Case Title: Yost v. Harpel Oil Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83-88

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-12-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Yost v. Harpel Oil Co.1983 WY 124674 P.2d 712Case Number: 83-88Case Number: 83-88Decided: 12/02/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
SHIRLEY 
M. YOST, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF ROBERT B. YOST, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 
YOST BROTHERS COMPANY, (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
HARPEL 
OIL COMPANY, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court, Laramie County, Alan B. Johnson, 
J.

 
 
J. 
Kent Rutledge of Lathrop & Uchner, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant.

 
 
James 
E. Fitzgerald, Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

 
 
Before 
ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN 
and CARDINE, JJ.

 
 

ROSE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This is a collection 
suit filed by plaintiff-appellee, a supplier of gasoline and other related 
products, against its retailer, appellant Yost Brothers Company, a Wyoming 
corporation, and appellant Shirley M. Yost as the administratrix of the estate 
of the principal stockholder Robert B. Yost. Recovery against the corporation 
was sought on the theory of goods having been sold and delivered. Recovery 
against the estate of the deceased shareholder was sought on the theory that the 
shareholder had guaranteed payment of the indebtedness, and on the theory that 
the corporation was a sham.

 
 

[¶2.]     The court found that 
the defendants in the trial court (one of whom is an appellant here) were 
indebted to the plaintiff (appellee here) in the sum of $207,105.22 for gasoline 
and other supplies which had been received but for which payment had not been 
made. Judgment was entered for this sum and costs, and Shirley M. Yost 
appeals.

 
 

[¶3.]     We will 
affirm.

 
 

[¶4.]     Plaintiff-appellee, 
Harpel Oil Company, hereinafter referred to as Harpel Oil, is a Colorado 
corporation engaged in the business of supplying gasoline and related products 
to various retail dealers. Defendant-appellant, Shirley M. Yost, is the widow 
and administratrix of the estate of Robert B. Yost, who died December 4, 1981. 
Robert Yost was one of three incorporators and the president and chief executive 
officer of defendant Yost Brothers Company, a Wyoming corporation which was 
organized and incorporated under the laws of the state of Wyoming in 1960. From 
1964 up until the time of his death, Robert Yost owned two-thirds of the stock 
in the corporation and made most if not all of the management decisions for the 
company. The remaining one-third of the outstanding stock was held in escrow 
subject to a purchase agreement between incorporator Peter Cheladyn and Yost 
Brothers Company. 

 
 

[¶5.]     Yost Brothers Company 
was organized for the purpose of operating a combination restaurant, grocery 
store, and gasoline station and Harpel Oil began supplying gasoline to the 
Company immediately after Yost Brothers Company had commenced doing business in 
the latter part of 1960. It was the practice for Harpel to invoice Yost Brothers 
for gasoline as it was delivered, and the outstanding invoices were carried on 
an open account by Harpel Oil. This relationship continued until just prior to 
the trial of this case in August of 1982.

 
 

[¶6.]     Yost Brothers did not 
stay current with the invoices from the very beginning of the business 
relationship, and by 1964 the past-due balance on the open account was 
$41,175.00. On July 28, 1964, Yost Brothers Company and Harpel Oil entered into 
a financing arrangement which was designed to reduce Yost's land payments to a 
third party and to provide for monthly payments to discharge the $41,175.00 debt 
with Harpel Oil. This arrangement included the conveyance of the real property 
of Yost Brothers Company to Harpel Oil, through a contract for deed with Yost's 
vendor which contract also provided that Yost Brothers Company would repurchase 
the property from Harpel Oil for $60,000.00. This agreement further contemplated 
a payment schedule, an interest provision, a promise on the part of the Yost 
Company that it would purchase all of its fuels from Harpel and would pay a one 
cent per gallon surcharge to be credited to the open account in the amount of 
$41,175.00. Payment in full of this last-mentioned amount was made a condition 
precedent to reconveyance of the land to the Yost Company under the contract for 
deed.

 
 

[¶7.]     The contract for deed 
was not signed or executed by Yost Brothers Company or anyone in behalf of the 
Company - nor by Robert B. Yost, individually. The corporate records seem to 
acknowledge a purchase arrangement concerning the property, but the books also 
indicate that the instrument was meant to contemplate some sort of a mortgage 
arrangement. Harpel testified that when the contract for deed was not honored, 
the parties entered into a rental agreement. However, contrary to the testimony 
of Mr. Harpel, the plaintiff's position was that the contract for deed continued 
to exist and sought judgment under the contract for $110,270.25.1 The trial court made no award for 
damages upon this claim of the appellee.

 
 

[¶8.]     The stockholders of 
Yost Brothers Company entered into still another agreement 
which

 
 
"individually 
guaranteed the payment of all amounts due Harpel Oil by Yost Brothers Company, 
and thereby assumed personal responsibility and liability for all such 
indebtedness."

 
 
This 
agreement, which contained the individual guarantee of the shareholders of Yost 
Brothers Company, was signed in behalf of Yost Brothers Company by Robert B. 
Yost and Bonnie E. Yost. Bonnie E. Yost does not appear on the business records 
as a shareholder and Mr. Cheladyn did not sign the agreement. When the agreement 
was executed, Robert B. Yost held two-thirds of the shares of Yost Brothers 
Company. The agreement recites that Bonnie E. Yost is a shareholder of Yost 
Brothers, Inc.

 
 

[¶9.]     All parties acknowledge 
that by July, 1973 the sum of $41,175.00, representing the original indebtedness 
on the open account of 1964, had been paid in full by Yost Brothers Company. 
However, the record reveals that, during the period from July 28, 1964 through 
May 31, 1982 Harpel continued to supply Yost Brothers Company on an open account 
until, as of June 30, 1982, the unpaid balance was in the amount of 
$207,105.22.

 
 

[¶10.]  The following is a summary of the 
evidence upon which the trial court relied to hold that the corporate veil had 
been pierced.

 
 

[¶11.]  After 1962, Robert B. Yost was the 
managing officer of Yost Brothers Company, and this corporation was the only 
vehicle by which Robert Yost conducted business and the company was, at all 
times, closely identified with him personally. Robert Yost funneled corporate 
money through his personal account to finance a drug paraphernalia business and 
utilized corporate funds to invest in the stock market under his personal 
account. There were few corporate meetings. Annual-meeting minutes were prepared 
by the corporation attorney and sent to Robert Yost for signature. The minutes 
were inaccurate and reflected such things as listing one A.C. Weber as 
president, although he had long since been deceased. The minutes show Peter 
Cheladyn as present and participating as a stockholder in meetings after he had 
sold his stock. The minutes show people attending meetings together when the 
evidence showed that these persons either did not attend meetings together or 
did not attend meetings at all. An employee who worked for Yost Brothers Company 
since 1968 and who was in a position to observe testified that she had never 
seen the stockholders in a corporate meeting.

 
 

[¶12.]  With reference to Robert B. Yost's 
personal finances, the evidence disclosed that Yost and his wife had indicated 
very meager personal combined income on their tax returns, yet their bank 
deposits were greatly in excess of any explained income. During this period of 
time, the funds of the corporation were minimal or nonexistent and creditors 
such as the appellee remained unsatisfied. In these years, Robert B. Yost 
acquired a coin collection valued at in excess of $100,000.00, and those who 
testified were unable to furnish any satisfactory explanation as to how the 
funds for this acquisition were obtained.

 
 

[¶13.]  The record discloses that moneys were 
used for Yost's drug paraphernalia business, and Shirley Yost conducted a music 
business as a sole proprietorship through the joint checking account with Yost 
Brothers Company, thus commingling personal and corporate assets. In sum, the 
personal funds of Shirley and Robert Yost and the corporate funds of Yost 
Brothers Company were commingled at will until - to paraphrase the trial court - 
it became impossible to determine how the corporate funds and Robert B. Yost's 
personal funds were handled or to trace the origin and disposition of these 
moneys.

 
 

[¶14.]  The trial court found and held that the 
funds of the Company had been commingled with those of Robert and Shirley Yost; 
that Robert Yost had given his personal assurance and guarantee on numerous and 
continuing occasions that he would be personally responsible for the debt to 
Harpel Oil; and that the plaintiff should have judgment in the sum of 
$207,155.22 against the estate of Robert B. Yost for the products received by 
Yost Brothers Company for which payment was not made and for 
costs.

 
 
The 
Trial Court's Decision

 
 

[¶15.]  Based upon the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and judgments of record, we perceive the trial court's 
decision to be that the appellee has judgment against the appellant for 
$207,155.22 for moneys owed on an open account by Yost Brothers Company to 
Harpel Oil Company, on two theories:

 
 
1. 
Robert B. Yost, deceased, had guaranteed the account and thus it became his 
personal debt and, upon his death, the debt of his estate.

 
 
2. 
Whether or not there was a valid guarantee, the debt was in fact the debt of 
Robert B. Yost and, upon his death, the debt of his estate, for the reason that 
his corporation was not the actual debtor because of the way Mr. Yost conducted 
his personal and the corporation's business. The court found that these business 
practices were carried on in such manner so as to permit the plaintiff-appellee 
to pierce the corporate veil, the result of which holding is that the purported 
debts of the corporation were in fact the debts of Robert B. Yost and, at his 
death, the debt of his estate. 

 
 

[¶16.]  The appellants raise the following issues 
for our consideration:

 
 
1. 
Is there sufficient evidence to support a judgment on the theory that the 
corporate veil should be pierced?

 
 
2. 
Is plaintiff-appellee entitled to recover on the theory of a personal 
guarantee?

 
 
3. 
If so, is there sufficient evidence to sustain the finding of a personal 
guarantee?

 
 
4. 
Can plaintiff-appellee recover an amount greater than specified in its claim 
against the estate?

 
 

[¶17.]  In response to Issue No. 1 above, we find 
that there is sufficient evidence to support the judgment on the theory that the 
corporate veil should be pierced. We will therefore not address designated Issue 
No. 2 and Issue No. 3 above. With respect to Issue No. 4, we will hold that the 
claim with the estate was properly amended and was before the civil and the 
probate court in good form.

 
 
Issue 
No. 1

 
 

[¶18.]  Is there sufficient evidence to support a 
judgment on the theory that the corporate veil should be 
pierced?

 
 

[¶19.]  We find that there 
is.

 
 

[¶20.]  This issue raises a factual question, 
i.e., sufficiency of the evidence. We have said that where the separate-entity 
doctrine is relied upon, each case must be governed by its own facts, Opal Mercantile v. Tamblyn, Wyo., 616 P.2d 776 (1980). Fact questions must be decided by the trier of fact, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company v. 
Stover, 327 F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 1964); H.A.S. Loan Service, Inc. v. McColgan, 
21 Cal. 2d 518, 133 P.2d 391, 145 A.L.R. 349 (1943); Opal Mercantile v. Tamblyn, supra. We 
will not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact, findings of fact 
will be presumed to be correct and we will set them aside on appeal only where 
such findings are "clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of 
evidence," Kvenild v. Taylor, Wyo., 
594 P.2d 972, 976 (1979); see also, Plains Tire and Battery Company v. Plains A 
to Z Tire Co., Inc., Wyo., 622 P.2d 917, 920 (1981); Shores v. Lindsey, Wyo., 591 P.2d 895, 
899 (1979). Additionally, in examining a fact issue,

 
 
"`We 
must assume that evidence in favor of the successful party is true, leave out of 
consideration entirely evidence of the unsuccessful party in conflict therewith, 
and give to the evidence of the successful party every favorable inference which 
may reasonably and fairly be drawn from it.'" Peters Grazing Association v. 
Legerski, Wyo., 544 P.2d 449, 455 (1975), reh. denied, 546 P.2d 189 (1976), 
quoting from Stock v. Roebling, Wyo., 459 P.2d 780, 784 
(1969).

 
 
See 
also Overcast v. Baldwin, Wyo., 544 P.2d 464, 465 (1976).

 
 

[¶21.]  In AMFAC Mechanical Supply Co. v. Federer, 
Wyo., 645 P.2d 73 (1982), this court discussed various factors which are 
relevant to a consideration of the corporate-entity issue and we there reviewed 
the concepts set out in Opal Mercantile 
v. Tamblyn, where we said:

 
 
"Ordinarily, 
a corporation is a separate entity distinct from that of individuals comprising 
it. State ex rel. Christensen v. Nugget Coal Co., 60 Wyo. 51, 144 P.2d 944 
(1944); Durlacher v. Frazer, 8 Wyo. 58, 55 P. 306 (1898). This is true although 
all or a majority of the stock is owned by a single individual. Durlacher v. 
Frazer, supra; W.D. Miller Lumber Corporation v. Miller, 225 Or. 427, 357 P.2d 503 (1960). However, in an appropriate case and in furtherance of public policy 
or the ends of justice, the doctrine will be disregarded. Peters Grazing 
Association v. Legerski, supra; State ex rel. Christensen v. Nugget Coal Co., 
supra; Caldwell v. Roach, 44 Wyo. 319, 12 P.2d 376 (1932)." 616 P.2d  at 
778.

 
 
In 
AMFAC Mechanical Supply Co. we then 
sounded this warning:

 
 
"For 
a corporation to be accorded treatment as a separate entity, it must exist and 
function as such and not be the alter ego of the person owning and controlling 
it and cannot be used or ignored just to fit the convenience of the individual. 
Cohen v. Williams, 294 Ala. 417, 318 So. 2d 279 (1975)." 645 P.2d  at 79.

 
 
We 
looked with approval upon certain aspects of the opinion contained in Arnold v. Browne, 27 Cal. App. 3d 386, 103 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1972), overruled on other grounds, 25 Cal. 3d 124, 158 Cal. Rptr. 1, 599 P.2d 83 (1979) when we quoted from that opinion as 
follows:

 
 
"* 
* * `"Before a corporation's acts and obligations can be legally recognized as 
those of a particular person, and vice versa, it must be made to appear that the 
corporation is not only influenced and governed by that person, but that there 
is such a unity of interest and ownership that the individuality, or 
separateness, of such person and corporation has ceased, and that the facts are 
such that an adherence to the fiction of the separate existence of the 
corporation would, under the particular circumstances, sanction a fraud or 
promote injustice."' [Citations.]" 103 Cal. Rptr.  at 781, quoted in AMFAC Mechanical Supply Co. v. Federer, 
supra, 645 P.2d  at 77.

 
 

[¶22.]  We then took note of the factors to be 
considered in deciding whether a corporation is a separate entity when we again 
quoted Arnold v. Browne, 103 Cal. Rptr.  at 781-782, with approval, as follows:

 
 
"`Among 
the possible factors pertinent to the trial court's determination are: 
commingling of funds and other assets, failure to segregate funds of the 
separate entities, and the unauthorized diversion of corporate funds or assets 
to other than corporate uses; the treatment by an individual of the assets of 
the corporation as his own; the failure to obtain authority to issue or 
subscribe to stock; the holding out by an individual that he is personally 
liable for the debts of the corporation; the failure to maintain minutes or 
adequate corporate records and the confusion of the records of the separate 
entities; the identical equitable ownership in the two entities; the 
identification of the equitable owners thereof with the domination and control 
of the two entities; identification of the directors and officers of the two 
entities in the responsible supervision and management; the failure to 
adequately capitalize a corporation; the absence of corporate assets, and 
undercapitalization; the use of a corporation as a mere shell, instrumentality 
or conduit for a single venture or the business of an individual or another 
corporation; the concealment and misrepresentation of the identity of the 
responsible ownership, management and financial interest or concealment of 
personal business activities; the disregard of legal formalities and the failure 
to maintain arm's length relationships among related entities; the use of the 
corporate entity to procure labor, services or merchandise for another person or 
entity; the diversion of assets from a corporation by or to a stockholder or 
other person or entity, to the detriment of creditors, or the manipulation of 
assets and liabilities between entities so as to concentrate the assets in one 
and the liabilities in another; the contracting with another with intent to 
avoid performance by use of a corporation as a subterfuge of illegal 
transactions; and the formation and use of a corporation to transfer to it the 
existing liability of another person or entity [citation].'" 645 P.2d  at 
77-78.

 
 

[¶23.]  Given the factors which will support the 
disregard of the corporate entity, we look to the findings of the trial 
court.

 
 
Diversion 
of Assets from the Corporation to the Detriment of 
Creditors

 
 

[¶24.]  With respect to the diversion of assets, 
the trial judge found:

 
 
"Robert 
B. Yost had no income producing business other than Yost Brothers Company. He 
never withdrew more than $130 per week in salary from the corporation. In 1973, 
Robert and Shirley Yost's combined income was $12,043.87, yet Robert Yost made 
deposits into his personal account totaling $16,147.45. * * * In 1974 Robert and 
Shirley Yost's combined income was $12,468.80, yet Robert Yost made deposits 
into his personal account of $30,062.58, of which $18,780 was in cash. * * * In 
1977, Robert and Shirley Yost's combined income was $10,368.80, yet Robert Yost 
deposited $23,930 into his personal checking account. * * 
*

 
 
* 
* * * * *

 
 
"* 
* * It would appear to the Court that there is a great likelihood in view of the 
testimony of various witnesses as to transactions in the stock market, in coins 
and in behalf of third persons without substantiating records that there was an 
unauthorized diversion of corporate funds or assets to other than corporate 
uses."

 
 
The 
court found detriment to creditors where the judge said:

 
 
"In 
1964 the defendant had fallen behind in payments for gasoline products and was 
indebted to the plaintiff in the amount of $41,175. Further, the defendant, Yost 
Brothers Company, had failed to make payments under a purchase agreement for the 
business real estate."

 
 
Commingling 
Funds and Other Assets

 
 

[¶25.]  The trial judge 
found:

 
 
"Robert 
B. Yost funneled corporate money through his personal account to finance a drug 
paraphernalia shop for the business. * * *

 
 
* 
* * * * *

 
 
"The 
wife of Robert B. Yost, Shirley Yost, conducted a music business as a sole 
proprietorship through the joint checking account with Yost Brothers Company, 
commingling personal and corporate assets. Yost Brothers Company carried the 
music business equipment as a corporate asset since 1976 and declared music 
income since 1976. * * *

 
 
"The 
consistent use of cash in acquiring business inventory, making purchases for the 
business, making cash deposits to the personal checking account of Robert B. 
Yost, making purchases for the personal use of Robert B. Yost and for Shirley 
Yost make it difficult if not impossible to accurately determine how corporate 
funds were handled or to trace the origin of said funds. It appears that 
expenses for food, entertainment, fuel, and automobile expenses were not paid 
from the personal accounts of Robert and Shirley Yost."

 
 
Representation 
With Respect to Personal Liability for the Debts of the 
Corporation

 
 

[¶26.]  The trial judge 
found:

 
 
"* 
* * On July 28, 1964, the defendant and the plaintiff entered into certain 
agreements by which the plaintiff agreed to purchase the business property from 
the defendants' vendor and resell the business property to Yost Brothers Company 
for the sum of $60,000 under a contract for deed. Another agreement provided 
that all of the stockholders of Yost Brothers Company, including Robert B. Yost 
`individually guaranteed the payment of all amounts due Harpels by Yost Brothers 
and hereby assume personal responsibility and liability for all such 
indebtedness.'

 
 
* 
* * * * *

 
 
"It 
should be noted that the agreement containing the individual guarantee of the 
shareholders of Yost Brothers Company has been signed in behalf of the defendant 
Robert B. Yost, by Robert B. Yost personally and by Bonnie E. Yost. The record 
does not indicate what interest as a shareholder was held by Bonnie E. Yost and 
it further appears that the one-third owner or shareholder, Mr. Cheladyn did not 
sign the agreement. At the time that the agreement was signed, Robert B. Yost 
apparently held two-thirds of the shares of Yost Brothers Company. The agreement 
recites that Bonnie E. Yost is a shareholder of Yost Brothers, 
Inc.

 
 
* 
* * * * *

 
 
"Robert 
B. Yost continuously extended to plaintiff his personal guarantee for the 
corporation's debts after John Harpel became personally involved in the 
supervision of credit with Robert B. Yost."

 
 
 

 
 
The 
Use of a Corporation as a Mere Shell for the Business of the 
Corporation

 
 

[¶27.]  With respect to this factor, the court 
found:

 
 
"Robert 
B. Yost, Peter Cheladyn, and Jack Yost were the incorporators of Yost Brothers 
Company. Cheladyn furnished the capital and the Yost Brothers were to operate 
the business. Jack Yost left the business in 1962. Mr. Cheladyn sold his shares 
to the company in 1975, but was never paid. Throughout the corporate history, 
Robert B. Yost was the president, operating executive of the corporation, and 
member of the board of directors of the corporation. In 1964 until his death, he 
held two-thirds of the stock of the corporation, and the remaining one-third was 
held in escrow after 1975, subject to the purchase agreement of Mr. Cheladyn's 
shares by Yost Brothers Company.

 
 
* 
* * * * *

 
 
"That 
after 1962, Robert B. Yost was the sole managing officer of Yost Brothers 
Company. The corporation is revealed by the evidence to be the only vehicle by 
which Robert B. Yost conducted business and it was closely identified with him, 
personally."

 
 
Identical 
Equitable Ownership in the Personal and Corporation 
Entities

 
 

[¶28.]  As indicated above, the trial court found 
that Shirley Yost declared income from her personal music business as sole 
proprietor and deducted business expenses from her personal income tax, yet the 
corporation carried her equipment as assets and depreciated 
them.

 
 
Failure 
to Observe the Legal Formalities of the Corporation

 
 

[¶29.]  The trial judge 
found:

 
 
"There 
were few formal meetings of the corporation, Yost Brothers Company, conducted. 
Annual meetings were prepared by the corporate attorney, Richard F. Pickett, and 
sent to Robert Yost for his signature. Those corporate meetings frequently list 
A.C. Weber as president and participating, although he died in 1970. * * * The 
minutes list Peter Cheladyn as present and participating after 1975, although he 
had sold his stock and left the business that same year. * * * The meetings 
showed Gene Weber and Peter Cheladyn together at shareholder and director 
meetings although the testimony is that Gene Weber did not attend any company 
meetings and did not attend meetings with Mr. Cheladyn. Sharon Petzoldt, who 
worked for the defendant Yost Brothers Company since 1968, had never seen a 
corporate meeting."

 
 

[¶30.]  Given the rules which govern the 
parameters of our inquiry into the fact-finding aspects of the trial process, we 
find that there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion 
that appellee Harpel Oil Company is entitled to pierce the corporate veil of 
Yost Brothers Company to reach the assets of Robert B. Yost's 
estate.

 
 
Issue 
No. 2 for Decision

 
 

[¶31.]  Was the appellee's claim properly and 
timely filed in the estate of Robert B. Yost?

 
 

[¶32.]  We will hold that it 
was.

 
 

[¶33.]  This issue comes on by reason of the fact 
that the appellee first filed a claim for $74,390.00 which was rejected. Then 
the claim was amended in order to recover $207,105.22, the amount of the court's 
judgment. The appellant argues that the plaintiff-appellee

 
 
"* 
* * did not, however, ever allege or prove that it had filed a claim for any 
greater amount [than the $74,390.00], or that it properly amended its original 
claim, or that any other or amended claim had been rejected. These are necessary 
elements of pleading and proof, and the failure to plead and prove these 
elements prevents Plaintiff from stating a cause of action for any amount 
greater than $74,390.00. LoSasso v. Braun, 386 P.2d 630, 632 (Wyo. 1963) and 3 
Bancroft's Probate Practice 2d Sec. 889."

 
 

[¶34.]  There is no question but that the 
appellee filed its $74,390.00 claim with the estate in a timely fashion and has 
complied with all statutory conditions precedent to filing suit. Section 
2-7-717, W.S. 1977 (1980 Replacement) requires:

 
 
"No 
holder of any claim against an estate shall maintain any action thereon unless 
the claim is first rejected in whole or in part by the personal representative 
and the rejection filed with the clerk * * *."

 
 

[¶35.]  In response to this mandate, appellee 
first filed a claim in the probate proceedings pursuant to § 2-7-703(a), W.S. 
1977 (1980 Replacement), which provides in pertinent part:

 
 
"All 
claims whether due, not due or contingent, shall be filed in duplicate with the 
clerk within the time limited in the notice to creditors and any claim not so 
filed is barred forever."

 
 
The 
claim was rejected.

 
 

[¶36.]  When the claim was filed, appellant 
reserved the right to supplement the claim. Paragraph 5 of the original claim 
provided:

 
 
"Liability 
of the individual, Robert B. Yost, may be primary, secondary, or founded on an 
agreement of which claimant is presently unaware and claimant reserves the right 
to amplify, supplement or correct this claim in subsequent 
discovery."

 
 

[¶37.]  On the first day of trial, appellee 
orally moved to amend the claim. Appellant objected to the amendment and the 
trial court deferred its ruling on the amended claim. In a decision letter, the 
district judge noted:

 
 
"* 
* * It is the opinion of the Court that the original claims may contain a 
reservation of the right to amend the claim from time to time due to the 
difficulty encountered by the claimant in this matter in obtaining accurate 
information. This situation is caused by the confused records of the parties and 
deaths of material witnesses (Yost and Naylor). The plaintiff specifically 
reserved the right to amend in his original claim and the statute provides for 
equitable relief due to peculiar circumstances. An additional problem may be 
posed by the failure to file an amended claim from time to time. The proposed 
amended claim was only made orally to the Court and should be in written form; 
however, the defendant certainly was not prejudiced thereby and was aware 
throughout discovery in the civil case of the nature of the proceedings and the 
areas being explored. It would seem in the interests of justice that the 
defendant's motion should be denied and the plaintiff directed to submit a 
formal written claim amending the original claim filed in the probate matter." 
(Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶38.]  The equitable relief to which the judge 
referred is contained in § 2-7-703(c), W.S. 1977 (1980 Replacement) relating to 
the filing of claims, which statute provides:

 
 
"This 
section shall not bar claimants entitled to equitable relief due to peculiar 
circumstances, if so found by the court in adversary 
proceedings."

 
 

[¶39.]  Harpel Oil filed an amended claim on 
August 26, 1982, increasing the amount of the claim from $74,390.00 to 
$207,105.22, pursuant to order of the court. This claim was rejected on 
September 23, 1982. In response to the further order of the trial court, the 
amended claim was again filed on April 1, 1983, along with an application for an 
order directing the administratrix to satisfy this second amended claim. This 
order noted that the original claim reserved the right to amend the claim from 
time to time, that this reservation was reasonable due to confused records of 
the parties and deaths of material witnesses, that claimant had moved orally at 
trial to amend the claim and defendant was not prejudiced thereby, and that 
appellant was aware throughout discovery of the nature of the proceedings and 
the areas being explored. In an order entered May 6, 1983, the probate court 
allowed Harpel Oil's second amended claim against the estate of Robert B. Yost 
and directed the administratrix of the estate to pay the claim in the amount of 
$207,105.22 in due course of administration of the estate.

 
 

[¶40.]  The purpose of the creditor's-notice 
period as set forth in § 2-7-703(a), W.S. 1977 (1980 Replacement) is to insure 
that an estate can be settled in an orderly manner. LoSasso v. Braun, Wyo., 386 P.2d 630 
(1963). Appellant had notice of appellee's claim and had ample opportunity to 
prepare for the litigation. As this court has held, the purpose of pleadings is 
to give notice to the parties. Johnson v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of Hartford, Conn., Wyo., 608 P.2d 1299, 
1302 (1980). Appellant cannot claim that it did not have notice of the 
debt.

 
 

[¶41.]  If appellant's theory is correct, 
creditors in actions against estates would be required to complete all discovery 
and research before the expiration of the creditor-notice period. This is not 
only practically impossible, but also contrary to the purpose of discovery, 
which is to give the parties the opportunity to learn all the facts, thus 
insuring litigation which can fairly establish the facts.

 
 

[¶42.]  The public policy of speedy settling of 
estates was not thwarted here. A claim was filed and rejected and litigation 
promptly ensued, all in a timely fashion. There was no delay occasioned by the 
amendment of the claim.

 
 

[¶43.]  The corporate veil was pierced, the 
amendment of the claim satisfied statutory requirements and the judgment must be 
affirmed.

 
 

[¶44.]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court found that 
Harpel Oil Company terminated the sales agreement for the land and thereafter 
treated the land-related payments as rent. The trial court further found that 
the amount of rent due and owing was impossible to calculate and so denied the 
plaintiffs' claim for this item of damage. The appellee does not appeal from 
this ruling and so the issue is not before us for review.

 
 

ROONEY, 
Chief Justice, specially concurring.

 
 

[¶45.]  I do not believe it to be necessary to 
reach the issue in this case relative to "piercing the corporate veil." The 
trial court found that:

 
 
"* 
* * The plaintiff had received * * * oral assurances * * * from Robert B. Yost 
that he would as sole management and apparent owner of Yost Brothers Company 
assume responsibility for the indebtedness as it grew for gasoline products. * * 
*"

 
 
The 
testimony was to this effect. If corroboration is required to meet the 
requirements of the "dead man's statute," § 1-12-102, W.S. 19771, the unusual extension of credit 
over the long period of time and the July 28, 1964, written agreement provides 
the necessary corroboration. The agreement signed by Robert B. Yost provided in 
part that the stockholders, including Robert B. Yost:

 
 
"* 
* * individually guarantee the payment of all amounts due Harpels by Yost 
Brothers and hereby assume personal responsibility and liability for all such 
indebtedness."

 
 

[¶46.]  I would affirm on this 
basis.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 
Section 1-12-102, W.S. 1977, provides in pertinent part:

 
 
"* 
* * no judgment or decree founded on uncorroborated testimony shall be rendered 
* * * adverse to the person incapable of testifying or his trustee, executor, 
administrator, heir or other representative. * * *"