Case Title: Almy v. Grisham

Citation: 

Docket Number: 052378

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2007-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
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PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
KATHARINE ALMY 
 
v.  Record No. 052378   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 12, 2007 
JOHN GRISHAM, JR., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY 
William R. Shelton, Judge Designate 
 
 
In this appeal involving an action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and a related civil conspiracy 
claim, we consider whether the circuit court erred in sustaining 
the defendants’ demurrers.  As part of our consideration, we 
decide the issue of first impression whether a civil claim for 
conspiracy to intentionally inflict emotional distress will be 
recognized as a cause of action in this Commonwealth. 
I. MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
In February 2004, Katharine Almy filed a motion for 
judgment against John Grisham, Jr., Alan Swanson, Donna Swanson, 
David Liebman, and Cina L. Wong (collectively, defendants), 
alleging claims including intentional infliction of emotional 
distress and conspiracy to intentionally inflict emotional 
distress.  Almy had asserted similar claims in a previous 
action, which was dismissed without prejudice on her motion for 
nonsuit. 
The defendants each filed demurrers asserting that Almy had 
failed to state a cause of action.  At a hearing on the 
 
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demurrers, defendant Grisham asked that the circuit court take 
judicial notice of the deposition testimony of Dr. Stephen 
Alexander, a licensed professional counselor and potential 
witness in the case, who had given the deposition testimony in 
the previous action.  Almy did not object to Grisham’s request. 
After considering the parties’ arguments, the circuit court 
issued a letter opinion stating: 
[T]he intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
conspiracy to intentionally inflict emotional distress 
claims will not survive demurrer, based on the depositions 
which are part of the record in this case.  The 
depositions[] allow[] the court to evaluate and decide the 
merits of claims set forth in the motion for judgment.1 
 
In a final order incorporating its letter opinion, the circuit 
court sustained the defendants’ demurrers and dismissed the 
action with prejudice. 
Almy’s motion for judgment recounted a series of events 
that allegedly occurred between 1996 and 1999.  Beginning in 
1996 and continuing through 1998, Donna Swanson (Donna) received 
several anonymous, hand-written letters that made various 
accusations, including allegations of marital infidelity on the 
part of Alan Swanson (Alan), Donna’s husband.  In 1998, Grisham 
also received an anonymous, hand-written letter.  According to 
Almy’s allegations, Grisham and the Swansons decided together 
                     
1 Although the circuit court did not identify which 
depositions it was considering, Dr. Alexander’s deposition was 
the only deposition before the court. 
 
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that they should determine the source of the anonymous letters, 
suspecting that Almy was the author.  Grisham allegedly stated 
during a tape-recorded conversation that he “really, really 
wanted to make Ms. Almy suffer for writing those letters.” 
As part of their effort to determine if Almy was the author 
of the letters, Grisham and the Swansons contacted Liebman, a 
handwriting analyst.  Liebman asked to see the anonymous 
letters, along with known samples of Almy’s handwriting.  
Grisham produced for Liebman’s analysis a “thank-you” note 
written by Almy and a form Almy had completed when she 
registered her daughter to play baseball in a league in which 
Grisham was a coach.  Liebman later requested additional samples 
of Almy’s handwriting. 
To provide Liebman with the requested additional samples, 
Grisham and Alan allegedly agreed to obtain documents bearing 
Almy’s handwriting from her children’s files at St. Anne’s-
Belfield School (St. Anne’s).  Grisham served on the board of 
directors at St. Anne’s, and Alan was a teacher there.  Alan, 
without permission from anyone at St. Anne’s, allegedly obtained 
from the school files an enrollment and medical release form 
that Almy had completed, which was marked “Strictly 
Confidential” and contained confidential and personal 
information.  Alan provided a copy of the document to Grisham, 
who allegedly sent it to Liebman. 
 
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Wong, a handwriting examiner who worked with Liebman, also 
analyzed the submitted samples.  Liebman and Wong concluded in a 
written report (Liebman report) that it was possible Almy had 
written the letters, and that she appeared to have addressed the 
envelopes containing the letters.  Almy alleged that Grisham, 
Liebman, and Wong collaborated regarding the desired contents 
and phrasing of the Liebman report. 
Grisham and the Swansons next met with Grisham’s attorney, 
John Zunka.  Grisham allegedly told Zunka that the Liebman 
report concluded that Almy had written the anonymous letters.  
Based on this information, Zunka advised Grisham to contact the 
local Commonwealth’s Attorney, James Camblos, to initiate 
criminal proceedings against Almy. 
Grisham and the Swansons met with Camblos and allegedly 
told him that their handwriting experts concluded that Almy had 
written some of the anonymous letters and had addressed the 
envelopes containing those letters.  Camblos contacted Detective 
Thomas Grimes of the Albemarle County Police Department, who 
arranged a meeting with the Swansons.  The Swansons provided 
Grimes with copies of the anonymous letters and told him that 
they thought Almy was the author. 
In August 1998, Grimes confronted Almy at her residence and 
asked her if she had written the anonymous letters.  After Almy 
denied writing the letters, Grimes informed Almy that she was 
 
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not under arrest but that he “want[ed] the letters to stop.”  
Almy alleged that Grimes was “rude and demeaning” during the 
visit, causing her to cry and become upset. 
Almy asserted that as a result of Grimes’ visit in August 
1998, she suffered severe emotional distress, including 
nervousness, sleeplessness, stress with accompanying physical 
symptoms, and an inability to concentrate.  Almy further alleged 
that after Grimes’ visit she withdrew from her customary 
activities, could not perform her duties as wife and mother, was 
unable to manage her mother’s real estate properties, and could 
not perform her administrative duties at a nonprofit 
organization. 
In November 1998, Almy sought treatment for her emotional 
distress from Dr. Alexander, who concluded that Almy suffered 
from a “major depressive disorder.”  Almy refused medication for 
her depression but, over the next seven months, she received 
therapy from Dr. Alexander on several occasions. 
Almy alleged that her depressed condition improved until 
about August 1999, when she learned that Grisham and the 
Swansons earlier had obtained materials from certain files at 
St. Anne’s containing confidential information about Almy’s 
children.  According to Almy’s allegations, upon learning that 
Grisham and the Swansons had made copies of documents from those 
files, Almy felt “extremely violated, outraged, deeply disturbed 
 
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and worried,” and she “feared for how her children would be 
treated during the upcoming school year.”  As a result, Almy 
allegedly suffered a serious “setback” in her depression.  She 
asserted that her husband and several friends observed a “return 
of her depressive state and debilitating functioning.”  Almy 
also alleged that she again sought counseling from Dr. 
Alexander, who concluded that Almy’s discovery concerning her 
children’s files had caused the “setback” in her depression. 
II. ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL 
Almy argues that the circuit court erred in considering Dr. 
Alexander’s deposition testimony when ruling on the defendants’ 
demurrers, because a demurrer addresses only the legal 
sufficiency of the allegations of a motion for judgment.  Almy 
also contends that the circuit court erred in sustaining the 
demurrers because Almy properly pleaded all required elements of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and an accompanying 
conspiracy claim. 
In response, Grisham initially argues that Almy did not 
preserve for appeal the issue whether the circuit court erred in 
relying on Dr. Alexander’s deposition testimony when ruling on 
the demurrers.2  Next, addressing the merits of Almy’s pleadings, 
Grisham contends that the pleadings fail to state a cause of 
                     
2 The Swansons and Wong assert essentially the same 
arguments as Grisham.  Liebman has not filed a brief in this 
appeal. 
 
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action.  Grisham asserts that Almy’s allegations of emotional 
distress are identical to the plaintiff’s allegations in Russo 
v. White, 241 Va. 23, 400 S.E.2d 160 (1991), in which this Court 
held that the pleadings were insufficient to support a claim of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Grisham also argues that Almy’s pleadings are deficient 
because they do not allege facts sufficient to establish that 
the defendants’ actions were intentional or reckless and were 
outrageous.  He further contends that because Almy’s pleadings 
do not support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, her conspiracy claim based on that underlying tort 
likewise fails. 
III. ANALYSIS 
We first observe that when ruling on a demurrer, in 
contrast to ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court is 
not permitted to decide the merits of a claim but only may 
decide whether a plaintiff’s factual allegations are sufficient 
to state a cause of action.  Barber v. VistaRMS, Inc., 272 Va. 
319, 327, 634 S.E.2d 706, 711 (2006); see Fun v. Virginia Mil. 
Inst., 245 Va. 249, 252, 427 S.E.2d 181, 183 (1993); Elliott v. 
Shore Stop, Inc., 238 Va. 237, 239-40, 384 S.E.2d 752, 753 
(1989).  Thus, a demurrer presents an issue of law, not an issue 
of fact.  See Code § 8.01-273; Harris v. Kreutzer, 271 Va. 188, 
 
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196, 624 S.E.2d 24, 28 (2006); Glazebrook v. Board of 
Supervisors, 266 Va. 550, 554, 587 S.E.2d 589, 591 (2003). 
In the present case, the circuit court erred in considering 
the factual merit of Almy’s allegations in ruling on the 
defendants’ demurrers.3  Our analysis does not end here, however, 
because Almy asks us to review the circuit court’s express 
holding that her claims “will not survive demurrer.”  Almy’s 
failure to object to the circuit court’s consideration of the 
deposition testimony does not affect our review because, given 
the court’s erroneous mode of procedure, we do not address the 
substance of the court’s analysis but consider only whether the 
court reached the correct result, albeit for the wrong reason.  
Thus, we confine our review to the legal sufficiency of Almy’s 
pleadings.4  See Harris, 271 Va. at 195, 624 S.E.2d at 28; Dreher 
                     
3 We find no merit in the defendants’ argument that, based 
on our decision in Fleming v. Anderson, 187 Va. 788, 48 S.E.2d 
269 (1948), the circuit court properly considered Dr. 
Alexander’s deposition when ruling on the demurrer.  Fleming is 
inapposite because, there, the circuit court took judicial 
notice of prior judicial proceedings when ruling on a demurrer 
solely because the plaintiff’s cause of action arose from the 
outcome of those prior proceedings. Id. at 794-95, 48 S.E.2d at 
272-73. 
4 We observe, in contrast, that on at least two prior 
occasions when a circuit court erroneously decided the merits of 
a case in ruling on a demurrer, we nevertheless reviewed the 
circuit court’s decision as if it were a ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment.  See Shelor Motor Co. v. Miller, 261 Va. 473, 
544 S.E.2d 345 (2001); Carmel v. City of Hampton, 241 Va. 457, 
403 S.E.2d 335 (1991).  In those cases, however, the parties, as 
well as the circuit court, treated the pleadings in this manner.  
Here, the parties did not ask the circuit court to rule on the 
 
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v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 272 Va. 390, 395, 634 S.E.2d 
324, 326-27 (2006); Thompson v. Skate Am., Inc., 261 Va. 121, 
128, 540 S.E.2d 123, 126-27 (2001). 
We consider the factual allegations of the motion for 
judgment in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  
McDermott v. Reynolds, 260 Va. 98, 100, 530 S.E.2d 902, 903 
(2000); W.S. Carnes, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 252 Va. 377, 
384, 478 S.E.2d 295, 300 (1996).  We will consider as true the 
facts alleged therein, the facts impliedly alleged, and the 
reasonable inferences of fact that can be drawn from the facts 
alleged.  See McDermott, 260 Va. at 100, 530 S.E.2d at 903; Delk 
v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 259 Va. 125, 129, 523 S.E.2d 
826, 829 (2000); Breeding v. Hensley, 258 Va. 207, 211-12, 519 
S.E.2d 369, 371 (1999). 
A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
We first recognized this intentional tort as a cause of 
action in Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 
(1974).  There, we held that the tort has four elements that 
must be proved: 1) the wrongdoer’s conduct was intentional or 
reckless; 2) the conduct was outrageous or intolerable; 3) there 
was a causal connection between the wrongdoer’s conduct and the 
resulting emotional distress; and 4) the resulting emotional 
                                                                  
merits of the claims, and the defendants merely asserted that 
Dr. Alexander’s deposition supported their position that Almy 
had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
 
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distress was severe.  Id. at 342, 210 S.E.2d at 148; accord, 
Harris, 271 Va. at 203, 624 S.E.2d at 33; Delk, 259 Va. at 136, 
523 S.E.2d at 833; Jordan v. Shands, 255 Va. 492, 498-99, 500 
S.E.2d 215, 218-19 (1998). 
Because of problems inherent in proving a tort alleging 
injury to the mind or emotions in the absence of accompanying 
physical injury, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress is “not favored” in the law.  Harris, 271 Va. at 203-
04, 624 S.E.2d at 33; Russo, 241 Va. at 26, 400 S.E.2d at 162; 
Ruth v. Fletcher, 237 Va. 366, 373, 377 S.E.2d 412, 415-16 
(1989).  Thus, in contrast to a claim of negligence, a plaintiff 
alleging a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress must allege in her motion for judgment all facts 
necessary to establish the cause of action in order to withstand 
challenge on demurrer.  Harris, 271 Va. at 204, 624 S.E.2d at 
33; Russo, 241 Va. at 28, 400 S.E.2d at 163.  Accordingly, we 
must consider whether Almy alleged sufficient facts to establish 
each element of the tort. 
1) Intentional or Reckless Conduct 
We conclude that Almy’s pleadings sufficiently allege that 
Grisham, Alan, and Donna intended to cause Almy severe emotional 
distress.  This element of the tort is set forth in Almy’s 
allegations that Grisham, Alan, and Donna acted intentionally to 
falsely accuse Almy, with the specific purpose of causing her 
 
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humiliation, ridicule, and severe emotional distress.  Almy 
further alleged that these three defendants intentionally 
manufactured evidence to cause her distress, and that Grisham 
expressed his intent to have her “really, really, suffer” for 
writing the letters. 
Almy fails to allege in her motion for judgment, however, 
that Liebman and Wong engaged in conduct with the intent to 
cause Almy emotional distress.  Likewise, Almy’s pleadings do 
not contain allegations that the actions of Liebman and Wong 
were reckless, such that they knew or should have known their 
act of writing a false report likely would cause Almy severe 
emotional distress.  Therefore, we hold that Almy has failed to 
state a cause of action against Liebman and Wong for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. 
2) Outrageous or Intolerable Conduct 
We conclude that Almy sufficiently alleged the element of 
outrageous conduct perpetrated by Grisham, Alan, and Donna.  
This conduct is described in Almy’s allegations that the three 
defendants devised a scheme to falsely accuse Almy of writing 
the letters and that, in furtherance of this scheme, Alan and 
Grisham provided Liebman with the confidential documents 
improperly obtained from St. Anne’s.  Almy further alleged that 
Alan and Donna knew or should have known that Grisham 
inappropriately influenced the wording of Liebman’s report, 
 
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causing Liebman to issue a false report implicating Almy.  In 
addition, Almy alleged that Grisham, Alan, and Donna caused 
Officer Grimes to confront Almy by providing false information 
that a handwriting examiner had determined that Almy was the 
author of the letters. 
In reviewing these allegations, we acknowledge that the 
term “outrageous” does not objectively describe particular acts 
but instead represents an evaluation of behavior.  Russo, 241 
Va. at 26, 400 S.E.2d at 162.  Nevertheless, in the absence of 
an objective definition of the term, we must make this threshold 
assessment in determining the sufficiency of Almy’s allegations.  
See id.  
We hold that reasonable persons could view the conduct 
alleged, if proved, as being “so outrageous in character, and so 
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of 
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly 
intolerable in a civilized community.”  See Russo, 241 Va. at 
27, 400 S.E.2d at 162 (quoting Ruth, 237 Va. at 368, 377 S.E.2d 
at 413).  When reasonable persons could view alleged conduct in 
this manner and the other elements of the tort are properly 
pleaded, the controversy must be resolved at a trial on the 
merits of the claim, rather than by a circuit court on demurrer.  
See Burroughs v. Keffer, 272 Va. 162, 168, 630 S.E.2d 297, 301 
(2006); Chapman v. City of Virginia Beach, 252 Va. 186, 191, 475 
 
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S.E.2d 798, 801 (1996); Womack, 215 Va. at 342, 210 S.E.2d at 
148. 
3) Causal Connection Between Conduct and Distress 
We hold that Almy alleged sufficient facts to support a 
conclusion that the conduct of Grisham, Alan, and Donna 
proximately caused her severe emotional distress.  Almy’s 
pleadings contain two primary allegations of proximate 
causation.  First, Almy alleged that these three defendants 
provided false information to local law enforcement officials 
and that, as a result, Detective Grimes confronted Almy, causing 
her to suffer severe emotional distress and depression.  Second, 
Almy alleged that she suffered severe emotional distress caused 
by her discovery that Grisham and Alan had removed from school 
files confidential information related to her family.  Thus, 
these allegations of proximate causation were sufficient to 
survive the defendants’ demurrers. 
4) Severity of Resulting Emotional Distress 
Finally, we hold that Almy adequately alleged that she 
suffered severe emotional distress.  Almy asserted that the 
conduct of Grisham, Alan, and Donna caused her to suffer from 
several debilitating conditions, including depression, 
nervousness, and an inability to sleep, which ultimately caused 
a complete disintegration of virtually every aspect of her life.  
She allegedly was unable to manage her mother’s financial 
 
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affairs, to carry out her family duties, or to perform her 
various charitable endeavors.  Also relevant are Almy’s 
allegations that due to her “major depressive disorder” caused 
by the defendants’ false accusations, she was required to 
undergo extensive therapy from Dr. Alexander.5 
We hold that these allegations are materially different 
from the allegations of severe emotional distress in Russo, 
which we held were inadequate to survive a demurrer.  Unlike the 
plaintiff in Russo, Almy alleged that she was required to seek 
professional counseling because of her depression occasioned by 
the defendants’ misconduct. 
We likewise conclude that Almy’s allegations of severe 
emotional distress exceed those alleged by the plaintiff in 
Harris v. Kreutzer, 271 Va. 188, 624 S.E.2d 24 (2006).  While 
both Almy and the plaintiff in Harris alleged that they required 
counseling and suffered from severe psychological trauma, 
depression, humiliation, and injury to reputation, Almy 
additionally alleged that the defendants’ actions rendered her 
functionally incapable of carrying out any of her work or family 
responsibilities.  See id. at 204-05, 624 S.E.2d at 34. 
                     
5 In addition, the motion for judgment alleges that Almy 
obtained a forensic psychiatric assessment conducted by David 
Pickar, M.D.  Although the assessment was obtained for purposes 
of litigation and Almy did not seek treatment from Dr. Pickar, 
Dr. Pickar nevertheless allegedly concluded that Almy suffered 
from a major depressive disorder as a result of the defendants’ 
actions. 
 
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According to Almy, her emotional distress reached such a 
level of severity that “[e]very aspect of [her] life [was] 
fundamentally and severely altered,” such that she “had trouble 
even walking out of the front door.”  As a result, Almy’s motion 
for judgment sufficiently alleges emotional distress “so severe 
that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.”  See 
id. at 205, 624 S.E.2d at 34 (citing Russo, 241 Va. at 28, 400 
S.E.2d at 163).  Thus, we hold that Almy’s factual allegations 
describing her severe emotional distress are adequate to survive 
a demurrer on this fourth and final element of the tort. 
B. Conspiracy Allegations 
We next consider Almy’s conspiracy allegations.  We decide 
the question whether the tort of conspiracy to intentionally 
inflict emotional distress should be recognized as a cause of 
action in this Commonwealth. 
We begin our analysis with the observation that, in 
Virginia, a common law claim of civil conspiracy generally 
requires proof that the underlying tort was committed.  See 
Commercial Bus. Sys. v. Halifax Corp., 253 Va. 292, 300, 484 
S.E.2d 892, 896 (1997).  This general rule reflects the view of 
a majority of states that have considered the question.  See, 
e.g., Macomber v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Corp., 894 A.2d 240, 
254-55 (Conn. 2006); Paul v. Howard Univ., 754 A.2d 297, 310 n. 
27 (D.C. 2000); Alexander & Alexander Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander & 
 
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Assocs., 650 A.2d 260, 265 (Md. 1994); Jones v. BP Oil Co., 632 
So.2d 435, 439 (Ala. 1993); Middlesex Concrete Prods. & Excav. 
Corp. v. The Carteret Indus. Ass’n, 181 A.2d 774, 779 (N.J. 
1962); Cook v. Robinson, 116 S.E.2d 742, 744-45 (Ga. 1960). 
“The gist of the civil action of conspiracy is the damage 
caused by the acts committed in pursuance of the formed 
conspiracy and not the mere combination of two or more persons 
to accomplish an unlawful purpose or use an unlawful means.”  
CaterCorp, Inc. v. Catering Concepts, Inc., 246 Va. 22, 28, 431 
S.E.2d 277, 281-82 (1993) (quoting Gallop v. Sharp, 179 Va. 335, 
338, 19 S.E.2d 84, 86 (1942)); accord, Commercial Business Sys. 
v. BellSouth Servs., 249 Va. 39, 48, 453 S.E.2d 261, 267 (1995).  
As stated above, a claim for intentional infliction of severe 
emotional distress requires proof of severe emotional distress 
proximately caused by a defendant’s outrageous conduct that is 
intentional or reckless.  See Harris, 271 Va. at 203, 624 S.E.2d 
at 33; Delk, 259 Va. at 136, 523 S.E.2d at 833; Jordan, 255 Va. 
at 499, 500 S.E.2d at 219; Womack, 215 Va. at 342, 210 S.E.2d at 
148.  Thus, under the common law in Virginia, a conspiracy claim 
based on this underlying tort would include these same elements 
of proof.  See Halifax, 253 Va. at 300, 484 S.E.2d at 896. 
As we already have observed, the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress is “not favored” in the law.  
See Harris, 271 Va. at 204, 624 S.E.2d at 33; Russo, 241 Va. at 
 
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26, 400 S.E.2d at 162; Ruth, 237 Va. at 373, 377 S.E.2d at 416.  
A primary reason for the tort’s disfavored status is that 
because the prohibited conduct cannot be defined objectively, 
clear guidance is lacking, both to those wishing to avoid 
committing the tort, and to those who must evaluate whether 
certain alleged conduct satisfies all elements of the tort.  See 
Russo, 241 Va. at 26, 400 S.E.2d at 162. 
If we were to recognize a conspiracy claim based on an 
agreement to commit this tort, the difficulties resulting from 
this absence of clear guidance would be compounded.  Courts and 
juries would be faced with the amorphous task of determining 
whether parties have entered into an agreement to engage in 
conduct that cannot be defined objectively.  See id.  
Determinations of this nature would invite great uncertainty and 
speculation on the part of the fact finder.  
We also observe that, in Virginia, a plaintiff can allege 
joint liability of parties who acted in concert to commit the 
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress without the 
need to assert a claim of conspiracy.  The case before us 
plainly illustrates this point.  Accordingly, upon consideration 
of these several factors, we hold that a plaintiff may not 
assert a cause of action in Virginia for civil conspiracy to 
intentionally inflict severe emotional distress. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
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When a circuit court has reached the correct result for the 
wrong reason, we will assign the correct reason and affirm the 
relevant portion of the court’s judgment.  Whitley v. 
Commonwealth, 260 Va. 482, 492, 538 S.E.2d 296, 301 (2000); 
Mitchem v. Counts, 259 Va. 179, 191, 523 S.E.2d 246, 253 (2000); 
Hartzell Fan, Inc. v. Waco, Inc., 256 Va. 294, 303, 505 S.E.2d 
196, 202 (1998).  Therefore, based on our holdings in this 
appeal, we will affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of Almy’s 
conspiracy claim with regard to all defendants.  We also will 
affirm the circuit court’s dismissal with prejudice the claims 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress with regard to 
David Liebman and Cina L. Wong.  We will reverse the circuit 
court’s dismissal of the claim of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress with regard to John Grisham, Jr., Alan 
Swanson, and Donna Swanson, and remand the case to the circuit 
court for a trial on the merits of the remaining claims. 
Affirmed in part and final judgment, 
    reversed in part and remanded. 
JUSTICE KINSER, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur in the majority’s refusal to recognize an 
independent cause of action for civil conspiracy to 
intentionally inflict emotional distress, as well as its 
decision to affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of Katherine 
Almy’s claims against David Liebman and Cina L. Wong.  With 
 
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respect to the portion of the majority opinion holding that 
Almy’s motion for judgment contained sufficient allegations of 
each element of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress to survive demurrer, I respectfully dissent. 
 
To recover for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, a plaintiff must show: 
One, the wrongdoer’s conduct was intentional or 
reckless. . . . Two, the conduct was outrageous and 
intolerable in that it offends against the generally 
accepted standards of decency and morality. . . . 
Three, there was a causal connection between the 
wrongdoer’s conduct and the emotional distress.  Four, 
the emotional distress was severe. 
 
Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 342, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 
(1974).  Even assuming Almy pled sufficient facts to satisfy the 
first three prongs of the four-part Womack test, I find that her 
allegations concerning the severity of her emotional distress 
are deficient.1 
The majority holds otherwise, notwithstanding the opposite 
conclusion this Court recently reached when confronted with 
similar allegations in Harris v. Kreutzer, 271 Va. 188, 624 
S.E.2d 24 (2006).  In that case, the plaintiff alleged that a 
licensed clinical psychologist verbally abused her, causing the 
plaintiff to suffer “severe psychological trauma and mental 
                     
1 I express no opinion whether Almy’s allegations as to the 
other three prongs were sufficient because her failure to 
sufficiently plead the severity of her emotional distress is, by 
itself, fatal to her cause of action. 
 
 
20
anguish affecting her mental and physical well-being,” the 
symptoms of which were “nightmares, difficulty sleeping, extreme 
loss of self-esteem and depression.”  Id. at 204−05, 624 S.E.2d 
at 34.  Notably, the plaintiff in Harris, unlike the plaintiff 
in Russo v. White, 241 Va. 23, 25, 28, 400 S.E.2d 160, 161–63 
(1991), alleged that she needed “additional psychological 
treatment and counseling” as a result of the psychologist’s 
actions.  Harris, 271 Va. at 205, 624 S.E.2d at 34.  
Nonetheless, we affirmed the trial court’s judgment sustaining 
the psychologist’s demurrer, holding that the plaintiff failed 
to allege facts showing emotional distress “‘so severe that no 
reasonable person could be expected to endure it.’”  Id. 
(quoting Russo, 241 Va. at 27, 400 S.E.2d at 163).  We reached 
the same result in Russo even though the plaintiff there alleged 
that she “withdrew from activities and was unable to concentrate 
at work.”  241 Va. at 28, 400 S.E.2d at 163. 
In my view, Almy has failed to plead facts relative to the 
severity of her emotional distress that materially differ from 
the allegations we held insufficient in Harris and Russo.  For 
this reason, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion 
inasmuch as it holds that Almy adequately pled this element in 
 
21
tort.  Thus, I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court in 
its entirety.2 
                     
2 The parties in this case have not argued whether Almy’s 
alleged emotional distress was exaggerated and unreasonable 
under the circumstances.  See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 46 cmt. j (1965) (“The distress must be reasonable and 
justified under the circumstances, and there is no liability 
where the plaintiff has suffered exaggerated and unreasonable 
emotional distress, unless it results from a peculiar 
susceptibility to such distress of which the actor has 
knowledge.”); Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 703 F.2d 1152, 1159 (10th Cir. 1981); Drejza v. 
Vaccaro, 650 A.2d 1308, 1314 n.16 (D.C. 1994); Cafferty v. 
Garcia’s of Scottsdale, Inc., 375 N.W.2d 850, 854 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1985); Dickerson v. Int’l United Auto Workers Union, 648 
N.E.2d 40, 48 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); Tanner v. Rite Aid of W. 
Va., Inc., 461 S.E.2d 149, 157 n.11 (W. Va. 1995).  Thus, I 
express no opinion on that issue.