Case Title: The People v. Patrick Zephrin

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2010-03-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 40  
The People &c.,
            Appellant,
        v.
Patrick Zephrin,
            Respondent.
Susan Paulson, for appellant.
Lynn W. L. Fahey, for respondent.
CIPARICK, J.:
The issue presented on this appeal is whether
defendant's jail-time credit toward his sentence of imprisonment
also reduces his term of probation where defendant received a
split sentence of incarceration and probation.  We hold that
defendant was entitled to credit toward his term of probation
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and, as a result, such term had expired prior to the filing of
the declaration of delinquency.
On January 3, 2001, upon defendant's guilty plea to
grand larceny in the third degree arising from internet purchases
made with stolen credit card information, County Court imposed a
split sentence of six months incarceration and five years
probation.  The court acknowledged that defendant had been in
custody since August of 2000 prior to sentencing and would
receive credit for time served toward the period of
incarceration.  As a result, defendant was released from custody
on the day of sentencing and probation was transferred to the New
York City Department of Probation.  
On April 27, 2005, defendant was arrested for,
among other things, forgery in the second degree.  In December
2005, the Department of Probation filed a declaration of
delinquency based on defendant's April 2005 arrest.  The
following month, defendant pleaded guilty to the charge of
possession of a forged instrument.  
Later in January 2006, defendant appeared in Supreme
Court in connection with the charge that he had violated his
probation.  After Supreme Court rejected his argument that his
term of probation had ended in August 2005 prior to the filing of
the declaration of delinquency, defendant pleaded guilty to
violating his probation.  Supreme Court sentenced defendant to an
indeterminate term of one to three years imprisonment to run
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concurrently with the sentence imposed for his January 2006
conviction for possession of a forged instrument.  
Defendant appealed.  The Appellate Division unanimously
reversed and vacated the sentence, concluding that the
probationary period had expired prior to the filing of the
declaration of delinquency (54 AD3d 1066, 1067 [2d Dept 2008]). 
The People appealed by permission of a Judge of this Court, and
we now affirm.
Supreme Court had the authority to proceed on the
declaration of delinquency only "during the period of
[defendant's] sentence of probation" (CPL 410.30; see also People
v Montgomery, 115 AD2d 102, 103 [3d Dept 1985]).  The Appellate
Division here concluded that defendant's term of probation had
expired prior to the filing of the declaration of delinquency
because defendant should have received credit toward his
probationary term for the time he spent confined prior to
sentencing (see 54 AD3d at 1067; see also People v Teddy W., 56
AD3d 697, 698 [2d Dept 2008], lv denied 12 NY3d 860 [2009];
People v Dawson, 301 AD2d 659, 659-660 [2d Dept 2003]).  We
agree. 
Authorized by Penal Law § 60.01 (2) (d), a "split
sentence" consists of a term of imprisonment combined with a term
of probation or conditional discharge (see Pirro v Angiolillo, 89
NY2d 351, 353 [1996]).  The statute states: 
"In any case where the court imposes a
sentence of imprisonment . . . not in excess
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of six months for a felony . . ., it may also
impose a sentence of probation or conditional
discharge provided that the term of probation
or conditional discharge together with the
term of imprisonment shall not exceed the
term of probation or conditional discharge
authorized by article sixty-five of this
chapter.  The sentence of imprisonment shall
be a condition of and run concurrently with
the sentence of probation or conditional
discharge."
Penal Law § 65.00 (3) (a) authorizes a five-year term of
probation for most felony offenses.  Section 65.00 (2), however,
recognizes that, where a split sentence is imposed, the
limitations set forth in Penal Law § 60.01 (2) (d) may trump the
time period set forth in section 65.00 (3) (a).  Specifically,
section 65.00 (2) states: "When a person is sentenced to a period
of probation the court shall, except to the extent authorized by
paragraph (d) of subdivision two of section 60.01 of this
chapter, impose the period authorized by subdivision three of
this section and shall specify . . . the conditions to be
complied with" (emphasis added).  Taken together, the explicit
statutory command of Penal Law § 60.01 (2) (d) and Penal Law §
65.00 dictate that, where a court imposes a split sentence, the
term of imprisonment and term of probation together may not
exceed, in most cases, five years.  In other words, for most
felonies, the relevant statutory provisions create a cap of five
years that the two components of a split sentence together may
not exceed.  
Thus, in cases where a defendant has been incarcerated
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pending sentencing and, as a result, receives credit for time
served toward the term of imprisonment of a split sentence (see
Penal Law § 70.30 [3]), that defendant's probationary term is
also reduced by the period the defendant was incarcerated prior
to sentencing.  For example, if a defendant was incarcerated for
two months prior to sentencing, and was subsequently sentenced to
a split sentence of six months' incarceration and five years'
probation, that defendant's post-sentence prison term would be
reduced by the two months of pre-sentence detention.  The
defendant's probationary term, which runs concurrently with the
term of imprisonment (see Penal Law § 60.01 [2] [d]) would also
be reduced by the two months of pre-sentence detention.  As a
result of that "reduction," the probationary term, together with
the term of imprisonment, would equal five years, thereby
complying with the plain language of the split sentence statute.  
The People argue that the period of probation had not
yet expired when the declaration of delinquency was filed against
defendant and that the applicable statute is Penal Law § 65.15
(1), which provides that "[a] period of probation . . . commences
on the day it is imposed."  The People note that some Appellate
Division decisions have relied on this statutory provision to
conclude that, where a split sentence is imposed, a defendant is
not entitled to credit toward his probationary term for time
spent in custody prior to sentencing (see People v Ellis, 27 AD3d
236, 237 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 847 [2006]; People v
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Feliciano, 1 AD3d 163 [1st Dept 2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 571
[2003]).  Further, the People argue that Penal Law § 70.30 (3)
requires that a defendant be given credit for pre-sentence time
served toward a term of imprisonment only, because it is silent
about credit to be given against a probationary term.  
However, if defendant's probationary period is not
calculated to begin until his sentencing date, his probationary
period together with his term of imprisonment would exceed his
five-year term of probation, in clear violation of section 60.01
(2) (d) of the Penal Law.  By calculating defendant's term of
probation to begin at the same time as and to run concurrently
with the term of incarceration, we give effect to both the split
sentence statute and Penal Law § 65.15.  The result of our
holding is that defendant's period of probation, "reduced" by the
period of incarceration, begins on the day the sentence is
imposed (see Penal Law § 65.15 [1]).  Even if Penal Law § 65.15
(1) can be read to conflict with the specific directive of Penal
Law § 60.01 (2) (d), we have held on numerous occasions that a
specific statutory provision governs over a more general
provision (see Matter of Town of Riverhead v New York State Bd.
of Real Prop. Servs., 5 NY3d 36, 42 n 8 [2005]; Matter of
Dutchess County Dept. of Social Servs. v Day, 96 NY2d 149, 153
[2001] [a "well-established rule of statutory construction
provides that a 'prior general statute yields to a later specific
or special statute'], quoting Erie County Water Auth. v Kramer, 4
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AD2d 545, 550 [4th Dept 1957], affd 5 NY2d 954 [1959]).  In this
instance, Penal Law § 60.01 (2) (d) is not only the more specific
statutory command, inasmuch as it was enacted specifically to
provide for split sentences, but it is also the later-enacted
statute vis-a-vis Penal Law § 65.15 (1).  We also refuse to read
Penal Law § 70.30 (3) in isolation to preclude our conclusion. 
In short, all parts of this sentencing scheme are best harmonized
by running the term of probation together with the term of
imprisonment, not to exceed five years.
Finally, we note that a defendant's term of probation
should not be reduced by time-served credit longer than the
sentence of imprisonment.  In the case of a split sentence the
probationary term can only be reduced by time-served credit up to
six months (see e.g. People v Dawson, 301 AD2d 659, 659-660 [2d
Dept 2003]; People v Montgomery, 115 AD2d 102, 103 [3d Dept
1985]).  Thus, the term of probation to be served would never be
less than 4 1/2 years, regardless of the time spent in pre-
sentence confinement.  In that regard, we reemphasize that, since
the statute requires that the term of incarceration, together
with the term of probation, may not exceed the term of probation
authorized by article 65 of the Penal Law (see Penal Law §§ 60.01
[2] [d], 65.00 [3] [a]), here five years, defendant's term of
probation had expired before the declaration of delinquency was
filed and Supreme Court was without authority to adjudicate
defendant a probation violator.   
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Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed.
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Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Ciparick.  Chief Judge Lippman
and Judges Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.
Decided March 30, 2010