Case Title: Huebner v. Farmers Cooperative Ass'n of Holland

Citation: 167 N.W.2d 369

Docket Number: 

State: minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Date: 1969-04-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
167 N.W.2d 369 (1969) Lyle HUEBNER, Relator, v. FARMERS COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION OF HOLLAND, et al., Respondents. No. 41206. Supreme Court of Minnesota. April 18, 1969. *370 Mott, Grose, Von Holtum & Hefferan, Worthington, for relator. Paul A. LaRocque, Tracy, for respondents. Heard before KNUTSON, C. J., and NELSON, MURPHY, OTIS, and FRANK T. GALLAGHER, JJ. NELSON, Justice. Certiorari to review a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. Relator, Lyle Huebner, resides with his family on the farm he owns and operates in the vicinity of Holland, Minnesota. He has been farming for some years. In order to obtain feed for his livestock, he found it necessary at times to grind corn, oats, and other grain, and to mix these grains with commercial feed. For this purpose, on November 29, 1965, he called Farmers Cooperative Association of Holland, an elevator company, and requested that its portable mixer and grinder be brought to his farm for mixing and grinding some feed. The cooperative's employee, Robert Hammer, Jr., brought the grinder to the farm and, as was the practice, relator helped him with the grinding. Hammer operated the grinder-mixer and relator, using his tractor, scooped corn into the grinder's hopper. In attempting to adjust the machinery, Hammer got his hand caught in the gears. After releasing his hand, he informed relator that he had injured it and asked relator to take him to get medical attention. Relator claims that in the act of jumping off his tractor he injured his knee. He was not certain, but thought he might have stepped on a corn cob or something like that in reaching the ground. He made no complaint at that time to Hammer about falling or about injuring his knee. He took Hammer to the doctor but made no complaint about his alleged injury to the doctor, nor did he seek any medical attention or treatment at that time. Eventually, however, he was hospitalized and surgery was performed on his knee. Relator kept books and records for his farming operation and included his medical and surgical expenses as part of his business expenses. Relator testified that on the day of Hammer's injury relator informed the manager of the elevator company that he had injured his knee in jumping off the tractor. Relator's attending physician and surgeon was of the opinion that relator had suffered a 25-percent permanent partial loss of the use of his left leg. Dr. Meyer Z. Goldner, who examined relator at his request for the purpose of testifying before the referee, said that relator had suffered a 20-percent permanent partial disability. Dr. T. J. Arneson, who also examined relator at the request of employer, testified that relator had received a 20-percent permanent partial disability. *371 On these facts the referee awarded compensation to relator, but upon appeal to the commission his findings were reversed by the full commission. 1-2. Farmers are exempt from the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act under Minn.St. 176.041, subd. 1, which in part reads as follows: Section 176.011, subd. 16, states what constitutes personal injury in part as follows: Section 176.011, subd. 19, defines "worker" as meaning "employee." This court has held that, to exclude an employee from the Workmen's Compensation Act, the employment must be both casual and not in the usual course of the employer's business. See, Farnam v. Linden Hills Congregational Church, 276 Minn. 84, 93, 149 N.W.2d 689, 696, where this court said: Accord, Amundsen v. Poppe, 227 Minn. 124, 128, 34 N.W.2d 337, 340. We have also held that if employment is within the usual course of employer's business, it is within the Workmen's Compensation Act, even though the employment may be casual. Altermatt v. Altermatt, 239 Minn. 241, 58 N.W.2d 256. We have examined many cases bearing upon what constitutes casual employment. The court's interpretation of that term in Schneeberg v. Industrial Comm., 67 Ohio App. 499, 503, 37 N.E.2d 427, 429, is in agreement with our views and furnishes a clear statement of the applicable rule: Thus, an employer may be liable under the compensation act for injuries to an employee whose employment is casual but who is performing work in the regular course of the employer's business. See, Vescio v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 336 Pa. 502, 9 A.2d 546. In Partridge v. Blackbird, 213 Minn. 228, 6 N.W.2d 250, 12 Minn.W.C.D. 404, this court held that the nature of the employment taken as a whole is the test as to whether an employee is a farm laborer within the exceptions to the application of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The principal question presented in that case was whether or not Partridge was a "farm laborer." This court reversed the Industrial Commission, which had awarded compensation to Partridge against his employer, *372 saying (213 Minn. 230, 6 N.W.2d 251, 12 Minn.W.C.D. 406): In Peterson v. Farmers State Bank, 180 Minn. 40, 230 N.W. 124, this court in a very complete way distinguished between when a workman is a farm laborer and when he is not one. 3. Relator seeks to come under the ruling of this court in State ex rel. Nienaber v. District Court, 138 Minn. 416, 165 N.W. 268, L.R.A.1918F, 200. In that case the relator was engaged in the retail sale and delivery of coal and other fuel. One of his wagons, loaded with coal for delivery to a purchaser, became mired and the team hitched thereto was unable to remove it. The driver requested plaintiff, who was passing the scene, and who was in the employ of the city of St. Paul as a street sprinkler, driving his own team, to assist in releasing the coal wagon. In complying with the request, plaintiff was injured. This court held that, though not otherwise in relator's employ, plaintiff was its servant and employee in rendering the assistance; that the driver in charge of the wagon so mired had implied authority to employ him for the temporary purpose; and that plaintiff was entitled to an award for his injury under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Mr. Chief Justice Brown, who authored the opinion, dissented from the conclusion of the majority that plaintiff, under the facts stated, became an employee of relator within the meaning of the compensation act, stating (138 Minn. 418, 165 N.W. 268, L.R. A.1918F, 200): A few years later this court in State ex rel. Albert Lea Packing Co. v. Industrial Comm., 155 Minn. 267, 193 N.W. 450, had before it the following facts: A proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act was brought by Arthur Nelson, employee, against Minnesota Waterloo Creamery Company and Albert Lea Packing Company, employers. The two companies occupied separate parts of the same set of buildings in the city of Faribault. The boiler room of the creamery adjoined the engine room of the packing company and the rooms were connected by a doorway. Herbert Suddendorf was the engineer and Nelson the fireman of the creamery. William Lambert was the engineer of the packing company. The three were on friendly terms and occasionally did small favors for each other. The packing company operated its refrigerating plant with an electric motor, but also had a steam engine for use whenever the electric power might be interrupted. The steam for this engine was furnished by the creamery company from its boilers, the packing company paying it for the steam used. Lambert had changed from the electric power to the steam power while repairing a belt driven by the electric motor. Having completed the repairs, he decided to change back to the electric motor and so informed the foreman of the packing company, who directed a mechanic to assist him. In making this change, it was necessary to disconnect and remove a 7-foot-long steel rod weighing about 450 pounds. Although this rod had been removed at times *373 by only two men, Lambert knew that it would be difficult for him and the mechanic to remove it without assistance and asked Suddendorf for help. Suddendorf directed Nelson to assist them. While assisting them, one of Nelson's fingers was caught between the rod and the iron frame and crushed so badly it had to be amputated. Each company denied any liability for workmen's compensation, asserting that if any claim for compensation existed it was against the other company. The commission awarded compensation against the packing company, and that company brought the case here by certiorari. Nelson was employed and paid by the creamery company. His contract of hire was with that company, not with the packing company. He had never received or claimed any wages from the packing company and did not expect any pay for the aid given to Lambert. The relation of employer and employee as defined by the compensation law did not exist between him and that company. While this was not seriously questioned, it was nevertheless contended that an emergency had arisen which brought the case within the doctrine of State ex rel. Nienaber v. District Court, supra, and therefore authorized Lambert to employ such assistance as he deemed necessary. This court was unable to sustain that contention. We pointed out that Lambert could select his own time for making the change. He had received no instructions concerning it and there was no need for haste. He was familiar with the situation and conditions, and knew fully what it was necessary to do to make the change and how to do it. He had informed the foreman that he would change back to the electric power on Sunday morning and the foreman directed a mechanic employed by the company to assist him in doing so. Nothing unusual or unexpected had occurred. No unforeseen difficulty had been encountered. Lambert could have obtained any needed help by merely reporting his need to the packing company's foreman, who was in another part of the plant and readily accessible. Upon these facts this court concluded (155 Minn. 270, 193 N.W. 451): Relator has placed reliance upon State ex rel. Nienaber v. District Court, supra, and a leading case from Wisconsin, Conveyors Corp. of America v. Industrial Comm., 200 Wis. 512, 228 N.W. 118, although neither case has subsequently been extended beyond its facts. In the Conveyors Corporation case an employee, Collins, was found by another employee of Conveyors Corporation, Becker, lying at the bottom of a tank the company was installing for another corporation. Collins had been overcome by gas, and Becker immediately went to get aid from the employees of the other corporation. While getting Collins out of the tank, one of the other corporation's employees, Galko, died. The Wisconsin Supreme Court awarded compensation to Galko's widow against Conveyors, holding that the other corporation's employees procured by Becker were, during the rescue, acting for Conveyors. The court said: The Wisconsin court cited State ex rel. Nienaber v. District Court, supra, as authority for its decision. Nemeth v. Farmers Co-op. Elev. Co., 252 Wis. 290, 31 N.W.2d 569, involved an *374 action for injuries to a woman pinioned by a post with which she was preparing to block a rear wheel of the defendant's truck so that it would remain stationary on sloping ground while the driver delivered coal to her home. The defendant contended that the plaintiff should not be permitted to recover because, under the circumstances, an emergency had been recognized by a regular employee of the defendant and when he arranged with plaintiff to place the block she became a temporary employee of defendant; and that as such she had a right of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act which constituted her exclusive remedy. Without referring to the Conveyors Corporation case, the Wisconsin court rejected this argument, saying (252 Wis. 294, 31 N.W.2d 570): A new trial upon the merits was ordered. In Denton v. Morgan, 166 App.Div. 117, 151 N.Y.S. 729, affirmed without opinion, 223 N.Y. 591, 119 N.E. 1038, plaintiff was sent by his employer to pick up machinery it had purchased from Ingersoll-Rand Company. The machinery was too bulky to be loaded on plaintiff's truck, so defendant express company was called to pick up the machinery. Defendant's two employees could not handle it alone, so plaintiff and two of Ingersoll-Rand's employees undertook to help load the machinery on defendant's wagon. In doing so plaintiff was injured. He sought to establish that he was an "emergency employee" of defendant upon the theory that where an employer charges a regular employee with the performance of a certain duty and it appears that the force available to perform it is not sufficient, or an emergency occurs which requires assistance for the employee to perform it, he is impliedly authorized to call on others to assist him and that they thereby become employees of the original employer, who is responsible for their negligence under such circumstances and assumes toward them the same obligation as he has toward his regular employees. In that case, however, the author of the opinion said (166 App.Div. 119, 151 N.Y.S. 730): There is no doubt that one in peril and faced with an emergency as a result of his employment has, dependent upon the circumstances and the type of facts involved, the implied authority to hire help. But the question is, does the power and authority to hire automatically create the relationship of master and servant between the contractor whose employee is in peril and a volunteer who speeds to the rescue. We hold that it does not. It is elementary that the primary essential of a master-servant relationship is a contract of hire, either express or implied. The question is, was there an implied contract in the instant case. Was there a meeting of the minds, if not expressed, at least implied? 1 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation Text, § 234, has this to say in regard to emergency helpers and assistants: There is nothing in the record in the instant case to indicate that relator expected any pay. Obviously he did not. There is also the question of whether either Hammer, who asked for help, or petitioner, who jumped off his tractor in response thereto, had in mind at that time that they were about to establish and create a master-servant relationship. Relator, instead of claiming workmen's compensation as an employee, might have brought suit against the cooperative for negligence. Had he done so, it seems clear that the elevator company could not have successfully raised the defense that relator's only rights were under the Workmen's Compensation Act because there had been thrust upon him at the moment of rescue the relationship of master and servant. Nemeth v. Farmers Co-op. Elev. Co., supra. 4. We have searched the cases in this state subsequent to the Nienaber case and have found none determinative of the issue in the case at bar. As stated earlier, it is clear that relator expected no compensation in the first instance. Neither is there any indication that he considered himself a servant under the control of the cooperative. *376 As suggested by the commissioner who wrote the opinion accompanying the decision of the commission, relator's response at the time of Hammer's injury would seem to be that of a Good Samaritan, a volunteer instinctively going to the aid of a person in peril. In the light of the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and the cases in this state since State ex rel. Nienaber v. District Court, supra, defining the master-servant relationship, the Nienaber case is not controlling in the fact situation presented here. While relator's accident was unfortunate, we must conclude that the record herein, taken as a whole, fails to establish the relationship of master and servant as between relator and the cooperative within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission is affirmed. Affirmed.