Case Title: Plaintiff v. Defendant

Citation: 

Docket Number: S258498

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2022-01-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
CURTIS OLSON, 
Cross-complainant and Appellant, 
v. 
JANE DOE, 
Cross-defendant and Respondent. 
 
S258498 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Eight 
B286105 
 
 Los Angeles County Superior Court  
SC126806 
 
 
January 13, 2022 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, 
Groban, Jenkins, and Moor* concurred. 
 
 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
1 
OLSON v. DOE 
S258498 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 provides a 
specialized procedure for a petitioner who has suffered 
harassment within the meaning of the statute to expeditiously 
seek a limited judicial remedy — injunctive relief to prevent 
threatened future harm.  (All undesignated statutory references 
are to the Code of Civil Procedure.)  A petitioner who also desires 
retrospective relief in connection with the same underlying 
conduct, such as tort damages, must do so separately. 
Cross-defendant Jane Doe and cross-complainant Curtis 
Olson each own units in the same condominium building.  Doe 
sought a civil harassment restraining order against Olson 
pursuant to section 527.6.  As a result of court-ordered 
mediation, the parties agreed “not to contact or communicate 
with one another or guests accompanying them, except in 
writing and/or as required by law,” to “go[] their respective 
directions away from one another” if “the parties encounter each 
other in a public place or in common areas near their 
residences,” and “not to disparage one another.”   
The question here is whether the nondisparagement 
clause in the parties’ mediation agreement potentially applies to 
and thereby limits Doe’s ability to bring a subsequent unlimited 
civil lawsuit against Olson seeking damages.  Doe later filed 
such a lawsuit; Olson cross-complained for breach of contract 
and specific performance, arguing that Doe’s suit violated the 
OLSON v. DOE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
nondisparagement clause; and Doe moved to strike Olson’s 
cross-complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute.  We hold that 
the mediation agreement as a whole and the specific context in 
which it was reached — a section 527.6 proceeding — preclude 
Olson’s broad reading of the nondisparagement clause.  
Accordingly, Olson has failed to show the requisite “minimal 
merit” on a critical element of his breach of contract claim — 
Doe’s obligation under the agreement to refrain from making 
disparaging statements in litigation — and thus cannot defeat 
Doe’s anti-SLAPP motion.  (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 
Cal.4th 82, 94 (Navellier).)   
I. 
Doe and Olson met in 2002 and worked together to acquire 
and preserve a historic apartment building.  Olson acquired the 
building, converted the apartments into eight condominium 
units, and ultimately became the owner and part-time resident 
of one of the units.  Olson served as the president of the 
building’s homeowners association (HOA) board from 2013 to 
January 2016, and Doe resided in one of the condominium units.   
In December 2016, Doe filed an unlimited civil lawsuit 
against Olson and various other defendants, including other 
residents of the building, the HOA, and the property 
management company.  Through the complaint, Doe seeks 
damages for a variety of claims, including sexual battery, 
assault, and discrimination based on perceived ethnicity, 
religion, and marital status.  The complaint alleges multiple 
romantic advances over a long period of time by Olson toward 
Doe, which Doe rejected, followed by “a pattern of retaliatory 
events” by Olson, friends and associates of Olson (some of whom 
resided in the building after purchasing units from Olson), and 
OLSON v. DOE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
the HOA.  Doe ultimately moved out of the building for a period 
from 2009 to 2013.   
The complaint further alleges that in May 2015, after Doe 
had resumed living in her unit, Olson invited her to meet with 
him in order to “ ‘bury the hatchet,’ ” and after socializing in the 
courtyard of the building, Doe accompanied Olson to his 
condominium unit to watch a short video on the internet that he 
was having difficulty loading.  According to the complaint, Doe 
was sitting on a sofa in Olson’s unit when Olson “forced himself 
on top of” her and “started touching her face, hair, and breasts 
and tried to kiss” her before she was able to struggle free and 
leave.  After this incident, Doe alleges, Olson confronted her in 
the courtyard visibly upset, and over the ensuing months Olson 
and his associates continued to harass and stalk her by, for 
example, “peeping, filming, videotaping, and/or photographing 
[Doe] and her guests,” including through the bedroom and 
bathroom windows of her condominium unit, which prompted 
Doe to file police reports.   
The events described in the complaint initially prompted 
Doe to seek a civil harassment restraining order against Olson 
pursuant to section 527.6 in October 2015.  Her request included 
allegations of sexual battery, peeping, harassment, and threats 
to Doe’s life and property, and it sought both personal conduct 
and stay-away orders against Olson.  The court granted Doe’s 
request for a personal conduct order against Olson and issued a 
temporary restraining order, but the court denied Doe’s request 
for a stay-away order in advance of a hearing.   
Olson opposed Doe’s request for a civil harassment 
restraining order, “vehemently deny[ing] th[e] allegations” in 
her request and asserting that the HOA “and its vendors have 
OLSON v. DOE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
had a well-documented history of problems with [Doe] in 
connection with her use and residency” at the building, 
including her continued use of a basement storage unit.  At a 
hearing on December 10, 2015, the court ordered the parties to 
mediation supervised by a volunteer mediator from the 
California Academy of Mediation Professionals (CAMP).  The 
parties then entered into single-page “Mediation” and 
“Mediation/Confidentiality” agreements that same day.   
Pursuant to the mediation agreement, Doe’s request for a 
civil harassment restraining order was dismissed without 
prejudice, and the parties agreed to resolve their dispute in 
pertinent part as follows:  “(1) [Olson] denies each and every 
allegation made by [Doe] in the dispute.  (2) This agreement is 
made voluntarily by mutual agreement of the parties, and 
nothing contained herein is to be construed as an admission of 
any wrongdoing of the parties.  (3) The parties agree not to 
contact 
or 
communicate 
with 
one 
another 
or 
guests 
accompanying them, except in writing and/or as required by law.  
(4) Should the parties encounter each other in a public place or 
in common areas near their residences, they shall seek to honor 
this agreement by going their respective directions away from 
one another.  (5) The parties agree not to disparage one another.  
(6) The term of this agreement shall be three (3) years.”   
According to Doe’s civil complaint, harassment by the 
HOA board and other associates of Olson continued even after 
the mediation agreement was reached, including a demand by 
the HOA board in May 2016 that Doe pay a percentage of the 
legal fees incurred by Olson in connection with opposing the civil 
harassment restraining order.  In August 2016, Doe filed an 
administrative complaint with the United States Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), naming Olson and the 
OLSON v. DOE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
HOA as respondents and alleging discrimination based on sex 
and gender.  The administrative complaint was referred to the 
California Department of Fair Employment and Housing 
(DFEH) for investigation.  In the administrative complaint, Doe 
claimed “discrimination based on sex and gender,” alleging that 
Olson “stalked her,” “subjected her to unwanted sexual 
comments and touching,” took “pictures of [her] while she [wa]s 
in the bathroom and in her bedroom,” and “used his position as 
board president to direct the maintenance man to install 
cameras in [her] unit,” and that “as a result of the restraining 
order [Olson and the HOA] tied in a portion of the attorney fees 
to her home” such that “[i]f the balance[] is not paid in full a 10% 
monthly fee is added to the unpaid balance and they are able to 
foreclose on [her] property.”   
Doe subsequently filed a civil complaint against Olson and 
the other defendants seeking damages.  In May 2017, Olson filed 
a cross-complaint against Doe for breach of contract damages 
and specific performance.  The cross-complaint alleges that Doe 
breached the mediation agreement’s nondisparagement clause 
by filing her administrative complaint and her civil complaint 
for damages, and it requests contract damages and an order for 
specific performance requiring Doe “to withdraw and dismiss all 
claims in this case, the HUD Complaint, and the DFEH 
Complaint against Olson or that otherwise disparage Olson.”   
Doe moved to strike Olson’s cross-complaint under the 
anti-SLAPP statute, asserting that it was “retaliatory litigation” 
and “an attempt to chill Doe’s exercise of her rights of free 
speech under the United States or California Constitution . . . 
and right to petition the courts and the executive branch for 
redress of grievances.”  (See § 425.16, subds. (b)(1), (e)(1) & 
(e)(4).)  Doe argued that Olson could not establish a probability 
OLSON v. DOE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
of prevailing because “[t]here was an exception clause that 
expressly preserves Doe’s right to sue and no release of all 
claims executed by Doe and Doe’s Complaint and reports to 
HUD and DFEH are absolute [sic] privileged under California 
Civil Code § 47.”  Olson opposed the motion, arguing that the 
parties “agreed not to disparage one another for three years,” 
that Doe breached that agreement by filing the administrative 
and civil complaints, and that “having contractually obligated 
herself not to disparage Olson, Doe is not entitled to th[e] 
protections” of the anti-SLAPP statute.   
The trial court granted Doe’s special motion to strike, and 
Olson appealed.  The Court of Appeal affirmed in part and 
reversed in part.  With respect to Doe’s administrative 
complaint, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court and 
viewed Vivian v. Labrucherie (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 267 as 
dispositive, concluding that applying the litigation privilege was 
necessary to promote full and candid disclosure to a public 
agency whose purpose is to protect the public from illegal 
activity and thus absolved Doe of any liability.  With respect to 
Doe’s civil complaint, however, the Court of Appeal disagreed 
with the trial court, concluding that the public policy underlying 
the litigation privilege did not support its application to Doe’s 
complaint.  The Court of Appeal further concluded that Olson 
had demonstrated the minimal merit needed to pass the second 
prong of the anti-SLAPP inquiry with respect to his breach of 
contract claim for damages but had failed to do so with respect 
to his claim for specific performance.  We granted review to 
decide under what circumstances the litigation privilege of Civil 
Code section 47, subdivision (b) applies to contract claims, and 
whether an agreement following mediation between the parties 
in an action for a civil harassment restraining order, in which 
OLSON v. DOE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
they agree not to disparage one another, can lead to liability for 
statements made in a later unlimited civil lawsuit arising from 
the same alleged misconduct. 
II. 
The parties’ dispute centers on the construction of their 
mediation agreement, which was reached within the context of 
a civil harassment restraining order proceeding.  (§ 527.6.)  We 
begin with some background on this specialized civil procedure. 
The Legislature enacted section 527.6 in 1978 in order “to 
protect the individual’s right to pursue safety, happiness and 
privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution.”  (Stats. 
1978, ch. 1307, § 1, p. 4294; see Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.)  The 
provision was intended to “ ‘establish an expedited procedure for 
enjoining acts of “harassment” ’ ” in order “ ‘to provide quick 
relief to harassed persons.’ ”  (Smith v. Silvey (1983) 149 
Cal.App.3d 400, 405 (Smith).)  In the Legislature’s view, 
“procedures under [then-]existing law” — namely “a tort action 
based either on invasion of privacy or on intentional infliction of 
emotional distress” — were “inadequate to remedy the mental 
and emotional distress suffered by a person,” and “[t]he length 
of time it takes to obtain an injunction in many cases is too long.”  
(Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3093 (1977–
1978 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 19, 1978, pp. 1–2.)  Section 
527.6, subdivision (a)(1) enables a victim of “harassment” to 
“seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing 
prohibiting harassment.”  In its current form, section 527.6 
provides “for the issuance of a temporary restraining order 
without notice . . . on the same day that the petition is submitted 
to the court” (§ 527.6, subd. (e)) and generally requires the court 
to hold a hearing on the petition within 21 days (id., subd. (g)).  
OLSON v. DOE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
“If the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that 
unlawful harassment exists, an order shall issue prohibiting the 
harassment.”  (Id., subd. (i).) 
Thus, “section 527.6 provides a quick, simple and 
truncated procedure . . . and was drafted with the expectation 
that victims often would seek relief without the benefit of a 
lawyer.”  (Yost v. Forestiere (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 509, 520 
(Yost).)  To that end, section 527.6 from its inception has 
required the Judicial Council to develop forms for use in these 
proceedings (Stats. 1978, ch. 1307, § 2, subd. (k), p. 4296; see 
§ 527.6, subd. (x)(1)), and current law requires that “[t]he 
petition and response forms . . . be simple and concise, and their 
use by parties in actions brought pursuant to [section 527.6] is 
mandatory” (§ 527.6, subd. (x)(1)). 
Section 527.6 has also made clear since its inception that 
utilizing this specialized civil procedure does not “preclude a 
plaintiff’s right to utilize other existing civil remedies.”  (Stats. 
1978, ch. 1307, § 2, subd. (j), p. 4296; see § 527.6, subd. (w).)  
“The quick, injunctive relief provided by section 527.6 ‘lies only 
to prevent threatened injury’ — that is, future wrongs” — and 
“is not intended to punish the restrained party for past acts of 
harassment.”  (Yost, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 520, quoting 
Scripps Health v. Marin (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 324, 332.) 
III. 
With this statutory context in mind, we consider the 
subject of Doe’s special motion to strike Olson’s cross-complaint:  
whether Doe’s civil lawsuit violated the nondisparagement 
clause in the parties’ mediation agreement arising from Doe’s 
section 527.6 action seeking a temporary restraining order.  (See 
§ 425.16.)  The question is whether such a nondisparagement 
OLSON v. DOE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
clause applies to statements made in a later unlimited civil 
lawsuit arising from the same alleged misconduct. 
A. 
Pursuant to section 425.16, a party may file a special 
motion to strike a cause of action or particular claims underlying 
a cause of action that arise from activity protected by the anti-
SLAPP statute.  The moving party “must establish that the 
challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 
425.16”; if the moving party does so, “the burden shifts” to the 
nonmoving party “to demonstrate the merit of the claim by 
establishing a probability of success.”  (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 
Cal.5th 376, 384 (Baral); see § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)  Before the 
trial court and on appeal, Olson conceded that Doe’s 
administrative and civil complaints — the conduct that gave 
rise to Olson’s actions for breach of contract and specific 
performance — constitute petitioning activity protected by 
section 425.16.  Thus, the only issue before us is whether Olson 
has shown a probability of success.  In that regard, we address 
only the breach of contract claim that Olson raised in the Court 
of Appeal:  that Doe breached their agreement, not by suing him 
under his own name, but by filing the administrative and civil 
complaints against him.  The Court of Appeal held that Olson 
“failed to prove the requisite minimal merit” for his claim for 
specific performance and affirmed that portion of the trial 
court’s order, and Olson did not seek review.  (Doe v. Olson (Aug. 
30, 2019, B286105) [nonpub. opn.].) 
To succeed in opposing a special motion to strike, the 
nonmoving party must “demonstrate both that the claim is 
legally sufficient and that there is sufficient evidence to 
establish a prima facie case with respect to the claim.”  (Taus v. 
OLSON v. DOE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 714.)  “[C]laims with the requisite 
minimal merit may proceed.”  (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 
p. 94.)  The moving party prevails by “defeat[ing]” the “claim as 
a matter of law” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 385) in “a 
summary-judgment-like procedure” (Taus, at p. 714).   
As relevant here, we recognized in Navellier that the anti-
SLAPP statute can apply to a breach of contract claim, but the 
statute “preserves appropriate remedies for breaches of 
contracts involving speech” since “a defendant who in fact has 
validly contracted not to speak or petition has in effect ‘waived’ 
the right to the anti-SLAPP statute’s protection in the event he 
or she later breaches that contract.”  (Navellier, supra, 29 
Cal.4th at p. 94.)  An essential element of Olson’s breach of 
contract action is showing that Doe breached the mediation 
agreement.  (E.g., Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 
51 Cal.4th 811, 821 [setting forth elements of breach of contract 
claim].)  In light of the language of the nondisparagement 
clause, the mediation agreement as a whole, and the broader 
context in which the agreement was negotiated, we hold that the 
nondisparagement clause does not apply to statements made by 
Doe in the litigation context.  Thus, Olson has failed to make a 
prima facie showing on this element sufficient to overcome Doe’s 
special motion to strike. 
The language of the nondisparagement clause is simple:  
“The parties agree not to disparage one another.”  Read in 
isolation, this language is vague as to its scope and conceivably 
could be understood to sweep broadly as Olson suggests.  Yet a 
few reasons suggest that such a reading — i.e., one that 
prevents Doe from making any allegations potentially 
disparaging against Olson in future litigation — is foreclosed as 
a matter of law.  (See People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 
OLSON v. DOE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
413, fn. 17 (Doolin) [“[w]here . . . the meaning of [the] agreement 
does not turn on the credibility of extrinsic evidence, 
interpretation is a question of law”].) 
First, the nondisparagement clause must be understood in 
connection with the mediation agreement as a whole.  (See 
Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 413, fn. 17 [“Our interpretation 
of the agreement is guided by the basic principle that ‘[a]ny 
contract must be construed as a whole, with the various 
individual provisions interpreted together so as to give effect to 
all, if reasonably possible or practicable.’ ”].)  It is one of only six 
numbered terms of the one-page agreement, and only three of 
those constitute the substantive terms intended to directly 
govern the prospective conduct of the parties.  Apart from the 
nondisparagement clause, Doe and Olson agreed “not to contact 
or communicate with one another or guests accompanying them, 
except in writing and/or as required by law,” and “to honor this 
agreement by going their respective directions away from one 
another” if “the parties encounter each other in a public place or 
in common areas near their residences.”  The purpose and 
primary focus of the mediation agreement is self-evident from 
the agreement as a whole:  to set forth mutually agreeable 
parameters to govern the parties’ potential future physical 
interactions with one other, including encounters rendered 
unavoidable by the fact that both owned condominium units in 
the same building. 
The terms of 
Doe and Olson’s 
agreement were 
handwritten.  The mediator had apparently run out of the 
standard-issue, typed mediation agreements used at the 
courthouse.  But the substantive terms contained in Doe and 
Olson’s agreement nonetheless share substantial similarity 
with those contained in the version provided by the clerk in 
OLSON v. DOE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
response to a request for the “standard mediation agreement.”  
The standard agreement provides:  “The parties agree not to 
communicate with each other directly or through persons acting 
on their behalf . . . .”  Further, although the standard agreement 
does not anticipate parties sharing a residential building, it 
says:  “The parties agree to stay away from each other and their 
respective property, including but not limited to, their 
residences, places of employment, and personal property,” and 
“[s]hould the parties encounter each other in a public place, they 
agree to continue going in their respective directions away from 
one another.”  
The standard-issue mediation agreement also has a 
nondisparagement clause of sorts.  It provides that the “parties 
agree to not gossip about each other to anyone.  The parties 
further agree to not comment . . . about each other to non-
governmental 3rd parties unless specifically requested to do so.  
If they are asked to comment, they shall refer to each other 
using neutral terms and shall not use negative words or 
disparage 
one 
another.” 
 
By 
specifically 
exempting 
“governmental 3rd parties” from its ambit, the form makes clear 
that such agreements are intended to prevent interpersonal 
third party “gossip” and rumor-spreading, not official filings 
with legal authorities.  The similarities between Doe and Olson’s 
agreement and the standard-issue form suggest that the parties 
did not intend something out of the ordinary with their 
agreement.  The standard-issue form, moreover, makes clear 
that the typical nondisparagement clause is not intended to 
apply to litigation conduct. 
Absent from either Doe and Olson’s agreement or the 
standard mediation agreement are terms providing any release 
from liability or waiver of claims.  Olson seeks a broad reading 
OLSON v. DOE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
of the nondisparagement clause, one that would effectively serve 
the purpose of those missing terms.  Yet we must tread carefully 
in such circumstances.  “ ‘Release, indemnity and similar 
exculpatory provisions are binding on the signatories and 
enforceable so long as they are . . . “clear, explicit and 
comprehensible in each [of their] essential details.  Such an 
agreement, read as a whole, must clearly notify the prospective 
releasor or indemnitor of the effect of signing the agreement.” ’ ”  
(Skrbina v. Fleming Companies (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1353, 
1368, quoting Powers v. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 
318, 320.)  Moreover, according to the terms of the agreement, 
Doe’s section 527.6 petition was dismissed “without prejudice,” 
in clear contemplation of the potential for further section 527.6 
proceedings.  A broad reading of the nondisparagement clause 
would render a dismissal without prejudice meaningless if Doe 
could be liable for breach of the mediation agreement were she 
to exercise her right to seek further section 527.6 relief against 
Olson or against any other party where the underlying factual 
allegations touch on Olson.  Olson concedes that the mediation 
agreement does not limit Doe’s ability to file a renewed petition 
for a restraining order against him; he agrees that Doe would 
not face contract damages for doing so.  But he provides no 
reason to believe the parties intended to permit Doe to make 
disparaging remarks in one kind of litigation (a subsequent 
petition for a restraining order) but not in other litigation 
seeking a different type of relief.  
The parties’ agreements further suggest that they 
contemplated the possibility of future litigation outside of 
section 527.6 proceedings.  The “Mediation/Confidentiality 
Agreement” between Doe and Olson says that “each party . . . 
understands and acknowledges that evidence presented during 
OLSON v. DOE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
this mediation may be verified outside of the mediation process 
and used as evidence in subsequent legal proceedings.”  (Italics 
added.)  The mediation agreement itself also specifically 
provides, immediately above the signature line, that “this 
written settlement may be disclosed in a court of law.  Upon 
disclosure, this agreement may be admitted as evidence and/or 
enforced as determined to be appropriate by the court.”  Thus, 
the parties’ agreements as a whole counsel against an expansive 
reading of the nondisparagement clause. 
Second, the mediation agreement is inextricably linked to 
the broader context in which it was negotiated — i.e., in a 
proceeding for a civil harassment restraining order.  This 
context is critical.  (See Civ. Code, § 1647 [“A contract may be 
explained by reference to the circumstances under which it was 
made, and the matter to which it relates.”]; id., § 1648 
[“However broad may be the terms of a contract, it extends only 
to those things concerning which it appears that the parties 
intended to contract.”].)  Such a proceeding is statutorily 
designed to narrowly focus on interpersonal conflict.  Its 
purpose, when warranted by the circumstances, is to prevent 
threatened future injury through a resulting “order enjoining a 
party from harassing, intimidating, molesting, attacking, 
striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, 
abusing, telephoning, including, but not limited to, making 
annoying telephone calls, as described in Section 653m of the 
Penal Code, destroying personal property, contacting, either 
directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, or coming within a 
specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of, the petitioner.”  
(§ 527.6, subd. (b)(6)(A).) 
The narrow focus of these proceedings is communicated to 
petitioners through instructions issued by the Judicial Council.  
OLSON v. DOE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
Judicial Council form CH-100-INFO explains that the purpose 
of a civil harassment restraining order is to “protect people from 
harassment.”  The instructions explain that in a civil 
harassment case, the court can “order a person to . . . [¶] [n]ot 
harass or threaten you[,] [¶] [n]ot contact or go near you, and [¶] 
[n]ot have a gun.”  But the court cannot, among other things, 
“[o]rder a person to pay money that he or she owes you.” 
That the petitioner in a section 527.6 proceeding has no 
ability to seek, and the court has no authority to order, redress 
of past wrongs through damages or otherwise does not mean 
that a petitioner waives the right to separately seek such other 
remedies merely by utilizing this specialized statutory 
procedure for imminent injunctive relief.  To the contrary, the 
statute expressly provides that “a petitioner” is “not preclude[d] 
from using other existing civil remedies.”  (§ 527.6, subd. (w).)  
“Section 527.6 was passed to supplement the existing common 
law torts of invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress by providing quick relief to harassment 
victims threatened with great or irreparable injury,” not to 
supplant those complementary remedies.  (Grant v. Clampitt 
(1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 586, 591, italics added.) 
“Compromise agreements are, of course, ‘governed by the 
legal principles applicable to contracts generally’ . . . [and] 
‘regulate and settle only such matters and differences as appear 
clearly to be comprehended in them by the intention of the 
parties and the necessary consequences thereof, and do not 
extend to matters which the parties never intended to include 
therein, although existing at the time.’ ”  (Folsom v. Butte 
County Assn. of Governments (1982) 32 Cal.3d 668, 677.)  We 
have applied this principle in a somewhat analogous context 
where we considered the meaning of the standard language used 
OLSON v. DOE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
to release claims and causes of action in workers’ compensation 
settlements.  (See Claxton v. Waters (2004) 34 Cal.4th 367.)  
Despite the broad language of the release at issue in Claxton — 
“ ‘releas[ing] and forever discharg[ing] said employer and 
insurance carrier from all claims and causes of action, whether 
now known or ascertained, or which may hereafter arise or 
develop as a result of said injury’ ” — we held that it “releases 
only those claims that are within the scope of the workers’ 
compensation system, and does not apply to claims asserted in 
separate civil actions.”  (Claxton, at pp. 371, 376.)  We construed 
this language in light of the statutory context governing 
workers’ compensation — in particular, the statute focuses 
narrowly on eligible employee injuries where it provides the 
exclusive remedy; some claims based on conduct contrary to 
fundamental public policy are not subject to the scheme’s 
exclusivity provisions; and other claims are not compensable or 
cognizable under the scheme at all and must be pursued 
separately.  (Id. at pp. 372–374.)  We also noted the goal of 
“quickly provid[ing] benefits” to “injured workers,” the “informal 
rules of pleading [that] apply to such proceedings,” and the fact 
that “workers may be represented by individuals other than 
attorneys.”  (Id. at p. 373.) 
Similar reasoning applies here.  As noted, a petitioner 
seeking a civil harassment restraining order and a court 
reviewing such a request are confined by the limited nature of 
section 527.6 proceedings.  Tort and other actions seeking 
retrospective relief by way of damages for the conduct 
underlying a petition are not cognizable.  It is clear from the 
statute and legislative history that section 527.6 proceedings 
are not intended to provide a forum for a global resolution of a 
petitioner’s potential claims related to the underlying conduct 
OLSON v. DOE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
at issue.  Rather, section 527.6 provides “ ‘an expedited 
procedure . . . to provide quick relief to harassed persons’ ” 
(Smith, supra, 149 Cal.App.3d at p. 405), not to the exclusion of 
a petitioner’s right to seek other relief through traditional civil 
litigation and at a much slower pace (see § 527.6, subd. (w)).  
Like the workers’ compensation scheme in Claxton, section 
527.6 procedures are relatively informal, proceeding by “simple 
and concise” forms that parties are required to use (§ 527.6, 
subd. (x)(1)) and “with the expectation that victims often . . . 
seek relief without the benefit of a lawyer,” as was the case here 
with Doe proceeding in propia persona (Yost, supra, 51 
Cal.App.5th at p. 521). 
Moreover, the specific procedures governing the mediation 
process for section 527.6 proceedings seem uniquely unsuited to 
expanding a section 527.6 mediation beyond the statute’s 
narrow focus.  The parties were referred to mediation on the day 
of the trial court hearing on Doe’s petition.  As amici curiae note, 
such mediations “are conducted only by court appointed 
specially trained mediators,” “only on the court’s premises,” and 
agreements “must be agreed to and signed the same day, by the 
close of the courthouse day, which is usually about 4:30 p.m.”  If 
the parties fail to reach an agreement, an evidentiary hearing 
on the section 527.6 petition typically begins the following day.  
These procedures appear tailored to the narrow focus and 
expedited nature of section 527.6 proceedings; expanding the 
mediation to consider additional issues would run counter to the 
statutory purpose of “ ‘provid[ing] quick relief to harassed 
persons.’ ”  (Smith, supra, 149 Cal.App.3d at p. 405.)  This 
counsels skepticism toward reading an agreement reached 
through such a process to have far-reaching implications beyond 
the section 527.6 context. 
OLSON v. DOE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
Finally, it is undisputed that Doe’s administrative and 
civil complaints constitute petitioning activity protected by 
section 425.16 and article I, section 3 of the California 
Constitution.  (See Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & 
Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115 [“ ‘petitioning activity 
involves lobbying the government, suing, [and] testifying’ ” and 
“ ‘ “[t]he constitutional right to petition . . . includes the basic act 
of filing litigation or otherwise seeking administrative 
action” ’ ”].)  Although the right to petition is somewhat 
differently situated from the right to a jury trial under article I, 
section 16 of the California Constitution (see Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 631; Grafton Partners v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 944), 
the 
fact 
that 
Olson’s 
broad 
construction 
of 
the 
nondisparagement clause in the mediation agreement would 
impair Doe’s exercise of constitutional rights remains an 
important consideration.  (Janus v. American Federation of 
State, County & Mun. Employees, Council 31 (2018) 585 U.S. __, 
__ [138 S.Ct. 2448, 2486] [waiver of 1st Amend. rights “cannot 
be presumed” and, “to be effective, . . . must be freely given and 
shown by ‘clear and compelling’ evidence”].) 
In sum, the mediation agreement as a whole, the statutory 
context in which it was negotiated, and the fact that it 
implicates constitutionally protected petitioning activity lead us 
to conclude that the nondisparagement clause does not apply to 
the circumstances here.  Under the reading Olson urges, the 
clause would seem to constrain Doe’s ability to further avail 
herself of the very protections provided by section 527.6, 
including filing another petition or utilizing the “other existing 
civil remedies” that the statute expressly preserves.  (§ 527.6, 
subd. (w).)  Under Olson’s interpretation of the agreement, the 
nondisparagement clause would even apply to statements the 
OLSON v. DOE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
parties make in litigation involving third parties or about 
conduct occurring after Doe and Olson entered into the 
agreement.  We see no indication that the parties understood 
the nondisparagement clause to sweep so broadly.  Olson’s 
reliance on the bare text of the clause, devoid of context and 
without more, is insufficient to proceed on a breach of contract 
claim in the face of an anti-SLAPP motion. 
We are not confronted with factual circumstances that 
might make the anti-SLAPP question more difficult, such as 
conduct that falls somewhere between direct communication 
between the parties as contemplated by the mediation 
agreement and subsequent litigation.  For example, this case 
does not concern whether the nondisparagement clause might 
apply to a concerted, hostile media campaign by one party 
against the other.  We have no occasion here to address such a 
scenario.  Olson has failed to show “the requisite minimal merit” 
to “proceed” on his breach of contract claim.  (Navellier, supra, 
29 Cal.4th at p. 94.) 
B. 
Olson argues that Doe may “try to prove her tort causes of 
action” but “cannot shoot and miss without facing the penalty of 
contract damages.”  First, Olson analogizes the Court of 
Appeal’s holding to the statutory provisions governing family 
law proceedings and custody determinations in the face of one 
parent’s potentially false accusations of sexual abuse by the 
other.  According to Olson, such family law provisions 
demonstrate “another context where the Legislature has 
recognized the incentive to make false accusations can be so 
great as to overwhelm the motivation for veracity.”  But the 
analogy does not hold.  We are not confronted with how to apply 
OLSON v. DOE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
a 
highly 
reticulated 
statutory 
scheme 
reflecting 
the 
Legislature’s sensitive policy judgments.  This case turns on an 
ordinary question of contract interpretation that the Legislature 
likely did not contemplate when enacting section 527.6 or the 
anti-SLAPP statute. 
Next, Olson contends that the answer to the question 
before us is “simple because the Court of Appeal’s holding does 
not bar Doe’s claims but allows Olson to plead and prove his.”  
Olson’s argument is that “the non-disparagement clause in the 
mediated agreement does not operate to ‘bar’ Doe’s ‘unlimited 
civil lawsuit’ ” because Doe can still proceed with her claims, just 
with the specter of breach of contract liability hanging over her 
head.  This fails to respond to the substance of the question at 
hand.  Whether the claim is that Doe cannot file suit or that she 
may be subject to damages liability for doing so is materially the 
same for purposes of assessing whether the nondisparagement 
clause applies to statements made in connection with 
subsequent litigation.   
In Olson’s view, even if Doe prevailed on her sexual 
battery claim, he could also prevail on his breach of contract 
claim and seek damages for economic injury based on 
reputational harm to offset any damages he owed her.  Such an 
interpretation could require Doe to pay Olson after having 
successfully proven her case if his damages exceed those 
awarded to her.  There are strong public policy reasons to refrain 
from such an interpretation.  Not long after the mediation 
agreement in this case was signed, the Legislature clarified that 
a provision within a settlement agreement that prevents the 
disclosure of factual information related to sexual assault or 
harassment is prohibited.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1001, subd. (a)(1), 
(2); see Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 820 
OLSON v. DOE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 20, 2018, pp. 3–4 
[expressing 
concerns 
with 
confidentiality 
provisions 
in 
settlement agreements in cases involving sexual harassment 
and assault].)  While Olson’s interpretation of the clause would 
not prohibit Doe from revealing factual information, the specter 
of liability would clearly disincentivize it. 
Olson is correct, of course, that generally speaking a party 
can “validly contract[] not to speak or petition” and thereby 
“ ‘waive[]’ the right to the anti-SLAPP statute’s protection in the 
event he or she later breaches that contract.”  (Navellier, supra, 
29 Cal.4th at p. 94.)  But the circumstances here are 
meaningfully different from what we have confronted in other 
cases. 
In Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, a 
tort settlement “included several provisions purporting to 
impose confidentiality obligations on the parties and their 
counsel,” and counsel signed the agreement “under a notation 
that they approved [it] as to form and content.”  (Id. at p. 785.)  
Monster Energy subsequently sued counsel, alleging that public 
statements about the settlement constituted breach of the 
agreement.  We held that Monster Energy had met its burden of 
showing the “minimal merit” needed to proceed on the breach of 
contract claim “[i]n light of the nature and extent of provisions 
in the agreement here purporting to bind counsel, and the other 
properly submitted evidence.”  (Id. at p. 796.)  We specifically 
looked to the agreement’s “numerous references to counsel as 
one whose keeping of confidentiality is assured,” which 
“reflect[ed] an expectation that the confidentiality provisions 
would apply to counsel as well.”  (Ibid.)  Thus, we found it 
“reasonable to argue that counsel’s signature on the document 
evinced an understanding of the agreement’s terms and a 
OLSON v. DOE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
willingness to be bound by the terms that explicitly referred to 
him.”  (Ibid.) 
Whereas the agreement as a whole, together with 
extrinsic evidence, supported the breach of contract claim in 
Monster Energy, Olson relies solely on the text of the 
nondisparagement clause.  Going beyond that isolated language, 
as we must, to consider the mediation agreement as a whole and 
the context in which it was negotiated undermines Olson’s 
showing on a critical element of his claim:  Doe had no obligation 
under the contract to refrain from making disparaging 
statements in litigation.  Olson thus cannot defeat Doe’s anti-
SLAPP motion.  
C. 
We 
also 
granted 
review 
to 
decide 
under 
what 
circumstances the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, 
subdivision (b) applies to contract claims.  Because we conclude 
that Olson has not demonstrated a probability of success 
necessary to overcome Doe’s anti-SLAPP motion, we need not 
and do not reach the question whether the litigation privilege 
also poses a barrier to Olson’s claims.  (See Flatley v. Mauro 
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 323 [“The litigation privilege is also 
relevant to the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis in that 
it may present a substantive defense a plaintiff must overcome 
to demonstrate a probability of prevailing.”].)  We note only that 
the approach we have taken here — carefully construing a 
clause that would effectively waive claims — is similar to the 
approach of courts that have assessed the application of the 
privilege in the context of a contract said to have waived it.  (See 
O’Brien & Gere Eng’rs. v. City of Salisbury (Md. 2016) 135 A.3d 
473, 489–491.)  
OLSON v. DOE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
23 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal insofar as 
it reversed the trial court’s order granting Doe’s special motion 
to strike the breach of contract cause of action with respect to 
statements in Doe’s civil complaint.  We remand the matter for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur:  
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
MOOR, J.*
 
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Olson v. Doe 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 8/30/19 – 2d Dist., 
Div. 8 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S258498 
Date Filed:  January 13, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  Craig D. Karlan 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Buchalter, Robert M. Dato, Eric Michael Kennedy, Robert Collings 
Little and Paul Augusto Alarcón for Cross-complainant and Appellant. 
 
Martinez Business & Immigration Law Group, Gloria P. Martinez-
Senftner; Keiter Appellate Law, Mitchell Keiter; Sidley Austin, David 
R. Carpenter, Collin P. Wedel, Andrew B. Talai, Joel L. Richert, Paula 
C. Salazar; Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner, Jean-Claude André, Anne 
Redcross Beehler and Kristy Anne Murphy for Cross-defendant and 
Respondent. 
 
Goodwin Procter, Neel Chatterjee, Alexis S. Coll-Very, Stella Padilla, 
Megan D. Bettles; Arati Vasan, Janani Ramachandran, Jennafer 
Dorfman Wagner, Erin C. Smith; and Amy C. Poyer for Family 
Violence Appellate Project and California Women’s Law Center as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Cross-defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
Law Offices of Aimee J. Zeltzer and Aimee Zeltzer for John K. Mitchell 
and Dr. Jack R. Goetz as Amici Curiae on behalf of Cross-defendant 
and Respondent. 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Eric Michael Kennedy 
Buchalter 
1000 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1500 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
(213) 891-5051 
 
Jean-Claude André 
Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP 
120 Broadway, Suite 300 
Santa Monica, CA 90401-2386 
(310) 576-2148