Case Title: Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Thomas

Citation: 

Docket Number: 982682

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1999-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY 
 
v.  Record No. 982682   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
November 5, 1999 
KENNETH LEE THOMAS, SR. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE 
Jonathan M. Apgar, Judge 
 
 
 
In this appeal of a judgment in an action brought under the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act (the FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60, 
we consider whether the trial court erred in refusing to 
instruct the jury on an issue of contributory negligence. 
 
In August 1995, Kenneth Lee Thomas, Sr., allegedly injured 
his back while working as a student mechanic for Norfolk & 
Western Railway Company (the railway).*  When the incident 
occurred, Thomas was employed on the second shift in the 
railway's car repair shop in Roanoke (the shop) where hopper 
cars used for carrying coal were dismantled, reconditioned, and 
reassembled.  As part of this procedure, employees in the shop 
removed each car's wheel assemblies, which weighed about three 
to four tons each, reconditioned them, and lowered them by crane 
                     
 
*Following the trial of this action, Norfolk & Western 
Railway Company merged with Norfolk Southern Railway Company.  
The trial court substituted Norfolk Southern Railway Company in 
the place of Norfolk & Western Railway Company in its final 
order.  The term "the railway" will be used in this opinion to 
refer to either entity. 
back into place.  Thomas's duties included guiding and aligning 
the reconditioned wheel assemblies during this process. 
 
One evening, after working for about an hour and a half on 
a floor area that was slippery from accumulated work debris, 
Thomas slipped while guiding a reconditioned wheel assembly into 
place.  Thomas immediately felt a "stabbing" pain in his lower 
back and was taken by ambulance to the emergency room of a local 
hospital.  After receiving a variety of medical treatments over 
the course of two years, Thomas underwent spinal fusion surgery. 
 
Thomas filed this action against the railway under the 
FELA, alleging, among other things, that the railway failed to 
provide a safe workplace.  In response, the railway denied that 
Thomas was injured and alternatively alleged that any injuries 
he may have sustained were caused by his own negligence. 
 
At trial, the evidence established that the "burning" 
process, used by workers on the first shift when dismantling the 
wheel assemblies, caused a spray of molten metal particles, 
described as "slag," to fall on the shop floor.  The slag, which 
solidified after reaching the floor, left a slippery dust 
residue on the floor.  Thomas testified that "if you had a 
handful of salt and spread it on the [shop floor,] . . . 
[t]hat's basically [how] it felt." 
 
There was evidence that bolts, rust particles, and other 
debris also fell onto the shop floor during both the first and 
 
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second shifts.  Thomas testified that due to these floor 
conditions, slipping was "a normal part of the day," and that he 
would slip frequently when guiding the reconditioned wheel 
assemblies as they were lowered by crane. 
 
At the time Thomas was injured, the railway had in effect a 
safety regulation, which provided that "[e]mployees must keep 
premises subject to their control neat and clean."  The evidence 
showed that the railway had placed brooms and shovels at 
Thomas's work station.  When asked whether employees were 
supposed to clean their work area at any particular time during 
their shift, William J. East, the senior general foreman in the 
shop, testified that the employees were given "discretion" in 
determining when their work areas needed to be cleaned.  Thomas 
and his co-worker, David Atkins, testified that they understood 
that the railway's policy was that they were expected to clean 
their work area only at the end of their shift. 
 
Various witnesses testified that workers on the second 
shift frequently complained to the railway that employees on the 
first shift had failed to clean the shop floor.  Atkins 
testified that, in January 1995, he filed a written safety 
complaint informing the railway of this problem.  In response to 
Atkins's complaint, the senior general foreman instructed the 
first shift supervisor to "insure work area is clean at end of 
shift." 
 
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Thomas testified that on the day he was injured, the first 
shift had not cleaned the shop floor in the area of his work 
station, and that he did not clean the floor at any time prior 
to his fall.  Thomas explained that he had slipped on other 
occasions during his shift before the time he slipped and 
injured his back, including instances while working on the same 
wheel assembly. 
 
At the close of the evidence, the trial court granted 
Thomas's motion to strike the railway's evidence of contributory 
negligence and refused the railway's proffered jury instructions 
on that issue.  The court ruled that the evidence was 
insufficient to submit this issue to the jury, because the 
railway's senior general foreman had testified that an employee 
was given discretion in exercising his duty to keep his work 
station clean during his shift.  In support of its ruling, the 
court also noted that the railway had failed to present evidence 
"as to what an abuse of that discretion or a negligent failure 
to act on that discretion would be." 
 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Thomas and awarded 
him $1.5 million in damages.  The trial court entered judgment 
on the jury's verdict. 
 
On appeal, the railway argues that the evidence at trial 
presented an issue of contributory negligence for the jury's 
determination.  The railway contends that this issue was 
 
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supported by the evidence that each employee had a duty to keep 
his work area clean, and that Thomas failed to use the brooms 
and shovels provided by the railway to clean his floor area 
despite his knowledge that the floor was slippery. 
 
In response, Thomas asserts that the railway failed to 
produce any evidence from which a jury could have concluded that 
Thomas was guilty of contributory negligence.  He contends that 
there was no evidence establishing that he violated any duty, or 
that he acted unreasonably under the circumstances.  Thomas 
contends that the railway's evidence presented only an issue of 
assumption of the risk, a defense that is not permitted under 
the FELA.  We disagree with Thomas's arguments. 
 
In deciding this appeal, we apply federal decisional law, 
because the issue whether negligence, or contributory 
negligence, has been established under the FELA is a federal 
question.  See Norfolk S. Ry. v. Trimiew, 253 Va. 22, 24, 480 
S.E.2d 104, 106, cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1265 (1997); Norfolk & 
W. Ry. v. Hodges, 248 Va. 254, 260, 448 S.E.2d 592, 595 (1994).  
Since the defense of assumption of the risk has been abolished 
under the FELA, a federal question also is presented in 
determining whether evidence relates solely to assumption of the 
risk and, thus, cannot support a jury instruction on 
contributory negligence.  See Hose v. Chicago Northwestern 
Transp., 70 F.3d 968, 978 (8th Cir. 1995); Fashaeur v. New 
 
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Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 57 F.3d 1269, 1279-80 (3rd Cir. 
1995); Birchem v. Burlington N. R.R., 812 F.2d 1047, 1049 (8th 
Cir. 1987). 
 
A defendant has the burden of proving contributory 
negligence and is entitled to a jury instruction on this issue 
if there is any evidence to support that theory.  Hose, 70 F.3d 
at 978; Gish v. CSX Transp., Inc., 890 F.2d 989, 992 (7th Cir. 
1989); Taylor v. Burlington N. R.R., 787 F.2d 1309, 1316 (9th 
Cir. 1986).  The fact that an employee may have been guilty of 
contributory negligence does not bar him from recovering damages 
under the FELA for the employer's negligence, but the damages 
shall be reduced by the jury in proportion to the amount of 
negligence attributable to the plaintiff employee.  45 
U.S.C. § 53; Hodges, 248 Va. at 262, 448 S.E.2d at 596; Norfolk 
S. Ry. v. Rayburn, 213 Va. 812, 816, 195 S.E.2d 860, 864 (1973).  
Since issues of the plaintiff's conduct and of damages usually 
are interwoven in FELA actions, the issue of damages is rarely 
submitted to a jury without also allowing the jury to consider 
the question of contributory negligence.  See Hodges, 248 Va. at 
262, 448 S.E.2d at 596; Norfolk S. R.R. v. Ferebee, 238 U.S. 
269, 273 (1915). 
 
Although there may be overlapping evidence pertinent to 
both the defense of contributory negligence in a FELA action and 
the abolished defense of assumption of the risk, there are 
 
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important distinctions between the two theories that have been 
addressed by the federal courts.  Assumption of the risk 
consists of a plaintiff's implicit consent to known risks and 
dangers necessary to the performance of his duties when he 
undertakes a routine assignment in compliance with the 
directives of his employer.  Fashaeur, 57 F.3d at 1278; Taylor, 
787 F.2d at 1316; Rivera v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 474 F.2d 255, 
257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973).  In contrast, 
contributory negligence is a careless act or omission by the 
plaintiff that tends to add new dangers to conditions that the 
employer negligently created or allowed to exist.  Taylor, 57 
F.3d at 1316; see also Gish, 890 F.2d at 991-92; Birchem, 812 
F.2d at 1049; Rivera, 474 F.2d at 257; Hodges, 248 Va. at 262, 
448 S.E.2d at 596. 
 
Evidence of contributory negligence cannot be excluded from 
a jury's consideration merely because that evidence may also be 
relevant to assumption of the risk.  Hose, 70 F.3d at 978; 
Beanland v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 480 F.2d 109, 116 
n.5 (8th Cir. 1973); Murray v. New York, New Haven & Hartford 
R.R., 255 F.2d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 1958); see Sauer v. Burlington 
Northern R.R., 106 F.3d 1490, 1496 (10th Cir. 1996).  However, 
when evidence relates solely to assumption of the risk, such 
evidence cannot support a jury instruction on contributory 
negligence.  Hose, 70 F.3d at 978; see Birchem, 812 F.2d at 
 
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1049; Taylor, 787 F.2d at 1316.  Thus, a plaintiff's damage 
award under the FELA cannot be reduced on the basis that he or 
she implicitly consented to the risks inherent in the employment 
by performing a task in the manner directed by the employer.  
Fashaeur, 57 F.3d at 1279; see Birchem, 812 F.2d at 1049; 
Taylor, 787 F.2d at 1316. 
 
When there are reasonable alternatives to performing a task 
in an unsafe way, a plaintiff must act with due care and will be 
held responsible for acting unreasonably.  Combs v. Norfolk & W. 
Ry., 256 Va. 490, 498, 507 S.E.2d 355, 360 (1998); Fashaeur, 57 
F.3d at 1280.  Thus, an issue of contributory negligence is 
presented based on evidence that an employee failed to follow a 
specific safety instruction reasonably imposed to protect the 
employee from the injury that occurred.  Fashauer, 57 F.3d at 
1280; see Kendrick v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 669 F.2d 341, 
343-44 (5th Cir. 1982); Chesapeake & O. Ry. v. Richmond, 217 Va. 
258, 263-64, 227 S.E.2d 707, 711-12 (1976). 
 
In the present case, the railway presented evidence that 
Thomas failed to follow the specific safety instruction that 
"employees must keep premises subject to their control neat and 
clean."  Thomas knew that the floor in his work area was 
slippery and actually had slipped earlier during his shift while 
working on the same wheel assembly.  Nevertheless, he did not 
 
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clean his work area with a broom that the employer had placed at 
his work station for his use. 
 
The fact that employees were given "discretion" in 
determining when their work areas needed cleaning did not excuse 
Thomas from the duty to use reasonable methods provided by the 
employer as an alternative to performing a task in an unsafe 
manner.  See Combs, 256 Va. at 498, 507 S.E.2d at 359; Fashaeur, 
57 F.3d at 1280.  Thomas was still required to exercise 
reasonable care for his own safety, and the question whether any 
portion of his injury was attributable to his own acts or 
omissions should have been decided by the jury.  See Sauer, 106 
F.3d at 1496; Martinez v. Union Pac. R.R., 82 F.3d 223, 229 (8th 
Cir. 1996); Hodges, 248 Va. at 262, 448 S.E.2d at 596. 
 
Thomas's acts or omissions at the time he was injured were 
evidence of contributory negligence under the FELA, and not 
solely evidence of assumption of the risk, because they would 
support a conclusion that he caused dangers that were additional 
to any hazardous conditions that the railway may have caused or 
permitted to exist.  See Gish, 890 F.2d at 991-92; Birchem, 812 
F.2d at 1049; Taylor, 787 F.2d at 1316; Hodges, 248 Va. at 262, 
448 S.E.2d at 596.  Therefore, we hold that the trial court 
erred in striking the railway's evidence of contributory 
negligence and in refusing to submit the issue to the jury for 
its determination. 
 
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For these reasons, we will reverse the trial court's 
judgment and remand the case for a new trial on all issues 
consistent with the principles expressed in this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded.
 
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