Case Title: VICTOR L. McMURRY v, ROBYN LOVING McMURRY

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0039

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
VICTOR L. McMURRY v, ROBYN LOVING McMURRY2010 WY 163Case Number: No. S-10-0039Decided: 12/15/2010NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

VICTOR 
L. McMURRY,Appellant (Plaintiff),v.ROBYN LOVING 
McMURRY,Appellee (Defendant).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sublette County

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Weston 
W. Reeves and Anna Reeves Olson, Park Street Law Office, Casper, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Reeves.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Kim 
D. Cannon and Alison Ochs of Davis & Cannon, Sheridan, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Cannon.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Victor 
L. McMurry (Husband), challenges the Decree of Divorce entered of record by the 
district court on December 9, 2009.  
Husband contends the district court's conclusion that Husband intended to 
gift one-half of his overriding royalty interests to Appellee, Robyn Loving 
McMurry (Wife), is clearly erroneous.  
He also contends that the district court abused its discretion by 
allocating one-half of the parties' combined estates to Wife.  Finally, he contends that the district 
court erred by awarding Wife attorney's fees when she plainly did not need them 
to defend the action.  We will 
affirm the decree of divorce in all respects, as well as the award of attorney's 
fees.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Husband raises 
these issues:

 
 
A.  Whether 
the trial court's conclusion that [Husband] intended to gift one-half of his 
overriding royalty interests to [Wife] was clearly 
erroneous.

 
 
B.  Whether 
the erroneous finding that [Husband] intended his overriding royalties to be 
joint property removed from the analysis of factors material to finding an 
equitable division of assets, the required consideration of "the party through 
whom the property was acquired."

 
 
C.  Whether 
the trial court abused its discretion by allocating one-half of the parties' 
combined estates to [Wife].

 
 
D.  Whether 
the trial court abused its discretion by awarding [Wife] attorney's fees when 
she plainly did not need them to defend the action.

 
 
Wife 
summarizes the issues like this:

 
 
1.  Did 
the district court abuse its discretion by awarding Wife approximately one-half 
of the marital assets?

 
 
2.  Did 
the district court abuse its discretion in awarding Wife her attorney's fees and 
costs?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      Husband's 
Complaint for Divorce was filed in the district court on July 29, 2005.  The parties stipulated to a 
comprehensive list of the assets owned by them.  That list included jointly held 
property, as well as property owned by the parties separately.  The parties were married in the summer 
of 1981.  Wife lived in the parties' 
Phoenix home for over 20 years preceding the trial in this matter and is very 
much attached to that home.

 
 
[¶4]      A very 
significant piece of evidence in this case was the testimony of Robert 
Taylor.  Taylor's services were 
arranged for by Wife's attorney.  He 
created a report entitled "Assessment of Future Care Needs."  In that report he concludes that Wife 
cannot care for herself at all and needs around the clock care and 
supervision.  She will continue to 
need that care as long as she lives.  
Based on an evaluation of Wife's current living expenses, an estimate was 
produced that the approximate sum of $9,000,000.00 would be needed to maintain 
her living circumstances in her home in Phoenix for a period of 28.5 years.  Wife was born during the autumn of 
1953.  One of Husband's central 
claims is that Wife's annual living expenses could be dramatically reduced if 
the large, expensive home she currently occupies was sold in favor of more 
modest accommodations (i.e., $200,000.00 townhouse versus $1,000,000.00 family 
home).  He also points to other 
living expenses, including three automobiles, which are in excess of her 
needs.

 
 
[¶5]      There are very 
few facts in dispute.  The principal 
source of controversy in this case arises because much of the marital estate was 
amassed through gifts from Husband's father.  The deposition of Neil McMurry is a part 
of the record on appeal.  In that 
deposition he explains the circumstances surrounding his gifts of property to 
his son.  In his testimony at trial, 
Husband explained his handling of the property gifted to him by his 
Father.

 
 
[¶6]      The district 
court resolved the disputes over the division of the marital estate in an 18 
page Decision Letter and a nine-page Decree of Divorce.  The district court divided the marital 
estate of approximately $18 million into, more or less, two equal shares.  In addition, the district court ordered 
that Husband pay to wife $106,421.94 for her attorney's fees and court 
costs.  We will include other 
pertinent facts in our discussion of the individual 
issues.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶7]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-114 (LexisNexis 2009) provides:

 
 
§ 
20-2-114. Disposition of property to be equitable; factors; alimony 
generally.

 
 
In 
granting a divorce, the court shall make such disposition of the property of the 
parties as appears just and equitable, having regard for the respective merits 
of the parties and the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the 
party through whom the property was acquired and the burdens imposed upon the 
property for the benefit of either party and children.  The court may decree to either party 
reasonable alimony out of the estate of the other having regard for the other's 
ability to pay and may order so much of the other's real estate or the rents and 
profits thereof as is necessary be assigned and set out to either party for 
life, or may decree a specific sum be paid by either party. 

 
 
[¶8]      Our jurisprudence 
provides us with many applicable precedents.  In Warren v. Warren, 361 P.2d 525, 526-27 
(Wyo. 1961) we iterated these basic principles which endure to this 
day:

 
 
[O]n 
several previous occasions this court has announced these principles with 
respect to property divisions in divorce cases:  (1)  In making a division of property under 
the statute the trial court exercises a discretion; (2) there are no hard and 
fast rules to control its action; (3) the statute does not require an equal 
division; (4) a just and equitable division is as likely as not to be unequal; 
and (5) the decision of the trial court should not be disturbed, except on clear 
grounds, as that court is usually in a better position than the appellate court 
to judge of the respective merits and needs of the 
parties.

 
 
Also 
see, Barbour v. Barbour, 518 P.2d 12, 
15-16 (Wyo. 1974); Kane v. Kane, 577 P.2d 172, 174-76 (Wyo. 1978); Breitenstine v. Breitenstine, 2003 WY 
16, ¶ 9, 62 P.3d 587, 590-91 (Wyo. 2003); Wallop v. Wallop, 2004 WY 46, 88 P.3d 1022 (Wyo. 2004); Humphrey v. 
Humphrey, 2007 WY 72, ¶¶ 8-15, 157 P.3d 451, 453-55 (Wyo. 
2007).

 
 
[¶9]      In Moss v. Moss, 2007 WY 67, ¶ 4, 156 P.3d 316, 317-18 (Wyo. 2007) we repeated our longstanding view 
that:

 
 
            
The division of marital property is within the sound discretion of the 
district court.  Hall v. Hall, 2005 WY 166, ¶ 5, 125 P.3d 284, 286 (Wyo. 2005); DeJohn v. 
DeJohn, 2005 WY 140, ¶ 11, 121 P.3d 802, 807 (Wyo. 2005); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 2004 WY 68, ¶ 9, 91 P.3d 922, 925 (Wyo. 2004).  We 
afford the district court considerable discretion to structure a distribution 
scheme appropriate to the peculiar circumstances of the case, and we will not 
disturb its determination absent clear grounds demonstrating that the court 
abused its discretion.  Hoffman, ¶ 9, 91 P.3d  at 925.  Whether the district court's property 
division is just and equitable is evaluated from the perspective of the overall 
distribution of marital assets and liabilities rather than the effects of any 
particular disposition.  Dunham v. Dunham, 2006 WY 1, ¶ 6, 125 P.3d 1015, 1016-17 (Wyo. 2006).  We 
generally defer to the district court's findings since it is in a better 
position to assess the witnesses' credibility, weigh the evidence and judge the 
respective merits and needs of the parties.  Sweat v. Sweat, 2003 WY 82, ¶ 6, 72 P.3d 276, 278 (Wyo.2003).  We will find 
an abuse of discretion when the property disposition shocks the conscience of 
the Court and appears to be so unfair and inequitable that reasonable people 
could not abide it.  Hall, ¶ 5, 125 P.3d  at 286; Mann v. Mann, 979 P.2d 497, 500 (Wyo. 
1999).

 
 
[¶10]   Husband asserts that the district 
court did not give adequate consideration to the source of Husband's 
wealth.  The record reveals that the 
district court made findings about the origin of all of the assets in the 
marital estate.  The district court 
gave full recognition to the circumstance that Husband received gifts from his 
father which included stock in a family owned company and overriding royalties 
paid on production from Jonah Field.  
At the time the gifts were made, they did not have the value they came to 
have after the discovery of the magnitude of the productivity of the mineral 
reserves contained therein.  In 
support of his argument, Husband relies in part on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-201 
(LexisNexis 2009).  That statute 
provides:

 
 
§ 
20-1-201. Separate estate of real and personal property; not subject to control 
of spouse; exceptions.

 
 
            
All property belonging to a married person as his separate property which 
he owns at the time of his marriage or which during marriage he acquires in good 
faith from any person by descent or otherwise, together with all rents, issues, 
increase and profits thereof, is during marriage his sole and separate property 
under his sole control and may be held, owned, possessed and enjoyed by him the 
same as though he were single.  Such 
property is not subject to the disposal, control or interference of his spouse 
and is exempt from execution or attachment for the debts of his spouse if the 
property was not conveyed to him by his spouse in fraud of his creditors.  The necessary expenses of the family and 
the education of the children are chargeable upon the property of both husband 
and wife, or either of them, for which they may be sued jointly or 
separately.

 
 
[¶11]   When that statute is considered in 
light of § 20-2-114, it is clear that it does not affect the district court's 
discretion to "make such disposition of the property of the parties as appears 
just and equitable."  Rather, it 
speaks only to the limitations on the availability of separate property of one 
spouse, to the other spouse, during the course of the 
marriage.

 
 
[¶12]   Husband contends that there is no 
evidence that Husband's father intended the "gift" of overriding royalties to 
confer one-half of Husband's interest to Wife.  However, that argument begs the 
issue.  Even if the property was 
Husband's separate property, it was still within the jurisdiction of the 
district court to divide between husband and wife, incidental to dissolution of 
the marriage and the distribution of all marital assets.

 
 
[¶13]   Husband also appears to argue that 
because this Court has often affirmed divisions of marital estates that were not 
50/50, indeed some of them were more like 90/10, then that circumstance serves 
to support his contention that the 50/50 split in this case, wherein most of the 
wealth to be divided can be traced to Husband, is an abuse of discretion.  See France v. France, 902 P.2d 701, 702-6 
(Wyo. 1995).  A review of this 
Court's decisions does not show much of a "pattern," of any sort.  Indeed, it might well be said that the 
division of marital estates is at best a hodgepodge of decision with little 
rhyme or reason.  However, at 
bottom, that is just what is contemplated by our often applied standards of 
review.  Each case is to be decided 
on its unique set of facts and circumstances and this Court will not interfere 
unless and until the record as a whole clearly establishes that the property 
division is so irrational as to shock the conscience of the Court.  That level of irrationality is not 
present here.  Indeed, we will go so 
far as to say that a 50/50 split of the assets is likely the "ideal" in many 
cases.

 
 
[¶14]   While our cases most often 
emphasize that the division of marital property in circumstances like these is, 
as likely as not, not to be two "equal" shares, we have never held or even 
intimated that an almost exact 50/50 split of the marital estate is likely to be 
an abuse of discretion.  Although 
our cases have never held that "equitable" means "equal," likewise we have never 
held that "equal" shares are not "equitable."  Our cases are very clear on the point 
contested by Husband, i.e., all property of the parties is subject to 
distribution.  Humphrey, ¶¶ 12-15, 157 P.3d 454-55.

 
 
[¶15]   We hold that the distribution of 
assets fashioned by the district court was not an abuse of discretion, and it 
does not shock the conscience of this Court.

 
 
The 
Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs

 
 
[¶16]   The district court's authority to 
award a spouse attorney's fees and costs is found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-111 
(LexisNexis 2009):

 
 
§ 
20-2-111. Alimony during pendency of action; allowances for prosecution or 
defense of action; costs.

 
 
            
In every action brought for divorce, the court may require either 
party to pay any sum necessary to enable the other to carry on or defend the 
action and for support and the support of the children of the parties during 
its pendency.  The court may decree 
costs against either party and award execution for the costs, or it may direct 
costs to be paid out of any property sequestered, in the power of the court, or 
in the hands of a receiver.  The 
court may also direct payment to either party for such purpose of any sum due 
and owing from any person.  
[Emphasis added.]

 
 
[¶17]   In Weiss v. Weiss, 2009 WY 124, ¶¶ 8-9, 217 P.3d 408, 410-11 (Wyo. 2009), we explained:

 
 
Although 
Wyoming generally subscribes to the American rule regarding the recovery of 
attorney's fees, under which rule each party pays his or her own fees, a 
prevailing party may be reimbursed for attorney's fees when provided for by 
contract or statute.  Forshee v. Delaney, 2005 WY 103, ¶ 7, 
118 P.3d 445, 448 (Wyo. 2005).  In 
determining the reasonableness of the fees requested, our trial courts are to 
follow the federal lodestar test, which requires a determination of "(1) whether 
the fee charged represents the product of reasonable hours times a reasonable 
rate; and (2) whether other factors of discretionary application should be 
considered to adjust the fee either upward or downward."  Id. at ¶ 7, at 448;  Shepard v. Beck, 2007 WY 53, ¶ 17 n. 5, 
154 P.3d 982, 989 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
            
The statute relied upon to award attorneys' fees in this case was Wyo. 
Stat.  Ann. § 20-2-111, the 
provisions of which are set forth above.  
See supra ¶ 6 n. 2. The statute does not require the party requesting 
an award of fees to prove financial necessity, nor is the award meant to 
punish the non-prevailing party.  Black v. De Black, 1 P.3d 1244, 1252 
(Wyo. 2000); Hendrickson v. 
Hendrickson, 583 P.2d 1265, 1268 (Wyo. 1978).

 
 
[T]he 
decision to award attorney's fees under Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 20-2-111 rests within the sound 
discretion of the district court.  
Russell v. Russell, 948 P.2d 1351, 1355-56 (Wyo. 1997); Rocha v. 
Rocha, 925 P.2d 231, 234 (Wyo. 1996).  
The party seeking to recover attorneys' fees bears the burden of 
establishing the reasonableness of the fees requested.  Id.

 
 

Seherr-Thoss 
v. Seherr-Thoss, 
2006 WY 111, ¶ 12, 141 P.3d 705, 712 (Wyo. 2006).  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
[¶18]   In Black v. DeBlack, 1 P.3d 1244, 1252-53 
(Wyo. 2000) we spoke directly to the use of the word "necessary" as used in the 
above-cited statute:

 
 
The 
purpose of attorney fees in a divorce case is to assist the party, as necessary, 
so that the party can carry on or defend the action.  Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 583 P.2d 1265, 1268 (Wyo. 1978); Prentice v. 
Prentice, 568 P.2d 883, 886 (Wyo. 1977).  The party seeking to recover attorney's 
fees bears the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of the fees and must 
submit an itemized bill reflecting the time and rate charged.  Pekas v. Thompson, 903 P.2d 532, 536 
(Wyo. 1995) (quoting Hinckley v. 
Hinckley, 812 P.2d 907, 915 (Wyo. 1991)).  Even though Hessel [f/k/a DeBlack] and 
Black are both independently wealthy, the statute does not require that Hessel 
establish financial necessity for the award of attorney's fees and costs.  Rocha, 925 P.2d  at 234.  Hessel attached an itemized list of her 
expenses to her Reply to Defendant's Response and Objection to Plaintiff's Bill 
of Costs and Attorney's Fees.  That 
document was sufficient to establish reasonableness in light of the expenditures 
Black made to create his elaborate presentations in this case.  Hessel's expenses under the 
circumstances were reasonable and necessary to a defense against the attack 
mounted by Black on the Decree of Divorce.  
We find in this record more than sufficient information to permit the 
district court reasonably to decide as it did, and nothing indicates that the 
decision was arbitrary or capricious.  
In the absence of an abuse of discretion, we affirm the order awarding 
Hessel attorney fees and costs.

 
 
Also 
see Rocha v. Rocha, 925 P.2d 231, 234 
(Wyo. 1996).

 
 
[¶19]   In this case Husband did not 
challenge the reasonableness of the attorney's fees.  He suggests that the Court has written 
the word "necessary" out of the statute by judicial construction/fiat.  Husband contends that Wife had ample 
money to pay her own attorney's fees.  
We believe Husband has missed the mark completely in this analysis.  The award of attorney's fees in cases 
such as this is not designed to punish one party or the other, it is only 
designed to allow for the payment of such attorney's fees, within the sound 
discretion of the district court, in those circumstances where the expenditures 
become "necessary" for a party because that party has no choice but to incur the 
expenses in defending against, or pursuing, a complaint for divorce.  In such cases a party does not act 
voluntarily to incur rather large attorney's fees such as those at issue here, 
but rather because such expenditures are made essential given the 
circumstances.  See Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary, "necessary," 1511 (1986).  
The remainder of Husband's argument merely points out various cases 
wherein this Court either did or did not affirm an award of attorney's 
fees.  For more than a decade we 
have applied this explanation of judicial discretion:  "Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously."  Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 
1998).  The district court did not 
abuse its discretion by ordering an award of attorney's fees to 
Wife.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶20]   The Decree of Divorce and the order 
awarding Wife attorney's fees are affirmed.