Case Title: GEORGINA DANYEL CAZIER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
GEORGINA DANYEL CAZIER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 153148 P.3d 23Case Number: No. 05-114Decided: 12/15/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 

GEORGINA DANYEL CAZIER,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofLincolnCounty

The Honorable Dennis L. 
Sanderson, Judge

 
 
Representing Appellant:

Ken Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, 
Appellate Counsel; Tina N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel. 

 
 
Representing Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, 
Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Georgina Danyel 
Cazier appeals her conviction for aggravated assault and battery.  She asserts that the district court 
should have granted her motion for a mistrial based upon her claim that a 
prosecution witness improperly commented on her right to remain silent.  Additionally, she claims error in the 
admission of evidence regarding prior bad acts, character evidence, and vouching 
for the victim's credibility.  Ms. 
Cazier also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction 
and contends that cumulative error warrants reversal.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 

[¶2]      We rephrase the 
issues presented by Ms. Cazier as follows:

 
 

I.                     
Did the district court 
abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for mistrial after the 
investigating officer testified that Ms. Cazier had refused to speak to 
him?

 
 

II.                   
Did the district court 
erroneously permit evidence or argument concerning prior bad acts of Ms. 
Cazier?

 
 

III.                  
Was improper character 
evidence admitted, resulting in plain error?

 
 

IV.               
Did improper vouching for 
the victim occur, resulting in plain error?  

 
 

V.                 
Does sufficient evidence 
support Ms. Cazier's conviction?

 
 

VI.               
Does cumulative error 
warrant reversal?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On the morning of 
March 16, 2004, Ms. Cazier and her husband, Chad, were together at their residence in 
Lincoln County, Wyoming.  
After their children left for school, the couple began to argue.  Ms. Cazier became angry.  She punched Mr. Cazier in the face and 
whipped him repeatedly with television cables.1

[¶4]      Later that day, 
Kevin Jackson, Chief of the Afton Police Department, received an anonymous phone 
tip that Mr. Cazier should be contacted.  
The informant believed that Mr. Cazier "was being beaten by his wife and 
. . . was in very bad physical condition."  
The following day, March 17, 2004, Chief Jackson met with Mr. Cazier and 
accompanied him to the Lincoln County Sheriff's office to meet with Officer 
Timothy Malik.2  Officer Malik immediately observed that 
Mr. Cazier was injured, noting a black eye and cuts on his face and head.  Mr. Cazier lifted his shirt, revealing 
numerous lacerations and bruises on his torso.  Mr. Cazier described the events of the 
previous day and explained that Ms. Cazier had inflicted his injuries.  Mr. Cazier also showed Officer Malik a 
cut on his forearm and explained that his wife came at him with a knife.  He believed he had been cut in the 
course of attempting to defend himself.  
Additionally, Mr. Cazier related a prior incident of whipping on March 
11, 2004.

 
 
[¶5]      Officer Malik 
accompanied Mr. Cazier to the emergency room at StarValleyMedicalCenter.  During the physical examination, Officer 
Malik took photos of Mr. Cazier to document his injuries.  Mr. Cazier was admitted and remained in 
the hospital for several days.  

            

[¶6]      On March 18, 
2004, Officer Malik executed a search warrant at the Cazier residence and 
retrieved the television cables and a note from Ms. Cazier apologizing to her 
husband for her behavior.  Ms. 
Cazier was charged with aggravated assault and battery, in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2003) for beating her husband with the 
television cables on March 16, 2004.3  Ms. Cazier was also charged with two 
other felony counts -- aggravated assault and battery, in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i), for the alleged beating on March 11, 2004, and 
assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2003), for allegedly cutting Mr. Cazier with a 
knife.

 
 
[¶7]      A jury trial was 
held.  Ms. Cazier denied any fight 
with her husband on March 11, 2004, and introduced evidence that he was at work 
at the time.  Ms. Cazier did not 
dispute that she and her husband fought on March 16, 2004, that she had hit him 
with the cables, or that she had armed herself with a knife.  However, she claimed that Mr. Cazier had 
been the aggressor and described her actions as self defense.  She denied that Mr. Cazier had been cut 
by the knife during their fight.  She also claimed that Mr. Cazier caused 
many of his own injuries by hitting himself.  The jury found Ms. Cazier guilty of one 
count of aggravated assault and battery for beating Mr. Cazier with the cables 
on March 16, 2004.  The jury 
returned a not guilty verdict on the other two counts.

 
 
[¶8]      Ms. Cazier was 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of eighteen months to five years, which was 
suspended pending completion of a split sentence -- one year of incarceration in 
the Lincoln County Jail and three years of supervised probation.  The sentence was stayed pending this 
appeal.  Further facts will be 
discussed as needed in our review of Ms. Cazier's claims on 
appeal.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

            

[¶9]      We review the 
denial of a mistrial motion under an abuse of discretion standard.  Lucero v. State, 14 P.3d 920, 924 (Wyo. 
2000).  Judicial discretion is a 
composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  Id.  

 
 
[¶10]   Evidentiary rulings are also 
committed to the sound discretion of the district court and are not subject to 
appellate second guessing absent an abuse of discretion.  Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 103, ¶ 21, 98 P.3d 143, 149 (Wyo. 2004).  When no 
objection is made at trial to the evidence challenged on appeal, we apply our 
plain error standard of review.  
Plain error will not be found unless: (1) the record clearly reflects the 
alleged error; (2) the party claiming the error demonstrates a violation of a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law; and (3) the party proves that the violation 
adversely affected a substantial right resulting in material prejudice.  Miller v. State, 2006 WY 17, ¶ 15, 127 P.3d 793, 797-798 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶11]   In reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence, "[w]e assess whether all the evidence presented is adequate to form 
the basis for an inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by a 
finder of fact when that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the 
State."  Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 28, ¶ 16, 86 P.3d 851, 857 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Estrada-Sanchez v. State, 2003 WY 45, ¶ 
6, 66 P.3d 703, 707 (Wyo. 2003)).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Motion for mistrial (for 
improper comment on silence)

 
 
[¶12]   Ms. Cazier claims that the district 
court should have granted her motion for a mistrial after the State's first 
witness, Officer Malik, testified "I 
tried to interview [Ms. Cazier] and she didn't want to talk to me."  
She contends this constituted an improper comment on her exercise of 
her constitutional right to remain silent.  

 
 
[¶13]   We have described the right to 
remain silent as "one of the most fundamental rights accorded a defendant in our 
criminal justice system."  Williams v. State, 2004 WY 117, ¶ 18, 99 P.3d 432, 444 (Wyo. 2004).  The 
right to silence provided by Article 1, Section 11 of the Wyoming Constitution 
is self-executing, existing pre-arrest when an individual is questioned by the 
state's agents for purposes of a criminal investigation.4  Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 390 
(Wyo. 
1995).  "Accordingly, the 
prosecutorial use of the citizen's silence to infer the guilt of the citizen is 
constitutionally prohibited."  
Id.

 

            
In right-to-silence cases, we evaluate "the entire context in which the 
statements were made' and we will not take sentences and phrases out of 
context.'" Spinner v. State, 2003 WY 
106, ¶ 19, 75 P.3d 1016, 1024 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 373 
(Wyo. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 980, 121 S. Ct. 1620, 149 L. Ed. 2d 483 (2001)). We also consider "whether the 
prosecutor asked improper questions, whether he emphasized or followed up on the 
silence issue, and whether he attempted to exploit the issue in any way.'" 
Spinner, 2003 WY 106, ¶ 19, 75 P.3d  
at 1024 (quoting Lancaster v. State, 
2002 WY 45, ¶ 39, 43 P.3d 80, 96 (Wyo. 2002)).

Abeyta v. State, 2003 WY 136, ¶ 12, 78 P.3d 664, 667-668 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶14]   The statement at issue arose during 
cross examination when defense counsel inquired as to the nature and extent of 
the investigation.  Officer Malik 
testified as follows: 

 
 
[Defense Counsel]    Now, and you never 
interviewed [the children] to see--

 
 
[Malik]                         
I never interviewed them.

 
 
Q.  -- to see what they had to say, if this 
incident even took place on the 11th?  Is that what you mean by an objective 
interview? You just took [Mr. Cazier's] word for it, didn't 
you?

 
 
A.  Say that again?

 
 
Q.  You just took [Mr. Cazier's] word for it 
that it had happened as he said?

 
 
A.  Well, I tried to interview Danyel and she 
didn't want to talk to me.

 
 
(Emphasis added.)  

 
 
[¶15]   Defense counsel objected.  The district court sustained the 
objection and then held discussions with counsel in chambers.  Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, 
which the district court took under advisement.  The district court offered to provide a 
curative instruction to the jury when the trial resumed, but defense counsel 
preferred not to draw undue attention to the testimony at that time.  After dismissing the jury at the end of 
the first day of trial, the district court announced its ruling on the motion 
for a mistrial.  The district court 
provisionally denied the motion, indicating that if the State tried to refer to 
the statement or include it in argument, that it would reexamine the 
motion.  The prosecution made no 
reference to Officer Malik's statement during the remainder of the trial. 

 
 
[¶16]   "Granting a mistrial is an extreme 
and drastic remedy that should be resorted to only in the face of an error so 
prejudicial that justice could not be served by proceeding with trial."  Allen v. State, 2002 WY 48, ¶ 75, 43 P.3d 551, 575 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Warner 
v. State, 897 P.2d 472, 474 (Wyo. 1995)).  In reviewing the district court's 
decision for an abuse of discretion, we inquire as to the reasonableness of the 
choice made by the trial court. Lucero, 14 P.3d  at 924.  We have recognized that the district 
court is in the best position to assess any prejudicial impact of this type of 
claimed error.  Allen, ¶ 75, 43 P.3d  at 575.  

 
 
[¶17]   Ms. Cazier characterizes Officer 
Malik's response to the question as a "gratuitous, unsolicited comment to the 
jury" concerning the exercise of her right to remain silent.  "A comment upon an accused's silence 
occurs when used to the state's advantage either as substantive evidence of 
guilt or to suggest to the jury that the silence was an admission of 
guilt."  Tortolito, 901 P.2d  at 391.  The statement was not elicited by the 
prosecution.  The record, read in 
context, does not reflect Officer Malik's intent to cast guilt upon Ms. 
Cazier.  He was responding to 
vigorous cross-examination, and in his efforts to defend his impartiality and 
investigatory techniques, he mentioned Ms. Cazier's refusal to speak to 
him.

 
 
[¶18]   The district court responded 
reasonably to the motion.  The 
district court offered to draft a curative instruction, advising the jury of Ms. 
Cazier's constitutional right and prohibiting any inference from her pretrial 
silence.  Defense counsel's 
rejection of this offer was a "tactical decision that this court will not second 
guess."  Chapman v. State, 2001 WY 25, ¶ 22, 18 P.3d 1164, 1174 (Wyo. 2001).  The 
district court gave thoughtful consideration to Ms. Cazier's request for a 
mistrial and even upon denying it, left the matter open for further 
consideration if the State attempted to use that portion of Officer Malik's 
testimony to its advantage.  In 
concluding that a mistrial was not warranted, the district court relied on Hughes v. State, 658 P.2d 1294 
(Wyo. 
1983).  In Hughes, we held that "a fleeting 
reference to appellant's silence, not resulting from inquiry by the 
prosecution nor exploited by the prosecution, is not error."  Id., 658 P.2d  at 1296.  We agree with the district court's 
assessment.  The record does not 
reveal that the State attempted to use Officer Malik's statement to its 
advantage.  The State did not ask 
the jury to consider Ms. Cazier's pretrial silence as evidence of her 
guilt.  Accordingly, we can find no 
abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Ms. Cazier's motion for a 
mistrial.  

            

Evidentiary 
rulings

 
 
[¶19]   Ms. Cazier presents three issues 
relating to the admission of evidence.  
In each instance, defense counsel did not object to the evidence that was 
admitted.  Often, it was defense 
counsel's questioning that elicited the testimony which Ms. Cazier complains of 
on appeal.  Rather than assume these 
aspects of defense counsel's trial presentation were misguided, we are mindful 
that in some circumstances, a failure to object may not be a failure at all, but 
a tactical decision.  Trial counsel 
may not want to highlight troublesome testimony or, alternatively, may see an 
opportunity to use such evidence to its advantage.  E.g., Sorensen v. State, 6 P.3d 657, 666 (Wyo. 
2000) (recognizing that defense counsel may make a tactical decision to avoid 
highlighting certain testimony); Dudley 
v. State, 951 P.2d 1176, 1181 (Wyo. 1998) (recognizing that it is a 
"tactical decision to follow the path to impeachment rather than challenging the 
admission of the evidence"); Beintema v. 
State, 936 P.2d 1221, 1228 (Wyo. 1997) ("Counsel may, as a matter of trial 
strategy, choose not to request a limiting instruction in order to avoid 
emphasizing the unfavorable evidence.").  
We are reluctant to second guess such tactical decisions.  "It is difficult to discern the 
atmosphere of a trial or how the jury perceived the proceedings from the 
sterile, black and white transcript."  
Belden v. State, 2003 WY 89, ¶ 
24, 73 P.3d 1041, 1081 (Wyo. 2003).  
We are in a much better position to review claimed evidentiary errors 
when an objection is made at the trial level and counsel and the district court 
can explore and express how the evidence at issue may be impacting the 
trial.

[¶20]   At trial Ms. Cazier did not deny 
the tumultuous nature of the Cazier's marital relationship and the physical 
altercation on March 16, 2004.  
However, the defense claimed that Ms. Cazier acted in self-defense and 
that her husband was the first aggressor and the cause of the injuries.  The defense sought to provide alternate 
explanations for the State's evidence and challenged the credibility of the 
State's two key witnesses, Mr. Cazier and Officer Malik.  The defense focused upon Mr. Cazier's 
self-destructive behavior and his motives for fabricating allegations against 
his wife.  Additionally, the defense 
attempted to show that Officer Malik was biased, had rushed to judgment, and had 
conducted his investigation accordingly.  
As a result of this strategy, defense counsel pursued lines of 
questioning and introduced evidence to develop those 
theories.

 
 
[¶21]   "Generally, a party introducing 
evidence cannot complain on appeal that the evidence was erroneously 
admitted."  Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 755, 
120 S. Ct. 1851, 1853, 146 L. Ed. 2d 826 (2000).  We have also explained that defense 
counsel may "open the door" to evidence that the State would otherwise not have 
been allowed to introduce:

 
 
This Court has recognized 
that a defendant may open the door to otherwise inadmissible testimony when he 
inquires about a particular subject, including evidence of prior criminal 
misconduct. When the defendant initiates a line of questioning, the prosecutor 
is entitled to make a permissible inquiry without crossing into prosecutorial 
overkill.

 
 
                                                
It is usually a basic function of redirect examination to allow a witness 
to explain his testimony elicited on cross-examination. . . . The opening of the 
door concept, however, reaches further and is an extension of that familiar 
rule. Succinctly stated, the opening the door rule is that a party who in some 
way permits the trial judge to let down the gates to a field of inquiry that is 
not competent but relevant cannot complain if his adversary is also allowed to 
avail himself of the opening within its scope.

 
 

White v. 
State, 
2003 WY 163, ¶ 11, 80 P.3d 642, 648 (Wyo. 2003) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted).  See also United States v. Beverly, 5 F.3d 633, 
639 (2d Cir. 1993) (recognizing that once a defendant has put certain activity 
in issue by offering innocent explanations for or denying wrong-doing, the 
government is entitled to rebut by showing that the defendant has lied); United States v. Garcia, 936 F.2d 648, 
653-654 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that 
when a defendant offers an innocent explanation, he opens the door to 
questioning into the truth of his testimony).  With these general comments in mind, we 
address Ms. Cazier's claims of evidentiary error.  

A) Prior bad acts 

 
 
[¶22]   Ms. Cazier asserts that the 
district court erred in admitting evidence of uncharged misconduct, contrary to 
W.R.E. 404(b).  Ms. Cazier 
challenges testimony that she: (1) hurt her husband on previous occasions; (2) 
forced Mr. Cazier to make a false police report after one of those previous 
occasions; and (3) made her daughter falsely report the events of March 16, 
2004.  It is helpful to examine how 
the challenged testimony arose, placing the testimony in context, before 
analyzing Ms. Cazier's claim of error.  

 
 
[¶23]   Mr. Cazier testified during the 
State's case-in-chief.  During 
cross-examination, defense counsel expounded upon its theory that Mr. Cazier's 
injuries were self-inflicted.  Mr. 
Cazier was questioned about hurting himself:

 
 
[Defense Counsel]    [The prosecutor] asked you if 
you did that to yourself, if you ever hurt yourself. You do sometimes, don't 
you?

 
 
[Mr. Cazier]                
No.

 
 

Q.    
When you get 
angry?

 
 

A.     
No.

 
 

Q.    
Haven't people seen you 
do that?

 
 

A.     
No.

 
 

Q.    
Didn't you not too long 
before that hit yourself  well, hit Danyel and yourself with a broom 
stick?

 
 

A.     
I was just  I took it 
from her. I was hitting around with it. I accidentally hit 
her.

 
 

Q.    
And you hit yourself, 
also?

 
 

A.     
Yeah, not 
hard.

 
 

Q.    
Don't you sometimes hit 
yourself in the face when you get mad?

 
 

A.     
No.

 
 

Q.    
Don't you sometimes thump 
yourself on the thigh when you get mad?

A.     
I  I hit my thigh 
because I  I didn't want to hit her.  
I wasn't about to hit her.

 
 

Q.    
So you channel your anger 
elsewhere?

 
 

A.     
Yes.

 
 

Q.    
Okay. Sometimes, you even 
bang you head on the tile, don't you?

 
 
A.  No. She'd grab my hair and throw me down 
on the ground, down on the floor, and end up hitting the 
tile.

 
 
In response to this line 
of questioning, redirect included the following exchange:

 
 
[Prosecutor]   Okay. And [defense counsel] talked 
to you and asked you if you, in the past, had hurt yourself.  Had you hurt yourself in the 
past?

 
 
[Mr. Cazier]    No.

 
 

Q.    
Okay. Had you told people 
that you'd hurt yourself in the past?

 
 

A.     
Yes.

 
 

Q.    
And who have you told 
that to?

 
 

A.     
People I work 
with.

 
 

Q.    
Okay. Why do you tell 
them that?

 
 

A.     
I didn't want them to 
know the truth. I was ashamed of it, embarrassed.

 
 

Q.    
Had you told Deputy Malik 
earlier this year that you'd hurt yourself?

 
 

A.     
Yes.

 
 

Q.    
Why did you tell Deputy 
Malik that?

 
 
A.  Because she would  told me that she 
wasn't going to jail over  if I died or that.She was forcing me to do 
it.

 
 
Q. And did you do what you were told to 
do?

A.  Yes.

 
 
[¶24]   Ms. Cazier testified on her own 
behalf.  At the end of her 
description of the physical altercation that she and Mr. Cazier had on March 16, 
2004, she testified:

 
 
[Ms. Cazier]               
 And he got mad and let out a yell, like an aggravated yell like 
(indicating) and he was punching his legs.

 
 
[Defense counsel]     Punching his own 
legs?

 
 

A.     
Yes.

 
 

Q.    
Where did he 
punch?

 
 

A.     
In the thigh, the leg, 
right here.

 
 

Q.    
Just with a 
fist?

 
 

A.     
With a 
knuckle.

 
 

Q.    
 Is that something he 
does 

 
 

A.     
All the 
time.

 
 

Q.    
-- when he gets angry or 
frustrated?

 
 

A.     
When he gets mad and 
frustrated.

 
 

Q.    
Does he say 
why?

 
 

A.     
No.

 
 

 
 

A.     
Anything else 

 
 

Q.    
To 
himself?

 
 

A.     
He's banged his head on 
the tile floor. He's hit himself in the head with shoes.  He's busted things.  He's punched his truck bumper, which is 
metal. 

[¶25]   The defense also presented the 
testimony of LC, Mr. and Ms. Cazier's thirteen-year old daughter.  She was asked about having seen her 
parents fight:

 
 
[Defense counsel]     Do they sometimes hit 
each other?

 
 
[LC]                             
Yeah.

 
 

Q.    
Have you seen your dad 
get real mad?

 
 

A.     
(The Witness 
nodded.)

 
 

Q.    
What does he do when he 
gets mad?

 
 
A.  He either  he sometimes smacks his head 
against the tile and hits himself with a  with a broom.  And he would punch himself in the face 
and hit himself in the face with a shoe.  

 
 
The State cross examined 
LC and elicited the following:

 
 
[Prosecutor]               
Have you seen your mom hit your dad?

 
 
[LC]                             
Yeah.

 
 

Q.    
Have you seen your mom 
hurt your dad?

 
 

A.     
(The Witness 
nodded.)

 
 
                  


 
 

Q.    
Did you call the 
Sheriff's Office and tell them that your mom had hit your 
dad?

 
 

A.     
No.

 
 

Q.    
Okay. Did you call the 
Sheriff's Office after your dad left home?

 
 

A.     
Yeah.

 
 

Q.    
Okay. What did you tell 
them?

 
 

A.     
I don't remember exactly 
what I said.  I think it was, like, 
what my mom did to my dad, my dad done to her, also.

 
 
                  


 
 

Q.    
Do you remember talking 
to Chief Kevin Jackson of the Afton Police Department some months 
later?

 
 

A.     
Yeah.

 
 

Q.    
Did you talk to Chief 
Jackson about that?

 
 

A.     
Yeah.

 
 

Q.    
What did you tell Chief 
Jackson?

 
 

A.     
I didn't  I didn't talk 
that much.  He did most of the 
talking.

 
 

Q.    
Okay. Did you tell Chief 
Jackson that your mom had you make that phone call?

 
 

A.     
(The Witness shook her 
head.)

 
 

Q.    
Okay. You don't remember 
that?

 
 
A.  I know he  he never asked me that.           

 
 
[¶26]   In its rebuttal case, the State 
called Afton Police Chief Kevin Jackson as a witness.  He was asked about a conversation he had 
with LC a few weeks after the incident of March 16, 2004.  When asked if LC had spoken to him about 
making a phone call to the Sheriff's Office after her dad was in the hospital, 
Chief Jackson testified that LC told him "that she had been told to call the 
Sheriff's Department and say that [Mr. Cazier] had been beating the 
mother."

 
 
[¶27]   Also in rebuttal, the State 
recalled Officer Malik.  He 
described contact he had with the Caziers in January of 2004, when they came in 
to talk to him:

 
 
[Prosecutor]               
Did you speak to both of them?

 
 
[Malik]                         
Yes, I did.

 
 
Q.  What did they want to speak to you 
about?

 
 
A.  They wanted to speak to me about  Danyel 
was pretty adamant . . . that [Mr. Cazier] tell me that whatever marks were on 
him at the time were done by himself, that he had  he had hit 
himself.

Q.  Okay. And did you talk to [Mr. Cazier] 
about that?

 
 
A.  Yes.

 
 
Q.  Did you talk to him 
alone?

 
 
A.  Yes.

 
 
Q.  Did he have a tape 
recorder?

 
 
A.  Yes, he did. She was pretty adamant about 
 that he carry it with him and not turn it off.

 
 
Q.  Okay. Did he use that tape 
recorder?

 
 
A.  Yes.        

      

Defense counsel inquired 
further on cross examination:

 
 
[Defense Counsel]          
And [Mr. Cazier] told you he'd inflicted those injuries on 
himself?

 
 
[Malik]                               
Yes, he did.

 
 
[¶28]   Ms. Cazier did not object to the 
testimony at trial.  She contends 
that no objection was needed, citing to Williams, ¶ 12, 99 P.3d  at 439 and Howard v. State, 2002 WY 40, ¶ 23, 42 P.3d 483, 491 (Wyo. 2002) (holding that where a defendant files a pretrial demand 
for notice of intent to introduce evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), the same shall 
be treated as the making of a timely objection to the introduction of such 
evidence).  The State concedes that 
Ms. Cazier filed a pretrial demand but questions whether it was timely because 
it did not comply with the district court's scheduling order.  The record is not clear whether the 
district court imposed a deadline for defense counsel to demand notice of 404(b) 
evidence.5  However, for purposes of this opinion, 
we will assume that Ms. Cazier's pretrial demand was timely, and pursuant to Williams and Howard, constituted a timely objection 
to 404(b) evidence.

 
 
[¶29]   Ms. Cazier claims that contrary to 
the requirements of Gleason v. State, 
2002 WY 161, 57 P.3d 332 (Wyo. 2002), the State failed to provide notice and 
identify the permissible purpose of this evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), and the 
district court failed to evaluate this evidence prior to its admission.  We directed in Gleason that in cases involving the 
admissibility of evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), "the record shall reflect the 
trial court's identification of the purpose or purposes for admission of the 
evidence, the findings and conclusions establishing relevance and probative 
value, and the factors considered in balancing probative value against the 
potential for unfair prejudice."  
Id., ¶ 30, 57 P.3d  at 343.  

 
 
[¶30]   W.R.E. 404 
provides:

 
 
(a) Character evidence generally. - Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in 
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: 

 
 
(1) 
Character of Accused. - Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered 
by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 

 
 
(2) 
Character of Victim. - Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim 
of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or 
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the 
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first 
aggressor; 

 
 
(3) 
Character of Witness. - Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in 
Rules 607, 608, and 609.

 
 
(b) 
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. - Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that 
he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

 
 
We have described Rule 
404 as governing evidence introduced "only to demonstrate that the defendant has 
a disposition to commit crimes." Gleason, ¶ 17, 57 P.3d  at 340.  

 
 
[¶31]   Although admission of 404(b) 
evidence in the absence of proper notice of the State's intent to introduce such 
evidence is error, an appellant cannot demonstrate error by simply branding any 
evidence 404(b) evidence.  Neither 
defense counsel nor the trial court recognized any 404(b) issue regarding the 
testimony set forth above.  On 
appeal, the State argues that the lack of objection or trial court attention to 
the testimony can be easily explained if the testimony did not implicate W.R.E. 
404.

 
 
[¶32]   Pursuant to the exception in W.R.E. 
404(a)(3), evidence admitted to impeach a witness' credibility falls outside the 
ambit of the rule.  "The credibility 
of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling 
him."  W.R.E. 607.  "A corollary to the rule allowing a 
party to attack the credibility of a witness is to permit the opposing party to 
bolster that credibility."  Strickland v. State, 2004 WY 91, ¶ 22, 
94 P.3d 1034, 1046 (Wyo. 2004).  

 
 
[¶33]   We agree with the State that the 
evidence challenged by Ms. Cazier was not truly 404(b) evidence.  While some of this testimony may have 
had the collateral effect of painting Ms. Cazier in an unfavorable light, the 
primary purpose of the testimony involved the impeachment and rehabilitation of 
the credibility of witnesses.  
Moreover, when the defendant initiates a line of questioning, the 
prosecutor is entitled to make a permissible inquiry without crossing into 
prosecutorial overkill.  Espinoza v. State, 969 P.2d 542, 546 
(Wyo. 
1998).  Specifically, "[a] defendant 
may open the door' on cross-examination to evidence of prior criminal 
misconduct."  Id. (quoting Chavez-Becerra v. State, 924 P.2d 63, 69 
(Wyo. 
1996)).  

 
 
[¶34]   None of the three areas of 
testimony challenged by Ms. Cazier contravened W.R.E. 404(b).  The claimed instances of past violence 
by Ms. Cazier arose in the rehabilitation of Mr. Cazier, after defense counsel 
had opened the door by questioning him concerning specific injuries he had 
incurred in the past.  Officer 
Malik's description of his contact with the Caziers in January of 2004 was 
permissible because it provided specific contradiction to Ms. Cazier's testimony 
that she had not forced her husband to tape record his conversation with Officer 
Malik.  Additionally, Chief 
Jackson's rebuttal testimony was permissible under W.R.E. 613(b) to introduce 
the prior inconsistent statement of LC because she was first given an 
opportunity to explain that statement but denied making it.6  

 
 
[¶35]   Under the circumstances, we do not 
find impermissible inquiry or "prosecutorial overkill."  Espinoza, 969 P.2d  at 546.  The State responded to the defense's 
theory and the testimony rebutting it was reasonably limited in scope.  The State did not suggest that Ms. 
Cazier had a propensity to commit crime, nor was there any attempt to use 
evidence regarding Ms. Cazier's prior conduct as substantive evidence of her 
guilt.  Accordingly, we reject Ms. 
Cazier's claim that the district court was required to evaluate the evidence in 
accordance with the strictures of our 404(b) jurisprudence.  We find no error.

 
 

B) Improper character 
evidence 

 
 
[¶36]   For her next claim of error, Ms. 
Cazier asserts that Officer Malik offered "quasi-expert" opinion on "domestic 
violence couples" that constituted improper character evidence.  She characterizes the testimony as 
"profile evidence" and analogizes it to expert testimony on battered woman 
syndrome, as discussed in Skinner v. 
State, 2001 WY 102, 33 P.3d 758 (Wyo. 2001).  Ms. Cazier contends that this testimony, 
combined with the evidence of prior violence between herself and Mr. Cazier, 
demonstrated efforts by the prosecution to prove that she was a batterer who had 
acted in conformity with that role on March 16, 2004.  No objection was made at trial, and so 
our review is for plain error.  Kenyon v. State, 2004 WY 100, ¶ 20, 96 P.3d 1016, 1024-1025 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶37]   During the State's rebuttal case, 
Officer Malik testified as follows:

 
 
[Prosecutor]:              
[T]hroughout your law enforcement career, how many couples have you 
observed in situations like you've described?

 
 

A.     
Domestic violence 
couples, you mean?

 
 

Q.    
Yeah.

 
 

A.     
Lots.

 
 
                  


 
 

Q.    
Have you watched and been 
able to get an idea about who the dominant party is when you deal with these 
types of situations?

 
 

A.     
Oh, absolutely. Anybody 
could.  Just in talking with the 
people, they would be able to see who was dominant.

 
 

Q.    
On January 16, were you 
able to form an opinion as to who you thought was the dominant 
party?

 
 

A.     
Absolutely.  And I did state it in my  in my report, 
that I felt that Danyel was the  the dominant person in this 
relationship.

  

[¶38]   We have stated that we will closely 
scrutinize battered woman syndrome testimony presented by the State in its 
case-in-chief.  Skinner, ¶¶ 26-27, 33 P.3d  at 767; Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46, 55 
(Wyo. 
1999).  We recognize that such 
testimony may run afoul of the Rule 404(a) prohibition on character evidence to 
prove that the defendant "acted in conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion."  However, the ban of 
W.R.E. 404(a) is not absolute.  The 
State is allowed to rebut evidence of character of the accused or the victim 
presented by the defense.  W.R.E. 
404(a)(1) and (2).  

 
 
[¶39]   Ms. Cazier opened the door to this 
testimony.  She presented evidence 
that Mr. Cazier engaged in self-injuring behavior on March 16, 2004, and 
buttressed that claim with evidence that he often acted that way.  It is clear that Ms. Cazier introduced 
such evidence in order to prove that he had acted in conformity with that 
unusual trait on March 16, 2004.  
Additionally, she denied being the aggressor on that date.  She testified regarding Mr. Cazier's 
larger size and greater strength, denying any possible dominance she could have 
had over her husband.  In its 
rebuttal case, the State was entitled to counter Ms. Cazier's characterizations 
and denials.  One permissible method 
was to offer opinion evidence of character contradicting the traits that Ms. 
Cazier had described in Mr. Cazier and denied as to herself.  See W.R.E. 405(a) ("In all cases in 
which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, 
proof may be made by testimony  in the form of an opinion."); Duran v. State, 990 P.2d 1005, 1010-1011 
(Wyo. 1999).     

 
 
[¶40]   Ms. Cazier further claims that the 
prosecutor erred by emphasizing in closing argument that the couple acted in 
conformity with their domestic violence roles.  The general rule in Wyoming is that a failure 
to interpose a timely objection to improper argument is treated as a waiver, 
unless the prosecutor's misconduct is so flagrant as to constitute plain error, 
requiring reversal.  Belden, ¶ 38, 73 P.3d  at 1087.  Having determined that the State was 
permitted to present opinion evidence of character in its rebuttal case, Ms. 
Cazier has failed to establish plain error.  Id.  To establish plain error, appellant must 
demonstrate "violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law, clearly reflected 
in the record, resulting in the abridgment of a substantial right of 
the party to his material prejudice."  
Id.  

 
 
C) Vouching for 
credibility of victim

            

[¶41]   Ms. Cazier claims that Officer 
Malik improperly vouched for the credibility of the victim, by saying Mr. Cazier 
looked "like a whipped pup" and "in my mind, I guess, I believed that he had 
been beat."  The description of Mr. 
Cazier as a "whipped pup" arose during Officer Malik's testimony during the 
State's case-in-chief when he was describing his contact with Mr. Cazier on 
March 17, 2004:

 
 
[Prosecutor]:              
When you saw [Mr. Cazier], what was his demeanor?

 
 
[Malik]:                        
I guess I'll say he looked like a 
whipped pup.  He wouldn't make 
eye contact.  He would always look 
down.  Slumped over.  You could hardly understand what he had 
to say.  He was hard to understand. 

 
 
(Emphasis added.)    

 
 
There was no objection to 
the use of the phrase "whipped pup."  
As the trial progressed, defense counsel pursued a strategy to discredit 
Officer Malik's conclusions as lacking impartiality and resulting from a hasty 
and predetermined investigation.  

 
 
[¶42]   During the State's rebuttal case, 
Officer Malik testified concerning his contact with the Caziers in January 2004, 
prior to his investigation in March.  
On cross examination, defense counsel questioned Officer Malik regarding 
his impressions of the Caziers at that time, challenging his ability to read 
people and interpret relationship dynamics:

 
 
[Defense counsel]:    Okay.  Assessing the dominant party, how do you 
tell -- by talking to them, is it the one that talks the 
most?

 
 
[Officer Malik]:           
Well, it's kind of obvious - - I think pretty much anybody could see that 
- - that [Mr. Cazier], especially at that point in time, he wouldn't even look 
at me.  I mean, he would look down 
at his - - at the desk.  He would 
look down at his hands.  I would ask 
him a question.  I couldn't hardly 
hear what he had to say.  He - 
-  he - - I think I said this before 
in the  in the previous hearings, that he looked like a whipped pup. That's 
exactly what he - - 

 
 
Q.  I remember that and I was going to ask 
you that about yesterday.  You 
mentioned when he came in on the 16th - - or the 17th of 
March that he looked like a whipped pup.  
His head was down, he wouldn't look at you, etc., 
etc.

 
 
A.  Um-hum.

 
 
Q.  And I guess that struck me from reading 
the affidavits of police officers, like some of you in your agency - - I don't 
know if I've ever read any from you, but they always say - - describe those same 
things.  They say from "My training 
and experience, I know these to be signs of deception."  Have you ever read anything like that, 
looking away, not making eye contact, looking down at the 
ground?

 
 
A.  Well, we learn to read people and that's 
not what I read from him. It wasn't deception that I was seeing.  This was  he was  he just looked 
whipped.

 
 

 
 


 
 

A.     
Well, they can be 
interpreted that way if they are  like I said, if you are there, you know the 
difference between what I'm talking about as far as deception and  and I guess, in a way, he was deceiving me 
because, in my mind, I guess, I believed that he had been beat. 

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶43]   We analyze Ms. Cazier's claim in 
terms of plain error because there was no objection at trial to Officer Malik's 
testimony on the basis of impermissible vouching and also because the 
prosecution did not pose questions to elicit testimony vouching for Mr. Cazier's 
credibility.  Mitchell v. State, 2003 WY 160, ¶ 11, 81 P.3d 180, 183 (Wyo. 2003); Dudley, 
951 P.2d at 1178-79; Curl v. State, 
898 P.2d 369, 374 (Wyo. 1995).  We review the record to determine if the 
officer is implying that he believed or held an opinion with respect to the 
victim's version of the events surrounding the assault.  Whiteplume v. State, 841 P.2d 1332, 
1339-40 (Wyo. 
1992).  If the officer intended to 
impliedly vouch for the truth of the victim's accusations, no corroborating 
evidence exists, and the central jury issue is the victim's credibility, we will 
find reversible error when our review of all of the circumstances demonstrates 
prejudice to the extent that our confidence in the verdict is 
undermined.  Id. at 1340-41; 
Dudley, 951 P.2d  at 
1180.

 
 
[¶44]   Ms. Cazier summarily brands Officer 
Malik's isolated statements as impermissible vouching, but the record reveals a 
context for these comments.  Officer 
Malik did not volunteer a belief in Mr. Cazier's version of the events.  He was explaining the basis for his 
opinion that Ms. Cazier was the dominant party, which rebutted her testimony 
that the violence in the marriage was mutual or was caused by Mr. Cazier.  When Officer Malik mentioned the 
description of "whipped pup," defense counsel was reminded of a line of 
questioning he had forgotten to pursue during the State's case-in-chief.  Defense counsel seized upon that 
opportunity, attempting to demonstrate what Officer Malik had interpreted could 
have been consistent with deception by Mr. Cazier.  Officer Malik conceded that possibility 
because in January when Mr. Cazier was reporting that he had inflicted his own 
injuries, Officer Malik did not find his story believable.  

 
 
[¶45]   Officer Malik's expression of 
belief does not amount to impermissible vouching for the credibility of Mr. 
Cazier.  It did not concern the 
truth of Mr. Cazier's accusations leading to the felony charge.  It pertained to a story told about a 
different, earlier incident.  More 
importantly, Officer Malik explained that in January he did not believe Mr. 
Cazier's story.  We agree with the 
State's characterization that Officer Malik's "testimony occurred as a result of 
defense counsel's questions, and  the defense used this testimony as part of 
the defense strategy to cast doubt upon the credibility of [Mr.] Cazier as a 
witness and upon the thoroughness and impartiality of [Officer] Malik's 
investigation."  We conclude that 
impermissible vouching did not occur.

 
 
Sufficiency of the 
evidence

 
 
[¶46]   Ms. Cazier claims that the evidence 
was not sufficient to support her conviction of aggravated assault and 
battery.  She asserts that the 
evidence did not demonstrate that Mr. Cazier suffered "serious bodily injury" or 
that his injuries resulted solely from the events of March 16, 2004.  In considering Ms. Cazier's challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence, and any applicable 
inferences based on the evidence, in a light most favorable to the State.  Davis v. State, 2005 WY 93, ¶ 37, 117 P.3d 454, 469 (Wyo. 2005).  In conducting 
such a review, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the jury; rather, 
we determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or 
even could, have found the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Davis, ¶ 37, 117 P.3d  at 469.

 
 
[¶47]   The jury was instructed on the 
elements of aggravated assault and battery as follows:

 
 
The elements of the crime 
of Aggravated Assault and Battery, as charged 
in Count II of this case, are:

 
 

1.      
On or about the 16th day of March, 2004

2.      
In the County of Lincoln, State of Wyoming

3.      
The Defendant, Georgina Danyel Cazier

4.      
Intentionally or 
knowingly

5.      
Caused serious bodily 
injury to Chad Cazier

6.      
Under circumstances which 
showed an extreme indifference to the value of human life.

 
 
The jury was instructed 
that

 
 
"[s]erious bodily injury" 
means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes 
miscarriage, severe disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ. 

 
 
This definition of 
serious bodily injury is that provided in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(x) 
(LexisNexis 2003).  

 
 
[¶48]   Evidence favorable to the State 
demonstrated the extraordinary circumstances of the cable whipping Mr. Cazier 
endured on March 16, 2004.  He 
described how he had been viciously beaten for an extended period of time, 
perhaps two hours.  Evidence was 
presented that Mr. Cazier had to be hospitalized for several days.  The beating caused chemical 
abnormalities in Mr. Cazier's body.  
Dr. Stibor testified that he "literally couldn't believe" what he saw. 
According to Dr. Stibor, Mr. Cazier's injuries were "extremely remarkable," 
"significant," and it was apparent that he had been "whipped."  The jury viewed photos of the injuries 
taken on March 17, 2004.  The photos 
depict numerous wounds inflicted to his body, face, and head.  Mr. Cazier removed his shirt to show the 
jury the scarring he had suffered.  
Although we do not know the severity of what the jury saw on Mr. Cazier's 
back and torso, scars were apparently visible more than eight months after the 
whipping.  We are not in a position 
to second guess the jury's evaluation of Mr. Cazier's scars, and, viewing the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we accept that notable scarring 
was demonstrated.  We conclude that 
such evidence could have allowed the jury to conclude that Mr. Cazier had, at a 
minimum, suffered severe disfigurement.

 
 
[¶49]   Despite this evidence, Ms. Cazier 
asserts that the jury could not have determined which of Mr. Cazier's injuries 
were sustained on March 16, 2004.  
In a separate count, Ms. Cazier was also charged with aggravated assault 
and battery for similar conduct allegedly occurring on March 11, 2004.  Because the jury found Ms. Cazier not 
guilty of the March 11, 2004 charge, she reasons that the evidence was 
insufficient to demonstrate that any, or all, of the injuries the jury 
considered had been inflicted on March 16, 2004.  However, the jury viewed the photos of 
Mr. Cazier taken on March 17, 2004, and heard Dr. Stibor's testimony that on 
that date most of the injuries appeared to be "fresh."  Although Ms. Cazier denied any sort of 
confrontation with her husband on March 11, 2004, she admitted that she used the 
cables to repeatedly hit her husband on March 16, 2004.  After Mr. Cazier did not return home on 
March 17, 2004, she wrote a note apologizing to him the next day, which said: 
"Chad, I'm sorry I was going to tell 
you that the other night and then you never came home.  We can work this out and I'll get 
help.  I've decided that I don't 
want to loose [sic] you."  Mr. 
Cazier never returned to the home, but Officer Malik found the note on the 
kitchen counter, resting on top of the cables.  We conclude that the evidence was 
sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that Mr. Cazier's injuries had resulted 
from the beating on March 16, 2004. 

 
 
Cumulative 
error

 
 
[¶50]   In the absence of a finding of any 
error, Ms. Cazier's claim of cumulative error must fail.  Thomas v. State, 2006 WY 34, ¶ 38, 131 P.3d 348, 359 (Wyo. 2006); Bhutto v. 
State, 2005 WY 78, ¶ 35, 114 P.3d 1252, 1265 (Wyo. 2005); Luedtke v. 
State, 2005 WY 98, ¶ 36, 117 P.3d 1227, 1234 (Wyo. 
2005).

 
 
[¶51]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The cables 
were admitted into evidence, photographs of which were included in the record on 
appeal.  Although there is no 
testimony describing the cables, they appear to be multi-component audio visual 
cables several feet in length with colored RCA-type leads on each 
end.

 
 

2Timothy 
Malik was a Lieutenant with the Lincoln County Sheriff's office in March, 
2004.  When he testified, he held 
the position of Undersheriff.

 
 

3Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502 
provides, in pertinent part:

 
 
(a)        A 
person is guilty of aggravated assault and battery if 
he:

   

(i) Causes 
serious bodily injury to another intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human 
life;

(ii)   Attempts to cause, 
or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly 
weapon;

 
 
            
. . .

(b)        Aggravated 
assault and battery is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten 
(10) years.

 4Article 1, 
Section 11 of the Wyoming Constitution states:

 
 
No person 
shall be compelled to testify against himself in any criminal case, nor shall 
any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. If a jury disagree, or 
if the judgment be arrested after a verdict, or if the judgment be reversed for 
error in law, the accused shall not be deemed to have been in 
jeopardy.

 
 

5Several 
orders refer to a deadline for motions, requiring them to be filed within twenty 
days of arraignment.  However, at 
the scheduling conference, the district court indicated that the 
post-arraignment deadline pertained to jurisdictional matters or motions 
involving the charges. The district court distinguished evidentiary motions and 
directed the parties to file such motions prior to the pretrial 
conference.

 
 

6Upon 
request, Ms. Cazier would have been entitled to have a jury instruction setting 
forth the limited purposes of the testimony.  Blumhagen v. State, 11 P.3d 889, 896 
(Wyo. 2000).  In the absence of such 
a request, however, we cannot find fault with the district court for not giving 
a limiting instruction.  Id.