Case Title: In re Alberg.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 108649

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2013-02-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No.  108,649 
 
In the Matter of STEVEN C. ALBERG, 
Respondent. 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed February 22, 2013. Disbarment. 
 
Alexander M. Walczak, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and Stanton A. 
Hazlett, Disciplinary Administrator, was with him on the formal complaint for the petitioner. 
 
John J. Ambrosio, of Ambrosio & Ambrosio, Chtd., Topeka, argued the cause, and Steven C. 
Alberg, respondent, argued the cause pro se. 
 
Per Curiam: This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the 
Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent, Steven C. Alberg, of Olathe, an 
attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 1980. 
 
 
The office of the Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal complaint against the 
respondent on June 14, 2011, alleging multiple violations of the Kansas Rules of 
Professional Conduct (KRPC). The respondent answered the complaint on July 7, 2011. 
The Disciplinary Administrator filed an amended formal complaint on November 16, 
2011, and a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys conducted a hearing 
on that complaint on June 12, 2012. The respondent personally appeared at the hearing 
and was represented by counsel. The hearing panel determined the respondent violated 
KRPC 1.5(f)(1) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 492) (fees); 1.7(a)(2) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 
506) (conflict of interest); 1.8(k) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 516) (sexual relationship with 
client); 1.15(a), (b), and (d)(2)(iii) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 541) (safekeeping of 
2 
 
property); 3.3(a)(1) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 582) (candor toward the tribunal); and 
8.4(b) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 643) (commission of a criminal act reflecting adversely 
on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer). 
 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, together with its recommendation to this court: 
 
"FINDINGS OF FACT 
 
. . . . 
"Representation of T.G. 
 
 
"6. 
In April, 2007, T.G. called the Respondent regarding representation for a 
divorce. T.G. had previously retained the Respondent to represent her in an action for 
divorce years before. 
 
 
"7. 
The Respondent and T.G. agreed to meet for lunch. During the lunch 
meeting, T.G. and the Respondent discussed her domestic situation. The Respondent 
provided T.G. advice on how to prepare for her divorce. Specifically, the Respondent told 
T.G. what documents she needed to gather in order to file for divorce. The Respondent 
and T.G. re-formed their attorney client relationship during the lunch meeting. 
 
 
"8. 
The Respondent and T.G. did not enter into a fee agreement. 
 
 
"9. 
Shortly after the lunch meeting, T.G. and the Respondent began a sexual 
relationship. T.G. and the Respondent continued their personal and sexual relationship in 
excess of a year. In late 2007, T.G. moved into the Respondent's residence. 
 
 
"10. 
On October 4, 2007, the Respondent filed a petition for divorce on behalf 
of T.G. Eventually, the Respondent and counsel for T.G.'s estranged husband settled the 
property issues. As a result, the Respondent received a check in the amount of 
$47,516.00, for T.G.'s share of the equity in the marital home. 
 
 
3 
 
 
"11. 
T.G. instructed the Respondent to deposit the check into the 
Respondent's client trust account. 
 
 
"12. 
From time to time, T.G. instructed the Respondent to provide her with a 
portion of the money. Additionally, from time to time, the Respondent asked and 
received permission from T.G. to borrow some of the money he held on her behalf. On 
one occasion, the Respondent borrowed money from T.G.'s funds held in trust to make 
his payroll. 
 
 
"13. 
In March, 2008, contrary to T.G.'s understanding of the Respondent's 
intention, the Respondent asked T.G. to pay attorneys fees for her representation in the 
divorce proceedings. The Respondent told T.G. that she owed him $10,000 in attorneys 
fees. T.G. allowed the Respondent to withdraw the attorney fees from the funds he held 
for her in his client trust account. [Footnote:  There was some evidence in this matter that 
after asking for $10,000 in attorney fees, the Respondent later reduced that amount to 
$7,500. Whether the Respondent requested $10,000 or $7,500 is only relevant to 
determine how much money the Respondent owed T.G. The evidence clearly established 
that the Respondent requested $10,000 as that is the amount of T.G.'s check written at the 
time.] 
 
"14. 
The personal relationship between T.G. and the Respondent deteriorated 
and eventually, T.G. moved out of the Respondent's residence. 
 
 
"15. 
T.G. repeatedly requested that the Respondent provide her with an 
accounting of the $47,516 which he held in trust for her. The Respondent failed to 
provide T.G. with a complete accounting of the funds. The accounting that the 
Respondent provided to T.G. listed only the amounts which the Respondent provided to 
T.G. The Respondent failed to include the amounts which he borrowed from time to time. 
 
 
"16. 
Later, T.G. filed suit against the Respondent. The litigation proceeded to 
jury trial. At trial, the jury found in favor of T.G. On November 8, 2011, the Court issued 
a journal entry of judgment on the jury verdict, which provides: 
 
4 
 
 
'The jury found that Steven Alberg breached a fiduciary duty to 
the plaintiff [T.G.] and awarded zero damages to plaintiff on the breach 
of fiduciary claim. The jury then stated "yes" to the question of whether 
"punitive damages should be assessed against the defendant for breach of 
his fiduciary duty." 
 
 
'The jury found in favor of the plaintiff on her quantum meruit 
claim and awarded plaintiff $16,000. The jury answered "yes" to the 
question of "did the defendant Steven Alberg convert the money placed 
into his trust account or the personal property of the plaintiff [T.G.]?" 
and found that plaintiff's damages were $12,000. The jury answered "no" 
as to whether punitive damages should be assessed for conversion. 
 
 
'The jury awarded $28,000 in total damages to the plaintiff 
[T.G.].' 
 
 
"17. 
Additionally, the Court also stated that it would conduct a hearing on 
punitive damages on a later date. The Court did not order any punitive damage. 
Thereafter, T.G. appealed the Court's decision to not award punitive damages to the 
Kansas Court of Appeals, appellate number 107211. T.G.'s appeal remains pending. 
 
"Representation of K.J. 
 
 
"18. 
During the Respondent's representation of T.G., T.G. referred her sister, 
K.J., to the Respondent for representation. K.J. was seeking a divorce from her estranged 
husband, who resided in Africa. K.J. and her estranged husband owned property and a 
variety of businesses in Africa, including a precious gem mining operation. 
 
 
"19. 
The case involving K.J. and her estranged husband was contentious and 
required a significant amount of the Respondent's time. K.J.'s estranged husband refused 
to acknowledge the Kansas court's jurisdiction and did not appear personally in court. 
 
 
"20. 
On April 1, 2008, the Respondent successfully negotiated a stipulation 
and property settlement agreement. 
5 
 
 
 
"21. 
At the time the Respondent began the representation, the Respondent 
failed to reduce their fee agreement to writing. Later, however, on April 29, 2009, the 
Respondent memorialized his understanding of their agreement in a letter. The letter 
provided, in pertinent part, as follows: 
 
 
'[K.J.], in light of my relationship with your family, we have 
continued on this case/quest for quite some time without formally 
rendering our longstanding oral agreement into writing as to my fees, 
costs and representation. In that regard we have agreed that you will be 
responsible for attorney's fees at the rate of $175.00 per hour or I will 
receive fees consisting of 1/3 of any and all proceeds of any kind or 
nature received or recovered from Respondent. As you know there are 
also "costs" involved for which you will be ultimately responsible. In 
regards to my attorney fees awarded me by the court you need to know 
that does not remove your ultimate responsibility for the fees which will 
remain as above without credit or offset of your responsibility hereunder. 
In the event no proceeds are collected you are still responsible for the 
hourly fees as a minimum.' 
 
 
"22. 
On May 20, 2009, the Court issued a journal entry in K.J.'s divorce case. 
In the journal entry, the Court granted the Respondent's request for an award of 
temporary attorney's fees in the amount of $50,000 to be paid by K.J.'s estranged husband 
to K.J. K.J.'s estranged husband did not pay the award of temporary attorney's fees. 
 
 
"23. 
At the time of the final hearing in the divorce, the Respondent provided 
the Court with an itemized billing statement. The Respondent sought $184,432 in 
attorney fees. The Respondent's billing statement contained false entries. 
 
 
"24. 
Following the divorce trial, K.J. terminated the Respondent's 
representation. 
 
 
"25. 
On October 23, 2009, the Court issued a journal entry of divorce. In the 
journal entry of divorce, the Court included the following: 
6 
 
 
'21. 
The Petitioner is requesting an award of attorney fees in the 
amount of $184,432.00. The Court has reviewed the itemized 
billing by the Petitioner and the response from counsel for the 
Respondent. The Court hereby awards unto the Petitioner total 
attorney fees in the amount of $45,000.00 and hereby enters a 
judgment in favor of the Petitioner and against the Respondent in 
the amount of $45,000.00 as and for her attorney fees.' 
  
 
"26. 
On November 16, 2009, the Respondent wrote to K.J. regarding the 
outstanding attorney fees. The letter provided: 
 
 
'Thank you for yours of November 13, 2009. Needless to say we 
disagree with your version of the events. In regards to the fee we were 
doing the divorce itself for an hourly fee. We also agreed that I would be 
entitled to 1/3 of any recovery we could make in collection of the award. 
I think we have always known he would not voluntarily pay you and 
collection efforts would more than likely be required. In any event, 
please note that I am putting a lien in the file for the hourly fees and I 
actually don't expect to get any contingency from the "collection" since 
we are out of the case. 
 
 
"27. 
On December 4, 2009, the Court issued an order, sua sponte. The order 
provided: 
 
 
'The Court hereby finds that former counsel for the Petitioner, 
Steven C. Alberg, shall not have an attorney's lien on child support or 
spousal maintenance, both arrears and current, due from the Respondent 
to the Petitioner. Furthermore, the Court previously Ordered that all child 
support and spousal maintenance payments shall be paid by the 
Respondent to the Kansas Payment Center.' 
 
7 
 
 
"28. 
K.J., through new counsel, filed a motion to determine attorney-client 
agreement. On January 28, 2011, the Court ruled on the motion. The Court made the 
following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
 
'1. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
 
a. 
The Petitioner obtained the services of Steven C. Alberg 
in the year 2007 to represent her in a divorce action 
against her husband. There was no written attorney-
client agreement signed between the Petitioner and Mr. 
Alberg. The Petition for Divorce was filed in September 
of 2007; 
 
b. 
In April of 2009, during the pendency of the divorce, 
Mr. Alberg prepared a letter to [K.J.] summarizing his 
understanding of the fee arrangement. The letter begins 
with the language "This letter is to better acquaint you 
with our procedures in handling domestic relations 
matters. In order to enlighten you and avoid possible 
misunderstandings I would like to set some of the 
policies and procedures out in writing." The letter further 
states ". . . we have agreed that you will be responsible 
for attorney's fees at the rate of $175.00 per hour or I 
will receive fees consisting of 1/3 of any and all 
proceeds of any kind or nature received or recovered 
from Respondent."; 
 
c. 
After the divorce trial in September of 2009, the 
Petitioner terminated the services of Mr. Alberg and Mr. 
Alberg sent a letter to [K.J.] dated November 16, 2009. 
The letter reveals "In regards to the fees we were doing 
the divorce itself for an hourly fee. We also agreed that I 
would be entitled to 1/3 of any recovery we could make 
in collection of the award." 
8 
 
 
d. 
The Petitioner testified that she never received any 
regular billings or any billing statements at all from Mr. 
Alberg during his representation of her in this matter; 
 
e. 
The Petitioner sent Mr. Alberg a letter dated November 
13, 2009 wherein she indicated that her understanding of 
the attorney-client fee arrangement was a contingent fee 
of 1/3; 
 
f. 
Mr. Alberg did generate a billing statement that was 
submitted to the Court at the time of closing arguments 
indicating computation of time expended in this matter 
at an hourly rate of compensation; 
 
g. 
Mr. Alberg testified that he did not have a written 
attorney-client fee contract, that the Petitioner told him 
that she would give him 1/3 of what she got in the 
divorce and that he did not send regular billing 
statements to the Petitioner. Mr. Alberg testified that he 
had a contingent fee agreement with the Petitioner at the 
beginning of his representation in the divorce action for 
any amounts that he would collect after judgment was 
entered. Mr. Alberg testified that he was of the opinion 
that he would charge the hourly rate and then upon 
collection of any judgment amount that exceeded the 
hourly rate total he would credit or waive the hourly rate. 
Mr. Alberg testified that he did not charge a retainer fee 
to be paid at the beginning of his representation of the 
Petitioner and that he did not expect his client to be 
making regular payments towards his fees; and 
 
h. 
The Petitioner, K.J., testified that her understanding of 
the attorney-client fee arrangement was that Mr. Alberg 
9 
 
was going to take 1/3 of what she received in the divorce 
excluding child support and spousal maintenance. She 
further testified that she never received an itemized 
billing statement from Mr. Alberg or his office and that 
she was unaware that a contingent fee arrangement in a 
divorce case was unlawful. She testified that Mr. Alberg 
handed her the letter of April 29, 2009, while at his 
office and that he said not to worry about the contents of 
the letter since it was only for Court. 
 
'2. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
 
a. 
Mr. Alberg entered into a contingent fee arrangement 
with [K.J.] to represent her in a divorce action in 
violation of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct as 
adopted by the Kansas Supreme Court and found in Rule 
1.5(f)(1). See In re Jarvis, 254 Kan. 829, 869 P.2d 671 
(1994); 
 
b. 
The evidence is substantial, compelling, clear and 
convincing to the Court that the attorney-client fee 
arrangement entered into by Mr. Alberg with his client, 
[K.J.] at the beginning of his representation of her was 
contingent upon Mr. Alberg obtaining a divorce for his 
client and obtaining a judgment from the Court upon 
which he then could collect and receive 1/3 of the 
proceeds as his fees. This was not a post-divorce 
contract wherein Mr. Alberg would receive 1/3. This 
type of contract in a divorce action violates public policy 
established in Kansas and is non-compensable. 
 
c. 
Therefore, the attorney-client fee arrangement is 
unenforceable by Mr. Alberg and therefore the Court 
hereby extinguishes his attorney fee lien. Furthermore, 
10 
 
the Court hereby sets aside any previous award of 
attorney fees in favor of Mr. Alberg and based upon the 
findings and Order of the Court on this issue, finds that 
adjudication of Mr. Alberg's attorney fees lien is now 
moot and unnecessary as it is dismissed; and 
 
d. 
The Court by certified copy of this Journal Entry does 
hereby give notice to the Office of the Disciplinary 
Administrator of the Findings and Order of the Court.' 
 
 
"29. 
Thereafter, the Respondent asked the Court to reconsider its ruling. The 
Court declined. As a result, the Respondent appealed the decision to the Kansas Court of 
Appeals. 
 
 
"30. 
The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court, stating: 
 
 
'In sum, we must accept the district court's factual finding that 
Alberg entered into a contingent-fee agreement in [K.J.]'s divorce case. 
Because Alberg entered into an agreement that is void as against clearly 
established Kansas public policy, Alberg may not recover any fee for his 
work in the case. We therefore affirm the district court's judgment.' 
 
"Criminal Convictions 
 
 
"31. 
On May 20, 2010, the County Attorney of Miami County, Kansas, 
charged the Respondent in a three-count complaint with cultivation of marijuana, a level 
3 nonperson drug felony, possession of marijuana, a class A nonperson misdemeanor, 
and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A nonperson misdemeanor. 
 
 
"32. 
The Respondent entered into plea negotiations with the County Attorney. 
As a result of the negotiations, the Respondent entered a plea of guilty to possession of 
marijuana, a class A nonperson misdemeanor and possession of drug paraphernalia, a 
class A nonperson misdemeanor. In return, the County Attorney dismissed the felony 
charge. 
11 
 
 
 
"33. 
The Court sentenced the Respondent to a jail term of one year but 
suspended the imposition of the sentence and placed the Respondent on supervised 
probation for one year. Additionally, the Court ordered the Respondent to pay court costs 
and fees. 
  
 
"34. 
The Respondent successfully completed the terms and conditions of 
probation. According to the Respondent, he has not used marijuana since his arrest. 
 
"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
 
 
"35. 
Based upon the findings of fact, the Hearing Panel concludes as a matter 
of law that the Respondent violated KRPC 1.5, KRPC, 1.7, KRPC 1.8, KRPC 1.15, 
KRPC 3.3, and KRPC 8.4, as detailed below. 
 
 
"36. 
Attorneys may charge contingent fees in certain cases. However, 
 
 
'A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or 
collect . . . [a]ny fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or 
amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the 
amount of alimony, support, or property settlement.' KRPC 1.5(f)(1). 
 
In representing K.J., the Respondent entered into a fee agreement in a domestic relations 
case which was contingent upon the [sic] securing a divorce and property settlement, in 
violation of KRPC 1.5(f)(1). Thus, the Hearing Panel concludes that the Respondent 
violated KRPC 1.5(f)(1). 
 
 
"37. 
KRPC 1.7 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
 
 
'(a) 
Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not 
represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of 
interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: 
 
 
. . . . 
12 
 
 
(2) 
there is a substantial risk that the representation of one or 
more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's 
responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person 
or by a personal interest of the lawyer.' 
 
This subsection has been interpreted to prohibit sexual relations between attorneys and 
clients. In re Berg, 264 Kan. 254, 955 P.3d 1240 (1998). 
 
 
"38. 
The same day the Respondent re-formed his attorney-client relationship 
with T.G., he began a personal and sexual relationship with T.G. The Respondent's 
personal interest in the personal and sexual relationship with T.G. created a substantial 
risk that the Respondent's representation of T.G. would be materially limited. 
Accordingly, the Hearing Panel concludes that the Respondent violated KRPC 1.7(a)(2). 
 
 
"39. 
On July 1, 2007, KRPC 1.8(k) became effective. That subsection 
provides:  '[a] lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a client unless a consensual 
sexual relationship existed between them when the client-lawyer relationship 
commenced.' The Respondent's sexual relationship with T.G. began in April 2007, 
following their lunch meeting and continued well after July 1, 2007. The sexual 
relationship did not exist until after the attorney-client relationship was re-formed. As 
such, the Hearing Panel concludes that the Respondent also violated KRPC 1.8(k) by 
engaging in a sexual relationship with a client. 
 
 
"40. 
Lawyers must deal properly with clients' property. KRPC 1.15 provides 
the requirement in this regard. 
 
 
"41. 
Specifically, KRPC 1.15(a) requires lawyers to refrain from 
commingling their property with their clients' property: 
 
 
'A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in 
a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from 
the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account 
maintained in the state of Kansas. Other property shall be identified as 
13 
 
such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account 
funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be 
preserved for a period of five years after termination of the 
representation.' 
 
In this case, the Respondent violated KRPC 1.15(a) when he converted T.G.'s property to 
his own and when he commingled his property with T.G.'s property. The Respondent 
took funds from his client trust account—money belonging to his client—and put those 
funds into his operating account to make payroll. Therefore, the Hearing Panel concludes 
that the Respondent violated KRPC 1.15(a) by converting his clients property and by 
commingling client property with his own property. 
 
 
"42. 
KRPC 1.15(b) and KRPC 1.15(d)(2)(iii) require attorneys to provide an 
accounting of property which a client is entitled to receive, as follows: 
 
 
'(b) 
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client 
or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client 
or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by 
law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to 
the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or 
third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third 
person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
'(d) 
Preserving identity of funds and property of a client. 
 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
(2) 
The lawyer shall:  
 
 
 
. . . . 
 
14 
 
(iii) 
Maintain complete records of all 
funds, securities, and other properties of 
a client coming into the possession of 
the lawyer and render appropriate 
accountings to the client regarding 
them.' 
 
The Respondent violated KRPC 1.15(b) and KRPC 1.15(d)(2)(iii) when the Respondent 
repeatedly failed to provide T.G. with an accounting of the $47,516 which the 
Respondent held in his client trust account. As such, the Hearing Panel concludes that the 
Respondent violated KRPC 1.15(b) and KRPC 1.15(d)(2)(iii). 
 
 
"43. 
KRPC 3.3(a)(1) provides that '[a] lawyer shall not knowingly make a 
false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal.' The Respondent provided false 
information to the Court when he provided the Court with the billing statement that 
contained false entries. Because the Respondent provided false information to the Court, 
the Hearing Panel concludes that the Respondent violated KRPC 3.3(a)(1). 
 
 
"44. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . commit a criminal act 
that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in 
other respects.' KRPC 8.4(b). In this case, the Respondent was charged with marijuana 
cultivation, a felony, possession of marijuana, a misdemeanor, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a misdemeanor. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Respondent entered a 
plea of guilty to possession of marijuana and possession of paraphernalia. Based upon the 
Respondent's convictions, the Hearing Panel concludes that the Respondent committed 
criminal acts and those criminal acts reflect directly on the Respondent's fitness as a 
lawyer in other respects, in violation of KRPC 8.4(b). 
 
"AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 
"STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 
 
 
"45. 
In making this recommendation for discipline, the Hearing Panel 
considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors 
15 
 
to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual 
injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating 
factors. 
 
 
"46. 
Duty Violated.  The Respondent violated his duty to his client to properly 
safeguard his client's property. Further, the Respondent violated his duty to the public, to 
the legal system, and to the legal profession to maintain his personal integrity. 
 
 
"47. 
Mental State.  The Respondent knowingly violated his duties. 
 
 
"48. 
Injury.  As a result of the Respondent's misconduct, the Respondent 
caused actual injury to his clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession. 
 
 
"49. 
Aggravating or Mitigating Factors.  Aggravating circumstances are any 
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be 
imposed. In reaching its recommendation for discipline, the Hearing Panel, in this case, 
found the following aggravating factors present: 
 
 
"50. 
Dishonest or Selfish Motive.  The Respondent's misconduct was 
motivated by dishonesty and selfishness. The Respondent provided false information to 
the Court in his billing statement. Accordingly, the Hearing Panel concluded that the 
Respondent's misconduct was motivated by dishonesty. 
 
 
"51. 
A Pattern of Misconduct.  The Respondent engaged in a pattern of 
misconduct. Over time, he repeatedly borrowed money from his client. Further, he 
repeatedly failed to provide a proper accounting. Finally, the Respondent engaged in a 
sexual relationship with his client over an extended period of time. 
 
 
"52. 
Multiple Offenses.  The Respondent committed multiple offenses. The 
Respondent violated KRPC 1.5, KRPC 1.7, KRPC 1.8, KRPC 1.15, KRPC 3.3, and 
KRPC 8.4. 
 
16 
 
 
"53. 
Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law.  The Kansas Supreme 
Court admitted the Respondent to the practice of law in 1980. The Respondent has 
substantial experience in the practice of law. 
 
 
"54. 
Illegal Conduct, Including that Involving the Use of Controlled 
Substances.  The Respondent engaged in illegal conduct. As a result of his misconduct, 
he was convicted of possession of marijuana and possession of paraphernalia. As such, 
the Respondent engaged in illegal conduct. 
 
 
"55. 
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the Hearing Panel, in this case, found the following 
mitigating circumstances present: 
 
 
"5[6]. Absence of a Prior Disciplinary Record.  The Respondent has not 
previously been disciplined. 
 
 
"57. 
The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by His or Her 
Cooperation During the Hearing and His or Her Full and Free Acknowledgment of the 
Transgressions.  At the hearing, the Respondent admitted much of his misconduct. 
 
 
"58. 
Imposition of Other Penalties or Sanctions.  As a result of the 
Respondent's criminal convictions, he was placed on probation and successfully 
completed the terms and conditions of his probation. 
 
 
"59. 
In addition to the above-cited factors, the Hearing Panel has thoroughly 
examined and considered the following Standards: 
 
'4.12 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a 
lawyer knows or should know that he is dealing 
improperly with client property and causes 
injury or potential injury to a client. 
 
17 
 
'4.32 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a 
lawyer knows of a conflict of interest and does 
not fully disclose to a client the possible effect 
of that conflict, and causes injury or potential 
injury to a client. 
 
'6.11 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a 
lawyer, with the intent to deceive the court, 
makes a false statement, submits a false 
document, or improperly withholds material 
information, and causes serious or potentially 
serious injury to a party, or causes a significant 
or potentially significant adverse effect on the 
legal proceeding.' 
 
"RECOMMENDATION 
 
 
"60. 
The Disciplinary Administrator recommended that the Respondent be 
disbarred. Counsel for the Respondent recommended that the Respondent be censured 
and that the censure be published in the Kansas Reports. 
 
 
"61. 
Based upon the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the Standards 
listed above, the Hearing Panel unanimously recommends that the Respondent be 
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years. At the time of his 
reinstatement, the Respondent should be required to provide evidence from his treatment 
provider that he is currently mentally and emotionally fit to practice law. While the 
Hearing Panel is recommending that the Respondent provide evidence of current fitness 
prior to reinstatement, the Hearing Panel is not recommending that the Respondent be 
required to undergo [a] reinstatement hearing. 
 
 
"62. 
Costs are assessed against the Respondent in an amount to be certified by 
the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator. 
 
 
18 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the findings of the 
disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the parties and determines whether violations of 
KRPC exist and, if they do, the discipline to be imposed. Attorney misconduct must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 258 P.3d 
375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 350). Clear and 
convincing evidence is "'evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that "the truth of 
the facts asserted is highly probable."'" In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 610 
(2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 [2008]).  
 
The respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint, to which he 
filed an answer, and adequate notice of both the hearing before the panel and the hearing 
before this court. The respondent filed no exceptions to the hearing panel's final hearing 
report. As such, the findings of fact are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule 212(c), (d) 
(2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 368). Those admitted facts support the hearing panel's 
conclusions of law, and we therefore adopt the panel's findings and conclusions. Thus, 
the only issue before us is the appropriate discipline. 
 
The hearing panel recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice 
of law for a period of 2 years and that before reinstatement, he be required to provide 
evidence from his treatment provider that he is currently mentally and emotionally fit to 
practice law. At the hearing before this court, at which the respondent appeared, the 
office of the Disciplinary Administrator recommended that respondent be disbarred from 
the practice of law. Respondent recommended that he be censured with such censure 
published in the Kansas Reports.  
 
"The recommendation of the panel or the Disciplinary Administrator as to 
sanctions to be imposed shall be advisory only and shall not prevent the Court from 
19 
 
imposing sanctions greater or lesser than those recommended by the panel or the 
Disciplinary Administrator." Supreme Court Rule 212(f) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 370). 
 
 
Here, the respondent's violations are significant, repeated, and numerous, 
and include entering into a contingent fee agreement in a domestic relations case 
in violation of KRPC 1.5(f)(1) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 492); engaging in a 
sexual relationship with a client in violation of KRPC 1.8(k) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. 
Annot. 516) thereby creating a substantial risk that representation of the client 
would be materially limited in violation of KRPC 1.7(a)(2) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. 
Annot. 506); converting and commingling client property in violation of KRPC 
1.15(a); repeatedly failing to provide an accounting of client's funds held in 
respondent's client trust account in violation of KRPC 1.15(b) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. 
Annot. 541) and KRPC 1.15(d)(2)(iii); providing the court with a billing statement 
containing numerous false entries in violation of KRPC 3.3(a)(1) (2012 Kan. Ct. 
R. Annot. 582); and committing criminal acts reflecting directly on the 
respondent's fitness as a lawyer in other respects in violation of KRPC 8.4(b) 
(2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 643). 
 
 
At oral argument in this case, respondent demonstrated no real perception 
of the significance of his numerous violations of the rules of professional conduct. 
Nor did he fully accept responsibility for his violations, instead describing himself 
as "a white knight" who allowed himself to be led by his heart. Respondent's 
inability to understand or take responsibility for the nature and breadth of his 
professional misconduct underscores the significance of the misconduct and 
engenders our decision that disbarment from the practice of law is the appropriate 
sanction. However, a minority of the court would impose discipline short of 
disbarment. 
 
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CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Steven C. Alberg be disbarred from the practice of 
law in the state of Kansas, effective on the filing of this opinion, in accordance with 
Supreme Court Rule 203(a)(1) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 294). 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent shall comply with Supreme Court 
Rule 218 (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 397), as amended December 1, 2012. 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to the 
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas reports.