Case Title: State v. Hendricks

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015AP002429-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2018-02-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
2018 WI 15 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP2429-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Shannon Olance Hendricks, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 373 Wis. 2d 309, 895 N.W.2d 104 
(2017 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 20, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 2, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
David L. Borowski and M. Joseph Donald 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. dissents, joined by A.W. BRADLEY, 
J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by and an oral argument by Hannah Schieber Jurss, 
assistant state public defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
and an oral argument by Warren D. Weinstein, assistant attorney 
general, with whom on the brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney 
general.
 
 
2018 WI 15
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2015AP2429-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2011CF4101) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Shannon Olance Hendricks, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 20, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   Shannon Olance Hendricks 
seeks to withdraw the guilty plea he entered to one count of 
child enticement.  He claims the circuit court's failure to tell 
him the legal definition of "sexual contact" at his plea hearing 
violated Wis. Stat. § 971.08's requirement that a pleading 
defendant must understand the nature of the charge.1  Because 
sexual contact is not an element of the crime of child 
enticement, and because the record shows Hendricks understood 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 2015AP2429-CR 
 
2 
 
the nature of the charge to which he pled guilty, the plea 
colloquy comported with both § 971.08 and State v. Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), and Hendricks is not entitled 
to an evidentiary hearing.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of 
appeals decision2 upholding the circuit court's order3 denying 
Hendricks' motion for plea withdrawal.  Moreover, we decline the 
State's request to modify the Bangert requirements. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
The criminal complaint charged Hendricks with one 
count of second-degree sexual assault of a child under the age 
of 16.  The charges stemmed from Hendricks taking his 
girlfriend's 14-year-old niece to a park where he touched the 
victim's chest over her clothes, tried to touch her breasts 
under her clothes, rubbed her thighs, and touched her buttocks 
over her clothes while pressuring her to let him have sexual 
intercourse with her.4  In January 2012, on the second day of his 
                                                 
2 See State v. Hendricks, No. 2015AP2429-CR, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2016). 
3 The Honorable M. Joseph Donald, Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court decided this postconviction motion; the Honorable David L. 
Borowski, Milwaukee County Circuit Court presided over the plea 
colloquy, 
subsequent 
hearings, 
sentencing, 
and 
the 
postconviction motions through the entry of the amended judgment 
of conviction. 
4 The victim testified at the preliminary hearing (which 
Hendricks agreed to use as the factual basis for his plea) that 
as Hendricks touched these different parts of her body, he kept 
saying "please" and that "he hasn't had it [meaning sexual 
intercourse] in a while." 
No. 2015AP2429-CR 
 
3 
 
trial for second-degree sexual assault, Hendricks decided to 
take the State's plea offer:  Hendricks would plead guilty to 
the reduced charge of child enticement and the State would 
recommend a sentence concurrent to the prison sentence Hendricks 
was currently serving.  With help from his lawyer, Hendricks 
filled out a guilty plea questionnaire and waiver of rights 
form.  After he completed the form, the circuit court conducted 
a plea colloquy. 
¶3 
The circuit court began the colloquy by going over the 
plea questionnaire and waiver of rights form and personally 
confirming with Hendricks that:  (1) he was admitting he 
committed child enticement, a felony; (2) he was 31 years old, 
completed high school, understands English, and understands the 
charge; (3) he was taking medication for anxiety and depression, 
but had not used any other drugs or alcohol in the last 24 
hours; and (4) he understood the constitutional rights he was 
giving up by pleading guilty including the right to trial, the 
right to remain silent, the right to testify, the right to a 
jury trial, and the right to force the State to prove its case 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
¶4 
Next, the circuit court asked Hendricks' lawyer if he 
had discussed the elements of the offense with his client and 
noted defense counsel had attached an element sheet to the plea 
questionnaire.  Hendricks' lawyer answered:  "Correct, Your 
Honor.  We did go over the elements."  Defense counsel told the 
court he was satisfied that Hendricks understood the elements.   
The circuit court then asked Hendricks again if he understood he 
No. 2015AP2429-CR 
 
4 
 
was "pleading guilty and admitting to, as I said, child 
enticement, 
which 
is 
a 
felony," 
and 
Hendricks 
answered 
affirmatively.  Next, the circuit court asked Hendricks if he 
was admitting that he: 
 . . . did entice a child, a person under the age of 
18, to go into a vehicle, building or room or secluded 
place, in this case, given the facts in the complaint 
and given what's indicated on the element sheet, 
you're admitting that you did cause the victim in this 
case to go into a secluded area; you intended to have 
her go to that secluded area, and you understand and 
knew that the victim was under the age of 18; is that 
correct? 
Hendricks answered, "Yes, Your Honor."  After going through all 
the information related to sentencing, the required deportation 
warning, the effect pleading guilty would have on Hendricks' 
right to vote and possession of a firearm, and confirming he was 
pleading guilty of his "own free will" because he was in fact 
guilty, the circuit court recognized it had not mentioned any of 
the prohibited intents listed in the child enticement statute 
and the elements sheet attached to the plea questionnaire did 
not specify a prohibited intent. 
¶5 
After a sidebar, the circuit court continued with the 
plea colloquy: 
[T]he plea under 948.07 needs to be entered to child 
enticement but under a specific subsection. 
There are six subsections.  Subsection (1) is the 
person, the defendant, enticing a child under 18 to go 
to a vehicle, room, building or secluded place for one 
of – and there are alternate purposes.  Subsection (1) 
is having sexual contact or intercourse with a child; 
subsection (2) is for the purpose of prostitution; 
subsection (3) is exposing a sex organ; subsection (4) 
No. 2015AP2429-CR 
 
5 
 
is making a recording of a child engaged in explicit 
conduct; subsection (5) is causing bodily or mental 
harm to the child; subsection (6) is giving or selling 
the child a controlled substance. 
Obviously, 
in 
this 
case, 
according 
to 
the 
complaint and the information, and what I just 
discussed with the attorneys, what applies, correct me 
if I'm wrong is Subsection (1), the enticement was for 
the purpose of, at a minimum, sexual contact, correct 
counsel? 
Hendricks' lawyer answered, "Correct, Your Honor."    
¶6 
The circuit court then directly addressed Hendricks, 
asking him if he understood "that's what you're admitting to; 
you're admitting to child enticement?  You were bringing this 
child under 18 to, in this case, a secluded area for the purpose 
of potentially having sexual contact with that child, and that's 
indicated in the complaint, indicated in this case; is that 
correct, sir?"  Hendricks replied, "Yes, it is, Your Honor."  
The circuit court asked again if Hendricks was pleading guilty 
because he was guilty and he replied "Yes, I am, Your Honor."  
The circuit court then went through whether anyone threatened, 
forced, or told Hendricks to plead guilty and Hendricks assured 
the court no one had.  Hendricks confirmed that his attorney had 
gone over the guilty plea form with him, that Hendricks read the 
form, "went over the case" with his lawyer, signed the form, and 
"had enough time to review this matter" and discuss it with his 
attorney.   
¶7 
The 
circuit 
court 
then 
addressed 
questions 
to 
Hendricks' lawyer: 
THE COURT:  Counsel, you went over the agreement with 
your client? 
No. 2015AP2429-CR 
 
6 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  We did, Your Honor. 
THE COURT:   You're satisfied his plea today is free, 
voluntary and intelligent? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I am, Your Honor. 
THE COURT:  You saw your client sign and date the 
questionnaire today? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT:  I've read the complaint.  The parties are 
stipulating to the facts in the complaint as a factual 
basis to support the amended charge and the plea; is 
that correct? 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Yes. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, we are agreeing to the 
complaint.  As far as what the contact was, we're 
agreeing to what the victim testified to at the 
preliminary hearing, which, you know, which would also 
support the plea. 
THE COURT:  Well, it was certainly enough on this 
case. 
¶8 
The circuit court then directly asked Hendricks if he 
was "admitting to that," and he said "Yes, Your Honor."  The 
circuit court continued with Hendricks:  "You're admitting to 
the contact, again, with a child who was under 18, the victim, 
with a date of birth of 9/19/1996, and you're admitting that it 
was sexual contact, correct, sir?"  Hendricks replied, "Yes, 
Your Honor." 
¶9 
Based on the stipulation, the complaint, and "what's 
been indicated in court by counsel and the defendant," the 
circuit court found:  (1) there was a factual basis "for the 
charge of and plea to child enticement, which is a felony, under 
948.07(1)"; and (2) "the defendant has freely, voluntarily and 
No. 2015AP2429-CR 
 
7 
 
intelligently 
entered 
his 
plea; 
freely, 
voluntarily 
and 
intelligently waived his rights in this matter."  The circuit 
court accepted the plea, ordered a pre-sentence investigation 
report, and set a date for sentencing.   
¶10 Before sentencing occurred, Hendricks filed a motion 
seeking to withdraw his plea claiming he pled guilty because he 
felt rushed and overwhelmed that the victim was going to testify 
against him; he now claimed he was not guilty.  This also led to 
the withdrawal of his first attorney and the appointment of a 
second State Public Defender.  Hendricks testified at the plea 
withdrawal hearing that the medication he was on made him "go 
along" with his first attorney's suggestion that he take the 
plea because his lawyer said if he did not plead guilty, he 
would lose at trial and be sentenced to the maximum of 40 years.  
He admitted that he read the criminal complaint and an "outline 
of what the jurors would have to go by" to convict him.  He also 
testified he understood the charges against him: 
Q  Now, in terms of understanding the charges against 
you and the content of it, your defense attorney 
showed you the complaint, correct? 
A  The original complaint? 
Q  Correct. 
A  Yes.  I saw it before. 
Q  And you guys went over the elements; what you're 
pleading to prior to the entry of your plea, correct? 
A  Yes. 
No. 2015AP2429-CR 
 
8 
 
Q  And you also knew exactly what you were being 
accused of because you've been through the revocation 
hearing on October 26th of 2011, correct? 
A  Yes.   
When the circuit court questioned why Hendricks admitted his 
guilt during the plea colloquy and why he said his guilty plea 
was of "his own free will," Hendricks explained he really did 
not want to plead guilty but his lawyer said he would lose at 
trial.  He said he just answered yes to all of the circuit 
court's questions because he thought his lawyer would not fight 
for him if the case was tried.    
¶11 Hendricks' 
first 
lawyer 
testified 
at 
the 
plea 
withdrawal hearing that:  (1) he "very thoroughly" discussed 
with Hendricks the plea offer's amendment of the sexual assault 
charge to child enticement; (2) he "was totally convinced that 
[pleading guilty to the reduced charge] was a voluntary decision 
that [Hendricks] was making"; (3) there was no indication that 
Hendricks felt rushed; and (4) after going over the plea offer, 
and the strengths and weaknesses, the decision of whether to 
plead or go to trial was left to Hendricks.    
¶12 At the end of the plea withdrawal hearing, the circuit 
court indicated that Hendricks' request for plea withdrawal was 
based on his hope that the victim would not show up to testify 
against him at a trial.  The circuit court believed the request 
was based solely on Hendricks' "change of heart."  It reviewed 
the 
plea 
colloquy 
finding 
it 
to 
be 
extremely 
thorough.  
Hendricks' lawyer agreed it was "a great colloquy" and suggested 
No. 2015AP2429-CR 
 
9 
 
its only flaw was the failure to ask Hendricks if his 
medications affected his ability to understand.   
¶13 In January 2013, the circuit court denied the plea 
withdrawal motion.  It found:  (1) the plea questionnaire and 
plea colloquy were "very thorough"; (2) Hendricks answered 
questions indicating he "was making this decision freely and 
voluntarily"; (3) Hendricks did not indicate "any hesitancy, 
whatsoever" at any time during the plea colloquy; (4) the 
circuit court discussed and explained the elements of the 
offense a couple times; (5) defense counsel "was satisfied that 
the defendant's plea was free, voluntary and intelligent"; (6) 
Hendricks had "plenty of time, more than adequate amount of time 
to go over the plea questionnaire, discuss it with his 
attorney"; (7) Hendricks' claim that his medication made him 
just "go along" was not credible because he was currently on the 
same medication but "fighting and fighting and fighting" to 
withdraw his plea; (8) he is a high school graduate with 
vocational training and some college; he does not have any 
learning disabilities; and (9) Hendricks failed to present a 
fair and just reason for plea withdrawal——his reason was nothing 
more "than a complete and total change of heart."  
¶14 In February 2013, over a year after Hendricks entered 
his plea, he was sentenced in accordance with the agreed upon 
recommendation.  The circuit court sentenced him to three years 
of initial confinement concurrent to the sentence he was then 
serving, plus four years of extended supervision. 
No. 2015AP2429-CR 
 
10 
 
¶15 After some postconviction motions not pertinent here, 
an amended judgment of conviction was entered in September 2014.5  
Initially, Hendricks' appellate counsel filed a no-merit appeal, 
but then requested dismissal of the no-merit appeal and an 
extension of time to file a new postconviction motion.  The 
court of appeals granted those motions.  Hendricks then filed a 
motion in the circuit court alleging a deficiency in his plea 
colloquy——namely, the circuit court failed to explain the 
meaning of "sexual contact" or to verify Hendricks understood 
the meaning of that term.  Hendricks argued Wis. Stat. § 971.08 
requires the circuit court to ensure a defendant understands the 
nature of the charge, which means a defendant must have an 
awareness of the essential elements of the crime.  Hendricks 
contends the intent to have sexual contact is an essential 
element of sexual enticement and therefore the circuit court's 
failure to give him the legal definition of "sexual contact" 
rendered his plea deficient.  He wanted the circuit court to 
hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion.  The State conceded 
at the circuit court level that an evidentiary hearing should be 
held. 
¶16 The 
circuit 
court 
summarily 
denied 
the 
motion, 
reasoning: 
                                                 
5 These motions dealt with sentence modification issues, 
ultimately resulting in a reduction of the initial confinement 
portion of his sentence so that it matched the time left on the 
sentence he was already serving. 
No. 2015AP2429-CR 
 
11 
 
The cases the defendant and the State rely on all 
involve sexual assault of a child.  There is not a 
single case which holds that the meaning of sexual 
contact is an essential element of child enticement.  
 . . . . 
[T]he defendant in this case was not convicted of 
sexual assault of a child – he was convicted of child 
enticement.  These crimes are not the same.  As 
relevant 
to 
this 
case, 
the 
elements 
of 
child 
enticement include causing, or attempting to cause, a 
child to go into any vehicle, building, room, or 
secluded place, with the intent to have sexual contact 
with the child.  Actual sexual contact is not a 
required element.  This is because the purpose of 
section 
948.07, 
Stats., 
is 
not 
to 
punish 
the 
commission of the enumerated act, but succeeding in 
getting a child to enter a place with intent to commit 
such a crime.  State v. Hanson, 182 Wis. 2d 481 (Ct. 
App. 1994).  On the other hand, the purpose of section 
948.02, Stats., is to punish the sexual contact 
itself.  Consequently, when a defendant enters a 
guilty or no contest plea to a crime of sexual assault 
of a child, a crime which carries a far greater 
penalty 
than 
child 
enticement, 
the 
court 
must 
ascertain that the defendant understands the essential 
elements of that offense, including the element of 
sexual contact.  But when a defendant enters a guilty 
or no contest plea to child enticement for the purpose 
of sexual contact, actual sexual contact is not a 
required element, and therefore, a court is not 
required to explain the meaning of sexual contact.  
See State v. Trochinski, 253 Wis. 2d 38, 61 (2002) (a 
valid plea requires only knowledge of the essential 
elements of the offense, not knowledge of nuances and 
descriptions of the elements).   
The circuit court found both the plea colloquy and the plea 
questionnaire established that Hendricks had the requisite 
knowledge of the elements of child enticement; he "understood 
the essential elements of this offense" when he pled guilty.    
Thus, he failed to establish a defect in the plea colloquy, and 
No. 2015AP2429-CR 
 
12 
 
no evidentiary hearing was required.  The court of appeals 
affirmed.  We granted the petition for review. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶17 Whether a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing on his plea withdrawal motion under Bangert is a 
question of law we review independently.  See State v. Howell, 
2007 WI 75, ¶30, 301 Wis. 2d 350, 734 N.W.2d 48.  We review de 
novo whether Hendricks (1) "has pointed to deficiencies in the 
plea colloquy that establish a violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08 
or other mandatory duties at a plea hearing"; and (2) 
sufficiently alleged that he did not know or understand 
information that should have been provided at the plea hearing."  
See State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶21, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 
N.W.2d 906. 
III.  DISCUSSION 
A.  There is no deficiency in the plea colloquy. 
¶18 Hendricks asserts intent to have "sexual contact" is 
an essential element of child enticement and, therefore, the 
circuit court's failure to define the term "sexual contact" 
during the plea colloquy rendered it deficient under both Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08 and Bangert.6   The State responds that because 
"sexual 
contact" 
is 
not 
an 
essential 
element 
of 
child 
enticement, the circuit court was not required to give Hendricks 
                                                 
6 See State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 
(1986). 
No. 2015AP2429-CR 
 
13 
 
its legal definition, and therefore the plea colloquy complied 
with § 971.08 and Bangert.  The State is correct. 
¶19 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08(1) requires a court to do 
four things before it "accepts a plea of guilty or no contest": 
(a) 
Address the defendant personally and determine 
that 
the 
plea 
is 
made 
voluntarily 
with 
understanding of the nature of the charge and the 
potential punishment if convicted. 
(b) 
Make such inquiry as satisfies it that the 
defendant in fact committed the crime charged. 
(c) 
Address the defendant personally and advise the 
defendant as follows:  "If you are not a citizen 
of the United States of America, you are advised 
that a plea of guilty or no contest for the 
offense with which you are charged may result in 
deportation, the exclusion from admission to this 
country or the denial of naturalization, under 
federal law." 
(d) 
Inquire of the district attorney whether he or 
she has complied with s. 971.095(2). 
The issue here focuses solely on paragraph (a) and whether 
Hendricks 
understood 
"the 
nature 
of 
the 
charge." 
 
"An 
understanding of the nature of the charge must include an 
awareness of the essential elements of the crime."  Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 267.  To ensure a defendant understands the nature of 
the charge, a circuit court must employ "any one or a 
combination of" three methods:  (1) "summarize the elements of 
the 
crime 
charged 
by 
reading 
from 
the 
appropriate 
jury 
instructions . . . or from the applicable statute"; (2) ask 
defense "counsel whether he explained the nature of the charge 
to the defendant and request him to summarize the extent of the 
No. 2015AP2429-CR 
 
14 
 
explanation, including a reiteration of the elements at the plea 
hearing"; or (3) "expressly refer to the record or other 
evidence of defendant's knowledge of the nature of the charge 
established prior to the plea hearing."  Id. at 267-68. 
¶20 The record demonstrates the circuit court employed a 
combination 
of 
the 
various 
methods. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
interacted directly with Hendricks and repeatedly summarized the 
elements of child enticement.  Every time, Hendricks responded 
that he understood.  The circuit court asked defense counsel if 
he explained the nature of the crime and if he discussed the 
elements with Hendricks.7  Defense counsel assured the circuit 
court he had.  Further, during the plea colloquy the circuit 
court referred to the record demonstrating Hendricks' knowledge 
of the nature of the charge, including the complaint, the guilty 
plea waiver form, and the victim's testimony at the preliminary 
hearing.  There is no question the circuit court conducted an 
extremely thorough and complete plea colloquy. 
¶21 The child enticement statute, Wis. Stat. § 948.07 
provides: 
Whoever, with intent to commit any of the following 
acts, causes or attempts to cause any child who has 
not attained the age of 18 years to go into any 
vehicle, building, room or secluded place is guilty of 
a Class D felony: 
                                                 
7 Had this been the only method the circuit court chose, it 
would have had to make defense counsel reiterate the elements.  
This, however, was not the court's primary method; instead, it 
was an additional check to ensure Hendricks' counsel discussed 
the elements of the charge with him. 
No. 2015AP2429-CR 
 
15 
 
(1) 
Having sexual contact or sexual intercourse with 
the child in violation of s. 948.02, 948.085, or 
948.095. 
(2) 
Causing the child to engage in prostitution. 
(3) 
Exposing genitals, pubic area, or intimate parts 
to the child or causing the child to expose 
genitals, pubic area, or intimate parts in 
violation of s. 948.10. 
(4) 
Recording the child engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct. 
(5) 
Causing bodily or mental harm to the child. 
(6) 
Giving or selling to the child a controlled 
substance 
or 
controlled 
substance 
analog 
in 
violation of ch. 961. 
There are three elements the State must prove in a child 
enticement case: 
(1) 
[T]hat the defendant caused or attempted to 
cause 
a 
child 
to 
go 
into 
a 
vehicle, 
building, room or secluded place; 
(2) 
[T]hat the defendant did so with any one of 
the 
six 
enumerated 
intents, 
generally 
relating to sex and drug crimes; and  
(3) 
[T]hat the victim had not attained the age 
of 18. 
State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, ¶31, 236 Wis. 2d 721, 613 N.W.2d 
833 (citing Wis. Stat. § 948.07).  This court emphasized in 
Derango that child enticement is "one offense with multiple 
modes of commission."  236 Wis. 2d 721, ¶17.  The crime is the 
"act of enticement," "not the underlying intended sexual or 
other misconduct."  Id.  Thus, an act of sexual contact is not 
an element of child enticement.  The crime of child enticement 
prohibits "the act (or attempt) of enticement luring a child to 
No. 2015AP2429-CR 
 
16 
 
a secluded place, away from the protections of the general 
public" for some improper purpose.  Id., ¶¶18, 21.  Textually, 
the act of enticement itself encompasses a bad intent. 
¶22 Relying on three sexual assault by sexual contact 
cases, State v. Jipson, 2003 WI App 222, 267 Wis. 2d 467, 671 
N.W.2d 18, State v. Nichelson, 220 Wis. 2d 214, 582 N.W.2d 460 
(Ct. App. 1998), and State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, 232 
Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199, Hendricks argues that sexual 
contact is an essential element of child enticement and the term 
should have been defined for him at the plea hearing.  We 
disagree.  As the circuit court correctly noted in its order 
denying Hendricks' postconviction motion, child enticement is a 
different crime from child sexual assault.  The elements are 
different, the punishments are different, and "[t]here is not a 
single case which holds that the meaning of sexual contact is an 
essential element of child enticement."  Because the State must 
prove sexual contact itself in a child sexual assault case, it 
makes sense that to understand the nature of the charge, a 
defendant pleading to sexual assault based on sexual contact 
must be told the specific statutory definition of sexual contact 
in Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5).8  The crime of child enticement, 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat § 948.01(5) defines "sexual contact" as 
"any of the following": 
(a) Any 
of 
the 
following 
types 
of 
intentional 
touching, whether direct or through clothing, if that 
intentional touching is either for the purpose of 
sexually 
degrading 
or 
sexually 
humiliating 
the 
(continued) 
No. 2015AP2429-CR 
 
17 
 
however, does not require the State to prove a defendant 
committed (or attempted to commit) an act of sexual contact; 
rather, the State must prove the act of criminal enticement, 
which presupposes bad intent.  Obviously, a person could not be 
charged with the crime of child enticement for luring her child 
into their garage to surprise the child with a brand new 
bicycle. 
¶23 In addition, the courts in Jipson, Nichelson, and 
Bollig specifically held that sexual contact is an essential 
                                                                                                                                                             
complainant or sexually arousing or gratifying the 
defendant: 
1. Intentional touching by the defendant or, upon the 
defendant's instruction, by another person, by the use 
of any body part or object, of the complainant's 
intimate parts. 
2. Intentional touching by the complainant, by the use 
of any body part or object, of the defendant's 
intimate parts or, if done upon the defendant's 
instructions, the intimate parts of another person. 
(b) Intentional penile ejaculation of ejaculate or 
intentional 
emission 
of 
urine 
or 
feces 
by 
the 
defendant or, upon the defendant's instruction, by 
another person upon any part of the body clothed or 
unclothed of the complainant if that ejaculation or 
emission is either for the purpose of sexually 
degrading or sexually humiliating the complainant or 
for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying the 
defendant. 
(c) 
For 
the 
purpose 
of 
sexually 
degrading 
or 
humiliating the complainant or sexually arousing or 
gratifying the defendant, intentionally causing the 
complainant to ejaculate or emit urine or feces on any 
part of the defendant's body, whether clothed or 
unclothed. 
No. 2015AP2429-CR 
 
18 
 
element of the crimes of second-degree sexual assault of a 
child, first-degree sexual assault of a child, and attempted 
sexual contact with a child.  None of these cases, however, say 
sexual contact is an element of the crime of child enticement.  
This distinction follows naturally from the differences in the 
language of the statutes involved.  The statutes at issue in 
Jipson, Nichelson, and Bollig list "sexual contact" as a 
specific element of the crime, whereas the child enticement 
statute lists "sexual contact" as one of six alternative modes 
of commission rather than as a specific element.9 
¶24 Hendricks 
argues 
we 
cannot 
rely 
on 
Derango's 
conclusion that sexual contact is not an element of child 
enticement because Derango did not involve plea withdrawal, but 
instead addressed jury unanimity.  Hendricks insists Derango's 
analysis and holding on the elements of child enticement must be 
limited to unanimity cases.  We disagree.  Although Hendricks is 
correct that this court in Derango analyzed the child enticement 
statute in the context of jury unanimity, this in no way 
influences 
our 
identification 
of 
the 
elements 
of 
child 
                                                 
9 State v. Jipson, 2003 WI App 222, 267 Wis. 2d 467, 671 
N.W.2d 18, dealt with Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2), which states 
"[w]hoever has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a 
person who has not attained the age of 16 years."  (Emphasis 
added.)  State v. Nichelson, 220 Wis. 2d 214, 582 N.W.2d 460 
(Ct. App. 1998), dealt with Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(1997-98), 
which states "[w]hoever has sexual contact or sexual intercourse 
with a person who has not attained the age of 13 years."  
(Emphasis added.)   State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 
605 N.W.2d 199, also dealt with § 948.02(1). 
No. 2015AP2429-CR 
 
19 
 
enticement.  Sexual contact is either an element of child 
enticement or it is not.  It cannot be an element for one type 
of case, but not in another.  In Derango, this court examined 
the plain language of the statute to determine that sexual 
contact is not an element of the crime of child enticement.  See 
Derango, 236 Wis. 2d 721, ¶¶16-17.  We held the statutory 
language to be "straightforward"——"[t]he act of enticement is 
the 
crime, 
not 
the 
underlying 
intended 
sexual 
or 
other 
misconduct."  Id., ¶17.  We supported this interpretation with 
additional cases interpreting the child enticement statute and 
with the statute's legislative history.  Id., ¶¶19-20. See, 
e.g., id., ¶19, (citing State v. Hanson, 182 Wis. 2d 481, 487, 
513 N.W.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1994)) ("The gravamen of the crime is 
not the commission of an enumerated act, but succeeding in 
getting a child to enter a place with intent to commit such a 
crime." (emphasis added)).  Our analysis remains sound and we 
see no reason to overturn, abandon, or distinguish it. 
¶25 Our conclusion is further supported by State v. 
Steele, 2001 WI App 34, 241 Wis. 2d 269, 625 N.W.2d 595.  Steele 
was a plea withdrawal case, which relied upon a jury unanimity 
case to ascertain the essential elements of armed burglary.  
Id., ¶¶1, 8-9.  Steele argued his plea colloquy was deficient 
because the circuit court did not specifically identify which 
"felony" supported the burglary charge; he claimed the specific 
felony was an essential element and needed to be discussed.  
Id., ¶¶1-3, 8.  The circuit court identified the elements as:  
(1) entering a dwelling; (2) intentionally; (3) without consent; 
No. 2015AP2429-CR 
 
20 
 
(4) intending to commit a felony; (5) armed with a dangerous 
weapon.  Id., ¶3.  In rejecting Steele's claim that the felony 
had to be explained10 because it is an essential element, the 
court of appeals relied on State v. Hammer, 216 Wis. 2d 214, 576 
N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1997).  Hammer was a jury unanimity case, 
which analyzed the statutory language of Wis. Stat. § 943.10, 
the burglary statute, and concluded that what specific felony a 
defendant intends to commit is not an essential element because 
§ 943.10 "sets forth a 'single offense with multiple modes of 
commission,' not multiple offenses defined by each possible 
underlying felony."  Steele, 241 Wis. 2d 269, ¶9 (quoting 
Hammer, 216 Wis. 2d at 220). 
¶26 From Derango, Steele, and Hammer, we discern a 
governing principle.  The modes of commission following "intends 
to commit" language within statutes do not constitute an element 
of a crime.  Of course, a statute's mode of commission must 
                                                 
10 The court of appeals in State v. Steele, 2001 WI App 34, 
241 Wis. 2d 269, 625 N.W.2d 595, additionally held that the 
circuit  court's "failure to specify the underlying felony was 
not a defect in the plea proceedings."  Id., ¶10.  While the 
particular mode of commission in a child enticement case need 
not be legally defined because it is not an element of the 
offense, it does need to be identified during the plea colloquy 
to ensure a factual basis exists for the plea.  In the context 
of a burglary, Wis. Stat. § 943.10 does not specify the 
particular felonies the defendant must have intended to commit; 
therefore, as the court in Hammer noted, "it does not matter 
which felony formed the basis of that intent."  State v. Hammer, 
216 Wis. 2d 214, 220, 576 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1997). The child 
enticement statute, in contrast, specifies six separate intended 
acts, at least one of which must be identified during the plea 
colloquy. 
No. 2015AP2429-CR 
 
21 
 
still be disclosed and acknowledged at a plea hearing in order 
to ensure a factual basis for the plea.  For burglary, the 
circuit court must advise a defendant that one of the elements 
is the "intent to commit a felony."  It would be insufficient 
for the circuit court to simply say "intent to commit."  
Likewise, for child enticement, a circuit court cannot simply 
say to a pleading defendant that he must have enticed a child to 
a secluded place "with intent."  That would be absurd.  A 
circuit court must identify at least one of the prohibited modes 
of committing child enticement to ensure there exists a factual 
basis for accepting a plea.11  And, Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08(1) 
requires a court, prior to accepting a plea, to "determine that 
the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of 
the charge."  Before accepting Hendricks' plea, the circuit 
court accomplished both of these requirements.  
¶27 The 
circuit 
court 
here 
recognized 
the 
mode 
of 
commission was initially missing and took the proper steps to 
correct the omission.  As a result, the circuit court actually 
read all six of the prohibited intents listed in the statute 
during the plea colloquy and then specifically asked Hendricks 
                                                 
11 The dissent's fabricated Bokononism example is not one of 
the modes of commission in the child enticement statute.  See 
dissent, ¶51.  Our decision in this case is based on the actual 
law in place and the extensive record recounted in part I of 
this opinion.  The record establishes that Hendricks failed to 
demonstrate any plea defect.  The dissent's insistence that a 
plea deficiency exists does not make it so——no matter how many 
times the dissent says it. 
No. 2015AP2429-CR 
 
22 
 
if he was admitting to the prohibited intent of sexual contact.  
Hendricks 
repeatedly 
answered 
affirmatively, 
expressing 
no 
confusion at any point regarding the meaning of sexual contact 
or otherwise.  In fact, as detailed more fully below, Hendricks 
conceded the victim's testimony at the preliminary hearing 
accurately recounted his actions, thereby establishing his 
understanding of the nature of the charge, including his 
intention 
to 
engage 
in 
sexual 
contact 
with 
the 
victim.  
Hendricks fails to establish any deficiency in his plea 
colloquy.12 
B.  The record shows Hendricks knew the nature of the charge. 
¶28 We further hold Hendricks failed to sufficiently 
allege he did not know or understand information that should 
have been provided at the plea hearing.  We already rejected his 
claim that he should have been given the legal definition of 
sexual contact.  We also reject his contention he did not 
understand the meaning of this term because the record belies 
Hendricks' claim. 
¶29 The entire record is fair game in assessing whether 
Hendricks understood the circuit court's repeated questions as 
to whether he committed the crime of child enticement.  See 
Bollig, 232 Wis. 2d 561, ¶53.  The record before us is 
substantial and to some extent unusual because we not only have 
                                                 
12 Hendricks turns to party-to-a-crime cases to support his 
position.  Because Hendricks was not charged as party to a 
crime, we decline to analyze the unique nature of plea 
colloquies involving party-to-a-crime charges. 
No. 2015AP2429-CR 
 
23 
 
the plea colloquy to consider, we also have Hendricks' own 
testimony from his pre-sentence plea withdrawal hearing.  At 
that hearing, Hendricks admitted to knowing the charges to which 
he pled because he was present at a revocation hearing where the 
charges were read; he admitted his attorney went over the 
elements of the charge; and he admitted that he saw and read the 
original complaint.  The original complaint, as material, 
states: 
 The defendant "did have sexual contact" with the 
victim, who "had not attained the age of 16 years." 
 "The victim has known the defendant for a long 
period of time and thinks of him as an uncle." 
 "The defendant walked with the victim to . . . the 
victim's grandmother's house.  The defendant learned 
that his girlfriend, the victim's aunt, was coming 
to the location so he suggested that he wanted to 
leave the area and that the victim should go with 
him.  The victim went with the defendant to Pulaski 
Park." 
 "Once they were in the park, the victim was seated 
on the top of a picnic table and the defendant sat 
on the seat portion of the table.  The defendant 
positioned himself between the victim's legs." 
 "[T]he defendant started to touch her legs.  The 
victim told him to stop.  The defendant picked up 
the victim's legs and held them until they were 
level with his shoulders.  The defendant then stated 
to the victim, 'Can I kiss there?'  The victim 
understood this to mean her vagina because that is 
where he seemed to be looking when he said this.  
The defendant stated, 'Please, I haven't had it in a 
while.'" 
 "The defendant continued to rub the victim's legs 
and tried to touch her vagina over her shorts.  The 
No. 2015AP2429-CR 
 
24 
 
victim pushed her knees together to stop the 
defendant and told the defendant, 'No.'" 
 "The victim pushed the defendant's hand away from 
her vagina and repeatedly told [him] to stop.  The 
defendant then reached around the victim and grabbed 
her buttock over her clothing." 
 "The defendant then kissed the victim's upper arms 
and chest area." 
 "The defendant rubbed and squeezed the victim's 
breasts over her clothing and kept saying, 'Please, 
please, please,' into her ear.  The defendant placed 
his hand inside the victim's shirt and moved his 
hand onto her breast but was not able to fully grab 
her breast before she pushed his hand away.  The 
defendant then attempted to unhook her bra and 
expose her breasts." 
¶30 Also, Hendricks was present when the victim testified 
at the preliminary hearing, and he conceded the victim's 
testimony 
accurately 
recounted 
his 
actions. 
 
The 
victim 
testified that Hendricks placed his hands on her inner thighs, 
her chest and her buttocks while begging her to "please" let him 
have sexual intercourse with her because he had not "had it in a 
while."  This case goes beyond showing Hendricks acted to entice 
the child victim to a secluded place with the intent to have 
sexual contact.  Hendricks' claim that he did not understand the 
nature of the charge is belied by the record before us.  Even 
Hendricks' lawyer at the pre-sentence plea withdrawal hearing 
admitted the circuit court conducted a "great colloquy."  
Hendricks failed to show any Bangert violation, as the record 
conclusively establishes Hendricks' graphic understanding of the 
nature of the crime to which he pled guilty. 
C.  State's request to modify Bangert 
No. 2015AP2429-CR 
 
25 
 
¶31 The State requests this court modify Bangert to 
conform Wisconsin plea practice to what the United States 
Supreme Court held is constitutionally-mandated.  Specifically, 
the second Bangert method requires the circuit court to first 
ask defense counsel if he explained the nature of the charge to 
the defendant and then request counsel to "summarize the extent 
of the explanation, including a reiteration of the elements, at 
the plea hearing."  131 Wis. 2d at 268.  In asking us to 
eliminate the latter requirement, the State cites Bradshaw v. 
Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175 (2005), which held a plea colloquy 
sufficient where competent defense counsel simply assures the 
circuit court "the defendant has been properly informed of the 
nature and elements of the charge to which he is pleading 
guilty."  Id. at 183.  In other words, defense counsel would not 
need to "summarize the extent of the explanation" or reiterate 
the elements on the record, as Bangert requires.  It would be 
enough for defense counsel to simply advise the circuit court 
that counsel had the requisite conversation with the defendant. 
¶32 We reject the State's request to change Bangert.  
Bangert set forth three reasonable methods of satisfying Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08's statutory requirement ensuring a pleading 
defendant understands the nature of the charge, which includes 
an awareness of the elements of the crime.  Each of the three 
methods adequately protects the rights of a defendant who elects 
to plead guilty or no contest.  Scaling back Bangert's second 
method in favor of a general assurance from defense counsel 
would inevitably lead to motions where defendants claim the 
No. 2015AP2429-CR 
 
26 
 
conversation with defense counsel never occurred.  Bangert's 
current method puts the conversation between defense counsel and 
the defendant on the record contemporaneously with taking the 
plea.  Bangert's methods have worked well for over 30 years and 
we are not convinced a modification of Bangert is necessary or 
prudent.  In addition, the State forfeited the right to request 
a change to Bangert by failing to raise this issue in a cross-
petition for review or in its response to Hendricks' petition 
for review.  See State v. Smith, 2016 WI 23, ¶41, 367 
Wis. 2d 483, 878 N.W.2d 135. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶33 We hold sexual contact is not an element of the crime 
of child enticement.  Rather, the six enumerated prohibited 
intents are modes of commission.  At least one mode of 
commission must be referenced during a plea colloquy, but the 
terms comprising each mode need not be specifically defined.  
This is because the crime of child enticement does not require 
proof of the actual, physical action contemplated by the mode of 
commission, only that the defendant acted to entice a child 
while intending to do one of the prohibited acts.  The act of 
enticement is the crime, not the underlying intended sexual or 
other misconduct.  Hendricks failed to establish any deficiency 
in this plea colloquy, which comported with both Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08 and Bangert.  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08(1) requires a 
court, prior to accepting a plea, to "determine that the plea is 
made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the 
charge."  The record establishes Hendricks fully understood he 
No. 2015AP2429-CR 
 
27 
 
enticed the child victim to a secluded place with the intent of 
having sexual contact.  His claimed incomprehension contradicts 
the record.  Finally, we reject the State's invitation to alter 
Bangert's required procedures.  The Bangert framework is 
designed to ensure a defendant understands the nature of a 
charge in order to protect a defendant's rights when entering a 
plea.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals decision 
upholding the circuit court's order denying Hendricks' motion 
for plea withdrawal. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2015AP2429-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶34 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
majority's conclusion in the instant case that a circuit court 
need not verify that a defendant understands the specific mode 
of commission of the crime to which he is pleading guilty 
creates serious due process concerns.   
¶35 As Hendricks aptly queried in his brief:  "How can a 
defendant knowingly and intelligently plead guilty to causing a 
child to go into a secluded place with intent to do 'X' if he 
need not understand what 'X' is?"1  How indeed? 
¶36 The majority fails to articulate a satisfactory answer 
to this question.  Instead, the majority looks to the law 
governing jury unanimity.  It holds that the modes of commission 
within the child enticement statute are not elements as to which 
a defendant is entitled to jury unanimity and concludes that as 
a consequence, the circuit court was not required to verify that 
Hendricks understood what constituted "sexual contact" under the 
law before accepting his guilty plea. 
¶37 I conclude that it is inconsistent with due process 
for a circuit court to accept a defendant's guilty plea to a 
charge that requires proof of an intended underlying act without 
verifying that the defendant understands what the underlying 
intended act is.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
¶38 I begin by setting forth two settled legal principles 
that guide my analysis in the instant case.  
                                                 
1 Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 
17. 
No.  2015AP2429-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶39 First, proof of an intended underlying act is an 
element2 of some crimes, even though there may be several 
alternative qualifying acts.  The individual jurors need not 
agree as to which particular intended underlying act was proven, 
so long as they agree that at least one qualifying intended 
underlying act was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.3   
¶40 For example, in order to convict a defendant of child 
enticement, the jury must unanimously agree that the defendant 
caused a child to go to a secluded place with intent to commit 
at least one of six statutorily listed acts.  If an individual 
juror does not believe that the State proved intent to commit 
any of the six qualifying acts, the defendant cannot be 
convicted.  However, if the individual jurors agree that the 
State proved intent to commit at least one of the six qualifying 
acts, the defendant can be convicted even though the jurors 
disagree about which particular intended underlying act was 
proved.  See State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, ¶¶13-25, 236 
                                                 
2 In State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 
(1986), and other cases, the court sometimes uses the undefined 
phrase "essential element." 
3 See, e.g., State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, ¶25, 236 
Wis. 2d 721, 613 N.W.2d 833 (defendant not entitled to jury 
unanimity at trial as to the underlying mode of committing child 
enticement); 
State 
v. 
Hammer 
216 
Wis. 2d 214, 
220, 
576 
N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1997) (defendant not entitled to jury 
unanimity as to intended underlying felony in a burglary charge 
because burglary——entering a building with intent to commit a 
felony——is a single offense with multiple modes of commission 
based upon the intended underlying felony). 
No.  2015AP2429-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
Wis. 2d 721, 613 N.W.2d 833; see also State v. Hammer, 216 
Wis. 2d 214, 218-22, 576 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1997).   
¶41 Second, Wis. Stat. § 971.08 and State v. Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), address the plea colloquy.  
The statute requires a circuit court to "[a]ddress the defendant 
personally and determine that the plea is made voluntarily with 
understanding of the nature of the charge" before accepting the 
defendant's guilty plea.  Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a).  As 
interpreted by Bangert, § 971.08 makes it "mandatory upon the 
trial judge to determine a defendant's understanding of the 
nature of the charge . . . ."  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 267. 
¶42 The Bangert court declared that the circuit court must 
(1) either inform the defendant of the nature of the charge or 
ascertain that the defendant "possesses accurate information 
about the nature of the charge[,]" and then (2) "ascertain the 
defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge . . . ."  
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 267.  "Nature of the charge" is not 
defined 
in 
the 
statute, 
but 
Bangert 
stated 
that 
"[a]n 
understanding of the nature of the charge must include an 
awareness of the essential elements of the crime."  Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 267.  Compliance with Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) helps 
ensure that a defendant's plea is knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary and satisfies due process.  State v. Brown, 2006 WI 
100, ¶23, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906; State v. Finley, 2015 
WI App 79, ¶17, 365 Wis. 2d 275, 872 N.W.2d 344. 
¶43 Thus, in order to accept a guilty plea, the circuit 
court must verify that the defendant is aware of the elements of 
No.  2015AP2429-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
the crime.  With regard to crimes with alternative modes of 
commission, the defendant is advised at the plea hearing of the 
mode of commission to which he is pleading guilty even though, 
if the defendant does not plead guilty and the case goes to 
trial, a jury need not be unanimous on the mode of commission in 
order to return a guilty verdict. 
II 
¶44 The 
majority 
opinion 
is 
flawed. 
 
The 
majority 
essentially adopts the reasoning of the court of appeals 
decision in State v. Steele, 2001 WI App 34, 241 Wis. 2d 269, 
625 N.W.2d 595.  Majority op., ¶25-26.  In Steele, the court of 
appeals relied on jury unanimity law in determining the elements 
of burglary in order to decide whether the circuit court 
properly discharged its obligations under Wis. Stat. § 971.08 
and Bangert.  The court of appeals held in Steele that because 
the particular underlying felony to which the defendant pleaded 
was not an element that required jury unanimity, the circuit 
court did not err in failing to specify the particular 
underlying felony during the plea colloquy.  Steele, 241 
Wis. 2d 269, ¶¶7-10. 
¶45 The majority adopts the reasoning enunciated in 
Steele, although the court of appeals has raised doubts about 
the validity of its own Steele decision and has suggested that 
this court should overturn Steele.  I agree with the court of 
appeals that Steele is not good law and should be overturned.  
The court of appeals challenged the reasoning in Steele for 
improperly relying on jury unanimity law for purposes of 
No.  2015AP2429-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
evaluating the adequacy of a plea colloquy.  State v. Hendricks, 
No. 2015AP2429-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶28-30 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Dec. 15, 2016).  
¶46 Nevertheless, the majority adopts the reasoning of 
Steele, as follows: 
We hold sexual contact is not an element of the crime 
of child enticement.  Rather, the six enumerated 
prohibited intents are modes of commission.  At least 
one mode of commission must be referenced during a 
plea colloquy, but the terms comprising each mode need 
not be specifically defined.  This is because the 
crime of child enticement does not require proof of 
the actual, physical action contemplated by the mode 
of commission, only that the defendant acted to entice 
a child while intending to do one of the prohibited 
acts.  The act of enticement is the crime, not the 
underlying intended sexual or other misconduct. 
Majority op., ¶33 (emphasis in majority).4 
¶47 The general rule derived from the majority opinion is 
that a circuit court is not required to verify in the plea 
colloquy that a defendant understands the meaning of any 
particular qualifying intended underlying acts of the charged 
                                                 
4 The majority borrows language directly from the court's 
decision in Derango.  Derango, 236 Wis. 2d 721, ¶17 ("The act of 
enticement is the crime, not the underlying intended sexual or 
other misconduct.").  I conclude this statement in Derango needs 
clarification. 
The crime of child enticement is actually a combination of 
enticing a child and having the intent to commit statutorily 
proscribed conduct.  Causing a child to go into a secluded place 
without the requisite intent is not a violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.07.  A defendant must cause a child to go into a secluded 
place with intent to commit statutorily proscribed conduct in 
order to be convicted of child enticement.  Wis. Stat. § 948.07.  
Thus, the act of enticement with the necessary intent is the 
crime. 
No.  2015AP2429-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
crime because no one particular qualifying intended underlying 
act constitutes an element of the crime charged. 
¶48 The majority's conclusion has at least two significant 
flaws.  First, the majority's conclusion leads to an irrational 
result.  Suppose, for example, that child enticement had only 
one mode of commission——namely, a person is guilty of child 
enticement if he or she causes a child to enter a secluded place 
with intent to have sexual contact.  According to the majority, 
the circuit court would be required to verify the defendant's 
understanding of child enticement and sexual contact.  However, 
once five additional alternative modes of commission are 
introduced into the statute, according to the majority, the 
circuit court is no longer required to verify that Hendricks 
understands any of the possible modes of commission because he 
is not entitled to jury unanimity as to any particular mode of 
commission of the crime.  What is the logic in this reasoning? 
¶49 Second, the majority's conclusion fails to explain 
adequately how a defendant can knowingly and intelligently plead 
guilty to a charge that requires proof of intent to do "X" if 
the defendant does not understand what "X" is. 
¶50 Of course, the "X" in the instant case happens to be 
"sexual contact," a term with which adults are generally 
familiar 
even 
though 
the 
term 
has 
a 
distinct 
statutory 
definition.  See Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5).  I posit that the due 
process problem left unaddressed by the majority is more obvious 
if the reader replaces "sexual contact" with a term with which 
the reader is unfamiliar.   
No.  2015AP2429-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶51 Suppose that there was a seventh mode of committing 
child enticement:  causing a child to go into a secluded place 
with the intent to convert the child to Bokononism.  Unless the 
defendant happens to be a reader of Vonnegut, he or she is not 
likely to know what Bokononism is.5  Can a defendant really be 
said to knowingly and intelligently plead guilty to causing a 
child to go into a secluded place with intent to convert the 
child to Bokononism if he or she does not know what Bokononism 
is?  The majority apparently sees no problem with the circuit 
court's accepting a guilty plea from a defendant under these 
circumstances.  I do.  My hypothesizing an entirely unfamiliar 
mode of committing an offense highlights the absurdity of the 
majority's reasoning. 
III 
¶52 Unlike the majority, I conclude that in order to 
satisfy due process, a circuit court may not accept a guilty 
plea from a defendant charged with a crime that requires proof 
of an intended underlying act unless the court verifies that the 
defendant understands what the intended underlying act is. 
¶53 The circuit court need not explain every mode of 
commission of the crime before accepting a defendant's guilty 
                                                 
5 Bokononism is an artificial religion practiced by the 
inhabitants of the fictional Caribbean island of San Lorenzo in 
Kurt Vonnegut's novel Cat's Cradle. 
No.  2015AP2429-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
plea.6  Rather, the circuit court is required to verify the 
defendant's understanding of the mode(s) of commission to which 
the defendant is pleading guilty and for which an adequate 
factual basis exists.  Such a rule is workable in practice and 
ensures that a defendant's plea is knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary and therefore in compliance with the requirements of 
due 
process. 
 
Brown, 
293 
Wis. 2d 594, 
¶23; 
Finley, 
365 
Wis. 2d 275, ¶17. 
IV 
¶54 In addition to holding that Hendricks failed to 
establish any deficiency in his plea colloquy, the majority also 
concludes that Hendricks is not entitled to a hearing because 
"the 
record 
conclusively 
establishes 
Hendricks' 
graphic 
understanding" of the meaning of sexual contact.  Majority op., 
¶30.  Essentially, the majority reasons that Hendricks is not 
entitled to a hearing to determine if he understood the meaning 
of "sexual contact" because it is obvious that he understood the 
                                                 
6 An argument could be made that the circuit court actually 
does need to verify that the defendant understands every 
possible mode of commission.  After all, were the defendant to 
stand trial, the State could convict him by convincing the jury 
that the defendant intended at least one of the six statutorily 
proscribed acts, and the jury need not agree which one of those 
intended underlying acts was proved.  Thus, the argument goes, 
the 
defendant 
should 
understand 
all 
qualifying 
intended 
underlying acts that could be relied upon by individual jurors 
to return a guilty verdict. 
While this approach might prove workable with regard to a 
plea of guilty to child enticement, which has six possible modes 
of commission, it will be unworkable with regard to a plea of 
guilty to burglary, which has many more modes of commission. 
No.  2015AP2429-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
meaning of "sexual contact."  Such reasoning is incompatible 
with due process.   
¶55 In 
Bangert, 
the 
court 
established 
that 
when 
a 
defendant shows "a prima facie violation of Section 971.08(1)(a) 
or other mandatory duties, and alleges that he in fact did not 
know or understand the information which should have been 
provided at the plea hearing, the burden will then shift to the 
state to show by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant's plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 
entered, despite the inadequacy of the record at the time of the 
plea's acceptance."  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274.  Subsequent 
cases 
have 
made 
clear 
that 
if 
the 
defendant's 
motion 
"establishes a prima facie violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08 or 
other court-mandated duties and makes the requisite allegations, 
the 
court 
must 
hold 
a 
postconviction 
evidentiary 
hearing . . . ."  Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶40 (emphasis added).   
¶56  In 
State 
v. 
Hampton, 
2004 
WI 
107, 
¶72, 
274 
Wis. 2d 379, 683 N.W.2d 14, the court explained the defendant's 
right to an evidentiary hearing when the circuit court errs at 
the plea hearing and the defendant alleges that he or she did 
not understand the information that should have been provided: 
The State has offered several arguments as to why the 
defendant in fact understood that the court was not 
bound by the plea agreement.  This case, however, is 
not really about Corey Hampton's understanding at the 
time of his plea.  It is about the circumstances under 
which a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing when the court errs at a plea hearing.  We 
hold that Hampton is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing on his motion.  At the hearing the State will 
have the opportunity to prove that Hampton was aware 
No.  2015AP2429-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
in fact that the court was not bound by the terms of 
the plea agreement. 
Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶72. 
¶57 The court reiterated this point in State v. Howell, 
2007 WI 75, ¶70, 301 Wis. 2d 350, 734 N.W.2d 48: 
In a Bangert motion, a circuit court and a reviewing 
court examine only whether "a defendant is entitled to 
an evidentiary hearing when the court errs at a plea 
hearing."  The State cannot circumvent a defendant's 
right to an evidentiary hearing under Bangert by 
arguing that based on the record as a whole the 
defendant, 
despite 
the 
defective 
plea 
colloquy, 
entered a constitutionally sound plea. 
Howell, 301 Wis. 2d 350, ¶70 (footnote omitted).7 
 
¶58 Are Brown, Howell, and Hampton now overruled?  The 
majority flatly refuses to follow these cases.  How are the 
bench and bar to reconcile Brown, Howell, and Hampton with ¶¶28-
30 of the majority opinion? 
¶59 The 
majority's 
reasoning 
that 
Hendricks 
is 
not 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he 
understood the meaning of "sexual contact" because it is obvious 
that he understood the meaning of "sexual contact" makes a 
mockery of these prior cases and due process.  The majority's 
                                                 
7 The Howell court has characterized the requirements of a 
Bangert motion as "relatively relaxed," explaining that the 
court "require[s] less from the allegations in a Bangert motion 
because the circuit court bears the responsibility of preventing 
failures in the plea colloquy."  State v. Howell, 2007 WI 75, 
¶28, 301 Wis. 2d 350, 734 N.W.2d 48. 
For this court's review of a defendant's motion to withdraw 
a guilty plea after sentencing, see State v. Reyes Fuerte, 2017 
WI 104, 378 Wis. 2d 504, 904 N.W.2d 773; State v. Negrete, 2012 
WI 92, ¶¶16, 17, 19, 343 Wis. 2d 1, 819 N.W.2d 749. 
No.  2015AP2429-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
reasoning is akin to "[d]ispensing with confrontation because 
testimony is obviously reliable" or "dispensing with jury trial 
because 
a 
defendant 
is 
obviously 
guilty." 
 
Crawford 
v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004). 
V 
¶60 A major failing of the majority's reasoning and 
conclusion is that the majority rests on jury unanimity cases 
that are not applicable in the context of determining the 
adequacy of a plea colloquy.8  Relying on jury unanimity law for 
guidance in the instant case results in the absurd proposition 
that a defendant can knowingly and intelligently plead guilty to 
a crime that involves an intended underlying act without knowing 
the meaning of the intended underlying act.  
¶61 The 
majority's 
ruling 
is 
inconsistent 
with 
due 
process.  I would hold that in order to satisfy due process, a 
circuit court may not accept a guilty plea from a defendant 
charged with a crime that requires proof of an intended 
underlying act unless the circuit court verifies that the 
defendant understands the intended underlying act.  The circuit 
court must verify that the defendant understands the specific 
mode(s) of commission of the crime to which he or she is 
pleading guilty. 
                                                 
8 Indeed, the court of appeals has correctly challenged the 
reasoning in its earlier Steele decision for improperly relying 
on jury unanimity law for purposes of evaluating the adequacy of 
a plea colloquy.  State v. Hendricks, No. 2015AP2429-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶¶28-30 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2016).   
No.  2015AP2429-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
¶62 Accordingly, I would overrule State v. Steele, 2001 WI 
App 34, 241 Wis. 2d 269, 625 N.W.2d 595, as the court of appeals 
suggests, State v. Hendricks, No. 2015AP2429-CR, unpublished 
slip op., ¶¶28-30 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2016), and remand the 
instant case to the circuit court with instructions to hold an 
evidentiary hearing at which the State bears the burden of 
proving that Hendricks' plea was knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary despite the deficiency in the plea colloquy. 
¶63 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
¶64 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissenting opinion. 
 
No.  2015AP2429-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1