Case Title: Davis v. State

Citation: 344 Md. 331

Docket Number: 38/95

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1996-12-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
TYRONE DAVIS v. STATE OF MARYLAND
NO. 38, SEPTEMBER TERM, 1995
HEADNOTE:
CRIMINAL LAW - ALIBI - EVIDENCE - THE ONLY FOUNDATION THE STATE
MUST ESTABLISH BEFORE BEING ALLOWED TO CROSS-EXAMINE A DEFENSE
ALIBI WITNESS WITH REGARD TO HIS OR HER PRE-TRIAL SILENCE CONSISTS
OF FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES INDICATING A RELATIONSHIP SUFFICIENT TO
MOTIVATE THE WITNESS TO ACT TO EXONERATE THE DEFENDANT.  THE
REASONS THE WITNESS DID NOT SO ACT ARE MATTERS FOR THE JURY IN
ASSESSING THE WITNESS'S CREDIBILITY.
                                           
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
NO. 38
SEPTEMBER TERM, 1995
___________________________________
TYRONE DAVIS
V.
STATE OF MARYLAND
___________________________________
    *Murphy, C. J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker
          
JJ.
___________________________________
OPINION BY BELL, J.
CONCURRING OPINION By Raker, J.
DISSENTING OPINION By Eldridge,
J.    
_________________________________
     FILED: December 26, 1996
*Murphy, 
C.J., 
now 
retired,
participated in the hearing and
conference of this case while an
active member of this Court; after
being recalled pursuant to the
Constitution, Article IV, Section
3A, he also participated in the
decision and the adoption of this
opinion.
The issue which Tyrone Davis, the petitioner, raises before
this Court is the propriety of the trial court's ruling allowing
the prosecution to cross-examine a defense alibi witness regarding
his failure, prior to trial, to inform the police or the
prosecution of exculpatory evidence, i.e., the defendant's alibi,
of which the witness was aware.  More particularly, we address
whether, and, if so, under what circumstances, an alibi witness's
pretrial silence is relevant to the impeachment of that witness's
testimony at trial.  The Circuit Court for Baltimore City permitted
the cross-examination and, in an unreported opinion, the Court of
Special Appeals affirmed.  We granted the writ of certiorari at the
petitioner's request and, for the reasons that follow, we too will
affirm. 
I.
Because, rather than the sufficiency of the evidence, the
issue in this case pertains to an evidentiary ruling at trial, it
is sufficient to recount that the petitioner, who had been
identified by the victim as the person who attempted to rob him,
was apprehended by the police after a short chase.  He was arrested
and charged with the attempted robbery of Earl Spain, a State
correctional officer.   Discovered in his possession was a plastic
toy gun, which the victim identified as the weapon used in the
attempted robbery.
Consistent with his not guilty plea, the petitioner denied
attempting to rob the victim.  To substantiate that defense, he
2
called Mr. Kabacca Bey as an alibi witness.  According to Mr. Bey,
the petitioner was either within his sight or in his presence
during the entire time when the victim claimed to have been
accosted by the petitioner.  More particularly, he testified to
seeing the victim and petitioner engage in conversation on two
separate occasions.  According to Mr. Bey's testimony, after each
occasion, the victim left the area only to return later.  While the
victim was away from the area, Mr. Bey testified that he and the
petitioner talked together.  When the victim returned on the second
occasion, the police were with him and the petitioner and other men
on the corner ran away, as did Mr. Bey.
During the cross-examination of Mr. Bey, the following
occurred:
Q [By the prosecutor]  You came to court one
other day besides this day, is that correct?
A  Right.
Q  What day was that?
A  Tuesday, the 22nd.
Q  Did you ever try to speak to anyone in the
State's attorney's office or the police about
this case?
A  No.
Q  You just wanted to come in and -
A  Oh you mean -
Q  About this case, yes?
A  After, after came here or prior to coming
in?  No, I told his fiancé, say, you know,
3
that she can tell him that he can, you know,
use me as a witness.
Q  But after you came to court, you still
didn't try to talk to the police or State's
attorney's office -  
MR. ROGERS [Defense Counsel]:  Objection.
Q - Did you?
THE COURT:  Overruled.
A  Why?  I don't understand the question.
Q  To say this, this couldn't have happened.
A  I still don't understand the question.  I
don't know why I would have to go to -
Q  Let's just answer the question.  Did you
try to talk to the police when you came to
court on Tuesday?
A  I don't understand the procedure.
Q  Did you talk to the police?
A  No, no.
Q  Did you make any effort to talk to the
police?
A  No.
Q  Did you try to talk to the State's
attorney's office?
A  No.  
The State had previously established that Mr. Bey knew the
petitioner, the circumstances under which they met and the length
of time they had known each other.  In addition, the State brought
out that Mr. Bey was aware of the petitioner's arrest and the
reason for that arrest.  It had shown also when Mr. Bey acquired
4
his knowledge.  Finally, the State's cross-examination revealed
that the sources of Mr. Bey's information were the petitioner's
fiancé and the man who was with the petitioner on the day of the
incident. 
 
II.
 A.
Absent legislative directive, a citizen ordinarily is not
legally obligated to volunteer exculpatory information to law
enforcement authorities.  See, e.g., State v. Silva, 621 A.2d 17,
21 (N.J. 1993) (citing State v. Bryant, 523 A.2d 451, 465 (Conn.
1987)); Commonwealth v. Brown, 416 N.E.2d 218, 224 (Mass. App.
1981) cert. denied, 383 N.E.2d 891 (Mass. 1981); People v. Brown,
405 N.Y.S.2d 691, 695 (N.Y.App.Div. 1978), aff'd, 401 N.E.2d 177
(N.Y. 1979); People v. Dawson, 406 N.E.2d 771, 775 (N.Y. 1980);
United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 175-76 n.24, 98
S.Ct. 364, 373-74 n.24, 54 L.Ed.2d 376, 385 n.24 (1977).
Therefore, "an assumption that it is natural for a defense alibi
witness to tell his or her story to the police is not always
warranted."  People v. Fuqua, 379 N.W.2d 442, 445 (Mich. App. 1985)
See also Bryant, 523 A.2d at 466.  This does not mean, however, as
some courts have held, that an alibi witness's pretrial silence may
never be the basis for the impeachment of his or her trial
testimony. See e.g. United States v. Young, 463 F.2d 934, 938 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) ("[N]o inference can be drawn from the fact that a
5
witness did not go to the police when he learns they have made an
arrest of a defendant for a crime committed at a time for which he
could provide alibi testimony."); Whiteside v. Bordenkircher, 435
F.Supp. 68, 71 (1977).  Indeed, whether, and under what
circumstances, "prior silence is so inconsistent with ... present
statements that impeachment by reference to such silence is
probative," Jenkins v. Anderson, 477 U.S. 231, 239, 100 S.Ct. 2124,
2132, 65 L.Ed.2d 86, 93 (1980), are matters left to each
jurisdiction to determine as a part of its Rules of Evidence.  Id.
 
The majority of the courts that have considered the issue,
while acknowledging that alibi witnesses are not legally bound to
report exculpatory evidence to law enforcement authorities,
conclude that there is "no sound reason flatly [to] prohibit this
type of cross-examination of a defense witness in all criminal
proceedings."  Dawson, 406 N.E.2d at 778.  See also People v.
Ratliff, 189 Cal.App.3d 696, 701 (1987).  In fact, some of those
courts hold that such impeachment is always appropriate.  See e.g.,
Peterson v. State, 305 S.E.2d 447, 449 (Ga.App. 1983) (the
witness's failure to inform the authorities of facts which would
have tended to absolve his roommate of any criminal wrongdoing was
a proper subject for impeachment by the State during cross-
examination.); People v. Outlaw, 394 N.E.2d 541, 555 (Ill. App.
1979) ("[A] prosecutor [is permitted] to inquire of witnesses as to
whether they had told the same story previously in order to
determine whether the testimony was recently fabricated.").
6
Other courts, indeed, the majority, view the question as
whether pretrial silence is relevant to the credibility of the
alibi witness's trial testimony.  These courts recognize that
pretrial silence may be relevant to the credibility of exculpatory
testimony given at trial, but only if "the natural impulse of a
person possessing exculpatory information would be to come forward
at the earliest possible moment in order to forestall the mistaken
prosecution...."  Dawson, 406 N.E.2d at 775.  In that event, they
point out, the witness's pretrial silence "is a form of conduct
that may be analogized to a prior inconsistent statement by the
witness. Id. at 778 ("the witness' prior failure to come forward
[is admissible] insofar as it casts doubt upon the witness' in-
court statements by reason of its apparent inconsistency."); People
v. Van Zile, 363 N.E.2d 429, 434 (Ill.App.3d 1977) (where it would
be reasonable for an alibi witness to disclose the exculpatory
evidence to the authorities, the inference raised by the witness's
silence is inconsistent with that witness's testimony); Brown, 416
N.E.2d at 224 ("[T]he failure of a witness to offer the information
when it would have been natural to do so might well cast doubt on
the veracity of the witness' trial testimony ... [and] is akin to
a witness' prior inconsistent statement.").  See also United States
v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 2136, 45 L.Ed.2d 99, 104
(1975) ("[A]s a preliminary matter ... the court must be persuaded
that the statements are indeed inconsistent.... If the government
fails to establish a threshold inconsistency between silence at the
7
police station and later exculpatory testimony at the trial, proof
of silence lacks any significant probative value and must therefore
be excluded."); U.S. v. Carr, 584 F.2d 612, 618 (2nd Cir.
1978)(citing U.S. v. Rice, 550 F.2d 1364, 1373-74 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied,  434 U.S. 954, 98 S.Ct. 479, 54 L.Ed.2d 312 (1977));
U.S. v. Standard Oil Co., 316 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1963); Silva, 621
A.2d at 21 ("[W]hen a court finds that 'silence may reasonably be
viewed as inconsistent with [the witness's] testimony ...' the
Rules 
of 
Evidence 
allow 
cross-examination 
on 
the 
prior
inconsistency.") (Quoting State v. Marshall, 617 A.2d 302, 305
(N.J. Super. 1992)).  Such statements are relevant and, hence,
admissible to impeach the witness's trial testimony.
B.
Critical to the relevance determination, i.e., whether the
witness's pretrial silence is inconsistent with his or her trial
testimony exculpating the defendant, is that the natural response
of the witness be to come forward, at the earliest possible time,
with any exculpatory information regarding the defendant, he or she
may have and relate it to the police or the prosecution. Whether,
in the given case or situation, such a natural tendency exists is
a matter of proof.  Brown, 416 N.E.2d at 225.  The party seeking to
impeach the witness has the burden of proof in that regard.  Id.
Initially this burden can be met by laying a proper foundation,
i.e., producing evidence from which it could be concluded that the
witness's pretrial silence is inconsistent with the witness's
8
pretrial possession of information exculpatory of the defendant.
The threshold fact to be established, by way of foundation, is that
the natural response of the witness, assuming the witness was in
possession of exculpatory evidence, would have been to disclose
that information to the proper authorities.  From that fact, the
inconsistency between his or her pretrial silence and his or her
trial testimony may be inferred. Silva, 621 A.2d at 22.  If that
burden is not satisfied "proof of silence lacks any significant
probative value and must therefore be excluded."  Hale, 422 U.S. at
176, 95 S.Ct. at 2136, 45 L.Ed.2d at 104.
The trial court is charged with making the determination as to
whether, under the circumstances of a particular case, an alibi
witness's failure to report exculpatory evidence is relevant, see
Grandison v. State, 341 Md. 175, 206, 670 A.2d 398, 413 (1975);
Ratliff, 189 Cal.App.3d at 702; Dawson, 406 N.E.2d at 778, and,
thus, constitutes grounds for impeachment.  State v. Ghere, 513
A.2d 1226, 1234 (Conn. 1986); Brown, 416 N.E.2d at 224-25;  Dawson,
406 N.E.2d at 778.  Consequently, determining whether the required
foundation has been laid is committed to the trial court's
discretion, which will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of
discretion.  Oken v. State, 327 Md. 628, 669, 612 A.2d 258, 278
(1992) (citing Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387, 401-02, 478 A.2d
1143, 1150 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230, 105 S.Ct. 1231, 84
L.Ed. 368 (1985)).  This means that the court must be persuaded
that the witness's pretrial silence with regard to the exculpatory
9
testimony and his or her trial testimony are, indeed, inconsistent.
That determination is a preliminary one that must be made prior to
any inquiry being pursued with regard to the witness's pretrial
silence.  Hale, 422 U.S. at 176, 95 S.Ct. at 2136, 45 L.Ed.2d at
104.  It is preferable that the determination be reflected in an
express finding; however, because judges are presumed to know and,
properly to have applied, the law, Beales v. State, 329 Md. 263,
273, 619 A.2d 105, 110 (1993), where the required foundation is
itself independently admissible, it may be implicit.  
The determination of the ultimate issue, the credibility of
the alibi witness and, in particular, the legitimacy of the alibi
he or she provides, is entrusted to the trier of fact, in this
case, the jury. Dawson, 406 N.E.2d at 778; People v. Thomas, 595
N.Y.S.2d 72, 73 (N.Y.App.Div. 1993).   Of course, the jury is not
bound to accept the trial court's preliminary determination.  That
preliminary determination merely explains why, i.e., because it is
relevant, the State is permitted to cross-examine the alibi witness
regarding his or her pretrial silence.  The significance of the
witness's pretrial silence is another matter which must be
determined by the jury.  State v. Brown, 395 P.2d 727, 729 (Utah
1964)("[W]hen a person claims to have ... exculpatory information
and remains silent when it would be natural to expect that persons
of normal sensibilities and concern for others would speak, that
fact may be shown as having a bearing on the credibility of the
witness and upon the existence or non-existence of the facts the
10
     Maryland Rule § 4-325© provides in pertinent part:
1
 
© How Given.---  The court may, and at the request of any
party shall, instruct the jury as to the applicable law
and the extent to which the instructions are binding.
The court may give its instructions orally or, with the
consent of the parties, in writing instead of orally.
The court need not grant a requested instruction if the
matter is fairly covered by the instructions actually
given.
      But see People v. Allen, 425 N.Y.S.2d 144, 148 (1980) ("This
2
court has often held that a prosecutor may not attempt to discredit
an alibi witness upon the ground that the witness did not inform
witness later comes forward to assert.").  Thus, the trial court,
on request, see Maryland Rule 4-325(c),  must instruct the jury
1
that the alibi witness is not obligated, by law, to report
exculpatory evidence he or she may possess to law enforcement
authorities and that the jury must determine, based upon the
attendant facts and circumstances presented by both the prosecution
and the defense, whether the alibi witness's testimony is credible.
Dawson, 406 N.E.2d at 778; Thomas, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 73.
The foundation prescribed by the cases requiring a preliminary
determination of relevance consists of evidence that the witness:
(1) had a relationship with the defendant sufficient to motivate
the witness to act to exonerate the defendant; (2) was aware of the
nature of the charges pending against the defendant; (3) had
knowledge that he or she was in possession of exculpatory
information; and (4) had knowledge of the procedural means by which
to make such information available to law enforcement authorities.
Dawson, 406 N.E.2d at 777 n.4.   See also People v. Kelly, 618
2
11
law enforcement authorities of his or her knowledge.") (citation
omitted).
N.Y.S.2d 821, 822 (1994); Silva, 621 A.2d at 20; Ratliff, 189 Cal.
App.3d at 696; Bryant, 523 A.2d at 466;  People v. Watson, 418
N.E.2d 1015, 1021 (Ill. App. 1981); People v. McMath, 244 N.E.2d
330, 336 (Ill.App. 1968), aff'd 256 N.E.2d 835 (Ill. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 846, 91 S.Ct. 92, 27 L.Ed.2d 843 (1970); Fuqua,
379 N.W.2d at 445.  In Brown, 416 N.E.2d at 224, the court added to
the list of foundational requirements, whether the witness
maintained silence at the request of the defendant, the defendant's
counsel or both.  See, to the same effect, Commonwealth v. Egerton,
487 N.E.2d 481, 487 (Mass. 1986).
 C.
Of the foundational requirements the courts have prescribed,
only one of them, the nature of the relationship between the
witness and the defendant, directly informs the inquiry whether the
natural response of a witness in possession of exculpatory
information would be to come forward and disclose that information
to the police or the prosecution.  If they do so at all, the others
inform that inquiry only indirectly.  What they do directly is
explain why, in a particular case, the witness did, or could, not
disclose the exculpatory evidence pretrial.  Assuming possession of
the requisite information, a close friend, relative, or the like,
of the defendant could be expected to act to exonerate the
defendant and, so, could be expected to inform the police or the
12
prosecution immediately of any exculpatory evidence he or she
possessed.  Silva, 621 A.2d at 22.  It is the relationship of the
alibi witness to the defendant that is determinative of that
witness's natural tendency so to respond.  Indeed, the cases
espousing the majority view recognize that the natural tendency of
an alibi witness to report exculpatory information to law
enforcement authorities can be inferred from the nature of the
relationship between the witness and the defendant.  Id. at 21
("[W]hen an alibi witness has a close relationship with the
accused, as with the mother/son relationship ... or the
brother/sister relationship ... a jury can infer that the alibi
witness' natural conduct would be to report the alibi to the
authorities."); Ghere, 513 A.2d at 1235 ("[A] witness in many
instances naturally may be expected to convey such information,
especially if the witness is friendly with the accused....); Brown,
416 N.E.2d at 224 ("[T]here are many situations, however, where the
natural response of a person in possession of exculpatory
information would be to come forward in order to avoid a mistaken
prosecution of a relative or a friend."); Dawson, 406 N.E.2d at 777
("[T]he inferences which may be drawn from [a defendant's] silence
may be highly prejudicial.  The same cannot always be said for an
ordinary witness who may have no personal stake in remaining silent
and who, indeed, may very well have a personal interest in speaking
up in order to aid the defendant.  It is this interest in speaking
up which, in a given case, may render the witness' failure to do so
13
of probative worth when used to impeach his or her testimony.").
The nature of the relationship, including its closeness, may also
be dependent on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
An alibi witness's knowledge of the defendant's predicament,
of the procedure for reporting exculpatory information to the
proper authorities, or any other reasons that a witness may be
unable to disclose the exculpatory evidence pretrial is not
reflective of a natural tendency, on the part of that witness, to
act to exonerate the defendant; it simply explains his or her
inability to act in compliance with that tendency.  The
relationship between the alibi witness and the defendant, on the
other hand, has an independent relevance.  Not only does it
directly inform the inquiry whether the witness's natural response
would be to report the alibi to the authorities, but it is also
relevant to whether that witness is biased in favor of the
defendant.  Consequently, whether this factor supports the court's
allowance of the cross-examination is reviewable, even when the
court has made no explicit finding with respect to it.
Requiring a foundation broader than the relationship between
the witness and the defendant, to include knowledge of the
defendant's predicament and the means by which to report such
information, as well as reasons why, in this particular case, the
witness did not disclose the alibi, presents quite a different
situation.  Under that approach, the relevance of the witness's
pretrial silence depends upon the trial court's preliminary factual
14
finding as to each of the foundational elements.  This is so
because the majority view proceeds on the premise that, simply
because, under certain circumstances, pretrial silence may be
inconsistent with a witness's possession of exculpatory evidence,
it does not follow that it always will be. The question of pretrial
relevance is a matter to be determined on a case-by-case basis.  As
pointed out in Brown, 
There may be ... situations ... where it would
not be natural for the witness to offer
exculpatory 
evidence 
to 
law 
enforcement
officials.  In these circumstances, the
witness's failure to speak is perfectly
consistent with his trial testimony.  Some
individuals, for example, may believe that the
disclosure of their information to the police
would be futile.  Indeed, the prosecutor
conceded 
in 
the 
present 
case 
that 
the
disclosure of the witness's information would
not have led to the defendant's release.  In
other situations, the witness may not be aware
of the charges against the defendant with
sufficient detail to know that he possesses
important exculpatory information.  Finally,
some individuals may have been implicitly told
by the defendant's lawyer not to discuss the
case. 
416 N.E.2d at 224. 
The relevance of the witness's pretrial silence is a function
of the foundation required to be laid and each component of that
foundation involves a factual determination.  As noted, only the
relationship between the defendant and the alibi witness  has
independent relevance and, thus, is independently admissible
without regard to any tendency it may have to establish the natural
impulse of the alibi witness to have disclosed the exculpatory
15
evidence to the authorities.  The other "foundational" requirements
initially have relevance only with regard to whether the witness's
pretrial silence constitutes an inconsistency with the witness's
trial testimony and, thus, are only conditionally admissible.  They
are not relevant to any issue before the court until, and unless,
the trial court decides that the witness's pretrial silence is
inconsistent with his in-court testimony and permits the State to
cross-examine the witness as to that silence.   Once that
determination is made, the witness's credibility on that point is
at issue.  Knowledge of whether, when, how and to whom exculpatory
evidence, possessed by the witness was reported bears on that
issue, as well as on the witness's general credibility, the
ultimate determination of both of which is entrusted to the trier
of fact.  
Thus, in a jury trial, requiring the State to lay a foundation
consisting of the witness's relationship to the defendant, the
nature and extent of that witness's knowledge, including his or her
familiarity with the means by which to report exculpatory
information to the authorities, where the defendant lodges an
objection, a hearing outside the hearing of the jury will be
required.  The hearing will permit the trial court to make the
required findings of fact on each of the "foundational"
requirements, before the witness's pretrial silence can be proven.
Thereafter, evidence concerning each of those factors is
independently 
admissible. 
 
To 
determine 
what 
exculpatory
16
information the witness has, when he or she acquired it, whether he
or she is familiar with the means by which to report it, and
whether non-disclosure was the result of a request by the defendant
or counsel, in the absence of direct evidence, necessarily will
require an assessment of the credibility of the witness. See
Dawson, 406 N.E.2d at 777 ("[T]he information elicited during this
type of questioning might well aid the trier of fact in its effort
to determine whether the testimony of a defense witness is an
accurate reflection of the truth or is, instead, a `recent
fabrication.'").  That ordinarily is a matter for the jury to
decide. But see Ebb v. State, 341 Md. 578, 590, 671 A.2d 974, ___
(1996); Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95, 98-99, 613 A.2d 379, 380-81
(1992).
III.
We agree with those cases that hold that an alibi witness's
pretrial silence may be relevant to that witness's credibility.
Moreover, we believe that the relevance of that witness's pretrial
silence must be established as a matter of foundation prior to the
proponent of the impeachment evidence being allowed to inquire into
it.  It is enough of a foundation, however, we believe, if the
proponent of the impeachment evidence establishes a relationship
between the witness and the defendant, or circumstances, such as to
permit the trial court to conclude that it would have been a
natural impulse on the part of the witness to have come forward
with the exculpatory evidence.  The latter requirement recognizes
17
that whether it would be natural for a witness with a particular
relationship to the defendant to come forward may also depend upon
the circumstances existing at the time.  The extent of the
witness's knowledge, the timing of its acquisition, etc. are
matters, we hold, of defense or explanation, offerable by the
defense, for the purpose of allowing the trier of fact, fully and
accurately to evaluate the witness's testimony.  Not only does such
evidence not directly relate to the natural impulse of the witness
to come forward with exculpatory evidence, but it is not evidence
readily available to the prosecution.  Since it is more readily
available to the defense, it is more appropriately offered by the
defense. 
We hold that, before the prosecution may cross examine an
alibi witness regarding his or her pretrial silence, it must lay a
foundation.  The foundation consists of establishing the existence
of a relationship between the witness and the defendant, or
circumstances, such that it would be the natural response of the
witness to act to exonerate the defendant, a relationship and/or
circumstances of such a nature that, if the witness possessed
evidence exculpating the defendant, he or she would disclose it
immediately to law enforcement authorities.  This is sufficient to
give rise to an apparent inconsistency between the witness'
pretrial silence and his or her testimony at trial. Hale, 422 U.S.
at 176, 95 S.Ct. at 2136, 45 L.Ed.2d at 104.  
In addition to the fact of pretrial disclosure, those factors
18
which, under the majority view, are characterized as foundational
prerequisites, are the "attendant facts and circumstances", on the
basis of which the credibility of the alibi witness's testimony is
to be evaluated.   Whether, and when, a witness acquired knowledge
making it possible for that witness to provide law enforcement
authorities with exculpatory evidence, and his or her awareness of
the procedure or means of doing so, do not tend to prove a natural
tendency to report exculpatory information and, thus, do not give
rise to an impeachable inconsistency; only the relationship between
the witness and the defendant gives rise to such an inference.
Instead, those matters tend to explain why the witness did not, in
the particular case at issue, disclose the exculpatory information.
Indeed, that is their only relevance.  Consequently, the proponent
of the alibi evidence is best situated to present the reasons why,
although it would have been natural to do so, the alibi witness
failed to disclose to the authorities information he or she
possessed which tended to exculpate the defendant.  Such evidence
is more logically and appropriately presented on redirect
examination, to rehabilitate the alibi witness.  To place that
burden on the State would be both onerous and illogical.
As we see it, the State may inquire into the alibi witness's
pretrial silence once it has established that the relationship
between the witness and the defendant is such that the witness
would have a natural tendency to disclose the exculpatory evidence
he or she possessed to the proper authorities.  Based on that
19
inquiry, the jury could infer that the witness's pretrial silence
is inconsistent with his or her trial testimony.  The defense would
then be free to attempt to negate the inconsistency by explaining
his or her silence.  As the court in  State v. Archer, 255 P.2d
396, 400 (N.M. 1927) opined:
It is well understood that, if the witness,
when he has an opportunity to speak, and where
it would be natural to speak ... fails to make
an important disclosure which he afterwards
makes on the stand, it is a circumstance
which, although susceptible of explanation, if
unexplained, tends to impair his credibility,
and it is error to refuse cross-examination of
the witness to develop such facts.
Thus, we review the judgment of the circuit court to determine
whether the record reflects a relationship between Mr. Bey and the
petitioner that would support a conclusion that it would have been
natural for Mr. Bey to have contacted the police and, therefore,
that his failure to do so constitutes a prior inconsistent
statement.  In this case, the trial court's finding is implicit. As
previously noted, it will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse
of discretion.  Oken, 327 Md. at 669, 612 A.2d at 278 (citation
omitted).
IV.
The petitioner contends, that "[t]he record does not reflect
any reason why Mr. Bey would naturally feel obligated to testify on
Petitioner's behalf."  He directs our attention to several cases in
which the alibi witnesses were either close friends or relatives of
the defendant.  See Ratliff, 189 Cal.App.3d at 700 (defendant's
20
sister and close family friends); Egerton, 487 N.E.2d at 486
(defendant's mother and a close friend); Young, 463 F.2d at 937
(someone with whom the defendant had worked and socialized).
There is no prescribed or bright line by which the closeness
of the relationship between a defendant and his or her alibi
witness must be assessed.  While the cases cited by the petitioner
all involved alibi witnesses who were close friends or relatives of
the defendant, they do not exclude other, less intimate
relationships.  All that is required is that the relationship be
such that it would motivate the witness to come forward in an
effort to exculpate the defendant.  People v. Figueroa, 436
N.Y.S.2d 1, 2-3 (N.Y.App.Div. 1981) (court excluded proof of
silence, reasoning that because the alibi witness was a neighbor,
with whom the defendant had had little contact, "there was [no]
connection between the witness and defendant as to provide a basis
for an argument of existence of a natural impulse to come
forward").
Mr. Bey testified, on cross-examination, regarding the nature
of his relationship with the petitioner, as follows:
I met him a few times within a week.  First
time was like, like the Friday before this
incident 
supposed 
[sic] 
to 
have 
taken
place....  I've seen him but we never-- I've
seen him, you know, from a distance....  Well
actually he spoke to me because he stopped the
cars for me.  I was trying to get across the
street and I had my crutches and the cars just
didn't seem like they would stop, the ones
that was [sic] coming around the corner and he
say [sic], man, you need some help, and he
21
came out and he stopped the cars for me....
Well, we actually--  Well, we met that time
when he was stopping the cars but we actually
met when we was [sic] talking about that time
and different things and he offered to buy me
a beer.
He also acknowledged telling the petitioner's fiancé, when speaking
to her regarding the petitioner's arrest:
If there was anything that I could do, you
know, to help in the matter, then I was
willing to do that because he did it for me.
Moreover, the petitioner's fiancé, and Steve, the petitioner's
companion on the day of his arrest, divulged to Mr. Bey the details
of the petitioner's arrest.  Considered together, the court's
implicit finding that it would have been natural for Mr. Bey to
disclose, to the authorities, information he possessed, which could
exonerate the petitioner, is supported by the record.
The facts of the case sub judice are analogous to those
considered in McMath, supra, 244 N.E.2d 330.  The alibi witness in
that case was a gas station attendant.  He was acquainted with the
defendant as a result of the defendant frequently being at the gas
station.  On the night of the robbery with which the defendant was
charged, the victim went to the gas station and had the defendant's
alibi witness place a call to the police, reporting the crime.
Although the witness spoke to the police and witnessed the
defendant being arrested, he did not tell the police that the
defendant had been at the gas station at the time that the victim
was being robbed.  The trial court permitted the gas station
22
     During cross-examination of Mr. Bey, the State did inquire of
3
Mr. Bey and did explore what knowledge he had with regard to the
nature and seriousness of the charges against the petitioner:
Q: [By the Prosecution]  When did you find out
that the defendant had been arrested?
A:  A few days later.  Few days.
Q:  Who told you?
A:  The guy, I saw the guy that he was with.
attendant to be cross-examined regarding his pretrial silence.  The
Illinois intermediate appellate court affirmed, opining,
Sutton knew that there had been a robbery and
had even placed the call to the police as soon
as he had learned of it.  When the police
arrived, he had discussed the robbery with
them and knew that they were investigating
it....  It was a fair argument on behalf of
the State that a man who knew the defendant
well ... would have mentioned something to the
police when given the opportunity to speak.
244 N.E.2d at 336.
We reach the same conclusion on the facts before us.  Given
Mr. Bey's testimony describing his relationship to the defendant,
and the attendant circumstances, we conclude that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in permitting him to be cross-examined
as to his pretrial silence.
The petitioner also contends that the State failed to prove,
as it was required to do as a foundational prerequisite to cross-
examining Mr. Bey concerning his pretrial silence, that Mr. Bey was
aware of the nature and seriousness of the charges against the
petitioner  or that he was aware of the procedural means to
3
23
Q:  Steve?
A:  Yes ... 
Q:  When Steve told you that the defendant was
arrested, did you call the police?
A:  No, I tried to get in touch with, with,
his fiancé.
Q:  And did she tell you everything that had
happened -
A.  Objection.
Q:  - with respect to this case?
Defense Counsel:  Objection
COURT:  Overruled.
A:  No, she just told me he was locked up and
told me what he was locked up for.
From this colloquy, the jury reasonably could have found that Mr.
Bey was aware, not only of the petitioner's arrest arising out of
the subject incident, but had knowledge of the reasons for that
arrest.
To be sure, the witness testified that he did not understand
the procedure for disclosure of exculpatory evidence to the police.
It is also true that there is no other evidence in the record
indicating the contrary.  Nevertheless, the jury was not obliged to
believe Mr. Bey.  It need not have accepted that explanation and
thus credited the petitioner's alibi.   
     Even if the witness's knowledge of the charges and the
procedure for disclosing exculpatory evidence were foundational,
the petitioner did not object on that basis or, for that matter, to
the State's cross-examination along those lines.  Thus, he waived
any ground on the basis of which that evidence could have been
disclose exculpatory information to the appropriate law enforcement
authorities.  Inasmuch as we do not view these matters as
foundational,  but rather as explanatory of why the witness did not
4
1
excluded.  See Maryland Rule 4-323(a).
     The petitioner neither asked for nor did the trial judge give,
on its own motion, an instruction on the significance of the alibi
witness's pre-trial silence. See Maryland Rule 4-325(e), which
provides:
(e) Objection. --- No party may assign as error the
giving or failure to give an instruction unless the party
objects on the record promptly after the court instructs
the jury, stating distinctly the matter to which the
party objects and the grounds of the objection.  Upon
request of any party, the court shall receive objections
out of the hearing of the jury.  An appellate court, on
its own initiative or on the suggestion of a party, may
however, take cognizance of any plain error in the
instructions, material to the rights of the defendant,
despite a failure to object. 
disclose the exculpatory information pretrial, and so, are matters
addressed to the jury to assist it in evaluating the alibi
witness's credibility, there was no error.  The trial court simply
was not required to resolve those issues, whether disputed or not.
And since no exceptions were taken to the jury instructions,  we
5
presume that the jury was adequately instructed and complied with
the instructions it was given.  
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE PETITIONER.
                                   
2
Concurring Opinion follows next page:
Concurring Opinion by Raker, J.:
I concur in the result affirming the conviction because
I believe that although the trial court erred in permitting the
cross-examination of the alibi witness, the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Rubin v. State, 325 Md. 552, 578-
80, 602 A.2d 677, 689-70 (1992); Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 646-
61, 350 A. 2d 665, 670-79 (1976).  I do not believe there was any
reasonable possibility that evidence of Mr. Bey's failure to come
forward to the police contributed to the jury's decision to find
Petitioner guilty.  We must credit jurors with a modicum of common
sense.  It is unlikely that jurors would conclude that Mr. Bey
lacked credibility simply because he did not go to the police or
the State's Attorney with exculpatory evidence.  See Dissenting op.
at 2.  This testimony had little, if any, bearing on the witness's
credibility.  The witness provided a plausible explanation for his
failure to come forward to the authorities.  The eyewitness, Mr.
Spain, testified to his extensive opportunity to observe Petitioner
at the time of the crime, and he identified Petitioner on the
street immediately prior to and at the time of the arrest.  The
police officer testified to Petitioner's flight.  There was no
3
reasonable possibility that this evidence contributed to the guilty
verdict.
    Whether the failure of an alibi witness to go to the
authorities with exculpatory evidence has any probative value has
been the subject of many appellate opinions.  See Annot.,
Impeachment of Defense Witness in Criminal Case by Showing Witness'
Prior Silence or Failure or Refusal to Testify, 20 A.L.R.4th 245
(1983).  I agree with the observation of the Court of Special
Appeals that there are some people who would shout from the
rooftops in an effort to exculpate a friend or a relative whom they
believe has been wrongfully accused.  Williams v. State, 99 Md.
App. 711, 719, 639 A.2d 180, 184 (1994).  As Judge Eldridge notes,
however, some would not do so.  Dissenting op. at 2.  Other
appellate courts have also recognized that many citizens might not
go to the authorities out of mistrust or fear, or because they feel
their efforts would be futile, or because they were instructed not
to come forward by the defendant's attorney.  See, e.g., People v.
Dawson, 50 N.Y.2d 311, 406 N.E.2d 771, 777-78 (1980).  This
conflict does not mean, however, that an alibi witness's pre-trial
silence may never be the basis for impeachment.  See State v.
Silva, 131 N.J. 438, 621 A.2d 17, 22 (1993) (agreeing with Dawson
court that although witness's silence may have low probative value,
no sound reason exists to flatly prohibit this type of cross-
examination).  The difficulty is in fashioning an appropriate test.
4
 The record reflects the following facts.  When asked whether
he tried to talk to the police when he came to court, Mr. Bey
responded:  "I don't understand the procedure."  This is not a case
of pre-trial silence.  Mr. Bey testified that he told Petitioner's
fiancee that "she can tell him that he can, you know, use me as a
witness."
I cannot subscribe to the evidentiary test crafted by the
majority, nor can I find that the test is satisfied by the record
in this case.  Indeed, under any test, the evidence was not
relevant.  The alibi witness hardly knew Petitioner.  In fact, when
asked how long he had known Petitioner, Mr. Bey testified:
Well, actually I don't really know him.  I
seen him a few times.  Within a week I seen
him about three or four times.  First time is
when he helped me across the street and every
other time I seen him in passing, so I don't
know him well.    
I agree with Judge Eldridge when he observes that this is hardly
the type of relationship warranting the finding of a "natural
impulse."  Dissenting op. at 3-4.  Applying the Dawson test, or the
majority's test, the cross-examination should not have been
permitted.  In addition to the lack of a sufficient relationship
between the witness and Petitioner, the witness lacked the
knowledge of the "reporting" procedure.  Moreover, the witness
disclosed the information to Petitioner's fiancee, with an offer to
testify at trial.6
I do not disagree that the nature of the relationship between
a defendant and an alibi witness is a key factor in determining
whether the witness would have been motivated to contact the
1
authorities to disclose exculpatory evidence.  I believe, however,
that the additional foundational requirements set forth by the
Court of Appeals of New York in People v. Dawson, 50 N.Y.2d 311,
406 N.E. 2d 771, 777 n.4, 778-79 (1980), constitute a better test
than that adopted by the majority today.  See also State v. Bryant,
202 Conn. 676, 523 A.2d 451, 466 (1987); Commonwealth v. Egerton,
396 Mass. 499, 487 N.E.2d 481, 486-88 (1986); State v. Silva, 131
N.J. 438, 621 A.2d 17, 22 (1993).  In Dawson, the Court of Appeals
observed:
In most cases, the District Attorney may lay a
"proper foundation" for this type of cross-
examination by first demonstrating that the
witness was aware of the nature of the charges
pending against the defendant, had reason to
recognize 
that 
he 
possessed 
exculpatory
information, had a reasonable motive for
acting 
to 
exonerate 
the 
defendant 
and,
finally, was familiar with the means to make
such information available to law enforcement
authorities.
Dawson, 406 N.E. 2d at 777 n.4.  The Dawson test takes into account
the notion that there may be explanations about why a witness would
not go to the police with exculpatory evidence.  The test created
by the majority is far too limited.  I believe the Dawson test will
better assist the trier of fact in determining whether the
testimony of the alibi witness "is an accurate reflection of the
truth or is, instead, a `recent fabrication.'"  Id. at 777.
2
Dissenting Opinion follows next page:
Eldridge, J., dissenting:
Today, this Court holds for the first time that, in a
criminal case, an alibi witness's earlier failure to search out law
enforcement authorities and relay information that could exonerate
a defendant may be used for impeachment purposes.  The majority
reasons that the "natural impulse" of an alibi witness would be to
tell the police or state's attorney office prior to testifying that
he or she has information exonerating the defendant, and failure to
do so reflects negatively on the witness's credibility.  I
disagree.  
In my view, in large areas of society today, the average
citizen's natural impulse may well be to have as little to do with
the law enforcement authorities as possible.  Consequently, in a
criminal case, an alibi witness's credibility ordinarily should not
be impugned solely because the witness did not previously contact
the police or prosecutor.  Furthermore, the majority's holding
today improperly burdens the defendant by placing the responsi-
bility on the defense to explain a witness's prior failure to
contact law enforcement authorities.
3
I fully agree with the principle of evidence law that
there are circumstances whereby prior silence may amount to an
inconsistent statement and thus may be used to impeach the
testimony of the witness. I seriously doubt, however, that such
circumstances usually include the earlier failure of an alibi
witness, in a criminal prosecution, to have contacted law
enforcement authorities and give information about the defendant.
In the majority of criminal cases, this failure is sufficiently
ambiguous that it lacks significant probative value regarding the
credibility of an alibi witness.  
In these times, with the vast majority of serious
criminal cases involving street crimes, crimes of violence, and
drug-related crimes, I question the proposition that there is a
natural tendency, by most of the average defendant's acquaintances,
to go forward to the police or the prosector with exculpatory
information.  Whether this is because many people are suspicious of
government, or is due to a perceived governmental failure to stem
the amount of violent and drug-related crime, or is due to abusive
or arrogant conduct by a minority of law enforcement officers, or
results from a combination of these or other factors, I do not
know.  Nonetheless, many persons want to have as little to do with
the police as possible.  That this may be unfortunate does not make
it any less of a fact.
 
The majority adopts the assumption expressed in the
4
  1. Although the defendant also called his father and aunt as
alibi witnesses, the Court of Appeals of New York held that the
defendant did not preserve the issue of whether these witnesses'
prior silence could be used to impeach their trial testimony.  
leading case of People v. Dawson, 50 N.Y.2d 311, 318, 406 N.E.2d
771, 775 (1980), where the Court of Appeals of New York stated that
"there exists a wide variety of situations in which the natural
impulse of a person possessing exculpatory information would be to
come forward at the earliest moment in order to forestall the
mistaken prosecution of a friend or loved one."  In Dawson, the
impeached alibi witness was the defendant's mother.   The New York
1
Court of Appeals, holding that the impeachment of the mother based
on her silence prior to trial was appropriate, implicitly
recognized that the mother/child relationship is a unique one,
involving perhaps the most protective and strongest bond between
individuals.  Thus, the Court assumed that, as a result of this
bond, a mother would feel compelled to tell law enforcement
authorities of information that would exonerate her son.  
The theory applied in the Dawson case seems to
contemplate a perfect society where, as to every mother/child
relationship, a protective impulse exists that would cause a mother
to give police and prosecutors information to exonerate her child
prior to trial.  We do not live in a perfect society, however, as
indicated by daily news stories that document the breakdown in
family 
relationships, 
including 
mother/child 
relationships.
5
  2.The majority's own recitation of the facts of the instant case
counters its assumption that most alibi witnesses would go to the
police at some point to convey their exculpatory information.  As
the majority states (slip opinion at 2), "when the victim returned
on the second occasion [to the area where the crime occurred], the
police were with him and the petitioner and other men on the corner
ran away, as did Mr. Bey.  If Mr. Bey ran from the police at the
time of the incident between the victim and the defendant, why
should it be assumed that he would ever feel compelled to go to the
Moreover, even with respect to strong mother/child relationships,
I am dubious about drawing the inference that exculpatory
information, if true, would almost always be relayed to the police
or to the state's attorney's office.   
Moreover, even assuming that we should follow the
decision in the Dawson case, I would not extend the principle of
that case to relationships not as close as the relationship between
mother/child.  The instant case illustrates the fallacy of
extending the principle announced in Dawson, under the guise that
a "natural impulse" exists, to include relationships that are not
among the closest of familial or personal relationships.
The defendant's alibi witness, Mr. Bey, seems to have
been, at best, an acquaintance or casual friend of the defendant;
there is no indication that he was a relative of the defendant or
an extremely close friend.  Indeed, from the majority's opinion all
that can be discerned about the relationship between Mr. Bey and
the defendant is that they knew one another for a certain length of
time.  This is hardly the type of relationship warranting the
finding of a "natural impulse."   Cf. People v. Ratliff, 189 Cal.
2
6
police?
App. 3d 696, 234 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1987) (defendant's sister and
friend); State v. Bryant, 202 Conn. 676, 523 A.2d 451 (1987)
(defendant's mother, step-father, and friend); State v. Miller, 259
Kan. 478, 912 P.2d 722 (1996) (girlfriend and relatives of
defendant as alibi witnesses); Com. v. Brown, 11 Mass. App. Ct.
288, 416 N.E.2d 218 (1981) (defendant's step-sister and friend);
People v. McClow, 40 Mich. App. 185, 198 N.W.2d 707 (1972)
(defendant's brother); State v. Silva, 131 N.J. 438, 621 A.2d 17
(1993) (defendant's sister); State v. Plowden, 126 N.J. Super. 228,
313 A.2d 802 (1974) (defendant's sister); State v. Howard, 56 Ohio
St. 2d 328, 383 N.E.2d 912 (1978) (defendant's sister); Wright v.
State, 531 P.2d 696 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) (defendant's wife);
Glover v. State, 531 P.2d 689 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) (defendant's
wife and aunt); Commonwealth v. Walloe, 472 Pa. 473, 372 A.2d 788
(1977) (defendant's sisters).  
The majority holds that this nebulous relationship
between the defendant and Mr. Bey is all that the prosecution must
prove in establishing the foundation for asking why Mr. Bey did not
go to the police or to the state's attorney office with his
information.
This is so despite the majority's initial assertion  (slip opinion
at 10) that, in addition to showing that the witness has a
7
relationship with the defendant, a proper foundation requires
evidence that the witness knew that the defendant has been charged
with the crime, knew that the information he or she possesses is
exculpatory, and knew the procedures for submitting information to
the authorities.  Although the majority refers to all four factors
as "foundational requirements," it ultimately concludes (slip
opinion at 15-16, emphasis added):
"Moreover, we believe that the relevance of
that pretrial witness's silence must be estab-
lished as a matter of foundation prior to the
proponent of the impeachment evidence being
allowed to inquire into it.  It is enough of a
foundation, however, we believe, if the pro-
ponent of the impeachment evidence establishes
a relationship between the witness and the
defendant, or circumstances, such as to permit
the trial court to conclude that it would have
been a natural impulse on the part of the
witness to have come forward with the excul-
patory evidence.  The extent of the witness's
knowledge, the timing of its acquisition, etc.
are matters, we hold, of defense or explana-
tion, offerable by the defense . . . ."
Thus, the majority ultimately places the burden on the defense for
explaining how any relationship between the alibi witnesses and the
defendant does not warrant an inference of non-credibility from
inaction.  Once the prosecutor has established that the alibi
witness knows the defendant, even tangentially, the prosecution is
then free to impeach the witness because the witness did not
initially search out the police or the state's attorney.  The
majority suggests that the witness may be rehabilitated by redirect
8
examination, such as having the witness explain that he or she did
not know how to contact the police or the state's attorney office.
The majority creates an unfair presumption in favor of the state by
requiring only that the prosecutor show that there is a relation-
ship between the defendant and the witness, and, as illustrated
today, only that this relationship is that of a mere acquaintance.
In contrast, other jurisdictions following the "natural
impulse" theory invoked by the majority do require that the
foundational criteria be met before proceeding with the question of
whether the alibi witness conveyed his or her information to law
enforcement authorities prior to testifying.  See People v. Dawson,
supra, 50 N.Y.2d at 321 n.4, 406 N.E.2d at 777 n.4 (the prosecution
must establish that "witness was aware of the . . . charges . . .,
recognize[d] that he possessed exculpatory information, had a
reasonable motive for acting to exonerate the defendant and . . was
familiar with the means to make such information available to law
enforcement authorities").  See also, e.g., People v. Ratliff,
supra 189 Cal. App. 3d at 701, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 504-505; State v.
Bryant, supra, 202 Conn. at 705, 523 A.2d at 466; State v. Silva,
supra,  131 N.J. at 447-448, 621 A.2d at 22.
The testimony from the trial transcript cited by the
majority indicates that not only was the alibi witness in the
present case lacking knowledge as to the procedural means to inform
the authorities of his information but was prevented from explain-
9
ing that lack of knowledge. The colloquy between the state's
attorney and Mr. Bey, cited by the majority, suggests that Mr. Bey
was unaware of the procedure necessary to go to the police.  More
importantly, the very foundation that is required to be established
in most jurisdictions, that the witness knew of the procedure by
which to inform law enforcement authorities, was undermined when
the prosecution prevented Mr. Bey from explaining his lack of
awareness and proceeded to allow the witness only to answer with a
yes/no response. 
In my view, the trial court erred by permitting the
prosecutor to impeach the alibi witness by the testimony that the
witness did not "try to talk to the police or the state's
attorney's office."  Under the circumstances, this had no bearing
on the witness's credibility.