Case Title: State v. Zima

Citation: 2004-Ohio-1807

Docket Number: 20030090

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-04-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Zima, 102 Ohio St.3d 61, 2004-Ohio-1807.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. ZIMA, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Zima, 102 Ohio St.3d 61, 2004-Ohio-1807.] 
Criminal law — Principles of double jeopardy do not apply to bar successive 
prosecutions for the offense of driving under the influence in violation of 
R.C. 4511.19(A) and the offense of aggravated vehicular assault under 
R.C. 2903.08(A)(2). 
(No. 2003-0090 — Submitted December 3, 2003 — Decided April 28, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 80824, 2002-Ohio-
6327. 
_______________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Principles of double jeopardy do not apply to bar successive prosecutions for the 
offense of driving under the influence in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A) (or 
a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance) and the offense of 
aggravated vehicular assault under R.C. 2903.08(A)(2). 
_______________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J. 
{¶1} 
The facts of this case are undisputed.  The parties agree that on 
July 3, 2001, defendant-appellant, Karen Zima, operated her motor vehicle left of 
center on Broadview Road in Cleveland and collided with an oncoming 
motorcycle driven by Gary Schlairet.  On July 6, 2001, the city of Cleveland filed 
a complaint in the Cleveland Municipal Court charging Zima with driving under 
the influence in violation of Cleveland Codified Ordinances 433.01(a)(1), driving 
under suspension, failure to yield, and failure to wear a seatbelt.  On August 23, 
2001, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury returned a three-count indictment against 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
Zima, charging her with aggravated vehicular assault in violation of R.C. 2903.08 
on the basis that she was driving under the influence, aggravated vehicular assault 
in violation of R.C. 2903.08 on the basis that she was driving recklessly, and 
driving under the influence in violation of R.C. 4511.19. 
{¶2} 
On August 27, 2001, after plea negotiations with the city, Zima 
entered a no-contest plea in municipal court to the charge of driving under the 
influence, for which she was found guilty.  As part of the plea agreement, the city 
nolled the three remaining municipal charges.  It is undisputed that Zima was not 
aware of the indictment at the time of her plea. 
{¶3} 
After her sentencing in municipal court, Zima moved to dismiss 
the state charges in common pleas court on grounds of double jeopardy.  On 
December 28, 2001, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas granted 
Zima’s motion to dismiss, finding that pursuant to State v. Best (1975), 42 Ohio 
St.2d 530, 71 O.O.2d 517, 330 N.E.2d 421, and State v. Carpenter (1993), 68 
Ohio St.3d 59, 623 N.E.2d 66, “double jeopardy attached” to bar the “additional 
felony charges.” 
{¶4} 
In a split decision in which all three judges filed separate opinions, 
the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in dismissing the aggravated 
vehicular assault charges but properly dismissed the charge of driving under the 
influence of alcohol.1 
{¶5} 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
                                                 
1.  The state does not challenge the ruling on the third count of the indictment, conceding that 
“Cleveland Codified Ordinance 433.01 and ORC 4511.19 mirror one another in their provisions 
against Driving Under the Influence” and, therefore, that “count three of Appellant’s indictment, 
Driving Under the Influence, in violation of Ohio Revised Code section 4511.19, is in fact the 
same charge that she previously pled no contest [to] on August 27, 2001, in Cleveland Municipal 
Court.” 
January Term, 2004 
3 
{¶6} 
The general issue presented for our review is whether appellee, the 
state of Ohio, is barred from prosecuting Zima for the offense of aggravated 
vehicular assault under R.C. 2903.08 following her conviction in municipal court 
for driving under the influence. 
I 
Applicability of State v. Carpenter 
{¶7} 
In Carpenter, this court held: 
{¶8} 
“The state cannot indict a defendant for murder after the court has 
accepted a negotiated guilty plea to a lesser offense and the victim later dies of 
injuries sustained in the crime, unless the state expressly reserves the right to file 
additional charges on the record at the time of the defendant’s plea.”  Id., 68 Ohio 
St.3d 59, 623 N.E.2d 66, syllabus. 
{¶9} 
The essence of this holding is to require the state “to reserve its 
right to file additional charges based upon the contingency of the death of the 
alleged victim.”  Id. at 61, 623 N.E.2d 66.  Zima argues, however, that 
Carpenter’s rationale is broader than its holding.  According to Zima, the state 
should be required either to reserve or forfeit its right to file additional charges in 
all cases where the defendant reasonably believes that his or her negotiated guilty 
plea will terminate the incident, including those in which “all of the facts 
underlying the greater offense [are] known at the time of the plea.” 
{¶10} We find it unnecessary to determine whether Carpenter should be 
applied so expansively, and so expressly decline to resolve that issue.  Even if 
Carpenter’s analysis were held to apply across-the-board to all negotiated guilty 
pleas, it would still be of no benefit to Zima under the circumstances of this case. 
{¶11} The holding in Carpenter is essentially a synthesis of contract and 
criminal law in a particular factual setting.  Its supporting analysis is ultimately 
derived from the proposition that plea agreements are a necessary and desirable 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
part of the administration of criminal justice and, therefore, “ ‘must be attended by 
safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the circumstances.’ ”  
Id., 68 Ohio St.3d at 61, 623 N.E.2d 66, quoting Santobello v. New York (1971), 
404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427.  The court in Carpenter found 
that under the circumstances of that case, the defendant reasonably “anticipated 
that by pleading guilty to attempted felonious assault, and giving up rights which 
may have resulted in his acquittal, he was terminating the incident and could not 
be called on to account further on any charges regarding this incident.”  Id. at 61-
62, 623 N.E.2d 66.  In order to enforce this expectation, the court found it 
necessary to recognize what is basically an implied promise on the part of the state 
not to prosecute the defendant for any further offenses that may arise out of the 
same incident.  In so doing, the court followed State v. Thomas (1972), 61 N.J. 
314, 294 A.2d 57, where the New Jersey Supreme Court directed the dismissal of 
an indictment for murder that was filed after the defendant had pled guilty to one 
of three lesser charges and the victim subsequently died. 
{¶12} Critically, in both Carpenter and Thomas, the defendant’s 
expectation that his guilty plea would terminate the incident was inherently 
justified because the prosecutor and the court had jurisdiction over all the charges, 
both actual and potential, and because the negotiated guilty plea included the 
dismissal of all pending charges.  In the absence of these or equivalent 
circumstances, however, it would be exceedingly difficult to sustain a defendant’s 
belief that no further charges will be brought or prosecuted. 
{¶13} The same inquiry into the reasonableness of the defendant’s 
expectation would also be required in cases where, in Zima’s phrase, “all of the 
facts underlying the greater offense [are] known at the time of the plea.”  In State 
v. Lordan (1976), 116 N.H. 479, 363 A.2d 201, for example, the Supreme Court 
of New Hampshire applied Thomas to dismiss indictments that were based on 
January Term, 2004 
5 
offenses to which the defendant had already pled guilty and that were known to 
the prosecutor and chargeable at the time of the defendant’s original negotiated 
plea.  Yet, the court carefully held that the state must give notice of its intent to 
pursue additional charges when “the prosecutor has knowledge of and jurisdiction 
over all [the] offenses and the defendant disposes of all charges then pending by a 
guilty plea to one or more of the charges.”  Id., 116 N.H. at 482, 363 A.2d 201. 
{¶14} These qualifying factors are absent in the present case.  When Zima 
entered her plea in municipal court on August 27, 2001, she had already been 
indicted for aggravated vehicular assault.  Neither the municipal court nor the city 
prosecutor had the authority to dismiss those pending felony charges.  See R.C. 
1901.20.  Although Zima may not have been aware of the indictment at the time 
of her plea, we agree with the observation of one of the judges on the appellate 
panel that “[a] defendant should be aware that a plea taken before a municipal 
judge with limited criminal jurisdiction might not dispose of the matter fully.  
Therefore, Zima cannot simply rely on an implied representation that no further 
charges would be brought but must articulate the circumstances showing why her 
belief was reasonable in this case, which she has failed to do.”  2002-Ohio-6327, 
2002 WL 31618556, ¶ 44 (Kilbane, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
{¶15} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals 
insofar as it bears on this issue. 
II 
Double Jeopardy 
{¶16} The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
that “[n]o person shall * * * be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb.”  Similarly, Section 10, Article I, Ohio Constitution 
provides, “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
{¶17} In Best, supra, 42 Ohio St.2d at 533, 71 O.O.2d 517, 330 N.E.2d 
421, the court explained that “the fact that the indictment was brought in the name 
of the state of Ohio, and the other * * * charges in the name of the city * * *, does 
not affect the claim of double jeopardy. * * * [T]he state and the city are parts of a 
single sovereignty, and double jeopardy stands as a bar to a prosecution by one, 
after an accused has been in jeopardy for the same offense in a prosecution by the 
other.” 
{¶18} In determining whether an accused is being successively 
prosecuted for the “same offense,” the court in Best adopted the so-called “same 
elements” test articulated in Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299, 
304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306, and held: 
{¶19} “The applicable rule under the Fifth Amendment is that where the 
same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, 
the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is 
whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.  A single 
act may be an offense against two statutes, and if each statute requires proof of an 
additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either 
statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the 
other.”  Best at paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶20} In State v. Thomas (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 254, 259, 15 O.O.3d 262, 
400 N.E.2d 897, overruled on other grounds in State v. Crago (1990), 53 Ohio 
St.3d 243, 559 N.E.2d 1353, syllabus, the court explained, “This test focuses upon 
the elements of the two statutory provisions, not upon the evidence proffered in a 
given case.”  Thus, as summarized in United States v. Dixon (1993), 509 U.S. 
688, 696, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556, the Blockburger test “inquires 
whether each offense contains an element not contained in the other; if not, they 
January Term, 2004 
7 
are the ‘same offence’ and double jeopardy bars additional punishment and 
successive prosecution.” 
{¶21} In the instant case, Zima was convicted of violating Cleveland 
Codified Ordinances 433.01(a)(1), which provides: 
{¶22} “(a) No person shall operate any vehicle * * * within this City, if * 
* * any of the following apply: 
{¶23} “(1) The person is under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, 
or a combination of them.” 
{¶24} A violation of this ordinance would necessarily constitute a 
violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1), which provides: 
{¶25} “(A) No person shall operate any vehicle * * * within this state, if 
at the time of the operation, any of the following apply: 
{¶26} “(1) The person is under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, 
or a combination of them.” 
{¶27} The state now seeks to further prosecute Zima for aggravated 
vehicular assault in violation of R.C. 2903.08, which provides: 
{¶28} “(A) No person, while operating or participating in the operation of 
a motor vehicle, * * * shall cause serious physical harm to another person * * * in 
either of the following ways: 
{¶29} “(1)(a) As the proximate result of committing a violation of 
division (A) of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code or of a substantially 
equivalent municipal ordinance; 
{¶30} “* * * 
{¶31} “(2) Recklessly.” 
{¶32} The trial court determined that successive prosecutions for driving 
under the influence and aggravated vehicular assault are barred because the 
offense of driving under the influence “is one of the elements” of aggravated 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
vehicular assault.  However, the offense of driving under the influence is one of 
two alternative elements of aggravated vehicular assault, the other being reckless 
operation.  Thus, the court of appeals correctly concluded that the state is not 
required to prove aggravated vehicular assault under R.C. 2903.08(A)(1) but may 
prove that offense under R.C. 2903.08(A)(2), which does not require proof of 
driving under the influence. 
{¶33} Moreover, under the Blockburger test, the offense of driving under 
the influence in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) or Cleveland Codified 
Ordinances 433.01(a)(1) is not the same offense as aggravated vehicular assault 
under R.C. 2903.08(A)(2) for purposes of double jeopardy.  A conviction for 
aggravated vehicular assault under R.C. 2903.08(A)(2) requires proof of serious 
physical harm; a conviction for driving under the influence does not.  Similarly, 
the state and municipal provisions proscribing driving under the influence require 
proof that a person is under the influence of alcohol or a drug of abuse, which 
R.C. 2903.08(A)(2) does not.  As succinctly stated by the court in State v. Hyman 
(Sept. 28, 1993), 10th Dist. No. 93AP-530, 1993 WL 387267, “Recklessness can 
occur without alcohol or drug involvement, and operating a motor vehicle while 
[under the influence] can occur without resulting physical injury.” 
{¶34} Zima argues that in this case, however, “the state [will] have to 
prove that [she] was reckless by driving under the influence and failing to yield 
the right of way.”  She then asserts that further prosecution under Count 2 of the 
indictment is barred, “as [she] has [already] been placed in jeopardy for each of 
the constituent elements needed to prove Count Two.” 
{¶35} We find Zima’s assertions to be unsupported.  Blockburger 
requires a comparison of elements, not evidence.  R.C. 2903.08(A)(2) does not 
make driving under the influence and failure to yield necessary elements of 
recklessly causing serious physical harm.  Indeed, the statute lists driving under 
January Term, 2004 
9 
the influence and recklessness as distinct predicate offenses.  In reality, Zima is 
proposing that even though her subsequent prosecution for aggravated vehicular 
assault under R.C. 2903.08(A)(2) would pass the Blockburger test, that 
prosecution is nevertheless barred because the state will prove conduct that 
constitutes an offense for which she has already been prosecuted.  This, however, 
is in substance a feature of the now-defunct “same conduct” test, which was 
adopted by the high court in Grady v. Corbin (1990), 495 U.S. 508, 510, 110 S.Ct. 
2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548, but then overruled in Dixon, supra, 509 U.S. at 711-712, 
113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556. 
{¶36} In any event, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the state 
will have to rely on the components of the lesser offenses that were charged in the 
municipal proceedings in order to prove recklessness.2  Even under an evidentiary 
or conduct-related analysis, the mere possibility that the state may seek to rely on 
the ingredients of these lesser offenses to prove recklessness under R.C. 
2903.08(A)(2) is not sufficient to bar the latter prosecution.  See Illinois v. Vitale 
(1980), 447 U.S. 410, 419-420, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 65 L.Ed.2d 228.  See, also, Dixon, 
509 U.S. at 707, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (limiting Vitale). 
{¶37} We hold that principles of double jeopardy do not apply to bar 
successive prosecutions for the offense of driving under the influence in violation 
of R.C. 4511.19(A) (or a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance) and the 
offense of aggravated vehicular assault under R.C. 2903.08(A)(2). 
                                                 
2.  The state maintains that it will be able to demonstrate recklessness in this instance “by evidence 
that [Zima] was weaving across the double yellow line of traffic, that she was speeding, that she 
did not use her turn signal, that she improperly judged the allotted time to turn in front of the 
victim’s motorcycle, that she was not paying full time and attention to other motorists on the 
roadway, that she failed to react when the accident was still avoidable, that she actually hit the 
victim on the motorcycle head on and with such force that the victim flew off his motorcycle and 
landed on the other side of the intersection, etc.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
{¶38} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals 
insofar as it permits the state to prosecute Zima for the offense of aggravated 
vehicular assault as proscribed under R.C. 2903.08(A)(2) and charged in the 
second count of the indictment. 
{¶39} The lead opinion of the court of appeals did not specifically 
address the issue of whether the state may prove aggravated vehicular assault 
under R.C. 2903.08(A)(1), which proscribes seriously injuring another as a 
proximate result of driving under the influence.  It does hold, however, that both 
counts of aggravated vehicular assault under the indictment survive the 
Blockburger test because “[a]ggravated vehicular assault may also be shown by 
proving reckless behavior.”  2002-Ohio-6327, 2002 WL 31618556, ¶ 35.  This 
suggests that the state could choose to prove aggravated vehicular assault by 
relying on the elements under division (A)(1), despite Zima’s prior conviction for 
driving under the influence.  The unstated but essential rationale for this holding is 
that R.C. 2903.08(A)(1) and (2) should be viewed merely as constituent parts of a 
single offense, rather than as two different species of aggravated vehicular assault.  
Under this view, the predicate offense driving under the influence escapes the tag 
of “lesser included offense” even under division (A)(1) because the statute 
incorporates recklessness as an alternative.  We disagree. 
{¶40} In Whalen v. United States (1980), 445 U.S. 684, 694, 100 S.Ct. 
1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715, the Supreme Court rejected this approach and determined 
that when the Blockburger test is applied to a statute containing alternative 
elements, each statutory alternative should be construed as constituting a separate 
offense and analyzed accordingly.  See, also, Pandelli v. United States (C.A.6, 
1980), 635 F.2d 533, 537 (“The theory behind the [Whalen] analysis is that a 
criminal statute written in the alternative creates a separate offense for each 
January Term, 2004 
11 
alternative and should therefore be treated for double jeopardy purposes as 
separate statutes would”).3 
{¶41} Applying this analysis, it is clear that driving under the influence is 
necessarily a lesser included offense of aggravated vehicular assault under R.C. 
2903.08(A)(1), which proscribes causing serious physical harm to another as a 
proximate result of driving under the influence.  By definition, a lesser included 
offense contains no element of proof beyond that required for the greater offense.  
Thus, Blockburger applies to bar successive prosecutions for greater and lesser 
included offenses whatever the order of trials.  See Brown v. Ohio (1977), 432 
U.S. 161, 168, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187. 
{¶42} Accordingly, the state is limited to proving aggravated vehicular 
assault under R.C. 2903.08(A)(2), and the judgment of the court of appeals is 
reversed as to the first count of the indictment. 
{¶43} Based on all of the foregoing, the judgment of the court of appeals 
is affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and 
YOUNG, JJ., concur. 
                                                 
3.  Prior to Whalen, this court had already taken a similar approach in applying Blockburger to 
alternative-element statutes in the context of successive prosecutions.  See Best, supra, 42 Ohio 
St.2d at 535-536, 71 O.O.2d 517, 330 N.E.2d 421.  Later, the court rejected Whalen’s treatment of 
alternative-element statutes in the context of determining whether two crimes constitute “allied 
offenses of similar import” for purposes of cumulative punishments under R.C. 2941.25.  State v. 
Rance (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 632, 636-637, 710 N.E.2d 699.  However, Rance did “not involve 
the successive-prosecution branch of the Double Jeopardy Clause.”  Id. at 634, 710 N.E.2d 699.  
Since the present case involves only the issue of successive prosecutions, it is not controlled by 
R.C. 2941.25 or Rance.  In any event, the court in Rance was able to reject Whalen because a state 
legislature “may prescribe the imposition of cumulative punishments for crimes that constitute the 
same offense under Blockburger without violating the federal protection against double jeopardy * 
* *.”  Rance at 635, 710 N.E.2d 699.  We have found no corresponding authority for rejecting 
Blockburger and its progeny in the context of successive prosecutions. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
FREDERICK N. YOUNG, J., of the Second Appellate District, sitting for 
O’DONNELL, J. 
_______________ 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Matthew 
T. Norman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Paul Kuzmins, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 
__________________