Case Title: LOPEZ v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-03-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
LOPEZ v. STATE2004 WY 10398 P.3d 143Case Number: 03-76Decided: 09/07/2004
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

LEE 
LLOYD LOPEZ,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

Kenneth 
Koski, State Public Defender; Donna Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Tina N. Kerin, 
Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; Diane Courselle, Director, and Bob 
Hitchcock, Student Intern, of the Wyoming Defender Aid Program.  Argument by Mr. 
Hitchcock.

 

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Faculty Director, and Robert W. 
Ingram, Student Director, of the Prosecution Assistance Program.  Argument by Mr. 
Ingram.

 

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
In 
this appeal, Lee Lloyd Lopez, convicted of third degree sexual assault of CS, 
the ten-year-old daughter of Mr. Lopez's ex-wife, raises three issues in this 
effort to overturn the judgment and sentence of imprisonment for not less than 
six nor more than eight years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary.  Mr. Lopez contends that a prosecution 
witness, Lynn Huylar, a social worker and self-styled "forensic interviewer" at 
a child advocacy center, impermissibly vouched for CS's truthfulness; the trial 
court violated his constitutional right to present a defense when it excluded 
evidence that showed an alternative source for CS's sexual knowledge and 
evidence that showed CS had reason to believe that an accusation of the kind 
made could get the attention of adults without getting the person accused into 
serious trouble; and the prosecutor committed misconduct during Mr. Lopez's 
cross-examination by trying to goad Mr. Lopez into inviting inadmissible 
evidence, and the trial court erroneously changed a previous evidentiary ruling 
on the inadmissible evidence in question which allowed the prosecutor to benefit 
from the misconduct.  We hold that 
prosecution witness Huylar impermissibly vouched for CS's truthfulness and, 
therefore, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

 

 

GENERAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS

 

[¶2]           
CS 
was born May 10, 1990, to DS, her father, and KL, her mother.  They also had a younger son, KS.  DS and KL separated for nine months and 
eventually divorced June 11, 1999, when CS was eight years old.  DS received custody of CS and KS; they 
live in Laramie. Her parents' divorce was emotionally difficult for CS; she 
began and continued professional counseling for several years and was in 
counseling with her school counselor at the time of her accusations against Mr. 
Lopez.  KL worked at Behavioral 
Health Services; she was Mr. Lopez's counselor.  KL and Mr. Lopez married June 17, 1999, 
six days after her divorce from DS. This marriage ended in divorce on March 31, 
2000, but the couple maintained a relationship, a son, J, being born to them in 
January 2001. CS's mother and Mr. Lopez were living in Cheyenne.  About every other weekend, CS and KS 
would visit their mother in Cheyenne. Mr. Lopez was present in their mother's 
home during these visits; he often took the children on recreational outings. A 
friendly relationship developed between Mr. Lopez and the children. Mr. Lopez 
had martial arts training; occasionally he and CS rough-housed and wrestled, CS 
often initiating the contact.  

 

[¶3]           
On 
Presidents' Day weekend in 2001, CS, then age 10, and KS visited their mother, 
Mr. Lopez, and J in Cheyenne, arriving on Friday, February 16, and returning to 
Laramie on Monday, February 19.  On 
Saturday, February 17, CS and KS accompanied Mr. Lopez to a martial arts 
tournament in Denver.  That evening 
the family dined at a restaurant, returned to KL's home, and watched television. 
All of the family members, except for CS and Mr. Lopez, went to bed; CS and Mr. 
Lopez continued watching television. 

 

[¶4]           
Mr. 
Lopez and CS began wrestling, first on the floor and then on the couch.  At trial, CS testified that Mr. Lopez 
had her "pinned on the couch, or something like that . . . .  He was kind of laying on me . . . more 
like sitting and leaning on me." Her left leg was pinned against the side of the 
couch.  Mr. Lopez began tickling CS, 
first her feet, then moving up to her knee and to her thigh, "and then he moved 
up closer in between."  She 
testified that Mr. Lopez touched her on her "private area," with his index 
finger, and was "kind of tickling" her. She testified that this tickling of her 
private area lasted for more than ten seconds.  CS was giggling, and it tickled.  She told Mr. Lopez to stop, but he kept 
tickling her.  She did not know for 
how long it continued. Finally, she went to her room and went to bed. 

 

[¶5]           
According 
to KL, CS's mother, the next day CS was sick to her stomach and did not want to 
come out of the bathroom.  CS 
testified, however, that she and KS started teasing and kickboxing with Mr. 
Lopez in the hallway the next day.  
CS ran up to Mr. Lopez and playfully kicked him.  Mr. Lopez turned around, and they began 
wrestling again.  Mr. Lopez 
testified that CS did not indicate that she was uncomfortable with this contact 
or ask him to stop. At trial, CS testified that Mr. Lopez tickled her in her 
private area on the outside of her jeans while they were rough-housing. Mr. 
Lopez denied that he tickled her there. Mrs. Lopez and KS were in the area while 
all of this was going on. 

 

[¶6]           
CS 
did not immediately tell her mother that Mr. Lopez had touched her "private 
area."  And she did not immediately 
tell her father when she returned home to Laramie on Monday, February 19.  The first person she told was her 
sitter, Trish Brady, on Wednesday, February 28, eleven days after the alleged 
incident.  Ms. Brady called CS's 
father, DS, to come home.  CS talked 
to her father; he did not notify authorities.  Instead, DS told CS to talk to her 
school counselor, Linda Kaiser, about it. 

 

[¶7]           
On 
March 6, 2001, CS was interviewed by Lynn Huylar, a social worker employed as 
program director and forensic interviewer by Safe Harbor, a children's justice 
center.  The interview was recorded 
on videotape.  On March 7, 2001, Mr. 
Lopez was interviewed by Cheyenne Police Department Detective Ray Bilkie and 
made a statement to Detective Bilkie which was recorded on audio tape.  

 

[¶8]           
At 
trial, CS testified that Mr. Lopez had inappropriately touched her; Mr. Lopez 
testified and denied that he had inappropriately touched CS.  There was no physical evidence of the 
alleged assault.  Additional facts 
relevant to each of the three issues before us are set forth as necessary 
below.

 

  

 

Issue 
One:  Whether the State's witness, Lynn 
Huylar, social worker and forensic interviewer, impermissibly vouched for CS's 
truthfulness during her testimony as a prosecution witness.

 

Background 
facts

 

[¶9]           
Before 
the trial, Mr. Lopez's trial counsel filed a motion in limine, moving the court 
to rule that the prosecutor and the State's witnesses refrain from stating an 
opinion that CS was molested.  The 
court ruled that witnesses, with the exception of CS, could not testify that, in 
their opinion, Mr. Lopez molested CS or that CS's statements were true.  

 

[¶10]      During 
the prosecutor's opening statement to the jury, the following 
occurred:

 

[Prosecutor]:  Lynn [Huylar] specializes in conducting 
forensic interviews with children, and Miss Huylar will explain to you the 
basics of conducting a forensic interview, how her interview with [CS] went, 
what the requirements of that interview were based on her 
experience.

            
She'll tell you that [CS's] story was consistent.  It was full of important contextual 
details, and that the dialog [CS] used in conveying the incident was very age 
appropriate.  She'll tell you she 
classified the interview as a credible disclosure.

 

[Defense]:      Your Honor, I'm 
going to have to object, sounds like there's some vouching and argument going 
on.

 

The 
Court:      Well, 
he may indicate what the expected testimony will be.

 

[Prosecutor]:  May I continue?

 

The 
Court:      Go 
ahead.

 

[Prosecutor]:  [CS's] story to this point to March 
5th to Trish Brady, to her father; to Mrs. Kaiser, the school 
counselor, and now Miss Huylar was consistent.

 

[Defense]:      Your Honor, I'm 
going to have to object again.  It's 
argumentative, and if the State is going to put these people on the stand, I'm 
going to be objecting.  It sounds 
like they're vouching for credibility, and it's 
inappropriate.

 

The 
Court:      Well, 
it is going past opening statement into argument.  I'll sustain that objection. 

 

[¶11]      CS, 
CS's day-care provider, CS's mother, CS's father, and a friend of Mr. Lopez 
testified before the prosecutor called Lynn Huylar.  Immediately before Ms. Huylar took the 
stand as a prosecution witness, Mr. Lopez's trial counsel expressed concern to 
the court and the prosecutor at a bench conference that Ms. Huylar would be 
using terms like "credible" and "credibility."  Mr. Lopez's trial counsel wanted "to 
object to her doing that right now before she even begins." The prosecutor, in 
responding to the anticipatory objection of Mr. Lopez's trial counsel, responded 
twice:

 

            
Your Honor, that was handled in a motion in limine.  [Lynn Huylar] did find the report was 
credible; however, she doesn't  and she will say that that doesn't mean [CS] 
was telling the truth.  Those are 
the terms of art used in her profession to classify a disclosure, and she 
classified it as credible.  It's 
part of our findings in this case.

 

* 
* * *

            
The case law in Lancaster's clear that you can say these are the things 
on which I conduct my interview, whatever the case may be, and this is what I 
found.  That is not 
impermissible.  She's not going to 
say that [CS's] telling the truth.  
She's going to say, "In my field, these are the things I look for, and 
based on my training, and experience, I found this particular report to be 
credible."  That does not 
necessarily mean she was telling the truth.  

 

The 
trial court responded, "I think I understand that distinction, but in common 
parlance, it might be a distinction without a difference to the jury." The court 
ruled that the words "credible" and "credibility" were not to be used in Ms. 
Huylar's testimony. 

 

[¶12]      During 
the prosecutor's direct examination of Ms. Huylar, the prosecutor asked what CS 
had told her; Mr. Lopez's trial counsel lodged a hearsay objection and requested 
a continuing objection out of concern about improper vouching. The court 
overruled the hearsay objection and did not address the request for a continuing 
objection. Later in the prosecution's direct examination of Ms. Huylar, Ms. 
Huylar testified as follows:

 

[Prosecutor]:  Is there anything else about the 
interview [with CS] that you should share with the jury?

 

Huylar:            
I will.  The interview 
process is a way of obtaining information, and it has a methodology use to 
it.  It's a subsequent way.  I use the same kind of methodology that 
I did with [CS] on all the other interviews that I do, so it doesn't 
change.  It's very specific 
methodology.  It's very scientific, 
and I'm testing things because I want to make sure that the information we get 
is true and accurate.  

 

Mr. 
Lopez's trial counsel did not make a contemporaneous objection to that 
testimony.

 

[¶13]      During 
cross-examination of Ms. Huylar by Mr. Lopez's trial counsel, counsel explored 
generally the making of false allegations by children.  Mr. Lopez's counsel inquired whether 
various factors in connection with the making of false allegations had been 
present in Ms. Huylar's interview of CS.  
Finally, counsel asked:

 

Q.        
Children can make false allegations; isn't that 
correct?

 

[Huylar]:          
That can happen.

 

Q.        And 
it does happen?

 

A.        It 
can happen.

 

Q.        Does 
it happen?  Have kids falsely 
accused people, to your knowledge?

 

A.        To my 
knowledge, there have been instances, yes; yes, but hopefully, we assess that 
through the process. 

 

[¶14]      On 
redirect examination by the prosecutor, in response to a question whether Ms. 
Huylar had found false allegations in her interview in this case, Ms. Huylar 
responded, "It did not  I didn't find those elements that would concern me 
saying it was a false allegation."  
Mr. Lopez's trial counsel did not make a contemporaneous objection to 
this answer. 

 

[¶15]      In 
the prosecutor's closing argument, the prosecutor commented several times on Ms. 
Huylar's testimony.  Excerpts of 
those comments reveal these comments:

 

[CS 
is] interviewed by Lynn Huylar, who's a trained forensic interviewer.  That's what she does.  She discusses these types of things with 
kids.  She has a protocol.  She's taught over thousands of kids 
about this.  She is trained to look 
for inconsistencies in their story.  
She's trained to look for age-appropriate language, and she testified, 
and Lynn told you there was no language that this child used that was 
inappropriate for a 10-year-old child.

            
She told you she evaluated her competency, she found her to be competent; 
she could understand concepts, in, out, over[.]  She is trained to look for third-party 
influence, things like using language that is inappropriate.  [CS] didn't use any language that was 
inappropriate.  

            
Lynn Huylar found no evidence of any third-party influence.  She's trained to look and determine 
whether or not the child has actually lived the experience, has this child lived 
through this experience, thing like contextual details.

            
Now, she didn't mean things like, "Now, is there a candlestick up on the 
mantel?"  She means things like, 
"How  did it feel?"  [CS] told you how it felt.  "What did you think when this 
happened?"  "I was stunned."  That's what [CS] testified.  Those are emotions and feelings you 
would have if it were to happen to you, if you were to live through the 
experience, the contextual details of, "We were watching TV.  I was on the couch.  He was on the couch.  I was laying with my feet this way.  He pinned my leg up behind his 
back.  He started tickling my 
thigh.  He started tickling my 
legs.  He moved up, and he tickled 
me over my underwear." [C]ontextual details that she could give to 
you.

            
Motivational reasons.  Why 
would [CS] not tell the truth?  Lynn 
Huylar could find none.  The 
defendant was asked by Detective Bilkie, "Any reason why, that you can think of, 
this child might not tell the truth, might be making up these things?"  Lynn Huylar could find none, and neither 
could he.  Folks, I submit to you, 
because there are no reasons for her to make it up.  There are none.

 

* 
* * *

            
Lynn Huylar, who had interviewed the child; Lynn Huylar, who had done 
this a number of times; Lynn Huylar, who is a trained forensic interviewer could 
find nothing wrong with that child's story, with that child.  She told her what had 
happened.

 

[¶16]      In 
the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument, he made these final comments about 
Ms. Huylar's testimony:

 

Lynn 
Huylar is not an investigator.  She 
is not a police investigator.  It is 
not her job to talk to the defendant.  
It's not her job to investigate the crime that occurred.  Her job is to evaluate what the child is 
saying.

            
That's Lynn's job.  What 
happens from there is out of her hands, whether the State presses charges, 
whether the defendant's interviewed or not interviewed, what other witnesses are 
interviewed or not interviewed.  
That is not her job.  Her job 
is to evaluate what the child is saying.  
Years at the Department of Family Services in the sexual abuse unit, at 
the Department of Family Services interviewing thousands of kids, specialized 
training on how to interview kids throughout her career.  Yes, I think that that may separate her 
from us in this area.  That's 
experience and training in this area upon which she can base an opinion.  That's specialized experience and 
training.  She's done it thousands 
of times, and she did not say  she did not say that in her career only two kids 
have ever lied.  She didn't say 
that. 

 

 

Standard 
of Review

 

[¶17]      Mr. 
Lopez focuses on two particular instances of Ms. Huylar's direct examination 
testimony:  (1) when characterizing 
her "very specific" and "very scientific" interview methodology, she said she is 
"testing things because I want to make sure that the information we get is true 
and accurate;" and (2) when the prosecutor in essence asked whether she found 
elements of a false allegation in CS's disclosure during her interview, she 
answered, "I didn't find those elements that would concern me saying it was a 
false allegation."

 

[¶18]      Mr. 
Lopez urges us to forego the abuse-of-discretion standard of review ordinarily 
applicable to the trial court's evidentiary rulings and, instead, to use an 
error per se standard as is used when testimony offers an opinion that the 
accused is guilty of the charge being tried.  Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 
68 (Wyo. 1989); Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879, 881 (Wyo. 
1990).

 

[¶19]      The 
State contends, however, that the proper standard of review to apply to these 
two particular instances of Ms. Huylar's testimony is not entirely clear because 
Mr. Lopez's trial counsel did not make specific contemporaneous objections to 
them.  Arguably, the State asserts, 
plain error is that proper standard of review in such a case, and, the State 
points out, Mr. Lopez's principal brief does not present a plain error 
analysis.  Concluding, the State 
maintains that the abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies.  

 

[¶20]      A 
study of Mr. Lopez's principal brief reveals, however, that his trial counsel 
had, in effect, "preemptively" objected to Ms. Huylar's improper vouching 
testimony four times before the two particular instances occurred.  Mr. Lopez's appellate counsel lists the 
four objections:  the pre-trial 
motion in limine, the objection during the prosecutor's opening statement to the 
jury, the objection immediately before Ms. Huylar's direct examination, and the 
"continuing objection" lodged early in Ms. Huylar's direct examination.  With respect to this "continuing 
objection," the State notes that the Wyoming Rules of Evidence apparently do not 
specifically address it; further, the State argues, it would appear incongruous 
for the trial court to permit such an anticipatory objection to an entire class 
of evidence.  It is true, however, 
that the trial court has broad discretion in exercising reasonable control over 
the mode of witness examination and evidence presentation in order to avoid 
needless consumption of time.  
W.R.E. 611(a).  Indeed, our 
review of the record reveals that, before Ms. Huylar's direct examination, the 
trial court recognized Mr. Lopez's trial counsel's use of a continuing hearsay 
objection during the prosecutor's direct examination of CS's day-care provider. 
Given that practice by the trial court with that witness, we believe that Mr. 
Lopez's trial counsel reasonably relied on that practice when making the 
continuing improper vouching objection to Ms. Huylar's 
testimony.

 

[¶21]      Having 
carefully considered the parties' standard-of-review skirmish, we cannot 
conclude that Mr. Lopez's trial counsel failed to preserve the improper vouching 
issue for appeal.  Counsel alerted 
the trial court before trial and at every appropriate point as the trial 
unfolded and Ms. Huylar's testimony was offered that she objected to any attempt 
by the prosecution to bolster the testimony of the alleged victim with any form 
of testimony concerning her credibility.  
"[A] defense attorney does not have to walk over any more legal coals to 
protect the record after first stating the grounds for objection."  State v. Milbradt, 756 P.2d 620, 
624 (Or. 1988).  Consequently, we 
shall apply the abuse-of-discretion standard of review.  In Seward v. State, 2003 WY 116, 
¶13, 76 P.3d 805, ¶13 (Wyo. 2003), we set forth the steps of such 
review:

 

Rulings 
on the admissibility of evidence are committed to the sound discretion of the 
district court and are not subject to appellate second guessing absent an abuse 
of discretion.

Curl 
v. State, 
898 P.2d 369, 373 (Wyo. 1995). 

We 
have described the standard of an abuse of discretion as reaching the question 
of the reasonableness of the trial court's choice.  Griswold v. State, 2001 WY 14, 
¶7, 17 P.3d 728, ¶7 (Wyo. 2001). Judicial discretion is a composite of many 
things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. Id. "In the absence of 
an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's determination." 
Id. The burden is on the defendant to establish such abuse. Trujillo 
[v. State], 2 P.3d [567] at 571 [(Wyo. 2000)].

            
"If the trial court erred by admitting evidence, we then must ascertain 
whether the error affects any substantial rights of the accused, providing 
grounds for reversal, or whether it is harmless.  The harmless error standard is set out 
in W.R.A.P. 9.04:

 

            
 Any error, defect, 
irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be 
disregarded by the reviewing court."

 

See 
also W.R.Cr.P. 
52.  An error is harmful if there is 
a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to the 
defendant if the error had never occurred.  
To demonstrate harmful error, the defendant must show prejudice under 
circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct 
which offends the public sense of fair play.'  Johnson v. State, 790 P.2d 231, 
232 (Wyo.1990)."

Solis 
[v. 
State], 981 P.2d [34] at 36 [(Wyo. 1999)] (some citations omitted); see 
also Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46, 52-53 (Wyo. 1999)."

Skinner 
v. State, 
2001 WY 102, ¶25, 33 P.3d 758, 766-67 (Wyo. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 994, 122 S. Ct. 1554, 152 L. Ed. 2d 477 (2002).

 

 

Discussion

 

[¶22]      The 
State and Mr. Lopez recognize that this Court, in a long line of decisions, has 
clearly and unambiguously held it is error for expert and lay witnesses alike to 
vouch for the credibility of the testimony of an alleged sexual assault 
victim.  See, e.g., Seward, 
¶¶18-29 (expert witness); Wilde v. State, 2003 WY 93, ¶¶17-19, 74 P.3d 699, ¶¶17-19 (Wyo. 2003) (expert witness); Curl, 898 P.2d  at 373-74 (lay 
witness); Whiteplume v. State, 841 P.2d 1332, 1337-41 (Wyo. 1992) (lay 
witness); Stephens, 774 P.2d  at 68 (expert witness); Zabel v. 
State, 765 P.2d 357 (Wyo. 1988) (expert witness); and Lessard v. 
State, 719 P.2d 227, 232-34 (Wyo. 1986) (expert witness).  The State and Mr. Lopez specifically 
focus on Seward and Wilde because in those decisions this Court 
held that Ms. Huylar's testimony erroneously vouched for the alleged sexual 
abuse victim's credibility.  Mr. 
Lopez argues that Ms. Huylar's testimony in his trial was "virtually identical" 
to her erroneous testimony in those previous decisions.  The State, on the other hand, argues 
that, although Ms. Huylar's testimony in Mr. Lopez's trial was similar to her 
testimony in those other decisions, the scope and nature of her vouching 
testimony identified in those other decisions was substantially more extensive 
than in the present case.  Although 
Mr. Lopez appears to question whether Ms. Huylar testified as an expert, the 
State argues that she did, and we agree that it is clear from the record that 
she did.

 

[¶23]      Although 
the State labors mightily to try to distinguish Ms. Huylar's testimony in this 
case from her testimony condemned in Seward and Wilde, we are 
unconvinced.  The criticisms leveled 
at her vouching testimony in those decisions are equally appropriate to her 
testimony in this case.  In this 
case, as in those, Ms. Huylar testified that she has conducted thousands of 
interviews with children; she has had extensive training in forensic 
interviewing of children; the word "forensic" "means more of a scientific kind 
of interview" in which she uses a "semi-structured protocol;" she "builds 
rapport with the child;" she does a "developmental assessment" of the child; she 
looks at "competency;" she determines whether the child knows "the difference 
between the truth and a lie;" she looks for "elements of coaching or a 
third-party influence;" she commits the child "to tell the truth during our 
interview process;" she looks for "contextual details," i.e., "details 
that only a person that's [sic] actually witnessed something would be able to 
provide;" she looks for motivational reasons for the child's disclosure; and she 
looks for alternative explanations for the disclosure. Ms. Huylar testified that 
CS, age 10, was "developmentally at her age," and "had an understanding of truth 
and lie, and she could commit that she would tell me the truth."  She testified she "did not find any 
other elements to suggest that someone had told her what to say . . . or that 
she was influenced in any way by a third-party."  She testified that CS "was able to give 
contextual details" of the incident in question.  She testified she found "no elements to 
support . . . that there had been any dramatic reasons for the disclosure. . . . 
[S]he thought [Mr. Lopez] was cool up until this event." She testified she found 
no plausible alternative explanation for the disclosure.  She testified that her interview process 
"has a methodology use to it. . . . It's a very specific methodology.  It's very scientific, and I'm testing 
things because I want to make sure that the information we get is true and 
accurate."  On cross-examination, 
Ms. Huylar testified "there's no certification that provides for certification 
in forensic interviewing."  She 
testified she is neither a psychologist or psychiatrist. She testified that 
forensic interviewing is abstracting and assessing information given to her in 
the interview. She testified that in her interview she is "looking for specific 
information . . . and . . . staying specifically focused, and I'm not there to 
talk about treatment modalities or what they're working on in treatment."  She testified that her "level stops 
after the interview."  In further 
explaining her role in working with law enforcement in these kinds of cases, she 
testified that she is "given a child to interview.  There has been an allegation made, and 
then it's my job to obtain some information and to test some things, and rule 
out some things . . . ." In explaining her job in false allegations, she 
testified her job "is to become critical of the interview process, to take a 
look at those elements, to assess that during the whole process, and . . . that 
factors into where the investigation goes from that point on.  If we find elements of that, cases turn 
very different, and we as a team assess that, and we factor that in, and that's 
part of the whole investigation." Answering the prosecutor's last question on 
redirect examination, whether she found elements of a false allegation in her 
interview with CS, Ms. Huylar answered, "I didn't find those elements that would 
concern me saying it was a false allegation."  

 

[¶24]      As we have done in Seward and the 
other cases examining this type of testimony, we have here also considered the 
prosecutor's use of this testimony in this case.  Appreciating the absence of physical evidence 
of the alleged inappropriate touching and that the jury's verdict turned on the 
credibility contest between CS and Mr. Lopez, the prosecutor argued "if you 
believe that 12-year-old child when she was sitting on that witness stand, and 
you believe what she told you was the truth, that is all the evidence you 
need."  The 
prosecutor argued Ms. Huylar's evidence:  She is a "trained forensic interviewer;" "she 
has a protocol;" "[s]he is trained to look for inconsistencies in [a child's] 
story;" she found CS competent; she "found no evidence of any third-party 
influence;" she found "contextual details;" she could find no motivational 
reasons why CS would not tell the truth; she, "a trained forensic interviewer[,] 
could find nothing wrong with [CS's] story."  In rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor 
revisited Ms. Huylar's testimony:

 

Her job is to evaluate what the child is saying.  Years at the 
Department of Family Services in the sexual abuse unit, at the Department of 
Family Services interviewing thousands of kids, specialized training on how to 
interview kids throughout her career.  Yes, I think that that may separate her from 
us in this area.  
That's experience and training in this area upon which she can base an 
opinion.  That's 
specialized experience and training.  She's done it thousands of times . . . .

 

[¶25]      Our appellate assessment here is the same as our assessments 
in Seward, Wilde, and Zabel:  Ms. Huylar's testimony, in the two 
specifically identified instances and in the instances we have identified above, 
constituted harmful vouching and reversible error, especially given the 
difficult credibility issues the jury had to assess in this case.  "Credibility was the 
central issue in the case  a close factual dispute existed regarding whether to 
believe the victim's testimony, or appellant's testimony . . . . The evidence of 
appellant's guilt does not rise to the level of overwhelming' nor was any 
physical evidence introduced to support the State's case."  Seward, ¶29.  Accordingly, because an expert witness 
"essentially vouched directly for the victim's credibility based solely on the 
content of the victim's disclosure, and considering the prosecutor's utilization 
of that testimony during closing and rebuttal argument, we find that a 
reasonable possibility exists that the verdict might have been more favorable to 
the appellant if the error had never occurred."  Id.  We have said it many 
times before, and we will say it again, and this time with more emphasis  we 
really mean it:  
no "forensic interviewer" may testify directly or inferentially on 
whether an alleged victim is credible.  The assessment of credibility is exclusively 
for the trier of fact.

 

[¶26]      Although resolution of this issue is dispositive of this 
appeal, we shall now address the two other assigned issues because they may 
recur on retrial. 

 

 

Issue Two:  
Whether the trial court's evidentiary ruling excluding Mr. Lopez's 
evidence of CS's 1998 report to DFS concerning her mother's sexual behavior 
violated Mr. Lopez's constitutional right to present a defense.

 

Statement of the Specific Facts

 

[¶27]      Before the trial in this case, the prosecutor filed a 
"Motion in Limine  Exclude Evidence of Prior Report Made by C.S." In the motion 
the prosecutor noted that in October of 1998 a report had been made to the 
Department of Family Services that CS had observed her mother masturbating in a 
bathtub.  An 
investigation had been made, and the Department of Family Services had 
determined that the claim was unsubstantiated, with the result that no further 
action was taken.  
The prosecutor argued that the 1998 occurrence was not relevant to the 
case against Mr. Lopez and was not impeachment evidence in any sense.  The prosecutor 
further asserted that any probative value of such evidence was outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury; and 
the evidence was not admissible under W.R.E. 608 as evidence of the character of 
a witness. 

 

[¶28]      Mr. Lopez's counsel responded to the prosecutor's motion, 
arguing that the 1998 allegations made by CS regarding her mother's conduct were 
relevant in that, if the allegations were false, such was relevant as to whether 
CS had made a false allegation against Mr. Lopez in the present case.  Alternatively, 
counsel argued that if CS's allegations were true, they were relevant to show an 
alternative source of CS's sexual knowledge, and an improper motive on the part 
of CS.  

 

[¶29]      The court held a hearing on the prosecutor's motion in 
limine. The prosecutor asserted that, in 1998, when CS was eight years old, she 
observed her mother masturbating in the bathtub and reported that fact; the acts 
did not fall within child abuse guidelines, and the Department of Family 
Services filed a report that the allegations were unsubstantiated. Subsequently, 
CS's mother admitted that CS saw her washing her private parts while the child 
was in the bathroom. The prosecutor argued that the 1998 occurrence was not 
relevant to the present charges against Mr. Lopez and could not be used to 
attack the credibility of CS. 

 

[¶30]      Mr. Lopez's counsel responded that CS's allegations had been 
made during the time of her parents' divorce, when there was controversy over 
the custody of CS and her brother.  Counsel argued that the prior occurrence was 
relevant in order to impeach the credibility of CS. He further argued that, if 
CS had seen her mother masturbate, it was admissible as a source of CS's sexual 
knowledge. 

 

[¶31]      The court ruled that, while prior false accusations by an 
alleged victim of a sexual assault would be relevant, in the present case it had 
not been shown that CS had made a false report.  Accordingly, the court granted the 
prosecutor's motion in limine, although it agreed to consider the authority 
cited by Mr. Lopez's counsel and indicated it would reverse its ruling if 
appropriate.  

 

[¶32]      The first day of trial, Mr. Lopez's counsel filed a motion 
to reconsider the court's ruling on the prosecutor's motion in limine.  Counsel argued that, 
if CS had mistakenly reported, it was relevant to the possibility that CS had 
also been mistaken when she reported that Mr. Lopez had touched her private 
parts.  Counsel 
reiterated that the incident with CS's mother was relevant as a source of CS's 
sexual knowledge. The motion to reconsider was accompanied by copies of the 
Department of Family Services investigatory file from 1998. 

 

[¶33]      At trial, in the cross-examination of CS, the following took 
place:

 

[Defense]:      He tickled your 
private parts?

 

[CS]:   Yes.

 

Q.        It was 
after you were done, and he tickled you on your foot?

 

A.        Yes.

 

Q.        And you 
were giggling, and then you said he moved up farther and tickled you on your 
private part?

 

A.        Yes.

 

Q.        Had you 
ever seen anything like that, tickling your private parts ever before?

 

A.        Well, my 
mom did, but that's about it. 

The prosecutor promptly objected that this questioning was 
in violation of the court's order on the prosecutor's motion in limine.  Mr. Lopez's counsel 
argued that the information was relevant and asked the court to reconsider its 
ruling and to permit the questioning.  The court ruled that counsel should "make no 
further inquiry on that," but that she could make an offer of proof. 

 

[¶34]      At the close of the prosecution's case-in-chief, Mr. Lopez's 
counsel made an offer of proof relating to Mr. Lopez's motion to reconsider the 
order granting the prosecutor's motion in limine.  Mr. Lopez's counsel called as witnesses CS and 
CS's mother.  CS 
testified that her "mother was taking a bath one day, and my brother and I went 
in there, or something, just to go visit with her, and then she started putting 
her hand somewhere between her vagina and started, well, touching herself in 
between the vagina lips." CS described her mother's act with her hand as "kind 
of like she was sawing." 

 

[¶35]      CS's mother testified that in October of 1998, CS had said 
she had seen her doing something sexual, i.e., 
masturbating in the bathtub.  CS's mother admitted that she had indeed been 
masturbating. Mr. Lopez's counsel then argued that, in light of Lynn Huylar's 
testimony of the importance of contextual details in a child's story, "this 
prior experience would be proper impeachment of [CS] to show that she knows 
these details, and she knows of these things because she's seen her mother do 
them."  The 
trial court denied the motion to reconsider its ruling excluding this evidence, 
stating that now that it appeared that CS's 1998 allegation was in fact true, "I 
think it's just remote and collateral, and question the probative value.  It just doesn't go 
at all to her credibility in this case, and so I will not change that earlier 
ruling."

 

 

Standard of Review

 

[¶36]      This Court has repeatedly articulated the standard of review 
for evidentiary rulings:

 

Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the 
trial court and include determinations of the adequacy of foundation and 
relevancy, competency, materiality, and remoteness of the evidence.  This Court will 
generally accede to the trial court's determination of the admissibility of 
evidence unless that court clearly abused its discretion.

Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo. 1999) (citation omitted). We have described the standard of an 
abuse of discretion as reaching the question of the reasonableness of the trial 
court's choice.  
Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously.  "In the absence of an abuse of discretion, we 
will not disturb the trial court's determination."  [Griswold v. State, 2001 WY 14, ¶7, 17 P.3d 728, ¶7 (Wyo. 
2001.]  The 
burden is on the defendant to establish such abuse.

 

Goulart v. State, 2003 WY 108, ¶17, 76 P.3d 1230, ¶17 (Wyo. 
2003) (quoting Willis v. State, 2002 WY 79, ¶16, 46 P.3d 890, ¶16 (Wyo. 
2002) (quoting Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, ¶25, 33 P.3d 758, ¶25 (Wyo. 
2001)).

 

 

Discussion

 

[¶37]      Mr. Lopez argues that CS's 1998 accusation was relevant 
because, "if the allegation was true, it could show an alternate source for the 
sexual knowledge CS expressed in her allegation against" Mr. Lopez.  While it may be true 
that an alternative source of a young child's knowledge regarding complex or 
bizarre sexual activities could be relevant where the child has made current 
allegations of unusual sexual practices, nothing of the sort is present in this 
case.  Cf. Griswold v. State, 994 P.2d 920, 923-24 (Wyo. 
1999) (A seven-year-old girl and her companion reported that Griswold had anally 
and vaginally penetrated them both digitally and with his penis, had performed 
cunnilingus upon them, and had forced them to perform fellatio upon him.)  See also Griswold v. State, 2001 WY 14, ¶¶18-20, 17 P.3d 728, ¶¶18-20 (Wyo. 
2001).

 

[¶38]      In this case, the sexual contact consisted of simple 
touching accompanied by some digital "tickling."  No special sexual knowledge is involved when a 
child reports such conduct.  Even the youngest child has a sense of bodily 
integrity which is violated when the child is touched inappropriately.  There is no showing 
that CS at the age of ten lacked a general sense of the impropriety of an 
invasion of her bodily privacy, such as that involved here.  Her ability to 
report this touching was not contingent upon her acquisition of knowledge of 
sexual acts or that such touching might be considered sexual in nature.  It depended simply 
on the fact that she was uncomfortable with Mr. Lopez's alleged touching her 
private parts. 

 

[¶39]      Mr. Lopez further asserts that the prior experience of CS 
showed "her ability to fabricate a detailed description of how she was 
touched."  This 
claim is likewise without substance.  There is nothing in the record to substantiate 
the implication that CS ever "fabricated" anything.  The earlier report 
of her mother's masturbation was true; nothing was fabricated there.  That CS truthfully 
reported one experience cannot rationally support an inference that her report 
of a later experience of a different kind was fabricated.  Also, CS did not 
provide a "detailed description of how she was touched."  She simply reported 
that Mr. Lopez had "tickled" her private parts.  Evidence regarding the 1998 accusation made by 
CS simply does not suggest that she had the capacity or inclination to create a 
detailed fabrication.

 

[¶40]      Mr. Lopez next claims that because CS was aware her mother 
did not suffer any major consequences as a result of her earlier report, such 
may have led CS to believe she could make a false report regarding Mr. Lopez in 
order to get a brief reprieve from her weekly visit to see her mother and Mr. 
Lopez, without Mr. Lopez, who she did not dislike, being in serious 
trouble.  This 
claim rests upon speculation.  It was properly rejected by the district 
court.  
Moreover, there was nothing to prevent Mr. Lopez's counsel on 
cross-examination from directly asking CS whether she had fabricated her 
accusation against Mr. Lopez for this somewhat attenuated reason.  CS was never asked 
by Mr. Lopez's counsel whether she would rather not have visited her mother, or 
what alternative things she would rather have been doing.  Such questions were 
not barred by any order of the district court, yet none were asked.  In short, this claim 
is speculative.

 

[¶41]      Mr. Lopez also asserts that the 1998 occurrence was relevant 
to the present charges because "what [CS] saw her mother do and what she alleged 
happened to her were similar." But the "similarity" is attenuated at best.  CS saw her mother 
touch herself; what happened to CS is that Mr. Lopez allegedly improperly 
touched CS's private parts.  The only "similarity" is that the female 
genitals were involved in both instances.  Again, the claim of relevance is simply too 
tenuous.  That 
CS, when asked whether she had "ever seen anything like" Mr. Lopez's act of 
tickling her private parts, answered that her mother had done it, does not show 
that CS fabricated her report that Mr. Lopez had touched her 
inappropriately.

 

[¶42]      Finally, Mr. Lopez argues that CS's use of the term "lips" 
to describe genital labia both in 1998 and in the present case "suggests CS 
could have been using her prior knowledge to fabricate the allegations against" 
Mr. Lopez.  Mr. 
Lopez claims that "lips" is a term "one might not ordinarily expect from a 
ten-year-old." There is nothing in the record, however, to suggest that CS's use 
of "lips" to describe her feminine anatomy was at all unusual for a ten-year-old 
child.

 

[¶43]      None of the arguments advanced regarding the relevancy of 
CS's 1998 report regarding her mother stand up under scrutiny.  In ruling on this 
evidentiary issue, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

 

 

Issue Three:  
Prosecutorial Misconduct.

 

Statement of Specific Facts:

 

[¶44]      Before trial in this case, Mr. Lopez's counsel filed a 
"Motion in Limine  Reference to Defendant Being Sexually Abused as a Child." 
The motion asked for an order "instructing the prosecutor . . . to refrain from 
using as evidence or making any direct or indirect mention whatsoever to the 
fact that Mr. Lopez was sexually abused as a child."  The motion stated 
that Mr. Lopez "told law enforcement that he was sexually abused as a 
child.  The 
state intends to use such evidence to argue that individuals that [sic] are 
sexually abused are likely to abuse children."  Mr. Lopez argued that whether he was abused as 
a child was not relevant to the issues in this case, and, further, that "[t]here 
is no scientific proof to support the state's theory."  Finally, counsel 
contended that the evidence was "dangerously close to inadmissible 
character/propensity evidence," and that the "danger of unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighs any probative value." 

 

[¶45]      Counsel's motion in limine was argued in a motions hearing. 
The trial court heard argument from Mr. Lopez's counsel and from the prosecutor 
regarding the admissibility of Mr. Lopez's statement, made to Detective Ray 
Bilkie during a taped interview, that he had been sexually abused when he was a 
child.  The 
court initially observed that one of Mr. Lopez's admissions to the detective was 
admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule because he admitted "having 
been alone with the child at certain critical periods of time.  It seems to me that 
that admission would be admissible, but his reference to having been abused 
himself I think would not be admissible by the State."  The court stated 
that the reference to Mr. Lopez's having himself suffered abuse was "not an 
admission, but rather, a denial," because it constituted an explanation that Mr. 
Lopez was aware of the harm that sexual abuse might inflict. 

 

[¶46]      The prosecutor responded that any statement by Mr. Lopez 
came within the scope of W.R.E. 801(d)(2), whether or not it was against the 
interest of the declarant.  The court expressed its opinion that, to 
qualify under W.R.E. 801(d)(2), a statement had to be an "admission"  that is, 
it had to be against the declarant's interest.  The prosecutor pointed to the fact that Rule 
801(d)(2) referred to a "statement" by a party, not to an "admission" by a 
party. The court maintained its position that Rule 801(d)(2) applied only to 
admissions, and the prosecutor offered to provide further authority.  The prosecutor 
further represented that it did not intend to argue that, because Mr. Lopez "was 
abused as a child, . . . he probably abused [CS]."  Rather, the 
prosecutor proposed to use Mr. Lopez's statement so that the jury could be 
informed as to the "honest and true answer that Mr. Lopez gave to Detective 
Bilkie when asked the questions."  The prosecutor's position was the Mr. Lopez's 
answers to Detective Bilkie's questions were not a denial of having sexually 
abused CS but were "a nondenial at best and ambiguous." 

 

[¶47]      The court persisted in its view that a statement covered by 
W.R.E. 801(d)(2) must be against the declarant's interest and stated that "the 
reference to his own abuse may need to be redacted.  We'll have to look 
at some cases on that."  Finally, without ruling further, the court 
directed that the hearing proceed to the next motion.  The court did not 
enter a written order embodying its ruling on this motion in limine.

 

[¶48]      At trial, during the prosecutor's case and immediately 
before the testimony of Detective Bilkie, the prosecutor presented authority to 
constitute an admission against his interest in order to be admissible under 
W.R.E. 801(d)(2), citing 4 Mueller and Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 411 (2d ed. 1994).  Mr. Lopez's counsel 
responded that Mr. Lopez never admitted guilt. The court observed that the 
probative value of Mr. Lopez's statement was "dubious from  especially from the 
State's point of view."  However, the court went on:  "To the extent that 
it corroborates some of the alleged victim's testimony, I still think that it's 
an admission to that extent, but I feel inclined to change the ruling on the 
inadmissibility of his statement of his own sexual abuse."

 

[¶49]      During the subsequent direct examination of Detective 
Bilkie, the prosecutor questioned him regarding Mr. Lopez's interview at the 
police department on March 7, 2001, but did not refer to Mr. Lopez's assertion, 
made at that time, that he had been sexually abused when he was a child. When 
the prosecutor offered the audio tape of the interview and the transcription of 
the audio tape into evidence, the court sustained Mr. Lopez's objection.  

 

[¶50]      During cross-examination of Detective Bilkie, Mr. Lopez's 
counsel questioned him as to the details of Mr. Lopez's statements during the 
interview.  The 
prosecutor asked for a bench conference, at which he asserted that the answers 
given by Mr. Lopez to Detective Bilkie's questions should be given in their 
entirety.  Mr. 
Lopez's counsel responded, in essence, that she was only using selective 
portions of Mr. Lopez's statement and was not opening the door to the entire 
statement.  The 
trial court responded, "Well, I think we're about 100th of an inch making this entire thing 
admissible."  
Mr. Lopez's counsel responded that she would "just rephrase how I'm doing 
it."  

 

[¶51]      The defense called Mr. Lopez as its first and only witness. 
During direct examination, Mr. Lopez admitted that on the occasion in question 
he had wrestled with CS and had tickled her feet and knees but denied that he 
had tickled her private area.  The direct examination concluded:

 

Q.        You went 
and talked to Detective Bilkie at some point?

 

A.        Yes, I 
did.

 

Q.        You didn't 
have to go?

 

A.        No.

 

Q.        Why did you 
go?

 

A.        Because he 
asked me to come down and make a statement, and tell me what the allegations 
were because, at that time, I didn't know.  I said, "Yeah," I'd come down.

 

Q.        You told 
him that you didn't tickle her in her private area?

 

A.        That's 
right.

 

* * * *

Q.        You told the 
detective you didn't do it?

 

A.        Yes, I did 
tell him.

 

Q.        And it 
wasn't good enough?

 

A.        No.

 

Q.        And you 
still ended up getting charged?

 

A.        Yes, I 
did.

 

Q.        Afraid of 
being convicted for something you didn't do?

 

A.        
Exactly.

 

Q.        You didn't 
do this, did you?

 

A.        No, I did 
not do this. 

 

 

[¶52]      On cross-examination, the prosecutor inquired into Mr. 
Lopez's statement to Detective Bilkie:

 

Q.        And in 
fact, when you were first asked whether or not you could have accidentally 
inadvertently tickled her somewhere else where she may have construed it as 
something sexual where you didn't actually mean it to be, you did not deny 
touching [CS] in response to that question, did you?

 

A.        I believe 
I did.

 

Q.        Would you 
like to read your answer?

A.        
Please.

 

Q.        Again, I'd 
be happy to play the tape.

 

A.        Just say 
the answer.  
Avoid all that stuff, all that wasted time.

 

Q.        At the 
top, the highlighted portion, Detective Bilkie's question, you don't say, "I 
didn't do it," did you?

 

A.        In a 
roundabout way, yes I did.

 

[Prosecutor]:  Your Honor, at this point in time, I think the 
defendant could read his answer that he gave to Detective Bilkie into the 
record. 

 

Mr. Lopez's counsel objected that Mr. Lopez had answered the 
question by saying he did not do it, and that this was an accurate 
characterization of what Mr. Lopez had stated to Detective Bilkie. The 
prosecutor responded that Mr. Lopez's statement to Detective Bilkie was not a 
flat denial, as he had characterized it.  Mr. Lopez's counsel countered that "the State 
has been told that they can't go into this, and they're using cross-examination 
trying to goad the defendant into saying something so they can get around a 
court order;" that "the State is inappropriately using cross-examination to get 
him to open the door so they can bypass the Court's order." The prosecutor 
rejoined that Mr. Lopez's counsel had opened the door on her direct examination 
of Mr. Lopez by eliciting his answer that he had said he didn't do it. 

 

[¶53]      The court ruled that the prosecutor had been "prohibited 
from offering this in its case-in-chief.  The State complied with that.  We've gotten to the 
point now in the state of the record where on cross-examination I just think 
it's admissible."  Mr. Lopez's objection to the prosecutor's 
cross-examination was overruled. 

 

[¶54]      The prosecutor resumed cross-examination of Mr. Lopez:

 

Q.        . . . 
turning again to Page 17 of the transcript of your interview with Detective 
Bilkie, would you please read Detective Bilkie's question to you?

 

A.        "Was there 
a chance in all of this where she's kicking and moving around, and you're 
tickling her that maybe you accidentally or inadvertently tickled her somewhere 
else where  where she may have construed it as something sexual where you 
didn't actually mean to do it?"

"To be honest"  this is my statement  "To be honest with 
you, I'll  I'll tell you right now, like I said, I've been abused physically, 
sexually, psychologically through most of my childhood."  Right there, you're 
just turning my words around right there. 

 

Mr. Lopez acknowledged that this was his answer to Detective 
Bilkie's question. The prosecutor's cross-examination of Mr. Lopez continued 
with questions asking him about the details of what happened on February 17 and 
18, 2001. 

 

[¶55]      On redirect examination, Mr. Lopez's counsel asked Mr. Lopez 
to read an additional portion of his statement to Detective Bilkie which 
immediately followed that part about which Mr. Lopez had testified on 
cross-examination.  
After repeating his statement that he had been "abused physically, 
sexually, psychologically through most of [his] childhood," Mr. Lopez added:

 

Mr. Bilkie, "Okay."

 

This is me, "When I wrestle with these kids I make sure my 
hands never go around those areas."

 

Mr. Bilkie:  "Of course.  Of course." 

 

At the end of Mr. Lopez's redirect examination, the defense 
rested.  The 
prosecutor asked that Mr. Lopez's entire statement be played for the jury.  The court ruled that 
the jury would be given the transcript of Mr. Lopez's statement to Detective 
Bilkie, and admitted State's Exhibit 7 into evidence. 

 

 

Standard of Review

 

[¶56]      Where a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is made, the 
entire record must be considered.  The basic inquiry is whether misconduct by the 
State has so seriously prejudiced the defendant's case that a fair trial has 
been denied.  Metzger v. State, 4 P.3d 901, 910 (Wyo. 
2000).  As 
recognized in Simmons v. State, 2003 WY 84, ¶15, 72 P.3d 803, ¶15 (Wyo. 
2003), when prosecutorial misconduct has been found, this Court focuses on 
whether the substantial rights of the accused have been adversely affected.  This involves a 
determination of whether, "based on the entire record, a reasonable possibility 
exists that, in the absence of the error, the verdict might have been more 
favorable to the accused."  Id. (quoting Earll v. State, 2001 WY 66, ¶9, 29 P.3d 787, ¶9 (Wyo. 
2001)).  See also Williams v. State, 2002 WY 136, ¶21, 54 P.3d 248, ¶21 (Wyo. 
2002).

 

[¶57]      The first question that must be decided when there is an 
allegation of prosecutorial misconduct is whether the prosecutor acted 
improperly.  
Only if that is found is it necessary to examine whether the accused's 
substantial rights were affected.

 

[¶58]      As to Mr. Lopez's claim that the trial court improperly 
admitted into evidence his statement to a police detective that he was abused as 
a child, the standard of review examines whether the court abused its 
discretion.

 

Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are within the 
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a 
showing of a clear abuse of discretion.  We will not overturn a trial court's 
discretionary decision unless the court acted in a manner exceeding the bounds 
of reason and could not rationally conclude as it did. Decisions of the trial 
court with respect to the admissibility of evidence are entitled to considerable 
deference and, as long as there exists a legitimate basis for the trial court's 
ruling, that ruling will not be reversed on appeal.  It is also well 
settled that a district court judgment may be affirmed on any proper legal 
grounds supported by the record.

 

Billingsley v. State, 2003 WY 
61, ¶9, 69 P.3d 390, ¶9 (Wyo. 
2003) (citations omitted).

 

 

Discussion

 

[¶59]      In light of the specific facts framing this issue, we hold 
that the prosecutor did not commit prosecutorial misconduct as Mr. Lopez 
contends.  The 
prosecutor obeyed the trial court's order that, in its case-in-chief, the 
prosecutor not refer to that portion of Mr. Lopez's statement that he had been 
physically, sexually and psychologically abused as a child.  This was 
specifically recognized by the court. During the defense case, in the direct 
examination of Mr. Lopez by his counsel, the claim was made that Mr. Lopez had 
denied to Detective Bilkie that he had inappropriately touched CS. The 
prosecutor's position was that this direct examination had opened the door to 
cross-examination on the full content of Mr. Lopez's statement to Detective 
Bilkie. The trial court agreed with the prosecutor's position and permitted the 
cross-examination of Mr. Lopez about the details of his statement, and 
ultimately permitted the jury to have the transcript of the statement. 

 

[¶60]      The assertions of Mr. Lopez's counsel before the trial court 
that the prosecutor was acting "to goad the defendant into saying something so 
they can get around a court order," and that the prosecutor was "using 
cross-examination to get Mr. Lopez to open the door so they can by bypass the 
Court's order," were without merit.  The identical arguments before this Court are 
likewise without merit.  There was no prosecutorial 
misconduct.

 

[¶61]      Mr. Lopez also asserts that the trial court "erred when it 
changed its evidentiary ruling following the prosecutor's manipulation of the 
record."  
However, Mr. Lopez does not present us with any analysis or authority 
which would support this contention.  Moreover, this contention is without 
merit.  The 
trial court properly admitted evidence of that part of Mr. Lopez's statement in 
which he asserted that he had been abused as a child, which properly permitted 
the jury to evaluate Mr. Lopez's full statement to Detective Bilkie.

 

[¶62]      The trial court did not "change its evidentiary 
ruling."  The 
court ruled at the motions hearing that Mr. Lopez's "reference to having been 
abused himself I think would not be admissible by the State."  The court reasonably 
construed this to mean that the prosecutor would not be permitted in his 
case-in-chief to offer that portion of Mr. Lopez's statement that he had been 
abused as a child. There was no "change" in this ruling.  The prosecutor made 
no reference to this evidence in his case-in-chief.

 

[¶63]      The trial court's evidentiary ruling has not been shown to 
be in error.  
The trial court's action was fully consistent with the principles 
underlying W.R.E. 106:

 

            
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a 
party, an adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any other part 
or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be 
considered contemporaneously with it.

 

This is characterized as the "rule of completeness."  See e.g., 1 McCormick on 
Evidence § 56, 248-52 (John W. Strong 5th ed. 1999).  In Hayes v. State, 
935 P.2d 700, 706 (Wyo. 
1997), this Court stated:

 

We see no abuse of discretion in allowing the State to 
present a more complete and accurate picture of the police report once the 
defense opened the door and presented a partial and selective picture of what 
was in the report.  

 

 

[¶64]      Given the dispute regarding what Mr. Lopez had actually said 
in his statement to Detective Bilkie, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in permitting the jury to have the entire statement to consider.  The State points out 
that although Mr. Lopez could have requested a limiting instruction directing 
the jury to restrict its consideration of the evidence to the question of 
whether Mr. Lopez's statement actually constituted a denial that he touched CS 
in appropriately, under W.R.E. 105, the record does not show that he did so.

 

[¶65]      Finally, Mr. Lopez suggests that he was denied a fair trial 
because the admission of his statement that he was abused as a child played to 
"the general belief that people who are abused as kids are more likely to become 
abusers."  The 
State notes that this claim is at odds with the record and the claim made 
earlier in Paragraph 3 of Mr. Lopez's motion in limine, which sought to exclude 
evidence of Mr. Lopez's statement that he had been abused as a child.  Paragraph 3 declared 
that "there is no scientific proof" to support the belief that those who have 
been abused are likely to abuse other.  Moreover, Mr. Lopez points to nothing in the 
record indicating the existence of  "general belief that people who are abused as 
kids are more likely to become abusers."  Thus, he offers neither a scientific nor an 
unscientific basis for his speculation as to how the challenged evidence might 
have affected his jury.  On this point, we observe that the trial court 
expressed its uncertainty whether evidence of childhood abuse would assist or 
prejudice Mr. Lopez:  
"It occurred to me that it would be something that might tend to evoke 
sympathy for Mr. Lopez by the way of exculpation, explanation, and so 
forth.  It just 
seems to me like it could cut both ways."  The record does not establish that the trial 
court was wrong or unreasonable in its belief.

 

[¶66]      Reversed and remanded for a new trial.