ignitions.  The properly admitted 
evidence was sufficiently strong to overcome any prejudice which the 
inadmissible evidence may have caused.  
The district court did not, therefore, commit plain error by allowing the 
improper evidence to be heard by the jury.  

 
 
            
B.        Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel

 
 

[¶17]   Mr. Luftig bears the burden of 
proving that his trial counsel was ineffective.  Rutti v. State, 2004 WY 133, ¶¶ 22-23, 100 P.3d 394, 405 (Wyo. 2004).  In addition, he must demonstrate the 
existence of a reasonable probability that, absent the deficiency in counsel's 
performance, the result of the proceedings would have been different.  Id.  Failure to make the required showing of 
either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats an ineffectiveness 
claim.  Id.  See also, Dettloff v. State, 2007 WY 29, ¶ 17, 152 P.3d 376, 382 (Wyo. 2007); 
Hirsch v. State, 2006 WY 
66, ¶ 15, 135 P.3d 586, 594 
(Wyo. 2006), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).  These inquiries involve mixed questions 
of law and fact.  Strickland, 
466 U.S.  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068. 
 Our review, therefore, is de novo. 
Dettloff, ¶ 17, 152 P.3d  at 
382.

 
 

            
When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the paramount determination 
is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's acts or omissions were 
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.  We indulge a strong presumption that 
counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the 
exercise of reasonable professional judgment.  Under the two-prong standard 
articulated in Strickland, to warrant reversal on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate 
that his counsel failed to 
render such assistance as would 
have been offered by a reasonably competent attorney and that counsel's deficiency prejudiced the 
defense of the case. "The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness 
must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result." 

 
 

Id., 
¶ 
18, 152 P.3d  at 382 (internal citations omitted).  

 
 

[¶18]   We do not evaluate counsel's 
efforts in hindsight, but attempt to "reconstruct the circumstances surrounding 
the challenged conduct and evaluate the professional efforts from the 
perspective of counsel at the time."  Sincock 
v. State, 2003 
WY 115, ¶ 35, 76 P.3d 323, 336 
(Wyo. 2003).  In evaluating 
counsel's performance, we determine whether his actions could be considered 
sound trial strategy.  Id.  

 
 

[¶19]   Mr. Luftig strongly criticizes 
trial counsel's failure to object to Officer Bruce's testimony stating:  "[H]e was either asleep, incompetent, or 
under the false impression that the District Court had somehow admitted the 
improper evidence." 4  The State asserts that, although defense 
counsel could have objected to Officer Bruce's testimony, his failure to do so 
reflected his trial strategy. 

 
 
[¶20]   We analyze defense counsel's 
performance from his perspective at the time of trial.  Once the trial court ruled that the 
Colorado conviction and the 
circumstances surrounding the underlying charges were admissible, defense 
counsel had to construct his trial strategy to undermine the evidence.   

 
 
[¶21]   Defense counsel began his efforts 
to minimize Mr. Luftig's role in the Colorado case by mentioning it in his 
opening statement:

 
 
Now, 
you are going to hear about this prior conviction that Mr. Luftig pled to in 
Fort Collins in 2005.  Now, the 
evidence there is going to show that these were Honda vehicles that were 
involved.  We believe the evidence 
will . . . show that the only reason Mr. Luftig entered into this plea deal is 
because . . .  it was a plea 
bargain, and he was looking at five [sic] potential felonies versus the one he 
pled to, just to make it go away.  
And that's what he did . . . .

 
 
Defense 
counsel was simply informing the jury that Mr. Luftig's guilty plea was a 
tactical decision and did not necessarily identify him as the car thief. 

 
 
[¶22]   To further his efforts to constrain 
the effect of the Colorado crimes, defense counsel requested an instruction 
informing the jury about the limited purpose of the testimony.  The district court instructed the jury 
directly after Officer Bruce's testimony as follows:  

 
 
Ladies 
and gentlemen, I need to read you a supplementa[l] instruction.  I'll do that now.  Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of the person in order to show 
that he acted in conformity with the crime or crimes he is presently charged 
with.  The court has admitted 
evidence that Mr. Luftig previously pleaded guilty on a charge of motor vehicle 
theft for the limited purpose of attempting to establish Mr. Luftig's identity, 
modus operandi, knowledge,5 and plan.  You must not and are [prohibited] from 
considering this evidence [for] any other purpose except the limited purposes 
for which it was admitted.  

 
 
[¶23]   In accordance with the instruction, 
defense counsel crafted his objections to Officer Bruce's testimony to undermine 
the limited purposes for which the evidence was admitted.  Specifically, defense counsel raised an 
objection when the prosecutor asked Officer Bruce whether the other males with 
Mr. Luftig in Fort Collins had made any statements about the ignition.  His hearsay objection was sustained, 
thereby preventing the jury from hearing that Mr. Luftig's friends had singled 
him out as the person who had actually punched the ignition.  Importantly, none of Officer Bruce's 
testimony identified Mr. Luftig as the person who actually broke into the cars 
or punched the ignitions.   

 
 
[¶24]   Defense counsel's cross examination 
of Officer Bruce sheds further light on his strategy.  His examination emphasized that the 
officer did not know whether Mr. Luftig had actually punched the ignitions and 
that Mr. Luftig had never admitted to doing so.  Defense counsel also elicited admissions 
from the officer that Hondas were popular cars to steal and it was common to 
"punch" the ignitions in order to accomplish the theft.  Thus, his cross examination had the 
effect of showing that stealing Hondas by punching ignitions was not a unique 
signature crime and there was no proof that it was actually Mr. Luftig who 
punched the ignitions in the Colorado thefts.  

 
 
[¶25]   Defense counsel reiterated these 
concepts in his closing argument.  
He stressed that there was no evidence from the Colorado case that Mr. 
Luftig was the person who actually punched the ignitions and stole the cars and 
that he simply pleaded guilty to one deferred felony in order to avoid several 
possible felony convictions.  He 
also reminded the jury that they could consider the evidence of the Colorado 
crime only for the limited purpose of establishing Mr. Luftig's identity, modus operandi, knowledge and plan.     

 
 
[¶26]   Mr. Luftig asks us to analyze 
defense counsel's strategy in hindsight.  
Such an approach would violate our standard for reviewing defense 
counsel's performance from his perspective at the time of trial.  When we consider trial counsel's 
performance from the proper perspective, his trial strategy becomes clear.  He knew the evidence of the Colorado 
conviction and the circumstances leading to the underlying charges was going to 
be part of the trial evidence.  If 
defense counsel had elected to object to Officer Bruce's testimony regarding the 
evidence the district court had already ruled was admissible, it would only have 
resulted in the evidence being presented in a different manner and would have 
accomplished nothing except, perhaps, accentuating the evidence and alienating 
the jury.  

 
 
[¶27]   Mr. Luftig also asserts that 
defense counsel was ineffective because he told the jury in his opening 
statement that Mr. Luftig had previously been charged in Colorado with several 
car theft related felonies pertaining to the events of November 6, 2005, and had 
pleaded guilty to one count.  Mr. 
Luftig asserts that, because the prosecution did not ultimately offer the 
Statement of Plea Disposition into evidence, the jury would not have known of 
the dismissed counts if his counsel had not mentioned it.    

 
 
[¶28]   However, the district court's order 
was not limited to introduction of the Statement of Plea Disposition.  The district court also specifically 
allowed the prosecution to offer evidence of Mr. Luftig's conviction in Colorado 
of aggravated vehicle theft, the underlying charges and the circumstances which 
led to those charges.  Defense 
counsel understandably believed that the State would offer the Statement of Plea 
Disposition at trial and mentioned the other charges in his opening statement to 
explain that Mr. Luftig pleaded guilty to one deferred felony conviction to 
avoid several potential felony convictions.  His obvious intent was to defuse, as 
much as possible, the prejudice that would result from that information.  

 
 
[¶29]   When viewed in the appropriate 
light, we cannot say that defense counsel's failure to object to Officer Bruce's 
testimony about the evidence included in the district court's pre-trial 404(b) 
ruling was outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.  Defense counsel's actions amounted to 
sound trial strategy, and Mr. Luftig did not overcome the presumption 
that his counsel provided the constitutionally guaranteed assistance of 
counsel.

 
 
[¶30]   Defense counsel's failure to object 
to Officer Bruce's testimony about acts that were not included in the trial 
court's 404(b) ruling is, however, a different matter.  When the officer mentioned the 
automobiles recovered on December 1, 2005, etc., he was testifying about matters 
that were beyond the trial court's pre-trial 404(b) ruling.  Defense counsel did not appear to be 
following a sound trial strategy when he did not object to that evidence and his 
performance was deficient.  

 
 
[¶31]   Mr. Luftig is not, however, 
entitled to have his conviction reversed  
because he has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by his 
counsel's failure to object to the inadmissible testimony.  As we explained above, the evidence 
pertaining to the Laramie car theft and Officer Johnson's identification of Mr. 
Luftig as the man he saw in the burglarized car, together with the properly 
admissible evidence of his Colorado conviction and circumstances surrounding it, 
was sufficient to justify a conviction.  
Under these circumstances, we are not convinced that had defense counsel 
objected and succeeded in keeping the improper testimony from the jury, the 
result of the proceedings would have been different.

 
 
[¶32]   Affirmed.   

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Section 
6-3-301(a) states in relevant part:

 
 
   (a) A person is guilty of burglary 
if, without authority, he enters or remains in a building, occupied structure or 
vehicle, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with intent to 
commit larceny or a felony therein.

 
 
Mr. Luftig was also initially charged with possession of burglar's tools 
in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-304(a) (LexisNexis 2009), but he was not 
bound over to the district court on that charge.  

 
 

2Because Mr. Luftig testified at trial, his conviction was also admissible 
under W.R.E. 609(a)(1) to attack his credibility.

 
 

3The prosecution did not offer the Statement of Plea Disposition, which 
referenced the three dismissed felony charges, as evidence at trial.  Nevertheless, the evidence was part of 
the district court's pre-trial ruling and, consequently, Officer Bruce's 
discussion of the facts that resulted in those charges fell within the evidence 
it admitted.  

 
 

4Mr. Luftig argues that defense counsel's failure to object was especially 
egregious because some of Officer Bruce's testimony included repetition of 
witness statements indicating they believed Mr. Luftig was "stealing" a 
car.  He claims that this testimony 
was error per se under Whiteplume v. 
State, 841 P.2d 1332, 1338 
(Wyo. 1992).  The problem with Mr. 
Luftig's argument is that the Whiteplume 
rule applies when a witness offers an opinion as to the defendant's guilt of 
the charged crime.  Here, the 
witness was making a statement about the defendant's possible involvement in a 
prior bad act.

 
 

5The 
district court's order allowing the other bad acts evidence did not mention 
"knowledge" as one of its purposes for admitting the evidence.  Nevertheless, the supplemental 
instruction included "knowledge."  
Because Mr. Luftig does not specifically argue that adding "knowledge" to 
the list of purposes in the limiting instruction was improper, we will not 
discuss it any further.