Case Title: The Florida Bar Re: Advisory Opinion - Shore v. Wall, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC17-1510

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2018-10-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-1510 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR RE:  ADVISORY OPINION— 
SHORE v. WALL, et al. 
 
October 4, 2018 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
James Wall filed with the Standing Committee on the Unlicensed Practice of 
Law (Standing Committee) a request for issuance of an advisory opinion pursuant 
to the procedures set forth in Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 10-9.1 and this 
Court’s opinion in Goldberg v. Merrill Lynch Credit Corp., 35 So. 3d 905 (Fla. 
2010).  In the request, Wall alleged that Jeffrey Paine and his company, Jupiter 
Asset Recovery, LLC (collectively “JAR”), engaged in the unlicensed practice of 
law in connection with JAR’s attempt to recover surplus funds from the Manatee 
County Clerk of Court’s registry on Wall’s behalf.  The Standing Committee held 
a public hearing where it considered live and written testimony, see Rule 
Regulating the Florida Bar 10-9.1(f), and ultimately filed with this Court a 
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proposed advisory opinion concluding that JAR’s conduct, as alleged by Wall and 
if taken as true, would constitute the unlicensed practice of law.1 
 
After the Standing Committee’s proposed advisory opinion was filed, 
interested parties were permitted to file briefs in support of or in opposition to the 
proposed advisory opinion.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 10-9.1(g)(3).  JAR and 
Global Discoveries, Ltd., filed briefs in opposition to the proposed advisory 
opinion; the Standing Committee filed a response to the briefs.  After considering 
the proposed opinion and the briefs of the interested parties, the Court approves the 
proposed advisory opinion as set forth in the appendix to this opinion.2 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA and LAWSON, JJ., 
concur. 
CANADY, C.J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
CANADY, C.J., dissenting. 
 
I adhere to the view that “the Florida Constitution gives this Court no  
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.; R. Regulating Fla. 
Bar 10-9.1(g). 
 
2.  References in the Appendix to TABS A, B, and C, are to the attachments 
to the proposed advisory opinion originally filed by the Standing Committee in this 
case on August 15, 2017. 
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authority to issue” the advisory opinions regarding pending litigation contemplated 
by rule 10-9.1.  Fla. Bar re Advisory Op.—Scharrer v. Fundamental Admin. Servs., 
176 So. 3d 1273, 1279 (Fla. 2015) (Canady, J., dissenting).  I therefore would 
dismiss this proceeding. 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar Re: Advisory Opinion  
 
Kellie D. Scott, Chair, Jeffrey T. Picker, and William A. Spillias, Standing 
Committee on Unlicensed Practice of Law, Tallahassee, Florida,  
 
for Petitioner  
 
Kevin P. Tynan of Richardson & Tynan, P.L.C., on behalf of Jupiter Asset 
Recovery, LLC and Jeffrey Paine, Tamarac, Florida; Amy L. Dilday, Starlett M. 
Massey, and Jonathan D. Kaplan of McCumber, Daniels, Buntz, Hartig, Puig, & 
Ross, P.A., on behalf of Global Discoveries, Ltd., Tampa, Florida, 
 
Responding 
 
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APPENDIX 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR 
STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE 
UNLICENSED PRACTICE OF LAW 
 
 
 
FAO #2017-1, SHORE V. WALL, ET. AL. 
                                                                                                                                    / 
 
 
 
PROPOSED ADVISORY OPINION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
August 15, 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This request for a formal advisory opinion is brought pursuant to Rule 10- 
 
9.1 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar and Goldberg v. Merrill Lynch Credit 
Corp., 35 So. 3d 905 (Fla. 2010); (TAB A). 1 The Petitioner, James Wall 
(hereinafter, “Wall”), is a defendant in an interpleader action filed by the Clerk of 
the Circuit Court of Manatee County (Case No. 2014 CA 3155). In Wall’s Answer 
to Complaint For Interpleader and Objection and Defenses to Jupiter Asset 
Recovery, LLC’s Claim to Surplus Funds, he asserted that Jupiter Asset Recovery, 
LLC (hereinafter, “JAR”) engaged in the unlicensed practice of law. The Circuit 
Court, citing Goldberg, found that it did not have jurisdiction over the unlicensed 
practice of law claim and stayed the case pending a determination by the Supreme 
Court of Florida whether JAR’s conduct constitutes the unlicensed practice of law 
(TAB A, p. 23). 
Pursuant to Rule 10-9.1(f) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, public 
notice of the hearing was provided on The Florida Bar’s website, in The Florida 
1 Petitioner filed an unlicensed practice of law complaint/request for formal 
advisory opinion, which was originally investigated by the local circuit committee 
under Rules 10-5 and 10-6 of the R. Regulating Fla. Bar. Finding that respondent, 
Jeffrey Paine, and his company, Jupiter Asset Recovery, LLC, engaged in the 
unlicensed practice of law, the circuit committee offered respondent a cease and 
desist affidavit, which he refused to sign. Because there is no Florida case law on 
point, the local circuit committee closed its investigation and forwarded the request 
for formal advisory opinion to the Standing Committee on the Unlicensed Practice 
of Law (hereinafter, “Standing Committee”). 
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Bar News, and in the Orlando Sentinel. The Standing Committee held a public 
hearing on January 26, 2017. Testifying on behalf of the petitioner were attorneys 
Ryan J. Hittel and Christopher M. Hittel. Testifying on behalf of JAR was attorney 
Kevin Tynan and Jeffrey Paine (hereinafter, “Paine”). Also testifying were 
attorneys Starlett Massey and Jonathan D. Kaplan (Tab B). In addition to the 
testimony presented at the hearing, the Standing Committee received written 
testimony from the Petitioners and JAR/Paine which has been filed with this Court 
(Tab C). 
The question presented for consideration by the Standing Committee is 
whether a nonlawyer company is engaged in the unlicensed practice of law when it 
holds itself out as having special knowledge on how to recover excess proceeds 
from a tax deed sale held by the Clerk of Court under Chapter 197, Fla. Stat.; 
identifies and contacts owners of excess tax deed sale proceeds for the purpose of 
offering to recover the excess proceeds on their behalf from the Clerk of Court; 
offers the owners of excess proceeds a contingency arrangement using a purported 
assignment modified by an agreement to share the excess proceeds upon recovery, 
with the owner retaining a 60% interest in the excess proceeds; requests from the 
Clerk of Court the surplus funds based on the purported assignment; and files 
pleadings in interpleader actions to recover the surplus funds. 
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GOLDBERG V. MERRILL LYNCH CREDIT CORP. 
In Goldberg, the petitioners filed class action lawsuits to recover document 
preparation fees charged by respondent Merrill Lynch for services performed by its 
clerical personnel in processing mortgage loans. Merrill Lynch moved to dismiss 
the complaints, arguing, among other things, that the circuit court lacked 
jurisdiction to hear any claims relating to the unlicensed practice of law. The 
circuit court granted the motions and dismissed the cases. The Fourth District 
Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissals because the respondents had not 
previously been prosecuted for the unlicensed practice of law by The Florida Bar or 
disciplined by this Court. This Court approved the Fourth District’s decision to 
affirm the dismissals finding that: 
To state a cause of action for damages under any legal 
theory that arises from the unauthorized practice of law, 
we hold that the pleading must state that this Court has 
ruled that the specified conduct at issue constitutes the 
unauthorized practice of law. (citation omitted) Stated 
another way, a claimant must allege as an essential 
element of any cause of action premised on the 
unlicensed practice of law that this Court has ruled the 
activities are the unauthorized practice of law. (citations 
omitted) 
* * * 
 
[A] plaintiff will not be able to state a cause of action 
premised on the unauthorized practice of law on a case of 
first impression (where this Court has not ruled on the 
actions at issue). In those cases, the pleading may be 
dismissed without prejudice or the action may be stayed 
 
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until a determination from this Court pursuant to the 
advisory opinion procedures of rule 10-9.1 or the 
complaint and injunctive relief procedures of rules 10-5, 
10-6, and 10-7 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. 
(citations omitted) 
Goldberg at 907-8. 
 
In staying the Manatee County interpleader action at issue here, the circuit 
court cited to Goldberg, and noted that the Supreme Court of Florida has exclusive 
jurisdiction to determine the issue of unlicensed practice of law (TAB A, p. 23). 
RULE 10-9.1 OF THE RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR 
 
In Goldberg, this Court recognized that rule 10-9.1(c) of the Rules 
Regulating The Florida Bar prevents a proposed formal advisory opinion from 
being issued “with respect to any case or controversy pending in any court or 
tribunal in this jurisdiction” thereby prohibiting the Standing Committee from 
issuing a proposed formal advisory opinion while the underlying action is stayed or 
dismissed without prejudice. The Court, therefore, suspended the rule in the 
circumstances described in Goldberg and directed The Florida Bar to propose a 
rule change according to the opinion. Subsequently, rule 10-9.1 was amended to 
add language to provide that “the [Standing Committee] shall issue a formal 
advisory opinion under circumstances described by the court in Harold Goldberg 
v. Merrill Lynch Credit Corporation, 35 So. 3d 905 (Fla. 2010) when the petitioner 
is a party to a lawsuit and that suit has been stayed or voluntarily dismissed without 
 
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prejudice.” The Court, sua sponte, amended rule 10-9.1(c) in In re: Amendments 
to Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 10-9.1, 176 So. 3d 1273 (Mem) (Fla. 2015).2 
Consequently, if a proper Goldberg request is brought, a proposed advisory 
opinion must be issued.3 
Because this is a case of first impression, and the circuit court stayed the 
action pending a determination from this Court, this was a proper Goldberg 
request. A public hearing was held on January 26, 2017, after which the Standing 
Committee voted to issue the proposed formal advisory opinion that follows. 
FACTS 
 
The factual allegations relating to Wall’s claim that JAR engaged in the 
unlicensed practice of law are contained in paragraphs numbered 15 – 47 of 
Defendant, James M. Wall’s Answer to Complaint for Interpleader and Objection 
and Defenses to Jupiter Asset Recovery, LLC’s Claim to Surplus Funds (TAB A, 
pp. 12 – 17), Mr. Wall’s April 15, 2015 statement accompanying his unlicensed 
practice of law complaint (TAB A, pp. 3 – 4), and the January 13, 2017, Statement 
of Petitioner, James M. Wall, For Hearing on Request for Goldberg Advisory 
 
 
 
2 Consistent with Goldberg, the amendment deleted the requirement for a 
“voluntary” dismissal. 
3 Footnote 3 of Goldberg provides “To be clear, the Florida Bar shall issue a 
formal advisory opinion upon request of a party in the circumstances described 
herein.” 35 So. 3d at 908. 
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Opinion (TAB C, pp. 2 – 17). Wall alleged the following operative facts which are 
summarized in relevant part as follows: 
1. Paine/JAR contacted Wall regarding a tax deed surplus being held in the 
court’s registry after a tax deed sale of Wall’s property. (TAB A, p. 3 and p. 12, 
paragraph 15) 
2. Paine convinced Wall to hire JAR/Paine to recover the surplus funds on 
his behalf (TAB A, p. 12, paragraph 16). Wall assumed he was dealing with a 
licensed attorney (TAB C, p. 3, paragraph 6). 
3. Paine sent a notary to Wall’s business with two documents to sign, an 
“Agreement” (TAB A, p. 5) and an “Absolute Assignment of Interest in Tax Deed 
Surplus Proceeds” (TAB A, p. 6). Wall signed both documents. (TAB A, p. 13, 
paragraphs 17 and 19) 
4. Wall believed at the time he signed the Agreement and Absolute 
Assignment that Paine was agreeing to represent him. (TAB A, p. 4) 
5. The Agreement attempts to allow JAR to file documents to recover the tax 
deed surplus on Wall’s behalf, with 60% of the proceeds going to Wall and the 
remainder (minus any costs) going to JAR. (TAB A, p. 13, paragraph 18) 
6. Under the Agreement, Wall purports to transfer his interest in the surplus 
funds to JAR so that JAR can “file all necessary documents in order to recover any 
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and all monies available as a result of the tax deed sale.” (TAB A, p. 15, paragraph 
33) 
7. The Agreement also states that JAR shall “make every effort to obtain any 
available funds through the Clerk of Court.” (TAB A, p. 15, paragraph 34) 
8. The essence of the Agreement is clear, JAR will file the necessary court 
documents to obtain payment from the Clerk of Court on a contingency basis, for a 
40% fee (which would amount to a fee near $94,000). (TAB A, p. 16, paragraph 
35) 
9. Because JAR is not a law firm, and Paine is not an attorney, the only way 
JAR could file documents with the court on Wall’s behalf was to come before the 
court as a straw-man assignee. (TAB A, p. 16, paragraph 36) 
10. JAR did not disclose the Agreement when filing his proof of claim with 
the Clerk of Court to recover the surplus tax deed funds nor did it disclose the 
Agreement to the court in the interpleader action so that it would not be apparent 
on the face of its claim that it was representing another party. (TAB A, p. 16, 
paragraph 37, and TAB A, pp. 7 – 9) 
11. Even though Wall signed the Absolute Assignment and Agreement he 
understood that JAR/Paine would receive 40% of all funds recovered in return for 
their work to recover the funds. (TAB A, p. 3) 
 
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12. At the time Wall signed the Absolute Assignment and Agreement, liens 
on the property held by the IRS and Manatee County Code Enforcement exceeded 
the amount of the surplus. (TAB A, p. 13, paragraph 20) 
13. After the tax deed sale, the IRS lien was paid in full at the closing of the 
sale of another property Wall owned, and the Manatee County Code Enforcement 
lien was substantially reduced. The payment of the IRS lien and the reduction in 
the code enforcement fine resulted in the surplus funds available to the owner 
increasing from $0 to approximately $235,000. (TAB A, p. 13, paragraphs 21 – 
23) 
14. JAR seeks to recover 40% of this $235,000. (TAB A, p. 13, paragraph 
 
24) 
 
15. Paine drafted a letter for Wall’s signature to the attorney for the Clerk of 
Court in the interpleader action (TAB A, p. 10). The letter, which Wall did not 
sign, includes the following language: “I understand that Jupiter has filed an 
Answer and Cross Claim in this matter which protects my interest in these funds[]” 
and “Please consider this letter as notice that I shall not file a responsive pleading 
in this case and I consent to a default against me in this case.” (TAB A, p.10 and p. 
16, paragraphs 38 – 40) 
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DISCUSSION 
 
As this Court noted in The Florida Bar re: Advisory Opinion – Scharrer v. 
Fundamental Administrative Services, 176 So. 3d 1273, 1278 (Fla. 2015), it is not 
the Standing Committee’s role to sit as the trier of facts or to decide disputed facts: 
Although we recognize that the Standing Committee does 
not sit as a trier of fact, and it is not the Committee’s role 
to decide disputed issues of fact, our decision in Goldberg 
does authorize the Standing Committee to determine 
whether the specific facts as alleged in a petition for an 
advisory opinion, if those facts are taken as true, would 
constitute the unlicensed or unauthorized practice of law. 
 
Thus, in reviewing the alleged facts the Standing Committee takes as true 
those facts, and applies existing case law to the facts to determine whether the 
activity in question constitutes the unlicensed practice of law. 
Essentially, Wall alleged that JAR/Paine: (1) held himself out as an attorney 
and as having special knowledge on how to recover excess proceeds from a tax 
deed sale, (2) represented him in the interpleader action, and (3) prepared legal 
documents for him which affected his important legal rights. 
Holding Out 
 
Allegations regarding Paine holding himself out as an attorney are contained 
within paragraphs 2 and 4 above, and paragraph 43 of Wall’s Interpleader Answer 
(TAB A, p. 17), which states that: 
Mr. Paine also holds himself out to be an attorney on his 
website, despite not being licensed to practice law in 
Florida. See Composite Exhibit ‘E’, attached (Google 
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search showing title of jupiterassetrecovery.com to be 
“Jupiter Asset Recovery | Jeffrey Paine Attorney”; Source 
code of jupiterassetrecovery.com containing the page title 
“Jupiter Asset Recovery | Jeffrey Paine Attorney”.) 
Taken as true, these allegations raise unlicensed practice of law concerns 
because it constitutes the unlicensed practice of law for nonlawyers to hold 
themselves out as lawyers. The Florida Bar v. Warren, 655 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 
1995). As this Court found in The Florida Bar v. Gordon, 661 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 
1995), it constitutes the unlicensed practice of law for nonlawyers to “impliedly or 
expressly, personally or by use of advertisement, hold[] themselves out as lawyers 
and authorized to practice law in Florida and describing themselves as lawyers, 
attorneys, attorneys at law, esquire, counselor, counsel, or any other title that is 
designed to lead a member of the public into believing that respondents are  
licensed to practice law in Florida and able to render assistance with legal matters.” 
By contacting owners of excess tax deed sale proceeds for the purpose of 
offering to recover the excess proceeds on their behalf from the Clerk of Court, 
JAR/Paine is implicitly holding out as having special knowledge on how to recover 
the excess proceeds. This raises unlicensed practice of law concerns because it 
constitutes the unlicensed practice of law for a nonlawyer to hold himself out as 
having special knowledge or expertise in legal areas. The Florida Bar v. Davide, 
702 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1997) (nonlawyer engaged in unlicensed practice of law and 
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enjoined from advertising that his or her company specializes in legal areas or that 
gives the public the expectation that the company has expertise in the field of law, 
and that describes legal procedures). 
Representation in Interpleader Action 
 
The gravamen of the allegations in paragraphs 3 – 15 above are that 
JAR/Paine had Wall execute both an Absolute Assignment and an Agreement to 
assist Wall in obtaining the tax deed surplus from the Clerk and the court. 
However, JAR/Paine only filed the Absolute Assignment with the Clerk and the 
court in the interpleader action, so that it would appear to the Clerk and court that 
Wall assigned his interest in the tax deed surplus to JAR/Paine. The Absolute 
Assignment provides “This Agreement is complete, in and of itself, representing 
the entire agreement between all Parties hereto[.]” However, the Agreement, 
executed contemporaneously with the Absolute Assignment, indicates that there 
was not an absolute or complete assignment. The Agreement, which mandates that 
JAR make every effort to obtain the surplus funds, provides that Wall will receive 
60% of the surplus funds recovered by JAR. The remaining 40% would go to  
JAR. The effect of this Agreement, which was not disclosed to the Clerk or the 
court, is that any action that JAR took with the Clerk or the court in the 
interpleader action to obtain the tax deed surplus it took not only on its own behalf, 
but on behalf of Wall as well. Before Wall filed his Answer in the interpleader 
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action, JAR/Paine prepared and sent him a letter to sign and send to the Clerk’s 
attorney, wherein Wall asserts his understanding that JAR filed an Answer and 
Cross Claim which protects his interest in the surplus funds and that he would not 
be filing a responsive pleading in the interpleader case and that he consents to a 
default judgment against him.  Wall did not sign this letter. 
Taken as true, the allegations in paragraphs 3 – 15 above raise unlicensed 
practice of law concerns because it constitutes the unlicensed practice of law for a 
nonlawyer to represent another in court. As this Court stated, axiomatically, “It is 
generally understood that the performance of services in representing another 
before the courts is the practice of law.”4   See The Florida Bar v. Smania, 701 So. 
2d 835 (Fla. 1997) (nonlawyer enjoined from appearing in court on behalf of others 
other than as a witness); The Florida Bar v. Eubanks, 752 So. 2d 540 (Fla.      
1999) (nonlawyer engaged in unlicensed practice of law and enjoined from 
appearing in any Florida court, directly or indirectly, as a spokesperson or 
representative for litigants in any court proceeding); The Florida Bar v. Snapp, 472 
So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1985) (nonlawyer engaged in unlicensed practice of law and 
enjoined from representing an individual other than himself in court proceedings); 
The Florida Bar v. Strickland, 468 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1985) (nonlawyer engaged in 
 
 
4 The Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 1962), judg. vacated on other 
grounds, 373 U.S. 379 (1963). 
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the unlicensed practice of law and enjoined from appearing in Florida courts on 
behalf of a party in family law matters); The Florida Bar v. Rich, 481 So. 2d 1221 
(Fla. 1986) (nonlawyer engaged in unlicensed practice of law and enjoined from 
representing others in court in eviction and criminal matters). 
Here, JAR/Paine was representing Wall because Wall still had an interest in 
the litigation. This was not a situation where Wall signed over all of his interests 
in the proceeds of the sale to JAR/Paine so that JAR/Paine became the party to the 
action. Instead, JAR/Paine offered Wall a contingency fee agreement where Wall 
retained an interest in the proceeds of the sale as he stood to gain 60% from any 
recovery.  Wall was, therefore, a party to the action and was being represented by 
JAR. By so representing Wall, JAR/Paine engaged in the unlicensed practice of 
law. 
Preparation of Documents Affecting Legal Rights 
Taken as true, the allegations in paragraphs 9 and 15 above raise unlicensed 
practice of law concerns because it constitutes the unlicensed practice of law for a 
nonlawyer to prepare a document for another which affects their important legal 
rights. The Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 1962), judg. vacated 
on other grounds, 373 U.S. 379 (1963); The Florida Bar v. Gordon, 661 So. 2d 
295 (Fla. 1995) (nonlawyer engaged in unlicensed practice of law and enjoined 
from allowing members of the public to rely on respondents to properly prepare 
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legal forms or legal documents affecting an individual’s legal rights); The Florida 
Bar v. Eidson, 703 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1997) (nonlawyer enjoined from preparing and 
filing legal documents on behalf of another); The Florida Bar v. Williams, 388 So. 
2d 564 (Fla. 1980) (nonlawyer enjoined from assisting customers in preparing 
documents or forms necessary for submission to any court or governmental 
agency); The Florida Bar v. Miravalle, 761 So. 2d 1049, 1051 (Fla. 2000) (“This 
Court has repeatedly held that the preparation of legal documents by a nonlawyer 
for another person to a greater extent than typing or writing information provided 
by the customer on a form constitutes the unlicensed practice of law.” (citations 
omitted)). Both the letter to the Clerk’s attorney consenting to a default judgment 
and the answer filed by JAR/Paine in the interpleader action would certainly affect 
Mr. Wall’s important legal rights by requesting from the Clerk of Court surplus 
funds. 
Further, taken as true, the above allegations raise unlicensed practice of law 
concerns to the extent Wall relied on JAR/Paine to file with the Clerk and court the 
necessary documents to obtain the surplus tax deed funds. As this Court noted in 
The Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1193-4 (Fla. 1978), “it is clear 
that her clients placed some reliance upon her to properly prepare the necessary 
legal forms for their dissolution proceedings. To this extent we believe that Ms. 
Brumbaugh overstepped proper bounds and engaged in the unauthorized practice 
 
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of law.” See also The Florida Bar v. Williams, 388 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 1980) 
(nonlawyer enjoined from allowing members of the public to rely on her to 
properly prepare legal forms or legal documents affecting a customer’s legal 
rights). 
PUBLIC HARM 
Separate from the unlicensed practice of law issue, the Standing Committee 
was also concerned that JAR/Paine’s business model of only filing the Absolute 
Assignment with the Clerk and court, and not also disclosing the 
contemporaneously executed Agreement, when attempting to recover the tax deed 
surplus was, at a minimum, misleading, and perhaps, a fraud on the court, because 
the true relationship between JAR/Paine and its customers is not disclosed to the 
Clerk and court. Without knowledge of the Agreement, the court would have no 
way of knowing about the unlicensed practice of law occurring before it. If an 
attorney filed misleading documents with a court that hid his or her true 
relationship with the client, the attorney would be subject to discipline for lack of 
candor toward the tribunal. Just as lawyers must avoid conduct that undermines 
the integrity of the adjudicative process, this Court must ensure that nonlawyers do 
not undermine the integrity of the adjudicative process. As this Court noted in The 
Florida Bar v. Moses, 380 So. 2d 412, 417 (Fla. 1980), “the single most important 
 
 
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concern in the Court’s defining and regulating the practice of law is the protection 
of the public from incompetent, unethical, or irresponsible representation.” 
The Standing Committee had similar concerns about the language in the 
Absolute Assignment, which provides that “This Agreement is complete, in and of 
itself, representing the entire agreement between all Parties hereto.” The statement 
was patently false. The Absolute Assignment did not represent the entire 
agreement between JAR/Paine and Wall; there was also the contemporaneously 
executed Agreement between the parties. It was this Agreement which resulted in 
JAR/Paine’s improper representation of Wall before the Clerk and the court in the 
interpleader action. The Standing Committee felt that this patently false language 
in the Absolute Assignment was, at a minimum, misleading, and perhaps a fraud 
on the court, and warrants the public’s protection by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
 
It is the opinion of the Standing Committee on the Unlicensed Practice of 
Law that a nonlawyer company is engaged in the unlicensed practice of law when 
it holds itself out as having special knowledge on how to recover excess proceeds 
from a tax deed sale held by the Clerk of Court under Chapter 197, Fla. Stat.; 
identifies and contacts owners of excess tax deed sale proceeds for the purpose of 
offering to recover the excess proceeds on their behalf from the Clerk of Court; 
offers the owners of excess proceeds a contingency arrangement using a purported 
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assignment modified by an agreement to share the excess proceeds upon recovery, 
with the owner retaining a 60% interest in the excess proceeds; requests from the 
Clerk of Court the surplus funds based on the purported assignment; and files 
pleadings in interpleader actions to recover the surplus funds. 
The Standing Committee is not sitting as the trier of fact in this matter. 
Should this Court adopt the Standing Committee’s proposed formal advisory 
opinion, it would establish the precedent required by Goldberg and be the standard 
to be applied by the trier of fact in ultimately deciding whether the defendants 
engaged in the unlicensed practice of law. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
 
/s/ Kellie D. Scott by Jeffrey T. Picker 
Kellie D. Scott, Chair 
Standing Committee on 
Unlicensed Practice of Law 
The Florida Bar 
651 E. Jefferson Street 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300 
(850) 561-5840 
Fla. Bar No. 432600 
Primary Email: upl@flabar.org 
 
/s/ Jeffrey T. Picker 
Jeffrey T. Picker 
Fla. Bar No. 12793 
 
/s/ William A. Spillias 
William A. Spillias 
Fla. Bar No. 909769 
The Florida Bar 
651 East Jefferson Street  
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Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300 
(850) 561-5840 
Primary Email: jpicker@flabar.org 
Secondary Email: upl@flabar.org