Case Title: Hannah v. Dayton Power & Light Co.

Citation: 1998-Ohio-408

Docket Number: 19970783

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1998-08-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
HANNAH, ADMR., APPELLANT, v. DAYTON POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Hannah v. Dayton Power & Light Co. (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Employer and employee — Employer requires employee to perform a dangerous 
task — Requirements employee must satisfy in order to prevail against 
employer for an intentional tort — Sufficient evidence is presented to 
generate a triable issue whether employer had knowledge of a dangerous 
condition and of a substantial certainty of harm to employee, when. 
(No. 97-783 — Submitted March 24, 1998 — Decided August 5, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 16209. 
 
This appeal stems from the death of Dayton Power & Light (“DP & L”) 
employee Paul Hannah.  Decedent Hannah, as a member of DP & L’s Killen 
Station rescue team, died while attempting a vertical rescue of two men stranded at 
the four-hundred-fifty-foot level of a nine-hundred-foot smokestack at DP & L’s 
Killen Electric Generating Station.  The rescue attempt was prompted when a 
faulty elevator inside the smokestack became stuck just above the four-hundred-
fifty-foot level, stranding Roy Douglas Horsley, a subcontractor’s employee.  
Horsley climbed out of the elevator and down the attached ladder to a landing just 
below.  Horsley then called for assistance.  Using a ladder, rope, and harness, DP 
& L employee Mike Kelly climbed up to Horsley, but was unable to start the 
elevator.  Exhausted and overcome by the extreme heat inside the stack, Kelly 
climbed out onto the platform and called his supervisor, and DP & L’s control 
room operator, who had monitored the call.  The control room operator sounded 
the emergency alarm to summon DP & L’s Killen Station rescue squad to the 
scene. 
 
The Killen Station rescue squad was formed by DP & L in response to 
federal regulations that addressed the need for rescue teams on power plant 
 
2
premises.  In June 1994, the squad was composed of nine volunteers.  The squad 
received rescue training, primarily for rescues in confined spaces, i.e., rescues of 
persons stranded in pits, wells, etc.  The training was paid for by DP & L and 
occurred on the plant premises. 
 
On the day in question, DP & L employees who were members of the Killen 
Station rescue team, including decedent Paul Hannah and others, responded to the 
alarm.  They gathered equipment and met at the base of the smokestack.  Team 
member Gary Nibert said that he was physically unable to climb the ladder, and 
asked Hannah whether he could perform the rescue.  Hannah agreed, and climbed 
to the four-hundred-fifty-foot level and then onto the elevator to check on co-
employee Kelly.  The two of them attempted to repair the elevator, but to no avail.  
After about twenty or thirty minutes, Kelly came down to the landing.  Hannah 
followed, but collapsed upon reaching the landing.  Despite Kelly’s and Horsley’s 
attempts to rouse him and cool him down, Hannah remained unresponsive. 
 
Kelly and Horsley managed to rappel to the ground together using a harness 
and rope.  However, since Hannah had to be left on the platform, additional rescue 
workers were summoned from DP & L’s rescue squad at J.M. Stuart Electric 
Generating Station, located seventeen miles away.  Unlike the Killen Station team, 
which had been trained largely in confined space rescues, the Stuart Station rescue 
squad had trained more extensively in vertical rescues, i.e., rescues of persons 
stranded in high places.  When members of the Stuart Station team could not 
resuscitate Hannah, they lowered him to the ground.  Hannah was rushed to the 
hospital, where he died of hyperthermia. 
 
Hannah’s surviving spouse, Trisha E. Hannah, plaintiff-appellant, brought 
this lawsuit against defendant-appellee DP & L, alleging inter alia that DP & L 
committed an intentional tort by requiring the decedent to attempt a vertical rescue 
 
3
of individuals stranded at the four-hundred-fifty-foot level of the plant’s 
smokestack.1  DP & L filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court 
granted.  The court reasoned that the decedent had volunteered to perform the 
rescue.  Since there was no evidence from which reasonable minds could conclude 
that DP & L required the decedent to perform the rescue that led to his death, there 
was no showing of an intentional tort.  The court of appeals affirmed on the same 
grounds. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Waite, Schneider, Bayless & Chesley Co., L.P.A., Stanley M. Chesley, D. 
Arthur Rabourn and Theresa L. Groh, for appellant. 
 
Furnier & Thomas, Scott R. Thomas and Sean D. McMurtry, for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.  In Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron 
Chemicals, Inc. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 608, 23 O.O.3d 504, 433 N.E.2d 572, this 
court first recognized an intentional tort exception to the workers’ compensation 
exclusivity doctrine by allowing employees to bring an intentional tort lawsuit 
against their employers.  We later defined the term “intentional tort” in Jones v. 
VIP Dev. Co. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 90, 15 OBR 246, 472 N.E.2d 1046.  Adopting 
1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965), Section 8A and Prosser & Keeton, 
Law of Torts (5 Ed.1984) 36, Section 8, we stated that an intentional tort is “an act 
committed with the intent to injure another, or committed with the belief that such 
injury is substantially certain to occur.”2  Jones at paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
In subsequent decisions, we focused on what proof is necessary to establish 
intent on the part of an employer.  In Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988), 
 
4
36 Ohio St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489, we held that the proof required to establish an 
intentional tort must be beyond that required to prove negligence or recklessness.  
Id. at paragraph six of the syllabus.  We set forth a three-part test an employee 
must satisfy in order to prevail against his or her employer for an intentional tort.  
Id. at paragraph five of the syllabus.  This test was modified in Fyffe v. Jeno’s, Inc. 
(1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 115, 570 N.E.2d 1108, where we held that the employee 
must prove “(1) knowledge by the employer of the existence  of a dangerous 
process, procedure, instrumentality or condition within its business operation; (2) 
knowledge by the employer that if the employee is subjected by his employment to 
such dangerous process, procedure, instrumentality or condition, then harm to the 
employee will be a substantial certainty; and (3) that the employer, under such 
circumstances, and with such knowledge, did act to require the employee to 
continue to perform the dangerous task.”  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.3  At 
issue in this case is the third prong of the Fyffe test, and whether the entry of 
summary judgment was proper. 
 
Civ.R. 56(C) provides for the granting of summary judgment when “(1) [n]o 
genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that 
reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence 
most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary 
judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party.”  Temple v. Wean 
United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 4 O.O.3d 466, 472, 364 N.E.2d 267, 
274.  In deciding whether there exists a genuine issue of fact, the evidence must be 
viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.  Civ.R. 56(C).  Even the inferences to be drawn 
from the underlying facts contained in the evidentiary materials, such as affidavits 
and depositions, must be construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing 
 
5
the motion.  Turner v. Turner (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 337, 341, 617 N.E.2d 1123, 
1127. 
 
In the context of an intentional tort allegedly committed by an employer, we 
have previously held that to overcome a motion for summary judgment, an 
employee alleging an intentional tort must set forth specific facts to raise a 
genuine issue of fact that the employer committed an intentional tort.  Van Fossen, 
36 Ohio St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489, at paragraph seven of the syllabus.  Proof of 
the three elements of an employer intentional tort may be made by direct or 
circumstantial evidence.  Adams v. Aluchem, Inc. (1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 261, 
264, 604 N.E.2d 254, 256.  With these principles in mind, we now must determine 
whether summary judgment was appropriate. 
 
In granting summary judgment, the trial court relied upon the deposition 
testimony of Killen Station rescue squad member Gary Nibert and former plant 
manager Fred Southworth.  Both men testified that the Killen Station rescue squad 
was composed of volunteers and that the decision to perform a rescue was a 
voluntary one.  Additionally, Nibert testified that  members of the Killen Station 
squad were not expected to do anything they chose not to do.  Based upon this 
evidence, the court held that the rescue by the decedent was purely voluntary and 
there was no showing of an intentional tort. 
 
DP & L likewise emphasizes that the evidence shows that the Killen Station 
rescue team is purely autonomous, in that it operates without management 
influence and interference.  Since there was no evidence presented to show 
anything other than a voluntary rescue attempt made by the decedent, DP & L 
argues, summary judgment was proper.  We disagree.  Although the rescue team is 
autonomous in certain respects and membership on the squad is voluntary, we 
cannot say as a matter of law that the decision to make the rescue attempt in this 
 
6
case was strictly voluntary, without any direction by management.  Even though 
there was evidence presented regarding the voluntary nature of the rescue attempt, 
we find that there was also evidence presented to the contrary. 
 
Since DP & L created the Killen Station rescue team, management at DP & 
L has been involved in many facets of the squad’s operation.  For instance, 
training of the rescue squad is paid for by DP & L and is considered to be part of 
the employee’s job.  Training is conducted on DP & L premises during work 
hours, and members continue to receive their pay during training sessions.  
Management also has the ultimate authority to approve or reject training sessions.  
Additionally, management personnel at DP & L also order and pay for all rescue 
squad equipment and DP & L owns and operates an ambulance, which the rescue 
squad uses.  Furthermore, DP & L policy requires that all rescue squad drills be 
coordinated through the station manager and shift supervisor.  Thus, this evidence 
refutes DP & L’s assertion that the rescue team operates independently of 
management. 
 
We find that genuine issues of material fact exist under the third prong of 
Fyffe, which DP & L concedes is the focus of this appeal.  Under the third prong 
of this test, the employer, with knowledge of a dangerous condition and of a 
substantial certainty of harm, must have required the employee to perform a 
dangerous task.  We find that appellant has presented sufficient evidence to 
generate a triable issue whether the employer had this knowledge yet required the 
decedent to perform the vertical rescue. 
 
There was evidence that the elevator inside the smokestack had 
malfunctioned previously, yet the rescue team had never been trained on how to 
respond to this type of emergency.  There was further evidence that DP & L was 
aware that the rescue team had minimal training in vertical rescues.  In fact, rescue 
 
7
team members received no training at platform levels inside the stack or at any 
level over one hundred feet.  Nor had the squad ever attempted a vertical rescue 
before.  In a letter to DP & L management dated two years before his accident, the 
decedent had, at one time, resigned from the rescue squad, protesting that the 
squad’s training was inadequate.  Even though DP & L had been advised that 
additional training was necessary, there is evidence that DP & L did not authorize 
any additional vertical training.  Given these circumstances, we find that 
reasonable minds could conclude that DP & L was aware of a dangerous condition 
that created a substantial certainty of harm. 
 
Additionally, sufficient evidence was presented to create an issue of fact 
whether DP & L required the decedent to perform the rescue.  DP & L contends 
that this requirement is not satisfied because DP & L never ordered the decedent to 
climb up the ladder to rescue the stranded men.  However, under the third element 
of Fyffe, DP & L did not have to expressly order the decedent to make the rescue.  
Instead, to overcome a motion for summary judgment, an opposing party can 
satisfy this requirement by presenting evidence that raises an inference that the 
employer, through its actions and policies, required the decedent to engage in that 
dangerous task.  Here, former plant manager Fred Southworth testified that DP & 
L expected the rescue squad to respond to an emergency, and to do so in a safe 
manner.  Thus, when DP & L sounded the alarm and summoned its own rescue 
squad into action, reasonable minds could differ as to whether DP & L required 
the squad to make the rescue. 
 
We are unwilling to conclude that, as a matter of law, the decedent, in 
attempting the rescue, did so purely as a volunteer.  Obviously, DP & L formed the 
rescue squad primarily for its own benefit, to provide on-site personnel to respond 
to plant emergencies.  DP & L paid for the squad’s training and equipment, and 
 
8
arranged for members to train on company time.  Under these circumstances, and 
based upon the evidence presented, we hold that questions of fact remain as to 
whether DP & L did act to require the decedent to make the rescue attempt in 
question.  Since sufficient evidence was presented to overcome DP & L’s motion 
for summary judgment, we find that the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment for DP & L. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and this cause 
is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
Plaintiff also named as defendants Fluor Daniel, Inc. and various elevator 
companies. 
2. 
In response to this decision, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 4121.80, 
which attempted to restrict the scope of employer intentional torts.  However, in 
Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 624, 576 N.E.2d 722, this court 
found that R.C. 4121.80 was unconstitutional in its entirety.  Id. at paragraph two 
of the syllabus.  In response to Fyffe v. Jeno’s, Inc. (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 115, 570 
N.E.2d 1108, the General Assembly subsequently enacted R.C. Chapter 2745, 
effective November 1, 1995 (after the filing of this action), as a further attempt to 
expressly overrule various decisions, including Blankenship v. Cincinnati 
Milacron Chemicals, Inc. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 608, 23 O.O.3d 504, 433 N.E.2d 
572; Jones v. VIP Dev. Co. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 90, 15 OBR 246, 472 N.E.2d 
1046; Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 522 
 
9
N.E.2d 489; and Fyffe, supra.  See Am.H.B. No. 103, Section 3, 146 Ohio Laws, 
Part I, 758. 
3. 
In Fyffe, an injured employee brought an intentional tort action against his 
employer for allegedly removing a safety guard and then directing him to clean the 
unguarded machine.  The trial court granted summary judgment for the employer, 
and the court of appeals affirmed.  We reversed the judgment and remanded the 
cause on the ground that reasonable minds could differ concerning whether an 
intentional tort had been committed by the employer. 
__________________ 
 
Moyer, C.J., dissenting.  Because the trial court properly granted summary 
judgment to defendant-appellee Dayton Power & Light Company, I respectfully 
dissent from the decision of the majority.  Appellant did not provide sufficient 
evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, to overcome a motion for summary 
judgment. 
 
In Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 8 
O.O.3d 73, 375 N.E.2d 46, this court stated that for summary judgment to be 
granted, it must appear “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) that 
reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse 
to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, who is 
entitled to have the evidence strongly construed in his favor.”  Id. at 66, 8 O.O.3d 
at 74, 375 N.E.2d at 47.  See, also, Civ. R. 56(C). 
 
An employee who wishes to recover against his employer for an intentional 
tort must demonstrate the following three elements:  (1) knowledge by the 
employer of the existence of a dangerous process, procedure, or condition within 
the business operation; (2) knowledge by the employer that if the employee is 
 
10
subjected by his employment to the dangerous process, procedure, or condition, 
then harm to the employee will be a substantial certainty; and (3) the employer, 
under such circumstances and with such knowledge, acted to require the employee 
to continue to perform the dangerous task.  Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. 
(1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489, paragraph five of the syllabus; Fyffe 
v. Jeno’s, Inc. (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 115, 570 N.E.2d 1108, paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
 
In order to overcome a motion for summary judgment, plaintiff-appellant 
Trisha E. Hannah must establish evidence to support all three prongs of the test.  
Evidence in support of one or two of the elements is not enough.  Appellant has 
been unable to produce evidence in support of the third prong. 
 
No evidence has been presented in support of the proposition that Dayton 
Power & Light Company required Paul Hannah to attempt the vertical rescue of 
two men at Dayton Power & Light’s Killen electric generating station.  The 
deposition testimony of Killen rescue squad member Gary Nibert and former plant 
manager, Fred Southworth, indicates that the rescue squad was composed of 
volunteers and that any decision to perform a rescue was completely  voluntary.  
This testimony is supported by the fact that Paul Hannah had earlier quit the 
rescue squad without any apparent criticism, negative evaluation, or other 
repercussions to his career as an employee of Dayton Power & Light, and he later 
rejoined the squad without incident.  Appellant argues that this evidence should 
not be accepted at face value, but must be presented to a jury for full examination.  
However, the sufficiency of the appellee’s evidence is not at issue here.  It is the 
sufficiency of the evidence produced by the appellant that must be established in 
order to survive a motion for summary judgment.  Appellant has failed to produce 
 
11
any evidence in support of the proposition that Dayton Power & Light required 
Paul Hannah to make that rescue attempt. 
 
The only evidence cited by the majority in support of the contention that 
Dayton Power & Light required Hannah to act is the testimony of former Killen 
Station plant manager Fred Southworth, who testified that Dayton Power & Light 
expected the rescue squad to respond to an emergency, and to do so in a safe 
manner.  However, Southworth’s comments do little to support the assertion that 
Dayton Power & Light required Hannah to make a rescue attempt.  It is not 
reasonable to infer that whenever one is expected to act, one is also required to act.  
Additionally, any inference from Southworth’s testimony that there was a 
requirement to act directly contradicts Nibert’s testimony that the rescue unit was 
purely a volunteer group. 
 
The majority also asserts that Dayton Power & Light’s formation of the 
rescue squad, its funding of the squad’s training and equipment needs, and its 
arrangements for the squad to train on company time create a question of fact as to 
the voluntariness of Hannah’s decision to attempt the rescue.  That Dayton Power 
& Light played a major role in the training and supplying of the rescue team is not 
related in any way to Hannah’s personal decision on whether or not to attempt the 
rescue.  The degree of Dayton Power & Light’s involvement in the administration 
of the rescue team did not preclude Gary Nibert, another member of the rescue 
team who was present at the accident, from refusing to attempt the rescue, nor did 
it compel Hannah to take the action he took.  The level of Dayton Power & Light’s 
involvement does nothing to support any inference that Paul Hannah was 
compelled to act by his employer. 
 
There can be no doubt that Paul Hannah’s attempted rescue of two men at 
the Killen station was a heroic deed.  It was heroic not because Hannah was 
 
12
coerced into acting by his employer, but because Hannah chose to act out of his 
own free will.  Appellant is unable to produce any evidence to support any 
reasonable inference that Hannah was required by Dayton Power & Light to 
perform the rescue.  Because no evidence of prong three of the Fyffe test has been 
presented, appellant cannot recover against Dayton Power & Light for an 
intentional tort. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals, and uphold the granting of appellee’s motion for summary judgment. 
 
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting 
opinion.