Case Title: State v. Davis

Citation: 2008-Ohio-4537

Docket Number: 20071039

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Davis, 121 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-4537.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. DAVIS, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Davis, 121 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-4537.] 
Criminal law — Amending an indictment — Crim.R. 7(D) does not permit the 
amendment of an indictment when the amendment changes the penalty or 
degree of the charged offense; amending the indictment to change the 
penalty or degree changes the identity of the offense. 
(No. 2007-1039 – Submitted April 8, 2008 – Decided September 16, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Highland County,  
No. 06CA26, 2007-Ohio-2249. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Crim.R. 7(D) does not permit the amendment of an indictment when the 
amendment changes the penalty or degree of the charged offense; 
amending the indictment to change the penalty or degree changes the 
identity of the offense. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶ 1} Under Crim.R. 7(D), a court may amend an indictment “at any 
time” if the amendment does not change “the name or identity of the crime 
charged.”  We consider whether an amendment that changes the penalty or degree 
of a charged offense is permissible under Crim.R. 7(D).  We hold that Crim.R. 
7(D) does not permit the amendment of an indictment when the amendment 
changes the penalty or degree of the charged offense, because such a change alters 
the identify of the offense.  We affirm the judgment of the Fourth District Court 
of Appeals. 
I 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
{¶ 2} Michael A. Davis was indicted in the Highland County Court of 
Common Pleas on several drug-related charges, including two counts of 
aggravated trafficking in drugs.  One of the counts for aggravated trafficking in 
drugs charged as follows:  “Michael A. Davis * * * did knowingly sell or offer to 
sell Oxycontin, a schedule II controlled substance in the amount less than the bulk 
amount, to wit: approximately 7.2 grams, in violation of § 2925.03(A)(1) ORC * 
* *.”  (Emphasis added.)  As written, the charge was a felony of the fourth degree.  
R.C. 2925.03(C)(1)(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in division (C)(1)(b), (c), 
(d), (e), or (f) of this section, aggravated trafficking in drugs is a felony of the 
fourth degree * * *”).1 
{¶ 3} Upon motion of the state of Ohio and during the trial, the court 
amended the above charge for aggravated trafficking in drugs and increased the 
amount of controlled substance involved.  The defense did not object to this 
amendment.  The amended count charged:  “Michael A. Davis * * * did 
knowingly sell or offer to sell Oxycontin, a schedule II controlled substance in an 
amount greater than five times the bulk amount but less than fifty times the bulk 
amount, in violation of 2925.03(A)(1) ORC * * *.”  (Emphasis added).  As 
amended, the charge was a felony of the second degree.  R.C. 2925.03(C)(1)(d) 
(“if the amount of the drug involved equals or exceeds five times the bulk amount 
but is less than fifty times the bulk amount, aggravated trafficking in drugs is a 
felony of the second degree”). 
{¶ 4} Davis was convicted on the amended charge of aggravated 
trafficking in drugs, as well as one charge of deception to obtain dangerous drugs.  
After holding that the amendment of the indictment was plain error, the Fourth 
District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings.  The 
                                                 
1.  The definition of “bulk amount” applicable to Oxycontin is “[a]n amount equal to or exceeding 
twenty grams or five times the maximum daily dose in the usual dose range specified in a standard 
pharmaceutical reference manual of a compound, mixture, preparation, or substance that is or 
contains any amount of a schedule II opiate or opium derivative.”  R.C. 2925.01(D)(1)(d). 
January Term, 2008 
3 
court determined that the amendment of the aggravated-trafficking charge was 
unlawful pursuant to Crim.R. 7(D).  State v. Davis, Highland App. No. 06CA26, 
2007-Ohio- 2249, ¶ 25.  We accepted the discretionary appeal.  State v. Davis, 
115 Ohio St.3d 1420, 2007-Ohio-5056, 874 N.E.2d 537. 
II 
{¶ 5} Crim.R. 7(D) provides that a court may amend an indictment “at 
any time before, during, or after a trial * * *, provided no change is made in the 
name or identity of the crime charged.”  (Emphasis added.)  In the present case, 
no change was made to the name of the crime charged:  Davis was charged with 
aggravated trafficking in drugs both before and after the amendment.  The only 
issue before this court is whether an amendment that changes the penalty or 
degree of the offense thereby changes the identity of the crime. 
{¶ 6} We have previously held that a particular amendment was proper 
when the amendment did not change the penalty or the degree of the offense.  In 
State v. O’Brien (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 122, 123, 30 OBR 436, 508 N.E.2d 144, 
the state amended the indictment to specify the mens rea element of 
“recklessness” in a charge of endangering children.  The mens rea, which was an 
essential element of the offense, had been omitted in the original indictment.  Id. 
at 122–123.  This court held that the indictment was properly amended to include 
the mens rea element:  “[T]he identity of this crime was not changed by the 
addition of ‘recklessness’ to the indictment.  Neither the penalty nor the degree of 
the offense was changed as a result of the amendment.  Since the addition of the 
culpable mental state of ‘recklessness’ did not change the name or identity of the 
crime of endangering children, the amendment was proper pursuant to Crim. R. 
7(D).”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 126.  This court thus held that the amendment in 
O’Brien did not change the identity of the crime charged because it did not 
change the penalty or the degree of the offense. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 7} We have also previously indicated that an amendment was 
improper because the amendment would increase the severity of the offense.  In 
State v. Headley (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 475, 479, 6 OBR 526, 453 N.E.2d 716, the 
state amended the indictment to specify the type of controlled substance involved 
in a drug-trafficking charge, when the original indictment had not identified it.  
Although the issue was whether the original indictment was fatally defective—not 
whether the amendment was proper—this court analyzed the omission and 
subsequent amendment pursuant to Crim.R. 7(D). 
{¶ 8} The court noted that “[t]he severity of the offense is dependent 
upon the type of drug involved,” and in particular, that possession of certain 
controlled substances merits a charge of aggravated trafficking, while possession 
of others merits a charge of trafficking in drugs, a lesser offense.  Id. at 479, 6 
OBR 526, 453 N.E.2d 716.  Following these statements, we concluded that an 
amendment to specify the type of drugs involved was improper:  “Under this 
analysis, it is evident that R.C. 2925.03 sets forth more than one criminal offense 
with the identity of each being determined by the type of controlled substance 
involved.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id.  Amendment was improper because changing 
the type of drug involved would “change the very identity of the offense 
charged.”  Id. 
{¶ 9} Pursuant to our decisions in O’Brien and Headley, we hold that 
Crim.R. 7(D) does not permit the amendment of an indictment when the 
amendment changes the penalty or degree of the charged offense; amending the 
indictment to change the penalty or degree changes the identity of the offense.  In 
the present case, the amendment significantly increased the quantity of drugs 
alleged to have been sold.  The amendment thereby changed the degree of the 
offense to a second-degree felony from a fourth-degree felony and altered the 
potential penalties as well.  The amendment is therefore not permitted by Crim.R. 
7(D). 
January Term, 2008 
5 
{¶ 10} We disagree with the state’s argument that Headley is 
distinguishable on the ground that the amendment in that case supplied “an 
essential element of the crime” that had previously been omitted.  The state 
incorrectly cites the following passage in favor of this argument:  “Where one of 
the vital elements identifying the crime is omitted from the indictment, it is 
defective and cannot be cured by the court as such a procedure would permit the 
court to convict the accused on a charge essentially different from that found by 
the grand jury.”  Headley, 6 Ohio St.3d at 478–479, 6 OBR 526, 453 N.E.2d 716.  
The above passage makes two statements:  first, an indictment that omits an 
essential element is defective; second, a court cannot allow an amendment that 
would allow the court to convict the accused on a charge different from that found 
by the grand jury.  The fact that the type of drug was an essential element of the 
offense never influenced the court’s Crim.R. 7(B) analysis; rather, it influenced 
the court’s analysis of whether the original indictment was defective.  We 
therefore reject the state’s argument that Headley is distinguishable on the ground 
that the amendment in that case changed an essential element of the crime.  The 
state’s attempt to justify the amendment at issue by arguing that it did not supply 
an essential element of the crime therefore fails. 
III 
{¶ 11} Finally, we reject the state’s argument that the amendment to the 
indictment at issue was not plain error.  Pursuant to Crim.R. 52(B), “[p]lain errors 
or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not 
brought to the attention of the court.”  Plain error does not exist unless “but for 
the error, the outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise.”  State v. 
Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 97, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804.  The plain-
error rule is applied “under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a 
manifest miscarriage of justice.”  Id.  It is clear that the facts in this case satisfy 
the criteria for plain error. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 12} Under Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, “no person 
shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous, crime, unless on 
presentment or indictment of a grand jury.”  If a court were permitted to amend an 
indictment to increase the penalty or degree of the offense, the court would be 
able to “convict the accused on a charge essentially different from that found by 
the grand jury.”  Headley, 6 Ohio St.3d at 478–479, 6 OBR 526, 453 N.E.2d 716.  
The error in this case thus clearly affected substantial rights and produced an 
outcome that would have been otherwise but for the error.  It is also necessary to 
correct the error in order to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.  We 
therefore hold that the court of appeals was correct to hold that the error in this 
case was plain error. 
IV 
{¶ 13} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Crim.R. 7(D) does not 
permit the amendment of an indictment when such amendment changes the 
penalty or degree of the charged offense; amending the indictment to change the 
penalty or degree changes the identity of the offense.  The judgment of the court 
of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
CUPP, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
CUPP, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 14} Under the facts of this case and the structure of this criminal 
statute, I concur in the judgment of the court.  I would not hold, however, as the 
court apparently does, that an amendment to an indictment that also changes the 
degree or the penalty of the crime upward will necessarily always result in a 
change to the identity of the crime. 
January Term, 2008 
7 
__________________ 
 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 15} I respectfully dissent because in my view, an amendment to an 
indictment that alters only the severity of a charged offense does not violate 
Crim.R. 7(D). 
{¶ 16} As set forth in Crim.R. 7(D), a trial court may amend an 
indictment “provided no change is made in the name or identity of the crime 
charged.”  The rule does not, however, specify that the identity of an offense 
includes its severity or penalty.  In my view, the “identity” of the crime refers to 
its statutory definition, not its penalty.  Thus, I agree with Justice Holmes, who 
stated in State v. Headley (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 475, 6 OBR 526, 453 N.E.2d 716, 
that “[t]o hold otherwise is also a hypertechnical and incorrect reading of the 
criminal rules and statutes which reading favors the criminal rather than 
protecting the general public.”  Id. at 480 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 17} In this case, Davis’s indictment originally charged him with 
aggravated trafficking in less than the bulk amount of Oxycontin in violation of 
R.C. 2923.03(A)(1).  After the amendment, the indictment continued to charge a 
violation of R.C. 2923.03(A)(1) but alleged that he trafficked in an amount of 
drugs between five and 50 times the bulk amount.  Although the increase in the 
amount of the drugs also increased the severity of the offense from a fourth-
degree felony to a second-degree felony, the amendment did not in any way alter 
the crime’s identity. 
{¶ 18} The majority’s decision further disrupts the long-standing practice 
of trial courts throughout the state.  If trial courts may no longer use Crim.R. 7(D) 
to amend indictments to conform to the evidence, then they will be forced to 
dismiss cases and send them back to the grand juries for reindictment.  Not only is 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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this result unnecessary, in my view, but it will prevent trial courts from effectively 
managing their dockets and their ever-increasing case loads. 
{¶ 19} For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
James B. Grandey, Highland County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
William L. Archer Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Kelly & Wallace Co., L.P.A., Michael P. Kelly, and Timothy J. 
Kelly, for appellee. 
______________________