Case Title: Haase v. Starnes

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-02-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Roger HAASE v. C. Wayne STARNES, M.D.

95-892                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 5, 1996


1.   Appeal & error -- summary judgment -- standard of review. --
     On appellate review of a case in which the facts are not in
     dispute and summary judgment is granted, the appellate court
     simply determines whether appellee was entitled to judgment as
     a matter of law. 

2.   Negligence -- medical malpractice -- when expert testimony is
     required. -- The trial court erred in granting summary
     judgment to appellee because, contrary to its ruling, expert
     testimony is not necessary per se in every medical malpractice
     case; it is well-settled that expert testimony is required
     only when the asserted negligence does not lie within the
     jury's comprehension as a matter of common knowledge, when the
     applicable standard of care is not a matter of common
     knowledge, and when the jury must have the assistance of
     experts to decide the issue of negligence.

3.   Statutes -- construction of -- Ark. Code Ann.  16-114-206
     (1987) does not apply to actions for medical injury based on
     breach of express warranty where issue is whether medical-care
     provider guaranteed results. -- The trial court erred in
     granting summary judgment to appellee because, contrary to its
     ruling, Ark. Code Ann.   16-114-206 (1987) does not apply to
     actions for medical injury based on breach of express warranty
     where the issue is whether the medical-care provider
     guaranteed the results; so to apply section 16-114-206 would
     defy common sense and produce absurd results, and the supreme
     court does not interpret statutes in that manner.

4.   Statutes -- statutory burden-of-proof requirements in medical-
     malpractice action have no relevance in contract-based action
     arising out of guarantee of specific, favorable results. --
     The supreme court held that the burden-of-proof requirements
     of Ark. Code Ann.  16-114-206(a) typify three requirements of
     a cause of action sounding in tort -- duty, breach, and cause
     -- and have no relevance in a contract-based cause of action
     arising out of a guarantee of specific, favorable results; the
     standard of care used by medical-care providers in similar
     communities and situations simply has no relevance in a case
     where the sole issue is whether a medical-care provider
     breached a particular express warranty.

5.   Appeal & error -- part of order granting summary judgment to
     appellee on breach-of-warranty claim reversed and remanded. --
     Analyzing appellant's contract action under the principles of
     contract rather than negligence law, the supreme court
     reversed and remanded that part of the trial court's order
     granting summary judgment to appellee on appellant's breach-
     of-warranty claim due to appellant's failure to satisfy the
     burden-of-proof requirements set forth in Ark. Code Ann.  16-
     114-206 for an action for medical injury.

6.   Physicians & surgeons -- physician may make express contract
     with patient. -- A physician may make an express contract with
     a patient whereby the physician makes a special agreement with
     the patient or promises to cure the patient.

7.   Appeal & error -- trial court erred in granting summary
     judgment where appellant pleaded and offered proof of express
     warranty made by appellee. -- Where appellant pleaded and
     offered some proof of an express warranty made by appellee,
     and appellant alleged by complaint that he relied on
     appellee's advertisements in receiving treatment, the supreme
     court could not affirm the trial court's granting of summary
     judgment on the basis that appellant failed to plead or prove
     that a contract or express warranty existed.

8.   Appeal & error -- failure to obtain ruling -- issue waived on
     appeal. -- Where appellant failed to obtain a ruling on his
     contention that a medical-care provider waives the protection
     afforded by the Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act when the
     medical-care provider makes an express warranty with respect
     to the success or results of a particular treatment, the issue
     was waived on appeal, and the supreme court did not address
     the merits of the point.

9.   Constitutional law -- only necessary constitutional issues
     decided. -- It is well-settled that no constitutional issues
     are decided except those that are necessary to a decision in
     the specific case at hand. 

10.  Constitutional law -- contract clause -- not to be construed
     literally but to allow state to exercise police powers -- no
     violation of contract clause. -- It is well-settled that the
     "contract clause" of the United States Constitution, art. 1,
     10, cl. 1, is not to be construed literally but is construed
     to allow a state to exercise its police powers; however, the
     contract clause imposes some limits upon the power of a state
     to abridge existing contractual relationships, even in the
     exercise of its otherwise legitimate police power; where the
     operative facts of the present case occurred well after the
     passage of the Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act in 1979, and
     no contract between appellant and appellee then existed, the
     supreme court  could not say that Ark. Code Ann.  16-114-206
     violated the contract clause in the case.

11.  Appeal & error -- failure to present convincing argument --
     issue not addressed. -- Where appellant argued that the
     Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act violated the equal-protection
     clauses of the United States and Arkansas Constitutions but
     did not make any convincing argument for his contention, and
     it was not apparent to the supreme court without further
     research that the argument was well-founded, the issue was not
     addressed.

12.  Constitutional law -- constitutional preference for general
     rather than special laws -- directory or cautionary as applied
     to General Assembly. -- Under Ark. Const. art. 5,  25, the
     General Assembly is prohibited from enacting a special law
     where a general law can be made applicable; it is well-settled
     that the clause in question is not mandatory but is directory
     or merely cautionary as applied to the General Assembly;
     compliance is left to the discretion of the General Assembly.

13.  Statutes -- no conflict between Ark. Code Ann.  16-114-206(a)
     and Ark. R. Evid. 702. -- Where appellant maintained that Ark.
     Code Ann.  16-114-206(a) was in direct conflict with Ark. R.
     Evid. 702, the supreme court concluded that there was no
     conflict and that the argument was based on a false premise
     regarding mandatory or permissive presentation of expert
     testimony.

14.  Appeal & error -- summary judgment -- order modified to
     reflect that summary judgment was granted with prejudice. --
     The supreme court held that the questions whether a complaint
     states a cause of action and whether a plaintiff has failed to
     offer sufficient proof of a cause of action to survive a
     defendant's motion for summary judgment are questions of law
     with respect to which trial courts have no discretion; where
     the trial court's order specifically stated that it granted
     appellee's motion for summary judgment because appellant had
     not proven his case, the summary judgment should have been
     granted with prejudice, and the supreme court modified the
     judgment so to reflect.


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, Fifth Division; Morris W.
Thompson, Judge; affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part
on direct appeal; affirmed as modified on cross-appeal.
     Hartsfield, Almand & Grisham, by: Larry J. Hartsfield, for
appellant/cross-appellee.
     The Trammell Law Firm, by: Thomas F. Meeks and Robert
Trammell, for appellee/cross-appellant.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     Associate Justice Donald L.
Corbin, 2-5-96  *ADVREP5*





ROGER HAASE,
                    APPELLANT/
               CROSS-APPELLEE,

V.

C. WAYNE STARNES, M.D.,
                    APPELLEE/
               CROSS-APPELLANT



95-892



APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT, FIFTH DIVISION,
NO. 94-4258,
HON. MORRIS W. THOMPSON, JUDGE,

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED
AND REMANDED IN PART ON DIRECT
APPEAL; AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED ON
CROSS-APPEAL.





     Appellant, Roger Haase, appeals an order of the Pulaski County
Circuit Court granting summary judgment to appellee, C. Wayne
Starnes, M.D., and dismissing without prejudice appellant's
complaint for negligence and breach of express warranty. 
Thereafter, appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, which
included a request for rulings on the constitutional challenges he
made to the Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act, Ark. Code Ann.  16-
114-201 to -209 (1987 and Supp. 1995).  Appellee filed a motion to
correct the judgment to reflect that the dismissal of the complaint
was with prejudice.  The trial court entered an order denying both
motions.  From that order, appellant also appeals and appellee
cross-appeals.  This case was certified to this court as one
involving a question about the law of torts.  Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-
2(a)(16).  We find error in the part of the order granting summary
judgment of the claim for expressed warranty and therefore affirm
in part and reverse and remand in part.  On cross-appeal, we modify
the judgment to reflect that the dismissal of the complaint as to
the claim for negligence was with prejudice.
     Appellant filed a complaint against appellee alleging
negligence and breach of express warranty arising from appellee's
treatment of appellant for a series of hair transplants.  Appellant
alleged that appellee placed advertisements stating "We guarantee
you a full, growing head of hair for the rest of your life," and
"Transplants guaranteed to grow for the rest of your life." 
Appellant asserted that he relied on such advertisements when he
agreed to undergo a year-long series of hair transplants, grafts,
and scalp reductions performed by appellee.  Appellant further
alleged that he suffered a severe infection during the course of
appellee's treatment that resulted in a scar which is incapable of 
sustaining hair transplants.  
     Eventually, appellant stipulated that he would not offer
expert testimony to show appellee failed to maintain the applicable
standard of care.  Thereafter, appellee moved for summary judgment,
arguing that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law due to
the absence of expert testimony.  Appellant responded to the
motion, arguing that expert testimony was not necessary on the
facts of this case and that proof of the applicable standard of
care and breach thereof is not necessary to a claim predicated on
breach of express warranty.  
     The trial court granted appellee's motion for summary
judgment, ruling that, regardless of whether the "medical injury"
resulted from negligence or breach of warranty, as long as it
resulted from professional services rendered by a medical-care
provider, the proof was governed by the Arkansas Medical
Malpractice Act, and specifically section 16-114-206.  Appellant
asserts six arguments for reversal of that order.  
        I. BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY -- BURDEN OF PROOF
     The facts are not in dispute.  As the trial court stated in
its order, the question before it was one of law.  On appellate
review of such a case, we simply determine whether appellee was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  National Park Medical
Center, Inc. v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 322 Ark. 595, ___
S.W.2d ___ (1995).
     As his first point for reversal, appellant argues that expert
testimony is not necessary to establish a cause of action based on
breach of express warranty where the breach can be proven from
evidence that is within a jury's common knowledge.  Appellant
acknowledges that he seeks recovery for a "medical injury" as
defined by section 16-114-201(3), and that his burden of proof is
therefore governed by section 16-114-206.  He argues, however, that
when section 16-114-206 is applied to his breach-of-warranty claim,
he is placed in the ridiculous posture of being required to offer
proof that appellee was negligent in order to prove that appellee
breached an express warranty.  In summary, appellant's first point
has two components: one, he should not be required to prove
negligence in this case in order to sustain a cause of action for
breach of express warranty; two, expert testimony is not required
in his case for breach of express warranty because the contract
issue is within the common knowledge of lay persons.  
     Appellee responds that expert testimony is required regardless
of whether a medical-malpractice plaintiff's claim is for
negligence or breach of warranty, essentially because the general
public is not knowledgeable regarding techniques and procedures for
hair-transplant surgery.  Appellee responds further that regardless
of appellant's argument on this point, he is entitled to summary
judgment because appellant did not plead nor offer proof of an
express warranty made by him to appellant.
     The trial court ruled that, if the injury complained of is a
"medical injury," expert testimony is necessary to establish the
standard of care and breach thereof and that proof is governed by
section 16-114-206 regardless of whether the claim is for
negligence or breach of warranty.  Because appellant stipulated he
would not offer expert testimony on the standard of care and breach
thereof, the trial court ruled appellee was entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.  
     The trial court's ruling was in error for two reasons.  First,
expert testimony is not necessary per se in every medical
malpractice case.  Our law is well-settled that expert testimony is
required only when the asserted negligence does not lie within the
jury's comprehension as a matter of common knowledge, when the
applicable standard of care is not a matter of common knowledge,
and when the jury must have the assistance of experts to decide the
issue of negligence.  Robson v. Tinnin, 322 Ark. 605,