Case Title: In re S.E.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 197A19

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2020-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 197A19 
Filed 28 February 2020 
IN THE MATTER OF: S.E., S.A., J.A., V.W. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 7 
March 2019 by Judge Wesley W. Barkley in District Court, Burke County. This 
matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 5 February 2020 but 
determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of 
the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
N. Elise Putnam for petitioner-appellee Burke County Department of Social 
Services.  
 
Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP, by John E. Pueschel and Patricia I. Heyen, 
for respondent-appellee guardian ad litem. 
 
Anné C. Wright for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
 
HUDSON, Justice 
 
 
Respondent-mother appeals from an order entered by the trial court 
terminating her parental rights to her children, S.E. (Sara), S.A. (Shanna), J.A. 
(Jacob), and V.W. (Vera).1 After careful consideration of respondent-mother’s 
                                            
1 The minor children will be referred to throughout this opinion as “Sara,” “Shanna,” 
“Jacob,” and “Vera,” which are pseudonyms used to protect the children’s identities and for 
ease of reading. The children also had an older sibling who was part of the underlying abuse, 
neglect, and dependency case but turned eighteen years old prior to the termination of 
parental rights case.  
IN RE S.E., S.A., J.A., and V.W. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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challenges to the trial court’s jurisdiction and conclusion that grounds exist to 
terminate her parental rights on the basis of her willful failure to pay a reasonable 
portion of the cost of care for the children during their placement in DHHS custody, 
we affirm the trial court’s order. 
On 26 June 2016, the Burke County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) 
obtained non-secure custody of Sara, Shanna, Jacob, and Vera, and filed a petition 
alleging they were abused, neglected, and dependent juveniles. DSS had received a 
report alleging Jerry A. had been physically assaulting the children.2 At the time of 
the filing the children were respectively, twelve, nine, eight, and two years old. DSS 
interviews with the children uncovered specific and repeated instances of physical 
abuse of the children and regular instances of domestic violence between respondent-
mother and Mr. A. Shanna also disclosed numerous instances of sexual abuse by Mr. 
A., of which she had informed respondent-mother and an aunt. Respondent-mother 
was questioned about the sexual abuse and initially denied knowing about it, but she 
subsequently admitted Shanna had told her about the abuse. DSS also learned 
respondent-mother and the children had been involved in a child protective services 
case in Oklahoma. Respondent-mother had temporarily left Mr. A., which led to the 
closure of the Oklahoma case. She then moved to North Carolina with the children, 
where she reconciled with Mr. A.  
                                            
2 Jerry A. is the biological father of Shanna and Jacob. 
IN RE S.E., S.A., J.A., and V.W. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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After multiple continuances due to DSS’s difficulty serving the children’s 
fathers, the trial court conducted a hearing on the petition on 23 March 2017 and 
entered its adjudication order on 18 April 2017. Respondent-mother and Mr. A. 
stipulated to the relevant facts and allegations in the petition, and the court found 
them to be true. The court found Mr. A. had physically abused Shanna, Jacob, and 
respondent-mother; and he had sexually abused Shanna on multiple occasions. 
Respondent-mother knew about the physical and sexual abuse of the children and 
failed to protect them. Respondent-mother had been convicted of intentional child 
abuse inflicting serious injury on 2 November 2016. She was sentenced to a 
suspended term of 38 to 58 months imprisonment and placed on supervised probation 
for 24 months. Mr. A. had been convicted of first-degree statutory rape on 13 February 
2017. He was sentenced to an active term of 221 to 326 months imprisonment. The 
court adjudicated all the children to be abused, neglected, and dependent juveniles. 
Disposition was continued, but the trial court kept custody of the children with DSS 
and suspended visitation with their parents.  
The trial court entered its dispositional order on 1 June 2017. The court found 
aggravated circumstances existed in that a parent sexually abused a child in the 
home while the other children were home and the respondent-mother allowed the 
abuse to occur. Reunification efforts were initially found not to be in the best interests 
of the children except for Vera, whose biological father had been located. DSS was in 
the process of completing a home-study under the Interstate Compact on the 
IN RE S.E., S.A., J.A., and V.W. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Placement of Children (“ICPC”) on Vera’s father’s home to see if he would be an 
appropriate placement for her. The court continued custody of the children with DSS 
and directed DSS to provide respondent-mother with one two-hour visitation with the 
children, after which she was to have no further contact with them. DSS was also 
directed to identify and inform respondent-mother of programs that would assist her 
with the issues she was facing. The primary permanent plan for Vera was identified 
as reunification with her father, with a secondary plan of guardianship. The primary 
permanent plan for Sara, Shanna, and Jacob was identified as adoption, with a 
secondary plan of guardianship.  
The trial court conducted four permanency planning hearings from 18 May 
2017 to 9 August 2018. Respondent mother offered an out-of-state relative as a 
possible placement for the children, which required DSS to request and obtain a home 
study under the ICPC. In its orders from the first three hearings, the court 
consistently found the children may benefit by being adopted, but they were not free 
to be adopted due to the outstanding home studies of their relatives and Vera’s father. 
By the fourth hearing, however, the trial court found the ICPC home studies for 
Vera’s father and respondent’s relatives indicated their homes were not appropriate 
placements for the children. In its permanency planning order entered from the 9 
August 2018 hearing, the trial court set the primary permanent plan for Vera as 
adoption and the secondary permanent plan as reunification with her father. The 
IN RE S.E., S.A., J.A., and V.W. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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primary and secondary plans for Sara, Shanna, and Jacob remained adoption and 
guardianship.  
DSS filed a petition to terminate parental rights to the children on 27 
September 2018. As to respondent-mother, DSS alleged grounds existed to terminate 
her parental rights on the bases of abuse, neglect, willfully leaving the children in 
foster care for more than 12 months without making reasonable progress to correct 
the conditions that led to their removal, willfully failing to pay a reasonable portion 
of the cost of care for the children during their placement in DHHS custody, and for 
committing a felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury to a child residing in 
the home. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(3), (8) (2017). After a hearing on 7 February 
2019, the trial court entered an order on 7 March 2019, terminating respondent-
mother’s parental rights to the children.3 The court concluded grounds existed to 
terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights on the bases of neglect, willfully 
leaving the children in foster care for more than 12 months without making 
reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to their removal, and willfully 
failing to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the children during their 
placement in DSS custody.4 The court further concluded terminating respondent-
                                            
3 Mr. A. relinquished his parental rights to Shanna and Jacob on 18 October 2018. 
The trial court’s order also terminated the parental rights of the fathers of Sara and Vera. 
None of the fathers are parties to this appeal. 
4 At the hearing, DSS elected not to proceed on N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(8).  
IN RE S.E., S.A., J.A., and V.W. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Respondent-mother 
appeals.  
 Respondent-mother first argues the trial court’s order as to Sara is void for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and must be vacated.5 Respondent-mother 
contends the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Sara’s underlying juvenile 
case, because it failed to meet the requirements of the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”). See N.C.G.S. §§ 50A-201–204 (2017). She 
argues an allegation in the initial juvenile abuse, neglect, and dependency petition 
that one of the children reported child protective services in Oklahoma took the 
children out of her home put the trial court on notice there was a prior Oklahoma 
custody determination involving the children, which required the trial court to 
contact the Oklahoma court to determine if that court would cede jurisdiction to the 
North Carolina trial court. Respondent-mother’s arguments are misplaced. 
 “The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law and cannot be 
conferred upon a court by consent. Consequently, a court’s lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction is not waivable and can be raised at any time.” In re K.J.L., 363 N.C. 343, 
345–46, 677 S.E.2d 835, 837 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted).  
Nonetheless, 
“where the trial court has acted in a matter, every 
                                            
5 Respondent-mother only challenges the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over 
the juvenile case involving Sara and concedes the court had jurisdiction over the cases 
involving the other children.  
IN RE S.E., S.A., J.A., and V.W. 
 
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presumption not inconsistent with the record will be 
indulged in favor of jurisdiction . . . .” Nothing else 
appearing, we apply “the prima facie presumption of 
rightful jurisdiction which arises from the fact that a court 
of general jurisdiction has acted in the matter.” As a result, 
“[t]he burden is on the party asserting want of jurisdiction 
to show such want.” 
 
In re N.T., 368 N.C. 705, 707, 782 S.E.2d 502, 503–04 (2016) (first quoting Cheape v. 
Town of Chapel Hill, 320 N.C. 549, 557, 359 S.E.2d 792, 797 (1987) then quoting 
Williamson v. Spivey, 224 N.C. 311, 313, 30 S.E.2d 46, 47 (1944)).   
The UCCJEA applies to proceedings in which child custody is at issue, 
including those involving juvenile abuse, neglect, dependency and termination of 
parental rights; and a trial court must comply with its provisions to obtain 
jurisdiction in such cases. See N.C.G.S. §§ 50A-102(4), -201(a)–(b) (2017). Generally, 
North Carolina courts have jurisdiction to make a child custody determination if 
North Carolina is the home state of the child. N.C.G.S. § 50A-201(a)(1). “ ‘Home state’ 
means the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent 
for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child-
custody proceeding.” N.C.G.S. § 50A-102(7) (2017). If a court of another state has 
home state jurisdiction, North Carolina courts do not have jurisdiction unless one of 
several statutory exceptions applies. See N.C.G.S. § 50A-201(a)(2)–(4).  
Respondent-mother contends the allegations in the initial juvenile petition 
established that a prior child-custody determination had been made as to Sara in 
IN RE S.E., S.A., J.A., and V.W. 
 
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Oklahoma6, and the trial court failed to take the requisite action under the UCCJEA 
to obtain jurisdiction over her case. Respondent-mother, however, relies on 
allegations and inferences to support her argument and has not met her burden of 
showing the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Sara’s case.  She neglects to mention 
the finding of fact made by the trial court in its initial adjudication order, wherein 
the court found only Shanna was removed from respondent-mother’s custody by child 
protective services in Oklahoma. Furthermore, the respondent-mother stipulated to 
the court that the child protective services matter in Oklahoma had been closed, a 
fact she had a duty to disclose pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 50A-209(a) (2017). Given these 
stipulations and other record facts, it was reasonable for the trial court to infer that 
Oklahoma did not have continuing jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.  
Sara had lived with respondent-mother in North Carolina during the six 
months immediately preceding the filing of the juvenile petition, and North Carolina 
was her home state. The record before us establishes the trial court thus had “home 
state” jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to make an initial child-custody determination 
regarding Sara. See N.C.G.S. § 50A-201(a)(1). The trial court’s orders granting DSS 
custody of Sara are not void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and DSS had 
standing to file the petition to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights to Sara 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1103(a)(3). 
                                            
6 Oklahoma has also adopted the UCCJEA.  See Okla. Stat. tit. 43 §§ 551-101–402 
(2019). 
IN RE S.E., S.A., J.A., and V.W. 
 
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We next address respondent-mother’s argument that the trial court erred in 
concluding grounds exist to terminate her parental rights due to her willful failure to 
pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the children although physically and 
financially able to do so, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3). Respondent-mother 
concedes she paid nothing toward the cost of care for her children and could have 
done so but argues her failure to pay was not willful. She contends she did not know 
she could pay towards the cost of care for her children, did not know how to pay 
towards the cost, and could not reasonably have been expected to do so.  We disagree. 
Termination of parental rights under the North Carolina Juvenile Code 
involves a two-stage process—an adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage. 
N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2017). “At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears 
the burden of proving by ‘clear, cogent, and convincing evidence’ the existence of one 
or more grounds for termination under section 7B-1111(a) of the General Statutes.” 
In re A.U.D., 832 S.E.2d 698, 700 (N.C. 2019) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (2017)). 
“If a trial court finds one or more grounds to terminate parental rights under N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1111(a), it then proceeds to the dispositional stage,” id., where it “determines 
whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interest.” N.C.G.S. § 
7B-1110(a) (2017). 
At the time DSS filed its petition, a court could terminate parental rights upon 
finding that: 
The juvenile has been placed in the custody of a county 
IN RE S.E., S.A., J.A., and V.W. 
 
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department of social services . . . and the parent has for a 
continuous period of six months immediately preceding the 
filing of the petition or motion willfully failed to pay a 
reasonable portion of the cost of care for the juvenile 
although physically and financially able to do so. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3) (Supp. 2018). The cost of care “refers to the amount 
it costs the Department of Social Services to care for the child, namely, foster care.” 
In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 113, 316 S.E.2d 246, 254 (1984). “A parent is 
required to pay that portion of the cost of foster care for the child that is fair, just and 
equitable based upon the parent’s ability or means to pay.” In re Clark, 303 N.C. 592, 
604, 281 S.E.2d 47, 55 (1981). 
 
Respondent-mother’s argument that she did not know she had to pay a 
reasonable portion of the cost of care for her children or how to do so is fundamentally 
without merit. The absence of a court order, notice, or knowledge of a requirement to 
pay support is not a defense to a parent’s obligation to pay reasonable costs, because 
parents have an inherent duty to support their children. See In re T.D.P., 164 N.C. 
App. 287, 289, 595 S.E.2d 735, 737 (2004) (citing In re Wright, 64 N.C. App. 135, 139, 
306 S.E.2d 825, 827 (1983) (“Very early in our jurisprudence, it was recognized that 
there could be no law if knowledge of it was the test of its application. Too, that 
respondent did not know that fatherhood carries with it financial duties does not 
excuse his failings as a parent; it compounds them.”)), aff’d per curiam, 359 N.C. 405, 
610 S.E.2d 199 (2005); see also In re Biggers, 50 N.C. App. 332, 339, 274 S.E.2d 236, 
241 (1981) (holding “[a]ll parents have the duty to support their children within their 
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means . . . .”). Given her inherent duty to support her children, respondent cannot 
hide behind a cloak of ignorance to assert her failure to pay a reasonable portion of 
the cost of care for her children was not willful. Moreover, respondent-mother was on 
notice of her failure to pay something towards the cost of care for her children, as 
shown by the trial court’s repeated findings in each of its permanency planning orders 
that none of the respondent-parents were paying child support.  
 
In support of this ground to terminate respondent’s parental rights, the trial 
court found: 
42. 
The respondent mother is an able bodied person 
capable of gainful employment and is capable of paying a 
sum greater than zero per month toward the support of the 
minor children during the six months prior to the filing of 
the petition to terminate her parental rights. The 
respondent is employed . . . and has been for over one year 
prior to the date of this hearing and earning at least $600 
to $700 per week. 
 
43. 
During the six months prior to the filing of the 
petition to terminate parental rights, a period of time from 
March 27, 2018 through September 27, 2018, the 
respondent mother paid zero toward the support of the 
minor children. 
 
44. 
A reasonable portion of the cost of care for the minor 
children for the respondent mother to have paid during the 
six months prior to the filing of the petition to terminate 
said respondent’s parental rights would have been an 
amount greater than zero per child per month. 
 
Apart from her argument that she had no knowledge she was required to pay a 
reasonable portion of the cost of care for her children or how to do so, which we have 
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rejected, respondent-mother does not challenge the evidentiary basis for these 
findings of fact. These findings are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing 
evidence and are binding on appeal. In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407, 831 S.E.2d 54, 
58 (2019) (citing Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991)). 
We hold that the findings in this case fully support the trial court’s conclusion that 
grounds exist to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights based upon her 
willful failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the children during 
their placement in DHHS custody pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3). The trial 
court’s conclusion that one ground existed to terminate parental rights “is sufficient 
in and of itself to support termination of [respondent-mother’s] parental rights[,]” In 
re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 413, 831 S.E.2d at 62, and we need not address her arguments 
challenging the remaining grounds. Respondent-mother does not challenge the trial 
court’s conclusion that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best 
interests. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating respondent-
mother’s parental rights to Sara, Shanna, Jacob, and Vera. 
AFFIRMED.