Case Title: People v. Anderson

Citation: 

Docket Number: S253227

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2020-07-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
VERNON ANDERSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S253227 
 
First Appellate District, Division Three 
A136451 
 
San Francisco City and County Superior Court 
206013 
 
 
July 23, 2020 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON 
S253227 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
 
A jury convicted defendant Vernon Anderson of several 
offenses, including five counts of second degree robbery.  As to 
each of these five counts, the operative information alleged 
personal firearm use enhancements that would have increased 
Anderson’s sentence by three, four, or 10 years as to each count.  
(Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (b); id., § 12022.5, subd. (a).)  But 
after the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on 
a set of more serious, 25-year-to-life firearm enhancements 
based on a different theory:  that Anderson was vicariously 
responsible for a coparticipant’s harmful discharge of a firearm 
in the commission of a gang-related crime.  (Id., § 12022.53, 
subds. (d), (e).)  One such vicarious firearm discharge 
enhancement had been alleged in connection with a different 
count of the information, but none had been alleged in 
connection with the robbery counts.  The jury returned true 
findings, and the trial court enhanced Anderson’s sentence for 
the robberies by five consecutive additional terms of 25 years to 
life.  The Court of Appeal affirmed. 
 
We granted review to consider whether the trial court 
properly imposed the five 25-year-to-life enhancements in 
connection with counts as to which the enhancements had not 
been alleged.  The answer is no.  Because Anderson did not 
receive adequate notice that the prosecution was seeking to 
impose this additional punishment on these counts, we reverse 
and remand for resentencing. 
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
2 
I. 
 
Anderson, together with a group of at least five other 
young men, arrived at a house party in San Francisco.  The host 
asked them to leave.  They left briefly but then returned to the 
house with guns.  Standing outside the house, the young men 
began demanding money from several partygoers, trying to go 
through their pockets and snatching their purses.  One of the 
men — it is not clear who — then began shooting.  Five of the 
bullets struck and killed Zachary Roche-Balsam, another 
partygoer who had been standing in front of the house.   
 
Anderson was charged by information with the first 
degree murder of Roche-Balsam (Pen. Code, § 187) and active 
participation in a street gang (id., § 186.22, subd. (a)).  Based on 
the robberies of other partygoers, Anderson was originally 
charged with four counts of second degree robbery (id., § 212.5, 
subd. (c)), including two completed robberies and two attempts 
(id., §§ 664, 212.5, subd. (c)).  Finally, Anderson was charged 
with conspiracy to commit second degree robbery (id., §§ 182, 
subd. (a)(1), 212.5, subd. (b)) and two counts of discharging a 
firearm at an inhabited dwelling (id., § 246).  During trial, the 
prosecution successfully moved to amend the original 
information to add another attempted robbery count, for a total 
of five robbery counts.  Other than the additional robbery count 
(and the enhancements attached to it, which are described 
further 
below), 
this 
first 
amended 
information 
was 
substantively identical to the original.   
 
For each of the substantive offenses charged, the 
information alleged various sentence enhancements.  This case 
concerns firearm enhancements under Penal Code section 
12022.53 (section 12022.53).  That provision “imposes sentence 
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
3 
enhancements for firearm use applicable to certain enumerated 
felonies.  [Citations.]  These enhancements vary in length, 
corresponding to various uses of a firearm.”  (People v. Garcia 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 1166, 1171.)  In connection with the murder 
count, which was count 1, the first amended information alleged 
Anderson was subject to a 25-year-to-life enhancement based on 
vicarious liability for the injurious discharge of a firearm by a 
coparticipant in a gang-related offense.  (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), 
(e).)  By contrast, in connection with each of the robbery counts, 
which were counts 3 through 7, the information alleged two 
personal use firearm enhancements — one a 10-year 
enhancement (id., subd. (b)) and the other a three-, four-, or 10-
year enhancement (id., § 12022.5, subd. (a)).  None of the five 
robbery counts included a 25-year-to-life vicarious firearm 
discharge enhancement allegation under section 12022.53, 
subdivision (e) (section 12022.53(e)).   
 
Before trial, the prosecution offered to strike all charges 
and enhancements if Anderson pleaded guilty to second degree 
murder with a 15-year-to-life penalty, as well as to one count of 
robbery and one count of being an active participant in a street 
gang.  Anderson rejected the deal.  At that time, the prosecutor 
stated in open court that, by his calculations, Anderson, then 
age 25, faced approximately “60 years to life or more” if he lost 
at trial — a calculation apparently based on the premise that 
Anderson faced only one 25-year-to-life enhancement, the 
enhancement alleged in connection with the murder count.   
 
At trial, the evidence connected Anderson to the robberies 
outside the house party in San Francisco.  No witness could 
clearly identify the person who shot and killed Roche-Balsam, 
but witnesses identified Anderson as one of several people 
holding a gun and robbing partygoers.  An expert witness opined 
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
4 
that Anderson was a member of a gang called Randolph Mob 
and that the crimes were gang related.   
 
The trial court instructed the jury that it could find that 
the prosecution proved the elements of the 25-year-to-life 
vicarious firearm discharge enhancements under section 
12022.53(e) as to the robbery counts — even though they were 
not alleged in the operative information — and approved verdict 
forms to the same effect.  The record does not show definitively 
how this occurred, but it appears the prosecution requested this 
instruction as to the robbery counts after the close of the 
evidence.  The jury convicted Anderson on all 10 counts and 
returned true findings on all the enhancement allegations 
contained in the verdict forms.   
 
At the sentencing hearing the prosecution initially asked 
the court to impose the less severe 10-year personal firearm-use 
enhancements, which had been pleaded in the information, and 
to “[i]mpose and stay” the 25-year-to-life vicarious firearm 
discharge enhancements as to the robbery counts.  Uncertain 
whether the court had the authority to impose and stay the 
enhancements, the defense asked the court to strike them 
altogether.  After a short recess to study the issue, the 
prosecution pointed the court to People v. Palacios (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 720, which held that Penal Code section 654 does not 
preclude imposing multiple section 12022.53 enhancements, 
even when the enhancements are based on a single shot fired at 
a single victim.  (Palacios, at pp. 723–733.)  Based on Palacios, 
the prosecution asked the trial court to impose the 25-year-to-
life enhancements as to the five robbery counts after all.  The 
defense objected on the ground that the prosecution’s 
recommended sentence would constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment.  (See U.S. Const., 8th Amend.)  The court overruled 
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
5 
the objection and sentenced Anderson to a total of 189 years to 
life, including a total of 125 years to life for the enhancements 
corresponding to the five robbery counts.   
 
On appeal, Anderson argued for the first time that the 
trial court erred in imposing the five unpleaded 25-year-to-life 
enhancements because the enhancements had not been 
adequately pleaded in the charging document.  Anderson relied 
on People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735 (Mancebo), where 
we held that a court could not impose a sentence under the “One 
Strike” law (Pen. Code, § 667.61) based on a multiple-victim 
circumstance not alleged in the accusatory pleading.  (Mancebo, 
at p. 739.) 
 
The Court of Appeal rejected Anderson’s argument in a 
footnote of its unpublished opinion (People v. Anderson (Nov. 19, 
2018, A136451)), concluding “defendant was properly sentenced 
in conformity with People v. Riva (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 981.”1  
In Riva, the Court of Appeal held that an information 
adequately pleaded a section 12022.53, subdivision (d) (section 
12022.53(d)) firearm enhancement as to one count by alleging 
the enhancement as to other counts based on the same set of 
facts.  (Riva, at pp. 1000–1003.)  The court distinguished 
Mancebo on the ground that the enhancement at issue in that 
case had not been pleaded as to any count, while in Riva the 
relevant enhancement “was pled by number and description as 
                                        
1  
The Court of Appeal remanded the matter to the trial 
court for it to exercise its newly acquired discretion under 
section 12022.53, amended subdivision (h) (Stats. 2017, ch. 682, 
§ 2), to strike the enhancements imposed under that section and 
for Anderson to augment the record with information relevant 
to his youth offender parole hearing, but otherwise affirmed.   
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
6 
to some of the counts in the information, just not the one on 
which the trial court imposed it.”  (Riva, at p. 1002.) 
 
We granted review to decide whether the trial court erred 
by imposing firearm enhancements under section 12022.53(e) 
that were not pleaded in connection with the relevant counts. 
II. 
 
As a rule, all sentence enhancements “shall be alleged in 
the accusatory pleading and either admitted by the defendant 
in open court or found to be true by the trier of fact.”  (Pen. Code, 
§ 1170.1, subd. (e) (section 1170.1(e)).)  Firearm enhancements 
under section 12022.53(e) are no exception to this rule.  Another 
statutory pleading provision, specific to section 12022.53 
enhancements, restates the same basic point:  For any of the 
firearm enhancements prescribed by section 12022.53 to apply, 
“the existence of any fact required [by the relevant provision] 
shall be alleged in the accusatory pleading and either admitted 
by the defendant in open court or found to be true by the trier of 
fact.”  (§ 12022.53, subd. (j); see People v. Garcia, supra, 28 
Cal.4th at p. 1175 [describing this provision as “simply a 
restatement of section 1170.1[](e)”].)  And still another statutory 
provision, specific to the particular vicarious liability firearm 
enhancement at issue here, sets out its own pleading 
requirements:  Section 12022.53(e) says the vicarious liability 
enhancements shall apply only if the prosecution has both “pled 
and proved” that the defendant committed a felony on behalf of 
a street gang (see Pen. Code, § 186.22) and that a “principal in 
the offense committed any act specified in subdivision (b), (c), or 
(d)” — that is, an act that would trigger a firearm enhancement 
had 
the 
defendant 
committed 
that 
act 
personally.  
(§ 12022.53(e)(1).) 
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
7 
 
Beneath all three statutory pleading requirements lies a 
bedrock principle of due process.  “ ‘No principle of procedural 
due process is more clearly established than that notice of the 
specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues 
raised by that charge, if desired, are among the constitutional 
rights of every accused in a criminal proceeding in all courts, 
state or federal.’  [Citations.]  ‘A criminal defendant must be 
given fair notice of the charges against him in order that he may 
have a reasonable opportunity properly to prepare a defense and 
avoid unfair surprise at trial.’ ”  (People v. Toro (1989) 47 Cal.3d 
966, 973 (Toro).)  This goes for sentence enhancements as well 
as substantive offenses:  A defendant has the “right to fair notice 
of the specific sentence enhancement allegations that will be 
invoked to increase punishment for his crimes.”  (Mancebo, 
supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 747.)   
 
The question before us is whether the accusatory pleading 
in this case gave Anderson adequate notice of the allegations 
that were ultimately invoked to add at least 125 years to his 
sentence.  The information alleged a section 12022.53(e) 
vicarious liability enhancement as to the murder count but not 
as to the robbery counts.  Both parties now agree that the 
operative information did not provide Anderson with statutorily 
adequate notice that the prosecution would seek to invoke 
vicarious liability enhancements as to each of the robberies.  We 
agree as well. 
 
The starting point for our inquiry is Mancebo.  That case 
concerned the pleading requirements under the One Strike law, 
Penal Code section 667.61 (section 667.61), which provides an 
alternative, more severe set of penalties for certain sex offenses 
committed under certain enumerated circumstances.  We held 
in Mancebo that the trial court had erred by imposing a One 
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
8 
Strike sentence based on an unpleaded multiple victim 
circumstance.  (Mancebo, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 739–754.)  We 
relied primarily on the plain language of section 667.61.  
(Mancebo, at p. 743.)  Section 667.61, subdivision (i), at the time, 
read:  “ ‘For the penalties provided in this section to apply, the 
existence of any fact required under subdivision (d) or (e) shall 
be alleged in the accusatory pleading and either admitted by the 
defendant in open court or found to be true by the trier of fact.’ ”  
(Mancebo, at p. 742, fn. 4, quoting § 667.61, former subd. (i), as 
amended by Stats. 1997, ch. 817, § 6, p. 5577.)  Section 667.61, 
subdivision (f) further said that the “ ‘circumstances . . . 
required for the punishment’ ” under the One Strike law had to 
be “ ‘pled and proved.’ ”  (Mancebo, at p. 742, fn. 4, quoting 
§ 667.61, former subd. (f).)  Even though the facts that would 
establish the multiple victim circumstance (i.e., that the 
defendant’s crimes involved multiple victims) were evident from 
the information, nothing in the information revealed that the 
prosecution sought to use the multiple victim circumstance as a 
basis for One Strike sentencing.2  This, we held, violated “the 
                                        
2  
The information had alleged two qualifying circumstances 
with respect to each victim.  (Mancebo, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 
pp. 742–743.)  As to victim Y., it had alleged kidnapping and 
firearm use circumstances.  (Id. at p. 742.)  As to victim R., it 
had alleged firearm use and binding.  (Id. at pp. 742–743.)  
When it came to sentencing, the trial court imposed a One Strike 
sentence but also a 10-year firearm use enhancement under 
Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a).  (Mancebo, at 
p. 744.)  The relevant statute prohibited the court from using 
the firearm use circumstances both as the basis for this 10-year 
firearm-use enhancement and as the basis for One Strike 
sentencing.  (See § 667.61, subd. (f).)  To get around this 
problem, the trial court had substituted the unpleaded multiple 
 
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
9 
explicit pleading provisions of the One Strike law,” as well as 
the due process principles underlying them.  (Mancebo, at 
p. 743; see id. at pp. 739, 753.)  We explained that the 
prosecution has the power to make discretionary charging 
decisions, and the information was reasonably read to indicate 
that the prosecution had chosen to exercise that discretion in not 
charging a multiple victim circumstance.  (Id. at p. 749.)  The 
information failed to provide the defendant with fair notice that 
the prosecution would instead seek to rely on that allegation to 
increase his punishment.  (Id. at p. 753.) 
 
Mancebo’s 
holding 
was 
limited 
to 
the 
pleading 
requirements of section 667.1, subdivisions (f) and (i).  
(Mancebo, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 745, fn. 5.)  But Mancebo’s 
reasoning was not so limited.  California courts accordingly have 
followed Mancebo’s lead in interpreting various other statutory 
pleading 
requirements, 
including 
section 
12022.53(e)’s 
requirement that certain facts must be “pled and proved” in 
connection with the defendant’s “offense.”  In People v. Botello 
(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1022–1026, for example, two 
codefendants were charged with and convicted for their roles in 
a gang-related shooting and the jury found true allegations 
supporting an enhancement under section 12022.53(d) for 
having personally discharged a firearm in the commission of the 
offense, causing great bodily injury.  On appeal, because no 
evidence showed which of the two defendants was the shooter, 
the People conceded the personal use enhancements could not 
stand.  (Botello, at p. 1022.)  But the People asked the court 
instead to impose vicarious liability enhancements under 
                                        
victim circumstance for the pleaded firearm use circumstances.  
(Mancebo, at pp. 738–739.)   
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
10 
section 12022.53(e), noting that all the necessary findings had 
been made by the jury in connection with other charges.  
(Botello, at p. 1022.)  Citing Mancebo, the Court of Appeal 
refused.  (Botello, at pp. 1022–1027.)  It explained that the 
accusatory pleading had charged defendants only with personal 
use enhancements, not vicarious liability enhancements.  (Id. at 
p. 1027.)  Under Mancebo, “to apply section 12022.53, 
subdivision (e)(1) for the first time on appeal would violate the 
express pleading requirement of that provision, and defendants’ 
due process right to notice that subdivision (e)(1) would be used 
to increase their sentences.”  (Botello, at p. 1027.) 
 
We now confirm that the reasoning of Mancebo applies 
equally to a sentence enhancement imposed under section 
12022.53 and hold that the information in this case did not 
comport with the relevant statutory pleading requirements.  
Anderson was entitled to a pleading that provided him with fair 
notice that he faced 25-year-to-life enhancements under section 
12022.53(e) as to each charged robbery offense if this was the 
prosecution’s intent.  The operative information here did not 
allege that a coparticipant in the robbery offenses discharged a 
firearm, causing great bodily injury or death; it alleged only that 
Anderson personally used a firearm in the commission of those 
crimes.  The information therefore did not comply with the 
applicable statutory pleading requirements, nor did it comport 
with the due process principles underlying those requirements. 
 
In concluding otherwise, the Court of Appeal relied on 
Riva, which concerned the pleading of enhancements under 
section 12022.53(d) for personally discharging a firearm.  In 
Riva, the defendant had fired a gun from inside his car at the 
occupants of another car, injuring a nearby pedestrian.  (People 
v. Riva, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 986 (Riva).)  The defendant 
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
11 
was charged by information with attempted voluntary 
manslaughter, assault, and shooting at an occupied vehicle.  
(Ibid.)  The information also alleged a firearm enhancement 
under section 12022.53(d) in connection with the attempted 
voluntary manslaughter and assault counts.  (Riva, at p. 1000.)  
Although the information did not also allege a firearm 
enhancement in connection with the shooting-at-an-occupied-
vehicle count, the verdict forms nonetheless asked the jurors to 
determine 
whether 
the 
prosecution 
had 
proved 
the 
enhancements as to all three counts, and the jury found them 
true as to all three.  (Ibid.)  The trial court then imposed the 
section 12022.53(d) enhancement only for the shooting-at-an-
occupied-vehicle count — the one count as to which the 
enhancement was not pleaded.  (Riva, at pp. 1000–1001.)   
 
The Court of Appeal in Riva held that the information 
satisfied the statutory pleading requirements, notwithstanding 
this omission, because “the enhancement under section 
12022.53[](d) was pled by number and description as to some of 
the counts in the information, just not the one on which the trial 
court imposed it.”  (Riva, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 1002, 
italics added.)  The pleading, the court ruled, thus “complied 
with the literal language” of section 12022.53, subdivision (j), 
which requires that the accusatory pleading allege the facts 
supporting any section 12022.53 firearm enhancement but does 
not expressly require that the information allege those facts in 
connection with a particular count.  (Riva, at p. 1001.)  The court 
underscored that the information in that case did allege the 
relevant facts supporting the enhancement in connection with 
other counts of the information.  (Ibid.)  The court also reasoned 
that the case raised no concerns about fair notice comparable to 
those in Mancebo:  The information put the defendant on notice 
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
12 
that he had to defend against the allegation that he personally 
and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily 
injury in the course of the shooting because the allegation was 
pleaded as to two other counts stemming from the defendant’s 
same conduct.  (Riva, at p. 1003.) 
 
The Attorney General does not rely on Riva, instead 
conceding that the prosecution was required to plead the 
vicarious liability enhancements under section 12022.53(e) in 
connection with the robbery counts if it wished for the court to 
impose those enhancements as to those counts.  We accept the 
concession and, further, disapprove People v. Riva, supra, 112 
Cal.App.4th 981.  The statutory pleading requirements of 
section 12022.53 and section 1170.1(e), read against the 
backdrop of due process, require more than simply alleging the 
facts 
supporting 
an 
enhancement 
somewhere 
in 
the 
information.  (Contra, Riva, at p. 1001.)  The pleading must 
provide the defendant with fair notice of the potential sentence.  
A pleading that alleges an enhancement as to one count does not 
provide fair notice that the same enhancement might be 
imposed as to a different count.  When a pleading alleges an 
enhancement in connection with one count but not another, the 
defendant is ordinarily entitled to assume the prosecution made 
a discretionary choice not to pursue the enhancement on the 
second count, and to rely on that choice in making decisions such 
as whether to plead guilty or proceed to trial.  (See People v. 
Sweeney (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 295, 301 [information alleging 
gang enhancements under Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b) did not 
give the defendant adequate notice that enhancement under 
Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (d) might apply].)  Fair notice 
requires that every sentence enhancement be pleaded in 
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
13 
connection with every count as to which it is imposed.  (See 
People v. Nguyen (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 260, 267.) 
 
The Riva court reasoned that the pleading failure there 
did not interfere with the defendant’s ability to contest the 
factual basis for the allegation at trial because the same 
enhancement was pleaded as to other counts.  (Riva, supra, 112 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1003.)  Given the specific circumstances of the 
case, the defendant was “on notice he had to defend against the 
allegation,” and it seemed unlikely the error “affected his 
decision whether to plea bargain.”  (Ibid.)  These are not, 
however, reasons to conclude that no pleading error occurred; 
they are reasons to conclude the error was not prejudicial.  The 
Riva court erred by confusing the question whether the pleading 
was adequate with the separate question whether the pleading 
defect prejudiced the defendant (see pt. III, post).   
 
Here the section 12022.53(e) vicarious firearm discharge 
allegation as to the murder count failed to provide Anderson 
with fair notice that the prosecution would seek additional 
vicarious firearm discharge enhancements as to each of the five 
robberies, with each enhancement carrying an additional 
penalty of 25 years to life.  Indeed, Anderson had reason to 
believe the prosecution was exercising its discretion not to seek 
the same 25-year-to-life enhancement as to the robbery counts:  
With respect to those counts, the prosecution chose to allege 
other, lesser enhancements for personal use of a firearm under 
section 12022.53, subdivision (b) and Penal Code section 
12022.5, subdivision (a).  Insofar as the prosecution 
nevertheless sought to impose the uncharged vicarious liability 
enhancements as to the robbery counts, we agree with both 
parties that the operative information failed to comply with the 
relevant statutory pleading requirements. 
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
14 
 
We do not mean to suggest that an information that fails 
to plead the specific numerical subdivision of an enhancement 
is necessarily inadequate.  (Mancebo, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 
p. 753.)  Neither the relevant statutes nor the due process clause 
requires rigid code pleading or the incantation of magic words.  
But the accusatory pleading must adequately inform the 
defendant as to how the prosecution will seek to exercise its 
discretion.  Here the information had to inform Anderson that 
he faced five additional 25-year-to-life enhancements in 
connection with the five robbery counts.  It failed to do so. 
III. 
Although the Attorney General acknowledges that the 
information did not satisfy the applicable statutory pleading 
requirements, he urges us to uphold Anderson’s sentence on the 
ground that the jury instructions and verdict forms gave 
Anderson sufficient notice that he faced the five 25-year-to-life 
additional vicarious firearm discharge enhancements as to the 
robbery counts.  The Attorney General makes three arguments 
in this vein.  He first argues that, because Anderson failed to 
object to the instructions or verdict forms submitting the 
challenged vicarious firearm discharge enhancements to the 
jury, he impliedly consented to an informal amendment of the 
information.  Alternatively, the Attorney General argues 
Anderson’s failure to object forfeited his right to raise the issue 
on appeal.  Finally, the Attorney General argues Anderson 
cannot show he was harmed by the pleading defect and has thus 
failed to establish reversible error.  We reject all three 
arguments.  
 
 
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
15 
A. 
 
As previously noted, although the information did not 
plead vicarious firearm discharge enhancements with respect to 
the five robbery counts, the jury instructions and verdict forms 
nonetheless asked the jury to return findings that would 
support these enhancements.  The record does not reveal 
precisely how this came to pass.  But we know defense counsel 
did not object to the instructions or verdict forms, instead 
initialing the relevant documents and telling the court the 
instructions “appear to be in order and complete.”  The Attorney 
General argues that, by failing to object, Anderson impliedly 
consented to an informal amendment of the information to add 
the additional enhancement allegations as to the robbery 
counts.   
 
Under the Penal Code, an accusatory pleading may be 
amended for “defect or insufficiency, at any stage of the 
proceedings.”  (Pen. Code, § 1009.)  After the defendant has 
entered a plea, amending the accusatory pleading requires leave 
of court, which may be granted or denied in the court’s discretion 
provided the amendment does not “change the offense charged” 
or otherwise prejudice the defendant’s substantial rights.  (Ibid.; 
People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 129.)  Here the Attorney 
General did not seek leave to amend the information, nor was 
leave granted.  But in certain limited circumstances, we have 
recognized informal, unwritten amendments as effective.  This 
is what the Attorney General argues we should do here.   
 
The Attorney General’s argument relies primarily on 
Toro.  In that case, we held that the defendant’s failure to object 
on notice grounds to the inclusion of a lesser related offense on 
the verdict form forfeited his inadequate notice claim on appeal.  
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
16 
(Toro, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 976–977.)  We considered this 
failure to object to be implied consent to treat the information 
as informally amended to include the lesser offense.  (Ibid.)  But 
our willingness to imply the defendant’s consent to amend from 
his silence rested on considerations specific to that situation.  
We emphasized that “submission of lesser related offenses to the 
jury enhances the reliability of the fact-finding process to the 
benefit of both the defendant and the People.”  (Id. at pp. 969–
970, italics added; see also id. at p. 977 [“Lesser related offense 
instructions generally are beneficial to defendants and in a 
given case only the defendant knows whether his substantial 
rights will be prejudicially affected by submitting a lesser 
related offense to the jury”].)  This was true in Toro itself, where 
submission of the lesser related instruction to the jury permitted 
the defendant to escape far more severe punishment for an 
admitted act of violence.  (Id. at pp. 970–971 [explaining that 
the defendant, who had initially been charged with attempted 
murder and assault with a deadly weapon, put on no defense at 
trial and conceded he had stabbed the victim; court was entitled 
to imply the defendant’s consent to submit lesser related charge 
of 
battery 
with 
serious 
bodily 
injury 
for 
the 
jury’s 
consideration].)  We drew support from out-of-state cases 
holding that “instructing on a nonincluded offense may not be 
cited as error on appeal if the defendant had an opportunity to 
object to the instructions but failed to do so and the offense is 
lesser in degree and penalty than the charged offense.”  (Id. at 
p. 977, italics added, citing Ray v. State (Fla. 1981) 403 So.2d 
956, 961.) 
 
The situation in Toro, in which the jury was given the 
option of convicting the defendant of a lesser offense, was quite 
different from the situation we confront in this case.  Unlike the 
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
17 
defendant in Toro, Anderson derived no possible benefit from 
submitting the unpleaded 25-year-to-life enhancements to the 
jury.  There is therefore no reason to presume from defense 
counsel’s silence that Anderson consented to this procedure.  
(Cf., e.g., People v. Ramirez (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 603, 623 
[“Conviction for an uncharged greater offense not only raises the 
problem of notice but makes the inference of consent more 
difficult, as there is no reason why a defendant should acquiesce 
in substitution of a greater for a lesser offense.”]; People v. 
Haskin (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1440 [applying same 
principle in context of sentence enhancements].) 
 
The reasoning of People v. Arias (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 
1009 is persuasive on this point.  In that case the Court of 
Appeal held that the defendant’s sentences for two attempted 
murders violated the relevant statutory pleading requirements 
because the prosecution failed to allege that the offenses were 
committed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation — a 
fact that increased the defendant’s punishment.  (Id. at 
pp. 1016–1020; Pen. Code, § 664, subd. (a).)  The People argued 
the defendant impliedly consented to an informal amendment of 
the information by approving jury instructions and verdict 
forms that asked the jury to determine whether the defendant 
acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation.  (Arias, at 
p. 1020.)  The court rejected this argument, distinguishing Toro:  
Unlike with lesser related offense instructions, the “defense will 
generally have no tactical interest in presenting the jury with a 
new avenue for imposing greater punishment.  Had the 
prosecution sought to amend the information to include the 
missing allegations, the defense may well have objected.  Of 
course, it is the People’s burden to show implied consent by the 
defense.  Given the absence of anything in the record showing 
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
18 
an amendment — and because the defense had no apparent 
reason to consent to one — we decline to extend the Toro holding 
to this situation.”  (Arias, at p. 1021.)   
 
Based on People v. Sandoval (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 111, 
132–134, the Attorney General argues courts may apply the so-
called informal amendment doctrine not just where it benefits 
the defendant but also to allow for the addition of greater crimes 
or additional enhancements.  In Sandoval, the prosecution, 
formally, in open court, and with the defendant and counsel 
present, orally requested and was granted an amendment to the 
information to allege a prior strike conviction that increased the 
defendant’s sentence.  (Id. at p. 134.)  Defense counsel stated she 
had no objection to the amendment.  (Ibid.)  The defendant then 
admitted the strike in open court and signed a plea form 
admitting the same.  (Ibid.)  The record there made clear that 
the defendant “had reasonable notice of the prior strike 
allegation and that any defect in the form of the allegation did 
not prejudice [him].”  (Ibid.)  The oral amendment of the 
information, therefore, provided the defendant with adequate 
notice of the prior strike allegation.  (Ibid.) 
 
Sandoval makes clear that not every amendment to a 
pleading — even one that increases the defendant’s potential 
criminal liability — need be made in writing.  But the problem 
in this case is not just that there was no written amendment to 
the information.  Here, in contrast to Sandoval, there was no 
hearing in open court where the prosecution asked to make an 
oral amendment to the information to add the section 
12022.53(e) enhancements as to the robbery counts, nor was 
Anderson asked if he consented to the amendment, nor did the 
trial court ever grant such a request. 
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
19 
 
All we are left with, then, is counsel’s failure to object to 
certain jury instructions and verdict forms that presented a set 
of issues to the jury that radically increased the potential 
penalties Anderson faced.  For all the record shows, the drafting 
of the instructions and verdict forms may have simply been a 
mistake the parties did not manage to catch before it was too 
late.  Under these circumstances, to treat defense counsel’s lack 
of objection as acquiescence or consent would go a long way 
toward eroding Anderson’s right to notice of the potential 
penalties he faced.  We conclude no informal amendment of the 
information occurred here. 
B. 
The Attorney General next argues Anderson forfeited his 
statutory notice claim by failing to raise it in the trial court.  As 
noted above, when it became clear, on the day of sentencing, that 
the prosecution intended to ask the court to impose the 25-year-
to-life enhancements as to each of the five robbery counts, 
defense counsel objected in writing and orally, but only on 
Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment grounds.  
(See U.S. Const., 8th Amend.)  She did not call the trial court’s 
attention to any deficiency in the information as to these 
enhancements.  We conclude, however, that the pleading failure 
here is the type of error we should address even though 
Anderson did not bring it to the trial court’s attention.   
As a general rule, a criminal defendant who fails to object 
at trial to a purportedly erroneous ruling forfeits the right to 
challenge that ruling on appeal.  (People v. Smith (2001) 24 
Cal.4th 849, 852.)  But there are exceptions to this rule.  (See In 
re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 881, fn. 2 (Sheena K.).)  
Anderson argues his case falls into a “narrow exception” for 
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
20 
“ ‘unauthorized sentence[s]’ ” or those entered in “ ‘excess of 
jurisdiction.’ ”  (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354.)   
Anderson’s argument relies heavily on Mancebo, where we 
reached the merits of the pleading deficiency issue even though 
the defendant had not objected at the time of sentencing.  
(Mancebo, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 749, fn. 7.)  We explained:  “In 
People v. Scott[, supra,] 9 Cal.4th 331, we held that ‘complaints 
about the manner in which the trial court exercises its 
sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons 
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.’  (Id. at p. 356.)  We 
distinguished as outside the scope of the rule nonwaivable 
errors such as ‘legal error resulting in an unauthorized sentence 
[that] commonly occurs where the court violates mandatory 
provisions governing the length of confinement.’  (Id. at p. 354, 
fn. omitted.)”  (Mancebo, at pp. 749–750, fn. 7.)  Because the One 
Strike law precluded the trial court from imposing the 
unpleaded enhancement, leaving no room for the exercise of 
sentencing discretion, we held that “the waiver rule announced 
in Scott is inapplicable here.”  (Id. at p. 750, fn. 7.)  Anderson 
reads this footnote to mean that the imposition of an unpleaded 
enhancement necessarily results in an unauthorized sentence. 
Anderson is not alone in this reading.  (See, e.g., Mancebo, 
supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 755, 758 (dis. opn. of Brown, J.) 
[criticizing the majority for its expansion of the unauthorized 
sentence doctrine].)  But as subsequent cases make clear, 
Mancebo does not stand for the broad proposition that 
imposition of an unpleaded enhancement necessarily results in 
an unauthorized sentence that may be raised, and corrected, for 
the first time on appeal.  
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
21 
The unauthorized sentence doctrine is designed to provide 
relief from forfeiture for “obvious legal errors at sentencing that 
are correctable without referring to factual findings in the 
record or remanding for further findings.”  (People v. Smith, 
supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 852.)  It applies when the trial court has 
imposed a sentence that “could not lawfully be imposed under 
any circumstance in the particular case.”  (People v. Scott, supra, 
9 Cal.4th at p. 354.)  Take, for example, a sentence in excess of 
the statutory maximum.  An appellate court would be required 
to correct such an error even if raised for the first time on appeal, 
since such a correction would require no fact-specific inquiry and 
the sentence would be unlawful under any circumstances.  (See 
People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 349.)   
To impose unpleaded sentence enhancements is an error 
of a different variety, a point we made clear in People v. Houston 
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1227 (Houston).  In that case, a capital 
defendant contended he was improperly sentenced to life 
imprisonment for attempted murder, in addition to his death 
sentence, because the indictment failed to allege that the 
attempted murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated.  
(Id. at p. 1225.)  Much as in this case, the defendant claimed the 
omission violated an express statutory pleading requirement; 
the relevant statute required that “ ‘the fact that the attempted 
murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated [must be] 
charged in the accusatory pleading . . . .’ ”  (Ibid., quoting Pen. 
Code, § 664, former subd. 1, as amended by Stats. 1986, ch. 519, 
§ 2, p. 1859.)  We held that the defendant forfeited the claim.  
(Houston, at pp. 1228–1229.)  The trial court had, during trial, 
given the defendant notice of his potential sentence on the 
attempted murder count and asked the parties if they had 
objections to instructions and verdict forms asking the jury to 
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
22 
determine whether the attempted murders were willful, 
deliberate, and premeditated.  (Id. at p. 1227.)  We distinguished 
a follow-on case to Mancebo — and, by implication, Mancebo 
itself — on the ground that the court in Houston “actually 
notified defendant of the possible sentence he faced before his 
case was submitted to the jury, and defendant had sufficient 
opportunity to object to the indictment and request additional 
time to formulate a defense.”  (Houston, at p. 1229.)  By 
affirming on forfeiture grounds, Houston effectively rejected the 
notion that a pleading defect necessarily results in an 
unauthorized sentence. 
Even so, as Mancebo itself illustrates, we have the power 
to reach the merits of Anderson’s claim here, notwithstanding 
his failure to object below.  It is well settled that an appellate 
court may decide an otherwise forfeited claim where the trial 
court has made an error affecting “an important issue of 
constitutional law or a substantial right.”  (Sheena K., supra, 40 
Cal.4th at p. 887, fn. 7.)  In Mancebo, the trial court made such 
an error, and it was therefore within our discretion to correct it 
notwithstanding the absence of a timely objection.  The trial 
court in this case made much the same sort of error, and we 
address it for much the same reasons. 
First of all, the error here is clear and obvious.  The trial 
court imposed five 25-year-to-life enhancements even though 
they were never pleaded, in contravention of the express 
pleading requirements of the relevant statutes.  Second, the 
error affected substantial rights by depriving Anderson of timely 
notice of the potential sentence he faced.  In this case — like 
Mancebo and unlike Houston — there was no midtrial 
discussion highlighting the prosecution’s intent to seek the more 
serious vicarious firearm enhancements instead of the less 
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
23 
serious personal-use enhancements charged in the information.  
Rather, as discussed in more detail below (post, pt. C), the 
prosecution’s intentions did not become clear until the day of the 
sentencing hearing.  And finally, the error was one that goes to 
the overall fairness of the proceeding.  We thus conclude this is 
a case where we should reach the merits of Anderson’s claim. 
C. 
The Attorney General’s final argument is that the 
pleading error here was harmless because Anderson received 
adequate notice before the trial court imposed the sentence 
enhancements and could thus prepare his defense strategy 
accordingly.  (See Pen. Code, § 960.)  We disagree.  The record 
does not support a conclusion that Anderson had adequate 
notice of the prosecution’s intention to seek the additional 
section 12022.53(e) enhancements as to the robbery counts, 
notwithstanding the prosecution’s failure to plead those 
enhancements in the information.   
In the middle of trial, the prosecution filed proposed jury 
instructions that listed the Judicial Council of California 
Criminal Jury Instruction numbers for those instructions it 
planned to request.  The list included CALCRIM No. 1402 — the 
citation for the vicarious firearm discharge instruction.  But the 
proposed instructions did not specify whether the prosecution 
was asking the court to give that instruction as to the murder 
count or as to the robbery counts.  Based on the filed 
information, the defense would reasonably have assumed that 
the prosecution planned to request the 25-year-to-life 
enhancement instruction only as to the murder count.   
Then, the day before the parties rested, the prosecution 
filed a written, amended information, which did not include any 
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
24 
vicarious firearm enhancements as to the robbery counts.  
Again, it appeared the prosecution planned to exercise its 
discretion not to pursue the 25-year-to-life enhancements as to 
the five robbery counts.   
After the parties rested, they reviewed the requested jury 
instructions with the court.  It is, again, unclear from the record 
whether both parties knew at that time that the court intended 
to give the vicarious firearm discharge instruction as to the five 
robbery counts or only as to the murder count.  In the end, the 
instructions and verdict forms given to the jury included the 
unpleaded enhancements as to the robbery counts.  But even 
after the jury convicted, the prosecution did not ask the court to 
impose the vicarious firearm discharge enhancements in 
connection with the robbery counts.  In its first two (of three) 
sentencing memoranda, the prosecution instead asked that the 
court impose lesser firearm use enhancements that had been 
pleaded.  The prosecution’s intention to ask for the five 
unpleaded, 25-year-to-life enhancements only became apparent 
on the day of the sentencing hearing.   
As Mancebo makes clear, the purpose of a statutory 
pleading requirement is not simply to ensure the defendant has 
notice of the potential sentence on the day of sentencing.  It is 
meant to give sufficient notice to permit the defense to make 
informed decisions about the case, including whether to plead 
guilty, how to allocate investigatory resources, and what 
strategy to deploy at trial.  (Mancebo, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 
p. 752.)  Here Anderson learned how many years he might 
expect to serve only just before the jury left to deliberate on his 
guilt, and the prosecution did not clarify its actual intentions 
regarding the enhancements until midway through the 
sentencing hearing.  Indeed, on the day of sentencing, defense 
PEOPLE v. ANDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
25 
counsel remarked that, up until that afternoon, she and her 
client “were looking at it as if 50 to life on the murder charge 
and the enhancement for the murder charge was the more 
significant charge because we weren’t looking at the 12022.53 
as it related to the other counts.”  At that point, the damage was 
done — it was by then too late to consider the prosecution’s 
pretrial plea deal or reshape his trial strategy.  This would be a 
different case if the prosecution had told Anderson from the 
outset that it planned to seek the section 12022.53(e) 
enhancements as to the robbery counts but for some reason 
failed to include them in the information.  (See Houston, supra, 
54 Cal.4th at pp. 1227–1228.)  But no such discussion occurred 
here.  Here the notice given was too late to cure the defective 
pleading.  Anderson received inadequate notice of the potential 
sentence he faced, and the deficiency was not harmless. 
IV. 
 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand with instructions to remand the case to the trial court 
for resentencing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               KRUGER, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Anderson   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 11/19/18 – 1st Dist., Div. 3 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted     
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S253227  
Date Filed:  July 23, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior      
County:  San Francisco      
Judge:  Anne-Christine Massullo      
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
John Ward, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, 
Edward C. DuMont, State Solicitor General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Samuel P. 
Siegel, Deputy State Solicitor General, Catherine A. Rivlin, Ann P. Wathen and Greg E. Zywicke, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
John Ward   
Attorney at Law 
584 Castro Street, No. 802 
San Francisco, CA 94114 
(415) 255-4996 
 
Samuel P. Siegel 
Deputy State Solicitor General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA 95819 
(916) 210-6269