Case Title: Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Associates

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-151-01

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2003-11-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Plaintiff's attorney filed a medical malpractice complaint against defendants alleging negligent treatment of plaintiff's fractured left heel. Several months before filing suit, plaintiff's attorney retained a board certified orthopedic surgeon to review plaintiff's records and provide an affidavit, pursuant to the Affidavit of Merit statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to 29, attesting to the merits of the claim. After receiving a verbal opinion from the surgeon, plaintiff's attorney filed the complaint on May 31, 2000. On August 17, 2000, defendants filed and served their answer and demanded, in part, the production of a medical expert affidavit. Plaintiff's attorney claimed that the answer was incorrectly filed in his office and that he did not see it until January 2001. The Affidavit of Merit statute requires service of an affidavit on the defendant with 120-days of the filing of the answer. Within ten days of the filing of the answer, plaintiff's attorney received the signed affidavit of merit from the surgeon, but he inadvertently failed to provide it to defense counsel. Discovery proceeded. Defense counsel made no further request for the affidavit during the 120-day period. Eighteen days after the statutory deadline, plaintiff's attorney was advised by defense counsel during a telephone conversation that no affidavit had been served. Plaintiff's attorney faxed the affidavit to defense counsel the same day. Approximately two weeks later, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint with prejudice for failing to comply with the Affidavit of Merit statute. The trial court granted the motion and the Appellate Division affirmed. HELD : Principles of equity and the essential goals of the Affidavit of Merit statute to eliminate frivolous lawsuits are not advanced by dismissing the complaint in this case in which the plaintiff possessed an affidavit of merit within the 120-day statutory period and served the affidavit on defense counsel outside that time frame but before defense counsel filed the motion to dismiss. 1. Pursuant to the Affidavit of Merit statute, plaintiff must show that the complaint is meritorious by obtaining an affidavit from an appropriate, licensed expert attesting to the reasonable probability of professional negligence. The statute further requires that the plaintiff provide the affidavit to the defendant within sixty days of the filing of the answer or, for good cause shown, within an additional sixty-day period. Finally, plaintiff's failure to serve the affidavit within 120 days of the filing of the answer is considered tantamount to the failure to state a cause of action, subjecting the complaint to dismissal with prejudice. (Pp. 6 8). 2. The Affidavit of Merit statute has dual purposes. Those purposes are to weed out frivolous lawsuits early in the litigation while, at the same time, ensuring that plaintiffs with meritorious claims will have their day in court. The legislative purpose was not to create a minefield of hyper-technicalities in order to doom innocent litigants possessing meritorious claims. Therefore, the Court has recognized two equitable remedies that temper the results of an inflexible application of the statute. A complaint will not be dismissed if the plaintiff can show that he or she substantially complied with the statute. Further, a complaint will be dismissed without prejudice if there are extraordinary circumstances to explain noncompliance. (Pp. 8 9). 3. Plaintiff's counsel did not meet the requirements of substantial compliance, nor did the misfiling of the answer and failure to calendar the matter constitute extraordinary circumstances. However, plaintiff's counsel complied with the underlying purpose of the statute by having an expert verify the meritorious nature of the claim at an early stage of the case. Defendants do not contend that they suffered prejudice by the late service of the affidavit. Nor did defendants request the affidavit at any point between the filing of the answer and the end of the 120-day statutory period. It was not until after the receipt of the affidavit that defendants filed the motion to dismiss. Under those circumstances, the Court concludes that defendants should be estopped from claiming entitlement to dismissal as a remedy. (Pp. 9 12). 4. The Affidavit of Merit statute was intended to flush out insubstantial and meritless claims that have created a burden on innocent litigants and detracted from the many legitimate claims that require the resources of the civil justice system. The statute was not intended to encourage gamesmanship or a slavish adherence to form over substance. The statute was not intended to reward defendants who wait for a default before requesting that the plaintiff turn over the affidavit of merit. In a case where the plaintiff has in hand an affidavit within the 120-day statutory period and serves the affidavit on defense counsel outside that time frame but before defense counsel files a motion to dismiss, the defendant shall not be permitted to file such a motion based on the late arrival of the affidavit. If defense counsel files a motion to dismiss after the 120-day deadline and before plaintiff has forwarded the affidavit, the plaintiff should expect that the complaint will be dismissed with prejudice provided the doctrines of substantial compliance and extraordinary circumstances do not apply. (Pp. 12 13). 5. To ensure that discovery related issues, such as compliance with the Affidavit of Merit statute, do not become sideshows to the primary purpose of the civil justice system to shepherd legitimate claims expeditiously to trial the Court proposes that an accelerated case management conference be held within ninety days of the service of an answer in all malpractice actions. At the conference, the court will address all discovery issues, including whether an affidavit of merit has been served on defendant. If an affidavit has been served, defendant will be required to advise the court whether he or she has any objections to the adequacy of the affidavit. If there is any deficiency in the affidavit, plaintiff will have to the end of the 120-day time period to conform the affidavit to the statutory requirements. If no affidavit has been served, the court will remind the parties of the obligation. Early court intervention in the discovery process will permit the Affidavit of Merit statute to fulfill its true purpose. This proposal does not restrict the flexibility of trial courts to convene additional case management conferences to facilitate the discovery process and motion practice. (Pp. 13 15). The decision of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED. JUSTICE LONG wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which JUSTICE ZAZZALI and JUDGE PRESSLER join, agreeing with the majority's decision to reinstate the complaint, but disagreeing with the majority's rationale. Justice Long contends that Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218 (1998), should be modified to limit a dismissal with prejudice to those cases in which a plaintiff cannot or will not produce an affidavit of merit, and to permit trial judges a panoply of discretionary remedies to address procedural deficiencies in complying with the Affidavit of Merit statute. JUSTICE ZAZZALI wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by JUDGE PRESSLER, expressing reservations about the constitutionality of the Affidavit of Merit statute. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA and WALLACE join in JUSTICE ALBIN's opinion. JUSTICE LONG filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which JUSTICE ZAZZALI and JUDGE PRESSLER, temporarily assigned, join. JUSTICE ZAZZALI filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which JUDGE PRESSLER joins. JUSTICE VERNIERO did not participate. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 151 September Term 2001 AGOSTINO FERREIRA and MARGARIDA FERREIRA, h/w, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RANCOCAS ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCIATES and BRUCE W. WULFSBERG, M.D., Defendants-Respondents. Argued March 3, 2003 Decided November 24, 2003 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Mark R. Cuker argued the cause for appellants (Williams Cuker & Berezofsky, attorneys). Jeremy P. Cooley argued the cause for respondents (Lenox, Socey, Wilgus, Formidoni, Brown, Giordano & Casey, attorneys). Abbott S. Brown argued the cause for amicus curiae, Association of Trial Lawyers of America-New Jersey (Bendit Weinstock, attorneys). Justice ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. The Affidavit of Merit statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to 29, requires a plaintiff in a malpractice action to serve on a defendant within 120 days of receipt of the answer an expert s sworn statement attesting that there exists a reasonable probability that the professional s conduct fell below acceptable standards. The Legislature enacted the statute with the laudatory purpose of weeding out frivolous lawsuits early in the process. The statute does not impose overly burdensome obligations. The plaintiff must keep an eye on the calendar and obtain and serve the expert s report within the statutory timeframe. This seemingly simple scheme has generated a tide of litigation and a new area of jurisprudence as this Court and our appellate courts have grappled with the derelictions of plaintiffs counsel, who have filed well-grounded complaints, but have neglected to file technically correct or timely affidavits. The failure to deliver a proper affidavit within the statutory time period requires a dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 242 (1998). Beginning with Cornblatt, we have fashioned equitable remedies to mitigate the harshness of a rigid application of the statute that would result in the dismissal of an otherwise meritorious cause of action. In this case, plaintiff s attorney possessed an affidavit of merit ten days after the receipt of the answer well within the time permitted by the statute to serve the affidavit on opposing counsel. The validity of the complaint is not at issue. Due to inadvertence, plaintiff s attorney served the affidavit eighteen days out-of-time, but before defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with the statutory deadline. We hold that this case is a suitable candidate for equitable relief. This case brings to mind the adage that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Therefore, going forward, we will require case management conferences in the early stage of malpractice actions to ensure compliance with the discovery process, including the Affidavit of Merit statute, and to remind the parties of the sanctions that will be imposed if they do not fulfill their obligations. The statute was one of five bills passed as part of a 1995 tort reform package designed to strike[] a fair balance between preserving a person s right to sue and controlling nuisance suits. Palanque v. Lambert-Woolley, 168 N.J. 398, 404 (2001) (quoting Office of the Governor, News Release 1 (June 29, 1995)); Cornblatt, supra, 153 N.J. at 228. See footnote 1 The statute imposes a set of procedural requirements in order for a plaintiff to maintain a professional malpractice action. Cornblatt, supra, 153 N.J. at 228-29. First, the plaintiff must show that the complaint is meritorious by obtaining an affidavit from an appropriate, licensed expert attesting to the reasonable probability of professional negligence. N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27; Palanque, supra, 168 N.J. at 404. Second, the affidavit must be provided to the defendant within sixty days of the filing of the answer or, for good cause shown, within an additional sixty-day period. N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27; Burns v. Belafsky, 166 N.J. 466, 470-71 (2001). Third, the plaintiff s failure to serve the affidavit within 120 days of the filing of the answer is considered tantamount to the failure to state a cause of action, subjecting the complaint to dismissal with prejudice. N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-29; Palanque, supra, 168 N.J. at 404; Cornblatt, supra, 153 N.J. at 247. The statute also places certain burdens on the defendant to provide the documents necessary for the preparation of the affidavit by the plaintiff s expert. In the absence of compliance with a document request, the plaintiff may provide a sworn statement, in lieu of the affidavit, certifying that the necessary records were not made available. N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28. The Legislature did not intend to give medical malpractice defendants the power to destroy a meritorious malpractice action by refusing to provide the very records the expert would need to prepare the affidavit. Barreiro v. Morais, 318 N.J. Super. 461, 470 (App. Div. 1999). Our cases have repeatedly emphasized the dual purpose of the Affidavit of Merit statute: to weed out frivolous lawsuits early in the litigation while, at the same time, ensuring that plaintiffs with meritorious claims will have their day in court. Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 395 (2001); see Palanque, supra, 168 N.J. at 404 (stating that Legislature intended to curtail frivolous litigation without preventing access to the courts for meritorious claims ); Galik, supra, 167 N.J. at 359 ( there is no legislative interest in barring meritorious claims brought in good faith ). The legislative purpose was not to create a minefield of hyper-technicalities in order to doom innocent litigants possessing meritorious claims. Mayfield v. Community Med. Assocs., P.A., 335 N.J. Super. 198, 209 (App. Div. 2000). We have recognized consistent with our understanding of its legislative intent two equitable remedies that temper the draconian results of an inflexible application of the statute. A complaint will not be dismissed if the plaintiff can show that he has substantially complied with the statute. Palanque, supra, 168 N.J. at 405-06; Fink v. Thompson, 167 N.J. 551, 561-65 (2001); Galik, supra, 167 N.J. at 351-59; Cornblatt, supra, 153 N.J. at 239-42. Moreover, a complaint will be dismissed without prejudice if there are extraordinary circumstances to explain noncompliance. Palanque, supra, 168 N.J. at 404-05; Cornblatt, supra, 153 N.J. at 246-47. In Cornblatt, supra, we first applied the doctrine of substantial compliance in the context of the Affidavit of Merit statute. 153 N.J. at 239-42. The doctrine is invoked so that technical defects will not defeat a valid claim. Id. at 239; see also Galik, supra, 167 N.J. at 352 ( It is a doctrine based on justice and fairness, designed to avoid technical rejection of legitimate claims. ) The doctrine requires the moving party to show: (1) the lack of prejudice to the defending party; (2) a series of steps taken to comply with the statute involved; (3) a general compliance with the purpose of the statute; (4) a reasonable notice of petitioner's claim; and (5) a reasonable explanation why there was not strict compliance with the statute. Galik, supra, 167 N.J. at 353, 347-48 (finding substantial compliance where plaintiff did not file affidavit within statutory time frame, but plaintiff s counsel, before initiating suit, provided defendants insurance carriers with two detailed expert s reports that established legitimacy of complaint and served as basis for settlement discussions); Palanque, supra, 168 N.J. at 405 (finding substantial compliance doctrine not satisfied where plaintiff had expert s report in hand before filing suit, but failed to provide defendant with affidavit of merit or expert s report within 120 days after filing of answer); Fink, supra, 167 N.J. at 561-64 (finding substantial compliance where timely-served affidavit and extensive expert s report clearly focused on conduct of defendant and his relationship to malpractice case, even though both documents failed to name defendant doctor); Cornblatt, supra, 153 N.J. at 239-242 (finding substantial compliance where plaintiff served timely certification instead of affidavit). Although we have yet to define the full scope of extraordinary circumstances as an equitable remedy for failure to comply with the statute, we do know that attorney inadvertence is not such a circumstance entitling plaintiff to a remedy of dismissal of a complaint without prejudice. Palanque, supra, 168 N.J. at 405. In the present case, plaintiff s counsel was in possession of the affidavit of merit within ten days of the filing of the answer. Moreover, plaintiff s counsel had complied with the underlying legislative purpose by having an expert verify the meritorious nature of the malpractice claims at an early stage of the case. Defendants do not contend that they suffered prejudice by the eighteen-day late service of the affidavit. There was no delay in the proceedings or unnecessary expense incurred by defendants as a result of the affidavit s tardy arrival. Defendants did not request the affidavit at any point between the filing of the answer and the end of the 120-day statutory period. Significantly, it was not until after the receipt of the affidavit that defendants filed the motion to dismiss. Although this case satisfies most of the factors necessary to establish substantial compliance with the statute, it nevertheless falls short of the mark. As in Palanque, supra, plaintiff s counsel did not, within the statutory time frame, take steps to forward the affidavit to opposing counsel. 168 N.J. at 405-06. Moreover, counsel s carelessness in misfiling defendant s answer and failing to calendar this matter does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance. See id. at 405. That, however, does not end our equitable analysis. This plaintiff possessed the affidavit of merit almost at the time the clock began to run and served the affidavit before defendants filed a motion to dismiss. In that respect, he stands apart from the plaintiffs in Palanque, Fink, and Galik, who did not serve affidavits that conformed to the statute until after defendants had filed motions to dismiss. Ordinarily, one would expect the defendant who claims to be prejudiced by the failure to receive discovery to file an appropriate motion based on its absence, not on the occasion of its receipt. We do not fault defendants for attempting to enforce the time requirements of the Affidavit of Merit statute to their advantage. However, principles of equity and the essential goal of the statute to eliminate frivolous lawsuits are not advanced by dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff s malpractice action was verified by an expert as meritorious within 120 days of the filing of defendants answer and served on defendants only eighteen days later. Defendants waited until after they received the affidavit to file the dismissal motion. Under those circumstances, we conclude that defendants should be estopped from claiming entitlement to dismissal as a remedy. We do not condone the misfiling of pleadings by plaintiff s counsel or his failure to use the simple expedient of a calendar as a guard against inadvertence. The Association of Trial Lawyers of America-New Jersey, as amicus curiae, has urged this Court to adopt a rule that would require, as a condition of the filing of a malpractice action, the contemporaneous attachment of an affidavit of merit to the complaint. That would appear to be a disheartening concession that not all plaintiffs counsel can be expected to follow the time restrictions in the Affidavit of Merit statute. We cannot rewrite the statute, eliminating the time afforded to the diligent attorneys who follow its mandate, to create a fail-safe system for the few neglectful attorneys who do not. The Affidavit of Merit statute was intended to flush out insubstantial and meritless claims that have created a burden on innocent litigants and detracted from the many legitimate claims that require the resources of our civil justice system. The statute was not intended to encourage gamesmanship or a slavish adherence to form over substance. The statute was not intended to reward defendants who wait for a default before requesting that the plaintiff turn over the affidavit of merit. The rule we announce in this case will further the fundamental purpose of the Affidavit of Merit statute. In a case where the plaintiff has in hand an affidavit within the 120-day statutory period and serves the affidavit on defense counsel outside that time frame but before defense counsel files a motion to dismiss, the defendant shall not be permitted to file such a motion based on the late arrival of the affidavit. If defense counsel files a motion to dismiss after the 120-day deadline and before plaintiff has forwarded the affidavit, the plaintiff should expect that the complaint will be dismissed with prejudice provided the doctrines of substantial compliance and extraordinary circumstances do not apply. That formulation places strong incentives on both plaintiffs and defense counsel to act diligently. Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RANCOCAS ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCIATES and BRUCE W. WULFSBERG, M.D., Defendants-Respondents. Justice LONG, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I have no quarrel with the court s ultimate disposition of this matter. Reinstatement of the complaint is the obviously correct outcome. My point of departure from my colleagues is a global one. I am no longer willing to pen or join in the reasoning of yet another opinion that limns excessively fine distinctions solely to avoid the injustice that necessarily flows from the holding of Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218 (1998), that all deviations from the Affidavit of Merit statute warrant dismissal with prejudice except for the narrowly prescribed category of exceptional circumstances. I therefore write separately to express my view that it is time for Cornblatt to be modified. When the Legislature enacted the Affidavit of Merit statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to -29, as a tort reform measure, it declared that that initiative was designed to weed out frivolous lawsuits at an early stage and to allow meritorious cases to go forward. Galik v. Clara Maass Med. Ctr., 167 N.J. 341, 350 (2001) (citing Cornblatt, supra, 153 N.J. 242). Obviously underlying that scheme was the wholly unremarkable notion that, if a plaintiff in a malpractice case cannot obtain an expert s report regarding deviation, his or her claim should not stand. To relieve the system and individual litigants of the burdens of prosecuting and defending against such claims, the Legislature set forth within the statute a methodology for the filing of an affidavit of merit. N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27. Plaintiff s failure to provide an affidavit pursuant to the act is deemed a failure to state a cause of action. N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-29. In Cornblatt, this Court held that deviation from the Affidavit of Merit statute should result in a dismissal with prejudice except in extraordinary circumstances. Cornblatt, supra, 153 N.J. at 247 (citing Hartsfield v. Fantini, 149 N.J. 611, 618 (1997). In line with the legislative intent, Cornblatt was on firm legal ground in concluding that, if a plaintiff is unable to provide an affidavit of merit in a malpractice case, a fundamental element necessary to the ultimate rendering of a judgment (the fact of deviation) is absent. Presumably, that is what led the Court to state that [t]he violation giving rise to the dismissal goes to the heart of the cause of action as defined by the Legislature, Cornblatt, supra, 153 N.J. at 244, and to conclude that dismissal with prejudice is the proper response. Id. at 245 (citing Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989)). However, experience over the past eight years has taught us that there are two distinct classes of cases arising under N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27. The first is the class that infused Cornblatt. It makes perfect sense that, where a plaintiff is unable to provide an affidavit at all, the omission should be considered substantive, resulting in a merits-dismissal with prejudice. The vastly more common category is entirely different. It does not involve the inability of a plaintiff to produce an affidavit regarding deviation, but arises out of procedural slip-ups in filing or service or out of curable technical deficiencies. Such defects do not go to the heart of the cause of action. Indeed, because they do not reflect negatively on the merits of a plaintiff s malpractice claim, dismissing the complaint does nothing to advance the legislative goal of ridding the system of frivolous cases. On the contrary, it thwarts the stated aim of allowing meritorious cases to go forward. That was never the intention of the Legislature when it enacted the Affidavit of Merit statute. Accordingly, Cornblatt s mandatory dismissal with prejudice rule should be limited to those cases in which a plaintiff cannot or will not produce an affidavit of merit at all. Con-comitantly, trial judges should have available to them a full panoply of discretionary remedies for procedural deficiencies in complying with the Affidavit of Merit statute, including dismissal with or without prejudice and discovery-type sanctions such as reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the affidavit along with counsel fees. See R. 4:23-1 et. seq. In each case, the trial judge should assess the facts, including the willfulness of the violation, the proximity of trial and any prejudice that would accrue to the party aggrieved by the filing deviation, and apply the appropriate remedy. The availability of sanctions short of dismissal with prejudice would align the Affidavit of Merit procedure with R. 4:37-2(a) for the first time since the statute was enacted. Moreover, it would provide judges with a response that is proportionate to most procedural violations and also would serve to save for trial the meritorious cases of injured victims of malpractice. Nothing in the statute itself precludes such an approach. It is only Cornblatt that stands in the way. Modifying Cornblatt will not offend notions of stare decisis. Certain expectations about Affidavit of Merit litigation, particularly that it would spring from cases in which plaintiffs could not support their claims of deviation, obviously underpinned Cornblatt and directed its result. Those expectations have not materialized. In fact, the heartland of Affidavit of Merit cases involves nothing more than procedural mistakes that are entirely irrelevant to the legitimacy of the cause of action. That reality not only justifies but requires a modification of Cornblatt. Stare decisis operates to control change, not to prevent it. Fox v. Snow, 6 N.J. 12, 23 (1950)(Vanderbilt, J., dissenting). Indeed, as Justice Vanderbilt observed in Fox, that doctrine does not require us to adhere blindly to rules that have lost their reason for being. Ibid. The broad mandatory dismissal with prejudice language of Cornblatt falls into that category. Until it is modified, we will be required to continue on our course of painstakingly deconstructing the facts in every single Affidavit of Merit case in order to find some basis on which to escape Cornblatt and achieve a just result. Stare decisis does not require that of us. One final note. The preventive case management scheme the majority has put into place essentially carves a class of cases out of the template for case management set forth in R. 4:5. That rule was enacted as part of the Best Practices initiative and fundamentally altered the way cases are managed in order to render our system more effective and efficient. Under the majority s opinion, not only is the judicial discretion and flexibility that is a hallmark of R. 4:5 altered, but the very notion that a case-management conference is not automatic becomes a nullity. Given the ameliorative goals of the Best Practices revisions, that kind of piecemeal amendment of the new rules seems counter-productive at best. More importantly, I deem it unlikely that the court s innovation will forestall a new round of litigation. Rather, I see it as simply moving the field of battle to a different location. For those reasons, although I concur in the result, I cannot agree with the Court s rationale. Justice Zazzali and Judge Pressler join in this opinion. Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RANCOCAS ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCIATES and BRUCE W. WULFSBERG, M.D., Defendants-Respondents. Justice ZAZZALI, concurring in part and dissenting in part. The majority and concurring opinions represent positive efforts to address an intractable problem. I agree with the result reached by Justice Albin on behalf of the majority, a result that will salvage yet another meritorious claim from dismissal under the Affidavit of Merit statute. Although I concur in the majority s granting of relief to plaintiff, as to future cases I prefer the approach taken by Justice Long in her concurring opinion. I recognize that the Affidavit of Merit statute has important objectives, but I write separately to express my reservations about its constitutionality. Because the parties have not briefed nor argued the issue, it would be inappropriate to speak conclusively on the subject. Nonetheless, the question, which is a profound one, remains unresolved. I offer these observations. In Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 248 (1998), this Court discussed, but did not decide, whether the Affidavit of Merit statute impermissibly invades our exclusive power to regulate practice and procedure. In dicta, we suggested that the statute does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers. Ibid. Underlying that suggestion were two observations. First, we stated that [i]t is within the Legislature s authority to define a cause of action to include a limitations period within which the plaintiff must act. Ibid. (citing E.A. Williams Inc. v. Russo Dev. Corp., 82 N.J. 160, 164-67 (1980)). Second, we found that the Legislature s decision to require an affidavit of merit neither conflicted with our rules applying to malpractice suits nor interfered with the judiciary s role in resolving such disputes. Ibid. Notwithstanding that dicta, we noted that the constitutional issue did not generate significant . . . public concern, and, therefore, we found it unnecessary and inappropriate to deal conclusively with the question given that it had not been raised properly below. Ibid. Five years later, and after extensive litigation over strict application of the statute, one fairly can say that the affidavit-of-merit requirement has engendered significant concerns that call for a more thorough exploration of the statute s constitutionality. Indeed, numerous courts have struggled with the statute when its application would bar an apparently meritorious claim. See, e.g., Burns v. Belafsky, 166 N.J. 466, 478 (2001) (reasoning that because statute was not intended to bar meritorious claims, lawyer s inadvertent failure to file timely affidavit of merit did not preclude plaintiff from establishing good cause for sixty-day extension); Mayfield v. Cmty. Med. Assocs., 335 N.J. Super. 198, 209 (App. Div. 2000) (finding, under circumstances, that it would be wholly counter to the remedial purpose of the statute to dismiss [an] apparently meritorious action based on what would be no more than a merely mechanical application of the dry statutory words ). Whether the struggle encountered by our courts demonstrates that the Legislature has impinged on powers reserved to the judiciary remains an open question. Because the parties have not raised the matter, the well-intentioned majority opinion does not address it. Confined by our decision in Cornblatt, the majority attempts to reduce litigation over the statute by mandating a case-management conference, a measure that I hope will succeed on a practical level. However, I agree with Justice Long that the case-management requirement may become another source of litigation as parties dispute compliance with the mandate. In any event, we must begin to address the more fundamental question whether the statute unconstitutionally usurps judicial power. AGOSTINO FERREIRA and MARGARIDA FERREIRA, h/w, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RANCOCAS ORTHOPEDIC ASSOCIATES and BRUCE W. WULFSBERG, M.D., Defendants-Respondents. DECIDED November 24, 2003 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Albin CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY J.J., Long and Zazzali DISSENTING OPINION BY