Case Title: STATE v BROWN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-08-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13152 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 19 7 6 STATE OF M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - DAVID OTTLEY BROWN, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Robert J. Rice argued, Bozeman, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Donald White, County Attorney, argued, Bozeman, Montana Submitted: May 26, 1976 Decided : AUG 2 1976 Filed : AuG 2 5 197F M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant David O t t l e y Brown appeals from a conviction i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , G a l l a t i n County. Defendant was convicted of one count of aggravated a s s a u l t and one count of simple a s s a u l t . He appeals from t h e conviction of aggravated a s s a u l t . The r e l e v a n t f a c t s a r e : O n t h e evening of March 13, 1 9 7 5 , one Ann Docksey, a student a t Montana S t a t e University, was walking back t o her dormitory from work i n downtown Bozeman. A t an i n t e r s e c t i o n near t h e campus she approached a man stand- ing a t t h e corner. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t a s she passed him, t h e man grabbed h e r , pressed what was apparently a screwdriver t o her t h r o a t and attempted t o f o r c e her i n t o a c a r . A s she w a s being pressed a g a i n s t t h e c a r , another c a r drove by, f r i g h t e n i n g her a t t a c k e r . She then t o l d him she w a s expected soon a t a nearby house t o babysit; and a t t h a t p o i n t t h e man l e t her go. About 1 0 : O O p.m. t h a t same n i g h t Ann Docksey w a s shown a set of photographs by t h e p o l i c e . She f a i l e d t o i d e n t i f y her a t t a c k e r . Later, a t 12:30 a.m., March 1 4 , defendant who had been taken i n t o custody a s a r e s u l t of a s e p a r a t e disturbance i n another p a r t of town, w a s shown t o her i n a two-man lineup. A t t h i s time, Ann Docksey i d e n t i f i e d defendant as her a t t a c k e r . De- fendant w a s then on p a r o l e f o r a rape conviction which occurred i n 1972. O n March 17, 1975, based i n p a r t on Ann Docksey's i d e n t i - f i c a t i o n , an Information was f i l e d a g a i n s t defendant. Count I of t h a t Information charged him with aggravated a s s a u l t a g a i n s t Ann Docksey. It read, i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , t h a t defendant, i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 94-5-202 (1) (a) , R.C.M. 1947 : " * * * purposely o r knowingly caused s e r i o u s bodily i n j u r y t o Ann Docksey by grabbing her by t h e shoulder and p u t t i n g h i s arm around her t h r o a t and t r y i n g t o f o r c e her i n t o a c a r " . O n March 24, 1975, defendant w a s arraigned and plead not g u i l t y t o Count I and one a d d i t i o n a l count r e l a t e d t o a s e p a r a t e i n c i d e n t . O n A p r i l 2 t h e s t a t e moved t o amend Count I of t h e Information t o charge defendant with v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 94-5-202(1)(c), R.C.M. 1947, by purposely o r knowingly causing "reasonable apprehension of s e r i o u s bodily i n j u r y i n Ann Docksey by use of a weapon * * *." The d i s t r i c t c o u r t granted t h i s motion over t h e o b j e c t i o n o f defendant, and t h e amended Information was f i l e d t h e same day. Defendant plead n o t g u i l t y t o t h e amended Information. T r i a l was had on May 6, 1975, approximately 34 days a f t e r f i l i n g of t h e amended ~ n f o r m a t i o n . The jury r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t f i n d i n g defendant g u i l t y of aggravated a s s a u l t a s s p e c i f i e d i n Count I and g u i l t y of simple a s s a u l t on t h e u n r e l a t e d second count. H e received concurrent sentences of 20 y e a r s and 6 months r e s p e c t i v e l y . It is from t h e judgment and sentence a s t o aggravated a s s a u l t t h a t defendant appeals. Defendant p r e s e n t s s e v e r a l i s s u e s f o r review, b u t w e need d i s c u s s only one a s it is d i s p o s i t i v e of t h i s appeal. That i s s u e i s whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n allowing t h e prosecution t o amend Count I of t h e Information a f t e r defend- a n t had plead t o t h e o r i g i n a l information. Section 95-1505, R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 , reads: " ( a ) A charge may be amended i n m a t t e r s of sub- s t a n c e a t any t i m e before t h e defendant pleads, without l e a v e of c o u r t . " ( b ) The c o u r t may permit any charge t o be amended a s t o form a t any t i m e before v e r d i c t o r f i n d i n g i f no a d d i t i o n a l o r d i f f e r e n t o f f e n s e is charqed and i f t h e s u b s t a n t i a l rights of the defendant a r e n o t prejudiced. " ( c ) N o charge s h a l l be dismissed because of a formal d e f e c t which does n o t tend t o p r e j u d i c e a s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t of t h e defendant." (Emphasis supplied. ) Defendant contends t h e amendment t o Count I a f t e r pleading, w a s a s t o matters of substance, and prejudiced s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of defendant and t h e r e f o r e should n o t have been granted by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . The state c o u n t e r s a s s e r t i n g t h e amendment of Count I t o be one of form r a t h e r than substance. I n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , t h e s t a t e argues t h a t even i f t h e amendment was one of substance, it d i d n o t p r e j u d i c e a s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t of t h e defendant. Believing d i s c u s s i o n of t h e s t a t e ' s two-pronged argument t o be t h e b e s t method of r e s o l v i n g t h e i s s u e , w e w i l l d i s c u s s t h e s t a t e ' s contentions i n t u r n , c i t i n g t h e r e c e n t d e c i s i o n i n S t a t e v. Stewart, 161 Mont. 501, 504, 507 P.2d 1050, as t h e b a s i s . I n Stewart, t h i s Court discussed t h e g e n e r a l test f o r determining whether a n amendment t o an information w a s v a l i d : " * * * The question t o be decided by t h i s Court i s whether t h e amended information charged a crime d i f f e r e n t i n n a t u r e from t h a t previously charged, - and i f such amendment s u f f i c i e n t l y ap- p r i s e d t h e defendant of t h e charges a g a i n s t him." (Emphasis supplied. ) I n determining whether an amendment t o an information is one of substance o r form, w e again quote from Stewart where t h i s Court was confronted with t h e same question. There t h e Court s a i d : " The crime charged i s t h e same * * *. The elements are t h e same. The proof t o t h e crime would remain t h e same. " C l e a r l y then, t h e amendment is one of form r a t h e r than substance. What does a comparison of t h e crime charged i n Count I of t h e o r i g i n a l Information and t h a t charged i n Count I of t h e amended Information r e v e a l i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e ? The o r i g i n a l Information charged defendant with v i o l a t i o n of subsection ( l ) ( a ) of s e c t i o n 94-5-202, R.C.M. 1947. The amended Information charged him w i t h v i o l a t i o n of subsection ( l ) ( c ) of s e c t i o n 94-5-202, R.C.M. 1947. The p e r t i n e n t subsections read: "94-5-202(1) A person commits t h e o f f e n s e of aggravated a s s a u l t i f he purposely o r knowingly causes : " ( a ) s e r i o u s bodily i n jury t o another; o r " ( c ) reasonable apprehension of s e r i o u s bodily i n j u r y i n another by use of a weapon; o r * * *". Subsection ( l ) ( a ) r e q u i r e s t h e causing of serious bodily injury. Subsection ( l ) ( c ) merely requires t h e causing of reasonable apprehension of s e r i o u s bodily i n j u r y by use of a weapon. Ob- viously, t h e e s s e n t i a l elements required under subsections (1) ( a ) and ( l ) ( c ) a r e d i f f e r e n t and therefore under t h e c r i t e r i a of Stewart t h e amended Information charged a crime d i f f e r e n t i n nature from t h a t previously charged and t h e r e f o r e Count I of t h e amended Information contained a new and d i f f e r e n t offense. Con- sequently, t h e amendment w a s one a s t o matters of substance. See: S t a t e v. Tropf, 166 Mont. 79, 530 P.2d 1158, 32 St.Rep. 56; Com- mission Comments t o Sections 94-5-201 and 94-5-202, R.C.M. 1947. The s t a t e , c i t i n g t h e f a c t t h e motion t o amend and amend- ment occurred 34 days p r i o r t o t r i a l , next argues t h a t even i f t h e amendment was one of substance, it was still v a l i d s i n c e no s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of defendant were prejudiced. Such an i n t e r - p r e t a t i o n ignores t h e clear language of s e c t i o n 95-1505, R.C.M. 1947. Subsection (a) allows information amendments of substance p r i o r t o pleading. However subsection (b) e s s e n t i a l l y c a r r i e s a two-fold requirement where information amendment is desired subsequent t o defendant pleading: (1) such an amendment is only allowed a s t o matters of form, and (2) only when no s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t of t h e defendant is prejudiced. W e recognized t h i s s t a t - utory p r i n c i p l e i n Stewart when t h e Court s a i d an amendment t o an Information subsequent t o pleading can only be as t o form and i f such amendment s u f f i c i e n t l y apprised t h e defendant of t h e charges a g a i n s t him. Therefore once it is determined t h a t an amendment subsequent t o pleading i s as t o matters of substance, t h e Court need go no f u r t h e r , a s t h a t determination is controlling. This reasoning a l s o a p p l i e s t o s e c t i o n 95-1505(c), s i n c e t h a t subsection reads "No charge s h a l l be dismissed because of a formal d e f e c t * * *I1. (Emphasis supplied.) Here, subsequent t o defendant's not g u i l t y plea, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t permitted amendment t o t h e Information which charged a new and d i f f e r e n t offense. Such a c t i o n is d i r e c t l y contrary t o section 95-1505, R.C.M. 1947, and c o n s t i t u t e s r e v e r s i - b l e e r r o r . This does not mean t h a t t h i s Court is not cognizant of t h e S t a t e ' s argument a s t o t h e lack of prejudice t o s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of defendant r e s u l t i n g from t h e amendment t o t h e Informa- t i o n . However t h e language of t h e s t a t u t e i s c l e a r : no sub- s t a n t i v e amendment of t h e Information subsequent t o pleading i s allowed. The f u r t h e r q u a l i f i c a t i o n as t o matters a f f e c t i n g sub- s t a n t i a l r i g h t s is j u s t t h a t , a q u a l i f i c a t i o n concerning only amendments which have already been determined t o be those of form . W e f i n d t h e statement i n S t a t e v. Fisher, 79 Mont. 46, 51, 254 P. 872, is appropriate here. I n attempting t o resolve a s i m - i l a r s i t u a t i o n where Information amendment occurred a f t e r plead- ing, t h i s Court quoted with approval from S t a t e v. D i s t r i c t Court, 36 Utah 396, 1 0 4 P. 282, where t h e Utah Supreme Court said: "'The l e g i s l a t u r e must be understood t o mean what it has p l a i n l y expressed. It i s our duty t o give t h e s t a t u t e such e f f e c t and not t o set it a s i d e o r evade its operation by forced and unreasonable construction.'" The judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t is reversed and Count I dismissed. -- Just ----- ----- ------ % ------ W e concur: ------------ ' , & . -. Hon. Bernard,,Thomas, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g i n place of M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison - 6 - M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d i s s e n t i n g : I d i s s e n t . The Court here r e v e r s e s a d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r allowing a timely c o r r e c t i o n of an e s s e n t i a l l y c l e r i c a l e r r o r i n a charging document. The county a t t o r n e y o r i g i n a l l y charged t h e defendant with t h e offense of aggravated a s s a u l t s p e c i f i c a l l y enumerating s e c t i o n 94-5-202(1) ( a ) . That subsection of t h e o f f e n s e of aggravated a s s a u l t has a s i t s aggravating f a c t o r s e r i o u s bodily i n j u r y . I n t h e a f f i d a v i t i n support of t h i s charge, it i s a l l e g e d t h a t : "The victim, Ann Docksey, a d v i s e s t h a t she w a s accosted on t h e street by a male who attempted t o f o r c e her i n t o a red c a r , t h e a s s a i l a n t t o l d her t h a t he had a k n i f e a t her t h r o a t , she reached up with her hand and f e l t a k n i f e , she subsequently escaped and went t o t h e Bozeman P o l i c e Department and she has i d e n t i f i e d David O t t l e y Brown a s her a s s a i l a n t . " This charge was amended a l i t t l e more than two weeks a f t e r t h e o r i g i n a l charge was f i l e d and more than a month before t h e t r i a l s e c t i o n t o a l l e g e aggravated a s s a u l t under/94-5-202(1)(c) which had a s an aggravating f a c t o r t h e reasonable apprehension of s e r i o u s bodily i n j u r y with a weapon. Looking a t t h e f a c t s a l l e g e d i n t h e a f f i d a v i t , it i s obvious t h a t t h i s is t h e appropriate sub- s e c t i o n under which t o charge. The majority r e v e r s e s t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r allowing t h i s amendment. The requirements f o r an amendment as t o form a r e set o u t i n s e c t i o n 95-1505(b). N o a d d i t i o n a l o r d i f f e r e n t o f f e n s e may be charged and t h e r e may be no prejudice t o t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of t h e defendant. Here t h e offense i s t h e same, aggravated a s s a u l t . Section 94-5-202 begins by saying, "(1) A person commits t h e o f f e n s e of aggravated a s s a u l t * * *" (Emphasis supplied.) and then enumerates t h e various manners i n which aggravated a s s a u l t may be committed. The amendment d i d not add another offense, it d e l e t e d one sub- s e c t i o n and s u b s t i t u t e d another subsection of t h e same offense. The first requirement for an amendment as to form is met, there is no new or additional offense charged. The remaining question is whether the amendment prejudiced the substantial rights of the defendant. The affidavit in support of the original charge set out the fact that a weapon was used and set out facts which give rise to an inference that there was a reasonable apprehension of serious bodily harm. This gave the defendant notice that these facts would be used to support the charge of aggravated assault. It must be remembered that the basic purposes of the in- formation and the affidavit which supports it are to show that the court has jurisdiction, give notice to the defense of his offense and to protect the defendant against a second prosecution for the same offense. State v. Heiser, 146 Mont. 413, 407 P.2d 370. The original affidavit and information fulfilled these re- quirements. An examination of two of the cases cited by the majority helps in understanding the boundaries of section 95-1505(b). In State v. Stewart, 161 Mont. 501, 507 P.2d 1050, the Court allowed an amendment on these facts. The original charge was first degree burglary which did not have second degree burglary as a lesser included offense and which required that the burglary occur during the nighttime. On the day of trial the charge was amended to burglary which included both first and second degree burglary. This Court upheld the amendment saying: "The crime charged is the same, i.e., burglary. The elements of the crime are the same. The proof to the crime would remain the same. The only difference between the two charges would be the degree of the crime, which must be determined by the jury. The amendment of the information did not surprise the defendant and did not prohibit him from preparing his defense against the crime." This language is equally applicable here. The crime is the same, aggravated a s s a u l t . The proof, based on t h e a l l e g a t i o n s i n t h e a f f i d a v i t , would be t h e same. It is c l e a r t h a t a f u l l months n o t i c e p r o h i b i t s any c l a i m of s u r p r i s e o r i n a b i l i t y t o prepare a defense t o t h e charge. An e x c e l l e n t example of a case where t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t was j u s t i f i e d i n r e f u s i n g an amendment is S t a t e v. Tropf, 166 Mont. 79, 530 P.2d 1158. There t h e o r i g i n a l charge gave t h e f i f t h of October a s t h e d a t e on which t h e crime took place. Defendant gave n o t i c e of h i s defense of a l i b i and l i s t e d h i s witnesses. The s t a t e proceeded t o attempt t o amend t h e charge by changing t h e d a t e of t h e crime. This Court properly upheld t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o allow such an amendment. But these a r e n o t t h e f a c t s a l l e g e d i n t h e p r e s e n t case. H e r e t h e o r i g i n a l a f f i d a v i t c l e a r l y a l l e g e s f a c t s which support a d i f f e r e n t subsection of t h e aggravated a s s a u l t s t a t u t e than t h e one typed on t h e information. It gave c l e a r n o t i c e of t h e f a c t u a l b a s i s of t h e charge. The amendment, a l i t t l e over two weeks a f t e r t h e o r i g i n a l charge and b e t t e r than a month before t r i a l , gave t h e defendant adequate n o t i c e of t h e crime and p l e n t y of t i m e t o prepare h i s defense. Unless it is argued t h a t t h e defendant has a s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t a r i s i n g o u t of c l e r i c a l e r r o r s i n t h e charging document, t h e r e was no p r e j u d i c e t o t h e sub- s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of t h e defendant. The basic purposes of both t h e Code of Criminal Procedure and t h e Criminal Code a r e t o eliminate t h e excessively formal code pleading a s p e c t s of t h e previous criminal s t a t u t e s and t o promote j u s t i c e , secure s i m p l i c i t y i n procedure and f a i r n e s s i n administration. This means f a i r n e s s and j u s t i c e both t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l charged and t o s o c i e t y . I n a c a s e l i k e t h i s one where t h e r e is no p r e j u d i c e t o t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of t h e defendant, s o c i e t a l j u s t i c e r e q u i r e s t h a t it be allowed t h a t t h i s e r r o r be corrected. I woul,Cqffirm t h e conviction. Mr. Justice Castles dissenting: I join ~ustice John Conway Harrison's dissent. I add that the majority opinion is doing great damage to a simple system of charging crimes as contemplated by the Code of Criminal Procedure. We appear to be returning to the highly technical dotting of the "i" andcrossing the "t" by distinguishing be- tween subsections of major crimes. I would affirm the judgment. I N THE S U P R E M E COURT O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A No. 13152 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, V S . DAVID OTTLEY BROWN, Defendant and Appellant. M E M O OPINION PER CURIAM: I n t h i s cause a p e t i t i o n f o r rehearing w a s granted. The Court having heard o r a l arguments, taken t h e matter under advisement i n conference, and t h e r e being no change i n p o s i t i o n , I T I S H E R E B Y O R D E R E D t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l opinion stand. Let t h e r e m i t t i t u r i s s u e . & DATED t h i s /& day of December, 1976.