Case Title: Harris Design Services v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc.

Citation: 2018-Ohio-2395

Docket Number: 2017-0436

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2018-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re Complaint of Harris Design Servs. v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2018-
Ohio-2395.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-2395 
IN RE COMPLAINT OF HARRIS DESIGN SERVICES, APPELLANT, v. COLUMBIA 
GAS OF OHIO, INC., INTERVENING APPELLEE; PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 
OF OHIO, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as In re Complaint of Harris Design Servs. v. Columbia Gas of 
Ohio, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-2395.] 
Public 
utilities—R.C. 
4905.22—Utility 
provided 
adequate 
notice 
of 
disconnection—Orders of Public Utilities Commission affirmed. 
(No. 2017-0436—Submitted April 10, 2018—Decided June 28, 2018.) 
APPEAL from the Public Utilities Commission, No. 15-405-GA-CSS. 
_________________ 
DEWINE, J. 
{¶ 1} A public-utility company claims that it gave its customer adequate 
notice that natural-gas service to the customer’s property had been disconnected by 
hanging two notices on the front door of the property.  The customer, who was not 
occupying the property, did not discover the notices and thus did not realize that 
the gas had been disconnected until the pipes froze and burst, causing damage.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
Whether the utility company furnished adequate notice of the service disconnection 
is the main question in this appeal from orders of the Public Utilities Commission 
of Ohio (“PUCO”).  We conclude that the utility did provide adequate notice 
through the door tags, and we affirm the orders. 
BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. (“Columbia”) supplied natural-gas 
service to a property in Columbus (“the property”) that was leased to Harris Design 
Services (“HDS”), an architectural-design firm.  In November 2007, the firm 
physically vacated the property but continued to lease and maintain it. 
{¶ 3} In February 2014, Bruce Harris, the owner and president of HDS, 
discovered that the building had sustained damage as a result of water pipes that 
had burst due to freezing temperatures.  The pipes had frozen because, 
unbeknownst to HDS, Columbia had disconnected gas service to the property.  
HDS eventually filed a complaint, alleging that Columbia had failed to give proper 
notice of the disconnection, in violation of R.C. 4905.22, which requires utilities to 
provide “necessary and adequate service.” 
{¶ 4} The PUCO held a hearing on the complaint.  The evidence established 
that service to HDS’s building had been disconnected in September 2013 after a 
cable company hit a gas line near the property.  Ryder Long, a Columbia service 
technician, was sent to repair the line.  After making the repairs, Long reestablished 
service to the meter, but he left the meter valve off and locked it so that no gas 
would go into the structure until service was reestablished.  He knocked on the front 
door to speak with someone about restoring service to the building, but no one 
answered.  Long testified that he had prepared a tag to hang on the door to notify 
the customer to call Columbia to reestablish service but saw that he did not need to 
leave the tag, because there was already a yellow Columbia tag on the door.  He 
believed that the yellow tag had been placed on the door by a different technician 
who had been there earlier in the day. 
January Term, 2018 
 
3
{¶ 5} In November 2013, Long was called back to the property because the 
gas line had been hit a second time.  After making repairs, Long checked the meter 
valve and saw that it was still off and locked.  Once again, he knocked on the door 
and no one answered.  Long testified that he saw the yellow door tag still hanging 
on the door from the September incident and that this time, he placed an orange tag 
on top of the yellow tag. 
{¶ 6} In its posthearing brief, HDS challenged the credibility of Long’s 
testimony about the door tags.  It noted that three individuals had testified that they 
had visited the property on behalf of HDS during the relevant time period and none 
of them had stated that he or she had seen a tag on the door.  Janet Harris, Bruce’s 
wife and the office manager for HDS, said that she had driven by the property on a 
monthly basis.  Bruce Harris testified that he had been in the building in December 
2013 (when everything was fine) and again in February 2014 (when he discovered 
the damage).  And a landscaper who mowed the lawn through November 2013 
testified that he did not remember seeing anything on the door. 
{¶ 7} HDS further argued that even if door tags had been hung on the door, 
they would not constitute sufficient notice.  In addition to door tags, HDS 
maintained, Columbia should have sent letters and made telephone calls to HDS. 
{¶ 8} Crediting Long’s testimony, the PUCO found that Columbia had 
placed the tags on the door.  It further concluded that hanging a notice on a door to 
a property constitutes adequate notice of disconnection after an emergency repair.  
Thus, it determined that HDS had failed to establish that Columbia had acted 
improperly. 
{¶ 9} HDS filed a rehearing application alleging errors in the PUCO’s 
decision.  The PUCO’s first rehearing entry granted HDS’s rehearing application 
“for the limited purpose of further consideration of the matters specified in the 
application for rehearing.”  Pub. Util. Comm. No. 15-405-GA-CSS, ¶ 1 (July 20, 
2016).  The PUCO later issued a second rehearing entry in which it substantively 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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rejected the alleged errors assigned by HDS and denied HDS’s rehearing 
application.  HDS then filed this appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
{¶ 10} HDS presents six propositions of law on appeal.  For ease of 
discussion, we divide these propositions into three topics: (1) door tags—whether 
Columbia hung them on the property’s front door and, if so, whether that 
constituted adequate notice, (2) the PUCO’s actions related to its rehearing process, 
and (3) evidentiary decisions made by the PUCO attorney examiner at the initial 
hearing. 
Door-Tag Issues 
{¶ 11} HDS first challenges the PUCO’s determination that Columbia 
provided adequate notice of the disconnection by hanging tags on the property’s 
front door.  HDS challenges the PUCO’s finding that door tags were placed on the 
door, arguing that that finding was based on evidence that was uncorroborated, 
lacking in detail, and not credible.  It also asserts that even if door tags were hung 
on the door, they did not provide adequate notice and Columbia should have done 
more to alert HDS about the disconnection. 
{¶ 12} As to the PUCO’s factual finding that door tags were hung on the 
door, the result is dictated largely by our standard of review.  We will not reverse 
or modify a PUCO decision as to questions of fact when the record contains 
sufficient probative evidence to show that the PUCO’s decision was not manifestly 
against the weight of the evidence and was not so clearly unsupported by the record 
as to show misapprehension, mistake, or willful disregard of duty.  Monongahela 
Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 104 Ohio St.3d 571, 2004-Ohio-6896, 820 N.E.2d 
921, ¶ 29. 
{¶ 13} There was no direct evidence contradicting Long’s testimony about 
the door tags.  HDS suggests that it is implausible that Long could remember the 
details of his visits nearly two years later.  But the PUCO believed Long’s 
January Term, 2018 
 
5
testimony, noting that he remembered “explicit details” from his visits, namely, his 
having seen the same yellow tag hanging from the door in September 2013 and 
November 2013.  Pub. Util. Comm. No. 15-405-GA-CSS, ¶ 13 (May 25, 2016).  
HDS points to the testimony of the three witnesses who did not mention seeing the 
door tags.  But there was no evidence that any of these witnesses had actually 
approached the front door of the building.  Although Mr. Harris entered the 
property, there was no evidence presented to establish that he went in through the 
front door. 
{¶ 14} We defer to the PUCO’s credibility determinations in its role as 
finder of fact.  See Lycourt-Donovan v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 152 Ohio St.3d 
73, 2017-Ohio-7566, 93 N.E.3d 902, ¶ 35.  The PUCO received evidence, weighed 
that evidence, and determined that two tags had been hung on the property’s front 
door.  Because there is sufficient probative evidence in the record to support the 
PUCO’s findings, we conclude that HDS has not carried its burden to justify 
reversal of those findings.  Monongahela Power Co. at ¶ 29. 
{¶ 15} We turn next to HDS’s contention that even if tags were placed on 
the door, they did not constitute adequate notice.  The PUCO determined that 
Columbia complied with R.C. 4905.22, which provides that “[e]very public utility 
shall furnish necessary and adequate service and facilities, and every public utility 
shall furnish and provide with respect to its business such instrumentalities and 
facilities, as are adequate and in all respects just and reasonable.”  In doing so, the 
PUCO concluded that “placing a notice on the door is adequate notice of a 
disconnection after an emergency repair and that [Columbia] complied with all 
standards and regulations.”  Pub. Util. Comm. No. 15-405-GA-CSS, at ¶ 14. 
{¶ 16} In holding that the door-tag notice was adequate, the PUCO relied 
on its adoption of federal gas-pipeline safety standards in Ohio Adm.Code 
4901:1-16-03(A).  These standards require a utility to comply with its own internal 
standards.  Columbia’s internal standards required a technician to leave a tag on the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
door when gas must be shut off and no one answers the door.  In addition, the PUCO 
cited administrative regulations that provide that attaching written notice in a 
conspicuous location on the premises is required when gas service is disconnected 
for reasons other than safety.  Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-13-09(B)(2) (disconnection 
for 
tampering 
or 
unauthorized 
reconnection) 
and 
4901:1-18-06(A)(2) 
(disconnection for nonpayment). 
{¶ 17} HDS’s merit brief almost completely ignores the PUCO’s legal 
rationale for concluding that Columbia’s actions were adequate.  It does not cite, 
let alone analyze, the administrative-code provisions that formed the primary basis 
for the PUCO’s determination.  The one rule that HDS does analyze, Ohio 
Adm.Code. 4901:1-13-02, was not relied on by the PUCO.  Only in its reply brief 
does HDS try to mount a substantive challenge to the legal rationale set forth in the 
PUCO decision.  The waiver doctrine, however, forecloses our consideration of 
arguments first raised on reply.  In re Application of Am. Transm. Sys., Inc., 125 
Ohio St.3d 333, 2010-Ohio-1841, 928 N.E.2d 427, ¶ 35. 
{¶ 18} The thrust of HDS’s argument in its merit brief is that the door-tag 
notice was not adequate, because Columbia could have provided better notice—for 
example, through a telephone call or a letter.  But HDS fails to tether this 
proposition to any legal requirement.  And the question is not whether another type 
of notice might have been more likely to provide actual notice to the customer but 
whether the door-tag notice comported with the requirement that Columbia “furnish 
necessary and adequate service,” R.C. 4905.22.  We find nothing “unlawful or 
unreasonable” in the PUCO’s determination that the door-tag notice was adequate, 
and therefore, we will not disturb its holding in this regard.  Constellation 
NewEnergy, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 104 Ohio St.3d 530, 2004-Ohio-6767, 820 
N.E.2d 885, ¶ 50. 
 
 
January Term, 2018 
 
7
The Rehearing Process 
{¶ 19} HDS next asserts that because the PUCO granted HDS’s rehearing 
application, the agency was required by statute to grant HDS a “live, in-person, 
rehearing.”  HDS further contends that the failure to hold such a hearing violated 
its procedural-due-process rights.  HDS also argues that it was not given proper 
notice of how the PUCO’s rehearing process would unfold.  Before we can get to 
these arguments, we must address Columbia’s and the PUCO’s contention that the 
issues are not properly before this court. 
{¶ 20} R.C. 4903.10 provides that an application for rehearing “shall be in 
writing and shall set forth specifically the ground or grounds on which the applicant 
considers the order to be unreasonable or unlawful.  No party shall in any court 
urge or rely on any ground for reversal, vacation, or modification not so set forth in 
the application.”  We have “long held that setting forth specific grounds for 
rehearing is a jurisdictional prerequisite for our review.”  In re Complaint of 
Cameron Creek Apts. v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 136 Ohio St.3d 333, 2013-
Ohio-3705, 995 N.E.2d 1160, ¶ 23.  Thus, “when an appellant’s grounds for 
rehearing fail to specifically allege in what respect the PUCO’s order was 
unreasonable or unlawful, the requirements of R.C. 4903.10 have not been met.”  
Discount Cellular, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 112 Ohio St.3d 360, 2007-Ohio-53, 
859 N.E.2d 957, ¶ 59.  We strictly enforce R.C. 4903.10’s requirements.  Id. 
{¶ 21} In this case, HDS’s rehearing application alleged three errors.  HDS 
asserted that the PUCO erred in finding that HDS had not met its burden of proof, 
in determining that the door tags constituted adequate notice of the disconnection, 
and in making certain evidentiary findings.  The PUCO issued a first rehearing 
entry granting HDS’s rehearing application for the purpose of further considering 
those alleged errors, but upon review of HDS’s arguments, it denied the application 
in a second rehearing entry. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
{¶ 22} In contrast to HDS’s rehearing application, HDS’s proposition of 
law Nos. Two through Five assert (or depend on the assertion) that the PUCO was 
required to hold a live, in-person hearing during the rehearing phase after 
conditionally granting HDS’s rehearing application.  Because these propositions 
were not presented below for the PUCO’s consideration, Columbia and the PUCO 
argue, we do not have jurisdiction over them. 
{¶ 23} HDS rejoins that because these propositions all fault the PUCO for 
actions that the PUCO took after HDS filed its rehearing application, it could not 
have included these issues in its rehearing application.  But once the PUCO issued 
its second rehearing entry, HDS should have filed a second rehearing application 
that asserted the rehearing-related arguments it now asserts for the first time.  
Because it did not do so, we cannot consider these arguments.  See Lycourt-
Donovan, 152 Ohio St.3d 73, 2017-Ohio-7566, 93 N.E.3d 902, at ¶ 53; Discount 
Cellular, 112 Ohio St.3d 360, 2007-Ohio-53, 859 N.E.2d 957, at ¶ 66. 
Exclusion of Evidence 
{¶ 24} HDS asserts that the PUCO erred in upholding the attorney 
examiner’s exclusion of certain documentary and testimonial evidence.  First, HDS 
objects to the PUCO’s affirmance of the attorney examiner’s exclusion of 
documents that HDS obtained from Columbia in discovery.  The attorney examiner 
excluded the documents on the grounds that HDS had failed to create a foundation 
for the documents with witness testimony.  Because “[t]he common manner of 
identifying a document is through testimony of a witness with knowledge,” St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Ohio Fast Freight, Inc., 8 Ohio App.3d 155, 158, 456 
N.E.2d 551 (10th Dist.1982), citing Evid.R. 901(B)(1), we conclude that the 
PUCO’s affirmance of the attorney examiner’s ruling does not reflect an abuse of 
its “very broad discretion to conduct its hearings,” Greater Cleveland Welfare 
Rights Org. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 2 Ohio St.3d 62, 68, 442 N.E.2d 1288 (1982). 
January Term, 2018 
 
9
{¶ 25} Second, HDS challenges the PUCO’s affirmance of the attorney 
examiner’s rulings on when and whether HDS could call certain witnesses.  The 
attorney examiner denied HDS’s attempt to call Long as upon cross-examination 
at the beginning of HDS’s case-in-chief.  The attorney examiner explained that 
because Long’s testimony was prefiled and because HDS’s questions concerned 
the prefiled testimony, HDS had to hold its questions for Long until after Columbia 
called him during its defense.  This is another hearing-management decision that 
falls squarely within the “very broad discretion” granted to the PUCO in the 
conduct of its hearings.  Id.  Indeed, the rules specifically empower the PUCO to 
“[d]etermine the order in which the parties shall present testimony and the order in 
which witnesses shall be examined,” Ohio Adm.Code 4901-1-27(B)(2). 
{¶ 26} HDS’s other witness-related challenge concerns the PUCO’s 
affirmance of the attorney examiner’s denial of HDS’s request to call Bruce and 
Janet Harris as witnesses on rebuttal.  As with Long, the testimony of the Harrises 
had been prefiled.  In refusing to allow the Harrises to be called again in rebuttal, 
the examiner noted that the case was mainly factual in nature, that the submission 
of irrelevant or cumulative evidence should be avoided, and that HDS had been 
given an opportunity to develop the facts that it believed were relevant to its case.  
As before, the attorney examiner’s ruling here falls within the broad authority 
granted to the PUCO to conduct its hearings and control the manner of witness 
testimony.  Furthermore, HDS has not identified what part of Columbia’s defense 
it wanted the witnesses to rebut or how it has been prejudiced. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 27} We affirm the PUCO’s orders for the reasons set forth above. 
Orders affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, and 
DEGENARO, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
 
Rinehart, Rishel & Cuckler, Ltd., and Grant A. Wolfe, for appellant. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and William L. Wright, Robert A. 
Eubanks, and Thomas G. Lindgren, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 
Brooke E. Wanchek, Stephen B. Seiple, and Joseph M. Clark, for 
intervening appellee. 
_________________