Case Title: Gale v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-05-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Gale v. State1990 WY 46792 P.2d 570Case Number: 87-192Decided: 05/02/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
RICHARD KANE GALE, 

APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,

 APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Campbell County, Joseph F. Maier, J.

Richard A. 
Hostetler, Denver, Colo., and Willis C. Geer, Gillette, for 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Bryne, David K. 
Gruver, Gerald P. Luckhaupt, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]      The primary 
questions presented in this case concern the rights of an accused in a sexual 
abuse case to compel a victim's psychological examination; to compel the state's 
furnishing summaries of expected expert witness testimony; to discover favorable 
evidence; and to obtain dismissal of the charges because of the state's failure 
to preserve evidence.

[¶2]            
Appellant Richard Kane Gale, D.D.S. (Gale), appeals his jury trial 
convictions on three counts of taking immodest, immoral, or indecent liberties 
with a child in violation of W.S. 14-3-105 (June 1983 Repl.). Gale presents 
numerous issues premising error upon his inability to obtain various types of 
evidence for trial preparation; his issues include:

A. Whether the trial 
court erred in denying Dr. Gale's motion for psychiatric evaluation.

B. Whether the trial 
court erred when it denied Dr. Gale's motion for discovery of summaries of the 
substance of the expected trial testimony of the prosecution's expert 
witness.

C. Whether (sic) trial 
court erred in failing to order disclosure of the psychological and/or 
psychiatric records of the R children.

D. Whether the trial 
court erred in failing to disclose the social services files. 

E. Whether the trial 
court erred in denying the motion (sic) disclosure of the tape 
recordings.

F. Whether the trial 
court erred in denying the motion for disclosure of school records.

G. Whether the trial 
court erred in denying the motion to dismiss or in the alternative suppress 
testimony of the R family.

H. Whether the trial 
court erred in denying the Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Suppress 
Testimony for failure to preserve evidence.

[¶3]      We 
affirm.

FACTS

[¶4]      Gale was accused 
of entering the R family home on the evening of August 30, 1986 and sexually 
molesting three of the female R children in their rooms. A criminal complaint 
and warrant were issued on December 11, 1986. Gale was arrested the same day and 
charged with three counts of taking indecent liberties with a minor in violation 
of W.S. 14-3-105 (June 1983 Repl.). An information was filed on February 6, 
1987.

[¶5]            
Underlying this case is the bizarre atmosphere of sexual abuse and 
neglect that prevailed in the family home of GR and LR in 1986, and possibly 
before that time. In 1986, the R family included the parents GR and LR, five 
girls, ages three, three, seven, ten, seventeen, and a boy age eleven. On 
October 31, 1986, the Wyoming Division of Public Assistance and Social Services 
(D-PASS) received information that GR was sexually abusing the seven year-old 
child. The initial information led to a November 17, 1986, D-PASS interview of 
the seven year-old in which she indicated that GR had sexually abused her; in 
that interview, she also stated that her dentist had come into her bedroom one 
night and performed oral sex upon her. D-PASS used this information as the basis 
for two ongoing investigations into the conduct of GR and Gale, the family 
dentist, during the ensuing weeks. D-PASS conducted additional interviews and 
discussions with the ten year-old child, the seventeen year-old child, and LR, 
which resulted in a criminal charge being filed against GR on October 28, 1986, 
alleging that he sexually assaulted the seven year-old child. GR received a 
preliminary hearing but was not bound over for trial.

[¶6]      At the same time 
the state was proceeding against GR on criminal charges, it also had a petition 
pending in juvenile court concerning the well-being of the R children. This 
record does not contain transcripts or recordings of any hearings which took 
place as a result of that juvenile petition. It does appear, however, that the R 
children were taken from GR and LR sometime in late 1986 and placed in foster 
homes. Gale also alleges that GR was under a court order not to have 
unsupervised contact with his children while the juvenile petition was pending 
and that, based on conversations which Gale's original defense counsel, a Terry 
Preuit, had with former Campbell County Prosecuting Attorney, Robert Rose, III, 
GR may have violated that order and been tried for contempt. These allegations 
are speculative, at least in terms of the information available in the record 
presented to this court.

[¶7]      The Campbell 
County Attorney decided not to reprosecute GR or bring charges against LR; 
instead, on January 16, 1987, LR entered into a "Juvenile Court Admission 
Agreement" in which the state agreed to grant her immunity from prosecution for 
child abuse or neglect in connection with the alleged acts committed by her 
husband. The stated purpose of this agreement was to allow LR "the opportunity 
to obtain help and to keep her family together if possible and further to 
facilitate the protection of the R children through the processes of the 
juvenile court." Under the agreement, LR admitted she had suspicions and actual 
knowledge that some of her children complained about sexual misconduct by GR and 
Gale. LR also agreed to interview with the state and truthfully relate her 
knowledge of contact between Gale and her children. She also agreed to testify 
truthfully about that subject if requested to do so by the state. The agreement 
obligated the state to grant immunity to both LR and GR concerning the incidents 
that allegedly occurred in the R home and further stated that "[t]he state 
further warrants that it presently has no plans for alternative prosecution of 
[GR] in any other forum or for any other offense." The agreement also provided 
that "[t]his promise of immunity applies whether evidence of the crime or crimes 
comes from [LR] or any other source."

[¶8]      The parties to 
this appeal assert that a similar written agreement was reached between the 
state and GR. This agreement is said to have contained an admission by GR that 
he had repeated sexual contact with the seventeen year-old child, that he 
punished his son excessively, and that he endangered his family through 
alcoholism. The agreement, like LR's, is said to have granted GR immunity from 
prosecution on the charge that had been initially filed against him and further 
immunity from prosecution for any previous sexual misconduct or abuse he 
committed towards his children in the family home. In return, GR apparently 
agreed to interview and/or testify truthfully concerning his knowledge of Gale's 
alleged contact with the R children. This is supported in the record by 
testimony from the Campbell County prosecutor who made the decision not to 
refile the charge initially filed against GR in lieu of an agreement from GR 
that contained an admission of his past sexual misbehavior with his children and 
his promise to help the state prosecute Gale. The actual agreement between GR 
and the state, however, does not appear in the record on appeal. After these 
agreements were completed, the state pursued a case against Gale.

[¶9]      Gale had an 
extensive three-day preliminary hearing on January 30-31, 1987, and February 2, 
1987. At this hearing, the state presented testimony from the three R daughters 
who implicated Gale. Gale's counsel was given an extensive opportunity to 
cross-examine them. Over 100 pages of the 600-page transcript from that hearing 
contain Gale's counsel's cross-examination of the eldest R daughter. The state 
also called LR and an expert witness, Dr. William Heinecke of Northern Wyoming 
Mental Health Center. Gale's counsel examined the male R child and a number of 
witnesses who gave testimony about the R children and the R family. Gale's 
counsel also examined the officer who compiled the police reports on GR and 
Gale. After listening to all of this testimony, the county court made a finding 
of probable cause and bound Gale over for trial.

[¶10]   On April 6, 1987, Gale filed 
numerous motions for discovery. Among these motions were: (1) a motion to compel 
three of the female children to undergo psychiatric evaluations to determine 
whether their mental condition could affect their credibility as prosecution 
witnesses; (2) an extensive general discovery motion which sought, among other 
things, summaries of the proposed testimony of prosecution expert witnesses; (3) 
a motion to compel disclosure of psychiatric records on three of the female 
children; (4) a motion for the disclosure of all Campbell County D-PASS records 
pertaining to the R family; (5) a motion for disclosure of any public or private 
school records on four of the R children; (6) and a motion for disclosure of any 
tape recording or transcript of any hearing regarding GR and LR's agreement with 
the state not to have contact with their children. Gale supported these motions 
with the affidavit of his own private investigator, which concluded that some of 
these records needed to be screened to gain an understanding of the dynamics of 
the R family and how those dynamics might play into the charges against Gale. He 
also attached police records, a written statement of the eldest R daughter, a 
written statement of one of the R children's friends, LR's juvenile court 
agreement, and other juvenile court documents. He filed requisite subpoenas 
duces tecum in support of these motions on April 22, 1987. Gale also filed 
motions to dismiss or suppress victim testimony because the state failed to 
preserve the initial interviews of the victims on audio or video tape; and to 
dismiss or suppress the testimony of the R family. D-PASS filed an objection and 
motion to quash in response to the subpoena duces tecum seeking D-PASS records 
on April 22, 1987. The state filed opposition to Gale's motions to compel the 
child witnesses to undergo psychiatric examinations, for disclosure of tape 
recordings or transcripts of any juvenile court hearings, for disclosure of a 
summary of proposed testimony of prosecution expert witnesses, to dismiss for 
failure to preserve evidence, and to dismiss or suppress the testimony of the R 
family.

[¶11]   The trial court filed a decision 
letter on May 18, 1987, explaining its actions and findings concerning Gale's 
motions. Gale's motion for psychiatric examinations of the victims was denied 
based on the trial court's decision that the potential harassment of such 
examinations would not be justified by the information they might yield. The 
trial court similarly denied Gale's motion for summaries of proposed testimony 
from prosecution expert witnesses on the grounds that Gale had no right to such 
summaries under the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure. Further, the trial 
court explained that it reviewed, in camera, the documents produced under 
Gale's subpoenas duces tecum for psychiatric records, D-PASS records, and school 
records. After completing this review, the trial court stated that it was 
applying the principles set forth in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987), and found that none of the documents produced 
under the subpoenas duces tecum contained any information that was 
constitutionally material to Gale's case. The trial court did not review any of 
the psychiatric records requested by Gale's subpoena because none were produced; 
the trial court did agree to conduct an in camera review of such 
materials should any surface before trial. Gale's motion for tapes or 
transcripts of the juvenile court hearings was denied on the basis that those 
records were to remain confidential under Wyoming statute. Gale's motion to 
dismiss for failure to preserve evidence was denied based on the holding in 
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 81 L. Ed. 2d 413 n. 8 
(1984). The trial court denied Gale's motion to dismiss or suppress the 
testimony of the R family, finding the agreement between the state and LR to 
have been legal and entered into after the initial allegations against Gale were 
first made. A series of orders denying the motions as explained in the decision 
letter were filed on June 1, 1987.

[¶12]   A jury trial took place on May 
18-21, 1987. The state presented evidence to support its theory that Gale had 
come into the R family home on the evening of August 30, 1986, and sexually 
molested three of the R daughters. Countering the defense's theory, the state 
argued that the trial testimony did not bear out the idea that the R family had 
conspired to place blame on Gale and away from GR. The state also called an 
expert witness who engaged in a general discussion of the characteristics one 
might expect to see in a sexual addict or professional abuser and the 
characteristics that might be manifested by a child sexual assault victim. 
Viewing the trial as a credibility contest between Gale and the R family, Gale's 
counsel argued that the testimony of LR and the R children was rehearsed and 
untrue and that they had psychologically "transferred" the sexual abuse their 
father had visited upon them to an unsuspecting Gale who was only a family 
friend. At trial, both Gale and his wife testified that Gale was at home during 
the evening of the alleged incidents, and did not visit the R home that night or 
the next day. Gale's counsel called its own expert witness, who answered 
questions about the testimony given by the state's expert witness, about Gale's 
scores on various personality tests, and about the effect abuse and neglect 
might have on a child's ability to recall specific events. The jury returned a 
guilty verdict on all three counts against Gale.

[¶13]   After a June 29, 1987, sentencing 
hearing, the court sentenced Gale to three terms in the state penitentiary of 
two to five years, those sentences to run concurrently. This appeal 
followed.

I.

Gale's Motion For 
Independent Psychological Examinations of the Minor Victims

[¶14]   Gale's first issue charges that the 
trial court somehow denied Gale a fair trial by refusing to compel the minor 
victims to be examined by Gale's psychologist. Gale sought these examinations to 
provide his expert witness with a clinical basis for attacking the credibility 
and veracity of the R children as complainant witnesses and possibly to provide 
additional evidence to allow him to cross-examine the prosecution expert 
witness. We are uncertain as to how a trial court could actually compel a 
witness to undergo a psychological examination were one deemed to be 
appropriate, and these parties do not discuss that aspect of this issue. We also 
note that this issue does not involve any challenge to the competency of the 
complainant witnesses in this case. Cf. Easterday v. State, 254 Ind. 13, 256 N.E.2d 901, 905-06 (1970). Our discussion on this issue is limited to resolving 
Gale's assertion of a right to have these victims examined and is not intended 
to express any view on the potential problem of witness compliance or 
competency.

[¶15]   There is no specific legal 
authority allowing a defendant to compel a witness in a criminal trial to 
undergo an independent psychological examination at a defendant's request. In 
the civil arena, W.R.C.P. 35(a) provides for a mental examination of a party 
when the mental condition of that party is in issue in the case. Assuming an 
application of this rule to criminal cases, it does not confer authority to 
compel an examination of a victim who is a witness but not a party. See State v. 
Liddell, 211 Mont. 180, 685 P.2d 918, 924 (1984). Gale must also acquiesce to 
the legal proposition that he does not have a general state or federal 
constitutional right to conduct wide-ranging criminal discovery in the state's 
files. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S. Ct. 837, 846, 51 L. Ed. 2d 30, 42 (1977) (citing Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474, 93 S. Ct. 2208, 2212, 
37 L. Ed. 2d 82, 87 (1973)) (no federal due process right to general discovery in 
a criminal case); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 218-19 (1963) (prosecution has an affirmative duty to turn over 
exculpatory material to the defense); and Hubbard v. State, 618 P.2d 553, 554-55 
(Wyo. 1980) (no state due process right to general discovery in a criminal 
case). See also W.R.Cr.P. 18. These precedents leave Gale with the argument that 
a Wyoming trial court has inherent "due process" discretion to order a 
complainant witness to undergo a psychological examination by a defendant's 
psychologist and that failing to do so in this case amounted to an abuse of that 
inherent discretion.

[¶16]   To support his initial argument 
that this court should recognize an inherent trial court discretion to compel 
sexual assault victim/witnesses to submit to a psychological examination, Gale 
relies primarily on the California Supreme Court's holding in Ballard v. 
Superior Court of San Diego County, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838, 18 A.L.R.3d 1416 (1966), which has since been revisited and clarified by 
that court in People v. Russel, 69 Cal. 2d 187, 70 Cal. Rptr. 210, 443 P.2d 794 
(1968). In Ballard, the California court held that there may be sexual assault 
trials in which psychological expert testimony might be admissible to attack the 
credibility of uncorroborated testimony given by a complainant witness. Ballard, 
49 Cal. Rptr.  at 313, 410 P.2d  at 849. Using this conclusion the California court 
held:

We therefore believe that 
the trial judge should be authorized to order the prosecutrix to submit to 
psychiatric examination if the circumstances indicate a necessity for an 
examination. Such necessity would generally arise only if little or no 
corroboration supported the charge and if the defense raised the issue of the 
effect of the complaining witness' mental or emotional condition upon her 
veracity. Thus, in rejecting the polar extremes of an absolute requirement 
that the prosecutrix submit to a psychiatric examination, we have accepted a 
middle ground, placing the matter in the discretion of the trial 
judge.

Id. (emphasis 
added). See also O'Neale, Court Ordered Psychiatric Examination of a Rape Victim 
in a Criminal Rape Prosecution - or How Many Times Must a Woman Be Raped? 18 
Santa Clara L.Rev. 119, 123-26 (1978). Russel echoed this reasoning and 
solidified the California court's conclusion that a charge of sexual assault in 
which the complainant witness' testimony is uncorroborated might warrant using 
expert psychological or psychiatric testimony to challenge the credibility or 
veracity of that witness, thereby necessitating a compelled examination. The 
Russel court then went on to discuss the way in which trial court discretion 
should be exercised regarding the admission of expert testimony at trial for 
those purposes. Russel, 70 Cal. Rptr.  at 216-17, 443 P.2d  at 800-01.1 Cf. State ex rel. Holmes v. 
Lanford, 764 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex. App. 1989) (trial court does not have 
inherent authority to order independent psychological evaluation of four-year 
old sexual assault victim to challenge victim's competency), and numerous cases 
cited in Annotation, Necessity or Permissibility of Mental Examination to 
Determine Competency or Credibility of Complainant In Sexual Offense 
Prosecution, 45 A.L.R.4th 310 (1986).

[¶17]   We cannot adopt the Ballard-Russel 
rationale because doing so, under the facts of this case, would directly 
contradict recent case law from this court. See Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357 
(Wyo. 1988). There, this court held unanimously that it is plain error in a 
sexual assault case for the trial court to allow an expert witness to comment 
directly on the credibility or veracity of a complainant witness. Determining 
credibility is the sole province of the jury, and we will not allow expert 
witness comment or testimony on the direct effect which an alleged emotional 
disturbance might have on a complainant witness' ability to tell the truth at 
trial. Id. at 362 (citing Lessard v. State, 719 P.2d 227, 233 (Wyo. 1986)). See 
also W.R.E. 702; People v. Visgar, 120 Ill. App.3d 584, 75 Ill.Dec. 784, 791, 
457 N.E.2d 1343, 1350 (1983); State v. Walker, 506 A.2d 1143, 1148 (Me. 1986); 
State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Minn. 1982); People v. Souvenir, 83 
Misc.2d 1038, 373 N.Y.S.2d 824, 827 (1975).

[¶18]   Here, there is no doubt that Gale's 
primary purpose for seeking compelled psychological or psychiatric examinations 
of the minor victims was to form a foundation for expert psychological testimony 
on the effect the victims' emotional and psychological health might have on 
their ability to tell the truth. That is the continuous theme under which he has 
pursued his motion to compel psychiatric examination from the day he filed his 
initial motion through this appeal. This is illustrated in Gale's appellate 
brief on this issue, which expressly states:

Dr. Gale filed a 
pre-trial motion seeking an order directing that [the three minor victims] 
submit to a psychiatric examination for the purpose of determining whether 
their mental or emotional condition effected [sic] the credibility of their 
allegations against Dr. Gale. The motion first argued that there was a 
significant question regarding the affect [sic] of the children's emotional and 
mental condition upon their veracity which was of such a nature as to 
establish a sufficiently compelling need for a psychological evaluation. Second, 
a psychological examination was essential to enable the defense to investigate, 
prepare to confront and cross-examine the prosecution expert 
witness.

(emphasis 
added). Obviously, this argument is fashioned exactly around the rationale used 
by the California Supreme Court in Ballard and Russel. Semantic arguments 
concerning the "way" the defense might try to use this type of expert testimony 
at trial to attack the credibility of a victim/witness do not change this 
court's unanimous rejection of the use of expert testimony to invade the 
function of a jury. Zabel, 765 P.2d  at 363. We do not imply that this type of 
evidence would not be admissible for other acceptable purposes, for example to 
explain some peculiar behavior of the victim to the jury. See Griego v. State, 
761 P.2d 973 (Wyo. 1988); Lessard, 719 P.2d  at 233; Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1046 (Wyo. 1987). That use of expert testimony, however, is not the basis 
for allowing compelled psychological examinations explained in Ballard and upon 
which Gale now relies. Since the Ballard-Russel rationale does not comport with 
the unanimous decision of this court in Zabel, we must reject it as a rule of 
law for Wyoming. Gale was not entitled to have the trial court order these minor 
victims to undergo psychological examinations to provide a foundation for his 
expert witness to challenge their credibility or veracity on the 
stand.

[¶19]   The only remaining reason Gale 
presents as justification for compelling psychological examinations is that he 
might have been able to use the results of such examinations to help him prepare 
for cross-examination of the state's expert witness. He cannot cite Ballard, 
Russel, or any cases that rely on those cases as authority for that proposition. 
Those cases are premised upon the idea that the examination provides the defense 
expert with a clinical basis to testify directly as to the credibility of the 
complainant witnesses. Russel, 70 Cal. Rptr.  at 216-17, 443 P.2d at 800-01; 
Ballard, 49 Cal. Rptr.  at 310-12, 410 P.2d  at 846-48.

[¶20]   The other information and evidence 
available to Gale to prepare for cross-examination of the state's expert witness 
were substantial. That body of material included conferring with his own expert 
witness who testified at the trial concerning the results of numerous 
personality tests given to Gale, reviewing the pre-1984 D-PASS files and 
juvenile court records in his possession, reviewing the Gillette police records 
on the R family from 1980 through 1987 in his possession, tape recordings of 
over three hours of interviews with the R children conducted by Gale's original 
defense counsel, timely notice of who the state's expert witnesses might be, and 
an unbridled opportunity to interview various persons who might be called as 
witnesses in the case. Gale had an opportunity to cross-examine the expert 
witness called by the state at the three-day preliminary hearing. At trial, the 
state called an expert witness, but the transcript shows that he was never asked 
to give a direct clinical opinion on the condition of the R children. 
After that testimony, Gale's counsel conducted an extensive cross-examination of 
the state expert witness. Considering the evidence available to Gale for the 
preparation of his defense, the trial court properly denied his request for 
psychiatric examinations of the R children on that basis.

II.

Gale's Motion for 
Summaries of Expected State Expert Witness Testimony

[¶21]   Gale begins this argument by again 
admitting he has no general federal or state constitutional right to discovery 
in a criminal case and that no statute or rule of this court entitles him to 
discovery. We agree with his analysis to that point. See Weatherford, 429 U.S. 
at 559-60, 97 S. Ct.  at 845-46, 51 L. Ed. 2d  at 42; Hubbard, 618 P.2d  at 554-55. 
See also W.R.Cr.P. 18(c) (defendant has a right to the statement of a state 
witness after testimony is given). Instead, he relies on the idea that a trial 
court possesses some degree of inherent due process authority to grant a 
specific discovery request in a criminal case to insure fairness. Gale builds on 
this general conclusion by referencing American Bar Association Standards for 
Criminal Justice, by citing a federal case involving civil discovery, and by 
citing this court's holdings in Gee v. State, 662 P.2d 103, 104-05 (Wyo. 1983), 
and Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Wyo. 1982) for the proposition 
that

when a prosecution 
utilizes scientific or quasi-scientific methods which may impact upon the 
assessment of credibility at trial, it is important to insure that the defense 
has adequate pretrial opportunity to prepare to confront the evidence at trial. 
This may require pretrial discovery that goes beyond the generally applicable 
rules of procedure.

[¶22]   We do not necessarily disagree with 
Gale that the trial court does have a certain degree of due process discretion 
to grant exceptional criminal discovery requests to insure fairness. However, 
his assertion that under the facts of this case the trial court abused that type 
of discretion by denying him summaries of prospective testimony from state 
expert witnesses lacks authority. The American Bar Association Standards and the 
federal civil discovery case referenced by Gale are inapposite in this fact 
situation and of no consequence. As for Gee and Chapman, while those cases might 
stand for the above proposition when the case involves enhancing witness 
testimony through hypnosis, that specific application of due process does not 
automatically extend every discovery request by a criminal defendant beyond the 
bounds of W.R.Cr.P. 18.

[¶23]   The issue here is whether Gale 
received a fair trial. Under this issue Gale has to prove that by denying his 
motion for the summaries of potential state expert witness testimony, the trial 
court rendered this trial unfair and abused its discretion. In Martin v. State, 
720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986), this court defined judicial discretion as "a 
composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously." Under this 
standard, Gale's challenge must be considered in light of evidence in the record 
indicating: (1) Gale was notified that the state would call certain expert 
witnesses at trial and that Gale has not alleged he was denied the opportunity 
to interview those individuals; (2) Gale was allowed to cross-examine 
extensively the state's expert witness at trial; and (3) Gale also offered 
substantial testimony of his own expert witness in rebuttal. Against this 
backdrop, we have difficulty understanding Gale's claim that he was denied a 
fair trial in this regard or how the trial court abused its discretion when it 
denied Gale's motion to compel the production of summaries of the testimony 
potential state expert witnesses might give at trial. Applying the Martin 
definition of abuse of discretion, we conclude Gale has shown no abuse of 
discretion under this issue.

III.

Gale's Motions to Obtain 
Psychiatric Records, D-PASS Records, School Records, and Juvenile Court 
Transcripts or Records

[¶24]   The trial court denied Gale's 
various discovery motions for disclosure of statutorily privileged information 
based on the holding in Ritchie. There, the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to review the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's vacating of Ritchie's 
convictions for rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, incest, and 
corruption of a minor, all charges that were brought on behalf of Ritchie's 
thirteen year-old daughter. Id., 480 U.S.  at 43, 107 S. Ct.  at 994, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 
48. Before his trial, Ritchie served a Pennsylvania social service agency (CYS) 
with a subpoena seeking access to records concerning his daughter. CYS 
apparently acknowledged that the records existed but refused to produce them. 
There was no indication that the prosecution had access to or knowledge of the 
contents of the records at any time. Id., 480 U.S.  at 44, 107 S. Ct.  at 995, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 49 n. 4. Ritchie scheduled a sanctions hearing at which the trial 
court heard Ritchie's arguments that the records might contain the names of 
persons who might be favorable witnesses for him at trial. Ritchie also made a 
specific request for a medical report he believed to have been compiled by CYS 
in 1978. The trial court acknowledged not having reviewed the entire CYS file 
and accepted CYS' assertion that no 1978 medical report existed. It then denied 
Ritchie's motion for sanctions. Id., 480 U.S.  at 44, 107 S. Ct.  at 995, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 49 n. 3. At trial, the prosecution's main witness was Ritchie's 
daughter and Ritchie was allowed to conduct an extensive cross-examination. The 
jury then convicted Ritchie on all counts, and he received a three to ten year 
prison sentence. Id., 480 U.S.  at 45, 107 S. Ct.  at 995, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 
49.

[¶25]   In his appeal to the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court, an intermediate appellate court, Ritchie argued that his sixth 
amendment rights under the confrontation clause were violated when the trial 
court denied his motion for sanctions on CYS' refusal to honor the subpoena. 
That appellate court vacated Ritchie's conviction, holding that although Ritchie 
did not have an unlimited right to full disclosure of any statutorily privileged 
information in the CYS file, he did have a right to have the trial court conduct 
an in camera examination of any privileged records so that the victim's 
statements could be released. The full record was then to be released to 
Ritchie's lawyer so that he could use it to argue relevancy of those statements. 
Counsel for both the prosecution and the defense could then argue harmless error 
and relevancy, respectively, and the trial court could determine whether denying 
the information to Ritchie was prejudicial or not. Id.

[¶26]   On appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania, that court agreed to vacate Ritchie's conviction and remand, 
concluding that Ritchie's lawyer was entitled to search the entire record for 
useful evidence. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974) (criminal defendant had sixth 
amendment confrontation clause right to question witness concerning juvenile 
criminal record notwithstanding state statute making such records inadmissible) 
to hold that denying Ritchie's lawyer access to the file denied him his sixth 
amendment right to confront his accusers because his counsel was not allowed to 
look at the entire file in an effort to locate evidence for the defense and 
because the trial court's review would not fulfill that end. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 
at 46, 107 S. Ct.  at 995-96, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 50.

[¶27]   On certiorari, the United States 
Supreme Court discussed the balance between the need to safeguard the privacy of 
privileged information and a criminal defendant's rights under the confrontation 
clause. It also reviewed that subject in the context of its holding in Davis and 
concluded that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's interpretation of the holding in 
Davis was too broad. The Court explained that while its decision in Davis did 
protect a defendant's trial-right to substantive cross-examination of 
prosecution witnesses, it did not "transform the confrontation clause into a 
constitutionally-compelled rule of pre-trial discovery." Ritchie, 480 U.S.  at 
52, 107 S. Ct.  at 999, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 54. On that basis, a plurality of the Court 
held that Ritchie's confrontation clause right to cross-examine the prosecutrix 
had been preserved by the trial court's actions. Id., 480 U.S.  at 53, 107 S. Ct. 
at 1000, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 54.

[¶28]   Next, the Court discussed the 
implications which the trial court's actions might have in terms of the sixth 
amendment compulsory process clause and eventually opted to address Ritchie's 
claim within the context of more carefully defined due process precedents 
concerning fundamental fairness in criminal trials.2 The opinion first emphasized that 
under the sixth amendment due process clause the "government has the obligation 
to turn over [to the defense] evidence in its possession that is both favorable 
to the accused and material to guilt or punishment." Id., 480 U.S.  at 57, 
107 S. Ct.  at 1001, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 57. (emphasis added) (citing Brady, 373 U.S.  at 
87, 83 S. Ct.  at 1196, 10 L.Ed.2d at 218). The Court also acknowledged the 
qualified statutory policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in keeping this 
type of information confidential unless its release was compelled by court 
order. Ritchie, 408 U.S.  at 57, 107 S. Ct.  at 1002, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 56.3 Next, the Court recognized that 
under the applicable Pennsylvania statute, and in certain circumstances, such 
records might contain constitutionally material information vital to the 
defense. The Court then drew upon the standard for constitutional materiality it 
had previously articulated in United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 494 (1985)4, and stated:

     It is well settled 
that the government has the obligation to turn over evidence in its possession 
that is both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment. 
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976); Brady 
v. Maryland, supra, [373 U.S.] at 87, 83 S. Ct.  at 1194. Although courts have 
used different terminologies to define "materiality," a majority of this Court 
has agreed, "[e]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability 
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. A `reasonable probability' is a 
probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome." United 
States v. Bagley, supra, 473 U.S.  at 682, 105 S. Ct.  at 3375 (opinion of 
BLACKMUN, J.); see id., at 685, 105 S. Ct.  at 3375, 87 L. Ed. 2d  at 481 (opinion of 
WHITE, J.).

Ritchie, 480 U.S.  at 57, 107 S. Ct.  at 1001-02, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 57. Cf. Aguilar v. State, 764 P.2d 684, 688-89 (Wyo. 1988); W.R. Cr.P. 49(a); W.R.A.P. 7.04 (harmless error 
standard in Wyoming). Using this standard, the Court affirmed the decision of 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to remand the case for further proceedings and 
held that:

Ritchie is entitled to 
have the CYS file reviewed by the trial court to determine whether it contains 
information that probably would have changed the outcome of his trial. If it 
does, he must be given a new trial. If the records maintained by CYS contain 
no such information or if nondisclosure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the lower court will be free to reinstate the prior conviction.

Ritchie, 480 U.S.  at 58, 107 S. Ct.  at 1002, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 58.

[¶29]   The remaining task facing the Court 
was to apply the constitutional materiality standard it had just adopted in a 
way that guaranteed a defendant's rights to a fair trial without radically 
altering traditional constitutional limits on criminal discovery. The Court 
began this discussion by noting that a defendant has never had a general 
constitutional right to conduct his own unsupervised search in the state's files 
to argue relevancy. Id., 480 U.S.  at 59, 107 S. Ct.  at 1003, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 58 
(citing Bagley, 473 U.S.  at 682, 105 S. Ct.  at 3383, 87 L. Ed. 2d  at 494; and 
Weatherford, 429 U.S.  at 559, 97 S. Ct.  at 846, 51 L. Ed. 2d  at 42. Cf. Hubbard, 
618 P.2d  at 554-55. The Court also described that in a typical case settled 
practice was for the defendant to make a general request to the prosecution for 
exculpatory evidence and then the state would decide what information must be 
disclosed. Ritchie, 480 U.S.  at 59, 107 S. Ct.  at 1003, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 58-59 
(citing Brady). Considering these things in conjunction with the requirements of 
due process, the Court struck the necessary compromise by holding that a 
defendant would not be allowed to have his attorney look through the privileged 
records, but defense counsel would be allowed to have the trial court conduct an 
in camera review for information constitutionally material to the 
defense. The Court characterized this as a balance between the competing 
interests and reiterated that a trial court's duty to disclose such information 
was ongoing, requiring the trial court to release privileged information 
whenever it becomes constitutionally material to the proceedings. 
Id.

[¶30]   This in camera review for 
constitutionally material evidence was the standard under which the trial court 
addressed Gale's subpoenas for various records in which the state asserted a 
privilege. The trial court conducted this review focusing on privileged 
materials at issue, on the defendant's ability to gather such evidence from 
other sources, and on how the privileged evidence may relate to the defendant's 
theory of the case. This approach is consistent with Ritchie; we adopt it for 
Wyoming and will employ it to review the trial court's actions in this case. See 
State v. Cusik, 219 N.J. Super. 452, 530 A.2d 806, 813 (1987).

A. Psychiatric 
Records

[¶31]   Gale begins his argument for 
disclosure of psychiatric records by asserting he has a right to examine any 
records of psychological counseling or treatment experienced by the R children. 
The state responds that before we can address the propriety of Gale's argument 
we must determine if the record contains any evidence of these documents such 
that this issue is properly preserved for appeal. This requires us to review the 
record concerning Gale's requests for such information.

[¶32]   Two of Gale's requests for pretrial 
discovery concerned speculation by his counsel that some records of 
psychological counseling or treatment of the R children existed which might lead 
to the discovery of exculpatory evidence or witnesses for the defense. Gale's 
counsel filed a motion to compel the state to produce psychological records on 
April 6, 1987, and similarly had a subpoena duces tecum issued to Dr. Heinecke 
of Northern Wyoming Mental Health Center on April 24, 1987. The trial court held 
a motions hearing on the same day during which Gale's attorney admitted his 
request for psychological records was speculative. Gale's counsel was also given 
an opportunity to cross-examine Heinecke at this motions hearing but did not 
question him about the existence of any psychiatric records concerning the R 
children. There was minimal evidence that Heinecke took some notes during his 
treatment of the R children, but Gale's counsel did not pursue that point in the 
motions hearing or in subsequent pleadings.

[¶33]   At the motions hearing, the trial 
court addressed the subpoena duces tecum issued to Heinecke and concluded that 
because any examinations or treatment Heinecke might have conducted with the R 
children were pursuant to the earlier juvenile court proceedings, their 
availability to the defense would be decided under Gale's motion for release of 
the juvenile court records. The issue is discussed in this appeal below. In its 
decision letter on the issues raised in Gale's motions hearing, the trial court 
stated:

In discussing the 
disclosure of psychiatric records sought by the defendant's motion, there has 
not been shown to exist any such psychiatric examinations or records to this 
Court up to this time [May 15, 1987]. I will simply repeat what I have said 
earlier, that under the due process clause this court recognizes that the State 
has the obligation to turn over evidence in its possession that is both 
favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment, but there is no 
general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case and the Brady case 
did not create one. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, supra. In any event, 
should it be brought to the Court's attention that there are psychiatric 
records of the minor complainants in this case, the court will consider them in 
camera as it has the other confidential information sought by defendant to 
determine their materiality.

(emphasis 
added.)

[¶34]   Gale has never put forth any 
additional evidence showing that such records exist, let alone establish some 
basis for a claim that such records might contain information constitutionally 
material to his defense. See Ritchie, 480 U.S.  at 58, 107 S. Ct.  at 1002, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 58 n. 15. Further, Gale has the burden to provide us with a record 
supporting further review of this issue. Edwards v. Edwards, 732 P.2d 1068, 1070 
(Wyo. 1987) (citing Nicholls v. Nicholls, 721 P.2d 1103, 1105 (Wyo. 1986); and 
State v. Dieringer, 708 P.2d 1, 12 (Wyo. 1985)). The district court did all that 
it could do. It gave Gale an open invitation to present evidence establishing 
the existence of psychological records not a part of the juvenile court file and 
information within such records that might be constitutionally material to his 
defense. Gale never took advantage of the district court's offer; consequently, 
he has not fulfilled his burden to present this court with a record that would 
afford him appellate review on this issue.

B. D-PASS 
Files

[¶35]   Gale moved for disclosure of all 
D-PASS files involving the R family. His motivation for that disclosure was that 
D-PASS caseworker notes of interviews with R family members might contain 
references to the allegations against him that could be useful in constructing 
his defense. Pursuant to the analysis set out in Ritchie the trial court 
reviewed the D-PASS records in camera. After this review it sealed the 
D-PASS records and made them a part of the record now before us on appeal. Based 
on its review of these records the trial court found no material or relevant 
evidence concerning the charges against Gale and denied his request that they be 
disclosed to him.

[¶36]   D-PASS records are statutorily 
privileged materials under W.S. 14-3-214 (July 1986 Repl.), which provides in 
pertinent part:

(a) All records 
concerning reports and investigations of child abuse or neglect are confidential 
except as provided by W.S. 14-3-201 through 14-3-215.

(b) Applications for 
access to records concerning child abuse or neglect contained in the state 
agency or local child protective agency shall be made in the manner and form 
prescribed by the state agency. Upon appropriate application, the state agency 
shall give access to any of the following persons or agencies for purposes 
directly related with the administration of W.S. 14-3-201 through 
14-23-215:

(i) A local child 
protective agency;

(ii) A law enforcement 
agency, guardian ad litem, child protection team or the attorney representing 
the subject of the report;

(iii) A physician or 
surgeon who is treating an abused or neglected child, the child's family or a 
child he reasonably suspects may have been abused or neglected;

(iv) A person legally 
authorized to place a child in protective temporary custody when information in 
the report or record is required to determine whether to place the child in 
protective custody;

(v) A person responsible 
for the welfare of the child;

(vi) A court or grand 
jury upon a showing that access to the records is necessary for the 
determination of an issue, in which case access shall be limited to in camera 
inspection unless the court finds public disclosure is necessary; 
and

(vii) Court personnel who 
are investigating reported incidents of child abuse or neglect.

(emphasis 
added). The D-PASS records in question are only those files created after 
sometime in 1984. A predecessor Campbell County attorney had earlier provided 
Gale's counsel with pre-1984 D-PASS files. The record does not explain why those 
privileged files were prematurely released.

[¶37]   Gale challenges the trial court's 
actions under this issue in essentially two ways: (1) he argues that 
nondisclosure of the post-1984 D-PASS records denied him his constitutional 
rights to a fair trial under the due process guarantee, as well as effective 
assistance of counsel, right to confrontation, and compulsory process;5 and (2) he argues that the trial 
court erred when it applied the constitutional materiality standard for 
reviewing the privileged records set out in Ritchie.

[¶38]   We have already decided Gale's 
general constitutional challenges by adopting the United States Supreme Court's 
reasoning in Ritchie. His right to confrontation was satisfied when he was 
allowed to conduct extensive cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses 
against him. Ritchie, 480 U.S.  at 52-53, 107 S. Ct.  at 999-1000, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 
54-55 (explaining Davis, 415 U.S.  at 318-20, 94 S. Ct.  at 1110-12, 39 L.Ed.2d at 
354-56). See also Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020, 1034 (Wyo. 1986) (this court's 
recognition and explanation of the holding in Davis). Like the United States 
Supreme Court, we will address his challenge concerning the compulsory process 
clause under our overall analysis of the fairness of this trial as a matter of 
due process. Ritchie, 480 U.S.  at 56, 107 S. Ct.  at 1001, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 57. 
Gale's assertion that the trial court somehow denied him effective assistance of 
counsel by refusing to disclose all of the D-PASS records is make-weight. Gale's 
counsel did all that he could do when he moved for disclosure of the records and 
argued for their disclosure at the motions hearing. The trial court denied those 
disclosure requests based on controlling United States Supreme Court precedent. 
The only general constitutional issue presented is whether, in doing so, the 
trial court compromised Gale's due process right to a fair trial when it applied 
the holding from Ritchie. Hence, our discussion of the trial court's application 
of Ritchie is dispositive for both of Gale's challenges under this 
issue.

[¶39]   Gale argues that the in 
camera procedure mandated by the holding in Ritchie should not have been 
applied to his request for D-PASS files because the language of W.S. 
14-3-214(b)(iii), set out above, provides for release of such files to law 
enforcement agencies under certain specific circumstances. Gale also claims the 
record shows that D-PASS employees actively aided law enforcement personnel in 
investigating the case against him. He then combines these points, concluding 
that because information in the D-PASS files was "directly available" to the 
state it should have been deemed to be in its possession. That presumption, he 
urges, should be the basis for releasing the D-PASS files to Gale's counsel to 
insure fundamental fairness and due process.

[¶40]   We agree with the state that Gale's 
novel reasoning rests precariously upon several of his own assumptions, which do 
not find support in this record. He first assumes that the state must have had 
the post-1984 D-PASS records in its files because D-PASS was obligated by 
statute to investigate the charges at issue. See W.S. 14-3-204. Whether those 
interviews were reported or not, the record does not indicate that the state 
obtained copies of them for use in constructing a case against Gale. Gale has 
pointed to no record evidence indicating that the state actually had those 
reports. Further, the statute specifically provides that a law enforcement 
agency wishing to obtain D-PASS records in this situation must apply for them 
and obtain them pursuant to agency disclosure rules. The record does not contain 
any evidence of such an application by the prosecution in this case.

[¶41]   Gale's argument also seems to be 
premised on an assumption that, because he did not receive any post-1984 D-PASS 
files from the county attorney, the prosecution in this case must have decided 
not to comply with its Brady obligation to disclose to the defense any 
exculpatory material it actually possessed. Ritchie, 480 U.S.  at 57, 107 S. Ct. 
at 1001, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 57. See also Wilde v. State, 706 P.2d 251, 255 (Wyo. 
1985). We decline to make that assumption, lacking some evidence in the record 
to the contrary. The determination of whether evidentiary items are subject to 
disclosure under Brady belongs to the prosecution. Weatherford, 429 U.S.  at 560, 
97 S. Ct.  at 845, 51 L. Ed. 2d  at 42; Hubbard, 618 P.2d  at 554-55. If the defense 
has a basis for requesting evidence it believes the prosecution has, but is not 
divulging, then application for disclosure of that evidence can be made to the 
prosecution and, if necessary, to the trial court. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106-07, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2398-99, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342, 351 (1976); Jones v. 
State, 568 P.2d 837, 848 (Wyo. 1977). This record shows that the prosecution had 
a thorough understanding of its obligations under Brady and repeatedly 
acknowledged them in open court and in its pleadings.

[¶42]   Gale's argument that the Ritchie 
standard for constitutional materiality should not be applied under this issue 
also lacks merit. He claims applying that standard is unfair because it is an 
appellate standard that "is necessarily backward looking and therefore is framed 
in terms of whether the evidence would change the result." This argument ignores 
the parallel that exists between the prosecution's obligation to turn over 
evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the accused and material to 
guilt or punishment and the trial court's obligation to review privileged 
information for evidence that might be constitutionally material to the 
defendant's case. Ritchie, 480 U.S.  at 56, 107 S. Ct.  at 1001, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 
56-57 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S.  at 672, 105 S. Ct.  at 3378, 87 L. Ed. 2d  at 487; 
Agurs, 427 U.S.  at 111, 96 S. Ct.  at 2401, 49 L. Ed. 2d  at 354; and Brady, 373 U.S. 
at 87, 83 S. Ct.  at 1196, 10 L.Ed.2d at 218); see also Wilde, 706 P.2d  at 255. 
Gale cites no authority supporting his criticism of the constitutional 
materiality standard as being devised to be used only in hindsight. Cf. Bagley, 
473 U.S.  at 683, 105 S. Ct.  at 3384, 87 L. Ed. 2d  at 494-95. Rather, like the 
standard applied to the prosecution in Brady, it appears to have been intended 
to focus the trial court's attention on an in camera search for privileged 
information that could change the outcome of a defendant's trial. Gale seems 
eager to apply this type of standard to the prosecution once he assumes they 
have not met their obligations under Brady, but he does not want the trial court 
to apply it to him when it reviews privileged information he speculates might be 
pivotal in his defense. He cannot have it both ways.

[¶43]   The Ritchie materiality standard 
provides a workable balance between the state's interest in the confidentiality 
of certain information and a defendant's potential need for such information in 
some situations, and it controls in this situation. Ritchie, 480 U.S.  at 60-61, 
107 S. Ct.  at 1003-04, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 59-60, cited in Cusik, 219 N.J. Super. 452, 
530 A.2d 806, 813 (1987). See also People v. Reber, 177 Cal. App. 3d 523, 223 Cal. Rptr. 139, 147 (1986). We also note that Gale had in his possession copies 
of a fairly extensive set of pre-1984 D-PASS reports along with Gillette police 
department reports on the R family for 1986 and 1987 and had ample opportunity 
at trial to focus the jury's attention on the social problems that were a 
day-to-day reality in the R family home from at least 1980 forward. Applying the 
Ritchie standard, and after our own review of the D-PASS records and considering 
the evidence that was available to Gale before trial, we agree with the trial 
court that the D-PASS records contain no evidence that is or was 
constitutionally material to the outcome of this case. That conclusion requires 
us to affirm on this issue.

C. School 
Records

[¶44]   Our review of the trial court's 
decision not to disclose the school records parallels the analysis we used to 
review its decision on the D-PASS records. The school records of the R children 
are statutorily privileged under W.S. 16-4-203(d)(viii) (Cum.Supp. 1987):6

(d) The custodian shall 
deny the right of inspection of the following records, unless otherwise provided 
by law:

(viii) School district 
records containing information relating to the biography, family, physiology, 
religion, academic achievement and physical or mental ability of the person 
except to the person in interest or to the officials duly elected and appointed 
to supervise him.

See also 20 
U.S.C. § 1232g(b) (1982) (school records in schools receiving federal funding 
are confidential but may be released pursuant to court order).

[¶45]   Gale requested disclosure of the 
school records based on the theory that grade fluctuations and attendance 
records might be relevant to the relationship between the R children and their 
father. The school records were produced at the motions hearing pursuant to 
Gale's subpoenas duces tecum to the various schools the R children had attended. 
The trial court reviewed them in camera, the same way it reviewed the 
D-PASS records, and concluded that there was no information in the school 
records that was constitutionally material to Gale's defense.

[¶46]   Gale makes the same legal arguments 
for disclosure of the school records that he made above concerning the D-PASS 
files. As before, he has made no showing that the prosecution ever actually 
possessed these records. On the other hand, Gale has made no complaint that he 
was hindered in his ability to learn more about the R family by having his 
investigator interview people in the community who knew the R children and their 
parents. Considering all of these circumstances, we again apply the 
constitutionally material standard from Ritchie in review of the trial court's 
ruling against disclosure of the school records. That review reveals no evidence 
that is or was constitutionally material to Gale's defense. See Reber, 223 Cal. Rptr.  at 147; and Cusik, 530 A.2d  at 813. Therefore, we affirm the trial 
court's conclusion that they did not contain evidence material to Gale's 
defense.

D. Juvenile 
Court Transcripts, Recordings, or Records

[¶47]   In this issue, Gale premises error 
upon his inability to obtain transcripts or recordings of any juvenile court 
hearings concerning GR's contact with the R children once he had been accused of 
abusing and sexually molesting them. Gale wanted to review this information, if 
it existed, to gather more evidence in support of his theory that GR intimidated 
or coerced LR and the R children into implicating Gale to shift blame from 
himself. Gale has never put forth evidence actually establishing the existence 
of such transcripts or recordings or showing that the prosecution used them in 
this case. Rather, his basis for believing that such records exist, and are 
material to his defense, centers around hearsay statements made by his original 
defense counsel, Terry Preuit, that former Campbell County Attorney, Robert 
Rose, had at least considered trying to hold GR in contempt of court for having 
unsupervised visits with the R children in violation of a juvenile court order 
allowing only supervised visits.

[¶48]   Gale filed his motion for 
disclosure of any juvenile court transcripts or records on April 6, 1987. 
Attached to that motion were a number of exhibits including a copy of the 
November 18, 1986 juvenile petition filed on behalf of the R children, LR's 
January 16, 1987 juvenile court agreement, a number of police files which 
chronicled investigations of the R family and the R children from mid-1980 
through December 1986, and statements of several of the R children and their 
friends. It is not clear how Gale obtained these records.

[¶49]   At the April 24, 1987 motions 
hearing, Gale called Rose as a witness and examined him during a telephone 
conference call. Gale's counsel questioned Rose at length about the events 
leading up to GR and LR's juvenile court agreements. Curiously, he did not ask 
Rose about any attempt or consideration to seek a contempt citation against GR 
for violating the alleged juvenile court order prohibiting unsupervised 
visitation or for any violations of the juvenile court agreement GR is said to 
have signed. Gale did not call his former defense counsel, Preuit, or any other 
witnesses to bolster his suspicion that transcripts, recordings, or records of 
such a hearing actually existed.

[¶50]   The trial court denied Gale's 
motion for disclosure of any Juvenile Court transcripts or records, noting that 
the holding in Davis did not provide Gale with carte blanche authority to 
examine privileged juvenile court records in a search for information helpful to 
his case. See also Ritchie, 480 U.S.  at 59, 107 S. Ct.  at 1003, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 
58-59 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S.  at 675-76, 105 S. Ct.  at 3379-80, 87 L.Ed.2d at 
489-90; and Weatherford, 429 U.S.  at 559, 97 S. Ct.  at 846, 51 L. Ed. 2d 30. Cf. 
Hubbard, 618 P.2d at 554-55). The trial court did not explain whether the 
prosecution was ever shown to have possessed the alleged juvenile court 
transcripts, recordings, or records and did not say whether it had reviewed any 
such information in camera.

[¶51]   This issue is similar to the issue 
above dealing with independent psychological records in that even the sealed 
portion of the record before this court does not contain the information that 
Gale wanted disclosed. Consequently, we are left with a few scraps of testimony 
from Rose's deposition to try and determine whether these records did exist, 
whether the state ever possessed them for use in this trial, and if so, whether 
the trial court unfairly denied Gale access to them.

[¶52]   When Gale filed his motion for 
disclosure, he had an obligation to the trial court to establish a basis for his 
claim that the privileged information he sought contained evidence 
constitutionally material to his defense. Ritchie, 480 U.S.  at 58, 107 S. Ct.  at 
1002, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 58 n. 15. We also reiterate that Gale, as appellant, has the 
obligation to provide this court with enough record evidence to allow review of 
this issue. Edwards, 732 P.2d  at 1070 (citing Nicholls, 721 P.2d  at 1105; and 
Dieringer, 708 P.2d at 12). Gale has not only failed to establish a basis that 
any juvenile court transcripts, recordings, or records contain evidence 
constitutionally material to his defense, he has not put forth minimal evidence 
establishing that such records exist.

[¶53]   We hold that the appellate record 
is insufficient to support Gale's challenge concerning any alleged juvenile 
court transcripts, recordings, or records.

IV.

Gale's Motion to Dismiss 
or Suppress Testimony of the R Family

[¶54]   Gale presents two arguments under 
this issue. First, he challenges the effect which the GR and LR's juvenile court 
agreements had on the testimony of the entire R family as violative of his 
rights to due process. Second, he challenges the substance of the agreements 
between GR and LR and the state as violative of his rights to due process. We 
address Gale's sub-issues in reverse order.

[¶55]   In his challenge to the substance 
of the juvenile court agreements, Gale identifies the appropriate standard of 
due process review as set out in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205, 96 L. Ed. 183 (1961). In Rochin, the Court held that the prosecution 
violated federal due process when it obtained evidence by "conduct that shocks 
the conscience." Id., 342 U.S.  at 172, 72 S. Ct.  at 209, 96 L. Ed.  at 190. See 
also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 408, 17 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1966). 
Gale also refers us to federal case law discussing the propriety of 
prosecutorial agreements to obtain evidence. See, e.g., United States v. 
Waterman, 732 F.2d 1527 (8th Cir. 1984); Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Baresh, 595 F. Supp. 1132 (S.D.Texas 
1984). As observed by the trial judge in his decision letter, these cases all 
involve contingency arrangements in which the prosecution conditions its 
offer to seek sentence reduction or immunity for the defendant upon the 
defendant's ability to produce evidence leading to the arrest or indictment of 
another specific individual in criminal activity. Waterman, 732 F.2d  at 1529 n. 
1, 1530; Williamson, 311 F.2d  at 442-45 (illegal contingent fee agreement); 
Baresh, 595 F. Supp.  at 1134.

[¶56]   These arguments and citations do 
not apply to the specific facts of this case. The agreement between LR and the 
state is not a contingency agreement. That is, it does not condition the grant 
of immunity given to LR, and apparently to GR, upon their ability to produce 
evidence that resulted in the arrest, indictment, or conviction of Gale. LR's 
agreement specifically recited that she would receive immunity from prosecution 
so long as she testified truthfully concerning her knowledge of Gale's 
involvement with her children; in terms of her testimony, this is nothing more 
than her affirmance of the obligation she would be under if the state subpoenaed 
her as a trial witness. The record is unclear on the exact terms of GR's 
juvenile court agreement, but Gale admits it did not contain any contingency 
provisions. This type of agreement between the prosecution and the parents of 
admittedly abused children is not one that shocks the conscience of this court. 
Gale fails to cite any precedent for the idea that this type of agreement is 
somehow per se illegal; and he also fails to refute or distinguish more recent 
federal case law upholding prosecutorial contingent arrangements and suggesting 
that the jury, not an appellate court, should determine the credibility of 
witnesses who are party to prosecution agreements. See United States v. 
Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 312-16 (5th Cir. 1987) and cases cited 
therein.

[¶57]   Gale's challenge to the overall 
effect of the juvenile court agreements as violative of his rights to due 
process is couched in his argument that this court should invoke an "inherent 
supervisory power to ensure fair conduct from the prosecution in furnishing 
evidence to the courts." Since we held above that the agreements themselves were 
not violative of due process it is hard to understand how Gale's speculation as 
to their effect leads to the conclusion that their existence alone denied him 
due process. While Gale has set out his theories of how the juvenile court 
agreements were incentive for R family members to lie, he offers no record 
evidence in support of those theories or any assertion that his extensive 
opportunity at trial to cross-examine those witnesses on credibility was 
undermined. Bald assertions do not take the place of record evidence from which 
real inferences can be drawn. Cf. Greenwood v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079, 1086 
(Wyo. 1987) (conclusory affidavits in summary judgment proceedings have little 
or no effect). This court will not substitute itself for the jury simply because 
Gale wanted certain witnesses to testify in another way; his argument on this 
issue lacks merit. Newton v. State, 698 P.2d 1149, 1151 (Wyo. 1985).

V.

Gale's Motion to Dismiss 
for Failure to Preserve Evidence

[¶58]   This issue involves Gale's 
assertion that the initial police interviews with the victims must have 
contained information that would potentially aid him in his defense. Gale does 
not argue that he was denied access to the interviewer's notes or that the trial 
court denied him the right to cross-examine any of the state's witnesses whose 
testimony could be traced to the initial victim interviews; he also forgoes any 
suggestion that the police or the state acted in bad faith concerning the 
content of the interviews. Instead, Gale argues that the lack of such recordings 
somehow deprived him of his best opportunity to judge what the victim's precise 
allegations and explanations for their allegations were when they were first 
uttered. Gale says this deprivation violates the holding in Trombetta, which he 
asserts stands for the legal proposition that the police have an affirmative 
constitutional duty to gather and preserve evidence, as well as the recognized 
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence. See Brady, 373 U.S.  at 87, 83 S. Ct.  at 
1196-97, 10 L. Ed. 2d  at 218.

[¶59]   We disagree with Gale's 
interpretation of the law on this issue. This court held that the state does not 
have a constitutional duty to manufacture evidence in addition to its duty under 
Brady to disclose exculpatory evidence in its possession. We also specifically 
held that a deputy's apparent negligence in not properly tape recording a 
conversation between the defendant and the deputy did not violate the 
defendant's rights to due process of law. Wilde, 706 P.2d  at 255 (citing 
Trombetta, 467 U.S.  at 488-91, 104 S. Ct.  at 2529-30, 81 L.Ed.2d at 421-24). 
Here, the trial court's ruling paralleled our conclusions in Wilde.

[¶60]   Gale's assertion would expose the 
state to the risk of automatic dismissal for failure to tape record every 
initial interview it conducts with a minor victim alleging sexual assault. The 
state has a duty to preserve evidence only if the disputed evidence is shown to 
have been constitutionally material because it possessed known exculpatory value 
and if the defendant could not obtain comparable evidence using other reasonable 
means. Wilde, 706 P.2d  at 255 (citing Trombetta, 467 U.S.  at 479-80, 104 S. Ct. 
at 2529, 81 L.Ed.2d at 416-17). Wilde and Trombetta plainly limit the state's 
duties to preserve and disclose evidence to those duties explained in 
Brady.

[¶61]   We also note the United States 
Supreme Court's recent opinion in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S. Ct. 333, 102 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1988). In Youngblood, the defendant was charged with 
kidnapping and sexually assaulting a minor. When the victim reported the crime, 
a physician used a "sexual assault kit" to take samples from the victim that 
might later be used as evidence at trial. The police took these samples and the 
victim's clothing, but they did not refrigerate the clothing. Later, when the 
state criminologist tried to compare samples from the kit with stains he found 
on the clothing, the failure to refrigerate the clothing made the comparison 
impossible. Evidence from such a comparison could have exonerated the defendant 
who was convicted. The state appellate court reversed the conviction focusing on 
the potential which the lost evidence had for exoneration and the Court granted 
the state's petition for certiorari. In its opinion, the Court discussed the 
constitutional standards for the obligation the police have to preserve evidence 
and then held that "unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part 
of the police, [negligent] failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does 
not constitute a denial of due process of law." Youngblood, 488 U.S. at ___, 109 S. Ct.  at 337, 102 L. Ed. 2d  at 289.

[¶62]   Gale had access to the 
interviewer's notes and an extensive opportunity to cross-examine the 
interviewer and the victims; he has never alleged police bad faith. Due process 
was satisfied in this regard.

[¶63]            
Affirmed on all issues.

THOMAS, J., files a specially 
concurring opinion in which CARDINE, C.J., joins.

URBIGKIT, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

THOMAS, Justice, concurring 
specially, with whom CARDINE, Chief Justice, joins.

[¶64]   I agree with the decision of this 
case according to the majority opinion. I am content with all aspects of its 
holdings, and the rationale for those holdings, except for part "I. Gale's 
Motion For Independent Psychological Examinations of the Minor Victims." The 
final dispositive statement of that issue as provided in the majority opinion 
("The trial court acted properly and within its discretion when it denied Gale's 
motion to compel the examinations.") suggests by implication that the trial 
court could have granted that motion as a matter of discretion. It is only in 
attaching that significance to the majority opinion that I find myself in 
agreement with the dissent. That implication is contrary to the specific 
rejection of the California theory articulated in Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838, 18 A.L.R.3d 1416 (1966), and People 
v. Russel, 69 Cal. 2d 187, 70 Cal. Rptr. 210, 443 P.2d 794, cert. denied 393 U.S. 864, 89 S. Ct. 145, 21 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1968). It is also inconsistent with our 
ruling in Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357 (Wyo. 1988). I can only conclude that the 
majority opinion inadvertently indicated that the trial court might be vested 
with discretion to order a psychiatric or psychological evaluation of a victim 
witness.

[¶65]   I have no quarrel with the 
criticism of the Ballard and Russel rationale found in the opinions of other 
jurisdictions. I add my own. It is certain that no court can require any person 
to submit to a psychological or psychiatric examination or evaluation. Without 
the cooperation of the subject, no meaningful conclusions can be drawn nor can 
an appropriate diagnosis be made. A court could, however, order submission to 
the procedure under penalty of contempt of court. I unequivocally believe that 
even our enlightened society would not long tolerate a result that found the 
victim incarcerated for refusing to submit to an evaluation or examination while 
the accused perpetrator suffered no consequences. The only other alternative 
would be a dismissal of the state's charges if the victim witness would not 
cooperate in the procedure. Again, I am firm in my conviction that the people 
would find that approach too ludicrous to bear. Consequently, because the 
possible remedies are inefficacious, there is no point in affording any 
discretion to the trial courts in this regard, and this court should say clearly 
that no such discretion is recognized in the law.

[¶66]   I perceive the dissenting opinion 
as essentially a call for reform of the rules of discovery that pertain in a 
criminal case. In the dissent, n. 22 at 619-620, it is mentioned that the 
prescience for this call is obtained through a walk in the "watered garden of 
academia." While that prescience and call may be appropriate for the 
academicians, it must be remembered that any garden depends on fertilizer as 
much as water. An appellate court should not attempt to adjust rules in any case 
in an ad hoc and after the fact fashion. Such an approach is nothing more than 
chaotic and evidences an abandonment of the judicial function. It stands as the 
truest example of government by men, not law.

[¶67]   The dissenting opinion is committed 
to establishing the innocence of Gale and the culpability of the victims' 
parents for different crimes, which is obviously not a material concern in 
resolving this case. That conclusion of Gale's innocence is articulated and 
reiterated, and the goal of the dissent is to establish what is perceived to be 
the just result that would have been achieved had the rules been different for 
this case or had the parents been tried for sexual offenses against the victims. 
In short, the dissent determines that Gale is innocent, and then reasons from 
that conclusion. It is not appropriate for any appellate court, particularly a 
supreme court, to adjust the rules in an ad hoc manner from case to case or 
crime to crime. There is no question that there are many convicts languishing in 
durance vile who might have been acquitted if some novel or special rule 
of discovery or procedure had been invoked to govern a particular case. If we 
are to claim a system of criminal justice and rules that serve that system, 
however, they must be the same and consistently applied. While it is a favorite 
technique of defense counsel to try the prosecution or the prosecution 
witnesses, that tactic has no place in appellate opinions. 

[¶68]   As set forth in the dissent, the 
effort to mix civil discovery concepts into the criminal law is simply 
inappropriate. The suggestion that the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure are 
invoked in criminal cases by virtue of the language of Rule 1, W.R.C.P., is not 
only a leap in logic, but also a leap in faith. That faith is not well founded. 
No credence is given to the proposition that civil discovery can be justified 
because the same opportunity is available to both parties since that is not true 
in a criminal case. In arguing for expanded discovery for the defendant, the 
dissent mentions equivalency, but the concept is fictitious in the criminal 
arena. The Fifth Amendment stands as a clear bar to reciprocal discovery, and 
the discovery permitted by Rule 18, W.R.Cr.P., represents the compromise that 
has been achieved in the criminal law. Furthermore, we must remember that even 
civil discovery is limited to the bounds of relevance.

[¶69]            
Neither should we lightly assume that a witness in a criminal case, 
whether the complainant or not, is subject to the same requirements for 
discovery as a party in a civil case. The judiciary should not be so blind as to 
assume that the constitutions serve only criminal defendants. Others have rights 
as well. The demand for psychiatric examinations in cases such as this is a call 
for a rule that victims of sexual assault, primarily women, must not only be 
stripped of their physical integrity, but they must also surrender their minds 
and souls at the behest of their tormentors.

[¶70]   In Wyoming, discovery in a criminal 
case is governed by Rule 18, W.R.Cr.P., and the decisions of this court that 
have construed it. That rule does not extend to summaries of expert witnesses 
like Rule 26(b)(1), W.R.C.P. Neither do the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice. 
The quoted language,

"(iv) any reports or 
statements made by experts in connection with the particular case, including 
results of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests, experiments, 
or comparisons; * * *." II ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 11-2.1 
(2d ed. 1980),

is no different 
in substance from Rule 18, W.R.Cr.P., and it does not justify furnishing 
summaries of the testimony of expert witnesses.

[¶71]   The justification for enhanced 
discovery because of perjury in this case also requires rebuttal. The dissent 
adopts a very far ranging concept of perjury. Not every inconsistent statement 
or fact that impeaches a witness demonstrates perjury. People can be mistaken, 
and wilful prevarication is not demonstrated in every instance by contrary 
information. The instances recited in the majority opinion would not serve, in 
any case, to justify a criminal charge of perjury and might, therefore, be more 
fairly described as inconsistencies.

[¶72]   The majority opinion addresses the 
issues actually present in this case in a very professional manner. They are 
resolved by a correct application of the applicable principles of law. Since it 
is not an appropriate role for this court to either serve as an advocate for the 
defendant or as the prosecutor and jury for the parents, I am pleased to join in 
the disposition of this case that is announced in the majority 
opinion.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

I. STATEMENT OF 
FACTS

[¶73]   This case presents the history of 
Elmer Jean "Gene" Rounsaville (Gene Rounsaville), a fifty-four year old 
ex-police officer who admitted to sexually molesting two of his five daughters 
(the eldest is a step-daughter), probably abused a third and perhaps the 
youngest twins. It also presents the tragedy of appellant Richard K. Gale, 
D.D.S. (Dr. Gale), a Gillette, Wyoming dentist, following his conviction of 
three counts of immoral or indecent acts with three of the Rounsaville children 
who had previously and subsequently been the victims of their father's 
incestuous activities for most of a decade. Finally, it presents an ironic 
situation where a prosecutor agreed not to prosecute the father of sexually 
molesting his children in return for his testimony regarding one questionable 
event with Dr. Gale.

[¶74]   At issue within this exhaustive 
history is the guilt of Dr. Gale but not the criminal conduct of Gene 
Rounsaville nor complicity of the mother, Linda Rounsaville. This is not a case 
for consideration for those with weak stomachs. The facts of non-prosecution of 
Gene and Linda Rounsaville contrasted with the charged offenses against Dr. Gale 
belie understanding.

[¶75]   I dissent in reasoning that 
probabilities provide answers about the truth with a concern engendered by the 
unfairness of the trial and a residual concern that questionable miscarriage of 
justice did occur. Fairness, due process and equal protection seem faintly 
present as a symptom but not the substance of justice. Nearly every motion filed 
by Dr. Gale for discovery and defense was denied and any contact with agency 
witnesses or the complainants themselves was proscribed by the prosecutorial 
forces. Actually, only two motions by Dr. Gale were ever sustained; one was to 
preemptively challenge the first trial judge and the second was to travel 
out-of-state for trial preparation with his lawyer. Otherwise, every one of the 
dozen or so discovery and defensive motions were denied.

[¶76]   The eight arguments for appeal can 
only be characterized and defined within a considerably more detailed factual 
analysis than is provided by the majority. This record and documentation, 
incomplete as it still may be, are encompassed within welfare and school records 
as well as a modicum of police department material and some parts of the 
juvenile proceedings. Much of the basic information is not available in this 
record. What is available was, in significant part, denied to Dr. Gale by 
rejection of all requested discovery motions.

[¶77]   What do you do in a course of 
events directly managed to hide miscreants from public observation or individual 
responsibility? Since Dr. Gale is named, so will be the father, Gene, and the 
mother, Linda. See Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 326, 107 L. Ed. 2d 316 (1989) and 
Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981). The children 
and other minor participants who were the victims of societal and law 
enforcement failure will be designated, not by letters, but by age at time of 
trial.

[¶78]   Actors in this parade of horror 
include Gene Rounsaville, Linda Rounsaville, and their six children: first 
daughter, age seventeen (D-17); son, age eleven (S-11); second daughter, age ten 
(D-10); third daughter, age seven (D-7); and twin daughters, age three (D1-3 and 
D2-3). The other principal, in addition to the multitude of school personnel, 
welfare workers and police investigators, is Dr. Gale age forty-one, the family 
dentist whose substantial bill for dental services went unpaid until at least 
trial date. Dr. Gale officed and resided in Gillette and the Rounsaville family 
resided in Rozet, Wyoming, a small rural town thirteen miles to the east of 
Gillette.

[¶79]   A Department of Public Assistance 
and Social Services (D-PASS) child protection file was first opened for D-17, 
questioning parental child abuse in July 1979. That incident, lacking further 
action, was closed as "I & R for future reference." Action really developed 
the next year following a slumber party and a complaint involving sexual 
offenses by Gene Rounsaville, not only with the oldest daughter D-17, but also 
with two of her friends at the Rounsaville home. Confirming statements from 
D-17's friends were not actually taken until 1986. No real investigation was 
made, although a meeting was held on June 30, 1980 where the entire family met 
with a welfare worker. Following this second opened file, a count reveals eight 
more contact complaints, D-PASS form SS-219, until 1986 when an active criminal 
investigation was undertaken because of a sexual abuse complaint against Gene 
Rounsaville involving D-7, the third-oldest daughter. It is admitted and 
confirmed that Gene Rounsaville engaged in a course of sexual offenses against 
D-17, which appears to have commenced at about age eight, two years before the 
first complaint by school authorities to D-PASS in 1979, and continued for about 
six years. Gene Rounsaville also admitted sexual abuse against D-7. The record 
strongly demonstrates that when Gene Rounsaville started to leave D-17 alone, he 
commenced a course of sexual misconduct with the second-oldest daughter, D-10. 
This sexual misconduct continued until 1986. At the same time, sexual misconduct 
was commenced with D-7 and continued for about two years. Finally, Gene 
Rounsaville may have engaged in sexually motivated misconduct with his 
three-year-old twins. A record submitted by D-PASS in 1984 contains interview 
information that Linda Rounsaville became aware of D-17's molestation by Gene 
Rounsaville sometime before the welfare worker met with the family on June 30, 
1980.

[¶80]            
Although a stated prosecutor's open file policy had existed in both law 
enforcement and county prosecutorial offices for two or more years, perhaps 
four, obviously all files were not available to Dr. Gale. Climactic events 
developed after law enforcement officials commenced their first serious 
investigation of Gene Rounsaville in 1986 which resulted in his arrest. During 
this investigation of Gene Rounsaville's 1986 sexual offenses, information came 
to the attention of the investigating officers by comments from the children 
that a year earlier, Dr. Gale had also committed sexual offenses involving D-17, 
D-10 and D-7 in a brief episode at the Rounsaville home when the parents were 
present in the house.

[¶81]   Finite criminal problems of the 
family are not confined to the slumber party incident and the sexual offenses on 
at least three of the daughters. In unconfirmed reports which were never really 
investigated, it was related that Linda Rounsaville's boyfriend raped D-17 and 
beat up Linda Rounsaville in early 1985. Extreme punishment and physical abuse 
had also been committed by Gene Rounsaville on all of the older children, 
including the son, S-11, which involved coat hanger whippings, a belt and 
possible use of a bull whip.

[¶82]   When the name of Dr. Gale appeared, 
the county attorney's office and Gene and Linda Rounsaville entered into a 
custody child protection settlement which required Gene Rounsaville to leave the 
home and gave both parents prosecutorial immunity from all criminal offenses in 
exchange for their testimony against Dr. Gale.1 The documentary detail of 
prosecutorial conduct, although the reasons for delayed action are not 
demonstrable since all correspondence cannot be found in this record, shows a 
developed intent during the investigation of Gene Rounsaville in 1986 to convict 
Dr. Gale at a price of forgiveness of the incest by Gene Rounsaville and 
complicity by Linda Rounsaville. The petition filed in district court upon which 
a custody order was entered included in jurisdictional claim and for probable 
cause:

The above named minor 
children are subject to the jurisdiction of this court pursuant to Wyoming 
Statute § 14-6-203(a)(i), in that they are neglected child[ren] as defined by 
Wyoming Statute § 14-6-201(a)(xvi)(B), in that they have been abused by the 
inflicting or causing of physical or mental injury, harm or imminent danger to 
the physical or mental health or welfare of the children other than by 
accidental means, to wit: the infliction of excessive or unreasonable corporal 
punishment by the father, "Gene" Rounsaville; the commission of a sexual offense 
against one or more of the children by the father "Gene" Rounsaville, and the 
allowing of the commission of a sexual offense against one or more of the 
children by their mother, Linda Sue Rounsaville.

* * * On November 17, 
1986, Investigator Monty Trenary, of the Campbell County Sheriff's Office and 
Terry Waldorf, a social worker for the Campbell County Department of Public 
Assistance and Social Services, met at the Rozet School to interview [D-7], a 
minor child, pursuant to a complaint that she had been sexually molested by her 
father, "Gene" Rounsaville. The minor, who is 7 years old, told Inv. Trenary and 
Mrs. Waldorf that her father had begun sexually molesting her when she was 
approximately 5 years old, and the latest incident was on or about October 28, 
1986. The minor said that she had been sleeping in a room with her 11 year old 
brother when her father came into the bedroom and pulled down her bed covers. He 
then began rubbing her vaginal area for a while, and then left the bedroom. The 
minor was uncertain if her father placed his finger inside of her vagina, 
because he had touched her so much in the past she can't recall the times he did 
or didn't. The minor also indicated that when her father molested her in the 
past, he has told her that he would "kill her" if she ever told anyone. The 
minor's brother, [S-11], also witnessed the sexual assault on the evening of 
October 28, 1986.

Further investigation by 
Inv. Trenary and Mrs. Waldorf have revealed an extensive history of physical and 
sexual abuse upon the children by their father, and a passive acceptance of it 
by their mother. Mrs. Waldorf has obtained documented reports from the 
Department of Public Assistance and Social Services dating back to 1980 
involving excessive corporal punishment and possible sexual abuse by Mr. 
Rounsaville. The corporal punishment on the children has taken the form of 
beatings with coat hangers and other wires as well as leather straps. 
Additionally, Mr. Rounsaville has been known to fire weapons inside the home and 
was reported to have placed a gun against his wife[']s head.

[D-17], age 17, has 
reported an extensive history of being sexually abused by her father, beginning 
when she was 8 years old. [D-17] also indicated that when she was 9 years old 
her mother witnessed an incident of sexual molestation, but instead blamed 
[D-17] for it. At one point [D-17] indicated that her mother sent her to her 
aunt[']s home in Utah as punishment for being responsible for the sexual 
molestation. That occurred in May, 1982, and [D-17] returned in the Fall of 
1982. Upon her return, her father molested her once again. [D-17] also reported 
that her younger sister [D-7], age 7, had been molested by her father in early 
1982. [D-17] told her mother about it at that time and her mother then 
confronted her father. Mr. Rounsaville admitted to having molested [D-17], but 
denied molesting any of the other girls or their friends. [D-17] also reported 
that when she was approximately 9 or 10 years of age, her father took nude 
photographs of her. When her mother discovered the photographs, she accused 
[D-17] of "being bad" and then burned the photos.

These 
allegations were confined in detailed investigation reports for the petition 
which was pursued in November 1986.

[¶83]   To dispose of the petition and 
concurrent evidence of the course of criminal behavior of Gene and Linda 
Rounsaville, two juvenile court admission agreements were made. Gene 
Rounsaville's agreement stated:

     Elmer Jean 
Rounsaville, by and through his attorney, * * *, and the State of Wyoming, by 
and through its representative, * * *, Campbell County Attorney, have entered 
into the following agreement relating to the admission/denial phase of this 
juvenile proceeding. The purpose of the agreement is to secure for Elmer Jean 
Rounsaville the opportunity to obtain help and keep his family together if 
possible and further to facilitate the protection of the Rounsaville children 
through the processes of the juvenile court. It is also a purpose of this 
agreement to secure, for the state, information and testimony regarding Dr. 
Richard Gale and his involvement with the Rounsaville family and children. The 
parties agree as follows: 1. Elmer Jean Rounsaville will admit the following in 
support of the court taking jurisdiction of his family: 

a) That he had sexual 
contact with his stepchild, [D-17], on several occasions when [D-17] was 7 to 11 
years of age. This contact included touching or rubbing of the genital area or 
breasts.

b) That on two occasions 
he has whipped his son [S-11] in excess of a reasonable punishment for a child 
[S-11's] age. That on these occasions he whipped [S-11] with a belt or 
strap.

c) That he is an 
alcoholic and as late as the initiation of this proceeding he was often drinking 
to the point of blackout. This usually was done in his home and around his 
family causing them a great deal of apprehension and pain. He is informed and 
now believes he endangered his wife and family during some of these times. This 
includes but is not limited to the allegation in the petition that he held a gun 
against his wife's head. This occurred in approximately 1980.

d) That all these actions 
occurred in Campbell County, Wyoming.

2. Elmer Jean Rounsaville 
will interview with the Campbell County Attorney's office and will truthfully 
tell all that he knows about the contact of his family with Dr. Richard Gale 
including all he knows about sexual contact with any of his children or 
stepchildren by Richard Gale.

Elmer Jean Rounsaville 
also agrees to testify completely and truthfully about these matters if he is 
requested to do so by the Campbell County Attorney's office.

In return for these 
promises by Elmer Jean Rounsaville the state of Wyoming agrees:

A. No criminal charges 
for neglect, abuse, assault, incest, illegal sexual contact or any other crime 
allegedly or actually committed by Elmer Jean Rounsaville against his wife, 
children or stepchildren will be filed. No charges of any kind will be filed for 
an incident which allegedly occurred at the Rounsaville's home involving [D-17], 
[BJC], [CD], [CC], [JH] and others. This incident is the subject of [BJC's] 
written statement dated 11/18/86. This promise includes any crime against 
children or stepchildren or persons named above which occurred after Elmer Jean 
Rounsaville's taking up residence in the State of Wyoming and before the date of 
execution of this agreement.

This promise of immunity 
from prosecution applies whether evidence of the crime(s) comes from Elmer Jean 
Rounsaville or any other source, and it is binding upon successors in office of 
the present Campbell County Attorney and staff.

B. The state will seek to 
prevent under W.S. 26-2-310 the release of the names of any minor victim or 
information likely to identify that victim in proceedings against Richard 
Gale.

C. The state agrees that 
Elmer Jean Rounsaville may have an attorney present during any interviews with 
the County Attorney's office and during his testimony in court.

Both parties warrant that 
they enter into this agreement in the utmost good faith. The state's 
representative warrants that by signing this agreement he has full authority to 
do so and that the immunity given herein is within his power to give. The state 
further warrants that it presently has no plans for alternative prosecution of 
Elmer Jean Rounsaville in any other forum or for any other offense.

Linda 
Rounsaville's agreement stated:

     Linda Rounsaville, by 
and through her attorney, * * *, and the State of Wyoming, by and through its 
representative, * * *, Campbell County Attorney, have entered into the following 
agreement relating to the admission/denial phase of this juvenile proceeding. 
The purpose of the following agreement is to secure for Linda Rounsaville the 
opportunity to obtain help and to keep her family together if possible and 
further to facilitate the protection of the Rounsaville children through the 
processes of the juvenile court. It is also a purpose of this agreement to 
secure, for the state, information and testimony regarding Dr. Richard Gale and 
his involvement with the Rounsaville family and children. The parties agree as 
follows:

1. Linda Rounsaville will 
admit the following in support of the court taking jurisdiction of her 
family:

a. That Linda Rounsaville 
had suspicions that Elmer Jean Rounsaville was having sexual contact with [D-17] 
when she was approximately 9 to 11 years of age. Mrs. Rounsaville did not 
further investigate that contact and did not notify authorities of her 
suspicions.

b. That in the fall of 
1986, [D-7] reported to Linda Rounsaville that Elmer Jean Rounsaville had 
sexually molested her. Linda Rounsaville did not believe these statements by the 
children and the authorities were not notified and Linda Rounsaville did no 
further investigation or inquiry into the matter.

c. That on approximately 
the 29th of August, Richard Gale came to the Rounsaville's home and had sexual 
contact with [D-17] and [D-10]. Linda Rounsaville was informed of this incident 
by [D-10] and [D-17] but did not report the incident to the police or other 
authorities and did not do any further investigation of the matter concerning 
Richard Gale.

2. Linda Rounsaville will 
interview with the Campbell County Attorney's office and will truthfully tell 
all that she knows about the contact of her family with Dr. Richard Gale 
including all she knows about sexual contact with any of her children or 
stepchildren by Richard Gale. Linda Rounsaville also agrees to testify 
completely and truthfully about these matters if she is requested to do so by 
the Campbell County Attorney's office.

In return for these 
promises by Linda Rounsaville, the State of Wyoming agrees that:

A. No criminal charges 
for neglect, abuse, assault, incest, illegal sexual conduct, contact or any 
other crime allegedly or actually committed by Linda Rounsaville against her 
children will be filed. No charges of any kind will be filed for an incident 
which allegedly occurred at the Rounsaville's home involving [D-17], [BJC], 
[CD], [CC], [JH] and others. This incident is the subject of [BJC's] written 
statement dated 11/18/1986. Also no criminal charges will be filed for any other 
sexual misconduct or failure to report such sexual misconduct which occurred 
involving Elmer Jean Rounsaville from the time the Rounsaville's took up 
residence in the State of Wyoming to the date of the execution of this 
agreement.

This promise of immunity 
from prosecution applies whether evidence of the crime or crimes comes from 
Linda Rounsaville or any other source.

B. The state will seek to 
prevent under W.S. 26-2-310 the release of the names of any minor victim or 
information likely to identify that victim in proceedings against Richard 
Gale.

C. The state agrees that 
Linda Rounsaville may have an attorney present during any interviews with the 
County Attorney's office and during her testimony in court.

Both parties warrant that 
they enter into this agreement in the utmost good faith. The state's 
representative warrants that by signing this agreement he has full authority to 
do so and that the immunity given herein is within his power to give. The state 
further warrants that it presently has no plans for alternative prosecution of 
Elmer Jean Rounsaville in any other forum or for any other offense.

[¶84]   The case must be summarized in 
exercised discretion of the prosecutor that conviction of one dentist was better 
than two parents. The difficulty is the charged events against Dr. Gale were so 
curious and unlikely as developed a year after the date of a claimed occurrence 
and only then related conjunctively to the charges against Gene and Linda 
Rounsaville. The factual situation is particularized since Dr. Gale specifically 
denied ever being at the Rounsaville's residence on the date claimed and his 
statement was corroborated with believable testimony.

[¶85]   The Rounsaville family lived in a 
double-wide modular home in Rozet. The back door was nailed shut and it is 
claimed the front door was unlocked. Attached to this dissent as an appendix is 
a diagram of the home drawn by D-17 at trial which provides a general 
understanding of the location of the participants within the residence and 
affords some background as invoked by the issue of denied motions made by Dr. 
Gale.2 From that background and the 
specific testimony given, we are presented with the following:

D-17's 
testimony:

[¶86]   August 29, 1985 at 2:00 a.m., Dr. 
Gale awakened her with his hand on her stomach, touching her private parts. She 
got out of bed and went to the bathroom for ten minutes, spoke to Gene 
Rounsaville in the living room, and was told to go back to the bedroom. She 
then asked her sister D-10, who was in the same room, if she was okay and 
received an affirmative response. Dr. Gale cornered D-17 between himself and the 
bed and fifteen to twenty minutes passed. Gene Rounsaville came down the 
hall and Dr. Gale went down the hallway to talk to him. The front door 
slammed and the family, except for Linda Rounsaville, gathered in the living 
room before the children were sent back to bed. Dr. Gale came back into the 
house. There was a fire going in the fireplace and Gene Rounsaville was not 
drunk and was awake. D-17 also attended a meeting the next morning, after having 
been called home from baby-sitting for a neighbor, when Dr. Gale returned to the 
mobile home when both her mother and father were present to meet with 
him.

D-10's 
testimony:

[¶87]   She was sleeping in the top bunk 
bed and was awakened. Dr. Gale was beside the bed, touched her legs, and touched 
and rubbed her private parts while kneeling at the bunk bed. D-17 got out of bed 
and went to the bathroom. She saw Dr. Gale after D-17 returned from the 
bathroom. The night light was on in the room and it fell to the floor. Gene 
Rounsaville got up out of the chair in the living room and got Dr. Gale. Dr. 
Gale left. A family meeting was held. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Gale came back to 
get his hat. She was not present the next day when a meeting occurred involving 
Gene and Linda Rounsaville and Dr. Gale since she was in school.

D-7's 
testimony:

[¶88]   She shares a bedroom with her 
brother, S-11. She was in the bottom bunk bed and was awakened during the night. 
Dr. Gale was in the room, pulled down her covers, pulled up her nightgown and 
pulled down her panties and licked her "monkey." He then "went back to [D-10's] 
room." D-7's room is across the hallway from D-10's room and the living room 
where Gene Rounsaville was sitting. Her door was open. She then heard Gene 
Rounsaville and Dr. Gale talking. Gene Rounsaville had been sleeping in a chair 
in the living room. The family, except for Linda Rounsaville, gathered that 
night. She did not attend the meeting the next day when it was said that Dr. 
Gale returned to get his hat since she was in school.

Gene Rounsaville's 
testimony:

[¶89]   He was sleeping in the chair in the 
living room, he waited five or ten seconds and then went into D-17's 
room. Dr. Gale was sitting there with a cigarette lighter in his hand. He took 
Dr. Gale out and escorted him to the door. Dr. Gale came back and was told to 
leave. He had not been drinking and there was no fire in the fireplace. 
The hallway is two feet wide and he was sitting close to it. He woke up when 
D-17 came in and got him. Following the incidents of 2:00 a.m., he went out 
drinking the next morning and returned home mid-morning (August 30) to be 
present for a meeting when Dr. Gale came back to get his hat. 

Linda Rounsaville's 
testimony:

[¶90]   The date used by all of the 
participants was identified from a calendar with a marking which she had made on 
the 30th of August for August 29. She did not participate in anything during the 
night since she never woke up. She attended the meeting the following 
morning, August 30, when Dr. Gale said he turned down the wrong hallway. She 
owed Dr. Gale about $1,100 on the dental bill. She noted the date on the 
calendar to be sure of the date in case "I decide to turn him in at any time." 
The back door was not sealed. She was sleeping soundly because of a prescription 
drug obtained from Dr. Gale that day.

Dr. Gale's 
testimony:

[¶91]   He had been at the Rounsaville 
residence in the spring of 1985, but none of the events described for August 29 
through August 30 had ever occurred. He was home in bed that night and did not 
go to Rozet the next morning. Dr. Gale indicates the entire story is a 
conception of someone's imagination and obvious joint preparation. Stormie Gale, 
his wife, confirmed he was home in bed during that night.

Larry Maier's 
testimony:

[¶92]   Maier was an employee relations 
manager at Carter Mining Company. He testified from the records of the mining 
company where Gene Rounsaville worked that Rounsaville had worked at the mine, 
which is some distance from Gillette and Rozet, from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. 
on August 30, 1985. The daytime work schedule for that day was separately 
scheduled in order for Gene Rounsaville to participate in a mine safety project 
which had been scheduled for August 30 during the day. This witness was not 
cross-examined, the records were not disputed, and there is no rebuttal or doubt 
created about his testimony, except the statements of the Rounsaville family 
involving the August 30th morning meeting with Dr. Gale at the Rounsaville 
house.

[¶93]            
Observedly, the jury accepted the testimony of the Rounsaville family and 
rejected that provided by the Gale family. Consequently, credibility was 
absolutely controlling in their decision. It is within the nature of this 
factual umbrella that the decision of the trial court in denial of requested 
discovery and case development is to be tested.

II. ISSUES OF THE 
CASE

[¶94]   The issues of this case must be 
accommodated to the facts presented, including recognition that the charged 
offenses were committed within twenty or, at the most, thirty feet from the 
physical presence of both Gene and Linda Rounsaville. None of the victims 
raised any verbal objection. Thereafter, testimony is provided about a meeting 
the following morning that could not have actually happened.3

[¶95]   These issues are all directed to 
the development within the facts presented to review whether a fair trial 
occurred which include question or denial:

A. Dr. Gale's request for 
psychological evaluation of the Rounsaville children;

B. Denial of discovery of 
summaries of expected testimony of the prosecution's expert 
witnesses;

C. Disclosure of 
psychological or psychiatric records of the Rounsaville children;

D. Disclosure of D-PASS 
files;

E. Disclosure of school 
records;

F. Disclosure of tape 
recordings; and

G. Denial of motion to 
dismiss or to suppress for failure to disclose evidence. 

[¶96]   The search for truth which is 
intrinsic to due process, equal protection and justice cannot be extinguished by 
discretional denial. If justice is only exercised discretion, then the process 
is only the rule of man and not of law. To the extent that justification is not 
provided by the majority in denial to Dr. Gale of the tools to seek the truth, 
it cannot be accommodated in discretion unless that discretion is related to the 
facts presented. The movement of this majority away from discretion as seen in 
Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831 (Wyo. 1980) to the understanding as defined in 
Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894 (Wyo. 1986) postulates this recognition. 
Discretion does not exist in a vacuum. It should be a rational application of 
facts to a reasoned decision within a real world of conflicting forces and 
factors. Truth, except where the actuality is presumed by arbitrary definition, 
can, to the observer, only be a reasoned probability.

III. PSYCHOLOGICAL 
EXAMINATION OF THE ROUNSAVILLE CHILDREN

[¶97]   My disagreement and dissent on the 
first issue of the psychological examination of the children does not foreclose 
the exercise of discretion. With discretion recognized, I perceive improper 
exercise. The rationale of the majority completely misses the logic and ratio 
decidendi of the voluminous case law. The proper inquiry should be exercised 
discretion to search for the truth when it is uncontroverted that Gene and Linda 
Rounsaville both committed perjury at trial. The majority seeks to reconstruct 
the case of Ballard v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838 (1966) into a credibility analysis. I pursue a 
competency inquiry definable within the complexity of historical occurrences. 
The minimum protection afforded to sex offense charged defendants only denies 
prosecution expert testimony about credibility, while we admit W.R.E. 404(b) 
character evidence with profusion. Those considerations are now extended in this 
decision to pretrial examinations which is a different decision from the 
admissibility of tendered evidence. If the general thesis advanced by the 
majority is valid, medical and psychological assistance to young victims as 
helpful in analysis for prosecution should never have been permitted. Cf. 
McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony About Child Complainants in Sexual Abuse 
Prosecutions: A Foray Into the Admissibility of Novel Psychological Evidence, 77 
J.Crim.L. & Criminology 1 (1986). This majority switches justification from 
pretrial case and status development to apply rules relating to the introduction 
of expert opinions. We would have got from here to there only if the motion had 
been granted, the examinations conducted and the expert was then presented to 
testify, in his opinion, that the criminal offense never occurred.

[¶98]   If justice is a system of proper 
investigation and case development and presentation of relevant and material 
evidence to the fact finder, the principle is misunderstood or ignored here. 
Justice cannot be addressed adequately if the prosecution is given investigatory 
access and opportunity.4 Exercise of discretion for this 
case is confined by facts where information is indispensable for trial 
preparation. Access to required information for trial preparation is the essence 
of the trial court's decision. Discretion fails where unequal rights between 
prosecution and defense result. Fairness, as a principle, demands an opportunity 
for adequate factual development by either litigant. People v. Hunter, 374 Mich. 
129, 132 N.W.2d 95 (1965); State v. Franklin, 49 N.J. 286, 229 A.2d 657 (1967); 
State v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560, 143 A.2d 530 (1958).

[¶99]   Three separate choices for 
consideration of psychiatric examination are generally revealed by present rules 
of civil procedure and criminal law applications. The first is to deny 
discretion to the trial court to approve that requirement for the complainant. 
The second considers that the issue is soundly bounded in exercised 
discretion.5 Finally, the third would prove a 
defendant's right to secure the examination.

[¶100] Dr. Gale does not contend that discretion did 
not exist. Rather, he argues that the decision is factually unrelated to the 
case and the request was improperly denied as abused discretion. The holding of 
the majority is confusing in intermixing absence of discretion with exercise of 
discretion in first rejecting the discretion cases of People v. Russel, 69 Cal. 2d 187, 70 Cal. Rptr. 210, 443 P.2d 794, cert. denied 393 U.S. 864, 89 S. Ct. 145, 21 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1968) and Ballard, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838 and then 
conceding that the trial court acted under its discretion. There will likely be 
few if any fact sensitive cases comparable to this unbelievable and clearly 
perjury pervaded trial scenario. That some of the witnesses lied comprehensively 
cannot be questioned, that Gene and Linda Rounsaville committed significant 
misstatements cannot be challenged, and that the meeting scripted for August 30 
did not occur is dispositively authenticated. If the majority were to say that 
the State in prosecution cannot secure psychiatric testimony by medical 
witnesses for case presentation, then equivalency for denial to the defendant 
would at least exist. That is neither the general law nor well-followed Wyoming 
precedent. I agree with Dr. Gale that the decision of whether psychiatric 
evaluation should be required is a matter of discretion and, if discretion was 
exercised here, the denial was improper as abused.6 

[¶101] We do not proceed into a subject of first 
impression. Generally, see Annotation, Necessity or Permissibility of Mental 
Examination to Determine Competency or Credibility of Complainant in Sexual 
Offense Prosecution, 45 A.L.R.4th 310 (1986).7 The similar case was Ballard, 49 Cal. Rptr.  at 313, 410 P.2d  at 849 (emphasis in original and footnotes 
omitted):

     Rather than formulate 
a fixed rule in this matter we believe that discretion should repose in the 
trial judge to order a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness in a 
case involving a sex violation if the defendant presents a compelling reason for 
such an examination. The Supreme Court of South Dakota recently stated, "In an 
article entitled Psychiatric Opinions as to Credibility of Witnesses: A 
Suggested Approach, in Vol. 48, Cal.L.Rev. 648 at , this conclusion is reached: 
`Most of the courts which have dealt with this problem have recognized the 
authority of the trial judge to order a psychiatric examination of a witness on 
the question of credibility. The principle established by the majority of the 
cases is that the judge has the discretion to order such an examination, 
although the failure to do so has rarely been held an abuse of discretion.' We 
are not aware of any good reason why that should not be the rule concerning 
complaining witnesses in sex offenses." (State v. Klueber, supra, [81 S.D. 223], 
132 N.W.2d 847, 850 (1965); * * *.)

We therefore believe that 
the trial judge should be authorized to order the prosecutrix to submit to a 
psychiatric examination if the circumstances indicate a necessity for an 
examination. Such necessity would generally arise only if little or no 
corroboration supported the charge and if the defense raised the issue of the 
effect of the complaining witness' mental or emotional condition upon her 
veracity. Thus, in rejecting the polar extremes of an absolute prohibition and 
an absolute requirement that the prosecutrix submit to a psychiatric 
examination, we have accepted a middle ground, placing the matter in the 
discretion of the trial judge.

See likewise the 
Kansas court in State v. Gregg, 226 Kan. 481, 602 P.2d 85, 91 
(1979):

     We, too, adopt the 
"middle ground" and hold a trial judge has the discretion to order a psychiatric 
examination of the complaining witness in a sex crime case if the defendant 
presents a compelling reason for such examination. Even if a trial court finds a 
compelling reason for ordering the psychiatric examination, the further 
safeguard as to its admissibility remains.

[¶102] The voluntary confession case of State v. 
Jerousek, 121 Ariz. 420, 590 P.2d 1366, 1371 (1979) does not reveal a contrary 
persuasion in the conclusion:

The need for a 
psychiatric examination of a victim of a sex crime would generally arise "only 
if little or no corroboration supported the charge and if the defense raised the 
issue of the effect of the complaining witness' mental or emotional condition 
upon her veracity." (Emphasis added.) Ballard, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 176, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 313, 410 P.2d 838, 849.

     In the instant case, 
the victim's testimony was corroborated not only by the defendant's confession 
but by the testimony of several neighborhood children. (The competency of these 
children was not challenged.) It was, therefore, not an abuse of the trial 
court's discretion to find a psychiatric examination of the victim 
unnecessary.

Proper exercised 
discretion was found by the appellate court in the consent contested rape case 
of Government of Virgin Islands v. Scuito, 623 F.2d 869 (3rd Cir. 1980). Special 
circumstances for exercised discretion were also found to be absent in People v. 
Estorga, 200 Colo. 78, 612 P.2d 520 (1980). See, likewise, People v. Piro, 671 P.2d 1341 (Colo. App. 1983).

[¶103] The second significant case which clarified the 
two-stage decisional process is Russel, 70 Cal. Rptr. 210, 443 P.2d 794. The 
reasoning for this majority to reject Russel lacks clarity. The Russel court 
recognized the involvement of discretion in a first decision whether the 
psychological examination of the complainant would be ordered if requested by 
the defendant. The test was exercised discretion with evidentiary factors to be 
weighed in decision. Id., 70 Cal. Rptr.  at 216 n. 8, 443 P.2d  at 800 n. 8. Then 
only is a decision presented whether admissible testimony might be tendered at 
trial. That decision is just not present here since the examination was not 
first permitted. Relevancy and materiality of tendered evidence is totally 
academic. Actually, defendant's initial interest was discovery and rights of 
effective cross-examination with the constitutional guaranty of confrontation. 
If we accept Dr. Gale's contention as attempted trial preparation that the 
children would lie - he wanted to know why.

[¶104] In regard to discretion, the court in Russel, 
70 Cal. Rptr.  at 215-216, 443 P.2d  at 799-800 comprehensively 
analyzed:

     We have explicated the 
concept of judicial discretion on innumerable occasions and in a variety of 
factual contexts. Obviously the term is a broad and elastic one (see 27 C.J.S. 
p. 292) which we have equated with "the sound judgment of the court, to be 
exercised according to the rules of law." (Lent v. Tillson (1887) 72 Cal. 404, 
422, 14 P. 71, 78.) We have also declared that the "only limitation that the law 
had placed upon the exercise of discretionary judicial power is that it must not 
be abused." (Clavey v. Lord (1891) 87 Cal. 413, 419, 25 P. 493, 495, observing 
at the same time that "it may be difficult to define exactly what is meant by 
abuse of judicial discretion * * *" (idem). However we have said: "`In a legal 
sense discretion is abused whenever in the exercise of its discretion the court 
exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being 
considered.'" (State Farm, etc., Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal. 2d 428, 432, 304 P.2d 13, 15, quoting Berry v. Chaplin (1946) 74 Cal. App. 2d 669, 
672, 169 P.2d 453; see also Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 A.C. 527, 
542, 67 Cal. Rptr. 761, 439 P.2d 889 and cases therein cited.)

     The courts have never 
ascribed to judicial discretion a potential without restraint. In the early case 
of Bailey v. Taaffe (1866) 29 Cal. 423, at , this court took pains to delineate 
limits of judicial discretion in the following terms: "The discretion intended, 
however, is not a capricious or arbitrary discretion, but an impartial 
discretion, guided and controlled in its exercise by fixed legal principles. It 
is not a mental discretion, to be exercised ex gratia, but a legal discretion, 
to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law, and in a manner to 
subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice." Similar 
standards were expressed in Gossman v. Gossman (1942) 52 Cal. App. 2d 184, 195, 
126 P.2d 178, 184, where the court quoted from Davis v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co. 
(1920) 235 Mass. 482, 496-497, 126 N.E. 841 as follows: "`The word imports the 
exercise of discriminating judgment within the bounds of reason. Discretion in 
this connection means a sound judicial discretion, enlightened by intelligence 
and learning, controlled by sound principles of law, of firm courage combined 
with the calmness of a cool mind, free from partiality, not swayed by sympathy 
nor warped by prejudice nor moved by any kind of influence save alone the 
overwhelming passion to do that which is just.'"

     The foregoing 
authorities, and particularly the passages quoted from Bailey and Gossman, make 
it quite clear, we think, that all exercises of legal discretion must be 
grounded in reasoned judgment and guided by legal principles and policies 
appropriate to the particular matter at issue. We shall here undertake to 
briefly outline some of the considerations relevant to discretionary 
determinations concerning the production and admission of psychiatric evidence 
bearing on credibility.

With decision 
made for the examination then merged in review to relate connection between the 
examination decision and the admissibility of evidence, it was 
stated:

     In our Ballard opinion 
we set forth in a footnote (which is quoted in relevant part in the margin) some 
of the "dangers" involved in the use of psychiatric evidence to impeach 
credibility. As we there suggested, each of the considerations indicated is a 
factor to be weighed by the court at some point in the course of its overall 
determinations relative to the production and admission of such evidence. It 
must be observed, however, that some of these factors pertain for the most part 
to determinations undertaken at the time of passing upon the motion for 
examination, while some are peculiarly relevant to determinations undertaken 
when the products of an ordered examination are sought to be introduced into 
evidence.

* * * * * *

     When such an 
examination has been ordered by the court, however, and evidence based 
upon it is sought to be introduced, the court must address it[s]elf to 
considerations dealing with the specific evidence offered.

Id., 70 Cal. Rptr.  at 216, 443 P.2d  at 800 (emphasis in original and footnotes 
omitted).

[¶105] The court in Russel was not presented with a 
challenge for improper discretion in sustaining the ordered examination since it 
was permitted and only based the decision on denied admissibility which provided 
the basis for conviction reversal. Cf. State v. Boutwell, 18 Conn. App. 273, 558 A.2d 244, certification denied 212 Conn. 803, 561 A.2d 945 (1989), admissibility 
review. Case law which has followed the Ballard test includes Pickens v. State, 
675 P.2d 665, 669 (Alaska App. 1984) in examining a basis for a "specific 
showing of need" and that the complainant's "testimony was uncorroborated or 
otherwise untrustworthy." The basic prerequisite for the requirement of an 
examination considered that the court be "sensitive to the privacy interests of 
the witnesses generally and reluctant to permit inquiry into a witness's mental 
health history absent a clear indication of relevance." Id. at 669. See also 
Murphy v. Superior Court In and For Maricopa County, 142 Ariz. 273, 689 P.2d 532 
(1984); State v. Wahrlich, 105 Ariz. 102, 459 P.2d 727 (1969); McDonald v. 
State, 307 A.2d 796 (Del.Super. 1973); Dinkins v. State, 244 So. 2d 148 (Fla.App. 
1971); State v. Kahinu, 53 Haw. 536, 498 P.2d 635 (1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1126, 93 S. Ct. 944, 35 L. Ed. 2d 258 (1973); People v. Visgar, 120 Ill. App.3d 
584, 75 Ill.Dec. 784, 457 N.E.2d 1343 (1983); People v. Glover, 49 Ill. 2d 78, 
273 N.E.2d 367 (1971), involving discretionary denial where no compelling reason 
advanced for the examination; Easterday v. State, 254 Ind. 13, 256 N.E.2d 901 
(1970); State v. Sullivan, 360 N.W.2d 418 (Minn. App. 1985); State v. Boisvert, 
119 N.H. 174, 400 A.2d 48 (1979); State v. R.W., 104 N.J. 14, 514 A.2d 1287 
(1986); State v. Romero, 94 N.M. 22, 606 P.2d 1116 (1980); State v. Clasey, 252 
Or. 22, 446 P.2d 116 (1968); State v. Klueber, 81 S.D. 223, 132 N.W.2d 847 
(1965); State v. Ayers, 369 S.E.2d 22, 27 n. 4 (W. Va. 1988) as a discretion to 
deny second examination by a motion "inadequately documented;" and State v. 
Miller, 35 Wis.2d 454, 151 N.W.2d 157 (1967). The majority's posture is surveyed 
in State v. Walker, 506 A.2d 1143, 1147 (Me. 1986) which recognized that 
"[c]ourts in most states have held that the grant or denial of a motion to 
compel victims of sex abuse to submit to psychological testing rests within the 
sound discretion of the trial judge." Authority to order examination in these 
courts is not at issue, only discretional exercise. See Franklin, 229 A.2d 657.

[¶106] It is recognized there are cases essentially 
rejecting authority to order the examination. See State v. Looney, 294 N.C. 1, 
240 S.E.2d 612 (1978), suggesting statutory application.8 Likewise, in State v. Liddell, 211 
Mont. 180, 685 P.2d 918 (1984), the court permitted the state to provide rape 
trauma syndrome expert witness testimony, but denied expert witness examination 
requested by the defendant. See also Com. v. Widrick, 392 Mass. 884, 467 N.E.2d 1353 (1984); People v. Souvenir, 83 Misc.2d 1038, 373 N.Y.S.2d 824 (1975); and 
State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984). The posture of this line of cases 
denying any discretion of the trial court to order the examination is clearly 
the minority approach in jurisdictions in which it is considered. See, 
generally, cases listed in Franklin, 229 A.2d 657 and Annotation, supra, 45 
A.L.R.4th 310.

[¶107] I am neither bothered nor bewildered by 
application of the strong requirements for demonstration of justification 
including either a compelling reason from Ballard, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838 or a specific showing of need from Pickens, 675 P.2d 665. In this 
case, however, first following the majority's consideration of discretion, I 
would find an adequately demonstrated basis and consequent abuse of discretion 
in denial under these circumstances.

[¶108] Need remains to address the conjecture of the 
majority that the allowance as discretion is foreclosed by earlier Wyoming 
precedent. Dual misapprehensions are invoked in that contention. In first 
consideration, the present issue is not admissibility of evidence, Russel, 70 Cal. Rptr. 210, 443 P.2d 794, but examination prior to trial. In second 
misconstruction, the question of what opinion evidence may be admissible need 
not expire on the logic of Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357 (Wyo. 1988) with which I 
concurred. I have strongly dissented, in prior unsuccessful arguments, to a 
whole series of prosecutorial expert witnesses which are used to corroborate the 
complainant's testimony. Brown v. State, 736 P.2d 1110 (Wyo. 1987). That posture 
on the Zabel rule does not rationally decide the constitutional rights of Dr. 
Gale.

[¶109] Since we are not presented with evidence 
admissibility questions, a close look at Zabel, 765 P.2d 357 as well as Griego 
v. State, 761 P.2d 973 (Wyo. 1988); Brown, 736 P.2d 1110; Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036 (Wyo. 1987); Lessard v. State, 719 P.2d 227 (Wyo. 1986); and United 
States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1986), provide no authority for a denial 
of pretrial examination. How and to what extent the expert witness might testify 
is not presented on appeal. See, however, Russel, 70 Cal. Rptr. 210, 443 P.2d 794; Easterday, 256 N.E.2d 901; and Butler, 143 A.2d 530. At this juncture, the 
issue was due process in adequacy of information for proper trial preparation. 
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985); 
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S. Ct. 763, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972); 
Brady v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). 
Cf. State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1989), where the court first rejected 
admissibility of battered woman syndrome evidence particularized to the 
defendant and then rejected right of prosecution to obtain her mental 
examination.

IV(A). DENIED 
DISCOVERY

[¶110] This appeal is anchored basically on a due 
process examination derived from trial court denial of access to information for 
an adequate defense. With recognition by the prosecution that a factual conflict 
did exist, this due process inquiry, resulting from denied discovery and 
deterred trial preparation, assumes importance in denied access to justice for 
the charged defendant.9 

[¶111] The course of preparatory efforts and denied 
discovery to Dr. Gale is consequently significant. The record in itself 
established documentation, which was not made available to defense counsel, that 
"someone" had told D-PASS workers not to talk to Dr. Gale's representative. 
Interviews with the children were not possible and nothing other than written 
interview statement information from investigating officers regarding the 
Rounsaville family was available.

[¶112] On December 12, 1986, Dr. Gale filed a general 
notice for discovery in typical form requesting all available documentation held 
by law enforcement officials and the prosecutor. A motion for a bill of 
particulars was filed February 27, 1987. On March 5, 1987, the State filed a 
motion in opposition to the requested bill of particulars, stating that 
everything had been furnished including the criminal file of State of Wyoming v. 
Gene Rounsaville, Docket No. 86CR-8813. On April 6, 1987, Dr. Gale filed a 
motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to suppress testimony for failure to 
preserve evidence. The basis of the motion challenged failure to record 
interviews by audio or video tape, resulting in the prosecutorial failure to 
collect or preserve material evidence. On April 6, 1987, an amended motion for 
bill of particulars and points and authorities was filed, realleging the 
requirement for greater specificity in the charges. The request was supported in 
detailed analysis and case law. A motion for psychiatric examination, which was 
discussed in section III of this dissent, was likewise filed April 6, 1987. 
Additionally, a motion for disclosure of tape recordings or transcript of the 
juvenile court hearings and a motion for pretrial discovery, including requests 
itemized in eighteen paragraphs for informational documentation, were filed on 
April 6, 1987. Additional motions filed on April 6, 1987 included a motion to 
dismiss or, in the alternative, to suppress testimony of the Rounsaville family 
premised on the immunity agreement made by Gene and Linda Rounsaville with 
prosecutor's authority; a motion to compel the disclosure of psychiatric 
records; a motion for disclosure of impeaching information; and a comprehensive 
memorandum brief in support of these motions for discovery. Every one of these 
motions were ultimately denied. No judicial support was given to reach the due 
process goal of Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S. Ct. 3375; United States v. Agurs, 
427 U.S. 97, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974); and Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194. See Quinn, Standards of Materiality Governing the Prosecutorial Duty to 
Disclose Evidence to the Defense, VI Alaska L.Rev. 147 (1989).

[¶113] Topics included in discussion in the memorandum 
brief in support of the motions for discovery were:

1. Dr. Gale is entitled 
to immediate W.R.Cr.P. 18 discovery;

(a) Dr. Gale's own 
statements;

(b) Documents and 
tangible objects;

(c) Scientific reports 
and tests.

2. Dr. Gale is entitled 
to discover the conviction record of all government witnesses. 

3. Dr. Gale is entitled 
to immediate discovery of all exculpatory evidence in the possession of the 
government.

4. Dr. Gale is entitled 
to a government witness list.

5. Dr. Gale is entitled 
to eventually inspect all Jencks Act statements and is entitled to immediate 
inspection of other documents reflecting non-Jencks Act exculpatory statements 
of witnesses.

[¶114] Filed also on April 6, 1987 was a motion for 
disclosure of all Campbell County D-PASS files and a motion for discovery of 
school records. With the motions, subpoenas were served on D-PASS to produce 
records for the anticipated motion hearing; on the Sheriff to furnish 
psychiatric records concerning Linda Rounsaville, Gene Rounsaville, D-17, D-10, 
S-11 and D-7; on the prosecuting attorney for production of books, documents or 
tangible materials relating to the juvenile admission agreements between the 
State and Gene and Linda Rounsaville; to the Clerk of the District Court to 
produce juvenile proceeding files for the children; to the school district for 
school files; and to the private school attended by D-17 for her school records. 
Responsive to the subpoenas, an objection and motion to quash subpoena duces 
tecum was filed by the State in behalf of the D-PASS organization.

[¶115] On April 23, 1987, the prosecuting attorney 
moved for notice of alibi and for an order requiring reciprocal discovery, 
requiring Dr. Gale to make available for examination and inspection, 
photocopying, etc. the following:

1. List of all witnesses 
that the defendant intends to call at the trial in this matter.

2. Copies of any and all 
written statements made by the witnesses to be called by the defendant 
(excluding statements of the defendant), and copies of all tape recorded 
interviews of the 3 minor victims and transcripts thereof.

3. Any scientific or 
medical reports, books, papers, documents, or other tangible objects the 
defendant expects to produce at trial.

4. Production for viewing 
of any and all tangible evidence in the possession of the defendant that the 
defendant expects to introduce at trial.

Compliance was 
provided by Dr. Gale without entry by the trial court of a formal order. See 
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 93 S. Ct. 2208, 37 L. Ed. 2d 82 (1973) and 
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S. Ct. 1893, 26 L. Ed. 2d 446 (1970). See also 
Comment, Limiting Prosecutorial Discovery Under the Sixth Amendment Right to 
Effective Assistance of Counsel: Hutchinson v. People, 66 Den.U.L.Rev. 123 
(1988) and 2 W. LaFave and J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 19.4 
(1984).

[¶116] A hearing was held on April 24, 1987 on all 
pretrial motions. Subsequently, on May 1, 1987, the State filed a motion in 
opposition to Dr. Gale's motion for psychiatric examination; a motion in 
opposition to Dr. Gale's motion for disclosure of tape recordings or transcript 
of the juvenile court hearings; a motion in opposition to Dr. Gale's motion to 
dismiss or, in the alternative, to suppress testimony for failure to preserve 
evidence; a motion in opposition to Dr. Gale's motion to dismiss or, in the 
alternative, to suppress the testimony of the Rounsaville family; and a response 
to Dr. Gale's motion for pretrial discovery, contending generally that all 
documentation had been or would be furnished as requested involving reports, 
confessions, all statements of Dr. Gale and other available documentation. On 
May 8, 1987, Dr. Gale filed a response to the State's opposition to the motion 
to dismiss or, in the alternative, to suppress testimony for failure to preserve 
evidence; and his witness and exhibit lists in detail. Dr. Gale filed a notice 
of his defense; a response to the State's opposition to his motion for 
disclosure of tape recordings or transcripts of juvenile court hearings; a 
response to the State's demand for notice of alibi; and a further motion to 
compel. A further affidavit was filed in support of all previously filed 
discovery requests in detail from the licensed consulting psychologist employed 
by Dr. Gale stating a factual premise for the request. A further motion to 
produce was filed May 14, 1987 to obtain notes, memoranda, etc. relating to 
contact between members of the Sheriff's office with any designated witness 
proposed by Dr. Gale.

[¶117] Each requested item of discovery was denied in 
an opinion letter filed May 18, 1987. The equivalency criteria of Wardius, 412 U.S. 470, 93 S. Ct. 2208 and Williams, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S. Ct. 1893 was not 
required. Denial of the motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to suppress 
testimony was premised on the lack of demonstrable inducement. The motion for 
disclosure of school records was denied on the basis of an in camera review and 
the determination that nothing of materiality or relevance existed. The motion 
for disclosure of the D-PASS files was denied on the basis that part of the 
files had previously been furnished and the additional material, examined in 
camera, was asserted to be immaterial and irrelevant in stating:

This has been done 
pursuant to the holding in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. [39], 94 L. Ed. 2d 40, 108 [107] S.Ct. [989] (1987). The materiality and relevance of the materials 
reviewed was determined pursuant to the definition of materiality contained in 
the Pennsylvania v. Ritchie case, which stated "evidence is material only if 
there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A [] 
`reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome'."

The trial court 
considered the motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to suppress testimony 
for failure to preserve evidence and found that the defense failed to meet the 
test of the United States Supreme Court in California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 479, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 2529, 81 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1984) by statement that the 
material "`must possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the 
evidence * * * was destroyed, and [must also] be of such a nature that the 
defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably 
available means.' It is obvious in the instant case that these two conditions 
have not been met." The motion for pre-trial discovery was answered by comment 
that either the item had been resolved by oral rulings or the State agreed to 
furnish, which is the instant subject of this segment of this 
dissent:

The defendant has 
requested that there be furnished to him the substance of the opinions which any 
expert witness to be produced by the State is expected to testify to and the 
factual basis for each factual opinion of the expert. The State has objected to 
the defendant's request for the substance of the expert opinion to which the 
expert is expected to testify and the factual basis for each such opinion. Rule 
18(a)(ii) requires the State to permit the defendant to inspect and copy any 
relevant "results of reports of . . . scientific tests or experiments made in 
connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the possession, 
custody, or control of the State, the existance [sic] of which is known, or by 
the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the prosecuting attorney . . 
.". The material requested by the defendant in the instant case does not appear 
to be mandated by Rule 18 under the quoted subsection or any other portion 
thereof and accordingly the defendant's motion is denied to that 
extent.

[¶118] In regard to the motion for disclosure of 
impeaching information, the trial court said:

     The Court has 
considered the defendant's "Motion for Disclosure of Impeaching Information". 
Under the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in previous opinions and 
reiterated in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, supra, defense counsel has no 
constitutional right to conduct his own search of the State's files to argue 
relevance. Unless the defense counsel becomes aware that other exculpatory 
evidence was withheld and brings it to the Court's attention, the prosecutor's 
decision on disclosure is final. If a defendant is aware of specific information 
contained in a confidential file, he is free to request it directly from the 
Court and argue in favor of its materiality. Moreover, the duty to disclose is 
ongoing; information that may be deemed immaterial upon original examination may 
become important as the proceedings progress and therefore this Court, having 
denied certain of the confidential matters in its rulings above and also it's 
subsequent ruling below, still feels obligated to release any information that 
may later appear material in the fairness of the trial, and will do 
so.

[¶119]            
Disposing then of the request for psychiatric examination, the trial 
court concluded that it was not appropriate to require the children to submit to 
the trauma of undergoing the indignity of a psychiatric examination. See n. 5, 
supra.

[¶120] The problem with this conclusion and the entire 
sequence of denied discovery is the fact that the events could not have occurred 
in accord with the testimony presented in prosecution and, if proper discovery 
had been allowed, dispositive proof could have more appropriately been developed 
before the time the prosecution was about to close and found that records in her 
hands had revealed that perjury had already been committed in regard to the 
mid-morning meeting (unless the employment time records possessed by prosecution 
were different than the record furnished by the mine supervisor and introduced 
into evidence without objection).

[¶121] The relationship between discovery and due 
process and the inaneness of the blase critique that there is no constitutional 
right to discovery as a constituent of due process cannot be more vividly 
illustrated. 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, supra, § 19.3 at 481. The relationship 
between the prosecutorial standard of conduct and denial of accountability by 
immunity also cannot be ignored. Beatty, The Ability to Suppress Exculpatory 
Evidence: Let's Cut Off the Prosecutor's Hands, 17 Idaho L.Rev. 237 (1981); 
Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 
Wn.U.L.Q. 279 (1963); Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecutor's Duty to 
Disclose, 40 U.Chi.L.Rev. 112 (1972). Effectiveness of counsel cannot be better 
than the due process opportunities for adequate preparation. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, reh'g denied 467 U.S. 1267, 104 S. Ct. 3562, 82 L. Ed. 2d 864 (1984); Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence 
Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 Stan.L.Rev. 1133 
(1982).

[¶122]            
Somewhere in the records of the prosecutorial files and police 
officialdom, there are interview statements where Gene Rounsaville stated that 
on the morning of August 30, he first went out drinking and then came home to 
the mid-morning meeting with Dr. Gale. Somewhere also in those files are time 
cards which demonstrate without question, as was determined by another witness 
whose significance in testimony was obviously missed by the participants at 
trial, that none of this occurred at that time and that on the morning of August 
30, instead of going out drinking, Gene Rounsaville went to work to attend a 
safety meeting session held by his employer which was the reason for the 
scheduled change from his normal graveyard working hours during that period. 
Somewhere also to be found are school records which would directly relate to the 
presence or absence of the children in that mid-morning hour on August 30, 1985. 
Davis, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105. Materiality would not be in question. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S. Ct. 3375; Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S. Ct. 2392; Quinn, 
supra, VI Alaska L.Rev. 147. In specificity, due process generalizations from 
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 97 S. Ct. 837, 51 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1977) should 
not be dispositive. Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 
Stan. L.Rev. 293 (1960); Developments in the Law, Discovery, 74 Harv.L.Rev. 940, 
1051 (1961).

IV(B). D-PASS FILES AND 
JUVENILE COURT RECORDS

[¶123] It is not true to say as stated in majority 
opinion that all pre-1984 D-PASS files had been furnished to Dr. Gale. Only 
certain documents had been furnished. Clearly, for the period after 1984, record 
information which would have been informative in trial preparation was denied 
and complete file material is not present here. It is also clear the files 
themselves show sanitation so that involvement and decisions of agencies other 
than D-PASS could be concealed. Generally, this category of information relates 
to non-activity from the first incest report of 1979 until action was finally 
undertaken in 1986 and then terminated in order to pursue Dr. Gale.10

[¶124] The real issue in school, D-PASS and juvenile 
proceeding records is how much was the prosecution and the trial court going to 
protect the Rounsaville family from prosecution for perjury in trial 
proceedings. Directly presented are both the Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987) due process and the Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 
83 S. Ct. 1194 confirmation issues by denial of production of these kinds of 
records. That justification as encompassing the privacy interests of the minor 
victims has no weight here since what information was available had already 
established the general outline of the criminal misconduct of Gene Rounsaville 
against his children. Availability of all documentation would not invade 
privacy, it could only serve to advance the search for truth in a pending 
criminal complaint. Pitchess v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 113 Cal. Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305 (1974); People v. Crawford, 114 Ill. App.2d 
230, 252 N.E.2d 483 (1969).

[¶125] Herein emerges the real problem about the in 
camera inspection. There has to be a limit to judicial discretion justifying 
ignored responsibilities to fairness and due process for the litigant. Even with 
the discount for the smaller base of information available to the trial judge 
from what is now available to this writer, there was no reasonable basis for 
denial of availability of these records to counsel for Dr. Gale except either 
knee-jerk determination to deny all discovery or, alternatively, to countenance 
the county officials' conduct which covered up the incestuous offenses of a 
father upon his young daughters. To be hidden by the conviction of Dr. Gale was 
the seven year course of offenses by Gene Rounsaville against those same 
children.

[¶126] There are two attitudes about exercise of 
discretion for trial court in camera review. One adaptation leaves the judge to 
be the critical analyst in advocacy aptitude and consequently tends the decision 
to a denial of access to the litigant unless clear and significant justification 
is discerned by the judge. This philosophy is to be observed in plurality 
writing in Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. 989. The second, and more clearly attenuated to 
fairness in full fact finding and adjudicatory process, is to leave critical 
analysis to counsel for inspection or review unless special harm or privacy 
invasion without balancing benefit is evident. Denial of discovery about 
post-defense victim counseling where the defendant was the perpetrator is an 
example of such properly proscribed discovery.11 In either event, in camera 
inspection should be a rational, realistic and fair-minded examination and 
analysis. Here, I would find a clear abuse of discretion lacking any persuasive 
reason for denial except use for trial preparation and subsequent 
cross-examination and with clear justification for availability in improved fact 
finding. Since neither defending trial counsel nor appellate counsel, if 
different, have ever seen the material, in camera rejection in this fashion puts 
a due process and fairness review totally on the appellate opinion 
writers. To require the litigant to write an appellate brief where part of 
the record is undisclosed creates a mockery or facade of the justice delivery 
system. For example, I have difficulty in believing that investigating officers 
in Campbell County failed to investigate where D-17 and Gene Rounsaville were on 
the morning of August 30. If this was not done, why not?

[¶127] Finally, I am lost in the majority's discussion 
of this issue. Perjury was committed at trial by the Rounsaville family. Records 
were available to prosecution to permit defense to explore whether perjury was 
committed for information of the jury. Access was denied. Perjury at trial does 
not seem to bother the majority - it does me in moral, ethical and 
constitutional terms. I do not read Ritchie in majority disposition of its 
issues to promote trial conduct to the contrary or to seek countenance of 
perjury and particularly so when directly involved in a constitutional test of a 
man's reputation, career and liberty interest when infected by a sexual offense 
criminal conviction. Hutton, Confrontation, Cross-Examination and Discovery: A 
Bright Line Appears After Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 33 S.D.L.Rev. 437 
(1988).

[¶128] There is significant authority for D-PASS 
record disclosure which is compatible with the confidentiality provisions of 
W.S. 14-3-214 and its access exception in subsection (b)(vi) providing for the 
in camera inspection before disclosure and use.12 The status of public assistance 
records in summary of reported decisions is analyzed in Reynolds, Emerging 
Trends in Civil Practice: Confidentiality of Public Assistance Records, 23 
Clearinghouse Review 540 (1989):

Briefly stated, they 
establish that where public assistance recipients themselves seek disclosure of 
their files, where the records sought are pertinent to the subject of a judicial 
inquiry related to the administration of the public assistance program in 
question, where the production request is limited and manageable in its scope, 
and where no compelling, countervailing interest has been demonstrated by the 
agency, the balance of interests mandates disclosure.

Perhaps the 
strongest reason for availability was stated in an early New York case which 
would otherwise permit the recipient to testify "and at the same time seal the 
lips of those who may successfully contradict them." People v. Feuerstein, 161 
Misc. 426, 293 N.Y.S. 239, 241 (1936). See also the careful and exacting pursuit 
of informational release in People v. Reidout, 140 Misc.2d 632, 530 N.Y.S.2d 938 
(1988) and People v. Prim, 47 A.D.2d 409, 366 N.Y.S.2d 726 (1975). Certainly, no 
absolute privilege is presented. Stivahtis v. Juras, 13 Or. App. 519, 511 P.2d 421 (1973). The rule and the policy adopted by this court in Price ex rel. 
Laramie County Dept. of Public Welfare v. Pearson, 447 P.2d 501 (Wyo. 1968) is 
consistent with the same policy and process and has not been destroyed by 
statute or denied by court decision where this court specifically recognized the 
disclosure process and in camera responsibility of the trial court.

[¶129] The majority also seems to say that if a 
defendant challenges the adequacy of the Brady compliance, it becomes 
inappropriate to strengthen the challenge by access to other documents for a 
demonstration of non-compliance. The majority says:

Gale cites no authority 
supporting his criticism of the constitutional materiality standard as being 
devised to be used only in hindsight. Cf. Bagley, 473 U.S.  at 683, 105 S. Ct.  at 
3384, 87 L. Ed. 2d  at 494-95. Rather, like the standard applied to the prosecution 
in Brady, it appears to have been intended to focus the trial court's attention 
on an in camera search for privileged information that could change the 
outcome of a defendant's trial. Gale seems eager to apply this type of standard 
to the prosecution once he assumes they have not met their obligations under 
Brady, but he does not want the trial court to apply it to him when it reviews 
privileged information he speculates might be pivotal in his defense. He cannot 
have it both ways.

[¶130] It is my persuasion that rather than an attempt 
of the defendant to "have it both ways," this was an effort to have access to 
the truth "some way." My recitation of authority in criminal prosecution need go 
no further than the clear text of both the United States Constitution and the 
Wyoming Constitution and clear principle uninterruptedly announced that 
conviction by perjury is unacceptable. Napue v. People of the State of Illinois, 
360 U.S. 264, 79 S. Ct. 1173, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217 (1959); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S. Ct. 340, 79 L. Ed. 791, reh'g denied 294 U.S. 732, 55 S. Ct. 511, 79 L. Ed. 1261 (1935); Crawford, 252 N.E.2d 483.

[¶131]            
Discovery and production of the entire juvenile proceeding records 
addresses an even broader inquiry. I am again confused with the majority's 
reasoning. The basis of the requirement was to prepare to demonstrate perjury. 
The fact that some perjury did occur is, within this record, undeniable. The 
juvenile proceedings for the children and the criminal preliminary hearing 
proceeding for Gene Rounsaville would have provided information directly 
comparable to the trial testimony of those witnesses. Within the constitutional 
context of Davis, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, no reason for denial is reflected 
except an adamant rejection of discovery to assist Dr. Gale's trial preparation 
with a consequent and perhaps unintended insulation of perjury from 
responsibility.13 

[¶132] Once we have properly confined the issues for 
review to prosecutorial obligation to identify and consequent in camera 
inspection by the trial court, it would seem that Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. 989 is 
dispositive and this court need go no further into the subject. Clearly, Ritchie 
abjures categorical motion denial without determination of what, if any, records 
exist and if reasonable necessity is shown, then subsequent submission to the 
trial court for in camera review.

     We find that Ritchie's 
interest (as well as that of the Commonwealth) in ensuring a fair trial can be 
protected fully by requiring that the CYS [Children and Youth Services] files be 
submitted only to the trial court for in camera review. Although this rule 
denies Ritchie the benefits of an "advocate's eye," we note that the trial 
court's discretion is not unbounded. If a defendant is aware of specific 
information contained in the file (e.g., the medical report), he is free to 
request it directly from the court, and argue in favor of its materiality. 
Moreover, the duty to disclose is ongoing; information that may be deemed 
immaterial upon original examination may become important as the proceedings 
progress, and the court would be obligated to release information material to 
the fairness of the trial.

Ritchie, 107 S. Ct.  at 1003.

[¶133] I perceive that this court clearly disregards 
the Sixth Amendment, constitutional confrontation, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 
due process requirement, related in Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. 989 and earlier addressed 
in Davis, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105. See also Napue, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S. Ct. 1173. The compulsory process clause compliance in criminal prosecution would 
also at least reach to the same juncture. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct.  at 1001; Bagley, 
473 U.S. 667, 105 S. Ct. 3375; Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S. Ct. 2392; Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194.14

V. REQUEST FOR SUMMARY OF 
EXPECTED EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY

[¶134] This pervasive problem of expert witnesses in 
criminal litigation is summarized after an extended analysis in Myers, Bays, 
Becker, Berliner, Corwin, & Saywitz, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse 
Litigation, 68 Neb.L.Rev. 1, 145 (1989):

Expert testimony plays an 
important role in child sexual abuse litigation. Such testimony can assist the 
jury in many ways. Yet, the issues raised by expert testimony are exceedingly 
complex, and clinical and scientific understanding of child sexual abuse is 
still developing. Courts should proceed cautiously when considering the 
admissibility of expert testimony on child sexual abuse. It is vitally important 
that professionals offering such testimony be highly qualified. Courts should 
insist on a thorough showing of expertise before permitting individuals to 
testify as experts. Furthermore, courts should require the proponent of expert 
testimony to lay a complete foundation so that the court understands precisely 
how the evidence is relevant. When appropriate caution is exercised, qualified 
experts can assist in attaining justice.

[¶135] I do not accept the attitude that "what should 
be is however yet untimely to be" in procedural equivalency as a search for 
justice. The issue of this case is not whether Dr. Gale received a fair trial. 
No average unbiased examiner, whether learned in the law or not, would likely 
examine the record and find a fair result presented. The issue is whether an 
unconstitutionally unfair relationship for defense was created by the trial 
court's uniform rejection of Dr. Gale's discovery motions.

[¶136]            
Differing from the majority, I would extend the obvious unfairness to 
reach a degree of prohibited unconstitutional unfairness. Denial of a summary of 
expected state expert witness testimony was one of the significant steps toward 
unfairness in contradistinction to even-handed justice.15 First I reject the subsurface 
premise that justice and procedural fairness should only be available to civil 
litigation and the prosecutor in criminal cases. See Comment, supra, 66 Den. 
U.L.Rev. 123. The entire thesis of the federal rules and modernized procedures 
which include motion practice, pretrial and discovery was to provide equal 
opportunity for equivalency in knowledge before trial and a consequent rational 
presentation of the facts at trial. Trial by ambush and accident was to be 
eliminated. Reference to W.R.C.P. 1 may be urgently required. W.R.C.P. 1 
states:

     These rules govern 
procedure in all courts of record in the State of Wyoming, in all actions, suits 
or proceedings of a civil nature, in all special statutory proceedings except as 
provided in Rule 81, and in all appeals in criminal cases. In all cases in which 
statutes of civil procedure are made applicable by statute to the trial of 
criminal cases and are not superseded by the Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, these rules shall govern insofar as they supersede or are in conflict 
with such statutes. They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and 
inexpensive determination of every action.

(Emphasis 
added.) (Originally adopted by the Wyoming Supreme Court effective December 1, 
1957 or thirty-two years ago.)

[¶137]            
Despite that noble purpose, or perhaps for criminal trials only to be a 
platitude, I find it terribly obnoxious that three decades and millions of 
nationally adjudicated cases later, we argue about what is obviously fair in 
exchange for summary of expected expert witness testimony. It was out of a quest 
for fairness to the prosecution that the alibi rules, W.R.Cr.P. 16.1 and 16.2, 
and reciprocal discovery provisions, W.R.Cr.P. 18(d), were created.

[¶138] The decision made here cannot be defined in 
justification of exercised discretion unless it is said that criminal defendants 
should be denied rights guaranteed to civil litigants. Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 
626 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 918, 101 S. Ct. 1363, 67 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1981). Uniform Rules for the District Courts 601, pretrial 
practice, in part provides:

(a) In all cases in which 
a pretrial conference is ordered reasonable notice of the time and place shall 
be given.

* * * * * *

(c) Before pretrial 
counsel shall:

* * * * * *

(4) Furnish opposing 
counsel names and addresses of witnesses with a summary of their expected 
testimony[.]

In recognizing 
the right to have access to the names of witnesses, this court, in Jackson v. 
State, 522 P.2d 1286, 1289 (Wyo. 1974), said:

Counsel is not required 
to develop a defense for the first time upon trial, and any attorney who 
attempted to do so at that late stage would justifiably have his competency 
questioned and be open to criticism at the least. The interviewing of 
prospective witnesses, or any party who may have some knowledge of the subject 
event, is such a basic procedure in the proper preparation of either a civil or 
criminal case that it is axiomatic.

Discretion 
properly exercised involves choice within arguably appropriate alternatives. In 
exercise, it is not an opportunity to deny fundamental equivalency and fairness 
for each litigant. Martin, 720 P.2d 894.

[¶139] There could be reasons for discretional denial 
of expected expert witness testimony summaries in criminal cases which should be 
no less nor no more than civil cases and not just because it is a criminal case. 
Neither litigant nor present majority cites authority or provides cogent 
reasoning why, as an attitude on adaptation of what is required for justice in 
civil litigation, it need not be provided - as a matter of course - in 
criminal cases. Casual readers of state appellate court reports cannot have any 
perspective to the degree that experts have invaded criminal prosecutions and 
particularly so, like this case, where sexual offenses are charged.16

[¶140] To address the subject forcibly then within the 
rights granted by the 1957 rules of civil procedure, were rights to expert 
witness summary extricated or extinguished by the 1968 rules of criminal 
procedure? We have W.R.Cr.P. 18,17 conjecturally W.R. Cr.P. 1918 and empirically W.R.Cr.P. 16.119 and 16.220 which are specific prosecutorial 
discovery rules as well as W.R.Cr.P. 1721 which appears even-handedly to 
apply.

[¶141]            
Unfortunately in grandiose characterization in past opinions, it is said 
that no general constitutional right to discovery is guaranteed. But this court 
has never related W.R.C.P. 1 to the criminal rules to analyze due process, equal 
protection and proper discretion denial of rights to the criminal defendant that 
effectively or casually are available to the prosecutor and civil litigant. Due 
process cannot be properly shunted aside by ignoring the modern thesis of fact 
finding in modernized processes. Brennan, supra, 1963 Wn. U.L.Q. 
279.

[¶142] It is surely justified to argue in both rule 
requirement application and constitutional explication that the criminal 
defendant should have rights equal to the prosecutor and all rights of the civil 
litigant unless that equivalency is expressly denied by rule or statute and even 
then with questionable constitutional validity. How then does W.R.Cr.P. 18 deny, 
if it does, the right to expert witness summary which is assured by our civil 
rules? We are not informed by discussion in the briefs nor by citation in the 
majority. We are, however, directed to the proviso of subsection (b) which 
becomes (c) as the Jencks Act proviso. 18 U.S.C. § 3500; Jones v. State, 568 P.2d 837 (Wyo. 1977); Deluna v. State, 501 P.2d 1021 (Wyo. 1972). Specifically, 
counsel for the State does not argue and the majority does not conclude that 
W.R.Cr.P. 18(c) excludes, or the exclusion of W.R.Cr.P. 18(b) includes, 
summaries of expert witnesses within W.R.C.P. 26(b)(1) requirements.

[¶143] It is here that II ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice § 11-2.1 (2d ed. 1982) follows our legal heritage found in modern rules 
of procedure:

(a) Upon the request of 
the defense, the prosecuting attorney shall disclose to defense counsel all of 
the material and information within the prosecutor's possession or control 
including but not limited to:

(i) the names and 
addresses of witnesses, together with their relevant written or recorded 
statements;

(ii) any written or 
recorded statements and the substance of any oral statements made by the accused 
or made by a codefendant;

(iii) those portions of 
grand jury minutes containing testimony of the accused and relevant testimony of 
witnesses; 

(iv) any reports or 
statements made by experts in connection with the particular case, including 
results of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests, experiments, 
or comparisons;

(v) any books, papers, 
documents, photographs, tangible objects, buildings, or places which the 
prosecuting attorney intends to use in the hearing or trial or which were 
obtained from or belong to the accused; and

(vi) any record of prior 
criminal convictions of the defendant or of any codefendant.

(b) When the information 
is within the prosecutor's possession or control, the prosecuting attorney shall 
inform defense counsel:

(i) if relevant recorded 
grand jury testimony has not been transcribed;

(ii) if the defendant's 
conversations or premises have been subjected to electronic surveillance 
(including wiretapping);

(iii) if the prosecutor 
intends to conduct scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons which may 
consume or destroy the subject of the test, or intends to dispose of relevant 
physical objects; and

(iv) if the prosecutor 
intends to offer (as part of the proof that the defendant committed the offense 
charged) evidence of other offenses.

(c) The prosecuting 
attorney shall disclose to defense counsel any material or information within 
the prosecutor's possession or control which tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused as to the offense charged or which would tend to reduce the punishment 
of the accused.

(d) The prosecuting 
attorney's obligations under this standard extend to material and information in 
the possession or control of members of the prosecutor's staff and of any others 
who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case and who 
either regularly report or, with reference to the particular case, have reported 
to the prosecutor's office.

[¶144] We need not consider the fearsome calamities of 
witness intimidation and contamination considered in congressional action 
addressing mandatory general witness listing.

     But see 18 
U.S.C. § 3432 (1976), which provides for mandatory disclosure of the prosecution 
witness list in capital cases "at least three entire days" before 
trial.

     The Supreme Court 
proposal to amend the federal rule to include disclosure of the names and 
addresses of witnesses was not adopted, apparently because Congress feared 
witness intimidation and contamination. Conference Committee, Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure Act of 1975, H.R.Rep. No. 94-414, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 
(1975). Compare House Committee on the Judiciary, Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure Amendments Act, H.R.Rep. No. 94-247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, 14 
(1975), reprinted in [1975] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 674, 686.

II ABA Standards 
for Criminal Justice, supra, § 11-2.1 at 11.19 n. 17. We are only concerned in 
this analysis with expert witnesses and summaries of their anticipated 
forensic contribution to deliver justice to be no less fair in request by 
defendant as well as prosecution.

[¶145]            
Although release of witness statements may be denied until after 
testimony, W.R. Cr.P. 18(c), Jencks Act - 18 U.S.C. § 3500 - summaries of 
expected expert witness testimony should be available pretrial by application 
of present Wyoming rules and by recognition of the validity of the ABA 
standards unless extraordinary cause for denial in behalf of either 
prosecution or defense is provided in resistance to the disclosure motion.22 

VI. NON-DISCLOSURE OF 
PSYCHOLOGICAL OR PSYCHIATRIC RECORDS OF THE ROUNSAVILLE CHILDREN

[¶146] None of the discovery and disclosure cases, 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S. Ct. 3375; Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S. Ct. 2392; or 
Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, can be applied to justify the preliminary 
denials presented on this medical record issue. Defendant's counsel can only 
find out what exists by asking, which was done in Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S. Ct. 3375.23 Since we are left to conjecture 
when the initial issue of disclosure of existence is not considered, for 
relevancy we are lead by stage skipping to in camera inspection examination by 
litigant request and finally trial evidence utilization which are the subjects 
addressed in briefing and majority opinion. The disclosure requirements of 
Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. 989; Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S. Ct. 3375; and Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 as well as equal protection due process requirements of 
Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6; art. 1, § 10; and art. 1, § 34 should serve to resolve 
constitutional denial from the criminally charged defendant of exculpatory file 
information, including existence of medical reports.

[¶147] A broad collection of cases has been cited 
about constitutional rights to discovery, privilege, relevance and materiality, 
but none address the question faced here. That question is whether the 
prosecution should be required to reveal if any medical reports exist and what 
they are so that usage can be considered by defendant in order to request in 
camera inspection by the trial court. Cf. State v. Trammell, 231 Neb. 137, 435 N.W.2d 197 (1989). Confrontation under the Sixth Amendment cannot come into 
analysis until it is first established whether there is anything to be 
considered. See Ritchie, 107 S. Ct.  at 1002, which said:

Ritchie is entitled to 
have the CYS [Children and Youth Services] file reviewed by the trial court to 
determine whether it contains information that probably would have changed the 
outcome of his trial. If it does, he must be given a new trial. If the records 
maintained by CYS contain no such information, or if the nondisclosure was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the lower court will be free to reinstate 
the prior conviction.

In the context 
of that case, I find a due process issue and wonder repeatedly whether due 
process in Wyoming is empirically confined to practice in civil litigation only. 
Bond v. District Court In and For Denver County, 682 P.2d 33 (Colo. 
1984).

[¶148]            
Discussion of this travesty in adjudicatory due process at times 
approaches the achievement of swatting flies with a piece of wet tissue paper. 
The goal of review escapes significant consideration by perambulating nonsense. 
Cf. State v. Bruno, 197 Conn. 326, 497 A.2d 758 (1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1119, 106 S. Ct. 1635, 90 L. Ed. 2d 181 (1986). Pages of discussion appear in the 
State's brief and references in the majority directed to the question of Dr. 
Gale's proof that the psychiatric records for the Rounsaville children may not 
exist or are not demonstrated to exist. Having been denied access to the 
information required to determine what records exist, the controversy is then 
answered that no rights exist because proof of the existence of the records has 
not been provided by the party to whom disclosure has not been made. This is 
adjudicatory nonsense and sheer lunacy along with wasted time. If the records do 
not exist or were unknown to prosecution, why should we waste taxpayer's 
resources determining the hypothetical question about what we might do if there 
is something with which we might have available to do it. In context at this 
stage and particularly since none of the in camera records or tendered 
documentation establishes anything about what may exist as psychiatric or 
psychological records which were developed before or after the 1986 event, we 
reach not much further in conjecture than re-examining the ancient history 
inquiry of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.

[¶149] There is nothing in all of this to reasonably 
demonstrate beyond whatever test of inquiry whether certain other records may 
exist to determine if they do exist and, if so, where. Dr. 
Gale concluded in his brief:

    In summary, this court 
should find that under certain circumstances the confidentiality that attaches 
to psychiatric records must yield to a criminal defendant's rights to due 
process, confrontation, and compulsory process * * * to both the United States 
and Wyoming constitutions. Furthermore, under the circumstances of this case 
good cause had been shown to justify a disclosure of the requested records. 
Hence, the trial court erred in not ordering the records to be produced and 
disclosing them to the defense or at least reviewing them in camera.

The State 
responded:

     If Appellant believed 
that the existence of such records had been established, he certainly had the 
opportunity to so inform the court. Before trial began, defense counsel made 
specific inquiries regarding some of the court's rulings or apparent lack of 
rulings, yet took no exception to the black and white statement of the court 
that no psychiatric records had been shown to exist. Counsel did not avail 
himself of the court's willingness to conduct an in camera review of such 
material. * * *

* * * * * *

When the balancing test 
of Davis and Ritchie is applied, the victims' significant privacy interest in 
psychiatric records, and the State's compelling interest in maintaining 
confidentiality, outweighed Appellant's interest in this setting. Even if 
Appellant had shown to the trial court that psychiatric records existed, there 
should have been no in camera review.

(Emphasis in 
original.) This court confuses:

     At the motions 
hearing, the trial court addressed the subpoena duces tecum issued to Dr. 
Heinecke and concluded that because any examinations or treatment Dr. Heinecke 
might have conducted with the R children were pursuant to the earlier juvenile 
court proceedings, their availability to the defense would be decided under 
Gale's motion for release of the juvenile court records. * * *

* * * * * *

     Gale has never put 
forth any additional evidence showing that such records exist, let alone 
establish some basis for a claim that such records might contain information 
constitutionally material to his defense. * * * The district court did all that 
it could do. It gave Gale an open invitation to present evidence establishing 
the existence of psychological records not a part of the juvenile court file and 
information within such records that might be constitutionally material to his 
defense. Gale never took advantage of the district court's offer; consequently, 
he has not fulfilled his burden to present this court with a record that would 
afford him appellate review on this issue.

[¶150] It is intrinsic to this discussion that no 
challenge is made to in camera inspection. Not only to be applied to medical 
resources, but this Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. 989 adaptation is surely appropriate for 
other private documentation consideration. Hutton, supra, 33 S.D.L. Rev. 437. 
Proper in camera examination first enjoins a competitive unequivalency against 
the flexible and energized defense attorney and secondly reserves confidential 
information from the semi-public scrutiny of litigant counsel where no merit or 
relevancy to the issues at hand are demonstrable. At the same time, the proper 
in camera examination requires study by the trial court of a character to be 
expected from the energized and imaginative trial counsel. Detective work 
examination in trial preparation is the hallmark of the superior litigator and 
the obligation and opportunity of trial court in in camera examination is to 
recognize leads and not always admissible evidence as a high challenge in trial 
preparation. It is to be recognized as a responsibility of in camera examination 
that the trial court cannot see the moon if the examiner is only looking for the 
sun. Likewise, what is significant to portray and develop veracity and validity 
is a complex of interrelated stimuli developed by the rational application of 
reasoning and review.

[¶151]            
Consequently, in camera examination appropriately approached should not 
make the trial judge a soothsayer or adjunct to either or both trial counsel. 
In camera is only directed to exclude from review and evaluation by counsel 
what is unnecessarily harmful to the subject of the records. Otherwise, the 
thoughtful scrutiny should be done by counsel and not anticipated by exercised 
responsibility of the trial court.

[¶152] There is nothing in this record, provided by 
the State or the State's witnesses, which establishes that there are no 
psychological or psychiatric records. The involvement of Dr. Heineke, referenced 
in the majority opinion, and modest knowledge of responsibility of professional 
health care personnel for maintenance, preparation and preservation of defined 
records suggests a probability. The trial court could and should have required 
the prosecution to state what, if any, records were known to exist, of where, 
whom and what and then pursued argument whether contents would be reviewed in 
camera and, if not, at least consideration and text would be available for 
review in this record. Consequently, in assuming something existed that 
prosecutor, public institutions and, in result, even the trial court desired to 
immunize from review involving either the offenses committed against the 
Rounsaville children or the doubt of guilt of Dr. Gale for his charged offense, 
I will not pursue this subject generally except to demonstrate that existence 
and identification should have been required. Thereafter, in camera examination 
should have been pursued by a realistic trial court review.24

[¶153] I can only properly examine the authorities to 
review precedent as to whether the availability of records should have been 
identified to permit the course of requested discovery to the stage at least of 
in camera examination by the trial court. Anything less makes the entire review 
meaningless. Anything more renders discussion ephemeral and also 
hypothetical.

[¶154] Cited case authority does not demonstrate a 
logical and persuasive basis for affirming what the majority does here. State v. 
Esposito, 192 Conn. 166, 471 A.2d 949 (1984) recognized the constitutional 
confrontation interest and consequent effectuation where appropriate by striking 
the testimony of the witness if the privilege was not waived. The case was 
decided on the failure of proof for defendant to demonstrate any mental problem 
of the witness which affected her testimonial capacity as a threshold 
"relevancy" requirement by stating that "[w]e are not inclined to conjure up a 
picture of mental abnormality out of nothing more substantial than the 
defendant's gossamer illusions." Id., 471 A.2d  at 957. Com. v. Kyle, 367 Pa. 
Super. 484, 533 A.2d 120 (1987), appeal denied 518 Pa. 617, 541 A.2d 744 (1988) 
was both factually and substantively different as involving post-offense 
treatment. Similarly, see People v. District Court In and For City and County of 
Denver, 719 P.2d 722 (Colo. 1986) and People v. Foggy, 121 Ill. 2d 337, 118 
Ill.Dec. 18, 521 N.E.2d 86, cert. denied 486 U.S. 1047, 108 S. Ct. 2044, 100 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1988). State v. Cusick, 219 N.J. Super. 452, 530 A.2d 806 (1987) 
provides little converse authority, if any, since the trial court did make an in 
camera inspection and a specific finding that there was no necessity to disclose 
since "almost all of the information that is in those reports is obtainable and 
can be obtainable from other sources." Id. at 809. Cusick is to be compared with 
People v. Reber, 177 Cal. App. 3d 523, 223 Cal. Rptr. 139, 146 (1986) for failure 
to make a proper in camera inspection and was found to constitute error where, 
as stated by the frequently cited decision, it was stated:

     Accordingly, the trial 
court erred to the extent it failed to (1) obtain and examine in camera all the 
materials under subpoena, (2) weigh defendants' constitutionally based claim of 
need against the statutory privilege invoked by the People, (3) determine which 
privileged matters, if any, were essential to the vindication of defendants' 
rights of confrontation and (4) create a record adequate to review its 
ruling.

See also People 
v. Pack, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1512, 240 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1987).

[¶155] Bobo v. State, 256 Ga. 357, 349 S.E.2d 690 
(1986) also affords no support on the issue presented since the subject of the 
proposed testimony was made available and an inadequate showing of necessity for 
the trial testimony denied its use for witness impeachment. It is apparent the 
courts have been particularly protective of post-event victim counseling 
assistance in this regard. District Court In and For City and County of Denver, 
719 P.2d 722; Esposito, 471 A.2d 949; and Foggy, 521 N.E.2d 86 are identical and 
distinguishable.25 If it is to be considered that the 
United States Constitution in the most recent due process inspection on the 
subject in Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. 989 is not decisive, the foundational case in 
philosophy is In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 464 U.S. 983, 
104 S. Ct. 426, 78 L. Ed. 2d 361 (1983), which addressed identification and dates 
of treatment. The court recognized:

Clearly then, the Court 
has the authority to recognize a psychiatrist-patient privilege. This authority 
must be exercised with caution. As the Supreme Court has noted "[e]videntiary 
privileges in litigation are not favored." Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176, 
99 S. Ct. 1635, 1648, 60 L. Ed. 2d 115 (1979), and "[w]hatever their origins, these 
exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor 
expansively construed for they are in derogation of the search for the truth." 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 3109, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039 
(1974).

* * * * * *

Having recognized the 
compelling necessity for the privilege, it remains for the Court to determine 
its applicability to the instant action. It should be emphasized in this regard 
that no attempt is made here to define the appropriate perimeters of the 
privilege. Just as the recognition of privileges must be undertaken on a 
case-by-case basis, so too must the scope of the privilege be considered. See, 
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396-97, 101 S. Ct. 677, 686, 66 L. Ed. 2d 584 (1981). This is necessarily so because the appropriate scope of a 
privilege, like the propriety of the privilege itself, is determined by 
balancing the interests protected by shielding the evidence sought with those 
advanced by disclosure.

Id. at 
637-40.

[¶156]  Clearly in constitutional context, the 
denial of evidence availability by privilege is not absolute. In United States 
v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1166 (11th Cir. 1983), the court said "[w]hen 
balanced against the great probative weight of the psychiatric records for the 
issues in this case, the district court's justifications of cumulativeness and 
remoteness are insubstantial." See also United States v. Society of Independent 
Gasoline Marketers of America, 624 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub 
nom. Kayo Oil Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 1078, 101 S. Ct. 859, 66 L. Ed. 2d 801 
(1981).

[¶157] In analysis, we properly consider McCormick on 
Evidence § 105 at 259 (3d ed. 1984) (footnote omitted) as the sweeping curtain 
of privilege accomplishing

the complete failure to 
consider the other side of the shield, namely, the loss which comes from 
depriving the courts of any reliable source of facts necessary for the right 
decision of cases.

* * * * * *

     Some of the analytical 
weaknesses of the utilitarian rationale of the privilege, except in the 
psychotherapeutic context, have been noted earlier. To these must be added the 
perplexities and confusions arising from judicial and legislative attempts to 
render tolerable a rule which essentially runs against the grain of justice, 
truth, and fair dealing. The uncertainties of application of a privilege so 
extensively and variously qualified and restricted should suffice conclusively 
to rebut any continuing effort to justify it on utilitarian grounds, for no one 
familiar with the vagaries of its operation will be disposed to repose 
confidence in its protection. Those not so knowledgeable will often find it a 
snare and a delusion.[26]

[¶158]            
Additional authority for error in denied identification of the existence 
of the medical records and in camera inspection by the trial court as relevant 
to this factual relationship is included in the discussion of the Georgia court 
in Bobo, 349 S.E.2d 690. The function of trial preparation and presentation is 
uniquely different here than is illustrated by that opinion in order to justify 
the veil of the non-removal privilege. In the broad due process context, we are 
faced with pretrial events which "undercut the right of cross-examination" and 
are then the essence of confrontation. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct.  at 1008, Brennan, J., 
dissenting. We cannot know here whether the medical record file "contains 
information that may have changed the outcome of [the] trial had it been 
disclosed," Id. at 1004, and even to meet the Blackmun special concurrence 
test:

In my view, there might 
well be a confrontation violation if, as here, a defendant is denied pretrial 
access to information that would make possible effective cross-examination of a 
crucial prosecution witness.

Id. at 1004.27 The difference in advantage to the 
prosecution for the opportunity to convict and fairness to each contestant to 
advance fact finding for justice should not be ignored. See II ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice, supra, §§ 11-1.1, 11-2.1, 11-2.2, 11-2.3 and 11-2.4 as well as 
the countervailing disclosure to prosecution.

[¶159] At issue is the fundamental fairness that must 
be the touchstone of all judicial inquiry. See State v. McBride, 213 N.J. Super. 
255, 517 A.2d 152 (1986), where at least an in camera review should have been 
made to determine whether the report or any part thereof was discoverable. See 
also Greene v. Wainwright, 634 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1981) and United States v. 
Partin, 493 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974). In even more recent review, the subject of 
use and availability of medical records is comprehensively addressed in Com. v. 
Lloyd, 567 A.2d 1357 (Pa. 1989).

[¶160] In criminal analysis, in following both 
Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. 989 and Reber, 223 Cal. Rptr. 139, the case of People v. 
Caplan, 193 Cal. App. 3d 543, 238 Cal. Rptr. 478, 486-87 (1987) is both adaptive 
and persuasive, where the court enunciated that

constitutional due 
process, and not the right to confrontation, compels the People to turn over 
evidence in its possession pretrial that is both favorable to the accused and 
material to guilt or punishment. Both cases set out procedures for the trial 
court to follow for in camera review of the sought-after material.

     The trial court here 
did not review the records, notes or files of Dr. Brennan subpoenaed by Caplan 
and argued by Caplan to be necessary for the preparation and presentation of his 
defense. The court merely upheld Cindy's privilege not to allow any disclosures. 
Therefore, the court again erred.

[¶161]            
Preclusive authority which would even require a different result for 
confrontation and due process rights under the Wyoming constitution which would 
be less protective than the United States Constitution is not authenticated by 
briefing or statement of cases in the majority opinion. Additionally, the 
Wyoming Constitution need not be limited in its protective right for Wyoming 
citizens by national concepts of a different court derived from a different 
document. Jones, 568 P.2d 837 did not provide a definable answer since their 
lists of witnesses were provided by each side and that production was not an 
issue as the Jencks Act statement review W.R.Cr.P. 18(c)(1) and (3) was not 
adapted since never reached. Consideration of materiality is intrinsic to the 
lack of identification from which any conclusion could be drafted. The 
manufactured evidence issue of Wilde v. State, 706 P.2d 251 (Wyo. 1985) is 
likewise absent since the records and documentation would generally be within 
the custody of other agencies and instrumentalities as a product of juvenile 
court proceedings. The broad conception that the trial court has discretion in 
determining the requirements of adherence to pretrial and discovery orders in 
civil cases lacks application here where, in a civil case in Wyoming, an 
enforceable right to lists of expected witnesses is mandated by rules and 
general practice. See State v. Dieringer, 708 P.2d 1 (Wyo. 1985). Aguilar v. 
State, 764 P.2d 684 (Wyo. 1988) provides no additional weight in consideration 
of the confused record and trial facts that the document was available for 
cross-examination and only admissibility as an exhibit was an issue. The 
document had been furnished and its use for impeachment is not deterred. 
Privilege is no more appropriate when used to insulate the complainant from 
questions of perjured testimony than is the case for the civil litigation 
plaintiff where waiver is implied. The same balance should be applied. Bond, 682 P.2d 33. The dicta of the "non-discovery" Wyoming cases is outdated and contrary 
to both modern precepts of due process and our present rules of procedure. I 
find no basis in those cases to countenance perjury or deny adequate trial 
preparation. Fitzgerald v. State, 601 P.2d 1015 (Wyo. 1979); Dodge v. State, 562 P.2d 303 (Wyo. 1977); Coca v. State, 423 P.2d 382 (Wyo. 1967). Compare the 
hypnosis cases and duty to reveal in Gee v. State, 662 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 1983) and 
Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982). 

[¶162] In sum, neither the Constitution of the United 
States, the Constitution of the State of Wyoming nor the precedential case law 
serves to justify the due process denial of documentary identification and 
consequent in camera inspection for prejudice, materiality and factual content 
relatable to accusatory witnesses for their defense of their father and 
substantive prosecution of the bystander.

VII. THE JUVENILE 
PROCEEDING "IMMUNITY" AGREEMENT

[¶163]            
Differing from the majority, my conscience is shocked by this saga of 
family incest and the public official's failure to effectively act to protect 
the children from their father except by an immunity agreement for the father 
and mother. This is perjury, bought and paid for. This case, within an augmented 
record which is disclosed in in camera documents and much more that is not 
disclosed and consequently unknown except to prosecution and the perpetrators, 
swims with both incestuous sexual abuse and trial time perjury. This is not a 
bald assertion from which real inference cannot be drawn. It commences in 1979 
by entry in D-PASS records form SS-219 dated July 23, 1979 under the caption of 
D-17, a fourth grader, involving child protection with the statement made, 
"complaint lodged by school nurse on last day of school. Since I was out of town 
and didn't have enough info. to follow up on the complaint, I've tabled it until 
Sept. School will check on it for us then. This should be logged as an I & R 
for future reference." This was then followed by a June 4, 1980, D-PASS form 
SS-219, captioned Gene Rounsaville, with comments:

S.O. [school office] 
reported alleged sexual molestation by Gene of [D-17] and two of her friends at 
a slumber party. S.O. attempted to investigate, but initial efforts failed to 
turn anything more up. It is turned back to us for investigation.

[¶164] A conference was held involving Gene 
Rounsaville, Linda Rounsaville and D-PASS personnel to be followed by reports in 
late 1980, 1981, and other documentation which reveals that the evil continued 
uncorrected as to D-17 and the other children until the first real investigative 
action in 1984 when legal action was then reviewed but not instituted until two 
years later. One does not need to be totally informed in methodology of record 
preparation by D-PASS offices to discern quickly that the in camera file has 
been sanitized by someone or only partly collected. It would appear that party 
interview records and reports are generally not included. What did occur was 
that D-PASS forms were extracted and other detail and documentation material 
were only partially made available even to the trial court. This status of 
questionably incomplete records provides little confidence in the delivery of 
the justice system in its operation regarding the Rounsaville 
family.

[¶165]            
Everyone involved, including specifically the trial court, knew from 
examination of this record that preliminary hearings and juvenile court 
proceedings had occurred and records existed. Besides actual knowledge, judicial 
notice is not unknown in Campbell County. Obviously, either the documents were 
not examined in camera or this record is incomplete because complete files are 
not included.

[¶166] To make clear what samples are available to 
authenticate evidence of the proceedings, the record reveals:

Criminal Complaints dated 
March 17, 1986, 86-CR-88-13 and 86-7128 against Gene Rounsaville by deputy 
sheriff, Monty Trenary, sexual assault on D-7.

Two juvenile court 
admission agreements, In the Interest of: Rounsaville Children, Juvenile 
Nos. 1029, 1032, 1033, 1034, 1035, 1036, filed January 16, 1987, signed by Linda 
Rounsaville with the second being signed by Gene Rounsaville.

Juvenile petition 
entitled In the Interest of D-17, S-11, D-10, D-7, D1-3, and D2-3 dated 
November 18, 1986.

Transcript of the 
examination of the assistant prosecuting attorney taken April 24, 1987, 
discussing both juvenile proceedings and criminal proceedings against 
Gene.

[¶167] Dr. Gale's exhibit list indicates: 

All preliminary hearing 
exhibits in the matter of State v. Gale and State v. Elmer Jean Rounsaville 
(these documents were never made available by prosecution for trial introduction 
by Dr. Gale).

In camera documents. In 
the Interest of D-17, S-11, D-10, D-7, D1-3 and D2-3, order for shelter care 
filed December 1, 1986.

Notice of setting 
entitled In the Interest of [the Rounsaville Children], hearing scheduled April 
22, 1987 (dispositional hearing).

In the Interest of D-17, 
S-11, D-10, D-7, D1-3 and D2-3, order to appear filed November 18, 
1986.

VIII. MOTION TO DISMISS 
OR SUPPRESS TESTIMONY

[¶168]            
Analysis of this issue requires framing the denial of discovery for 
review within a landscape clearly established by trial testimony of unrequited 
perjury by most, if not all, of the Rounsaville family. It may be arguable when 
the prosecution first knew about the full scope of "discrepancies" until during 
trial when it became obvious that one critical facet could not have happened - 
the morning after conference, which was intrinsic to the testimony of all of the 
witnesses. The prosecution, from even the minimal records available, many of 
which were not available for defense, knew or should have known that both Gene 
and Linda Rounsaville never testified truthfully about the seven year scope of 
incest occurrences. It is curious that office correspondence to D-PASS about 
non-prosecution cannot be found. Intrinsic to the status of anticipated 
perjurious testimony at trial was the non-prosecution agreements which were 
executed. I do not write about bald assertion. Examination reveals minimized 
record production and examination reveals events and circumstances authenticated 
from the records which were only made available for in camera inspection and 
never given to counsel. This does not meet a due process test. Louisell, 
Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 Calif.L.Rev. 56 (1961); 
Louisell, The Theory of Criminal Discovery and the Practice of Criminal Law, 14 
Vand.L. Rev. 921 (1961).

IX. UNAVAILABLE 
EVIDENCE

[¶169] As almost a post-script, we are faced with an 
argument about non-use by investigators, police and D-PASS of recordings for 
interviews with members of the Rounsaville family or, for that matter, other 
knowledgeable witnesses which could have included the classmate guests who were 
also members of the 1980 sexual offense by Gene Rounsaville at the slumber 
party. Obviously, if nothing was recorded, nothing can be produced. I reject 
implicitly and explicitly the broad absolution of this majority that 
investigating officers do not, at least under the Wyoming Constitution, have a 
participative responsibility to provide due process in the investigation of a 
person to be charged with a crime. People v. Pope, 724 P.2d 1323 (Colo. 1986). I 
do not excuse apparent negligence to necessarily deny violation of the 
defendant's right to due process of law. State v. Leslie, 147 Ariz. 38, 708 P.2d 719 (1985). This court serves to assure due process and justice and not just to 
explain how a questionable conviction can be justified by excuses for 
affirmation. Neither Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S. Ct. 333, 102 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1988), reh'g denied ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 885, 102 L. Ed. 2d 1007 
(1989) nor other recent United States Supreme Court decisions serve to repeal 
the Wyoming Constitution or to justify the decision presented here.28[fn28] Although different as 
relating to interrogation of a suspect instead of the complainants, I would 
follow the due process ideal of Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985) 
and not the legislature's approval of People v. Everette, 187 Ill. App.3d 1063, 
135 Ill.Dec. 472, 543 N.E.2d 1040 (1989) and State v. Gorton, 149 Vt. 602, 548 A.2d 419 (1988). To record is to preserve for future certainty. Stephan, 711 P.2d 1156. The problem in this case was magnified since not only was documentary 
evidence not available to the defense, but the record reflects an active program 
in school and D-PASS to assure non-availability of witnesses for interviews by 
representatives of Dr. Gale for his trial preparation. The State should not have 
denied access to witnesses. Sosebee v. State, 190 Ga. App. 746, 380 S.E.2d 464, 
cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 323, 107 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1989).

X. CONCLUSION

[¶170] Due process, equal protection and fairness have 
not been served in this proceeding which ended with conviction. Consequently, I 
dissent. 

FOOTNOTES

1 The rationale used by 
the Ballard and Russel courts in the mid-1960's has been the subject of some 
strong criticism since it was established. The California legislature passed a 
statute in 1980 legislatively overriding the reasoning set forth in Ballard. See 
California Penal Code § 1112 (West 1985). A number of state appellate courts 
have openly refused to adopt the holdings in Ballard and Russel because they 
perceive the cases to be based upon the sexist assumption that the 
uncorroborated testimony of a sexual assault victim is necessarily less 
believable and must be confirmed by psychiatric examination, or more simply 
stated, "most sexual assault victims must be crazy." See, e.g., State v. R.W., 
104 N.J. 14, 514 A.2d 1287, 1291 (1986); and State v. Looney, 294 N.C. 1, 240 S.E.2d 612, 622 (1978). The Wyoming legislature has specifically disavowed any 
requirement that a sexual assault victim's testimony must be corroborated for 
sufficient evidence to exist to sustain a sexual assault conviction. W.S. 
6-4-312 (1977); Heinrich v. State, 638 P.2d 641, 646 (Wyo. 1981).

2 In Ritchie the Court 
stated:

This Court has never 
squarely held that the Compulsory Process Clause guarantees the right to 
discover the identity of a witness, or to require the Government to produce 
exculpatory evidence. Instead the Court traditionally has evaluated claims such 
as those raised by Ritchie under the broader protections of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the applicability of the Sixth 
Amendment to this type of case is unsettled, and because our Fourteenth 
Amendment precedents addressing the fundamental fairness of trials establish a 
clear framework for review, we adopt a due process analysis for purposes of this 
case. Although we conclude that compulsory process provides no greater 
protections in this area than those afforded by due process, we need not decide 
today whether and how the guarantees of the Compulsory Process Clause differ 
from those of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is enough to conclude that on these 
facts, Ritchie's claims more properly are considered by reference to due 
process.

Ritchie, 480 U.S.  at 56, 
107 S. Ct.  at 1001, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 56-57. (citations omitted).

3 Note the Court's 
statement in footnote 14 that it was not expressing any opinion concerning the 
balance it might strike when the state statute creating the privilege would not 
allow for a court ordered disclosure. Ritchie, 480 U.S.  at 57, 107 S. Ct.  at 
1002, 94 L. Ed. 2d  at 56 n. 14. This is a significant factual distinction which 
has created different results when the statute involved creates an "absolute" 
privilege. Cf. People v. Foggy, 121 Ill. 2d 337, 118 Ill.Dec. 18, 22, 521 N.E.2d 86, 90 (1988); Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa. Super. 484, 533 A.2d 120, 129 
(1987).

4 In Bagley, the Court 
discussed three scenarios that can exist when the prosecution's obligations 
under Brady come into play. It then articulated the constitutional standard of 
materiality to be applied in those three situations. The Court explained that 
the defendant might not make any request for Brady material, or that the 
defendant might make a "general" or a "specific" request for material it 
believed to be in the prosecution's possession. After explaining these three 
situations the Court stated:

The Court has relied on 
and reformulated the Agurs standard for the materiality of undisclosed evidence 
in two subsequent cases arising outside the Brady context. In neither case did 
the Court's discussion of the Agurs standard distinguish among the three 
situations described in Agurs. In United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 874, 102 S. Ct. 3440, 3450, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1193 (1982), the Court held that due 
process is violated when testimony is made unavailable to the defense by 
Government deportation of witnesses "only if there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the testimony could have affected the judgment of the trier of fact." And 
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 
(1984), the Court held that a new trial must be granted when evidence is not 
introduced because of the incompetence of counsel only if "there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct.  at 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. The Strickland Court defined a "reasonable probability" as "a probability 
sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome." Ibid.

We find the Strickland 
formulation of the Agurs test for materiality sufficiently flexible to cover the 
"no request," "general request," and "specific request" cases of prosecutorial 
failure to disclose evidence favorable to the accused: The evidence is material 
only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed 
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 
"reasonable probability" is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome.

Id., 473 U.S.  at 681-82, 
105 S. Ct.  at 3383, 87 L. Ed. 2d  at 493-94. (emphasis added).

5 See U.S. Const. amend. 
VI and XIV; and Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 6 and 10.

6 Codified as amended at 
W.S. 16-4-203 (Cum. Supp. 1988).

 

FOOTNOTES for the 
Dissent

1 The legal basis for the 
entry of this immunity from prosecution is not established nor discussed. See 
Hennigan v. State, 746 P.2d 360 (Wyo. 1987) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting). Nothing 
about this case is pretty, and certainly not the conduct of any of the 
participants. When Linda Rounsaville was initially interviewed in 1986 about 
Gene Rounsaville's current sexual abuse charges involving the children, her 
immediate response was:

"`[W]hat do you want me 
to say? That my husband is * * * my children?' * * * `[Y]es, I believe that he 
has touched my kids in the past.'"

2 This is one of two 
exhibits hand-drawn by the children during the trial and neither provide 
clarification of size. At no time was either parent more than twenty to thirty 
feet from the children when the sexual assault events were alleged to have 
occurred. It was stated they occurred, in part, after D-17 "alerted" her 
step-father that Dr. Gale was a visitor to this well-occupied living facility 
(two parents and six children).

3 All of the children 
testified they knew the meeting had occurred, although D-17 stated she was 
present. The younger children were in school and were told about the meeting by 
their older sister. D-17 said she was not in school, but had been baby-sitting 
that morning since it was a holiday. It was not a holiday, but apparently her 
school had not yet started. She had been called home from the neighbor's house 
where she was baby-sitting to attend the mid-morning meeting with Dr. Gale when 
he had returned to get his hat. If the meeting did happen as testified, Gene 
Rounsaville had the capacity to be working at the mine while at the same time 
drinking in town and to then return to his residence to be present for an 
unscheduled meeting with Dr. Gale who happened to return to retrieve his 
hat.

4 For example, I reject 
denied access for Dr. Gale to secure properly supervised interviews with the 
complainants and certainly his insulation from any contact with welfare agency 
workers and school officials. People v. Russel, 69 Cal. 2d 187, 70 Cal. Rptr. 210, 
443 P.2d 794, cert. denied 393 U.S. 864, 89 S. Ct. 145, 21 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1968). 
Availability and justification should be a question of exercised discretion 
based on validity, relevancy and materiality. If there is no real issue, there 
is no particularized justification for usage. Any rational review of this record 
authenticates, in the midst of these confounding questions of validity, clear 
doubt of anything wrongfully done by Dr. Gale or probative of a criminal act by 
him. Full factual investigation for trial presentation was crucially important. 
The rules of logic and scientific knowledge of chaos teach that anything can 
happen, no matter how improbable. Improbability teaches that it likely did not 
occur. Here, probability outweighs chaos.

5 In this case, the 
decision made by the trial court may have been discretionary, but clearly unfair 
to the defendant. The search for truth seems lost wherein:

The Court has, first, 
decided in its discretion that it is not appropriate in this case to require 
these minor children to submit to the trauma of undergoing the indignity of a 
psychiatric examination. I do not find that there is any compelling reason for 
it in this case. The trauma attending the role of these minor complainants in 
sex offense prosecution would be sharply increased by the indignity of a 
psychiatric examination, the examination itself might serve as a tool of 
harassment and, if granted routinely, such request might well deter victims from 
lodging any complaint at all.

* * * * * *

In discussing the 
disclosure of psychiatric records sought by the defendant's motion, there has 
not been shown to exist any such psychiatric examinations or records to this 
Court up to this time. I will simply repeat what I have said earlier, that under 
the due process clause this Court recognizes that the State has the obligation 
to turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the accused 
and material to guilt or punishment, but there is no general constitutional 
right to discovery in a criminal case and the Brady case did not create one. 
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, supra [480 U.S. 39, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 
(1987)]. In any event, should it be brought to the Court's attention that there 
are psychiatric records of the minor complainants in this case, the Court will 
consider them in camera as it has the other confidential information sought by 
defendant to determine their materiality.

6 Another non-sequitur is 
conjecture of possible refusal by the complainants to participate in the 
examination. That issue was not reached and is at best ephemeral in the context 
of the juvenile proceedings and admitted sexual abuse by Gene Rounsaville on his 
children with complicity by Linda Rounsaville. See Ballard, 49 Cal. Rptr.  at 313, 
410 P.2d  at 849, which states "[t]he complaining witness should not, and 
realistically cannot, be forced to submit to a psychiatric examination or to 
cooperate with a psychiatrist. In the event that the witness thus refuses to 
cooperate, however, a comment on that refusal should be permitted." See, 
however, Butler, 143 A.2d 530.

It 
is also disturbing to see the decision rested by citation on the effect of the 
children of a psychiatric evaluation in relation to the sloganistic law journal 
article. If justice is the search for truth, where do we position this decade 
long course of sexual abuse of the children by Gene Rounsaville, including 
admittedly more recent abuse than this present event and then prosecutorial 
absolution when an investigation was finally commenced? I do question, even 
today, whether the deals were validly made and whether prosecution can still be 
pursued if, in fact, justice demands punishment for criminal conduct. Clearly, 
no statutory basis for the immunity existed. The only statutory provision for a 
grant of immunity in Wyoming is provided for drug case prosecutions. W.S. 
35-7-1043.

7 Directly converse 
positions which consider the fair trial and due process rights of the accused 
against rights of privacy are noted in Comment, Psychiatric Testimony for the 
Impeachment of Witnesses in Sex Cases, 39 J.Crim.L. & Criminology 750, 751 
(1949):

Unfortunately, the 
present rules of evidence hinder rather than aid a proper inquiry into the 
veracity of complaints about sexual misconduct. These rules are usually adequate 
and appropriate in the ordinary case, but there are certain factors in sex cases 
which require a relaxation of the common law exclusionary rules respecting 
evidence as to character. Adequately probing the truth of a complaint against a 
man charged with a sexual crime is difficult when the charge may stem from the 
psychic complexes of the female complainant.

The 
author in O'Neale, Court Ordered Psychiatric Examination of a Rape Victim in a 
Criminal Rape Prosecution - Or How Many Times Must a Woman Be Raped?, 18 Santa 
Clara L.Rev. 119, 119-20 (1978) said:

Initially, this article 
provides an overview of the present law governing the use of psychiatric 
evidence in rape cases, focusing on California's experience. After developing 
this overview, the article demonstrates that the court ordered psychiatric 
examination is merely one of a host of special procedures utilized by the legal 
system in sex offense cases. Then, the article explores the key role traditional 
attitudes have played in the formulation of the present law, and exposes the 
lack of foundation for these attitudes given the current realities of rape 
prosecution. Since these attitudes have little or no basis in reality, the 
article concludes that the use of psychiatric examinations based on such 
assumptions should be severely restricted, if not abandoned.

Other views on the 
subject are to be found in Juviler, Psychiatric Opinions as to Credibility of 
Witnesses: A Suggested Approach, 48 Calif.L. Rev. 648 (1960); Comment, Pre-trial 
Psychiatric Examination as Proposed Means for Testing the Complainant's 
Competency to Allege a Sex Offense, 1957 U.Ill.L.F. 651 (1957); Comment, 
Psychiatric Evaluation of the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 59 Yale L.J. 1324 
(1950); and Recent Case, Criminal Law. Psychiatric Aid in Evaluating the 
Credibility of a Prosecuting Witness Charging Rape, 26 Ind.L.J. 98 
(1950).

Clearly, the justice 
delivery system has advanced for a rational access to actual facts since Union 
Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 11 S. Ct. 1000, 35 L. Ed. 734 (1891), where 
a physical examination in advance of trial was denied. See F.R.C.P. 35 (W.R.C.P. 
35).

8 That court, however, 
noted that "[o]bviously, there are types of sex offenses, notably incest, in 
which, by the very nature of the charge, there is grave danger of completely 
false accusations by young girls of innocent appearance but unsound minds, 
susceptible to sexual fantasies and possessed of malicious, vengeful spirits." 
Looney, 240 S.E.2d  at 622. Justice Exum, in concurrence, indicated:

As have most of the 
well-considered decisions on the subject, to which the majority refers, I would 
conclude that our trial judges have the power, to be carefully used in the 
exercise of their sound discretion, to order in appropriate circumstances the 
psychiatric examination of any witness as a condition to receiving the testimony 
of that witness. In this case the denial of defendant's motion for such an 
examination was well within the discretion of the trial judge and should not be 
held for error.

As the majority wisely 
recognizes the witness' rights must be given due consideration. Defendant should 
be required to make a strong showing that the witness' mental make-up is such 
that a psychiatric examination would probably reveal either that the witness is 
incompetent or that the witness' credibility may be subject to serious question. 
Situations calling for the entry of such an order would, it seems, be rare 
indeed. But if called for, our judges should have the power to enter the 
order.

Id. 
at 628.

9 References in the 
testimony about the work schedule of Gene Rounsaville, in accord with the 
witness called by Dr. Gale, demonstrated it was not possible for Rounsaville to 
have attended a meeting with Dr. Gale on the morning of August 30. This 
uncontroverted testimony destroys the credibility of the dating for the entire 
occurrence.

MS. PATTON: Yes, Your 
Honor. The state would like to recall Mr. Gene Rounsaville for a matter of 
correction, and I will need to go downstairs to get him.

MR. MARKS: May we 
approach the bench, Your Honor?

THE COURT: 
Yes.

(The following 
proceedings had at the bench, outside the hearing of the jury.)

MS. PATTON: Your Honor, I 
found out that his work record for August, 1985, indicates that he was at work 
on the 29th, that he was not at work on the 30th, and there's no apparent 
explanation for that. I believe it's appropriate to correct the record, rather 
than being accused of withholding exculpatory material.

THE COURT: What's your 
position if Mr. Rounsaville is recalled for that purpose?

MR. MARKS: If I 
understand what you are saying, is that on the 29th, in the morning, he was at 
work, and on the 30th he was home. The next day he was home, is that what you 
are saying?

MS. PATTON: Well, it's 
not real clear. The cards indicated that on the 29th he was working the 
graveyard shift, and on the 30th he was not.

Now I don't want it to 
come up that we knew and didn't let you have that. He testified that he didn't 
really know what day it was.

MR. MARKS: I definitely 
want that in. If they don't want to call him and put that in, I will call 
him.

THE COURT: Let me ask you 
before we do that, can you find - in other words, I don't want the jury 
confused. I don't know when he worked on the 29th, whether it would be from 
midnight to 8 a.m. on the 29th, or he didn't work the midnight shift. I don't 
know whether that occurred from midnight the 29th through 8 a.m. on the 30th, 
whatever it was on the 30th. I want you to ascertain that from the custodian of 
the records and not leave it hanging. I think it should come in at some point. I 
am taking an extra half hour at noon for Mr. Hayden, and perhaps between the two 
of you, you can get the work record and can get somebody, the custodian of the 
record, to tie it in.

MS. PATTON: We have 
copies.

THE COURT: Can you find 
somebody to verify it? You said it was confusing.

MR. GEER: Your Honor, I 
believe that we can obtain testimony, not within a few minutes, but within a 
couple of hours.

THE COURT: Mr. Geer 
thinks he can have the verification, and then if you want to recall him, we will 
leave it that way.

MR. MARKS: Do you have 
another witness?

MS. PATTON: That's the 
problem. I was going to rest.

The 
evidence by the employer witness, Larry Maier, established that Gene Rounsaville 
worked the midnight shift Thursday, August 29th (11:30 p.m. to 7:30 a.m.) and 
the daylight morning shift Friday, August 30th (7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.). 
Consequently, he was at work at the mine at the time that he testified that the 
morning meeting with Dr. Gale occurred following the 2:00 a.m. incident. 
Apparently this exchange first revealed to the prosecution that the witness had 
lied. There was no rebuttal testimony conflict with the employer's records and, 
consequently, without cross-examination or rebuttal, the testimony is not in 
dispute that Gene Rounsaville could not have attended a meeting on August 30th 
because he was at work at the coal mine. Furthermore, it was established that 
his schedule for that time had been predetermined and, contrary to the 
intimation of the prosecution, there was no basis upon which he could have 
expected to have worked the night before when the events were alleged to have 
occurred. D-17 testified she was present when Dr. Gale came back in the morning. 
D-10 admitted she was not present and all she knew was what she had been told by 
either D-17 or her mother. D-7 thought it was winter, but she was not there the 
next morning. All she knew was what was told to her by D-17. Why the family 
testified to a meeting that did not occur authenticates the entire philosophy 
upon which discovery is founded so that exculpatory information will not be 
hidden. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974); 
Giglio, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S. Ct. 763; Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194; Pitchess 
v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 113 Cal. Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305 (1974).

10 A large amount of 
information can be obtained from a comprehensive review of the in camera 
documents by comparison with what was revealed with question remaining about the 
"completeness" of production. It is obvious, for example, that the school 
district did not "create" records for documentation of sexual abuse reporting 
and that either their documents were destroyed or the school district had a 
telephone only file policy so that it could remain hidden from identification 
beyond its reporting responsibilities. We know that the school authorities 
reported, but the school records do not report that they did. It is also 
apparent that the decision of non-prosecution by the county attorney, not only 
for the incest but the sexual offenses committed on other children as well as 
the rape of D-17, is sanitized by non-inclusion of documents that clearly did 
exist before removal from the D-PASS files. Any record that would explain 
decisions to forego prosecution of Gene Rounsaville for sexual assault on three 
(or five) of his children as a seven year course of events to chase one 
questionable event against the dentist, where obvious date disputes exist, is 
also undisclosed.

Comprehensive review of 
the school records provides an interesting conclusion. There is absolutely 
nothing provided about the school district personnel contacts with D-PASS or 
other public agency as showing involvement of its personnel in accord to 
reporting responsibilities for the Rounsaville family incest problems. D-PASS 
records at least show contact with school personnel, but the school provided, in 
the non-disclosed in camera records, no evidence of contacts and no 
documents.

In 
fairness to the trial court, present review of the total documentation, not once 
but at least four times, without an absolute time limitation for completion and 
by careful comparison of obvious trial and preliminary hearing perjury of the 
Rounsaville family provides a different opportunity from what was available 
pretrial within the in camera review.

11 To be repetitive, any 
requests for documentation made by Dr. Gale related to offenses committed upon 
the Rounsaville children by their father and if any documentation relates to Dr. 
Gale, except a few investigative summaries, such information is not now here and 
remained undisclosed for the in camera inspection by the judge.

12 Privilege and 
confidentiality, when applied to communications or records, have been used 
interchangeably but have a different linguistic derivation. Confidentiality 
refers to the secrecy or non-public nature of the document. Privilege relates to 
the status of the actor as exempted, excluded or not-accountable. See W. Burton, 
Legal Thesaurus 99, 407 (1980). Cf. Black's Law Dictionary 269, 1077 (5th ed. 
1979).

13 I do not understand the 
majority discussion about the existence of juvenile court proceedings. 
Obviously, there were not only pleadings and file documents, a few of which 
found their way into this record, but transcripts of all proceedings before the 
trial court as required by court rules. There would also be a tape recording of 
the county court appearance of Gene Rounsaville at his preliminary hearing when 
he was initially charged with the incest-sexual abuse offenses by one or more of 
the children, whichever it may have been. Since existence of the seven year 
course of offenses is realistically unquestionable on this record, his perjury 
at that appearance with probably that of other members of the family, if any 
testified, must also exist.

We 
play unbecoming and avoidance games to question whether the prosecution has 
copies of the juvenile records, the existence of which cannot be doubted since 
samples are to be found in this record as witnessed by the petition, 
stating:

COMES NOW * * *, Deputy 
Campbell County and Prosecuting Attorney, and hereby petitions and states to the 
court that the above named minor children are subject to the jurisdiction of 
this court as follows:

1. [D-17], is a minor 
child of the age of seventeen (17) years, having been born on August 20, 
1969.

2. [S-11], is a minor 
child of the age of eleveen [sic] (11) years, having been born on April 9, 
1975.

3. [D-10], is a minor 
child of the age of ten (10) years, having been born on April 5, 
1976.

4. [D-7], is a minor 
child of the age of seven (7) year[s], having been born on February 2, 
1979.

5. [D2-3], is a minor 
child of the age of three (3) years, having been born on June 22, 
1983.

6. [D1-3], is a minor 
child of the age of three (3) years, having been born on June 22, 
1983.

7. That the father of the 
minor children is Elmer Jean "Gene" Rounsaville, who resides at # 12 Silver 
Hills, Rozet, Campbell County, Wyoming.

8. That the mother of the 
minor children is Linda Sue Rounsaville, who resides at # 12 Silver Hills, 
Rozet, Campbell County, Wyoming.

9. That the minor 
children are currently in protective custody of the Campbell County Department 
of Public Assistance and Social Services in Gillette, Campbell County, 
Wyoming.

10. The above named minor 
children are subject to the jurisdiction of this court pursuant to Wyoming 
Statute § 14-6-203(a)(i), in that they are neglected child[ren] as defined by 
Wyoming Statute § 14-6-201(a)(xvi)(B), in that they have been abused by the 
inflicting or causing of physical or mental injury, harm or imminent danger to 
the physical or mental health or welfare of the children other than by 
accidental means, to wit: the infliction of excessive or unreasonable corporal 
punishment by the father, "Gene" Rounsaville; the commission of a sexual offense 
against one or more of the children by the father "Gene" Rounsaville, and the 
allowing of the commission of a sexual offense against one or more of the 
children by their mother, Linda Sue Rounsaville.

11. FOR PROBABLE CAUSE: 
On November 17, 1986, Investigator Monty Trenary, of the Campbell County 
Sheriff's Office and Terry Waldorf, a social worker for the Campbell County 
Department, of Public Assistance and Social Services, met at the Rozet School to 
interview [D-7], a minor child, pursuant to a complaint that she had been 
sexually molested by her father, "Gene" Rounsaville. The minor, who is 7 years 
old, told Inv. Trenary and Mrs. Waldorf that her father had begun sexually 
molesting her when she was approximately 5 years old, and the latest incident 
was on or about October 28, 1986. The minor said that she had been sleeping in a 
room with her 11 year old brother when her father came into the bedroom and 
pulled down her bed covers. He then began rubbing her vaginal area for a while, 
and then left the bedroom. The minor was uncertain if her father placed his 
finger inside of her vagina, because he had touched her so much in the past she 
can't recall the times he did or didn't. The minor also indicated that when her 
father molested her in the past, he has told her that he would "kill her" if she 
ever told anyone. The minor's brother, [S-11], also witnessed the sexual assault 
on the evening of October 28, 1986.

Further investigation by 
Inv. Trenary and Mrs. Waldorf have revealed an extensive history of physical and 
sexual abuse upon the children by their father, and a passive acceptance of it 
by their mother. Mrs. Waldorf has obtained documented reports from the 
Department of Public Assistance and Social Services dating back to 1980 
involving excessive corporal punishment and possible sexual abuse by Mr. 
Rounsaville. The corporal punishment on the children has taken the form of 
beatings with coat hangers as well as leather straps. Additionally, Mr. 
Rounsaville has been known to fire weapons inside the home and was reported to 
have placed a gun against his wife[']s head.

[D-17], age 17, has 
reported an extensive history of being sexually abused by her father, beginning 
when she was 8 years old. [D-17] also indicated that when she was 9 years old 
her mother witnessed an incident of sexual molestation, but instead blamed 
[D-17] for it. At one point [D-17] indicated that her mother sent her to her 
aunt[']s home in Utah as punishment for being responsible for the sexual 
molestation. Upon her return, her father molested her once again. [D-17] also 
reported that he younger sister [D-7], age 7, had been molested by her father in 
early 1982. [D-17] told her mother about it at that time and her mother than 
[sic] confronted her father. Mr. Rounsaville admitted to having molested [D-17], 
but denied molesting any of the other girls or their friends. [D-17] also 
reported that when she was approximately 9 or 10 years of age, her father took 
nude photographs of her. When her mother discovered the photographs, she accused 
[D-17] of "being bad" and then burned the photos.

12. The above described 
events occurred in Campbell County, Wyoming.

13. * * * has been 
appointed guardian ad litem for said minor children.

WHEREFORE, your 
petitioner prays that [t]his matter be set for hearing and for such other 
proceedings as may be proper in this matter.

DATED this 18 day of 
November, 1986.

/s/ __________________ * 
* *

Deputy Campbell County 
Attorney

I, * * *, Deputy Campbell 
County Attorney being first duly sworn state that I am the petitioner in the 
foregoing matter; that I have read the foregoing petition, know and understand 
the contents and that the statements made therein are true.

/s/ __________________ * 
* *

Deputy Campbell County 
Attorney

Subscribed and sworn to 
before me this 18 day of November, 1986.

/s/ __________________ 
NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission Expires: 
Aug. 15, 1988

14 The three scenario 
analysis of Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S. Ct. 3375 as directed to knowing use of 
perjured testimony, Napue, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S. Ct. 1173 and Mooney, 294 U.S. 103, 
55 S. Ct. 340; specific request of defense and prosecutorial failure to disclose 
responsive evidence, Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194; and thirdly, that 
defendant does not make a Brady request and prosecutor fails to volunteer 
favorable information, Agurs, 427 U.S.  at 112, 96 S. Ct.  at 2401 are only 
applicable here if the psychiatric or psychological records do exist and the 
examination of the contents by the prosecutor had occurred so that whatever 
relevant information might exist was consequently undisclosed. United States v. 
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 874, 102 S. Ct. 3440, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1193 (1982), 
alien witness deportation; Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 
ineffectiveness of counsel. See however, Giglio, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S. Ct. 763, 
where false information was provided by prosecutor.

15 Having now read and 
re-read the testimony of clinical social worker Geral Blanchard as the 
prosecution's wind-up witness (B.A. in sociology and anthropology and a minor in 
psychology), I can understand the reluctance of the prosecution to provide a 
pretrial basis for expert witness classification and summary of testimony. It is 
not raised as an appellate issue, but I cannot find anything pertinent, relevant 
or material but a generalized discussion clearly directed to provide an umbrella 
of reliability to the testimony of the children, although not so directly done 
as in Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60 (Wyo. 1989). I would challenge the entire 
testimony of the social worker as essentially directed to bolster credibility 
and provide an atmosphere of believability of guilt. State v. York, 564 A.2d 389 
(Me. 1989).

Lacking appropriate trial 
objection and non-inclusion as an issue on appeal, we can only fairly consider 
undisclosed text and consequent inadequate preparation. An in limine attack on 
the entire scope of testimony should have been made to directly raise the 
credibility bolstering character of what was then said at trial. See York, 564 A.2d 389. Neither caution in admissibility nor relevance in receipt is apparent 
here. Myers, Bays, Becker, Berliner, Corwin & Saywitz, supra, 68 Neb.L.Rev. 
1. Cf. State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 564 A.2d 626 (1989), when undenied by 
defendant. This type of evidence is in a twilight zone where the witness should 
have special skill and knowledge to make their testimony information helpful to 
the jury.

16 Excluding the one 
defensive effort in the abused spouse homicide cases, the use of experts in 
these cases are predominantly limited to prosecutorial advantage. Examination of 
the criminal opinions nationwide for just one week might reveal fifteen to 
twenty appellate reviews where use of the rape offense expert is noteworthy in 
discussion. Prosecution by forensic specialist is not unobserved in Wyoming. See 
Brown, 736 P.2d 1110 and Scadden, 732 P.2d 1036 as non-exclusive 
examples.

17 (a) Defendant's 
statement; report of examinations and tests; defendant's grand jury 
testimony. - Upon motion of a defendant, the court may order the attorney 
for the state to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph any 
relevant:

(1) Written or recorded 
statements or confessions made by the defendant or copies thereof, within the 
possession, custody or control of the state, the existence of which is known, or 
by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the prosecuting 
attorney;

(2) Results of reports of 
physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments made in 
connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the possession, 
custody or control of the state, the existence of which is known, or by the 
exercise of due diligence may become known, to the prosecuting attorney; 
and

(3) Recorded testimony of 
a defendant before a grand jury.

(b) Other books, 
papers, documents, tangible objects or places. - Upon motion of a defendant 
the court may order the prosecuting attorney to permit the defendant to inspect 
and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, tangible objects, buildings or 
places, or copies or portions thereof, which are within the possession, custody 
or control of the state, upon a showing of the materiality to the preparation of 
his defense, and that the request is reasonable. Except as provided in 
subdivision (a)(2) this rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection of 
reports, memoranda or other internal governmental documents made by governmental 
agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case, or of 
statements made by state witnesses or prospective state witnesses (other than 
the defendant) to governmental agents except as provided in subdivision (c) of 
this rule.

(c) Demands for 
production of statements and reports of witnesses.

(1) After a witness 
called by the state has testified on direct examination, the court shall, on 
motion of the defendant, order the state to produce any statement (as 
hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the state which relates 
to subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the entire contents 
of any such statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the 
witness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for 
his examination and use.

(2) If the state claims 
that any statement ordered to be produced under this subdivision contains matter 
which does not relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the 
court shall order the state to deliver such statement for the inspection of the 
court in camera. Upon such delivery the court shall excise the portions of such 
statement which do not relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the 
witness. With such material excised, the court shall then direct delivery of 
such statement to the defendant for his use. If, pursuant to such procedure, any 
portion of such statement is withheld from the defendant and the defendant 
objects to such withholding, and the trial is continued to the adjudication of 
the guilt of the defendant, the entire text of such statement shall be preserved 
by the state, and in event the defendant appeals, shall be made available to the 
appellate court for the purpose of determining the correctness of the ruling of 
the trial judge. Whenever any statement is delivered to the defendant pursuant 
to this rule, the court in its discretion, upon application of the defendant, 
may recess proceedings in the trial for such time as it may determine to be 
reasonably required for the examination of such statement by said defendant in 
his preparation for its use in the trial.

(3) If the state elects 
not to comply with an order of the court under subdivision (1) or (2) hereof to 
deliver to the defendant any such statement or such portion thereof as the court 
may direct, the court shall strike from the record the testimony of the witness 
and the trial shall proceed unless the court in its discretion shall determine 
that the interests of justice require that a mistrial be declared.

(4) The term "statement" 
as used in subdivisions (1) and (2) and (3) of this rule relating to any witness 
called by the state, means:

(a) A written statement 
made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him; 
or

(b) A stenographic, 
mechanical, electrical or other recording or a transcription thereof, which is a 
substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said witness to an 
agent of the state and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral 
statement.

(d) Discovery by the 
state. - If the court grants relief sought by the defendant under subdivision 
(a)(2) or subdivision (b) of this rule, it may, on motion of the state, 
condition its order by requiring that the defendant permit the state to inspect 
and copy or photograph scientific or medical reports, books, papers, documents, 
tangible objects or copies or portions thereof, which the defendant intends to 
produce at the trial and which are within his possession, custody or control, 
upon a showing of materiality to the preparation of the state's case, and that 
the request is reasonable. Except as to scientific or medical reports, this 
subdivision does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda 
or other internal defense documents made by the defendant or his attorneys or 
agents in connection with the investigation or defense of the case, or 
statements made by the defendant, or by state or defense witnesses, or by 
prospective state or defense witnesses, to the defendant, his agents or 
attorneys.

(e) Time, place and 
manner of discovery and inspection. - An order of the court granting relief 
under this rule shall specify the time and place and manner of making the 
discovery and inspection permitted and may prescribe such terms and conditions 
as are just.

(f) Protective orders. - 
Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that the discovery or 
inspection be denied, restricted or deferred, or make such other order as is 
appropriate. Upon motion by the state the court may permit the state to make 
such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be 
inspected by the court in camera. If the court enters an order granting relief 
following a showing in camera, the entire text of the statement shall be sealed 
and preserved in the record of the court to be made available to the appellate 
court in the event of an appeal by the defendant.

(g) Time of motions. - 
The motion under this rule may be made only within ten (10) days after 
arraignment or at such reasonable later time as the court may permit. The motion 
shall include all relief sought under this rule. A subsequent motion may be made 
only upon a showing of cause why such motion would be in the interest of 
justice.

(h) Continuing duty to 
disclose; failure to comply. - If subsequent to compliance with an order issued 
pursuant to this rule, and prior to or during trial, a party discovers 
additional material previously requested or ordered which is subject to 
discovery or inspection under the rule, he shall promptly notify the other party 
or his attorney or the court of the existence of the additional material. If at 
any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of 
the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule or with an order 
issued pursuant to this rule, the court may order such party to permit discovery 
or inspection of materials not previously disclosed, grant a continuance or 
prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, or 
it may enter such other order as it deems just under the 
circumstances.

W.R.Cr.P. 18.

18 At any time after the 
filing of the indictment or information the court upon motion of any party or 
upon its own motion may order one (1) or more conferences to consider such 
matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. At the conclusion of a 
conference the court shall prepare and file a memorandum of the matters agreed 
upon. No admissions made by the defendant or his attorney at the conference 
shall be used against the defendant unless the admissions are reduced to writing 
and signed by the defendant and his attorney. This rule shall not be invoked in 
the case of a defendant who is not represented by counsel.

W.R.Cr.P. 19.

19 (a) Notice by 
defendant. - Upon written demand of the attorney for the state stating the 
time, date, and place at which the alleged offense was committed, the defendant 
shall serve within ten (10) days, or at such different time as the court may 
direct, upon the attorney for the state a written notice of his intention to 
offer a defense of alibi. Such notice by the defendant shall state the specific 
place or places at which the defendant claims to have been at the time of the 
alleged offense and the names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom he 
intends to rely to establish such alibi.  
Such notice by the defendant shall state the specific place or places at 
which the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and 
the names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom he intends to rely to 
establish such alibi.

(b) 
Disclosure of information and witness. - Within ten (10) days thereafter, 
but in no event less than ten (10) days before trial, unless the court otherwise 
directs, the attorney for the state shall serve upon the defendant or his 
attorney a written notice stating the names and addresses of the witnesses upon 
whom the state intends to rely to establish the defendant's presence at the 
scene of the alleged offense and any other witnesses to be relied on to rebut 
testimony of any of the defendant's alibi witnesses.

(c) 
Continuing duty to disclose. - If prior to or during trial, a party 
learns of an additional witness whose identity, if known, should have been 
included in the information furnished under subdivision (a) or (b) the party 
shall promptly notify the other party or his attorney of the existence and 
identity of such additional witness.

(d) 
Failure to comply. - Upon the failure of either party to comply with the 
requirements of this rule, the court may exclude the testimony of any 
undisclosed witness offered by such party as to the defendant's absence from or 
presence at, the scene of the alleged offense. This rule shall not limit the 
right of the defendant to testify in his own behalf.

(e) 
Exceptions. - For good cause shown, the court may grant an exception to 
any of the requirements of subdivisions (a) through (d) of this 
rule.

(f) 
Inadmissibility of withdrawn alibi. - Evidence of an intention to rely 
upon an alibi defense, later withdrawn, or of statements made in connection with 
such intention, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against 
the person who gave notice of the intention. W.R.Cr.P. 
16.1.

20 (a) Notice by defendant. - 
Upon written demand of the attorney for the state, stating the time, date, and 
place at which the alleged offense was committed, the defendant shall serve 
within ten (10) days, or at such different time as the court may direct, upon 
the attorney for the state, a written notice of his intention to offer a defense 
of unconsciousness, automatism, or traumatic automatism. Such notice by the 
defendant shall state with particularity the facts upon which the defendant 
relies to justify the defense of unconsciousness, automatism, or traumatic 
automatism and the names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom he intends to 
rely to establish such defense.

(b) Examination of 
defendant. - Upon the filing of such notice by the defendant, the court 
shall order an examination of the defendant by a designated examiner. A written 
report of such examination shall be filed with the clerk of court, and the 
report shall include detailed findings and an opinion of the examiner as to 
whether the accused did suffer from unconsciousness, automatism, or traumatic 
automatism at the time of the alleged offense. The clerk of court shall deliver 
copies of the report to the attorney for the state and the accused or his 
counsel.

(c) Disclosure of 
information and witness. - Within ten (10) days after the examiner's report 
is served upon him, but in no event not less than ten (10) days before trial 
unless the court otherwise directs, the attorney for the state shall serve upon 
the defendant or his attorney a written notice stating the names and addresses 
of the witnesses upon whom the state intends to rely to establish that the 
defendant did not, at the time of the alleged offense, suffer from 
unconsciousness, automatism, or traumatic automatism and any other witnesses, to 
be relied upon to rebut testimony of any of the defendant's witnesses relating 
to such a defense.

(d) Continuing duty to 
disclose. - If prior to or during trial, a party learns of an additional 
witness whose identity, if known, should have been included in the information 
furnished under subdivision (a) or (b) the party shall promptly notify the other 
party or his attorney of the existence and identity of such additional 
witness.

(e) Failure to 
comply. - Upon the failure of either party to comply with the requirements 
of this rule, the court may exclude the testimony of any undisclosed witness 
offered by such party as to the defense of unconsciousness, automatism, or 
traumatic automatism. This rule shall not limit the right of the defendant to 
testify on his own behalf.

(f) Exceptions. - 
For good cause shown, the court may grant an exception to any of the 
requirements of subdivisions (a) through (e) of this rule.

(g) Inadmissibility of 
withdrawn defense. - Evidence of an intention to rely upon the defense of 
unconsciousness, automatism, or traumatic automatism later withdrawn, or of 
statements made in connection with such intention, is not, in any civil or 
criminal proceeding, admissible against the person who gave notice of the 
intention.

W.R.Cr.P. 16.2.

21 (a) When taken. - If it 
appears that a prospective witness may be unable to attend or prevented from 
attending a trial or hearing, that his testimony is material and that it is 
necessary to take his deposition in order to prevent a failure of justice, the 
court at any time after the filing of an indictment or information may upon 
motion of any party and notice to the other parties order that his testimony be 
taken by deposition and that any designated books, papers or documents or 
tangible objects, not privileged, be produced at the same time and place. If a 
witness is committed for failure to give bail to appear to testify at a trial or 
hearing, the court on written motion of the witness and upon notice to the 
parties may direct his deposition be taken. After the deposition has been 
subscribed, the court may discharge the witness.

(b) Notice of 
taking. - The party at whose instance the deposition is to be taken shall 
give to every other party reasonable written notice of the time and place for 
taking the deposition. The notice shall state the name and address of each 
person to be examined. On motion of a party upon whom the notice is served, and 
for cause shown on notice and hearing, the court may extend or shorten the time 
for taking the deposition.

(c) Defendant's counsel 
and payment of expenses. - If a defendant is without counsel, the court 
shall advise him of his right and assign counsel to represent him unless the 
defendant elects to proceed without counsel or is able to obtain counsel. If it 
appears that a defendant cannot bear the expense of depositions, the court may 
direct that the expenses of travel and subsistence of the defendant's attorney 
for attendance at the examination shall be paid by the county. In that event the 
county shall make payment accordingly.

(d) How taken. - A 
deposition shall be taken in the manner provided in civil actions. The court at 
the request of a defendant may direct that a deposition be taken on written 
interrogatories in the manner provided in civil actions.

(e) Use. - At the 
trial or upon any hearing a part or all of a deposition so far as otherwise 
admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used if it appears: That the 
witness is dead; or that the witness is out of the state, unless it appears that 
the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition; or 
that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of sickness or 
infirmities; or that the party offering the deposition has been unable to 
procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena. A deposition may also be used 
by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of the 
deponent as a witness. If only a part of a deposition is offered in evidence by 
a party, an adverse party may require him to offer all of it which is relevant 
to the part offered and any party may offer other parts.

(f) Objections to 
admissibility. - Objections to receiving in evidence the deposition or part 
thereof may be made as provided in civil actions.

W.R.Cr.P. 17.

22 I do not reach this prescience 
without walking somewhat in the watered garden of academia examination and 
analysis. For example, see Babcock, supra, 34 Stan.L.Rev. 1133; Brennan, supra, 
1963 Wn.U.L.Q. 279; Datz, Discovery in Criminal Procedure, 16 U.Fla.L.Rev. 163 
(1963); Fletcher, supra, 12 Stan.L.Rev. 293; Goldstein, The State and the 
Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 Yale L.J. 1149 (1960); 
Hutton, supra, 33 S.D.L.Rev. 437; Krantz, Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases: 
A Necessity for Fair and Impartial Justice, 42 Neb. L.Rev. 127 (1962); Louisell, 
The Theory of Criminal Discovery and the Practice of Criminal Law, 14 
Vand.L.Rev. 921 (1961); Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 
49 Calif. L.Rev. 56 (1961); Moran, Federal Criminal Rules Changes: Aid or 
Illusion for the Indigent Defendant?, 51 A.B.A.J. 64 (1965); Quinn, supra, VI 
Alaska L.Rev. 147; Rezneck, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 
Geo.L.J. 1276 (1966); Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 228 (1964); Zagel & Carr, State Criminal Discovery and the New 
Illinois Rules, 1971 U.Ill.L.F. 557 (1971); Comment, supra, 66 Den.U.L.Rev. 123; 
and Developments in the Law, supra, 74 Harv.L.Rev. 940. See also Bibliography, 
Criminal Discovery, 5 Tulsa L.J. 207 (1968).

23 It is not completely accurate to 
say that no known psychological records existed. A preliminary hearing was held 
where Dr. Gale subpoenaed Dr. Heineke (preliminary motion hearing) for a 
decision on production of his reports and test results in the Northern Wyoming 
Mental Health Center as a staff psychologist. Whatever may have been included in 
his records relating to the Rounsaville children came from juvenile proceedings 
adjunct to the criminal proceedings which had been instituted against the father 
and this file was neither reviewed by the trial court nor made available to Dr. 
Gale. The final decision made in the production hearing by the trial court was 
to delay decision on those records and then in final decision and opinion 
letter, it was held that Dr. Gale had not shown any psychiatric investigation or 
records existed. No witness for the mental health center was called to testify 
at trial and whatever records may have existed remained undisclosed by action of 
the trial court in denying consideration of juvenile court records by discovery 
motion of Dr. Gale. In initial motion, the request was for the prosecutor to 
disclose and make available for inspection. Subsequently, Dr. Heineke was 
subpoenaed for the motion hearing. The State never responded as to whether or 
not any other examination records were known to exist. Juvenile record 
production when denied resulted in the concurrent denial of access to any 
records of the mental health center and none of these records were considered in 
camera or otherwise by the trial court. Actually, since the decision was 
deferred by the trial court and consequent discovery of the mental health center 
records denied nothing was really determined about what records existed or what 
periods were involved except that in context, it was clear that the records were 
the result of juvenile proceedings which were the result of the recognized 
incest offenses committed upon the Rounsaville children by their 
father.

In the presentation of the 
State and decision of this court, no citation of authority or discussion is 
directly presented about discoverability of the existence of medical reports 
and their availability as differentiated from examination after existence is 
disclosed.

The privilege of these 
records in either constitutional or statutory terms is certainly indeterminate. 
In addition to constitutional considerations presented by both the United States 
and Wyoming constitutions, we have W.R.E. 501 constituting a rule of evidence 
for asserted privilege.

W.R.E. 501 adopted the 
common law foundation of the federal rules for privilege. Emplaced in statutes 
are a psychologist privilege statute, W.S. 33-27-103, a lawyer and physician 
privilege statute, W.S. 1-12-101(a)(i), and crisis center advocacy privilege 
statutes, W.S. 1-12-116 and 14-3-210. W.S. 14-3-210 states:

(a) Evidence regarding a child in 
any judicial proceeding resulting from a report made pursuant to W.S. 14-3-201 
through 14-3-215 shall not be excluded on the ground it constitutes a privileged 
communication:

(i) Between husband and 
wife;

(ii) Claimed under any provision of 
law other than W.S. 1-12-101(a)(i) and (ii); or

(iii) Claimed pursuant to W.S. 
1-12-116.

This court considered these statutes in determining 
that privilege was limited in all cases by the text of W.S. 14-3-210. Matter of 
Parental Rights of PP, 648 P.2d 512 (Wyo. 1982).

24 What this means is that the whole 
arena of privilege, admissibility, proper trial preparation, discovery, 
confrontation and impeachment is solely ephemeral and hypothetical as to lack 
any justification for scrutiny in this case as now presented. On those subjects 
not now addressed, see Trammell, 435 N.W.2d  at 200. See also Boutwell, 558 A.2d  
at 249 and State v. Hankins, 232 Neb. 608, 441 N.W.2d 854, 870 
(1989).

If there is anything rational to what the trial court 
did in denial of obligation to state what might exist and the continued 
inadequacy of the State in appellate brief as well as the distended discourse of 
the majority, it would be that any simple assertion of non-existence of 
information and records of psychological or psychiatric examination of the 
Rounsaville children is not credible. Consequently, I assume such documentation 
did exist, but remains undisclosed and approach the burden of this issue in 
appellate discussion to consider a denial of access to Dr. Gale for his defense 
within these facts of a near decade of sexual abuse of the same children by 
their father, after which a non-prosecution arrangement absolved the father from 
his course of criminal behavior.

25 The general subject of testimony 
privilege is discussed in Developments in the Law, Privileged Communications, 98 
Harv.L.Rev. 1450 (1985), as the entire study in introduction by quotes may be 
prophetic or self-contradictory. "`Whatever their origins, these exceptions to 
the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively 
construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.'" Id. at 1450 
(quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039 (1974)). And, in conclusion, undefinable:

As the preceding Parts demonstrate, 
the law of privilege defies any single, unifying principle or justification. 
This conclusion is hardly surprising; privileges cut across all classes of 
society and all manner of relationships, and raise "issues that lie at the 
center of the contemporary debate about the foundations of liberal society." In 
the ten years that have passed since the enactment of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, the law of privilege has continued to exhibit the complexity and power 
of the underlying social forces that combined to eliminate specific privilege 
provisions from those rules. Few, if any, areas of evidence law raise such 
fundamental dilemmas and result in such controversial outcomes.

Nonetheless, some broad principles 
do emerge. Both camps in the privilege debate are hampered by empirical 
uncertainty. One can never prove that costs outweigh benefits or vice-versa with 
regard to a particular privilege: such arguments inevitably degenerate into 
simple unsupported assertions. The debate must instead focus on the values that 
society seeks to protect in a particular area or particular relationship. Once 
these values are identified, the evaluation of the privilege must rest not 
merely on an attempted cost-benefit analysis, but also on considerations of 
personal privacy and the social acceptability of a legal system that intrudes 
into particular areas.

The law of privilege is likely to 
continue to thrive, unstable as its justifications may be. Social realities 
require that some balance be found between the forces of truth-seeking and 
privacy.

Developments in the Law, 
supra, 98 Harv.L.Rev. at 1665-66 (footnote omitted and quoting Levinson, 
Testimonial Privileges and the Preferences of Friendship, 1984 Duke L.J. 631, 
662 (1984)).

 

26 It is undisputed in factual record that any analysis 
of case law about medical treatment programs of the Rounsaville children and any 
medical records or documentation results from the sexual abuse of those children 
by Gene Rounsaville and not Dr. Gale. It is the context of prosecutorial 
absolution of principle miscreant and arguable redirection of the criminal 
application to the bystander where here, discovery, Brady information and 
medical record production assume case relevance and singular significance. Com. 
v. Lloyd, 567 A.2d 1357 (Pa. 1989).

27 It is obvious that the anticipation 
of the authorities and text writers of two decades ago were unusually wrong and 
completely optimistic that their principles would be accepted in order for 
criminal defendants to have the same rights and protection as all litigants in 
civil cases and the prosecution in criminal cases. "In any event it seems 
inevitable that criminal discovery, which has seen significant expansion in 
recent years, will continue to develop in the future." Note, Criminal Discovery 
- The State of The Law, 6 Utah L.Rev. 531, 545 (1959). "It becomes readily 
apparent that the accused in the criminal case does not have rights equal to 
those of a defendant in a civil case, and by no means can he be considered * * * 
to have equal rights with the prosecution." Datz, supra n. 22, 16 U.Fla.L.Rev. 
at 165.

Discovery is a bad word to devotees 
of the old-time theater of hide-and-go-seek. It is time to ask whether the 
element of surprise they set such store by is not one of the most overrated 
elements in the judicial process. It is one thing to acknowledge its usefulness 
in testing credibility, but quite another to glorify it as the keystone of the 
adversary system. If it were indeed the keystone, the arch would in truth be 
fallen. The truth is most likely to emerge when each side seeks to take the 
other by reason rather than by surprise. The more open the process for eliciting 
it, the less need there is of surprise.

Traynor, supra n. 22, 39 
N.Y.U.L.Rev. at 249. See Goldstein, supra n. 22, 69 Yale L.J. at 1172 and Y. 
Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern Criminal Procedure ch. 20 at 1147 
(5th ed. 1980).

 

28 It is not the conclusion of my exacting file review 
that Dr. Gale is determinably innocent of some kind of misconduct involving the 
Rounsaville children at another time. I would see within a degree of probability 
as far less certain than a reasonable doubt that if anything ever occurred, it 
did not occur in the fall of 1985, namely on August 30, in the early morning 
hours. The tie-in factors of empirical probability upon which decision can 
rationally be made rejects that date for occurrence. Consequently, we are led to 
reason that if something ever did happen, it was six months earlier and this 
scenario of prosecution was wholly concocted by the Rounsaville family to deter 
prosecution of the father and his resulting incarceration which factually was 
what happened. Among other aspects of the testimony, there are too many basic 
tests of evidence which relate to a winter time and not late summer occurrence, 
including Dr. Gale's testimony. In review of all available documentation in 
these files, I do not find reasonable doubt, I find probable 
innocence.

 

URBIGKIT, Justice, dissenting 
from the rehearing denial.

[¶ 171]  Gale requests a rehearing based in 
particular on Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357 (Wyo. 1988) which was rendered by 
this court after original appellate briefs were filed here. Although I would 
agree with appellant that Zabel was misplaced in majority opinion to justify 
rejection of the Ballard v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 
49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838 (1966) and People v. Russel, 69 Cal. 2d 187, 70 Cal. Rptr. 210, 443 P.2d 794, cert. denied 393 U.S. 864, 89 S. Ct. 145, 21 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1968) rationales for psychiatric examination, the repeated mistake now made 
by the majority is incomprehensively more severe where Zabel precedentially 
addresses the Gale trial introduction of totally inappropriate testimony of a 
clinical social worker. The testimony of that witness, Geral Blanchard, as the 
wind-up performer for the prosecution is explicitly inadmissible under Zabel, 
although arguably not reversible under earlier Wyoming case law including Brown 
v. State, 736 P.2d 1110 (Wyo. 1987), Urbigkit, J., dissenting.

[¶ 172]  The plain error found in Zabel should 
equally provide plain error now clearly authenticated from the trial of Richard 
Gale. Although appellant did not earlier include this contention, lacking the 
prescience to anticipate a decision such as Zabel, the wrongfulness of admitting 
the testimony of the social worker was not unnoticed by this writer with 
reflective time to review for dissent. See n. 15, Urbigkit, J., 
dissenting.

[¶ 173]  This court, to provide fairness and 
constitutional due process, should grant the rehearing in the interest of simple 
justice in behalf of an accused, who in my opinion is probably innocent, by 
recognition that Zabel in itself should mandate reconsideration for rehearing 
and reargument. The exhaustive and persuasive differentiation between testimony 
which is admissible as rape trauma syndrome evidence and nonadmissible as proof 
of occurrence evidence decisively delineated in People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 
552 N.Y.S.2d 883, 552 N.E.2d 131 (1990) should buttress our decision as the 
Zabel standard of Wyoming law and now require a rehearing for Gale.