Case Title: Reno Newspapers v. Gibbons

Citation: 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 79

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2011-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
427 Nev, Advance Opinion “74
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

RENO NEWSPAPERS, INC., A
NEVADA CORPORATION,

No, 63360
Appellant,

JIM GIBBONS, GOVERNOR OF THE FILED
STATE OF NEVADA, AND THE STATE vec 15 2011
OF NEVADA, EX REL. OFFICE OF

THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF

NEVADA,
Respondents.

   

Appeal from a district court order granting in part and
denying in part a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the former
Nevada Governor's refusal to provide access to or information regarding
certain e-mail communications. First Judicial District Court, Carson City:
James Todd Russell, Judge.

Reversed and remanded with instructions,

Burton, Bartlett & Glogovac and Scott A. Glogovac, Reno,
for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, and James T. Spencer, Chief of
Staff, Carson City,
for Respondents.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

nee M- 38659

 
 

OPINION
By the Court, SAITTA, C.J.:

‘This appeal involves the denial of a records request made
pursuant to the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA). The primary issue
we are asked to resolve is whether, after the commencement of a public
records lawsuit, the state entity withholding the requested records is
required to provide the requesting party with a log containing a factual
description of each withheld record and a legal basis for nondisclosure.
We conclude that based upon the provisions of the NPRA, our NPRA

jurisprudence, and elementary notions of fairnet

 

inherent in our

 

adversarial system, the requesting party generally is entitled to a log. In
most cases, this log should contain, at a minimum, a general factual
description of each withheld record and a specific explanation for
nondisclosure. Here, we conclude that such a log was required and that
the district court erred to the extent it denied the request for a log.

We also address what the state entity withholding the
requested records is required to provide to the requesting party in
prelitigation situations. We conclude that, as mandated by NRS
289.107(1)(@), if a state entity denies a public records request prior to the
commencement of litigation, it must provide the requesting party with
notice of its claim of confidentiality and citation to legal authority that
justifies nondisclosure. Here, we conclude that the state entity
withholding the requested records failed to satisfy these responsibilities.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant Reno Newspapers, Inc., is a Nevada corporation
doing business as the Reno Gazette-Journal (RGJ). Respondents are Jim
Gibbons, former Governor of the State of Nevada, and the State of Nevada
(collectively, the State). In 2008, the RGJ made a records request,

2

 
en

 

pursuant to the NPRA, for e-mail communications sent over @ six-month
time period between Governor Gibbons and ten individuals. The request
specified that the e-mails being sought were transmitted to or from
Governor Gibbons’ state-issued e-mail account. In the event that the State
rejected the request, the RGJ asked that it be provided a log identifying,
for each e-mail, the sender, all recipients, the mess

 

ige date, and the legal
basis upon which the State was denying access, The State denied the
RGJ's request for the e-mails or a log, Citing to our decision in DR
Partners v. Board of County Commissioners, 116 Nev. 616, 6 P.3d 465
(2000), California caselaw, a Nevada Attorney General Opinion, and the
State of Nevada Policy on Defining Information Transmitted via E-mail as
a Public Record,! the State informed the RGJ that all of the requested e-

mails were confidential because they were either privileged or not

 

considered public records. The RGJ repeated its request for a log
containing a description of each individual e-mail so that it could assess
whether to challenge the State's classification of the e-mails as
confidential. The State again denied the RGJ's request.

‘Thereafter, the RGJ filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in
the district court seeking access to the e-mails or, in the alternative, to
receive a detailed log or index identifying the sender, recipient(s), date,
subject matter, and the basis upon which the State was denying access to
each of the total 104 requested e-mails. Ultimately, after conducting a

This policy provides state employees with informal guidelines on
how to determine if a given e-mail is a public record and describes
procedures for dealing with e-mails classified as public records. For
example, it indicates that publie records should not be deleted.

 
hearing to consider the RGJ's petition and an in camera review of the e-
mails, the district court denied the RGJ's request for a detailed log or
index, reasoning that given the brevity of some of the e-mails, such a log or
index would disclose otherwise confidential information. The district court,
then determined that, of the 104 requested e-mails, 24 were personal in
nature, 32 were of a transitory nature, 42 were of a transitory nature

and/or covered by the deliberative proce

 

privilege, and 6 were not
confidential. The district court therefore granted the petition as to the 6 e-
mails that it determined were not confidential and denied the petition a
to the remaining 98 e-mails. The RGJ filed this appeal.?
DISCUSSION

Although the district court's denial of a writ petition is
ordinarily reviewed for an abuse of discretion, when, as here, the petition
entails questions of law, we review the district court's decision de novo.
Reno Newspapers v, Sheriff, 126 Nev. _, __, 234 P.3d 922, 924 (2010).
The district court erred in denying the RGJ's request for alog

‘The RGd's primary contention on appeal is that the district
court erred in refusing to order the State to provide it with a detailed log
describing the factual nature of each withheld e-mail and the legal basis
for nondisclosure so that it could make an informed decision regarding
whether to challenge the State's claim of confidentiality. We begin our
analysis of this contention by providing an overview of the NPRA and our

*The State did not file a cross-appeal challenging the district court's
issuance of the writ of mandamus with respect to 6 of the requested e-
mails. As such, our consideration of this appeal is limited to whether the
district court erred in denying the RGJ's writ petition as to the 98
remaining e-mails.

 

 
jurisprudence regarding claims of confidentiality made in response to
public records requests.
Overview of the NPRA

‘The NPRA provides that all public books and public records of,
governmental entities must remain open to the public, unless “otherwise
declared by law to be confidential.” NRS 239.010(1). The Legislature ha:
declared that the purpose of the NPRA is to further the democratic ideal of
an accountable government by ensuring that public records are broadly
accessible. NRS 239,001(1). ‘Thus, the provisions of the NPRA are
designed to promote government transparency and accountability.
the

 

In 2007, in order to better effectuate these purpos
Logislature amended the NPRA to provide that its provisions must be
liberally construed to maximize the public’s right of access. NRS
289,001(1)-(2); 2007 Nev. Stat., ch. 435, § 2, at 2061. Conversely, any
limitations or restrictions on the public's right of access must be narrowly
construed. NRS 239.001(3); 2007 Nev. Stat., ch. 435, § 2, at 2061. In
addition, the Legislature amended the NPRA to provide that if a state
entity withholds records, it bears the burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the records are confidential. NRS.
289.0113; 2007 Nev. Stat., ch. 436, § 5, at 2062.
Overview of our NPRA jurisprudence

In Donrey of Nevada v. Bradshaw, 106 Nev. 630, 798 P.24 144
(1990), we built the foundation for analyzing claims of confidentiality
made in response to NPRA requests. Bradshaw involved a request from
KOLO-TV and Reno Newspapers for a police investigative report into
bribery of a public official. Id. at 631, 798 P.2d at 145. The Reno City
Attorney's Office and the Reno Police Department refused the request. Id.

KOLO-TV and Reno Newspapers subsequently filed a petition for a writ of

 

 
mandamus in the district court, asserting that the NPRA required the
disclosure of the investigative report. Id. at 682, 798 P.2d at 145. The
district court denied the petition, determining that the report was
confidential based upon NRS Chapter 179A, which contains provisions
concerning the dissemination of criminal history records, Id. It also
determined that no balancing of the interests involved was needed. Id.

On appeal, we determined that the confidentiality provisions
contained in NRS Chapter 179A did not cover the record at issue. Id, at
634, 798 P.2d at 147. As a consequence, we explained that “a balancing of

 

the interests involved is necessary” before any common law limitations on
disclosure could be applied. Id, at 635, 798 P.2d at 147, Under this
balancing test, we concluded that the investigative report should be
released to KOLO-TV and Reno Newspapers. Id, at 636, 798 P.2d at 148.
Our conclusion was based on the facts that no criminal proceeding was
pending or anticipated, no confidential sources or investigative techniques
were contained in the report, there was no possibility of denying anyone a
fair trial, and disclosure did not jeopardize law enforcement personnel. Id,
We therefore directed the district court to issue a writ of mandamus
ordering the City Attorney's Office and the Reno Police Department to
release the report. Id,

We expanded upon Bradshaw's consideration of claims of
confidentiality in DR Partners v. Board of County Commissioners, 116
Nev. 616, 6 P.3d 465 (2000). DR Partners concerned the Las Vegas
Review Journal's attempt to compel the disclosure of billing statements

documenting county officials’ use of publicly owned cellular telephones.
Id, at 619, 6 P.3d at 467. Clark County released the records but redacted
portions of the incoming and outgoing telephone numbers, thereby

 

 
preventing any person reviewing the statements from determining the
identity of the individuals with whom conversations occurred. Id. ‘The
Review Journal filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the district
court seeking to compel Clark County to disclose the records. Id. at 620, 6
P.8d at 467. The district court denied the petition, id., determining that
the records were confidential based upon the common law deliberative
process privilege. Id, at 619, 6 P.3d at 467.

On app

 

1, we first set forth the requirements for showing
that the deliberative process privilege applies—namely, that the withheld
records be both “predecisional” and “deliberative.” Id, at 623, 6 P.3d at
469. We also reiterated that when the requested record is not explicitly
made confidential by a statute, the balancing test set forth in Bradshaw
must be employed, explaining that “[iJn Bradshaw, this court, at least by
implication, recognized that any limitation on the general disclosure
requirements of NRS 239.010 must be based upon a balancing or
‘weighing’ of the interests of non-disclosure against the general policy in
favor of open government.” Id, at 622, 6 P.3d at 468. We then concluded
that even if the deliberative process privilege applied to the records at
issue, the absence of a particularized evidentiary showing by Clark
County “prevented the district court from engaging in the weighing
process mandated by Bradshaw.” Id, at 627, 6 P.3d at 472. We therefore
reversed the district court's order denying the writ and remanded the case
to the district court to issue the writ compelling Clark County to provide

the Review Journal with unredacted copies of the requested records. Id, at
628-29, 6 P.3d at 478,

We recently considered a claim of confidentiality made in
response to an NPRA request in Reno Newspapers v. Sheriff, 126 Nev. __,

 

 
on Be

 

__. 284 P.3d 922, 923 (2010), where we concluded that the identity of a
holder of a concealed firearms permit and records of any post-permit
investigation, suspension, or revocation of such a permit are public records

subject to disclosure unless the requested records contain confidential

 

information. In reaching this conclusion, we explained that under the
NPRA, “all public records generated by government entities are public
information and are subject to public inspection unless otherwise declared

to be confidential.” Id, at _, 234 P.3d at 924, We also emphasized that

 

under the NPRA, “open records are the rule,” and any nondisclosure of
records is the exception, Id, at _, 284 P.3d at 926, Furthermore, we
explained that by virtue of the 2007 amendments to the NPRA, “the
balancing test under Bradshaw now requires a narrower interpretation of
private or government interests promoting confidentiality or nondisclosure

to be weighed against the liberal policy for an open and accessible

 

government.” Id, More specifically, in order for requested records to be
withheld under this balancing test, the state entity bears the burden to
prove that its interest in nondisclosure “clearly outweighs the public's
ight to access.” Id, at __, 284 P.3d at 927, We concluded that the
withholding entity failed to meet this burden because it presented no
evidence to support its claim that releasing the records would increase
crime or expose permit holders or the public to harm. Id, Finally, while
we acknowledged that portions of the records made available for public
inspection might contain confidential information, we concluded that such
portions should simply be redacted. Id, at __, 284 P.3d at 928.

Our jurisprudence has therefore established a framework for
testing claims of confidentiality under the backdrop of the NPRA’s
declaration that its provisions “must be construed liberally” to facilitate

 
access to public records, NRS 239.001(2), and that any restrictions on
access “must be construed narrowly.” NRS 239.001(3). First, we begin
with the presumption that all government-generated records are open to
disclosure. See Reno Newspapers v. Sheriff, 126 Nev. at __. 234 P.8d at
924; DR Partners, 116 Nev. at 621, 6 P.3d at 468, The state entity
therefore bears the burden of overcoming this presumption by proving, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that the requested records are
confidential. NRS 239.0113; DR Partners, 116 Nev, at 621, 6 P.3d at 468.
Next, in the absence of a statutory provision that explicitly declares a
record to be confidential, any limitations on disclosure must be based upon
involved, DR Partners, 116 Nev. at 622,
6 P.ad at 468; Bradshaw, 106 Nev. at 635, 798 P.2d at 147, and the state
entity bears the burden to prove that its interest in nondisclosure clearly
‘outweighs the public's interest in access. Reno Newspapers v. Sheriff, 126
Nev. at _, 234 P.3d at 927, Finally, our caselaw stresses that the state

a broad balancing of the interest

 

entity cannot meet this burden with a non-particularized showing, DR
Partners, 116 Nev. at 627-28, 6 P.3d at 472-73, or by expressing
hypothetical concerns. Reno Newspapers v, Sheriff, 126 Nev. at _, 234
P.3d at 927.

After_the commencement of an_NPRA lawsuit, the state entity
withholding requested is generally ‘ide the

requesting party with a log
With the foregoing principles in mind, we turn to the RGJ's

 

ssertion that because the district court did not order the State to provide
it with a log describing each e-mail withheld, it could not meaningfully

 

 

and challenge the State's claim that the requested e-mails were
confidential. It urges us to adopt a rule whereby each time that a state

entity asserts that requested records are confidential, the state entity

 

 
must provide the requesting party with a log in the form of a “Vaughn
index’ as described in Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

‘The RGJ contends that without a Vaughn index, the requesting party is at

 

a sovere disadvantage in NPRA cases because it otherwise lacks the
necessary information to meaningfully advocate for disclosure.

‘A Vaughn index is a submission commonly utilized in cases
involving the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the federal analog of the
NPRA. This submission typically contains “detailed public affidavits
identifying the documents withheld, the FOIA exemptions claimed, and a
particularized explanation of why each document falls within the claimed
exemption.” Lion Raisins v, U.S, Dept. of Agriculture, 354 F.3d 1072, 1082
(8th Cir, 2004), Broadly stated, a Vaughn index is designed to preserve a
fair adversarial proceeding when a lawsuit is brought after the denial of a
FOIA request. See Wiener v. F.BL, 943 F.2d 972, 977 (@th Cir. 1991)
(The purpose of the index is to ‘afford the FOIA requester a meaningful
opportunity to contest, and the district court an adequate foundation to
review, the soundness of the withholding.” (quoting King v. US. Dept, of
Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

While we agree that the RGJ should have been provided with
a log under the circumstances of this case, we disagree that this log was
required to be in the specific form of a Vaughn index or that a log is
required each time records are withheld. As federal courts have explained
when considering the FOIA, although a Yaughn index is often a vital
method for resolving the tension between the government's interest in

keeping certain records confidential and the requesting party's need for
enough information to meaningfully contest a claim of confidentiality, “a
Vaughn index... is {not] necessarily required in all cases.” Fiduccia v.

 

 
oe <a

 

U.S. Dept. of Justice, 185 F.3d 1085, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 1999). Indeed, even
the authority that the RGJ relies upon recognizes that a Vaughn index is
not required in all FOIA cases. See, e.g, Wiener, 943 F.2d at 978 n.5
(discussing circumstances in which a Vaughn index was not required),
For instance, when the requesting party “has sufficient information to
present a full legal argument, there is no need for a Vaughn index.”
Minier v, Central Intelligence Agency, 88 F.3d 796, 804 (Sth Cir. 1996);
see Wiener, 943 F.2d at 978 n.6 (‘Consistent with its purpose, a Vaughn
index is not required where it is not needed to restore the traditional
’); Brown v, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 658 F.2d
71, 74 (2d Cir, 1981) (When the facts in plaintiff's possession are
sufficient to allow an effective presentation of its c
indexed justification of the specificity contemplated by Vaughn may be
unnecessary.”). Moreover, if we were to require a log—in the form of a

 

adver

 

ry proce:

0, an itemized and

 

Vaughn index or otherwise—each time a lawsuit is brought after the
denial of an NPRA request, we would essentially be rewriting the NPRA
because it imposes no such unqualified requirement,

Nonetheless, the provisions of the NPRA place an
unmistakable emphasis on disclosure. The NPRA expressly provides that
its provisions “must be construed liberally” to ensure the presumption of
openness and explicitly declares that any restriction on disclosure “must
be construed narrowly.” NRS 239,001(2)-(3). In harmony with the
overarching purposes of the NPRA, the burden of proof is imposed on the
state entity to prove that a withheld record is confidential. NRS 239.0113.
Equally unmistakable is the emphasis that our NPRA jurisprudence
places on adequate adversarial testing. Indeed, the framework

established in Bradshaw, DR Partners, and Reno Newspapers v. Sheriff

 

u

 
exemplifies an intensely adversarial method for determining whether
requested records are confidential.

In view of the emphasis placed on disclosure and the
importance of testing claims of confidentiality in an adversarial setting,
we agree with the Vaughn court that “it is anomalous” and inequitable to
deny the requesting party basic information about the withheld records,

thereby relegating it to advocating from a nebulous position where it is

 

powerless to contest a claim of confidentiality, 484 F.2d at 823.
Furthermore, requiring the requesting party to blindly argue for
disclosure not only runs contrary to the spirit of the NPRA and our NPRA

 

jurisprudence but it “seriously distorts the traditional adversary nature of
our logal system’s form of dispute resolution.” Id, at 824. In sum, a claim
that records are confidential can only be tested in a fair and adversarial
manner, and in order to truly proceed in such a fashion, a log typically
must be provided to the requesting party.

We therefore conclude that after the commencement of an
NPRA lawsuit, the requesting party generally is entitled to a log unless,
for example, the state entity withholding the records demonstrates that
the requesting party has sufficient information to meaningfully contest
the claim of confidentiality without a log. We decline to spell out an
exhaustive list of what such a log must contain or the precise form that
this log must take because, depending on the circumstances of each case,
what constitutes an adequate log will vary. See Keys v. U.S. Dept. of
Justice, 830 F.2d 337, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stressing that “it is the
function, not the form, of the index that is important”). For purposes of
this opinion, it is sufficient to simply explain that in most cases, in order

to preserve a fair adversarial environment, this log should contain, at a

 

 
1 non Se

 

minimum, a general factual description of each record withheld and a
specific explanation for nondisclosure.?

‘The State asserts that it was not required to provide the RGJ
with a log because the district court conducted an in camera review of the
requested e-mails. It further asserts that an in camera review is the
optimal method for the district court to review claims of confidentiality

while protecting confidential information from being disclosed.

8We caution that in this log, the state entity withholding records
“need not specify its objections in such detail as to compromise the secrecy
of the information.” Church of Scientology, Etc. v. U.S. Dept., 611 F.2d
788, 742 (9th Cir. 1979). The district court nonetheless must require the
state entity to provide the requesting party an explanation for
nondisclosure “in as much detail as possible on the public record before
resorting to in camera review.” Lion Raisins v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture,
364 F.3d 1072, 1084 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, in the instant matter, the
district court may very well be correct that given the brevity of some of the
requested e-mails, an extensive log might disclose otherwise confidential
information. The district court nonetheless should have required the
State to provide the RGJ with a log containing as much information as
possible before resorting to an in camera review.

 

 

Furthermore, we are cognizant that requiring an individual
description of each requested record may become overly burdensome when
the requesting party seeks access to several hundred records. In such a
circumstance, a log providing a representative sampling of the larger
group of records may be appropriate. See Bonner v. U.S. Dept. of State,
928 F.2d 1148, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Representative sampling is an
appropriate procedure to test an agency's FOIA exemption claims when a
large number of documents are involved.”). A log containing only
representative samples of the requested e-mails, however, would likely not
be appropriate here given the relatively limited number of e-mails
involved.

13

 
ne

 

In and of itself, an in camera review is not improper. See
Griffis v. Pinal County, 156 P.3d 418, 422 (Ariz, 2007) (‘In camera
review .. . reinforces [the notion] that the courts, rather than government
officials, are the final arbiter of what qualifies as a public record”). An in
camera review, however, is not a replacement for a log when a log is

necessary to preserve a fair adversarial proceeding. See Wiener, 943 F.2d

 

at 979 (explaining that an in camera review of withheld records “is not an
acceptabl
doves not permit effective advocacy"); Church of Scientology, Ete. v. U.S.
Dept., 611 F.2d 738, 748 (9th Cir. 1979) (in camera review is “not a

 

substitute” for an adequate log because “fiJn camera review

substitute for the government's burden of proof, and should not be
resorted to lightly”). In other words, an in camera review may be used to
supplement a log but it may not be used as a substitute when a log is
necessary to preserve a fair adversarial proceeding.

Here, the State responded to the RGJ's petition for a writ of
mandamus* by providing the district court with the e-mails claimed to be
confidential, as well as a log, The State, however, did not provide the RGJ
with a log of any type containing a general factual description of these e-
mails and a specific explanation of why each e-mail was confidential, nor
did the State demonstrate that the RGJ possessed sufficient information
to argue for disclosure without a log. Thus, the State's response was, ina
word, deficient. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in

4We note that mandamus was the appropriate procedural vehicle for
the RGJ to seek access to the withheld e-mails or a log. See generally DR
Partners v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 116 Nev. 616, 621, 6 P.3d 465, 468
(2000).

4

 
denying the RGJ's request for a log containing a general factual
description of each of the records withheld and a specific explanation for
nondisclosure.
State 0 rolitigation duties under the NPRA
‘The RGJ contends that the State also failed to satisfy its

 

prelitigation duties under the NPRA. In particular, it asserts that the
state entity denying an NPRA request prior to the commencement of
litigation is required to provide the requesting party with a Vaughn index

We decline to adopt the Vaughn index as a prelitigation
requirement under the NPRA. First, a Vaughn index is not required
outside of the litigation context. See Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc_v. NRC, 216 F.3d 1180, 1190 (D.C, Cir, 2000), But, more
importantly, the NPRA already defines precisely what is required in
prelitigation situations. NRS 239.0107(1)(d) provides:

If the governmental entity must deny the person's
request to inspect or copy the public book or record
because the public book or record, or a part

 

5In light of this conclusion, we need not consider whether the district
court correctly determined that of the 98 e-mails at issue here, 24 were
personal in nature, 32 were of a transitory nature, and 42 were of a
transitory nature and/or covered by the deliberative process privilege. See
Davin_v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 60 F.8d 1043, 1049 (Bd Cir. 1995)
(explaining that under the FOIA, before considering whether requested
records were correctly determined to be exempt from disclosure, a
reviewing court must first examine “whether the [withholding entity's]

explanation was full and specific enough to afford the FOIA requester a
meaningful opportunity to contest, and the district court an adequate
foundation to review, the soundness of the withholding.” (quoting
McDonnell v, U.S., 4 F.3d 1227, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993)))..

 

 
 

thereof, is confidential, [the governmental entity
shall] provide to the person, in writing:

(1) Notice of that fact; and

(2) A citation to the specific statute or other
legal authority that makes the public book or
record, or a part thereof, confidential.

‘Thus, if state entity declines a public records request prior to
litigation, it must provide the requesting party with notice and citation to
legal authority that justifies nondisclosure. No log, in the form of a
Vaughn index or otherwise, is required under NRS 239.0107(1)().
Nevertheless, in the instant case, we conclude that the State failed to meet
its prelitigation responsibilities under NRS 239.0107(1)(@).

In response to the RGJ's prelitigation request for Governor
Gibbons’ e-mails, the State informed the RGJ that “all [the requested]
emails are cither privileged or are not considered public records.”
Following this blanket denial, the State summarily listed DR Partners,
California caselaw, a Nevada Attorney General Opinion, and the State of
Nevada Policy on Defining Information Transmitted via E-mail as a Public
Record. The State provided no explanation whatsoever as to why the
cases it cited actually supported its claim of confidentiality or were
anything other than superfluous, We cannot conclude that merely pinning
a string of citations to a boilerplate declaration of confidentiality satisfies
the State's prelitigation obligation under NRS 239.0107(1)(4)(2) to cite to
“specific” authority “that makes the public book or record, or a part
thereof, confidential.” And, suffice it to say, the State's informal employee
e-mail policy does not have the force of law, and therefore, we reject the
notion that the State satisfied its prelitigation duties by citing this policy.
See generally State v. City of Clearwater, 863 So. 2d 149, 154 (Fla. 2003)
(explaining that a “Computer Resources Use Policy” could not alter the

16

 
   

statutory definition of what constitutes a public record under Florida law).
We therefore conclude that the State's prelitigation response, in the first
instance, was inadequate under NRS 239.0107(1)(@).
CONCLUSION
We reverse the district court's order denying in part the RGJ's

petition for a writ of mandamus and remand this case to the district court,

  

with instructions to direct the State to provide the RGJ with a log

 

containing a general factual description of each of the 98 e-mails withheld
and a specific explanation for nondisclosure. ‘The district court must then
determine, under the framework delineated in this opinion, whether these

e-mails are subject to disclosure.