Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V BONNIE JUNE SHERMAN-HUFFMAN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 117468

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2002-04-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 24, 2002  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant 
and Cross-Appellee,  
v  
No. 117468  
BONNIE JUNE SHERMAN-HUFFMAN,  
Defendant-Appellee 
and Cross-Appellant.  
MEMORANDUM OPINION  
Defendant was charged with and convicted of third-degree  
child abuse1 after she spanked the victim, her daughter,  
1 MCL 750.136b(5), which provides:  
A person is guilty of child abuse in the third 
degree if the person knowingly or intentionally 
causes physical harm to a child.  Child abuse in  
the third degree is a misdemeanor punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than 2 years.  
twice, and pushed her in the face, causing a nosebleed and  
bruising on the victim’s face and back.  The Court of Appeals  
affirmed defendant’s conviction, holding that third-degree  
child abuse is a specific intent crime and that the  
prosecution presented sufficient evidence of defendant’s  
specific intent to harm her child.  We originally granted  
leave to consider whether third-degree child abuse is a  
specific or general intent crime.  We conclude, however, that  
there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of third­
degree child abuse regardless of whether the statute requires  
general or specific intent.2
 Accordingly, we affirm  
defendant’s conviction.  
In determining whether sufficient evidence exists to  
sustain a conviction, this Court reviews the evidence in a  
light favorable to the prosecution.  People v Wolfe, 440 Mich  
508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992).  This Court must consider  
“‘whether there was sufficient evidence to justify a rational  
trier of fact in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’”  
Id. at 513-514, quoting People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354, 366;  
285 NW2d 284 (1979).  See also People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392,  
399-400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000).  
2 The statement by the Court of Appeals that third-degree 
child abuse is a specific-intent crime is dictum, in light of 
our finding that there was sufficient evidence to support 
defendant’s conviction under either standard.  
2  
Here, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence of  
defendant’s guilt at trial. Defendant admitted striking her  
child.
 The victim’s testimony corroborated defendant’s  
admission.  The testimony of school, law enforcement, and  
medical personnel established that the victim sustained  
physical injury in the form of extensive bruising to parts of  
her body and a nosebleed.  Further, the injuries to the  
victim’s face were sufficiently painful that the victim asked  
for an ice pack at school on the following day.  
Michigan’s third-degree child abuse statute states that  
a defendant must “knowingly or intentionally” cause physical  
harm to a child. Regardless of whether the statute requires  
general or specific intent, the evidence is sufficient to  
convict 
defendant 
of 
third-degree child abuse because she knew  
of her daughter’s susceptibility to bruising, due to asthma  
medication taken by the victim, yet still spanked her with  
enough force to dislodge a blood clot from her daughter’s nose  
and to cause bruises that raised the suspicion of several  
school, law enforcement, and medical personnel.  Thus, the  
prosecution presented sufficient evidence that defendant had  
the requisite mens rea to convict her of third-degree child  
abuse.  
Accordingly, we affirm the conclusion of the Court of  
Appeals that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to  
3  
 
convict defendant of third-degree child abuse.  
Defendant also argues that the prosecution failed to  
prove that her conduct toward the victim was not a reasonable  
disciplinary measure.  She invokes MCL 750.136b(7)3 to make  
this argument.  
Defendant did not formally invoke the “reasonable  
discipline” statute at trial, but she did indicate in her  
trial testimony that the victim (her daughter) was “getting  
real, real lippy” with her and that she intended to punish the  
victim by spanking her.  The trial court did not expressly  
refer to the “reasonable discipline” statutory provision in  
its findings of fact.  However, the trial court obviously  
rejected 
the 
credibility of the pivotal testimony of defendant  
and the victim as it refused to accept their assertions that  
much of the victim’s bruising was due to sources other than a  
physical assault by defendant. Further, as summarized above,  
the 
evidence 
indicated that the victim was attacked forcefully  
enough to dislodge a blood clot, triggering a nosebleed, and  
3  
This section [which defines the child abuse 
crimes] shall not be construed to prohibit a parent 
or guardian, or other person permitted by law or 
authorized by the parent or guardian, from taking 
steps to reasonably discipline a child, including 
the use of reasonable force.  
4  
 
to leave visible bruising on various parts of her body.4  
Wherever the outer limits of “reasonable discipline” are to be  
drawn, given the injuries inflicted by the force used in this  
matter, they were plainly exceeded.  
Accordingly, we conclude that, in rejecting defendant’s  
version of events, the trial court implicitly concluded that  
this case did not involve the use of reasonable discipline.  
In this regard, we note the presumption that a trial judge in  
a bench trial knows the applicable law. See, e.g., People v  
Cazal, 412 Mich 680, 686-687; 316 NW2d 705 (1982) (stating  
that “a trial judge should be aware of lesser-included  
offenses without the need for instruction” and referring to  
“the trial judge’s knowledge of the law”).  
Therefore, we presume that the trial court correctly  
rejected the applicability of the “reasonable discipline”  
provision and did not address it more specifically for the  
simple reason that any claim of “reasonable discipline” in  
this case was plainly unsupportable.  Additionally, we affirm  
the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the prosecution  
4 While defendant indicates that asthma medication being 
taken by the victim made her more susceptible to bruising, 
because this was known to defendant, rather than being 
exculpatory, it provided all the more reason that defendant 
should have shown restraint in her treatment of her child.  
Moreover, defendant admitted that she hurt her hand in 
connection with her “punishment” of the victim, which  
underscores the use of an extreme degree of force against the 
child.  
5  
 
 
 
 
presented sufficient evidence to convict defendant of third­
degree child abuse.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, 
KELLY, TAYLOR, 
YOUNG, 
and  
MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.  
6