Case Title: State v. Johndro

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2013-12-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
     
    Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2013 ME 106 
Docket: 
Aro-13-27 
Argued: 
September 9, 2013 
Decided: 
December 5, 2013 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, 
JJ. 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
CHRISTOPHER J. JOHNDRO 
 
 
SILVER, J. 
 
[¶1]  The State appeals from an order of the Superior Court (Aroostook 
County, Hunter, J.) granting Christopher Johndro’s motion to suppress evidence.  
The Superior Court found that search warrants for Johndro’s house, garage, and car 
were not supported by probable cause.  The court further found that, because the 
initial affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause, officers did not rely on 
the warrants in objectively reasonable good faith.  Finally, the court concluded that 
evidence seized pursuant to the third search warrant must be excluded as fruit of 
the poisonous tree.  We affirm the order granting Johndro’s motion to suppress. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  On April 15, 2009, Chief Stacey Mahan of the Limestone Police 
Department was called to investigate a burglary at 257 Long Road in Limestone.  
 
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Several footprints were found near the garage, and a footprint inside the house 
appeared to match the footprints outside.  At Mahan’s request, a Maine State 
Police Trooper arrived on scene with his dog and conducted a search of the area.  
The dog followed footprints from the driveway to Blake Road, located to the east 
of the residence. 
 
[¶3]  Mahan was called to the scene of another burglary in Limestone later 
that day, this time at 646 Blake Road.  A footprint found inside the residence 
appeared to match the footprints found at the scene of the Long Road burglary. 
 
[¶4]  The following day, April 16, a Limestone resident informed Mahan 
that he had observed a “strange” vehicle driven by a male operator at 257 Long 
Road around noon the previous day.  He described the vehicle as a Dodge Intrepid 
bearing the license plate 2196MD. 
 
[¶5]  Later in the day, a local resident named Vinal Paul Chasse informed 
Mahan that Chasse’s stepfather, a trash collector in Limestone named Carl Morin, 
had observed a vehicle on Blake Road, also around noon the previous day.  
According to Chasse, Morin saw the vehicle pull in and out of  “a couple” of 
driveways, which made him nervous.  Morin had written down the license plate 
number, which Chasse provided to Mahan.  The number, 2196RD, was assigned to 
a 2002 Dodge Intrepid registered to Christopher Johndro.  Mahan ran a criminal 
history check on Johndro and found that he had multiple burglary convictions. 
 
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[¶6]  Mahan immediately completed an affidavit containing only the above 
facts and submitted it, along with a proposed search warrant for Johndro’s house 
and car, to a justice of the peace on April 16, 2009.  The affidavit did not mention 
what items, if any, had been taken from the homes, nor did it provide any other 
information regarding the reason for which a search was requested.  The draft 
search warrant did include a list of items that purportedly constituted evidence of 
burglary, including loose change, a green pillowcase, shoes, jewelry, firearms, and 
safes.  The justice of the peace signed and issued the proposed warrant that same 
day, and Mahan, along with other officers, executed it at Johndro’s residence.  
They seized several items, including marijuana, loose change, and a diamond ring.  
Later that day, using the same affidavit, Mahan applied to the same justice of the 
peace for a second warrant to search a shed behind the house.  The justice of the 
peace granted the warrant.  The search of the shed did not produce any further 
evidence. 
 
[¶7]  Five days later, on April 21, 2009, Mahan applied to the same justice of 
the peace for a third warrant authorizing another search of Johndro’s house.  The 
affidavit in support of this warrant was from another officer, who had observed a 
gold wristwatch inside Johndro’s house during the first search and had later 
learned that it matched the description of a watch connected to a burglary in 
 
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Caribou.1  The third affidavit further stated that officers had learned that Johndro 
might have hidden evidence in an area of the house that was not searched during 
the execution of the first warrant.  The justice of the peace issued the third warrant, 
pursuant to which the police seized additional evidence. 
 
[¶8]  On November 6, 2009, Johndro was indicted on five counts of burglary 
(Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 401(1)(B)(4) (2012), two counts of theft (Class B), 17-A 
M.R.S. § 353(1)(B)(2) (2012), and three counts of theft (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. 
§ 353(1)(B)(6) (2012).  Johndro entered not guilty pleas on all counts on 
January 21, 2010, and later filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained 
pursuant to the three search warrants.  The trial court granted the motion, finding 
that the first affidavit did not establish probable cause for a search, and that 
evidence seized pursuant to the third search warrant must be suppressed as fruit of 
the poisonous tree.  The State appealed.  Because we conclude that the first 
affidavit provided an insufficient basis for a finding of probable cause, and that the 
second affidavit was tainted by the illegality of the first search, we affirm the 
suppression of the evidence obtained in the three searches. 
                                         
1   It is unclear from the record if this affidavit referred to a separate burglary in Caribou, or if the 
affiant mistakenly referred to Caribou instead of Limestone.  The trial court did not address the apparent 
discrepancy. 
 
 
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II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Probable Cause 
[¶9]  When the State appeals an order suppressing evidence, we directly 
review the finding of probable cause made by the magistrate2 who issued the 
warrant.  State v. Crowley, 1998 ME 187, ¶ 3, 714 A.2d 834.  Our inquiry is 
limited to whether there is a substantial basis for the finding of probable cause.  
State v. Diamond, 628 A.2d 1032, 1033 (Me. 1993).  We must “give the affidavit a 
positive reading and review the affidavit with all reasonable inferences that may be 
drawn to support the magistrate’s determination.”  State v. Higgins, 2002 ME 77, 
¶ 20, 796 A.2d 50 (quotation marks omitted).  Although we must test the affidavit 
in a commonsense fashion, the test for probable cause is restricted to the four 
corners of the affidavit.  State v. Thornton, 414 A.2d 229, 233 (Me. 1980). 
[¶10]  The magistrate must determine whether probable cause exists based 
on the “totality of the circumstances” test adopted in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 
(1983).  Crowley, 1998 ME 187, ¶ 3, 714 A.2d 834.  This test requires a practical, 
commonsense determination whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
                                         
2  We clarify that only a judge or a justice of the peace may issue a search warrant pursuant to 
M. R. Crim. P. 41(a).  Traditionally, a person with less authority than a judge, but who had the authority 
to issue search warrants, was referred to as a magistrate.  See e.g. 15 M.R.S. § 55 (2012).  Thus, although 
much of our search and seizure precedent refers to the findings of a magistrate, we apply the same 
principles to cases involving search warrants issued by a justice of the peace. 
 
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found in a particular place.  Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.  Further, the affidavit must set 
forth some nexus between the evidence to be seized and the locations to be 
searched.  State v. Samson, 2007 ME 33, ¶ 15, 916 A.2d 977. 
[¶11]  Here, the witnesses’ veracity is not a concern.3  The witnesses were 
disinterested “citizen informants” whose accounts were not inherently unreliable.  
See State v. Perrigo, 640 A.2d 1074, 1076 (Me. 1994.)  However, even if we 
accept the State’s contention that it was, in fact, Johndro’s car that the witnesses 
observed in the vicinity of the crime scenes on the day the burglaries were 
reported,4 the affidavit nevertheless fails to provide a substantial basis for a finding 
of probable cause. 
[¶12]  The affidavit provides no information about what items, if any, were 
stolen during the burglaries.  The State urges us to look to the proposed warrant, 
which included a list of items to be seized as evidence of the crime of burglary.  
The State argues that, because we must give the affidavit a commonsense review, 
we should consider all of the materials that were presented to the justice of the 
                                         
3  That Mahan received one witness’s statement from a third party is irrelevant to the probable cause 
analysis under the “totality of the circumstances” test.  Evidence that would be inadmissible at trial, 
including hearsay, may properly be considered in evaluating whether probable cause exists.  Draper v. 
United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172-73 (1949).  See 
also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241-242. 
 
4  According to Mahan’s affidavit, the first witness described the vehicle he saw as “possibly” a tan 
Dodge Intrepid, and indicated that he “felt” that the license plate number was 2196MD, which was similar 
to, but did not match, Johndro’s license plate number.  The search warrant indicates that Johndro’s 2002 
Dodge Intrepid is silver. 
 
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peace as part of Mahan’s search warrant application.  However, although a warrant 
may incorporate an accompanying affidavit by reference, Groh v. Ramirez, 540 
U.S. 551, 557-58 (2004), our inquiry when reviewing a finding of probable cause 
is restricted to the four corners of the affidavit.  Thornton, 414 A.2d at 233; State v. 
Ruybal, 398 A.2d 407, 414 (Me. 1979); State v. Smith, 381 A.2d 1117, 1120 (Me. 
1978).  Thus, the list of items in the proposed warrant cannot remedy the 
affidavit’s failure to establish probable cause. 
[¶13]  We recognize that “innocent behavior frequently will provide the 
basis for a showing of probable cause.”  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 
(1983).  However, “[w]ithout a specific allegation of criminal activity to color the 
noncriminal behavior described in [the] affidavit, there is no information from 
which to conclude that evidence of criminal activity would be found at the time of 
the search.”  State v. Diamond, 628 A.2d 1032, 1034 (Me. 1993).  Here, the 
affidavit indicates that both witnesses saw a “suspicious car” in the area of the 
burglarized homes around noon on the day the burglaries were discovered.  It 
provides no indication as to what time the burglaries occurred, or what time they 
were reported.  A vehicle being driven down the road in the middle of the day, and 
even pulling in and out of several driveways, without more, is not a sufficient 
nexus to criminal activity, notwithstanding the subjective feelings of the witnesses 
who observed this behavior.  This is not a case where innocent behavior is used to 
 
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corroborate an informant’s specific allegation of criminal activity.  See Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 243 n.13.  Nothing in either the witnesses’ statements or 
Mahan’s affidavit links the noncriminal behavior to the burglaries. 
[¶14]  Johndro argues that it was improper for the justice of the peace to 
consider his prior burglary convictions as part of the probable cause analysis.  The 
affidavit’s reference to Johndro’s convictions did not compromise the neutrality of 
the justice of the peace.  Past criminal activity and interactions with law 
enforcement provide background and are properly considered as part of the totality 
of the circumstances.  State v. Estabrook, 2007 ME 130, ¶ 7, 932 A.2d 549.  
Standing alone, however, this history would not give a prudent person reason to 
believe that evidence of the burglaries would exist in Johndro’s home.  Id. 
[¶15]  This is especially true because there is no indication that Johndro was 
the person driving the car near the crime scenes.  According to the affidavit, one 
witness observed that the operator was male; no further description was provided.  
The affidavit’s failure to identify Johndro as the operator renders the weak 
connection between the vehicle and Johndro’s home even more tenuous.  The State 
urges us to infer that a burglar who drives his car to the scene of a burglary will 
almost certainly transfer stolen property from the car to his own residence.  Even if 
we accept that proposition, the State’s theory requires us to go one step further and 
 
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to assume that Johndro was the person who drove the car and committed the 
burglaries.  The basis for this assumption is simply lacking from the affidavit. 
[¶16]  We are required to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of a finding 
of probable cause.  The inferences the State asks us to draw, however, are so 
attenuated as to exceed the bounds of reasonableness.  We cannot say that 
observation of a car driving in the vicinity of a crime scene gives rise to a fair 
probability that evidence of that crime will be found inside the home of the car’s 
registered owner.  Accordingly, there is no substantial basis for the finding of the 
justice of the peace that the affidavit demonstrated probable cause sufficient to 
justify a search of Johndro’s home, car, and shed. 
B. 
The Good Faith Exception 
[¶17]  The Fourth Amendment does not require suppression of evidence 
seized pursuant to a facially valid warrant if officers relied on the warrant based on 
an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause.  United States 
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984).  An officer cannot manifest objective good faith 
in relying on a search warrant based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of 
probable cause as to render belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.  
Id. at 923 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶18]  In Diamond, we concluded that, because an affidavit based entirely on 
noncriminal behavior contained no information from which to conclude that 
 
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evidence of criminal activity would be found at the time of the search, officers’ 
reliance on the warrant was not objectively reasonable.  628 A.2d at 1034.  In that 
case, a drug enforcement agent learned from the federal Drug Enforcement Agency 
that a confidential source, whose information had already led to dozens of arrests 
for indoor marijuana growing operations, had relayed that Diamond had received 
four shipments from two companies identified as “A.G.S. Inc.” and “Light Mfg.”  
Id. at 1033.  The affidavit did not specify that the informant suspected these 
companies of being suppliers of marijuana seeds or growing equipment.  Id.  
Further investigation revealed that tax assessors had been denied access to the 
inside of Diamond’s residence, and that Diamond’s monthly electricity use far 
exceeded that of a typical residential customer.  Id. at 1034.  While conducting 
surveillance in a heavily wooded area surrounding Diamond’s property, the agent 
was accosted by two dogs, which came from and returned toward the direction of 
Diamond’s house, apparently to alert Diamond to the presence of strangers.  Id.  A 
justice of the peace issued a search warrant based on these facts, and agents seized 
marijuana plants and indoor growing equipment from Diamond’s house the same 
day.  Id. at 1033.  On these facts, we held not only that the affidavit failed to 
establish probable cause, but also that the good faith exception did not apply.  Id.  
We concluded that reasonable judges could not disagree that the affidavit, based 
 
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solely on noncriminal behavior, failed to establish probable cause, and that the 
agent’s reliance on the warrant was not objectively reasonable.  Id. at 1034. 
[¶19]  That reasoning compels the same result here.  Although the affidavit 
indicates that two burglaries occurred, the only activity that could potentially be 
linked to Johndro⎯his car having been seen driving in the area⎯is entirely 
noncriminal and unsuspicious on its own.  Moreover, there is no specific allegation 
that Johndro, or anyone with ties to his residence, engaged in suspicious or 
criminal activity.  In Diamond, we characterized the affidavit as “bare bones,” id. 
at 1034, even though it recited that the informant’s information had led to dozens 
of arrests, id. at 1033.  Similarly, the affidavit in this case is based entirely on 
noncriminal behavior and fails to explain how such behavior provides a basis for 
suspecting that evidence of the burglaries would be found in Johndro’s home or 
vehicle. 
[¶20]  Nothing in the record suggests that Mahan intended to mislead the 
justice of the peace, or that any of the information in the affidavit was false.  
However, an officer’s subjective good faith is not the appropriate inquiry.  Because 
nothing in the affidavit establishes a connection between the burglaries and 
Johndro’s residence, officers’ reliance on the warrant was not objectively 
reasonable. 
 
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C. 
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree 
 
[¶21]  The exclusionary rule applies to evidence obtained as a direct result of 
an illegal search and seizure, as well as to evidence later discovered and found to 
be derivative of an illegality.  Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984).  
Illegally seized evidence need not be excluded if the connection between the illegal 
police conduct and the discovery and seizure of the evidence is so attenuated as to 
dissipate the taint.  Id. at 805 (quotation marks omitted).  However, any evidence 
obtained through the exploitation of police illegality must be excluded as fruit of 
the poisonous tree.  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). 
[¶22]  The third warrant, which permitted officers to search Johndro’s house 
again five days after the initial search, relied heavily on observations officers made 
while executing the first warrant.  Had officers not been illegally present inside of 
Johndro’s home, they would not have observed the gold wristwatch matching the 
description of a watch that had been stolen during a burglary.  The third warrant 
undoubtedly exploited information gleaned from the illegal search; therefore, 
evidence seized pursuant to that warrant must be suppressed as well. 
         The entry is:  
Judgment affirmed. 
____________________________________ 
 
 
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On the briefs: 
Todd R. Collins, District Attorney, and Kurt A. Kafferlin, Asst. Dist. Atty., 
Prosecutorial District 8, Houlton, for appellant State of Maine 
 
Michael E. Carpenter, Esq., Houlton, for appellee Christopher J. Johndro 
 
 
At oral argument: 
 
Kurt A. Kafferlin, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellant State of Maine 
 
Michael E. Carpenter, Esq., for appellee Christopher J. Johndro 
 
 
 
Aroostook County Superior Court docket number CR-2009-502 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY