Case Title: PUBLIC UTILITIES COM'N v. District Court

Citation: 431 P.2d 773

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1967-09-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
431 P.2d 773 (1967) The PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION of the State of Colorado, Henry E. Zarlengo, Howard S. Bjelland, and Ralph C. Horton, individually and as Commissioners of the Public Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado, and Acme Delivery Service, Inc., a Colorado corporation, Petitioners, v. The DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF ARAPAHOE, State of Colorado, and Robert B. Lee, a Judge of said court, Respondents. No. 22965. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. September 5, 1967. Rehearing Denied October 2, 1967. *774 Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Denver, J. David Penwell, Robert Lee Kessler, Asst. Attys. Gen., for petitioner Public Utilities Commission. Hughes & Dorsey, Raymond B. Danks, Richard Kitchen, Denver, for petitioner Acme Delivery Service. John P. Thompson, Edward T. Lyons, Jr., T. Peter Craven, Denver, Hays, Thompson & Johnston, Jones, Meiklejohn, Kehl & Lyons, Denver, of counsel, for respondents. MOORE, Chief Justice. This is an original proceeding in prohibition in which this court issued a rule requiring the district court of Arapahoe county to show cause why the relief prayed for in the complaint of the above named petitioners should not be granted. Facts pertinent to the questions to be decided are as follows. Acme Delivery Service, Inc. filed an application with the Public Utilities Commission for authority *775 to extend its operations under certificates theretofore issued to it by the commission. Weicker Transfer & Storage Co., and others hereinafter referred to as protestants, objected to the application filed by Acme. Hearings were held on several days in December 1965 and February and March 1966. The decision of the Public Utilities Commission, issued on August 16, 1966, granted Acme substantial extensions in its field of authorized operation, to which the protestants took exception. They have taken the record of proceedings before the commission to the district court for review pursuant to C.R.S.1963, 115-6-15. In the action for review, on October 18 and 19, 1966, the petitioners below served the commissioners, Zarlengo, Bjelland and Horton (commissioner Horton has retired and Mr. Lundborg has been appointed to fill his position) with Requests for Admissions under Rule 36 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. Within the time provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the commission, by its attorney, filed its objections to these requests for admissions. The district court, presided over by the Honorable Robert B. Lee in and for the county of Arapahoe, held a hearing on the commission's objections to the requests for admissions on April 17, 1967. On April 19, 1967, the Honorable Robert B. Lee entered his order overruling the commission's objections and requiring the commissioners to answer the requests for admissions within fifteen days. Following entry of this order the petition for writ of prohibition was filed in this court; a rule to show cause was issued; answer was made pursuant to the rule; briefs were filed; and oral argument was had. The Attorney General argues on behalf of the commissioners that the rule should be made absolute for the following reasons: The "Petition for Writ of Certiorari or Review" filed in the district court by protestants contains the following allegations, inter alia: The petition contains additional allegations to the effect that applications for rehearing were filed before the commission which were denied by action of all three members. This action was taken before any transcript of the evidence, which was taken at the hearings, was prepared. The following allegations contained in the Petition for Certiorari are pertinent to the question before us for determination: Admittedly no transcript of the evidence presented before commissioner Zarlengo was available to the other two commissioners at the time they concurred in the decision of the commission. This was also true as of the date upon which the petition for rehearing was denied by unanimous vote of the commission. The requests for admissions which were served on each of the members of the commission would require that the members of the commission who did not hear the evidence respond as to whether they were personally present when any testimony was taken; whether they read any transcript of the evidence, or whether reporter's notes were read to them; whether "all of the testimony of any of the witnesses who testified" was orally reported at any meeting or series of meetings attended by them ; whether at any time prior to the date of decision they conferred with any person "concerning all of the testimony heard in connection with the application" made by Acme and other questions of similar import. Admissions requested of commissioner Zarlengo were of the same character but were couched in different language to fit the role which he played as the member of the commission who actually heard all the evidence which was offered. There is express authority throughout the statute governing procedures before the Public Utilities Commission for hearings to be conducted before the full commission, or before "any commissioner" or "any examiner" of the commission. C.R.S. 1963, 115-6-1 et seq. There is a presumption of regularity and validity with which the acts of an administrative agency are clothed in carrying out its statutory responsibilities. In Volume II of his Administrative Law Treatise, Professor Davis discusses this presumption at Section 11.06 on page 63: In the subject case there has been no showing by the petitioners whatsoever to overcome the presumption of regularity and the mere allegation that the commissioners did not consider the entire record as insufficient, as discussed by Davis in the case of Cupples Co. Mfrs. v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 953, 957, 958 (8th Cir. 1939), where the court stated that: For a collection of further authorities on this subject see also 2 A.L.R.2d, Section 10 at page 625. This presumption of course is an adjunct and a supplement to the idea that the manner and extent of the reading and considering of the evidence of the deciding officials of an administrative agency can not be probed and, as was stated in the case of Taub v. Pirnie, 3 N.Y.2d 188, 195, 165 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5, 144 N.E.2d 3, 6 (1957), There is a substantial body of law which holds that officials of an administrative agency can not be compelled to testify concerning the procedure or manner in which they made their findings and rendered a decision in a given case. United States et al. v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 61 S. Ct. 999, 85 L. Ed. 1429. For a collection of authorities on this principle see 18 A.L.R.2d, Section 10 at page 624. While there are some decisions to the contrary we believe that the great weight of authority prohibits inquiring or probing the mental processes or procedure by which an administrative decision is reached, and the only exception to this rule is where an allegation has been made and there is a clear showing of illegal or unlawful action, misconduct, bias or bad faith on the part of the commissioners or a specific violation of the applicable statute. No such showing is made in the instant case. Other cases hold that relief of the kind sought in this action will be granted on a showing of "fraud, bad faith, dishonesty, corruption, collusion, malice, wrongful motive or intentional wrongdoing." 2 Am.Jur. 2, 514, Sec. 653. See also Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District, et al. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., et al., 307 Ky. 413, 211 S.W.2d 122, 4 A.L.R.2d 588. We hold that under the particular circumstances disclosed by this proceeding the trial court erred in directing that the members of the commission make answer to the Request for Admissions. PRINGLE and KELLEY, JJ., concur in the result.