Case Title: Johnson, B., etc. v. American Standard, et al., No. 43 EAP 2009; Mauger, D., etc. v. A.W. Chesterton, Inc., et al., No. 44 EAP 2009; Stea, D., etc. v. A.W. Chester, Inc., et al. (Concurring And Dissenting Opinion)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 2010-11-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[J-6A-C-2010] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT BRUCE JOHNSON, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF THORNTON JOHNSON v. AMERICAN STANDARD, AMCHEM PRODUCTS, INC., A.W. CHSTERTON, INC., BENJAMIN FOSTER CO., BRAND INSULATIONS, BROWN BOVERI CORP., BURNHAM BOILER CORP., CERTAINTEED CORPORATION, CRANE CO., DEMMING DIVISION, CRANE PACKING, CROUSE-HINDS, CROWN CORK & SEAL, INC., DRESSER INDUSTRIES, INC., EASTERN GUNNITE CO., INC., GEOGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION, GOULD PUMPS, INC., GREEN TWEED & COMPANY, INC., HAJOCA PLUMBING CO., INGERSOLL RAND CO., J.H. REFRACTORIES CO., METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE, NOSROC CORP., OWENS-ILLINOIS, INC., PECORA CORPORATION, RILEY STOKER CORPORATION, UNION CARBIDE CORP., WALTER B. GALLAGHER CO., WEIL MCLAIN CO., VIACOM/WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION, BONDEX INTERNATIONAL INC., CLEAVER BROOKS CO., DURABLA, DURAMETALLIC CORPORATION, GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO., GOODYEAR CANADA, INC., HERCULES CHEMICAL CO., HERMAN GOLDNER : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 43 EAP 2009 Appeal from the Judgment of Superior Court entered on 2/6/09 at No. 2954 EDA 2006 affirming the order entered on 10/3/06 in the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, Civil Division at No. 3609 November term 2005 COMPANY, IMO INDUSTRIES, INC., ITT CORPORATION, MELRATH GASKET, INC., PARS MANUFACTURING COMPANY, RITE HOSE & PACKING, INC., ROCKBESTOS COMPANY, MCMASTER CARR SUPPLY HOUSE APPEAL OF: BRUCE JOHNSON DOROTHY MAUGER, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF RUSSELL MAUGER AND IN HER OWN RIGHT v. A.W. CHESTERTON, INC., CERTAINTEED CORP., INC., CRANE CO., CRANE PACKING, CROWN CORK & SEAL CO., INC., DURABLA MANUFACTURING CO., FOSECO, INC., GARLOCK, INC., GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORP., GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO., GOODYEAR CANADA, INC., GOULDS PUMPS, INC., GREEN TWEED & CO., INC., HERCULES CHEMICAL CO., J.H. REFRACTORIES CO., METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE, NOSROC CORP., PECORA CORP., RAPID AMERICAN CORP., UNION CARBIDE CORP., VIACOM/WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION APPEAL OF: DOROTHY MAUGER DOLORES STEA, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF JOSEPH STEA AND IN HER OWN RIGHT v. : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 44 EAP 2009 Appeal from the judgment of Superior Court entered on 2/6/09 at No. 2955 EDA 2006 affirming the order entered on 10/3/06 in the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, Civil Division at No. 2154 November Term 2004 45 EAP 2009 Appeal from the Judgment of Superior Court entered on 2/6/09 at No. 2956 EDA 2006 affirming the order entered on A.W. CHESTERTON, INC., CRANE CO., DEMMING DIVISION, CROWN CORK & SEAL CO., INC., FOSTER WHEELER CORP., INC., GARLOCK, INC., GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., GOULDS PUMPS, INC., GREEN TWEED & CO., INC. MELRATH GASKET, INC., METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE, PECORA CORPORATION, RAPID AMERICAN CORP., BEVCO INDUSTRIES, WEIL MCLAIN CO., VIACOM/WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP. APPEAL OF: DOLORES STEA : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 10/3/06 in the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, Civil Division at No. 1631 November term 2004 ARGUED: March 9, 2010 CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION MR. JUSTICE SAYLOR DECIDED: November 18, 2010 In many past decisions, I have taken a broader view of standing than the majority of other Justices. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC v. Commonwealth, 585 Pa. 196, 209-11, 888 A.2d 655, 663-64 (2005) (Saylor, J., dissenting). Here, I support the majority’s judgment that a zone-of-interest test should not be the sole determinant of “immediacy” as that factor is used in standing analysis in Pennsylvania. Although I have no difficulty with the conclusion that Appellants have a direct, immediate, and substantial interest in the outcome of the litigation, I would note that such factors predominantly serve as the litmus applicable to standing to commence litigation (most frequently in controversy where a plaintiff seeks some sort of declaration of his or her rights and interests). With respect to those already enmeshed in an action where their rights and interests are unquestionably in issue, their standing to assert [J-6A-C-2010] - 2 particular questions -- here, a facial constitutional challenge to a presumptively valid statute -- generally has been treated as a more refined inquiry. In this regard, facial constitutional challenges typically are disfavored by courts. See Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2008); Dickerson v. Napolitano, 604 F.3d 732, 741 (2d Cir. 2010); accord National Automobile Service, Inc. v. Barfod, 288 Pa. 227, 229, 135 A. 630, 630-31 (1927) (explaining that, to support a challenge to a statute under which a court has acted, “‘it must plainly appear from the facts presented by the record, … that the complainant is one who has been directly affected by what he claims to be the unconstitutional part or feature of the statute in question”). As to such contests to duly enacted pronouncements by the legislative branch of government, judicial restraint is implicated, and special rules of standing pertain. See, e.g., Dickerson, 604 F.3d at 741- 42. Since this particular line of analysis is not set out in the submissions to this Court, I do not consider it further here. I note only that I would not obviate its development in the intermediate or common pleas courts, to the extent it may remain available for consideration by those tribunals. Thus, I reference the limitations on facial challenges here primarily because, without their consideration, I am unable to support the majority’s broader pronouncements concerning Appellants’ standing to invoke the dormant Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses to challenge the facial validity of Section 1929.1. I also find the principles helpful to a better grasp of standing jurisprudence as applied to those whose individual interests are unquestionably at stake in an existing civil action.