Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Maignan

Citation: 402 Md. 39

Docket Number: 13ag/06

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2007-11-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Peter R. Maignan, Misc. Docket AG
Nos. 13 and 64, September Term 2006.  Opinion by Wilner, J.
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE: UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY THE COURT,  
(1) AN ORDER DISBARRING OR SUSPENDING A LAWYER TAKES EFFECT ON
THE DATE OF THE ORDER, AND (2) THE LAWYER MAY NOT THEREAFTER
CONTINUE TO REPRESENT A CLIENT.  MD. RULE 16-760(C)(2), REQUIRING
THE LAWYER TO TAKE ACTION NECESSARY TO PROTECT CURRENT
CLIENTS, DOES NOT PERMIT THE LAWYER TO APPEAR IN COURT FOR THE
CLIENT.  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 13
September Term, 2006
_______________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
PETER R. MAIGNAN
_______________________________________
Misc. Docket AG No. 64 
September Term, 2006
_______________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
PETER R. MAIGNAN
_______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, Specially           
        Assigned),
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired, Specially            
        Assigned),
JJ.
_______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
_______________________________________
                                 Filed: November 8, 2007
1 The petition in No. 13 included a third complaint, initiated by Bar Counsel.  That
complaint was subsequently abandoned.
Before us are two petitions for disciplinary or remedial action filed by Bar
Counsel, on behalf of the Attorney Grievance Commission, against respondent, Peter
Richard Maignan.  Although the petitions were filed separately, involve different matters,
and were referred to different judges for hearing, upon receipt of the findings and
conclusions of the hearing judges, we consolidated the petitions and shall deal with them
in this one Opinion.  As a backdrop, we note that Maignan is currently on an indefinite
suspension as the result of a trust account violation.  See Attorney Grievance v. Maignan,
390 Md. 287, 888 A.2d 344 (2005).
NO. 13 (FULLER AND THOMAS)
The petition in No. 13, which involves complaints by Morris Fuller and Monica
and Benny Thomas, was filed in May, 2006.1  In accordance with Maryland Rule 16-752,
we referred the petition to Judge Dwight D. Jackson, of the Circuit Court for Prince
George’s County, who conducted a hearing in October, 2006, and presented us his
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Unfortunately, the testimony of Monica Thomas
was not recorded, and, on Bar Counsel’s motion, we remanded the petition to Judge
Jackson, who conducted a further evidentiary hearing in June, 2007, and filed a revised
statement of his findings and conclusions.
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Morris Fuller
Bar Counsel’s petition with respect to Fuller alleges that, in December, 2003,
Morris Fuller retained Maignan and his firm to collect a $28,502 judgment that Fuller had
obtained against Bryant Enterprises, Inc., a defunct corporation.  Fuller paid Maignan an
initial retainer of $2,000 and made a subsequent payment of $2,700.  Bar Counsel averred
that Maignan charged an unreasonable fee, including a charge of $62 for preparing the
retainer agreement, that he or his associate filed frivolous motions and defective
pleadings, that he failed to supervise lawyer and non-lawyer employees, and that he failed
to return unearned fees to Fuller.  
On those allegations, Bar Counsel charged Maignan with violations of Maryland
Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 1.1 (Competent representation), 1.3 (Diligence),
1.5(a) (Reasonable fee), 1.16(d) (Refund unearned fees), 3.1 (Frivolous proceeding), 5.1
(Assuring professional conduct by lawyer-employees), 5.3(a) and (c) (Assuring
professional conduct by non-lawyer employees), 8.4(a) (Violating other MRPC), and
8.4(d) (Conduct prejudicial to administration of justice).
After hearing evidence, Judge Jackson found that Bar Counsel had failed to prove
any of the charges.  He noted that Fuller had the assistance of another attorney in
obtaining the judgment and that the other attorney, prior to her dismissal, had filed and
served on the debtor interrogatories in aid of execution.  When the interrogatories were
not answered, Maignan filed a motion for contempt and for a writ of execution.  The
2 Evidence was presented that Fuller had already received a payment of $7,500 on
the judgment.
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motion for contempt was never ruled on; the writ of execution was denied.  At some point
thereafter, Fuller and John Bryant, a principal in the defunct corporation, agreed to settle
the judgment for $10,000.2 A note evidencing that debt was prepared by someone, Bryant
made an advance payment of $3,500, and Maignan was instructed by Fuller to draft an
agreement memorializing the settlement.  At a meeting held in Maignan’s office on April
10, 2004, Bryant tendered a check for the $6,500 balance, but Fuller declined to accept
the money, repudiated the settlement, and told Maignan that he wanted full payment.  
Maignan informed Fuller that he did not wish to represent him further, and he
instructed an associate who had been working on the matter to cease doing any more
work for Fuller.  Despite that instruction and without Maignan’s knowledge, the associate
filed additional motions for oral examination, which were not granted.  When Maignan
learned of her conduct, he discharged her.  Fuller was not charged for her work in
connection with those motions.  Bar Counsel has filed no exceptions to Judge Jackson’s
findings and conclusions in the Fuller matter, and, given the record before us, we shall
dismiss that part of the petition.
Monica and Benny Thomas
Bar Counsel alleged that Maignan had represented Monica and Benny Thomas in
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connection with a case in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County and that he agreed
to represent the Thomases in an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  Maignan was
paid $110 and an appeal was noted in September, 2002.  Maignan failed to file an
Information Report, as required by Maryland Rule 8-205, however, and, on or about
October 25, 2002, the appeal was dismissed.  Bar Counsel contended that notice of the
order of dismissal and the ultimate mandate were “forwarded” to Maignan and that
Maignan failed to disclose the dismissal to the Thomases.
In July, 2003, according to Bar Counsel, Maignan advised Mr. Thomas that, to
continue with the appeal, Thomas would have to pay $3,500 plus $1,000 on an
outstanding balance.  In August, 2003, the Thomases paid Maignan $3,000 to pursue the
appeal.  In October and November, a non-lawyer employee, Erica Gayle, prepared a brief
to be filed in the appeal, for which the Thomases were charged $100/hour.  On November
24, 2003, Maignan informed the Thomases that he was ceasing work on the appeal
because of their failure to tender payment on overdue invoices.
Complaining that Maignan had inappropriately charged the Thomases for work on
an appeal that had already been dismissed, refused to refund the moneys paid by them,
and failed to supervise Ms. Gayle, Bar Counsel charged Maignan with violations of
MRPC 1.1 (Competent representation), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4 (a) and (b) (Keeping client
informed), 1.5 (Reasonable fee), 1.16(d) (Returning unearned fee), 5.1 (Assuring
professional conduct by lawyer-employees), 5.3 (Assuring professional conduct by non-
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lawyer employees), 8.4(a) (Violating other MRPC), 8.4(c) (Dishonest conduct), and
8.4(d) (Conduct prejudicial to administration of justice).
After hearing evidence from the Thomases and Maignan, Judge Jackson
determined, as he had with respect to the Fuller complaint, that Bar Counsel had failed to
prove any of the alleged violations.  He found that, in March, 2002, the Thomases
retained Maignan to represent them in a lawsuit pending in the Circuit Court for Prince
George’s County against Mercedes Benz Credit Corporation and other entities.  In
September, 2002, the action was dismissed, and Maignan, on behalf of the Thomases,
filed a notice of appeal, for which he was paid or reimbursed $110.  The retainer
agreement that the parties had did not include the appeal, and, when Maignan advised that
he would not continue with the appeal unless the balance then due him was paid, Ms.
Thomas informed Maignan that the Thomases would be handling the appeal pro se. 
Judge Jackson made no finding as to when that conversation took place.  Although
neither of the Thomases was a lawyer, Ms. Thomas had worked in some capacity for the
U.S. Department of Justice and one or both of them had litigated pro se in the past.  
It appears that neither Maignan nor the Thomases ever filed an Information Report
with the Court of Special Appeals, which is required in civil cases by Maryland Rule 8-
205.  As a result, the appellate court, on October 25, 2002, dismissed the appeal.  The
mandate reflecting that dismissal was issued a month later, on November 25.  Although
Maignan’s name appears on both the notice of dismissal and the mandate, Maignan
3 At oral argument before us, Maignan’s attorney, when questioned about this,
indicated that Maignan had moved his office.
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denied receiving those documents, and Judge Jackson noted that “there was no evidence
that the Respondent received the documents...” 3  Maignan, it thus appears, was unaware
at the time that the appeal had been dismissed.
In July, 2003, the Thomases advised Maignan that the appeal was ongoing and that
their brief was due on September 1.  Maignan agreed to prepare the brief if the Thomases
paid (1) money owed for the Circuit Court case, (2) money owed for his representation of
the Thomases’ son in a different matter, and (3) a retainer for writing the appellate brief. 
In August, the Thomases paid Maignan $3,000, of which $1,000 was allocated to
preparation of the brief, and advised that the time for filing the brief had been extended to
December.  Maignan testified that he prepared a brief, had it printed, and sent a copy to
Mr. Thomas, but at some point noticed that it had no case number, and that, when he
called the Clerk of the Court of Special Appeals to get the case number, he was informed
that the appeal had been dismissed.  He relayed that information to Ms. Thomas, who
denied that the appeal had been dismissed.  Maignan did no further work and billed
nothing more than the $1,000 paid in August.
Upon these findings, Judge Jackson concluded that Maignan had never actually
represented the Thomases in the appeal, and, for that reason, had not committed any of
the violations alleged by Bar Counsel.  He stated:
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“An attorney has a duty to keep himself informed as to the
status of a case, but in the instant case Respondent did not
represent the Thomases on the appeal of the Mercedes Benz
matter since they initially elected to pursue the appeal in
proper person.  The Respondent reasonably relied upon the
representations of the Thomases that they were actively
pursuing the appeal because he thought he was preparing an
appellate brief due initially on September 1, 2003 and
extended until December 2003.  The Respondent believed he
could rely upon the representations made by the Thomases
since they were active litigators with a history of pro se
filings.  This Court recommends these charges be dismissed
and no disciplinary violations found.”
Bar Counsel excepts to Judge Jackson’s failure to find any violations.  He
complains that the Judge “relied exclusively on the testimony of the Respondent and gave
no credence to the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Thomas nor to the documentary evidence
presented.”  The short answer to Bar Counsel’s complaint is that Judge Jackson had every
right to make that kind of credibility determination.  Paraphrasing what we said recently
in Attorney Grievance v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50, 891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (2006), we accept
a hearing judge’s findings of fact unless we determine that they are clearly erroneous,
precisely because he or she is in the best position to assess the demeanor-based credibility
of the witnesses.  
Some of the evidence was in dispute – the stories told by Maignan and the
Thomases differed in some respects.  Judge Jackson had the opportunity to evaluate their
credibility, and we have no occasion, on this record, to second-guess that evaluation. 
Judge Jackson could find that, although Maignan actually filed the notice of appeal, he
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properly relied on the Thomases’ statement that they would thereafter handle the appeal
pro se, that he never did receive notice of the dismissal, that, when asked and paid to do
so, he prepared a brief, but that he ceased work when advised by the Court of Special
Appeals that the appeal had been dismissed.  Upon those findings, the judge could
properly conclude that Bar Counsel had failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence,
the alleged violations.  We shall therefore overrule Bar Counsel’s exceptions and dismiss
that aspect of the petition as well.
NO. 64 (BAR COUNSEL AND CLARK)
The petition in No. 64 presented two complaints, one directly by Bar Counsel and
one by Joann Clark.  It was filed in January, 2007, and was referred to Judge Albert W.
Northrop, of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, to conduct a hearing and
present us with his findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Bar Counsel’s Complaint
On December 14, 2005, Maignan entered his appearance in the Circuit Court for
Prince George’s County on behalf of Mark Fleming, who was charged with burglary and
other property offenses.  A week later, on December 22, 2005, this Court entered an order
indefinitely suspending M aignan from the practice of law.  See Attorney Grievance v.
Maignan, supra, 390 Md. 287, 888 A.2d 344.  Bar Counsel alleged that, on December 30,
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Maignan appeared at a motions hearing in the Fleming case before Judge Richard
Sothoron, that he represented to the judge that, despite his suspension, he was authorized
to appear for Fleming on that date and falsely stated that he could continue his
representation until January 13, 2006.  On that averment, Bar Counsel charged Maignan
with violating MRPC 3.3(a)(1) (Making false statement of fact to a tribunal), 5.5(a)
(Unauthorized practice of law), 8.4(a) (Violating another MRPC), 8.4(c) (Conduct
involving misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (Conduct prejudicial to administration of
justice).  After a hearing, Judge Northrop found that, by his appearance on December 30,
while suspended, and by representing to Judge Sothoron that his representation of
Fleming could continue until January 13, Maignan had violated each of those Rules. 
Maignan has filed exceptions to all of those conclusions, except MRPC 8.4(a).
The principal evidence of what occurred before Judge Sothoron comes from the
transcript of the December 30 proceeding, which was admitted into evidence, and from
Maignan’s testimony before Judge Northrop.  Maignan testified that Judge Sothoron,
obviously aware that Maignan had been suspended, convened a preliminary bench
conference at which the suspension order was discussed.  Maignan informed the judge
that, based on his calculations, he had fifteen days “to wrap up certain matters that had to
be wrapped up before the suspension would take into effect.”  The judge then asked when
that 15-day period would end, to which Maignan replied, either January 6 or 13.  Maignan
said that he had been on vacation when our suspension order was filed and did not learn
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of it until his return on December 27.  He apparently believed that he had a 15-day grace
period, commencing when he learned of the order on the 27th.  Judge Sothoron then left
the bench for a time, and, when he returned, told Maignan that he could proceed but
would have to let the judge know when he would be withdrawing.
None of that is recorded in the transcript of the December 30 hearing.  The
transcript begins with a brief introductory statement by the judge, noting that Maignan
had entered his appearance on December 14, that trial was scheduled for January 19, that
the motions hearing was initially set for December 23 but had to be postponed to the 30th
because the detention center had failed to transport Fleming to court.  Judge Sothoron
then asked whether the State was ready to proceed.  Complaining that, given the short
period of postponement – only a week with the intervening Christmas holiday –  the State
had been unable to notify its witnesses of the new date, the State sought another
postponement, to which Maignan objected.  
The court granted the State’s request and scheduled the matter for January 13,
2006.  The judge asked if Maignan would be able to represent Fleming.  Maignan replied,
“If I can’t, Your Honor, I will arrange.”  Judge Sothoron then advised Fleming that
Maignan would not be able to represent him at trial on January 19, and that Fleming
would need to find another lawyer.  He then asked Maignan what the last day would be
that he could represent Fleming, to which Maignan replied, “My understanding is the
13th.”  The court looked for a convenient date to hold an “attorney status inquiry,” and,
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with Maignan’s acquiescence, selected January 13.  That concluded the hearing.
Bar Counsel’s complaint and Judge Northrop’s conclusions were based on the fact
that our order of indefinite suspension took effect immediately upon entry of the order, on
December 22, 2005, and that Maignan was not authorized to practice law thereafter.  His
appearance in court before Judge Sothoron on December 30 was therefore unlawful and
his representation that he could continue to represent Fleming until January 13 was false. 
Maignan does not contest that his suspension took effect on December 22.  He argues,
however, that, under M aryland Rule 16-760(c), he had at least fifteen days from the date
of that order to conclude current client matters, which allowed him to appear at the
motions hearing on December 30.  He acknowledges that, even under his reading of Rule
16-760(c)(3), the 15-day grace period, if applicable, would expire before January 13, but
he urges that his assertion that he could continue to represent Fleming until the 13th was
an innocent mistake, not a deliberate misrepresentation.
The issue here is governed by Maryland Rule 16-760, which deals with the effect
of an order suspending or disbarring a lawyer.  Rule 16-760, which took effect July 1,
2001, replaced former Rule 16-713.  In relevant part, Rule 16-713 stated flatly that an
attorney “may not practice law after entry of an order disbarring the attorney, placing the
attorney on inactive status, or accepting the attorney’s resignation or during the period the
attorney, by order, is suspended.”  The Rule did not provide for either a delayed effect of
a disbarment or suspension order or a post-order grace period during which the attorney
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could wind up his or her practice or act to protect existing clients.  
Under Rule 16-713, the vast majority of suspension or disbarment orders entered
by consent, or to implement reciprocal discipline to that imposed in other States took
effect immediately, and they still do under Rule 16-760.  See, for example, Attorney
Griev. Comm. v. Essrick, 343 Md. 1, 680 A.2d 464 (1996); Attorney Griev. Comm. v.
Williams, 348 Md. 362, 704 A.2d 420 (1998); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Saul, 337 Md.
258, 653 A.2d 430 (1995); Attorney Grievance v. Richardson, 350 Md. 354, 712 A.2d
525 (1998); Attorney Grievance v. Evans, 394 Md. 302, 905 A.2d 384 (2006); Attorney
Grievance v. Bakare, 394 Md. 303, 905 A.2d 840 (2006).  There were, however, cases in
which suspension orders entered by consent had a delayed effective date.  See Attorney
Grievance v. Maier, 351 Md. 654, 719 A.2d 978 (1998); Attorney Grievance v. Leader,
351 Md. 655, 719 A.2d 978 (1998); Attorney Grievance v. Adams, 350 Md. 746, 715
A.2d 213 (1998).  Whether consent orders for suspension had a delay provision seemed to
depend on what was agreed to by Bar Counsel and the attorney and not on any
deliberative adjudication by the Court.
On the other hand, when a suspension or disbarment was non-consensual, involved
a lawyer actually practicing in Maryland, and was accompanied by an Opinion of the
Court, the Opinion often, though not always, provided for a 30-day delay in the order
taking effect.  See, for example, Attorney Grievance v. Brennan, 350 Md. 489, 502, 714
A.2d 157, 163 (1998); Attorney Grievance v. Ober, 350 Md. 616, 632, 714 A.2d 856, 864 
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(1998); Attorney Grievance v. Post, 350 Md. 85, 101, 710 A.2d 935, 943 (1998); Attorney
Grievance v. Cohen, 361 Md. 161, 179, 760 A.2d 706, 716 (2000); but compare Attorney
Griev. Comm. v. Milliken, 348 Md. 486, 704 A.2d 1225 (1998); Attorney Grievance v.
Middleton, 360 Md. 34, 756 A.2d 565 (2000).
In its 144th Report to the Court, filed in March, 1999, the Court’s Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure recommended a substantial revision in the
Rules governing the disciplining of lawyers for ethical violations.  See 26:9 Md. Register
677 et seq. (April 23, 1999).  Proposed Rule 16-770, intended to supplant Rule 16-713,
attempted to address some of the implementation issues arising from an order of
suspension or disbarment – issues not addressed in Rule 16-713 but sometimes dealt with
in the individual orders entered by the Court.  Section (a) of the proposed Rule provided
that an order disbarring or suspending a lawyer “may provide that the order shall become
effective immediately or on an effective date stated in the order” and that “[i]f no
effective date is stated, the order shall take effect 30 days after the date of the order.” 
That provision, the Reporter’s Note advised, was modeled after Rule 27E of the ABA
Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement and was intended to provide “a
transition period to enable the disciplined attorney to wind down his or her practice, give
notices, transfer files, and perform the other duties imposed by section (c).”  See 26:9 Md.
4 ABA Model Rule 27E provides, in relevant part, that “Orders imposing
disbarment, suspension, or transfers to disability inactive status are effective on a date
[15] days after the date of the order, except where the court finds that immediate
disbarment or suspension is necessary to protect the public.”
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Register, at 708.4  
Section (c) listed various duties that a suspended or disbarred lawyer would be
required to perform.  In part, that section was derived from ABA Model Rule 27F and G;
in part, it iterated things that this Court had occasionally required in individual suspension
or disbarment orders.  See, for example, Attorney Grievance v. Massagli, 352 Md. 277,
721 A.2d 698 (1998) and other cases cited in Reporter’s Note to proposed Rule 16-770
(26:9 Md. Register at 709).  The intent was to consolidate those “wind-up” duties in the
Rule itself, to avoid having to state them in individual orders.
The Court made substantial revisions to many of the Rules Committee’s proposals,
and, although it left most of proposed Rule 16-770 (which, as the result of other revisions,
was renumbered to Rule 16-760) intact, we made critical changes to sections (a) and
(c)(1).  Section (a) was rewritten to provide:
“Unless otherwise stated in the order, an order providing for
the disbarment, suspension, or reprimand of a respondent or
the placement of a respondent on inactive status shall take
effect immediately.  The order may provide that the
disbarment, suspension, reprimand, or placement on inactive
status be deferred for a specified period of time to allow the
respondent a reasonable opportunity to comply with the
requirements of section (c) of this Rule.”
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That, in effect, reversed the “default” provided for in the Rules Committee
proposal and in the ABA Model Rule: the order was to take effect immediately unless it
provided otherwise.  The intent was to require the Court to act affirmatively if it wanted
to delay the effect of the order.
Section (c), as recommended by the Rules Committee, directed, in relevant part,
that, unless otherwise stated in the order, a lawyer who is suspended or disbarred:
(c)(1) “shall not undertake any further legal matters or accept any new
clients” (Emphasis added),
(c)(2) “shall take any action necessary to protect current clients,”
(c)(3) “shall conclude any current client matters that can be concluded
within 15 days of the date of the order,” and
(c)(6) within 30 days after the date of the order, “shall withdraw from all
client matters.”
We left the last three of those provisions essentially intact, but we rewrote §(c)(1)
to require that the suspended or disbarred lawyer “not accept any new clients or undertake
any new or further representation of existing clients.”  (Emphasis added).  That change
was intended to make more specific the recommended prohibition against undertaking
“further legal matters,” to make clear that, unless the order provided otherwise, the
attorney could not undertake any further representation of existing clients.  Unless the
Court affirmatively chose otherwise, a suspended or disbarred lawyer simply could not
5 See Attorney Grievance v. Tayback, 378 Md. 578, 837 A.2d 158 (2003); Attorney
Grievance v. Greenberg, 378 Md. 175, 835 A.2d 1102 (2003); Attorney Grievance v.
West, 378 Md. 395, 836 A.2d 588 (2003); Attorney Grievance v. Gore, 380 Md. 455, 845
A.2d 1204 (2004); Attorney Grievance v. Velasquez, 380 Md. 651, 846 A.2d 422 (2004);
Attorney Grievance v. Brown, 380 Md. 661, 846 A.2d 428 (2004); Attorney Grievance v.
Mininsohn, 380 Md. 536, 846 A.2d 353 (2004); Attorney Grievance v. Watson, 382 Md.
465, 855 A.2d 1213 (2004); Attorney Grievance v. Rose, 383 Md. 385, 859 A.2d 659
(2004); Attorney Grievance v. Christopher, 383 Md. 624, 861 A.2d 692 (2004); Attorney
Grievance v. MacDougall, 384 Md. 271, 863 A.2d 312 (2004); Attorney Grievance v.
Duvall, 384 Md. 234, 863 A.2d 291 (2004); Attorney Grievance v. Ellison, 384 Md. 688,
867 A.2d 259 (2005); Attorney Grievance v. James, 385 Md. 637, 870 A.2d 229 (2005);
Attorney Grievance v. Brisbon, 385 Md. 667, 870 A.2d 586 (2005); Attorney Grievance v.
Zuckerman, 386 Md. 341, 872 A.2d 693 (2005); Attorney Grievance v. Mitchell, 386 Md.
386, 872 A.2d 720 (2005); Attorney Grievance v. Jordan, 386 Md. 583, 873 A.2d 1161
(2005); Attorney Grievance v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 876 A.2d 642 (2005); Attorney
Grievance v. Zakroff, 387 Md. 603, 876 A.2d 664 (2005); Attorney Grievance v. Cherry-
Mahoi, 388 Md. 124, 879 A.2d 58 (2005); Attorney Grievance v. Parker, 389 Md. 142,
884 A.2d 104 (2005); Attorney Grievance v. Kovacic, 389 Md. 233, 884 A.2d 673 (2005);
Attorney Grievance v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 891 A.2d 1085 (2006); Attorney Grievance v.
Rose, 391 Md. 101, 892 A.2d 469 (2006); Attorney Grievance v. Reinhardt, 391 Md. 209,
892 A.2d 533 (2006); Attorney Grievance v. Kapoor, 391 Md. 505, 894 A.2d 502 (2006);
Attorney Grievance v. Calhoun, 391 Md. 532, 894 A.2d 518 (2006); Attorney Grievance
v. Holt, 391 Md. 673, 894 A.2d 602 (2006); Attorney Grievance v. Guberman, 392 Md.
131, 896 A.2d 337 (2006); Attorney Grievance v. Lee, 393 Md. 385, 903 A.2d 360
(2006); Attorney Grievance v. Roberts, 394 Md. 137, 904 A.2d 557 (2006); Attorney
Grievance v. Sutton, 394 Md. 311, 906 A.2d 335 (2006); Attorney Grievance v. Butler,
395 Md. 1, 909 A.2d 226 (2006); Attorney Grievance v. Steinberg, 395 Md. 337, 910
A.2d 429 (2006); Attorney Grievance v. Sweitzer, 395 Md. 586, 911 A.2d 440 (2006);
Attorney Grievance v. Midlen, 395 Md. 628, 911 A.2d 852 (2006); Attorney Grievance v.
Hodgson, 396 Md. 1, 912 A.2d 640 (2006); Attorney Grievance v. Baker, 396 Md. 15,
912 A.2d 651 (2006); Attorney Grievance v. Ward, 396 Md. 203, 913 A.2d 41 (2006);
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continue to practice law, even for existing clients.
Since our adoption of Rule 16-760, the Court has rarely delayed the effect of
disbarment or suspension orders, even in non-consensual cases involving lawyers who
were actively practicing in Maryland, in which a full Opinion was filed.5  Only in a
Attorney Grievance v. McCulloch, 397 Md. 674, 919 A.2d 660 (2007); Attorney
Grievance v. Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. 690, 919 A.2d 669 (2007); Attorney Grievance v. Hill,
398 Md. 95, 919 A.2d 1194 (2007); Attorney Grievance v. Goff, 399 Md. 1, 922 A.2d 554
(2007); Attorney Grievance v. Wingerter, 400 Md. 214, 929 A.2d 47 (2007); Attorney
Grievance v. Floyd, 400 Md. 236, 929 A.2d 61 (2007); Attorney Grievance v. Pak, 400
Md. 567, 929 A.2d 546 (2007); Attorney Grievance v. Robertson, 400 Md. 618, 929 A.2d
576 (2007); Attorney Grievance v. Siskind, 401 Md. 41, 930 A.2d 328 (2007).
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handful of cases, mostly involving short periods of suspension, has the Court delayed the
effect of the order.  See Attorney Grievance v. Potter, 380 Md. 128, 164, 844 A.2d 367,
388 (2004); Attorney Grievance v. Kreamer, 387 Md. 503, 539, 876 A.2d 79, 100 (2005);
Attorney Grievance v. Obi, 393 Md. 643, 661, 904 A.2d 422, 432 (2006); Attorney
Grievance v. Ward, 394 Md. 1, 39, 904 A.2d 477, 500 (2006); Attorney Grievance v.
Rees, 396 Md. 248, 255, 913 A.2d 68, 72 (2006); see also Attorney Grievance v. Ficker,
399 Md. 445, 455, 924 A.2d 1105, 1111 (2007).  Maignan’s case did not fall into that
category.  As noted, the suspension was effective immediately, on December 22, 2005.
Although some of the provisions of section (c) may, at first glance, appear
inconsistent with a suspension or disbarment order that takes effect immediately, they are
not really so and can be read in harmony with section (a).  Most are basically clerical or
housekeeping in nature.  See Rule 16-760(c)(4), (5), and (7) through (12).  The only ones
at issue here are those noted above – §(c)(1), (2), (3), and (6) –  and they, too, can be read
harmoniously. 
Section (c)(1) is the critical provision: from and after the effective date of the
order, the lawyer “shall not accept any new clients or undertake any new or further
6 In situations where, based on the findings and conclusions of the hearing judge,
any exceptions thereto filed by Bar Counsel, and a recommended sanction by Bar
Counsel, suspension or disbarment may reasonably be regarded as a possible sanction if
this Court were to find a violation, attorneys would be well-advised to inform the Court of
any known or anticipated implementation issues and request consideration of some grace
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representation of existing clients.”  (Emphasis added).  There is nothing unclear about
that provision and nothing inconsistent between it and the requirement in §(c)(3) that the
attorney conclude current client matters that can be concluded within 15 days after the
date of the order, or the requirement in §(c)(6) that the attorney withdraw from all client
matters within 30 days.  Even within those times, intended to permit the attorney to do
what is necessary to sever all professional connection with his or her clients – delivery of
files, notifying judicial or other tribunals and various interested persons, withdrawing
appearances, assisting the client in finding other counsel, etc. –  the attorney may not
provide further representation for those clients.  
The one provision that needs some clarification is §(c)(2), requiring the lawyer to
“take any action necessary to protect current clients.”  That may require a very prompt
notice to the client, to adverse or other interested parties, and to tribunals in which
litigation is pending.  It may require expedited efforts to assist the client in obtaining new
counsel, and, if necessary because of a true emergency, a request of this Court to consider
a limited stay of the disbarment or suspension order. It cannot properly be read, however,
as contravening the clear prohibition in §(c)(1) against any further representation of a
client.6 
period in the event a disbarment or suspension order is entered.  That, at least, would give
the Court some basis for considering whether to delay the effective date of such an order. 
The Court is aware that, when the attorney is involved in pending litigation and has court
appearances looming, a disbarment or suspension order that takes effect immediately can
cause problems for the tribunal and for other litigants and their attorneys, and that it may
need to balance that against the basic precept that a lawyer who has been disbarred or
suspended should not be allowed to continue practicing law.  The Court has not been
inclined to weigh that balance, however, if it is unaware that it needs to do so; it is not for
the Court to have to guess at what a lawyer has pending.
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In the case at hand, Maignan should have advised the court, as soon as he learned
of the suspension, that he was not permitted to continue his representation of Fleming, on
December 30 or at any time thereafter.  His failure to do that, coupled with his appearance
on behalf of Fleming and his assertion that his representation could continue until January
13, did, indeed, constitute a violation of MRPC 3.3(a)(1), 5.5(a), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d),
and we therefore overrule his exceptions to Judge Northrop’s findings.
Complaint of Joann Clark
Bar Counsel averred that, in June, 2002, Ms. Clark retained Maignan to pursue an
employment discrimination case and that, on June 27, 2002, she paid him, in cash, a fee
of $4,000.  The retainer agreement stated that the fee would be placed in Maignan’s
escrow account and that his firm would bill against that amount.  Bar Counsel charged
that, in contravention of that agreement, Maignan did not deposit the money in his escrow
account and that he failed to maintain complete records of that money.  On those
allegations, he charged Maignan with violating MRPC 1.1 (Competent representation),
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1.15 (Safekeeping client property), 8.4(a) (Violating another MRPC), and 8.4(d)
(Conduct prejudicial to administration of justice).  Maignan claimed that he never
received the $4,000.
At the hearing before Judge Northrop, Ms. Clark testified that she was an
employee of the District of Columbia school system, that she desired to pursue a
discrimination claim against her employer, that she was referred to Maignan by her
sister’s church, that she met with him in May, 2002, that Maignan quoted a fee of about
$3,500 to handle her case, and that she then cashed in $4,000 of savings bonds from her
grandson’s college fund and paid him the proceeds in cash.  The payment was made in
May at Maignan’s office.  A few days later, she said, she received a letter from Maignan
thanking her for choosing his firm along with a retainer agreement.  In March, 2005, she
paid an additional $2,000, which Maignan admitted receiving.  
In support of her testimony regarding the $4,000, Ms. Clark produced redemption
statements from Sun Trust showing that, on May 13, 2002, U.S. Savings bonds in the face
amount of $2,900 were redeemed for an aggregate amount, including accrued interest, of
$4,103.  There was produced as well a two-page letter from Maignan, the first page
carrying a date of June 27, 2002, and the second page showing a date of March 13, 2006. 
The letter confirmed that Maignan would commence representation after receipt of the
$4,000.  Attached to the letter was a retainer agreement, dated March 13, 2006, which
also noted that Ms. Clark would pay a $4,000 retainer fee “to secure Maignan &
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Associates’ representation, for initial interview, for creating a file and for initial office
personnel work.”  The fee, it continued, would be placed in the Law Firm’s escrow
account.
Ms. Clark said that she paid the $4,000 before receiving the letter and retainer
agreement, although those documents, dated at the earliest June 27, 2002, suggest that the
fee had not yet been paid and that the representation would not commence until that was
done.  Yet among Maignan’s records was found a copy of a composite statement to Ms.
Clark, also dated March 31, 2006, showing a credit to her account of $4,000 as of June
27, 2002.  According to that statement, Maignan proceeded in July, 2002, to work on her
case.  At some point, Maignan filed a lawsuit on Ms. Clark’s behalf in the D.C. Superior
Court.  In March, 2004, the action was removed to the U.S. District Court.  By then, over
$7,000 had been charged against the $4,000.  Maignan continued with the case until his
suspension in December, 2005, by which time, even with the payment of the additional
$2,000, $20,451 was shown as due.  No records from the D.C. Superior Court are in
evidence, but docket entries from the District Court show more than modest activity prior
to the payment of the $2,000 in March, 2005, including the filing and answering of
discovery.  If, in fact, the $4,000 had not been paid, not only would the running account
kept by Maignan have been largely fictional, but he would have done a great deal of work
on Ms. Clark’s case in contravention of the assertions in his letter and retainer agreement
that representation would not commence until the $4,000 was paid.
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Maignan testified that, when he terminated his representation in December, 2005,
he sent his entire file to Ms. Clark and had nothing left.  He claimed that the letter and
retainer agreement placed in evidence were not genuine.  He said that he recreated those
documents electronically in March, 2006, which accounted for the March dates on the
letter and retainer agreement.  The statement showing the $4,000, he said, was not created
until 2003, and was an attempt to recreate what had occurred earlier based on the retainer
agreement that called for a $4,000 payment.
On this disputed evidence, Judge Northrop credited Ms. Clark’s testimony and
found as a fact that Maignan had received the $4,000 fee at the outset of the
representation.  Indeed, he declared that he “seriously questions the credibility of the
Respondent.”  The judge referred to the running balance statement and noted that
Maignan had not produced any record to contradict Ms. Clark’s testimony.  He also
noted, in response to Maignan’s claim that the retainer agreement placed into evidence
was not genuine, a letter sent by Maignan’s attorney to the D.C. Bar Counsel enclosing a
copy of the letter and retainer agreement and attesting that “there is no dispute that Mr.
Maignan was retained in this matter under the parameters of the retainer agreement.” 
Clearly, the $4,000 was never deposited in Maignan’s trust account, and, on that basis,
Judge Northrop found violations of MRPC 1.1 (failure to maintain trust funds in a trust
account constitutes incompetence), 1.15(a), 8.4(a), and 8.4(d).  
Maignan’s exceptions challenge most of the credibility-based fact-finding by
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Judge Northrop and his conclusions drawn from that fact-finding.  We overrule those
exceptions.  Judge Northrop was entitled to resolve the disputed evidence in accordance
with his assessment of the relative credibility of Ms. Clark and Maignan, which was not
favorable to Maignan.  As the judge indicated, Maignan’s version required him to
disavow his own records.
SANCTION
The violations found with respect to No. 64 are serious ones.  Given that this is the
first opportunity we have had to address the relevant implementation issues in Rule 16-
760, which is a relatively new Rule, we are inclined to be somewhat lenient with respect
to Maignan’s belief that he had some leeway in winding up his representation of Fleming,
even though we conclude that his belief was not well-founded.  Given Judge Northrop’s
findings with respect to the Clark matter, however, little leniency is warranted.  Maignan
is currently on an indefinite suspension.  We shall continue that suspension.
PETITION IN NO. 13 DISMISSED. AS TO NO. 64, IT IS
ORDERED THAT RESPONDENT BE INDEFINITELY
SUSPENDED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL
COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT,
INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS,
PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761, FOR
WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR
OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
AGAINST PETER RICHARD MAIGNAN.