Case Title: State v. Vance

Citation: 

Docket Number: 81038-9

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 17–0460 
 
Filed February 9, 2018 
 
 
CHAD DENNIS VANCE, 
 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
vs. 
 
IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR FLOYD COUNTY, 
 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Floyd County, Peter B. 
Newell, District Associate Judge. 
 
 
Criminal defendant appeals a magistrate’s extension of a no-
contact order for five years in a simple misdemeanor case.  WRIT 
SUSTAINED; CASE REMANDED. 
 
 
Joseph A. Cacciatore of Graham, Ervanian & Cacciatore, L.L.P., 
Des Moines, for appellant. 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Louis S. Sloven, Assistant 
Attorney General, and Rachel Ginbey, County Attorney, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
2 
ZAGER, Justice. 
Chad Dennis Vance appeals from the district court order affirming 
a magistrate’s extension of a no-contact order for five years.  After Vance 
filed his notice of appeal to our court, we issued an order directing Vance 
to file an application for discretionary review pursuant to Iowa Code 
section 814.6(2).  We subsequently granted his application for 
discretionary review and requested that the parties brief the following 
jurisdictional issues: (1) whether the magistrate court had subject matter 
jurisdiction to extend a no-contact order in a simple misdemeanor case 
under Iowa Code chapter 664A, and (2) whether a right to appeal exists 
from the extension of a no-contact order in a simple misdemeanor case.  
Vance also presents other claims on appeal.  Upon our review of the 
record and the arguments of counsel, we conclude that the present 
appeal should be treated as a petition for writ of certiorari.  Considering 
the appeal as a certiorari action, we grant the writ and proceed to the 
merits.  On the merits, we hold that the magistrate had subject matter 
jurisdiction to extend the no-contact order under Iowa Code chapter 
664A.  However, we conclude that the findings of fact and decision of the 
district court are not supported by substantial evidence in the record, 
and we reverse the district court order extending the no-contact order for 
five years and remand the case to the district court for entry of an order 
terminating the no-contact order. 
I.  Facts and Procedural Background. 
In February 2016, Chad Vance pled guilty to a charge of 
harassment in the third degree.  In his plea, Vance admitted that he 
communicated with Les and Amy Staudt “with the intent to annoy” in 
violation of a civil no-contact order previously entered against him and in 
favor of the Staudts.  Vance had sent his son to the state wrestling 
 
 
 
3 
tournament the previous month to annoy the Staudts, who Vance knew 
would be in attendance.  As part of his plea agreement, Vance agreed to 
the entry of a one year no-contact order.  The no-contact order included 
a provision prohibiting Vance from entering any school in the Charles 
City Community School District at any time, as well as “any college or 
university campus, or anywhere in the vicinity of a school currently being 
attended by any of the protected parties.”  After approving the plea 
agreement, the magistrate issued the no-contact order on March 4, 2016, 
which was to remain in effect for one year.  In addition to the 
aforementioned school-related provisions, this no-contact order required 
Vance to refrain from any contact with the Staudt family. 
On January 24, 2017, the State filed a motion to extend the no-
contact order.  Vance resisted the motion, and the court held a hearing 
on the motion on February 15.  Amy Staudt testified at the hearing that 
she wanted the no-contact order extended.  She feared the situation with 
Vance would go back to the way it was before the no-contact order was 
entered if the court did not extend it.  However, she admitted that Vance 
had not violated the no-contact order in any way since it was entered.  
William Vetter, a Charles City police officer, testified on Vance’s behalf.  
He testified that he had known Vance since Vance worked as a 
probation/parole officer.  He was unaware of any instances in which 
Vance had violated the terms of the no-contact order, and he saw no 
reason why Vance could not be present in a school environment.  Finally, 
Vance testified on his own behalf.  He testified that he had fully complied 
with all terms of the no-contact order and that he was no threat to the 
Staudts.  Most importantly, he wanted to be able to attend his daughter’s 
activities within the Charles City Community School District.  The 
magistrate granted the motion and, based on the testimony, extended the 
 
 
 
4 
no-contact order for a period of five years pursuant to Iowa Code section 
664A.8 (2017).  This no-contact order is now set to expire on March 4, 
2022. 
Vance appealed the magistrate’s decision to the district court 
pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.73(3).  On appeal, the 
associate district court judge affirmed the magistrate’s order to extend 
the no-contact order.  Vance then appealed to our court.  We treated the 
appeal as an application for discretionary review and granted the 
application.  However, as we will explain later, we now decide to treat 
this appeal as a certiorari action. 
II.  Standard of Review. 
Our standard of review for questions of statutory interpretation is 
for correction of errors at law.  State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 889 N.W.2d 467, 
470 (Iowa 2017).  We also review an original certiorari action for the 
correction of errors at law.  State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 828 N.W.2d 607, 611 
(Iowa 2013).  “Illegality exists when the court’s findings lack substantial 
evidentiary support, or when the court has not properly applied the law.”  
State Pub. Def. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 747 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Iowa 2008) 
(quoting Christensen v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 578 N.W.2d 675, 678 (Iowa 1998)).  
“Evidence is considered substantial when reasonable minds could accept 
it as adequate to reach a conclusion.”  State v. Garrity, 765 N.W.2d 592, 
595 (Iowa 2009). 
III.  Analysis. 
When we granted Vance’s application for discretionary review, we 
specifically directed the parties to brief the following jurisdictional issues: 
whether a magistrate has subject matter jurisdiction to extend a no-
contact order in a simple misdemeanor case pursuant to Iowa Code 
chapter 664A, and whether the defendant has a right to appeal the 
 
 
 
5 
extension of a no-contact order in a simple misdemeanor case.  
Additionally, Vance presents a number of other issues on appeal.  He 
argues the associate district court judge unlawfully affirmed the 
magistrate’s extension of the no-contact order.  Moreover, he asserts 
Iowa Code section 664A.8 is unconstitutionally vague.  Further, Vance 
claims courts cannot extend a one year no-contact order to five years 
unless the State can show a change of circumstances warranting 
extension.  Finally, Vance alleges the State provided insufficient evidence 
to establish that he continued to pose a threat to the safety of the victims 
as required to extend a no-contact order.  We will address each of these 
arguments in turn as necessary. 
A.  Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Magistrate.  Vance 
contends that the magistrate lacked subject matter jurisdiction to extend 
the no-contact order under Iowa Code chapter 664A, so the extension is 
void.  Vance claims that the legislature’s decision to grant magistrates 
subject matter jurisdiction to hold trials in simple misdemeanor cases 
did not confer magistrates with unlimited jurisdiction to extend no-
contact orders arising in those simple misdemeanor cases.  Vance notes 
the omission of chapter 664A from Iowa Code section 602.6405, the 
statute governing subject matter jurisdiction for magistrates.  In 
contrast, the State argues the magistrate exercised appropriate subject 
matter jurisdiction in extending the no-contact order in this simple 
misdemeanor case because nothing in section 602.6405 specifies that 
magistrates only have jurisdiction over the trial phase of simple 
misdemeanors. 
“Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to hear 
and determine cases of the general class to which the proceeding in 
question belongs.”  State v. Erdman, 727 N.W.2d 123, 125 (Iowa 2007) 
 
 
 
6 
(quoting Smith v. Smith, 646 N.W.2d 412, 414 (Iowa 2002)).  The subject 
matter jurisdiction of a magistrate is governed by Iowa Code section 
602.6405, 
which 
grants 
magistrates 
“jurisdiction 
of 
simple 
misdemeanors.”  Iowa Code § 602.6405(1).  Thus, our decision on this 
issue hinges on our interpretation of both section 602.6405 and chapter 
664A. 
Our statutory interpretation turns on whether or not the statute is 
ambiguous.  Iowa Dist. Ct., 889 N.W.2d at 471.  We enforce the plain 
language of the statute when the statute’s language is unambiguous.  Id.  
Yet, “if reasonable minds could differ or be uncertain as to the meaning 
of the statute,” the statute is ambiguous, and we must rely on our tools 
of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity.  Id. (quoting Iowa Ins. 
Inst. v. Core Grp. of Iowa Ass’n for Justice, 867 N.W.2d 58, 72 (Iowa 
2015)).  In this case, both parties present reasonable interpretations of 
the statutes governing a magistrate’s jurisdiction to extend no-contact 
orders in simple misdemeanor cases.  Therefore, we must use our 
customary principles of statutory construction to resolve this issue.  See 
id. at 472. 
“It is universally accepted that where statutory terms are 
ambiguous, courts should interpret the statute in a reasonable fashion 
to avoid absurd results.”  Brakke v. Iowa Dep’t of Nat. Res., 897 N.W.2d 
522, 534 (Iowa 2017).  In the case of a magistrate’s jurisdiction to extend 
no-contact orders in simple misdemeanor cases, we must interpret Iowa 
Code section 602.6405 to coincide with Iowa Code chapter 664A to avoid 
absurd results.  See State v. Nail, 743 N.W.2d 535, 540–41 (Iowa 2007) 
(“[W]e necessarily operate on the objective assumption that the 
legislature strives to create a symmetrical and harmonious system of 
laws” and may interpret statutes “by reference to other similar statutes 
 
 
 
7 
or other statues related to the same subject matter.”).  As noted 
previously, Iowa Code section 602.6405(1) states in relevant part that 
“[m]agistrates have jurisdiction of simple misdemeanors.”  Iowa Code 
§ 602.6405(1).  While nothing in section 602.6405 explicitly mentions 
chapter 664A, Iowa Code section 664A.2(1) provides that no-contact 
orders are applicable to criminal offenses involving a “public offense for 
which there is a victim.”  Id. § 664A.2(1).  Vance pled guilty to a simple 
misdemeanor—harassment in the third degree—that involved victims.  
Thus, his offense falls squarely within the offenses for which a magistrate 
can, at the very least, issue a no-contact order under chapter 664A. 
Contrary to the argument forwarded by Vance that a magistrate’s 
jurisdiction is limited to the trial phase of simple misdemeanor cases, 
nothing in the language of Iowa Code section 602.6405 or chapter 664A 
specifically limits the magistrate’s jurisdiction to the trial phase of simple 
misdemeanor cases.  “Statutory text may express legislative intent by 
omission as well as inclusion,” so we may not expand or alter the 
language of a statute in a way that is not evident from the legislature’s 
word choice within the statute.  State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 730 N.W.2d 677, 
679 (Iowa 2007).  Vance is asking us to read a limitation into the 
jurisdiction of magistrates that is not present in the wording of the 
statute.  If the legislature wanted to limit the jurisdiction of a magistrate 
to solely govern the trial phase of simple misdemeanors, it could have 
expressly stated as much.  However, it did not, and we may not expand 
or alter the language of Iowa Code section 602.6405 to create this 
distinction since it is not evident from the language used by the 
legislature that it intended to create this limitation.  See id. 
Similarly, the legislature never distinguishes between a magistrate 
and other district court judges in Iowa Code section 664A.8, which would 
 
 
 
8 
bar a magistrate from extending a no-contact order in a simple 
misdemeanor case.  Iowa Code section 664A.8 provides,  
Upon the filing of an application by the state or by the 
victim of any public offense referred to in section 664A.2, 
subsection 1, which is filed within ninety days prior to the 
expiration of a modified no-contact order, the court shall 
modify and extend the no-contact order for an additional 
period of five years, unless the court finds that the defendant 
no longer poses a threat to the safety of the victim, persons 
residing with the victim, or members of the victim’s family.  
The number of modifications extending the no-contact order 
permitted by this section is not limited. 
Iowa Code § 664A.8.  Had the legislature sought to limit the jurisdiction 
of a magistrate to only the issuance of an initial no-contact order in a 
simple misdemeanor case, without giving the magistrate the power to 
subsequently modify or terminate it, it could have expressed this intent 
within the statute.  Yet, the legislature declined to implement this 
limitation on the jurisdiction of a magistrate, and it is not for us to read a 
limitation into the statute that is not evident from its language or 
purpose.  See Iowa Dist. Ct., 730 N.W.2d at 679. 
Further, Iowa Code chapter 664A contains a number of provisions 
supporting our interpretation that a magistrate has subject matter 
jurisdiction throughout the pretrial and posttrial stages of simple 
misdemeanor cases that would allow the magistrate to extend a no-
contact order.  For example, a magistrate has the authority to enter a no-
contact order when a person is brought before the magistrate for an 
initial appearance for offenses that include harassment, stalking, 
violating a protective order that arose from a domestic abuse assault or 
sexual abuse, or public offenses involving victims.  See Iowa Code 
 
 
 
9 
§ 664A.3(1) (2018)1 (authorizing a magistrate to enter a no-contact order 
“[w]hen a person is taken into custody for contempt proceedings 
pursuant to section 236.11, taken into custody pursuant to section 
236A.12, or arrested for any public offense referred to in section 664A.2, 
subsection 1”); id. § 664A.2(1) (explaining the applicability of no-contact 
orders when a person allegedly violates certain statutes).  Likewise, Iowa 
Code section 664A.3 states that a no-contact order “has force and effect 
until it is modified or terminated by subsequent court action,” and 
“[u]pon final disposition of the criminal or juvenile court action, the court 
shall terminate or modify the no-contact order pursuant to section 
664A.5.”  Id. § 664A.3(1), (3).  Nothing in this section distinguishes 
between magistrates and other district court judges. 
Additionally, the legislature declined to exclude magistrates or 
simple misdemeanors when it granted “the court” the sentencing 
authority to “enter a no-contact order or continue the no-contact order 
already in effect for a period of five years from the date the judgment is 
entered or the deferred judgment is granted” for any offense covered 
under section 664A.2.  Id. § 664A.5.  The legislature went so far as to 
designate 
certain 
violations 
of 
no-contact 
orders 
as 
simple 
misdemeanors, thereby granting the magistrate jurisdiction to hear cases 
arising out of violations of these no-contact orders and authorizing the 
magistrate to enter another no-contact order.  See id. § 664A.7(5).  It 
would be absurd and incongruent with the rest of chapter 664A to hold 
that section 664A.8 distinguishes between magistrates and other district 
court judges in bestowing authority to extend no-contact orders.  
                                                 
1Following Vance’s hearing, the Iowa legislature amended Iowa Code sections 
664A.1, 664A.2, 664A.3, 664A.4, 664A.5, and 664A.7 to incorporate the newly enacted 
Sexual Abuse Act of chapter 236A.  See Iowa Acts 2017 ch. 121, §§ 26–32. 
 
 
 
10 
Chapter 664A clearly encompasses magistrates within the pretrial and 
posttrial stages of simple misdemeanor cases. 
Moreover, to give a magistrate jurisdiction to enter a no-contact 
order at the pretrial and trial phase of a simple misdemeanor,  and then 
deprive a magistrate of jurisdiction to extend or modify this no-contact 
order in a posttrial proceeding, would create problematic results within 
our criminal justice system.  The simple misdemeanors that magistrates 
preside over are “commenced by filing a subscribed and sworn to 
complaint” rather than a trial information with minutes.  Iowa R. Crim. 
P. 2.54.  Also, simple misdemeanor trials are not reported “unless a party 
provides a reporter at such party’s expense,” or the magistrate opts to 
report them electronically.  Id. r. 2.67(9).  Otherwise, the magistrate is 
only required to “make minutes of the testimony of each witness and 
append the exhibits or copies thereof.”  Id.  Consequently, if the 
magistrate was stripped of jurisdiction over the no-contact order in 
simple misdemeanor cases after trial, the district court or associate 
district court judge presiding over the requested modification of the no-
contact order would be forced to reach a decision based on a sparse 
record.  In many cases, this would not provide the full factual extent of 
what occurred in the underlying proceedings.  We doubt the legislature 
intended to create an inconvenient and impracticable statute.  See Iowa 
Code § 4.4(4) (“In enacting a statute, it is presumed that . . . [a] result 
feasible of execution is intended.”). 
Overall, nothing in chapter 664A or section 602.6405 expressly 
precludes a magistrate from extending a no-contact order in simple 
misdemeanor cases.  Although Vance correctly points out that section 
602.6405 does not mention chapter 664A to grant magistrates 
jurisdiction over simple misdemeanor cases, it is clear from reading these 
 
 
 
11 
provisions together that a magistrate has jurisdiction to extend a no-
contact order in simple misdemeanor cases.  Consequently, we need not 
address the claim by Vance that the associate district court judge could 
not lawfully extend the no-contact order because the extension was void 
from its inception. 
B.  A Defendant’s Legal Avenue for Challenging the Extension 
of a No-Contact Order in Simple Misdemeanor Cases.  No right of 
appeal exists from the magistrate’s extension of a no-contact order in a 
simple misdemeanor case.  Rule 2.73(1) of the Iowa Rules of Criminal 
Procedure provides that “an appeal may only be taken by the defendant 
. . . upon a judgment of conviction.”  Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.73(1).  With 
regard to simple misdemeanors, “the Code prescribes appellate 
jurisdiction within the district court for certain parties and does not 
provide an avenue for appellants to bypass that jurisdiction.”  In re M.W., 
894 N.W.2d 526, 532 (Iowa 2017).  Therefore, rule 2.73 does not 
authorize any form of discretionary review.  Id. 
Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a) governs appeals from the district 
court where the defendant is the appellant and states that the “[r]ight of 
appeal is granted the defendant from . . . [a] final judgment of sentence, 
except in case of simple misdemeanor and ordinance violation 
convictions.”  Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a) (2017).  Section 814.6(2)(d) further 
states that discretionary review may be available from a simple 
misdemeanor conviction.  Id. § 814.6(2)(d).  The extension of the no-
contact order was a collateral matter to Vance’s underlying criminal 
proceeding that stood separately from his conviction and sentence.  
Consequently, there is no right of direct appeal to our court from the 
magistrate’s order under rule 2.73 or discretionary review from the 
associate district court judge’s ruling under section 814.6(2)(d).  
 
 
 
12 
Additionally, because we find that the magistrate had subject matter 
jurisdiction to extend the no-contact order in this case, Vance cannot 
collaterally attack the judgment in district court through a motion to 
vacate based on his claim that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction. 
Notably, we specifically authorized discretionary review in this case 
pursuant to Iowa Code section 814.6(2)(e).  Vance filed a notice of appeal 
to the district court from the order extending his no-contact order for an 
additional five years pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.73.  
Subsequently, Vance filed a timely notice of appeal to us from the 
associate district court judge’s ruling, and we issued an order directing 
Vance to file an application for discretionary review pursuant to Iowa 
Code section 814.6(2).  We granted the application for discretionary 
review because this case involved “[a]n order raising a question of law 
important to the judiciary and the profession,” and we specifically 
directed the parties to brief the two issues that we found raised 
important legal questions.  Iowa Code § 814.6(2)(e).  But, for the reasons 
set forth below, we find that the extension of a simple misdemeanor no-
contact order, or a district court’s appellate ruling on such extension, is 
not the proper subject of an application for discretionary review.  We 
conclude that the most appropriate method to treat an appeal of this 
nature is through a petition for writ of certiorari.  Certiorari would be 
first sought from the district court pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil 
Procedure 1.1401. 
Rule 1.1401 states, “A party may commence a certiorari action 
when authorized by statute or when the party claims . . . a judicial 
magistrate exceeded proper jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally.”  
Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1401.  Rule 2.73 of the Iowa Rules of Criminal 
Procedure would then come into play if the petition is granted because it 
 
 
 
13 
guides the procedure of appellate review from a magistrate’s decision in a 
simple misdemeanor case.  See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.73(3).  Under rule 
2.73, “[i]f the original action was tried by a judicial magistrate, the appeal 
shall be decided by a district judge or district associate judge.”  Id.  This 
aligns with the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure, which state, “A district 
court judge may order the issuance of a writ to an inferior tribunal, 
board, or officer, or to a judicial magistrate.”  Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1404.   
After the appeal of a decision by the magistrate on the extension of 
a no-contact order has gone through this process in the district court, 
the only other remedy that the defendant has to challenge the extension 
is through a petition for writ of certiorari under rule 6.107 of the Iowa 
Rules of Appellate Procedure.  See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1412 (“An appeal 
[from an order or judgment of the district court in a certiorari proceeding] 
is discretionary when the order or judgment sought to be reviewed is 
itself a discretionary review of another tribunal, board, officer, or 
magistrate.”).  Rule 6.107(1) allows a party to file a petition for writ of 
certiorari if the party is “claiming a district court judge, an associate 
district court judge, an associate juvenile judge, or an associate probate 
judge exceeded the judge’s jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally.”  Iowa 
R. App. P. 6.107(1).  While this language does not expressly include 
claims that a magistrate exceeded its jurisdiction or acted illegally, we 
have previously held that “our constitutional powers to issue writs to, 
and exercise supervisory and administrative control over, other judicial 
tribunals” provides us with the authority to review petitions for writs of 
certiorari to challenge a magistrate action.  State v. Davis, 493 N.W.2d 
820, 822 (Iowa 1992). 
Since a district court reviews the decision of a lower tribunal for 
correction of errors at law, “a review on the record is not equivalent to a 
 
 
 
14 
proceeding 
where 
the 
appellate 
court 
makes 
its 
own 
factual 
determinations or receives additional evidence before announcing its 
sentence.”  State v. Bower, 725 N.W.2d 435, 447–48 (Iowa 2006); see also 
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.73(3) (binding the district court to findings of fact in 
the original action so long as those facts are supported by substantial 
evidence).  Certiorari is particularly appropriate in handling claims that 
“a lower court or tribunal has exceeded its authority or otherwise acted 
illegally” by making findings that are not supported by substantial 
evidentiary support or improperly applying the law.  Iowa Dist. Ct., 828 
N.W.2d at 611.  We find this approach most logical to review the 
extension of a no-contact order after it has already been appealed and 
reviewed by the district court.  Accordingly, we will treat the notice of 
appeal and accompanying briefs as a petition for writ of certiorari.  See 
State v. Propps, 897 N.W.2d 91, 97 (“[I]f a case is initiated by a notice of 
appeal, but another form of review is proper, we may choose to proceed 
as though the proper form of review was requested by the defendant 
rather than dismiss the action.”); see also Iowa R. App. P. 6.108. 
C.  Sufficiency of the Evidence.  Vance claims the magistrate 
and associate district court judge both made findings that were not 
supported by substantial evidence in the record when it decided to 
extend his no-contact order for an additional five years.  He argues that 
the mere assertion by Amy Staudt that she wanted the order continued 
for the safety of herself and her family, without more evidence, was 
insufficient to extend his one-year no-contact order for an additional five 
years.  We agree. 
When the State or victim requests the modification or extension of 
a no-contact order, Iowa Code section 664A.8 states that 
 
 
 
15 
the court shall modify and extend the no-contact order for an 
additional period of five years, unless the court finds that the 
defendant no longer poses a threat to the safety of the victim, 
persons residing with the victim, or members of the victim’s 
family. 
Iowa Code § 664A.8 (emphasis added).  Vance argues this provision is 
unconstitutionally vague because it does not allocate or explain the 
burden of proof, or the circumstances that must be shown to extend a 
no-contact order.  However, section 664A.8 can be construed to avoid 
constitutional adjudication, so we need not address this constitutional 
argument regarding the alleged vagueness of the statute.  See Simmons 
v. State Pub. Def., 791 N.W.2d 69, 74 (Iowa 2010) (“Only if the statute 
cannot bear a constitutional construction do we consider the merits of 
the constitutional issues.”). 
Nothing in the language of Iowa Code section 664A.8 explicitly 
places the burden of proof on the defendant.  Yet, the language of the 
statute implies this by requiring the court to extend the no-contact order 
“unless the court finds that the defendant no longer poses a threat” to 
the protected parties.  Iowa Code § 664A.8.  Further, nothing in the 
language of Iowa Code section 664A.8 requires the victim or the State to 
claim or prove that the defendant violated the existing order to show the 
defendant poses a continuing threat.  Similarly, the court presiding over 
the extension hearing need not consider the defendant’s needs or how he 
or she may be negatively affected by the extension of the no-contact 
order.  This coincides with the purpose of the statute to “grant the court 
express authority to extend the duration of no-contact orders when the 
circumstances require continuing protection.”  Ostergren v. Iowa Dist. 
Ct., 863 N.W.2d 294, 299 (Iowa 2015).  Thus, it is clear from the 
statutory language and purpose of section 664A.8 that the statute 
 
 
 
16 
prioritizes the safety of the victims and places the burden of proof upon 
the defendant to show that he or she no longer poses a threat.   
Additionally, although the statute does not explicitly provide the 
standard of proof a defendant must meet to show he or she no longer 
poses a threat, no-contact orders are “civil in nature and based only 
upon a determination of probable cause and a need to protect the safety 
of another.”  State v. Wiederien, 709 N.W.2d 538, 543 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, 
J. dissenting).  We have likewise previously noted that no-contact orders 
are analogous to injunctions.  Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 
898 N.W.2d 127, 135 (Iowa 2017) (citing Iowa Code section 664A.5 
governing no-contact orders as support for the proposition that a 
permanent injunction may be subject to court-ordered time limits).  
Given the analogous relationship between no-contact orders and 
injunctions, we can apply the same preponderance-of-the-evidence 
standard of proof governing similar injunctions to establish that the 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies under Iowa Code section 
664A.8.  See Wiederien, 709 N.W.2d at 544; see also Iowa Code 
§ 236.4(1) (codifying the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard as the 
standard of proof to justify a temporary protective order in domestic 
abuse cases); Kennedy v. Oleson, 100 N.W.2d 894, 896 (Iowa 1960) 
(holding the standard of proof for an injunction is the preponderance of 
the evidence).  Consequently, if the defendant proves by a preponderance 
of the evidence that he or she no longer poses a threat to the protected 
persons, the court should not extend the no-contact order for an 
additional five years. 
As noted above, on an appeal from a magistrate decision, 
“[f]indings of fact in the original action shall be binding on the judge 
deciding the appeal if they are supported by substantial evidence.”  Iowa 
 
 
 
17 
R. Crim. P. 2.73(3).  However, we are not convinced that the findings of 
the magistrate that Vance continues to pose a threat to the protected 
persons, and in turn the decision of the associate district court judge to 
affirm those findings, were supported by substantial evidence in the 
record.  To the contrary, Vance proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he is no longer a threat to the Staudts that would warrant 
an extension of the no-contact order.  Consequently, we find the district 
court erred in its decision to affirm the extension of the no-contact order 
for an additional five years. 
The record before us is largely devoid of any evidence explaining 
the underlying conduct that gave rise to the civil no-contact order.  
However, this case is not about domestic abuse or sexual harassment.  
There is no evidence that the conduct giving rise to the no-contact order 
ever involved violence, the threat of violence, or that the physical safety 
of any member of the Staudt family was of concern.  At the extension 
hearing, Staudt testified the case was brought on by “unsolicited and 
unreciprocated texts and tweets, Snapchats, and phone calls.”  Yet, at 
the same extension hearing, Staudt testified that Vance had not 
contacted them “through texts or calls or social media, Snapchats, 
anything along that lines” during the year since the no-contact order at 
issue was entered.  The only evidence offered to show that Vance 
continued to pose a threat to the Staudts was the testimony by Amy 
Staudt that she was worried her family’s relationship with Vance would 
go back to the way it was before the civil no-contact order was entered.  
Still, Staudt agreed that Vance had fully complied with the no-contact 
order. 
Additionally, Vance presented evidence that he posed no threat to 
the Staudts.  William Vetter, a Charles City police officer, testified that 
 
 
 
18 
Vance had fully complied with the no-contact order.  He explained that 
he has known Vance for ten years in a professional capacity and that he 
could not think of any reason why Vance should not be allowed at 
school-sponsored events.  He further testified that Vance had never been 
prone to violence or posed a threat to the safety of anyone in the 
community. 
Moreover, Vance testified about his own compliance with the no-
contact order.  The only interaction Vance and the Staudts had during 
the term of the no-contact order was a coincidental encounter at the 
local gas station when Amy Staudt and her son arrived at the gas station 
while Vance was already there.  To ensure his own compliance with the 
no-contact order, Vance contacted the police and made them aware of 
the situation while it was happening.  The record contains absolutely no 
other interactions between Vance and the Staudts during the time the 
no-contact order was in place.  Vance made clear at the extension 
hearing that he wants nothing to do with the Staudts and poses no 
threat.  Vance acknowledged that he was fighting the extension of the no-
contact order out of a desire to attend his daughter’s school-sponsored 
events, which he cannot do under the no-contact order. 
Given 
the 
testimony 
of 
both 
Vance 
and 
Officer 
Vetter 
demonstrating that Vance did not continue to pose a threat to the 
protected parties, there is no substantial evidence in the record to 
support the finding by the magistrate and associate district court judge 
that Vance continued to pose a threat to the Staudts.  To the contrary, 
the substantial evidence in the record clearly demonstrates that Vance 
does not pose a continued threat to the Staudt family warranting an 
extension of the no-contact order.  Additionally, all parties acknowledged 
that Vance had fully complied with the terms and conditions of the no-
 
 
 
19 
contact order.  However, in reaching our decision, we are not holding 
that mere compliance with the terms of a no-contact order, while 
important, should by itself foreclose the possibility of the extension of a 
no-contact order.  This would be particularly true if the original conduct 
at issue involved violence or the threat of violence. 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the district court to extend 
the no-contact order for a period of five years and remand this case for 
the entry of an order terminating the no-contact order.  In light of our 
disposition of the appeal, we need not address the additional claims that 
Vance presented in his brief in support of his overall request for us to 
reverse the extension of his no-contact order. 
IV.  Conclusion. 
For the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that the magistrate 
had subject matter jurisdiction to hear and decide the issue of the 
extension of the no-contact order.  However, we reverse the decision of 
the district court to extend the no-contact order for an additional five 
years.  We remand to the district court for entry of an order terminating 
the no-contact order. 
WRIT SUSTAINED; CASE REMANDED.