Case Title: Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Post

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-10-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
ARKANSAS STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION v. Charles
K. POST, Shelby Jean Post, and First
Financial Savings and Loan

96-1403                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered October 30, 1997


1.   Trial -- civil cases -- order of trial governed by statute.--
     The order of trial in civil cases is clearly prescribed by
     Ark. Code Ann.  16-64-110 (1987); subsection (3)(A) of that
     statute provides that the party on whom rests the burden of
     proof in the whole action must first produce his evidence.

2.   Eminent domain -- proceeding concerning -- landowners must
     present proof first. -- In an eminent-domain proceeding, the
     "whole action" is devoted to allowing proof that the
     landowners have not been adequately compensated for the
     taking; the law clearly provides that they are to present
     their proof first; it is proper for the defendant landowner
     "to open and close" such a case because he has the burden of
     proof on the issue of his entitlement to damages.

3.   Trial -- appellees should have been required to present
     evidence first -- trial court's failure to follow procedure
     erroneous. -- The trial court should have required appellees
     to present their evidence first because the burden of proof in
     the whole action rested on them; where the trial court
     identified no "special reasons" that warranted a departure
     from the order prescribed by  16-64-110(3), the trial court's
     failure to follow the procedure outlined in this provision was
     erroneous.

4.   Trial -- prejudicial error found. -- Although the trial court
     correctly instructed the jury that the appellees had the
     burden of proof with respect to the adequacy of the $1,600
     deposit, the unexpected decision to rearrange the order of
     proof unfairly hindered appellant Commission's ability to
     present its case; the Commission was put at an unfair
     disadvantage when it was made to proceed in the posture of a
     plaintiff and present what was in essence a rebuttal case at
     the beginning of trial; the Commission could not have
     anticipated this unorthodox procedure; the eleventh-hour
     surprise encountered by the Commission was not harmless.

5.   Eminent domain -- partial-taking case -- inadmissible evidence
     -- trial court erred by admitting evidence. -- Evidence is
     inadmissible in partial-taking cases when it pertains to the
     temporary conditions of the property during the course of
     construction; such evidence does not assist the jury in
     determining "just compensation" in a partial-taking case
     because it is irrelevant to (1) the value of the part taken;
     (2) the value of the part taken plus the damages to the
     remainder; or (3) the before- and after-value rule; temporary
     conditions prevailing on the land during the course of a
     construction project simply have no bearing on the worth of
     the land prior to the taking or what its worth will be after
     the project is completed; in a partial-taking case, evidence
     of temporary conditions caused by ongoing construction is
     irrelevant, as well as potentially misleading and prejudicial,
     and should not be admitted; here the trial court erred by
     admitting the photograph of the piles of dirt and dead trees
     that resulted from the ongoing construction work.

6.   Eminent domain -- testimony had no remedial effect --
     admission of photograph not harmless error. -- Where the
     witness's testimony, rather than suggesting the piles would be
     cleared after the project was complete, tended to suggest that
     the entire property, for an unspecified amount of time, would
     eventually be covered with dead trees, it in no way clarified
     to the jury that the conditions depicted in the photograph
     were merely temporary; the error in admitting the photograph
     was not harmless.


7.   Eminent domain -- expert witness -- must have reasonable basis
     for opinion. -- Although an expert's opinion is admissible
     even if the expert fails on direct examination to explain the
     basis for his conclusions, the testimony must be stricken if
     the Commission demonstrates on cross-examination that the
     landowners' expert witness had no reasonable basis for his
     opinions.

8.   Eminent domain -- expert's opinion speculative -- trial court
     erred in refusing to strike after-value testimony. -- The
     trial court erred in refusing to strike an expert witness's
     after-value testimony where his opinion that the value of
     appellee's home would decrease in direct proportion to the
     decrease in distance between the home and the right-of-way was
     speculative and lacked a sound and reasonable basis; his
     approach had no specific name and was not rooted in the three
     approaches to valuation previously recognized in eminent-
     domain cases; he was unable to point to any market data to
     corroborate his view that the value of a home decreases in
     direct proportion to the decrease in distance between the home
     and the right-of-way; the testimony concerning the property's
     after value lacked a sound and reasonable basis; because the
     public cannot be compelled to pay prices based upon
     speculation, the case was reversed and remanded.


     Appeal from Union Circuit Court; David F. Guthrie, Judge;
reversed and remanded.
     Robert L. Wilson, Chief Counsel, Barbara A. Griffin and
Lawrence W. Jackson, Staff Attorneys, for appellant.
     Ronald L. Griggs, for appellee.

     David Newbern, Justice.
     This is an eminent domain case.  For the purpose of widening
a highway, the Arkansas State Highway Commission ("the Commission")
condemned .14 acres of frontage which was part of a tract owned by
the appellees Charles and Shelby Post.  The Posts reside on the
remaining portion of the tract consisting of some 4.2 acres. 
Appellee First Financial Savings and Loan holds a mortgage on the
Posts' property.  Along with its condemnation complaint, the
Commission deposited $1,600 into the court registry as "just
compensation."  The Posts contended that the deposited amount was
inadequate, and a jury trial was held to determine proper
compensation.  The Commission's liability for the taking was not
contested.  A judgment was entered upon a jury verdict awarding the
Posts $7,000, and the Commission appealed.  The Arkansas Court of
Appeals affirmed by an opinion not designated for publication. 
Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Post, No. CA95-906 (Nov. 6, 1996). 
We review the decision of the Trial Court as if it had come to this
Court in the first instance.  See Allen v. State, 326 Ark. 541,
542, 932 S.W.2d 764, 765 (1996).  We granted review and now reverse
and remand on three of the four points raised by the Commission. 
     We hold that the Trial Court erred by (1) requiring the party
who did not have the burden of proof, i.e., the Commission, to
present its case first; (2) allowing the Posts to introduce a
photograph of the temporary conditions on their property caused by
ongoing construction; and (3) refusing to strike the speculative
testimony of Peter Emig, the Posts' expert witness, regarding the
property's after-taking value.  As a new trial is in order, we need
not consider the Commission's fourth argument that the damages
verdict was excessive.

                       1.  Order of proof 
     Over the Commission's objection, the Trial Court ruled that
the Commission would present its case before the Posts presented
their case.  Ms. Griffin, counsel for the Commission, was not
permitted to make an objection on the record until after she had
concluded the Commission's case.  She asserted that the Posts had
the burden to prove that the $1,600 deposit was inadequate and that
they therefore should have proceeded first.  Ms. Griffin argued
that the Commission had been prejudiced by "having to go forward
first and having the burden of proof placed on us."  She maintained
that the Commission had prepared its case on the assumption that
its presentation of evidence would follow the Posts' and that its
witnesses had expected to be in the position of rebutting the
testimony given by the Posts' witnesses.  Mr. Griggs, counsel for
the Posts, responded that the Commission had the burden of proving
the value of the Posts' property and that the Commission had not
been prejudiced by the Trial Court's ruling.
     The Trial Court stated that its ruling caused only "minimal
prejudice" to the Commission and that the Commission would have the
opportunity to present rebuttal evidence after the Posts completed
their case.  The Trial Court referred to Ark. Code Ann.  27-67-316
(Repl. 1994), which provides that eminent domain actions should
proceed "as in other civil cases," and observed that, in the
pleadings, the Commission was listed as the plaintiff and the Posts
as the defendants.  The Trial Court agreed with the Commission that
the Posts would have the burden of proving their entitlement to the
damages claimed and said that it would make that clear in a jury
instruction.  The Trial Court later instructed the jury that "the
burden of proof is on the landowner to prove his claim for just
compensation due him by a preponderance of the evidence."  
     The order of trial in civil cases is clearly prescribed by
Ark. Code Ann.  16-64-110 (1987).  Subsection (3)(A) of that
statute provides, "The party on whom rests the burden of proof in
the whole action must first produce his evidence."  In an eminent
domain proceeding such as this one, the "whole action" is devoted
to allowing proof that the landowners have not been adequately
compensated for the taking.  The law clearly provides that they are
to present their proof first.
     In Springfield and Memphis Railway v. Rhea, 44 Ark. 258
(1884), we held that it was proper for the defendant landowner "to
open and close" the case because he had the burden of proof on the
issue of his entitlement to damages.  Id. at 260.  That case was
followed by the Court of Appeals in Property Owners Improvement
Dist. 247 v. Williford, 40 Ark. App. 172, 843 S.W.2d 862 (1992), in
which it was held that the landowner had the right to "open and
close" in the presentation of evidence and argument to the jury.
     In the case at bar, the Trial Court should have required the
Posts to present their evidence first because "the burden of proof
in the whole action" rested on them.   16-64-110(3)(A).  The Trial
Court identified no "special reasons," and we can think of none,
that warranted a departure from the order prescribed by  16-64-
110(3).  Thus, we must conclude the Trial Court's failure to follow
the procedure outlined in this provision was erroneous.
     The error was prejudicial.  Although the Trial Court correctly
instructed the jury that the Posts had the burden of proof with
respect to the adequacy of the $1,600 deposit, the unexpected
decision to rearrange the order of proof unfairly hindered the
Commission's ability to present its case.  Having relied on the
procedures long established by statute and case law, the Commission
reasonably expected that the Posts would present their case first,
and it tailored its own case to be in the form of a rebuttal.  The
Commission was put at an unfair disadvantage when it was made to
proceed in the posture of a plaintiff and present what was in
essence a rebuttal case at the beginning of trial.  The Commission
could not have anticipated this unorthodox procedure, and we cannot
say that the eleventh-hour surprise encountered by the Commission
was harmless.

                   2.  Construction photograph
     During the Posts' case-in-chief, the Posts' expert witness,
Peter Emig, testified that the value of the Posts' land prior to
the taking was $73,000 and that the value after the taking was
$55,000.  The Posts moved to introduce into evidence the appraisal
report that Mr. Emig had produced and referred to during his
testimony.  The appraisal report included several photographs of
the Posts' home and surrounding land.
     One of the photographs included in the appraisal report was
taken from the right-of-way in front of the Posts' home.  The
highway, located to the east of the home and right-of-way, appears
on the far right side of the photograph.  The driveway leading from
the highway to the Posts' home is in the foreground, toward the
bottom of the photograph.  The middle portion of the photograph
depicts three trees standing in the Posts' front yard.  In the
background, toward the top of the photograph, is the right-of-way
to the north of the home.  That portion of the photograph depicts
piles of dirt and dead trees that appeared to have been cut in the
course of construction work.
     The Commission objected to the introduction of the photograph
and suggested that the photograph was prejudicial because it might
lead the jury to believe that the dead trees would remain on the
land after completion of the construction project and affect the
value of the property.  The Posts responded that the photograph
would not prejudice the Commission and that it simply revealed the
part of the land that was being "taken."  The Trial Court ruled
that the photograph could be admitted because it depicted "the land
at the time of the taking" and because it showed part of the basis
for Mr. Emig's opinion and was an "accurate reflection of the
property at the time he based his opinion on it."  The Trial Court
acknowledged that the photograph "obviously shows construction,"
but it stated it could not "see how that's going to be
prejudicial."
     Mr. Griggs questioned Mr. Emig about the photograph as
follows:

     Q.   Okay.  Now, turn to the third page and it shows a
          photograph and I believe the caption is "Current
          construction of the right-of-way as seen from the
          right-of-way in front of the home," is that
          correct?
     A.   That is correct.
     Q.   Now, that is not the right-of-way as it will exist after
          the taking, is it?  It's not gonna look like that after
          the taking, is it?
     A.   The front of the property, once the trees are removed,
          will look like the area in the background.
     Q.   Okay.  And so those are trees that will be removed from
          the taking?
     A.   My understanding is those are the trees.
     The Trial Court erred by admitting the photograph of the piles
of dirt and dead trees that had resulted from the ongoing
construction work.  Evidence is inadmissible in partial-taking
cases when it pertains to the temporary conditions of the property
during the course of construction.  Such evidence does not assist
the jury in determining "just compensation" in a partial-taking
case because it is irrelevant to "(1) the value of the part taken;
(2) the value of the part taken plus the damages to the remainder;
[or] (3) the before- and after-value rule."  Arkansas State Hwy.
Comm'n v. Frisby, 329 Ark. 506, 508, ___ S.W.2d ___ (1997), quoting
Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Barker, 326 Ark. 403, 405, 931 S.W.2d 138, 140 (1996).  Temporary conditions prevailing on the land
during the course of a construction project simply have no bearing
on the worth of the land prior to the taking or what its worth will
be after the project is completed.  Thus, in a partial-taking case,
evidence of temporary conditions caused by ongoing construction is
irrelevant, as well as potentially misleading and prejudicial, and
should not be admitted.  Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. Ptak, 236
Ark. 105,