Case Title: Kingsley v. Sachitano

Citation: 783 So. 2d 824

Docket Number: 1990368

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2000-11-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
783 So. 2d 824 (2000)
John R. KINGSLEY, M.D.
v.
Richard SACHITANO, M.D., et al.
1990368.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
November 17, 2000.
*825 Charles A. Dauphin and Elizabeth W. McElroy of Baxley, Dillard, Dauphin & McKnight, Birmingham, for appellant.
Robert L. Williams of Spain & Gillon, L.L.C., Birmingham; and Larkin Radney of Barnes & Radney, P.C., Alexander City, for appellee Richard Sachitano, M.D.
Mark W. Lee and Dorothy A. Powell of Parsons, Lee & Juliano, P.C., Birmingham, for appellee Russell Medical Center.
Thomas H. Keene, Patrick M. Shegon, and Ben C. Wilson of Rushton, Stakely, Johnston & Garrett, P.A., Montgomery, for appellees John L. Watwood, M.D., and Frank Burns, M.D.
ENGLAND, Justice.
This appeal arises from a discovery order holding that the plaintiff is not entitled to discovery of certain hospital documents, based on the confidentiality provisions of § 22-21-8, Ala.Code 1975. We affirm.
Dr. John R. Kingsley, the plaintiff, is a vascular surgeon who developed a vascular-surgery department at Russell Medical Center. On April 1, 1998, he sued Dr. Richard Sachitano, Dr. John L. Watwood, and Dr. Frank Burns, alleging 1) negligence or wantonness in the performance of a peer review of the plaintiff by the Tissue and Transfusion Committee of Russell Hospital, and 2) libel and slander.
After filing his complaint, the plaintiff issued a subpoena to Russell Hospital, seeking numerous documents. Russell Hospital filed an objection to his request, based upon the confidentiality provisions of § 22-21-8, Ala.Code 1975. The trial judge held a hearing on the matter and entered the following order:
The plaintiff then moved the trial court to provide the certification permitted by Rule 5, Ala.R.Civ.P., so he could request this Court's permission to appeal. The trial court entered an addendum expressing the opinion that this ruling constitutes an interlocutory order that involves one or more controlling questions of law as to which there are substantial grounds for difference of opinion, and that an immediate appeal from this order would materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation and would avoid protracted and expensive litigation. This Court allowed a permissive appeal, pursuant to Rule 5.
It is settled that decisions concerning evidentiary matters are left to the discretion of the trial judge, and, therefore, will not be disturbed absent a palpable abuse of that discretion. Peoples v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 681 So. 2d 1388, 1390 (Ala.1996). Thus, we must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the discovery of these peer-review documents based upon the privilege afforded under § 22-21-8, Ala. Code 1975. The statute reads, in pertinent part:
In Ex parte Krothapalli, 762 So. 2d 836 (Ala.2000), this Court chronicled the reasoning behind confidentiality statutes such as § 22-21-8, which have been adopted by many states. The statutes provide confidentiality for peer-review processes as a method of "encouraging self-regulation by the medical profession through peer review and evaluation." Cruger v. Love, 599 So. 2d 111, 113-14 (Fla.1992) (quoted in Krothapalli, 762 So.2d at 838). The Florida Supreme Court, in Cruger, explained that the statutes were enacted "in an effort to control the escalating cost of health care by encouraging self-regulation by the medical profession through peer review and evaluation." 599 So. 2d  at 113-14 (quoted in Krothapalli, 762 So.2d at 838).
In support of his position, the plaintiff cites Ex parte St. Vincent's Hospital, 652 So. 2d 225 (Ala.1994), in which this Court declined to apply § 22-21-8 so as to prevent disclosure of the records of a hospital's infection-control committee. However, in that case there was no evidence that a function of the committee was accreditation or quality assurance.
The trial judge in this case had before him the deposition of Frank Harris, president and chief executive officer of Russell Hospital. Harris testified that he had reviewed the documents requested by the plaintiff and had determined that they were the subject of quality assurance, credentialling, and accreditation and thus were subject to the privilege of § 22-21-8.
We have carefully reviewed the record in this case, and we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge. His judgment is due to be affirmed, on the authority of Ex parte Qureshi, 768 So. 2d 374 (Ala.2000), and Ex parte Krothapalli, supra.
AFFIRMED.
HOOPER, C.J., and HOUSTON, LYONS, and BROWN, JJ., concur.