Case Title: Charles Ruffing v. Ada County Paramedics, et al. Injury sustained while on duty as firefighter

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2008-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
DOCKET NO. 33514 
 
 
CHARLES RUFFING,                                          
 
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          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent,     
                                                            
v.                                                          
                                                            
ADA COUNTY PARAMEDICS and 
BARBARA LINDY MC PHERSON,         
and JOHN DOES I through II                             
                                                            
           Defendants-Respondents-Cross     
           appellants.         
                                                                                 
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Boise, May 2008 Term 
 
Opinion No. 79 
 
Filed: June 11, 2008 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Ada County.  Hon. Darla S. Williamson, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is vacated and the case is remanded.  
 
Richard S. Owen, Nampa, for appellant. 
 
Herzfeld & Piotrowski, LLP, Boise, for Amicus Curiae Professional Firefighters of 
Idaho and International Association of Firefighters Local Union 149.  Alan Herzfeld 
argued.   
 
Greg Bower, Ada County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, Boise, for respondents.  
Ray J. Chacko argued.   
 
_____________________ 
 
J. JONES, Justice 
 
Charles Ruffing, a Boise firefighter, sued the Ada County Paramedics and one of its 
employees, Barbara McPherson, after he sustained an injury while on duty.  The district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.  Ruffing appeals, arguing the district court 
erred in several respects.  Ada County cross-appeals, arguing the district court erred when it denied 
its expert witness costs.  We vacate the district court’s decision and remand.   
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I. 
 
Charles Ruffing sued Ada County Paramedics and Barbara McPherson, an employee of Ada 
County Paramedics, after he sustained an injury while on duty as a firefighter with Boise City.  On 
the day of the incident, Ruffing and McPherson were housed together at Fire Station 3, which is 
located on Gekeler Lane.  In keeping with their usual practice for medical calls, both the firefighters 
and a paramedic team responded to a call that evening from Chili’s Restaurant on Broadway 
Avenue.  After medical assistance was rendered to the patient, the firefighters loaded her into the 
paramedics’ ambulance.  Ruffing then assisted McPherson in backing the ambulance.  While she 
was backing the ambulance, McPherson hit a parked car.  Ruffing alleges his left leg became pinned 
between the ambulance and the parked car, causing the injury for which he sought damages.  
 
Ada County filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming Idaho’s fireman’s rule barred 
Ruffing’s suit.  Alternatively, Ada County argued that worker’s compensation provided Ruffing’s 
exclusive remedy based on the joint operations between the parties.  The district court granted 
summary judgment, finding the fireman’s rule barred Ruffing’s personal injury action for public 
policy reasons.  In addition, the district court found that Ada County was Ruffing’s statutory 
employer for worker’s compensation purposes, since the paramedics and firefighters were engaged 
in a joint function at Fire Station 3.  Therefore, worker’s compensation provided Ruffing’s 
exclusive basis for recovery.  The district court awarded Ada County $2,951.35 in costs as a matter 
of right, and $337.50 in discretionary costs.  The court denied Ada County’s requested expert 
witness fees on the basis that the deposition testimony of Ruffing’s treating physicians was for the 
purpose of setting forth factual evidence, not expert opinions.   
 
Ruffing appeals to this Court, arguing the district court erred by expanding Idaho’s 
fireman’s rule to preclude his recovery.  In addition, Ruffing alleges the district court improperly 
applied I.C. § 72-223 to the facts of this case because Ada County is not his statutory employer.  
The Professional Fire Fighters of Idaho and International Association of Fire Fighters Local Union 
149 filed an amicus brief in support of Ruffing’s argument that the fireman’s rule should not apply 
to the facts of this case.  Ada County cross-appeals, alleging the district court erred when it denied 
its expert witness costs. 
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II. 
 
In this case, we consider whether the fireman’s rule bars recovery for Ruffing’s injury; 
whether Ada County is Ruffing’s statutory employer under I.C. § 72-223; and whether Ada County 
is entitled to recover expert deposition costs for deposing Ruffing’s treating physicians. 
A. 
 
On appeal from a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, this Court applies the same 
standard used by the district court originally ruling on the motion.  Carnell v. Barker Mgmt., Inc., 
137 Idaho 322, 326, 48 P.3d 651, 655 (2002).  Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.”  Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c).  The court must construe all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving 
party, and draw all reasonable inferences it can draw in favor of the nonmoving party.  Carnell, 137 
Idaho at 327, 48 P.3d at 656.  Summary judgment is appropriate where the nonmoving party bearing 
the burden of proof fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 
essential to the party’s case.  Id.  If the evidence reveals no disputed issue of material fact, only a 
question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review.  See Farm Credit Bank of 
Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 272-73, 869 P.2d 1365, 1367-68 (1994). 
B. 
The first issue revolves around the interpretation and application of the “so-called ‘fireman’s 
rule,’ which provides that neither a fireman nor a policeman may recover in tort when his injuries 
are caused by the same conduct that required his official presence.”  Winn v. Frasher, 116 Idaho 
500, 501, 777 P.2d 722, 723 (1989).  Because of the unusual posture of the Winn case – an 
interlocutory appeal of a summary judgment order holding the fireman’s rule to be inoperable in the 
State of Idaho – the court ruled narrowly, holding the rule to be operable in Idaho but declining to 
flesh out its contours or apply it to the facts at issue there.  After rejecting several legal theories for 
adopting the fireman’s rule, the Court determined public policy was the most appropriate rationale 
for its adoption.  “We are persuaded that public policy is the appropriate ground for us to consider 
whether the fireman’s rule should apply in Idaho.”  Id. at 503, 777 P.2d at 725.  
The Court relied heavily on a Michigan Supreme Court decision, Kreski v. Modern 
Wholesale Electric Supply, 415 N.W.2d 178 (Mich. 1987), in evaluating the public policy 
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considerations behind its adoption of the rule.  The Court said, “The policy arguments for adopting 
a fireman’s rule stem from the nature of the service provided by fire fighters and police officers, as 
well as the relationship between these safety officers and the public they are employed to protect.”  
Id. at 503, 777 P.2d at 725 (quoting Kreski, 415 N.W.2d at 186-87).  In addition, “The public hires, 
trains, and compensates fire fighters and police officers to deal with dangerous, but inevitable 
situations.  Usually, especially with fires,  negligence causes the occasion for the safety officer’s 
presence.”  Id. (quoting Kreski, 415 N.W.2d at 186-87).  The Court continued, “It is this 
relationship between police officers, fire fighters, and society which distinguishes safety officers 
from other employees.  Thus, safety officers are not ‘second-class citizens,’ but, rather, are 
‘different’ than other employees.”  Id. (quoting Kreski, 415 N.W.2d at 186-87).  Thus, this Court 
adopted the firefighter’s rule in Idaho: “For similar policy reasons, we declare that the fireman’s 
rule applies in Idaho.”  Winn, 116 Idaho at 503, 777 P.2d at 725.   
 
There was one concurring opinion, one special concurrence, and one dissent in Winn.  Both 
parties rely in part on statements from these opinions to support their claims.  Ruffing and amici 
contend the opinions support its contention that the Court must read the rule narrowly.  The special 
concurrence expresses a reluctance to judicially adopt the rule.  Id. at 504, 777 P.2d at 726 (Bistline, 
J., specially concurring) (“My initial impulse is to dissent on the basis that the establishment of the 
fireman’s rule is a matter for the legislature.”).  The concurring opinions express concern that the 
majority declined to clarify the precise parameters of the rule.  See, e.g., id. (“I suggest that meat be 
added to this bare bones statement of the rule.”).  These concerns, along with the narrow scope the 
plain language of the rule commands, lead us to conclude we should read the rule narrowly here.  It 
is the Legislature’s prerogative to expand the rule should it desire to do so. 
Ruffing and amici argue the district court’s decision expands the fireman’s rule as stated in 
Winn.1  They contend the expansion “exposes Idaho fire fighters, police officers and emergency 
medical service providers to an even greater range of risks without recourse to the tort law 
protection available to other members of society.”  Amici argue that Winn¸ the only Idaho case to 
consider the fireman’s rule, supports their proposition that courts must define and apply the 
fireman’s rule “as narrowly as possible.”  Specifically, amici contend the rule does not extend to 
immunize third-party co-responders.  They claim that McPherson’s alleged negligence occurred 
                                                 
1 As noted above, the Professional Fire Fighters of Idaho and International Association of Fire Fighters Local Union 149 
filed an amicus brief in this case.  The amicus brief addresses the fireman’s rule, which Ruffing’s brief expressly adopts.  
Ruffing’s briefing focuses primarily on the worker’s compensation issue. 
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after and independently from the original call for medical assistance.  Thus, it is not “the same 
conduct that required [Ruffing’s] official presence.”  Therefore, amici conclude the Winn Court 
would not have extended the fireman’s rule to bar Ruffing’s claims “against a third party for 
negligence which was wholly unrelated to his reasons for being present on the scene and which 
occurred after his arrival at the scene.”   
 
Ada County relies heavily on the public policy grounds set out in Kreski.  According to Ada 
County, the district court properly looked to Kreski when it held that the risks associated with and 
inherent in Ruffing’s work fell within the ambit of the fireman’s rule.  Since the Court in Winn 
decided only the specific question of whether the fireman’s rule exists in Idaho, it left a 
determination of the parameters of the rule to the district courts to develop in light of specific 
factual situations presented to them.  Here, the district court highlighted the following public policy 
reasons: 
The important public policy of encouraging agencies to work together is vital to 
the orderly and rational operation of the various public safety agencies employed 
within a city.  Fear of being sued by an employee of the other agency for 
negligence could stifle an employee’s or agency’s response to a public safety 
emergency. 
 
While we do not necessarily disagree with the district court, we observe that these public policy 
considerations are primarily the business of the Legislature.  We now turn to consideration of the 
specifics of this case. 
 
As stated in Winn, neither a firefighter nor a police officer may recover in tort when his 
injuries are caused by the same conduct that required his official presence.  See Winn, 116 Idaho at 
501, 777 P.2d at 723.  Although the EMT units and firefighters were clearly involved in a joint 
safety operation, the particular conduct that caused Ruffing’s injury falls outside the ambit of the 
rule stated in Winn.  It was a call to respond jointly to a medical emergency which required both 
Ruffing’s and McPherson’s presence on the scene.  However, the conduct that required Ruffing’s 
presence was the medical emergency of a woman in Chili’s restroom.  McPherson’s backing of the 
ambulance, which caused Ruffing’s alleged injury, was not the “same conduct” that required his 
official presence.  In order for the fireman’s rule to reach the circumstances here, we would have to 
expand the rule stated in Winn, and we are not inclined to do so.  Therefore, we find the fireman’s 
rule does not bar Ruffing’s claim here.  The decision of the district court to the contrary is 
overruled. 
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C. 
Although it held that the fireman’s rule barred Ruffing’s claim, the district court further held 
Ada County was Ruffing’s statutory employer and, therefore, worker’s compensation provided 
Ruffing’s exclusive remedy.  We disagree. 
I.C. § 72-209(1) provides that the liability of the employer under the worker’s compensation 
law shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of the employer to the employee, subject to 
the provisions of section 72-223.  (emphasis added).  I.C. § 72-102(13)(a) defines “employer” as 
“any person who has expressly or impliedly hired or contracted the services of another.”  I.C. 
§ 72-102(13)(a) (emphasis added).  I.C. § 72-223 governs third party liability.  The statute excludes 
two primary groups from third party liability: (1) employers of contractors and subcontractors 
(72-216) who have complied with 72-301 (security for payment of compensation); and (2) the 
owner or lessee of premises, or other person “who is virtually the proprietor or operator of the 
business there carried on.”  I.C. § 72-223(1).  Aside from these exclusions, action may be instituted 
against any third party by the employee.  Id.  Ada County argues it is a statutory employer based on 
the first category, which excludes it from potential third party liability under I.C. § 72-223.  The 
district court agreed, finding that although there was no contractual relationship between Ada 
County and Boise City, the parties nevertheless engaged in a joint function.  The district court found 
this joint function sufficient, applying Kolar v. Cassia County, Idaho, 142 Idaho 346, 127 P.3d 962 
(2005).   
In Kolar, the plaintiff contended the Legislature’s reference to “contractors or 
subcontractors” in § 72-223 excluded independent contractors from statutory employer status.  
Kolar, 142 Idaho at 352, 127 P.3d at 968.  This Court rejected that argument and held that the 
respondents were category one employers, immune from suit.  Id. at 353, 127 P.3d at 969.   
First, we have categorized independent contractors who employed the injured 
worker as “contractors or subcontractors” within the meaning of § 72-223. . . . An 
“employer” is “any person who has expressly or impliedly hired or contracted the 
services of another.”  I.C. § 72-102(12)(a).  This definition “includes contractors 
and subcontractors.”  Id.  It is undisputed that the respondents contracted the 
services of JUB Engineers.  They are therefore an “employer” within the meaning 
of that term as it is found in § 72-223(1). 
 
Id. at 352, 127 P.3d at 968 (additional citations omitted).  The Court further noted that Kolar was 
the direct employee of JUB (the subcontractor), which operated under a contract with an owner of 
the construction project.  Id. at 353, 127 P.3d at 969.  See also Venters v. Sorrento Delaware, Inc., 
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141 Idaho 245, 249, 251, 108 P.3d 392, 396, 398 (2005) (Sorrento qualified as a statutory employer 
of Venters “simply because of its contractual relationship with 3-C Trucking”); Robison v. 
Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 213, 76 P.3d 951, 957 (2003) (“There are a number of recent 
cases addressing the scope of statutory employer liability without considering the nature of the 
business being contracted in relation to the nature of the contracting party’s business. . . . In these 
cases, the contract itself, including identifying the specific contracting parties, is of primary 
import.”); Pierce v. Sch. Dist. #21, 144 Idaho 537, 539, 164 P.3d 817, 819 (2007) (discussing 
application of the category one statutory employer concept, “In each of these cases the court looked 
at the contractual employment relationship between the parties and whether the direct employer 
provided worker’s compensation coverage.”). 
 
Kolar does not apply under the facts here.  In Kolar, there was a direct contractual 
relationship between Kolar’s actual employer and the purported statutory employer.  In this case, 
there is no evidence of a contract between the two agencies.  Although the agencies work together, 
Ada County does not contend there was a contractual relationship between them.  The case before 
us is factually distinct from cases where this Court has applied the category one exception to grant 
the employer immunity.  Because there is no evidence of a contract here, there can be no statutory 
employer relationship.  Therefore, worker’s compensation does not preclude Ruffing’s third party 
suit against Ada County.  The district court’s decision to the contrary is overruled. 
D. 
The district court awarded Ada County the costs it incurred below, except for expert witness 
fees incurred in taking the depositions of Ruffing’s treating physicians.  Ada County has cross-
appealed, claiming that the district court erred in failing to grant expert witness fees.  However, 
because of our vacation of the district court’s summary judgment, this issue has been rendered 
moot.  We vacate the cost award.   
III. 
We vacate the district court’s summary judgment order in its entirety and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  Costs on appeal are awarded to Ruffing. 
 
Chief Justice EISMANN, and Justices BURDICK, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.