Case Title: Gomez v. Morning

Citation: 

Docket Number: 414, 2001

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2002-04-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
GLADYS GOMEZ,
)  No. 414, 2001
)
Respondent Below,
)  Court Below:  Family Court
Appellant,
)  of the State of Delaware in
)  and for Kent County
v.
)
)  CK-00-04606
JAMES A. MORNING,
)
)
Petitioner Below,
)
Appellee.
)
Submitted:  March 5, 2002
Decided:  April 11, 2002
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and STEELE, Justices.
O R D E R
This 11th day of April 2002, on consideration of the briefs of the parties, it
appears to the Court that:
1)
In January 2001, the Family Court granted interim custody of Ramon
Morning to Appellant, Respondent-below, Gladys Gomez with visitation rights for
Appellee, Petitioner-below, James A. Morning.  Throughout the summer of 2001,
Gomez and Morning, the natural parents, engaged in a series of dueling Petitions
for Custody and Petitions for Rule to Show Cause regarding the placement of and
attendant visitation rights with Ramon.  In August 2001, after conducting a
hearing, the Family Court issued an order on the consolidated petitions.  For
2
reasons stated on the record, the Family Court awarded joint legal custody to both
parents, primary placement with the Father.  This is Gomez’s direct appeal.
2)
Appellant Gomez contends that the trial judge abused her discretion in
awarding primary placement with the Father by failing to properly apply the best
interest factors set forth in Del. Code Ann. tit. 13 § 722.  Specifically, she argues
that the Family Court judge placed undue emphasis on the visitation issues raised
at the hearing and thus did not give proper weight to Ramon’s interaction with his
parents and grandparents in the household and his adjustment to home, school and
community.  The record clearly reflects that the trial judge considered each of the
factors listed in Section 722.  Although the judge did not make explicit findings
concerning each factor, she specifically listed each of the Section 722 factors on
the record and stated that she considered all of the relevant factors in determining
Ramon’s best interests.  We find that this constitutes sufficient consideration under
the standard we articulated in Fisher v. Fisher1 and Jones v. Lang.2
3)
This Court has stated that every custody disposition requires that the
criteria set forth in Section 722 be balanced in accordance with the factual
circumstances presented to the Family Court.3  Because of this, the amount of
weight given to one factor or a combination of factors will differ in each
                                                
1 622 A.2d 619,622-23 (Del. 1997).
2 591 A.2d 185, 188 (Del. 1991).
3 Fischer 622 A.2d at 623.
3
proceeding.4  Indeed, we have held that it is “quite possible that the weight of one
factor will counterbalance the combined weight of all other factors and be outcome
determinative in some situations.”5  The Family Court judge’s order suggests that
this was the case in this instance.  We find that the record contains sufficient
evidence for us to conclude that the trial judge’s determination resulted from an
orderly and logical deductive process, and therefore does not constitute an abuse of
discretion.
4)
Gomez also argues that the trial judge committed reversible error by
refusing to allow witnesses from both parties to testify because of time constraints
on the hearing.  Both parties stated in the record that the additional testimony
proffered merely corroborated testimony already presented to the court.  Rule 403
of the Delaware Rules of Evidence allocates broad discretion to the trial judge to
exclude needless presentation of cumulative evidence.  Given the statements of
both parties acknowledging the cumulative nature of the evidence that their final
witnesses were to provide, we find no basis for Appellant’s contention that the
Family Court judge abused her discretion by declining to hear the additional
proffered witnesses.
                                                
4 Id.
5 Id.
4
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, that the judgment of the Family
Court be, and hereby is, AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
_/s/ Myron T. Steele__________________
Justice