Case Title: Peterson v. Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97-182

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Peterson v. Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n1999 WY 143989 P.2d 113Case Number: 97-182Decided: 11/05/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
CLAYTON E. PETERSON, JR., and TANYA PETERSON, Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

WYOMING GAME AND FISH 
COMMISSION, WYOMING GAME AND FISH DEPARTMENT, Appellees 
(Defendants).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Laramie County, The Honorable Edward L. Grant, 
Judge.

James Richard 
McCarty and Keith P. Tyler, Casper, representing 
Appellants.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; John W. Renneisen; Deputy Attorney General; Thomas C. Wilson, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Jennifer A. Cudworth, Assistant Attorney 
General, representing Appellees.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument; retired November 2, 1998.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The sole issue in 
this appeal evolves out of the contention that a Wyoming Game and Fish warden, 
serving as a Bear Management Officer, was a peace officer so as to invoke the 
waiver provision found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-112 (Lexis 1999) of the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act pertaining to peace officers. Clayton E. Peterson, Jr. 
and Tanya Peterson (the Petersons) seek to recover for Mr. Peterson's injuries 
when he was mauled by a bear that was the subject of bear management activities 
of the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission (Game and Fish), which the Petersons 
contend were negligently performed. The Petersons seek to have Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-2-101(a)(iv) (Michie Repl. 1995) construed broadly to include a warden's 
activities as the Bear Management Officer within the functions of a peace 
officer. We agree with the district court that the statute should not be 
construed so broadly, and we affirm the Order Granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment.

[¶2]      In the Brief of 
Appellants, filed by the Petersons, the articulated issue 
is:

Whether Section 
7-2-101(a)(iv)(C) is meant to be read in the conjunctive or in the disjunctive, 
that is, does the comma between the word "felony" and the word "during" mean 
"or" or "and".

This Statement 
of the Issues is found in the Brief of Appellees, filed on behalf of the Game 
and Fish:

I. As a matter 
of statutory construction, whether the comma between the words "felony" and 
"during" stated in the definition of "peace officer," pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 
7-2-101(a)(iv)(C), should be interpreted to mean an "or" or 
"and".

II. Whether the 
particular duty of managing bears as a Game and Fish bear management officer 
falls within the traditional definition of "peace officer" and whether this 
activity under the particular facts of this case falls within the intent of the 
legislature in adopting Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-112.

III. Whether 
injury by a grizzly bear is an inherent risk assumed by appellant when hunting 
in grizzly bear country, thereby barring appellant from recovery pursuant to the 
Recreational Safety Act, Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-121, et seq.

[¶3]      On July 3, 1978, 
the federal government captured a grizzly bear and placed a radio collar on it 
so that it could be used as a research bear in the Yellowstone ecosystem. The 
animal was designated as Bear 34. Some time later, Bear 34 became a research 
bear in the Livestock Interaction Study of the Game and Fish. On May 17, 1991, 
Bear 34 was recaptured by Game and Fish personnel in order to inspect it. They 
discovered that Bear 34 had a cut on its neck associated with the previous 
placement of the radio collar, and the wound was infected. The Game and Fish 
personnel treated the wound with antiseptic and released Bear 
34.

[¶4]      Bear 34 was 
captured and released by Game and Fish personnel three times between July 1994 
and September 1994 for the purpose of monitoring the bear. During that period of 
time, the Game and Fish personnel became aware that Bear 34 had been killing 
livestock on nearby ranches, and they learned that Bear 34 was deaf. Despite 
this information, the Game and Fish personnel never classified Bear 34 as a 
nuisance bear, nor was it removed from the habitat.

[¶5]      On September 20, 
1994, while hunting elk near the Pacific Creek area in Teton County, Mr. 
Peterson was attacked by Bear 34. Peterson shot the bear, but he failed to kill 
it. After Peterson shot Bear 34, it grabbed and mauled him, causing serious 
injuries. The bear was mortally wounded, and it subsequently was found and 
destroyed by Game and Fish personnel.

[¶6]      On April 18, 
1995, the Petersons filed a Complaint naming the Game and Fish and ten of its 
unidentified personnel as defendants. The thrust of the Petersons' action was 
that the Game and Fish personnel were negligent with respect to their 
maintenance and supervision of Bear 34. A motion for summary judgment was filed 
on May 3, 1996, in which the Game and Fish contended that the Petersons' claims 
were barred by the Recreation Safety Act and that the allegations did not bring 
the Petersons' claims within any exception to the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act. On May 13, 1997, the district court granted the motion for summary judgment 
on the premise that the Game and Fish personnel doing "bear management" work did 
not come within the peace officer exception to the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act. The thrust of that ruling was that the State of Wyoming had not waived 
immunity from the action brought by the Petersons. The Petersons appeal from the 
Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

[¶7]      When only 
questions of law are presented to the court, a summary judgment is an 
appropriate remedy because it eliminates the necessity for a formal trial. 
Raymond v. Steen, 882 P.2d 852, 856 (Wyo. 1994); Bryant v. Hornbuckle, 728 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Wyo. 1986). We are satisfied that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact present in this case. Summary judgment, therefore, is appropriate 
if the prevailing party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Nowotny v. 
L & B Contract Industries, Inc., 933 P.2d 452, 455 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting 
Thomas By Thomas v. South Cheyenne Water and Sewer Dist., 702 P.2d 1303, 1304 
(Wyo. 1985)); Bidache, Inc. v. Martin, 899 P.2d 872, 873 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting 
Thunder Hawk By and Through Jensen v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 844 P.2d 1045, 
1047 (Wyo. 1992)); Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 884 P.2d 968, 971 (Wyo. 1994). 
Statutory interpretation involves a question of law, and our review in such a 
case is plenary. Thomas v. Thomas, 913 P.2d 854, 855 (Wyo. 1996); Butts v. 
Wyoming State Bd. of Architects, 911 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Wyo. 1996). No deference 
is accorded to the decision of the district court on issues of law. Hermreck v. 
United Parcel Service, Inc., 938 P.2d 863, 866 (Wyo. 1997); Griess v. Office of 
the Atty. Gen., Div. of Criminal Investigation, 932 P.2d 734, 736 (Wyo. 
1997).

[¶8]      The Petersons' 
theory in the district court, reiterated in this appeal, is that this case comes 
within one of the statutory exceptions to sovereign immunity articulated in the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. Under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, 
immunity is the rule, and liability is the exception. Newberry v. Board of 
County Com'rs of Fremont County, 919 P.2d 141, 145 (Wyo. 1996); Vigil v. 
Ruettgers, 887 P.2d 521, 524 (Wyo. 1994). Liability exists only when the statute 
recognizes an exception to sovereign immunity. May v. Southeast Wyoming Mental 
Health Center, 866 P.2d 732, 736 (Wyo. 1993); Veile v. Board of County Com'rs of 
Washakie County, 860 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Wyo. 1993). In the absence of a statutory 
exception, no liability attaches to the state or its employees. Cline v. State, 
Dept. of Family Services, 927 P.2d 261, 263 (Wyo. 1996); Harbel v. Wintermute, 
883 P.2d 359, 363 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶9]      The exception 
that the Petersons endeavor to invoke is found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-112: 

A governmental 
entity is liable for damages resulting from tortious conduct of peace officers 
while acting within the scope of their duties.

The definition 
of a peace officer for purposes of this exception to the Wyoming Governmental 
Claims Act is set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-2-101(a)(iv)(C):

(a) As used in 
W.S. 7-2-101 through 7-2-105:

* * 
*

(iv) "Peace 
officer" means:

* * 
*

(C) Game and 
fish law enforcement personnel qualified pursuant to W.S. 9-1-701 through 
9-1-707 and when enforcing Wyoming felony statutes following observation or 
discovery of the commission of a felony, during the performance of their 
statutory duties, or while responding to requests to assist other peace officers 
performing their official duties[.]

The question 
squarely presented is the correct interpretation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-2-101(a)(iv)(C).

[¶10]   The Petersons' argument is that the 
statutory definition should be given a broad construction to the end that there 
are a series of requirements separated by a comma or a conjunction. Under the 
Petersons' theory, a Game and Fish law enforcement officer who is qualified 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 9-1-701 through 9-1-707 (Michie Repl. 1995) is a 
peace officer "when enforcing Wyoming felony statutes following observation or 
discovery of the commission of a felony;" "when engaged in the performance of 
his statutory duties;" or "while responding to requests to assist other peace 
officers performing their official duties * * *." The Game and Fish argues to 
the contrary seeking a narrow construction of the statute. Under its theory, the 
phrase "during the performance of their statutory duties" is simply a modifier 
of the phrase "when enforcing Wyoming felony statutes following observation or 
discovery of the commission of a felony * * *." Under its construction, a 
qualified Game and Fish employee would be a peace officer: (1) "when enforcing 
Wyoming felony statutes following observation or discovery of the commission of 
a felony" and "during the performance of their statutory duties;" or (2) "while 
responding to requests to assist other peace officers performing their official 
duties * * *."

[¶11]   Our rules relating to the 
interpretation of statutes demand that we abide by the plain meaning of the 
statute if its language is clear and unambiguous. JA v. CJH, 923 P.2d 758, 761 
(Wyo. 1996) (quoting Deloges v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Div., 750 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Wyo. 1988)); Rue v. Carter, 919 P.2d 633, 635 (Wyo. 
1996). The statute will be construed as a whole with the ordinary and obvious 
meaning applied to words as they are arranged in paragraphs, sentences, clauses 
and phrases to express the intent of the legislature. Newton v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 922 P.2d 863, 865 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting State 
Dept. of Revenue and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1994)); 
In re Honeycutt, 908 P.2d 976, 978 (Wyo. 1995). In analyzing the clarity or 
ambiguity of the statute, we turn to the guidance of grammarians. Management 
Council of Wyoming Legislature v. Geringer, 953 P.2d 839, 843-44 (Wyo. 
1998).

[¶12]   In this instance, the disagreement 
of grammarians as to the correct method for treating the effect of the commas in 
the statute leads to the ineluctable conclusion that the statute is ambiguous. 
In interpreting the legislature's placement of the commas in the statute, the 
definition may reasonably be interpreted as either incorporating several items 
in a series, or the phrase, "during the performance of their statutory duties," 
can reasonably be construed as merely modifying the phrase which precedes it. In 
support of the position that the statutory definition consists of items in a 
series, Anne Stilman, Grammatically Correct, 79-80 (1997) 
remarks:

Separating 
Elements in a Series

* * 
*

Whenever you 
construct a sentence that contains a list of elements of equal grammatical 
weight, you must use commas to separate them. The elements can range from single 
words to phrases and clauses.

In a list of 
three or more elements, separate the elements with commas. Each element up to 
the second-to-last one may be: that is, it's a style decision. A comma in this 
position is called a serial or series comma, and some writers put it in and some 
don't.

See also John E. 
Warriner, English Composition and Grammar, 642 (Benchmark ed. 1988); and Merriam 
Webster's Guide to Punctuation and Style, 21 (1995).

[¶13]   Alternatively, the statute may be 
narrowly construed so that the phrase, "during the performance of their 
statutory duties," merely modifies the phrase that precedes it and imposes an 
additional limitation upon the phrase, "when enforcing Wyoming felony statutes 
following observation or discovery of the commission of a felony * * *." As 
Marie L. Waddell, et al., The Art of Styling Sentences - 20 Patterns for 
Success, 71 (3rd. ed. 1993) states:

Modifiers

Adding modifiers 
is a good way to clarify a sentence that is too brief or lean. Often some key 
word will require additional explanation - one or more modifiers - in order to 
make its meaning clear. Modifiers are especially helpful if you wish to appeal 
to your reader's sense, to add some figurative language, or to make comparisons 
or allusions.

These modifiers 
may be single words, phrases, even clauses; they may be at the beginning, in the 
middle, or at the end of a sentence. They may be ideas or descriptions or 
figures of speech. Take two short ineffective sentences. Make one into a 
modifier or a dependant clause, and then combine it with the other sentence for 
a stronger, clearer construction.

See also James 
R. Hurford, Grammar - A Student's Guide, 129 (1994) and James G. Fernald, 
English Grammar Simplified, 167 (Cedric Gates revised 
1968).

[¶14]   Our methodology for statutory 
interpretation is summarized in Wylie v. Wyoming Dept. of Transp., 970 P.2d 395, 
398 (Wyo. 1998):

[¶15]   In interpreting statutes, our 
primary consideration is to determine the legislature's intent. State ex rel. 
Motor Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 736 (Wyo. 1983). All statutes must be 
construed in pari materia; and in ascertaining the meaning of a given law, all 
statutes relating to the same subject or hav[ing] the same general purpose must 
be considered and construed in harmony. Id. at 735. Holtz explained our 
statutory construction rules:

"If the language 
is sufficiently clear, there is no need to resort to rules of construction. When 
the language is not clear or is ambiguous, the court must look to the mischief 
the statute was intended to cure, the historical setting surrounding its 
enactment, the public policy of the state, the conclusions of law, and other 
prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances, making use of the accepted 
rules of construction to ascertain a legislative intent that is reasonable and 
consistent."

Holtz, 674 P.2d  
at 736.

[¶16]   In our endeavor to discern 
legislative intent with respect to this definitional statute, we recognize that 
the construction claimed by the Petersons would result in Game and Fish law 
enforcement personnel being peace officers for all purposes while involved in 
the performance of their statutory duties. Had the legislature intended to make 
Game and Fish law enforcement personnel peace officers for all purposes, surely 
it would have pursued the pattern of definitional phraseology found in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-2-101(a)(iv)(A), (B), (D), (F) and (H). Those provisions in the 
statute are forthright:

(iv) "Peace 
officer" means:

(A) Any duly 
authorized sheriff, under sheriff or deputy sheriff who has qualified pursuant 
to W.S. 9-1-701 through 9-1-707;

(B) Any duly 
authorized member of a municipal police force, a college or university campus 
police force or the Wyoming highway patrol who has qualified pursuant to W.S. 
9-1-701 through 9-1-707;

* * * 

(D) Agents of 
the division of criminal investigation appointed pursuant to W.S. 9-1-613 and 
capitol police designated and appointed under W.S. 9-1-612 who have qualified 
pursuant to W.S. 9-1-701 through 9-1-707;

* * 
*

(F) Any duly 
authorized arson investigator employed by the state fire marshal who has 
qualified pursuant to W.S. 9-1-701 through 9-1-707;

* * 
*

(H) Any duly 
authorized detention officer in the performance of his duties and who has 
qualified pursuant to W.S. 9-1-701 through 9-1-707[.]

Instead, 
subparagraph (C) reads much more like Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-2-101(a)(iv)(E), (G), 
and (J), in which limitations upon general law enforcement activities are 
obvious:

(E) Inspectors 
of the Wyoming livestock board authorized under W.S. 11-18-101 through 11-18-113 
and 11-20-201 or duly authorized investigators of the Wyoming livestock board 
who have qualified pursuant to W.S. 9-1-701 through 9-1-707 when enforcing W.S. 
11-19-101 through 11-24-115 and 11-29-101 through 11-30-113 and any laws 
prohibiting theft, killing or mutilation of livestock or any part 
thereof;

* * 
*

(G) Any 
superintendent, assistant superintendent or full-time park ranger of any state 
park or historic site who has qualified pursuant to W.S. 9-1-701 through 
9-1-707, when acting within the boundaries of the state park or historic site, 
or when responding to a request to assist other peace officers performing their 
official duties;

* * 
*

(J) 
Investigators employed by the Wyoming state board of outfitters and professional 
guides and qualified pursuant to W.S. 9-1-701 through 9-1-707, when enforcing 
W.S. 23-2-401 and 23-2-406 through 23-2-417 and board rules and regulations 
promulgated under W.S. 23-2-410(a)(ii).

[¶17]   As the Game and Fish correctly 
points out in its brief, prior to 1979 the definition of a peace officer did not 
include Game and Fish employees. We discern a historic reluctance on the part of 
the legislature to invest Game and Fish employees with broad law enforcement 
powers. We are satisfied that the language the legislature used in defining Game 
and Fish law enforcement personnel as peace officers requires us to hold that 
the phrase, "during the performance of their statutory duties," modifies and 
provides a limitation upon the preceding phrase, "when enforcing Wyoming felony 
statutes following observation or discovery of the commission of a felony * * 
*." We find grammatical support for this conclusion in the proposition that had 
the legislature intended the definition to be construed as a series, it would 
have omitted the comma before the last "or" so that the statute would have 
defined peace officers as qualified game and fish personnel "when enforcing 
Wyoming felony statutes following observation or discovery of the commission of 
a felony, during the performance of their statutory duties or while responding 
to requests to assist other peace officers performing their official duties * * 
*." The omission of the final comma would have resulted in an unambiguous 
definition of Game and Fish law enforcement personnel as peace officers when 
performing the functions of any one of the three phrases in the series because 
that phrase could not have modified the preceding phrase without the significant 
comma.

[¶18]   We hold that the correct 
interpretation of this statute results in qualified Game and Fish personnel 
being defined as peace officers only (1) when enforcing Wyoming felony statutes 
following observation or discovery of the commission of a felony that occurs 
during the performance of their statutory duties; or (2) while responding to 
requests to assist other peace officers performing their official duties. It is 
undisputed in this case that the Game and Fish personnel responsible for the 
bear management program were neither "enforcing Wyoming felony statutes 
following observation or discovery of the commission of a felony," nor were they 
"responding to requests to assist other peace officers performing their official 
duties * * *." The supervision and monitoring of Bear 34 by Game and Fish 
personnel, even those who were qualified as law enforcement officers, did not 
bring them within the definition of a peace officer, and the district court 
properly granted the Game and Fish's motion for summary 
judgment.

[¶19]   The Order Granting Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment entered in the district court is affirmed.