Case Title: MACKRILL v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 03-101

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
MACKRILL v. STATE2004 WY 129100 P.3d 361Case Number: 03-101Decided: 11/03/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

 

DONALD 
S. MACKRILL,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Kenneth M. Koski, Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; 
and Tina N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. 
Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Peggy A. Trent, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      The appellant, 
Donald S. Mackrill, argues that the district court erred in denying a motion to 
suppress his statements to law enforcement officers and the evidence seized from 
his automobile.  In particular, the 
appellant contends on appeal that law enforcement officers were required to 
advise him in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966) (hereinafter Miranda) before 
asking him about the presence of weapons in his automobile. We find that the 
circumstances of the instant case implicate the "public safety" exception to the 
Miranda rule, and we affirm the district court's denial of the 
suppression motion.

 

 

[¶2]      Whether, under 
the circumstances, law enforcement officers were required to advise the 
appellant in accordance with Miranda prior to asking him about the 
presence of weapons in his automobile?

 

 

[¶3]      On April 5, 2002, 
Cheyenne police officer Patrick Kailey assisted federal Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) agents and Arizona authorities in arresting Chad 
Schaub (Schaub).  Schaub was the 
subject of a federal felony arrest warrant for possessing ten pipe bombs, 
"drugs[,] and drug paraphernalia,"1 and was wanted for questioning as 
"a possible suspect or a relevant witness" in connection with the attempted 
murder of an assistant district attorney in Arizona.  The officers considered Schaub to be 
"very dangerous" and "possibly armed," and they had information that Schaub "had 
partaken in that kind of violent behavior before."  The officers also knew that Schaub was 
"with other individuals"2 and that the appellant in 
particular "had been with Mr. Schaub" for "quite some time before our arrival . 
. .."  However, Officer Kailey had 
no specific information that the appellant was dangerous, independent of his 
association with Schaub, or was suspected of having committed a criminal 
offense.

 

[¶4]      Around 5:00 p.m., 
Officer Kailey learned that Schaub was likely at an automobile body shop on East 
Pershing Boulevard in Cheyenne, which location was near a restaurant and a 
bank.  The officers proceeded to 
surveil the body shop from about two blocks away and observed a pickup parked in 
the parking lot approximately sixty to one hundred feet from the body shop.  After watching the location for thirty 
or forty minutes, other officers notified Officer Kailey that a "male subject 
had walked from the north side of the building around to the parking lot and had 
entered the driver's door of the vehicle in the parking lot," removed something 
from the vehicle, and returned to the north side of the building; the male 
subject was not Schaub.  Although 
the officers did not know it at the time, the pickup belonged to the 
appellant.

 

[¶5]      At some point, 
Officer Kailey was notified that "three subjects, including [Schaub], were 
walking south through the parking lot and approaching the pickup."  The other two individuals were 
ultimately identified as the appellant and Schaub's cousin, who worked at the 
body shop.  For "safety reasons," 
the officers wanted to attempt to arrest Schaub "away from the building as far 
as [they] could possibly get him."  
The officers converged on the body shop and proceeded to "move in and try 
to apprehend [Schaub] in the parking lot near the vehicle."  As the officers approached the scene, 
Officer Kailey and another officer drew their weapons on the appellant, who was 
"entering the driver's side of the pickup,"3 while ATF agents drew their weapons 
on Schaub, who was "entering the passenger door of the pickup."  According to Agent Raponi, Schaub was 
next to the passenger side of the vehicle and was "in the process of getting in 
the vehicle at the time he was arrested."  
The officer believed that the vehicle's passenger door was open.4

 

[¶6]      All three 
individuals were ordered to the ground.  
Schaub and the appellant were handcuffed (the appellant was handcuffed 
for "officer safety"), and Schaub's cousin was segregated further back from the 
vehicle but apparently was not handcuffed.  
At some point, the officers performed a "pat down" to determine whether 
any of the three individuals possessed a weapon.  The appellant stated that, while he was 
handcuffed and lying on the ground, an officer asked whether he "had any 
weapons," to which he replied that he had "a belt knife and a pocket knife in my 
pocket."  Schaub's cousin said that 
he saw the officers subsequently remove a knife from the appellant's 
pocket.

 

[¶7]      Schaub was placed 
in a police vehicle, and with one possible exception, the officers stowed their 
weapons.5  According to Officer Kailey, the 
appellant was asked about his association with Schaub and an ATF agent explained 
"what was happening and asked [the appellant] if there were any weapons or 
contraband inside the vehicle that [the officers] needed to know about . . 
.."  According to the appellant, the 
officer asked: "Are there any weapons in your vehicle?"  The appellant replied that he had a gun 
and a clip "between the two front bucket seats of the truck, and that it would 
be in that place where [the officer] would find it."6  At this point in time, the appellant 
(now on his feet) remained handcuffed, was not free to leave the scene (but was 
not under "arrest," according to Officer Kailey), and had not received a 
Miranda advisement.  
According to Officer Kailey, an ATF agent then asked the appellant "if he 
would give consent for us to enter the truck and retrieve that weapon" and the 
appellant "said that he would consent to us entering the vehicle."  The appellant denied that he told the 
officers that they could enter his vehicle.

 

[¶8]      Officer Kailey 
entered the vehicle to retrieve the firearm.  He observed two large leather gloves in 
between the front bucket seats and, upon removing one glove, Officer Kailey saw 
the grip of a handgun and a "bag of marijuana" within two inches of the handgun 
"in plain view."  The officer 
secured the firearm (ensuring that it "was unloaded and safe") and removed the 
bag of marijuana.  He then expanded 
his search for additional controlled substances and found another bag of 
marijuana "stuffed inside" one of the leather gloves.

 

[¶9]      The appellant was 
arrested and received a Miranda advisement.  Thereafter, the appellant told the 
officers that the marijuana was for "personal use only," but later stated that 
he had transported the marijuana from Nebraska with the intent to "sell it or 
use it" and that he "often buys  more marijuana than he would use, and [used] 
the proceeds from the sale of marijuana to support his habit."  The officers ultimately released 
Schaub's cousin.

 

[¶10]   The appellant was charged with 
possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, a felony, in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003).  The appellant filed a motion to suppress 
his statements to law enforcement and the items seized from his vehicle.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the 
district court denied the appellant's suppression motion.  In doing so, the district court found, 
in pertinent part, that:  (1) Schaub 
was "probably or potentially armed" and was "dangerous;" (2) the officers had 
"reason to believe that [the appellant] was in [Schaub's] company for some time" 
prior to April 5, 2002; (3) the location of the arrest was a "busy commercial 
area" and the officers' reasoning in wanting to attempt the arrest as far away 
from the building as possible was "entirely sound;" (4) Schaub and the appellant 
were "at least" about to enter the appellant's vehicle when the officers 
initiated contact with them and the appellant was "near the vehicle with the 
opened door;" and (5) the appellant, while handcuffed, was asked "if there was a 
weapon in the vehicle."  The 
district court concluded, alternatively, that the appellant consented to the 
officers retrieving the firearm from the appellant's vehicle, that the search 
was valid pursuant to exigent circumstances to secure the scene "for both 
officer and public safety," and that the search was a valid search incident to 
Schaub's lawful arrest.

 

[¶11]   The appellant later conditionally 
pled guilty to the charged offense, preserving his right to appeal the district 
court's denial of his suppression motion.  
The district court sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for four to 
six years, suspended that sentence, and placed the appellant on supervised 
probation for four years.  The 
appellant now appeals from that judgment and sentence, claiming that the 
district court erred in denying his suppression motion.

 

 

[¶12]   Our standard of review is as 
follows:

 

Findings 
on factual issues made by the district court considering a motion to suppress 
are not disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous.  Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 
218 (Wyo.1994).  Since the district 
court conducts the hearing on the motion to suppress and has the opportunity to 
assess the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the 
necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions, evidence is viewed in the 
light most favorable to the district court's determination.  Id.  The issue of law, whether an 
unreasonable search or seizure has occurred in violation of constitutional 
rights, is reviewed de novo.  
Id.; Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168, 1170-71 
(Wyo.1997).

 

McChesney 
v. State, 
988 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Wyo. 1999).  The appellant does not contend that any 
particular factual finding by the district court was erroneous.  "On those issues where the district 
court has not made specific findings of fact, this Court will uphold the general 
ruling of the court below if supported by any reasonable view of the 
evidence."  State v. 
Williams, 2004 WY 53, ¶ 12, 90 P.3d 85, 88 (Wyo. 2004).

 

 

[¶13]   The appellant argues that the 
district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence.  The premise of the appellant's appellate 
argument is that, under the circumstances, the law enforcement officers should 
have advised him in accordance with Miranda prior to asking him whether 
there were "weapons or contraband" inside the vehicle.7  The appellant does not offer an 
independent state constitutional analysis; accordingly, our discussion is 
limited to federal constitutional principles.

 

[¶14]   The United States Supreme Court has 
stated the following with respect to Miranda:

 

            
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."  In Miranda this Court for the 
first time extended the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory 
self-incrimination to individuals subjected to custodial interrogation by the 
police.  384 U.S., at 460-61, 467, 
86 S.Ct., at 1620-21, 1624.  The 
Fifth Amendment itself does not prohibit all incriminating admissions; "[a]bsent 
some officially coerced self-accusation, the Fifth Amendment 
privilege is not violated by even the most damning admissions."  United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187, 97 S. Ct. 1814, 1818, 52 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1977) (emphasis added).  The Miranda Court, however, 
presumed that interrogation in certain custodial circumstances is inherently 
coercive and held that statements made under those circumstances are 
inadmissible unless the suspect is specifically informed of his Miranda 
rights and freely decides to forgo those rights.  The prophylactic Miranda warnings 
therefore are "not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] 
instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination 
[is] protected."  Michigan v. 
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2364, 41 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1974); see 
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 492, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1888, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981) (POWELL, J., concurring).  
Requiring Miranda warnings before custodial interrogation provides 
"practical reinforcement" for the Fifth Amendment right.  Michigan v. Tucker, supra, 
417 U.S., at 444, 94 S.Ct., at 2364.

 

New 
York v. Quarles, 
467 U.S. 649, 654, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2630, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1984) (footnote omitted).

 

[¶15]   Even if we were to assume for 
purposes of this appeal that the Miranda rule applied to the instant 
case, we note that the United States Supreme Court has recognized an exception 
to that rule.  In Quarles, 
467 U.S.  at 651-52, 
a young woman informed officers that "she had just been raped by a black male," 
provided the officers a description of the individual, and stated that he had 
just entered a nearby supermarket while carrying a gun.  After spotting a man in the supermarket 
who matched the description provided by the young woman, Officer Frank Kraft 
drew his gun and pursued the man, ordering the man to stop and put his hands 
over his head.  Id. at 
652.

 

            
Although more than three officers had arrived on the scene by that time, 
Officer Kraft was the first to reach respondent.  He frisked him and discovered that he 
was wearing a shoulder holster which was then empty.  After handcuffing him, Officer Kraft 
asked him where the gun was.  
Respondent nodded in the direction of some empty cartons and responded, 
"the gun is over there."  Officer 
Kraft thereafter retrieved a loaded .38-caliber revolver from one of the 
cartons, formally placed respondent under arrest, and read him his 
Miranda rights from a printed card.  
Respondent indicated that he would be willing to answer questions without 
an attorney present.  Officer Kraft 
then asked respondent if he owned the gun and where he had purchased it.  Respondent answered that he did own it 
and that he had purchased it in Miami, Fla.

 

Id.  The United States Supreme Court further 
noted that Quarles was handcuffed and surrounded by at least four police 
officers, which officers were no longer concerned for their own physical safety, 
when the questioning at issue occurred.  
Id. at 655.

 

[¶16]   The United States Supreme Court's 
analysis follows:

 

            
We hold that on these facts there is a "public safety" exception to the 
requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers may 
be admitted into evidence, and that the availability of that exception does not 
depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved.  In a kaleidoscopic situation such as the 
one confronting these officers, where spontaneity rather than adherence to a 
police manual is necessarily the order of the day, the application of the 
exception which we recognize today should not be made to depend on post 
hoc findings at a suppression hearing concerning the subjective motivation 
of the arresting officer.  
Undoubtedly most police officers, if placed in Officer Kraft's position, 
would act out of a host of different, instinctive, and largely unverifiable 
motivestheir own safety, the safety of others, and perhaps as well the desire 
to obtain incriminating evidence from the suspect.

 

            
Whatever the motivation of individual officers in such a situation, we do 
not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda require that it 
be applied in all its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask 
questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety.  The Miranda decision was based in 
large part on this Court's view that the warnings which it required police to 
give to suspects in custody would reduce the likelihood that the suspects would 
fall victim to constitutionally impermissible practices of police interrogation 
in the presumptively coercive environment of the station house.  [Miranda] 384 U.S., at 455-458, 
86 S.Ct., at 1617-1619.  The 
dissenters warned that the requirement of Miranda warnings would have the 
effect of decreasing the number of suspects who respond to police 
questioning.  Id., at 504, 
516-517, 86 S.Ct., at 1643, 1649-1650 (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart and WHITE, 
JJ., dissenting).  The 
Miranda majority, however, apparently felt that whatever the cost to 
society in terms of fewer convictions of guilty suspects, that cost would simply 
have to be borne in the interest of enlarged protection for the Fifth Amendment 
privilege.

 

            
The police in this case, in the very act of apprehending a suspect, were 
confronted with the immediate necessity of ascertaining the whereabouts of a gun 
which they had every reason to believe the suspect had just removed from his 
empty holster and discarded in the supermarket.  So long as the gun was concealed 
somewhere in the supermarket, with its actual whereabouts unknown, it obviously 
posed more than one danger to the public safety:  an accomplice might make use of it, a 
customer or employee might later come upon it.

 

            
In such a situation, if the police are required to recite the familiar 
Miranda warnings before asking the whereabouts of the gun, suspects in 
Quarles' position might well be deterred from responding.  Procedural safeguards which deter a 
suspect from responding were deemed acceptable in Miranda in order to 
protect the Fifth Amendment privilege; when the primary social cost of those 
added protections is the possibility of fewer convictions, the Miranda 
majority was willing to bear that cost.  
Here, had Miranda warnings deterred Quarles from responding to 
Officer Kraft's question about the whereabouts of the gun, the cost would have 
been something more than merely the failure to obtain evidence useful in 
convicting Quarles.  Officer Kraft 
needed an answer to his question not simply to make his case against Quarles but 
to insure that further danger to the public did not result from the concealment 
of the gun in a public area.

 

            
We conclude that the need for answers to questions in a situation posing 
a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule 
protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.  We decline to place officers such as 
Officer Kraft in the untenable position of having to consider, often in a matter 
of seconds, whether it best serves society for them to ask the necessary 
questions without the Miranda warnings and render whatever probative 
evidence they uncover inadmissible, or for them to give the warnings in order to 
preserve the admissibility of evidence they might uncover but possibly damage or 
destroy their ability to obtain that evidence and neutralize the volatile 
situation confronting them.

 

            
In recognizing a narrow exception to the Miranda rule in this 
case, we acknowledge that to some degree we lessen the desirable clarity of that 
rule.  At least in part in order to 
preserve its clarity, we have over the years refused to sanction attempts to 
expand our Miranda holding.  
. . .  As we have in other 
contexts, we recognize here the importance of a workable rule "to guide police 
officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the 
social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they 
confront."  Dunaway v. New 
York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-214, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2257, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824 
(1979).  But as we have pointed out, 
we believe that the exception which we recognize today lessens the necessity of 
that on-the-scene balancing process.  
The exception will not be difficult for police officers to apply because 
in each case it will be circumscribed by the exigency which justifies it.  We think police officers can and will 
distinguish almost instinctively between questions necessary to secure their own 
safety or the safety of the public and questions designed solely to elicit 
testimonial evidence from a suspect.

 

            
The facts of this case clearly demonstrate that distinction and an 
officer's ability to recognize it.  
Officer Kraft asked only the question necessary to locate the missing gun 
before advising respondent of his rights.  
It was only after securing the loaded revolver and giving the warnings 
that he continued with investigatory questions about the ownership and place of 
purchase of the gun.  The exception 
which we recognize today, far from complicating the thought processes and the 
on-the-scene judgments of police officers, will simply free them to follow their 
legitimate instincts when confronting situations presenting a danger to the 
public safety.

 

            
We hold that the Court of Appeals in this case erred in excluding the 
statement, "the gun is over there," and the gun because of the officer's failure 
to read respondent his Miranda rights before attempting to locate the 
weapon.  Accordingly we hold that it 
also erred in excluding the subsequent statements as illegal fruits of a 
Miranda violation.

 

Quarles, 
467 U.S. at 654-59 (footnotes omitted).  See also United States v. 
Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 960-61 (10th Cir. 1987) and Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379, 
386-87 (Wyo. 1992).  This exception "extends beyond safety to 
civilians.  The exception 
undoubtedly extends to officers' questions necessary to secure their own 
safety.'  [Quarles, 467 U.S.] 
at 659, 104 S. Ct. 2626; cf. United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1221-26 
(10th Cir.2001) (en banc) (concerns about officer safety justify 
routinely asking about presence of weapons during traffic stop)."  United States v. Lackey, 334 F.3d 1224, 1228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 502 
(2003).

 

[¶17]   We find the United States Supreme 
Court's reasoning in Quarles to be particularly persuasive in the instant 
case.  See United States v. 
Brady, 819 F.2d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 1068 (1988) (applying Quarles despite factual 
differences).  In the instant 
case:

 

            
1.         
Schaub was the subject of a felony arrest warrant for possessing ten pipe 
bombs, drugs, and drug paraphernalia, and was a suspect or relevant witness in 
the attempted murder of a prosecutor.  
Accordingly, the officers considered Schaub to be very dangerous, 
possibly armed, and apparently had information that Schaub had a violent 
history.

 

            
2.         
The officers were informed that the appellant had been with Schaub for 
"quite some time" leading up to Schaub's arrest, and knew that Schaub had also 
contacted a relative in Cheyenne.

 

            
3.         
The officers thought Schaub was at a body shop in a busy commercial area 
around 5:00 p.m.  The owner of the 
body shop was able to observe and hear the incident from the body shop's office 
and there were "other people that were inside the office at the time . . 
.."

 

            
4.         
The appellant's vehicle was parked in the body shop's parking lot, within 
sixty to one hundred feet of the business.  
While the officers were watching the body shop, a male subject (not 
Schaub) entered the vehicle's driver's door, retrieved something, and returned 
to the body shop.

 

            
5.         
Three male subjects, including Schaub, exited the body shop and 
approached the appellant's vehicle.  
For safety reasons, the officers wanted to arrest Schaub as far from the 
business as possible.  By the time 
the officers reached the scene, it is undisputed that Schaub was entering the 
vehicle's passenger door.  The 
district court found that the appellant was, at the very least, about to enter 
the vehicle and the appellant was near the vehicle with the opened door.  According to Officer Kailey, the 
appellant was standing at the vehicle with the driver's door 
open.

 

6.         
The officers arrested Schaub.  
While he was placed in a police vehicle, the record does not indicate 
that Schaub was otherwise removed from the scene.  The officers simultaneously ordered the 
appellant and the third individual to the ground and handcuffed the appellant 
for officer safety.  Schaub's cousin 
was segregated further back from the vehicle but apparently was not 
handcuffed.  The officers conducted 
a "pat down" of the individuals to determine whether they possessed any 
weapons.  According to the 
appellant, an officer also asked the appellant whether he had "any weapons . . 
.."  The appellant informed the 
officer that he had a belt knife and a pocketknife in his pocket, and the 
officers apparently removed those items from the appellant's person.  The appellant does not question the 
officers' actions to this point in the encounter.

 

7.         
An officer "explained what was happening" and asked the appellant, now on 
his feet but still handcuffed, about his association with Schaub.8  Having apparently removed two knives 
from the appellant's person, an officer also asked the appellant if there "was a 
weapon in the vehicle" or whether there "were any weapons or contraband inside 
the vehicle that [the officers] needed to know about . . .."  The appellant informed the officer that 
he had a particular handgun and a clip between the vehicle's two front bucket 
seats.  An officer then went to that 
precise location to retrieve the firearm, where he found the firearm and a bag 
of marijuana.  Aside from the 
claimed Miranda violation, the appellant does not assert that the officer 
acted improperly in retrieving the firearm from the vehicle or 
thereafter.

 

[¶18]   We therefore conclude that the 
officer's question as to the presence of weapons in the appellant's vehicle was 
related to an objectively reasonable need to secure the officers' safety and/or 
the public's safety.9  See generally, for example, United 
States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 677-79 (2nd Cir. 
2004); 
United States v. DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536, 538-39 (9th Cir. 
1989); 
Brady, 819 F.2d at 887-89; 
and State v. McKessor, 246 Kan. 1, 785 P.2d 1332, 1336-37, cert. 
denied, 495 U.S. 937 (1990).

 

[¶19]   Neither the fact that Schaub 
presumably remained handcuffed in the police vehicle at the scene nor the fact 
that the appellant remained handcuffed when he was asked the question at issue 
necessarily diminish the immediacy of the exigencies at hand,10 particularly once the officers had 
discovered two knives on the appellant's person.  Considerations similar to those posed by 
the instant case have often been articulated in the context of a Fourth 
Amendment analysis.  For example, in 
Fender v. State, 2003 WY 96, ¶ 19 n.5, 74 P.3d 1220, 1229 n.5 (Wyo. 
2003) (quoting United States v. 
Sanders, 994 F.2d 200, 209 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 955, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1014 (1993)), 
we noted the following with respect to the use of 
handcuffs:

 

"[The] 
argument is entirely dependent on the assumption that, by handcuffing a suspect, 
the police instantly and completely eliminate all risks that the suspect will 
flee or do them harm.  As is sadly 
borne out in the statistics for police officers killed and assaulted in the line 
of duty each year, however, this assumption has no basis in 
fact.

 

            
Handcuffs are a temporary restraining device; they limit but do not 
eliminate a person's ability to perform various acts.  They obviously do not impair a person's 
ability to use his legs and feet, whether to walk, run, or kick.  Handcuffs do limit a person's ability to 
use his hands and arms, but the degree of the effectiveness of handcuffs in this 
role depends on a variety of factors, including the handcuffed person's size, 
strength, bone and joint structure, flexibility, and tolerance of pain.  Albeit difficult, it is by no means 
impossible for a handcuffed person to obtain and use a weapon concealed on his 
person or within lunge reach, and in so doing to cause injury to his intended 
victim, to a bystander, or even to himself.  Finally, like any mechanical device, 
handcuffs can and do fail on occasion."

 

[¶20]   In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051-52, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983) (emphasis in 
original), 
the United States Supreme Court stated:

 

            
The Michigan Supreme Court appeared to believe that it was not reasonable 
for the officers to fear that Long could injure them, because he was effectively 
under their control during the investigative stop and could not get access to 
any weapons that might have been located in the automobile.  . . .  This reasoning is mistaken in several 
respects.  During any investigative 
detention, the suspect is "in the control" of the officers in the sense that he 
"may be briefly detained against his will . . .."  Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1], at 
34, 88 S.Ct., [1868] at 1886 [20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)] (WHITE, J., 
concurring).  Just as a Terry 
suspect on the street may, despite being under the brief control of a police 
officer, reach into his clothing and retrieve a weapon, so might a Terry 
suspect in Long's position break away from police control and retrieve a 
weapon from his automobile.  . . 
.  In addition, if the suspect is 
not placed under arrest, he will be permitted to reenter his automobile, and he 
will then have access to any weapons inside.  . . .  Or, as here, the suspect may be 
permitted to reenter the vehicle before the Terry investigation is over, 
and again, may have access to weapons.  
In any event, we stress that a Terry investigation, such as the 
one that occurred here, involves a police investigation "at close range," 
Terry, 392 U.S., at 24, when the officer remains particularly vulnerable 
in part because a full custodial arrest has not been effected, and 
the officer must make a "quick decision as to how to protect himself and others 
from possible danger . . .."  
Id., at 28.

 

[¶21]   Similarly, in United States v. 
Palmer, 360 F.3d 1243, 1247-48 (10th Cir. 2004), 
a case involving a dangerous suspect detained in a patrol car by one officer 
while another officer searched the locked glove box in the suspect's vehicle for 
weapons, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:

 

            
If Defendant had broken away from the officers, obtaining a gun from 
inside the glove box would have taken only a moment more than obtaining a gun 
from anywhere else within the passenger compartment.  To be sure, the tasks of getting a key 
and unlocking the glove box would delay Defendant somewhat; but a suspect who is 
able to break free of officers detaining him could also seize the keys, and the 
suspect may have another means of entry to the glove box, such as a key that 
would not be detected during a proper frisk or a weapons search of the 
vehicle.  Furthermore, Defendant 
would have access to the gun at the conclusion of the encounter, assuming that 
he was only issued a citation and not arrested.

 

. 
. .

 

            
. . . Moreover, as noted in Long, Defendant would certainly have 
had access to the gun after the citation was issued and he was released to 
go.

 

[¶22]   Regarding the form of the question 
at issue in this case, the appellant emphasizes the officer's use of the word 
"contraband" in questioning the appellant at the scene.  The district court found that the 
officer asked the appellant "if there was a weapon in the vehicle," which 
finding is consistent with the appellant's testimony that the officer asked him 
about the presence of "weapons" in the vehicle.  Nevertheless, the possibility (according 
to Officer Kailey's testimony) that the officer asked the appellant about the 
presence of "weapons or contraband" in the vehicle does not necessarily 
transform the officer's question into an "investigatory" question.  The officer's subjective motivation in 
posing the question is not part of the analysis.  Quarles, 467 U.S.  at 
656.  Objectively, then, the officers had a 
reasonable basis to be concerned for their safety, and the public's safety, 
pursuant to the aforementioned circumstances.  An officer specifically asked the 
appellant about the presence of "weapons or contraband," the appellant answered 
the question specifically as to where the officer could find a particular weapon 
in the vehicle, and the officer went to retrieve the weapon in the precise 
location identified by the appellant.  
Once the appellant was formally arrested due to the bag of marijuana that 
was also found in that location, an officer Mirandized the appellant and 
then began to ask the appellant investigatory questions about the marijuana.11

 

[¶23]   We note that in Newton, 369 F.3d  at 663, 
the officer asked a handcuffed suspect whether he had any "contraband" in the 
house.  The suspect replied "only 
what is in the box," and when asked what was in the box, further replied "a two 
and two."  Id. at 664.  The officer found a .22 caliber handgun, 
a loaded magazine, and some ammunition in the box.  "To be sure, the public safety exception 
does not permit officers to pose questions designed solely to elicit 
testimonial evidence from a suspect.'  
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.  at 658-59, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (emphasis 
added).  Thus, to fall within the 
exception, a question must have some rational relationship to defusing the 
perceived danger."  Newton, 
369 F.3d  at 679 n.8.  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
reasoned:

 

The 
same logic applies to this case.  
Although [the officer's] inquiry about "contraband" did not specifically 
refer to firearms, the term plainly encompassed such items.  Indeed, [the suspect's] response 
indicates that he so understood the question.  That the term "contraband" could also 
include items not presenting immediate public safety concerns does not defeat 
the Miranda exception in this case.

 

Id. 
at 679.

 

[¶24]   For comparison purposes, we further 
note that the officer's question in the instant case was much more specific as 
to the presence of weapons than the question at issue in United States v. 
Williams, 181 F.3d 945 (8th Cir. 
1999).  In Williams, 181 F.3d  at 
948, 
the defendant was located in his bedroom and handcuffed.  An officer asked the defendant, without 
a Miranda warning, "[i]s there anything we need to be aware of?,'" and 
the defendant replied that there was a gun in the bedroom closet.  Id.  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
analyzed the question at issue as follows:

 

            
While the officer did not specifically refer to weapons or safety 
concerns in the question posed to Williams, the question sought information 
related to weapons or other safety concerns.  The fact that the question was also 
broad enough to elicit other information does not prevent application of the 
public safety exception when safety was at issue.  Moreover, we believe that conditioning 
admissibility of evidence under the public safety exception on an officer's 
ability to ask questions in a specific form would run counter to the 
Quarles Court's decision that an officer may forego announcement of 
Miranda warnings when public safety is threatened.  The Quarles Court believed that 
the value of the Miranda warning was outweighed by safety concerns in 
situations "where spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual is 
necessarily the order of the day."  
Quarles, 467 U.S.  at 656, 104 S. Ct. 2626.  Under the circumstances of this case, 
the concerns for the safety of the officers required a spontaneous inquiry by 
the officer.

 

Williams, 
181 F.3d  at 953-54 n.13.

 

[¶25]   Accordingly, we affirm the denial 
of the appellant's suppression motion.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1According to ATF agent Daniel 
Raponi, Schaub was "pulled over in a van with three other individuals [in the 
Phoenix area].  I believe they found 
drugs and drug paraphernalia, ended up searching the vehicle, found 10 
destructive devices."  Schaub was 
"interviewed initially right on the spot, and he admitted that they were his and 
in his possession."  Schaub was 
initially held on local charges and, due to a communication error, was released 
from custody before the federal arrest warrant was issued.

 

  2Agent Raponi testified that Schaub 
had contacted a relative in Cheyenne.

 

  3Officer Kailey testified that the 
appellant was standing "right at the vehicle with the driver's door open."   The appellant denied that he 
opened the driver's door of the vehicle.  
Schaub's cousin claimed that the appellant was approximately ten feet 
from the vehicle when the officers initiated the stop and that the appellant had 
not opened the driver's door.  The 
body shop owner also stated that the appellant was fourteen feet from the 
vehicle when the appellant was placed on the ground during the incident, that 
the appellant never actually reached the pickup, and an officer "with the 
federal government" opened the driver's door.

 

  4According to the body shop owner, 
Schaub was "[r]ight next to the vehicle" and was opening the passenger door when 
officers arrived at the scene.

 

  5The appellant stated that one 
officer still had her shotgun "out," but that to the best of his knowledge, the 
other officers had holstered their firearms.

 

  6According to the appellant, the 
officer also asked whether the gun was loaded, and the appellant replied that it 
was not.

 

  7In his appellate brief, the 
appellant also summarily claims that his statements were involuntary under the 
circumstances.  The appellant's 
analysis on this issue consists of a citation to the applicable legal standard 
and his one-sentence declaration that the statements were involuntary because he 
had been "put or ordered to the ground, handcuffed, had a multiplicity of 
firearms pointed at him, and was immediately questioned . . .."  We do not consider this to be cogent 
argument and it does not appear that the appellant raised this issue in the 
district court.

 

  8The record does not indicate 
precisely what the appellant was asked, or what, if any, response was given by 
the appellant.  On appeal, the 
appellant merely declares that this "constituted interrogation" in the context 
of whether Miranda was applicable to the instant case.  Given the state of the record, and the 
context in which the issue was addressed by the appellant, we do not place much 
significance on the issue in analyzing the applicability of the public safety 
exception to the Miranda rule.  
The nature of the subject appears to relate directly to the officer's 
effort to secure the scene and defuse the perceived danger, as opposed to some 
investigatory purpose.  In addition, 
the focus of the appellant's appellate argument clearly is the officer's 
question as to whether "there were any weapons or contraband inside the vehicle 
. . .."

 

  9In distinguishing Quarles 
from Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 89 S. Ct. 1095, 22 L. Ed. 2d 311 
(1969), 
a case in which it found the officers' questions about a gun to be 
investigatory, the Court stated that the questions in Orozco "did not in 
any way relate to an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the 
public from any immediate danger associated with the weapon.  In short there was no exigency requiring 
immediate action by the officers beyond the normal need expeditiously to solve a 
serious crime."  Quarles, 467 U.S.  at 659 n.8.

 

  10The appellant does not question the 
officers' justification, under the circumstances, for detaining the appellant at 
the scene, the means used to restrain the appellant, or the officers' actions 
leading up to the question at issue.

 

  11Quarles, 467 U.S.  at 
652; 
see also State v. Caldwell, 639 N.W.2d 64, 68 (Minn.App. 
2002) (noting that the officer "did not 
continue with investigatory questions until after he gave the Miranda 
warning to appellant").