Case Title: People v. Stewart

Citation: 

Docket Number: 82947

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1997-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
People v. Stewart, 
 
              Docket No. 82947--Agenda 17--September 1997. 
     THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. CHARLES STEWART, 
                               Appellant. 
                    Opinion filed December 18, 1997. 
 
          JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the court: 
          Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, the defendant, Charles 
     Stewart, was found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
     of 70 years. In finding defendant guilty the trial court relied, in part, expressly upon a 
     highly inculpatory post-arrest statement determined by that court to have been made by 
     him. The statement was admitted into evidence as People's Exhibit No. 58 but was 
     neither published in the record in the trial court nor included in the record on appeal. In 
     the appellate court defendant appears to have presented two issues for review: (1) that his 
     constitutional rights to due process and to confront and cross-examine witnesses testifying 
     against him were violated by the admission of the grand jury testimony of a witness as 
     substantive evidence and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond 
     a reasonable doubt. In an order issued according to Supreme Court Rule 23 (134 Ill. 2d 
     R. 23), the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Thereafter, in a 
     modified order upon denial of rehearing, the appellate court again affirmed the judgment 
     of the trial court. No. 1--95--3666 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We 
     allowed the defendant's petition for leave to appeal as a matter of right pursuant to 
     Supreme Court Rule 317 (134 Ill. 2d R. 317). Seeking reversal of his conviction, he raises 
     two issues for our review: (1) whether the appellate court denied defendant his 
     constitutional guarantees to effective assistance of counsel, confrontation, and due process 
     of law when it affirmed his conviction for first degree murder "by relying upon the 
     content of the defendant's post-arrest statement previously ordered, on objection by the 
     State, barred from the record on appeal" and (2) whether the appellate court erred in 
     considering defendant's post-arrest statement "on rehearing" without first ruling on issues 
     concerning the State's noncompliance with Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) (155 Ill. 2d R. 
     341(e)(7)) and the doctrine of waiver. 
          During the pendency of his appeal, defendant moved that the appellate court direct 
     the State to supplement the record on appeal. In the motion, a copy of which is appended 
     to each party's brief in this court, defendant's appellate counsel stated as affiant that he 
     had not been defendant's trial attorney, that he had read the eight-volume record on 
     appeal, and that 
               "[t]he most significant and major portion of the evidence against Defendant 
                    Charles Stewart on the trial of the instant cause consisted of Grand Jury 
                    testimony of two State witnesses plus a written statement allegedly made 
                    by the Defendant. However, undoubtedly due to the fact that this was a 
                    bench trial, none of those documents were published in the record on 
                    appeal. Instead, the documents were introduced into evidence and then 
                    delivered to the trial judge for his perusal and consideration. The report of 
                    proceedings clearly indicates that the trial judge considered these 
                    documents in finding the Defendant guilty. Though introduced into 
                    evidence by the People these documents do not appear in the common law 
                    record." 
     Counsel stated in the motion that he had never seen these documents and that it was not 
     possible for him accurately to assess their worth in arguments before the court concerning 
     a record on appeal from which they were omitted. Counsel reasoned in the motion that 
     "[p]resumably, the People of the State of Illinois still have available a clean copy of the 
     documents, if not the actual exhibits themselves, suitable for presentation to this 
     Honorable Court in a supplemental record on appeal." Defendant moved that the court 
     "enter an order directing the People of the State of Illinois to cause to be prepared and 
     to submit to this Honorable Court a supplemental record on appeal containing any 
     exhibits introduced by the People of the State of Illinois on the trial of this cause which 
     the People will seek to rely upon before this Honorable Court on the appeal of the instant 
     cause." 
          In its response to this motion, a copy of which also is appended to each party's 
     brief in this court, the State objected strongly to defendant's request that it be directed to 
     file a supplemental record. The State submitted "that the record before this Honorable 
     Court is complete, thereby enabling it to fully decide all issues presented" and contended 
     that defendant had "failed to meet his burden of demonstrating what part of the record is 
     incomplete, incorrect or made any clearer by the Grand Jury testimony of two State 
     witnesses plus a written statement allegedly made by the defendant." The State maintained 
     further in its response that "[t]he Record from the Grand Jury testimony of two State 
     witnesses plus a written statement allegedly made by the defendant, which was not in 
     evidence at trial, is wholly inappropriate for review on appeal" and concluded that 
     "defendant is improperly attempting to contradict the record and embellish it with 
     cumulative material." 
          In an order, a copy of which is likewise appended to the brief of each party, the 
     appellate court denied the defendant's motion, described by the court in its order as 
     "requiring the People of the State of Illinois to cause the Clerk of the Circuit Court of 
     Cook County to prepare a supplemental record on appeal in the instant cause containing 
     the People's exhibits introduced on the trial in the instant cause which the People will 
     rely upon in the prosecution of the instant appeal." 
          In its initial order affirming the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court 
     indicated that defendant's confession had been admitted into evidence but noted that 
     defendant had not included it in the record. In this order the appellate court said that the 
     State had focused in its closing argument on the fact that defendant had admitted in his 
     confession to having held the victim, Stephen Green, while others beat the victim. During 
     closing argument at trial, the prosecutor asked, "What does Charles Stewart's statement 
     tell you, your Honor?" and proceeded, without objection by defendant, to catalogue in 
     detail and at some length most of the contents of the statement in the same order in which 
     they appear in it. Having found that the evidence supported defendant's conviction for 
     first degree murder, the appellate court stated further in this order: "In his confession, 
     defendant told the police that he held the victim and kicked him during a gang meeting 
     at Sheila's apartment. Sheila testified before the grand jury that she saw defendant hold 
     the victim and participate in the `violation.' Based on all of the evidence at trial, a 
     reasonable trier of fact could have found each element of the crime beyond a reasonable 
     doubt." 
          In a petition for rehearing, a copy of which is appended to the State's brief in this 
     court, defendant took the position that since no witness had testified to the content of the 
     defendant's statement at trial and, thus, there was no evidence to support the appellate 
     court's statements about defendant's confession, the conclusion was "inescapable" that the 
     appellate court had "either communicated ex parte with someone having access to the 
     defendant's post-arrest statement, or else this Court has simply fictionalized the existence 
     of defendant's `confession' wherein `defendant admitted to holding the victim and kicking 
     him during the violation***.' " Defendant asserted further in the petition for rehearing 
     that the appellate court had "ordered that the defendant's post-arrest statement not be 
     filed." (Emphasis in original.) 
          In its response to the defendant's petition for rehearing, a copy of which is 
     appended to the defendant's brief in this court, the State denied that the State's Attorney's 
     office had engaged in ex parte communication with the court and declared that the 
     appellate court's order makes clear that the source of the court's knowledge of a single 
     sentence from the defendant's confession came not from viewing the written document 
     itself, but from viewing the record of the prosecutor's remarks summarizing it during 
     closing argument at trial. The State said further, with reference to its earlier response to 
     the defendant's motion for an order directing it to cause to be prepared and to submit a 
     supplemental record on appeal, that the State had objected when it was not in possession 
     of the record on appeal and before any assistant State's Attorney had been assigned to 
     write its brief and that it had done so while under the mistaken impression that the 
     documents had not been admitted into evidence at trial. The State indicated further in its 
     response to the defendant's petition for rehearing that at oral argument counsel for the 
     State had recounted her unsuccessful efforts to obtain a copy of the defendant's 
     confession after defendant had filed his brief and that, after defendant had filed his 
     petition for rehearing, the State had obtained through its Felony Review Division 
     defendant's written confession admitted into evidence at trial and would attempt to have 
     the document bound and certified and move for its inclusion in the record on appeal. 
     While asserting that the defendant's petition for rehearing should be denied, the State 
     suggested that if the appellate court should determine that rehearing were warranted, the 
     court should rehear the case with the benefit of the defendant's confession included in the 
     record on appeal. 
          Thereafter, over defendant's objection, the State moved successfully to supplement 
     the record on appeal with the written, five-page confession, stating in its motion that the 
     confession had been prepared for submission to the appellate court and since it was now 
     available, it should be included in the record on appeal because of its significance in view 
     of the defendant's argument that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. 
     Following entry of an order of the appellate court permitting defendant to file a reply 
     within two weeks to the State's response to his petition for rehearing, defendant filed such 
     a reply, almost six weeks after the supplemental record containing his post-arrest 
     statement had been filed in the appellate court. As we have already indicated, in a 
     modified order upon denial of defendant's petition for rehearing the appellate court 
     thereafter affirmed the judgment of the trial court. In finding that the evidence supported 
     defendant's conviction for first degree murder, the appellate court noted that "[a] 
     supplemental record containing defendant's confession, filed subsequent to the original 
     order issued in this matter, in fact shows that defendant admitted to holding the victim 
     and kicking him during the violation." Based on all of the evidence, when viewed in a 
     light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court found that a reasonable trier 
     of fact could have found each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
          In his petition for leave to appeal as a matter of right, defendant contended that 
     the "reliance by the Appellate Court upon matters not made available to the defendant at 
     the appellate level," namely, his post-arrest statement, had denied him his rights of 
     confrontation, due process, and effective assistance of counsel on appeal. As a 
     consequence, a constitutional question had arisen for the first time in and as a result of 
     the action of the appellate court. 
          With respect to the first issue defendant raises for our review, he contends that 
     "[a]s a general proposition, it violated the rulings of this Court and every district 
     Appellate Court, including the First District, when the court in the case at bar considered 
     matters already ruled excluded from the record on order of the Appellate Court." He 
     reasons that when the appellate court "entered its orders affirming the defendant's 
     conviction predicated upon a purported post-arrest statement which had been excluded by 
     its own previous order from the record, and which was unavailable to defense counsel, 
     the result was a `denial of counsel [which] left petitioner completely without 
     representation during the Appellate Court's actual decisional process.' " The appellate 
     court, he asserts, "committed constitutional error of first magnitude when it decided a 
     critical issue on appeal--the sufficiency of the evidence to convict--without affording to 
     the defendant his right to counsel during the actual decisional process." 
          The State responds that in its initial Rule 23 order the appellate court properly 
     affirmed defendant's conviction in the absence of defendant's post-arrest statement in the 
     record, presuming that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding of 
     guilty. The State maintains further that there was nothing in the appellate court's order 
     denying defendant's motion to compel the State to supplement the record that prevented 
     defendant from doing that which by law he has a duty to do, namely, to preserve and to 
     file a complete record on appeal. The State contends as well that the appellate court 
     properly granted the State leave to supplement the record with defendant's post-arrest 
     statement and properly relied upon that statement in its modified order upon denial of 
     rehearing after having given the defendant an opportunity to consider the supplemental 
     record in arguing the sufficiency of the evidence in his reply to the State's response to 
     his petition for rehearing. 
          Responsibility for preserving and presenting a sufficient record of the asserted 
     error necessarily falls on the party who makes the assertion of error. People v. Smith,  106 Ill. 2d 327 , 334-35 (1985); People v. Edwards,  74 Ill. 2d 1 , 6 (1978). When the record 
     presented on appeal is incomplete, a court of review will indulge in every reasonable 
     presumption favorable to the judgment from which the appeal is taken, including the 
     presumption that the trial court ruled or acted correctly, and any doubt arising from the 
     incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant. See People v. Majer, 
     131 Ill. App. 3d 80, 84 (1985). Although defendant takes the position that the appellate 
     court barred his confession from inclusion in the record on appeal, the appellate court did 
     not do so. Instead, it declined to direct the State to cause to be prepared and to submit 
     a supplemental record on appeal containing any exhibits it had introduced at trial upon 
     which it would rely on appeal. Although defendant attempted to cause the record on 
     appeal to be supplemented, he did so by means of a motion to compel the State to 
     provide these exhibits. While the State's remarkably erroneous response to the defendant's 
     motion to supplement the record cannot be condoned, the obvious incompleteness of this 
     record was, nevertheless, a circumstance chargeable to the defendant as appellant, and in 
     its initial order affirming the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court properly 
     resolved any doubt arising from the incompleteness of the record against him (see People 
     v. Dowdy, 140 Ill. App. 3d 631, 639 (1986)). 
          Supreme Court Rule 366(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 366(a)) provides that "[i]n all appeals 
     the reviewing court may, in its discretion, and on such terms as it deems just, *** (3) 
     order or permit the record to be amended by correcting errors or by adding matters that 
     should have been included." The appellate court's subsequent order allowing the State to 
     amend the record by adding defendant's confession was entirely in accord with the terms 
     of Rule 366(a) and appropriate under the circumstances here. Thereafter the appellate 
     court afforded defendant an opportunity to reply to the State's response to his petition for 
     rehearing and, thus, to address the contents of the confession. Therefore, it cannot be said 
     that the appellate court decided the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to convict 
     in its modified order upon denial of rehearing without having afforded defendant the right 
     to counsel during the decisional process. Moreover, inasmuch as the appellate court did 
     not order defendant's post-arrest statement barred from the record on appeal prior to 
     relying upon it, as defendant avers, his claim that the appellate court's conduct in so 
     doing denied him his right to confrontation and due process is without merit. Hence, the 
     appellate court's reliance upon defendant's confession in its modified order upon denial 
     of rehearing affirming the judgment of the trial court was not improper. 
          We have examined the defendant's contentions with regard to Supreme Court Rule 
     341(e)(7) and the doctrine of waiver and conclude that they are not meritorious. We agree 
     with the State that the defendant, having previously moved that the State be directed to 
     supplement the record on appeal with his post-arrest statement among other of its exhibits, 
     is in no position to object to the subsequent inclusion of this statement in the record and 
     to argument concerning it. 
          The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed. 
 
     Affirmed. 
 
                                                                           JUSTICE BILANDIC, dissenting: 
          This case involves a murder conviction and a sentence of 70 years' imprisonment. 
     On appeal, the defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty 
     beyond a reasonable doubt. In finding the evidence sufficient and thereby affirming the 
     defendant's conviction, the appellate court relied on the defendant's purported post-arrest 
     statement. The majority opinion holds that the appellate court's reliance upon the 
     defendant's alleged post-arrest statement in affirming the judgment of the trial court was 
     not improper. Slip op. at 8. For the reasons that follow, I find that the actions of the 
     appellate court deprived the defendant of a fair appellate review. 
          It is a basic principle of appellate law that a court of review is prohibited from 
     considering matters outside the record on appeal. See Logan v. Old Enterprise Farms, 
     Ltd.,  139 Ill. 2d 229  (1990). In Logan, the plaintiff sued the defendant for damages 
     resulting from injuries sustained on the defendant's property. The trial court granted the 
     defendant's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the appellate court reversed, but 
     in so doing, the appellate court considered an affidavit from an expert filed by the 
     plaintiff after the filing of the notice of appeal. This court held that the appellate court 
     erred in considering the affidavit, which was not a part of the trial court record. See 
     Logan, 139 Ill. 2d  at 237. Here, the defendant's alleged post-arrest statement was 
     considered by the trial court but was never made part of the trial court's record. As a 
     result, the statement was not a part of the record on appeal. When the appellate court 
     denied the defendant's motion to compel the State to supplement the record with the 
     alleged post-arrest statement, the defendant submitted his brief without reference to that 
     statement. Despite the fact that the post-arrest statement was not a part of the record on 
     appeal, the appellate court relied on that statement in its original order affirming the 
     defendant's conviction. Thus, the appellate court improperly considered a document not 
     reflected in the record on appeal in upholding the defendant's murder conviction. The 
     majority opinion fails to provide a sufficient basis for upholding this obviously 
     inappropriate action of the appellate court. 
          It is true that, in his petition for rehearing, the defendant pointed out the appellate 
     court's error in relying on the alleged post-arrest statement. In its response, the State 
     sought to supplement the record on appeal with the statement, although the State had 
     originally objected to the inclusion of the statement in the record. As noted in the facts, 
     the appellate court then allowed the statement to be included in the record and, in its 
     modified order upon denial of rehearing, the appellate court continued to rely on the 
     statement to reject the defendant's argument that the evidence was insufficient. These 
     actions by the appellate court did not remedy its prior error. Instead, because the appellate 
     court relied on a statement outside the record on appeal to decide a critical issue on 
     appeal, without providing his defense counsel an opportunity to use that same statement 
     in preparing the defendant's appeal, the appellate court deprived the defendant of his 
     constitutional right to assistance of counsel. See Penson v. Ohio,  488 U.S. 75 , 102 L. Ed. 2d 300, 109 S. Ct. 346 (1988). 
          In Penson, the defendant's court-appointed appellate counsel filed a "Certification 
     of Meritless Appeal" and was given leave by the state appellate court to withdraw. The 
     state appellate court subsequently reviewed the record and considered the briefs of the 
     codefendants. The court determined that there existed several arguable claims and that 
     plain error had been committed which required reversal of the defendant's conviction on 
     one count. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the defendant's convictions and sentences on 
     the remaining counts. The preceding determinations were made by the state appellate 
     court without the benefit of any input by any counsel on behalf of the defendant. The 
     United States Supreme Court initially noted that "the right to be represented by counsel 
     is among the most fundamental of rights." Penson, 488 U.S.  at 84, 102 L. Ed. 2d  at 311, 
     109 S. Ct.  at 352. The Penson Court then held that the state appellate court had violated 
     the defendant's constitutional right to counsel on appeal. Penson,  488 U.S. 75 , 102 L. Ed. 2d 300, 109 S. Ct. 346. It further found that such decisionmaking by the state appellate 
     court without the benefit of counsel on appeal amounted to reversible error. The Court 
     stated: "It is apparent that the Ohio Court of Appeals *** committed *** serious error 
     when it failed to appoint new counsel after finding that the record supported several 
     arguably meritorious grounds for reversal of petitioner's conviction ***. As a result, 
     petitioner was left without constitutionally adequate representation on appeal." Penson, 
     488 U.S.  at 81, 102 L. Ed. 2d  at 309, 109 S. Ct.  at 350. 
          The actions taken by the state appellate court in Penson are analogous in their 
     result to those of the appellate court in the case at bar. As previously noted, the appellate 
     court entered its orders affirming the defendant's conviction predicated upon the 
     defendant's purported post-arrest statement, which was unavailable to defense counsel in 
     preparing his brief and argument on appeal. Such actions by the appellate court resulted 
     in a denial of counsel during the appellate court's actual decisional process. See Penson, 
     488 U.S.  at 88, 102 L. Ed. 2d  at 313, 109 S. Ct.  at 354. 
          After examining the unusual procedural circumstances in this case, I find that the 
     defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel because defense 
     counsel was not provided an opportunity to consider the defendant's purported post-arrest 
     statement when preparing his appeal. In light of this constitutional violation and on 
     grounds of fundamental fairness, I believe that the appellate court's judgment should be 
     vacated and the cause remanded to the appellate court, where the parties can proceed with 
     a complete record in preparing their briefs and arguments on appeal. 
 
          JUSTICES McMORROW and NICKELS join in this dissent. 
 
          JUSTICE NICKELS, also dissenting: 
          The manner in which this case was heard in the appellate court denied defendant 
     the right to due process and effective assistance of counsel. Therefore, I respectfully 
     dissent. 
          In a bench trial, the trial judge found defendant guilty of first degree murder based 
     almost entirely on the strength of a post-arrest statement. Defendant's statement was 
     admitted into evidence and read silently by the trial judge, but erroneously excluded from 
     the record on appeal. 
          Defendant's appellate counsel, who was new to the case and who had not seen the 
     statement, discovered that the statement was not part of the record and responsibly sought 
     to supplement the record so he could prepare an appeal. The State objected to turning 
     over the statement, which it held in its files, mysteriously claiming that the record on 
     appeal was complete. The appellate court ultimately denied defendant's motion to 
     supplement the record. 
          Without having seen the statement, defendant's counsel was forced to brief the 
     issue of whether defendant was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt without referring 
     to the sole evidence on which the trial judge found a sufficient basis to convict. The State 
     also did not refer to the contents of defendant's statement in its brief, having argued that 
     the record was complete without the statement. 
          Despite the fact that the statement was not read into the transcript in the trial 
     court, was not part of the common law record on appeal and had not been argued by the 
     parties, the appellate court relied upon the content of defendant's statement in finding that 
     the evidence was sufficient to convict him. No. 1--95--3666 (unpublished order under 
     Supreme Court Rule 23) ("In his confession, defendant told the police that he held the 
     victim and kicked him during a gang meeting at Sheila's apartment"). The appellate court 
     apparently gleaned this information from trial testimony, prosecutor arguments or the 
     judge's comments about the statement made when finding defendant guilty of the murder. 
          Defendant thereafter filed a petition for rehearing, arguing that the appellate court 
     must have overlooked that the statement was not made part of the record on appeal. The 
     State, apparently sensing it had erred in objecting to defendant's motion to supplement 
     the record and in arguing that the record was complete, responded to the petition for 
     rehearing by now offering defendant's statement from its files. The appellate court this 
     time granted the motion to supplement the record. The appellate court then rendered a 
     modified order upon denial of rehearing again basing its affirmance on the content of 
     defendant's statement. This procedure denied defendant's counsel any opportunity to brief 
     and argue in the appellate court the evidentiary value of defendant's statement. 
          A majority of this court determines that the absence of defendant's statement from 
     the record on appeal is a circumstance chargeable to the defendant. Although it is 
     certainly true that the party alleging error generally has the responsibility to preserve the 
     record on appeal, here the defendant sought to fulfil that responsibility upon learning the 
     record was incomplete by requesting that the State provide an important exhibit in its 
     possession. I believe that the appellate court erred in refusing this request. The 
     amendment of a record is governed by Supreme Court Rule 329 (134 Ill. 2d R. 329), 
     which is a "broad provision" intended to facilitate the amendment of the record where 
     necessary to supply omissions or correct inaccuracies. People v. Chitwood,  67 Ill. 2d 443 , 
     447 (1977). 
          The majority determines the appellate court did not err in rejecting defendant's 
     motion because a defendant cannot compel the State to supply exhibits in its possession. 
     Why not? How else is a defendant going to obtain this document while it is in the State's 
     files? Rule 329 provides that the appellant may be forced to pay costs of supplementing 
     the record, but it says nothing about relieving the State from any responsibility to turn 
     over a confession from its files in a murder case. 
          Unlike the majority, I do not believe that defendant's duty to insure a complete 
     record on appeal relieves the State from the duty to produce a confession in its files 
     inadvertently omitted from the record on appeal. Constitutional principles of due process 
     and effective assistance of counsel require something more than affirming a murder 
     conviction based upon critical evidence not part of the record on appeal. I would therefore 
     order the appellate court to rehear the case, after giving defendant's counsel and the State 
     the opportunity to brief and argue the reasonable doubt issue with the benefit of the 
     statement as part of the record. 
 
          JUSTICES BILANDIC and McMORROW join in this dissent.