Case Title: Mundy v. State

Citation: 214 N.E.2d 389, 247 Ind. 224

Docket Number: 30,458

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1966-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
247 Ind. 224 (1966)
214 N.E.2d 389
MUNDY
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 30,458.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed March 3, 1966.
*225 John G. Bunner, of Evansville, for appellant.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, for appellee.
MYERS, C.J.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Vanderburgh Circuit Court convicting appellant of the crime of manslaughter. He was indicted on the charge of second-degree murder. Following a plea of not guilty, he was tried by jury which returned a verdict finding him guilty of manslaughter as included in the indictment. A sentence of two to twenty-one years in the Indiana State Prison was imposed. A motion for new trial was filed and overruled. This appeal followed. The assignment of errors is based upon the overruling of the motion for new trial.
The only specification in the motion for new trial which the court needs to consider is No. 5, which reads as follows:
Appellant argues that this instruction attempts to distinguish between murder and manslaughter, but the last sentence thereof unequivocally states that even if there is sufficient provocation to rebut the presumption of malice, the killing is still unlawful and the offense is manslaughter. It is claimed that there is no explanation to the jury advising them that such killing might not be unlawful due to an act of self-defense. *227 Accordingly, appellant contends that this is an erroneous instruction which is reversible error.
Appellee says that the court deliberately did not attempt to explain self-defense in State's Instruction No. 7, but rather chose to set it out in separate instructions for the clarification of the jury. It argues the general rule that instructions are to be considered by the jury as a whole, and that it is not necessary to embrace all the law in one instruction, citing as authority Flowers v. State (1956), 236 Ind. 151, 139 N.E.2d 185, Southerland v. State (1936), 209 Ind. 308, 197 N.E. 841, and Bohan v. State (1924), 194 Ind. 227, 141 N.E. 323.
However, it is also the rule that an instruction correctly defining the law cannot cure an erroneous instruction unless such instruction is withdrawn or modified. Moore v. State (1948), 226 Ind. 428, 81 N.E.2d 669; Krauss v. State (1947), 225 Ind. 195, 73 N.E.2d 676; Brannin v. State (1943), 221 Ind. 123, 46 N.E.2d 599.
In the case at bar, appellant relied upon the doctrine of self-defense and submitted evidence pertaining thereto. State's Instruction No. 7 not only ignored this doctrine, but affirmatively excluded it from the jury's consideration. It states that a wilfully-intended killing is unlawful, although without malice, "because a man is bound to curb his passions and the offense is accordingly manslaughter." This is erroneous since a wilfully-intended killing may be excused in the eyes of the law if committed in self-defense. It is then a justifiable killing. Culp v. State (1944), 222 Ind. 202, 52 N.E.2d 486.
Appellee argues that the instruction explicitly stated that a "wilfully" intended death was unlawful; that using the word "wilfully" to modify the word "intended," the court meant more than just any intentional killing, but an unjustified, evil-designed and unlawful killing. The court, however, gave its own Instruction No. 7 which stated the definition of manslaughter as set forth in Burns' Ind. Stat., § 10-3405, 1956 Replacement, and which reads as follows:
In this context, the jury could have understood the words "wilfully intended death" to mean merely a "voluntary killing." If the court had meant something other than "voluntary" by use of the word "wilful," it could have met appellant's objections by inserting the words "unless justified or excused" following the phrase "but the killing is still unlawful."
State's Instruction No. 7 as read to the jury is erroneous. Although correct instructions were given on the law of self-defense, there is no way of knowing which ones the jury followed. For these reasons, the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded, with instructions to sustain appellant's motion for new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
Jackson, J., concurs. Arterburn, J., dissents. Achor and Rakestraw, JJ., not participating.
NOTE.  Reported in 214 N.E.2d 389.