Case Title: Rhoades v. K-Mart Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 93-38

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-11-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rhoades v. K-Mart Corp.1993 WY 143863 P.2d 626Case Number: 93-38Decided: 11/12/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Mary RHOADES, 

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

K-MART CORPORATION, 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Natrona County, Harry E. Leimback, J.

Steven R. 
Helling, Casper, representing appellant.

J. Scott 
Burnworth, Casper, representing appellee.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

CARDINE, Justice.

[¶1]      Mary Rhoades 
(Rhoades) sued the K-Mart Corporation (K-Mart) after she slipped and fell in 
K-Mart's Casper, Wyoming store. The trial court directed a verdict for K-Mart. 
Rhoades appeals from the judgment entered on the directed verdict asserting that 
genuine issues of fact existed which precluded a directed verdict and arguing 
that the trial court erred in refusing to admit certain testimony.

[¶2]      We 
reverse.

[¶3]      Rhoades presents 
the following issues:

     Did the Trial Court 
err when it granted Appellee's (Defendant below) Motion for a directed verdict? 
Was there sufficient evidence for this case to go to the jury?

     Did the Trial Court 
err in excluding testimony by Roger Ruegsegger, former assistant manager for 
Appellee, regarding the length of time water or liquid would have had to have 
been on the floor in order for the wax to have come up from the 
floor?

I. 
FACTS

[¶4]      On April 26, 
1988, Mary Rhoades slipped and fell while walking down an aisle of the Casper, 
Wyoming K-Mart store. During her testimony, she described the incident as 
follows:

I walked out of the aisle 
in to the main aisle ready to leave when my right foot hit something that felt 
like slime and I slipped, I slipped. I tried to catch my balance. It was like 
water, you'll sometimes hit a dry spot, but this was just like grease, slime, it 
just went zoom. It was like in a cartoon.

When she fell, 
Rhoades landed heavily on her left knee, then tried to get up but could not and 
fell on her backside. An unidentified customer was first on the scene and first 
to assist Rhoades. According to Rhoades' testimony, that customer noticed a 
medium sized cup on its side near where Rhoades slipped and surmised that it was 
the source of the slippery substance. After observing the cup, the customer 
searched further by pushing some clothes aside, which were hanging on a rack, 
and discovered a thin stream of water which extended six inches into the aisle 
where Rhoades had fallen. 

[¶5]      As Rhoades was 
assisted to her feet, she slipped again; but she did not fall a second time. 
After being assisted to her vehicle, Rhoades and her husband drove away. When 
Rhoades washed the pants she was wearing when she fell in K-Mart, she discovered 
that the backside of the pants were covered with a dried white waxy 
substance.

[¶6]      Two K-Mart 
employees, who did not witness the incident, arrived on the scene shortly after 
Rhoades' fall. Approximately one-half hour after the incident, one of these 
employees found a lid and straw on the floor near where Rhoades had fallen. This 
same employee testified that at least twelve times that day she had passed the 
area where Rhoades fell, the last time just one minute before Rhoades' fall, and 
never saw any moisture on the floor. This employee also testified that during 
her ten-month employment with this K-Mart she had previously found soda pop and 
water on the floor three or four times and that she had previously slipped on 
the floor.

[¶7]      The floors in 
this K-Mart were tiled and were waxed for appearance. There was a cafeteria 
located at the rear of the store and a separate sandwich counter located at the 
front of the store where customers could purchase beverages. A K-Mart document, 
intended to be used as guidance for employees, titled "Safety and Environmental 
Health Bulletin," states:

The third hazard of 
walking is the type of surface combined with the type of shoes we wear. In a 
working environment, employees should wear safe foot-gear. Metal heeltaps are 
hazardous on a hard-surface floor. In addition, the wrong wax, wet floors and 
leather and synthetic soles do not mix well for your stability while walking. 
The best combination for work is a nonwaxed surface and rubber soles and 
heels. [emphasis added]

The store's 
procedure for inspecting its floors consisted of having employees check the 
floor surface as they went about their other duties.

II. 
DISCUSSION

A. 
DIRECTED VERDICT

1. Standard of 
review

[¶8]      We review a 
directed verdict by examining the evidence, "without weighing the credibility of 
the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, [to] 
determine whether there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that 
reasonable jurors could have reached." Vassos v. Roussalis, 658 P.2d 1284, 1286 
(Wyo. 1983). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party 
against whom the motion is directed "together with all reasonable and legitimate 
inferences which may be drawn therefrom." Vassos, 658 P.2d  at 1286 (citing Carey 
v. Jackson, 603 P.2d 868 (Wyo. 1979)). Whether there was sufficient evidence to 
create an issue of fact is a question of law, thus we give no deference to the 
trial court's decision. Id. at 1287. Lastly, we note that trial courts should 
cautiously and sparingly direct verdicts. Id.

2. Standard of 
Care

[¶9]      It is undisputed 
that K-Mart's standard of care was as follows:

The store owner must use 
ordinary care to keep the premises in a safe condition, and he is charged with 
an affirmative duty to protect visitors against dangers known to him and against 
dangers which he might discover by use of reasonable care.

Buttrey Food 
Stores Div. v. Coulson, 620 P.2d 549, 552 (Wyo. 1980).1 Under that standard, Rhoades must 
prove either that K-Mart had actual notice, i.e., that it knew of the spilled 
water and failed to protect Rhoades from the spill, or that K-Mart had 
constructive notice, i.e., it should, in the exercise of reasonable care, have 
discovered the spilled substance. Buttrey, 620 P.2d  at 552 (citing Dudley v. 
Montgomery Ward & Co., 64 Wyo. 357, 374, 192 P.2d 617, 622 (1948)). In 
addition to the above, in Buttrey, we adopted the following 
doctrine:

"when plaintiff has shown 
that the circumstances were such as to create a reasonable probability that the 
dangerous condition would occur, he need not also prove actual or constructive 
notice of the specific condition * * *."

Id., 620 P.2d  at 
552 (quoting F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Stokes, 191 So. 2d 411, 416 (Miss. 1966)). 
Rhoades could not prove that K-Mart had actual notice of the spilled substance. 
Rhoades then could avoid a directed verdict in this case only by demonstrating 
that there was some evidence that would create an issue of fact as to whether 
K-Mart, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the spilled 
substance or that the circumstances surrounding the incident were such as 
created a reasonable probability that the dangerous condition would 
occur.

3. Sufficiency of the 
Evidence

[¶10]   The record reveals that K-Mart was 
not actually aware of the specific water spill involved in this incident. One of 
K-Mart's employees testified that she walked past the area of the spill twelve 
times, the last time being one minute before Rhodes fell, without noticing any 
liquid foreign substance on the floor. Thus, there is insufficient evidence of 
actual notice of this specific danger.

[¶11]   There was, however, evidence from 
which the jury could find that K-Mart, in the exercise of reasonable care, 
should have known of the foreign substance on the floor. Rhoades testified to 
the existence of the foreign substance on the floor where she fell. K-Mart's 
employee passed this area one minute before the accident. If the substance was 
there, she, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have observed it; or 
perhaps it was spilled sixty seconds before the incident; or perhaps there never 
was any slippery substance on the floor at all. That was for the jury to 
determine.

[¶12]   How long the spill had been on the 
floor is unknown and impossible to prove. Rhoades could do no more than present 
the facts available to her. She argues that the fact that the lid and straw were 
dry when discovered one-half hour after her fall infers that the foreign 
substance had been there a long time and should have been discovered in the 
exercise of reasonable care, so that K-Mart had constructive notice of the 
substance. Surely that was some evidence from which the jury could infer that 
the foreign substance had been on the floor for a sufficient length of time to 
infer constructive notice.

[¶13]   The circumstances described in the 
testimony may also be sufficient to suggest a reasonable probability that there 
would be soda and/or water spills, thus precluding the requirement that actual 
or constructive noticed be demonstrated. In Buttrey we quoted the Colorado 
Supreme Court's reasoning for this rule:

"However, when the 
operating methods of a proprietor are such that dangerous conditions are 
continuous or easily foreseeable, the logical basis for the notice requirement 
dissolves. Then, actual or constructive notice of the specific condition need 
not be proved."

Buttrey, 620 P.2d  at 553 (citations omitted) (quoting Jasko v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 177 Colo. 
418, 494 P.2d 839, 840 (1972)). In Jasko, the operating methods, which made the 
dangerous condition involved - slipping on a slice of pizza - easily 
foreseeable, were: (1) a pizza counter located in the store which sold a high 
volume of pizza slices on waxed paper, (2) testimony that the store was often 
cleaning pizza spills off a slippery floor, and (3) that customers stood in the 
aisles eating their pizza slices. Jasko, 494 P.2d  at 840. Based upon this 
"operating methods" rule, the Colorado court reversed a directed verdict because 
the defendant's "operating methods" raised issues concerning defendant's 
negligence. Id., at 840-41.

[¶14]   This "operating methods" rule has 
been commonly invoked in other jurisdictions. See generally, Annotation, 85 
A.L.R.3d (1978); Pimentel v. Roundup Co., 100 Wn.2d 39, 666 P.2d 888, 892-93 
(1983) (provides explanation of the three different interpretations of this 
rule). More specifically, New Mexico's highest court invoked the doctrine in 
reversing a JNOV where the plaintiff slipped and fell while walking down a 
store's stairs after stepping on some gum. Mahoney v. J.C. Penney Co., 71 N.M. 
244, 377 P.2d 663 (1962). There, the testimony revealed that no one could say 
how long the gum had been present, but the store's manager of six years stated 
that he had previously seen gum on the stairs on several occasions and that the 
presence of gum on these particular stairs was a common occurrence. Id., 71 N.M. 
at 249, 377 P.2d  at 666.

[¶15]   Additionally, a Washington appeals 
court reversed summary judgment granted to a self-service restaurant in another 
slip-and-fall case where the evidence revealed that the plaintiff fell after 
slipping on a "liquid-like" substance near the self-service line for food, which 
tended to be a greasy area due to spills. Ciminski v. Finn Corp., Inc., 13 Wn. App. 815, 537 P.2d 850 (1975). That court concluded:

[A]n owner of a self 
service establishment has actual notice that his mode of operation creates 
certain risks of harm to his customer. Since a self-service operation involves 
the reasonable probability that these risks will occur, these risks are 
foreseeable. Thus, it is not necessary to show actual or constructive notice of 
the specific hazard causing injury, and it becomes the task of the jury to 
determine whether the proprietor has taken all reasonable precautions necessary 
to protect his invitees from these foreseeable risks.

Id., at 
854.

[¶16]   Like the circumstances in Jasko, 
Mahoney, and Ciminski, the circumstances in this case may be such that it was 
reasonably probable that soda or water would be spilled in this area and thus 
that risk was foreseeable. One of K-Mart's employees testified that, in her ten 
months of employment, she had found soda and water on the floors on three or 
four occasions prior to this incident and had in fact slipped herself. Other 
testimony revealed that a medium sized cup and a straw and lid were located near 
a thin stream of water in the aisle where Rhoades fell. Also, the store manager 
testified that this store had two separate places where a customer could 
purchase beverages. In addition, the floors of this store were waxed despite a 
K-Mart safety publication specifically stating that non-waxed floors were the 
least slippery and that liquid on waxed floors caused instability. Under these 
circumstances, it may be foreseeable that beverages would be spilled on these 
waxed floors causing slippery conditions. Therefore, whether Rhoades 
demonstrated constructive notice and the question of whether K-Mart acted 
reasonably under the circumstances was for the jury.

[¶17]   K-Mart argues that, even if Rhoades 
did not have to prove actual or constructive notice, the evidence demonstrated 
that K-Mart exercised reasonable care under the circumstances because its 
employee had passed down the aisle and had seen no spill one minute before 
Rhoades' fall. However, whether K-Mart's inspection procedures - employees 
looking for spills while performing other duties - were sufficient to meet the 
standard of ordinary care under these circumstances was a question of fact for 
the jury. Thus it was error to direct a verdict.

B. 
EXCLUSION OF WITNESS TESTIMONY

[¶18]   We address this issue because of 
the likelihood of its recurrence at a second trial. Rhoades' asserts that the 
trial court erred when it excluded testimony by K-Mart manager, Roger Ruegsegger 
(Ruegsegger), concerning the length of time the liquid had been on the floor. 
Rhoades argues this issue in terms of impeachment and cross-examination of a 
witness, while K-Mart argues in terms of lack of foundation to qualify the 
witness as an expert.

[¶19]   The testimony at issue occurred 
during Rhoades' case in chief on direct examination of Ruegsegger and proceeded 
as follows:

[Rhoades' Counsel]: Let's 
take an example of a soda pop spill on the floor. Isn't it right that it would 
take several hours for the wax -

[K-Mart's Counsel]: 
Objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Let's hear the 
question.

[Rhoades' Counsel]: Isn't 
it true that it would take at least several hours for the wax to come up from 
the floor as a result of having the soda pop on it?

[K-Mart's Counsel]: This 
calls for the witness to speculate and there is a lack of foundation as to his 
expertise to testify about soda pop softening floor wax.

[Rhoades' Counsel]: Your 
Honor, if I could respond, this witness observed spills on the floor, he worked 
with waxes in his head custodian position. I think he is familiar with this area 
and should be permitted to testify.

THE COURT: I'll sustain 
the objection on foundation.

[Rhoades' Counsel]: What 
experience do you have with waxes?

[Ruegsegger]: As far as 
knowing what they are going to do, none. We put them on the floors to make the 
floors shiny is all I know.

[Rhoades' Counsel]: Did 
you work with various waxes at Garfield School?

[Ruegsegger]: Just one 
type that they supplied to us and told us to put down. It wasn't something that 
we knew it would do or wouldn't do.

[Rhoades' Counsel]: Did 
you ever observe the wax coming up from the floor on the K-Mart store 
-

[Ruegsegger]: No I 
didn't.

[Rhoades' Counsel]: - on 
East Second Street? Then how was it that you could tell me during your 
deposition -

[K-Mart's Counsel]: 
Objection. We are referring to testimony.

THE COURT: Sustained. It 
would be argumentative if he said something in the deposition. Read it to 
him.

[Rhoades' Counsel]: Mr. 
Ruegsegger, let me direct your attention to - May I approach the witness, Your 
Honor?

THE COURT: Why would you 
want to do that?

[Rhoades' Counsel]: Just 
to have him read it.

* * * * * *

[K-Mart's Counsel]: Your 
Honor, counsel is attempting to get back in to an area that you just ruled Mr. 
Ruegsegger did not have sufficient foundation to testify about regarding 
softening of the wax. Now if -

* * * * * *

THE COURT: * * * I agree. 
I'll sustain the defense objection.

[Rhoades' Counsel]: Your 
Honor, at this point, I would like to make an offer of proof.

THE COURT: All 
right.

(At the 
Bench)

[Rhoades' Counsel]: Your 
Honor, my offer of proof is that during his [Ruegsegger's] deposition, he was 
asked how long it would take for the wax to get - would it actually come up from 
the floor as a result of having the liquid on it, and he said it would have to 
set for several hours before it is going to penetrate the wax. Then he goes on 
to state the water and liquid didn't hurt it, you know, unless it sat there for 
quite a long period of time.

     I think if nothing 
else, I should be able to use this to impeach his testimony now where he says he 
has no reason for knowing.

The trial court 
stood by its earlier ruling, excluding the testimony and denying the attempted 
impeachment through the deposition, because there was no foundation for 
Ruegsegger's opinion.

[¶20]   Two questions are raised concerning 
this disputed testimony of Ruegsegger. First, was proper foundation presented to 
permit Ruegsegger to answer the question concerning his knowledge of the effects 
of soda on floor wax? Second, was the trial court correct in denying Rhoades' 
counsel's attempted impeachment of Ruegsegger?

[¶21]   Since Ruegsegger was not offered as 
an expert, any opinion testimony elicited from him is governed by W.R.E. 701, 
which provides:

     If the witness is not 
testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is 
limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the 
perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his 
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.

We liberally 
construe this rule in favor of admitting opinion evidence of lay witnesses. 
McCabe v. R.A. Manning Constr. Co., Inc., 674 P.2d 699, 705 (Wyo. 1983). Mr. 
Ruegsegger testified that he had been the manager of K-Mart, which included 
responsibility of floor care, and that K-Mart waxed its floors. As the manager 
in charge of maintaining waxed floors, Ruegsegger had personal knowledge of 
waxing floors and the effect of spills and answered in his deposition concerning 
what he knew about how long it took soda to cause wax to come up from the floor. 
Whatever Ruegsegger might have said in response to Rhoades' counsel's question, 
Ruegsegger's experiences as the manager in this K-Mart store would have been a 
rational basis for his answer. Therefore, sufficient foundation existed for 
Rhoades' counsel to ask the question and for Ruegsegger to answer.

[¶22]   The record reflects that Ruegsegger 
was never permitted to answer the question which counsel insisted would have 
been inconsistent with his deposition. However, if the statements made in 
Ruegsegger's deposition concluded that it would take several hours for soda to 
penetrate floor wax and his testimony at trial is that he cannot make that same 
conclusion, then the two statements are clearly inconsistent and fair game for 
impeachment purposes because "[t]he credibility of a witness may be attacked by 
any party, including the party calling him." W.R.E. 607.

III. 
CONCLUSION

[¶23]   We reverse the trial court's 
judgment entered upon K-Mart's motion for a directed verdict because the 
circumstances surrounding Rhoades' fall were such as would allow a reasonable 
jury to conclude that there was constructive notice of the existence of a 
foreign substance on the floor or that there was a foreseeable risk of slippery 
floors because of the potential soda or water spills, all of which raised jury 
questions of whether K-Mart acted reasonably in light of the risk.

[¶24]   Reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1 In our recent decision, 
Clarke v. Beckwith, 858 P.2d 293 (Wyo. 1993), we abolished the historical 
landowner liability classifications - invitee and licensee - in favor of a 
single standard of care, ordinary care under the circumstances, but kept the 
applicable standard for trespassers. However, we opted to apply the new doctrine 
prospectively only.