Case Title: Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Curry

Citation: 1997-Ohio-166

Docket Number: 19962435

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
CUYAHOGA COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. CURRY. 
[Cite as Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Curry (1997), ____ Ohio St.3d ____.] 
Attorneys at law – Misconduct – Six-month suspension with sanction 
stayed on condition – Failure to cooperate with a grievance 
investigation. 
 
(No. 96-2435 – Submitted April 16, 1997 – Decided July 16, 1997.) 
 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 96-35. 
 
In a complaint filed April 15, 1996, relator, Cuyahoga County Bar 
Association, charged respondent, Diane Marie Curry of Bedford Heights, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0023737, with two counts of professional misconduct.  
Count One charged respondent with violating DR 1-102(A)(1) (violation of a 
Disciplinary Rule), 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct that adversely 
reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law), 6-101(A)(3) (neglect of a legal 
matter), 7-101(A)(1) (failing to seek the lawful objectives of her client through 
reasonably available means permitted by law), 7-101(A)(2) (failing to carry out a 
contract of employment entered into with a client for professional services), and 7-
101(A)(3) (causing prejudice or damage to her client during the course of a 
2 
professional relationship).  Count Two charged respondent with violating Gov.Bar 
R. V(4)(G) (failing to cooperate with the Certified Grievance Committee) and DR 
1-102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to 
practice law).  Numerous attempts were made to serve respondent with a copy of 
the formal complaint filed with the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”).  Specifically, the board made three 
unsuccessful attempts to serve respondent by certified mail.  On May 7, 1996, the 
board requested the Cuyahoga County Sheriff to personally serve respondent with 
a copy of the complaint.  The sheriff’s office made four unsuccessful attempts to 
serve respondent.  Finally on May 28, 1996, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of 
Ohio was served with a copy of the complaint as agent for the respondent.  See 
Gov.Bar R. V(11)(B).  Respondent failed to respond to the complaint.  On August 
23, 1996, the matter was heard before a three-member panel (“panel”) appointed 
by the board.  Respondent did not appear before the panel, and the matter was 
considered upon the evidence and testimony submitted by relator. 
 
Relator presented the following evidence to the board.  On August 8, 1993, 
respondent was retained by Kenneth and Susan Koshar to represent them in a 
custody matter regarding their grandchildren, Gregory and Jeremy.  The Koshars 
3 
had the grandchildren in their care.  Gregory’s biological father was seeking 
custody of Gregory.  Because the Koshars did not want the two boys separated, 
they were seeking custody of both grandchildren. 
 
The board found that respondent instructed the Koshars not to contact her, 
despite the fact that respondent was representing the Koshars.  The board also 
found that respondent did not appear at a juvenile court hearing scheduled for 
September 20, 1993.  Susan Koshar testified before the panel that she and her 
husband repeatedly attempted to contact respondent after the September 20 
hearing but that respondent never returned their calls.  The Koshars sent a certified 
letter dated March 31, 1994, notifying respondent that another hearing had been 
scheduled.  Respondent failed to contact the Koshars and did not attend the 
hearing. 
 
At the May 31 hearing, Gregory’s biological father was awarded custody of 
Gregory.  The other grandchild, Jeremy, was placed in the custody of the Koshars.  
After the hearing, the Koshars discharged respondent and filed a complaint with 
relator. 
 
Attorney Nancy M. Russo was appointed by relator to investigate the 
complaint.  Russo made several attempts to contact respondent before successfully 
4 
scheduling a meeting with her in March 1995.  The meeting was canceled through 
no fault of respondent. 
 
Russo made several attempts to reschedule the meeting.  Respondent did not 
return Russo’s calls and failed to reschedule a date for the meeting.  On May 4, 
1995, Russo sent a letter informing respondent of her duty to cooperate with the 
grievance process.  Respondent notified Russo that she would forward a complete 
copy of the Koshars’ file.  Respondent failed to send the file and did not attempt to 
contact Russo. 
 
Based upon the foregoing, the panel concluded that respondent had 
systematically avoided contact with the Koshars, had failed to appear at hearings 
on behalf of her clients, and had failed to cooperate with the investigator during 
the grievance process.  The panel found that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(1), 
1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(6), 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(2), 7-101(A)(3) and Gov.Bar R. 
V(4)(G).  The panel found that respondent did not violate DR 7-101(A)(1). 
 
The relator recommended that respondent receive a one-year suspension 
with restitution of $250 to the Koshars, and proof of fitness to practice law in the 
form of a medical statement certifying that the respondent is mentally able to 
practice law.  The panel rejected relator’s recommendation and instead found that 
5 
the appropriate sanction under these circumstances was an indefinite suspension.  
The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
recommendation.  The board also recommended that the costs of the disciplinary 
proceedings be taxed to the respondent in any disciplinary order entered in this 
matter. 
___________________ 
 
Timothy M. Bittel, Lester S. Potash and Deanna L. DiPetta, for relator. 
 
Diane M. Curry, pro se. 
___________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  Our review of the record does not entirely support the board’s 
findings of two counts of misconduct.  Accordingly, we do not concur in the 
board’s recommendation that respondent be indefinitely suspended from the 
practice of law. 
I 
 
The relevant inquiry under Count One is whether respondent provided 
competent legal representation to the Koshars with respect to the child custody 
matter.  For the reasons that follow, we hold that respondent adequately 
represented the Koshars’ interests. 
6 
 
Respondent was retained by the Koshars to help them in a custody matter 
involving their two grandchildren.  A custody action was pending in Cuyahoga 
County Juvenile Court.  The Koshars were not parties to this action.  The Koshars 
wanted respondent to file a motion for them to obtain legal custody of both 
grandchildren.  After explaining the relevant legal issues to the Koshars, 
respondent filed a motion for the Koshars to intervene as parties to the custody 
action. 
 
The board found that respondent failed in her legal duties by not attending 
hearings in the custody action.  Because they were not parties to the custody 
action, respondent argues that the Koshars had no legal right to participate in the 
juvenile court proceedings, nor was there any corresponding legal duty for 
respondent to represent them at the hearing.  Additionally, respondent argues that 
the September 20 hearing did not involve a final determination of custody but 
rather a standard review of custody.  Respondent contends that as a result of her 
legal services the Koshars were allowed to speak at the custody proceedings, 
something they had previously been unable to do, and that a guardian ad litem was 
appointed to represent the interests of the grandchildren.  We find respondent’s 
7 
argument persuasive and accordingly we disagree with the board’s determination 
as to the September 20 hearing. 
 
As to the May 31, 1994 hearing determining final custody, the board’s 
findings indicate that the Koshars informed respondent of the hearing by certified 
mail dated March 31, 1994.  The Koshars’ March 31 letter makes no mention of a 
May 31 hearing date.  Before the panel, Mrs. Koshar testified that she left 
messages notifying respondent of the May 31 hearing date.  However, the Koshars 
were informed at the September 20, 1993 custody review hearing that their motion 
to intervene was denied.  The Koshars therefore had no standing to participate in 
any hearing before the juvenile court.  More important, respondent was 
presumably not notified by the juvenile court of the May 31 hearing because the 
Koshars were not parties to the action.  We therefore find that respondent did not 
violate any Disciplinary Rules by not attending the May 31 hearing. 
 
The board also found that respondent systematically avoided contacting the 
Koshars.  At their initial consultation respondent explained the legal issues to the 
Koshars, agreed to represent them, and filed a motion, on their behalf, to 
intervene.  Respondent told the Koshars that she would contact them if necessary.  
The record before this court indicates that respondent and the Koshars had two 
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subsequent telephone conversations.  The Koshars were informed by the juvenile 
court that their motion to intervene was denied.  The Koshars were, however, 
permitted to participate in the custody proceedings, not as parties, but as 
concerned grandparents.  Clearly, respondent did not return calls from the Koshars 
after the review hearing.  But the record strongly suggests that any further contact 
between respondent and the Koshars was not warranted.  Respondent had already 
explained that the children’s parents had to be given a reasonable opportunity to 
regain custody of their children.  Respondent further explained that a motion for 
custody of their grandchildren could not be filed unless the Koshars were admitted 
as parties to the action.  The lack of communication between respondent and the 
Koshars ultimately had no effect on the juvenile court’s final determination of 
custody. 
 
We do not suggest that respondent’s actions should be condoned.  Attorneys 
do have an obligation to communicate with clients.  Attorneys should make every 
reasonable effort to keep clients abreast of their pending legal matters.  The 
Koshars might not have filed a grievance had respondent been more accessible.  
Nonetheless, respondent’s actions do not support the board’s findings and 
recommendation. 
9 
II 
 
With respect to Count Two we concur with the board’s findings that 
respondent failed to cooperate with the grievance investigation.  Gov.Bar R. 
V(4)(G) requires an attorney to assist in an investigation of a complaint.  The 
board found that respondent failed to respond to Russo’s requests to discuss the 
Koshars’ complaint, did not answer the formal complaint filed with the board, and 
also did not appear at the hearing before the panel of the board.  Respondent’s 
defenses for failing to cooperate with the investigation were her chronic health 
problems and ignorance of the grievance process.  While sympathy can be found 
for respondent’s ill health, ill health is no excuse for a failure to cooperate with 
disciplinary proceedings.  Neither is ignorance of the process, as it is respondent’s 
duty to know the rules and to abide by them.  Respondent has fallen woefully short 
on this count. 
 
Nancy Russo, the investigator for the relator, made several attempts to meet 
with respondent to review the Koshars’ file.  Yet respondent made little effort to 
cooperate with Russo.  In fact, respondent neglected to forward the Koshars’ file 
after assuring Russo she would do so. 
10 
 
The board made every effort to notify respondent throughout the various 
stages of the grievance process.  In the proceedings before the board, respondent 
was on notice of a pending complaint against her but failed to file an answer with 
the board.  A hearing was scheduled before a panel of the board, yet respondent 
failed to attend.  Without substantive explanation, respondent inexcusably chose 
not to cooperate with the grievance process, despite attorney Russo’s 
extraordinary efforts to conduct an investigation.  In addition, having knowledge 
that a formal complaint was pending against her, respondent did not appear before 
the board to answer the charges against her. 
 
Given the evidence before us, it can be inferred that had respondent 
cooperated with the investigation of the grievance against her, the filing of a 
formal complaint may very well have been precluded.  Had respondent appeared 
before the panel, this matter may not have found its way to this court.  In any 
event, respondent’s lack of cooperation calls for us to administer an appropriate 
sanction.  In administering a sanction we are cognizant of the fact that our records 
show no other formal disciplinary actions against respondent in thirteen years of 
practice. 
11 
 
Accordingly, we hold that respondent be suspended from the practice of law 
for a period of six months, with the suspension stayed on the condition that 
respondent not be found, in the future, to have violated any of the Disciplinary 
Rules. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
RESNICK, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and COOK, J., would suspend respondent for one year with six 
months stayed and order monitoring. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., would suspend respondent for six months without stay.