Case Title: The People v. Albeiro Valencia

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2010-06-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 99  
The People &c.,
            Appellant,
        v.
Albeiro Valencia,
            Respondent.
            
Judith R. Sternberg, for appellant.
Marianne Karas, for respondent.
New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
et al., amici curiae.
MEMORANDUM:
The order of the Appellate Division, insofar as
appealed from, should be affirmed.  There is insufficient
evidence to support a conviction for depraved indifference
assault.  The trial evidence established only that defendant was
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No. 99
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extremely intoxicated and did not establish that he acted with
the culpable mental state of depraved indifference. 
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People v Albeiro Valencia
No. 99
GRAFFEO, J. (concurring):
Defendant's blood alcohol level was about three times
the legal limit when he drove at night in the wrong direction on
a Long Island parkway at a high rate of speed.  He continued on
this course despite attempts by oncoming drivers to warn him of
the danger he was creating.  After approximately four miles,
defendant crashed head-on into another vehicle and then careened
into another car.  Defendant's response after being informed that
he had injured other people was:  "I don't know and I don't
care." 
 
Defendant was indicted for, among other offenses,
vehicular assault in the second degree for causing serious
physical injury to another person while driving in an intoxicated
condition (Penal Law § 120.03 [1]), assault in the second degree
for causing serious physical injury with his automobile (Penal
Law § 120.05 [4]), and assault in the first degree -- the top
count -- for causing serious physical injury while recklessly
creating a grave risk of death under circumstances evincing a
depraved indifference to human life (Penal Law § 120.10 [3]). 
The trial court determined that the People failed to prove that
defendant acted with depraved indifference at the time of the
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collision because he was so drunk that he was "oblivious" to the
danger he created.  The court did, however, find defendant guilty
of first-degree, depraved indifference assault on the theory that
he created a grave risk of harm by becoming extremely inebriated
knowing that he would eventually drive himself home from his
friend's house.  
The Appellate Division reversed the first-degree
assault conviction, concluding that defendant's state of mind
before he drove home was too remote in time from the car crash. 
The reversal of that conviction reduced defendant's culpability
from a class B felony to the class D felony of second-degree
assault and a five-year determinate prison sentence. 
We are now affirming the reduction to assault in the
second degree, but on narrower grounds, with which I concur,
because of the lack of evidence to support all the elements of
depraved indifference assault.  But this leaves an open issue: 
does the voluntary consumption of alcohol to the point of extreme
inebriation preclude the formation of a depravedly indifferent
state of mind? 
 
For many years, the phrase "[u]nder circumstances
evincing a depraved indifference to human life" had consistently
been interpreted to refer to objective circumstances, not a state
of mind (see e.g. People v Register, 60 NY2d 270 [1983]; People v
Sanchez, 98 NY2d 373 [2002]).  As a result, it was recognized
that the intoxication defense (see Penal Law § 15.25) did not
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apply to the depraved indifference element (see People v
Register, 60 NY2d at 279).
In a series of cases that culminated with People v
Feingold (7 NY3d 288 [2006]), this Court declared that depraved
indifference is a state of mind.  In holding that depraved
indifference is a mens rea component, this state of mind element
was described in Feingold as "best understood as an utter
disregard for the value of human life -- a willingness to act not
because one intends harm, but because one simply doesn't care
whether grievous harm results or not" (7 NY3d at 296 [internal
quotation marks omitted]).  Depraved indifference "is embodied in
conduct that is 'so wanton, so deficient in a moral sense of
concern, so devoid of regard of the life or lives of others, and
so blameworthy' as to render the actor as culpable as one whose
conscious objective" is to cause a particular result (People v
Suarez, 6 NY3d 202, 214 [2005]).  In Feingold, this Court did not
depart from every aspect of our prior jurisprudence on this
subject.  Indeed, we have re-emphasized that there are certain
"[q]uintessential examples" of depraved indifference, including -
- of particular relevance is the act of "driving an automobile
along a crowded sidewalk at high speed" (People v Suarez, 6 NY3d
at 214; see also People v Gonzalez, 1 NY3d 464, 467 [2004]).
Certainly, the Penal Law recognizes that intoxication
may be used "by the defendant whenever it is relevant to negative
an element of the crime charged" (Penal Law § 15.25).  But it is
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also well settled that voluntary intoxication does not excuse a
reckless state of mind (see Penal Law § 15.05 [3]).  This is
because "recklessness itself -- defined as conscious disregard of
a substantial risk -- encompasses the risks created by [a]
defendant's conduct in getting drunk" (People v Register, 60 NY2d
at 280, overruled on other grounds People v Feingold, 7 NY3d 288
[2006]).  The same may be true for the "extreme recklessness . .
. that is needed to establish depraved indifference" (People v
Baker, 14 NY3d 266, 273 [2010]) since it makes little sense to
allow intoxication to be asserted as a defense to depravedly
indifferent conduct that is the direct result of severe
inebriation:  "there is no social or penological purpose to be
served by a rule that permits one who voluntarily drinks to be
exonerated from failing to foresee the results of his conduct if
he is successful at getting drunk" (People v Register, 60 NY2d at
280-281 overruled on other grounds People v Feingold, 7 NY3d 288
[2006]).   
When the accident happened in this case -- in November
2005 -- the People's charging options were more limited than they
are today.  At that time, the Penal Law contained fewer assault
and homicide offenses that applied to drunk drivers, such as
vehicular assault in the second degree.  In 2006, the Legislature
added a new subdivision to first-degree vehicular assault (Penal
Law § 120.04) by elevating second-degree vehicular assault (Penal
Law § 120.03), a class E felony punishable by a maximum
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No. 99
* Like vehicular assault in the first degree, aggravated
vehicular assault presumably could have been available in this
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indeterminate sentence of 1a to 4 years in prison, to a class D
felony punishable by a prison term of up to 2a to 7 years when a
person causes serious physical injury to another individual while
operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol level of .18% or more
(see L 2006, ch 732, § 21; Penal Law § 120.04 [1]).  Had this law
been in existence a year earlier, defendant may have been charged
with this offense.
After enactment of the 2006 legislation, and apparently
as a result of our revision of depraved indifference
jurisprudence, it became more difficult to prove depraved
indifference in vehicular crimes where assault in the first
degree or murder in the second degree was charged -- a drunk
driver accused of acting with depraved indifference to human life
could "[p]erversely" try "to defend such a charge by using a
claim of extreme intoxication" (L 2007, ch 345, Bill Jacket at
16) to negate the requisite state of mind requirement. 
Consequently, in 2007, the Legislature created the new
crime of aggravated vehicular assault (see L 2007, ch 345).  That
crime is similar to vehicular assault in the first degree except
that it requires the People to prove that the defendant drove
recklessly (see Penal Law § 120.04-a).  Aggravated vehicular
assault is a class C felony punishable by an indeterminate prison
term of up to 5 to 15 years.*  In addition, another provision 
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No. 99
case if it had been added to the Penal Law before this crime
occurred.
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was added to article 125 of the Penal Law enacting the offense of
aggravated vehicular homicide, a class B violent felony
punishable by a maximum determinate sentence of 25 years'
imprisonment.  The stated purpose of this 2007 legislative
package was to "repair th[e] apparent anomaly" (L 2007, ch 345,
Bill Jacket at 16) caused by Feingold in cases where an
inebriated driver who maimed or killed another person could rely
on his intoxication to mitigate criminal responsibility.
 Yet there remains disagreement between courts as to
whether the transformation of depraved indifference into a
subjective state of mind precludes intoxication as a defense to
that mens rea (compare People v Wimes, 49 AD3d 1286 [4th Dept],
lv denied 11 NY3d 743 [2008]; People v Coon, 34 AD3d 869 [3d Dept
2006]) with People v Wells, 53 AD3d 181 [1st Dept], lv denied 11
NY3d 858 [2008]).  I therefore write separately to point out that
the Legislature, which is entrusted with determining social
policy and degrees of culpability, should resolve this perplexing
question of whether intoxication, to whatever extent, functions
as a defense to depraved indifference crimes.
There are a variety of options if the Legislature
chooses to act.  For example, Penal Law § 15.05 could be amended
to add depraved indifference as a culpable mental state
(consistent with Feingold) and specify, as it does with the mens
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rea of recklessness, that voluntary intoxication cannot be used
to undermine a depravedly indifferent state of mind.  The
Legislature could also elect to include specific provisions in
the first-degree assault and second-degree murder statutes to
cover severely intoxicated drivers.  This would differ from the
existing aggravated vehicular assault and homicide statutes
because they do not require the People to establish both
excessive inebriation and serious injury or death to more than
one person (see Penal Law §§ 120.04-a, 125.14).  Or, if the
Legislature sees fit, it could declare that intoxication is a
defense to the depraved indifference mens rea component with
respect to all crimes or just vehicular crimes.  Although the
courts have and will continue to rule on the applicability of the
intoxication defense in particular cases, the Legislature is more
suitably charged with determining the level of crime, the
appropriate statutory defenses and the extent of punishment to
attribute to the various crimes related to the operation of motor
vehicles.   
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People v Albeiro Valencia
No. 99 
JONES, J. (concurring):
While I agree with the result in the majority's
memorandum, I write separately to express my position on the
necessity of a temporal connection between mens rea and actus
reus in the context of depraved indifference offenses.
Sometime after drinking at the house of a friend in
Nassau County, defendant, with a blood alcohol level over .21,
got into his car and drove onto the Wantagh State Parkway in the
direction of oncoming traffic at a speed of 60 miles per hour.  A
few minutes later, defendant collided with two vehicles, injuring
the drivers, one severely.  Various witnesses observed that
defendant appeared not to know that he was about to crash and
never attempted to avoid the accident.  When told about the
accident, defendant stated that he "didn’t know" what had
happened and "didn’t care."  He was unable to tell the police at
the scene if there was a passenger in his car and he kept falling
asleep when the police tried to question him.
Defendant was charged with numerous offenses, including
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No. 99
1 Under Penal Law § 120.10 (3), "[a] person is guilty of
assault in the first degree when . . . [u]nder circumstances
evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another
person, and thereby causes serious physical injury to another
person."
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assault in the first degree (depraved indifference assault).1  At
defendant's non-jury trial, the People presented two theories in
support of the first-degree assault charge, either of which, they
argued, was sufficient to sustain a conviction.  First, they
argued that the nature of defendant’s behavior behind the wheel
established proof beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) he was aware
of what he was doing while he was driving, and (2) he, with
depraved indifference to human life, continued his course of
conduct.  The trial court, as the trier of fact, rejected this
theory, finding that defendant was so intoxicated at the time of
the accident that he was oblivious to his circumstances.  Thus,
according to the court, defendant lacked the mens rea of depraved
indifference at the time of the collision.  
The People’s second theory was that defendant, prior to
his state of oblivion, consciously drank himself "into a state of
gross impairment."  In particular, they argued that his conscious
choice to drink, get drunk, and then drive reflected a complete
indifference to the foreseeable circumstances he might face while
driving drunk.  In other words, it was the People's contention
that defendant's conduct, prior to getting into his car,
established his guilt of the crime, including the applicable mens
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rea.
The defense countered that all of the evidence,
including the prosecution expert’s testimony that extreme
intoxication could cause micro-blackouts, showed that defendant
was unaware of the danger he was creating and that if he did not
know that he was driving in the wrong direction, he was not
guilty of depraved conduct.  Further, the defense argued that at
the time of the collision, defendant did not have the requisite
depraved state of mind to be guilty of first-degree assault.
The trial court agreed with the People, holding that a
conviction for assault in the first degree could be based on
defendant's excessive drinking to a state of oblivion, knowing
that shortly thereafter he would be driving himself home on
heavily trafficked roads, "was evidence of depraved indifference
to human life."  In so holding, the court found that "liability
for depraved conduct can be predicated on the facts of this case
even though defendant was not aware or appreciative of the
dangers of his conduct at the time of the collision or moments
before."
In addition to assault in the first degree, Supreme
Court convicted defendant of assault in the second degree,
vehicular assault in the second degree, assault in the third
degree, operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol
(two counts), reckless driving, and other violations of the
Vehicle and Traffic Law.  The Appellate Division modified Supreme
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2 Actus reus is defined as "[t]he wrongful deed that
comprises the physical components of a crime and that generally
must be coupled with mens rea to establish criminal liability"
(Black's Law Dictionary 39 [8th ed 2004]).
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Court's judgment by vacating the conviction of assault in the
first degree.  Relying on People v Feingold (7 NY3d 288 [2006]),
the court held the evidence was legally insufficient to establish
that defendant acted with the culpable mental state of depraved
indifference to human life at the time he collided with the two
vehicles.  The court found unpersuasive the People's contention
that the mens rea component of depraved indifference assault may
be satisfied by considering the defendant’s state of mind at a
point much earlier in time to the accident, when he drank
excessively, knowing he was going to drive himself home.  The
People appeal by permission of the Appellate Division.
With respect to crimes requiring mental culpability and
an act or omission, 
"it is a basic premise of Anglo-American
criminal law that the physical conduct and
the state of mind must concur.  Although it
is sometimes assumed that there cannot be
such concurrence unless the mental and
physical aspects exist at precisely the same
moment of time, the better view is that there
is concurrence when the defendant's mental
state actuates the physical conduct" 
(LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 6.3 [a]), at 451 [2d ed]
[footnotes omitted]).2  
Based on the foregoing, the mens rea component of
depraved indifference assault may not be satisfied by considering
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the defendant's state of mind at a point much earlier in time
than the accident, in this instance when he was drinking at his
friend's house.  As such, it cannot be argued that defendant's
mental state at the time he was drinking actuated his physical
conduct.  Stated differently, in this case, there is no
concurrence of mens rea and actus reus.  In conclusion,
defendant's state of mind when he consumed the alcohol was too
temporally remote from the act of driving to support a conviction
of assault in the first degree.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order, insofar as appealed from, affirmed, in a memorandum. 
Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith,
Pigott and Jones concur, Judges Graffeo and Jones in separate
concurring opinions.
Decided June 17, 2010