Case Title: COUNTY ROAD ASSOCIATION OF MI V GOVERNOR

Citation: 

Docket Number: 125665

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2005-11-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED NOVEMBER 8, 2005 
COUNTY ROAD ASSOCIATION OF 
MICHIGAN and CHIPPEWA COUNTY 
ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees 
and 
MICHIGAN PUBLIC TRANSIT ASSOCIATION,
ANN ARBOR TRANSPORTATION 
AUTHORITY, CAPITAL AREA
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, and
SUBURBAN MOBILITY AUTHORITY FOR 
REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION, 
Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v 
 
No. 125665 
GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, DIRECTOR OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND 
BUDGET, STATE BUDGET DIRECTOR,
STATE TREASURER, DEPARTMENT OF
TREASURY, SECRETARY OF STATE, and
STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
PER CURIAM. 
 
 
 
 
This case involves the authority of the Governor, 
exercised in Executive Order No. 2001-9, to reduce the 
Legislature’s allocation of general sales taxes to the 
Comprehensive Transportation Fund (CTF) by $12,750,000 for 
the fiscal year ending September 30, 2002, and to transfer 
those revenues to the state’s general fund. 
Appellants 
claim that the general sales tax revenues allocated to the 
CTF are “constitutionally dedicated” funds within the 
meaning of Const 1963, art 9, § 9, and therefore immune to 
the Governor’s power to balance the budget, Const 1963, art 
5, § 20. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that art 9, § 9, which 
it found to be ambiguous, does not dedicate any portion of 
the 
general 
sales 
tax 
revenues 
for 
comprehensive 
transportation purposes. 
260 Mich App 299; 677 NW2d 340 
(2004). 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the 
revenues at issue are not constitutionally dedicated and 
that 
the 
Governor 
had 
the 
authority 
to 
reduce 
the 
Legislature’s allocation of general sales tax revenues to 
the CTF in EO 2001-9. 
We disagree, however, that art 9, § 
9 is ambiguous. In affirming the Court of Appeals, we rely 
on the plain meaning of the constitutional provision. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
To alleviate a budget shortfall for the fiscal year 
ending September 30, 2002, the Governor implemented 
EO 
2001-9. The order transferred $12,750,000 in general sales 
tax revenues from the CTF to the general fund. 
Plaintiffs 
sought 
and 
obtained 
a 
preliminary 
injunction from the Ingham Circuit Court to enjoin the 
transfer. Plaintiffs maintained that the general sales tax 
revenues 
allocated 
to 
the 
CTF 
were 
“constitutionally 
dedicated” within the meaning of Const 1963, art 9, § 9 and 
immune to the Governor’s power to reduce the expenditure 
and balance the budget under Const 1963, art 5, § 20. 
In 
a 
published 
decision, 
the 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
reversed. 
260 Mich App 299; 677 NW2d 340 (2004).  The 
Court of Appeals found the language of the constitutional 
provision 
ambiguous, 
and 
examined 
the 
historical 
development of art 9, § 9 in determining whether the 
allocation to the CTF was “constitutionally dedicated.” We 
granted oral argument on the application. 
471 Mich 887 
(2004). 
II. Standard of Review 
Constitutional issues are reviewed de novo. 
Wayne Co 
v Hathcock, 471 Mich 445, 455; 684 NW2d 765 (2004). 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
Our first inquiry, when interpreting constitutional 
provisions, “is to determine the text’s original meaning to 
the ratifiers, the people, at the time of ratification.” 
Id. at 468. 
This is accomplished by “applying each term’s 
plain meaning at the time of ratification.” 
Id. at 468­
469. 
See also Silver Creek Drain Dist v Extrusions Div, 
Inc, 468 Mich 367, 375; 663 NW2d 436 (2003). 
III. Analysis 
The Governor’s authority to reduce state expenditures 
is found in art 5, § 20, which states: 
No appropriation shall be a mandate to 
spend. 
The governor, with the approval of the
appropriating committees of the house and senate,
shall 
reduce 
expenditures 
authorized 
by
appropriations whenever it appears that actual
revenues for a fiscal period will fall below the
revenue estimates on which appropriations for 
that 
period 
were 
based. 
Reductions 
in 
expenditures shall be made in accordance with
procedures prescribed by law. 
The governor may
not reduce expenditures of the legislative and
judicial branches or from funds constitutionally 
dedicated 
for 
specific 
purposes. 
[Emphasis
added.] 
The disputed issue in this case is whether the general 
sales tax revenues that the Legislature allocated to the 
CTF are “constitutionally dedicated for specific purposes,” 
and therefore immune from the Governor’s authority to 
reduce expenditures. 
The answer to this question is found 
in art 9, § 9, which states, in relevant part: 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
 
All specific taxes, except general sales and
use taxes and regulatory fees, imposed directly
or indirectly on fuels sold or used to propel
motor 
vehicles 
upon 
highways 
and 
to 
propel
aircraft and on registered motor vehicles and
aircraft shall, after the payment of necessary
collection expenses, be used exclusively for 
transportation purposes as set forth in this 
section. 
* * * 
Amount used for transportation purposes.
The balance, if any, of the specific taxes, 
except general sales and use taxes and regulatory
fees, imposed directly or indirectly on fuels
sold or used to propel motor vehicles upon
highways and on registered motor vehicles, after
the payment of necessary collection expenses;
. . . and not more than 25 percent of the general 
sales taxes, imposed directly or indirectly on
fuel sold to propel motor vehicles upon highways,
on the sale of motor vehicles, and on the sale of
the parts and accessories of motor vehicles . . .
shall be used exclusively for the transportation
purposes of comprehensive transportation purposes
as defined by law. [Emphasis added.] [1] 
While construing the wording of art 9, § 9 might 
require effort, the provision’s meaning is clear. 
The 
provision limits the amount of general sales taxes that the 
Legislature can allocate to comprehensive transportation to 
1 The manner in which any funds allocated under this
provision to “comprehensive transportation purposes” will
be distributed is set forth in the General Sales Tax Act,
MCL 205.51 et seq. 
For fiscal year 2001-2002, MCL 
205.75(4) apportioned only 27.9 percent of the 25 percent
of revenues to the CTF.  The balance of the general sales
tax revenues described in art 9, § 9 was directed to the 
state general fund. 
5  
 
 
  
 
 
“not more than 25 percent of the general sales taxes . . . 
.” 
In doing so, it places a ceiling on the amount of 
general sales tax revenues that can be used “exclusively 
for . . . comprehensive transportation purposes . . . ,” 
but does not dedicate any specific amount of general sales 
taxes to be used for comprehensive transportation purposes. 
The only conclusion that can be drawn from art 9, § 9 is 
that the general sales tax revenues described in that 
provision are not constitutionally dedicated funds. 
When construing art 9, § 9, the Court of Appeals 
mistakenly found that the constitutional provision was 
subject 
to 
alternative 
interpretations, 
and 
then 
unnecessarily considered its history and purpose and the 
circumstances under which it was written and later amended. 
See 260 Mich App 307-311. 
As described above, the Court 
should have looked no further than the plain language of 
art 9, § 9 to determine that the general sales tax revenues 
allocated 
by 
the 
Legislature 
to 
the 
CTF 
were 
not 
constitutionally dedicated funds. 
Our obligation is to 
give 
the 
words 
of 
our 
Constitution 
a 
reasonable 
interpretation consistent with the plain meaning understood 
by the ratifiers. 
Hathcock, 471 Mich at 468-469. 
Text 
that may require reasonable effort to parse is not for that 
reason ambiguous. 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV  
In sum, we conclude that art 9, § 9 is unambiguous, 
and we agree with the Court of Appeals that, with respect 
to the reduction of the general sales tax revenues 
allocated to the CTF by EO 2001-9, the executive order was 
a 
lawful 
exercise 
of 
the 
Governor’s 
constitutional 
authority under art 5, § 20. 
We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals resolution of 
this issue in favor of the defendants. 
In all other 
respects, leave to appeal is denied because we are not 
persuaded that the remaining questions should be reviewed 
by this Court. 
This case is remanded to the trial court 
for entry of a judgment in favor of defendants on the 
merits. 
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
CAVANAGH, J. 
I concur in the result only. 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
COUNTY ROAD ASSOCIATION OF 
MICHIGAN and CHIPPEWA COUNTY 
ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees 
and 
MICHIGAN PUBLIC TRANSIT ASSOCIATION,
ANN ARBOR TRANSPORTATION 
AUTHORITY, CAPITAL AREA
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, and
SUBURBAN MOBILITY AUTHORITY FOR 
REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION, 
Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
No. 125665 
GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, DIRECTOR OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND 
BUDGET, STATE BUDGET DIRECTOR,
STATE TREASURER, DEPARTMENT OF
TREASURY, SECRETARY OF STATE, and
STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
WEAVER, J. (concurring). 
I concur in the result of the 
opinion per curiam because I agree that the revenues at 
issue are not constitutionally dedicated and that the 
Governor had the authority to reduce the Legislature’s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
allocation 
of 
general 
sales 
tax 
revenues 
to 
the 
Comprehensive Transportation Fund. 
As noted by the 
majority opinion, Const 1963, art 9, § 9 places a ceiling 
on the amount of general sales tax revenues that can be 
used for comprehensive transportation purposes, but it does 
not dedicate any specific amount of general sales tax 
revenues 
to 
be 
used 
for 
comprehensive 
transportation 
purposes. 
I also agree with the majority that art 9, § 9 
is not ambiguous. 
I write separately because I cannot join some of the 
principles of constitutional interpretation, as they are 
articulated 
and 
applied 
in 
the 
opinion 
per 
curiam, 
including the standard of review section of the opinion, 
which relies on cases in which I concurred in part and 
dissented in part. 
See Wayne Co v Hathcock, 471 Mich 445, 
485; 684 NW2d 765 (2004) (Weaver, J. concurring in part and 
dissenting in part), and Silver Creek Drain Dist 
Extrusions Div, Inc, 468 Mich 367, 382; 663 NW2d 436 (2003) 
(Weaver, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). In 
each of these cases, I disagreed with the method by which 
the majority attempted to carry out our mandate that we 
2  
v 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
interpret a constitutional provision according to the 
“common understanding” that the people would give it. 
1 
Further, although I agree that the Court of Appeals 
was wrong to conclude that art 9, § 9 is ambiguous, I would 
not be unduly critical of the Court of Appeals for 
considering the history and purpose of the amendment. Ante 
at 6. 
A court may “also consider the circumstances 
surrounding the adoption of a constitutional provision and 
the purpose sought to be accomplished by it” when the 
common understanding of the provision is questioned. Wayne 
Co, supra at 487 (citing Traverse City School Dist, supra 
1 As described by Justice Cooley, the rule of “common
understanding” means: 
“A constitution is made for the people and
by the people. The interpretation that should be
given it is that which reasonable minds, the
great mass of the people themselves, would give 
it. ‘For as the Constitution does not derive its 
force from the convention which framed, but from
the people who ratified it, the intent to be 
arrived at is that of the people, and it is not 
to be supposed that they have looked for any dark 
or abstruse meaning in the words employed, but 
rather that they have accepted them in the sense 
most obvious to the common understanding, and 
ratified the instrument in the belief that that 
was 
the 
sense 
designed 
to 
be 
conveyed.’”
[Traverse City School Dist v Attorney General,
384 Mich 390, 405; 185 NW2d 9 (1971), quoting
Cooley’s Const Lim 81 (emphasis in Traverse City 
School Dist).] 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
at 405). 
Moreover, when interpreting a constitution, “the 
technical rules of statutory construction do not apply.” 
Traverse City School Dist, supra at 405. 
For these reasons, I concur in the result of the 
opinion per curiam. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
COUNTY ROAD ASSOICATION OF MICHIGAN 
and CHIPPEWA COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
and 
MICHIGAN PUBLIC TRANSIT ASSOCIATION,
ANN ARBOR TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,
CAPITAL AREA TRANSPORTATION 
AUTHORITY, and SUBURBAN MOBILITY
AUTHORITY FOR REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION, 
 
Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
No. 125665 
GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, DIRECTOR OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSORTATION, DIRECTOR
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND 
BUDGET, DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, STATE BUDGET DIRECTOR, STATE
TREASURER, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,
SECRETARY OF STATE, and STATE OF
MICHIGAN, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
KELLY, J. (concurring in the result only). 
I concur with the majority that general sales tax 
revenues are not constitutionally dedicated funds for the 
reasons stated in the Court of Appeals opinion. 
The 
Governor has the authority to reduce the Legislature’s 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
allocation 
of 
general 
sales 
tax 
revenues 
to 
the 
Comprehensive Transportation Fund. 
I write separately because, unlike the majority on 
this Court, I agree with the Court of Appeals that Const 
1963, art 9, § 9 is ambiguous. 
It is ambiguous because it 
reasonably 
has 
“several 
possible 
meanings 
or 
interpretations.”1 
The Court of Appeals panel accurately explains the 
nature of the ambiguity: 
[The 
section] 
unequivocally 
exempts 
all 
general sales taxes from the restrictions imposed
on 
specific 
taxes 
but 
then 
simultaneously
subjects up to twenty-five percent of general
sales taxes to the very same restrictions.” [260
Mich App 299, 306; 677 NW2d 340 (2004) (emphasis
in original).] 
When 
interpreting 
an 
ambiguous 
constitutional 
provision, it is proper for a court to consider its history 
and purpose. 
The Court of Appeals did not err when it 
looked outside the text to the section’s history and 
purpose to determine which of the text’s several possible 
meanings was intended. 
The majority’s criticism of this 
approach is misplaced. 
For these reasons, I concur only in the result of the 
majority opinion. 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
1 This is the first definition of “ambiguous” found in
the Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2001). 
2