Case Title: State v. Lipka

Citation: 174 Vt. 377, 817 A.2d 27

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2002-11-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Lipka (99-466); 174 Vt. 377; 817 A.2d 27

[Filed 01-Nov-2002]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 99-466


  State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

  Bernard R. Lipka	                         November Term, 2000


  Brian L. Burgess, J.
      
  William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant
    Attorney General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Robert Appel, Defender General, and Anna Saxman, Appellate Attorney,
    Montpelier, for  Defendant-Appellant.


  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.


       DOOLEY, J.   Defendant Bernard Lipka appeals from a judgment of
  conviction, based on a jury verdict, of two counts of sexual assault of a
  minor in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 3252(a)(3), and one count of lewd and
  lascivious conduct with a child in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 2602. 
  Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error by: (1)
  granting a special seating arrangement for a child witness in violation of
  defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation; (2) admitting evidence
  of prior sexual misconduct; and 3) refusing to admit the videotape of
  defendant's police interview.  We agree with defendant's first claim of
  error and find that the error was not harmless. We also agree that the
  evidence of prior sexual misconduct was not admissible on the grounds
  asserted by the State.  Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
   
 

       The sequence of events in the investigation and trial was as follows:
  Defendant and J.C. became lovers in the early fall of 1997.  J.C. lived in
  an apartment in Burlington with her twin daughters, M.C. and K.C., who were
  seven years old at the time.  When an apartment below J.C.'s became vacant
  later in the fall, defendant rented it.  The girls were sometimes permitted
  to visit defendant in his apartment, and defendant would occasionally
  babysit for them.

       On Halloween night 1997, J.C. refused to allow M.C. to go
  trick-or-treating because she had gone to a friend's house after school
  without permission.  Defendant offered to watch M.C. while J.C. took her
  other daughter trick-or-treating.  J.C. testified that the next day, while
  in defendant's car, she "heard the girls talking . . . about a shower." 
  When questioned, M.C. told her mother that she had taken a shower with
  defendant.  M.C. said there had been no inappropriate touching - she washed
  defendant's back and he washed hers.  J.C. asked defendant about the
  incident that evening.  According to J.C., defendant claimed that he and
  M.C. may have passed each other while he was getting into the shower and
  M.C. was getting out, or vice versa, but that they had not actually
  showered together.

       Following this conversation, J.C. did not permit defendant to be alone
  with her children.  She stopped seeing defendant romantically several days
  after New Year's Eve 1998.  The following July, J.C. heard one of her
  daughters make a comment about "sucking on private parts."  Describing
  herself as "stunned," she talked with M.C. alone.  As J.C. recalled, "I let
  her know that she wasn't in trouble. . . .  And she reluctantly told me
  that they were talking about sucking on [defendant's] private parts.  That
  this was something that had happened."
   
       A few days later, according to J.C., M.C. further revealed that sexual
  contact had occurred between her and defendant on a number of occasions,
  and that she and defendant "had taken pictures of their private parts." 
  M.C. told her mother that these events had occurred "when she was supposed

 

  to be at the Boys & Girls Club."  J.C. called the police to report the
  allegations of sexual misconduct.  As a result, M.C. was interviewed at an
  office of the Department of Social and Rehabilitative Services (SRS) by an
  SRS worker and a policeman, at which time she described her sexual activity
  with defendant. (FN1) 

       M.C. stated in the interview that between the time defendant moved
  into his apartment and July of 1998, she sucked on defendant's penis five
  or six times, he placed his fingers in her vagina many times and she rubbed
  his penis with her hands more than ten times, possibly as many as seventy
  times.  M.C. described an incident in which she and defendant showered
  together: First, she played with defendant's penis outside the shower. 
  Then, she entered the shower while defendant was in it waiting for her. 
  They soaped each other, and she again played with his penis.  M.C. also
  recalled one occasion on which she and defendant took nude photographs of
  each other in defendant's laundry room.  She stated that the photograph she
  took of defendant did not come out.  M.C. also stated that she and
  defendant had touched each other's private parts while they were lying on a
  couch in her apartment with a blanket covering them, while her mother and
  sister were in another room.
                       
       Defendant was later questioned by three police detectives, including
  the officer who interviewed M.C.  They talked for approximately one hour in
  the detectives' vehicle.  The detectives recorded the conversation without
  defendant's knowledge.  The officer who interviewed M.C.  testified that
  defendant denied having oral sex with M.C., but admitted that it was
  possible that M.C.'s hand had accidentally touched his penis while she was
  getting into his shower and he was getting out.  Defendant also told the
  detectives that he had gone to the store with M.C. to buy her 

 

  candy "before we took the shower."  Defendant described another incident in
  which he was playing with the girls when they allegedly pulled down his
  pants and M.C. reached up and grabbed his penis. (FN2)  Defendant denied
  that he and M.C. had taken photographs of each other.  A search warrant
  executed that same day resulted in the discovery of an under-exposed
  Polaroid photograph depicting a man wearing camouflaged pants, such as
  those habitually worn by defendant, displaying his erect penis. (FN3)

       The State charged defendant with three counts of sexual misconduct,
  all involving M.C. and all involving conduct occurring between September
  1997 and June 1998.  The first two counts charged defendant with child
  sexual abuse, a crime for which the maximum punishment is life in prison,
  for (1) inserting his fingers in the vagina of M.C., and (2) bringing his
  penis in contact with the mouth of M.C.  The third count charged him with
  lewd conduct with a child by having contact between the hand of M.C. and
  the penis of defendant.  Although this charge also involved a felony, the
  maximum punishment was only five years in prison, far less than that of the
  first two charges.

       The State moved to introduce evidence of uncharged sexual conduct with
  M.C. over the expanded time frame.  The trial court granted the State's
  motion, finding that the prior bad act evidence was "admissible to show the
  'situational context' for the abuse of M.C. by her mother's boyfriend."
   
       The State also moved to admit evidence that defendant had similar
  sexual contact with his six-year-old daughter, R.L., and a third victim,
  A.G., the seven-year-old daughter of another 

 

  girlfriend. (FN4)   The court granted the motion in a written order,
  finding that the evidence of defendant's prior bad acts was "clearly
  relevant to the State's theory of the case, not only to show absence of
  mistake, intent and motive, but also to demonstrate opportunity to commit
  the offenses."  The court noted that when interviewed by the police,
  defendant "suggested that there might have been accidental sexual contact
  between [him] and M.C. during a shower incident."  Hence, the court found
  that the prior bad act evidence was "directly related to a disputed issue
  in the case" and "clearly bears on Defendant's claims of accident or
  mistake."  Additionally, the court found that "[t]he repetitive series of
  sexual abuse of young girls in the same or similar settings shows a common
  scheme or plan by Defendant and therefore is highly probative as to his
  intent to commit the acts alleged."

       The evidence consisted of the testimony of six persons: the officer
  who interviewed M.C., J.C., defendant, R.L., R.L.'s mother (defendant's
  ex-wife) and defendant's father.  M.C. testified by video deposition, and a
  videotape of her statement to the police officer and the SRS worker was
  also admitted.  The remaining exhibits consisted of the Polaroid camera, a
  film box, the Polaroid photo described above, camouflaged pants, and the
  search warrant under which the pants were obtained.  M.C.'s description of
  the incidents alleged in the charge was graphic and largely consistent with
  her earlier statement.
   
       Defendant testified at trial.  He denied all of the sexual acts
  alleged by M.C.  He did not claim accident or lack of intent as a defense. 
  He did admit the contact as he left the shower on Halloween, but his
  description of the shower incident was not remotely similar to the incident
  described by M.C.  Neither in his opening nor in his closing did
  defendant's counsel argue that defendant committed any 

 

  of the acts alleged but did not have the criminal intent.  Nothing in his
  examination or cross-examination of witnesses supported such a claim.

       Over objection, R.L. testified at trial.  She described an incident
  that occurred in her paternal grandparents' home about eighteen months
  before the charged offenses in which defendant touched her vagina while
  they were watching television with R.L.'s older brother.  The court later
  instructed the jury that R.L.'s testimony, if believed, was to be
  considered "for a limited purpose only . . . that defendant is capable of
  taking the chance of having a lewd contact with a child in the presence of
  another person . . . [or] in determining whether any contact between the
  Defendant's penis and [M.C.'s] hand was accidental or intentional on
  Defendant's part."  In connection with R.L.'s testimony, her mother,
  defendant's former wife, testified that she learned about the incident when
  R.L. disclosed it at the day care center, that the incident brought her in
  contact with the police, and that, since the incident, defendant has had no
  visitation with his daughter.  Also, defendant's father testified that he
  was in the room when the alleged touching occurred and did not see it
  happen.

       The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts.  Defendant's motion
  for new trial was denied.  This appeal followed.

                                     I.

                                     A.

       Defendant first contends that his Sixth Amendment right to
  confrontation was violated by a special seating arrangement at trial in
  which R.L. was seated facing away from defendant during her testimony.  We
  discuss this issue briefly because the State has essentially conceded it,
  briefing and arguing instead that the error was harmless.
   
       The trial court granted the State's pretrial motion for the special
  seating arrangement, noting that R.L. was nine years old, and that she had
  not seen defendant since disclosing that he had 

 

  inappropriately touched her two years earlier.  As described by defense
  counsel in noting his objection, R.L. sat at a table placed in front of the
  jury with her back to defendant.  The prosecutor sat at the table facing
  R.L. during questioning.  Defense counsel was offered the same opportunity
  to sit facing R.L., but chose not to cross-examine her.

       Prior to R.L.'s testimony, the court instructed the jury that the
  special seating arrangement had been made "because it's a child and we feel
  the child would be more at ease if she's sitting [in] this kind of
  configuration rather than sitting on the witness stand."

       The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that the
  Confrontation Clause "guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with
  witnesses appearing before the trier of fact," Coy v. Iowa,