Case Title: State v. Powell

Citation: 703 So. 2d 444

Docket Number: 89964

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1997-11-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
703 So. 2d 444 (1997)
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
Noah POWELL, III, Respondent.
No. 89964.

Supreme Court of Florida.
November 20, 1997.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; Robert J. Krauss, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Chief of Criminal Law, and Deborah F. Hogge, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Petitioner.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender and Allyn Biambalvo, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Clearwater, for Respondent.
SHAW, Justice.
We have for review State v. Powell, 696 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), wherein the court certified the following two questions:
Id. at 792-93. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
Noah Powell pled guilty to sexual battery for committing an act of nonconsensual sexual intercourse with his ex-girlfriend, who is *445 the mother of his three-year-old son. The trial court imposed a twelve-year sentence and then suspended it and replaced it with a two-year period of community control and a four-year term of probation to be served consecutively. As a condition of community control, Powell was required to enroll in a sex offender counseling program.
The State challenged the legality of Powell's conditional suspended sentence on appeal arguing first, that the sentence suspends all, not just a portion, of the period of incarceration and second, that the sentence is replaced with a term of community control and probation that is shorter than the suspended period of incarceration. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the sentence, reasoning thusly:
Powell, 696 So. 2d  at 791-92 (citations omitted). We agree with the district court's analysis and conclusion. As long as there exists a valid reason for a downward departure, a trial court may impose a true split sentence in which the entire period of incarceration is suspended. A trial court may also impose a true split sentence in which the period of community control and probation is shorter than the suspended portion of incarceration.
Accordingly, we answer both certified questions in the affirmative, approve the decision of the district court, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.[3]
It is so ordered.
KOGAN, C.J., OVERTON, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., and GRIMES, Senior Justice, concur.
[1]  Section 948.01(6), Florida Statutes (1995), states in pertinent part:

(6) Whenever punishment by imprisonment for a misdemeanor or a felony, except for a capital felony, is prescribed, the court, in its discretion, may, at the time of sentencing, impose a split sentence whereby the defendant is to be placed on probation or, with respect to any such felony, into community control upon completion of any specified period of such sentence which may include a term of years or less.
Id. (emphasis added).
[2]  Section 948.01(11), Florida Statutes (1995), states:

(11) The court may also impose a split sentence whereby the defendant is sentenced to a term of probation which may be followed by a period of incarceration or, with respect to a felony, into community control, as follows:
(a) If the offender meets the terms and conditions of probation and community control, any term of incarceration may be modified by court order to eliminate the term of incarceration.
(b) If the offender does not meet the terms and conditions of probation or community control, the court shall impose a term of incarceration equal to the remaining portion of the order of probation or community control. Such term of incarceration shall be served under applicable law or county ordinance governing service of sentences in state or county jurisdiction. This paragraph does not prohibit any other sanction provided by law.
Id. (emphasis added).
[3]  We disapprove the following cases to the extent they are inconsistent with our opinion today: Warrington v. State, 660 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); State v. Davis, 657 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); State v. Farthing, 652 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); State v. Conte, 650 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Gaskins v. State, 607 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). We note that the district court in Powell certified conflict with State v. McEachern, 700 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). We have now quashed McEachern. McEachern v. State, 701 So. 2d 865 (Fla.1997).