Case Title: Gail M. Washington v. Melvin K. Washington

Citation: 2000 WI 47

Docket Number: 1998AP001234

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2000-06-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
2000 WI 47 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-1234 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
In re the Marriage of: 
 
Gail M. Washington,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Melvin K. Washington,  
 
Respondent-Respondent.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  229 Wis. 2d 251, 599 N.W.2d 665 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 7, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
March 14, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Ozaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Joseph D. McCormack 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner, there 
were briefs by Donald Roy Fraker and Fraker Law Firm, S.C., 
Mequon, and oral argument by Donald Roy Fraker. 
 
 
For the respondent-respondent, there was a brief 
by Melvin K. Washington, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Melvin 
K. Washington. 
 
2000 WI 47 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
No. 98-1234 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Marriage of: 
 
Gail M. Washington,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Melvin K. Washington,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded. 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, 
Washington v. Washington, No. 98-1234, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App., June 9, 1999), affirming an order of the circuit 
court for Ozaukee County, Joseph D. McCormack, Circuit Judge.  
The circuit court denied Gail M. Washington's post-divorce 
motion to grant her appreciation and interest, from the date of 
divorce until pension payments begin, on her award of a lump-sum 
share of her ex-husband Melvin K. Washington's federal employee 
pension. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
held 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.32(1)(a)(1997-98) 
prohibited 
the 
circuit 
court 
from 
FILED 
 
JUN 7, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-1234 
 
 
2 
modifying or revising the provisions of the judgment and order 
with respect to the final division of property.1 
¶2 
Although the court of appeals expressed concern that 
the result was unfair to Mrs. Washington, it affirmed the order 
of the circuit court.  The court of appeals concluded that the 
circuit court was barred by Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1)(a) from 
modifying or revising the provisions of the judgment and order 
with respect to the final division of property.  
¶3 
This case presents an issue of law pertaining to the 
power of a circuit court over the final division of property in 
a divorce judgment.  More specifically the legal issue is 
whether a circuit court may construe its judgment and allocate 
appreciation and interest on a lump-sum share of a pension 
awarded to a spouse (but not payable immediately) when the final 
division of property in the divorce judgment is silent about any 
such allocation.  The court decides this question of law 
independently of other courts, benefiting from the analyses of 
the circuit court and court of appeals.  
¶4 
We conclude that a circuit court may construe the 
final division of property in a divorce judgment and allocate 
appreciation and interest on a pension when the divorce judgment 
is silent about the allocation of appreciation and interest on a 
                     
1 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 767.32(1)(a)(1997-98) 
provides 
in 
pertinent part as follows: ". . . nor shall the provisions of a 
judgment or order with respect to final division of property be 
subject to revision or modification." 
Unless otherwise noted, all references to the Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 1997-98 volumes. 
No. 
98-1234 
 
 
3 
lump-sum share awarded to a spouse but not payable immediately. 
 The silence about appreciation and interest makes the judgment 
ambiguous.  A circuit court's construction of the ambiguous 
final division of the pension in this divorce judgment does not 
violate Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1)(a).2  Accordingly we reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the 
circuit court to determine the allocation of appreciation and 
interest to the spouses under the final division of property in 
the divorce judgment. 
 
I 
                     
2 Because we conclude that the circuit court had the power 
to construe the final division of property in the present case, 
we need not determine whether the circuit court could have 
relieved Mrs. Washington of that part of the judgment relating 
to the division of the pension under Wis. Stat. §  806.07(l)(h).  
Section 806.07(1)(h) provides in pertinent part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court 
 . . . may relieve a party or legal representative 
from 
a 
judgment, 
order 
or 
stipulation 
for 
the 
following reasons:  
 
(h) Any other reasons justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) has been applied in divorce 
cases.  "Although a property division is not subject to the 
court's continuing jurisdiction and may not be modified based on 
a change of circumstances under sec. 767.32(1), sec. 806.07 
gives the court discretionary authority to grant relief from the 
judgment."  Thorpe v. Thorpe, 123 Wis. 2d 424, 426, 367 N.W.2d 
233 (Ct. App. 1985).  See also Spankowski v. Spankowski, 172 
Wis. 2d 285, 290, 493 N.W.2d 737 (Ct. App. 1992). 
No. 
98-1234 
 
 
4 
¶5 
The 
relevant 
facts 
are 
not 
in 
dispute. 
 
The 
Washingtons' divorce proceedings began in the summer of 1991.  
After a series of hearings, the circuit court decreed on May 19, 
1993, that the couple was divorced.  Because of continuing 
disputes between the parties, however, the findings of facts, 
conclusions of law and judgment were not entered until December 
1995. 
¶6 
In December 1995, the circuit court determined the 
final division of the property, with each party getting one-
half.  Included in the property to be divided was Mr. 
Washington's interest in his U.S. Civil Service Retirement 
System pension.  The federal pension plan was valued at $50,273 
as of the time of the divorce.  Desiring to maintain an equal 
property division of all the property, the circuit court awarded 
Mrs. 
Washington 
$23,910 
of 
the 
pension 
and 
awarded 
Mr. 
Washington $26,363.  The judgment made no mention of interest or 
appreciation on either party's lump-sum share of the pension or 
when or how payment of the federal pension was to be made.  The 
judgment is silent about any details of the division of the 
pension except for the value of the total pension and the lump-
sum division between the spouses at the time of the divorce 
judgment. 
¶7 
Mr. Washington is not expected to begin receiving 
payments of his federal pension until his retirement, which is 
anticipated to be approximately 21 years from the date of the 
divorce judgment.  Mrs. Washington will not get her share under 
the divorce judgment until payments are made to Mr. Washington.  
No. 
98-1234 
 
 
5 
¶8 
Supplemental documents were needed to effectuate the 
court's division of the pension.  In 1997, the federal Office of 
Personnel Management, which handles federal employee pension 
benefits, informed Mr. Washington that in order to process the 
award to Mrs. Washington the divorce judgment must include 
language specifically referring to the Office of Personnel 
Management and particular provisions in the code of federal 
regulations. 
¶9 
As a result, Mr. Washington filed a motion in circuit 
court requesting that the judgment be amended by adding the 
language suggested by the Office of Personnel Management.  When 
Mr. Washington proposed this amendment of the final division of 
the property in the divorce judgment, the parties became aware 
of the ambiguity resulting from the silence of the judgment 
regarding the allocation of appreciation and interest on the 
pension division.  The parties debated the correct construction 
of the circuit court's division of the federal pension.  Mr. 
Washington urged that at the time of his retirement Mrs. 
Washington would receive her specified lump-sum share of the 
pension and that he alone would receive any and all appreciation 
and interest that accumulated on both spouses' shares. 
¶10 Mrs. Washington asserted that, in keeping with the 
circuit court's intent to divide the property equally, she would 
receive appreciation and interest on her lump-sum share of the 
pension and that Mr. Washington would receive appreciation and 
interest on his lump-sum share of the pension. 
No. 
98-1234 
 
 
6 
¶11 Paying out Mrs. Washington's share of the pension 21 
years after the divorce, without giving her the benefit of 
appreciation and interest, would result in her receiving only 
the $23,910 the circuit court awarded her in the final division 
in 1995.  In contrast, allocating to Mr. Washington all the 
appreciation and interest for 21 years would result in his 
receiving far more than the $26,363 the circuit court awarded 
him in the final division in 1995.  The result is that the two 
would not receive an equal division of the property as the 
circuit court intended.  We assume that the court of appeals was 
referring to this inequality in the division of the pension when 
it concluded that the result of the circuit court decision was 
unfair to Mrs. Washington. 
¶12 Concurrent with Mr. Washington's motion in the circuit 
court to amend the judgment to comply with the federal 
requirements for distribution of the federal pension under the 
divorce judgment, Mrs. Washington filed a motion asking the 
circuit court to amend its 1995 divorce judgment to award her 
appreciation and interest on her lump-sum share of the pension. 
 The circuit court granted Mr. Washington's motion to amend the 
judgment but denied Mrs. Washington's motion to amend the 
judgment. 
 
II 
¶13 Mr. Washington claims that his motion to amend the 
final division of property in the judgment is permissible in 
order 
to 
put 
the 
judgment 
into 
effect, 
but 
that 
Mrs. 
No. 
98-1234 
 
 
7 
Washington's motion to amend the final division of property in 
the judgment violates Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1)(a).3  The statute 
reads in relevant part: ". . . nor shall the provisions of the 
judgment or order with respect to final division of property be 
subject to revision or modification. . . ."  One of the purposes 
of Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1)(a) is to achieve finality in divorce 
decrees for property divisions.  A significant aspect of justice 
is finality of decisions, and the court takes this legislative 
goal of finality seriously.  Furthermore, when a marriage ends, 
the law envisions the parties as having an opportunity to be 
independent of each other and go their separate ways in regards 
to their property. 
¶14 Nevertheless, the legislature and the courts recognize 
that a final division of property in a divorce judgment does not 
                     
3 Mr. Washington argues that, in addition to Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.32(1), the federal regulations governing the distribution 
of his pension bar Mrs. Washington's request for appreciation 
and interest.  He argues that 5 C.F.R. § 838.123 puts the burden 
on the non-employee spouse to present to the federal Office of 
Personnel Management a proper court order and related documents 
to enable the non-employee spouse to receive portions of the 
pension.  Mr. Washington also notes that 5 C.F.R. § 838.235, 
regarding state court judgments that do not specify how the 
pension sums are to be distributed, does not specifically 
account for appreciation. 
We reject this argument based on the federal regulations.  
The federal regulations are concerned with how distributions 
from federal pensions get paid from the federal government to 
former spouses; they do not regulate or restrict the amount that 
can be awarded by state courts.  Indeed, 5 C.F.R. § 838.122 
specifically gives state courts the responsibility for issuing 
the orders to pay benefits and for settling disputes between the 
employee and former spouse. 
No. 
98-1234 
 
 
8 
always resolve all matters between the parties and that remedial 
action by the circuit court may be needed to effectuate the 
objectives of the final division without disrupting the finality 
of the judgment.  While the final division of property in a 
divorce judgment is indeed final, the jurisdiction of the court 
"continue[s] until the property [is] disposed of  pursuant to 
the provisions of the division contained in the judgment of 
divorce."4  Section 767.01(1) vests in the circuit courts the 
authority to do all things "necessary and proper" in actions 
affecting the family and "to carry [the courts'] orders and 
judgments into execution." 
¶15 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 767.32(1)(a) 
should 
not 
be 
interpreted to strip a circuit court of its authority to put its 
judgment in effect.  Without the authority to do all things 
necessary and proper to carry out the provisions of a divorce 
judgment, the judgment would have no effect.5  So although a 
circuit court may not revise or modify the final division of 
property, 
this 
court 
has 
recognized 
that 
by 
virtue 
of 
§ 767.01(1) the circuit court has the power to effectuate its 
                     
4 Morrissette v. Morrissette, 99 Wis. 2d 467, 470, 299 
N.W.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1980)(quoting Yelk v. Yelk, 20 Wis. 2d 35, 
41, 121 N.W.2d 225 (1963)).  See also Roeder v. Roeder, 103 
Wis. 2d 411, 419, 308 N.W.2d 904 (Ct. App. 1981). 
5 Rotter v. Rotter, 80 Wis. 2d 50, 62-63, 257 N.W.2d 861 
(1977). 
No. 
98-1234 
 
 
9 
orders and do justice.  Rotter v. Rotter, 80 Wis. 2d 56, 62-63, 
257 N.W.2d 861 (1977).6 
¶16 Thus in this case the circuit court could "amend" the 
final division of property in the divorce judgment to add the 
language required by the federal government to effectuate the 
division of the pension.  Accordingly the circuit court could 
and did grant Mr. Washington's motion to add the necessary 
language.  But the silence in the final division of the property 
created an ambiguity about the allocation of appreciation and 
interest on the shares of the pension in light of the equal 
division of the property. 
¶17 A divorce judgment that is clear on its face is not 
open to construction.7  In contrast, if a divorce judgment is 
ambiguous, construction is allowed.8  Divorce judgments are to be 
construed as of the time of entry9 and in the same manner as 
                     
6 An order to show cause is commonly issued by circuit 
courts 
to 
attain 
compliance 
with 
judgment 
provisions.  
Morrisette, 99 Wis. 2d at 470 (citing Foregger v. Foregger, 40 
Wis. 2d 632, 646, 162 N.W.2d 553 (1968)). 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 767.305 
for 
enforcement 
provisions 
including contempt. 
7 Wright v. Wright, 92 Wis. 2d 246, 255, 284 N.W.2d 894 
(1979); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 177 Wis. 2d 539, 547, 502 N.W.2d 
869 (Ct. App. 1993). 
8 Wright v. Wright, 92 Wis. 2d 246, 255, 284 N.W.2d 894 
(1979); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 177 Wis. 2d 539, 547, 502 N.W.2d 
869 (Ct. App. 1993). 
9 Wright v. Wright, 92 Wis. 2d 246, 254, 284 N.W.2d 631 
(1979). 
No. 
98-1234 
 
 
10
other written instruments.10  The court will consider the whole 
record in construing a divorce judgment.11 
¶18 Ambiguity exists when the language of the written 
instrument is subject to two or more meanings, either on its 
face or as applied to the extrinsic facts to which it refers.12  
Determining whether an ambiguity exists is a question of law.13  
¶19 Mrs. Washington may avoid the proscription of Wis. 
Stat. § 767.32(1)(a) if her motion seeks to clarify the circuit 
court's ambiguous division of the federal pension, rather than 
to revise or modify the final division of property.  The words 
"revise" and "modify" prohibited by § 767.32(1)(a) refer to 
change or alter; the word "clarify" as used by Mrs. Washington's 
brief means to make clear or intelligible, to free from 
ambiguity.  The line between impermissible modification and 
revision on the one hand and permissible construction and 
enforcement of an ambiguous final division of property on the 
other hand may in some 
cases be 
difficult 
to discern.  
Nevertheless, the statute and the case law make the distinction 
                     
10 Vaccaro v. Vaccaro, 67 Wis. 2d 477, 482, 227 N.W.2d 62 
(1975); Fessler v. Fessler, 147 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 432 N.W.2d 103 
(Ct. App. 1988). 
11 Wright v. Wright, 92 Wis. 2d 246, 255, 284 N.W.2d 894 
(1979); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 177 Wis. 2d 539, 547, 502 N.W.2d 
869 (Ct. App. 1993). 
12 Schultz v. Schultz, 194 Wis. 2d 799, 805-06, 535 N.W.2d 
116 (Ct. App. 1995). 
13 Schultz v. Schultz, 194 Wis. 2d 799, 806, 535 N.W.2d 116 
(Ct. App. 1995). 
No. 
98-1234 
 
 
11
between the competing interests of finality of judgments and the 
need for circuit courts to have the power to effectuate their 
judgments, including ambiguous judgments. 
¶20 Numerous divorce cases demonstrate that after a final 
division of property, problems may arise that require the 
circuit court to construe a final division of property in a 
divorce judgment, in order to effectuate the judgment.  For 
example, in Mathewson v. Mathewson, 135 Wis. 2d 411, 400 N.W.2d 
485 (Ct. App. 1986), three years after a final division of 
property in a divorce judgment the parties disputed the division 
of the proceeds of the sale of the parties' real estate.  The 
judgment was silent on the allocation of the expenses of the 
sale and the interest due to the husband under the divorce 
judgment.  The court of appeals ordered the circuit court to 
make a finding regarding the parties' obligations to each other 
on the sale.  Mathewson, 135 Wis. 2d at 418-19. 
¶21 In Dewey v. Dewey, 188 Wis. 2d 271, 525 N.W.2d 85 (Ct. 
App. 1994), two years after the final division of property in a 
divorce judgment the husband retired and began receiving pension 
benefits.  The wife moved the circuit court for an order 
requiring the husband to execute documents to divide the pension 
as provided by the judgment.  The husband maintained that under 
the divorce judgment he owed his wife a sum of money rather than 
an interest in the pension and his debt to her was discharged by 
bankruptcy.  The court of appeals upheld the circuit court's 
construction of the judgment as giving the wife a 50% property 
No. 
98-1234 
 
 
12
interest in the pension at the time of the divorce that was not 
dischargeable in bankruptcy. 
¶22 In Schultz v. Schultz, 194 Wis. 2d 799, 535 N.W.2d 116 
(Ct. App. 1995), the final division of property in a divorce 
judgment gave the husband a right of first refusal if the wife 
"desires to sell, assign, or transfer" the family home within 10 
years of the divorce.  The wife died three years after the 
divorce, still owning the home at the time of her death.  The 
husband asserted that the wife's death triggered his right of 
first refusal; the wife's estate disagreed.  The husband filed a 
motion with the circuit court to enforce his alleged right of 
first refusal.  The circuit court concluded that although the 
judgment spoke only of sale, assignment or transfer and was 
silent about whether the right of first refusal was against the 
wife personally or ran with the land, the correct construction 
of the judgment was that the right of first refusal ran with the 
land.  The circuit court reasoned that any other construction 
would in effect repeal a central part of the judgment that 
recognized the husband's interest in the home. 
¶23 On appeal by the estate, the court of appeals 
concluded, as a matter of law, that the divorce judgment was 
ambiguous and that the circuit court was clarifying, not 
modifying, the judgment.  Schultz, 194 Wis. 2d at 809.  The 
Schultz case has been cited and followed in other decisions of 
the court of appeals. 
¶24 In Rotter v. Rotter, 80 Wis. 2d 56, 257 N.W.2d 861 
(1977), the divorce judgment ordered the husband to cooperate in 
No. 
98-1234 
 
 
13
getting health insurance coverage for the wife.  The husband 
failed to do so.  The wife later incurred substantial medical 
indebtedness, and the trial court ordered the husband to pay 
part of the indebtedness.  The trial court specifically stated 
that its order was not intended as a modification of the divorce 
judgment.  The supreme court held that the order was authorized 
by the precursor of Wis. Stat. § 767.01, which vested authority 
in the trial court to enforce its judgment.  Rotter, 80 Wis. 2d 
at 62-63. 
¶25 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1)(a) does not 
bar construction of an ambiguous final division of property in a 
divorce judgment.  Section 767.01(1) grants power to the circuit 
courts to effectuate a divorce judgment by construing an 
ambiguous provision in a final division of property, and the 
case law demonstrates that circuit courts have exercised this 
power with the approval of this court and the court of appeals.14  
                     
14 Cases in which a circuit court construes a final division 
of property in a divorce judgment arise with some frequency.  We 
cite the unpublished court of appeals decisions not for 
precedential authority, see Wis. Stat. § 809.23(3), but rather 
to demonstrate that this factual scenario presents itself in a 
number of cases.  See, e.g., Arneson v. Arneson, 97-2509-FT, 
unpublished slip-op at 2 (Wis. App. 1998) (circuit court 
permissibly interprets ambiguous language in final property 
division 
of 
divorce 
judgment); 
Stred 
v. 
Stred, 
82-2232, 
unpublished slip-op (Wis. App. 1984) (circuit court permissibly 
interprets the sale date of property as a reasonable time from 
judgment when the final division of property did not specify the 
sale date); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 177 Wis. 2d 539, 546-47, 502 
N.W.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1993) (construing the divorce judgment to 
determine 
whether 
payments 
were 
maintenance 
or 
property 
division). 
No. 
98-1234 
 
 
14
III 
¶26 We now turn to the question of whether the final 
division of property in the divorce judgment in this case is 
ambiguous and in need of construction.  As we stated previously, 
whether a judgment is ambiguous is a question of law that we 
determine independently of other courts, benefiting from the 
analyses of the circuit court and the court of appeals.  Schultz 
v. Schultz, 194 Wis. 2d 799, 805, 535 N.W.2d 116 (Ct. App. 
1995).  A written document is ambiguous if it is reasonably 
susceptible to more than one meaning.  Schultz, 194 Wis. 2d at 
805-06. 
¶27 We conclude that the final division of the pension in 
this divorce judgment, which fails to provide for allocation of 
appreciation and interest from the date of the divorce until 
distribution of the pension, is open to several reasonable 
                                                                  
Our decision allowing such construction is consistent with 
decisions of other states that also have statutory prohibitions 
against modifying property divisions in divorce judgments.  See, 
e.g., McGee v. McGee, 749 So.2d 193, 194 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) 
(court's 
order 
regarding 
division 
of 
"antiques" 
was 
clarification of ambiguous provision and not impermissible 
modification); Garris v. Garris, 643 So.2d 993 (Ala. Civ. App. 
1999) (court's failure to provide for tax consequences of IRA 
investments left original divorce order ambiguous and subject to 
permissible clarification and enforcement with new order); Ford 
v. 
Ford, 
783 
S.W.2d 
879, 
880-81 
(Ark. 
Ct. 
App. 
1990) 
(recognizing court's inherent power to correct judgments where 
necessary to reflect intent of judgment, even a property 
division in a divorce judgment); Echols v. Echols, 900 S.W.2d 
160, 162-63 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (court's order awarding ex-wife 
money was not impermissible modification of divorce judgment but 
rather clarification of judgment made ambiguous by facts not 
anticipated by court's original judgment). 
No. 
98-1234 
 
 
15
meanings: (1) the appreciation and interest should be pro-rated 
and allocated to each spouse on the basis of the lump-sum share 
awarded in the divorce judgment; (2) all of the appreciation and 
interest should be awarded to the wife; or (3) all of the 
appreciation and interest should be awarded to the husband. 
¶28 The circuit court went to great lengths in this case 
to ensure that the property was divided equally between the 
spouses.  Yet failure to consider the allocation of appreciation 
and interest on the pension could result in an unequal division 
of the property and contravene the objective of the divorce 
judgment.  The result of the circuit court's holding that it had 
no authority under Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1)(a) to construe the 
divorce judgment was, in effect, a decision to give Mr. 
Washington approximately 21 years of appreciation and interest 
on the lump-sum shares awarded to both spouses.  This result 
appears contrary to the circuit court's objective for the final 
division of property and "unfair," as the court of appeals 
stated. 
¶29 In addition to considering the language of the 
judgment, we consider the nature of the property at issue in 
determining whether the final division of the property in the 
divorce judgment is ambiguous. 
¶30 In many divorce proceedings the employee pension 
benefits of one or both spouses are the most significant assets 
owned by the couple.  Bloomer v. Bloomer, 84 Wis. 2d 124, 129, 
267 N.W.2d 235 (1978).  Allocating appreciation and interest on 
a pension payable in the future, as well as discounting pension 
No. 
98-1234 
 
 
16
benefits to present value, are recurring issues in circuit 
courts.  The circuit courts retain broad discretion in valuing 
pension rights and dividing them between the spouses.  See, 
e.g., Olski v. Olski, 197 Wis. 2d 237, 248, 540 N.W.2d 412 
(1995); Bloomer, 84 Wis. 2d at 134; Steinke v. Steinke, 126 
Wis. 2d 372, 383, 376 N.W.2d 839 (1985); Alby v. Alby, 155 
Wis. 2d 286, 290, 455 N.W.2d 632 (Ct. App. 1990). 
¶31 Yet valuing and dividing pension benefits is one of 
the most difficult matters a circuit court faces in the final 
division of property in a divorce judgment.  Olski, 197 Wis. 2d 
at 248; Bloomer, 84 Wis. 2d at 129-30.  As one commentator put 
it: "The complexity of classifying, valuing and dividing these 
plans is unmatched by any other issue in any area of modern 
law."  Brett R. Turner, Equitable Distribution of Property 288 
(2d ed. 1994). 
¶32 In Corliss v. Corliss, 107 Wis. 2d 338, 347, 320 
N.W.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1982), the court of appeals concluded that 
a circuit court may exercise discretion in determining whether 
to award interest on a property division payable in future 
installments.  But if a circuit court does not award interest in 
such a division, the court must state its reasons for not doing 
so, since persons are generally required to pay interest on 
money owed.  Either by awarding interest or by considering the 
present value of the property payable in the future, the circuit 
court compensates a recipient spouse who will receive the award 
in the future.  See also Jasper v. Jasper, 107 Wis. 2d 59, 69-
70, 318 N.W.2d 792 (1982) (one party making installment cash 
No. 
98-1234 
 
 
17
payment over extended period to compensate other party for 
interest the award would earn during installment period).  
Although the Corliss and Jasper cases do not specifically 
address pensions with deferred payments, the principles set 
forth in those cases are applicable to this case.  The circuit 
court's failure to explain what provision was being made for the 
allocation of appreciation and interest on the pension between 
the date of the divorce and distribution of the pension makes 
for an ambiguous judgment in this case. 
¶33 Furthermore, parties and circuit courts frequently 
fail to work out the details of the final division of a pension 
until after a divorce judgment.  The present case illustrates 
this practice.  It was not until after the divorce judgment and 
after Mrs. Washington urged that steps be taken to finalize the 
division of the pension that the parties explored dividing the 
pension 
with 
the 
appropriate 
federal 
authorities. 
 
Mr. 
Washington, a lawyer, undertook this task himself with the 
permission of the circuit court, although the parties to a 
divorce often hire a professional technical support service to 
draft and submit the required documents to implement a final 
division of a pension. 15  Mrs. Washington had suggested hiring 
such a service. 
                     
15 See William M. Troyan, Moving Beyond Pension Evaluation: 
Deferred 
Pay 
Program 
Evaluation 
for 
Marriage 
Dissolution 
Actions—An Evaluator's Perspective, ch. 45 at 45-2 in 3 Lexis 
Publishing, Valuation Distribution of Marital Property (Rel. 20-
1/96 Pub. 133).  
No. 
98-1234 
 
 
18
¶34 In light of the limited language about the pension in 
this judgment, the complexity of dividing pensions, and the 
understanding that more work would be needed in this case to 
divide the pension, it would be unreasonable to read Wis. Stat. 
§ 767.32(1)(a) as prohibiting the circuit court from construing 
the final division of the pension in order to allocate 
appreciation and interest on the pension.  Such a reading would 
trump the circuit court's powers as set forth in § 767.01(1).  
¶35 In sum, on the basis of Wis. Stat. §§ 767.32(1)(a) 
(barring revision and modification of a final division) and 
767.01(1) (authorizing a circuit court to effectuate its 
judgments), the language and objective of this divorce judgment, 
and the nature of the property at issue, we conclude that the 
final judgment is ambiguous about the allocation of appreciation 
and interest on the pension between the date of the divorce and 
distribution of the pension.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
circuit court should determine the allocation of appreciation 
and interest on the pension under the final division of property 
in the divorce judgment. 
¶36 For the foregoing reasons we reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court 
to determine the allocation of appreciation and interest on the 
pension under the final division of property in the divorce 
judgment. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded. 
 
No. 
98-1234 
 
 
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