Case Title: State ex rel. Bednar v. N. Canton

Citation: 1994-Ohio-89

Docket Number: 19930628

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1994-05-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
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The State ex rel. Bednar, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. City                  
of North Canton et al., Appellants and Cross-Appellees.                          
[Cite as State ex rel. Bednar v. N. Canton (1994),      Ohio                     
St.3d     .]                                                                     
Municipal corporations -- Civil service -- Police officers --                    
     Mayor of chartered city required to fill vacancy of                         
     lieutenant's position, when -- Determining eligibility for                  
     back pay for wrongful failure to promote.                                   
     (No. 93-628 -- Submitted March 1, 1994, -- Decided May 11,                  
1994.)                                                                           
     Appeal and Cross-Appeal from the Court of Appeals for                       
Stark County, No. CA-9047.                                                       
     Greg Bednar, appellee and cross-appellant, was a police                     
officer in the city of North Canton.  On or about July 5, 1990,                  
he was certified second on the eligibility list for the                          
position of lieutenant after having taken an examination                         
certified by the North Canton Civil Service Commission.  That                    
eligibility list was extended until July 5, 1992.  On or about                   
June 4, 1991, the person certified first on the eligibility                      
list was promoted to lieutenant, leaving Bednar first on the                     
eligibility list.  On or about June 2, 1992, a lieutenant                        
retired from the force.  Thereafter Bednar's name was certified                  
to the "appointing authority" for promotion, but the mayor did                   
not appoint Bednar to the position because he believed that the                  
vacancy could be filled at his discretion.                                       
     Bednar filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the                      
Court of Appeals for Stark County seeking to compel the city                     
and its officials, appellants and cross-appellees (the "city"),                  
to appoint him to the lieutenant's position and also seeking                     
back pay to June 2, 1992 and attorney fees.  The court of                        
appeals allowed the writ of mandamus compelling Bednar's                         
appointment, but denied his request for back pay and attorney                    
fees.                                                                            
     The cause is before the court upon an appeal and                            
cross-appeal as of right.                                                        
                                                                                 
     Roetzel & Andress and Thomas A. Treadon, for appellants                     
and cross-appellees.                                                             
     Schulman, Mestel & Burick Co., L.P.A., and Allen Schulman,                  
Jr., for appellee and cross-appellant.                                           
                                                                                 
     Per Curiam.  For the following reasons, we affirm the                       
judgment of the court of appeals in part and reverse it in part.                 
     R.C. 124.44 states in part:                                                 
     "Whenever a vacancy occurs in the position above the rank                   
of patrolman in a police department, * * *  [and there is an                     
eligibility] list, the [civil service] commission shall, where                   
there is a vacancy, immediately certify the name of the person                   
having the highest rating, and the appointing authority shall                    
appoint such person within thirty days from the date of such                     
certification."                                                                  
     Bednar relies on this statute to mandate his appointment.                   
The city contends that its home rule authority under Section 3,                  
Article XVIII, Ohio Constitution, and implemented by Section                     
1.02 of its charter and Ordinance No. 21-92, permits it to                       
deviate from R.C. 124.44.  According to the city, Section 1.02                   
of the charter states:                                                           
     "The municipality shall have all powers of local                            
self-government and home rule and all powers possible for a                      
municipality to have under the Constitution of the State of                      
Ohio.  The municipality shall have all powers that now or                        
hereafter may be granted to municipalities by the laws of the                    
State of Ohio.  All such powers shall be exercised in the                        
manner prescribed in this charter, or if not prescribed                          
therein, in such manner as shall be provided by ordinance of                     
council."                                                                        
     Ordinance No. 21-92 provides in part:                                       
     "'Authorized Manpower:                                                      
     "That the total number of persons to be employed by the                     
Police Department and the classifications set forth herein of                    
the Police Department of the City of North Canton, Ohio, be,                     
and it shall not exceed the following:                                           
     "* * *                                                                      
     "Police Lieutenant 6[']"                                                    
     The city also relies on State ex rel. E. Cleveland Assn.                    
of Firefighters  v. E. Cleveland (1988), 40 Ohio St. 3d 222,                     
533 N.E.2d 282.  In that case, home rule authority prevailed                     
over R.C. 124.46, which required the appointment of the                          
examinee with the highest examination grade in case of a                         
vacancy in the rank of lieutenant on the fire department.  We                    
held that East Cleveland's "* * * express charter language                       
enables the city to exercise local self-government powers in a                   
manner contrary to state civil service statutes.  Charter of                     
the city of East Cleveland, Sections 28-31."  Id. at 224, 533                    
N.E.2d at 284.                                                                   
     In the instant case, the court of appeals found that                        
Ordinance No. 21-92 lacked the specificity that was required by                  
State ex rel. Bardo v. Lyndhurst (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 106, 524                  
N.E.2d 447.  In fact, Bardo required specificity in the charter                  
itself to invoke home rule authority:                                            
     "The rule of charter supremacy applies only where the                       
conflict appears by the express terms of the charter and not by                  
mere inference. State, ex rel. Ryan, v. Kerr (1932), 42 Ohio                     
App. 19, 12 Ohio Law Abs. 292, 181 N.E. 546, affirmed (1932),                    
126 Ohio St. 26, 183 N.E. 535.  In the absence of express                        
language in a charter showing that it conflicts with the                         
statutes, it is the duty of the courts to harmonize the                          
provisions of the charter with the provisions of the statute                     
relating to the same matter.  State, ex rel. Votaw, v. Matia                     
(1932), 43 Ohio App. 279, 12 Ohio Law Abs. 414, 183 N.E. 122,                    
affirmed on other grounds (1932), 125 Ohio St. 598, 183 N.E.                     
533.  While the express language of a charter may abrogate or                    
nullify a state civil service law, such a result cannot be                       
accomplished by a charter provision delegating authority to a                    
municipal commission to nullify the law by adoption of a rule.                   
Id. at 281, 12 Ohio Law Abs. at 415, 183 N.E. at 123."  37 Ohio                  
St. 3d 109, 524 N.E.2d at 450.                                                   
     However, the East Cleveland Charter, which we found                         
sufficient to authorize the ordinance that superseded the state                  
statute in that case, is more specific than Section 1.02 of the                  
North Canton Charter, quoted above, only insofar as it reserves                  
home rule authority specifically directed to the classified                      
service:                                                                         
     "SECTION 30.  APPOINTMENTS AND REMOVALS.                                    
     "* * *                                                                      
     "Except as herein otherwise provided, ordinances shall be                   
passed to fix the powers and duties of the Civil Service                         
Commission and to prescribe rules and regulations governing the                  
classified service."                                                             
     Thus, the East Cleveland and North Canton Charters differ                   
in that the former reserved home rule authority specifically                     
directed to ordinances affecting the classified service whereas                  
the latter reserved such authority generally directed to all                     
powers of local self-government.                                                 
     Appointment of police officers is a "'matter of local                       
self-government'" delegated to all municipal corporations by                     
Section 3, Article XVIII, Ohio Constitution.  State ex rel.                      
Canada v. Phillips (1958), 168 Ohio St. 191, 194, 5 O.O.2d 481,                  
483, 151 N.E.2d 722, 725, and paragraph one of the syllabus.                     
Since a municipal corporation's authority over matters of local                  
self-government derives directly from the Constitution, we find                  
it competent for the people of a municipal corporation to                        
reserve to their legislative authority any residual home rule                    
powers not exercised directly in the charter.  Such a                            
reservation makes practical sense.  Many "matters of local                       
self-government" are, in fact, matters of detail and procedure                   
that are out of place in a charter, which is comparable to a                     
local constitution.  Perrysburg v. Ridgway (1923), 108 Ohio St.                  
245,253, 140 N.E. 595, 597.                                                      
     Moreover, we perceive no legal difference between a                         
specific reservation of such power, as in the East Cleveland                     
Charter, and a general reservation, as in the North Canton                       
Charter.  Accordingly, we hold that Section 1.02 of the North                    
Canton Charter sufficiently reserved home rule authority to                      
permit enactment of an ordinance at variance with R.C. 124.44,                   
and we limit Bardo, supra, to cases involving delegation of                      
authority to municipal civil service commissions.  Cf. Treska                    
v. Trumble (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 150, 4 OBR 394, 447 N.E.2d 1283                  
(state statute [R.C. 124.32] prescribing layoff procedures                       
prevails over conflicting ordinance of noncharter municipality).                 
     The question remains whether Ordinance No. 21-92 does, in                   
fact, contradict R.C. 124.44.  The ordinance merely states that                  
the police department shall not exceed six lieutenants; R.C.                     
124.44 prescribes mandatory procedure to be followed when a                      
vacancy occurs in the rank of lieutenant.  East Cleveland                        
involved such an ordinance, but we permitted variation from the                  
statute in part because of another ordinance that plainly                        
stated:                                                                          
     "The City Manager shall have full authority to leave                        
positions vacant or to combine the duties of two positions                       
under a single employee whenever he deems it in the best                         
interest of the City."  40 Ohio St. 3d at 224, 533 N.E.2d at                     
285, fn. 2.                                                                      
     By itself, an ordinance limiting the force to a certain                     
number of lieutenants does not sufficiently indicate an intent                   
to alter the mandatory appointment procedures set forth in R.C.                  
124.44.  See Zavisin v. Loveland (1989), 44 Ohio St. 3d 158,                     
541 N.E.2d 1055, in which we held in the syllabus:                               
     "The procedure for promotion provided in R.C. 124.44 is                     
mandatory upon the occurrence of a vacancy in a position above                   
police patrolman, and the vacant position must be filled by                      
appointment before it is abolished pursuant to R.C. 124.37,                      
which presupposes the existence of an incumbent."                                
     In the instant case, it appears from the second sentence                    
of Section 1.02 of the North Canton Charter that state law                       
prevails when the charter and ordinances are silent.  Ordinance                  
No. 21-92 does not contradict the appointment procedures                         
prescribed by R.C. 124.44, and, according to Zavisin, such                       
procedures are "mandatory upon the occurrence of a vacancy."                     
Therefore, in the instant case Bednar was entitled to be                         
appointed pursuant to such statute, and the decision of the                      
court of appeals so holding is affirmed.                                         
     On cross-appeal, Bednar first claims that he is also                        
entitled to back pay with interest, regardless of whether the                    
city acted in bad faith.  However, if bad faith is required, he                  
argues that the city is guilty of bad faith.  The court of                       
appeals denied back pay, and thus interest, finding no bad                       
faith by the city.                                                               
     Bednar cites cases in which a public employee is                            
reinstated following a wrongful dismissal, in which we have                      
allowed a mandamus action for back pay, "provided the amount                     
recoverable is established with certainty."  State ex rel.                       
Martin v. Columbus (1979), 58 Ohio St. 2d 261, 12 O.O. 3d 268,                   
389 N.E.2d 1123, paragraph one of the syllabus.  We have also                    
allowed interest on back pay in such cases at the statutory                      
rate.  State ex rel. Crockett v. Robinson (1981), 67 Ohio St.                    
2d 363, at 367-368, 21 O.O. 3d 228, at 231-232, 423 N.E.2d                       
1099, at 1102-1103.  However, when, in State ex rel. Gibbons v.                  
Cleveland (1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 216, 9 OBR 526, 459 N.E.2d 892,                   
several Cleveland police officers sought writs of mandamus for                   
back pay, claiming they were wrongfully denied promotion to                      
sergeant, we reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and                   
denied the writ, holding that mandamus "does not lie to compel                   
the granting of benefits conferred by the civil service laws                     
unless it has been established that the employee was appointed                   
to the civil service position in question."  9 Ohio St. 3d at                    
217, 9 OBR at 527, 459 N.E.2d at 893.                                            
     Then, in Morgan v. Cincinnati (1986), 25 Ohio St. 3d 285,                   
25 OBR 337, 496 N.E.2d 468, we "limited" Gibbons, but in doing                   
so prescribed a different test for granting back pay than was                    
used in Martin and Crockett.  Morgan, like this case, involved                   
failure to promote pursuant to R.C. 124.44.  First, we found                     
bad faith on the part of the city.  We distinguished Gibbons                     
on the basis that there the city denied promotion based on                       
certain ordinances later declared unconstitutional, whereas in                   
Morgan Cincinnati simply violated R.C. 124.44 without                            
justification.  We then held in the syllabus:                                    
     "Where a civil service employee shows that a promotion to                   
which he was entitled was delayed as the result of actions                       
taken by a municipality in violation of R.C. 124.44, that                        
employee is entitled to recover back pay and seniority for the                   
period of the delay."                                                            
     In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Holmes                    
noted that although the court appeared to rely on the city's                     
bad faith in reaching its decision, the syllabus did not                         
reflect that reliance.  Id. at 292, 25 OBR at 342, 496 N.E.2d                    
at 474.  The same problem arose in Hungler v. Cincinnati                         
(1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 338, 25 OBR 392, 496 N.E.2d 912,                           
announced the same day as Morgan.  Hungler also involved                         
failure to promote when vacancies in the lieutenant position                     
occurred.  The city failed to promote the top candidates on the                  
eligible list pursuant to R.C. 124.44 and instead concocted a                    
demotion-repromotion scheme that ultimately resulted in the                      
lieutenants' positions being abolished rather than filled                        
through promotion.  The top persons on the eligibility list                      
sought promotion and back pay via declaratory judgment in the                    
common pleas court.  That court granted them relief, but the                     
court of appeals reversed.  We reversed and reinstated the                       
judgment of the common pleas court.  While not finding "bad                      
faith" per se, we nevertheless condemned city procedure:                         
     "The machinations employed by the city in the instant case                  
disrupted the stability and predictability of the civil service                  
system on which appellants relied.  Although the city expresses                  
its concern for the seniority system, the demotion-repromotion                   
shell game used to abolish the two lieutenant's positions was                    
in contravention of R.C. 124.37 and adversely affected                           
appellants' seniority rights by delaying or denying their                        
promotions.  In essence, the city, by abolishing these                           
positions in an unlawful manner, was tinkering with the civil                    
service promotional system as well as R.C. 124.37.  The                          
abolishment of a classified civil service position above the                     
rank of patrolman in the police department for lack of work or                   
funds, or for causes other than those outlined in R.C. 124.34,                   
must be accomplished in conformance with R.C. 124.37.  Because                   
the city did not accomplish the abolishment of these two                         
lieutenant's positions in accordance with R.C. 124.37, the                       
elimination of these positions was unlawful and therefore                        
void."  25 Ohio St. 3d at 344, 25 OBR at 397, 496 N.E.2d at 917.                 
     We then compared the case with Morgan and found them                        
similar in that each city had "actively violated state civil                     
service laws."  25 Ohio St. 3d at 289, 25 OBR at 340, 496                        
N.E.2d at 472; 25 Ohio St. 3d at 345, 25 OBR at 398, 496 N.E.2d                  
at 918.                                                                          
     Having examined these two classes of cases - - wrongful                     
dismissals and wrongful failure to promote - - we now prescribe                  
a single test to determine eligibility for back pay--the test                    
now applicable to wrongful dismissals.  The relator must first                   
establish that the dismissal or denial of promotion was                          
wrongful.  In wrongful-failure-to-promote cases, this proof may                  
be in the mandamus action itself.  Then, the relator must prove                  
a clear right to relief by establishing the amount due with                      
certainty.  Martin and Crockett, supra.  If certainty is                         
established, then prejudgment interest is allowed as a matter                    
of law.  Crockett at 367-368, 21 O.O.3d at 231-232, 423 N.E.2d                   
at 1102-1103; State ex rel. Dean v. Huddle (1976), 45 Ohio St.                   
2d 234,236, 74 O.O.2d 378, at 379, 344 N.E.2d 138, at 140.                       
     By standardizing the burden of proof in these cases, we do                  
not suggest that mandamus may be resorted to for proof of                        
wrongful dismissal where appeal is an adequate remedy at law in                  
such cases.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Shine v. Garafalo (1982),                  
69 Ohio St.2d 253, 23 O.O.3d 251, 431 N.E.2d 680.                                
     Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of                         
appeals requiring that Bednar be promoted to lieutenent,                         
effective July 2, 1992, the date that is thirty days after the                   
date on which Bednar's name should have been "immediately"                       
certified to the mayor, and hence the latest date for the mayor                  
to make the promotion pursuant to R.C. 124.44.                                   
     We also reverse the judgment of the court of appeals                        
insofar as it denied a writ for back pay with statutory                          
interest because Bednar failed to establish bad faith by the                     
city.  However, because the record shows that Bednar did not                     
establish the amount of back pay with certainty in the court of                  
appeals, we remand for further proceedings in accordance with                    
this opinion.  State ex rel. Colangelo v. McFaul (1980), 62                      
Ohio St.2d 200, 16 O.O. 3d 239, 404 N.E.2d 745.                                  
     Finally, we concur with the court of appeal's disallowance                  
of attorney fees.  We find no bad faith, vexatious, wanton,                      
obdurate, or oppressive conduct necessary to allow attorney                      
fees, absent a statute allowing them.  Sorin v. Warrensville                     
Hts. School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 177, at                      
183, 75 O.O.2d 224, at 227, 347 N.E.2d 527, at 531.                              
                                    Judgment affirmed in part,                   
                                    reversed in part and                         
                                    cause remanded.                              
     Moyer, C.J., A.W. Sweeney, Wright,  Resnick and Pfeifer,                    
JJ., concur.                                                                     
     Douglas and F.E. Sweeney, JJ., concur in judgment only.