Case Title: Hankins v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 532, 2008

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2009-07-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
RONALD T. HANKINS, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  C.A. No. 532, 2008 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID No. 0603026103A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  April 29, 2009 
Decided:  July 15, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Jerome M. Capone (argued) and Peter W. Veith, Wilmington, Delaware for 
appellant. 
 
 
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for 
appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
A Superior Court jury convicted Ronald T. Hankins of two counts of Murder 
First Degree.  On appeal, Hankins argues that the trial judge incorrectly instructed 
the jury by refusing to link his instruction on Extreme Emotional Distress to the 
instruction on Murder First Degree.  Because the trial judge properly instructed the 
jury, the judgments of the Superior Court are AFFIRMED. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On March 30, 2006, Hankins woke up next to Carolyn Seeney at her house.  
The two had been engaged in an active sexual relationship for at least seven 
months.  When Hankins arrived at his temp job site on March 30, 2006, he was 
told that there was no work available that day.  He returned to Seeney’s house.  
Within the two hours it took Hankins to walk to and from his job site that morning, 
Seeney arranged to spend part of the day with Vince Coleman—her intermittent 
paramour.  Hankins and Coleman knew each other.  Hankins also knew that 
Seeney and Coleman had a sexual relationship.  He had previously asked Seeney to 
terminate that relationship, but she refused. 
 
Once Coleman arrived at Seeney’s house, Seeney kissed Hankins goodbye 
and left with Coleman and Coleman’s sister, Kim Coleman.  After dropping Kim 
Coleman off at a friend’s house, Seeney and Coleman drove to Coleman’s house 
where they watched a movie and had sexual intercourse.  Hankins contacted 
 
3 
Seeney’s cell phone several times to ask her to return.  She told him that she would 
return when she wanted. 
Eventually Coleman and Seeney picked up Kim Coleman.  They bought 
food at the McDonald’s Drive Thru down the street from Seeney’s house.  When 
Coleman, Seeney, and Kim Coleman returned to Seeney’s house, Coleman parked 
his van next to the curb outside Seeney’s house so they could eat their food in the 
van.  Hankins came outside and walked around to the driver’s side of the car where 
Coleman was sitting.  Hankins asked Coleman why he did not permit Seeney to 
return home.  According to Seeney, Coleman’s response was “nonchalant,” like he 
did not care.  At this time, Kim Coleman got out of the car and began cursing 
loudly at Hankins.  Hankins pulled a gun from his waistband and shot through 
Coleman’s driver’s window killing Coleman.  Hankins then shot and killed Kim 
Coleman. 
 
Hankins fled to North Carolina where police arrested him on April 27, 2006.  
Delaware indicted him on two counts of Murder First Degree.  The State chose to 
seek the death penalty.  At trial, Hankins maintained that he acted under Extreme 
Emotional Distress and, as a result, the jury should find him guilty of Manslaughter 
and not Murder First Degree.  Hankins requested a jury instruction on Extreme 
Emotional Distress.  While the trial judge instructed the jury on Emotional 
Distress, he refused to charge in the form Hankins requested.  The jury convicted 
 
4 
Hankins on both counts of Murder First and, after the penalty phase, the trial judge 
sentenced him to life imprisonment.1  The way in which the trial judge instructed 
the jury is the sole issue on appeal. 
ANALYSIS 
 
Initially, the parties disagree about the applicable standard of review, 
particularly the correct interpretation of our recent decision in Wright v. State.2  In 
Wright, we held that “this Court will review de novo a refusal to instruct on a 
defense theory (in any form); and it will review a refusal to give a ‘particular’ 
instruction (that is, an instruction is given but not with the exact form, content or 
language requested) for an abuse of discretion.”3  In Wright, the trial judge refused 
to give an instruction on the defense of accident; we reviewed de novo and 
affirmed because the trial judge correctly concluded that the accident defense was 
not legally available.4  Here, because the trial judge instructed the jury on Extreme 
Emotional Distress, but not in the form requested by Hankins, we review for abuse 
of discretion.5 
                                                 
1 
After the penalty phase, the jury recommended that the aggravating factors outweighed 
the mitigating factors by a 9-3 vote. 
2 
Wright v. State, 953 A.2d 144 (Del. 2008). 
3 
Id. at 148.   
4 
Id. at 149. 
5 
Id. at 147-48. 
 
5 
 
Hankins correctly argues that Extreme Emotional Distress is an affirmative 
defense to Murder First Degree.6  Therefore, Hankins asserts that, because Extreme 
Emotional Distress adds an element to Murder First Degree, it is not a lesser 
included offense and the jury must be instructed accordingly.  Hankins asked the 
trial judge to link the Extreme Emotional Distress instruction to the Murder First 
Degree instruction and then to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses.  
The trial judge agreed to give the Extreme Emotional Distress instruction, but did 
so as part of the lesser included offense instructions.  Hankins argues that this 
instruction “invited the jury to consider EED/Manslaughter only if the jury has 
found that the State did not prove all the elements of Murder 1st degree.” 
 
In response, the State relies on the trial judge’s entire jury instructions and 
our decision in Flamer v. State.7  The State correctly asserts that Flamer stands for 
the proposition that a defendant is not entitled to a particular instruction, but has an 
“unqualified right to a correct statement of the substance of the law.”8  Under 
Flamer, we must review the jury instructions in their entirety and must not 
consider any one statement in a vacuum.9  Our focus is “not on whether any special 
                                                 
6 
See, e.g., Henry v. State, 805 A.2d 860, 863 n.7 (Del. 2002). 
7 
Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104 (Del. 1983). 
8 
Id. at 128; see also Wright v. State, 953 A.2d 144, 148 (Del. 2008). 
9 
Flamer, 490 A.2d at 128.  
 
6 
words were used, but whether the instruction correctly stated the law and enabled 
the jury to perform its duty.”10  The State argues that when viewed in its entirety, 
the trial judge’s instructions clearly establish that if the jury found Hankins guilty 
of Murder First Degree, then they may go on to consider whether he did so under 
Extreme Emotional Distress and, as a result, find him guilty of Manslaughter. 
Here, the trial judge did not instruct the jury in the particular form that 
Hankins requested.  But viewed in its entirety, the instructions correctly instructed 
the jury on the affirmative defense of Extreme Emotional Distress.  The relevant 
portion of the trial judge’s jury instruction provided: 
Murder First Degree is defined as follows, a person is guilty of 
Murder in the First Degree when he intentionally causes the death of 
another person.  In order to find the defendant guilty of Murder First 
Degree charged in Counts I and III, you must find that the following 
elements have been established beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
. . . . 
 
If, Ladies and gentlemen, after considering all of the evidence 
you find that the State has established beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant acted in such a manner as to satisfy all of the elements 
which I have just stated at or about the date and place stated in the 
indictment, you should find the defendant guilty of Murder First 
Degree as set forth in Count I and/or Count III of the indictment.  If 
you do not so find or if you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of 
the defendant as to the offence charged in Count I and/or Count III, 
then you must find the defendant not guilty of one or both offence[s] 
so charged. 
                                                 
10 
Miller v. State, 893 A.2d 937, 949 (Del. 2006) (quoting Cabrera v. State, 747 A.2d 543, 
545 (Del. 2000)). 
 
7 
 
A defendant may be convicted of an offense not charged in the 
indictment, if it is included in an offense charged in the indictment.  
An offense is so included when it is established by proof of the same 
or less than all of the facts required to establish the commission of the 
offense charged. Here if you find the State has not established beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted in a manner as to satisfy 
all the elements of Murder First Degree or if you have reasonable 
doubt as to any element of this offense, you must find the defendant 
not guilty of Murder First, and go on to consider the lesser included 
offense of Murder Second Degree, or the lesser included offense of 
Manslaughter, depending upon the circumstances.  I will explain. 
 
As I just told you, a person is guilty of Murder First Degree 
when he intentionally causes the death of another person.  However, if 
the defendant intentionally caused the death of another person under  
the influence of extreme emotional distress, the crime of Murder First 
Degree becomes the lesser included offense of Manslaughter.  I will 
define Manslaughter and Extreme Emotional Distress for you shortly.  
Alternatively, if a defendant recklessly causes death of another, the 
crime of Murder First Degree becomes lesser included offense of 
Murder Second Degree. 
 
. . . . 
  
As to Count I, if you find the defendant intentionally caused the death 
of Vincent Coleman but acted under the influence of Extreme 
Emotional Distress, you must find the defendant not guilty of the 
crime of Murder First Degree, and guilty of the lesser included 
offense of Manslaughter, assuming the State has proved each element 
of that offense. 
 
. . . . 
  
As to Count III, if you find that the defendant intentionally caused the 
death of Kim Coleman, but acted under the influence of Extreme 
Emotional Distress, you must find the defendant not guilty of the 
crime of Murder First Degree, and guilty of the lesser included 
offense of Manslaughter, assuming the State has proved each element 
of that offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
 
8 
 
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he gave these instructions.  
When one reads the instructions as a whole, the trial judge properly instructed the 
jury.  The trial judge instructed the jury that if they were to find Hankins guilty of 
Murder First Degree but also find that he acted under Extreme Emotional Distress, 
then they must find him guilty of Manslaughter.  “While ‘some inaccuracies and 
inaptness in statement are to be expected in any charge,’ this Court will reverse if 
the alleged deficiency in the jury instructions ‘undermined . . . the jury’s ability to 
intelligently perform its duty in returning a verdict.’”11  “A trial court’s jury 
instructions are not a ground for reversal if they are reasonably informative and not 
misleading when judged by common practices and standards of verbal 
communication.”12  Here, the trial judge’s instructions were reasonably 
informative, not misleading, and allowed the jury to perform its duty intelligently 
in returning a verdict.  
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the Superior Court are 
AFFIRMED.   
                                                 
11 
Flamer, 490 A.2d at 128 (internal citations omitted). 
12 
Burrell v. State, 953 A.2d 957, 963 (Del. 2008).