Case Title: Ex parte William Earl Mitchell. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Perry & Williams, Inc. v. William Earl Mitchell)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1060356

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2008-01-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:01/25/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1060356
_________________________
Ex parte William Earl Mitchell 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re:  Perry & Williams, Inc.
v.
William Earl Mitchell )
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-98-312;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2050508)
BOLIN, Justice.
1060356
2
In November 2005, William Earl Mitchell filed a motion in
the trial court asking the court to award him a motorized
scooter and a lift to put the scooter on his vehicle under a
previous workers' compensation judgment that left open the
issue of future medical benefits.  The trial court granted
Mitchell's motion.  Relying on this Court's decision in Ex
parte City of Guntersville, 728 So. 2d 611 (Ala. 1998), the
Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial
court awarding Mitchell the scooter and the lift.  See Perry
& Williams, Inc. v. Mitchell, [Ms. 2050508, November 17, 2006]
__ So. 2d __ (Ala. Civ. App. 2006).  This Court held in Ex
parte City of Guntersville that a van was not a device that
served to improve a disabled employee's condition and,
therefore, did not come within the meaning of the term "other
apparatus" under § 25-5-77(a), Ala. Code 1975.  We granted
Mitchell's petition for a writ of certiorari to determine
whether this Court's holding in Ex parte City of Guntersville
should be clarified or overruled.
Factual and Procedural Background
On May 11, 1999, the Montgomery Circuit Court entered a
judgment finding that Mitchell had suffered a compensable
1060356
3
injury in July 1996, caused by inhaling toxic fumes during the
course of his employment with Perry & Williams, Inc.  The
trial court awarded Mitchell workers' compensation benefits in
accordance with the Workers' Compensation Act, § 25-5-1 et
seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the Act").  The trial court specified
in its judgment that Mitchell's right to any future medical
benefits would remain open pursuant to the Act.  See § 25-5-
77, Ala. Code 1975.
On November 10, 2005, Mitchell moved the trial court to
enforce the medical-benefits provision of the May 1999
workers' compensation judgment, alleging that his medical
condition had deteriorated, that he was in "need of a scooter
and a lift for the scooter for mobility," and that Perry &
Williams should pay for the expenses associated with the
purchase of the scooter and the lift.
Perry 
& 
Williams 
responded 
to 
Mitchell's 
motion,
disputing that the scooter and the lift were properly payable
medical benefits under § 25-5-77(a), Ala. Code 1975, which
mandates that the employer provide "reasonably necessary
medical and surgical treatment and attention, physical
rehabilitation, medicine, medical and surgical supplies,
1060356
4
crutches, artificial members, and other apparatus as the
result of an accident arising out of and in the course of the
employment ...."  Perry & Williams argued that based on this
Court's holding in Ex parte City of Guntersville, supra, the
scooter and the lift did not constitute "other apparatus" so
as to be a compensable medical expense under § 25-5-77(a),
because the scooter and the lift were merely to assist
Mitchell with his mobility and did not improve his medical
condition.  Perry & Williams also argued that Mitchell's
alleged need for a scooter and a lift was not related to his
workers' compensation injury, but was related to other medical
conditions from which Mitchell also suffered. In support of
their position, Perry & Williams presented the affidavits of
Mitchell's treating physicians, Dr. Mont F. Highley III and
Dr. William P. Saliski, Jr. Dr. Highley stated as follows in
his affidavit:
"I am a licensed physician practicing in the
field of family medicine.  In my position as a
physician, I have had the opportunity to treat
William Earl Mitchell, the plaintiff in the above
styled action.
"In my professional opinion, Mr. Mitchell's
medical condition is such that I believe he would
benefit from a scooter and lift.  It is further my
opinion that the scooter and lift would assist his
1060356
5
mobility and function, but would not be expected or
intended to improve his medical condition.
"As for defining the specific conditions that
have caused or contributed to Mr. Mitchell's need
for a scooter and lift, I defer my opinion to that
of Dr. William Saliski, to whom I have referred Mr.
Mitchell for further assessment and treatment."
Dr. Saliski testified as follows in his affidavit:
"I am a licensed physician practicing in the
field of pulmonology.  In my position as a
physician, I have had the opportunity to treat
William Earl Mitchell, the plaintiff in the above
styled action.
"I am aware that Mr. Mitchell is interested in
obtaining a scooter and lift.  In my professional
opinion, any benefit that Mr. Mitchell would gain
from a scooter and lift would be to assist his
mobility and function.  The scooter and lift would
not in any way improve his medical condition.
"It 
is 
my 
professional 
opinion 
that 
Mr.
Mitchell's need for a scooter and lift is unrelated
to his workers' compensation injury; his need for a
scooter and lift was not as the result of his
workers' compensation injury and the injury neither
caused nor contributed to his perceived need for
those items.  Instead, it is my opinion that any
need Mr. Mitchell has for a scooter and lift is
secondary to his diabetes, morbid obesity, severe
cardiac disease, and history of smoking."
Mitchell responded to Perry & Williams's response by
submitting on December 15, 2005, a second affidavit of Dr.
Highley, which addressed the issue of causation.  Dr. Highley
testified in his second affidavit as follows:
1060356
6
"Mr. Mitchell has been disabled for many years
because of pulmonary fibrosis.  His lung condition
is related to an on-the-job exposure in my opinion.
"He 
has 
recently 
developed 
severe 
aortic
stenosis.  He initially was approved for a scooter
to help him with his mobility.  However, the
development of the aortic stenosis and the issue of
the ideology of his disability became clouded.
However, it is my feeling that the patient has
sufficient disability on the basis of his lung
disease to warrant a scooter.  I think the fact that
he has aortic stenosis is probably unrelated, but
his lungs are unquestionably severely diseased to
the point where he is on oxygen on a constant basis.
It is my opinion that he should be approved for a
scooter and a lift to put the scooter on his car to
increase his mobility and decrease his dependence on
others."
On January 13, 2006, the trial court entered an order
requiring Perry & Williams to provide Mitchell with the
requested scooter and lift, finding that they were "other
apparatus" covered under § 25-5-77(a).  The trial court's
order reads, in part, as follows:
"The question at bar is whether the requested
'scooter and lift' are required under § 25-5-77(a),
Ala. Code (1975), which in pertinent part states, an
employer is responsible for paying only those
medical benefits that are associated with,
"'reasonably 
necessary 
medical 
...
treatment 
and 
attention, 
physical
rehabilitation ... medical ... supplies,
crutches, artificial members, and other
apparatus as the result of an accident
1060356
7
arising out of and in the course of the
employment.'
"The plaintiff contends that the scooter and
lift are covered within the broad mandate of the
statute.
"Two 
treating 
physicians 
have 
provided
affidavits in this action.  Dr. Saliski has provided
an affidavit to the defendant signed December 8,
2005.  Dr. Highley has provided affidavits to both
the 
plaintiff 
and 
defendant. 
 
Dr. 
Highley's
affidavit to the defendant is signed December 13,
2005.  Dr. Highley's affidavit to the plaintiff is
signed December 15, 2005.
"Dr. Saliski, in his affidavit to the defendant
states, 
"'In my professional opinion, any benefit
that Mr. Mitchell would gain from a scooter
and lift would be to assist his mobility
and function.  The scooter and lift would
not 
in 
any 
way 
improve 
his 
medical
condition.'
"Dr. Highley in his affidavit to the defendant,
states, 
"'In 
my 
professional 
opinion, 
Mr.
Mitchell's medical condition is such that
I believe he would benefit from a scooter
and lift.  It is further my opinion that
the scooter and lift would assist his
mobility and function, but would not be
expected or intended to improve his medical
condition.'
"Dr. Highley in his affidavit to the plaintiff
states, 
1060356
8
"'Mr. Mitchell has been disabled for many
years because of pulmonary fibrosis.  His
lung condition is related to an on-the-job
exposure in my opinion. 
"'He has recently developed severe aortic
stenosis.  He initially was approved for a
scooter to help him with his mobility.
However, the development of the aortic
stenosis and the issue of the ideology of
his disability became clouded.  However, it
is 
my 
feeling 
that 
the 
patient 
has
sufficient disability on the basis of his
lung disease to warrant a scooter.'
"While 
Dr. 
Highley's 
and 
Dr. 
Saliski's
affidavits for the defendant are consistent and
parallel, however, Dr. Highley's affidavits for the
plaintiff state a distinct opinion from his and Dr.
Saliski's affidavits for the defendant. It was
represented in open court by plaintiff's attorney
that Dr. Highley has been plaintiff's long-time
treating physician and would have more knowledge of
plaintiff's condition than Dr. Saliski, who only saw
plaintiff one time for approximately one and one-
half hour.  The defendant does not dispute this
representation.  While it is no question that both
doctors are credible, however, it is reasonable to
accept the long term treating physician's latest
conclusion as more persuasive on the need for the
scooter and lift.  Dr. Highley's latest conclusion
is that a scooter is warranted.  Thus, if the
scooter is warranted, so is the lift."
Perry & Williams argued on appeal to the Court of Civil
Appeals that the scooter and the lift were not "other
apparatus" that was "reasonably necessary ... as the result of
an accident arising out of and in the course of the
1060356
9
employment" pursuant to § 25-5-77(a), as that provision was
construed by this Court in Ex parte City of Guntersville,
supra.
In Ex parte City of Guntersville, a police officer
suffered a gunshot wound to his back during the course of his
employment with the City of Guntersville. The officer was
rendered a paraplegic and was confined to a wheelchair as the
result of the gunshot wound. After a judgment had been entered
awarding the officer workers' compensation benefits under the
Act, the City sued the officer, seeking a determination that
the City was not obligated under § 25-5-77(a) to pay for a van
equipped with a wheelchair lift. The trial court entered a
judgment in favor of the officer, which the Court of Civil
Appeals affirmed. See City of Guntersville v. Bishop, 728 So.
2d 605 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997).
We granted the City's petition for a writ of certiorari.
In reversing the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, this
Court concluded that "because the Legislature specifically
provided for transportation costs in § 25-5-77(f), [Ala. Code
1975,] it would not be logical to conclude that the
Legislature intended for the more general language of §
1060356
10
25-5-77(a) to cover costs related to transportation as well."
728 So. 2d at 616.  
This Court went on to conclude that the van did not fall
within the term "other apparatus" as that term is used in §
25-5-77(a).  This Court reasoned:
"The parties also agree that the van is
necessary 'for restoring [Bishop's] mobility "to the
highest possible level" of independent functioning.'
It is important to note that the parties further
stipulated that '[o]ther than as stated, there are
no other medical purposes for the van.'  If we held
that the workers' compensation statute required
reimbursement of a claimant's expenses where the
sole purpose of those expenses was to enhance the
claimant's independent functioning, we believe we
would be dangerously disturbing the balance of
interests that the Legislature built into the
workers' compensation system.
"Our workers' compensation system was designed
to provide limited, but guaranteed, benefits to
employees injured on the job.  In addition to those
benefits, employers are required to pay for medical
and rehabilitative treatment.  However, we hold that
those benefits do not include the purchase price of
a motor vehicle.  Put simply, a motor vehicle is not
a device that, in and of itself, can serve to
improve a disabled claimant's condition.  Its only
use is to improve the claimant's independent
functioning.  While human concern would cause one to
wish that a disabled person would reach the maximum
possible 
level 
of independent functioning, we
believe that allowing reimbursement for such costs
as are claimed in this case would stretch the
workers' compensation statute beyond its intended
meaning."
1060356
11
728 So. 2d at 616-17.
Judge Pittman, writing for the Court of Civil Appeals in
this case, stated in the main opinion:
"[U]nder 
the 
reasoning 
in 
Ex 
parte 
City 
of
Guntersville, for an item or device prescribed for
an injured employee, such as the scooter and the
lift at issue in this case, to be deemed a covered
'other apparatus' under § 25-5-77(a) so as to render
an employer liable for the cost of that item or
device, it must be shown that the purpose of the
item or device is to improve the physical or mental
condition of the injured employee."
Mitchell, __ So. 2d at __. The Court of Civil Appeals then
reversed the trial court's judgment awarding Mitchell the
scooter and the lift, finding that no substantial evidence
existed that indicated that the scooter and the lift were
intended to improve Mitchell's physical condition.  Mitchell,
_____ So. 2d at ____.
Judge Thompson concurred specially in the court's
decision, noting that the interpretation of Ex parte City of
Guntersville in the main opinion may have focused too closely
on the language in Guntersville questioning whether the
requested apparatus served to improve the disabled employee's
medical condition.  Judge Thompson noted that many items that
do not improve an employee's condition but that merely serve
1060356
Justice Murdock was a member of the Alabama Court of
1
Civil Appeals when that court decided this case.
12
to alleviate or remedy the effects of that condition are
compensable under § 25-5-77(a), including those specifically
mentioned in § 25-5-77(a), such as crutches and artificial
limbs, and those not specifically mentioned, such as a
wheelchair.  Mitchell, supra.
Judge Bryan also concurred specially; he expressed
concern that the holding in Ex parte City of Guntersville
could be applied to foreclose an employer's liability for
common and essential devices such as wheelchairs, canes,
hearing aids, braces, and walkers, which merely serve to
improve an employee's independent functioning and do not
improve the employee's condition. Mitchell, supra.
Justice Murdock  concurred in the result in Mitchell,
1
reasoning that the main opinion gave much more import to this
Court's statement in Ex parte City of Guntersville -- that the
van was not a device that served to improve the employee's
medical condition –- than this Court reasonably could have
given it.  Justice Murdock noted that the purpose of the items
and services provided for in § 25-5-77(a) was not only to
improve the employee's condition, but also (1) to prevent the
1060356
13
deterioration of the employee's condition and (2) to relieve
the employee of the adverse effects of the employee's
condition as it related to the basic appearance or the basic
functioning of the body.  Justice Murdock, using a cane as an
example, explained that a cane does not serve to improve an
employee's condition but serves only to relieve the employee
of the adverse effect of his condition as it related to basic
functioning, i.e., walking.  He pointed out that a cane is not
an item specifically mentioned in § 25-5-77(a) and thus would
be compensable only as an "other apparatus."  However, Justice
Murdock concluded that under the approach adopted by the Court
of Civil Appeals' opinion, employers would no longer be
required to provide canes to injured employees because a cane
does not serve to improve an employee's condition.  Mitchell,
supra. 
Justice Murdock offered in his special writing a
distinction between the van at issue in Ex parte Guntersville
and the more common devices such as walkers, wheelchairs,
hearing aids, back braces, and the like, routinely provided by
employers pursuant to § 25-5-77(a).  He stated that the
latter, more common, devices aid the body in its basic
1060356
14
appearance or function, whereas the sole purpose of the van
was to provide the employee with greater independence or
convenience in interacting with society.  Mitchell, supra.
Justice Murdock then framed the dispositive issue as follows:
"[W]hether the [scooter and the lift] at issue were shown by
[Mitchell] (a) to be reasonably necessary and (b) to relieve
[Mitchell] of the adverse effects of his condition insofar as
the basic appearance or functioning of his body." Mitchell, __
So. 2d at __.  Justice Murdock concluded that the evidence in
the record indicated that Mitchell sought the scooter and the
lift for the purpose of enhancing his independence and
convenience in accessing and interacting with  society rather
than for relieving him of the effect of his condition insofar
as it relates to the body's basic appearance or function.
Mitchell, supra.
Standard of Review
The standard of review on a petition for a writ of
certiorari is as follows:
"'On certiorari review, this Court accords no
presumption of correctness to the legal conclusions
of the intermediate appellate court.  Therefore, we
must apply de novo the standard of review that was
applicable in the Court of Civil Appeals.'  Ex parte
Toyota Motor Corp., 684 So. 2d 132, 135 (Ala. 1996).
1060356
15
The Court of Civil Appeals, in turn, is bound by
Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-[81](e), which provides that
legal issues are to be reviewed de novo and requires
that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed if
its factual findings are supported by substantial
evidence."
Ex parte Fort James Operating Co., 895 So. 2d 294, 296 (Ala.
2004).  Further, because the trial court received no ore tenus
evidence and its decision was based on the affidavits of
Mitchell's treating physicians, no presumption of correctness
attaches to the trial court's judgment, and appellate review
is de novo.  Hacker v. Carlisle, 388 So. 2d 947 (Ala. 1980).
  Discussion
Mitchell asks this Court to overrule, or at least to
clarify, its decision in Ex parte City of Guntersville, to the
extent that that decision sets forth an overly restrictive
standard for determining what constitutes "other apparatus"
under § 25-5-77(a), Ala. Code 1975.  Section 25-5-77(a)
provides, in relevant part, that an employer shall pay for
"reasonably necessary medical and surgical treatment and
attention, physical rehabilitation, medicine, medical and
surgical supplies, crutches, artificial members, and other
apparatus as the result of an accident arising out of and in
the course of the employment."  The phrase "other apparatus"
1060356
16
is not defined by the Act; therefore, it is subject to
construction. 
"'The 
cardinal 
rule 
of 
statutory
interpretation is to determine and give
effect to the intent of the legislature as
manifested in the language of the statute.
Absent a clearly expressed legislative
intent to the contrary, the language of the
statute is conclusive.  Words must be given
their 
natural, 
ordinary, 
commonly
understood 
meaning, 
and 
where 
plain
language is used, the court is bound to
interpret that language to mean exactly
what it says.'  
"... 'Courts must liberally construe the workers'
compensation law "to effectuate its beneficent
purposes," although such a construction must be one
that the language of the statute "fairly and
reasonably" supports.'" 
Ex parte Weaver, 871 So. 2d 820, 823-24 (Ala. 2003) (citations
omitted).  This Court in Ex parte City of Guntersville
discussed the history and underlying policy of the Act:
"'[T]he 
necessity 
for 
workers' 
compensation
legislation arose out of the coincidence of a sharp
increase in industrial accidents attending the rise
of the factory system and a simultaneous decrease in
the employee's common-law remedies for his or her
injuries.'  1 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson,
Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, § 4.00 (1997).
In an effort to meet changing societal needs more
efficiently than they were being met by the common
law and early statutory law, the states began
enacting workers' compensation statutes, in their
modern form, in the first part of this century.
Larson, § 5.30.  In doing so, the states created a
1060356
17
new system that was delicately balanced between the
interests 
of 
employees 
and 
the 
interests 
of
employers.  Under this new system, the employer is
automatically responsible for paying medical and
disability benefits to employees who are injured on
the job.  '[T]he employee and his or her dependents,
in exchange for ... modest but assured benefits,
give up their common-law right to sue the employer
for damages for any injury covered by the act....'
Larson, § 1.10(e).  'A correctly balanced underlying
concept of the nature of workers' compensation is
indispensable to an understanding of current cases
and to a proper drafting and interpretation of
compensation acts.'  Larson, § 1.20.  The Alabama
Legislature incorporated that balanced concept in
our workers' compensation statute.  Understanding
that balance is, of course, a constant challenge for
courts.  In deciding the issue at hand, we must
determine how to best effectuate the intended aims
of the compensation statute while maintaining the
balance upon which it was based."
728 So. 2d at 615-16.  Therefore, in setting forth the
appropriate 
standard 
to 
be 
used 
in 
determining 
what
constitutes "other apparatus" under § 25-5-77(a), this Court
must strike a balance between the competing interests of
employees and employers that is the basis of our workers'
compensation system.
As Justice Murdock aptly pointed out in his special
concurrence to the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion Mitchell,
a casual reading of § 25-5-77(a) reveals that not all the
apparatus and services specifically mentioned there have as
1060356
18
their sole purpose the improvement of an employee's condition.
They may also serve (a) to prevent the deterioration of the
employee's condition and (b) to relieve the  employee of the
adverse effects of his condition as it relates to "the basic
appearance or the basic functioning of [the] body."  Mitchell,
__ So. 2d at __ (Murdock, J., concurring in the result).  For
example, "medical and surgical treatment,"  in addition to
improving an employee's condition, may also serve to prevent
the further deterioration of the employee's condition or
restore the employee to a level of basic functioning.
"Physical rehabilitation" may serve to improve an employee's
condition, but it may also be prescribed for the purpose of
preventing the further deterioration of the employee's
condition or restoring the employee to a level of basic
functioning.  "Crutches" do not improve the condition of an
employee's injured leg, but they serve to prevent the further
deterioration of the employee's leg and also help restore the
employee to a level of basic function, i.e., ambulation.
"Artificial members" cannot restore or mend a employee's
severed limb; however, they would restore the employee's
appearance as it relates to the severed limb, and may, in some
1060356
19
cases, return the employee to a level of basic functioning.
The same could be said for many other items not specifically
mentioned in § 25-5-77(a).  For example items such as
wheelchairs, 
walkers, 
canes, 
hearing 
aids, 
eyeglasses,
dentures, and braces (such as back, knee, and elbow braces) do
not necessarily serve to improve an employee's condition but,
nonetheless, are routinely provided to injured employees under
§ 25-5-77(a).  A narrow interpretation of the phrase "other
apparatus" 
could 
conceivably 
foreclose 
an 
employer's 
liability
for these common items, which are routinely provided to the
employee pursuant to § 25-5-77(a).
The ejusdem generis rule of statutory construction
provides that where general words or phrases follow or precede
a specific list of classes of persons or things, the general
word or phrase is interpreted to be of the same nature or
class as those named in the specific list.  Ex parte McLeod,
718 So. 2d 682 (Ala. 1997).  Applying the rule of ejusdem
generis to § 25-5-77(a), we must interpret the phrase "other
apparatus" to be in the same nature or class as "medical and
surgical treatment," "physical rehabilitation," "crutches,"
and "artificial members."  As discussed above, those items and
1060356
20
services do not have as their sole purpose the improvement of
an employee's condition.  As noted by Justice Murdock, they
may also act to prevent the deterioration of the employee's
condition, but they serve to relieve the employee of the
adverse effects of his condition as it relates to the basic
appearance or basic functioning of his body.  Therefore, the
phrase "other apparatus" must not be construed to include only
those items that improve an employee's condition; rather, it
must be construed to also include like items that also serve
to prevent the deterioration of the employee's condition and
to relieve the employee of the effects of his condition as it
relates to the basic appearance or functioning of the
employee's body.  
In Ex parte City of Guntersville this Court was asked to
consider the narrow issue whether a wheelchair-accessible van
fell within the phrase "other apparatus" as that phrase is
used in § 25-5-77(a). This Court concluded that the
legislature 
had 
specifically 
provided 
for 
transportation 
costs
in § 25-5-77(f); therefore, it reasoned, the legislature did
not intend for the more general language of § 25-5-77(a) to
cover costs related to transportation.  Ex parte City of
1060356
21
Guntersville, supra.  In dicta, this Court went on to state
that the payment of medical benefits pursuant to § 25-5-77(a)
did not include the purchase price of a van because a van is
not a device that can serve to improve a disabled employee's
condition; its only use is to improve the employee's
independent functioning.  Id. We reject as too restrictive and
inconsistent with legislative intent the dicta in Ex parte
City of Guntersville, to the extent that it defines the phrase
"other apparatus" to include only those items that serve to
improve an employee's condition.
In this case, this Court is asked to clarify the standard
to be used in determining what constitutes an "other
apparatus" under § 25-5-77(a).  We do so by incorporating the
principles discussed above into a functional standard that is
consistent with legislative intent and that strikes a balance
between the competing interests of employees and employers.
Thus, in order to constitute "other apparatus" and be
compensable as a medical benefit under § 25-5-77(a), the item
must be: (a) reasonably necessary and (b) intended to improve
the injured employee's condition, to prevent the further
deterioration of the employee's condition, or to relieve the
1060356
22
employee from the effect of his condition by restoring the
employee to a basic level of appearance or functioning.  The
determination of what constitutes a reasonably necessary
"other apparatus" should be made on a case-by-case basis.  For
example, a wheelchair may restore an otherwise healthy
employee to a level of basic functioning; however, an employee
who suffers from a condition that, in addition to requiring a
wheelchair, has also weakened the employee's upper body to the
point that the employee cannot operate a wheelchair, may
require a scooter to return that employee to a similar level
of basic functioning.
We now turn specifically to Mitchell's request for a
scooter and a lift.  The function of the lift is solely to
facilitate access to transportation in connection with a motor
vehicle. As stated above, the basis for this Court's holding
in Ex parte City of Guntersville was that the legislature had
specifically provided for transportation costs in 25-5-77(f),
and a lift can serve no function other than as an attachment
to a mode of transportation to facilitate the injured
employee's transportation. The lift itself cannot improve
Mitchell's condition, prevent the further deterioration of his
1060356
23
condition, or relieve him from the effect of his condition by
restoring him to a basic level of appearance or functioning.
Therefore, we conclude as a matter of law that a lift cannot,
pursuant to the standard announced today, be considered
"other apparatus" under § 25-5-77(a).  Therefore, we affirm
the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals as to the lift.
However, a scooter could be considered "other apparatus"
reasonably necessary to return Mitchell to a level of basic
functioning pursuant to the new standard and could therefore
be compensable under § 25-5-77(a).  Accordingly, we reverse
the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals as to the scooter
and remand the case to that court for it in turn to remand the
case for the trial court to conduct further proceedings to
determine whether Mitchell is entitled to a scooter, as
"other apparatus," pursuant to the standard set forth above.
Because this Court has announced a new standard in this case,
the trial court is free to exercise its discretion and conduct
further proceedings, including taking additional evidence, in
making its determination.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED WITH
INSTRUCTIONS.
1060356
24
Cobb, C.J., and See, Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, and
Parker, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., recuses himself.