Case Title: People ex rel. Department of Public Aid v. Smith

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97120

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2004-09-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 97120-Agenda 17-May 2004.
THE PEOPLE ex rel. THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AID, 							
Appellant, v. ROMEL C. SMITH, Appellee.
Opinion filed September 23, 2004. 
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	At issue is whether a man who signs a voluntary acknowledgment
of paternity can later seek to undo the acknowledgment on the basis
of DNA test results. We hold that he cannot.

BACKGROUND
	On October 9, 1997, Valerie Dawson gave birth to Kendra
Smith. Dawson and respondent, Romel Smith, executed a voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity two days later. By executing this form,
respondent became Kendra's legal father. See 750 ILCS 45/6(a), (b)
(West 2002). The acknowledgment form informed respondent that, by
signing it, he would become "the legal father of the child for all
purposes." Moreover, the form advised respondent of his right to
genetic testing, the legal consequences of his decision to sign the
form, and what rights he was waiving by signing the form. Under the
large bold heading "Notice of Rights and Responsibilities," respondent
was advised of the following:
			"1. When the mother and alleged biological father properly
sign the Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity form and,
if required, the husband/exhusband and mother sign the
Voluntary Denial of Paternity form, the alleged biological
father becomes the legal father of the child for all purposes.
The biological father and/or mother may be ordered to pay
child support until the child is at least eighteen years old,
including retroactive child support from the date of the
child's birth, reimbursement of public assistance paid to the
custodial parent for the child; medical costs; and medical
insurance for the child until the child is at least eighteen years
old.
			2. You have the right to an attorney, a hearing and a right
to have genetic testing. When the alleged biological father
and the mother sign the Voluntary Acknowledgment of
Paternity they are waiving those rights. Custody of the child
is presumed to be with the mother. The alleged biological
father may petition the courts for custody and visitation
rights.
			3. You should have a genetic test if you are not sure who
is the biological father of the child. If the results of the
genetic testing show that the man is the biological father of
the child you can sign the Voluntary Acknowledgment of
Paternity form and the mother and husband/exhusband may
sign the Voluntary Denial of Paternity form.
			4. If you want legal advice you should talk to an attorney.
If you would like to establish paternity without going to court
or need other child support services, you may call the Illinois
Department of Public Aid at 1-800-447-4278. Persons using
a teletypewriter (TTY) may call 1-800-526.5812."
Respondent's signature appears on the form directly under an
affirmation that he (1) had read and understood his rights and
responsibilities listed on the form; (2) was waiving those rights; (3) did
not want a genetic test; and (4) was accepting the obligation to
provide child support.
	On December 3, 1997, the State, on behalf of the Illinois
Department of Public Aid, filed a petition to set child support. The
petition alleged that respondent had failed to meet his obligations
under the Illinois Public Aid Code and asked the circuit court to order
respondent to pay child support commensurate with statutory
guidelines. On May 4, 1998, the court ordered respondent to pay
$38.18 per week in child support and further ordered him to obtain
medical insurance coverage for Kendra.
	On June 18, 2002, respondent filed a pro se petition to terminate
child support. Respondent alleged in the petition that he was not
Kendra's biological father. The State moved to dismiss the petition
pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS
5/2-615 (West 2002)).
	Respondent obtained an attorney and refiled his action as a
complaint to declare the nonexistence of the parent and child
relationship pursuant to section 7(b-5) of the Illinois Parentage Act
of 1984 (Parentage Act) (750 ILCS 45/7(b-5) (West 2002)).
Respondent asserted in the complaint that he had signed the voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity in 1997 based on Dawson's
representation that he was Kendra's biological father. Respondent
entered the military on or about July 7, 1998, and was discharged on
or about December 12, 1999. During this time, respondent saw
Kendra on only a few occasions. In March 2002, respondent began to
doubt that Kendra was his child because she did not share any of his
physical characteristics. Respondent had himself and Kendra tested at
DNA Diagnostics Center on April 29, 2002, and the test results
showed a 0% chance that he was Kendra's biological father. The test
results were certified on May 10, 2002, but respondent alleged that he
did not receive them until June 17, 2002, because of administrative
problems. Respondent attached the DNA test results to his complaint.
	The State moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section
2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West
2002)), arguing that respondent could not pursue this action because
he had signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity. The State
relied on section 5(b) of the Parentage Act (750 ILCS 45/5(b) (West
2002)), which provides that the presumption of paternity arising out
of a voluntary acknowledgment becomes conclusive if the
acknowledgment is not rescinded upon the earlier of (1) 60 days after
the acknowledgment is signed; or (2) "the date of an administrative or
judicial proceeding relating to the child (including a proceeding to
establish a support order) in which the signatory is a party." The State
further relied on section 6(d) of the Parentage Act (750 ILCS 45/6(d)
(West 2002)), which provides that a voluntary acknowledgment of
paternity may be challenged only on grounds of fraud, duress, or
material mistake of fact.
	Respondent argued in a brief in support of his complaint that he
had filed a proper action pursuant to section 7(b-5) of the Parentage
Act, which provides as follows:
			"An action to declare the non-existence of the parent and
child relationship may be brought subsequent to an
adjudication of paternity in any judgment by the man
adjudicated to be the father pursuant to the presumptions in
Section 5 of this Act if, as a result of deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) tests, it is discovered that the man adjudicated to be
the father is not the natural father of the child. Actions
brought by the adjudicated father shall be brought by verified
complaint. If, as a result of the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
tests, the plaintiff is determined not to be the father of the
child, the adjudication of paternity and any orders regarding
custody, visitation, and future payments of support may be
vacated." 750 ILCS 45/7(b-5) (West 2002).
Section 7(b-5) references the presumptions in section 5. These
presumptions are as follows:
			"§5. Presumption of Paternity
			(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if:
				(1) he and the child's natural mother are or have been
married to each other, even though the marriage is or
could be declared invalid, and the child is born or
conceived during such marriage;
				(2) after the child's birth, he and the child's natural
mother have married each other, even though the marriage
is or could be declared invalid, and he is named, with his
written consent, as the child's father on the child's birth
certificate;
				(3) he and the child's natural mother have signed an
acknowledgment of paternity in accordance with rules
adopted by the Illinois Department of Public Aid under
Section 10-17.7 of the Illinois Public Aid Code; or
				(4) he and the child's natural mother have signed an
acknowledgment of parentage or, if the natural father is
someone other than one presumed to be the father under
this Section, an acknowledgment of parentage and denial
of paternity in accordance with Section 12 of the Vital
Records Act." 750 ILCS 45/5(a) (West 2002).
Respondent argued that, because he had satisfied all the requirements
of section 7(b-5), his cause of action must be allowed to proceed. He
signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, and therefore was
presumed to be Kendra's father under subsection (a)(4). He later
obtained DNA tests that showed he was not Kendra's father. Thus,
respondent contended that he was entitled to file an action under
section 7(b-5).
	Following a hearing, the circuit court granted the State's motion
to dismiss. The circuit court relied on the provision of the Parentage
Act that the presumption of paternity arising from a voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity becomes conclusive unless it is timely
rescinded. 750 ILCS 45/5(b) (West 1992). The court further relied on
section 6(d) of the Parentage Act, which provides that a voluntary
acknowledgment may be challenged only on the basis of fraud, duress,
or material mistake of fact. 750 ILCS 45/6(d) (West 2002). As
respondent had neither rescinded the acknowledgment within 60 days
nor challenged the acknowledgment on one of the grounds listed in
section 6(d), the court ruled that his action had to be dismissed.(1) The
court specifically found that respondent's interpretation would "render
the acknowledgment provision of the statute meaningless."
	The appellate court reversed. 343 Ill. App. 3d 208. The court
relied on the plain language of section 7(b-5), which it noted allowed
a cause of action to be brought by a man adjudicated to be the father
" 'pursuant to the presumptions in Section 5 of this Act.' " 343 Ill.
App. 3d at 214, quoting 750 ILCS 45/7(b-5) (West 2002). The court
stated that, pursuant to section 6(b) of the Parentage Act, a voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity has " 'the full force and effect of a
judgment.' " 343 Ill. App. 3d at 216, quoting 750 ILCS 45/6(b) (West
2002). Thus, according to the court, respondent had been adjudicated
to be Kendra's father pursuant to one of the presumptions in section
5. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 216. The court acknowledged the conflict with
section 6(d)'s provision that " '[a] signed acknowledgment of
paternity entered under this Act may be challenged in court only on
the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact' " (343 Ill. App.
3d at 215, quoting 750 ILCS 45/6(d) (West 2002)). However, the
court held that, because section 6 was part of the original Act, which
became effective July 1, 1985, and section 7(b-5) became effective
August 7, 1998, it was "evident that section 7(b-5) was intended to
create a limited exception to that rule." 343 Ill. App. 3d at 215. The
court acknowledged that its interpretation rendered section 6
confusing, and suggested that the legislature amend section 6 to
"eliminate the confusion." 343 Ill. App. 3d at 215. The court
specifically rejected the State's argument that the terms "adjudicated"
and "adjudication" in section 7(b-5) referred to judicial proceedings
and were thus inapplicable to voluntary acknowledgments of paternity
because there is no judgment entered in these cases. According to the
court, this argument would render section 7(b-5) "entirely
meaningless" because the presumptions in sections 5(a)(1) (man
presumed to be the father if child is born or conceived during
marriage) and 5(a)(2) (man presumed to be father if after child's birth
he marries child's mother and is named as the father on the birth
certificate) do not necessarily involve judgments either. 343 Ill. App.
3d at 216. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal.

ANALYSIS
	Resolving this issue is solely a matter of statutory construction.
We review issues of statutory construction de novo. In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 418 (2001). The primary objective in construing a statute
is to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent. Yang v. City
of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96, 103 (2001). This effort properly begins
with an examination of the statutory language. Texaco-Cities Service
Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d 262, 270 (1998). Each undefined
word in the statute must be ascribed its ordinary and popularly
understood meaning. Texaco-Cities, 182 Ill. 2d  at 270. If the language
of the statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to
other aids of construction. In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2000). A
statute is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation. In re B.C., 176 Ill. 2d 536, 543 (1997).
	Here, the apparent conflict arises when a man who has signed a
voluntary acknowledgment of paternity wishes to bring a section
7(b-5) action. Section 7(b-5) provides that the cause of action it
describes may be brought by a man "adjudicated to be the father
pursuant to the presumptions in Section 5 of this Act." 750 ILCS
45/7(b-5) (West 2002). Section 5 contains four types of presumptions
of paternity, two arising out of marriage (750 ILCS 45/5(a)(1), (a)(2)
(West 2002)), and two arising out of voluntary acknowledgments
(750 ILCS 45/5(a)(3), (a)(4) (West 2002)). However, allowing this
cause of action to be brought by a man who becomes a father
pursuant to a voluntary acknowledgment would directly contradict
section 6(d) of the Act, which clearly provides that a "signed
acknowledgment of paternity entered under this Act may be
challenged in court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material
mistake of fact" (750 ILCS 45/6(d) (West 2002)).
	One way to avoid the apparent conflict would be simply to give
the terms "adjudication," "adjudicated," and "judgment" in section
7(b-5) their plain and ordinary meanings. "Adjudicate" means "[t]o
rule upon judicially"(Black's Law Dictionary 45 (8th ed. 2004)), while
an "adjudication" is "[t]he legal process of resolving a dispute; the
process of judicially deciding a case" (Black's Law Dictionary 45 (8th
ed. 2004)). We have previously held that "judgment" has a well-settled definition as a legal term: "it is a court's official decision with
respect to the rights and obligations of the parties to a lawsuit." In re
Marriage of Logston, 103 Ill. 2d 266, 277 (1984). Section 7(b-5)
provides that the cause of action may be brought "subsequent to an
adjudication of paternity in any judgment by the man adjudicated to be
the father pursuant to the presumptions in section 5." The State
contends that this ends the inquiry because a man who becomes a
father pursuant to a voluntary acknowledgment is never adjudicated
to be the father and there is no judgment entered. Thus, according to
the State, a man who has become a father by signing a voluntary
acknowledgment lacks standing to bring a section 7(b-5) action. The
State correctly points out that section 6(c) of the Parentage Act
provides that "[a] judicial or administrative proceeding to ratify
paternity established in accordance with subsection (a) [providing for
establishment of paternity by voluntary acknowledgment] is neither
required nor permitted." 750 ILCS 45/6(c) (West 2002). The State's
interpretation would give effect to the plain language of both section
7(b-5) and section 6(d).
	Respondent points out, however, that the Parentage Act treats a
voluntary acknowledgment as having the same effect as a judgment.
Section 6(b) provides that "[p]aternity established in accordance with
subsection (a) has the full force and effect of a judgment entered under
this Act and serves as a basis for seeking a child support order without
any further proceedings to establish paternity."(2) 750 ILCS 45/6(b)
(West 2002). Moreover, it is apparent that the legislature intended for
actions under section 6(d) of the Parentage Act (challenging voluntary
acknowledgments of paternity on the basis of fraud, duress, or
material mistake of fact) to be brought by means of a section 2-1401
petition (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2002)). As part of the same
public act that added subsection (d) to section 6 of the Parentage Act,
the legislature amended section 2-1401(a) of the Code of Civil
Procedure to provide that "[e]xcept as provided in Section 6 of the
Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, there shall be no distinction between
actions and other proceedings, statutory or otherwise, as to
availability of relief, grounds for relief or the relief obtainable."
(Emphasis added.) Pub. Act 90-18, §90, eff. July 1, 1997; 735 ILCS
5/2-1401(a) (West 2002). Section 2-1401 is entitled "Relief from
Judgments," and by its express terms applies when a party is seeking
"[r]elief from final orders and judgments." 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(a)
(West 2002). Thus, the legislature has provided that voluntary
acknowledgments should be attacked by the method of relief used to
attack final orders and judgments. Both the State and respondent have
presented reasonable arguments as to what the legislature meant by
the terms "adjudication," "adjudicated," and "judgment" in section
7(b-5), and thus we must look to other aids of construction.
	Before doing so, however, we may easily reject the appellate
court's resolution of the meaning of the word "adjudicate." Relying
on the rule of statutory construction that no term should be rendered
superfluous or meaningless, the court held that the State's
interpretation would render section 7(b-5) "entirely meaningless." 343
Ill. App. 3d at 216. The court reasoned that, just as the voluntary
acknowledgment presumptions never involve judgments, the two
marital presumptions contained in sections 5(a)(1) and (a)(2) do not
necessarily involve judgments either. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 216. The
appellate court held that because a judgment is not necessarily entered
when a man is presumed to be the father in one of these instances, the
State's interpretation would render section 7(b-5) entirely without
meaning. Of course, this is not the case at all. The section would apply
to a man adjudicated to be a father in a dissolution of marriage
judgment. A man adjudicated to be a father in a dissolution of
marriage judgment, who learns through DNA tests that he is not the
child's father, would have standing to bring a section 7(b-5) action.
Thus, it is unclear how the appellate court reached the conclusion that
the State's interpretation would render section 7(b-5) entirely without
meaning. Moreover, the legislative history shows that the situation
described above is exactly what the legislature had in mind when it
enacted section 7(b-5).
	When a statute's meaning is unclear, the court may examine the
legislative history. Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Teachers
Insurance Co., 195 Ill. 2d 322, 330 (2001). Section 7(b-5) was added
by Public Act 90-715, which became effective on August 7, 1998.
The legislative history shows that the bill that became Public Act
90-715 was inspired by the case of a man who was adjudicated a
father pursuant to one of the marital presumptions. The legislation
was sponsored by Senator Beverly Fawell. When introducing the
legislation, Senator Fawell stated the following:
			"This is a bill that was brought to me by a constituent of
mine who had a problem that didn't seem to be solved any
other way. He was married, he went overseas, because he
was in the Army. His wife had a child. Came back, his wife
had announced she wanted a divorce. They got the divorce.
He, of course, was ordered to pay child support, which he
had no objection to. She moved to another State. He kept
saying, I want to see my son, she would not allow him to see
him until four years after the child was born. He then found
out that this child was not his through a DNA test." 90th Ill.
Gen Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 2, 1998, at 49
(statements of Senator Fawell).
Further, Senator Fawell stated:
		"It amends the Parentage Act, and it *** allows a man who
has been adjudicated the father of a child pursuant to the
presumption that he is the father due to the marriage, if
there is-a DNA test discovers that the man is not the natural
father, then the orders involving custody, visitation and child
support can be declared null and void." (Emphasis added.)
90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 1, 1998, at
10 (statements of Senator Fawell).
She also remarked that the problem she was trying to correct involved
situations involving the marriage presumptions:
			"[T]hese are for cases *** where the man assumed he was
the father, as in the case of my constituent, didn't question
the fact that this might not be his child, *** he was overseas,
so he had no knowledge of the fact that his wife was running
around. And now because he didn't contest [paternity], or
bring the question up during the divorce, or two years
afterwards-didn't find out until three years afterwards, he's
stuck. *** This is not right. And that's all I'm trying to
correct." (Emphases added.) 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate
Proceedings, April 2, 1998, at 53 (statements of Senator
Fawell).
	Notably, in the debates of neither the House nor the Senate is
there any mention of the presumptions arising out of voluntary
acknowledgments of paternity. This is significant because the
subsection of the Parentage Act providing that voluntary
acknowledgments may be challenged only on the basis of fraud,
duress, or material mistake of fact had been in effect for only one year.
The appellate court mistakenly suggested that this provision had been
in effect since 1985 and implied that the legislature must have simply
overlooked it:
		"Section 6 was part of the original Act, which became
effective July 1, 1985. Section 7(b-5) was an amendment to
the Act that became effective August 7, 1998. Although
section 6(d) continues to set forth the rule that voluntary
acknowledgments of paternity may be challenged only on the
basis of fraud, duress, or mistake of fact, it is evident that
section 7(b-5) was intended to create a limited exception to
that rule. *** Nonetheless, we agree that the current
language in section 6(d) is confusing, and we hope the
legislature would consider amending this language to
eliminate the confusion."(3) 343 Ill. App. 3d at 215.
The appellate court's assertion was true only in the sense that the
current version of the Parentage Act and the original version both
contain a section 6. The 1985 version of section 6, however, bears
little relation to the current version. Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch.
40, par. 2506, with 750 ILCS 45/6 (West 2002). And, most
importantly, the provision of section 6(d) that voluntary
acknowledgments may be challenged only on the basis of fraud,
duress, or material mistake of fact, became effective merely one year
before section 7(b-5). See Pub. Act 90-18, §120, eff. July 1, 1997.
This portion of section 6(d) was not, as the appellate court suggested,
a 20-year-old relic that the legislature had simply forgotten.
	This amendment to section 6(d) was not passed on a whim, but
served a distinct purpose: bringing Illinois' statute in line with Title
IV-D of the Social Security Act. In 1996, Congress passed the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 (Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105), which replaced the federal
AFDC program contained in Title IV-A with a program of block
grants to states for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
(Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2112-13). States participating in the
TANF program receive federal funding for their public assistance
programs to families with dependent children. In re Marriage of
Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d 414, 425 (1997). A state's participation in the
TANF program is voluntary, but if a state chooses to participate, its
plan must comply with the requirements of the Social Security Act
and the regulations promulgated thereunder. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (2000);
Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d  at 423-26. Illinois has elected to participate in the
TANF program. 305 ILCS 5/4-0.5 et seq. (West 2002); Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d  at 426. One of the requirements of TANF participation is that
a state must operate a child support enforcement program in
compliance with Title IV-D. 42 U.S.C. §602(a)(2) (2000). Among the
requirements of Title IV-D are that participating states (1) provide a
simple process for voluntarily acknowledging paternity (42 U.S.C.
§666(a)(5)(C)(I) (2000)); (2) require that voluntary acknowledgments
may be rescinded only within the earlier of 60 days or the date of an
administrative or judicial proceeding relating to the child in which the
signatory is a party, including a proceeding to establish a support
order (42 U.S.C. §666(a)(5)(D)(ii) (2000)); and (3) ensure that, after
the recession period, a voluntary acknowledgment may be challenged
in court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact,
with the burden of proof on the challenger (42 U.S.C.
§666(a)(5)(D)(iii) (2000)). Illinois amended the Parentage Act to
contain this exact language, and the amendment became effective July
1, 1997. See Pub. Act 90-18, §120, eff. July 1, 1997. Not
coincidentally, this was the date upon which the TANF program
officially replaced the AFDC program (see 305 ILCS 5/4-0.5 (West
2002); 42 U.S.C. §601 et seq. (2000)). The Legislative Synopsis and
Digest explains that one of the purposes of the legislation enacting this
provision was to make "changes to implement the federal Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 with
respect to changes to child support enforcement provisions." III Final
Legislative Synopsis and Digest of the 90th Ill. Gen. Assem. (No. 12),
at 2208.
	If we accepted the view of respondent and the appellate court,
then "only" in section 6(d) would no longer mean "only." In addition
to bringing a challenge based on fraud, duress, or material mistake of
fact, a man who had voluntarily acknowledged paternity could also
bring a challenge based on DNA test results. Thus, Illinois would no
longer be in compliance with Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. As
noted previously, nothing was said in the debates of either the House
or the Senate on Public Act 90-715 about using DNA test results to
undo voluntary acknowledgments of paternity. Moreover, there is
nothing to indicate that the legislature sought to undo the sweeping
and comprehensive changes it had made just one year previously to
bring Illinois law into compliance with federal requirements.
	We further believe that the difference in the way the marital
presumptions and the voluntary acknowledgment presumptions are
treated in the Parentage Act supports the State's construction of the
statute. Statutes should be construed as a whole, with each provision
evaluated in connection with every other section. Primeco Personal
Communications, L.P. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 196 Ill. 2d 70,
88 (2001). The Parentage Act provides that the marital presumptions
of paternity are rebuttable presumptions, while the voluntary
acknowledgment presumptions are conclusive presumptions. Section
5(b) provides that the marital presumptions may be rebutted only by
clear and convincing evidence. 750 ILCS 45/5(b) (West 2002). By
contrast, the presumption arising from a voluntary acknowledgment
becomes conclusive if not rescinded before the earlier of two dates
provided by the Parentage Act. 750 ILCS 45/5(b)(1), (b)(2) (West
2002); see also 410 ILCS 535/12(5)(a) (West 2002) ("The signing and
witnessing of the acknowledgment of parentage or, if the presumed
father of the child is not the biological father, the acknowledgment of
parentage and denial of paternity conclusively establishes a parent and
child relationship in accordance with Sections 5 and 6 of the Illinois
Parentage Act of 1984"). A rebuttable presumption is one that "may
be overcome by the introduction of contrary evidence" (Black's Law
Dictionary 1224 (8th ed. 2004)), while a conclusive presumption is
one that "cannot be overcome by any additional evidence or
argument" (Black's Law Dictionary 1223 (8th ed. 2004)). Thus, it
makes sense to allow presumed fathers under sections 5(a)(1) and
(a)(2) to challenge the presumption with DNA evidence because that
is merely a rebuttable presumption that can be overcome by clear and
convincing evidence. It makes no sense, on the other hand, to allow
those men who sign voluntary acknowledgments to challenge the
presumption of their paternity with DNA evidence because the
presumption with respect to them is conclusive. Under the limited
circumstances presented in section 6(d), a man who voluntarily
acknowledges paternity can later challenge the voluntariness of the
acknowledgment if he can show that it was procured by fraud, duress,
or material mistake of fact, but the Parentage Act does not allow him
to challenge the conclusive presumption of paternity with contrary
evidence.
	The Parentage Act's disparate treatment of these two groups of
presumed fathers is logical. A man who voluntarily acknowledges
paternity signs an acknowledgment form advising him of his rights and
specifically informing him that he is accepting the responsibility of
being a parent to the child, that he has a right to genetic testing, and
that he is waiving that right by signing the voluntary acknowledgment.
Thus, a presumed father who signs a voluntary acknowledgment is in
an entirely different position from a man who simply assumes he is the
child's father because of his marriage to the child's mother. Unlike a
man presumed to be a child's father under subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2),
a man who signs a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity specifically
agrees to forgo any further inquiry into whether he is the child's
biological father and to assume the responsibility for being a parent to
the child. Clearly, it would be unreasonable to allow a man in this
position to undo his voluntary acknowledgment years later on the
basis of DNA test results, when his paternity was based not on a mere
marital presumption that he was the child's father but on his conscious
decision to accept the legal responsibility of being the child's father.
This is obviously the reason that the legislature chose to make the
marital presumptions rebuttable and the voluntary acknowledgment
presumptions conclusive. Consideration of the Parentage Act as a
whole supports the State's argument that the legislature did not intend
for section 7(b-5) to apply to voluntary acknowledgments of
paternity.
	Finally, we reject the appellate court's conclusion that section
7(b-5) must apply to voluntary acknowledgments because it refers to
the "presumptions in Section 5" and not to the "presumptions in
sections 5(a)(1) and (a)(2)." The legislature could also limit the reach
of section 7(b-5) to sections 5(a)(1) and (a)(2) by requiring an
adjudication, and we believe that this is what the legislature did. A
section 7(b-5) action may be brought only by a man adjudicated to be
a father in a judgment. Neither respondent nor the appellate court
have explained why the legislature would go out of its way to use the
terms "adjudicated," "adjudication," and "judgment" if it wanted
section 7(b-5) to apply to those men who have signed voluntary
acknowledgments. We believe that when the Parentage Act is
considered as a whole, along with the legislative histories of sections
6(d) and 7(b-5), it is clear that the legislature meant to give the terms
"adjudicated," "adjudication," and "judgment" their plain and ordinary
meanings, and that the legislature was not referring to documents that
only had the force and effect of judgments or that could be attacked
in the same manner as judgments. This interpretation gives effect to
the plain language of both sections 7(b-5) and 6(d) and does not
result in a version of the Parentage Act that is no longer in compliance
with Title IV-D of the Social Security Act.
	For all of the above reasons, we agree with the State that a
section 7(b-5) action may not be brought by a man who has signed a
voluntary acknowledgment of paternity. Accordingly, we reverse the
appellate court's judgment and affirm the circuit court's dismissal of
respondent's complaint.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
 
 
1.                 
             
            
Respondent did not amend his complaint to assert a cause of action based on one of the grounds listed in section 6(d), and 
this opinion addresses solely whether he was entitled to maintain a cause of action under section 7(b5).
2.               
This provision could also be seen as supporting the State's view because it is an explicit recognition by the legislature 
that voluntary acknowledgments are not judgments.
 
3.                 
      The appellate court held that this interpretation gives effect to the plain language of both sections 6(d) and 7(b5). 
343 Ill. App. 3d at 215. We fail to see how this interpretation gives effect to the word "only" in section 6(d), which is arguably the most 
important word in that section.