Case Title: William E. Marberry v. Phillip G. Macht

Citation: 2003 WI 79

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 79 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
99-2446 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel.  
William E. Marberry,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Phillip G. Macht, Superintendent, Wisconsin 
Resource Center and Joseph S. Leean, Secretary, 
Department of Health and Family Services,  
 
Respondents-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 133 
Reported at:  254 Wis. 2d 690, 648 N.W.2d 522 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 2, 2003 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 9, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert Hawley   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and BABLITCH, J., join 
concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondents-respondents-petitioners the cause was 
argued by Marguerite M. Moeller, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the petitioner-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by Donald T. Lang, assistant state public defender. 
 
 
2003 WI 79 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  99-2446  
(L.C. No. 
99 CV 506) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel.  
William E. Marberry,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Phillip G. Macht, Superintendent,  
Wisconsin Resource Center and Joseph S.  
Leean, Secretary, Department of Health  
and Family Services,  
 
          Respondents-Respondents- 
          Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 2, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.  This is a review of a decision of 
the court of appeals granting habeas corpus relief and ordering 
the release of a sexually violent person from commitment under 
Chapter 980 of the Wisconsin Statutes as a remedy for the 
failure of the Department of Health and Family Services ("the 
department") 
to 
conduct 
a 
timely 
post-commitment 
initial 
No. 
99-2446   
 
2 
 
reexamination under Wis. Stat. § 980.07 (2001-2002).1  We 
reverse. 
¶2  Although we agree with the court of appeals' conclusion 
that the initial reexamination specified in Wis. Stat. § 980.07 
is mandatory rather than directory, it does not follow that the 
extraordinary remedy of release pursuant to a writ of habeas 
corpus is proper.  Habeas corpus relief is warranted only when 
the petitioner's liberty is restrained in violation of the 
constitution or by a court or tribunal lacking jurisdiction, and 
only when no other remedies are adequate.  State ex rel. Haas v. 
McReynolds, 2002 WI 43, ¶12, 252 Wis. 2d 133, 141, 643 N.W.2d 
771.  Here, we need not decide whether the failure to comply 
with the mandatory statutory timeframe for reexamination affects 
the constitutionality of the underlying Chapter 980 commitment, 
or the competency of the court to conduct further proceedings in 
connection with that commitment.  The petitioner has not 
demonstrated that other available remedies are inadequate.  
Those remedies include a petition for supervised release 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.08, or mandamus and contempt.  
Because there are adequate alternative remedies, habeas corpus 
relief in the form of discharge and release from commitment is 
unwarranted. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
                                                 
1 All subsequent statutory references are to the 2001-2002 
version of the statutes. 
No. 
99-2446   
 
3 
 
¶3 
William Marberry was committed as a sexually violent 
person on July 15, 1998, in Dane County Circuit Court, pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 980.06.  According to Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1), 
the department was required to reexamine Marberry's mental 
condition within six months of his initial commitment. 
¶4 
The department failed to conduct this reexamination 
within six months of Marberry's initial commitment.  Eleven 
months after his commitment, on June 15, 1999, Marberry filed a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Winnebago County Circuit 
Court seeking discharge and release from the Chapter 980 
commitment because he still had not received the initial 
reexamination required by Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1).  On September 
9, 1999, the circuit court, the Honorable Robert A. Hawley, 
denied Marberry's habeas petition, but ordered the department to 
promptly conduct the reexamination.  Marberry appealed. 
¶5  The court of appeals certified the case to this court.  
We accepted the certification and, with one justice not 
participating, divided equally.  State ex rel. Marberry v. 
Macht, 2001 WI 19, 241 Wis. 2d 695, 623 N.W.2d 135 (per curiam).  
The matter was returned to the court of appeals. 
¶6 
In the meantime, on June 29, 2000, almost two years 
after his initial commitment and more than nine months after the 
order from the Winnebago County Circuit Court, the department 
finally conducted a reexamination of Marberry's mental health 
under Wis. Stat. § 980.07.  The examiner concluded that 
Marberry's mental disorder had not abated.  Marberry received 
No. 
99-2446   
 
4 
 
another reexamination, and, in a report dated January 8, 2002, 
was again found to be unfit for release.2 
¶7  Subsequent to these findings, the court of appeals 
reversed the circuit court, holding that the six-month timeframe 
in Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1) for an initial reexamination is 
mandatory and that Marberry was entitled to release from his 
Chapter 980 commitment as a remedy.  See State ex rel. Marberry 
v. Macht, 2002 WI App 133, 254 Wis. 2d 690, 648 N.W.2d 522.  We 
granted the state's petition for review, and now reverse. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶8 
We apply a de novo standard of review to legal issues 
arising in the context of a petition for habeas corpus.  State 
ex rel. Hager v. Marten, 226 Wis. 2d 687, 693-94, 594 N.W.2d 791 
(1999).  This habeas petition arises in the context of a Chapter 
980 
commitment 
and 
presents 
an 
issue 
of 
statutory 
interpretation.  Statutory interpretation is a legal issue that 
we review de novo.  In re Commitment of Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, 
404, 597 N.W.2d 697 (1999); In re Commitment of Sprosty, 227 
Wis. 2d 316, 323, 595 N.W.2d 692 (1999); State v. R.R.E., 162 
Wis. 2d 698, 706-07, 470 N.W.2d 283 (1991).   
III.  DISCUSSION 
                                                 
2 We take judicial notice of the subsequent reexamination 
proceeding.  We also take judicial notice that Marberry has 
received a third reexamination, subsequent to oral argument in 
this case.  At a hearing in Dane County Circuit Court on 
December 12, 2002, the Honorable Daniel R. Moeser held that 
Marberry remains a sexually violent person and ordered that his 
commitment continue. 
No. 
99-2446   
 
5 
 
¶9 
Chapter 980 governs the involuntary commitment of 
individuals who have been adjudicated as "sexually violent 
person[s]."  See Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2).  A "sexually violent 
person" is a person who has been convicted, adjudicated 
delinquent, or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or 
defect of a sexually violent offense and "is dangerous because 
he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it 
substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of 
sexual violence."  Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7).  If a circuit court 
or a jury determines that a person is a sexually violent person 
within the meaning of Chapter 980, "the court shall order the 
person to be committed to the custody of the department for 
control, care and treatment until such time as the person is no 
longer a sexually violent person."3  Wis. Stat. § 980.06. 
¶10 Chapter 980 provides for periodic reexaminations of 
the committed person's status as a sexually violent person: 
If a person has been committed under s. 980.06 and has 
not been discharged under s. 980.09, the department 
shall conduct an examination of his or her mental 
condition within 6 months after an initial commitment 
under s. 980.06 and again thereafter at least once 
each 12 months for the purpose of determining whether 
the person has made sufficient progress for the court 
                                                 
3 The chapter's provisions have been upheld against repeated 
challenge.  See, e.g., In re Commitment of Laxton, 2002 WI 82, 
254 Wis. 2d 185, 647 N.W.2d 784, cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 870 
(2003); In re Commitment of Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, 597 N.W.2d 
697 (1999); In re Commitment of Kienitz, 227 Wis. 2d 423, 597 
N.W.2d 712 (1999); State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 541 N.W.2d 
115 (1995), cert. denied 521 U.S. 1118 (1997); State v. 
Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995), cert. denied, 
521 U.S. 1118 (1997). 
No. 
99-2446   
 
6 
 
to consider whether the person should be placed on 
supervised release or discharged.  At the time of a 
reexamination under this section, the person who has 
been committed may retain or seek to have the court 
appoint an examiner as provided in s. 980.03(4). 
Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1).4 
¶11 In addition to the periodic reexaminations required by 
Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1), persons committed under Chapter 980 may 
petition for supervised release into the community: 
Any person who is committed under s. 980.06 may 
petition the committing court to modify its order by 
authorizing supervised release if at least 18 months 
have elapsed since the initial commitment order was 
entered or at least 6 months have elapsed since the 
most recent release petition was denied or the most 
recent order for supervised release was revoked.  The 
director of the facility at which the person is placed 
may file a petition [for supervised release] under 
this subsection on the person's behalf at any time. 
Wis. Stat. 980.08(1).5 
¶12 Within 20 days of the receipt of a petition for 
supervised release, the court "shall appoint one or more 
examiners having the specialized knowledge determined by the 
court to be appropriate, who shall examine the person and 
furnish a written report of the examination to the court within 
                                                 
4 Indigent persons have the right to a court-appointed 
examining expert.  See Wis. Stat. § 980.03(4). ("If the person 
is indigent, the court shall, upon the person's request, appoint 
a qualified and available expert or professional person to 
perform an examination and participate in the trial or other 
proceeding on the person's behalf."). 
5 At the time Marberry was committed in 1998, this statute 
allowed a petition for supervised release after only six months.  
The six-month period was amended to 18 months by 1999 Wis. Act 
9, § 3232p, effective October 29, 1999. 
No. 
99-2446   
 
7 
 
30 days after appointment."  Wis. Stat. § 980.08(3).  The court 
must hear the petition within 30 days of the filing of the 
report, unless the petitioner waives the time limit.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.08(4).  The statute provides that "[t]he court shall grant 
the petition [for supervised release] unless the state proves by 
clear and convincing evidence that the person is still a 
sexually violent person and that it is still substantially 
probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence 
if the person is not continued in institutional care."  Id. 
¶13 Chapter 980 also provides that a committed person may 
petition for discharge with the approval of the secretary of the 
department, Wis. Stat. § 980.09(1), or without the secretary's 
approval, Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2).  There is also an additional 
discharge procedure that can be invoked by the committed person 
at any time, although this option carries some procedural 
obstacles if prior discharge petitions have been denied or 
declared frivolous.  See Wis. Stat. § 980.10 (If there are prior 
denials or frivolous petitions, "the court shall deny any 
subsequent petition under this section without a hearing unless 
the petition contains facts upon which a court could find that 
the condition of the person had so changed that a hearing was 
warranted.").  Assuming no previous denials or frivolous 
petitions, a petition for discharge pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 
980.10 triggers the procedures in Wis. Stat. § 980.09.  At the 
hearing on any of these discharge petitions, "[t]he state has 
the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the 
No. 
99-2446   
 
8 
 
petitioner 
is 
still 
a 
sexually 
violent 
person."  
Wis. Stat. § 980.09(1)(b) and (2)(b).   
¶14 We have held that Chapter 980 "is aimed primarily at 
treating 
the 
sexually 
violent 
person, 
not 
punishing 
the 
individual."  State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 267, 541 
N.W.2d 105 (1995).  The law is intended to "protect[] the public 
by providing concentrated treatment for convicted sex offenders 
who are at a high risk to reoffend based upon a mental disorder 
which predisposes them to commit acts of sexual violence."  Id. 
at 273-74.  Protection of the public and treatment of persons 
who are dangerous because of mental disorders that predispose 
them to sexual violence are "significant nonpunitive and 
remedial purposes" that justify indefinite civil commitment.  
Id. at 271; State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 314, 541 N.W.2d 115 
(1995).  Chapter 980 provides for discharge from commitment once 
the statutorily-defined dangerousness "abates."  Carpenter, 197 
Wis. 2d at 268 (citing Wis. Stat. § 980.09).  Until that point, 
"[c]ommitment in a secure setting that provides specialized 
treatment for sexual offenders serves both to protect society 
and to treat the individual."  Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 314. 
A.  Mandatory Or Directory 
¶15 We agree with the court of appeals that the time 
limits for periodic reexamination contained in Wis. Stat. § 
980.07(1) are mandatory rather than directory.6   See Marberry, 
                                                 
6 The department did not contest this conclusion in its 
current briefs, and conceded this point at oral argument.  
Accordingly, we address it only briefly.  
No. 
99-2446   
 
9 
 
254 Wis. 2d 690, ¶27.  Whether a statutory provision is 
mandatory or directory is a question of legislative intent.  
R.R.E., 162 Wis. 2d at 707.  "Although the use of the word 
'shall' in a statute suggests that the provision is mandatory, 
this court has often held that statutory time limits are 
directory despite the use of the word 'shall.'"  Id.  Thus, "the 
determination of whether 'shall' is mandatory or directory is 
not governed by a per se rule."  Id.  
¶16  Although we have stated that there is no per se rule, 
we have also held that "[t]he general rule in interpreting 
statutory language is that the word 'shall' is presumed 
mandatory. 
 
Further 
support 
is 
given 
to 
a 
mandatory 
interpretation of 'shall' when the legislature uses the words 
'shall' and 'may' in a particular statutory section, indicating 
the legislature was aware of the distinct meanings of the 
words."  In re Commitment of Sprosty, 227 Wis. 2d 316, 324, 595 
N.W.2d 
692 
(1999)(citations 
and 
internal 
quotation 
marks 
omitted).  The legislature has used both the word "shall" and 
the word "may" in Wis. Stat. § 980.07.7  "Therefore, we 'can 
infer 
that 
the 
legislature 
was 
aware 
of 
the 
different 
denotations and intended the words to have their precise 
meanings.'" Id. at 325 (quoting Karow v. Milwaukee Cty. Civ. 
Serv. Comm'n, 82 Wis. 2d 565, 571, 263 N.W.2d 214 (1978)). 
                                                 
7 See Wis. Stat. 980.07(1)("the department shall conduct an 
examination") and Wis. Stat. § 980.07(3)("the court . . . may 
order a reexamination")(emphasis added).   
No. 
99-2446   
 
10 
 
¶17  In addition to the foregoing general rules, we 
consider 
the 
following 
factors 
in 
determining 
whether 
a 
statutory time limit is mandatory or directory: "the existence 
of penalties for failure to comply with the limitation, the 
statute's nature, the legislative objective for the statute, and 
the potential consequences to the parties, such as injuries or 
wrongs."  State v. Thomas, 2000 WI App 162, ¶9, 238 Wis. 2d 216, 
222, 617 N.W.2d 230; see also R.R.E., 162 Wis. 2d at 708. 
¶18  The statute does not provide a penalty for failure to 
comply with the time limits for periodic reexamination.  While 
"[t]he legislature's failure to state the consequences of 
noncompliance with the established time limit lends support for 
construing the statute as directory," the absence of a penalty 
for noncompliance "is only one factor to be considered in the 
analysis of whether the legislature intended the provision to be 
mandatory or directory."  Karow, 82 Wis. 2d at 571-72. 
¶19  As we have noted, Chapter 980 is a civil commitment 
statute with dual objectives: protection of the public and 
treatment of persons with dangerous mental disorders.  Untimely 
periodic reexamination frustrates the treatment objective and 
may keep persons who are no longer a danger to the public in 
institutionalized care longer than necessary. 
¶20  In this regard, the failure to comply with the time 
limits for periodic reexamination has substantial consequences 
for 
the 
committed 
person. 
 
The 
initial 
and 
periodic 
reexaminations determine the committed person's appropriateness 
for 
continued 
institutional 
care, 
supervised 
release, 
or 
No. 
99-2446   
 
11 
 
discharge.  As the court of appeals observed, the "committed 
person's 
liberty hinges 
upon this 
initial 
reexamination."  
Marberry, 254 Wis. 2d 690, ¶27. 
¶21  The weight of these considerations leads us to 
conclude, as did the court of appeals, that the time limits for 
periodic reexamination in Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1) are mandatory.  
This conclusion, however, does not necessarily require release 
and discharge from commitment as a remedy for noncompliance with 
the statutory mandate. 
B.  Remedy 
¶22  "The writ of habeas corpus has its origins in the 
common law, and its availability is guaranteed by the U.S. 
Constitution, the Wisconsin Constitution, and by state and 
federal statute."8  Haas, 252 Wis. 2d 133, ¶11 (citing State ex 
rel. Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 225 Wis. 2d 446, 450, 593 
N.W.2d 48 (1999)); see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; 28 
U.S.C. § 2241; Wis. Const. art I, § 8(4); Wis. Stat. § 782.01.  
Habeas corpus is a civil proceeding which "test[s] the right of 
a person to his personal liberty."  State ex rel. Dowe v. 
Waukesha County Cir. Ct., 184 Wis. 2d 724, 728, 516 N.W.2d 714 
(1994).  The purpose of the writ is to protect and vindicate the 
petitioner's right to be free from illegal restraint.  State ex 
                                                 
8 Literally, habeas corpus is an imperative that translates 
to "that you have the body."  A writ of habeas corpus is used to 
command an official "to bring a person before a court, most 
frequently to ensure that the party's imprisonment or detention 
is not illegal."  See Black's Law Dictionary 715 (7th ed. 1999). 
No. 
99-2446   
 
12 
 
rel. Zdanczewicz v. Snyder, 131 Wis. 2d 147, 151, 388 N.W.2d 612 
(1986).   
¶23 The extraordinary relief provided by the writ of 
habeas corpus is available only in limited circumstances and is 
subject to three prerequisites.  Haas, 252 Wis. 2d 133, ¶12.  
First, the petitioner must be restrained of his liberty.  Id.  
Second, 
the 
restraint 
must 
have 
been 
imposed 
without 
jurisdiction or contrary to constitutional protections.  Id.  
Third, the petitioner must demonstrate that there are no other 
adequate remedies available in the law.  Id.  Absent a showing 
that all three criteria are met, the writ of habeas corpus will 
not issue.  Id. 
¶24  In Haas, we evaluated the propriety of habeas relief 
by reference to the third requirement alone, because our 
conclusion 
on 
the 
adequacy 
of 
alternative 
remedies 
was 
dispositive.  Id., ¶13.  We do the same here.  While there is no 
dispute that Marberry is restrained of his liberty, the parties 
disagree about whether the department's noncompliance with the 
statutorily mandated time limits for initial reexamination 
affects the constitutionality of the underlying commitment or 
the competency of the court to conduct further proceedings in 
connection with the commitment.  The court of appeals did not 
directly address this second criterion for habeas relief.  In 
any event, because the absence of any of the three habeas 
requirements defeats the writ, we confine our analysis to the 
third requirement, as we did in Haas. 
No. 
99-2446   
 
13 
 
¶25 "The writ of habeas corpus does not issue as a right."  
Id., ¶14. 
We 
have 
long 
and 
consistently 
held 
that 
the 
extraordinary writ of habeas corpus is not available 
to a petitioner when the petitioner has other adequate 
remedies available.  For instance, habeas corpus is 
not available to challenge a bindover decision by a 
court 
commissioner 
because 
the 
decision 
is 
challengeable 
on a 
statutory motion to 
dismiss.  
Similarly, the writ is not available to challenge the 
sufficiency of probable cause to issue a criminal 
complaint, even when the challenge is brought between 
arrest and the preliminary hearing, because the 
challenge can be made using other remedies at trial.  
Habeas corpus proceedings are likewise not available 
to 
challenge 
an 
administrative 
order 
revoking 
probation, since a writ of certiorari is available, 
and is the proper remedy under such circumstances. In 
short, if the petitioner has an otherwise adequate 
remedy that he or she may exercise to obtain the same 
relief, the writ will not be issued. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
¶26 It is undeniably true that in Marberry's case, the 
department was in prolonged and inexcusable noncompliance with 
its mandatory duties under Wis. Stat. § 980.07.  Nevertheless, 
the law provides adequate remedies for the failure to conduct 
timely periodic reexaminations other than release pursuant to a 
habeas writ.  Chapter 980 contains a procedure, outlined above, 
by which a committed person can trigger a court-ordered 
reexamination via a petition for supervised release pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08. 
¶27  As we have noted, Wis. Stat. § 980.08 was amended in 
1999 to preclude petitions for supervised release during the 
No. 
99-2446   
 
14 
 
first 18 months of commitment.9   Under certain circumstances, 
therefore, this statutory vehicle for compelling reexamination 
may be unavailable.  There is, in such circumstances, another 
remedy: a writ of mandamus to compel an initial or periodic 
reexamination, backed up by contempt, with a fine or jail as a 
sanction.  Mandamus may issue to compel a public officer to 
perform a duty of his office presently due to be performed where 
there is a clear legal right, a positive and plain duty, 
substantial damage in the absence of performance, and no other 
adequate remedy.  Pasko v. City of Milwaukee, 2002 WI 33, ¶24, 
252 Wis. 2d 1, 643 N.W.2d 72.  Because Wis. Stat. § 980.07 
imposes a mandatory duty upon the department, mandamus to compel 
performance of that duty is an appropriate and available remedy. 
¶28  As Judge Brown noted in his partial dissent in this 
case, "[w]here a writ [of mandamus] or court order has been 
issued 
and 
the 
mental 
reexamination 
still 
has 
not 
been 
performed, as is the case in this instance, the public officials 
may be held in contempt for their failure to comply with the 
order. . . . [T]his remedy would be an effective tool precisely 
because it focuses on the particular persons who have the 
authority to ensure that procedures are established to carry out 
the requirements of the statute."  Marberry, 254 Wis. 2d 690, 
¶52 (Brown, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
                                                 
9 See supra note 5.  As we have also noted, however, at the 
time Marberry was committed in 1998, the statute allowed him to 
file a petition for supervised release after only six months, 
the same timeframe as the initial reexamination under Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.07(1). 
No. 
99-2446   
 
15 
 
¶29  We agree with Judge Brown on the adequacy and 
appropriateness of mandamus and contempt as remedies for the 
department's failure to perform its mandatory duties under Wis. 
Stat. § 980.07.  Release and discharge from commitment pursuant 
to habeas for failure to conduct a timely reexamination would 
jeopardize public safety and contradict the express statutory 
criteria for supervised release and discharge.  Chapter 980 
provides that a person committed may be released on supervision 
or discharged from commitment only after a court finds that he 
or she is no longer a sexually violent person and that it is no 
longer substantially probable that he or she will commit acts of 
sexual violence.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 980.08, 980.09, 980.10; see 
also Wis. Stat. § 980.06 (Sexually violent persons are committed 
to the department for "control, care and treatment until such 
time as the person is no longer a sexually violent person.").  
Release absent this substantive determination by a court would 
compromise both of Chapter 980's principal purposes——treatment 
and public protection——because, until a circuit court finds 
otherwise, the committed person remains in need of treatment and 
at high risk to reoffend. 
¶30  "Release of a ch. 980 patient whose dangerousness or 
mental disorder has not abated serves neither to protect the 
public nor provide care and treatment for the patient."  
Marberry, 254 Wis. 2d 690, ¶39 (Brown, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part.)  Accordingly, "release is not only 
inappropriate, it is not justifiable under the dual purposes of 
the statute: protection of the public from sexually violent 
No. 
99-2446   
 
16 
 
persons likely to reoffend and care and treatment of the 
patient."  Id., ¶42.  Mandamus and contempt are more appropriate 
to the purposes of the statute: 
If the purpose is to provide a sanction that will 
force state officials to follow the law, contempt is 
the better sanction than release [of the committed 
person].  Release is an excessive sanction because the 
costs are way too high.  Contempt is workable and gets 
the message out to the people who are really and 
finally responsible for violating the legislature's 
mandatory time periods for reexamination.  The cost is 
visited upon these flagrant violators and not the 
public.  If someone at [the department] knew he or she 
could go to jail for ignoring a mandamus, he or she 
would take extra care to make sure the individual 
received his or her reexamination.    
Id., ¶54. 
¶31 Although admittedly in a somewhat different context, 
we have previously held that the failure to comply with 
reexamination time limits in a civil commitment does not 
necessarily require release as a remedy.  R.R.E., 162 Wis. 2d at 
No. 
99-2446   
 
17 
 
711-12.10  R.R.E. involved a Chapter 51 commitment following a 
verdict of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect in a 
criminal case pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.17.  R.R.E., 162 Wis. 
2d at 703.  The circuit court failed to conduct a hearing within 
30 days of the filing of a reexamination petition as required by 
Wis. Stat. § 51.20(16)(c).  In R.R.E., we recognized the "strong 
competing 
policy 
of 
requiring 
courts 
to 
strictly 
follow 
procedural rules and time limitations which are designed to 
ensure that the right of committed persons to a hearing to 
review the need for their continued confinement is not unduly 
delayed or effectively denied by a court's delays."  Id. at 711. 
¶32  We concluded, however, that had the legislature 
intended to provide for release when the time limits for the 
                                                 
10 As a general matter, Chapter 51 commitments are permitted 
for reasons other than danger to others, although R.R.E. arose 
in the context of a Chapter 51 commitment following a verdict of 
not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect in a criminal 
case pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.17.  State v. R.R.E., 162 Wis. 
2d 698, 703, 470 N.W.2d 283 (1991).  In contrast, under Chapter 
980, significant danger to others is the only justification for 
commitment.  Persons committed under Chapter 980, therefore, are 
considered more dangerous as a class than those committed under 
Chapter 51.  See Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 322.  This distinction 
between Chapter 980 and other types of civil commitment led the 
court of appeals to distinguish this case from State ex rel. 
Lockman v. Gerhardstein, 107 Wis. 2d 325, 320 N.W.2d 27 (Ct. 
App. 1982)(failure to conduct final commitment hearing within 14 
days of detention pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 51.20(7)(c) requires 
release from temporary detention and dismissal of commitment 
petition); and N.N. v. County of Dane, 140 Wis. 2d 64, 409 
N.W.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1987)(same result in Chapter 55 protective 
placement).  Marberry, 254 Wis. 2d 690, ¶¶6-16.  We agree with 
the court of appeals' analysis on this point.  Lockman and N.N. 
were also in a different procedural posture than this case, as 
commitment had not yet occurred in either case.   
No. 
99-2446   
 
18 
 
reexamination hearing were violated, it likely "would have 
expressly stated its intention in order to alert the circuit 
courts of the extreme consequences for failing to comply with 
the time limitations."  Id. at 710.  We further held that the 
statutory policy of protecting the public outweighed the 
competing interest of the committed individual in receiving his 
or her hearing in strict accordance with the statutory time 
limitations for the reexamination hearing.  Id. at 711.  
Although these conclusions were reached in the context of a 
decision that the statutory time limits were directory rather 
than mandatory (unlike our conclusion here), we also observed 
that release was not proper as a matter of remedy, because the 
committed individual retained the ability to compel a hearing 
through other statutory means, and also by a writ of mandamus, 
when the time limitation in the statute went unobserved.  Id. at 
714-15. 
¶33  Similarly here, release is not the only adequate 
remedy for noncompliance with the statutory time limits for 
reexamination, because the committed person retains the ability 
to compel a reexamination under the statutory procedure for 
supervised release, or, if the statutory remedy is unavailable, 
by a writ of mandamus.  These remedies are effective and 
adequate, and consistent with statutory purposes of treatment 
and protection of the public. 
¶34 For the foregoing reasons, therefore, we conclude that 
Marberry is not entitled to release from his Chapter 980 
commitment as a remedy for the department's failure to perform 
No. 
99-2446   
 
19 
 
an initial reexamination in accordance with the six-month time 
limit of Wis. Stat. 980.07(1).11  Because there are adequate, 
alternative remedies available, relief pursuant to habeas corpus 
is improper. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.   
¶35 JUSTICE DAVID T. PROSSER, JR. did not participate.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
11 We emphasize again that Marberry has now been reexamined, 
three times, and his mental disorder and dangerousness has not 
abated.  According to each of these reexaminations, he remains a 
sexually violent person.  
  
No.  99-2446.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶36 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I understand 
and share the reticence of Justice Sykes' lead opinion for the 
remedy of release.  Marberry continues to suffer from a mental 
illness which makes it substantially probable that he will 
engage in 
acts of sexual 
violence 
if not 
continued in 
institutional care.  Release at this time would unduly endanger 
the public. 
¶37 Nevertheless, I disagree with the proffered remedies 
of the lead opinion.12  They are inadequate and unworkable.  
Perhaps most problematic, however, is that the lead opinion's 
remedies are misdirected.  Rather than put the onus of ensuring 
compliance with the law on a mentally ill, institutionalized 
patient, I would put it where it belongs: on the Department of 
Health and Family Services (DHFS). 
¶38 The judges of the court of appeals and the justices of 
this court have concluded that DHFS has violated the law in 
failing to conduct a timely initial reexamination.  An initial 
reexamination is mandatory.  As the lead opinion recognizes, the 
constitutionality 
of 
a 
Chapter 980 
commitment 
hinges 
on 
treatment and the initial reexamination is an essential part of 
that treatment.  It is important to the safety of the citizens 
of our state, to the mentally ill committees, and to our system 
                                                 
 
12 Because the court is evenly divided on the issue of 
remedy, neither the lead opinion nor the concurring opinion 
establishes precedent on this issue.  Nevertheless, the court is 
unanimous in the conclusion that release is not a proper remedy 
at this time. 
 
No.  99-2446.awb 
 
2 
 
of justice to make sure that Chapter 980 continues to be applied 
constitutionally. 
¶39 Unlike the lead opinion, I would not rely on a 
mentally 
ill, 
institutionalized 
patient, 
likely 
without 
resources and representation, to ensure compliance.  Instead, I 
would direct the effort to ensure compliance towards those who 
are violating the law.  Because I believe that the remedies 
offered by the lead opinion are illusory and will ultimately 
lead to Chapter 980 being unconstitutionally applied, I cannot 
join it.  Let me explain. 
¶40 The essence of the lead opinion rests on the premise 
that its proffered remedies are adequate.  It suggests that a 
writ of mandamus or order followed by contempt charges will 
satisfactorily protect the constitutional rights at stake.  Even 
a cursory examination of these remedies demonstrates that they 
are both inadequate and unworkable. 
¶41 I need not look to the facts of some hypothetical case 
to illustrate the inadequacy.  Marberry was held for over 23 
months 
before 
he 
received 
his 
initial 
post-commitment 
reexamination.  Such an examination was required to occur within 
six months after commitment, and subsequent reexaminations are 
required to occur at least once every 12 months thereafter. 
¶42 Here, 
eight 
months 
after 
the 
State 
missed 
the 
statutorily mandated deadline, the circuit court ordered DHFS to 
"promptly" conduct the reexamination.  Instead, apparently 
disregarding the court order that it be done promptly, DHFS 
finally conducted the reexamination nearly two years after 
No.  99-2446.awb 
 
3 
 
Marberry's initial commitment and nine months after receiving 
the court order.  The facts of this case, alone, demonstrate the 
inadequacy of the lead opinion's remedy of getting a mandamus or 
order from the court to obtain prompt compliance with the 
mandatory time frames imposed by the statute. 
¶43 Undoubtedly realizing the dilemma that the facts of 
this case present to the validity of its approach, the lead 
opinion incorporates into its proffered remedy a second step: a 
committed 
individual should 
bring 
contempt 
proceedings to 
enforce the court's order.  It is unclear from the lead opinion 
what type of contempt it is suggesting. 
¶44 If it is a punitive contempt proceeding, as the 
dissent in the court of appeals seems to suggest, the proffered 
remedies border on the impossible.13  If it is a remedial 
contempt proceeding, it approaches the improbable.  Neither 
constitutes an adequate or workable remedy. 
¶45 It 
borders 
on 
the 
impossible 
because 
punitive 
sanctions for contempt of court may not be initiated by a 
committed person like Marberry.  Wis. Stat. § 785.03(1)(b).  
Only a district attorney, the attorney general, or a special 
prosecutor appointed by a court may seek imposition of such 
                                                 
13 In suggesting that contempt is an alternative remedy, the 
partial dissent in the court of appeals states: "If an 
individual's actions are shown to be in flagrant disregard of 
the court's order, a jail term would be more than appropriate."  
Such an assertion implies that the contempt is imposed as a 
sanction for past "flagrant disregard of the court's order."  
State ex rel. Marberry v. Macht, 2002 WI App 133, ¶54, 254 
Wis. 2d 690, 648 N.W.2d 522 (Brown, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  Thus, the partial dissent apparently is 
referring to punitive contempt. 
No.  99-2446.awb 
 
4 
 
sanctions.  It is unlikely that the same individuals who are 
filing Chapter 980 petitions on behalf of the State will change 
hats and initiate proceedings on behalf of a committed person to 
impose punitive sanctions against state officials who fail to 
conduct a timely reexamination. 
¶46 Obtaining 
relief 
through 
a 
remedial 
contempt 
proceeding is at best improbable.  To seek remedial sanctions 
for contempt of court, the committed person must first obtain 
the initial court order and wait for a period of time for DHFS 
to comply with the order.  Next, the committed person would have 
to identify the person to be held accountable for not complying 
with the order. 
¶47 Identifying the person who is responsible for the 
delay is typically not readily accomplished in this type of 
case.  Is it the secretary of DHFS or the superintendent of the 
particular facility who is responsible for performing this task?  
Perhaps the culprit is the head of the treatment unit or a 
particular staff psychologist, if any, assigned to conduct the 
exam.  Significantly, to this day, there has been no indication 
of the identity of who should have been held accountable in this 
case. 
¶48 Additional delays will inevitably occur as the court 
determines who should be the subject of a contempt order and 
grants those individuals time to comply with the order.  This is 
a cumbersome process, particularly for a committed person who is 
suffering from a mental illness and who is often unrepresented.  
It is likely that, if relief is obtained at all, such relief 
No.  99-2446.awb 
 
5 
 
will occur long after the time when the reexamination should 
have taken place. 
¶49 Particularly troublesome is the fact that this remedy 
does not provide the relief to which the committed person is 
legally entitled: a timely reexamination.  Additionally, it 
fails to create any incentive for the State to comply with the 
law.  At the end of the day, assuming that the mentally ill, 
institutionalized person is 
able 
to 
successfully navigate 
through the mandamus and contempt process, all the State likely 
will have to do to avoid remedial sanctions is provide the 
reexamination--which is what it should have done in the first 
place, months or even years ago. 
¶50 Finally, almost parenthetically, the lead opinion 
references petitioning for supervised release pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 980.08 as an adequate remedy.  Lead op., ¶¶26, 27.  Its 
summary discussion of this remedy belies its assertion that it 
is adequate.  The lead opinion dedicates only three sentences to 
its discussion of this remedy and in the third sentence 
ultimately concedes that it would not be available as a remedy 
for some committed persons.  Lead op., ¶27. 
¶51 The constitutionality of Chapter 980 has repeatedly 
been said to rest upon the treatment measures provided for the 
committed individual.  See State v. Rachel, 2002 WI 81, ¶59, 254 
Wis. 2d 215, 647 N.W.2d 762; State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 
252, 271-272, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995).  In Carpenter and Post, we 
found Chapter 980 to be constitutional because we concluded that 
treatment 
and 
protection 
of 
the 
public, 
not 
additional 
No.  99-2446.awb 
 
6 
 
punishment, were the primary purposes of Chapter 980.  See 
Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 266; State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 
313, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995). 
¶52 In Marberry’s case, 
having 
received 
his initial 
reexamination after nearly two years of commitment, only the 
public 
protection 
function 
can 
be 
said 
to 
have 
been 
accomplished.  Without viable treatment, Chapter 980 becomes a 
mechanism for general deterrence and retribution, a hidden 
criminal punishment and not a civil involuntary commitment for 
the betterment of the individual committed and the community at 
large. 
¶53 In State v. Rachel, 2002 WI 81, 254 Wis. 2d 215, 647 
N.W.2d 762, the majority predicated the constitutionality of 
Chapter 980 on the various procedures available to the committed 
individual to secure review of his commitment.  It is apparent 
that the procedures, as implemented here, have failed. 
¶54 In Rachel, I wrote a separate concurring opinion to 
clearly delineate the emerging dilemma with Chapter 980: 
 
In State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 267, 541 
N.W.2d 105 (1995), which I authored, the court assumed 
that the State was "prepared to provide specific 
treatment to those committed under ch. 980 and not 
simply warehouse them." 
 
In State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 308, 541 
N.W.2d 115 (1995), where I joined the majority, the 
court assumed that "the legislature will proceed in 
good faith and fund the treatment programs necessary 
for those committed under chapter 980." 
 
. . . . 
 
The court's assumptions and the State's good 
faith are wearing thin. 
No.  99-2446.awb 
 
7 
 
Rachel, 254 Wis. 2d 215, ¶¶72, 73, 75 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
¶55 In the dissenting opinion in Rachel, Justice Bablitch 
also 
expressed 
his 
concern 
regarding 
the 
development 
of 
Chapter 980. 
 
Most 
notably, 
he 
points 
to 
the 
lack 
of 
institutional accountability and the illusory nature of the 
options given to the involuntarily committed individual.  See 
id., ¶¶94, 95 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).  Both the lack of 
institutional accountability and the illusory nature of the 
remedies remain present in our system, as evidenced by this 
case. 
¶56 The accountability to ensure that there is compliance 
with the mandates of Chapter 980 and the constitution should 
rest with the institution responsible for compliance.  To 
jettison the responsibility for compliance and place it on the 
back of a mentally ill, institutionalized person makes neither 
good law nor good sense.  As noted above, if there remains 
continued noncompliance, the constitutional viability is in 
jeopardy. 
¶57 The legislators who wrote the law and the public who 
are protected by the law depend on DHFS complying with the law.  
We should insist upon no less. 
¶58 To preserve the constitutional viability of Chapter 
980, which is of great import to the public, and to ensure 
compliance, I would hold this case open for two years so that 
DHFS can report to the legislature and the public every six 
months on the status of its compliance.  The report should 
include: (1) the names of the Chapter 980 committed persons who 
No.  99-2446.awb 
 
8 
 
are legally required to have an initial reexamination; (2) the 
dates of the scheduled reexaminations; and (3) the dates on 
which the reexaminations actually were conducted. 
¶59 The lead opinion's remedies provide no incentive to 
DHFS to conduct its statutorily mandated duties in a timely 
manner.  Its approach creates no deterrence for the egregious 
behavior of the State that occurred in this case.  Instead, it 
informs committed persons that they must pursue inadequate and 
unworkable remedies.  Because I believe that the remedy to 
ensure compliance lies not in some mandamus or contempt 
proceeding brought by a mentally ill, institutionalized person, 
but in holding DHFS accountable for complying with the law, I 
respectfully concur. 
¶60 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and JUSTICE WILLIAM A. BABLITCH join this opinion.  
 
 
 
No.  99-2446.awb 
 
 
 
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