Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V WAYNE L YOUNG

Citation: 

Docket Number: 124811

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MARCH 29, 2005 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 124811 
WAYNE L. YOUNG, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
CORRIGAN, J.   
In People v McCoy, 392 Mich 231; 220 NW2d 456 (1974), 
this Court invented a new rule regarding cautionary 
instructions on accomplice testimony. 
That rule provided 
that the trial court’s failure to give a cautionary 
instruction upon a defense request requires reversal of a 
conviction. Moreover, reversal may be required even in the 
absence of a defense request if the issue of guilt is 
“closely drawn.” 
We reject the McCoy rule because it has 
no basis in Michigan law. 
Indeed, it contravenes long­
standing authorities according discretion to trial courts 
 
 
 
in deciding whether to provide a cautionary instruction on 
accomplice 
testimony. 
Moreover, 
the 
McCoy 
rule 
is 
inconsistent with MCL 768.29, which provides that the 
failure to instruct on a point of law is not a ground for 
setting aside a verdict unless the instruction is requested 
by the accused, and MCR 2.516(C), which states that a party 
may assign as error the failure to give an instruction only 
if the party objects on the record before the jury retires 
to consider the verdict. 
We further clarify that an unpreserved claim of 
failure to give a cautionary accomplice instruction may be 
reviewed only in the same manner as other unpreserved 
arguments on appeal. That is, appellate review is confined 
to the plain-error test set forth in People v Grant, 445 
Mich 535; 520 NW2d 123 (1994), and People v Carines, 460 
Mich 750; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). 
We therefore affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals, because it reached the 
correct result in affirming defendant’s convictions and 
sentences. 
I. UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Defendant shot and killed two people in an execution­
style slaying while robbing a drug house in Detroit. Among 
other 
evidence 
of 
guilt, 
the 
prosecution 
presented 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
testimony from two witnesses whom defendant now claims were 
his accomplices, Michael Martin and Eugene Lawrence. 
Martin testified that defendant came to his house and 
asked him for a gun to rob someone. 
Martin had no gun. 
Defendant then spoke on the telephone to Martin=s brother­
in-law, Lawrence. 
Martin did not hear their conversation. 
Martin then drove defendant to Lawrence=s house. After they 
arrived, defendant and Lawrence spoke in a back room away 
from Martin, who again could not hear their conversation. 
Lawrence testified that during this conversation, 
defendant asked him for a gun because some men had 
threatened him. 
Defendant did not mention to Lawrence any 
plan to rob a drug house. 
Lawrence did furnish a gun to 
defendant. 
Martin and defendant then drove back to 
Martin’s home. Martin went inside his home while defendant 
walked off in the direction of a nearby drug house. 
Defendant later telephoned Martin, stating that he was 
planning to rob a drug house. Martin hung up. Later that 
day, defendant visited Martin’s home and admitted that he 
had shot the two victims in the head. 
After defendant 
left, Martin contacted Lawrence. 
Martin and Lawrence then 
went to defendant=s home. 
Defendant told them that he was 
angry because he had killed the victims for only six rocks 
of crack cocaine. 
Defendant called an unknown person and 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
directed him to tell Martin where to find the gun. 
Defendant eventually directed Martin and Lawrence to a 
field near Martin’s home where Martin found the gun. 
The police questioned Martin twice. During the second 
interview, he disclosed what had happened. The police then 
retrieved the murder weapon. 
Martin and Lawrence were 
never charged with a crime in connection with the murders. 
In addition to the testimony of Martin and Lawrence, 
the prosecution presented other evidence of defendant’s 
guilt. One witness testified that defendant had also asked 
him for a gun. 
Another witness, Ronald Mathis, had seen 
defendant in the drug house just before the murders 
occurred. At that time, defendant offered to sell Mathis a 
gun. 
Mathis then left the premises. 
Upon his return 
approximately fifteen minutes later, Mathis discovered the 
victims’ 
bodies 
and 
noted 
that 
defendant 
was 
gone. 
Finally, a cigarette butt recovered at the murder scene 
contained deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) material that matched 
defendant=s DNA. 
Defendant was charged with several offenses, including 
first-degree murder, MCL 750.316. 
The jury convicted 
defendant of two counts of second-degree murder, MCL 
750.317; one count of assault with intent to commit armed 
robbery, MCL 750.89; one count of possession of a firearm 
4  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; and one 
count of possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a 
felony, 
MCL 
750.224f. 
Defendant 
was 
sentenced 
to 
concurrent 
terms 
of 
forty-five 
to 
seventy 
years’ 
imprisonment for the second-degree murder convictions, 
forty 
to 
sixty 
years’ 
imprisonment 
for 
the 
assault 
conviction, and two to five years’ imprisonment for the 
felon in possession of a firearm conviction. 
Those 
sentences are to be served consecutively to the two-year 
term of imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s convictions.1 
It rejected defendant=s contention that the trial court had 
erred under McCoy in failing to sua sponte provide a 
cautionary instruction on accomplice testimony, concluding 
that: (1) this case did not present a closely drawn 
credibility contest, and (2) it was not clear that Martin 
and Lawrence were accomplices. 
We granted defendant’s application for leave to 
appeal. 470 Mich 869 (2004), mod 471 Mich 862 (2004). 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the McCoy rule has a basis in Michigan law and 
whether it is consistent with MCL 768.29 and MCR 2.516(C) 
1 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued September 25,
2003 (Docket No. 240832). 
5  
 
 
 
are questions of law that we review de novo.  Jenkins v 
Patel, 471 Mich 158, 162; 684 NW2d 346 (2004). 
Moreover, 
as discussed later in this opinion, the decision whether to 
give a cautionary accomplice instruction falls within the 
trial court’s sound discretion. 
MCL 768.29; People v 
Dumas, 161 Mich 45, 48-49; 125 NW 766 (1910); People v 
Wallin, 55 Mich 497, 505; 22 NW 15 (1885). 
We therefore 
review that decision for an abuse of discretion. 
Finally, 
where, as here, the defendant failed to preserve his claim, 
our review is confined to the plain-error framework set 
forth in Grant and Carines. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Legal Background 
In McCoy, this Court discussed dangers that inhere in 
accomplice testimony, including “'the effect of fear, 
threats, hostility, motives, or hope of leniency.'” McCoy, 
supra at 236, quoting 30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence, § 1148, p 
323. 
The McCoy Court stated that in People v Jenness, 5 
Mich 305, 330 (1858), this Court referred to a judge’s duty 
to comment, where warranted, on the nature of accomplice 
testimony. 
The McCoy Court acknowledged, however, that 
subsequent case law reflected that the trial court had 
discretion in deciding whether to provide a cautionary 
accomplice instruction. See Dumas, supra. 
6  
 
 
 
The McCoy Court also acknowledged that federal courts 
have not articulated a definitive rule regarding cautionary 
instructions on accomplice testimony. 
Indeed, the United 
States Supreme Court refused to reverse a conviction on the 
basis of a failure to give such an instruction in Caminetti 
v United States, 242 US 470, 495; 37 S Ct 192; 61 L Ed 442 
(1917). 
The Caminetti Court stated that “there is no 
absolute 
rule 
of 
law 
preventing 
convictions 
on 
the 
testimony of accomplices if juries believe them.” Id. 
Despite these authorities, the McCoy Court invented a 
novel rule: “For cases tried after the publication of this 
opinion, it will be deemed reversible error . . . to fail 
upon request to give a cautionary instruction concerning 
accomplice testimony and, if the issue is closely drawn, it 
may be reversible error to fail to give such a cautionary 
instruction even in the absence of a request to charge.” 
McCoy, supra at 240. 
Justice Coleman dissented in McCoy. 
She cited MCL 
768.29, which provides: “The failure of the court to 
instruct on any point of law shall not be ground for 
setting 
aside 
the 
verdict 
of 
the 
jury 
unless 
such 
instruction is requested by the accused.” 
She also quoted 
the predecessor to MCR 2.516(C), GCR 1963, 516.2: “No party 
may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury 
retires to consider the verdict, stating specifically the 
matter to which he objects and the grounds of his 
objection.” 
Justice Coleman noted that the 
articulation in 
Jenness of a duty to comment on accomplice testimony 
predated both the statute and the court rule. 
Moreover, 
Jenness “was not a rigorously applied precedent.” 
McCoy, 
supra at 248. For example, in Dumas, this Court stated: 
It is the long settled rule in this State
that the credibility of an accomplice, like that
of any other witness, is a question exclusively
for the jury. 
And while there have been 
intimations, rather than rulings, to the effect
that it is proper, or is not improper, especially
in cases where an accomplice is the sole witness
upon a material point, for the trial court to
direct 
the 
attention 
of 
the 
jury 
to 
the 
circumstance and invite the exercise of caution 
upon the part of the jury, we know of no decision
of this court in which it is held or intimated 
that the failure of the court to indulge in
voluntary comment is ground for reversal. [Dumas, 
supra at 48.] 
The Dumas Court had also quoted from Wallin, supra, 
where the trial court had refused a defense request to 
instruct the jury regarding circumstances that tended to 
discredit a witness. 
Chief Justice Cooley, writing for a 
unanimous Court in Wallin, rejected the defense argument: 
"We repeat that instructions respecting the
credibility 
of 
witnesses, 
which 
involve 
no 
question of law, are not matter of right. 
The 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
judge is under no obligation to comment upon the
facts; he may, if he chooses, confine himself
strictly to laying down such rules of law as must
guide the action of the jury, and leave the facts
to them without a word of comment. In many cases
this is no doubt the desirable course. And it is 
always within the discretion of the judge to
adopt it." [Id. at 48-49, quoting Wallin, supra
at 505.] 
Justice Coleman’s dissenting opinion in McCoy also 
noted that the Court of Appeals had rejected an argument 
for a cautionary accomplice instruction in People 
Sawicki, 4 Mich App 467; 145 NW2d 236 (1966), in part 
because defense counsel on cross-examination had fully 
explored the circumstances of the accomplice=s testimony: 
In a criminal case it is not only proper but
it is the duty of counsel for defendant to place
before the jury all circumstances surrounding the
people=s witness upon the stand, as well as any
fact which would have any reasonable tendency to
affect their credibility. 
It is the function of 
the jury to decide first if the witness is 
interested, and second if the witness’ interest has
affected the credibility of his testimony. 
The 
trial judge is not required to comment in his
instruction concerning a witness’ interest since it
bears upon the question of credibility which is
reserved to the jury. [Id. at 475 (citations
omitted).] 
In 
light 
of 
these 
authorities, 
Justice 
Coleman 
concluded in McCoy that neither statute nor case law 
required 
the 
court 
to 
give 
a 
cautionary 
accomplice 
instruction in the absence of a request. 
Moreover, the 
failure to so instruct did not deny the defendant in McCoy 
9  
v 
 
 
 
 
 
a fair trial, because “the accomplice was thoroughly cross­
examined and the jury fully aware of all facets of his 
involvement. 
The judge correctly instructed that the 
testimony of all witnesses should be considered as to 
motive, prejudice, bias or interest in the outcome.” 
McCoy, supra at 250. 
This Court discussed the holding in McCoy in People v 
Reed, 453 Mich 685; 556 NW2d 858 (1996). 
In Reed, a 
codefendant testified in a joint trial, and the defendant 
argued on appeal that a cautionary accomplice instruction 
should have been given sua sponte. 
This Court rejected 
that argument because such an instruction would have 
prejudiced the codefendant. 
The Court in Reed also explained that McCoy does not 
require automatic reversal for failure to instruct sua 
sponte in a closely drawn case. 
Rather, McCoy says only 
that such a failure to instruct may require reversal. 
Before Reed, this Court had not established standards for 
determining when the failure to instruct sua sponte 
requires reversal. 
The Reed Court concluded that reversal 
was 
not 
required 
where 
the 
accomplice=s 
potential 
credibility problems have been plainly presented to the 
jury by other means, such as through defense counsel’s 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cross-examination of the alleged accomplice. 
Reed, supra 
at 693. 
The Reed Court did not require reversal because the 
codefendant/accomplice=s credibility problems were plainly 
apparent to the jury. 
Defense counsel and the prosecutor 
had explored credibility problems during cross-examination. 
Moreover, the accomplice was not a prosecution witness, but 
was a codefendant, and thus was not the beneficiary of any 
favorable bargains from the prosecution. 
In People v Gonzalez, 468 Mich 636; 664 NW2d 159 
(2003), this Court questioned McCoy. We quoted MCL 768.29, 
which provides that “[t]he failure of the court to instruct 
on any point of law shall not be ground for setting aside 
the verdict of the jury unless such instruction is 
requested by the accused,” and MCR 2.516(C), which states 
that “[a] party may assign as error the . . . failure to 
give an instruction only if the party objects on the record 
. . . .” We then stated: 
In this case, defendant neither requested a
cautionary accomplice instruction nor objected to
the court=s failure to give one. 
Therefore,
defendant is precluded from arguing that the 
omitted instruction was error. 
MCR 2.516(C).
Furthermore, because he failed to request the
omitted instruction, defendant is not entitled to
have 
the 
verdict 
set 
aside. 
MCL 
768.29. 
Consequently, defendant=s only remaining avenue
for relief is for review under People v Grant,
445 Mich 535; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Because defendant failed to object to the
omitted instruction, defendant=s claim of error 
was forfeited. 
A forfeited, nonconstitutional
error may not be considered by an appellate court
unless the error was plain and it affected 
defendant=s substantial rights. 
Grant, supra at 
552-553. [Gonzalez, supra at 642-643.] 
We then concluded that no error occurred because there 
was no evidence that the alleged accomplice was involved in 
the 
crime, 
and 
because 
the 
cautionary 
accomplice 
instruction would have been inconsistent with the defense 
theory 
at 
trial. 
Because 
the 
defendant 
could 
not 
demonstrate an error, he could not establish a plain error 
that affected his substantial rights, and thus he was not 
entitled to relief for the forfeited claim under Grant. 
B. Analysis 
The rule created in McCoy has no basis in Michigan 
law. 
The McCoy rule mandates reversal of convictions for 
failing to give a cautionary accomplice instruction upon 
request, and allows reversal for failing to give such an 
instruction sua sponte where the issue of guilt is “closely 
drawn.” 
But as Justice Coleman’s dissent in McCoy 
demonstrates, this Court’s decisions have historically 
accorded discretion to trial courts in deciding whether to 
provide a cautionary accomplice instruction. The mandatory 
rule invented in McCoy subverts this historical discretion. 
12  
 
 
 
Moreover, the discretion that this Court had, before 
McCoy, accorded to trial courts in this area is consistent 
with our statutory law. 
MCL 768.29 states: “The court 
shall instruct the jury as to the law applicable to the 
case and in his charge make such comment on the evidence, 
the testimony and character of any witnesses, as in his 
opinion the interest of justice may require.” 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
The phrase “as in his opinion the interest of 
justice may require” vests discretion in the trial court to 
decide to what extent it is appropriate to comment on 
matters such as the credibility of witnesses. 
The McCoy 
Court failed to consider this provision of MCL 768.29. 
Despite these authorities, the McCoy Court chose to 
invent an unfounded rule. 
Indeed, in People v Atkins, 397 
Mich 163, 171; 243 NW2d 292 (1976), this Court acknowledged 
the lack of a historical basis for the McCoy rule: “[T]he 
McCoy 
rule 
under 
discussion 
was 
given 
prospective 
application for the reason that it went beyond long­
established Michigan precedent to the effect that special 
instructions regarding credibility was [sic] a matter 
within the sound discretion of the trial court.” 
Further, the first portion of the McCoy rule, i.e., 
that reversal is automatically required when the court 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
fails to give an instruction upon request, conflicts with 
MCL 769.26. That provision states: 
No judgment or verdict shall be set aside or
reversed or a new trial be granted by any court
of this state in any criminal case, on the ground
of misdirection of the jury, or the improper
admission or rejection of evidence, or for error
as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless
in the opinion of the court, after an examination
of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively
appear that the error complained of has resulted
in a miscarriage of justice. 
As we explained in People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484; 596 
NW2d 607 (1999), in light of MCL 769.26, a defendant on 
appeal must demonstrate that a preserved nonconstitutional 
error was not harmless by persuading the reviewing court 
that it is more probable than not that the error affected 
the outcome of the proceedings. 
“An error is deemed to 
have been ‘outcome determinative’ if it undermined the 
reliability of the verdict.” 
People v Elston, 462 Mich 
751, 766; 614 NW2d 595 (2000). 
See also People v 
Rodriguez, 463 Mich 466, 474; 620 NW2d 13 (2000). 
The 
McCoy mandate of automatic reversal for failing to give a 
cautionary accomplice instruction upon request plainly 
contradicts MCL 769.26. 
Accordingly, we reject the 
automatic-reversal portion of the rule. 
Next, the portion of the McCoy rule permitting 
reversal in the absence of a defense request if the issue 
14  
 
 
 
 
of guilt is “closely drawn” contradicts MCL 768.29, which 
states that “[t]he failure of the court to instruct on any 
point of law shall not be ground for setting aside the 
verdict of the jury unless such instruction is requested by 
the accused,” and MCR 2.516(C), which says that "[a] party 
may assign as error the . . . failure to give an 
instruction only if the party objects on the record 
. . . ."  As we explained in Gonzalez, an appellate court’s 
review of unpreserved claims is governed by MCL 768.29 and 
MCR 2.516(C). 
This Court in Reed correctly observed that McCoy does 
not by its own terms require automatic reversal for failure 
to instruct sua sponte where the issue of credibility is 
closely drawn. 
The McCoy Court said that reversal may be 
required in the absence of a request, not that reversal is 
automatic. 
The central flaw in this aspect of the McCoy 
rule, however, is that it authorizes reversal without 
regard to the plain-error analysis required by Grant and 
Carines, by focusing solely on whether the issue of guilt 
is closely drawn. 
As this Court explained in Reed, 
potential credibility problems in a closely drawn case may 
become plainly apparent to a jury in the absence of a 
cautionary instruction. 
15  
 
 
 
 
Fundamentally, it is the province of the jury to 
assess the credibility of witnesses. 
In making that 
assessment, the jury should decide whether witnesses harbor 
any bias or prejudice. 
Dumas, supra; Wallin, supra; 
Sawicki, supra. 
And it is the role of defense counsel, 
through cross-examination of prosecution witnesses and 
closing argument, to expose potential credibility problems 
for the jury to consider. 
Id. 
The McCoy “closely drawn” 
rule fails adequately to take account of these central 
components of our system of trial by jury. 
For 
these 
reasons, 
we 
hold 
that, 
as 
with 
all 
unpreserved claims of error, an unpreserved claim that the 
court failed to give a cautionary accomplice instruction 
may 
be 
reviewed 
only 
for 
plain 
error 
that 
affects 
substantial rights. 
An appellate court must follow the 
Grant/Carines plain-error analysis, and only when the 
defendant satisfies that test is reversal ever appropriate. 
We discern no basis for treating this one category of 
unpreserved claim any differently from other categories of 
alleged error that a defendant has failed to preserve. 
Moreover, in considering whether a plain error exists, 
a reviewing court should be mindful of the discretion 
historically accorded to trial courts in deciding whether 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
to give a cautionary accomplice instruction. Dumas, supra; 
Wallin, supra. 
Finally, applying the plain-error test to this case, 
we conclude that defendant has not met his appellate 
burden. 
A cautionary accomplice instruction was not 
clearly or obviously required in this case. 
As the Court 
of Appeals noted, it is not clear that Martin and Lawrence 
were accomplices in any event. 
Moreover, the prosecution 
presented evidence of guilt beyond the testimony of the 
alleged 
accomplices, 
including 
testimony 
from 
other 
witnesses and physical evidence that defendant was at the 
murder scene. 
Further, defense counsel thoroughly cross­
examined Martin and Lawrence and challenged their testimony 
during closing argument, thereby exposing their potential 
credibility 
problems 
to 
the 
jury. 
The 
court 
also 
instructed the jury to consider any bias, prejudice, or 
personal interest that a witness might have. 
For these 
reasons, defendant has not demonstrated a plain error that 
affected his substantial rights. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We conclude that the McCoy rule has no basis in 
Michigan law and is inconsistent with MCL 769.26, MCL 
768.29, and MCR 2.516(C). 
A trial court has discretion in 
deciding 
whether 
to 
give 
a 
cautionary 
accomplice 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
instruction. 
Also, an unpreserved claim that the court 
failed to give a cautionary accomplice instruction may be 
reviewed only for plain error, under the framework set 
forth in Grant and Carines. Accordingly, we overrule McCoy 
and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Maura D. Corrigan
Clifford W. Taylor
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 124811 
WAYNE L. YOUNG, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
KELLY, J. (concurring). 
I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision, but I 
strongly disagree with the majority’s reasoning. 
The 
decision in People v McCoy1 should not be applied to this 
case. 
It represents a valid rule of law that we should 
retain, and the majority should not use this case as a 
vehicle to abandon it. 
MCCOY IS INAPPOSITE 
In McCoy, we stated: 
[I]t will be deemed reversible error . . .
to fail upon request to give a cautionary
instruction concerning accomplice testimony and,
if the issue is closely drawn, it may be 
reversible 
error 
to 
fail 
to 
give 
such 
a 
cautionary instruction even in the absence of a
request to charge. [McCoy, supra at 240.] 
1 392 Mich 231; 220 NW2d 456 (1974). 
1  
 
 
 
 
Defendant did not request a cautionary instruction in 
this case. 
To warrant giving the instruction, as McCoy 
tells us, the issue must be “closely drawn.” Id. An issue 
is said to be closely drawn if a credibility contest 
between the defendant and an alleged accomplice must be 
resolved in order to rule on it. 
People v Gonzalez, 468 
Mich 636, 643 n 5; 664 NW2d 159 (2003); McCoy, supra at 
238-239. 
This case does not involve a closely drawn issue. 
It 
is not one in which contrary versions of the facts were 
offered, leaving the jury to choose between them. Instead, 
the defense proceeded under the theory that the prosecution 
would be unable to prove every element of the charged 
offenses. 
In argument before the jury, defense counsel attacked 
the story offered by the prosecution. 
He tried to show 
that the prosecution failed to meet the requirements for 
conviction. In some cases, to create a credibility contest 
between 
a 
defendant 
and 
an 
alleged 
accomplice, 
the 
defendant 
would 
have 
to 
take 
the 
stand. 
Other 
circumstances could arise as well that would create a 
credibility contest. 
However, because defendant in this 
case did not take the stand and his credibility was not 
2  
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
   
otherwise put at issue, he was not entitled to the 
cautionary instruction permitted by McCoy.2 
Id. at 240. 
I also agree with the Court of Appeals that there was 
insufficient evidence to conclude that Michael Martin and 
Eugene Lawrence were defendant’s accomplices. 
Whereas 
Martin accompanied defendant on some of his travels on the 
day of the murders, he never agreed to participate in the 
crime. In fact, he refused to participate. Martin may not 
have done enough to stop defendant, but his failure does 
not make him defendant’s accomplice legally. 
Lawrence provided defendant with a gun. 
But the 
evidence suggests that Lawrence was unaware that defendant 
planned to use it to commit a felony. 
Defendant asked 
Lawrence for the gun to protect himself from a person who 
had threatened him. 
Although insufficient evidence exists 
that Lawrence was defendant’s accomplice, defense counsel 
implied during closing argument that Lawrence and Martin 
were defendant’s accomplices. 
The facts of the McCoy case were entirely different. 
There, the police arrested an individual whom they believed 
had been an accomplice in a robbery. 
The accomplice 
admitted that he and McCoy had committed the crime. Id. at 
2 At oral argument in this case, defense counsel
admitted that McCoy was a “narrow case” and did not fit the 
facts of this case. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
                                                 
 
 
   
 
241 (Coleman, J., dissenting.). 
Here, there was no such 
admission. 
All the evidence suggested that Martin and 
Lawrence were not involved in the crime. Because they were 
not accomplices, the trial court did not err in failing to 
give the special instruction on accomplice testimony. 
Id. 
at 238-240. 
Hence, the McCoy decision has no application to this 
case, and the majority offers no justification for reaching 
and overruling it here. 
It is as inappropriate to address 
McCoy in this case as it was in People v Gonzalez, supra, 
in which Justice Young wrote: 
[W]e conclude that there was no evidence of
an accomplice in this case, and, therefore, 
McCoy's "closely drawn" rule is not implicated.
For that reason, we do not reach the question
whether 
McCoy 
conflicts 
with 
MCL 
768.29. 
[Gonzalez, supra at 643 n 6.] 
We should not do here what we chose not to do in Gonzalez. 
MCCOY REPRESENTS A VALID RULE OF LAW3 
3 Given that McCoy is inapposite, there is no need to
apply it to the facts of this case. 
However, because the
majority has decided to overturn McCoy, I provide a full
discussion of the rules of law laid out in that case. 
Therefore, I will discuss both the requested cautionary
instructions and sua sponte instructions. I feel that both 
were wisely recognized in McCoy and that both fit well 
within the established framework of appellate review in
this state. 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
  
The majority accuses the McCoy decision of lacking any 
basis in Michigan jurisprudence and of inventing a novel 
rule of law. Those claims should be examined more closely. 
This Court stated long ago: 
We think the credibility of an accomplice,
like that of any other witness, is exclusively a
question for the jury; and it is well settled
that a jury may convict on such testimony alone
without confirmation. 
There is no good sense in
always applying the same considerations in every
case to every witness who may stand in the 
relation of particeps criminis. 
We think it is 
the duty of a judge to comment upon the nature of
such testimony, as the circumstances of the case
may require; to point out the various grounds of
suspicion which may attach to it; to call their
attention to the various temptations under which
such witness may be placed, and the motives by
which 
he 
may 
be 
actuated; 
and 
any 
other 
circumstances which go to discredit or confirm
the witness, all of which must vary with the
nature and circumstances of each particular case.
[People v Jenness, 5 Mich 305, 330 (1858).] 
This was a rule of law that has been endorsed by this Court 
repeatedly over the past 134 years.4
 Obviously, because 
McCoy represents a natural growth of that history, it is 
neither novel nor lacking in legal basis. 
REQUESTED CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS AND  
ABUSE OF DISCRETION/HARMLESS ERROR REVIEW  
Not only does 
McCoy have substantial historical 
support, it fits well within Michigan’s long established 
4 See People v Schweitzer, 23 Mich 301, 305 (1871),
People v Hare, 57 Mich 505, 518; 24 NW 843 (1885), People v
Considine, 105 Mich 149, 163; 63 NW 196 (1895), and People
v Koukol, 262 Mich 529, 532-533; 247 NW 738 (1933).
5 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
  
 
framework of appellate review. 
McCoy5 holds that “it will 
be deemed reversible error . . . to fail upon request to 
give 
a 
cautionary 
instruction 
concerning 
accomplice 
testimony . . . .” 
The majority concludes that this rule contradicts the 
review established for both abuse of discretion and 
harmless error issues. 
It accuses McCoy of ignoring the 
discretion of the trial court to instruct the jury. 
The opposite is true. McCoy explicitly recognizes the 
trial 
court’s 
discretion 
and 
hews 
to 
the 
abuse 
of 
discretion standard. 
McCoy, supra at 237. 
Moreover, it 
provides guidance to when the standard is met. 
McCoy recognizes that it is an abuse of discretion for 
a trial court to refuse to instruct a jury about the 
inherent unreliability of accomplice testimony. 
Id. at 
236-237. This is consistent with MCL 768.29.6  If the trial 
5 Supra at 240. 
6 MCL 768.29 provides: 
It shall be the duty of the judge to control
all proceedings during the trial, and to limit 
the introduction of evidence and the argument of
counsel to relevant and material matters, with a
view 
to 
the 
expeditious 
and 
effective 
ascertainment of the truth regarding the matters
involved. The court shall instruct the jury as to
the law applicable to the case and in his charge
make such comment on the evidence, the testimony
and character of any witnesses, as in his opinion
the interest of justice may require. The failure
6 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
court fails to give an accomplice instruction, it fails to 
work toward “the expeditious and effective ascertainment of 
the truth regarding the matters involved.” 
MCL 768.29. 
And it fails to make the comments on the evidence, the 
testimony, and the character of witnesses that justice 
requires. 
As McCoy noted, accomplice testimony is fraught with 
dangers. 
Whether because of fear, threats, or hostility 
caused by government overreaching or the witness’s greed or 
hopes 
of 
leniency 
occasioned 
by 
government 
deals, 
accomplice 
testimony 
has 
severe 
credibility 
problems. 
Given this inherent weakness, a skeptical approach to such 
testimony “'is a mark of the fair administration of 
justice.’” 
McCoy, supra at 236, quoting 30 Am Jur 2d, 
Evidence, § 1148, p 323. 
Therefore, a court fails to meet 
the mark of fair administration of justice when it omits a 
requested accomplice instruction. 
Moreover, the omission 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
For the same reason, the McCoy rule does not violate 
the tenets of review for harmless error. 
Given the 
inherent 
unreliability 
of 
accomplice 
testimony, 
any 
conviction based on such testimony, absent a proper 
of the court to instruct on any point of law
shall not be ground for setting aside the verdict
of the jury unless such instruction is requested
by the accused. 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
instruction, will affirmatively appear to be a miscarriage 
of justice. 
The failure to give the instruction fails to 
meet the mark. 
We should avoid letting the standards of 
the Michigan criminal justice system fall below this mark. 
The inclusion of the accomplice witness instruction 
ensures the fairness of the trial. 
Its exclusion, when it 
is merited, undermines the reliability of the verdict. 
Accordingly, the error cannot be harmless. 
People v 
Krueger, 466 Mich 50, 54; 643 NW2d 223 (2002). 
SUA SPONTE INSTRUCTION AND REVIEW FOR PLAIN ERROR 
McCoy states that it may be error requiring reversal 
to fail to give the accomplice instruction if the issue is 
closely drawn, even absent a request from counsel. 
McCoy, 
supra at 240. 
The majority attacks this portion of McCoy, 
claiming that it contradicts the established review for 
plain error. 
A failure to instruct when there was no 
request is subject to review for plain error, the majority 
reasons, because the issue was neither raised nor addressed 
in the trial court. 
For there to be plain error, our Court has decided, 
there must first be an error. 
Next, the error must be 
clear and obvious. 
Finally, it must adversely affect the 
defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 
750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). 
To warrant reversal, the 
8  
 
 
 
 
error must either result in the conviction of an actually 
innocent 
defendant 
or 
it 
must 
affect 
the 
fairness, 
integrity, 
or 
public 
reputation 
of 
the 
judicial 
proceedings. 
Id. 
Again, the McCoy rule fits within the 
confines of these principles. 
The first two elements of the plain error test are 
satisfied 
if 
a 
judge 
mistakenly 
fails 
to 
give 
the 
cautionary accomplice instruction. 
The error exists, and 
it is clear and obvious. 
The next question is whether the 
error 
adversely 
affected 
the 
defendant’s 
substantial 
rights. 
To determine if an error affects substantial 
rights, the appellate court makes the same inquiry as when 
reviewing for harmless error, except that the defendant 
bears the burden of persuasion. United States v Olano, 507 
US 725, 734; 113 S Ct 1770; 123 L Ed 2d 508 (1993). 
The 
failure 
to 
give 
the 
cautionary 
accomplice 
instruction if it is appropriate undermines the reliability 
of any jury verdict. Hence, the error cannot be considered 
harmless. 
Krueger, supra at 54. 
This is especially true 
when the case boils down to a closely drawn credibility 
contest. 
Without basic protections, a criminal trial 
cannot reliably serve as a vehicle for properly determining 
guilt. 
Arizona v Fulminante, 499 US 279, 310; 111 S Ct 
1246; 113 L Ed 2d 302 (1991). 
Because this failure to 
9  
 
 
                                                 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
instruct meets the harmless error standard, it also meets 
the plain error standard. Olano, supra at 734. 
Moreover, such closely drawn cases will likely always 
meet the requirements for reversal. 
The omission of the 
instruction would mean that the trial court failed to meet 
the mark of the fair administration of justice. 
McCoy, 
supra at 236. 
This failure would raise serious questions 
regarding fairness, integrity, or the public reputation of 
the proceedings. Carines, supra at 763. 
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, McCoy does not 
contradict MCL 769.267 or MCR 2.516(C).8  MCL 769.26 and MCR 
7 MCL 769.26 provides: 
No judgment or verdict shall be set aside or
reversed or a new trial be granted by any court
of this state in any criminal case, on the ground
of misdirection of the jury, or the improper
admission or rejection of evidence, or for error
as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless
in the opinion of the court, after an examination
of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively
appear that the error complained of has resulted
in a miscarriage of justice. 
8 MCR 2.516(C) provides: 
Objections. A party may assign as error the
giving of or the failure to give an instruction
only if the party objects on the record before
the jury retires to consider the verdict (or, in
the 
case 
of 
instructions 
given 
after 
deliberations have begun, before the jury resumes
deliberations), stating specifically the matter
to which the party objects and the grounds for
the objection. Opportunity must be given to make
the objection out of the hearing of the jury. 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.516(C) merely require that a defendant preserve issues 
for review. 
Those issues not preserved are subject to 
review for plain error. 
McCoy works within the framework of plain error 
review. 
In overruling it, the majority abandons an 
important protection. 
CONCLUSION 
McCoy 
does 
not 
apply 
to 
this 
case 
because 
no 
credibility contest existed and there was insufficient 
evidence to justify characterizing Martin and Lawrence as 
accomplices. 
Therefore, 
this 
case 
provides 
an 
inappropriate vehicle for the majority to attack McCoy. 
Moreover, McCoy represents a valid rule of law that fits 
well within the established rules of appellate review. 
It 
should not be struck down. 
Marilyn Kelly
Michael F. Cavanagh 
11