Case Title: Lechliter v. Sussec County Planning & Zoning Commission, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 619, 2015

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2016-04-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GERALD A. LECHLITER, 
 
Petitioner Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
SUSSEX COUNTY PLANNING 
AND ZONING COMMISSION, J.G. 
TOWNSEND, JR. & CO., and JACK 
LINGO ASSET MANAGEMENT, 
LLC, 
 
Respondents Below- 
Appellees. 
§ 
§  No. 619, 2015 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  C.A. No. S15A-05-003 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: March 4, 2016 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: April 28, 2016 
 
Before HOLLAND, VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 28th day of April 2016, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Gerald Lechliter, filed this appeal from the 
Superior Court’s order dated May 11, 2015 and from the letter opinion dated 
October 20, 2015, which denied reargument.  The Superior Court dismissed 
Lechliter’s “Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Appeal” as untimely.  After 
careful consideration, we find no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
 
2 
(2) 
The underlying matter involves a subdivision application filed 
by the appellees, J.G. Townsend, Jr. & Company (“Townsend”) and Jack 
Lingo Asset Management, LLC (“Lingo”), as the owner and developer, 
respectively, of the subdivision referred to as Harbor Point.  On March 12, 
2015, the Sussex County Planning and Zoning Commission (“the 
Commission”) granted preliminary approval of Harbor Point with 
conditions.  The Commission notified Townsend and Lingo that the 
preliminary approval was valid for three years, during which time the 
conditions must be satisfied.  On May 7, 2015, Lechliter filed his “Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari and Appeal” with the Superior Court, seeking to 
challenge the Commission’s decision.  On May 11, 2015, the Superior 
Court, sua sponte, dismissed Lechliter’s petition, holding that the petition 
was untimely under Section 99-39C of the Sussex County Code1 and 9 Del. 
C. § 6918.2 
(3) 
Lechliter filed a motion for reargument.  Thereafter, the 
Superior Court directed legal counsel for the Commission to file a response 
to the motion for reargument and permitted Lechliter to file a reply.  The 
                                                 
1 Section 99-39C of the Sussex County Code provides that appeals to the Superior Court 
shall be “in the same manner as appeals from decisions of the Board of Adjustment as 
specified in 9 Del. C. § 6918.” 
2  9 Del. C. § 6918 provides that a person aggrieved by a decision of the Board of 
Adjustment “may present to the Superior Court in and for Sussex County, a 
petition….within 30 days after the filing of the decision….” 
 
3 
Superior Court issued a letter opinion, which was dated October 20, 2015, 
denying Lechliter’s motion for reargument.  The Superior Court expressly 
rejected Lechliter’s contention that his filing was not untimely because he 
had 60 days under 10 Del. C. § 8126 to file his petition, holding that § 8126 
only applies to final approvals and the Commission’s approval in this case 
was only preliminary.  The Superior Court also held that, under § 99-39 of 
the Sussex County Code, Lechliter’s right of review of the Commission’s 
decision approving the preliminary plat plan was to the Sussex County 
Council.  Even if Lechliter had not been required to exhaust his 
administrative remedies by filing his petition with the County Council first, 
the Superior Court found that his petition was still subject to dismissal 
because it was untimely under 9 Del. C. § 6918. This appeal followed. 
(4) 
The Court has carefully considered the parties’ briefs and the 
record on appeal.  We find it evident that the judgment below should be 
affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons assigned by the Superior Court 
in its well-reasoned letter opinion, dated October 20, 2015, denying 
Lechliter’s motion for reargument.  The Superior Court properly held that, 
even if Lechliter could have overcome the presumption favoring the doctrine 
of exhaustion of administrative remedies, his petition was still subject to 
summary dismissal because it was untimely under 9 Del. C. § 6918. 
 
4 
 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice