Case Title: Patricia A. Steiner v. Wisconsin American Mutual Insurance Company

Citation: 2005 WI 72

Docket Number: 2003AP001959

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
2005 WI 72 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP1959 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Patricia A. Steiner  
          Plaintiff-Co-Appellant, 
John M. Steiner,  
          Plaintiff, 
Unity Health Plans Ins. Corp. and  
Healthcare Financing Administration,  
          Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
     v. 
Wisconsin American Mutual Insurance Company,  
          Defendant-Respondent, 
Robert Steiner and Mt. Morris Mutual Ins. Co.,  
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 135 
Reported at:  275 Wis. 2d 359, 685 N.W.2d 831 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 9, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 1, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Adams   
 
JUDGE: 
Duane Polivka   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ROGGENSACK, J., joins the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by Jeffrey T. Nichols, Stacy K. Luell and Crivello, Carlson & 
Mentkowski, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Stacy Kay 
Luell. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Timothy 
J. Yanacheck, Ward I. Richter and Bell, Gierhart & Moore, S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by Timothy J. Yanacheck. 
 
2005 WI 72
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP1959  
(L.C. No. 
01 CV 125) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Patricia A. Steiner  
 
          Plaintiff-Co-Appellant, 
 
John M. Steiner,  
 
          Plaintiff, 
 
Unity Health Plans Ins. Corp. and  
Healthcare Financing Administration,  
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin American Mutual Insurance  
Company,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Robert Steiner and Mt. Morris Mutual Ins.  
Co.,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants- 
          Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 9, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
2 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 affirming a judgment 
of the Circuit Court for Adams County, Duane H. Polivka, Judge.  
The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Wisconsin 
American Mutual Insurance Company (WAMIC), Steiner Corporation's 
insurer, against Patricia Steiner and her husband John Steiner, 
the plaintiffs, concluding that the Corporation (the land 
contract vendee) did not own the property in question as of 
October 7, 1999, 
and 
therefore was 
not 
liable for the 
plaintiffs' injuries sustained on the property on October 15, 
1999.   
¶2 
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
circuit court, concluding that the period for redemption for the 
judgment of strict foreclosure of a land contract against the 
Corporation (the land contract vendee) ended on October 7, 1999, 
and that under Wis. Stat. § 846.30 (2001-02),2 equitable title 
reverts to the land contract vendor at the expiration of the 
redemption period if the land contract vendee fails to make full 
payment, that is, fails to redeem.  According to the court of 
appeals, the Corporation ceased to own the property as of 
October 7, 1999.  Therefore, the corporation was not liable for 
                                                 
1 Steiner v. Wis. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 2004 WI App 135, 275 
Wis.2d 359, 685 N.W.2d 831. 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise indicated. 
 
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
3 
 
any personal injuries occurring on the property after October 7, 
1999.   
¶3 
The issue presented in this case is when, under Wis. 
Stat. § 846.30,3 does equitable title to the property in a land 
contract revert from a land contract vendee to the land contract 
vendor.  That is, does equitable title remain with a land 
contract vendee until a circuit court, following expiration of 
the redemption period for strict foreclosure, enters an order 
confirming the land contract vendee's default?  Or does 
equitable title to the property automatically revert to the land 
contract vendor at the expiration of the redemption period for 
strict foreclosure without a circuit court entering an order?  
¶4 
We hold that under Wis. Stat. § 846.30 equitable title 
remains with a land contract vendee until a circuit court enters 
a final order, following the redemption period for strict 
foreclosure, 
confirming 
the 
land 
contract 
vendee's 
nonredemption.  As a result, in the present case equitable title 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 846.30 reads: 
If a court finds that the purchaser under a land 
contract is obligated to make certain payments under 
that land contract, that the purchaser has failed to 
make the required payments and that the vendor is 
entitled to a judgment of strict foreclosure, the 
court shall set a redemption period of at least 7 
working days from the date of the judgment hearing or, 
if there is no hearing, from the date of the entry of 
the judgment order.  No judgment of strict foreclosure 
is final until the court enters an order after the 
expiration of the redemption period confirming that no 
redemption has occurred and making the judgment of 
strict foreclosure absolute. 
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
4 
 
did not pass from the Steiner Corporation (the land contract 
vendee) to the land contract vendors until December 1, 1999, 
when 
an 
order 
confirming 
the 
nonredemption 
was 
entered.  
Accordingly, the Corporation had equitable title to the property 
under the land contract on October 15, 1999, the date of the 
plaintiffs' personal injuries, and the Corporation and WAMIC, 
its insurer, may be subject to liability for plaintiffs' 
injuries. 
¶5 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this decision. 
¶6 
We discuss the issue presented, exploring its various 
aspects, in the following order:  I. The standard of appellate 
review.  II. The facts.  III. The law of foreclosure of land 
contracts.  IV. The interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 846.30.  V. 
The application of Wis. Stat. § 846.30 to the facts.  VI. The 
liability of Steiner Corporation for the acts of Robert Steiner.  
I 
¶7 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate 
court applies the standards governing summary judgment set forth 
in Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) in the same manner as the circuit 
court.4  Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no issues 
of material fact, but only questions of law upon which the 
moving party is entitled to judgment.5  In reviewing whether 
                                                 
4 Badger State Bank v. Taylor, 2004 WI 128, ¶12, 276 Wis. 2d 
312, 688 N.W.2d 439. 
5 Id. at ¶12. 
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
5 
 
there are genuine issues of material fact, a reviewing court 
will draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving 
party.6 
¶8 
There are no issues of material fact at issue in the 
present case.  The only question presented is one of law, 
namely, the interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 846.30 to the undisputed facts.  This court determines this 
question of law independently of the circuit court and the court 
of appeals, benefiting from their analyses.7 
II 
 
¶9 
We set forth the facts that are, for purposes of the 
motion for summary judgment, not in dispute. 
 
¶10 Patricia Steiner and John Steiner, Sr., Patricia's 
husband, are the plaintiffs in this suit for personal injuries. 
They and John Steiner, Sr.'s brother, Robert Steiner, purchased 
the resort property at issue in this case in 1954.8  The three 
will be referred to as the land contract vendors. 
 
¶11 The land contract vendors conveyed their interest in 
the property in 1995 to the Steiner Corporation by a series of 
                                                 
6 Strasser v. Transtech Mobile Fleet Serv., 2000 WI 87, ¶32, 
236 Wis. 2d 435, 613 N.W.2d 142. 
7 Id. at ¶13. 
8 Patricia Steiner and her husband owned an undivided half 
interest; 
Robert 
Steiner 
owned 
the 
other 
undivided 
half 
interest. 
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
6 
 
land contracts.9  The plaintiffs' three sons, John, Jr., Patrick, 
and David Steiner, were the shareholders of Steiner Corporation. 
WAMIC provided Steiner Corporation liability insurance coverage 
for the property. 
 
¶12 The Steiner Corporation apparently made a modest down 
payment and paid very little on the principal and interest under 
the land contract.  By 1998 Steiner Corporation had stopped 
making payments on the land contract altogether.  Third parties 
had liens on the property.  
¶13 The land contract vendors filed suit in April 1999 to 
foreclose on the land contract and take back the property.  They 
moved for a default judgment on the foreclosure action in August 
1999.  In response to this motion, on September 7, 1999, the 
circuit court held a hearing.   
¶14 The 
land 
contract 
vendors' 
suit 
for 
foreclosure 
originally sought strict foreclosure, but at the hearing the 
parties and the circuit court agreed that specific performance 
(judicial sale) would be preferable in this case because of 
third-party debts, including a tax lien by the state.   
¶15 The property was not sold by judicial sale.  Instead, 
the circuit court entered a strict foreclosure judgment on 
October 19, 1999, not the previously agreed-upon specific 
performance.  The judgment provided that if the Corporation did 
                                                 
9 Originally, the land contract vendees were John Steiner, 
Jr. and Patrick Steiner, but a year later the land contract was 
voided and the land was conveyed by land contract to Steiner 
Corporation. 
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
7 
 
not pay the amount owed by October 7, 1999, "all right, title 
and interest" of the Steiner Corporation in the property would 
cease to exist; title would vest in the land contract vendors.  
The judgment read, in relevant part: 
[T]here is now due and unpaid on said Land Contract, 
as of September 7, 1999, the sum of [$178,330.15 plus 
costs, fees, and interest]. . . . That the said Land 
Contracts . . . be strictly foreclosed.  That the 
Defendants shall, on or before October 7, 1999, pay 
the Clerk of this Court the total sum now due under 
said Contract [plus interest to redeem the contract.] 
 . . . . 
That if payment is not made within the time above 
specified, the real estate described herein, and any 
interest 
therein 
of 
Defendants 
and 
any 
persons 
claiming under them, and all right, title and interest 
of Defendants therein, shall cease to exist, with the 
title vesting in the name of Plaintiffs . . . . 
[The judgment also contained provisions should Steiner 
Corporation 
redeem 
the 
property 
by 
paying 
the 
outstanding amount.] 
The judgment's typewritten date line reads: "Dated September 
____, 1999."  "September" is crossed out and "October" is hand- 
written over it; the blank is filled in with "19th."  This 
October 19 judgment provides for a redemption period ending 30 
days after the September 7 hearing, or October 7. 
¶16 A final judgment was entered on December 1, 1999.  The 
final judgment states that the October 19, 1999 order provided 
for strict foreclosure with a redemption period ending 30 days 
from October 19.  This final judgment does not mention the 
September 7 hearing or a 30-day redemption period ending on 
October 7.  The December 1 judgment nevertheless confirmed that 
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
8 
 
Steiner Corporation failed to pay the amount owed within 30 days 
of October 19, 1999, and that the land contract vendee's 
interest "shall cease to exist and shall be and hereby are 
forever barred."  The relevant portion of the December 1, 1999 
judgment reads as follows: 
The Court having entered its judgment . . . on October 
19, 1999, providing for the strict foreclosure of Land 
Contracts by and between Plaintiffs, as vendors and 
Defendants . . . as 
purchasers, 
providing 
the 
Defendants shall have thirty (30) days from October 
19, 1999 to pay the Clerk of this Court the amount due 
under said Land Contracts recorded on September 6, 
1994 . . . . 
That the Court having been further advised that no 
payment has been received by the Clerk of Court as 
appears 
by 
the 
Affidavit 
of 
Non-Redemption 
on 
file . . . . 
NOW, THEREFORE, the original judgment entered by this 
Court on October 19, 1999 be and the same hereby is 
confirmed in all respects; that any and all right, 
title and interest of Defendants, and each of them in 
the original Land Contracts between Plaintiffs and 
said Defendants, and any parties claiming under them, 
shall cease to exist and shall be and hereby are 
forever barred. 
The judgment's date line reads, "Dated November ____, 1999."  
November is crossed out and "December" is handwritten over it; 
the ____ is filled in with "1st." 
 
¶17 All the preceding hearings and judgments would have 
passed without notice if Patricia Steiner had not been injured 
on the resort property on October 15, 1999, by slipping and 
falling into a dry well. 
¶18 The plaintiffs sued WAMIC in August of 2001 alleging 
that the Steiner Corporation was the owner of the property on 
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
9 
 
October 15, 1999, and that WAMIC was responsible for paying the 
damages associated with her injuries.  The plaintiffs later 
amended their complaint to include Robert Steiner and his 
homeowner's insurer, Mt. Morris Mutual Insurance Company (Mt. 
Morris) as defendants.  Mt. Morris filed a cross-claim against 
WAMIC seeking indemnification for Robert Steiner because he was 
allegedly acting as an agent of Steiner Corporation when he 
uncovered the dry well into which Patricia Steiner fell. 
¶19 On May 20, 2003, the circuit court held that the 
Steiner Corporation no longer owned the property as of October 
7, 1999, and that the Corporation "had no basis on which to 
employ Robert Steiner and no right to control his activities."  
Accordingly, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor 
of WAMIC and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit for personal injury. 
¶20 The plaintiffs appealed the circuit court's judgment.  
The court of appeals affirmed; the plaintiffs sought review in 
this court.  
III 
¶21 We now turn to the law of foreclosure of land 
contracts.  
¶22 Land contracts are an important and long-standing 
instrument 
in 
Wisconsin 
real 
estate 
transactions. 
 
Land 
contracts provide a number of advantages for both the land 
contract vendor and land contract vendee. Because the land 
contract vendee may make a smaller down payment and avoid 
mortgage transaction costs, a land contract may present the 
vendee with the opportunity to purchase property.  The land 
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
10 
 
contract vendor has the advantage of greater flexibility in 
structuring terms, installment payments for beneficial income 
tax advantages, and alternative remedies in the event the vendee 
defaults.10  Similarly, it has historically been faster and 
cheaper to foreclose a defaulted land sale contract.11 
¶23 A land contract vendor holds legal title as security 
for the unpaid balance of the contract, while the land contract 
vendee holds equitable title.12  Holding equitable title in 
effect 
gives 
the 
land 
contract 
vendee 
"full 
rights" 
of 
ownership, including the ability to "sell, lease or encumber the 
real estate subject to the rights of the Vendor unless the 
contract provides to the contrary."13  The land contract vendee 
has liabilities generally attributed to ownership, such as 
                                                 
10 Jay E. Grenig & Nathan A. Fishbach, Methods of Practice, 
1 Wisconsin Practice Series § 8.3 at 275 (4th ed. 2004); Martin 
J. Greenberg & Henry R. Pinekenstein, Wisconsin Land Contracts 
2-7 (1986); John S. Goodland, Mortgage and Land Contract 
Foreclosures in Wisconsin § 11.01 at 45 (1989). 
11 J.H. 
Beuscher, 
Buying 
Farms 
on 
Installment 
Land 
Contracts——A Preface, 1960 Wis. L. Rev. 379, 381 (comparing 
strict foreclosure of land contracts with foreclosure of real 
estate mortgages in 1941 and finding that it took 11 months less 
time and cost approximately 40% less to foreclose a land 
contract). 
12 City of Milwaukee v. Greenberg, 163 Wis. 2d 28, 36-39, 
471 N.W.2d 33 (1991). 
13 Greenberg & Pinekenstein, supra note 10, at 2. 
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
11 
 
payment of taxes,14 and is also generally liable as the owner to 
third parties injured on the property.15 
¶24 In addition to providing parties the flexibility to 
set the terms of the conveyance, the land contract offers a 
vendor several alternative remedies should the vendee default.16  
Each remedy has advantages or disadvantages depending on the 
particulars of the situation.  The relevant remedy in this case 
is strict foreclosure. 
                                                 
14 Greenberg, 163 Wis. 2d at 37-38. 
15 McCarty 
v. 
Covelli, 
182 
Wis. 2d 342, 
345-46, 
514 
N.W.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1994). 
16 Kallenbach v. Lake Publ'ns, Inc., 30 Wis. 2d 647, 651, 
142 N.W.2d 212 (1966).  A land contract vendor can elect to sue 
for the unpaid purchase price (not an attractive option unless 
the land contract vendee has other assets to satisfy a 
judgment).  Id.  A land contract vendor can also sue for 
specific performance of the contract (under this option the 
vendor "elects to affirm the contract by having the property 
auctioned at judicial sale").  Id.  If specific performance is 
chosen, the land contract vendor recovers only the purchase 
price plus costs and disbursements.  Id.  Were the property to 
sell for more than this amount, the land contract vendee gets 
any surplus.  Id.  Conversely, any shortfall between the 
purchase price and the sale price results in a liability for the 
land contract vendee.  Id.  See also Grenig & Fishbach, supra 
note 10, §§ 8.40-8.64 at 294-302. 
In certain situations the vendor can declare the contract 
at an end and resolve the parties' rights under the land 
contract with a quiet-title action.  Id. 
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
12 
 
¶25 Strict foreclosure is a long-standing equitable remedy 
in Wisconsin.17  It is generally a faster remedy for the land 
contract vendor than the remedies provided a mortgagee.18 
¶26 In strict 
foreclosure, the 
land 
contract 
vendor 
forgoes his or her right to collect the amount remaining on the 
debt19 and instead recovers the property.20  In the event of a 
vendee's default on a land contract, under strict foreclosure 
the 
circuit 
court's 
judgment 
sets 
a 
period, 
called 
the 
                                                 
17 Exchange Corp. of Wis. v. Kuntz, 56 Wis. 2d 555, 559, 202 
N.W.2d 393 (1972); Kallenbach, 30 Wis. 2d at 652.  For brief 
descriptions of the remedies, including strict foreclosure and 
specific performance, see Goodland, supra note 10, §§ 11.02-
11.08 at 46-51. 
18 State of Wisconsin Real Estate Examining Board, Dep't of 
Regulation and Licensing, Wisconsin Real Estate Law 8-1 (1976) 
("Here is the principal reason for the seller's choosing a land 
contract rather than a mortgage.").  See also Beuscher, supra 
note 11, at 381. 
19 Kallenbach, 30 Wis. 2d at 657. 
20 Kallenbach, 30 Wis. 2d at 652 (quoting Henry Uihlein 
Realty Co. v. Downtown Dev. Corp., 9 Wis. 2d 620, 628, 101 
N.W.2d 775 (1960)); see also Exchange Corp., 56 Wis. 2d at 559 
("There is no dispute that the purpose of a strict foreclosure 
action is to terminate any further right to perform the land 
contract on the part of the vendee because of his default and to 
confirm the legal title in the vendor free of any equitable 
ownership or claim under the contract of purchase."). 
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
13 
 
redemption period, in which the vendee must pay up or lose all 
his or her interest in the land.21 
¶27 At common law, the circuit court had the discretion to 
set the duration of the redemption period.22  The only limit on 
the operation of the circuit court's discretion was that the 
period had to be "reasonable" when viewed under the totality of 
the circumstances of the case.23 
¶28 As part of Wis. Stat. § 846.30,24 the legislature 
mandated that a redemption period for a land contract must be at 
least seven working days from the date of the judgment hearing 
                                                 
21 In both specific performance and strict foreclosure 
actions, the circuit court usually grants the land contract 
vendee a redemption period in which the vendee is given the 
opportunity to pay the amount due.  Benkert v. Gruenewald, 223 
Wis. 44, 269 N.W. 672 (1936) (strict foreclosure); Godwin v. 
Miller, 199 Wis. 497, 226 N.W. 954 (1929) (strict foreclosure); 
Dickson v. Loehr, 126 Wis. 641, 106 N.W. 793 (1906) (strict 
foreclosure); Buswell v. Peterson, 41 Wis. 82 (1876) (strict 
foreclosure). 
22 Scott C. Minter & Richard J. Staff, Wisconsin Real Estate 
Law 368 (2001 ed.). 
23 Godwin 199 Wis. at 500. 
The fixing of the period of time within which a vendee 
under the land contract may redeem is a matter 
committed to the sound discretion of the court.  But 
the time fixed must be reasonable in view of all the 
circumstances of the case.  Unless the time fixed is 
reasonable, the court abuses its discretion, and the 
judgment will be set aside or so modified as to 
prescribe a reasonable time.  Id. 
24 1995 Wis. Act 250, § 3 (effective May 3, 1996); see also 
Minter & Staff, supra note 22, at 368. 
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
14 
 
or, if there is no hearing, from the date of the entry of the 
judgment order. 
¶29 We turn now to an examination of Wis. Stat. § 846.30. 
IV 
¶30 To understand Wis. Stat. § 846.30, we look first to 
the text of the statute.  Wisconsin Stat. § 846.30 reads as 
follows: 
Redemption period for land contracts.  If a court 
finds that the purchaser under a land contract is 
obligated to make certain payments under that land 
contract, that the purchaser has failed to make the 
required payments and that the vendor is entitled to a 
judgment of strict foreclosure, the court shall set a 
redemption period of at least 7 working days from the 
date of the judgment hearing or, if there is no 
hearing, from the date of the entry of the judgment 
order.  No judgment of strict foreclosure is final 
until the court enters an order after the expiration 
of the redemption period confirming that no redemption 
has occurred and making the judgment of strict 
foreclosure absolute. 
¶31 The first sentence of the statute requires, as we 
stated previously, that a court set a redemption period in a 
strict foreclosure judgment and further requires that, at a 
minimum, the redemption period be at least seven working days 
from the date of the judgment hearing or the date of the entry 
of the judgment order.  This provision appears to be a direct 
reaction to an unpublished court of appeals decision, Walker v. 
Dorney, No. 1993AP2389-FT, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Feb. 8, 1994).   
¶32 In Walker, the court of appeals affirmed a circuit 
court's strict foreclosure judgment that granted no redemption 
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
15 
 
period to the land contract vendees in default.  A letter in the 
drafting file suggested the text of the first sentence of the 
statute, stating: "Were it not for the Walker vs. Dorney case I 
would not suggest legislation——I never previously considered the 
possibility that a judge hearing a contested strict foreclosure 
action would even have the authority to issue a foreclosure 
judgment without a redemption period."25   
¶33 The second and final sentence of the statute, at issue 
today, provides the mechanism for finalizing the judgment of 
strict 
foreclosure. 
 
It 
reads: 
"No 
judgment 
of 
strict 
foreclosure is final until the court enters an order after the 
expiration 
of 
the 
redemption 
period 
confirming 
that 
no 
redemption has occurred and making the judgment of strict 
foreclosure absolute."  Wisconsin Stat. § 846.30 does not 
explicitly address whether the final order merely confirms that 
title has been transferred at an earlier date or whether the 
final order transfers title.  The parties dispute the import of 
this sentence, and they present alternative interpretations of 
the sentence. 
¶34 WAMIC asserts that Wis. Stat. § 846.30 does not change 
the common law rule that a land contract vendee's equitable 
title automatically reverts to the land contract vendor at the 
end of the redemption period, so that in the present case 
                                                 
25 See January 4, 1995 Letter from Atty. Bruce A. Marshall 
to Representative Marty Reynolds and Senator Dave Zien found in 
the Drafting Records to 1995 Act 250, Legislative Reference 
Bureau, Madison, WI. 
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
16 
 
equitable title and legal title were combined in the land 
contract vendors when the period of redemption expired on 
October 7, 1999.  According to WAMIC, the final order merely 
"confirms" the reversion of title; the final order does not 
supplant the parties' substantive rights that exist at the 
expiration of the redemption period.  
¶35 Conversely, the plaintiffs assert that under the 
common law and under Wis. Stat. § 846.30 a land contract 
vendee's equitable title reverts to the land contract vendor 
only upon entry of the final order.  
¶36 Relevant to interpreting the final sentence of Wis. 
Stat. § 846.30 is the statute's impact on common law.  WAMIC 
argues, as the court of appeals held, that because Wis. Stat. 
§ 846.30 does not clearly indicate that the legislature intended 
to overrule or modify the common law, the statute does not alter 
the common law.26 
                                                 
26 Gaugert v. Duve, 2001 WI 83, ¶41, 244 Wis. 2d 691, 628 
N.W.2d 861 (a rule of statutory interpretation is that the 
legislature's intent to change the common law must be clearly 
expressed). 
The rule that statutes changing the common law must do so 
through a clear legislative expression and must be interpreted 
narrowly is a rule that has been the object of a great deal of 
criticism as hindering legislative change and as having no 
analytical or philosophical justification.  See 3 Norman J. 
Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 61:4 (5th ed. 
Supp. 2001). 
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
17 
 
¶37 As the basis of its understanding of the common law, 
WAMIC relies on a passage in Exchange Corp. of Wisconsin v. 
Kuntz, a 1972 case.27  This court said in Exchange Corp.:  
Normally, a decree in strict foreclosure, which at 
best is an unusual form of decree, finds a default on 
the part of the vendee, confirms absolute title in the 
vendor, 
and 
provides, 
subject 
to 
a 
condition 
subsequent, that the vendor may have to convey if the 
vendee pays the total purchase price within a given 
period of time. 
. . . . 
[T]he judgment . . . becomes final or absolute only 
upon the expiration of the period of redemption.  Such 
a judgment may be considered as an interlocutory 
judgment which automatically becomes final upon the 
expiration of the period of redemption without any 
further motion or decree making it absolute.  If the 
record is to reflect the fact the vendee did not 
redeem, an order may be entered finding the vendee did 
not meet the conditions; sometimes an affidavit of 
such fact is filed.  But if the order is used, it 
would normally not confirm the title but merely 
reaffirm the legal title in the vendor.28 
¶38 In essence, the judgment, under Exchange Corp., is an 
interlocutory judgment that automatically becomes final on the 
expiration of the redemption period.  That is, the parties need 
take no further action to affect title; failure of the vendee to 
redeem means the vendor has complete title.   
¶39 The Exchange Corp. court also concluded that a circuit 
court could extend the period of redemption if the current 
                                                 
27 Exchange Corp. of Wis. v. Kuntz, 56 Wis. 2d 555, 202 
N.W.2d 393 (1972). 
28 Id. at 560-61. 
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
18 
 
period of redemption had not yet expired, but once the period 
expired, the period of redemption could not be extended unless 
the circuit court had reserved the power to do so. 
¶40 WAMIC is correct:  Exchange Corp. can be viewed as 
holding that when a vendee is in breach of a land contract and 
the circuit court has entered a strict foreclosure judgment, 
title vests in the vendor without any further action of the 
parties or the circuit court should the vendee fail to pay the 
full purchase price during the redemption period set by the 
court.  WAMIC's position is supported by at least two property 
treatises that state that upon expiration of the redemption 
period, the land contract vendee's equitable rights in the 
property are cut off, and the vendor is the sole owner of the 
property.29 
¶41 Given this, WAMIC asserts that the failure of Wis. 
Stat. § 846.30 to mention any change from the common law rule 
announced in Exchange Corp. about when title passes under a 
defaulted land contract must mean that the common law still 
stands and any circuit court order subsequent to the judgment is 
merely a confirmation that equitable title has already passed to 
the vendor. 
¶42 The plaintiffs dispute WAMIC's reading of the common 
law under Exchange Corp.  They contend that in a defaulted land 
                                                 
29 See, e.g., 15 Powell on Real Property, § 84.D.03[3] at 
84D-35 (Rel. 79-6/97 Pub. 550) (Michael Allan Wolf ed. 2000); 12 
Thompson on Real Property § 100.08(c) at 312 (David A. Thomas 
ed. 1994).  
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
19 
 
contract, equitable title does not automatically revert to the 
land contract vendor at the end of the redemption period absent 
any additional court action.  The plaintiffs rely on a 1937 
case, St. Joseph's Hospital v. Maternity Hospital, as a 
declaration of the common law.30  In St. Joseph's Hospital, the 
court concluded, "A judgment of strict foreclosure of a land 
contract does not produce absolute finality.  In such judgments, 
a subsequent order barring the defendant's interest and claims 
for want of redemption is essential in order to declare and 
quiet title in the plaintiff . . . ."31  The St. Joseph's 
Hospital court declared that because the strict foreclosure 
judgment was not absolute, a court has equitable power to allow 
a land contract vendee to pay under the land contract, even if 
the vendee had failed to pay before expiration of the redemption 
period.32   
¶43 The plaintiffs are correct:  St. Joseph's Hospital 
demonstrates that the land contract vendee's equitable ownership 
interest does not automatically transfer to the vendor; a 
judicial decree is needed.  According to St. Joseph's Hospital, 
if the land contract vendee's equitable ownership interest had 
automatically transferred to the vendor upon expiration of the 
redemption period, the court would not have been able to allow 
                                                 
30 St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Maternity Hosp., 224 Wis. 422, 272 
N.W.669 (1937). 
31 St. Joseph's Hosp., 224 Wis. at 430. 
32 St. Joseph's Hosp., 224 Wis. at 430.  
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
20 
 
the vendee's interest in the property to continue after 
expiration of the redemption period. 
¶44 Although cases subsequent to St. Joseph's Hospital  
have expressed reservations about the continued vitality of the 
St. Joseph's Hospital rule,33 the plaintiffs argue that St. 
Joseph's Hospital was the basis for the second and final 
sentence of Wis. Stat. § 846.30.  The plaintiffs assert that the 
sentence is a codification of St. Joseph's Hospital and 
establishes that equitable title to property in a land contract 
remains 
with 
the 
land 
contract 
vendee, 
despite 
strict 
foreclosure and despite nonredemption by the vendee, until a 
circuit court enters a final order declaring title in the land 
contract vendor. 
¶45 The first sentence of Wis. Stat. § 846.30 is not a 
substantial change from the common law.  All that the first 
sentence does is place a limit on a circuit court's discretion 
in setting a period of redemption.  A circuit court cannot 
completely deny a period of redemption; the redemption period 
                                                 
33 See Exchange Corp., 56 Wis. 2d at 562 ("Broader dicta in 
the St. Joseph's Hospital Case to the effect the court of equity 
has inherent jurisdiction after the expiration of the period of 
redemption without reserving such power is disapproved."); 
Kallenbach, 30 Wis. 2d at 656 (the power the circuit court 
exercised in St. Joseph's Hospital is contrary to the general 
rule). 
WAMIC and Exchange Corp. limit the significance of St. 
Joseph's Hospital, which was decided in the shadow of the Great 
Depression.  They assume that the balance of equities tilted 
toward the land contract vendee in that case because of the 
special circumstances of the period. 
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
21 
 
must be, at a minimum, seven working days.  Courts still have 
significant control in setting redemption periods, just as 
before the enactment of § 846.30; the standard continues to be 
reasonableness in light of the circumstances.34 
¶46 It is not clear whether the second and final sentence 
of Wis. Stat. § 846.30 alters the common law, because the common 
law is not clear.  It is not clear that Exchange Corp. altered 
the portion of St. Joseph's Hospital upon which the plaintiffs 
rely, despite language in Exchange Corp. disapproving "broader 
dicta" in St. Joseph's Hospital.35  As discussed previously, 
Exchange Corp. suggests equitable title automatically reverts to 
the vendor without any court order; St. Joseph's Hospital 
suggests that equitable title reverts to the vendor only upon 
entry of a final court order.   
¶47 The last sentence of § 846.30 can be read as WAMIC 
reads it, that is, as addressing only when a strict foreclosure 
judgment becomes final, but not addressing the transfer of 
title.  Therefore, the order entered can be viewed under 
Exchange Corp. as providing finality by confirming a transfer of 
title to the vendor that has already occurred.  Alternatively, 
the required order in the last sentence of § 846.30 can be read 
as the plaintiffs read it, that is, as establishing the date on 
which a land contract vendee's equitable title reverts to the 
                                                 
34 Godwin, 199 Wis. at 497. 
35 Exchange Corp., 56 Wis. 2d at 562. 
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
22 
 
vendor.  This reading would be consistent with St. Joseph's 
Hospital. 
¶48 Given that the common law is not clear on when 
equitable title reverts to a land contract vendor, we turn to 
the practice of attorneys in land contract foreclosure, as well 
as the legislative drafting records, to cast light on the 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § 846.30. 
¶49 Apparently, the practice before the 1995 adoption of 
Wis. Stat. § 846.30 was for a land contract vendor to obtain a 
final judgment after the expiration of the redemption period 
upon filing an affidavit of nonredemption.  A 1989 practice 
manual on land contract foreclosures includes a form for a final 
judgment in a strict foreclosure of a land contract which states 
that the final judgment confirms the original judgment and 
proclaims that "any right, title and interest" of the land 
contract vendees "shall cease to exist and shall be and hereby 
are forever barred."36  This practice suggests that the final 
judgment or order confirming the strict foreclosure judgment 
performs a much more significant role than just reaffirming 
something everyone already knows, namely that equitable title 
                                                 
36 Goodland, supra note 10, at A-91. 
For a similar form of confirmation of judgment suggested in 
2004, see Grenig & Fishbach, supra note 10, Form 8-12 at 324. 
See also Grenig & Fishbach, supra note 10, § 8.53 at 298.  
The circuit court enters the order confirming the judgment upon 
an affidavit of nonredemption; the order should be recorded in 
the office of the register of deeds in the county where the land 
is located. 
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
23 
 
has been vested in the vendor.  This final judgment would be 
needed to clear record title to determine whether the land 
contract vendee paid the amount due during the redemption 
period.    
¶50 The drafting record for Wis. Stat. § 846.30 decidedly 
supports the plaintiffs' position that if a land contract vendee 
fails to redeem, the equitable title of the land contract vendee 
does not pass to the land contract vendor until a circuit court 
enters an order after the expiration of the redemption period 
confirming nonredemption.37  The court of appeals interpreted 
§ 846.30 without examining the drafting record.   
¶51 The most relevant document in the drafting file on the 
issue presented in the instant case is a September 29, 1995 
letter from the Chicago Title Insurance Company to Atty. Peter 
Christianson, suggesting what would become the last sentence of 
Wis. Stat. § 846.30.  The letter explains that the purpose of 
requiring "a final order" is to make the statute consistent with 
St. Joseph's Hospital.38  As far as the drafters of § 846.30 were 
concerned, the St. Joseph's Hospital case was still in full 
force and effect.  The letter does not mention Exchange Corp. 
¶52 The letter reads in relevant part: 
This bill formalizes the requirement for a redemption 
period after a judgment of strict foreclosure.  Such a 
right 
has 
been 
recognized 
under 
[Godwin 
and 
                                                 
37 Drafting Records for 1995 Wis. Act 250 (available at the 
Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wisconsin). 
38 Id.   
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
24 
 
Kallenbach]. 
 
However, 
the 
bill 
overlooks 
the 
requirement for a final order established under St. 
Joseph's Hospital . . . , which states at page 430: "A 
judgment of strict foreclosure of a land contract does 
not produce absolute finality.  In such judgments, a 
subsequent order barring the defendant's interest and 
claims for want of redemption is essential in order to 
declare and quiet title in the plaintiff . . . ." 
We should take this opportunity to propose that AB 579 
be amended to include a requirement for a final order.  
This can be done very simply by adding the following 
language as part of proposed Section 846.30, Wisconsin 
Statutes, or as a new section: 
No judgment of strict foreclosure shall be final until 
the entry of an order, after the expiration of the 
redemption period, confirming that no redemption has 
been 
made 
and 
making 
the 
judgment 
of 
strict 
foreclosure absolute (emphasis added).  
¶53 Representative 
Marty 
Reynolds 
requested 
that 
the 
Legislative Reference Bureau draft legislation based on the 
problems discussed in the Chicago Title Insurance Company 
letter. 
¶54 The suggested change makes sense from the perspective 
of a title insurance company.  A title insurance company would 
be interested in pinpointing, to the extent possible, the date 
on which a land contract vendee's equitable title passes to the 
vendor.  A circuit court order creates certainty, finality, and 
clarity for passage of title, easing the task of examining real 
property records to determine and insure ownership.  A title 
insurance company's interest in clarity and finality of the 
rights and interests of the parties to the land contract is 
especially strong because, as we discussed above, the case law 
is confusing concerning rights and interests in the event of 
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
25 
 
strict foreclosure and failure to redeem.  In light of the 
Exchange Corp. and St. Joseph Hospital cases, clarification of 
when a land contract vendee's equitable interest reverts to the 
vendor should be welcome.   
¶55 On the basis of the text of Wis. Stat. § 846.30, the 
case law, Wisconsin practice, and legislative history, we are 
persuaded that § 846.30 requires that in strict foreclosure a 
circuit court must issue a final order to confirm a land 
contract vendee's failure to redeem prior to the expiration of 
the redemption period, and that only upon entry of the final 
order does a land contract vendee's equitable title revert to 
the land contract vendor. 
¶56 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
reached 
a 
different 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 846.30 based on three additional 
considerations, none of which we consider persuasive enough to 
convince us that our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 846.30 is 
misplaced.   
¶57 First, the court of appeals held that the plaintiffs' 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 846.30 that equitable title 
reverts to the vendor only upon the final order would create an 
illogical result.  According to the court of appeals, an 
indefinite period of time may elapse between the end of the 
redemption period and the order transferring title, during which 
the land contract vendee remains the equitable owner with all 
the rights and responsibilities thereof.  This result is not 
illogical.  This situation is similar to a foreclosure on a 
mortgage when there is a period between the end of the 
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
26 
 
redemption period and a sheriff's sale; the mortgagor holds 
title.  
¶58 Second and related to the first point, the court of 
appeals concluded that "the date on which the confirming order 
is entered would not be tied, either by statute or by practical 
realities, to the actual situations of the vendor and vendee."  
The transfer of equitable title should depend, according to the 
court of appeals, on what is happening between the parties, not 
on when an order is presented to the court and when a court may 
sign and enter it.  We disagree with the court of appeals.  It 
is not always clear what is happening between the parties.  Take 
the instant case, for example.  Three different dates of passage 
of equitable title are possible: October 7, November 17, and 
December 1.  For anyone interested in clear title, determining 
where title rests during the confusion created by the parties' 
actions may be a daunting task indeed.  The facts of this case 
demonstrate that title reverting only upon a final court order 
makes sense. 
¶59 The court of appeals' final consideration is that 
although under its interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 846.30 the 
confirming order does not establish the date of transfer of 
title, it does add a measure of certainty and predictability 
that did not exist at common law.    
¶60 We agree with the court of appeals that the second and 
final sentence of Wis. Stat. § 846.30 appears to have been 
designed 
to 
add 
certainty 
and 
predictability 
to 
strict 
foreclosures by characterizing the order as final and absolute.  
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
27 
 
We part company with the court of appeals, however, because its 
interpretation of § 846.30 disrupts certainty and predictability 
by mandating that a land contract vendee's equitable title 
reverts to the vendor at the expiration of the redemption period 
without any court order.  The instant case illustrates the 
uncertainty that can occur and the importance of a court order 
that definitively establishes the rights and interests of the 
parties.   
¶61 For the reasons set forth, we hold that under Wis. 
Stat. § 846.30, equitable title remains with a land contract 
vendee until a circuit court enters an order pursuant to 
§ 846.30 
confirming 
the 
land 
contract 
vendee's 
default, 
following the expiration of the redemption period for strict 
foreclosure. 
V 
¶62 We now turn to the instant case and apply Wis. Stat. 
§ 846.30: The land contract vendee's equitable title reverts to 
the land contract vendor on the entering of a final order in a 
strict foreclosure proceeding.  
¶63 Although the facts are undisputed for purposes of a 
motion for summary judgment, we must examine the circuit court 
judgments and orders closely.  There are inconsistencies in the 
proceedings, some of which were on the record in the circuit 
court and others of which were not.  
¶64 The first hearing on the strict foreclosure action 
took place on September 7, 1999.  According to the transcript of 
the proceedings, the court ordered the remedy of specific 
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
28 
 
performance, not strict foreclosure, and set a redemption date 
of October 7, 1999.  It held that if the Steiner Corporation did 
not redeem before that time, the property would be sold at a 
sheriff's sale. 
¶65 The Steiner Corporation did not redeem in the 30-day 
redemption period set to expire on October 7, 1999, nor was the 
property sold by sheriff's sale.  Therefore, the remedy of 
specific performance was not effectuated.  Instead, the parties 
returned to court on October 19, 1999.  At the October 19, 1999 
hearing, the circuit court entered a judgment of strict 
foreclosure, ordering (retroactively) October 7, 1999, as the 
redemption date.   
¶66 The date of October 7, 1999 is inconsistent with Wis. 
Stat. § 846.30.  Wisconsin Stat. § 846.30 requires at a minimum 
a seven working day redemption period "from the date of the 
judgment hearing or, if there is no hearing, from the date of 
the judgment order."  Regardless of the nature of the October 19 
hearing and "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law," the 
redemption period under Wis. Stat. § 846.30 can be construed as 
expiring no earlier than October 28, 1999, seven working days 
from the October 19 hearing, or as expiring no earlier than 
November 18, 30 days from October 19.  
¶67 Another hearing on the matter was held on December 1, 
1999, and resulted in a document entitled "Final Judgment."  
That document confirmed the October 19, 1999 order "in all 
respects" and stated "all right, title and interest of [the land 
contract vendees] . . . shall cease to exist."   
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
29 
 
¶68 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
"the 
only 
reasonable explanation" for the discrepancies of the redemption 
dates in the documents of this matter "is that the period of 
redemption described in the December 1 final judgment is a 
mistake."  According to the court of appeals, the parties agreed 
to change the remedy to strict foreclosure after September 7 and 
before the judgment entered on October 19 but agreed to use the 
same 30-day redemption period established by the court on 
September 7 for a sale.  Under this reasoning the redemption 
period expired on October 7, 1999.39  There is no support in the 
record for the court of appeals' explanation of the discrepancy. 
¶69 Regardless of possible explanations for the numerous 
conflicting dates, we conclude under our interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 846.30 that the equitable title of the Steiner 
Corporation (the land contract vendee) did not revert to the 
land contract vendors until December 1, 1999, the date of the 
final order.  Thus, Steiner Corporation had equitable title to 
the property as vendee under the land contract when Patricia 
Steiner fell in the dry well on October 15, 1999.  
VI 
¶70 The parties disagree whether Robert Steiner was an 
agent of Steiner Corporation at the time of the accident.  If he 
was, 
his 
allegedly 
negligent 
actions 
(leaving 
the 
well 
uncovered) would be imputed to the Corporation and WAMIC would, 
                                                 
39 Steiner v. Wis. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 2004 WI App 135, ¶¶15, 
17, 275 Wis.2d 359, 685 N.W.2d 83. 
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
30 
 
according to plaintiffs, be required to indemnify him for 
Patricia's injuries. 
¶71 The injury is alleged to have occurred as follows:  
 
¶72 Robert Steiner, despite having sold his interest in 
the land, continued to perform maintenance at the resort, 
including draining water from the cabins in preparation for 
winter.  The procedure, which Robert was following on October 
15, 1999, was to drain the water from the cabins into dry wells.  
Covering each dry well was a removable wood cover, under which 
was a piece of Styrofoam.  The wood cover protected the well 
should a car or other large object traverse it; the Styrofoam 
cover underneath was meant to keep the water from freezing.  
Robert Steiner had removed the wood coverings from some of the 
dry wells, but not the Styrofoam coverings.   
¶73 Patricia 
Steiner, 
concerned 
about 
her 
husband, 
approached a dry well to see if he had fallen in.  She noticed 
that the Styrofoam covering was still in place, but when she 
turned away from the well she slipped and fell into the dry 
well. 
¶74 Robert Steiner heard Patricia Steiner's cries for help 
and found her wedged into the bottom of a dry well.  She 
sustained a variety of personal injuries. 
¶75 Neither the circuit court nor the court of appeals 
addressed Robert Steiner's possible status as an agent of the 
Steiner Corporation.  Likewise, we will not address that issue 
here.   
* * * * 
No. 
2003AP1959   
 
31 
 
¶76 In summary, we hold that equitable title remains with 
a land contract vendee until a circuit court enters a final 
order, following the expiration of the redemption period for 
strict foreclosure, 
confirming the 
land contract vendee's 
failure to redeem.  As a result, in the present case equitable 
title did not pass from the Steiner Corporation (the land 
contract vendee) to the land contract vendors until December 1, 
1999, when an order confirming the nonredemption was entered.  
Accordingly, the Corporation had equitable title to the property 
under the land contract on October 15, 1999, the date of the 
plaintiffs' injuries, and the Corporation and WAMIC, its 
insurer, may be subject to liability for the plaintiffs' 
injuries. 
¶77 We therefore reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this decision. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded. 
 
No.  2003AP1959.jpw 
 
1 
 
¶78 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (dissenting).  I disagree with the 
majority's conclusion that "under Wis. Stat. § 846.30 [2000-0140] 
equitable title remains with a land contract vendee until a 
circuit court enters a final order, following the redemption 
period for strict foreclosure, confirming the land contract 
vendee's nonredemption."  Majority op., ¶4.  I would hold that 
under § 846.30, equitable title on a land contract passes as a 
matter of law following the vendee's nonpayment at the end of 
the redemption period, as established by the land contract or a 
previously issued court order for strict foreclosure.  While the 
circuit court is required under the statute to enter a final 
order confirming the vendee's nonredemption, such order is not 
required in order for title to pass.   
¶79 This position is in accordance with the common law 
governing land contracts, which, contrary to the majority's 
assertion, majority op., ¶46, was quite clear.  The common law 
governing the passage of title for land contracts was shaped 
primarily by two cases:  St. Joseph's Hospital v. Maternity 
Hospital, 224 Wis. 422, 273 N.W.791  (1937), and Exchange 
Corporation 
of 
Wisconsin 
v. 
Kuntz, 
56 
Wis. 2d 555, 
202 
N.W.2d 393 (1972). 
¶80 The issue in St. Joseph's Hospital was whether a 
circuit court had power in a strict foreclosure action to extend 
the period of redemption before that period expired.  St. 
                                                 
40 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No.  2003AP1959.jpw 
 
2 
 
Joseph's Hosp., 224 Wis. at 424-425.  In addressing this issue, 
the court stated: 
A judgment of strict foreclosure of a land contract 
does 
not 
produce 
absolute 
finality. 
 
In 
such 
judgments, a subsequent order barring the defendant's 
interest 
and 
claims 
for 
want 
of 
redemption 
is 
essential in order to declare and quiet title in the 
plaintiff, and a writ for removing the defendant from 
the premises is contemplated in case it becomes 
necessary.  Proceedings at the foot of the judgment 
are a matter of course in these cases and the 
litigation is not at an end until they are taken.  It 
would seem, a priori, that until the final order 
contemplated, an order making the judgment absolute, 
has 
been 
entered, 
anything 
discretionary 
might 
properly be done by the court that has material 
bearing upon the equities of the parties respecting 
the order finally ending the litigation between them.  
Independent of a statute providing for extension in 
strict foreclosure cases of the period of redemption 
from judgments not become absolute, a court as a court 
of equity would unquestionably have power to extend in 
effect the period of redemption provided for in its 
judgment if such extension were required by equity and 
good conscience. 
Id. at 430.   
 
¶81 This language from St. Joseph's Hospital can be read 
in one of two ways.  First, it could be interpreted as holding 
that equitable title in a land contract does not pass at the end 
of the redemption period in a strict foreclosure action, but 
requires a final order confirming that title had passed because 
the court retains the power to extend the redemption period 
until a final order is entered confirming a judgment of strict 
foreclosure. 
 
However, 
such 
a 
broad 
ruling 
would 
seem 
unnecessary in light of the facts in St. Joseph's Hospital 
because there, the challenged circuit court order was an order 
extending the period of redemption on a land contract before the 
No.  2003AP1959.jpw 
 
3 
 
original period of redemption had expired.  Id. at 424.  Thus, 
St. Joseph's Hospital could be read as simply providing that in 
an action for strict foreclosure, a court retains the equitable 
power to extend the period of redemption before a final order is 
issued, assuming the redemption period has not yet run.   
 
¶82 Whatever confusion existed as to the scope of the 
holding in St. Joseph's Hospital was put to rest in Exchange 
Corporation, which explained and clarified the meaning of the 
above 
passage 
from 
St. 
Joseph's 
Hospital. 
 
In 
Exchange 
Corporation, 
56 
Wis. 2d at 
562, 
when 
discussing 
strict 
foreclosure judgments, this court held:  
A strict foreclosure judgment is of such a nature that 
the court must be considered as having the power to 
control the judgment even beyond a term of court to 
the extent the period of redemption may be extended on 
equitable grounds if an application for extension is 
made prior to the expiration of the period; the 
judgment did not reserve this power for it becomes 
final or absolute only upon the expiration of the 
period of redemption.  Such a judgment may be 
considered 
as 
an 
interlocutory 
judgment 
which 
automatically becomes final upon the expiration of the 
period of redemption without any further motion or 
decree making it absolute.  If the record is to 
reflect the fact the vendee did not redeem, an order 
may be entered finding the vendee did not meet the 
conditions; sometimes an affidavit of such fact is 
filed.  But if the order is used, it would normally 
not confirm the title but merely reaffirm the legal 
title in the vendor.  It is possible for a court to 
reserve power to extend the period of redemption even 
after the original period of redemption has expired, 
in which case it would have power to extend time even 
without the vendee's application prior to expiration 
of the original period.  If the court does reserve 
this power, a subsequent order would seem necessary to 
finally terminate any possible rights in the vendee; 
but this would be an unusual case. 
No.  2003AP1959.jpw 
 
4 
 
Id. at 561-62 (emphasis added).  In so holding the court 
expressly stated:  "Broader dicta in the St. Joseph's Hospital 
Case to the effect the court of equity has inherent jurisdiction 
after the expiration of the period of redemption without 
reserving such power is disapproved."  Id. at 562 (emphasis 
added).  Thus, Exchange Corporation explained that a narrow 
reading of St. Joseph's Hospital was correct and it disapproved 
any dicta suggesting a broader holding that title in a land 
contract passes only upon the circuit court entering a final 
order indicating that title has passed.   
 
¶83 The following rules governing the passage of title on 
land contracts in strict foreclosure actions are apparent from 
Exchange Corporation.  First, "the period of redemption may be 
extended on equitable grounds if an application for extension is 
made prior to the expiration of the period[.]"  Id. at 561.  
Second, the period of redemption may be extended after the 
original redemption period has expired only if the court 
expressly "reserve[d] power to extend the period of redemption 
even after the original period of redemption has expired."  Id. 
at 561-62.  
Third, if 
the 
original judgment 
of 
strict 
foreclosure did not expressly reserve the power to extend the 
redemption period after the redemption period had expired and no 
application was made to extend the period of redemption before 
it expired, the judgment "automatically becomes final upon the 
expiration of the period of redemption without any further 
motion or decree making it absolute."  Id. at 561.  In this 
third scenario, although "an order may be entered finding the 
No.  2003AP1959.jpw 
 
5 
 
vendee did not meet the conditions[,] . . . [the order] would 
normally not confirm the title but merely reaffirm the legal 
title in the vendor."  Id.  Thus, such an order merely effects 
record title; it is not a prerequisite for the title to pass in 
the first instance.  Title passes as a matter of law at the end 
of the redemption period.  The only time a final order is 
required for title to pass is where the judgment of strict 
foreclosure reserved the right of the circuit court to extend 
the period of redemption after the redemption period has 
expired.   
 
¶84 With these common-law rules in mind, I now turn and 
examine § 846.30, which provides:   
If a court finds that the purchaser under a land 
contract is obligated to make certain payments under 
that land contract, that the purchaser has failed to 
make the required payments and that the vendor is 
entitled to a judgment of strict foreclosure, the 
court shall set a redemption period of at least 7 
working days from the date of the judgment hearing or, 
if there is no hearing, from the date of the entry of 
the judgment order.  No judgment of strict foreclosure 
is final until the court enters an order after the 
expiration of the redemption period confirming that no 
redemption has occurred and making the judgment of 
strict foreclosure absolute.  
Wis. Stat. § 846.30.  
 
¶85 I am not persuaded by the majority's discussion of 
legislative history that the last sentence of § 846.30 was 
intended 
to 
overrule 
this 
court's 
decision 
in 
Exchange 
Corporation and treat land contracts similar to mortgages.  
Majority op., ¶¶50-53, 57.  Section § 846.30 was enacted as 1995 
Wis. Act 250.  The legislative history of the Act indicates that 
No.  2003AP1959.jpw 
 
6 
 
its purpose was twofold.  First, the Act was intended to require 
a mandatory minimum redemption period in an action for strict 
foreclosure, as existing law did not mandate that a redemption 
period exist and an unpublished court of appeals decision had 
recently held that there was no right to a redemption period.  
Second, the Act was intended to codify "existing case law 
requirements" in relation to the need for a final order in a 
strict foreclosure action.   
 
¶86 At the time 1995 Wis. Act 250 was enacted, the law 
governing the passage of title and need for a final order was 
that as explained by Exchange Corporation, which clarified the 
holding of St. Joseph's Hospital.  Nothing in the legislative 
history of 1995 Wis. Act 250 evinces an intent to overrule 
Exchange Corporation.  Quite the opposite, the goal was to 
codify "existing case law requirements."  While the intent of 
the legislation was to require a final order, it is Exchange 
Corporation that sets forth the effect of such an order.   
¶87 As such, I would interpret the last sentence of 
§ 846.30 in accordance with the rules set forth by this court in 
Exchange Corporation and hold that equitable title on a land 
contract passes as a matter of law following the vendee's 
nonpayment at the end of the redemption period for strict 
foreclosure.  A final order merely reaffirms that title has 
indeed passed; however, in doing so, it provides clarity and 
certainty to third parties about legal title.  In addition to 
being consistent with our common law, this interpretation avoids 
the inequitable result that a land contract vendee who has 
No.  2003AP1959.jpw 
 
7 
 
failed to pay at the end of the redemption period will still 
hold title to the land until the circuit court enters a final 
order.  Majority op., ¶57.   
 
¶88 Finally, even if the last sentence of § 846.30 is 
viewed as overturning the portion of Exchange Corporation that 
holds that equitable title on a land contract passes as a matter 
of law following the vendee's nonpayment at the end of the 
redemption period for strict foreclosure, § 846.30 does not 
affect the remainder of the opinion.  That is, even if a final 
order is required before title may pass, under Exchange 
Corporation, the circuit court does not have the power to extend 
the period of redemption once the period of redemption has 
expired, unless the judgment of strict foreclosure reserved such 
a power.  Exch. Corp., 56 Wis. 2d at 561-62.  As the text of 
§ 846.30 does not state differently, this portion of Exchange 
Corporation remains good law.  As such, if the period of 
redemption has expired and the vendee has not made payment, the 
circuit court may not subsequently extend the period of 
redemption unless its judgment of strict foreclosure reserved 
such a power.  
 
¶89 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.   
¶90 I am authorized to state that Justice PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK joins this dissent.   
 
No.  2003AP1959.jpw 
 
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