Case Title: Locker v. How Soel, Inc

Citation: 

Docket Number: 37622

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2011-11-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 37622 
 
SHANNA R. LOCKER, 
 
       Claimant-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
HOW SOEL, INC., dba LOGAN’S  
FOODTOWN, Employer, and IDAHO  
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
 
       Respondents-Respondents on Appeal.                            
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Boise, June 2011 Term 
 
2011 Opinion No.  101  
 
Filed:  November 1, 2011 
 
Stephen Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho. 
 
The decision of the Industrial Commission is affirmed. 
 
Law Offices of Cynthia J. Woolley, PLLC, Ketchum, for appellant.  Cynthia J.  
Woolley argued. 
 
Salladay Law Office, Boise, for respondent How Soel, Inc. dba Logan’s   
Foodtown.  G. Lance Salladay argued. 
 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent Idaho  
Department of Labor.  Tracey K. Rolfsen argued. 
                     _______________________________________________ 
 
HORTON, Justice. 
Shanna Locker (Locker) appeals the Industrial Commission’s (Commission) finding that 
she was insubordinate when she failed to provide a medical release at the request of her 
employer, Logan’s Foodtown.  The Commission found that this constituted employment-related 
misconduct which rendered Locker ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits.  We affirm. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Locker was employed by Logan’s Foodtown from July 17, 2008 through June 1, 2009.  
During her interview for employment, Locker informed assistant manager Brian Cruz (Cruz) that 
she suffered from multiple sclerosis (MS).  Logan’s Foodtown hired Locker and employed her in 
a variety of positions, accommodating Locker’s MS-related limitations by scheduling her on 
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days that did not involve moving freight and allowing other employees to do heavy lifting or 
above-the-head reaching on Locker’s behalf.   
In April 2009, Locker took a six-week long medical leave in order to undergo and 
recover from a hysterectomy.  She returned to work on June 1, 2009.  Locker had expressed 
interest in becoming the deli manager, and she took up that role upon her return.  On Locker’s 
first day back to work, she engaged in a conversation with manager Barb Chandler (Chandler), 
which she characterized as “girl talk.”  In that conversation, Locker and Chandler spoke about 
hysterectomies.  Locker told Chandler that the surgery had been more difficult than she had 
expected, that she “still felt weak,” and that being on her feet at work had increased the bleeding 
she was experiencing after the surgery.   
On this first day back to work, after two to three hours performing inventory and freight 
duties, Locker informed Chandler and Cruz that she could not continue to work.  Although 
Locker later testified that balance problems caused by MS were causing her difficulty at work 
that day, both Cruz and Chandler testified that Locker did not mention her MS when she told 
them that she needed to leave work.  Locker testified that she did not tell Cruz or Chandler that 
she was in pain, however, the two managers testified to the contrary.  According to Chandler, 
Locker was crying and in visible pain.  Chandler informed Greg Jarolimek (Jarolimek), manager 
and part owner of Logan’s Foodtown, that Locker left work because she had not yet healed from 
the hysterectomy.   
Jarolimek testified that when Locker returned to work two days later, he told her he 
needed “some information from a doctor that would let me know what limitations she might 
have . . . . Or if she actually needed more time off, you know, something that would give me 
something that I could work with, you know, to plan for the next two or three weeks, you know, 
if she took more time.”  Jarolimek testified that Locker never provided a medical release as 
requested,1 which “made it hard for me to determine what she could or could not do. . . . [If] you 
bring me the information, I can determine what we can do, what changes we need to make . . . .”  
According to Jarolimek, he told Locker that “if you gave me something from your doctor, you 
know, so that we can determine what you can do and what you can’t do, you know.”   
                                                 
1 According to Locker, a nurse denied her request to obtain a medical release from her surgeon’s office.  Locker did 
not inform anyone at Logan’s Foodtown of this circumstance. 
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Later that week, Locker returned to Logan’s Foodtown to check the work schedule.  She 
had an impromptu meeting with Cruz, Chandler, and a third manager.  There is conflicting 
evidence in the record regarding the conversation that day.  Cruz testified that he told Locker “I 
was concerned for her safety and her well being and that . . . I needed a safety note from the 
doctor or a release note and she fired at me and she said are you firing me and I said, no, I’m not 
firing you, just concerned for your safety and until I get a note there is nothing I can do.”  Cruz 
also testified that “I just talked to her about her safety and well being and how I was under the 
impression of a doctor’s note that I needed, so I could tell what she could and could not do.”  
According to Chandler, however, she heard Cruz tell Locker that Locker “needed to be able to do 
the job details of a deli manager and that he had to let her go, because she cannot do that work 
entailed in that – in the lifting.”  Locker testified that she left the meeting with the clear 
impression that she was no longer employed by Logan’s Foodtown.  Locker left work and did 
not return. 
Locker filed for unemployment benefits, and the Idaho Department of Labor found her 
ineligible for benefits because she had quit without cause.  Locker appealed.  The appeals 
examiner affirmed the eligibility determination on alternative grounds, finding that Logan’s 
Foodtown had terminated Locker’s employment and that Locker had committed misconduct by 
failing to produce the requested medical release.  Locker appealed the issue to the Industrial 
Commission and asserted, for the first time, claims arising under the Family Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA).  The Commission concluded that Locker’s FMLA claims were waived as untimely and 
for lack of evidence that the Act was applicable, adopted the appeals examiner’s findings of 
fact,2 and affirmed the appeals examiner’s decision denying Locker’s request for unemployment 
benefits.  Locker appeals the Commission’s order and raises claims arising under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA).  Locker and the 
Department of Labor request attorney fees on appeal. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court upholds decisions of the Industrial Commission unless (1) the Commission 
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its powers; (2) the Commission’s findings of fact 
are not based on substantial and competent evidence; (3) the findings of fact, order or award 
                                                 
2 The adopted finding of fact most pertinent to this appeal states that Locker “was advised by [Cruz] that they were 
concerned for her safety and wellbeing and they needed a medical release.  [Cruz] advised [Locker] that he had to let 
her go as she had not shown that she could perform the job duties.”  (Emphasis added). 
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were procured by fraud; (4) as a matter of law, the findings of fact do not support the order or 
award.  I.C. § 72–732.  When this Court reviews a decision of the Industrial Commission, we 
exercise free review over questions of law.  Funes v. Aardema Dairy, 150 Idaho 7, ___, 244 P.3d 
151, 154 (2010) (citations omitted).  However, our review of questions of fact is limited to a 
determination of whether substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission’s 
findings.  Id.  “Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind 
might accept to support a conclusion.  Because the Commission is the fact finder, its conclusions 
on the credibility and weight of the evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are 
clearly erroneous.”  Id.   
III. ANALYSIS 
A.  The Commission’s conclusion that Locker was terminated for misconduct is supported 
by substantial and competent evidence. 
 
Article V, section 9 of the Idaho Constitution, conferring jurisdiction upon this Court to 
review orders of the Commission, applies to unemployment compensation cases.  Idaho Mut. 
Ben. Ass’n v. Robison, 65 Idaho 793, 800, 154 P.2d 156, 159 (1944).  This section provides, in 
pertinent part:  “On appeal from orders of the industrial accident board the court shall be limited 
to a review of questions of law.”  Id.; Idaho Const. art. V, § 9.  Thus, this Court is 
“constitutionally compelled to defer to the Industrial Commission’s findings of fact where 
supported by substantial and competent evidence.”  Teffer v. Twin Falls School Dist. No. 411, 
102 Idaho 439, 439, 631 P.2d 610, 610 (1981).   
Locker asserts that she was discharged because MS prevented her from performing the 
deli manager role and that the Commission’s conclusion that she was discharged for committing 
misconduct is not supported by the record.  We are constitutionally constrained to disagree. 
An employee is ineligible for unemployment benefits if she was “discharged for 
misconduct in connection with h[er] employment.”  I.C. § 72-1366(5).  The employer must prove 
misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence.  Appeals Exam’r of Idaho Dep’t of Labor v. J.R. 
Simplot Co., 131 Idaho 318, 320-21, 955 P.2d 1097, 1099-100 (1998).  Misconduct may take the 
form of “wilful, intentional disregard of the employer’s interest; a deliberate violation of the 
employer’s rules; or a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to 
expect of his employees.”  Johns v. S. H. Kress & Co., 78 Idaho 544, 548, 307 P.2d 217, 219 
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(1957).  Misconduct does not include “[m]ere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, [or] failure of 
good performance as the result of inability or incapacity.”  IDAPA 09.01.30.275.03.   
The Commission determined that the standards of behavior test applied to Locker’s case.  
That test requires the employer to prove that (1) the employee’s conduct fell below a standard of 
behavior (2) which the employer subjectively expected of its employee, and (3) that the 
employer’s expectation was objectively reasonable.  Adams v. Aspen Water, Inc., 150 Idaho 408, 
___, 247 P.3d 635, 640 (2011).  In order to be reasonable, an employer’s expectation should flow 
naturally from the employment relationship or be communicated to the employee.  Id.  In the 
present case, Logan’s Foodtown communicated to Locker that it expected her to produce a 
medical release that would clarify what types of work she was able to perform, as is 
demonstrated by the testimony of both Cruz and Jarolimek, and therefore the second and third 
prongs of the test are satisfied.  The remaining question, then, is whether Locker’s conduct fell 
below the standard of behavior expected of her. 
This Court has recognized insubordination as one form of conduct that violates the 
standard-of-behavior test.  Avery v. B & B Rental Toilets, 97 Idaho 611, 614, 549 P.2d 270, 273 
(1976).  Insubordination is an employee’s “deliberate or wilful refusal . . . to obey a reasonable 
order or directive which an employer is authorized to give and entitled to have obeyed.”  Id.  
When reviewing claims of insubordination, this Court looks to the facts of each case to 
determine whether an employee’s conduct is reasonable under the circumstances.  Thus, an 
employee’s expression of disagreement or discontentment to her employer may not be an act of 
insubordination.  Folks v. Moscow School Dist. No. 281, 129 Idaho 833, 838, 933 P.2d 642, 647 
(1997) (holding that employee lacked requisite intent where the interaction that led to her 
discharge was emotionally charged and instigated by stress); Avery, 97 Idaho at 615, 549 P.2d at 
274 (stating that the law does not require “unswerving docility and servility” of employees, and 
that “[a] single incident of comparatively nonserious disrespect by complaining and arguing is 
not misconduct.”); cf. Pimley v. Best Values, Inc., 132 Idaho 432, 435, 974 P.2d 78, 81 (1999) 
(holding that employee’s use of vulgar, disrespectful language in presence of retail customers fell 
below employer’s reasonable standard of behavior).  Likewise, an employee who informs his 
employer about circumstances that prevented compliance may protect himself against discharge 
for misconduct.  Whittier v. Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 137 Idaho 75, 79, 44 P.3d 1130, 1134 
(2002).  Thus, the applicable law takes the social realities of the workplace into account.   
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We are unable to conclude, as a matter of law, that an employee has not willfully and 
deliberately disregarded the employer’s order when the employee has both failed to comply with 
her employer’s order and also failed to communicate any justification for her lack of compliance.  
Id. (stating that employee “should have communicated to [his supervisor] the obstacles 
preventing him from performing her order.”).   
Thus, although there was a substantial conflict in the evidence presented to the 
Commission, we consider whether there is substantial evidence in the record which supports the 
Commission’s factual determination that Locker was discharged for insubordination.  It is 
uncontradicted that Locker did not provide a release to Logan’s Foodtown.  Although Jarolimek 
and Cruz each informed Locker that she could not return to work until she provided a medical 
release that “show[ed] that she could perform the job duties,” Locker did no more than make a 
single phone call to request the release.  When she was rebuffed by her surgeon’s nurse, Locker 
neither pursued other avenues of obtaining a medical release, nor took the simple step of 
informing her employer that she was experiencing difficulty in obtaining the release.  As was the 
case in Whittier, Locker both failed to comply with her employer’s reasonable directive and 
failed to communicate the circumstances that prevented her compliance.   
Additionally, while Locker contends that she lacked the physical capacity to perform the 
deli manager role because of MS, she did not express that concern to anyone at Logan’s 
Foodtown when her continued employment was conditioned on receipt of a medical release.  
Rather, the very day Locker returned to work after a six-week long medical leave for a 
hysterectomy, she discussed difficulties associated with that surgery with a female manager and 
soon after informed management that she could not continue to work that day.  While Logan’s 
Foodtown was aware that Locker suffered from MS, Locker’s attempt to obtain the requested 
medical release from her surgeon indicates that she understood that Cruz and Jarolimek believed 
that any limitations on her ability to work were related to the surgery.  A reasonable person could 
conclude that if Locker believed her inability to work was MS-related, she would have both 
informed Logan’s Foodtown as such and requested accommodations similar to those she had 
received in the past.  Thus, substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission’s 
conclusion that Locker was not terminated because she lacked the capacity to work, but rather 
because she failed to provide the medical release that Logan’s Foodtown requested in order to 
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determine the types of work she was able to perform.  We therefore affirm the decision and order 
of the Industrial Commission. 
B. Locker waived all claims arising under the ADA and IHRA. 
Locker raised FMLA claims before the Commission, but she raises ADA and IHRA 
claims for the first time on appeal.  “Issues not raised before the Industrial Commission and 
presented for the first time on appeal will not be considered by this Court.”  Creps v. Idaho Dep’t 
of Labor, 149 Idaho 634, 640, 238 P.3d 1284, 1290 (2010) (citing Higgins v. Larry Miller 
Subaru–Mitsubishi, 145 Idaho 1, 6, 175 P.3d 163, 168 (2007)).   Accordingly, we do not address 
Locker’s ADA and IHRA claims. 
C. Under Smith v. Washington County, we may not award attorney fees on appeal. 
All parties to this appeal request attorney fees under I.C. § 12–117.  However, “I.C. § 12–
117(1) does not allow a court to award attorney fees in an appeal from an administrative 
decision.”  Smith v. Washington Cnty., 150 Idaho 388, ___, 247 P.3d 615, 618 (2010).  Although 
the Department of Labor and Logan’s Foodtown are the prevailing parties, we lack the power to 
award attorney fees in this case.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
We affirm the decision and order of the Industrial Commission finding Locker ineligible 
for unemployment benefits.  Costs, but not attorney fees, to Respondents.  
 
Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices EISMANN, J. JONES and W. JONES CONCUR.