Case Title: Curutchet v. Bordarrampe

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-10-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Curutchet v. Bordarrampe1986 WY 185726 P.2d 500Case Number: 86-48, 86-49Decided: 10/10/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Alvina E. CURUTCHET, 
Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

Florence BORDARRAMPE and 
Guillaume Delgue, Appellees (Defendants).

Florence BORDARRAMPE and 
Guillaume Delgue, Appellants (Defendants),

v.

Alvina E. CURUTCHET, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, JohnsonCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

Timothy S. 
Tarver, Sheridan, for Alvina E. 
Curutchet.

Hayden F. 
Heaphy, Jr., Burgess & Davis, Sheridan, for Florence Bordarrampe and Guillaume Delgue. 

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The primary issue in 
this appeal is whether Alvina E. Curutchet, the owner of a servient estate 
subject to an appurtenant easement by prescription established by a judgment 
entered in 1976, may assert a claim of civil trespass against Florence 
Bordarrampe, the owner of the dominant estate, and Guillaume Delgue, the lessee 
of the dominant estate. There are corollary issues relating to the propriety of 
the summary judgment with respect to Curutchet's claim for damages for misuse of 
the easement and Bordarrampe's and Delgue's claims for damages for interference 
with the easement. These latter issues depend upon the propriety of the summary 
judgment entered by the district court enjoining Curutchet from interfering with 
the use of the easement by Bordarrampe and Delgue on the ground that the 
easement had been judicially established. We affirm the judgment of the district 
court with respect to the existence of the easement by prescription. As that 
court anticipated in its remarks from the bench, we conclude that the summary 
judgment must be reversed with respect to the several claims for damages because 
there are present genuine issues of material fact relating to those damages 
which must be determined by trial.

[¶2.]     This dispute has been 
before this court previously, and the court's decision is reported in Delgue v. 
Curutchet, Wyo., 677 P.2d 208 (1984). About 19 months 
after the denial of Curutchet's petition for rehearing in that case, she filed a 
complaint in this case asserting that the "decision in the prior case was not 
binding on the parties because it was inconsistent, ambiguous and the product of 
compromise," and she sought a judgment for damages for trespass; for a 
declaration that Bordarrampe's and Delgue's use of the road constituted a 
trespass; and an injunction against future trespasses. Bordarrampe and Delgue 
then filed separate answers in which each of them incorporated a counterclaim 
for damages, punitive damages, costs and attorney's fees for interference with 
the use of the easement by Curutchet. The district court entered a summary 
judgment enjoining Curutchet from interfering with the use of the easement, as 
judicially established by Bordarrampe and Delgue, and also denying the 
respective claims of the parties for damages. Curutchet has appealed from that 
judgment by the district court. Bordarrampe and Delgue also have appealed 
because the judgment denied their claim for damages.

[¶3.]     In her brief in this 
court Curutchet asserts the following issues to be 
resolved:

"1. Was it improper for 
the District Court to grant summary judgment to Defendants Bordarrampe and 
Delgue based on a judgment in another case when this Court has already ruled 
that the other judgment was invalid and directed the parties to institute new 
proceedings to determine their rights?

"2. Was it improper for 
the District Court to enter summary judgment with respect to Mrs. Curutchet's 
claim for damages since there are genuine issues of fact concerning that 
claim?

"3. Should injunctive 
relief have been granted where no injury would have been incurred by Defendants 
if they were not allowed to use the disputed road?"

In their joint 
brief Bordarrampe and Delgue state these issues:

"1. Was it proper for the 
District Court to grant Summary Judgment to Appellees Bordarrampe and Delgue on 
the Appellant's Complaint for trespass, where the Supreme Court had previously 
determined, in a case involving the same parties and the same issue, that 
Appellees were entitled to use of an appurtenant easement across Appellant's 
lands? In other words, is the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in Delgue v. 
Curutchet, 677 P.2d 208 (1984) determinative of the claim of trespass raised by 
Appellant Curutchet's Complaint in District Court? 

"2. There is no 
reasonable cause for appeal by Appellant Curutchet, and Appellees Delgue and 
Bordarrampe are entitled to attorney's fees and a penalty, pursuant to Rule 
10.05, Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure.

"3. Was it proper for the 
District Court, on its own motion, to have granted Summary Judgment to Appellant 
on Appellees' counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees resulting from 
Appellant's interference with Appellees' use of the prescribed easement without 
giving Appellees the opportunity to present evidence to the 
Court?"

[¶4.]     We will not reiterate 
all of the facts encompassed in the prior decision, Delgue v. Curutchet, supra. 
Suffice it to say that Curutchet and Bordarrampe, together with her husband who 
has died, were and are neighboring landowners. Prior to 1974, for access to 
their land from a county road, the Bordarrampes had used a road crossing the 
Curutchet lands. That road also had been used by Dean Smith who had leased the 
Bordarrampes' property. A dispute arose, and Curutchet sought to prevent the use 
of the road by the Bordarrampes and Smith. The Bordarrampes and Smith then 
brought an action seeking to establish a prescriptive easement in their favor 
with respect to the road across Curutchet's property.

[¶5.]     That dispute was 
resolved in 1976. In pertinent part the court's judgment 
recited:

"`IT IS THEREFORE 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiff, FLORENCE BORDARRAMPE, her 
successors in title and assigns, and employees, suppliers, social guests, 
truckers, and drovers of livestock belonging to the Plaintiff or her successors 
and assigns, but not lessees shall, and do hereby have, a permanent and 
perpetual easement across the lands of the Defendant, Alvina E. Curutchet, for 
general ranch and social purposes, the approximate width of a motor vehicle 
along the center line as described as follows * * *.'" Delgue v. Curutchet, 
supra, 677 P.2d  at 211.

No appeal was 
taken by any of the parties from that judgment. It thus became a final 
resolution of the rights of the parties unless correctable in some appropriate 
way.

[¶6.]     Delgue leased the 
Bordarrampe ranch after Smith's lease expired. He began to use the road in 
question, and Curutchet blocked the road. She then brought an action against 
Delgue in which she sought an injunction restraining him from using the road and 
for compensatory and exemplary damages. Delgue counterclaimed in his answer 
asserting his right to use the easement as a lessee of the Bordarrampe lands. In 
that case, the trial court concluded that Bordarrampe and Delgue were foreclosed 
from any attempt to establish Delgue's right to use the easement by the prior 
judgment. This court held in Delgue v. Curutchet, supra, that Delgue was not 
foreclosed by the prior judgment under the doctrine of res judicata or its 
related concept of collateral estoppel from pursuing the relief which he sought 
in his counterclaim. This court also held that the original judgment was 
erroneous because the attempt to foreclose use of the road by a lessee was 
inconsistent with the availability of the easement to any other person in lawful 
possession of the dominant estate. Our earlier opinion settled the right of 
Delgue to use this road.

[¶7.]     Delgue also had 
presented a claim for damages, and upon reversal, this court remanded the case 
for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion. The district court 
professed not to understand what the supreme court thought needed to be done 
upon remand and simply ordered the parties to comply with its orders as modified 
by the supreme court. An appeal then was attempted from that order, and this 
court dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was not taken from a final 
order. The Order Dismissing Appeal reads in part:

"[T]he decision of this 
court in Delgue v. Curutchet, supra, determined that Guillaume Delgue was 
entitled to use a prescriptive easement previously adjudicated in favor of his 
lessor Florence Bordarrampe; the contrary judgment of the district court was 
reversed as a matter of law; in the pleadings which previously had been filed in 
the district court Guillaume Delgue had asserted a counterclaim pursuant to 
which he sought, in addition to the establishment of his entitlement to use the 
easement, punitive damages for interference by Alvina E. Curutchet with the 
quiet and peaceful use of the right-of-way across her premises, actual damages 
for the wrongful, intentional and tortious interference by Alvina E. Curutchet 
with the road and its use, and his costs and expenses; none of these issues have 
been adjudicated by the district court, and in the absence of a withdrawal of 
such claims Guillaume Delgue is entitled to have those claims adjudicated; the 
completion of the litigation in these respects is what this court intended the 
district court should do upon remand; * * *."

Delgue did not 
prosecute his damage claims, and ultimately that case was 
dismissed.

[¶8.]     In October of 1985, 
Curutchet then filed a complaint in the case which now is on appeal alleging 
that Delgue's and Bordarrampe's use of the easement was a trespass. Curutchet 
claimed the right to collateral attack upon the prior judgment establishing the 
easement by alleging that:

"The Wyoming Supreme 
Court held that the decision in the prior case [in which the easement was 
established] was not binding on the parties because it was inconsistent, 
ambiguous and the product of compromise."

Curutchet also 
alleged that Delgue and Bordarrampe had caused damage to surrounding land by 
leaving the roadway described in the easement. Bordarrampe and Delgue in their 
respective answers asserted that their right to use the easement had been 
established by the prior litigation. They counterclaimed for actual and punitive 
damages, attorney's fees and costs based upon Curutchet's interference with 
their use of the easement.

[¶9.]     After a hearing the 
district court entered an injunction which granted Bordarrampe and Delgue the 
right to use the easement as previously established. It granted summary judgment 
in favor of Bordarrampe and Delgue on the issue of damages for their trespass 
and also granted a summary judgment in favor of Curutchet for Delgue's and 
Bordarrampe's claims for damages for interference with the easement. All of the 
parties have appealed from that summary judgment.

[¶10.]  In her appeal Curutchet maintains her 
position that this court held the prior judgment was not binding upon the 
parties. She then asserts that there was no valid factual basis in the original 
litigation for granting a prescriptive appurtenant easement. Whatever the 
problems may have been with respect to the prior judgments, the doctrine of res 
judicata makes those judgments binding upon Delgue, Bordarrampe and Curutchet. 
We hold that the district court correctly ruled that it could not look behind 
those judgments to reconsider the right of Bordarrampe to the prescriptive 
easement nor Delgue's right to use it as lessee:

"* * * Res judicata can 
be described generally as that rule which precludes the presentation by parties 
or those in privity with them of the same claim that was resolved by an earlier 
judgment. * * (Citations omitted.)" Delgue v. Curutchet, supra, 677 P.2d  at 
214.

The summary 
judgment entered by the district court properly follows this 
rule.

[¶11.]  Because the doctrine of res judicata is 
applicable in this instance, Curutchet's effort to collaterally attack the prior 
judgments depends upon a showing that the court lacked jurisdiction of the 
subject matter or of the parties. Travis v. Travis Estate, 79 Wyo. 329, 334 P.2d 508 
(1959). In this appeal, Curutchet does not suggest in any way a lack of 
jurisdiction over the parties to the prior actions or the subject matter of 
those prior actions. Instead, Curutchet argues that because this court 
previously held that the original judgment was not binding upon Delgue in the 
second action, and the court suggested that Bordarrampe might have a remedy for 
correcting the erroneous judgment, that it should not bind Curutchet under the 
doctrine of mutuality. She also argues that this result is appropriate in a case 
in which the form of judgment was erroneous and the result of a compromise. The 
effect of the appeal in Delgue v. Curutchet, supra, was to abrogate the 
erroneous aspect of the district court's original judgment. That does not result 
in a void judgment as Curutchet apparently chooses to argue. We hold that 
Curutchet is foreclosed from attacking the existence of the easement and 
Delgue's right to use it. Curutchet simply manifests confusion as to the effect 
of collateral estoppel as compared with res judicata.

[¶12.]  Curutchet also contends that even 
conceding the existence of the easement the district court should not have 
enjoined her interference with Delgue and Bordarrampe's continued use of the 
easement. In making this argument she invokes the doctrine of comparative 
hardship. Analysis of the cases upon which Curutchet relies, in which that 
doctrine was applied, demonstrates that it has no applicability in this 
instance. In Rossi v. Sierchio, 30 N.J. Super. 575, 105 A.2d 687 (1954), the 
court refused to order the removal of a large garage when its existence was of 
little inconvenience to the holder of the easement. In Lee v. Brown, Wyo., 357 P.2d 1106 (1960), this court held that the maintenance and operation of an 
irrigation ditch should not have been enjoined in an instance in which there 
existed at most a mere possibility of harm from the continued irrigation 
operation and the irrigation was essential to the ability of the irrigator to 
make a living. We need go no further in refuting this argument. The hardships 
Curutchet alleged, such as the possibility of gates being left unlocked and 
possible damage to pasture, are relatively minor; they may be compensated by the 
award of damages; and they certainly do not constitute any basis for invoking 
the doctrine of comparative hardship.

[¶13.]  With respect to Curutchet's claim against 
Delgue and Bordarrampe for trespass arising out of the use of the easement, 
there was no genuine issue as to any material fact. The only conflict was with 
respect to the legal conclusion which should be drawn from undisputed facts, and 
the summary judgment was appropriate. Fugate v. Mayor and City Council of Town 
of City of Buffalo, 
Wyo., 348 P.2d 76, 97 A.L.R.2d 243 
(1959).

[¶14.]  We note that the summary judgment entered 
in this case provides that snow may be removed from the road with respect to 
which the easement was granted without improving it. To the extent that the 
activity does not constitute an enlargement of the established easement, the 
holder of a prescriptive easement may go upon the servient estate to perform all 
acts reasonably necessary for the proper use and enjoyment of the easement so 
long as he does not impress a new or additional burden on the servient estate. 2 
Thompson on Real Property, § 426 pp. 656-657 (1980). We perceive the intent of 
the trial judge with respect to this proviso in the summary judgment to be 
consistent with this rule and to not affect the adjudicated easement in any 
other way.

[¶15.]  In his closing remarks from the bench the 
perceptive district judge said among other things:

"[T]hey [referring to the 
Supreme Court] probably will reverse this Court in part, at least, which is fine 
with me, so we can get the thing back here on the issues to be decided on so all 
of these parties can finally have a resolution."

We do indeed 
hold that as to the remaining claims in this case summary judgment was entered 
erroneously. Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P., provides:

"* * * The judgment 
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. * * *"

The burden is on 
the party moving for summary judgment to demonstrate clearly that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact, and in the absence of such a demonstration 
summary judgment should not be granted. Greenough v. Prairie Dog Ranch, Inc., 
Wyo., 531 P.2d 499 (1975). Summary judgment is not appropriate if inquiry into the facts is 
necessary to clarify any application of the law. Wyoming Insurance Department v. 
Sierra Life Insurance Company, Wyo., 599 P.2d 1360 
(1979).

[¶16.]  In her complaint Curutchet also alleged 
that Delgue and Bordarrampe had, in the course of using the easement, left the 
roadway and damaged the surrounding pasture. The owner of the servient estate 
may recover damages if those using the easement exceed their rights under the 
easement. See cases cited in 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 122, at 
524-525 (1966). Curutchet submitted an affidavit which supported her claim for 
damages flowing from the alleged misuse of the easement by Delgue. In support of 
their motion for summary judgment on Curutchet's claims, neither Bordarrampe nor 
Delgue submitted any information which would demonstrate that there was no 
genuine issue of fact with respect to Curutchet's claim for damages for improper 
use of the easement. At the hearing held on the motions for summary judgment, 
counsel for Bordarrampe and Delgue acknowledged that "[I]f there are any damages 
in the nature of the use of that easement by virtue of its being outside of the 
easement that might be a legitimate subject for a hearing on the facts." 
Bordarrampe and Delgue did not establish that they were entitled to summary 
judgment on Curutchet's claim for damages on the record, and it should not have 
been granted.

[¶17.]  It is equally clear that Curutchet was 
not entitled to a summary judgment on Delgue's and Bordarrampe's counterclaim 
for damages due to her alleged interference with their use of the easement. 
Curutchet argues here that this summary judgment was proper because there was no 
genuine issue with respect to any damage sustained by either Delgue or 
Bordarrampe. She offers in support of this contention the testimony of 
Bordarrampe and Delgue at the injunction hearing, which the parties stipulated 
could be a part of the record of the hearing on summary 
judgment.

[¶18.]  With respect to Delgue's counterclaim, 
Curutchet refers to portions of Delgue's testimony which she argues demonstrate 
that each time she attempted to keep him off of the easement by locking the 
gates she failed. This is not a complete representation of Delgue's testimony, 
however. He also testified that he recently had been forced to take a different 
route to the Bordarrampe ranch to deliver corn to his livestock. Delgue took the 
alternate route because the road over the Curutchet land was snow covered, and 
he testified that it took longer and cost more to use it. Earlier Delgue had 
asked the county to plow the easement route, but before that could be 
accomplished, Curutchet requested the supervisor of the county employees to 
inspect documents relating to the earlier litigation. The supervisor, after 
visiting with Curutchet, directed the operators to clear a path for the feed 
truck to turn around and to then clear the alternate route. This refutes 
Curutchet's claim that Delgue admitted that her interference did not cause 
damages to him.

[¶19.]  As to Bordarrampe's counterclaim for 
damages, Curutchet refers to Bordarrampe's testimony at the injunction hearing 
to the effect that she used an alternative route to reach her ranch after 
Curutchet had locked the gate over the easement road. We cannot discern how this 
testimony requires a conclusion that Bordarrampe suffered no damage as a result 
of Curutchet's interference.

[¶20.]  Curutchet did not successfully assume her 
burden of showing that there was no genuine issue of fact with respect to 
Delgue's and Bordarrampe's claims for damages. As with Curutchet's claims for 
damage, summary judgment on these claims was improper as the record now 
stands.

[¶21.]  Delgue and Bordarrampe also claim that 
because there is no reasonable cause for the appeal by Curutchet, the sanctions 
provided in Rule 10.05, W.R.A.P., should be invoked. This court does impose 
those sanctions in appropriate cases. See, e.g., Skurdal v. State ex rel. Stone, 
Wyo., 708 P.2d 1241 (1985). We do not have any desire, however, to discourage 
legitimate appeals. Our reversal of the summary judgment in favor of Delgue and 
Bordarrampe on the claim for damages for improper use of the easement 
establishes that Curutchet did have a reasonable cause to appeal, at least with 
respect to that issue. Therefore, we will not impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 
10.05, W.R.A.P.

[¶22.]  We affirm the summary judgment in favor 
of Delgue and Bordarrampe with respect to Curutchet's claim for trespass because 
of the use of the appurtenant easement by prescription established in accordance 
with the prior litigation. The summary judgment in favor of Delgue and 
Bordarrampe on Curutchet's claim for damages for improper use of the easement 
and the summary judgment in favor of Curutchet on Delgue's and Bordarrampe's 
counterclaims for damages are reversed. The case is remanded for trial of the 
damage claims by the respective parties.