Case Title: Carter v. State

Citation: 367 Md. 447

Docket Number: 35/01

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2002-01-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Lisa Cheere Carter v. State of Maryland, No. 35, September Term, 2001.
[Criminal Procedure – Suppression of Evidence Seized From a Warrantless Search Incident
to an Arrest, held: the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 26
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights do not require suppression of a marijuana cigarette
found during a warrantless search incident to arrest of the petitioner’s lunch bag which she
carried with her at the time of her arrest.  Petitioner failed to challenge directly the lawfulness
of her arrest by the Frederick Police Department pursuant to an outstanding warrant from
Montgomery County.  Similarly, the scope of the arresting officer’s search of petitioner’s
lunch bag and open cigarette package contained therein did not exceed the standards of
constitutionally valid searches incident to arrest as established in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 35
September Term, 2001
LISA CHEERE CARTER
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Bell, C.J., Eldridge, Raker, JJ., dissent
Filed:   January 11, 2002
In the matter now before us, the petitioner, Lisa Cheere Carter, asks us to consider
whether a Frederick police officer’s search of individual cigarettes in a pack contained in
petitioner’s lunch bag subsequent to her arrest on an outstanding warrant issued by a
Montgomery County court was a valid search incident to arrest under the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution and Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  In
so doing, petitioner also challenges the legality of her arrest by arguing that the State
improperly failed to produce the arrest warrant at trial. 
I.
Facts
In the summer of 1999, the petitioner, Lisa Cheere Carter (hereinafter “Carter”), took
a job with Macro Janitorial Services, Inc., which had contracted with Frederick County to
clean the Frederick County Courthouse and the facilities of the Frederick Police Department.
As an employee of Macro, Carter had to undergo a preliminary background check for
security purposes, which was undertaken by the Frederick Police Department at the behest
of Bea Trout, the building manager for the Courthouse.  As a result of this background check,
the Frederick police found that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for Carter in
Montgomery County. 
On July 1, 1999, Carter reported for work at the Frederick Police Headquarters at
which time Officer Steven Cirko of the Frederick Police Department, who had been notified
by the police department dispatcher that Carter was wanted on the outstanding arrest warrant
in Montgomery County, approached Carter, inquired as to her name, and took her into
custody by bringing her into the processing area of the police station.  At that time, he
informed Carter that there was an outstanding warrant for her arrest in Montgomery County
1
Section 287, concerning unlawful possession of controlled dangerous substances and
paraphernalia states, in relevant part, as follows:
Except as authorized by this subheading, it is unlawful for any person:
(a) To possess or administer to another any controlled dangerous
substance, unless such substance was obtained directly, or
pursuant to a valid prescription or order from a practitioner,
while acting in the course of his professional practice.
* * *
(e) Any person who violates this section shall, upon conviction,
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment for not more than four (4) years, a fine of not
more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), or both;
provided, however, that any such person convicted of a violation
of this section involving the use or possession of marihuana
shall be punished by a period of imprisonment not to exceed one
(1) year or by a fine not to exceed $1,000.00 or both.
Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 287.
2
and that she was being placed under arrest based on the outstanding warrant.  Within
moments, Officers Cirko and Dawn Moore, also of the Frederick Police Department,
searched Carter’s belongings, which included a purple lunch sack that Carter had been
carrying with her to work within which there was an open pack of cigarettes in which Officer
Cirko discovered what he believed to be a marijuana cigarette.  He field-tested the suspected
marijuana cigarette, which tested positive for the substance.  Officer Moore then transported
Carter to the Frederick County Detention Center, served the outstanding warrant from
Montgomery County and charged her with possession of marijuana in violation of Maryland
Code, Art. 27, § 287 based on discovering the marijuana cigarette in the cigarette pack found
in Carter’s lunch bag.1  
2
In addition to the request for suppression of the marijuana, Carter sought the
suppression of other items or identifications not relevant to the proceedings now before us.
3
On September 17, 1999, Carter filed a Request for Discovery and Motion to Produce
Documents pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-263.  In her discovery request, Carter asked the
State to produce any relevant material concerning “[a]ny search or seizure of any kind of the
Defendant . . . together with a copy of all arrest warrants, search warrants, applications and
affidavits in support thereof, inventories, and all reports regarding any such searches and
seizures whether or not the State intends to use any so seized at any hearing in the above-
captioned case or at the trial of this matter.”
Contemporaneous with her motion for production of documents, Carter filed a motion
to suppress the evidence of the marijuana cigarette seized by Officer Cirko following her
arrest.2  Specifically, the motion stated, “[t]hat articles of evidence taken from [Carter] by
police authorities were obtained as the result of an illegal search and seizure in violation of
[Carter’s] constitutional rights.”  
A hearing was held on the motion to suppress on November 19, 1999, at which time
the State called Bea Trout and Officers Cirko and Moore to testify about Carter’s arrest and
the seizure of the marijuana cigarette.  In the midst of the State’s questioning of Bea Trout
concerning her role in identifying Carter as the subject of the outstanding warrant defense
counsel objected:
Your Honor, the State has an additional problem in, the case is
Duggins v. State, it’s 7 Md. App. 486, it’s a 1969 case.  And the
blurb is where defendant’s counsel challenged the legality of a
federal arrest warrant on [the] theory. . . that ... the warrant was
4
not properly completed and, therefore, legally defective, the
State could not overcome the challenge by producing only
testimony of those who procured warrants to the effect that it did
exist and it was a lawful warrant. Now assuming the State is
going to introduce a warrant somewhere in the evidence they
produce, or testimony they produce before this Court, they need
the warrant here in court.  Hearsay testimony, what people say
about the warrant is not sufficient under Maryland Law.  It’s,
it’s based in the best evidence rule, but it goes further than that
actually.
The trial court overruled the objection on both hearsay and Duggins grounds.
Officer Cirko thereafter gave the following account of the arrest, search and seizure
of the marijuana cigarette during direct examination:
State: Did you make efforts to confirm that warrant through
Montgomery County?
Cirko: Our dispatch did, they notified us that the warrant was
confirmed, and they were just waiting to find out whether it was
going to be faxed to us, or whether Montgomery County wanted
to come up and pick up Ms. Carter.
State: And did you ever receive a copy of that warrant from
Montgomery County?
Cirko: Yes sir, it was faxed up to us.
State: And did you ever obtain possession of that warrant?
Cirko: Yes, Officer Moore would have, sir.
State: Following your taking Ms. Carter into custody was a
search done of her?
Cirko: Yes sir, it was.
State: Who did that search?
Cirko: I searched her bag that she was carrying with her, and
Officer Moore did the body search, the strip search of Ms.
Carter.
State: When you searched her bag what did you do with the
contents of that bag?
Cirko: I took the contents out of the bag individually, inspected
all of it, inside the bag were some food items, and numerous
personal items, along with a pack of cigarettes, when I took the
cigarettes out of the pack I found a marijuana cigarette within
5
the pack.
State: Were there other cigarettes in the pack?
Cirko: I do believe so, sir.
State: What did you do with the marijuana cigarette?
Cirko: It was confiscated, I field tested it, received a positive
result for marijuana and it was sent to the lab and placed on
property.
Thereafter, defense counsel cross-examined Officer Cirko:
Defense: . . . Did you make an inventory of the contents of this
bag?
Cirko: No sir.
Defense: Did you get a warrant for the bag?
Cirko: No sir.
Defense: Was the bag closed when you had it?
Cirko: That I don’t recall, sir.
Defense: What kind of cigarettes were these?
Cirko: I don’t remember the brand, sir.
Defense: . . . how many cigarettes were in the pack?
Cirko: That I don’t remember either, sir.
Defense: Had the pack been opened before or not?
Cirko: Yes sir, the pack was open.
Defense: This marijuana cigarette in the pack, was it the first
cigarette you pulled out, or the last, or in the bottom, or where?
Cirko: That I don’t remember, sir.
Defense: Did you get a warrant for the cigarette pack?
Cirko: No sir.
Defense: Did you have any reason to believe at the time that you
searched the contents of Ms. Carter’s purse that there was any
contraband in it before you started?
Cirko: No sir.
Defense: Did you bring a copy of the warrant from Montgomery
County with you?
Cirko: No sir, I don’t have the case file.
Following closing remarks by both parties, the court denied Carter’s motion to
suppress the seizure of the marijuana cigarette:
In this case what you have is a search incident to an arrest.
6
Certainly as [defense counsel] points out it’s not an inventory
search, and I won’t consider it as such.  Background check was
done, warrant was found to be outstanding from Montgomery
County.  Officer Cirko testified they verified that was a valid
warrant.  I do not agree that you have to physically produce the
warrant today. . . .the arrest was a valid . . . arrest.  Pursuant to
that arrest there is a search.  He used the term bag.  Even based
upon her testimony this is akin to more like something that’s
traveling with her, not separate luggage or things of that nature.
This is a search incident to arrest, it’s something that’s akin to
her.  Motion to suppress is denied.
A bench trial began on February 28, 2000.  The trial court heard testimony from Bea
Trout, Officer Cirko, and Officer Moore who testified on behalf of the State, and Carter who
testified in her own defense.  The State introduced the marijuana cigarette found in Carter’s
possession into evidence over defense counsel’s continuing objections during direct
examination of Officer Moore.  At the conclusion of the presentation of the State’s evidence,
defense counsel made a motion for a judgment of acquittal, which the trial court denied.
Carter took the stand and gave the following account of the events and circumstances
surrounding her July 1, 1999 arrest:
Defense counsel:  Would you explain to the Court what happens
in the back of the police station?
Carter:  Oh well when I was back there in the processing room,
well she came back and she patted me down, and you know, I
didn’t have any kind of contrabands [sic] or anything on me
personally, you know.
Defense counsel:  Um-hmm.
Carter:  And so then Officer—
Defense counsel:  The other officer—
Carter:  Yeah—
Defense counsel:  --the male officer that’s there?
Carter:  --yeah, the male officer, you know, he asked what was
in here, and I said it was my lunch.
7
Defense counsel:  Um-hmm.
Carter:  And so then, you know, he, you know, he says well he
has to search the bag, and which, you know, I have no problem
with, I didn’t have any problem with him searching the bag,
‘cause it was my lunch.
Defense counsel:  Um-hmm.
Carter:  And then, you know, he had searched the bag, and then
when he had took the cigarettes out, you know, he said well how
many cigarettes do you have in here, I said well I guess it’s
round about two ‘cause I asked a girlfriend of mine to give me
some cigarettes.  And then when he opened up the cigarette pack
he took the two cigarettes out and then you know he smelt the
pack, and then he opened up the pack and when he did like that
it dropped out, it was a little roach, a mar, a little marijuana
roach.  And I told him right then there that’s not mine.
The trial court found Carter guilty and sentenced her to one year imprisonment, which
was suspended, and two years of supervised probation, during which Carter had to remain
free of drugs and alcohol.
Carter filed an appeal with the Court of Special Appeals, asserting that the trial court
erred in denying her motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search of her lunch bag
and pack of cigarettes, erred in ruling that her motion to suppress could be denied without
production of the arrest warrant, and that the trial court failed to comply with Maryland Rule
4-264 when Carter waived her right to a jury trial.  In an unreported decision, the Court of
Special Appeals affirmed Carter’s conviction, holding that the arresting officer did not
violate the Fourth Amendment by searching Carter’s lunch bag and the pack of cigarettes
contained therein following her arrest.  With regard to Carter’s argument that the State failed
to produce the arrest warrant at the suppression hearing, the Court of Special Appeals
concluded, “because [Carter] did not challenge either the legality of her arrest or the illegality
3
Petitioner has not challenged the validity of her jury trial waiver under Maryland Rule
4-246 before this Court.  We do note, however, the Court of Special Appeals held that Carter
made a knowing and voluntary waiver of her right to a jury trial as required by Rule 4-246,
by being informed on the record in open court that she was entitled to have a jury of twelve
citizens of Frederick County hear her case and decide her innocence or guilt, or that she
could elect to have the matter heard by the judge, and by stating that she wished to have the
matter decided by the judge.
8
of the warrant at any time during the evidentiary phase of the suppression hearing, the State
was not required under Duggins [7 Md. App. 486, 256 A.2d 354 (1969)] to physically
produce the warrant.”3
Carter filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals asking this
Court to consider the following:
1.
Whether the trial court erred in concluding that, without any
basis for suspicion, the police could examine the individual
cigarettes in a pack of cigarettes as a search incident to an arrest;
2.
Whether the trial court erred in concluding that where the arrest
was made by a Frederick County Officer based on a
Montgomery County Warrant, the State was not obligated to
produce the warrant.
II.
Discussion
Our review of a circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, ordinarily, is
limited to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.  See Ferris v. State, 355 Md.
356, 368, 735 A.2d 491, 497 (1999).  Thus, we refrain from engaging in de novo fact-finding
and looking at the trial record for supplemental information.  See Cartnail v. State, 359 Md.
272, 282, 753 A.2d 519, 525 (2000).  In so doing, the evidence presented at the hearing on
Carter’s motion to suppress must be viewed in the light most favorable to the State.  See Scott
9
v. State, 366 Md. 121, 143, 782 A.2d 862, 875 (2001); Simpler v. State, 318 Md. 311, 312,
568 A.2d 22 (1990).  We review legal questions 
de novo, and where, as here, petitioner raises
a constitutional challenge to a search or seizure, we must make an independent constitutional
evaluation by reviewing the relevant law and applying it to the unique facts and
circumstances of the case.  See Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554, 569, 774 A.2d 420, 429 (2001);
Stokes v. State, 362 Md. 407, 414, 765 A.2d 612, 615 (2001)(quoting Jones v. State, 343 Md.
448, 457, 682 A.2d 248, 253 (1996)); In re Tariq A-R-Y, 347 Md. 484, 489, 701 A.2d 691,
693 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1140, 118 S. Ct. 1105, 140 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1998).  We will
not disturb the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.  See Wengert
v. State, 364 Md. 76, 84, 771 A.2d 389, 394 (2001). 
A.
Lawfulness of the search of a container
within a container incident to a lawful arrest.
Carter relies on the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights in support of her challenge of the search of her
lunch bag and package of cigarettes contained therein.   The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV. Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights states “[t]hat all
warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or to seize any person or
property, are grevious [grievous] and oppressive; and all general warrants to search suspected
10
places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without naming or describing the place, or the
person in special, are illegal, and ought not to be granted.”  Md. Dec. of Rights, Art. 26.  We
have stated that Art. 26 is considered in pari materia with the Fourth Amendment, such that
we accord great respect and deference to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
in interpreting the federal amendment.  See Richardson v. McGriff, 361 Md. 437, 452-53, 762
A.2d 48, 56 (2000); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 493, n.3, 479 A.2d 903, 907, n.3 (1984). 
We consider whether Officer Cirko’s  warrantless search incident to arrest of Carter’s
lunch bag and the cigarette pack contained therein was reasonable.  We have explained that
the Fourth Amendment prohibits only those searches and seizures found to be unreasonable
under the circumstances.  See Gadson v. State, 341 Md. 1, 9, 668 A.2d 22, 26 (1995), cert.
denied, 517 U.S. 1203, 116 S. Ct. 1704, 134 L. Ed. 2d 803 (1996); Little v. State, 300 Md.
at 493, 479 A.2d at 907; see also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S. Ct.
1568, 1573, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 613 (1985).  Carter asks this Court to adopt a rule which
would limit warrantless searches incident to arrest to those searches directed at locating
weapons or evidence of the crime for which the person has been arrested.  In Carter’s view,
these would be the only searches meeting the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, and thus, the search of Carter’s lunch bag and cigarette pack would fail.
The Supreme Court previously has established “readily administrable rules” for
warrantless searches incident to arrest through its decisions in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
4
In Chimel, the officers conducted a warrantless search incident to arrest of Chimel’s
entire three bedroom home, including the attic, garage and a small workshop.  395 U.S. at
754, 89 S. Ct. at 2035, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 688.  The search included officers looking inside of
dresser drawers so that the officers could see if Chimel possessed any items from the
burglary for which Chimel was being arrested.  Id.  The search, which lasted between forty-
five minutes to an hour yielded several items stolen from a local coin shop.  Id.  Although
the affidavit on which the arrest warrant was based had been set forth in conclusory terms,
the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court both found the arrest to be
constitutionally valid because the officers had acted in good faith in obtaining the warrant
and had enough information to constitute probable cause for Chimel’s arrest.  Id. at 754, 89
S. Ct. at 2035, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 688-89.
5
In Robinson, a police officer stopped Robinson on reasonable suspicion that he was
operating a motor vehicle without a valid license.  414 U.S. at 220, 94 S. Ct. at 469-70, 38
L. Ed. 2d at 432.  The officer arrested Robinson for operating a motor vehicle following
revocation of his license and for obtaining a driving permit through misrepresentation.  Id.
at 220, 94 S. Ct. at 470, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 432.  The officer then conducted a patdown of
Robinson during which he felt an object in the left breast pocket of the heavy coat Robinson
was wearing.  Id. at 221-23, 94 S. Ct. at 470-71, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 433.  Because the officer
could not identify the object by merely feeling it through Robinson’s coat, he reached inside
of the coat pocket and pulled out a crumpled up cigarette package.  Id. at 223, 94 S. Ct. at
471, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 434.  The officer opened the crumpled cigarette package to reveal
fourteen gelatin capsules of heroin.  Id.  The Supreme Court upheld the warrantless search
of Robinson’s person and the cigarette package found in his left coat pocket as a lawful
search incident to arrest.  Id. at 236-37, 94 S. Ct. at 477, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 441.
11
752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969)4 and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,
94 S. Ct. 467, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1973).5
Prior to the decision in Chimel, the Supreme Court had held that when a search is
conducted incident to a lawful arrest, “whatever is found upon his person or in his control
which it is unlawful for him to have and which may be used to prove the offense may be
seized and held as evidence . . . .”  Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158, 45 S. Ct. 280,
287, 69 L. Ed. 543,  553 (1925).  Thereafter in Chimel, the Supreme Court set forth the
following standards for searches incident to lawful arrests:
12
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer
to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons
that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect
his escape.  Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated.  In addition, it is
entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and
seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent
its concealment or destruction.  And the area into which an
arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary
items must, of course, be governed by a like rule.  A gun on a
table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as
dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the
clothing of the person arrested.  There is ample justification,
therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area
“within his immediate control”—construing that phrase to mean
the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 762-63, 89 S. Ct. at 2040, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 694.  In
Robinson, the Court further refined the doctrine espoused in Chimel as follows:
The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial
arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover
evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was
the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or
evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect.
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a
reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that
intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no
additional justification.  It is the fact of the lawful arrest which
establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case
of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only
an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, but is also a “reasonable” search under that
Amendment.
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235, 94 S. Ct. at 477, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 440-41; see United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1661, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 100 (1984)(“The
13
concept of an interest in privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable is, by its
very nature, critically different from the mere expectation, however well justified, that certain
facts will not come to the attention of the authorities”).  Previously we have relied on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Robinson in recognizing that “the right of the police to search
a suspect incident to a lawful arrest follows automatically from the arrest.”  Evans v. State,
352 Md. 496, 508, 723 A.2d 423, 429, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 833, 120 S. Ct. 310, 145 L. Ed.
2d 77 (1999)(citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 225-26, 94 S. Ct. at 472, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 435).
In clarifying the point made in Robinson that there need be no additional justification
for the search incident to arrest, the Supreme Court has stated, “it is the fact of custodial
arrest which gives rise to the authority to search . . .” such that the officer need not indicate
“any subjective fear” of the arrestee or suspect that the arrestee was armed.  Gustafson v.
Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266, 94 S. Ct. 488, 492, 38 L. Ed. 2d 456, 461 (1973).  In Gustafson,
the arresting officer found marijuana cigarettes inside of a cigarette box located in the
defendant’s front coat pocket following a lawful arrest for driving without a driver’s license.
Id. at 262, 94 S. Ct. at 490, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 459.  The Supreme Court found that  the officer
was entitled to seize the marijuana cigarettes “as ‘fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband’
probative of criminal conduct.”  Id. at 266, 94 S. Ct. at 492, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 462 (citing
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236, 94 S. Ct. at 477, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 441; Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143, 149, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1925, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 619 (1972); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 307, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 1650, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782, 792 (1967); Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145, 154-155, 67 S. Ct. 1098, 1103, 91 L. Ed. 2d 1399, 1407-08 (1947)).
14
We find, therefore, that the officer’s warrantless search of Carter’s lunch bag was a
lawful search incident to arrest.  Remaining for our consideration is petitioner’s contention
that the police exceeded the scope of what would otherwise be a lawful warrantless search
incident to arrest by searching the open cigarette pack found inside the lunch bag.  Carter
argues that the warrantless search of the container within a container is unreasonable under
the facts and circumstances of this case and exceeds the scope of what otherwise might be
considered a valid search incident to arrest.  While this Court has not previously considered
the validity of a warrantless search incident to arrest of a container within a container, other
courts have found such searches and subsequent seizures of evidence to be constitutionally
permissible.
In United States v. Kralik, 611 F. 2d 343 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 953,
100 S. C. 1603, 63 L. Ed. 2d 788 (1980), the police discovered an unlocked suitcase
containing a sawed off shotgun in the trunk of a car while executing a valid search warrant
for that car.  The suitcase belonged to Kralik who asserted that absent a second search
warrant, the police could not lawfully search the suitcase.  Id. at 344.  The United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s denial of Kralik’s motion to
suppress the evidence obtained from the suitcase holding that the Fourth Amendment does
not require a second or subsequent warrant to search a container within a container (here, a
suitcase within the trunk of an automobile).  Id. at 345.  In reaching this conclusion, the court
stated:
Any other result is inconsistent with practicality.  Many
15
containers can be placed one within the other.  Theory should
not be entirely divorced from practicality.
Id. at 345.  See United States v. Buckhanan, 905 F. Supp. 654, 661-62 (D. Neb.
1995)(denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of crack cocaine found inside of a
cigarette case located within defendant’s purse which was searched subsequent to a lawful
warrantless arrest).
In State v. Caraher, 653 P.2d 942 (Or. 1982), the Supreme Court of Oregon
considered whether the police officer’s search of the defendant’s purse and wallet contained
therein was properly classified as a search incident to arrest.  In so doing, the Oregon court
applied its own more stringent constitutional standards to uphold the search of the wallet. 
Id. at 947.  In Caraher, while transporting the defendant to a booking facility, the arresting
officer opened the defendant’s purse, removed the defendant’s wallet and opened the coin
compartment of the wallet revealing amphetamines.  Id. at 943.  The court upheld the search
of the defendant’s purse and wallet contained therein, although not for the benefit of
protecting the officer nor for the purpose of preventing the destruction of evidence, because
the defendant did not have access to the purse at the time of the search.  Id. at 952.  Rather,
the court found that the search was reasonable because it was conducted close in time and
space to the arrest and related directly to the arrest.  Id. (citing State v. Chinn, 373 P.2d 392
(Or. 1962)).
In the case sub judice, Carter was carrying her lunch bag with her at the time of the
arrest.  Although Officer Cirko testified that he was not conducting an inventory search of
16
the bag, nor was he suspicious that Carter was concealing a weapon or contraband within the
lunch bag, the Supreme Court’s holding in Gustafson, supra, has rendered obsolete the need
for the officer to express a subjective fear for safety or belief of evidence concealed within
the bags or belongings which the defendant has within their control at the time of their arrest.
See Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 266, 94 S. Ct. at 492, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 461; see also New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462-63, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2865, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 776 (1981)(holding
that a warrantless search of the arrestee’s jacket which was within the arrestee’s immediate
control inside the passenger compartment of the car just prior to his arrest was a valid search
incident to a lawful custodial arrest).  Rather, as the Gustafson Court found, the arresting
officer is entitled to make a full search of the defendant’s person incident to the lawful arrest.
See Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 266, 94 S. Ct. at 492, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 461-62. 
Carter also gave Officer Cirko permission to search her lunch bag.  Thus, under the
facts and circumstances of this case, Officer Cirko conducted a reasonable warrantless search
incident to arrest of Carter’s lunch bag and pack of cigarettes.
B.
Defense counsel’s request for production of the Montgomery
County arrest warrant at the hearing on the motion to suppress.
Carter also argues that the Motion to Suppress should have been granted because at
the hearing on the motion her defense counsel asked Officer Cirko if he had brought a copy
of the Montgomery County warrant with him to which he replied “[n]o, sir, I don’t have the
case file.”  Carter postulates that by failing to produce the warrant at the hearing, the State
failed to meet its burden of showing that the arrest was lawful.  In support of her argument,
17
Carter cites Duggins v. State, supra, as being analogous to the case at bar.  
In Duggins, another case involving a warrantless search incident to arrest,  there was
an explicit challenge to the legality of an arrest warrant, and a demand that the warrant be
produced to the court so that the court could evaluate its legality in determining whether
Duggins’s arrest was unlawful and the search unconstitutional.  See Duggins, 7 Md. App. at
487-88, 256 A.2d at 355.  The Court of Special Appeals held, “where, as here, the
constitutional validity of that arrest was properly challenged by the appellant, evidence to
show the basis upon which the arresting officers acted in making the arrest must
affirmatively be shown by the State if it is to carry its burden of proving the legality of the
arrest.”  Id. at 488, 256 A.2d at 356.  The court also stated that because the appellant
challenged the legality of the arrest and asked for production of the warrant, “the State was
required to do more than simply make a testimonial showing that the warrant actually existed
at the time of the arrest.”  Id.
The case now before us presents facts and circumstances distinguishable from those
of the Duggins case.  First of all, at the outset of the suppression hearing, defense counsel
made the following statement:
I talked to the State about this this morning.  I have the, what I
have in discovery is the statement of probable cause, and we did
serve on the State a request for all information regarding
suppression issues, I believe we did.  In any event, I have the
same information that [the State’s Attorney] does.
(emphasis added).  In fact, the Statement of Probable Cause recites that Officer Moore
transported Carter to the Frederick County Detention Center, wherein Carter was served with
18
the warrant, and charged with possession of marijuana arising out of the search incident to
her arrest on the Montgomery County warrant.
Further distinguishing the present case from Duggins is the fact that Carter, unlike
Duggins, specifically did not attack the legality of the arrest warrant in her mandatory pre-
trial motions.  Maryland Rule 4-252 provides in relevant part:
(a) Mandatory motions.  In the circuit court, the following
matters shall be raised by motion in conformity with this Rule
and if not so raised are waived unless the court, for good cause
shown, orders otherwise:
(1) A defect in the institution of the prosecution;
(2) A defect in the charging document other than its
failure to show jurisdiction in the court or its failure to charge an
offense;
(3) An unlawful search, seizure, interception of wire or
oral communication, or pretrial identification;
(4) An unlawfully obtained admission, statement, or
confession; and
(5) A request for joint or separate trial of defendants or
offenses.
Md. Rule 4-252 (2001).  The challenges Carter made pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-252(a)(3)
are limited by the very words of her motion to “suppress[ing] all evidence obtained by police
authorities as the result of an illegal search and seizure.”  The motion to suppress does not
specifically question the existence of the warrant or legal defects in the arrest warrant itself,
as was the Duggins challenge.  We can find no authority in Maryland or elsewhere that the
lawfulness of an arrest can be vitiated by the State’s failure to produce an arrest warrant at
a suppression hearing when the defendant already has received a copy of it and has not
6
The record reflects that Carter requested a copy of the warrant in discovery, but does
not indicate whether the State ever provided a copy pursuant to the discovery request. 
Defense counsel never filed a Motion to Compel Discovery pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-
263(f).  Nevertheless, the Statement of Probable Cause states that Officer Moore provided
Carter with a copy of the arrest warrant upon transporting Carter to the Frederick County
Detention Center following her arrest.  
19
specifically challenged the legality of the warrant.6 
Further, Carter relies on language taken from Whitley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.
Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1971) and United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S. Ct.
675, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985), as explained in Ott v. State, 325 Md. 206, 214, 600 A.2d 111,
114-15 (1992) to bolster her argument.  Essentially, Carter argues that Whitley and Hensley
support her contention that the Motion to Suppress should have been granted because the
State failed to prove the lawfulness of the arrest by not putting the warrant into evidence at
the hearing.
Carter fails to acknowledge, however, that the Supreme Court recently and quite
explicitly opined that, “[a]lthough Whitely clearly retains relevance in determining whether
police officers have violated the Fourth Amendment . . . its precedential value regarding
application of the exclusionary rule is dubious.”  Arizona v. Evans. 514 U.S. 1, 13, 115 S. Ct.
1185, 1192, 131 L. Ed. 2d 34, 46 (1995)(internal citations omitted).  In Arizona, the court
applied the principles expounded in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82
L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984), to uphold the seizure of a hand-rolled marijuana cigarette and a bag
of marijuana seized incident to an arrest by an officer who acted in reliance on a police
record indicating the existence of an outstanding arrest warrant, when that record later was
20
determined to be erroneous.  514 U.S. at 16, 115 S. Ct. at 1194, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 47.  In
Arizona v. Evans, the State conceded that the defendant’s arrest, based on a clerical computer
error indicating the existence of an outstanding warrant for his arrest when in fact there was
not, violated the Fourth Amendment.  See 514 U.S. at 6, n. 1, 115 S. Ct. at 1189, n. 1, 131
L. Ed. 2d at 41, n. 1.  In upholding the seizure, the Court emphasized the reasonableness of
the police officer’s conduct in light of the facts and circumstances presented to him at the
time of the arrest and search.  See id. at 10-11, 115 S. Ct. at 1191, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 43-44
(explaining that the Fourth Amendment only prohibits those searches and seizures which are
unreasonable).
We need not go so far as the Supreme Court did in Arizona v. Evans to apply the good
faith and reasonableness principles of Leon to this case.  We do note, however, that the Court
in Arizona v. Evans did not exclude evidence seized in a warrantless search incident to an
arrest in the face of allegations of governmental misfeasance, which clearly are not presented
in the present case.  See id. at 28-29, 115 S. Ct. at 1200, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 56 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting)(reasoning that the majority erred in not applying the exclusionary rule based on
her finding that court personnel and police officers are indistinguishable governmental actors
when fulfilling the State’s investigative duties which resulted in the erroneous police record).
In the present case, Officer Cirko had a copy of the Montgomery County warrant,
served on the defendant and testified about his reliance on the existence of the warrant.  The
fact that he did not have a copy of the warrant in his possession at the hearing does not
obviate the lawfulness of Carter’s arrest.
21
For all of the foregoing reasons, we find that no violation of the Fourth Amendment
or Article 26 occurred when Officer Cirko seized the marijuana cigarette from the pack of
cigarettes in the lunch bag carried by the petitioner in the course of conducting a search
incident to a lawful arrest based on an outstanding search warrant issued in Montgomery
County.  The lawfulness of the arrest is not vitiated by the failure of the State to reproduce
the arrest warrant at the suppression hearing when the petitioner had a copy of the warrant
and did not sufficiently challenge the legality of the arrest.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED.  COSTS TO BE PAID
BY PETITIONER.
Circuit Court for Frederick County
Case No. 25512
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 35
September Term, 2001
______________________________________________
LISA CHEERE CARTER
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
______________________________________________
Dissenting Opinion by Raker, J., in which Bell, C.J. and
Eldridge, J., join
______________________________________________
Filed:   January 11, 2002
23
Raker, J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.  I agree with the majority that the search by the police of the
individual cigarettes contained in the package concealed in petitioner’s lunch bag would have
been a valid search had the State, with competent evidence, met its burden of proving that
the arrest was lawful.  Nonetheless, I would reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court
denying the motion to suppress on the grounds that the State, in failing to produce the arrest
warrant at the suppression hearing, did not establish that the search of petitioner was pursuant
to a lawful arrest. 
By failing to produce the arrest warrant for the trial court’s review once petitioner
challenged the validity of the search, the State failed to make the required showing that the
search was, in fact, incident to a valid arrest.  Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the
Court of Special Appeals affirming the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion to suppress
and reverse the judgment of conviction.  I would hold that the evidence seized incident to
petitioner’s arrest improperly was admitted in evidence at her trial over her objection.
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.
See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985).  A
warrantless search or seizure is presumptively unreasonable, unless the State can show that
it falls within one of a few carefully delineated exceptions.  See Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576,(1967); State v. Bell, 334 Md. 178, 191, 638
A.2d 107 (1994).  The State bears the burden of proving the applicability of an exception to
the warrant requirement.  See Bell, 334 Md. at 191, 638 A.2d at 114.  This Court’s review
-2-
7Maryland Rule 5-1002 provides:
“To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the
original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as
otherwise provided in these rules or by statute.”
of the denial of a motion to suppress evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment is
limited to the record of the suppression hearing.  See Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 282,
753 A.2d 519, 524 (2000); Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 368, 735 A.2d 491, 497 (1999).
The resolution of the search and seizure issue presented by this case is provided
fundamentally by an application of the Maryland Rules of Evidence, and specifically by the
requirements of the Best Evidence Rule, codified in Maryland Rules 5-1001 through 5-1008.
The Best Evidence Rule requires, as an evidentiary matter, that an original writing must be
produced to prove its existence and contents, except for a few narrow exceptions that do not
apply to the present case.  See Maryland Rule 5-1002;7 see also Maryland Rule 5-1004
(providing that the contents of a document may be proven extrinsically if the original is lost
or destroyed, not reasonably obtainable, or is in the possession of the opponent).  We have
long recognized that the Best Evidence Rule is applicable in criminal cases in Maryland.  See
Forrester v. State, 224 Md. 337, 167 A.2d 878 (1961).
This case is strikingly similar to the case of Duggins v. State, 7 Md. App. 486, 256
A.2d 354 (1969), decided by the Court of Special Appeals more than thirty years ago.  In that
case, like the one sub judice, the appellant challenged the seizure of incriminating evidence
from his person justified by the State as a search incident to a lawful arrest.  The appellant
challenged the legality of the warrant and demanded its production at his suppression hearing
-3-
so that the court could assess the constitutional validity of his arrest.  See id. at 487-88, 256
A.2d at 354-55.  The State declined to produce the warrant, and the trial court denied the
appellant’s motion to suppress, finding that the testimony of the arresting agents that they
had a valid warrant in their possession at the time of the arrest was sufficient evidence to
demonstrate the arrest’s validity.  See id.  Chief Judge Robert C. Murphy, later Chief Judge
of this Court, writing for the Court of Special Appeals, held:
“Under the facts of this case, the constitutional validity of the
seizure of the incriminating evidence from appellant’s person
manifestly depended upon the constitutional validity of his
arrest.  And where, as here, the constitutional validity of that
arrest was properly challenged by the appellant, evidence to
show the basis upon which the arresting officers acted in making
the arrest must affirmatively be shown by the State if it is to
carry its burden of proving the legality of the arrest.  The State
relied solely upon the warrant to justify the arrest, and since
appellant challenged its legality and called for its production, we
think the State was required to do more than simply make a
testimonial showing that the warrant actually existed at the time
of the arrest.”
Id. at 488, 256 A.2d at 355 (internal citations omitted).  The court also relied on Bumper v.
North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 20 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1968), when it observed
that:
“if the State relied upon a search warrant to justify a search, but
failed to produce it in evidence, ‘there is no way of knowing the
conditions under which it was issued, or determining whether it
was based upon probably cause.’  And it has been hld that under
the so-called ‘best evidence rule,’ the contents and existence of
a search warrant may, where challenged, be proved only by the
introduction of the warrant itself, unless it is shown that the
warrant is unvariable for some reason other than the fault of the
prosecution.” 
-4-
Duggins, 7 Md. App. at 488, 256 A.2d at 356 (citations omitted).  
In Duggins, the Court quoted extensively from People v. Wohlleben, 67 Cal. Rptr. 826
(Cal. Ct. App. 1968), a case applying the best evidence rule to an arrest warrant.  The
defendant had been arrested following a traffic stop based on outstanding warrants.  At trial,
the State did not produce the warrants and instead attempted to prove their existence and
contents by parole evidence.  The court overruled defense counsel’s objection, and the
intermediate appellate court reversed, applying the best evidence rule. In reversing
defendant's conviction for possession of marijuana found in a search incident to this arrest,
the court applied the best evidence rule and stated: 
“Unless a foundation is laid for the use of other evidence, no
evidence of the contents of a writing other than the writing itself
is admissible. . . . The contents of the warrants under which
defendant was arrested were necessarily in issue since it was
incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that defendant was the
person named in the warrants.  Defendant having objected to the
competency of the prosecution's evidence of the warrants, the
court erred in not requiring that the original warrants be
produced or that a proper foundation be established for the use
of the secondary evidence.  A rule which requires the production
of the original warrant does not place a burden on the People
because, as the Supreme Court observed in People v. Burke [394
P. 2d 67, 68 (1964)], in connection with search warrants,
‘Ordinarily proof of the existence of a search warrant is a simple
matter, and in the face of an objection that the evidence has been
illegally obtained, it seems obvious that the prosecution will
produce a warrant if one exists.’” 
Id. at 830.
The Duggins court also cited Cain v. State, 148 S.E.2d 508 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) with
approval.   In that case, the defendant objected to oral testimony about the contents of a
-5-
search warrant on the ground that the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant was not
admissible until the State first established a valid search warrant.  The trial court overruled
defense counsel’s argument, and the appellate court reversed, stating that defense counsel
had stated “an objection that the existence and validity of the search warrant had not been
shown by the best evidence, and that until such showing evidence of the result of the search
was inadmissible.”  Id. at 511.  The court held that the trial court erred in permitting parol
testimony of the contents of the warrant. 
The same analysis is equally applicable to the case at bar.  Prior to trial, petitioner
filed a pretrial motion, pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-252, which included a motion to
suppress the evidence taken from petitioner by police “as the result of an illegal search and
seizure.”  During the suppression hearing, petitioner’s counsel opposed the search of
petitioner’s belongings after she was taken into custody based on the allegation that she was
wanted through Montgomery County.  
At the hearing, petitioner’s counsel objected to the State’s attempt to establish the
existence and validity of the arrest warrant without producing the warrant itself.  Defense
counsel made a timely objection during the suppression hearing as to the hearsay evidence
related to the contents of the warrant:
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, the State has an
additional problem, the case is Duggins v. State, it’s 7 Md. App.
486, it’s a 1969 case.  And the blurb is where defendant’s
counsel challenged the legality of a federal arrest warrant on the
theory that . . . it was possible for the warrant was not properly
completed and, therefore, legally defective, the State could not
overcome the challenge by producing only testimony of those
-6-
who procured warrants to the effect that it did exist and it was
a lawful a warrant.  Now assuming the State is going to
introduce a warrant somewhere in the evidence they produce, or
testimony they produce before this Court, they need the warrant
here in court.  Hearsay testimony, what people say about the
warrant is not sufficient under Maryland law.  It’s, it’s based in
the best evidence rule, but it goes further than that actually.”
(emphasis added)
When petitioner challenged the validity of the search incident to her arrest at the
pretrial hearing on her motion to suppress, the State’s burden to prove the legality of her
arrest and the resulting search was triggered.  The State failed to produce an original or even
a copy of the arrest warrant at the hearing on petitioner’s motion to suppress.  Nor did the
State make any showing that the original warrant was unavailable for some reason other than
the fault of the State.  Clearly, the original warrant is the best evidence of its terms and
contents.  See Brown v. State, 87 So.2d 84, 85 (Miss. 1956) (“[T]he warrant itself was the
best evidence of its existence and terms, and . . . the original should be offered in evidence,
or proof be made that it was lost, or could not be produced, . . . to justify admission of
secondary proof . . . .”).  Nonetheless, the majority gives no explanation for how it is
possible for a trial court to determine, as a matter of law, that a contested search was incident
to a validly executed arrest warrant without seeing the warrant itself.  As this Court opined
in Howell:
“In passing upon issues which are of constitutional dimension,
a court can neither fill gaps in the record with conjecture nor
substitute surmise for positive proof.  Consequently, care should
be taken by the State in presenting its case to insure that there
will be sufficient evidence, if any exists, placed in the record to
justify the execution of a warrantless search incident to a lawful
-7-
8As the Court of Special Appeals explained in Duggins v. State, 7 Md. App. 486, 490 n.2,
256 A.2d 354, 356 n.2 (1969): “We note that the warrant is in fact available to the prosecutor
since the Attorney General has appended it to his brief on appeal.  For obvious reasons,
however, the time to produce the warrant was at the trial when the issue of the legality of the
arrest was before the court for resolution.”
arrest.”
Howell, 271 Md. at 386, 318 A.2d at 193.
The mistake that the majority makes in this case is in conflating the discovery issue
of whether a copy of the arrest warrant was provided to petitioner prior to trial with the
evidentiary issue of whether the original warrant was produced and entered in evidence at
the pretrial hearing on petitioner’s motion to suppress.  In doing so, the majority obliquely
concludes that “[t]he lawfulness of the arrest is not vitiated by the failure of the State to
reproduce the arrest warrant at the suppression hearing when the petitioner had a copy of the
warrant and did not sufficiently challenge the legality of the arrest.”  Maj. op. at 21.  This
case is not about pretrial discovery.  Therefore, it is irrelevant whether a copy of the warrant
was given to the defendant at the time of the arrest or to her counsel during discovery.  
 The majority fails to address the real issues presented – namely, the manner in which
the State can meet its burden to prove that an arrest is valid when it forms the basis for a
contested search incident to arrest and whether the State sufficiently proved that petitioner’s
arrest in this case was lawful.8  Nor does the majority explain how petitioner’s alleged
possession of a copy of the warrant resolves the failure of the State to meet its burden or how
petitioner’s challenge to the legality of her arrest was “insufficient” given her motion to
suppress, her attorney’s objections at the suppression hearing, and the allocation of the
-8-
burden of persuasion with respect to the constitutional issue.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  Chief Judge Bell and Judge Eldridge have
authorized me to state that they join in this dissent.