Case Title: Ex Parte Ellard

Citation: 474 So. 2d 758

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1985-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
474 So. 2d 758 (1985)
Ex parte Richard Mark ELLARD.
(re Richard Mark Ellard v. State of Alabama).
83-1352.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 3, 1985.
*759 Ralph I. Knowles, Jr., Tuscaloosa, and Ira A. Burnim, Montgomery, for petitioner.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Joseph G.L. Marston, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Frank D. McPhillips of Maynard, Cooper, Frierson, & Gale, Birmingham, for amicus curiae Johnny Wayne Wade.
MADDOX, Justice.
We issued the writ of certiorari in this case in order to review the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision, 474 So. 2d 743, upholding the Board of Pardon and Parole's revocation of Richard Mark Ellard's parole. We affirm.
A complete statement of the facts is contained in the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, but we set out a sufficient set of facts to support the reasons why we affirm.
Mark Ellard was incarcerated in the Alabama prison system pursuant to a life sentence for murder and a twenty-year sentence for assault with intent to murder. On December 8, 1980, parole officer Thomas Tate evaluated the social, criminal, and custodial record of Mark Ellard and recommended that he be paroled. The board met with Ellard on December 15, 1980, interviewed him, and later reviewed the parole board file. In addition to the parole evaluations and social histories made at the time of his sentencing, the file included reports on the nature of his crimes and his activities on escape in 1977, as well as documents from classification officers, work supervisors, and the warden of Holman Prison recommending that Ellard be paroled.
Based upon its investigations, evaluations, and interview, the board issued Ellard a certificate of parole. Additional factors established by petitioner's Ala.R. App.P. 39(k) statement shall be considered below in light of their relevance to the issues presented.
In the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion, Judge Patterson, writing for the court, set forth a detailed history of the establishment of the Board of Pardons and Paroles. He also set forth the applicable law for reexamination of the grant of parole by administrative boards.
The critical questions raised in this petition are: (1) Did Ellard have a liberty interest? and (2) Could the parole board, based on the record in this case, revoke the parole?
The Court of Criminal Appeals correctly determined that Alabama's parole statutes do not create a "liberty interest" that cannot be revoked. Andrus v. Lambert, 424 So. 2d 5 (Ala.Crim.App.1982); Thomas v. Sellers, 691 F.2d 487 (11th Cir. 1982); Johnston v. Alabama Pardon and Parole Board, 530 F. Supp. 589 (M.D.Ala. 1982). In Thomas the Middle District held as follows:
*760 When the statute is framed in discretionary terms there is not a liberty interest created."
Although Ellard did not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest, nevertheless, we recognize that Ellard was entitled to a due process hearing; here, however, as the Court of Criminal Appeals found, Ellard was accorded substantial procedural safeguards in accordance with the mandates of Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1971).
Can a parole be revoked in the absence of a showing that the parolee violated a condition of his parole? There is a split of authority on this issue. In Ex parte Urbanowicz, 24 F.2d 574 (D.Kan.1928), the Court held that a parole granted to a United States prisoner could not be cancelled or rescinded except for some offense committed by him subsequent to the date of the parole which constituted a violation of the terms of the parole.
Courts have reached a contrary conclusion, however, under statutes which confer more extensive authority on the parole board or commission. In Johnson v. Walls, 185 Ga. 177, 194 S.E. 380 (1937), the Georgia Supreme Court held that the parole board did not exceed its power in revoking a parole when the prison commission which granted the parole mistakenly thought that the prisoner had served several months of his sentence instead of, in actuality, only two days of his sentence. See also In re Tobin, 130 Cal. App. 371, 20 P.2d 91 (1933).
This issue of whether a parole board can revoke a parole was addressed most recently in Tracy v. Salamack, 440 F. Supp. 930 (S.D.N.Y.1977), modified and affirmed, Tracy v. Salamack, 572 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1978).
The Tracy decision, although involving work release inmates and New York statutes, is strikingly similar to this case. We quote the second opinion in that case in its entirety for a complete understanding of the facts and the laws, omitting only the footnotes:
Id. at 936.
572 F.2d  at 394-397.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals modified the preliminary injunction issued by the district court to read as follows:
572 F.2d  at 397 (2d Cir.1978).
Although the Tracy court was interpreting New York statutes, we find that court's reasoning applicable to the situation at hand. In fact, in Tracy the Second Circuit found that New York amended its statutes to correct those situations in which "a convicted murderer, rapist or armed robber [was] too easily entitled to participate in work release." 572 F.2d  at 396, n. 11.
The thrust of the Tracy decision, as we read it, is that a state can review a conditional release of a prisoner and revoke it if the prisoner is given a hearing accompanied by a written statement of reasons. Although not stated by the Tracy court, we believe the underlying rationale for the result reached there is that the public has an interest in protecting itself against the early or conditional release of prisoners who might pose a threat to the community. We recognize that in Tracy this public interest was spelled out in amendments to New York law governing work release inmates, but we do not believe that a parole board, like Alabama's, could not reexamine an inmate's past record and conclude that in granting parole it had failed to follow the public will, as expressed in the parole statutes.
We believe that a determination of whether a parole board can revoke a parole requires a balancing of the public interest against the interest of the prisoner in receiving the benefits of the parole granted to him. In balancing these interests, we must not, of course, be guided by public clamor or media interest, but by an application of the principles of law which delineate the public interest in granting paroles only to those found by the Board of Pardons and Paroles to be legally eligible for parole, and the prisoner's interest in being accorded his freedom if the Board in the exercise of its discretion determines that the prisoner is eligible. Here, there was great media interest and the attorney general, as the chief legal officer of the state, was of the opinion that Ellard should not have been paroled.
As we understand the opinion by the Second Circuit in Tracy, a board is not limited to a consideration of the events occurring after a parole is granted, but may reconsider the character of the offense and can reexamine the very basis on which parole was initially granted, and can determine that it did not follow the statutory scheme.
In Tracy, the prison commissioner was authorized to reexamine the record of work release inmates who were murderers, rapists, and robbers, and remove them from the program. The Court opined that "[d]ue *763 process requires a reevaluation by the commissioner of each participating inmate's eligibility in the light of the threat that the inmate presents to the security of the community,... taking into account his eligibility for parole, his past institutional record, the particular circumstances underlying the violent offense for which he is under sentence, and his previous temporary release record." 572 F.2d  at 396-97.
The parole board is charged with the responsibility of determining who is eligible for parole. If it determines that it made a mistake in carrying out its duties, it is not powerless to rescind its actions, provided, of course, the prisoner is accorded his due process rights.
We hold that based upon the record before it and after a reexamination of all of the information, including the prisoner's eligibility for parole, his past institutional record, the circumstances underlying the violent offense for which he is under sentence, and his previous parole record, the board was authorized to determine that in the initial grant of parole, it failed to properly exercise its discretion in accordance with Alabama's statutory scheme; therefore, we find that the Board had authority to determine that an error was made on initial review of Ellard's eligibility and, after notice, hearing, and a reexamination of the pertinent facts, had the authority to revoke his parole. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and FAULKNER, SHORES and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
JONES, ALMON, EMBRY and BEATTY, JJ., dissent.
EMBRY, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent for the reasons set out below.
Initially, I am awestruck by the majority's incredible position that the powers of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles under Code 1975, §§ 15-22-1, et seq., are to be interpreted by decisions of foreign courts, speaking to statutes enacted in foreign jurisdictions. With all due deference to New York, I fail to see how an interpretation of New York's temporary release program has any bearing on the ability of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles to revoke a legally executed parole where the prisoner has already been released from custody. I would prefer to look to Alabama's statutory law.
Second, Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S. Ct. 2064, 76 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1983), leaves no doubt that, once released from prison, a parolee has a liberty interest which attaches, commanding a due process hearing before a revocation of that parole. Due process requires that a parolee be apprised of any violations of parole conditions before a hearing is held. In this case, Ellard was not notified of any violations, as there were none charged.
The writ of certiorari was issued in this case in order to review the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision upholding the Board of Pardons and Paroles' revocation of Richard Mark Ellard's parole. I would reverse.
The dispositive facts of this case are adequately set out in the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Additionally, petitioner properly submits an ARAP 39(k) statement, the pertinent provisions of which are summarized below.
Mark Ellard was incarcerated in the Alabama prison system pursuant to a life sentence for murder and a twenty year sentence for assault with intent to murder. On 8 December 1980, Parole Officer Thomas Tate evaluated the social, criminal, and custodial record of Mark Ellard and recommended that he be paroled. The Board met with Ellard on 15 December 1980, interviewed him, and later reviewed the Parole Board file. In addition to the parole evaluations and social histories made at the time of his sentencing, the file included reports on the nature of his crimes and his activities *764 on escape in 1977, as well as documents from classification officers, work supervisors, and the Warden of Holman Prison recommending that Ellard be paroled.
Based upon its investigations, evaluations, and interviews, the Board issued Ellard a Certificate of Parole. Additional factors established by petitioner's ARAP 39(k) statement shall be considered below in light of their relevance to the issues presented.
The essential issue presented by this case is whether the Board of Pardons and Paroles, upon reconsideration, may revoke a legally executed parole where the parolee has not violated any terms or conditions of that parole. To reach this issue, however, it is first necessary to determine whether the actions of the Board, in this case, constituted a legal issuance of Ellard's parole.
The Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the Board's revocation of Ellard's parole based on a finding that "certain substantial and legal evidence" pertaining to Ellard was not considered by the Board on its initial review. Therefore, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded, under Code 1975, §§ 15-22-25 and 15-22-40, the Board's execution of Ellard's parole was null and void. In so finding, that court erred in its interpretation of the requirements of § 15-22-25.
Furthermore, the above section is supplemented by Code 1975, § 15-22-40, which states:
The State argues, and the Court of Criminal Appeals found, that the Board's action was null and void for failure to consider: (1) a psychological report on Ellard; (2) evidence of misconduct and criminal activity while Ellard was on escape in 1977; (3) *765 an escape attempt in 1971; and (4) considerable public opposition to Ellard's parole.
In Sellers v. Thompson, 452 So. 2d 460 (Ala.1984), this court found that the requirements of Code 1975, § 15-22-25, did not necessitate the review of a psychiatric report on all inmates to be considered for parole.
In contrast to Sellers, a psychological report on Ellard was in existence. Nevertheless, I do not read Code 1975, § 15-22-25, to require the physical examination of every extant document relevant to a prospective parolee. To so hold would be both to require an omniscient Parole Board and to question the legality of every current and future parole.
On this point I note that the Board considered the report of Parole Officer Thomas Tate, dated 8 December 1980, which catalogs Ellard's criminal offenses, sentences, and prison record. Also before the Board, inter alia, were the supplementary reports compiled by Parole Officer Frank Fendley, of Oneonta, Alabama, in September 1972; the report of Parole Officer Winfred Smithson of Jefferson County, Alabama, in November 1972; and the report of Georgia Parole Investigator Lee Robinson on 26 May 1976. Additionally, Ellard's file included reports on the nature of his crimes and activities while on escape in 1977, as well as documents from classification officers, work supervisors, and the warden of Holman Prison. Accordingly, I find the Board considered a complete investigation of Ellard's social and criminal record before granting him parole, and thereby satisfied the provisions of Code 1975, § 15-22-25.
Regarding the public opposition to Ellard's parole, I opine that public opinion is neither required by law to be considered by the Board, nor relevant in any way to a proper parole determination. In fact, the very genesis of Code 1975, §§ 15-22-1, et seq., is the intention to isolate the pardon and parole process from political concerns. See "Report of the Special Legislative Committee Investigating Pardons and Paroles", Special Session (1951).
On alternative grounds, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that the Board lacks the statutory authority to parole an inmate from an Alabama sentence where that prisoner is subject to a foreign jurisdiction's detainer for custody and sentencing. Therefore, that court concluded, the Board's action in paroling Ellard to Georgia's custody was null and void, warranting revocation. That is an erroneous conclusion.
As aptly pointed out by the amicus curiae, such a conclusion would base an inmate's eligibility for parole not upon the criteria established by the legislature under Code 1975, § 15-22-26, but, rather, upon the terms of a sentence imposed by a court in a foreign jurisdiction. There is no support for this proposition.
To the contrary, Code 1975, § 15-22-36(a), affirmatively vests the following powers in the Board:
Thus, unless there is a specific statutory exclusion, the Board has the authority to determine parole eligibility. Although the Court of Criminal Appeals implies to the contrary, Code 1975, § 15-22-27, does not exclude from parole consideration those inmates who may be subject to a detainer from another jurisdiction. That section merely grants to the Board certain powers in addition to its power to grant pardons and paroles. It provides that the Board may, at its option, transfer an inmate to another jurisdiction without paroling him from the sentence imposed by an Alabama court. It by no means prohibits or otherwise limits the Board from exercising its power to parole an inmate pursuant to Code 1975, § 15-22-36(a).
*766 In a collateral argument, the State contends Ellard was never paroled, but merely transferred to Georgia's custody pursuant to Code 1975, § 15-22-24(i). This is a frivolous argument, in that every relevant document, including a signed and sealed Certificate of Parole, indicates that Ellard was to be paroled, not transferred.
Based upon the foregoing, I would hold the petitioner was awarded a legally executed parole by the Board. It is undisputed that Ellard has not violated any of the conditions of that parole. Thus, I turn my attention to whether the Board, in the absence of any parole violations, is empowered to reconsider and revoke a legally executed parole after the inmate has been released.
There is no provision under Alabama law, the regulations of the Board, or the terms of petitioner's Certificate of Parole, authorizing the Board to reconsider a parole in the absence of any parole violation. Code 1975, § 15-22-32, provides for declaring a parolee delinquent, but only where "there is reasonable cause to believe that a prisoner who has been paroled has violated his parole." Furthermore, Code 1975, § 15-22-29, provides that a parolee may be liable for arrest and imprisonment after a violation of any parole condition. A statutory power to reopen and reconsider a parole after an inmate's release, however, can hardly be gleaned from the above code sections in the absence of any parole violations.
Neither do I find the Board vested with any inherent or implied power to reconsider paroles where no violation has occurred. Such a construction would be in clear abrogation of the restrictions set out in Code 1975, § 15-22-38, which states:
In any event, for the Board to now reopen and reconsider Ellard's parole, in the absence of any parole violations, and without authority under statute, regulation, or Certificate of Parole conditions, would be an act so arbitrary and capricious as to violate the due process clause of the United States Constitution. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972); See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S. Ct. 2064, 76 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1983).
Accordingly, I would hold that the Board was without legal authority to reconsider a legally executed parole in the absence of any parole violations. Consequently, I would hold the Board's "revocation" of Ellard's parole is null and void. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is due to be reversed.
JONES, ALMON and BEATTY, JJ., concur.