Case Title: State v. Hyleman

Citation: 324 N.C. 506, 379 S.E.2d 830

Docket Number: 209A88

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1989-06-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
379 S.E.2d 830 (1989) 324 N.C. 506 STATE of North Carolina v. Kenneth Ray HYLEMAN. No. 209A88. Supreme Court of North Carolina. June 8, 1989. *831 Lacy H. Thornburg, Atty. Gen. by G. Patrick Murphy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the state. Gray and Hodnett by James C. Gray, Gastonia, for defendant. MARTIN, Justice. Defendant was tried on three counts of trafficking cocaine by possessing, delivering, and selling, and on one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. We hold that defendant is entitled to a new trial because the trial judge erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress. The state's evidence showed that on 25 July 1986, Detective William Durst of the Gaston County Police Department participated in a cocaine sale organized by a confidential informant. At approximately 7 p.m., the informant and Detective Durst met with Gene Orendorff and Jeff Manning. Durst delivered $1,650 in previously photocopied currency to Orendorff and Manning. Durst was to make a final payment in the same amount upon receipt of two ounces of cocaine. Police surveillance units observed Orendorff and Manning driving into a trailer park from which they departed with a third man, Kenneth Wood, at approximately 8:15 p.m. Police then lost track of the three until they were again spotted at 10:25 p.m. At approximately 10:50 p.m. the three men returned to the site of their earlier meeting with Durst and delivered the cocaine to him. At completion of the deal, Durst signaled nearby officers and the three men were arrested. Later that night, Kenneth Wood identified defendant from a photographic lineup as the person from whom he had acquired the cocaine. Based on this information and on similar statements made by Orendorff to another officer, Detective Durst prepared an affidavit for a warrant to search defendant's residence. The magistrate found probable cause to issue the search warrant based upon the warrant application. The resulting search yielded drug paraphernalia and two hundred and fifty dollars, of which thirty-six bills matched previously-made photocopies. *832 Defendant was convicted of the sale of cocaine, for which he received a sentence of ten years, and of possession of drug paraphernalia, for which he received a twelve-month sentence. The Court of Appeals found no error in defendant's trial. Defendant first assigns error to the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Defendant argues that the affidavit for the search warrant under which the evidence was seized fails to establish probable cause. The affidavit prepared by Detective Durst for the search warrant application reads as follows: The validity of this warrant is governed by N.C.G.S. § 15A-244(3): This Court has held that probable cause cannot be shown by conclusory affidavits stating only the belief of the affiant or an informer that probable cause exists to issue the warrant. State v. Campbell, 282 N.C. 125, 191 S.E.2d 752 (1972). Recital of some of the circumstances underlying this belief is essential. Id. When hearsay information is a part of the foundation of the affiant's belief, such information must be sufficiently detailed in order to form a substantial basis for the magistrate's finding of probable cause. State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 319 S.E.2d 254 (1984). Furthermore, the affidavit must implicate the premises to be searched. Campbell, 282 N.C. 125, 191 S.E.2d 752. Here, the application for a search warrant fails to comply with the statute in several respects. The affiant fails to state what information he received from the informants during and after the purchase of *833 cocaine. The affidavit fails to disclose any facts that would lead Durst or a magistrate to reasonably believe that the identified currency and contraband were at the defendant's residence. The inadequacies of the affidavit resulted in the magistrate being confronted with an insufficient, "bare bones" application for a search warrant. Under the totality of circumstances analysis, the affidavit did not comply with N.C. G.S. § 15A-244(3). The failure of the affidavit to comply with N.C.G.S. § 15A-244(3) constituted a substantial violation. Manifestly, the evidence was seized as a result of the inadequate affidavit upon which the warrant was issued. See State v. Hunter, 305 N.C. 106, 286 S.E.2d 535 (1982). The interest of a defendant to be free from unlawful searches and seizures is, of course, a fundamental constitutional and statutory right in North Carolina. The "bare bones" conclusory affidavit was totally inadequate to support a finding of probable cause under the totality of circumstances analysis. Additionally, there was evidence of willfulness on the part of the affiant demonstrated by the statement in the affidavit that the suspects were under surveillance by the officers from 7:15 p.m. to 10:50 p.m. The evidence disclosed that the suspects disappeared from the view of the officers from 8:15 p.m. to 10:25 p.m. and that the affiant was aware of this break in the surveillance. The exclusion of illegally seized evidence is the greatest deterrent to similar violations in the future. See State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988). The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized in the search. Defendant is therefore entitled to a new trial. N.C.G.S. § 15A-974(2) (1988). Having decided upon statutory grounds that defendant's motion to suppress should have been allowed, this Court will not decide the same issue on constitutional grounds. State v. Creason, 313 N.C. 122, 326 S.E.2d 24 (1985); State v. Blackwell, 246 N.C. 642, 99 S.E.2d 867 (1957); State v. Jones, 242 N.C. 563, 89 S.E.2d 129 (1955). It follows that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is not applicable. The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule arises upon the exclusion of evidence based upon federal constitutional grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984); State v. Welch, 316 N.C. 578, 342 S.E.2d 789 (1986). The Court of Appeals erred in relying upon the federal "good faith" exception doctrine. We discuss the defendant's second assignment of error because the question it raises may recur at a new trial. This issue involves the state's use of Detective Durst's testimony to impeach the testimony of the state's witness Kenneth Wood. Wood denied making a statement to Detective Durst identifying defendant as the person from whom he obtained the cocaine. The state thereafter recalled Durst, who testified that Wood said he had bought the cocaine from defendant. This Court recently analyzed this issue in State v. Hunt, 324 N.C. 343, 378 S.E.2d 754 (1989), holding that it is improper to impeach a witness who has denied making a prior statement by the use of testimony relating the substance of that prior statement. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further remand to the Superior Court, Gaston County, for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. WEBB, Justice, dissenting. I dissent. Conceding for purposes of argument that the search warrant does not comply with N.C.G.S. § 15A-244(3) I do not believe that N.C.G.S. § 15A-974(2) requires that evidence seized during the search should be suppressed. N.C.G.S. § 15A-974 provides in part: Considering the matters which the statute says we must consider I do not believe the violation was substantial. Certainly the right to be free from an unlawful search is an important interest. The deviation from lawful conduct, however, was slight. Mr. Durst applied for a search warrant but, according to the majority, he did not comply with all the requirements in the language he used. I would hold this is not a major deviation from lawful conduct. There is no showing at all that the deviation was willful and the exclusion of this evidence will not tend to deter future violations of the chapter. There is no evidence Mr. Durst did not make a good faith effort to prepare a proper affidavit for a search warrant. That is all we can expect from officers in the future. Considering these statutory factors I believe we should hold the violation was not substantial and evidence seized during the search should be admissible. I realize that in State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988) we held that there is not a good faith exception under our state Constitution which allows the admission of evidence seized in contravention to our Constitution. This might prevent the admission of the evidence although it should not have been excluded pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-974(2). Suffice it to say I joined in the dissent in Carter and I believe Carter should be overruled. I vote to affirm the Court of Appeals. MEYER and MITCHELL, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.