Case Title: Matter of Injury to Taylor

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-04-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Matter of Injury to Taylor1986 WY 107718 P.2d 63Case Number: 85-284Decided: 04/29/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
In 
the Matter of the Injury to Larry L. TAYLOR, An Employee of Big Horn Coal 
Company. BIG HORN COAL COMPANY, Appellant (Employer), The State ofWyoming, ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, 
Appellant (Objector/Defendant),

v.

Larry L. TAYLOR, Appellee 
(Employee/Claimant).

Appeal from District 
Court, SheridanCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

Rex O. Arney, 
Sheridan, for appellant Big Horn Coal 
Company.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Terry J. Harris and 
Patrick J. Crank, Asst. Attys. Gen., for 
appellant State of Wyoming.

Hardy H. Tate, 
Sheridan, for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
an order of the district court awarding benefits to Larry L. Taylor, appellee, 
under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act. We must decide whether there was 
sufficient competent medical testimony before the district court to find a 
direct causal connection between appellee's work activities and his cardiac 
condition.

[¶2.]     We 
reverse.

[¶3.]     Appellee was employed 
by Big Horn Coal Company as an earth-moving equipment operator. On May 17, 1985, 
as he was driving down a hill in the course of his employment, he narrowly 
avoided an accident with another truck. Moments later, he experienced pain in 
his chest, left arm, and jaw. Six days later he met with a doctor who concluded, 
approximately one month thereafter, that appellee had suffered a heart attack on 
or about May 17, 1985.

[¶4.]     Appellee filed an 
employee's report of injury with the clerk of district court, generally claiming 
that he had suffered a heart attack during the course of his employment. 
Appellants denied that appellee's condition was work 
related.

[¶5.]     At trial, the following 
medical testimony was given by appellee's doctor:

"Q Doctor, * * * could 
you state within a reasonable medical certainty that that incident caused or 
precipitated that myocardial infarction?

* * * * * 
*

"THE WITNESS: As Mr. 
Taylor describes the incident, I think it's possible."

On 
cross-examination, the doctor gave the following 
testimony:

"Q Do I recall your 
opinion testimony that it was possible that the near miss, that stressful 
situation with the truck nearly hitting another truck, it was possible in your - 
to phrase your opinion - that it might have contributed to the myocardial 
infarction? Isn't that what you said - it was possible?

"A 
Yes.

"Q It's also possible 
that it did not contribute or cause the heart attack, 
right?

"A Anything is 
possible.

* * * * * 
*

"Q But you are saying 
that it's possible that the stressful situation surrounding the near miss at the 
intersection while at work possibly contributed or caused his heart attack, 
right?

"A Yes. As Mr. Taylor relates 
it.

"Q Was it your further 
opinion that that same stressful situation could have aggravated or precipitated 
myocardial infarction?

"A 
Yes.

"Q But, it may not have, 
too; isn't that right?

"A Yes, 
sir."

[¶6.]     At the close of the 
trial, the trial court found that appellee had met his burden of proving that 
his heart condition was work related. In an order filed November 7, 1985, the 
trial court awarded appellee benefits under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Act.

[¶7.]     Appellants now contend 
that the trial court erred in finding that appellee met his burden of proof as 
to medical causation under § 27-12-603(b), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement). 
That section provides as follows:

"(b) Benefits for 
employment-related coronary conditions except those directly and solely caused 
by an injury or disease are not payable unless the employee establishes by 
competent medical authority that there is a direct causal connection between the 
condition under which the work was performed and the cardiac condition, and then 
only if the causative exertion occurs during the actual period of employment 
stress clearly unusual to, or abnormal for, employees in that particular 
employment, and further that the acute symptoms of the cardiac condition are 
clearly manifested not later than four (4) hours after the alleged causative 
exertion."

[¶8.]     To fulfill the 
statutory requirement, the claimant must demonstrate by competent medical 
evidence a direct causal connection between the work activity and the heart 
condition. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Division v. Kemp, Wyo., 711 P.2d 1142 (1986); State ex rel. Worker's 
Compensation Division v. McCarley, Wyo., 590 P.2d 1333 (1979). The causal 
connection requirement is met if a medical expert 
testifies

[¶9.]     "`* * * that it is more 
probable than not that work exertion or stress contributed in a material degree 
to the precipitation, aggravation, or acceleration of a myocardial infarction.'" 
State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division v. Kemp, 711 P.2d  at 1143, 
quoting from Kaan v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, Wyo., 
689 P.2d 1387, 1389 (1984).

[¶10.]  In the present case, although the doctor 
testified that it was "possible" that appellee's work activity caused his heart 
attack, he also testified that it was equally "possible" that there was no 
connection between the two. That testimony is clearly inadequate to fulfill the 
standard articulated above. This is not a case such as State ex rel. Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Division v. Kemp, in which the physician's statements, 
when considered together, could be said to satisfy the causal connection 
requirement. Instead, when considered together, the doctor's statements in this 
case entirely foreclose the conclusion that appellee's work activity more 
probably than not materially contributed to his heart 
attack.

[¶11.]  For these reasons, we hold that appellee 
did not meet his burden of proof as to medical causation and, therefore, was not 
entitled to worker's compensation benefits.

[¶12.]  Reversed.