Case Title: In re Stark - Two-year suspension suspended, and respondent placed on 2-years' probation video

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2016-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 114,583 
 
In the Matter of STEPHEN M. STARK, 
Respondent. 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed June 10, 2016. Two-year suspension suspended, 
and respondent placed on 2-years' probation. 
 
Stanton A. Hazlett, Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and was on the formal 
complaint for the petitioner. 
 
David M. Rapp, of Hinkle Law Firm, L.L.C., of Wichita, argued the cause, and Stephen M. Stark, 
respondent, argued the cause pro se. 
 
Per Curiam:  This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the 
Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent, Stephen M. Stark, of Wichita, an 
attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 1984. 
 
 
On February 3, 2015, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal 
complaint against the respondent alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct (KRPC). The respondent filed an answer on March 9, 2015. The parties entered 
into a written stipulation on April 20, 2015. A hearing was held on the complaint before a 
panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys on April 21, 2015, where the 
respondent was personally present and was represented by counsel. The hearing panel 
determined that respondent violated KRPC 1.3 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 461) 
2 
 
 
 
(diligence); 1.4(a) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 482) (communication); and 8.4(d) (2015 
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 672) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). 
 
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, together with its recommendation to this court: 
 
"Findings of Fact 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"8. 
On February 20, 2009, Robert D. Myers, city attorney for the City of 
Newton, Kansas, negotiated an option to purchase 120 acres of real estate owned by the 
Claassen family at a price of $7,500.00 per acre, on behalf of the city. The Claassens 
requested assurance that they would receive at least as favorable a price as other property 
owners who sold their property to the city. Therefore, the city agreed to include a 'Most 
Favored Nation' (MFN) clause in the Claassen option agreement. The MFN clause would 
assure the Claassens would receive the best price per acre paid by the city for other 
property. The Claassen option expired on August 31, 2010. 
 
 
"9. 
On July 29, 2009, the city purchased a separate tract for the industrial 
park at $8,000.00 per acre. On January 8, 2010, the city acquired another option to 
purchase property in connection with the industrial park at a price of $10,000.00 per acre. 
 
 
"10. 
On February 18, 2010, the city exercised its option to purchase the 
Claassen property, but only offered to pay the Claassens $8,000.00 per acre. The 
Claassens believed they were entitled to $10,000.00 per acre. The city and the Claassens 
agreed to close on the purchase of the Claassen property at a price of $8,000.00 per acre. 
However, the city and the Claassens entered into a Reservation of Rights Agreement 
under which the Claassens reserved the right to claim a higher price pursuant to the MFN 
clause. The Reservation of Rights provision contained additional post-closing obligations 
not set forth above, such as the parties' obligation to negotiate in good faith to attempt to 
resolve any dispute over the claim for additional compensation. 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
"11. 
In December 2010, the Claassens filed a lawsuit against the city claiming 
$240,000.00 in damages ($2,000.00 per acre for 120 acres). 
 
 
"12. 
The city initially engaged the respondent in 2010, to review the Claassen 
option contract and provide advice regarding the interpretation of the MFN clause. When 
the Claassens sued the city over the price of the property, the respondent was retained to 
handle the litigation on behalf of the city. The respondent was to communicate with the 
city through Mr. Myers. Mr. Myers would normally have served as co-counsel in the 
litigation, but it was anticipated that he would be a material witness in the litigation due 
to his involvement in negotiating the option with the Claassens. Mr. Myers was involved 
in the strategic planning for the litigation. It was agreed that the appropriate strategy was 
to move for summary judgment as soon as possible. Alternative arguments would be 
advanced regarding the MFN clause in the Claassen option:  (1) there was no ambiguity 
regarding the option terms, so no extrinsic evidence would be necessary to construe it; (2) 
and, the city's limitations under the Kansas Cash Basis Law and Budget Law rendered the 
option void. 
 
 
"13. 
From that time until the first part of 2012, the parties were involved in 
discovery and various other preliminary matters. During that time, the city also retained 
the respondent to negotiate with Claassens' counsel to get the transaction closed with the 
Reservation of Rights Agreement. The respondent successfully handled that portion of 
the representation. 
 
 
[14. 
Not used.] 
 
 
"15. 
On June 5, 2012, Mr. Myers sent the respondent an e-mail asking for a 
status report regarding the case and asking what needed to be done with respect to the 
filing of a motion for summary judgment. In July of 2012, the respondent obtained 
approval from Mr. Myers to have a summer law clerk perform some research on the case. 
 
 
"16. 
On July 11, 2012, the plaintiff's attorney, Lee Thompson, deposed Mr. 
Myers. 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
"17. 
On September 28, 2012, the respondent's firm issued a billing invoice for 
time worked in July and August of 2012. That billing included an entry by the respondent 
on August 20, 2012, with the description 'review for scheduling.' No billing memos or 
invoices were provided to the city after the invoice dated September 28, 2012. 
 
 
"18. 
A scheduling conference was held in September, 2012. The respondent 
failed to inform Mr. Myers of the scheduling conference held in September, 2012. 
 
 
"19. 
On October 31, 2012, the respondent filed a motion for summary 
judgment on behalf of the city. The motion asserted that the Claassens' claim was barred 
by the Cash Basis Law and Budget Law. The memorandum in support of the motion for 
summary judgment did not present any argument that the MFN clause was unambiguous. 
The motion also did not address the secondary issues in the lawsuit related to the 
Claassens' personal property. The respondent failed to discuss the motion with Mr. 
Myers. Further, the respondent failed to inform Mr. Myers that a motion had been filed. 
Finally, the respondent failed to provide Mr. Myers with a copy of the motion. 
 
 
"20. 
The Cash Basis Law and Budget Law arguments were based on the 
theory that the city had not appropriated the money that would have been necessary to 
pay the higher purchase price demanded by the Claassens. In the motion for summary 
judgment, the respondent represented that the argument would be supported by an 
affidavit from Mr. Myers. Specifically, the memorandum in support of the motion 
referred to an affidavit of Mr. Myers and the affidavit was listed as an exhibit to the 
memorandum. However, the affidavit was not attached. Although the respondent 
prepared a draft of an affidavit for Mr. Myers to sign, it was never presented to Mr. 
Myers for review and execution. While the respondent had not submitted the affidavit to 
Mr. Myers for review and execution, he believed, based on past communications with 
Mr. Myers and Mr. Myers' involvement as the city's 30(b)(6) deposition witness, that Mr. 
Myers had personal knowledge of the facts, law, and concepts set forth in the draft 
affidavit. The respondent also believed that Mr. Myers would be willing to sign the 
affidavit as drafted. 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
"21. 
On November 28, 2012, Mr. Thompson sent the respondent an e-mail 
requesting the missing affidavit, noting:  'I would assume that we got it; but could you e-
mail or fax me a copy?' Mr. Thompson also requested a 5-day extension of time to 
respond to the motion for summary judgment. On November 29, 2012, the respondent 
agreed to the 5-day extension and told Mr. Thompson that the absence of the affidavit 
was an 'oversight.' On December 4, 2012, Mr. Thompson again e-mailed the respondent 
asking for a copy of the Myers affidavit. The respondent responded the next day, saying:  
'I will check w/Myers, but I'm buried today.' 
 
 
"22. 
On December 7, 2012, Mr. Thompson filed a response to the 
respondent's motion for summary judgment. 
 
 
"23. 
On December 17, 2012, a hearing was held on the city's motion for 
summary judgment. The court asked the respondent about the missing affidavit, to which 
the respondent replied: 
 
'I've not obtained exhibit 9, the Myers' [sic] affidavit, yet. Since counsel's 
brief indicated that whatever the facts attested to by Mr. Myers—
prepared to argue around those, I went ahead and proceeded forward, but 
I'll shore that up and provide that.' 
 
Later in that hearing, the court again raised the issue of the affidavit and it said: 
 
'It sounds like this isn't a big deal, the affidavit from Mr. Myers, exhibit 
9, but just out of an abundance of caution, Mr. Stark, why don't you, if 
you could—and I'm assuming you can. If you could, get that in our court 
file and then also to Mr. Thompson, say before the end of the day 
tomorrow. I am assuming it's in your materials.' 
 
As part of this discussion about the affidavit, Mr. Thompson raised a concern about 
obtaining some assurance that the affidavit actually existed at the time of hearing: 
 
6 
 
 
 
'I'm just a little bothered. I, of course, want counsel to represent to the 
Court or show that that was done prior to today's argument. I mean—and 
I'm not questioning Mr. Stark. He and I know each other, but I haven't 
seen it or anything else, and I think to protect my client, we need that 
representation that it was available and was part of what should have 
been submitted.' 
 
The court acknowledged Mr. Thompson's concern, saying, 'Mr. Stark if you could let us 
know along the lines of what Mr. Thompson suggests, what the availability was of that 
exhibit.' The respondent did not respond on the record regarding the status of the 
affidavit. No further discussion was had regarding the affidavit at the hearing. 
 
 
"24. 
The respondent failed to communicate with Mr. Myers from July, 2012, 
until December 19, 2012, when the respondent phoned Mr. Myers. Mr. Myers was 
unavailable, but responded by an e-mail inviting the respondent to provide him 
information regarding the law clerk's research and inquiring about the summary judgment 
motion. The respondent did not reply to Mr. Myers' December 19, 2012, e-mail. He did 
attempt to reach Mr. Myers by phone on two occasions, but Mr. Myers was out of the 
office at those times. 
 
 
"25. 
On December 20, 2012, Mr. Thompson filed a supplemental 
memorandum in opposition to the respondent's motion for summary judgment. The 
respondent failed to provide Mr. Myers with a copy of the supplemental memorandum in 
opposition to the respondent's motion for summary judgment. 
 
 
"26. 
The court held a pretrial conference on January 4, 2013. On January 11, 
2013, a pretrial conference order was entered setting the case for a 3-day jury trial 
beginning February 20, 2013. The respondent failed to inform Mr. Myers that a pretrial 
conference had been held, that a pretrial order had been entered, or that the court 
scheduled the case for jury trial beginning February 20, 2013. 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
"27. 
On January 14, 2013, Judge Joe Dickinson sent the parties a letter 
denying the city's motion for summary judgment. Regarding the affidavit, Judge 
Dickinson wrote: 
 
'At the hearing it was brought to my attention that exhibit 9 was never 
filed by the defense, although it was referenced in the Memorandum in 
Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment (see page 6). I checked 
again today and the Court has never received exhibit 9, apparently an 
Affidavit of Robert Myers. I've seen, as did claimant's counsel, that this 
was inadvertent and would be supplied by the defendant, and 
accordingly, I allowed additional time to supply the document. In any 
event, setting that issue aside, I find that the city's motion for summary 
judgment should be denied . . . .' 
 
The respondent did not advise Judge Dickinson that the affidavit had never been signed. 
The respondent failed to inform Mr. Myers that the court sent the parties a letter denying 
the city's motion for summary judgment. The respondent failed to provide a copy of 
Judge Dickinson's letter to Mr. Myers. 
 
 
"28. 
In the journal entry and order denying motion for summary judgment, the 
court noted the following regarding the affidavit: 
 
'The factual basis for the city's argument was set out in paragraphs 27 
through 33 of its Memorandum, citing the Affidavit of Robert Myers, 
City Attorney for Newton. However, the reference to the affidavit was 
not attached to the Memorandum. Even though the issue was raised in 
Plaintiffs' response at oral argument and by way of a Supplemental 
Memorandum, no affidavit was filed of record.' 
 
The respondent failed to provide Mr. Myers with a copy of the journal entry and the order 
denying motion for summary judgment. 
 
8 
 
 
 
 
"29. 
Through January and early February of 2013, the respondent and Mr. 
Thompson exchanged various communications regarding possible mediators for the case. 
On February 13, 2013, they agreed the trial date should be rescheduled to May 8, 2013, 
and May 9, 2013, to allow additional time for mediation. From February 21, 2013, 
through April 5, 2013, Mr. Thompson contacted the respondent at least six times to 
address potential mediators and waiver of a jury trial. The respondent did not respond to 
Mr. Thompson. On March 13, 2013, a legal secretary from the respondent's firm, Linda 
Hansen, sent an e-mail to the respondent stating: 
 
'Lee Thompson is getting desperate. He left a voicemail message for me 
saying he had been trying to contact you by e-mail and phone to schedule 
mediation and wondered if I could help him. Will you call him?' 
 
 
"30. 
On April 5, 2013, Mr. Thompson sent a letter to the respondent stating 
the following: 
 
'I have written, called and e-mailed on numerous occasions 
trying to get your input on acceptable dates to conduct a mediation in the 
captioned case. I agreed to your suggestion of Mert Buckley as a 
mediator and identified numerous dates I would be available. . . . 
 
'Given the absence of a response to possible mediation, my 
clients have reviewed the case with me and a [sic] willing to make an 
offer of settlement at this time. . . .' 
 
Mr. Thompson's April 5, 2013, letter further outlines a settlement proposal in which the 
Claassens would accept a lower cash amount ($200,000.00) in exchange for favorable 
leasing terms related to other farmland owned by the city. The respondent failed to 
communicate the settlement offer to Mr. Myers. 
 
 
"31. 
In early May 2013, Mr. Myers was contacted by telephone by the 
respondent and three other attorneys in his firm. At that time, the respondent, for the first 
time, informed Mr. Myers that the case was scheduled for trial on May 8, 2013, and May 
9 
 
 
 
9, 2013. The respondent and the other attorney also informed Mr. Myers of other matters 
that had already transpired without his knowledge, including:  entry of a scheduling 
order; filing of a motion for summary judgment; argument upon the motion of summary 
judgment; ruling (against the city) on the motion for summary judgment; and entry of a 
pretrial order closing discovery and identifying the issues and witnesses in the case. 
 
 
"32. 
Thereafter, Mr. Myers retained other counsel to represent the city in the 
pending litigation. Following the engagement of substitute counsel for the city, a motion 
was filed supported by an affidavit from the respondent to re-open the pretrial proceeding 
and continue the trial. 
 
 
"33. 
As a result of the respondent's conduct, the trial was continued from May 
2013, to August 2013, the court amended the pretrial conference order, and the court re-
opened discovery. 
 
 
"34. 
On May 2, 2013, the respondent self-reported his misconduct to the 
disciplinary administrator. On May 10, 2013, Mr. Myers filed a complaint against the 
respondent for the same conduct. 
 
"Conclusions of Law 
 
 
"35. 
Based upon the respondent's stipulation and the above findings of fact, 
the hearing panel concludes as a matter of law that the respondent violated KRPC 1.3, 
KRPC 1.4, and KRPC 8.4(d) as detailed below. 
 
"KRPC 1.3 
 
 
"36. 
Attorneys must act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing their clients. See KRPC 1.3. The respondent failed to diligently and 
promptly represent the City of Newton, Kansas. Because the respondent failed to act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing his client, the hearing panel 
concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.3. 
 
10 
 
 
 
"KRPC 1.4 
 
 
"37. 
KRPC 1.4(a) provides that '[a] lawyer shall keep a client reasonably 
informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for 
information.' In this case, the respondent violated KRPC 1.4(a) when he failed to inform 
Mr. Myers of the many events occurring in the litigation. Accordingly, the hearing panel 
concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.4(a). 
 
"KRPC 8.4(d) 
 
 
"38. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that 
is prejudicial to the administration of justice.' KRPC 8.4(d). The respondent stipulated 
that he engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice by: 
 
a. 
failing to present the affidavit to Mr. Myers for consideration and 
signature; 
 
b. 
making reference in the memorandum to an affidavit that had not been 
reviewed or signed by Mr. Myers; 
 
c. 
filing a motion for summary judgment and memorandum without 
attaching a signed affidavit; and 
 
d. 
failing to advise opposing counsel or the court that the affidavit had not 
been presented to Mr. Myers for consideration or signature. 
 
The respondent's conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice. As such, the 
hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(d). 
 
11 
 
 
 
"American Bar Association 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
 
 
"39. 
In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel 
considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors 
to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual 
injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating 
factors. 
 
 
"40. 
Duty Violated. The respondent violated his duty to his client to provide 
diligent representation and adequate communication. The respondent violated his duty to 
the legal profession to refrain from conduct which is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice. 
 
 
"41. 
Mental State. The respondent negligently and knowingly violated his 
duties. 
 
 
"42. 
Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent caused 
potential injury to his client, the City of Newton, Kansas. 
 
 
"43. 
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors. Aggravating circumstances are any 
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be 
imposed. In reaching its recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, 
found the following aggravating factors present: 
 
 
a. 
Prior Disciplinary Offenses. The respondent has been previously 
disciplined on one occasion. On February 20, 2003, the respondent entered into a 
diversion agreement. In the diversion agreement, the respondent stipulated that he 
violated KRPC 1.3 and KRPC 1.4. 
 
12 
 
 
 
 
b. 
A Pattern of Misconduct. The respondent engaged in a pattern of 
misconduct by neglecting this matter for an extended period of time and by repeatedly 
failing to inform Mr. Myers regarding the status of the litigation. 
 
 
c. 
Multiple Offenses. The respondent committed multiple rule violations. 
The respondent violated KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4, and KRPC 8.4(d). Accordingly, the 
hearing panel concludes that the respondent committed multiple offenses. 
 
 
d. 
Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The Kansas Supreme 
Court admitted the respondent to practice law in the State of Kansas in 1984. At the time 
of the misconduct, the respondent has been practicing law for more than 25 years. 
 
 
"44. 
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
mitigating circumstances present: 
 
 
a. 
Personal or Emotional Problems if Such Misfortunes Have Contributed 
to Violation of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. The respondent has suffered 
from chronic depression and anxiety throughout the majority of his adult life. He has 
sought treatment for this condition and is currently working with a treatment professional 
to control his depression. It is clear that the respondent's depression contributed to the 
misconduct. 
 
 
b. 
The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by His or Her 
Cooperation During the Hearing and His or Her Full and Free Acknowledgment of the 
Transgressions. The respondent fully cooperated with the disciplinary process. 
Additionally, the respondent admitted the facts that gave rise to the violations. Finally, 
the respondent stipulated that he violated KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4, and KRPC 8.4(d). The 
respondent's cooperation is a significant mitigating factor. 
 
 
c. 
Previous Good Character and Reputation in the Community Including 
Any Letters from Clients, Friends and Lawyers in Support of the Character and General 
13 
 
 
 
Reputation of the Attorney. The respondent is an active and productive member of the 
bar of Wichita, Kansas. The respondent also enjoys the respect of his peers and generally 
possesses a good character and reputation as evidenced by several letters received by the 
hearing panel. 
 
 
d. 
Remorse. At the hearing on this matter, the respondent expressed 
genuine remorse for having engaged in the misconduct. 
 
 
e. 
Remoteness of Prior Offenses. The respondent's participation in the 
attorney diversion program in 2003 is remote in time but not in character to the 
misconduct in this case. 
 
 
"45. 
In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly 
examined and considered the following Standards: 
 
'4.42 
Suspension is generally appropriate when: 
 
(a) 
a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for 
a client and causes injury or potential injury to a 
client; or 
 
(b) 
a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and 
causes injury or potential injury to a client.' 
 
"Recommendation 
 
 
"46. 
The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent be 
suspended from the practice of law for a period of 2 years. The disciplinary administrator 
further recommended that the imposition of the suspension be suspended and that the 
respondent be placed on probation subject to the terms and conditions detailed in the 
respondent's proposed probation plan. Finally, the disciplinary administrator 
recommended that the respondent continue in treatment, that the respondent execute 
14 
 
 
 
appropriate releases, and that the treatment provider provide quarterly written reports 
regarding the respondent's progress in treatment. 
 
 
"47. 
The respondent recommended that he be suspended for a period of 90 
days and that he be granted probation from that suspension subject to the terms and 
conditions detailed in his proposed probation plan. 
 
 
"48. 
In order for the hearing panel to consider recommending that the 
respondent be placed on probation, the respondent must first comply with Kan. Sup. Ct. 
R. 211(g)(1) and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211(g)(2). Additionally, the hearing panel must then 
consider, based upon the factors detailed in Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211(g)(3), whether to 
recommend to the Court that the respondent be placed on probation. 
 
 
 
'(g) 
Requirements of Probation 
 
(1) 
If the Respondent intends to request that the Respondent 
be placed on probation for violating the Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct or the Kansas Supreme Court Rules, the Respondent shall 
provide each member of the Hearing Panel and the Disciplinary 
Administrator with a workable, substantial, and detailed plan of 
probation at least fourteen days prior to the hearing on the Formal 
Complaint. The plan of probation must contain adequate safeguards that 
will protect the public and ensure the Respondent's full compliance with 
the disciplinary rules and orders of the Supreme Court. 
 
(2) 
If the Respondent provides each member of the Hearing 
Panel and the Disciplinary Administrator with a plan of probation, the 
Respondent shall immediately and prior to the hearing on the Formal 
Complaint put the plan of probation into effect by complying with each 
of the terms and conditions of the probation plan.  
 
(3) 
The Hearing Panel shall not recommend that the 
Respondent be placed on probation unless: 
15 
 
 
 
 
(i) 
the Respondent develops a workable, 
substantial, and detailed plan of probation and 
provides a copy of the proposed plan of 
probation to the Disciplinary Administrator and 
each member of the Hearing Panel at least 
fourteen days prior to the hearing on the Formal 
Complaint; 
 
(ii) 
the Respondent puts the proposed plan of 
probation into effect prior to the hearing on the 
Formal Complaint by complying with each of 
the terms and conditions of the probation plan; 
 
(iii) 
the misconduct can be corrected by probation; 
and 
 
(iv) 
placing the Respondent on probation is in the 
best interests of the legal profession and the 
citizens of the State of Kansas.' 
 
Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211(g). The respondent provided each member of the hearing panel and 
the disciplinary administrator with a workable, substantial, and detailed plan of probation 
at least fourteen days prior to the hearing on the formal complaint. The respondent's plan 
contains adequate safeguards that will protect the public and ensure the Respondent's full 
compliance with the disciplinary rules and orders of the Supreme Court. The respondent 
put the plan of probation into effect by complying with each of the terms and conditions 
of the probation plan. The respondent's misconduct can be corrected by probation. 
Finally, placing the respondent on probation is in the best interests of the legal profession 
and the citizens of the State of Kansas. 
 
 
"49. 
The hearing panel has carefully considered the facts of this case. The 
respondent's depression is profound and the mitigation factors are significant. As a result 
16 
 
 
 
of the persuasive factors in mitigation, the hearing panel unanimously recommends that 
the respondent be suspended for a period of 2 years. The hearing panel further 
recommends that the respondent be granted probation, subject to the following terms and 
conditions: 
 
 
a. 
Term of Probation. The respondent will remain on probation for a period 
of 2 years. 
 
b. 
Practice Supervision. Charles E. Cole, Jr. will serve as the respondent's 
practice supervisor. The respondent will allow the practice supervisor full and complete 
access to his files, calendar, and trust account records. The respondent will comply with 
all requests made by the practice supervisor. The respondent will meet with the practice 
supervisor on a monthly basis throughout the period of probation. The practice supervisor 
will provide a report to the respondent and the disciplinary administrator's office every 
quarter throughout the period of probation, detailing the respondent's compliance with 
each term and condition of probation. The practice supervisor will be acting as an officer 
and agent of the Kansas Supreme Court while supervising the respondent on probation. 
The practice supervisor will be afforded all immunities granted by Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 223 
during the course of his supervising activities. 
 
c. 
Inventory. Within 30 days of the date of this report, the respondent will 
provide the practice supervisor with an inventory of cases and clients. The inventory will 
include all deadlines and scheduled activity. Each month, the respondent will provide the 
practice supervisor with an updated inventory. 
 
 
d. 
Limitation on Practice. The respondent will not accept any new clients or 
new matters for existing clients unless an additional member of his law firm is added as 
the responsible party for the new matter. The respondent agrees to engage the assistance 
of an additional member of his law firm on all currently existing and newly initiated 
litigation matters. The respondent will not serve as first-chair on any litigation matters. 
 
e. 
Communication. The respondent will review every open file to determine 
whether he has adequately communicated with each client. For every case where no 
17 
 
 
 
activity has taken place for 30 days or more, the respondent will make written contact 
with the client providing a status report. 
 
f. 
Billing. The respondent will ensure that monthly billing statements are 
sent to each client unless a written agreement with the client provides otherwise. 
 
g. 
Audits. Within 30 days of the date of this report, the practice supervisor 
will conduct an initial audit of the respondent's files. Thereafter, every 6 months, the 
practice supervisor will conduct additional audits. At the conclusion of probation, the 
practice supervisor will conduct a final audit. If the practice supervisor discovers any 
violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct, the practice supervisor will 
include such information in his report. The practice supervisor will provide the 
disciplinary administrator and the respondent with a copy of each audit report. The 
respondent will follow all recommendations and correct all deficiencies noted in the 
practice supervisor's periodic audit reports. 
 
h. 
Psychological Treatment. The respondent will continue his treatment for 
depression and anxiety throughout the period of supervised probation, unless the 
treatment provider determines that continued treatment is no longer necessary. The 
treatment provider will notify the practice supervisor and the disciplinary administrator in 
the event that the respondent discontinues treatment against the recommendation of the 
treatment provider during the probationary period. The respondent will provide the 
treatment provider with appropriate releases of information to allow the treatment 
provider to provide such information to the practice supervisor and the disciplinary 
administrator. 
 
i. 
Continued Cooperation. The respondent will continue to cooperate with 
the disciplinary administrator. If the disciplinary administrator requests any additional 
information, the respondent will timely provide such information. 
 
j. 
Additional Violations. The respondent will not violate the terms of his 
probation or the provisions of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. In the event that 
the respondent violates any of the terms of probation or any of the provisions of the 
18 
 
 
 
Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct at any time during the probationary period, the 
respondent will immediately report such violation to the practice supervisor and the 
disciplinary administrator. The disciplinary administrator will take immediate action 
pursuant to Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211(g). 
 
 
"50. 
Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified by 
the office of the disciplinary administrator." 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the findings of the 
disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the parties and determines whether violations of 
KRPC exist and, if they do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 
258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 350). 
Clear and convincing evidence is "'evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that "the 
truth of the facts asserted is highly probable."'" In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 
610 (2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 [2008]). 
 
Respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint, to which he filed 
an answer, and adequate notice of the hearing before the panel and the hearing before this 
court. The respondent did not file exceptions to the hearing panel's final hearing report. 
As such, the findings of fact are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule 212(c) and (d) 
(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 369). 
 
 
The evidence before the hearing panel establishes by clear and convincing 
evidence the charged misconduct violated KRPC 1.3 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 461) 
(diligence); 1.4(a) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 482) (communication); and 8.4(d) (2015 
19 
 
 
 
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 672) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), 
and it supports the panel's conclusions of law. We adopt the panel's conclusions. 
 
The only remaining issue before us is the appropriate discipline for respondent's 
violations. As noted, the panel recommended a 2-year suspension from the practice of 
law in the state of Kansas but that the suspension be stayed to allow respondent to be 
placed on probation under the terms and conditions set forth in its final hearing report. At 
oral arguments before this court, the Disciplinary Administrator recommended the panel's 
proposed sanction of a 2-year suspension, stayed to allow respondent to be placed on a 2-
year probation upon the panel's proposed terms and conditions, but with the added 
condition that respondent make a reasonable effort to pay restitution for the additional 
legal fees his misconduct cost his aggrieved client. Respondent's counsel argued for a 
shorter term for the underlying suspension but agreed to the 2-year probation. 
 
 We are not bound by the recommendations of either the Disciplinary 
Administrator or the hearing panel. See In re Mintz, 298 Kan. 897, 911-12, 317 P.3d 756 
(2014). We fashion a disciplinary sanction in each case presented to us based upon its 
particular facts and circumstances, including the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances of the violations. 298 Kan. at 912. In this case, however, a majority of the 
court finds the sanction recommended by the Disciplinary Administrator at the hearing 
before this court to be appropriate; a minority of the court would impose a shorter term 
for the underlying suspension.  
 
Specifically, we hold that the respondent is suspended from the practice of law in 
the state of Kansas for a period of 2 years but that suspension is stayed and the 
respondent is placed on probation for a period of 2 years from and after the filing of this 
opinion, on the terms and conditions set forth in the hearing panel's final hearing report, 
as outlined above, with the additional condition that respondent make a reasonable effort 
20 
 
 
 
to pay restitution for the additional legal fees his misconduct cost his aggrieved client. 
The termination of probation, whether probation was successful or not, shall be governed 
by the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 211(g) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 350). A 
minority of the court would impose a different condition of probation regarding a more 
certain restitution to the aggrieved client. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Stephen M. Stark be and is hereby suspended 
from the practice of law in the state of Kansas, in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 
203(a)(2) and (5) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 293), for a 2-year period, but imposition of 
that discipline shall be stayed and respondent placed on probation for a 2-year period 
from the date this opinion is filed, upon the terms and conditions outlined above. 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the termination of respondent's probation, whether 
probation was successful or not, shall be effected pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 
211(g). 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to the 
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports. 
 
BEIER, J., not participating.