Case Title: Richard Joslyn v. State of Indiana

Citation: 

Docket Number: 49S04-1102-CR-85

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2011-02-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
Victoria L. Bailey 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
Ann L. Goodin 
Special Deputy Attorney General  
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
_________________________________ 
No. 49S04-1102-CR-85 
RICHARD JOSLYN, 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
v. 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49G22-0812-FC-272486 
The Honorable Carol Orbison, Judge 
_________________________________ 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A04-0908-CR-460 
_________________________________ 
February 16, 2011 
Shepard, Chief Justice. 
Today we address the importance of protective orders for Hoosiers in two cases.  In this 
case we hold that a minor defect in the service of a protective order was cured by Joslyn’s 
statements to police and his testimony at trial.  Allowing protective order respondents to evade 
enforcement through technicalities is counter to the purpose of the Civil Protection Order Act 
and simply dangerous for those whom the act is designed to protect.  Therefore, we affirm 
Joslyn’s convictions for stalking and invasion of privacy. 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Feb 16 2011, 12:11 pm
 
 
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Facts and Procedural History 
In late 2007 or early 2008, Stephanie Livingston moved back to Indianapolis after a 
breakup with her youngest son’s father.  Livingston and her third cousin Richard Joslyn agreed 
that she would stay with Joslyn and his son rather than with her mother because there would be 
more room for Livingston and one of her sons to live.  Livingston struggled with alcohol while 
living with Joslyn, drinking on a “daily basis for almost the whole six months I was there.” (Tr. 
at 22.)    
 After a brief reconciliation with her son’s father, Livingston moved back in with her 
mother, about a quarter of a mile from Joslyn’s home.  Livingston eventually became aware of 
and watched a video Joslyn recorded of the two of them engaging in sexual intercourse.  
Livingston had no memory of the act. 
After moving back with her mother, Livingston applied ex parte for a protective order 
under the Indiana Civil Protective Order Act.1  The court granted her request and issued the order 
on November 10, 2008.  The protective order prohibited Joslyn from having any contact with 
Livingston.  
On November 13, a deputy with the Marion County Sheriff’s Department served Joslyn 
with a copy of the protective order by leaving a copy attached to the door of his residence.  
(State’s Ex. 18; Tr. at 23, 165, 169.)  The deputy did not indicate on the return of service form 
that a copy of the order was also mailed to Joslyn’s last known address as required by Indiana 
Trial Rule 4.1. (State’s Ex. 18; Ind. Trial Rule 4.1(A)(3), (B).)  
On evening of November 14, Livingston and some friends went to a liquor store.  While 
Livingston was inside the store with one of her friends, the others noticed Joslyn observing them 
from across the street.  Later that evening, the group went to a local bar where they spotted 
Joslyn watching them from the end of the bar.  While Livingston was on the dance floor, Joslyn 
stood at the edge of the dance floor watching Livingston throughout a song.    
                                                 
1 Ind. Code § 34-26-5 (2008 & Supp. 2010). 
 
 
3 
On November 17, Livingston was visiting a friend, Richard Neutzman.  While she was 
there, Neutzman received a call, which he put on speakerphone.  Livingston heard Joslyn asking 
whether Neutzman knew where Livingston was.  On another visit to Neutzman’s house, 
Livingston saw Joslyn peering through a window. 
On November 18, Livingston’s mother found a note on the front porch of their home.  
Livingston recognized the handwriting as Joslyn’s.  The next day, Livingston found a rose on the 
doormat of the home. 
On November 23, Livingston was entertaining friends at the home when she heard a 
crash outside.  When she looked outside, she saw Joslyn running away and discovered her 
friend’s vehicle had four windows smashed.    
On November 25, Livingston and her cousin observed Joslyn hiding under Livingston’s 
home in the crawl space.  The next day Livingston saw Joslyn looking into the window of her 
home.  Livingston called 9-1-1.  The police later apprehended Joslyn with help from a canine 
officer.  The dog located him hiding in a van on a neighbor’s property. 
On December 3, 2008, the State charged Joslyn with class C felony stalking,2 four counts 
of class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy3 and a class A misdemeanor resisting law 
enforcement.4  The case went to trial by jury.  At the close of the evidence, the court granted 
Joslyn’s motion for judgment on the evidence as respects the charge of resisting law 
enforcement.  The jury found Joslyn guilty on the remaining counts.   
On appeal, Joslyn has challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 
convictions, arguing the State did not prove he was properly served with the protective order.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed, citing Joslyn’s admission that he received the notice left at his 
home by an agent of the State as sufficient to permit his conviction for invasion of privacy and 
                                                 
2 Ind. Code § 35-45-10-5(b)(2) (2008). 
3 Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1 (Supp. 2010). 
4 Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3 (Supp. 2010). 
 
 
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stalking. Joslyn v. State, 928 N.E.2d 906 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (table).  We think the Court of 
Appeals was right to affirm, and grant transfer to address the service of protective orders.  
Sufficiency of Evidence 
When the claim is a sufficiency of evidence challenge, we do not reweigh the evidence or 
judge the credibility of the witnesses, and we respect a fact-finder’s “exclusive province to weigh 
conflicting evidence.”  Alkhalidi v. State, 753 N.E.2d 625, 627 (Ind. 2001).   We “consider only 
the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict.”  McHenry v. State, 820 
N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005).  We will affirm “if the probative evidence and reasonable 
inferences drawn from the evidence could have allowed a reasonable trier of fact to find the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Tobar v. State, 740 N.E.2d 109, 111–12 (Ind. 
2000).  
Joslyn’s convictions were based on his violation of the protective order obtained by 
Livingston.  We first note that the statutes defining the crimes of stalking and invasion of privacy 
do not require actual service of a protective order for a conviction.  Invasion of privacy does 
require “knowingly or intentionally violat[ing]” an order, and the stalking statute requires that 
the “person has been given actual notice of the order.” Ind. Code §§ 35-46-1-15.1, 35-45-10-
5(b)(2).  Joslyn argues that implicit in these crimes is a requirement that the protective order was 
properly served under the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure. (Appellant’s Br at 6–7.)   
The Court of Appeals affirmed Joslyn’s convictions in accordance with earlier decisions 
holding that actual notice was sufficient for a conviction if the defendant received actual notice 
of the protective order from an agent of the State.  Joslyn v. State, No. 49A04-0908-CR-460, slip 
op. at 3–4, (Ind. Ct. App. June 30, 2010); see Dixon v. State. 869 N.E.2d 516 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2007); Hendricks v. State, 649 N.E.2d 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). 
In the present case, a process server testified that she left a copy of the order at Joslyn’s 
home. There was no indication that she also sent a copy of the order to his house by first class 
 
 
5 
mail as required under our Trial Rules. See Ind. Trial Rule 4.1(B) (requiring a copy be sent by 
mail when an order is left at a dwelling house).    
The trial court admitted, over objection, a recording and transcript of a statement Joslyn 
made to police:  
Q:  
OK, and you’re aware you have a restraining order against 
you?     
A: 
Yeah. Yeah, I know I got a restraining order.  I ain’t, I 
haven’t been callin’ her or talkin’ to her or seein’ her.  Uh, 
as a matter of fact, she’s been callin’ my house . . . .           
* * * * * 
Q:  
Do you know, do you know when your protective order 
was effective?                                                                                              
A:  
It was more like the 20th or somethin’. . . . 
* * * * * 
Q:  
Uh, how about the 10th and it was serve [sic] to you on the 
13th? 
A:  
OK. 
* * * * * 
Q:  
OK. Right now, you need to help yourself. 
A:  
This, No…November 10th was when the restraining order 
or whatever was and then I got it three days later, so the 
13th, so I’ve only had it for a couple weeks now (sigh) and 
nothin’s been goin’ on and then all of a sudden (pause) 
Sh** happens? 
(State’s Ex. 16, pp. 3–4, 44.)  Joslyn also testified at trial admitting that he found the protective 
order at his residence, but could not recall when.  (Tr. at 285–86.)   
We agree with the Court of Appeals that Joslyn’s admission of receipt is sufficient to 
sustain his convictions.  As the court noted, the purpose of the Indiana Civil Protection Order Act 
is to promote the protection and safety of all victims of domestic violence and prevent future 
incidents.  It would run contrary to this purpose if we were to embrace Joslyn’s contention that a 
defendant does not violate the criminal code because of some defect in civil process even where 
the court had in fact issued a protective order and the defendant in fact knew it had done so.  
 
 
6 
The Court of Appeals reliance on Hendricks and Dixon, was well placed.  In Hendricks, 
the Mercado family obtained an emergency protective order against Hendricks.  Six days later, 
Hendricks called the Mercado’s home and Bernadette Mercado informed him of the protective 
order and told him he was not to have any contact with the family.  Later that day, Hendricks 
called the home again and an officer who was at the home spoke with Hendricks and told him of 
the protective order and its parameters.  The next day, Hendricks came within 1000 feet of 
Altimease Mercado and was arrested in violation of the protective order.  Hendricks appealed 
claiming he did not have notice of the protective order, but the Court of Appeals affirmed 
holding the evidence was sufficient that Hendricks’ knowingly violated the emergency protective 
order. Hendricks, 649 N.E.2d at 1052. 
  The evidence that Bernadette Mercado informed Hendricks of the protective order and 
its parameters (that he was not to have any contact with the family) could have by itself been 
sufficient to prove Hendricks’ knowledge of the protective order.  The additional notification by 
the officer to Hendricks would simply have been cumulative evidence of his knowledge of the 
protective order.  
In Dixon, Demetrice Bruno obtained a protective order against Dixon.  Later, an officer 
was dispatched to Bruno’s home where Demetrice and Dixon were engaged in a verbal dispute.  
The officer performed a warrant check and discovered there was a protective order against 
Dixon, but Dixon had not been served with it.  Bruno showed a copy of the order to the officer 
and told him she had previously given Dixon a copy.  The officer advised Dixon that he had been 
served and was not to come back to Bruno’s residence.  Later that day Dixon returned, and he 
was arrested.   
On appeal, Dixon argued he did not have sufficient notice of the protective order.  The 
Court of Appeals affirmed:  
[Dixon] claims that the only evidence that he knew of the 
protective order was the hearsay testimony of Officer Gomez 
regarding Bruno’s claims that she gave Dixon the order.  However, 
it is clear from Officer Gomez’s testimony that he informed Dixon 
 
 
7 
of the protective order and advised Dixon that he was not to return 
to Bruno’s residence.  
Dixon, 839 N.E.2d at 520.  Had there been testimony from Bruno that she had given Dixon a 
copy of the order, that testimony could have been sufficient to sustain a conviction for invasion 
of privacy, assuming the finder of fact thought it credible.  The additional oral notice by the 
police officer would again be cumulative evidence.  
One need only brush the surface of domestic violence statistics to realize the importance 
of protective orders in the prevention of domestic and family violence.  The declared legislative 
intent that these provisions in the Code be interpreted in a way that will “promote the: protection 
and safety of all victims of domestic or family violence in a fair, prompt, and effective manner; 
and [the] prevention of future domestic and family violence.”  Ind. Code § 34-26-5-1 (2008).  
Joslyn’s proposed rule that one who acknowledges actual receipt at his home but not an 
additional copy by mail commits no violation would have real world implications placing far too 
many Hoosiers at risk of becoming a domestic violence statistic.  
Therefore, limiting an actual notice exception to instances when it comes from an agent 
of the State does little to further the protection of petitioners or the protection order process if 
there is evidence the respondent already has knowledge of the order.  Here, Joslyn admitted in 
statements to police and again during trial that he was aware of the protective order and had read 
its terms. (Tr. at 286.)  That sufficed to prove that he “knowingly” violated the order. 
 
Conclusion 
Joslyn’s convictions for stalking and invasion of privacy are affirmed. 
Dickson, Sullivan, Rucker, and David, JJ., concur.