Case Title: Baggett Transp. Co. v. Holderfield

Citation: 68 So. 2d 21

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1953-08-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
68 So. 2d 21 (1953)
BAGGETT TRANSP. CO.
v.
HOLDERFIELD.
7 Div. 195.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 11, 1953.
Rehearing Denied November 27, 1953.
*22 Lange, Simpson, Robinson & Somerville and Reid B. Barnes, Birmingham, for appellant.
Copeland & Copeland and Geo. C. Hawkins, Gadsden, for appellee.
MERRILL, Justice.
Certiorari was granted on petition of Baggett Transportation Company, a corporation, to review a final judgment of the Circuit Court of Etowah County awarding compensation to the plaintiff, R. E. Holderfield, for injuries received while he was an employee of said company. The proceedings were instituted in the trial court under the Alabama Workmen's Compensation Law, chapter 5, Title 26, Code 1940.
The trial judge made a full statement of the facts, his conclusions thereon and his views of the law applicable thereto. We do not set out the statement in full but merely state the effect of the findings which are applicable to this appeal.
Plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action and included this statement: "Plaintiff admits that defendant has paid to him the sum of $357 as compensation for and on account of the injuries alleged herein, and plaintiff is informed that defendant company has paid hospital and doctors bills in the sum of approximately $400 for medical care received by him on account of said injuries." It is admitted by both parties that plaintiff and defendant were subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act of Alabama at the time the injuries occurred.
The answer of defendant alleges that plaintiff was paid his full wages of $51 per week for seven weeks ($357) while plaintiff was disabled from doing any work as a result of his injuries, and claims a set-off against plaintiff in the sum of $420.25 due by promissory note executed by plaintiff to the American National Bank of Gadsden, Alabama, which defendant had endorsed as surety and had paid and which was transferred to the defendant.
The plaintiff was working for defendant on September 12, 1950. During that day and prior thereto, some of defendant's employees were engaged in a strike or work stoppage and were picketing the entrance to defendant's Gadsden terminal. Plaintiff *23 was employed to fill the job of truck driver formerly held by one of the striking employees, and the employees showed resentment toward plaintiff by calling out in a threatening manner as plaintiff drove in and out of defendant's terminal in the truck assigned to him. On September 12th plaintiff had performed his duties in a normal manner and had no contact or discussion with the men on the picket line, except when he went in and out of the premises, at which time the strikers would call out to him. He entered the premises of the defendant on his last run at approximately 4:00 P.M. and punched his time card at approximately 6:30 P.M. He and other employees waited for a considerable length of time at the suggestion of defendant's manager before attempting to leave the terminal and pass through the picket line. At approximately 7:30 P.M. plaintiff left the defendant's premises in his automobile occupied by two other persons, one of whom was also an employee, and set out for his home which was about seventeen miles from Gadsden. Immediately upon his leaving two of the striking employees who had made threatening remarks, followed him in an automobile together with another automobile containing striking employees. They pursued plaintiff at close range and at high speed as he drove away from the terminal toward the City of Gadsden on the public highway. He saw them and attempted to elude them by swerving off Third Street to First Street at an intersection. One pursuing car failed to make the turn and continued down Third Street and reentered First Street at the intersection of Bay and First and picked up the close pursuit. At the intersection of First and Broad Street, which is approximately one mile from the defendant's terminal, the pursuing cars forced plaintiff to the curb. As he alighted from his automobile, having been forced to stop, one of the strikers shot him with a shotgun wounding him in the left leg, right thigh, scrotum and other parts of the body.
There is no question but that when the plaintiff left the terminal in his car and while he was driving on the public streets of Gadsden to the point where he was forced to stop by the strikers, he had finished all of his duties for the day, was on his way home and his intention was not to return to his work until the next morning.
Appellant does not complain of the amount of the award in the event it is found to be liable.
This case turns on the construction of Title 26, § 262, subsection (j), which reads:
As we understand it, appellant does not insist that the accident in question did not arise out of plaintiff's employment, but the question is was the accident "in the course of his employment," since his injuries occurred about one mile from defendant's premises while he was going home from his work in his own automobile.
At the outset we enumerate several applicable principles heretofore declared by this Court. In Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Bruce, 249 Ala. 675, 32 So. 2d 666, 668, this Court said:
In Barnett v. Britling Cafeteria Co., 225 Ala. 462, 143 So. 813, 85 A.L.R. 85, the Court said:
In Benoit Coal Mining Co. v. Moore, 215 Ala. 220, 109 So. 878, 880, we find:
In Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Bruce, supra, it was said:
We do not find agreement in other jurisdictions where the injury did not occur on the premises of the employer. Most of the cases in other jurisdictions cite one of two cases decided by the Court of Appeals of New York, which, while they can be distinguished on the facts, appear to reach different conclusions. The first case, decided in 1923, is Lampert v. Siemons, 235 N.Y. 311, 139 N.E. 278, 279. Lampert was an employee and was continuing to work during a strike. He sought protection from his employer in going to and from his work, and Mr. Siemons, the company president, had the general manager accompany Lampert from the factory to his home at night and to call for him in the morning and come with him to his place of work. One morning the general manager was unable to accompany Lampert and Lampert was met on his way to work by one of the strikers who assaulted him, causing permanent injury to his eye. It was conceded that the injury arose out of his employment. The question was whether it was received in the course of his employment. We quote two paragraphs from the opinion, wherein the court said:
The order of the lower court making the award was reversed.
The other case is that of Field v. Charmette Knitted Fabric Co., 245 N.Y. 139, 156 N.E. 642, 643, decided in 1927. The opinion was written by Chief Justice Cardozo. One Field was general manager of a mill. He discharged one Magid who refused to leave and following angry words, they probably would have fought, had not other workmen pulled Magid away. A few minutes later, at quitting time, Field went downstairs and out of the building. Magid was waiting for him on the sidewalk, three or four feet from the door and challenged him to fight. Field tried to walk away but Magid struck him in the face. He fell backward, fracturing his skull, and died. We quote from the opinion as follows:
The state industrial board had allowed the claim, the appellate division dismissed it and this decision reversed the order of the supreme court and confirmed the original award.
Each of these New York cases refers to Rourke's case, 237 Mass. 360, 129 N.E. 603, 13 A.L.R. 546, wherein an employee was injured by an assault by a picket on a public street after he had left his place of employment for the day and was proceeding toward his boarding house. There the court ruled that the injury was not within the course of employment. The holding in Rourke's case, supra, is criticised in Horovitz on Workmen's Compensation, page 174. Compensation was denied under similar circumstances in the case of Enterprise Foundry Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, 206 Cal. 562, 275 P. 432, which cites the Rourke's case, supra, and Lampert v. Siemons, supra.
A very recent (1952) publication, Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. 1, pp. 446-7, section 29.21, in discussing cases of this nature says:
The attitude of this Court as to the construction of the Workmen's Compensation Act is aptly stated in Hamilton Motor Co. v. Cooner, 254 Ala. 422, 47 So. 2d 270, 274, where we said:
In the instant case if Holderfield had been assaulted while on the premises of the defendant liability would have been conceded. The conclusions of which appellant complains are as follows:
We think the above finding is a reasonable view of the evidence in this case and that a liberal construction of the phrase of the Workmen's Compensation Act "in the course of his employment" justifies this Court in not disturbing the findings and judgment of the lower court.
The appellee has three cross-assignments of error: (1) the refusal of the court to include interest in the amount of appellee's judgment, (2) the allowance by the court of a set-off of $357 paid by appellant to appellee after the accident and (3) the allowance by the court of the amount of $420.25 claimed by way of set-off and recoupment.
The payment of interest from any given date is not referred to in the Act, nor do we find any Alabama cases under the Act dealing with that subject. This Court, in considering a similar claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq., cited the State Employers' Liability Act and declined to allow interest before judgment. Mobile and Ohio R. Co. v. Williams, 219 Ala. 238, 248, 121 So. 722, 731. We do not think Title 9, § 62, Code 1940, or Roe v. Brown, 249 Ala. 425, 31 So. 2d 599, are applicable here.
With reference to the second and third cross-assignments, we quote the following from the testimony of the plaintiff, Mr. Holderfield, which amply supports the finding of the court in those particulars:
"The witness. No, sir, that was not included.
We think a reasonable view of the evidence supports the conclusion reached by the trial court, and the decree is affirmed.
Affirmed.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and SIMPSON, STAKELY and GOODWYN, JJ., concur.
LAWSON, J., dissents.