Case Title: City of Pocatello v. State of Idaho, U.S.A., The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes Federal water rights

Citation: 

Docket Number: 33669

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2008-02-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 33669 
 
IN RE SRBA, CASE NO. 39576 SUBCASE 
NO: 29-11609.       
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CITY OF POCATELLO,                                    
                                                         
            Appellant,                                   
                                                         
  v.                                                     
                                                         
THE STATE OF IDAHO, UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA and THE SHOSHONE-
BANNOCK TRIBES,                           
                                                         
            Respondents.                                 
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Boise, January 2008 Term 
 
2008 Opinion No. 28 
 
Filed:  February 19, 2008 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Snake River Basin Adjudication, District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, Twin Falls County.  Hon. John M. Melanson, District Judge. 
 
The district court’s summary judgment order is affirmed.  
 
A. Dean Tranmer, City of Pocatello, Pocatello, and White & Jankowski, Denver, 
Colorado, for appellant.  Sarah A. Klahn argued. 
 
The Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent 
State of Idaho.  David J. Barber argued.  
 
David Negri, U.S. Department of Justice, Boise, and Todd S. Aagaard, United 
States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for respondent United States of 
America.   William Lazarus argued. 
 
Wolfley Law Office, Pocatello, for respondents Shoshone-Bannock Tribes.  
Jeanette Wolfley argued.  
 
____________________ 
 
 
J. JONES, Justice 
The City of Pocatello filed a claim in the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA), 
asserting it had been granted a federal water right under an 1888 Congressional act.  A special 
1 
master in the SRBA determined that no such right existed.  The district court affirmed on appeal, 
as does this Court.   
I. 
President Andrew Johnson designated the Fort Hall Indian Reservation for the use of 
certain bands of the Shoshone and Bannock Tribes (“Tribes”) by virtue of an 1867 executive 
order.  The boundaries and terms of the Reservation were established the next year in the Second 
Treaty of Fort Bridger.  The Treaty contained provisions for providing services on the 
Reservation, education for the Tribes, and allotments of land for farming by tribal members.  The 
Treaty specifically required the written consent of a majority of adult male Indians for the 
cession of any portion of the Reservation.   
In 1878, the Utah Northern Railway Company (the “Railroad”) built a north-south line 
across the Reservation without permission from either the Tribes or the United States 
government.  A few years later, the same company negotiated with the Tribes to build an east-
west railroad line.  The Tribes granted a right-of-way, which Congress approved.  The lines 
intersected in the middle of the Reservation at a site called Pocatello Junction.   
A settlement of non-Indian residents sprang up at the intersection.  The settlers were 
trespassers, being on the Reservation without permission.  In 1885, officials from the United 
States Department of the Interior ordered the removal of the trespassers, to no avail.  The 
settlement continued, and federal authorities eventually came to realize they would not be able to 
remove the settlers without violence and bloodshed.  A group of citizens from the town sent a 
petition begging not to be removed from the site, as many of them were railroad employees who 
would lose their jobs if forced to move.  As the situation grew ever more tense, the Railroad 
asked the Secretary of the Interior to assist in negotiations with the Tribes.   
In 1887, the Secretary of the Interior assigned Inspector Robert S. Gardner and Indian 
Agent Peter Gallagher, the agent in charge of the Reservation, to negotiate with the Tribes.  
Together, they negotiated a Cession Agreement in an intense one-day session.  The Agreement 
was not without dissent.  The Tribes were reluctant to cede any reservation land to non-Indians.  
However, Agent Gallagher persuaded the Indians that the cession would give them enough 
money to build irrigation ditches and shore up their farming industry, so a majority of male 
members of the Tribes voted to approve the Agreement.  The Agreement transferred the 
2 
Pocatello Townsite to the citizens of Pocatello and a right-of-way to the Railroad for its existing 
tracks.  The Agreement made no mention of water or water rights.   
After the Cession Agreement was approved by the Tribes, but before it was enacted into 
law, the question arose as to how the new city would obtain a water supply.  In late 1887, the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, J.D.C. Atkins, began discussions with Agent Gallagher in this 
regard.  Commissioner Atkins wrote to say, “The source of the water supply thus being, 
according to your statement, outside the limits of the proposed town-site . . . [and] on the 
reservation lands, I have construed your suggestion to mean that some guarantee in regard to 
water privileges, should be provided so far as the Indians and the reservation are concerned. . . ”  
He proposed language to address this issue for inclusion in the legislation approving the Cession 
Agreement.   
In a message to Congress, dated February 3, 1888, Commissioner Atkins called attention 
to the need to secure a water supply for the newly-formed City of Pocatello.  In pertinent part, 
the message states: 
Inasmuch as conflicting opinions seem to prevail as to the source or sources from 
which the town will derive its supply of water, I have deemed it advisable, as a 
matter of precaution, to insert in the bill a clause providing for the use by the 
citizens of the town, in common with the Indians, of the waters of any river, 
creek, stream, or spring flowing through the reservations lands in the vicinity of 
the town, with the right of access at all times thereto, and the right to construct, 
operate, and maintain all such ditches, canals, works or other aqueducts, drain and 
sewerage pipes, and other appliances on the reservation, as may be necessary to 
provide with proper water and sewerage facilities. 
Atkins provided Congress with the proposed legislation to approve the Cession Agreement.  The 
legislation included the following provision: 
That the citizens of the town hereinbefore provided for shall have the free and 
undisturbed use in common with the said Indians of the waters of any river, creek, 
stream, or spring flowing through the Fort Hall Reservation in the vicinity of said 
town, with right of access at all times thereto, and the right to construct, operate, 
and maintain all such ditches, canals, works, or other aqueducts, drain, and 
sewerage pipes, and other appliances on the reservation, as may be necessary to 
provide said town with proper water and sewerage facilities. 
This language became Section 10 of the bill approving the Cession Agreement.  Act of 
September 1, 1888, ch. 936, 25 Stat. 452 (the “1888 Act”).  
3 
One hundred and two years after passage of the 1888 Act, the City asserted Section 10 of 
the Act as the basis for its present claim.  In 1990, the City filed a claim in the SRBA for a 
federal reserved water right, as an alternative to 38 separate prior claims based on state law.     
The United States, the State of Idaho, and the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes (the “Opposing 
Parties”) filed objections to the City’s federal claim.  All took the position that the 1888 Act did 
not create a federal reserved water right.  All parties moved for summary judgment before a 
Special Master of the Snake River Basin Adjudication.  In its motion, the City departed from its 
notice of claim and stated Section 10 gave the City “an express grant of a water right” via the 
Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution, rather than a reserved water right.  The Special Master 
granted summary judgment to the Opposing Parties.  The Master recommended the City’s claim 
not be confirmed in a partial or final decree and denied the City’s motion to alter or amend the 
recommendation. 
The City challenged the Special Master’s decision in district court.  The district court 
affirmed the Special Master.  The SRBA court determined Section 10 granted, at most, a right of 
access for appropriating water, not a water right.  The court disallowed the City’s claim for a 
water right and certified its order for appeal.  The City appealed to this Court.   
II. 
 
The question presented is whether Section 10 of the 1888 Act granted a federal water 
right to the City of Pocatello.  We hold the Act created no such right.  Rather, it granted the City 
access to surface water sources on the Reservation, along with the opportunity to establish a 
water right under state law. 
A. 
This Court employs the same standard of review as the district court when ruling on a 
motion for summary judgment.  Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500, 504, 112 P.3d 788, 792 (2005).  
Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c).  If there is no 
genuine issue of material fact, “only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises 
free review.”  Watson, 141 Idaho at 504, 112 P.3d at 792.  Interpretation of a statute is a question 
of law over which this Court exercises free review.  Gooding Cty. v. Wybenga, 137 Idaho 201, 
204, 46 P.3d 18, 21 (2002).  Where a federal statute grants privileges it must be strictly construed 
4 
favorably to the government and “nothing passes but what is conveyed in clear and explicit 
language – inferences being resolved not against but for the government.”  Caldwell v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 14, 20 (1919).   
B. 
The City cited Section 10 of the 1888 Act as the basis for its SRBA claim to a federal 
reserved water right.  The claim states, “[t]he federal reserved water right claimed herein is in the 
alternative to, and not in addition to, water rights claimed by the city under state law.”  In the 
proceedings below, the City subsequently abandoned its reserved water right claim and amended 
its legal theory.  It became the City’s position that Section 10 of the 1888 Act expressly granted 
it a water right under the Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  U.S. Const., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.  
Thus, we need not address the reserved right claim.   
i. 
The City argues that the district court imposed a “magic words” test to deny it a federal 
water right.  However, that is not the case.  The district court merely considered the plain 
language of Section 10 and found it did not convey a federal water right.  Because this issue 
turns on statutory interpretation, we exercise free review.  Gooding Cty., 137 Idaho at 204, 46 
P.3d at 21. 
When interpreting a statute, the Court begins with the plain language.  “[I]f the statutory 
language is clear and unambiguous, the Court need merely apply the statute without engaging in 
any statutory construction. . . . Statutory interpretation begins with the words of the statute, 
giving the language its plain, obvious and rational meanings.”  State v. Hagerman Water Right 
Owners, 130 Idaho 727, 732, 947 P.2d 400, 405 (1997).  Further, the Court “[w]ill resort to 
judicial construction only if the provision is ambiguous, incomplete, absurd, or arguably in 
conflict with other laws.  There is no need to go beyond the language of the statute, when that 
language is clear and unambiguous.”  Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 134 Idaho 912, 914, 12 
P.3d 1256, 1258 (2000) (citation and internal quotations omitted).   
Section 10 reads: 
That the citizens of the town hereinbefore provided for shall have the free and 
undisturbed use in common with the said Indians of the waters of any river, creek, 
stream, or spring flowing through the Fort Hall Reservation in the vicinity of said 
town, with right of access at all times thereto, and the right to construct, operate, 
and maintain all such ditches, canals, works, or other aqueducts, drain, and 
5 
sewerage pipes, and other appliances on the reservation, as may be necessary to 
provide said town with proper water and sewerage facilities. 
The City contends the language of Section 10 is clear and plainly conveys it a water right.   
No one disputes Congress’ power to make a grant of water rights.  The federal 
government derives its power to dispose of the lands and waters of the United States under the 
Property Clause, U.S. Const., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.  “The relation of the federal government to the 
state government in the reclamation of desert lands arises out of the fact that the federal 
government owns the lands, and Congress is invested by the Constitution with the power of 
disposing of the same. . .”  Twin Falls Salmon River Land & Water Co. v. Caldwell, 272 F. 356, 
357 (9th Cir. 1921), cert. granted 44 S.Ct. 135, affirmed 266 U.S. 85 (1924).  However, the 
Court went on to say, “the states hav[e] jurisdiction to provide for the appropriation and 
beneficial use of the waters of the state. . .”  Id.  Merely because Congress could have granted the 
City a federal water right does not mean it did so in this case.   
The language of Section 10 provides a right of access to water sources on the Reservation 
and the right to construct, operate, and maintain water facilities to allow the  City to be served by 
those sources.  However, as the district court concluded, Section 10 did not “contain historically 
recognized and accepted terms of conveyance such as ‘grant’ ‘bargain’ ‘sell’ or ‘convey’ 
evidencing a transfer in a property interest.”  The statute does not purport to grant a property 
interest, nor does it make reference to a “water right.”  Section 10 contains no language defining 
the nature and scope of any water right supposedly granted.  The district court contrasted the 
language of Section 10 with Section 11 of the same Act, which provides, “[t]hat there be, and is 
hereby granted, to the said Utah and Northern Railway Company a right of way.”  (emphasis 
added).  The court correctly concluded that Congress would have used more exacting language if 
it had intended to grant a water right to the City.  This is especially true, given the rule of strict 
construction that federal courts apply to statutes in which the government grants privileges or 
relinquishes rights.  As noted above, such statutes are construed to pass nothing “but what is 
conveyed in clear and explicit language.”  Caldwell v. United States, 250 U.S. at 20.   
In support of its claim, the City cites Byers v. Wa-Wa-Ne, 86 Or. 617, 169 P. 121 (1917).  
In that case the Oregon Supreme Court determined that a license to a non-Indian on a reservation 
had been converted by Congress into a water right.  There, the Indian agent in charge of the 
Umatilla Indian Reservation granted a permit to a non-Indian to build a ditch through part of the 
reservation.  Id. at 620-621, 169 P. at 122.  The permission stated, “In granting this permission to 
6 
construct the said water ditch, it is upon the express condition that no permanent rights shall 
attach or become vested. . .”  Id. (emphasis added).  Fifteen years later, in 1885, Congress passed 
an allotment act that stated in part, “That the water-right across a portion of said 
reservation . . . for manufacturing, irrigating, and other purposes, be confirmed and 
continued. . .”  Id. at 628, 169 P. at 124-25 (emphasis added).  The Oregon Supreme Court 
examined this language and determined that the non-Indian received a water right because of the 
“confirmed” language of the allotment act.  It examined a number of authorities on the legal 
force and effect of using the word “confirmed,” and found it operated as a conveyance of a right.  
Id. at 629-30, 169 P. at 125.  Thus, the Oregon Supreme Court found it could “unmistakably 
grasp the legislative intent which is controlling in the interpretation of this statute. . . . This right 
was infirm and Congress confirmed it.”  Id. at 630-631, 169 P. at 125.  The same is not true in 
the case at bar.  The language of Section 10 is far less explicit than that of the allotment act in 
Byers.  As the district court pointed out, Section 10 contains none of the traditional terms of 
conveyance that would indicate that Congress actually granted a right.  Indeed, Section 11 of the 
1888 Act “grants” the Railroad a right of way, language Congress could easily have used in 
Section 10 but did not.  Nor does the 1888 Act use the language “water-right,” as does the 1885 
allotment act.  No Congressional action subsequent to 1888 “confirmed” any water right for the 
City.  Thus, Byers provides no support for the City. 
 
A plain reading of the statutory language shows that the City was not granted a federal 
water right.  Even if the language were determined to be ambiguous, the City’s claim would fail.  
In construing a statute, this Court examines the language used, the reasonableness of the 
proposed interpretations, and the policy behind the statute.  Hagerman Water Right Owners, 130 
Idaho at 733, 947 P.2d at 406.  Moreover, “the application of a statute is an aid to construction, 
especially where the public relies on that application over a long period of time.”  Id.  As this 
Court has stated: 
It is . . . improper to construe [statutes] in the abstract, without taking into con-
sideration the historical framework in which they exist. . . .Correlatively, such 
information is also relevant when deciding what the statute means to others 
because it is important to know how people affected by an act understand it. 
Id. at 733-4, 947 P.2d at 406-7 (quoting Sutherland Stat. Const. § 49.01 (5th ed. 1992)).  We first 
consider the historic context of the 1888 Act.   
7 
 
Section 10 must be viewed in the context of the development of the arid western states.  
The settling of the western United States was a long and arduous process.  A small number of 
people were charged with conquering vast territory.  Irrigating the arid lands of the west required 
one precious resource more than any other: water.  “From a line east of the Rocky Mountains 
almost to the Pacific Ocean, and from the Canadian border to the boundary of Mexico, an area 
greater than that of the original thirteen in the main, constituted a desert, impossible of 
agricultural use without artificial irrigation.”  California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland 
Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 156 (1935).  Initially, the task of settling the land fell to a few 
pioneers with little help from territorial or federal government.  Id.  These settlers depended on a 
system of appropriation to determine water rights, rather than deferring to the common law 
doctrine of riparian rights.  Id. at 157.  Eventually, the state, territorial, and federal governments 
recognized that the only way the arid lands of the west could be settled and turned to agricultural 
use was to officially recognize the law of appropriation as the law of the land.  Id.  at 157-58.  To 
that end, Congress passed laws regarding homesteading, mining, and other matters.  The import 
of these laws was clear: the federal government deferred to the states on the matter of controlling 
western waters.  “The public interest in such state control in the arid land states is definite and 
substantial.”  Id. at 165.  In California Oregon Power Co., the Supreme Court merely affirmed a 
doctrine the western state courts had long recognized – the law of appropriation.  See, e.g., Eddy 
v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252 (1853) (California Supreme Court establishes that water rights are 
based on first possession); Lobdell v. Simpson, 2 Nev. 274 (1866) (Nevada Supreme Court 
recognizes and applies prior appropriation doctrine); Coffin v. The Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 
443 (1882) (Colorado Supreme Court rejects riparian rights and adopts appropriation); Malad 
Valley Irrigation Co. v. Campbell, 2 Idaho 378, 18 P. 52 (1888) (Supreme Court of the Territory 
of Idaho recognizes that first appropriation for beneficial use gives superior right).   
Congress responded to the need for clarification of water rights with several laws in the 
1860s and 1870s.  The most important of these for our purposes is the Desert Land Act of March 
3, 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377.  The crucial portion of the Act stated that all water not claimed by 
appropriation “shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of the public.”  Id.  In 
construing the Desert Land Act, the Supreme Court stated, “Nothing we have said is meant to 
suggest that the act, as we construe it, has the effect of curtailing the power of the states affected 
8 
to legislate in respect of waters and water rights as they deem wise in the public interest.”  
California Oregon Power Co., 295 U.S. at 163.  Instead, the Court held,  
[F]ollowing the act of 1877, if not before, all nonnavigable waters then a part of 
the public domain became publici juris, subject to the plenary control of the 
designated states, including those since created out of the territories named, with 
the right in each to determine for itself to what extent the rule of appropriation or 
the common-law rule in respect of riparian rights should obtain. 
Id. at 163-64 (emphasis added).   
Deference to state water law has since continued uninterrupted.  For example, Congress 
passed the Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388, in order to create massive 
projects intended to fully reclaim the arid lands.  Projects built under the Act were required to 
comply with state water law.  In a fairly recent dispute involving the Reclamation Act, the U.S. 
Supreme Court conducted an extensive review of federal deference to state water law.  The Court 
stated, “The history of the relationship between the Federal Government and the States in the 
reclamation of the arid lands of the Western States is both long and involved, but through it runs 
the consistent thread of purposeful and continued deference to state water law by Congress.”  
California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653 (1978).  Ultimately, the Court recognized only 
two restrictions on the States’ exclusive control of water: reserved rights on federal government 
property and navigation servitude (neither of which is involved here).  Id. at 662 (citing United 
States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899)).   
Based on the long-standing and firmly established policy of deference and absent express 
Congressional action to the contrary, state water law controls.  While Congress can certainly 
grant water rights under the Property Clause, it would require explicit language in order to 
overcome the right of the state to manage and allocate its own water resources.  There being no 
such explicit language in Section 10, state water law controls any claims by the City.  If this 
Court were to determine Section 10 granted a federal water right, that right would conflict with a 
century’s-worth of federal deference to state law.   
Neither does the background for inclusion of Section 10 in the 1888 Act support the 
City’s position.  When the Cession Agreement was being negotiated with the Tribes, no mention 
was made of water rights, either for the Tribes or the City, or of non-Indians accessing or 
conveying water over those lands retained in the Reservation.  After the Cession Agreement was 
signed on May 27, 1887, Agent Gallagher suggested to Commissioner Atkins that legislation 
approving the Cession Agreement should contain a provision regarding water supply and sewage 
9 
for the proposed town of Pocatello.  In a letter directed by Atkins to Gallagher on December 29, 
1887, Atkins noted that the contemplated source of the city’s water supply was on Reservation 
lands, outside the limits of the proposed townsite.  Atkins proposed language along the lines 
subsequently included as Section 10 in the bill in order to provide “some guarantee to water 
privileges . . . so far as the Indians and the Reservation are concerned.”  In his message to 
Congress, accompanying the draft of legislation to approve the Cession Agreement, Atkins noted 
that he deemed it advisable to insert the Section 10 language “[i]nasmuch as conflicting opinions 
seem to prevail as to the source or sources from which the town will derive its water supply.” 
Prior to enactment of the 1888 Act, Gallagher again wrote to the Commissioner, asking 
“to be informed what rights are guaranteed to these tribes, under treaty & executive orders,” to 
the Blackfoot and Snake Rivers, pointing out that white settlers along the opposite side of the 
Blackfoot River appeared to be constructing ditches and dams that had left the Indians without 
water to irrigate their crops.  An acting Commissioner responded on August 20, 1888:  
I do not find that the treaty makes any provision relating to the use of water in the 
streams.   
 
Water rights and privileges are regulated by the laws of Idaho, and doubtless the 
Indians are entitled to the same rights as white settlers would be under similar 
circumstances.   
 
The acting Commissioner continued: 
I have to state that white men have no right to construct bridges, dams, flumes, or 
reservoirs on the reservation, nor have they the right to construct abutments, piers, 
or other works upon the reservation banks of the boundary streams.  Such 
authority can only be given by Congress.   
 
Several weeks later Congress passed the 1888 Act.   
The discussions leading up to enactment of Section 10 did not relate to water rights and 
who should have them but, rather, water sources and how to ensure that the City had access to 
them.  That is, the discussion focused on the fact that most surface water resources were located 
on Reservation lands and that the City would need to have access to those sources and the ability 
to convey water from them in order to have a water supply.  Because of the trespass problems 
leading up to the negotiation of the Cession Agreement, it was rather clear that there needed to 
be a right of way approved by Congress.  The participants in the discussion clearly indicated that 
10 
the issue of water rights – how they were to be obtained and granted – was a matter of state law.  
Congress, however, had to provide the necessary access for enjoyment of any state water rights. 
Events subsequent to the passage of the legislation confirm this state of affairs.  After the 
1888 Act was passed, the Idaho Canal Company began to build a canal from the Snake River to 
the City.  The president of the company wrote to Commissioner Atkins, explaining that the 
citizens of Pocatello wanted to contract with his company to construct the canal and bring water 
to the City.  He inquired of the Commissioner whether his crews could go onto the Reservation 
in order to access the water provided in Section 10.  The Commissioner sought the advice of 
Assistant Attorney General George Shields.   
In an 1891 letter interpreting Section 10, Assistant Attorney General George Shields 
opined that Section 10 was a mere license: 
In view of the fact that the provision of said section of the statute is in derogation 
of the rights of the Indians as secured by treaty, I am of the opinion that the grant 
should be strictly construed. . . .  
In other words, the statute authorizes those, at the time citizens of said town, to go 
upon the lands of the Indian for the purpose of bringing water to the town, and for 
that purpose to construct, operate, and maintain a canal.  This right is in the nature 
of a mere license – authority to do an act, which without such authority would be 
illegal. 
(emphasis added).  Thus, Shields determined the rights granted in Section 10 had to be strictly 
construed and extended only to “citizens” of Pocatello—not to a canal company.  Further, 
Shields determined Section 10 allowed only access, not water. 
In response to Shields’ opinion, Congress added a provision to the Indian Department 
Appropriation Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 989 (“1891 Act”).  The provision in the 
1891 Act allowed the Secretary of the Interior to grant rights of way into the Reservation for 
canal, ditch, and reservoir companies.  It reads: 
That the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to grant rights of way into and 
across the Fort Hall Reservation in Idaho to canal, ditch, and reservoir companies 
for the purpose of enabling the citizens to thereby receive the water supply, 
contemplated by section ten (10) of an act to accept and ratify an agreement made 
with the Shoshone and Bannock Indians, and for other purposes . . . and may also 
attach conditions as to the supply of surplus water to Indians on said Fort Hall 
Reservation. . . . 
Notably, the 1891 Act does not expand any of the rights in Section 10, nor does it refer to any of 
those rights as a water right.  Instead, the 1891 Act uses the term “water supply.”  The Act 
11 
simply granted the Secretary of the Interior authority to grant canal companies use of the access 
previously provided for in Section 10.   
Nor does any subsequent historical authority give support to the City.  The Tribes ceded 
more land for the City several years after the 1888 Act, and the border of the reservation moved 
more than 10 miles from the city limits.  Throughout the period from 1888 to 1990, the City 
sought adjudication of any water rights under state law.  Finally, the 1990 Fort Hall Water Rights 
Settlement Agreement settled water disputes between the Tribes, the State of Idaho, and the 
United States, but did not recognize any rights held by the City.  Thus, neither the history or 
purpose of the 1888 Act supports the City’s claim to a federal water right.   
ii. 
The City contends that the district court erred by failing to interpret the “in common 
with” language in Section 10 as granting the City a portion of the Tribes’ water right.  The City 
points to a number of cases, which it contends to be supportive of such interpretation.  However, 
the cases upon which the City relies deal with interpretation of Indian treaties and employ Indian 
canons of construction.  The district court correctly declined to apply Indian canons of 
construction to the City’s claim.  Such canons are for the benefit of Indian tribes, not non-
Indians. 
Treaty interpretation is similar to contract interpretation.  Bonanno v. United States, 12 
Cl. Ct. 769, 771 (1987).  However, unlike contract interpretation, the interpretation of a treaty, 
including an Indian treaty, is a question of law for a court to decide.  Cayuga Indian Nation of 
New York v. Cuomo, 758 F. Supp. 107, 111 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing United States ex rel. Chunie 
v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986)).  The examination of a treaty’s negotiating 
history and purpose does not render its interpretation a matter of fact but merely serves as an aid 
to the legal determination which is at the heart of all treaty interpretation.  Bonanno, 12 Cl. Ct. at 
772.   While we are dealing with a statute, the City contends that the treaty canons of 
construction apply equally here.  While we do not decide that to be the case, even if it were, the 
canons would not favor the City.  
The City argues that “in common with” language in a treaty grants a right, not merely a 
right of access.  In Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n 
(Fishing Vessel), 443 U.S. 658 (1979), the Supreme Court determined that treaty language 
securing a “right of taking fish . . . in common with all citizens of the Territory” granted the 
12 
Indians a share of each run of fish passing through historical tribal fishing areas.  Id. at 679.  In 
that case, the State of Washington and the commercial fishing associations had argued the “in 
common with” language merely granted the Indians a right of access.  Id. at 675.  The Court 
disagreed.  However, the case offers no support to the City.  The Court reached its conclusion 
after an extensive discussion of Indian tribal rights.  The Court acknowledged, “It is true that the 
words ‘in common with’ may be read either as nothing more than a guarantee that individual 
Indians would have the same right as individual non-Indians or as securing an interest in the fish 
runs themselves.”  Id. at 677.  However, the Court held that it was crucial to interpret the right in 
the sense the Indians themselves would have interpreted it.  It stated, “[t]he treaty must therefore 
be construed, not according to the technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but in the 
sense in which they would naturally be understood by the Indians.”  Id. at 676 (citing Jones v. 
Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899)).  The Court stressed it was crucial to consider both parties’ 
intentions in signing the treaty.  “[I]t is the intention of the parties, and not solely that of the 
superior side, that must control any attempt to interpret the treaties.”  Fishing Vessel, 448 U.S. at 
675.  Thus, the critical determination in that case was what the Indians felt they were giving up 
when signing the treaty.  As such, the Court found the “in common with” language in the treaty 
was intended to guarantee a share of the fish harvest to the Indians, not merely a right of access. 
The Court’s reasoning does not support the City.  In Fishing Vessel, the Court interpreted 
the “in common with” language to benefit the Indians, especially in that the treaty in that case 
was a grant of rights from them.  In this case, the district court correctly declined to apply the 
Indian canons of construction to the City’s claim.  The language that supported the fishing rights 
in Fishing Vessel was part of a treaty.  A treaty is viewed as “a contract between two sovereign 
nations.”  Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 675.  A treaty with an Indian Tribe constitutes a grant of 
rights from them, not a grant of rights from the United States to the Indians.  Id. at 680.  Thus, 
the language must be interpreted as the Indians themselves interpreted it.  In contrast, the 
language at issue in Section 10 is not embedded in a treaty—it is part of a statute.  The language 
in Section 10 did not originate as part of a treaty—indeed, it was added several months after the 
negotiations for the Cession Agreement had concluded.  The Tribes had no say in the 
development of Section 10.  As discussed below, Congress will not abrogate Indian rights 
without clear intent and an express agreement from the Indians.  Further, “[S]tatutes are to be 
construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their 
13 
benefit.” County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 
251, 269 (1992) (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985)).  
Thus, if Section 10 was ambiguous, this Court would construe it in favor of the Tribes, not the 
City.  In sum, the City cannot claim the benefit of the Indian canons of construction, and the 
district court properly declined to apply them.   
An additional consideration must be taken into account with regard to the City’s claim, 
which it asserts entitles it to a share of the Tribes’ reserved water right.  American law treats 
Indian tribes differently than it does other sovereign nations or private individuals.  First and 
foremost is the notion that agreements with Indians are to be interpreted to the benefit of the 
tribes.  For example, the Supreme Court has stated, 
[W]e will construe a treaty with the Indians as “that unlettered people” understood 
it, and “as justice and reason demand, in all cases where power is exerted by the 
strong over those to whom they owe care and protection,” and counterpoise the 
inequality “by the superior justice which looks only to the substance of the right, 
without regard to technical rules.”   
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905) (citing Choctaw Nation v. United States, 
119 U.S. 1, 28 (1886); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899)).  Congress certainly has the power to 
abrogate Indian treaty rights, but its intent to do so must be clear.  See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille 
Lacs Band of Chippea Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202 (1999); United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 
739-40 (1986) (abrogation of treaty rights requires “clear evidence that Congress actually 
considered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on 
the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty.”).   
The Tribes’ water rights in this case are not spelled out in the Second Treaty of Fort 
Bridger, but the Treaty’s failure to explicitly include the water right is immaterial to this 
question.  In Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), the Supreme Court recognized for 
the first time that, when the federal government withdraws land from the public domain for a 
federal purpose, it impliedly reserves enough water to fulfill that purpose.  Thus, the Tribes in 
this case impliedly received the water rights necessary to sustain the purposes of their reservation 
with the treaty establishing the Reservation.  The question is whether the Cession Agreement, 
ratified by the 1888 Act, abrogated any of the Tribes’ rights.  The answer to this question must 
be no.   
First, in order to abrogate any treaty rights, Congressional intent must be clear.  As 
demonstrated above, the plain language of Section 10 does not indicate an intent to grant the City 
14 
a water right.  Congress knew how to grant a water right in abrogation of Indian treaty rights, as 
demonstrated in the Byers case.  Byers is particularly important in demonstrating what Congress 
would do in granting a water right to a non-Indian in abrogation of treaty rights because the act 
in question, the Pendleton Townsite Act, was enacted in 1885, three years prior to the 1888 Act.  
Congress knew how to do what the City wants here, but failed to do so in the 1888 Act. 
Second, in order to abrogate any treaty rights held by Tribes, a majority of adult male 
Indians on the Reservation must consent.  Thus, the vote of a majority of adult male members of 
the Tribes was required in order to cede any water rights.  Such consent was not given.  Section 
10 was added several months after the Cession Agreement was negotiated.  Considering that the 
Indians were loathe even to give up any land, it seems unlikely they would have given up any 
water rights had the issue been raised.  The record does not reveal a single instance where the 
Indians were apprised of the possibility that they were to lose some water rights.  Serious 
discussions between the federal officials and the Indians would certainly have ensued if that were 
the case.  However, it was not.  In Byers, the court noted that it “affirmatively appears from the 
record in this case that a majority of the male adult Indians on the reservation assented in writing 
to the act. . .”  86 Or. at 632, 169 P. at 126.  Thus, without clear Congressional intent to abrogate 
some of the Tribes’ reserved water rights and an agreement by a majority of adult Indian males 
to cede some water rights, the City’s argument fails.   
C. 
Finally, the City argues that the district court erred in that it limited Congressional 
authority to grant a water right under Section 10.  Congress’s power to grant federal water rights 
arises under the Property Clause.  The clause states, “[C]ongress shall have Power to dispose of 
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging 
to the United States. . .”  U.S. Const., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.  Merely because Congress has this power 
does not mean it exercised it in Section 10.   
None of the parties denies Congress’ power to have granted the City a water right.  “The 
power of the government to reserve the waters and exempt them from appropriation under the 
state laws is not denied, and could not be.”  Winters, 207 U.S. at 577 (citing United States v. Rio 
Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899)).  The question is whether Congress 
exercised that power in this case.  As discussed above, Congress chose not to exercise its power 
here.   
15 
16 
D. 
Because we conclude the City does not have a federal water right, we need not address 
other issues raised by the parties, which depended upon a favorable outcome for the City on that 
issue.   
III. 
We affirm the district court.  Costs to the Respondents.   
 
 
Chief Justice EISMANN, and Justices BURDICK, W. JONES, and HORTON 
CONCUR.