Case Title: Norfolk and Western Railway Co. v. Johnson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 950585

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1996-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, and 
Keenan, JJ., and Cochran, Retired Justice 
 
 
NORFOLK AND WESTERN  
RAILWAY COMPANY 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record No. 950585                   January 12, 1996 
 
ALFRED REID JOHNSON 
 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE 
 
Clifford R. Weckstein, Judge 
 
 
In November 1989, plaintiff Alfred Reid Johnson began 
employment with defendant Norfolk and Western Railway Company as 
a "carman welder, junior student mechanic."  After a period of 
training in welding and "grinding," the plaintiff, age 38, was 
assigned to defendant's "reclamation shop" in the City of 
Roanoke. 
 
There, plaintiff began welding and grinding on "bolsters" 
and "side frames," components of wheel assemblies on which 
freight car bodies are mounted.  Grinding involved use of a hand-
held, two-handle, pneumatic tool having an abrasive wheel turning 
at 6,000 revolutions per minute.  Grinding on the bolsters and 
side frames was performed before and after welding in order to 
smooth the welds and the surface of the metal.  The grinding 
produced vibration described as "pretty tough." 
 
During 1990, the plaintiff began experiencing pain in his 
forearms and hands with associated numbness and difficulty in 
finger dexterity and manipulation.  He sought medical attention 
and eventually was diagnosed as having bilateral carpal tunnel 
syndrome, which was worse on the right side.  This condition 
 
 
 
 
- 2 -  
involves "compression of the median nerve as it passes through 
the tunnel of the wrist known as the carpal tunnel." 
 
In 1991, the plaintiff had bilateral surgery to release 
pressure on the carpal tunnels; this relieved the symptoms.  
Later, he returned to work, performing the same duties.  After a 
while, the symptoms returned, and the defendant took the 
plaintiff "out of service" in April 1993. 
 
The plaintiff's condition resulted from vibration connected 
with the grinding.  The injury rendered him unable "to obtain or 
retain employment in the economy." 
 
The plaintiff filed the present action against the defendant 
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 
et seq., seeking recovery for his injuries.  In an amended motion 
for judgment filed in September 1994, plaintiff alleged defendant 
exposed him to excessive vibration from the grinders which 
"required constant repetitive use of both hands."  He asserted 
defendant negligently failed to provide him a reasonably safe 
place to work, failed to provide suitable equipment to perform 
his assigned task, failed to warn him of unsafe working 
conditions, and failed to provide adequate instructions for the 
safe use of the equipment.  Responding, defendant denied the 
allegations of negligence and denied it was indebted to the 
plaintiff. 
 
In a four-day trial beginning December 19, 1994, a jury 
found in favor of the plaintiff and assessed his damages at 
 
 
 
 
- 3 -  
$200,000.  The trial court denied defendant's motion to set the 
verdict aside and entered judgment on the verdict in a January 
1995 order, from which we awarded the defendant this appeal. 
 
The defendant assigns three errors, the first of which 
raises the main question on appeal.  That question is whether the 
trial court erred in failing to rule as a matter of law that 
defendant was free of primary negligence when, according to 
defendant, plaintiff's evidence failed to establish defendant 
deviated from any applicable standard of care, failed to show his 
injury was foreseeable, and failed to establish causation. 
 
The plaintiff comes to this Court in a strong position.  He 
is fortified with a jury verdict confirmed by the trial judge; 
all conflicts in testimony have been resolved in his favor.  
Accordingly, the judgment below will not be set aside "unless it 
appears from the evidence that such judgment is plainly wrong or 
without evidence to support it."  Code § 8.01-680. 
 
Applying settled appellate principles, we shall view the 
evidence, much of which was conflicting, and all reasonable 
inferences flowing from the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiff.  Prior to employment by defendant, the 
plaintiff had used hand tools while in the Navy, had worked in 
construction, had served as a police officer, had driven large 
trucks, and had worked as a mechanic using mostly hand tools, 
some of which were pneumatic.  Prior to working for defendant in 
November 1989, he had experienced no "problems" with his hands, 
 
 
 
 
- 4 -  
wrists, or arms. 
 
Upon reporting to work, defendant sent plaintiff to Georgia 
for training.  This training did not include any instruction 
about "wrist posture," "static pressure" on wrists, or about 
vibration from any of the tools or equipment plaintiff would be 
using in his job. 
 
When plaintiff returned from training, defendant assigned 
him to a shop where he was involved for several weeks in welding 
and grinding on grain hopper cars.  Next, defendant transferred 
him to the reclamation shop in February 1990.  There, plaintiff 
performed his task from an upright position, standing on a flat 
surface.  The heavy pieces of metal being worked upon were not 
lifted by the employee but were moved into position for welding 
and grinding by a crane and rotated by a "jig." 
 
The work in the reclamation shop was not an assembly line 
operation in that the grinding was not a continuous function.  
Plaintiff did not grind and weld steadily during an eight-hour 
work period.  Instead, he would perform these tasks for 
"[p]robably four to five hours" daily, according to the 
plaintiff, and on an average of three hours daily, according to 
his expert witness.  He was required "to do" ten to eleven 
bolsters per day.  Later in 1990, plaintiff "moved from doing 
bolsters to start doing the side frames."  The side frame quota 
per employee per work period was nine. 
 
After working in the reclamation shop for several months, 
 
 
 
 
- 5 -  
plaintiff began to awaken at night with his hands "throbbing and 
no feeling in them."  He had "no idea" of the cause of the 
discomfort.  He continued to work for "a couple of months" before 
going to a physician in July 1990 because the condition had 
worsened.  During the course of his treatment, plaintiff was also 
seen by a neurologist, a neurosurgeon, and a rehabilitation 
specialist.  All four of his physicians diagnosed plaintiff with 
carpal tunnel syndrome.  The rehabilitation specialist testified 
that plaintiff's "carpal tunnel was very consistent with his 
history of grinding," and that plaintiff sustained the injury as 
a result of vibration. 
 
The plaintiff presented evidence that medical knowledge 
existed many years before he was employed by defendant of a 
relationship between grinding and carpal tunnel syndrome.  
Numerous articles of medical literature published before 1990 
were documented in the evidence that listed vibration as a risk 
factor for occupational carpal tunnel syndrome. 
 
For example, the results of a study published in 1987 in the 
American Journal of Industrial Medicine, after indicating that 
the grinder was one of the hand tools used to develop information 
for the study, stated:  "While vibration and awkward posture may 
be important risk factors for carpal tunnel, only vibration 
appeared to be important in this particular investigation."  In 
1981, an article entitled "Personal and Occupational Factors 
Associated With Carpal Tunnel Syndrome" was published in the 
 
 
 
 
- 6 -  
Journal of Occupational Medicine.  The author stated:  "In the 
present study use of vibrating tools was found to be strongly 
associated with carpal tunnel syndrome."   Dr. Mahmoud Ayoub, the 
defendant's expert witness in the fields of industrial 
engineering and ergonomics (defined as "the study of the 
relationship between people and the equipment or the systems that 
they use"), in an article published in 1989, opined that the 
"number one job type that placed one at risk for carpal tunnel 
syndrome" was "buffing and grinding."  Ayoub explained during 
cross-examination that his conclusion was meant to apply only if 
the worker was engaged in grinding continuously for eight hours. 
 
The evidence established that during plaintiff's period of 
employment by defendant and during the period of development of 
medical knowledge about the occupational causes of carpal tunnel 
syndrome, defendant had a medical department staffed by licensed 
physicians.  The defendant admitted "that in 1990, or before, its 
Medical Director and Medical Department were generally aware that 
certain literature existed which hypothesized that exposure to 
excessive vibration from hand tools may precipitate cumulative 
trauma disorders such as Carpal Tunnel Syndrome."  The plaintiff 
also established that, during the period beginning in the late 
1960s to and including the early months of his employment with 
defendant, no information was communicated by defendant's medical 
department to employees about the symptoms of carpal tunnel 
syndrome as they related to the use of grinders or welding 
 
 
 
 
- 7 -  
apparatus. 
 
The plaintiff presented evidence about the knowledge of the 
industrial community regarding carpal tunnel syndrome during the 
relevant period of time.  For example, Dr. Michael D. Shinnick, 
an expert in industrial engineering and ergonomics, testified 
that since the late 1970s industry has been aware that risk 
factors for the development of occupational carpal tunnel 
syndrome have included repetitiveness ("the number of cycles or 
the number of times that a person experiences a motion or even a 
flexion"), vibration, force (torque from using a tool having "a 
lot of" revolutions per minute), and "static positioning or 
holding something in the same position for continued periods of 
time."  These factors were present in the plaintiff's job. 
 
Shinnick testified that industry had established methods to 
prevent occupational carpal tunnel syndrome.  These include 
making an analysis of the tools used and performing an ergonomics 
study.  If the study identifies hazards at the work site, 
prevention and control is employed, which should include 
redesigning the tools, redesigning the methods used in performing 
the work, use of protective equipment (such as gloves and 
"vibration isolator-type grips"), medical tracking of workers, 
and training and education of employees. 
 
Shinnick, who had examined plaintiff's job site in 
defendant's reclamation shop, testified that he "saw absolutely 
all of the risk factors associated with producing carpal tunnel. 
 
 
 
 
- 8 -  
There is a high degree of repetitiveness in the fact that even 
though the cycle time might be a number of minutes, the 
repetitiveness is holding the grinder in a static position."  He 
emphasized:  "I saw repetitiveness.  I saw vibration." 
 
Shinnick opined that the hazards he observed "were of 
sufficient magnitude to invoke some ergonomic action."  He added, 
"My opinion is that this would be a high priority job.  One would 
begin to initiate the process of analyzing the job and invoking 
engineering controls and changing them."  The evidence showed 
that defendant had conducted no formal analyses of the jobs in 
its reclamation shop prior to the filing of this action. 
 
Moreover, defendant admitted that, as early as 1988, it had 
purchased grinders with a label attached to each grinder's 
removable "guard" which stated:  "Warning:  Repetitive work 
motions or exposure to vibration may be harmful to your hands and 
arms."  Also, the catalog from which defendant ordered the 
grinders used in the reclamation shop stated that "excessive or 
improper use may result in `white finger' or carpal tunnel 
syndrome."  Defendant did not advise its workers of either of 
these warnings.  And, there was evidence that defendant did not 
warn its workers about grinder use as related to wrist positions 
and carpal tunnel syndrome until 1994. 
 
On appeal, incorrectly placing a slant on the evidence in a 
light more favorable to it, the defendant argues that plaintiff 
failed to present evidence of any deviation from a standard of 
 
 
 
 
- 9 -  
care, failed to establish causation, and failed to establish his 
carpal tunnel syndrome was foreseeable where the evidence showed 
no prior claims of such injury had ever been made by reclamation 
shop workers.  We do not agree with any of defendant's 
contentions. 
 
The principles applicable to this case are settled.  Because 
whether negligence has been established for purposes of the FELA 
is a federal question, federal decisional law formulating and 
applying the doctrine governs in cases in state courts.  Stover 
v. Norfolk and Western Ry., 249 Va. 192, 199, 455 S.E.2d 238, 242 
(1995).  "Under the FELA, a plaintiff's proof must `justify with 
reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, 
even the slightest, in producing the injury . . . for which 
damages are sought.'"  Norfolk and Western Ry. v. Hodges, 248 Va. 
254, 260, 448 S.E.2d 592, 595 (1994) (quoting Rogers v. Missouri 
Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957)).  "Reasonable 
foreseeability of harm is an essential ingredient of FELA 
negligence."  Stover, 249 Va. at 201, 455 S.E.2d at 244 (citing 
Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 372 U.S. 108, 117 (1963)).  
Ordinarily, the issue of FELA negligence, including questions of 
causation and foreseeability, should be decided by the jury.  
Hodges, 248 Va. at 260, 448 S.E.2d at 595. 
 
Under the FELA, a railroad has a nondelegable duty, which is 
continuing, to exercise reasonable care in furnishing its 
employees a safe place to work.  Id. (citing Atchison, T. & S. F. 
 
 
 
 
- 10 -  
Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 558 (1987), and Bailey v. Central 
Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 353 (1943)).  "The employer must 
perform proper inspections to discover dangers in the place where 
employees are required to work, and after determining the 
existence of dangers the employer must take reasonable 
precautions for the employees' safety."  Id. at 260-61, 448 
S.E.2d at 596 (citing Williams v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 190 
F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1951)). 
 
In the present case, our responsibility is not to 
redetermine the facts on appeal.  Rather, we must decide whether 
there was credible evidence to raise a jury issue on the question 
of primary negligence.  If so, the judgment must be affirmed. 
 
A rehash of all the evidence we have just summarized is 
unnecessary to support the conclusion we now reach that a jury 
question was presented on the issues of negligence, causation, 
and foreseeability.  It is sufficient to point out that the jury 
was entitled to find from the evidence that plaintiff, prior to 
his employment by defendant, had no problems with his hands or 
arms; and, that after working in the reclamation shop for several 
months, he developed carpal tunnel syndrome due to grinder 
vibration, an injury that eventually became permanent. 
 
The jury also was entitled to find that prior to 1989, 
defendant had actual knowledge, from manufacturer's warnings, of 
industry opinion about the relationship between grinder vibration 
and carpal tunnel syndrome; and that, prior to 1989, defendant 
 
 
 
 
- 11 -  
had actual or constructive knowledge of opinion in the medical 
community about such relationship. 
 
Finally, the jury was entitled to find that defendant 
reasonably should have foreseen injury to its reclamation shop 
workers if precautions were not taken to address the problems of 
grinder vibration; that accepted standards and methods existed to 
allow the railroad, in the exercise of ordinary care, to provide 
a safe work site for grinder users; and that defendant 
negligently failed to warn of the known danger and failed to 
provide adequate instruction to its workers regarding the 
symptoms of carpal tunnel syndrome and the methods to be used to 
avoid its onset. 
 
In sum, paraphrasing Hodges, we hold the plaintiff presented 
proof sufficient to take the case to the jury that employer 
negligence played a part, even the slightest, in producing the 
injury for which damages were sought. 
 
The defendant dwells on the contention that because no 
person complained prior to plaintiff's injury regarding excessive 
vibration from the tools used in the reclamation shop and because 
no acceptable vibration standard for the workplace was shown to 
exist, plaintiff's injury was not foreseeable and no deviation 
from any standard of care was established.  This contention 
disregards the overwhelming evidence, and reasonable inferences 
drawn from the evidence, that vibration from grinder use was a 
known risk factor in development of carpal tunnel syndrome, that 
 
 
 
 
- 12 -  
all the risk factors associated with producing the malady were 
present in defendant's reclamation shop, and that the risk 
factors were of sufficient magnitude to invoke ergonomic action, 
which defendant failed to take.  The plaintiff's evidence 
established that whatever may have been his "dosage" of 
vibration, it was of a sufficient level to cause him to acquire 
occupational carpal tunnel syndrome, and defendant should 
reasonably have anticipated such a result.  This amounts to 
negligence, causation, and foreseeability. 
 
In conclusion, we have considered defendant's two remaining 
assignments of error dealing with what it contends to be 
speculative testimony of one of plaintiff's experts and admission 
of irrelevant evidence relating to conditions in the workplace 
having no effect on plaintiff's injury.  There is no merit to 
either contention. 
 
Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err in 
submitting the case to the jury and in refusing to grant 
defendant's motion to set the verdict aside.  Therefore, the 
judgment below will be 
 
Affirmed.