Case Title: Hendricks v. Jones

Citation: 

Docket Number: 108797

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2013-09-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
HENDRICKS v. JONES2013 OK 71Case Number: 108797Decided: 09/17/2013THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN 
THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 

JOSEPH W. HENDRICKS, Plaintiff/Appellant,v.JUSTIN JONES 
ex rel. STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 
Defendant/Appellee.
ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS,DIVISION 
IV
¶0 Plaintiff, a sex offender, challenges the constitutionality and 
application of the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), 57 O.S., § 581 et seq., as applied to offenses that 
predate the Act and its amendments. The trial court sustained summary judgment 
in favor of the Defendant. On appeal the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals 
affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS VACATED;THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ORDER SUSTAINING MOTION FOR SUMMARYJUDGMENT IS REVERSED AND REMANDED 
FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION
James Alexander Drummond, Jim Drummond Law Firm, PLC, Norman, Oklahoma, for 
Plaintiff/Appellant Larry Foster, II, Oklahoma Department of Corrections, 
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee Cornelius Leader and John 
David Hadden, Asst. Attys. Gen., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee 

COMBS, J.:
¶1 Plaintiff, Joseph W. Hendricks (hereinafter, "Hendricks"), challenges the 
constitutionality of the Sex Offenders Registration Act (hereinafter, "SORA") 
57 O.S., § 581 et seq., and enforcement 
thereof by the Defendant, Justin Jones ex rel. State of Oklahoma ex rel. 
Oklahoma Department of Corrections (hereinafter, "Department"). We hold applying 
SORA's requirements to sex offenders now residing in Oklahoma who were convicted 
in another jurisdiction prior to SORA's enactment but not applying the same 
requirements to a person convicted in Oklahoma of a similar offense prior to 
SORA's enactment, violates a person's equal protection guarantees.
BACKGROUND
¶2 This matter was assigned to this office on February 6, 2013. In 1989, the 
Oklahoma Legislature enacted SORA to provide a system to register sex offenders. 
Title 57 O.S. Supp. 1989, § 
581 et seq. In 1997, section 581 was amended to add legislative findings 
essentially stating the purpose of SORA was to create a system of registration 
permitting law enforcement to identify sex offenders and alert the public of 
such sex offenders when necessary.1 SORA has been amended by the Oklahoma legislature in 
almost every year since its creation. 
¶3 Hendricks came to Oklahoma in August 2009. At that time, subsection A of 
section 582 provided SORA was applicable to a person who after November 
1, 1989, has been convicted, received a suspended sentence or any other 
probationary term, or is currently serving a sentence or any form of probation 
or parole for one of the listed Oklahoma crimes and who is residing, working or 
attending school in Oklahoma.2 The language, "or is currently serving a 
sentence or any form of probation and parole," was added by 2005 Okla. Sess. 
Laws c. 123, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 2005. We interpret this language to mean SORA was 
also intended to apply to persons convicted in Oklahoma of one of the listed 
crimes, regardless of when the conviction occurred, and who, on November 1, 
2005, were still serving their sentence or any form of probation or parole. 
Subsection B of section 582 also made SORA applicable to persons who after 
November 1, 1989, reside, work or attend school in Oklahoma and who, at any 
time, were convicted or received a suspended sentence in any court of 
another state, federal court, an Indian tribal court or a military court for an 
applicable sex crime.3 Section 583 of SORA also provided, as follows:
B. Any person who has been convicted of an offense or received a deferred 
judgment for an offense in another jurisdiction, which offense if 
committed or attempted in this state, would have been punishable as one or more 
of the offenses listed in Section 582 of this title and who enters this state on 
or after November 1, 1989, shall register, in person, as follows: . . . .
Title 57 O.S. Supp. 2008, § 
583 (emphasis added).
Pursuant to such laws, persons convicted in Oklahoma of an applicable 
offense before November 1, 1989, would not have to register unless they were, as 
of November 1, 2005, still serving their sentence or any form of probation or 
parole; however, persons like Hendricks who were convicted of an equivalent 
offense in another jurisdiction before November 1, 1989, would have to 
register regardless if they were still serving their sentence or any form of 
probation or parole as of November 1, 2005.4 Therefore, the statute treated persons differently 
depending upon whether their conviction, suspended sentence, deferred judgment 
or any probationary term was imposed in Oklahoma or in another jurisdiction. 

¶4 Hendricks, was convicted in California in 1982 of the Oklahoma equivalent 
offense of lewd or indecent acts to a child.5 The record does not reflect whether he was serving his 
sentence or any form of probation or parole on November 1, 2005. He moved to 
Oklahoma in August 2009 and was informed of his duty to register under SORA a 
couple of months later. Hendricks registered but denied being subject to SORA. 
On March 22, 2010, he filed a Petition for Injunction to prohibit the Department 
from continuing to force him to register as a sex offender. Both parties 
thereafter filed for summary judgment. Hendricks argued the retroactive 
application of SORA by the Department violated the ban on ex post facto laws, 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution, the Due 
Process Clauses of the United States and Oklahoma Constitutions, and denied him 
equal protection of the law. 
¶5 The trial court entered an order sustaining summary judgment in favor of 
the Department, finding SORA and its application to the plaintiff 
constitutional. Hendricks appealed. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, 
Division IV, (hereinafter "COCA") affirmed the trial court's ruling, finding 
SORA applies to Hendricks but declined to address the constitutionality of SORA. 
COCA remanded the matter to determine what specific amendments to the original 
act should apply, stating that Hendricks was subject to only the SORA provisions 
in effect at the time he became subject to them. Hendricks appealed and we 
previously granted certiorari.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6 This case presents only questions of law, not fact, and we shall review 
such questions de novo. In re Estate of Bell-Levine, 
2012 OK 112, ¶5, 293 P.3d 964, 966. An appeal on summary judgment comes 
to this Court as a de novo review. Carmichael v. Beller, 1996 OK 48, ¶2, 914 P.2d 1051, 1053. On appeal, this Court assumes 
"plenary independent and non-deferential authority to reexamine a trial court's 
legal rulings." Kluver v. Weatherford Hospital Auth., 1993 OK 85, ¶14, 859 P.2d 1081, 1084. 
ANAYLSIS
¶7 Out of Hendricks' several constitutional challenges we find the equal 
protection argument to be dispositive. Hendricks was convicted in California in 
1982 well before SORA's enactment in 1989. From a simple reading of SORA, had he 
been convicted in Oklahoma in 1982 he would not be required to register under 
SORA unless on November 1, 2005, he was still serving his sentence or any form 
of probation or parole. However, based on subsections B of sections 582 and 583, 
because he was convicted in another jurisdiction prior to the enactment of SORA, 
he is required to register. Hendricks asserts by limiting registration to 
Oklahoma offenders whose convictions occurred after SORA's effective 
date, the law implicitly acknowledges those Oklahoma offenders convicted 
prior to SORA's enactment receive a benefit not available to him. 
However, SORA denies this protection to persons, like Hendricks, solely because 
their pre-SORA conviction occurred in another jurisdiction. Hendricks asserts 
there is no rational basis for this disparate treatment and he has been denied 
equal protection of the law. We agree.
¶8 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution mandates no state "deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."6 The Oklahoma Constitution 
does not have an equivalent to the federal Equal Protection Clause; however, 
this Court has identified a functional equivalent in our due process section.7 Although not an absolute 
guarantee of equality of operation or application of state legislation, the 
Equal Protection Clause's purpose is to safeguard against arbitrary 
discrimination.8 
¶9 An equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative 
classification only when such classification impermissibly interferes with the 
exercise of a fundamental right, such as, the right to vote, right of interstate 
travel, rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, or right to procreate, or 
operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class, such as, one based 
upon alienage, race, or ancestry.9 Unless a classification warrants some form of 
heightened review, the Equal Protection Clause only requires the classification 
rationally further a legitimate state interest.10 This lower threshold is identified as the 
rational-basis test.
¶10 Here the classification appears to be persons residing in Oklahoma 
after November 1, 1989, who were convicted of a sex crime in another 
jurisdiction prior to SORA's enactment on November 1, 1989. Neither the 
trial court nor the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals addressed what level of 
scrutiny to use in analyzing Hendricks' equal protection challenge concerning 
this classification. However, other jurisdictions have found classifications 
based upon where a person was convicted failed even the rational-basis test. We 
agree and find this classification fails to meet this lower threshold.
¶11 In Doe v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 513 F.3d 95 (3rd Cir. 2008), a Pennsylvania resident was 
convicted in New Jersey of a sex offense but was allowed to serve out his 
probation in Pennsylvania. He challenged the notification provisions of 
Pennsylvania's "Megan's Law"11 as applied to him because the provisions unfairly 
treated out-of-state offenders differently. Specifically, before notification 
was required of an in-state offender, the law required a comprehensive 
assessment procedure to determine whether the offender was a sexually violent 
predator. Doe, 513 F.3d  at 101. In contrast, all out-of-state offenders 
who transferred parole to Pennsylvania12 were subject to the community notification provisions, 
regardless of their offense of conviction or their potential danger to the 
community. Doe, 513 F.3d  at 101. Doe asserted such application violated 
his constitutional right to equal protection. Doe, 513 F.3d  at 100. 
¶12 The court found the rational basis test had not been satisfied, 
holding:
[h]ere, the Commonwealth argues that its interest in public safety is a 
legitimate concern, and that its practice of treating in-state and out-of-state 
offenders differently is rationally related to its efforts at alleviating this 
concern. We readily agree that protecting its citizens from sex offenses 
committed by repeat offenders is a legitimate state interest. The question, 
however, is whether the Commonwealth's denial of equivalent process to both 
in-state and out-of state parolees is rationally related to its security 
concerns. We conclude it is not. 
Doe, 513 F.3d  at 101.
The court rejected the state's various arguments for treating out-of-state 
offenders differently from in-state offenders as having no rational relation to 
the goal of protecting the state's population from sex offenders.13 It held:
In summary, we note that Pennsylvania's interest in protecting its citizens 
from sexually violent predators is certainly compelling. However, subjecting 
out-of state sex offenders to community notification without providing 
equivalent procedural safeguards as given to in-state sex offenders is not 
rationally related to that goal. 
Doe, 513 F.3d  at 112.
¶13 At least one state court has ruled similarly to the Third Circuit on this 
issue. In American Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico v. City of 
Albuquerque, 137 P.3d 1215 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006), the New Mexico Court of 
Appeals held the City of Albuquerque's sex offender registration requirements 
were unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause where they 
treated non-resident sex offenders differently than resident offenders. City 
of Albuquerque, 137 P.3d  at 1227. Following similar logic to that of the 
Third Circuit in Doe v. Pennsylvania, the New Mexico Court of Appeals 
held that:
[t]hese provisions result in differing treatment for resident and 
non-resident sex offenders that is not rationally related to the City's interest 
in protecting citizens from sex offenders . . . . In other words, the language 
in Section 5 does not require registration of those convicted sex offenders who 
are most likely to have the means and opportunity to reoffend in the City. Yet 
those offenders who were convicted of sex offenses outside of New Mexico, who 
reside outside the state, and are in the City only a limited number of days, 
must register. We agree with the district court that this violates equal 
protection guarantees. 
City of Albuquerque, 137 P.3d  at 1227.
¶14 The focal point of both of these cases is that state sex offender 
registration and notification requirements appear to violate the Equal 
Protection Clause where they discriminate against individuals solely because the 
conviction occurred in another jurisdiction. All other things being equal, such 
discrimination is not rationally related to the goal of protecting the 
population from sex offenders. Discrimination against categories of sex 
offenders based on factors such as type of offense and risk of recidivism is 
logical, whereas discrimination based on the jurisdiction in which the 
conviction occurred has no rational basis for protecting the public.
¶15 We find protecting its citizens from sex offenders is a legitimate state 
interest. The question, however, is whether requiring persons to register under 
SORA who were convicted in another jurisdiction prior to its enactment and not 
likewise requiring registration of persons convicted in Oklahoma prior to SORA's 
enactment is rationally related to its security concerns. We conclude it is 
not.
¶16 As mentioned, the purpose of SORA is to permit law enforcement the 
opportunity to identify sex offenders and alert the public of such sex offenders 
when necessary. The registration generally advances that purpose by providing 
information to the public about convicted sex offenders in order for the public 
to take adequate precautions. However, creating a classification of pre-SORA sex 
offenders based solely on where their conviction occurred does not rationally 
further the state's interest in providing information to the public of the 
presence of sex offenders. The scheme excludes notifying the public of the 
presence of pre-SORA Oklahoma convicted sex offenders. The legislative 
enactment would allow two similarly convicted individuals prior to November 1, 
1989, otherwise qualifying for registration to be treated dissimilarly solely 
based upon the jurisdiction of their conviction. We can find no rational basis 
for this classification and therefore it does not pass constitutional muster. 

CONCLUSION
¶17 We agree notifying citizens of the presence of convicted sex offenders is 
a legitimate governmental objective and protecting Oklahoma citizens from sex 
offenders is a compelling state interest. This objective, however, is not served 
by unequal application of the law to offenders solely based upon the 
jurisdiction of their conviction. Applying SORA's requirements to sex offenders 
who now reside in Oklahoma and were convicted in another jurisdiction prior to 
SORA's enactment when an Oklahoman convicted in Oklahoma of a similar offense 
prior to SORA's enactment is not required to register, violates a person's equal 
protection guarantees. This is so, however, if Hendricks was not serving a 
sentence or any form of probation or parole on November 1, 2005, for the 1982 
crime. Otherwise, he would have been treated in the same manner as a pre-SORA 
Oklahoma convicted person still serving a sentence or any form of probation and 
parole on November 1, 2005, and there would be no equal protection issue. We 
remand the matter back to the trial court to make a determination as to whether 
Hendricks as a result of the 1982 conviction, was serving a sentence or any form 
of probation or parole on November 1, 2005. If the trial court finds he was not 
serving a sentence or any form of probation or parole for the 1982 conviction on 
November 1, 2005, then he should be removed from the registry. We need not 
address his other constitutional arguments at this time. 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS VACATED;THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ORDER SUSTAINING MOTION FOR SUMMARYJUDGMENT IS REVERSED AND REMANDED 
FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION
¶18 COLBERT, C.J., REIF, V.C.J., KAUGER, WATT, EDMONDSON, COMBS, and 
GURICH, JJ., concur. 
¶19 TAYLOR, J., joined by WINCHESTER, J., dissenting: 
I dissent for the same reasons that I stated in my dissent in Starkey v. 
Oklahoma Department of Corrections, 2013 OK 43, 305 P.3d 1004.
 
FOOTNOTES
1 Title 57 O.S. Supp. 1997, § 581 (B) provides as follows: 

The Legislature finds that sex offenders who commit other predatory acts 
against children and persons who prey on others as a result of mental illness 
pose a high risk of re-offending after release from custody. The Legislature 
further finds that the privacy interest of persons adjudicated guilty of these 
crimes is less important than the state's interest in public safety. The 
Legislature additionally finds that a system of registration will permit law 
enforcement officials to identify and alert the public when necessary for 
protecting the public safety.
2 2009 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 234, § 147 (emerg. May 21, 
2009). 
3 Id. The "at any time" language was added to 
subsections B and C of § 582 by 2005 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 123, § 1 (eff. Nov. 1, 
2005).
4 Note: the registration portion of SORA found in § 583 
does not use the same language of "after November 1, 1989" as found in § 582. It 
instead it uses the language "on or after November 1, 1989." 
5 The current Oklahoma statute concerning lewd or 
indecent acts to a child is 21 O.S. 2011, § 1123. 
6 Art. 14 § 1, U.S. Const. When called upon to analyze a 
case on equal protection grounds, a court will apply one of three standards of 
review; (a) rational basis, (b) heightened scrutiny, or (c) strict scrutiny. If 
the classification does not implicate a suspect class or abridge a fundamental 
right, the rational-basis test is used. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne 
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440-42, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254-255, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985) (noted in Gladstone v. Bartlesville Independent 
School District No. 30, 2003 OK 30, ¶9 n.22, 66 P.3d 442, 447 n.22).
7 Art. 2, § 7, Okl. Const. provides:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law."
See Fair School Finance Council v. State, 1987 OK 114, ¶54, 746 P.2d 1135, 1148. 
8 Ross v. Peters, 1993 OK 8, ¶17, 846 P.2d 1107, 1114. 
9 Gladstone v. Bartlesville Independent School 
District No. 30, 2003 OK 30, ¶9, 66 P.3d 442, 447. 
10 Ross at ¶17.
11 A term used for the various laws requiring mandatory 
registration of sex offenders. It is named after Megan Kanka, a 7-year-old New 
Jersey girl, who was sexually assaulted and murdered in 1994 by a neighbor who, 
unknown to the victim's family, was a prior convicted sex offender. See Smith 
v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 1145, 155 L. Ed. 2d 164 (2003). 
In Smith the United States Supreme Court stated:
The crime gave impetus to laws for mandatory registration of sex offenders 
and corresponding community notification. In 1994, Congress passed the Jacob 
Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration 
Act, title 17, 108 Stat. 2038, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 14071, which conditions 
certain federal law enforcement funding on the States' adoption of sex offender 
registration laws and sets minimum standards for state programs. By 1996, every 
State, the District of Columbia, and the Federal Government had enacted some 
variation of Megan's Law.
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S.  at 89-90.
12 The parole transfer mechanism by which the offender 
moved to Pennsylvania was the result of a Parole Compact between Pennsylvania 
and New Jersey, the terms of which are described at Doe v. Pennsylvania Bd. 
of Probation and Parole, 513 F.3d  at 102-103. 
13 Pennsylvania made 4 basic arguments: 1) it would be 
impossible to replicate the legal proceedings it provides in-state offenders for 
out-of-state offenders; 2) providing such procedures would increase time and 
expense; 3) the "harshness" of community notification differs for in-state vs. 
out-of-state offenders; and 4) the publicity given to a sex offender's trial in 
Pennsylvania makes notification less necessary for those offenders. Doe, 
513 F.3d  at 108.