Case Title: Killian v. Heintz Div. Kelsey Hayes

Citation: 360 A.2d 620, 468 Pa. 200

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1976-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
468 Pa. 200 (1976) 360 A.2d 620 Vincent L. KILLIAN and Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, Appellants, v. HEINTZ DIV. KELSEY HAYES and Insurance Co. of North America. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued January 19, 1976. Decided July 16, 1976. *201 *202 Thomas F. McDevitt, Philadelphia, for appellants. Swartz, Campbell & Detweiler, R.D. Harburg, Philadelphia, for appellees. Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ. NIX, Justice. Claimant-appellant, Vincent L. Killian, filed a petition for compensation pursuant to the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, art. III, §§ 306(a), 306(b), as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 511, 512 (Supp. 1975-76) alleging total and subsequently partial disability as a result of accidental injury when his left hand was caught in a malfunctioning machine press. After a hearing, the referee entered an award of total disability benefits from April 24, 1968, through March 9, 1969, and partial disability benefits thereafter. On appeal to the Workmen's Compensation Board, the referee's award was affirmed. Subsequently, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the findings of fact, however, it concluded that an error of law had been committed and reversed *203 the decision of the Board. We granted allocatur and this appeal followed.[1] In September 1963 Killian was working as a machinist for his employer Heintz, when his left hand was caught in a press, causing substantial portions of each of the four fingers of the hand to be amputated.[2] Killian was fully compensated pursuant to Sections 306(c)(1) and (c)(24) of the Act, supra, as amended, 77 P.S. 513(1) and (24) for the specific loss of the use of a hand for all practical intents and purposes: See, Curran v. Walter E. Knipe and Sons, Inc., 185 Pa. Super. 540, 547, 138 A.2d 251, 255 (1958). The present litigation arose when Killian returned to work as a machinist and on April 23, 1968, sustained another injury to his left hand, requiring the remaining *204 portions of his fingers and part of his palm to be amputated. The referee found in pertinent part: As a result of this second injury, appellant remained unable to work for almost a year. When he returned to work for Heintz, Killian was assigned as a tool crib attendant at a salary less than that which he earned prior to April 23, 1968. In reversing the determination of total disability made by the Board, the Commonwealth Court perceived the issue to be an attempt by appellant to claim twice for the loss of his left hand. Section 306(c)(1), provides that it is the "exclusive" source of compensation for all disability for the loss of a hand, thus, the court reasoned: In our judgment, the Commonwealth Court has taken an unnecessarily restrictive view of this matter. The courts of this jurisdiction have frequently discussed the three classifications for compensation under the Act,[4] i.e., "total disability", Section 306(a), 77 Pa.C.S. § 511; "partial disability", Section 306(b), 77 P.S. § 512; and, "all disability resulting from permanent injuries", Section 306(c), 77 Pa.C.S. § 513. See e.g., Clark v. Clearfield Opera House Co., 275 Pa. 244, 119 A. 136 (1922); Lente v. Luci, 275 Pa. 217, 119 A. 132 (1922); Berskis v. Lehigh Valley Cool Co., 273 Pa. 243, 116 A. 888 (1922); Moran v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 154 Pa.Super. 608, 36 A.2d 845 (1944); Yanik v. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp., 150 Pa.Super. 148, 27 A.2d 564 (1942); Croll v. Miller, 133 Pa.Super. 448, 2 A. 527 (1938); Reading Tube Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 12 Pa.Cmwlth. 45, 315 A.2d 678 (1974). Under Sections 306(a) and (b), the legislature has attempted to provide for compensation during the periods of disability following an injury. The schedule of payment is dependent upon the extent of the disability, i.e., total or partial, and reflects an incapacity to perform one's duties and the loss of earning power resulting from that injury. Lackman v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 205 *206 Pa.Super. 129, 132-133, 208 A.2d 33, 35 (1965); Cunningham v. Guerrina, 188 Pa.Super. 288, 291, 146 A.2d 318, 319 (1958); Moran v. Glen Alden Coal Co., supra, 154 Pa.Super. at 610, 36 A.2d 845. Under Section 306(c), the legislature has set forth a schedule of payment of compensation for a permanent injury or a loss of a member of the body. This sum is a statutorily prescribed amount and is intended to include all disability emanating from or connected with the loss of a member or a permanent injury to that member. Lente v. Luci, supra, 275 Pa. at 220, 119 A. 132; Yaklich v. Union Collieries Co., 158 Pa.Super. 55, 58, 43 A.2d 591, 593 (1945); Vanaskie v. Stevens Coal Co., 133 Pa.Super. 457, 460, 2 A.2d 531, 532 (1938). Thus, even though a claimant was employed at the same work and at the same wages as before the accident he would not be barred from compensation under Section 306(c). Morrow v. J. S. Murray & Sons, et al., 136 Pa.Super. 277, 7 A.2d 109 (1939). Additionally, in Lente v. Luci, supra, the seminal case in this area, our Court recognized that there may be occasions where other parts of the body have been injured or destroyed as a result of the permanent injury. Under certain circumstances, such additional injury is compensable under Sections 306(a) or (b) of the Act. Id. at 275 Pa. 221-22, 119 A. 133. (Emphasis added) In Carnovale v. Supreme Clothes, Inc., 7 Pa.Cmwlth. 253, 298 A.2d 640 (1973), the claimant received compensation for the permanent loss of her hand. The employer asserted that a resultant injury to the claimant's wrist was insufficient to sustain an additional award for total disability because it was not another distinct part of her body. The Commonwealth Court disagreed and appropriately noted: Id., at 256, 298 A.2d at 641. See generally, Philadelphia Tramrail Co., et al. v. Kennedy, 18 Pa.Cmwlth. 526, 336 A.2d 924 (1975); Kraft Foods Division et al. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 16 Pa.Cmwlth. 592, 330 A.2d 283 (1975); Groncki v. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co., 204 Pa.Super. 465, 468, 205 A.2d 624, 625 (1949); but cf., Casper v. State Workmen's Insurance Fund, et al., 132 Pa.Super. 96, 105, 200 A. 186, 189 (1938). It would appear to follow under the reasoning of Lente v. Luci, supra, and Carnovale v. Supreme Clothes, Inc., supra, that the mere fact that a second injury involved the remnant of the member of the body for which permanent injury had been previously compensated under Section 306(c), would not preclude additional recovery under Sections 306(a) and (b) provided that the claimant could establish a destruction, derangement and deficiency to a separate and distinct part of his body as a result of that second injury. In the instant case, the *209 standards articulated in Lente v. Luci, supra, were not applied. There were no findings by the referee or the Board as to whether or not the additional injuries to Killian met the test for additional compensation under Sections 306(a) or (b). If there had been only one accident causing the injury now affecting appellant, it would have been clear that the proper inquiry would have been to determine whether there was disability separate and distinct which normally would not have followed from the loss of the member in question. Because a second accident had caused injury to the same hand previously injured, there was no reason not to apply the Lente test, that, is, whether the 1968 injury solely affected Killian's left hand or did that second injury also affect a separate and distinct part of his body. There is testimony which suggests that Killian sustained a separate and distinct injury to his arm as a result of the 1968 accident. Regrettably, the referee and the Board failed to make a finding as to whether or not the injuries to the arm fell within the test set forth in Lente, supra. We therefore remand this case to the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board for a determination of whether the injuries suffered in 1968 affected the left arm in such a manner that Killian was entitled to compensation for disability under Section 306(a) and/or (b) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. It is so ordered. JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, J., concur in the result. [1] On appeal from a compensation award, the scope of review of the Commonwealth Court is limited to a determination of whether or not constitutional rights were violated, an error of law was committed, or any necessary finding of fact was unsupported by substantial evidence. Jessop Steel Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board et al., 10 Pa.Cmwlth. 186, 188, 309 A.2d 86, 87 (1973). [2] His thumb remained intact. [3] It is well settled that a member does not necessarily need to be amputated for the injury to cause total loss. The correct test is to determine whether a claimant has suffered the permanent loss of the use of the injured member for all practical intents and purposes. This determination is a factual matter for the Board. E.g., Verna v. Stabler, 204 Pa.Super. 87, 91, 203 A.2d 578, 581 (1964); Curran v. Knipe & Sons, Inc., 185 Pa.Super. 540, 138 A.2d 251 (1958). See also, Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915, P.L. 736, art. III, § 306(c)(24), as amended, 77 P.S. § 513(24). [4] While the rates and schedules of compensation have been amended over the years, other material portions of Section 306(a), (b), and (c) have remained substantially unchanged since 1915. Compare, Symons, Jr. v. National Electric Products, 414 Pa. 505, 200 A.2d 871 (1964) with Berskis v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 273 Pa. 243, 116 A. 888 (1922).