Case Title: Dhillon v. John Muir Health

Citation: 

Docket Number: S224472

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2017-05-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 5/25/17 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
JATINDER DHILLON, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S224472 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/3 A143195 
JOHN MUIR HEALTH et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
Contra Costa County 
 
Defendants and Appellants. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. MSN-13-1353 
 
____________________________________) 
 
As a general rule, a litigant may appeal an adverse ruling only after the trial 
court renders a final judgment.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1.)  The question in this 
case concerns the application of this general rule when a trial court has granted a 
petition for writ of administrative mandamus and remanded the matter for 
proceedings before an administrative body.  The issuance of the writ did not 
definitively resolve the dispute between the parties, but it did mark the end of the 
writ proceeding in the trial court.  Is the court‟s order an appealable final 
judgment?  We conclude that it is, and we reverse the contrary judgment of the 
Court of Appeal.  
I. 
Plaintiff Jatinder Dhillon is a thoracic surgeon with clinical privileges at 
two San Francisco Bay Area hospitals owned and operated by defendant John 
Muir Health (John Muir).  In October 2011, one of Dr. Dhillon‟s colleagues 
lodged a complaint against him, claiming that he had been verbally abusive and 
 
2 
physically aggressive toward her during an administrative meeting.  Dr. Dhillon 
denied the allegations and requested that John Muir appoint an ad hoc committee 
of physicians from both hospital campuses to look into the matter.  John Muir 
complied.  After an investigation, the committee submitted a report to a joint 
medical executive committee (MEC) for both hospitals.  It concluded that neither 
Dr. Dhillon nor the complaining doctor had behaved in a professional manner, and 
it recommended that the two doctors either meet with a mediator to resolve their 
differences or attend an anger management program.  At a joint meeting held in 
June 2012, the MEC unanimously voted to require both doctors to attend a 
specified anger management class within eight months.    
Dr. Dhillon refused to attend, asserting that the requirement that he 
participate in the anger management class was “unfounded and unfair.”  In July 
2013, John Muir sent Dr. Dhillon a letter informing him that the MEC had 
concluded that if he did not attend the class within one month, his clinical 
privileges would be suspended for “a period of just under 14 full days.”  
Dr. Dhillon requested a hearing with John Muir‟s judicial review committee 
(JRC).  John Muir replied that Dr. Dhillon was not entitled to such a hearing. 
In September 2013, Dr. Dhillon filed a petition for writ of administrative 
mandamus in the Contra Costa Superior Court, naming John Muir and its board of 
directors as respondents.  As later amended, the petition alleged that John Muir 
had violated its bylaws by imposing the discipline without a hearing before the 
JRC.  He asked the trial court to order a hearing before the JRC or some other 
appropriate body, to direct John Muir to vacate its imposition of discipline, to find 
that John Muir‟s bylaws “violate due process and are unenforceable where the 
[resulting] discipline affect[s] the accused Practitioner‟s clinical reporting and 
disclosure requirements,” to order John Muir not to make disparaging comments 
 
3 
about Dr. Dhillon regarding the matter, and to authorize Dr. Dhillon to file suit 
against John Muir for damages.   
The superior court granted the writ petition in part.  It concluded that John 
Muir‟s bylaws entitled Dr. Dhillon to a hearing before the JRC or another 
appropriate body and that “he was deprived of . . . due process when John Muir 
. . . suspended his clinical privileges . . . without providing him a hearing.”  It 
issued a peremptory writ directing John Muir to conduct such a hearing.  In all 
other respects the court denied the petition for administrative mandamus.  
John Muir filed a notice of appeal.  It also filed a petition for writ of 
mandate and/or prohibition in the Court of Appeal, challenging the trial court‟s 
ruling.  After soliciting informal opposition from Dr. Dhillon, the Court of Appeal 
summarily denied the writ petition.  On the same day, it issued an order in John 
Muir‟s appeal directing the parties to brief the question whether the trial court‟s 
order directing John Muir to conduct a hearing was appealable.  After reviewing 
the parties‟ briefs, the Court of Appeal issued an order dismissing the appeal.  The 
order explained:  “The superior court‟s order remanding the matter to John Muir 
Health is not a final, appealable order.  (See Board of Dental Examiners v. 
Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1424; see also Gillis v. Dental Bd. of 
California (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 311, 318.)  Furthermore, the order and 
judgment at issue here are not appealable as a final determination of a collateral 
matter.”   
The Court of Appeal‟s dismissal order deepened a long-standing conflict 
concerning the appealability of a trial court‟s order, on a petition for writ of 
administrative mandamus, remanding the matter for further proceedings before the 
administrative body.  California cases have uniformly held that a trial court‟s 
complete denial of a petition for administrative mandamus is a final judgment that 
may be appealed by the petitioner.  (JKH Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of 
 
4 
Industrial Relations (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1056; 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure 
(5th ed. 2008) Extraordinary Writs, § 336, p. 1252.)  The cases have also held that 
a trial court‟s judgment granting administrative mandamus, and ordering the 
substantive relief sought by the petitioner, is a final judgment that may be 
appealed by the respondent agency.  (Beckley v. Board of Administration etc. 
(2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 691, 696, fn. 4; 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, 
Extraordinary Writs, § 337, p. 1253.)  In each of these situations, it is clear that 
“ „no issue is left for future consideration except the fact of compliance or 
noncompliance with the terms of‟ ” the court‟s decree.  (Griset v. Fair Political 
Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 698 (Griset), quoting Lyons v. Goss (1942) 
19 Cal.2d 659, 670.)  California courts have, however, divided over whether the 
same is true of a trial court‟s order that does not grant substantive relief, but 
instead remands the cause for further proceedings before the administrative 
agency. 
In one line of cases, on which the Court of Appeal in this case relied, courts 
have stated that a trial court‟s order on administrative mandamus remanding the 
matter for further administrative proceedings is not an appealable final judgment.  
(Gillis v. Dental Bd. of California, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 318; Village 
Trailer Park, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1133, 
1139-1140; Bolsa Chica Land Trust v. Superior Court (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 493, 
501-502; Board of Dental Examiners v. Superior Court, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1430.)  These cases contain no substantive reasoning to support that conclusion.  
Furthermore, in none of these cases did the court‟s conclusion affect the result, 
 
5 
because in each case the Court of Appeal elected to treat the appeal as a petition 
for extraordinary writ and considered the matter on the merits.1 
In another line of cases, courts have stated that a trial court‟s order on 
administrative mandamus remanding the matter for further administrative 
proceedings is appealable.  (Quintanar v. County of Riverside (2014) 230 
Cal.App.4th 1226, 1232; Carson Gardens, L.L.C. v. City of Carson Mobilehome 
Park Rental Review Bd. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 856, 866; City of Carmel-by-the-
Sea v. Board of Supervisors (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 964, 970; Carroll v. Civil 
Serv. Comm’n (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 727, 733.)  But as with the line of decisions 
concluding that a remand order on administrative mandamus is not appealable, 
these decisions contain little or no reasoning. 
We granted review to resolve this division of authority.  
II. 
The administrative mandamus statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 
1094.5, authorizes judicial review of final administrative decisions resulting from 
hearings that are required by law.  In determining whether to grant a writ of 
administrative mandamus, the trial court is instructed to consider “whether the 
respondent has proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; whether there was 
a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion.”  (Id., subd. 
(b).) 
In general, an adverse ruling in a judicial proceeding is appealable once the 
trial court renders a final judgment.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a); 
                                              
1  
In an opinion not cited by the Court of Appeal in this case or by any of the 
authorities on which that court relied, Kumar v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc. 
(1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1050 (Kumar) reached a somewhat similar conclusion 
about appealability based on a more thorough discussion of the question.  We 
discuss Kumar at footnote 4, post. 
 
6 
Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 740-741.)  This 
general rule applies equally in administrative mandamus proceedings.  An 
application for a writ of administrative mandamus is a “special proceeding of a 
civil nature” governed by the provisions of part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  
A final judgment in a special proceeding is appealable unless a statute expressly 
prohibits the appeal (Knoll v. Davidson (1974) 12 Cal.3d 335, 343; see also Code 
Civ. Proc., § 904.1), and the parties do not suggest that any such statute would bar 
the appeal in this case. 
The question before us is therefore whether the trial court‟s order in this 
case was a final judgment.  We have previously recognized that a judgment is 
final, and therefore appealable, “ „ “when it terminates the litigation between the 
parties on the merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by 
execution what has been determined.” ‟ ”  (Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1997) 
15 Cal.4th 288, 304, quoting Doudell v. Shoo (1911) 159 Cal. 448, 453.)  “ „It is 
not the form of the decree but the substance and effect of the adjudication which is 
determinative.  As a general test, which must be adapted to the particular 
circumstances of the individual case, it may be said that where no issue is left for 
future consideration except the fact of compliance or noncompliance with the 
terms of the first decree, that decree is final, but where anything further in the 
nature of judicial action on the part of the court is essential to a final determination 
of the rights of the parties, the decree is interlocutory.‟ ”  (Griset, supra, 25 
Cal.4th at p. 698; see also Dana Point Safe Harbor Collective v. Superior Court 
(2010) 51 Cal.4th 1, 5.)  “We have long recognized a „well-established policy, 
based upon the remedial character of the right of appeal, of according that right in 
doubtful cases “when such can be accomplished without doing violence to 
applicable rules.” ‟ ”  (Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 46 Cal.4th 
106, 113.) 
 
7 
As the cases make clear, the proper application of these principles depends, 
to a certain degree, on the circumstances of the case.  This is as true in the 
administrative mandamus context as it is elsewhere.  As the United States 
Supreme Court has noted, there is “great variety” in judicial remands to 
administrative bodies, “reflecting in turn the variety of ways in which 
[administrative] action may be challenged in the [trial] courts and the possible 
outcomes of such challenges.”  (Sullivan v. Finkelstein (1990) 496 U.S. 617, 623 
(Finkelstein).)  In Finkelstein, the high court considered whether the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services was entitled to an immediate appeal of a trial court 
order remanding a disability benefits claim for reconsideration, absent reliance on 
an agency regulation the court had effectively declared invalid.  In answering the 
question, the high court made clear that the question presented was not “the broad 
question whether remands to administrative agencies are always immediately 
appealable,” but instead whether the nature of the particular remand order at issue 
rendered it a final and appealable judgment.  (Ibid.)  The high court held that the 
order was a final judgment within the meaning of relevant federal statutes, both 
because it set aside the secretary‟s decision that the claimant was not entitled to 
benefits and “finally decided that the Secretary could not follow his own 
regulations” in considering the issue (id. at p. 625), and because the secretary 
might have no later opportunities to seek review of the order (ibid. [“[S]hould the 
Secretary on remand undertake the inquiry mandated by the District Court and 
award benefits, there would be grave doubt . . . whether he could appeal his own 
order.”]). 
Like the high court in Finkelstein, we do not here undertake to answer “the 
broad question whether remands to administrative agencies are always 
immediately appealable.”  (Finkelstein, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 623.)  Instead, 
focusing on the nature of the particular remand order before us, similar 
 
8 
considerations lead us to conclude that the superior court‟s order partially granting 
Dr. Dhillon‟s writ petition was an appealable final judgment.2 
In its order, the superior court either granted or denied each of 
Dr. Dhillon‟s claims.  Agreeing with Dr. Dhillon‟s reading of John Muir‟s bylaws, 
the trial court set aside the discipline John Muir had imposed and remanded with 
instructions to hold a hearing before the JRC or another appropriate body.  The 
court did not reserve jurisdiction to consider any issues.  (Cf. City of Los Angeles 
v. Superior Court (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 275, 280 [judgment not final when trial 
court ordered new administrative hearing while holding petitioner‟s application for 
administrative mandamus “ „in abeyance‟ ”]; Ng v. State Personnel Bd. (1977) 68 
Cal.App.3d 600, 604 [remand to the State Personnel Board not appealable when 
trial court retained “continuing jurisdiction to review the personnel board‟s final 
decision rendered after compliance with the interlocutory order”].)  Thus, as a 
formal matter, once the trial court issued the writ, nothing remained to be done in 
that court; no issue is now left for the court‟s “ „future consideration except the 
fact of compliance or noncompliance with the terms of the first decree.‟ ”  (Griset, 
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 698; see also Belt v. Davis (1850) 1 Cal. 134, 138 [“by a 
final judgment is to be understood, not a final determination of the rights of the 
parties, but merely of the particular suit”].) 3 
                                              
2  
To the extent that Gillis v. Dental Bd. of California, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th 
at page 318; Village Trailer Park, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., supra, 
101 Cal.App.4th at pages 1139-1140; Bolsa Chica Land Trust v. Superior Court, 
supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at pages 501-502; and Board of Dental Examiners v. 
Superior Court, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th page 1430 may be read as stating a 
categorical rule that a trial court‟s remand order in an administrative mandamus 
proceeding is never appealable, those decisions are disapproved. 
3  
Dr. Dhillon argues that the trial court‟s order here was not a final judgment 
because it was not a “judgment” as that term is defined by subdivision (f) of Code 
of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, which states:  “The court [in an administrative 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
9 
Moreover, as a practical matter, unless John Muir has a right of immediate 
appeal, the trial court‟s interpretation of its bylaws may effectively evade review.  
If Dr. Dhillon prevails at the JRC hearing, the bylaws provide for an internal 
appellate process whereby Dr. Dhillon or the MEC may seek review of the JRC‟s 
decision.  But John Muir‟s internal appeal board cannot overturn the superior 
court‟s determination that Dr. Dhillon was entitled to the JRC hearing in the first 
place.  If the administrative proceedings are again ultimately resolved adversely to 
Dr. Dhillon, John Muir would have no basis for seeking review of the decision.  
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
mandamus action] shall enter judgment either commanding respondent to set aside 
the order or decision, or denying the writ.  Where the judgment commands that the 
order or decision be set aside, it may order the reconsideration of the case in light 
of the court‟s opinion and judgment and may order respondent to take such further 
action as is specially enjoined upon it by law, but the judgment shall not limit or 
control in any way the discretion legally vested in the respondent.”  Dr. Dhillon 
reasons that under this provision, a court adjudicating an administrative mandamus 
petition may issue only three kinds of judgments:  (1) it may command the 
respondent to set aside the order or decision; (2) it may deny the writ, or (3) it may 
command the respondent to set aside the order or decision and reconsider the case, 
taking further action as required.  Here, he asserts, the trial court‟s order fell into 
none of these categories.  
Assuming that subdivision (f) of Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 
defines a “judgment” for the purposes of determining whether an order in an 
administrative mandamus proceeding is an appealable final judgment, 
Dr. Dhillon‟s argument nevertheless lacks merit.  Although the order did not 
explicitly set aside the discipline imposed on Dr. Dhillon, that consequence was 
implicit in the trial court‟s determination that Dr. Dhillon was entitled to further 
administrative proceedings before he could be disciplined.  By commanding John 
Muir to conduct those proceedings, the trial court necessarily set aside John 
Muir‟s order imposing the discipline.  (See Griset, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 698 
[“ „It is not the form of the decree but the substance and effect of the adjudication 
which is determinative.‟ ”].)   
 
10 
Thus, if Dr. Dhillon chose not to seek mandamus review, that would be the end of 
the matter.4  
                                              
4  
Federal courts have similarly held that a federal district court‟s order 
remanding a matter to an administrative agency is appealable when the order is 
effectively unreviewable after resolution of the merits of the controversy.  (E.g., 
Chugash Alaska Corp. v. Lujan (9th Cir. 1990) 915 F.2d 454, 457 [an exception to 
the general rule that remand orders are not final applies when “(1) the district court 
conclusively resolves a separable legal issue, (2) the remand order forces the 
agency to apply a potentially erroneous rule which may result in a wasted 
proceeding, and (3) review would, as a practical matter, be foreclosed if an 
immediate appeal were unavailable”]; see also, e.g., Rush University Medical 
Center v. Leavitt (7th Cir. 2008) 535 F.3d 735, 738 [“Unless the issues can be 
addressed in court while the agency deals with the remand, they might never be 
open to appellate review.  That makes the district judge‟s decision effectively 
final. . . .  The sort of remand ordered by the district judge is one that might well 
conclude without a return to court, so the decision is appealable.”].)  Although 
principles of finality under federal and California law may not be coextensive, 
these decisions reinforce our conclusion that practical unreviewability is a relevant 
consideration in determining whether a remand order is a final and appealable 
judgment. 
 
This practical consideration distinguishes this case from Kumar, supra, 218 
Cal.App.3d 1050.  In Kumar, as in this case, a doctor challenged the suspension of 
his hospital privileges in a petition for writ of administrative mandamus, and the 
trial court granted the petition in part:  It set aside the decision by the hospital‟s 
governing board upholding the doctor‟s suspension and remanded the matter for 
further administrative proceedings, but it did not reinstate the doctor‟s privileges.  
The doctor appealed.  The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the 
judgment was not appealable because the doctor was first required to exhaust his 
administrative remedies.  (Id. at pp. 1054-1057.)  But the doctor in Kumar, unlike 
John Muir, would have had a later opportunity to raise an appellate challenge to 
the hospital‟s discipline if he did not prevail in the administrative hearing:  He 
could file a second petition for administrative mandamus, and if the trial court 
ruled against him, he could appeal from the denial of his petition.  Here, John Muir 
has no comparable guarantee of future opportunities to raise its challenge to the 
trial court‟s conclusion that its bylaws require it to hold a JRC hearing before 
imposing disciplinary measures.  Thus, whether or not Kumar was correctly 
decided (a question we need not decide here), it is distinguishable on its facts. 
 
11 
 
III. 
Dr. Dhillon argues that even if the trial court‟s remand order was an 
appealable final judgment, John Muir has already received the functional 
equivalent of an appeal.  He explains that following the trial court‟s order, John 
Muir filed a writ petition challenging the trial court‟s remand order, with respect to 
which the Court of Appeal issued a Palma notice (Palma v. U.S. Industrial 
Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178-180) and ordered Dr. Dhillon to file 
informal opposition before summarily denying the petition.  This denial, 
Dr. Dhillon argues, reflects a careful consideration of the merits by the appellate 
court.  (See James B. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1018, fn. 3 
[“We hasten to dispel the bar‟s common misconception that a summary denial of a 
writ petition suggests summary consideration.  The Courts of Appeal review and 
evaluate the hundreds of petitions filed each year in each appellate district.  The 
merits of these petitions are fully examined.”].)  Dr. Dhillon notes that when a 
Court of Appeal rules on a writ petition, it is exercising its appellate jurisdiction.  
(Leone v. Medical Board (2000) 22 Cal.4th 660, 668 [“a reviewing court may 
exercise appellate jurisdiction . . . by an extraordinary writ proceeding”].)  
Dr. Dhillon reasons that John Muir therefore “did get a full and fair opportunity to 
present its arguments to the Court of Appeal” and it “has obtained appellate 
review of the trial court‟s remand order.”  
Dr. Dhillon‟s argument confuses the Court of Appeal‟s exercise of 
jurisdiction in a writ proceeding with appellate review of a final judgment under 
Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1.  There are important differences between 
the two.  Although a Court of Appeal exercises its constitutionally authorized 
appellate jurisdiction when it considers a writ petition, a party appealing a final 
judgment has certain rights not provided to parties seeking relief by means of an 
 
12 
extraordinary writ.  A Court of Appeal, for example, may summarily deny a writ 
petition, but it may resolve an appeal only by an opinion “in writing with reasons 
stated.”  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14.)  An appealing party also has the right to oral 
argument — a right we have described as conferring a “chance to make a 
difference in result” that is “extremely valuable to litigants.”  (Moles v. Regents of 
University of California (1982) 32 Cal.3d 867, 872; see Cal. Const., art. VI, § 3; 
Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1253-1255.)  Furthermore, “a 
petition for a writ of mandate may be dismissed if the plaintiff has an alternate 
„plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law.‟ ”  (Villery v. 
Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 407, 410; 
Powers v. City of Richmond (1995) 10 Cal.4th 85, 113 [“Mandate is available to 
review an appealable judgment only when the remedy by appeal would be 
inadequate or the issues presented are of great public importance and must be 
resolved promptly.  [Citations.]  A remedy by immediate direct appeal is presumed 
to be adequate, and a party seeking review by extraordinary writ bears the burden 
of demonstrating that appeal would not be an adequate remedy under the particular 
circumstances of that case.”]; Phelan v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 363, 
366.)  Because a mandate petition may be denied on this procedural ground, an 
order by a Court of Appeal denying such a petition, even after issuance of a Palma 
notice, does not necessarily demonstrate that the court has resolved the merits of 
the petition adversely to the petitioning party.  For all of these reasons, the Court 
of Appeal‟s consideration of the writ petition could not have afforded John Muir 
the functional equivalent of the appeal to which it is entitled under Code of Civil 
Procedure section 904.1. 
 
13 
 
DISPOSITION 
We reverse the order of the Court of Appeal dismissing John Muir‟s appeal, 
and we remand the matter to that court with directions to reinstate the appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
KRUGER, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Dhillon v. John Muir Health 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S224472 
Date Filed: May 25, 2017 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Contra Costa 
Judge: Laurel S. Brady 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Horvitz & Levy, David S. Ettinger, H. Thomas Watson; DiCaro, Coppo & Popcke, Carlo Coppo, Michael 
R. Popcke, Shelley A. Carder; Hooper, Lundy & Bookman and Ross E. Campbell for Defendants and 
Appellants. 
 
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, Barry S. Landsberg, Doreen W. Shenfeld and Joanna S. McCallum for Dignity 
Health as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch and Richard D. Barton for Medical Staff of Sharp Healthcare as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Jay-Allen Eisen Law Corporation, Jay-Allen Eisen, Jan T. Chilton, Dennis A. Fischer, Lisa R. Jaskol, 
Robin B. Johansen and Robin Meadow for California Academy of Appellate Lawyers as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
The Minnard Law Firm, Carla V. Minnard; The Arkin Law Firm and Sharon J. Arkin for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
David S. Ettinger 
Horvitz & Levy 
3601 West Olive Avenue, 8th Floor 
Burbank, CA  91505-4681 
(818) 995-0800 
 
Sharon J. Arkin 
The Arkin Law Firm 
225 S. Olive Street, Suite 102 
Los Angeles, CA  90012 
(541) 469-2892