Case Title: Beall Transport Equipment Co. v. Southern Pacific

Citation: 

Docket Number: S48108

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2002-12-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  December 27, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

BEALL TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT COMPANY,
an Oregon corporation,
		Respondent on Review,
	v.
SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation;
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,
a Utah corporation;
CITY OF PORTLAND;
STATE of OREGON,
by and through the
Department of Motor Vehicles;
JOHN HREN; JOHN R. GREISEN;
THOMAS MORRISON; W. RAYMOND HORN;
STUART ABRAMS; WAYNE C. KLEPPER;
and STUART ABRAMS,
dba ABRAMS METALS, INC.,
	Defendants,
     and
ABRAMS, INC.,
dba Abrams Scrap Metals, Inc.,
Petitioner on Review.
SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation;
and UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Respondents on Review,
     v.
WAYNE C. KLEPPER,
Third-Party Defendant,
     and
STUART ABRAMS,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 9701-00347; CA A102619; SC S48108)
	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted January 10, 2002.
	Michael H. Bloom, Portland,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioners on review. 
With him on the briefs was Thomas M. Christ.
	Patrick L. Block, of Buono Block P.C., Portland, argued the
cause and filed the briefs for respondent on review Beall
Transport Equipment Company.  With him on the briefs was Steven
G. Marks.
	Jeffrey M. Kilmer, of Kilmer, Voorhies & Laurick, P.C.,
Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondents
on review Southern Pacific Transportation Company and Union
Pacific Railroad Company.  With him on the briefs was Gregory B.
Snook.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson, 
Riggs, and Balmer, Justices.**
	LEESON, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and
reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings.
	*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Roosevelt Robinson, Judge. 170 Or App 336, 13 P3d 130 (2000).
	**De Muniz, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
		LEESON, J.
Abrams's (1) petition for review presents two issues.  
The first is whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying the
"abuse of discretion" standard of review in reviewing the trial
court's denial of Abrams's motion for a mistrial following an
off-the-record, ex parte communication between an opposing lawyer
and a juror.  The second is whether Abrams preserved the error it
assigned on appeal, namely, the trial court's failure to give a
jury instruction that Abrams had requested.  We decline to
address the mistrial issue, because Abrams failed to raise it in
the Court of Appeals.  In regard to the jury instruction issue,
for the reasons that follow, we reverse the decision of the Court
of Appeals.  
		We take the following undisputed facts primarily from
the Court of Appeals' opinion.  In May 1995, Klepper, the manager
of Southern Pacific's Brooklyn Yard in Portland, sold several
semi-trailers to Abrams, a scrap metal dealer.  Klepper falsely
told Abrams that Southern Pacific owned the trailers and that
Klepper was selling them on behalf of Southern Pacific.  In fact,
Southern Pacific only leased the trailers.  By the end of 1996,
Klepper had sold Abrams more than 100 such trailers, and Abrams,
in turn, had sold at least 79 of the trailers to Beall Transport
Equipment Co. (Beall), a used trailer dealer, which in turn sold
55 of the trailers to third parties.  Southern Pacific officials
eventually learned that their leased trailers were missing and,
with the help of the police, recovered many of the trailers from
Abrams and Beall.  
Those circumstances led to two lawsuits.  In one, Beall
filed a complaint against Southern Pacific (2) and Abrams, alleging
conversion, breach of contract, breach of warranty, and fraud. 
Southern Pacific filed a cross-claim against Abrams for
conversion, and Abrams filed a cross-claim against Southern
Pacific for conversion and indemnity.  In the second lawsuit,
Abrams filed a complaint against Southern Pacific, alleging, in
part, breach of contract and conversion.  Southern Pacific filed
a counterclaim against Abrams, again alleging conversion.  The
court consolidated the two lawsuits.
		Before trial, the court granted Beall's motion for
partial summary judgment against Abrams on Beall's breach of
contract claim.  The only issues for trial were the amount of
damages that Abrams owed on Beall's breach of contract claim, the
merits of Beall's fraud claim against Abrams, and Abrams's and
Southern Pacific's claims against each other.
		During a recess at trial, the lawyers representing
Abrams and Southern Pacific went into chambers with the judge to
discuss a matter that concerned only those parties.  During that
time, the lawyer representing Beall spoke to two members of the
jury.  Thereafter, Abrams moved for a mistrial.  A subsequent
inquiry revealed that the ex parte communication consisted of the
lawyer's comment on one juror's attire and a statement to another
juror that the lawyer recognized the juror as an employee of a
pub that the lawyer recently had visited.  The trial court denied
Abrams's motion for a mistrial.
At the close of all the evidence, Abrams submitted
section 222A of Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) (3) as a
written jury instruction on conversion.  The trial court gave
Southern Pacific's requested instruction instead.  That
instruction consisted of the first paragraph of section 222A
only.
		The jury returned two special verdicts.  In one
verdict, the jury awarded Beall damages on its breach of contract
claim against Abrams but found that Abrams did not commit fraud. 
In its second verdict, the jury found that Southern Pacific was
entitled to damages from Abrams for conversion.  Southern Pacific
and Abrams then litigated the amount of those damages in a trial
to the bench.  After that trial, the trial court entered
judgments on the jury's verdicts and on its own damages award.
		Abrams appealed, raising six assignments of error.  As
relevant to the issues on review, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's denial of Abrams's motion for a mistrial. 
Beall Transport Equipment Co. v. Southern Pacific, 170 Or App
336, 349, 13 P3d 130 (2000).  The Court of Appeals also held that
Abrams had not preserved its objection to the trial court's
failure to give Abrams's requested jury instruction containing
the complete text of section 222A of the Restatement.  Id. at
357.
		On review, Abrams first argues that the Court of
Appeals erred in reviewing for abuse of discretion the trial
court's denial of his motion for a mistrial.  Abrams contends
that the abuse of discretion standard is appropriate only when an
ex parte communication is between a party and a juror, or between
a witness and a juror.  According to Abrams, a communication
between a lawyer and a juror is analogous to a communication
between a judge and a juror, and should be considered error as a
matter of law.  Huntley v. Reed, 276 Or 591, 594, 556 P2d 122
(1976) (holding new trial required after judge's ex parte
communication with jury in response to jury question during
deliberations because there was "no way of reaching a conclusion
about what transpired other than by adopting the judge's
recollection").
		However, Abrams asked the Court of Appeals to review
for abuse of discretion the trial court's denial of Abrams's
motion for a mistrial based on the lawyer-juror ex parte
communication.  Even assuming that some other standard of review
is appropriate when reviewing the denial of a motion for mistrial
based on lawyer-juror ex parte communications, we will not
address Abrams's argument on that point for the first time on
review.  See Tarwater v. Cupp, 304 Or 639, 643-45 & n 5, 749 P2d
125 (1988) (refusing to address on review argument different from
one made before Court of Appeals).
		We turn to Abrams's contention that the trial court
erred in refusing to give Abrams's requested jury instruction
regarding conversion.  As noted, the Court of Appeals held that
Abrams had not preserved that error.  Beall, 170 Or App at 357. 
Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that, under ORCP 59 H,
set out below, ___ Or at ___ (slip op at ___), "the general rule
is that a litigant * * * need not except to failure to give a
requested instruction, because the trial court's refusal to give
the requested instruction 'import[s] an exception.'"  170 Or App
at 352 (emphasis and brackets in original) (quoting ORCP 59 H). 
However, the Court of Appeals, citing this court's decisions in
Holland v. Srs. of St. Joseph, Seeley, 270 Or 129, 522 P2d 208,
on reh'g, 526 P2d 577 (1974), and Roberts v. Mitchell Bros., 289
Or 119, 611 P2d 297 (1980), stated that there is an exception to
that general rule:  If the requested instruction does not
"clearly and directly" alert the trial court to the difference
between the instruction requested and the instruction that the
court chooses to give, and if the requested instruction does not
tell the court "why the court's [chosen instruction is] wrong,"
then requesting an alternative instruction is not sufficient to
preserve the claim that the trial court erred in refusing to give
the requested instruction.  Id. at 356-57.  
		Abrams contends that the Court of Appeals' conclusion 
contradicts ORCP 59 H.  Abrams argues that, under that rule,
requesting an instruction "imports an exception," so the party
requesting the instruction is not required also to except to the
trial court's failure to give that instruction.  Southern Pacific
responds that this court should adopt the Court of Appeals'
analysis and holding. (4)
		We begin with the text of ORCP 59 H.  See Mulier v.
Johnson, 332 Or 344, 349, 29 P3d 1104 (2001) (court applies usual
statutory construction method when construing Oregon Rules of
Civil Procedure).  That rule provides, in part:
	"* * * [N]o instruction given to a jury shall be
subject to review upon appeal unless its error, if any,
was pointed out to the judge who gave it and unless a
notation of an exception is made immediately after the
court instructs the jury.  Any point of exception shall
be particularly stated and taken down by the reporter
or delivered in writing to the judge.  It shall be
unnecessary to note an exception in court to any other
ruling made.  All adverse rulings, including failure to
give a requested instruction * * *, shall import an
exception in favor of the party against whom the ruling
was made."
The first two sentences of ORCP 59 H describe what a party must do in the trial court to preserve an error in
instructing the jury:  The party must point out the error to the
judge immediately after the judge has instructed the jury, and
the party must "particularly state" the objection and either
deliver the objection to the judge in writing or make sure that
the court reporter takes down the objection.  The next sentence
makes clear that, under the rules of civil procedure, a party
need not take those steps to preserve error regarding "any other
ruling made."  The last sentence specifies that the trial court's
"failure to give a requested instruction" is among the rulings to
which a party need not except:
	"It shall be unnecessary to note an exception in court
to any other ruling made.  All adverse rulings,
including failure to give a requested instruction     
* * *, shall import an exception in favor of the party
against whom the ruling was made."
(Emphasis added.)  
	By its terms, therefore, ORCP 59 H provides, first,
that a party must object specifically to a jury instruction that
the trial court gives immediately after the trial court instructs
the jury.  Second, the rule provides that a party is not required
to make a similar objection to the trial court's refusal to give
an instruction that the party had requested.  See Hernandez v.
Barbo Machinery Co., 327 Or 99, 105, 957 P2d 147 (1998) ("[I]f a
party requests a jury instruction that correctly states the law
on the subject in issue, that party need not register a separate
objection to the court's other instructions in order to preserve
for appellate review the question whether the court erred in
declining to deliver the requested instruction.").
	Nonetheless, Southern Pacific argues that this court's
cases compel a different result.  Specifically, Southern Pacific
argues that this court has created an "exception" to the rule
stated in the last sentence of ORCP 59 H.  Under that exception,
Southern Pacific argues, a party must do more than merely request
a jury instruction to preserve for appeal its objection to the
trial court's failure to give that instruction.  Rather, the
party also must show that the instruction that it requested
"clearly and directly" alerted the trial court to the error in an
instruction that the court gave.  
	As noted above, Southern Pacific bases its argument on
this court's decisions in Holland and Roberts.  Before discussing
those cases, we first must address this court's decision in Crow
v. Junior Bootshops, 241 Or 135, 404 P2d 789 (1965), the case
upon which both Holland and Roberts relied.  
	In Crow, the defendant assigned error on appeal to the
trial court's failure to give the defendant's requested
instruction on contributory negligence.  241 Or at 141.  The
defendant had not excepted specifically when the trial court
instructed the jury that it should consider contributory
negligence only in mitigation.  Id.  However, the defendant had
requested a jury instruction that correctly stated the law in
effect at the time, namely, that contributory negligence was a
bar to recovery.  Id.
	The statute that governed the preservation of jury
instruction error at the time of this court's decision in Crow
was former ORS 17.510 (1963), repealed by Or Laws 1979 ch 284, §
199, which provided:
		"[N]o instruction given to a jury in the circuit
court shall be subject to review upon appeal unless its
error, if any, was pointed out to the judge who gave it
and unless a notation of an exception was made in the
circuit court.  It shall be unnecessary to note an
exception in the circuit court to any other ruling
made.  All adverse rulings except those contained in
instructions given shall import an exception in favor
of the party against whom the ruling was made."
Unlike ORCP 59 H, former ORS 17.510 did not state explicitly that
it was unnecessary to except to the trial court's failure to give
a requested jury instruction.  Nevertheless, this court held that
the defendant had preserved the error at issue.  Relying on this
court's decision in Ira v. Columbia Food Co. et al, 226 Or 566,
573, 360 P2d 622 (1961) ("Exceptions to the refusal to give
requested instructions are automatic under ORS 17.510."), this
court explained that "[i]t is not necessary to except to the
court's failure to give a requested instruction."  Id.
		Southern Pacific and Abrams agree that, in Crow, this
court held that a party does not need to except to a trial
court's refusal to give that party's requested instruction. 
However, Southern Pacific argues that this court's decision in
Holland modified Crow by holding that Crow's "automatic
exception" rule applies only to those requested instructions that
"clearly and directly" call the trial court's attention to the
error.  As explained below, we disagree with Southern Pacific's
reading of Holland.  
		Holland was a medical malpractice case in which the
plaintiff, in writing, had requested an instruction about the law
of informed consent that described the physician's duty to warn
the patient of certain risks.  270 Or at 141.  The trial court
refused to give that instruction and, instead, instructed the
jury that the standard governing the defendant physician's
conduct was whether he advised the plaintiff of the risks and
feasible alternatives that "a reasonably prudent physician
specializing in radiology would have explained under the same or
similar circumstances."  Id. at 132-33.  On appeal, the plaintiff
contended that the trial court erred in giving that "reasonably
prudent physician" instruction to the jury.  Id. at 132.  Citing
Crow, the plaintiff contended that she had preserved that error
by requesting her own instruction containing a correct statement
of the physician's duty to warn. Id. at 133.  
		This court disagreed.  Id. at 141.  It held that
requesting a jury instruction does not preserve automatically the
error in the instructions given, unless the requested instruction
"clearly and directly" informed the trial court that it was error
to give that instruction.  Id.   
The plaintiff in Holland thus was in a different
position than the defendant in Crow.  In Crow, as discussed
above, the error asserted was error in failing to give the jury a
requested instruction, and this court held that the defendant had
preserved that error automatically by requesting the instruction. 
In Holland, by contrast, the error at issue regarded error in the
instruction given to the jury, and the plaintiff argued that she
had preserved that error by having requested an instruction on
the same topic. (5)  Holland, therefore, did not undermine the
holding of Crow that the refusal to give a requested instruction
automatically preserves the error of failing to give that
instruction.
		Finally, we turn to Roberts.  In that case, the trial
court refused to give the defendant's requested instruction
regarding bailment.  289 Or at 123-24.  On appeal, the defendant
assigned error to the trial court's failure to give the
defendant's requested instruction.  Id. at 121.  The plaintiff
argued that the defendant had failed to preserve its claim of
error regarding the trial court's failure to give the instruction
that the defendant had requested, because the defendant had not
objected to the instructions that the court had given.  Id. at
127-28.  This court rejected that argument, relying on Crow for
the proposition that exceptions are not required when trial
courts refuse to give requested instructions.  Id. at 128.
		Although the court reached the correct result in
Roberts, we acknowledge and now disavow the suggestion in Roberts
that a requested instruction must "clearly and directly" call to
the trial court's attention its error in failing to give that
instruction.  See id. at 131 ("Because defendant preserved * * *
error by requesting an instruction that 'clearly and directly'
called to the attention of the trial court its error in failing
to instruct the jury on the question of negligence, * * * the
defendant * * * was entitled to appeal from the failure to give
that instruction.").  Any misinterpretation of Holland in Roberts
did not affect the outcome in that case, nor has it affected this
court's reasoning in more recent cases.  See, e.g., Bennett v.
Farmers Ins. Co., 332 Or 138, 153, 26 P3d 785 (2001) (correctly
stating preservation rule regarding appeal from trial court's
failure to give proffered jury instruction).
		In sum, neither Holland nor the text of ORCP 59 H requires a party to except to the trial court's refusal to give
that party's requested jury instruction to preserve for appeal
the argument that the court erred in failing to give that
instruction.  In this case, Abrams requested a jury instruction
containing the complete text of section 222A of the Restatement. 
By requesting that instruction, Abrams preserved for appeal the
question whether the trial court erred in failing to give that
instruction to the jury.  On remand, the Court of Appeals must
address the merits of Abrams's assignment of error.  See State ex
rel Carlile v. Frost, 326 Or 607, 617, 956 P2d 202 (1998) ("When
this court concludes that the Court of Appeals has erred in not
deciding an issue on the merits, it usually remands the case to
that court to consider the issue in the first instance.").
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in
part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the Court
of Appeals for further proceedings.



1. In this opinion, "Abrams" refers to Stuart Abrams;
Stuart Abrams, dba Abrams Metals, Inc.; and Abrams, Inc., dba
Abrams Scrap Metals, Inc.  As explained below, Abrams was the
defendant in one of two consolidated actions and the plaintiff in
the other.

2. Beall's complaint listed Southern Pacific
Transportation Company and Union Pacific Railroad Company as
defendants.  In this opinion, we refer only to defendant Southern
Pacific.  According to the railroads, Union Pacific has acquired
Southern Pacific.

3. Abrams requested the following instruction:
		"Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion
or control over personal property which so seriously
interferes with the right of another to control it that
the actor may be justly required to pay the full value
of the personal property.
		"In determining the seriousness of the
interference and the justice of requiring the actor to
pay the full value, the following factors are
important:
		"(a) The extent and duration of the actor's
exercise of dominion or control;
		"(b) The actor's intent to assert a right in fact
inconsistent with the other's right of control;
		"(c) The actor's good faith;
		"(d) The extent and duration of the resulting
interference with the other's right of control;
		"(e) The harm done to the chattel; and
		"(f) The inconvenience and expense caused to the
other." 


4. Southern Pacific also contends that there is no
evidence in the record that the trial court in fact refused to
give Abrams's requested instruction and, therefore, that this
court should not address Abrams's argument regarding
preservation.  Southern Pacific relies on Fain v. Hughes, 262 Or
137, 141, 497 P2d 198 (1972), in which this court stated that
"[f]ailure to give an instruction does not constitute reversible
error unless the instruction is requested and refused."  In Fain,
however, the plaintiff never requested a jury instruction but
nonetheless assigned error to the court's failure to give the 
instruction that the plaintiff had wanted.  Id. at 141.  Fain is
inapposite here, where it is undisputed that Abrams requested a
jury instruction containing the six "factors" bearing on
conversion set out in section 222A of the Restatement. 

5. We acknowledge that, on first hearing the case in
Holland, this court referred to the error at issue as the trial
court's failure to give the instruction that plaintiff had
requested.  270 Or at 134.  In its opinion on rehearing, however,
this court stated that the error before it was the erroneous jury
instruction that the trial court gave, id. at 140-41, and that
distinction was dispositive.