Case Title: State v. Byrd

Citation: 363 N.C. 215

Docket Number: 499A07

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2009-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
)
)
v.
)
ORDER
)
BILLY RAY BYRD
)
No. 499A07
The opinion filed 1 May 2009 in this case is withdrawn, and
the revised opinion filed with this order substituted therefor. 
The sole change in the opinion is the deletion of the sentence at
the end of the first paragraph reading, “However, we hold that
the error was not prejudicial.”
By order of the Court in Conference this 5th day of May
2009.
Parker, C.J.
For the Court
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STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BILLY RAY BYRD
No. 499A07
FILED: 1 MAY 2009
1.
Domestic Violence--protective order--ex parte temporary restraining order entered
under Rule 65(b) not valid protective order under Chapter 50(b)
The trial court erred in an assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting
serious injury case by enhancing defendant’s sentence under N.C.G.S. § 50B-4.1(d) based on his
alleged knowing violation of a valid domestic violence protective order because: (1) the trial
court’s 11 March 2004 order stated that it was entered under N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 65(b), and
thus, it was an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO) entered under Rule 65(b) instead of a
valid domestic violence protective order entered under Chapter 50B; (2) the fact that the motion
was made in the victim’s existing action for divorce from bed and board under Chapter 50 and
that the TRO contains language similar to that in N.C.G.S. § 50B-3(a) does not bring the TRO
within the definition of a valid protective order as defined in N.C.G.S. § 50B-1; (3) although the
intended purpose of the TRO was to accomplish the same objective as a valid protective order
under N.C.G.S. § 50B-3(a), the Legislature did not provide in N.C.G.S. § 50B-4.1(a) that
knowing violation of a TRO or preliminary injunction entered under Rule 65 would constitute a
Class A1 misdemeanor, nor did the Legislature provide that such a violation would raise the
felony one class higher than the principal felony charged; (4) even if the TRO had been entered
under Chapter 50B, it failed to meet the second prong of the definition of a valid domestic
violence protective order since it was not entered upon a hearing by the court or consent of the
parties, and merely putting defendant on notice that a TRO had been entered against him does
not satisfy the hearing requirement necessary to permit a sentence enhancement under N.C.G.S.
§ 50B-4.1(d); and (5) by limiting applicability of the enhancement provision to violation of
protective orders issued after a hearing, our General Assembly recognized and gave deference to
protection of a defendant’s liberty interest through due process of law.
 
2.
Appeal and Error--appealability--discretionary review improvidently allowed
Discretionary review of the instructional issue regarding sentencing enhancement in an
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury case based on the alleged
knowing violation of a valid domestic violence protective order was improvidently allowed.
Justice NEWBY dissenting.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of
a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 185 N.C. App. 597, 649
S.E.2d 444 (2007), finding no prejudicial error in a trial
resulting in judgments entered 26 August 2005 by Judge James U.
Downs in Superior Court, Buncombe County.  On 8 November 2007,
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the Supreme Court allowed defendant’s petition for discretionary
review of additional issues.  Heard in the Supreme Court 17 March
2008.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Elizabeth F. Parsons,
Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
Glover & Petersen, P.A., by James R. Glover and Ann B.
Petersen, for defendant-appellant.
PARKER, Chief Justice.
Billy Ray Byrd (“defendant”) appeals the enhanced
sentence imposed upon his conviction for assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury based on his
knowing violation of a valid domestic violence protective order. 
For the reasons stated herein, we hold that the temporary
restraining order (“TRO”) entered in this case pursuant to Rule
65(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure was not a
valid domestic violence protective order as defined by Chapter
50B of the General Statutes.  The trial court, therefore, erred
in enhancing defendant’s sentence under N.C.G.S. § 50B-4.1(d).
Defendant’s wife Carrie Byrd (“Carrie”) filed a pro se
complaint and motion for a domestic violence protective order on
13 March 2003 in District Court, Transylvania County.  The
district court entered an ex parte domestic violence order on 13
March 2003 and, following a hearing, issued a domestic violence
protective order on 20 March 2003 valid for a term of one year.  
The couple reconciled within the order’s one-year term, and
Carrie’s motion to set aside the protective order was allowed on
10 July 2003.
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Approximately one year later on 11 March 2004, Carrie
filed a complaint through counsel seeking, inter alia, divorce
from bed and board.  With the complaint, Carrie filed a motion
for a preliminary injunction pursuant to North Carolina Rule of
Civil Procedure 65(a) and also sought a TRO pursuant to Rule
65(b).  Carrie’s complaint and affidavit generally alleged that
defendant had assaulted and battered her on numerous occasions up
to and including the date of the complaint but did not allege
specific acts of domestic violence except for an incident that
occurred on 11 March 2003.
The district court issued an ex parte order granting
Carrie’s request for a TRO on 11 March 2004 and set a hearing
date of 15 March 2004.  The TRO was properly served on defendant
on 12 March 2004.  Defendant’s counsel moved for a continuance on
15 March 2004, and the hearing and TRO were both continued until
24 March 2004.  In entering the TRO, the trial court found, inter
alia:
3.  That the said verified Complaint,
verified Motion, and Affidavit filed herein
by applicant adequately avers grounds for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and
that immediate and irreparable injury, loss,
or damage will result to the applicant before
notice can be served and a hearing had
thereon.
4.  The injury, loss or damage otherwise
occurring to applicant is that Defendant may
assault and batter Plaintiff as he has done
in the recent past . . . .
The trial court concluded:
7.  That the applicant’s request for a
temporary restraining order without notice to
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the Defendant should be allowed.
The trial court then ordered: 
3.  That pending the hearing provided
for above, the Court orders and directs as
follows:
. . . .
(b) That the Defendant is ordered and
directed not to go about, assault, threaten,
molest, harass, interfere with, or bother the
Plaintiff and the minor children in any way
whatsoever.
At trial on the charges in this criminal case, the
State presented evidence tending to show that on 23 March 2004,
defendant went to Carrie’s office with a .22-caliber
semiautomatic rifle.  Gerald Cotton (“Cotton”), a witness and
alleged victim of defendant’s actions, testified that defendant
pointed the rifle at Cotton’s chest and pulled the trigger, but
the gun did not fire.  Cotton ran toward the back door and heard
two more shots as he was fleeing.
Beth Vockley (“Vockley”), the branch supervisor at
Carrie’s workplace, came out of her office when she saw Cotton
running down the hall.  Vockley saw defendant pointing the gun at
Carrie and told him not to shoot her.  Carrie pushed the gun away
and ran toward Vockley’s office.  Vockley heard two gunshots. 
Carrie fell to the floor after the second.  Defendant dropped the
rifle on the floor and walked out of the office.
Carrie was taken to Mission Memorial Hospital, where
she underwent surgery for a bullet wound in the left frontal area
of her head.  She recovered after the surgery but continues to
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have difficulty forming words and multitasking.
Defendant was indicted for the following offenses: 
(i) attempted murder of Carrie Byrd and knowing violation of a
valid protective order under N.C.G.S. § 50B-4.1(a) (04CRS54011);
(ii) assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting
serious injury on Carrie Byrd and knowing violation of a valid
protective order under N.C.G.S. § 50B-4.1(a) (04CRS53565); (iii)
knowingly violating a valid domestic violence protective order by
going to Carrie’s workplace (04CRS53567); (iv) attempted murder
of Gerald Cotton and knowing violation of a valid protective
order under N.C.G.S. § 50B-4.1(a) (04CRS54012); and (v) assault
with a deadly weapon with intent to kill Gerald Cotton and
knowing violation of a valid protective order under N.C.G.S.
§ 50B-4.1(a) (04CRS53571).
On 25 August 2005 the trial court declared a mistrial
as to the attempted murder of Carrie, the jurors having reached
an impasse on that charge.  The jury found defendant guilty of
the Class C felony of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to
kill inflicting serious injury on Carrie, the misdemeanor charge
of knowingly violating a valid domestic violence protective
order, and misdemeanor assault with a deadly weapon on Cotton. 
Defendant was found not guilty of attempted murder of Cotton.
During the sentencing phase, the jury returned a
verdict that defendant knowingly violated a domestic violence
protective order in the same course of conduct which constituted
the assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting
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serious injury on Carrie.  The jury also found as an aggravating
factor that defendant inflicted permanent and debilitating injury
on Carrie Byrd.
The trial court found Prior Record Level I as to the
Class C felonious assault on Carrie.  Based on the jury’s finding
of a violation of a valid domestic violence protective order, the
offense was elevated to Class B2 pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 50B-
4.1(d).  The trial court found that mitigating factors were
outweighed by the jury’s finding of permanent and debilitating
injury.  The trial court imposed a sentence in the aggravated
range of 196 to 245 months’ imprisonment.  Finding Prior Record
Level II as to the misdemeanor assault on Cotton, the trial court
imposed a consecutive sentence of seventy-five days’
imprisonment.  The trial court arrested judgment on defendant’s
conviction for violation of a valid domestic violence protective
order.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals upheld
defendant’s conviction and enhanced sentence imposed under
N.C.G.S. § 50B-4.1(d) for his knowing violation of a valid 
protective order.  The dissenting judge disagreed with the
majority’s determination that defendant’s sentence was properly
enhanced for violation of a valid protective order.
On 9 October 2007 defendant gave notice of appeal to
this Court based on the dissent in the Court of Appeals.  On 8
November 2007, this Court allowed defendant’s petition for
discretionary review as to whether the trial court erred in its
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instructions to the jury on the enhancement provisions of
N.C.G.S. § 50B-4.1.
[1] Defendant first contends that the trial court erred
in denying, and the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
denial of, his motion to dismiss the enhancement of the penalty
for his felonious assault conviction on account of his knowing
violation of a valid domestic violence protective order.  When a
person commits a felony while knowingly violating a domestic
violence protective order, N.C.G.S. § 50B-4.1(d) enhances the
penalty one class higher.  The maximum penalty in the aggravated
range that could, therefore, be imposed was increased from a
Class C felony to that of a Class B2 felony.  N.C.G.S. §
15A-1340.17(c), (e) (2003).  As a result, defendant’s maximum
term of imprisonment was set at 245 months instead of 120 months. 
Id.
In deciding whether defendant’s contention has merit,
we must first determine whether the TRO entered pursuant to Rule
65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure was, as a matter of law, a
valid domestic violence protective order under Chapter 50B.  To
make this determination, we look to the language of the statutes.
“Statutory interpretation properly begins with an examination of
the plain words of the statute.”  Correll v. Div. of Soc. Servs.,
332 N.C. 141, 144, 418 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1992) (citing Elec.
Supply Co. of Durham v. Swain Elec. Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403
S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991)).  When a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the Court will give effect to the plain meaning of
-9-
1 The relevant portions of Chapter 50B have been amended
since March 2004, the date the TRO was issued.  Accordingly, for
purposes of this appeal the provisions of Chapter 50B in effect
in March 2004 are applicable.
the words without resorting to judicial construction.  Diaz v.
Div. of Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 387, 628 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006)
(citing Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205,
209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 136 (1990)).  “However, when the language of
a statute is ambiguous, this Court will determine the purpose of
the statute and the intent of the legislature in its enactment.” 
Id. (citing Coastal Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 299
N.C. 620, 629, 265 S.E.2d 379, 385 (1980)).
Section 50B-4.1 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided by law,
a person who knowingly violates a valid
protective order entered pursuant to this
Chapter or who knowingly violates a valid
protective order entered by the courts of
another state or the courts of an Indian
tribe shall be guilty of a Class A1
misdemeanor.
. . . .
(d) Unless covered under some other
provision of law providing greater
punishment, a person who commits a felony at
a time when the person knows the behavior is
prohibited by a valid protective order as
provided in subsection (a) of this section
shall be guilty of a felony one class higher
than the principal felony described in the
charging document.  This subsection shall not
apply to a person who is charged with or
convicted of a Class A or B1 felony or to a
person charged under subsection (f) of this
section.
N.C.G.S. § 50B-4.1 (2003).1  For the penalty to be enhanced, the
jury must make “a finding . . . that the person knowingly
-10-
violated the protective order in the course of conduct
constituting the underlying felony,” N.C.G.S. § 50B-4.1(e), as
was found by the jury in this case. 
Section 50B-1 defines the term “protective order” as
“includ[ing] any order entered pursuant to this Chapter upon
hearing by the court or consent of the parties.”  N.C.G.S. § 50B-
1(c) (2003).  The TRO entered pursuant to Rule 65 in this case
fails to meet either element of this definition as it was not
entered pursuant to Chapter 50B and was not entered after a
hearing by the court or with consent of the parties.
The order entered by the trial court on 11 March 2004 
states that it was entered under Rule 65(b) of the North Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure.  The trial court made a conclusion of
law stating that “the applicant’s request for a temporary
restraining order without notice to the Defendant should be
allowed.”  The order entered by the trial court was, therefore,
an ex parte TRO entered under Rule 65(b), not a valid domestic
violence protective order, entered pursuant to Chapter 50B.
The State, relying on N.C.G.S. § 50B-2, argues that the
TRO entered in this case is the “functional legal equivalent” of
a valid domestic violence protective order.  Section 50B-2(a)
provides that “[a]ny person residing in this State may seek
relief under this Chapter . . . by filing a motion in any
existing action filed under Chapter 50 of the General Statutes
alleging acts of domestic violence against himself or herself.” 
N.C.G.S. § 50B-2(a) (2003).  The State contends that the TRO was
-11-
entered pursuant to Chapter 50B in that it was obtained by
Carrie’s filing a motion, alleging acts of domestic violence, in
her action for divorce from bed and board, filed under Chapter 50
of the General Statutes.  We disagree.
For whatever reason, Carrie did not seek relief under
Chapter 50B.  Rather she sought relief under Rule 65(a) and (b)
of the Rules of Civil Procedure.  While Carrie might well have
filed a Chapter 50B motion in her existing action for divorce
from bed and board, she did not file such a motion.  The fact
that the motion was made in the victim’s existing action for
divorce from bed and board under Chapter 50 and that the TRO
contains language similar to that in N.C.G.S. § 50B-3(a) does not
bring the TRO within the definition of a valid protective order
as defined in N.C.G.S. § 50B-1.  At the time the TRO was entered,
N.C.G.S. § 50B-3(a) permitted the court to grant “any protective
order to bring about a cessation of acts of domestic violence.” 
Carrie’s complaint did not allege any recent specific acts of
domestic violence, asserting only that defendant had “physically
assaulted and battered the plaintiff on numerous occasions.”  The
TRO entered pursuant Rule 65(b) did not make a finding that the
order was necessary to bring about the cessation of acts of
domestic violence.  Unquestionably, the intended purpose of the
TRO was to accomplish the same objective as a valid protective
order under N.C.G.S. § 50B-3(a).  Nevertheless, the Legislature
did not provide in N.C.G.S. § 50B-4.1(a) that knowing violation
of a TRO or preliminary injunction entered under Rule 65 of the
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Rules of Civil Procedure would constitute a Class A1 misdemeanor. 
Nor did the Legislature provide that such a violation would raise
the felony one class higher than the principal felony charged in
the charging document.  N.C.G.S. § 50B-4.1(d) (2003).
Defendant also asserts that Carrie could not have met
the requirements of a Chapter 50B protective order and urges this
argument in support of his position that the TRO was not a valid
protective order for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 50B-4.1(d).  However,
this issue is not properly before this Court, and we will not
engage in speculation and conjecture as to how the trial court
might have ruled had Carrie’s motion been made pursuant to
Chapter 50B rather than Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Moreover, even if the TRO had been entered under
Chapter 50B, which we have held it was not, it fails to meet the
second prong of the definition of a valid domestic violence
protective order in that it was not entered “upon hearing by the
court or consent of the parties.”  N.C.G.S. § 50B-1(c).  The
State contends, and the Court of Appeals’ majority agreed, that
because an ex parte proceeding was held before the TRO was
issued, the hearing requirement under N.C.G.S. § 50B-1(c) was
satisfied.  Again we disagree.
The provisions of Chapter 50B demonstrate that in the
domestic violence context, the Legislature contemplated two
separate proceedings whereby two types of orders could be
entered, a valid protective order and an ex parte order. 
N.C.G.S. §§ 50B-1(c), -2(c), -3(b) (2003).  If exigent
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circumstances require immediate issuance, without notice to the
other party, of an order to protect a party, the General Assembly
has provided for an ex parte order.  Under Chapter 50B when
“[p]rior to the hearing, if it clearly appears to the court from
specific facts shown, that there is a danger of acts of domestic
violence against the aggrieved party . . . the court may enter
such orders as it deems necessary to protect the aggrieved party
. . . from such acts.”  N.C.G.S. § 50B-2(c).  A trial court
entering an ex parte order under this subsection is also required
to hold a “hearing . . . within 10 days from the date of issuance
of the order or within seven days from the date of service of
process on the other party, whichever occurs later.”  Id.  By
definition a valid protective order must be upon hearing or by
consent of the parties.  N.C.G.S. § 50B-1(c).  That the
definition of a “protective order” permits entry of the order by
consent also suggests that the enjoined party must have had
notice with the opportunity to be heard.  The record before this
Court reveals that no such hearing was held by the trial court
before it entered the TRO on 11 March 2004.  A hearing was
scheduled for 15 March 2004, but was continued, along with the
TRO, until 24 March 2004.  The order granting the TRO states that
the “applicant’s request for temporary restraining order comes on
without notice to the Defendant.”  The circumstances surrounding
its entry, as well as the language of the order itself, make
clear that no hearing of the type contemplated by N.C.G.S. § 50B-
1(c) was held in this case.  Only a valid protective order
-14-
entered under Chapter 50B can be used to enhance a defendant’s
sentence under N.C.G.S. § 50B-4.1(d).
The majority in the Court of Appeals concluded that the
ex parte hearing before entry of the TRO satisfied the hearing
required for a valid protective order.  In discussing this issue
the Court of Appeals’ majority opined that “what the act seeks to
accomplish is to protect individuals from domestic violence
through, inter alia, the imposition of an enhanced sentencing to
serve as a deterrent against those who perpetrate the violence.” 
State v. Byrd, 185 N.C. App. 597, 603, 649 S.E.2d 444, 449
(2007).  The majority then concluded that “the ‘hearing’
requirement found in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1(c) was satisfied
when defendant received notice that a TRO had been entered
against him.”  Id. at 604, 649 S.E.2d at 449 (footnote omitted). 
We acknowledge that the term “hearing” is often used generically
to refer to any proceeding before a court.  See Black’s Law
Dictionary 737 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a hearing as “[a]
judicial session . . . held for the purpose of deciding issues of
fact or of law, sometimes with witnesses testifying”).  We
cannot, however, agree that this generic definition comports with
the statutory scheme in Chapter 50B, which, in our view, requires
that a defendant be given notice and the opportunity to be heard
before entry of a protective order.
The dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals, after
discussing the hearing requirement under Chapter 50B and the
distinction between an ex parte proceeding and the hearing
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required for a valid protective order, notes that the TRO was
employed to deprive defendant of a liberty interest by enhancing
his sentence for this felony conviction.  The dissenting opinion
then concludes, “To increase Defendant’s prison term on the basis
of a TRO, without affording him the opportunity to be heard as to
the allegations of domestic violence against him, would violate
his right to due process.”  Byrd, 185 N.C. App. at 610, 649
S.E.2d at 452 (Wynn, J., dissenting).  We agree with the
dissenting opinion that merely putting defendant on notice that a
TRO had been entered against him does not satisfy the hearing
requirement necessary to permit  a sentence enhancement under
N.C.G.S. § 50B-4.1(d).
The State contends that no constitutional argument was
made before the trial court or the Court of Appeals and that the
dissenting judge raised an issue not properly before that court.
Defense counsel’s argument before the trial court of defendant’s
motion to dismiss was not recorded; hence, no transcript is
available from which this Court can ascertain what defendant
argued to the trial court.  In his brief to this Court, defendant
makes in essence the same argument asserted in his brief to the
Court of Appeals.  In his brief to the Court of Appeals,
defendant first noted that all orders issued under Chapter 50B
may be enforceable by contempt proceedings under N.C.G.S. § 50B-
4(a).  Then, although not using the words, “due process of law,”
defendant stated that:
Ex parte orders are granted on one sided
affidavits filed by one party.  Such orders
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may be sufficiently reliable to be
enforceable by contempt proceedings.  Only an
order issued after the opposing party has an
opportunity to be heard on the merits of a
claim is sufficiently reliable to justify
enforcement by criminal penalties.
We agree.  Indeed, the opportunity to be heard and to challenge
the truth of the adversary’s assertions is part and parcel of due
process.  Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306,
314, 94 L. Ed. 865, 873 (1950) (“An elementary and fundamental
requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be
accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.” (citations omitted)).  By limiting applicability of
the enhancement provision to violation of protective orders
issued after a hearing, our General Assembly recognized and gave
deference to protection of a defendant’s liberty interest through
due process of law.  We hold, therefore, that a TRO entered under
Rule 65(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure is not the “functional
legal equivalent” of a “protective order” entered pursuant to the
procedure set forth in Chapter 50B.
[2] Having determined that the TRO was not a valid
protective order under Chapter 50B, we conclude that the trial
court erred in submitting the sentencing enhancement issue to the
jury.  We, therefore, do not address whether the instruction was
proper.
For the foregoing reasons the decision of the Court of
Appeals is reversed as to whether the TRO entered under Rule
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65(b) satisfied the valid protective order requirement of
N.C.G.S. § 50B-4.1(d).  As to the instructional issue,
discretionary review was improvidently allowed.
REVERSED; DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IMPROVIDENTLY ALLOWED.
Justice NEWBY dissenting.
Defendant shot his wife in knowing violation of a court
order directing him not to commit acts of violence against her. 
Chapter 50B of the General Statutes evinces a clear legislative
intent to punish recurrent domestic violence by imposing enhanced
sentences on criminals such as defendant who violate protective
orders.  Yet today, our Court subverts the General Assembly’s
intent and raises formalistic concerns, thereby removing from the
trial court the authority under N.C.G.S. § 50B-4.1 to punish
defendant’s wanton disregard of a strict court order.  Because I
would read the General Statutes liberally in the interest of
deterring domestic violence through enhanced sentences, I
respectfully dissent.
The majority’s holding that enhanced sentencing under
section 50B-4.1 is not available in this case is based initially
on the fact that the temporary restraining order (“TRO”) aimed at
preventing acts of violence by defendant against his wife and
children was technically entered pursuant to Rule of Civil
Procedure 65(b) and was not specifically designated as a Chapter
50B domestic violence protective order.  I cannot agree with the
majority that the intent underlying section 50B-4.1 would
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2 Like the majority, I base my analysis of this appeal on
the provisions of Chapter 50B that were in effect in March 2004. 
I note, however, that this analysis would apply equally to
Chapter 50B as currently amended.
preclude enhanced sentencing based merely on the statutory
section number with which the violated order was labeled.
I believe the ex parte TRO granted to the victim Carrie
Byrd (“Carrie”) on 11 March 2004 was a protective order entered
pursuant to Chapter 50B.  Section 50B-2(a) provides in pertinent
part:  “Any person residing in this State may seek relief under
this Chapter . . . by filing a motion in any existing action
filed under Chapter 50 of the General Statutes alleging acts of
domestic violence against [the movant] . . . .”  N.C.G.S. § 50B-
2(a) (2003)2 (emphasis added).  Therefore, one may obtain relief
under Chapter 50B by making a motion to that end in a pending
Chapter 50 action.  Further, section 50B-2(a) imposes no
limitation as to the statutory section under which such a motion
must be filed.  Carrie filed her Rule 65(b) motion in conjunction
with a complaint under Chapter 50 of the General Statutes.  Her
Chapter 50 complaint alleged defendant had committed acts of
violence against Carrie, stating defendant “physically assaulted
and battered the Plaintiff on numerous occasions,” causing her
“humiliation and serious bodily injury” and leaving her “in fear
for her own physical and mental wellbeing [sic] and that of her
children.”  Carrie’s affidavit in support of her motion for the
TRO likewise asserted that defendant “repeatedly assaulted and
battered the Plaintiff on many occasions” and referred
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specifically to defendant’s assault and battery of Carrie on 11
March 2003, which in fact had previously been the basis of a
Chapter 50B protective order.  Carrie’s Rule 65(b) motion thus
satisfied the requirements of section 50B-2(a) for seeking relief
pursuant to Chapter 50B.
Not all orders under Rule 65(b) are Chapter 50B
protective orders.  For example, a TRO sought and granted for the
purpose of protecting personal property is appreciably different
from a Chapter 50B protective order, which is designed “to bring
about a cessation of acts of domestic violence” against spouses
and children.  Id. § 50B-3(a) (2003).  When an applicant seeks
protection from domestic violence as Carrie did, however, our
courts should not afford less protection than the laws envision
simply because the application explicitly invokes Rule 65(b)
rather than Chapter 50B.
In addition to being entered upon a motion that
satisfied section 50B-2(a), the TRO at issue here contains
findings and directives that squarely implicate the purposes of a
Chapter 50B protective order.  In the 11 March 2004 TRO, the
trial court found that “[t]he injury, loss or damage otherwise
occurring to applicant is that Defendant may assault and batter
Plaintiff as he has done in the recent past.”  The court went on
to order defendant “not to go about, assault, threaten, molest,
harass, interfere with, or bother the Plaintiff and the minor
children in any way whatsoever.”  The TRO was entered upon a
motion in a Chapter 50 action and was plainly intended “to bring
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about a cessation of acts of domestic violence.”  Id.  It
therefore qualifies as a Chapter 50B protective order.
It also bears noting that, because Carrie sought a TRO
aimed at preventing defendant’s acts of violence against her, the
showings she had to make to obtain the Rule 65(b) TRO were
indistinguishable from the showings required to obtain an ex
parte protective order under section 50B-2(c).  Rule 65(b)
authorizes a TRO only if “it clearly appears from specific facts
shown by affidavit or by verified complaint that immediate and
irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant
before the adverse party or that party’s attorney can be heard in
opposition.”  N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 65(b) (2007).  Indeed, in
granting the TRO, the trial court specifically found that
Carrie’s complaint, motion, and affidavit “adequately aver[red]
grounds for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will
result to the applicant before notice can be served and a hearing
had thereon.”  In terms almost identical to those of Rule 65(b),
section 50B-2(c) authorizes the court to “enter such [ex parte]
orders as it deems necessary to protect the aggrieved party or
minor children” from domestic violence “if it clearly appears to
the court from specific facts shown[] that there is a danger of
acts of domestic violence against the aggrieved party or a minor
child.”  Id. § 50B-2(c) (2003).  Because the “immediate and
irreparable injury, loss, or damage” from which Carrie sought
protection under Rule 65(b) was the same domestic violence with
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3 A section 50B-2(c) ex parte protective order is simply a
specialized form of TRO.  This is further demonstrated by the
fact that the effective duration of a TRO is roughly the same as
that of an ex parte order under section 50B-2(c).  A TRO “shall
expire by its terms within such time after entry, not to exceed
10 days, as the judge fixes.”  N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 65(b). 
Similarly, “[u]pon the issuance of an ex parte order under
[section 50B-2(c)], a hearing shall be held within 10 days from
the date of issuance of the order or within seven days from the
date of service of process on the other party, whichever occurs
later.”  Id. § 50B-2(c).
which Chapter 50B is concerned, Carrie could have obtained an ex
parte protective order under section 50B-2(c) based on the very
same affidavit that resulted in the TRO.3  At any rate, the TRO
Carrie obtained was a domestic violence protective order entered
upon a motion filed in accordance with section 50B-2(a), and it
thus qualifies as a protective order entered pursuant to Chapter
50B.  I believe this treatment of the TRO does more to vindicate
the legislative intent of deterring domestic violence than does a
rigid reading of Chapter 50B that focuses on the minutiae of the
TRO’s form rather than its function.
Because the TRO was a protective order entered pursuant
to Chapter 50B, defendant’s knowing and felonious violation of
the TRO should result in an enhanced sentence under section 50B-
4.1, which provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided by law,
a person who knowingly violates a valid
protective order entered pursuant to this
Chapter . . . shall be guilty of a Class A1
misdemeanor.
. . . .
(d) Unless covered under some other
provision of law providing greater
punishment, a person who commits a felony at
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4 The General Assembly’s preference in subsection 50B-4.1(d)
for the greatest possible punishment under the law for felons who
violate protective orders demonstrates the strength of the
legislative intent to deter domestic violence.  I believe the
majority’s approach is inconsistent with that intent.
a time when the person knows the behavior is
prohibited by a valid protective order as
provided in subsection (a) of this section
shall be guilty of a felony one class higher
than the principal felony described in the
charging document.
Id. § 50B-4.1 (2003).4
Besides unduly focusing on the fact that the TRO was
labeled with Rule 65(b) and not Chapter 50B, the majority also
concludes that the TRO did not meet another element of the
statutory definition of “protective order.”  “As used in [Chapter
50B], the term ‘protective order’ includes any order entered
pursuant to [Chapter 50B] upon hearing by the court or consent of
the parties.”  Id. § 50B-1(c) (2003) (emphasis added).  As
explained above, I believe the TRO was entered pursuant to
Chapter 50B.  The majority also asserts that the TRO fails to
satisfy the definition’s requirement of being entered “upon
hearing by the court or consent of the parties.”  It is
undisputed that defendant did not consent to the TRO.  I
disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that the TRO
was not entered after a hearing.
The TRO begins with the following language:  “This
cause coming on to be heard before the undersigned District Court
Judge . . . .” (emphasis added).  In addition, the trial court
granted the TRO only after “having considered the verified
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Complaint, Motion, and Affidavit herein filed by applicant.” 
Although the hearing was ex parte in nature, the TRO was
nonetheless granted after a hearing.  The majority’s assertion to
the contrary is due to the fact that the hearing was not fully
adversarial:  there was no notice to defendant and no opportunity
for defendant to be heard prior to entry of the TRO.  Nowhere
does the statutory definition of “protective order” require a
full adversarial hearing, however.  The order must simply be
entered “upon hearing by the court or consent of the parties.” 
Id.  Thus, this element of the definition excludes neither ex
parte protective orders under section 50B-2(c) nor Rule 65(b)
orders entered upon a section 50B-2(a) motion.
The inclusion of ex parte hearings within the meaning
of “upon hearing by the court” is especially plausible in light
of the fact that section 50B-2 itself explicitly recognizes the
existence of ex parte hearings.  When a party seeks emergency
relief ex parte as Carrie did here, an ex parte hearing before
the trial court is available.  See N.C.G.S. § 50B-2(c) (“If an
aggrieved party acting pro se requests ex parte relief, the clerk
of superior court shall schedule an ex parte hearing with the
district court division of the General Court of Justice within 72
hours of the filing for said relief, or by the end of the next
day on which the district court is in session in the county in
which the action was filed, whichever shall first occur.”).  The
statutory definition of “protective order” contained in the very
same chapter does not exclude orders entered after such ex parte
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hearings, nor does it otherwise qualify the hearing requirement. 
Id. § 50B-1(c).  I would therefore conclude that a section 50B-
2(c) ex parte hearing satisfies the definition’s hearing element,
as does an ex parte hearing conducted under Rule 65(b) when the
resulting TRO is a Chapter 50B protective order.  As the Court of
Appeals aptly stated, “To hold otherwise would allow one who had
notice that an ex parte Chapter 50B order had been entered
against him a ten-day window in which to continue acts of
domestic violence against the party who sought the order, while
avoiding the corresponding sentencing enhancement provided in
Chapter 50B.”  State v. Byrd, 185 N.C. App. 597, 603, 649 S.E.2d
444, 449 (2007) (footnotes omitted).  Like the Court of Appeals,
I doubt the legislature intended this result.
After concluding that the TRO in this case does not
satisfy the statutory definition of “protective order,” the
majority goes on to address the constitutional issue of whether
defendant’s right to due process of law would be violated by the
imposition of an enhanced sentence on the basis of an ex parte
order.  This approach is in conflict with the “longstanding
principle” that “appellate courts must ‘avoid constitutional
questions, even if properly presented, where a case may be
resolved on other grounds.’”  James v. Bartlett, 359 N.C. 260,
266, 607 S.E.2d 638, 642 (2005) (quoting Anderson v. Assimos, 356
N.C. 415, 416, 572 S.E.2d 101, 102 (2002) (per curiam)).  Because
the majority purports to decide this case on statutory grounds,
it is unnecessary to consider the more momentous constitutional
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question.
I also have strong misgivings as to whether the
constitutional issue is properly before this Court.  The record
does not reflect that defendant made any constitutional argument
to the trial court, and defendant did not specifically raise his
due process rights in his briefs to the Court of Appeals or to
this Court.  The majority reaches the due process issue based on
defendant’s contention that an ex parte order is not
“sufficiently reliable to justify enforcement by criminal
penalties.”  This assertion is found in the context of
defendant’s statutory argument that the TRO does not constitute a
Chapter 50B protective order, and while this isolated statement
may vaguely implicate due process, defendant cites no authority
for the unstated proposition that imposing an enhanced sentence
on the basis of an ex parte order would deprive defendant of a
liberty interest without due process of law.  “It is not the role
of the appellate courts . . . to create an appeal for an
appellant,” Viar v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 402, 610
S.E.2d 360, 361 (2005) (per curiam), so I hesitate to wade into
constitutional waters when the issue has not been fully briefed
and argued by the parties.
Because the majority reaches the due process issue,
however, I am compelled to respond.  In general, to deprive
defendant of a liberty interest on the basis of court proceedings
of which he had no prior notice, and in which he had no
opportunity to appear in his own defense, could raise questions
-26-
regarding defendant’s right to due process of law.  Mullane v.
Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct. 652,
657, 94 L. Ed. 865, 873 (1950) (citations omitted).  This case is
an exception to the general rule, however.  In its 11 March 2004
order granting Carrie’s motion for a TRO, the trial court set 15
March 2004 as the date for a full adversarial hearing on the
matter.  Defendant was properly served with the TRO on 12 March
2004.  On 15 March 2004, defendant’s counsel moved for and was
granted a continuance until 24 March 2004.  Defendant was thus
partly responsible for, and fully aware of, the fact that the TRO
remained in effect when, on 23 March 2004, he went to Carrie’s
place of work and flagrantly violated the court’s order by
shooting Carrie in the head.
By moving for a continuance, defendant postponed both
his own opportunity to be heard and the trial court’s opportunity
to enter an order that would have removed any constitutional
concerns over the enhancement of defendant’s sentence.  Further,
had defendant not engaged just one day before the rescheduled
hearing in the very conduct he had been ordered to avoid, he
would have had the opportunity for a hearing to satisfy the trial
court that he had not been committing acts of domestic violence. 
“Even a constitutional right may be waived ‘by conduct
inconsistent with a purpose to insist upon it.’”  State v.
Langford, 319 N.C. 332, 338, 354 S.E.2d 518, 522 (1987) (quoting
State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 342, 279 S.E.2d 788, 801
(1981)).  Defendant should not now be heard to complain of his
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lack of opportunity to contest the allegations of domestic
violence when he himself delayed the hearing by seeking a
continuance and then conducted himself in a manner egregiously
inconsistent with any claim that he was not violent toward
Carrie.  I would hold that defendant waived his right to contest
the allegations of domestic violence and thus was not prejudiced
by the enhancement of his sentence based on his violation of the
ex parte TRO.
By requiring enhanced sentences under section 50B-4.1
of the General Statutes, the General Assembly demonstrated a
clear intent to deter violations of court orders aimed at the
prevention of domestic violence.  Although the TRO in this case
had just such an objective and resembled a section 50B-2(c) ex
parte protective order in everything but name, the majority
refuses to give effect to the intent of section 50B-4.1 because
the applicant for domestic violence relief failed to explicitly
invoke Chapter 50B in her motion.  I do not believe the General
Assembly intended Chapter 50B to be interpreted so inflexibly. 
Neither do I believe the legislature intended to allow a
defendant who is subject to an ex parte protective order to use
the time before the full adversarial hearing to knowingly violate
the ex parte order without facing enhanced sentencing.  In my
view, Chapter 50B should be read broadly in favor of protecting
endangered spouses and children, rather than narrowly in favor of
defendants who commit crimes in knowing violation of court
orders.  I find no error in defendant’s sentencing and therefore
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respectfully dissent.