Case Title: Strong Construction Inc., v. City of Torrington

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0171

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-05-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
STRONG CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. CITY OF TORRINGTON2011 WY 82Case Number: No. S-10-0171Decided: 05/23/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011

STRONG CONSTRUCTION, 
INC.,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
CITY OF 
TORRINGTON,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Goshen County

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 
Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
Douglas W. Weaver, 
Wheatland, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
            
James A. Eddington, Jones & Eddington Law Offices, Torrington, 
Wyoming.

 
 
 
 

Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
The 
City of Torrington filed suit against Strong Construction, Inc., alleging breach 
of contract based on Strong's failure to supply and install water pump motors 
that conformed to contract specifications.  
After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the 
City.  Strong challenges the 
district court's decision.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]      
Strong presents the 
following issues:

 
 

1.    
Did the court err 
when it held Strong Construction breached the agreement with the City of 
Torrington and awarded the City of Torrington damages and attorney 
fees?

 
 

2.    
Was the City of 
Torrington's claim barred by the one year warranty period, pursuant to Article 
13.07 of the Standard General Conditions of the construction 
contract?

 
 

3.    
Is Strong 
Construction obligated to pay any portion of the judgment attributed to Baker 
and Associates' negligence?

 
 
The City phrases the 
issue as follows:

 
 

1.    
Were the trial 
court's factual findings and legal conclusions supported by the 
record?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
Strong entered into 
an Agreement with the City to provide general contracting services on the second 
phase of a municipal water project.  
The Agreement incorporated the "Standard General Conditions of the 
Construction Contract" prepared by the Engineers Joint Contract Documents 
Committee, No. 1910-8 (1996 Edition) (General Conditions).  As part of the project, Strong hired 
subcontractor Kelly-Deines Irrigation to supply and install three submersible 
water pumps and motors in three separate wells in a well field.  Prior to commencement of the work, 
Strong was required to submit plans and specifications relating to the motors to 
the City's engineer, Baker & Associates, Inc., for 
approval.

 
 

[¶4]        
The parties' 
Agreement required Strong to "furnish complete details of the pump and motor 
[it] intends to provide," including "[e]lectric motor performance and 
construction data."  The Agreement 
specified that the motors would need to operate at a frequency of 60 hertz and 
that they would need to be compatible with a "variable frequency drive" (VFD), 
which would allow the motors to operate within a range of frequencies.  The Agreement, however, did not specify 
the range of frequencies within which the motors would need to 
operate.

 
 

[¶5]        
Strong submitted 
specifications relating to a Hitachi motor, and Kelly-Deines ultimately supplied 
and installed Hitachi motors.  The 
district court found that Strong's submittals included a set of seven pages 
describing specifications relating to the Hitachi motor.  However, those seven pages included a 
document setting forth guidelines relating to a Centripro motor (Centripro 
Guidelines).  The Centripro 
Guidelines indicated that the motor would operate within a range of 42 to 60 
hertz and that the motor had "been used extensively with variable frequency 
drives."  The submittals were 
approved by Baker & Associates on March 17, 2005.

 
 

[¶6]        
In April of 2005, 
approximately four weeks before the motors were shipped to Kelly-Deines, the 
supplier sent revised operational guidelines for the Hitachi motor to 
Kelly-Deines indicating that the motors could operate only in the range of 55 to 
60 hertz.  Kelly-Deines, however, 
did not provide this information to Strong, to the City, or to Baker & 
Associates.  The pumps and motors 
were installed in the wells in July of 2005, but were not used until March of 
2007, after the third phase of the water project was completed.  After initial electrical problems with 
one of the motors, that motor was removed and replaced with the same model of 
Hitachi motor.  The failed motor was 
sent to the manufacturer, who determined that the type of damage to the motor 
was consistent with damage that typically occurs when the motor is operated for 
extended periods at frequencies between 51 and 55 hertz in conjunction with a 
VFD.  Based on the report by the 
manufacturer indicating a limited operational capacity for the Hitachi motors, 
Baker & Associates adjusted the operation of the well field to prevent the 
other motors from failing.  The 
adjustments, however, reduced the efficiency of the well field and limited water 
production to the City.  The City 
replaced all three Hitachi motors with Pleuger motors that could be operated in 
a wider range of frequencies, which allowed the City to return to normal 
operation of the wells.

 
 

[¶7]        
The City subsequently 
filed suit against Strong in district court, and a bench trial was held on 
February 23 and 24, 2010.  The City 
argued that Strong breached the Agreement by failing to provide motors with the 
specifications represented in Strong's submittals.  These specifications, the City 
contended, included the Centripro Guidelines indicating that the motor would 
operate within a range of 42 to 60 hertz.  
Strong argued that the Hitachi motors met the contract specifications 
because no range of frequencies was specified in the Agreement and because the 
motors operated in a range of 55 to 60 hertz, which, according to Strong, was 
compatible with a VFD.  Strong also 
disputed the City's claim that the contract submittals included the Centripro 
Guidelines and the claim that Baker & Associates relied on that document in 
approving the Hitachi motors.  Further, Strong argued that the one-year 
"Correction Period" for defective work under the General Conditions barred the 
City's claim against Strong. 

 
 

[¶8]        
The district court 
found that Kelly-Deines provided the Centripro Guidelines to Baker & 
Associates prior to approval of the project submittals and, further, that Strong 
was required to submit the information in the Guidelines pursuant to the 
specifications in the parties' Agreement.  The court also found that, in reliance on 
the information contained in the Centripro Guidelines, the parties agreed that 
the motors would have a minimum operating frequency of 42 hertz.  The court held that "Strong[,] through 
its subcontractors[,] breached the contract by providing motors that did not 
have the performance and construction data as represented in the submittal; and 
by providing motors that were incompatible with operation of the variable 
frequency drive system for this project."  The district court entered judgment in 
favor of the City and awarded damages equal to the cost of the replacement 
Hitachi motor and the three Pleuger motors.  Strong appeals the judgment of the 
district court.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 

[¶9]        
When reviewing the 
factual findings of a district court following a bench trial, we apply the 
following standard of review:

 
 
The factual findings 
of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a jury verdict.  While the findings are presumptively 
correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence 
in the record.  Due regard is given 
to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses, and our review does not entail re-weighing disputed evidence.  Findings of fact will not be set aside 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  A finding is clearly erroneous when, 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed. 

Piroschak [v. Whelan, 2005 WY 26], ¶ 7, 106 P.3d 
[887,] 890 [(Wyo. 2005)].  Findings 
may not be set aside because we would have reached a different result.  Harber v. Jensen, 2004 WY 104, ¶ 7, 97 P.3d 57, 60 (Wyo. 2004).  Further, 

 
 
we assume that the 
evidence of the prevailing party below is true and give that party every 
reasonable inference that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from it.  We do not substitute ourselves for the 
trial court as a finder of facts; instead, we defer to those findings 
unless they are unsupported by the record or erroneous as a matter of law.     

Id. (quotation marks omitted).        

Hofstad v. Christie, 2010 WY 134, ¶ 7, 240 P.3d 816, 818 (Wyo. 
2010) (quoting Belden v. Thorkildsen, 2007 WY 68, ¶ 11, 156 P.3d 320, 323 
(Wyo. 2007)).  To the extent that 
this appeal raises questions of law, those questions are reviewed de novo.  Ramsdell v. State, 2006 WY 159, ¶ 11, 
149 P.3d 459, 462 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶10]     
Before 
we address the district court's conclusion that Strong breached the Agreement 
with the City, we must review the court's finding that the Centripro Guidelines, 
indicating that the Hitachi motor would operate in the range of 42 to 60 hertz, 
were provided to Baker & Associates prior to approval of the project 
submittals.  Strong contends the 
district court erred in determining that the Centripro Guidelines were included 
in the project submittals.  This 
document was produced at trial and John Baker of Baker & Associates 
testified that he received the document either from Strong or from Kelly-Deines 
directly.  According to Strong, 
however, the evidence presented at trial establishes that this document was 
never provided with the project submittals.

 
 

[¶11]     
Indeed, 
Strong presented evidence at trial that raised an issue as to whether the 
Centripro Guidelines were included in the project submittals provided to Baker 
& Associates.  First, Strong 
pointed to the fact that the Centripro Guidelines set forth specifications 
relating to a Centripro motor, not a Hitachi motor, and Strong presented 
testimony relating to the distinctions between the two motors.  Second, Strong established that the 
document was not included in the submittals that Baker & Associates returned 
to Strong after approving the submittals.  
Third, Strong noted that other submittals related to the Hitachi motor 
were stamped by the supplier, Mid-America Pump & Supply, identifying the 
customer and project relating to the specifications, and that no such stamp 
appeared on the Centripro Guidelines.  Fourth, and finally, Strong presented 
testimony from Frank Strong and Dave Deines, principals of the contractor and 
subcontractor, respectively, who each claimed that he did not send the document 
to Baker & Associates.

 
 

[¶12]     
After 
weighing the evidence, however, the district court found that the preponderance 
of the evidence established that the Centripro Guidelines were provided to Baker 
& Associates prior to approval of the submittals: 

 
 
            
The Court finds that Kelly-Deines Irrigation did provide specific 
electric motor performance and construction data to Baker and Associates as 
found on page 7 of Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 [the Centripro Guidelines].  The preponderance of the evidence 
establishes that Mid-America provided that information to Kelly-Deines, and 
Kelly-Deines in turn provided it to Baker and Associates; and the Court 
recognizes that Kelly-Deines denies that, but the preponderance shows 
otherwise.

 
 
Under our standard of 
review, which requires that we assume the evidence of the prevailing party is 
true and give that party every reasonable inference that can fairly and 
reasonably be drawn from it, we cannot conclude that the district court's 
determination was clearly erroneous.  
The district court did not articulate its reasons for determining that 
the preponderance of the evidence weighed in favor of Baker & Associates' 
receipt of the Centripro Guidelines.  
Nonetheless, after examining the 
entire record, we are not convinced that a mistake was made.  We note that we do not reweigh the 
evidence or substitute ourselves for the trial court as the finder of fact.  Rather, we defer to the trial court's 
factual findings unless they are unsupported by the record.  

 
 

[¶13]     
Based 
on our review of the record, we find there is ample evidence to support the 
district court's decision that the Centripro Guidelines were provided to Baker 
& Associates prior to approval of the project submittals.  John Baker testified that Baker & 
Associates received the document and relied on the information it contained in 
approving the project submittals.  Dave Deines' testimony that he did not 
provide the document was contradicted by earlier testimony in his deposition, 
where he admitted that the document had been provided to Baker & 
Associates.  Kevin Price, Vice 
President of Sales and Services for the distributor of the Hitachi motor, 
testified that "[t]he only difference [between the Centripro and Hitachi motors] 
is that the Hitachi can be supplied in 1800 or four-pole speed.  The Centripro is manufactured by Hitachi 
under the same specifications and requirements as the Hitachi two-pole 
motor."  This testimony indicates 
that it would be reasonable for Strong to provide, and in turn, for Baker & 
Associates to approve, specifications relating to a Centripro motor despite the 
fact that a Hitachi motor was supplied.  
Finally, John Baker testified that all of the project submittals were not 
received at the same time and that submittals are often sent on a staggered 
timeline, which may explain why some of the submittals were stamped and returned 
and others were not.  In light of 
this evidence, we conclude that the district court's factual findings were 
supported by the evidence and were not clearly erroneous.

 
 

[¶14]     
Having 
concluded that the district court did not err in determining that the Centripro 
Guidelines were provided to Baker & Associates, we must now review the 
district court's determination as to the effect of that document on the parties' 
Agreement.  The district court 
determined that the parties agreed the motor would operate within a range of 42 
to 60 hertz based on the specifications set forth in the Centripro Guidelines 
and concluded that Strong breached the Agreement because it failed to provide a 
motor conforming to those specifications.  Strong contends that the Agreement simply 
required the motor to operate at a frequency of 60 hertz and to be compatible 
with a VFD.  Strong contends that it 
fulfilled its obligations under the Agreement by providing a motor that met the 
60 hertz and VFD compatibility criteria.  
We disagree.

 
 

[¶15]     
The 
general rules relating to incorporation of plans and specifications into a 
construction contract are stated as follows:

 
 

            
Where a building contract refers to the plans and specifications and 
makes them a part of itself, the contract is to be construed as to its terms and 
scope together with the plans and specifications. Where the plans and 
specifications are by express terms made a part of the contract, the terms of 
the plans and specifications will control with the same force as if they were 
physically incorporated in the very contract itself. 

 
 
13 
Am. Jur. 2d Building and Construction 
Contracts § 13 (2010) (footnotes omitted). Further, with regard to 
incorporation of documents into a contract, the general rule is that 
"[d]ocuments annexed (attached) to the agreement and those reasonably well 
identified and incorporated by reference thereto are construed along with the 
executed agreement."  Steven G.M. 
Stein, Construction Law, § 
3.10[5][a][ii] (2006) (and cases cited therein); see also Western Util. Contractors v. 
Casper, 731 P.2d 24, 26 (Wyo. 1986) ("reference in a contract to extraneous 
writings renders them part of the agreement for indicated purposes") (quoting Busch Development, Inc. v. City of 
Cheyenne, Wyo., 645 P.2d 65, 70 (1982)).

 
 

[¶16]     
The specification 
criteria in Part 1.2 of Section 11212 of the parties' Agreement required Strong 
to furnish complete details of the pump and motor it intended to supply and to 
provide those submittals to Baker & Associates for approval prior to 
acceptance of the pump and motor for installation.  That section also required the submittals 
to include "[e]lectric motor performance and construction data."  The required submittals, in turn, were 
expressly incorporated into the parties' Agreement pursuant to Article 7 of the 
Agreement.  Under Sections 7.6 and 
7.12, respectively, the "Contract Documents" included the General Conditions and 
"[a]ll Written Amendments and other documents amending, modifying, or 
supplementing the Contract Documents pursuant to paragraphs 3.04 of the General 
Conditions."  Paragraph 3.04(B) of 
the General Conditions states that "[t]he requirements of the Contract Documents 
may be supplemented . . . [in] one or more of the following ways: (i) a Field 
Order; (ii) ENGINEER's approval of a Shop Drawing 
or Sample; or (iii) ENGINEER's written interpretation or clarification." 
 (Emphasis added.) 

 
 

[¶17]     
We find that the 
Centripro Guidelines constitute a "Shop Drawing" as that term is defined in the 
General Conditions and, as a result, we conclude that the Guidelines were 
incorporated into the Agreement upon Baker & Associates' approval of that 
document.  The General Conditions 
broadly define "Shop Drawings" to include "[a]ll drawings, diagrams, 
illustrations, schedules, and other data or information which are 
specifically prepared or assembled by or for CONTRACTOR and submitted by 
CONTRACTOR to illustrate some portion of the Work."  (Emphasis added.)  The Centripro Guidelines included 
information relating to the minimum and maximum speeds of the motor, ramp-up and 
ramp-down times, required overload protection, and other pertinent information 
describing the manner in which the motor should be operated in conjunction with 
a VFD.  Despite the fact that the 
Centripro Guidelines do not represent a "drawing" in the general sense, the 
broad definition of a Shop Drawing in the General Conditions encompasses the 
information submitted in the Guidelines.  
Further support for this interpretation is found in the provisions of the 
General Conditions relating to the contractor's responsibility to provide Shop 
Drawings, which contemplate a broader set of information than is indicated by 
the terms "drawing" or "illustration."  
The General Conditions provide as follows:

 
 
6.17 Shop Drawings and 
Samples

 
 
            
A.  CONTRACTOR shall submit 
Shop Drawings to ENGINEER for review and approval in accordance with the 
acceptable schedule of Shop Drawings and Sample submittals.  All submittals will be identified as 
ENGINEER may require and in the number of copies specified in the General 
Requirements.  The 
data shown on the Shop Drawings will be complete with respect to quantities, 
dimensions, specified performance and design criteria, materials, and similar 
data to show ENGINEER the services, materials, and equipment CONTRACTOR proposes 
to provide and to enable ENGINEER to review the information for the limited 
purposes required by paragraph 6.17.E.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  Finally, we note that the 
Centripro Guidelines were submitted along with six other documents detailing the 
design and specifications of the Hitachi motor.  Some of these documents included 
drawings and others did not.  It 
would not be reasonable, however, in light of the definition of a Shop Drawing, 
to conclude that some of the submittals relating to the Hitachi motors were 
incorporated into the Agreement, but not others, based on whether the submittals 
included a drawing or illustration.  For the foregoing reasons, we find that 
the Guidelines, which were approved by Baker & Associates, were incorporated 
into the parties' Agreement pursuant to Article 7.  We conclude that the district court did not 
err in determining that Strong breached the Agreement with the City by failing 
to provide motors that conformed to the specifications in the parties' 
Agreement.

 
 

[¶18]     
Addressing 
Strong's next argument, we must determine whether the City's claim is barred by 
the repair obligation described in Section 13.07 of the General Conditions.  That Section states as 
follows:

 
 
13.07  Correction Period

 
 
            
A. If within one year after the date of Substantial Completion or such 
longer period of time as may be prescribed by Laws or Regulations or by the 
terms of any applicable special guarantee required by the Contract Documents or 
by any specific provision of the Contract Documents, any Work is found to be 
defective, . . . CONTRACTOR shall promptly, without cost to OWNER and in 
accordance with OWNER's written instructions: (i) repair such defective land or 
areas, or (ii) correct such defective Work or, if the defective Work has been 
rejected by OWNER, remove it from the Project and replace it with Work that is 
not defective, and (iii) satisfactorily correct or repair or remove and replace 
any damage to other Work, to the work of others or other land or areas resulting 
therefrom. 

 
 
. . . 

 
 
            
D.  CONTRACTOR's obligations 
under this paragraph 13.07 are in addition to any other obligation or 
warranty.  The provisions of this 
paragraph 13.07 shall not be construed as a substitute for or a waiver of the 
provisions of any applicable statute of limitation or 
repose.

 
 
The 
district court concluded that Section 13.07 did not preclude the City's breach 
of contract claim against Strong.  
The court concluded that "[t]his is simply a contract claim, not a 
warranty claim.  In fact no claim is 
made here that the motor or the installation [were] defective in and of 
themselves.  It's that the motor did 
not meet the specifications that were represented that it 
would."

 
 

[¶19]     
We agree that Section 
13.07 does not preclude the City's breach of contract claim.  Section 13.07 sets forth a warranty that 
the contractor will repair defects for a specified period of time.  See Stein, Construction Law, § 5B.01[2][a][v] (2006).  This warranty obligation, however, does 
not limit the availability of a breach of contract claim.  As noted by the district court, the City 
did not allege that the work was defective.  Rather, the City claimed that Strong 
breached the contract by failing to provide motors that conformed to agreed-upon 
specifications.  Because the City 
was asserting a breach of contract, as opposed to a breach of warranty, Section 
13.07 does not apply to the City's claim.  
Furthermore, the repair obligation, by its terms, is not limited to one 
year, but instead applies to defective work that is found "within one year after 
the date of Substantial Completion or such longer period of time as may be 
prescribed by Laws or Regulations."  (Emphasis added.)  Accordingly, even if the City had 
brought a breach of warranty claim, Section 13.07 would not operate to bar that 
claim.

 
 

[¶20]     
Despite 
the fact that the City has not asserted any claim relating to defective work 
that might engage the repair obligation described in Section 13.07, Strong 
contends that our determination as to the effect of this provision is controlled 
by Mountain View/Evergreen Improvement 
and Service Dist. v. Casper Concrete Co., 912 P.2d 529 (Wyo. 1996).  In that case, Mountain View sought 
damages from the contractor, Casper Concrete, for the costs to repair defective 
work.  Id. at 530-31.  We held that the trial court 
appropriately dismissed Mountain View's claim because, pursuant to the governing 
contractual provisions, Mountain View waived its right to file any claims for 
defective work and 
did 
not make any warranty claims until after the one-year warranty period for 
defective work in the contract expired.  
Id. at 533.  However, Mountain View is factually 
distinguishable from the present case.  

 
 

[¶21]     
First, 
there is no provision in the Agreement between Strong and the City analogous to 
the waiver provision in Mountain 
View.  The terms of the waiver 
in Mountain View stated as 
follows:

 
 
Waiver of 
Claims:

 
 
14.16. 
The making and acceptance of final payment will constitute: 

 
 
14.16.1 
A waiver of claims by Owner against Contractor, concerning claims arising from 
unsettled liens, from defective work, from failure to comply with the Contract 
Documents or the terms of any special guarantees specified therein of any rights 
with respect to Contractor's continuing obligations under the Contract 
Documents; and  14.16.2 The 
nature and acceptance of direct payment will constitute a waiver of all claims 
by Contractor against Owner.         

Id. 
at 532.  We concluded that "[o]nce 
Mountain View made its final payment to Casper Concrete, the waiver provision 
dictate[d] that Mountain View waived its claims against Casper Concrete for 
defective work from failure to comply with the Contract Documents.'"  Id.  In this case, however, Strong has not 
called our attention to, and we are not aware of, any provision in the parties' 
Agreement that would operate to waive the City's claim. 

[¶22]     
Second, 
in contrast to the present case, the claim asserted in Mountain View was governed by the repair 
obligation in the parties' contract because Mountain View sought damages to 
compensate for the repair of defective work.  As quoted in Mountain View, the relevant contractual 
provision stated as follows: 

 
 
13.12. 
If within one year after the date of final acceptance . . . any Work is found to 
be defective, CONTRACTOR [Casper Concrete] shall promptly, without cost 
to OWNER [Mountain View] and in accordance with OWNER's written 
instructions, either correct such defective Work, or, if it has been rejected by 
OWNER, remove it from the site and replace it with nondefective Work.  

Id. 
at 531-532 (emphasis omitted).  We 
held that Mountain View's claim must be dismissed because it failed to assert 
the claim within the one-year limitation period provided in the repair warranty. 
 Id. at 533.  In this case, because the City did not 
make a claim based on defective work, the warranty provision does not similarly 
preclude the City's action.  In 
addition, as noted above, even if the City had made a warranty claim, the repair 
obligation in Section 13.07 of the Agreement was not limited to one year.  Consequently, due to factual differences 
relating to the nature of the City's claim and the terms of the Agreement 
between Strong and the City, Mountain 
View does not control our determination as to the effect of the warranty 
provision in this case.

 
 

[¶23]     
Finally, 
Strong contends the damages awarded by the district court should be apportioned 
according to the respective degrees of fault of the parties under a negligence 
theory of liability.  After 
concluding that Strong breached the Agreement with the City, the district court 
found that several of the parties were negligent.  The court allocated fault 60 percent to 
Kelly-Deines, for which Strong would be vicariously liable, 30 percent to Baker 
& Associates, and 10 percent to the project electrician.  The court, however, did not apportion 
the damages.1  Strong does not contest the 
determination that its liability to the City was contractual.  Nonetheless, Strong argues that the 
damage award should be reduced by the amount of damages attributable to the 
negligence of Baker & Associates.  

  

[¶24]     
Strong's 
first argument with respect to apportionment of damages is that it is not 
obligated to pay any portion of the judgment attributable to the negligence of 
Baker & Associates based on Section 6.01 of the parties' Agreement.  That Section states as 
follows:

 
 
6.01 
Supervision and 
Superintendence

 
 
            
A.  CONTRACTOR shall 
supervise, inspect, and direct the Work competently and efficiently, devoting 
such attention thereto and applying such skills and expertise as may be 
necessary to perform the Work in accordance with the Contract Documents.  CONTRACTOR shall be solely responsible 
for the means, methods, techniques, sequences, and procedures of construction, 
but CONTRACTOR shall not be responsible for the negligence of OWNER or ENGINEER 
in the design or specification of a specific means, method, technique, sequence, 
or procedure of construction which is shown or indicated in and expressly 
required by the Contract Documents.  
CONTRACTOR shall be responsible to see that the completed Work complies 
accurately with the Contract Documents.

 
 
Strong 
does not explain how this Section of the Agreement applies to reduce its 
liability for contract damages.  
Section 6.01 applies to the engineer's negligence in the "specification 
of a specific means, method, technique, sequence, or procedure of construction." 
 The breach of contract that 
occurred here involves Strong's failure to supply the motor identified in the 
Centripro Guidelines that were approved by Baker & Associates.  The approval of that motor did not 
involve the "specification of a specific means, method, technique, sequence, or 
procedure of construction."  Accordingly, Section 6.01 does not 
relieve Strong of liability.

 
 

[¶25]     
Next, 
Strong urges this Court to adopt the principles of comparative fault in the 
context of a claim for breach of contract.  However, we have been presented with no 
cogent argument or pertinent authority suggesting that the tort concept of fault 
has a counterpart in a breach of contract action, or that contractual damages 
should be similarly apportioned.  
Rather, as one recent decision from California explains, contract damages 
are generally awarded on an all-or-nothing basis:

 
 
In 
order to recover for breach of contract, the nonbreaching party must prove that 
it has substantially performed the conditions of the breaching party's 
performance (or that performance was excused).  If it fails to do so, it obtains no 
recovery.  If it does establish this 
predicate, it is entitled to recover all damages foreseeably caused by the other 
party's breach.  (Bruckman v. Parliament Escrow Corp. 
(1987) 190 Cal. App. 3d 1051, 1063 [235 Cal. Rptr. 813]; see Rest.2d Contracts, § 235, com. b, p. 212 
["[w]hen performance is due,  anything short of full performance is a breach, 
even if the party who does not fully perform was not at fault and even if the 
defect in his performance was not substantial"]; III Farnsworth on Contracts (3d 
ed. 2004) § 12.8, pp. 195196 ["contract law is, in its essential design, a law 
of strict liability"].)  Thus, 
contract damages normally are awarded on an all-or-nothing basis.  While the breaching party is liable only 
for damages foreseeably caused by its breach, there is no apportionment of that 
amount even if less than perfect performance of the conditions by the 
nonbreaching party contributed in some measure to the loss.  (Bruckman v. Parliament Escrow Corp., supra, at p. 1063; see 11 Corbin on 
Contracts (rev. ed. 2005) § 55.9, pp. 3132.).          

Stop 
Loss Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. Brown & Toland Medical Group, 
143 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1051 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 2006).          
The Court of Appeals of New York has also noted the reasons that 
apportionment of damages does not translate to the realm of contract 
law:

            

Nor 
are we persuaded that we should create a common-law right of contribution in 
contract actions. . . .  [T]he need 
to liberalize the inequitable and harsh rules that once governed contribution 
among joint tort-feasors -- are not pertinent to contract matters.  Parties to a contract have the power to 
specifically delineate the scope of their liability at the time the contract is 
formed.  Thus, there is nothing 
unfair in defining a contracting party's liability by the scope of its promise 
as reflected by the agreement of the parties.  Indeed, this is required by the very 
nature of contract law, where potential liability is determined in advance by 
the parties.           

Board of Education v. Sargent, Webster, 
Crenshaw & Folley, 71 N.Y.2d 21, 29 (N.Y. 1987).  Because we have been presented with no 
rebuttal to the principles expressed in these authorities, we find no basis in 
common law to extend apportionment of damages to breach of contract 
actions.

 
 

[¶26]     
Finally, Strong 
appears to contend that Wyoming's comparative fault statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109, provides 
a statutory basis for apportionment of liability in a breach of contract 
action.  Strong requests that we 
adopt the reasoning of Justice Cardine's dissent in Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, 806 P.2d 834 (Wyo. 1991), which suggested 
that the comparative fault statute should be extended to breach of warranty and 
strict liability actions.  However, 
as noted in the majority opinion in Phillips, when interpreting a statute, 
we look initially and primarily to the words used in the statute to determine 
legislative intent:

 
 
            
Statutory interpretation and application addresses review of the 
perceived legislative intent.  With 
little or nothing more than the specific language of the enactment, we cannot be 
justified in superimposing over its plain provisions what is not otherwise 
stated. . . .

 
 
            
Whenever this court is engaged in the construction of a statute, the 
primary consideration is to discern the intention of the legislature. . . . 
 That legislative intent should be 
ascertained, as nearly as is possible, from the language incorporated in the 
statute, which is viewed in the light of its object and purpose.  . . .  In those instances in which the language 
in the statute is plain and unambiguous, the words used are to be accorded their 
plain and ordinary meaning unless there is some manifestation of a legislative 
intent that they not be accorded the plain and ordinary 
meaning.

Id. at 837 (quoting Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. State, 766 P.2d 537, 542 (Wyo. 1988)) (footnote omitted); see also Olivas v. State ex rel. Wyo. 
Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2006 WY 29, ¶ 15, 130 P.3d 476, 484 (Wyo. 
2006).  Although Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-1-109 has been extended to strict tort liability and products liability 
actions since the decision in Phillips, the statute does not provide 
any indication that comparative fault is applicable to a breach of contract 
action.  The statute provides that 

 
 
"Fault" 
includes acts or omissions, determined 
to be a proximate cause of death or injury to person or property, that 
are in any measure negligent, or that subject an actor to strict tort or strict 
products liability, and includes breach of warranty, assumption of risk and 
misuse or alteration of a product.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109(a)(iv) (emphasis added).  The comparative fault statute applies to 
tort claims where a party seeks personal injury or property damages caused by 
the fault of another.  The City, 
however, did not pursue a claim for personal injury or property damage in this 
case.  The comparative fault statute 
is not applicable to this breach of contract action.

 
 

[¶27]     
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Although the district 
court did not apportion damages resulting from the cost of replacement of the 
Hitachi motors, the court, relying on an indemnification provision in the 
parties' Agreement, apportioned attorney fees in accordance with its allocations 
of fault.  However, we need not 
address whether apportionment of attorney fees was appropriate because neither 
Strong nor the City contests that decision.