Case Title: Lee v. Cardington

Citation: 2014-Ohio-5458

Docket Number: 2013-1400

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2014-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Lee v. Cardington, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-5458.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-5458 
LEE, APPELLEE, v. VILLAGE OF CARDINGTON, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Lee v. Cardington, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-5458.] 
Employment relations—R.C. 4113.52—Whistleblower protection—Reporting of 
employer’s criminal violations—Standards that must be met to qualify for 
protection. 
(No. 2013-1400—Submitted July 8, 2014—Decided December 17, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Morrow County,  
No. 12CA0017, 2013-Ohio-3108. 
______________________ 
FRENCH, J. 
{¶ 1} This case concerns R.C. 4113.52, Ohio’s “whistleblower” statute, 
which protects employees from discipline if they discover and report certain 
violations during the course of their employment.  Appellee, Donald Lee, was 
instrumental in exposing crimes related to an automotive-parts manufacturer’s 
discharge of hazardous chemicals into the public water supply.  The question 
before us, however, is whether he also exposed crimes involving his own 
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employer—appellant, the village of Cardington—so as to qualify as a 
whistleblower under either R.C. 4113.52(A)(1) or (2).  We hold that he did not. 
Background 
{¶ 2} For purposes of this appeal, which is before us pursuant to the trial 
court’s granting of a motion for summary judgment, we consider Lee’s version of 
the relevant facts, as follows. 
{¶ 3} Lee worked as the “crew chief” for the village from 2000 to 2009.  
His duties included supervising the operation of the village’s wastewater 
treatment plant (“WWTP”).  This appeal arises from Lee’s discovery that 
someone was discharging a hazardous chemical that was passing through the 
WWTP into the water supply.  The WWTP could not effectively handle or treat 
the discharge and the chemical ultimately caused more than $750,000 in damages 
to the WWTP.  That someone—according to the ensuing state and federal 
investigation—turned out to be Cardington Yutaka Technologies, Inc. (“CYT”), 
an automotive-parts manufacturer and the village’s largest employer. 
{¶ 4} Starting in 2000, Lee began to notice equipment disruptions that 
occurred around the time that CYT conducted biannual shutdowns of its 
manufacturing plant.  The WWTP uses bacteria to digest the solids contained in 
the wastewater it treats, and the bacteria were dying.  According to Lee, this 
caused a significant accumulation of foam, so much that foam would spill over 
the WWTP walls and into the yard.  Lee notified the local representative of the 
Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (“Ohio EPA”) of his concerns. 
{¶ 5} The biannual problems worsened by the spring of 2007.  Lee 
noticed the increased problems at his farm, where Ohio EPA permitted him to use 
sludge treated by the WWTP as fertilizer that he spread on his fields.  After 
noticing that the treated sludge was preventing plant growth, Lee asked Ohio EPA 
to investigate the source of the unknown pollutant and stopped using the sludge. 
January Term, 2014 
 
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{¶ 6} Ohio EPA began to rule out potential sources of contamination, 
including the WWTP itself.  After a two-day inspection in 2007, Ohio EPA 
determined that the WWTP was not the source of the pollutant and was satisfying 
the conditions of its operating permit. 
{¶ 7} By the end of 2007, the investigation centered on CYT’s 
manufacturing plant.  When CYT officials consistently denied the discharge, Ohio 
EPA obtained the assistance of the United States Environment Protection 
Agency’s (“U.S. EPA”) criminal division.  U.S. EPA also ruled out the WWTP as 
the source of the pollutant and CYT was ultimately determined to be responsible.  
Testing eventually revealed that the pollutant was glycol, an industrial chemical 
used by CYT. 
{¶ 8} A main area of Lee’s focus was repairing the damage to the 
WWTP.  In 2007 and 2008, Lee continuously discussed the problems with his 
supervisor, Dan Ralley, the village administrator.  Lee was concerned that 
because the WWTP was not filtering out the pollutant discharged by CYT, the 
glycol was passing through to Whetstone Creek, a source of drinking water for 
water plants downstream from the village.  He also voiced his concerns that the 
glycol had damaged some of the WWTP’s equipment and that if left uncorrected, 
the damage would cause the plant to exceed the discharge limitations of its 
permit. 
{¶ 9} Lee and Ralley clashed over how to fix the equipment problems. 
According to Lee, Ralley was uncooperative and resisted Lee’s attempts to fully 
notify him of the problems.  Although Ralley was seeking restitution from CYT 
and was considering a proposal from an outside engineering firm, Lee claimed 
that Ralley was overly dismissive of Lee’s own proposal to repair the problems.  
Lee believed that his proposal was more effective and less costly than the 
alternative. 
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{¶ 10} Lee voiced his concerns about the WWTP to the village council at 
two meetings in September and December 2008.  At the September meeting, Lee 
stated that “something” was causing equipment problems in the WWTP and 
causing the WWTP to send toxic water downstream.  He told the council that the 
WWTP had not yet violated its operating permit, but that the failure to repair the 
equipment would lead to a permit violation in the future.  In December 2008, Lee 
attended a village council committee work session with Ralley.  Lee told the 
council that the plant was still in compliance with its permit, but that “someone 
should pay” for the resulting damage. 
{¶ 11} In June 2009, the village terminated Lee for reasons disputed by 
the parties.  Lee alleges a retaliatory motive, but the village cites alleged incidents 
of insubordination, failure to complete jobs, personal use of village property, and 
taking time off without notice. 
{¶ 12} Lee sued the village in October 2009, claiming that the village 
fired him in violation of Ohio’s whistleblower statute, R.C. 4113.52, and in 
violation of public policy.  In support of his statutory whistleblower claim, Lee 
alleged that the village retaliated against him for “reporting the problems with the 
[WWTP], his opposition to some of the proposals and projects advanced by the 
village, and his support for the work of the EPA.” 
{¶ 13} The village moved for summary judgment, arguing that Lee had 
reported only CYT’s wrongdoing and did not identify any criminal violation 
involving the village.  Lee countered that the village had committed two crimes.  
First, he cited R.C. 2927.24(B)(1), which prohibits knowingly placing a 
hazardous chemical into a public water supply.  Second, he pointed to R.C. 
6111.04(C), which prohibits a permit holder such as the WWTP from discharging 
higher levels of sewage than those specified in the permit. 
{¶ 14} The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the village 
on the statutory claim relevant to this appeal.  The court determined that Lee was 
January Term, 2014 
 
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not entitled to whistleblower protection because he did not report any criminal act 
of an environmental nature, only equipment failures caused by CYT’s illegal 
discharge. 
{¶ 15} The court of appeals reversed, finding a genuine issue of material 
fact to exist as to whether Lee engaged in whistleblowing under R.C. 
4113.52(A)(1) and (2).  5th Dist. Morrow No. 12CA0017, 2013-Ohio-3108. 
{¶ 16} We accepted the village’s appeal.  137 Ohio St.3d 1440, 2013-
Ohio-5678, 999 N.E.2d 695. 
Analysis 
{¶ 17} R.C. 4113.52(D) provides a cause of action to any employee who 
suffers disciplinary or retaliatory action “as a result of * * * having filed a report 
under division (A)” of R.C. 4113.52.  The question here is whether Lee qualified 
for protection under R.C. 4113.52(A)(1) or (2), which identify two forms of 
whistleblowing.  An employee must “strictly comply” with the reporting 
requirements to obtain whistleblower protection.  Contreras v. Ferro Corp., 73 
Ohio St.3d 244, 652 N.E.2d 940 (1995), syllabus. 
The Alleged Whistleblowing 
{¶ 18} We begin by underscoring that Lee seeks whistleblower protection 
based on the concerns he expressed regarding the village, not CYT.1  As he did in 
his memorandum opposing summary judgment, Lee argues that the village was 
not only a victim of CYT’s illegal glycol discharge, but was the perpetrator of its 
own crimes, given its failure to repair the damage the glycol had caused to the 
WWTP.  First, Lee cites R.C. 6111.04(C), which prohibits a permit holder from 
discharging sewage at levels exceeding those in the permit.  He explains that by 
not repairing the equipment damage, the village was at risk of violating the 
                                                          
 
1 Lee’s complaint filed in common pleas court was less than clear on this point.  It alleged only 
that the village retaliated against Lee for “reporting the problems with” the WWTP.  Lee did not 
explain how these “problems” constituted any of the criminal violations covered by R.C. 
4113.52(A)(1) or (2) until he filed his memorandum opposing summary judgment. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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discharge limitations in its operating permit.  Second, Lee makes a conclusory 
reference to R.C. 2927.24(B)(1), which prohibits a person from knowingly 
placing a hazardous chemical into a public water supply.  Lee maintains that 
although CYT was the source of the pollutant, the village was knowingly placing 
the pollutant into the water supply. 
Lee Did Not Strictly Comply with R.C. 4113.52(A)(1) or (2) 
{¶ 19} Nevertheless, what Lee claims to have reported is demonstrably 
different from what he actually reported.  Even viewing the evidence in his favor 
for purposes of summary judgment, see Bostic v. Connor, 37 Ohio St.3d 144, 146, 
524 N.E.2d 881 (1988), the evidence shows only that Lee helped expose CYT’s 
illegal discharge, not that he also reported crimes involving the village or that he 
did so in strict compliance with R.C. 4113.52(A)(1) or (2). 
R.C. 4113.52(A)(1) 
{¶ 20} R.C. 4113.52(A)(1) applies when an employee “becomes aware in 
the course of the employee’s employment of a violation of any state or federal 
statute or any ordinance or regulation of a political subdivision.”  R.C. 
4113.52(A)(1)(a).  The violation must be one that the “employer has authority to 
correct” and that the “employee reasonably believes * * * is a criminal offense 
that is likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to 
public health or safety, a felony, or an improper solicitation for a contribution.”  
Id. 
{¶ 21} To report a violation, the employee must start with his or her 
employer.  The employee must orally report the violation to his or her supervisor 
or other responsible officer and “subsequently shall file with that supervisor or 
officer a written report that provides sufficient detail to identify and describe the 
violation.”  Id.  If the employer does not correct or make a good faith effort to 
correct the violation within 24 hours, the employee may then notify outside 
authorities.  Id. 
January Term, 2014 
 
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{¶ 22} Lee did not satisfy the statute’s written-report requirement.  There 
is no written report in the record, only Lee’s own recollection of a “supervisor’s 
report” that he gave to Ralley in 2009.  As described in Lee’s deposition and 
affidavit, the report identified the “equipment failures” that resulted from CYT’s 
illegal discharge over the years.  The report identified the repairs that Lee 
believed would be necessary “to keep the village operating within the parameters 
of its permit which would prevent EPA violations.”  Lee prepared the report at the 
suggestion of a U.S. EPA official, who thought that village council could use it as 
a “tool to seek reimbursement from CYT.” 
{¶ 23} Lee’s report of “equipment failures” does not qualify as a report 
that sufficiently identifies and describes any crimes involving the village, as the 
statute requires.  Although Lee may have identified ways to “prevent” the WWTP 
from committing a permit violation under R.C. 6111.04(C), he knew that the 
WWTP had not yet committed such a violation.  In his deposition, Lee admitted 
that the WWTP had never lost its permit during his employment, and he 
repeatedly told the village council that the WWTP continued to meet its permit 
obligations. 
{¶ 24} Likewise, Lee’s written report did not reveal that the village was 
knowingly placing glycol into the water supply.  See R.C. 2927.24(B)(1).  By the 
time of his report, it was well known that CYT was the source of the glycol, and 
Ohio EPA and U.S. EPA had definitively ruled out the WWTP as the source.  
Further, Lee admitted that he had never prepared a written report expressing his 
concerns about glycol—“only talk.” 
{¶ 25} In addition to being too little, Lee’s written report was too late.  
R.C. 4113.52(A)(1)(a) requires the employee to file the report before notifying 
outside authorities.  This affords the employer an “opportunity to correct the 
violation.”  Contreras, 73 Ohio St.3d at 248, 652 N.E.2d 940.  Here, Lee did not 
give his written report to Ralley until 2009, after years of discussing the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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equipment failures with EPA officials.  In this regard, Lee’s report is no different 
from the one in Contreras, in which we found the report to be deficient because 
the employee provided it “well after the matters had been revealed to a number of 
sources outside” the employer.  Id. at 249. 
{¶ 26} Even after viewing the evidence in Lee’s favor for purposes of 
summary judgment, we conclude that it does not show that Lee strictly complied 
with the reporting procedure in R.C. 4113.52(A)(1). 
R.C. 4113.52(A)(2) 
{¶ 27} We now turn to whether the concerns Lee voiced about the WWTP 
constituted environmental whistleblowing under R.C. 4113.52(A)(2).  An 
employee qualifies for protection under that statute only after (1) discovering a 
criminal violation of R.C. Chapter 3704, 3734, 6109, or 6111 and (2) providing 
oral or written notification to “any appropriate public official or agency that has 
regulatory authority over the employer and the industry, trade, or business in 
which the employer is engaged.”  R.C. 4113.52(A)(2). 
{¶ 28} Although Lee was in constant contact with EPA officials at the 
state and federal level, there is no evidence that Lee notified them about any 
crimes perpetrated by the village.  Lee worked with the authorities to expose the 
illegal discharge from CYT and then to repair the damage the discharge caused to 
the WWTP.  As Lee put it in his deposition, “we were trying to resolve a problem 
that we were being stymied with.” 
{¶ 29} Lee repeats his argument that he reported a permit violation under 
R.C. 6111.04(C).  But again, both Lee and Ohio EPA knew that the WWTP was 
continuing to satisfy the conditions of its permit.  Lee also knew that the village 
was working to repair the problems at the WWTP, both by seeking restitution 
from CYT and by considering proposals from an outside engineering firm.  Even 
assuming that Lee may have reported a permit violation to authorities, he lacked a 
“reasonable basis” to do so.  R.C. 4113.52(C). 
January Term, 2014 
 
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{¶ 30} As for Lee’s claim that the village was knowingly discharging a 
hazardous pollutant in violation of R.C. 2927.24(B)(1), that statute is not among 
those qualifying for protection under R.C. 4113.52(A)(2).  In any event, Lee did 
not have any reasonable basis to believe that the WWTP was knowingly 
discharging glycol into the water.  Ohio EPA and U.S. EPA told him that the 
WWTP was not the source of the glycol. 
{¶ 31} On this evidence, we conclude that Lee did not satisfy the 
procedural requirements of R.C. 4113.52(A)(1) or (2).  Therefore, he did not 
qualify for whistleblower protection. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 32} Having concluded that Lee did not qualify for whistleblower 
protection, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the 
judgment of the trial court. 
Judgment reversed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and KENNEDY, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent. 
______________________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 33} This case should be dismissed as improvidently allowed.  It is 
highly fact specific and does not involve an important or novel legal question, but 
rather the application of settled law. 
{¶ 34} Barring a dismissal of this appeal, the better course is to allow the 
plaintiff to proceed with his case.  It is possible that the water discharged after 
treatment by the village of Cardington’s wastewater treatment plant contains 
levels of chemicals and compounds that are not permitted.  As the court of 
appeals noted, in that situation, “the Village is violating the law.”  5th Dist. 
Morrow No. 12CA0017, 2013-Ohio-3108, ¶ 24.  Further proceedings are 
necessary in order to determine whether Donald Lee is able to prove his case 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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given all of the facts.  There are insufficient grounds to support the majority’s 
conclusion that the village is entitled to summary judgment. 
{¶ 35} Instead of reversing, I would dismiss the appeal or would affirm 
the judgment of the court of appeals.  I dissent. 
O’NEILL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
______________________________ 
Newhouse, Prophater, Letcher & Moots, L.L.C., Michael S. Kolman, and 
D. Wesley Newhouse, for appellee. 
O’Toole, McLaughlin, Dooley & Pecora Co., L.P.A., and John D. 
Latchney, for appellant. 
Trent A. Dougherty, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio 
Environmental Council. 
Valore & Gordillo, L.L.P., and Gregory A. Gordillo; and The Gittes Law 
Group and Frederick M. Gittes, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio 
Employment Lawyers Association. 
______________________________