Case Title: State ex rel. Skyway Invest. Corp. v. Court of Common Pleas

Citation: 2011-Ohio-5452

Docket Number: 2011-0320

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-10-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Skyway Invest. Corp. v. Ashtabula Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Slip Opinion No. 
2011-Ohio-5452.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-5452 
THE STATE EX REL. SKYWAY INVESTMENT CORPORATION, APPELLANT, v. 
ASHTABULA COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Skyway Invest. Corp. v. Ashtabula Cty. Court of 
Common Pleas, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-5452.] 
Common pleas court did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction in 
underlying matter—Court of appeals’ judgment denying petition for writs 
of prohibition and mandamus affirmed. 
(No. 2011-0320—Submitted September 20, 2011—Decided October 27, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Ashtabula County, No. 2007-A-0058. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a court of appeals judgment denying the 
petition of appellant, Skyway Investment Corporation (“Skyway”), for a writ of 
prohibition to prevent appellee, Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas, from 
proceeding to place certain property owned by Skyway in receivership and a writ 
of mandamus to compel appellee to vacate its orders concerning the property in 
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an underlying civil case.  Because the common pleas court did not patently and 
unambiguously lack jurisdiction in the underlying matter, we affirm the judgment 
of the court of appeals. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} In November 1992, the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas 
entered a judgment in favor of John Poss and against Marilyn Morris in the 
amount of $149,750 plus interest in Poss v. Morris, Ashtabula C.P. case No. 
80956.  When Poss experienced difficulties in enforcing the judgment against 
Morris, he filed a forcible-entry-and-detainer action against her. 
{¶ 3} Poss and Morris settled the dispute concerning the enforcement of 
the judgment with a July 19, 1993 agreement under which Morris agreed to 
convey her property to Poss and Morris would be permitted to remain in a 
building on a 2.505 acre tract of the property until January 1, 1994.  The parties 
specified that the “agreement constitutes a full and complete release between the 
parties and John Poss will release his judgment lien and mortgage lien upon 
receipt of the deed to the property.”  Just a few days before the agreement was 
executed, Morris filed a motion in the common pleas court to enforce the 
settlement.  On September 16, 1993, the common pleas court incorporated the 
parties’ settlement agreement into the judgment of the court. 
{¶ 4} Morris subsequently filed for bankruptcy in 1995, which resulted 
in further litigation regarding the subject property.  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that because of the 1993 judgment in favor of 
Poss, a constructive trust had been imposed on the property in his favor and thus 
the property was not affected by Morris’s bankruptcy filing.  In re Morris (C.A.6, 
2001), 260 F.3d 654. 
{¶ 5} In December 2002, Poss filed a motion in the common pleas court 
for an order that Morris transfer to him the property as she had agreed.  
Arguments on the motion were heard in April 2003.  On November 4, 2003, 
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before the court ruled on Poss’s motion, Morris transferred the property to 
Skyway.  Skyway’s attorney knew of the previous litigation, but concluded that 
Skyway was a bona fide purchaser for value. 
{¶ 6} In July 2005, Poss filed a motion to appoint a receiver to take 
possession of the property that is the subject of the constructive trust and to 
appoint a person pursuant to Civ.R. 70 to execute the conveyance of the property 
to him as directed by the court’s September 1993 judgment.  In March 2006, the 
common pleas court granted the motion and appointed a receiver to take 
possession of the subject property and a person to prepare and execute a deed for 
the conveyance of the property to Poss.  The court directed service of the 
judgment on Skyway and set the matter for a May 2006 hearing at which Skyway 
could object to the judgment. 
{¶ 7} Skyway entered an appearance in the case on May 10, 2006, and 
filed a motion on May 30, 2006, to vacate the judgment.  In February 2007, the 
common pleas court joined Skyway as a party defendant to the case and set a May 
2007 hearing on Skyway’s motion to vacate the judgment.  At the hearing, 
Skyway claimed for the first time that it was not a party in the case and that the 
court lacked subject-matter and personal jurisdiction to enter any order affecting 
its purported title to the property it had received from Morris.  On May 7, 2007, 
the common pleas court rejected Skyway’s jurisdictional argument, denied 
Skyway’s May 2006 motion to vacate the judgment, approved its prior judgment, 
and authorized Poss to proceed to maintain and protect his interest in the property 
and to secure the transfer of the property to him. 
{¶ 8} In July 2007, Skyway filed a petition in the Court of Appeals for 
Ashtabula County for a writ of prohibition to prevent the common pleas court 
from proceeding with the receivership and confiscating the property and for a writ 
of mandamus to compel the common pleas court to vacate its judgments and 
orders concerning the property.  The common pleas court filed an answer, and the 
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parties submitted motions for summary judgment.  At a hearing before a court of 
appeals magistrate, Skyway’s counsel conceded that it had not submitted a copy 
of its motion to vacate the common pleas court’s judgment into evidence, because 
the motion was contrary to Skyway’s current position that it had not voluntarily 
appeared in the common pleas court case.  In January 2011, the court of appeals 
denied the writ. 
{¶ 9} This cause is now before the court upon Skyway’s appeal as of 
right. 
Legal Analysis 
{¶ 10} Skyway asserts that the court of appeals erred in denying its claims 
for extraordinary relief in prohibition and mandamus.  “Neither mandamus nor 
prohibition will issue if the party seeking extraordinary relief has an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of law.”  Dzina v. Celebrezze, 108 Ohio St.3d 385, 
2006-Ohio-1195, 843 N.E.2d 1202, ¶ 12.  “In the absence of a patent and 
unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter 
jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party contesting that 
jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal.”  State ex rel. Plant v. Cosgrove, 
119 Ohio St.3d 264, 2008-Ohio-3838, 893 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 5; see also State ex rel. 
Mosier v. Fornof, 126 Ohio St.3d 47, 2010-Ohio-2516, 930 N.E.2d 305, ¶ 2. 
{¶ 11} For the following reasons, the common pleas court did not patently 
and unambiguously lack either subject-matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction 
over Skyway to rule in the underlying proceeding. 
{¶ 12} First, the court had inherent and statutory authority to rule in the 
underlying case.  See Cramer v. Petrie (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 131, 133, 637 
N.E.2d 882 (“courts have inherent authority—authority that has existed since the 
very beginning of the common law—to compel obedience of their lawfully issued 
orders”); State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Gibbs (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 69, 73, 573 
N.E.2d 62 (“It has long been recognized that the trial court is vested with sound 
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discretion to appoint a receiver”); R.C. 2735.01(C) (common pleas court may 
appoint a receiver “[a]fter judgment, to carry the judgment into effect”); R.C. 
2735.01(D) (common pleas court may appoint a receiver “[a]fter judgment, to 
dispose of the property according to the judgment”). 
{¶ 13} Second, the common pleas court did not lack jurisdiction to order 
the conveyance of the interest in the subject property notwithstanding that the 
1992 judgment against Skyway’s predecessor-in-title was for money only.  Civ.R. 
69 authorizes a common pleas court to direct the enforcement of the judgment:  
“Process to enforce a judgment for the payment of money shall be a writ of 
execution, unless the court directs otherwise.”  (Emphasis added.)  Because Poss 
had difficulty collecting on the money judgment, he filed a forcible-entry-and-
detainer action against Morris, which led to the parties’ settlement agreement.  In 
fact, Morris invoked the continuing jurisdiction of the common pleas court by 
requesting that the court enforce the parties’ settlement agreement.  Ultimately, 
the court incorporated the settlement into its own order, as it was authorized to do.  
Thereafter, the court had jurisdiction to direct Morris to comply with the court 
order.  Civ.R. 70 (“If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land * 
* * and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may, where 
necessary, direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some 
other person appointed by the court, and the act when so done has like effect as if 
done by the party”). 
{¶ 14} Third, Skyway’s claim that any judgment became dormant because 
of the passage of time is not cognizable in an extraordinary-writ action, and it has 
or had an adequate remedy by appeal from the court’s denial of its motion to 
vacate to raise this claim.  See State ex rel. Perotti v. McMonagle (Oct. 5, 2000), 
Cuyahoga App. No. 78295, 2000 WL 1474510, *3 (claim that convictions and 
judgments for court costs were dormant because they were over 20 years old was 
not cognizable in prohibition, because common pleas court judge was authorized 
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to revive any dormant judgment and any claim that he erred in doing so would be 
remediable by Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment).  Moreover, the 
court’s September 1993 judgment incorporating the parties’ settlement in the 
underlying case was arguably not dormant, because it addressed ownership rights 
in the subject property rather than the initial monetary judgment.  See Poss v. 
Morris, Ashtabula App. No. 2004-A-0093, 2006-Ohio-1441, ¶ 42, citing In re 
Estate of Dinsio, 159 Ohio App.3d 98, 2004-Ohio-6036, 823 N.E.2d 43, ¶ 54. 
{¶ 15} Fourth, Skyway’s claim that the 1993 settlement agreement was 
defective because of a lack of consideration does not raise a jurisdictional defect.  
And the parties’ agreement evidenced sufficient consideration.  See Minster 
Farmers Coop. Exchange Co., Inc. v. Meyer, 117 Ohio St.3d 459, 2008-Ohio-
1259, 884 N.E.2d 1056, ¶ 28, quoting Perlmuter Printing Co. v. Strome, Inc. 
(N.D.Ohio 1976), 436 F.Supp. 409, 414 (defining consideration as a “ ‘bargained 
for legal benefit and/or detriment’ ”). 
{¶ 16} Fifth, there was sufficient evidence for the court of appeals to 
conclude that the common pleas court had personal jurisdiction over Skyway 
because Skyway had entered an appearance in the underlying case and did not 
raise any jurisdictional objection until almost a year later.  See Maryhew v. Yova 
(1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 154, 156-157, 11 OBR 471, 464 N.E.2d 538 (“In order for 
a judgment to be rendered against a defendant when he is not served with process, 
there must be a showing upon the record that the defendant has voluntarily 
submitted himself to the court’s jurisdiction or committed other acts which 
constitute a waiver of the jurisdictional defense”); Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Five Star Fin. Corp., Hamilton App. No. C-100037, 2011-Ohio-2476, ¶ 19, fn. 
15, quoting McBride v. Coble Express (1993), 92 Ohio App.3d 505, 510, 636 
N.E.2d 356 (“ ‘[A]ny objection to assumption of personal jurisdiction is waived 
by a party’s failure to assert a challenge at its first appearance in the case, and 
such defendant is considered to have consented to the court’s jurisdiction’ ”).  
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And insofar as Skyway claims that there is conflicting evidence on this issue, the 
requested extraordinary relief is unavailable.  See Goldstein v. Christiansen 
(1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 232, 238, 638 N.E.2d 541 (when resolution of a claim 
alleging the lack of personal jurisdiction is dependent upon facts to be determined 
by a court, the court’s ruling that it has jurisdiction is mere error for which 
extraordinary relief in prohibition is not the appropriate remedy). 
{¶ 17} Finally, the cases that Skyway cites in support of its claim for 
extraordinary relief in prohibition and mandamus are either distinguishable, see 
State ex rel. White v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 543, 
684 N.E.2d 72, and State ex rel. Natl. City Bank of Cleveland v. Cuyahoga Cty. 
Court of Common Pleas (1950), 154 Ohio St. 74, 42 O.O. 147, 93 N.E.2d 465, or 
were decided in the ordinary course of law by way of appeal rather than by an 
action for an extraordinary writ.  Baltimore & Ohio RR. v. Hollenberger (1907), 
76 Ohio St. 177, 81 N.E. 184. 
{¶ 18} Therefore, the common pleas court did not patently and 
unambiguously lack jurisdiction to appoint a receiver and a person to effect the 
conveyance of the property in the underlying case, and Skyway, which had been 
joined as a party defendant in the proceeding by the common pleas court, had an 
adequate remedy by appeal to raise its claims. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 19} Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals denying the writs of prohibition and mandamus.  We also deny Skyway’s 
request for oral argument, because the parties’ briefs are sufficient to resolve this 
appeal. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, CUPP, 
and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
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__________________ 
 
Robert S. Wynn and Emanuel H. McGregor for appellant. 
 
Thomas L. Sartini, Ashtabula County Prosecuting Attorney, and Rebecca 
K. Divoky, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
_____________________