Case Title: Perry v. Bakewell Hawthorne, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: S233096

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2017-02-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 2/23/17 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
WILSON DANTE PERRY, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S233096 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/2 B264027 
BAKEWELL HAWTHORNE, LLC, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BC500198 
 
____________________________________) 
 
After a trial date is set, a party may demand a simultaneous exchange of 
expert witness information by all parties.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2034.210.)1  
Unreasonable failure to respond makes the noncomplying party‟s expert opinion 
inadmissible, unless the court grants relief.  (§§ 2034.300, 2034.620, 2034.720.)  
The question here is whether this exclusionary rule applies at the summary 
judgment stage.  The expert witness disclosure statutes provide no answer.  
However, section 437c, subdivision (d) requires that affidavits and declarations 
submitted in summary judgment proceedings “set forth admissible evidence.”  
Therefore, we hold that when the court determines an expert opinion is 
inadmissible because disclosure requirements were not met, the opinion must be 
excluded from consideration at summary judgment if an objection is raised. 
                                              
1  
Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 
 
2 
Plaintiff Wilson Dante Perry sued Bakewell Hawthorne, LLC and JP 
Morgan Chase Bank, NA, claiming he was injured in a fall on property owned by 
Bakewell and leased by Chase.  Chase demanded an exchange of expert witness 
information, but Perry made no disclosure.  In response to Bakewell‟s motion for 
summary judgment, however, he submitted the declarations of two experts opining 
that the stairs he fell on were in disrepair and did not comply with building code 
and industry standards.  The trial court sustained Bakewell‟s objection to the 
introduction of these declarations because Perry had failed to disclose the experts.  
Summary judgment was granted.  Perry moved for reconsideration, but the motion 
was never heard because it was discovered that the law license of Perry‟s counsel 
had been suspended.  After judgment was entered for Bakewell, Perry substituted 
counsel and unsuccessfully moved for permission to designate his experts. 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in Bakewell‟s favor. 
DISCUSSION 
Perry relies on Kennedy v. Modesto City Hospital (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 
575 (Kennedy).  There, the trial court entered summary judgment for the 
defendants after refusing to consider the declaration of a plaintiff‟s expert who had 
not been timely designated.  (Id. at pp. 578-579.)  The Court of Appeal reversed.  
As we explain, its analysis was flawed. 
The Kennedy court noted that the timing requirements of the expert witness 
disclosure statutes and the summary judgment statute are not coordinated.  Unless 
the court orders otherwise, summary judgment motions are not made until 60 days 
after the opposing party‟s general appearance, and are heard no later than 30 days 
before trial.  (Kennedy, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 581; see § 437c, subd. (a)(1) 
& (3).)  A demand for expert witness information, on the other hand, must be 
made no later than the 10th day after the initial trial date is set, or 70 days before 
that trial date, whichever is nearer the date.  The exchange must occur 20 days 
 
3 
after the demand or 50 days before the initial trial date, whichever is later.  As 
with summary judgment motions, the court may alter the deadlines on a showing 
of good cause.  (Kennedy, at p. 580; see §§ 2034.220, 2034.230.)2 
Without a court order, the period for demanding “and exchanging expert 
witness information . . . , which is keyed to the initial trial date, would ordinarily 
preclude making and determining a motion for summary judgment after the . . . 
exchanges have been completed.  The summary judgment motion was noticed and 
heard in this case within this time frame only because the trial judge continued the 
initial trial date.[3]  Normally a summary judgment will be heard and determined 
before the exchange of expert witness information is completed . . . .  Thus, 
considering the timing alone, there is no ascertainable [legislative] intent to make 
the exclusion of expert testimony applicable to a summary judgment proceeding.”  
(Kennedy, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 581.) 
Kennedy emphasized the various references in the expert witness disclosure 
statutes to “ „expert trial witnesses,‟ ” “ „evidence at the trial,‟ ” testimony “ „at 
the trial,‟ ” and “ „the trial court‟ ” that “ „shall exclude from evidence the expert 
opinion‟ ” offered by a party who has failed to make the required disclosure.  
(Kennedy, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 582, italics added; see, e.g., §§ 2034.210, 
2034.260, 2034.300.)  “We infer from these provisions the Legislature had in mind 
the exclusion of expert testimony offered by noncomplying parties at trial, not at a 
pretrial proceeding.  [¶]  Admissibility at trial is not necessarily the same as 
admissibility at a summary judgment proceeding.  For example, a declaration is 
                                              
2  
The statutes have been renumbered since Kennedy was decided, but the 
relevant provisions remain the same. 
3  
In this case the trial date was also continued.  As Perry and an amicus 
curiae observe, this is not an unusual occurrence. 
 
4 
not admissible at trial, but is expressly made admissible by section 437c in a 
summary judgment proceeding.  So too, evidence made inadmissible at trial by 
reason of the express procedural bar [of the disclosure statutes] does not 
necessarily make the evidence inadmissible in a summary judgment proceeding.”  
(Kennedy, at p. 582.)  The court further reasoned that the plaintiff might be able to 
overcome the bar by seeking leave to amend her disclosure or make a tardy 
disclosure.  (Id. at p. 583; see §§ 2034.610, 2034.710.) 
The Kennedy court pronounced that it wrote “on a clean slate” because no 
case law or statutory history bore on the issue at hand.  (Kennedy, supra, 221 
Cal.App.3d at p. 581.)  But the issue had been addressed, albeit briefly, in Mann v. 
Cracchiolo (1985) 38 Cal.3d 18 (Mann).  There the plaintiff did not timely 
designate an expert, and the trial date was continued.  (Id. at pp. 26-27.)  In this 
court the principal issue was the sufficiency of the expert‟s declaration, but the 
Mann defendants also argued that the declaration had to be disregarded at 
summary judgment because the expert could not testify at trial.  The Mann court 
noted that under the disclosure statutes, “the court upon such terms as may be just 
may permit a party to call an expert witness not included in the list of expert 
witnesses so long as the court finds that the party made a good faith attempt to list 
expert witnesses, that the party has given notice to the opposing party . . . , and 
that as of the date of the exchange of lists the party would „not in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence have determined to call such witness.‟  [Fn. omitted.]  
Because the trial court might choose to grant relief, the court ruling on the motions 
 
5 
for summary judgment could not assume that it would not.”  (Id. at pp. 39-40; see 
§ 2034.620, subd. (c)(1).)4 
Mann did not mention the requirement that “[s]upporting and opposing 
affidavits or declarations” submitted on a summary judgment motion “shall set 
forth admissible evidence.”  (§ 437c, subd. (d).)  The Kennedy court quoted this 
provision but did not discuss it.  (Kennedy, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 581.)  The 
condition that an expert‟s declaration must set out admissible evidence, however, 
has determinative importance.  Even if all the references to “trial” in the expert 
witness disclosure statutes are read strictly, including the specification that the 
“trial court” must exclude the testimony of an undisclosed expert (§ 2034.300), the 
summary judgment statute still requires the evidence provided in declarations to 
be admissible at trial.  (Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 755, 761 
(Bozzi); Towns v. Davidson (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 461, 472; 6 Witkin, Cal. 
Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Proceedings Without Trial, § 226, pp. 667-668; Weil & 
Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 
2015) ¶ 10:124 et seq., p. 10-50 et seq.)  Declarations themselves are not 
ordinarily admissible because they are hearsay.  But the Kennedy court erred when 
it suggested that the evidence contained in summary judgment declarations need 
not be admissible at trial.  (Kennedy, at p. 582.) 
Both Mann and Kennedy reasoned that the appellants before them might 
have been able to avoid the consequences of their failure to designate an expert.  
(Mann, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 39; Kennedy, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 583.)5  
                                              
4  
Mann examined an earlier version of the disclosure statutes than the one 
before the Kennedy court.  The differences in the various versions, including those 
in effect today, do not affect our analysis. 
5  
The Court of Appeal below distinguished Kennedy on the ground that there 
the plaintiff might have been able to remedy her failure to comply with the 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
6 
Under section 2034.610, the court may permit amendment of an expert witness 
disclosure, if section 2034.620‟s conditions stated are met.  Similarly, an untimely 
disclosure may be allowed under section 2034.710 if the statutory conditions are 
satisfied.  (§ 2034.720.)  But these remedies are available to a party before 
summary judgment, and should be invoked as soon as the party discovers the need 
to submit a declaration by a previously undisclosed expert.6  Unless the court 
grants relief, the declaration contains inadmissible evidence, excludable upon 
objection if the failure to disclose was unreasonable.  A court ruling on a summary 
judgment motion “shall consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except 
that to which objections have been made and sustained.”  (§ 437c, subd. (c), italics 
added.)  Here, the trial court sustained Bakewell‟s objection to Perry‟s expert 
testimony because he unreasonably failed to make the required disclosure.7 
When Mann and Kennedy were decided, summary judgment was more 
disfavored than it is today.  The Mann court said that “[t]he summary judgment 
procedure, inasmuch as it denies the right of the adverse party to a trial, is drastic 
and should be used with caution.”  (Mann, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 35.)  The 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
disclosure requirements.  The court deemed Perry‟s failure irremediable because 
his postjudgment application for relief had been rejected by the trial court. 
6  
If the time limit on submitting opposition to a summary judgment motion 
(§ 437c, subd. (b)(2)) prevents a party from obtain a ruling on a motion for relief 
under sections 2034.610 or  2034.710, the party may seek a continuance for that 
purpose under section 437c, subdivision (h). 
7  
It does not appear that Perry‟s counsel relied on Kennedy or Mann in the 
trial court.  They were not cited in the motion for reconsideration that was filed 
after summary judgment.  Counsel has not made the subsequent application for 
leave to designate experts a part of the record on appeal.  Nor is there any 
indication that counsel ever attempted to persuade the trial court that the failure to 
disclose Perry‟s experts had been reasonable. 
 
7 
Kennedy court commented that “[t]he purpose of the summary judgment statute is 
to eliminate the necessity of trying sham and meritless cases [citation], not to stop 
facially meritorious cases at the summary judgment stage by reason of a 
procedural bar which at trial may be overcome.”  (Kennedy, supra, 221 
Cal.App.3d at pp. 582-583.)  But section 437c was significantly changed when 
amendments in 1992 and 1993 brought it closer to its federal counterpart, “in order 
to liberalize the granting of [summary judgment] motions.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic 
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 848 (Aguilar); see Weil & Brown, Cal. 
Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial, supra, ¶ 10:278, pp. 10-127-128.)  
Summary judgment is now seen as “a particularly suitable means to test the 
sufficiency” of the plaintiff‟s or defendant‟s case.  (Caldwell v. Paramount 
Unified School Dist. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 189, 203; accord, City of Monterey v. 
Carrnshimba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1080; see Aguilar, at p. 855; Bozzi, 
supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at pp. 760-761.) 
The results in Mann and Kennedy reflect the more restrictive approach to 
summary judgment prevailing when they were decided.  Nevertheless, it has 
always been “[t]he purpose of the law of summary judgment . . . to provide courts 
with a mechanism to cut through the parties‟ pleadings in order to determine 
whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their 
dispute.”  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843, citing Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. 
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107.)  And section 437c has always required the evidence 
relied on in supporting or opposing papers to be admissible.  (See Reid v. Google, 
Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 528.)  The Mann and Kennedy courts overlooked the 
significance of this requirement. 
We overrule Mann v. Cracchiolo, supra, 38 Cal.3d 18, to the extent it is 
inconsistent with this opinion, and disapprove Kennedy v. Modesto City Hospital, 
supra, 221 Cal.App.3d 575.  A party may not raise a triable issue of fact at 
 
8 
summary judgment by relying on evidence that will not be admissible at trial.  
(See § 437c, subd. (c).)  When the time for exchanging expert witness information 
has expired before a summary judgment motion is made, and a party objects to a 
declaration from an undisclosed expert, the admissibility of the expert‟s opinion 
can and must be determined before the summary judgment motion is resolved. 
DISPOSITION 
The Court of Appeal‟s judgment is affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J.  
 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J.   
LIU, J.   
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J.   
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Perry v. Bakewell Hawthorne, LLC 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 244 Cal.App.4th 712 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S233096 
Date Filed: February 23, 2017 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Gregory Keosian 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Howard Posner; Bral & Associates and S. Sean Bral for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Schumann | Rosenberg, Kim Schumann and Jeffrey P. Cunningham for Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Horvitz & Levy, Steven S. Fleischman, Joshua C. McDaniel; Gordon & Rees and Don Willenburg for 
Association of Southern California Defense Counsel and Association of Defense Counsel of Northern 
California and Nevada as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Howard Posner 
2734 Oakhurst Avenue 
Los Angeles , CA  90034 
(310) 497-0449 
 
Jeffrey P. Cunningham 
Schumann | Rosenberg 
3100 Bristol Street, Suite 100 
Costa Mesa, CA  92626 
(714) 850-0210 
 
Joshua C. McDaniel 
Horvitz & Levy 
3601 West Olive Avenue, 8th Floor 
Burbank, CA  91505-4681 
(818) 995-0800