Case Title: Belliveau v. Whelan

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019 ME 122

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2019-07-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 122 
Docket: 
Yor-18-509 
Argued: 
June 25, 2019 
Decided: 
July 30, 2019 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
MARK BELLIVEAU 
 
v. 
 
JANET WHELAN 
 
 
JABAR, J. 
[¶1]  Mark Belliveau appeals from the District Court’s (Biddeford, 
Sutton, J.) dismissal of his complaint for divorce from Janet Whelan because the 
parties were never legally married.  Belliveau argues that the court erred by 
declining to adopt the putative spouse doctrine or the doctrine of marriage by 
estoppel.  We affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The following facts were found by the court following a hearing on 
September 17, 2018, and are fully supported by the record.  In May 1992, 
Belliveau and Whelan traveled to England to be married.  Upon arriving, they 
attempted to obtain a marriage license from the local town hall, but were 
denied a license because they did not meet the residency requirement.  Despite 
 
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this, Belliveau and Whelan went ahead with their planned wedding ceremony, 
which was officiated by a friend who was neither a minister nor an official 
authorized to solemnize marriages there.  Upon their return to Maine, Belliveau 
and Whelan held a “wedding reception,” but did not seek or obtain a marriage 
license in Maine, nor did they take any other steps to create a valid marriage.   
[¶3]  Over the next twenty-six years, Belliveau and Whelan held 
themselves out to others as a married couple.  Their son, now twenty, has 
believed, and continues to believe, that Belliveau and Whelan are married.  
Belliveau and Whelan filed joint income taxes, signed medical insurance 
documents as a married couple, and signed and had notarized a “Property 
Ownership Agreement” that characterizes them as “husband and wife.”  This 
agreement indicates that, in the event of a divorce, Whelan would retain 
exclusive ownership of the property.   
[¶4]  In March 2017, Belliveau filed a complaint for divorce.  In response, 
Whelan asserted that the parties were never legally married and sought a 
dismissal of the complaint.  After holding an interim hearing, the court agreed 
with Whelan and dismissed the complaint.  Belliveau timely appealed.   
 
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II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶5]  In Maine, the requirements for a valid marriage are provided by 
statute.  See 19-A M.R.S. §§ 650-753 (2018).  On this basis, we have declined to 
recognize common law marriage and have continuously left policy decisions 
regarding marriage and divorce to the Legislature.  See State v. Patterson, 2004 
ME 79, ¶ 13, 851 A.2d 521 (“Maine does not recognize common law marriage.”); 
Pierce v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 254 A.2d 46, 47 (Me. 1969) 
(“Sound public policy dictates that there be a minimum of uncertainty as to 
whether or not a [valid] marriage exists.  The meeting of statutory 
requirements has this desirable effect.”); Miliano v. Miliano, 2012 ME 100, ¶ 21, 
50 A.3d 534; Levy, Maine Family Law § 7.13 at 7-80 (8th ed. 2013). 
[¶6]  There is no dispute that Belliveau and Whelan did not comply with 
the statutory requirements to enter into a valid marriage.  See 19-A M.R.S. 
§§ 651-52, 654-56.  Belliveau asks us to create an end-run around those 
requirements by adopting one, or both, of two equitable doctrines—the 
putative spouse doctrine or the doctrine of marriage by estoppel.  See Williams 
v. Williams, 97 P.3d 1124, 1126 (Nev. 2004) (describing the putative spouse 
doctrine); Lowenschuss v. Lowenschuss, 579 A.2d 377, 381-82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
 
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1990) (describing the doctrine of marriage by estoppel).1  Because the adoption 
of either of these doctrines by us would be an infringement on the Legislature’s 
function and “would only introduce new uncertainties into our law,” Grishman 
v. Grishman, 407 A.2d 9, 12 (Me. 1979), we decline to do so. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dana E. Prescott, Esq. (orally), Prescott Jamieson Murphy Law Group, LLC, Saco, 
for appellant Mark Belliveau 
 
James B. Smith, Esq. (orally), Woodman Edmands Danylik Austin Smith & 
Jacques, P.A., Biddeford, for appellee Janet Whelan 
 
 
Biddeford District Court docket number FM-2017-125 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY 
                                         
1  Other jurisdictions vary in their treatment of these doctrines.  In some states, the legislature has 
adopted the putative spouse doctrine, or some version of it, by statute.  See, e.g., Alaska Stat. 
§ 25.05.051 (LEXIS through 2019 SLA, ch. 5); Cal. Fam. Code § 2251 (Deering, LEXIS through Ch. 1-6, 
18, 22-23 of 2019 Reg. Sess.); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-2-111 (LEXIS through 2018 Legis. Sess.); Minn. 
Stat. § 518.055 (LEXIS through ch. 2 of 2019 First Special Sess.); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 8.060 (LEXIS 
through 2019 Sess.); see also Unif. Marriage & Divorce Act § 209 (Unif. Law Comm’n 1973).  In other 
states, courts have judicially adopted one or both of the doctrines.  See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 
97 P.3d 1124, 1128-29 (Nev. 2004); Xiong v. Xiong, 648 N.W.2d 900, 905-06 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002); 
Martin v. Coleman, 19 S.W.3d 757, 760-61 (Tenn. 2000); Lowenschuss v. Lowenschuss, 579 A.2d 377, 
381-82, 386 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Chrismond v. Chrismond, 52 So. 2d 624, 628-29 (Miss. 1951).  Yet, 
in other states, courts have declined to adopt the doctrines in deference to the legislature’s 
policy-making function.  See, e.g., Hill v. Bell, 747 S.E.2d 791, 791-93 (S.C. 2013); Watts v. Watts, 
405 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Wis. 1987); Goldin v. Goldin, 426 A.2d 410, 412-13 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981).