Case Title: Rose v. State

Citation: 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 43

Docket Number: 53813

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2011-07-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
127 Nev., Advance Opinion 43,
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

BRIAN ROSE, No, 58813

Appellant, F 1 L E D
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent. UL 2 2011

 

 

Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury

verdict, of second-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. ighth

Judicial District Court, Clark County; Michael Villani, Judge.
Reversed and remanded,

David M. Schieck, Special Public Defender, and JoNell Thomas, Deputy

Special Public Defender, Clark County,
for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; David Roger,
District Attorney, Stephen S. Owens, Chief Deputy Distriet Attorney, and
Sonia V. Jimenez, Deputy District, Attorney, Clark County,

for Respondent,

 

BEFORE DOUGLAS, C.J., PICKERING and HARDESTY, JJ.

OPINIO!

By the Court, DOUGLAS, C.J.:

In this appeal, we address whether a charge of assault with a
deadly weapon merges with a charged homicide so that it cannot be used
as the basis for second-degree folony murder. To maintain the narrow
confines of second-degree felony murder, wherein the folonies that can be
used to support a conviction are not statutorily enumerated and the use of

We B/9IE

 
one

 

the felony-murder rule has “the potential for untoward prosecutions,
Sheriff v. Morris, 99 Nev. 109, 118, 659 P.2d 852, 859 (1983), we hold that
assaultive-type felonies that involve a threat of immediate violent injury
merge with a charged homicide for purposes of second-degree felony
murder and therefore cannot be used as the basis for a second-degree
felony-murder conviction, Whether the felony is assaultive must be
determined by the jury based on the manner in which the felony was
committed. Because the crime at issue here, assault with a deadly
weapon, could be assaultive based on the manner in which it was
committed, we conclude that the district court erred when it failed to
instruct the jury to determine whether the felony underlying the second-
degree felony-murder theory was assaultive based on the manner in which
the felony was committed. We further conclude that the error was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment of conviction and remand this case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
EACTS

Appellant Brian Rose was convicted of second-degree murder
with the use of a deadly weapon for shooting his girlfriend, Jackie
Watkins, in the head. On the day of the killing, Rose and his friend, Jake
‘Timms, went target shooting in the desert with Rose's .40 caliber Smith &
Wesson semiautomatic handgun. Afterwards, they picked up Watkins and
went to a barbeque at the home of another friend, Julius Castano. Rose
brought the gun inside the house and placed it in the family room because
he claimed he feared someone might break into his car and steal his
registered gun.

‘Throughout the evening, Rose, Timms, and Julius handled the
gun. At one point, Rose took the magazine out of the gun and pulled the

2

 
 

slide back to make sure the chamber was empty. Timms took the gun and
put it in a holster on his hip. After eating dinner and drinking, Rose,
Watkins, Timms, and Julius retired to the living room. Timms eventually
fell
At some point Rose took the gun from the sleeping Timms and placed it in

 

leep on the couch with the gun still in the holster around his waist.

his waistband,

Later in the evening, Rose shot Watkins in the head while she
spoke on the phone to her friend Erin Fragoso, Fragoso called Watkins
and the two spoke briefly. According to Rose's voluntary statement to
police, he aimed the gun at or near Watkins while she was talking to
Fragoso and told her to get off the phone. He then shot a single round
from his gun and hit the top of Watkins's head, Fragoso could hear Rose’s
voice in the background and could tell that it was firm and forceful, but
she could not hear his exact words. Fragoso ended the call after a long
silence from Watkins; she did not hear a gunshot.

Although witnesses in the home heard the gunshot, none of
them saw Rose fire the gun. Julius's father, Joseph Castano, was upstairs
in his room at the time and heard laughing from downstairs right before
the gunshot was fired. Julius heard the gunshot and turned around to see
Watkins on the couch, not moving. Rose was standing right next to
Watkins with the gun in his hand. Julius testified that “there was no stiff
pointing the gun at nobody .... It was in [Rose's] hand like he wanted me
to take it from his hands.” Julius took the gun from Rose, and Rose left
‘the house in his car. Joseph checked Watkins and directed his son to call
911

Officers arrived quickly at the home and noted that Watkins
was positioned as if she was still talking on the phone. Medical personnel
took Watkins to the hospital where she died from deprivation of blood to

8

 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 

the brain. At the Castano home, officers found an ejected cartridge on the
floor against the wall, behind a couch. Officers also found Rose's loaded
Smith & Wesson handgun upstairs in a bedroom,

A police officer located Rose, who was driving at speeds
approaching 100 miles per hour, and followed him but did not pull him

 

over. Rose pulled over voluntarily, exited his car, and was taken into
custody, Upon his arrest, the police read Rose his Miranda rights, and he
was interviewed by Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department homicide
detectives. Rose admitted to knowing how to use his gun and knowing
that the gun had no hammer. Rose told the detectives that he did not
know his gun was loaded and that he accidentally shot Watkins. He also
told them that he considered fleeing to Mexico. When the detectives asked
Rose if he intended to shoot Watkins, he responded, “God no.”

Rose acknowledged that he must have pulled the trigger when
he turned, but there was no witness testimony presented that Rose
purposefully aimed and fired at Watkins. In his voluntary statement to
detectives, Rose claimed that he had pointed the gun at the chair next to
Watkins to be “a dick.” He said he gave Watkins “a squinted look” and
smiled to let her know he was playing around. Rose stated that he “looked
back the other way and, and then when [he] looked back, that’s when it
actually went off.” Rose asserted that he did not care whether Watkins
got off the phone or not, and, at the time, he believed the gun was empty.
At the end of the interrogation, the detectives told Rose that Watkins died,
and Rose became very upset and cried.

Rose was charged with one count of murder with use of a
deadly weapon. Rose pleaded not guilty and filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus with the district court challenging the probable cause to
support the indictment. The district court denied the petition. Next, Rose

4

 
on

 

filed a pretrial motion asking the district court to strike the second-degree
felony-murder theory and disallow the State from presenting any

instructions on such a charge. Specifically, Ros

 

asked the court to apply
the merger doctrine, arguing that “assault with a deadly weapon cannot
support a murder conviction under the second-degree felony-murder rule
because to allow that would alleviate the State from ever having to prove
intent to kill in all cases wherein a killing results from a felonious
assault.” The district court denied Rose's motion and permitted the State
to argue this theory.

‘The case went to trial with Rose continuing to challenge the
State's pursuit of a murder conviction. During the settling of jury
instructions, Rose requested the first-degree murder charge be stricken
from the instructions, arguing that since the State declared it was seeking
a second-degree murder conviction during its opening statement, it had
conceded that there was no evidence of premeditation and deliberation
that would subject him to first-degree murder. The State countered Rose's
claim, arguing that there was evidence of premeditation and deliberation,
and it had not conceded it by arguing second-degree murder during its
opening statement. The district court denied Rose’s motion, Rose further
objected to all jury instructions concerning murder, and the district court
overruled each objection.

Ultimately, the jury returned a general verdict finding Rose
guilty of second-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, Rose
filed a motion to set aside the guilty verdict or, in the alternative, for a
new trial. The district court denied Rose's motion, stating it would not
have been shocked if the jury returned either a manslaughter or second-

degree murder verdict. Rose was sentenced to 10 to 25 years in prison,

 
—s

 

plus an equal and consecutive term for the use of a deadly weapon, Rose
now appeals from his judgment of conviction.
DISCUSSION
‘The record indicates that the State relied on the felony-
murder rule as one of its theories for second-degree murder, During
closing argument, the State argued that malice could be established in
four ways: (1) express malice (intent to kill), (2) implied malice (reckless
disregard of consequences and social duty), (3) felony murder based on
assault with a deadly weapon, and (4) commission of an unlawful act that
naturally tends to destroy the life of a human being, It argued that if the
killing occurred during “the prosecution of committing a felony,”
specifically, assault with a deadly weapon, the crime was second-degree
murder. This argument was consistent with the jury instruction the
district court gave regarding involuntary manslaughter and second-degree
murder.)

Instruction No, 17 given at Rose’s trial stated:

 

Involuntary Manslaughter is the killing of a
human being, without any intent to do so, in the
commission of an unlawful act or a lawful act
which probably might produce such a consequence
in an unlawful manner.

Where the involuntary killing occurs in the
commission of an unlawful act, which, in its
consequences, naturally tends to destroy the life of
a human being, or is committed in the prosecution
of a felonious intent, the offense is Second Degree
‘Murder.

In order for a killing committed in the
prosecution of a felonious intent to be Second
continued on next page . .

 
On appeal, Rose contends that

 

ault with a deadly weapon
cannot be used as a predicate felony to obtain a second-degree murder
conviction under the felony-murder rule because it merges with the
homicide and thus

  

's barred by the merger doctrine, He contends that the
State's reliance on this theory, and the concomitant instructions given

regarding second-degree felony murder, were therefore improper.
continued

‘Degree Murder, the following must be established
by the evidence:

(@) The unlawful act is inherently dangerous
in the abstract, ie., without reference to the
specific victim.

(2) There must be an immediate and causal
relationship between the unlawful act of the
defendant and the death of the victim. The term
immediate” means without the intervention of
some other source or agency, and

 

(8) The causal relationship must extend

beyond the unlawful act and to his involvement by

commission or omission in the means of the

killing.
‘The first two paragraphs of this instruction encompass NRS 200.070,
which defines involuntary manslaughter and “distinguishes manslaughter
from murder by referring to the factors which indicate malice, a required
element of murder.” Barton v. State, 117 Nev. 686, 695, 30 P.3d 1103,
1109 (2001), overruled on other grounds by Rosas v. State, 122 Nev. 1258,
147 P.8d 1101 (2006). ‘The remaining portions of the instruction include
the elements of second-degree felony murder as explained in Morris, 99
Nev. 109, 659 P.2d 852. We note, however, that the instruction’s focus on
whether the felony was inherently dangerous in the abstract is
inconsistent with our recent decision in Ramirez v. State, which holds that
the focus is on the “manner in which the felony was committed.” 126 Nev.
1 —n.2, 235 P.3d 619, 622 n.2 (2010).

 

 
 

Standard of review

“The district court has broad discretion to settle jury
instructions, and this court reviews the district court’s decision for an
abuse of that discretion or judicial error.” Crawford v, State, 121 Nev.
744, 148, 121 P.3d 582, 585 (2006) (citing Jackson v, State, 117 Nev. 116,
120, 17 P.3d 998, 1000 (2001)). Here, the instructional error involves a
question of law, and we therefore review the instruction for judicial error.
Jackson, 117 Nev. at 120, 17 P.3d at 1000. When the jury has been given
an erroneous instruction, we will not reverse the judgment of conviction if
the error is harmless. Santana v. State, 122 Nev. 1458, 1463, 148 P.3d
741, 745 (2006). An erroneous instruction on the elements of an offense “is,
harmless when it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury
would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.” Allred v. State.
120 Nev. 410, 415, 92 P.3d 1246, 1250 (2004) (internal quotations
omitted),

Second-degree felony murder

‘The felony-murder rule makes a killing committed in the
‘course of certain felonies murder, without requiring the State to present
additional evidence as to the defendant's mental state. See State v.
Contreras, 118 Nev. 382, 334, 46 P.3d 661, 662 (2002). ‘The rule takes two
forms in Nevada: first-degree felony murder and second-degree felony
murder. The Legislature has specified the felonies that provide the
malicious intent necessary to characterize a killing as first-degree murder.
NRS 200.030(1)(b); Contreras, 118 Nev. at 334, 46 P.3d at 662. In
contrast, there are no statutorily enumerated felonies with respect to

 

second-degree felony murder, which is based on the involuntary
manslaughter statute (NRS 200.070) and the murder statute (NRS
200.030(2)). Ramirez, 126 Nev. at __, 236 P.8d at 622; see also Morris, 99

8

 
Nev. 109, 659 P.2d 852. When read together, those statutes broadly
provide that killings occurring in the commission of an unlawful act that
naturally tends to destroy human life or committed in the “prosecution of
a felonious intent” are murder and, unless the murder is committed in a
manner that satisfies NRS 200.030(1), are murder of the second degree.
Despite that broad language, this court has placed restrictions on the use
of the felony-murder rule to establish second-degree murder in order to
avoid the potential for “untoward” prosecutions that a broad application of
the felony-murder rule would allow. Morris, 99 Nev. at 118, 659 P.2d at
859. In particular, we have required that “two elements [be] satisfied:
(1)... ‘the [predicate] felony {must be] inherently dangerous, where death
or injury is a directly foreseeable consequence of the illegal act,’ and
(2)... ‘there [must be] an immediate and direct causal relationship—
without the intervention of some other source or agency—between the
actions of the defendant and the victim's death.” Ramirez, 126 Nev. at
. 285 P.3d at 622 (third alteration in original) (quoting Labastida v.
State, 115 Nev. 298, 307, 986 P.2d 443, 448-49 (1999). The question
presented by Rose is whether we should further narrow the use of the
felony-murder rule to establish second-degree murder by applying the
merger doctrine.

Application of the merger doctrine

‘The merger doctrine developed in the felony-murder context as

a means of restricting the scope of the felony-murder rule, particularly
when it is used to support a second-degree murder convietion. People v.
Sarun_Chun, 203 P.3d 425, 434 (Cal. 2009). “The merger doctrine
developed due to the understanding that the underlying felony must be an
independent crime and not merely the killing itself. ‘Thus, certain

 

 
en

 

underlying felonies ‘merge’ with the homicide and cannot be used for
purposes of felony murder.” Id, at 434-35.

‘This court has considered the merger doctrine in the context of
first-degree felony murder. In Contreras, 118 Nev. 932, 46 P.9d 661, we
considered whether the merger doctrine precluded the State from
pursuing a first-degree felony-murder charge based on the underlying
felony of burglary with the intent to commit battery, ‘This court
recognized that it had traditionally applied the merger doctrine only when
an offense is included within another offense and had refused to apply the
merger doctrine in determining whether “double jeopardy applies to a
prosecution for both felony murder and the underlying felony.” Id, at 337,
46 P.3d at 664. After considering a California decision adopting the
merger doctrine to preclude a first-degree felony-murder charge based on
the underlying felony of burglary with the intent to commit assault,
People v, Wilson, 462 P.2d 22 (Cal. 1969), overruled by People v. Farley,
210 P.3d 361 (Cal. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 1285 (2010),
we declined to apply the merger doctrine to first-degree felony murder
when the underlying felony was burglary with the intent to commit
battery. Contreras, 118 Nev. at 337, 46 P.Sd at 664. In doing so, we
emphasized the fact that the Legislature had specifically included
burglary as a felony that supports first-degree felony murder regardless of
the intent underlying the burglary, and that we were reluctant to depart
from the Legislature's intent in that respect. Id.; accord Farley, 210 P.3d
at 409-11. However, Contreras did not address the merger doctrine in the
context of second-degree felony murder. We do so now.

‘The merger doctrine was first articulated and applied to
second-degree felony murder in California in People v, Ireland, 450 P.24
580 (Cal. 1969). See also State v. Essman, 403 P.2d 540 (Ariz. 1965); State

10

 
 

x Severns, 148 P.2d 488 (Kan, 1944); People v, Moran, 158 N.E, 35, 36
(NY. 1927); People v, Wagner, 156 N.E. 644 (N.Y. 1927); State v. Branch,
415 P.2d 766 (Or. 1966), The issue arose in Ireland in response to a trial
court instruction allowing second-degree felony murder based on assault
with a deadly weapon as the predicate felony. 450 P.2d at 590, The
California Supreme Court held that such an instruction was improper
because “[t]o allow such use of the felony-murder rule would effectively
preclude the jury from considering the issue of malice aforethought in all

 

cases wherein homicide has been committed as a result of a felonious
assault—a category which includes the great majority of all homicides.”
Id

Recently, in Sarun Chun, the California Supreme Court
further clarified when an underlying felony merges with murder in the
context of second-degree felony murder. 203 P.3d 425. It plainly stated
that an underlying felony that is assaultive in nature necessarily merges
with the homicide and cannot be the basis for a second-degree felony-
murder instruction. Id, at 443. ‘The court went on to define an assaultive
felony as any felony that involves a threat of immediate violent injury. Id.
“Accordingly, if the elements of the crime have an assaultive aspect, the
crime merges with the underlying homicide even if the elements also
include conduct that is not assaultive.” Id. The Sarun Chun court
declined to enumerate which felonies are assaultive but held that shooting
at an occupied vehicle is assaultive and cannot be used as the underlying
felony to support a second-degree felony-murder charge; therefore, it
concluded that the trial court erred in instrueting the jury on second-
degree felony murder. Id.

We have not always followed California's example with regard
to the applicability of the merger doctrine to the felony-murder rule. As

u

 
 

noted above, we rejected a California case in refusing to apply the merger
doctrine to a first-degree felony-murder charge that was based on burglary
with the intent to commit battery. Contreras, 118 Nev, at 937, 46 P.3d at
664. One of the primary reasons we declined to follow Californi

 

example was our recognition that the Legislature had specified the
felonies that can be used for purposes of establishing first-degree felony
murder. NRS 200.030(1)(). We noted that it is not this court’s role to
“override the [LJegislature’s determination that [a certain felony] should
be one of the enumerated felonies appropriate to elevate a homicide to
felony murder.” Contreras, 118 Nev. at 337, 46 P.3d at 664; accord Farley,
210 P.3d at 409-11, But the Legislature has not specified the felonies that
can be used for purposes of second-degree felony murder, and absent such
clear divection, we are convinced that the merger doctrine has a
worthwhile place in restricting the scope of the second-degree felony-
murder rule to avoid the potential for “untoward” prosecutions that has
led us to restrict the rule in other ways. See Ramirez, 126 Nev. at__, 235
P.3d at 622 (requiring that the felony supporting second-degree felony
murder be inherently dangerous and that there be a direct causal
relationship between defendant's actions and victim's death): Morris, 99
Nev. 109, 659 P.2d 852.

We are persuaded by the California Supreme Court's
reasoning that allowing assaultive-type felonies to form the basis for a
second-degree murder conviction based on the felony-murder rule would
mean that virtually every homicide would occur in the commission of a
felony and therefore be murder, unless otherwise justifiable or excusable
or committed upon a sudden irresistible impulse. See Sarun Chun, 203
P.8d at 435; Ineland, 450 P.2d at 590; accord Moran, 158 N.E. at 36
(addressing felony-murder rule and holding that felonious assault that

12

 
co ie

 

culminated in homicide could not be used to apply the felony-murder rule
because the result would be that almost every homicide would be
committed in the course of a felony so that no further evidence of intent
would ever be required for a murder conviction; therefore, the felony “must
be one that is independent of the homicide and of the assault merged
therein” (emphasis added). However, we are mindful of the differences
between the second-degree murder statutes in California and Nevada,

Under our decision today, the application of the merger
doctrine turns on a determination of whether the underlying felony is
assaultive in nature. We therefore also must determine whether that
question presents a factual determination for the jury or a legal
determination for the trial court. We faced a similar decision as to the
question of whether a felony is inherently dangerous for purposes of
second-degree felony murder. Recently, in Ramirez _v. State, we
abandoned earlier cases that had suggested that that question is a legal
one to be determined in the abstract based on the elements of the
underlying felony; we instead held that the jury must determine whether
the felony underlying a second-degree felony-murder charge is inherently
dangerous based on the manner in which the felony was committed. 126
Nev. at __ n.2, 235 P.3d at 622 n.2. In applying the merger doctrine, we
are similarly persuaded that the jury should determine whether the
underlying felony is assaultive—ije, involves a threat of immediate
violent injury—based on the manner in which the felony was committed

In the present case, the predicate felony for the second-degree
felony-murder theory was assault with a deadly weapon. At the time that
Rose shot Watkins, NRS 200.471 defined assault as “{ullawfully

13

 
attempting to use physical force against another person” or
“fiJntentionally placing another person in reasonable apprehension of
immediate bodily harm.” The offense was a felony if the assault was made
with the use of a deadly weapon. The assault here is based on Rose's act
of aiming the gun at or near Watkins and telling her to got off the phone.
‘The conduct could be viewed as using a deadly weapon to intentionally
place the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm by
threatening her with immediate violent injury. A jury therefore could find
that the felony was assaultive and merged with the homicide.
Alternatively, a properly instructed jury could have found implied malice
based on the circumstances of the killing, see NRS 200.0202), and still
convicted Rose of second-degree murder. But based on the facts of this

 

case and the conflicting evidence as to Rose's state of mind, we cannot
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found
Rose guilty of second-degree murder absent the omitted instruction?
Allred, 120 Nev. at 415, 92 P.3d at 1250.

"Rose also argues that the jury was erroneously instructed that if it
was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the shooting of Watkins was
accidental, then it must return a verdiet of not guilty, shifting the burden
of proof from the State to Rose. Because we overturn Rose’s conviction on
other grounds, we do not address this issue at length. However, we note
that under the particular circumstances of this case, the accidental
homicide instruction misstated the law and violated Rose’s due procoss
rights by relieving the government of its duty to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Rose intentionally killed Watkins. Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 326 (1985) (noting that jury instructions which
relieve the government of its burden of proof violate a defendant's due
process rights), Further, we take this opportunity to emphasize that the
district courts should always be vigilant to give appropriate instructions
on presented issues, and failure to do so may prompt appellate review,

continued on next page

 

 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction and

remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this

Lege Ca.
Douglas

opinion.

We coneur:

Gcbeuig

Pickering

cp Male

fardesty

~ continued

even in the absence of objection below, when necessary to protect a
defendant's right to a fair trial. See Flanagan v. State, 112 Nev. 1409,
1423, 930 P.2d 691, 700 (1996).

We also have considered Rose's claim that there was insufficient
evidence to support his conviction and conclude that it lacks merit. See
Origel-Candido v, State, 114 Nev. 378, 381, 956 P.2d 1378, 1380 (1998)
("The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(internal quotations omitted); see also NRS 200.020(2) (“Malice shall be
implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when all the
circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.”);
Kevs v. State, 104 Nev. 736, 738, 766 P.2d 270, 271 (1988) (explaining that
malice may be implied from “the intentional use of a deadly weapon in a
deadly and dangerous manner” (quoting Moser v, State, 91 Nev. 809, 812,
544 P.2d 424, 426 (1975))). Given our decision to reverse the judgment of
conviction, we need not address Rose's other claims on appeal.