Case Title: Blake v. Hometown America Communities, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12902

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-11-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12902 
 
MAUREEN BLAKE & others1  vs.  HOMETOWN AMERICA 
COMMUNITIES, INC., & another.2 
 
 
 
Bristol.     September 9, 2020. - November 24, 2020. 
 
Present:  Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Manufactured Housing Community.  Practice, Civil, Summary 
judgment, Class action, Damages, Attorney's fees.  Consumer 
Protection Act, Landlord and tenant, Class action, Damages.  
Contract, Lease of real estate.  Landlord and Tenant, Rent.  
Damages, Consumer protection case, Attorney's fees. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Southeast Division of the 
Housing Court Department on September 28, 2012. 
 
 
A motion for class certification was heard by Anne Kenney 
Chaplin, J.; and motions for summary judgment were heard by 
Wilbur P. Edwards, Jr., J., the remaining issues were heard by 
him, and a motion for reconsideration was also heard by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 Richard Blake, Barbara Craw, Jennifer Crowley-Rhodes, Pat 
A. Henry, Nancy Joseph, Linda McCarey, James McDonald, Cindy A. 
McKenna, Timothy Robinson, and Oakhill Community Residents 
Association, Inc. 
 
 
2 Hometown Oakhill, LLC. 
2 
 
 
 
Robert Kraus for the defendants. 
 
Peter V. Tekippe for the plaintiffs. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Brian J. O'Donnell & Ethan R. Horowitz for Manufactured 
Home Federation of Massachusetts, Inc., & others. 
 
Patrick T. Voke, Shanna M. Boughton, & Justin L. Amos for 
Manufactured Housing Institute. 
 
Jeffrey w. Hallahan, II, for Massachusetts Manufactured 
Housing Association, Inc. 
 
Daniel A. Less, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
Attorney General. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  Under § 32L (2) of the Manufactured Housing 
Act, G. L. c. 140, §§ 32A-32S (act), "[a]ny rule or change in 
rent which does not apply uniformly to all manufactured home 
residents of a similar class shall create a rebuttable 
presumption that such rule or change in rent is unfair."  In the 
instant case, the defendants, the new owners of a manufactured 
home community, charged those who had rented their lots after 
the defendants purchased the community ninety-six dollars per 
month more for lot rent than those who had rented their lots 
before the change in ownership, even though the lots were 
essentially if not exactly the same.  A group of ten people who 
were paying the additional lot rent brought suit, and a class 
was certified without opposition. 
 
A judge in the Housing Court determined that the additional 
rent for essentially the same lot was a violation of § 32L (2).  
We affirm, as we reject the owners' argument that time of entry 
into a lot rental agreement renders the renters dissimilar under 
3 
 
 
the statute.  If this were the case, every time a new lot lease 
were entered into, a higher rent could be charged.  Such a 
reading of the statute would defeat its purpose, which is to 
provide relatively uniform, stable, long-term lease and 
community cost-sharing arrangements for those renting 
manufactured housing lots. 
 
We do, however, reverse and remand the case to the Housing 
Court to reconsider a different judge's class certification 
decisions.  Although there was no opposition to the 
certification of the class, and we conclude that a class was 
properly certified, the judge erred in requiring class members 
to opt in.  "Opt-in" classes are contrary to the purpose of 
class action suits and our consumer protection statute, and they 
are not permitted under Mass. R. Civ. P. 23, as amended, 471 
Mass. 1491 (2015), or G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (2). 
 
The subclassifications for damages calculations also 
require reconsideration, as the judge who conducted a trial on 
damages considered improper factors.  In the instant case, the 
owners of the manufactured housing community increased the rent 
on lots whose only distinguishing characteristic was that the 
lease began after the change in ownership.  Therefore, the judge 
should have certified a class defined by the time of entry into 
rental agreements -- that is, post-ownership versus pre-
ownership -- to address this statutory violation.  Moreover, the 
4 
 
 
judge should have awarded damages for class members on the basis 
of who paid the ninety-six dollars more per month in rent, in 
whole or part, for a lot that was essentially the same as a lot 
renting for ninety-six dollars less.3 
 
1.  Background and procedural history.  The defendants 
operate a manufactured housing community in Attleboro.  After 
acquiring the property on which the community rests in January 
of 2006, the defendants uniformly increased lot rent on new lot 
rental agreements by ninety-six dollars.  That meant that those 
who entered into lot rental agreements after the change in 
ownership paid ninety-six dollars per month more to rent a lot 
than those who entered into such agreements before the change in 
ownership, even though the lots rented were of similar sizes and 
had similar amenities. 
 
In September 2012, ten named plaintiffs filed a complaint 
seeking relief under § 32L (2) and G. L. c. 93A. The plaintiffs 
were described in the complaint as "residents" and "tenants" of 
the defendants in the community, as such terms are defined in 
940 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.01 (1996).  The regulations define a 
"[r]esident" as "any person who normally resides in a 
                                                          
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by Manufactured 
Home Federation of Massachusetts, Inc.; Sandcastle Mobile Home 
Owners Association, Inc.; and 739 Homeowners Association, Inc.; 
by Manufactured Housing Institute; by Massachusetts Manufactured 
Housing Association, Inc.; and by the Attorney General. 
5 
 
 
manufactured home in a manufactured housing community, 
regardless of whether or not he or she has an occupancy 
agreement with the operator," and a "[t]enant" as "a person who 
has an occupancy agreement or oral tenancy agreement with an 
operator for the use and occupancy of a manufactured home site, 
common areas, facilities, and other appurtenant rights."  Id.  
The act also refers to both tenants and residents, providing 
protections for both.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 140, § 32J 
(prohibiting no-cause evictions and requiring extensive 
procedural protections for residents prior to actual eviction); 
G. L. c. 140, § 32P (requiring bona fide, good faith offers of 
five-year leases to tenants). 
 
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' creation and 
maintenance of two separate classes of rent violated § 32L (2) 
by creating a "change in rent which does not apply uniformly to 
all manufactured home residents of a similar class," and that, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 140, § 32L (7), they were due damages under 
G. L. c. 93A.  A judge in the Housing Court (class certification 
judge), without opposition, certified a class consisting of 
"individual unit owners who reside within Hometown America 
Communities Oak Hill Park and who acquired the units after 
February 1, 2006."  The class certification judge also ordered 
that a letter be sent to potential class members, giving them a 
sixty-day period to opt in or out of the class. 
6 
 
 
 
The parties cross-moved for summary judgment in December 
2014.  A second Housing Court judge granted the plaintiffs' 
motion for summary judgment, while denying the defendants' 
motion.  In October 2015, the defendants filed a motion for 
reconsideration, presenting expert affidavits and requesting the 
opportunity to rebut the statutory presumption that "[a]ny rule 
or change in rent which does not uniformly apply to all 
manufactured home residents of a similar class . . . is unfair."  
G. L. c. 140, § 32L (2).  The judge denied this motion. 
 
In December 2016, the second judge conducted a trial that 
focused primarily on evidence regarding damages.  In July 2017, 
the court issued a judgment granting damages to the plaintiffs 
and dividing the class members into five different subclasses.4  
At the end of trial, the judge also had granted the defendants' 
request for a directed finding in their favor as to the 
                                                          
 
 
4 The second Housing Court judge created the following 
subclasses:  individuals who resided in their unit and paid the 
excess monthly rent; individuals who resided with a coowner who 
did not opt into the action; individuals who rented their unit 
for at least a portion of time to a third party; individuals 
whose status was determined by "a combination of factors such as 
co-ownership, rental during a period of time, statute of 
limitations or similar factors"; and individuals who failed to 
opt into the class, were found to not have an interest in the 
manufactured housing unit, failed to testify, or did not testify 
credibly. 
 
7 
 
 
plaintiffs' allegation that the defendants' violation of G. L. 
c. 93A was willful and knowing.5 
 
The plaintiffs requested $104,850.30 in attorney's fees and 
costs.  The defendants opposed this motion, objecting to 
specific requests for certain itemized fees.  In December 2017, 
the second judge awarded $87,800.30 in attorney's fees and costs 
to the plaintiffs, reducing the amount of attorney's fees and 
costs originally requested in response to the defendants' 
motion. 
 
The defendants appealed to the Appeals Court from the 
ruling granting the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and 
denying the defendants' motion for reconsideration.  The 
plaintiffs cross-appealed from the determination of damages with 
regard to certain individuals in the class and the second 
judge's decision at trial not to allow the admission of certain 
evidence. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Summary judgment.  "We review a grant 
of summary judgment de novo to determine 'whether, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all 
material facts have been established and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'"  DeWolfe v. Hingham 
                                                          
 
 
5 The plaintiffs have not appealed from the ruling that the 
defendants' violation of G. L. c. 93A was not willful and 
knowing.  Therefore, we do not address it. 
8 
 
 
Centre, Ltd., 464 Mass. 795, 799 (2013), quoting Juliano v. 
Simpson, 461 Mass. 527, 529–530 (2012).  When reviewing a 
decision on cross motions for summary judgment, the evidence is 
reviewed in the light most favorable to the unsuccessful party, 
here, the defendants.  Rawan v. Continental Cas. Co., 483 Mass. 
654, 655 (2019).  The court must determine whether, in viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendants, the 
plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id. at 
662. 
 
The defendants contend that, under G. L. c. 140, § 32L (2), 
the plaintiffs may be charged more in rent because they entered 
into a lot rental agreement at a later time.  The defendants 
argue that the timing of entry into lot rental agreements 
renders the plaintiffs not in a "similar class" under the 
statute, even if the lots rented are essentially the same with 
the same amenities.  This contention is incorrect. 
 
"[T]he duty of statutory interpretation rests ultimately 
with the courts" (citation omitted).  Souza v. Registrar of 
Motor Vehicles, 462 Mass. 227, 230 (2012), and cases cited.  We 
interpret a statute based on the intent of the Legislature, 
ascertained from "all the statute's words, 'construed by the 
ordinary and approved usage of the language' and 'considered in 
connection with the cause of its enactment . . . and the main 
object to be accomplished'" (citation omitted).  Meyer v. Veolia 
9 
 
 
Energy N. Am., 482 Mass. 208, 211 (2019).  "Our principal 
objective is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the 
Legislature in a way that is consonant with 'common sense and 
sound reason'" (citation omitted).  Id. at 212.  The Attorney 
General is authorized to interpret § 32L (2), and therefore, 
"her interpretation is entitled to substantial deference, unless 
it is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute."  
Boelter v. Selectmen of Wayland, 479 Mass. 233, 242 (2018), 
citing Smith v. Winter Place LLC, 447 Mass. 363, 367-368 (2006).  
See G. L. c. 140, § 32S (granting power to implement 
interpretative regulations to Attorney General). 
 
As mentioned, § 32L (2) provides that "[a]ny rule or change 
in rent which does not apply uniformly to all manufactured home 
residents of a similar class shall create a rebuttable 
presumption that such rule or change in rent is unfair."  
Charging different amounts of rent for essentially the same lot 
appears to violate the uniformity presumption presented by the 
plain language of the statute.  Although different lot sizes or 
amenities would clearly divide the residents into different 
classes, time of rental does not appear to defeat the uniformity 
principle contained within the statute.  If every time a lot 
turned over, a different class were created, there would be no 
uniformity whatsoever. 
10 
 
 
 
The act and its regulations also prioritize distributing 
manufactured housing fees and costs evenly.  See G. L. c. 140, 
§ 32G (mandating each home owner pay uniform license fee, rather 
than variable property taxes); Wright v. Peabody, 331 Mass. 161, 
164-165 (1954) (§ 32G, requiring uniform license fees per lot, 
is adequate way of protecting community owners from paying 
another's property tax); 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.05(4)(b)-(c) 
(1996) (operator shall supply and pay for water, sewage 
disposal, and basic utilities, and may recoup these costs 
through nondiscriminatory rent increases); 940 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 10.03(2)(e) (1996) (prohibiting per capita occupant fees 
except where such fees relate to actual costs and conform rent 
to that of resident households with same number of adult 
occupants). 
More generally, the act also prioritizes maintaining 
manufactured housing communities as affordable housing options 
by protecting residents from unfair practices or arbitrary 
distribution of operating costs.  Section 32L (2) clearly states 
this concern by creating a presumption that nonuniform rents for 
similar classes of residents are unfair.  The act as a whole 
protects residents against evictions, park closures, and 
monopolies on services.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 140, § 32J 
(prohibiting no-cause evictions and requiring extensive 
procedural protections for residents prior to actual eviction); 
11 
 
 
G. L. c. 140, § 32L (3) (prohibiting operators from restricting 
residents in their choice of providers of fuel, goods, services, 
and accessories and from instituting unreasonable insurance 
requirements); G. L. c. 140, § 32L (7A) (mandating community 
operators to provide notice and relocation costs upon closure of 
community); G. L. c. 140, § 32R (providing residents with right 
of first refusal upon sale of community). 
Indeed, the vulnerability of manufactured home residents 
and the need for their protection resound throughout the 
legislative history.  The Office of the Attorney General 
supported the enactment of the 1973 amendments to the act, which 
included the adoption of § 32L (2), see St. 1973, c. 1007, § 2, 
by stressing the importance of "comprehensive protection to the 
owners of mobile homes, which protection has until this time 
been lacking under our statutes."  Letter from Assistant 
Attorney General Walter Mayo to Edward Morrow, Legislative 
Secretary to the Governor (Nov. 1, 1973). 
When the 1993 amendments were passed, the Attorney General 
wrote: 
"Because manufactured housing offers the opportunity of 
relatively low-cost homeownership, it has increasingly 
attracted low-income, particularly elderly and single-
parent, families in need of affordable housing.  However, 
due to the unique characteristics of manufactured housing, 
wherein the resident owns his own home but rents the cement 
pad and lot upon which it sits, standard residential 
landlord-tenant law fails to sufficiently protect the 
tenants of these communities. . . .  Because of their 
12 
 
 
inability to move elsewhere, residents are often subjected 
to unfair rules and other restrictions on their lives that 
would never be tolerated in any other residential 
community." 
 
Letter from Attorney General Scott Harshbarger to Governor 
William Weld (Aug. 10, 1993). 
Upon signing the bill into law, the Governor explicitly 
referenced "the urgent need to address a crisis faced by a large 
number of elderly and low-income residents of mobile home 
parks," and the "urgent necessity of protecting the affordable 
housing option which manufactured housing communities offer to 
residents of the Commonwealth."  Letter from Governor William 
Weld to the Legislature (Aug. 13, 1993). 
Although we have not specifically addressed § 32L (2),6 we 
have echoed the more general concern about the vulnerability and 
need for protection of manufactured home residents.  In 
Greenfield Country Estates Tenants Ass'n, Inc. v. Deep, 423 
Mass. 81, 83 (1996), we stated, "Both the Legislature and the 
courts of the Commonwealth have recognized that manufactured 
housing communities provide a viable, affordable housing option 
                                                          
 
 
6 We have discussed § 32L (2) only once before in passing, 
when the owner of a manufactured housing community challenged 
the rent control bylaw adopted by the town of Chelmsford.  
Chelmsford Trailer Park, Inc. v. Chelmsford, 393 Mass. 186 
(1984).  Our analysis there did not interpret § 32L, but simply 
stated that "[i]n granting or denying adjustments [to rent], 
. . . the rent board must be mindful of the provision of G. L. 
c. 140, § 32L (2)."  Id. at 193. 
13 
 
 
to many elderly persons and families of low and moderate income, 
who are often lacking in resources and deserving of legal 
protection." 
In sum, the language and legislative history of § 32L (2) 
provide for a presumption of uniform treatment and protection of 
the low income residents of manufactured housing communities, 
new and old.  Nowhere does the text or legislative history of 
the statute indicate that a turnover in a lot lease would create 
a new class of resident and subject that new resident to paying 
more rent than others for the same lot.  If every such change 
created a new class of resident, and allowed unrestricted rent 
increases, there would be no uniformity and no protection. 
 
The defendants argue that a settlement agreement negotiated 
by the Attorney General, the rent control board of Chelmsford, 
and a manufactured park owner in 1987, which encompassed a 
master lease, demonstrates the Attorney General's interpretation 
of the act, which is entitled to some deference.  See 
Commonwealth vs. James DeCotis, Mass. Super. Ct., No. 87-7160 
(Suffolk County 1987).  We conclude that the settlement 
agreement is not binding and that the Attorney General's 
guidance, including its contemporaneous interpretation of the 
act and its amendments discussed above, and the Attorney 
General's most recent advisories, do not support the defendants' 
14 
 
 
position that any turnover in rent creates a different class of 
resident. 
 
The parties in the 1987 case agreed to the following 
language in the master lease: 
"Whenever a tenant of his own volition vacates, removes the 
mobile home from his lot, transfers or sells his or her 
mobile home for other than nominal monetary consideration 
to an immediate family member or is evicted pursuant to 
legal proceedings, a new tenant shall be regarded as a 
member of a dissimilar class for the purpose of construing 
[G. L. c. 140, § 32L (2)]." 
 
 
This settlement agreement, however, is just that -- a 
settlement agreement.  It creates no legal precedent, either by 
its nature or by its own terms.  It explicitly states:  "The 
Master Lease Agreement set forth below is part of a multi-
faceted settlement that has been achieved by all of the above 
litigants.  It is not intended to create nor shall it create any 
financial, legal or other obligations on the part of the 
COMMONWEALTH and/or TENANTS ASSOCIATION under the Master Lease 
but merely to have the aforesaid class action tenant 
representatives bind the present and future tenants of PARK."  
The parties in this case are not part of said class, and have 
reached no such agreement.  We are also cognizant that the 
settlement agreement concerned a community that was part of a 
rent control district.  Consequently, there were other 
significant protections in place governing increases in rent. 
15 
 
 
 
In regard to deference to the Attorney General more 
generally, we emphasize that the Attorney General submitted an 
amicus letter to this court explicitly stating that the master 
lease settlement "did not amount to an official interpretation 
of [§ 32L (2)] to the effect that new and present tenants are 
always 'dissimilar.'" 
 
The Attorney General's amicus letter further points to the 
regulations at 940 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 10.00 (1996) and the 
Attorney General's guide to the act for an "actual 
interpretation of § 32L (2)."  The Attorney General's guide 
explicitly references § 32L (2)'s use of the term "similar 
class" only once, stating that, "[i]n general, any change in 
rent must be applied uniformly to all residents of a similar 
class.  A rent increase that is not applied uniformly to 
residents who receive similar services and have similar lot 
sizes may be unfair under the [act]."  Attorney General's Guide 
to Manufactured Housing Community Law 24 (Nov. 2017).  The 
regulations refer to "non-discriminatory rent increases."  940 
Code Mass. Regs. §§ 10.01, 10.05(4)(c), 10.05(8) (1996).  The 
Attorney General indicates that, together, these interpretations 
of the act indicate that the determination of a similar class 
under § 32L (2) is "a fact-specific inquiry that principally 
relates to the nature of the residents' lots and the services 
they receive," although it is possible that such an inquiry 
16 
 
 
could lead to a determination that charging new residents a 
higher rent might be fair "based on . . . particular 
circumstances."  All of this guidance is consistent with our 
interpretation of § 32L (2). 
 
In light of the text of the statute as a whole, the 
Attorney General's guidance, and the legislative history, we 
hold that time of entry into an occupancy agreement does not 
create a dissimilar class under § 32L (2).  Such an 
interpretation would allow a manufactured housing community 
operator to completely circumvent § 32L (2) by creating a new 
class each time a new lease is signed, and remove the 
protections that the statute offers against unfair and non-
uniform changes in rent.  See Casseus v. Eastern Bus Co., 478 
Mass. 786, 801 (2018) ("An interpretation that causes a statute 
to have no practical effect is absurd" [quotation, alteration, 
and citation omitted]). 
 
This interpretation does not in any way suggest that rent 
can never be raised in manufactured housing communities.  We 
recognize, as did the Legislature, that manufactured housing 
owners will not create or preserve such low income housing 
communities if they cannot get an adequate return on their 
investment and recoup the additional costs imposed by the 
passage of time.  As the Governor stated in his signing 
statement, "It is my hope that this act will assist both 
17 
 
 
manufactured home community tenants and owners by making 
manufactured housing communities in the Commonwealth a more 
secure and affordable investment."  Letter from Governor William 
Weld to the Legislature (Aug. 13, 1993).  Although the act 
stresses uniformity and stability, especially in its requirement 
that leases of five years be offered, it does not interfere with 
the determination of fair market rental rates within a given 
five-year period or at the turnover of a five-year period, so 
long as such rates are uniform for similar classes of lots.7  
Community owners and operators have been, and continue to be, 
free to enter into fair occupancy agreements so long as they do 
not discriminate between similar classes of residents. 
 
b.  Motion for reconsideration.  We briefly address the 
defendants' motion for reconsideration, in which they provided 
information on "vacancy deregulation," or "vacancy decontrol," a 
method by which regulated rents can account for changes in 
residency after establishing a rent by the change of time.  
According to the defendants, this evidence "demonstrated the 
plain error of the original decision and manifest injustice that 
would result." 
                                                          
 
 
7 Title 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.03(5) (1996) notes that 
operators are responsible for offering five-year leases at fair 
market rental rates.  These rates are "subject to any applicable 
rent control restrictions" and do not replace or supersede 
applicable rent control laws. 
18 
 
 
 
A motion for reconsideration "should specify (1) 'changed 
circumstances' such as (a) newly discovered evidence or 
information, or (b) a development of relevant law; or (2) a 
particular and demonstrable error in the original ruling or 
decision."  Audubon Hill S. Condominium Ass'n v. Community Ass'n 
Underwriters of Am., Inc., 82 Mass. App. Ct. 461, 470 (2012), 
citing Peterson v. Hopson, 306 Mass. 597, 600 (1940).  In 
reviewing a decision to deny a motion for reconsideration, this 
court reviews for an abuse of discretion.  See Commissioner of 
Revenue v. Comcast Corp., 453 Mass. 293, 303, 312-313 (2009). 
 
We discern no abuse of discretion here.  The defendants' 
motion presented no evidence or argument that could not have 
been presented prior to summary judgment.  "There is no error in 
the denial of a motion that merely seeks, as this one did, a 
'second bite at the apple.'"  Liberty Square Dev. Trust v. 
Worcester, 441 Mass. 605, 611 (2004).  See Littles v. 
Commissioner of Correction, 444 Mass. 871, 878 (2005) ("if there 
is no material change in circumstances, a judge is not obliged 
to reconsider a case, issue, or question of law after it has 
been decided").  Much of the additional evidence and argument 
also related to law and practice in California, not 
Massachusetts.  Nonetheless, the second judge considered and 
rejected the argument, concluding that it oversimplified the 
basis of his decision and did not change his essential 
19 
 
 
reasoning.  Most importantly, there was no plain error of fact 
or law in the original ruling, as the judge's reading of the 
statute was correct. 
 
c.  Class certification.  The plaintiffs moved for class 
certification pursuant to G. L. c. 93A, § 9, and Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 23.8  The motion was not opposed.  The only dispute was 
whether to require an opt-in class.  After a hearing, the motion 
for class certification was allowed.  The class certification 
judge then provided for a sixty-day notice period.  The judge 
ruled that "[s]aid notice shall inform potential class members 
that they must act affirmatively in order to 'opt into' the 
class."  The decision to certify a class was correct.  Requiring 
class members to opt in was not. 
 
"With respect to both rule 23 and G. L. c. 93A, we review a 
grant or denial of class certification for an abuse of 
discretion."  Bellermann v. Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co., 470 
Mass. 43, 51 (2014), citing Salvas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 452 
Mass. 337, 361 (2008), and Moelis v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 
451 Mass. 483, 486 (2008).  Although the standards for class 
certification under rule 23 and G. L. c. 93A differ, class 
                                                          
 
 
8 Rule 23 of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure 
governs class action procedures in Massachusetts generally.  
General Laws c. 93A, § 9, provides additional guidance on class 
actions in the consumer protection context. 
 
20 
 
 
certification was not opposed here, and regardless, the 
standards for class certification under either rule 23 or G. L. 
c. 93A are satisfied.9  Class certification was appropriate.  The 
class certification judge erred, however, in requiring the 
plaintiffs to opt into the class, and in defining the class as 
resident owners. 
 
This court previously addressed the issue of opt-in classes 
in Sullivan v. First Mass. Fin. Corp., 409 Mass. 783 (1991).  In 
that case, the trial court judge ruled that those "who wished to 
join the class that he had certified could do so only by 
affirmatively opting to join it."  Id. at 789.  We rejected this 
requirement, explaining, "Massachusetts law does not allow an 
'opt in' class any more than it allows an 'opt out' class."  Id. 
at 790.  See Fletcher v. Cape Cod Gas Co., 394 Mass. 595, 602 
                                                          
 
 
9 "[T]he requirements for class certification under the 
statutory class action provision in [G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (2),] are 
easier to satisfy than under Mass. R. Civ. P. 23."  Feeney v. 
Dell Inc., 454 Mass. 192, 201 (2009).  See Aspinall v. Philip 
Morris Cos., 442 Mass. 381, 391-392 (2004) ("similarly situated" 
and "similar injury" requirements of G. L. c. 93A should not be 
equated with rule 23 [a]'s similarity requirements, where 
reading "traditional technicalities" into statute would "impede 
the accomplishment of substantial justice" [citation omitted]); 
Baldassari v. Public Fin. Trust, 369 Mass. 33, 40 (1975) (G. L. 
c. 93A omits rule 23 requirements that "common questions 
'predominate' over individual questions and that the class 
action be 'superior' to other available methods").  Here, the 
plaintiffs satisfy even the stricter requirements of rule 23, as 
their claimed injuries are nearly identical, center on a single 
question of law, and are most effectively dealt with through a 
class action.  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 23 (a), (b). 
21 
 
 
(1985) ("There are no provisions in our rule 23 or [G. L. 
c. 93A, § 9 (2),] which would permit a judge to allow individual 
parties to 'opt out' of a class action").  The class 
certification judge therefore committed an error of law by 
requiring that plaintiffs opt in before certifying the class or 
finding liability.10 
 
The reasons for not requiring opt-in classes have been well 
explained by the Federal courts as they considered changes to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.11  Those with small claims may often lack the 
financial incentive or legal understanding to opt in.  As the 
United States Supreme Court stated:  "Requiring a plaintiff to 
affirmatively request inclusion would probably impede the 
prosecution of those class actions involving an aggregation of 
small individual claims, where a large number of claims are 
required to make it economical to bring suit. . . .  The 
plaintiff's claim may be so small, or the plaintiff so 
unfamiliar with the law, that he would not file suit 
individually, nor would he affirmatively request inclusion in 
                                                          
 
 
10 In the case before us, no plaintiffs opted out of the 
class.  We therefore address only the prohibition of opt-in 
classes.  We do not address here the prohibition of "opt-out" 
classes, which may raise different issues regarding the binding 
effects of class actions on members. 
 
 
11 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was 
originally enacted in 1938 and amended in 1966. 
22 
 
 
the class if such a request were required by the Constitution."  
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812-813 (1985). 
 
Indeed, we can trace this reasoning back to the Reporter of 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Benjamin Kaplan, who would later serve on 
this court.  He wrote in an often-cited article:  "[R]equiring 
the individuals affirmatively to request inclusion in the 
lawsuit would result in freezing out the claims of people -- 
especially [those with] small claims . . . -- who for one reason 
or another, ignorance, timidity, unfamiliarity with business or 
legal matters, will simply not take the affirmative step."  
Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee:  1966 Amendments 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 
356, 397–398 (1967).12,13  We agree with this reasoning and stress 
                                                          
 
 
12 This specific reasoning has been cited in multiple 
Federal and State cases.  See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 
U.S. at 813 n.4; Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120, 124 (2d 
Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1034 (2005); Cox v. American 
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1557 (11th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank of 
Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1201 n.18 (11th Cir. 1985); Robinson v. 
Union Carbide Corp., 544 F.2d 1258, 1262 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977) (Wisdom, J., concurring); 
Hypertouch, Inc. v. Superior Court, 128 Cal. App. 4th 1527, 1548 
(2005); Hale v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 231 S.W.3d 215, 231 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2007). 
 
 
13 Kaplan's article reviews the 1966 amendments of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Prior to these amendments, 
Federal courts consistently applied an opt-in requirement to 
class actions, although no such requirement was explicit in the 
previous version.  See Note, Opt-in Class Actions Under the 
FLSA, EPA, and ADEA:  What Does It Mean to Be "Similarly 
Situated"?, 38 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 95, 96 (2004) (discussing 
23 
 
 
its importance particularly in consumer class actions brought 
pursuant to G. L. c. 93A. 
 
General Laws c. 93A reflects "a strong public policy in 
favor of the aggregation of small consumer protection claims," 
so that harmful practices are litigated and corrected even where 
individual plaintiffs might not be incentivized to take action.  
Feeney v. Dell Inc., 454 Mass. 192, 201–203 (2009).  Requiring 
opt-in classes would weaken the consumer protection statute's 
ability to deter those in violation of the statute by 
constraining class participation and limiting liability, and 
thereby "impede the accomplishment of substantial justice," 
particularly with regard to consumers who may lack the financial 
                                                          
 
practice of upholding opt-in classes under 1938 rule); Spahn, 
Resurrecting the Spurious Class:  Opting-in to the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act and the Equal Pay Act through 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 71 Geo. L.J. 119, 127-131 (1982) 
(discussing de facto opt-in requirements of certain class action 
suits under 1938 rule).  When drafting the amended rules, "[t]he 
Advisory Committee specifically rejected the practice of forcing 
absent class members to opt into a [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 23 class 
action to secure its benefits."  Cox, 784 F.2d at 1557.  
Multiple Federal courts have since held that, in light of the 
clear difference between the amended Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and 
Federal statutes that do explicitly require opt-in classes, opt-
in classes are impermissible under the modern Federal rule 23.  
See, e.g., Ackal v. Centennial Beauregard Cellular, L.L.C., 700 
F.3d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 2012); Kern, 393 F.3d at 126.  General 
Laws c. 93A, § 9 (2), and Mass. R. Civ. P. 23 were each "written 
in the light of" Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, after courts had ceased to 
require and begun to deny opt-in classes.  Baldassari, 369 Mass. 
at 40.  We do note, however, that this interpretation of the 
Federal rule is not unanimous.  Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 
647 F.2d 388, 394-395 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that judge did not 
abuse his discretion by certifying opt-in class). 
24 
 
 
incentive or legal understanding to opt into a class.  
Baldassari v. Public Fin. Trust, 369 Mass. 33, 40-41 (1975).  
The result of the opt-in requirement in this case was to leave a 
number of potential class members who were damaged by the 
defendants' actions without compensation.  We hold that G. L. 
c. 93A, § 9 (2), and Mass. R. Civ. P. 23 do not permit a judge 
to require that plaintiffs opt into a class.14 
 
We also modify the class certified to reflect the relevant 
statutory considerations.  Section 32L (2) is directed at unfair 
changes in rent for lots that are similar.  As explained above, 
the time of entry into lot rental agreements does not justify 
dissimilar rent for similar lots.  In light of this reading of 
the statute, the correct class to certify in the instant case 
was those who paid rent on lots where the lease agreements tied 
to those lots began after the defendants took over the 
community. 
                                                          
 
 
14 Massachusetts law forbidding the requirement of opt-in 
classes before liability is established does not preclude a 
judge from fashioning practical orders that require class 
members to take responsive action in order to be compensated 
after liability has been found.  General Laws c. 93A, § 9 (2), 
provides a judge with discretion to fashion notice of an action 
to unnamed petitioners "in the most effective practicable 
manner," and to provide "notice of any proposed dismissal, 
settlement, or compromise" to all class members "in such manner 
as the court directs."  Rule 23 (e) gives the judge discretion 
to promulgate orders that "establish[] a process for identifying 
and compensating members of the class." 
25 
 
 
 
We read the statute, particularly its reference to 
residents, to provide broad protection for those unlawfully 
required to pay such rent.  The members of the class need not 
own the manufactured housing unit, as appears to be the case in 
the class certification here.  The statute makes no reference to 
unit ownership.  Nor need they be tenants with formal lease 
arrangements.  The statute's express reference to residents is, 
we conclude, meant to be broadly inclusive, as residents are 
protected from unlawful rent increases even if they have not 
entered into formal lot rental agreements with the operator.15  
In sum, the class includes all of those who paid rent on lots 
with lease agreements beginning after the change in ownership. 
 
d.  Damages.  General Laws c. 140, § 32L (7), provides that 
"[f]ailure to comply with the provisions of [G. L. c. 140, 
§§ 32A-32S], inclusive, shall constitute an unfair or deceptive 
practice under the provisions of [G. L. c. 93A, § 2 (a)].  
Enforcement of compliance and actions for damages shall be in 
accordance with the applicable provisions of [G. L. c. 93A, 
§§ 4-10]."  Because the defendants have violated G. L. c. 140, 
§ 32L (2), damages are governed by G. L. c. 93A. 
                                                          
 
 
15 This reading of § 32L does not exclude from recovery 
nonresident tenants who did not pass on the cost of the 
additional lot rent to subtenants.  The statute's use of the 
term "resident" is meant to be inclusive, not exclusive, 
providing as much protection as possible to those who bear the 
actual burden of unfair rent changes. 
26 
 
 
 
The plaintiffs have brought an action under G. L. c. 93A, 
§ 9, which states that any person "who has been injured" by a 
violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 2, may bring an action for damages, 
and that "if the court finds for the petitioner, recovery shall 
be in the amount of actual damages or twenty-five dollars, 
whichever is greater."  G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (1), (3). 
 
The second Housing Court judge divided the plaintiffs into 
five separate subclasses for the determination of damages based 
on multiple factors, including whether they opted into the 
class, whether they owned the manufactured housing unit, whether 
they were cohabitants of the unit, whether they subleased the 
unit, whether they failed to testify, and whether the statute of 
limitations had expired.  We reverse and remand the damages 
classifications for the reasons stated infra. 
 
As discussed above, class certification was appropriate but 
the requirement that plaintiffs opt into the class was improper.  
Therefore, injured plaintiffs who were excluded on the basis of 
their failure to opt in were improperly denied damages.16  
Section 32L (2) is also not concerned with ownership of the 
                                                          
 
 
16 Requiring class members to take positive action, such as 
testifying, to remain in the suit was also problematic.  See 
Cox, 784 F.2d at 1556-1557 (dismissing passive plaintiffs for 
not complying with discovery order is functionally opt-in device 
contrary to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23).  Testimony may be necessary for 
allocation of damages, but should not have served as a basis for 
disqualification from the class. 
27 
 
 
manufactured housing unit, the number of people living in the 
unit, or intrafamily arrangements unrelated to rent payments.  
Classifications based on those considerations were improper. 
 
Every month since the defendants took ownership of the 
property, someone has paid an additional ninety-six dollars on 
lots leased after the change in ownership.  Those who have paid 
the additional ninety-six dollars per month for those lots have 
been injured and are entitled to compensation pursuant to G. L. 
c. 93A.17  Payment information should be readily available to the 
defendants, as they signed the lot rental agreements and 
received the lot rental payment.18  Nonetheless, some additional 
                                                          
 
 
17 Although under G. L. c. 260, § 5A, the statute of 
limitations for G. L. c. 93A actions is generally four years, 
the parties do not dispute that the defendants' violation of 
G. L. c. 140, § 32L (2), is a contract action and therefore has 
a six-year statute of limitations under G. L. c. 260, § 2.  See 
Calimlim v. Foreign Car Ctr., Inc., 392 Mass. 228, 236 (1984), 
quoting Linthicum v. Archambault, 379 Mass. 381, 383 (1979) 
("recovery under the Consumer Protection Act should be 'in 
addition to, and not an alternative to, traditional tort and 
contract remedies'").  Therefore, no damages can be recovered 
for the months in which the plaintiffs paid excess lot rent more 
than six years prior to the filing of the complaint. 
 
 
18 In their cross appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the 
second Housing Court judge erred when he did not allow the 
defendants' response to a particular interrogatory in evidence 
at trial.  That interrogatory required one of the defendants to 
identify every tenant that became a tenant after the defendants' 
acquisition of the manufactured home community.  In their 
response, the defendants incorporated the response to a request 
for production of documents, a rent roll listing a single name 
for each unit in the community that corresponded with the 
interrogatory.  Insofar as this answer provides information with 
28 
 
 
fact finding may be required to determine who was actually 
injured by the requirement of paying an additional ninety-six 
dollars per month for each lot.  This may not be clear if, for 
example, there were lot subleases, or other allocations of 
responsibilities for lot rental payments within each lot.19  
Where residents are bearing the cost of dissimilar rent, § 32L 
provides protection even when the residents are not signatories 
to the lot rental agreements.  A remand for recalculation and 
reallocation of damages is required, as a number of the factors 
considered and requirements imposed by the second judge in 
determining damages were incorrect. 
                                                          
 
regards to the lot rental agreements and lot rent, the court may 
consider it, and other evidence of rental payments, upon remand. 
 
 
19 As explained above, § 32L was designed to provide broad 
protection.  Residents were protected by the statute, not just 
tenants with formal lease arrangements.  Nothing in G. L. c. 93A 
precludes such protection.  With regard to subtenants, we note 
that the absence of privity of contract does not necessarily bar 
a claim under G. L. c. 93A, particularly if the parties can show 
that they "engaged in more than a minor or insignificant 
business relationship," for example, a formal assignment of lot 
rent responsibilities.  Standard Register Co. v. Bolton-Emerson, 
Inc., 38 Mass. App. Ct. 545, 551 (1995).  We have previously 
held that G. L. c. 93A is protective of third-party rights, even 
in the absence of privity.  See Rawan, 483 Mass. at 669 (noting 
that 1979 amendments to G. L. c. 93A and subsequent case law 
were "clear affirmations of third-party rights" [citation 
omitted]).  Recovery by subtenants who can show that they bore 
the cost of increased lot rent is consistent with both G. L. 
c. 93A's concern for consumers and the act's concern for low 
income residents. 
29 
 
 
 
e.  Attorney's fees.  A decision regarding attorney's fees 
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Gyulakian v. Lexus of 
Watertown, Inc., 475 Mass. 290, 305 n.24 (2016), quoting 
Fontaine v. Ebtec Corp., 415 Mass. 309, 324 (1993). 
 
The defendants oppose the awarding of attorney's fees for 
(1) preparation of a motion to compel depositions, when the 
depositions were mutually agreed upon; (2) work spent assessing 
damages that were ultimately rejected by the second judge; (3) 
time that was described in such a way that it was impossible to 
attribute that time to any particular task; and (4) trial time, 
which the defendants claim was excessive because the plaintiffs 
could have subpoenaed records to shorten the time for trial. 
 
An award of attorney's fees "is largely discretionary with 
the [trial] judge, who is in the best position to determine how 
much time was reasonably spent on a case, and the fair value of 
the attorney's services."  Fontaine, 415 Mass. at 324.  Further, 
the determination of reasonable attorney's fees and costs is a 
multifactor assessment of "the nature of the case and the issues 
presented, the time and labor required, the amount of damages 
involved, the result obtained, the experience, reputation and 
ability of the attorney, the usual price charged for similar 
services by other attorneys in the same area, and the amount of 
awards in similar cases."  Berman v. Linnane, 434 Mass. 301, 303 
30 
 
 
(2001), quoting Linthicum v. Archambault, 379 Mass. 381, 388-389 
(1979). 
 
Here, the plaintiffs initially requested attorney's fees 
and costs of $104,850.30.  After a hearing, the second judge 
issued a written decision with detailed findings that reduced 
the requested award by $17,050 to $87,800.30.  The defendants 
have provided no information in their brief that is sufficient 
to discern any abuse of discretion by the judge, particularly 
given that he has already taken note of the defendants' 
arguments and reduced the award of attorney's fees. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
determination that time of entry into a lot rental agreement 
does not render the renters dissimilar under G. L. c. 140, 
§ 32L (2), and thus the requirement that renters pay ninety-six 
dollars per month in additional rent for essentially the same 
lots was a violation of the statute.  We also affirm the 
decision to certify a class, but we reverse and remand to the 
Housing Court the class certification decisions, as the initial 
class definition requires further clarification and the 
subclasses created for the purposes of allocation of damages 
were erroneous. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.