Case Title: Miles v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2006-09-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ., 
and Carrico, S.J. 
 
ELLIS LORENZO MILES 
 
v.  Record No. 052568   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
September 15, 2006 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Melvin R. Hughes, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider a statutory requirement that is 
part of the Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act, 
Code §§ 37.2-900 through –919 (the Act).1  We decide the issue 
whether a certain numerical test score specified in Code § 37.2-
903(C), which identifies an inmate for further review under the 
Act, is a condition precedent for additional proceedings against 
that inmate. 
Ellis Lorenzo Miles challenges the circuit court’s 
determination classifying him as a sexually violent predator and 
ordering his civil commitment.  In 1995, Miles was convicted of 
rape in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond and received a 
sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment, with 14 years suspended.  
His criminal history prior to the date of the rape included one 
conviction of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, 
originally charged as statutory rape, and five other convictions 
                     
1 The Act, originally located in Title 37.1, was recodified 
effective October 1, 2005.  References contained herein are to 
the current Act. 
 
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that are not pertinent here because they did not involve 
prohibited sexual conduct.  During his incarceration for the 
rape conviction, Miles was convicted of indecent exposure and 
committed 18 disciplinary infractions, seven of which were 
sexual in nature. 
Because Miles was incarcerated for rape, a predicate 
offense under the Act, the Virginia Department of Corrections 
(DOC) evaluated him about 10 months before his scheduled release 
date.  The DOC administered the Rapid Risk Assessment for Sex 
Offender Recidivism (RRASOR), an objective testing instrument 
authorized by Code § 37.2-903(C) to identify potential sexually 
violent predators. 
The RRASOR has four categories that yield a maximum total 
score of six.  Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission, 
Assessing Risk Among Sex Offenders in Virginia 29-30 (2001).  An 
inmate receives one point if any of his sex offenses have 
involved male victims, one point if his age at release would be 
less than 25, and one point if any victim of his sex offenses is 
not related to the inmate.  Id. 
The remaining points are assessed based on the number of 
prior sex offense convictions, and prior charges of sex 
offenses, that occurred before the date of the inmate’s 
predicate offense.  The inmate is given one point if he has a 
single prior conviction of a sex offense, or if he has one or 
 
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two prior charges of sexual offenses.  If an inmate has two or 
three prior convictions of sex offenses, or has between three 
and five prior charges involving such offenses, the inmate is 
assigned two points.  Finally, an inmate is assessed three 
points when he has four or more prior convictions of sex 
offenses, or has six or more prior charges of that nature.  Id.  
According to the analysis performed by the DOC, Miles received a 
score of four on the RRASOR and therefore, under Code § 37.2-
903(C), qualified for further review by the Commitment Review 
Committee (CRC). 
Miles received a mental health examination as part of the 
CRC assessment.  Dr. Christine A. Nogues, a licensed clinical 
psychologist, was appointed by the Commissioner of the 
Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance 
Abuse Services (Department of Mental Health) to perform the 
examination.  Dr. Nogues diagnosed Miles as having “Personality 
Disorder [Not Otherwise Specified] with antisocial features.”  
She determined that Miles was “a sexually aggressive, or 
antisocially personality disordered offender” whose “personality 
disorder appears to predispose him to commit sexually violent 
offenses.” 
During the course of her examination, Dr. Nogues conducted 
various actuarial evaluations to assist in determining Miles’ 
level of risk of committing future sexually violent offenses.  
 
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Among those assessments, she independently scored Miles’ RRASOR 
and also assigned him a result of four, which incorrectly 
included “three points for having four or more convictions.” 
The Office of the Attorney General (the Commonwealth) 
reviewed the CRC’s recommendation, together with Miles’ mental 
health examination, institutional history, treatment record, and 
criminal record, and determined that he is a sexually violent 
predator.  Accordingly, the Commonwealth filed a petition in the 
circuit court requesting that Miles be classified as a sexually 
violent predator and subjected to civil commitment under the 
Act. 
Miles filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that his correct 
RRASOR score was three and, thus, that the circuit court was not 
authorized to conduct further proceedings to determine whether 
he is a sexually violent predator.  The circuit court denied 
Miles’ motion. 
At a bench trial, the circuit court heard evidence on the 
issue whether Miles is a sexually violent predator.  Dr. Nogues 
testified regarding her examination of Miles and concluded that 
he is likely to commit sexually violent acts in the future.  On 
cross-examination, however, Dr. Nogues admitted that Miles’ 
RRASOR score was incorrectly computed.  She stated that Miles’ 
correct score was three, not four as originally indicated. 
 
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At the conclusion of the testimony, the circuit court 
entered an order finding that Miles suffers from “personality 
disorder [Not Otherwise Specified] with antisocial traits” and 
that he is likely to commit other offenses of a sexually violent 
nature.  After hearing evidence from the Commonwealth and from 
Miles during the commitment phase of the trial, the circuit 
court ordered that Miles be involuntarily confined in a secure 
facility pursuant to the Act.  This appeal followed. 
Miles argues that the circuit court erred in denying his 
motion to dismiss.  He emphasizes that the evidence was 
undisputed that the Commonwealth initiated proceedings against 
him under the Act based on an incorrect RRASOR score computed by 
the DOC.  Miles asserts that absent this erroneous score, he 
would not have been identified as a potential candidate for 
classification as a sexually violent predator.  Therefore, Miles 
contends that because his correct score was below the baseline 
score established in Code § 37.2-903(C) for further proceedings 
under the Act, the circuit court erred in conducting evidentiary 
proceedings to determine whether he is a sexually violent 
predator and should be committed. 
In response, the Commonwealth argues that its use of an 
inmate’s RRASOR score is a procedural mechanism, rather than a 
requirement for further proceedings under the Act.  The 
Commonwealth observes that the Act does not provide an inmate 
 
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the remedy of having the proceedings against him terminated when 
the inmate’s RRASOR score has been incorrectly computed to his 
detriment.  Therefore, according to the Commonwealth, a RRASOR 
score has no effect on the Commonwealth’s right to proceed under 
the Act but is “merely a convenient, objective way of narrowing 
the prison population who will undergo the civil commitment 
review process.”  We disagree with the Commonwealth’s arguments. 
The statutory provision at issue, found in Code § 37.2-
903(C), states in relevant part: 
[T]he Director shall review the database and identify all 
such prisoners who are scheduled for release from prison 
within 10 months from the date of such review who receive a 
score of four or more on the Rapid Risk Assessment for 
Sexual Offender Recidivism or a like score on a comparable, 
scientifically validated instrument designated by the 
Commissioner.  Upon the identification of such prisoners, 
the Director shall forward their names, their scheduled 
dates of release, and copies of their files to the CRC for 
assessment. 
 
Under basic rules of statutory construction, we determine 
the General Assembly’s intent from the words contained in the 
statute.  Tucker v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 490, 493, 604 S.E.2d 
66, 68 (2004); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 266 Va. 260, 264, 585 
S.E.2d 552, 554 (2003).  When the language of a statute is plain 
and unambiguous, courts are bound by the plain meaning of that 
language and may not assign the words a construction that 
amounts to holding that the General Assembly did not mean what 
it actually stated.  Tucker, 268 Va. at 493, 604 S.E.2d at 68; 
 
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Caprio v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 507, 511-12, 493 S.E.2d 371, 374 
(1997). 
Because proceedings under the Act may result in a 
defendant’s involuntary confinement, he has a substantial 
liberty interest at stake.  See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 
131, (1990); Townes v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 234, 240, 609 
S.E.2d 1, 4 (2005).  As a result of this liberty interest, we 
apply the rule of lenity normally applicable to penal statutes 
to the Act’s provisions.  Id.  Under that rule, a statute must 
be strictly construed in favor of a defendant’s liberty and may 
not be extended by implication or construction.  See id.; Welch 
v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 558, 563, 628 S.E.2d 340, 342 (2006); 
Milteer v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 732, 738, 595 S.E.2d 275, 278 
(2004). 
When strictly construed, the plain language of Code § 37.2-
903(C) subjects only those prisoners who receive a score of four 
or more on the RRASOR to further proceedings under the Act to 
determine whether they should be civilly committed as sexually 
violent predators.  The statute is wholly silent concerning the 
Commonwealth’s authority to initiate proceedings under the Act 
against inmates who have received a correct RRASOR score of less 
than four. 
Contrary to the Commonwealth’s argument, we are not 
permitted to construe the statute to imply such authority.  
 
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Acceptance of the Commonwealth’s position would require us to 
extend by implication the scope of Code § 37.2-903(C), and to 
hold that the statute permits further proceedings against any 
prisoner incarcerated for a predicate offense under the Act 
merely because the statute does not expressly preclude such 
proceedings.  Such a construction would violate the rule of 
lenity and principles of strict construction that we must apply 
in a case of this nature.  Townes, 269 Va. at 240, 609 S.E.2d at 
4. 
Additionally, we find no merit in the Commonwealth’s 
argument that its proceedings against Miles were proper because 
the Act does not provide a remedy of dismissal for prisoners who 
incorrectly receive a RRASOR score of four.  This argument 
similarly asks us to draw an implication from the absence of 
statutory language, which we are not allowed to do in our strict 
construction of Code § 37.2-903(C).  Id. 
We observe, however, that the Commonwealth’s misapplication 
of this statutory requirement of Code § 37.2-903(C) does not 
affect the circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction to decide 
cases initiated under the Act.  Thus, this requirement may be 
waived by a defendant’s failure to raise a timely and proper 
objection in the circuit court.  See Nelson v. Warden, 262 Va. 
276, 285, 552 S.E.2d 73, 77 (2001).  However, because the record 
 
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before us does not raise such an issue of waiver, we need not 
further discuss this principle. 
Next, we note that the Commonwealth concedes in its brief 
that Miles’ correct RRASOR score was three, and that the 
Commonwealth mistakenly computed the score of four that Miles 
initially received.  At oral argument in this case, the 
Commonwealth also conceded that it would not have initiated 
proceedings against Miles if he had not received a score of four 
on the RRASOR.  By these concessions, the Commonwealth 
effectively refutes its own argument that the RRASOR score 
provision of Code § 37.2-903(C) is purely a procedural screening 
guideline and lacks any substantive effect because but for 
Miles’ erroneous RRASOR score, the Commonwealth would not have 
taken further action against Miles. 
Finally, we observe that the Commonwealth’s position 
is also without merit because it effectively asks us to 
hold that the Commonwealth’s own errors should redound to 
Miles’ detriment.  We find no basis for accepting such an 
argument.  Accordingly, we hold that, when strictly 
construed, the provisions of Code § 37.2-903(C) require 
that an inmate evaluated under the RRASOR receive a 
correctly computed score of four as a condition precedent 
before the Commonwealth may initiate proceedings to have 
 
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the inmate declared a sexually violent predator under the 
Act.2 
For these reasons, we will reverse the circuit court’s 
judgment and dismiss with prejudice the Commonwealth’s petition. 
Reversed and dismissed. 
                     
2 Based on our holding, we do not reach Miles’ remaining 
assignments of error.  We also do not reach the Commonwealth’s 
assignment of cross-error, which addresses issues related to the 
circuit court’s qualification of Miles’ expert witness at trial.