Case Title: Firchau v. Barringer Crater Co.

Citation: 344 P.2d 486, 86 Ariz. 215

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1959-09-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
86 Ariz. 215 (1959) 344 P.2d 486 Albert J. FIRCHAU, Appellant, v. BARRINGER CRATER CO., a corporation, Appellee. No. 6667. Supreme Court of Arizona. September 30, 1959. *216 Wilson, Compton & Wilson, Flagstaff, and Lewelling & Gies, Salem, for appellant. Mangum & Christensen, Flagstaff, for appellee. UDALL, Justice. This is an appeal by defendant Albert J. Firchau from an order of the lower court denying a motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order theretofore issued and the granting of an injunction pendente lite to plaintiff-appellee. We shall hereafter refer to the parties as they were designated in the trial court, i.e., plaintiff and defendant. The facts giving rise to the appeal are as follows: The Barringer Crater Company, a corporation, as plaintiff, on October 23, 1957, brought an action against defendant-appellant, Albert J. Firchau, to quiet its title to: Also, injunctive relief and damages were sought against defendant. On the same *217 day the complaint was filed, the plaintiff without notice to defendant obtained from the court a temporary restraining order, and an order to show cause on November 1, 1957, why a preliminary injunction should not be ordered pendente lite. A bond of $1,000 was exacted and later furnished by plaintiff. From the court's minutes, dated November 1, 1957, it appears that by stipulation of counsel the hearing on temporary restraining order and order to show cause was ordered continued until November 18, 1957, and the temporary restraining order was directed, in the interim, to remain in full force and effect. On November 18, 1957, defendant filed his answer wherein he claimed to be in lawful possession of the premises under an express contract in writing for the working, mining and development of said property; and by a separate defense and counterclaim he asked for a dissolution of the restraining order and for damages, plus attorney's fees. On the last mentioned date with all parties represented a day-long hearing was had on the temporary restraining order and the order to show cause. A half dozen witnesses testified, and numerous documents were admitted in evidence as exhibits, whereupon the court took the matter under advisement and asked for briefs. Thereafter, on December 24, 1957, there was filed with the clerk a letter from the presiding judge directing the entry of the following order, viz.: Said order was properly entered and docketed by the clerk. A motion for new trial was filed and denied by operation of law. This appeal, under A.R.S. section 12-2101, subd. F, par. 2, followed. There are but two assignments of error, the first of which reads: The section of the code above referred to is as follows: Though this unique section, unchanged in phraseology, has been a part of our statutory law at least since the adoption of the Civil Code, Revised Statutes, 1913 (Section 1465) prior thereto it appeared in substance as Section 2746, R.S. '01 it has never heretofore been interpreted by this court. Its source or purpose and scope is not readily apparent, though possibly it was considered by the legislature that the ordinary mining claim could hardly be subject to irreparable damage through the continued working or mining of the claim during the period of the notice this for the reason that the interest of the parties in a mining claim is primarily in the minerals, and not in the property as such. Here, however, we have a much more involved and complicated situation. It will be noted that we are dealing strictly with fee lands and that areas and interests other than the four patented placer claims are sought to be protected. The placer claims in question cover what is known as "Meteor Crater", created by a falling meteor, which is widely recognized as a scientific phenomenon. It is a tourist and scenic attraction; and this part of the property in question was under lease to the Bar-T-Bar Ranch, Inc. for these purposes long prior to any dealings between plaintiff and defendant. The following quotation from the temporary restraining order, stating the grounds for its issuance, is self-explanatory: With these added factors it seems doubtful whether, under the peculiar facts of this case, the legislature intended by enactment of the statute in question to deny plaintiff immediate relief without notice. *219 However, assuming, without deciding, that section 12-1807, supra, is applicable and governs rather than Rule 65(d), Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S. which rule undoubtedly formed the basis for the issuance of the order in question because some mining operations are concededly involved here, still we believe that defendant is endeavoring to unduly narrow the issue by contending in his brief As a matter of law the temporary restraining order became functus officio when superseded by the court's orders of November 18th and December 24, 1957. The latter order which is the subject of this appeal as we interpret it, in effect, granted a temporary injunction after a full hearing thereon. The distinction is succinctly stated in 28 Am.Jur., Injunctions, section 11, viz.: Furthermore it will be remembered that on November 1st, by stipulation of the parties, the court restrained further activities by defendant until the date of the postponed hearing which was held on November 18, 1957. Then at the close of plaintiff's evidence the court denied defendant's motion to dissolve the restraining order *220 and later exercised its equitable jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief, thereby preserving the status quo until the case could be determined upon its merits. The question of damages and whether a permanent injunction should finally issue still remain to be determined. It is stated in 28 Am.Jur., Injunctions, section 256: We hold there is no merit to this first assignment. The second assignment of error is: In support thereof two propositions of law are advanced, viz.: Counsel for plaintiff does not question the correctness of these abstract propositions of law, but he does challenge their applicability to the over-all evidence shown by the record. In support of their position it is apparent defendant's counsel are relying upon the testimony of Firchau that during the early part of January, 1957, in the presence of his attorney, he signed the proposed lease agreement, dated December 12, 1956, submitted and theretofore signed by plaintiff; supporting this statement is the testimony of his attorney, Lawrence Morley of Lebanon, Oregon, and that of the secretary, Mrs. John Carlson, who stated that she mailed the letter on the date it was signed. Inasmuch as there was no direct contradiction of this testimony as to the signing and mailing of the agreement, it is claimed this conclusively proves (a) *221 that a binding agreement was entered into between the parties; (b) the defendant was lawfully on the property of the plaintiff performing this agreement, and that hence an injunction could not issue to restrain such act. Were this all of the evidence, defendant's position would be correct, but we must consider all of the evidence and, furthermore, construe it in a light most favorable to a sustaining of the order in question. After carefully examining the reporter's transcript and documentary exhibits admitted into evidence, we are of the opinion the record is such that the trial court was not compelled to find the evidence was conclusive that an agreement had been entered into and defendant was therefore lawfully upon the premises. While there was no express finding on the matter, the order entered constituted at least an implied tentative determination that there was no binding lease agreement between the parties. We shall briefly summarize some of the contra evidence that led us to state, supra, that the evidence was not conclusive. The parties first corresponded in 1954, discussing the possibility of extracting the meteorite from the crater. Defendant and the president of the plaintiff corporation (D. Moreau Barringer) met personally in November, 1956, and further discussed this project. The latter, under date of November 15, 1956, prepared and signed a memorandum of this meeting, setting forth the conditions under which it proposed to enter into an agreement, and forwarded a copy to defendant for his signature. Defendant returned a signed copy to the plaintiff. Obviously this document was intended only as an "outline of a proposed agreement" to be later prepared, though defendant now attempts to place some reliance thereon. On December 12, 1956, plaintiff prepared and signed a draft of an agreement based upon the prior memorandum, but before sending same, plaintiff received a letter, dated December 15, 1956, from defendant's attorney (Mr. Morley) requesting clarification of certain provisions contained in the November memorandum. The plaintiff replied to this letter on December 27, 1956, addressing his communication to Firchau, and sending therewith two copies of the letter and the proposed agreement of December 12th. Copies were also sent to Attorney Morley. It should be noted that no description of the property was included with this draft. The real dispute, however, centers around the events following defendant's receipt of the December 12th agreement. The plaintiff maintains that he never received said agreement back from defendant but that he next heard from him by telephone about March 20, 1957, at which time President Barringer was advised defendant didn't entirely approve of all of *222 the clauses in the agreement and, therefore, he had not signed it. Plaintiff told defendant to redraft them and submit them as an alternative offer. This was done. Later, according to plaintiff's testimony, other letters were exchanged and telephone calls made in an effort to reach an agreement that would be satisfactory to both parties. Negotiations were finally broken off by plaintiff sending defendant a letter, by registered mail, dated September 12, 1957, cancelling all further negotiations. Possibly the most significant bit of evidence tending to show that no agreement had been arrived at is that it was not until September 20, 1957, that Firchau acknowledged before a notary public his copy of the December 12th agreement. He then without any authorization from plaintiff appended a description of the property thereto and had it recorded in the office of the county recorder of Coconino county. The question of whether there had been a meeting of the minds on the December 12, 1956, proposed agreement, and whether it had been signed by defendant in January, 1957, and mailed to plaintiff, were questions of fact for the determination of the trial court on all of the evidence submitted: 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 611, pages 1271 and 1274 respectively. Judgment affirmed. PHELPS, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, JOHNSON and BERNSTEIN, JJ., concur.