Case Title: State v. Chrysler Outboard Corporation

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1996AP001158

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1998-06-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-1158 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Chrysler Outboard Corporation, a/k/a Beaver Dam 
Products Corporation, a/k/a Chrysler Marine 
Corporation, a foreign corporation, 
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 19, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
December 3, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick L. Snyder 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Bablitch, J. (concurs in part/dissents in part) 
 
 
 
(opinion filed) 
 
 
Geske, J., (concurs in part/dissents in part) 
 
 
 
(opinion filed) 
 
 
Abrahamson, C.J. and Bradley, J., join 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued 
by Shari Eggleson, and Cynthia R. Hirsch, assistant attorney 
generals, with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney 
general. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by 
Steven C. Kohl and Howard & Howard Attorneys, P.C., Bloomfield 
Hills, MI and William F. Reilly and Hippenmeyer, Reilly & Moodie, 
S.C., Waukesha and oral argument by Steven C. Kohl. 
 
No.  96-1158 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-1158 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Chrysler Outboard Corporation, a/k/a  
Beaver Dam Products Corporation, a/k/a  
Chrysler Marine Corporation, a foreign  
corporation,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent.  
FILED 
 
JUN 19, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Waukesha 
County, Patrick L. Snyder, Judge.  Affirmed in part and reversed 
in part. 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.    This case is before the court on 
certification from the court of appeals following an order of 
the Circuit Court for Waukesha County, Patrick L. Snyder, Judge, 
which dismissed the appellant State of Wisconsin's (State) 
environmental enforcement action pursuant to Wis. Admin. Code 
§§ RD 51.05-.06 (1969) (Solid Waste Law) for failure to commence 
the action within the applicable statute of limitations.  The 
circuit court also held that the State could not impose 
liability upon the respondent Chrysler Outboard Corporation 
No.  96-1158 
 
2 
(Chrysler)1 pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3) (1977) (Spills 
Law) because Chrysler caused the hazardous substance spill at 
issue prior to the effective date of the Spills Law.  The State 
appealed. 
¶2 
On certification, we consider two issues: (1) whether 
the State's Solid Waste Law violation enforcement action is 
subject to a statute of limitations bar or to the application of 
the "discovery rule"; and (2) whether Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3) 
(1977) is applicable to post-1978 discharges resulting in part 
from pre-1978 acts when the implicated party does not own or 
possess the affected property but generated the wastes and 
failed to remediate their subsequent spillage.  We hold that the 
discovery rule is not applicable to the State's environmental 
enforcement action under the Solid Waste Law,2 and that the 
Spills Law is applicable in actions by the State to compel 
remediation of, and to impose penalties for, hazardous substance 
spills which, although initially caused in part by actions 
preceding the statute's May 21, 1978, effective date, continue 
to discharge after that date.  Therefore, we affirm the order of 
                     
1 In their briefs to this court, the State refers to the 
respondent 
as 
"Chrysler 
Outboard 
Corporation," 
while 
the 
respondent uses its current corporate title, "Beaver Dam 
Products Corporation."  For purposes of simplicity, we use the 
former title throughout this opinion. 
2 At oral argument in this case, the State clarified that it 
seeks 
"to 
apply 
the 
discovery 
rule 
to 
violations 
of 
environmental law, particularly this environmental law in this 
case."  We express no opinion on the application of the 
discovery rule to violations of environmental law that are not 
present in this case. 
No.  96-1158 
 
3 
the circuit court dismissing the State's action pursuant to the 
Solid Waste Law as time-barred, and reverse the circuit court's 
order which dismissed the State's action under the Spills Law. 
¶3 
The facts relevant to our decision are not in dispute. 
 Chrysler, a foreign corporation registered to do business in 
the state of Wisconsin, owned and operated a plant in Hartford, 
Wisconsin, from 1965 to 1984 where it manufactured outboard 
marine engines.  The manufacturing process generated waste 
paints, oils, and solvents, some of which contained hazardous 
substances as defined by Wis. Stat. § 144.30(10) (1977). 
¶4 
For approximately the first six months of 1970, 
Chrysler contracted with a construction and demolition business 
known as Keller Transit to remove the waste, contained in 55-
gallon drums, from the Hartford plant for disposal.  Keller 
Transit hauled the waste to a site located in the Village of 
Hartland, then owned by Mr. Lee Hasslinger, president of Keller 
Transit, and now owned by a real estate partnership named Bark 
River Properties (Bark River site).  Keller Transit dumped the 
drums together with other rubbish in a low spot at the Bark 
River site, and covered the area with fill.  The drums remained 
buried there until they were discovered in late 1992. 
¶5 
On August 25, 1992, the State became aware of the 
drums for the first time.  In the ensuing investigation, the 
State determined that at least some of the drums originated at 
Chrysler's Hartford plant.  Testing at the Bark River site has 
shown that the hazardous wastes have discharged into the ground, 
producing a plume of groundwater contamination at least one-half 
No.  96-1158 
 
4 
mile long.  The plume contains levels of chlorinated solvents as 
much as ten times the safe drinking water standard. 
¶6 
The 
subsequent 
litigation 
between 
the 
State and 
Chrysler produced a settlement, by which Chrysler agreed to 
excavate and properly dispose of the drums and to remediate the 
environmental damage caused by the discharge of the hazardous 
waste.  In August 1993, in consultation with the Department of 
Natural Resources (DNR), Chrysler submitted a work plan for 
investigation and interim response activities.  Excavation of 
the 
site 
commenced 
in 
December 
1993, 
and 
the 
DNR 
has 
subsequently issued a closure letter to Chrysler which indicates 
that the site has been satisfactorily remediated with respect to 
the removal of the buried drums and remediation of the 
contaminated soil, but not with respect to the groundwater 
contamination at the site.3  Of the 401 drums eventually 
excavated from the Bark River site, 240 contained hazardous 
wastes. 
¶7 
In 1995, the State commenced this action seeking both 
injunctive relief and civil penalties under both the Solid Waste 
Law and the Spills Law.4  The Solid Waste Law was promulgated 
                     
3 Specifically, the April 3, 1997, closure letter from the 
DNR to Chrysler indicates: "This closure determination does not 
include groundwater contamination found on the property nor the 
groundwater contamination migrating off the property."  Record 
on Appeal 26:1. 
4 The State voluntarily dismissed, with prejudice, a third 
claim against Chrysler which alleged that Chrysler had illegally 
operated a hazardous waste facility without a license from the 
DNR.   
No.  96-1158 
 
5 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 144.43 (1967), which provided in 
pertinent part: 
 
144.43 
 
Solid 
Waste 
Disposal 
Standards. 
 
The 
department shall, no later than January 1, 1969, 
prepare and adopt minimum standards for the location, 
design, 
construction, 
sanitation, 
operation 
and 
maintenance 
of 
solid 
waste 
disposal 
sites 
and 
facilities . . . .5 
The standards developed by the DNR are set forth in the 
Administrative Code, Wis. Admin. Code §§ RD 51.05-.06 (1969), 
and provide in relevant part: 
 
RD 51.05  Collection and transportation of solid 
waste.  (1) The owner and occupant of any premises, 
business 
establishment 
or 
industry 
shall 
be 
responsible 
for 
the 
satisfactory 
collection 
and 
transportation of all solid waste accumulated at that 
premises, business establishment or industry to a 
solid 
waste 
disposal 
site 
or 
facility 
unless 
arrangements for such purpose have been made with a 
collecting and transporting service holding a permit 
from the department. 
(2) All persons engaged in the business of collecting 
and transporting services . . . shall obtain an annual 
permit from the department as indicated in this 
chapter. 
 
RD 51.06  Disposal of solid waste.  No person shall 
dispose of any solid waste, including salvageable 
material, at any site or facility not licensed by the 
department . . . .6 
 
¶8 
The Spills Law, Wis. Stat. § 144.76 (1977), provides 
in part: 
                     
5 The enabling statute is currently codified at Wis. Stat. 
§ 289.05 (1995-96).  
6 The DNR regulations are currently set forth in the NR500 
series of the Wisconsin Administrative Code.  
No.  96-1158 
 
6 
 
144.76  Hazardous substance spills.  (1) DEFINITIONS.  As 
used in this section: 
   (a) "Discharge" means, but is not limited to, 
spilling, 
leaking, 
pumping, 
pouring, 
emitting, 
emptying or dumping. 
   (b) "Hazardous substance" has the meaning given 
under s. 144.30(10). 
. . . 
(3) RESPONSIBILITY.  Persons having possession of or 
control over a hazardous substance being discharged, 
or who cause a hazardous discharge, shall take the 
actions necessary to restore the environment to the 
extent practicable and minimize the harmful effects 
from any discharge to the air, lands or waters of this 
state.7 
¶9 
Violations of both the Solid Waste Law, effective May 
1, 1969, and the Spills Law, effective May 21, 1978, were 
subject to penalties as provided by Wis. Stat. § 144.57 (1969) 
or a subsequent version of the same statute.  The penalties 
provision states: 
 
144.57  Penalties.  Any person who violates this 
chapter, or who fails, neglects or refuses to obey any 
general or special order of the department, shall 
forfeit not less than $10 nor more than $5,000, for 
each violation, failure or refusal.  Each day of 
continued violation is a separate offense. . . .8 
¶10 The State seeks penalties for every day of violation 
of the Solid Waste Law in 1970, and every day of violation of 
the Spills Law since May 21, 1978.  More specifically, the State 
seeks to impose penalties under the Solid Waste Law for 
                     
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 144.76(3) (1977) is currently codified 
at § 292.11(3) (1995-96).  
8 In 1979, Wis. Stat. § 144.57 was renumbered to Wis. Stat. 
§ 144.99.  It is currently codified at § 299.97 (1995-96) and 
reads substantially the same as it did in 1969. 
No.  96-1158 
 
7 
Chrysler's failure to use licensed haulers to remove its solid 
waste, and for failure to deposit that waste at a licensed 
facility.  The penalties sought for violations of the Spills Law 
relate to Chrysler's post-1978 failure to remediate the Bark 
River site.  The injunctive relief sought by the State includes 
both an order requiring that Chrysler continue and complete 
remediation of the contamination at the Bark River site, and an 
order requiring Chrysler to determine where the rest of the 
hazardous wastes it generated prior to 1976 at its Hartford 
plant were disposed. 
 
¶11 Both parties moved for summary judgment.  The State 
asserted: (1) that the discovery rule should apply to its Solid 
Waste Law claim so as to eliminate any statute of limitations 
concern; and (2) that its attempt to impose liability under the 
Spills Law was not a retroactive, ex post facto application of 
the law since it sought to address only Chrysler's post-1978 
failure to remediate the Bark River site—not its pre-1978 
dumping activities.  Chrysler responded and argued in its own 
motion for summary judgment that the discovery rule, previously 
employed in tort actions alone, should not be extended to 
environmental enforcement actions brought by the State years 
after the environmental violations occurred.  In addition, 
Chrysler argued that any attempt to impose penalties and 
forfeitures under the Spills Law, which became effective in 
1978, violates the ex post facto provisions of the state and 
federal constitutions since they would be predicated upon 
Chrysler's actions in 1970. 
No.  96-1158 
 
8 
¶12 Citing the fact that neither the legislature nor this 
court has extended the discovery rule to an environmental 
enforcement action of this sort, the circuit court denied the 
State's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment 
for Chrysler on the Solid Waste Law claim.  Later, the circuit 
court denied the State's motion for summary judgment, and 
granted summary judgment in favor of Chrysler on the Spills Law 
claim.  The circuit court concluded that the Spills Law does not 
allow the State to seek remediation from Chrysler because the 
hazardous substance spill was caused prior to the effective date 
of the Spills Law.  Any penalties or forfeitures imposed on 
Chrysler would, according to the circuit court, violate the ex 
post 
facto 
clauses 
of 
the 
United 
States 
and 
Wisconsin 
Constitutions.9  The State appealed from the circuit court's 
final order, and the court of appeals certified the case to this 
court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (1995-96). 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
¶13 Before we proceed to the first issue presented in this 
case, we must decide which statute of limitations applies to the 
                     
9 Article I, § 12 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides in 
relevant part: 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law 
impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be 
passed . . . . 
 
Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution provides: 
No state shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex 
post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility. 
  
No.  96-1158 
 
9 
Spills Law claim, commenced on February 16, 1995.10  The State 
asserts that Wis. Stat. § 893.87 (1995-96)11 is the applicable 
statute of limitations in this action.  It provides in pertinent 
part: 
 
893.87  General limitation of action in favor of the 
state.  Any action in favor of the state, if no other 
limitation is prescribed in this chapter, shall be 
commenced within 10 years after the cause of action 
accrues or be barred. . . . 
Chrysler contends that Wis. Stat. § 893.93(2)(a) (1995-96) 
applies to the State's claim.  That statute reads in relevant 
part: 
 
893.93  Miscellaneous actions. 
. . .  
(2) The following actions shall be commenced 
within 2 years after the cause of action accrues or be 
barred: 
(a) An action by a private party upon a statute 
penalty, or forfeiture when the action is given to the 
party prosecuting therefor and the state, except when 
the 
statute 
imposing 
it 
provides 
a 
different 
limitation. 
. . . 
¶14 We agree with the State that Wis. Stat. § 893.87 
(1995-96) is the controlling statute of limitations for the 
Spills Law claim.  Wis. Stat. § 893.93(2)(a), on its face, 
                     
10 We need not decide which statute of limitations applies 
to the Solid Waste Law claim, since the State has exceeded all 
time limits in this case and seeks instead to apply the 
discovery rule to this cause of action.  
11 For purposes of simplicity, we use the 1995-96 version of 
the statutes of limitation in question.  At all times relevant 
to this action, the substance of these statutes remained the 
same.  
No.  96-1158 
 
10
applies only to actions by a private party for penalties or 
forfeitures when the action is given to the private party and 
the state.  This is not an action by a private party.12  There 
being no other statute of limitations prescribed for the State's 
action, the general statute of limitations for actions in favor 
of the State applies to the Spills Law claim.  This conclusion 
is important for the following reason. 
¶15 In State v. Wisconsin Telephone Co., 91 Wis. 2d 702, 
717-19, 284 N.W.2d 41 (1979), this court considered a statute of 
limitations defense in the context of a forfeiture/penalty 
action.  Most notably, the case involved an action controlled by 
Wis. Stat. § 893.21(1) (1975), the precursor to the statute of 
limitations which Chrysler proposes to be controlling here, Wis. 
Stat. § 893.93(2)(a) (1995-96).  We held that where every day of 
violation of a statute constitutes a separate violation of that 
statute (as is the case with the penalty provision here), a 
cause of action accrues on each of those days of alleged 
violation.  See id. at 719. 
¶16 Therefore, a statute of limitations will act as a bar 
to any forfeiture claims which are based on violations that 
occurred more than, using this case as an example, 10 years 
prior to the date the action was commenced.  Compare id. at 719 
(concluding that Wis. Stat. § 893.21(1) (1975) barred forfeiture 
                     
12 We also note that Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3) does not create 
a private cause of action.  See Grube v. Daun, 210 Wis. 2d 682, 
693, 563 N.W.2d 523, amended by 213 Wis. 2d 533, 570 N.W.2d 851 
(1997).  
No.  96-1158 
 
11
claims occurring more than two years prior to commencement of 
action).  Contrary to the State's assertions, then, the State 
may not collect penalties for violations of the Spills Law 
beginning on the statute's effective date, but only for those 
violations which have occurred since February 16, 1985, ten 
years prior to the commencement of this action.13 
THE SOLID WASTE LAW 
¶17 We now turn to the first issue presented on appeal: 
whether the "discovery rule" should apply to the State's 
environmental enforcement action under the Solid Waste Law, so 
as to render it timely under Wis. Stat. § 893.87 (1995-96).  
Upon review of the application of appropriate law in granting a 
motion for summary judgment, we exercise a de novo standard of 
review.  Thus, we analyze and apply the law without deference to 
the circuit court's conclusion of law.  See Le Fevre v. 
Schrieber, 167 Wis. 2d 733, 736, 482 N.W.2d 904 (1992). 
¶18 The discovery rule was first adopted by this court in 
Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 
(1983).  In that case, the plaintiff (Hansen) had a Dalkon 
                     
13 Relying upon no less weighty authority than the State's 
brief to this court in State v. Mauthe, 123 Wis. 2d 288, 366 
N.W.2d 871 (1985), Chrysler asserts that penalties cannot be 
assessed under the Spills Law until a defendant affirmatively 
declines to undertake remedial action.  We find no support for 
this position—nothing in the statute itself, Wisconsin case law, 
or even the State's brief in Mauthe suggests that this is an 
accurate reading of the Spills Law.  To the contrary, a plain 
reading of Wis. Stat. § 144.76 (1977) and Wis. Stat. § 144.57 
(1969) illustrates that a de facto violation of the Spills Law 
is sufficient to trigger penalties. 
No.  96-1158 
 
12
Shield intrauterine device inserted into her uterus by medical 
personnel.  See id. at 552.  Approximately four years later, she 
began to experience various health problems, which eventually 
prompted her doctor to remove the device.  See id. at 552-53.  
Although the Dalkon Shield was removed, the plaintiff did not 
escape unharmed: she contracted pelvic inflammatory disease, 
which left her fallopian tubes blocked and rendered her sterile. 
 See id. at 553. 
¶19 The applicable statute of limitations in Hansen's 
subsequent personal injury action stated that actions to recover 
damages for injuries to the person must be commenced within 
three years after the cause of action accrues or be barred.  See 
id. at 554.  If Hansen's personal injury cause of action had 
accrued at the time of the negligent act—the insertion of the 
Dalkon Shield—her claim against A.H. Robins would have been 
barred.  Instead, recognizing "the injustice of commencing the 
statute of limitations before a claimant is aware of his or her 
right of action," and that "using the date of injury as the 
benchmark for accrual of claims can yield extremely harsh 
results," id. at 556, we adopted the discovery rule for Hansen's 
action and others like it.  See id. at 560-61.  
¶20 In adopting the discovery rule, we stated: 
 
In the interest of justice and fundamental fairness, 
we adopt the discovery rule for all tort actions other 
than those already governed by a legislatively created 
discovery rule.  Such tort claims shall accrue on the 
date the injury is discovered or with reasonable 
diligence 
should 
be 
discovered, 
whichever 
occurs 
first.  All cases holding that tort claims accrue at 
No.  96-1158 
 
13
the time of the negligent act or injury are hereby 
overruled. 
Id. at 560.  Because Hansen could not have discovered her injury 
any earlier, or could not be expected to personally diagnose her 
condition, we held that her personal injury claim accrued in 
1978, upon discovery of her medical condition.  See id. at 561. 
 Thus, her cause of action was timely filed. 
¶21 The State seeks to have this same rule applied to the 
present cause of action: an environmental enforcement claim for 
violations of the Solid Waste Law which occurred in 1970, but 
which were not discovered until 1992.  According to the State, 
this court has continued, without legislative direction, to 
expand the discovery rule since our decision in Hansen, and has 
indicated its intention to make the discovery rule applicable to 
other types of cases.  To support this proposition, the State 
cites several cases, including Claypool v. Levin, 209 Wis. 2d 
284, 562 N.W.2d 584 (1997), Spitler v. Dean, 148 Wis. 2d 630, 
436 N.W.2d 308 (1989), Kohnke v. St. Paul Fire Ins. Co., 144 
Wis. 2d 352, 424 N.W.2d 191 (1988), and Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 
130 Wis. 2d 397, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986).  We disagree with the 
State's argument and use of authority. 
¶22 This court has recently declined to extend the 
discovery rule to causes of action not sounding in tort.  See 
CLL Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Arrowhead Pacific Corp., 174 
Wis. 2d 604, 617, 497 N.W.2d 115 (1993) (holding that causes of 
action sounding in contract accrue at the time the contract is 
breached, regardless of whether the injured party knew or should 
No.  96-1158 
 
14
have known that the breach occurred).14  Moreover, although 
several of the cases cited by the State arguably represent some 
"expansion" of the discovery rule, they are all cases in which 
the plaintiff's cause of action sounded in tort.  Stated more 
precisely, these cases all involved claims for personal injury. 
 See Claypool, 209 Wis. 2d at 287-88 (barring claim for medical 
malpractice); 
Spitler, 
148 
Wis. 2d 
at 
631-32 
(permitting 
intentional tort claim arising from assault and battery); 
Kohnke, 144 Wis. 2d at 355 (permitting claim for medical 
malpractice); Borello, 130 Wis. 2d at 423-24 (permitting claim 
for personal injury resulting from defective furnace). 
¶23 In none of these cases did we indicate our intention 
to expand the discovery rule to situations arising outside of 
the tort context.  The State brings our attention to a paragraph 
in Kohnke which states: "The plain language of the Hansen case 
did not limit its discovery rule to certain types of cases, such 
as medical malpractice or products liability, but was applicable 
to any case not 'already governed by a legislatively created 
discovery rule.'"  Kohnke, 144 Wis. 2d at 361 (quoting Hansen, 
113 Wis. 2d at 560).  The State misinterprets this statement. 
¶24 Nothing in that paragraph purports to apply the 
discovery rule to situations arising outside the tort context.  
This is made evident by the fact that Kohnke involved a personal 
injury tort claim for damages sustained during the plaintiff, 
                     
14 We also recently clarified that the judicially-created 
discovery rule cannot be applied to a statute of repose.  See 
Tomczak v. Bailey, No. 95-2733, op. at 15 (S. Ct. May 22, 1998). 
No.  96-1158 
 
15
Kohnke's, childhood surgery.  See Kohnke, 144 Wis. 2d at 356.  
The statement cited by the State simply reflects our conclusion 
that the discovery rule should apply to Kohnke's action—a claim 
controlled 
not 
by 
the 
medical 
malpractice 
statute 
of 
limitations, but by a personal injury statute of limitations in 
effect when Kohnke suffered his injury and which did not contain 
its own rule of discovery.  Kohnke, 144 Wis. 2d at 359-61. 
¶25 Nevertheless, the State attempts to analogize the 
social purposes underlying environmental enforcement actions to 
those generally served by tort law.  According to the State, 
environmental enforcement actions are "strikingly similar" to 
tort claims because the actions shift the losses, in the form of 
injunctions to remediate the environment or forfeitures, to the 
party at fault for damaging the environment.  Placing this cost 
with the law-violating party—the one most able to prevent the 
injury—serves to deter other would-be violators from handling or 
disposing of their hazardous wastes in an unsafe manner.  
Finally, just as in tort law, losses are distributed widely 
since industry considers the cost of compliance as part of the 
cost of doing business in Wisconsin.15 
¶26 We are not persuaded by the State's analogy.  Nor are 
we persuaded that the State's request in this case comports with 
our traditional understanding of the discovery rule.  We now 
                     
15 For a discussion of the broad social purposes served by 
tort law, see CLL Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Arrowhead Pacific 
Corp., 174 Wis. 2d 604, 610, 497 N.W.2d 115 (1993), and sources 
cited therein.  
No.  96-1158 
 
16
proceed to expound upon these important distinctions, and to 
explain our decision to defer to the legislature for adopting 
the discovery rule in environmental enforcement actions brought 
pursuant to the Solid Waste Law. 
DISCOVERY OF INJURY RULES v. DISCOVERY OF VIOLATION RULES 
¶27 By clarifying the precise nature of the State's 
request in this case, we expose the first critical deviation 
from our traditional use and understanding of the discovery 
rule.  A brief look at a decision of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit will make our task 
an easier one. 
¶28 In 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1994), 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sought to assess civil 
penalties against 3M for violations of the Toxic Substances 
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629.  See id. at 1454.  The 
relevant question faced by the United States Court of Appeals 
was whether a five-year statute of limitations began running 
only when EPA reasonably could have expected to detect the 
violations giving rise to the civil penalties.  See id. 
¶29 Just as the State contends here, the EPA argued that a 
discovery rule was needed to address the agency's difficulties 
in enforcing the environmental law.  See id. at 1460.  After 
noting the laudable purposes of a discovery of injury rule, the 
3M court illustrated that the federal courts had not limited the 
rule to personal injury actions.  However, in those instances 
where the federal courts had expanded the discovery rule outside 
the boundaries of tort claims, the court emphasized that "the 
No.  96-1158 
 
17
rule has only been applied to remedial, civil claims."  Id. 
(citations omitted). 
¶30 In contrast to cases involving remedial claims, the 3M 
court noted: 
 
[t]he rule EPA sponsors is of an entirely different 
sort.  It is a "discovery of violation" rule having 
nothing whatever to do with the problem of latent 
injuries.  The rationale underlying the discovery of 
injury rule—that a claim cannot realistically be said 
to accrue until the claimant has suffered harm—is 
completely inapposite. . . . In an action for a civil 
penalty, the government's burden is to prove the 
violation; injuries or damages resulting from the 
violation are not part of the cause of action; the 
suit 
may 
be 
maintained 
regardless 
of 
damage.  
Immediately upon the violation, EPA may institute the 
proceeding to have the penalty imposed. . . . Because 
liability for the penalty attaches at the moment of 
the violation, one would expect this to be the time 
when the claim for the penalty "first accrued." 
Id. at 1460-61.  As a result, the 3M court declined to adopt the 
discovery rule for the EPA's environmental enforcement action.  
See id. at 1462-63. 
¶31 In the same way, our adoption of the discovery rule in 
this context would represent a dramatic departure from our 
previous thinking on the subject: the discovery rule would no 
longer be designed to offer those with latent, concealed 
injuries a chance to have their day in court.  Were we to adopt 
the discovery rule in this case, the State would be afforded the 
opportunity to compel both remediation and the payment of 
penalties by individuals or entities whose violations of a state 
law were not discovered within the applicable statute of 
limitations. 
No.  96-1158 
 
18
¶32 The State could have brought this civil penalty action 
under the Solid Waste Law even if the drums at the Bark River 
site had remained intact, without discharging hazardous wastes 
into the ground.  All that need be proved in the Solid Waste Law 
claim is that a violation of state law occurred, regardless of 
any damage or injury to the environment.  Thus, the State does 
not seek to apply the "discovery of injury" rule which this 
court has seen in the past, but rather a "discovery of 
violation" rule which has never before been employed in this 
state.   
¶33 The State argues that it truly seeks to apply a 
discovery of injury rule to this case, not the discovery of 
violation rule encountered by the 3M court.  The State reasons 
that the discovery rule would not apply to this case if no 
leaking or discharge of hazardous substances had occurred.  In 
other words, an "injury" or damage—which in this case, the State 
concedes, was the discharge of hazardous substances—is required 
under the State's theory in order to apply the discovery rule.  
It is this injury requirement that separates the present case 
from the 3M scenario. 
¶34 Although the State's theory dictates that a discharge 
must actually occur in order to impose remedial and punitive 
liability against Chrysler with help from the discovery rule, we 
disagree with the State's assertion that it seeks a discovery of 
injury rule for its Solid Waste Law claim.  Neither "leaking" 
nor "discharge" are elements of a Solid Waste Law violation.  A 
violation of the Solid Waste Law is complete when an entity uses 
No.  96-1158 
 
19
unlicensed haulers or an unlicensed facility to dispose of its 
waste.  The unlawful leaking or discharge of a hazardous 
substance are subsequent violations which may be prosecuted via 
the Spills Law of 1978, but not, under any reading of its terms, 
by using the Solid Waste Law. 
¶35 Therefore, we find it difficult to conceive how the 
State can employ the discovery rule to impose penalties for a 
violation of the Solid Waste Law when an element it concedes is 
necessary for its claim (discharge or leaking causing damage to 
the environment) is not an element of the Solid Waste Law to 
begin with.  The only logical—indeed, legally sustainable—
interpretation that remains of the State's Solid Waste Law 
enforcement claim is that it does seek a discovery of violation 
rule, whereby the failure to use licensed haulers or a licensed 
dump site is, by itself, enough to impose remedial and punitive 
liability against Chrysler.  This new-found approach to the 
discovery rule is cause for consideration on several levels. 
PENALTIES UNDER THE SOLID WASTE LAW 
¶36 To adopt the discovery rule in this instance would be 
to allow the State to punish those who violated a state law, as 
in this case, nearly 25 years prior to the commencement of any 
action by the State.  As the 3M court noted, "[f]ines, penalties 
and forfeitures, whether civil or criminal, may be considered a 
form of punishment."  3M, 17 F.3d at 1460 (citing Austin v. 
United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993)).  Although we concede that 
there is, as the State emphasized at oral argument, no 
possibility of "jail time" for Chrysler, we conclude that Wis. 
No.  96-1158 
 
20
Stat. § 144.57 (1969)'s authorization of penalties up to $5,000 
per day serves, at least in part, to punish offenders of the 
Solid Waste Law.  See, e.g., State v. Peterson, 104 Wis. 2d 616, 
624, 312 N.W.2d 784 (1981) (noting that "forfeiture actions are 
of a hybrid nature, i.e. part civil, part criminal"); City of 
Milwaukee v. Wuky, 26 Wis. 2d 555, 561-62, 133 N.W.2d 356 (1965) 
(same).  Thus, the State's attempt to impose penalties against 
Chrysler for a violation of the Solid Waste Law is more 
analogous to a criminal action than to the civil tort actions in 
which we have previously employed the discovery rule.16   
¶37 In criminal actions, the State is ordinarily subject 
to a statute of limitations bar—it does not have unfettered 
discretion to prosecute at any time because liability for the 
offense attaches at the time the offense is committed.  See, 
e.g., Wis. Stat. § 939.74 (1995-96) (providing that prosecutions 
for felonies must be commenced within 6 years and misdemeanors 
within 3 years after commission of a crime, except in certain 
circumstances).  As the United States Supreme Court concluded 
nearly 200 years ago, "[i]n a country where not even treason can 
be prosecuted after a lapse of three years, it could scarcely be 
                     
16 The State cites two cases for the proposition that 
penalties are like damages because they both make the injured 
party whole.  See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), 
overruled by Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997); 
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980).  We are not 
persuaded by this argument.  These cases reiterate that civil 
penalties have a remedial purpose of making the government 
whole, but do not attempt to equate penalties and damages in a 
comparison 
of 
tort 
actions 
with 
environmental 
enforcement 
actions. 
No.  96-1158 
 
21
supposed that an individual would remain for ever liable to a 
pecuniary forfeiture."  Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 
342, 2 L.Ed. 297 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.).  Indeed, the 
inherently punitive nature of the present action increases 
Chrysler's need to be protected from stale claims brought 
decades after the violations occurred. 
¶38 These considerations lead us to the conclusion that 
the State's need for an expansive period of limitations in this 
remedial and punitive action is much less critical than that we 
have seen with the tort victims in our previous discovery rule 
cases.  Under these circumstances, we see no reason to respond 
with the unilateral imposition of an open-ended, judicially-
created discovery rule that for all practical purposes would 
apply to every environmental enforcement action brought by the 
State.17 
¶39 The State argues that defendants such as Chrysler will 
not be prejudiced in situations similar to the one at hand 
because the discovery rule will commence the statute of 
limitations 
when 
the 
State 
discovers 
or 
with 
reasonable 
diligence should have discovered the violation.  According to 
the State, this standard puts a "heavy burden" on the regulatory 
agency to discover violations of the Solid Waste Law.  We are 
not persuaded that the discovery standard which would require 
                     
17 In fact, were we to adopt the discovery rule in this 
case, we find it difficult to understand why the rule wouldn't 
apply generally to every forfeiture/penalty action brought by 
the State. 
No.  96-1158 
 
22
the State to exercise "reasonable diligence," see Hansen, 113 
Wis. 2d at 560, in discovering violations of the Solid Waste Law 
should alter our conclusion.  This argument ignores our 
preeminent concern with the need to protect defendants from 
stale claims in all cases involving violations of the Solid 
Waste Law, not just those in which the State should have 
discovered a violation, but didn't because it failed to exercise 
"reasonable diligence." 
ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE 
¶40 We acknowledge that a violation of the Solid Waste Law 
can be said to affect all citizens of the state of Wisconsin, 
such that the State commenced this action on behalf of those 
"injured" citizens.  Nevertheless, a request to equate the 
violation of state law with the concealed, latent injury of a 
tort victim, so as to expand the statute of limitations in this 
case, is one better directed to the legislature than to this 
court.  "Wisconsin courts have traditionally held that statutes 
of limitation are policy considerations within the province of 
the legislature."  Miller v. Kretz, 191 Wis. 2d 573, 580, 531 
N.W.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1995).  See also Tomczak v. Bailey, No. 95-
2733, op at 8 (S. Ct. May 22, 1998) ("In short, the decision to 
close the courthouse doors on litigants with stale claims is a 
pure question of policy that is better left to the legislative 
branch of government.").  Even in the context of tort actions, 
this court was extremely reluctant to adopt a common-law 
discovery rule for this very reason.  See Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d at 
556-557 (illustrating that we adopted the discovery rule for 
No.  96-1158 
 
23
actions sounding in tort at least some 23 years, and one 
legislative amendment, after the problem of discovery of injury 
was officially noted in an opinion). 
¶41 More importantly, the decision to adopt an open-ended 
discovery rule of this sort is a course of action that should be 
undertaken only after substantial review by the legislature.  
This review may reveal that the State's perceived inability to 
discover violations of its environmental laws and regulations is 
a serious problem that ought to be dealt with immediately.  On 
the other hand, the legislature may learn that the situation 
presented here is a relatively uncommon one, so that no 
discovery rule, or perhaps a very limited one,18 is needed. 
¶42 As yet another option, the legislature might conclude 
that adopting a discovery rule would not cure what it perceives 
to 
be 
the 
real 
problem: 
an 
ill-designed 
or 
inefficient 
environmental enforcement program or statute to begin with.  On 
this point, the words of the 3M court are once again pertinent 
to our discussion: 
 
An 
agency 
may 
experience 
problems 
in 
detecting 
statutory violations because its enforcement effort is 
not sufficiently funded; or because the agency has not 
devoted an adequate number of trained personnel to the 
task; or because the agency's enforcement program is 
ill-designed or inefficient; or because the nature of 
the statute makes it difficult to uncover violations; 
or because of some combination of these factors and 
others. 
. 
. 
. 
An 
agency's 
failure 
to 
detect 
violations, for whatever reasons, does not avoid the 
problems 
of 
faded 
memories, 
lost 
witnesses 
and 
                     
18 See, for example, the legislature's choice of action in 
the medical malpractice context, Wis. Stat. § 893.55 (1995-96).  
No.  96-1158 
 
24
discarded documents in penalty actions brought decades 
after alleged violations are finally discovered. 
3M, 17 F.3d at 1461. 
¶43 In sum, the legislature is in a better position to 
adopt the discovery rule for violations of the Solid Waste Law: 
it has the resources, the time, and the investigatory capability 
to review and analyze the competing interests at stake in this 
matter.  The words of Justice Day in State v. Mauthe, 123 
Wis. 2d 288, 302, 366 N.W.2d 871 (1985), may best summarize our 
reasons for leaving the choice to adopt this discovery of 
violation rule to the legislature: 
 
The manner in which our air, water and land is to be 
safeguarded, protected and improved is under the 
control of the legislature.  The various laws passed 
and the grants of authority to state agencies is the 
means by which this is done.  Wisconsin Environmental 
Decade v. D.N.R., 115 Wis. 2d 381, 414, 340 N.W.2d 222 
(1983).  The vitally important work of protecting the 
life 
sustaining 
forces 
around 
us, 
collectively 
referred 
to 
as 
the 
environment, 
is 
basic 
and 
fundamental to our survival.  The means to achieve 
these ends are not always agreed upon.  Experts often 
are in disagreement as to how to achieve these 
results.  Under our system it is the legislature and 
the agencies it empowers to carry out its mandates 
that bear this tremendous responsibility.  It is they 
who 
must 
resolve 
the 
conflicting 
interests 
and 
approaches to specific problems.  "[T]he D.N.R. is the 
state agency with the staff, sources and expertise in 
environmental 
matters. 
. 
. 
." 
 
Wisconsin's 
Environmental Decade, 115 Wis. 2d at 391. 
Id. 
¶44 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the 
discovery rule is inapplicable to the State's remedial and 
punitive environmental enforcement action under the Solid Waste 
No.  96-1158 
 
25
Law.  In this situation, the need to protect defendants from 
stale 
claims 
outweighs 
any 
injustice 
caused 
by 
barring 
environmental enforcement actions under the Solid Waste Law 
prior to discovery.  Because liability for the remediation and 
penalties imposed by the Solid Waste Law attached at the moment 
of the violation, the claim also "accrued" at that time, thereby 
rendering the State's action untimely.19 
THE 1978 SPILLS LAW 
¶45 The second issue we consider is whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 144.76(3) (1977) is applicable to post-1978 discharges of 
hazardous wastes resulting in part from the pre-1978 dumping of 
waste drums at the Bark River site, when Chrysler did not own or 
possess the site, but generated the wastes and failed to 
remediate their subsequent spillage.  Once again, upon review of 
the circuit court's order granting summary judgment in favor of 
Chrysler, we exercise a de novo standard of review and apply the 
law without deference to the circuit court's conclusion of law. 
 See Le Fevre, 167 Wis. 2d at 736. 
                     
19 The State cites, and at times lists, a plethora of cases 
from foreign jurisdictions in an attempt to persuade this court 
that the discovery rule should be adopted in this case.  See 
State's Brief at 16-21.  We do not find it necessary to respond 
to these arguments.  As we have stated, the policy behind our 
prior applications of the discovery rule to tort cases involving 
concealed, latent injuries simply does not apply to an open-
ended 
discovery 
of 
violation 
rule 
for 
an 
environmental 
enforcement action brought under the Solid Waste Law.  Because 
none of the foreign authority cited by the State persuades us 
that a different conclusion should be reached, we decline to 
address those cases.  
No.  96-1158 
 
26
¶46 Chrysler makes three primary arguments before this 
court relating to the Spills Law.  First, Chrysler contends that 
the Spills Law does not allow the State to seek remediation from 
a party who caused a pre-Spill Law enactment discharge of a 
hazardous substance, but who does not currently possess or own 
the property which requires remediation.  Second, Chrysler 
argues that Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3) (1977) is intended to apply 
prospectively.  Finally, Chrysler asserts that even if the 
remedial 
provision 
of 
the 
Spills 
Law 
could 
be 
applied 
retroactively, applying its penalty and forfeiture provisions 
would violate the ex post facto clauses of the United States and 
Wisconsin constitutions.  We address these arguments in turn. 
APPLICABILITY OF THE SPILLS LAW 
¶47 Chrysler's argument regarding the applicability of the 
Spills Law to its conduct in this case revolves around our 
decision in Mauthe, 123 Wis. 2d 288.  In Mauthe, the DNR 
discovered evidence of hazardous substance spills near a site 
that had been used by Wisconsin Chromium Corporation for chrome 
electroplating activities since 1960.  See id. at 293.  The 
defendant Mauthe, president of Wisconsin Chromium, had purchased 
the site in 1966, and leased it to the corporation.  Wisconsin 
Chromium continued to conduct chrome electroplating activities 
at the location until 1976, at which time the corporation 
dissolved 
and 
all 
electroplating 
activities 
ceased. 
 
At 
approximately the same time, Mauthe formed his own company.  See 
id. 
No.  96-1158 
 
27
¶48 Tests at and adjacent to the site revealed extensive 
hexavalent chromium contamination of the soil and groundwater—a 
hazardous substance within the meaning of Chapter 144.  See id. 
at 292-93.  The state sought injunctive relief as well as 
forfeitures from Mauthe under Wis. Stat. § 144.99 (1981-82)20 for 
the violations of the Spills Law caused by chromium leakage into 
the soil coupled with surface water runoff and groundwater flow. 
 See id. at 294. 
¶49 We 
first 
rejected 
Mauthe's 
argument 
that 
the 
definition of "discharge" provided in Wis. Stat. § 144.76(1)(a) 
(1981-82) required some kind of human activity which results in 
contaminant seepage.  See id. at 298.  Because "[w]ords such as 
'leaking' or 'emitting' have no apparent tie to human activity 
and often refer to phenomena which occur absent human conduct," 
id., we concluded that "discharge" encompasses inactive waste 
sites from which hazardous substances are flowing. 
¶50 We then concluded that although he did not cause the 
hazardous substance spill, Mauthe could be held responsible for 
remediation of the spill because he owned the property in which 
the contaminated soil was located.  In doing so, we rejected 
Mauthe's assertion that holding him liable under the Spills Law 
would violate the ex post facto clause of the Wisconsin 
Constitution since the electroplating activities ceased in 1976, 
                     
20 For purposes of this opinion, it may be assumed that the 
statutory provisions at issue in Mauthe contained the same 
language as the provisions at issue in this case.  
No.  96-1158 
 
28
prior to the statute's effective date.  See id. at 300-01.  We 
stated: 
 
[t]he action brought by the state relates only to the 
discharge from the contaminated soil located on his 
property and . . . does not relate to the activities 
which took place on his property prior to the 
statute's enactment.  It is the abatement of this 
current 
discharge 
that 
the 
state 
is 
seeking.  
Therefore, this is not an ex post facto application of 
law. 
Id. at 301-02. 
¶51 Chrysler contends that the rationale of Mauthe does 
not apply to the current situation since Mauthe had actual 
possession or control of the land.  In this case, Chrysler has 
never owned, possessed or controlled the Bark River site.  We 
agree with this assertion.  Nevertheless, Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3) 
(1977) imposes liability on "[p]ersons having possession of or 
control over a hazardous substance being discharged, or who 
cause a hazardous discharge . . . ." (emphasis added).  The 
situation presented here is different from that in Mauthe only 
to the extent that a different clause of the Spills Law is being 
used to impose liability.  The State does not seek remediation 
and penalties from Chrysler because it possessed or controlled 
the hazardous substance after 1978, but only upon the theory 
that Chrysler caused a hazardous discharge after the Spills Law 
took effect. 
¶52 Therefore, to determine whether Chrysler may be held 
liable in this case, we must examine both the remedial and 
punitive segments of the Spills Law in the context of a party 
No.  96-1158 
 
29
who is charged for "causing" the spill.  As to remediation, we 
conclude that the legislature intended to apply the Spills Law 
retroactively.  As to penalties and forfeitures, we conclude 
that the imposition of penalties in this case does not 
constitute a retroactive application of the Spills Law. 
 
REMEDIATION AND RETROACTIVITY 
¶53 It is a well-established rule in Wisconsin that 
legislation is presumed to be prospective in application unless: 
(1) the statute reveals by express language the legislature's 
intent to apply the provisions retroactively; or (2) the 
language reveals such intent by necessary implication.  See, 
e.g., Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 199-200, 531 N.W.2d 
70 (1995); Chappy v. LIRC, 136 Wis. 2d 172, 180, 401 N.W.2d 568 
(1987); State v. ILHR Dept., 101 Wis. 2d 396, 403, 304 N.W.2d 
758 (1981).  We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3) (1977) 
reveals the legislature's 
intent 
to 
authorize 
retroactive 
remediation under the Spills Law by necessary implication. 
¶54 Wisconsin Stat. § 144.76(3) (1977) requires those in 
violation of its provisions to "take the actions necessary to 
restore the environment to the extent practicable and minimize 
the harmful effects from any discharge to the air, lands or 
waters of this state."  We must presume that the legislature 
chose its words carefully in drafting this statute.  See, e.g., 
Ball v. District No. 4, Area Bd. of Vocational, Technical and 
Adult Educ., 117 Wis. 2d 529, 539, 345 N.W.2d 389 (1984).  Use 
of 
the 
phrase 
"restore 
the 
environment 
to 
the 
extent 
No.  96-1158 
 
30
practicable" by necessary implication reveals an intent to 
address past conduct.  Even those whose conduct in part predated 
the Spills Law cannot escape liability under this provision: 
they must perform complete remediation of the spill site to make 
the environment whole again. 
¶55 Any other interpretation or construction of this 
language would produce an absurd result, which this court has a 
duty to avoid.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Reimann v. Circuit 
Court for Dane County, 214 Wis. 2d 604, 621, 571 N.W.2d 385 
(1997).  If remediation under the Spills Law were to apply in a 
prospective fashion only, Chrysler would be liable solely for 
remediation of the hazardous substance spills which occurred 
after 1978.  Even assuming that courts could ascertain the 
precise date upon which the barrels began discharging their 
hazardous substances, it would be absurd to allow Chrysler to 
stop short of complete remediation by focusing on that portion 
of the spill which represents post-1978 spillage alone. 
¶56 Were Chrysler to do so, it would not be restoring the 
environment to the extent practicable.  Therefore, we conclude 
that the language of Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3) (1977) necessarily 
implies that violators of the Spills Law are liable for complete 
and thorough remediation of hazardous substance spills—even 
No.  96-1158 
 
31
those spills which in part occurred prior to the statute's 
effective date.21 
¶57 Our interpretation of the Spills Law is analogous to 
the interpretation that federal courts have given to the 
imminent hazard provision of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1994).  In United States 
v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D. N.J. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204 
(3d Cir. 1982), the United States brought an action for 
injunctive relief to remedy the hazards posed by chemical 
dumping that occurred at a landfill in 1971 and 1972.  The 
action 
was 
brought 
pursuant 
to, 
among 
other 
statutory 
provisions, section 7003 of RCRA.22  See id. at 1057.  Section 
7003 became effective in 1976, several years after the dumping 
had occurred.  See id. at 1070. 
                     
21 At oral argument, Chrysler argued that the State already 
has the power to compel remediation of the hazardous substance 
spills in this case by utilizing the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601-75 (1994).  For the sake of argument, we will assume 
that Chrysler's assertions regarding CERCLA law are accurate.  
Even so, we are not persuaded that a different conclusion should 
be reached in this case.  Regardless of its options under 
federal law, the State may also compel remediation under Wis. 
Stat. § 144.76(3) (1977) for the hazardous substance spills that 
occurred at the Bark River site. 
22 The relevant provision imposed liability upon persons 
"contributing 
to" 
the 
handling, 
storage, 
treatment, 
transportation or disposal of hazardous waste, when those 
techniques "may present an imminent and substantial endangerment 
to health or the environment."  United States v. Price, 523 F. 
Supp. 1055, 1069-70 (D. N.J. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 
1982). 
No.  96-1158 
 
32
¶58 In responding to the defendants' argument that the 
statute should not be applied retroactively to impose liability 
for acts they performed in 1971 and 1972, the United States 
District Court stated: 
 
The gravamen of a section 7003 action, as we have 
construed it, is not defendants' dumping practices, 
which admittedly ceased with respect to toxic wastes 
in 1972, but the present imminent hazard posed by the 
continuing disposal (i.e., leaking) of contaminants 
into the groundwater.  Thus, the statute neither 
punishes past wrongdoing nor imposes liability for 
injuries 
inflicted 
by 
past 
acts. 
 
Rather, 
as 
defendants 
themselves 
argue, 
its 
orientation 
is 
essentially prospective.  When construed in this 
manner, the statute simply is not retroactive.  It 
merely relates to current and future conditions. 
Admittedly, 
from 
a 
practical 
perspective, 
defendants may be compelled under our reading of the 
statute to remedy the continuing effects of acts they 
performed prior to the statute's adoption.  But we do 
not conceive of this as contrary to the purposes of 
the RCRA . . . .  Because the gravamen of a section 
7003 action is the current existence of a hazardous 
condition, not the past commission of any acts, we see 
no retroactivity problem with the statute. 
Id. at 1071-72 (citation omitted). 
¶59 In Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1436 
(S.D. 
Ohio 
1984), 
the 
district 
court 
reached 
a 
similar 
conclusion regarding RCRA.  Noting that the word "disposal" is 
defined by RCRA as "the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, 
spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous 
waste into or on any land or water so that . . . [it] may enter 
the environment," see 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (emphasis added), the 
Jones court concluded that RCRA "authorizes restraint of further 
leaking of hazardous wastes [originally disposed of in 1973 and 
No.  96-1158 
 
33
1974], and that the leaking need not result from any affirmative 
action by the defendant."  Jones, 584 F. Supp. at 1436.23  See 
also United States v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 17 Env't Rep. Cas. 
(BNA) 1329, 1334 (N.D. Ohio 1981) ("To hold that remedial 
environmental statutes could or should not apply to conduct 
engaged in antecedent to the enactment of such statutes, when 
the effects of such conduct create a present environmental 
threat, would constitute an irrational judicial foreclosure of 
legislative attempts to rectify pre-existing and currently 
existing environmental abuses."). 
FORFEITURES AND RETROACTIVITY 
¶60 The State' attempt to impose penalties and forfeitures 
in this case warrants a distinct analysis.  Upon review of the 
language of the Spills Law and supporting material to ascertain 
the legislature's intent, we conclude that the State does not 
seek a retroactive, ex post facto application of the Spills Law. 
¶61 Although Chrysler concedes that a hazardous substance 
"discharge" occurred after 1978, Chrysler argues that it did not 
"cause" the hazardous discharge in this case.  According to 
Chrysler, Keller Transit caused the discharge when it dumped the 
                     
23 Congress has subsequently amended RCRA to make clear that 
the government may commence actions "against 'past or present' 
generators, transporters or disposers of hazardous wastes to 
redress any 'past or present' hazardous waste activities which 
may present an imminent and substantial endangerment."  Joel A. 
Mintz, Abandoned Hazardous Waste Sites and the RCRA Imminent 
Hazard 
Provision: 
Some 
Suggestions 
for 
a 
Sound 
Judicial 
Construction, 11 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 247, 273 (1987).  For a 
discussion of RCRA's imminent hazard provision, see generally 
id.  
No.  96-1158 
 
34
waste drums at the Bark River site in 1970.  Even if Chrysler 
did cause the discharge, it did so prior to the effective date 
of the Spills Law—again, when the drums were buried at the Bark 
River site in 1970.  Therefore, using the Spills Law to impose 
liability 
on 
Chrysler 
in 
this 
situation 
would 
be 
to 
retroactively apply the law in violation of the ex post facto 
provisions of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions. 
¶62 We might be compelled to agree with Chrysler's 
argument if we agreed with its definition of the term "cause," 
as it is used in Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3) (1977).  Under 
Chrysler's theory, the only cause of the hazardous substance 
discharge in this case was the dumping of waste drums at the 
Bark River site in 1970.  We do not agree with this 
interpretation. 
¶63 "Cause" is not defined in Chapter 144 of the Wisconsin 
Statutes, nor has any court in this state defined the term as it 
is used in this context.  Therefore, we must apply the standard 
principles of statutory construction to determine its meaning.  
The goal of our examination, as usual, is to discern the intent 
of the legislature.  See State v. Rosenburg, 208 Wis. 2d 191, 
194, 560 N.W.2d 266 (1997). 
¶64 To determine the intent of the legislature, a court 
must first look to the language of the statute.  If that 
language clearly and unambiguously sets forth the legislative 
intent, it is the court's duty to apply that intent to the case 
at hand and not look beyond the statute's language to determine 
its meaning.  See N.E.M. v. Strigel, 208 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 559 
No.  96-1158 
 
35
N.W.2d 256 (1997).  However, if a statute is ambiguous, a court 
should examine the scope, history, context, subject matter, and 
purpose of the statute in order to determine the legislature's 
intent.  See State ex rel. Jacobus v. State, 208 Wis. 2d 39, 48, 
559 N.W.2d 900 (1997).  A statute is ambiguous if it is capable 
of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in more 
than one way.  See id. 
¶65 In this case, we may determine the common and ordinary 
meaning of a word by examining the definition given by a 
recognized dictionary.  See Mauthe, 123 Wis. 2d at 300.  "Cause" 
is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as follows: 
 
Cause, v.  To be the cause or occasion of; to effect 
as an agent; to bring about; to bring into existence; 
to make to induce; to compel. 
 
Cause, n. . . . Each separate antecedent of an event. 
 Something that precedes and brings about an effect or 
a result.  A reason for an action or condition. . . . 
An agent that brings something about.  That which in 
some manner is accountable for condition that brings 
about an effect or that produces a cause for the 
resultant action or state. 
Black's Law Dictionary at 221 (6th ed. 1990). 
¶66 Using these accepted definitions as a guide, we 
address Chrysler's arguments that Keller Transit, not Chrysler, 
caused the discharge at the Bark River site and that if Chrysler 
indeed caused the discharge, it did so prior to the effective 
date of the Spills Law.  We conclude that "cause" is capable of 
being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in more 
than one way.  A person or entity can "bring about" an event not 
only by acting affirmatively to produce that event, but also by 
No.  96-1158 
 
36
failing to act.  Stated differently, the failure to act can be a 
"reason for an action or condition" and can be a necessary 
"antecedent of an event" in the same way that affirmative action 
can precede and bring about an effect. 
¶67 Using the term "cause" in this manner, a reasonably 
well-informed person may conclude that Chrysler caused hazardous 
substance discharges after the Spills Law took effect by failing 
to remediate any and all discharge which occurred after 1978.  
That is, by failing each day after May 21, 1978, to clean up the 
hazardous waste at the Bark River site, Chrysler would thereby 
"cause a hazardous discharge" independent of its, or Keller 
Transit's, actions in 1970.  As we have already held in Mauthe, 
conscious human conduct is not needed to comport with the 
definition of "discharge" in Wis. Stat. § 144.76(1)(a) (1977) 
because "[w]ords such as 'leaking' or 'emitting' have no 
apparent tie to human activity and often refer to phenomena 
which occur absent human conduct."  Mauthe, 123 Wis. 2d at 298. 
 Because the leaking or emitting of hazardous waste is an 
ongoing process that occurs absent human conduct, one may 
reasonably conclude that a person can cause that leaking by 
failing to clean up the hazardous waste it has generated. 
¶68 Therefore, we examine factors such as the scope, 
history, context, subject matter and purpose of Wis. Stat. 
§ 144.76(3) (1977) to determine whether the legislature intended 
the term "cause" to include both the commission and omission of 
an act which leads to a hazardous waste spill.  In this case, 
No.  96-1158 
 
37
the purpose of the Spills Law alone leads us to the conclusion 
that the legislature did intend such a result. 
¶69 The purpose of Wis. Stat. § 144.76 (1977) is, as we 
have stated:  
 
to prevent, minimize, and, if necessary, abate and 
remedy contamination of this state's environment and 
the 
resultant 
risks 
to 
human 
health 
caused 
by 
discharges of hazardous substances.  The same risks to 
this state's environment and to human health are 
present whether or not the seepage of a hazardous 
substance occurred in relation to some human activity 
at the time the seepage occurred. 
Mauthe, 123 Wis. 2d at 299.  Thus, it would be inconsistent with 
legislative purpose to place a limitation upon the term "cause" 
that would restrict it to the action taken by Chrysler in 1970—
action which already forms the basis for liability under the 
Solid Waste Law.  Failing to remediate hazardous waste spills 
can have the same, or perhaps greater, effect as any affirmative 
spilling 
or 
dumping 
of 
that 
waste: 
the 
environment 
is 
contaminated and damaged, posing serious risks to human health. 
 It is the legislature's purpose to abate and remedy that 
contamination regardless of the cause. 
¶70 Evidence of the legislature's purpose may also be 
gleaned 
from 
the 
penalties 
provision 
of 
Chapter 
144 
as 
reproduced above, Wis. Stat. § 144.57 (1969).  That provision, 
the substantial equivalent of which was in effect in 1978, 
indicates that "each day of continued violation is a separate 
offense."  This provides clear evidence that the legislature 
recognized the ongoing nature of hazardous waste spills, and 
No.  96-1158 
 
38
that the failure to remediate, each day, could itself be a cause 
of a hazardous discharge within the meaning of the Spills Law. 
¶71 The logical counter-argument to our interpretation of 
the Spills Law—one that is implicit in Chrysler's argument to 
this court—is that Chrysler could not know of the hazardous 
substance spill which occurred after 1978, eight years after the 
waste had been removed from Chrysler's manufacturing plant.  
Nevertheless, Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3) (1977) imposes liability 
upon persons causing hazardous discharges regardless of whether 
they knew about the discharge.  If the legislature had desired 
to impose liability only upon those who "knowingly cause a 
hazardous discharge," it certainly could have done so. 
¶72 Evidence of the legislature's intent not to require 
intentional causation is made apparent by looking to the 
Hazardous Waste Management Act, Wis. Stat. §§ 144.60-144.74 
(1977), enacted by the same legislation as the Spills Law.  See 
1977 Laws ch. 377, §§ 21, 23.  Specifically, § 144.74(3) 
indicates as follows: 
 
Any person who transports any hazardous waste subject 
to ss. 144.60 to 144.74 to a facility which the 
transporter 
knows 
does 
not 
have 
a 
license, 
intentionally disposes of any hazardous waste subject 
to ss. 144.60 to 144.74 without having obtained a 
license 
for 
disposal 
of 
hazardous 
wastes 
or 
intentionally 
makes 
any 
false 
statement 
or 
representation . . . . 
(emphasis added).  This provision—again, having been enacted by 
the same legislation as the Spills Law—makes clear that the 
No.  96-1158 
 
39
legislature could have established "intent" as an element of a 
Spills Law violation if it had so desired. 
¶73 Therefore, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Chrysler 
caused 
a 
hazardous discharge in this case after 1978 by failing to clean 
up the hazardous waste left at the Bark River site.  Because the 
State does not seek penalties for Chrysler's pre-1978 conduct, 
but rather for Chrysler's post-1978 failure to remediate the 
spill alone, we are not presented with a retroactive, ex post 
facto application of the law. 
¶74 Indeed, 
"[a] 
statute 
does 
not 
operate 
'retrospectively' merely because it is applied in a case arising 
from conduct antedating the statute's enactment, or upsets 
expectations based on prior law.  Rather, the court must ask 
whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to 
events completed before its enactment."  Landgraf v. USI Film 
Products, 511 U.S. 244, 269-70 (1994).  Stated differently, "[a] 
retroactive law 'takes away or impairs vested rights acquired 
under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new 
duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions 
or considerations already past . . . .'"  In re Estate of 
Bilsie, 100 Wis. 2d 342, 357, 302 N.W.2d 508 (Ct. App. 1981) 
(quoting Sturges v. Carter, 114 U.S. 511, 519 (1885)). 
¶75 In this case, the ongoing nature of a hazardous 
substance spill eliminates any concern that the State seeks to 
"impose a new duty" or "attach new legal consequences" to events 
completed before the effective date of the Spills Law.  The 
hazardous 
discharge 
at 
the 
Bark 
River 
site 
was 
not 
a 
No.  96-1158 
 
40
"consideration or transaction already past."  Rather, as we have 
stated, it was an ongoing process which Chrysler continued to 
cause after the effective date of the Spills Law by failing to 
remediate the spill.24 
¶76 In sum, we conclude that the remedial portion of Wis. 
Stat. § 144.76(3) (1977) was intended to have both retroactive 
and prospective application.  Therefore, Chrysler is liable for 
complete remediation of the hazardous substance spill in this 
case, even if the leaking had in part occurred before the Spills 
Law took effect. 
¶77 We further conclude that Chrysler caused the discharge 
at issue after the Spills Law took effect in 1978, irrespective 
of Chrysler's activities prior to that date.  Therefore, because 
Chrysler generated the hazardous substances,25 and caused their 
discharge after 1978 by failing to remediate, it is liable for 
penalties for each day of violation by failure to remediate. 
¶78 There being no genuine issue of fact that remains for 
trial, we conclude that summary judgment was properly granted in 
                     
24 It is important to note that our interpretation of the 
Spills Law imposes liability that is no more wide-reaching than 
that imposed by Mauthe, 123 Wis. 2d 288.  Mauthe illustrates 
that a property owner is liable under the law merely by owning 
the property upon which hazardous wastes are located, regardless 
of the owner's connection to, or knowledge of, the wastes.  See 
id. at 301.  In the present case, our interpretation of the 
Spills 
Law 
clarifies 
that 
the 
State 
may 
also 
allocate 
responsibility for environmental investigations, remediation and 
penalties to more culpable parties such as Chrysler. 
25 "A statute is not made retroactive merely because it 
draws upon antecedent facts for its operation."  Cox v. Hart, 
260 U.S. 427, 435 (1922).  
No.  96-1158 
 
41
favor of Chrysler on the Solid Waste Law claim.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the order of the circuit court on this issue.  Because we 
affirm the circuit court's order, we need not address Chrysler's 
argument that the Solid Waste Law was not intended to apply to 
Chrysler and that the law exceeded the DNR's rule-making 
authority.  However, we reverse the order of the circuit court 
granting summary judgment in favor of Chrysler on the Spills Law 
claim and conclude that summary judgment should be granted in 
favor of the State on this issue.26 
¶79 Accordingly, 
Chrysler 
is 
compelled 
to 
complete 
remediation of the Bark River site, conduct an investigation to 
determine the location of any and all other unlicensed sites in 
Wisconsin at which its solid and hazardous wastes from its 
Hartford, Wisconsin plant were disposed and to submit both the 
results of that investigation, and if necessary, a remediation 
plan, to the DNR. 
¶80 The cause is remanded to the circuit court in order to 
assess the penalties authorized by Wis. Stat. § 144.57 (1969) 
and subsequent versions of that same statute from February 16, 
1985 until the date that remediation was commenced by Chrysler 
                     
26 We note the following assertion by Chrysler in its brief: 
"In the event this Court reverses either holding of the trial 
court, the action must be remanded for further proceedings 
regarding the other defenses raised by Defendant-Appellant [sic] 
below."  Chrysler Brief at 40-41 (emphasis added).  Although we 
reverse the circuit court's order on the Spills Law claim, we 
can identify no additional defenses to the Spills Law claim that 
were left unaddressed and which would necessitate remanding this 
case for trial on that issue. 
No.  96-1158 
 
42
in December 1993.  As mentioned, § 144.57 (1969) provides a 
forfeiture range of $10 to $5,000 for each day of violation.  
"This reflects the legislature's intention to give the trial 
court a wide range of discretion in fixing the amounts of 
forfeitures for ch. 144 violations."  State v. Schmitt, 145 
Wis. 2d 724, 734, 429 N.W.2d 518 (Ct. App. 1988) (emphasis 
added). 
¶81 There are no statutorily mandated factors which the 
circuit court must consider.  See id. at 730 (discussing Chapter 
778 of the Wisconsin statutes, which sets forth the appropriate 
procedures for the collection of forfeitures).  Instead, "the 
trial court is permitted to use the limits provided by sec. 
[144.57] to fashion an appropriate forfeiture based on the facts 
of the individual case."  Id. at 735.  The following are some of 
the factors which the circuit court should consider in this 
case: (1) Chrysler's cooperation with the DNR in remediating the 
Bark River site thus far, including removal of the buried waste 
drums and remediation of the contaminated soil; (2) Chrysler's 
initiation of remedial activities without being compelled to do 
so by the DNR via judicial or administrative enforcement 
procedures; (3) the environmental harm caused; and (4) the 
degree of Chrysler's culpability in this matter—not for its 
violations of the Solid Waste Law in 1970, but for its 
violations of the 1978 Spills Law alone. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed in 
part and reversed in part.  The cause is remanded to the circuit 
court for further fact-finding, if necessary, and for the 
No.  96-1158 
 
43
assessment of penalties against Chrysler Corporation in a manner 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
No. 96-1158.wab 
 
1 
¶82 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. (concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).   Because I conclude that this court should 
extend the discovery rule to actions brought to enforce 
Wisconsin’s Solid Waste Law, I respectfully dissent.   
¶83 In 1970, Chrysler Corporation knowingly violated the 
State’s law with respect to disposal of solid wastes.  Chrysler 
received the State of Wisconsin Solid Waste Disposal Standards 
(effective May 1, 1969) on December 15, 1969 but did not hire a 
licensed hauler until some time in the early 1970s.  The 
regulations, Wis. Admin. Code ch. 51, clearly and unambiguously 
required that generators of solid waste such as Chrysler dispose 
of their waste: a) at a licensed facility, or b) by a licensed 
hauler. 
¶84 Chrysler did neither. 
¶85 Instead, 
Chrysler 
hired an 
unlicensed 
hauler to 
transport 
over 
400 
drums 
of 
waste, 
including 
hazardous 
substances, for disposal.  Evidence in the record indicates that 
Chrysler knew that the waste disposal hauler was not licensed, 
and further knew that the regulations forbade their activities. 
  
¶86 The buried drums were not unearthed and discovered 
until 1992 when the site was excavated.  I agree with the State 
that “[i]t would be an injustice to apply the statute of 
limitations to bar the State from prosecuting the defendants 
when the State had absolutely no ability to identify the 
violations, to identify the defendants, or to assess the damage 
No. 96-1158.wab 
 
2 
to the environment prior to discover of the barrels.”  State’s 
Brief at 21-22. 
¶87 I dissent because I believe that the discovery rule 
should apply to enforcement actions of the Solid Waste Law 
provided for in Wis. Stat. § 144.43 (1969) and Wis. Admin. Code 
§ RD 51.05-51.06.  Extending the discovery rule is the proper 
result in this case because: 1) a violation of the Solid Waste 
Law and resultant liability bears a far closer resemblance to an 
analysis of a tort of negligence, to which the discovery rule 
applies, than it does to a contract analysis, to which the 
discovery rule does not apply; 2) applying the discovery rule to 
violations of the Solid Waste Law fits squarely with this 
court’s rationale extending the discovery rule to torts in 
Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 
(1983), Spitler v. Dean, 148 Wis. 2d 630, 436 N.W.2d 308 (1989), 
and Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 130 Wis. 2d 397, 388 N.W.2d 140 
(1986); 3) Chrysler’s violation of the Solid Waste Law includes 
aspects similar to frauda cause of action to which the 
discovery rule statutorily applies; and 4) other states have 
extended 
the 
discovery 
rule 
to 
enforcement 
of 
similar 
environmental statutes.  
I. 
¶88 Extending the discovery rule to violations of the 
Solid Waste Law, Wis. Stat. § 144.43 and Wis. Admin. Code §§ RD 
51.05-51.06 is logical because of the close resemblance that 
violations of the Solid Waste Law and resultant liability have 
to a classic tort analysis.  This court declined to extend the 
No. 96-1158.wab 
 
3 
discovery rule to a contract case, holding that a cause a action 
accrues when the contract is breached regardless of whether the 
party knew or should have known of the breach.  See CLL 
Associates v. Arrowhead Pacific, 174 Wis. 2d 604, 617, 497 
N.W.2d 115 (1993).  But a violation of the Solid Waste Law bears 
no resemblance to 
a contract case. 
 
It 
bears striking 
resemblance to a negligent tort case.   
¶89 A person is liable for negligence if that person has a 
duty, he or she breaches that duty, the breach in fact causes 
harm (cause-in-fact), and public policy considerations do not 
preclude imposing liability.  See Morgan v. Pennsylvania Gen. 
Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 732-37, 275 N.W.2d 660 (1979). 
¶90 In Wisconsin everyone has a duty of due care to the 
whole world.  “The test of negligence is whether the conduct 
foreseeably creates an unreasonable risk to others.  [Citations 
omitted.]  The risk need not be to the particular plaintiff.  
The test is whether unreasonable risk to the world at large is 
created by the conduct."  Morgan, 87 Wis. 2d at 732 (citations 
omitted).   
¶91 Chrysler, as a corporate citizen of Wisconsin, had a 
duty 
of 
due 
care 
to 
the 
whole 
world. 
 
Chrysler’s 
conductcontracting with an unlicensed hauler to remove drums 
containing 
hazardous 
substances, 
foreseeably 
created 
an 
unreasonable risk to the citizens of the State of Wisconsin.  
Chrysler’s duty to refrain from such conduct was codified as the 
Wisconsin Solid Waste Law at Wis. Stat. § 144.43 and in 
regulations promulgated as Wis. Admin. Code §§ RD 51.05-51.06. 
No. 96-1158.wab 
 
4 
¶92 Chrysler breached its duty to the State of Wisconsin 
and its citizens when it hired an unlicensed hazardous waste 
hauler in violation of Wis. Admin. Code § RD 51.05.  The record 
shows that after the Wisconsin legislature enacted the Solid 
Waste Law and promulgated regulations, Chrysler nonetheless 
persisted in contracting with a unlicensed waste hauler to 
remove hazardous waste from its facility.   
¶93 The third aspect of negligence law is whether the 
defendant’s breach of its duty of due care caused harm, a 
question generally left for the jury.   
 
Legal cause in negligence actions is made up of two 
components, cause-in-fact and ‘proximate cause,’ or 
policy considerations.  [citations omitted.]  The test 
of cause-in-fact is whether the negligence was a 
‘substantial 
factor’ 
in 
producing 
the 
injury.  
[citations omitted.]  Under this test, there can be 
more than one substantial factor contributing to the 
same result and thus more than one cause-in-fact. 
Morgan, 87 Wis. 2d at 735 (citations omitted).  
¶94 Chrysler’s “negligence,” illegally contracting with an 
unlicensed hauler which, in turn, dumped the drums at an 
unlicensed site, was a substantial factor in producing the 
harman environmental nightmare.  But for Chrysler’s illegal 
actions in 1970 and its continued failure to clean-up the site, 
the soil and ground water at the Bark River site would be free 
from contamination. 
¶95 If the present case were one for negligence, a court 
might conclude that public policy precludes holding Chrysler 
liable even though Chrysler breached its duty by illegally 
No. 96-1158.wab 
 
5 
dumping hazardous waste and this breach was cause-in-fact of 
injury to the environment.   
 
Some of the public policy reasons for not imposing 
liability despite a finding of negligence as a 
substantial factor producing injury are: (1) The 
injury is too remote from the negligence; or (2) the 
injury is too  wholly out of proportion to the 
culpability of the negligent tort-feasor; or (3) in 
retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that 
the negligence should have brought about the harm; or 
(4) because allowance of recovery would place too 
unreasonable a burden on the negligent tort-feasor; or 
(5) because allowance of recovery would be too likely 
to open the way for fraudulent claims; or (6) 
allowance of recovery would enter a field that has no 
sensible or just stopping point. 
Id. at 737 (citations omitted).  Generally an appellate court 
does not address the public policy issues before a jury 
determines the negligence and cause-in-fact issues.  See id. at 
738.  However, where the “’question of public policy is fully 
presented by the complaint and demurrer,’” the court may 
determine the public policy issue based on the pleadings.  Id.   
¶96 If the present case were one for negligence, I believe 
that none of the public policy considerations would preclude 
holding Chrysler liable.  Chrysler’s actions so directly caused 
the environmental damage that, even though it was more than 20 
years ago when Chrysler violated the Solid Waste Law, the injury 
is not too remote from Chrysler’s actions.  Without regard to 
the consequences, Chrysler violated the law.  By contracting 
with an unlicensed hauler, Chrysler had to realize that the 
hauler might well dump the hazardous waste at an unlicensed 
site, thereby evading state inspectors or other enforcement 
No. 96-1158.wab 
 
6 
mechanisms.  In retrospect, it is not extraordinary that 
Chrysler’s actions would bring about environmental damage.  
Chrysler allowed over 400 drums, some containing hazardous 
waste, to be dumped at an unlicensed waste site.  Of course, 
over time this would cause environmental damage.  Holding 
Chrysler liable would not be unduly burdensome.  Chrysler was 
directly 
“responsible for 
the satisfactory 
collection and 
transportation of all solid waste accumulated at that premises.” 
 Wis. Admin. Code § RD 51.05.   
¶97 The Solid Waste Law enforcement action in the present 
case bears a close resemblance to a classic negligence action; 
for the same reasons we chose to adopt the discovery rule in 
tort actions, we should adopt it here. 
II. 
¶98 Applying the discovery rule to violations of the Solid 
Waste Law fits squarely with this court’s rationale in Hansen, 
adopting 
the 
discovery 
rule 
for 
tort 
causes 
of 
action.  
Violation of the Solid Waste Law is so akin to the tort of 
negligence, as discussed in part I of this dissent, that it 
logically follows to extend the discovery rule to violations of 
the Solid Waste Law. 
¶99 The discovery rule applies to “all tort actions other 
than those already governed by a legislatively created discovery 
rule.  Such tort claims shall accrue on the date the injury is 
discovered or with reasonable diligence should be discovered, 
whichever occurs first.”  Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d at 560.  The 
discovery rule requires not only discovery of injury “but also 
No. 96-1158.wab 
 
7 
that the injury was probably caused by the defendant’s conduct 
or product.”  Borello, 130 Wis. 2d at 411 (footnote omitted).  A 
plaintiff’s cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff 
“knew the identity of the defendant, or in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, should have discovered the identity of the 
defendant.”  Spitler, 148 Wis. 2d at 636.   
¶100 This court extended the discovery rule to torts 
because we recognized that in some instances, “negligence may 
cause an injury which is initially latent.  Such an injury may 
not be discovered until it is manifested at a later date.”  
Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d at 555.  Not applying the discovery rule 
could have extremely harsh results, punishing blameless victims 
for any delay in bringing a claim while rewarding defendants by 
barring meritorious claims.  See id. at 556, 559. 
 
Although 
theoretically 
a 
claim 
is 
capable 
of 
enforcement as soon as the injury occurs, as a 
practical matter a claim cannot be enforced until the 
claimant discovers the injury and the accompanying 
right of action.  In some cases the claim will be time 
barred before the harm is or could be discovered, 
making it impossible for the injured party to seek 
redress. 
Id. at 559.   
¶101 Violations of Wisconsin’s Solid Waste Law can result 
in just as much of a latent injury as can be caused by a tort 
such as medical malpractice.  There is a certain similarity 
between the injury to Mother Earth caused by illegally dumping 
drums of hazardous waste and an injury to a person caused, for 
example, by leaving a sponge in a person during surgery.  Just 
No. 96-1158.wab 
 
8 
as we do not allow a negligent tort-feasor to bury its mistake 
and escape liability on the ground that the tort was discovered 
“too late,” so too we should not allow a corporate citizen to 
bury its waste and escape liability on the ground that the 
violation was discovered “too late.” 
¶102 Chrysler relies on this court’s decision in CLL, 174 
Wis. 2d 604, to argue that the discovery rule should not be 
extended to claims under the Solid Waste Law.  Chrysler asserts 
that the State, in its enforcement role, is more similar to a 
contract claimant than a tort claimant.  Chrysler also argues 
the State is not akin to a hapless tort victim, but is more like 
a criminal prosecutor in that the State seeks to impose 
penalties and forfeitures to protect the public interest.  The 
majority also cites CLL as an example of this court declining to 
extend the discovery rule.  See majority op. at 13-14.   
¶103 I believe that CLL is inapposite to the present case. 
 In CLL, the court recognized that the Hansen court balanced the 
conflicting public policy concerns raised by statutes of 
limitations and concluded that protecting meritorious tort 
claims outweighed the policy of preventing stale or fraudulent 
claims.  See CLL, 174 Wis. 2d at 610 (referring to Hansen, 113 
Wis. 2d at 560).  The court in CLL weighed these same policy 
considerations in the contract context and determined that 
“public policy favors the current rule that the contract statute 
of limitations begins to run at the time of the breach.”  Id. at 
611.   
No. 96-1158.wab 
 
9 
¶104 Weighing these same policy considerations, I believe 
that a Solid Waste Law enforcement action is far more akin to a 
tort than contract and, on balance, public policy favors 
extending the discovery rule.  On one hand, a statute of 
limitations is meant to discourage stale and fraudulent claims. 
 Corporate records may be lost or destroyed and personnel may be 
long gone.  However, the test under the discovery rule is that 
the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers or 
should have discovered the harm.  The State’s enforcement action 
would be barred if it should have discovered the violation 
earlier and the statute of limitations has expired.  Also, in a 
Solid Waste Law enforcement action, the State has the burden to 
prove its allegations.  The State may simply be unable to prove 
the alleged violations if there is insufficient evidence because 
the violation happened so long ago.  
¶105 The competing public policy is protecting meritorious 
claimants who have been as diligent as possible.  When Chrysler 
contracted with an unlicensed hauler, which in turn dumped the 
hazardous waste at an unlicensed waste site, there was no 
possibility that the DNR could have detected the violation 
absent some outside action such as self-reporting or, as 
actually occurred, excavation of the waste site.  It is 
impossible for the DNR to inspect every acre of land in the 
state to monitor possible environmental violations.   
¶106 On balance, the State, which has been as diligent as 
possible, should have an opportunity to seek redress for 
Chrysler’s violations of the Solid Waste Law.  Any other outcome 
No. 96-1158.wab 
 
10
works a harsh result and injustice on the State and its 
citizens. 
¶107 Chrysler argues that the State has control to detect 
violations of the Solid Waste Law because it can determine 
standards as needed to enforce the law.  While the State does 
have authority to promulgate the necessary regulations, this 
does not garner an amount of control over the risk of loss 
similar to that which a contracting party has in drafting a 
contract and benefiting from a bargain.  
¶108 A Solid Waste Law enforcement action is nothing like a 
contract action.  A contract is “an agreement between two or 
more persons which creates an obligation to do or not to do a 
particular thing.”  Black’s Law Dictionary, at 322 (6th ed. 
1990).  Under the Solid Waste Law, there is no agreement between 
any parties.  Rather, companies such as Chrysler have an 
obligation to do or refrain from doing a particular thing 
because the legislature has expressed public policy by enacting 
a statute regarding certain conduct. 
¶109 Chrysler further argues that the discovery rule should 
not apply to this case, in which the government is requesting 
civil penalties, because the public policy concerns surrounding 
the statute of limitations is different in penalty cases than in 
No. 96-1158.wab 
 
11
damages cases, such as tort.27  To the contrary, the public 
policies regarding statutes of limitations are the same for all 
statutes of limitations.  See, e.g., Korth v. American Family 
Ins. Co., 115 Wis. 2d 326, 332, 340 N.W.2d 494 (1983) (“[S]ec. 
893.54, the three-year statute of limitations, is, like all 
statutes of limitations, designed to ensure prompt litigation of 
valid claims and to protect the defendant from fraudulent or 
stale claims brought after memories have faded or evidence has 
been lost.” (emphasis added)).  I discern that Chrysler’s 
assertion stems from the fact that different statutes of 
limitation apply to claims for penalties and claims for damages. 
 See, e.g., Open Pantry Food Marts v. Falcone, 92 Wis. 2d 807, 
810-13, 286 N.W.2d 149 (Ct. App. 1979) (applying a two-year 
statute of limitations to penalty provisions of the Wisconsin 
                     
27 Some 
federal 
jurisdictions 
that 
have 
applied 
the 
discovery rule to an environmental action for civil penalties 
have declined to extend the rule to the equitable relief of an 
injunction.  See Reichelt v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 969 
F. Supp. 519, 521 (N.D. Ind. 1996); U.S. v. Hobbs, 736 F. Supp. 
1406, 1410 (E.D. Va. 1990).  Whether a claim for injunctive 
relief is barred is a determined under the doctrine of laches.  
See Reichelt, 969 F. Supp. at 521.  “Laches requires dismissal 
if a party did not pursue the case diligently and the other 
party is prejudiced.”  Id. (citations omitted); see also Hobbs, 
736 F. Supp. at 1410 (citing Benedict v. City of New York, 250 
U.S. 321, 328 (1919)).   
I need not determine whether the State’s request for relief 
in the form of an injunction is barred by the statute of 
limitations or doctrine of laches.  The injunctive relief 
available under the Solid Waste Law, cleaning up the illegally 
dumped drums, has already been completed.  The remediation left 
to be completed, cleaning up the soil and ground water 
contamination, is actionable under the Wisconsin Spills Law.  
No. 96-1158.wab 
 
12
Antitrust Law, but applying a six-year statute of limitations to 
the remedial provisions of the Wisconsin Antitrust Law).  The 
underlying policies, however, are the same.   
¶110 Chrysler and the majority also rely heavily on the 
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in 3M v. 
Browner, 17 F.3d 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1994) for its conclusion that 
the discovery rule does not apply to environmental enforcement 
actions.  I reject the 3M case.  Its rationale is based on an 
unfounded and erroneous premise: “The ‘discovery rule’ rests on 
the idea that plaintiffs cannot have a tenable claim for the 
recovery of damages unless and until they have been harmed.”  
3M, 17 F.3d at 1460. 
¶111 In Hansen, this court made clear that plaintiffs 
cannot have a tenable tort claim unless and until they have 
discovered their injury or harm.  See Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d at 
560.  The plaintiff suffers harm, however, at the time that 
“both 
a 
negligent 
act 
and 
the 
accompanying 
injury 
have 
occurred.”  Id. at 554.  The discovery rule provides that even 
though the plaintiff’s injury, i.e., the harm, may have occurred 
long ago, the cause of action does not accrue until the injury 
is discovered.  In contrast, the 3M court incorrectly began with 
the premise that the plaintiff does not have a tenable claim 
until the plaintiff is harmed.  See 3M, 17 F.3d at 1460.  This 
is not the discovery rule.  Rather, this is the statement of law 
without the adoption of the discovery rule.  See Hansen, 113 
Wis. 2d at 554 (“Therefore, we have held that tort claims accrue 
on the date of injury.”). 
No. 96-1158.wab 
 
13
¶112 Having begun with a faulty premise, the analysis of 
the 3M court is also necessarily faulty.  The 3M court referred 
to the EPA’s proposal to extend the discovery rule to violations 
of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) as a “discovery of 
violation” rule “having nothing whatever to do with the problem 
of latent injuries.  The rationale underlying the discovery of 
injury rulethat a claim cannot realistically be said to accrue 
until the claimant has suffered harmis completely inapposite.” 
 See 3M, 17 F.3d at 1460.  
¶113 The 3M court was correct to point out that in the 
EPA’s imposition of civil penalties to enforce the TSCA, “the 
government’s burden is to prove the violation [of the TSCA]; 
injuries or damages resulting from the violation are not part of 
the cause of action; the suit may be maintained regardless of 
damage.”  3M, 17 F.3d at 1460.  Similarly, in imposing civil 
penalties under Wisconsin’s Solid Waste Law, the DNR need not 
prove that the illegally dumped drums of hazardous waste leaked 
and caused environmental damage.  The DNR only needs to prove 
that the provisions of the Solid Waste Law were violatedthat 
is, that Chrysler failed to use a licensed waste hauler or 
failed to ensure the waste was dumped at a licensed waste 
facility.  See Wis. Admin. Code §§ RD 51.05 - 51.06.   
¶114 In this case the violative act, using an unlicensed 
waste hauler to haul drums containing hazardous substances to an 
unlicensed waste facility, occurred in early 1970.  The harm or 
injurythe violation of the Solid Waste Lawoccurred at that 
time.  However, like a tort in which the injury is initially 
No. 96-1158.wab 
 
14
latent, the DNR did not and could not discover the violation of 
the Solid Waste Law until the harm was manifested at a later 
date, when the drums were uncovered in 1992.  It was at that 
time that the State’s cause of action accrued.  And it was at 
that time that the statute of limitations began to run.  
Accordingly, I conclude that the State timely filed its claim. 
III. 
¶115 A further basis for extending the discovery rule to 
Solid Waste Law enforcement actions is that this case is closely 
akin to fraud cases to which the discovery rule is statutorily 
applied.   
¶116 In common law fraud cases, the statute of limitations 
begins to run “’[w]hen the information brought home to the 
aggrieved party is such as to indicate where the facts 
constituting the fraud can be effectually discovered upon 
diligent inquiry . . . .’”  Koehler v. Haechler, 27 Wis. 2d 275, 
278, 133 N.W.2d 730 (1965) (citation omitted).  Once a party is 
in possession of essential facts that would, upon diligent 
inquiry, disclose fraud, the party has a duty to make such 
inquiry.  See id.  If the party fails to make a diligent inquiry 
within a reasonable time, the party is nevertheless charged with 
knowledge of all facts which he or she may have learned through 
diligent inquiry.  See id.  Like the discovery rule articulated 
in Hansen, under the statutory discovery rule in fraud, the 
cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to 
run only when the plaintiff discovers or with due diligence 
No. 96-1158.wab 
 
15
could have discovered the injury or harm.  See Koehler, 27 
Wis. 2d at 278; Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d at 560.   
¶117 The legislature, in its wisdom, extended the discovery 
rule to fraud because, where a party knowingly makes a false 
representation, the injured party generally has no way of 
detecting the falsehood except by some fortuitous event. 
¶118 In this case, the State does not claim fraud; yet 
Chrysler 
knowingly 
and 
intentionally 
contracted 
with 
an 
unlicensed waste hauler.  Taking a “see no evil, hear no evil” 
approach, Chrysler argues that it did not know that the hauler 
would bury the waste, ergo no fraud.  But Chrysler’s actions 
come perilously close to fraud.  Having contracted with an 
unlicensed hauler, Chrysler should be held to know that this 
unlicensed hauler might well dump the hazardous waste in an 
unregulated, unlicensed landfill, and that environmental damage 
was the likely result.  I conclude that the mere fact of 
knowingly violating the law by hiring an unlicensed hauler 
should subject Chrysler to the same penalty, i.e., a discovery 
rule, as if they knew the waste was being intentionally hidden. 
 Chrysler should be held to know.  Chrysler should not be able 
to escape liability for penalties because “they didn’t know.”  
Far more plausible is the explanation that they did not want to 
know. 
IV. 
¶119 Finally, an extension of the discovery rule to 
violations 
of 
the 
Solid 
Waste 
Law 
would 
mirror 
other 
No. 96-1158.wab 
 
16
jurisdictions which have extended the discovery rule to similar 
statutes.   
¶120 The State of Washington imposes a two-year statute of 
limitations on environmental actions in which the State seeks to 
impose a forfeiture or penalty.  See U.S. Oil Refining Co. v. 
State, Dept. of Ecology, 633 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Wash. 1981) 
(referring to Revised Code of Washington (RCW) 4.16.100(2)).  
However, the discovery rule in Washington provides that “a 
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the 
plaintiff, using reasonable diligence, would have discovered the 
cause of action.”  U.S. Oil, 633 P.2d at 1333 (citations 
omitted).  In U.S. Oil, the state’s Department of Ecology (DOE) 
alleged that U.S. Oil violated its waste discharge permit under 
the Washington version of the Clean Water Act (CWA).  The court 
concluded: 
 
Since U.S. Oil did not properly report its discharges, 
discovery of the violations was delayed until DOE 
suspected that monitoring reports were inaccurate and 
investigated.  Without a discovery rule, industries 
can discharge pollutants, and by failing to report the 
violation, can escape penalties. 
Id. at 1333-34.   
¶121 Like this court in Hansen, the Washington Supreme 
Court extended the discovery rule by balancing the competing 
public policies raised by a statute of limitations: prohibiting 
stale and fraudulent claims and allowing meritorious claims.  
“That balancing test has dictated the application of the 
[discovery] rule where the plaintiff lacks the means or ability 
to ascertain that a wrong has been committed.”  Id. at 1334.   
No. 96-1158.wab 
 
17
 
[I]f the [discovery] rule were not applied the 
plaintiff would be denied meaningful opportunity to 
bring a suit.  . . .  Not applying the rule in this 
case would penalize the plaintiff and reward the 
clever defendant.  Neither the purpose for statutes of 
limitation nor justice is served when the statute runs 
while the information concerning the injury is in the 
defendant’s hands. 
Id. Applying a discovery rule to environmental enforcement 
actions “discourages the government from unreasonably delaying 
in bringing actions, while protecting the public from harm 
resulting from an inability to prosecute claims for violations 
that could not reasonably have been discovered.” U.S. v. 
Aluminum Co. of American, 824 F. Supp. 640, 646 (D.C. Tex. 1993) 
(citing U.S. v. Winward Properties, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 690, 694 
(N.D. Ga. 1993)).   
¶122 The State points to several other jurisdictions that 
have extended the discovery rule to environmental enforcement 
actions.  See Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. 
Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64 (3rd Cir. 1990); U.S. 
v. Winward Properties, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ga. 1993); 
Reichelt v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 969 F. Supp. 519 (N.D. 
Ind. 1996); Atlantic States Legal Found. V. Al Tech Specialty, 
635 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. N.Y. 1986); Aluminum Co. of America, 824 
F. Supp. 640; U.S. v. Hobbs, 736 F. Supp. 1406 (E.D. Va. 1990). 
  
¶123 These cases cited by the State involved alleged 
violations of the federal Clean Water Act (CWA), and usually the 
entity 
bringing 
suit 
discovered 
the 
violations 
through 
No. 96-1158.wab 
 
18
information reported by the defendant, as required by reporting 
provisions of the statute.  Like the Wisconsin Solid Waste Law, 
an injury in the traditional sense of the word is not an element 
of violating the Clean Water Act.  Like the Wisconsin Solid 
Waste Law, mere violation of the Clean Water Act’s provisions 
triggers enforcement of the statute.  Like the Wisconsin Solid 
Waste Law, the enforcing agency may impose penalties for 
violations of the Clean Water Act.  Like the Wisconsin Solid 
Waste Law, violations of the Clean Water Act are difficult to 
discover and may be discovered long after the violation occurs. 
 However, unlike the majority’s decision in this case to not 
extend the discovery rule to violations of the Solid Waste Law, 
federal courts have extended the discovery rule to violations of 
the Clean Water Act. 
¶124 “[A] statute of limitations must be ‘interpreted in 
light of the general purposes of the statute and its other 
provisions, and with due regard to those practical ends which 
are to be served by any limitation of the time within which an 
action must be brought.’”  Aluminum Co. of America, 824 F. Supp. 
at 644-45 (quoting United States v. Core Laboratories, Inc., 759 
F.2d 480, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1985)).  Extending the discovery rule 
to violations of the CWA is consistent with the Act’s purpose to 
“protect 
human 
health, 
welfare, 
and 
the 
environment, 
to 
eliminate the discharge of all pollutants to waters of the 
United States, and to restore the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”  Id. at 645 
(citing 33 USC § 1251(a)).   
No. 96-1158.wab 
 
19
¶125 Without the discovery rule, the entity violating the 
CWA would benefit from the EPA’s inability to inspect and 
immediately discover violationsa result which would frustrate 
the purposes of the CWA.  See id. at 647.  Without the discovery 
rule, polluters would be encouraged to hide violations until the 
statute of limitations expires.  See Reichelt, 969 F. Supp. at 
522.  Accordingly, a cause of action under the CWA for civil 
penalties does not accrue when violations of the act actually 
occur, but rather when the violations are discovered.  See, 
e.g., Reichelt, 969 F. Supp. at 522; Aluminum Co. of America, 
824 F. Supp. at 647; Hobbs, 736 F. Supp. at 1409. 
 
It would have been practically impossible for the 
plaintiff to have discovered the alleged violations of 
the defendant on its own.  It is only when reports are 
filed with the E.P.A. that the public becomes aware 
that violations have occurred.  To hold that the 
statute begins to run when violations actually occur, 
as opposed to when they are discovered, would impede, 
if not foreclose, the remedial benefits of the 
statute. 
Atlantic States Legal Found., 635 F. Supp. at 287-88 (citations 
omitted) (regarding citizens suit under the CWA).   
¶126 The Wisconsin legislature expressed the purpose of the 
Wisconsin Solid Waste Law in a Statement of Policies and 
Purposes included in the enacting statute:  
 
(2) Inefficient and improper methods of waste 
disposal have caused an ever increasing pollution of 
our vital air, land and water resources threatening 
the utility of our resources and the quality of the 
environment in which we live.  The problems of waste 
disposal 
endanger 
the 
public health, 
safety and 
welfare, create public nuisances, result in scenic 
blight and adversely affect land values. 
No. 96-1158.wab 
 
20
(3) The close interrelationship of air, land and 
water pollution requires concerted action to prevent 
the worsening of these problems.  . . .  Immediate 
remedial action is needed to protect our valuable 
resources. 
(4) It is the purpose of this act to grant the 
necessary powers to organize a comprehensive program 
to enhance the quality, management and protection of 
the state’s air and land resources.  
§ 1, ch. 83, Laws of 1967.  This legislative intent was repeated 
as a Preamble to the Department of Natural Resources Solid Waste 
Disposal Standards, a copy of which Chrysler received on 
December 15, 1969.  As expressed by the legislature, the purpose 
of the Wisconsin Solid Waste Law is to prevent environmental 
pollution and to remediate existing problems.  As the court 
expressed in Aluminum Co. of America with regard to the CWA, 
extending the discovery rule to violations of the Solid Waste 
Law is consistent with the statute’s purpose. 
¶127 For all of the above reasons, I respectfully dissent 
to that part of the majority opinion that fails to extend the 
discovery rule to violations of the Wisconsin Solid Waste Law. 
 
96-1158.jpg 
 
1 
¶128 JANINE P. GESKE, J. (Concurring in part and dissenting 
in part).  I join the majority's holding with regard to the 
Solid Waste Law, and I concur in the mandate permitting 
remediation under the Spills Law.  I dissent to that part of the 
majority opinion holding that the Spills Law is applicable to 
actions by the State to impose forfeitures for hazardous 
substance spills which were initially caused in part by actions 
preceding the statute's effective date, and which continue to 
discharge after that date.  This holding allows the State to 
penalize actors for conduct that was legal at the time it 
occurred, and in my view violates the Ex Post Facto clause of 
the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.28   
¶129 In 1969, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 144.43 (1967), the 
Solid Waste Law, the DNR promulgated standards for the disposal 
of hazardous substances.  The DNR rules made owners and 
occupants of a premises responsible for the collection of all 
solid waste accumulated at the premises, and for the waste's 
proper disposal at a licensed facility.  In the alternative, the 
                     
28 Article I of the United States Constitution provides: 
Section 10.  No State shall . . . pass any Bill of 
Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of 
Nobility. 
  
Article I of the Wisconsin Constitution provides: 
Attainder; ex post facto; contracts.  Section 12.  No 
bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law 
impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be 
passed, and no conviction shall work corruption of 
blood or forfeiture of estate. 
96-1158.jpg 
 
2 
owners and occupants could arrange with a licensed transporter 
to convey their solid wastes to a proper facility.  See Wis. 
Admin. Code §§ RD 51.05-.06 (1969).  Violators of the Solid 
Waste Law were subject to penalties, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 144.57 (1969). 
¶130 For the first half of 1970, Chrysler contracted with 
Keller Transit to remove and dispose of drums containing 
manufacturing waste.  Keller was not a licensed transporter.  
Keller dumped and buried the drums.  Eight years later, the 
Spills Law, Wis. Stat. § 144.76, became effective, providing 
that persons having possession of or control over a hazardous 
substance being discharged, or who cause a hazardous discharge, 
shall take actions necessary to restore the environment and to 
minimize the harmful effects of any discharge.  Persons 
violating the Spills Law were also subject to the penalty 
provisions of Wis. Stat. § 144.57.  The drums buried by Keller 
were not discovered until late 1992, and were found to have 
leaked hazardous substances.  The State seeks penalties against 
Chrysler for every day of violation of the Solid Waste Law in 
1970,29 and for every day of violation of the Spills Law since 
May 21, 1978. 
                     
29 There is no dispute that the Solid Waste Law also permits 
the State to seek remediation of the site in the form of 
removing the hazardous material.  Beginning in late 1993, 
Chrysler excavated the site and removed 401 drums.  Chrysler 
also remediated the contaminated soil, but thus far has not 
remediated the contaminated groundwater.  
96-1158.jpg 
 
3 
¶131 The majority opinion holds that "[a]s to remediation, 
we conclude that the legislature intended to apply the Spills 
Law retroactively.  As to penalties and forfeitures, we conclude 
that the imposition of penalties in this case does not 
constitute a retroactive application of the Spills Law."  
Majority op. at 28-29. These conclusions are inconsistent, at 
best.  This is particularly true when both provisions apply to 
the same conduct. 
¶132 I do not believe that the majority has adequately 
analyzed whether either the remedial or the punitive portion of 
the 
Spills 
Law 
can 
be 
applied 
retroactively 
under 
the 
retroactivity analysis test set out by the United States Supreme 
Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), as 
clarified by Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997).30  I 
believe that such an analysis would result in the conclusion 
that the legislature intended the remedial portion of the Spills 
Law 
to 
apply 
retroactively, 
therefore 
I 
agree 
with 
the 
majority's ultimate conclusion on that point. I do not believe, 
however, that such an analysis would result in the conclusion 
                     
30 In deciding that application of the penalty provision of 
the Spills Law in this case is not retroactive, and thus is not 
unconstitutional, the majority quotes Landgraf v. USI Film 
Products, 511 U.S. 244, 269-70 (1994), "a statute does not 
operate 'retrospectively' merely because it is applied in a case 
arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment, or 
upsets expectations based on prior law.  Rather, the court must 
ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to 
events completed before its enactment."  This single reference 
to the retroactivity analysis of Landgraf is insufficient to 
support the majority's conclusion.  
96-1158.jpg 
 
4 
that the legislature intended the penalty assessment portion of 
the Spills Law to apply to past conduct.  Despite the assertions 
of the majority, the penalties it allows against Chrysler here 
are based on pre-Spills Law conduct, and are unconstitutional. 
¶133 The Supreme Court recently described why our citizens 
and institutions disfavor retroactive application of laws, 
particularly those which impose penalties: 
 
[T]he presumption against retroactive legislation is 
deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a 
legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic.  
Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that 
individuals should have an opportunity to know what 
the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; 
settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted. 
. . .  It is therefore not surprising that the 
antiretroactivity 
principle 
finds 
expression 
in 
several provisions of our [national] Constitution. . . 
. 
These provisions demonstrate that retroactive 
statutes raise particular concerns.  The Legislature's 
unmatched powers allow it to sweep away settled 
expectations 
suddenly 
and 
without 
individualized 
consideration. 
 
Its 
responsivity 
to 
political 
pressures poses a risk that it may be tempted to use 
retroactive legislation as a means of retribution 
against unpopular groups or individuals. . . . 
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265-67 (1994) (citations omitted).  
¶134 The Landgraf analysis, as clarified by Lindh, involves 
three steps.  First, the court must consider whether the 
legislature has clearly expressed an intention in the statutory 
text 
that 
the 
benefits 
of 
retroactivity 
outweigh 
the 
disadvantages, and that the statute should apply to conduct 
occurring before its enactment.  See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 257, 
268.  If there is no express statement of retroactivity in the 
96-1158.jpg 
 
5 
statute, the court will employ traditional rules of statutory 
construction to determine whether application of the statute 
would have a retroactive effect.  See Lindh, 117 S. Ct. at 2063. 
 If after applying rules of construction and interpretation the 
court finds there would be a retroactive effect, Landgraf's 
default rule, or the presumption against retroactivity, applies. 
 See id.31  In this case, the majority concedes that application 
                     
31 Citing Wisconsin cases, the majority acknowledges the 
presumption that legislation applies prospectively only, unless 
express statutory language or necessary implication indicates an 
intended retroactive application.  See majority op. at 29. In my 
view, the approach taken by our prior decisions is consistent 
with the approach and philosophy of Landgraf.  See, e.g., 
Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Smith, 154 Wis. 2d 199, 223-24, 453 
N.W.2d 856 (1990) ("The strong common-law tradition is that the 
legislature's primary function is to declare law to regulate 
future behavior.  As a matter of justice, laws should not be 
enforced before people can learn of the law and conduct 
themselves accordingly, and retroactivity disturbs the stability 
of past transactions."). 
We 
have 
noted 
that 
the 
doctrine 
of 
prospective 
interpretation 
does 
not 
apply 
to 
procedural 
or 
remedial 
statutes.  See, e.g., Gutter v. Seamandel, 103 Wis. 2d 1, 17, 
308 N.W.2d 403 (1981); Employers Ins., 154 Wis. 2d at 224 n.21. 
 "While statutes in general are construed prospectively the rule 
is otherwise with statutes whose operation is procedural or 
remedial. . . . 'This doctrine . . . is not understood to apply 
to remedial statutes, which . . . only go to confirm rights 
already existing and in furtherance of the remedy, by curing 
defects 
and 
adding 
to 
the 
means 
of 
enforcing 
existing 
obligations.'" 
 
Gutter, 
103 
Wis. 2d 
at 
17-18 
(citations 
omitted).  Procedural and remedial statutes are therefore 
distinguished from statutes that affect substantive rights.  
See, e.g., the distinction made by the Landgraf Court: "We have 
sometimes said that new 'remedial' statutes . . . should 
presumptively apply to pending cases.  While that statement 
holds true for some kinds of remedies, we have not classified a 
statute introducing damages liability as the sort of 'remedial' 
change that should presumptively apply in pending cases."  511 
U.S. at 285 n.37. 
96-1158.jpg 
 
6 
of 
the 
Spills 
Law 
necessarily 
involves 
Chrysler's 
past 
affirmative conduct of surrendering its hazardous waste to an 
unlicensed hauler.  See majority op. at 2-3, 6.   
¶135 As a first step, there is no dispute that the 
Wisconsin legislature did not clearly express an intent that the 
Spills Law be applied to pre-enactment conduct.32  Nor does the 
forfeitures provision applicable to 
Spills 
Law 
violations 
expressly address retroactivity.33 
                                                                  
I conclude that the Spills Law, as it imposes liability for 
the restoration or remediation of environmental contamination 
and for penalties or forfeitures, affects substantive rights.  
Effective May 21, 1978 it imposed a new obligation on persons 
possessing or controlling or causing a hazardous discharge. 
Therefore, the Spills Law is not merely procedural or affecting 
a remedy.   
32 Wis. Stat. § 144.76 (1977) Hazardous substance spills. 
(1) DEFINITIONS.  As used in this section: 
(a) "Discharge" means, but is not limited to, spilling, 
leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying or dumping. 
(b) "Hazardous substance" has the meaning given under s. 
144.30(10). 
. . . 
(3) RESPONSIBILITY.  Persons having possession of or control 
over a hazardous substance being discharged, or who cause a 
hazardous discharge, shall take the actions necessary to restore 
the environment to the extent practicable and minimize the 
harmful effects from any discharge to the air, lands or waters 
of this state.  
33 Wis. Stat. § 144.57 (1969) Penalties.  Any person who 
violates this chapter, or who fails, neglects or refuses to obey 
any general or special order of the department, shall forfeit 
not less than $10 nor more than $5,000, for each violation, 
failure or refusal.  Each day of continued violation is a 
separate offense.  
96-1158.jpg 
 
7 
¶136 Thus, the next step in the Landgraf analysis is to 
determine whether application of the Spills Law will have a 
retroactive effect.  The majority denies that application of the 
forfeiture provision of the Spills Law to Chrysler will have a 
retroactive effect based on its interpretation of the verb 
"causes" in Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3).  Because the verb "causes" 
is not defined in the Spills Law, the majority invokes rules of 
statutory construction to determine the common and ordinary 
meaning of "causes."  In doing so, the majority first considers 
the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 144.76. 
¶137 This court has said that the purpose of the Spills Law 
is to "prevent, minimize, and, if necessary, abate and remedy 
contamination of this state's environment . . . caused by 
discharges of hazardous substances."  State v. Mauthe, 123 
Wis. 2d 288, 299, 366 N.W.2d 871 (1985); also see Wis. Stat. 
§ 144.025;34 144.76.  The majority contends that this statement 
of purpose alone compels the conclusion that the legislature 
intended the verb "causes" to include both the commission and 
omission of an act which leads to a hazardous waste spill.  See 
majority op. at 36.  But identifying remediation as a statutory 
purpose does not, ipso facto, insert "failure to remediate" into 
                     
34 Wis. Stat. § 144.025, the statement of policy and purpose 
for ch. 144, states that this act and rules and orders pursuant 
to it shall be liberally construed in favor of the policy 
objectives of the act.  I agree that remedial statutes, such as 
those requiring restoration of contaminated property, can be 
liberally construed.  Punitive statutes, in contrast, are 
strictly construed. 
96-1158.jpg 
 
8 
Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3), the liability provision.  Nor does a 
statement of legislative purpose necessarily absolve a statute 
of an ex post facto taint.  "It will frequently be true . . . 
that retroactive application of a new statute would vindicate 
its purpose more fully.  That consideration, however, is not 
sufficient to rebut the presumption against retroactivity."  
Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 285-86. 
¶138 The majority consults a legal dictionary to ascertain 
the meaning of the verb "causes."  Normally, our rules of 
statutory construction, which seek to ascertain the common and 
ordinary meaning of a term, look to general dictionaries of the 
English language.  For instance, in the American Heritage 
Dictionary at 305, the verb "cause" is defined as 
 
1. To be the cause of or reason for; result in.  2. To 
bring about or compel by authority or force: The 
moderator invoked a rule causing the debate to be 
ended. 
The difference between an ordinary dictionary definition of the 
verb "cause," and the definition found in a legal dictionary may 
be minor.  But the majority combines the law dictionary 
definitions of both the verb "cause" and the noun "cause" to 
reach its conclusion that Chrysler's failure to act, more than 
eight years after delivering its waste to Keller, can be a 
reason for the condition of discharge existing on the Bark River 
site today.  Enhancing the definition of the verb with the 
definition of the noun enables the majority to put the verb 
"causes" as used in Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3) on a timeless 
continuum.  In addition, the majority blends Mauthe's conclusion 
96-1158.jpg 
 
9 
that conscious human conduct is not needed to comport with the 
definition of "discharge" into a conclusion that conscious human 
conduct is not needed to fit the liability provision "causes a 
discharge."  See majority op. at 36. 
¶139 Moreover, the majority's brief effort at statutory 
construction does not take up the canon that when determining 
the meaning of a single word or phrase, the word or phrase 
should be viewed in light of the entire statute.  See State v. 
Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d 409, 416, 561 N.W.2d 695 (1997).  The 
contemporaneous language of various other Spills Law provisions 
are, like Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3), devoid of an intent to apply 
to past conduct.   
¶140 For example, Wis. Stat. § 144.76(4) provides:  
 
"PREVENTION OF DISCHARGE. (a) The department may require 
that preventive measures be taken by any person 
possessing or having control over hazardous substances 
when it finds: 
 . . . 2. Past discharges by this person indicate that 
the 
existing 
control 
measures are 
inadequate in 
preventing discharges." (Emphasis added). 
In addition, Wis. Stat. § 144.76(7)(b) provides: 
 
The person causing the discharge shall reimburse the 
department for actual and necessary expenses incurred 
in carrying out its duties under this subsection. 
(Emphasis added). 
Subsection 
(9)(c) 
of 
the 
Spills 
Law 
also 
speaks 
in 
contemporaneous terms: "Any person discharging with a permit or 
approved under this chapter is exempted from the reporting and 
penalty requirements of this section."  Finally, Wis. Stat. 
§ 144.76(10)(b) directs that: 
 
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10
"Any person who discharges a hazardous substance, 
where the responsibilities for such a discharge are 
prescribed by statute other than ss. 144.60 to 144.74, 
shall be subject to the penalty under either this 
section or the other section but not both." 
¶141 All of the referenced subsections speak in active 
terms about persons who possess or control, or who cause, 
hazardous discharges.  Application of those subsections would 
not have a retroactive effect.  However, under the majority's 
application 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 144.76(3) 
to 
Chrysler, 
that 
subsection does have a retroactive effect.  
¶142 Landgraf reminds us that the Court has "strictly 
construed the Ex Post Facto Clause to prohibit application of 
new statutes creating or increasing punishments after the fact." 
 511 U.S. at 275 n.28.  In this case, the State seeks to recover 
penalties 
from 
Chrysler. 
 
The 
majority 
concedes 
that 
"authorization of penalties up to $5,000 per day serves, at 
least in part, to punish offenders of the Solid Waste Law."35  
Majority op. at 19-20.  In my view, by applying the Spills Law 
to Chrysler, the State seeks to create or increase punishment 
after the fact.  Chrysler's only conduct in this case occurred 
in 1970.  Under the majority's reasoning, Chrysler will pay 
                     
35 Violations of both the Solid Waste Law and the Spills Law 
were subject to penalties or forfeitures as provided by Wis. 
Stat. § 144.57, or a subsequent version of the same statute.  
See majority op. at 6. 
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11
Spills Law forfeitures for action it took eight years before the 
law was enacted.36    
¶143 The majority relies on the continuing nature of a 
discharge to avoid invocation of ex post facto: "In this case, 
the ongoing nature of a hazardous substance spill eliminates any 
concern that the State seeks to 'impose a new duty' or 'attach 
new legal consequences' to events completed before the effective 
date of the Spills Law."  Majority op. at 39.  But the federal 
environmental case law cited by the majority makes a distinction 
between prospective remedial or injunctive relief, and the 
retroactive imposition of compensatory or punitive sanctions. 
¶144 The majority cites United States v. Diamond Shamrock, 
17 E.R.C. 1329, 12 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,819 (N.D. Ohio 1981), where 
a district court considered a summary judgment motion under 
§ 6973 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).  
The defendant asserted that as it applied to antecedent acts, 
the RCRA provision was unlawfully retroactive.  The district 
court disagreed, citing legislative history characterizing the 
particular RCRA provision as "designed to abate and remedy 
conditions which constitute imminent hazards to health or the 
                     
36 I am perplexed by the majority's conclusion, despite 
Chrysler's assertion that penalties cannot be assessed under the 
Spills Law until a defendant affirmatively declines to undertake 
remedial action, that "a plain reading of (the statutes) 
illustrates that a de facto violation of the Spills Law is 
sufficient to trigger penalties."  Majority op. at 11 n.13 
(emphasis added).  If de facto violation means a literal, in 
fact or actual violation, how is that description different from 
Chrysler's interpretation?  
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12
environment.  Its focus is on the prevention and amelioration of 
conditions, 
rather 
than 
the 
cessation 
of 
any 
particular 
affirmative human conduct."  12 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20822.  The 
Diamond Shamrock court concluded that because § 6973 provided 
for injunctive relief, "as opposed to compensatory or punitive 
relief," it was not impermissibly retroactive.  See id. 
¶145 The majority essentially ignores this distinction by 
the Diamond Shamrock court in the remainder of its discussion of 
penalties for Spills Law violation. In avoiding this analysis, 
the majority overlooks the fact that the presumption against 
retroactivity is strongest when the application of the law 
results in punishment.37 
                     
37 The parties' briefs and the majority opinion to some 
extent blend the analysis of whether a statute which imposes 
sanctions 
for 
past 
conduct 
violates 
either 
the 
specific 
prohibition 
against 
ex 
post 
facto 
laws, 
or 
the 
general 
presumption against retroactivity.  This court said that "An ex 
post facto law is one which imposes punishment for an act which 
was not punishable at the time it was committed or imposes an 
additional 
punishment 
to 
that 
then 
prescribed. 
 
[This] 
constitutional provision() appl[ies] only to statutes which 
impose penalties."  Wis. Bingo Sup. & Equip. Co. v. Bingo 
Control Bd., 88 Wis. 2d 293, 304-05, 276 N.W.2d 716 (1979) 
(citations omitted).  The Wis. Bingo court went on to describe 
the prohibition against retroactive laws.  "This doctrine is 
applicable to civil statutes which adversely affect vested 
rights.  A retrospective statute is unconstitutional if its 
effect is to deprive a person of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law."  Id. at 306 (citation omitted). 
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13
¶146 Despite the ongoing nature of a hazardous discharge, 
Chrysler's conduct in this case, unlike the conduct of Mr. 
Mauthe, was a completed event before the enactment of the Spills 
                                                                  
More recently, this court adhered to the United States 
Supreme Court's definition of an ex post facto law as one which 
"punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was 
innocent when done; which makes more burdensome the punishment 
for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged 
with crime of any defense available according to law at the time 
when the act was committed . . . ."  State v. Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d 
695, 703, 524 N.W.2d 641 (1994), quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 
497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990).  In my view, the ex post facto 
prohibition is directed not only against crimes, but against 
certain civil offenses.  For instance, this court cited both 
Thiel and Collins in State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 272, 
541 N.W.2d 105 (1995), when it said that "[i]t is well 
established that the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto 
laws applies only to penal statutes."  Black's Law Dictionary at 
1132 (6th ed. 1009), defines the word "penal" as "punishable; 
inflicting a punishment; containing a penalty, or relating to a 
penalty."  Black's defines "penal action" in this manner: 
In its broadest context, it refers to criminal 
prosecution.  More particularly, it refers to a civil 
action in which a wrongdoer is subject to a fine or 
penalty payable to the aggrieved party . . . 
The word 'penal' is inherently a much broader term 
than 'criminal' since it pertains to any punishment or 
penalty and relates to acts which are not necessarily 
delineated as criminal. 
 
Id.    
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14
Law.  The majority's application of the forfeiture provision to 
Chrysler attaches new legal consequences to a completed event.38 
¶147 In my view, the majority's analysis of the retroactive 
effect of the Spills Law forfeiture provision, as applied to 
Chrysler, is inadequate, in error, and as a result reaches the 
wrong conclusion.  I would affirm that part of the decision and 
order of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Chrysler 
on the State's request for forfeitures under the Spills Law. 
¶148 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Shirley S. 
Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley join in this opinion. 
 
                     
38 Indeed, when the majority opines that "Chrysler caused 
the discharge at issue after the Spills Law took effect in 1978, 
irrespective of Chrysler's activities prior to that date," 
majority op. at 40 (emphasis added), it unleashes Spills Law 
forfeiture liability on anyone who failed to restore land or 
groundwater 
contaminated 
by 
a 
hazardous 
discharge. 
 
The 
majority's following statement, that "because Chrysler generated 
the hazardous substances, and caused their discharge after 1978 
by failing to remediate, it is liable . . ." does not re-tether 
liability to the terms of the statute.  
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