Case Title: Hunt v. N.C. Dept. of Labor

Citation: 348 N.C. 192

Docket Number: 110PA97

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1998-05-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 110PA97
FILED: 8 MAY 1998
JASON LAMONT HUNT, by and through his Guardian Ad Litem,
DAVID H. HASTY
v.
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of
a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 125 N.C. App. 293,
480 S.E.2d 413 (1997), affirming a decision of the Industrial
Commission denying defendant’s motion pursuant to N.C.G.S. §
1A-1, Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) to dismiss plaintiff’s claim.  Heard
in the Supreme Court 20 November 1997.
MacRae, Perry, Pechmann, Williford & MacRae, by
James C. MacRae, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by William H.
Borden, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant-
appellant.
PARKER, Justice.
Plaintiff, by and through his guardian ad litem,
commenced this negligence action against defendant, North
Carolina Department of Labor, pursuant to the Tort Claims Act,
N.C.G.S. §§ 143-291 to -300.1 (1993) (amended 1994).  Plaintiff
sought damages for injuries resulting from an accident at an
amusement park in Cumberland County, North Carolina.  Defendant
moved, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rules 12(b)(1) and (6), to
dismiss plaintiff’s claim.  Deputy Commissioner John A. Hedrick
denied the motion.  The full Commission affirmed and adopted his
decision.
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    Nothing in the record suggests that the Industrial
1
Commission treated the motion as anything other than a motion
under Rule 12(b)(1) and (6) or that the Commission considered
depositions or other evidence in its deliberations.  Accordingly,
statements in any such materials are not properly before this
Court and cannot be considered.
The Court of Appeals affirmed.  The Court of Appeals
held that the North Carolina Administrative Code, specifically
13 NCAC 15 .0405, which describes the duties of inspectors for
the Department of Labor, imposes a duty upon defendant to inspect
amusement devices to ensure compliance with the Administrative
Code and that breach of this duty could give rise to an action
for negligence.  Hunt v. N.C. Dep’t of Labor, 125 N.C. App. 293,
297, 480 S.E.2d 413, 416 (1997).  The lower court also held that
the public duty doctrine does not apply to actions brought
against the State under the Tort Claims Act.  Id. at 296, 480
S.E.2d at 415.  On 5 June 1997 this Court granted defendant’s
petition for discretionary review.
This appeal is before us based on defendant’s motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, N.C. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1), (6);  thus, we treat plaintiff’s factual allegations
1
contained in his affidavit before the Industrial Commission as
true.  See Cage v. Colonial Bldg. Co., 337 N.C. 682, 683, 448
S.E.2d 115, 116 (1994).  On 28 July 1993 plaintiff was operating
a go-kart, owned by Ride ‘N Slide, Inc., in Fayetteville, North
Carolina, when the brakes failed, causing plaintiff to hit a
pole.  Plaintiff suffered severe injuries to his abdominal area
when his seat belt tightened.  Tony Brewer, an elevator and
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amusement ride inspector for defendant North Carolina Department
of Labor, had previously inspected and passed the go-karts when
the seat belts were not in compliance with the rules and
regulations contained in section .0400 of the North Carolina
Administrative Code.
Plaintiff contends that defendant had a duty under the
Amusement Device Safety Act, chapter 95, article 14B of the North
Carolina General Statutes, and the rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder in the Administrative Code; that defendant
breached that duty by failing to inform the amusement park’s
manager that, pursuant to rule .0429(a)(3)(B) of the
Administrative Code, shoulder straps, as well as seat belts, must
be mounted on the go-karts; that defendant’s breach caused
plaintiff’s injury; and that plaintiff’s injury entitles him to
damages in tort.
Plaintiff has thus alleged a common law negligence
action against the State under the Tort Claims Act.  The Tort
Claims Act provides, in pertinent part, that
[t]he Industrial Commission shall determine
whether or not each claim arose as a result
of negligence of any officer, employee,
involuntary servant or agent of the State
while acting within the scope of office,
employment, service, agency or authority 
under circumstances where the State of North
Carolina, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the
laws of North Carolina.
N.C.G.S. § 143-291(a).  To recover damages for common law
negligence, a plaintiff must establish (i) a legal duty, (ii) a
breach thereof, and (iii) injury proximately caused by such
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breach.  Tise v. Yates Constr. Co., Inc., 345 N.C. 456, 460, 480
S.E.2d 677, 680 (1997); see also Petty v. Cranston Print Works
Co., 243 N.C. 292, 298, 90 S.E.2d 717, 721 (1956).
Defendant contends that the public duty doctrine bars
this action against the State; that plaintiff has, therefore,
failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; and
that the claim is subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 
The public duty doctrine was adopted by this Court in Braswell v.
Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 370-71, 410 S.E.2d 897, 901-02 (1991). 
The doctrine “provides that governmental entities and their
agents owe duties only to the general public, not to individuals,
absent a ‘special relationship’ or ‘special duty’ between the
entity and the injured party.”  Stone v. N.C. Dep’t of Labor, 347
N.C. 473, 477-78, 495 S.E.2d 711, 714 (1998).  Defendant further
contends that because plaintiff has failed to state a claim, the
Industrial Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
defendant.
We recently examined the public duty doctrine and its
applicability to claims brought under the Tort Claims Act.  In
Stone we held that “the Tort Claims Act . . . incorporat[es] the
existing common law rules of negligence, including [the public
duty] doctrine.”  Id. at 479, 495 S.E.2d at 715; see also Floyd
v. N.C. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm’n, 241 N.C. 461, 464, 85
S.E.2d 703, 705 (1955), overruled in part on other grounds by
Barney v. N.C. State Highway Comm’n, 282 N.C. 278, 284-85, 192
S.E.2d 273, 277 (1972); McKinney v. Deneen, 231 N.C. 540, 542, 58
S.E.2d 107, 109 (1950).
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In Stone v. N.C. Dep’t of Labor, plaintiffs brought a
negligence claim against the Department of Labor and its
Occupational Safety and Health Division for failure to inspect
the Imperial Foods Products plant.  Stone, 347 N.C. at 477, 495
S.E.2d at 713.  A fire broke out at the plant, killing or
injuring more than one hundred employees.  Id.  Plaintiffs
brought suit under the Tort Claims Act arguing that defendants
owed each employee a duty under N.C.G.S. § 95-4  to inspect the
plant.  Id. at 483, 495 S.E.2d at 717.  In concluding that the
public duty doctrine applied to plaintiffs’ claims in Stone, we
expressly found that N.C.G.S. § 95-4 imposed a duty upon
defendants for the benefit of the general public, id., and that
“[t]he policies underlying recognition of the public duty in
Braswell support its application here,” id. at 481, 495 S.E.2d at
716.  Accordingly, defendants did not owe a duty to each
individual complainant in Stone; and, since the exceptions to the
doctrine did not apply, defendants’ motion to dismiss was
improperly denied.
This Court having determined in Stone that the public
duty doctrine can apply to actions against state agencies brought
under the Tort Claims Act, we must determine applicability of the
public duty doctrine to this case.
The general rule is that a governmental entity acts for
the benefit of the general public, not for a specific individual,
and, thus, cannot be held liable for a failure to carry out its
duties to an individual.  Braswell, 330 N.C. at 370, 410 S.E.2d
at 901.  Without any distinct duty to any specific individual,
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the entity cannot be held liable.  Tise, 345 N.C. at 460, 480
S.E.2d at 680.
A review of the Amusement Device Safety Act discloses
that nowhere in the Act did the legislature impose a duty upon
defendant to each go-kart customer.  Pursuant to N.C.G.S. §
95-111.4, the Commissioner of Labor has promulgated rules
governing the inspection of go-karts.  13 NCAC 15 .0400 (June
1992).  These rules similarly do not impose any such duty.  As
this Court said in Stone, “‘[A] government ought to be free to
enact laws for the public protection without thereby exposing its
supporting taxpayers . . . to liability for failures of omission
in its attempt to enforce them.  It is better to have such laws,
even haphazardly enforced, than not to have them at all.’” 
Stone, 347 N.C. at 481, 495 S.E.2d at 716 (quoting Grogan v.
Commonwealth, 577 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Ky.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 835,
62 L. Ed. 2d 46 (1979)).
This Court has, however, recognized two exceptions to
the public duty doctrine in order “to prevent inevitable
inequities to certain individuals.”  Braswell, 330 N.C. at 371,
410 S.E.2d at 902.  The exceptions exist (i) where there is a
special relationship between the injured party and the
governmental entity (“special relationship”) and (ii) when the
governmental entity creates a special duty by promising
protection to an individual, the protection is not forthcoming,
and the individual’s reliance on the promise of protection is
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    What our courts have labeled the “special duty” exception to
2
the public duty doctrine, other jurisdictions call the “special
relationship” exception.  See Hamilton v. Cannon, 267 Ga. 655,
657, 482 S.E.2d 370, 373 (1997) (stating that the “special
relationship” exception exists when the municipality makes
promises of an affirmative undertaking); Yonker v. State Dep’t of
Social & Heath Services, 85 Wash. App. 71, 76-77, 930 P.2d 958,
961 (1997) (labeling the situation when the governmental entity
gives explicit assurances the “special relationship” exception);
Jeffrey v. W. Va. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 198 W. Va. 609, 614, 482
S.E.2d 226, 231 (1996) (stating that the “special relationship”
exception exists when there is direct contact between the
governmental entity’s agents and the injured party and the
injured party justifiably relied on the entity’s affirmative
undertaking).  But see Hurd v. Woolfork, 959 S.W.2d 578, 582
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that the “special duty” exception
applies where there is a “special relationship” between plaintiff
and the public employee that gives rise to a “special duty”). 
causally related to the injury suffered (“special duty”).   Id. 
2
These exceptions are narrowly applied.  Id. at 372.
Plaintiff argues that the “special relationship”
exception applies because the Amusement Device Safety Act and the
Administrative Code created a special duty to him.  As support
for his position, plaintiff cites Coleman v. Cooper, 89 N.C. App.
188, 366 S.E.2d 2, disc. rev. denied, 322 N.C. 834, 371 S.E.2d
275 (1988).  We note first that the Court of Appeals did not
apply the public duty doctrine in Coleman.  Moreover, to the
extent that Coleman is inconsistent with the holding in this
case, it is hereby disapproved.
To determine whether the “special relationship”
exception applies, we compare the regulatory language at issue in
this case with the language at issue in Stone.  In Stone we held
that the applicable statute, N.C.G.S. § 95-4 (1989), “imposes a
duty upon defendants, [but] that duty is for the benefit of the
public, not individual claimants as here.”  Stone, 347 N.C. at
-8-
483, 495 S.E.2d at 717.  The statute “‘charged [the Commissioner
of Labor] with the duty’ to visit and inspect ‘at reasonable
hours, as often as practicable,’ all of the ‘factories,
mercantile establishments, mills, workshops, public eating
places, and commercial institutions in the State.’”  Id. (quoting
N.C.G.S. § 95-4(5)).  We conclude that the language of the
Administrative Code at issue in this case is analogous to that in
Stone.
Rule 13 NCAC 15 .0405, entitled “Inspections,” provides
that “[a]n inspector shall inspect each amusement device at each
location to determine if the device:  . . . (3) has complied with
the rules and regulations of this Section . . . .”  Rule 13 NCAC
15 .0429(a)(3), which governs go-karts, provides:
(3) Seats, Seat Belts and Shoulder Straps. 
All karts shall meet one of the following
requirements:
  (A) The seat, back rest, and leg area shall
be designed to retain the driver/occupants
inside the kart in the event of a rollover or
a collision at the front, rear, or side of
the kart; or
  (B) The Kart shall be equipped with seat
belts and shoulder straps mounted in a manner
that will restrain the occupant(s) in the
vehicle in case of a collision or rollover. 
Properly mounted safety harnesses as
effective as seat belts and shoulder straps
may be substituted for seat belts and
shoulder straps.
These rules do not explicitly prescribe a standard of conduct for
this defendant as to individual go-kart customers.  The Amusement
Device Safety Act and the rules promulgated thereunder are for
the “[p]rotection of the public from exposure to such unsafe
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conditions” and do not create a duty to a specific individual. 
N.C.G.S. § 95-111.1(b) (1989).
To hold contrary to our holding in Stone, in which we
held that the defendants’ failure to inspect did not create
liability, would be tantamount to imposing liability on defendant
in this case solely for inspecting the go-karts and not
discovering them to be in violation of the Code.  “A showing that
a [governmental entity] has undertaken to perform its duties to
enforce such statutes is not sufficient, by itself, to show the
creation of a special relationship with particular individual
citizens.”  Sinning v. Clark, 119 N.C. App. 515, 519, 459 S.E.2d
71, 74, disc. rev. denied, 342 N.C. 194, 463 S.E.2d 242 (1995). 
If such a “special relationship” were to be found in this case,
defendant would become a virtual guarantor of the safety of every
go-kart subject to its inspection, thereby, “exposing it to an
overwhelming burden of liability for failure to detect every code
violation or defect.”  Id. at 519-20, 459 S.E.2d at 74.  Thus, we
hold that in order to fall within the “special relationship”
exception to the public duty doctrine, plaintiff must allege a
special relationship, such as that between “a state’s witness or
informant who has aided law enforcement officers,” Braswell, 330
N.C. at 371, 410 S.E.2d at 902.
Although plaintiff does not assert that his case falls
within the “special duty” exception, nonetheless, we examine this
exception.  To come within the “special duty” exception,
plaintiff must show that an actual promise was made by defendant
to create the special duty, that this promise was reasonably
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relied upon by plaintiff, and that plaintiff’s injury was
causally related to plaintiff’s reliance.  Id.  In this case
plaintiff has not alleged an actual promise; thus, the “special
duty” exception cannot be a basis for liability.  Cf. Davis v.
Messer, 119 N.C. App. 44, 56, 457 S.E.2d 902, 910 (holding the
plaintiffs’ allegations that “the Town . . . promised it would
provide fire-fighting assistance and protection; [that] the
promised protection never arrived; and [that] plaintiffs relied
upon the promise to respond to the fire as their exclusive source
of aid, resulting in the complete destruction of their home,”
stated a claim for relief under the “special duty” exception to
the public duty doctrine), disc. rev. denied, 341 N.C. 647, 462
S.E.2d 508 (1995).
Since the public duty doctrine applies to plaintiff’s
claim under the Tort Claims Act, the claim fails unless it fits
into one of the two exceptions.  We conclude that plaintiff’s
claim does not fit into either exception.  For the reasons stated
the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Industrial
Commission’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss.  The
decision of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, reversed; and the
case is remanded to that court for further remand to the
Industrial Commission for entry of an order of dismissal.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
==========================
Justice ORR dissenting.
The practical effect of the majority opinion in this
case sends a chilling message regarding the State’s lack of
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accountability for its negligent conduct and resulting injuries
to innocent third parties.  Regardless of the fact that the
legislature has imposed a duty on the State either directly
through legislation or indirectly through administrative rule,
regardless of the evidence of negligence by the State in carrying
out such duties, regardless of the severity of injury to an
innocent third party or parties, and regardless of the fact that
the legislature has removed state immunity from suit under the
Tort Claims Act, the majority holds that the public duty doctrine
allows the State to escape liability for its negligence, and
injured parties are thus left with no means of recovery against
the State.  This was clearly not the law before Stone, nor should
it be now.  Stone v. N.C. Dep’t of Labor, 347 N.C. 473, 495
S.E.2d 711 (1998).
In my dissent in Stone, I concluded that the majority
had incorrectly extended the public duty doctrine to protect the
State from lawsuits, with the result being that the Tort Claims
Act’s protection of the public was seriously eroded.  Suffice it
to say, I am still convinced of the correctness of my dissent in
Stone, particularly in light of the petition for rehearing and
accompanying affidavits filed by the plaintiffs in Stone.  (The
petition for rehearing was denied by this Court on 2 April 1998.)
However, for purposes of this dissent, I will not repeat those
earlier arguments against the majority’s unwarranted extension of
the public duty doctrine.
The majority, relying on Stone, has determined in this
case that the public duty doctrine applies to the State and
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concludes that plaintiff’s claim is barred.  According to the
record, plaintiff, an eleven-year-old child, was seriously
injured in a collision that occurred while he was riding a go-
kart at the Ride ‘N Slide amusement park.  Plaintiff was secured
in the go-kart by an improper seat belt.  Tony Brewer, a North
Carolina Department of Labor elevator and amusement ride
inspector, had inspected the go-karts in June of 1993 within the
course and scope of his employment.  Brewer negligently and
incorrectly informed the manager of the Ride ‘N Slide that only
lap belts needed to be installed on each go-kart, when in fact a
three-point shoulder-type harness was required on the go-karts
under the North Carolina Administrative Code.  13 NCAC 15
.0429(a)(3)(B) (May 1992).  Because of this failure to inform the
manager about the seat-belt requirement, the proper belts were
never installed, and the eleven-year-old rode a go-kart with only
a lap belt, suffering severe internal injuries when the go-kart
crashed.
Whether this evidence was sufficient to establish
negligence on the part of the State and what damages, if any, 
plaintiff would be entitled to recover should, according to the
majority, never be reached.  By applying the public duty
doctrine, the majority concludes that the State owed only a
general duty to the public and that the Amusement Safety Act did
not impose a duty upon the State for the protection of
individuals, in many cases minors, who operate go-karts at these
facilities.  The majority thus concludes that plaintiff’s claim
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should be dismissed because of the protection now afforded the
State under the public duty doctrine.
In addition to my disagreement with the application of
the public duty doctrine to this case, I find no basis for the
majority’s conclusion that article 14B of chapter 95 of the
General Statutes, the Amusement Device Safety Act of North
Carolina, imposes no legislative duty upon those who inspect go-
karts.  This article begins with N.C.G.S. § 95-111.1, which 
provides in pertinent part:  “It is the intent of this Article
that amusement devices shall be designed, constructed, assembled
or disassembled, maintained, and operated so as to prevent
injuries.”  N.C.G.S. § 95-111.1(c) (1985).  The article concludes
some eight pages later with N.C.G.S. § 95-111.18, which provides
in pertinent part:  “This Article and the rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder shall receive a liberal construction to
the end that the welfare of the people may be protected.” 
N.C.G.S. § 95-111.18 (1985).  Contained within the article is a
lengthy list of powers and duties of the Commissioner of Labor,
which includes the power to adopt rules and regulations for
enforcement of article 14B and authority to inspect and test
devices subject to the article.  N.C.G.S. § 95-111.4 (1985).  As
a result, the Commissioner of Labor adopted administrative rules,
including:
.0405 INSPECTIONS
An inspector shall inspect each
amusement device at each location to
determine if the device:
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(1) has been soundly constructed and
properly erected,
(2) has been modified to comply with any
changes in safety requirements prescribed by
the manufacturer,
(3) has complied with the rules and
regulations of this Section, and 
(4) has in existence a policy of
insurance as required by G.S. 95-111.12.
13 NCAC 15 .0405 (Aug. 1987) (emphasis added).  This would
certainly appear to impose a duty on the State for the specific
protection of individuals operating go-karts.
Let there be no misunderstanding of the breadth and
logical extension of the holdings in Stone and now in Hunt.  This
is not limited just to inspections of the workplace as in Stone,
or to inspections of go-karts as in the case before us.  Every
device regulated by the Department of Labor requiring inspection
falls within the scope of these holdings.  When the State Fair
comes to Raleigh or when small, independent amusement operators
set up rides in communities all across North Carolina, and the
State agency required by law to inspect those amusement rides is
negligent and injuries to innocent third parties occur, the State
is now shielded from liability by the majority’s holdings.
If, as in Stone, there can be no claim for failing to
follow the law and inspect a workplace, and if, as in Hunt, there
can be no claim for failing to follow the law and correctly
inspect an amusement ride facility, then the myriad requirements
throughout the General Statutes and Administrative Code requiring
various types of inspections by State officials are meaningless
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to innocent third parties injured by the State’s negligence. 
Without exhausting the possibilities, one need only contemplate
some of the types of inspections provided by the State.  For
example, regulations are in place dealing with inspections
involving day-care centers, hazardous-waste facilities, nuclear
energy systems, mines and quarries, meat and poultry products,
and milk production, as well as sanitary and health inspections
involving epidemics and other communicable diseases.  The list
could go on and on, and if the State negligently performs its
duties, then those injured must look elsewhere for relief.  The
doctrine of sovereign immunity -- “the King can do no wrong” --
has been reimposed by judicial extension of the law.  Steelman v.
City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 592, 184 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1971).
Although the two cases now decided on this issue deal
with questions of negligent inspection, I find no language in the
decisions limiting the application of the public duty doctrine 
only to those cases involving inspections by state agents.  The
potential ramifications of these holdings to negligent acts of
the State beyond the realm of inspections would appear to be
without limit.
The underlying basis of the majority decision is:  A
duty to all is a duty to none.  According to the majority, no
duty was owed to the workers who perished or were injured in the
Hamlet fire, and no duty was owed to eleven-year-old Jason Hunt
when he sat down in a go-kart and put on an improper seat belt. 
The public duty doctrine should never have been extended to the
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State by this Court in Stone and further applied in this case.  I
dissented then, and I dissent now.
Justice Frye joins in this dissenting opinion.