Case Title: Fullmer v. Wyoming Employment Sec. Com'n

Citation: 

Docket Number: 93-55

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-09-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Fullmer v. Wyoming Employment Sec. Com'n1993 WY 113858 P.2d 1122Case Number: 93-55Decided: 09/02/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
David 
Michael FULLMER; Fullmer Construction & Trucking, Inc.; 

and 
Fullmer Construction Equipment Company, 

Appellants 
(Petitioners),

v.

WYOMING 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION, 

Appellee 
(Respondent).

Appeal 
from The District Court, Laramie County, Edward L. Grant, 
J.

Georg 
Jensen of Law Offices of Georg Jensen, Cheyenne, for 
appellants.

Joe 
Scott, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Casper, for appellee.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

MACY, 
Chief Justice.

[¶1]      This appeal is 
from an order affirming the decision by the Unemployment Insurance Commission 
(the Commission) which affirmed the appeals examiner's dismissal of an 
administrative appeal filed by David Michael Fullmer, Fullmer Construction & 
Trucking, Inc., and Fullmer Construction Equipment Company (collectively 
referred to as the Fullmers) because it was not filed in a timely 
manner.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      The Fullmers 
state the issue for review as:

     1. Did the district 
court err in concluding that the Petitioner's (Appellant's) administrative 
appeal was properly dismissed as being untimely filed?

[¶4]      In 1989, the 
Department of Employment, Division of Unemployment Insurance (the Division) 
(formerly known as the Wyoming Employment Security Commission) began an audit of 
three separate business entities associated with the Fullmers. The purpose of 
the audit was to determine whether the Fullmers had properly paid unemployment 
taxes for the years 1985 through 1989.

[¶5]      The Division 
informed the Fullmers of the results of its audit by a letter dated July 10, 
1991. It concluded that the Fullmers owed $26,857.811 in unpaid unemployment taxes and 
interest. The letter specifically informed the Fullmers that they had the right 
to appeal from the audit findings by filing a written notice of appeal within 
fifteen days of the date of the July 10, 1991, letter. The Fullmers appealed 
from the Division's findings by filing a notice of appeal dated July 25, 1991, 
and postmarked on July 26, 1991.

[¶6]      On August 13, 
1991, the Division informed the Fullmers that their notice of appeal had not 
been filed within the required fifteen days because it was postmarked on July 
26, 1991, the sixteenth day after the date of the July 10, 1991, letter. It 
indicated that the Fullmers could request that the case be forwarded to the 
appeals examiner for consideration of the timeliness issue and, if the Fullmers 
prevailed on that issue, of the merits of the case. The Fullmers requested that 
the case be forwarded to the appeals examiner. The appeals examiner heard the 
case on February 19, 1992. On April 23, 1992, he dismissed the Fullmers' appeal 
because it had not been filed in a timely manner.

[¶7]      The Fullmers 
appealed to the Commission. The Commission considered and affirmed the appeals 
examiner's dismissal on June 23, 1992. The Fullmers appealed to the district 
court which affirmed the Commission's decision. They timely filed a notice of 
appeal with this Court.

[¶8]      No material issue 
of fact exists in this case. The Fullmers concede that their notice of appeal 
was postmarked on July 26, 1991. As such, the notice was not mailed until the 
sixteenth day after the date of the Division's July 10, 1991, letter. The 
Fullmers argue that their notice was timely even though it was not mailed until 
the sixteenth day. They contend that they were entitled to have an additional 
three days in which to file their notice under W.R.C.P. 6(e)2 (now W.R.C.P. 6(d)) because the 
Division's determination was delivered to them by mail. We 
disagree.

[¶9]      The applicable 
statutes and regulations supersede W.R.C.P. 6(e). The Commission has the 
statutory responsibility to promulgate rules "setting forth the nature and 
requirements of all formal and informal procedures available in connection with 
contested cases." WYO. STAT. § 16-3-102(a)(i) (1990). See also WYO. STAT. § 
27-3-602(b) (1991). When rules are adopted pursuant to statutory authority and 
are properly promulgated, they have the force and effect of law. Drake v. State 
ex rel. Department of Revenue and Taxation, 751 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Wyo. 1988); 
Yeik v. Department of Revenue and Taxation, 595 P.2d 965, 968 (Wyo. 1979). Thus, 
an administrative agency is bound to follow the applicable statutes and its own 
rules and regulations. Jackson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division, 786 P.2d 874, 878 (Wyo. 1990).

[¶10]   Chapter X, Section 1(a) of the 
REGULATIONS OF THE DIVISION OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AS ADOPTED BY THE 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION provided that an employer who was not 
satisfied with the Division's determination of his liability for unemployment 
tax contributions had to file his request for a hearing within fifteen days of 
the date of the mailing of the determination. Timely filing of a request for 
administrative review of a decision is mandatory and jurisdictional. Employment 
Security Commission of Wyoming v. Young, 713 P.2d 198, 201 (Wyo. 
1986).

[¶11]   The method for computing the 
timeliness of an appeal with the Division is prescribed by statute and 
regulation. Under WYO. STAT. § 16-4-301(a)(i) (1990), the post office 
cancellation mark establishes the date of filing for a document filed by mail 
with the State of Wyoming. Similarly, Chapter XVIII, Section 1 of the 
REGULATIONS OF THE DIVISION OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, supra, stated in relevant 
part:

     Section 1. 
Applicability. When the Employment Security Law provides a deadline for 
filing appeals, paying contributions, making reports, or for any other purpose, 
the following rules apply:

. 
. . .

     (b) By Mail. When a 
person makes a payment or files an appeal, report or other document with the 
Division by mail, that payment is deemed to be made or document is deemed to 
have been filed as of the postmark date on the envelope by which the payment or 
document is mailed.

[¶12]   The Fullmers' argument that 
W.R.C.P. 6(e) should have controlled the computation of the time period for 
filing an administrative appeal disregards the statutory and regulatory 
provisions cited above. The applicable statutes and regulations did not adopt 
W.R.C.P. 6(e). The omission of words from a statute is considered to be an 
intentional act by the Legislature, and the Supreme Court will not supply words 
in the process of interpretation. PR v. Shannon (Matter of TR), 777 P.2d 1106, 
1111 (Wyo. 1989) (citing Voss v. Ralston, 550 P.2d 481, 485 (Wyo. 1976)); 
Carroll by and through Miller v. Wyoming Production Credit Association, 755 P.2d 869, 873 (Wyo. 1988). In International Association of Fire Fighters, Local No. 
279 v. Civil Service Commission of Fire Department of City of Cheyenne, 702 P.2d 1294, 1297 (Wyo. 1985), we held: "The reasoning used in interpretation of 
statutes is applicable to the interpretation of [administrative] rules made 
pursuant to statute." Accordingly, we will not interpret the applicable statutes 
and regulations to include an extension of time for filing under W.R.C.P. 
6(e).

[¶13]   The Fullmers were required to file 
their appeal within fifteen days of the date of the mailing of the Division's 
determination. The date of the filing is determined by the postmark date. The 
notice from the Division was mailed on July 10, 1991. The Fullmers' appeal was 
postmarked on July 26, 1991. Because their appeal was not postmarked until the 
sixteenth day, the Fullmers did not perfect their appeal within the legal time 
limit. The Commission's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. WYO. STAT. § 
16-3-114(c)(ii)(A) (1990). The Fullmers' appeal was, therefore, properly 
dismissed as being untimely.

[¶14]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The record indicates that the audit was later amended, reducing the 
Fullmers' liability to some extent. The amount currently in dispute is not clear 
from the record but is of no consequence to our 
determination.

2 Before its revision in 1992, W.R.C.P. 6(e) 
provided:

(e) Additional time after service by mail. - Whenever a party has the 
right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed 
period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him, and the notice or 
paper is served upon him by mail or by delivery to the clerk, 3 days shall be 
added to the prescribed period, provided however, this rule shall not apply to 
service of process by registered mail under Rule 
4(1)(2).