Case Title: Thompson v. McCormick

Citation: 335 P.2d 265

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1959-01-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
335 P.2d 265 (1959) M. B. THOMPSON, Plaintiff in Error, v. William R. McCORMICK, Defendant in Error. No. 18516. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. January 26, 1959. Rehearing Denied February 24, 1959. *266 Albin Anderson, Jr., Grand Junction, for plaintiff in error. Max D. Melville, Fred M. Winner, Denver, for defendant in error. HALL, Justice. The parties appear here in the same order as they appeared below, and we refer to them as plaintiff and defendant. On May 7, 1953, plaintiff commenced this action in Dolores County by filing with the clerk of the court at Dove Creek his complaint seeking for partnership accounting, the appointment of a receiver, and for $20,000 damages for conversion by the defendant of partnership assets. The complaint shows the plaintiff to be represented by Denver and Cortez counsel and shows the plaintiff's address as "Cortez, Colorado." On September 1, 1953 (extension of time for filing answer having been agreed to by plaintiff), the defendant filed his answer denying generally the allegations of the complaint, and particularly denying that there was ever any partnership. Defendant's answer shows him to be represented by Cortez counsel. On October 14, 1954, at the call of the docket at Dove Creek, one of Cortez counsel for plaintiff appeared and in open court stated: The following then ensued: "I think before permitting withdrawal you should notify counsel, that would be fair to the defendant, and that may be understood, after trial setting you may renew request for withdrawal. The cause will be passed and placed on the trial docket for trial setting." (There is nothing in *267 the record to indicate that this suggestion was followed.) On December 10, 1954, at Dove Creek, the court set various cases for trial and set this case for trial on March 7, 1955, at 10:00 a. m. A member of the Cortez firm, attorneys representing plaintiff was present at the time. On December 14, 1955, a setting order was entered as follows: Copy of this order with schedule attached, showing this case set for trial March 7, 1955, was mailed to and received by plaintiff's Cortez attorneys. On February 25, 1955, plaintiff's Cortez counsel filed "Motion To Withdraw Appearance Of Counsel," wherein they requested that they and Denver counsel be permitted to withdraw. The motion is verified, and in addition to reasons previously urged for withdrawal, alleged that plaintiff had about one year previously (about February 25, 1954) discharged his attorneys of record, had procured from his Cortez attorneys his file on the case, and had announced that he had retained the services of another Cortez attorney. This motion shows: "Address of plaintiff, "Last known address, "Grand Junction, Colorado." This motion was never ruled upon and as of now remains undetermined. On March 7, 1955, at Dove Creek the case was called for trial. The defendant and his counsel were present. Neither the plaintiff nor any one representing plaintiff was present. Whereupon the court entered its order dismissing the case with prejudice and formal judgment was entered, dated March 7, 1955, which provides: "Done in Open Court this 7th day of March, 1955. On September 16, 1957, plaintiff, through his present counsel, filed his "Motion To Vacate Judgment," wherein plaintiff urges that the judgment is (a) void because entered without notice; (b) procured by a fraud upon the court; (c) that plaintiff has a just claim and is entitled to have it determined on its merits. This motion is supported by several affidavits. Defendant has filed no responsive pleading other than a motion to strike plaintiff's motion to vacate. Testimony was taken and exhibits introduced in evidence purporting to support the *268 motion. At the close of the testimony the court took the matter under advisement and, after reviewing all of the court records and testimony, entered its order denying the motion to vacate the judgment. In this order the court reviewed all of the pertinent portions of the record and testimony and found that plaintiff had, on or about May 8, 1954, taken from his Cortez attorneys all of their office files pertaining to the case and that plaintiff considered this as an act of final discharge of said attorneys, and that he never notified the court of such discharge; that plaintiff never employed other counsel, though he did have some preliminary negotiations looking thereto; that the oral request of counsel for permission to withdraw was denied and counsel were continued as the record attorneys for plaintiff; that Cortez counsel was present on December 10, 1954, when the case was set for trial, and a copy of the trial calendar, showing the setting of this case, was mailed to and received by Cortez counsel; that Cortez counsel testified that on February 22, 1955, he directed a letter to the plaintiff addressed to Cortez, Colorado, plaintiff's address as shown on the complaint, informing plaintiff of the March 7th setting, and that such testimony remains unrefuted except by plaintiff's assertion that he did not receive it; that no formal action was taken on counsel's formal motion to withdraw, filed February 25, 1955; that on March 7, 1955, plaintiff was not present in person or by counsel nor had plaintiff yet made any desires known to the court concerning discharge or employment of counsel. The trial court stated: In the case before us, plaintiff sets forth a claim against the defendant, defendant denies there is any merit to plaintiff's claim, the issue remains unresolved, and if the judgment of dismissal with prejudice *269 were permitted to stand would forever remain unresolved. As of March 7, 1955, plaintiff, according to the trial court's ruling, was in an anomalous position indeed; he was the plaintiff in a lawsuit; he had, and the court so found on May 8, 1954, discharged his attorneys; he had not prior to trial employed other counsel, and yet his original counsel, who had been stripped of all authority to speak for plaintiff, or to accept or receive any notice on his behalf, were denied permission to withdraw as counsel and were considered by the court as counsel of record and retaining enough of the attributes of attorney for plaintiff as to constitute notice to the attorney as notice to the plaintiff. With this conclusion we do not agree. Clearly plaintiff had the right to discharge his attorneys and, having done so, they were in no position to bind plaintiff in any manner; they had lost their former status as being his agent for service of certain notices and processes of the court. The court, in denying counsel's request for permission to withdraw, could not create or continue the relationship of attorney and client contrary to the expressed wishes of the client. Counsel, after their discharge, continued their status as officers of the court and subject to its lawful ordersto hold that they continued the status as attorneys for plaintiff finds no sanction in law or fact. According to the court's findings, plaintiff was without counsel from May 8, 1954, until long after the judgment was entered on March 7, 1955. True, the record does not show that the court was aware of this fact until filing on February 25, 1955, of counsels' formal motion to withdraw. Service of trial notice on counsel, who had ten months previously been discharged, was ineffectual for any purpose. Had the trial court granted permission to withdraw, such action would have been compatible with the existing facts; refusal to rule on the motion or denial thereof could only continue a fiction and ignore the facts. The court acted sua sponte in dismissing plaintiff's case with prejudice. If the judgment entered be considered one in default, then there was no compliance with Rule 55, R.C.P.Colo., which provides: "(2) By the Court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor; * * *. If the party against whom judgment by default is sought has appeared in the action, he (or, if appearing by representative, his representative) shall be served with written notice of the application for judgment at least 3 days prior to the hearing on such application. * *." There was no application for default judgment nor notice, so the court's action finds no support under this rule. If the judgment be considered one of involuntary dismissal, then there was failure to comply with Rule 41, R.C.P. Colo.: Here again, there was failure to comply with the rulethere was no motion for dismissal; there was no notice or service thereof, as provided by Rule 5, R.C.P., and no compliance with the trial court's Rule 36. The judgment of dismissal having been entered without notice is void and is subject to direct or collateral attack. Laches does not preclude attack upon a void judgment. The court was in *270 error in entering judgment, also in error in denying plaintiff's motion to vacate the judgment. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to sustain the motion to vacate, grant counsels' motion to withdraw, enter an order vacating the judgment of March 7, 1955, and to proceed with the trial of the case on its merits. DAY, J., not participating.