Case Title: FOSS v LEIFER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-06-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13193 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1976 C H E R Y L LEIFER FOSS , Appellant and P e t i t i o n e r , -vs - JAMES T. LEIFER, Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable R. J. Nelson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Jardine, Stephenson, Blewett and Weaver, Great F a l l s , Montana K. Dale Schwanke argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent : Swanberg, Koby, Swanberg and Matteucci, Great F a l l s , Montana B r e t t C. Asselstine argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted: April 19, 1976 Decided : &Fib! 1 4 'i976. Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This appeal concerns a petition seeking to modify child custody provisions contained in a decree of divorce granted to appellant on August 10, 1972. The judgment appealed from is that of the district court, Jefferson County, entered December 17, 1975. Appellant Cheryl Leifer Foss and respondent James T. Leifer were married in the city of Butte, Montana, in November 1968. Their son Christopher Lance Leifer was born the following year. The divorce decree provided,inter alia,that appellant should have the care, custody and control of the child, subject to the right of reasonable visitation by respondent. The court ordered respondent to pay child support in the amount of $100 per month. Respondent has never defaulted-in paying the child support payments . Respondent made no attempt to contest the provisions of the divorce decree at the time. Shortly after the divorce respondent moved to the state of Michigan and later to Pullman, Washington, where he spent approximately eighteen months com- pleting requirements necessary to obtain a Master's degree. Following his graduation respondent became employed in Yakima, Washington. At the time of the hearing on the petition for modification, respondent was contemplating the prospect of a transfer on his employer's behalf to Hermiston, Oregon. It is our understanding that he has now made that move. Following her divorce, appellant was employed at several local financial institutions in the city of Butte. She was transferred by her employer to Great Falls in May 1974. She gave birth to a second child in September 1973, and at the time this matter was heard, the child was living with appellant and her son Lance. In early January 1975, appellant began to date Richard Foss. He moved i n t o a p p e l l a n t ' s home several weeks l a t e r . They were subsequently married. Several months a f t e r the marriage, appellant was able t o terminate her employment t o devote more time t o the care of her two children. Respondent commenced the action t o p e t i t i o n f o r modification of the divorce decree shortly a f t e r receiving a l e t t e r from h i s ex-wife informing him t h a t she and Foss had begun l i v i n g together. I n h i s p e t i t i o n respondent alleged t h a t circumstances bearing a d i r e c t relationship t o the best i n t e r e s t s of h i s c h i l d had materially changed since the date of the divorce decree i n t h a t : "a. * * * the s p i r i t u a l and moral atmosphere i n the home has deteriorated t o a s t a t e wherein the issue of the p a r t i e s hereto, Christopher Lance Leifer, w i l l be materially affected and altered. "b.Jc * * the p l a i n t i f f i n the above captioned matter i s residing with a male who i s not t h e spouse of the above named p l a i n t i f f and the presence of t h i s indi- vidual has aided and contributed. t o the moral decline and decay of the atmosphere i n which the minor party of t h e p a r t i e s hereto must reside. I I The p a r t i e s agreed by stipulation t h a t the matter be heard i n the eighth j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , Cascade County, and a two-day hearing commenced on October 16, 1975. The d i s t r i c t court 11 found respondent was best suited and motivated morally and emotionally t o meet the needs of Lance Leifer and i s the parent most l i k e l y t o see the needs of Lance Leifer a r e met." and granted respondent's petition. In Montana i t has been firmly established t h a t the court's jurisdiction i n matters of custody i s of a continuing nature. Barbour v. Barbour, 134 Mont. 317,,330 P.2d 1093; Libra v. Libra, 154 Mont. 222, 462 P.2d 178. This concept a l s o controls under the recently enacted Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, section 48- 339, R.C.M. 1947, which c l e a r l y provides d i s t r i c t courts may not exercise discretionary power t o modify a p r i o r custody decree un- l e s s two basic elements a r e shown t o e x i s t : 1) new f a c t s o r f a c t s unknown t o the court a t t h e time the i n i t i a l decree was entered demonstrate that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or those of his custodian; and 2 ) this change is sufficient to warrant a modification in order to promote the particular child's best interests. This basic standard was applied in this jurisdiction long before the enactment of the new law, and a determination of which law would be applicable under the facts presented would have no bearing on the result. Jewett v. Jewett, 73 Mont. 591, 237 P.702; Trudgen v. Trudgen, 134 Mont. 174, 329 P.2d 225; Simon v. Simon, 154 Mont. 193, 461 P.2d 851. Here, the issue to be decided is whether the district court, in granting the petition for modification, abused its discretion. Although no specific finding to this effect appears in the order, such judicial action must inherently be predicated on the conclusion that a change in circumstances had occurred sufficient to endanger the welfare of the child to support the modification order. In reviewing orders which affect the custody of a child, this Court is mindful that the primary duty of deciding the proper custody of children is the task of the district court. Thus, all reasonable presumptions as to the correctness of that determination will be made. No ruling will be disturbed absent a clear showing the district court's dis- cretion was abused. In re Corneliusen et al., 159 Mont.6, 494 P.2d 908; State ex rel. Veach v. Veach, 122 Mont. 47, 195 P.2d 697; Ex parte Bourguin, 88 Mont. 118, 290 P. 250; In re Thompson, 77 Mont. 466, 251 P. 163. It is elemental that the phrase "change in circumstances" is a term of art which must not be considered in a vacuum. No change in circumstances, regardless of its substantiality, is legally sufficient to support a modification order altering custody unless the best interests and general welfare of the child will be promoted. Altmaier v. Altmaier, 135 Mont. 404, 340 P.2d 829; Haynes v. F i l l n e r , 106 Mont. 59, 75 P.2d 802. In a l l cases, t h e lodestar of the d i s t r i c t court i n exercise of i t s discretion i s the welfare and best i n t e r e s t s of the c h i l d , and not the parent. Grant v. Grant, 166 Mont. 229, 531 P.2d 1007, 32 St.Rep. 191; In r e Adoption of Biery, 164 Mont, 353, 522 P. 2d 1377; Turk v. Turk, 164 Mont. 35, 518 P.2d 804. In the i n s t a n t case the pleadings and testimony offered a t hearing suggest the i s s u e t o be decided should be considerably narrowed. The record i s r e p l e t e with evidence t h a t both p a r t i e s t o t h i s action a r e well-qualified t o be f i t and proper parents t o Christopher Lance Leifer. Respondent i s a well-educated individual with promising and steady employment, The record amply demonstrates the affection respondent has f o r h i s son and h i s willingness t o do a l l t h a t is necessary t o provide him with an environment conducive t o a happy childhood and the development of a well-adjusted adulthood. Investigations made by the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services e s t a b l i s h t h a t appellant i s a capable and enthusiastic mother t o her two children, and t h a t her present husband i s qualified t o adopt the children. Neither party seriously challenges the general f i t n e s s of the other regarding parenthood. The d i s t r i c t court made no finding t o the e f f e c t t h a t appellant was an u n f i t parent. Reports concerning both p a r t i e s were requested and furnished t o the d i s t r i c t court by a c l i n i c a l psychologist. These reports show a conspicuous absence of the types of adverse psychological f a c t o r s which, i f possessed by e i t h e r party, might tend t o a f f e c t unfavorably the well-being of the child. The record does show t h a t t h e child has been some- what slow t o develop due t o a r a t h e r loosely defined "learning disability". The prognosis concerning t h i s problem was described i n the record a s good, and the record f a i l s t o substantially connect the problem t o the home environment. The c l i n i c a l psychofogist t e s t i f i e d : "A. * 9 : * I think t h i s youngster has a natural d i f f i c u l t y coping with change, coping with a great many pieces of information which might be - given t o him a t one time * * *. "Q. Would the f a c t that your report said M r s . Foss, formerly Mrs. Leifer had some g u i l t feelings about her past and about her family * * a f f e c t a child? A. It could. But i n t h i s case 1 do not think i t does t o any marked degree." (Emphasis supplied.] The f a c t t h a t a parent allows her paramour t o l i v e with her f o r a short time before t h e i r marriage does not, by i t s e l f , ? 1 c o n s t i t u t e a change i n circurnstances" s u f f i c i e n t t o support t h e granting of a custodial modification order. This Court has never s p e c i f i c a l l y decided t h i s precise issue. But a number of recent cases from other jurisdictions have examined t h e matter. They a r e almost unanimous i n holding t h a t such conduct may be t h e b a s i s f o r a change i n custody only upon a showing t h a t the children have i n some way been adversely affected. Christensen v. Christensen, 31 Ill.App.3d 1041, 335 N.E.2d 581; Van Buskirk v. Van Buskirk, 19 Ill.App.3d 647, 312 N.E.2d 395; Christian v. Randall, 33 Colo.App. 129, 516 P.2d 132; Howland v. Howland, (1nd.App. 1975), 337 N.E.2d 555. Of p a r t i c u l a r relevance i s the language of the Washington S t a t e Supreme Court speaking through J u s t i c e F a r r i s i n Wildermuth v. Wildermuth, 14 Wash.App. 442, 542 P.2d 463, 466: "We find t h a t the controlling s t a t u t e requires more than a showing of i l l i c i t conduct by the parent who has custody. There must be a showing of the e f f e c t of t h a t conduct upon t h e minor child o r children. * * * Unless the record contains evidence from which t h e t r i e r of f a c t can reasonably conclude t h a t the c h i l d ' s environ- ment i s detrimental t o h i s o r her physical, mental, or emotional health and, further, t h a t the harm l i k e l y t o be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of a change t o the child,the court errs i n entering an order changing custody." Here, the record i s devoid of evidence t o reasonably e s t a b l i s h t h a t the conduct of the custodial parent caused a "moral decline" i n the home which has e i t h e r materially o r adversely affected the well-being of the minor child. Further, the record establishes t h a t progress concerning the c h i l d ' s aforementioned learning d i s a b i l i t y might be interrupted by a geographical change of residence, indicating t h a t change must be c l e a r l y j u s t i f i e d t o promote the c h i l d ' s best i n t e r e s t s . Returning t o the issue of abuse of discretion on the p a r t of the d i s t r i c t judge i n modifying t h e divorce decree, we consider f i r s t whether any change of circumstances has occurred which a f f e c t s t h e best i n t e r e s t s and general welfare of the child. N o change of substance appears from the record. The d i s t r i c t court found no lack of f i t n e s s of the mother. There simply appears no evidence upon which the d i s t r i c t court could /fund such a lack of f i t n e s s including love, affection and care. Thus, t h i s amounts t o an abuse of discretion t o change custody without a finding of changed circumstances. The order of the d i s t r i c t court modifying and awarding custody t o respondent i s s e t aside. W e Concur: Justices -- - Hon. Arnold Olsen, D i s t r i c t Judge s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison. M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell dissenting: I find substantial credible evidence i n the record supporting the custody award of the d i s t r i c t court. In m y view, the majority here has simply substituted its judgment on custody f o r t h a t of the d i s t r i c t court contrary t o law. 22e&.&SA Justice. M r . Arnold Olsen, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison, dissenting: I agree with the foregoing dissent of M r . J u s t i c e / Frank I. Haswell. Chief J u s t i c e James T . Harrison.