Case Title: Commonwealth v. Caetano

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11718

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-03-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11718 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JAIME CAETANO. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     December 2, 2014. - March 2, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Firearms.  Constitutional Law, Right to bear arms.  Self-
Defense.  Practice, Criminal, Indictment placed on file. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Framingham Division 
of the District Court Department on September 30, 2011. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Robert V. Greco, J.; the 
case was heard by Martine G. Carroll, J., and a motion for 
sentencing was considered by her. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for the defendant. 
 
Michael A. Kaneb, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Keith G. Langer, for Commonwealth Second Amendment, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Eugene Volokh, of California, Michael E. Rosman & Michelle 
A. Scott, of the District of Columbia, & Lisa J. Steele, for 
Arming Women Against Rape & Endangerment, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
SPINA, J.  The defendant, Jaime Caetano, asks us to 
interpret the holdings of the United States Supreme Court in 
McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010), and District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008), to afford her a 
right under the Second Amendment to the United States 
Constitution to possess a stun gun in public for the purpose of 
self-defense.  The defendant was arrested for possession of a 
stun gun in a supermarket parking lot, claiming it was necessary 
to protect herself against an abusive former boy friend.  She 
now challenges the constitutionality of G. L. c. 140, § 131J, 
which bans entirely the possession of an electrical weapon with 
some exceptions not applicable here.  We hold that a stun gun is 
not the type of weapon that is eligible for Second Amendment 
protection, see Heller, supra at 622, and we affirm the 
defendant's conviction.1 
 
1.  Background.  At approximately 3 P.M. on September 29, 
2011, Ashland police officers responded to a call about a 
possible shoplifting at a supermarket.  The manager of the 
supermarket had detained someone in the store, and he informed 
police that the defendant and a man with whom she left the store 
also may have been involved.  The manager pointed to a man 
standing next to a motor vehicle in the parking lot outside the 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by Commonwealth 
Second Amendment and Arming Women Against Rape & Endangerment in 
support of the defendant. 
3 
 
supermarket.  The defendant was seated in the vehicle.  Officers 
approached it.  Following a conversation with officers, the 
defendant consented to a search of her purse.  Inside the purse, 
the defendant had an operational stun gun.2  The defendant told 
police that the stun gun was for self-defense against a former 
boy friend.  Police charged her with possession of a stun gun in 
violation of G. L. c. 140, § 131J.3 
 
The defendant challenged the constitutionality of § 131J in 
a pretrial motion to dismiss.  She argued that the stun gun is 
an "arm" for purposes of the Second Amendment, that it is a 
weapon primarily for self-defense and in common use in the 
United States for that purpose, and that she kept her stun gun 
for purposes of self-defense.  As such, she argued that her 
                     
 
2 The stun gun was a black electronic device with two metal 
prongs and a switch.  Once the switch was thrown, an electrical 
current appeared between the prongs.  Stun guns are designed to 
stun a person with an electrical current after the prongs are 
placed in direct contact with the person and the switch is 
thrown. 
 
 
3 General Laws c. 140, § 131J, forbids the private 
possession of a "portable device or weapon from which an 
electrical current, impulse, wave or beam may be directed, which 
current, impulse, wave or beam is designed to incapacitate 
temporarily, injure or kill" except by specified public officers 
or suppliers of such devices, if possession is "necessary to the 
supply or sale of the device or weapon" to agencies utilizing 
it.  Violation of this section is punishable "by a fine of not 
less than $500 nor more than $1,000 or by imprisonment in the 
house of correction for not less than [six] months nor more than 
[two and one-half] years, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment."  Id. 
4 
 
possession of the stun gun was protected by the Second 
Amendment.  The motion was denied. 
 
At a jury-waived trial, the parties stipulated that the 
device in question was a stun gun regulated by G. L. c. 140, 
§ 131J.  The defendant testified that the stun gun was for self-
defense against a former boy friend.  She further testified that 
her former boy friend was violent, and that previously she had 
displayed the stun gun during a confrontation with him.  She 
said that she had been homeless and living in a hotel.  The 
judge found the defendant guilty of possession of the stun gun 
and placed the case on file.  The defendant consented to having 
the case placed on file.  Approximately two and one-half months 
later the defendant filed a written objection to the case being 
placed on file, and she moved for sentencing. 
 
A hearing was held on the motion.  The Commonwealth 
recommended the imposition of the minimum fine.  The defendant 
proposed a fine less than the minimum.  Both the Commonwealth 
and the judge recognized that the purpose of the hearing was to 
preserve the defendant's right of appeal.  After discussion, the 
judge again placed the case on file over the defendant's 
objection in the belief that this action would preserve the 
defendant's right of appeal. 
 
The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.  We granted 
her application for direct appellate review. 
5 
 
 
2.  Appellate jurisdiction.  As an initial matter, the 
Commonwealth argues that this appeal is not properly before the 
court.  The basis of this argument is that no judgment resulted 
from the defendant's conviction because a conviction placed on 
file is not a judgment from which an appeal may be taken.  
Generally, a judgment in a criminal case is the sentence, and a 
defendant has no right of appeal until after the sentence is 
imposed.  See Commonwealth v. Ford, 424 Mass. 709, 713 n.2 
(1997) (conviction placed on filed suspends defendant's right to 
appeal alleged error in proceeding); Commonwealth v. Delgado, 
367 Mass. 432, 438 (1975) (no appeal until after judgment "which 
in criminal cases is the sentence").  See also Mass. R. Crim. P. 
28 (e), 453 Mass. 1501 (2009) (court may file case after guilty 
verdict without imposing sentence). 
 
We have recognized that a defendant has a right to appeal a 
conviction on file without her consent.  Delgado, supra.  It was 
clear to all involved that the defendant wanted to pursue an 
appeal on the constitutionality of the criminal statute of which 
she was adjudged guilty, and that she withdrew her consent and 
moved for sentencing for that purpose.  We conclude that the 
defendant may proceed with her appeal.  See id. 
 
3.  Discussion.  Where we must determine whether the 
Massachusetts ban on stun guns violates the Second Amendment, we 
are bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court on the 
6 
 
matter.  The Supreme Court recently interpreted the Second 
Amendment in a historical context that focused on the meaning of 
various words and phrases in the amendment as they probably were 
understood and used by Congress at the time of the Second 
Amendment's enactment.  In accord with that analysis we must 
determine whether a stun gun is the type of weapon contemplated 
by Congress in 1789 as being protected by the Second Amendment. 
 
In Heller, 554 U.S. at 635, the United States Supreme Court 
held that "[a] ban on handgun possession in the home violates 
the Second Amendment, as does its prohibition against rendering 
any lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of 
immediate self-defense."  The Court in Heller was confronted 
with a total ban on handgun possession in the home, and a 
further requirement that any lawful firearm kept in the home be 
rendered inoperable.  Id. at 628.  The Court reasoned that 
"the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the 
Second Amendment right.  The handgun ban amounts to a 
prohibition of an entire class of 'arms' that is 
overwhelmingly chosen by American society for that lawful 
purpose.  The prohibition extends, moreover, to the home, 
where the need for defense of self, family, and property is 
most acute.  Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we 
have applied to enumerated constitutional rights, banning 
from the home 'the most preferred firearm in the nation to 
"keep" and use for protection of one's home and family,' 
. . . would fail constitutional muster."  (Footnote 
omitted; emphasis added.) 
 
Id. at 628-629, quoting Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 
370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  The Supreme Court extended this 
interpretation of the Second Amendment to the States in 
7 
 
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791.  The defendant now urges that the 
outright prohibition on the private possession of stun guns in 
Massachusetts violates the right articulated in Heller.4 
 
"Since Heller, '[c]ourts have consistently recognized that 
Heller established that the possession of operative firearms for 
use in defense of the home constitutes the 'core' of the Second 
Amendment.'"  Commonwealth v. McGowan, 464 Mass. 232, 235 
(2013), quoting Hightower v. Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 72 (1st Cir. 
2012).  Moreover, the Supreme Court said in Heller that the 
Second Amendment individual right to keep and bear arms is "not 
unlimited."  554 U.S. at 595.  The Court identified certain 
examples of lawful prohibitions and limitations on the Second 
Amendment right including, but not limited to, "prohibitions on 
the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill."  Id. 
at 626.  In addition to the lawfulness of prohibitions against 
possession of arms by certain persons, the Court recognized the 
existence of 
                     
 
4 At issue here is only the applicability of the Second 
Amendment to the statute.  The cognate Massachusetts 
constitutional provision, art. 17 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights, previously has been held to encompass a 
collective, and not an individual, right to bear arms.  See 
Commonwealth v. Davis, 369 Mass. 886, 888 (1976).  The Heller 
Court, before reaching its conclusion, first conducted a survey 
of Second Amendment jurisprudence.  District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576-628 (2008).  In so doing, the Court 
concluded that the Second Amendment secured an individual right 
to bear arms for defensive purposes.  Id. at 602.  We therefore 
view the defendant's claim only through the lens of the Second 
Amendment. 
8 
 
"another important limitation on the right to keep and 
carry arms.  [United States v.] Miller said, as we have 
explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those 
'in common use at the time.' . . .  We think that 
limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition 
of prohibiting carrying of 'dangerous and unusual 
weapons.'" 
 
Heller, supra at 627, quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 
174, 179 (1939). 
 
The conduct at issue in this case falls outside the "core" 
of the Second Amendment, insofar as the defendant was not using 
the stun gun to defend herself in her home, see Hightower 693 
F.3d at 72 & n.8, quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 627, and involves 
a "dangerous and unusual weapon" that was not "in common use at 
the time" of enactment.  "From Blackstone through the 19th-
century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that 
the [Second Amendment] right was not a right to keep and carry 
any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever 
purpose."  Heller, supra at 626.  Without further guidance from 
the Supreme Court on the scope of the Second Amendment, we do 
not extend the Second Amendment right articulated by Heller to 
cover stun guns. 
 
Here, we are concerned not with ensuring that designated 
classes of people do not gain access to firearms or weapons 
generally, but rather with prohibiting a class of weapons 
entirely.  The traditional prohibition against carrying 
9 
 
dangerous and unusual weapons is not in dispute.  See Heller, 
554 U.S. at 627, citing 4 Blackstone 148-149 (1769). 
 
The question of the dangerousness of a weapon is well fixed 
in the common law through the distinction drawn between weapons 
that are dangerous per se and those that are dangerous as used.  
See Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296, 303, cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 1004 (1980) (setting out common-law definitions of 
dangerous weapons).  See also Commonwealth v. Wynton W., 459 
Mass. 745, 748-755 (2011) (analyzing term "dangerous weapon" in 
context of G. L. c. 269, § 10 [j], barring possession of 
dangerous weapons on school grounds).  At common law, a weapon 
is dangerous per se if it is an "instrumentality designed and 
constructed to produce death or great bodily harm" and "for the 
purpose of bodily assault or defense."  Appleby, supra at 303.  
Weapons of this type include "firearms, daggers, stilettos and 
brass knuckles" but not "pocket knives, razors, hammers, 
wrenches and cutting tools."  Id.  The weapons not so classified 
all share the same characteristic:  they were designed primarily 
as tools and only secondarily utilized as weapons.  The Court in 
Heller confirms this method of analysis in discussing Miller, 
307 U.S. at 178.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 622 (Miller decision 
concerned with design or "type of weapon at issue" and not use 
[emphasis omitted]). 
10 
 
 
The statute at issue here explicitly prohibits "a portable 
device or weapon from which an electrical current, impulse, wave 
or beam may be directed, which current, impulse, wave or beam is 
designed to incapacitate temporarily, injure, or kill."  G. L. 
c. 140, § 131J.  From this statutory definition, we easily 
conclude that any weapon regulated by § 131J would be classified 
as dangerous per se at common law.  The parties have stipulated 
that the stun gun at issue here falls within the purview of 
§ 131J and is a weapon.  Accordingly, we consider the stun gun a 
per se dangerous weapon at common law.  The record demonstrates 
no evidence or argument that its purpose is for anything other 
than "bodily assault or defense."  Appleby, 380 Mass. at 303. 
 
We turn next to the question whether a weapon is unusual.  
Historically, when considering challenges to the ban of 
dangerous and unusual weapons under the Second Amendment or 
equivalent State statutes, courts have asked whether the weapon 
in question is unusual by ascertaining if it is a weapon of 
warfare to be used by the militia.  See Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 
472, 474-477 (1874); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154, 158-160 
(1840); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 476-477 (1871); State v. 
Workman, 335 W. Va. 367, 372-374 (1891).  The Supreme Court 
utilized this approach in Miller, 307 U.S. at 178, and approved 
its use in Heller.  The Court said, 
"'In the colonial and revolutionary war era, [small-arms] 
weapons used by militia men and weapons used in defense of 
11 
 
person and home were one and the same.'  State v. Kessler, 
289 Ore. 359, 368 . . . (1980) (citing G. Neumann, Swords 
and Blades of the American Revolution 6-15, 252-254 
[1973]).  Indeed, that is precisely the way in which the 
Second Amendment's operative clause furthers the purpose 
announced in its preface.  We therefore read Miller to say 
only that the Second Amendment does not protect those 
weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for 
lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns."5 
 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 624-625.  Thus, the questions whether a 
weapon is "unusual" and whether the weapon was "in common use at 
the time" of enactment are interrelated.  Id. at 627-628. 
 
The ban on the private possession of stun guns will not 
burden conduct that falls within the scope of the Second 
Amendment if a stun gun is a weapon not "in common use at the 
time" of enactment of the Second Amendment and would be 
dangerous per se at common law without another, primary use, 
i.e., as a tool.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 624-625, 627, quoting 
Miller, 307 U.S. at 179.  For reasons that follow, there can be 
no doubt that a stun gun was not in common use at the time of 
enactment, and it is not the type of weapon that is eligible for 
Second Amendment protection.  See Heller, supra at 622. 
 
The record is silent as to the development of the stun gun.  
The record indicates only that stun guns have been available 
commercially for private purchase since the early 1990s.  We 
                     
 
5 In State v. Kessler, 289 Ore. 359, 368 (1980), the Oregon 
Supreme Court described the type of weapons typically used by 
militiamen in defense of home and for purposes of the militia as 
being a musket or rifle, a hatchet, sword and knife or pike (a 
long shaft with a spear head). 
12 
 
note that that the first patent for stun gun was filed in 1972.  
See Weapon for Immobilization and Capture, U.S. Patent No. 
3,803,463 (filed July 10, 1972).  The recent invention of this 
weapon clearly postdates the period relevant to our analysis.  
We therefore conclude that stun guns were not in common use at 
the time of the Second Amendment's enactment.  A stun gun also 
is an unusual weapon.  In her motion to dismiss the complaint 
against her, the defendant acknowledged that the "number of 
Tasers and stun guns is dwarfed by the number of firearms."  
Moreover, although modern handguns were not in common use at the 
time of enactment of the Second Amendment, their basic function 
has not changed:  many are readily adaptable to military use in 
the same way that their predecessors were used prior to the 
enactment.  A stun gun, by contrast, is a thoroughly modern 
invention.  Even were we to view stun guns through a 
contemporary lens for purposes of our analysis, there is nothing 
in the record to suggest that they are readily adaptable to use 
in the military.  Indeed, the record indicates "they are 
ineffective for . . . hunting or target shooting."  Because the 
stun gun that the defendant possessed is both dangerous per se 
at common law and unusual, but was not in common use at the time 
of the enactment of the Second Amendment, we conclude that stun 
guns fall outside the protection of the Second Amendment.  See 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 622, 627. 
13 
 
 
The question remains whether the total ban on stun guns has 
a rational basis.  Those who challenge the constitutionality of 
a statute that burdens neither a suspect group nor a fundamental 
constitutional right bear a heavy burden in overcoming the 
presumption of constitutionality in favor of the statute's 
validity.  See English v. New England Med. Ctr., Inc., 405 Mass. 
423, 427, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1989).  Such is the case 
before us.  For due process claims, the test under "the Federal 
Constitution is 'whether the statute bears a reasonable relation 
to a permissible legislative objective' . . . and, under the 
. . . State Constitution [is] whether the statute 'bears real 
and substantial relation to public health, safety, morals, or 
some other phase of the general welfare'" (citations omitted).  
Id. at 430.  For equal protection claims, the test is the same 
under both Constitutions, namely, whether the statute is 
"rationally related to the furtherance of a legitimate State 
interest" (citations omitted)".  Id. at 428.  Under the State 
Constitution the test also "includes a requirement that an 
impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the 
classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that 
transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class."  
Id. at 429, quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 
U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).  The defendant 
does not challenge the statute on the basis of any group 
14 
 
classification.  We therefore focus on the challenge under 
principles of due process. 
 
The defendant does not articulate any basis for challenging 
the statute under the rational basis test.  Nevertheless, we 
note that stun guns deliver a charge of up to 50,000 volts.  
They are designed to incapacitate a target by causing disabling 
pain, uncontrolled muscular contractions, and general disruption 
of the central nervous system.  See Amnesty International, Less 
than Lethal?  Use of Stun Weapons in U.S. Law Enforcement, 1-2, 
6-7 & nn.17, 18 (2008), available at 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/52000/amr510102008en.
pdf [https://perma.cc/JK53-XMR3] (last visited February 26, 
2015).  It is difficult to detect clear signs of use and misuse 
of stun guns, unlike handguns.  Stun guns can deliver repeated 
or prolonged shocks without leaving marks.  Id. at 1-2.  The 
Legislature rationally could ban their use in the interest of 
public health, safety, or welfare.  Removing from public access 
devices that can incapacitate, injure, or kill a person by 
disrupting the central nervous system with minimal detection is 
a classic legislative basis supporting rationality.  It is 
immaterial that the Legislature has not banned weapons that are 
more lethal.  Mathematical precision by the Legislature is not 
constitutionally required.  See Commonwealth v. McQuoid, 369 
Mass. 925, 927-928 (1976).  The statute easily passes the 
15 
 
rational basis test under both the Federal and State 
Constitutions. 
 
Self-defense when homeless.  Although we already have 
concluded that the defendant's possession of a stun gun was in 
violation of a statute regulating a weapon not protected by the 
Second Amendment, we touch briefly on her claim that her 
homelessness at the time of her arrest should not deprive her of 
her right to defend herself.  As noted above, the Supreme 
Court's holding in Heller stressed the particular importance of 
the right to defend hearth and home as the core of the Second 
Amendment.  See Hightower, 693 F.3d at 72 & n.8 (noting emphasis 
in Heller on "hearth and home" and subsequent interpretations).  
A homeless person may indeed have a home for constitutional 
purposes, and this question must be determined on a case-by-case 
basis.  For example, constitutional protections against 
unreasonable search and seizure can be extended to a variety of 
living situations.  See Commonwealth v. Porter P., 456 Mass. 
254, 260-261 (2010) (holding reasonable expectation of privacy 
exists in transitional living space); Commonwealth v. Paszko, 
391 Mass. 164, 184-185 (1984) (hotel room during rental period).  
However, where a stun gun itself is not a type of weapon the 
possession of which is protected under the Second Amendment, we 
need not decide whether a hotel room may be treated as a home 
under the Second Amendment.  Moreover, the stun gun was found 
16 
 
not in the defendant's hotel room but on her person in a motor 
vehicle, outside the "core" of the Second Amendment. 
 
Finally, neither the legislative ban on stun guns nor our 
decision affects the defendant's right to bear arms under the 
Second Amendment.  Barring any cause for disqualification the 
defendant could have applied for a license to carry a firearm.  
See G. L. c. 140, §§ 129B, 131 (c).  In addition, again barring 
any disqualification, possession of mace or pepper spray for 
self-defense no longer requires a license.  See G. L. c. 140, 
§ 122D, inserted by St. 2014, c. 284, § 22.  We hold only that 
the defendant's weapon of choice, the stun gun, is not protected 
by the Second Amendment.  We acknowledge that stun guns may have 
value for purposes of self-defense, but because they are not 
protected by the Second Amendment and because a rational basis 
exists for their prohibition, the lawfulness of their possession 
and use is a matter for the Legislature. 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated above, we hold that 
G. L. c. 140, § 131J, does not violate the Second Amendment 
right articulated in Heller.  We affirm the defendant's 
conviction of possession of an electrical weapon in violation of 
G. L. c. 140, § 131J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.