Case Title: In re Obert

Citation: 

Docket Number: S50320

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2004-05-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  May 6, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re: Complaint as to the Conduct of
MARK G. OBERT,
Accused.
(OSB Nos. 01-150, 01-151, 01-170; SC S50320)
En Banc
On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
Argued and submitted March 4, 2004.
Walter J. Todd, Salem, argued the cause for the accused. 
Mark G. Obert, Salem, filed the brief on his own behalf.
Stacy J. Hankin, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake
Oswego, argued the cause and filed the briefs for the Oregon
State Bar.
PER CURIAM
The accused is suspended from the practice of law for
30 days, effective 60 days from the date of the filing of this
decision.  
PER CURIAM
In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (Bar) charged the accused lawyer, Mark G. Obert, with
multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility
stemming from his conduct in matters involving three clients: 
Cooper, Crawford, and Williams.  In the Cooper matter, the Bar
charged the accused with violations of Disciplinary Rule (DR) 5-105(E) (representing multiple current clients whose interests
conflict) and DR 6-101(B) (neglect of legal matter).  In the
Crawford matter, the Bar also charged the accused with a
violation of DR 6-101(B), as well as a violation of DR 1-102(A)(3) (conduct involving misrepresentation) and DR 5-101(A)(1) (continued representation of client whose interests
conflict with lawyer's self-interest).  Finally, in the Williams
matter, the Bar charged the accused with violating DR 9-101(C)(4)
(failure to return client property promptly).   
A trial panel of the Disciplinary Board found that the
Bar had failed to prove two of the three charges in the Crawford
matter, viz., DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 5-101(A)(1).  The trial panel
concluded, however, that the accused had violated the four
remaining disciplinary rules at issue before it.  The trial panel
imposed a sanction of a suspension from the practice of law for
90 days, but stayed the suspension in favor of a two-year period
of probation.  The Bar seeks review, contending that an
appropriate sanction should entail a suspension of at least six
months.
On de novo review, ORS 9.536(2), we conclude that the
accused violated DR 6-101(B), DR 5-105(E), DR 1-102(A)(3), and DR
9-101(C)(4).  As a result, we suspend the accused from the
practice of law for 30 days.  
I.  FACTS
The accused has been an Oregon lawyer since 1996.  He
is a sole practitioner.  In the matters that follow, the facts
have been established by clear and convincing evidence.
A.  The Cooper Matter
In September 1999, the Coopers retained the accused to
represent them in the adoption of Mrs. Cooper's son from a prior
relationship.  The child's birth father -- Sifuentez -- appeared
to have abandoned the child.  Although the Support Enforcement
Division of the Department of Justice recently had provided Mrs.
Cooper with several child support payments from Sifuentez, the
Coopers had had no contact with him for two years and were unsure
of his residence or mailing address. 
The Coopers signed their adoption petition in November
1999.  The accused filed the petition early in January 2000 and
informed the Coopers of that fact shortly thereafter.  Between
the time of that communication and June 2000, the accused's
assistant made several telephone calls to the Driver and Motor
Vehicle Services Branch in unsuccessful attempts to locate
Sifuentez's residence and mailing address.  Aside from those
telephone calls, however, the accused did little substantively to
advance the Coopers' adoption during that period because, as he
conceded at the trial panel hearing, he did not know what to do. 
Eventually, the accused stopped returning the Coopers' frequent
telephone calls.  As a result, the Coopers contacted the Bar for
help.  Thereafter, and until the accused withdrew as their
lawyer, the accused's direct communications with the Coopers
usually occurred only following instances of direct Bar
intervention.
The accused withdrew from the Coopers' case in
September 2000 when he discovered that he inadvertently had
represented Sifuentez in several unrelated matters at the same
time that he had been representing the Coopers.  In late July
2000, a trial court had appointed the accused to represent
Sifuentez in three criminal matters.  Because the accused did not
recognize who Sifuentez was from memory and because the accused
lacked any means in his office that otherwise could have help him
identify conflicts of interest, it was not until mid-September
2000, when Mrs. Cooper discovered that Sifuentez was in jail and
called the accused to inform him of that fact, that the accused
realized Sifuentez's relationship to the Cooper adoption.  The
accused subsequently withdrew as the Coopers' lawyer, refunded
their money, including filing fees, and referred them to another
lawyer who specialized in adoptions.  The Cooper's new lawyer
completed the adoption shortly thereafter, and the Coopers then
filed a Bar complaint regarding the accused in January 2001.
B.  The Crawford Matter 
In December 1999, the court appointed the accused to
represent Crawford in a proceeding for post-conviction relief. 
The post-conviction court denied Crawford's petition for relief
in a judgment filed June 21, 2000, and Crawford instructed the
accused to appeal.  Under ORS 138.650, the accused had 30 days
from that date in which to file Crawford's notice of appeal.  On
the thirtieth day, July 21, 2000, the accused mailed the notice,
but neglected to send it by either registered or certified
mail. (1)  As a result, Crawford's appeal was not deemed filed
until after the court received the notice three days later, on
July 24, 2000.  On August 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals
dismissed Crawford's appeal as untimely.
  Before becoming aware of the dismissal, however, the accused, at some point, had informed Crawford that work on his
appellate brief was proceeding ahead of schedule.  In a letter
dated August 23, 2000, Crawford expressed his pleasure with the
accused's progress and asked the accused to consider representing
him in several other matters.  Upon learning that Crawford's
appeal had been dismissed, the accused failed to relay that
information promptly to Crawford.  Instead, the accused began
legal research to ascertain whether the appeal could be
reinstated.  Upon concluding that it could not, the accused cut
off all contact with Crawford, refusing to return his telephone
calls or correspondence.  At the trial panel hearing, the accused
testified that he was too ashamed and embarrassed at the time to
admit to his client that he had failed him.  It was not until
January 24, 2001, five months after the Court of Appeals had
dismissed Crawford's appeal, that the accused finally informed
Crawford of that development.  Until that time, Crawford thought
that his appeal was moving forward.  Shortly thereafter, the
accused withdrew as Crawford's lawyer, and this Bar complaint
followed.
C.  The Williams Matter
In March 1999, the court appointed the accused to
represent Williams on appeal after the court had denied
Williams's petition for post-conviction relief.  The Court of
Appeals subsequently affirmed the post-conviction court's
judgment, and this court denied further review. 
When the accused first became Williams's lawyer,
Williams gave him transcripts, police reports, and briefs
relating to Williams's case.  In February 2001 -- after the Court
of Appeals had issued its final judgment and the accused had 
forwarded it to Williams -- Williams wrote the accused, asking
him to return those documents.  At the trial panel hearing,
Williams testified that he had needed the documents to pursue a
new petition for federal habeas corpus relief.  
The accused admitted at the trial panel hearing that he
failed to take immediate action on Williams's letter when it
arrived and, as a result, had placed it in a pile of other
documents and had forgotten about it.  In both March and May
2001, Williams left telephone messages to the accused from
prison, reiterating Williams's need for his files.  The accused
admitted at the hearing that, despite those reminders, he
continued to forget about the documents until the end of May
2001, when he finally instructed an employee to find the stored
files and return them to Williams.  In the interim, however, the
accused had not returned Williams's messages, and, in June 2001,
Williams filed a complaint with the Bar.  Shortly thereafter --
and over four months after they had been requested -- the accused
returned Williams's papers to him. 
II.  DISCUSSION
A.  The Cooper and Williams Matters
As a result of the accused's conduct in the Cooper
matter, the Bar charged him with violations of DR 6-101(B) and DR
5-105(E).  DR 6-101(B) provides:
"A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to the lawyer."
DR 5-105(E) provides:  
"Except as provided in DR 5-105(F), a lawyer shall
not represent multiple current clients in any matters
when such representation would result in an actual or
likely conflict."
In the Williams matter, the Bar alleged a violation of DR 9-101(C)(4).  That disciplinary rule provides, in part:
"A lawyer shall:
"* * * * *
"(4) Promptly pay or deliver to a client as
requested by the client the funds, securities or other
properties in the possession of the lawyer which the
client is entitled to receive."
The accused concedes that he violated DR 6-101(B), DR 5-105(E),
and DR 9-101(C)(4) in the course of representing the Coopers and
Williams.  The accused's concessions are well-taken.  We find by
clear and convincing evidence that the accused committed the
violations noted above. 
B.  The Crawford Matter
In the Crawford matter, the Bar charged the accused
with a separate violation of DR 6-101(B), as well as violations
of DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 5-101(A)(1).  As he did in the Cooper
matter, the accused acknowledges that he also violated DR 6-101(B) while representing Crawford, and we again agree.  We turn
now to the Bar's remaining charges.  
1.  DR 5-101(A)(1) 
DR 5-101(A) provides, in part:
"Except with the consent of the lawyer's client
after full disclosure,
"(1) a lawyer shall not accept or continue
employment if the exercise of the lawyer's professional
judgment on behalf of the lawyer's client will be or
reasonably may be affected by the lawyer's own
financial, business, property, or personal interests."
In this proceeding, the Bar contends that the accused's
continued representation of Crawford by conducting legal research
in hopes of rectifying the accused's filing error after the court
dismissed his appeal created a conflict of interest under DR 5-101(A)(1).  The Bar asserts that after the Court of Appeals had
dismissed Crawford's appeal, the accused's interest and
Crawford's interest necessarily diverged.  The Bar argues that
there was clear and convincing evidence that, in continuing to
represent Crawford, the accused's professional judgment (1)
actually was impaired by his own interests because he admitted
that shame and embarrassment had kept him from promptly informing
his client of the untimely appeal notice; and (2) potentially may
have been impaired because he faced the possibility of a
malpractice claim as a result of his conduct in the Crawford
matter.  
We agree that the accused continued to represent
Crawford by searching for a way to reinstate Crawford's appeal. 
However, the Bar's arguments nevertheless miss the mark framed by
the facts at issue here.  With regard to the Bar's first
argument, we agree that it is clear that the accused became
paralyzed by shame and embarrassment at some point in the
Crawford matter.  There is nothing in the record, however, to
suggest that the accused was so affected or that his interest was
adverse to Crawford's interest when the accused was searching for
a way to rectify his mistake.  And, after the accused ascertained
that Crawford's appeal could not be reinstated, there is no
evidence that the accused performed any further work for Crawford
or reasonably could have anticipated doing so.  As a result,
there is no evidence that the accused's professional judgment
actually was impaired while representing his client.   
The Bar's second argument similarly misses the mark. 
Pointing to the exercise of professional judgment that
"reasonably may be affected by the lawyer's own * * * personal
interests," the Bar argues that the potential for impaired
judgment always accompanies the prospect of a malpractice claim. 
According to the Bar, when that prospect surfaces as the result
of a lawyer's mistake or misconduct, the lawyer's malpractice
automatically invokes the DR 5-101 requirements of full
disclosure and client consent before the lawyer can accept or
continue employment.  That argument, however, ignores the fact
that, in such scenarios, the potential for impaired professional
judgment must be reasonable under the wording of DR 5-101(A). 
Here, after the accused concluded that he could not rectify his
mistake, and after his interests arguably began to diverge from
those of his client, there is no evidence that the accused
performed any further work for Crawford or reasonably could have
anticipated doing so.  Under those facts, it is not reasonable to
conclude that the accused's professional judgment may have been
impaired in continuing employment as Crawford's lawyer.  We
conclude that the Bar has failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the accused violated DR 5-101(A)(1).    
2.  DR 1-102(A)(3)   
DR 1-102(A)(3) provides:
" It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
"* * * * *
"(3) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[.]"
As this court noted in In re Starr, 326 Or 328, 342, 952 P2d 1017
(1998), dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation are not
identical concepts.  Fraud and deceit, for example, require,
among other things, "a false representation to another, with the
intent that the other act upon the false representation to his or
her damage."  Id. at 342-43.  Dishonesty is conduct indicating a
disposition to "lie, cheat or defraud."  Id. at 343. 
A misrepresentation, in contrast, is unique in several
ways.  For example, it need not be driven by an improper motive. 
In re McKee, 316 Or 114, 125, 849 P2d 509 (1993).  Neither does
it require an intent to deceive or commit fraud.  In re Williams,
314 Or 530, 537, 840 P2d 1280 (1992).  A misrepresentation can
be, as alleged here, simply an omission of fact that is knowing,
false, and material in the sense that, had it been disclosed, the
omitted fact would or could have influenced significantly the
hearer's decision-making process, In re Eadie, 333 Or 42, 53, 36
P3d 468 (2001), or conduct, In re Gatti, 330 Or 517, 527-28, 8
P3d 966 (2000).  This court has held that "a lawyer's failure to
correct a false impression made by an unintentional misstatement"
is a misrepresentation, In re Boardman, 312 Or 452, 457, 822 P2d
709 (1991), as is the failure "to correct a representation that,
although true when made, is no longer true in the light of
information later acquired."  Williams, 314 Or at 536. 
This proceeding illustrates how other material
omissions beyond those that Eadie and Gatti identified, also can
violate the rule.  Here, for example, the accused's failure to
disclose the dismissal of his client's case, when that case
provided the basis for the lawyer-client relationship, was
material, regardless of the reason behind the dismissal.  A
lawyer-client relationship is a fiduciary relationship.  In re
Brown, 326 Or 582, 601, 956 P2d 188 (1998).  This court
subsequently explained in In re Kimmell, 332 Or 480, 31 P3d 414
(2001), that one acts in a fiduciary capacity    
"when the business which he transacts, or the money or
property which he handles, is not his own or for his
own benefit, but for the benefit of another person, as
to whom he stands in a relation implying and
necessitating great confidence and trust on the one
part and a high degree of good faith on the other
part."
Id. at 491 n 9 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 625 (6th ed 1990)
(emphasis added)).  It follows, we think, that a lawyer
effectively jettisons his or her fiduciary responsibility to
safeguard a client's confidence and trust when the lawyer
knowingly withholds from a client the all-critical fact that the
court has spoken and the client's case is over.
That scenario accurately describes the accused's
actions in the Crawford matter.  The record demonstrates that,
before the Court of Appeals had ordered Crawford's appeal
dismissed, the accused had informed Crawford that his appellate
brief was proceeding ahead of schedule.  Although that may have
been true at the time, ultimately that schedule, as well as the
brief itself, both became irrelevant as a result of the accused's
filing error.  Thereafter, once he determined that Crawford's
appeal could not be reinstated, the accused had a duty to tell
Crawford that his case was over.  Instead, the accused shunned
that duty for approximately five months.  As a result, we find by
clear and convincing evidence that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3). 
III.  SANCTION
On review, the Bar argues that this court should
suspend the accused for at least six months.  The accused argues
that the appropriate sanction for his actions should be a public
reprimand or, alternatively, the two-year probationary period
that the trial panel imposed.  
In determining the appropriate sanction for lawyer
misconduct, "we recognize that the purpose of sanctions is not to
penalize the accused, but rather to protect the public and the
integrity of the legal profession."  In re Glass, 308 Or 297,
304, 779 P2d 612 (1989).  In formulating a sanction, this court
takes guidance from the American Bar Association's Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards),
as well as its own cases.  See In re Eakin, 334 Or 238, 257, 48
P3d 147 (2002) (stating principle).  Our methodology is first to
estimate preliminarily a sanction by focusing on (1) the duty
violated; (2) the accused's mental state; and (3) the actual or
potential injury involved.  Id.  "We then examine any aggravating
or mitigating circumstances to determine if the sanction should
be adjusted."  Id.  Finally, we review and compare the sanctions
imposed in other Oregon cases to determine a final sanction for
the proceeding at hand.  Id.
A.  Preliminary Analysis
1.  Duties Violated
Under the ABA Standards, the accused's actions in the
matters described above violated four distinct standards of
conduct.  In the Cooper matter, the accused violated his duty to
avoid conflicts of interest, ABA Standard 4.3, by representing
the Coopers and Sifuentez at the same time in unrelated matters. 
The accused also violated his duty to represent his clients
diligently under ABA Standard 4.4 when he allowed the Coopers's
adoption case to languish and then refused to take their
telephone calls or return their messages.  
In the Crawford matter, the accused agrees that he
violated his duty to represent his client diligently.  The
accused then violated his duty of candor, ABA Standard 4.6, by
waiting five months to inform Crawford that his case had ended.
In the Williams matter, the accused violated ABA
Standard 4.1 by failing to return Williams' property promptly
when asked to do so.
      2.  Mental State
The ABA Standards define the mental state of
"knowledge" as the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant
circumstances of particular conduct, but without the conscious
objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.  ABA
Standards at 7.  "Negligence," in turn, is "the failure of a
lawyer to heed a substantial risk that circumstances exist or
that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the
situation."  Id. 
In the Cooper matter, the accused negligently failed to
advance the Cooper adoption case and then knowingly failed to
maintain contact with his clients as they began inquire as to its
progress.  He also negligently represented Sifuentez at the same
time that he represented the Coopers. 
In the Crawford matter, the accused negligently failed
to file a timely notice of appeal.  Thereafter, he knowingly
waited five months before informing Crawford of that fact.
In the Williams matter, the accused failed to act on
Williams' file request in a timely manner and continued to forget
about its return until finally delegating that task to an
employee.  As a result, the accused negligently failed to return
the file to Williams for approximately four months.
3.  Injury 
Under the ABA Standards, the actionable injuries that a
lawyer's professional misconduct create may be either actual or
potential.  In the Cooper matter, the accused injured the Coopers
by delaying their adoption and by failing to maintain contact
with them.  See, e.g., In re Arbuckle, 308 Or 135, 140 775 P2d
832 (1989) (injury to client in lawyer disciplinary case measured
in terms of "time, anxiety, and aggravation" spent in trying to
coax cooperation from accused lawyer).  The Coopers and Sifuentez
also were subject to the potential for injury as adverse parties
who were represented simultaneously by the accused in separate
matters.
In the Crawford matter, Crawford sustained actual
injury as a result of the accused's failure to file a timely
appeal notice.  Crawford lost the opportunity to pursue his
claims in an appellate court.  The accused's failure also
effectively eliminated Crawford's opportunity to pursue federal
habeas corpus relief, because he had failed to exhaust state
remedies.  28 USC § 2254(b)(1)(A).  "Exhaustion," in that
context, means that the state's highest court must have been
provided with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of the
claims.  Picard v. Connor, 404 US 270, 275-76, 92 S Ct 509, 30 L
Ed 2d 438 (1971).  See also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 US 722, 755-57, 111 S Ct 2546, 115 L Ed 2d 640 (1991) (because there is no
constitutional right to appointed counsel in post-conviction
proceedings, lawyer's failure to file timely notice of appeal
from post-conviction judgment is not cause to excuse petitioner's
failure to exhaust state remedies).  
In the Williams matter, the accused created the
potential for injury by delaying the return of Williams's legal
materials.  As Williams had made clear to the accused, Williams
needed his file to complete his federal habeas corpus petition. 
When the accused failed to produce those materials promptly,
Williams lost valuable time that could have hindered the
completion of his habeas corpus petition.  
4.  Preliminary Sanction Under ABA Standards
As noted above, the accused negligently violated his
duty to avoid conflicts of interest in the Cooper matter.  The
ABA Standards suggest that a reprimand is the appropriate
sanction for that conduct.  See ABA Standard 4.33 (reprimand
appropriate when lawyer negligently determines whether
representation will affect another client adversely and thereby
creates potential for injury).  In both the Cooper and Crawford
matters, the accused also violated his duty of diligence.  The
ABA Standards suggest that suspension is the appropriate sanction
in those cases.  See ABA Standard 4.42 (suspension generally
appropriate when lawyer engages in pattern of neglect and causes
injury or potential injury to client).  
The accused knowingly violated his duty of candor in
the Crawford matter.  The ABA Standard that is most applicable
under those facts suggests that suspension is the appropriate
sanction.  See ABA Standard 4.62 (suspension generally
appropriate when lawyer knowingly deceives client and causes
injury).     
In the Williams matter, the accused was negligent in
dealing with his client's property.  The ABA Standards suggest
that a reprimand is the appropriate sanction.  See ABA Standard
4.13 (reprimand generally appropriate when lawyer is negligent in
dealing with client property and creates potential for injury).   
Our preliminary analysis under the ABA Standards leans
toward suspension as the potentially appropriate sanction in this
proceeding.  We now examine the aggravating and mitigating
factors present here, as well as Oregon case law, to arrive at a
final sanction.  
B.  Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
"[A]ggravating circumstances are any considerations or
factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline
to be imposed."  ABA Standard 9.21.  Three are present here. 
First, the accused engaged in a pattern of misconduct, ABA
Standard 9.22 (c), by knowingly avoiding communication with
different clients on a number of different occasions.  The
accused also committed multiple offenses.  ABA Standard 9.22(d). 
Finally, the accused's misconduct in the Crawford case involved a
vulnerable victim.  ABA Standard 9.22(h).  Because Crawford was
incarcerated, he had no ability to travel to the accused's office
to obtain a direct answer to his inquires, but had to rely solely
on mail and the telephone.
In contrast, mitigating factors are "any considerations
or factors that may justify a reduction in the degree of
discipline to be imposed."  ABA Standard 9.31.  A number are
present in this proceeding: (1) absence of a prior disciplinary
record; (2) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) timely
good faith effort to make restitution in the Cooper matter; (4)
full and free disclosure to the Disciplinary Board and
cooperative attitude; (5) good character or reputation; and (6)
remorse.  See ABA Standards 9.32(a), (b), (d), (e), (g), (l)
(listing factors that may be considered in mitigation). 
C.  Oregon Cases
In this instance, only one Oregon case presents a
factual scenario that is even roughly analogous to the one before
us now, particularly when the accused's case is framed within the
violations that could result in his suspension from the practice
of law. 
In In re Butler, 324 Or 69, 921 P2d 401 (1996), an
experienced lawyer was retained to represent a client in a
personal injury action.  Although the lawyer filed a timely claim
on his client's behalf, the lawyer failed to perfect service on
the defendant and failed to correct that error when the trial
court notified him of it.  As a result, the trial court
subsequently dismissed the matter with prejudice.  Id. at 71-72. 
The lawyer, however, continued to assure his client that he was
moving forward on the case, while trying to find a way to
reinstate the action.  The lawyer never informed his client that
the court had dismissed his case.  Id. at 72.  In the
disciplinary action that followed, the lawyer conceded that he
both had neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by his client
and had engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation.  Id.  Ultimately, this court suspended the
lawyer from the practice of law for one year.
D.  Appropriate Sanction
Based on the foregoing review of Butler and the ABA
Standards, we likewise conclude that suspension is appropriate. 
The totality of the accused's actions in the Crawford matter
effectively deprived Crawford of the very access to justice that
lawyers are hired or appointed to secure for their clients. 
It is important to recognize, however, that several factors that are not present in this case weighed heavily in
formulating the length of the sanction that this court imposed in
Butler.  There, this court found that the accused lawyer
"knowingly" had failed to perfect service on the defendant and
then acted with "intent" to hide that fact from his client.  Id.
at 73.  Second, this court recognized the lawyer's substantial
experience in the practice of law.  Id.  And, finally, this court
found that the lawyer had engaged in a 10-year pattern of similar
misconduct.  Id. at 76.
In contrast, we find no evidence here that the accused
acted with the same disregard for professional responsibility
exhibited by the lawyer in Butler: (1) the accused did not act
with a dishonest intent in the matters at issue; (2) he has no
prior disciplinary record; (3) he enjoys a reputation for good
character among his colleagues; (4) he also has made restitution
when he could; and (5) he has cooperated fully with the Bar and
the Disciplinary Board.  In light of those considerations, we
conclude that a 30-day suspension is appropriate in this
instance.
In imposing the foregoing sanction, we are aware that
the trial panel stayed the accused's initial 90-day suspension in
favor of a lengthy period of probation.  Although we concur with
the trial panel's implicit recognition that a 90-day suspension
was not warranted here, this court has not, as a general matter,
utilized probation as an alternative to other forms of sanction. 
Indeed, this court rarely, if ever, imposes a probationary
sanction in a disciplinary case that was litigated before it.  It
is true that the Bar Rules of Procedure allow the imposition of
probation, see BR 6.2, and this court has approved a sanction of
probation from time to time in connection with stipulations for
discipline.  Those stipulations, however, arise under
circumstances that are different from cases actually litigated
before the court.  In the former category, many factors of which
this court has been unaware may have contributed to the sanction
of probation.  In the latter category, by contrast, all the
relevant factors are in the record before the court.  For the
purposes of this and future disciplinary cases that are appealed
to this court, we advise the Bar that we do not favor
probationary terms unless they are the result of a stipulation. 
When a lawyer's misconduct is sufficiently serious to warrant a
lengthy probationary period, the uncertainties of the monitoring
process lead us to prefer, when appropriate, imposition of a
sanction involving a concrete period of suspension. 
The accused is suspended from the practice of law for
30 days, effective 60 days from the date of the filing of this
decision.  
1. See ORS 19.260 (for appellate purpose, filing date of
appeal is date that appellant mails notice, provided appellant
sends notice by registered or certified mail and subsequently
files proof of mailing with court).