Case Title: Herman v. Speed King Mfg. Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83-66

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1984-01-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Herman v. Speed King Mfg. Co.1984 WY 5675 P.2d 1271Case Number: 83-66Decided: 01/13/1984DONALD HERMAN AND SIBBLE HERMAN, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

SPEED KING MANUFACTURING COMPANY, A KANSAS CORPORATION, G & G MANUFACTURING COMPANY, A NEBRASKA CORPORATION, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
DONALD HERMAN AND SIBBLE 
HERMAN, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

SPEED KING MANUFACTURING 
COMPANY, A KANSAS CORPORATION, G & G MANUFACTURING COMPANY, A NEBRASKA 
CORPORATION, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, ConverseCounty, William A. Taylor, 
J.

Robert P. 
Chaloupka (argued) of Van Steenberg, Brower, Chaloupka, Mullin & Holyoke, 
Scottsbluff, Neb.; and Sue Davidson of Urbigkit & Whitehead, P.C., 
Cheyenne, for appellants.

Glenn A. 
Hottenstein (argued), of Guy, Williams, White & Argeris, Cheyenne, for appellee Speed King Mfg. 
Co.

G.G. Greenlee 
(argued), of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, for appellee G & G Mfg. 
Co.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and 
CARDINE, JJ. 

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
the judgment in an action seeking damages for a personal injury arising out of a 
farm accident allegedly caused when a PTO shaft malfunctioned. The case was 
tried without a jury. The court held that the appellants' negligence was equal 
to or greater than any fault on the part of the appellees and, therefore, 
entered judgment denying recovery.

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellants raise three 
issues:

"1. Did the Court err in 
failing to grant Appellants' request for a jury made at the time of the filing 
of their Amended Petition?

"2. Were the Findings of 
Fact, and the Judgment entered by [the] Court, so unsupported and against the 
great weight of the evidence that they should not stand?

"3. Did the trial court 
commit reversible error in refusing to admit certain portions of Appellants' 
evidence, and in admitting certain portions of Appellees['] evidence over timely 
objections by Appellants?"

[¶4.]     Appellant, Donald 
Herman, was severely injured in a farm accident involving a power take off 
(herein referred to as PTO) driven Speed King Auger. The PTO shaft was 
manufactured by appellee, G & G Manufacturing, and made part of a grain 
auger manufactured by appellee, Speed King Manufacturing Co. This particular PTO 
shaft was protected by a plastic safety shield.

[¶5.]     On the day of the 
accident, appellant Herman arrived at Dr. Cross' ranch to deliver a load of 
alfalfa pellets. He was driving a large, double axle truck and pulling a pup 
trailer. Both were full of the pellets. He used a Speed King Auger owned by Dr. 
Cross to unload the pellets into a granary located at the farm. The truck and 
trailer were equipped with traps which could be opened in order to allow the 
pellets to drain into an area from which they could be augered into the 
granary.

[¶6.]     At the time of the 
accident, the auger was protected by a plastic shield. It was not equipped with 
an implement master shield, which is a component of the auger rather than the 
PTO shaft. The implement master shield would protect against entanglements in 
the unshielded portion of the PTO universal joint where it connects to the 
auger. The plastic shield protects the auger itself.

[¶7.]     While appellant was 
unloading the feed, he leaned across the rotating PTO shaft to open a trap door 
in the bottom of a trailer. From this point on, it is not clear what happened. 
The appellant testified that as he grabbed the grain trap release lever, he felt 
his chest inadvertently contact the safety shield of the PTO shaft. He remembers 
nothing from that point. Dr. Cross testified that he saw the PTO shaft suddenly 
"scoop" Mr. Herman up and begin to beat him about the grain trailer. However, he 
also testified that the accident happened so quickly that he could not really 
say that he saw anything in regard to the shaft. Appellants' expert witness 
testified that in his opinion the PTO shaft destructed because of a process 
known as "resonance phenomena." He defines this cause as:

"Resonance phenomena 
simply means that a system, dynamic system, vibrates at a frequency or is being 
rotated at a frequency where the system would start to resonate such as music 
strings do and unless they're of adequate strength or dampening, this leads to 
failure."

[¶8.]     Speed King contended 
that it was impossible to know what caused the accident. However, they contend 
that the more probable cause was that the shaft had been deformed in a prior 
incident, that the safety shields had been removed before this accident, and 
therefore, when the plaintiff leaned over the unguarded shaft, he was picked up 
and thrown against the trailer. They contend that the shaft assembly was not 
defective. Appellee G & G Manufacturing proposed the argument that the 
accident was caused when Mr. Herman's right sleeve became entangled in the 
unguarded universal joint thereby pulling his body into the 
shaft.

[¶9.]     The burden is on the 
appellants to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary 
to a prima facie case. The trial court judge found that the PTO shaft was not 
defective when it left the possession of G & G, that it was not altered nor 
modified by Speed King, that it was not defective when finally affixed to the 
Speed King grain auger, and appellants did not meet their burden of 
proof.

I

RIGHT TO JURY 
TRIAL

[¶10.]  Appellants did not request a jury at the 
time of filing their original complaint. The trial judge recognized this 
omission and advised counsel by letter, fifteen months later, that, since no 
jury demand had been asserted, trial would be to the court. Appellants then 
presented a motion for leave to amend their complaint, which included a demand 
for a trial by jury. The judge allowed the amended complaint to be filed. 
However, he ruled that trial would be to the court because the jury demand was 
not timely. Appellants assert that the amended complaint contained new material, 
issues, and claims which of right are triable by jury. They contend that new and 
additional facts, developed throughout the period of discovery, were the basis 
for alternate additional claims under the theories of negligence, strict 
liability, breach of warranty, and for punitive damages.

[¶11.]  Rule 38(b)(1), W.R.C.P., 
states:

"Any party may demand a 
trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury by serving upon the other 
parties a demand therefor in writing at any time after the commencement of the 
action and not later than 10 days after service of the last pleading directed to 
such issue. Such demand may be endorsed upon a pleading of the 
party."

[¶12.]  Appellants would have us construe this 
rule as permitting a demand for a jury within ten days after any pleading which addresses the issue. 
Appellants assert that their amended complaint falls within this classification. 
However, we have consistently stated that:

"`"* * * Demand may be 
made within ten days after service of the amended or supplemental pleading for 
new issues raised by that pleading but the amendment does not revive a right, 
previously waived, to demand jury trial on the issues already framed by the 
original pleadings. Nor does the late demand create a right to jury trial on 
issues raised by the amended or supplemental pleadings if those issues were 
fairly raised by the original pleadings."'" Cates v. Daniels, Wyo., 628 P.2d 862, 865 (1981), quoting from Scherling v. Kilgore, Wyo., 
599 P.2d 1352, 1356 (1979).

[¶13.]  Amendments to the pleadings which do not 
change the issues do not revive a right to a jury trial. 5 Moore, Federal Practice § 
38.41 (2nd ed. 1948); Western Geophysical 
Co. of America, Inc. v. Bolt Associates, Inc., 440 F.2d 765 (2nd Cir. 1971); 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Civil § 
2320.

[¶14.]  However, if fundamental factual questions 
or new issues are stated in the amendment, a jury trial can be granted as to 
those new issues. The complaint, as originally filed in this case, set forth 
claims for relief based upon theories of negligence, breach of warranty, and 
strict liability. The amended complaint sets forth the same claims and contains 
also a claim for punitive damages. However, there were no new facts, nor any 
facts at all, which would justify a claim for punitive damages. Therefore, the 
allegations are similar, and the case upon the amended complaint was based on 
the same theories. We perceive no difference.

[¶15.]  If Rule 38(b)(1) is not complied with, 
Rule 38(d), W.R.C.P., comes into effect and states in 
part:

"The failure of a party 
to serve a demand as required by this rule and to file it as required by Rule 
5(d) constitutes a waiver by him of trial by jury. * * *"

 

There being no new facts 
nor issues contained in the amended complaint, the right to a jury trial was 
waived by not being timely filed. There was no error in the denial of a trial by 
jury.

II

WAS THE JUDGMENT 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE?

[¶16.]  On appeal, this court assumes that the 
evidence in favor of the successful party is true, leaving out of consideration 
entirely the evidence presented by the unsuccessful party. We will not 
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court unless that judgment is 
clearly erroneous and contrary to the great weight of the evidence. City of Rock 
Springs v. Police Protection Ass'n, Wyo., 610 P.2d 975 (1980); Barnette v. Doyle, Wyo., 
622 P.2d 1349 (1981).

[¶17.]  Appellants contend that ten of the 
fourteen findings of fact and two conclusions of law are not supported by the 
evidence in whole or in part. They are as follows:

"3. * * * The PTO shaft 
also was sold with a universal-joint shield, not in use at the time of the 
accident. * * *

"4. * * * The only 
eyewitness to the accident, Dr. Robert Cross, was vague in his memory of some 
circumstances surrounding the accident. His position at the time of the accident 
would have made it difficult for him to accurately observe the exact 
circumstances of the accident. There was little apparent damage to the plastic 
shield or tubing and steel PTO bar either as the result of the accident or as 
the result of the method used in straightening the PTO shaft after the 
accident.

"5. If the PTO shaft had 
been bent to an angle of 60 degrees there would have been significant damage to 
the plastic shield and the metal tubing.

* * * * * 
*

"8. The Court finds that 
the Defendant, Speed King, purchased 1100 identical shafts from G & G. Other 
than the instant case there have been no complaints or reports of failure or 
self destruction. * * *

"9. Speed King in 1972 
made certain tests of the PTO shaft. * * * The tests did not produce a 
distortion of the PTO shaft in the same manner as alleged to have occured [sic] 
in this case.

"10. The testing 
conducted by G & G did not result in failure of the PTO until the shaft was 
operated at an extension far beyond that recommended by the manufacturer and 
then did not produce the same distortion as here alleged.

"11. In reviewing the 
evidence there are numerous explanations for the accident occurring which were 
not considered by the experts in arriving at their conclusions, for example: 
over extension or disattachment of the shaft from the auger or the 
tractor.

"12. That this particular 
PTO shaft with auger had been in use a number of years and had been operated 
while over extended, had been dropped and dragged by a pickup during 
transportation, and had other wise [sic] been poorly 
maintained.

"13. Steel pins are 
original equipment used to attach the PTO shaft and auger assembly. At some 
period in time the pins had been replaced with nails.

"14. That the plaintiff 
had worked around PTO shafts and grain augers for a number of years and was 
aware of the inherent danger of this type of machinery but disregarded the 
danger in reaching over the PTO shaft to open the trap door beneath the 
trailer.

Conclusions of 
Law

* * * * * 
*

"5. The design of the PTO 
shaft is utilized by the PTO and auger industry throughout the country. There is 
no evidence before the court of a safer design * * *.

* * * * * 
*

"7. That the plaintiff's 
conduct was negligent, a misuse of the product and an assumption of risk, which 
fault was equal to or greater than any fault on the part of the defendants. * * 
*"

[¶18.]  The first finding of fact which 
appellants contend is not supported by the evidence is that the auger was sold 
with the master universal joint shield. The parties are not in dispute that the 
master universal joint shield was not in use at the time of the accident. 
However, appellants contend that the shield was not sold with the auger. There 
was evidence presented that the 1971 owner's manual showed the shield; that 
Speed King had engineering drawings of the shield; and that the packing list 
used by Speed King to pack the parts for shipment listed the shield. These items 
were in use prior to the purchase of the auger by Dr. Cross. Speed King's 
president testified that the master shield would have been packed with the 
packing box of parts for Speed King's auger not later than April 1971. Dr. Cross 
bought the auger in 1973. Applying our standard of review to these facts, there 
was sufficient evidence from which the district court judge could find that the 
auger was sold with a master universal joint shield.

[¶19.]  Appellants next argue that the finding of 
fact concerning the testimony of the eyewitness was not supported by the 
evidence. Appellants state that Dr. Cross was not vague in remembering the 
circumstances surrounding the accident and that his only problem in testifying 
was recalling how he separated the PTO shaft after the accident. Dr. Cross 
testified that he was underneath the truck, positioning a tire when the accident 
happened. He stated that he saw Don Herman's arm reach up to pull on the 
compartment and

"* * * all of a sudden 
things started happening and I saw him fly in the air. I saw his feet in the air 
and I could look up and I saw the auger jump out of the top of the granary and I 
knew the shaft bent. I didn't have to see it bend. * *"

[¶20.]  On cross-examination, portions of Dr. 
Cross' deposition were read in which he was asked,

"Before the accident 
happened, just before it happened, could you see him?"

Dr. Cross 
answered,

"I could, yes. It's just 
from memory. I'm not positive though."

When asked if he 
remembered seeing any part of Don Herman as opposed to all of him, he 
answered,

"Well, I can remember 
seeing - after the accident his feet were in the air and I quickly rushed around 
to the back of the truck * * *."

When asked if he 
could see the entire body or just the feet, his answer 
was,

"Well, I think I could 
see most of him, but I'm not positive. You know, I'm just assuming that I saw 
him. It's been so long ago."

[¶21.]  Part of Dr. Cross' testimony 
states

"Q. (By Mr. Greenlee) 
Isn't it true, Mr. - Dr. Cross, that you never saw Mr. Herman put any weight on 
the shaft?

"A. I assumed he did, but 
I didn't see him put weight on it.

"Q. And it's true, isn't 
it, that you weren't expecting anything to happen, so you weren't observing very 
well; isn't that so?

"A. That's 
right."

Viewing the 
evidence in a light most favorable to appellees, the trial judge could 
reasonably find that Dr. Cross' testimony concerning the accident was 
vague.

[¶22.]  Appellants next contend that the trial 
judge could not have found the PTO shaft had been bent to an angle of 60 
degrees. The evidence verifies the fact that the shaft was bent at an angle of 
approximately 120 degrees. Visual exhibits, drawings, and pictures were all 
presented showing the angle to be 120 degrees. It seems logical to conclude that 
the trial judge, in finding the angle of 60 degrees, was referring to the 
deformation of 60 degrees, the angle resulting from a comparison of the original 
position and the bent position. There was a great deal of testimony and visual 
exhibits concerning the angle. We conclude from a review of the record that, 
from the conflicting evidence, the trial judge could interpret that evidence and 
conclude as he did regarding the extent to which the shaft had 
bent.

[¶23.]  We do not feel it would be productive to 
go through each of the findings of fact which appellants contend are not 
supported by the evidence. The record is voluminous; there is considerable 
testimony by many witnesses, much of which was conflicting. The trial court was 
in a position to observe the witnesses, their demeanor on the stand, and to hear 
and weigh their testimony. The evidence was conflicting and often confusing. Krist v. Aetna Casualty&Surety, Wyo., 
667 P.2d 665 (1983). The court, if the case is tried without a jury, 
has:

"* * * the exclusive 
function of appraising credibility, determining the weight to be given to the 
testimony, drawing inferences from facts established, resolving conflicts in 
evidence, and reaching ultimate conclusions of fact. * * *" (Emphasis omitted.) 
Rasmussen Drilling, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee 
Nuclear Corp., 571 F.2d 1144, 1149 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 862, 99 S. Ct. 183, 58 L. Ed. 2d 171.

[¶24.]  Appellant was injured in an accident 
occurring while he was using a grain auger. However, this accident was not 
proven to be the result of any negligence or breach of duty by either appellee 
which was greater than the negligence of appellants. Although it is not clear 
exactly how the accident occurred, it is clear that the trial judge was not 
convinced of the theory propounded by appellants. After reading the record, we 
are persuaded that the court's analysis of the situation was in accord with the 
weight of the evidence. Considering the complicated nature of this case, the 
court did an admirable job. It was the trier of facts with the duty of weighing 
evidence, resolving conflicts, and making findings. There was evidence in every 
instance to support the court's findings; and, applying our standard for review, 
these findings will not be disturbed on appeal.

[¶25.]  Again we stress that a reviewing court 
does not provide an opportunity to attorneys to retry their cases. We do not 
redetermine conflicts in evidence.

III

ADMISSION OF 
EVIDENCE

[¶26.]  Appellants argue that their expert was 
not allowed to testify as to the standard of a reasonable and prudent 
manufacturer. However, the record indicates that appellants were allowed 
considerable leeway in putting on testimony to this effect. Thus, appellants' 
expert testified:

"Q. Do you have an 
opinion as to whether a reasonable and prudent manufacturer of PTO shafts should 
test in the design of those products for vibration?

"A. 
Yes.

"Q. What is 
that?

"A. It's my opinion that 
they should."

When appellees 
objected to the expert's answer that he had an opinion as to whether or not G 
& G acted as a reasonable and prudent manufacturer in 1971 or 1972, the 
objection was sustained because the court said:

"* * * I think he has 
answered the question, if not the exact wording of that question, certainly he 
has gone over that same territory at least two or three 
times."

Appellants' 
attorney answered:

"I certainly accept that. 
I just am trying to make sure that what I consider to be an essential element of 
the case has been covered and if your notes reflect that his opinion is that G 
and G did not meet that standard, then that is good enough for 
me."

Appellants were 
able to present this and other expert testimony in support of their case; it is 
simply that the trial judge did not find it to be sufficiently compelling when 
weighed against the other evidence.

[¶27.]  Appellants also argue that their expert 
should have been allowed to testify with regard to the design of plastic 
shields. Rule 702, W.R.E., states: 

"If scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."

[¶28.]  Foundation has been laid for the opinion 
of the expert when the qualification of the witness with respect to his 
knowledge or special experience is sufficiently established. This is a matter 
resting within the discretion of the trial court. We will not disturb that 
determination except in extreme cases. Elite Cleaners and Tailors, Inc. v. Gentry, 
Wyo., 510 P.2d 784 (1973); Taylor v. McDonald, Wyo., 409 P.2d 762 
(1966).

[¶29.]  Appellants' expert witness 
testified:

"Q. It's true, Mr. 
Sevart, that you do not consider yourself an expert in plastics; is that 
correct?

"A. That's 
correct.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. (By Mr. Greenlee) You 
never worked in the PTO industry as such, have you?

"A. I have never been 
employed by a company manufacturing PTO's; that's right.

"Q. And you have never 
consulted to a PTO manufacturer as an engineer.

"A. To a company that 
manufactures them?

"Q. Yes, 
sir.

"A. Only in the sense 
that that was part of - that the PTO was part of the equipment. I have had 
several clients over the years who have PTO shafts, but it's part of their 
equipment.

"Q. Your consulting had 
nothing to do with the PTO portion of the equipment.

"A. As far as any 
extension, that would be true."

The trial judge 
determined that sufficient foundation had not been laid to permit the witness to 
testify concerning the state of art in this industry, particularly in regard to 
plastic shields. Although the framers intended liberal application of the Rules 
of Evidence in considering receipt of opinion evidence, we cannot say that in 
this instance the exclusionary ruling was incorrect as a matter of law. There 
will be times when the witness is not qualified and the opinion should not be 
received. Appellants' expert had been allowed to testify exhaustively on many 
subjects relating to appellants' theory of the case. But in the last analysis, a 
witness must be qualified as an expert with regard to each area in which he 
offers testimony - here he was not. The trial court found he was an expert but 
not in this particular field.

[¶30.]  Finally, Rule 7.04, W.R.A.P., 
states:

"Any error, defect, 
irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be 
disregarded."

[¶31.]  Appellants have the burden of 
establishing that any error is prejudicial and, therefore, warrants reversal. Spilman v. State, Wyo., 633 P.2d 183 
(1981). In civil cases, we have said that

"* * * for an error to be 
harmful, there must be a reasonable possibility that in the absence of error the 
verdict might have been more favorable [to the losing party]. * * *" ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, Wyo., 632 P.2d 925, 935 
(1981).

Here the court 
received most of the expert's testimony, but excluded some of it. Appellants 
claim error in the court's rulings so as to require reversal in this 
case.

[¶32.]  It is not often that a ruling upon 
evidence of this kind constitutes reversible error. It is a small part of the 
total trial. In this case the trial to the court was lengthy and complicated. 
There was a vast amount of expert testimony adduced. Exclusion of the testimony 
complained of could hardly have affected the outcome. We can find no prejudice 
of the kind required nor has such prejudice been demonstrated by 
appellants.

[¶33.]  We will not address the second part of 
this issue, i.e., that the trial court erred in admitting certain portions of 
appellees' evidence over timely objections by appellants, because no cogent 
argument was presented. Holding's 
Little America v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of 
LaramieCty., Wyo., 
670 P.2d 699 (1983).

[¶34.]  The general principle is that where there 
is sufficient competent evidence to sustain a finding in a case tried by the 
court without a jury, admission or exclusion of incompetent evidence is not a 
ground for reversal. Arnold v. 
Jennings, 75 Wyo. 463, 296 P.2d 989 (1956). This case lasted a considerable 
amount of time; the record contained over fifteen hundred pages of testimony. 
After having read the transcript thoroughly, we conclude that there was 
substantial evidence to support the findings of the trial judge; that there was 
not error in the evidentiary rulings of the court; and that jury trial was 
waived by appellees' failure to timely file a jury demand. The judgment, 
therefor, is

[¶35.]  Affirmed.